STATE
OF THE
LEGACY

REVIEWING A DECADE OF WRITING ON THE
'REGENERATION' PROMISES OF LONDON 2012

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STATE OF THE LEGACY

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INTRODUCTION TO THE REVIEW
A DECADE OF URBAN RESEARCH

It has been ten years since London hosted the Olympic and Paralympic Games. London’s bid differentiated itself from other host cities in its commitment to legacy covering a range of themes from public participation in sports to the regeneration of East London. There have been more academic papers generated about London 2012 and its aftermath than any other Olympic host city, many of which have been produced by academics working in different disciplines at our host institutions – UCL (University College London), UEL (University of East London), University of Cardiff, and Oxford Brookes University – but never collated in one place. Therefore, it was agreed that to coincide with the tenth anniversary of London 2012 we would produce a literature review examining the ‘State of the Legacy’ from a critical, academic perspective, that would provide a summary and overview of the key themes and findings that had emerged in the literature over this period and identify any significant gaps for ongoing interrogation.

The review is an outcome of a collaboration between academics and postgraduate students at the aforementioned universities. Students worked with supervisory input on allocated topics linked to the Olympic legacy promises for the regeneration of East London and the governance context in which these have evolved and been delivered over this period. The resulting review provides an overarching insight into the contribution that has been made across a wide range of academic disciplines, including architecture and planning,
urban studies, the social sciences, environmental studies, political science and law, to understandings and critique of the urban legacy outcomes of London 2012. This body of work, itself produced through a great deal of intensive collaborative work between academics and several generations of students, as well as with numerous external organisations and interlocutors, stands alongside, and often in counterpoint to, the more celebratory and affirmative outputs embodied in policy and governmental reviews of the Olympic legacy over the last decade. In that sense, it reflects the role and value of universities as independent centres of critical urban thinking and expertise, that can provide an important balance to the indicators and measures of success that inform decision-making in other domains of public life, and a depth of qualitative analysis that may be missing from policy-driven interventions.

The State of the Legacy review has been produced concurrently with, and has been published following a two-day conference, *State of the Legacy: interrogating a decade of Olympic regeneration* in East London, 12th – 13th September 2022. The conference brought together past and current research into the legacies of London 2012, alongside articulations in a variety of media of the lived experience of regeneration in East London during the decade following the Games. Some but by no means all the authors whose work is referenced in the review contributed to the conference, alongside the new and emerging researchers whose voices will inform both the direction for new avenues of debate and future research in this field, and insights into the practical and transferable lessons which the legacy of London 2012 offers to future Olympic cities starting with Paris 2024. As such, we recognise that this review already represents a partial perspective on the ongoing task of documenting and analysing the long-term impacts of the legacy promises, and look forward to embracing the opportunities it offers to promote the next generation of critical urbanists in addressing the challenges around development and regeneration that cities face in the mid-21st century.
The following document is organised in five core parts, covering The Promise of Legacy, The Governance of Legacy, Employment and Opportunities, Housing, and A New Urban Park. The content of each part is summarised below.

PART I
THE PROMISE OF LEGACY

In Part 1, Luz Navarro Eslava analyses the evolving definition of legacy and its promises over time, in the context of a shifting political and economic landscape. As many commentators have noted, the successful outcome of London’s bid rested on a clear articulation of a vision for and concept of legacy. While elements of that vision have remained at the heart of London’s distinctive framing of legacy, of the promises that have been made to the future beyond the Games at different times and, indeed, to what has transpired on the ground over the past ten years, the notion of legacy has been fluid. The Games have been described at different times as the ‘Regeneration Games’ and the ‘Games for a Nation’, speaking to quite different social goals and effects.

Priorities, commitments, plans, targets, and outcomes have all changed over the period from the initial bid document.
launched by Ken Livingstone as Labour mayor, and in the context of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s New Labour government, to today. These changes, as the review shows, owe much to the changing political landscape of London and the wider UK – the shifts from Livingstone/Blair to Johnson as Conservative mayor with Gordon Brown as Labour Prime Minister and, soon after, David Cameron as leader of a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government, to Sadiq Khan as Labour mayor and a Conservative central government under several changes of leadership.

It is in the context of the original bid that we see legacy defined in urban terms as regeneration and the delivery of material, life-changing benefits for a deprived area of East London, building on years of discussion about the post-industrial regeneration of this part of the city, and effectively ‘de-risking’ the capital’s standing as a de-regulated, global financial centre from a private investment perspective (Smith, 2014a). The Games were seen as a catalyst (Bishop, Everett and Fawcett, 2020), accelerating the process of the regeneration of East London beyond what could have otherwise been achieved, especially following the 2008 financial crash. In 2008 Livingstone rebranded these ‘beneficial impacts’ as London’s ‘Five Legacy Commitments’, in the process advancing the goal of ‘transforming the heart of East London’ (Mayor of London, 2008): a comprehensive redevelopment of the section of the Lower Lea Valley designated as the Olympic site, with regeneration encompassing economic and social development (Calcutt, 2015: 285), anchored in thousands of new homes targeted at low-income Londoners, 50,000 new jobs, and £10bn of investment in transport infrastructure.

Under Mayor Boris Johnson and the new Conservative-majority coalition government, as well as in the context of economic recession and the rise of new national austerity policies, local authorities faced massive budget cuts, including the Host Boroughs. Given their reliance on public funds, this had rami-


fications for the legacy plans launched in 2008 and the newly launched 'convergence' agenda (Lock, 2016: 75; Gunter, 2017: 294), aimed at bringing East London into line with the rest of the city in terms of its social and economic outlook and opportunities. In December 2010, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) published new plans for the legacy of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, re-branded as 'Games for a Nation'. Now notably lacking in detail, they created in Mike Weed’s analysis, a new open-endedness to legacy in the wake of the numerical specificity of Livingstone’s commitments, ‘that will allow the outputs and outcomes from as many programmes as possible to be claimed as legacies secured from the Games’ (Weed, 2013: 285). This is the contested narrative that unfolded in the aftermath of the Games, in the absence of both a clear and coherent conceptual framework for legacy (Poynter, Viehoff and Li, 2015), and ‘a lack of robust evidence relating to longer term benefit’ (Davies, 2012: 316), which this review seeks to unpack.

PART II
GOVERNANCE OF LEGACY

In Part 2, Michael Berry provides a comprehensive review of the changing landscape of governance which accommodated and shaped this shifting narrative, positioning the evolution of legacy as ‘a governance issue’ (Leopkey and Parent, 2017: 439). It demonstrates firstly, how the agencies and mechanisms for decision-making and delivery themselves helped shape legacy and who was engaged in it; and secondly, the lasting impact of legacy governance on the governance arrangements and cultures in East London. Whilst the literature is diverse, there is an agreement that the defining characteristic of Olympic and legacy governance has been its complex and shifting nature, and the frequently evolving and 'complex

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assemblages of firms, consultancies, agencies and organizations’ (Moore et al., 2018) that constitute the Olympic legacy governance model. Vasil Girginov submits that it is the ‘tension between what is being done in the name of legacy, for whom, and at what cost and to what effect, that turns Olympic legacy into a governance issue’ (Girginov, 2012: 544–545). This, suggests Leopkey and Parent (2017: 439), makes the focus on the stakeholders, or ‘event actors’ and how they influence decision-making, a key aspect of understanding Olympic legacy.

The legacy governance model is described as including supra-national, regeneration planning and sport governance components, blurring the lines of governance between different sectors (Davis, 2019). The literature overwhelmingly characterizes London’s Olympic legacy governance model as one replacing a ‘hierarchical’ mode of government to one of ‘governance’, a system subject to negotiations between a wide range of stakeholders, whose interactions give rise to a relatively stable pattern of policy-making that constitutes a specific form of regulation, or mode of coordination (see Lo, 2018: 650). The chapter traces the evolution of the legacy governance arrangements and the consequential impact on the lack of accountability and transparency of the emerging complexity (Bernstock, 2014). It then goes on to discuss the different governance structures including public private partnerships and networks which underlay this complexity, how they have been understood and characterised in the literature, and how this has influenced which stakeholders have been able to influence the decision-making organizations in the shaping of East London regeneration. Finally, it discusses in more detail the operation of power, the inclusion and exclusion of certain interests, and the marginalization of alternative perspectives (Brownill et al., 2013).
PART III
EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITIES

In Part 3, Lui Tam reviews the academic analysis of the Olympic legacy of employment and opportunities. It may seem something of a contradiction that a development process predicated on generating an employment legacy from an Olympic Games should begin by comprehensively redeveloping an area devoted to employment. However, this is what the first stage of developing the Olympic Park entailed. In 2005, at the time the London Olympic bid was won, the designated Games site was largely a place of employment. Tam explores what redevelopment and the long-term promise of regeneration meant for existing landscapes, uses, and people at that time, followed by the literature related to the employment generated in the delivery of the Games, and finally the more limited data and commentaries on the unfolding legacy of development related to employment on the site after 2012.

