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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Mutual interests management with a purposive approach: Evidence from the Turkish shipyards for an amorphous impact model between (subjective) well-being and performance

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Abstract

To enhance the academic endeavours confronting the globalisation of managerial orthodoxy (predicated on antagonising the interests of companies and employees), we will investigate the relationship between institutional performance and employees' (subjective) wellbeing in Turkish shipyards by undertaking an extensive survey. We will argue that there is a positive association between the two covariates that lends itself to a conceptual frame of Mutual Interests Management (MIM). The MIM refers to the managerial impacts that result in cross-fertilisations between the interests of companies and employees. However, we will also argue that MIM has a dynamic and amorphous character in the sense that no correlation whether it be positive, negative or the lack of thereof necessarily survives through our purposive analyses with the trial of various interaction models among the specific types and combinations of variables considered. Accordingly, the conclusion stresses that the amorphous nature of MIM can be adapted by the managers at company-level to tailor or innovate feasible MIM strategies.

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1 | INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, the World has witnessed the globalisation of managerial orthodoxy premised on the Tayloristic steering strategies (Taylor, 1911) with a misguided dogma of diametrical antinomy between the cost and productivity/profitability of labour (Goldman & Van Houten, 1980; Madrick, 2012). With a long history dating back to the utopian ideas of the early 19th century (Owen, 1819), the progressive attempts, generally speaking, to confront the managerial orthodoxy, on the other hand, have experienced frustrating outcomes vis-à-vis their search for harnessing the interests of companies and employees.

The recent resurgence in the bids to denounce 'laissez-faire belligerence' was blended with both political and academic thrusts. Despite some interventions by the NGOs (Heery & Simms, 2008), much of the political resistance against 'the harsh realities of capitalism' has been led by the trade union movements such as 'the reconstruction of corporate trade unionism' in France, 'European trade unionism' to promote 'corporate social responsibility' in a broader context (Edmans, 2012) and the 'partnership' discourses in the United Kingdom to a lesser extent (Saridakis et al., 2017), in addition to the 'social movement trade unionism' in developing countries (Scipes, 1992). The demise of membership, especially in the West, nonetheless, has become an impediment for the effectiveness of trade unions' struggle.

The early academic rebuttals of liberal abruptness were mostly led by the humanistic management debates which had shifted the focus from the motivations issue rooted in the mid-20th century (Ryder, 1967) to the notion of organisational culture with a wishful appeal to the shared values between firms and their employees (Daly, 1986). Then, as the aggressiveness of managerialism has intensified, the humanistic agendas moved to the community-centred approaches after the turn of the millennium with an under-substantiated emphasis on employees' political aptitude outside the workplaces (Melé, 2003). A decade after, the weight has begun to ebb toward condemnatory calls proposing the reconciliation of economic rational and moral codes with no arresting impact on the managerial orthodoxy (Spitzeck, 2011).

In different settings, too, there were academic pursuits to confine the 'anti-labour sentiment' without dissuasive attainments. Marxists interlockers, for example, have deplored it reiterating the critique of exploitation and inequalities for surging to unprecedented levels in the neo-liberal era (Ramsay et al., 2000). Although the labour process theories had been the spearheading genre within the critical schools until the early 1980s, their popularity has been deteriorated by the loss of interest in the mezzo level accounts of industrial relations by and large during the following decades (Procter & Rowlinson, 2011).

Over the past decade or so, micro/company level investigations have increasingly sought to stimulate the profit instincts of employers by pointing to the positive bearings of employees' job satisfaction (JS) and subjective wellbeing (SWB) on labour productivity (Hakim & Sudarmiatin, 2018). Even though to a limited degree, the benign affects have been referred to in terms of the profitability of companies as well (Kersemaekers et al., 2018). A nationally representative survey in the United Kingdom (Bryson et al., 2017) and a cross-national analysis in Europe (Addison & Teixeira, 2020) have particularly produced sanguine upshots. Crucially, the relevance of JS/SWB to the institutional performance was also asserted to be resilient to the conventionally influential intermediary factors such as establishment size, industrial/sectoral variations and the national differences (Cam & Palaz, 2021; Mahy et al., 2011).

Nevertheless, the micro/company level studies have culminated in the reproduction of some 'inconsistent' results in the literature as will be stipulated later. It is important to underline here that disconcerted research narratives keep hampering theoretical

understandings (Guest, 2011) and progressive actions among the managers (Turnbull, 1991)—or the policy makers (Godard, 2007) whose well-registered cynicism about change has been galvanised since the outset of the pandemic as a new catalyst for tougher management mantras (Hodder, 2020).

2 | MUTUAL INTERESTS MANAGEMENT (MIM) AS AN AMORPHOUS MODEL WITH A PURPOSIVE APPROACH

This paper will contribute to the debate by delving into the correspondence between the institutional performance and employees' well-being in Turkish shipyards of which tendency toward autocratic managerialism and deficient productivity has provided an appropriate aura for the underpinning research (See Section 3). We will argue that there is a positive correlation between the standards of labour and institutional performance that can be encapsulated in what one might call for the sake of convenience a model of MIM. Through the use of MIM, we will systematically capture various managerial inputs that deliberately or inadvertently boost the interests of companies and employees by cross-fertilising them. Even so, we will further argue that the pertinences between institutional performance and employees' well-being can be better understood by a specific consideration of their sensitivities to the types and combinations of variables analysed rather than subscribing to universalist assumptions.

The credibility of existing literature on the conjunctures between JS/SWB and performance is hindered by the 'inconsistent' results and limited quests for the explanatory/theoretical models (Richter & Schrader, 2017). A significant coupling, for instance, between JS/SWB and performance is not ratified by all research (Edwards et al., 2006). Moreover, there is evidence suggesting inverse correlations between the two as a consequence of 'realistic' managerial strategies that may ignite higher profit rates (Bockerman et al., 2012; Hammer & Plugor, 2016).

Incompatible findings have been associated with the selective reporting of data owing to the ideological frailties (Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2009). They are also related to the over dependency of outcomes on the sampling variations (Mahy et al., 2011; Meloni & Stirati, 2022) so much so that just like the positive (and non-existent) connections between JS/SWB and performance, the adversarial ones were long shown to have been resilient to the prominent control variables aforementioned (McCarthy, 1994).

There is a dearth of systematic inquiries into the conditions under which the interactions between JS/SWB and performance illustrate variations even between (outwardly) resembling workplaces. Arguably, this is attributable to the empirical pragmatism triggered by the limited research interest into insignificant (and the significant residual) relationships. Concentrating exclusively on the significant observations, however, has potentially detrimental implications for the theoretical and policy-oriented headways (Amrhein et al., 2019). Whilst feeding into the lacuna of comprehension as to how the links between JS/SWB and performance are sensitive to the potentially neglected factors, it has fuelled some static/inflexible 'imaginations' of those interconnections (Basterretxea & Storey, 2018; Guest, 2017).

Particularly in the field of progressive policy practices such as racial and gender equalities, for instance, it may well be critical to undertake deeper analyses beneath the surface to spot discriminatory and inequitable situations since they are occasionally buried under the seemingly insignificant relationships (Steinmetz, 2005). Congruously, the literature into the bearings of JS/SWB on performance set aside, take as an example, trade unions for no

discernible membership dividend (Cameron, 1987), but the connection has lately been understood to be embedded in the workplace unionisation (Bryson et al., 2017).

