To what extent is the Horn African maritime security agenda locally-owned?

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Summary

Maritime security in the Horn of Africa is a major concern affecting citizens, governments and agencies on local, national and international levels. This study critically interrogates the Horn of Africa maritime security agenda (MSA) which was established in 2008 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in response to an escalation of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Within the MSA, the international imperative for freedom of navigation generally trumps regional and local priorities, which are more focused on economic development and the specific maritime threats affecting this region. A key reason for this is that the original agenda has been driven by the liberal peace project which allows no place for a strong regional voice. This inherent structural imbalance continues to hamper local ownership of the MSA. However, definitions of what maritime security entails, and the capacities that security at sea requires, remain contested as a result of the exercise of concerted and assertive agency by both regional and national actors, and this perspective has not been adequately explored in the previous literature. This study aims to advance our understanding of the MSA within and across contexts through a multiscale case study of the Horn of Africa, exploring both national and regional dimensions of the agenda. The study shows that the MSA, as it currently stands, has been undermined by both regional and national actors using their agencies. At the regional level, government elites have re-set the MSA, while, at the national level, obstacles have been placed in its path by local actors, both at the elite and community levels. Theorising the MSA provides a lens through which to view it as well as an invitation to see the MSA from a different perspective. What this reveals is that, in response to the specific circumstances, priorities, and needs of the Horn of Africa, regional and national actors have distorted, subverted, adapted, and, on occasion, deadlocked the MSA through collective securitisation and hybridisation processes. Hence, this research adds to the limited existing literature on the contestation over the nature of maritime security and the capacities it requires in the Horn of Africa.
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
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<td>AIM</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BE</td>
<td>Blue Economy</td>
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<td>CCAP</td>
<td>Coastal Communities Against Piracy</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Copenhagen School</td>
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<td>CRIMARIO</td>
<td>Critical Maritime Routes Indian Ocean</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUTLASS EXPRESS</td>
<td>Naval training exercise in the Indian Ocean</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP World</td>
<td>Dubai Ports</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>East African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESA–IO</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa-Indian Ocean Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European and Security Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCAP</td>
<td>The European Capacity Building Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federal Member States</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMCP</td>
<td>Global Maritime Crime Programme</td>
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<td>GMDSS</td>
<td>Global Maritime Distress and Safety System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIM strategy</td>
<td>Integrated Maritime Safety and Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>The International Criminal Police Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISN</td>
<td>Information Sharing Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUU fishing</td>
<td>Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWCO</td>
<td>World Commission on the Oceans</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMLC</td>
<td>International Maritime Labour Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIMICC</td>
<td>Joint Maritime Information and Coordination Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMRCC</td>
<td>Jeddah Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARPOL</td>
<td>The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASE</td>
<td>Programme to Support Regional Maritimes Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Maritime Domain Awareness</td>
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<td>MPU</td>
<td>Maritime Police Unit</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Maritime Security</td>
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<td>MSA</td>
<td>Maritime Security Governance</td>
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<td>MSCB</td>
<td>Maritime Security Agenda</td>
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<td>MSSR</td>
<td>Maritime Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>MSG</td>
<td>Maritime Security Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>NESTOR</td>
<td>Regional Maritime Capacity Building Mission in the Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>Nautical Miles</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIOTC</td>
<td>Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEA</td>
<td>Political Economy Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme</td>
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<td>RMPU</td>
<td>Regional Maritime Police Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBEC</td>
<td>Sustainable Blue Economy Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Somali Federal Coast Guard</td>
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<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Small Island and Developing States</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOLAS</td>
<td>International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOPS</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>STCW</td>
<td>Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCLOS</td>
<td>The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>VII UN Charter</td>
<td>Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter</td>
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To what extent is the Horn Africa maritime security agenda locally-owned?

1 SETTING THE SCENE: AIM, OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE

Regional security and stability are desirable objectives in any part of the world, and maintaining them is in the interests of local, regional and external actors. Maritime nations, however, can face a particular set of challenges whose effects are often felt transnationally, well beyond their own regions. Ungoverned ocean spaces, such as the Gulf of Aden, represent danger and instability both for the countries in that region and elsewhere. These potential problems in turn inevitably impact on issues of international security and global trade. Among the strategies needed to minimise these significant risks, therefore, maritime security is key.

Ideally, the strategy for achieving effective maritime security and the capacities it requires should involve the local stakeholders affected by it, participating in the setting of an agreed agenda. In other words, it should be locally owned. The definition of the local as provided by Mac Ginty and Richmond is used in this study. As Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013, p. 770) describe it, “[t]he local is not necessarily exclusive of the national and international … indeed, it is often much less ‘local’ than imagined, and is the product of constant social negotiation between localised and non-localised ideas, norms and practices”. To this end, this study uses the term local to refer to both national and regional ideas, norms and practices within a local context.

However, achieving consensus that encompasses a full range of localised and non-localised ideas, norms, and practices is not always possible. One particularly compelling example of this is the international agenda for maritime security in the Horn of Africa, formulated in 2008 at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC authorised military force in response to an increase in piracy in the Horn of Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter through a series of Resolutions, most notably Resolution 1816, but this Resolution also called on the international community to assist affected states in maritime security capacity building. This latter move was tacit support for a liberal peace project on the part of the UNSC. Liberal peace is “conceptualised as being predicated upon the cornerstones of democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neoliberal development” (Richmond 2009, p. 4). Indeed, Singh and Bedi (2016, p. 433) point out that
the counter-piracy initiatives are “strategies that marry the ‘liberal state-building project’ with ‘indigenous mechanisms of authority and governance’ along the Horn of Africa”. Indeed, the UNSC passed Resolution 1976 in 2011, in which it argued that “the ongoing instability in Somalia is one of the underlying causes of the problem of piracy”. Thus, it called for international assistance in building the capacity of Somali government institutions, and support for economic and social development. In other words, Resolution 1976 promoted the liberal peace initiative for Somali maritime capacity building, which is manifested in the EU’s engagement in the maritime security of the country. Winn and Lewis (2017) conclude that “the EU preoccupation with security and post-liberal state-building rather than land-based development approaches undermines European policies in Somalia”.

The focus of the present study is on the non-military intervention through the liberal peace project, described by donors and their implementing partners in terms such as:

- ‘maritime security governance’ (MSC) – which incorporates a framework for international cooperation at sea;
- ‘maritime security sector reform’ (MSSR) – in other words a blueprint for institutional reforms;
- ‘maritime security capacity building’ (MSCB) – which concerns the provision of infrastructure and equipment as well as technical level training

It is the purpose of the present study to investigate the extent to which the international agenda of 2008 is locally owned. As this research will show, in the absence of local agency in agenda setting, an externally formulated agenda for maritime security in the Horn of Africa has undergone and continues to undergo a process of ‘hybridity’, defined by Mac Ginty (2010, p 298) as “the ability of local actors to resist, ignore or subvert the liberal peace”. To put it differently, the agenda goes through a process of change and ultimately of distortion, resulting from contestation over its implementation. While hybridisation of such an agenda is not ideal, it is nonetheless preferable to a deadlock.

Indeed, my study suggests that hybridity does emerge, to some extent, at the regional level as a result of the fusion of external and local ideas and norms to produce a hybrid agenda. However, hybridity is more subtle and nuanced at the national level in some cases, while efforts to hybridise have resulted in a deadlock in others. The reasons are complex: they involve a range of entities (local and external) which are ostensibly working towards a
common goal (i.e. maritime security), but whose methods to achieve that goal do not necessarily always coincide. However, where this ideological contestation over maritime security policy and practice results in hybridity as a process, it produces a compromise rather than the perfect solution for all actors involved.

1.1 Aims and objectives

This research aims to enhance and advance our understanding of the current state of play in the Horn of Africa maritime security agenda. A new approach is needed as the object of maritime security study has changed; there has been a shift away from security-centric maritime security as a result of structural changes in policy and practice in this field.

To achieve these aims, I will:

1. Analyse policy documents on maritime security that help explain the origins of the agenda and its failures to consider local actors as relevant audiences.
2. Conduct discourse analysis to illuminate local agency which has resulted in the agenda being resisted and adapted to the region’s priorities for the use of ocean resources for economic growth.
3. Interview implementing organisations of MSSR and MSCB, as well as their elite counterparts in Somalia, to solicit responses in order to shed light on the more nuanced and subtle hybrid process at the national level.

The overarching argument of the thesis is two-fold. Firstly, the maritime security agenda in the Horn of Africa was chiefly shaped by the UNSC, framing the escalation of piracy in this region as exacerbating the instability in Somalia. This situation, in turn, was constructed as a threat to international peace and security, providing justification for international military intervention. Along with this move, the UNSC called for a liberal peace initiative to help the states in the Horn of Africa with maritime security governance and it is the implementation of the initiative which is the focus of this thesis. The outcomes of the initiative show varying degrees of distortion and adaptation by local actors (both elites in government and coastal communities). Such outcomes are illustrated by a case study of the Horn of Africa, with regional and national dimensions. Its most important finding is that the Horn of Africa maritime security agenda took a top-down approach at the design phase and that this has remained contested during implementation. Thus, drawing on the concepts of collective
securitisation and hybridity, this research demonstrates that regional policymakers reconfigured and reoriented the agenda away from its original security-centric form. Meanwhile, at the national level, government elites and coastal communities have distorted and, at least partially, adapted the agenda to suit their own capacity building priorities, while continuing to resist which has led to a deadlock in some negotiations.

The scholarly community in maritime security for the most part consider the agenda in separate categories: maritime security governance (Shemella 2016) the blue economy (Mboce and McCabe 2021), maritime security sector reform (Ryan 2013 Vreý et al. 2021), maritime security capacity building (Jacobsen 2017; Alcock 2021; Bueger et al. 2020, and the notion of local ownership (Ejdus 2017, Ejdus 2018). As a result, the agenda for security at sea – as a whole – has received little attention (Bueger and Edmunds 2017, p. 1294). The only exception is one comprehensive study on the specific theme of capacity building for maritime security (Bueger et al. 2021). Reviewing the existing work on maritime security suggests that this field might benefit from more theorisation. Indeed, there is an emerging consensus on the need to theorise security at sea from constructivist and critical security perspectives (Bueger and Edmunds 2017, p. 1295), as well as maritime security capacity building due to the contested, co-constructed and emergent nature of this process in practice (Edmunds and Juncos 2020, Bueger and Tholens 2021). Therefore, the present study advances this strand of the theorisation of maritime security and capacity building in order to provide insights into how a range of actors negotiate, reorient, contest, and construct these processes.

This research analyses and adds to the existing literature on maritime security and the capacity building it necessitates by way of empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions. Empirically, it provides an insight into how an externally formulated strategy for responding to an escalation of piracy in the Horn of Africa has been confronted with local indifferences, in the first instance, and then has become subverted and distorted, as it contends with local ideas, norms and practices; as well as cases in which international and national actors have reached a point where no progress can be made because of a fundamental disagreement. From a theoretical point of view, this research brings together the discipline of critical security studies (namely the securitisation theory), and the trio disciplines of peacebuilding, state-building, and capacity-building (notably the concept of hybridity) in order to shed new light on the subversion of the maritime security agenda for
the Horn of Africa. This approach demonstrates, through the lens of securitisation theory, the role of local agency in agenda setting to effect change in maritime governance structures at the regional level. Then, at the national level, the approach demonstrates, through the lens of hybridity, how local and external actors agree on some issues while disagreeing on others to produce a more compromised but generally agreed agenda. This study also goes beyond the binary of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ hybridity (Richmond 2015, p. 50). It considers potential/possible failures of this binary conceptualisation through the lens of what might be termed ‘deadlocked hybridity’, that is a complete failure to achieve hybridity. Methodologically, this study presents a case study of the Horn of Africa that adds to what is known about the evolving nature of the object of maritime security study. The emerging literature on the contestation over maritime security capacity building in practice is limited to single case study research, leading to a greater focus on agency at the level of government elites. In contrast, the present case study of the Horn of Africa is multiscale and examines the agenda within and across contexts. This increases the potential for considering the extent to which the results of regional (the Horn of Africa) and national (Somalia) case studies are more broadly generalisable.

1.2 Thesis structure: regional and national dimensions

This introductory chapter is followed by a literature review and a chapter on methodology. Thereafter, the thesis includes five empirical chapters in a structure determined by the evolution of the maritime security agenda from a regional basis to a national focus. Each of the empirical chapters examines a particular facet of the of the research question posed, building a case that leads toward the conclusion. Thus, the regional case is comprised of chapters four and five. The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) and the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC are discussed in chapter four. Theoretically, this chapter draws on the securitisation theory, in particular the collective securitisation dimension. Meanwhile, an analysis of the 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference (SBEC)\(^1\) is presented in chapter five through the lens of hybridity. The chapter on the DCoC draws on document analysis, while the chapter on the SBEC uses both document and discourse analyses. The national case study is presented in detail in chapters six, seven and eight, each of which looks at the extent to which the agenda is nationally owned. On a theoretical level, chapters six and seven

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\(^1\) The SBEC was held in Nairobi, Kenya in November 2018.
examine specific instances of positive hybridity, whereas chapter eight explores when the hybridisation process fails due to a deadlock in negotiations between international actors and the locals. In other words, the notion of ‘deadlocked’ hybridity is explored. This case study accomplishes this through analyses of key agenda components such as MSSR and MSCB. These chapters are based on document analysis and in-depth interviews with MSSR and MSCB implementing organisations, as well as government elites.

1.2.1 Chapter Two: Literature Review

This chapter provides a critical examination of existing research into maritime security. It focuses primarily on the material that is the most significant relative to the proposed study. The literature review is organised by topics. It breaks the maritime security agenda into a number of debates, each of which it discusses individually. This approach was selected because the agenda is shaped by several competing discourses. To this end, the first section reviews the securitisation of the oceans and the developing discourse on the blue economy. The second section analyses the debate on MSSR, while the discourse on the burgeoning practice of MSCB is examined in the third section. The fourth section traces the literature on hybridity to its origins in both the liberal peace and the local turn literature.

1.2.2 Chapter Three: Methodology

This chapter on methods explains the approach adopted to achieve the aims of the study, which are to enhance and advance our understanding within the Horn of Africa maritime security agenda. The research method selected is a case study of the Horn of Africa. Ragin and Becker (1992, p. 192) emphasised the need to clearly identify “what is this a case of?” From this perspective, the Horn of Africa region is the entity selected as a case because it has been a testing ground for the international maritime security agenda, which is the research topic of this study. In other words, the Horn of Africa is only of interest as a case because it allows the examination of the topic of interests (i.e. local ownership of the agenda, with its regional and national dimensions). The regional dimension (the Horn of Africa) structures and frames the national dimension – the Somali experience. At the regional level, the agenda was initially shaped by the liberal peace project, but as it evolved, regional policymakers from the Horn of Africa (among others) exercised a more concerted agency in subverting the notion of security-centric maritime security. Thus, these actors adapted the original agenda to respond to the Horn of Africa specific priorities for economic development. Moreover, the
Somali experience provides insights into the Horn of Africa maritime security agenda in two ways. Firstly, it shows a more subtle and nuanced resistance to the agenda by elites at the national level and by coastal communities, manifested in a lack of local cooperation with international actors. Secondly, the Somali experience also sheds light on a more assertive contestation between the EU and government elites over local ownership of the agenda, often resulting in a deadlock.

1.2.3 Chapter Four: Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) and the Jeddah Amendment

This chapter on the DCoC is the first of five empirical chapters presented in this thesis. While the DCoC has evolved into an interregional initiative, the focus on the DCoC here is critical to the contextualisation of the construction of the maritime security agenda for this region. As will be shown, the DCoC was created under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as a framework for coordinating counter-piracy measures, and its agenda was primarily inherited from the UNSC. The DCoC was not adopted until 2009, at the height of piracy in the Horn of Africa, following the passing of the UNSC Resolution 1816 in 2008. The Resolution called for a blend of civilian and military responses to the outbreak of piracy in the region. Thus, the DCoC was created to supplement the military operation at sea by coordinating maritime security capacity building activities influenced by the liberal peace project.

This chapter suggests that, since the agenda for the DCoC was inherited from UNSC, the dedicated threat of piracy to the shipping sector overshadowed the central role of oceans in food and maritime security, as well as blue growth, resulting in acquiescent regional policymakers. In other words, while these policymakers did contribute to the DCoC's formulation process, their acquiescence can be attributed to seablindness. However, those local policymakers who eventually overcame seablindness pushed for a different way of viewing maritime security that went beyond piracy. This alternative viewpoint focused on the interconnected nature of various types of maritime crime in the first instance. Indeed, the Mombasa Protocol represents states from the Horn of Africa’s first foray into agenda setting for defining ocean governance. Such an approach was spearheaded by the host states of the regional information sharing centres (Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, and Djibouti). The Protocol reframed the notion of security at sea by addressing piracy as emblematic of a broader problem of maritime threats (Mombasa Protocol 2015, p. 12), thereby presenting an
alternative form of governance structure to the DCoC, which was solely focused on piracy and armed robbery. McCabe (2021, p. 138) points out that the Mombasa Protocol was a preliminary to the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC, which now combines an emphasis on the different forms of security at sea with a focus on economic development.

This chapter (for the first time) theorises about the role of policymakers (including actors from the Horn of Africa) in agenda-setting for governing the Horn of Africa maritime arena. As a theoretical basis, the first section of this chapter draws on the original Copenhagen School (CS) of securitisation theory. The notion of securitisation for agenda-setting purposes (as developed by Vuori 2008, p.1) is used in the first section to shed light on the IMO’s attempt to galvanise the international community to address the escalation of piracy in the Horn of Africa from 2005. Thus, the IMO, to some extent, set the tone for the agenda for the Horn of Africa maritime security. Section two draws on the collective dimension of securitisation (as developed by Haacke and Williams 2008 and refined by Sperling and Webber 2017). This dimension illuminates local agency (at the region level) in contributing to agenda setting for the first-ever framework (the DCoC) for maritime security governance for the Horn of Africa and beyond, of which the IMO was the principal facilitator. The collective securitisation dimension is also used in section three to shed light on a more concerted agency by regional policymakers in effecting change in the DCoC, that is the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC. Also presented in this section is the interaction of threat, referent object, audience and the securitising actor. To put it differently, it is the collective securitisation process that paved the way for the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC.

1.2.4 Chapter Five: Sustainable Blue Economy Conference (SBEC)

Through an examination of the SBEC held in Nairobi in 2018, this second empirical chapter demonstrates how the Horn of Africa has subverted the original maritime security agenda and adapted to respond to the region’s specific circumstances and priorities. The chapter argues that the region’s attitude toward the maritime environment has shifted, as a result of the real potential for blue growth. In this region, socio-economic and political-economic considerations now point to a development-first mindset. On the one hand, the socio-economic aspect of blue growth refers to the revitalisation of the maritime sector in terms of fishing, trade, transportation, and tourism. On the other hand, political economic considerations relate to the institutionalisation of the blue economy agenda, which is
currently an issue of particular importance for policymakers in the Horn of Africa. This is due to the potential for the blue economy to contribute to national economic development, which was a recurring theme during the SBEC.

The concept of hybridity is used as a theoretical foundation in this chapter. It does this by showing how local policymakers have exercised agency in formulating and maintaining an alternative maritime security agenda built around the blue economy. Mac Ginty (2010, p. 392) argues that one of the “conceptual model[s] to help visualize the interplay that leads to hybridized forms of peace [is] …. the ability of local actors to present and maintain alternative forms of peacemaking”. Through a process of hybridisation, this chapter shows how local policymakers have subverted and adapted the original maritime security agenda, as developed at the UNSC and shaped by the liberal peace initiative. As a result of this subversion, an alternative hybrid agenda has emerged at the regional level, centred on the nexus between maritime security and the blue economy.

The outcome of this hybridisation process reflects the convergence of external actors’ overarching concern for security at sea (in order to protect the smooth flow of international trade on which their respective national economies rely) with regional policymakers’ interests in blue growth as a means of addressing socioeconomic concerns. This latter focus is evidenced by the priorities that the SBEC assigned to the narrative about food and economic security as well as the sustainable use of ocean and marine resources. Indeed, my analysis of the SBEC shows that government elites from the Horn of Africa have defied the notion of a security-first mindset when it comes to maritime security in the Horn of Africa. This represents a shift away from the original agenda established at the UNSC in 2008, which had come to dominate the early stages of maritime security.

1.2.5 Chapter Six: Maritime Security Sector Reform (MSSR)

With an investigation of the MSSR process in Somalia, the third empirical chapter is the first of three chapters which present in detail the national case study. Piracy off the coast of Somalia was the catalyst for international interests in maritime security in the country. Since then, Somalia has served as an experimental laboratory for MSSR policies and practices. Empirically, this chapter argues that MSSR is predominantly, though, not exclusively, state-centric, with evidence drawn from specific projects which both foreground the state in MSSR and contrastingly decentre the state in the reform process to integrate coastal communities in
the programme of reform. Nonetheless, the dominance of the notion of the state in MSSR means that breakaway republics, such as Somaliland, are still excluded from the process. The argument relating to the state-centric nature of mainstream security sector reform (SSR) has already been extensively explored by a number of scholars (Ansorg and Gordon 2019; Jackson 2018; Sedra 2018; Jackson and Bakrania 2018). Thus, this chapter examines the extent to which MSSR remains state-centric, drawing on two projects that fuse state and relevant non-state actors in the reform process to produce a hybrid agenda for MSSR. A brief synopsis of two projects that decentre the state in MSSR is discussed below.

The first project aims to include coastal and fishing communities in the reform process by institutionalising the fishing sector, with the revenue generated trickling down to coastal communities. This initiative was implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which was funded by the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation. The policy output was an Interim Agreement on Revenue Sharing for the issuance of fishing licenses, which was signed in February 2018. Under the terms of the agreement, Somalia will generate revenue from offshore fisheries resources in its economic exclusive zone (EEZ), particularly tuna and tuna-like species, with a portion of the proceeds reinvested in the inshore fisheries sector, thereby providing food security and livelihoods for remote coastal communities. The second project is a community-based fisheries cooperative management (co-management), which is a collaboration between the government and local resource users to provide an effective governance structure for fisheries management. Secure Fisheries, which is an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) has partnered with two remote fishing communities in Bander Beyla (the Puntland region) and Zeila (Somaliland) to support the establishment of co-management associations. These new associations help to establish a communication channel between the government and coastal communities, to foster local ownership of coastal and marine resources, and to develop fisheries management plans that yield profits while ensuring sustainability in order to provide food security and livelihoods for the locals.

On a conceptual level, MSSR is, by nature, a strategy designed to achieve overall aims and objectives in relation to security capacities, such as the creation of a maritime security force. On the other hand, MSCB is the principal MSSR agent. So MSCB is an organised programme of specific activities to be undertaken in order to achieve the aims and objectives of MSSR. In other words, MSCB is the process of building the capacity for infrastructure
development and the provision of equipment to develop, for example, a coastguard or maritime police unit. The interplay between MSCB and MSSR is illustrated in this thesis through the EU and UN strategy for Somali MSSR. As a theoretical lens, this chapter draws on hybridity to help identify the dominance of international norms in MSSR processes in Somalia. Peterson (2012, p. 12) argues that “the lens of hybridity allows for the recognition of hegemony (the external liberal model, which can be characterised as homogenous to a degree)”. The chapter demonstrates the dominance of international norms and practices in MSSR, which tantamount to the liberal peace project. Hybridity has extensively been applied to mainstream security sector reform (SSR): (Schroeder et al. 2014, Podder 2013, Schroeder and Chappuis 2014, Schroeder et al. 2014, Bagayoko 2012, Bagayoko et al. 2016). Indeed Donais (2018) argues that “hybridity that lie at the nexus of local and national ownership will in many ways determine the future of security sector reform”.

In the course of this chapter, I draw on document analysis and in-depth interviews with officials from three different UN organisations, as well as an independent NGO, all of which are involved with the implementation of MSSR in Somalia.

1.2.6 Chapter Seven: Maritime Security Capacity Building (MSCB)

This chapter examines how external actors and local elites negotiate, translate, situate, contest, and assemble MSCB. As a result, the process of MSCB has produced pressure for the fusion of local demands and externally designed programmed shaped by the liberal peace initiative. The chapter demonstrates that when confronted with a lack of cooperation from both the elites in government and coastal communities, the UN agencies involved with MSCB processes in Somalia take a more pragmatic approach to project implementation in order to make headway with the negotiations. Such an approach has allowed for local adaptation of the assistant programme. This adaptive strategy for local context, in turn, makes possible for the combining of local expectations and the aims of external actors. In other words, this is positive hybridity.

On a theoretical level, this chapter draws on hybridity to analyse the interactions between international and local actors, which help explain how these elites take a more subtle approach to resist the liberal peace initiative. Mac Ginty (2010, p. 402) notes that subtle resistance from the locals “may take the form of non-cooperation…”. Edmunds and Juncos (2020) investigate capacity-building practices that are shaped by the local context, revealing
how preconceived notions about the nature of local capacity challenges are distorted during the implementation process. My study builds on the findings of these scholars on the theoretical front to help explain a process of change that occurs in the implementation of MSCB in Somalia via three projects.

The first project is the EU-funded ‘Coastal Communities Against Piracy’ (CCAP), which was established during the height of piracy to raise awareness of the piracy problem in coastal communities. This project suggests a hybridisation process at the grassroots level. Albrecht and Moe (2015, p. 3) argue that hybridity as a theoretical lens goes beyond the state and elite level actors as the sole focus on analysis to “also include and take seriously the agency of non-elites (or local elites), everyday needs and capacities as well as subaltern politic”. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was originally assigned to the CCAP, but IGAD abandoned it due to inertia resulting from a lack of cooperation on the part of the locals. It was later taken up by the FAO. However, when it came to implement the project, local indifference led to it being distorted to meet the needs of the communities in areas such as net repair and maintenance, fish drying and processing, and the provision of equipment such as refrigerated vehicles, vessels, and solar-powered flake iced machines. Here, the process of change is the adaptation of an external programme to the local context, which occurred when implementers were confronted with a lack of local interest.

The second hybridised project is manifested in the newly built EU-funded facility for the Mogadishu Police Unit. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Office for Project Services collaborated on this initiative (UNOPS). The funding was intended to be used to build maritime security capacity in Somalia, but disagreements over how to proceed resulted in a stalemate. Following negotiations between the EU delegation in Somalia and the Ministry of Internal Security, it was agreed that the funding would be used for infrastructure development as well as the provision of equipment to equip the Maritime Police Unit (MPU). The outcome of this project shows that local expectations and external strategies coalesced to form a hybrid agenda for MSCB, which gave rise to positive hybridity.

The third project shows hybridity in MSCB through incorporating the interests of the wider civil society into the development intervention. For example, the Resilient Fisheries and Livestock Value Chain for Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Somalia (RAAISE) project is the result of a local push for development-oriented maritime security initiatives. It is funded by the EU and implemented by the FAO. This project aims to address the root causes of
maritime threats, namely underdevelopment by creating a market-driven chain for Somali fisheries. To this end, the project aims to connect artisanal and industrial fisheries to international markets, create new jobs, increase and diversify livelihoods, foster inclusive economic opportunities, and rehabilitate primary infrastructures within the fisheries. The fusion of external interests in security at sea and national imperatives for development in productive sectors, is what gives rise to hybridity in this context. This project shows that a balance between security and development was achieved through a process of hybridisation.

Finally, these findings are illustrated and supported through document analysis and in-depth interviews with UN officials and local actors (both at the elite and community levels) in order to shed light on the hybridity process in MSCB in practice.

1.2.7 Chapter Eight: Deadlocked negotiation over MSCB implementation

This chapter examines situations in which the EU and local elites in government are unable to reach an agreement on the implementation of externally formulated MSCB. To this end, it sheds light on the contestation over EUCAP Somalia’s programme of support, which has led to local resistance to EU MSCB. The evidence presented in this chapter shows that MSCB in practice involves a process of conflict and friction between the local elites and the EU, resulting from different considerations, often pulling in different directions. The struggle between EUCAP Somalia and local elites in government over the specific nature of MSCB programmes is indeed a perfect candidate for this analysis. In 2012, the EU launched EUCAP Nestor, a civilian mission mandated to support maritime security capacities in five states in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean (Djibouti, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Tanzania). However, due to a lack of cooperation on the part of some of the intended recipient countries, such as Kenya and Tanzania, the EU mission was only successful to a very limited extent (only in the Seychelles) in creating the conditions for a discernible impact on the region’s maritime capacity challenges. Kenya and Tanzania resisted the core support of the mission, namely mentoring and advising, and instead demanded assistance in equipment, such as coastguard vessels. However, the mission refused to cave in to these local demands. Due in part to this impasse, the EU undertook a strategic review of EUCAP Nestor in 2015. As a result, the EU phased out its region-wide activities and renamed the mission EUCAP Somalia. My research reveals that the EU is now also in the process of phasing out the maritime component of this mission after failing to break the deadlock over local
demands for support that directly responds to the specific MSCB challenges in Somalia. The irony of the EU maritime engagement in Somalia is that it knew the country's inability to provide maritime security was due to infrastructure and equipment constraints, yet the EU shifted focus from region-wide activities to country-specific activities in the absence of any major alteration to policies that had already been shown to fail.

On a theoretical level, this chapter investigates those occasions when hybridity as a process fails to occur because of a deadlock. It explores what might be termed ‘deadlocked’ hybridity. The existing literature divides hybridity into two types: positive and negative hybridisation. Positive hybridity is a more compromised outcome that resolves, to some extent, a situation where local elites and international interveners have different opinions about the specific nature of MSCB, whereas negative hybridity is the imposition of externally designed assistance on local actors (Richmond 2015, p. 51). My study suggests, through the lens of hybridity, that the usual formulation of external actors’ strategic review of a programme of assistance, as an indicator of lessons learned, is problematic. This is due to the fact that such an approach focuses on the EU side of the equation, whereas the process that characterises the MSCB contestation between local and external actors is essentially dynamic, with ideas and negotiations flowing in both directions. In other words, hybridity, as a process, more accurately reflects this two-way dynamic, in which the emphasis shifts away from the donor (in this case the EU) as the object of inquiry and toward a broader consideration of both the vision and objectives of external actors alongside local ideas and demands. This research, however, reveals that when these players fail to attain hybridity, the result is impasse or deadlock. Such an outcome can result in an abrupt withdrawal of international assistance, which would be detrimental to the potential for the reform programme to become institutionalised and self-sustaining. To support these claims, the chapter relies on document analysis and in-depth interviews with EUCAP Somalia officials and government elites.
Conclusion

Ideally, an agenda for maritime security in the Horn of Africa should reflect the ideas, norms and practices of the locals affected by it. However, due to competing local and external ideas, norms and practices, the ideal outcome is not always possible to achieve. One particularly compelling example of this tension is manifested in the original maritime security agenda for this region. This agenda was established by the UNSC through Resolution 1816 in 2008, which called upon the international community to assist the states in the Horn of Africa with maritime capacity building, and Resolution 1976 in 2011, which called for international support for strengthening the Somali government institutions. Thus, the UNSC framed the agenda in such a way as to reflect or conform to an overarching aims and values, namely the liberal peace project.

Initially, local actors were indifferent to maritime matters due to seablindness, but as the agenda developed, they became more aware of the region’s maritime development potentials. This greater understanding resulted in some resistance from local actors to the original agenda. Consequently, there was a push at the local level to broaden the scope of the DCoC to also include other forms of maritime threat, which was articulated through the Mombasa Protocol. This Protocol served as a prelude to the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC, which was adopted in 2017, and is a manifestation of the exercise of a concerted agency by regional policymakers to integrate security and development to create a multi-sectoral framework for maritime security governance.

Meanwhile, the Horn of Africa’s keen interest in developing the blue economy resulted in an overt subversion of the original agenda through a locally driven strategy, built around the nexus between maritime security and the blue economy. This agenda was established at the SBEC. Thus, the outcome of the SBEC suggests, to a greater degree, the hybridisation of the maritime security agenda that had its origins in the UNSC’s securitisation of piracy in the Horn of Africa.

At the national level, the case study of Somalia shows that the agenda, as established by the UNSC, prioritised the liberal peace project over local context. This move was instrumental in moulding external ideas, norms, and practices in both MSSR and MSCB. However, my research shows that local actors resist, subvert, distort, and only partially adapt the agenda to suit their own priorities for development, resulting in varied degrees of hybridisation. In some
cases, the contestation that occurs over competing local and external ideas, norms and practices leads to compromises made by implementing organisations in an attempt to break the deadlock through a hybridisation process. For example, the UN organisations engaged in the MSSR and MSCB processes, such as the UNODC, UNOPS, and FAO take a pragmatic approach to competition and conflict during programme implementations in Somalia. The outcome is, to a certain extent, hybridisation of MSSR and MSCB.

In other cases, the EU follows a path-dependency model, which seeks to impose specific assistance on the locals based on its beliefs and values, rather than embracing the local context. My research suggests that such an approach is inimical to hybridity as a process. Thus, when negotiations between local actors and the EU inevitably reach a deadlock, neither side is willing to give in and no agreement can be made. In consequence, EUCAP Somalia has been forced to reconsider its stance on the maritime component of the mission and may withdraw from this component completely, due to Brussel’s perceived lack of local cooperation, whereas in fact the deadlock is the end point of a negotiating process.

The following chapter will review the existing literature to identify both the central themes that shape the maritime security agenda and important issues that remain unresolved in order to establish a rationale for this study.
2 THEMATIC DEBATES ON THE MARITIME SECURITY AGENDA: REVIEWING THE LITERATURE

The theoretical basis of the contemporary maritime security agenda can be traced back to the 1990s, when there was a resurgence of interest in how to govern the oceans in a post-Cold-War era. The 1998 report of the Independent World Commission on the Oceans (IWCO) launched in 1995, assessed the status of ocean governance at that time in order to set out the way forward (IWCO 1998, p. 15). The report highlighted the challenges presented by non-military maritime threats – such as piracy and terrorism – to peace and security in the oceans and recommended how best to respond to them (IWCO 1998, p. 17). In practice, non-traditional threats to security at sea, in particular terrorism, rose to prominence in the aftermath of the bombing of the MV Limburg off Yemen in 2002 (Sinai 2004, p. 50). Non-military threats did not, however, rise to the top of the international security agenda at the UNSC until the emergence of piracy in the Horn of Africa from 2005 onwards. The UNSC’s engagement was triggered by international actors, with no substantive contribution from local voices, and it repositioned piracy, which had previously been classified as maritime crime, as the region’s principal threat to maritime security (Vreÿ 2010, p. 122).

The UNSC Resolution 1816 in 2008\(^2\) set in motion a securitisation process that allowed parallel initiatives: military intervention in the region’s maritime space, and international assistance in maritime capacity building to the affected states (Guilfoyle 2008, p. 695). Such a process provides considerable latitude in how policymakers respond to dedicated threats (Balzacq and Guzzini 2015, p. 99). In this context, policy responses to the phenomenon of piracy encouraged a mode of international interaction (Klein 2011, p. 2). This interaction has taken a two-pronged approach – in line with the UNSC Resolution 1816. The first element engendered international military cooperation to combat piracy and armed robbery in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Percy 2016, p. 3). Transboundary cooperation is critical since responsibility for maritime security is often shared by a variety of actors (local, regional and external) (Bowers and Koh 2019, p. 3). The non-military intervention, the second component, began in earnest in 2009, kick-starting a maritime security governance

\(^2\)The resolution “calls upon all states interested in the security of maritime activities to take part actively in the fight against piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia, in particular by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft”. (S/RES/1816 (2008), 1). The UNSC also called on the international community to assist neighbouring states with the provision of maritime capacity building (S/RES/1816 (2008), 3)
(MSG) framework for coordinating anti-piracy measures, namely the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) (Kraska and Wilson 2009, p. 1).

Initially, international support for maritime security capacity building (MSCB) followed a regional approach (McCabe 2021, p. 131). A prime example is the then European Union (EU) Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor). However, that mission suffered setbacks, which had been attributed to its top-down approach to its programme of support for the counterparts (Ejdus 2017, p. 461). The mission was restructured in 2015, with a national approach and a focus on Somalia. Meanwhile, a lack of a blueprint for maritime security sector reform (MSSR) prompted joined-up thinking between diverse US governmental institutions, spanning five agencies. The process culminated in the publication of a comprehensive document on international best-practice in MSSR (US Government 2010, p. ii). The document represents a toolkit for assessing the reform process in the maritime sectors (Bueger et al. 2020, p. 9). Nonetheless, it relegates important non-state stakeholders, such as fishing and coastal communities, in the agenda to a secondary position (Ryan 2013, p. 173). Yet, these stakeholders have a vital interests in ensuring maritime security (Okafor-Yarwood et al. 2020, p. 1).

As a result, the maritime security agenda, which eschewed development in favour of security, failed to strike a chord with regional actors more concerned about socio-economic development (Egede 2016, p. 1). For example, policies of some of the states in the Horn of Africa took a more developmental approach to maritime security. These include Djibouti’s national economic development plans to stimulate blue growth (McCabe 2019, p. 332), as well as Kenya’s keen interest in the blue economy (Mboce and McCabe 2020, p. 164). The Sustainable Blue Economy Conference (SBEC), held in Nairobi in 2018, was the climax of the Horn of Africa’s policy on the blue economy. The scope of the blue economy agenda reflects the region’s diversity, as it encompasses both coastal and land-locked states in the Horn of Africa.\footnote{The Concept Paper for the SBEC defines the blue economy as “sustainable use and conservation of the oceans, seas, lakes, rivers and other water resources. These resources present a development front with immense potential for contributing to sustainable and inclusive development”.

\footnote{EUCAP Nestor had been operating in Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles and Somalia from 2012 to 2015.}

\footnote{The institutions are: the US Department of State, Defence, Homeland security, Transportation and Justice and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).}
Meanwhile, regional states (among others) have taken a different approach to maritime security, focusing on issues other than piracy (Lannon 2017). This alternative position emphasised on the linked nature of various forms of maritime crime, as manifested in the Mombasa Protocol (Mombasa Protocol 2015, p. 16). The momentum provided by this Protocol along with a decline in piracy in the region led to signatories to the DCoC to recalibrate this framework. This process resulted in the so-called Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC in 2017, with a strong emphasis on the blue economy (Menzel 2018, p. 164, IMO Document 2017).

This chapter provides a review of the debates that have shaped the Horn of Africa maritime security agenda. Its core conclusion is two-fold and reflects the overall argument of the thesis, which is that the agenda, in the first instance, was primarily shaped by the liberal peace project, and only partly corresponded to local ideas, norms and practices. However, upon implementation, it has undergone a process of change due to local resistance, distortion, subversion, and adaptation, which varies according to national and regional levels. Thus, on the one hand, there is a gap in the existing literature, as a result of which processes such as MSG, MSSR and MSCB are primarily discussed from the perspective of donors and their implementing partners. In consequence, local agency in these processes remains empirically and theoretically underexplored. On the other hand, addressing this lack of attention to the role of the locals in bringing about changes to the original agenda would allow for a better understanding of whether, and to what degree, the agenda for maritime security is in practice locally owned.

As my research suggests, true local ownership should incorporate local ideas, norms and practices in the construction of maritime security agendas. However, in the absence of such an inclusive strategy for maritime security, the process of hybridisation (which challenges to a certain extent embedded ideas, established interests and institutions) is more palatable to the local actors. To this end, hybridity provides a realistic solution to an externally designed policy confronted with resistance from local stakeholders. Going further, my research also shows that when the implementation of the agenda in the host country reaches deadlock, hybridisation does not occur, leading to possible withdrawal of the external programme of assistance in MSCB. These findings are significant because they demonstrate the exercise of local agency in distorting, subverting, and adapting the original agenda for local context and
priorities, and in certain circumstances even forcing external actors to abandon development interventions where a compromised cannot be achieved.

There are five main sections to this chapter. The first section establishes the context by drawing on the literature on global governance and the securitisation theory, both of which help explain the agenda setting processes at different stages. The second section situates this research within the literature on the maritime security/blue economy debate. Section three analyses the emerging literature on MSSR. The fourth section explores the nascent literature on MSCB, which demonstrates that it is a new phenomenon that is still in the experimental stage. The final section is twofold: firstly, it reviews the relevant aspects of the literature on the liberal peace project; and, secondly, goes on to review the debate on the concept of hybridisation as a theoretical lens for analysing the trio-disciplines of peace-building, state-building, and capacity-building; as a solution to the weaknesses of the liberal peace agenda.

2.1 Agenda setting stages: literature on global governance and securitisation

The agenda-setting stages of the contemporary maritime security programme for the Horn of Africa have received little attention in the academic literature. Scholars such as Guilfoyle (2008) and Smith (2017) trace this agenda back to the UNSC Resolution 1816 to demonstrate the securitisation of the ocean. However, to help explain why the outcome of the UNSC's intervention focused on liberal forms of intervention in the Horn of Africa rather than the imperative for local context, it is necessary to contextualise and locate the current study within the larger literature on both global governance and the securitisation theory.

2.1.1 Global governance literature

The literature on global governance sheds light on the exclusionary membership policy of the UNSC forum as well as its exclusive powers to determine international security matters. Imber (2006, p. 328) notes that the UNSC has an extraordinary capacity to securitise matters and thereby dramatize the rules-based international order. This then allows security actors to justify international intervention – in the form of a UNSC resolution. Lee (2011, p. 406) argues that the UNSC’s legitimacy – the justification behind its acceptance of political power – for determining international security matters remains unquestionable. In addition, international perception of the Council’s legitimacy enhances compliance with its resolutions (Hurd 2008, p. 201). The UNSC has economic, diplomatic, and political leverage to force
implementation of its resolutions at a regional level. Thus, regional institutions have typically been reduced to playing a supportive role in implementing UNSC resolutions. In this context, the African Union (AU) is relegated to a secondary role (Hettne and Söderbaum 2006, p. 227). Welz (2013, p. 426) points out that the AU’s interaction with the UNSC has involved the deployment of UN troops in Burundi (2003) and the hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur (since 2007). Williams and Boutellis (2014) examine the challenges facing UN-AU cooperation on peace and security issues, with a particular focus on Somalia.

The exclusivity and elitism of the UNSC forum means that permanent members, such as France and the United Kingdom, set the agenda for international peace and security (Morris 2000, p. 265). As a result, an elite group of states have the remit to determine matters that have global security implications. A case in point is the UNSC Resolution 1816 passed in 2008. This resolution authorised military intervention into the Horn of Africa maritime space in order to combat piracy. France – a permanent member – used its political clout to get the issue onto the Council’s agenda, following the hijacking of the French yacht Le Ponant in 2008 (Smith 2017, p. 219). In other words, France used the UNSC as a platform for framing the situation in Somalia – piracy included – as a threat to international peace and security. This move added new urgency to the piracy situation, which had become an intractable problem by that point.

However, the locals did not share external actors’ sole concern about piracy. Policymakers in Africa, as a whole, have taken a more developmental approach to security at sea, with emphasis on the blue economy in order to address prevalent socio-economic issues (AU 2014; Adewumi 2020). Indeed, the Horn of Africa has come to see the maritime security agenda, as established at the UNSC, as eschewing development (the revitalisation of the blue economy) in favour of security at sea (Egede 2016, p. 1). The tension between an externally designed comprehensive strategy for maritime security and local ideas, norms and practice, which leads to contestation, conflict, and friction, is a recurring theme in my research.

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6 The Concept Paper for the Sustainable Blue Economy Conference held in Nairobi in 2018 defines the blue economy as “sustainable use and conservation of the oceans, seas, lakes, rivers and other water resources. These resources present a development front with immense potential for contributing to sustainable and inclusive development”.
2.1.2 The securitisation literature

Over the past two decades, the Copenhagen School (CS) rose to prominence within the scholarly debate in security studies. The CS outlines the necessary conditions for a securitisation process to succeed. Firstly, such a process begins with the basic idea of security as a ‘speech act’ (Stritzel 2007, p. 360), which is performed by a securitising actor (Floyd 2021, p. 81). The securitising actor creates a discourse on an issue, which must be presented as an existential threat – a threat to the existence of something valued, namely the referent object (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 36). It is the framing of an issue as an existential threat that constitutes to the securitisation move (McInnes and Rushton 2013, p. 81). This process is facilitated if it can be linked to a matter that is already being viewed as being a security concern (Brown et al. 2018). Secondly, those making the ‘speech act’ must be recognised as having the authority to securitise due to the position they hold. Singh and Bedi (2016, p 442) point out that in the context of piracy in the Horn of Africa, actors with authority to securitise have included the UNSC. Finally, the securitisation must be accepted by an audience whose recognition makes an issue a security concern; therefore as Buzan states: “the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effect” (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 25). The CS, therefore, focuses on analysing the declarations made by actors in a position of authority, such as the UNSC, and examining how they set the political or security agenda. The section that follows examines the literature that has used the concept of securitisation toanalyse maritime matters as a security issue.