Whatever long-term gains in employment are made through the Olympics and legacy development should be balanced against the 5,000 odd jobs lost through the process of compulsorily purchasing the site and displacing all businesses and other occupants in order to free it up for redevelopment. Further, it is important to recognise the relationship between ideas of regeneration and the social construction of a particular image of place (Raco and Tunney, 2010; Davies et al., 2017). Notions of regeneration as presented in London’s Olympic bid, the legacy commitments, and in the extensive documentation of the compulsory purchase order hinged on a representation of the site of the Games as declined, poor, and at least partly derelict - an inevitable focus for change.
The aspiration to get long-term economically inactive people into work characterised all the recruitment activities of the main organisations – The London Development Agency (LDA), the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) and the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG) – employing people to prepare the Olympic site, construct the venues, provide training, delivering the mayoral commitments, and stage the Games (Vadiati, 2020: 60). These, as Vadiati argues (ibid: 61), shared a ‘mission’ to address structural issues of employment in the Host Boroughs, emphasising the intersections of skill and opportunity. The overall achievement of the employment-focused projects, according to Vadiati’s analysis, is the creation of around 70,000 jobs, far exceeding the jobs accommodated previously on the pre-Olympic site (Vadiati, 2020: 100). However, Minnaert (2014) argues that inclusivity and diversity were defined or understood differently by these different organisations with consequences for evaluation of impacts and effectiveness.

Overall, the site is more diverse in terms of land uses, and even employment uses, than in 2005. This reflects a policy of economic diversification rather than transition entirely away from industry.

The estimated total number of jobs created as a result of the development of employment areas and workspaces across what is now branded the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park (QEOP) by 2030 is 13,300 (LLDC, 2020a). Around the QEOP, the development of employment areas has proceeded apace since 2012, encompassing Chobham Farm, the huge shopping centre at Westfield Stratford City, and the International Quarter with its high-rise office buildings. However, while the amount of workspace and number of jobs may seem impressive, these are clearly not opportunities for local people in and of themselves. A detailed analysis of the employment legacy is clearly needed as data sources on what has been achieved today against plans and promises are scant.
In the fourth part of the review Mark Sustr focuses on the Olympic housing legacy. The candidate file submitted in support of the Olympic and Paralympic bid described the proposed legacy as a ‘model of social inclusion’, and a promise of new and affordable housing was one of the central drivers underpinning legacy. This resonated with local communities given most of the Olympic boroughs scored highly on the government’s Index of Multiple Deprivation, of which poor housing conditions was an important indicator, including overcrowding – identified as an acute problem (Bernstock, 2014; Brittain & Mataruna-Dos-Santos, 2017; Watt & Bernstock, 2017). In 2011 published findings by the housing charity Shelter aligned with other research and rated Hackney, Waltham Forest, Tower Hamlets and Newham amongst the top 8 percent of ‘very unaffordable’ boroughs in the country (Bernstock, 2014). Additionally, studies also reported some of the longest housing waiting lists in England and high incidents of homelessness (Ibid; Watt & Bernstock, 2017; Sagoe, 2017).

The literature demonstrates early housing predictions were portrayed as both expansive and ambitious, yet they were also vague and changeable. During the lifetime of the development so far, housing priorities have fluctuated with different targets promised by different agencies and stakeholders responding to shifting economic, political and policy landscapes. Bernstock’s research makes clear that there were no firm plans for affordable housing beyond those in the East Village, and that there was a presumption that adequate levels of affordable housing would be extracted from private developments through planning gain mechanisms. In fact the plan was always to build a predominance of market housing aimed to attract new communities to the area. This was underpinned
by the philosophy of ‘mixed communities’ and the creation of what are sometimes described as ‘socially-balanced communities’. Corcillo explored the trajectory of emerging Olympic neighbourhoods by mapping the development of the East Village, but concluded that the stated ambition of a socially mixed neighbourhood is yet to be realised in practice.28

Sagoe further explored the LLDC’s formulation of its first local plan in 2015 and the inherent tensions in the LLDC’s role as landowner, hence the need to maximise returns on the sale of land and its remit to deliver a meaningful affordable housing legacy, and argues this resulted in a lower requirement for affordable housing despite the extensive housing need in the area (Sagoe, 201727). In a recent article by Oliver Wainwright for The Guardian newspaper, he claims that so far, the number of homes delivered as part of the Olympic legacy is approximately 13,000, of which only 11% are truly affordable to locals on average wages; he states that in the four Host Boroughs that straddle the Olympic Park, there are over 75,000 households on waiting lists for council housing which is why many East Londoners regard the legacy as a massive betrayal (Wainwright, 202229). Bernstock’s recent analysis of legacy housing promises and outcomes reinforces the shortage of genuinely affordable housing provision in the Olympic Park. Based on a detailed breakdown of planning applications approved by the LLDC Planning Committee between 2005 and 2021, Bernstock documents the number of new units alongside ongoing discussions on how tests of ‘genuine affordability’ can be developed linking cost to local incomes.30

This analysis shows that of 4,200 homes approved between 2012 and 2017, fewer than 500 or around 11% met the genuine affordability test. This dropped to 8% in 2017/18 and 6% in 2018/19. However, Bernstock documents a noticeable policy change between 2019 and 2021 resulting in an increase in affordable housing to 20% in 2019/20 and 17% in 2020/21.30


29 Wainwright, O. (2022) “A massive betrayal”: how London’s Olympic legacy was sold out’, The Guardian, 30 June. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jun/30/a-massive-betrayal-how-londons-olympic-legacy-was-sold-out

30 Bernstock, P. (2022) Key facts about London’s Olympic Housing Legacy. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363368576_Key_Facts_about_London%27s_Olympic_Housing_Legacy_2022_-_Copy_1
PART V
A NEW URBAN PARK

In the final part of the review, authored by Jason Katz, we examine the Olympic Legacy promise to deliver a new urban park, one of the biggest in Europe for 200 years. As a key element of the legacy masterplan, the Park would significantly contribute to its green urban design credentials, and to improved health and wellbeing outcomes in East London by providing a substantial new public open space accessible to local communities for leisure and participation in sports activities through the re-use of Olympic venues such as the Aquatics Centre. Under the terms of the 2007 planning approval, local authorities were obliged to provide 102 hectares of open space, but subsequent plans for housing and other developments during the post-Games decade have led to concerns that this provision would be eroded by a creeping urbanism.

This section discusses the transition from the Olympic promise of delivering a green open space and public amenity, to the emergence of a narrative focused on cultural regeneration, through the development of the surrounding area as a cultural destination and the Park itself as a site for public art installations, such as the Arcelor Mittal Orbit, and events. Provision of parkland was regarded as vital given the shortage of open space in adjacent boroughs. The northern part of the QEOP would be characterized by waterways and landscaped parklands, with the emphasis on outdoor recreation and biodiversity; the southern area (around the Olympic Stadium and close to Westfield Shopping Centre) is leisure- and events-oriented – intended, according to Gold and Gold, to become ‘an animated space along the lines of the Tivoli Gardens in Copenhagen or the South Bank in London’ (Gold and Gold, 2017; OPLC, 2010). However, the literature shows how the legacy and sustainability principles embedded in the original promise gave way to a concern with cost-saving and

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income generation, which repositioned the Park as a development asset rather than a public or environmental good.

This section assesses how the different considerations surrounding development of the Park, specifically sustainability, regeneration, and securitization, evolved and complicated the process of delivery, resulting in what might be viewed as a compromised legacy promise. The ‘island site’ was well suited for the security and themes of the Games, but despite the intention to ‘stitch’ the landscape into the wider site, the academic literature largely finds that the Park remains isolated and underused by the local community, creating a similar disjunction in historical continuity and place attachment through the erasure of a pre-existing local heritage and identity with a new narrative of top-down placemaking focused on arts and culture and embodied in the East Bank development.

POSTSCRIPT
REFRAMING LEGACIES

The report concludes with a postscript by Joseph Cook and Saffron Woodcraft – a reflection on themes emerging from the conference and priorities for the next decade of Olympic legacy research.
STATE OF THE LEGACY

THE PROMISE OF LEGACY

LUZ NAVARRO ESLAVA
Legacy has been a key theme for the London 2012 Olympics since the bid was launched in 2003-4 by the then Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, with the support of Prime Minister Tony Blair. As many commentators have noted, the successful outcome of London’s bid depended upon a clear articulation of a vision for legacy. But as we will see in the following discussion, the concept of legacy has in fact been fluid. While elements of that vision have remained at the heart of London’s distinctive framing of legacy, the promises that have been made to future generations beyond the Games at different times, under different banners, speak to quite different social goals and effects. For example, the ‘Regeneration Games’ at the time of the bid, was re-branded as the ‘Games for a nation’ on the eve of the event.

Priorities, commitments, plans, targets, and outcomes have all changed over the period from the initial bid document launched by Livingstone, as a Labour mayor under Blair’s Labour government, to today. These changes, as this review shows, owe much to the changing political landscape of London and the wider UK following the election of Boris Johnson as Conservative mayor in 2008 under Gordon Brown’s Labour government, soon followed by a Coalition government led by Conservative David Cameron in 2010; and then Sadiq Khan as Labour mayor from 2016 under a Conservative-led central government.
THE CHANGING NARRATIVES OF LONDON’S OLYMPIC LEGACY

In London’s Candidate File, the 2012 Games were to be a ‘Games that make a difference’. Specifically, they would achieve the following:

- Deliver the experience of a lifetime for athletes.
- Leave a legacy for sport in Britain.
- Benefit the community through regeneration.
- Support the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Olympic Movement.