To address the empirical 'inconsistencies' and pragmatism of the academic efforts against managerial orthodoxy, this paper will project MIM as a dynamic and amorphous model. The very origins of the model are rooted in the unitarist frame which maintained 'innately harmonised' interests for the common good (Parsons, 1937). Notwithstanding, the MIM dissents from not only a 'taken-for-granted unitarism', but also the radicalism that deems conflicts irreconcilable for the capitalist confiscation of surplus (Burawoy, 1979). Nor does it happily sit with pluralism that conflates both social democratic and neo/liberal views (Heery, 2016) upholding compromises to institutionalise conflicts and competition (Dahrendorf, 1957) for efficiency in the service of productivity (Coser, 2007). The reason for this is because MIM does not rely on any of these generalisations. Unlike the micro and mezzo-level theories (Mills, 1959), however, it does not necessarily dismiss their capacity for the case-merited explanations, either.

We will operationalise MIM as a dynamic and our morphous model through a purposive approach that is widely employed in the predictive economic scenarios to guide decision makers about the inputs paving the way for the targets envisaged (Duncan & Wack, 1994). Because the purposive approach involves the manipulation of statistical data for the end results aimed at, there had been concerns over the risks of academic bias in the broader sections of social sciences. In present times, however, such hesitations have begun to relent as it is better appreciated that purposive exercises are no substitute to the conventional analytics of more apparent actualities (Kok & Helfgott, 2016). In the labour law, for instance, these types of inferences have successfully espoused restorative verdicts and policies (Davidov, 2017).

For the deployment of purposive approach, we will set out a systematic manipulation of the statistical data by reconfiguring the combinations of the variables used. In doing so, we will explore the requirements that maximise the prediction capacity of the MIM model. We will specifically trail the impacts of altering the amalgamations of well-being and performance indicators on the significance of their nexus. We will additionally provide a ranking matrix to compare the relative strength of significances.

From a theoretical perspective, instigating the amorphous MIM model through the purposive approach will help redress the superficiality of empirical pragmatism since it will challenge the predilection toward oversighting insignificant findings by manipulating the data and ascertaining the circumstances that heighten (or curtail) the strength/significance of the interactions (Amrhein et al., 2019). The problem of 'inconsistent' research reports due to the variegated sample frames will also be mitigated against with such quays experiments in so far as they can refute universalist assumptions (Richter & Schrader, 2017).

From a utilitarian point of view, the amorphous MIM model through the purposive approach may assist spotting the existing managerial practices and seeking out the new ones that promote the interests of companies and employees by cross-fertilising them. That is, examining various contingencies between JS/SWB and performance will engender managerial alternatives for the firms to set their priorities right. The model will be tailorable to individual institutions to devise more efficient solutions through the replication/adaptation of the statistical analyses advanced in the paper, but without ruling out generalisabilities per se.

3 | SHIPYARDS IN TURKEY

Shipyards are quintessential for Turkey as one of the largest emerging market economies in the World. Being an offshore manufacturing hub of Europe, the industry boasts strategic roles for the EU and NATO as a civilian and military maritime supplier. Following a long-term expansion, however, the industry has endured financial hardships ignited by the 2008 turmoil. The surge in the number of employees amid the decade preceding the recession, for example, was from less than 5000 to 34,000 in 2007 as opposed to a one-third plunge by 2012 (UBAK, 2014). Yearly exports of the ships also halved to $1.3 bn between 2009 and 2012 (Ship2Shore, 2012). Pursuant to the latest available data, the recovery signs were modest until 2019, with a growth in the output capacity to 4.5 m dwt and employment to 31,500, compared to a stagnation in exports (MofTMAC, 2019; OECD, 2021).

Shipbuilding in Turkey constitutes a suitable setting for the purpose of this paper with an overarching problem of low productivity across the economy regarding both investments and labour (Bakış et al., 2020), while the handicap turns out to be amplified in dockyards by a stiffened competition with the concomitant globalisation of sector. Poor institutional performance heavily supresses the expansion of manufacturing and the exports of industry. The available evidence suggests that companies run 6 months behind the completion deadlines of shipbuilding orders on average. The delay means a substantial rise in the cost of projects given that the usual production periods seldom go beyond 2–3 years. The losses of firms are exacerbated by the hefty fines of armatures imposed with day-to-day tariffs. This adds to the complains about the opportunist customers who allegedly abuse the legal loopholes to pay the shipyards less for trivial excuses (Cam & Palaz, 2018). Such burdens have knock on effects on the investment productivity as they squeeze the resources to fund, among others, research and development activities. The Covid pandemic and the invasion of Ukraine by Russia have rendered Turkey's productivity predicament an international hindrance because of the escalated reliance of Europe on the imports of sophisticated ships from the newly industrialised economies (Voytenko, 2022).

Public concerns over the strained industrial relations further justify the present research into Turkish shipyards. Although the empirical scrutiny is sparse, it has been demonstrated that managerial inefficacies such as authoritarianism is rife in the sector. The adversarial outlook of managerial milieu goes hand in hand with the undesirable labour standards. The remuneration regime, for example, is characterised by highly polarised pay settlements with the majority being at the lower end of the wage-scale. Unionisation is largely repressed, and the 'permissible' mode of unionism is often dismissed as an 'apparatus chick of the ruling classes'. The insufficiency of health and safety precautions occasionally features the headlines with the news of fatal accidents at work. Employees mostly have limited or no accesses to the social security and fringe benefits largely for the statutorily omitted prerogatives in the 'contingent hiring contracts'—by the end of work-in projects (Cam & Palaz, 2021). The on-going mushrooming of engineering schools has been commensurate with that of unemployed graduates and long working hours at the expense of work-life balance. There are sporadic reports of poor commitment and motivation indicators in shipyards (Voytenko, 2022).

Constructive initiatives of the government to ameliorate industrial relations appear to be far removed from being impressive. This reflects the under-regulation of labour markets, especially since the start of massive privatisation operations in the early 2000s with the inclusion of shipbuilding (Akan, 2012). However, the efficiency of policy interventions is also claimed to be debilitated with the acquisition of companies by the top bureaucrats through the reputedly

unscrupulous tender offers. The conflict of interests due to partisan recruitment and glass-ceiling predispositions are widely disputed, too (Cam & Palaz, 2016).

4 | METHODS

The research draws on a cross-sectional survey in shipyards conducted with 650 employees between 2017 and 2019. Respondents were randomly selected as a sampling of convenience in the workplaces. Over 100 participants considered themselves manager, but we had only a few females as a result of gender segregation in the sector. The spread of age was also limited, from 30 to 55 on average.

The companies investigated are located in the Marmara and Black Sea regions like most of the shipyards. We worked with six firms as the pairs of smaller, medium and larger establishments—the small ones in Turkey are officially defined as those with less than 50 employees as opposed to the medium-sized ones, with up to 250 employees, in line with the international literature (Forth et al., 2006). Analyses are not replicated by the demographic/institutional variations since such an attempt could go beyond the scope of this paper.

The data presented in such a way that empirical inputs cannot be traced back to their original sources for the ethical considerations aggravated by the political tensions in the country.

We will assess the relation of SWB to performance with the use of conventional sub-questions, 'Here it is very busy'; 'Works cannot be completed on time'; 'My mind is always busy with work'; 'The last week was stressful'; and 'The last week was relaxed' (WERS, 2011).