The securitisation of migration has been well-documented (Bourbeau 2011; Huysmans 2000; McDonald 2011). In addition, a number of scholars have used the concept of securitisation (as developed by Wæver 1993, Lispchutz 1995, Buzan et al. 1998) to help explain and critically analyse the securitisation of piracy in the Horn of Africa. Bueger (2015, p. 164) examines how some issues in the maritime security agenda are securitised through the lens of securitisation theory, which allows for the identification of the securitising actor, the issues that have been securitised, and the referent object. To this end, Vreŷ (2011, p. 55) examines the UNSC’s securitisation of piracy in the Horn of Africa. Lehr (2009, p. 128) notes how regional maritime crime in this region was turned into an international security agenda by external actors, driven by concerns about the escalation of piracy in this region. Vreŷ (2010, p. 122) notes that a contributory factor to the global security concern about piracy was the disruption of vital shipping lanes through the Gulf of Aden, which had implications for the
international community. Percy and Shortland (2013) notes that piracy was securitised because it posed a serious threat to the shipping sector, thereby affecting all states. In this context, the notion of securitisation for agenda-setting purposes (as developed by Vuori 2008, p.1) has particular saliency especially when examining the role of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the securitisation of piracy in the Horn of Africa.

As a result, piracy was securitised and subsequently placed high on the international security agenda by external states impacted by disruptions to the smooth flow of international trade on which their respective national economies relied (Lehr 2013, p. 104). This process paved the way for the militarisation of the region’s maritime space by the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Lehr 2013, p. 111). Germond and Smith (2009, p. 573) point out that the EU naval force “exercises a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence on the high seas and within another state’s territorial waters [that is Somalia]” so as to preserve the EU’s vested interests. Oliveira (2018, p. 507) argues that the securitisation of maritime crime (piracy) as a threat to international peace and security “creat[ed] the conditions for a more robust, intrusive and institutionalised forms of intervention that can contribute to stabilising purposes of global governance”. On a more global level of securitisation, Struett et al. (2013, p. 102) draw on the macrosecuritization framework for studying the counter-piracy policies formulated and implemented in response to the securitisation of piracy in the Horn of Africa as a new global security arrangement.

However, Singh and Bedi (2016, p. 433) provide a critique of the counter-piracy initiatives, which they argue marry the ‘liberal state-building project’ with ‘indigenous mechanisms of authority and governance’ along the Horn of Africa. Winn and Lewis (2017, p. 2121) take a more national perspective on this debate, pointing out that “all EU actions have preferred military and counter-insurgency approaches to the issue of Somali security over dealing with existing land-based development problems”. Bueger (2014, p. 10) notes that while external actors prioritise enforcement at sea, economic development is of prime importance to local stakeholders.

More recently, other maritime threats have been securitised. For example, the securitisation of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing can be seen through the “commitment both in rhetoric and resources allocated” (Österblom et al. 2011, p. 261). Local actors, concerned about food insecurity and the physical wellbeing of coastal communities, frame maritime security as illegal fishing and trafficking in humans and weapons (Okafor-Yarwood
et al. 2020; Voyer et al. 2018). Indeed, Vreÿ (2013, p. 1) identifies one of the shortcomings of securitisation policies as focusing just on piracy, implying a “limited problem-solving” strategy, whereas piracy is emblematic of broader maritime threats to maritime security. Thus, security can have different meanings in different contexts (Balzacq and Guzzini 2015, p. 99).

On the whole, the literature that uses the securitisation concept to analyse the emergence of piracy in the Horn of Africa as a security issue shows how piracy rose to the top of the international security agenda. Analysing the UNSC’s role in the securitisation of piracy is critical to understanding how maritime crime was elevated to a threat to international peace and security against the backdrop of the instability in Somalia. However, be that as it may, this sole focus on the UNSC neglects the collective securitisation of piracy and armed robbery by regional actors. Indeed, maritime security still remains undertheorized (Bueger and Edmunds 2017, p. 1296). To this end, one notable area that merits theorisation is the collective securitisation (as undertaken by regional actors) of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean. This process resulted in the first-ever framework for maritime security governance, namely the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC).

Therefore, the present research addresses this gap in security studies, adopting the concept of collective securitisation (as developed by Haacke and Williams 2008 and refined by Sperling and Webber 2017). Security challenges such as piracy have no national boundaries, so “one of the primary functions of a ‘region’ is to establish cooperation to tackle transnational security challenges that require a regional, if not global, solution” (German 2016, p. 13). Thus, this study will dissect the interactions of threat, referent object, audience and the securitising actor, through the lens of collective securitisation, in order to shed light on the social process that led to the creation of the DCoC and the so-called Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC. As Lake and Morgan (2010, p. 6) argue, the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as a level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs.

Collective securitisation was first used in the literature on regional security complexes (RSCs) to describe the process of collectively designating an issue as a security threat (Buzan et al. 2003, p. 57). Understanding the security relations between states with interests in the Horn of Africa maritime space requires a regional level of analysis. Lake and Patrick (1997,
p. 7) point out that following on from the Cold War era, “greater responsibility now falls on local states to manage conflicts” because “regions are a substantially more important venue of conflict and cooperation than in the past”. The regional analysis is predicated on the idea that one or more member states of a regional organisation initiate a securitisation move, which then galvanises other members into action. As Haacke and Williams describes

*It is possible to conceive of securitization within a regional arrangement as involving one or more securitizing actors within that arrangement identifying a particular development or issue as an existential threat to a security referent, making relevant validity claims, and finding a receptive audience among other regional actors (Haacke and Williams 2008, p. 785).*

Haacke and Williams were the pioneers of the concept of collective securitisation. They first applied it to the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations because – according to them – ‘transnational challenges’ “… are more concerning to decision makers in these regions than state-based threats” (Haacke and Williams 2008, p. 776). In a recent intervention, Sperling and Webber (2017, p. 21) sought to explicate the relationship between the securitising actor and the audience when multiple state actors undertake securitisation collectively, within an international institution. They argue that the relationship between the securitising actor and the audience is not one of speaker and listener – rather, collective securitisation occurs through an interactional process in which the organisation gains assent from member states (Sperling and Webber 2017, p. 21). As a result, the salient feature of the collective securitisation is that it spotlights (to some extent) the audience of a securitisation process.

The notion of audience in a securitisation process has already been extensively problematised, both on a theoretical and an empirical level, in the literature on the CS of securitisation theory. This has shown that the audience is a major determinant in the success of a securitisation process. When actors in positions of authority construct a threat to security at sea, such as piracy, the process of securitisation begins, awaiting the audience’s acceptance of such a move. Buzan et al.(1998, p. 25) give a broad outline of the role of the audience by stating that “the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such (it must) gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures...”. The audiences that responded to the UNSC’s securitisation move in the context of piracy in the Horn of Africa were primarily external players, rather than local actors who are also affected by the securitisation process. On the one hand, securitisation is
framed as “an essentially intersubjective process” (Buzan et al. 1998 p. 30). From this vantage point, the triggering of the process requires a shared understanding of the ‘existential threat’ to a ‘referent object’ between the securitising actor and the audience. This then would lead to the audience ultimately giving approval to the securitisation move. Emmers (2017) points out that “securitisation thus refers to the classification of and consensus about certain phenomena, persons, entities as existential threats requiring emergency measures”.

On the other hand, the identity of the audience of a securitising move is unspecified in this process. The audience is defined as “those the securitising act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issues” (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 41). However, such a definition overlooks some of the nuances of maritime security where multiple actors, both external and local, have a stake in security at sea. McDonald (2008, P. 573) argues that how some voices are empowered or marginalised in defining security and threat is contextual and it is this that the CS ignores. Indeed, when the UNSC's securitisation move is considered in context, there are multiple potential, relevant audiences – other than external actors – such as regional policymakers, maritime commercial actors, coastal and fishing communities, all of which are affected by the process differently. The lack of clarity as to who constitutes the relevant audience in the CS of securitisation theory has attracted scholarly criticism.

There is a dichotomy between the CS’s emphasis on the role of the audience in the securitisation process and the lack of defining characteristics of such a target audience as Balzacq describes it:

Although the CS points out that a ‘significant audience’ must concur with the securitizing actor (who speaks ‘security’) for a referent subject, i.e. the threatening event to be securitized—the nature and status of that audience—remains unaccounted for (Balzacq, 2005, p. 173).

Similarly, Salter (2008, p. 324) notes that the interplay between the securitising move and the audience’s assent to it needs explicating because “it is precisely the dynamics of this acceptance, this resonance, this politics of consent that must be unpacked”. Going further, others have questioned the extent and life cycle of a securitised move. Dunn (2007, p. 26) argues that “it remains largely unclear which audience has to accept what argument, to what degree, and for how long”. As a result, the theory fails to explain why the UNSC did not present stakeholders from the Horn of Africa, who were directly affected by the securitisation
process, as relevant audiences. On a practical level, the CS’s blind spot in terms of audience specificity has implications for applying the notion of securitisation to empirical research. Vaughn (2009, p. 273) argues “the omission of detailed criteria for recognizing and delimiting the audience weakens empirical research as the audience plays such an important role for securitization”. As a result, the identification of the audience in practice becomes problematic (Bright 2012, p. 864). However, Williams (2008, p. 7) notes that in the context of nondemocratic countries, the relevant audience could just be the security apparatus, such as the military and the security services. In such cases, the securitisation theory would preclude relevant non-state actors from being considered as relevant audiences.

2.2 Locating the study in the maritime security/blue economy nexus

Maritime security and the blue economy are inextricably linked. This is because the maritime space presents both challenges of insecurity at sea and opportunities for the harnessing of blue growth (Bueger et al. 2021, p. 5). From this perspective, these policy areas overlap with each other. Potgieter (2018, p. 51) argues that if blue growth is premised on the sustainable exploitation of ocean resources, then maritime security provides protection against threats to sustainability, such as environmental degradation. Indeed, security at sea is an enabler of development. Atri and Bohler-Mulleris (2018, p. 3) point out that the maintenance of peace and security in the maritime arena is a necessary prerequisite for the promotion of the blue economy. Similarly, Bueger and Edmunds (2017, p. 1299) note that the blue economy necessitates the provision of maritime security to safeguard against threats to sectors, such as shipping and fisheries. Van Wyk (2015, p. 155) concurs that a blue economy-focused initiative cannot thrive in an environment plagued by maritime security concerns, and suggests that actors should consider the threat environment when thinking about blue growth. Voyer et al. (2018b, p. 28) identify commonalities of interest between maritime security and the blue economy. According to these scholars, maritime security protects freedom of navigation, on which international trade hinges, as well as marine resources within national jurisdictions, thereby creating favourable conditions for blue growth to occur in coastal states. As Klein (2011, p. 7) puts it, “the economic importance of living and non-living resources has also meant that states wish to protect not only the resources themselves but also information about those resources”. Because of the economic potential in areas under their maritime jurisdictions, littoral states’ policy priorities include governing the oceans, which
encompasses security and development (Bateman 2016, p. 5). Thus, maintaining maritime security is necessary for vibrant socioeconomic development.

However, the securitisation of the ocean space has potential ramifications for the relationship between littoral and user states, as well as for international security. For example, the process of securitisation could present a geopolitical rivalry in the maritime environment. The potential for a geopolitical tension at sea is the focus of Percy's (2018, p. 609) analysis. She points out that protecting a littoral state’s maritime resources is a component part of national security, but at the same time user states’ ability to safeguard maritime trade routes ensures economic security nationally. Strachan (2013, p. 153) explains why user states have a vested interest in freedom of navigation in more distant maritime spaces: “mercantilism, the argument that states control of overseas trade was vital to national wealth and national security, connected the protection of shipping and sea routes to governmental policy”. The significance of trade and the obvious security problems posed by maritime crime has made the provisions of maritime security and geopolitical dimensions crucial pillars of maritime strategies of the Western hemisphere (Percy 2016, p. 155). Huang (2018, p. 277) observes that China’s business relations with Djibouti are key to Beijing’s maritime strategy (Huang 2018, p. 277). Indeed, there has recently been a proliferation of strategies developed by maritime nations to deal with security governance at sea – both within and beyond national jurisdiction (Bueger et al. 2020, p. 6).

The relationship between maritime security and the blue economy has become, to some extent, the focus of empirical research. On a policy level, Menzel (2018, p. 166) notes that the revision to the DCoC – the Jeddah Amendment – represents an attempt to link the combating of maritime crime to the revitalisation of the blue economy. The Amendment calls upon signatory states to develop national strategies and regulatory frameworks for the reinvigoration of the blue economy at a national level to address socio-economic concerns of the regional states (Brits and Nel 2018, p. 230). On a practical level, Bueger and Wivel (2018, p. 182) point out that Seychelles has become the leading exemplar of the nexus between maritime security and the blue economy through achieving crossover success in these complex issue areas. This has enhanced the country’s international standing as a promoter of sustainable development of ocean resources (Bueger and Wivel 201, p. 171). Malcolm and Murday (2017, p. 36) provide a complimentary analysis to shed light on how Seychelles and Mauritius constructed a sustainable blue economy narrative that has been an
important driving force behind endeavours to interlink maritime security and blue economy policies. Maritime security is the anchor of the sustainable exploitation of ocean resources, given that sustainability is at the heart of the blue economy initiative (Okafor-Yarwood et al. 2020, p. 1). Vreÿ et al. (2021, p. 99) note that blue growth is the flagship of the South African government’s maritime security agenda, the so-called ‘Operation Phakisa’. McCabe (2019, p. 332) observes that initially, Kenya focused on enhancing policing at sea and judicial capacity-building on land as a measure to deal with the prosecution and imprisonment of suspect pirates in the region. However, the containment of piracy in the region ushered in ideas and policies on blue growth, which led to the country becoming an advocate of the blue economy through hosting the International Blue Economy Conference (SBEC) in 2018 (Mboce and McCabe 2021, pp. 171-172). Okafor-Yarwood et al. (2020, p. 1) highlight an important facet of Africa's blue economy debate, namely coastal communities as key stakeholders. Barbesgaard (2018, p. 130) points out that “the blue growth envisions ‘triple-benefit’ solutions, where everybody supposedly wins: coastal communities, the environment and investors”. To put it differently, economic inclusion lies at the heart of a sustainable BE. These scholars are united through the common denominator of maritime security/blue economy nexus. In other words, their core argument is that maritime security and the blue economy are two sides of the same coin.

2.3 Reforming maritime security sectors

There is no agreed-upon definition of what maritime security sector reform (MSSR) entails in practice. Ryan (2013, p. 179) defines MSSR through the issues that form part of the reform programme. He notes that MSSR is the composition of “key law enforcement agencies together with military forces and civilian administration” which are a component part of land-based security sector reform. This approach suggests that MSSR is an extension of mainstream security sector reform. Edmunds (2014) takes an institutionalist approach, focusing on institution building in response to weak maritime security governance created by state failure. He argues that institutional vacuum in the state apparatus acts as a spur to the process of MSSR, which “… sets out to meet these gaps in security governance by strengthening or rebuilding local institutions” Edmunds (2014, p. 2). A practical application lens of MSSR analyses the type of activities that implementing partners undertake under the banner of MSSR. For example, Bueger (2015, p. 38) who adopts this approach notes that “the prosecution programme, notably UNODC’s work, has a more long-term orientation and is
geared towards maritime security sector reform and the rule of law”. The practice of MSSR implies that it entails international assistance in judicial reform to facilitate mechanisms for retribution and deterrence against crimes committed at sea. In this context, Mboce and McCabe (2021, p. 186) concur that the IMO has provided Kenya with technical support for a whole-of-government approach to MSSR.

While MSSR as a distinct field has not received substantial treatment, two articles stand out as being particularly dedicated to this area. Firstly, Ryan's (2013) article on ‘zones and routes: Securing a western Indian Ocean’ analyses the US blueprint for MSSR. It concludes that there is more emphasis on the policing of the maritime domain over the revitalisation of the blue economy (Ryan 2013, p. 173). Secondly, according to Vreÿ et al.'s (2021, p. 107), the most notable reform programme for South Africa’s maritime sectors is 'Operation Phakisa,' a reform agenda heavily influenced by economic development. Several scholars have also mentioned MSSR in passing elsewhere. Bueger et al. (2020, p. 231) discuss the subject in an article that examines the international burgeoning maritime security capacity building activity, comparing the comprehensive nature of the reform process to that of land-based security sector reform. Vreÿ (2017, p. 359) explains why a holistic approach to MSSR is preferred, stating that “the transformation of multiple maritime sectors is required to promote or benefit from cooperation”. In other words, an all-encompassing MSSR opens up several avenues for international cooperation, particularly given the transnational nature of illicit maritime activities, which necessitates cooperation on multiple fronts.

However, the geopolitical dimension of MSSR may be a barrier to effective international cooperation. To think otherwise would be to ignore states' proclivity to pursue narrow vested interests (Duarte and de Barros 2019, p. 7). The Horn of Africa is a case in point, where regional states pursue MSSR in critical infrastructure and port developments influenced by geography in order to advance national interests. As Bueger and Larsen describe, these geopolitical developments are taking place on the African side of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden:

*Where authorities in the Horn of Africa are currently partnering with shifting constellations of external public/private actors to pursue policy goals closer to the state apparatus, such as the construction of deep-water ports or hosting new military bases (Bueger and Larsen 2020, p. 155).*
Meanwhile, Meester et al. (2018, p. 27) zero in on the external drivers of the geopolitical dynamics in the region, arguing that “…the most crucial element that brings Gulf capital to the shores of northeast Africa is geopolitical”. The geostrategic location of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has propelled MSSR in this maritime space into the national priorities of external users that rely on the smooth flow of trade between Europe and the Far East. It is in this context that China’s infrastructure investment in Djibouti lies “…at the very core of China’s plan to promote its maritime strategy” (Huang 2018, p. 277). Indeed, Djibouti serves as a gateway for China to pursue its global and military ambitions while also safeguarding its economic interests. This development helps explain China's large-scale investment in MSSR in Djibouti (Dube 2016, p. 4). Thus, international support for MSSR in the Horn of Africa falls into two categories: traditional EU foreign aid and Chinese financial assistance aimed at tapping into the region's expanding market. The latter adds a geopolitical dimension to the reform process. This dimension has given rise to conflicting geopolitical forces both within and outside the region.

The conflicting geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa waters have resulted in global competition for regional influence, most notably in Djibouti – which has become an international hub of military bases. Perennial adversaries, such as the US and China have military bases stationed in Djibouti (Cabestan 2020, p. 731). Yet, the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) upholds freedom of navigation for both littoral and user states in the Horn of Africa, as it does in all maritime spaces except internal waters, where the coast state has absolute sovereignty (Klein 2011, p. 12). The presence of a naval base might achieve some geopolitical posturing, but it does not keep non-traditional threats at bay. The preparation and planning of maritime crime happens on land and often in remote areas, which then affects security at sea (Winn and Lewis 2017, p. 2112). Thus, threats to seaborne trade in this arena come not from foreign military bases, but from non-traditional threats, such as piracy and maritime terrorism.

The regional reaction to external attempts to gain a foothold in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden through MSSR is the focus of Gebreegzhabhere’s analysis. He points out that the “…Ethiopian government has intensified its efforts to diversify its maritime outlets to reduce its overwhelming dependence on Port Djibouti” (Gebreegzhabhere 2018, p. 29). Cannon and Rossiter (2017, p. 2) turn their attention to the region's emerging geopolitical competition as a means of influencing the power balance in the Horn of Africa. They note that Ethiopia’s
investment in the development of the Port of Berbera represents the country’s “…bid to ascend to the top of the region’s local hierarchy” (Cannon and Rossiter 2017, p. 2). As a result, conflicting geopolitical forces in the region have given rise to MSSR, which is motivated by competition for influence and ports among actors outside the region. This situation has, in turn, engendered an undercurrent of rivalry, mistrust and division between regional states.

2.4 Building capacity for maritime security

The concept of capacity building has been dogged by a definitional problem. The literature on development studies suggests that capacity building has become fashionable in policy circles. However, what it actually entails remains ambiguous. This indicates that the concept has become a key buzzword to describe certain types of international activities, but lacks coherence (Eade 2007, pp. 631-632). Going further, Kühl (2009, p. 551) argues that, through the lens of sociological studies of organisational fashion, international organisations formulate concepts such as capacity building as a defensive mechanism for reinventing their core activities. Despite the fact that the definition of capacity building is contested, the concept has appeal for donors and their implementing partners due to the perception that increased capacity in the security sector improves service delivery (Denney and Valters 2015, p 4).

The origins of capacity building activities can be traced back to international development interventions. Following independence from colonial rules, capacity building marked the start of a new era of development through technical assistance to previously colonised states. As Webster (2011, p. 250) observes, capacity building “seemed a fair and non-colonial way of development through skill sharing, promising continued links between North and South after the end of colonialism on the basis of cooperation rather than exploitation”. Technical assistance was meant to ensure a fairly smooth transition to decolonisation (Webster 2009,Webster 2011). Thus, this form of international support took root in development assistance practices (Bueger and Tholens 2021, p. 22). Meanwhile, the scope of the beneficiaries of capacity building projects widened to include the societies of recipient states, with the aim of turning the assistance into a participatory process.
The rationale behind this shift in approach was to allow the counterparts to make inputs into the design phase of international programmes in practice, as Eade notes:

_The ‘early origins’ of capacity building ‘lay in the belief that the role of an engaged outsider is to support the capacity of local people to determine their own values and priorities, to organise themselves to act upon and sustain these for the common good, and to shape the moral and physical universe that we all share_ (2007, p. 632).

There are two dimensions to the evolution of capacity building – both as the provision of technical assistance and as ways and means to empower recipient states and societies. These were brought into line with a new narrative about aid as partnership, governed by the principle of ownership (Abrahamsen 2004, Donais 2009). This then set the agenda for international assistance in which the counterpart would own the capacity building processes. Venner (2015, p. 85) points out that “capacity building has thus become something that any development assistance organization must do if it is conducting its programmes according to the current ‘state of the art’. However, it was not until the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, that security became an important facet of capacity building activities. Thus, international attention focused on failed and fragile states, during which time a nexus of security and development discourse emerged. This was the beginning of a new international agenda for state building, with a focus on capacity gaps in development and security sectors (Hameiri 2009, p. 55). In consequence, capacity building is now seen as the panacea for some of the challenges presented by the international system (Bueger and Tholens 2020, p. 22). However, maritime security capacity building (MSCB) is a relatively new phenomenon.

From the onset, the process of MSCB started as a regional endeavour (McCabe 2020, p. 131). A lack of a common position on regional security was a contributory factor to regionalising international assistance in this area. Stein (2009, p. 14) notes that “each country has had historically divergent strategies, politics and relations with donors that have affected how the orthodox strategy has been implemented”. The DCoC and the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC, as discussed above, have served as the foundation for a regional approach to MSCB. However, this instrument did not emerge in a vacuum. The lessons learned from the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), informed the formulation of the DCoC, which solely addressed piracy and armed robbery in Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Menzel 2018, p. 152). Khalid (2009,
p. 433) points out that piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Strait of Malacca were instrumental in moulding security-centric maritime capacity building. In this context, external actors focused their efforts on two processes: first, ensuring enforcement status at sea in the Horn of Africa – driven by an attempt to bring piracy under control – and second, building the capacity of the region’s criminal justice system to ensure that pirate suspects face justice on land (Bueger et al. 2011, pp. 360-361). International support for the rehabilitation of courts and prisons as well as support for strengthening governance in the maritime domain overshadowed sustainable development ashore (Bueger 2012, p. 17). In other words, international assistance in maritime capacity building had a security skew from the very beginning as a measure to deal with the threat posed by piracy.

This security-oriented strategy, however, was more appealing to some Horn of Africa nations, who came to perceive piracy as a transnationally shared problem that posed a danger to regional states that lacked or had insufficient capacity to secure their maritime territories. Some scholars note that this narrative about the security-centric strategy resonated with countries in the Western Indian Ocean, such as Kenya and Seychelles who took the lead on the land-based law enforcement component of the anti-piracy measures (Vreÿ 2013; Marie and Bueger 2021; Mboce and McCabe 2021). The proliferation of international programmes for capacity building was in response to the emergence of piracy in the region. While developing these programmes, because of the lack of lessons to draw on, the region has become “…an international laboratory for capacity building projects” (Bueger et al. 2020, p. 132). However, each nation in the Horn of Africa has a different capacity deficit, making a one-size-fits-all approach impossible to adopt throughout the region.

Thus, responding to specific country circumstances, such as those in Somalia, necessitates a strong international presence in the host country. Bueger (2012, p. 27) argues that “investing in onshore measures in Somalia requires close proximity to Somali actors, partnership, a direct form of engagement and deep immersion and commitment on the village level”. Such a move requires logistical efforts, which might help explain the EU’s decision to relocate the moribund EUCAP NESTOR mission from Djibouti to Mogadishu, Somalia. The regional mission was renamed EUCAP Somalia with a broader mandate than its predecessor, in an attempt to respond to the capacity challenges on the ground in Somalia (Ejdus 2017b, p. 476). Bueger et al. (2020b, p. 240) argue that the mission represents a policy area that has been a learning curve because the shift in focus “… ameliorated some of the most significant
pathologies of the original mission and demonstrated an emergent capacity for reflexivity in
the face of failure and a willingness to reorganise and refocus activity in response to lessons
learned”. Jacobsen (2017, p. 237) makes a complementary point – stemming from her
research on capacity building in the Gulf of Guinea – that it is important to take a step back
and assess the underlying reasons for a holistic approach to maritime capacity building and
the challenges involved in putting a comprehensive agenda into practice.

The first attempt to impose coherence on the field of MSCB has been undertaken by Bueger
et al. (2020e) – “Capacity Building for Maritime Security: The Western Indian Ocean
Experience”. This empirical investigation casts a wider net, drawing together – to a certain
extent – the different threads of the maritime security agenda through an in-depth study of
how littoral states in the Western Indian Ocean have addressed the capacity gaps in this
maritime space (Bueger et al. 2020, p. v). In a similar vein, Alcock (2021, p. 251) in his case
study of Somalia shows that the country is an example of international actors’ failure to stand
back and take stock of capacity building provision. On a theoretical level, Bueger and
Tholens (2021) seek to theorise MSCB through the lens of practice theory, which focuses on
the context in which knowledge of capacity building is created. Hence, the process of
capacity-building is informed by interactions between MSCB implementers and their
counterparts in the recipient state (Bueger and Tholens 2021, p. 24). Edmunds and Juncos
(2020) analyse MSCB through the lens of the concept of hybridity, drawing attention to the
contested nature of the process in practice. Meanwhile, Ejdus (2018) uses international
governmentality as a lens – a concept first developed by Michel Foucault – to argue that
MSCB is implemented as a process of responsibilisation. The conclusion that can be drawn
from the literature reviewed above is that the policy and practice of MSCB is nascent. The
process has been implemented by trial and error, providing lessons learned for donors and
their implementing partners.

2.5 From liberal peace to hybrid peace

The extant literature on peace-building in conflict-affected environments has already been
extensively and critically analysed. This literature shows that for over two decades,
international peace-building practice has been shaped by the so-called “liberal peace”
approach (Richmond and Visoka 2021, p. 613). This approach posits that the prospect for
lasting peace in post-conflict societies lies in the establishment of liberal state institutions and
a market-oriented economy (Visoka 2012; Uesugi et al. 2021; de León and Tager 2016). This postulate formed the basis for international interventions designed to promote the new liberal peace through either in-country missions (by donors themselves) or in partnership with international organisations, such as UN agencies, as implementers (Paris 2004, p. 5). The liberal peace-building project developed as an offshoot from “…the preexisting local and global inequalities” and sets out to preserve “..the international status quo, an imbalance that does little to represent the local context” (Richmond 2012, p. 361). This project’s roll-out in war-torn societies was part of “the globalisation of a particular model of domestic governance – liberal market democracy – from the core to the periphery of the international system” (Paris 2002, p. 638). Thus, the liberal peace strategy was conceptually connected with state-building, through an understanding of the state as Western Weberian state, and was operationalised by developing the state and their capabilities (Richmond and Visoka 2021, p. 614).

Donors turned to the UN as a crucial implementation partner in extending the peace-building initiative in conflict-affected nations. Indeed, the UN was the first organisation to take on the responsibility of putting the new liberal peace aspirations into action (Paris 2004, p. 2). The UN describes peace-building as creating the right conditions for “basic security, deliver[ing] peace dividends, shor[ing] up and build[ing] confidence in the political process, and strengthen[ing] core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts, thereby beginning to lay the foundations for sustainable development” (Assembly and Council 2016, p. 1). The emphasis in such a process is on enhancing local ownership during or immediately following a conflict. However, the liberal approach to peace-building in conflict-affected societies has had limited success in producing sustainable results, due to the complexities of civil wars in host states. This shortcoming is compounded by inconsistencies in the norms and practices of the international community (Visoka 2012, p. 23). When introduced to conflict-torn societies, these liberal norms and practices have produced neither stable political structures nor economic development (Nadarajah and Rampton 2015, p. 49). This model proved a “largely unsuccessful attempt to address state fragility and conflict by the emulative modelling of western liberal democracies” (Edmunds et al. 2018, p. 229). The critique of the liberal approach is well documented, as a result of which some scholars “now argue that the idea of a liberal peace is in major crisis or, indeed, already dead” (Kappler 2017, p. 32). Chetail and Oliver (2015) conducted a thorough review of the literature on peace-building, whereas Rigual (2018) concentrated on the ontologies of peacebuilding. In it, he identifies a number
of discourses on the practice and theory of peacebuilding including: (1) economic, (2) liberal, (3) critical, and (4) feminist peace-building. This holistic assessment outlines the current trends in this field, one of which is critical peace-building.

The critical peace-building discourse ushered in new thinking on how the process of peace-building as state-building interventions should be approached. It introduced the notion of the ‘local turn’ (Richmond 2012a; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Richmond and Mitchell 2011). The ‘local turn’ idea is based on the belief that “inclusion and participation can overcome the colonial/imperialistic shape of liberal peacebuilding and strengthen peacebuilding initiatives” (Rigual 2018, p. 159). This approach involves a series of activities that are carried out under the banner of peace-building in order to achieve a particular result depending on the circumstances that form the setting of such an outcome (De Coning 2018, p. 301). In other words, rather than goal-oriented peace-building based on ‘justice’ and ‘legitimacy,’ this is a context-driven process understood from the perspective of the societies affected by it. This is because preconceived Western notions of what constitutes peace are at odds with local expectations and experiences (Richmond 2009, p. 15). Thus, the emergence of the ‘local turn’ seeks to learn lessons from the liberal peace-building failures. Critical scholars, (such as Donais 2008; Donais 2018; and Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013) spotlight the role of the locals in the process of peace-building. These scholars foreground the locals who live and experience the environmental context within which peace-building initiatives occur (Richmond 2015, p. 57). However, the local turn is sometimes conflated with the notion ‘local ownership’ which has become a buzzword in policy circles.

The UN commissioned the Brahimi Report, which places emphasis on local ownership in peace-building efforts. The Report argues that “effective peace-building requires active engagement with the local parties” (UN 2000, p. 23). Ten years later after the publication of this report, local ownership became “not something that is merely desirable or politically correct”, but “an imperative, an absolute essential if peacebuilding is to take root” (UN document 2010, p. 9). Similarly, the EU espouses the belief that local ownership is “inherent in the European approach to international relations” (EU 2008, p. 3). Indeed, the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security policy states that the EU “will pursue locally owned rights-based approaches to the reform of the justice, security and defence sectors” in recipient countries (EU 2016, p. 26).
However, some scholars remain critical, despite the rhetoric about local ownership. Von Billerbeck (2016, p. 1) argues that the UN deviates from “the version of local ownership present in its discourse in order to persevere the achievement of a key operational goal in this case the liberalization of the post-conflict state”. Others have observed an inconsistency between the EU’s rhetoric on local ownership and its crisis and management responses in its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012, Ejdus 2017). Indeed, the EU takes a top-down approach to the notion of local ownership as manifested in EUCAP Somalia mission (Ejdus 2017b, p. 461). Wolff (2018, p. 63) argues that EUCAP Somalia’s predecessor (EUCAP Nestor) suffered from a lack of local buy-in because it “was solely designed by the EU and the operation was authorized before consent from two states in the region”. EU engagement in the host states lacks local consultation at the design stage of its assistant programmes (Eckhard 2016, p. 47). In consequence, Edmunds et al. (2018, p. 14) note that “many of these activities have prioritized forms of external technical and experts approaches over embedded forms of local knowledge, practices and ways of doing things”. Bueger et al. (2020b, p. 239) state that nascent status of maritime capacity building has meant that there has been only a superficial commitment to local ownership of the reform process.

Ultimately, within the policy discourse on local ownership, international donors and peace-builders only have in mind a specific type of local, namely “the local that is part of the Western civil society imaginary while the rest is deemed violent and intolerable” (Richmond 2012a, p. 153). This narrow view of what constitutes local ownership privileges some actors over others, which helps explain resistance from excluded local groups. However, hybridity as a process offers an alternative to the notion of local ownership because it maintains diversity in the locals and, to some extent, promotes inclusiveness.

As the critical peace-building discourse gained traction in the academic literature, a third strand (hybridity) arose as a lens for understanding peace-building and development practices in their context, thereby expanding on the ‘local turn’ (Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012, p. 3). Awareness and engagement with the local context are vital in peace-building efforts because they assist both local and international players better comprehend what it takes to achieve peace, and hence neither player is free of such context (Uesugi et al. 2021, p. 26). Belloni (2012, p. 24) describes the hybridisation process as conflict and friction between the local and international, and it is the very essence of this character of hybridity that creates
opportunities for addressing context-specific peace-building issues. Björkdahl and Höglund (2013, p. 294) attribute this friction to the inherently asymmetric interactions between internationals and locals. Hybridity can also be used as a conceptual lens to identify the hegemonic influence of the liberal peace project in state-building. Peterson (2012, p. 12) points out that “the lens of hybridity allows for both the recognition of hegemony (the external liberal model, which can be characterised as homogenous to a degree) alongside the contextual, heterogeneous specificities of the locale”. Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013, p. 764) take a pluralist approach to the concept of hybridity in order to address the dichotomy between international and local, thereby defining peace as hybrid, multiple and often agonistic. This hybridisation process allows external actors to recognise the strategies of locals who resist both overt and subtle forms of colonisation and domination (Richmond 2015, p. 52). It is in this context that Peterson's (2012, p. 12) emphasis on agency as a key feature in hybridity is relevant “to those seeking to produce more accurate reflections of peace and development interventions”.

The concept of hybridity enjoys a widespread popularity within the twin areas of security sector reform (SSR) and capacity building. A number of scholars have used hybridity as a theoretical lens to examine the processes of SSR and mainstream capacity building. These include (Schroeder et al. 2014, Podder 2013, Schroeder and Chappuis 2014, Schroeder et al. 2014, Bagayoko 2012, Bagayoko et al. 2016). Because of its widespread appeal, Donais (2018) claims that “hybridity that lie at the nexus of local and national ownership will in many ways determine the future of security sector reform”. However, Newby (2017, p. 156) notes that the success of hybridity in SSR depends on when key stakeholders and the local population accept the normative nature of the reform process. To put it another way, the hybridisation process requires a certain amount of give and take, with locals having to accept some types of normativity. Richmond (2015, p. 51) categorises a hybrid process as either positive or negative: positive hybridity represents a compromised solution to a disagreement between local elites and international actors, whereas negative hybridity is “the outsourcing of power and norms from the international to the state or society”. However, such a binary choice does not take into account contestations between international and local actors that result in neither positive nor negative hybridity. Indeed, Belloni (2012, p. 31) seems to be aware of this situation when he states that “… although the peacebuilders’ difficulty of ensuring conformity to their demands testifies to the local ability to manipulate and shape the mechanics of intervention, this subversion of international objectives rarely leads to a
fundamental reassessment of peacebuilding priorities”. However, the existing literature on hybridity does not explicitly/directly account for what might be described as ‘deadlocked’ hybridity, which the current study will explore in chapter eight of this thesis.

Ultimately, different actors, both local and external, may interpret peace-building and development efforts differently, based on their respective ideas, norms and practices. Thus, the mixing and adaptation that occurs in response to these competing local/international ideas, norms, and practices is central to the argument of hybridity as a theoretical lens to analyse peace-building as a state-building intervention. As Lee (2021, p. 597) notes “local resistance and hybrid peace have emerged as useful conceptual frameworks to capture the dynamic interaction between the stakeholders at international and local levels, as well as the forms of peacebuilding that develop as a result”. Thus, hybridity as an approach accounts for both context and local agency in how the locals resist, alter and subvert the liberal peace project and development strategies.
Conclusion

The literature on both global governance and the Copenhagen School (CS) of securitisation theory helps contextualise the agenda-setting stages of the Horn of Africa maritime security programme. It shows that there were practical and theoretical reasons for the failure to represent local stakeholders as relevant audiences in the process. On a practical level, the material on global governance demonstrates that the Horn of Africa did not have significant influence within the UN Security Council (UNSC) in order to integrate the blue economy in the agenda for maritime security. Most authors attribute this obstacle to a lack of representation for the affected region in the UNSC agenda setting platform itself, which is dominated by the permanent members (Hurd 2008; Hettne and Söderbaum 2006; Welz 2013; Williams and Boutellis 2014). On a theoretical level, analysis of the CS model of securitisation shows how agendas relating to threats at sea in the Horn of Africa were constructed and subsequently securitised by the UNSC (Imber 2006; Lehr 2013; Oliveira 2018; Struett et al. 2013). This body of work indicates that the UNSC excluded Horn of Africa stakeholders as relevant audiences in the securitisation process, largely because of a failure in the theoretical model itself to define the nature and status of the target audience. The inference that can be drawn from this ambiguity in the theory is that local agents were unrepresented in the construction of the Horn of Africa maritime security agenda.

However, this theoretical ambivalence about the nature and status of the relevant audience was – to a certain extent – addressed by the collective securitisation dimension, which was first pioneered (by Haacke and Williams 2008 and later explicated by Sperling and Webber 2017). The collective securitisation dimension of the CS model eventually defined the audience as the member states of an international organisation. From this perspective, collective securitisation helps explain the process that resulted in the creation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) under the auspices of the IMO. Herein lies the thesis’s contribution to this theoretical discussion: it shows how regional policymakers’ use of agency influenced a change in governance structure (the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC), but at the same time how the new definition of audience, as provided by the collective securitisation dimension, excluded equally important non-state stakeholders from the process. These stakeholders include commercial maritime actors, and coastal and fishing communities. Thus, while collective securitisation includes some local elites, it overlooks locals at grassroots level as well as the wider civil society.
The importance of the blue economy discourse for the Horn of Africa states has been considered, to a certain extent, in the literature. For example, some academics have investigated the keen interest of the Kenyan government in the blue economy (Mboce and McCabe 2020). Their study provides a useful analysis of how Kenya – a key nation in the region – has addressed the issue of sea-blindness (Mboce and McCabe 2020, p. 164). My research builds on this study empirically and theoretically. On a practical level, it sheds light on a common set of interests among policymakers in the Horn of Africa in the blue economy through document and discourse analyses of the Sustainable Blue Economy Conference (SBEC), held in Nairobi in 2018. On a theoretical level, my research helps explain the Horn of Africa’s new maritime security agenda, which is built around the blue economy, through the lens of hybridity. In other words, the Horn of Africa’s renewed interest in the blue economy remains undertheorized. To address this gap, this thesis presents the SBEC as evidence of regional policymakers’ subversion of the original maritime security agenda established at the UNSC in 2008 through the exercise of agency in resetting the agenda. It will show that the SBEC served as a medium for regional actors to articulate their agenda for maritime security, steering the debate away from the security-centric perspective of the original agenda. In order to dissect this new regional initiative, in which blue growth has a particular salience, this study will consider contextual factors such as socioeconomic and political considerations as well as local agency in subverting the original agenda.

The emerging literature on maritime security sector reform (MSSR) suggests that there is a lack of agreement on the conceptual level (Edmunds 2014; Ryan 2013; Vreÿ et al. 2021). In response, this study offers a conceptual discussion of MSSR through the strategy for reforming Somali MSSR developed by the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and EUCAP Somalia, with the goal of demystifying this concept. MSSR can be viewed as an experimental approach, with proposed reforms being offered to governmental agencies in response to presumed problems that may or may not exist in the recipient country. From this perspective, it could be argued that MSSR is an extension of mainstream security sector reform (SSR), which also adopts a similar approach to the reform process. Abrahamsen (2016, p. 281) argues that SSR is informed by international ‘best practice’. Such practice gives preference to knowledge that is based on a technocratic approach to security (Jackson and Bakrania 2018, p. 11). The argument relating to the state-centric nature of mainstream SSR has already been extensively explored by a number of scholars (Donais...
and Barbak 2021; Ansorg and Gordon 2019; Jackson 2018; Sedra 2018; Jackson and Bakrania 2018). Thus, this chapter examines the extent to which MSSR remains state-centric.

The current research argues that MSSR is predominantly, though not exclusively, state-centric. It builds on existing scholarship (such as Edmunds 2014; Ryan 2013; Vreÿ et al. 2021) but also this study argues that MSSR is not solely state-oriented, drawing on two projects that fuse state and relevant non-state actors in the reform process to produce a hybrid agenda for MSSR. These projects (which are examined in chapter six of this thesis) decentre, to some extent, the state in MSSR as manifested in their implementation by UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the UN in Somalia.

As a theoretical lens, this study draws on the concept of hybridity. Hybridity has extensively been applied to mainstream SSR: (Schroeder et al. 2014; Podder 2013; Schroeder and Chappuis 2014; Schroeder et al. 2014, Bagayoko 2012; Bagayoko et al. 2016). Indeed, because of this widespread application of this concept to SSR, Donais (2018) argues that “hybridity that lie at the nexus of local and national ownership will in many ways determine the future of security sector reform”. The use of hybridity as a conceptual lens is useful in explaining the process of MSSR in Somalia by identifying the hegemony of international norms and practices in the country’s MSSR process. Peterson (2012, p. 12) argues that “the lens of hybridity allows for the recognition of hegemony (the external liberal model, which can be characterised as homogenous to a degree)”.

There is nascent literature on maritime security capacity building (MSCB), both theoretical and empirical. On a practical level, there are a number of studies that have examined MSCB in the Horn of Africa and beyond. These include: the experiences of MSCB in the Western Indian Ocean (Bueger et al. 2020a); EU engagement in MSCB in the Horn of Africa (Ejdus 2017b); the burgeoning nature of MSCB (Bueger et al. 2020b). On theoretical and conceptual levels, scholars have used a diverse range of theories and concepts to help explain the process of MSCB, such as practice theory (Bueger and Tholens 2021); international governmentality (Ejdus 2018); hybridity (Edmunds and Juncos 2020).

The present research, on the empirical front, suggests that UN agencies typically draw on the liberal peace playbook, seeking to address maritime security capacity gaps in Somalia through institutionalisation in the first instance. However, such a strategy is resisted by both
government elites and local communities. On the theoretical front, I use hybridity as a conceptual lens to help explain a process of change that occurs in the implementation of MSCB in Somalia by UN organisations. My findings suggest that the UN agencies involved with the process of MSSR take, to a degree, an adoptive approach to contestation and conflict during project implementation. This approach allows the fusion of local and external ideas and norms to form a hybrid strategy for MSCB. In order to substantiate this claim, I draw on examples of hybridised projects with varying outcomes, which are implemented by the relevant UN organisations.

Finally, scholars who critically examine the EU crisis and management responses under the auspices of its Common Security and Defence Policy (such as Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012; Ejdus 2017; Edmunds et al. 2018) heavily rely on the notion of local ownership as an analytical lens, drawing on the critical peace-building literature. With the exception of Edmunds and Juncos (2020), who emphasise the contested nature of MSCB processes, i.e. hybridity, the literature on MSCB neglects on the whole hybridity as an outcome of a process.

The current literature on hybrid forms of peace-building presents such a process a solution to the weaknesses in the liberal peace project. These are the oversimplification of the local context and the overlooking of its complexities through the focus on the binary of liberal or illiberal (Peterson 2012). However, hybridity has also been critiqued. Some scholars have pointed out that the concept draws on the same binary issue it aims to rectify, i.e. it provides a lens through which the process of peace-building/MSCB is divided into only two distinct categories: international and local (Albrecht and Moe 2015, p. 2). Others seem to allude to the need for academic rigour in addressing hybrid peace rather than simply focusing on the point at which international and locals meet, interact, and have an effect on each other. For example, Stepputat (2013) points out that if we simply take the argument that different cultural and political institutions and actors interact and shape one another at face value, we do not know whether the debate on hybridity can stands up to scrutiny. Meanwhile, Belloni (2012, p. 31) argues that although local agency in subverting the liberal peace project has impeded its imposition on the local actors “this subversion of international objectives rarely leads to a fundamental reassessment of peacebuilding priorities”.

