An Appraisal of Africa’s Aspirations for Permanent membership of the UN Security Council: A Case Study of Nigeria’s Prospects and Challenges

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A thesis submitted to the Cardiff University in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations.

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Cardiff School of Law and Politics
Cardiff University
December 2021

Word count: 64,105
STATEMENTS AND DECLARATION

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Date: 29 December 2021

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63,556 words (excluding abstract, acknowledgements, contents pages, dedication, list of acronyms, bibliography and appendix).
ABSTRACT

The membership composition of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and especially the permanent seats has been major issues of contestation since the founding of the UN in 1945. This thesis appraises Africa’s quest for a UNSC permanent seat with Nigeria as a possible candidate state. Through so doing it adds to existing literature by examining whether there can be an “African” perspective on the legitimacy of the Security Council without an African permanent member. The thesis presents a qualitative research design supported by empirical data derived from both semi-structured interviews and primary documents of the UN and AU. The thesis builds on the assumptions of realist theory to explore Nigeria’s relative power and influence in Africa to address the prospects and challenges associated with its aspiration to hold a UNSC permanent seat. It then suggests that Nigeria has neither a coordinated approach nor an institutional framework to pursue her aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat; as, for instance, revealed by its inconsistent foreign policy directions with respect to UN peacekeeping operations and its lack of coherent policy in terms of its aspiration for UNSC permanent membership. The thesis considers that Nigeria needs to create a Standing Committee as a national coordinating body that will define its foreign policy strategy and diplomatic engagements with respect to its quest for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am profoundly thankful to God for this life and opportunity to undertake and complete this PhD programme. I am highly grateful to my supervisors Prof Edwin Egede and Dr Sarah Dezalay for their relentless supervision, guidance and encouragement through every stage of my research. It was a wonderful experience working under your supervision and you are indeed exceptional. I would like to acknowledge the contributions of all the staff in the School of Law and Politics in this academic journey. My special appreciation goes to Major Generals (Retired) GA Wahab, AB Abubakar and MK Yunusa for their huge financial support and encouragement towards the accomplishment of this work. I must also acknowledge the financial support of Late Major General Alkali. I pray the Almighty grants him eternal rest and reward him with paradise. I am grateful to Ambassador Joy Ogwu and Lieutenant General C Obiakor for their insightful interviews and guidance. I am also thankful of all other personalities and diplomats interviewed in the course of writing this thesis. Let me express my sincere appreciation to staff of the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria and also officers of the Defence Section of the Mission for their hospitality and kindness to me while I was in New York for my research fieldwork. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Fatima, daughter (Nasreen) and entire family and friends for their love and support. Lest I forget, I take responsibility for all inadequacies herein.
DEDICATION

This PhD is dedicated to Almighty God, the Creator, the Sustainer and the Protector for His blessings, guidance and favours to me.

And

To my late mother, Hajiya Fatima Yanchiko (May Allah reward you with paradise) and my dad for their love, guidance and relentless prayers for my success in life.
<table>
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<tr>
<td>A4P</td>
<td>Action for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, China and South African</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMIB</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau</td>
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<td>ECOMIG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>G4</td>
<td>Group of Four</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>International Courts</td>
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<td>IGN</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Negotiation</td>
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<td>ISWAP</td>
<td>Islamic State of West African Province</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIIA</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nation Operation in the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAFMECA</td>
<td>Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Permanent Members</td>
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<tr>
<td>RN2V</td>
<td>Responsibility not to Veto</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCD</td>
<td>Special Committee on Decolonisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Technical Aid Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>UfC</td>
<td>United for Consensus</td>
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UNAMID: United Nations - African Union Mission in Darfur
UNAMIR: United Nations Mission in Rwanda
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background

The structure and membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has remained a contentious issue in the politics of the UN in 1945 (Bosco 2009). The outcome of the World War II defined the membership composition of the UNSC (Lattila and Ylonen 2019; Bosco 2009). The Allied powers such as Britain, United States and Soviet Union that won the war had overriding influence on the deliberations of the San Francisco Conference of 1945 that founded the UN (Lattila and Ylonen 2019). As such, a five-permanent UNSC seat with veto and a six-non-permanent seat were agreed at the Conference with 51 pioneer UN member states (Bosco 2009). However, it is widely acknowledged that the membership composition of the UNSC needs to be transformed to conform to the realities of the international system and strengthen its legitimacy (Hosli and Dofler 2019). The UNSC may, by virtue of its powers and primary function of the maintenance of world peace and security, be regarded as the most powerful organ of the UN (Oludoun 2014; Bosco 2009; Alvarez 2005). The UN Charter, as amended in 1965, created a fifteen-member council with the authority to impose binding decisions on all UN member states. The Security Council’s power resides with the five permanent (P5) members; China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Chapter V, Article 23(1), UN Charter 1945). The UNSC permanent seat represented by the P5 members is vested with the power to veto decisions made during Council meetings by Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. The veto power is a departure from the norm of sovereign equality of UN member states under the UN Charter (Chapter I, Article 2(1), UN Charter 1945). The veto power historically vested on the permanent members tended to undermine the legitimacy perception of the Council by African states as discussed in Chapter 4.

This thesis appraises Africa’s quest for a UNSC permanent membership seat with Nigeria being the focus of that research as a possible candidate state. In doing so, the thesis considers a more inclusive, representative, and equal power sharing and decision-making UNSC. It can be argued that historic reasons for making the Security Council the primary organ of the UN and the UNSC permanent seat to P5 members has been overtaken by events. The international system since the formation of the UN has continuously experienced transformation which has resulted in various groups such as Africa’s Ezulwuni Consensus group emerging to demand equitable representation in the UNSC (Hosli and Dofler 2019).
Many former colonies are now independent nation states. Despite this, the UNSC has not been transformed to reflect to the present realities of the global order (Sinha 2018). As such, the power relation within the Security Council is arguably a colonial construct that remains imbalanced as it excludes permanent representation of countries from Africa, South America and Australia. This had led to the creation of power hierarchies in the UNSC that have ensured that African states remain subordinated as non-permanent members (Mbara 2019). The decolonisation of African territories was a prelude to the quest for the reform of the UNSC as it significantly increased the membership of the UN and the consciousness of African states to challenge the existing status quo of the UNSC (Gambari 2012). This thesis demonstrates the limitations associated with the non-permanent seat such as limited tenure and diminished formal powers in the Security Council influenced Africa’s quest for permanent membership in a reformed UNSC.

Africa’s quest for reform of the UNSC as advocated by the African Union (AU) Common Position on the reform adopted in 2005 and popularly regarded as the Ezulwuni Consensus reflects on the composition and representativeness of the UNSC and the veto power (Odeyemi and Igwebueze 2016). These issues raised numerous questions pertaining to the legitimacy and authority of the P5 members. This thesis contributes to the debate on Security Council reform by investigating whether there is a distinct African perception on the legitimacy of the UNSC, and also explores the prospects and challenges of Nigeria’s quest for a UNSC permanent seat. It does so by critically evaluating empirical data gathered from interviews with UN diplomats and in-depth analysis of UN and AU primary documents. The contribution of the interviews with high profile African and other high-ranking diplomats actively involved in existent discourse adds to the unique contribution to the furtherance of existing academic knowledge made by this thesis.

1.1 Situating the Study
Despite being a continent with 54 UN member states, Africa does not have a UNSC permanent seat. This thesis is positioned to address fundamental issues regarding the legitimacy implications of the absence of an African state in the Council, as well as the suitability of Nigeria as a potential candidate state for a UNSC permanent seat. The restricted representation and controlled power relations in the UNSC (Maseng 2013), is indicative of an unequal, exclusive and discriminatory institution that is not representative of UN member nations; especially African states that form the largest regional bloc in the UN. In other to
address these concerns, this thesis explores the structural realist framework that emphasizes that states strive for power because of the architecture of the international system and also their interests are defined differently (Brown 2019). The thesis deconstructs the power relations that exist within the Security Council by situating Africa’s quest for a UNSC permanent seat within the context of overarching issues of representation, membership composition, and the veto power that may also be seen to impact upon legitimacy perceptions of the UNSC.

1.2 Nigeria’s Journey to the UN
Nigeria became the 99th member of the UN during the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly in October 1960 after the Tunisian delegation sponsored Nigeria’s admission to the Organisation (Akindele 2005). Nigeria’s transition to a sovereign state in this period reached its peak with the admission of the country into the UN; enabling it to conduct multilateral diplomatic relations on the stage of the world body. The UN has since become a major platform through which Nigeria has conducted aspects of its foreign policy, as well as being a ‘diplomatic theatre’ for negotiations, and a forum in which to search for solutions to the country’s domestic and global challenges (Gambari 2012). After several decades as a UN member state, Nigeria indicated interest for the first time in 1992 to be a UNSC permanent seat member because of her strong commitment to the maintenance of world peace and security (Akintenriwa 2005); an issue to which this thesis return, in detail, in Chapter 6.1.2.

1.3 Statement of Research Problem
Many decades after the formation of the UN, the organisation can be applauded for having maintained world peace. However, critiques of the organisation have also argued that the organisation has been (and is) confronted with functional and structural defects, which have (and continue to) negative impact on its performance (Dokubo 2005). Many power centres have emerged since the establishment of the UN and its membership has increased considerably to 193 nations (Hassler 2013). However, some member states of the UN have questioned the composition of the permanent membership of the UNSC. Although Africa is represented in the Security Council under the non-permanent category, it does not have any permanent members. This is extraordinary when one considers that Africa currently has 54 countries as UN members states representing about a third of the UN membership and has a huge population size of 1.3 billion (Kaba 2020). This situation raises fundamental questions as to the legitimacy of a UNSC and how such legitimacy can be maintained when the UNSC does not include an African state as a permanent member. It is therefore not surprising that the
AU and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has been actively involved in seeking reform of the UNSC to include African States as permanent members. As Badza and Maerasera (2019), Thekiso and Wyke (2019) and Omoruyi et al. (2020) note, in Africa there are various potential candidate states such as Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt for a permanent seat of the UNSC; each of the nations can be regarded a regional powerhouses; an issue to which this thesis returns in Chapter Five.

1.4 Research Questions
This study answers the following research questions:
1. How legitimate is the UNSC in the absence of an African state(s) as a permanent member?
2. Is Nigeria a potential candidate state from Africa for permanent membership of the UNSC?
3. What are the prospects of AU support for Nigeria’s quest to gain a permanent seat of the UNSC?

1.5 Research Objectives
The broad objective of this thesis is to appraise Africa’s aspiration for permanent membership of the UNSC. However, the specific research objectives are as follows: First, it determines whether historical factor such as colonial rule can be associated with Africa’s exclusion as a permanent member and the resultant African-legitimacy perceptions of the UNSC. Second, it examines the impacts of OAU/AU resolutions in the adoption of the African Common Position on UNSC reform. Thirdly, it examines the perspectives of major African contenders for a permanent seat in the UNSC. Finally, it analyses the potential for Nigeria to gain a permanent seat in the UNSC as well as the challenges that it would face in seeking the same.

1.6 Scope of the Research
The scope of this study was defined by its time, space and content boundaries. In terms of time, the research covered the period 1960, when Nigeria became a UN member states to 2019. The period also covered when majority of African states were decolonised thereby increasing the number of UN member states. The rise in UN membership changed the dynamics of diplomatic engagements within the UN General Assembly as UN member states began to clamour for the reform of UNSC. Hence, the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution 1991 of 1963 that amended the UN Charter and increased UNSC non-permanent seat from six to ten in 1965. Furthermore, the time was chosen because it was the period when
the erstwhile Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and now the African Union (AU) play a significant role in the 1965 amendment of the UN Charter 1945. Similarly, the period was when the African Common Position for UNSC reform, the Ezulwini Consensus was adopted in 2005. The study also covered the time Nigeria began its diplomatic engagement with regards to its quest for a UNSC permanent seat. In terms of space, the study focussed on Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt being major African contenders for UNSC permanent seat. However, with regards to content, the study sought to appraise the prospects and challenges of Nigeria’s aspiration for permanent membership of the Security Council.

### 1.7 Research Propositions

In order to both guide this study and provide a basis for testing and validating the findings of this research, the following research propositions are put forward:

- The UNSC creates power hierarchies in which African states are subordinated.
- This *modus operandi* could be challenged by the inclusive representation of African states as permanent members of the Security Council with veto power.

### 1.8 Research Methodology and Techniques

This section provides a description of the research methodologies employed for this thesis. In so doing, it describes the fieldwork activity, data collection and analysis methods deployed, as well as limitations of this research. The chapters that make up this thesis present qualitative research supported by an examination of the historical processes that led to the formation of the UNSC, the norms which established power relations therein, its decision-making processes, and the doctrine that provides the Council with its legitimacy. Such normative and doctrinal assessment is supported by empirical research comprised of fieldwork data sources derived from semi-structured interviews. The entire research work encompassed two major activities. The first was an extensive review of scholarly literature and an exploration of the OAU/AU and UN primary documents with respect to resolutions and official statements by representatives. The exploration of primary documents aim to discern the various perspectives on the overarching issues on UNSC reform. The second was fieldwork activity as explained in Chapter 1.6.1, which collated empirical data from interviewees.

Hart (1988) considered methodology to be a system of methods and rules that ease the gathering and analysis of data. The nature and peculiarity of the themes of the study informed the choice of a suitable research approach to analyse data and present outcomes. Generally,
Qualitative research methods were utilized in this thesis for data generation and analysis. Qualitative research involves discursive analysis of data such as political behaviour and attitude that are not required to be quantified (Harrison 2001). This research deals with social phenomenon that could be related to wider circumstances of human endeavours (Burns and Sinfield 2016). It is usually inductive in nature as it explores meaning and insights in a particular situation (Mohajan 2018). By so doing, it makes deductions from a collection of data in order to explain a discourse. The choice of qualitative research methods for this study was necessary to elicit rich data to offer broader insights into the research questions and political discourse. This research approach provides greater prospects to explore and understand the viewpoints of the respondents with regards to Africa’s quest for reform of the UNSC. Qualitative research is suitable for this research since it involves obtaining non-numerical and verbal data gathered from interviews with stakeholders and enabled the researcher to interpret meaning from the same. The approaches adopted in this research aided the collection of first-hand information from diplomats in the UN Permanent Missions of the AU, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Russia, and France. These interviewees were targeted because of their active advocacy for UNSC reform and because of the diplomatic engagements of their respective countries in the UN General Assembly. The data generated facilitated the evaluation and interpretation of the overarching issues of legitimacy and representation in the UNSC. The views gathered from respondents were used either to support or counter the arguments in the research.

1.8.1 The Fieldwork Process

The fieldwork process generated data from primary sources. In this study, interviews were conducted with some key stakeholders who have played a role in Africa’s bid for permanent seat of UNSC in order to evaluate their insights. The author was guided by a phenomenological philosophy in his conducting of the interviews. The phenomenological philosophy entails “intellectual engagement in interpretations and meaning making that is used to understand the lived world of human beings” (Qutoshi 2018, p.215). It is a scientific method of description of experienced events from the perspectives of participants (Giorgi 2003). By using this philosophical approach, the researcher was able to understand and relate the lived experiences of UN diplomats interviewed and their different perspectives with respect to discourse on UNSC reform. The fieldwork activity was initially planned to take place in four locations; Nigeria, New York, Geneva and Addis-Ababa (AU Headquarters). However, in the event, the fieldwork took place in all the targeted places except Addis-Ababa,
which the researcher could not visit due to difficulty in acquiring an Ethiopian visa for the trip. All efforts were made to contact officials of the AU at Addis-Ababa through phone calls and email messages with the aim of scheduling a Skype interview with officials of the Organisation. Regrettably, no positive response was received. The researcher tried to minimize the impact of this setback by reaching out to two AU officials at the AU Permanent Mission in the New York and the AU Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, in order to solicit the AU’s perspective on the discourse. The diplomats interviewed in these UN Permanent Missions were senior officials of Political Affairs who have been involved in diplomatic engagements concerning UNSC reform.

The first leg of the fieldwork was conducted in Nigeria between September 2019 and October 2019. It involved two former high-ranking UN diplomats as well as senior officials from the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). The senior officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NIIA were identified for interview because of their expertise and experiences with respect to the presentation of papers on UNSC reforms at conferences and their participation at various UN General Assembly Sessions. The second leg of the interviews took place in October 2019 and involved a senior diplomat at the AU Permanent Mission to the UN, Geneva. The final part of the fieldwork was conducted in New York where interviews were held with six diplomats from the UN Permanent Missions of the AU, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Russia and France. All conducted interviews were recorded and transcribed; they are referred to at every stage of the discourse analysis as indicated in Section 1.8.2. The transcripts of all the interviews conducted are attached in Appendix A.

1.8.2 Data Analysis
The data collated for this study from both the primary and secondary sources were analysed using content analysis and the outcomes are presented herein. The content analysis involved qualitative data reduction and making deductions from a volume of qualitative materials as well as identification of core consistencies and meanings; all in keeping with the approach advanced by Patton (2002). The content analysis focused on the primary documents of the UN and AU and the interviews conducted with UN diplomats and senior officials of Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the NIIA. Content analysis was also employed in the analysis of some UNSC Resolutions on African matters, AU/OAU Resolutions on UNSC reforms, and official statements of delegations at UN General Assembly Sessions. The views of
interviewees regarding issues of legitimacy, text-based negotiation proposals for UNSC reform and the veto power controversy amongst others were also analysed by this approach. The data collected was logically interpreted and analysed critically, systematically and objectively based on their content; in keeping with the research approach advanced by Patton (2002). The content analysis was used throughout the thesis by focussing on the study of text; in keeping with the opinions of Halperin and Heath (2017). It should also be noted that, within this thesis, thematic issues were analysed using a qualitative content approach; an appropriate approach given in the work of Halperin and Heath (2017).

Qualitative content analysis uses thematic analysis in order to reveal the meanings and substance of a subject. Thematic analysis involves evaluation of the presence of specified themes, issues, states, actors or ideas in the text to be examined (Pennings et al. 2006). Thematic content analysis was also employed in the analysis of the interviews so as to connect the various viewpoints of individual respondents. Using content analysis enabled the presentation of data elicited from respondents to thence be grouped in terms of themes covered during the interviews. The responses from interviewees were validated through placing the findings in the wider context established in scholarly literature; thereby also providing triangulation to the findings obtained by verification by multiple sources of data. Triangulation in this regard ensures credibility of the viewpoints of respondents by corroborating their perspectives with academic literature and also leads to a comprehensive understanding of a discourse.

1.8.3 Field Research Interviews

The research populace for the interview targeted respondents and diplomats under four broad categories that composed of the UN, NIIA, Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former UN Diplomats. Thus, a total of 14 officials were interviewed at New York, Nigeria and Geneva as stated in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. These respondents were chosen for interview because of their diplomatic experiences with the UN and because they had participated in intergovernmental consultations and negotiations at the UN regarding UNSC reform. In addition to their diplomatic experiences with the UN, some of the respondents have written scholarly papers on the UN and presented papers at conferences regarding the clamour by UN member states for reform of the UNSC. The number of the officials interviewed was arrived at based on the diplomats who have given consent to participate in the interview and have experiences of diplomatic engagement regarding UNSC reform. The experiences and
expertise of the respondents were valuable as they provided empirical data; thereby enriching the findings of this research. For the targeted respondents under the UN category, interviewees for the study were drawn from the UN Permanent Missions of the Russia, France and AU Permanent Missions in New York and the UN at Geneva. In each of these UN Permanent Missions, a senior official was assigned to be interviewed by the author. In each instance they had represented their respective countries in diplomatic engagements with respect to UNSC reform. The names and designations of these officials are not stated so as to ensure anonymity and underline the extent to which this thesis conforms to the highest standards of ethical research (see also Section 1.8 below). In addition, Responses by Envoys from the UN Permanent Missions of Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt who were readily accessible for interview were taken into account as they provided empirical data, which were evaluated in the research. However, the researcher’s efforts to interview diplomats from the US, UK, and China was not successful as explained in Section 1.5.4. At the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the interviews conducted with the two senior officials authorized to grant interviews with the researcher because of their experience as former UN diplomats were taken into account in this research. In the NIIA, interactions were held with two senior officials of the Institute. For the category of former diplomats, the research elicited the views of Ambassador Joy Ugwu, a former Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the UN and a former three times President of the UNSC. Furthermore, a former Adviser to the UN Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General Military Affairs, Lieutenant General Isaac Obiakor (Retired) was interviewed.

1.8.4 Research Limitations
Some of the respondents were citizens of Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa that are major contending states from Africa for a UNSC permanent and they showed passion for the reform of the Security Council and aspiration of their home countries. There are therefore the chances of inherent biases in some of their responses. This was expected, as biases are inherent limitations in social science research. As a safeguard, the researcher was guided by the principle of empathic neutrality as advanced by Pathon (2015), which involves the mindfulness of being neutral rather than judgemental while interacting with respondents. The researcher was non-judgmental by displaying awareness, openness and maintained bond and trust with the interviewees. The undertaking of a careful analysis and juxtaposing of the various views by the respondents also mitigated possible prejudices. Furthermore, the reliability of the perspectives by respondents in certain contested cases were also validated by
established arguments from secondary literatures. Another drawback to this research was the inability to interview some of the targeted respondents from the UN Permanent Missions of the US, UK and China due to their official engagements and the researcher’s limited stay in New York during the research field trip. Efforts by the researcher to reschedule interview with these diplomats via Skype conversation was unsuccessful, as they did not consent to the request. These limitations were however mitigated by recourse to extensive analysis of UN official documents and secondary sources of data.

1.9 Ethical Considerations
The research conducted conformed with the guidelines of the Cardiff University School of Law and Politics Research Ethics Committee. The researcher was aware of the necessity to ensure the confidentiality and privacy of participants. Accordingly, all data gathered from interviewees was stored in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation in force in the UK. The interviews were conducted in offices and workplaces in line with research ethics. Participation in the research was voluntary, and every interviewee was informed that they could withdraw from the study during the interview or even after the interview without giving reasons. The research only identified interviewees that gave their consent while those who wished to remain unidentified were anonymised. Also, comments were presented in this thesis “as spoken” by the interviewees. The interviewees were identified by pseudonyms such as Diplomat, Representative, and Senior Official, Interviewee A, B, C and so on.

1.10 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis comprises seven chapters. Chapter One, the Introduction, presents the background of the study and outlines the research problem including the research methods utilised. The Chapter also addresses the research questions and objectives, the hypotheses and research limitations. Chapter Two is the literature review and also provides a theoretical framework. Chapter three discusses the nexus between the decolonisation of Africa and her quest for reformation of the UNSC, whilst Chapter Four explores different perspectives with respect to legitimacy in order to discern if there is an African perspective on the legitimacy of the UNSC. Thereafter, Chapter Five discusses African representation in the UNSC under the non-permanent seat in order to identify the limitations associated with it, whilst Chapter Six interrogates the rationale for Nigeria’s quest for UNSC reform. Finally, Chapter Seven is the conclusion. It summarizes the previous chapters, draws logical conclusions by identifying certain findings, comments on the limitations of the study, presents the contribution of the
thesis to the furtherance of existent academic knowledge as well as its originality, and also proffers areas for further research which build upon the findings herein presented.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

The legitimacy of the UNSC as a result of the composition of its membership and the veto power of the P5 members has been a subject of major debate. This Chapter positions this research in a broader academic context by critically engaging with the underlying issues that relate to UNSC reform and identifies gaps in existent literature. Acknowledging that existing literature did not provide in-depth engagement of legitimacy of the UNSC from an African perspective, this thesis provides a comprehensive explanation of African perceptions of the legitimacy of the Council synthesised with analysis emanating from extensive interviews with key players in a variety of UN Permanent Missions. The Chapter initially explores scholarly arguments on the legitimacy of the UNSC. Thereafter it evaluates various arguments on the legitimacy of the UNSC and notes a major omission of not identifying and justifying how the absence of an African state as a permanent member of the Security Council has affected the legitimacy of the UNSC. Secondly, the Chapter considers relevant literature on African interests in the UNSC’s reform to identify how these contributions differ from this thesis. Thirdly, the Chapter engages with literature that specifically addresses Nigeria’s perspective of UNSC reform. Thereafter, the literature review explores literature on veto power and how veto power impacts on Africa’s perception of UNSC reform. Lastly, the discussion of the theoretical framework that underpins this thesis follows the literature review. The section analyses realism as a theoretical framework by relating its core elements of power and state interest with legitimacy in order to deconstruct the overarching issues involved in the quest by African states for the reform of the UNSC. Also, the weaknesses of the adopted theory for this thesis will be critically examined.

2.1 Scholarly Arguments pertaining to the Legitimacy of the UNSC

This section considers scholarly literature on legitimacy in relation to UNSC by scholars such as Caron (1993), Thakur (2006), Buchanan and Keohene (2006) and Stephen (2018). In his work, Caron (1993) adopted a broad perspective of legitimacy by focussing on the membership composition of the UNSC and apportionment of veto power privilege to the P5 as underlying issues that undermine the credibility of the Council. In the same vein, Thakur (2006) noted that legitimacy acts as a middle ground between the exercise of authority and recourse to power. This position underscores the fact that action or inaction by the Council is
not subjected to judicial interpretation or any review process by any organ of the UN. The activities of the UNSC are not subjected to judicial scrutiny but developments in the UN General Assembly especially with regards to the intergovernmental negotiation on the UNSC reform suggests that there have been deliberate efforts to review structure of the Security Council.

In commenting on the legitimacy of international organisations, Stephen (2018) demonstrates the puzzle of legitimacy drift, which arises when the institution remained the same despite the transformation of its normative and political environment. This implies that legitimacy drift occurs when an institution loses legitimacy as a consequence of its failure to adapt to changing environments. The submission by Stephen (2018) is consistent with the rationale that justifies the need for reform of the UNSC as a consequence of changes in its power configuration and membership composition. Though Stephen explored a wide range of UN primary documents to appraise speeches of the intergovernmental debates on UNSC reform, he did not consider evaluating AU resolutions on UNSC reform which formed the basis of African states engagements at the UN General Assembly on the issue. This thesis addresses this gap in existent knowledge by evaluating OAU/AU resolutions in respect of UNSC reform and addresses the extent to which there is consistency in the framing of resolutions that seek reform.

Buchanan and Keohane (2006) noted that global governance institutions such as the UN and its international bodies should not only be structured to discharge their functions legitimately but also be perceived as such. Legitimacy is an important component of any multilateral institution especially in a democratic situation, as the institution will thrive if it is to be perceived legitimate by the public. Another core argument of these scholars emphasized that when there is no focus on achieving legitimacy, public support for an institution of global governance could be undermined, thereby reducing its efficiency. Hence, the legitimacy of the UNSC must be prioritized for it to succeed and gain wider acceptability in a democratic world (Buchanan and Keohane 2006). From the foregoing, it is clear that existent arguments pertaining to the legitimacy of the UNSC have not been situated within the African context as they focused on a generalized perception of member states with regards to issues of legitimacy. The literature has not looked at the legitimacy of the UNSC from the viewpoint of African states and how they negotiate to get their power relation. This thesis addresses this imbalance
within existent understanding and literature by critically and extensively examining AU resolutions and documentations that focus on UNSC legitimacy.

2.2 Africa and UNSC Reform

As mentioned in Chapter One, the central thrust of this thesis is that Africa’s quest for reform of the UNSC is largely premised on the perception that the absence of African permanent members affects the legitimacy of the UNSC. A substantial proportion of literature that deals with reform of the UNSC, even that written by African writers did not effectively engage with the issue of such reform from the perspective of an African viewpoint on the legitimacy of the present UNSC. The quest for reform of the UNSC was a result of the limited membership and non-representative structure of the Council, and its perceived lack of transparency in the working methods (Agwu 2013, pp.161-162). Thus, Agwu (2013) maintained that the decisions of the UNSC would be more democratic and enforceable if the Security Council membership was comprehensive. Similarly, Strydom (2007) noted that the growing demand for reform of the UNSC by the Global South was based on the desire to have a democratic and secure global community. The foregoing arguments did not, however, deal with the issue of reformation of the UNSC in the context of legitimacy but discerned the discourse mainly from a democratic standpoint and African representation in the permanent seat. This thesis will advance this argument by considering whether the permanent representation of an African state in the UNSC would have any impact on the legitimacy of the UNSC and whether there is any linkage between legitimacy and the efficiency of the Council.

Badza (2019) explored the dynamics of the AU reform position of the UNSC popularly regarded as the Ezulwuni Consensus and observed that the rigid stance of the AU reform proposal on the veto privilege was arguably the greatest challenge to her aspiration for reform of the UNSC. The AU’s common position on the UNSC reform proposed the granting of the veto power to new permanent members in the event of reform of the membership of the Security Council (AU 2005). This aspect of the reform proposal was, however, problematic as the P5 members would likely oppose any reform to the veto system that might diminish the exclusive privilege of the original permanent members (Sinha 2018). In addition, the Ezulwuni Consensus called for two veto wielding permanent seats for Africa; this has been argued to be an unrealistic proposal (Tharoor 2011). Though Badza (2019) conceived that the call for reform of the UNSC was inspired by the need to address the imbalance in its membership composition and the frequency of African conflicts in the Agenda of the UNSC. He argued that the desire to gain diplomatic prestige and power by UN member states could
also be related to the clamour. Badza (2009) did not, however, relate this argument with a relevant power theory such as the realist theory. Furthermore, Kugel (2009) argument noted Africa’s significant role in the UNSC in the areas of active participation in UN peacekeeping and dominance of African issues on UNSC Agenda. Badza (2019) and Kugel (2009) advanced a similar position that suggest that African matters dominated UNSC Agenda deliberations in conflict resolutions and yet did not provide relevant primary UNSC data to validate their claims. This thesis analyses UNSC resolutions/meetings from 2010 to 2021, as this period clearly showed a significant consideration of African matters in UNSC debates. Also, the thesis will attempt to fill this gap by critical examination of the Ezulwuni Consensus in order to situate the African perspective of the UNSC reform. The thesis will also gather empirical data on the issue of Africa’s perspective on the UNSC reform by interviews with some senior diplomats at UN Permanent Missions of the AU, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, France, and Russia.

Joyner (1997) contended that the future constitutional law consideration that is likely to confront the UN lies in the composition of the UNSC. He noted the enormous political pressure for the expansion of the UNSC membership, particularly the permanent category. He suggested Germany, Japan, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria as credible aspirants for a UNSC permanent seat and maintained that:

The argument put forward is that the world community has changed appreciably since 1945, but the composition of the Security Council has not kept pace with those developments. Certain great powers are now not so great and certain other states have ascended to power greatness. Hence, the conclusion follows that the time has come to alter the composition of the Security Council by adding more members with the veto power. This would be done by amendment of the UN Charter (Joyner 1997, p. 455).

Joyner’s view suggests that reform of the UNSC requires the political will of the permanent members of the UNSC. This is essentially because a Charter change will demand a two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly including the concurring vote of the permanent members. Obiozor and Ajala (1998) supported the position taken by Joyner when they claimed that enlargement of the UNSC has become a knotty problem since it would require constitutional amendment of the UN Charter by two thirds of UN member states with the corresponding votes of the P5. Also, the requirement under Article 109 (2) of the UN Charter, which requires the concurring vote of the P5 before any amendment of the Charter, is another issue that would need to be contended with in a reformation of the UNSC. This study will extend the foregoing argument by critically exploring the text-based negotiations as a proposed mechanism for dialogue of the UNSC reform process whereby the written positions
of states will be harmonised and adopted by reaching broad consensus in addressing their various interests. The text-based negotiation is consistent with the AU position as will be discussed later in Chapter 5.3. Therefore, such concise text could provide the basis for a concrete and result oriented negotiations in the restructuring of the UNSC thereby ensuring a speedy delivery of the reform process.

According to Hosli et al. (2011), UNSC reform is mainly a political process, and will involve the reallocation of gains and losses for an organisation through readjustment of decision-making authority requiring structural reorganisation. Such structural reformation, which may entail enlargement of the membership of the UNSC, is arguably required in view of the large number of African membership of the UN. Thus, reforming the Security Council may tackle the underlying challenges of legitimacy and unequal representation of member states. Luck (2006) further stressed that the debate on the composition of the UNSC and the veto power being exercised by the P5 members reflects the inherent tension between the founding goals of the organisation and the representation in the Council amidst the increasing membership of the UNSC. He further contended that the argument by those in favour of radical reform of the UNSC was based on their belief that there is an absence of sovereign equality in the UN and inequality in the rights and privileges of member states. In a similar perspective, Baylis et al. (2011) contended that the UNSC has witnessed changes in its working procedures and also argued that unequal representation in the Council had promoted the aspiration by South Africa, India, Egypt, Brazil and Nigeria for permanent membership of the Council. Whilst this existent literature emphasises the need for inclusivity in the UNSC by increased membership representation and abolition of the veto power, the works are silent on the strategies and diplomatic engagement being employed by UN member states towards the reformation of the Security Council. The thesis addresses this gap by identifying how AU resolutions on UNSC reforms explored foreign policy strategies in encouraging member states to promote the AU reform positions of the Security Council in their foreign relations with non-African states.

2.3 Nigeria’s Perspective on UNSC Reform

Mbara et al.’s (2020) work on Nigeria’s aspiration for the reform of the UNSC investigates the implications for attaining a permanent seat in a reformed UNSC upon Nigerian domestic politics. The study aligns with Badza (2019) position as it identified the acquisition of national prestige and power, which Nigeria could use to its economic and political interests. In addition,
achieving a permanent seat might provide a rallying impetus for tackling some of Nigeria’s domestic problems. The study by Mbara et al. (2020) inclined towards paying greater emphasis on what Nigeria stands to gain as a permanent member of the UNSC rather than making a comprehensive appraisal of the challenges Nigeria would face in making a reality of that desire. Also, the study by Mbara et al. (2020) presented interviews from only Nigerian government institutions such as the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies and Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Information. Thus, the Nigerian officials interviewed stated their positions from a nationalistic standpoint. The interviewees rationalized Nigeria’s quest for UNSC permanent seat on the basis of her credentials as a regional power in Africa and also contended that UNSC permanent seat will strengthen her bargaining power for the negotiation of political, military and economic matters at international level. This thesis will build on the argument by Mbara et al. (2020) beyond evaluating the perspectives of only Nigerian officials by interviewing some high-ranking officials from contending African states such as Egypt and South Africa and other senior officials from the UN Permanent Missions of the AU, France and Russia to discern their perspective on the discourse.

Akindele (2005) and Uhomoibhi (2005) argued about Nigeria’s desire for restructuring of the Council from different standpoints. While Akindele’s position considered regional equity and balance as fundamental in improving the representativeness and democratization of the UNSC, Uhomoibhi (2005) narrowed his argument for the reform in the context of Africa being a major theatre of global conflicts that appear frequently in the UNSC agenda. Furthermore, Uhomoibhi (2005) argues that Nigeria’s yearning for a permanent seat was informed by the political realities of Africa and Nigeria’s own contributions to the stability of the region. He maintained that inclusion of African states in the permanent seat offered an opportunity for the continent to be a major stakeholder in addressing the incessant conflicts in the continent. Although the conflicts in Africa seemed to be an important emphasis in Uhomoibhi’s argument, he did not give any explanation to trace the root causes of such disputes.

Aderemi (2005) opined that Nigeria would need to refocus her strategy for a permanent seat of the UNSC by showing that its representation of Africa on the Security Council would be in the interests of Africa. Nigeria’s view over the years has been focused on the desirability of increasing both the permanent and non-permanent seats of the UNSC as stated by Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari at the 73rd UN General Assembly Session (UN 2018-A/73/PV.6, p.50). Its contributions to maintenance of global peace and security have also been advocated
by Nigeria to be given prominence in the consideration for any proposed reform (Ononihu and Oddih 2017). This thesis therefore examines the participations of Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt as major African state contenders for a UNSC permanent seat in UN peacekeeping Missions in order to evaluate their contributions to world peace.

2.4 Abolition or Retention of Veto Power and the Permanent Members

The veto power abolition, retention by the P5 or its extension to other permanent members has been an issue that is central to debates pertaining to the Security Council. The veto has been opposed by UN member states since the inception of the UN as its negative vote defeats decisions of the Security Council (Ronzitti, 2010). The conception of veto was based on the premise of protecting the interests of the P5 and also acted to safeguard against rash Security Council decisions (Sellen 1992). Akpotor and Agbebaku (2010) contend that veto is in conflict with the sovereign equality of states, which is one of the main principles of the UN enshrined in its Charter. The scholars argued that ‘veto power’ is not in line with the principles and norms of international law as it serves the political interests of the P5. This concern was underscored by the positions of Freiesleben (2013) and Gasimova (2018) that faulted the P5 members of exercising veto power to serve their national interests or the interest of their allies in contradiction with the original purpose of the veto to prevent the UN from taking action against any of the major founding members. Following a similar line of argument, Nadin (2016) describes the exercise of veto power as undemocratic and anachronistic especially given that the UN is an organisation of 193 countries. The veto mechanism may also be argued to be in contradiction to the values of the UN, which promotes unity, enforcement and justice. Veto power has, in some instances, prevented enforcement and affected the unity of UN member states (Sellen 1992); an example being the Syrian conflict (Webb 2014). The persistent stalemate has stalled negotiations and the adoption of favourable resolutions to end the humanitarian crises in Syria. This was why the Syrian crisis has been argued to be symptomatic of the growing concern of the veto in the post-cold war era of being out-dated, ineffective and contradictory to the primary responsibility of the UN Charter (Webb 2014). This thesis advanced the positions held by the above scholars by situating the dominance of the veto wielding P5 within the context of UNSC legitimacy. The exercise of the veto power was considered as a fundamental issue that tended to undermine the legitimacy perception of the UNSC as will be discussed in Chapter 4.2.
Wouters and Ruys (2005) opined that apart from the issue of membership composition of the UNSC, the existence of the veto remains an impediment to the effective functioning of the Council. The undemocratic nature and lack of transparency in the veto power is a major drawback to the actualization of the goals of the UN (Iyase and Folarin 2018). The two authors further argue that despite the negative effects of the veto, there were also no established mechanisms to address excessive use of the veto. This submission may, however, not be totally valid, as it did not take into account the Responsibility not to Veto (RN2V) that had been conceived as a deliberate effort to restrict the usage of the veto in Responsibility to Protect (R2P) situation in circumstances such as genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing (Stojkovski 2017). Further to that, Lund (2010) contends that the application of veto blocks the ability of the UNSC to take effective and timely action to ensure global peace and security. While the foregoing perspectives can be seen to support arguments for a review or abolition of the veto, Davies and Bellamy (2014) observe that limiting veto privilege is not necessary in current circumstances. In their view, veto power is essential in the functioning of the UNSC as it ensures that issues that are not agreed upon by the P5 are set aside while engaging the great majority of other matters in the Council’s debate. One major shortcoming by this contribution is that they did not carry out empirical studies to justify their arguments, as the issues raised would require interaction with stakeholders that have been involved in the UNSC for in-depth evaluation of the discourse. This thesis however bridged this gap through interviews with critical stakeholders drawn from some UN Permanent Missions and will appraise the views of UN diplomats in order to discern whether the veto has impacted on how African states perceive the legitimacy of the UNSC.

Butler (1999) contended that the P5 members would not give up their veto privilege voluntarily since the UN Charter allows them to block any proposal for its removal. Egede (2014) concurred with Butler’s (1999) view as he argued that the veto is a power-tool in the hands of the P5 and that they would want to retain it to pursue their national interests. From a human rights perspective, Amnesty International regards veto power as being manipulated by the P5 members for their own political self-interests rather than being a tool by which to protect civilians (Amnesty International Annual Report 2014/2015). The views of Butler (1999) and Amnesty International Report (2014/2015) imply that amendment of the UN Charter would be difficult to achieve because of the power of the P5 and the requirement under Article 108 of the Charter for them to concur to any amendment of the Charter. The literature reviewed did not emphasize the consequences of veto power with regards to
undermining timely UNSC action as was the case in the 1994 Rwanda conflict, where France and the United States of America blocked the proposal for the establishment of a robust intervention force (Wouters and Ruys 2005). Also, by the use of veto, Russia and China obstructed prompt UN intervention and action against the Sudanese Government during the 2004 Darfur conflict that resulted to large-scale killing and raping of civilians (Wouters and Ruys 2005; Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005). Such abuse of veto could hinder peace enforcement operations thereby impacting on global peace and security by escalating and prolonging conflicts as argued by Lund (2010) and Iyase and Folarin (2018). Furthermore, none of the foregoing literature established how the exercise of veto impacts on Africa’s perception of the UNSC. Hence, this thesis will demonstrate how selective enforcement in the exercise of UNSC powers especially with regards to the 1994 Rwandan genocide undermines legitimacy perception of the Security Council by African states.

2.5 Theoretical Framework – Political Realism
The need to situate this study in a theoretical framework arises from the fact that theories can provide rational bases for interpreting the results or findings of research. Theories are relevant in any social inquiry as they help in the understanding of a contextual discourse. The section critically examine political realism, also known as the realist theory in order to situate it within the context of Africa’s quest for the reform of the UNSC and justify the relevance of realist theory as conceptual framework for the study as explained in Section 2.5.1. The power relations in the UNSC could be situated in the context of exclusive membership of permanent seat to the P5 and the powers associated to it that undermines the legitimacy perception of the Security Council (Sleat 2014). To this end, this thesis is built on the realist theory as it argues that Nigeria’s aspiration for UNSC permanent membership seeks to advance Nigeria’s power and influence on the world stage. Given the dictates of political realism, permanent seat of the UNSC will give Nigeria the prestige and bargaining power to exert greater influence to promote her political and economic objectives as well as strengthen its regional superiority in Africa (Mbara et al. 2020). Also, this thesis adopted the realist theory given that it underlines the legitimacy drift of the UNSC, which is arguably a result of the failure of the Security Council to adapt to its changing environment (Stephen 2018). This underscores the position that the membership composition of the UNSC permanent seat does not reflect the current reality of the international system with 193 UN member states as opposed to the power play in 1945 when the UN was founded. Generally, realist scholars such as Morgenthau, Waltz and
Mearsheimer explained international relations and diplomacy in terms of national interest, power and balance of power (Dougherty et al. 1990). Additional to these fundamental features as rationalised by these scholars, this section shows how realist theory engages with legitimacy, which is crucial in the quest for the reform of the UNSC.

International organisations are reflections of the interests of states, and states are unwilling to surrender their powers (Bayeh 2014). This explains why states are concerned about their own relative gains by ensuring better positioning of their interests at the detriment of others (Waltz 1993). According to the realist assumption, it is difficult to achieve harmony in the behaviour of states because their self-interests are defined differently (Walz 1993). Hence, there is a clash of interest between UN member states including African states that are clamouring for reform of the UNSC and the P5 members who want the status quo maintained. To this end, the structure and roles of the UNSC are evaluated within this thesis by exploring the realist theory in the context of UNSC membership and power distribution. The UNSC bears realism’s imprint in the veto power exclusively granted to P5 members (Fidler 1996). The Security Council as an organ of the UN is consistent with the realist model of international politics based on its functions and powers as provided under Article 24 of the UN Charter 1945 (Cronin and Hurd 2008). The Council’s composition reflects coercive power as its decisions are binding on all UN member states while also granting special right to the P5 by virtue of the veto power (Cronin and Hurd 2008). The restricted membership and special powers of the P5 influences Africa’s quest for permanent membership of the UNSC. Though realism does not engage with the exploration of the African position on UNSC reform, the primary documents examined and interviews conducted revealed that there is a critical need to engage with the concept of legitimacy being a fundamental element of the research question of this thesis.

As earlier observed by Sleat (2014), the power politics of the Security Council may be associated with the allocation of permanent membership and the power of veto to the P5 (Heywood 2011). To this end, Mearsheimer (1995) explains power in the context of international institutions like the UN and specifically the UNSC where it serves, to a great extent, to the benefit of the P5. The permanent members have been accused of utilizing the instrument of veto power to advance their national interests as well as those of their allies; thereby undermining the legitimacy perception of the UNSC (Lord-Mallam, 2012). In addition, Morgenthau (1967) contends that international organisations are a reflection of states’ power distribution during the period in which the given organisation is established. It follows,
that the UNSC is a reflection of power politics that prevailed in the immediate post-World War II period in 1945, which produced the permanent membership seat of the UNSC and remains despite the emergence of a new global order (Yilmaz, 2019). The failure of the UNSC to reform after initial reform in 1965 cannot be because the P5 vetoed resolutions for reform but was as a result of the absence of a broad consensus amongst UN member states that advocate for different reform positions often influenced by their national interests and the quest for power (Yilmaz 2019). Disparities in the perspectives of UN member states reflect the realist assumption that the possibility of change in international structure is limited (Antunes and Camisao 2017). A major proposition of the account of traditional realist (classical) theorist like Hans Margenthau is the desire by states to pursue their interests, which is defined in terms of power (Brown and Ainley 2009, p.29). Classical theory underscores the centrality of power in politics because the pursuit of any interest requires power (Morgenthau 1948). As such, interests are defined in terms of power, which is reflected in the contestation of the exclusive UNSC permanent membership seat and the quest for its reformation. More recent literature by Stephen (2018) and Symons (2011) have explored the interactions between power and legitimacy in the setting of an international organisation. Legitimacy and power are interrelated as international organisations become more powerful when they have legitimacy and conform to the demands of the public to maintain their legitimacy (Stephen 2018; Symons 2011). However, the failure of the UNSC to adapt to the changing realities of the political and normative environment of the international system by ensuring inclusive membership representation in the UNSC has a declining effect on the legitimacy perception of the Council in the eyes of UN member states (Binder and Heupel 2015).

2.5.1 Core Assumption of Political Realism and Africa’s Ezulwuni Consensus

The realist theory is grounded in the core assumption that states’ desire for security and power is necessitated by the anarchic structure of the international system (Brown 2019). Therefore core assumption of the realist theory reflects the power play in the Security Council, which define its legitimacy perception by African states not represented under the UNSC permanent seat. The P5 want to maintain the current status quo in the UNSC permanent seat and retain its power and privileges while African states including Nigeria seek for permanent membership of the Security Council. Political realism emphasises the structural restrictions on the behaviour of states, and how these are influenced by changes in the current realities of the international system occasioned by power configuration (Waltz 1993). The quest by African states to deconstruct the UNSC permanent membership and the veto monopoly of the P5
through advocacy for structural reform based on the Ezulwuni Consensus is arguably driven by relative gains of power and security put forward by the realists’ assumptions as will be examined in Chapters three and four of this thesis. Hence, the quest by African states to challenge the perceived dominance of the UNSC by the P5 through the adoption of the Ezulwuni Consensus and sustained advocacy for the reform by official statements of their representatives during the UN General Assembly Sessions as will be examined in Chapter Four. The influence of power within the arena of international politics and its dominance in realist discourses rationalises the significance of the UNSC and desire for reform of the Council especially by regions excluded from the permanent seat.

Realist theory is generally entrenched in elements of state, survival and self-help (Dunne and Schmidt 2004). The state is the focal principle of realism as it is considered to be the most important actor; superior to other actors in international politics. While states are generally the primary actors in international organisations, the membership of state actors in the context of the UNSC is defined by hierarchical structure that exclusively allocates permanent seats to the P5 (Yilmaz 2019). The UNSC could be interpreted as a structure or system that functions with various units represented by the permanent members and the non-permanent states with African representatives. Furthermore, the sovereignty of a state symbolises the existence of an independent political entity with judicial authority over its territory. A state is, therefore, a major player on the world stage as admission of membership into the UN recognises the sovereignty of states as a distinguishing trait. Another major assumption of the realist perspective is the element of survival; a primary objective of all states in international politics (Waltz 1979). Waltz contends that the security of a state is a pre-condition for attaining all other goals. Maintaining security is the principal interest of states in order to guarantee their survival and the UNSC is granted significant powers by virtue of the UN Charter to uphold world peace and security (Chapter V, Articles 24-26, UN Charter 1945). The self-help element of traditional realist theory is based on the principle that no other state or institution can be trusted to guarantee the survival of another state (Waltz 1979). It follows, that self-help is not an inevitable consequence of the absence of a world government but a logic that states have selected (Dunne and Schmidt 2004). Based on the principle of self-help, states seek to enhance their power capabilities with military might whenever their security is threatened (Ekwealor 2015). Alternatively, in order to preserve the territorial integrity of states against hegemonic states, weaker states may explore the option of a balance of power through the formation of alliances (Donnelly 2000). The balance of power strategy is a stabilizing factor
in the realm of the international system and a measure to control and counter the excesses of states.

Gareis and Varwick (2005) submitted that the realists’ school explains politics on the basis of interests defined in terms of power. As such, states project their power and national interests when they occupy dominant positions in international organisations (Gareis and Varwick 2005). This underscores the aspiration by African states for the reform of the UNSC, as its current structure is not in conformity with the contemporary global realities and also arguably perceived to be serving the interests of the P5 (Agwu 2013). This contestation to change the status quo in the UNSC is consistent with the realist assumption that states struggle for power because the global order leaves them with little choice if they want to survive (Heywood 2011). In addition, and according to Rittberger and Zangl (2006), international organisations are usually manipulated by powerful states to pursue their national interests, thereby making their success dependent on the existence of a powerful hegemony. That is why realists argue that the emergence of international organisations does not significantly change the fundamental behaviour of states in the international system but instead confers more power and influence on a few actors as is the case in the present set up of permanent seats of the UNSC which excludes African states (Rittberger and Zangl 2006).

2.5.2 Strengths of the Adopted Theory – Political Realism
The quest for the reform of the UNSC by the African bloc aims to promote the national interests of states in Africa (Badza 2019). The desire for UNSC permanent seat constitutes a fundamental element of the Ezulwuni Consensus, which sought for two permanent seats with veto power for Africa (Badza 2019). Nigeria’s aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat is essential to promote her core national interests of national security and self-preservation as a nation because the possession of a permanent seat will boost her diplomatic significance and enable her to gather international support and alliances to confront her domestic challenges; particularly terrorism (Mbara et al 2020; Gambari 2012). The furtherance of such national interests is also likely to boost Nigeria’s political, economic, and military objectives on the international stage. Nigeria’s stance and motivation aligns with the political realism expounded in this work. Furthermore, the norms and institutional framework of the UNSC are framed in terms of a power-based approach, which reflects power relations in an institution that favours the advancement of the interests of the major powers as represented by the P5 members in the case of the Security Council (Deitelhoff 2009). It follows, the realist theory is
explored in this thesis to evaluate the arguments to deconstruct the power dominance of the P5. This paradigm shift being advocated by majority of UN member states especially the African bloc aims to promote the interests of states in Africa by ensuring equitable permanent membership representation in the UNSC (Maseng and Lekaba 2014).