However, a number of commonly-used variables over the links between performance and well-being will be revised (Richter & Schrader, 2017). The JS, to start with, is in want of decomposing since employees may be satisfied with, for instance, their jobs as a whole, but they may be disillusioned about creativity (Foley & Polanyi, 2006; Rose, 2005). Hence, we will split it with regard to pay (Mahy et al., 2011), success, participation, training (Daly, 1986), job security and the job itself (Aleksynska, 2018).

The existing literature is also deprived of the disaggregation of some other key categories for the reliability of analyses as in the case of income and participation (FitzRoy & Kraft, 2005). We will divide income as the pay and fringe benefits satisfactions (Gallie et al., 2012) in addition to the participation into one's own tasks and wider decision-making processes (Leslie, 2015).

The literature has largely focused on the 'subjective' dimensions in the shape of participants' perceptions (Felstead & Henseke, 2017). It benefits less from the factual questions about, for instance, the state of transport/commuting or maternity/paternity leave as the putative leverages of well-being (Skurak et al., 2018). Therefore, we will probe 'reality-checks' by reviewing kindergarten, housing allowance, transport and maternity/paternity leave (Skurak et al., 2018).

The limited range of measurements reflects on the paucity of references to the pivotal indicators of employment relations such as working hours, unions' responsiveness, employees' satisfaction with the career trajectories and the sense of commitment as well as the managerial attitudes (Kersemaekers et al., 2018) toward trade unions (Armstrong, 1987) and skilling up (Shibata, 2001). We will fortify the paper by delving into these questions.

Similarly, the factors of which importance has increasingly become recognised in more recent times including the demand for less work (Cam, 2012) and managerial mindfulness with regard to dignity at work (Fevre et al., 2007), supportiveness (McClean & Collins, 2011),

keeping promises (Rogers & Richmond, 2016) and fairness (Gallie et al., 2021) are missing in the debate. We will prepend them into our appraisals.

The variables underpinning the current debates are compounded within the boundaries of HR management failing to make systematic connections with the issues of logistics management (Chow et al., 2018) which are closely interwoven with the former such as the quality control practices, output projections and the financial affairs (Robinson & Wilson, 2006). We will expand the analysis toward these spheres, albeit in a restricted way.

Another gap is pertinent to the explicit managerial strategies like disciplinary deterrents (Wood, 2017) and H&S directions (Sirven et al., 2017; Walters et al., 2005). In addition to them, we will cover the deliberate strategies concerning the daily liaisons with the staff (Robinson & Wilson, 2006), flexible hours (Marsden & Thompson, 1990) and working from home (Felstead et al., 2003) as the key elements of work-life balance (Krishnan et al., 2019).

Critiques have contested that the covariation-based attestations about the impact of JS/SWB on performance may simply be spurious (Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2009) or express the other way around effects (Stiglitz, 2002). In response, we will explicitly ask participants their opinions as to how the motivations and productivity of employees (Edmans, 2012) are impinged on by various managerial wellbeing-related strategies in terms of, for instance, pay, teamwork, training and breaktimes (Ohueri et al., 2018).

As a leading dependent variable in the literature, labour productivity is basically limited to employees' total productivity without making a distinction about the productivity of individuals. The lack of such a differentiation overlooks the danger that people may react more defensively to the latter (Schumann, 1998). Because of that, we will draw on the personal and collective productivity separately.

Although a few scholars have honed in on the effects of JS/SWB on profitability as a proxy for the company performance (McClean & Collins, 2011), the causation may become arbitrated by the 'extrinsic factors' such as the efficiency of investments (Guest et al., 2003). We will introduce investment productivity as potentially bridging conduit with not only JS/SWB (Foroohar, 2022), but also labour productivity (Hammer & Plugor, 2016).

Finally, we will augment the aggregated outcomes by analysing the combined interactions of all the new variable sets introduced in the paper. It would obviously be too ambitious to try to rectify entirely the weaknesses of the literature stipulated above in a single study. As evidenced in the following sections, however, it is important to begin to address these deficits while explicating the MIM.

We have developed a regression model to dissect the relation of JS, SWB, commitment, participation, managerial attitudes, communication and motivation to the antecedents of performance (profitability, individual productivity, general productivity, productivity of investments, and the managerial productivity impact) as they are measured with the Likert scale. We used Multi-Way ANOVA for the fringe benefits, H&S, flexi-hours and trade unions since they are binary parameters (against the Likert-scaled performance indicators).

To initiate the purposive approach for the amorphous MIM model, we will carry out stepwise since it allows us to see the variety of significances (or the absence of thereof) for the confluences between employees' well-being and performance. For the ranking analysis, we will compare the strength of the significant results inspected (as well as observing the changes in the rankings along with the stepwise-based manipulations) by controlling the r^2 values.

5 | DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 | MIM with multivariate analyses

The aggregated multivariate findings presented in the block columns across the tables lend a prima facie warrant for the very notion of MIM as both, for instance, JS (Table 1) and SWB (Table 2) are strongly linked with profitability whilst the former is also intertwined with the productivity of employees.

That said, specific assessments exhibit intricacies for the little or variegated affinities of particular modules with performance: Satisfaction with success, job itself, discretion at one's own work to performance or the SWB regarding stress and continuous preoccupation with work does not correspond with either profitability or employees' productivity. In contrast, satisfaction with salaries, participation in broader decision-making processes and training to certain degree are related to overall performance as is the inability to complete jobs on time within a busy work environment.

The introduction of new segments to the JS analyses further points to the multi-factorial and complicated nature of the interactions with performance. Satisfaction with social benefits, for instance, does not accompany the performance whereas satisfaction with working hours is responsive to the profits just like the satisfaction with promotion which conforms to employees' productivity and the satisfaction with respect to performance (Table 3).

Taking on board a new set of commitment questions has aided learning more about the ramifications of employees' feelings for performance (Table 4). There is a conspicuous covariation between commitment and performance at the aggregated levels. Happily working in a workplace, in particular, heralds the most unequivocal associations with performance compared to the agreement with the company principles and being proud with the company worked for.

The incorporation of welfare provisions into the analyses has been instrumental in tracking down the support of, for example, housing benefits funded by the employers to both profitability and employees' productivity as well as the truss for the latter by the combined effects of social benefits specified in Table 5. Even so, individual variables such as maternity/paternity leave, kindergarten and transport do not follow suit.

Having specifically inquired how much say people have in various facets of their working lives such as work design and task distributions, it became clear that participation beefs up employees' productivity and the company profitability (Table 6). Such an occurrence defies the hitherto highlighted absence of the relationship between satisfaction with participation and performance (Table 1).

Our inferences have illustrated the loyalty of certain managerial strategies pursued to performance such as H&S training and sufficient indemnities in the event of accidents (Table 7). Allowing workers to have flexibility in terms of shortening or extending their working hours also correlates with the performance indicators as opposed to the flexibility policies for the start of working time or working from home (Table 8).