In order to advance this critique of hybridity, this study will transcend the binary of positive and negative hybridity. Thus, my research will investigate those occasions when hybridity as
a process fails to occur as a result of a deadlock. To put it differently, this is what might be termed ‘deadlocked’ hybridity. This deadlock is caused by conflict and friction between local elites and EUCAP Somalia, which often becomes irreconcilable due to different considerations. For example, the EU predetermines the capacity challenges in Somalia as soft capacity in the form of knowledge transfer, technical assistance, and logistical resources over the actual requirement for infrastructure and equipment in practice. This tension between the aims of the EU and local expectations leads to conflict in the first instance, and ultimately to a deadlock in the absence of a positive or negative hybrid outcome. In consequence, the deadlock forces the EU to reconsider its stance on the programme of assistance, potentially withdrawing the development intervention completely. Having identified the gaps in the existing literature and how this study will contribute to filling these gaps, the following chapter, discusses research methods, and will explain the means of achieving the aims of this study.
3 METHODS: A MULTISCALE CASE STUDY OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

This chapter discusses positionality, the research design, and data analysis. As a point of departure, the chapter clarifies my position in relation to the social and political context of this study, namely the participant groups, which are comprised of elites in government and international organisations. The research design explains the rationale for the chosen qualitative methodology (what it offers, what claims it allows and disallows). Also discussed in this section is the data generated and how it will help answer the research question as well as an acknowledgement of blank spots. The methodology explains the choice of setting and how the context connects with the research question. The reason for selecting the sample is provided. Details on when, where, and how data were generated are also discussed, while explaining the theoretical and conceptual frameworks used. The approach taken to ethical concerns is outlined as well as discussion about risk and mitigating strategies. When it comes to data analysis, the tradition in which the data is analysed is explained, namely the inductive approach. The implications for using this approach are also considered. Finally, an interpretive approach was adopted to make sense of the data generated. There are three main sections to this chapter: section one discusses reflexivity; section two discusses the research design; section two discusses data analysis.

3.1 Reflexivity

One of the salient features of qualitative research is reflexivity. This means that researchers appreciate that their perspective on the phenomenon under study will reflect, in part, their own background and current situation (Schutt 2016, p. 121). Indeed, qualitative research treats the researcher’s interaction with the empirical setting as part and parcel of the overall knowledge production and their impressions and feelings become data in their own right to form part of the interpretation. Thus, researchers’ reflection on their actions and observations in the field, and their impressions and feelings become data in their own right; these form part of the interpretation (Flick 2014, p. 17). In this context, my own positionality as a Somali researcher is relevant. The concept of positionality is used in action research in relation to the researcher’s insider or outsider relationship to the community engaged in the inquiry. Herr and Anderson (2014) discuss the continuum of insider and outsider relationships and define an insider as a researcher who works for or is a member of the participant community, while
an outsider (such as an academic researcher) is seen as a non-member. From this perspective, I was seen as an academic researcher (an outsider), belonging to an overseas institution.

However, wearing my ethnicity hat allowed me to gain access to interviewees for the national case study, both with local elites and their international counterparts. For example, my contacts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Somalia facilitated access to international actors, such as EUCAP Somalia, without which the interview with the head of this mission would have been difficult to secure. Thus, my ethnicity as a Somali played a key role in facilitating access to both local elites and, by extension, their international counterparts. Creswell (2014, p. 186) notes that the background of the researcher can add value in shaping the future direction of the research. Indeed, my background has had an enabling effect on the research process. Dew (2007, p. 435) notes that in “qualitative research, the effect of the researcher is assumed and often reflected upon by the researcher”. My positionality also, to some extent, informed the character of my engagement with the respondents – both international and local.

The character of my engagement with the local elites was one of close rapport; they welcomed me as ‘one of them’, which I attribute to my Somali positionality. Locals were pleased to be interviewed for my study and stated that they wanted their opinions and voices to be heard through someone from the same cultural background. They believed they had little opportunities for having their voices heard in international policymaking. However, the character of my engagement with international actors was mixed. On the one hand, they were neutral and impartial in their representation of actual events. For example, during interviews, there were moments of empathy and understanding for local resistance, particularly why the locals oppose EU funding for soft maritime capacity building, such as mentoring and advising. The EUCAP officials interviewed acknowledged that the mission was not responding to immediate local priorities and needs. On the other hand, international actors expressed frustration at the obstacles put in the way of progress by the locals, such as the lack of continuity of training programmes due to an absence of local interest, as well as an indifference to nourishing knowledge gained. For example, voluntary police cadets recently trained by EUCAP Somalia would take up other jobs where they are paid a salary and abandoned the Somali police service altogether. As a result, EU officials felt locked in a vicious circle: they train new cadets who do not stay on after qualifying and the cycle is repeated. These officials appeared to use the interview as an opportunity to air their
grievances about the lack of headway with the programme, maybe due to my positionality as a Somali researcher with an understanding of Western perspective.

3.2 Research design: qualitative methodology

This study will carry out qualitative research into the extent to which the Horn of Africa maritime security agenda is locally owned. This agenda rose to prominence as a result of an escalation of piracy and its impact on peace and security in this region and beyond, which rattled security actors globally. Schutt (2016, p. 121) notes that qualitative methods have their greatest appeal when we need to explore a new phenomenon. In order to examine whether the agenda for dealing with the phenomenon of piracy in the Horn of Africa was locally driven, an in-depth examination of the degree to which this was the case is required. Thus, the focus is on the ideas, norms and practices that the agenda represents. To make sense of these ideas, the study focuses on the meanings and processes that are associated with the agenda. Harrison and Callan (2013a, p. 116) define qualitative methods in relation to their purpose, that is to help the researcher better understand meaning. Klotz et al. (2008, p. 3) concur that these qualitative methods “are somehow linked to meaning”. This requires the use of methods, such as interviews, and document and discourse analyses to provide insights into how international actors and locals interpret the maritime security agenda.

The logical process of interpreting the agenda from the standpoints of both the international and locals requires using particular facts and examples to form the unit of analysis. This means that this researcher adopts an inductive mode of reasoning. Lamont (2015a, p. 78) observes that “qualitative methods rely on inductive reasoning” (Bryman 2016, p. 78). According to this approach, the researcher begins by gathering data in the first instance and then progresses to organising the data into more abstract units of information (Dew 2007, p. 434). An inductive approach involves working back and forth between the themes and database until the researcher is in a position to organise the study into themes. This type of research design in the initial stages, therefore, is inductive in that it is emergent, flexible and dynamic.

The present study takes an inductive approach as it aims to contribute to wider theoretical debates on two fronts. Firstly, it will discuss collective securitisation of the oceans by policy-makers, and suggest that this process includes government elites while excluding coastal and fishing communities affected by it. In other words, the collective dimension of securitisation
provides a platform for government elites to exercise their agency in agenda setting, while denying the same to commercial maritime actors, as well as fishing and coastal communities. Secondly, through the lens of hybridity, this study sheds light on how the maritime security agenda has undergone a process of change, triggered by local agency in both resetting the original agenda and in subtle resistance to the liberal peace project, such as non-cooperation with international actors. To this end, this research presents a case study, combining regional and national levels of analysis. As part of this study, different forms of data were collected through the use of interviews, and document and discourse analyses. This multiscale approach and integrated methodology were required to piece together a complex picture of the genesis and gestation of the maritime security agenda, as well as the contestation over maritime security and the capacity building required in the Horn of Africa.

Thus, this comprehensive approach to the study has allowed the capturing of the subjective experiences and perspectives of the local actors (both at the elite and community levels) on the maritime security agenda. It was important to identify the meanings that the participants attach to the key themes that shape this thesis. These are: securitisation of the ocean, the notion of hybridity, the blue economy, maritime security as well as security sector reform and capacity building. Creswell (2014, p. 186) notes that these meanings are central to qualitative methodology. For example, themes, such as maritime security and capacity building differ depending on whether they are considered from an international or a local perspective. It was, therefore, important to learn about the phenomenon under investigation (i.e., the agenda for maritime security) from these perspectives.

3.2.1 Theoretical framework

This section discusses the rationale for the theoretical framework selected for the thesis. Methodology entails judgements about theory and perspective, driven by interests, assumptions and purposes (Taylor et al. 2015, p. 14). Two main theoretical perspectives are found in the social sciences: positivism and interpretivism (Creswell 2013, Saldana 2011). On the one hand, positivism aims to ascertain objective facts about social phenomena (Taylor et al. 2015, p. 14). On the other hand, interpretivism seeks to understand social phenomena from the actor’s own experiences, namely the ideas and feelings existing in the actor’s mind (Douglas 2017; Taylor et al. 1992). The divergence between these two theoretical perspectives means that they set out to address different types of problems and seek different
types of answers. Thus, these two approaches require different methodologies. For example, positivists take a natural science approach to reach into the causes of the natural phenomena through methods, such as questionnaires suited to statistical analysis. In contrast, interpretivism seeks understanding through qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews and document analysis, which yield descriptive data. For interpretivists, the motives and beliefs behind people’s actions take centre stage in the research process (Hennink et al. 2020, p. 16). This research will take an interpretivist approach to understanding the particular ways in which the international actors and locals behave as well as their interactions through the lens of specific theories, as discussed below.

The study will draw on theoretical concepts to provide insights into how the maritime security agenda was created and how it has evolved. Some scholars have noted that theoretical positions provide context for the selection of methods (Avis 2003; Carter and Little 2007). From a theoretical point of view, this study is positioned in constructivist thinking as the best-suited strategy to achieve the goal of this research. Lamont (2015a, p. 77) notes that “…constructivist, as a theoretical approach to IR [international relations], often relies upon qualitative techniques to advance constructivist claims about norms…”. It is not uncommon for a qualitative researcher to commence the study with a specific theory or theories in mind. Qualitative researchers broadly operate within theoretical frameworks (Tracy 2012; Ritchie et al. 2013). Garner and Scott (2013, p. 147) emphasise the importance of linking research design to theory because “theoretical foundations lead to a deeper analysis and help us to understand underlying processes, not just the problems of the day”. Thus, the theoretical foundations for this study help to explain the maritime security agenda for the Horn of Africa and the extent to which it has been hybridised by the locals, both at the regional and national levels. A key part of qualitative methodology is the phenomenological perspective. Taylor et al. (2015, p. 21) defines phenomenology as “a research method that emphasizes the study of conscious experiences as a way of understanding the reality around us”.

The phenomenological outlook is closely linked to a wide range of theoretical frameworks. However, qualitative researchers identify in different ways with a particular theoretical perspective, namely social constructivism (constructivism) (Taylor et al. 2015, p. 76). Lamont (2015, p. 76) notes that “constructivist as a theoretical approach to IR, often relies upon qualitative techniques to advance constructivist claims about norms”. There are two
ways in which this research identifies with social constructivism. Firstly, it draws on the collective securitisation dimension of the Copenhagen School (CS) of securitisation theory. This dimension sheds light on a coordinated approach to the exercise of agency by regional policymakers. The nascent research on collective securitisation has extended the securitisation literature to processes in which actors collectively securitise an issue area, such as piracy, within an international institution, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (Haacke and Williams 2008; Sperling and Webber 2017). Analysing the deliberative process of the collective securitisation of piracy and armed robbery by regional actors helps to identify the nature and status of the relevant audience. However, this dimension of the CS of securitisation has its limitations: it includes in its definition of audience some elites, such as policymakers, to the exclusion of coastal communities and the wider civil society.

The second way in which this research identifies with social constructivism is through the concept of hybridity as a theoretical lens. This approach provides insights on how local actors respond to, resist, and ultimately reshape the maritime security agenda through interactions with international actors and institutions (Uesugi et al. 2021, p. 26). Hybridity focuses solely on how local agency has resulted in resistance to a predetermined agenda in the face of the overwhelming weight of the liberal peace project. In this context, a hybrid lens is useful for demonstrating how local actors have significant agency in shaping the domestic environment in which interactions between international interveners and elites in government occur. Thus, local agents hybridise precisely through this process of resistance to external pressures, defined as positive hybridity, rather than simply operating under external subjection, i.e. negative hybridity (Richmond 2015, p. 51).

As a result, these theoretical approaches aid in making sense of the data gathered in the course of this study. Taylor et al. (2015, p. 19) argue that “the goal of qualitative research is to make sure that the theory fits the data and not vice versa”. In other words, a theory is intended to explain the data generated rather than forming the basis for data collection.

3.2.2 Case study selection: a multiscale case study

This thesis presents a multiscale case study of the Horn of Africa. To this end, this study examines the maritime security agenda within and across contexts of the Horn of Africa. Ragin and Becker (1992, p. 192) draw attention to the importance of identifying “what is this a case of”? The Horn of Africa was chosen as a case study because it provides a broad
context within which the maritime security agenda can be studied as a specific research topic. It follows that this study will analyse the different facets of the agenda both at the regional (the Horn of Africa) and national (Somalia) levels. Levy points out that

.. a historical episode like the Cuban missile crisis is not itself a case, but different aspects of the Cuban missile crisis are cases of broader, theoretically defined classes of events, such as coercive diplomacy, crisis management, the operational codes of political leaders, etc (Levy 2008, p. 2).

The Horn of Africa has become an experimental laboratory for the maritime security agenda established at the UN Security Council in 2008, which is the topic of interest of this study. The multiscale approach to the present case study sheds light on the varying degrees to which the agenda has changed, as a result of a more concerted and assertive agency by regional policymakers and subtle and nuanced resistance by national actors. These findings are a reflection on the conceptual frameworks for this study, namely the concepts of collective securitisation and hybridity.

The regional case structures and frames the national case through examining the developmental stages of the agenda, which in the first instance, took a regional approach. Lamont (2015, p. 132) notes that a case study is an illustration of the evolution of a specific international activity or discourse. At the regional level, the agenda was influenced by the liberal peace initiative, but over time, policymakers from the Horn of Africa (among others) exercised a more assertive agency in subverting the notion of security-centric maritime security, thereby adapting the original agenda to respond to their specific regional priorities for economic development. Moreover, the Somali experience also provides insights into a more subtle and nuanced resistance to the Horn of Africa maritime security agenda both by local elites and coastal communities through a lack of cooperation with international actors. Going further, the national case study explores a situation in the hybridisation process in which neither side can make headway. Taylor et al. (2015, p. 20) notes that “the goal of qualitative research is to examine how things look from different vantage points”. From this perspective, the two cases inform each other in terms of the varying degrees of the use of local agency and the extent to which it has effected changes in the original agenda as established the UNSC in 2008 in response to an escalation of piracy in this region.
3.2.3 Choosing the sites

Before I went into the fieldwork context, I had decided which institutions to visit, which events or activities to observe, which people to interview, and which policy documents to read. To this end, I established selection criteria for determining the appropriate entities and people for the sample. This entailed first sketching out what characteristics of my sample are closely related to my research, and then locating individuals and organisations that met those standards (Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 97). What follows are my guidelines for selecting organisations, events, respondents, and documents:

1) For institutions and events, the criteria were that they had to have been responsible for policy discussions and development in maritime security and the blue economy in the Horn of Africa.

2) For respondents, they were required to be both elites in charge of managing policies, such as state officials and heads of international institutions which do organisational work, as well as respondents from grassroots.

3) For content analysis of official documents, they were selected based on the following criteria: a) Narrative scale: they had to have the terms ‘maritime security or ‘blue economy’ in the title, b) Temporal scale: they had to have been published from 2005, which is when maritime security issues in the Horn of Africa were brought to the fore, and c) Administrative scale: they had to have been released by states or international governmental organisations that possess the discursive power to set up political and security agendas.

However, while the particular focus and the research question determined who I had hoped to recruit to participate in my research, the disruption created by the COVID 19 Pandemic meant that planned interviews with respondents at the grassroots level had to be postponed. The locals I had in mind when I originally formulated the selection criteria, stated above, were the elites in government, the grassroots, such as fishing and coastal communities, and the wider civil society. However, due to the disruption caused by the COVID in 2020, the question of who should be interviewed presented some challenges. As a result, it became impossible to travel to coastal areas in Somalia or interact with the wider civil society, despite the fact that I had obtained an ethical approval for and made arrangements to visit remote coastal areas in Puntland and Galmudug regions. These are areas used by pirates as private fiefdoms during the peak of piracy. Thus, interviews with this category of the locals
would have offered valuable insights into the structures and local conditions that enabled piracy in the Horn of Africa, as well as the extent to which they are still intact on land.

Left with the choice of only recruiting local policymakers to participate in this research, the key premise was that the people chosen should be in a position to provide rich data on the maritime security agenda to enable me to answer the research question posed. In my assessment of suitable interviewees who were able to provide the necessary data, it became evident that I needed to interview local elites in government who interacted with international actors; given that I was exploring the extent to which the maritime security agenda was locally owned. This particular segment of the locals had a wealth of knowledge about the degree to which the agenda is locally driven, which meant defining the locals as governmental officials. In relation to the international actors, the selection process was somewhat straightforward. I wanted to recruit participants that could provide not only the necessary data in terms of an objective assessment of the situation, but also in a position to provide a subjective viewpoint based on interactions with local counterparts. To this end, my target participant were heads of UN and EU missions to Somalia, who can speak authoritatively on the topic of interest, both because of their wealth of experience as practitioners and their respective positions of seniority.

3.2.4 Discussion of methods

There is an important distinction between methodology, considered above, and methods. Dew (2007, p. 433) notes that “methodology refers to the principles underlying particular research approaches, as distinct from ‘methods’, which are ways of collecting data”. According to Avis (2003, p. 1003), researchers must provide their ‘methodological justification,’ which explains why they chose a specific method for their research. The information I needed to answer the research question posed in this thesis required the use of specific data collection tools, such as interviews, and document and discourse analyses. In turn, the discourse analysis and the interview data have helped to provide insights and information that would not be available in any other form. Asking, reviewing, and observing are the most common methods of data collection (Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 104). Thus, the following section discusses the interview process.
3.2.4.1 Interview technique: semi-structured

This research used interviews as a key technique to collect the necessary data in order to effectively answer the research question posed, namely the extent to which the maritime security agenda is locally owned. Interviews provide an important way to obtain an insight into a political actor’s values, motivations, and processes of decision making in the area of international relations (Harrison and Callan 2013, p. 72). Given that this agenda has not been sufficiently explored from perspective of the dynamics between the locals and international actors, interviews with both parties were critical to this study. Stedward (1997, p. 151) claims that “It [the interview] is also an excellent method of obtaining data from contemporary subjects, which have not been extensively studied and for which there is little literature”. In this context, data from interviews provided useful information about how the locals and international actors interact and have effects on each other, as well as the contestation that arises over local/international ideas, norms and practices. Therefore, the type of information I required to address the research question posed affected my decision to use interviews as a data collection tool. There are different types of interview techniques, one of which is a semi-structured interview.

A semi-structured interview as a technique for data collection was chosen for this study in order to shed light on previously overlooked issues in the existing literature, such as the exercise of local agency in agenda-setting and in resisting the liberal peace project. In this context, Dew (2007, p 435) states that “semi-structured interviews, where perceptions and understandings may be revealed that have not been documented before, would be a preferred approach”. Lamont (2015, p. 84) notes that semi-structured interviews are also referred to as elite interviews because they seek to interview elites; they can help to interpret the personalities behind certain decisions, and thereby provide better explanations of the outcome of events. Due to the limited time elites have and the challenges associated with gaining access to them, semi-structured interviews provide the best chance of obtaining information from elites (Richards 1996, pp. 199-200). It is on this basis that semi-structured interview was chosen as a technique for data collection from people in elite positions. The information obtained, as a direct result of these interviews, are not available in any other form. These interviews provide a wealth of information about the hybridisation process of the maritime security agenda as well as the changeable and unsettled status of the international agenda for maritime security.
3.2.4.2 Access to interviewees

The research participants in this study were visible and not difficult to access. For example, the international actors were part of an organisation, such as the EU and UN and were accessible in their heavily fortified compounds in Mogadishu and Garowe. Of course, the local elites assisted in the recruitment of the international actors. I also established trust and rapport with the international actors through my presence at meetings between them and the local elites on several occasions, during which programmatic issues were discussed. MacDougall and Fudge (2001, 122) states that “in the contact stage, we suggest that researchers seek endorsement from key contacts … who may turn out to be champions for the research. In the present study, the local elites played a key role in facilitating access to their international counterparts. As a result of the professional relationship I developed with the local elites, they endorsed my research.

However, I am fully aware that people in elite positions are difficult to recruit, especially in Somalia, which is compounded by the security situation. This latter factor makes these elites reluctant to participate. Nonetheless, I have become well connected with the circle of elites that agreed to be interviewed for my study through my involvement with an initiative to promote governance in the Red Sea. Zuckerman (1972, p. 161) emphasises the importance of using connections to recruit elite interviewees. Prior to going into the fieldwork context, I worked as a consultant to the UN Office for the Horn of Africa. I, along with a Professor from the European University Institute, worked with IGAD member states to help them formulate a new mechanism for political and security cooperation on the north shore of the Red Sea. To this end, IGAD facilitated consultative meetings in each of its member countries to help member states develop a common internal position on the Red Sea.

It was during the consultation meeting with Somali policymakers that I networked and suggested to participants that I would like to interview them for my study, accentuating how my research would benefit from their contribution. Richards (1996, p. 202) points out that researchers should ‘[f]latter] the prospective interviewees by emphasising the significance of their input for the research being carried out. I established their confidence in subsequent interactions held in Djibouti and Addis Ababa, during which regional meetings focused on the cooperation problem that the member states needed to overcome. Such cooperation problems included the gains of minimising negative spill-over effects on the IGAD region, such as conflicting geopolitical forces and climate change, and the benefits of maximising the
positive spill-over effects of cooperation on the blue economy, namely socioeconomic development.

I also used a snowball method to recruit participants from the regional state of Puntland as well as non-elite interviewees. An example from the latter category would be Secure Fisheries\textsuperscript{7}, an NGO liaising between coastal communities and the federal and regional governments. Morris (2015, p. 6) notes that “the snowball method requires that you ask interviewees if they know anybody else who may be interested”. It was through the suggestion of an official from the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources of Somalia that I recruited the interviewee from Secure Fisheries. Similarly, the Attorney General’s office in Mogadishu connected me with its counterpart in Puntland region, which put me in touch with its Ministry of Justice. Patton (2015, p. 298) notes that “by asking a number of people who else to talk with, the snowball gets bigger and bigger as you accumulate now information-rich cases”. Indeed, all interviewees from the Puntland Government were recruited through the snowball method.

3.2.4.3 Number of interviewees

The total number of people interviewed were seventeen. Eight of the interviewees were from international organisations, for example: the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (one); the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the UN (one); the International Maritime Organisation of the UN (one); UN Office for Project Services (one); EUCAP Somalia (2); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (one); and Secure Fisheries (one).

For the locals, ten people were interviewed: five at the federal level and five at the regional level (Puntland). Interviewees from the Federal Government comprised of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (one), The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (one); The Attorney General Office (one); the Coastguard Agency (one); Office of the President (one). Also interviewed were officials from the Puntland region: the Ministry of Justice (one); the Criminal Investigation Department (one) the Attorney General Office (one); Joint Maritime Information and Coordination Centre (one) and the Bossaso Port Authority (one).

\textsuperscript{7} Secure fisheries is an intergovernmental organisation (NGO) based in the capacity of Puntland, Garowe.
3.2.5 Documentary data

Documentary research is an essential form of data collection in IR. The study of international organisations and policies of international implications require the researcher to consult with documents such as treaties, official reports, or policy statements (Lamont 2015, p. 80). However, documentary data is an umbrella term for a wide range of documents. Those that were relevant for the purposes of this study include: instrumental memoranda, reports, and policy documents and papers. Of the various types of documents and artefacts that are available to qualitative researchers, public record documents were most relevant to the present study. The documentation included: policy documents, government documents, agendas and minutes of organisational meetings, discourses on maritime security and the blue economy, state and private agent reports, and individual policy recommendation records. Since policy recommendation records are developed at the governmental level, I sought out the paper trail for what it can reveal about the hybridisation process of the maritime security agenda. This is because paper trail “can reveal aspirations, arrangements, tensions, relationships and decisions that might be otherwise unknown through direct observation” (Patton 2015, p. 376).

However, while analysing the documentation, I considered the possibility of inaccuracy in the documents; the goal was to triangulate data obtained through various means. Indeed, Yin (2014, p. 107) suggests that “documents must be carefully used and should not be accepted as literal recordings of events that have taken place”. I have engaged with both primary and secondary forms of documentation. For example, I reviewed and analysed policy documents as a type of primary text. Some of these are publicly available, such as the DCoC and the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC, the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) strategy. Other documents, such as reports on the DCoC process, EU and UN strategic documents, are not in the public domain. Thus, I needed to establish a close rapport with interview respondents in order to have access to these documents, which provided important sources of information for validating and triangulating the data collected. Harrison and Callan (2013, p. 34) argue that answering most IR questions requires consulting with existing documents about the issues under investigation. Similarly, I analysed secondary documents, such as journal articles, books and reports that mention and analyse the increasing interest in maritime security initiatives, observable in the Horn of Africa over the past two decades.
3.2.6 Ethical discussion: consent

Before I went into the fieldwork context, I developed a comprehensive strategy for dealing with ethical issues related to obtaining participant consent. Firstly, I explained the purpose of their invitation to take part in the research, provided them with background information about myself and gave them a clear rationale for the research. I then explained how the research findings will be collected, how they will be stored and used. I also explained the added incentive for participating in this research to both the locals and the international actors. For local participants, I emphasised how the study will offer them a voice in policymaking processes that impact them; to the international participants, I highlighted the benefits of this evidence-based research to inform them of their local counterparts' perceptions of assistant programmes.

Thus, this study adhered to the doctrine of valid consent. I provided participants with all the necessary information for them to make an informed decision about whether or not to take part in this research. For example, participants were informed of their free will, and should they agree to take part, of their right to withdraw from the study. Also provided was a Participant Information sheet that explained my research and asked them to sign it if they approved and were willing to participate. Once participants gave consent, I then drew their attention to my contact details should they have any further questions about the research at a later stage. In addition, in each Participant Consent Form, I stated the deadline for withdrawing after the interviews to ensure that participants had a clear timeline and to allow some flexibility if interviews take a longer period of time to complete than originally anticipated. In the event that participants had concerns about the conduct of the interview, I explained that they had the opportunity to raise it with me directly in the first instance. However, should the need to elevate the matter arise, I informed them that they will have the chance to contact Professor Edwin Egede, and Dr Sara Dezalay, and their contact details were also included on the Consent Form. I plan on presenting my research findings to the research subjects to thank them for their participation.

3.2.7 Risk and mitigating strategies

The security risk to participants from the international community in my research was minimal. I visited these participants in their heavily fortified Halane base in Mogadishu (the capital) and a guarded compound in Garowe (the regional capital of Puntland). The
identification of these respondents in potentially published papers was thoroughly discussed with them in advanced of interviews. In relation to local actors, concerns of anonymity and confidentiality can be of particular importance while studying populations that are affected by unstable political situations, such as Somalia. Thus, I assuaged concerns from the locals through developing trust and rapport with interview participants and was sensitive to local conditions so as not embarrass, frighten, offend or harm participants. To establish the local participants' confidence, I emphasised the fact that I was primarily concerned with giving voice to the research subjects and increasing their participatory potential in policymaking processes that directly affect them. I suggested to local participants in my research that they decide upon the level of anonymity. I then sent interview transcripts to the interviewees who then had the opportunity to decide if they wanted any part of them anonymised or not published. All interviewees (both international and local) agreed to be identified by name and in professional capacity.

As a researcher, I considered the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) travel advice and completed a risk assessment, using university guidance prior to going into the fieldwork context. However, security in Somalia remains volatile, so I was exposed to potential risks to my safety. To mitigate these risks, interviews with international actors occurred within UN and EU fortified compounds. As for interviews with the local elites, I minimised potential risks by scheduling them during the day and ensuring that someone knew where I was and the timescale for my visits. I also made arrangements to contact my supervisors to let them know that I had finished and on the way to my hotel when visiting participants in the setting.

However, one notable occasion when I became concerned about my safety was when I went to interview the Attorney General (AG) in his residence, as he could not see me in his office due to work commitments. He sent me an EU donated bullet proof car, which picked me up at around 7 pm local time from my hotel. I arrived at the AG’s house at 8:50 pm for a journey that normally takes 15 minutes maximum. The travel delay was not caused by road traffic, but by well over twenty roadside checkpoints, to my recollection, conducted by local militias on roads with no functioning lights. The situation became frightening when a fierce disagreement erupted between my driver’s companion and a member of one of the local militias, both of whom were heavily armed. This experience made me wonder whether researchers who glean new knowledge from conflict affected settings are appreciated in terms
of the dangers to their safety because no correct precautionary measures can assure the safety of researchers in such circumstances.

3.3 Data analysis

My data set consisted of interview transcripts, field notes and documents. I took an inductive approach to data analysis. This method allows for greater versatility in capturing meaning and complexities (Drisko and Maschi 2015, p. 86). For example, I analysed data collected both within and outside of the fieldwork context. During fieldwork, I performed some simple data analysis to familiarise myself with the data generated. However, in data collection there is a point at which no new data is being produced. This is the point of saturation. Saturation occurs as continuous data gathering ceases to yield additional knowledge about the phenomena under investigation (Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 199). For example, as I continued to interview, I realised that there was some repetition from previous interviewees. This meant that no new evidence was being produced. Following that, I embarked on a large-scale data review. I began coding and then selecting extracts for analysis. Inductive logic was used as the explanatory perspective, with the aim of understanding the participants' points of view on their own terms. This is a data-driven approach in which applicable theoretical concepts were implemented after data collection was completed.

Interpretation of the data followed a two-tier approach. In tier one, I first selected extracts for analysis in those areas identified as most important by the individual participants. I then evaluated each of these extracts based on its ability to contribute to an appropriate theoretical and/or substantive literature. For instance, whether they endorse, qualify, or completely contradict some accepted aspect of the relevant literature. Tier-two yielded a second pool of extracts that were purposefully sampled and drawn in relation to issues from theoretical and/or substantive literature. As a result, each selected extract shows something unique and intriguing and makes a discernible contribution to the literature.

For coding, I read the selected transcripts several times. The purpose was to begin identifying important issues in the data. It was critical in an inductive approach to interpret the evidence from the participants’ perspectives, namely the subjects that were most significant to them and the narratives they had created. I used a two-level coding scheme. Level one focused on analysing descriptive passages in the transcript, such as the subject-matter, themes, or issues that the participant was interested in at that point of the transcript. I then wrote a code in the
left-hand margin – for example, ‘capacity building as an objective’ – and continued looking for a repetition. Level two moved to the interpretive stage. The focus here was how ownership in reference to the maritime security agenda was being discussed; identifying the participant understanding or constructing of the subject-matter, theme, or issue that they were interested in at that point of the transcript. Themes and sub-themes were identified using level one code and level two code respectively. For example, capacity building (main theme) as assistance in infrastructure development (sub-theme).

Due to length of the interview transcripts it became necessary to select extracts for analysis based on how they could add value to findings. Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 94) point out that the selected extracts should be “used to illustrate/support an analysis that goes beyond their specific content, to make sense of the data, and tell the reader what it [the extract] does or might mean”. To this end, each extract was subjected to a thorough, systematic, and microscopic examination. To put it differently, the meanings and understandings already implicit within a given extract were explicitly unpacked, drawn out and amplified. This approach resulted in the interpretation shifting its focus away from the participant toward the theme.

3.3.1 Qualitative content analysis

In this study, document and discourse analyses supplemented interview data. Since the latter is about the respondents’ perception and understanding of the reality around them, interview data pose issues of subjectivity in answers. The combination of interviews, and document and discourse analyses provided for greater methodological rigour in this regard. Qualitative content analysis is a set of techniques for the systemic analysis of texts of many kinds, addressing not only manifest content (“frequencies and means”) but also the themes and core ideas found in texts as primary content (Mayring 2010, p. 105). Analysing qualitative data is hermeneutical or interpretive in nature, requiring diligent interpretation of the text in order to make sense of it all (Neuendorf 2014). To apply content analysis to documentation or other textual sources, the scope of sources must be defined to ensure its appropriateness to the research questions being asked (Lamont 2015, p. 90). Indeed, in the context of this study, the number of documents that discuss the phenomenon under investigation were too great to cover systematically.
Following a two-stage process, I firstly chose a number of representative documents across the spectrum. These included official reports, policy documents and strategy documentation, internal memos and minutes of meetings. Secondly, I worked through the content and the language of selected texts for the analyses process. For example, I read the text fully to gain a general understanding on the basis of the overarching research question. I then outlined sub-questions and answered them as I worked through the text. I formally examined the text for nuances: the words that were being used – particularly noticeable words such as the blue economy and maritime security – the sort of metaphors used and how ideas were presented. After reading through the text, I wrote a case summary in which I noted relevant issues such as the characteristics of the individual documentation. The process of qualitative content analysis goes beyond the substance of the text and requires explanations of the larger context in which the text is interpreted as well as any latent content (Drisko and Maschi 2015, p. 85). For example, in one joint policy initiative by the EU and UN for Somali maritime security sector reform, I focused on how the document was developed, whether local authorities contributed to the design process, and which government departments the document was submitted to for consideration. The answers to each of these questions provided an insight into the extent to which the agenda for reform is locally-driven.

In relation to discourse analysis, this study analysed speeches by regional heads of government, specifically in the chapter on the blue economy (chapter five). Dew (2007, p. 438) notes that “in general, discourse analysis focuses on features of language, styles of argumentation and the way language is used to represent a particular phenomenon or issue”. From this perspective, discourse analysis was used in order to identify and explain linguistic features that provide insight into how the participants represent or interpret maritime security and the reasons for choosing specific language. The information gleaned from discourse analysis sheds light on the positive hybridisation engendered by regional agency in subverting and adapting the original maritime security agenda.
Conclusion

This research focuses on the region of the Horn of Africa, which is the entity selected as a ‘case’ because it has become a testing ground for the maritime security agenda. The agenda is the topic of interest of this research. The methodological frameworks for this study necessitated judgments about theory and perspective based on the interests, conclusions, and intentions of the study topic. Qualitative research was adopted because it is suitable to understanding the phenomenon of maritime security in the Horn of Africa from the respondent’s own experiences. These are the ideas and feelings existing in the participants’ minds. The selection criteria for the case study were centred on the research question, pointing to a multiscale case study, with regional and national dimensions.

This case study has considered the evolution of the maritime security agenda and the various degrees to which local actors (both at the regional and national levels) have hybridised it. Such a diachronic analysis of the maritime security agenda sheds light on local agency in agenda setting through the lens of collective securitisation theory, as well as hybridity in subverting the original agenda as established at the UNSC. For example, while the agenda was initially shaped by the liberal peace initiative (via its institutionalisation processes), regional policymakers, to a greater degree, subverted and adapted the original agenda to suit their specific circumstances and priorities. Thus, the regional case study sheds light on not only the developmental stages of the agenda, but also a positive form of hybridisation. Similarly, the national case illuminates a more subtle and nuanced hybridity manifested in the lack of cooperation from the local actors. In addition, this case study provides an insight into when hybridity fails to occur, resulting from a stalemate between the international interveners and the local actors. In other words, this is what might be described as ‘deadlocked’ hybridity. It is in this context that the national case diverges, to some extent, from the conventional mode of discourse on positive/negative hybridity.

This chapter has justified the case study selected, provided theoretical foundations for the study, and discussed about the research's organisation and methodology. The chapter that follows is the first of a two-part analysis of a regional case study, discussing the topic of interest, namely the DCoC and the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC.
4 RECALIBRATING MARITIME SECURITY GOVERNANCE: FROM THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE DJIBOUTI CODE OF CONDUCT TO THE ASSERTIVENESS OF THE JEDDAH AMENDMENT

Over the past fifteen years, the emphasis on security – the protection of seaborne trade from piracy and armed robbery – has come to dominate the agenda for maritime security in the Horn of Africa, ultimately at the expense of development. The UN Security Council (UNSC), through its Resolution 1816 in 2008, constructed a new narrative about governing this region’s maritime environment as a direct result of the outbreak of piracy from 2005. The imperative of shipping security was also instrumental in moulding a security-centric framework for governance, namely the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC), which was adopted in 2009, under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). For the first time, the DCoC provided a framework for implementing the UNSC’s call for assisting the affected region by enabling capacity building as part of the wider strategy to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa. However, it was not until 2017 that the DCoC’s scope was expanded through the Jeddah Amendment to address other maritime issues, most notably the blue economy, as a result of more assertive regional policymakers.

From an empirical point of view, tracing the evolution of the DCoC is a worthwhile endeavour because it seeks to disentangle all the factors that have contributed to the shift from a security-focused approach to more development-oriented maritime security governance. In this chapter, it will become clear that more acquiescent stakeholders from this region embraced the DCoC, however, this could be attributed to ‘sea blindness’. In other words, this is an under-appreciation of the various roles the oceans play in food and maritime security as well as in commerce. Nevertheless, the timing of the Jeddah Amendment is significant because it led to an emergence of maritime security awareness among policymakers in the Horn of Africa since the DCoC was first adopted. This awareness in turn sensitised these actors to the multi-faceted role that the ocean plays in socio-economic development, which is especially important to this region, since it is grappling with development issues. Thus, on a practical level, this chapter looks at the evolution of that awareness.

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8 The UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008) on piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia moved maritime crime into the realm of security.
From a theoretical point of view, this chapter dissects the referent object of the collective securitisation of the Horn of Africa maritime space, which was facilitated by the IMO. In this discussion, it will become clear that the agenda for collective securitisation was inherited from the UNSC. From this perspective, the referent object was seaborne trade because the nature of the threat posed by piracy was disruption to shipping. However, as regional actors increasingly became cognisant of the imperative for a blue economy, so did their use of agency in asserting a more developmental approach to the securitisation of the ocean. As a result, different actors have focused on different referent objects: for international actors, the referent object has remained shipping, whereas for regional actors, the blue economy in relation to artisanal and industrial fisheries, as well as other maritime crimes that pose a security threat to the blue economy, such as illegal fishing and environmental degradation, has grown in importance.

Collective securitisation is a variant on the Copenhagen School (CS) of securitisation theory. The nascent research in this field has extended the securitisation literature to study processes in which actors collectively securitise an issue within an international institution, where the securitising actors also comprise the audience (Haacke and Williams 2008; Sperling and Webber 2017). The implications of these developments for our understanding of the collective securitisation process are that its lifecycle is mutable, contingent upon the appraisal of the audience. In the present context, rather than de-securitising the original issue (piracy), the securitising actors created a new discourse on illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and presented it as an existential threat to referent objects, namely a threat to food security and national economic development. In other words, the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC demonstrates a conscious effort on the part of some signatory states, such as the Seychelles and Kenya, to manage and augment the securitisation process, thereby asserting agency in agenda-setting processes.

This chapter is divided into two parts. Section one discusses the IMO’s efforts to set the agenda for the securitisation of piracy as a threat to shipping, while section two examines regional efforts to direct the securitisation process and decide what is important in terms of the referent object. Methodologically, this chapter draws on analysis of documents produced by the IMO, the UNSC and WFP.
4.1 Securitisation for agenda-setting purposes: evidence from the IMO

The IMO is the specialised agency of the UN, with responsibility for setting global standards for the safety, security, and environmental performance of international shipping. Article 15 (j) of the Convention on the IMO underpins the functions of the Assembly in relation to regulations and guidelines concerning maritime safety and the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships (IMO 1958). Given that piracy posed a threat to the security and safety of one of the busiest and most important maritime routes in the world – the gateway to the Suez Canal, the IMO was under obligation to act. However, the IMO is a technical rather than a political body. As a result, it was unable to securitise piracy, instead employing the concept of securitisation for agenda setting purposes. The IMO primarily focuses on what the civil maritime industry can do to safeguard itself and to assist governments in protecting the global maritime trade through the provision of capacity building. For example, in 2010, it published "Best Management Practice" 4, BMP 4, to advise all ship owners and masters on how to protect themselves from piracy and armed robbery (Feldt et al. 2013, p. 2).

Piracy in the Horn of Africa has been a source of concern for the IMO, as it directly affects its constituency, the shipping sector. In order to trigger a securitisation process, there is a need for a sense of threat to the reference object. Thus, the IMO framed Piracy as a threat to shipping – the reference object. However, the IMO used the notion of securitisation for agenda setting purposes, given that it is a technical organisation rather than a political body, such as the UNSC discussed below. Indeed, Vuori (2008, p.1) has made the case for the notion of securitisation for agenda-setting purposes. To this end, the IMO expressed grave concern about the increasing number of cases of piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia, in 2005. The IMO channelled the securitisation agenda through the UN Secretary-General. As the IMO resolution states:

Request further the Secretary-General to transmit a copy of the present resolution to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for consideration and any further action he may deem appropriate including bringing the matter to the attention of the Security Council for consideration and action as appropriate... A979(24) (2005)

Through the passing of resolution A979 (24) (2005), the IMO had hoped to determine what was important in the securitisation process, namely the protection of shipping from piracy. It framed maritime crime as a threat to the interest of its constituency and sought to enlist the support of the UNSC to securitise piracy. This is because the UNSC has the power to
“determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken”.\(^9\) In other words, the UNSC is the final arbiter of what is considered to be a threat to international peace and security. Had the IMO secured buy-in from the UNSC, such an outcome may have had significant political and legal implications because the Charter of the UN designates the UNSC as one of the principal bodies of the organisation responsible for “the maintenance of international peace and security” (Article 24 (1), UN Charter). In addition, the UNSC has the power to bind states and demand compliance of the resolutions it passes.\(^10\) As Balzacq describes,

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\text{Often, it is the formal decision by an institution (for instance in the form of a vote by a Parliament, Security Council or Congress) that mandates the government to adopt a specific policy. This support, is generally, necessary and sufficient (Balzacq 2005, 185).}
\]

However, the statement of the President of the UNSC suggests that it was ambivalent about the securitisation of the ocean, instead urging member states to take appropriate measures to safeguard “merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid”.\(^11\) Thus, the response from the President of the UNSC places more emphasis on the humanitarian ground for self-protection rather than the threat posed by piracy to the international shipping industry per se. This outcome suggests that the IMO failed to get the agenda for securitising piracy high on the UNSC agenda in the first instance.

After two years of inaction by the UNSC on the piracy situation and a growing awareness of how the UNSC was leaning toward the humanitarian case, the Secretary General of the IMO teamed up with the head of the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2007. Both organisations then urged the international community to take concerted and coordinated action against the existential threat that piracy and armed robbery posed to ships passing through the Gulf of Aden. In a joint statement, WFP Executive Director Josette Sheeran, states “the continuing incidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery in these waters is of great concern” (IMO and WFP 2007). The WFP was concerned about getting humanitarian food aid into Somalia, while the IMO was interested in the protection of shipping from piracy hijacking. They

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\(^9\) See Article 39, UN Charter.

\(^10\) Article 25 of the UN Charter stipulates that ‘The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decision of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter’.

collectively urged the UNSC to expedite the process of addressing the piracy problem in the Horn of Africa, as it was threatening economic and food security in this region and beyond. The UNSC had once again acknowledged the heads of the two UN agencies’ joint securitisation agenda, but this time around, the IMO’s and the WFP’s joint call for action against piracy was expressed in a UNSC resolution. Meanwhile, the IMO requested that the then Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia notify the UNSC that “... it consents to military intervention into its maritime jurisdiction” (IMO 2007). However, it was not until a permanent member of the UNSC was directly affected by the piracy situation that it became a matter of some urgency.

The landmark moment came when France – a permanent member of the UNSC – was impacted by the piracy crisis, tipping the scales in favour of the securitisation of maritime crime in the Horn of Africa. Following the hijacking of the French yacht Le Ponant in 2008, France was the guiding force behind the UNSC’s decision to authorise a military operation in this region (Smith 2017, p. 219). France’s push for UNSC intervention was bolstered by the TFG of Somalia’s willingness to agree to such intervention to show that it was in control of the country, even if it was in existence de jure. During an address by then President Abdullahi Yusuf to the UNSC, he alluded to the TFG’s willingness to tolerate encroachment on its territorial waters in return for the securitisation of the interlinkages between piracy and illegal fishing. The TFG dangled the sovereignty carrot in front of the UNSC, which ultimately lanced the boil of piracy through the passing of a series of resolutions in 2008. The call to securitise piracy then gained traction at the highest levels of international security; rising piracy incidents in the region further acted as a spur to UNSC intervention.

As a result, the UNSC became the dominant securitising actor, and its resolutions lent countenance to the securitisation processes first initiated by the IMO in collaboration with WFP. Both UN agencies had lobbied the UNSC to espouse the threat agenda for piracy they had constructed. However, France’s action provided the main impetus for the Council’s intervention. The UNSC passed Resolution 1816 with Somalia’s consent, on 02 June 2008.