Political realism has remained relevant in global politics as the fundamental structure of the international system has remained the same with African states constituting key actors within the international arena in the quest for the reformation of the UNSC (Maseng and Lekaba 2014). The rise in the number of UN member states by admission of African states after their political independence and the emergence of nuclear weapons, which changed the security architecture of states against perceived adversaries, resulted to a significant transformation of the international system (Aksu 2003; Waltz 1993). Such changes have not, however, altered the anarchic nature of the international system that made realism the dominant theory of international relations (Waltz 1993). The realist theory provides a well-structured understanding of the World Wars and the collapse of Cold War (Mearsheimer 2006). The practicability and application of this theory to the thesis is based on the insights that it provides to questions and issues of the pursuit of relative gains and interests that reform groups such as the African bloc seek to achieve by the restructuring of the UNSC (Pijovic 2012). The relative gain element associated with states in the realist assumption is not only relevant for analysis of the African Common Position but also for appraising the UNSC reform perspectives of major African contenders for UNSC permanent seat; discussed in Chapter Five.

Furthermore, the theory is applicable to debates on UNSC reform in view of its broader perspectives pertaining to elements of state power, national interests, and security. The theory is central to understanding the dynamics of world politics in relation to the UN system. The international system has been transformed since the formation of the UN; occasioned by changes in global power configurations and expansion of the membership of the organisation. Mindful of this, this thesis explores the analytical parameter of political realism in Chapters Five and Six to argue Africa’s quest for reform of the Security Council and to evaluate Nigeria’s prospects and the challenges it faces to occupy a UNSC permanent seat.

The realist theory account argues that states with distinct domestic peculiarities may pursue similar foreign policy to project their national interests (Burchill 1996). This assumption is
convincing as it can be applied to the African context where African states, despite the differences in their domestic environments and national interests, adopted the Common African Position in their pursuit of reform of the UNSC. The diplomatic interactions of African states in the UN General Assembly with respect to UNSC reform are guided and influenced by the Ezulwuni Consensus. For instance, recently at the 76th UN General Assembly Session, President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria echoed Africa’s quest for UNSC reform when he declared that; “No reform of the United Nations system is more urgent than that of the Security Council…Consensus has been achieved in some of the elements of this reform, especially that of the representation of Africa on the basis of the Ezulwuni Consensus and the Sirte Declaration” (76th Session of the UN General Assembly, 2021). The official statements of African states’ delegations during the annual UN General Assembly sessions usually reflects Africa’s position of the UNSC reform during UN General debates; as subsequently discussed in Chapter 4.

2.5.3 Weaknesses and Limitations of Realist Theory

As discussed in section 2.5.1, this thesis responds to the realist theory in the context of Africa’s quest for the reform of the UNSC as it explains the politics involved in terms of power and relative gains associated with the Security Council permanent membership but did not reflect on the historical nuances that have resulted in the exclusive reservation of the permanent membership seat to the P5 members. Therefore the limitations of the theory are that it does not resonate with the historical development of the founding of the UN, which granted permanent membership to the victorious allied powers and excluded the axis power comprising of Germany, Japan and Italy (Christopher 2021). The founding of the UN was a result of fierce negotiations led by the UN with 50 nations at a time that majority of African states were under colonial rule as will be discussed in Chapter Three. This raises a fundamental issue of legitimacy of the composition of the permanent membership of the UNSC that excluded African states. Also, the realist theory does not take into account the perspective of decolonisation of Africa territories in relation to Africa’s clamour for UNSC reform. Consequently, Chapter Three of this thesis was designed to extend the realist argument to recognise a decolonisation perspective as a fundamental issue that altered the number of UN membership and shaped the narrative of the quest for the enlargement of the UNSC membership especially for the permanent category.
A significant drawback of political realism is evident in its underestimation of the importance of international organisations to achieve international cooperation as it emphasises mainly, the relative gains the actors seek to accomplish (Bayeh 20014). The realists argue that international organisations are used by powerful states to project power and pursue their national interests (Mearsheimer 2006). This assumption could undermine the credibility of international organisations towards promoting peace and security as demonstrated by the misuse of the veto power by some P5 states, which impacted on UNSC’s intervention in the Rwandan and Darfur conflicts as mentioned in Section 2.4.

Additionally, the plausibility of the realist theory is contested on the basis that it does not have normative criteria for legitimacy (Sleat 2014, p.315). This is because its inclusion of moral conditions for legitimacy ensures that realism collapses into moralism (Sleat 2014). Furthermore, realism is opposed by the cooperative ideals of liberalism. Liberals disagree with the realist standpoint that pursuit of power and survival is a dominant factor of international politics (Shiraraev and Zubok 2015). However, liberalism does not dismiss realists’ position of states seeking to pursue their national interests because it promotes the achievements of those interests by states working together in concert as could be seen in the case of Africa where its quest for UNSC reform is advocated under the Common African position (Maseng and Lekaba 2014). Hence the liberals’ standpoint that international diplomacy is critical for the promotion of cooperation among states (Shiraraev and Zubok 2015). The cooperative posture of liberalism is also extended to its believe in collective security, which is crucial to the primary function of the UNSC as it argues that states can organise themselves through international organisations to promote such security interest (Bayeh 2014). The UNSC by virtue of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which sets out the power of the Security Council, has been able to resolve some conflicts in Africa by deployment of UN peacekeeping force in African states such as Eriteria, Sudan and Liberia amongst others. However, the dominant influence of the P5 in the UNSC’s decision-making mechanism tended to affect the legitimacy perception of the Security Council by African states.

Critics of the realist theory observed that its dialogue on international relations is inclined towards a predetermined ideology (Burchill 1996). Consequently, it is observed that the theory sets out an approach that makes its adherents appreciate international relations from a narrow and one-sided perspective. One such instance is its state-centric assumption that appeared to be less plausible (Brenner 2006). The realist viewed states as unitary actors in international politics, which acts in a rational manner in its interaction. The consideration of
states as being rational and acting in a cooperative manner to achieve a set goal is doubtful in the UNSC structure that reflects the dominance of the P5 (Bosco 2009). The hegemonic status of the permanent members engenders power struggle and the quest for structural reformation of UNSC by UN member states (Bosco 2009).

2.6 Conclusion
The chapter examined relevant literature on the overarching issues of UNSC legitimacy and the veto power. Existing debates on the legitimacy of the Security Council and the veto power in relation to the composition and functions of the UNSC were analysed to identify gaps, and also discern whether the arguments are situated in the context of the absence of African representation in the Council. The review considered Africa and Nigeria’s conception of UNSC reform. Much of the literature reviewed had limited scope in terms of their engagement with African discourse. In most instances the African viewpoint of the UNSC reform and recent developments in the UN General Assembly intergovernmental negotiations was ignored. Furthermore, a critical analysis of realism as a major theory of international relation was undertaken; essential as this is the theoretical framework adopted by this thesis. Through its considerations of these various points, this chapter was able to place the thesis within existent literature, identified key gaps within same, which the thesis subsequently discusses and also placed in an appropriate theoretical framework. The thesis now turns to a discussion of the connections that exist between the decolonisation of Africa and UNSC reform and explores the genesis of Africa’s desire to see reform of the Council.
3.0 Introduction

Whilst the movement for self-rule across African territories began to manifest in the early 19th century, it gained critical momentum after the Second World War (Fajana and Anjorin 1980). At the time of the foundation of the UN in 1945 many African states had not attained political independence (Arnold 2017), and the UN occupied a significant place in the struggle for decolonisation (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2). Decolonisation of Africa is generally described in existent literature from the perspective of international antagonism against colonialism, the dwindling position of European powers after the world war, and the awakening of Africans towards freedom from colonial domination (Sklar 2004; Ajayi 1988; Austen 1982). This Chapter focuses on decolonisation from the standpoint of the struggles by nationalist movements and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to attain political independence in Africa and thence addresses how this may have influenced the position taken by African states on UNSC reform. In so doing, the Chapter establishes the linkages that exist between colonialism, decolonisation and UNSC reform. The roles of the OAU and AU in African decolonisation politics and the struggle for UNSC reform are also examined. The Chapter thus explores the influence of the concept of Pan-Africanism on the OAU/AU’s approach to UNSC reform. It demonstrates how Pan-Africanism inspired the adoption of the various OAU/AU resolutions examined in Section 3.5 and the Ezulwuni Consensus and the AU Agenda 2063’s position on the quest for Africa to have permanent seat(s) in the UNSC.

3.1 Africa and Decolonisation: Some Lessons for UNSC Reform

The aftermath of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 brought African territories under imperial control and marked the official beginning of colonial rule (Nwosu 1993). The colonial superimposition of territories altered the geographical map of Africa. Post-independence Africa has witnessed many internal conflicts and border disputes that can be linked to the historic, colonial, fragmentation of the continent (Adeba 2014; Adebajo 2005, p.83). The artificial borders established by the colonial powers split tribal homelands across countries and created several heterogeneous countries in Africa, including Nigeria (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016; Aghie 2005). The OAU resolution on border dispute
among African states clearly recognized that the arbitrary demarcation of African borders constituted a grave and permanent factor of dissention that often result to UNSC interventions (OAU Resolution 1964 AHG/Res.16 [1]). One such intervention of the UNSC was in the Morocco and Western Sahara dispute in which the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established in 1991 in pursuant to Security Council Resolution 690 (UNSC Resolution-S/RES/690/1991). The age-long hostilities between the Morocco and Western Sahara have resulted in the prolong mandate of the MINURSO as indicated in the recent 2021 Report of the Secretary General on Situation concerning Western Sahara (UNSC 2021- S/2021/843). As such, the dominance of African conflicts in UNSC deliberations is often put forward as a justification for Africa’s quest for a UNSC permanent seat as discussed in Chapter 4.3.

The struggle for power and conquest of colonial territories by the European powers during the colonial rule was formalised by the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 (Nwosu 1993). Subsequently, the contest for power by the great powers was extended to global governance institutions such as the UN as the victorious allies in the World War II allocated the UNSC permanent seat to the P5 (Nadin 2016). The UN Charter 1945 allocated special rights and responsibilities to the permanent members, conferred upon the P5 the veto power and permanent membership (Bosco 2009). The UNSC is not a product of international bureaucracy but a creation of great-power politics (Nadin 2016; Bosco 2009; Pedrazzi 2007). Therefore, the perceived dominance of the UNSC by the P5 members and the calls by other UN member states including African states for change to the status quo of membership structure reflects the politics of UNSC reform where all parties want to promote their own interests. Hence, such an approach is consistent with the realists’ assumption of relative gains that actors seek to achieve in the international arena (Malik 2005). As at the early stage of the formation of the OAU, African states adopted OAU Resolution 1964 Resolution AHG/Res.13 (1), which called for equitable representation of Africa in the organs of the UN especially the UNSC.

The negotiations that led to the creation of the UN took into consideration the roles played by the victorious allies (Christopher 2021). The allies negotiated themselves into the Security Council Permanent Seat at a time when only Egypt, Liberia and Ethiopia were the only African States, amongst the stakeholders that drafted the UN Charter; the rest of Africa was under colonial administration (Odeyemi and Igwebueze 2016). The attainment of political
independence by a majority of African states including Nigeria by 1960 increased Africa’s solidarity in the UN for the advancement of African interests (Odeyemi and Igwebueze 2016). The decolonisation struggle can be regarded as a precursor by which African states gained admission into the UN after independence and used their membership status to advocate for reform of the UNSC. The struggle against colonialism and the apartheid regime by African UN member states was a further step in Africa’s solidarity and advocacy in the UN before progressing to the quest for a UNSC permanent membership as explained in Chapter 3.2.

The solidarity by African states to advance their interests could be accentuated by the common desire to challenge international regimes and institutions often brings African states together (Egede 2011). Africa’s solidarity against colonial rule was consistent with a major objective of the OAU at inception in 1963; to end the remaining vestiges of colonial rule and apartheid in the continent (Arnold 2017). The strategies adopted by the OAU had meaningful impacts on the journeys towards political independence of front-line states (El-Khawas 1978). The admission of new independent states into the UN expanded the membership of the UN and defined the dynamics of power relations in the UNSC as member states demanded better representation in the Security Council (Weiss 2003). This also impacted on the aspiration for the reform of the UNSC as Africa, for the first time, through OAU Resolution 1964 Resolution AHG/Res.13 (1), which argued for African representation in all the organs of the UN including the UNSC. As subsequently discussed in Section 3.2, this resolution was followed by the OAU Harare Resolution of 1997 by the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of the OAU, which formally marked the beginning of Africa’s quest for permanent membership of the UNSC (OAU 1997 Decl.3 XXIII).

It is noteworthy that the declaration of the Atlantic Charter and its incorporation into the UN Charter of 1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 were major instruments that supported liberation movements in Africa (Burke 2010). The third clause of the Atlantic Charter sought for the respect of the rights of the people to determine the form of government under which they will live and wish to realize sovereign rights (Atlantic Charter 1941). Also, the UN Charter affirmed its “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (UN Charter 1945, Article 1[2]). As such, this provision delegitimised colonial administration and inspired decolonisation campaign across Africa (Burke 2010). The Charter was therefore a major political tool in the quest for self-governance by territories under colonial governments. The period between 1955 and 1965 witnessed the
largest wave of decolonisaion as 47 new states emerged from colonial rule (Aksu 2003). The transition from colonialism to post-colonial rule impacted on the UN and also evolved a unifying concept for African states as was espoused by the fusion of the Casablanca and Monrovia groups discussed in Section 3.2. The anticolonial struggle by African nationalists in the UN was significant in altering the balance of power with the expansion of membership of the organisation from its original 51 members to its current number - 193 states, which includes 54 African member states (Ekwealor 2015). The rise in the membership of the UN, which was not anticipated by the founders of the organisation, had implications for the decision-making process of the UN and has also resulted in the calls for its reform (Hosli and Dofler 2019).

3.2 The OAU struggle for Decolonisation and Security Council Reform

This section examines the impact of decolonisaion in Africa and the quest by Africa for UNSC reform. It also analyzes the various OAU/AU resolutions on UNSC reform in relation to Africa’s aspiration. The pursuit of decolonisaion agenda in Africa under a collective entity prior to the establishment of the OAU in 1963 was a major challenge. The differences in ideological approaches between the opposing camps of African leaders of the radical Pan-Africanism movement regarded as the Casablanca group on one side and the conservative pro-western bloc, the Monrovia group on the other hand slowed down liberation struggle against colonial rule in Africa (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2014). The Casablanca group’s ideology was based on the political integration of Africa and the establishment of a supranational entity (Arnold 2017). However, the philosophy of the Monrovia bloc favoured a loose political association of independent states (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2014). The conciliation between both groups culminated into the emergence of the OAU as a Pan-African institution (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2014). The ideological disparities between the various camps impacted the continent’s desire to have a continental body to promote Africa’s interest in global affairs especially in the reform of the UNSC. The ideological conflict delayed the establishment of the OAU and brought to light the controversies in the approach to African unity by various interests. The eventual formation of the OAU in 1963 was a milestone in the fight against colonialism, and also set the stage for the continental organisation’s involvement in the clamour for UNSC reform by passing various resolutions. The first of these resolutions was the 1964 OAU Resolution (OAU 1964 Resolution AHG/Res.13 [1]) on Africa’s representation within the various organs of the UN which endorsed the UN General Assembly Resolution 1991 that recommended amendment of the UN Charter for the enlargement of membership of the
UNSC non-permanent seat. The resolution focussed on African representation on the UNSC non-permanent seat thereby setting the stage for the quest for permanent membership seat by the Harare Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the Reform of the UN Security Council’ (OAU 1997 Decl.3 XXXIII). The OAU 1964 Resolution AHG/Res.13 (1) resolution: “Authorizes African Ambassadors in non-African capitals to impress upon such Governments the importance of ratifying the amendments; Instructs the Permanent African Representative at the United Nations to continue their efforts so as to obtain the ratification of proposed amendments to the Charter of the United Nations” (OAU 1964 Resolution AHG/Res.13 [1]). By this resolution, African states demonstrated their resolve for the reform of UNSC. The resolution also laid the foundations for subsequent UNSC reform resolutions and the subsisting African Common Position on UNSC reform.

In its early years the OAU was not active in debates on the reform of the UNSC as it was occupied with the struggle for decolonisation of African territories, though it participated in the first review of the UN Charter 1964 (Agwu 2013). Despite the focus of the regional body on the decolonisation of African colonial territories, it was also involved in the diplomatic negotiations on the UNSC reform as it adopted the OAU 1964 Resolution AHG/Res.13 (1) earlier examined which endorsed the UN General Assembly Resolution 1991 (UN-A/RES/1991[XVIII]). The 1964 OAU Resolution on Africa’s representation within various organs of the UN urged all African member states of the UN to endorse the ratification of the amendments to UN Charter and also requested African ambassadors in non-African countries to persuade their host governments to support the review of membership composition of the UNSC (OAU 1964 Resolution AHG/Res.13 [1]). The UN General Assembly Resolution 1991 adopted the amendments to the UN Charter on the composition of the Security Council and established the allocation of seats to various regions (UN-A/RES/1991[XVIII]). Consequently, the ratification to the amendments by two thirds of the UN General Assembly in 1965 increased the number of non-permanent seats from six to ten with three seats allocated to Africa (Schwelb 1966).

The emergence of the Open-ended Working Group consultation in 1993 on the restructuring of the UNSC rekindled Africa’s interest for UNSC reform (Bourantonis and Magliveras 2002). As such resulted in the adoption of the OAU resolution ‘Harare Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the Reform of the UN Security Council’ (OAU 1997 Decl.3 XXXIII). This resolution was the first OAU resolution that sought a
permanent membership seat for Africa. The Harare Declaration also reaffirmed the desirability of a democratized composition of the Security Council, expansion of membership of the Council to 26, and the need for two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats allotted to Africa in an expanded UNSC (OAU 1997 Decl.3 XXXIII). The OAU, which has since transmuted to the AU played significant role in Africa’s diplomacy in the quest for UNSC permanent seat by adoption of resolutions on UNSC reform (Musabende 2020). Indeed, the OAU/AU resolutions on UNSC reform since the Harare Declaration of 1997 have been consistent in demanding two permanent seats for Africa and extension of the veto power to new members (OAU 1997 Decl.3 XXXIII). However, the Harare Declaration is different from other AU resolutions such as the Ezulwuni Consensus as it introduced a time-limited duration for UN member states serving in a permanent seat. In so doing, the Harare Declaration recommended the periodic election of permanent members based on a rotational system through nomination by respective regions and election by the General Assembly. This approach was, in its nature, similar to the non-permanent seat category where membership is time-based; usually 2 years duration. The Ezulwuni Consensus is different from the Harare Declaration reform proposal because it does not have any term limitation to the permanent membership seat. In the Harare Declaration reform proposal, all the regions including Africa would be represented in the permanent membership seat with the veto power privilege and the eligibility of a UN member state to contest the election to the permanent seat at the UN General Assembly would only depend on nomination by its region. Though this proposal appears to promote equitable geographical representation in the permanent membership of the UNSC, it may not resolve contentious issues regarding the exercise of the veto power.

All AU resolutions after 2005 (see Table 3.0 for a summary) have been consistent in reaffirming Africa’s common position as enunciated in the Ezulwuni Consensus and the 2005 Sirte Declaration on the UNSC reform. Whilst the Ezulwuni Consensus specifically focuses only on the reformation of the Security Council (AU 2005 Ext/EX.CL/2 [VII]), the Sirte Declaration integrates a comprehensive institutional reform of the UN on three fronts; the UNSC, the General Assembly, and the Secretariat (AU July 2005 Decl.2 [V]). The thrust of the reform proposals by the Sirte Declaration is greater African representation in all the organs of the UN. With regard to reform of the UNSC, the Sirte Declaration proposes the allocation of two permanent seats with all privileges including the veto right and additional two non-permanent seats to Africa as demanded by the Ezulwuni Consensus. With regard to the reform of the UN General Assembly, the Sirte Declaration focuses on strengthening of its leadership
to enable it to function efficiently as the most representative and democratic organ of the UN. Lastly, and with regard to the UN Secretariat, the declaration proposals seek a strengthening of the Secretariat so that it may deliver effective service delivery and greater African representation (AU July 2005 Decl.2 [V]).

There is also a pattern of inconsistency in the titles of OAU/AU resolutions for UNSC reform as indicated in Table 3.0 below. Initially the titles reflect the call for UNSC reform as captured in the Harare Declaration of 1997 but subsequent titles of resolutions refer to UN reforms more generally, with the titles of the resolutions from 2008 being exclusively on UNSC reform. This clearly shows a shift in focus from a demand for institutional reform of other organs of the UN to only the UNSC. Therefore, it can be suggested that focusing attention on the reform of the UNSC was a major priority for the continent to challenge its exclusion from occupation of a permanent seat. In addition, AU resolutions on UNSC reform from the onset appeared to be silent on the necessity for the cooperation and unity of African states in their diplomatic engagements for UNSC reform. The realization of the need for the continent to collaborate as one entity manifested itself from 2015 as evidenced in the resolutions adopted, and resulted in a reiteration of the necessity for cooperation and solidarity amongst African states in the promotion of the Common African Position (AU 2015- Dec.564 [XXIV]). To this end, the AU resolution Dec.564 (XXIV) affirmed “Africa to continue to speak with one voice and cohesively on all issues related to the United Nations Security Council Reform and related matters”.

Further analysis of the pattern of AU resolutions starting from Resolution Dec.564 (XXIV) of 2015 shows the inclusion of a strategy of expanded consultation to galvanize support for the African position on reform (Assembly/AU/Dec.564 [XXIX]). Paragraph 10 of the resolution stated that “member states of the African Union will continue to include the issue of the reform of the Security Council among the priorities of their foreign policies while engaging with non-African partners in particular, to include in their statements at the United Nations General Assembly Debate the need to redress the historical injustice the continent continues to suffer” (Assembly/AU/Dec.564 [XXIX]). The potential African contenders for UNSC permanent seat include: Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt and these three states often reflect the demand for reform of the UNSC in their official statements in general debates of the UN General Assembly Sessions (UN 2017- A/72/PV.42; UN 2018- A/73/PV.36; UN-2019-A/74/PV.3). Further evaluation of the AU resolution Dec.564 (XXIV) of 2015 also reveals a
special role for the Committee of Ten to galvanize support for the Common African Position (Assembly/AU/Dec.564 [XXIX]). The resolution asserted: “the Committee of Ten to continue to intensify efforts in advocating, canvassing and promoting the Common African Position and to reach out at the highest levels for the purpose of garnering and galvanizing the necessary political will in support thereof” (Assembly/AU/Dec.564 [XXIX]). The Committee of Ten established by the Assembly of AU Heads of States and Government has the mandate to promote Africa’s quest for a UNSC permanent seat as will be discussed in Chapter 5.2. In furtherance of this resolution, Sierra-Leone, Kenya, and Senegal all members of the AU Committee of Ten on UNSC reform have included the issue of Security Council reform in their official foreign policy communications as evident in the official statements of their delegations at the General Debates of the UN General Assembly Sessions (UN 2016-A/70/PV.113; UN-2018- A/72/PV.104).
### Table 3.1: OAU and AU Resolutions on UNSC Reform

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Resolution/Declaration Number</th>
<th>Title of Resolution</th>
<th>Summary of Resolution</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1964</td>
<td>OAU -AHG/Res. 13(1)</td>
<td>African Representation within the various organs of the UN.</td>
<td>The resolution endorsed the recommendation by the 18th UN General Assembly for the amendments of Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the UN Charter. In line with this endorsement, African states were to ratify the amendments to the Charter before 31 August 1964 and also Permanent African Representatives of the UN were to maintain the momentum towards the eventual ratification of the planned amendments.</td>
<td>This resolution being the first on UNSC reform by the OAU formed the basis for subsequent reform proposal by the OAU/AU such as the Harare Declaration of 1997 (Declaration 3 [XXXIII]) by the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of the OAU on the reform of the UNSC that sought for the enlargement of the UNSC membership to 26 with 2 permanent seats and 5 non-permanent seats allotted to Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1996</td>
<td>In the period 1965-1965 after the first amendment of the UN Charter, there were no OAU resolutions adopted regarding UNSC reform. The resolutions passed by the OAU in this period were essentially on the independence of African states under colonial rule and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>Declaration 3(XXXIII)</td>
<td>Harare Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the Reform of the UNSC.</td>
<td>The declaration underlined the necessity for democratisation of the Security Council to reflect the increase in the number of member states of the UN. It thus recommended the expansion of the membership of the UNSC to 26 with two permanent and five non-permanent seats for Africa in the expanded Security Council. Also, it emphasized on the need for periodic review of the structure and functioning of the UNSC to respond effectively in dealing with new challenges. Furthermore, it emphasized on strengthening the transparency and methods of work of the Security Council.</td>
<td>The adoption of this resolution was significant being the first OAU resolution that sought a UNSC permanent seat for Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII)</td>
<td>The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the UN: “The Ezulwuni Consensus“</td>
<td>The focus also is on the full representation of Africa in the UNSC with two permanent seats with the veto power and five non-permanent seats. Additionally, AU was to determine the criteria for the selection of African representatives.</td>
<td>The Ezulwuni Consensus can be regarded as furtherance to the Harare Declaration. However, it differed from the Harare Declaration because it did not propose a periodic review of the composition and functions of the UNSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>AU/Decl. 2(V)</td>
<td>Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the UN</td>
<td>The declaration reaffirmed the commitment of the AU to Ezulwuni Consensus.</td>
<td>This declaration envisaged the institutional reforms of the UN in three broad fronts; the UNSC, General Assembly and Secretariat.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>AU/Dec.105 (VI)</td>
<td>Decision on the UN Reform</td>
<td>This resolution essentially renewed the mechanism for consultations to promote and support the Ezulwuni Consensus and Sirte Declaration. The resolution also affirmed the determination of Africa to correct the historical injustice to Africa arising from the non-inclusion of Africa in the permanent seat.</td>
<td>The resolution seeks to underscore the mandate of the Committee of Ten in advancing Africa’s interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2007</td>
<td>AU/Dec.155 (VIII)</td>
<td>Decision on the Report of the Committee of Ten on the Reform of the UNSC</td>
<td>The resolution maintained that no development has taken place to alter the Common African Position on the reform of the UNSC. Therefore, the AU encouraged the Committee of Ten to continue consultations to promote the Ezulwuni Consensus.</td>
<td>This resolution also seeks to strengthen the mandate of the Committee of Ten just as the above resolution (AU/Dec.10 [VI]).</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 2008</td>
<td>AU/Dec.184 (X)</td>
<td>Decision on the Reform of the UNSC</td>
<td>The resolution reaffirmed the Ezulwuni Consensus and Sirte Declaration on the reform of the UNSC. The Committee of Ten was further enjoined to intensify efforts in the promotion of African position on the reform.</td>
<td>The resolution clearly recognizes the Ezulwuni Consensus and Sirte Declaration as Africa’s course of action for UNSC reform that will include African permanent members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2015</td>
<td>AU/Dec.564 (XXIV)</td>
<td>Decision on the 15th Report of the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government on the Reform of the UNSC</td>
<td>The decision restated Africa’s commitment to the Consensus/Sirte Declaration and urged AU member states to speak with one voice on matters of the UNSC reform. The decision encouraged African states to include the issue of reform among their priorities in foreign policy engagement with non-African states. It further appealed to African states to include the reform issue in their address to UN General Assembly debates to redress the historical injustice to the continent.</td>
<td>This resolution began to show a pattern of expanded consultation on the UNSC reform through encouragement of African states to include the reform in their foreign policy interactions with other nations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2016</td>
<td>AU/Dec.599 (XXVI)</td>
<td>Decision on the Reform of the UNSC.</td>
<td>The resolution maintained the Ezulwuni Consensus and Sirte Declaration as the viable option to reform the UNSC to rectify the historical injustice to the continent.</td>
<td>There is inconsistency in the framing of the titles of the resolution. Initially “UNSC reform” was reflected in the Harare Declaration of 1997 and subsequent title of resolutions concentrated generally on UN reform. However as from 2008, the title of the resolutions were specific to only UNSC reform. This clearly shows a shift in the desire for the institutional reform of other organs of UN to only the UNSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2017</td>
<td>AU/Dec.648 (XXIX)</td>
<td>Decision on the Reform of the UNSC.</td>
<td>The decision reiterates commitment to the African position on the UNSC reform and the need for the Committee of Ten to continue to canvass for support for the position. The decision also restated the need for Africa’s solidarity and unity towards the reform and encouraged African states to withdraw their membership with other interest Groups to focus on the consolidation and realization of the Ezulwuni consensus.</td>
<td>Starting from 2015, the resolutions of the AU began to reiterate the need for cohesion and cooperation amongst African states to pursue the AU UNSC reform proposal. Furthermore, the emphasis for periodic review of the structure and functioning of the UNSC as espoused in the Harare Declaration of 1997 were discarded in subsequent resolutions.</td>
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Source: Adopted from AU Commission with modifications in the summary of resolutions and comment columns (Decisions and Declarations of the Assembly).
3.3 The Quest for UNSC Reform: A Place of Pan-Africanism

The Pan-Africanism philosophy united Africa in the struggle against colonial rule and also promoted African solidarity especially with regards to its quest for UNSC permanent seat as evidenced by the Ezulwuni Consensus and the AU Agenda 2063 as examined in Chapters 4.4 and 3.4 respectively. The UN and OAU have acted as rallying points for Africa’s emancipation as previously discussed. African solidarity was considered by newly independent African states as an ideal and practical method of resolving problems within the continent (Hatch 1967). Kwame Nkrumah, a renowned pan-Africanist and proponent of the Casablanca group offered a unique contribution to Pan-African Nationalist Movement and supported the political integration of Africa (Kah 2016). The philosophy was the cornerstone of Nkrumah’s struggle for independence of Ghana and was extended to Africa as he advocated for the political unity of the continent by the formation of a United States of Africa (Kah 2016). The Pan-African philosophy inspired liberation struggles across the continent in the post-Second World War period but the prospects of uniting African states into one political entity as proposed by Nkrumah remains uncertain due to the diversity and heterogeneity of African culture and political structures (Abrahamsen 2020). The vision of having a United States of Africa is not feasible because it would undermine the national sovereignty of independent states (Abrahamsen 2020). The long-term quest for Africa’s unity since the formative stage of the OAU was based on the rhetoric of Pan-Africanism (Kumah-Abikwu and Oncha-Echel 2013). The OAU Charter of 1963 supposedly kept alive the philosophy of Pan-Africanism, with Article II of the Charter listed the purposes of the OAU as being, amongst others to include “promote the unity and solidarity of African states” (OAU Charter 1963 Article II 1(a), p.3) and “eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa” (OAU Charter 1963 Article II 1(d), p.3).

Pan-Africanism has no universally agreed meaning as a political philosophy since scholarship and African nationalists have advanced different explanations for the concept (Abrahamsen 2020). Nevertheless, the philosophy can be explained in terms of three broad contending visions of world order within Pan-Africanism: (1) a world of racially defined units; (2) advancing a continental unity and transnational solidarity; (3) and advancement of national sovereignty (Abrahamsen 2020,p.57). The above standpoints of the philosophy all attempt to reawaken and unite Africa as they promote a feeling of oneness among African people (Esedebe 1980). Ani and Ojakorotu (2017) presented the Pan-Africanism philosophy as a socio-political and cultural phenomenon that embodies Africans and their descendants as one
entity. The perspective of the philosophy by Abrahamsen (2020), Esede (1980), and Ani and Ojakorotu (2017) is directed towards advancing the common interest of African people. The philosophy was instrumental to the founding of the erstwhile OAU in 1963 as previously explained in Section 3.2. The OAU embraced the Pan-African philosophy in the struggle for the political independence of African states and against the apartheid regime in South Africa (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2014). Furthermore, the AU Agenda 2063, which is discussed in more detail in Section 3.4 was articulated based on the Pan-African philosophy with Aspiration Seven of the Agenda projecting Africa’s desire for a UNSC permanent seat as an influential global actor.

The 1958 Accra Pan-African Conference, which was based on the philosophy of Pan-Africanism was convened to dialogue on the common interests of Africa and promote the struggle for the independence of African territories under colonial rule (Ani and Ojakorotu 2017). It emphasized the decolonisation of African territories as it notes “the Conference expressed itself firmly against the continuation of colonialism, as well as against all forms of imperialism” (C.L. [The World Today] 1958). The Conference was significant because, for the first time, African states assembled at an inter-governmental level to discuss African issues (Ani and Ojakorotu 2017). The Convener of the Conference and Ghana’s Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah declared, “we stand for international peace and security in conformity with the United Nations Charter. This will enable us to assert our own African personality and to develop according to our ways of life, our own customs, traditions and cultures” (Adera 1963, p.147). The resolutions of the Accra conference focused on the promotion of cooperation and negotiations by African states in political, economic, social, and cultural spheres (Adera 1963; Johnson 1962). The Conference also crafted a resolution for African states to consider consultation with the UN regarding Africa’s representation in the global body but it did not make specific reference to the UNSC (Adera 1963). The 1958 Conference introduced a new dimension to Africa’s diplomacy in the UN, and arguably laid the foundation for the continent’s interest for greater representation in the UNSC as reflected in the adoption of the Ezulwuni Consensus analysed in Chapter Four, and the AU Agenda 2063 which is considered in Section 3.4.

The UN acts as a theatre to advance African solidarity especially on the representation of the region in the UNSC and other organs of the UN (Odeyemi and Igwebueze 2016). The pertinent question that arises is ‘to what extent has the Pan-African philosophy been
successful in the pursuit of African interests in multilateral institutions such as the UN?’. The failure of African states to have a unified position on common candidates to put forward as potential permanent candidates from Africa clearly indicates that the philosophy has not been operationalised and further suggests that the philosophy only exists in theory. Chapter Six explores the issues surrounding the non-selection of suitable potential permanent candidates from Africa with respect to the Ezulwuni Consensus. Africa’s unity on the basis of ideals of solidarity and cooperation as advocated by the Pan-African philosophy is essential for the AU to make any meaningful progress in the dialogue for the reform of the UNSC (Maseng and Lekaba 2014).

3.4 AU Agenda 2063 and the Quest for Permanent Representation in the UNSC

The AU Agenda 2063 adopted in 2015, entrenched the Pan-African philosophy, and provides a robust framework for addressing past injustices to Africa (AU Agenda 2063, 2015). The project with the broad framework of advancing the prosperity, integration and well-being of the African people developed on seven aspirational goals (AU Agenda 2063, 2015). This section, however, only examines Aspiration Seven as it is connected to UNSC reform and targeted at projecting Africa as a strong, united, resilient, and influential global player in world affairs (AU Agenda 2063, 2015). Through its examination and evaluation, this section evaluates the objectives of Aspiration Seven, which stressed that:

Africa shall continue to advocate for the reform of the United Nations and other international institutions, with particular reference to the UN Security Council, in order to correct the historical injustice of Africa not being represented on the Council by a permanent seat (AU Agenda 2063:2015, p. 10).

The description of Africa’s exclusion from the UNSC since the inception of the UN as ‘historical injustice’ in the advocacy for UNSC permanent seat for Africa gained ground with its usage in the AU Agenda 2063 Framework and has subsequently been reflected in AU resolutions such as AU 2016/AU/Dec.599 (XXVI). Agenda 2063 considers the need to address structural imbalance in the composition of the UNSC as the latter’s decisions have direct consequences on the stability of the region. AU Declaration (AU 2016 /AU/Dec.599 [XXVI]) that urged member states to include the issue of UNSC reform within their foreign policy priorities and interactions with non-African states advances the objective of Aspiration Seven on UNSC reform (AU 2016 /AU/Dec.599 [XXVI]). It aims to promote the pursuit of the overall interest of Africa rather than the narrow national interests of member states, which could be detrimental to the common position of the region on reform of the UNSC.
The AU is an important platform to advance African solidarity (Joshua and Faith 2017), and Aspiration Seven of the AU Agenda 2063 framework seeks to position Africa as a united and influential global player in the quest for UNSC permanent seat (Osei 2018). Aspiration Seven presents a unique opportunity to further the African narrative for the reform of the UNSC as encapsulated in the Ezulwuni Consensus and address the geographical imbalance of representation in the Security Council. However, the implementation of the framework of AU Agenda 2063 as it relates to Aspiration Seven has not made significant progress because of weak political commitment by the AU (Osei 2018). As such, there is no deliberate mechanism to enforce the commitment towards achieving Aspiration Seven of the AU Agenda 2063 (Osei 2018). Also, the divisions and competing interests between sub-regional organisations in Africa tended to affect continental unity thereby undermining the Pan-African philosophy (Adeyemi and Ayodele 2007). Such divisions in the AU as noted by Omoruyi et al (2020) is arguably the underlying issue that has prevented the AU from nominating suitable African candidates states for UNSC permanent seats.

In addition, Aspiration Seven has failed to address or settle the issue of some African states maintaining membership of reform groups such as L69 Group (a bloc of developing countries that seeks the reform of the UNSC) despite the decision of the AU that African states would disengage from such reform groups as subsequently discussed in Chapter 5.2. Therefore, inclination or preference of some AU member states to pursue their national or sub-regional interests as was the case in the election of the AU Commission Chairmanship position where regional-based biases influence the choice of candidate for the position as discussed in Chapter 6.5 (Maseng and Lekaba 2014; Uzodike 2009, p.35). Hence, such attachment to regional interest rather than the collective African interest could undermine the commitments to the principles of the AU Agenda 2063 Aspiration Seven and Africa’s cohesion in the advancement of the Common African Position on the UNSC reform.

### 3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the connections, which exist between the decolonisation of Africa and UNSC reform. The attainment of political independence by all African states increased Africa’s membership of the UN from the original three founding member states to the current 54 African states. This did not only change the power dynamics and membership composition of the UN from its original 51 founding members but also significantly influenced the quest for UNSC reform. The adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution
1991 of 1963 to address the question of equitable representation on the Security Council was the first instance of the call for reorganisation of the UN. In addition, and throughout the Chapter, it was noted how Pan-African ideology has been a unifying theme for Africans and how it reflects on the past historical experiences of the people. The AU Agenda 2063 is entrenched on the tenet of Pan-Africanism and Aspiration Seven of the Agenda presents a unique opportunity to promote African narrative for reform of the UNSC as captured in the Ezulwuni Consensus. The realisation of the framework of Agenda 2063 with respect to Aspiration Seven has however been limited due to the failure of African states to reach consensus on selecting a suitable African candidate for UNSC permanent membership. The next chapter will explore diverse perceptions on the legitimacy discourse and will also discern whether there is the AU perspective on the legitimacy of the UNSC.
CHAPTER FOUR

EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY AND THE UNSC: CAN WE DISCERN AN AFRICAN CONCEPTION OF LEGITIMACY?

4.0 Introduction

This chapter seeks to examine whether there is an “African” perception on the legitimacy of the UNSC. A major contribution of this chapter is the analysis of responses by interviewees from the UN Permanent Missions of the AU, South Africa, Nigeria, Russia, and France on UNSC legitimacy and Africa’s exclusion in the Council. These interviewees are key stakeholders as they have been involved in diplomatic engagements in the debate for the reform of the UNSC and are from states with representations in the permanent seat, as well as others with experience as non-permanent members. African documents such as the AU resolutions and UN primary documents like UNSC resolutions and the UN Charter were explored in this chapter in order to argue for African representation in the permanent membership of the Council and also discern the legitimacy of UNSC membership and activities. Africa’s conception of UNSC legitimacy is interconnected with power as a major element in the realist assumption and as such, power relations of the UNSC are associated with the membership and privileged powers of the permanent seat that excludes majority of other UN member states. Symons (2011) established a relationship between legitimacy and power in a specific constituency such as international organisation as will be explored in Section 4.1. This Chapter will build on the argument of Symons (2011) by situating the connection between power and legitimacy in the context of how the UNSC is perceived by African states as lacking legitimacy due to the absence of an African permanent member.

This Chapter initially explores the concept of legitimacy by engaging diverse perceptions of the notion as it relates to the UNSC and thence proceeds to examine UNSC legitimacy from the standpoint of the composition of the permanent membership of the Council, veto power functions and the selective exercise of UNSC powers by the P5 members. The Chapter analyses interviews conducted with some high-ranking officials from some P5 states and African states. It then synthesises that data with an examination of primary documents of the AU and the UN in order to discern their perceptions of legitimacy with regards to Africa’s exclusion from the UNSC permanent membership. Finally, the Chapter considers the African Common Position on the reform of UNSC.
4.1 The Legitimacy Concept: A Contested Discourse

The UN Charter acts as a constituent instrument and social contract between UN member states, obligates the UNSC to maintain international peace and security, and they perform their function as reflected in the agenda of the Council (Frederking and Patane 2017). The evaluation of legitimacy of the UNSC through its agenda revealed that the interventions by P5 have been able to address significant global conflicts (Frederking and Patane 2017). However, the legitimacy of the UNSC is contested on the basis of the limited membership composition of UNSC permanent seat (Hosli and Dofler 2019). Hence, it is desirable to amend Articles 23 and 27 of the UN Charter regarding membership composition of the UNSC and concurring votes of the P5 respectively to enhance the legitimacy of the Security Council (Hosli and Dofler 2019). This chapter seeks to discern an African perception of legitimacy of the Security Council in the context of exclusion of African states from the permanent membership of the UNSC based on critical evaluation of OAU/AU resolutions, which regarded Africa’s absence as a historical injustice to the continent. In addition, the African perception of legitimacy would be further discerned in this chapter from the feedback from high-ranking officials in the UN Permanent Missions of the AU, Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa.

Legitimacy is a fundamental discourse for international organisations to exert influence in global politics due to the absence of a hierarchical international legal and political order (Tallberg and Zurn 2019). The acceptability of a particular constituency such as an international organisation is expressed by a strong legitimacy that enhances its powers and effectiveness and is normatively desirable by all actors (Symon 2011, p.2558). Legitimacy is inherently a contested concept in international relations as scholars and actors in international politics have advanced different arguments upon it (Badansky 2011). This section of the thesis explores legitimacy from a fusionist approach that connects authority with legitimacy, the state versus legal approach, and the realists’ perspective because of the centrality of their argument to interest representation and institutional effectiveness of international organisation that are related to debates on UNSC reform. Legitimacy from these approaches is derived from a combination of inputs and outputs. The input legitimacy conceives that political choices are legitimate when they reflect the will of the people and democratic tenets (Oates 2017; Scharpf 1999). The inputs aspect of legitimacy emanates from the principle of all member states having sovereign equality and as such, corresponds with the argument for the enlargement of permanent membership seats to strengthen the legitimacy perception of
the UNSC. In contrast, output legitimacy comes from the capacity of state and institutional policies to effectively manage problems to reflect the concern of the people (Oates 2017). This aspect of legitimacy stems from the activities of the international organisations and their benefits to members (Corbett et al. 2018). As such, Section 4.4.2 accentuate the AU’s legitimacy perception of the UNSC as it advocates for UNSC reform to deconstruct the current membership composition of the Council.

4.1.1 The Fusionist Approach to Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a notion that is interconnected with authority from the fusionist standpoint because institutions are regarded as being legitimate when they are backed with an instrument of authority. It follows, that authority confers the power of a rightful and binding decision for an entity and establishes the basis for acquiring legitimacy (Hurd 2007). Commenting further, Hurd (2007) contended that an institution has authority when it is perceived as being legitimate. Thus, authority and legitimacy are interrelated, and an institution needs authority before considering the existence of legitimacy. Authority is a legitimate power since it is binding and derived from a recognised standard of governance (Gary et al. 2008). These principles of governance may emanate from a constitution, special statutes, or even norms. Anderson et al. (2019) also linked the authority of global governance institutions with their legitimacy. Their argument indicates that the extent of the authority of an international organisation affects perceptions of its legitimacy.

Tallberg and Zurn (2019) differ from the fusionist approach as they observe that legitimacy is distinct from authority. They argue that authority recognises that an institution has the right to make decisions and interpret them within a given sphere, while legitimacy signifies that these rights are correctly exercised. Therefore, as authority implies the acceptance to conform to established rules, it possesses no fundamental judgment concerning the legitimacy of an authoritative institution. Moreover, authority may exist in the absence of legitimacy as some political regimes may, though seemingly lacking democratic legitimacy, retain their authority (Koppel 2008). For instance, the USA is doubtful of the democratic legitimacy of the Iranian government since its 1979 Revolution and often regarded the latter’s governments to be a regime rather than democratic governments (Koppel 2008). Notwithstanding the position of the US, the Iranian state still exercises its authority as its citizens abide by the dictates of the government; and thus legitimises it as an institution.
Hooghe et al. (2016) conceived legitimacy and authority to be cohesive but institutions can obtain authority over new issues without being considered more legitimate by all actors. Merging the two concepts negates the existence of illegitimate authority (Peters and Schaffer 2013). The perspective of Hooghe et al. (2016) does not address the issue of distinction between authority holders and institutionalised authority as his argument is consistent with the fusionist approach and contrary to the position of Alter et al. (2016). Citing International Courts (ICs) as example, authority and legitimacy are distinguishable (Alter et al. 2016). The ICs have legal competence derived from consensual agreement of delegation from states. Hence, their legal right to ruling is less controversial than other international institutions whose pronouncements are supposed to be binding on member states.

4.1.2 State versus Legal Approaches to Legitimacy

Citizens consider their respective state as rightfully holding and wielding political power under the state approach to legitimacy (Gilley 2006). This viewpoint of legitimacy highlights two substantive issues; subjects and objects. Citizens are the major constituency in the evaluation of legitimacy and represent the ‘subject’. State legitimacy emanates from acceptance of, and voluntary compliance to the state by citizens (Gemperle, 2018). On the other hand, objects are reflected by the state as holding and exercising political power. The acceptance of a government by its citizens may be influenced by different reasons derived from conditions such as justice, correct procedure, adequate representation, charismatic leadership, and the lawful exercise of authority (Jackson and Bradford 2019; Junne 2001). A combination of these conditions can improve the legitimacy profile of the state in the eyes of its citizenry. Acquiring legitimacy is not limited to only these conditions because effective functional public institutions manifested in areas such as service delivery and social welfare schemes can also favourably impact a state’s legitimacy (Jackson and Bradford 2019). Furthermore, it is doubtful if the charismatic leadership identified by Jackson and Bradford (2019) and Junne (2001) could independently bestow legitimacy to a state, as conditions such as the rule of law would also need to be fulfilled. Legitimacy is essentially a contested social concept (Zaum 2015), in which social norms or common interests of different social groups define legitimacy may differ. Thus, member states of the UN measure the legitimacy of the UNSC by various parameters such as membership representation, veto power, and the effectiveness of the Council (Sinha 2018).
The legal conception of legitimacy is inherent and connected to the fundamentals of legitimacy as stressed under the state approach of legitimacy. The emphasis by legal legitimacy on rightful obligation in order to submit to, or comply with, a system can be equated with correct procedure and the lawful exercise of authority (Thomas 2014). This approach of legitimacy depends on legal norms, which are related to moral considerations (Fallon 2005). To this end, an act could be illegal but legitimate as was the case of NATO action in Kosovo without UNSC resolution to prevent genocide as discussed in Section 4.2.3. In contrast, the Nazi Germany laws were legal, but mostly illegitimate (Evans 2007). The Nazis did not seize power as they acquired it legally by consent and the application of coercive measures such as repression to small minorities in concentration camps were legitimatised by laws passed by elected legislative assemblies but regarded as illegitimate (Evans 2007, p.57). Legal legitimacy may thus be recognized under an effective legal system as a consequence of its self-justification, which provides a major reason for compliance even if there are opposing moral considerations.

Legitimacy from both the state and legal approaches depends on normative tenets or moral standards to justify the system or institution (Buchanan and Keohane 2008). However, a distinction can be identified in the normative criteria of these approaches of legitimacy. The state approach is based on a set of normative principles that assess whether an institution or actor has the right to govern, while the legal perspective considers only the normative criteria of the right to govern by an institution according to prevailing law (Risse and Stollenwerk 2018; Hollis 2002). The argument that the UNSC is not legitimate relies on procedural notion by which it is dominated by the P5 and does not have fair decision-making procedures (Frederking and Patane 2017). It follows that legitimacy is, in this regard, consistent with a normative understanding of legitimacy based on the idea that institutions are considered to be legitimate when they meet the conditions required to have a moral right to rule (Westergren 2016). This explanation of legitimacy from a political dimension is in contrast with Max Weber’s viewpoint of legitimacy that was built on recognised law (Griffiths et al. 2002; Weber 1968). From Weber’s argument, legitimacy is derived in a system where actors responsible to it make value judgment that the laws proclaimed by the institution ought to be obeyed and the institution also depends on voluntary compliance (Hermann 1983; Weber 1968). Accordingly, value judgments regarding the validity of a system are determined by general compliance to laws.
4.1.3 The Realist Approach to Legitimacy

Legitimacy can be explored from traditional and neo-realist viewpoints. Legitimacy from the standpoint of a traditional realist is a means of power wielding by which states promote their interests (Morgenthau, 1967). The power-seeking behaviour of states can, therefore, be associated with human nature, whilst human nature is associated with the features of the international system such as war and competition (Morgenthau, 1967). The traditional realists’ perspective is devoid of either a distinct moral or normative considerations in making judgments regarding legitimacy as it arose within political spheres rather than moral spheres. The traditional realists’ view of international politics is generally doubtful when it comes to the legitimacy of international organisations.

Realists accounts of legitimacy tried to situate itself between moralism and realpolitik (Sleat 2014, p.324). Thus, legitimacy is expressed both in terms of power relations and the norms and principles that exist within a society. It follows, that legitimacy is not measured only by the ability to rule or dependent only on moral conditions that are external to the political domain. Political moralism develops the condition for legitimacy from those moral values and principles that are external to the political sphere (Sleat 2014). However, in the realm of realpolitik, neo-realists agree with the centrality of power to politics but do not acknowledge legitimacy in the context of power without normative considerations. To this end, it could be argued that legitimacy of the UNSC vis-à-vis realism should be based on current power configurations of the international system rather than the world order that existed in the 1945 (Nadin 2016, p.74). This is because the negative perception of the UNSC is often discerned on the basis of its membership composition, Council procedures and compliance to its legal mandates (Binder and Heupel 2015). The fundamental issues that influence the legitimacy perception of the UNSC by UN member states will be considered in Section 4.2 below.