The insertion of managerial attitudes has dispensed more clarity on the ties between management and performance (Table 9). Ethical managerial propensities (as measured with the managers keeping their promises, trying to comprehend and resolve employees' problems, skilling them up, treating everyone fairly, 'getting on well with the subordinates' and taking unions seriously) have unmistakable connections with performance. Positive dialogues with

TABLE 1 Satisfaction and performance (regression)

		Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial[a] productivity impact	
Satisfaction with	***N***[b]	**Block**[c]	**SW**[d]	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**
Success	641	0.764	[e]0.069**(2)	0.960	0.069***(3)	0.649	0.023***(3)	0.029**	0.099**(1)	0.279	0.069***(2)	0.836	0.033***(3)
Discretion at your work	631	0.726	0.035**(3)	0.459	0.093***(2)	0.664	0.017***(4)	0.724	0.025***(3)	0.919	0.048***(3)	0.392	0.040***(3)
Broader participation	633	0.240	0.043***(3)	0.050**	0.116***(1)	0.521	0.029***(2)	0.798	0.057***(2)	0.668	0.090***(2)	0.429	0.038***(2)
Training	635	0.000[f]***	0.087***(1)	0.162	0.076***(2)	0.782	0.036**(2)	0.113	0.016***(4)	0.402	0.098**(2)	0.211	0.158**(1)
Salary	637	0.002**	0.109***(1)	0.007***	0.098***(1)	0.017**	0.048***(1)	0.000***	0.066***(1)	0.000***	0.106***(1)	0.029**	0.152***(1)
Job itself	640	0.156	0.076***(2)	0.101	0.124***(1)	0.068*	0.078**(1)	0.289	0.047***(2)	0.052*	0.148***(1)	0.829	0.047**(2)
Job security	638	0.000***	0.128***(1)	0.020**	0.131**(1)	0.000***	0.070***(1)	0.000***	0.091***(1)	0.000***	0.134***(1)	0.000***	0.110***(1)
Aggregated[g]	601	0.000***	0.112	0.000***	0.135	0.000***	0.067	0.000***	0.075	0.000***	0.140	0.000***	0.101

Note: All the specifications above apply to every table in this paper.

[a]Aggregated variable for the dis/agreements of the participants with each one of the following statements: "'Employees' productivity is increased by the managerial strategies with regard to pay/task distribution/work design/output quantity/quality control/teamwork/training/participation/discipline/breaktimes."

[b]Sample size varies due to missing values, but all the response rates are relatively high considering the total sample size, 650.

[c]Individual p Values for each variable in the block multivariate analysis. *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, and ***$p < 0.001$.

[d]SW (stepwise): Numbers in brackets specify the step numbers.

[e]Numeric values refer to r^2 results for the steps. The hierarchy of r^2 values reflects the removal order of the variable(set)s within the same steps. (The largest value is for the first step and so on). Orders within and across the steps gives the maximum level of interactions. r^2 changes are significant at least at 0.05 level, unless otherwise stated.

[f]Asterisks refer to their significance levels throughout.

[g]Aggregated results refer to the values for all the row variables combined as a single variable.

TABLE 2 Subjective well-being (SWB) and performance (regression)

		Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial productivity impact	
SWB	***N***	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**
Here it is very busy	644	0.000***	0.038***(1)	0.000***	0.116***(1)	0.000***	0.072***(1)	0.000***	0.160***(1)	0.000***	0.140***(1)	0.000***	0.117***(1)
Works cannot be completed on time	637	0.000***	0.100***(1)	0.000***	0.161***(1)	0.000***	0.122***(1)	0.000***	0.193***(1)	0.000***	0.208***(1)	0.000***	0.170***(1)
My mind is always busy with work	638	0.170	x	0.858	x	0.295	x	0.237	x	0.279	x	0.472	x
Last week stressful	605	0.928	x	0.959	x	0.828	x	0.218	x	0.481	x	0.110	0.016***(2)
Last week relaxed	627	0.003***	0.113***(1)	0.022**	0.169**(1)	0.052*	0.009**(2)	0.136	x	0.007***	0.216***(1)	0.002***	0.192***(1)
Aggregated	573	0.008***	0.011	0.883	−0.002	0.423	−0.001	0.065*	0.004	0.812	−0.002	0.153	0.002

Note: x: does not fit the model—throughout.

Abbreviation: SW, stepwise.

TABLE 3 Satisfaction and performance (regression)

Satisfaction with	*N*	Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial productivity impact	
		Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW
Social benefits	604	0.092	0.098***(2)	0.449	0.099**(2)	0.520	0.083**(2)	0.464	0.041***(3)	0.743	0.159***(2)	0.001***	0.415***(1)
Respect	388[a]	0.033**	0.108***(1)	0.007***	0.139***(1)	0.127	0.093***(1)	0.016**	0.148***(1)	0.004***	0.162***(1)	0.004***	0.435***(1)
Working hours	388	0.029**	0.125***(1)	0.209	0.092***(2)	0.251	0.070***(2)	0.227	0.093***(2)	0.064*	0.140***(2)	0.015**	0.443**(1)
Promotion	384	0.839	0.064***(3)	0.005***	0.115***(1)	0.063*	0.078***(1)	0.001***	0.129***(1)	0.015**	0.189***(1)	0.000***	0.350***(1)
Aggregated	384	0.000***	0.127	0.000***	0.131	0.000***	0.099	0.000***	0.137	0.000***	0.193	0.000***	0.443

Abbreviation: SW, stepwise.

[a]Sample size for the last three questions is considerably smaller since they were added in the middle of the research (after realising their importance for the respondents).

TABLE 4 Commitment and performance (regression)

		Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial productivity impact	
Commitment	***N***	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**
Happily working here	658	0.000***	0.125***(1)	0.000***	0.110***(1)	0.000***	0.112***(1)	0.000***	0.192***(1)	0.000***	0.204***(1)	0.000***	0.442***(1)
Agreed company principles	657	0.885	0.069***(2)	0.749	0.056***(3)	0.068*	0.118**(1)	0.002***	0.201***(1)	0.795	0.101***(3)	0.022**	0.474**(1)
Proud of working here	654	0.037**	0.131**(1)	0.758	0.067***(2)	0.482	0.086***(2)	0.169	0.108***(2)	0.173	0.141***(2)	0.000***	0.470***(1)
Aggregated	652	0.000***	0.121	0.000***	0.095	0.000***	0.196	0.000***	0.136	0.000***	0.181	0.000***	0.460

Abbreviation: SW, stepwise.

TABLE 5 Benefits (close-up) and performance (multi-way ANOVA)

		Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial productivity impact	
Benefits	***N***	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**
Maternity/ paternity leave?	618	0.148	0.006**(3)	0.466	0.015***(3)	0.010***	0.031***(1)	0.318	−0.003(2)	0.077*	0.051***(1)	0.493	−0.001(3)
Kindergarten?	593	0.577	−0.002[a](4)	0.893	0.015***(3)	0.918	0.000(4)	0.196	−0.003(2)	0.490	0.000(3)	0.787	0.004**(2)
Transport?	599	0.336	0.015**(2)	0.287	0.033***(2)	0.425	0.015**(2)	0.014**	0.062***(1)	0.116	0.020***(2)	0.058*	0.052***(1)
Housing?	378	0.030**	0.020**(1)	0.003***	0.033***(1)	0.094	0.009**(3)	0.000***	0.062***(1)	0.001***	0.051***(1)	0.002***	0.052***(1)
Aggregated[a]	359	0.052*	0.015	0.004***	0.032	0.011**	0.026	0.001***	0.040	0.001***	0.042	0.001***	0.042

Abbreviations: ANOVA, analysis of variance; SW, stepwise.