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12 See UNSC Resolution 1772 (2007).
13 I drew on conversations I had with Somali government officials who were privy to the situation.
14 UNSC resolutions S/RES 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851.
15 Which states the UNSC’s grave concern about ‘the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels pose to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes and to international navigation . . .’
This resolution designated piracy as a threat to a composite of several referent objects, which included issues that fall within the remit of the three UN agencies. For example, the IMO’s and the WFP’s securitisation agendas were linked to their respective constituencies’ interests, namely the smooth flow of merchant shipping and the provision of safe passage for humanitarian aid respectively. However, in order to make the case for UNSC intervention, the piracy issue was portrayed as part of Somalia’s political instability, posing a threat to the international system. Thus, the UNSC Resolution 1816 concerned the broader insecurities presented by the collapse of the Somali state to international peace and security (Guilfoyle 2008, p. 695).

The UNSC Resolution 1816 propelled maritime crime into the realm of security by authorising military action – an exceptional response – to use “all possible means” to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea (Guilfoyle 2008, p. 695). It steered maritime criminality in the direction of international security. The reason for this strategy being that piracy poses a transnational challenge (Salvador and See 2020, p. 3). It is a source of threat to international peace and security, which helps explain the plethora of UNSC resolutions on piracy (Wilson 2018, p. 3). While the UNSC’s securitisation move triggered responses from a diverse range of audiences, it did not engage regional players in a meaningful way. Indeed, the UNSC omitted the concerns that matter more to the Horn of Africa audiences from the securitisation move, most notably the lack of reference to illegal fishing as a threat to the blue economy in Resolution 1816.

The UNSC’s construction of the instability in Somalia as a threat to international peace and security provided the impetus to external intervention into the maritime environment of the Horn of Africa. This situation evinced powerful states’ interests in providing security outside their maritime jurisdictions in ungoverned geostrategic spaces such as the Gulf of Aden. As a result, the United States (US) established a coalition of the willing maritime task force (CTF-151) intended to fight piracy (Bridger 2013, p. 1), in response to the UNSC’s call for all states to cooperate and coordinate efforts to address piracy off the coast of Somalia. Kraska and Wilson (2009, p. 224) point out that the Somali piracy case has presented the United States with an opportunity to promote a Global Maritime Partnership agenda in line with “the 2007 Cooperative strategy for 21st Century Seapower, that are built on collaboration rather than confrontation”. The US move was followed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) launching the humanitarian operation “Allied Provider” to protect WFP shipments. As NATO Spokesperson James Appathurai puts it:

*NATO will have its Standing Naval Maritime Group, which is composed of seven ships, in the region within two weeks. Nations agreed that NATO would make use of that presence, not necessarily all of the seven ships, but some of those ships, to do two things. One, to ensure that the World Food Programme ships have the escort they need to deliver their essential food supplies, and more generally, to patrol the waters around Somalia, to help stop acts of piracy.*

Following this declaration, a series of NATO missions would culminate in the launching of ‘Operation Ocean Shield’ in 2009, focusing on counter-piracy operations at sea (Feldt et al. 2013, page 16). This intervention came to an end in 2016 when it was declared mission accomplished. As NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu (NATO 2016) notes it: “Operation Ocean Shield has been a great success – making an essential contribution to combatting piracy in the seas off Somalia and therefore keeping one of the world’s most important waterways safe and secure”.

Meanwhile, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) began deliberations on the potential launch of an EU military mission off the coast of Somalia under European and Security Defence Policy (Mai’a and Cross 2010, p. 22). The EUMC “…could see the benefit of a formal ESDP operation under EU leadership, what was to become NAVFOR Atalanta… These various initiatives were spearheaded by the military committee, based on military logic in close cooperation with national capitals” (Mai’a and Cross 2010 p. 22). Eventually, the EU deployed the European Union Naval Force Operation Atlanta (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) in the Gulf of Aden, a maritime space that had become a critical theatre in the region's fight against piracy by that point. The mission was launched to protect humanitarian aid bound for Somalia as well as vulnerable vessels from piracy (EU 2008a).16

Despite NATO's presence in the Gulf of Aden at the time, the EU entered the theatre of operations, suggesting it had its own particular vested interests in the region's maritime governance. As a motivating force behind this intervention, France pressed for the militarisation of the Horn of Africa maritime sphere. Riddervold (2014, p. 546) argues that “France, who held the Presidency, used particular favourable geopolitical conditions to put an

autonomous EU operation on the agenda”. Smith (2017, p. 215) observes that “EUNAVOR Somalia would not have been possible without a common perception of a clear threat to various EU interests”. In other words, the EU’s intervention in the region during France's presidency, was as much an effort to protect its interests as it was to provide safe passage for humanitarian aid bound for Somalia.

To summarise, the IMO made several attempts to shape the securitisation process of piracy in the Horn of Africa, including its collaboration with the WFP. However, the process began in earnest after the UNSC designated maritime piracy in this region as a security challenge to the international system as a result of the instability in Somalia; the IMO lacked a UN mandate to securitise an issue threatening international peace and security. The referent object was the shipping sector. The audiences that responded to the securitisation move were international actors with special interests in the agenda for maritime security as well as the material tools to operationalise “extraordinary actions” (in other words, the use of military force). Acceptance from the EU, NATO, and the United States – the target audiences for the UNSC’s call for military action – was critical to the implementation of the UNSC’s call. The securitisation process was completed with the launching of a number of military missions, thereby constituting ‘extraordinary’ measures. In the current context, the UNSC expressed maritime crime in terms of security, while actors who helped choreograph the process, namely the permanent members of the UNSC, responded positively. The implications for our understanding of the securitisation process are that, while this theoretical model fails to define the nature and status of the relevant audience, the securitising actor has a specific audience in mind in practice. Here, the securitising actor (the UNSC) has a target audience (the permanent members) in mind who approved the securitisation move, which was framed in such a way that this type of audience was likely to approve it. For example, the French government first brought the piracy problem to the UNSC’s political agenda and then, in response to the UNSC’s securitisation move, France galvanised the EU into action with a military response. In other words, as a permanent member of the UNSC, France securitised piracy under the banner of the UNSC in a way that appealed to other members, namely the security threat to the shipping sector. The target audience included the permanent members of the UNSC who approved the securitisation move by launching a military intervention to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa.
4.2 Collective Securitisation of piracy: an agenda inherited from the UNSC

The collective securitisation of piracy and armed robbery by regional actors under the auspices of the IMO can be seen as a continuation of the securitisation agenda set by the UNSC in 2008. Regional policymakers, including actors from the Horn of Africa, expanded on this agenda by incorporating armed robbery into the securitisation strategy. As mentioned above, the concept of collective securitisation has expanded the literature in this area to investigate processes in which actors collectively securitise an issue within an international institution (Haacke and Williams 2008; Sperling and Webber 2017). In addition, this concept clarifies the nature and role of the relevant audience and, as a direct result, broadens stakeholder participation in the securitisation process. Floyd (2018, p. 392) notes that the audience is the member states of an international organisation. In contrast, the Copenhagen School “has not adequately addressed how its concept of securitization might be applied to the level of regional arrangements and the processes involved in the collective construction of, and responses to, threat agendas” (Haacke and Williams 2008, p. 776). When one or more member states of a regional organisation construct an issue – such as piracy – as a threat to security at sea, this is known as collective securitisation. This social construct, then prods other member states into supporting the securitisation move. As Haacke and Williams describe it:

*It is possible to conceive of securitization within a regional arrangement as involving one or more securitizing actors within that arrangement identifying a particular development or issue as an existential threat to a security referent, making relevant validity claims, and finding a receptive audience among other regional actors* (Haacke and Williams 2008, p. 785).

These scholars were the architect of the collective securitisation concept. They first applied this concept to the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations because “transnational challenges’… are more concerning to decision makers in these regions than state-based threats” (Haacke and Williams 2008, p. 776).

Other academics have sought to explicate further the relationship between the securitising actor and the audience when multiple state actors undertake securitisation collectively. Sperling and Webber (2017, p. 21) argue that collective securitisation occurs in an interactional phase through which the organisation receives member state consent. They refer to this process as a “recursive interaction” during which “the member states serve as the validating audience of a securitisation move and provide an organisation with agency in
responding to threats”. As a result, the securitising actor and the audience are said to engage in repeated interactions, with the end result of the negotiations producing common ground on the nature and response to the perceived threat. Haacke and Williams (2008, pp. 785-786) clarify who constitutes the relevant audience, namely the state, and by this they mean “the state representatives of participating countries” such as “leaders, ministers and especially their senior officials”.

An international institution is the cornerstone of collective securitisation because it facilitates a forum for the exchange of views and ideas on the securitisation process. Thus, the focus is on how multiple state actors undertake securitisation collectively within an international organisation, but the latter has no bearing on the national sovereignty of participating states (Floyd 2018, p. 391). It is against this backdrop that applying this concept to the DCoC process under the umbrella of the IMO – the IMO’s facilitative role is detailed below – could shed light on both the IMO’s convening influence, which in turn set the tone for the collective securitisation agenda by regional actors. This agenda was solely about the protection of shipping (the referent object) from piracy and armed robbery, both of which posed security threats to the IMO’s constituency. In other words, the IMO had vested interests in getting the states in the affected region to agree a framework for cooperation against piracy and armed robbery.

4.2.1 Tracing the process of the DCoC: IMO’s facilitative role in collective securitisation

The upsurge of piracy, in 2008, in the Horn of Africa was a catalyst for debates about maritime security governance as it lacked a common maritime security strategy. The IMO provoked the affected countries into thinking about interstate cooperation against maritime threats. The IMO’s efforts to facilitate negotiations between its member states on anti-piracy measures could be traced back to 1985 through the passing of Resolution A.545 – measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. However, in relation to the Horn of Africa, two UN General Assembly Resolutions formed this regionally based approach to maritime security governance. Firstly, the Resolution A/RES/55/7 called upon coastal States in affected regions to take all necessary and appropriate measures to prevent and combat incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea, including through regional cooperation (UN 2001, p. 7). Secondly, the Resolution A/RES/59/24 also urged all states, in cooperation with the IMO, to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea (UN 2004, p. 24). This latter UN
General Assembly intervention provided a spur for action. It sensitised the affected regions to the importance of cooperation against maritime threats and commissioned the IMO to work with its member states on achieving a cooperative arrangement. This was the start of the organisation’s role in providing a forum for collective securitisation of piracy and armed robbery in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which was later extended to the Western Indian Ocean.

The IMO’s regular workshops on maritime safety and security have sensitised participating states to the importance of regional cooperation in the maritime environment. As the empirical evidence (presented below) shows, the IMO has also convened high-level meetings for the affected regions to promote interstate cooperation. Even when there had been a cleavage between prospective partners about possible regional cooperation, the IMO held sensitisation workshops to foster a culture of trust and confidence building. They did so by providing a forum for debate and information dissemination about the challenges and opportunities presented by the maritime environment in the region.¹⁷ These initiatives have assisted the Horn of Africa states in cultivating an interest in maritime security governance. Reasonably informed about the threat posed by piracy to shipping, regional actors, particularly Egypt which was affected much more than others, pushed for the collective securitisation of piracy and armed robbery.

The IMO organised a meeting between countries, with no history of interstate cooperation in the maritime environment, to discuss cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, in a seminar in Sana’a. This Seminar occurred from 9th to 13th of April 2005 – on piracy and armed robbery against ships and maritime security, facilitated by the IMO. Participants were senior officials in the maritime and port authorities including: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen (IMO 2005). The agenda for discussion covered policy areas as diverse as maritime safety, security, and the protection of the maritime environment. Indeed, the preliminary discussions made reference to maritime crime convergence (IMO 2005). The states that participated in the Sana’a Seminar unanimously adopted Resolution One on the prevention and suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships and enhancement of maritime security.

¹⁷ I draw on several conversations I had with state representatives while working as a researcher at the IMO from July to September 2017.
This resolution consisted of twenty-two operative paragraphs which may broadly be divided into four categories. These categories are: 1) national legislation (operative paragraphs 9 to 12 and 19); 2) coordination, including development and implementation of national maritime security policies and programmes (operative paragraphs 1 to 3, 13, 18 and 20); 3) communication, including the establishment of a regional maritime information centre (operative paragraphs 4 to 6, 8, 21 and 22); and 4) co-operation, including international agreements, support for Somalia and involvement of third-party ships and warships in the enhancement of security (operative paragraphs 7 and 14 to 17) (IMO 2005). The Sana’a Seminar was seen as a prelude to regional states’ intention to undertake securitisation collectively. However, participating countries did not propose an extraordinary measure to counter the perceived sense of the threat – piracy – which is a vital component of the collective securitisation continuum. Nonetheless, the Seminar attendees created the conditions for a constructive dialogue going forward.

The IMO convened a follow-up regional workshop on maritime security, piracy and armed robbery against ships—on 18th January 2006—in Muscat, Oman. In addition to the state representatives, non-state actors also took part in the Muscat Meeting. For example, presentations were given by representatives from: the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, INTERPOL, the International Chamber of Shipping, United Kingdom Department for Transport - Transport Security Division, Italian Navy, Royal Navy, and IMO Secretariat (IMO 2006, p. 3). The Muscat workshop aimed to assess, promote and enhance the standard of national legislation, and national & regional coordination, communication and cooperation within and between States in the region. This was a continuation of the agreed strategy detailed in Sana’a Seminar Resolution One.

During the workshop, the delegation from the Egyptian Ministry of Transport framed maritime crime as a threat to international trade. As an Egyptian delegate describes it:

_The strategic goal of such security focusses not only on Bab El Mandab straight and Suez Canal due to their importance and impact on international trade, but it also focuses on all the countries located on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (Muscat presentation 2006, p. 1)._ 

Egypt was primarily concerned about the impact of piratical incidents on shipping costs, and port traffic flows, with ships potentially avoiding risky routes. The concern expressed by the
Egyptian delegation was that “the incidents occurring in the area of south Red Sea may lead the Insurance Companies to impose extra charges on vessels sailing to the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea” … a fact that may result in an increase in the cost of maritime transport through the Suez Canal” (Muscat presentation 2016, p. 1). The Egyptian officials’ emphasis on the operational costs to shipping, resulting from rising piracy incidents, suggests their attempt to galvanise participants into taking collective action to securitise piracy. According to Haacke and Williams' (2008, p. 785) concept of collective securitisation, the process is triggered when “one or more securitizing actors within [a regional] arrangement identifi[es] a particular development or issue as an existential threat to a security referent”. Thus, an individual country might begin the process of securitisation, but such a move does not act on behalf of the participating states as a whole. This helps explain a separate proposal submitted by Yemen with additional inputs from Egypt on a draft agreement for regional cooperation against piracy and armed robbery.

The proposal was submitted for consideration during a high-level meeting in Muscat in 2006, which was again facilitated by the IMO. As the Memorandum of Understanding prepared by the Government of Yemen states:

_Recognizing the great hazards of the acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, the subsequent threats they pose against the safety of lives and properties and their negative effects on maritime navigation and trade ... Call upon the Governments of Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen to consider the approval of this Memorandum of Understanding... (Government of Yemen 2006)_

The above-mentioned states were the audiences that needed to give consent to the securitisation move. While there was a growing consensus on the perceived threat to security at sea, the delegation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did not give its specific agreement to the securitisation move. Saudi Arabia took note of the proposals submitted by Yemen in collaboration with Egypt, but wished it to be noted that the subject would require further consideration and discussion (IMO 2006, p. 5). This suggests that collective securitisation of maritime crime under the auspices of the IMO failed to materialise because the participating states as a whole did not perceive the socially constructed threat of piracy and armed robbery the same way. Haacke and Williams (2008, p. 778) argue that “the question of whether collective securitization has occurred is at the heart of assessments of how regional arrangements construct threat agendas”. For example, a lack of consensus on the nature of the special measures to be adopted by a group of states within a regional arrangement could
impinge on successful securitisation. Indeed, it has been argued that “collective securitization by regional arrangements can be ascertained on the basis of shared understandings about threats and the endorsement of special measures to address these…” (Haacke and Williams 2008 p. 778).

As a result, a shared understanding of the perceived threat is insufficient for collective securitisation to occur; participating states must also agree on collective countermeasures to the threat. However, Saudi Arabia, a key audience, did not approve the securitisation move. The country’s reluctance to support the proposed special measure resulted in a failed securitisation attempt. In other words, Egypt and Yemen failed to make a compelling case for cooperation in combating piracy and armed robbery. This supports the underlying assumptions of the concept of collective securitisation, in which securitising actors are the relevant audience. Their collective acceptance of a securitisation move determines whether or not securitisation has taken place. In consequence, the IMO’s facilitation of the first attempt to collectively securitise maritime crime in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden reached an impasse. As result, plans to adopt a cooperative agreement remained dormant for several years.

In 2007, the IMO General Assembly made some headway. It adopted the Resolution A.1002 (25), calling upon governments in the region to conclude – in co-operation with the IMO – an agreement to prevent, deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships as a matter of urgency (IMO 2007, p. 7). Similarly, the IMO Resolution A.1002 (25) advised the Somali government to consent to military intervention into the country’s territorial waters to combat piracy (IMO 2007 p. 7). In a separate development, the UNSC securitised piracy in the Horn of Africa in 200818, consolidating the case for cooperation on maritime security governance in this region. As a result of the UNSC’s intervention, what had previously been addressed as a maritime crime – piracy – was elevated to the top of the international security agenda (Vreÿ 2010, p. 122). This process established parallel initiatives including naval intervention and international assistance in maritime capacity building (Guilfoyle 2008, p. 695). Elsewhere, the UN resolution A/RES/63/111 (13) urged the international community “to provide additional funding for capacity-building programmes, including for transfer of technology,

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18The resolution “calls upon all states interested in the security of maritime activities to take part actively in the fight against piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia, in particular by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft”. (S/RES/1816 (2008), 1). The UNSC also called on the international community to assist neighbouring states with the provision of maritime capacity building (S/RES/1816 (2008), 3)
including [sic] through the International Maritime Organization and other competent international organizations”, in support of the second prong of UNSC resolution – the non-military intervention (UN General Assembly 2008).

To facilitate the implementation of these Resolutions, the IMO convened a high-level meeting in Dar es Salaam – Tanzania – entitled “Protection of Vital Shipping Lanes: Regional meeting to conclude agreements on maritime security, piracy and armed robbery against ships for States from the Western Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea areas” (IMO 2008, p. 1). A draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea was presented for discussion. This second round of negotiations was a follow-up to the Muscat Meeting and was designed to resolve outstanding issues between the participating states with the aim of reaching consensus. However, participants noted that the document required further consideration by prospective signatories in the region. As a result, a further meeting was planned in Sana’a in October 2008 to finalise the agreement, but it had to be postponed due to security concerns (IMO 2008, p. 2). In January 2009, a high-level meeting was agreed upon in Djibouti, allowing for a final regional agreement applicable to the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, in accordance with IMO the Resolution A.100 (25).

The Regional Meeting on maritime security, piracy and armed robbery against ships for Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea States was held in Djibouti from 26 to 29 January 2009. Seventeen states attended the Meeting: Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen. The purpose of the Djibouti Meeting was to consider and adopt the draft text presented at the Dar es Salaam meeting. By that time, the threat posed by piracy in the region had become existential with far-reaching and wide-ranging security implications for diverse actors. As a result, more actors entered the discussion. Those included observer states19, intergovernmental organisations20, non-

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19 Observer states included Canada; Iran; India; Indonesia; Italy; Japan; Nigeria; Norway; Philippines; Singapore; United Kingdom; and the United States.
20 Observers from the following intergovernmental organisations also participated in the meeting European Commission (EC); INTERPOL; League of Arab States; Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Robbery Against Ships in Asia- Information Sharing Centre ReCAAP-ISC); Regional Organisation for the Conservation of the Environment of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (PERSGA; African Union;
governmental organisations\textsuperscript{21}, and representatives from the relevant UN agencies.\textsuperscript{22} These observers were all seeking a solution to the then restive piracy off Somali waters. During the deliberative process, all the stakeholders coalesced around progressing cooperative efforts between regional states with support from international partners (IMO 2009, pp. 1-2). The Djibouti Meeting culminated in the adoption of the DCoC, which indicates successful collective securitisation of piracy and armed robbery, illustrating a shared understanding of the nature of the threat and an endorsement of special measures to address it (Haacke and Williams 2008, p. 778). In other words, the consensus in favour of institutionalising interstate cooperation constituted an extraordinary measure, considering that it occurred in a region that lacked a culture of multilateralism up until that point. Resolution Two of the DCoC establishes a framework for technical cooperation and assistance, while Resolution Three addresses capacity-building issues such as training and information sharing between coast guards and naval officers.

The IMO’s Technical Cooperation Programme is designed to support developing countries to comply with international regulatory procedures for maritime safety and the prevention and control of marine pollution (IMO 2020, p. 1). For example, in 2000, the IMO Resolution A.901 (21) solidified the organisation’s position as a provider of maritime capacity building to ensure “…safer shipping and cleaner oceans” (IMO 2000, p. 3). IMO assistance in capacity building focuses on human resource development and strengthening institutional capacities. However, the maritime security capacity building division (MSCB) – a niche within the Maritime Security and Facilitation (MSF) section – is a subset of the Maritime Safety Division (MSD).

The MSCB caters to capacity building for maritime security rather than to human resource development and strengthening institutional capacities.\textsuperscript{23} While the IMO’s MSCB is primarily a technical division, it also convenes member nations, particularly those in maritime insecurity-affected regions to discuss measures to ensure security at sea. For

\textsuperscript{21}Observers from the following non-governmental organisations were in attendance too: BIMCO; International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO); Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA).

\textsuperscript{22}by representatives from the United Nations (UN) and UN bodies and programmes such as UN Department for Peacekeeping Operation, UNODC; UN Political Office for Somalia and the World Food Programme also attended.

\textsuperscript{23}This author was exposed to the organisational structure of the IMO during an internship in 2017.
example, the IMO set the tone for a discussion about maritime security governance in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden by hosting high-level meetings for its member states. These meetings provided a forum for the exchange of views and ideas between the participating states on maritime security governance. Thus, the IMO, through its facilitative role, encouraged state representatives to consider a coordinated approach to maritime security capacity building. The IMO’s initiative was in response to the UNSC’s call in Resolution 1816 upon the international community to assist the states in the affected region with maritime capacity building. In this context, the IMO helped to shape a security-centric agenda for the Horn of Africa. It inherited this agenda from the UNSC focusing entirely on piracy.

Signatory states work with the IMO on capacity building projects funded through the Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund. This support covers both soft capacity building (technical level training) and hard capacity building (infrastructure development and equipment). Practical examples of the Code’s blueprint for maritime infrastructure development include the establishment of national focal point network and information sharing centres (ISCs) in Dar es Salaam, Mombasa, and Sana’a. In addition, a regional training centre was constructed in Djibouti to facilitate the implementation of the Code. These initiatives were designed to promote a culture of information sharing between government agencies at both national and regional levels.

The centres have been critical in collating data about activities at sea, thereby contributing to Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) regionally. MDA refers to the holistic understanding of operations at sea and taking stock of all the issues that occur in the maritime environment (Rahman, 2010, p. 202). To this end, in 2017, the DCoC programme started working on the implementation of equipment programmes for enhanced MDA in the Indian Ocean. These include an integrated maritime surveillance software platform for Seychelles, deployment of a marine-VHF radio network along the Kenya coastline and procurement and the fitting of GMDSS marine simulator training room at the Djibouti Regional Training Centre in Doraleh (IMO 2017, p. 7). These projects were funded through contribution by the Danish Government to the DCoC Trust Fund. The IMO has also established partnerships with other development agencies that provide training to signatories to the DCoC. This move has led to the creation of collaborative training programmes among a number of international organisations. These are the UNODC, the FAO, INTERPOL, EU CRIMARIO, the East
African Standby Force (EASF), Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed Bin Naif Academy for Maritime Science and Security Studies, the US Coast Guard, and the US Naval Criminal Investigation Services (NCIS) as well as the Humanitarian Peace Support Centre, NMIOTC. Similarly, these entities support IMO by providing trainers for IMO led courses in-kind. This practice allows implementing agencies to view technical level training in the same way and seek collaborative solutions.

In sum, the securitisation of maritime crime by multiple state actors within a regional arrangement demonstrates that the process proceeds in incremental stages. In the event of an unsuccessful collective securitisation move at the first attempt, actors adopt a pragmatic approach to the process in order to secure buy-in from other like-minded actors. A prime example is the extension of the securitisation process into the Western Indian Ocean, which co-opted Kenya and Seychelles on to the securitisation endeavour. Eventually, the securitising imperatives of those with common interests are aggregated to form collective securitisation within an international institution (Haacke and Williams 2008, p. 785). This process helps to galvanise enough support for a small group of states to undertake securitisation collectively, which in this instance resulted in the adoption of the DCoC. According to the documents examined, the Horn of Africa states were largely acquiescent during the deliberative processes at the 2006 high-level meeting in Muscat. For example, the presentations that participants from this region gave did not raise concerns about the other forms of maritime threats that present challenges to the Horn of Africa, such as IUU fishing and environmental degradation (IMO 2006, p. 19). These presentations suggest that stakeholders shared concerns about the security threat posed by piracy and armed robbery to shipping but neglected the threat IUU fishing presents to the blue economy. However, the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC (examined in the following section) suggests a more assertive role for policymakers from the Horn of Africa in influencing a more developmental approach to maritime security.

4.2.2 Recalibrating the DCoC: the Jeddah Amendment

The Jeddah amendment to the DCoC shows that the lifespan of a collective securitisation move is mutable, contingent on it continuously commanding the collective acceptance of the

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24 During the deliberation process in Muscat, States from the Horn of Africa did not make the case for a comprehensive approach to maritime crime, which would have encouraged cooperation against other forms of maritime threats that matter more to the region.
relevant audience. Here, the initial collective securitisation move that resulted in the establishment of the DCoC no longer held sway with some of the Horn of Africa audiences that were critical to its initial adoption. Some signatories to the DCoC expressed concerns about the narrow focus of the Code on piracy and armed robbery, when in fact other threats were and still are prevalent in the maritime space of this region (IMO 2016, p. 3). For example, Djibouti and Kenya, as well as the Seychelles, which was affected due to the transboundary nature of some fish species, argued that the Code's scope should be expanded to include other forms of maritime crime, such as illegal fishing and human and weapon trafficking.25

This realisation of the need to expand the scope of the Code can be illustrated by the threat posed by IUU fishing to the blue economy (the referent object) of the region. The security threats presented by IUU fishing affected the Horn of Africa as well as neighbouring countries. This is because when migratory tuna is depleted in one state’s waters by foreign trawlers, it has a detrimental effect on the level of stock of tuna fish coming into a neighbouring states (Kadagi et al. 2020, p. 14). Indeed, the issue of IUU fishing was of particular concern to the Small Island Developing State of Seychelles, which heavily relies on fisheries both for food security and economic development. Similarly, Kenya pushed for the securitisation of illegal fishing because industrial fisheries contribute to its national economic development plan. As the next chapter shows, Kenya has taken a leading role in taking the blue economy agenda forward.

The decline of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden prompted the IMO to recalibrate the original securitisation agenda toward a more developmental approach. Thus, the suppression of piracy acted as a basis for expanding the scope of the maritime security agenda beyond piracy and armed robbery. As the then Secretary-General of the IMO, Koji Sekimizu describes it:

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\text{The decline of piracy in the region now presents a window of opportunity for IMO Member States in the region to implement capacity building programmes to prevent a resurgence of piracy and to address wider issues including other transnational organised crimes committed at sea, as a basis for the sustainable development of the maritime sector (IMO Maritime Safety Division 2015).}
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25 This is based on discussions I had with state representative at the IMO General Assembly 30th Session, 27th November 2017.
The above quote suggests a recognition – on the part of policymakers – that piracy is representative of a larger problem of interconnected maritime threats, and that in order to prevent a revival of piracy, the underlying causes, notably underdevelopment, must be addressed. To this end, regular interactions among regional states under the banner of the IMO increased the salience of blue growth. As a result, the economic opportunities presented by the maritime sector moved to the forefront of the maritime security agenda. The potential for a blue economy to contribute to national economic development plans in less developed DCoC signatory states gained attraction.

Regional sentiments regarding a balanced approach – the twin tasks of blue growth and the provision of security at sea – led to an extraordinary meeting of DCoC National Focal Points held in Djibouti, on 11th November 2015 (IMO 2015 p. 1). During the meeting, these National Focal Points touted their intention to extend the scope of the DCoC mandate to also include other forms of maritime threats, most notably IUU fishing (IMO 2015, p. 2). In other words, states were negotiating the collective securitisation of broader transnational threats. In the ensuing period, the IMO’s Maritime Security Division enlisted the technical support of the Pew Charitable Trust26 – a non-state actor – to draft a text for a comprehensive framework for tackling maritime threats in consultation with signatory states in the affected region. This was because the outputs of the organisation, such as treaties, regulations and codes of conduct typically reflect the collective will of its 172 member states working by consensus. They put forward a proposal to Committees for outputs (IMO induction programme 2017). However, the IMO had to deviate from its customary policy-making approach because the framework only affected a segment of its member countries. This explains why the agreement was drafted by the Pew Charitable Trust, after which a follow-up meeting held on the sidelines of the 29th regular session of the IMO Assembly in London, in 2015. This meeting gave focus to discussing a blueprint for extending the DCoC (IMO document 2015, p. 1). Thereafter, the IMO convened signatories to the DCoC to debate the expansion of the scope of the Code, which then received overwhelming support (IMO document 2015, p. 2). This penultimate meeting in London lay the groundwork for a final meeting that would be held in Jeddah, during which the process of collective securitisation would be initiated.

26 The Pew Charitable Trusts is an independent non-profit, non-governmental organisation.
The senior officials who met in Jeddah, engaged with transnational maritime crime, played a crucial role in collectively securitising different forms of maritime threats under the auspices of the IMO. A keynote speech by the Head of the Border Guard of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Admiral Awwad Eid Al-Aradi Al-Balawi constituted the collective securitisation move (keynote speech 2017, p. 2) in which he stated that:

*The political and security situation in some countries in the region has helped the breakout of terrorist organizations, armed militias and organized crime groups that are active in smuggling, human trafficking and other crimes affecting maritime security. Actually, these acts do not threaten a certain country, but threaten the security and safety of the whole international community.*

The preceding speech act emphasises two fundamental patterns of maritime security: the interconnected nature of maritime threats and how these are shared transnationally. The implication is that piracy and armed robbery cannot be addressed in isolation from other threats that occur at sea. To this end, the Admiral constructed different forms of maritime issues, such as terrorism, and trafficking in humans and weapons as threats to maritime security. The audience of the above securitisation move were the senior government officials who participated in the process and approved the move through the adoption of the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC. Haacke and Williams (2008, pp. 785-786) states that the relevant audiences in a collective securitisation process are “the state representatives of participating countries” such as “leaders, ministers and especially their senior officials”. As discussed above, the process of collective securitisation officially begins when one or more member states of a regional organisation initiate a securitisation move, which, in turn, galvanises other members into action (Haacke and Williams 2008, p. 785). Indeed, the Head of the Border Guard of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia staged various forms of maritime crime as security threats and the participating states in the process accepted this move, leading to successful collective securitisation. Haacke and Williams (2008, pp. 785-6) note that the power to override general public policy in light of a change in the threat picture lies within the ambit of state authorities. In the present context, the collective securitisation process was completed through the adoption of the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC, which represented a special measure (because it expanded the maritime security agenda to other threats at sea). The Revised Code became effective from the date it was signed, on 12th January 2017. It includes
all of the existing provisions of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (Jeddah Amendment 2017, 6).\textsuperscript{27}

The Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC drives the message that the interlinkages of maritime threats pose far-reaching interrelated problems – security, economic and environment. Hence, maritime insecurity is a pressing concern with implications for a multitude of interconnected sectors. These include traditional maritime industries, such as fisheries, tourism and maritime transport. Thus, in the deliberative process, state representatives approved the creation of a secure maritime domain, which is conducive to the harnessing of a blue economy that is multisectoral – fisheries, trade, transport and tourism. In essence, maritime security was framed as creating an environment that is conducive to the revitalisation of the blue economy. Likewise, a stabilised blue economy creates greater demand for the provision of security at sea (Voyer et al. 2018, p. 28). This move propelled the case for addressing other strategic crimes, including terrorism against oil and gas installations and transport systems, trafficking in drugs, in weapons and people, and IUU fishing (IMO Document 2017, p. 6). However, the implementation of the revised Code depended on overcoming political will.

In the Jeddah Meeting, participating states recognised that securing political will depended on the implementation of a number of enabling initiatives. These included: adequate legal frameworks; maritime situational awareness; law enforcement capability ashore; interdiction capability at sea; appropriate training and logistic support; and interagency cooperation (Jeddah Meeting 2017). A programme of activities was agreed during the Jeddah Meeting. These activities encompass implementation of a regional training programme throughout the year, building the capacity of the information sharing network (ISN) and conducting of national workshops to build strong national maritime security coordination as a basis for regional coordination (IMO 2016, p. 3). To achieve the objectives, the IMO called upon donors to make additional financial contributions to the DCoC Trust Fund. As a result, the expansion of the DCoC mandate led to a change in the function of the ISN from primarily dealing with piracy incidents to a comprehensive approach that includes the sharing of information on other illicit maritime activities. These include: illegal arms and drug trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, maritime terrorism, human trafficking, IUU fishing and

\textsuperscript{27} The range of offences addressed by the Jeddah Amendment is non-exhaustive but includes piracy and armed robbery against ships, IUU fishing and transnational organised crime in the maritime domain, all of which are defined in the text.
environmental crimes. In other words, the Jeddah Amendment is a comprehensive framework that addresses issues outside the scope of the IMO, necessitating collaboration with other organisations involved with maritime security capacity building.

The IMO convened a series of meetings with key implementing partners in order to assist the Horn of Africa in meeting the expanded information sharing requirements. This move then led to a number of initiatives (IMO 2017, p. 3). Firstly, EU CRIMARIO started working jointly with the IMO on a concept to add two new centres in the Seychelles and Madagascar to create synergy with the DCoC network. Secondly, Saudi Arabia offered to support the ISC in Sana’a through the Jeddah Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (JMRCC) – because its technical function was hampered by the on-going civil strife in Yemen. Thirdly, US AFRICOM developed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the ISN and implementation of a training programme on MDA and information sharing as part of the CUTLASS EXPRESS exercise.

To sum up, the logic behind the Jeddah Amendment is that transnational maritime crime is transboundary; it undermines the security of the national borders of the signatory states. This, in turn, poses a threat to the national sovereignty of a state (political security). Secondly, the increasingly interconnected nature of maritime crime presents an existential threat to a blue economy; international trade heavily depends on a ‘just in time’ operation, with illicit activities at sea presenting a hindrance. The depletion of fish stocks – due to rampant IUU fishing – poses a severe economic impact on national budgets and on communities whose livelihoods heavily rely on seafood (economic security). Thirdly, the destruction of fishing grounds through bottom trawling has a catastrophic environmental impact on the marine ecosystem, on habitats and species (environmental security). The Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC provides a framework for structural transformation and sustainable development in the maritime sectors of signatory states. From this perspective, this revised version of the DCoC has now yoked the blue economy and maritime security together to form a security/development nexus agenda for the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean. It establishes an equilibrium between the littorals – more concerned about development – and user states whose priorities lie in security at sea.
Conclusion

The securitisation of the ocean in the Horn of Africa by the UNSC was driven by the need to protect merchant shipping from piracy. Thus, the UNSC staged piracy as a threat to shipping, particularly humanitarian aid bound for Somalia. This narrative about security at sea came to dominate the agenda for maritime security in this region, ultimately at the expense of development. The IMO helped shape the early stages of this agenda, through the use of securitisation as agenda setting purposes. Following the successful securitisation of piracy at the UNSC, the IMO were able to set the tone for the conversation about the agenda through its facilitation of interstate negotiations among the states in the region. As a result, the IMO could determine what was important in the collective securitisation process in collaboration with regional actors. For example, the IMO included armed robbery in the securitisation agenda in addition to piracy. The DCoC reflects these binary issues as security threats to shipping, making it a security-centric framework for maritime governance.

The concept of collective securitisation provides a lens through which to examine regional agency in agenda setting. In the present context, collective securitisation occurred incrementally. For example, when common ground could not be found during the initial stage, the IMO reached out to other states from the region in order to gain enough support for the collective securitisation move. The process that led to the adoption of the DCoC, which began in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, is a prime example of this evolution. This initiative was later extended to the Western Indian Ocean in order to garner enough support for the securitisation agenda.

The security-centric nature of the DCoC can broadly be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the securitisation agenda was inherited from the UNSC, which constructed piracy as a threat to shipping. Thus, the discourse on the surge in piracy in 2008 in the Horn of Africa to a new peak of violent activity shaped the securitisation agenda. It is within this frame of reference that the collective securitisation occurred. Secondly, a lack of appreciation, on the part of the Horn of Africa, of the imperative for development (the blue economy) led to their acquiescence in the DCoC. However, it was not until 2017 that the DCoC broadened its scope through the Jeddah Amendment in order to address other maritime matters, most notably the blue economy. Minutes of the Jeddah Meeting, which was held on 12th January 2017, show that the agenda for maritime security governance as it was encapsulated in the
DCoC was reappraised under the sway of the relevant audience – here, the signatories to the DCoC. The Jeddah Amendment process suggests that regional policymakers (including actors from the Horn of Africa) managed and augmented the securitisation process this time around through the use of concerted agency.

This chapter has examined the evolution of the maritime security agenda for the Horn of Africa. The following chapter is the second of a two-part analysis of the regional case study, taking the Sustainable Blue Economy Conference (SBEC) 28 as its example. It will examine a new regionally-owned maritime security agenda, which is built around the blue economy. From a theoretical point of view, the chapter draws on the concept of hybridity, which helps explain how policymakers in this region have subverted the original maritime security agenda, discussed in the present chapter, to create a hybrid strategy that fuses security and development together.

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28 The Sustainable Blue Economy Conference (SBEC) was held in Nairobi, Kenya in November 2018.
5 DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF MARITIME SECURITY: SUBVERTING THE ORIGINAL AGENDA THROUGH THE 2018 SUSTAINABLE BLUE ECONOMY CONFERENCE

In November 2018, the Sustainable Blue Economy Conference (SBEC) was held in Nairobi, Kenya. The Conference brought together over 16,320 participants from 184 countries, including heads of state and government, 84 ministers, several heads of international organisations, mayors and governors, the business and private sector, community leaders, and representatives of the civil society, including women’s and youth’s organisations (Kenyan Government 2018a). The Conference’s dominant theme was the sustainable development of the blue economy. As a result, the SBEC represented a significant shift toward a commitment, by the Horn of Africa governments, to implementing developmental policies as part of maritime security governance. Thus, the SBEC created a new narrative about, and definition of, maritime security, which went beyond traditional security metrics.

In analysing these developments, this chapter considers factors that made it possible for the region to influence an agenda-setting process previously dominated by external actors at the UNSC. For the first time, regional voices had a say in the development of a new maritime security agenda built around a blue economy. The definition of the blue economy is one in which it is seen to extend beyond oceans to include lakes and rivers. This definition has led to the revitalisation of this concept by coastal and landlocked states in this region, with a new agenda taking into account local socioeconomic concerns. These include unsustainable use of fish stocks, environmental degradation and soil erosion. Thus, the Horn of Africa heads of state used the SBEC as a platform to express their maritime interest in linking economic development and security at sea within the context of maritime security.

On a theoretical level, this chapter draws on the concept of hybridity to demonstrate how local policymakers subverted the notion of security-centric maritime security (solely focused on piracy), thereby exercising agency in adapting the original agenda to address the Horn of Africa specific circumstances and priorities. As a result of this subversion, a hybrid agenda,

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29 The author of this thesis was invited to attend the SBEC as an observer and gained access to closed sessions with African leaders.

30 The Concept Paper for the SBEC defines the blue economy as “sustainable use and conservation of the oceans, seas, lakes, rivers and other water resources. These resources present a development front with immense potential for contributing to sustainable and inclusive development”.

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built around the interface between maritime security and the blue economy, has emerged at the regional level. This new hybridised agenda has disrupted the original maritime security strategy, as developed at the UNSC, which was shaped by the liberal peace initiative.

There are four sections to this chapter. Section one traces the origins of the SBEC. Section two engages with the relevant literature on the nexus between the blue economy and maritime security. Section three, using evidence from the SBEC, shows how local policymakers undermined the influence of the liberal peace project on the original maritime security agenda via a process of hybridisation. In essence, regional governments, whose decisions carry more weight and have the capacity to make strategic choices, exercised agency in resetting the agenda for maritime security in the Horn of Africa. The political outcome of this process has been the creation of a new maritime security agenda, with a more developmental focus. Section four examines the implications of this regional agency for locals at the community level through the lens of political economy analysis. The tension between the domination of a security agenda centred on the blue economy by regional elites on one hand, and the need to gain the acceptance and support of marginalised coastal communities on the other, is examined in this section. Ultimately, this is a process being driven by regional governments to the exclusion of the local community. This chapter draws on document analysis and discourses on the blue economy, observed during the SBEC.31

5.1 Origins of the SBEC

The Kenyan government pioneered the blue economy agenda for the Horn of Africa, and the SBEC occurred against this backdrop. For example, during the third UN Environment Assembly, President Uhuru Kenyatta unveiled Kenya’s intention to host an international conference on the blue economy as a prelude to the country’s bid for the hosting of the second United Nations Oceans Conference in 2020 (Kenyan Government 2017). In addition, Kenya has been party to the Commonwealth Blue Charter, adopted in 2013. The Charter sets areas of action, such as Commonwealth Clean Ocean Alliance, Coral Reef Protection and Restoration, Mangrove Ecosystems and Livelihoods, Marine Protected Areas, Ocean Acidification, Ocean and Climate Change Ocean Observation, Sustainable Aquaculture, Sustainable Coastal Fisheries and Sustainable Blue Economy (Commonwealth Blue Charter, 2011).

31 The Leaders’ Segment was the focus of the political commitments made by the participating heads of government in the Global Conference on Sustainable Blue Economy, Nairobi Kenya, on 26/11/2018.)
As a signatory state, Kenya decided to spearhead an initiative to promote the blue economy as part of a broader aim to address the challenges and opportunities presented by the oceans. Twelve countries have volunteered to be Champions on nine topics they identified as priorities. Of these nine topics, Kenya chose to champion the blue economy by establishing a Commonwealth Blue Charter Action Group to promote this policy area as a priority for the member states (Commonwealth 2013, p. 2). This Action Group is tasked with ‘developing an integrated approach to the Blue Economy, pushing for the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods and ocean ecosystem health’ (Commonwealth 2013, p. 2). The Action Group serves a second purpose in that it provides a platform for information exchange and lessons learned, as Nick Hardman-Mountford\(^\text{32}\) describes it:

*By coming together to share and talk about the blue economy and work out what works and what are the ongoing challenges, member countries are able to address them together, and that’s really the value of these action groups* (Flavie Halais 2019, p. 3).

Thus, Kenya’s active participation in the process helps explain the context in which the SBEC occurred; it was guided by the priority areas for the Commonwealth member states, such as economic growth, improved livelihoods and ocean ecosystem health (Commonwealth 2013), which permeated every aspect of the SBEC. The priorities that the SBEC assigned to the narrative about food security and the sustainable use of ocean and marine resources reflect the aim of the Commonwealth Charter. For example, in her opening remarks, Monica Juma – then Kenya’s Minister for Foreign Affairs – pointed out that “oceans, seas, lakes and rivers held natural capital that could be used to accelerate economic growth, while creating employment and reducing poverty” (Kenyan Government 2018c). To this end, the Kenyan Government has created a state department for fisheries, aquaculture, and the blue economy. According to Nancy Karigithu\(^\text{33}\) “the blue economy is signalled out in the government’s ‘Kenya Vision 2030’ development blueprint, aimed at transforming the nation into a middle-income country” (Kenyan Government 2018d, p. c). While the country enlisted Canada’s and Japan’s financial support for hosting the SBEC, Kenya decided what was important from the perspective of the Horn of Africa, namely economic development.

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\(^\text{32}\) Head of oceans and natural resources at the Commonwealth Secretariat.

\(^\text{33}\) Principal Secretary, Shipping, and Marine Affairs of Kenya, Blue Economy Conference 2018.
The SBEC took place in Nairobi, from 26th to 28th November 2018, under the theme: ‘The Blue Economy and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’. The Kenyan government was also set to co-host the UN 2020 Ocean Conference with Portugal in Lisbon “that will focus on the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans, seas and marine resources in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals” (United Nations 2019). This conference has been postponed (at the time of writing) due to the COVID 19 pandemic. Recently, the UN Security Council held a high-level open debate on enhancing maritime security in August 2021, chaired by India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and attended by Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta. One of the thematic areas discussed was the blue economy (UNSC 2021). Thus, the Kenyan government’s leading role in the development of the blue economy agenda can be seen in its participation in regional and global platforms to promote the agenda.