Furthermore, the nature of the UNSC is consistent with the realists’ theory as its membership composition reflects coercive power whereby the decisions of the Council are binding on all UN member states (Mathiason 2008, p.827). Such powers and functions of the UNSC are legitimately exercised since they are derived from the UNSC Charter (Chapter V, Articles 24-26, UN Charter 1945). However, the realists’ account of legitimacy offers a pessimistic view of what could be rightful demands of political authorities (Erman and Moller 2018). Their positions rely on justificatory strategies such as the concept of politics and constitutive feature of politics. The explanation of legitimacy by employing the concept of politics and
the integral feature of politics failed since it relied on normative premises that are not plausible.

4.2. UNSC Legitimacy: Permanent Membership Representation and Legality of Exercise of UNSC Powers

This section engages with the overarching issues related to UNSC legitimacy in separate subsections having considered the different approaches of legitimacy to an institution and state in Section 4.1. The section will explore the discourse on UNSC with regards to legitimacy of representation in the membership composition of the permanent members. Furthermore, consideration of legitimacy in the exercise of UNSC powers will be brought to focus. The exercise of its power will be situated within the context of legality in terms of power conferred by the UN Charter. In this regard, the link between legitimacy and legality will be explored vis-à-vis UNSC reform.

4.2.1 UNSC Legitimacy and the composition of Permanent Membership

The Council being a creation of great-power politics is vested with more authority than other organs of the UN and has generated a huge call for its reform (Bosco 2009). Legitimacy has been a subject of criticism for many reasons (Scherz and Zysset 2019). The legitimacy of the UNSC has always been a contentious issue because of the veto power and the limited membership composition of the permanent seat (Antoinette and Alain, 2019). The imbalance in the composition of the UNSC permanent seat and the dominance of the Security Council’s agenda by issues of developing states has resulted in a desire for change in the status quo of the UNSC (Hassler 2012). This argument is supported in Section 4.3 by an analysis of UNSC resolutions adopted from the period 2010 to 2021.

The legitimacy of international organisations may be challenged by the perceived dominance of great power (or powers) that works to the detriment of weaker members (Coicaud and Heinskanen 2001). As previously analysed in Section 4.1.3, the realists view legitimacy from the power perspective as it explores legitimacy on the basis of realpolitik that is not based on ethical or moral consideration (Sleat 2014). It follows, that power relations are fundamental in measuring legitimacy and can be situated in the context of the veto power which is perceived to advance the interests of the P5 and their allies; thereby undermining the legitimacy perception of the UNSC (Sleat 2014). The real powers of the Council are limited to the permanent members which influences the quest by UN member states for the permanent seat (Hurd 2002). The argument by Hurd (2002) and Sleat (2014) demonstrates
that the legitimacy of the UNSC is measured on the account of the exclusive membership of the permanent seat and the powers associated with it. Commenting further, Stephen (2018, p.101) identified the failure of an organisation to adapt to changing environment as being a principal factor responsible for the legitimacy drift of an organisation. Consequently, three sources of legitimacy drift were explored by Stephen (2018, pp.101-102): (1) when the audience of the organisation perceive it of not meeting its standards (a broken promise); (2) when the organisation does not live up to its original condition of its legitimacy (a shifting standard); and (3) when the organisation is exposed to new legitimacy demand due to change in its relevant audience or constituency (an audience shift). The second source of legitimacy drift noted by Stephen (2018), the shifting standard, aptly captures the current reality of the international system and membership of the UN, which is different from the global order when the UN was founded in 1945.

Furthermore, the argument of Stephen (2018) with respect to legitimacy is consistent with the proponent of structural reform such as the Common African Position that advocated for equitable representation in the membership of the UNSC especially the permanent seat to reflect the present state of the global order. In addition, Stephen’s (2018) viewpoint differed from that advanced by the proponents of the working method who are concerned with the procedures of the UNSC (Winther 2020). The working method proposition, unlike the structural reform proposal, does not require amendment of the UN Charter based on the provision of Article 30 of the UN Charter that stipulated that “the Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedures, including the method of selecting its President” (Article 30, Chapter V, UN Charter 1945). It follows, given this, that the Security Council is the master of its own procedures (Sievers and Daws 2014).

In view of the foregoing, the restricted membership in the permanent seats can be seen to reduce the inclusiveness and wide acceptability of its decisions; undermining legitimacy of the UNSC (Hecht 2017). In contrast, the equal membership status granted to all UN member states by the General Assembly allows it to enjoy a high credibility rating by developing states, and the Assembly’s moral authority is derived from its broad membership as each member state has the right to participate in decision-making processes (Hecht 2017). By virtue of Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter, decisions of the Security Council on substantive matters are made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent member (UN Charter 1945). Therefore, by this provision of the UN Charter, it
is clear that the P5 members have overwhelming authority in all UNSC decisions through the exercise of veto. For this reason, the veto wielding states have been blamed for dominating the proceedings of the Council and determining the direction of action when it comes to the maintenance of global peace (Rothwell 2013).

4.2.2 Legitimacy and the perception of selective exercise of UNSC powers

The UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is empowered to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” (UN Charter 1945, Para 1). In order to end such situations, the Security Council may take measures that are legally binding on all UN member states (Vidmar 2014). From this provision of the Charter, the UNSC has broad powers and there seems to be no clarity in terms of when the Security Council is to act. This section explored some circumstances of the selective exercise of powers by the UNSC as such situations have implications on the legitimacy of the Council especially with regard to Africa.

A number of studies, including those by Gilligan and Stedman (2003) and Mullenbach (2005) have investigated what motivates the UN to intervene in crises situations. Gilligan and Stedman’s (2003) benchmarks for humanitarian intervention by the UNSC were conceived on the basis of death casualty and the size of the armies belonging to crisis states. The outcome of their analysis showed that the UN was more likely to intervene in conflicts where there is a high death casualty. Equally, their findings revealed that due to the size and capability of the armies of the conflict states, the UN was more likely to respond faster to conflicts in weaker states than in stronger states. Commenting further, Mullen Bach’s (2005) study revealed that the power status of a target state determined UN intervention. It follows, that UNSC intervention through authorisation of the deployment of a peacekeeping force was less feasible in instances where the target state was a major power or a close ally of one of the P5 members. This assumption was premised on the power and political influence of the permanent members of the Security Council, whilst UN action was considered to be likely if it had previously been involved in the settlement of a conflict in the same state now facing further crisis. From a different perspective, Lylon and Dolan (2007) evaluated the responses to humanitarian crises but focused only on US-led action. US strategic interests, past experiences, and domestic factors such as public opinion and media in the US were observed to have impacted on her responses to humanitarian situations. For example, the USA experience in Somalia in 1993 subsequently influenced her non-intervention in the Rwanda
and Darfur genocide of 1994 and 2003 respectively (Power 2003). The studies have also shown that the UNSC exercises its powers by reacting differently to humanitarian crises.

Such selective enforcement in the exercise of UNSC powers could undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of member states especially from Africa (Binder 2009). This claim is supported by the findings in the evaluation of 31 humanitarian crises from the period 1991 - 2004, which revealed that the Security Council acted more proactively to some crises than others such as in the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Binder 2015). The delayed authorization of a new intervention mission by the UNSC to compliments the existing limited peacekeeping operation in the Rwandan conflict resulted to huge humanitarian crises (Wouters and Ruys 2005, p.16). The selective response to some humanitarian crises by the UNSC raises concerns of double standards in the discharge of its primary responsibilities and may also attract condemnation by different parts of the world. This, in turn, can reduce the authority and effectiveness of the intervention for the host state and also undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the UNSC (Archibugi 2004). A set of factors such as the level of casualties in a conflict, and the capacity of the host state to deal with the conflict determines the extent and nature of UNSC intervention in humanitarian crises situation (Gruzdyte 2018). The extent of human sufferings; the risk of spill over effects from individual crises; and the strength of countervailing power which encompasses the ability of a target state to resist intervention have considerable roles in such circumstance (Binder 2017). Evaluating these factors showed that they could not individually prompt UNSC action but that a combination of them may influence how strongly the Council responds strongly in a given crisis situation.

4.2.3 Legitimacy and Legality within the framework of Compliance: The UNSC’s exercise of powers in relation to legality

Before establishing the linkage between legitimacy and legality within the framework of compliance, it is important to state that the legal element of the UNSC in the exercise of its functions and powers is derived from the UN Charter 1945 as the constituting instrument of the UN (Hurd 2014), with Article 24 of the Charter stipulating the functions and powers of the UNSC (Article 24, Chapter V, UN Charter 1945). Bodansky (2007) explained legitimacy to represent the basis for compliance as a state or an institution may comply with a directive because it is rationally persuaded that the decision is right. On the other hand, he observed that legitimacy performs the important function of ensuring that the exercise of authority by an institution is related to the basis of its treaty, which is state consent. By this clarification, both legitimacy and legality are connected on the basis that they embody compliance.
Legitimacy is a wider concept than legality because the exercise of authority may exist outside a legal system (Bodansky 2007). Ceteris paribus, the non-legal exercise of authority could raise issues of legitimacy. Furthermore, legitimacy is associated not only with compliance but also to the justification of authority in broad terms, while legality may provide a possible justification for the exercise of authority (Hooghe et al. 2016; Bodansky 2007).

The distinction between legality and legitimacy could be seen in contesting the use of force in the international arena such as in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (Falk 2005). It was from such position, that the submission was made that the intervention of NATO in Kosovo was illegal but legitimate (Falk 2005, p.39). However, an opposing position to these justifications for NATO’s intervention generally regarded its action as a violation of international law even if morally right (Johnstone 2003). The Independent International Commission Report concluded that the action of NATO was “illegal but legitimate” (Independent International Commission Report on Kosovo Report. 2000, p.4). The act was illegal under international law governing the use of force and it lacked the mandate of the UNSC (Simma 1999). The intervention was however, legitimate because it tackled a humanitarian emergency that diplomatic engagements had failed to resolve. The illegal but legitimate approach to NATO intervention in Kosovo reveals a gap between normative intuitions and positivist view of law under the UN Charter (Teitel 2014). The unilateral intervention by NATO and the alleged split in the UNSC was a resultant effect of contesting great power interests in the conflict (Frater 2015). The NATO campaign in Kosovo brought to the fore concerns about the scope of the UNSC powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Weifs 2008). The Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 can, resultantly, be perceived as an endorsement and justification of NATO’s unilateral action. The resolution authorised the deployment of international civilian and military presence for international transitional administration and security presence to supervise the return of refugees and withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo (UN Resolution S/RES/1244 [1999]). This resulted in the establishment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (Stahn 2004). To this end, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) initiative which calls for the voluntary refrain in the use of the veto by the P5 member is discussed in Section 4.4 as part of this thesis’s wider analysis of the legitimacy of the veto power function.
4.3 The Exclusion of African states in the UNSC: implications for legitimacy

This section analyses the interviews conducted with some senior officials from some P5 states and African states as indicated in Chapter 1.7. Based on the analysis of the interviews, this thesis will seek to draw out their perceptions of the legitimacy of the UNSC with regard to Africa’s exclusion from the permanent seat. In order to ascertain the extent to which African matters dominate UNSC deliberations as argued by some African scholars therein this section; the thesis analysed UNSC resolutions from 2010-2021 being a period that witnessed significant number of interventions by the UNSC in conflicts around the globe. The rationalisation for the categorisation of the UNSC into two distinct memberships has been in the front burner of UN debates and reflects considerations of legitimacy as derived from the membership composition of the Security Council analyzed in the previous section. The unequal membership representation has been a dominant issue in the Security Council due to the increasing differences between the present composition, which reflected the world in 1945 and the current large UN member states composition (Gupt 2006). The negotiation that led to the founding of the UN reflected the roles of the victorious allies in the World War II in constituting the membership of the Security Council (Kugel 2009).

The founders of the UN intentionally granted the membership of the UN General Assembly with universal membership and equal rights while the Security Council with restricted membership and rights (Ekwealor 2015). As such, the exclusion of African states from the UNSC permanent membership arguably undermines the legitimacy of the Council (Ekwealor 2015; Maseng and Lekaba 2014). The anachronistic composition of the UNSC raises concern for its legitimacy and influences Africa’s quest for its reformation (Spies 2008, p.96). Africa remains the largest of all regional groups; it has no permanent representation in the UNSC (Spies 2008). The UNSC permanent membership is not all-inclusive of all regions as it excludes Africa and impacts on the perception of the UN (Souare 2011). Furthermore, Africa’s suitability for UNSC permanent seat could be situated in the context of the dominance of African issues on UNSC Agenda (Maseng and Lekaba 2014). To this end, more than three-quarters of UNSC’s engagements are related to African matters (Maseng and Lekaba 2014). Therefore, the argument that African conflicts dominating UNSC engagements appears valid based on the outcome of the analysis of UNSC resolutions adopted from 2010-2021 as indicated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The analysis of the resolutions suggests that Africa has a fundamental stake in the deliberations of the Security Council.
The analysis of the feedback from interviews with some high-ranking diplomats of the P5 members and African states established two major positions on the perception of legitimacy of the UNSC with regards to Africa’s exclusion. A senior diplomat from the UN Permanent Mission of France (Interviewee L) emphasised that the membership composition of the UNSC was a creation of the UN Charter as he declared that; “I don’t think there should be any contention about the legitimacy of the Security Council since it is a creation of the UN Charter”. The interviewee from the UN Permanent Mission of Russia (Interviewee N) shared a similar view with the respondents from France as he averred that; “It was the event of World War II that determined the membership of the Security Council and the membership composition is enshrined in the UN Charter”. The submissions by the interviewees from France and Russia can be rationalised in the context of legality. Their position relies on the legal element of the UNSC, which is backed by Articles 23 and 24 of the UN Charter regarding the composition and powers and functions of the UNSC respectively (Articles 23-24, Chapter V, UN Charter 1945). It follows, that the legitimacy of the UNSC lies in its authority to exercise its powers and is derived from the UN Charter; which African states have consented to. However, the interviewee from the UN Permanent Mission of South Africa (Interviewee M) differed from these views as the Representative noted that; “the absence of African permanent membership delegitimised the Security Council as you cannot exclude a continent with a significant proportion of the total membership of the UN with more than a billion people”. The view of Interviewee M that the UNSC is delegitimised on account of Africa’s exclusion from the permanent membership of the UNSC is contestable as an act may be legal and yet illegitimate as was the case of NATO invasion of Kosovo discussed in Section 4.2.3. Also, the permanent membership of the UNSC is regarded as being in conformity to legal norms as the composition and powers of the UNSC follows the correct procedures and exercise of authority derived from the UN Charter 1945 (Fallon 2005).

In addition, a high-ranking diplomat in the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria (Interviewee J) disclosed that:

The UN talks about democratization and yet you have the Security Council permanent membership without equitable representation and geographical spread. Of-course there will be legitimacy problem when some continents are left out. For us until they sort out the historical injustices occasioned by Africa’s exclusion in the permanent seat of the Security Council despite our large membership of the UN. More so our demand for permanent representation is justifiable because when you read the official documents of the UN, you will realise that most issues considered in the Security Council are concerning Africa.
Interviewee J’s statement is similar to the views espoused by Interviewee M as they both attributed historical condition to Africa’s absence in the UNSC permanent seat. These interviewees are only concerned with structural reformation of the UNSC where changes in the membership of the Security Council are required and such changes can only occur via amendment of the UN Charter 1945 (Winther 2020). Their views are different from the working methods reform, which advances those amendments of the UN Charter are not necessary and that reforms could be agreed upon within the UNSC in accordance with Article 30 of the UN Charter that allows the Security Council to adopt its own rules of procedure for undertaking reviews (Sievers and Daws 2014).

Highlighting the extent to which African matters dominate Security Council debates, Ambassador Joy Ogwu, a former UNSC President, maintained that the security and conflict issues about Africa constituted nearly 75 per cent of the items on UNSC Agenda (Ogwu 2016). An evaluation of UNSC resolutions passed from 1 August 2010 to 31 July 2011 (see also Table 4.1) shows that a total of 67 resolutions were reached (Report of the Security Council 1 August 2010 – 31 July 2011- UN A/66/2). From the resolutions adopted, 39 mainly focused on African issues representing 58 per cent of the entire resolutions reached. In the further analysis of the resolutions adopted by the UNSC from 2010 to 2021, the outcome showed that African matters dominated the resolutions passed. Consequently, statistics presented in Table 4.2 reveal that more than 50 per cent of the resolutions were on African matters. Although the periods 1 August 2013 to 31 July 2014 and Year 2017 recorded 48 per cent and 46.7 per cent respectively relating to the region’s issues.

The legitimacy perception of the UNSC by African states reflects issues with the UNSC’s membership composition and the absence of Africa having permanent seat; as evidenced by the AU Resolution 2005 (Ext/EX.CL/2[VII]) on the Ezulwuni Consensus, which raised the issue of Africa’s exclusion from the permanent membership of the UNSC and made proposal for Africa’s representation (see Section 4.5). The framing of AU resolutions and statements by African states at the UN General Assembly have sought to encourage the UN to address the imbalances in the membership composition of the UNSC. For instance, AU Resolutions Assembly/AU/Dec.599 (XXVI) of January 2016 and Assembly/AU/Dec.648 (XXIX) of July 2017 respectively stressed concerns over the non-representation of Africa in the permanent membership of the Security as stated below:
AU Resolution January 2016- Assembly/AU/Dec.599 (XXVI)

The common African position, as contained in the Ezulwuni Consensus and the 2005 Sirte Declaration, shall continue to serve as the only viable option that reflects Africa’s legitimate right and aspiration to rectify, inter alia, the historical injustice endured by the Continent (Assembly/AU/Dec.599 [XXVI]).

AU Resolution July 2017- Assembly/AU/Dec.648 (XXIX)

The AU reaffirms the need to reform the United Nations to conform to present geopolitical realities, in particular, the need to address Africa’s non-representation in the permanent category of the UN Security Council and its underrepresentation in the non-permanent category. Reaffirms its strong commitment to the Common African Position espoused in the Ezulwuni Consensus and the Sirte Declaration as the only viable option for Africa’s full representation at the UN Security Council (Assembly/AU/Dec 648[XXIX]).

Furthermore, the statements by representatives of African states at the UN General Assembly Session at different times often reflect their concerns pertaining to the permanent membership composition of the UNSC. The representatives from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Ghana and Nigeria have respectively noted that:

South Africa

If the Security Council is to fulfil the role of custodian of peace and security envisaged for it in the Charter, it must be perceived to be legitimate by member states and the international community. This can happen only when its composition reflects the broad membership, which has almost quadrupled since 1945, thereby making it crucial that developing States be party to decision-making in the new Council (UN 1997 – A/52/PV.64.p.1).

Zimbabwe

I reiterate my country’s unflinching support for the Common African Position on Security Council reform, commonly known as the Ezulwuni Consensus. The overwhelming majority of us have accepted that we need to reform the current system in order to improve, but not destroying it. Nonetheless, the negotiations and process intended to yield the accepted reforms are painstakingly slow. We are left to wonder, justifiably so, whether those who enjoy and sometimes abuse the power and privileges of the current set-up are sincere interlocutors in those discussions (UN 2017-A/72/PV.13, p.14).

Ghana

While it has been talked about and scheduled for a long time, we have somehow never found the courage or the will to reform the United Nations. Ghana supports the process of United Nations reform, especially of the Security Council, as set out in the African Common Position on United Nations reform, based on the Ezulwuni Consensus. The time is long overdue to correct the long-standing injustice that the current structure and composition of the Security Council represents for the nations of Africa (UN 2017-A/72/PV.11, p.21).

Nigeria

No reform of the United Nation system is more urgent than the Security Council. Stakeholders around the world are asking how much power could be concentrated, with
scant representation. The intergovernmental negotiations have taken too long, some 15 years. We must avoid going in cycles. Consensus has been achieved in some of the elements of this reform, especially that of the representation of Africa on the basis of the Ezulwuni Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. It is unreasonable to expect unanimity in this matter. The issue indeed is about justice, not unanimity. Without justice, the legitimacy even efficacy of our organisation is called to question (UN 2021, 7th Session of the UN General Assembly-24 September 2021).

Such statements from African representatives at the UN General Assembly Sessions demonstrate their on-going and consistent advocacy for structural reformation of the UNSC, and it is also notable that they each presented the Ezulwuni Consensus as Africa’s agreed reform proposal. In addition, and with the exception of the representative of South Africa who put forward the issue of legitimacy directly in his statement, the other officials appeared to situate the legitimacy of the UNSC in the context of exclusion of Africa in the UNSC permanent membership seat, which they regarded as an historical injustice to the continent. Their statements indicate that the inclusion of Africa as part of the permanent membership of the Security would, in their opinion (both individually and collectively), ensure fairness and equitable representation in the Council.

The positions of the AU in respect of the continent’s exclusion from the UNSC permanent seat are often reiterated by the Representative of the Group of African states during plenary meetings of the General Assembly Sessions on the Question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the membership of the Security Council. For instance, the African representatives at the plenary meetings during the 70th and 72nd Sessions of the UN General Assembly respectively declared that:

**UN General Assembly 70th Session**

Africa will continue to constructively engage with all member states in mutual trust with a view to achieving equitable geographical representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council, with expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories, and thereby ensure a greater legitimacy of its decisions. It is only through such a reform that we can talk of a Security Council that is more representative, democratic, accountable, transparent, effective and efficient (UN 2016 – A/70/PV.113.p.2).

**UN General Assembly 72nd Session**

Africa looks forward to working with the Assembly to build on the gains made in favour of the Common African Position. We hope that those member states, especially countries friendly to Africa, will join in support of redressing the historical injustice done to the African continent and its people (UN 2018- A/72/PV.104.p.2).
Once more, the exclusion of Africa from permanent membership seat of the UNSC within the statements above is linked to historical antecedent and ultimately, the legitimacy of the Security Council. Furthermore, the responses by Interviewees from the UN Permanent Missions of South Africa and Egypt reinforces the perception of colonial experience being responsible for Africa’s non-representation in the UNSC permanent seat. Accordingly, a senior diplomat at the UN Permanent Mission of South Africa (Interviewee M) stated that; “we view Africa’s exclusion from the UN permanent seat as a great historical injustice to the African people. One of the reasons for this exclusion is because many African states were still under colonial rule at that time”. Whilst a Political Affairs diplomat at the UN Permanent Mission of Egypt (Interviewee K) disclosed that; “Historical factor was responsible for Africa’s non-representation in the Security Council and the Continent was not represented at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, which drafted the UN Charter”. Similarly, Interviewee B from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) adduced Nigeria’s absence from the permanent seat to historical factors as he declared that; “When it (UN) was founded Africa was not an international player and so the permanent seat was a function of those who won the Second World War”.

The views by respondents on the absence of African states was not only limited to historical influences; the provisions of Article 108 of the UN Charter were also considered to be impediments. To this end, a Representative from the AU Permanent Mission of the UN (Interviewee I) observed, “the provision of Article 108 of the UN Charter is an impediment to the reformation of the UN Security Council. It is partly a reason why today there is no membership of any African country or other deserving countries in the permanent seat”. In addition, Interviewee C who was a former Nigerian diplomat at the Embassy of Nigeria, Paris shared similar perspectives when he expressed the view that; “the UN operates on power politics which is favoured by Article 108 of the UN Charter that gives the P5 members power over any amendment of the UN Charter”. From these submissions, Article 108 of the UN Charter could be interpreted as being an impediment to any UNSC reform process since any expansion of the Council would require amendment of the UN Charter. Furthermore, Hosli and Dorfler (2019) contended that the USA, France and UK may be inclined towards Security Council expansion but will prevent any proposal that would take away the special status of the P5 members. As such, the positions by the interviewees conform to the arguments by Hosli and Dorfler (2019), which stressed the challenge that could impede the reformation of the UNSC. The special status of the P5 is central to Africa’s aspiration for
The membership of the UNSC is not organised to reflect the representativeness of all regions as it mainly took into consideration the interests and the roles played by the victorious allied powers in the World War II to grant them the permanent seat (Zhongyun 1998). However, the membership of the permanent seats has been criticised because of its exclusive membership granted to only few states (Ade-Ibijola 2015). The present permanent membership structure of the UNSC is arguably not sustainable as it weakens its acceptability by UN member states as witnessed by the increasing call for its reformation with the African Group having its own reform proposal (Ade-Ibijola 2015). Therefore, Ade-Ibijola’s (2015) position is coherent with the views advanced by the interviewees from African states and also not different from the Africa’s Ezulwuni Consensus that sought for permanent seat for Africa in order to address the structural imbalance of the permanent membership seat. African states and some proponents of UNSC reform argued that a more geographical representation of permanent seats would reposition the UNSC towards achieving its primary functions (Cox 2009). The African perspective on the UNSC reform could be faulted on the basis that membership composition, functions and powers of the Security Council are lawfully enshrined in the UN Charter 1945, which is a binding instrument for all UN member states. The proposals for the restructuring of the UNSC are mostly focused on making it democratic, legitimate, effective and accountable (Nahory 2004). The arguments by some proponents of UNSC reform tended to suggests the democratisation of the membership composition of the Council as a major
requirement for reforming the UNSC (Puchala et al. 2007). However, the UNSC was never intended to be democratic as was the case of the League of Nation that failed due to its egalitarian nature (Nicol 2006). The UNSC was designed to have limited membership and include only the major powers to exercise special rights and privileges (Nicol 2006).
Table 4.1: Resolutions Adopted by the UN Security Council from 1 August 2010 - 31 July 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution Number</th>
<th>Date of Adoption</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936 (2010)</td>
<td>5 August 2010</td>
<td>The situation concerning Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937 (2010)</td>
<td>30 August 2010</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East (UNIFIL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938 (2010)</td>
<td>15 September 2010</td>
<td>The situation in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939 (2010)</td>
<td>15 September 2010</td>
<td>Letter dated 22 November 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2006/920)</td>
<td>African matter</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940 (2010)</td>
<td>29 September 2010</td>
<td>The situation in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>African matter</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941 (2010)</td>
<td>29 September 2010</td>
<td>The situation in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>African matter</td>
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<tr>
<td>1942 (2010)</td>
<td>29 September 2010</td>
<td>The situation in Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>African matter</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943 (2010)</td>
<td>13 October 2010</td>
<td>The situation in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>1944 (2010)</td>
<td>14 October 2010</td>
<td>The question concerning Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945 (2010)</td>
<td>14 October 2010</td>
<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan</td>
<td>African matter</td>
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<td>1946 (2010)</td>
<td>15 October 2010</td>
<td>The situation in Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>African matter</td>
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<td>1948 (2010)</td>
<td>18 November 2010</td>
<td>The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>1951 (2010)</td>
<td>24 November 2010</td>
<td>The situation in Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>African matter</td>
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<td>1953 (2010)</td>
<td>14 December 2010</td>
<td>The situation in Cyprus</td>
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<td>The situation concerning Iraq</td>
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<td>1957 (2010)</td>
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<th>(a)</th>
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<td>20 April 2011</td>
<td>Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td>African matter</td>
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<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan</td>
<td>African matter</td>
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<td>1979 (2011)</td>
<td>27 April 2011</td>
<td>The situation concerning Western Sahara</td>
<td>African matter</td>
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<td>1982 (2011)</td>
<td>17 May 2011</td>
<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan</td>
<td>African matter</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>10 June 2011</td>
<td>Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>13 June 2011</td>
<td>The situation in Cyprus</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>17 June 2011</td>
<td>Recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>17 June 2011</td>
<td>Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>27 June 2011</td>
<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>28 June 2011</td>
<td>The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>29 June 2011</td>
<td>The situation in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>29 June 2011</td>
<td>International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>30 June 2011</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East (UNDOF)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6 July 2011</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and other such Violations Committed in the Territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>8 July 2011</td>
<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>11 July 2011</td>
<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>12 July 2011</td>
<td>Children and armed conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>13 July 2011</td>
<td>Admission of new Members (South Sudan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>27 July 2011</td>
<td>The situation in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>27 July 2011</td>
<td>The situation concerning Iraq</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>27 July 2011</td>
<td>The situation in Somalia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>27 July 2011</td>
<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: A Breakdown of UN Security Council Resolutions Adopted from 1 August 2010 – 31 December 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period/Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Resolutions Adopted</th>
<th>Number of Resolution Related to African Matters</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 August 2010 - 31 July 2011</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 August 2011 - 31 July 2012</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 August 2012 - 31 July 2013</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 August 2013 - 31 July 2014</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 August 2014 - 31 July 2015</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>51.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 August 2015 - 31 December 2016</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January - December 2017</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January - December 2018</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January - December 2019</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January - December 2020</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January - December 2021</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>


4.4. Overview of the African Common Position on UNSC Reform: The Ezulwuni Consensus

The AU reform proposal can be traced to the Harare Declaration of 1997, which formed the basis of Africa’s desire for reform of the UNSC (OAU 1997 AHG/Decl.3 [XXXIII]). The African Common Position on UNSC reform also known as the Ezulwuni Consensus is a comprehensive and all-inclusive reform proposal that covers the five cluster areas of UNSC reform regarding the questions of membership, regional representation, veto power, working methods, and the size of the UNSC (Ronzitti 2010). The proposal is a response to the recommendations by the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel Report 2004 (Spies 2008). The reform proposal was a sequel to the consideration of all aspects of the recommendations of the Panel Report on the reform of the UNSC by the AU Committee that met in Ezulwuni, Swaziland, in February 2005 (Akinterinwa 2005). The recommendations of the Committee to the AU Executive Council focused on three broad issues: collective security and the challenge of prevention; collective security and use of force; and institutional reform of the UN. An appraisal of the AU document on the Ezulwuni Consensus reflects some salient areas with respect to the UNSC reform (AU 2005 Ext/EX.CL/2(VII)). First, expanding membership of the Security Council from 15 to 26 with six new permanent seats and five new non-permanent seats. From this number, two permanent seats with all privileges of permanent
membership including the right of veto and additional two non-permanent seats were proposed for Africa. Secondly, Africa is opposed to veto but, as long as it exists and for the sake of common justice it was considered necessary that it be extended to all new permanent members in the event of the reformation of the UNSC. Africa has held strong to this position with respect to the veto as African states continue to regard the Ezulwuni Consensus as the surest way of achieving their aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat (Gordon 2014). Furthermore, the reform proposal has been promoted by engagements with other member states groupings in the UN intergovernmental negotiation as enjoined in the AU resolutions on UNSC reforms examined in Chapter Three. Thirdly, the need for the AU to take responsibility in the selection of African representatives for the UNSC and the last issue was for the AU to determine the criteria for the selection of the representatives (AU 2005 Ext/EX.CL/2[VII]). In this reform proposal by the AU, two issues appeared distinct and constitute a subject of contestation; membership of the permanent seat and the veto power. Africa’s position therefore questions the legitimacy of the UNSC on the basis of exclusion from permanent seat and restriction of the veto power to the P5 members as will be considered below.

4.4.1 Legitimacy and the Veto Power: African Perspective in focus

The AU perception of the restriction of veto privilege to selected members as being unfair influenced its position as seen in the Ezulwuni Consensus (AU 2005 Ext/EX.CL/2[VII]). The veto remains a relevant issue in the discourse on the reform of the UNSC as in what way it is exercised has direct consequences on the credibility of the Security Council thereby impacting on the legitimacy perception by member states. The misuse of the veto could impede UNSC action in responding to atrocities and humanitarian crises, which is prevalent in conflicts in Africa (Vilmer 2018). The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) initiative conceived to restrain the use of the veto as advocated by France brings to question the problems associated with respect to its application in conflict situations (UN Doc. S/PV.6870). Commenting upon this, Interviewee from the France Permanent Mission of the UN stated; “we proposed the regulation on the use of veto power because we wanted the permanent members to voluntarily or collectively agree not to use veto in instances of mass atrocities”. The proposal to limit the use of veto does not require any action by African states or other non-permanent states; it only requires the P5 members to voluntarily refrain from the use of veto in R2P circumstances (Vilmer 2018). By so doing, African states will benefit from it as the continent is often affected by conflicts with huge humanitarian consequences (Akonor
Therefore, the proposal for voluntary refrain of the use of veto could enhance the legitimacy perception of the UNSC by the non-permanent members, as the veto power controversy has always been associated with the permanent seat.

The African Common Position on UNSC reform supported the restraining of the veto as it is opposed to the veto in principle but as long as it exists for the P5 and to ensure fairness to potential UNSC permanent membership candidate states, the continent is aligned to granting this privileged power to all permanent members (Badza 2019, p.207). The granting of such privilege to all members of the UNSC will arguably be counter-productive, as it would render the decision-making process of the Council cumbersome thereby impeding quick intervention in crises situations (Caron 1993). As such, the challenges associated with an enlarged UNSC will be discussed in the next section below. The statement by the African Representative on the Question of Equitable Representation in the UNSC during the 43rd plenary meeting of the 70th Session of General indicated the continent’s view on the veto thus:

Africa’s position on the veto is clear; “abolish the veto”. As long as the veto exists, it should be extended to new permanent members. Africa’s position for at least two permanent seats with all the rights and obligations of current members including the veto is a matter of common justice, as was the right to have an equal say in decision-making on issues of international peace and security, in particular those that concerned the African continent (UN 2015- GA/11715, p. 2).

This statement suggests that veto is a fundamental issue around Africa’s conception of legitimacy. This assertion is reinforced by the feedback of interviewees from the UN Permanent Missions of Nigeria and South Africa as the veto influences how African states perceive the UNSC. Consequently, an interviewee from the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria (Interviewee J) stated that; “those who have the veto power are stalling any arrangement that will bring a resolution to the Syrian crisis. If the membership of the UNSC was democratized, we could eliminate the veto impediment by a voting pattern that could pass resolution by for instance six out of ten holders of the veto”. In addition, a Representative at the UN Permanent Mission of South Africa (Interviewee M) observed that; “I do not think it is right for only five members to have the veto. That is not democratic. I think we could reform the Security Council so that such privilege will be available to other members”. The foregoing implies that the veto may be conceived as an instrument of domination of the UNSC by a minority group (Beatty and Moore 2010). Though the Ezulwuni Consensus is inclined to retaining and conceding the veto to new members, it fell short of stating how the veto will work in its proposed reform. Consequently, a clear direction
on the use and restriction of the veto would need to be contextualized in any reform. Furthermore, what impact would the granting of veto to additional members have on the UNSC? The response by the structural reform proponents may tend to concur with the argument that such reorganisation would enhance representation in the UNSC thereby addressing legitimacy concerns. This may however not settle the criticism of the arbitrary or abusive usage of the veto as there is no guarantee that when extended to new members it would not be applied in a manner to protect their national interests. Extending the veto privilege to new members will not bring efficiency to the UNSC, as it would make the Council dysfunctional and even perpetuate the problem of abusing the veto rather than resolving it (Cillier 2018; Gasimova 2012). The AU declarations at the UN General Assembly meetings could also be regarded as a manifestation of the AU’s concern of the UNSC’s current structural and operational status especially the veto privilege. Much has changed since the UN was founded in 1945 but the Security Council remains the same and has resulted to a decline in its legitimacy, which African states often associate to the unjust structure of the UNSC (Winther 2020). For instance, the President of Sierra-Leone at the 74th Session of the General Assembly debate succinctly raised concern regarding the legitimacy of the UNSC as he declared that “The legitimacy and effectiveness of the Security Council’s decisions as well as the relevance of the United Nations, will continue to be questioned if urgent action is not taken to make the Council more broadly representative” (Anthony, 2019, p.1).

4.4.2 Legitimacy and the Enlargement of the UNSC: African Perspective in focus
This section will attempt to discern the African conception of the UNSC legitimacy in relation to the AU reform proposal on enlargement of the Security Council, especially as advocated in the Ezulwuni Consensus. The official statements by Representative of African states often associate the legitimacy of the UNSC to its exclusion from permanent membership as stated in their speeches indicated in Section 4.3. From the onset of the OAU, Africa’s interpretation of UNSC legitimacy and its reform was inclined towards addressing the historical injustices to the region by full representation. This position can be discerned from the phrasing of AU resolutions on UNSC reform. For instance, the AU 2016 Resolution Assembly/AU/Dec.599 (XXVI) quoted in Section 4.3 situated UNSC legitimacy on the basis of membership representation. It presupposes that by proposing the enlargement of permanent membership seat of the UNSC, the AU seeks to achieve geographic equity particularly from African states (Agwu 2013). The AU reform proposal is arguably
predicated mainly on achieving inclusive representation while ignoring the functional complications the changes in the permanent membership composition may portend to the efficacy of the UNSC (Cox 2009). As noted in Section 4.3, Africa’s exclusion from UNSC permanent membership underpin its legitimacy perception of the Security Council and such legitimacy drift as argued by Zaum (2013) occurs when the legitimacy of the international organisation is confronted with challenges due to aging process. Therefore, legitimacy problem will manifest when the international organisation cannot adapt to its changing environment as can be seen in the case of the UN where the prevailing situation as at the time of its establishment is different from the current global order and the scope of its membership (March and Olsen 1998).

Africa’s reform proposal for the enlargement of the UNSC can also be regarded as plausible in the context of scholarship on international organisation by Mathew (2018) and Beetham (1991) which explains that adaption to changing environments by an international organisation strengthens its legitimacy as it gains support of member states. Mathew (2018) notes how an international organisation will experience legitimacy drift when it does not meet the standard of legitimacy originally applied to it, and how it gains legitimacy when it conforms to the changing environment in sustaining its recognized legitimacy. Similarly, Beetham (1991) argued that legitimacy drift would occur in an international organisation when the organisation has diminished capacity to deliver the existing conditions of its legitimacy, but that it gains legitimacy when it is able to adjust to changing environments. The studies by Beethaw (1991), March and Olsen (1998) and Mathew (2018) seem to predicate the legitimacy of the UNSC on conforming to the current realities of the international system and also promoting structural reform of the UNSC as advocated in the proposal of the Common African Position. However, the positions of Bourantonis (2005) and Caron (1993) contests scholarship, which supports structural reformation of the UNSC, as they contend that enlargement of the UNSC could undermine the efficiency of the Council. Bourantonis’ (2005) argument indicated that enlargement of the UNSC would not serve the interest of the UNSC, as it will only give preference to an abstract principle (representation) and that it will undermine the efficiency of the UNSC. This was the case of the League of Nation where increase in the membership of the Council of the League made it more representative while its effectiveness was diminished as a political tool (Carr 1946). As the AU reform proposal seeks to achieve legitimacy of the UNSC by Africa’s representation in the UNSC permanent membership, it could lead to the problem of maintaining a balance
between representation and efficiency as an enlarged UNSC may interfere with its effective functioning (Caron 1993). The expansion could reduce the perceived dominance of the UNSC by the P5 and may also lead to further agitation for reform, as more members would seek for representation in the Council (Reismann 1993; Caron 1993).

A further appraisal of the Ezulwuni Consensus indicates that its stance on the reform is at variance with the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel Report 2004 recommendations. The AU reform proposal attempts to invent an egalitarian institution where member states of the UNSC will enjoy equal power and privileges. By so doing, the proposal seeks to enhance perceptions of the Security Council by addressing concerns regarding its membership composition. The African Common Position of the UNSC reform however failed to address the fundamental question of why the UNSC was created, and how any changes would satisfy both the interests of the P5 members and other UN member states (Agwu 2013). In the Model A reform proposal of the UN High Level Panel Report 2004, Africa would have two non-veto permanent seats and four non-permanent seats of two-year non-renewable (UN High Level Panel Report 2004). The AU reform proposal differs from this position as it favours the allocation of two permanent seats to Africa with full privilege of the veto (AU Resolution 2005 Ext/EX.CL/2[VII]).

In contrast to Model A, Model B proposed nine new non-permanent seats with a four-year tenure including two seats reserved for Africa (UN High Level Panel Report 2004). This again did not align with the African position that advocated for two additional non-permanent seats which implies five non-permanent seats for the region (AU Resolution 2005 Ext/EX.CL/2[VII]). The Ezulwuni Consensus proposed that the AU would be exclusively responsible for the selection of Africa’s representatives in the Security Council. This is different from the proposal in the High-Level Panel proposal that advocated and mandated the UN General Assembly to elect UNSC members. The AU seeks to enhance the legitimacy of the Security Council in the eyes of its member states by seeking to determine the choice of its own candidate states for UNSC permanent seat and ensuring regional consultations within the AU (Akintenrinwa 2005). Furthermore, neither of the UN High Level Panel Reform Models conceded the extension of the veto to possible new permanent members in the event of reform of the UNSC. However, the veto is one of the fundamental issues that influences Africa’s perception of the legitimacy and hence the proposal in the Ezulwuni Consensus for its extension to new permanent members. The High-Level Panel Report submitted that there
was no practical way of changing the existing veto powers exercised by the P5 members despite admitting its anachronistic character (UN High Level Panel Report 2004). The failure by the report to proffer possible solution to address the veto challenge raises concerns by stakeholders on the credibility of the models it proposed (UN High Level Panel Report 2004). Consequently, the AU proposal for UNSC reform is in contrast to the proposal in the High-Level Panel Report and suggests that Africa does not envisage any prospect in its recommendations to address the legitimacy perception of the UNSC with regards to the membership composition of the Security Council.

4.5 Conclusion
This Chapter has revealed and discussed how African states are inclined to perceiving the legitimacy of the UNSC based on the historical injustice of the non-inclusion of the continent under the permanent membership. It follows, within the context of issues discussed, that the exclusive membership of the permanent seat and the veto power to the P5 underpins the legitimacy perception of the UNSC by African states as revealed in the responses by interviewees from African states and official statements of African states at the UN General Assembly. Despite this perception, the exclusion of African states does not affect the legitimacy of the UNSC as its membership composition and primary functions are lawfully derived from the UN Charter. The Chapter provided empirical data with respect to Africa’s perception of UNSC legitimacy as it presented and analysed the responses by interviewees and official statements of Representatives at the UN General Assembly Sessions.

The Ezulwini Consensus is a structural reform proposal that is different from the working method proposal, as it will require amendment of the UN Charter. As such, the reform proposal focuses on achieving inclusive representation while arguably ignoring the functional complications the changes in the permanent membership composition may portend to the efficacy of the UNSC (Cox 2009). The granting of permanent membership seat to other states may deconstruct the power influence of the P5 but will not end the agitation for the reform because more members would, ceteris paribus, seek representation in the Council (Reismann 1993; Caron 1993). In addition, increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council would make the UNSC more cumbersome in its decision-making thereby affecting efficiency (Caron 1993). The AU Common Position on UNSC reform is regarded as a comprehensive and all-inclusive reform proposal that covers the five cluster areas of UNSC reform regarding the questions of membership, regional representation, veto power, working
methods and size of the UNSC (Ronzitti 2010). Building upon this chapter’s discerning of the fact that African perception of UNSC legitimacy is connected with the absence of African permanent membership in the Council, Chapter Five explores African representation in the Security Council and possible African contenders for a permanent seat in a reformed UNSC.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE IMPEDIMENTS OF NON-PERMANENT AFRICAN REPRESENTATION IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE REFORM PERSPECTIVES OF POSSIBLE AFRICAN CONTENDERS FOR A PERMANENT SEAT

5.0 Introduction
This Chapter appraises Africa’s representation in the Security Council as non-permanent members in order to bring out the limitations of the non-permanent seats. These limitations are with respect to limited tenure of membership and diminished formal powers in the Council by virtue of Article 27 of the UN Charter, which could affect the efficiency of UNSC non-permanent delegates. Africa’s quest for the reform of the UNSC could be associated with these limitations and underpinned by the realist assumption in which states are influenced in their diplomatic relations by motivations such as search for power and necessity for balance of power and the desire to enhance national interests (Mbara et al. 2020). In essence, Africa’s quest for UNSC reform aims to protect African interest and deconstruct the veto power monopoly of the P5 members through an African permanent representation in the UNSC. This chapter also interrogates the perspectives of African contenders for UNSC permanent seat with regards to the AU Committee of Ten and the text-based negotiations in advancing the AU reform position. The responses of interviewees from the UN Permanent Missions of South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria and official documents of the UN and AU will be mostly relied upon in the analyses of the text-based negotiation on the reform and the AU Committee of Ten due to limited scholarly publications on the themes. Furthermore, the UNSC reform positions of major African contenders for a permanent seat such as South Africa and Egypt will be discussed in this chapter. However, Nigeria’s perspective on UNSC reform will be considered in the next chapter in order to dovetail into critical examination of the prospects and challenges of her aspiration for a permanent seat.

The rationale for consideration of these states as main candidates from Africa for a permanent seat is based on their large economies and strategic importance in the continent as they could be regarded as regional hegemons (Omoruyi et al. 2020; Badza and Maeresera 2019). The economies of these countries constitute close to 50 per cent of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Africa as the GDPs of Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt represented 17 per cent, 16 per cent and 11 per cent respectively of the entire GDP of Africa in 2019 (Jimenez 2019). Politically, South Africa and Nigeria are regional powers as result of
their significant leadership influence in Africa and their sub-regions, large economies and vast potential of human resources (Vasudeo 2019). Also, Egypt as the most populous state in the Arab world and strategically positioned in North Africa and middle of the Arab states has strong regional influence in Africa and the Arab League (Bahi 2016). The influence and peculiar geographical location of Egypt was emphasised in the preamble of her 2014 Constitution, which recognised the country as being “blessed with a unique location and history, the Arab Nation of Egypt is the heart of the whole world” (Egypt’s Constitution of 2014, p.10).

5.1 African Representation in the non-permanent seat: The basis of Africa’s Quest for a Permanent Seat

The membership of the Security Council originally comprised 11 members; five permanent and six non-members (UN Charter 1945; Sinha 2018). Subsequently the non-permanent membership seats increased to 10 after the General Assembly in 1963 adopted Resolution 1991 (A/RES/1991[XVIII]). It should be noted that African States as mentioned in Chapter 3.2 played a significant role in pushing for this increase. The foregoing event established precedence for amending the UN Charter and thus implies that future reviews of the Charter are possible if there is the political will by all stakeholders in the UNSC and the General Assembly to adapt to current global realities (Dodge 2019). The necessary political will could occur by the reaching of political accord with the major stakeholders, which places the vision and objectives of the UN above the legitimate interests of member states and the different reform perspectives of interest groups. However, the institutional provisions of the UN under Article 108 of the UN Charter with respect to amendment of the Charter and the exponential growth in the membership of the UN are major obstacles to the reform of the UNSC (Hosli and Dofler 2019). The significant rise of UN member states presents a challenge of divergent preferences by various reform groups thereby reducing the chances of reaching consensus. Also linked to this, is the higher voting threshold of the two-third-majority requirement of the UN General Assembly for an amendment (Hosli and Dofler 2019). This could be an impediment to any reform effort because of the large number required (129 member UN states) to satisfy this condition.

The membership designation of the Security Council on a permanent or non-permanent basis and their composition is defined under Article 23 (1-3) of the UN Charter (UN Charter 1945). The non-permanent members experience obvious limitations in the Security Council because of their limited tenure of a two-years term and diminished formal powers in the Council.
The diminished formal powers of the non-permanent seats are apparent by their temporal status in the Security Council. States that occupy the non-permanent seats are elected for two-year terms based on their contributions to peace and security (Soderberg 2015). The election of a state into the UNSC is dependent on winning at least two-third of the votes in the UN General Assembly (UN Charter, 1945). The UN Charter from onset did not define the allotment of the rotational seats on a geographical basis but after the adoption of UN Resolution 1991A (XVIII), allocation was determined according to regions (McDonald and Patrick 2010). The 18th Session of the UN General Assembly adopted this resolution in which the election to the non-permanent seats was to be guided by the following pattern: (1) five seats for African and Asian States; (2) one seat for Eastern European States; (3) two seats for Latin American States; and (4) two seats for Western European and other States (UN 1963 Resolution 1991A [XVIII]). Therefore, the non-permanent seats are distributed on a regional basis with five non-permanent seats allocated to Africa and Asia implying that either of the regions would have a minimum of two seats and maximum of three seats at any time (Souare 2011). OAU Resolution 464(XXVI) of 1976 divided Africa into five regions: Northern, Western, Central, Eastern, and Southern (OAU 1976 CM/Res.464 [XXVI]). However, for the purpose of selecting three candidates for election into the UNSC non-permanent seats, Africa operates a model based on a rotational system within three broad regional groups (Dreher et al. 2014). The regional groups are a combination of the Eastern Africa and the Southern Africa bloc, the Northern Africa and Central Africa group and the Western African bloc each having one seat being rotated every two years within the member states of the group (Security Council Report 2011).

In principle the above model may seem suitable to achieve fair representation by ensuring that all African states eventually serve in the Council. However, a challenge that arises from this approach is that it could favour the candidacy of a state depending on the group and the disposition of the members who contest an election. Thus, the chances of being elected for a seat is higher in a group where few member states choose to frequently contest elections. Another problem with the rotational system is the possibility of challengers for a seat in a group emerging to upset the rotational arrangement as was the case in the West African group when Ghana took the turn of Liberia in 1985 to clinch a tenure in the UNSC from 1986-1987 as shown in Table 5.1 (Security Council Report 2009). Similarly, Nigeria took the turns of the Niger Republic and Guinea-Bissau in 1977 and 1993 respectively (Security Council Report 2009).
The Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which are regional groups that facilitate regional economic integration between member states of individual regions could play a role in determining African candidates for any possible permanent membership of the UNSC. The RECs are closely integrated with the work of the AU and serve as its building block (Article 3, Constitutive Act of the AU 2000). They perform the role of coordinating the interest of AU member states in the areas of peace and security, development, and governance amongst others (Constitutive Act of the AU 2000). For instance, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), an REC supported South Africa’s election into the UNSC non-permanent seat for a second term for the period 2011-2012 (Maseng and Lekaba 2014). In addition, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) in solidarity to the candidature of Senegal, endorsed her for UNSC non-permanent membership for the elections of October 2015 to fill non-permanent seats (46th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS of 15 December 2014 Final Communiqué). Furthermore, the ECOWAS Heads of States and Government at the 49th Ordinary Session of their Summit unanimously agreed to vote for Cote d’ Ivoire as a non-permanent UNSC member for the period 2018-2019 (49th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS of 4 June 2016 Final Communiqué). RECs in Africa such as the SADC and ECOWAS are arguably formidable blocs that could lobby and rally support for its members for candidacy of permanent UNSC. It should be noted that the RECs could also promote the interests of their members by strong advocacy of Africa’s quest for UNSC reform in their diplomatic engagements and pass resolutions to encourage the embassies of their member states to reach out to host nations and other non-member state missions to support the candidacy of an African state for any possible UNSC permanent seat.