It is in the context of the bid therefore that we first see legacy defined in urban terms as ‘regeneration’ that would benefit a deprived, eastern part of London. As described in the Candidate File, this would include the creation of a major new park and conversion of the Athlete’s Village into 3,600 housing units (Thornley, 2012).34

Blair and Livingstone’s support for the bid is said to have been given on the basis that the Olympics offered the means to channel government money into East London, the transformation of which was seen as necessary to advance the wider fortunes and global standing of the UK capital, and hence ‘de-risk’ it from a private investment perspective (Smith, 2014a).35 The Games were embraced as a financial catalyst (Bishop, Everett and Fawcett, 2020) for the long-discussed process of the regeneration of East London. The discourses of legacy associated with what was positioned as the ‘Regeneration Games’ accordingly revolved in public discourse around notions of ‘community’ and ‘regeneration’, with these priorities in many ways coming to eclipse the event’s sporting legacy. (Harvie, 2013; Calcutt, 2015: 286). The concept of a regeneration legacy was also strongly rooted in the social, spatial,
economic and historical contexts of East London, its industrial history, and its inhabitants.

Following the success of the bid in July 2005, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport published *Our Promise for 2012* (DCMS, 2007), in which the four themes of the bid were developed into five beneficial impacts associated with hosting the Games:

- Make the UK a world-leading sporting nation.
- Transform the heart of East London.
- Inspire a generation of young people to take part in local volunteering, cultural and physical activity.
- Make the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living.
- Demonstrate that the UK is a creative, inclusive and welcoming place to live in, visit and for business.

The document was followed by an action plan published the following year (DCMS, 2008), which clearly states that the transformation of the so-called ‘heart of East London’ would be achieved substantially through the physical development of the new Olympic Park, with the amenities this would create, and its subsequent transformation after the Games. It would include plans for 9,000 new homes in the Olympic Park many of which would be made available to the category of ‘key workers’, establishing a new living and working community; and significant transport infrastructure improvements in East London, including enhancements to rail, roads, bridges, waterways, footpaths, cycle paths and towpaths within the boundaries of the site itself, in order to enhance its connectivity.

In 2008, Livingstone rebranded DCMS’s ‘beneficial impacts’ as London’s ‘Five Legacy Commitments,’ subtly re-working their
phrasing and yet reiterating the promise to ‘transform the heart of East London’ (Mayor of London, 2008):

- Increasing opportunities for Londoners to be involved in sport.
- Ensuring Londoners benefit from new jobs, business and volunteering opportunities.
- Transforming the heart of East London.
- Delivering a sustainable Games and sustainable communities.
- Showcasing London as a diverse, creative and welcoming city.

Calcutt argues that though ‘transforming the heart of East London’ was listed third, the sheer scale of change described under the headline served to emphasise that the real driver for the Games was the long-term regeneration of East London through the comprehensive redevelopment of the piece of the Lower Lea Valley designated as the Olympic site, with regeneration encompassing economic and social development (Calcutt, 2015: 285). In the Legacy Commitments document, the term ‘local’ is used extensively (thirty-five times), seeming to emphasise the specific geographical contexts of the plans. And yet, significant emphasis is also placed on London, with the Games framed as a celebration of the whole city, as a showcase of the city to the world, and its benefits as being ultimately for all Londoners.

In the detail of the commitments, important ambitions for development post-Games were established, with these coming to frame a brief for the legacy masterplanning processes that quickly followed. To stay with commitment 3, transformation was to encompass an immediate post-Games legacy of ‘high-quality homes’ on the site of the Olympic Village, ‘of which at least 30 per cent will be affordable’ (Mayor of London,
Mayor of London (2008) Five legacy commitments. London: Greater London Authority. Available at: http://www.cslondon.org/publications/?did=40&phpMyAdmin=a804e4718f86ba134bc6398a7fe0c40b

Sadd, D. (2009) ‘What is event-led regeneration? are we confusing terminology or will London 2012 be the first games to truly benefit the local existing population?’, Event Management, 13(4): 265–275. DOI:10.3727/152599510X12621081189112


In 2008, Ken Livingstone lost the mayoral elections to the Conservative Party candidate Boris Johnson. Johnson seemed initially to endorse Livingstone’s ‘Five Legacy Commitments’, but did not commit to adopting them (GLA, 200943). In 2010, with the new Coalition Government led by David Cameron as Prime Minister, as well as in the context of economic recession and the rise of new austerity policies, local authorities – including the Host Boroughs – faced massive budget cuts. Given the latter’s reliance on public funds, the new political and financial context had ramifications for the Olympic legacy promises, the legacy plans launched in 2008, and the new ‘convergence’ agenda adopted by the Host Boroughs in 2009, promising to bring East London in line with the rest of the city in terms of social and economic opportunities (Lock, 2015: 7550; Gunter, 2017: 29451). In December 2010, the DCMS published new plans for the legacy of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, though these now notably lacked detail, creating, in Mike Weed’s analysis, a new open-endedness to legacy in
the wake of the numerical specificity of Livingstone’s commitments. This would, argues Weed, ‘allow the outputs and outcomes from as many programmes as possible to be claimed as legacies secured from the Games’ (Weed, 2013: 285).

In 2011, Johnson published his proposals to dismantle the London Development Agency (LDA) and replace it with a ‘special purpose legacy vehicle,’ or Mayoral Development Corporation (MDC) (Lock, 2015), controlled by him, but financially independent and with a clearly commercial purpose (Davis, 2019). This was the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC), which would allow for the privatisation of legacy, and for its benefits to local communities, if any, wrested through planning instruments and negotiation from the arms of profiteering, framed as a ‘trickle-down’ effect of the Games: in short, a by-product, rather than the beating heart of transformation.

A year later, a further document emerged - ‘Beyond 2012: The London 2012 Legacy Story’ (DCMS, 2012). Four main areas are outlined within it: ‘Sport’, ‘Growth’, ‘People’, ‘City’, each associated with a series of rhetorical objectives and headline statistics. Regeneration plays a much smaller role in this vision and, though legacy plans are referred to in the section on ‘City’, the actual elements of regeneration are more vaguely described, with emphasis placed on making the most of the infrastructure already built for the Games. Furthermore, the choice of focal areas, marks a shift from state-led regeneration and economy in the service of the public good to soft community gains from the Games and economic growth harnessed from the private sector in the context of austerity. For Weed, government once again fails in this document to ‘explain how priorities will be achieved’ with ‘few priorities (being) directly measurable, which means the extent to which they have been delivered can be the subject of political interpretation and debate rather than being determined by a clear assessment of whether a targeted policy outcome has been achieved’ (Weed, 2013: 285).
The Games were rebranded at this stage as the ‘Games for the nation’. Emphasis on East London and local communities was thus replaced by an overarching narrative of nationhood, as expressed in the stated goal to ‘squeeze every drop of economic potential out of the Games for the benefit of the country as a whole’ (DCMS, 2012: 31). Leveraging the assets of the Games entailed the creation of the new E20 quarter, now a ‘blueprint for modern [as opposed to sustainable] living’, the completion of parklands and branding of the former Press Centre as a high-technology district encompassing ‘green enterprise’ (ibid: 72). Mention is also made of the potential to create five new neighbourhoods to add substantially to the housing offer of the Olympic Village (ibid: 76). However, while the Olympic Park is framed as a hub for the high-tech and creative sectors – seeking to attract international investment – it becomes clear that the promise of legacy in terms of affordable housing, public transport investment (now £6.5 billion) and jobs has been slashed, as will be discussed in more detail below.

**CONTEXTUALISING THE CONCEPT OF OLYMPIC LEGACY**

The manipulation over time of the concept of legacy before and after London 2012 has arguably been facilitated by the vagueness of definitions of Olympic legacies more widely, dating back to the 1990s. As cities from the early 1990s onwards placed more emphasis on the transformative potential of the Games, based on an assumption of their positive impacts for host cities, legacy evolved apace into something that had to be carefully planned, with long term effects that need to be monitored and measured (Azzali, 2017). The term ‘legacy’ was eventually introduced into the Olympic Charter in 2003, from which date it became a key strategic priority for cities bidding for the Olympics, but one which they were free to frame in their own ways. Since then, host cities have been expected to present a strong vision of how lega-
cy will be planned and delivered, and a clear understanding of the impacts and the long-term effects associated with the Games (Girginov and Preuss, 2022 56). However, critics have argued that legacy should not just be understood as the output of future-oriented planning and intentions, but also on the basis of what is actually seen, evaluated, and experienced as a result of plans, policies and strategies. As Preuss argues, ‘irrespective of the time of production and space, legacy is all the planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures created for and by a sport event that remain longer than the event itself’ (Preuss, 2007: 211 57; Gratton and Preuss, 2008 58). It also includes, by extension, all the different meanings it comes to hold for different people, cities, and cultures. Legacy, then, resides in the assessment of all those complex outcomes which come to supersede and challenge legacy as planned/intended.

Given the absence of a clear and coherent conceptual framework, defining Olympic legacy has been a challenge that numerous authors have tried to address from multiple angles, different fields and in relation to different cities (Koenigstorfer et al., 2019 59; Thomson et al., 2019 60; Scheu, Preuss and Köncke, 2021 61; Girginov and Preuss, 2022 56). Preuss argues that precisely ‘the lack of agreement on the concept of legacy and its various elements makes it very hard to measure accurately or with confidence’ or to compare cities (Preuss, 2007: 207 57) which in turn ‘hampers knowledge development and the work of governments and Organising Committees’ (Girginov and Preuss, 2022: 2 56). In addition, despite growing interest in understanding the mid-to-long-term impacts of Olympic Games and developing a comprehensive framework for their evaluation, ‘there is a lack of robust evidence relating to longer term benefit’ (Davies, 2012: 316 62), which relates back to unclear definitions which have the capacity to morph as plans for the Olympic and legacy developments unfold. Evans (2012 46) suggests that the lack of long-term commitment to funding from organisations involved is tied to the lack of appropriate long term evaluation of the games. What

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is needed, Azzali writes, is a framework that should allow for legacy evaluation also ‘within a long-term time, and applicable to different geographical areas and contexts’ (Azzali, 2017: 263). Furthermore, attention should be drawn not only to what the legacy impacts are, but also what conditions have allowed these impacts to be generated and by whom (Chen and Henry, 2020).