5.2  Literature on blue economy/maritime security nexus

5.2.1  Definitions of the blue economy and maritime security

There is no agreed definition of the concept of the blue economy. In policy terms, this concept stems from the strong support for a blue economy among Small Island and Developing States (SIDS) (Silver et al. 2015). However, the debate on the nature of the blue economy began in earnest during the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, dubbed the Rio + 20 Conference. As it transpired at the conference, the blue economy was presented as an extension of the ‘green economy,’ defined as an economy ‘that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities’ (UNEP, 2011, p. 16). Thus, the upshot of the 2012 Conference was an augmented ‘green economy’ concept rather than a stand-alone blue economy agenda. An empirical examination of the blue economy concept suggests that the language of its discourse points towards competing perspectives of what it entails (Silver et al. 2015). Voyer et al. (2018) show that the blue economy could be associated with a number of policy areas (oceans as natural capital, oceans as livelihoods, oceans as good business, and oceans as a driver for innovation), and analyse how these fit into the overarching concept of

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ocean governance. In practice, this definitional problem could have implications for attempts to integrate the different sectors that fall within the ambit of the blue economy to ensure as wide an impact as possible.

Similarly, there is no universally accepted definition of maritime security; it is, at least in part, a broad topic that covers a wide range of policy areas. Kraska and Pedrozo (2013, p. 101) note that the concept is associated with peace and security at sea within the framework of the rule of law. Bueger (2015, p. 159) uses a three-pronged framework to understand maritime security: in relation to other concepts found in broader ocean governance, such as marine safety, seapower, and the blue economy, as well as through the lenses of both the securitisation and practise theories. Klein (2011, p. 3) suggests that, given the common interest in countering a variety of maritime threats, maritime security should be regarded as an all-encompassing interest. Germond (2015, p. 137) claims that maritime security is about the provision of security in the maritime sphere. Percy (2018) investigates the concept of maritime security in relation to the specific purpose it serves when international actors invoke it, such as strategic disputes and criminal activities at sea. As a result, the concept is open to a wide range of interpretations and encompasses both security and development.

5.2.2 Nexus between the blue economy and maritime security

The maritime space offers significant economic opportunities, particularly the harnessing of blue growth; however, security challenges abound in the maritime environment. This means that activities in the maritime domain exemplify the link between security and development (Bueger et al. 2020, p. 5). In other words, maritime security and the blue economy overlap with each other. Indeed, there has been a surge of interest in the protection of maritime boundaries in an effort to exploit the marine resources contained within them (Voyer et al. 2018b, p. 595). The economic potential of the maritime environment places a premium on security at sea. In the same vein, Potgieter (2018, p. 51) argues that if blue growth is premised on the sustainable exploitation of ocean resources, then maritime security provides protection against threats to sustainability, such as environmental degradation. According to Atri and Bohler-Mulleris (2018, p. 3) maintaining peace and security in the maritime sphere is a necessary prerequisite for the promotion of the blue economy. Bueger and Edmunds (2017, p. 1299) note that the blue economy – by which they mean seaborne trade and fisheries management – necessitates the provision of maritime security to safeguard against threats to these sectors. Van Wyk (2015, p. 155) agrees that a blue-economy-oriented
The initiative will not thrive in an environment plagued by maritime security concerns and suggests that actors should consider the prevailing threats in the maritime environment when thinking about blue growth.

Some scholars provide practical examples of the interface between maritime security and the blue economy. Voyer et al. (2018b, p. 28) show how maritime security underpins the blue economy by creating the right conditions, both for the exploitation of maritime resources within national jurisdictions and maritime commercial activities through the supply of important oceanographic data to industry. Maritime security, therefore, acts as a stimulus to blue growth. As Klein (2011, p. 7) puts it, “the economic importance of living and non-living resources has also meant that states wish to protect not only the resources themselves but also information about those resources”. The implication is that maintaining maritime security fosters conditions conducive to the revitalisation of the blue economy. It is against this backdrop that governance of the oceans – which includes maritime security – features in the policy priorities of littoral states because of the economic potential in areas under their jurisdictions (Bateman 2016, p. 5).

The growing interests in the securitisation of the ocean space for the sustainable exploitation of maritime resources have become – to some extent – the object of an empirical investigation. Menzel (2018, p. 166) notes that the revision to the DCoC – the Jeddah Amendment – represents an attempt to link the combating of maritime crime to the reinvigoration of the blue economy. The Amendment calls upon signatory states to develop national strategies and regulatory frameworks for realising blue growth at a national level (Brits and Nel 2018, p. 230). Okafor-Yarwood et al. (2020, p. 1) give focus to an overlooked important facet of the debate on Africa’s blue economy, namely coastal communities. Analysing country specific experiences of the blue economy, Bueger and Wivel (2018, p.182) note that the Seychelles has become the leading exemplar of the nexus between maritime security and the blue economy through achieving crossover success in these complex issue areas. This has enhanced the country’s international standing as a promoter of sustainable development on ocean resources (Bueger and Wivel 2018, p. 171). Malcolm and Murday (2017, p. 36) provide a complementary analysis to shed light on how the Seychelles and Mauritius constructed a sustainable blue economy narrative that has been an important driving force behind endeavours to interlink maritime security and blue economy policies. Vreÿ et al. (2021, p. 99) note blue growth is the flagship of the South African government’s
maritime security agenda, the so-called ‘Operation Phakisa’. From this vantage point, maritime security is the anchor of the sustainable exploitation of ocean resources, given that sustainability is at the heart of the blue economy initiative (Okafor-Yarwood et al. 2020, p. 1). McCabe (2019, p. 332) notes that initially, the Kenyan government focused on enhancing policing at sea and judicial capacity building on land as measures to deal with the prosecution and imprisonment of suspect pirates in the region. However, the containment of piracy ushered in ideas and policies on blue growth, which led to the country becoming an advocate of the blue economy through hosting the International Blue Economy Conference in 2018 (Mboce and McCabe 2021, pp. 171-172).

5.3 Developing an alternative form of maritime security

This section discusses the construction of a new maritime security agenda for the Horn of Africa centred on the blue economy. Here, discourse analysis is used as a method to identify and explain linguistic features used by heads of government at the SBEC to provide insights into how they framed and structured this new agenda. Dew (2007, p. 438) states that “in general, discourse analysis focuses on features of language, styles of argumentation and the way language is used to represent a particular phenomenon or issue”. In this section, it will become clear that local policymakers subverted the notion of maritime security (solely focusing on piracy) and created a new agenda around the security/development nexus. In other words, heads of states from the Horn of Africa exercised agency in deciding what was important in maritime security from the perspective of the region. With the ability to make strategic decisions, regional governments used their agency in resetting the original UNSC agenda, which has been shaped by the liberal peace project. To this end, policy-makers from this region have adapted the concept of the blue economy to suit their specific circumstances and priorities by defining it in relation to oceans, lakes and rivers (AU 2014). This new definition subverts the notion of ocean-centric blue economy as found in the EU strategy (EU 2016a). There are two contextual factors that help explain this security/development nexus strategy developed by regional actors: socioeconomic and political economic factors.
5.3.1 Socio-economic factors

The socio-economic factors shed light on how the blue economy has beneficial effects – actual or perceived – on the Horn of Africa and how this concept appeals to both coastal and landlocked states in this region. The revitalisation of the maritime economy in terms of fishing, trade, transport and tourism weighs heavily with policymakers from the Horn of Africa because of the potential for the blue economy to contribute to national economic development plans. This consideration gives government elites strong incentive to address threats to maritime security. It is in this context that President Abdullahi Farmajo (2018, Nairobi) emphasised the socio-economic benefits of harnessing the blue economy, pointing out how Somalia’s ‘… largely unexploited resource-base can have transformative outcomes in addressing poverty, food insecurity, water shortages, energy needs, and unemployment challenges’. The harnessing of the blue economy is seen by the Horn of Africa as a crucial move to ensure the long-term survival of underdeveloped nations and societies. For example, President Museveni (2018, Nairobi) framed the blue economy as being “…about our survival, linked with Sustainable Goals”…. and claiming that “The link of the water resources and survival cannot be overstressed”. President Museveni’s participation in the SBEC highlights that, from the African perspective, the blue economy is an encompassing concept that affects with both littoral and land-locked states. This is in line with the continent’s institutional framework for the oceans, lakes and rivers (AU 2014, p. 19). The leaders presented the blue economy as an avenue for promoting job creation and economic development and framed it as the path out of poverty in the Horn of Africa. However, instability at sea is a threat to blue growth.

Maritime security is a necessary precondition for the blue economy. As President Kenyatta (2018, Nairobi) reflects upon the blue economy in the face of unsustainable practices and security challenges:

Kenya would play a leading role in implementing proper policies and mechanisms to harness the Blue Economy; managing waste for the sake of food security and biodiversity; enforcing sustainable fishing; and ensuring security and safety in the high seas.

This extract suggests that the harnessing of the blue economy requires an enabling environment. At a policy level, the focus is on helping to preserve biodiversity as well as managing waste. Implicit in the extract is the recognition that these measures require adequate monitoring. In other words, only where a state has the capacity to ensure
enforcement at sea, could threats to the blue economy be averted. Yet enforcement cannot be achieved without the provision of maritime security, such as navies or coastguards. As a result, the extract indicates that blue growth occurs in tandem with a tight security enforcement policy at sea; meaning the blue economy and maritime security are two sides of the same coin. Thus, the construction of a threat – such as environmental degradation and illegal fishing – to the blue economy indicates that unsustainable exploitation of natural resources is a risk factor. To mitigate this risk, Kenyatta’s speech was an attempt to place environmental security onto the political agenda. Trombetta (2008, p. 589) notes that the rationale for securitising the environment is typically to assign a high priority to environmental sustainability. From this perspective, the extract underlines a general recognition of the urgent need for environmental protection as a basis for harnessing the blue economy.

Meanwhile, President Farmajo reaffirmed the need for security at sea in order to benefit from the blue economy. As Farmajo (2018, Nairobi) describes it: “…the potential for a sustainable blue economy, and the need for investment and industrial flow” depend on the imperative to “… first address all illegal activities along our coastlines”. The observations of these leaders point to the emergence of a consensus on the relationship between maritime security and the blue economy. In other words, secure and stable oceans have the potential to create an environment conducive to the revitalisation of the blue economy.

The challenge to the blue economy for landlocked states, however, is of a different kind. As President Museveni (2018, Nairobi) describes:

_The greatest challenges to a sustainable blue economy are; soil erosion as a result of the large numbers of our population being engaged in rudimentary farming methods, pollution by industrial affluence driven by greed which is a result of the use of cheap and often times dangerous inputs with the sole objective of maximizing profit, even at the expense of the environment._

This extract suggests the peculiar challenge to harnessing the blue economy where rivers and lakes are concerned. In this regard, President Museveni emphasises the effect of soil erosion on river pollution and sedimentation, which has the potential to clog waterways and lead to a decline in fish stocks. Thus, economic activities such as river fishing are impacted by subsistence farming in rudimentary forms as well as the risk of pollution from industrial production. These activities have a negative impact on the sustainable exploitation of the blue
economy in regard to rivers; they are commercial waterways – a key engine growth in land-locked states – while still ensuring food security and livelihoods.

However, soil erosion inhibits reinvigoration of economic development at a national government level as well as the economic wellbeing of communities who live on rivers and lakes. Thus, regenerative blue growth is a priority for land-locked states which have rivers and lakes. Barbesgaard (2018, p. 130) points out that “the blue growth envisions ‘triple-benefit’ solutions, where everybody supposedly wins: coastal communities, the environment and investors”. To put it differently, economic inclusion supposedly lies at the heart of the blue economy. From this vantage point, a sustainable blue economy boosts national economic development, but at the same time it is a bulwark against food insecurity and economic exclusion.

Therefore, the common Horn of Africa position on this new regionally-led maritime security agenda that can be discerned from the discourse is that it is a development tool closely linked to maritime security. From this perspective, political economic factors also come into the equation because they define the parameters of blue growth as part of the institutionalisation of the nexus between maritime security and the blue economy. The following section discusses political economic factors that help explain the institutionalisation of Africa’s blue economy.

5.3.2 Political economic factors

The political economic factors concern – in the broader sense – governing frameworks for blue economy activities. These frameworks are pre-established governing structures and “include norms, policy paradigms, and institutionalised systems of regulation that together constitute […] the rules of the game” (Judge and Maltby 2017, p. 184). Examples of such rules include: universal norms, such as UNCLOS, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)\(^{35}\); but also norms based on political associations, such as the 2050 AIM strategy and the Lomé Charter. These institutions help inform blue growth initiatives, such as seaborne trade, fisheries, tourism and the extraction of oil and gas from the sea. Norms based on political associations, such as the AIM Strategy and the Lomé Charter are driven by the potential for the blue economy to contribute to continental economic development in its

\(^{35}\) in particular SDG 14, which aims to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.
widest sense. Indeed, the process that led to the continent’s institutional frameworks for governing its maritime space is a telling indicator of the imperative for harnessing Africa’s maritime resources.

The continent’s commitment to the blue economy could be traced to the African Union (AU) Commission’s efforts to formulate a comprehensive and coherent strategy, a road map for the blue economy (AU 2009, p. 1). As a result, the blue economy concept entered the continent’s economic lexicon as an idea synonymous with a ‘new frontier of African Renaissance’. This process informed the formulation of the 2050 AIM Strategy. Member States of the AU eventually adopted the AIM Strategy, in January of 2014, at its twenty-second ordinary session. Following the adoption of the strategy, the continent started to make inroads into its agenda for the blue economy. Regional strategies were formulated to address resource deficiency and sensitisation workshops were held to educate policymakers on blue growth. For example, the Horn of Africa region adopted an Integrated Maritime Safety and Security Strategy IMSS (2030) in 2015 through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD). This strategy is an offshoot of the 2050 AIM Strategy. However, IGAD has recently developed a strategy specifically for the blue economy. This strategy is being implemented in selected priority countries for three years (2021–2023), namely Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan, which is funded by the Government of Sweden. At the time of writing, IGAD has started the validation process for the national blue economy baseline reports of the IGAD member states, with its first workshop held in Arta town of Djibouti. (IGAD Blue Economy, 2022).

An Africa-led agenda for the blue economy gathered further momentum in 2016, during which the former Chairperson of the AU Commission, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, pushed for the adoption of an African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development, in an effort to solidify the continent’s commitment to the blue economy. Dr. Zuma held a press conference ahead of the Lomé Summit in Togo, in which she emphasised the importance of utilising the continent’s maritime resources:

*The sea is a huge resource for us. We are very excited to have the Charter in Lomé, which will guide Africa in dealing with maritime issues. The World is looking at the sea as the next economic frontier, and so Africa cannot afford to lag behind* (Press Release No:346/2016, 1).
The Charter was signed at the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government on 15th October 2016 in Lomé. Two years later, the SBEC provided a showcase for a blue economy that reflects – to some extent – a set of African goals and values. According to President Faure (2018, Nairobi), the SBEC demonstrates Africa's role in promoting the blue economy, which “…is further evidence that Africa is beginning to make its presence felt in the growing worldwide movement to develop the Blue Economy”. Therefore, a new narrative about the blue economy galvanised African policymakers into action. Indeed, President Kenyatta (2018, Nairobi) made four pledges at the SBEC, in keeping with the trend of emphasising blue growth. Chief among them were the adoption of “appropriate policies, strategies and mechanisms to harness the blue economy to re-energize our national economies and create greater opportunities and jobs for our people” and to “ensure safety and security in the high seas so that global trade, connectivity and all businesses can thrive unhindered and unfettered” (Kenyatta, 2018, Nairobi).

While the President’s pledges reinforce the link between the blue economy and maritime security, the order in which they were made highlights an approach to maritime security that does not prioritise security at sea over economic considerations. This represents a shift away from a security-centric to a more developmental approach to the management of Horn of Africa maritime environment. This line of thought suggests that the blue economy acts as a spur to maritime security. Indeed, blue growth overshadows maritime security both in the 2050 AIM Strategy and the Lomé Charter. Ken Findlay and Narnia Bohler-Muller note that “the strategy identifies Africa’s Maritime Domain (AMD) as having significant resources (including fisheries, aquaculture, tourism, transport, shipbuilding, energy, bio-prospecting, and underwater mining) and growth opportunities” (Findlay and Bohler-Muller 2018, p. 235). As Faure (2018) puts it “…the Blue Economy represents the next frontier of development for the country [Seychelles]”. The Seychelles’ drive towards a sustainable blue economy to harness its ocean resources forms part and parcel of the country's developmental agenda. Therefore, for Africa, tapping into these ‘resources’ has been an incentive to address maritime insecurity on the policies front.

One of the fundamental purposes of the SBEC was to bring an African-led blue economy into line with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN 2017). Accordingly, the Conference was held under the theme ‘The Blue Economy and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (Kenyan Government 2018, p. 2). Findlay and Bohler-Muller
argue that harnessing the maritime resources in Africa’s maritime domain (AMD) has the potential to contribute to “social, economic, and political stability, and safety and security…” which places African countries in a position “…to promote sustainable development and wealth creation”. The added value of interlinking the blue economy with sustainability is to safeguard against a scramble for resources in the continent’s maritime environment because of a surge in the exploitation of maritime resources. DeLoughrey (2015, p. 356) notes that “this century is witnessing a resurgence in the scramble for the oceans….”. This might help explain the rationale behind Seychelles’ and Mauritius’s efforts to carefully construct a sustainable blue economy narrative to ensure that the revitalisation process does not result in a counter-productive outcome (Malcolm and Murday 2017, p. 36). For SIDS, food security, livelihoods and revenues generated from the maritime sector are at stake if a process of renewal and regeneration does not underpin the blue economy. This creates a greater demand for a sustainability-oriented approach to the blue economy. Thus, a sustainable blue economy promotes policy frameworks for pushing back the frontiers of poverty while promoting economic growth.

However, the harnessing of the blue economy through fisheries and extractive sectors, such as oil and gas depends on effective co-management of the Horn of Africa maritime space. The absence of an agreement on co-management – the practice of jointly managing marine resources – has an especially detrimental effect on migratory tuna and tuna-like species. These species present a transboundary problem affecting littoral states’ fish stocks in this region’s maritime environment in the same way (Kadagi et al. 2020, p. 14). A decline in fish catches has an overall impact on food security, human health and livelihoods. The corollary of resource scarcity is an increase in non-traditional threats to maritime security (Pomeroy et al. 2016, p. 94). Furthermore, the effects of climate change, such as rising sea levels and increased risk of flooding, pose threats to blue growth. For example, the impact of climate change on coral reefs leads to food insecurity, underdevelopment and human ill-health (Cinner et al. 2012, p. 12). These activities do not inspire confidence in the achievement of the UN SDG 14 (Mazaris and Germond 2018, p. 263). Therefore, while the political commitments made by the leaders at the SBEC suggest that there is common ground on the need to harness the blue economy, the confluence of interests is not best protected by unilateral action but on a multilateral basis.
The lack of a cooperative framework for the blue economy in the Horn of Africa was compounded by the ongoing maritime boundary dispute between Kenya and Somalia at the time of writing. The failure of the two countries to reach transboundary agreements could be detrimental to a regional agenda for achieving blue growth. Maritime boundary disputes pose a security threat to the blue economy, which arise “… [over] the presence of strategically significant resources in these zones” (Percy 2018, p. 4). The disputed maritime boundary between Kenya and Somalia is believed to contain significant oil deposits. Klein (2011, p. 7) points out that “the security concerns of a state may be intimately connected with defining and defending perceived entitlements to maritime areas”. Thus, competing claims to a maritime area laden with natural resources have implications for the revitalisation of the blue economy. In the event of an armed conflict between neighbouring countries over perceived entitlement to oil and gas deposits, a lack of stability and peace has the potential to uproot coastal communities from the shore and forced them to flee to terrestrial land. Yet a discussion about the interests of coastal communities in the blue economy was conspicuously absent from the agenda for the SBEC.

5.4 Blue economy agenda driven by government elites

Regional governments are driving the new maritime security agenda, as discussed in the previous section. This section will demonstrate that there was little representation for local actors at the community level in the SBEC leaders’ segment. Thus, the implications of the tension between regional elites’ dominance of a security agenda based on the blue economy and the need to secure buy-in from those affected by it at the community level are examined here through the lens of political economy analysis (PEA). Whaites (2017, p. 4) notes that in the context of development interventions “PEA is the attempt to find out what is really ‘going on’ in a situation, what lies behind the surface of the immediate problem, for example whether competing interests exist”.

The blue economy agenda for the Horn of Africa is an ideal candidate for PEA because it affects both national governments and local communities in different ways. On the one hand, the state’s interests in the blue economy are centred on the process of creating wealth from the ocean in order to contribute to national economic development plans. This help explain the domination of the agenda by regional governments. Local actors at the community level, on the other hand, are interested in the blue economy because they rely on the ocean for food
security and economic well-being. To put it another way, PEA sheds light on the intersection of politics and economic considerations in a society, specifically blue growth and political influence on economic decisions that affect its society. As Collinson (2003, p. 3) describes the dynamics of this process:

*The political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes within a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time.*

In the current context, PEA is a useful lens for determining who benefits and who loses from the process of this new regionally-led agenda. For example, whether blue growth leads to the equitable distribution of income and revenue generated among all stakeholders. Here, a fruitful starting point would be to consider whether members of the civil society played a role in determining the agenda for the blue economy, which was unveiled at the SBEC. The emerging literature on coastal community blue economy practices demonstrates these communities play an active role in the sustainable revitalisation of this sector. Chen et al. (2020, p. 1) show how local communities in China have helped to “bridge the poverty-environment nexus” through sustainable blue economy practices.

During the SBEC, members of the civil society participated in the blue economy debate in response to the Kenyan government’s call for civil society to play an active role in the SBEC. As Monica Juma’s statement\(^{36}\) states:

*We expect civil society to participate and exchange views, knowledge, information and best practices for sustainably using the blue economy to accelerate economic growth, job creation, social inclusion, poverty alleviation and protection of the environment.*

To this end, the University of Nairobi hosted the Civil Society Forum as part of the SBEC, on 27\(^{th}\) November 2018. The event provided a forum for the exchange of views on a broad range of issues in order to explore ways in which “Civil Society Organisations can partner with governments and other stakeholders” (Kenyan Government 2018, p. 26). Edwards (2009, p. 4) observes that the notion of civil society captures a wide range of non-state actors. Indeed, the SBEC provided an opportunity for debate and discussion among civil organisations, including religious leaders and the youths, through the Civil Society Forum. However, this

\(^{36}\) The then Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs made the statement on the Occasion of the Pledging Conference on Blue Economy, on 20/06/2018, at the Crowne Plaza, Nairobi.
Forum was held at the University of Nairobi, away from the conference venue where discussions on the agenda for a sustainable blue economy was being shaped by policymakers (Government of Kenya 2018). There, the business community was given preferential treatment over other members of the civil society in a private audience with President Kenyatta, during which the President (2018, Nairobi) appealed to the business community to invest in the blue economy:

*As a government, we are here to support your initiatives. We believe that there is great potential for that has huge returns that are available in Kenya, in our blue economy as well as other areas and we are here to support you to grow. We recognize that our role is facilitative, while your role is to engage and do business that helps us create jobs and prosperity.*

This extract suggests a blue economy model driven by private enterprise, whereby the government would ensure a facilitative environment for conducting business. This could include the formulation of business-friendly policies and regulatory frameworks for the reinvigoration of the blue economy. Thus, the President’s statement represents the inducement needed for an investment climate. The persuasive language used suggests an attempt to entice economic agents into supporting the blue economy in order to attract private investment. Such an initiative would increase the government’s ability to generate more revenue to finance security services, while still creating employment opportunities for the locals. For example, an increase in tax revenue could help fund the provision of maritime security governance. Effective enforcement status, in turn, gives the government a monopoly on tax on the revitalisation of the blue economy. This means that the state would generate income from levying tax on businesses, on workers’ income, as well as tax added to goods and services in the blue economy sectors. Similarly, enforcement typically creates the right conditions for the inflow of investment in the blue economy, which makes possible the above-mentioned activities. For the business community, greater leverage in negotiations over a blue economy regulation could result in a bias towards investors. For example, a policy outcome of blue economy regulations could be cutting red tape or the introduction of less stringent regulations to assuage the fears of risk-averse investors. Therefore, Kenyatta’s speech sets a favourable tone for the blue economy businesses with a firm commitment to government policy.
However, in the context of the blue economy, there are competing interest groups. Yet, the SBEC, as discussed above, paid more attention to investors in the blue economy to the exclusion of coastal communities. As a result, the SBEC did not provide an opportunity for interaction between other segments of the civil society and policymakers. Yet, the significance of the role of the civil society in the blue economy is encapsulated in the final report produced on the outcome of the Conference, in which it is stated that “Civil Society Organizations (SCOs) have a critical role to play in the blue economy agenda” (Kenyan Government 2018, p. 26). In addition, the report explores avenues for overcoming obstacles to civil society participation in policymaking processes. One of the key challenges identified is a lack of effective collaboration between “Governments and Civil Society Organisations” (Kenyan Government 2018, p. 26).

The Forum recognised that the SBEC presented an opportunity to open up the space for local community participation in the design and implementation of blue economy policies (Government of Kenya 2018). Thus, the Forum culminated in the adoption of the “Nairobi Declaration of the Civil Society Forum on Sustainable Blue Economy Agenda”. In it, it is proposed that the civil society should “collaborate with the government to promote transparency and accountability and inclusion of all through bottom-up approaches” (Kenyan Government 2018, p. 27). On a policy level, this move acknowledges that the civil society has an important role to play in enhancing national ownership of the blue economy through holding state authorities to account, in order to ensure that all stakeholders benefit from the process of blue growth.

However, the outcome of the SBEC reveals that the blue economy agenda has not trickled down to the community level. The design and implementation of the agenda for the SBEC have been top-down, with little civil society participation in the formulation phase. This is evidenced by the “Nairobi Declaration of the Civil Society Forum” discussed above. Civil society organisations were presented as an implementing partner of a policy formulated at the state level. Indeed, critics remain sceptical about the considerable hype surrounding the blue growth. For example, Brent et al. (2018, 19) point out that “…it is important to highlight that the millions of people who to this day still rely on ocean space for their lives and livelihoods – specifically small-scale fishers – have for the most part not been invited to the blue party”. This means that the blue economy agenda includes issues that affect the lives of stakeholders that are dependent on the ocean, thereby meriting a strategy that is broad church, not a
narrow clique. Pugh (1994, p. 214) argues that maritime security – of which the blue economy is a component part – constitutes, among other things, the safeguarding of coastal communities and their livelihoods.

Communities along the shores of oceans, lakes, and rivers bear the brunt of threats to a sustainable blue economy, such as environmental degradation, illegal fishing and maritime terrorism. These threats have an impact on food security and economic wellbeing because of the animal protein and employment opportunities that are provided by fisheries and aquaculture respectively (Kulkarni 2018, p. 256). It is, therefore, a social imperative that the blue economy agenda offers a safety net for these communities. This could be achieved if they are co-opted into the deliberative processes of the blue economy in order to get the issues that matter more to the affected community onto the agenda rather than being regarded as implementing partners of policies designed in isolation by a national government. Failure to account for the local community in the blue economy process is at odds with policymakers’ attempt to link the blue economy with security at sea. This is because the locals know the environment, with the potential to provide valuable insights into the prevalence and motive behind threats to maritime security, on which the blue economy depends.

However, excluding the locals from the formulation of blue economy policies could result in the marginalisation of coastal communities as peripheral, sowing resentment in their minds toward those in authority. This potentially has adverse spillover effects on the maintenance of maritime security. Bueger and Stockbruegger (2016, p. 48) consider the socio-economic concerns of coastal communities as a contributory factor to maritime threats, suggesting the economic dimension of maritime security and its overlap with the blue economy. While the link between IUU fishing and piracy off the coast of Somalia is contested, the prevalence of the former could give rise to passive indifference towards insecurity at sea on the part of the locals. In other words, piracy might re-emerge with the connivance of the locals. As will be shown in chapter eight, coastal communities hold sway in the locus of threats in post-conflict settings such as Somalia. Similarly, the evidence presented in chapter seven suggests that an ungoverned maritime environment creates a land-based security vacuum, which presents a source of threat to security at sea. In consequence, when regional governments construct a threat to the blue economy, as discussed in section three, in an attempt to link development with security at sea, such as the threat posed by IUU fishing, coastal communities need to
feel they have a stake in the securitisation process. Findlay and Bohler-Muller (2018, 35) point out that the blue economy has the potential to contribute to “social, economic, and political stability, and safety and security”. This implies a more inclusive strategy and a broader vision for the reinvigoration of the blue economy that benefits all stakeholders the same way in order to overcome the triple challenges of economic development, social justice and security at sea.
Conclusion

The SBEC presented a valuable opportunity for the Horn of Africa to construct a new narrative about maritime security. Indeed, it allowed the region to articulate a set of aims and values, namely a development-minded blue economy because it was able to influence an agenda-setting process previously dominated by external actors at the UNSC. Thus, the SBEC looked at the blue economy in the frame of the region’s specific circumstances and priorities. This region’s approach to broaden the scope of the blue economy concept to include lakes and rivers in addition to oceans attest to this developmental focus, as these are important commercial waterways and a key engine of growth in land-locked nations in the Horn of Africa. As a result, the regional leaders’ political commitments coalesced around a shared Horn of Africa position on the blue economy as a developmental solution to this region’s socioeconomic problems. While there was a recognition of the link between security at sea and the blue economy in these commitments, this recognition is manifested most notably in the leader’s emphasis on the combatting of environmental degradation and illegal fishing as a necessary condition for the blue growth. This approach represented a departure from the previously dominant anti-piracy measures evidenced in the original maritime security agenda as established at the UNSC in response to an escalation of piracy. For the Horn of Africa, the threat to security at sea is primarily linked to activities that are destructive to eco-systems and biodiversity, the twin pillars on which sustainable blue growth is built.

However, the outcome of the SBEC shows that there are many different strands of the blue economy that resonate with different stakeholders who have a wide range of interests, beliefs, and values. In other words, there are competing interest groups within the blue economy agenda. Yet, this agenda is primarily shaped by regional governments. While there is a rhetorical commitment, on the part of these governments, to allowing civil society participation in the process, the role the business community could play overshadowed potential involvement from coastal communities during the SBEC. However, the fact remains that the long-term legitimacy and success of this new agenda depends on the participation of all members of civil society in the debate about the blue economy in a meaningful way. Efforts were made during the Conference to appeal to the business community because the support of economic agents is critical to the delivery of blue growth. However, coastal communities received less attention despite their strategic importance as partners for local authorities in securing a stable environment for the blue economy, and this oversight
necessarily undermines local acceptance and support for a security agenda built around the blue economy.

This chapter has examined the new maritime security agenda driven by regional governments through the lens of the SBEC. The chapter that follows is the first in a three-part analysis of the national case study. It will analyse the process of maritime security sector reform as a distinct field of study on both empirical and theoretical levels.
6 Reforming Maritime Security Institutions: From International Norm Dominance Within a Narrow State-Centric Strategy to De-Centered State in MSSR

The current blueprint for maritime security sector reform (MSSR), which is shaped by the liberal peace initiative, centres exclusively on the state security institution within the host country. This approach to the reform process fails to pay attention to a range of relevant entities, including breakaway republics and non-state actors – such as coastal and fishing communities. Thus, the current model for MSSR may be effective in stable nations, but it poses significant challenges when dealing with war-torn societies or societies emerging from war, especially where the whole question of who the state is remains problematic.

Drawing on document analysis and in-depth interviews with implementers of MSSR, this chapter makes three arguments: conceptual, empirical and theoretical. Firstly, on a conceptual level, this research suggests that MSSR is, by nature, a plan (that focuses solely on security capacities) designed to achieve overall aims and objectives. Maritime security capacity building (MSCB) is, on the other hand, the principal MSSR agent; it implements, to some extent, MSSR aims and objectives. Secondly, on an empirical level, this study indicates that MSSR is predominantly, though not exclusively, state-centric with evidence from specific projects which both focus on the state in MSSR and contrastingly decentre the state in the reform process to integrate coastal communities in the reform programme. Thirdly, hybridity as a theoretical lens allows the identification of the hegemonic dominance of this normative approach to MSSR in Somalia (driven by the liberal peace project).

These arguments are illustrated in the first of a three-part case study of Somalia, which looks at different facets of international interventions into the country’s maritime sector, such as MSSR and MSCB. This study contributes to the emerging literature on MSSR both empirical and theoretical by highlighting a blind spot where decentring the state in MSSR is concerned as well as the contestation over the local and external actors’ ideas and practices of MSSR. This contestation, to some degree, has led to the fusion of external and local ideas to form a hybrid strategy for the reform process.

There are five sections to this chapter: section one provides an overview of the literature on MSSR; section two assists in conceptually clarifying MSSR in relation to MSCB; section
three discusses the hegemonic dominance of international norms in Somali MSSR strategy; section four examines specific projects that centre the state in MSSR; and section five identifies latent developments that decentre the state in MSSR.

6.1 State of the literature

There is no widely agreed-upon definition of maritime security sector reform (MSSR). Nonetheless, a few scholars have conceptually addressed this definitional problem. MSSR is defined by Ryan (2013, p. 179) through the issues included in the reform programme, such as “key law enforcement agencies, military forces, and civilian administration,” which are a component part of land-based security sector reform. This suggests that MSSR is an extension of mainstream security sector reform. Edmunds (2014) takes an institutionalist approach, focusing on institution building in response to weak maritime security governance created by state failure. He argues that institutional vacuum in the state apparatus acts as a spur to MSSR, which “… sets out to meet these gaps in security governance by strengthening or rebuilding local institutions”. A practice theory lens is another proposed theoretical framework, which analyses the type of activities that implementing partners undertake under the banner of MSSR. For example, Bueger (2015, p. 38) who adopts this theory notes that “the prosecution programme, notably UNODC’s work, [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime] has a more long-term orientation and is geared towards maritime security sector reform and the rule of law”. This implies that MSSR entails international assistance in judicial reform to facilitate mechanisms for retribution and deterrence against crimes committed at sea.

While MSSR as a distinct area has not received substantial treatment, two articles stand out as being particularly relevant to this study. Firstly, Ryan's (2013, p. 173) article on ‘zones and routes: Securing a western Indian Ocean’ analyses the US model of MSSR, and notes that it solely focuses on security at sea. Secondly, Vreÿ et al.'s (2021, p. 107) article on MSSR in South Africa examines MSSR in the context of MSCB; they observe that the most notable reform programme for South Africa’s maritime sectors is ‘Operation Phakisa’, a reform agenda that is heavily informed by economic development. Moreover, a few scholars have discussed MSSR in passing. Bueger et al. (2020, p. 231) touch on the subject matter in an article that studies the burgeoning MSCB activity internationally, comparing the comprehensive nature of the reform process to that of land-based security sector reform. Vreÿ
(2017, p. 359) explains the rationale behind the tendency to opt for a holistic approach to MSSR in that “the transformation of multiple maritime sectors is necessary to promote or benefit from co-operation”. In other words, an encompassing MSSR opens several avenues for cooperation at an international level, all the more so because illicit activities at sea are transnationally shared. Maritime security-related issues represent some of the most valuable areas for cooperation, ranging from people and drug trafficking, illegal fishing and other environmental crimes. To this end, MSSR provides a useful mechanism for neighbouring countries to coordinate on security issues at sea. However, the geopolitical dimension to MSSR could prove a hindrance to potential international cooperation in the maritime arena. To think otherwise would gloss over the propensity of states to focus on self-help interests (Duarte and de Barros, 2019, p. 7). This geopolitical dynamic can also be observed in the Horn of Africa region.

There is a growing MSSR agenda in this region, driven not by traditional development interventions, but ostensibly by private investment in critical infrastructure and port developments. Underpinning these investments is the geopolitics of external actors seeking to advance their national interests in maritime spaces further afield. Bueger and Larsen (2020, p. 155) observe that geopolitical developments are being played out on the African side of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden “… where authorities in the Horn of Africa are currently partnering with shifting constellations of external public/private actors to pursue policy goals closer to the state apparatus, such as the construction of deep-water ports or hosting new military bases”. Meester et al. (2018, p. 27) zero in on the external drivers of the geopolitical dynamics in this region, arguing that “…the most crucial element that brings Gulf capital to the shores of northeast Africa is geopolitical”. The Red Sea’s and Gulf of Aden’s geostrategic location has propelled MSSR in this maritime space into the national priorities of external users who rely on the smooth flow of trade between Europe and the Far East. It is in this context that China’s infrastructure investment in Djibouti lies “… at the very core of China’s plan to promote its maritime strategy” (Huang 2018, p. 277). Indeed, Djibouti serves as a gateway for China to pursue its global and military ambitions while also protecting its economic interests. This helps explain China’s large-scale investment in Djibouti’s MSSR (Dube 2016, p. 4). More recently, Styan (2022, p. 229) notes that “recent Chinese rail and port projects consolidated Djibouti as the fulcrum of Asian; Arab and western commercial rivalry and geostrategic cohabitation in the region”. Thus, Djibouti has played an enabling
role in conflicting geopolitics in the Red Sea, which is motivated by the geostrategic visions of intervening states of EU, the US, Middle East and Asia.

The regional reaction to external attempts to gain a foothold in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden through MSSR is the focus of Gebreegzabhere’s (2018) analysis. He points out that the “…Ethiopian government has intensified its efforts to diversify its maritime outlets to reduce its overwhelming dependence on Port Djibouti” (Gebreegzabhere 2008, p. 29). Cannon and Rossiter turn their attention to the emerging geopolitical competition within the region as a means to influence the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. They note that Ethiopia’s investment in the development of the Port of Berbera represents the country’s “… bid to ascend to the top of the region’s local hierarchy” (Cannon and Rossiter 2017, p. 2). As a result, conflicting geopolitical forces in the region have given rise to competition for influence and ports between external actors. Musa and Horst (2019, p. 35) argue that “recent engagements by multinational corporations in the Berbera port suggest that foreign private investments risk sparking violent conflict”. This development has, in turn, engendered an undercurrent of rivalry between regional states. The empirical literature on MSSR looks at the prioritisation of the reform process. It sheds light on the process of formulating MSSR in order of importance for specific countries.

Empirically, research into the process of MSSR shows the varying importance of the reform process for different countries. For example, some scholars have focused on the question of whether the navy or civilian law enforcement agencies should be in charge of maritime security at sea. Bowers and Koh (2019) attempt to address this pressing question through twelve in-depth case studies of coastal states from Northern Asia to Southeast Asia and from Europe to the Americas that shed light on the “navy-coastguard nexus”. The study provides food for thought for actors in the Horn of Africa, confronted with maritime security challenges. More specifically, it raises the question of whether the circumstances of the particular country warrant pursuing a dual reform process that results in the establishment of both a navy and a coastguard.37

37 The discussion of this topic is expanded upon in the second section by using Somalia as an example to show how the EU is influencing the discussion regarding the types of maritime security forces that the country would need to adopt.
However, Bowers and Koh’s comprehensive study neglects Africa where MSSR has become the focus of international attention. Coastal states in this region initially embarked on MSSR based on the issues that matter more to each country to cater to their priorities. McCabe (2019, p. 332) compares the evolution of MSSR between Kenya and Djibouti – based on document analysis – which diverge in their respective initiatives. He notes that the initial stages of MSSR in Kenya were more in tune with the maritime security agenda that had its origins in the securitisation of maritime crime in the region. In this context, Kenya focused on enhancing policing at sea and judicial capacity-building on land as a measure to deal with the prosecution and imprisonment of suspected pirates in the region. McCabe’s findings suggest that Kenya’s blue economy agenda grew out of the piracy response initiatives and later evolved into the triple nexus: coastal security, governance and development. In contrast to Kenya, blue growth was the primary driver of MSSR in Djibouti. Simply put, the country took a more developmental approach to MSSR at a time when the dominant discourse in the region was about how to combat piracy.

6.2 Demystifying the conceptual distinction between the MSSR and MSCB

The unpacking of the MSSR concept reveals that it is typically a plan that is intended to achieve a particular purpose, such as reforming a coastguard or a maritime police unit. Maritime security capacity building (MSCB), on the other hand, involves an organised programme of measures to be taken in order to implement this plan. The distinction between the two may be articulated as MSSR being more security-centric, in that it solely focuses on plans to develop security capacities, whereas the MSCB addresses development capacity challenges, such as the revitalisation of the blue economy in addition to security capacities. Hence, the MSCB is wider in scope. The MSSR plan determines the strategic nature of the reform programme and establishes objectives, while the process of MSCB involves deciding and implementing the course of action to achieve these objectives. To this extent, the MSCB is clearly dependent on the MSSR for determining its broad objectives.

However, it is also the case that the MSSR may determine objectives that are not in fact implemented by the MSCB process, or at least, not in the way originally intended. For example, in regard to security capacity, an MSSR plan may propose the objective of creating a coastguard. In turn, the process of MSCB may result in the establishment of maritime police unit (MPU) as an alternative to the original objective of a coastguard. However, as will
be discussed further below, such an outcome has political, economic and legal implications for the recipient country. These observations are illustrated in the strategy for reforming the Somali maritime security sector.

6.3 Somali MSSR strategy: hegemonic dominance of Western norms

Prior to the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991, the Somali Navy was tasked with protecting Somali waters, including its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as outlined in the Somali Maritime Law of 1988. As a result, the navy was responsible for carrying out coastguard duties, such as marine patrols against pollution, border control, and search and rescue. When Somalia descended into a prolonged civil war, much of the naval fleet and equipment fell into disrepair. In consequence, Somalia has not had an effective enforcement status at sea since 1991. Following the formulation of the country's first-ever National Security Architecture (NSArch), in 2007, Somali and its international partners have been actively exploring possible options for establishing a maritime security force. The EU, for example, is actively engaged in MSSR for Somalia. The EU blueprint for Somali MSSR is a revised version of a previous document, which was drafted by the international community and presented at the London Conference on Somalia in May 2017. The document was designed to provoke discussion, among Somali actors and their international partners, on what type of maritime security force Somali should have. The purpose of that document was to understand the current role and function of maritime security forces and to assess whether there was a misalignment in the Somali maritime security structure and to build on existing plans such as the overarching agreement on the Somali NSArch.

The NSArch and the international Security Pact call for the establishment of the “Coast Guard at the federal level and the Coast Guard police at FMS [Federal Member States] level” (Somali Government 2017, p. 3). These documents present sketchy information about command structures, which does not help to form coherent maritime security institutions. For example, the division of labour between the proposed federal coastguard and maritime police units at a regional level remains unclear in the NSArch, which states that “the Coastguard will be built and strengthened at the federal level, and the coastguard police at the FMS-level”. In addition, their duties of both entities were left undefined as the NSArch document states: “Their roles and responsibilities will be established later. This task shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017” (Somali Government 2017, p. 3).
Nonetheless, they provide practical guidance for MSCB implementers on which maritime security force should be established at the federal level and which one at the member state level. Thus, the EU blueprint is a follow-up to a document presented at the London Conference on Somalia and draws on “the directives contained in the National Security Architecture (NSArch) and the Security Pact regarding the establishment of the Somali Coast Guard” (EUCAP and UNSOM document 2017, p. 3). The document presents a detailed discussion of possible options for Somali MSSR. This blueprint, which was prepared by EUCAP Somalia and supported by UNSOM, clarifies the basic structural difference between the coastguard and the coastguard police: it categorises them into two distinct entities, namely “Somali Federal Coast Guard (SFCG) and Regional Maritime Police Units (RMPU)” (EUCAP and UNSOM document 2017, p. 13).

The blueprint establishes two main goals. The first goal is to carry out a threat assessment. The rationale behind this move is that the nature of the threat posed to Somalia’s maritime security determines whether the responsibility for maritime security and safety should be in the hands of a navy or of civilian maritime law enforcement agencies, such as a coastguard. One of the proponents of this approach is the EU. As the EU strategy document (EUCAP and UNSOM document 2017, p. 10) describes it: “whether maritime security force is considered a “Navy”, “Coast Guard”, or “State Maritime Police Unit” is of secondary importance to properly identifying threats and matching the correct resources to meet those threats”. Thus, the outcome of the threat assessment is used as a basis for making judgements about which maritime security forces should be created to maintain security at sea. In other words, the EU strategy for Somali MSSR focuses on bringing the security apparatus into alignment with the country’s “current and immediate threats” (EUCAP and UNSOM document 2017, p. 10).