Since the founding of the UN, 44 African states have been elected into the Security Council at various times (see Table 5.1). As evidenced, only 10 African states out of 54 UN member states in the region have not been represented in the Security Council. Nigeria and Egypt have been elected as non-permanent members of the UNSC more than any other African states having served five times each. As a result, they are arguably, the most experienced African states for permanent seat consideration. However, South Africa and nine other African states had occupied the non-permanent seat for three terms at various periods. A further evaluation of Africa’s representation indicated that 15 states (34 per cent) have served only one term. Despite the limited term of the non-permanent members and the reduced institutional memory of the Council, they also have to contend with their diminished formal powers by virtue of Article 27(3) of the UN Charter that did not extend to them the
concurring votes exclusively reserved for the P5 (the veto power). The momentum in promoting an agenda item by non-permanent members is reduced because of inherent lack of continuity of a policy due to their limited tenure of the non-permanent seat of the UNSC (Boulden and Charron 2018). The non-permanent members are in a disadvantaged position as a consequence of their temporary presence in the Security Council while the permanent members are fully incorporated in the Council and retain permanent delegates that have the advantage of shaping policy over the non-permanent members (Lai and Lefler 2009).

Ambassador Joy Ogwu, a former Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the UN and a three-time President of the UNSC, stressed this inadequacy confronted by non-permanent members of the UNSC regarding lack of experience and preparedness for the diplomatic activities in the Council. Accordingly, the Ambassador (Interviewee F) observed the challenges of inexperience and poor grounding in UNSC activities usually associated with non-permanent members when she stated that; “you first come trying to find your feet. They (P5) have been there and they have been schooled. We the developing countries just jump on the boat with no experience.” This means that the experiences of the P5 put them in a better position to have a good institutional memory of the Council than the non-permanent members. The non-permanent members have less cumulative understanding of the proceedings of the UNSC, which impacts their competence in the Council and undermines the quality of their representation (Rodiles 2013).

Africa’s membership in the UNSC under a united bloc of three African states known as the A3 aims to present a united position by African non-permanent members in their diplomatic approaches to the Security Council agenda and debates (Shiferaw 2021). In doing so, the A3 seeks to promote Africa’s interest in the decision-making of the Security Council in confronting contemporary challenges of international peace and security (Shiferaw 2021). The diplomatic capacity of African representation under the A3 was strengthened by the increasing partnership of the AU with the UN and, as a result, the A3 have been able to shape the Council’s debate and collective action (Carvalho and Forti 2020). This influence of the A3 in the UNSC could be attributed to the support that it has received from the large membership of African states in the UN about 28 per cent of the total membership of the UN and the approximately 70 per cent dominance of African issues in the UNSC resolutions regarding Chapter VII mandate on peace (Carvalho and Forti 2020).
Furthermore, the desire to participate in constructive engagement in the activities of the UN especially in conflict resolution and peacekeeping matters has been linked to the election of Nigeria into the UNSC on many occasions (Ogwu 2016). Egypt representation in the non-permanent seat could also be predicated on her quest to strengthen world peace through diplomatic interactions. President Abdul Fattah El-Sisi declared this position at the 70th UN General Assembly Session debate when he stressed that; “as a candidate for non-permanent seat on the Security Council for the coming two years, Egypt aspires to enhance its participation and consolidate international peace and stability” (UN 2015-A/70/PV.14, p.12). Egypt prioritized engagement with the UNSC and its commitment to maintain global peace is demonstrated in its active participation in UN Peacekeeping operations (see Section 5.4.2).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period Elected</th>
<th>Tenure Influence/Trend</th>
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<td>Botswana</td>
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<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>1996 – 1997</td>
<td>The probability of Liberia serving additional tenure in the UNSC from 1986-1987 was lost due to Ghana’s contest for the election in 1985.</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
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The AU Committee of Ten of Heads of State and Government on the UNSC Reform and the Major African Contenders

The AU Committee of Ten (C-10) of Heads of States and Government on Reform of the UNSC was founded with the mandate to promote and coordinate Africa’s quest for a UNSC permanent seat. The Fourth Extraordinary Session of the AU held 4 August 2005 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia established the C-10 following the adoption of the Ezulwuni Consensus as African Common Position on UNSC reform (AU 2005-Assembly/AU/Dec.1 [IV]). The C-10 as the focal group for the advocacy of the African Common Position on UNSC reform is comprised of the following countries: Uganda, Senegal, Kenya, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Libya, Algeria, Republic of Congo, Namibia, and Equatorial Guinea (Alene 2015). Coincidentally, the membership of the C-10 did not include any of the major potential African candidate
states for UNSC permanent seat and was allocated on the basis of two countries in each of the regions in Africa; North, South, West, East, and Central (Alene 2015). This was to ensure equitable representation and participation of all the sub-regions in the decision making of the C-10. The Committee works in collaboration with the highest political levels of AU member states including contenders for the permanent seat and holds regular high-level meetings outside the margins of the Summit of the AU (AU 2005-Assembly/AU/Dec.1 [IV]). As such, the AU C-10 Report to the 32nd Ordinary Session of the AU on the activities in the intergovernmental negotiation for the reform indicated its consultations with the P5 and other interest groups for support of the African Common Position (AU 2019-Assembly/AU/13[XXXII]). However, during the Committee’s consultation with the P5, a fundamental proposal of the AU to extend the veto power to new permanent members and the holding off of nomination of its preferred African candidate states were criticized by the representatives of the permanent members (AU 2019-Assembly/AU/13[XXXII], p.11). As such, Nadin (2016, p.62) maintained that many states including the P5 would not support a position on new permanent seat that is entrenched with such ambiguity. The consultation by the AU C-10 also brought to focus the dual membership of some African states in other interest groups (which could undermine the Ezulwuni Consensus) and the call for text-based negotiations to expedite the reform process as discussed in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.3 respectively.

5.2.1 Intergovernmental Negotiations for UNSC Reform and African Participation
The UN reform debate, which had hitherto taken place under the Open-Ended Working Group, entered a new phase with the adoption of the Intergovernmental Negotiation (IGN) by the UN General Assembly Decision 62/557 of 2008. It laid out five key issues to form the basis for debate on the reform of the UNSC (Corell 2014). These fundamental issues were: the types of membership, the veto, regional representation, the size of enlarged council with the working methods and the relationship between the General Assembly and the UNSC. The conversations in the IGN revolved around various negotiating platforms such as the L-69 Group, the Group of four (G4), the United for Consensus (UfC) Group, the African Group (the African Common Position Group) and others (Popovski 2015). The L-69 Group which derived its name from the UN General Assembly draft Resolution A/61/L.69 of 2007 is a bloc of 42 developing countries from Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific that advocate for the reformation of the UNSC (Nadin 2016). The L-69 is a major bloc that is united in seeking for a comprehensive UNSC reform through its support for
expansion of both membership types of the Security Council six additional seats being given over to each category and granting of veto to new permanent members (Fassbender 2020; Nadin 2016). The L-69 group and the African group seemed to have a common feature in their proposals as both sought for the extension of the veto to new permanent members and also granting of two permanent seats for Africa and additional two non-permanent seats for the region (Fassbender 2020). The 54 member states of Africa in the UN are represented in the African Group with Nigeria, South Africa, Burundi and some African states having affiliation with the L-69 Group as discussed in Section 5.2.2 (Nadin 2016).

5.2.2 The AU Committee of Ten and UNSC Reform

The AU Assembly Decision 617 was adopted to appeal to African states to withdraw from the L-69 Group and belong to only the African Group (AU 2016-Assembly/AU/Dec.617 [XXVII]). However, the continuous membership and separate diplomatic relations that some African states possess with other groups such as the L-69 in the IGN is in contrast with the AU decision and the mandate of the C-10, which sought a united front, cooperation, and a convergence of views by African states to promote the African Common Position on UNSC reform (Nadin 2016). The AU C-10 Malabo Summit 2017 underscored the need for the AU to continue to mandate only the AU C-10 to intensify constructive engagement with UN member states and UNSC reform interest groups in order to narrow down areas of divergence (Consultative Summit AU Committee of Ten 17 May 2017 Press Release). This was necessary because of the divisions between interest groups such as the UfC, L69 and the African group over a general approach to UNSC reform with regards to positions on the veto and membership of the UNSC (AU 2017-Assembly/AU/Dec. 648 [XXIX]). The aftermath of the Malabo Summit formed the basis of the 19th Report of the AU C-10, which was presented by the Committee to the AU 29th Ordinary Session. One of the key recommendations of the AU C-10 to the AU Summit was the rejection of any intermediary approaches on negotiating UNSC reform by any individual AU member state as this could undermine the Common African Position (AU 2017-Assembly/AU/Dec. 648 [XXIX], Paragraph 6[v]). A more recent report of the C-10 to the AU 32nd Ordinary Session indicated that the Committee has maintained this position as it engaged with the P5 and other interest groups with respect to support for the Africa’s Common Position on UNSC reform rather than leaving such roles in the hands of individual African states (AU 2019-Assembly/AU/13[XXXII]).
The AU 29th Ordinary Session resolution AU/Dec.648 (XXIV) clearly defined the responsibilities of African states in diplomatic interaction with regards to UNSC reform. It noted that; “all AU member states should remain firmly committed to preserving Africa’s unity and solidarity on all aspects of the reform process and outside the intergovernmental negotiations” (AU 2017-Assembly/AU/Dec. 648 [XXIX], Paragraph 6 [IV], p.1). The resolution strengthened the mandate of the AU C-10 in its engagements with all interest groups including the P5 while also urging AU member states to include the issue of UNSC reform in their foreign policy priorities (AU 2017-Assembly/AU/Dec. 648 [XXIX], Paragraphs 7[I] and 7[III]). Furthermore, African states were also requested to call for comprehensive reform of the UNSC in their national statements at the opening of the UN General Assembly Sessions (AU 2017-Assembly/AU/Dec. 648 [XXIX], Paragraph 7[IV]).

The resolution however did not end the opposing views between the AU C-10 and African states and especially the major contenders for a UNSC seat in respect to interactions with other IGN groups. Furthermore, interviewees J and L maintained that the solidarity of Nigeria and South Africa with other reform groups was to ensure interaction with other entities with common ideologies in terms reformation of the UNSC and gain their support for the African position. To this end, a high-ranking diplomat in the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria (Interviewee J) stated that:

The C-10 is a committee that has permanent membership because its membership has remained unchanged since it was set up. The Committee of Ten influenced the AU decisions few years back that African states should not belong other Groups. You cannot negotiate for Africa’s position when you don’t belong to other groups that believe in your position. It is from these groups that you can advance your position.

Furthermore, the statement by a senior diplomat at the UN Permanent Mission of South Africa (Interviewee L) on the strategy to ensure unity of purpose among African states on the UNSC reform could be connected to the foregoing statement. The interviewee observed that; “there should be extensive deliberations of the reports of the AU C-10 by all African Heads of Governments rather than just endorsing the reports as it is the practice today”. The views of the interviewees could be connected to the dynamics of conflict of interest, as their home states are major contenders for UNSC permanent seat. However, the entire membership states of the AU C-10 are not contenders for the UNSC permanent seat. Therefore, any decision of the AU C-10 in respect of Africa’s quest for a permanent seat of the UNSC may impact on their interests. The argument by these interviewees tried to justify the membership of African states in L-69 Group as opposed to AU Resolution AU/Dec.648 (XXIV) which sought their withdrawal from membership of other groups other than the African Group. The stance by
the major African contenders to maintain membership with other IGN Groups shows their preference to advance their nationalist interests as opposed to the AU position and points to disunity within their ranks. The AU C-10 could consider adopting a strategy of constructive engagement with AU member states and other IGN Groups with a view to taking advantage of existing commonalities and finding ways of narrowing down areas of divergence. The posture by the major African contenders for UNSC permanent seat to sustain their membership of the IGN Groups in contravention to the AU resolution AU/Dec.648 (XXIV) is consistent with the realist assumption that accentuate the desire by states to pursue their national interests in the international system. In addition, the conflicting stance of the major contending states against the AU position regarding the interaction with the IGN Groups reinforces the realists argument of power struggle being a constant feature of the international system (Brown and Ainley 2009). The contrasting position of the major contenders for the UNSC permanent membership undermines the objective of the Pan-African philosophy discussed in Chapter 3.1, which promotes the unity and solidarity of the African states (Taye 2019). Also, diplomatic engagement by the reform interest groups with the AU C-10 and Africa states tended to increase prior to AU Summit (Gowan and Gordon 2014). These consultations could influence the UNSC reform debates at the Summit and also promote the positions of such interest groups. The views by a Political Affairs diplomat in the UN Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt (Interviewee K) seemed to agree with this position when the interviewee stated that:

The developing states outside Africa like the Caribbean countries, the CARICOM are in support of African position on the reform. Indian and Japan had lately announced their support for Ezulwuni Consensus. Although some developing countries support AU’s position on the reform, there are many other non-African nations and reform groups that meet African Representatives to persuade them to back their own ideas about the reform.

The foregoing declaration was also corroborated by a senior diplomat in the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria (Interviewee J) when he observed that; “envoys from reform groups and China continue to discuss with us here in New York and sometimes on the side-lines of AU Summit to support their reform positions”. The diplomatic strategy adopted by these reform groups and China could shape and influence the positions of African states with divergent views on the reform, which could contradict the position of the AU for engagement in the IGN especially with respect to the text-based negotiation. By so doing, the diplomatic actions by the IGN Groups with individual African states are detrimental to the solidarity of African states thereby impacting on the Pan-Africanism philosophy, which underlines the Common African Position on the UNSC. For instance, such diplomatic interactions by the IGN Groups
with individual African states have impacted on the position of some African states such as Zambia on the text-based negotiation as will be examined in the next section. The influence by the IGN Groups which sways the decisions by African states against the position of the AU is a manifestation of the division amongst African states as expressed by their preference to advance their individual national interests as argued by the realists in order to achieve their aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat (Okhomina 2009).

5.3 Text-based negotiations on UNSC Reform

As noted in Chapter 4.4, the IGN process is driven by Decision 62/557 of the UN General Assembly adopted in 2008 for negotiating UNSC reform and was defined along five central issues with respect to: membership, the veto, regional representation, size of the UNSC, and the working method. The 69th Session of the UN General Assembly on 14 September 2015 through Decision 69/560 unanimously adopted a document or framework text with 122 member states stating their positions on the five areas of the reform to begin text-based negotiation in the IGN for subsequent UN General Assembly Session (UN, 2015-UNGA Dec. 69/560). The adoption of a suitable mechanism for dialogue in the IGN process is challenging as UN member states have different perceptions on text-based negotiation (Hosli and Dorfler 2015). The position of states such as China and Russia on the UNSC reform is averse to negotiation by text, as its adoption for the IGN was considered to be untimely. For instance, the Chinese Representative during the 104th plenary meeting of the 72nd UN General Assembly, 29 June 2018 asserted that:

For years, member states have been engaged in negotiations and laid out positions, proposals and recommendations that serve as an important basis for the parties to patiently conduct discussions and build consensus. Any attempt to artificially expedite the process or set timelines in that regard will lead to serious disagreement among member states, which will only serve to aggravate divisions and to undermine efforts and results accumulated over the years, and will contribute nothing to the healthy development of the reform process (UN 2018- A/72/PV.104, p.8).

Critiques of this approach seem to regard it as a hasty negotiation process that could widen disagreements between UN member states on the discourse and thereby undermine the UNSC reform processes. Moreover, a further challenge with text-based negotiation is that it could induce parties to focus on their own written positions without looking at the deeper reasoning behind other positions (Monheim 2015). This makes it difficult to proffer solutions to accommodate the differences between various interests.
The perspective of the African Group on the reform of the UNSC is coherent with text-based negotiations. The Representative of African Group at the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly succinctly declared that; “the African Group remains steadfastly committed to a comprehensive and meaningful text-based reform of the Security Council” (UN 2016-A/70/PV.113, p.2). The African Group is committed to the adoption of the text-based negotiation as it is considered to be relevant to fast tracking the reform process and ending the stalemate in the negotiation processes of UNSC reform. The African Group argued that the open-ended process in the negotiation process of IGN has failed in defining an agreeable roadmap by which to resolve the overarching issues of the UNSC reform such as enlargement and the veto power privilege of the P5 (UN 2016-A/70/PV.113). The position of Zambia and Zimbabwe however negates the stance of the AU on text-based negotiation as evidenced by the official statement of the Representative of Zambia at the 74th UN General Assembly when he declared; “my delegation does not presently support calls for text-based negotiations until broad consensus is reached among member states” (UN 2019-A/74/PV.35, p.2). Similarly, the Zimbabwe Representative in the same Session of the General Assembly declared that; “Zimbabwe therefore believes that it is premature to proceed to text-based negotiation” (UN 2019-A/74/PV.35, p.4). The argument by the representatives of Zambia and Zimbabwe for maintaining the same position was based on the need to focus on reducing the divergent views on the reform position before adopting text-based negotiations (UN 2019-A/74/PV.35). Analysis of the views by senior officials of the Nigerian and South African UN Permanent Missions shows that they held the same position of supporting the text-based negotiations. Similarly, the statements by the representatives of Nigeria and South Africa at the 72nd and 73rd Sessions of the UN General Assembly respectively were inclined to the adoption of text-based negotiations as will be examined in Section 5.3.2. While Nigeria and South Africa maintained the same position on text-based negotiations, the position held by the senior official at the UN Permanent Mission of Egypt was different as discussed in Section 5.3.1 below.

5.3.1 The Arab Republic of Egypt and Text-based Negotiations for UNSC Reform

From the accounts of a Political Affairs Diplomats at the UN Permanent Mission of Egypt, the position of Egypt on the IGN process opposed the text-based negotiations. This position was disclosed by the interview with an Egyptian senior official (Interviewee K) who stated:

Africa is united over the Ezulwini Consensus on the reform of the Security. We differ in the negotiation process through the text-based negotiation. My country (Egypt) is not in
support of the text-based negotiation for now because if we start the negotiation, it will fail when put to vote. The Ezulwini Consensus has to be acknowledged first before the commencement of the text-based negotiation.

The Interviewee observed that the General Assembly has to recognize the fundamental basis for the adoption of a Common African Position before it can support the text-based negotiation for the IGN process. Such a condition may be difficult to attain considering the divergence of positions that exist with respect to UNSC reform. However, the consultation by the AU C-10 with P5 states and UNSC interest groups (see Section 5.2) showed a gradual acceptance of the African Common Position on UNSC reform except with regard to the issue of the extension of the veto power to new permanent members (AU 2019-Assembly/AU/13[XXXII]). The opposition of granting the veto to new permanent members is not different from the High-Level Panel recommendation, which endorsed the retention of the veto power to only the P5 (UN 2004- A/59/565).

5.3.2 The Positions of Nigeria and South Africa on Text-based Negotiations

This sub-section focuses specifically on the perspectives of Nigeria and South Africa on the text-based negotiation as they both share similar position that supports the adoption of text as an instrument for the IGN. A holistic evaluation of South Africa’s perspective on UNSC reform will be undertaken in the next section while Nigeria’s perspective of the discourse will be analysed in Chapter 6. South Africa and Nigeria consider the adoption of text as the initial step to commence the UNSC reform. Both countries are aligned to this approach to accelerate the UNSC reform process. Accordingly, a diplomat at the South African UN Permanent Mission (Interviewee L) indicated the country’s passion for the adoption of a text-based negotiation as the interviewee noted that; “we are concerned by the prolong [sic] dialogue on the reform and we think that the text-based negotiation will deliver early reform”. In addition, and on the floor of the UN General Assembly 73rd Session, the South Africa Representative reiterated their commitment to this approach for IGN process when he stated that; “we join other member states in calling for the start of text-based negotiations and establishment of road map with clear and implementable time frames” (UN 2018-A/73/PV.36, p.20). Furthermore, a senior official at the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria (Interviewee J) stated that:

Nigeria and L-69 Group believe that the negotiation process for the reform should begin with text-based negotiation. This is because when you engage in discussions without a text you will have nothing in a document to revisit tomorrow for continuation of
negotiation. With the text-based negotiation, there will be attribution to know who is saying what and also it will help in the traction of negotiation processes.

This perspective on text-based negotiation is further reinforced by Nigeria’s position as indicated by the statement of Nigeria’s delegation at the 42nd Plenary Meeting of the 72nd of the UN General Assembly Session on Question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the Permanent Membership of the Security Council and other Matters Related to the Security Council (UN 2017-A/72/PV.42). The Nigerian Representative declared that; “what is required of us at this juncture is to move the process of intergovernmental negotiation forward through text-based negotiations” (UN 2017-A/72/PV.42. p.26). The IGN has not been able to agree on a text to be negotiated due to divisions between and within reform groups; each group represents a different set of positions (Hosli and Dorfler 2015).

Negotiations are undertaken by the presentation of positions and proposals for debate, which will require consensus by UN member states for its adoption and such compromises are usually difficult to reach because of diverse proposals and recommendations (Hosli and Dorfler 2015). The divergent view is indicative of the fact that the process will require more consultations in order to resolve outstanding issues on text-based negotiations.

Negotiation is crucial to achieving success in any dispute in a diplomatic sphere (Toca and Pocola 2014). The AU could consider addressing the issue of opposition to the text-based negotiation by some African states and also opposition to the decisions or resolutions of the AU by identifying the areas of convergence and disparities regarding its positions. This would provide opportunity for extensive engagements to be undertaken with a view to bridging such differences and arriving at a generally acceptable position. Alternatively, the UN General Assembly could consolidate on the feat attained through the adoption of Decision 69/560 by proceeding to the next stage of negotiation. A strategy of resilient diplomacy and compromises would need to be sustained within General Assembly debates to arrive at a point of a convergence for implementation of the text-based approach. It is also the case that the African Group could explore a similar diplomatic strategy to engage non-African states and IGN Groups in building support for the Common African Position on the UNSC. The first step in a multilateral negotiation, the Agenda-Setting Phase, has already been defined in this instance; it seeks text-based negotiation in the IGN. The UN General Assembly could consider moving the dialogue to the Problem-Definition and Negotiation of Agreement phases so that a negotiation outcome acceptable to all member states might be arrive at (Ulbert et al. 2004). In this regard, the President of the General Assembly and the
Chair of the IGN would have crucial roles in rallying the Permanent Representatives of UN member states and IGN Groups for continuous engagement with all positions. Furthermore, the AU would need to intensify its diplomatic outreach to persuade African states with contending views to support the African position on UNSC reform.

5.4 Potential African Candidate States for Permanent seat at the UNSC: South Africa and Egypt

This section will explore the potentials of South Africa and Egypt as African candidate states for permanent membership of the UNSC. The potential of Nigeria would be explored more extensively in Chapter Six, as only its contribution to peacekeeping operation will be examined in this Chapter. The UN Charter 1945 provided the requirement for membership of the UNSC. Consequently, Article 23(1) states that the election into UNSC non-permanent seat by the General Assembly will consider “due regard being specifically paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of world peace and security and to the other purposes of the organisation and also to equitable geographic distribution” (Article 23, UN Charter 1945).

Furthermore, the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel 2004 recommendations conforms with the requirements for representation in the UNSC under Article 23 (1) of the UN Charter 1945. Such requirements under Article 23(1) of the Charter are with respect to equitable geographic representation, contribution to maintenance of global peace and security and to other purposes of the organisations such as satisfying the criteria of financial, military and diplomatic contributions to the UN (Odello 2005; UN 2004- A/59/565). This is specifically to contributions to the UN accessed budgets, participation in authorized UN peacekeeping operations, support to voluntary activities of the UN in the areas of security and development and active involvement in the diplomatic activities in support of the objectives and mandates of the UN (UN 2004- A/59/565; Odello 2005). The term peacekeeping which appears to be a major instrument by which potential African states for UNSC permanent seat contribute to global peace and security did not appear in any part of the UN Charter. However, its emergence as an instrument of conflict resolution could be traced to some provisions of the Charter such as Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII. To this end, Chapter V, Article 29 of the UN Charter stated; “UNSC may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions” (UN Charter 1945). The purposes and principles of the UN
under Chapter I of the UN Charter laid the basis for participation of UN member states in peacekeeping operations. Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter states thus:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to breach of the peace (Article 1[1], UN Charter 1945).

This provision of the Charter creates the enabling environment for the maintenance of international peace and security. Additionally, Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter which deal with pacific settlement of dispute, action with regards to peace and acts of aggression and maintenance of global peace provided a framework for the establishment of UN peacekeeping missions.

Thekiso and Wyk (2019) and Lord-Mallam (2016; 2012) identified some analytical tools to determine suitability for UNSC permanent membership. Thekiso and Wyk (2019) and Lord-Mallam (2012; 2016) in their argument identified eligibility for a UNSC permanent seat on the basis of contribution to UN activities such as peacekeeping operations and financial contribution to UN regular budget. The choice of these criteria as possible determinants for the selection of permanent members is consistent with the recommendations therein the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel 2004 and also the requirements stipulated under Article 23 (1) of the UN Charter for the election of membership into the UNSC. Furthermore, the study by Thekiso and Wyk (2019) considered the suitability of African states for UNSC permanent seat on the basis of possession of the Pan-African credentials in promoting African stability and development thereby upholding the primary objective of the UNSC. Lord-Mallam (2016; 2012) on the other hand further examined consideration for UNSC permanent seat on the basis of analytical tools such as economic strength and being a regional power as possible requirements for permanent membership of the UNSC. Therefore, the evaluation of the potentials of African candidate states for UNSC permanent membership in this thesis will consider a combination of the requirements of UNSC membership under Article 23 (1) of the UN Charter, High Level Panel 2004 recommendations and the determinants tools for UNSC permanent seat as advanced by the above scholars.
5.4.1 The UNSC Reform Perspective and Foreign Policy of South Africa

This section will evaluate South Africa’s perspective on UNSC reform by critically engaging her foreign policy in respect of the discourse. South Africa’s critical position on UNSC reform can be traced to the time immediately after the post-apartheid era in 1994 and resonates within its diplomatic view that most conflicts that threaten international security stability occur within and between African states (Venter 2003). As such, its foreign policy strategy on UNSC reform has mainly focused on the advocacy of a UNSC permanent membership seat for Africa. Lord-Mallam (2016; 2012) argued that conditions such as contributions to peacekeeping operations, regional leadership and economic strength could be considered as criteria to determine permanent membership of the UNSC in the event of reformation of the Security Council. With the exception of condition of contributing to peacekeeping operations, the other requirements for membership of the UNSC identified by Lord-Mallam (2016; 2012) are different from those stipulated under Article 23(1) of the UN Charter for electing UN non-permanent members by the General Assembly. The scholar’s exploration of these conditions as possible determinants for consideration for UNSC permanent seat relied on the key role they could play in strengthening global peace (Lord-Mallam 2012). For instance, Nigeria deployed its regional leadership and economic strength to foster global peace and advance the economic and social development of African states as discussed in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. Also, it is worthy of note that UNSC in undertaking its primary responsibility of maintaining global peace and security adopt various measures including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation (Chapter VI, UN Charter 1945). The legal basis for such courses of action by the UNSC is covered under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter which deals with pacific settlement of dispute, action with regards to peace and acts of aggression and involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of global peace respectively (UN Charter 1945).

Historically the UN played a distinctive role in South Africa’s journey to democracy and the ending of the apartheid regime. South Africa’s experience of apartheid isolated the country from global and regional diplomacy and delayed her quest for a UNSC permanent seat. The international community prior to 1994 through the UN General Assembly and the UNSC adopted many resolutions such UN General Assembly Resolution 1761 (1962), UNSC Resolutions 182(1963) and 311 (1972) which condemned apartheid government in South Africa (Masters et al. 2015; Cornelissen 2006). In the post-apartheid era, South Africa
regained its diplomatic status and assumed its present position of being a major regional power bloc in Africa (Spies 2008).

The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa impacted on the foreign policy of the country. The post-apartheid era witnessed a shift from an isolationist approach to a multilateral approach, which prioritized the realization of her national objectives through the expansion of her global and regional influence (Landsberg 2015; Jordaan 2012). The UN has acted as a significant component in the building and projection of South Africa’s foreign policy priorities (Carvalho 2018). The perspective of South Africa on UNSC reform from the beginning supported the standpoints of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the OAU because of the developing countries argument of the UNSC not reflecting the current architecture of the international system and also exclusively dominated by the P5 (Efstathopoulos 2016). They perceived the UNSC as an imbalanced and non-transparent institution because of the absence of representation of developing states under the permanent seat (Efstathopoulos 2016). The position of the NAM and the OAU now the AU sought to alter the out-dated power structure of the UNSC by enlargement of both the permanent and non-permanent membership seats to represent all the regions (Venter 2003). The position by the NAM and AU with respect to UNSC reform focused on the advocacy for the enlargement of membership of the UNSC. However, while Africa’s position sought permanent membership seat, the NAM position advocated for a proportionally-based regional representation in the UNSC with due regards to population size rather than power and geopolitical influence in a region or the international system (Venter 2003, p.38). Therefore, the perspective of NAM on UNSC reform especially with regards to population is in contrast with the requirement for membership of the UNSC under Article 23 (1) of the UN Charter earlier examined.

Furthermore, the stance of South Africa on the reform of the UNSC is in solidarity with the continental agenda of the Ezulwini Consensus which is usually reflected in the official statements of her Representatives during UN General Assembly Sessions as examined in Chapter 4.3. Hence, its foreign policy prioritized the reform of the UNSC in order to promote representation and a more accountable institution that reflect global dynamics thereby enhancing the efficiency of the Council in the maintenance of global peace and security (Carvalho 2018, p.4). In addition, its foreign policy approach to global peace and security
laid emphasis on global presence by contribution to UN peacekeeping operations to support the primary roles of the UNSC (Carvalho 2018).

South Africa’s foreign policy fits the profile of middle power behaviour of developing countries, which mostly explores multilateral solutions in dealing with vexing international issues such as the case of the debate on UNSC reform (Nel 2000, p.45). The middle powers are significant stakeholders within the UN system as they aspire for greater representation in the global body (Nel 2000). South Africa’s foreign policy strategy during its campaign for the UNSC non-permanent seat during the period 2019-2020 encapsulated its position on the reform of the UNSC as it advocated for the transformation of global governance institution such as the UNSC on the basis of fairness and equitable representation (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa 2020). Furthermore, its foreign policy emphasized the need for a negotiated settlement on UNSC reform, promotion of the African Agenda of the Ezulwuni Consensus, and the need to work in partnership to reform the UN System and improve working methods of the UNSC (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa 2020). The recent Speech by the South African President at the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly Debate reinforced South Africa’s commitment to UNSC reform when he declared “we must address the under-representation of the African continent in the UN system, and ensure that the voice of the African continent and of the Global South in general is strengthened in the multilateral system (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa 2021).

An assessment of South Africa’s foreign policy between 1994 and 2004 regarding UNSC reform shows that it was largely ambivalent (Efstathopoulos 2016). This was as a result of the country’s foreign policy direction of refraining from taking a prominent role in the continent in an effort to distance South Africa from the legacy of apartheid regime (Efstathopoulos 2016). However, its foreign policy direction changed in September 2004 with the declaration of its aspiration for UNSC permanent membership seat (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa 2004). South African foreign policy under the current government of President Cyril Ramaphosa is focused on reviving the African Renaissance sentiment in her foreign relations; an approach that was initially popularized by the Thabo Mbeki Presidency of 1999-2008 (Domiro 2019). This foreign policy objective is entrenched on African identity and seeks to reintegrate the continent into the global economy in order to promote her political, economic, and social renewal (Domiro
A major contradiction of South Africa’s foreign policy about UNSC reform at the period it declared its aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat was its strategic alliance with the G4 position on UNSC reform despite endorsing Africa’s position (Kagwanja 2009). The flexible position of the G4 regarding UNSC reform compromised the granting of the veto to new permanent members, which was in contrast to Africa’s position that advocated for a permanent seat with the veto power (Freieslaben 2008). The alignment of South Africa’s position with that of the G4 and some African states like Nigeria with the L-69 Group impacted on the unity of Africa with respect to UNSC reform and undermined the fundamental objective of the Pan-African philosophy.

5.4.2 South Africa and Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations

South Africa’s participation in UN peacekeeping mission is supportive of the primary function of the UNSC to foster global security and such diplomatic action may also be seen to promote South Africa’s aspiration for a significant role in the UN especially for permanent membership of the UNSC (Adetiba 2017, p.164). South Africa’s participation in peacekeeping is underpinned by political considerations and advancement of its own interests (Lotze et al. 2015). Consequently, the deployment of a Staff Officer and later Military Observers and troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999 under the auspices of the United Nations Mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) marked South Africa’s first UN involvement in peacekeeping operations (Ditsong 2013). This was a sequel to the approval of the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace by the South African Cabinet in October 1998 (Ditsong 2013).

South Africa’s contribution to peace support operations conforms to the provisions of her constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1994). By the provisions of the Constitution, the South Africa National Defence Force (SANDF) will act in defence of the Republic and also participate in international peacekeeping undertakings. Participation in international peace operations constituted a priority area in the foreign policy of South Africa from 1999 onwards and was even a focal point in her campaigns for non-permanent seat (Carvalho 2018). Political rationality is a major consideration for South Africa’s involvement in international peace operations as its foreign policy aims to promote economic and social development of Africa in order to consolidate peace and security in the region (Lotze 2015). Consequently, the White Paper on South Africa’s participation in international peace missions was revised in 2012 to align its policies and strategic objectives with its global
presence in the maintenance of global peace and security (Mabera 2018). South Africa’s commitment to peacekeeping extends beyond UN-Led peacekeeping mission to regional peacekeeping operations by the AU (Nibishaka 2011). Its peacekeeping architecture at a regional level under the auspices of the AU has, for instance, been deployed in the Central African Republic, Burundi, and Lesotho as part of her foreign policy strategy to ensure a stable Africa and as part of her wider desire enhance her influence in multilateral institution (Nibishaka 2011; Zondi et al. 2014). South Africa’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations is shown in Table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2: South Africa’s Personnel Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations 1999 - 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (as at December)</th>
<th>Troops Contingent</th>
<th>Military Observer/Staff Officer</th>
<th>Police Contingent</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>Ranking among Contributors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>(f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>80th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>46th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>40th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1409</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2319</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2331</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>20th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>2178</td>
<td>13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>2187</td>
<td>14th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2067</td>
<td>14th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2044</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2138</td>
<td>13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2092</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2173</td>
<td>13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2139</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2179</td>
<td>14th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2114</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2131</td>
<td>16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1433</td>
<td>19th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1156</td>
<td>15 + 25 (Staff Officer)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>17th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1152</td>
<td>6 + 19 (Staff Officer)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>17th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1116</td>
<td>5 + 22 (Staff Officer)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>17th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Evaluation of the Table indicates that the peak of her contribution to UN peacekeeping efforts was in the 2004 with personnel strength of 2331. South Africa’s contribution of peacekeepers to the UN peacekeeping mission did not fall significantly between 2011 and
2015 (Retting 2016). This trend was a result of her seeking to strengthen her aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat, and a consequence of her considerations of her diplomatic mediation efforts in the resolution of conflict as a middle power (Retting 2016). The yearly deployment in UN peace operations by South Africa mostly exceeded a thousand personnel from year 2003 onwards until 2016 when it started to decline. The mismatch between funding and operational commitment of the SANDF is a major impediment in her participation in UN Missions (Lotze et al 2015). For instance, in the 2017/2018 South Africa national budget, the SANDF was allocated R 46.8 Billion, which represented a slight increase of only R1.5 billion on the 2016/2017 budget allocation (Martin 2017). The efficient employment of her military as an instrument of South Africa’s foreign policy would require a rethinking by the government regarding resource allocation to the SANDF (Maxi 2015).

The reduction in UN peacekeeping budgets by the end of 2017 due to financial cutbacks impacted on efficient delivery of peace support operations (Abdenur, 2019). The UN Peacekeeping budget in the period 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 dropped from 7.87 Billion USD to 6.80 Billion USD for 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 (UN, 2019 - DPI/1634/Rev.218). The budget went down further to 6.69 Billion USD in the period 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (UN, 2018-DPI/1634/Rev.208). The Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) Initiative is a reform strategy of UN peacekeeping operations in support of the primary roles of the UNSC as it is a valuable platform for dialogue with member states contributing to UN Peacekeeping Missions in order to evaluate and reposition UN peacekeeping operations and also to address their financial challenges (Sherman 2019). The A4P conceptualized in 2018 was designed to facilitate UN Peacekeeping operations to adapt to changes in the nature of conflicts that have occurred over the years and also to enable them to maximise functional efficient with the resources available (Gowan 2019).

5.4.3 Egypt’s UNSC Reform Perspective and Foreign Policy
The unique geographical location of Egypt between Africa and Asia predetermines her interaction with Africa and the Middle East (Chen 2011). The country is arguably the most influential Arab-African country because she is a bridge between the Western world and the Middle East especially with respect to its mediating role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Aida and Yehia 2016; Landau 2006). This section will explore the perspective of Egypt on the UNSC reform with reference to her foreign policy. The section will also analyse her participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations as such operations are important instrument for
the UNSC to maintain global peace and security under Chapter 23(1) of the UN Charter earlier discussed in Section 5.4.

Foreign policy is an essential component of Egypt’s state policy as the country seeks to maintain bilateral and multilateral cooperation with global governance institutions such as the UN and AU (El-Kamel 2010). Egyptian diplomacy seeks to strengthen its relationship with the UN by playing active role in the UN and its specialised agencies to foster development, peace, and security; especially through the UNSC (El-Kamel 2010). Egypt’s participation in such roles in the UNSC as seen by its frequent membership of the UNSC non-permanent seat and its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations enhances its influence in the global arena and promotes its aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat ((Pinfari 2014). At a continental level, Africa has been at the forefront of Egypt’s foreign policy since 1952 when the country mobilised support for the liberation of African territories from colonial rule and subsequently championed the establishment of the OAU to further the integration of the Continent (El-Kamel 2010). The historical leadership role of Egypt especially within countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) may, however, have been weakened by the events of the Arab spring, which led to political revolution in AMU states that mostly support Egypt’s candidacy for UNSC permanent seat (Maseng and Lekaba 2014). As a result, the shift in the political dynamics in the AMU states could impact on Egypt quest for permanent membership of the Security Council.

The changing orientation of the three different leaderships that emerged as a result of the Arab spring impacted on Egypt’s diplomacy with the international community but did not change her priority for the Common African Position on UNSC reform (Pinfari 2014). Egypt’s position on the UNSC reform under the governments of Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), Mohammed Hussien Tantawi (2011-2012), Mohamed Morsy (2012-2013) and Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (2013-Date) remained committed to the reform of the UNSC. For instance, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs during the government of Hosni Mubarak, at the opening of the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly debate in 2007 declared “as a member of the African Group, Egypt once again states its full commitment to the specifics of the unified African position. It remains a fair and balance position, if implemented, will achieve legitimate Africa aspirations” (UN 2007-A/62/PV.11, p.24). Whilst President Mohamed Morsy at the 67th Session of the UN General Assembly reiterated the commitment of Egypt to the reform of the UNSC as he disclosed that “reforming the structure of a Security Council,
which still reflects a bygone era, must remain our highest priorities and must be undertaken with due seriousness” (UN 2012-A/67/PV.9, p.32). In addition, it is noted that since its adoption in 2005, the Ezulwuni Consensus has also defined Egypt diplomacy with regards to UNSC reform; this remains the case under current President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. Indeed, President El-Sisi expressed this solidarity for the African position in an official statement during the 74th UNGA Session, 25 September 2019 when he asserted that:

We must ensure a just representation in the Council. We must work to rectify the historical injustice to which our African continent has been subjected. I reiterate our commitment to the common African position based on the Ezulwuni Consensus and the Sirte Declaration, and I call upon the Assembly to adopt that just position within the framework of the relevant governmental negotiations (UN 2019-A/74/PV.3, p.18).

The perspective of Egypt on UNSC reform and the arguments of her diplomats within the UN General Assembly debates have also been related to the issues of equitable representation and the legitimacy of the Council’s decision-making (Megahid 2020). Egypt’s stance upon African permanent membership representation in the Security Council aligns with the Africa’s Common Position on the UNSC and seeks to strengthen its influence as a political powerhouse in Africa (Megahid 2020). The dexterity in diplomatic relations demonstrated by Egypt could arguably position it to represent the interest of Africa when the latter is granted a permanent membership. Furthermore, Egypt advocacy for a UNSC permanent membership was reiterated by the representative of Egypt at the 73rd Session of UNGA when President El-Sisi stated: “there is no equitable representation in the Council since the membership of the Council has not increased despite rise in the membership of UN states to 193” (UN 2018-A/73/PV.37.pg.11). Also connected to the issue of equitable representation in Egypt’s position is the legitimacy of the UNSC. The credibility of the Council was questioned on the basis that the Group of African states which represents more than a quarter of the membership of the UN is not represented in the permanent seat and has only enjoyed a few instances of representation on the rotational seat (UN 2018-A/73/PV.37).

5.4.4 Egypt’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations
The involvement of Egypt in UN peacekeeping operations is driven by strategic and political interests (Coning and Prakash 2016). Strategically, Egypt regarded its participation in peacekeeping operations especially in Africa as a means of contributing to global peace and stability (Coning and Prakash 2016, p.31). The country’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations stems from its desire to foster global stability especially in Africa. Its involvement and approach also act to prevent spill over effects of conflict from her immediate neighbours
such as Sudan (UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference, 2019). Politically, Egypt’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operation is a boost to her regional leadership position, while also acting as a further mechanism for her advocacy for a reformed UNSC in a multilateral diplomacy based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (Coning and Prakash 2016).

The commitment of Egypt to UN peacekeeping operations can be traced to the country’s first peacekeeping experience in the Congo in 1960. Since then, it has participated in 37 UN Missions with more than 30,000 personnel in 24 countries across the globe (State Information Service, Egypt 2017). Details of Egypt’s contribution of peacekeepers to UN Missions from 2005 to date are at Table 5.3. Analysis of the Table shows that there was a peak in her support for UN peacekeeping operations in 2009 contributing 5,155 peacekeepers and emerging as the 5th largest contributor. However, there was a reduction in the participation by the country in UN Peacekeeping Missions from 2005 to 2008. This resulted in its low ranking of 23rd position among contributors of UN peacekeepers in the year 2006 and 2007. The decline in the involvement of Egypt in UN peacekeeping operations in this period impacted on its diplomacy with the UN with regards to promoting global peace and security (Pinfari 2014; El-Khami 2010).

Table 5.3: Personnel Deployment and Ranking of Egypt in UN Peacekeeping Operations 1999 - 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (As at December)</th>
<th>Troops Contingent</th>
<th>Military Observer/Staff Officer</th>
<th>Police Contingent</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>Ranking among Contributors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>35th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>33th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>43th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>49th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>50th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>19th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>23th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>23th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2201</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>2431</td>
<td>12th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4770</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>5155</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3573</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>4083</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3043</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>3577</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2236</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>2742</td>
<td>11th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.5 Nigeria’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations

The participation of Nigeria in UN peacekeeping operations conforms to Chapter II Section 19(c) of its foreign policy objectives under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; “the promotion of international co-operation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual support among all nations”. Drawing from the foregoing objective, Nigeria has pursued its search for global peace and security through participation in peacekeeping operations; central also to its quest for a UNSC permanent seat (Udeh and Okoroafor 2016). Such global presence in peacekeeping missions to promote global stability and Nigeria’s aspiration for permanent membership of the Security Council occurs at the levels of the UN, AU and the ECOWAS and also on the bilateral stage as is now discussed.

Nigeria since attainment of independence recognised the UN as a major multilateral pivot for contribution to international peace and security through peacekeeping and peace-making efforts (Oche 2005). Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping operation immediately after independence is a significant aspect of her behaviour in the international arena (Bamidele 2015). Thus, her first contribution to peacekeeping mission began in 1960 with the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC) (Chigozie and Ituma 2015). The Nigerian Contingent strived to execute their mandate of assisting the Congolese government to restore law and order (Chigozie and Ituma 2015). The successful completion of her peacekeeping mandate in Congo heralded the participation of Nigeria in mainstream UN peacekeeping missions across the globe (Oche 2005). Subsequently, Nigeria has participated in various UN peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi and Darfur amongst others (Bamidele 2015). However, Nigeria’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations is confronted by challenges pertaining to differences in operative doctrines and training which affects Nigeria’s operational efficiency in peacekeeping missions such as in the United

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Troops (C)</th>
<th>Police (D)</th>
<th>Total (E)</th>
<th>Staff Officer (f)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2119</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>2613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2281</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>2809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2083</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>2869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2294</td>
<td>67 + 74</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>3274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2846</td>
<td>64 + 63</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>3765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>2152</td>
<td>35 + 73</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>3085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (Akpan and Olisah 2019). Furthermore, the difficult operational environment as in the case of the UNAMID hinders Nigeria’s capability to deploy large number of peacekeepers; impacting on its contribution to UN peacekeeping mission and its quest for a UNSC permanent seat (Alli 2012). The country has rendered various services such as humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, peace building and medical services in the course of executing her peace support roles (Bamidele 2015). The record of Nigeria’s participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations and other regional peacekeeping initiative is summarised in Table 5.4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Mission</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Year of Participation</th>
<th>Personnel in the Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Operation in Congo</td>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>1960-1964</td>
<td>Peacekeeping contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission</td>
<td>UNIPOM</td>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group</td>
<td></td>
<td>1988-1991</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Angola Verification Mission</td>
<td>UNAVEM I, II and III</td>
<td>1989-1995</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>1991 – 2017</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission</td>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Interim Mission Kosovo</td>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>1999-2006</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU Monitoring Group in Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>Civil experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Operation in Mozambique</td>
<td>UNOSOZ</td>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(a)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(b)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(c)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(d)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>1993-1995</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia</td>
<td>UNCRO</td>
<td>1993-1995</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Peacekeeping Force in Tanzania (Bilateral)</td>
<td>TAPKM</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Group in the Aouzou strip, Libya/Chad</td>
<td>UNASOG</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Prevention Deployment in Macedonia</td>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>1995-2000</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slovenia, Baranja, Western Sirmium in Croatia</td>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Angola</td>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)-Liberia</td>
<td>Operation Harmony</td>
<td>1990-1997</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)-Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Operation Sandstorm</td>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>2000 – Date</td>
<td>Military Observers/Staff Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Civilian Police Support Group, Croatia</td>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Police Peacekeeping Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Transition Authority in East Timor</td>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>2003 -2018</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Contingent and Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>2007 – Date</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Contingent (2007-2015) and Military Observers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the Table, it can be seen that the country participated in a total of 31 UN Peacekeeping Missions and seven regional and sub-regional peacekeeping engagements. Thereafter, Table 5.5 below shows Nigeria’s personnel contribution to UN peacekeeping missions while Table 5.6 is a summary of contribution of peacekeepers to UN mission by Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa. According to the UN Department of Peace Operations (see Table 5.5), Nigeria was the highest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions in the Year 2000 and was rated among the top ten contributors of peacekeepers to the UN Missions from 1999 to 2015 (UN Department of Peace Operation, 2020; Bove and Smith 2011). A comparative analysis of the contributions by the major African state contenders for UNSC permanent seat is shown in Table 5.6. Based on the statistics indicated in that table, Nigeria contributed more peacekeepers to UN Peacekeeping operations than Egypt and South Africa. Nigeria was also among the top four UN contributors to peacekeeping at various times between 1999 and 2010. Table 5.5 shows a gradual decline in Nigeria’s contribution to UN peacekeeping from 2016 onwards. The country contributed only 317 peacekeepers to UN operations as of December 2019 and was ranked 43rd among contributing states to UN peacekeeping operations (UN Department of Peace Operation, 2020). The current security challenges in Nigeria due to the Boko Haram Insurgency and banditry activities in the country has significantly affected Nigeria’s capacity to sustain high participation in UN peacekeeping operations (Retting 2016). This could undermine her quest for a UNSC permanent seat if the downward trend in her contributions to UN peacekeeping operation persists over the long term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
<th>(d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in South Sudan</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>2011-Date</td>
<td>Military Observers and Staff Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>2013 – Date</td>
<td>Military Observers and Staff Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic</td>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>2014-Date</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>ECOMIB</td>
<td>2015-Date</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia</td>
<td>ECOMIG</td>
<td>2017-Date</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Contingent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dauda, M. et al. 2017; Marthins Luther Agwai Peacekeeping Centre, Jaji-Nigeria.
At a regional level, Nigeria’s approach to peacekeeping has been largely influenced by the belief that the country’s security is connected to that of other African states because of cultural, historical, and transnational security issues (Yoroms 2010). These issues are defined by the way in which the security of a nation is affected by what happens in contiguous countries around its neighbourhood (Yoroms 2010). This perspective puts Nigeria at centre stage with regards to commitments to the peace and security in West Africa and the entire region through her engagement in peacekeeping initiatives (Alli 2012). Nigeria’s peacekeeping experience at the regional level started under the auspices of the OAU Mission Intervention Force in Chad from 1981-1982 (Sanda 2005). The participation of the country in such operations also took place at a sub-regional level under the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping initiative in Liberia and Sierra-Leone. The ECOMOG intervened in the civil wars in both countries between 1990 and 2000 and maintained peace (Osakwe and Audu 2017; Hamman et al. 2014). Nigeria is also currently maintaining a peacekeeping force in both Guinea Bissau and the Gambia under the auspices of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB), and the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) respectively (Babatunde 2017). Nigeria’s contribution to peacekeeping operations in Africa and other parts of the world have been regarded as invaluable because of her efforts to promote world peace, as well as the financial commitments and personnel sacrifices to peace support operations (Eke 2015). The participation of Nigeria in peacekeeping operations in Africa has arguably come at a heavy price. The OAU Peacekeeping Operation in Chad in which Nigeria deployed peacekeepers cost her 82 million USD (Dauda 2017). Similarly, the country incurred 12 billion USD and lost more than 1,000 peacekeeping soldiers in her intervention in the Liberian civil war under the ECOMOG between 1991-2003 (Dauda 2017). Furthermore, Nigeria was also regarded as the major financier of ECOMOG peace support operations in Liberia and Sierra-Leone; she funded about 80 per cent of the total expenditure of the operations (Abubakar 2009).