In response to these challenges, the International Olympic Committee developed its own Technical Manual on Olympic Games Impact (IOC, 2007) to evaluate the impacts and effects of planned legacies. This evaluation guide is based on 126 environmental, socio-cultural, and economic quantitative indicators, and includes guidance on how they should be collected and measured. The legacy studies based on these quantitative indicators, however, as several authors point out, have many limitations as they only use quantitative data and do not include either ‘qualitative data, or soft and intangible legacies’ (Azzali, 2017: 263). Their framing may also serve to occlude legacies that are not part of the framework but that emerge as key in particular host cities and locales.

Returning to London, numerous books, articles and studies have tried to unpack the legacy and measure the impact of the Games from multiple angles. It is clear that despite the strong legacy concept identified in London’s bid, a lack of conceptual clarity (Poynter, Viehoff and Li, 2015; Weed, 2013) has come to be identified with London’s planning process over time. This is largely related to the fact that the concept of London’s Olympic legacy has been unfolding throughout time, from the initial bid until today. In fact, even before the Games, it is clear that ‘both legacy initiatives and success indicators’ were ‘changed, dropped or rebranded’ (Weed, 2013: 97). A political dimension, as discussed, is apparent as different discourses around the legacy of London 2012 have been built around the interests of local and national governments at different times, each with their own interpretation of legacy (Scott, 2014; Smith, 2014a; Tomlinson, 2014).
THE MULTIPLE PHASES AND DIMENSIONS OF LONDON’S OLYMPIC LEGACY PROMISES

Over the past fifteen years since the legacy commitments were developed, academic analysis has gradually shifted in emphasis from commenting on what legacy promises leave open, to how they have subtly been reinterpreted through different eras of UK and London government. Focussing on the over-arching legacy commitment of ‘Transforming the heart of East London’, and its subsequent evolution through promises, plans and places, the key findings of this analysis are briefly summarised below across a series of themes which are explored in more depth in subsequent chapters.

REGENERATION

As discussed above, regeneration was the main reason for Ken Livingstone’s support of the London 2012 bid, seeing it as a unique opportunity to accelerate the transformation of East London (Sadd, 2009) and provide thousands of high quality and affordable homes. However, several authors have highlighted that regeneration plans for the Lower Lea Valley area were already being drafted prior to the Olympic bid and would have happened in any case (Florio and Edwards, 2001; Watt, 2013). Without the Olympic Games, it is generally assumed that the process would likely have been slower, more cumbersome, incremental and less ambitious from sporting, cultural and environmental perspectives (Davis, 2012; 113).

Scholars interrogating the nature of pre-Olympic promises and commitments have also pointed to the failure to identify precisely the assumed beneficiaries of the transformation of East London, with people and place being continually conflated (Poynter and MacRury, 2009; Watt, 2013; Davis, 2014a, 2014b). It has been seen as something of an irony that a process predicated on delivering benefits for local
people should begin with large-scale displacement both of residents and workers, thus creating the perfect canvas for private-sector investors to step in. The beginnings of transformation have been described, not as beneficial processes, but as clear examples of state-led displacement creating a primer for gentrification (Cohen, 2012 76; Allen and Cochrane, 2014 79) through replacement by a more affluent population (Raco and Tunney, 2010 80; Brownill, Keivani and Pereira, 2013 81; Watt, 2013 73; Bernstock, 2014 82).

In the same vein, what and where exactly the ‘heart of East London’ is has been shown not to have been explicitly defined. This is significant given regeneration was supposed to be the vehicle to tackle the socio-economic issues that affected the areas local to the Olympic site, ‘creating wealth and reducing poverty, supporting healthier lifestyles and developing successful neighbourhoods’ (Smith, 2014a 69; Weber-Newth, 2014 83). Further, a shifting focus between material and socio-economic regeneration has been identified, with legacy sometimes framed in terms of the sheer quantum of construction coming forward and, at other times in terms of improvements in relation to socio-economic conditions such as deprivation. In 2009, for example, the ‘the Host Boroughs’ Strategic Regeneration Framework introduced ‘convergence’ as a new measure of regeneration, such that ‘within 20 years the communities who host the 2012 Games will have the same social and economic chances as their neighbours across London’ (London’s Growth Boroughs, 2009 84; Cohen and Watt, 2017 85).

Subsequent to 2012, the promise of regeneration has been interrogated across a broad literature from many different angles. Cohen and Watt (2017 85) for example, examine the ‘hollow’ relationship between legacy promises and their materialisation within the emerging landscape of London’s post-Olympic Park. Davis (2019 86) argues that as promises have evolved, they have flowed seamlessly into the unfolding
of legacy plans and developments, while Poynter et al. argue that the transformation of East London post-2012 owes less to Olympic legacy promises than to ‘a city economy that has been dominated over recent decades by London’s “financial turn”’ (Poynter, 2017).

**HOUSING**

In terms of housing, the promises clearly changed over time, feeding into different iterations and stages of legacy planning as well as the outcomes of housing development since 2012: in short, a reduction in both affordable housing and new homes overall, from 50% affordable in 2007 (GLA, 2007) and 40,000 new homes, to 30% affordable in 2008, with no change to the overall number of new homes (DCMS, 2008); and by 2009, only 10,000 new homes in addition to the 5,500 homes planned as part of the Olympic Village (GLA, 2009).

Housing targets changed again against the backdrop of the economic austerity era under Conservative governments with Johnson as mayor and Cameron as Prime Minister: only 11,000 in total by 2012, ‘with more than a third affordable housing, and 40 per cent of them suitable for families’ (DCMS, 2012: 76), reduced to 6,870 homes on top of the Stratford City/Olympic Village homes in 2011–2012, along with a reduction in affordable housing targets to a minimum of 20% and a maximum of 35% under the OPLC’s ‘Legacy Communities Scheme’ (LCS), later taken over by the LLDC. According to Bernstock, this reflected housing finance reform and ‘the need to capitalise on the sale of lands to pay back debts’ (Bernstock, 2013: 167). The LCS continued to promise that 40 per cent of homes would be suitable for families and emphasised the need for accessible housing including designs suitable for wheelchair users. The ‘Vision and Convergence’ statement emphasises the importance of affordable housing, specifically to promote ‘successful lifetime neighbourhoods and stable sustainable communities’ (Mayor of London, 2012: 27).
which points to ‘stability’ and ‘balance’ as the characteristics of largely middle-class, gentrified future neighbourhoods, justifying reduced affordable housing targets.

PUBLIC SPACE: ‘A NEW URBAN PARK’ AND SPORTING FACILITIES

As part of his legacy commitments, Ken Livingstone promised to create a world-class park that included plans to create five major sports venues within one of the largest new urban parks in Europe. It included regenerated habitats and waterways alongside new buildings constructed to the highest standards of sustainable design. This would benefit local people in East London who lacked access both to open space and to opportunities for participation in sport. In the ‘Five Legacy Commitments’ document, Livingstone pledged to work with local communities to ensure that post-Games facilities were accessible to everyone, including Londoners. While an emphasis on the importance of the Park to prospective residents remains at the heart of later promises, the emphasis on local people seems to recede into the background in subsequent documents produced by Johnson or the Coalition government; instead, it is framed as a park for Londoners and a draw for investors.

TRANSPORT

Livingstone’s ‘Five Legacy Commitments’ mentioned a ‘transport legacy’ that included the Eurostar rail link in Stratford International, extension and increased capacity of the Docklands Light Railway to Stratford International, an extended and improved East London line integrated into the London Overground network, new walking and cycling routes and extra capacity in the Jubilee Line with a budget of £1.1 billion. It highlights how both local communities and Londoners will benefit from this legacy.
With the change of government in 2010, official reports (see DCMS, 2012 for example) tend to focus on what has already been delivered in preparation for the Games, highlighting significant improvements to transport networks in East London and station upgrades, for example (Azzali, 2017). However, additional mayoral transport projects or priorities are not mentioned, apart from ‘upgraded walking and cycling routes to link the Park into its surrounding area and promote more sustainable living’ (DCMS, 2010: 12). The transport budget was reduced under the Conservative administration from £10bn to £6.5bn and transport benefits are considered London-wide more than locally, which is described as one of the best-connected areas in the capital (DCMS, 2012), and in the country (HM Government and Mayor of London, 2013). Kassens-Noor highlights that it is critical for transport and mobility needs to be integrated into wider strategic urban plans as an economic catalyst for the local area (Kassens-Noor, 2012); what remains to be explored is the role of transport in attracting investment and new population to the area, and its real impact on local communities.