To this end, EUCAP Somalia facilitated the National Maritime Threat Assessment (NMTA), in consultation with the Ministry of internal security in 2017, in the first instance. The NMTA classifies direct maritime threats into three tiers (Somali Government 2017, p. 4):

**TIER 1 THREATS: High** – requiring immediate action

- Maritime Movement of Migrants
- Maritime Movement of Contraband (Smuggling)
- Maritime Movement of Terrorists & Illegal Arms
- al-Shabaab (AS) ability to manoeuvre and operate by sea
- Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing
Piracy Resurgence

TIER 2 THREATS: Less prevalent but possible – highly damaging consequences
Toxic Dumping

TIER 3 THREATS: Unlikely soon – manageable consequences
Natural and man-made disasters
Conflict with Other Nations
Sharing Wealth Dispute i.e. Federal vs FMS Rights
Direct Threat to Legitimate Somali Seafarers from International Navies
Human and / or Live-stock Pandemic

The second goal of the EU blueprint for Somali MSSR is to align the identified maritime threats with the correct maritime security force in order to avoid a mismatch. To achieve this goal, EUCAP Somalia prepared a strategy document entitled ‘Somalia’s Maritime Security Forces, Their Current Alignment and An Examination of Possible Options’, in consultation with the Ministry of Internal Security, and with the support of the UNSOM. Thus, through the lens of hybridity, it is clear that the current strategy for Somali MSSR as designed by international actors is dominated by the external liberal model. Peterson (2012, p. 12) argues that “the lens of hybridity allows for the recognition of hegemony (the external liberal model, which can be characterised as homogenous to a degree)”.

As suggested in section three of the discussion on the conceptual relationship between MSSR and MSCB, if MSSR is the plan that lays out broad objectives, then MSCB is the process that determines and implements how to achieve these objectives. However, it is also possible that the MSSR plan may determine objectives that are not actually implemented by the MSCB process in its original form, thereby undermining such a plan. The Somali MSSR embodied in NSArch is an excellent example of an MSSR plan which has not been executed in its original form. Despite the NSArch being specific about the time frame for establishing both the federal coastguard and the MPU at the member state level, only the latter has been established. Five years after the NSArch document was developed, an MPU in Bossaso, Puntland, has been established to enforce FMS laws out to 12 nautical miles (NM). However, instead of creating the federal coastguard directed by the NSArch, an MPU was under construction at the time of writing in 2021 and has now been completed in Mogadishu – the
seat of the Federal Government. This MSCB project is supported by the EU, and jointly implemented by the UNODC and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

In consequence, the current MSCB process deviates from both the directive in the NSArch, and the EU plan for Somali MSSR, while also undermining what was agreed between the Federal and Regional authorities in the NSArch in terms of the structure of the Somali maritime security force. The NSArch was the result of a lengthy process in which the Federal Government and the Member States reached an agreement, which was then endorsed by the UN. According to the NSArch, only a federal coastguard has the mandate to exercise Somali jurisdiction (i.e. to apply the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) conventions) outside of territorial waters. There is currently a Somali Coastguard law in draft form to underpin the NSArch. Bateman (2003, p. 1) argues that “The protection of off-shore areas and resources is a central element of national security for most regional countries and an important consideration in nation building and governance”. However, instead of a coastguard, an MPU has been created at the federal level, but it does not have a constabulary function beyond 12 NM. This undermines Somalia’s overall strategy for MSSR.

As the plan to establish a federal coastguard has gone awry, due to the creation of the MPU at the federal level, this has political, legal and economic implications for Somalia’s ability to protect its EEZ. Politically, this perpetuates the EU’s role as a security provider to the country’s maritime domain beyond 12 NM, as the current MPUs are only mandated to operate within 12 NM. EU naval forces and a civilian mission on land have been active in Somalia since 2008. From a legal point of view, Somalia’s EEZ will continue to be unpoliced. Some have argued that piracy in Somalia developed in response to rampant illegal fishing in the country’s EEZ (Bahadur 2011; Beri 2011). Thus, the lack of a coastguard to protect Somalia’s EEZ means that it will remain unmonitored and unregulated, potentially triggering a resurgence of piracy in the Horn of Africa. For the Somalis, in particular coastal communities, piracy had a silver lining: when piracy reached a new peak of violent activity, it did have the effect of deterring some foreign fishers who considered the waters too dangerous (Kaplan et al. 2014, pp. 1728-1749). While naval intervention has combatted piracy at sea in Somalia, “very little has been done to stop illegal fishing. Some Somalis see this as tacitly enabling illegal fishing”(Glaser et al. 2019, p. 10). Weldemichael (2012, 110) notes that “combating poverty among fishing coastal communities require the eradication of illegal fishing”.
The irony is that successive development interventions, rather than establishing a Somali coastguard capable of operating up to 200 NM, actually ruled it out completely. Kraska and Wilson (2009, p. 1) note that the adoption of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) in 2009, represented a shift away from “distant-water naval forces to localized efforts, [in order] to effectively counter piracy in the region… an important component of this initiative includes the development of the Somali coast guard”. Economically, the lack of enforcement capacity in the EEZ has huge ramifications for Somalia’s national economic development plan. This country has come to see the blue economy as the next frontier of its development as manifested in President Abdullahi’s political commitment at the Sustainable Blue Economy Conference in Nairobi – examined in the preceding chapter. Indeed, Somali stakeholders, both the federal and member states, have reached a resource sharing agreement for the first time as the first step toward generating wealth from the country’s EEZ, which is examined in detail in below. Ultimately, the harnessing of Somalia’s blue economy will depend on its ability to effectively police and protect its maritime jurisdiction.

While there is no internationally agreed definition of coastguard (Bowers and Koh 2019b), there is a broad understanding of the range of functional activities that a state is required to exercise within its maritime zones of responsibility to deliver on its coastal state competencies (Oliver 2008, p. 578). Coast guarding can be seen as an expression of a state’s competence, sovereignty, and economic sustainability in its own waters. Choi (2020, p. 40) points out that “to the extent that a state was interested and had the requisite capabilities, sea control now included activities to control the passage of vessels threatening to cause environmental damage or to interfere with resources within a coastal state’s EEZ [exclusive economic zone]”. In other words, if a state can exhibit the ability to protect its EEZ effectively, this is an indication that it has the capacity and capability to comply with international obligations, protect its waters and sustainably harness marine resources. To this end, the EU has been the single largest contributor to a Somali MSSR plan. This plan, which is supplemented by various documents and is underpinned by the NSArch, determines Somalia's overall goals and interests, as well as the means of achieving them. One of these goals is the establishment of a federal coastguard. However, the activities undertaken by MSCB implementing agencies such as the UNODC and UNOPS, funded by the EU, are at odds with the MSSR plan as originally envisioned by the Somali stakeholders.
Thus, it seems counter-intuitive and contrary to the EU’s proposal (as discussed above) for the Somali MSSR to depart from the directive in the NSArch, which it had previously supported and even used as a reference point. What can be discerned from the current situation (Somalia’s lack of enforcement status out to 200 NM) is that it serves the vested interests of the EU to carve out a niche for itself in the provision of maritime security externally. Such a view somewhat captures the mood of the EU policymakers. For example, Federica Mogherini (the then High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) noted the “growing demand for an EU role as a maritime security provider not only in our region, but also further away’ – especially in Asia and the Indian Ocean” (Pejsova 2019, p. 1). Indeed, the EU’s intervention into Somalia’s maritime domain corroborates Ryan's (2013, p. 3) argument that MSSR “is a useful tool for foreign policy”. The ostensible purpose for the EU’s MSSR plan was to help usher in enforcement status in Somalia’s maritime jurisdiction, namely the setting up of a coastguard at the federal level, but the evidence in this research suggests that the real reason was to build a strategic presence in the country’s maritime domain. This line of argument is supported by an interview with the Head of EUCAP Somalia, which is presented and analysed in the following chapter on MSCB. The following section will discuss the state-centric nature of MSSR, with evidence from UN agencies involved with this process.

6.4 Centring the state in MSSR

The evidence presented in this section suggests that MSSR is predominantly, though not exclusively, state-centric. The section investigates the extent to which MSSR focuses solely on an internationally recognised state, excluding breakaway republics and non-state actors such as coastal and fishing communities. These arguments are supported by in-depth interviews with UNODC and IMO officials, which are triangulated with policy documents produced by these organisations.

The centrality of the state in MSSR in Somalia can be traced back to the UN response to the escalation of piracy off the coast of Somalia. For example, in 2011, the then Special Advisor of the Secretary-General on Legal Issues related to Piracy, Jack Lang, presented his report on the steps that needed to be taken to “prosecute and imprison persons who engage in piracy”. In it, he attributed “the lack of correctional capacities as the main obstacle to prosecuting pirates in Somalia as well as in the other States in the region” (UN 2011, p. 36). This report
presented a twenty-five-point plan for MSSR. For example, proposal 24 called for the immediate construction of two prisons (one in Somaliland and one in Puntland) each with the capacity to hold 500 prisoners and with protected status to allow for international monitoring (UN 2011, p. 36). However, what was conspicuously absent from this plan was a road map for a long-term solution to piracy beyond the immediate problem of the lack of correctional capacities.

As MSSR is a plan, in order to implement it, the UNODC developed the ‘Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme’ (PPTP). This programme (the MSCB) aimed to improve Somalia’s correctional systems in order to ensure safe and humane imprisonment, as well as to provide the option for those convicted of piracy in states in the region to be transferred back to Somalia to serve their sentences (UNODC 2011, p. 4). This led to the opening of a newly constructed five-hundred-bed prison in Garowe (the capital of Puntland) in 2014 (UNODC 2014). Thus, the UNODC’s Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP), under which the (PPTP) was developed, is evidence of the state-centric nature of MSSR, as Marquez, J. deputy head of UNODC country office (2020 Mogadishu) explains:

*UNODC’s approach is that we are an organisation that provides support to governmental agencies. Obviously, it is a very specific type of programme [PPTP] within the GMCP which has to be fully delivered for the benefit and capacity of the national agencies; in this case for the maritime enforcement agencies or the correctional settings. So, we only deal with governmental agencies.*

The extract suggests that the UNODC’s preferred strategy for MSSR is to support state institutions, such as through correctional infrastructure, perhaps to facilitate punishment, deterrence, and the rehabilitation of offenders. However, this approach fails to address the root causes of maritime criminality; it focuses on the symptoms of threats to maritime security rather than the underlying socio-economic issues, such as underdevelopment in remote coastal areas where the planning and preparation of piracy occurs. MSSR’s main focus on security institutions overlooks the need for a long-term solution, which lies in addressing economic dislocation in the affected coastal and fishing communities. Indeed, non-traditional threats, such as piracy, maritime terrorism and smuggling of weapons do not take place in isolation, but in the context of the local environment. Daxecker’s and Prins’s (2021) argue that non-state actors [which include coastal communities] have a significant role to play in international security affairs. For example, the Gulf of Aden poses a real threat to
freedom of navigation because of a security vacuum created by the collapse of the state apparatuses in Somalia and Yemen (Ulrichsen 2014, p. 10). This concern has contributed to the “intensification [of] superpower surveillance of shipping lanes; piracy and Islamists in…Yemen and Somalia” (Styan 2022, p. 229). Yet, local elites at the community level, for example, maintain security and stability on both sides of the Gulf of Aden due to their interconnected economy facilitated by this maritime space, in the absence of state-provided maritime security. As Majid and Abdirahman suggest:

*Ties mediated through the maritime space provide local communities on both sides of the Gulf of Aden opportunities to preserve livelihoods and autonomy. This is especially true where formal state structures and services are absent, remote, dysfunctional or convulsed by conflict* (Majid and Abdirahman 2019, p. 4).

Indeed, coastal communities are potentially significant enablers of maritime security. For example, their local knowledge can provide valuable insights into the prevalence and motive behind maritime threats (Chapsos and Malcolm 2017, pp. 182-183). This is because non-traditional threats, such as piracy, smuggling and illegal fishing do not occur in isolation from the physical environment and socio-economic issues in affected areas. Enlisting the support of local elites at a community level is a useful lever against organised crime syndicates who run the piracy industry and need the active or passive support of the local people for their operations. Thus, investment in the sustainable development of blue economy industries, such as fisheries and coastal and maritime tourism, could provide alternative livelihoods for communities at risk of turning to maritime crime (Belhabib et al. 2019, p. 80). Indeed, addressing the developmental concerns of these communities is the focus of section four of this chapter. Therefore, the solution to non-traditional threats to maritime security in Somali waters comes not just from MSSR in state institutions, but also from economic development.

The exclusion of breakaway republics from the reform process is further evidence of the normative approach to MSSR. However, while such a MSSR model may work in a country governed by a single government, it presents significant challenges when dealing with societies emerging from war, as a result of which a breakaway republic has emerged in the process. In this context, the normativity of MSSR has political implications for the breakaway republic of Somaliland. This observation can be demonstrated by the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) approach to the process of MSSR. As Azuh, W. the head of IMO Africa and Middle East Technical Cooperation division (London, 2020) describes it:
We are a regulatory agency of the UN to ensure that shipping is carried safely and securely and in an environmentally sound manner, and we can only do this through flag administration, a particular entity. That is why IMO has member states. So, essentially, it is the member states that are the ones we focus on, we cannot deal with non-state actors. For example, Somalia is a member of the UN and automatically a member of the IMO. So, Somaliland is not. They have tried their level best to become IMO member, but we said so you have to go through the Somali Federal Government because it is the recognised entity.

When considered in context, the IMO's approach to MSSR has clear political implications for Somaliland. As the extract suggests, the IMO assists its member states in giving effect to international conventions. For example, it has recently developed a Shipping Code for the Somali government. The Code will enable the country to adopt relevant international maritime conventions in order to fulfil its responsibilities as a flag, port, and coastal State (IMO Document 2020). As a result, Somalia can potentially serve as a preferred port of destination and registration of ships. This has the potential to revitalise the country’s blue economy, contributing to its national economic development plan through foreign ownership and joint ventures in the event of large-scale privatisation.

However, this shipping code may not apply to the breakaway republic of Somaliland, where large scale privatisation is already taking place. In May 2016, the Dubai Ports (DP) World, which specialises in integrated logistics solutions, signed a 30-year deal worth $440 million to develop Berbera port (Styan 2018). The Berbera port is expected to become a major trading hub to serve the Horn of Africa. The Berbera Economic Zone, in particular, will serve as a trade hub, potentially attracting investment and creating jobs in a variety of industries such as warehousing, logistics, trading, manufacturing, and other related sectors. However, Somaliland is not a member of the IMO, because it is not recognised as a sovereign state. As a result, it lacks its own shipping code that is independent of the Somali government. The shipping code is the blueprint for the relevant international regulatory frameworks. Thus, it provides the necessary steps required to accede to key international treaties, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), IMO conventions on safety of life at sea (SOLAS), prevention of pollution from ships (MARPOL), seafarer training (STCW), and the International Labour Organization's Maritime Labour Convention (MLC), none of which Somaliland is a signatory to.

Being party to these international conventions would enable Somaliland to meet its responsibilities in line with IMO and other UN conventions, thereby complying with its
obligations as a port and coastal State. If the Berbera port is to become a major trading hub for shipping in the Horn of Africa, then the Somaliland Authority needs a mechanism for acceding to international conventions for shipping, port operation and ocean governance in general. The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that, in the absence of international recognition as a sovereign state, Somaliland's potential for revitalising its blue economy will be hampered by a lack of relevant international conventions to regulate potential blue growth on an international scale.

6.5 De-centring the state in MSSR

MSSR is predominantly, though not exclusively, state-centric. This section discusses those situations that de-centre the state in MSSR. In this context, the reform process extends to local actors at the community level in two important ways. Firstly, the MSSR plan creates a mechanism for sharing the wealth generated from blue growth among the federal government, members states and local communities. Secondly, the MSSR strategy establishes co-management structures in which the state (federal and member states levels) shares power with coastal communities, with each given rights and responsibilities in decision-making. The first manifestation of de-centring the state in MSSR is the institutionalisation of the fishing sector, in which wealth is redistributed from the state to the coastal communities. This reform process is supported by the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation. The policy output was a framework for revenue sharing for the issuance of fishing licenses, which was signed in February 2018 by the Prime Minister of the Federal Government of Somalia, the heads of the Federal Member States, and the governor of Banadir. As Parvis, J. FAO Deputy head of country office (Mogadishu 2020) explains:

> Recently, we worked a lot with Italy where the main output was a policy level, such as licencing agreements, revenue sharing agreement. We held a lot of workshops, which were process focused in which the outputs were paper outputs. They were important, nonetheless. The project aimed at creating a transparent licensing process for the offshore, for the EEZ fisheries and foreign vessel licensing, a transparent licencing as well as a transparent system to share the revenue generated from that licensing process among all stakeholders including coastal communities.

According to the extract, the reform process in the MSSR decentres the state on two fronts. Firstly, MSSR contributes to greater transparency and accountability in the revitalization of the blue economy. As the following paragraph demonstrates, a lack of transparency has
corroded community trust for the state authorities in Somalia. Thus, such a reform process helps to build community confidence in state institutions. The intervention achieves this by developing a strategy for resource sharing among states and non-state actors, thereby de-centring the state in MSSR. Under the terms of the agreement, the federal government will generate revenue from offshore fisheries resources in its economic exclusive zone (EEZ), particularly tuna and tuna-like species. In turn, a share of the revenue is reinvested in the fisheries sector in order to addresses economic dislocation in coastal communities. The agreement was reached after a very lengthy process, during which halting progress was being made each time negotiations resumed. Competing authorities over the issuance of fishing licences between the federal and member states, on the one hand, and coastal communities' demand for an equitable distribution of revenue generated by fishing licences, on the other, had hammered the country from developing the fisheries sector transparently. Indeed, Glaser et al. (2019, p. 2) note that “disagreement and confusion over authority to issue licenses made many countries hesitant to engage in those modalities and encouraged some fleets to circumvent legal channels or refuse to fish in Somali waters at all”. For coastal communities, the legitimacy of foreign trawlers in Somali waters is determined not only by the legality of the licence issued, but also by whether some of the proceeds from fishing licences are reinvested back into the local communities. In other words, whether wealth creation from the country's maritime jurisdiction trickles down to the local level. As a result, this MSSR framework for reinvigorating the blue economy has squared the circle of transparency and accountability between the federal government and member states while also ensuring that local communities are not economically dislocated.

The second manifestation of de-centring the state in MSSR is a framework for community-based fisheries cooperative management (co-management). This MSSR plan is a proposed collaboration between the government and local resource users to provide an effective governance structure for fisheries management. For example, Secure Fisheries, which is an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) has partnered with two fishing communities in Bander Beyla (Puntland) and Zeila (Somaliland) to support the establishment of co-management associations. This move was triggered by a disagreement between local authorities and coastal communities. As Abdullahi, M. Project Manager (Garowe 2020) describes:

*Part of the co-management system is empowering coastal communities. We do workshops for the community in which we train the locals, convene community*
level meetings and sensitise them to the co-management system and its importance. We travel to coastal communities once every two months. We have a focal point in remote coastal towns, which liaises between us and the community. I recently came back from Bardenhayle. The reason for my travel was to develop a workplan for them on their priorities and needs for this year. Our intervention is addressing a gap in dialogue between the government and communities in remote coastal towns. So there was a disconnect between coastal communities and the local authorities, which are mostly based in the big cities. The government were designing policies that directly affected the coastal communities, but they were not consulted. So, implementation was not possible at the community level. For example, the Ministry of Fisheries in Puntland banned the harvesting of lobster during certain seasons, but the locals refuse to implement the ban because they were not consulted first. So, we wanted to close that gap and bring the government and the locals together.

The extract reveals that decentring the state in MSSR occurred as a result of coastal communities taking a more assertive stance on government policies that directly affect them. Here, the regional government called for a moratorium on lobster on the basis that they were in danger of extinction. However, these communities’ refusal to comply with the moratorium suggests that the state does not hold sway in remote coastal areas. Richmond (2015, p. 50) notes that “often radical transformations have evolved via a confrontation between elite and grassroots agency”. These communities also used Secure Fisheries as a platform to articulate their demand for co-management of resources. (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, p. 776) notes that “Importantly local activists have been able to tap into a series of platforms that have allowed local voices (whether authentic or not) to be more prominent”. Here, it is the complete breakdown in the relationship between the state and coastal communities, a deadlock and a hostile environment that prompted the intervention from Secure Fisheries. Through navigating Somalia’s complex network of actors, the intervention from Secure Fisheries has, to some extent, decentred the state in MSSR. This NGO has established a communication channel between the regional authority and coastal communities, empowering them to take ownership of the management of coastal and marine resources and assisting them in developing income-generating fisheries plans.

This situation has implications for international interveners whose aim is to achieve long-term security at sea through their principal interlocutor, namely the state. Yet, the state cannot be said to legitimately represent what is in fact self-governing and autonomous local communities. Indeed, Richmond (2011, p. 333) argue that “The state cannot be legitimate without those voices [community level] being present and without their views being part”. In addition, external actors’ sole focus on the state might antagonise leaders that wield power
within coastal areas, in the absence of a direct dialogue with these communities on MSSR. Ploch et al. (2011, p. 7) notes that “coastal Somalis lend their fishing boats, equipment, and navigational expertise to teams of would be pirates from inland communities”. Regardless of whether coastal communities aided pirates or not, the fact remains that they have significant influence on events in coastal areas. Thus, they are far too important a stakeholder to be excluded from the reform process.

The third manifestation of decentring the state in MSCB is the Inclusive Local Economic Development (ILED) programme of reform designed to promote private enterprise in the fisheries sector. This process will assist artisanal and industrial fisheries in reaching a global consumer market. The MSSR plan was developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which is currently funded through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. As Parvis, J. FAO Deputy head of country office (Mogadishu 2020) explains:

We are developing a new project at the moment under an EU funded programme. It is called Inclusive Local Economic Development, which has a fisheries component, which the FAO will be implementing. The project presents an opportunity to have a market-driven chain that is going to bring about a sustainable improvement in the whole sector, but driven by markets, not driven by satisfying short-term needs of those different groups [government agencies, fishing and coastal communities]. At the same time, you would be able to satisfy some of their demands for offices, cars and boats. But as you are also doing that, you also have a bigger picture, which is trying to improve the market demand for the fish that is coming through this chain.

According to the extract, this MSSR intervention broadens the reform process to include both states and non-state actors. Indeed, the reform process decentres the state in MSSR by taking into account the interests of blue economy businesses as well as the food security of the local communities in Somalia. Alinovi et al. (2007, p. 1) argues that ‘dysfunctional institutions [in Somalia] are at the root of structural food insecurity’. In order to address this problem, the FAO will deliver an integrated programme of reforms for revitalising Somalia’s blue economy that aims to contribute to sustainable investments in the fisheries sector. This is a market-driven chain intervention, which will focus on increased quantity, quality and consistency of production as well as expanding access to international markets (FAO 2019, 2-3). A MSSR in chain development of fisheries can create an economic environment which encourages enterprise. Such a move will clearly benefit artisanal and industrial fisheries in
Somalia. This MSSR programme aims to achieve the expansion and improvement of access to national and international markets and the strengthening of private enterprise for the fisheries value chain in the country. The reform outputs will improve sustainable management and development of fisheries resources. This can lead to building resilience among fisheries-dependent households and enhance the overall resilience and long-term development of artisanal and industrial fisheries. In turn, this strategy can improve the generally lower levels of economic development in coastal communities when compared to national economic hubs in Somalia (Farah et al. 2002, Cashion et al. 2018, pp.1953). Thus, this programme of reform has the potential to increase productivity and encourage entrepreneurship within Somalia’s nascent blue economy.
Conclusion

On a conceptual level, MSSR is a strategy for achieving a specific goal. It initiates a normative agenda for reforming a country's security apparatus. Hybridity as a theoretical lens suggests that this is due in part to the dominance of the liberal peace project in MSSR. MSCB, on the other hand, is the process of organising a programme of activities to achieve this goal. The preferred strategies of international actors are a focus on the state institutions, such as law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, correctional systems, and the maritime administration in the recipient country. Thus, MSSR plans predominantly emphasise a tight enforcement policy (detecting illegal activity at sea) working in tandem with a tight criminal justice system policy on land (prosecuting, convicting, and incarcerating the perpetrators). Such an emphasis on security capacities has been the dominant narrative about effective MSSR, which can be traced back to the counter-piracy measures that were introduced as a direct result of the surge in piracy off the Somali coast. However, this study has also presented specific projects which decentre the state in the reform programme, such as those aimed at coastal communities. These communities also resist the unilateral imposition of national government policies, making their voices heard by exercising agency in decision-making. This process naturally de-centres the state in MSSR since it also accommodates the interests of coastal communities. Lastly, since MSSR is the strategy, then the process of MSCB generally constitutes the plan of action, which is the focus of the following chapter.
7 BUILDING HYBRIDISED MARITIME SECURITY CAPACITIES:
RESOLVING DISPARATE EXTERNAL AND LOCAL CONFLICTING IDEAS AND PRACTICES

Achieving maritime security capacity building (MSCB) in conflict-affected settings, such as Somalia, involves building capacity on a number of fronts: infrastructure, equipment, technical skills and defensive force, as well as economic development. This case study of Somali MSCB suggests that, all too often, those who assume responsibility for this complex task get their priorities wrong. Common mistakes include a mismatch between the programme of assistance in MSCB and the priorities for Somalia. Inevitably, international support for capacity building is typically designed before the intervention occurs; it is not informed by or influenced by local actors. However, during MSCB implementation, these locals (both elites in government and those at the community level) contest the imposition of externally designed support.

One of the results of an externally formulated strategy for MSCB is that donors and their implementing partners fail to decide which are the most important capacity building projects for Somalia. In consequence, the development intervention in MSCB undergoes a process of change due to resistance both from government elites and coastal communities. As a result of this process, the agenda for MSCB becomes hybridised by combining the ideas and interests of local actors with those of international interveners. In other words, mutual concessions and compromises are made on both sides. The central argument of this chapter is that the original objective of MSCB becomes a more contested process than might first be portrayed. As a result of this contestation, elites in government and UN implementing agencies blend their ideas and practices to form a hybrid agenda for MSCB. The outcome is a holistic approach – combining infrastructure development and equipment and supplementing these with operational level support. These arguments are supported by evidence derived from an examination of interactions between UN agencies implementing MSCB and their Somali interlocutors at the government and local community levels, based on document analysis and in-depth interviews with these actors.

38 These UN organisations are: The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and International Maritime Organisation of the UN.
There are four main sections to this chapter: section one provides a brief overview of the literature on MSCB; section two analyses hybridity as a binary of international interveners and local elites while also drawing on a practice theoretical perspective on MSCB; section three examines the intricacies of hybridity in MSCB among international actors, elites in government, local communities; and section four investigates local voices for MSCB. These arguments made in these sections are supported by interview respondents drawn from UN organisations and government agencies involved with MSCB projects in Somalia.

7.1 Situating the study within the context of MSCB literature

MSCB practice is a relatively new phenomenon in the Horn of Africa. This process had its origins in the UN Security Council Resolution 1816 in 2018, which called upon the international community to assist the Horn of Africa countries in maritime capacity building (Guilfoyle 2008, p. 695). As a result, the process adopted a regional focus (McCabe 2021, p. 121). Such a move is manifested in the EU engagement in maritime security capacity building in the Horn of Africa (Ejduj 2017, p. 470). This shift departs from the previous practice of building land-based security capacity, which lacked a unified stance on regional security governance. For example, Stein (2009, p. 14) observes that “each country has had historically divergent strategies, politics and relations with donors that have affected how the orthodox strategy has been implemented”. The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC), which was discussed in chapter four, was the first regional framework for coordinating MSCB in the Horn of Africa, among other regions (Kraska and Wilson 2009, p. 1).

However, the DCoC did not emerge in a vacuum. The lessons learned from the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) influenced the development of the DCoC. According to Khalid (2009, p. 433), piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Malacca Strait played a key role in shaping security-centric capacity building within the framework of ReCAAP. Similarly, the DCoC was solely concerned with piracy and armed robbery in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. (Menzel 2018, p. 152). Meanwhile, the Mombasa Protocol was developed and approved in 2014 as a result of the region’s initiative to take control of the process of maritime security governance. This Protocol was spearheaded by the host countries of the regional information sharing centres, namely Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, and Djibouti (Lannon 2017, p. 193). The signing of the Protocol marked a clear shift in policy from a piracy-
focused to a more holistic approach to maritime security governance. It implicitly frames piracy and armed robbery as emblematic of a broader problem of maritime threats, thereby broadening the scope of the concept of maritime security governance. McCabe (2021, p. 138) observes that the Mombasa Protocol served as a precursor to the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC. In terms of maritime capacity building, the Amendment established a link between maritime security and the blue economy.

The literature that critically appraises the practice of MSCB suggests that external actors dedicate their efforts to building the capacity of the region’s criminal justice system to ensure that pirate suspects face justice on land (Bueger et al. 2011, pp. 360-361). International assistance for the rehabilitation of courts and prisons as well as support for strengthening maritime governance have overshadowed sustainable development ashore (Bueger 2012, p. 17). In other words, international programmes for maritime capacity building were designed with security in mind from the start as a countermeasure to the threat posed by piracy. In more recent literature, Bueger et al. (2020b, p. 240) point out that the restructured EUCAP Somalia (discussed in chapter eight) suggests that MSCB is an international practice that has also been a learning process. This is because of a shift in focus, which has “… ameliorated some of the most significant pathologies of the original mission and demonstrated an emergent capacity for reflexivity in the face of failure and a willingness to reorganise and refocus activity in response to lessons learned” Bueger et al. (2020b, p. 240). The first attempt to impose empirical and theoretical coherence on current international practice – “Capacity Building for Maritime Security: The Western Indian Ocean Experience” – has been undertaken by Bueger et al. (2021). Empirically, Bueger et al.’s findings suggest that MSCB is a new phenomenon which is still at an experimental stage. In addition, Alcock (2021) argues in his case study of Somalia that a successful MSCB entails sharing experiences, knowledge, understanding, and expectations among those involved with the process.

On a theoretical level, Bueger and Tholens (2021, p. 40) apply practice theory to the process of MSCB, emphasising the co-constructed and emergent nature of knowledge in capacity building in practice. Ejdus (2018, p. 28) draws on Michel Foucault’s concept of international governmentality to argue that the EU operationalises local ownership as responsibilisation. That is the process by which counterparts are made responsible for the implementation of an externally formulated agenda for local maritime security matters. In contrast, Edmunds and
Juncos (2020, p. 3) use hybridity as a theoretical lens to show that, while external actors may well envision what capacities are needed in conflict-affected settings, the way locals engage in the process determines the effectiveness of such a predesigned strategy. It is this analytical application of hybridity that this chapter expands upon by providing a more detailed treatment of the hybridisation process. This analytical form of hybridity “serves as a ‘heuristic device’ to illuminate a range of problematic and/or productive sites of exchange” (Wilcock 2021; Forsyth 2017). There are three key areas that will be examined in this chapter: firstly, it will examine the interface between international actors and local elites; secondly, and the interplay between external actors and local communities; thirdly, interactions between local elites and coastal communities.

### 7.2 Hybridity in practice

One of the defining features of hybridity in the triple discipline of peace-building, state-building and development interventions is the fusion of ideas from international and local elites and strategies to form a hybrid agenda that reflect these. Indeed, (Richmond 2011, p. 324) notes that “Liberal peacebuilding has often offered resources to an elaborate structuration of sometimes predatory elites/international and local/but not to the general populations of these multiple states. Thus, this section transcends a binary conceptualisation of hybridity as international interveners and local elites and captures the intricacies of the hybridisation process at the local level. To this end, this section is divided into two parts. Firstly, it discusses the hybridisation process in regard to international actors and local elites. Secondly, the section explores the interface between the international and local actors at the community level, and the interplay among the locals (national government, regional states, and local communities).

#### 7.2.1 Hybridity: the binary of international interveners and local actors

Local policymakers in the Horn of Africa began to view the MSCB as a tool for addressing the causes of maritime resource deficiency. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is one example, as there is a greater understanding of the value of blue growth for national economic development. As a result, tackling IUU fishing became a priority for Somalia, among other states in the region, thereby asserting agency in demanding hybridity in MSCB. In response to this reality, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) adapted its Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) to respond to local priorities which focus
more on threats to the blue economy. As Deputy Head of UNODC Country Office (Marquez, J. Mogadishu, 2020) explains:

While the GMCP started in 2009 as a response to the regional piracy outbreak off Somali waters, we have become more and more aware of security from the perspective of the sea and states have been turning their ideas and policies towards the protection of the sea. I would say that this is a recent transition in which governments are understanding how they can tap into their natural resources at sea and what the political, geographical, and economic benefits will be. This recent development prompted states from the region to call for capacity building in other areas. So, the programme moved to a broader mandate in which we have incorporated topics such as illegal fishing and illegal trafficking at sea in order to address the concerns of our counterparts.

The extract suggests that local actors’ awareness of and decisions about the issues of importance to them is critical to their exercise of agency in initiating the hybridisation process in MSCB. As will be shown, the initial focus of MSCB on anti-piracy measures does not imply that local actors were passive recipients of externally imposed agenda and thus lacked the ability to resist. In the present context, the process of MSCB in the Horn of Africa was shaped from the start by the liberal peace project, as evidenced by the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1816 in 2008. This Resolution called on the international community to assist the Horn of Africa in building maritime security institutions. Thus, initially, the discourse on MSCB was dominated by a sole focus on counter-piracy initiatives, one of which was the GMCP. It was established as part of concerted efforts by the international community to combat piracy in this region. Instead of addressing the underlying causes of piracy (which includes illegal fishing) the international community’s proposed strategy was to induce the region to take on pirate suspects in a process of investigation and prosecution. As Richmond (2015, p. 54) points out, “from the perspective of international actors, agency revolves around how to use its capacity legitimately to induce a top-down liberal peace, so addressing the local causes of conflict”. In order to implement this liberal peace initiative, the UNODC began assisting Kenya and later Somalia in capacity building in the criminal justice system.

Such capacity building was aimed at facilitating a ‘legal finish’, i.e. increasing the number of prosecutions and securing convictions in the region as a whole. Donors were unwilling to put Somali pirate suspects on trial in their countries for fear of them claiming asylum after serving their prison sentences. For example, warships from Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the United States would apprehend pirate suspects and then release them without
bringing them to trial (Sterio 2009; Guilfoyle 2012; Obuah 2012). However, this strategy failed to deter pirates, resulting in reoffending. As a result, these countries entered into transfer agreements with Kenya to prosecute suspect pirates captured by their own warships in Kenyan courts (Gathii 2010, p. 416). Richmond (2015, p. 54) notes that “a first stage [of hybrid form] may be tense forms of hybrid politics that…fail to resolve the contradictions between local and international norms, and reflect the outsourcing of colonial style rule”. Meanwhile, this top-down process was aided by local policymakers’ failure, at least in the first instance, to recognise the critical role that oceans play in the blue economy.

However, as the extract indicates, the ocean has become more economically important for the Horn of Africa; blue growth has the potential to contribute to the national economic development plans in the region while improving the economic well-being of coastal communities through revitalising artisanal and subsistence sectors. Local actors reconsidered their ideas of the ocean in light of the imperative for development (which is reinforced by the evidence presented in the chapter on the blue economy). Thus, maritime threats to food and economic security, such as IUU fishing, came to the fore. Here, the hybridisation of MSCB can be demonstrated in the broadening of the GMCP programme to address threats to harnessing maritime resources. The local policymakers' agency can be seen in the shift in policy from a security-centric to a more developmental approach. The next paragraph demonstrates the messiness inherent in hybridity, which shows that it is not always a straight-forward process.

The development of the Mogadishu Maritime Police Unit (MPU) illustrates the potential difficulties with ideological contestation over MSCB, leading to pragmatic/messy forms of hybridity. This project was completed in 2022 by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in collaboration with the UNODC. However, the EU preferred to assist Somalia in establishing an MPU, whereas the Somali Authority believed that a national coastguard was necessary. As the Head of the Federal Coastguard (Mohamed, M. Mogadishu 2020) explains:

*The federal government recently held a meeting with regional member states to discuss what type of maritime security force we should have. The EU and the UNODC were also invited. The EU proposed to fund the establishment of a maritime police unit. However, my colleague from the Ministry of Internal Security and I argued for the establishment of a national coastguard to protect Somalia’s entire EEZ. In the end, the EU agreed to build the coastguard headquarters in Mogadishu port, which has facilities such office space, training rooms, dormitories, classrooms, and a command centre.*
However, we do not have coastguard capability, so we only deliver security and safety around Mogadishu Port.

The extract provides an insight into the complex process that, in part, leads to concessions and compromises in hybrid MSCB. Here, the EU originally allocated funds for the development of Somalia's maritime security capacity under a project titled: “Support to the Mogadishu Maritime Police Unit”. According to the Director of Maritime Security (Jimale, M. Mogadishu 2020), “The EU was unable to engage the Ministry of Internal Security in project implementation, which caused a significant delay. When I was appointed, I liaised between the EU delegation and the Ministry to speed up the process”. When the project was finally presented to the Ministry of Internal Security, it insisted on assistance in building the country's national coastguard. This resistance, to some extent, forced the EU to adapt the programme of support to meet the demands of the local elites in government, though there was no increase in funding or changes made to the project title. For example, the EU supported the construction of a new headquarters for the coastguard. However, due to the limitation of funding, the cost of this adaptation was offset against the provision of a severely limited maritime capability to this new security agency. Indeed, as part of the EU's initial funding framework of three million dollars for specifically funding an MPU force, the agency was only given a floating jetty and a boat ramp, and as such, the EU continues to refer to this new agency as an MPU.

On the one hand, the EU made a concession to local actors in order to end a deadlock over the nature of the maritime security force to be established by supporting the construction of a headquarters for the Somali coastguard. On the other hand, the EU resisted a challenge from the local actors to its normative approach to MSCB by proceeding with the original agenda for the MPU. However, in order to carry out effective coast guarding in Somalia’s EEZ, this new agency would require critical equipment, such as a lifeboat for first-responder rescue, a special boat for conducting fast and high-speed manoeuvring tactics to ensure security at sea, sensors, and equipment for search and rescue missions. As the Senior Project Manager of UNOPS (Kahsay, M. Mogadishu, 2020) points out “to establish a fully operational institution, you need to build the infrastructure, provide the equipment and train the client on how to use the equipment”. Indeed, what the EU has achieved in Somalia does not enable the new entity to carry out the special activities of a coastguard. According to the EU (EU 2020), the functions of a coastguard include:
• Maritime safety, including vessel traffic management
• Maritime, ship and port security
• Maritime customs activities
• The prevention and suppression of trafficking and smuggling and connected maritime law enforcement
• Maritime border control
• Maritime monitoring and surveillance
• Maritime environmental protection and response
• Maritime search and rescue
• Ship casualty and maritime assistance service
• Maritime accident and disaster response
• Fisheries inspection and control
• and activities related to the above Coast Guard Functions

Yet, the Somali government identifies the building as belonging to the “Department of Coastguard”, but the operational activities of this agency are limited to providing maritime security and safety around the Mogadishu Port. Nonetheless, while this agency lacks coastguard capability to address the wide range of issue related to maritime safety and security, the new facility serves as an operational base for the federal coastguard. Thus, this facility can serve as a starting point for helping the federal government become more effective in providing port security and safety. The implications of this evidence for our understanding of the hybridisation of MSCB is that the process is not ideal for either the EU or Somalia. However, it is preferable to a stalemate. The end result is that neither party involved with the process gets what they want. Here, the Somali Authority gave up the provision of equipment for the coastguard agency in return for the construction of the headquarters. The EU, on the other hand, caved in to demands for infrastructure development, but retained its original normative approach, namely the creation of an MPU.

At other times, the knowledge that informs and influences the process of MSCB emerges during the interaction between external actors and local elites. This presents an opportunity for these actors to co-construct the nature of the capacity gaps that needs addressing, resulting in MSCB which responds more to local priorities. Such a process is more akin to what Bueger and Tholens (2021, p. 24) call the co-constructed and emergent nature of knowledge in capacity building in practice. Here, a preliminary discussion between the UNODC and the
Puntland Authority resulted in a mutually agreeable arrangement for MSCB. As the Director General of Bossaso Port (Ahmed M. Bossaso 2020) explains:

*When the UNODC approached us about assisting Puntland in establishing a maritime security agency, we told them that port security and safety were our top priorities. This is how the Bosaso Port Police were created. It is part of the Puntland Police Force. Puntland has a Maritime Police Force to combat piracy, which is funded by the UAE, but its base is far from the Bosaso Port. Also, there are many disagreements over the command of this force, so we cannot rely on it for port security. Our economic survival depends on the Bosaso Port.*

The extract suggests that what maritime security entails and the capacity building it requires were co-constructed by the UNODC and the Puntland Authority. The UNODC’s programme of support was originally intended to equip Puntland to combat piracy at sea. As discussed in the previous chapter on maritime security sector reform, the UNODC helped to build a five-hundred-bed prison in Garowe to house convicted pirates. This initiative addressed, to some extent, the challenges of imprisonment on land, which is a vital part of the strategy towards combating piracy. Thus, the UNODC wanted to build on its work in Puntland and enable the authority to interdict piracy at sea, so that different agencies (the police and justice sectors) work together in an efficient and organised way. However, as Puntland already has a maritime police force specifically designed to combat piracy, the actual capacity challenges were port security and safety to protect maritime commerce in and around Bosaso Port. Bueger et al. (2020, p. 286) argue that “… much capacity building in fact comprises a process of improvisation and experimentation, of probing and testing what could be done, and what might work”.

It is here that Bueger and Tholens' (2021, p. 24) theoretical framework for understanding the practice of MSCB can also be useful. Their approach as a lens illuminates how the local elites and the UNODC were able to co-construct a definition of maritime security and the capacity building it requires. In other words, what emerged from such co-construction was a broader definition of maritime security that went beyond the specific threat of piracy to also include port security. This in turn clarified the exact nature of the capacity building required to maintain port security and safety. It is clear from the extract above that the Bossaso Port is a maritime economic hub for the Puntland region and much of Central Somalia. In their agenda setting paper, Bueger and Edmunds (2017, p. 1293) also seem to be concerned that issues such as port security remain underexplored in the existing literature on maritime security.
Thus, the evidence presented in the extract suggests that the creation of the Port Police Unit was driven by a local demand for an environment conducive to economic development. These findings also reinforce the notion that maritime security is a precondition for the blue economy.

Moreover, the co-construction of a definition of maritime security also informed the scope and scale of the actual capacity challenges that required addressing in order to ensure port security and safety in and around the Bosaso Port. Indeed, the UNODC’s interaction with the local authority resulted in the former taking a comprehensive approach to the creation of the Bosaso Port Police Unit, which included three stages: infrastructure, equipment, and training. As the Deputy Head of UNODC Country Office (Marquez, J. Mogadishu, 2020) explains:

> Our main approach was to support three areas. First, infrastructure, which is fundamental to have coordinated capacity. Second, the provision of specialised equipment. Within that, we have vessels, specific maritime technical gear that is needed by the officers and the staff. Third, the training aspects of the support. They [The Puntland Authority] now have a fully functional operational centre, including classrooms where they can be trained and we definitely use that for our training support, but they have the capacity to conduct their own training with the use of that space.

The extract shows that there were three dimensions to the process of capacity building for the Bosaso Maritime Police Unit. The first step was infrastructure development; building the headquarters from which this agency can operate makes coordination possible, which enables policing in and around the port. The second stage was the provision of equipment to the maritime police force, such as vessels and specific maritime technical equipment, making it possible for the force to carry out its duties near the port. The third stage was and still is the operational know-how, and it is intended to put into practice the transfer of expertise, learning, and skills from the donor to the counterpart. Bueger et al. (2020, p. 286) point out that “…it is misleading to suggest that capacity building is only a technical process”. Indeed, such a holistic approach has two benefits. Firstly, the new headquarters for the Bosaso Police Unit serves a dual purpose: as an operational base, as well as an educational facility for the professional development of local officials through regular training. For example, both the Police Unit and external actors, such as the UNODC, IMO and EUCAP Somalia, use the facility to deliver training on coastal navigation, search and rescue, classification and identification of vessels approaching the port, and on maritime communication. Secondly, the equipment enables the local authority to assume responsibility not only for maritime security
but also for complying with international obligations to assist persons in distress by conducting search and rescue operations.