The noted contributions of Nigeria in the resolution of conflicts through international peacekeeping as this thesis contends, enhanced her credentials as an emerging power and can also be considered as a justification for her quest for a permanent seat in the UNSC (Bamidele 2015). However, Nigeria’s current participation in UN peacekeeping operation has arguably resulted in her no longer deserving any special recognition in the international scene as a result of the huge decline in her involvement in UN peacekeeping operations (see also Table 5.5). This decline has reduced her global visibility in the promotion of global peace and
security and impacted on her quest for UNSC permanent membership. Furthermore, Nigeria’s involvement in peacekeeping operations is argued to be influenced by financial rewards and reimbursement for military logistics deployed in peacekeeping missions (Fawole 2000). Such argument, is however, contradicted by the submissions of Eke (2015) and Dauda (2017) with respect to Nigeria’s sacrifices and huge financial resources expended in its regional intervention in Liberia and Sierra-Leone. Also, Ekwealor (2015) is convinced that Nigeria’s experiences and success stories in Liberia and Sierra Leone would enable her defeat any insurgency and uprisings in the region thereby strengthening her regional strength and aspiration for UNSC permanent seat. The position by Ekwealor (2015) seemed to differ from the current reality in Nigeria as the country is confronted with security challenges such as terrorism and armed banditry, which will be discussed in Chapter Six.

Table 5.5: Nigeria’s Personnel Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations 1960-2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (As at December)</th>
<th>Troops Contingent</th>
<th>Military Observer/Staff Officer</th>
<th>Police Contingent</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>Ranking among Contributors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>(f)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>1963-1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>1975</td>
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<td>1979-1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1990 (November)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3290</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>3525</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3468</td>
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</tr>
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<td>3159</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3277</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3228</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>3rd</td>
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107
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
</tr>
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<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
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<td>80th</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>40th</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10th</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>2331</td>
<td>10th</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>20th</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>1042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>15th</td>
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<td>2178</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2187</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>5409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 1. Martins Luther Agwai Peacekeeping Centre, Jaji - Nigeria.

Table 5.6: Summary of Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa-1999-2019
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
<th>(d)</th>
<th>(e)</th>
<th>(f)</th>
<th>(g)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>14th</td>
<td>4083</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>5749</td>
<td>5th</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2138</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>3577</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>5441</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2173</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>2742</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>4836</td>
<td>5th</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2179</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>2613</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>2930</td>
<td>8th</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2131</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>2809</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>2954</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1433</td>
<td>19th</td>
<td>2869</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>2171</td>
<td>14th</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>17th</td>
<td>3274</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>29th</td>
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<td>2018</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>17th</td>
<td>3765</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>427</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>17th</td>
<td>3085</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>43th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.6 Conclusion

The chapter examined African states’ representation with regard to the UNSC non-permanent seat. South Africa has served three terms as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, whilst Nigeria, and Egypt have been the most represented African states in the UNSC; each serving five terms of tenure. Their frequent non-permanent membership and experiences in the UNSC could arguably prepare the ground for their participation as permanent members in a reformed UNSC. Their frequent representation in the UNSC can also be linked to the desire to contribute actively to the conflict resolution mechanism of the Council and may also advance their foreign policies towards the reformation of the UNSC. The rotational model adopted by Africa for the selection of African states for the UNSC non-permanent seat could result to the possibility that some candidates within given groups are elected more frequently where the group contains member states which have no desire to contest the election or abstain from nomination.

The chapter presented the official statements and responses of interviewees from the UN Permanent Missions of Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt in respect of the text-based negotiation and the AU C-10 in order to contextualize the perspectives of major African contenders for the UNSC permanent seat. It was clear from the discussion within the Chapter, that there were divergent views on the adoption of the text-based negotiation in the IGN process. A majority of African states including the L69 and the G4 appeared supportive of text-based negotiations, as it will enable early reform and attribution of position. In contrast to this China and Russia argued that consideration of text-based negotiation in the IGN is not only premature but could make negotiations difficult as states may not be willing to concede their own written positions. The opposing position by the major contending African states against the AU position regarding interaction with the IGN Groups reinforces the realist
argument relating to power struggle being a constant feature of the international system (Brown and Ainley 2009). In turn, this explains why major African contenders for UNSC permanent membership seek to pursue their national interests in a manner that is defined in terms of power and influence; both are also fundamental to their quests for permanent membership (Dougherty et al. 1990).

The Pan-African philosophy that promotes the unity and solidarity of the African states is undermined by the contrasting position of the major African contenders for the UNSC permanent membership (Taye 2019). Whilst the philosophy was largely successful in the liberation of African states under colonial rule, it has not been able to significantly resolve the incessant conflicts and governance issues in Africa that often dominate the agenda of the UNSC (Taye 2019). The AU could consider addressing the issue of opposition to its decisions and resolutions by some African states with respect to Africa’s quest for UNSC reform by identifying the areas of convergence and disparities regarding its positions. This will provide opportunity for extensive engagements to bridge such differences and arrive at a generally acceptable position.

While South Africa and Egypt have maintained their participation in peacekeeping operations, Nigeria’s current contribution to peacekeeping operation arguably does not give it any special recognition in the international scene as a result of the huge decline in its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations as indicated in Table 5.5. This has reduced its global visibility in the promotion of global peace and security and impacted on its quest for UNSC permanent membership, as contribution to UN peacekeeping mission is central to its argument for a permanent seat. This chapter having discussed extensively the perspectives of South Africa and Egypt on UNSC reform, the next chapter will consider Nigeria’s UNSC permanent membership aspiration delving into critical overview of her prospects and challenges.
CHAPTER SIX

NIGERIA’S PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

6.0 Introduction

This Chapter examines the prospects and challenges involved in presenting Nigeria as a permanent member in a reformed Security Council. In doing so, it explores the perspectives expressed during interviews with high-ranking diplomats from the Permanent Mission of Nigeria to UN, senior officials of the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and senior officials the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. The Chapter examines Nigerian foreign affairs in relation to its bid for UNSC reform and in so doing interrogates the rationales for Nigeria’s quest for UNSC. This Chapter relies on realist assumption pertaining to the relative gains and interests that states seek to pursue, and explored Nigeria’s relative power and influence in Africa. Finally, the Chapter reviews the AU’s demand for UNSC reform and two permanent seats for Africa with a view to weighing the possibilities for support for Nigeria.

6.1 Nigerian Foreign Policy and her bid for UNSC Permanent Membership

This section briefly appraises Nigeria’s foreign policy and thereafter situates the same in the context of Nigeria’s quest for UNSC reform by different governments in the periods 1960-1991, and 1992 to date. The late Prime Minister of Nigeria, Tafawa Balewa first articulated Nigeria’s foreign policy on the global stage during his inaugural speech at the UN General Assembly on the occasion of its admission into the UN in October 1960 (Ade-Ibijola 2014). Thereafter, Nigeria’s multilateral diplomacy was deployed on the basis of principles and objectives such as friendliness with all nations, active involvement in the United Nations Organisation activities, and commitment to uphold the principles upon which the global institution was established (Balewa 1964). Nigeria’s foreign policy under the Balewa government did not advocate for a UNSC permanent seat for Nigeria but endorsed the 1964 OAU resolution AHG/Res.13 earlier mentioned in Section 3.2, which supported the UN General Assembly Resolution 1991 concerning enlargement of the membership of UNSC non-permanent seat (Ade-Ibijola 2014). The recognition of the UN as being part of the guiding principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy since the beginning of her independence is an indication of the great importance Nigeria attached to the world body. That the UN was the
first international organisation Nigeria joined after her independence reinforces the
significant place that the organisation occupies in her foreign relations (Akintenrinwa 2005).

The above principles articulated in the early period of Nigeria’s independence guided the
foreign policy objectives of successive Nigerian governments in the post-independence
decades (Ogwu 1986). The principles have also guided its commitment to the maintenance of
world peace and security especially through participation in UN peacekeeping operations; a
justification for Nigeria’s quest for UNSC permanent membership that is discussed in Section
6.3. Furthermore, the promotion of an Afro-centric foreign policy by successive Nigerian
governments after independence illustrates the country’s commitment to African solidarity
(Emmanuel 2020). The objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy under Chapter II, Section 19 of
the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria also succinctly reflect the
Afrocentric nature of her foreign policy: “the promotion of African integration and support
commitment to Africa could be demonstrated by its significant roles in Africa with regards to
support for the independence struggles in the continent, socio-economic development of
Africa and diplomatic engagements that facilitated the establishment of the OAU, which will
also be discussed in Section 6.3. The leadership roles of Nigeria in Africa arguably promote
its regional hegemonic status and could be related to its quest for the reform of the UNSC as
it enhance its prospects as an African contender for a permanent seat (Emmanuel 2020;
Owoeye 2002). Despite the gains in the projection of Nigeria’s Africa centered foreign policy,
her national interests in the area of her domestic economic structures have been overburdened
with enormous financial contributions for the development and stability of Africa (Emmanuel
2020). Nigeria provides substantial support to the ECOWAS more than any other African
state as it pays about 60 per cent of the sub-regional organisation’s annual budget (Emmanuel
2020).

6.1.1 Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and her Quest for a Permanent Seat 1960 - 1991

Nigeria’s foreign policy in the first three decades after independence was undertaken by
various democratic and military administrations: the First Republic (1960-1966); the first
phase of military rule (1966-1979); and part of the second phase of military regime (1983-
respect to Nigeria’s quest for UNSC permanent seat will be considered in Section 6.1.2. In
the period 1960-1991, Nigeria pursued various foreign policies under eight different military
and democratic governments and reform of the UNSC was never part of its foreign policy direction except in 1963 when Nigeria voted for the adoption of UN Resolution 1991 – (XVIII) that increased of membership of the Security Council from 11 to 15 (UN 1963-Resolution 1991 – [XVIII]). It follows, that, Nigeria’s foreign policy conforms to the 1964 OAU resolution (OAU 1964-AHQ/Res.13 [1]) concerning African representation in the various UN organs as noted in Section 3.2 with regard to UN Resolution 1991- (XVIII). Except for the support of the UN Resolution 19991-(XVIII), a major agenda of Nigeria’s foreign policy in this period at the UN was political emancipation of African states such as Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe that were under colonial rule (Adeniji 2005; Adebo 1988). Nigeria also advocated against apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa (Adeniji 2005; Gambari 1997; Adebo 1988). However, there were no diplomatic engagements with respect to reform of the UNSC by Nigeria’s succeeding governments until 1992 when Nigeria declared her aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat (UN 1992-A/47/PV.19). Nigeria’s foreign policy agenda in the pre-1992 period did not address reform of the UNSC because of the absence of any major international advocacy for such action following the 1965 amendment of the UN Charter that increased the number of non-permanent seat from six to ten (Fassbender 2020; Schwelb 1966; UN 1963- Resolution 1991- [XVIII]).

6.1.2 Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and her Quest for a Permanent Seat 1992-Date

The foreign policy of the country during this period was a continuation of the second phase of military government (1992-1999) and the Fourth Republic (1999-Date) (Nuamah 2003). Nigeria’s diplomatic relations with respect to her quest for a UNSC permanent seat gained traction for the first time when Nigeria’s Representative at the 47th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1992 advocated for a UNSC permanent seat for Nigeria (UN 1992-A/47/PV.19). He declared that:

The need to increase the number of permanent seats in the Security Council is in our view an idea whose time has come. Therefore, it should be a matter of principle for the international community that Africa must not continue to be a region without representation in the permanent members of the Security Council. Nigeria, the most populous African nation, with the largest economic potential and its proven commitment to the cause of world peace and security, possesses the qualification to fulfil Africa’s aspiration in this regard (UN 1992-A/47/PV.19, pp.83-84).

The foregoing declaration by the Nigerian government laid the foundations for its bid for a UNSC permanent membership seat becoming part of its foreign policy objectives (Akindele 2005). The desire to pursue reform of the UNSC emerged as part of its foreign policy agenda in order to ensure fair representation by accommodating regional heavyweights and
influential states in the UNSC whose contributions to international peace at both the global and regional levels deserved recognition (Akindele 2005). Nigeria sustained its diplomacy for the reform of the UNSC under the African Group of states in the UN after the adoption of the Ezulwuni Consensus and sometimes with the L69 group as discussed in Section 5.2.2. Calls for reform of the Security Council regained international prominence in the post-cold war era (1993) with increasing membership of the UN and the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution 48/26 that established the Open-Ended Working Group to consider all aspects of “the question of increased membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council” (UN 1993-A/Res/48/26). As a result, the enlargement of the permanent membership of the UNSC became a key issue in the debate by African states since Africa constitutes the largest regional grouping in the UN not to have a permanent seat (Odeyemi and Igwebueze 2016). As such, Nigeria’s quest for reform of the UNSC and its aspiration for a permanent seat have been reflected in the official statements of Nigeria’s Representatives during the General debate of the UN General Assembly as evidenced by, for instance, its representative at the 47th Session who advocated for UNSC reform and expressed Nigeria’s aspiration for permanent membership of the Security Council as stated above (UN 1992-A/47/PV.19).

The official statements by Nigeria’s representatives at the General debate of the UN General Assembly Session in the last decade (2011 to 2021) have not been consistent in terms of advocating UNSC reform of with regard to Nigeria’s aspiration for a permanent seat. Evaluation of the speeches of Nigeria’s Representative at the UN General Assembly debate from 2011 (66th Session UNGA) to 2021 (76th Session UNGA); shows that its statements from the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly debate to the 72nd Session did not advocate either for UNSC reform of its own permanent seat. In contrast, the speeches of its Representatives in other Sessions of the UN General Assembly in the period did. For instance, former President Goodluck Jonathan at the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly declared, “a reformed Security Council is the only way to demonstrate that all nations have equal stake in the United Nations. Nigeria looks forward to the prospects of membership in a reformed Security Council” (UN 2011-A/66/PV.11, p.46), whilst at the 67th Session of the General Assembly debate he stated “we must now commit ourselves to accelerating the long-overdue reforms of the Council…Nigeria believes that a reformed Security Council with expanded permanent membership would benefit from the unique experiences and capacities that regional representatives could bring to bear on its work” (UN 2012-A/67/PV.8, pp.11-
Recently, President Muhammadu Buhari at the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly reaffirmed such positioning by stating that “Nigeria supports expansion of the UN Security Council to reflect the diversity and dynamics of the 21st Century. Africa deserves permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council” (UN 2020-A/75/PV.5, p.61). Though Nigeria’s desire for a permanent seat in a reformed UNSC arguably follows the necessity for inclusive UNSC membership and principles of sovereign equality of all member states as encapsulated under the UN Charter 1945 (UN Charter 1945; Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the UN, 2015). Also, elements of realism such as power and national interest could be associated with its aspiration (Mbara 2020). Foreign policy and national interest could be discerned in terms of the contest for power and survival of states from a realist standpoint (Manan 2017, p.178). As such, states such as Nigeria aspiring for the permanent seat in the UNSC seek to enhance their power and national interest as will be examined in Section 6.3.1.

Apart from speechmaking and official statements by the Nigerian government for reform, there seemed to be no coordinated approach in her foreign policy strategy with regard to UNSC reform. As a former Nigerian Diplomat at the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria (Interviewee E) observed; “there is no deliberate policy and consistent approach by the Nigerian government in pursuing her ambition”. A Professor of International Relations at the NIIA (Interviewee B) corroborated this view when he stated that; “every government in Nigeria have its own vision and agenda on Nigeria’s aspiration for a permanent seat of the Security Council. Lack of coherent policy about the reform is one problem in the Nigeria’s foreign policy strategy”. The lack of coordinated approach may be associated with the absence of an institutional framework in which Nigeria can pursue it ambition. The inconsistency of Nigeria’s foreign policy as argued by the interviewees is obvious in terms of the differences between the policies of the previous governments and the current administration of President Muhammadu Buhari with respect to Nigeria’s engagement in UN peace support operations. Such inconsistency could result to the lack of clarity with regards to matters of international concern (Fayomi et al. 2015). The administrations of former Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Goodluck Jonathan visualised active international roles for Nigeria through its widespread involvement in UN peace operations; further bolstering her quest for a permanent seat (Bamidele 2015). As Bamidele (2015, p.48) noted, “Nigeria believed that its substantive contribution to peacekeeping would enhance its credentials as an emerging power and claims for a seat at the global high table”. This explains the increased involvement of Nigeria in UN peacekeeping operations in the early 2000s, and coincided
with diplomatic efforts both in the UN and the AU to achieve reform via the Ezulwuni consensus (Bamidele 2015). The government of President Muhammadu Buhari does not conceive Nigeria’s international role to be one that involves large participation in UN peace support operation as evidenced in the decreasing number of Nigerian peacekeepers deployed in peacekeeping missions as discussed in Chapter Five. Instead, the government was more focused on domestic policies (Odoh 2020). This refocusing will impact Nigeria’s chances of being awarded a UNSC permanent seat.

It is also important to note that there is general defectiveness in the institutional framework of managing Nigeria’s external relations as “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been found to be an attachment of the Office of the Presidency and therefore not free from Presidential biases” (Lawal 2020, p.65). The formulation and execution of foreign policies by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are sometimes undermined by Presidential biases without regard to national interest (Lawal 2020). In such circumstances, foreign policy decisions tend to be personalized by the political class rather than by public opinion and expertise initiative (Enuka and Ojukwu 2016). The priorities of political leaders in foreign policies may undermine national interests, which foreign policies are ideally designed to safeguard and promote (Ahmed 2020). Political leaders’ personalities can taint foreign policy processes and outcome (Ojieh 2016). For instance, the foreign policy of Nigeria under Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa’s government was arguably a reflection of his personality of being “more calculated to placate than to provoke” (Ogwu 1986, p.52). As such, this trait influenced the foreign policy of his government, which is regarded as being conservative (Nwigbo et al. 2016). Similarly, the radical posture of Murtala/Obasanjo Military government of 1976-1979 arguably contributed to the activism and dynamism that characterised Nigeria’s foreign policy at that time (Odubajo 2017). Therefore, the foreign policy of the Murtala/Obasanjo government also reflected the personality of General Murtala of being adventurous, activist, pragmatic and realist by principle (Ogwu 1986).

Former President Obasanjo’s government (1999-2007) also pursued a dynamic foreign policy (Ngara et al. 2013). However, he arguably exhibited a domineering attitude in his foreign policies as he established a monopoly over foreign policies without consultation with Nigeria’s National Assembly in decision-making (Ngara et al. 2013). A case in point was after the International Court of Justice awarded the disputed territory of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroun in 2002, President Obasanjo unilaterally ceded the disputed territory to Cameroun
in 2006 after signing the Green Tree Agreement with President Paul Biya of Cameroon without recourse to the National Assembly (Ojie 2016; Ploch 2008). This resulted to declaration of the surrender of the territory as illegal by the National Assembly as it was executed without its ratification and also contrary to Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria regarding the implementation of treaties (Ploch 2008; 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria). It is therefore clear that the personality attributes of political leaders influences Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making processes. There is the need for political leaders to ensure objectivity in foreign policy processes and outcomes (Ojieh 2016). It is also essential that the processes be institutionalised by revision of relevant laws, strengthening legislative oversight on foreign policies and adherence to best practices by political leaders (Ngara et al. 2013).

The contradictions in Nigeria’s foreign policy especially with regards to participation in international peacekeeping operations need to be addressed for it to successfully advance her aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat (Adetula 2014). The Nigerian government needs to consider a robust strategy by reviewing her current approach in seeking reform of the UNSC. A strong strategic plan and long term projection of Nigeria’s foreign policy strategy to outlast different governments should be conceived in order to ensure continuity of policies regarding its aspiration for permanent membership (Chuka and Ojukwu 2016). The government could consider establishing a Standing Committee to develop Nigeria’s strategy in her quest for the reformation of the UNSC. The Standing Committee, which would operate under the supervision of Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, should be composed of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NIIA being Nigeria’s think-tank on foreign affairs, and the Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Nigeria’s highest Centre for policymaking. Membership could also include the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria, as it is directly involved in Nigeria’s aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat and Nigeria’s Ministry of Defence to make projections for Nigeria’s participation in UN peacekeeping operation. The Committee would chart a way forward for Nigeria’s aspiration by formulating a consolidated working policy document that would continuously guide diplomatic interaction by succeeding Nigerian governments with respect to UNSC reform.

6.2 Any Rationale for Nigeria’s quest for UNSC Reform?
In order to discuss the rationale for Nigeria’s desire for the reform of the UNSC, it is important to put to context the basis for Africa’s absence under the UNSC permanent
membership category. The victorious allies in the global contest for power in 1945 presided over the design of the institutional framework of the UN in a circumstance where Africa was not a key stakeholder (Ekwealor 2015). Also, most of African territories except Ethiopia, Egypt and Liberia were under colonial dominance (Ekwealor 2015). Therefore, Africa did not have substantial influence at the global scene since it was not a major stakeholder in the post-second world war diplomacy that established the UN. The question for Nigeria’s rationale for reform of the Security Council could be associated with unequal regional representation in the UNSC permanent seat which impacts on the prevailing international consensus for expanded membership in the UNSC (UN 2018-A/73/Pv.6, p.50). Also, apart from the written privilege of the P5 members in respect of the veto power, privileges such as pen-holding responsibilities of presiding over the drafting of resolutions on major security issues in the UNSC, which excludes non-permanent members, would be explained in Section 6.2.2 as another issue of contention being clamored for reformation.

6.2.1 Inequitable Regional Representation in the UNSC Permanent Seat

The UN has been observed as a theatre of huge conflict of interests, competition of values, and cooperation in search of solutions to common problems (Rothwell, 2013). To this end, member states of the UN have various perceptions with respect to the representation, legitimacy, effectiveness, and accountability of the UNSC as an executive organ of the UN (Olumide 2018). The UN recognises the essence of democracy as the preamble of the UN Charter espouses the equal rights of nations and sovereign equality (UN Charter 1945, Chapter I - Article 2). However, there is unequal representation in the UNSC permanent seat as Africa and Latin American states are represented only on the non-permanent category seat. A few powerful states, which were the founding members of the organisation, have shown a determination to preserve the status quo, which historically has been in their favour (Cox 2009). The privileges bestowed on the P5 members have been observed as a major concern, which enables them to dominate the deliberations of the Security Council and influence its decisions thereby engendering inequalities amongst member states (Lattila and Ylonen 2019). The critics of the membership composition of the Security Council including Nigeria have based their argument for reform of the UNSC on the need for it to reflect the international reality of the 21st Century (Bamidele 2015). A major justification put forward by Nigeria and other African states is the historical injustice that led to the exclusion of African states from UNSC permanent (see Chapter Four). Although Africa is represented in the UNSC under the non-permanent category, it exerts little influence over the Security Council’s decisions that
affect the region as seen by the inaction of the P5 members in the case of the Rwanda genocide earlier discussed in Chapter Four (Lattila and Ylonen 2019).

Nigeria’s President, Muhammadu Buhari at the 73rd Session of the General Assembly reiterated the need for equitable membership representation and reform of the UNSC. He declared that; “the reconstitution of the Council to make it more equitable and more representative of our global community is both a political and moral imperative. We believe that a reformed Security Council, with expanded membership in both the permanent and non-permanent seat categories, is in accord with prevailing international consensus and it is in our collective interest to do so” (UN 2018-A/73/Pv.6, p.50). His statement also showcased Nigeria’s contribution to peacekeeping operations. He stated “we have been active participants in many Security Council and African Union-authorised peacekeeping operations around the world, beginning with the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1960”(UN 2018-A/73/Pv.6, p.50). It is clear that Nigeria’s position as articulated by its President sought to address concerns pertaining to African states being excluded from a UNSC permanent seat. The statement by President Buhari indicated Nigeria’s contribution to both UN and AU peacekeeping operations as earlier evaluated as one area of achievement that could justify her aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat. This position reinforces the views by Akintenrinwa (2005), Saliu (2005), Ekwealor (2015) and Lord-Mallam (2016) who advanced Nigeria’s contribution to UN peacekeeping as a prospect for her bid for a UNSC permanent seat.

6.2.2 The UNSC Penholder System

The P5 monopoly as penholders on African issues especially the US, UK and France affects Nigeria and other African states in their membership of the UNSC non-permanent seat the opportunity of being key stakeholders in the resolution of African conflicts through the UNSC conflict management instrument (Guerrero 2020). The dominance of the pen holding responsibilities of the P5 provides the rationale for the quest for reform of the Security Council as the existing system hinders transparent decision-making (Niemetz 2015). The penholder, which is a synonym for a lead country, is the UNSC member that initiates and chairs the informal drafting process that includes the Council’s resolutions, presidential statements and press releases (Sievers and Daws 2014). From this practice, the penholder exercises an unofficial monopoly to initiate the decisions and actions of the Council regarding issues (Niemetz 2015). In practice the power of pen holding is executed by the P3
members (US, UK and France) while China and Russia often rely on the veto power to block any decision they disagree with (Einsiedel et al. 2015).

The dominance of the P5 members undertaking pen-holding responsibilities reduce the chances that any African states will become penholders or undertake any tasks associated with the same. Indeed, France tends to be a penholder for matters relating to her former colonies mostly African states, while the UK maintains pen holding responsibilities on agenda items with respect to Libya and Yemen and matters of peacekeeping and the protection of their civilians (Sievers and Daws 2014). Additionally, the UK and the US have retained pen-holding responsibilities for South Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia agendas in the UNSC (Guerrero 2020). The P3 members have maintained the monopoly as penholders on African issues which implies that the three non-permanent African states in the UNSC have little input into political efforts to deal with conflict in Africa and also with regard to UN peace operations in the region (Guerrero 2020).

A former diplomat at the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria and a senior official of Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interviewee E) tried to relate the UNSC penholder system with the efficiency of the Council. The senior official observed: “as pen holders, the permanent members have significant influence in the decision making apparatus of the Security Council since they draft most resolutions. The other members of the Security Council are left out in the articulation of the final decisions of the Council. This could undermine transparency in the Security Council and also impact on its efficiency”. Furthermore, the views of a senior diplomat in the UN Permanent Mission of Egypt (Interviewee K) concurred with the above perspectives. The diplomat observed the dominance of the P5 members as penholders when he maintained that; “We the elected members are just running behind the P5 members asking them for their views and how they will draft resolutions. The P5 members are the majority penholders and drafters of resolutions”. The argument by Loiselle (2020) reinforces the positions expressed by the above interviewees; he observed that the penholder system concentrates power in the hands of the P5 members, and undermines transparent decision-making processes in the UNSC. Despite the tremendous pen holding roles of the permanent members, the adoption of any resolution by the UNSC is subject to the provision of Article 27(3) of the UN Charter that requires the affirmative votes of the nine members of the Security Council including the affirmative votes or abstention of the P5 members (UN Charter 1945- Article 27[3]). Although, the adoption of resolutions follows this provision of
the UN Charter, outcome documents such as presidential statements, notes and letters by the President of the UNSC are not subjected to the rules under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter (Loiselle 2020).

6.3 Critical Overview of the Prospects for Nigeria’s Aspiration for a UNSC Permanent Seat

As noted in sub-section 6.1.2, the Representative of Nigeria at the 47th Session of the UN General Assembly declared Nigeria’s aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat citing its population, economic potential, and contributions to global peace as justifications for its quest which is partly consistent with the requirements for UNSC membership under Article 23(1) of the UN Charter (UN 1992-A/47/PV.19). However, only its contributions to global peace and security through participation in peacekeeping operations satisfy the condition under Article 23(1) of the UN Charter 1945. In addition to the argument by Lord-Mallam (2016; 2012) and Thekiso and Wyke (2019) in Section 5.4 regarding possible considerations for UNSC permanent membership, Nigeria’s large population advanced by the Nigerian Representative above follows the rationale argued by Tella (2019) and Omoruyi et al. (2020) as a possible determinant for suitability for UNSC permanent seat. For instance, Omoruyi et al. (2020) argued the criterion of broader representation in terms of population, which they supported by part of the recommendations of the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel Report 2004 that states “To bring into the decision-making process, countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world” (UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel Report 2004 (A/59/565), p.88). Therefore Nigeria’s large population vis-à-vis Africa and also being the most populous black nation in the world implied that the country would be more representative of the continent in the UNSC than any African state (Omoruyi et al 2020; Tella 2019).

This section applied the requirement under Article 23 (1) of the UN Charter for membership of the UNSC especially with regards to contributions to maintenance of global peace and security and also considered the High Level Panel’s recommendations for UNSC membership in analysing Nigeria’s prospects for UNSC permanent membership. Furthermore, the evaluation of Nigeria’s prospects for UNSC permanent seat in this section was underpinned on the requirements such as its Pan-African credentials, regional influence, economic strength and contributions to UN activities as identified by Thekiso and Wyk (2019) and Omoruyi et al. (2020) in evaluating suitability for UNSC permanent seat. The section will examine the prospects of Nigeria’s aspiration for a permanent seat at the UNSC.
Nigeria arguably have some of the realist attributes of a hegemon such as large population, vast economy and leadership prowess which enhances it relative power and influence in the region as will be discussed in this Chapter (Amao 2019; Warner 2017). The prospects of Nigeria’s aspiration were explored based on the realist theory that underpins this thesis. Political realism emphasises the material structure of power and the pursuit of relative gains, which is reflected in Nigeria’s commitment to world peace and security, leadership roles in Africa, and large population as will be considered below (Waltz 1979).

6.3.1 Commitment to World Peace and Security through UN Peacekeeping Operations

Article 23 of the UN Charter states the membership composition of the UNSC and also stipulates the conditions or criteria to be considered by the General Assembly in electing the non-permanent members. Chapter V, Article 23(1) of the UN Charter states:

The Security Council shall consist of eleven members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the Organisation, and also to equitable geographical distribution (Article 23(1), UN Charter 1945).

The UN General Assembly Resolution 1991(XVIII) A of 17 December 1963 applied an amendment to the above Article 23 (1) of the Charter. The resolution increased the non-permanent seats from six to ten (UN 1963- A/Res/1991[XVIII]). Bearing in mind the provisions of Article 23 of the Charter, the UN High Level Panel in its report “Threats, Challenges and Change” also recommended some criteria for the reform of the Security Council in the areas of membership composition and the use of the veto (UN 2005-A/59/565). It advocated for increased involvement in decision-making by those who contribute most to the UN financially, militarily, and diplomatically. This support to the UN was in the areas of contributions to the UN assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations and contributions to voluntary activities of the UN in support of its objectives and mandates (UN 2005- A/59/565). Furthermore, the criterion of contribution to maintenance of international peace and security by a UN member state appeared in both Article 23(1) of the UN Charter and UN High Level Panel Report 2004.

Political realism recognises states as principal actors in the international system, and also recognises that they desire to acquire power and promote their national interests (Waltz 1979).
In line with this realist assumption, Nigeria has at various times deployed its military to project its national interest as seen by its interventions in the Liberia and Sierra-Leone conflicts under the ECOMOG (Osakwe and Audu 2017). Furthermore, its participation in UN peacekeeping operations enhances its global diplomatic image as a key player in the preservation of international peace and security, and also advances its national interest in the quest for a UNSC permanent seat. In the light of this, some interviewees argued that Nigeria’s participation in peace support operations across the globe justified her aspiration for a permanent seat. A senior diplomat at the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria (Interviewee H) stated that; “Nigeria has done well in the maintenance of world peace and security particularly in Africa. Nigeria has been one of the major troops contributing countries to the UN until the emergence of Boko Haram in the Country”. Furthermore, a former Nigerian diplomat at the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria (Interviewee E) agreed with this position when he disclosed that; “Nigeria has paid heavily with human and material resources in contributing to UN peacekeeping operations. The first of which was in 1960 when we sent a peacekeeping contingent to Congo. Since then we have our contingents participating in crises theatre in different part of the world”. The views put forward by the above interviewees reinforces the position by Sanda (2005), which emphasised that Nigeria’s participation in international peace missions is an indication of its will and ability to be provider of security resources and a show of solidarity for collective international security. In addition, Azgaku’s (2015) viewpoint is not different from their views as he argued that Nigeria’s commitment to the management of international peace is recognisable in her participation in the UN and regional peacekeeping interventions.

The potential candidate states for a UNSC permanent seat often explore contributions to peacekeeping operations to increase their international visibility (Kenkel 2010). Active participation in the international scene and especially in the maintenance of global peace and security, which is also, arguably, a primary function of the UNSC, strengthens their case for a permanent seat. A major criterion for eligibility for election of states into the UNSC by two-third majority of the UN General Assembly is the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security which is defined by financial or troop contribution (Council on Foreign Relations 2020). Thus, the consideration of contributions by UN member states towards maintaining global peace underscores the basis for which Nigeria could leverage its peace support role in the UN in her quest for a permanent seat in an expanded UNSC. Furthermore, the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel Report 2004 emphasised the
relevance of contribution to UN peacekeeping operations by aspiring states for a UN Security Council (UNSC) permanent seat in the event of consideration for the reformation of the UNSC. To this end, and as part of the Panel’s recommendations for the models for reform of the UNSC, the General Assembly was to give preference to the top three contributors from their regional areas to UN peacekeeping operations (UN Secretary General High Level Panel Report 2004; Saliu and Omotola 2008). International peacekeeping is therefore one area where Nigeria has shown firm commitment to the efforts of the world body in sustaining global peace and security.

Whilst Nigeria’s track record in peacekeeping operations as explained in Chapter 5 largely influenced its quest for a UNSC permanent seat, recent developments a result of the Boko Haram insurgency and armed banditry have indicated an abdication of its participation in peacekeeping. The security challenges in Nigeria as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency and armed banditry criminalities amongst others contributed to the relinquishment of its traditional peacekeeping roles as the Nigerian Military and Police are mostly engaged in addressing these challenges (Warner 2015). Furthermore, the increasingly absence of Nigeria in international peacekeeping roles suggests that the country no longer prioritises conflict management through peacekeeping interventions in its foreign policy (Omotuyi 2021). This is evident by the pull out of its peacekeeping contingents from all UN peacekeeping missions in 2015. Nigeria’s withdrawal from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2015 also demonstrates its lack of emphasis to peacekeeping responsibility in its foreign relations (Warner 2015). These developments raise fundamental questions as to Nigeria’s commitment to the maintenance of global peace and security through peacekeeping operations and in turn weakens her potential suitability for a permanent seat.

6.3.2 Leadership Role in Africa

Nigeria and South Africa are often cited as a hegemon because of their leading positions in Africa and their economic potential (Tella 2018). Nigeria and South Africa are the economic giants of Africa with a combined GDP of about 750 billion USD which accounts for about one-third of Africa’s GDP (Idahosa 2020). The leadership roles of Nigeria in Africa arguably position her as an important actor in global affairs and strengthen her quest for a permanent seat of the UNSC (Udeh and Okoroafor 2016). These leadership roles of Nigeria can be discerned in the context of its contributions to the establishment of the OAU and ECOWAS, the struggle for liberation of African states, and its support for the economic and social
The huge commitment of Nigeria to liberation movements in Africa arguably strengthened her leadership dominance in the continent and improved her reputation among African countries (Akindele 2005). Nigeria’s struggle for the liberation of African state is indicative of its commitment to Article 1(2) of the UN Charter 1945 which affirmed “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (UN Charter 1945). Accordingly, the pan-African track record of Nigeria and her pursuit for regional dominance is evident in
her commitment to the liberation of African states under colonial administration, and gave
her a place of prominence in African diplomacy from 1960 to 1980 (Ogunsanwo 2010).
Indeed, successive Nigerian governments often disclosed that its independence was
incomplete without the total emancipation of African territories from colonial domination
(Gambari 2012). The UN and OAU provided platforms, which Nigeria utilized to promote
her anti-colonial campaign. The UN recognized Nigeria’s anti-colonial activism as she
chaired the UN Special Committee against Apartheid for more than 20 years until the
dissolution of the Committee in 1994 (Seteolu and Okuneye 2017). The liberation struggles
championed by Nigeria contributed to the political independence of Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe), Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and South Africa (Gambari 2012;
Ogunsanwo 2010). Nigeria was regarded as a frontline state despite her distinct geographical
location because of her support to the political independence of Southern African states
(Ojokorutu and Adeleke 2017; Pine 2011). Therefore, commitment to anti-colonial activities
within the Nigerian foreign policy enabled the advancement of her hegemonic position in
Africa.

The TAC as earlier mentioned is a foreign policy thrust of Nigeria that projects her leadership
position in Africa. The TAC scheme, which was formally established in 1987, was designed
to promote the socio-economic development of African states and the Caribbean region
(Tella 2018). The scheme can be regarded as a soft power tool employed to strengthen
Nigeria’s status in the global arena. Deriving from Nye’s idea of soft power (Nye 1990),
Nigeria has been able to use the TAC as a soft power to enhance its leadership position,
national image and regional dominance in its aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat. For
instance, a former President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma disclosed that; “Nigeria has continued
to grant development assistance and personnel to support my government’s socio-economic
programmes, including the Technical Aid Corps Agreement under which Nigerian experts
work in Namibia” (Adebanwi 2011, p.34). Nigeria provides human capital with, amongst
others, the requisite expertise in engineering, medicine, and agriculture to beneficiary
countries through the framework of the TAC scheme (Tella 2018). Many African states such
as Namibia, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, and The Gambia have engaged the services of the
TAC (Ogbonna and Olusola 2018). However, the TAC has cost the Nigerian government
over 26 Billion Naira (equivalent of about 64 million United States Dollars) from 2009-2019
without its receiving commensurate national benefits (Awosusi 2020; Ogbonna and Olusola
2018). Nigeria is deficient in terms of trained manpower requirement for its medical and

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educational sectors and yet priority is given to providing Nigerian medical experts and lecturers to hospitals and universities across African states under the TAC (Ukaogu 2020). Though foreign policies aimed at advancing the values and interest of a state in relation to other states, the benefits of such interactions have to be maximized by due consideration to the contemporary realities of the state concerned (Ukaogu 2020).

6.3.3 Nigeria as the country with Africa’s Largest Population

The population of a country constitutes an important component of its national power. Although a large population is a major requirement of strength of a nation, the absolute strength of that criterion is also dependent on the qualitative and productive aspects of the population that contributes to national development (Masterpeter 2008). This implies that a small productive population endowed with technical skilled manpower has the potential to exercise greater national power than a country with large population that lacks skills. Nigeria is described as a regional hegemon based on indices such as large population and human resources and economic potential of the country (Ojakorutu and Adeleke 2017). Nigeria has experienced a continuously rapidly growing population between 1991 and 2006. The 1991 National Population Census in Nigeria puts Nigeria’s population at about 89 million people with an annual growth rate of 2.82 per cent (Eme and Idike 2015). The 2006 census which was the last population National Population Census conducted by Nigeria’s National Population Commission recorded Nigeria’s population at 140,003,542 (Eme and Idike 2015). This translates into an annual growth rate of 3.2 per cent. Furthermore, the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs estimates Nigeria’s 2020 population at 206,139,589 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019). A further review of Nigeria’s population between 1991 and 2020 indicated that the population had doubled in number within three decades. This expansion puts the population of Nigeria ahead of any other African state (Lord-Mallam 2016). Nigerian scholars often use this fact to promote its aspiration for a permanent representation in the UNSC (Omoruyi 2020). Its population offers the largest market in Africa thereby providing opportunities for selling and marketing of goods and services by foreign investors (Terwase et al. 2014).

The huge population of the country also reflects the strength of her human resources. The skilled manpower of Nigeria’s large population is employed to advance Nigeria’s foreign policy and strengthen her national power (Ojakorutu and Adeleke 2017). This is achieved through the TAC scheme discussed in Section 6.3.2. Nigeria’s large population is also
recognised as grounds for her being awarded a permanent seat (Lord-Mallam 2012); a view that was concurred with by Interviewee E (a senior diplomat at the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) who proclaimed that “there is no way any country can claim to be a more suitable representative of Africa and the black race in the Security Council than Nigeria. Our population is a huge asset we can leverage on to seek for a permanent seat”. The power of a state could be attributed to quantitative variables such as population, GDP and military capabilities, which empowers it to exert political, economic and strategic influence in global affairs (Archer and Nugent 2002).

The rise in population growth as considered above in the case of Nigeria could significantly undermine national power. Nigeria has not been able to utilise efficiently her large population potential as a result of high poverty rate prevalent in the country according to the UN Human Development Index, which is a tool that measures achievement in key areas of human development. The UN 2018 Human Development Index ranked Nigeria 157 from a total of 189 countries evaluated (UN 2018 Human Development Index). The report revealed that Nigeria has the highest level of poverty in the globe with 87 million people living in extreme poverty as against 73 million people in India that previously had highest number of people living in poverty (UN 2018 Human Development Index). The consequences of failure in economic development could be linked to challenges such as high unemployment and inadequate basic infrastructure which breed poverty.

### 6.4 Challenges Associated with Nigeria’s Ambition for Permanent membership of the UNSC

This section considers internal conditions amongst some of the issues that could portend a serious setback to Nigeria’s quest for a permanent UNSC seat. The internal condition encompasses the socio-economic and political realities on the domestic front that could constrain Nigeria’s bid for a permanent seat (Mbara 2019). In considering these issues, bad governance, security challenges and economic constraint will be discussed under sub-sections as domestic factors confronting Nigeria in the pursuit of her aspiration for permanent membership of the UNSC. The domestic environment is a key condition that can shape and influence the foreign policy objective of a nation. It is on this account that Nigeria’s former Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Joy Ugwu (Interviewee F) disclosed that; “is your domestic policies that reflects your weakness or power abroad. Nigeria and the developing countries have to put their domestic environment in order. If you are not strong at
all, you cannot be strong abroad. To be strong abroad, you must be strong at home because that is the foundation of your foreign policy”. Ahmed (2020) shared a similar position to that of Ambassador Ogwu as the scholar described the domestic conditions as those variables such as political, economic, military and institutional frameworks, which influence the nature and course of foreign policy of a state. The foreign policy, which promotes the national interests of a nation at international level, is by implication a reflection of the internal conditions and realities of a state (Lamido 2000).

It can therefore be advanced that internal factors influence state behaviour in the international arena and the responses that arise reflect how on how the state is perceived. Although, there could be exceptions where domestic conditions of a state may not actually affect the advancement of its foreign policy objectives as in the case of the UN General Assembly where support for member states are sometimes influenced by compromises or bloc voting (Hug and Lukacs 2014). For instance, despite the poor human right records in Venezuela and Libya, both countries were elected in 2019 as members of the UN Human Right Council for tenure of three years (Jerusalem Post 2019). Also, Libya was elected in 2003 as Chairperson of the UN Human Rights Commission (now UN Human Right Council) after securing the votes from 33 countries in its favour with three opposed and 17 abstentions (UN News 2003).

6.4.1 Bad Governance

The leadership of any government, which enhances the position of a state in the international scene, drives good governance. The leadership of a state reflects the image of the country internationally and could change its potential power into actual power (Rizwan 2009). To this end, bad governance due to leadership problem has been described as a major impediment that has prevented Nigeria from attaining its full potentials in all spheres of human development (Ade-Ibijola 2015). Achebe (1984, p.1) described the leadership problem in Nigeria thus; “the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership…. the Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which are the hallmark of true leadership”. More than three decades after this submission, the leadership problem still remains a major issue affecting good governance and probity in Nigeria as witnessed by the prevalence of corruption amongst political leaders. Nigeria has, arguably, not been able to harness its economic potentials from its enormous resources due to bad governance resulting from ineffective political leadership (Adefarasin 2015). The absence of credible leadership,
which result to bad governance, has been identified amongst the critical challenges confronting Nigeria. The challenges of leadership have been attributed to colonial misadventure as the British colonial administration divided the country into three (Nwagboso and Duke 2012). Hence, created divisions amongst ethnic nationalities in the country and made the emergence of a competent and nationally accepted leadership difficult. It may however not be logical to continue to blame colonial administration, which ended six decades ago for the current leadership woes in the country. Nigeria had governed itself as a sovereign nation since 1960 and it is doubtful if its present systemic and institutional challenges can be attributed to the colonial government (Adefarasin 2015).

A meaningful progress in national development in a country is a result of careful planning and efficient allocation of resources under competent, purposeful, and committed leadership (Saidu 2015). However, the absence of good and strong leadership in the saddle of the political leadership of the country was observed to have accounted for misgovernance in Nigeria after political independence (Ebegbulem 2012). This explains why some of the political leaders that have emerged have been immersed with corrupt practices and political bickering that has resulted in maladministration and wastage of national resources (Ogbak 2019). Commenting further, Imhonopi and Ugochukwu (2013) contended that the political leadership mismanaged national resources and undermined national development with attendant consequences upon issues of poverty, unemployment, and insecurity. Moreover, some scholars have also linked poor leadership to the heterogeneous nature of Nigeria while others view corruption and the absence of visionary leadership as impediments to good governance. Therefore corruption may be associated as parts of a leadership problem, which may, in turn, negatively impact on the image of Nigeria in its quest for a UNSC permanent seat. Corrupt practices such as embezzlement of public funds, favouritism and partiality in decision-making and allocation of values can weaken national development (Agboola et al. 2017). Corruption can adversely affect the soft power credentials of Nigeria and also diminish her international reputation. The consequences of corruption in Nigeria are enormous and manifested in decayed infrastructure, poverty, unemployment and misuse of public resources (Enofe and Odibo 2018).

Nigeria has undertaken several reforms since the return of democracy in 1999 in order to enhance its transparency and accountability (Itodo and O'Regan 2018). The resolve to implement these reforms led to the establishment of Anti-corruption institutions such as the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices and the other Related Offences Commission (Itodo and O'Regan 2018). Additionally, policies and enactments to improve public procurement and due process were, amongst other measures, put in place by past and present governments in Nigeria. The current government of President Muhammadu Buhari made the fight against corruption a top priority, and anti-corruption campaign was part of the government’s three cardinal pillars of its electioneering campaign (Adegoke 2017). Despite these reforms and government policies, there has not been substantial progress in the anti-corruption crusade based on assessment reports on corruption. The Transparency International reports have shown that Nigeria has not improved in terms of levels of corruption; it is still perceived as highly corrupt (Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2018, 2019, 2020). This has smeared the global image and perception of Nigeria and thus, may negatively impacts its popularity in the UN General Assembly as a suitable contender for permanent seat in a reformed UNSC.

In view of the foregoing, there is the need for the Nigerian government to change strategies to reposition its anti-corruption agencies by making them truly independent from government interference (Agboola et al. 2017). The agencies could be well equipped with trained personnel and strengthened financially by reviewing their annual operational budgets upward. The Nigerian government could also formulate new policies to enhance political integrity and public accountability in both political and public offices (Nwaodu et al. 2014). These measures would ensure greater law enforcement and prosecution by the anti-corruption agencies and serve as a major deterrent to corrupt practices. Furthermore, the Nigerian government could also consider reviewing the extant anti-corruption laws in order to ensure speedy trial of corruption cases. In doing so, a law establishing Federal Tribunal for Corruption Offences may be enacted by the National Assembly (Nwaodu et al. 2014). Such legislation will state the powers and scope of the court in the speedy dispensation of justice.

6.4.2 Security Challenges

The provision of security and the well being of citizens is the primary function of all governments. This responsibility is encapsulated in Chapter II, Section (2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The section provides that; “the security and welfare of the people shall be the purpose of government” (The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). The Nigerian state appears, however, to have failed to fulfil this obligation due to the unprecedented levels of insecurity in the country. Nigeria is facing the
most difficult time in her history after her civil war because of the incessant increase in the activities of insurgency and banditry activities (Chilaka and Idika 2019). It may thus seem hyperbolic for Nigeria to seek to defend other nations and maintain global security as a permanent member of the UNSC when she has not been able to guarantee her own security (Chilaka and Idika 2019). These specific internal problems that Nigeria faces in this regard (as subsequently discussed) may also affect its image in the international community represented in the UN General Assembly where Nigeria would seek for the support of UN member states in her aspiration for a permanent seat of the UNSC. Therefore, the image perception of a country could impact on its standing in the international system (Duke et al. 2017).

In the North East region of the country, the Boko Haram Insurgents and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have held sway in the region killing many people and causing huge humanitarian crises with the displacement of millions of citizens (Husted and Blanchard 2020). The Boko Haram group, which derived its name from the ideology that Islam forbids western education and lifestyle, was founded in 2002 as an indigenous Islamic sect known as “Jama’atu Ahlul Sunna Liddawati Wal Jihad” (Adeyemi-Suenu 2015). Thus, the meaning translated as “People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad”. The violent attacks by the group against the state necessitated it designation by the Nigerian government as a terrorist organisation in 2012 (Attoh 2018). The alliance of the Boko Haram with international terror groups led to its proscription and designation as international terrorist organisation by the United States and the United Kingdom in November 2013 and May 2014 respectively (Gilbert 2014). The ISWAP, which is a splinter group that emerged from Boko Haram due to leadership tussle, has allegiance to the Islamic State terrorist group (Husted and Blanchard 2020). This implied that the insurgency in Nigeria has direct collaboration with international terrorist organisations and such alliances could enhance the capacity of the insurgent groups in launching terror attacks and causing huge casualties.

The fatality figures from the activities of the insurgents group indicated that about 38,000 Nigerians were killed in the past decade (Husted and Blanchard 2020). Similarly, about 2.1 million Nigerians were internally displaced in the North East while about 300,000 Nigerians are living as refugees in Niger, Chad and Cameroon (UNHCR 2020). The security problem in the North West region has been worsened by the activities of armed bandits, cattle rustling and kidnappings. According to the International Crisis Group (2020), an estimated 8,000
people were killed and 200,000 displaced between 2011 and early 2020. The North Central region is confronted with communal conflict between farmer and herders while in the South, kidnapping, criminality and militancy in the Niger Delta region have contributed to the insecurity in the area (Husted and Blanchard 2020). Analysis of the fatality figures in the North Central region showed that about 2,000 Nigerians were killed annually between 2011 and 2016 (International Crisis Group 2020).