CULTURE

One of the promises of the cultural chapter of London’s Candidature Files was to place ‘culture at the heart of the Games’ (Garcia, 2015: 255), and this was carried into subsequent documents under Livingstone’s mandate. This said, culture figures little as a theme within the ‘Five Legacy Commitments’. Where it is mentioned here, it is exclusively in the context of the Games, seen as the ‘greatest celebration of sport and culture on earth,’ and as integrating diverse cultures under the banner of sporting contest. Nothing is mentioned in terms of tangible and physical cultural legacy. It is in the later promise documents produced under Johnson’s leadership of the GLA that culture emerges strongly as a theme.
In ‘Beyond 2012: The London 2012 Legacy Story’ the word ‘culture’ appears more times than the word ‘regeneration’. In the document, the new 114-metre ArcelorMittal-built Orbit sculpture near the Main Stadium is represented as symbolising a new cultural turn on the Park, and it is stated that ‘[a]s well as some of the finest community sports facilities in the world, Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park will be a magnet for the arts and culture.’ However the area that would later become ‘East Bank’ is still referred to as ‘Marshgate Wharf’ in the 2011/2012 Legacy Communities Scheme and is largely designated for housing use. It was only after the Games that the idea and promise of a cultural and educational quarter began to take shape, spanning the Johnson and Khan eras at the GLA and leading gradually to the integration of prestigious institutions including the Victoria and Albert Museum, University College London, Sadler’s Wells dance theatre and the London College of Fashion within it (Brown, 2022). Culture remained prominent within Sadiq Khan’s vision for legacy, with his assertion that East Bank would be somewhere ‘where everyone, regardless of their background, can access world-class culture and education on their doorstep’ (Mayor of London, 2018).

EMPLOYMENT

From the start, the Olympic Games were seen as a vehicle to provide new skilled jobs and training to those in need, benefiting local residents in the Host Boroughs. Through several plans, agreements, and partnerships, both the mayor and central Government committed to reduce the number of workless people in the Host Boroughs through the creation of skilled jobs. The Government’s 2008 document outlined the commitment to help 12,000 workless people from the Host Boroughs to have permanent jobs by 2012 in the area (DCMS, 2008). Livingstone’s ‘Five Legacy Commitments’ promised to create 50,000 new jobs in the Lower Lea Valley Area, and that London businesses would take full advantage of the opportunities created by the Games, emphasising how employment benefits would continue to grow in the coming years. The Host Bor-
oughs had a more ambitious target of ensuring that by 2015, 120,000 more residents were in jobs (DCMS, 2012). The Coalition Agreement produced by the new Coalition Government in 2010 committed the Government to outline the creation of 8,000 to 10,000 jobs ‘on top of the employment of 20,000 forecast for Stratford City’ (ibid.). In 2013, Mayor Boris Johnson and Prime Minister David Cameron promised that 10,000 jobs would be created on the Park, and 70,000 more for Londoners more widely through new developments such as iCity and Greenwich development (HM Government and Mayor of London, 2013). With a focus on economic growth, the document does not detail how these will be delivered and to whom, failing to address how many of those future new jobs would be available for local communities and how many of the jobs that were available pre-Games would turn into permanent jobs after the Games.

**SUMMARY**

This section of the review has provided an overview of the evolving promises that have characterised the emergence of London’s legacy, showing how the meaning of legacy and, hence the promises made for the future, changed over time, particularly during the period between the Olympic bid and 2012. It emphasises how the vision has continued to unfold, shaping a gradual and incremental emergence of legacy. It is likely that it will take another decade for a full overview of the legacy promises to be produced, when the long-anticipated ‘build-out’ of the site will surely be complete. Finally, this review has demonstrated that there is a strongly political dimension to the unfolding of promises, tied to broader ideas and ideologies about the role of the state in urban change, in the recognition and response to social needs, in the development of public goods and in the creation of benefits for different kinds of people and places.

This chapter was produced with specialist advice from Juliet Davis
STATE OF THE LEGACY

GOVERNANCE OF Legacy

MICHAEL BERRY
This chapter considers how the delivery and materialisation of the Olympic legacy has been shaped by its governance context in two ways. Firstly, through the form of the agencies and mechanisms for decision-making and delivery that were put in place, and who was represented in them. Secondly, through the lasting impact which these structures have had on the governance arrangements and cultures in East London. The first section of this chapter traces the lack of accountability and transparency which emerged through the evolution of the legacy governance (Bernstock, 2014\textsuperscript{103}). It then discusses the shape and characterisation of legacy governance including public private partnerships and networks, and how this influenced decision-making and stakeholder representation in East London’s regeneration. Finally, its implications for the operation of power, the inclusion and exclusion of certain interests, and the marginalization of alternative perspectives is discussed in more detail (Brownill et al., 2013\textsuperscript{104}).

**OLYMPIC LEGACY AS A GOVERNANCE ISSUE**

The literature analysing this context is limited, but diverse (see Leopkey and Parent, 2012\textsuperscript{105}, 2015\textsuperscript{106}, 2017\textsuperscript{107}, and Girginov, 2011\textsuperscript{108}, 2012\textsuperscript{109}), and ten years after the London 2012 Olympic Games, the ‘governance legacy’ remains contentious (Moore et al., 2018\textsuperscript{110}). However, there is agreement that the defining


characteristic of the Olympic and legacy governance model has been its complex and shifting nature, due to its frequently evolving and ‘complex assemblages of firms, consultancies, agencies and organizations’ (ibid. 110).

Girginov submits that it is the ‘tension between what is being done in the name of legacy, for whom, and at what cost and to what effect, that turns Olympic legacy into a governance issue’ (Girginov, 2011: 544–545 108), while Leopkey and Parent focus on the role of stakeholders, or ‘event actors’ in decision-making as key to understanding the delivery and shape of Olympic legacy (Leopkey and Parent, 2012 105; 2017: 439 107). As outlined in Part 1, the governance of legacy has been a shifting concept since the 1976 Summer Olympic Games in Montreal, linked to changes in the discourse from infrastructure and sport to broader ‘social legacy’ commitments (Leopkey and Parent, 2012b 111) which have been ‘institutionalized’ within the International Olympic Committee’s Olympic Charter (see also Chappelet, 2021 112). The legacy governance model is inherently complex and potentially disruptive, including supranational regeneration planning and sport governance components, blurring the lines between different sectors (Davis, 2019 113). The literature on London’s Olympic legacy governance model overwhelmingly characterises it as one which replaces a ‘hierarchical mode of government’ by ‘governance’: a system subject to negotiations between a wide range of stakeholders, whose interactions give rise to a relatively stable pattern of policy making that constitutes a specific form of regulation, or mode of coordination (Lo, 2018: 650 114), but also has potentially negative impacts on existing communities.

Bernstock (2014 103) suggests that the complex and challenging governance system may have contributed during the lead-in to the Games to the dilution of legacy afterwards. She notes that the governance arrangements for legacy were modified several times since 2005 as manifested in a plethora
of different agencies and mayors with different approaches to Olympic legacy, and a frequently changing tenure of board members and people in key leadership roles (Bernstock, 2020; Davies, 2012; Figure 1, & Table 1). However, most of the literature which has emphasised the complexity of legacy governance models (eg. Davies, 2012; Minton, 2012b; Bernstock, 2014; 2020; Davis, 2019; Edizel, 2014; Brown et al., 2012; and Farndon, 2016), focuses on the period linked to the delivery of the Games, running up to or immediately after 2012. By contrast, the literature discussing the delivery of legacy post-2012, describes a less complicated governance context (Owens, 2012).

Leopkey and Parent (2012) include the International Olympic Committee (IOC) itself as part of the city-wide legacy governance (see also Coaffee, 2013), and Owens notes that it was embedded within a ‘patchwork of public/private partnerships’ delivering East London regeneration, all blending ‘public sector backing, private sector partners, and local voluntary and community engagement reflected in governance structures’ (Owens, 2012: 218). This led to a reconfiguration of existing urban governance and stakeholder relationships in the Lower Lea Valley, which according to Minton led to a ‘proliferation of hundreds of agencies, quangos and competing companies’ generating confusion and bureaucracy. This further ‘fracture(d) the public realm into atomised, disconnected units, which makes the creation of holistic plans for places more difficult’ (Minton, 2012b: xxxviii). By contrast, Owens suggests that the establishment of agencies such as the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC), and the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) should be seen as the consolidation of the multiple agencies and vehicles for regeneration that were a feature of the pre-existing institutional context for regeneration in the Lower Lea (Owens, 2012: 223). According to Smith et al., the effect was ‘to simplify and reduce the number of public bodies involved in legacy planning post-Games’ (Smith et al., 2011: 322).
Other writers also highlight the complexity of legacy governance. Davis points to the way it has sought to manage the contradictions and tensions between different legacy objectives: growth and inclusion. To Davis, these do not sit easily together since what ‘one can offer by way of benefits of the public value, can in theory strip the basis of economic viability and capital value’ (Davis, 2014a: 338). In an attempt to manage these contradictory objectives, actor assemblages frequently shifted and remade conceptions of legacy as a means of delivering/focusing on different priorities throughout the Games. Brownill (2009 and 2013) points to the way that different modes of governance (networked, participatory, hierarchical and neoliberal) have also been in tension throughout the legacy story, opening-up, and closing-down spaces for alternatives and inclusion through the resulting dynamics. This focus on hybridity or assemblage (see also Allan and Cochrane, 2014) presents a view of legacy governance and politics which provides limited space for a range of voices to be heard.