[a]Lack of significance refers to both interactions and r^2 changes throughout.

TABLE 6 Participation (close up) and performance (regression)

How much say you have regarding	*N*	Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial productivity impact	
		Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW
Task distribution	639	0.370	0.011***(3)	0.031**	0.064**(1)	0.981	0.011***(3)	0.527	0.019***(2)	0.242	0.029***(3)	0.511	0.015***(3)
Work tempo	634	0.002***	0.023**(2)	0.014**	0.019***(3)	0.800	0.010***(4)	0.844	0.018***(4)	0.054*	0.017***(4)	0.480	0.016***(1)
Work design	632	0.013**	0.017***(2)	0.024**	0.046***(2)	0.204	0.017***(2)	0.991	0.018***(3)	0.050**	0.036***(2)	0.573	0.016***(2)
Working hours	632	0.003***	0.024***(1)	0.000***	0.057***(1)	0.032**	0.022***(1)	0.000***	0.048***(1)	0.000***	0.053***(1)	0.332	0.015***(4)
Aggregated	628	0.001***	0.016	0.000***	0.056	0.000***	0.021	0.000***	0.034	0.000***	0.045	0.000***	0.021

Abbreviation: SW, stepwise.

TABLE 7 H&S and performance (multi-way ANOVA)

		Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial productivity impact	
H&S	***N***	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**
Precautions taken?	636	0.524	0.051***(2)	0.182	0.015***(2)	0.356	0.017***(2)	0.249	0.007***(2)	0.719	0.030***(2)	0.150	0.014***(3)
Fair compensations	613	0.413	0.051***(2)	0.003***	0.095***(1)	0.415	0.012***(3)	0.881	0.000(3)	0.399	0.030***(2)	0.745	0.008**(2)
H&S training	265	0.001***	0.050***(1)	0.000***	0.095***(1)	0.000***	0.085***(1)	0.000***	0.059***(1)	0.000***	0.094***(1)	0.028**	0.033***(1)
Aggregated[a]	612	0.000***	0.053	0.000***	0.024	0.002***	0.017	0.001***	0.022	0.000***	0.034	0.004***	0.016

Abbreviations: ANOVA, analysis of variance; SW, stepwise.

[a]Only with the top two since only the last one, training is binary and may not be resulted from managerial neglect for every response.

TABLE 8 Flexi-hours (close-up) and performance (multi-way ANOVA)

		Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial productivity impact	
Flexibility to	***N***	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**
Work from home (weekdays)	638	0.413	0.005(2)	0.591	0.003(3)	0.679	−0.002(2)	0.918	−0.001(2)	0.532	0.001(2)	0.594	−0.001(2)
Work from home (weekends)	631	0.413	0.005(2)	0.221	0.006**(2)	0.101	−0.002(2)	0.481	−0.001(2)	0.759	0.001(2)	0.734	−0.001(2)
Change starting hours	627	0.544	0.099(2)	0.052*	0.031***(1)	0.653	−0.002(2)	0.017**	0.015***(1)	0.079*	0.032***(1)	0.000***	0.022***(1)
Reduce working hours	630	0.070*	0.014***(1)	0.008***	0.031***(1)	0.005***	0.032***(1)	0.105	−0.001(2)	0.006***	0.032***(1)	0.038**	0.022***(1)
Increase working hours	622	0.026**	0.014***(1)	0.002***	0.031***(1)	0.000***	0.032***(1)	0.009***	0.015***(1)	0.000***	0.032***(1)	0.327	−0.001(2)
Aggregated	605	0.000***	0.030	0.000***	0.034	0.012**	0.017	0.031**	0.013	0.000***	0.033	0.183	0.005

Abbreviations: ANOVA, analysis of variance; SW, stepwise.

TABLE 9 Managerial attitudes and performance (regression)

		Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial productivity impact	
Managers	***N***	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**
Keep promises	632	0.005***	0.087***(1)	0.142	0.057***(3)	0.045**	0.109**(1)	0.742	0.047***(4)	0.047**	0.145***(1)	0.047**	0.388***(1)
Understand and resolve our problems	631	0.449	0.105***(2)	0.970	0.060***(2)	0.427	0.065***(3)	0.700	0.079***(2)	0.893	0.094***(2)	0.162	0.345***(2)
Increase our skills	631	0.742	0.055***(3)	0.027**	0.070***(1)	0.236	0.070***(2)	0.073*	0.064***(3)	0.128	0.050***(3)	0.024**	0.366***(1)
Treat us fairly	630	0.437	0.050***(4)	0.054*	0.031***(4)	0.404	0.045***(4)	0.004***	0.024***(5)	0.038**	0.152**(1)	0.134	0.270***(3)
Good relations	626	0.009***	0.125***(1)	0.010***	0.070***(1)	0.000***	0.099***(1)	0.000***	0.136***(1)	0.000***	0.137***(1)	0.000***	0.321***(1)
Take unions seriously	506	0.007***	0.106***(1)	0.198	x	0.670	x	0.028**	0.165**(1)	0.099	0.070***(3)	0.283	0.350**(2)
Positively treat unions	459	0.389	x	0.423	x	0.181	0.053**(4)	0.030**	0.154***(1)	0.226	0.101**(2)	0.009***	0.376***(1)
Aggregated[a]	619	0.000***	0.092	0.000***	0.067	0.000***	0.100	0.000***	0.081	0.000***	0.126	0.000***	0.434

Abbreviation: SW, stepwise.

[a]Excluding 'positively treating unions' since it may be more related to politics than ethics.

the unions, however, are by no means a determinant for performance, probably due to the perception of unions as a political, as well as a moral entity.

Further analyses (Table 10) expounded the nature of unions' bearings on performance. The aggregated results for the existence of a recognised union, the responsiveness of unions, membership and inviting individuals to join the union are significantly predicting the performance. Against this background, no integrant is individually lined up with profitability, and no performance impact is achieved with membership, although the first variable persuasively harbingers labour productivity.

The expansion of extrapolations toward the logistics management in a range of issues has unveiled significant links to performance. These encompass the relaying of financial matters to the staff, quality reassurances and the quantity (output) management. Table 11 shows a fairly coherent correspondence, for example, between the managerial communication of financial affairs and each one of the performance gauges collated in the table.

The inclusion of investment productivity in the analyses has shed more light on the relation of JS/SWB to performance and its complexity. For instance, satisfaction with the job itself (Table 1) and promotion (Table 3) in addition to maternity/paternity leave, social benefits (Table 5) and working hours flexibility (Table 8) have little or no ostensible prowess in posting profits, while they are firmly responsive to investment productivity.

The separation of individual and collective productivity has exposed involutions in respect of the interactions with employees' well-being. For example, satisfaction with success and job security (Table 1), the composite SWB (Table 2), transport services provided by the company (Table 5) and the ability to change the start of working times have hardly anything to do with the total productivity of employees, whereas they are well aligned with individuals' own productivity. Conversely, satisfaction with participation in broader decision-making processes (Table 1), the sufficiency of H&S reparations (Table 7) and the flexibility to curtail working hours (Table 8) feed into employees' productivity, but they barely impinge on individuals' own productivity.