These security challenges may have adverse effect on Nigeria’s foreign policy as it undermines her image on the global scene and her quest for a permanent seat of the UNSC. The domestic condition of any country is a determinant of its foreign policy (Khara 2018) and, as explained in Section 6.4, the domestic factor is connected to the external environment because it influences the nature and course of the foreign policy of a state. Therefore, the high level of insecurity in Nigeria affects her foreign policy since her standing abroad is dependent on her domestic condition (Musa and Ajibade 2018). The ratings of Nigeria by the Global Terrorism Index suggest a worsened state of insecurity in the country with adverse implications on the global perception of the country. The Global Terrorism Index 2020 ranked Nigeria 3rd amongst the ten most impacted by terrorism for Years 2015 - 2019 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2020). The Boko Haram insurgents, banditry activities and the farmer-herders conflict were attributed the terror-related attacks. The spate of violent attacks by insurgents is not a security concern to Nigeria alone but also to the international community. The activities of the Boko Haram insurgents have constituted a security threat to ECOWAS member states such as Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon (Attoh 2018). The insurgency in the North-eastern part of Nigeria has affected her standing in the international system more than any other contemporary times and deride her quest for a UNSC permanent seat (Mbara 2019; National Human Development Report 2018).

6.4.3 Economic Constraints to Nigeria’s ambition for UNSC permanent membership

The criteria-based approach as advanced by the Council on Foreign Relations evaluates the suitability of contenders for a permanent seat of the UNSC based on criteria such as financial contributions to the UN regular budget including a potential threshold for permanent members (McDonald and Patrick 2010). The financial contribution condition of the criteria-based approach could be related to the economic power of a state, as it is a determinant of the contribution by the given member country. In evaluating contenders for a UNSC permanent seat based on financial contributions, Nigeria could be assessed to have a weak economy as
its contribution is extremely low compared to the P5 members and the G4 countries of Japan, Germany, India and Brazil that are also aspiring nations for a UNSC permanent seat (McDonald and Patrick 2010). African states are among the lowest financial contributors to the UN regular budget as they appear amongst the 135 countries, which contribute less than 1 per cent to the UN budget (UN 2019-ST/ADM/SER.B/1008). Despite being a major African contender for a UNSC permanent seat, Nigeria is not Africa’s top financial contributor to the UN regular budget as indicated in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Financial Contributions by Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt to UN Regular Budget Year 2016-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage Contribution</td>
<td>Amount Paid (United States Dollars)</td>
<td>Percentage Contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>8,390,135</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>8,335,646</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>9,784,785</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>10,106,569</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>9,828,684</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


An analysis of the contributions by Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt in the Table above reveals that South Africa is largest contributor to the UN budget with the contribution of 0.72 per cent and 0.364 per cent from 2016 to 2020. However, Nigeria contributed 0.209 per cent and 0.250 per cent for years 2016 to 2020 which is relatively low compared to the average financial contributions to the regular UN budget by the P5 (UN Finance Briefings 2017). As for instance, the USA, China and UK contribute averagely about 22, 12 and 4.5 per cent respectively of the total UN regular budget (Better World Campaign 2021; UN Finance Briefings 2017). The contribution by member states to UN regular budget is backed by Article 17 of the UN Charter, which states, “the Organisation’s expenses shall be borne by the member states as apportioned by the General Assembly” (Article 17, UN Charter 1945). The Administrative and Budgetary (Fifth) Committee of the UN General Assembly determines the contributions by each member state based on assessment after every three years (Global Policy Forum 2021). Such evaluations take into account the Gross National Product and per capital income of a state; both are usually connected to its economic
development in order to arrive at specific financial contribution to the UN regular budget (Shendruk 2020).

The criteria-based approach shifts the focus of eligibility for a UNSC permanent seat from a conversation of entitlement to qualification by contending states. The argument for eligibility for a permanent seat based on entitlement is influenced by the desire to have equitable geographical representation between the different regions of the world (Akindele and Akintenrinwa 1998). The African Common Position on UNSC reform is in contradiction to the criteria-based approach as it sought Africa’s representation in the permanent seat in order to redress historical injustices to the continent. Furthermore, the eligibility for a permanent seat based on geographical representation could be related to Article 23(1) of the UN Charter, which stipulates the criteria to be considered in electing the 10 non-permanent members of the UNSC (UN Charter 1945). One of these conditions is the consideration for equitable distribution of the non-permanent seat (UN Charter 1945). Consequently, the proponents for equitable representation desire to extend the scope of this criterion to address the non-representation of Africa and Latin America (Fassbender 2003).

Nigeria emerged as the largest economy in Africa with a GDP of $522 billion after the rebasing of its economy in 2014 (Ojokorutu and Adeleke 2017). As a result of this, Nigeria was rated as the fastest growing economy in Africa with a 6.2 growth rate (Dauda et al. 2019). Based on the economic potential of Nigeria as revealed by the rebasing of its economy, Cilliers et al (2015, p.7) submitted that; “Nigeria’s GDP is forecast to grow from slightly over $525 billion in 2014 to slightly over $4.2 trillion by 2040”. This projection does, however, seem doubtful because of the downward trend of world economies due to the Covid-19 pandemic and falling oil prices. According to Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistic, the economy of the country declined by 6.1 per cent in the second quarter 2020 and the GDP recorded a contraction of 3.62 per cent in the third quarter of 2020 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). The decline in Nigeria’s GDP figure in the second quarter seems close to the projection by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which forecasted a decline of 5.4 per cent in Nigeria’s economy for Year 2020 (IMF Regional Economic Outlook June 2020). Despite a lower GDP of $376.284 billion compared to its GDP in 2014, Nigeria still remains the biggest economy in Africa by GDP consideration (Omoruyi 2020). However, the Nigerian economy is confronted by economic challenges that could undermine its regional dominance and quest for a UNSC permanent seat. The economy is constrained by over
dependence on oil and infrastructural deficit such as chronic power shortages amongst others, which will be discussed in the sub-sections below (World Bank 2019).

6.4.3.1 Nigeria’s Reliance on oil
The huge reliance on oil is arguably Nigeria’s most significant economic constraint. The political economy of Nigeria has undergone a mixed history. In the pre - independence period and early 1960s, the agricultural sector was the dominant sector of the economy contributing about 90 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and employing 70 per cent of its population (Gbahabo and Oduro-Afriyie 2017). The groundnut pyramids, cocoa farms and palm plantations in the Northern, Western and Eastern regions of Nigeria respectively were the major sources of revenue that sustained these regions (Onimode 1999). This however changed with the discovery of oil, which became the dominant resources by mid-1970s while the agricultural and other non-oil sectors were neglected (Gbahabo and Oduro-Afriyie 2017; Adedipe 2004). As a result, the oil dependence exposes the nation to oil price volatility with consequences on Nigeria’s public finances and capital expenditures (Agbaeze 2015; Ahmad and Singh 2003).

Nigeria operates a mono product economy, which is heavily reliant on crude oil. The latter accounts for about 90 per cent of the nation’s gross exports leaving 10 per cent to non-oil sector such as agricultural produce and solid minerals (Adams 2019). Despite efforts through government policies to diversify the economy towards agriculture and solid minerals development, such policies and programmes have achieved only minimal results. The economic consequences of falls in oil price could have been minimized by fiscal measures such as an efficient Sovereign Wealth Fund to deal with macroeconomic shocks arising from fluctuations in the global oil market (Mesagan and Eregha 2018). The Sovereign Wealth Fund is an investment fund owned by the state for the pooling of earnings from excess crude for future use (Isola et al. 2017; Mehrpouya 2015; Tsani 2013). The Sovereign Wealth Fund in Nigeria established by the Sovereign Investment Authority Act 2011 has not, however, been efficiently managed to provide economic stabilisation against shock from global crude oil price fluctuation as evident by its recent negative impacts on the Nigerian economy (Mesagan and Eregha 2018). In addition, the mismanagement of oil earnings by weak institutions affects export performance and economic growth because it reduces the capacity of resource abundant countries to diversify their export structure (Kronenberg 2004). As such, the above economic constraints reduces the strength of the Nigerian economy and threatens her potential of sustaining the largest economy in Africa as her economic power in the
context of Africa is amongst the major prospects argued in favour of Nigeria’s aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat.

The fall in the price of crude oil in the global market has reduced Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings and distorted its economy with significant impact on sustainable growth and economic development (Adams 2019). The decline in the foreign exchange earnings has negative consequences on the economy on various fronts as it could result to balance of payment problems and difficulty to execute development projects thereby undermining Nigeria’s economic prospects as a potential candidate state for permanent membership of the UNSC (Metu et al. 2020). The huge dependence in oil revenue has resulted in external borrowing by the government to finance annual budgets (Adams 2019). Urama et al. (2018) revealed that Nigeria’s debt profile has consistently increased from 8.82 billion USD in December 2013 to 22.07 billion USD as at March 2018. According to the Debt Management Office (DMO), Nigeria’s external profile rose from 9.7 billion USD in 2015 to 27 billion USD by December 2020 (DMO 2020). Nigeria’s huge debt burden could lead to undesirable consequences on the economy and as such given the economic problem, it would be difficult to carry the financial burden often associated with the exalted position of the UNSC permanent seat (Udeh and Okoroafor 2016). As noted earlier in Section 6.4.3, the permanent members are amongst the major financial contributors to the regular UN budget while African states constitute the least contributors.

The increase in external borrowing resulted in a depletion of Nigeria’s external reserve, high inflation rate and unemployment (Metu 2020). The plunge in oil price has negatively impacted on Nigeria’s external reserve as it has induced its significant decline at different intervals between 2015 and 2020. Nigeria’s foreign reserve fell by 13.4 per cent ($4.628 billion) as of March 2015 compared to $34.493 in January 2015 and further declined to $ 28.28 billion by December 2015 (Nwafor 2017). According to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), external reserve reached the lowest level of $23.897 billion by October 2016 since 2005 as a result of the economic recession experienced by Nigeria occasioned by shock in oil price (CBN 2020). The external reserve grew in January 2018 from $38.91 billion to $43.12 billion by December 2018 (CBN 2018). However, by April 2020, the external reserve depleted to $33.44 billion due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which led to the decline in oil price (CBN 2020). The dwindling in the level of foreign reserve exposes the fragility of Nigeria’s economy and slows down its GDP growth. Nigeria’s GDP growth rate has continued to
decrease as a result of the crash in oil price (World Bank 2019). Nigeria’s GDP growth rate averaged 7.2 per cent between 2000 and 2014 while since 2015, the GDP growth plunged to an average of 5.0 per cent due to the oil price shock (World Bank 2019). Furthermore, the African Development Bank projected that Nigeria GDP will grow at an average rate of 2.9 per cent in 2020 and 3.3 per cent for 2021 (African Development Bank 2020). This clearly indicated a significant decrease in Nigeria’s GDP prior to the 2015 economic growth rate with negative implications to her economic power. As such, the contraction of Nigeria’s GDP undermines its economic potential and prospect for UNSC permanent membership from the standpoint of economic strength advanced in the argument by Lord-Mallam (2016) and Thekiso and Wyke (2019) as possible requirement for suitability for a UNSC permanent seat.

6.4.3.2 Infrastructural Deficit in Nigeria

Infrastructural deficit in Nigeria is also a major hindrance to economic growth. Poor infrastructure affects the efficacy of the Nigerian economy thereby weaken its competitiveness in the global arena especially as it aspires for a permanent seat in a reformed UNSC. The failure of the government to maintain critical infrastructure such as power generation, road networks and railways amongst others is partly responsible for the epileptic electricity supply, high unemployment, poverty and insecurity in Nigeria (Rufus and Bufumoh 2017). The infrastructural challenge could be related to the neglect of infrastructural development by the government as seen in the budgetary allocation to capital expenditures. The 2018 annual budget of Nigeria of 9.12 Trillion Naira earmarked barely 2.87 Trillion Naira (approximately $7.57 billion) as capital expenditure while only 2.09 Trillion Naira (approximately $5.51 billion) was allocated to capital expenditure in the 2019 annual budget of 8.92 Trillion Naira (Budget Office of the Federation 2018; BudgIT 2019). Similarly, in the 2020 Annual Budget of 10.59 Trillion Naira, the Federal Government of Nigeria appropriated only 2.47 Trillion Naira (approximately $6.51 billion) for capital expenditure (BudgIT 2020). From the foregoing, limited allocation for capital project could be regarded as a remote cause for decayed infrastructure in the country and impact on Nigeria’s economic potentials.

The extent of Nigeria’s infrastructural challenge was revealed when Nigeria’s Vice-President, Professor Yemi Osibanjo explained that the country would require about $3 Trillion over the next 30 years to address its infrastructural problems (Osibanjo 2020). This financial requirement estimate for infrastructural development in Nigeria far exceeded its total annual
budget (Osibanjo 2020). Hence, the Nigerian government does not have the financial resources to promptly bridge the infrastructural gap in the country. There is the need for the government to initiate policies that will encourage massive private investment in infrastructural development (Fidelis et al. 2014). To this end, increased collaboration between the public and private sector through Public-Private Partnership could assist in tackling the infrastructural deficit and favourably impact on her economic power thereby strengthening Nigeria’s economic prospect as a possible contender for a UNSC permanent seat.

6.5 The AU’s call for UNSC reform: Any possibility of AU support for Nigeria?

The quest by Africa for permanent seat in a reformed UNSC is mainly aimed at getting any African state into the permanent membership as earlier discussed in the assessment of AU reform proposal in Chapter Four. In Africa’s bid to secure permanent membership of the Council, African representatives in successive UN General Assembly debates have taken turns to demand African inclusion into the permanent chamber of the Security Council. The position of the AU as enunciated in the Ezulwuni Consensus did not state the possible African candidate states for a UNSC permanent seat. It did however show that the AU is desirous of a permanent seat for Africa and that the continent would collaborate and negotiate as a regional bloc to present a common candidate to the UN. It also maintained that the responsibility of which nation should be considered to be Africa’s permanent member in the Council should be solely an African matter. This is because the AU has the capacity to determine the rightful African candidate for a UNSC permanent seat as it has previously done for other international appointments through a Ministerial Committee (AU 2014 EX. CL/821 (XXIV) Rev.1). For instance, the AU Ministerial Committee on African Candidature within the International System during its Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session recommended African candidates for international appointments such as Secretary General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organisation and membership of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities amongst others (AU 2014 EX. CL/821 (XXIV) Rev.1).

At the same time, however, the AU may not necessarily have a preference towards any African state, as it has not yet established the criteria to be used to determine a suitable African state for the UNSC. Nigeria is a prominent African candidate state aspiring for a UNSC permanent seat despite the inadequacies that it possess; as previously noted in Section 6.4. The contribution of Nigeria to the promotion of peace, security and stability in
Africa and her leadership roles in the continent could also be used to make a case for the country as a possible candidate for UNSC permanent seat. However, Nigeria may have to contend with opposition by some AU member states due to conflict of interests in its quest for a permanent seat of the Security Council (Agwu 2013). Historically, Nigeria’s leading role in Africa has always been challenged by other African states since the 1960s (Lord-Mallam 2016). The Maghreb region has always demonstrated a competitive spirit against Nigeria with respect to its leadership in Africa (Lord-Mallam 2016). The resentment against Nigeria was, for instance, manifested after the strong objection by P5 members to the extension of veto power to the G4 countries or any reform interest group during the 2005 reform debate of the UN (Agwu 2013). Nigeria’s diplomatic efforts to mobilize African states during an emergent AU Summit in Addis Ababa to stand down Africa’s demand for a veto-wielding permanent membership as a result of the stance and inflexibility of the P5 members was unsuccessful (Udedibia 2010). The proposal failed due to resistance by a group of Africa states spearheaded by North African states of Libya, Egypt and Tunisia alongside Kenya and Senegal, which accused Nigeria of undermining the Ezulwuni Consensus by persuading African states to discard the demand for a veto wielding permanent seat (Agwu 2013). This suggests the problem associated with consensus building in the AU and also the rivalry Nigeria may encounter among African states if the AU decides to select suitable African candidate states in the event of any reformation of the UNSC. Hence, such contest could undermine Nigeria’s quest for a UNSC permanent seat.

Furthermore, regional-based biases could influence the AU’s choice of a suitable African state for a UNSC permanent seat. There are divisions within the AU caused by Regional Economic Communities (REC) such as the ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) due to their desire to advance their various interests by supporting the candidacy of their member states to secure international appointments or membership of multilateral organisation; as seen in the election of the AU Commission Chairperson (Maseng and Lekaba 2014). The election of the AU Commission Chairperson is often determined along regional lines (Omoruyi et al. 2020). A case in point was the election of the AU Chairperson in 2012, which revealed the regional divisions in the continent, and such differences could influence the AU’s selection of contending African states for a UNSC permanent seat. As a result of regional sentiments, the South African candidate was elected after gaining massive support from the SADC (Maseng 2013). In addition, the support base of the Gabonese candidate, Jean Ping who lost the election was from the ECOWAS bloc.
(Maseng 2013). As such, REC are undoubtedly contending bloc in Africa’s multilateral diplomacy that would influence the selection of suitable African states for a UNSC permanent seat.

6.6 Conclusion

The Chapter has been able to draw empirical data from senior UN diplomats and officials of the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to evaluate the prospects and challenges associated with Nigeria’s aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat. Nigeria’s desire for a UNSC permanent seat was not visible in her foreign relation in her first three decades after independence. However, its quest for reform of the Security Council was brought to prominence when its Representative at the 47th Session of the UN General Assembly declared for the first time her desire to occupy a permanent UNSC seat. The findings from the analysis of data collected from interviews of high-ranking officials of the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that Nigeria has no deliberate and coordinated policy approach to pursue her ambition for a permanent seat.

The Nigerian government could consider developing a long-term projection for its foreign policy strategy to outlast different governments in order to ensure continuity of policies regarding its aspiration for permanent membership. A Standing Committee could be established to address the issue of inconsistent strategy by different Nigerian governments especially with respect to Nigeria’s international role in the contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. The membership of the Committee would cover representatives from Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NIIA, NIPSS, the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria and the Ministry of Defence with the mandate to formulate a consolidated working policy document that would guide Nigeria’s diplomatic relation with respect to UNSC reform. Furthermore, the track record of Nigeria’s contribution to global peace and security and its leadership role in Africa were identified as key credentials that could favour her ambition. However, the prevailing domestic conditions of Nigeria appeared to be amongst the major constraints to Nigeria’s suitability as a permanent member in a reformed Security Council. The Chapter concludes that though the AU is Africa’s highest continental body, the REC will play a significant role in determining the selection of suitable African states for a UNSC permanent seat.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

7.0 Summary of Chapters

The main objectives of this thesis were to ascertain whether there is an African perspective on UNSC reform while also evaluating the prospects and challenges of Nigeria’s quest for a permanent seat of the Security Council. The thesis is divided into Six Chapters with Chapter Seven as the conclusion. The first Chapter generally presented the background of the study and was also structured to explain the research methodology employed for this thesis. The chapter briefly discussed the overarching issues on the debate for the reform of the UNSC. These fundamental issues were imbalance UNSC membership representation, veto power and the working methods of the Council. These issues were narrowed to membership composition and the veto in the context of Africa’s quest for the reform of the UNSC. Furthermore, the Chapter outlined the research problem followed by the examination of the research questions and objectives and discussion of the research methodology. The research methodology and techniques explained the fieldwork activity, data collection and methods of analysis and the research limitations. The Chapter also highlighted the research ethical consideration.

The second Chapter was structured into two parts of which the first part reviewed relevant literature with respect to the discourse investigated while the other segment discussed the theoretical framework adopted for this thesis. The Chapter reviewed the underlying issues on UNSC reform and the debate on the legitimacy of the UNSC and veto power. Most of the literature reviewed in this chapter seemed to have limited scope in their engagement of the discourse as emerging development such as the proposal for text-based negotiations in the UN General Assembly intergovernmental negotiations and the activities of the AU C-10 to project the AU reform position were not taken into account. The Chapter also reviewed literature on the UNSC reform debates from the perspectives of Africa and Nigeria. The second part of the Chapter critically examined the realist theory and related its core elements of power and state interest with legitimacy in order to deconstruct the overarching issues regarding the aspiration by African states for the reform of the UNSC. As such, political realism was adopted as a theoretical framework and its analytical parameter was used to argue Africa’s quest for UNSC reform and evaluate Nigeria’s prospects and challenges for a UNSC permanent seat. The elements of state power, national interest and security as
emphasized by the theory were central in explaining the dynamics of world politics in relation to the UN system. The realist theory interrogated moral philosophy and sought to reconstruct an understanding of virtue based on practice and historical circumstance, which could be connected to the decolonisation of African states that resulted to the enlargement membership states of the UN and subsequently influenced the quest for the reformation of the Security Council.

Chapter three examined the relationship between decolonisation of African states and the quest for the reform of the UNSC. The attainment of political independence by majority of African colonies changed the dynamics in the UN as it increased its membership composition, which influenced the quest for the reformation of the Security Council. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 that advocated the right of self-determination of colonial entities was instrumental to decolonisation of African territories. The roles of the OAU and AU could be identified in both the decolonisation processes of Africa and the quest for the reformation of the Security Council. While OAU resolutions and the Pan-African ideology of African nationalists specifically promoted the political emancipation of African states, the AU resolutions at different period defined Africa’s quest for UNSC reform. Therefore, the analysis of OAU/AU Resolutions in the Chapter was able to achieve a specific research objective of this thesis with regards to the impacts of the resolutions in the adoption of the Ezulwuni Consensus.

Chapter four aimed to investigate UNSC legitimacy from an African perspective while also addressing Research Question 1 (How legitimate is the UNSC in the absence of an African state(s) as part of the permanent member?). These tasks were undertaken by the presentation and analysis of empirical data from official statements by member states’ representatives at the UN General Assembly Session and also feedback from senior diplomats in some UN Permanent Missions in New York. The Chapter provided the framework to elucidate the discussion on legitimacy by exploring different perceptions of the concept from the fusionist, state versus legal and realist approaches to legitimacy. This set the basis for connecting UNSC legitimacy to permanent membership composition, veto power functions and the selective exercise of UNSC powers by the P5 members. The Chapter was able to establish the connection of African perception of UNSC legitimacy to Africa’s exclusion from UNSC permanent membership based on the analysis of the interviews of senior officials from African states and primary documents of the UN and AU.
Chapter five of this thesis aims to evaluate Africa’s non-permanent representation in the Security Council in order to identify the limitations of such representation thereby inspiring the quest for a UNSC permanent seat and also consider the reform positions of major African contenders. The limits of non-permanent membership of the UNSC are distinguishable by its short tenure of a two-years term and reduced formal powers in contrast with the permanent membership. The formal powers of the permanent members are specified under Articles 27, 108 and 109 of the UN Charter that deals with the P5 veto, their power to veto and amendment of the UN Charter respectively. The quest by other UN member states for reformation of the UNSC could be attributed to the special privileges and powers of the permanent seat. Therefore, the AU’s desire for UNSC permanent seat for Africa may be explained on this basis (veto power privilege) and exclusion from the permanent seat as advocated by the Ezulwuni Consensus. Furthermore, the perspectives on UNSC reform by major African contenders for permanent seat seemed supportive of the text-based negotiation for inter-governmental negotiations and elicited varying views about the mandate of the AU C-10 in the advancement of Africa’s proposal for the Security Council reform. In doing so, this Chapter was able to achieve a specific objective of the thesis, which is the examination of the perspectives of major African contenders for a permanent seat in the UNSC.

Chapter six explored Nigeria’s prospects and challenges for a UNSC permanent seat and also sought to respond to Research Questions 2 and 3 (Q2: Is Nigeria a potential candidate state from Africa for permanent membership of the UNSC; Q3: What are the prospects of the AU support for Nigeria’s quest for a permanent seat of the UNSC?). The prospects of Nigeria’s quest for UNSC permanent seat were driven by different arguments that are reinforced by political realism with emphasis on the pursuit of power and relative gains. Thus, Nigeria’s contributions to global peace and security could be argued to be in favour of her ambition based on the requirements for membership of the UNSC under Article 23(1) of the UN Charter 1945. Also, Nigeria’s aspiration was evaluated by exploring the analytic tool for determining UNSC permanent membership as advanced by Lord-Mallam (2016; 2012), Tella (2019), Thekiso and Wyk (2019) and Omoruyi et al (2020). As such, Nigeria’s prospects for UNSC permanent seat could be argued on the basis of its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, its regional leadership roles in the continent and being the largest economy in Africa. However, domestic conditions such as bad, insecurity and economic factors may be extrapolated as major constraints to Nigeria’s bid for a UNSC permanent seat. Furthermore, the AU as Africa’s continental body is likely to be impartial in its selection of suitable
candidate state for UNSC permanent seat in the event of reformation of the UNSC, as it already has established mechanism for the election of African representatives for international positions. However, Nigeria will have to contend with regional biases in its aspiration for a permanent seat as regional economic communities in Africa often influence the outcome of elections.

7.1 Discussion of Research findings

Based on the structural realist theory adopted by this thesis, critical evaluation of the overarching issues of Africa’s quest for permanent seat and legitimacy of the UNSC was undertaken. The thesis noted how the global system has evolved since the founding of the UN after the World War II and how membership of the organisation has also expanded. The theory was brought to bear in explaining the dynamics of world politics in relation to the UN system. This thesis explored the analytic parameter of political realism to argue Africa’s clamour for an enlarged Security Council, and also narrated Nigeria’s prospect and challenges with respect to her aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat. The thesis found that the overwhelming call for reform of the UNSC was not only a result of the increased membership of UN member states but also induced by the desire by non-permanent states to advance their national interests and the power influence associated with permanent membership. This, in turn, is consistent with realist arguments pertaining to relative gains and the quest for power state actors usually sought for in the international system.

The balkanization of African territories during the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 created artificial borders in Africa without taking into account the cultural, ethnic and tribal affinities of the pre-colonial African communities (Anghie 2005). The thesis observed that the preponderance of ethnic conflict, border dispute and civil wars in Africa was associated to the demarcation of borders during colonial rule. The research established that there is a strong connection between the decolonisation of colonial territories and the quest by African states for reform to the UNSC. Liberated from the yoke of colonialism, 47 African states including Nigeria were admitted into the UN in the period 1955 to 1965 after (Aksu 2003). Diplomatic engagements by African states with the UN raised their consciousness and belief for total emancipation of African territories and also influenced their desire for a reformed UNSC.

The study found that the decolonisation of colonial territories gave rise to two fundamental issues that have influenced calls for UNSC reform. First, the enlargement of the membership of the UN General Assembly from its original 51 member states to 193 including 54 African
states changed the dynamics of power configuration in the UN (Ekwealor 2015). Secondly, the increase in the number of UN member states had implications for decision-making processes of the UN with resultant calls for expansion of the Security Council and improvement in its working methods (Hosli and Dofler 2019). The adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 1991 of 1963 to address the question of equitable representation on the Security Council and ECOSOC was one of the first steps that sought to tackle these challenges.

The thesis has demonstrated that there is no universal agreement on the concept of Pan-Africanism as it can be explained from three different broad perspectives: a racially inclined position, an advancement of continental unity position, and an upholding of national sovereignty position. Despite their differences, all three perspectives appear to focus on the struggle for equality and the political emancipation of Africa. This thesis therefore conceived Pan-Africanism from the second viewpoint of solidarity of African states, which is related to Kwame Nkrumah’s viewpoint of the ideology that favours the identification of Africa as a common entity in the advancement of its interests but differs from his position by advocating for a loose federation of African states. The choice of this perspective of the ideology was because of the Ezulwini Consensus, which promotes the collective interests of Africa in the quest for a UNSC permanent seat, and espouses the objectives of the Pan-African philosophy. Furthermore, it is desirable to review the ideology of Pan-Africanism from the notion of colonial experiences to conform with emerging developments in the contemporary international system prompted by new political, social, and cultural trends in African civilisation (Kasanda 2016). The new narrative of Pan-Africanism should be one that is racially inclusive and detached from the historical past while acknowledging the socio-cultural diversities of Africa. In addition, the Afrocentric ideology could be envisaged on the basis of solidarity that reflects the struggle against social inequalities and exclusion, and seeks to entrench global justice and support for human rights; major concerns in the governance of African states (Kasanda 2016).

This study has shown that historical factors such as colonial experience can be related to the perceived unequal participation of Africa in multilateral institutions such as the UN. The granting of the UNSC permanent seats to the P5 from the inception was based on the roles the victorious allies played in the World War II (Christopher 2021). Africa does not have stake as most of African states were under colonial rule and as such, the focus is on
attainment of political independence rather than seeking for a permanent seat. Viewed in this way, the adoption of the African Common Position on UNSC reform aimed to address the historical injustices to Africa, which have resulted from its non-representation within a permanent seat. In addition, Aspiration Number Seven of the AU Agenda 2063 conceived in 2015 sought to promote the Ezulwuni Consensus. This goal, as part of the broad framework of the Continental Agenda, considers the need to address the structural imbalance in the composition of the UNSC because its decisions have direct consequences on the stability of the continent. The analysis of the above in Chapter three was able to address a specific research objective set out in this thesis regarding whether colonial rule influenced Africa’s exclusion from the UNSC permanent membership.

Through the evaluation of responses from interviewees and scholarly perspectives this thesis has shown that the veto power privilege of the P5 members is a contentious issue that affects the legitimacy perception of the UNSC by UN member states. The veto power confers legal hegemony to the P5 members, as it is implicitly an instrument of domination of the UNSC by a smaller group, which hinders its decision-making processes (Oludoun 2014). Such a concern is evidenced by the demand for its abolition or extension to new permanent members in UNSC reform proposals, as demonstrated in the case of the AU reform proposal, which sought for a veto power wielding permanent seat for Africa (Badza 2019). Though the written privilege of the P5 members in respect of the veto power is a major legitimacy concern of the UNSC, privileges such as the pen-holding responsibilities of presiding over the drafting of resolutions are also contested issue being advocated for reformation. Having extrapolated primary documents such as official statement of some UN member states’ representatives and responses by interviewee (see Section 6.2.2), it can be inferred that the pen-holding responsibilities with regards to the drafting of major global security issues have been mostly concentrated in the hands of the P5 members thereby ignoring an inclusive decision-making approach in the UNSC. Such practice does not allow for wide consultation and deliberation with all Council members for exchange of information. This could undermine a transparent decision-making process in the UNSC as such prepared draft by the pen-holder are usually reflected in the eventual resolutions, presidential statements and the President’s letter and notes. Furthermore, though the AU reform proposal seeks to achieve greater legitimacy for the UNSC through achieving permanent African membership, this could result in a challenge to maintaining the balance between representation and efficiency as an enlarged UNSC could interfere with its effective functioning (Caron 1993). The
expansion may reduce the perceived dominance of the UNSC by the P5 but it will not end the quest for reform as more members would seek for representation in the Council and as such will not significantly lead to stronger perception of legitimacy (Reismann 1993; Caron 1993).

In answer to Research Question one, this thesis established through the analysis of official statement of Africa’s Representatives at the UN, AU resolutions, feedbacks of interviewees and scholarly sources that African states perceived legitimacy of the UNSC on the basis of absence of an African state as a permanent member which was regarded by the AU as historical injustice to the continent (See Section 4.3). Hence, their arguments is underpinned by the advocacy for structural reformation of the UNSC, which is concerned with membership enlargement of the Security Council through the amendment of the UN Charter 1945 (Badza 2019). As such, the working method reform where the amendments of the UN Charter is not a requirement since the UNSC can adopt its own rules of procedure review, is not the focus of their position. The P5 members do not interpret the legitimacy of the Security Council on the basis of the non-representation of other regions in the permanent seat, as it is provisions of the UN Charter that establishes the derived legitimacy of the UNSC. Whilst Africa does not have a permanent seat in the Security Council, this study in further response to Research Question One concluded that its absence does not delegitimise the Council as its membership composition, functions, and powers are part of the lawful provisions of the UN Charter, which is binding on all UN member states.

Furthermore, the demand by Africa for the veto for new permanent members is a problematic clause in the Ezulwuni Consensus that makes consideration of Africa’s position in the reformation of the UNSC more arduous as the support of the P5 may not be feasible (Mbara et al. 2021). Such opposition by the P5 to the granting of the veto power to new permanent members in a reformed UNSC was noted in Chapter 5.2 as recent consultations by the AU C-10 with the permanent members revealed this challenge (AU 2019-Assembly/AU/13[XXXII], p.11). Therefore, the thesis concludes that granting veto power to new permanent members as proposed by the Ezulwuni Consensus may be counter-productive as it is not likely to resolve the problem of the arbitrary or abusive usage of the veto. To this end, expanding the veto power to new permanent members could render the decision-making in the Council cumbersome and obstruct quick intervention in crises situations (Oludoun 2014). It is therefore suggested that a review of the Ezulwuni Consensus with a proposal for a permanent
seat without the veto would be necessary in order to strengthen the support for Africa’s position on UNSC reform.

This research has revealed that security and conflict matters in Africa substantially dominate the items on UNSC agenda. For instance, an analysis of the resolutions in the Report of the Security Council for August 2010 to July 2011 (UN/A/66/2) showed that out of the 67 resolutions adopted, 39 of them were on Africa representing 58 per cent of the total resolutions. This can in turn be used to argue that Africa is a major stakeholder in the UNSC, which deserves a permanent seat. The research also discovered through its evaluation of UNSC resolutions passed over the period August 2010 to December 2021 that African issues were significantly high. The statistics revealed that more than 50 per cent of the resolutions were on African matters. However, the periods 1 August 2013 to 31 July 2014 and Year 2017 recorded 48 per cent and 46.7 per cent respectively relating to African matters. These statistics therefore show that Africa’s aspiration for permanent membership of the UNSC is grounded by empirical evidence and also demonstrates that African states have legitimate concern for its exclusion from the Security Council and justifies its call for reformation.

Despite the provisions of Article 108 of the UN Charter which conferred the power of concurrence of any amendment by the P5 members, it is suggested by this thesis that a future amendment of the UN Charter to achieve a reformed UNSC is possible since there is precedence to expand membership of the UNSC; as evidences by its membership expansion from 11 to 15 in 1965 after the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 1991 ((A/RES/1991[XVIII])). Though undertaking such amendment of the UN Charter may be difficult but not impossible if there is the political will by all stakeholders in the UNSC and the General Assembly to ensure membership of the Council is consistent with the current realities of the international system. The required political will could be reached by compromises and political accord with the major stakeholders which places the vision and objectives of the UN above the legitimate interests of member states and the different reform perspectives of interest groups.

This thesis also revealed that, as of 2021, only 44 African states had been into the UNSC at various times while 10 states out of the 54 African states have not been represented in the Security Council. Egypt was the first African state to serve in the Council in 1946, whilst Egypt and Nigeria have been the most represented African states in the Security Council with five terms each followed by Tunisia with four terms. South Africa and nine other African
states have occupied the non-permanent seat for three terms; 15 states have served only one term in the UNSC. It could therefore be implied that the frequency of Nigeria’s occupation of the UNSC non-permanent seat was because of its constructive engagement in the activities of the UN especially in conflict resolution and peacekeeping matters (Ogwu 2016). One of the issues that emerged as a challenge associated with African membership of the Security Council is the diminished formal power of the non-permanent members under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, as for example; the veto power is only exercised by the P5. In addition, the non-permanent members have limited tenure to get familiar to the working methods and practices of the Council as observed by a former Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the UN and former President of the UNSC Security Council, Ambassador Joy Ugwu. The experiences of the P5 members in the UNSC enhance their institutional memory of the Council but the non-permanent members have less cumulative understanding of its proceedings due to limited tenure, which could adversely impact on their competence in the Security Council.

The evaluation undertaken by this study of AU primary documents and responses by some senior diplomats at the UN Permanent Missions of Nigeria and South Africa in the course of this research observed that Nigeria and South Africa are members of the L-69 Group in the inter-governmental negotiation process of the UNSC reform in contrast with the AU Resolution 648 (XXIV) adopted at the AU 29th Ordinary Session. The resolution reaffirmed the mandate of the C-10 to engage with all interest groups in the inter-governmental negotiation process of UNSC to advance Africa’s position for the reform. Furthermore, the resolution demanded that the UN Permanent Missions of African states with dual membership in other interest groups to withdraw their membership from such groups in order to consolidate the Common African Position (AU 2017-Assembly/AU/Dec. 648 [XXIX]). However, Nigeria and South Africa still maintained their membership of the L69 group and justify their position on the basis that the group has a similar ideology with African states on reform of the UNSC. In addition, the practice of endorsement of recommendations by the C-10 without subjecting them to extensive deliberations by AU member states was also opposed by South Africa. Therefore, the positions taken by Nigeria and South Africa to maintain membership with other inter-governmental negotiation groups is suggestive of their discontent with the mandate of the C-10 and also their preferences to advance their nationalist interests ahead of the position of the AU. The C-10 could adopt a strategy of constructive engagement with AU member states as they collaborate with other inter-
governmental negotiation groups in order to narrow down areas of divergence and take advantage of the existing commonalities. Such collaboration will reduce the friction that arises between the C-10 and some African states regarding issues on Africa’s position on UNSC reform (Gowon and Gordon 2014). Furthermore, it is suggested that the AU could consider rotating the membership of the C-10, as the current member states of the Committee have remained the same since its inauguration in 2005 (AU 2005-Assembly/AU/Dec.1 [IV]). The reviewing of the membership of the C-10 will enhance its inclusivity and strengthen the trust and confidence of African states in the Committee.

The thesis also found that the inter-governmental negotiation process that was adopted by UN General Assembly Decision 62/557 (2008) for negotiating UNSC reform has not made substantial progress due to the absence of a suitable instrument of dialogue such as text-based negotiation. As Chapter 5.3 noted, divergent views still exist on the adoption of text-based negotiations, as China and Russia are opposed to negotiation by text, as they believed it was not ripe for the adoption of such approach in the IGN. Though African states endorsed negotiation by text, there are varying views on how to implement this process; as revealed by the perspectives of major African contenders for UNSC permanent seat. While Egypt’s viewpoints opposed the text-based negotiation, Nigeria and South Africa supported UNSC reform negotiation by text without any precondition and advocated for its immediate adoption in order to hasten the reform process. The division that exists among African states with respect to the adoption of the text-based negotiation undermine the purpose of the Pan-African ideology that seeks to unite the continent. Therefore, the existence of conflicting views on the text-based negotiation would imply that more consultations be considered in order to jointly resolve outstanding issues through dialogue which is fundamental in achieving successes in any dispute in a diplomatic sphere (Toca and Pocola 2014). The UN member states could identify the areas of convergence and disparities in their proposals in order to identify and then facilitate opportunities to resolve such differences. Furthermore, the strategy of resilient diplomacy as well as compromises could be sustained within General Assembly debates and inter-states levels. Such processes are needed if agreements are to be reached on the implementation of text-based negotiation.

The UN diplomacy of major African contenders for a UNSC permanent seat showed their support for the primary function of the UNSC with regards to peace and security. Such commitments were apparent by the deployment of military observers, staff officers and
contingents of military and police personnel to various UN Peacekeeping Missions as discussed in Chapter 5. Participation in international peace support operations was found to be an essential component of their foreign policy objectives and was underscored in their constitutions. For instance, South Africa’s engagement in peace support operations conformed to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1994. By the provision of this Constitution, the role of South Africa National Defence Force did not only stop at the defence of the territorial integrity of the country but also to undertake international obligations such as peace support operations in furtherance of its foreign policy objectives. Therefore, political rationale could be attributed as an important consideration that influences South Africa’s involvement in international peace operations as its foreign policy aims to consolidate peace and security in Africa by promoting economic and social development of the region (Lotze 2015). This follows to demonstrate South Africa’s commitment to supporting the primary objective of the UNSC through peacekeeping operations and thus justifies South Africa’s aspiration for permanent membership. In the case of Egypt, its participation in international peacekeeping operations is influenced by both strategic and political considerations (Coning and Prakash 2016). Strategically, its engagement in peace support operations was a means by which to promote global stability especially in Africa and prevent spill over effects of conflict from her immediate neighbours. Politically, Egypt’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operation may also be seen to have enhanced her regional leadership posture and to have promoted her aspirations for a permanent seat in a reformed UNSC based on the substantial deployment of peacekeepers that she had made to UN Missions.

In keeping with South Africa and Egypt, the participation of Nigeria in peace support operations is in line with Chapter II Section 19(c) of its foreign policy objectives under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which emphasized the “promotion of international co-operation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual support among all nations”. By this foreign policy objective, the country pursues international peace and security under four broad initiatives; the UN, the OAU/AU, ECOWAS, and bilateral peacekeeping initiatives. At various times between 1999 and 2010, Nigeria was rated among the top four UN personnel contributors to UN peacekeeping Missions. However, Nigeria has not been able to sustain such a contribution to UN peacekeeping operations as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency, banditry activities, cattle rustling, and other problems; especially in the northern part of the country. The absence of Nigeria in international peacekeeping roles suggests that the country does not prioritize conflict management through peacekeeping
Interventions in its foreign policy as demonstrated by the pulling out of its peacekeeping contingents from UN peacekeeping missions such as the UNAMID and MINUSMA in 2015. This undermines Nigeria’s commitment to the maintenance of global peace and security through peacekeeping operations in support of the primary function of the UNSC and may be seen to negatively impact the likelihood of her being favoured for a UNSC permanent seat.

Nigeria’s multilateral diplomacy since independence has also been guided by some principles and objectives such as friendliness with all nations and active involvement in United Nations activities and commitment to uphold the principles upon which the United Nations was established amongst others. Nigeria’s foreign relation in the immediate aftermath of colonialism was not focused on reform of the UNSC. Instead, its foreign policy priorities focused on the eradication of colonialism, and struggles against both apartheid and white minority rule in Southern Africa. Nigeria’s diplomatic position with regard to UNSC reform first came to the fore through the declaration made by Nigeria’s Representative at the 47th Session of the UN General Assembly. Nigeria’s desire for a permanent seat in a reformed UNSC could be attributed to the principles of sovereign equality of all member states as encapsulated under the UN Charter 1945 and the need for inclusive UNSC membership.

Furthermore, this thesis found that Nigeria’s diplomacy for a permanent seat of the UNSC has been mostly represented in the official statements of Nigeria’s Representatives during UN General Assembly debates. A review of the speeches of Nigeria’s Representative in UN General Assembly debates from 2011 to 2021 showed that they were not consistent in advocating for UNSC reform or promoting Nigeria’s aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat. For instance, its statements from the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly debate to the 72nd Session did not reflect the advocacy for the reform of the UN Security Council and Nigeria’s aspiration for a permanent seat. However, the speeches by its Representatives in other Sessions of the UN General Assembly during the period did reflect its quest for the reformation of the UNSC and Nigeria’s aspiration for permanent seat. This thesis holds the view that the inconsistency in advancing Nigeria’s quest for a UNSC permanent seat in an international forum is a result of the lack of a focussed strategic policy to pursue Nigeria’s aspiration and also the lack of dynamism by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to articulate Nigeria’s position. Nevertheless, these issues have not attracted public attention, as it appears that many Nigerians are not aware of the possible gains of Nigeria’s membership of the UNSC permanent seat (Mbara et al. 2020). Such policy apathy by the Nigerian public could
be associated to the view that the formulation and articulation of Nigerian foreign policies are often inspired by elitist considerations rather than representing the popular position of the Nigerian citizenry (Akintenrinwa 2004).

Furthermore, it can be discerned that speech-making strategy by Nigeria’s Representatives have so far been employed in the advancement of Nigeria’s quest for a UNSC permanent. In addition, evaluation of the comments made by the interviewees interviewed for this research revealed that the absence of a coordinated approach with respect to Nigeria’s UNSC aspiration was due to lack of institutional framework to promote its ambition for a UNSC permanent seat by key stakeholders such as Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria and the NIIA. The inconsistency in Nigeria’s foreign policy resulted in a significant decline in Nigeria’s participation in UN peacekeeping Mission despite reflecting its international role as a prospect for its quest for a UNSC permanent seat. For instance, the UN diplomacy of past administrations in Nigeria conceived active international roles for Nigeria through large participation in UN peacekeeping operations as a strategy to promote its aspiration for a UNSC permanent. However, the current government of President Muhammadu Buhari prioritized deploying its military resources to addressing its security challenges as the government is inclined to a foreign policy strategy that reflects domestic realities of the country (Odoh 2020). As such, the dynamics of the domestic environment of Nigeria constitute a fundamental element that dictates its foreign policy behaviour and choice in relation to participation in UN peace support operations (Yakubu 2020).

Also related to the above is the issue of formulation and execution of foreign policies which are sometimes influenced by Presidential prejudices and as such, foreign policy decisions tended to be personalized by the political class as opposed to public opinion and expertise initiative (Enuka and Ojukwu 2016). Consequently, the personalities of political leadership impact on Nigeria’s foreign policy resulting to continuity problem in policies as occasionally leaders implement their own ideas thereby making it difficult to define the country’s national interests (Nuamah 2003). It is essential that a revision of relevant laws, institutionalisation of policies, strengthening of legislative oversight on foreign policies and adherence to best practices by political leaders be activated so that Nigeria could have a foreign policy document on her aspiration for a UNSC permanent. In doing so, this thesis suggests that a long-term strategic plan to project Nigeria’s foreign policy plan beyond different
governments is considered. The Nigerian government could achieve this by establishing a Standing Committee as the national coordinating body to formulate and define Nigeria’s strategy in the pursuit of a UNSC permanent seat. The membership of the Committee would include representatives from Nigeria’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the NIIA, NIPSS and the UN Permanent Mission of Nigeria with the mandate to formulate a consolidated working policy document that would guide Nigeria’s diplomatic relation with respect to her ambition for a UNSC permanent membership.

Nigeria’s contribution to global peace and security and leadership roles in Africa including its large economy were considered by some scholars and interviewees as prospects for its aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat. Though these positions were rationalised and articulated by different arguments in support of Nigeria’s aspiration, this thesis found that the contribution to UN Peacekeeping Missions was a key issue being advanced to position Nigeria as a suitable African state for a UNSC permanent seat. Therefore, the foregoing prospects positioned Nigeria as a suitable candidate state for a UNSC permanent seat and as such responds to Research Question two and a specific research objective of analysing the potential for Nigeria to gain a permanent seat in the UNSC. Nigeria’s record of contributions and sacrifices to international peacekeeping is a credible credential to promote its ambition in the UNSC (Gambari 2012). This consideration relies on the contributions to the maintenance of global peace and security, as it is one of the eligibility requirements for election into the UNSC non-permanent seat as specified under Chapter V, Article 23(1) of the UN Charter. It follows, all else being equal, that this criterion may be implicitly applied to determining suitable candidate states for permanent membership of the Security Council. Given Nigeria’s recent lack of commitment in UN peacekeeping missions, it is reasonable to conclude that her prospects of attaining a permanent seat have been weakened. Also, the study discovered that domestic conditions especially the high level of insecurity has affected Nigeria’s image and relevance in the international arena (Mustapha et al. 2020), and poses a major challenge to its aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat. The poor rating of Nigeria by the Global Terrorism Index 2020 as the 3rd most terrorised nation in the world has unfavourably impacted on global perceptions of the country (Institute of Economics and Peace 2020). As such, it may be difficult to justify how a country that cannot guarantee its own security can in any meaningful way maintain global peace and security as a permanent member of the UNSC.
Employing the Council of Foreign Relations criteria-based approach that considers financial contributions to the UN regular budget as part of the conditions for suitability for UNSC permanents seat, further undermines Nigeria’s case. The economy of the country has been observed to be weak as its contribution to UN regular budget is substantially low compared to South Africa and non-African permanent seat contenders of the G4 (Japan, Germany, India and Brazil). An evaluation of UN primary documents revealed that African states are generally the lowest financial contributors to the UN regular budget as they are amongst the 135 countries that contribute less than 1 per cent to the UN budget (UN 2019-ST/ADM/SER.B/1008). Furthermore, the economic challenges that Nigeria faces was in part a consequence of her over dependence on oil and infrastructural deficits such as chronic power shortages negatively impact on her economy and her regional dominance thereby undermining the likelihood of her being considered for a UNSC permanent seat. Diversification of Nigeria’s economy through innovation in governance could gradually resolve the country’s dependence on oil. Such innovations could focus on the agricultural and tourism sectors, with the former relying on a modernised system of agriculture through the massive deployment of technology and accessible credit facilities to stakeholders (Eferakeya 2016). In addition, the rich ecosystem and cultural diversity of the country could be harnessed by encouraging private sector investment in tourism through tax incentives and friendly business environment. The Nigerian government could consider addressing the infrastructural gap in the country by inventing policies and programmes to encourage massive private investment in infrastructural development (Aja 2020). This is necessary, as the government alone cannot to provide all the infrastructural required for the social and economic growth of the country. Such measures could strengthen Nigeria’s economic power and enhance its prospects as a more likely contender for a UNSC permanent seat.

As noted in Chapters four and six, the African Common Position for UNSC reform demanded, amongst other proposals, two permanent seats for Africa but did not state the possible African states that might occupy those positions. This work concludes that the AU proposal may have intentionally excluded the aspect of identifying Africa’s candidates for the seats as the AU has an established institutional framework for the selection or election of African representatives for confirmed international positions. It may also be the case that the AU is not disposed to express any preference for any potential African state. The foregoing, answer Research Question three and as such Nigeria, will have to contend with conflicts of interests amongst African states that belong to different regional economic communities.
Also, Nigeria has to compete with the seemingly regionally based sentiments of regional economic communities that will seek to support candidates that will promote their interests in the desire to win any such nomination as Africa’s choice for permanent membership of the UNSC.