Figure 01: The Olympic Legacy Governance Timeline

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125 Smith, A., Stevenson, N. and Edmundson, T. (2011)

126 Davis, J. (2014a)

127 Brownill, S. (2009)
‘The Dynamics of Participation: Modes of Governance and Increasing Participation in Planning’. Urban Planning and Research, 27(4): 357-375. DOI:10.1080/08111140903308842

128 Brownill, S. (2013)

### Table 01: Remits and Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
<th>ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES</th>
<th>GEOGRAPHICAL REMIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>London Development Authority (LDA)</strong> (Mayor of London)</td>
<td>Regeneration body within the GLA responsible for land assembly (Brownill et al., 2013), jointly responsible with ODA on drafting the LM and broader masterplans for London, managing the clearance of local SMEs (Raco and Tunney, 2010) and undertake consultation with local communities, assists in informing the SRF, formed the Opportunity Area Planning Development Framework for the Lower Lee Valley area (Evans, 2016: 62) - Contains – LDA Legacy Directorate.</td>
<td>The Olympic Site and broader Greater London Authority jurisdiction (see Evans, 2016).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA)</strong></td>
<td>Statutory body set up by government to manage a programme of investment defined as ‘portfolio of projects and activities that are required for the delivery of venues, facilitates, infrastructure and transport on time for London 2012, in a way that maximises the delivery of a sustainable legacy within the available budget (ODA, 2007:6), and jointly responsible for legacy masterplan drafting i.e. LMF. Contains the ODA Planning Decisions Team (ODA) PDT (see Farndon, 2016), and ODA Planning Committee (which Host Borough Unit are a part).</td>
<td>Olympic Site, including the Athlete’s Village site - housing unit in Stratford City (Smith, 2014a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC)</strong></td>
<td>An SPV designed to ‘deliver social, economic, and environmental benefits for East London; deliver a return on investment, and to optimize the sustainability/success of the park/venues (Bernstock, 2014:86), develop/implement plans for the regeneration of the park to, promote the Park to potential investors, to manage and secure operators for venues and parklands, and to create a lively, livable place for excellent sport facilitates (Smith, 2014a). LDA responsibility for legacy passes from LDA to OPLC (Brown et al., 2012).</td>
<td>Took over ownership of the Olympic Park site, though excludes the Athlete’s Village (see Minton, 2012b:xxiv).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC)</strong></td>
<td>To promote and delivery physical, social, economic and environmental regeneration in the Olympic Park and the surrounding area through investment on development, transfer of property, rights and liabilities from ODA to the LLDC, and undertake consultations with local populous to determine usability of park and fridge areas under the LLDC planning authority (Hill, 2022:261, and Bernstock, 2014:86), Legacy responsibilities and assets from OPLC also transfers to the LLDC.</td>
<td>Incorporates some assets and projects owned by the LVRPA, and the LTGDC (see Townsen, 2011), including Bromley by Bow, and Hackney Wick, Stratford City Development, Westfield Shopping Centre, and Chobham Farm, Fish Island, Pudding Mill Lane, Sugar House Lane, Three Mills, and Mills Mead, The Carpenters Estate, land owned by the OPLC, and the Lee Valley Regional Park Authority including Eton Manor (see Bernstock, 2014:86, Evans, 2016, and Minton, 2012).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) (2007)  
*Design Principles for the Olympic Park: London: Olympic Development Authority*
### POWERS

Land Assembly, Compulsory Purchase Powers i.e. removal of businesses (see Davis and Thornley, 2010). Drafting of regional and Olympic masterplans. Ability to allocate funding to Host Boroughs for regeneration and improvement programs. Stipulate codes of practices in consultation, and commission third parties to undertake viability assessments, decides codes of best practice over consultation (see Davis and Groves, 2019).

Transport, planning decisions and compulsory purchase powers (Brown et al., 2012), development control over Olympic site, lead the production of masterplans and grant planning permission (until 2013), rewrite planning rules and protections to pursue Olympic development goals (Allen and Cochrane, 2014), parent company to Stratford Village Property Holdings 2 Ltd. (Watt and Bernstock, 2017), set contractual terms for delivery partners are areas such as sustainability (Raco, 2015).

Planning, development, management and maintenance of the Olympic Park, i.e. establishing a legacy for the Park and its venues (see Moore Stephens, 2017), identify potential tenants through competitions and tender for former Olympic sites i.e. the Olympic Stadium (which was soon awarded to the West Ham Consortium in 2011 as preferred bidder for mayoral approval), assess legacy options for the Park and its surrounding site (Moore Stephens, 2017).

Acts as freeholder, ‘collect fixed estate charges from residents and businesses with leases to go towards the Parks’ maintenance, compulsory purchase powers, land acquisition, planning authority, ability to create own policy, determine planning applications, given listed building and conservation area consent, ability to manage a major public asset, sell developer rights to private developers for neighborhood planning/development, set criteria for new masterplans for neighborhoods in contract negotiations (see Raco, 2015).

### BOARD/COMMITTEE COMPOSITION

LDA Board Committee Sector Composition:
- Private Sector Board Members: 8.
- Public Sector Board Members: 2, Civil and Community Board Members: 0, Not for profit Sector Board Members: 2, Charitable Sector Board Members: 1.
- Thomas Russel – Director of Olympic Legacy (worked on legacy for Commonwealth Games (East Manchester), Geoff Newton (Director of Olympic Opportunity at the Legacy Directorate – ‘Legacy Now’).

Sir John Armitt (Chair of the ODA) 2008 (Chief Executive from Network Rail 2002/2007, David Higgins (Chief Executive) 2008 (Chief Executive of Lendlease, 2003 CEO English Partnerships, 2011 CEO Network Rail), and Dennis Hone (CEO of ODA).

ODA Board: Private Sector Board Members: 8, Public Sector Board Members: 4, Civil and Community Board Members: 0, Not for profit Sector Board Members: 1, Charitable Sector Board Members: 2.

OPLC Non Executive Board/Committee Sector Composition:
- Private Sector Board Members: 9, Public Sector Board Members: 6, Civil and Community Board Members: 0, Not for profit Sector/ non-department public body Board Members: 3, Charitable Sector Board Members: 3.
- Margaret Ford (former Managing Director at the Royal Bank of Canada’s Global Infrastructure Group), and Chair of UK regeneration agency English Partnerships, Andrew Altman (Chief Executive 2009/2012) (previous Chief Executive at Philadelphia’s first Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development).

LLDC Chairs - Margaret Ford (Interim Chair), Apr/May 2012 David Moylan (Conservative MP & TfL Deputy Chair),Sept, Boris Johnson (Conservative Mayor of London), Sept 2012 Sir Edward Lister (Deputy Chair), 2015, David Edmonds LLDC Chair Executives - 2010/2011 Andrew Altman, 2011/2014 Dennis Hone (CE of ODA, COO of English Partnerships), 2014/2017 David Goldstone (former CFO at TfL), 2017, Lyn Garner (former strategic director of Regeneration, at Haringey Council).

LLDC 2022 Board: Private Sector Board Members: 7, Public Sector Board Members: 8, Civil and Community Board Members: 1, Not for profit Sector/ non-department public body Board Members; 1, Charitable Sector Board Members: 3.
Leopkey and Parent (2015\textsuperscript{134}) found that in order for a legacy governance structure to be considered ‘good governance’ by stakeholders, it should meet four key criteria: accountability, transparency, performance, and participation. This section focuses on accountability and transparency. Bernstock highlights that the GLA intended to avoid a ‘situation where it is unclear who is leading delivery of legacy goals, and who they are accountable to’ (Bernstock, 2014: 85\textsuperscript{135}), but that the opposite occurred. Duignan interviewed members of the London Assembly and noted that when someone ‘drops the ball’ it was not clear who should be held accountable as there was no clear ownership of the legacy responsibilities (Duignan, 2019: 150\textsuperscript{136}). Smith, 2014, describes a governance structure that lacked clarity in identifying those accountable for the delivery of legacy due to its distribution across a complex web of unidentified actors.\textsuperscript{137}

Bloyce and Lovett (2012\textsuperscript{138}) in their analysis of the legacy of London 2012 for participation found that an unintended outcome of the complexity of the networks was that ‘few organizations (were) willing to take accountability for any specific participation legacy outcome’ and note that ‘diminishing lines of communication and resources’ limited the control that any stakeholder could have over the way in which legacy was delivered, resulting in a legacy delivery characterised by superficiality. Raco highlights domination by private sector interests as a factor in the complexity of legacy governance, generating new tensions between ‘political projects’ and ‘democratic accountability’. For Raco, the legal and technical complexity of contractual arrangements made it all the more difficult to identify ‘the location of power and decision-making’ (Raco, 2012: 458\textsuperscript{139}). He argues that contractualisation was justified by delivery bodies such as the ODA, through a redefinition of
the public interest in prioritizing project delivery and privileging commercial interests. The embedding of state authority within private sector networks of expertise created a barrier to accountability for citizens, who were unable to see who was negotiating what, over what, and when, and lacked the necessary expertise and resources to challenge this. As Smith notes, whilst the involvement of the private sector may have been considered a ‘practical solution to a problematic situation’ (Smith, 2014a: 1935\(^{137}\)), the governance structures contributed to a distancing between the state, the electorate and the private sector.

NETWORKED GOVERNANCE: BEST PRACTICE OR EXCEPTIONALITY?