In a similar vein, the UNODC and officials from the Ministry of Justice co-developed knowledge about what capacities are required to ensure a legal finish, which led to the construction of the Ministry of Justice in Puntland. As the Director General in the Ministry (Jale M. Garowe, 2020) points out:

*We were working in an old, dilapidated building. Our efforts to administer justice were hampered by a lack of office space for some of our key staff. We discussed this capacity gap with UNODC. It recognised the value of constructing a new facility for the Ministry of Justice to ensure effective justice administration, which includes achieving a reasonable conviction rate for maritime crime, ensuring that convicted pirates serve their full sentences, and offenders are rehabilitated.*

According to the extract, knowledge of what capacities are required to increase the rates of prosecutions and securing convictions (i.e. legal finish) inside Somalia emerged during the interactions between elites in government and the UNODC. The knowledge gained from this process informed the nature of the capacity building required to deter potential criminals from posing a threat to maritime security. In response, the local government in Puntland proposed a crisis management plan, which anticipates the problems that might arise from the then newly built Garowe Prison complex to house convicted pirates in neighbouring countries, and seeks to reduce their impact by strengthening the justice sector to ensure the effective administration of justice. Thus, such interactions resulted in a new understanding of the importance of a whole-of-government approach to addressing maritime capacity gaps.

Initially, the UNODC’s assistance programme was driven by the liberal peace initiative, namely the institutionalisation of the prison system from top-down. As discussed in the previous chapter on maritime security sector reform, the construction of the Garowe Prison was envisioned in proposal 24 of the Jack Lang report on piracy. The UNODC’s original intervention was based on the understanding that prison sentences should meet the requirements for both retribution and deterrence, and that building a prison to facilitate the incarceration of pirates convicted in other countries would help achieve this goal. However, subsequent interactions between these actors revealed a weakness in the original plan, namely an inadequate justice sector due to capacity constraints. Bueger and Tholens (2021, p. 39) argue that “Uncertainty of how to deal with and organize maritime security persists”. Here, what became clear to external actors over time was that the Ministry not only oversees prison
operating standards, but also ensures that the overarching goals of protecting and advancing the principle of justice are met by cooperating and collaborating with various ministries, public administrations, and public agencies to provide a coordinated approach to achieving a legal finish. This realisation between the Ministry and the UNODC led a whole-of-government approach to MSCB as manifested in the construction of a new facility for the Ministry of Justice.

The section that follows expands on the binary analysis of international and local elites in the hybridisation process by examining the interaction of elites in government and local communities on the one hand, and international actors and coastal communities on the other hand.

7.3 Intricacies of hybridity: international actors, elites in government, local communities

This section discusses the interactions of international actors, government elites, and local actors at the community level that give rise to hybridity in MSCB. The intricacies of hybridisation process of MSCB among these actors remain an underexplored area in the literature. Indeed, Albrecht and Moe (2015, p. 3) argue that hybridity as a theoretical lens goes beyond the state and elite level actors as the sole focus on analysis to “also include and take seriously the agency of non-elites, everyday needs and capacities as well as subaltern politic”. The local dimension of hybridity suggests that agency is exercised both by the local elites and the local communities, which forces international actors to adapt their programme of assistance to suit the competing interests of these different categories of locals. As the Deputy Head of FAO Country Office (Parvis, J. Mogadishu, 2020) explains:

    An alignment between coastal communities, member states and the federal government is already a challenge. I want to have a project working on the priorities of the communities as well as the member states and the federal government. You have to try to understand a bit about each of them. We try to speak to them separately. But you always get simple answers. I mean the government always wants cars, offices and refrigerated trucks. Fishermen want more boats and more nets.

The extract shows the complex and multifaceted nature of the hybridisation process. It indicates the need for hybridity to go beyond its current conceptualisation of a binary choice between international actors and local elites in government. Nadarajah and Rampton (2015, p. 54) points out that “liberal peacebuilding is held to favour the interests of local ‘elites’ and
international interveners”. However, the extract sheds light on the intricacies of local agency, which present conflicting demands for implementers of MSCB. As a result, organisations such as the FAO attempt to bring into ‘alignment’ divergences of opinion and vested interests of various local stakeholders. In other words, hybridisation of MSCB occurs as a direct result of aligning the ideas and interests of different segments of the locals. The insights presented in this chapter have important implications for our understanding of local agency in the existing literature on hybridity, which treats it as no more than a two-way negotiation between external actors and the local elites responsible for policy implementation. Paffenholz (2015, p. 857) argues that “the local turn is hampered by a binary and essentialist understanding of the local and the international, which are presented as the only relevant locations of power or resistance”. These local elites can of course exert leverage over international actors simply by refusing to cooperate with them on the reform programme (Mac Ginty 2010). Indeed, these local elites have been shown to use agency in resisting externally formulated agendas (Elbasani 2018, p.152), which helps explain the emphasis on these groups in the hybridity literature. Mac Ginty (2010, p. 397) notes that “different actors and processes cooperate and compete on different issue agendas”. As the extract indicates, in the MSCB process, the relative agency of different local actors comes into play, resulting in a hybrid agenda that, to some extent, responds to the priorities and constraints of elites and coastal communities. However, in the analysis of hybrid development interventions, the narrow focus on local elites fails to capture the many different aspects of the process, especially in a post-conflict reconstruction environment. The FAO’s MSCB programme demonstrates how there is a tendency to compartmentalise local elites and non-elites based on the nature of their demands.

The second part of this section considers the interface between internationally supported development interventions and coastal communities’ reactions to these. For example, the EU devised a plan of action for the creation of alternative livelihoods and economic opportunities for the youth in coastal areas in Somalia. The “Coastal Communities Against Piracy” (CCAP) project in the coastal areas of Puntland, Galmudug and Mogadishu was designed under the EU-IGAD initiative, as part of the “Programme to Support Regional Maritimes Security” (MASE) in the Eastern and Southern Africa-Indian Ocean Region (ESA-IO). However, piracy declined significantly by the time the project was ready for implementation in 2016. Due to a lack of interest (on the part of coastal communities) in the project’s originally intended purpose, it was adapted for the priorities and constraints of these
communities. As the Country liaising officer for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Abdirashid, J. Garowe, 2020) explains:

*The CCAP project was created at the height of the piracy problem, so the goal was to disincentivise piracy among the youth. However, it was not until 2016 that we started to implement the project. We started off with awareness raising of the piracy problem in coastal communities, but they were not interested. They believed that their communities were being used as a scapegoat for the wrongdoing of other groups who did not belong to them. We then started talking directly to community leaders in order to learn what they hoped to gain from the project. After several consultations with local elders, we came to an agreement on a plan for developing the fisheries sector.*

As the extract suggests, agency at the community level was manifested in the lack of interest from coastal communities. In other words, a subtle resistance to the CCAP project from coastal communities resulted in negotiations between the local chieftains and international organisations on two fronts. Firstly, it led to a change in the narrative about the intervention, from disincentivising piracy for the youth to a more developmental approach. The original focus of the CCAP intervention was on the youth, on the assumption that this segment of the coastal population was designated as being more at risk of engaging in piracy (EU 2016c). The initial phase of the project focused on awareness raising through encouraging young people to wear t-shirts with the words “no to piracy” printed on them; IGAD and the FAO sought to increase awareness of the problem of piracy among the youth in coastal communities. However, this idea was quickly abandoned due to a lack of cooperation on the part of coastal communities. Such a local reaction forced IGAD and the FAO to adapt the project for the prevailing socio-economic problems in the local communities, resulting in hybridity in MSCB. Lee (2021, p. 600) notes that such a subtle resistance from the locals can produce a hybrid agenda. Here, a pre-designed MSCB plan underwent a process of change because the local elders were indifferent towards the proposed approach for the development intervention. Secondly, because the CCAP project was not fit for purpose when it was finally ready for implementation in 2016, it had to be adapted for the specific priorities of coastal communities, namely the revitalisation of the fishing industry. Thus, local agency at the grassroots level resulted in the project being significantly modified and tailored for local conditions in this context. These modifications include the provision of equipment, such as refrigerated vehicles, vessels, and solar-powered flake iced machines in order to revitalise artisanal and subsistence sectors. As a result, those who benefited from the CCAP project eventually became the fishermen and women who were unlikely to have ever been pirates.
7.4 Local voices for MSCB

This section presents local voices for MSCB based on their everyday practice. These voices shed light on the multifaceted and interconnected nature of threats to maritime security, and the capacity building necessary to address these threats. Indeed, the local elites in government argue that maritime security presents many challenges. Thus, it requires a comprehensive approach to the process of building the capacities needed to address these challenges. In this section, it will become clear that these elites advocate for MSCB to go beyond building security capacities and to address the root causes of maritime threats, namely socio-economic issues at the community level. Hence, the weakness identified in the current MSCB strategy, as designed by international actors, is twofold. Firstly, the plan of action for MSCB lacks a coordinated approach to the capacities needed to address maritime insecurities. Secondly, this plan, to a greater degree, overlooks the underlying causes of such threats at the community level. In what follows, I will discuss these flaws at length.

The first weakness identified by local elites in the current MSCB strategy is that it prioritises strengthening the capacity of law enforcement agencies directly involved in investigating and prosecuting suspect criminals in the region over building the capacity of the same agencies within Somalia. This is due to the diversion of investigative and prosecutorial capacity building to courts in the region. In consequence, suspect criminals who are captured by the Somali maritime police units (MPUs) end up being released due to a lack of a functioning and fully resourced criminal justice system component that deals with crimes committed at sea. As the Attorney General (Mohamed, S. Mogadishu, 2020a) explains:

*The current approach to capacity building neglects the investigative chain. It has little effect on preventing maritime crimes. Our international partners are mainly concerned with piracy, which is why when pirates are captured by their naval forces, they are tried in other countries, but they are blind to the fact that this problem must be addressed on land. Piracy and other crimes will continue to exist as long as we lack the capacity to investigate and prosecute these criminals.*

The extract suggests that there is a disagreement between international actors and local elites about the capacities necessary to address threats in the Somali maritime jurisdiction. On the one hand, international actors’ practice of what maritime security is and the capacity building it necessitates in the context of Somalia suggests a focus on piracy. As a result, these actors divide the capacities required to address such a threat into two categories: the creation of MPUs and prison construction in Somalia, and assistance to states in the region in
strengthening their prosecutorial and investigative chain to facilitate a legal conclusion to piracy cases. Local elites, on the other hand, point out that the failure of this approach is in its compartmentalisation of the criminal justice system chain, which has a negative effect on their ability to address maritime threats from land. Such a divergence of views on the threats to security at sea has implications for international assistance in capacity building. Thus far, international interveners have focused on three areas when it comes to MSCB: the establishment of MPUs in Somalia to enable the authority to provide port security, as EU naval forces are combating piracy at sea; increasing prosecution rates and securing convictions for piracy by supporting courts in the region; and ensuring the imprisonment of convicted pirates by building prisons inside Somalia. However, the flaw in this model is that much-needed assistance to the Somali criminal justice system is diverted into other countries in the region. This move affects the provision of capacity building rendered to key government agencies responsible for dealing with threats to maritime security at source, such as the Attorney General’s office. In consequence, the absence of trained advocates to handle maritime crime cases and facilitate investigation and prosecution means that perpetrators of crimes at sea are, to a large extent, not being brought to justice. In other words, there is currently no mechanism for deterring would-be pirates inside Somalia, which undermines local efforts to address threats to maritime security from land where they remain intact. Indeed, Edmunds (2017, p. 9) argues that “…capacity building initiatives have tended to manifest as discreet, technically separate activities, rather than as part of a strategically coherent, coordinated endeavour”. Thus, the extract reinforces the importance of a coordinated approach to MSCB.

There is a need for a comprehensive approach to MSCB because different types of maritime threats interact, implying that separating piracy from drug and human smuggling or illegal fishing is unrealistic. Bueger (2014, p. 2) argues that “In capacity building, piracy can hardly be separated from the broader maritime insecurity challenges”. The evidence presented in this chapter, on the other hand, suggests a compartmentalised approach to the criminal justice system chain, failing to take into account the interconnected nature of the various types of maritime threats. The following extracts, presented in chronological order, shed light on how various types of threats are interconnected, showing the need for a coordinated approach to the process of MSCB. As the Head of the Federal Coastguard (Mohamed, M. Mogadishu 2020) expands on this point:
We are seeing connections between different kinds of crime. For example, the weapons that enter the country [Somalia] are transported by sea. I interdicted weapon shipment destined for Somalia on a number of times. This is a threat to our national security. Recently, we were performing one of our regular patrols and we came across this empty fishing boat. We stopped it and asked what was inside and they said there was nothing. We searched it and found 60 KG of marijuana worth $9,000. We arrested them, put them in custody. They are now in the Central Prison waiting to appear in court. We regularly arrest drug smugglers, human traffickers, food smugglers.

Officials at the federal member state level echo the sentiment expressed above. As the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) (Hassan, I. Garowe, 2020) states:

Human and weapon smugglings have increased dramatically in coastal areas affected by pirates before. You see, the method is generally the same: planning and preparation happens on land, and the crimes are carried out using either a fishing boat or small skiff. Weapons are also being smuggled into Somalia by sea, according to intelligence we gathered on how the militant Daish (Islamic State IS) gets their weapons. Illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping are two other common crimes in our waters. Maritime crimes are interlinked, but we lack the enforcement resources to combat them all.

These two extracts demonstrate the interplay among different forms of maritime threats as well as the interface between land and sea. As a result, several insights emerge. Firstly, the lack of effective governance in Somalia’s maritime jurisdiction perpetuates instability on land. For example, weapon smugglers use the ocean to supply weapons and equipment to the militant group, Daish (Islamic State IS). Such findings show that ungoverned ocean spaces present a threat to the national security of the state. However, the existing literature approaches this issue from the opposite perspective, namely, Somalia's instability as being a contributory factor to maritime insecurity, such as piracy (Silva 2009; Middleton 2008; Woodward 2012). Secondly, following the decline in piracy, local coastal policing suggests an increase in other types of threats at sea. These findings indicate that maritime crime syndicates are able to maintain the momentum in the threat they present for good order at sea, even when one form of crime, such as piracy, is brought under control. The interaction of various types of maritime threats, as well as the multipurpose methods used to commit them, renders the current MSCB's sole focus on anti-piracy measures ineffective in achieving maritime security. As the extract suggests, criminals, for example, use fishing boats or small skiffs for drug and weapon smuggling, but they also use previously piracy-affected coastal areas as a base. Previously, pirates used this method to seize merchant ships passing through
the Gulf of Aden (Middleton 2008, p. 6). In addition, these threats have a cumulative effect on freedom of navigation, such as the impacts of drug and weapon smuggling on the facilitation of maritime traffic. Therefore, the construction of piracy as the sole maritime security concern in Somalia for international actors glosses over the interdependence of these threats, preventing different types of maritime capacity challenges from being linked together. Thirdly, the MPUs’ efforts to maintain law and order in port areas are hampered by a lack of appropriate institutions to facilitate due process of law on land. Perpetrators of maritime crimes continue to operate as usual, exploiting a weakness in the justice system. Ultimately, a legal finish can be achieved only when there is a competent authority to bring suspected criminals to justice. Fourthly, the extracts indicate that an informal division of labour is beginning to emerge from the binary management of the country’s maritime space. This is because while foreign naval forces are primarily concerned with piracy, the local port police units are left to grapple with other threats, such as trafficking in humans and weapons as well as IUU fishing. The tension between Somali authorities and their foreign counterparts draws attention away from the task at hand, which is to provide maritime security for all stakeholders. Because of this tension, local governments have turned a blind eye to piracy, leaving it to the international naval forces operating in the country's waters to deal with, rather than cooperating to address a common threat. To put it another way, this informal division of policing roles has the potential to devolve into a quagmire in which prospective partners engage in a zero-sum competition.

The second flaw in the current MSCB strategy identified by local elites is a conspicuous lack of community development in terms of social justice. The emphasis on MPUs and prison facilities highlights the asymmetric nature of maritime capacity development. Despite the fact that suspect pirates are investigated and prosecuted, the MSCB process fails to provide coastal communities with access to justice for illegal fishing activities perpetrated against them. As the Attorney General (Mohamed, S. Mogadishu, 2020a) explains:

*If we are serious about eliminating maritime crimes like piracy, we need the support of coastal communities because crimes begin and end on the coast. We simply assume that they will support us regardless. These communities will not cooperate with us unless we listen to their concerns. The reality is that illegal fishing jeopardises their food security and livelihoods, but they lack access to justice to have their grievances heard.*

The extract highlights the importance of situating MSCB within the larger context of social justice. In this regard, the Somali authority in charge of restoring law and order emphasise
access to justice at the grassroots level as a prerequisite for maritime security. They believe that the solution to the root causes of maritime crime lies in community development. The extract emphasises, in particular, the importance of empowering and enabling locals to have their voices heard. Lachapelle (2008) notes that “A sense of ownership in community development is described as a concept through which to assess whose voice is heard, who has influence over decisions, and who is affected by the process and outcome”. Here, local communities are struggling to combat illegal fishing, which presents a threat to their food security; they take their animal protein from fish. In addition, these communities rely on fisheries for their economic wellbeing. As a result, illegal fishing drives poor communities deeper into poverty by depriving them economically and socially. They are made to feel (both by the local elites and international actors) as if they are not important and cannot influence decisions or events that directly affect them. This situation compounds the negative effect of their grievances. Indeed, the marginalisation of coastal residents manifested itself in the piracy outbreak off the coast of Somalia. Deprivation and hardship caused by underdevelopment and resource spoliation at the community level contributed to the emergence of piracy, or at least the issue was treated with indifference by coastal communities. Meanwhile, the piracy problem has disrupted international trade, with global implications; the threat of piracy is still exist, as the local structure and support network have not be dismantled. It is against this backdrop that the authority emphasises local community participation in development initiatives as an effective counter to violent criminals' attempts to exploit the plight of coastal communities. The key message from the extract is that addressing the intertwined challenges of economic and social exclusion of coastal inhabitants is critical in the quest for a long-term solution to threats emanating from Somalia's coast.

The lack of community development is also a major risk factor for violence and instability in remote coastal towns. In consequence, these communities become trapped in a vicious circle in which poverty begets lawlessness and lawlessness begets more poverty. Indeed, this situation is already happening. As the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (Hassan, I. Garowe 2020) observes:

*The truth is that coastal communities are law-abiding citizens who value peace and stability in their communities, but we have failed them. So, violent extremist groups are taking advantage of their social problems. For example, Qandala, Puntland, is one of Somalia's poorest coastal towns. ISIS [the Islamic State] now fully controls of that ancient port town; they launch attacks on our security forces.*
The extract shows that impoverishment in coastal communities and maritime insecurity go hand in hand. In this context, criminals are able to sway ordinary people in remote coastal towns who are trapped in a cycle of poverty and underdevelopment. To get local communities on board, the extract suggests using soft power of persuasion. For example, the use of economic influence on local communities is especially important because the state does not have a monopoly on providing security in remote coastal areas where threats to maritime security originate. Communities along the coast can exert pressure over organised crime syndicates by refusing to harbour them. Their influence points to the need to cultivate positive relationships with coastal communities by addressing their socio-economic concerns.

In general, these communities are small and live in remote coastal areas. They are also close-knit communities that are difficult for outsiders to penetrate. Thus, without their passive support, ISIS would not have been able to infiltrate them. Somali communities in the coast are made up of small clans that are perceived as powerless minorities within the Somali clan structure. The emergence of piracy in their areas does not necessarily mean that they lost their moral compass. Indeed, throughout the Somali civil war, no known internecine clan conflicts have occurred in coastal areas. These communities have not been exposed to the trauma experienced by their counterparts in the hinterlands, which were used as a transit point by armed militias at the height of the civil war. As a result, they are predisposed to lead a peaceful life. It is possible to appeal to and win the hearts and minds of the local community by addressing the issues that are most significant to them. However, communities along the coast have been subjected to social and economic marginalisation by successive governments, in large part because onshore development has never been prioritised among the country's national economic development plans. Beyond the major cities, the development agenda has primarily focused on rural and agricultural hinterlands, which helps explain why coastal communities do not have a strong sense of loyalty to the government. This situation inevitably has implications for the maintenance of maritime security. As stated in the extract, decades of neglect of the local community have resulted in a security vacuum in some coastal areas. A prime example is the situation in Qandala, which has become a breeding ground for violent extremists. ISIS now uses Qandala as a base. Such a violent non-state actor endangers both Somalia’s national security and international maritime order. However, the goal of MSCB has been largely driven by a normative agenda, that is an overemphasis on strengthening the capacities of government agencies. Edmunds et al. (2018, p. 228) points out that “In large part this failure has been a consequence of the
difficulties international capacity builders have had in engaging with complex local actors, circumstances and political environments, in which actors are multiple, agency is negotiated, and outcomes are dynamic and iterative”. Indeed, as discussed above, local actor at the community have used their agency to resist external assistance that does not address their priorities, resulting in more hybridised outcomes. In what follows is a discussion of the resentment the local communities feel towards the EU Operation Atlanta.

Communities from the coast are deeply sceptical of Operation Atlanta’s presence in Somalia. Such a perception of this EU mission is significant as it is having a negative impact on the effectiveness of EU intervention into Somalia’s maritime jurisdiction. For example, EU naval forces and a civilian mission (EUCAP Somalia) on land have been active in the Gulf of Aden over the past two decades. However, this strategy has been neither cost effective, nor has it achieved a long-term stability at sea. While piracy has been contained at sea, it remains intact on land. Thus, such stability depends not only on cooperation between the EU and local elites in government, but also cultivating collaboration and understanding between the EU and coastal communities. However, these communities see the EU naval mission as serving only the EU's interests; they point to the mission’s use of double standards to combat piracy while turning a blind eye to illegal fishing. As the Director of Joint Maritime Information and Coordination Centre (JMICC) (Ahmed G., Garowe, 2020) states:

The EU naval mission [Operation Atlanta] only interacts with coastal communities when it offers escort to FAO to help with the delivery of fishing boats to these communities. For example, this mission was helping the FAO to deliver two fishing boats in Alula in November last year [2009], but the local chieftain and fishermen were angered by the presence of this force [Atlanta] in Alula. They believe the EU is only active in Somalia to protect its own interests because the naval mission takes action against pirates but ignores illegal fishing activities. Some community members even say that this mission protects EU trawlers fishing illegally inside Somalia.

Such a cynical perception of the EU’s engagement in Somalia is, to some extent, seems to be consistent with the motivating factors for the EU’s intervention into the country’s maritime environment. As Head of EUCAP Somalia (Reynolds, C. 2020, Garowe) states: “Europe’s

39 JIMIC is a government institution that has been established to gather information about the maritime environment.
40 Alula also spelled Aluula is a coastal town in the north-eastern Bari region and is part of the Puntland state of Somalia.
strategic interest is in maintaining freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden. That is where Europe has its main strategic interests in Somalia”.

The first extract captures the problematic relationship between Operation Atlanta and coastal communities. Its shows that the cooperation between these is based on one-off arrangements to facilitate the delivery of EU-funded fishing boats, which are individually organised rather than an ongoing cooperative relationship. This suggests that the EU forces do not take a genuine interest in cultivating the local communities as collaborators, which helps explain widely held belief within Somalia that the entity is self-serving. There is widespread concern about Atlanta’s insensitivity to other types of maritime threats, particularly the prevalence of illegal fishing in Somali waters. Illegal fishing is the greatest threat to coastal communities’ artisanal and subsistence fishing. Thus, relations between these communities and Atlanta remains under strain.

The underlying reasons for the EU naval intervention was and still is driven by strategic considerations, as evidenced by the second extract. Achieving long-term security in the Gulf of Aden is critical to the EU economy; this maritime area provides a vital conduit for international trade between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Thus, the tangible threat posed by the outbreak of piracy to freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden galvanised the EU into action (Smith 2017; Kraska and Wilson 2009; Guilfoyle 2008). The EU's strategic imperative to protect shipping from piracy, on the other hand, overshadows local communities’ concerns about illegal fishing. This outcome is consistent with international actors’ practice of MSCB in Somalia, which outsources the investigation and prosecution facets of the criminal justice system to courts in the region. Thus, capacity gaps in these components of the justice sector perpetuates social and economic injustice at the local level.
Conclusion

In order to achieve stable governance at sea in conflict-affected environments, such as Somalia, maritime capacity must be built in several sectors, including enforcement capability, the criminal justice system and economic development. Such an approach requires capacity assessment in the host country, which aims to provide a clear picture of maritime security capacity gaps. However, international interveners often make decisions which reflect the wrong priorities, in large part, because they fail to consult the recipient country before developing a plan of action for MSCB. In such cases, the plan goes through a process of change and ultimately of distortion as a direct result of local agency in resisting its implementation. This process of change is usually thought to be achieved through dialogue between local elites and international actors. However, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that it is not only local elites that have the ability to influence international actors to modify the MSCB plan, but also locals at the community level can exercise agency in bringing about change to externally designed MSCB. Thus, the implications of these findings for our understanding of the hybridisation process are that in war-torn societies, or societies emerging from war, an elite-centric approach to hybridity fails to account for locals at the community level who use their agency to force both external actors and elites in government to adapt their strategies for responding to their local concerns. In this context, different local actors (both elites and non-elites) wield different levels of power and influence on the process. Thus, the complex and multifaceted nature of the hybridisation process indicates the need for the hybridity literature to go beyond its current conceptualisation of it as a binary choice between international actors and local elites in government. Thus, the evidence sheds light on the intricacies of local agency, which presents conflicting demands for international actors. Evidence also suggests that local voices are critical of the MSCB’s compartmentalising of the criminal justice system chain, which has a negative effect on their ability to address maritime threats from land. In turn, this compartmentalisation by MSCB also has a detrimental effect on the provision of social justice for the local communities. Nevertheless, long-term maritime security in the Gulf of Aden remains dependent, not only on enforcement capability at sea, but also on gaining the trust and confidence of local communities who wield power and influence in the actual locus of maritime threats.
The chapter that follows investigates instances in which hybridity as a process fails to occur due to a stalemate between the EU and local elites in Somalia. As a result, it departs from the standard mode of discourse on positive or negative hybridity.
8 DEFINING AND EXPLORING ‘DEADLOCKED’ HYBRIDITY IN MARITIME SECURITY CAPACITY BUILDING: AN ANALYSIS OF EUCAP SOMALIA

This chapter goes beyond the binary of positive and negative hybrid peace. Hence, it explores what might be termed as ‘deadlocked’ hybrid peace/developments. Positive hybridity is a more compromised outcome that resolves disagreements between local elites and international interveners, whereas negative hybridity is described as “the outsourcing of power and norms from the international to the state or society” (Richmond 2015, p. 51). Alternatively, a third variant might be called ‘deadlocked’ hybridity. In other words, this is when neither side (external actors nor local elites) is prepared to entertain each other’s demands, resulting in a deadlock. Indeed, Belloni (2012, p. 31) seems to alludes to such an outcome when he points out that “… although the peacebuilders’ difficulty of ensuring conformity to their demands testifies to the local ability to manipulate and shape the mechanics of intervention, this subversion of international objectives rarely leads to a fundamental reassessment of peacebuilding priorities”. EUCAP Somalia is the perfect candidate for illustrating ‘deadlocked hybridity’ in practice. In 2012, the EU launched EUCAP Nestor, a civilian mission mandated to support maritime security capacity building (MSCB) in five states in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (Djibouti, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Tanzania). This civilian intervention was the EU’s first foray into this region’s maritime space. However, Kenya and Tanzania used their agency in resisting the core support of Nestor, namely mentoring and advising, and instead demanded assistance in equipment, such as coastguard vessels. The mission was unwilling to break the deadlock by combining technical assistance with the provision of equipment. In other words, the mission was reluctant to adopt a positive form of MSCB. Meanwhile, Kenya and Tanzania opted out of the programme of assistance in reaction to the EU’s failure to accommodate their demands. Rather than offering a way out of the impasse, the EU carried out a strategic review of EUCAP Nestor in 2015, assuming that the mission’s lack of discernible impact on the region’s capacity challenges was due to its broad mandate. As a result, the EU phased out its activities in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, renaming the mission EUCAP Somalia. For the first time, the evidence presented in this study suggests that the EU is once again in the process of phasing out the maritime facet of this mission, following resistance from the local elites in government. On a theoretical level, this research uses the concept of hybridity as a lens to analyse conflict and friction between EUCAP Somalia and local elites.
in government. It demonstrates that when these actors interact, they have different considerations in mind, often pulling in opposite directions. It should be possible to reach an acceptable compromise with a little flexibility on both sides. However, while local elites are willing to reach an agreement with the EU on the way forward, i.e. positive hybridity, the latter is unwilling to make concessions, i.e. negative hybridity.

This chapter draws on in-depth interviews with Somali officials at both federal and regional levels as well as heads of EUCAP Somalia headquarters in Mogadishu and its Field Office in Garowe. These interviews are triangulated with document analysis. There are three main sections to this chapter: section one engages with the relevant literature; section two examines EUCAP Somalia’s ideas and practices in MSCB; section three presents an analysis of the voice of the local elites for a more hybrid agenda for MSCB.

8.1 Reviewing the literature

Hybridity has become an integral part of state-building and development interventions. Indeed, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016, p. 2019) point out that hybrid peace as a process is now “part of statebuilding, stabilization and development strategies by major liberal peace actors”. Nevertheless, the hybridisation process is complex and unorganised, involving the interaction between local and international actors and changing power relations (Mac Ginty 2010; Mac Ginty 2011). The end result of a hybridisation process is context-dependent because “it is a constant process of negotiation as multiple sources of power in a society compete, coalesce, seep into each other and engage in mimicry, domination or accommodation” (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016, p. 2020). Hence, Richmond (2015, p. 50) describes hybrid peace outcomes as either positive or negative (Richmond 2015, p. 50). Simangan (2018, p. 1525) notes that a negative form of hybridity is one “in which peace is neither liberal nor emancipatory”.

Elsewhere, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016, p. 2020) argue that the renewed interest in hybridity is, to some extent, “shallow in nature and is driven by … a misunderstanding of the complexities of hybridized processes…”, citing as one example the notion of local ownership. Such a misunderstanding of the complexities of hybridity can be seen in the EU idea of local ownership. The notion of local ownership (as considered by Ejdus 2017; Edmunds et al. 2018) underpins the EU’s external engagement in the host countries and is
“inherent in the European approach to international relations” (EU 2008, p. 3). Indeed, the EU is emphatic about the importance of local ownership, stating in its Global Strategy for Foreign and Security policy that the EU “will pursue locally owned rights-based approaches to the reform of the justice, security and defence sectors” in recipient countries (EU 2016, p. 26). Bueger and Tholens (2021, p. 27) define the principle of local ownership as a process in which the locals should define their own agenda for international assistance, “with external actors only providing the knowledge, skills and resources to do so”.

However, this current research suggests the EU pays little more than lip service to local interests in development, all the while retaining agenda-setting powers in Brussels. Hence, this study adds to existing research, which shows a lack of congruent between the EU’s rhetoric on local ownership and its crisis and management responses within the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012, Ejdus 2017). In a more recent study, Bueger et al. (2020b, p. 240) observe EUCAP Nestor was part of a learning process for the EU and that the shift in focus on EUCAP Somalia “… ameliorated some of the most significant pathologies of the original mission and demonstrated an emergent capacity for reflexivity in the face of failure and a willingness to reorganise and refocus activity in response to lessons learned”. However, the present study modifies this sort of understanding of EUCAP Somalia, specifically by raising questions about the previously held view that the EU's strategic review of its assistance programme is an indicator of lessons learned. The current study suggests that the usual formulation of EUCAP Somalia as the object of inquiry is problematic because it focuses solely on the EU side of the equation. In contrast, the reality is the contestation over MSCB between local elites and the EU maritime civilian mission is essentially dynamic, with ideas and negotiations flowing in both directions. In other words, both positive and negative hybridisation processes better describe this two-way dynamic, in which the emphasis shifts away from EUCAP Somalia and toward efforts to reconcile the EU’s vision and objectives with local ideas, norms, and practices.

This research also challenges the notion of local ownership as an analytical approach to understanding EU engagement in MSCB interventions. Such an idea takes a normative approach to the interaction between the EU and local actors in regard to security sector reform. For example, the EU states that the reform programme “should be developed on the basis of nationally owned processes” (European Commission 2016, p. 5). However,
ownership of the reform process by local actors has been shown to be limited (Ejdus 2017a) or in some cases tends to be selective where external actors engage only the local elites in the design phase of the process in practice (Bueger and Edmunds 2017, p. 1309). Winn and Lewis (2017, p. 2121) argue that “The EU approach leads to ad hoc policies that do not properly engage with local communities”. The empirical literature that draws on local ownership as a lens, eschews an analysis of the everyday use of agency by local actors and how they resist externally designed programmes of assistance, i.e. positive hybridity. Indeed, Ejdus points out that:

*Most of the extant empirical research focuses on the EU side of the equation, while very little work has been done to unearth local discourses and practices. From this, we could glean how the locals render, co-opt, adapt, or resist the local ownership principle within different types of interventions or in different regions of the world (Ejdus 2017, pp. 477-478).*

Thus, local ownership focuses on whether and how these local actors should exercise agency in owning the process. As Bueger and Tholens (2021, p. 40) note “This discussion has mainly been interested in questions of the distribution of resources and political responsibilities”. In contrast, hybridity offers a more nuanced framework for understanding the tension between the norms of international interveners and local ideas and practices. As Mac Ginty and Richmond argue, hybridity is invariably present in state-building and development interventions. Nevertheless, this research reveals that when international and local actors fail to achieve positive or negative hybrid peace/development, the result is an impasse or deadlock. Hence, it explores ‘deadlocked’ hybridity.

### 8.2 EUCAP Somalia: background, norms, ideas and practices

In 2012, the European Union (EU) launched a Regional Maritime Capacity Building mission (EUCAP NESTOR), which preceded EUCAP Somalia. The previous mission was designed to enhance the maritime capacities of five countries41 in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (Tejpar and Zetterlund 2013). However, this regional approach to MSCB in the Horn of Africa failed to achieve its stated aim of equipping the host countries with the right capacities and capabilities to produce stability in the region.42 This failure was due in large

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41 These were Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania

part to the EU’s reluctance to operate in a hybridised context. For example, Kenya and Tanzania used their agency in resisting the specific nature of the capacity building, which was offered by Nestor, namely mentoring and advising. As a complement to such technical support, these countries proposed assistance in equipment, such as coastguard vessels. In this context, a positive hybrid process would have combined mentoring and advising with the provision of equipment in order to reach a compromise. However, the EU remained steadfast in its determination to implement a negative form of hybridity. According to one EU document, the “EEAS’s [EU External Action Service] consistent position has been that Nestor is a framework for transfer of skills and expertise, not of equipment” (Committee 2014b pp. 87-88). Yet, hybrid peace is an intersubjective process whereby local and international agency is determined both by power and legitimacy at the international and local levels (Massey 2013; Massey 2007). Such a process is tense “whereby various local factions and international norms and interests remain opposed in a hybrid negative peace arrangement, until an accommodation is reached that advances both local and international legitimacy” (Richmond 2015, p. 51). However, the EU did not modify its MSCB programme to accommodate Kenya and Tanzania’s objections, and these countries resisted the imposition of a negative hybridity, resulting in their withdrawal from the programme.

In 2013, the European Scrutiny Committee of the UK House of Commons43 raised concerns about the mission's poor performance and concluded that “EUCAP NESTOR has failed to make any discernible impact, and has suffered particularly from a lack of partner buy-in” (Committee 2014 Chapter 13). The UK government was at the forefront of efforts to reform the mission, which led to a proposed strategic review. The proposal “recommended a tighter focus on Somalia, thereby concentrating EU resources where piracy poses the greatest threat to UK trade and security…” (Committee 2014a, p. 89). Following a Strategic Review of the mission, on 12 December 2016, the Council of the EU amended the decision to launch EUCAP NESTOR in 2012 to give focus to Somalia, with a Mission Statement that states “EUCAP Somalia shall assist Somalia in strengthening its maritime security in order to enable it to enforce maritime law more effectively” (EU 2016a, p. 1). This move formed the basis for the decision to shift from a regionwide engagement to a country specific mission, namely EUCAP Somalia.

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43 The European Scrutiny Committee is a select committee of the House of Commons in the Parliament of the United Kingdom
EUCAP Somalia is headquartered in Mogadishu\(^{44}\) with two field offices in Hargeisa, Somaliland\(^{45}\) and Garowe, Puntland.\(^{46}\) For the period 2009-2020, the mission had a budget of € sixty-six million one hundred thousand (EU, 2018). It continues to be overseen by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) steering committee, which is housed within the EU External Action Service. On its website, the mandate of the mission states that “EUCAP Somalia contributes to the establishment and capacity building of maritime civilian law enforcement capability in Somalia, including Somaliland” (EU 2018). There are three components to the mandate of the mission. As Head of EUCAP Somalia (Reynolds, C., 2020, Garowe) describes:

There are three parts to EUCAP Somalia. First, it is meant to develop at least a system, a decision making around blue water entity; call it coastguard if you will; a law enforcement entity in the blue water that can exercise governance in Somali waters. The second leg is to assist with the development of the brown water capacity and that involves working with the maritime police units in at least three areas: in Barbara, in Bossasso to a small extent, and Mogadishu. And the other leg would be broader policing support, which is becoming more important for Somalia. And setting across that would be elements of human and gender, but also quite a strong rule of law.

The extract suggests that EUCAP Somalia operates on three fronts. The first focuses on advising and mentoring government institutions to improve their capacity to develop policies through workshops and seminars. The second is intended to assist the Maritime Police Units, which operate within Somalia’s 12 nautical mile (NM), in establishing police functions, such as port security and safety in and around major Somali ports. Such assistance includes tactical maritime police operations to help police forces across the board harmonise their procedures. The training is conducted in a facility built with the assistance of EUCAP Somalia in the form of a "Ship In A Box". It is made of standard shipping containers that have been assembled to resemble the bridge of a merchant vessel. The Somali Police Force and Maritime Police Units use this to train boarding procedures for conducting inspections aboard merchant ships. Aside from mentoring and advising, this artificial self-training capability is the closest equivalent to infrastructure development that the mission has assisted the federal authority in procuring. However, the EU is building a headquarters for the Somali coastguards at the time of writing. Nonetheless, the Federal and Regional authorities have

\(^{44}\) Mogadishu is the capital of the Federal Republic of Somalia.

\(^{45}\) Somaliland independence from Somalia in 1991, but it has not been internationally recognised.

\(^{46}\) Puntland is a semi-autonomous region under the auspices of the Federal Republic of Somalia.
very few operational seagoing vessels in their inventories. Similarly, there are a limited number of qualified coastguards to ensure safety and security at sea. Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter on MSSR, the EU and the Federal Authority disagree on the nature of the maritime security force Somalia should have. EUCAP Somalia’s third operational front consists of a combination of technical assistance and the donation of small pieces of equipment to the Somali Police Force (SPF) and the Judicial authorities. As part of its ongoing assistance to the (SPF) in preventing and combating maritime crime, EUCAP Somalia donates IT equipment and training materials. The rule of law component aims to improve collaboration between the police, prosecution, and court sectors. The Judiciary has received assistance in the form of a funded internship programme aimed at strengthening the skills of young Somalis pursuing careers in the judiciary, as well as the provision of furniture, bookshelves, tables, and chairs.

The EU delegation to Somalia recently signed an agreement with the Republic of Somalia regarding the status of EUCAP Somalia on 11th January 2020. The authorised signatory of the Somali government was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Awad, A. Mogadishu, 2020) explains:

_The agreement is intended to facilitate the continuation of EUCAP presence within Somalia to continue its work. The EU has launched a regional programme to build maritime security capacity in Red Sea littoral states, including Somalia. I understand from the EU Ambassador [to Somalia], Nicolas Berlanga, that this regional initiative complements what the EU is already doing at the Mogadishu Port and the presence of the EUCAP mission in Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland. Even though it is a regional project, it will be managed by the EU Delegation to Somalia._

The agreement consists of 20 articles. Only one article, article 19, mentions implementation issues. As the Agreement _EUCAP Somalia (2020)_ stipulates:

_For the purpose of the application of this Agreement, operational, administrative and technical matters may be the subject of separate arrangements to be concluded between the Head of Mission and the Host State’s administrative authorities._

This statement refers to a Technical Assistance Arrangement (TAA), which serves as the foundation for the mission’s assistance to federal and regional authorities. For example, if EUCAP Somalia intends to provide mentoring and advising on law drafting to the Ministry of Justice (whether at the federal or regional levels) local officials must first agree to the
terms of a TAA developed by the mission. Such an agreement is typically pre-designed and presented to the locals a fait accompli. By definition, this document is concerned with technical level support. When stretched to capacity, this would allow for the funding of internship programmes for a relatively short period of time. When entering into a TAA with local authorities, EUCAP Somalia must work within the parameters that have already been established by its mandate from the EU headquarters in Brussels. The agreement of a TAA depends on how far the local authorities can shift their priorities in the direction of the pre-designed TAA document. In other words, the onus is on local policymakers to align their needs with the terms of the TAA. Richmond (2015, p. 56) argues that “Leaning too far in either direction inevitably raises the possibility of a negative hybrid peace…”. Thus, the TAA can be seen as a negative form of hybridity. While local elites continue to push for positive hybridity, EUCAP Somalia insists on imposing negative hybridity on these actors. As a result, there has been a lack of cooperation between EUCAP and elites in government. As will be discussed below, local elites in both Mogadishu and Puntland have resisted (and continue to do so) the mission’s assistance in soft capacity building, in terms of cascading training to locals on maritime security governance. Meanwhile, the EU mission is resisting local elites’ attempts to subvert its technical support. In consequence, there is currently a stand-off between these actors. The TAA is a paradox in that it is intended for local implementation but does not allow local actors to contribute to its design or modify it during implementation.

With the exception of Somaliland, the EU mission's engagements in Mogadishu and Puntland have resulted in neither positive nor negative hybrid maritime security capacity building (MSCB). However, a positive form of hybrid MSCB can be observed in Somaliland, which is facilitated by the context in which the development intervention has occurred. In Somaliland, different international actors provide assistance in addressing different types of capacity gaps. In this case, the needs of the recipient society are met collectively, resulting in a blend of international norms and local ideas. The establishment of Somaliland’s coastguard is one such example. As Head of EUCAP Somalia (Reynolds, C. 2020, Garowe) explains:

*We struggle to get long-term change [in Somalia]. We have been quite successful in getting that in Somaliland because the UAE and the UK were there doing the infrastructure and the equipping, and we were then able to do the training and advising. We are working with one principal interlocutor in Somaliland [the Somaliland coastguard] who wants our support. And this is the key to local ownership, local need.*
The extract suggests that EUCAP Somalia has only been able to operate in a hybrid context in Somaliland because of the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) and United Kingdom’s (UK) engagement in infrastructure development and equipment provision in Somaliland. These countries have assisted Somaliland with infrastructure development and equipment, which have been critical to the EU mission’s ability to mentor and advise the local authority on decision-making around ‘blue waters entity’, i.e. a coastguard. Indeed, Somaliland now has a relatively developed coastguard that can provide an effective protection to its maritime resources (Mitchell 2020, p. 122). The extract offers several insights into MSCB in practice. Firstly, collaboration and coordination of activities is shown to be key to an effective MSCB, especially where multiple actors are involved with the process. Edmunds (2017, p. 9) argues that “One obvious reason for this weakness [i.e. the duplication of MSCB] concerns the sheer number of donors involved”. While there is a lack of agreement on the formal division of labour between the EU mission, the UAE, or the UK, as to who will focus on infrastructure development and the provision of hardware equipment to better coordinate MSCB, the actual state of play in Somaliland suggests that even a haphazard form of coordination can create the conditions for a hybridisation process. Secondly, the extract reinforces the argument that hybrid capacity building is an outcome of a process. As Baker (2013, p. 297) notes: hybridity is “used to define a process or institutional outcome of mixed organisational systems and practices”. From this vantage point, hybrid MSCB can be clearly distinguished from the notion of local ownership as emphasised by the EU as being a framework for achieving sustainability of its development intervention in security sector reform (European Commision 2016, p. 5). While the emphasis on local ownership prescribes how agency from local actors in agenda setting may be achieved, there has been a mismatch between policy and practice in this regard (Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012; Ejdus 2017; Ejdus 2018). On a policy level, the EU supports the concept of local ownership, but in practice, the EU and local elites interpret it differently. In other words, local ownership is open to a number of interpretations.

As shown in the following extract, the EU determines the extent to which the MSCB programme should be locally owned. Local ownership is defined by EUCAP Somalia as the transfer of responsibility from the mission to federal and regional authorities within a timeframe specified by the mission. In this context, the EU frames the assistance programme as a step toward local ownership of the reform process. To put it another way, the mission
views local ownership as a process in which local elites agree to receive assistance for a set period of time before becoming self-sufficient and taking responsibility for funding the reform programme. As the Head of EUCAP Somalia Field Office (Verhaenen, C. Garowe 2020) explains:

*Whatever agreement we make with the authorities here, the philosophy behind is that it is not timeless. So, generally speaking, we say okay we give you support, for instance, train and pay the interns of the Ministry of Justice to become law drafters. Our experts have said in two years' time, I can make you a law drafter. This means after two years, our programme stops. The Minister of Justice knows that after two years if he wants to keep his law drafters, he has to pay them. He has to take that ownership.*

The extract illustrates how EUCAP Somalia understands and implements the notion of local ownership. Here, the EU mission has developed a training programme for the Ministry of Justice in Puntland. The process of becoming a law drafter is constructed by the EU, with little regard for local context. Meanwhile, local officials are expected to become legislators within two years, after which the EU expects the Ministry to take over the process to ensure programme continuity. Thus, the EU’s interpretation of local ownership suggests that it is operationalised near the end of the support arrangement when responsibility is transferred to the local elites and such an approach is likely to defeat the purpose of the notion of local ownership. Bueger and Edmunds (2017, p. 1309) note that “In order to … increase the likelihood that reforms will become institutionalized and self-sustaining once external actors leave – capacity-builders often emphasize what is called ‘local ownership’ in their activities.” However, the reform programme in this particular case is unlikely to become institutionalised or self-sustaining.