7.2 Contribution to UNSC Reform Debate and Originality of Study

This thesis extended existent academic knowledge on the UNSC reform by providing a comprehensive explanation of African perceptions of the legitimacy of the Security Council and the AU position on the reform of the same. Furthermore, the work is original in its approach as evidenced by the interviews conducted with key players concerning UNSC reform. The thesis analysed empirical data obtained from interviews with senior diplomats in some UN Permanent Missions in New York and Geneva, and also evaluated UN and AU primary documents such as resolutions on UNSC reform and statements by African Representatives at the UN General Assembly debates. The thesis revealed the patterns of consistency of AU declarations in advancing the African common position by undertaking an in-depth assessment of OAU/AU resolutions on UNSC reform. In contrast, the study’s analysis of the speeches by Nigerian Representative at the UN General Assembly debates in the last decade showed inconsistency in their statements with regards to advancing the case for UNSC reform and with regard to Nigeria’s aspiration for permanent membership. This is a consequence of the absence of a focussed strategic policy regarding Nigeria’s aspiration for a UNSC permanent seat. It is on this account that the thesis suggests that the Federal Government of Nigeria should constitute a National Committee on UNSC Reform to develop a policy framework to promote Nigeria’s aspiration for permanent membership of the Security Council. This will provide inputs and direction for future policy documents of the Nigerian Government, which may assist her in leveraging her diplomatic interactions with the AU and the UN General Assembly upon the reform of the Security Council.

The research also provided insights on the politics of UNSC reform with respect to text-based negotiations and the activities of the AU C-10 in promoting Africa’s interests on the issue of reform based on the analysis of UN and AU primary documents and feedback from interviewees. Hence, the analysis revealed divergent views with respect of text-based negotiations even within the African states despite having a Common UNSC reform proposal. It follows, that the knowledge generated in this work will be of significant value to the AU and to Nigeria in her quest for reformation of the UNSC.
7.3 Suggestions for further Research

This study sought to investigate whether there is an African perspective of the legitimacy of the UNSC and also interrogated the prospects and challenges of Nigeria’s aspiration to win a permanent UNSC seat. It did not explore the issue of legitimacy from the perspective of other UNSC reform proposals in relation to the AU reform proposal. Therefore, future research could provide a comparative study of UNSC legitimacy in this area. Furthermore, this thesis noted that the decolonisation of African states and subsequent increase in African membership of the UN influenced the quest by African states for change in the current membership structure of the UNSC. In this regard, there will be need for this suggested area of future research as emphasised above to also attempt to identify the specific historical antecedents that could be related to other UNSC reform proposals.

The thesis generally appraised Africa’s quest for UNSC permanent seat. As such, it carried out a detailed analysis of OAU/AU resolutions in order to discern how the framing of such resolution impact on Africa’s aspiration for permanent membership of the UNSC and also examined the Ezulwuni Consensus. Though this thesis examined the impact of the UN General Assembly Resolution 1991 ((A/RES/1991[XVIII]) in the enlargement of the membership of the UNSC, it is suggested that further research could consider extensive analysis of all UN General Assembly Resolutions on reform of the UNSC. In this respect, the study will draw empirical argument concerning the overarching issues confronting the restructuring of the UNSC and develop a realistic inter-governmental negotiation approach to UNSC reform. Furthermore, since the present study critically explored the Ezulwuni Consensus with the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel, there will be need for future research to conduct a holistic comparative analysis of the Ezulwuni Consensus with other UNSC reform positions. For instance, such study could seek to identify diplomatic strategies to narrow the divergence that exists in those reform proposals as a way to ensure unanimity of position in the inter-governmental negotiations of UNSC reform.
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Appendix A

Interviews

The interviews were conducted in Nigeria, Geneva and New York. The catalogue of interviews were as follows: interview with a former UN Assistant Secretary General Military Affairs and also a former UNMIL Force Commander; interview with a Research fellow at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA); interview with a former diplomat and former Director General NIIA; interview with a senior official at the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; interview with a former diplomat and Assistant Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; interview with a former Nigerian Permanent Representative at the UN; interview with a senior diplomat at the AU Permanent Mission to the UN and World Trade Organisation, Geneva; and interview with a senior diplomat at the Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the UN. Other list of interviewees included: a Political Adviser at the AU Permanent Mission, New York; Deputy Permanent Representative at the Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the UN; a senior diplomat at the Permanent Mission of Egypt to the UN; a senior diplomat at the Permanent Mission of France to the UN; a senior official at the South African Permanent Mission to the UN; and a First Secretary at the Permanent Mission of Russia to the UN. The following transcripts were anonymised except for four interviewees who wished to be identified in the interviews.

Interviewee A: 11/09/2019

Q. The debate for the reformation of the UN Security has been a major topical international discourse. Having been a former Adviser to the UN Secretary General and a former UN Force Commander at Liberia, could you give me an insight on your view of the quest for the UN Security Council Reform and also speak on UN peacekeeping operations?

A. Peacekeeping operation is a tool applied by the UN to ensure peace and stability in conflict areas. Peacekeeping was never anticipated in the UN Charter. The first UN peacekeeping operation was in 1948 at the Palestine region. As of that time peacekeepers were not usually armed and peacekeeping has however evolved. The UN peacekeeping was initially conceived to deal with conflict with state actors but later changed to intra-state actors involving many actors. People feel that the decisions of the Security Council are unpalatable because of vested interests. When the Security Council takes a decision that does not favour your group, you wont feel comfortable with it. For some people the Security Council is not fair in some of its decisions while some regard it as being just. The major issue here is to
some people is that the Security Council does not protect their interests. That is why they think the membership of the Security Council should be democratized. So that if you have a representative, he/she would act in your best interest and meet your aspirations. The Security Council was a group of victorious elements of the First World War that defeated Germany. They actually have the strength and capability to have led the war. Some of those that want to be part of the UN Security Council do them have the same qualities as the permanent members? Generally what should compel you to aspire a permanent seat of the Security Council? Are you a hegemon in your region? How good is your economy? How much are you contributing to global peace and security? Can you act in your region to ensure peace and security? These are some qualities you should look out for. If you don’t have these capabilities, then you are only trying to get representation even though your contribution to the Council will be limited. Take a look at permanent members of the Security Council, they have those capabilities that other UN member states don’t have and their contributions to global peace and stability is glaring. There must be criteria for to meet to be a permanent member. There was a time Nigeria had the qualities to be a potential permanent member of the Security Council. If there was to be a debate of that time for those to be considered a permanent seat, you will agree that Nigeria should be considered straight away. But we are not consistent. Today we are number 42 from number three or five in the world in terms of contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. Our economy used to be very good. As it is today, we don’t have the capacity of furthering our foreign policies. When we went to Liberia and Sierra Leone, we had the capacity and capability to restore peace and order in Africa. And so, in the sub-region we were the hegemon. South Africa is nowhere today. Since the end of apartheid regime, South Africa has lost its fuse. The economy is not good. I am not too sure of their capacity and capability to aspire for a UN permanent seat. The only country in Africa that I think still have some strength is Egypt. Egypt too has its own problems. It is in a region that is highly flammable and anything could happen. Internally the government is not stable.

Q. From your views, it is clear that you are saying that the issue of membership of the UN Security Council should be based on capacity rather than regional representation?
A. Check out all the permanent members, they have influence in their regions. When world peace and stability is threatened, they usually have contributions to make.

Q. How do you think the fears of those you earlier said have no capacity to be permanent members of the Security Council could be allayed?
A. We can expand the Security Council membership to give it a democratic outlook. But we must remove the veto power so that decisions could be reached on the basis of democratic approach.

Q. Do you think the permanent members of the Security Council will agree to the proposal of abolishing the veto power as you suggested?

A. That is why I think the whole thing about reform of the Security Council may not work. Let me ask a rhetoric question. How sure are you that those asking for a permanent seat representation will be satisfied if they are eventually represented in the Security Council? Even if two states from Africa are considered for representation in the permanent seat, do you think all the African countries will be satisfy with that? This is why I humbly submit that if you increase the number, you remove the veto.

Q. Do you see participation in UN peacekeeping operations by UN member states as a possible criterion in determining the suitability of a country for a UN Security Council permanent seat?

A. Yes. It is a criterion that should be considered because it is an indication of your contribution to world peace and security. Already that shows that you have the capacity to assist in the peace process. That was one area Nigeria has done well.

Q. How would you rate the performance of Nigeria and Africa in the maintenance of global peace and security?

A. I will start by saying that Nigeria was an active participant in ensuring peace and security within its sub-region. But currently it has lost that capacity. This is not to say this cannot be re-enacted. It can be re-enacted if the leadership redefines its foreign policy thrust. As it is today, we don’t have a clear focus in our foreign policy.

Q. How do you think the Nigerian government could participate actively in UN peacekeeping operations in the face of contending security challenges especially the Boko Haram insurgency in the country?

A. It is an erroneous interpretation to relate Nigeria’s low participation in UN peacekeeping operations with the Boko Haram Insurgency. Do we have more security problems than those countries that have high participation in UN peacekeeping operations? Pakistan and India have their security challenges and yet they contribute significantly to UN peace support operations. I think we really need to get our priorities right as a country.

Q. But I thought the security problems over there is not as potent as the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?
A. Boko Haram is potent here because you don’t plan. That is the truth of the matter. Are you fighting insurgency? Is that how to fight insurgency? In fighting insurgency there are clear approaches to fighting it. There are two major approaches to fighting insurgency. You have to make up your mind on which approach. If you want to fight insurgency, you need intelligence. And when I say intelligence, I mean all manners of intelligence assisted by all means of technology. When you have that, then you will have forces that can be strategically put in place that are highly mobile and have all the support they need. That is one way and if you don’t have that, then you inundate the space. Do you have soldiers? You don’t! What is the current strength of the Nigerian Army? During the Nigerian Civil War, the whole strength of the Army was 6500. In 30 months, the Nigerian Army strength increased to 250,000. They recalled back soldiers that fought the Second World War. That is one. Secondly, another Depot was established at Abeokuta to train soldiers and all the new Army Divisions established were given the authority to recruit and train soldiers. All the Divisions had training schools. So in 30 months, you recruited 250,000 personnel. You have been fighting Boko Haram for 10 years and you still have low personnel strength. If we get our priorities right, we can be fighting insurgency and also maintain our high participation in UN peacekeeping engagements.

Q. Does the absence of an African state as a permanent member of the UN Security Council has any consequence on the legitimacy and efficacy of the Council?
A. It is desirable to have African representation in the Security Council’s permanent seat. What I am saying is who should represent Africa. Lack of democratization of the Security Council affects the interests of UN member states. I don’t want to use the word “efficacy” in explaining African’s absence in the permanent seat. I will rather want to talk about workability of the Security Council. To say Africa’s absence in the Security Council’s permanent seat affects its efficiency meant that the Council meets the aspirations and needs of members. This is not the case because the aspirations of majority member states are not met.

Q. Thank you so much for your time sir.
A. Always my pleasure.

Interviewee B: 17/09/2019

Q. The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs is a think-tank on foreign affairs. Bearing that in mind, what specific role did it play when Nigeria first expressed her interest for a UN Security Council Permanent seat in 1992?
A. Ok let me make this clear to you. This is a national institution. Some of us here are both academics and civil servants. The point I want you to understand is that Nigeria makes the request and want the institutions to help it achieve that. So we have held conferences here and wrote policy papers suggesting what should be done. In that conference many people expressed doubt about the possibility of that happening. So we actually organized conferences here and wrote policy papers telling the government that it will be good for Nigeria to have it and set up committees to work towards it. But in the debate that took place we realized that it would be a difficult task particularly after the High-Level Panel releases its report and stated that look even if the Council was going to be reformed, new members will not have the veto power. It cannot be taken away from those who have it but were advised to use it functionally for the benefit of humanity. To reform the UN Security Council, they are not going to give the new members the veto, so our position was if there is going to be African members that will make them redundant because they will not effectively participate in the decisions of the Security Council. Secondly, they won’t even have the resources; it is not just being a member but having the resources when the chips are down. For instance, if there is a military action to be taken, countries that are members will have certain obligations to bring certain number of troops and arms but we cannot. You know you are in the military, operationally we cannot. We don’t have the capacity and we don’t have the money.

Q. Sir I think you are talking more on the position with regards to the UN High Level Panel Report of 2005. The issue I want you to speak more about is the events around 1992 when Nigeria first expressed her interests for a UN Security Council permanent seat?

A. As at 1992 before the High-Level Panel released its report, we were arguing it would be good for the government to go for a permanent seat. We advised the government to go for it and pointed out some of the problems that will be confronted. The High-Level Panel Report came out against the backdrop of those problems we mentioned. In my book, there is an arrangement of countries according to how they contribute to the UN.

Q. In 1992 did the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs advised Nigeria whether to aspire for a Security Council with or without veto power?

A. The Institute advised the government to go for a permanent seat with veto.

Q. How did it arrive at that decision? Was there colloquia or conferences before it was decided to guide the government as such?

A. We had conferences on the issue before we made our recommendations to the government. We expressed the positive and negative aspects of aspiring for the seat.
Q. So the position of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs was for Nigeria to aspire for a UN Security Council permanent seat but by 2005 the position changed?
A. No it didn’t change. They still insisted that Nigeria should go for a permanent seat.
Q. So what is its current position with respect to Nigeria’s ambition for a UN Security Council’s permanent seat?
A. As an Institution, it has always been supporting Nigeria’s ambition.
Q. What countries in Africa are the current allied of Nigeria in respect of her ambition for a UN Security Council permanent seat?
A. There is a stalemate in the Ezulwuni Consensus. If you read my book […] you will see it. Nigeria has this peculiar misfortune in Africa of its foreign policy of not being in conformity with its national interest. That is why when we sought for non-permanent seat, we have countries like Chad competing with Nigeria. So, Nigeria is still tied down within the context of the Ezulwuni Consensus. Nigeria does not have a predictable number of countries it can say to be her allied. Because Nigeria has faced a lot of problems whenever it sought the support of Africa countries for a non-permanent seat. When we are talking of the permanent seat, Nigeria doesn’t have any country in Africa it can say it trusted that it could support it.
Q. Why is this so?
A. You see some countries are, I can use the word “jealous” and not happy Nigeria is the giant of Africa. People are not taking it kindly with Nigeria with that assertion and they also believe that Nigeria is over-bearing. So, it has made it difficult to support Nigeria. Look at what happened in South Africa during the election of AU Chairperson. South Africa presented its candidate for the seat and Nigeria supported Jean Ping from Gabon and we know what happened in the end. So, it is a kind of relationship you cant say these are my allied because people are not happy. So, when you read my book […], you will see a lot of point I made why Nigeria’s foreign policy hasn’t been yielding enough national dividend.
Q. But most West African countries always say Nigeria is their big brother?
A. Yes that is what they say but when they go for voting it is always a different story.
Q. How do you think Nigeria can correct that wrong impression by some African countries that it has been over-bearing and make them support Nigeria’s ambition?
A. We must have the national capacity. If you are a nobody in your community, nobody will take you seriously. If you are not of good behaviour, will people take you seriously? If you are poor, will people take you seriously? Look at what we are suffering in South Africa, xenophobic attacks. South Africa has businesses here but Nigeria doesn’t have there. South Africa sees us as coming from poor background. South Africa has MTN, IBTC, Multi-Choice,
Shoprite and many businesses. Go to South Africa do you have any? Now you will see Nigerians in South Africa committing crimes. So, we need to be good citizens of the world. We have to generate the national capacity that will enable other countries to respect us and we don’t have to be over-bearing. So, Nigeria has to build its economic viability. People will respect you and when they have problem you will assist them and play the relevant politics.

Q. In your view do you think the absence of an African state as permanent member has consequences on the efficiency and legitimacy of the Council?
A. No!

Q. Why?
A. It has consequences on the legitimacy and efficiency of the Council when it comes to African issues. In international politics it is your own interest that matters. The Security Council is strong when it comes to making big decisions. The only problem we are at disadvantage is that we don’t have representatives. We don’t have veto. For instance, if any African country had the veto there wouldn’t have been any need to invade Libya and assassinate Gaddafi. The African veto would have stopped the occupation of Libya.

Q. From what you have said, it means the Security Council has legitimacy concerns?
A. Yes that is for Africa and not for the Institution.

Q. So for Africa it has that challenge as a continent?
A. Yes for Africa.

Q. What do you think in your view are the underlying factors that are responsible for Africa’s absence in the permanent seat of the UN Security Council?
A. First they don’t have the capacity. The most important thing is that when it was created Africa was not an international player and so the permanent was a function of those who won the Second World. They were no African players then. Africans were used in the War. The West African Constabulary Force was just there to fight. Africa was an underdog, that was why Africa was not there. Today Africa doesn’t have the capability to be there. South Africa is no longer the South Africa under the racist regime. You know South Africa of the racist regime had nuclear capacity but when they were given the government back to the black people they took the nuclear power away. Look at how South Africa is being managed today, they becoming even worse than Nigeria in terms of corruption. So that is the problem.

Q. Your earlier submissions suggest that Nigeria does not have the capacity to occupy the permanent seat of the UN Security Council. So, what is the way forward?
A. There is no way out for Nigeria. Nigeria cannot have a place in the United Nations Security Council permanent seat unless the United Nations system itself is changed. It is not
possible to change the United Nations system because it is an arena for the strong. Even in Nigeria, here if people are vying for the office of the President, can I seek for election into that Office? Do I have the resources to do that? So, we must take cognizance of the fact that this requires capacity. Can Nigeria be a nuclear power today? The way the international system is structured, capability in nuclear power technology is one index that defines the strength of countries as potential contenders for permanent seat and African countries lack this capacity.

Q. Are you saying possession of nuclear power are a determinant for suitability of a country for a Security Council permanent seat?

A. It is an example. There are so many indices of power of which nuclear power is one of them. Tell me a member of the permanent seat who doesn’t have nuclear power? There is none. Even those that have got have not been admitted because there are so many issues involved in it. It is not just to have it; you must have second-strike capacity. If you read the High-Level Panel Report, you will appreciate the point I am making. They are saying we are trapped with the veto. The decision of the Security Council is taking by affirmative and concurrent votes of the permanent members.

Q. One of the challenges of the Ezulwini Consensus is the division among the African countries. For instance when the issue of the veto was discussed at the AU, Nigeria and South Africa were of the view Africa should go for a permanent seat without a veto but many other African countries opposed this view. How the do you think the AU could achieve a unity of purpose in advancing Africa’s quest for a permanent seat?

A. One of the major capacities of the AU is the lack of capacity. The AU cannot force unanimity on its members. Every country reacts according to how its national interests will be protected. That is why the international system is a relation between states and coordinate powers. There is no state at the level of the AU that is more equal to the other. At the United Nations, the five permanent members can be more equal than the others. Though they say every country is equal. But when the chips are down, they are the countries that are more powerful than others. The point I am making is that unlike domestic politics where decisions are taking and everybody is forced to obey it, here everybody cannot be forced to do anything except the ones you signed onto. But these are decisions and not treaties.

Q. During the colonial era, African nationalists had pan-African ideology and vigorously fought for the independence of African territories. Don’t you think if the current African leaders exhibit such zeal like our past nationalist leaders in advancing Africa’s quest for the reformation of the UN Security, the continent could one day realize its ambition?
A. Look it is not the passion of Africans that led to the collapse of colonialism and it is also not the passion of Africans that led to the end of apartheid regime in South Africa. The international system had condemned it. The permanent members don’t want the Security Council to be reformed and that is a big problem. China alone doesn’t want Japan to joined the permanent seat. You know that? They have a privilege and they want to retain that.

Q. Sir when you look at global contemporary issues on Security from Year 2000 to date what would you consider as a major issue of concern of legitimacy of the UN Security Council?

A. I want to take you to the 9/11 attack, it brought about so many changes in the way global terrorism is being handled. Take Libya for instance, Muammar Gaddafi was being labelled a terrorist. So they are dealing with countries that really did not partake in it. Afghanistan was invaded to fight the Talibans when it was the Al-Qaeda that was responsible for the attack on the US. So the 9/11 and advent terrorism has changed global security architecture. Even things that are have forbidden by the UN Charter are now being taken for granted. Look at Syria; the Security Council have not been able to agree on the way to deal with the problem. Russia was saying all of them fighting Assad are terrorists. So how the Security Council has managed all of these issues is a major concern for its legitimacy.

Q. Do you think Nigeria has a coherent strategy in pursuing its quest for A UN Security Council permanent seat?

A. I don’t think so. Every government in Nigeria have its own vision and agenda on Nigeria’s aspiration for a permanent seat of the Security Council. Lack of coherent policy about the reform is one problem of Nigeria’s foreign policy strategy. That is why we don’t have a history and record of our contributions to South Africa. Every government comes and does things differently without building on what is on ground. Look at what happened to Agenda 2010. When Abacha died another government brought agenda 2020. It is all lack of coherence that is part of Nigeria’s public policies problems including foreign policies.

Q. Though you spoke earlier about the veto power. Do you think abolition of veto or extending it to new members is a way forward?

A. You cannot abolish the veto because it is the regulator in the Security Council. What is the job of the veto? At a point there will be conflict, it is brought forward. That is why they cannot even extend it because those who have it cannot agree to share it with others. The people that will take the decision to bring people into it don’t want to take the decision to admit others. So the world is stuck in the veto and the High Level panel had already stated that there is no practical way of resolving the veto power issue. There is no way out of it unless there is a global war and a new system is established. And if there is another global
confrontation apart from the permanent members, those who will come on top would be may be Japan, Brazil and Germany.

Interviewee C: 17/09/2019

Q. Do you think the absence of an African state as a permanent member of the UN Security Council has any impact on its legitimacy and efficacy?

A. I will say yes that it seriously and adversely affect African interests. Nigeria was the 44th President of the UN General Assembly at the time General Joe Garba was the Foreign Minister and was elected into that position. When he was elected you will discover that African interests was always brought to the fore to be discussed. You are talking of a United Nations Security Council now and you talk of the period there were 51 UN members. Yes, you know by that time before the League of Nation ended up becoming United Nations, Ethiopia and Liberia were initial members because they were never colonized. Egypt was under the British and that is the fundamental difference between the other two. When you are talking about the legitimacy, I am saying that whatever decision that is taking at the level of the UN Security Council can only hurt Africa because the Security Council operates on the basis of power politics and the UN Charter necessarily condones it. You go to Article 108 of the Charter. It says the Charter cannot be amended without the consensus of the permanent members. So when people say the majority carries the vote, I say that is not valid at the level of international politics. The majority members at the level of UNGA can vote but you only need one veto vote to neutralize majority votes. The UN is imprisoned by the veto politics. If nothing is being done about general reform as at then and they are dealing with secondary issues just simply because of power politics. When the UN decided to sanction Israel on the issue of the Palestine-Israel conflict what happened? The US is always there to defend her. So frankly speaking if for instance Nigeria has the opportunity to preside over the Security Council because it is rotated among those who are elected and also the permanent members, you will now discover that the presiding officer necessarily has casting vote. So, when we have a time, you discover that whomever that is there who determine where exactly it should go. So, if you are now saying will it matter whether we have Africa or not, I will say it matters a lot because they will discuss all issues in your presence. It will not be done in your absence and you cannot be on ground and they will want to crucify you. I think that we use to have very great leaders like the Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister. He laid the foundation on the way we operated. He believed we should take active part in the UN politics. The foundation he laid actually prompted Nigeria to be seeking for permanent membership. So, I
am simply saying that it is good to have Africa represented there. The issue of legitimacy of the Security Council is neither here nor there but without Africa in the permanent seat I think their work is incomplete and most unfair. The UN operates on power politics, which is favoured by Article 108 of the UN Charter that gives the P5 power over any amendment of the UN Charter. The absence of African states does not affect the legitimacy of the Security Council but Africa’s presence in the Council will better help in protecting her interest. The absence of African state has consequences on the efficiency the Security Council because African issues dominate the agenda of the Council and having Africa in the permanent seat is therefore appreciable.

Q. So from your submissions I will say the absence of an African state undermines the legitimacy of the Security Council?

A. Enhhh! We should be more explicit at that level. The absence of Africa there does not prevent the discussion and activities there from going on. Whatever decisions arrive at cannot be considered to be illegitimate. The issue is that if Africa were to be on board, an African Ambassador there will have better pushed African interests. Nobody can defend Nigeria’s interest more than Nigeria but some people will be better prepared and equipped in doing so. But you cannot know better what a patient is suffering from more than the patient. The doctor can only help you on the basis of what you tell him. In the absence of Africa on board, the Security Council is still operating and they have been taking decisions even for Africa because it is acting on behalf the generality of the international community. So, what we are saying is if Africa has a representative on board, then the argument of equity, fairness and good governance people can subscribe to. The delay in the reform is largely due to the veto. It is not that those with the veto don’t want the reform but they don’t want it to the extent of the veto being reformed. They want more permanent members but without veto. That is the issue. The African countries are saying what is the essence of having a permanent membership that does not go with the veto. Initially African countries requested for five permanent seats and the logic for that is to have a seat each for South, West, Central, East and North Africa. They said it will be unyielding and it will be this or that. The criterion of regional representation was raised. So, I will say yes it does affect its legitimacy. By the time you avoid addressing issues that Africans consider of priority to them, there is no way you will not be impinging on their interest and on the efficiency.

Q. What would you consider as the underlying immediate factors responsible for Africa’s exclusion in the UN Security Permanent seat? May I humbly request for your quick response as I still have more questions and just a few hours to catch up with a flight back to Abuja.
A. Oh sorry for my digressions. I will be fast so that you could meet up with your flight schedule. Now to our discussions. You see only Liberia, Egypt and Ethiopia were in the UN as 1945 when it was established. So, most African countries were not part of the original members of the UN. Africa cannot influence what has already been put in place. Africa is technically excluded from the UN Security Council because the permanent members are not prepared to accommodate them. The permanent members are nuclear powers and they want coordinate issues between themselves rather than allowing its proliferation.

Q. What is your view about Africa’s perspective on the legitimacy of the UN Security Council?

A. Africa’s perspective on the legitimacy of the Security Council may be explained by their request for the democratization and fair permanent membership of the Council. The AU recognizes the legitimacy of the Council on the basis of rotational membership of the non-permanent seat and also expanding the permanent membership of the Security Council. So I think you cannot say an institution is illegitimate when you have a representation.

Q. Do you think Africa particularly Nigeria would eventually make a successful bid for a permanent seat?

A. Yes, I think despite the power politics in the UN that may be in the future Africa could get a permanent seat and Nigeria has the potentials to be there. Nigeria has many prospects that qualify it for a permanent seat. There is no country in Africa that has contributed so much to the UN peace support operation like Nigeria. Nigeria has shown faithfulness and commitment to the UN right from her independence in 1960. She has a huge population and strong influence in Africa as a regional leader. All these are advantages to it and good for its aspiration.

Q. Do you think the vibrancy of the pan-African ideology employed by African leaders during the struggle for the independence of African state could be replicated in the pursuit of Africa’s interest in multilateral institution such as the UN? I have to stop with this question but I will request for another interview appointment Sir.

A. That is fine. Essentially, I will say no because the current African leaders do not exhibit pan-African ideology like Nkrumah and the rest of them. Today we cannot talk of pan-African ideology. African states are no more united. Africans have become problems to themselves. The ECOWAS protocol for free movement of goods and services and citizens of West Africa within the sub-region is being breached. There is trade discrimination by Africans against Africans. Recently you saw trade discrimination imposed by Ghana against Nigerian traders. Look at the xenophobic attack by South Africans against Nigerians. There is
discrimination between the black and Arab Malians. All these tell you that there is no African ideology.

Q. Thank you for your time, sir.

Interviewee D: 18/09/2019

Q. The quest for the reform of the UN Security has been a topical issue for a long time with various justifications being advanced by the proponent of the reform. What would you consider as Africa’s perspective on the reform of the UN Security Council?

A. Let me welcome you once again to this Ministry. From the background of your research, I just listened to, I think you have an interesting research topic and I can only wish you the very best. I was just preparing to attend a meeting before I was informed of your arrival. I had wanted us to postpone this interview but I think we can proceed. I will be as much concise in my discussions with you so that I can meet up with my meeting schedule. I agree with you that the debate on the reform of the Security Council has been on for some time. Right from the 1960s there have been discussions for it to be reformed and this was when the UN Charter was amended in 1965 or so where the non-permanent membership seat was increased. We can dissect Africa’s view on the reform by looking at what is popularly referred to as the Ezulwuni Consensus. That is Africa’s view of what the reform should look like. What informed this view? Africa is not represented at all under the permanent seat. So, this brings us to the issue of regional representation and fairness in the Council. The AU looks at this as historical injustice to Africa and it is challenging this exclusion through its proposal for the reform. Right from the inception of the UN, Africa has not had a fair representation in the Security Council. Africa has quite a large membership in the UN but yet it is not well represented.

Q. So what would you consider as the underlying factors responsible for Africa’s exclusion as a permanent member of the UN Security Council?

A. From your educational background, you told me you have a BSc Political Science and Defence Studies. So, I won’t be wrong to say you studied the United Nations as part of your modules during your undergraduate days?

Q. Absolutely. I did.

A. Fine. So, in that study I am sure you were told about the founding members of the UN. Now from the 51 founding members of the UN, only three were African countries. That is Liberia, Egypt and Ethiopia. The rest were under colonial rule. So, you could see that right from the beginning Africa was not well represented. In such circumstance, you can’t have any influence in an institution when you don’t have strong presence. Of course, you can’t be
a force to reckon with in such situation. Again, another factor is the fact that the permanent membership seat was allowed to go to only the victors of the war. So these are issues one can argue to have accounted for Africa’s exclusion in the Security Council.

**Q.** Do you think the absence of an Africa state as a permanent member of the UN Security Council has any implication on its legitimacy?

**A.** It could be a “yes or no” response that the absence of an Africa states as permanent member impact on the legitimacy of the Security Council depending on the interpretation of legitimacy. Legitimacy may be discussed in different ways. It may mean acceptability of something and may also be argued from a legal point of view. Legally speaking you could say the absence of Africa states from the permanent seat has no impact on the legitimacy of the Security Council. The reason is because the UN Charter backs the membership allotment in the Security Council. On the other hand, the absence of African state as a permanent member has created acceptability problem to the Security Council. Africa as a region views the permanent membership representation as not being fair to the continent. So, on this basis you could say indeed the Security Council has a credibility problem.

**Q.** Do you think Nigeria is on the right track in making a successful bid for a permanent seat?

**A.** Though many people have been skeptical whether there would ever be a reform of the Security Council to let in new permanent members. I am an optimist and so I am sure there will be a reform. If not now in our lifetime but certainly in the future. The international systems have evolved with time and so we expect changes in the UN. My answer to your question is yes, Nigeria is a possible candidate for a permanent seat if the Council were to be reformed. The country has got all the potentials to be there.

**Q.** Don’t you think those that are doubtful about the reform of the Security Council are doing so because of the provision of Article 108 of the UN Charter, which deals with the issue of amendment the Charter?

**A.** I agree with you that Article 108 that speaks about the reform of the Security Council and makes it mandatory for the permanent members to consent to any review of the Charter could be a reason why some people are not convinced of the chances of reforming the Security Council. That is legitimate concern but remember that the UN Charter had previously been reviewed. So, the possibility of having another review one day is still possible.

**Q.** How do you think Africa as a continent could ensure unanimity of purpose in pursuing her aspiration?

**A.** Already Africa is united in advocating her position for the reform. That is why we have the Ezulwuni Consensus. Now there is no division at the AU level. I only envisage a division
in the ranks of African states when for instance Africa’s request is granted. The question would be who are the two best or most suitable African countries to occupy these seats? That will be the major issue. But I believe such conflict could be resolved by a democratic means through voting. Sorry I think I am almost late for my meeting. I will take the last question from you and we could arrange for another appointment.

Q. That is fine. Ok my last question for now. Do you think the AU will support Nigeria’s aspiration for a permanent membership of the UN Security Council?

A. The AU is there for all African countries. So, it will always support any African country for that role. In this case, it is an arbiter and will always want the best candidate to represent Africa regardless from which sub-region. It will definitely adopt the appropriate means in selecting or electing the appropriate candidate when the time comes. But I still believe Nigeria is well qualified for the position and African countries especially from the sub-Saharan region will of course support her.

Q. Thank you for your time and I look forward to having another interview with you.

A. Always my pleasure. I wish we could continue but my schedule is tight.

Interviewee E: 25/09/2019

Q. Do you think the absence of African state as a permanent member of the UN Security Council has any consequence on the legitimacy and efficiency of the Council?

A. The scenario that created the Security Council and veto power has changed over the years. As at the time the UN was established after the Second World War, they shared the permanent membership seats among the victors. That is why a country as powerful as Germany is not in the Security Council because they were among the vanquished. Today’s reality does not allow for proper efficiency of the Security Council and carrying along the rest of the world. It doesn’t really go well for the scenario to remain the way it is because the world should not be looked at from the point of view of the winner and the vanquished. We have gone passed that. More than 80 per cent of the Security Council agenda is about Africa. So, we need to always have Africa’s voice heard when crucial decisions are to be taking in the Security Council concerning the region. Let me give you a scenario in 2011 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 that authorized the use of force to take out Gaddafi. Just imagine if an African country were one of the P5 with the veto, we would have vetoed that resolution. Today that singular decision of Resolution 1973 led not only to the overthrow of Gaddafi but also the destruction of the country. A promising country I must
say. Do you know that Nigeria and many other African countries are suffering the impact of that crisis by way of security problems everywhere in the region?

Q. Yes, I know.

A. The wording of that Resolution was very clear. It was supposed to be liaison but the Western powers knew what they were up to. They want Gaddafi to have overwhelming advantage over the rebels so that they could have the advantage of using air power against him. Hours after Resolution 1973 was adopted they went all out and were bombing the country. I strongly agree in my perspective that Africa being represented in the permanent seat is the fair thing to do because whomever wears the shoes know wear it pinches. So as Africans if you have African member in the permanent seat, you will look at the entire scenario that affects you in terms of African perspective. That could help in shaping views in decision-making within the Security Council structure.

Q. So from the position you have advanced I can assume that Africa’s absence in the Security Council has implication on the legitimacy and efficiency of the Council?

A. The absence of African state does not affect the legitimacy of the Council because the Security Council was created Charter of the UN. To that extent I am not in the position to say it is illegitimate. The legitimacy concern will always be there until that structure is changed. In the Security Council, decisions taken are political. So, I will not say decisions taken are illegitimate. But it is not realistic, all-encompassing and sustainable for the structure of the Security Council to remain the way it is without Africa being represented in the permanent seat. The scenario that created the UN and its organs and other bodies have changed. So, we have to be realistic, forward looking and more accommodating. The absence of Africa in the Council affects its efficiency. We need to have powerful veto wielding members around which African countries will rally around when issues concerning Africa come up for those crucial decisions of the Security Council. Just imagine a country like Mali is in the Agenda of the Security Council and Nigeria was a permanent member. If certain decisions by other permanent members will be detrimental to the interest of Mali and Africa, of course we will veto such decision.

Q. As a former UN diplomat and now a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, could you give me an insight on Africa’s perspective on the issue of legitimacy of the Security Council?

A. African countries are guided by the decisions taken under the Ezulwuni Consensus. That explains our view about the Security Council. We are all in agreement that permanent membership seats should be expanded and we have not less than two seats. You can’t
challenge legitimacy of the Council since the UN Charter bound all nations. But we feel that Africans are wronged by not being represented in the permanent seat. The decisions that will make the reform happen are all political decisions and therefore we have to appeal to the consciences of those that will make it happen. We could continue to appeal to the major players within the UN system and when it is agreeable then it could be done.

Q. Do you think Nigeria is a suitable candidate state for a permanent seat of the UN Security Council?

A. Absolutely! Nigeria has paid it dues over the years for various reasons. The high point of Nigeria’s diplomacy was its struggle for the emancipation of African nations that were under colonial rule. Shortly after Nigeria’s independence, one of the cardinal principles that guided her foreign policy was to ensure that all countries under colonialism were liberated and the country pursued this so well. Again, Nigeria has paid heavily with human and material resources in contributing to UN peacekeeping operations. The first of which was in 1960 when we sent a peacekeeping contingent to Congo. Since then, we have our contingents participating in crises theatre in different parts of the world. In our sub-region in spite of our internal challenges, Nigeria has always been a stabilizer in West Africa. She is that country others look up to. Am sure you could remember our peacekeeping roles in Liberia and Sierra-Leone and currently in Mali and Guinea Bissau. Recently, Nigeria paid for the logistics for the election in Guinea Bissau. That shows you are a country that is ready to lead and represent Africa. Nigeria also has a large population to its advantage. There is no way any country can claim to be a more suitable representative of Africa and the black race in the Security Council than Nigeria. Our population is a huge asset we could leverage on to seek for a permanent seat. Economically we have made progress. Today we are one of the leading countries economically. Nigeria has the highest GDP in Africa.

Q. What challenges do you think Nigeria will be confronted with in pursuing her aspiration for a permanent seat of the Security Council?

A. Number one we have obstacle to encounter within Africa from those aspiring to be permanent members. By the time the reality is glaring that is when the problem will show it head in the continent. The number two challenge is within the permanent members. The most formidable of them is China. In the discussion we are having under the agenda item for reform, we said nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. From Asia, India and Japan are prominent contenders. So long as China is in the permanent seat, it won’t want Japan to be there. The permanent members are infiltrating African countries through the AU Committee of Ten on reform of the Security Council. China infiltrates the Committee of Ten to slow
down negotiations on the reform. What they want is eternal negotiation. China does not want a text-based negotiation. If there is no text you can never reach a negotiation.

Q. What are the chances the AU will support Nigeria’s aspiration for a permanent seat?
A. Well, I am sure that when we get to the point for the AU to determine African representatives for permanent seat, Nigeria will have the support. Our support base may not be huge or wide as it would have been said some twenty or thirty years ago. But I think we are going to have overwhelming support from African countries if we do our homework very well. I think we have done a lot as a nation but we can do better. When we get to that point, we are going to do our campaign and lobbying to convince others. We have to get as many African countries as possible on our side. The majority of African nations are Africans in the Sahara and I don’t see how South Africa, Egypt or Algeria will represent Africa when Nigeria is there. The population of some of these countries is just a fraction of Nigeria’s population. Nigeria is the only country that is more representative of Africa. Majority of the people who live in the continent are in the South of the Sahara.

Q. What would you consider as the underlying factors responsible for Africa’s exclusion in the UN Security Council’s permanent seat?
A. Most African countries were not represented, as the time of the formation of the UN. Only Liberia, Ethiopia and Egypt were independent when the UN Charter was negotiated. In the UN, once anything is put into writing it becomes a precedence and it is difficult to go back to change it. There is no process in the history of the UN that has been delayed like the issue of the reform of the Security Council and it is due to the deliberate policy of certain governments and countries of not wanting it to happen.

Q. How do you think the AU reform position can achieve unity of purpose in Africa’s quest for a permanent seat?
A. It is for Africa to determine when we get there. Within Africa there is problem of rivalry between countries on different diplomatic issues and even on this issue of the reform. Although we have a common position on paper on the reform, there are those who are saying let there be a rotational permanent seat for Africa. Again, there are those who feel it is better to have a permanent seat without a veto. So, it is a very complex issue.

Q. Do you think Nigeria has a focused strategy or approach in pursuing her ambition for a permanent seat?
A. In my view there is no coordinated approach by the country. There is no deliberate policy and consistent approach by the Nigerian government in pursuing her ambition. Even though we have expressed our ambition because of the scenario at that time, the campaign for the
seat has not really crystalized. We can develop our strategy internally so that other African countries don’t see us being too ambitious. The idea is for us to fight a battle for the UN to first accept our position and then we come back to fight a slot of the permanent seat. Perhaps that is why our campaign isn’t on track. Africa has a coherent position through the AU. The concept is there, we are not all out to campaign because we have not yet reached that point.

Q. Do you think the pan-African ideology embraced by our nationalist leaders during the colonial rule in the struggle for the independence of African states could be replicated in Africa’s quest for the reform of the UN Security Council?

A. The early generation of African leaders were more pan-African than the current leaders we have now. Many African leaders today do not share the pan-African ideology because they have been infiltrated by western ideology. We have African leaders today who do not know much about African decolonisation struggles. African leaders do not value their independence. We prefer to associate with people who are responsible for our current state. The pan-African ideology no longer exists because we are compelled to depend on the western countries for everything. You cannot move cap in hand and talk about Pan-Africanism.

Q. How would you situate the issue of efficiency and representation in the Security Council in the contest of the clamour for reformation of the Council?

A. The question is why should the power to make decisions on security related issues across the globe be vested in the hands of only 15 members? Is that democratic? If you want to be fair, then the UN General Assembly should be the one to take the decision being taken by the Security Council because it is more representative. You can’t arrogate the powers of the overwhelming majority to a few in the Security Council. The agitation that democratic principles should be entrenched in the governance of nations should also be extended to the UN. Those who don’t want the reform will always argue that the efficiency of the Security Council will be undermined when membership is expanded. How? I don’t see that happening. Expanding membership of the Security Council will make it even more efficient. This is because if you have permanent representation for Africa, they will be able to represent Africa so well. That is why we say African problem will require African solution. Also, the Security Council penholder system is not good it’s for efficiency. As penholders the permanent members have significant influence in the decision-making apparatus of the Security Council since they draft most resolutions. The other members of the Security Council are left out in the articulation of the final decisions of the Council. This could undermine transparency in the Security Council and also impact on its efficiency.
Q. Some people have argued the provision therein Article 108 of the UN is a major obstacle to the reform of the Security Council. What is your view on this?

A. Yes to some extent I share the same view because the powers given to the permanent members by this Article could be a problem to the reform. The process of this reform will be on for God knows how long. Even if the Generally Assembly agrees to the reform, the permanent members will always be there to exercise their powers to give effect to any decision or withhold their support. I feel that it is only if there is another world war before the current structure could be dismantled. Then you have the new emerging powers that will determine the structure of the Security Council.

Q. Do you think the veto power exercised by the permanent members has any impact on legitimacy perception of the Security Council?

A. Definitely yes. This happened in many an instance recently of which is the Syrian crisis. I also want you to understand all decisions of the Security Council are political. There is many times that certain resolutions are adopted without a vote. It is only the contentious issues that are political that leads to the casting of the veto. In the Syria conflict several attempts were made by the US, France and the UK to adopt resolutions but efforts are double veto by Russia and China. So, this is the problem of having the veto in the Security Council.

Q. Thank you for your time.

Interviewee F: 2/10/2019

Q. As a former Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the UN, how would you assess the disposition of the permanent members to the clamour for the reformation of the Security Council?

A. I think the permanent members are indisposed to the reform of the Security Council and you could understand the reason for that. The post Second World War arrangement was essentially conceived, actualized and implemented by them. So, there is some kind of what I will describe as ownership of an organisation that was created to stop future wars. But you can’t stop future wars if you exclude other members. Well, in theory the other members were not excluded, they brought in everybody on board. African countries that became independence were admitted into the Organisation. In practice, the P5 are certainly not disposed to any interference in their domination and in their pre-eminence. I won’t say governance; I want to be polite but they really governed. You must read the book “Five to Rule them All”. That book will give you an idea of what I am telling you. They are indisposed to it.
Q. During your time as a Permanent Representative to the UN, you were at some point in the Security Council and even served as the President of the Security Council. So, what were your roles in that capacity when you were in the Council?

A. Well, as President of the Security Council, in theory you set the agenda. Of course, from the original perspective, your country perspective and international perspective. There are also concerns here and there. The permanent members have concern too they want to table during your presidency. They are free to bring them and if you can accommodate them, so be it. I don’t want to draw the distinction between the P5 presidency and elected member presidency, all are subject to pressures. Some P5 will want you as elected member President to deal with an issue and if you cannot accommodate it, you tell them you can’t accommodate it unless there is a consensus that you should consider this in addition to the schedule. When you assume Presidency, the first day in your office is getting to know your colleagues and other member states of the UN. It is an opportunity for you to meet with them over breakfast. It is ahh (exclamation), should I call it a ritual; it is something that is done to give the impression of unity and a consensus. Then the second day, you spend time to make consultations. Your agenda would have been ready two weeks before. Those consultations are designed for your colleagues in the Security Council to look at the agenda you have set and make their inputs. These inputs may alter or may not alter the agenda. You take the totality of their contributions and then balance your agenda. On the same second day, you meet with the press, you tell them your agenda. This is what I want to do in my Presidency and they ask you questions. Then you meet formally with members of the General Assembly, the non-members of the Security Council. Again, you present your agenda to them. They ask you questions. It’s a tortuous period. That is why I said it is tough. You have to be on your toes. You have to know what you are doing. So that is how the early preparations are made. You start planning the day you get elected into the Security Council.

Q. So where you are able to speak on issues on the reform of the Security?

A. We brought to the Council issues that are relevant to our development not only as Nigeria but also as Africa. We started the A3 in the Security Council that is the three African member states in the Security Council. We consulted with one another. We sort of coalesced under the A3 to discuss and report to the AU. We had meeting of the AU in New York once a week. So, you take you agenda once again to the AU and they subject it to a debate and scrutiny and then of course during your presidency you must give them update. That was the development during our tenure. You are not representing Nigeria per say. You are engaged in conflict problems of the world, economic problems of the world and security problem of the world.
You just happen to be citizen from a country. But then if you find an issue that is of national concern to you which another share, you bring it forward. We brought the issue of Ebola during our time. That raised the profile of Nigeria because we were able to tackle Ebola. At that time, we were grabbling with the Chibok abduction. Again, it was during our second time we were the first to have the first ever standalone security sector resolution. Nobody is talking about it. The Security Council is highest political decision-making body on the face of this earth. Their powers, hmmm (exclamation), I don’t know what appropriate word to use to describe the extent of their powers. For us the non-permanent members, you first come there trying to find your feet but the permanent members have been there and been schooled. We the developing countries just jump on the boat with no experience. In fact, those middle powers that are also aspiring for permanent seat like Brazil usually come there well prepared. From Angela Merkel to the bottom line, they are all prepared. In the African case, we will be begging for money to hold breakfast. They don’t even care to know what you are doing. It is not a place you go unprepared. Everything is watching you and creating an impression about you. That is how they treat you. So, when is Africa going to grow? Well, I have been into it. I have my impression. I have my fears. Until you get there and if you are not perceptive, you will even get worse than you came in there. If you are perceptive, you will know that this is not a child’s play. I just told you about the power base, the Five to Rule them All and they are not ready to relinquish power. We hadn’t been in Security Council for 19 years by the time I came. So, in theory I have studied the UN as a student in the United States. I was not unfamiliar with the UN. My first participation in the UN was in 1988 when Babangida sent me as part of presidential delegate. Joe Garba was there. So, I developed interest.

Q. Then you were at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
A. No. I was at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. So, what we gained in theoretical terms and practical terms in policy at the Institute was so helpful. The place is an unpardonable scene. You can drown if you can’t swim. I had a colleague, a Russian colleague. He had been there for about eight to nine years but after him, in the history of the UN you never a permanent member who was president for so long. No even the permanent member. I Jewish friend of my said I should apply for Guinness book of record and I said I am not interested in sensations. But this Russia colleague surpassed me because he has been there for eight-to-eight years and he has done five presidencies. I ahhh! (exclamation), It was destined to be and it was not by my power. Sometimes as you do that rotation which is alphabetically you get it only once in your two-year tenure. We were fortunate that it came round once; it came round twice and third time.
Q. You mentioned some of the issues you were able to present to the Security Council like the Ebola pandemic? (Interviewee interrupted).
A. Yes, we did. Our theme in the second tenure was “Preventive Diplomacy” that was the rubric of our tenure. If you can nip conflicts through handling development issues. Of course, ultimately, it is lack of development that causes conflict. Isn’t it?
Q. Sure!
A. Inadequacies in development, lack of education, no access to health and facilities. You know, the struggle over scanty resources. That is what causes conflict. So preventive diplomacy was what we tried to do apart from bringing other issues. But the ones we felt were germane to our interest. In the first tenure we did “Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea”. That was our major concern, to ensure stability in the Gulf of Guinea. So that was an opportunity for us to present and it was well debated. So, if you look at the Resolution of African states, I will give you a book that covers our two years from 2010 to 2011 in the Security Council.
Q. So what specific issues were you able to push in respect of the UN Security Council reform?
A. Enmmmm (exclamation), reform is not a specific Security Council agenda. Reform is a General Assembly agenda where groups of states converge around the issue of the reform. The Security Council does not delve into specific issues on reform. The UN Security Council addresses peace and security matters. It does not address institutional reforms. Reform agenda is essentially the pre-occupation of the General Assembly.
Q. Does the absence of an Africa state as permanent member of the Security Council affect legitimacy and efficiency of the Council?
A. I don’t think so. This flows into the statement I made earlier. See, foreign policy begins at home. It is your domestic policy that reflects your weaknesses or power abroad. Nigeria and the developing countries have to put their domestic environment in order. If you are not strong at all, you cannot be strong abroad. To be strong abroad, you must be strong at home because that is the foundation of foreign policy. Simple! There are no two ways. The domestic base has to persuade observers. See the UN doesn’t mint money. The money they use to run that organisation comes from the contributions from member states. If one member state contributes one-third to the UN, you want him to give his power to you that contribute nothing? I am talking to you as a Nigerian and as an African. You are a young man and you don’t know what role you will play in the future. I am telling you in graphic terms, the reality of our conditions as Africans or developing countries. The Security Council will not baby seat us. I tell you country X, I am not going to tell you the name of the country. Use your
discretion when you write. Country X in this our West Africa sub-region, they ran for
election and they succeeded us. Let me tell you that anytime we fly our flag that we want to
run for election, some countries in West Africa will also want to run just to get something
from us.
Q. So, they obstructed Nigeria’s aspiration?
A. Yes. And we will say look what do you want? Because if you don’t and you allow them.
Those countries will support other countries to bring you down. When we went for election
the first time, we swept the place with 187 votes out of 191. Anyway, some countries stopped
us from clearing 100 over 100. They are all from West Africa. I can never forget this. They
voted for themselves. So, when they counted our votes, they gave us 187.
Q. Still on the issue of legitimacy of the Security Council. Do you think there is an African
perspective about the legitimacy of the Council?
A. See every African country is struggling for himself and guided by his master. We are all
not free in practical terms but in theory, yes. There are still big powers spheres of influence in
our continent and in the world. What we tried to do as ambassadors of African countries was
to put our position together but sometimes you can’t get it. South Africa had its own alliances.
It had alliance with Brazil, China, Russia and India under the BRICS. There was a time, it
was 2010/2011, we had all the members of the BRICS in the Security Council whether by
design or accident, I don’t know. And you don’t think that those BRICS members won’t
support South Africa in terms of who is going to the Security Council against Nigeria. Come
on!
Q. Do you think the veto power has to some extent impacted on the legitimacy perception of
the UN Security Council?
A. It is not something they use anyhow. This veto power issue has been over played. You see
dichotomies in the Security Council elected members, P5 and middle powers. The P5 have
their forum where they discuss issues. They discuss just as we do. They talk about ideological
differences, I tell you when the chips are down, there are none. All the P5 will come together
and that will determine whether they use the veto power or not. People keep talking about
Libya. See, China would have vetoed it easily. Russia would have exercised its veto power
easily and stop NATO from going to Libya but they did not. We discussed for nearly a week.
We could spend a whole three hours discussing procedures. They didn’t veto it and they
allowed NATO to go in there. Two of them would have done it. So, all these divisions people
are talking, the permanent members get together. So, I think the developing countries are in
delusion or they don’t analyse the situation they find intelligently. It is not a fight between them but they agree on what they want to agree on.