London 2012 legacy governance and legacy itself has been characterised in three main ways: as networked, neoliberal and hybrid/heterarchical (Brownill, 2013\(^{140}\)). The collection of special purpose delivery vehicles such as the OPLC and LLDC, private sector delivery partners, and informal groupings such as the Host Borough Unit have been typified as representing a ‘network governance’ model, defined by Lo as a situation where government is no longer in full control but relies on the ‘negotiations between a wide range of public, semi-public and private actors’ (Lo, 2018\(^{141}\), citing Sorensen & Tørfing, 2007: 3–4\(^{142}\)). Brownill et al. (2013\(^{143}\)) and Jennings (2013\(^{144}\)) identify the Olympic bid governance model as part of the ‘modern state’ of New Public Management and stakeholder democracy promoted by Blair’s New Labour government. Buck et al. (2005\(^{145}\)) and Newman (2007\(^{146}\)) highlight the role of networked governance during this period in bringing forward a ‘new regeneration narrative’ aimed at building sustainable communities through a consensus of agencies, actors and sectors in the planning and delivery of places and projects, combining economic competitiveness with inclusivity. Central
to this approach was the public-private partnership model defined by Kort and Klijn as ‘a more or less sustainable co-operation between public and private actors in which joint producers and/or services are developed and in which risks, costs and profits are shared’ (Kort and Klijn, 2011: 618). A small minority of authors have positively embraced the networked complexity of London 2012’s legacy governance as a best practice governance model, dubbed the London Model (see Moore et al., 2018), with Brown et al. depicting it as ‘an innovative structure designed to ensure the continuation of effective partnership work amongst the different levels of government and key stakeholders’ (Brown et al., 2012: 229). In this depiction, the remits and responsibilities of strategic coordination, monitoring, and delivery bodies, are presented as if clearly defined. Brown et al.’s paper describes a sleek system capable of galvanizing private investment and delivery of the Games themselves, through contractors such as CLM delivery consortium, with ‘democratic oversight’ from the Host Borough Unit. However the discussion notably overlooks the impact of private actors on legacy governance post-2012 (Ward, 2016).

Girginov notes in a similarly positive vein that the distribution of power amongst a network of actors was intended to ‘guide and steer collective actions towards a consensus amongst various parties involved in the delivery of any social, economic and sporting legacy from the Games’ (2011: 544). Grabher and Thiel also argue the need for a decentralized and networked system to maintain project flexibility and adaptability, as well as streamlining the delivery of the component parts of the Games through a ‘loose-tight approach’. Smith (2012) further argues that the overriding of local concerns was justified based on the pressures placed on project actors to deliver global projects on time and to budget. In contrast to these perspectives, the majority of the literature concurs that, far from a networked, consensual decision-making structure,
legacy governance is instead characterized by the dominance of certain interests which have shaped legacy outcomes.

Farndon (2016) represents this as a set of ‘exceptional governance structures’ that were used to steer desirable development through the ODA Planning Committee, or as Marrero-Guillamon calls it the ‘legal architecture of exception’ (2012: 22), justified on the ‘grounds of the temporary needs related to security and delivery, [...] through a rhetoric of efficiency’ (2017: 210). These can be typified as systems of hierarchical governance such as the ODA’s Planning Decision Team, who were able to make decisions based on prioritizing the delivery of the Games over the tangible impact that such decisions would have on both legacy and the residing communities. As part of the Olympic delivery process, delivery bodies such as the London Development Agency, and the Olympic Delivery Authority have required that local authority planning authorities devolve planning powers to delivery bodies as a means of simplifying and expediting delivery of the Olympic Park development. Post-2012 the setting up of one single delivery body for legacy delivery extended this. The LLDC’s ability to set the planning policy, review, and then grant planning permissions highlights a problematic lack of direct accountability to citizens (Marrero-Guillamon, 2017), especially given the dominance of business focused stakeholders on the LLDC planning board, with public stakeholders in the minority (see Table 1 and Bernstock, 2020 for a more in-depth breakdown of demographic makeup of the LLDC Planning Board). The Legacy Boroughs (Newham, Hackney, Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest), have also had limited influence over the board decisions, given that the Legacy Borough membership of the board has been constituted by the mayors of the boroughs themselves, not councillors (see Lock, 2015).
NEOLIBERAL DEREGULATION OR STATE-LED DE-RISKING?

The Blair Government’s predisposition towards networked governance structures and ‘iconic’ projects like the Millennium Dome and the Olympics has been interpreted as a form of neoliberal spatial governance, exemplifying New Labour’s modernist ideology (Jennings, 2013). The typification of Olympic governance as neoliberal is taken up by a number of authors, signifying ‘a politically guided intensification of market rule’ in the public realm (Brenner et al., 2010: 184). This involves, amongst other things: an approach to problem solving through privatisation and the operation of the market, the transition from state governance to market mechanisms and public private partnerships, increased dominance of the private sector in decision-making and the increasing heterogeneity and multi-level nature of urban governance.

For Poynter (2016), the London Olympic Games represented a unique opportunity to raise the global profile of the site as a destination for the foreign direct investment. He argues that not only was the Games used as an opportunity to attract investment as a means of delivering the main infrastructure of the Games, but also to attract FDIs to London more widely as a legacy in itself, mainly for the property sector (i.e., prime residential property or Prime Central London (PCL). Ferreri and Trogal (2018) refer to the LLDC shaping the land in order to make the park look more attractive to future investors, and Raco and Tunney (2010) also argued that the area was presented as a blank slate/tabula rasa that ignored existing land uses and enabled an argument to be articulated that only an ‘olympics’ could enable regeneration. Evans (2016) reviewed legacy governance as part of a broader initiative to introduce greater private-sector involvement in regeneration efforts, and Hill (2022) concludes that the main objectives of the LLDC were to achieve economic viability and a return on private investment in order to recoup public investment.
For many writers this has steered legacy towards particular outputs and outcomes designed to prioritise economic competitiveness and returns to the private sector over and above local needs and inclusivity. Duignan et al. (2019: 357) explain that ‘the ‘overriding’ of local concerns is widely attributed to and justified based on the aforementioned pressures placed on project actors to deliver global projects on time and to budget, often justified as a project in the city and national interests, while Watt (2013) has drawn attention to the spatial and political exclusion of working-class council tenants from Olympic legacy which these pressures have produced.

Other writers confirm the dominance of particular interests in decision-making but Smith (2014a) contests the idea that corporate interests and public-private partnerships drove legacy governance, arguing instead that private sector investors were promoted by government intervention in order to ‘de-risk’ East London (see Part 1). Both Girginov (2011, 2012), and Leopkey and Parent (2017) have also submitted that London Olympic legacy governance, far from representing the ‘hollowing out’ to the private sector that typifies neo-liberalism, can best be characterized as the ‘rolling out’ (see Peck and Tickell, 2002: 396) of the state, increasing its capacity for steering (see Grix and Goodwin, 2011: 538), and ‘promoting institutional conduct that was consistent with its legacy vision’ (Girginov, 2011: 553). The system can be considered as one dominated by the ‘delegation and nomination of legacy responsibilities’ (ibid., 2011), which many, such as Davis and Groves, 2019, have used to justify the labelling of London legacy governance as neoliberal.

While Leopkey and Parent argue that the delegation of legacy responsibilities represents a distribution of power through a network, they also maintain that, despite the inclusion of a variety of non-private sector interests in governance structures, this system still relies on the asymmetrical power imbalances (and delivery mechanisms) which drive regeneration towards

more market-oriented solutions. Raco (2014) suggests that whilst many authors argue for a neoliberal characterization of the Olympic legacy governance model, London’s Olympic legacy governance presented a paradox. Firstly, the Olympic legacy is designed under the pretext of economic growth, with regeneration being a measure of success for the London 2012 Olympic Games only if it brings about improvements in the life chances of London’s most deprived communities. To achieve this, privatization has not necessarily led to the full deregulation of Olympic legacy delivery, but instead to the creation of self-regulatory bodies and the use of instruments such as procurement and contractual terms. The use of contracts was therefore ‘designed to institutionalize policy outcomes and the mechanisms through which they are to be achieved’, outcomes heavily shaped by public-sector actors (Raco, 2014: 176). Whilst this may represent a new form of ‘state-led privatization’, in which public funds and objectives have been converted to privately run and contractually programs of delivery, this nonetheless is overseen by the strict regulatory hand of the state institutions using contract as a tool for ‘enforcing compliance through formal informal regulatory ties’ (ibid: 177).

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR STAKEHOLDERS: INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

Raco (2015) argues that the reliance on the formation of development partnerships enabled the establishment of ‘clear, rational, and output-centered practices that would make sustainability possible’, which would take precedence over a collective interpretation of ‘lofty aspirations and wider conceptual imaginations of sustainability’ shaped by community involvement. Legacy planning and neighbourhoods were therefore shaped by what was understood to be ‘realistic’ and ‘achievable’ by those enacted to deliver legacy, with ‘wicked problems’ such as social deprivation and poverty considered...
PART II GOVERNANCE OF LEGACY

to lie beyond the bounds of mere managerial solutions. Raco shows that citizens and community-led organizations can only influence decision-making processes if they subscribe to such ‘managerial discourses’ in order to be considered ‘legitimate’, while the dominance of technical expertise results in ‘judicialisation...the increasing use of courts to change how political actors achieve policy objectives’ (2015: 125\textsuperscript{177}). This creates further obstacles to citizen participation, given the technical expertise necessary to navigate complex legal processes (ibid.\textsuperscript{177}). Marrero-Guillamon argues that this process is reflected in policy-making in the post-Games period in the development of neighbourhoods such as Hackney Wick. He argues that highly technical processes and the ‘expertification of participation’ make it difficult for communities to engage, (Marrero-Guillamon, 2017: 227\textsuperscript{178}), and that they are therefore ‘para-democratic’ as they are self-deterministic whilst claiming to represent local communities.