There are three reasons for this: the EU presumes that the interns would become qualified law drafters in only two years despite their lack of any legal background and of relevant institutions to provide professional development; secondly, following completion of the training, these interns would become a financial burden for the Ministry of Justice, which would have to decide whether or not to divert scarce resources and money into long-term plans; and finally, the capacity challenges already facing the Ministry, in terms of infrastructure and equipment, militate against such a reform process becoming institutionalised. While this suggests the EU approach in this particular case seeks a short-term solution to a complex problem, the idea of local ownership does not help explain why
the EU operates in this manner. Thus, applying hybridity to the interactions between EUCAP Somalia and local elites can provide a more nuanced explanation of such an outcome than local ownership. Indeed, As Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016, p. 234) argue, “This is the reason for the existence of positive and negative pathways of hybridity, in which either emancipation in progressive, everyday and empathetic form is offered, or in which existing unequal power structures are maintained”. Here, the end result of such interactions is a case of negative hybridity wherein the Ministry of Justice is neither emancipated nor empathised with.

Indeed, such negative hybridity in MSCB is further demonstrated by the asymmetric relationship between EUCAP Somalia and local elites in government, in which ‘existing unequal power structures are maintained’ by the EU. As the Head of EUCAP Somalia (Reynolds, C. 2020, Garowe) indicates:

*The problem comes when it [local ownership] is conditional and then we say okay we will do this for a while and then you have to start doing something which involves say, we are now hiring interns for six months, but for the second six months we expect you to pay for the interns.*

The extract suggests an ideological contestation between EUCAP Somalia and local elites over how to institutionalise and make MSCB self-sustaining. Such contestation is the result of local actors asserting their agency in the reform process. On the other hand, EUCAP’s offer of a more compromised approach represents the outsourcing of its norms to local elites i.e. internships it choreographed by way of training legislators. However, this is an easy solution, which fails to address underlying problems. The legislative branch cannot be institutionalised through internships; it requires much more rigorous training. More importantly, the bureaucratic control of EU headquarters in Brussels over EUCAP decision-making is the most significant impediment to the emergence of a positive form of hybridity in this context. As the Head of EUCAP Somalia Field Office (Verhaenen, C. Garowe 2020) states:

*We spoke to our headquarters and they said what is the highest need and we said the highest need is so many manuals of various types of crime, so many manuals of the criminal code and of the civil code and that is what we have ordered, but that is far from that which the mandate envisaged.*

The extract shows that the EU’s approach amounts to negative hybridity, which is determined through the bureaucratic layers between the mission officials and the headquarters in
Demands from the local elites for a more hybridised MSCB must go through these two layers of hierarchy. In other words, local ownership is determined ad hoc within a hierarchical structure. Despite having first-hand knowledge of the capacity challenges on the ground, EUCAP officials have little influence over this process. Instead, these officials are lower in the hierarchy and act as gatekeepers, filtering demand to the mission. A demand-driven initiative from local actors for MSCB must be considered further up the chain of command in Brussels if they deviate from the EUCAP official mandate. In this context, such demands are analysed and unpacked, typically with a view to funding the highest priority activities. Under the instruction to assess the most pressing capacity needs of government agencies, EUCAP officials report back to the EU headquarters in Brussels with their findings. Ejdus (2017, p. 469) argues that “This micro-management of interventions through Brussels has proven to be an obstacle for local ownership in many CSDP interventions…”. As a result, the extract implies that the EU does not implement local ownership during the design stage of the reform programme, nor does it promote local ownership during the implementation phase, as the process is micromanaged by the EU at this stage as well. The EU’s prioritisation of its norms and practices over local ideas remains a highly contentious issue. Bueger and Edmunds (2017, p. 1309) point out that “…notions of local ownership can expose important differences of priority between external donors and local actors”. However, positive hybridity is one option for reconciling these competing priorities, but it is unlikely given the disconnect between local elites and those on the EU side in Brussels responsible for formulating the assistance programme in MSCB. As a consequence of such an EU approach to local ownership, EUCAP operational officials on the ground have found themselves at odds with local elites, resulting in a standoff. These actors do not share the EU’s presumed priority for mentoring and advising local actors with whom they have never interacted. This situation helps explain why such an intervention has been confronted with a lack of cooperation from the local elites.

As a result of this lack of cooperation and as the following extract reveals, the EU is considering the phasing out of the maritime component of EUCAP Somalia to give focus to police reform in Somalia. The mission has recently refocused its activities on police reform on the land due to its failure to achieve discernible impact on Somalia’s maritime capacity challenges. As Head of EUCAP Somalia (Reynolds, C. 2020, Garowe) explains:

In the strategic review, I think you will see us going more into policing than maritime. There will still be a maritime element, but I think there is frustration in
Brussels that the absence of the Federal Government being able to make a decision, the absence of collaboration with the Puntland Maritime Police Force really limits what we can do as a maritime mission. Maybe, there will be a time when we come back to being a maritime mission, but for the moment, we are moving into policing.

This extract makes it clear that EUCAP Somalia is in the process of moving away from capacity building for maritime security and towards police reform. However, the move to support the Somali Police Force is based on the flawed assumption that there is a local demand for mainstream security sector reform. Moreover, such a move would inevitably push MSCB off its pre-set agenda. Indeed, due to security threats posed by the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, MSCB in Somalia is already being overshadowed by interventions focusing on capacity building for land-based security institutions. Brits and Nel (2018, p. 226) point out that “traditionally the African concept of security concept has been dominated by land-based conflicts with little attention being paid to maritime threats and the protection of the maritime environment”. It is ironic that the EU’s endeavour to have a discernible impact on the Horn of Africa maritime security gaps, through the now defunct EUCAP Nestor and EUCAP Somalia, has proven futile. This is because the EU follows a path-dependency strategy for its engagement in MSCB. Such a strategy represents the imposition of externally designed assistance in MSCB, based on gaps in maritime security capacities as presumed by EU officials in Brussels. Edmunds et al. (2018, p. 233) note that “Despite its positive rhetoric, [the EU] programmes tend to be planned, funded and evaluated from Brussels, and implemented on the ground by international staff”. Local elites, on the other hand, have resisted such engagement, as it does not address their priorities and constraints, creating an opportunity for negotiation between the EU and local actors to decide on a more compromised approach, i.e. positive hybridity.

However, when negotiations have reached a deadlock, the EU has been unwilling to make a concession to local elites. This complete failure to reach an agreement has led to a pause in EUCAP operation in Somalia. As Head of EUCAP Somalia (Reynolds, C. 2020, Garowe) states: “Our coordination mechanisms are all shut down. The Ministries are quite difficult to work with. I have some sympathy. They expect us to come with full pockets and we are a mentoring and advising mission, that is what we do”. The irony is that the EU carried out a strategic review in 2015, knowing full well that Somalia’s capacity gaps lay in infrastructure development and equipment. Yet, the outcome of that review (EUCAP Somalia) is a continuation of EUCAP Nestor in terms of the substance of the capacity building it is
mandated to provide, namely only mentoring and advising. Rather than learning lessons from Nestor for EUCAP Somalia, the EU has recycled ideas and norms from a region-wide intervention (in the Horn of Africa) to a country-specific intervention, i.e., Somalia. In consequence, EUCAP Somalia has been forced to reassess its approach to the maritime component of the mission, potentially phasing out this component from its engagement in Somalia.

8.3 Local voices for ownership of the reform process

The notion of local ownership is regarded by the EU as a desirable goal for its engagement in Security sector reform in recipient countries. On a policy level, there is a normative expectation that the EU will pursue locally owned programmes of assistance in the reform process (European Commission 2016; EU 2008). However, this much vaunted local ownership has not been matched by EU practice in capacity building for maritime security in Somalia. In this context, the EU has designed a programme of support before first consulting the local elites affected by it, leaving them with no choice but to resist during implementation. As the Attorney General (Mohamed, S., Mogadishu, 2020a) explains:

*EU CAP stated that they would like to develop a strategic plan for my office, but this is not our top priority. My office's top priority is to build a specialised court for prosecuting maritime crimes. The problem is our international partners are not consulting us first about our key priorities.*

The extract suggests that the EU’s development intervention predetermines the maritime capacity gaps in Somalia, leading to the design of specific activities that do not respond to actual capacity challenges of the Attorney General’s Office. Here, the EUCAP has come forward with a proposal to develop a strategic plan for the Office, but the Attorney General has articulated his priority area for capacity building, namely infrastructure development. As discussed in the previous chapter, the process of prosecuting and investigating crimes at sea, such as piracy, is currently outsourced to courts in the region. This move has had implications for capacity building in this sector in Somalia, as international assistance has been diverted to courts in the region. As a result, the current international strategy for maritime capacity building is to strengthen the prosecutorial and investigative chain of the justice sector in neighbouring countries, such as Kenya and the Seychelles. This has been at the expense of Somalia’s weak justice sector, debilitated by decades of civil war. Thus, the EU Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) steering committee, which oversees EUCAP
Somalia, effectively pre-empts the opportunity for government agencies to problematise capacity gaps and envision solutions based on needs assessment. When local elites use their agency to articulate their needs in response, EUCAP resists pressure to go beyond policy level outputs such as strategy development, pointing out that it operates under a mandate set by its headquarters in Brussels. As a result, local elites maintain their demands, giving rise to a stalemate. This results in a situation in which neither positive nor negative hybridity can emerge.

Some local elites, on the other hand, take a more subtle approach to achieving positive hybridity in capacity building. In this context, local actors consider the hybridisation process as flexible and negotiable, rather than fixed and definite. As the economic advisor to the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (Osman, A. Mogadishu 2020) describes it:

*EUCAP Somalia wants to assist us in setting up the basics of a fisheries management system to tackle IUU [illegal unregulated and unreported] fishing, but we are already working with the FAO in this area. We told EUCAP that we welcome international assistance, but only in terms of enforcement capability, because we lack the ability to enforce fisheries management.*

The extract shows that EUCAP Somalia takes a supply-driven approach to maritime capacity building. In other words, the external actor presents a predetermined programme of support which it is willing to ‘supply’ to the local elite. Wolff (2018, p. 63) observes that the EU unilaterally offered externally formulated assistance through EUCAP Nestor, which was not sought by local actors. Indeed, EUCAP Nestor was envisioned by the EU and subsequently launched without first securing buy-in from all the proposed recipient states (Tejpar and Zetterlund 2013, pp. 17-23). In a similar vein, in the present context, EUCAP has made an offer of cooperation to government elites entirely at its discretion in order to deliver a specific policy output, namely a framework for fisheries management. Thus, it is clear that the supply-driven approach serves as a substitute for genuine local ownership of the support programme at the design phase. In turn, the host country’s decision to accept the offer is more likely to be strategic, in the sense that it agrees in principle to the development intervention, but with the goal of identifying alternative ways of collaboration with the donor to avoid duplication of ongoing efforts. As discussed in the previous chapter and supported by this extract, the FAO is assisting the Ministry with fisheries management as part of a long-term reform programme in this sector. This may help explain the concern about potential duplication or overlap. As a result, the Ministry has in turn demanded assistance in maritime
security force capability. In effect, such a move opens the door to discussions about a potential combination of external and local ideas, which if agreed would result in positive hybridity in maritime capacity building. The specific nature of this particular interaction between EUCAP and the Ministry of Fisheries suggests the possibility of nuances to the process of hybridisation. Here, EUCAP attempts to circumvent local ownership by making a predetermined offer of support to induce the Ministry to accept technical-level support, whereas the Ministry bargains to maximise the programme of assistance rather than simply being a passive recipient. In other words, the use of agency from local actors is strategic, in that it identifies the overall aims and interests of the Ministry of Justice (that is effective fisheries management) and the means of achieving them (through enforcement capability). However, the failure of EUCAP to reach a compromise has resulted in 'deadlocked' hybridity.

The exercise of agency by local elites does not always result in positive hybridity, particularly when EUCAP Somalia is unwilling to shift its position. This situation adds to the widespread scepticism among local actors about the EU’s involvement in Somali maritime security. As the Head of the Federal Coastguard (Mohamed, M. Mogadishu 2020) explains:

*The EU has a security interest in Somalia, that is why its naval forces continue to stay in our waters even after the piracy problem has ended. I do not believe they will help us with equipment as long as they believe they can provide security by themselves to protect their interests. For example, we informed EUCAP Somalia that we urgently require seagoing vessels to assist in ensuring maritime security around the Mogadishu Port, but they stated that they did not have the mandate to provide equipment.*

The extract suggests the cynicism felt by local elites about the EU engagement in maritime security in Somalia. There is a local perception that the EU has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, that is the lack of any alternative local maritime security force to provide security at sea. The local elites infer that the presence of EU naval mission to provide security for maritime trade passing through the Gulf of Aden obviates the need to help build effective national and local maritime security forces. Germond and Smith (2009, p. 573) argue that “Atlanta, however, exercises a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence on the high seas and within another state’s territorial waters in order to protect the EU’s and its member states’ own interests (maritime trade)...”. However, the EU's steadfast refusal to discuss or modify its assistance in capacity building for maritime security may have unintended consequences, such as failing to consider Somalia's national interests in terms of
security and safety for its people. For example, the lack of capability of local forces contributes to their inability to provide port security and combat illegal fishing, neither of which is the responsibility of the EU naval mission. Whatever the EU’s motivation, its lack of empathy and understanding of local capacity and capability challenges adds to the negative perception of its civilian mission on land among local elites. Such local perspectives do not foster an environment conducive to cooperation and collaboration between EUCAP Somalia and local elites in government. Indeed, the mission’s relations with government agencies both at the federal and member state level are under strain as they stand.

As a result, local elites regard EU capacity building for maritime security as an imposition and demand a partnership with EUCAP Somalia based on mutual respect and understanding. As the Director of Joint Maritime Information and Coordination Centre (JMIC)\footnote{JIMIC is a government institution that has been established to gather information about the maritime environment.} (Ahmed, G. Garowe, 2020) explains:

*EUCAP shared with us a technical arrangement agreement [TAA] for the creation of JIMIC. We informed EUCAP that we support the intervention, but we would prefer to enter into a partnership agreement with them. We wanted to make sure that the project would fit with our strategic objectives. EUCAP stated that a partnership agreement is not permitted under its mandate. We then stopped cooperating with EUCAP.*

The extract suggests that local elites agree, in principle, to a supply-driven approach to capacity building but insist on negotiating the terms. In this context, the JIMIC project was envisioned and designed by EUCAP Somalia. In the first instance, the project provoked a positive response from the local authority on two fronts. Firstly, it was framed as a government agency designed to assist local authorities in the process of gathering and sharing intelligence on crime syndicates, as well as to improve early warning capability along the coastline. Secondly, the local authority’s insufficient resources to support the establishment of a maritime domain awareness centre – due to other developmental imperatives – made the initiative appealing. Indeed, JIMIC was seen by the local authority as a positive step forward in the fight against nefarious activities at sea, which currently account for a small percentage of cases handled by law enforcement agencies. The initiative was also a symbolic gesture, potentially representing the gradual transition of responsibility for maritime domain awareness to the local authority, given the EU’s role as the country's sole security provider.
since 2008. Thus, JIMIC was viewed largely as a win-win situation for both the EU and the local government because one of the project’s primary goals was to provide geospatial information to both entities. This is because a national maritime domain centre would collect and collate data that would provide a more complete picture of the prevalence and nature of maritime crime along the coast, which would be useful to local enforcement agencies.

Because local actors lack the necessary expertise or know-how, the idea behind JIMIC provided an initial impetus to a potential coordination in local efforts to address maritime threats. However, as the extract makes clear, the local government demanded a reciprocal relationship in which it collaborated in “partnership” with EUCAP. In response, EUCAP firmly rejected such a demand on the basis that it was incompatible with the scope and limitations of the TAA, which underpins the missions’ activities in Puntland. As a result, both parties have remained unwilling to make concessions, resulting in ‘deadlocked’ hybridity.

On some occasions, lengthy negotiations between EUCAP Somalia and the local authority result in some form of positive hybridity. As the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) (Hassan, I. Garowe 2020) points out:

We started working with EUCAP on a pilot project last year [2009] to build a database system in all coastal regions. What you need to know is that this pilot project came about after three-and-a-half-year discussion with EUCAP about how they can best assist us. Even in this project, our ideas are not fully implemented.

The extract shows that hybridity in maritime security capacity building is a matter for negotiation between the support provider and the recipient authority. However, the power imbalance between these actors causes an uneven hybridisation outcome. Local elites’ starting point for negotiating is to present EUCAP Somalia with its various capacity gaps. On the one hand, the CID wishes to prioritise the issues that are at the top of its development agenda, but its capacity for negotiation is constrained, to some extent, by the sheer scale of the capacity challenges it faces. In addition, the lengthy duration of the negotiation process has worn down local actors. On the other hand, EUCAP’s goal is to keep any deviation from the terms of the externally designed support to a minimum. The challenges faced by CID weaken its negotiating position during the contestation over the nature of the EU’s assistance. In this case, the need to reconcile these competing interests resulted in several rounds of negotiations before these parties could agree on the pilot project to end the deadlock. Ultimately, the local
demands for infrastructure development and equipment have remained largely unmet. As a result, EUCAP agreed to launch a pilot project to create a database system in Puntland. While neither the EU mission nor the CID achieved their exact demands, a more hybridised form of capacity building for maritime security did emerge after much discussion.

On other occasions, local elites approach international assistance with realism. As a result, they recognise the importance of being practical and realistic about what can and cannot be accomplished with an externally devised programme. However, they oppose the imposition of negative hybridity, which seeks to implement external support without any modifications. As one Senior Official in the Ministry of Justice (Jale M. Garowe, 2020) states:

*We understand that international support is about give and take. Our main priority is institutional building because it feeds into the state-building process. We said to EUCAP we would only accept its support if it contributed to our state-building process.*

The extract indicates that local idealism about ownership of the reform process is being tempered by a degree of realism. Once international assistance has been formulated externally, local elites have a realistic expectation of the extent to which they may be able to exert pressure to force the EU to modify the assistance programme. To this end, local actors are open to reaching an acceptable compromise to ensure that they benefit from the international assistance in a meaningful way. However, they resist concessions that could dilute their demands. Local elites are concerned about whether external assistance will have a discernible impact on state-building, which is the Ministry’s primary goal, and of which institution building is one facet. Thus, elites in government are willing to trade off local ownership of the reform programme during the design phase to achieve EU agreement to alter and adjust the programme to contribute to the state-building process. Such a process invariably entails infrastructure development and the provision of some equipment. However, EUCAP Somalia has been reluctant to give in to local demands for a mutual concession in this way. Winn and Lewis (2017, p. 2121) argue that “…the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to development in Somalia is imbued with a technocratic understanding of state-building as capacity-building, is half-heartedly applied, and does not take local characteristics into account in a meaningful way”. The irony is that the misalignment between the EU maritime assistance and Somalia’s specific circumstances and priorities is in direct opposition to the
country’s overarching goal of state-building, which the EU has heavily invested in over the last two decades.
Conclusion

This research suggests that when it comes to EU engagement in the Horn of Africa maritime security, the EU’s consistent approach to local resistance has been to recycle its ideas and practices, even when these are strongly and continually contested by local elites. Such an approach has resulted in deadlocks, forcing the EU to reposition itself, but with the same ideas for addressing the same maritime security capacity gaps in the Horn of Africa. To put it differently, the EU maritime mission has always maintained that its core support is mentoring and advising, whereas local actors have insisted that their real capacity needs remain (1) infrastructure development and (2) the provision of equipment. Such contestation was first manifested in EUCAP Nestor. In this context, the EU formulated policy on how to deal with the gaps in maritime capacity in the Horn of Africa without consultation with the counterpart nations. After it had designed its plans, EU attention then turned to securing buy-in from states in the region at the implementation stages without any intention of making any concessions to local demands.

Resistance from Kenya and Tanzania to EUCAP Nestor’s core assistance provided an opportunity for the mission to take a more hybridised approach, combining mentoring and advising with some degree of equipment provision, as these countries demanded. If agreed, such an outcome would have produced positive hybridity, but EUCAP Nestor remained steadfast in its refusal to make any concession. As a consequence, Kenya and Tanzania opted out of the development intervention, resulting in a state of ‘deadlocked hybridity’ in which neither party was willing to allow the other to achieve positive or negative hybridity in order to break the deadlock. With the exception of the Seychelles, Nestor failed to make a discernible impact on the capacity challenges of the Horn of Africa, prompting a strategic review that led to it being phased out.

The use of hybridity as an analytical lens suggests that it is not realistic to anticipate the outcomes of state-building or development initiatives because the process is context dependent. In retrospect, the use of agency from Kenya and Tanzania to EUCAP Nestor assistance precipitated indifference from Djibouti and Somalia toward the specific nature of the EU intervention. In spite of its determination to implement a negative form of hybridity, the EU eventually withdrew from region-wide engagement. The paradox that lies at the heart of EUCAP Somalia is that the EU phased out Nestor to focus on Somalia in the absence of
any major alteration to policies that had already been shown to fail. Indeed, the current impasse is the result of a vicious circle of misaligned priorities at the design phase, followed by a failure to operate in a hybridised context in response to demands from local elites. There are a number of contributory factors to this failure of the EU to learn lessons. The process of capacity building is still hamstrung by an absence of local knowledge because decision-making about the provision of support occurs in Brussels, which is far removed from the reality on the ground. Although EU officials on the ground experience the capacity challenges first-hand, they exercise little influence on policymakers at the higher levels. Their role is limited to liaising between the local elites and decision-makers further up the chain of command. This way of operating has created a disconnect between the mission’s endeavours and the actual capacity gaps in Somalia. In effect, EUCAP is severely hampered by micromanagement from Brussels, which has negative implications for achieving a more compromised outcome that would address disagreements between local elites and EUCAP Somalia.

Ultimately, EUCAP is likely to continue to experience repeated failures as long as there is a perceived lack of local cooperation, from the point of view of the EU headquarters in Brussels, when in reality, the deadlock has arisen at the final stage of the negotiation process with the EU’s failure to offer appropriate concessions. To mitigate local ownership being used simply as a rhetorical phrase and to avoid being embroiled in counterproductive intervention, the EU’s support needs to strike a responsive chord with the local elites. The findings in this study suggest that common ground on the question of local ownership can be found, but it requires a rebalancing act. The EU needs to provide mutually beneficial support that strikes the right balance between external norms and practices and local demands. The EU has failed to understand that the reason why the programme of support needs to be designed to reflect Somalia’s specific circumstances is to maximise the EU’s allocated funding. Once the funding has dried up the EU would not be willing to take on further responsibility to finance projects. Thus, if the reform process is to become institutionalised and self-sustaining once the EU leaves, it needs to be more open-minded about local ideas and practices in order to achieve positive hybridity.
9 THESIS CONCLUSION

It is clear that maritime security in the Horn of Africa is a responsibility shared by a variety of actors: national, regional and external. Thus, definition of what maritime security is and the capacity required to maintain security at sea should be determined by all actors affected by it (including national and regional stakeholders); these must all be involved in the development of an agreed agenda that recognises and incorporates their aspirations, whether related to security or development. External attempts to impose a pre-determined agenda on national and regional actors in the Horn of Africa are likely to be frustrated in the absence of such an inclusive process in the first instance. Indeed, external actors’ strategy of envisioning a goal of maritime security, and the capacity building required to achieve it from top down, has been confronted by resistance from regional policymakers, national elites and local communities. This has serious negative implications for the international intervention becoming institutionalised and self-sustaining once it has ended. In this context, this thesis posed the crucial question: to what extent is the Horn of Africa maritime security agenda locally owned?

The discourse on the notion of local ownership is well established in development studies (Kühl 2009), but its application specifically to the field of capacity building for maritime security is nascent. A review of the relevant literature has shown, on the one hand, a line of scholarship that investigates the notion of local ownership of EU capacity building for maritime security (Ejdus 2017; Ejdus 2018). This literature focuses on the EU’s failure to consult local actors about their needs and constraints in the design phase of the programme of reform. Ejdus (2017) concludes that while the EU theoretically promotes the principle of local ownership, in practice, the institution approaches capacity building support for local counterparts from the top down. On the other hand, a newer tradition of research shifts towards the examination of the contestation between the EU and local elites over the implementation of an externally formulated agenda for capacity building (Edmunds and Juncos 2020). In other words, these scholars draw on hybridity as an analytical lens to examine the contested nature of maritime security capacity building in practice. The present study builds on this latter strand in three distinct ways. Firstly, it considers the interface between external norms and practices, and local ideas about what constitutes maritime security, and focuses on how the Horn of Africa region has subverted the notion of maritime security as originally framed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) as security-centric.
Secondly, it examines hybridisation processes achieved through subtle resistance from both local elites in government and those actors at the community level. Thirdly, this study expands the frame of reference by going beyond the binary concept of hybridity as positive or negative by investigating ‘deadlocked’ hybridity. This happens when neither the external actor nor the local elites are willing to give in to the demands of the other for positive or negative hybridity. In doing so, this study’s scope extends the emerging literature on hybridity in maritime security capacity building through the use of qualitative methodology.

The methodology has entailed a multiscale case study of the Horn of Africa. This region was selected because it provides insights into the extent to which the maritime security agenda is locally owned. To this end, the regional case (the Horn of Africa) has structured and framed the national case (the Somali experience) in two ways. Firstly, the study traces the agenda to its origins at the UNSC, and sheds light on a more concerted agency by regional policymakers in agenda setting for governance structures, such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) and the Jeddah Amendment. Secondly, it demonstrates the subversion of the notion of maritime security by regional actors, as conceived at the UNSC as part of the original maritime security agenda, through a process of hybridisation. The Somali experience illuminates a more subtle and nuanced hybridity through non-cooperation, but also shows how local elites resort to a form of ‘deadlocked’ hybridity as a result of such non-cooperation strategy failing to work for them. I arrived at these findings through analysing policy documents, conducting discourse analysis, and interviewing donors’ implementing partners as well as local actors in Somalia.

In answering the research question, weaknesses have been revealed in the design phase of the Horn of Africa maritime security agenda. On a policy level, the international imperative to ensure security at sea overshadowed regional concerns over development. Regional actors did not have significant influence in the decision-making processes in practice. Thus, policymakers from this region have had rather negligible participation in all phases of the early stages of the initiative, from defining its parameters to policy formulation and, in some ways, to implementation. This structural weakness still severely impedes local ownership of international programmes. This has negative implications for the support, provided through maritime security sector reform (MSSR) and maritime security capacity building (MSCB), becoming institutionalised and self-sustaining.
In relation to the agenda-setting phase of the contemporary maritime security programme for the Horn of Africa, my findings add to what we know about the origins of this process from scholars such as Guilfoyle (2008) and Smith (2017). These authors consider the agenda synchronically. They analyse the UNSC Resolution 1816, which authorised military intervention into the Horn of Africa maritime space, without considering how it developed to that point. In other words, such an analysis accepts UNSC resolutions on piracy in the Horn of Africa at face value, thereby overlooking the question of how such decisions are reached. This has implications for our understanding of how much influence local and regional actors had over these decisions. Through the lens of the global governance literature, my research findings suggest that policymakers from the Horn of African region were not invited to the table of the UNSC meetings during the deliberative process. The perceived national interests of the UNSC’s five permanent members – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – set the tone of the debate, which focused on the provision of security at sea. The tensions between competing international decision makers’ interests have overshadowed the issues that are of concern to the region in terms of environmental degradation and the potential for a blue economy. Because agenda-setting was limited to such a single forum – the UNSC with its exclusionary policy (as has been observed by (Hurd 2008; Hettne and Söderbaum 2006; Welz 2013; Williams and Boutellis 2014), it is likely that, considering the UNSC resolutions, there was negligible influence by both regional and national stakeholders from the Horn of Africa on agenda setting in maritime security.

On a theoretical level, the Copenhagen School (CS) of securitisation theory suggests that the UNSC constructed piracy in the Horn of Africa as a threat to the shipping sector (the referent object). However, However, the theory remains ambiguous as to the nature and status of the relevant audience (Vaughn 2009; Bright 2012; Williams 2008). In reality, the securitising actor makes a conscious choice of a target audience at the time of securitisation. In this sense, the target audience is predetermined in a securitisation process. For example, in the case of the UNSC, it choreographed the referent object to appeal to a particular type of audience (the permanent members), with vested interest in freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden. Thus, the implications for our understanding of the securitisation process are that, in principle, there can potentially be multiple audiences of a securitisation move because of a lack of clarity in the nature and status of the relevant audience. In reality though, different securitising actors often do have different target audiences in mind. This new understanding helps to explain the sole focus on piracy in the UNSC’s securitisation move in 2018. Here,
the IMO’s securitisation for agenda-setting purposes was targeted at the UNSC, whereas the target audience of UNSC’s securitisation of piracy was its permanent members, as the issue was of common concern to them.

This study brings the collective dimension of securitisation theory to a new area, namely security governance at sea, in order to demonstrate the exercise of concerted agency by regional policymakers in agenda setting. The collective dimension of the CS of the securitisation theory is pioneered by Haacke and Williams (2008) and is later revisited by Sperling and Webber in 2017. According to this concept, the audience of a securitisation move is described as the member states of an international organisation. In this context, this study shows the states from the Horn of Africa were among the relevant audiences in the securitisation of piracy and armed robbery embodied in the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Moreover, the current research advances the collective dimension of securitisation theory through empirical work in two important ways. Firstly, it shows the practice of agency in bringing about meaningful changes in governance structures, e.g. the formulation of the Jeddah Amendment to the DCoC. As a result of such agency, this governance framework plays a crucial role in balancing the importance of maritime security and the blue economy, thereby demonstrating the assumption of local ownership of the agenda by regional policymakers. Secondly, while this dimension of collective securitisation theoretically defines the target audience as member states of an organisation, this study shows that it excludes local actors at the community level who may be affected by the securitisation process.

In recent years, the Horn of Africa has developed a new narrative about a development-oriented maritime security concept. This new narrative has galvanised policymakers from across the region to take a unified stance on seas, lakes, and rivers as the next frontier of development. To this end, this research reveals a new regional maritime security agenda for the Horn of Africa built around the blue economy. The essence of this agenda is encapsulated in the SBEC. On an empirical level, the interface between maritime security and the blue economy has been considered by the existing literature (Menzel 2018; Brits and Nel 2018; Bueger and Wivel 2018; Malcolm and Murday 2017; Vreÿ et al. 2021). The blue economy discourse from the Horn of Africa’s perspective has also been examined to some extent (Mboce and McCabe 2021). My study builds on these scholarly debates both on empirical and theoretical levels.
On an empirical level, this study provides a more rounded insight into the blue economy discourse, which has been previously undocumented. The study reveals the presence of a shared set of interests among regional elites in the Horn of Africa (both coastal and landlocked states) in the blue economy, which is manifested in the SBEC. On a theoretical level, my research helps to develop and validate the concept of hybridity as a lens through which the Horn of Africa’s renewed interest in maritime security can be analysed. It applies this concept to the burgeoning discourse on the nexus between the blue economy and maritime security, which represents an alternative idea to the notion of security-centric maritime security, which has dominated the debate on security at sea. In other words, it shows the region’s use of agency in subverting the concept of maritime security, as it was originally shaped at the UNSC in 2008, in response to an escalation of piracy. States from this region have adapted the concept of maritime security for the specific circumstances and priorities of the Horn of Africa in terms of economic development, thereby yoking security at sea to blue growth. In this context, the implications for our understanding of hybridity are that regional actors are able to, and have the legitimacy to, shape the maritime security agenda and the outcome of liberal peacebuilding initiatives. Indeed, policymakers from the Horn of Africa have combined traditional security metrics, such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, with illegal fishing and environmental degradation as well as with the revitalisation of the blue economy to shape the maritime security agenda.

In the area of MSSR, this study presents the opportunity to review and re-think the emerging field of MSSR both on conceptual and empirical levels. On a conceptual level, this thesis has found that MSSR is typically a plan that is intended to achieve a particular purpose. It is concerned with strategic planning. For example, since maritime security is a responsibility, MSSR seeks to address the question of which force should assume such a responsibility: a maritime police force or a coastguard. This conceptual clarification is manifested in the example of Somali MSSR as implemented by the EU and supported by the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). The twin concepts of MSSR and MSCB can be distinguished in this context. The difference between MSSR and MSCB can be seen in the latter’s sole focus on a programme of activities designed for the implementation of a MSSR plan, which can entail either assistance in infrastructure development, or the provision of some equipment, or both. This conceptual distinction can further be articulated as MSSR being more focused on security capacities, whereas the MSCB addresses capacity gaps in both the
security sector and economic development, such as the revivalisation of the blue economy. Thus, this research advances our understanding of the twin concepts of MSSR and MSCB and their interrelationship in two ways. Firstly, the MSCB as a concept is found to be wider than MSSR in scope as it addresses security as well development matters. Secondly, the MSCB is, to some extent, dependent on the MSSR for determining its strategic objectives as far as the security sector is concerned. The need for a conceptual clarity about MSSR in the existing literature can be observed in the recent publication of Vreÿ et al. (2021) titled ‘South Africa: Maritime Security Sector Reform”. In it, the authors mention MSSR only once in the title and this is followed by an extensive discussion on MSCB. Thus, the present study contributes to the existing literature that conceptualises MSSR (Ryan 2013; Edmunds 2014; Sandoz 2012) by giving coherence and focus to the study and research of this area.

On an empirical level, this study challenges to some extent existing assumptions about MSSR in practice. It shows that MSSR focuses predominantly, though not exclusively, on the state. MSSR plans, such as those formulated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and IMO, suggest a tendency to reform state institutions. Such an approach excludes non-state actors (such as coastal and fishing communities) as well as breakaway republics (such as Somaliland) from the reform programme. On a policy level, Ryan (2013) draws attention to MSSR’s lack of consideration for coastal and fishing communities based on his analysis of the US MSSR guidelines, but he does not provide evidence of this oversight in practice. The present research has presented evidence of how the process of MSSR sidelines local actors at the community level, but at the same time it has brought out latent developments that serve to decentralise the state in MSSR. The existing literature draws attention to the importance of non-state actors in maritime security (Okafor-Yarwood et al. 2020; Chapsos and Malcolm 2017; Belhabib et al. 2019; Daxecker and Prins 2021; Ryan 2013). This study provides empirical evidence of specific projects that decentralise the state in MSSR, including reforms in the redistribution of wealth from the oceans and empowering coastal communities to contribute to national policymaking. However, the reform process currently has a structural bias, with the MSSR placing a greater emphasis on state institutions rather than broader stakeholders such as breakaway states. The process of MSSR solely accommodates a state considered as an organised political community controlled by one government. This has political implications for the breakaway republic of Somaliland and possibly even Taiwan. Both of these entities are located in strategically important maritime spaces, namely the Gulf of Aden and South China Sea respectively, which have attracted
global interests. Yet, without international recognition as states, these breakaway republics cannot play a key role in shaping maritime regulations that directly affect them, nor can they participate in international fora.

The present study also provides an insightful analysis of MSCB practice. It shows how the interactions between external and local actors resulting from the process of capacity building give rise to an outcome which distorts the original objectives of international interveners. In this context MSCB, as designed by international actors, is a more contested process in practice than might first be portrayed at a policy level. This study has shown that, as result of this contestation, elites in government and UN implementing agencies\(^48\) combine their ideas and practices, resulting in positive hybridity in MSCB. The outcome of such a process overcomes, to some extent, unforeseen obstacles created by the use of agency by local elites. This research adds to what is known about the contested nature of MSCB in practice from Edmunds and Juncos (2020), who in turn draw on the literature on peace-building (Mac Ginty 2010; Hoehne 2013; Richmond 2011; Schroeder and Chappuis 2014). The present study builds on these scholars’ analyses that suggest capacity building practice is not a simple or straightforward process. By studying the interactions between elites in government and external actors, the present research shows that once these actors formulate policies for addressing perceived gaps in the recipient country, these policies do not go unchallenged if they fail to respond to actual capacity challenges in government agencies. Moreover, this study transcends the current elite-centric approach to the study of hybridisation processes by examining the interactions between international actors and local communities as well as those between government elites and coastal communities. The outcomes of these interactions show that these communities are becoming more assertive in their refusal to cooperate with both local authorities and international actors, which has not previously been documented. As Albrecht and Moe (2015, p. 3) argue, hybridity as a theoretical lens should “also include and take seriously the agency of non-elites, everyday needs and capacities as well as subaltern politic”. As my research shows, the concept of hybridity provides a new perspective on coastal communities’ agency in resisting the imposition of external ideas and norms, resulting in the adaptation of international support for local circumstances.

\(^{48}\) These UN organisations are: The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and International Maritime Organisation of the UN.
Furthermore, this study presents cogent problematisation regarding the outcome of the hybridisation process as either purely positive or purely negative. This binary conceptualisation of hybridity is problematic because it excludes circumstances in which both the international and local actors engage in a hybrid process, but neither is willing to shift its position to accommodate the demands of the other, resulting in a deadlock. Hybridity as an analytical concept has already been criticised in the existing literature for drawing on the same binary problem it seeks to address, namely the interface between international and local norms, practices and ideas (Albrecht and Moe 2015, p. 2). Stepputat (2013) argues that the lack of problematisation takes such an underlying assumption for granted. By making this binary understanding of hybridity problematic, this current study offers analytical rigour. A third version of hybridity (deadlocked hybridity), as an outcome of a process, is shown in this study to be a useful lens for understanding a situation in which international and local actors are unable to make progress in the negotiation process, despite their desire for a hybridised outcome. The usefulness of this theoretical contribution (i.e. ‘deadlocked’ hybridity) can be seen in its utility for practice. For example, the case study of EUCAP Somalia suggests that the EU has failed to separate non-cooperation from negotiation; it has ended up conflating the two. From the perspective of the EU headquarters in Brussels, it phased out EUCAP Nestor because of a perceived lack of cooperation, concluding that the mission had failed to make a discernible impact on the capacity challenges of the Horn of Africa. This study reveals that, rather than learning lessons from Nestor for EUCAP Somalia, the EU is in the process of phasing out (yet again) the maritime component of its civilian mission, on the basis of a lack of cooperation on the part of local elites. In contrast, local policymakers, both at national and regional levels, have shown themselves to be willing to pursue a compromised solution reached by a process of negotiation. Thus, the repeated deadlocks have arisen at the final stage of the negotiation process because of the EU’s failure to offer appropriate concessions. The notion of ‘deadlocked’ hybridity has important implications for our understanding of the hybridisation process. It enables the analysis of failed MSCB processes, aids in explaining the underlying causes of ‘deadlocked’ negotiations, and improves prediction of outcomes.

This study also provides important further evidence for the idea that hybridity as a process and an outcome is a useful analytical lens for the study of maritime security and the capacity building it requires. The study enables the analysis of the exercise of local agency both in its shaping of development interventions through a process of negotiation, and agenda setting through subverting dominant narratives such as security-centric maritime security. The lens
of hybridity also emphasises the mismatch between externally envisioned assistance programmes and local demands for a more targeted approach to country-specific circumstances, priorities, and constraints. This is clearly manifested in the contestation over the specific nature of these programmes in Somalia. Ultimately, while international interveners may design programmes of support in their corridors of power, these will inevitably be resisted, distorted and even subverted by local actors both at the elite and community levels using their agency.

My findings open up potential areas for further research on at least five fronts. Firstly, the application of the concept of hybridity to the burgeoning discourse on the blue economy prompts further theoretical exploration beyond the current research context. There is an urgent need for research into whether coastal communities resist or contest the current narrative about the blue economy in the Horn of Africa as constructed at the SBEC. According to Chen et al. (2020), while there is growing research into the concept of the blue economy, the ways in which a sustainable blue economy can help address socioeconomic and environmental challenges remain underexplored. These scholars demonstrate how, through sustainable blue economy practices, local communities in China have helped to “bridge the poverty-environment nexus” (Chen et al. 2020, p. 1). The sustainable blue economy discourse in the Horn of Africa is currently being shaped by government elites, with little participation from local actors at the community level. While efforts were made during the SBEC to appeal to economic agents, since their support is crucial to the delivery of blue growth, the fishing and coastal communities have received less attention.

Secondly, the interactions between local elites and external actors suggest that there are occasions when neither positive nor negative hybridity occurs due to external actors’ reluctance to shift their position or at least offer appropriate concessions to local elites. In this context, further research into ‘deadlocked’ hybridity will help illuminate how the differences between these actors are reconciled and the implications for our understanding of the hybridisation process. My early findings suggest that ‘deadlocked’ hybridity is an end in itself as it serves as an important negotiation tactic used by both local elites and international actors to pressure each other to make more concessions. It also has the potential to bring relations between these actors to an abrupt end, which has negative implications for the reform programme becoming institutionalised and self-sustaining.
Thirdly, subtle resistance (through non-cooperation) from coastal communities to international interventions suggests the complex and multifaceted nature of hybridity in MSCB in practice. This clearly demonstrates that multiple actors can exercise agency, resulting in conflicting demands for international interveners. In this context, there is a need for the hybrid literature to move away from a sole focus on a binary choice between international actors and local elites in government, particularly in post-conflict reconstruction states. Further research could investigate the contestation between international actors and local communities over the specific nature of MSCB support and the extent to which such contestation gives rise to positive, or negative, or even ‘deadlocked’ hybridity.

A fourth potential avenue for further research is diachronic theorisation of the process of MSCB. Here, the practice theory lens offered by Bueger and Tholens (2021) can supplement, rather than supplant, the concept of hybridity. It is clear from these scholars’ approach to practice theory that actual (as opposed to presumed) knowledge about MSCB only emerges during interactions between international interveners and local elites. In part, chapter seven of this thesis draws on insights from this theory and reinforces its claims about the co-constructed nature of knowledge of MSCB in practice. Indeed, such knowledge is precursor to the ideological contestation over the specific nature of MSCB in addressing capacity challenges in the recipient country. It is against this backdrop that a hybrid lens is useful for demonstrating how local actors have significant agency, empowered by the available knowledge about MSCB, in shaping the domestic environment in which interactions between international interveners and elites in government occur. As has been shown in the case study of Somalia, the system of ideas and ideals that underpins MSCB policies as developed by external actors is contradicted by the actual local knowledge about the capacity gaps in the host country. The extent of the capacity challenges in Somalia is learned through the settings in which internal and external players engage in the process of MSCB. The knowledge that emerges, whether it raises questions about the prioritisation of technical assistance over infrastructure development and equipment provision or the adaptation of an externally designed intervention for local priorities, informs the hybridisation process. As a result, Bueger and Tholens’s theory accounts for the process of knowledge acquisition; this is significant because knowledge does not occur in a vacuum but is dependent on the interactions of these actors. However, further research can benefit from combining practice theory with hybridity because these theories help explain different parts of a continuum in MSCB practice; practice theory address knowledge production, while hybridity addresses the
extent to which that knowledge is embraced by external actors. Hence, this combination allows a more diachronic approach to the study of MSCB.

A final area for further research exploration is how might the results of the regional (Horn of Africa) case study also apply to the Gulf of Guinea region for three reasons. Firstly, the UNSC securitised the maritime spaces of both regions in response to an escalation of piracy. Secondly, this securitisation process has resulted in international interventions in maritime capacity building assistance to the affected states in both these regions. Thirdly, both regions share a maritime security agenda, which is built around the blue economy. However, while the national case study (Somalia) shares structural challenges to local ownership of international programmes with the Gulf of Guinea countries, there are limits to how far the Somali experience can be generalised. The reason for this is two-fold: firstly, external actors' singular focus on Somalia as an experimental laboratory for ideas and practice in maritime security; secondly, the lack of significant discernible impact on Somalia's capacity challenges despite heavy international investment. Nonetheless, there is the possibility of generalising the Somali experience to Yemen. For example, both countries have a history of civil wars, and they sit on both sides of the Gulf of Aden. Also, the EU has recently extended its maritime security capacity building programme engagement in the Gulf of Aden into the Red Sea arena, with special status for Yemen, but this is an extension without any major alteration to policies that have already been shown to fail.
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Full details of interviewees: names, positions, organisations, location of interview

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