Q. So should I assume the veto power has influenced how other member state view the Security Council?

A. You see the non-permanent sates have to first of all understand how it works. In order to understand how it works, you have to go back to history and think about the wars that took place. The first League of Nations set up in Geneva, how did it fail? There was another war after the First World War. It was from the Second World War that the Atlantic Charter and all that came about. Wasn’t Taiwan seated in the Council before? How comes they got kicked out and put China? We are going after this as if it will solve our problems. Or problems are in our hands. It’s a power equation. We don’t have the power. We need good governance. In theory you can talk about all of this. In practice it is far away from this theory.

Q. Though in your responses you have in a way spoken about Africa’s exclusion in the UN Security Council. Could you give me more insight on the factors or issues responsible for Africa’s exclusion from the Council?

A. We are the ones excluding ourselves. Nobody is excluding us. We have to develop our countries. We have to earn the respect. They give you aids and you want to go there and seat like equals. Come on! It’s all about power and not charity. Read the “Five to Rule them All”. Though I am an African, I am not taking side. I wish I could lay my hands on some of my notes when I presented a paper on these issues. It’s good to write from a national interest perspective. Whatever I find that will be of help to your research I will send them to you.

Q. Thank you ma. Let me proceed to my next question. Would you consider Nigeria as a suitable candidate state for a permanent seat of the UN Security Council?

A. Oh yes! Why not? We have got the credentials except it has to define itself. Nigeria has all the credentials and potential but it has to define itself. It has to learn not to take the world for granted, not to take power for granted. It is not given. You have to work to preserve it and sustain it. The politics of international politics is about power and the exercise of power. If it does happen and Nigeria doesn’t get it, who will get it?

Q. So ma, what challenges do you think Nigeria may face in pursuing her aspiration for a UN Security Council permanent seat?

A. The first challenge is at home as I have repeated in every sentence. Size alone doesn’t win you global spheres of influence. There are other indices of power. Quality of your system, quality of the welfare of your people and their educational standard. The quality of governance. If you read my book on “Leadership, Democracy and the Challenges of
Development”, it will help you. It clearly delineates the role of the citizen and the state. To be a good leader, you first learn to be a good citizen. You cannot be a good leader if you are not a good citizen.

Q. What are the chances that the AU will support Nigeria’s aspiration for a UN Security permanent seat?
A. Nigeria has to struggle for it. The AU is saying we stand on Ezulwuni Consensus. Is everybody still standing on the Ezulwuni Consensus? Is South Africa standing on the Ezulwuni? Look it is not going to be given away. We have to struggle for it at that level. We have to earn it and take it. It can’t be given away like that to us because there are other aspirants. We must learn not to take any small country for granted. See how Cuba shook the Western hemisphere for years.

Q. Do you think Nigeria has a coordinated strategy in advancing her ambition?
A. That reminds me of some years ago I was on the presidential Council on Foreign Relations led by respected Chief Anyaokwu. We got the nod to campaign for a permanent seat. At that time the issue was on the front burner. Then there were trips to African countries to meet the so-called influencers. It was when I got to the United Nations that I said kai (exclamation) see what we did. It was laughable. It is not like that. You know when you are so ignorant and you don’t believe. In fact me as the DG we were asked to organize a conference. If you go to the Institute, you will see it there, I edited it. We held a conference on Nigeria’s aspiration for the Security Council permanent seat.

Q. Was that the Conference held in 2005?
A. Yes. When you get there the game changes.

Q. So Nigeria’s approach isn’t right?
A. We need to go back to the domestic base and consolidate it to earn respect. We have the potentials but we don’t know how to exercise it.

Q. There is this argument that Africa’s position on the reform of the Security Council mainly focused on representation rather than efficiency of the Council. What is your view about this?
A. There are very serious countries in the General Assembly who have addressed some of the flaws of the Security Council. Those who have been there for long. They become master of the system. Each period they try to organize new comers to explain to them so that it becomes a continuous exercise like the Working Methods of the Security Council. The reform has to be comprehensive considering representation and efficiency. It is not really the number that matters but how efficient it is.
Q. Many scholars and commentators tend to argue that the provision of Article 108 of the UN Charter is one concern that could affect the reform of the UN Security Council. What are your thoughts about this?

A. The charter is not engraved on a stone. Member states can get together to revisit an article. For me it’s one track. I don’t see any other track unless my experience of forty years plus is lost and I don’t think so. We have to establish prerequisite for ourselves to pursue those things we feel strongly about. The P5 have their own issue, I told you earlier on. As far as interest goes, what the P5 don’t agree with will not take place. It’s all about their national interest. So, the P5 are not ready to give away their powers. The national interest transcends everything. Countries don’t go around promoting the national interests of others. Consensus comes in when national interests are served.

Q. What is your view of the AU reform position of the UN Security Council?

A. The AU does not have a united position on this as far as I am concerned. I just told you about South Africa and the BRICS. South Africa would rather prefer to align with BRICS.

Q. So it means Africa is not united on this. How then can Africa be united in advancing her position on the reform?

A. African states have to be mobilized under an undisputable leader. And it is not just by making pronouncement but also by getting real.

Q. Thank you much for your time.

A. Thank you.

Interviewee G: 17/10/2019

Q. Thank you for accepting to speak with me despite the short notice.

A. Thank you. As you were told, my colleague that was supposed to speak with you is away from the Mission attending to others matters but I will do my best to speak on some of the issues you want to know about. Maybe we could schedule another meeting but you said you have limited time here.

Q. Ok that is fine. What in your view is responsible for Africa’s exclusion in the permanent seat of the Security Council?

A. You see the UN was established in 1945. At that time how many African countries were independent? I think only three countries; Liberia, Egypt and the third country.

Q. Ethiopia?

A. Yes, Ethiopia. So, the reason for Africa’s exclusion cannot be farfetched. We had low representation in it, so we don’t have a voice there. Again, the determination of membership
of the organisation whether permanent or non-permanent was by the idea and influence of the victors of the Second World War. They are the ones in the permanent seat.

Q. So would you say Africa’s exclusion in the Permanent seat affects the legitimacy of the Council?

A. In my view, I think Africa’s exclusion has legitimacy concern for the Security Council because the membership of the permanent seat is not geographically balanced and so no fair representation. The P5 have significant control and influence over the majority of other member states of the UN. There are several instances where they project their individual interests against the generality of the UN. Some people will tell you that the Security Council has no legitimacy issue because all the founding members of the UN consented to the UN Charter. So, they don’t see any legitimacy concern about the Council because some member states from a region are exempted from the permanent seat.

Q. Do you see the veto power exclusively reserved for the P5 as a problem to the legitimacy of the Security Council?

A. I just told you the P5 usually stand to defend and promote their interests alone in the Security Council. They do this by exercising this veto especially if their interests are not served. We as Africans are not happy the way they sometimes use them, likewise other UN member states from other parts of the world.

Q. So what do you think the AU could do to make the reform of the Security Council happen such that African could be represented under the permanent seat?

A. Africa is already doing what it should do under this circumstance. There is the AU position on the reform. That position is well known. We are saying that African should have two permanent seats and more non-permanent seats in the Security Council. We have the African group in the UN that brings African states under one umbrella where they push Africa’s interest on the reform.

Q. So are there chances Africa could get permanent seat of the Security Council in the event of its reformation?

A. That is for the world to decide. It is left for UN member states to agree or disagree without our positions. I told you we are doing what we should be doing as far this issue of reform is concern.

Q. Is Nigeria a suitable candidate state for permanent seat of the Security Council?

A. There are countries like South, Egypt and Kenya that want to have the permanent seat just like Nigeria. They all have their positive sides, which I think, makes them qualified to have the seat. We know that Nigeria has all it takes to be permanent member. You have a big
economy and in fact the largest in Africa. Nigeria has wide diplomatic outreach. I am sure Nigeria or South Africa more than any other African countries has the greatest number of embassies in different parts of the world. The country is just visible everywhere especially with its large population. Although Nigeria needs to do more to increase its diplomatic relations and partnership with the rest of the world so that she gets more countries to support its ambition. Nigeria should be prepared to host more international cultural and sporting events to raise her global visibility. I am aware Nigeria’s economy is oil dependent. She could do more to strengthen her economy by focusing on other areas. The challenge I see Nigeria would have is from other aspiring African states especially South Africa. Apart from South Africa, there other countries too that wants it. It will be difficult to decide who should be there from Africa. Issues of the geography of those countries are factors that will be brought up at some point. Again, Article 108 of the UN Charter is an issue of concern. Will the P5 agree for the reform to happen in the manner the AU is proposing? These are issues we can’t just wish away. They really matter.

Q. Thank you for your time.
A. Thank you.

**Interviewee H: 4/11/2019**

Q. Considering your background and your activities in the permanent Mission, I will be eliciting more information from you regarding UN peacekeeping operations?
A. I will always be willing to speak to you anytime please.

Q. Do you see participation in UN peacekeeping operation as one possible area that states aspiring for permanent seat of the UN Security Council could leverage on to pursue their ambition?
A. I don’t think engagement in peacekeeping operations by states is something we should be looking at to determine eligibility for a UN permanent seat. You can project your force without physically having them on ground. Because of global economic meltdown executing a lot of issues have been affected by paucity of funds. The funding of the UN has been dwindling. Carrying out large-scale operations and sustenance of troops in peacekeeping operations is becoming more difficult by the day. So, the UN has to inwards and finds ways to remain relevant. One of the initiatives of the Secretary General is the A4P Initiative. That is Action for Peace Initiative that looks at seating down, talking and trying to resolve most of these conflicts around the world as against bringing troops physically.
Q. So by this initiative, UN peacekeeping operations may not in the future be used as an instrument in maintaining global peace and Security?
A. Though the A4P Initiative encourages negotiations as against physical deployment of troops does not really mean that there won’t be UN peacekeeping operations. UN peacekeeping missions will continue to remain relevant in achieving the primary objectives of the UN. Let me check through my papers here and read to you the essence of the Initiative. Just wait a minute. OK, the A4P Initiative aims to strengthen peacekeeping by spurring collective action by all peacekeeping stakeholders and including all member states, the Security Council, General Assembly, financial contributors, host countries, intergovernmental and regional organisations. By this, you could see that it’s a sort of multi-sectorial approach to peacekeeping activities. The troops contributing countries that are majorly developing countries from Asia, Africa and some countries in other regions have been able to find a voice through a group called the C-34 which is a non-aligned group of troops and police contributing countries.

Q. Is Nigeria a member of the C-34?
A. Of course yes. It is through this group that the troops contributing countries are able to get their voices heard. We had situations where the fund contributing; the US, China, Russia, Canada and the rest of them would want to impose their standards and regulations which are not feasible. They will tell you because they provided certain amount of money that your peacekeepers must be this or that. The C-34 through their group has been able to argue why some of the restrictions and conditions by the fund contributing countries are not practicable.

Q. How would you assess Nigeria and Africa in general regarding their contribution to world peace and security through the UN peacekeeping operations?
A. Nigeria has done well in contributing to the maintenance of world peace and security particularly in Africa. Nigeria was a major troop contributing country to the UN until the emergence of Boko Haram in the country. At some point Nigeria was the 4th troops contributing country. In general Africa has been active in participation in UN operations. Countries like Ethiopia, Egypt and Ghana are contributing greatly to these operations.

Q. It is interesting to hear that Nigeria was at a time among the major troop contributors to UN peacekeeping missions. Could you avail me with any formal document about this?
A. The information is there in the UN website. After this interview, I will get you the specific website that gives the breakdown of troops contributions to UN peacekeeping operations by countries.
Q. Ok. Thank you. You mentioned that Nigeria’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations has reduced due to the crisis of Boko Haram insurgency in the country. What in your view would you suggest that Nigeria could consider doing in order to sustain high participation in UN peacekeeping operations while also maintaining the momentum in tackling its security challenges at home?

A. We could improve on our participation in peacekeeping operations by establishing a parastatal under the Ministry of Defence to be responsible for peacekeeping operations matters. The parastatal will have to legislated and have its own funding which is another major problem of participation in peacekeeping. Another way is engage veteran groups as reserves. There is the need for the Defence Headquarters to bring the different veteran groups under one umbrella, get them legislated and integrate into the system. The greatest challenge of Nigeria’s participation in UN operations is the problem of Contingent Own Equipment, COE for short. You need to have them in the Mission and maintain them to earn some money from the UN but Nigeria does not deploy adequate COE to missions. We suggested Wet Leasing as the easiest way to resolve this problem of COE. Here you get contractor to provide the equipment and when the UN is reimbursing, the money goes to the supplier and eventually those equipments are paid off for and they become COE. So going for Wet Leasing could be a means of equipping our military units and formations.

Q. Some commentators argue that participation in UN peacekeeping operation is a means of generating revenue by the participating UN member states. What is your view about this?

A. Yes, participation in UN peacekeeping operations comes with financial benefits to countries for the COE deployed in the operations and even remunerations to peacekeepers. For every COE provided by countries, they are reimbursed by the UN and that is a source of revenue. Had it been my (...), were to be around, I would have asked him to explain to you the financial details of these reimbursement for COE. I am not conversant with the financial figures. Countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan who are leading contributors to UN peacekeeping operations are gaining a lot from the COE deployed in UN missions.

Q. Do you see Nigeria as a suitable candidate state for permanent seat of the Security Council?

A. I am sure that some of those you have interviewed may have given many reasons why Nigeria is qualified to be there. For me, the country has the capacity to be there if you look what we have done to bring about peace in many African countries under the ECOMOG and the UN. The Security Council is all about promoting global peace and security and Nigeria is doing that so well in its region.
Q. Thank you for speaking with me.
A. Thank you and I wish you the very best in your research.

**Interviewee I: 5/11/2019**

Q. Thank you for agreeing to speak with me on my research despite your busy schedule.
A. Let me once again welcome you to this Permanent Mission and sorry for keeping you waiting. I hope you are enjoying your stay in the New York? How is your research going over there in the UK?
Q. Very well.
A. I am familiar with the UK academic environment. I had my MSc at (…) University. Having listened to the thrust of your research and because of my busy schedule, I will speak to you on Africa’s position on the reform and then answer a few questions from you. I will prefer you send the rest of your questions to my mail and I will try to respond to them. I think you will need some AU documents for your research, I will send them to your mail.
Q. Thank you.
A. As you are already aware, Africa has no permanent representation in the UN Security Council and not only that; the Continent is also under-represented in the non-permanent seat. When our Heads of States met around 2005, they decided that we had a just cause and a just demand to ask for reform. They agreed that we should be well represented in both the permanent and non-permanent seats of the Security Council because about 70 per cent of the Security Council’s Agenda is about Africa. If you look at the agenda of the Security Council for the month, you will see that most of the items are concerning Africa. We have position on the reform of the Security Council. We are the only regional group that has a common position. The other reform positions of the Security Council are not championed by regional groups. We have the UfC led by Italy, the G4, the L69 and the CARICOM. I think there are one or two other groups that are basically about improving the working methods of the Security Council and they are not in favour of a comprehensive reform of the Council. There five clusters on the question of the reform of the Security Council; the category of membership, regional representation, working methods, the veto and size of the Council. Africa believes that the reform has to be comprehensive and not in piecemeal. There are some groups that are asking for discussion on the issue of working methods. Others say let’s talk about enlargement in the non-permanent category. So we in Africa don’t accept a piecemeal reform. We are asking for a comprehensive reform. Africa is the only region, which has a clear common position regarding the five clusters of the question of the reform.
of the Security Council. We are asking for two permanent seats and additional two non-permanent seats. For the question of the veto, we believe that the veto is undemocratic. African countries are against the exercise of the veto but as long as it exists and used by permanent members, new members too should have it. There are other groups that are asking for intermediate approach, which is a new category. They seek for long-term category of membership of up to 9 years. We have two categories right now; the permanent and non-permanent categories. Africa’s position is against the intermediate position. There was a decision on the Security Council reform by African Foreign Ministers that rejected any intermediate approach to the reform because it is conflict with Africa’s Common position. The Intergovernmental Negotiation (IGN) on the Security Council reform started after many years of the quest for the reform. For now, there is no text-based negotiation on the reform because no agreement has been reached on that. The President of the General Assembly every year appoints Co-facilitator or Chair of the IGN to the lead the process of the reform. The IGN is open-ended working group. It involves so many groups. We the African group with 54 African states. We have the L69, which has huge membership. The irony is you have some African member states that are members of the L69, so they have dual membership of groups. The L69 is supporting the position of the African group. The CARICOM too are supporting Africa’s position. The UfC is in conflict with our position. It is not in favour of enlargement of membership in the permanent category. So, it is an issue of principle for them (UfC). I want you to know that the provision of Article 108 of the UN Charter is a challenge to the reformation of the UN Security Council. It is partly a reason why today there is no membership of any African country or other deserving countries in the permanent seat.

Q. You talked about African position on the reform advocating for two permanent seats for Africa. So what two African states do you consider as the most suitable to occupy those seats and why?

A. This a question that I cannot really respond to now because its just a proposal. If our proposal is granted one day then of course the AU will decide on those to represent Africa.

Q. In your view is Nigeria is a suitable candidate state for a permanent seat?

A. Yes Nigeria is a suitable candidate for a permanent seat going by her historical antecedent. But I think the focus shouldn’t be only on Nigeria but Africa. Many Africa countries too are qualified to be there. Talk of Egypt, South Africa, Kenya and many more. They all have the requisite potentials to be there

Q. Though there is a common African position on the reform of the Security Council as you already alluded in your submissions but there seem to be bickering among African states on
the reform of the Security as some states wanted permanent seat for Africa without veto while some insist on having the veto. So how do you reconcile this?

A. Yes I agree with you that this agreement exists but does it takes away the fact that there is the Ezulwini Consensus that represents our position? Let me assure that the AU reform position is still on course. African Heads of States and Foreign Ministers meet from time to time and issues are debated to arrive at a common position. So we will continue to discuss to resolve our differences.

Q. I am aware of AU resolutions urging African states not to associate with other reform groups and you indicated that some African states have membership of the L69. Doesn’t that suggest lack of unity among African states in advancing its position on the reform?

A. The AU has large membership of about 55 African states. It is not possible to expect all members in such a large group to share the same view on an issue. There will definitely be varied opinions but like I said there are always discussions to resolve problems like that. The AU Committee of Ten is there to coordinate and advance the position of Africa on the reform.

Q. Thank you for your time and I will forward to your mail further questions.

A. Alright. Thank you.

**Interviewee J: 5/11/2019**

Q. What would you consider as the underlying issues responsible for Africa’s exclusion as permanent member of the Security Council?

A. There are countries that feel that if you have to be in the UN Security Council permanent seat you should have the financial muscle to take up responsibility of the UN. Secondly, there are those who don’t want any country to jump into the permanent membership category. Thirdly, there are those who want countries to jump in but will not have the veto power. So those are the issues that are playing out. Some don’t just want Africa being a continent with crises because of what value will it bring to the Security Council. From the beginning, the continent was at disadvantage. We were under colonial rule. So, we couldn’t be part of the discussion that led to the establishment of the UN.

Q. But countries like Egypt, Liberia and Ethiopia were part of the founding members of the UN?

A. Of course yes. But their numbers made no difference as they could not make any impact or influence decisions.

Q. From your experience as a UN diplomat, what are your views about the general perceptions of the non-permanent states in the UN Security Council on one hand and the
permanent members on the other hand with regards to the clamour for the reform of the Security Council?

A. The non-permanent members jump in and out of the Security Council. So, you can’t bring them together into one fold to know what they are saying because they serve a two years term. The permanent membership from my experience I can tell you that France and the UK seem to be disposed to the reform but I have not seen the same energy with other permanent members of the Security Council. The reason is because if you are enjoying some privileges, would you want others to join you? Naturally you won’t allow it. So, it is left for those who want to enjoy it to continue to fight for it. The process for the reform started about 25 years ago but the IGN process started 10 years ago. I mean the Intergovernmental Negotiation. The IGN since it started has not gone anywhere. It is just a talk shop. There is no negotiating document as people just come and talk. So, we are saying there should be traction of what is being discussed. In the UN there are various groups like the UfC, L69, G4 and so on. All these groups have their own perception of how they want the Security Council reform to be. Envoys from reform groups and China continue to discuss with us here in New York and sometimes on the sidelines of the AU Summit to support their reform positions. The Chinese Envoys are very active in the engagement of African states during AU Summits especially on the issue of the text-based negotiation.

Q. Do you think the absence of an African state as permanent member of the UN Security has any consequence on the legitimacy of the Council?

A. The UN talks about democratization and yet you have the Security Council permanent membership without equitable representation and geographical spread. Of course, there will be problem of legitimacy when some continents are left out. For us until they sort the historical injustices occasioned by Africa’s exclusion in the permanent seat of the Security Council despite our large membership of the UN. More so our demand for permanent representation is justifiable because when you read the official documents of the UN, you will realize that most issues considered in the Security Council are concerning Africa. So, when Africa is not represented it becomes a problem. This definitely creates legitimacy concern for the Security Council because there is an obvious absence of an African permanent member.

Q. Do you think Nigeria is a suitable candidate state for a permanent seat of the Security Council?

A. Yes because Nigeria has been an active player in the international system be it in peacekeeping operations and has also done a lot in support of the decolonisation of Africa.
Nigeria still has Africa as the centre-piece of her foreign policy. When you talk of population, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. She is the largest economy in Africa. So, when you put all parameters together Nigeria deserves to get a slot from the two permanent seats being proposed by the Ezulwuni Consensus.

Q. What would you consider as Africa’s perspective on the issue of legitimacy of the Security Council?

A. Africa’s perspective on the issue of legitimacy of the Security Council could be linked to the issue of historical injustice done to Africa by excluding it from the permanent seat. In order to address the historical injustice, Africa should have two permanent seats as enshrined in the Ezulwuni Consensus and Sirte declaration. The Security Council is becoming a lamed dog with no solution to the Syrian Crisis. Those who have veto power are stalling any arrangement that will bring a resolution to the Syrian crisis. If the membership of the UN Security Council was democratized, we could eliminate the veto impediments by a voting pattern that could pass resolution by for instance six out of ten holders of the veto.

Q. What challenges do you think Nigeria will have to confront in pursuing her aspiration for a UN Security Council permanent seat?

A. I tell you many challenges stand its way. The unwillingness of some members of the P5 to open up the door for other countries to come in is a major concern for the reform. Internal tension within the AU. South Africa and Egypt are major contenders for the seat so Nigeria has to compete with them. Nigeria lacks the capacity to deal with her own internal crises. We have not been able to eliminate Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria after 10 years of its emergence. How would you sell your candidacy if you have not shown capacity to deal with your own internal problems?

Q. How would situate the issue of efficiency vis-a-vis representation against the backdrop of the clamour for the reform of the Security Council?

A. When you expand, you change your working method. You adopt a new working method because it is no longer going to be the same with the old method. For me these two issues are inter-related because they work together. As you increase the membership, you are likely to enhance efficiency because you get wider inputs on your decision-making process. Although some people will look at this differently but I don’t subscribe to the view that membership expansion of the Security Council will not be helpful to its efficacy.

Q. Do you consider the provision of Article 108 of the UN Charter as a major impediment for the reformation of the UN Security Council?
A. That is a complicated matter but we will keep on pressing for the P5 to see the reason for the reform. Because the way the Security Council is now, it is not meeting its demand. There is the need for it to be reformed. So, I think at some point in time the P5 will see reason to say let’s reform now. Nobody who enjoys privileges will want to give it up just like that. So, everybody wants to hold on to privileges.

Q. Do you think Nigeria has a coordinated approach in pursuing her ambition for a permanent seat?

A. I think we do because all our Missions have been briefed and from time to time when we meet with our counterparts, we send them that message. The issue is not to fight for Nigeria’s position but to first fight for Africa’s position. Then we will go home to fight for our position. Right now, it is not time to fight for Nigeria, let them give us two slots of the permanent seat first and then we will now begin the struggle to get one of them. We are hearing that the Arab world want to ask for a slot of the permanent seat. Once they do that, it will take away Egypt in the contest for a permanent seat and Nigeria and South Africa will naturally take the seats for Africa.

Q. What do you think Nigeria should do to promote her aspiration for a UN Security Council permanent seat?

A. Nigeria should keep the peace in the country by defeating Boko Haram insurgency. For you to project your national interest, you must have the economic backbone. Our economy has gone down. We must get it back again. There must be good governance; respect for human rights and rule of law. We must show the world we have come of age in terms of our democratic activities. When you have all these in place and the world sees it, you will earn their respect and support. On the international front, we must continue to push that the process that has been on for more than 10 years to begin to gain traction rather than the arrangement where you have motion without movement.

Q. What is Nigeria’s position on the text-based negotiation on the UN Security Council reform?

A. The L69 is the largest group advocating for the reform of the Security Council, which Nigeria is a member of and we think we can achieve the reform from here. The L69 agrees with the text-based negotiation in order to have a document and traction of the negotiation. When it comes to text-based negotiation, there will be attribution to know who is saying what. There is problem of attribution, as some members don’t want to be attributed to what they stand for. When you discuss without a text, it renders all you have discussed a meaningless and a waste of time. Nigeria and L-69 Group believe that the negotiation process for the
reform should begin with text-based negotiation. This is because when you engage in discussions without a text you will have nothing in a document to revisit tomorrow for continuation of negotiation. With the text-based negotiation, there will be attribution to know who is saying what and also it will help in the traction of negotiation processes.

Q. What are your views on the activities of the AU Committee of Ten on the reform of the UN Security Council?
A. Some of the members of the AU Committee of Ten have been compromised by China. The Committee of Ten is a committee that has permanent membership because its membership has remained unchanged since it was set up. The Committee of Ten influenced the AU decisions years back those African states should not belong to other groups. You cannot negotiate for Africa’s position when you don’t belong to other groups that believe in your position. It is from these groups that you advance your position. Nigeria belongs to the L69 group, which presently has more than 80 member states. You cannot remove yourself from such an important group.

Q. In your view what African states are on the side of Nigeria in her quest for a UN Security Council permanent seat?
A. Many of the African states will prefer Nigeria than South Africa to get a permanent seat. South Africa is too individualistic. Nigeria has always fought the course of Africa. Check out the records of South Africa it doesn’t have that. Right now, it is not about who should take the slot in Africa, it is about the UN giving the slot to Africa.

Q. What do you think is the view of the P5 on Nigeria’s ambition for a permanent seat of the Security Council?
A. China and Russia supports Nigeria’s ambition but I don’t know for the remaining. I don’t know where the others stand. They know the potentials of Nigeria. They know Nigeria is qualified for that position is just that they don’t want open the door. The US will prefer to open the door for just Germany and Japan mainly because of their financial muscle. Russia does not want Germany and China doesn’t want Japan.

Q. What is your view about South Africa and Egypt who are major contenders in Africa aspiring for a UN Security Council permanent seat?
A. Those two countries in my view cannot be matched to Nigeria when you look at Nigeria’s achievement. It is just unfortunate that right now Nigeria is getting messed up with some internal problems if not this debate will not even come up. In this system (UN), I have seen somebody who said whatever Nigeria wants it gets it. Nigeria currently has President of the
UN General Assembly, UN Deputy Secretary General, AU Permanent Representative to the UN and other international appointments.

Q. What are the areas of internal tensions or division among African states in respect of Africa’s position on the reform of the UN Security Council?

A. Africa is united in terms of her reform position of the Security Council but the tension is in the negotiation process. Some countries are manipulating African countries. Some African states are being compromised by China not to accept the text-based negotiation. That is why you see some Africa countries that don’t want the text-based negotiation. In fact Envoys of some member states are not keen about the reform because they think their countries won’t get a permanent seat even if there is any reform.

Q. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak with you.

A. Always my pleasure. All the best.

Q. Thank you sir.

Interviewee K: 7/11/2019

Q. What in your view is responsible for Africa’s exclusion as permanent members of the Security Council?

A. Africa’s exclusion from the permanent seat is not defined by our qualification; that is how powerful we are, our economy or wealth. Historical factor was responsible for Africa’s non-representation in the Security Council and the Continent was not represented at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, which drafted the UN Charter. Political factor is another reason because majority of African territories were under colonial rule when the UN was established.

Q. You said Africa was not represented in the San Francisco Conference in 1945 but I am aware Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia were founding members of the UN?

A. When I said Africa was not represented in that Conference, I didn’t mean Africa was not at all represented. All I am saying is that Africa was not well represented.

Q. Do you think the absence of an African state as a permanent member of the UN Security Council affects the legitimacy of the Council?

A. Yes, our absence affects its legitimacy because Africa as the Security Council is presently constituted has no influence as the P5 that have the veto power. We are just running behind the P5 asking them for their views and how they will draft resolutions. The P5 are the majority penholders and drafters of resolutions. The penholders draft the resolutions and Presidential statements, which is the outcome of the UN Security Council’s resolution.
Q. So what would you say is Africa’s perspective on the legitimacy of the UN Security Council?

A. The present Security Council is not legitimate when you talk of representation, inclusivity, transparency and also not reflecting the general membership of the Council. The P5 encroach into the functions of other organs of the UN like the General Assembly. They want issues, which are supposed to be handled by the General Assembly to be brought under the Security Council. The African Group during the 74th UN General Assembly Session discussed extensively how to deal with the issue of illicit financial inflow to foreign nations but the P5 were not supportive. They were against it. There are lot of problems with the Security Council.

Q. It is a well-known fact that Africa has a common position on the reform of the UN Security Council. In this regard, do you think Africa would eventually be successful in realizing her aspiration for a UN Security Council permanent seat?

A. Right now I feel the message is that we will not have a permanent seat. If we cannot have a permanent seat, then there shouldn’t be any need for a reform in the first place. We believe that the rest of the UN member states should acknowledge the Ezulwuni Consensus. Then we can engage in the text-based negotiation in order to have a point of convergence.

Q. What is the current position of Egypt in respect of the growing clamour for the reform of the UN Security Council?

A. Egypt’s position on this reform is straightforward. We are with the Ezulwuni Consensus and support all its elements. Without the elements in the Ezulwuni Consensus, we wont support the reform.

Q. If I may I ask what are these elements are you talking about?

A. Those things we said we wanted in our position. Two permanent seats for Africa with veto and additional non-permanent seats.

Q. In my view I have always thought Africa would have been in a better position for negotiate for the reform if they had sought for a permanent seat without the veto?

A. (Smiles). That remains your opinion but Africa’s position is about a permanent seat with the veto. The P5 has it, so we should also get it. We didn’t just arrive at this position. There were extensive debates and consultation at the level of the AU before this position was agreed at.

Q. Since the AU is advocating for two permanent seats for Africa, in you view what two African countries are mostly suitable for the UN Security Council permanent seat?
A. This is too early for me to discuss what African countries are most suitable to have the permanent seat. We have to wait until the time it is agreed for Africa to get those two seats and we will decide what countries will get it. Africa needs to define the parameters to decide whom to represent us. The most important thing is to hold those selected as permanent members accountable to Africa by protecting its rights and promoting what is agreed upon.

Q. What countries outside Africa do you think are in support of Africa’s position on the reform of the UN Security Council?

A. I tell you many countries. The developing countries outside Africa like the Caribbean countries, the CARICOM are in support of African position on the reform. India and Japan lately announced their support for the Ezulwini Consensus. Although some developing countries support the AU’s position on the reform, there are many other non-African nations and reform groups that meet African Representatives to persuade them to back their own ideas about the reform.

Q. Do you think Egypt is a suitable contender for a permanent seat of the UN Security Council and if yes, why?

A. I will tell you anytime that Egypt is a strong candidate for a permanent seat. Egypt has the strongest military in Africa. Tell me what country in Africa can match their military might with us? We have the economic power. We are the second largest economy in Africa. We have good diplomatic records in dealing with African issues. Egypt always stands firm in defending Africa’s sovereignty and the rights of African people. We have our legacy and support for African countries during colonization of Africa.

Q. What countries are the close allies of Egypt in her aspiration for a UN Security Council permanent seat?

A. No country in Africa is against Egypt’s aspiration.

Q. Even the West African and Southern African countries?

A. (Laughs). I tell you African countries will support us when the time comes.

Q. What strategy or approach is Egypt adopting in pursuing her ambition for a UN Security Council permanent seat?

A. Egypt has no strategy for now. We have no national strategy in this quest but a continental strategy as stated in the Ezulwuni Consensus.

Q. So do you think Nigeria is also a potential candidate for a UN Security Council permanent seat?

A. Hahahaha (Exclamation). I don’t want to start discussing why or not this country is suitable to get a permanent seat. Anyway, Nigeria is qualified to aspire for the seat. She is the
most populous country in Africa; Nigeria has the largest economy in our continent and many other advantages that stands it out.

Q. Do you think the AU would support Nigeria’s aspiration for a permanent seat of the Security Council?
A. The AU will support any African country for the permanent seat. That is why they have a position for the reform of the Security Council. But again this is an issue for future discussion because the AU currently has no decision on who are the candidates for Africa. This will be decided only when Africa gets what it wanted.

Q. What are the areas of tensions and divisions among African states with respect to the reform of the UN Security Council?
A. Africa is united over the Ezulwuni Consensus on the reform of the Security. We differ in the negotiation process through the text-based negotiation. My country (Egypt) is not in support of the text-based negotiation for now because if we start the negotiation, it will fail when put to vote. The Ezulwuni Consensus has to be acknowledged first before the commencement of the text-based negotiation. The communiqué released at the AU Summit in 2019 mandated African states not to engage in text-based negotiation for now and the Committee of Ten was tasked to assess the text-based negotiation process and submit a report during the next Summit on the issue.

Q. What would be your comment about the bickering by some African states about the activities and long-stay of the membership of the AU Committee of Ten?
A. My response to this question is my personal opinion. The Committee of Ten has been in existence for more than a decade to pursue Africa’s common position on the reform of the UN Security Council. They have managed to present Africa’s position in the past ten years and I see that as a success. The Committee of Ten is a neutral body with no preference to any particular African country seeking for a permanent seat. In my view those countries not in support of the activities of the Committee of Ten only want to achieve their own national interests in the struggle for the reform of the Security Council. They are not after the common African position.

Q. Thank you for your time.
A. Thank you.

Interviewee L: 7/11/2019

Q. Thank you for agreeing to speak with me.
A. You are welcome and I hope we can just get this interview done quickly. We are always busy here. Maybe you could make your questions as brief as possible.

Q. Sure I will.

Q. What would you consider as the underlying factors responsible for the exclusion of Africa as permanent members in the UN Security Council?

A. The UN was established when most of African countries were colonial territories. So, their exclusion was because of historical reasons. The membership of the permanent seat of the Security Council was those considers as the victors of the Second World War. The membership has nothing to do about a particular region or continent.

Q. Although you said the membership of the permanent seat has no relationship with the regions but don’t you think the absence of an African state in the permanent seat has consequence on the legitimacy of the Council considering the growing clamour for an African representation?

A. I don’t think there should be any contention about the legitimacy of the Security Council since it is a creation of the UN Charter. However, the Security Council will be more legitimate when its membership is expanded to accommodate more countries. It should reflect the global realities of today.

Q. So in a nutshell you acknowledged there is a problem in the membership composition of the Security Council?

A. That is not what I am saying. The UN Charter guides the membership composition of the Security Council. I am only stating my view that membership of the Security Council could be enlarged.

Q. What are the challenges or areas of tensions that could stand the way of any proposal for the reform of the Security Council?

A. The review of Article 108 of the UN will be difficult because there is no consensus by the P5 on this aspect of the UN Charter and also, we don’t have a general position on how to reform the Security Council. On the part of France, we are not against the reform. We proposed the regulation in the use of the veto because we wanted the permanent members to voluntarily or collectively agree not to use the veto in instances of mass atrocities. This is a political commitment and does not require changes in the UN Charter. Though the US, China and Russia are not in support of the Initiative. Our proposal will make the Security Council more efficient. Let me give you a chart that gives you a graphical representation of countries that support our veto restraint proposal.

Q. Ok thanks.
A. In this chart, the maps of countries that support the initiative are painted in orange colour. As of today, we have 101 countries supporting the veto restraint proposal.

Q. So what changes do you envisage in any possible reformation of the Security Council and would France support increase in the number of permanent members of the Security Council?

A. France is in support of the G4 proposal for the reform of the Security Council and you know they want more permanent members. We are also back the African proposal for the reform. We want membership of the Security Council to expand. When we have more members in the Security Council, there will be that sense of representation by all. So when this happens I see the members having that satisfaction about the Council.

Q. What is the current position of France about the Reform?

A. My last response in a way has addressed this question. We think the reform of the Security Council is necessary and would bring understanding and strengthened cooperation in the UN. We are still in support of the G4 proposal and what the African group of countries are advocating for the reform.

Q. What is your view with respect to whether the veto power be maintained, abolished or extended to new permanent members in the event of any reformation of the UN Security Council?

A. Article 108 is a provision of the UN Charter and should not be viewed as a problem to the Security Council. We will always welcome a reform and the veto should be maintained with a caveat that it cannot be used to obstruct interventions in certain circumstances where there are mass atrocities. Retention of the veto is ideal. It is because of this veto power that the UN did not support the invasion of Iraq by the USA.

Q. Do you think the veto influences how other member states of the UN perceive the legitimacy of the Security Council?

A. Yes, I think so. The veto power has historical and practical justifications. Today those who don’t have the veto are criticizing it and they have their reasons for that. They oppose it since they think it makes the Security Council less efficient because of its frequent usage and threat to use it.

Q. What is the view of France about the Africa’s Ezulwuni Consensus?

A. They are not against it. France is of course in support of the Ezukwuni Consensus. We want Africa to have more representation in the Security Council.

Q. In your view what the African countries do you think could be considered for a permanent seat of the Security Council?
A. (Smile). No… I am not in the best position to speak on this. I think Africa’s continental organisation; the African Union is in better position to look at this.

Q. What is your view about Nigeria’s aspiration for a UN Security Council permanent seat?
A. I will say Nigeria is one possible candidate. It is left for Africa to tell us who they are putting forward to represent them. France will support any candidate the AU present to represent Africa.

Q. How would relate the issue of demand for an expanded membership of the Security Council vis-à-vis efficacy of the Council?
A. Yes, we can have an expanded membership of the Security Council so that more countries will have the opportunity to be represented. But for optimal efficiency of the Council, I think we will require a balance representation in a way that member state representations will not be too large. We can’t speak of efficiency when we have a huge membership representation. There must be a consideration for a balance representation.

Q. What is the view of France on the text-based negotiation on the reform of the Security Council?
A. It’s a beautiful idea to have a text-based negotiation in the discussion for the reform of the Security Council. There is a need to have a text if you want to do a reform. France is surely in support of the text-based negotiation.

Q. Thank you for your time.
A. Thank you.

**Interviewee M: 7/11/2019**

Q. What in your view is responsible for the exclusion of Africa states as permanent members of the UN Security Council?
A. Africa does not have a voice when the UN was created but now, we have a voice. We view that exclusion from the UN permanent seat as a great historical injustice to the African people. So, one of the reasons for this exclusion is because many African states were still under colonial rule at that time. This is a historical injustice that needs to be corrected. It is on this basis we are calling for the reform of the Security Council.

Q. Do you think the absence of an African state as permanent member of the UN Security Council has negative consequences on the legitimacy of the UN Security Council? If yes, why?
A. Absolutely! I believe that part of the reason the Security Council is pre-occupied with African issues is because of the absence of African representation in the permanent seat. The
absence of African permanent membership delegitimized the Security Council, as you cannot
eclude a continent with a significant proportion of the total membership of the UN with
more than one billion people. We are certainly not pleased with this arrangement.

Q. So, you are saying Africa’s perspective on the legitimacy of the Security Council is all
about representation?

A. That’s correct! Africa’s perspective on this debate is all about representation. When you
have all parts of the world represented in that Council, we wouldn’t have been talking about
its legitimacy because of membership composition. I tell you we can’t pretend that the
Security Council has no legitimacy problem. That is not true. So, we want a Security Council
that will be acceptable to all. We want a Council that will work for humanity and serve the
interests of all. We are seeking for the correction of this historical injustice.

Q. Do you think Africa would realize its ambition for permanent seat in the event of any
reformation of the UN Security Council?

A. Absolutely! I believe Africa would make a successful bid for a permanent seat. We
believe reform is possible because the call for the reform of the Security Council is legitimate.
South Africa is one of the loudest voices in the intergovernmental negotiations for the reform.
Africa has the support of some of the P5 members like France and the UK. The US believe
any new member in the permanent seat must have the financial capacity to shoulder the
responsibility of the Security Council and also have democracy. The Chinese don’t want the
text-based negotiation. The UfC is not in support of any reform under the permanent seat.
Actually, there are quite many changes we will need to tackle for us to get what we want.

Q. What is the position of South Africa on the reform of the UN Security Council?

A. Our position is not different from what the AU is advocating for. South Africa supports
the common African position, Ezulwuni Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. Our position is
that there should be reform in the permanent seat whereby Africa will get two permanent
seats with the veto and two additional non-permanent seats. I do not think it is right for only
five members to have the veto. That is not democratic. I think we could reform the Security
Council so that such privileges will be available to other members. We are concerned by the
prolong dialogue on the reform and we think that the text-based negotiation will deliver early
reforms.

Q. What countries are South Africa’s allies in her ambition for a permanent seat of the UN
Security Council?

A. I cannot start telling you the names of those that are with us or not. South Africa is a
friendly nation. We have friends across the different sub-region in Africa.
Q. Does South Africa have a strategy to coordinate and pursue her ambition for a permanent seat of the UN Security Council?

A. It is premature for South Africa to have strategy for now. South Africa has no strategy and will abide by the AU reform position. When the time comes South Africa will articulate its strategy to realize its aspirations.

Q. What reform groups do you think are in support of the AU position on the reform of the Security Council?

A. The L69 group is very much with us in this advocacy for the reform of the Security Council. The CARICOM are there, Nordic states and many independent states do not oppose our proposal. If you take the numbers from the UN General Assembly, I am sure you will get far more than 100 UN member states that are with us.

Q. In your opinion what two African countries are the most suitable for the UN Security Council’s permanent seat and why?

A. I don’t recognize any specific country as the most suitable contender in Africa to get the permanent seat. The AU will decide on who gets what if there is a reform of the Security Council and its proposal is acceptable to the generality of the UN member states.

Q. What are your views about Nigeria’s ambition for a UN Security Council’s permanent seat?

A. I think it’s good that Nigeria is showing interest for a permanent seat. It is also a good thing that many other African countries are doing the same. Nigeria should have a stronger voice in the intergovernmental negotiation for the reform. Nigeria should use her position as the current President of the UN General Assembly to push for Africa’s representation in the Security Council.

Q. Do you think the AU will support Nigeria’s ambition for a permanent seat of the UN Security Council?

A. I have no opinion on that. The AU will decide when the time comes.

Q. What do you think would be the line of division among African states if in the event Africa’s proposal is acceptable as part of any reform of the Security Council?

A. The voting process in deciding the right candidates may be an issue that will create friction. I see sub-regional representation being used as part of the methods in the selection. There will be regional alliances and all the rest politicking. But in the end, everybody will be happy with whatever choice that comes out from the process.

Q. What in your view could be done to ensure a united front and sustained advocacy by Africa in its quest for a permanent seat of the UN Security Council?
A. I am sure you know there is the AU Committee of Ten that coordinate and advises the AU on the reform of the UN Security Council. The AU must ensure that all the reports by this Committee are put for discussion at the Heads of States level so that during AU Summit issues of the reform will be debated. There should be extensive deliberations of the reports of the Committee of Ten by all African Heads of Governments rather than just endorsing their reports, as it is the practice today. When we do all these, everybody will be carried along and there won’t be dissenting voices on how to go about promoting Africa’s interest on the reform.

Q. Thank you very much for agreeing to speak with me.
A. Thank you. Good luck in your research and have a safe flight back to your destination.
Q. Thank you.

Interviewee N: 11/11/2019

Q. What in your is the underlying factor responsible for Africa’s exclusion as permanent member of the UN Security Council?
A. We are not saying this country or that country should be represented in the Security Council as permanent or non-permanent member. It is for all the member states of the General Assembly to decide on how the future of the Security Council should look like. It is up to future agreements by all interested parties to decide whether it will increase the number of permanent seats or that of the non-permanent seat as the UfC is seeking for. So, I cannot tell you why Africa is not in the Security Council, it is up to the membership of the General Assembly.

Q. But the permanent members have critical role to play in any decision to expand the membership of the Security Council?
A. That I know. That is why I said the General Assembly, which includes the P5, would decide. As you know all UN member States is part of the General Assembly.

Q. Do you think the absence of African state as a permanent member of the UN Security impact negatively on the legitimacy perception of the Council?
A. The absence of Africa in the Security Council has no legitimacy consequences for the Council because it was the events of the World War II that determined the membership of the Security Council and the membership composition is enshrined in the UN Charter. Though we think that Africa should be represented more in the Security Council and by so doing it will better for the legitimacy of the Council. The membership of the Security Council does not represent the modern world. It is clear that since the last reform of the Security Council a
lot of things have changed. That is why Africa has 54 states. Surely if you compare it with
the European Union which has six seats in the Security Council and Africa has two or three
you will see the difference. Surely, we want African to have more representatives.

Q. What are those practical challenges do you see could hold back the reform process of the
UN Security Council?

A. There are different views expressed in the IGN. Different groups express different vision
for the Security Council. We have the UfC, L69, the Arab group, CARRICOM, Scandinavian
group and so on. All these groups expressed different views about the reform without any
agreement for the reform. I will like to make it clear that it is not the P5 that is the stumbling
block in this reform process. If you see the discussions of the IGN, we are always supportive
of having a consensus of more than two-third of majority member states to decide the future
of the Security Council. This is Russia’s position and the position of the P5. We are in
support of consensus base Security Council reform. We should strike a balance between more
representatives in the Security Council and its efficiency. More than 20 members will be too
much for the Security Council. If we have the reform, six to eight new members should go to
Africa and other developing countries. Different countries have different vision. There are
different visions for instance for the veto. Some raise the issue of ACT that is Accountability,
Coherence and Transparency. The ACT is the initiative by France. It is supported by quite a
lot of member states. The ACT code of conduct is to restrain the use of veto in certain
occasions such as genocide and mass violence against humanity.

Q. What reform do you envisage is likely to happen in any future reformation of the Security
Council?

A. It is difficult to say right now but representation and efficiency of the Council would be
taken into account. We should consider very carefully how we would maintain the efficiency
of the Security Council and its readiness to react operationally to some urgent situations.
Now we have 15 members and sometimes it is difficult to agree on issues between us. We
should think of how we can improve our working method and how we can maintain
consensus in the Security Council.

Q. What is the position of Russia on the reform of the Security Council?

A. I have already talked about it in the introduction. It is for the General Assembly to decide
what reform we should have.

Q. What is your view about the issue of the veto? Should it be maintained, abolished or be
extended to new members in the event of any reformation of the Security Council?
A. The veto should be maintained as enshrined in the UN Charter. As regards extending it to new members, it is a matter of discussion. If there will be consensus for it to be extended to new members, Russia will support it.

Q. Do you think the veto power of the P5 influences the negative perception of the Security Council by some UN member states?

A. The veto is enshrined in the UN Charter and I don’t need to explain to you why in the came about when the UN was established in 1945. I will say that the veto is an instrument that helps us in many occasions to prevent very bad development in different situations. We think the veto is important to balance very unfortunate steps taken by other permanent members in the Security Council, which they sometimes try to impose their unpopular views as solution to certain situations. In Libya we did not impose our right to exercise the veto and unfortunately you saw the direction the events went in that country. The country is shattered after the overthrow of Gaddafi. The veto is legitimate, it is provided in the Charter. If other member states are abiding by the Charter, then they should understand it is the right of the P5 to exercise the veto. We don’t like to use the veto but sometimes some countries are pushing the decision that we could not support. Those decisions could be harmful in certain situations.

Q. So are you insinuating that other UN non-permanent members should be happy with the exercise of the veto power?

A. I am not saying that. We don’t think there is problem with the Charter that provides the veto. The veto is lawful. In many situations, the use of the veto was helpful. In Syria for instance, it was very useful.

Q. But many people will not agree with you on the use of the veto in the Syrian crises because its usage has been considered to make the resolution of the conflict difficult?

A. That is their own view about the conflict and I have told you mine.

Q. Are you saying the exercise of the veto in all instances have been helpful?

A. I cannot say in all instances it was useful. We should consider specific situations. We use it when we think that a decision on particular situation is not right and could escalate the situation.

Q. What is Russia’s position regarding Africa’s common position on the reform of the Security Council?

A. Russia is not against Africa’s position on the reform. Africa and other regions should agree on what is acceptable by two-third of the UN General Assembly. African countries should agree within their African family who should represent them and we would be ready to support Africa.
Q. What is Russia’s view about the text-based negotiation being clamoured for as a way forward for the reform process of the Security Council?

A. It is always an issue in our discussion whether to have the text-based negotiation or not. We should be very sincere to each other. It is very difficult to imagine how text-based negotiation will look like if everybody has his or her own views about the reform. The UfC is pushing for non-permanent seat, the G4 wants permanent seat and other groups are pushing their own views. It is difficult to make a text. How can you balance the text when the views are divergent? I think first of all countries should find a common ground before they can start the text-based negotiation. If not, we cannot start the text-based negotiation when we still have different groups that cannot arrive at an agreement between themselves. It is therefore difficult to discuss text. There should be a common ground first before we discuss how specific issues should look like.

Q. Thank you for your time.

A. Thank you.