Assembling a combined performance variable has proven that it is strongly informed by the subitems of JS/SWB including satisfaction with pay and job security (Table 1), having a relaxed week (Table 2), satisfaction with respect (Table 3), housing benefits (Table 5) and the flexibility to bring down the working hours (Table 8)—even if they do not necessarily flow with the specific aspects of performance to the same length.

Multivariate analyses in the block columns of the tables also demonstrate that the outcomes for the aggregated relations of JS/SWB to the conflated performance question remain largely intact when the inspections are repeated with 'the impact of managerial strategies on productivity' as seen by the participants (This reassures that the associations between JS/SWB and performance mirror the cause-effect formations between the two sets). Likewise, the managerial strategies which were reported by the participants to have motivated themselves in terms of various issues such as task distribution, quality control and teamwork are closely paired with both particular and combined parameters of performance at the aggregated levels (Table 12). However, the findings elucidate that productivity is not entirely dependent on motivation as discipline, for example, turns out to be no less relevant than the motivational pay strategies.

TABLE 10 Unions and performance (multi-way ANOVA)

		Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial productivity impact	
Unions	***N***	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**	**Block**	**SW**
Look after workers?	513	0.335	0.007(1)	0.177	0.012(2)	0.586	0.001(4)	0.003***	0.077***(1)	0.224	0.021**(2)	0.007***	0.096***(1)
Recognized Union?	589	0.959	0.007(1)	0.001***	0.037***(1)	0.051*	0.036***(1)	0.005***	0.077***(1)	0.011***	0.046***(1)	0.000***	0.096***(1)
Union member?	537	0.248	0.007(1)	0.747	0.012(2)	0.827	0.021***(3)	0.204	0.005(2)	0.795	0.021**(2)	0.421	0.041***(2)
If not, ever been?	493	0.576	0.007(1)	0.736	0.012(2)	0.259	0.013***(2)	0.954	0.005(2)	0.469	0.021**(2)	0.434	0.005*(3)
Ever been suggested?	509	0.347	0.029(1)	0.480	0.012(2)	0.024**	0.036***(1)	0.008***	0.077***(1)	0.053**	0.046***(1)	0.146	0.041***(2)
Aggregated[a]	343	0.048***	0.015	0.005***	0.030	0.002***	0.036	0.000***	0.056	0.000***	0.046	0.002***	0.038

Abbreviations: ANOVA, analysis of variance; SW, stepwise.

[a]Only with the top three to explicitly highlight the role of unions' potentials to influence.

TABLE 11 Communication and performance (regression)

Communication about	*N*	Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial productivity impact	
		Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW
Personnel management	639	0.001***	0.078***(1)	0.013**	0.094***(1)	0.082*	0.071**(1)	0.402	0.036***(3)	0.018**	0.112***(1)	0.002***	0.062***(1)
Financial affairs	630	0.034**	0.085**(1)	0.035**	0.108***(1)	0.012**	0.065***(1)	0.020**	0.051***(1)	0.011**	0.097***(1)	0.710	0.025***(3)
Your own tasks	636	0.961	0.034***(3)	0.450	0.053***(3)	0.978	0.027***(3)	0.883	0.018***(4)	0.909	0.046***(3)	0.152	0.042***(2)
Other issues	630	0.716	0.057***(2)	0.457	0.087***(2)	0.770	0.056***(2)	0.506	0.043***(2)	0.483	0.092***(2)	0.707	0.052***(2)
Aggregated	623	0.000***	0.078	0.000***	0.109	0.000***	0.068	0.000***	0.049	0.000***	0.109	0.000***	0.056

Abbreviation: SW, stepwise.

TABLE 12 Motivation and performance (regression)

Motivated with management of	*N*	Profitability		Employees productivity		Productivity of investments		My own productivity		Combined performance		Managerial productivity impact	
		Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW	Block	SW
Salaries	605	0.283	0.097***(4)	0.558	0.086***(6)	0.102	0.145***(1)	0.074*	0.160***(2)	0.111	0.229**(1)	0.004***	0.471***(1)
Task distributions	605	0.549	0.112***(3)	0.060*	0.118***(5)	0.838	0.112***(2)	0.734	0.118***(4)	0.455	0.150***(4)	0.095	0.397***(2)
Work design	601	0.136	0.115***(1)	0.291	0.186***(2)	0.757	0.106***(4)	0.749	0.103***(5)	0.539	0.194***(2)	0.403	0.344***(3)
Output quantity	591	0.202	0.104***(2)	0.188	0.134***(4)	0.442	0.126**(2)	0.595	0.082***(6)	0.393	0.174**(4)	0.774	0.354***(3)
Quality control	592	0.710	0.102***(3)	0.219	0.168***(3)	0.380	0.132***(3)	0.280	0.128***(3)	0.728	0.162***(3)	0.956	0.450***(2)
Teamwork	597	0.436	0.117***(2)	0.001***	0.213***(1)	0.611	0.117***(4)	0.406	0.146***(2)	0.193	0.223***(1)	0.001***	0.427***(1)
Training	596	0.740	0.083***(4)	0.546	0.162***(2)	0.997	0.120***(3)	0.001***	0.174***(1)	0.287	0.171***(2)	0.157	0.492**(1)
Participation	594	0.059*	0.066***(5)	0.947	0.154***(3)	0.872	0.097***(5)	0.107	0.104***(4)	0.231	0.169***(4)	0.494	0.434***(2)
Discipline	601	0.013**	0.130***(1)	0.007***	0.226***(1)	0.015**	0.129***(1)	0.092	0.180**(1)	0.003***	0.210***(1)	0.006***	0.487***(1)
Breaktimes	572	0.908	0.076***(5)	0.838	0.150***(4)	0.152	0.121***(2)	0.747	0.137**(3)	0.621	0.177***(3)	0.263	0.443***(2)
Aggregated	539	0.000***	0.117	0.000***	0.193	0.000***	0.112	0.000***	0.161	0.000***	0.221	0.000***	0.482

Abbreviation: SW, stepwise.

5.2 | Purposive analysis with stepwise and r^2 rankings

For the operationalization of purposive approach, the interactions between well-being and performance have been delved into further by reconfiguring different combinations of them with the use of stepwise and r^2 rankings. In this way, we have sought for the maximum level of significant correlations among the indicators checked for the present paper. The exercise has markedly consolidated the connections of well-being to performance through the creation of optimal contingencies as confirmed by, say, commitment (Table 4), H&S practices (Table 7) communication (Table 11) and the managerial attitudes toward the likes of keeping promises and treating employees fairly (Table 9).

More precisely, although there is no association between the satisfaction with success and profitability, for instance, they interact significantly, when the satisfaction with the job itself is added to the evaluation. Then, the significance of these two variables' affiliation with performance improves, if the profitability is replaced with the overall productivity of employees (Table 1).

Nevertheless, it is necessary to bring to the fore virtually by the same token that the results are quite sensitive to the components of amalgamations in a given analysis since the group influences may not become significant without correct matches. For example, 'being on good terms' with managers per se does not pace up with the individual productivity, if it is not combined with managers' efforts to foster employees' skills (Table 9) or having a recognised union does not intrinsically urge upon managerial strategies progressiveness in terms of their endorsement to the labour productivity unless unions 'really look after the workers' (Table 10).

Not only entering, but also the extraction of certain inputs from the equations alternates the significances. There is no connection between the satisfaction with working hours, take as an example, and the productivity of investments when they are accompanied by a poor satisfaction with the fringe benefits, respect and promotion. Even so, the overlap becomes significant, if the latter two dimensions of satisfaction are discounted—as the most likely nominators for making employees feel themselves undervalued (Table 3).

There is again no nexus between employees' participation in work designs and the productivity of investments when they are taken with the working hours, work tempo and the participation in decisions about task distributions. However, a significant pattern emerges once the working hours are subtracted, implying possible grievances regarding the work-life balance. The same is true for one's individual productivity, too, but with the elimination of task distributions this time, signalling potential difficulties with the workload disparity (Table 6).

A ranking analysis premised on the r^2 values highlighted that the degrees of impacts differ significantly between the determinative combinations. For instance, the satisfaction with salary, job security and the job itself is significantly tailing up with the combined performance indicator as is the satisfaction with success, training and participation in broader decision-making process, but the first set's adherence is more pronounced than the latter to a significant extent (Table 1). Similarly, the combination of transport and housing support by the employers is significantly attached to employees' productivity by and large as that of maternity/paternity leave and kindergarten, yet the influence of the former group is distinctly prominent compared to the other one (Table 5).

Considerable differences apply to individually significant benchmarks as well. The relation of one's own productivity to the satisfaction with respect (Table 3), for example, the productivity of investments to the sufficient H&S compensations (Table 7) and that of profitability to the managers taking unions seriously turn out to be undoubtedly resolute

(Table 9), compared to the satisfaction with social benefits, H&S training and the fair treatment of employees by the managers, respectively.

Besides, the reconfiguration of variables changes the relative strength of potent interactions compared to some others. The significance, for instance, between employees' productivity and communication with the personnel pertaining to the HR issues is much higher than the one with soliciting their views about the financial affairs, but such a difference is essentially reversed once employees' productivity is replaced with the combined performance indicator (Table 11). In a parallel way, the significance between motivational salaries and the individual productivity is roughly twice stronger than the one between the latter and the quantity management, but the gap again becomes upside down once the individual productivity is supplanted with the productivity of all employees (Table 12).

6 | DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

To confront a globalised managerial orthodoxy based on the Tayloritstic antagonising of the interests between companies and employees (Goldman & Van Houten, 1980; Madrick, 2012), academic interventions have increasingly begun to underscore the positive impacts of JS/SWB on the institutional performance (Hakim & Sudarmiatin, 2018; Kersemaekers et al., 2018). As a tribute to such scholarly endeavours, we have undertaken investigations across the Turkish shipyards where autocratic proclivities pervade along with the concerns over the poor productivity scores. We put forward the argument for a positive correlation between JS/SWB and intuitional performance through the conceptual model of MIM aiming to capture the managerial practices/influences that (intentionally or unwittingly) promote the interests of companies and employees by cross-fertilising them.

To instigate the MIM model, we have mostly benefited from the conventional indicators, but with some rectifications. We have delved into the relation of, for example, JS to performance by scrutinising specifically that of its individual constituents such as satisfaction with pay, success and participation (Rose, 2005). Participation was also broken-down into wider decision-making processes and employees' discretion on their own tasks. As opposed to the aggregated data, satisfaction with discretion at one's own tasks and the job itself or SWB with regard to stress and continuous preoccupation with work have hardly reacted to performance. An important implication of such bifurcations between the composite and precise assessments is that the former may not provide as much practical advice as hoped—especially in recently industrialised countries like Turkey—since the companies may not have all the assumed ingredients of JS/SWB in place at a given time (Saundry & Turnbull, 1999).

We have added a few novel predictors into the analyses, redressing the parochialism in the existing literature in terms of the contingencies between employees' well-being and performance (Freeman and Kleiner, 2019). To do so, we have borrowed a number of key variables from the broader cohorts of the workplace research such as working hours and promotions displaying their confluences with performance (Gallie et al., 2012).

We have also enriched the examinations with supplementary elements to the JS/SWB of which importance has been better recognised over the past decade or so, including the satisfaction of employees with managerial respect (Fevre et al., 2007) and mindfulness (Kersemaekers et al., 2018). These additions have uncovered powerful connections with performance implying didactic challenges to the autocratic penchants in Turkish shipyards.

We have introduced 'objective indicators' as a response to the criticisms over the lack of enough emphasis on the factual questions in the literature (Felstead & Henseke, 2017; Skurak et al., 2018). Thanks to such a probing, we have verified, for instance, that performance is accompanied by the social benefits, the availability of opting out for fewer working hours (Cam, 2012) and having a say on the work design and task distributions—contrasting the hitherto mentioned sense of satisfaction with participation in one's own tasks and the job itself (Foley & Polanyi, 2006).

Insertions were stretched toward the areas of logistics interwoven with the HR management in Turkish shipyards heeding the calls to end the monopoly of technical/economistic approaches in these domains (FitzRoy & Kraft, 2005). We have covered the communication of financial affairs with the employees, the quality control and quantity management strategies, unravelling their roles in the relationship between employees' well-being and performance.

Amid the deepening of well-being analyses, we have traced robust couplings between performance and deliberate managerial strategies as to, for example, working time flexibility and H&S precautions (Walters et al., 2005). This proves the managerial need to be more proactive in taking care of employees at the expense of contrary conventions in Turkish shipyards, if the delays in the fulfilment of armatures' orders, for instance, are to be cut back.

To stave off the shortcomings in the conceptions of interplays between profit and productivity (Hammer & Plugor, 2016), we have amended the performance indicators by introducing investment productivity in conjunction with the splitting of labour productivity as individuals' own and employees' joint productivity before devising a combined gauge for performance. Investment productivity helped explain the disjunctions between labour productivity and profitability in Turkish shipyards. For example, agreeing on the company principles as a conducer to the workplace commitment (Hakim & Sudarmiatin, 2018) and sensible compensations for the accidents nurture the labour productivity, but not the profitability since the latter is impinged on by the investment productivity, too (Foroohar, 2022).

Likewise, the separation of one's own productivity from the overall one has shed light on the discrepancies between the particular aspects of employees' well-being. Such a differentiation, for instance, corroborated that transport services supplied by the employer, the fair treatment of staff by the managers (Gallie et al., 2021) and the training facilities resonate only with the former—which the participants may deem more responsive than the latter (Bryson et al., 2017). The incorporation of a combined performance parameter into analyses also unveiled that the weak alliance of fringe benefits with profitability, take as an example, is overridden by the strength of their links to the labour and investment productivities at the aggregated levels (Gallie et al., 2012). Such convolutions between profitability and social benefits—as well as the H&S compensations—may overshadow the commercial value of employees' well-being for the managers in Turkish shipyards.

Flooring the cause-effect questions to the participants regarding the influence of managerial well-being strategies on performance has fended off the risks of spurious correlations (Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2009) and 'wishful illusions' about the impact of well-being on performance potentially prompted by the reverse affects (Stiglitz, 2002). Giving the participants the opportunity to explicitly confirm the positive ramifications of well-being strategies for performance has added more legitimacy to accentuating the mutual, rather than one-way, fertilisation between the interests of personnel and firms—as the overarching objective of this paper (Miller, 1980). That is to say, employees in Turkish shipyards themselves underlined the

importance of raising the labour standards, if the institutional performance is to be bettered, affirming the statistical inferences.

Broadly speaking, our MIM analyses have ratified that JS/SWB is largely responsive to performance in Turkish shipyards: The JS firmly intersects with the productivity of employees in general whereas both JS and SWB are predictive to profitability. These results mitigate against the managerial scepticism in Turkish shipyards about the role of employees' well-being in performance (Cam & Palaz, 2018). Even so, while reinforcing the empirical foundations of the debate, such findings as such also added more 'inconsistencies' to the literature.

The existing literature against the managerial orthodoxy, as highlighted previously, contains 'inconsistent' claims on the relationships between JS/SWB and performance (Bockerman et al., 2012; Edwards et al., 2006; Hammer & Plugor, 2016; Richter & Schrader, 2017). Although there are no systematic inquiries on 'inconsistencies', they are usually assumed to be a 'side-effect' of growing sampling variations together with the volume of research—in addition to that of ideological fallibilities (Mahy et al., 2011; Meloni & Stirati, 2022). We have suggested that one fundamental reason for this was stemmed from the empirical pragmatism that tended to neglect apparently insignificant (and the significant residual) differences (Amrhein et al., 2019).

We have further expounded that focusing disproportionately on the significant observations within the individual contexts of research projects has led to inflexible/static interpretations about the relevance of JS/SWB to performance (Guest, 2017), and hence, adverse repercussions for the development of compelling theoretical models (Basterretxea & Storey, 2018). Nor have the incompatible narratives been encouraging for the policy makers to take progressive actions (Godard, 2007), while their hesitations in the specific realm of industrial relations have been exacerbated by the reinvigoration of 'tough choices' rhetoric since the beginning of the COVID pandemic in Turkey as elsewhere (Hodder, 2020).

To deal with the issues of 'inconsistencies' and empirical pragmatism in academic efforts, we have elaborated the argument that MIM has a dynamic and amorphous character. Therefore, the paper has gone beyond the snapshots of statistical significances as they reveal themselves at first glance (Amrhein et al., 2019). Proactively seeking for significant relationships beneath the surface, we embarked on the purposive approach (Duncan & Wack, 1994) with a deliberate manipulation of empirical data systematically. To this end, we examined the interactions within the well-being antecedents as well as their links to performance by reconfiguring different combinations. Consequently, we have maximised the stock of significant correlations between the measurements of employees' well-being and performance analysed.

Through the use of stepwise, the purposive approach has delineated that both at the individual and combinational/sub-group levels, there are numerous instances in which employees' well-being and institutional performance can dynamically be associated (with high significances) in Turkish shipyards, even if they are not so in a readily available situation. We have unravelled, for example, that working from home or the flexibility to change the start of working times bears no significance for profitability, yet when working from home specifically over the weekends or the flexibility to reduce/increase working hours is added to the equation along with the replacement of profitability with the labour productivity, a significant amalgamation becomes materialised (Felstead et al., 2003). The overlap of maternity/paternity leave, kindergarten and transport services with the productivity of employees also seems to be insignificant, but if the transport is withdrawn, a significant correspondence arises—probably expressing the frustrations with shuttles (Gallie et al., 2012). All these derivatives defy the

superficiality of empirical pragmatism (McCarthy, 1994) for ignoring insignificant appearances without ascertaining the contingencies in which they may become meaningful.

Critically, the analyses failed to detect steadfast determinations. Looking at the relation of the presence of a recognised union to performance, for instance, one might conjure up the unassailability of unions' role (Addison & Teixeira, 2020). Nevertheless, albeit the connection remains sturdy, the evidence manifests that the relevance becomes significantly weakened, when the unions are unresponsive or not decisive enough in organising by inviting workers individually to join. Similarly, considering the pair of labour productivity and the pay strategies that employees find motivational, one might postulate that tangible rewards are resolutely predictive to higher performances. The decisiveness of such a tie-in, however, is negated as insignificant, if the staff is not happy, for instance, with the task distribution or teamwork (Freeman and Kleiner, 2019). That is to say, we could not capture unshakable patterns in Turkish shipyards owing to the changeability of results by the statistical simulations in terms of not only establishing or bolstering significant alignments, but also with regard to the invalidation of significances. Accordingly, the projection of MIM as an amorphous model is characterised by the avoidance from over relying on the adamantly universalist suppositions (Mills, 1959).

A ranking analysis on the basis of the r^2 values allowed us to stipulate variations in the degrees of significances of the relationships between the variables for more effective sightings of contingencies in Turkish shipbuilding companies. For instance, the combination of satisfaction with the job itself and participation in broader decision-making processes is significantly congruous with the individuals' own productivity just like that of pay, job security and success, but the latter group's influence is significantly stronger than the former (Madrick, 2012).

Moreover, it is possible to reconfigure the r^2 matrices by tracking down new junctures with differing pitch of significances. Following on the same example given in the previous paragraph, the r^2 ranking significantly shifts in favour of the former two when checked against the collective—in lieu of the individual—productivity of employees. In keeping with that, the strength of the significance of intersections between the HR-oriented communications with the staff and the labour productivity is pretty high compared to soliciting their views on the financial matters, but the gap is basically reversed when the labour productivity is supplanted with the overall company performance (Edmans, 2012). Such rejiggings have usefully unearthed ‘hidden treasuries’, as the communication instance illustrates the worthiness of consulting employees beyond the HR matters for a healthier institutional performance in Turkish shipyards—by deploying, say, their technical expertise to hoist the investment productivity.

To put it in a nutshell, the amorphous nature of MIM rules out, on the one hand, ‘one-size-fits-all’ type generalisations between employees’ well-being and performance, and yet the purposive approach, on the other, offers a multitude of dynamic correlations that can be captured if the right circumstances are ‘constructed’ by the means of quays experimental trials. The ranking analyses also offer the chance to appraise the fluidity in the relative strength of significant pertinences. Thus, the model helps circumvent the issue of ‘inconsistencies’ due to sample variations by systematically proving that no universalist assumption—of positive, negative or absent corollaries—as such hold out against the purposive perusal, anyway (Mahy et al., 2011).

With the ‘discoveries’ of significance scenarios and the specifications of their stronger versions via systematic statistical evaluations over the relationships between the well-being and

performance responses, the purposive approach opens a window of opportunity for the companies to select the most feasible MIM strategies to boost the institutional performance by cross-fertilising it with employees' (subjective) well-being. In particular, the accuracy of such practical remedies as the viable road maps for the accomplishment of end results in a utilitarian way may help alleviate managerial concerns over the ideological bias by enabling the firms to adapt the amorphous MIM model for themselves through the purposive approach (Davidov, 2017; Duncan & Wack, 1994).

Perhaps, one of the biggest challenges in advocating the company-level explorations, nonetheless, is the inadequacy of progressive cultures among the managers in Turkish shipyards, and they may prefer the status quo to eschew the perceived threats of 'new tricks' to their interests, even if the change may, in effect, turn out to be beneficial for the institutions and employees alike (Cam & Palaz, 2021). For that reason, the mainstreaming polices led by the proactive engagements with the business communities may become vital for the infusion of MIM practices.

It would be sensible to further enhance the pool of (dependent, independent and intermediating) variables for a more refined application of the purposive approach through the proliferation of case studies at a wide range (from the demographic to industrial, sectoral, institutional, regional and national variances). In this sense, the inclusion of new, if not sui-generis, variables is also critical for the micro/company level analyses to thread tailored MIM strategies.

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