This reliance on technocratic governance processes serves to depoliticise debates about regeneration and legacy governance, reducing legacy to a technical process (Raco and Tunney, 2010\textsuperscript{179}). Davis uses the development partnership between the LLDC and Chobham LLP (a joint venture company) to illustrate this point. Contracts between Development Partners and the LLDC set out a range of ways that partners would be held to account, enshrined in a set of performance indicators; however, communities did not have any involvement in this process and its complexity made it difficult for them to hold policy-makers to account (Davis, 2019\textsuperscript{180}). Chappelet highlights the fact that the IOC required the Games delivery to be depoliticised to ensure success (2021\textsuperscript{181}), and Raco demonstrates that the ‘privatization and hybrid formation has shielded those who delivered the Games infrastructure from the wider controversies that their actions have caused in East London and beyond, and made it clear how decisions over spending and risk transfer have been arrived at’ (2014: 191\textsuperscript{176}). In the lead up to the Games, some interests were included,
and others marginalized. Fussey et al., (2011: 122\textsuperscript{182}) argue that whilst organizations such as TELCO (the founding chapter of Citizens UK, representing ninety community groups across East London) was successful in realizing participatory engagement between local East London citizens and Olympic authorities (ibid.\textsuperscript{182}) many other interests were excluded. Armstrong et al., (2011\textsuperscript{183}) explored resistance to the Games and argue that the failure to build a robust community campaign resulted in the systematic segregation and marginalization of communities, thus ‘limiting the effectiveness of any group seeking to accomplish, or manage, change’ (Armstrong et al., 2011: 3176\textsuperscript{183}).

Raco (2015\textsuperscript{177}) uses the ODA/CLM partnership as an example to illustrate ways in which private sector interests were able to shape and steer plans with either an absence of community stakeholders or community involvement on limited terms. Evans’s ethnographic study inside the ODA and OPLC (Evans 2016\textsuperscript{184}), has argued that the search for development partners, the maximization of income, and the transition of assets were the key organizing principles of the policy agenda, whilst a regeneration model underpinned by a community engagement philosophy was de-prioritized reflecting a lack of genuine interest in engaging with community interests. Moore et al. (2016\textsuperscript{185}) argue that the London legacy agenda is the result of a restrictive interpretation of stakeholders, limited to private stakeholders, that has shaped a legacy governance model which was not shaped by community interests.
LEGACY GOVERNANCE AS A TOOL OF URBAN MANAGEMENT

Fussey et al. (2012) and Coaffee (2017) explore the strategies used for ‘cleansing’ and ‘purifying’ spaces as a critical feature of ‘urban management’ (Fussey et al., 2012: 265), and the formation of ‘exclusionary boundaries’ (Fussey and Coaffee, 2017: 62–63), designed to remove what they describe as ‘social pollutants’, or ‘flawed consumers’ (ibid.); in other words, less powerful and economically viable citizens through revanchist style approaches. Both papers submit that this has come in the form of urban beautification initiatives, alongside ‘physical, technological and behavioural forms of regulation’, such as the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) standards of secure-by-design, which became part of the Olympic legacy in the form of required adherence to these standards for new housing initiatives. These methods can be understood as governance mechanisms for the expulsion of undesirables from regenerated urban space, and the shaping of communities in line with desirable imagined users.

Cohen (2016) and Davis and Groves (2019) both explore the role of community consultation in the LLDC’s master planning process for new neighbourhoods, as another aspect of legacy governance. They show how images were deployed as part of a process of state-led gentrification, in order to manage expectations both for existing residents and potentially new and more affluent populations. Cohen (2016) explores how the LLDC used master planning, and housing tenure modelling as a means of reshaping the anticipatory user and re-imagining community in the new E20 neighbourhood and Park, as a more ‘professional/artistic class of people’ compared to the original ‘East-Enders’ (Cohen, 2016: 91). Davis and Groves (2019) highlight a perception on the part of local communities of a disconnect between the existing multi-ethnic communities already residing in the borough, and what they perceived as ‘white’, ‘affluent’ communities who

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Cohen, P. (2016)

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Cohen, P. (2016)
were represented in the images used in the consultation process. For Davis and Groves the network governance model which shaped the composition of stakeholders in quasi-governmental delivery bodies resulted in limited participation and the domination of certain types of knowledge to shape outcomes. Reviewing the governance of the LMF, they show how the LDA’s Code of Consultation (COC) served as an ‘intermediary in helping constitute forming relationships between actors’ (2019: 18189), predicated on a ‘baseline’ of economic data, economic viability, and plausibility. As such, it can be understood as a governance instrument designed to ‘build the legitimacy for the project among stakeholders, […] to attract market interest to help de-risk East London’, and build local community support in the name of ‘envisioning a better future’ (Davis and Groves, 2019: 18189; see also Smith, 2014a191).

Davis and Groves provide an analysis of participation in the two consultation stages which they suggest was characterized by pre-prepared visions based on ‘black-boxed calculations’ enshrined in ‘expert language’ (Davis and Groves, 2019: 20188). They describe a linear process of presenting the future vision through PowerPoint, and playing down counter-narratives, visions and critique by limiting engagement to breakout groups or suppressing it through unrationalized rebuke. Woodcraft has further argued that the ideological framing of the Games and their legacy through the medium of neoliberal politics and economics resulted in a ‘quantification’ of community and neighbourhoods which facilitated the ‘transformation’ of feelings and attachments into ‘planning approval and financial gain’ (Woodcraft, 2019: 181192).
GOVERNANCE BY DESIGN CODE

Some papers have further explored the use of design codes as tools of governance in shaping neighbourhoods. Davis (2014a) argues that the Legacy Communities Scheme (LCS) reflects a stronger desire towards a more market-orientated, risk-averse, and investment-focused plan for neighbourhood development than the LMF including ‘Zones of possibility’ delineated by stringent design codes which can only be negotiated between the delivery body and the developing partner. They represent formal tools which planners can ‘operate beyond statutory planning powers in order to shape local outcomes and to anticipate desirable stakeholders capable of fulfilling them’ (Carmona 2018: 107). Davis accounts for the removal of KCAP, the LMF lead planner, which originally advocated for an approach to urban design as ‘a process of piecemeal and organic growth… participation, use and appropriation’, as a shift towards a market-orientated approach using design codes and standards as a technocratic governance model, only deliverable by private stakeholders (Davis, 2014a: 34; 2019). This resulted in the exclusion of communities lacking technical skill and resources from neighbourhood design. Woodcraft (2019) affirms that this interpretative change from the LMF to the LCS, represented a shift away from ‘community governance’ based on organic growth principles, in order to expedite a renewed focus on investment following the Games which was demanded by the OPLC and LLDC.

THE EXCLUSION OF ALTERNATIVE VISIONS

Other writers who comment on the role of governance in constructing exclusionary narratives of legacy include Allen and Cochrane (2014), who argue that alternative political possibilities to shape the regeneration of East London were heavily undermined by the political coalitions formed between state...
developers and agencies. The Olympic space was used as an opportunity to ‘draw developers and state agencies together in place to deliver their grandiose visions and grand projects’ (ibid: 1613\(^\text{196}\)), to ‘mobilize both material and ideological resources to redefine the ‘local’ (ibid: 1615–1616\(^\text{196}\)), and to rework and reinterpret the delivery of the Olympics as a quasi ‘socially orientated development agenda’ (ibid: 1616\(^\text{196}\), citing Raco’s scepticism towards this interpretation). Armstrong et al. submit that this resulted in the systematic marginalization of counter-narratives that focused on the power of communities to enable change (2011a\(^\text{197}\)).

TELCO’s membership was initially reticent to support the bid given its negative experience of other large-scale regeneration projects in East London. However, they agreed to do so in exchange for commitments to tangible benefits including the provision of one hundred community land trust homes, jobs, training, and the implementation of a London Living Wage (Armstrong et al., 2011a\(^\text{197}\), 2011b\(^\text{198}\)). These were enshrined in an ‘Ethical Olympics Agreement’, the ‘People Guarantee’ signed in 2005 at London’s City Hall by TELCO, the then London mayor, Ken Livingstone, Lord Coe, and London Assembly Member, John Biggs (see Armstrong et al., 2011a: 3174\(^\text{197}\), and Minton, 2012: xxi\(^\text{199}\)). However, in 2007 the Olympic Development Authority denied any knowledge of the ethical Olympic Charter and its commitment to pay the London Living Wage, although it eventually agreed to encourage contractors to honour it (Lindsay, 2014\(^\text{200}\)). The failure to follow through on these commitments in a systematic way has meant that TELCO has been obliged to continue lobbying policy makers.

The legacy borough authorities also articulated a sense of increasing disenfranchisement both in the pre- and post-Games period. They established the Host Boroughs Unit in 2009 in response to what they perceived as a lack of focus on legacy and on their inclusion within debates and decisions. The Unit formulated an Olympic Strategic Regeneration

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Framework (SRF) aimed at measuring progress towards ‘convergence’, reflected in a narrowing of the gap between the life chances of residents living in the West of London and residents living in the East of London (Cohen and Watt, 2017). While on the surface this could appear as an alternative form of more locally-driven governance and legacy discourse, Evans (2016) suggests that it was relatively easy to win governmental support for the SRF as it demonstrated its support for socio-economic regeneration in the Olympic Host Boroughs without having to allocate any additional resources (Evans, 2016: 141). Hylton and Morpeth (2012) also suggest that the discourse of convergence essentially supported gentrification and the marginalization of existing communities, represented as needing improvement, in line with state objectives. Davis concurs that convergence was not really designed around existing social groups and self-identifying communities and could only really be realised on this spatial scale for imagined communities (Davis, 2016).

POST-2012 GOVERNANCE: LOCALISM AND BEYOND

There is a relative dearth of literature exploring governance and legacy in the post-2012 period. However, Evans discusses the implication of Conservative-led localism and decentralization agendas following the 2010 elections for the replacement of the OPLC by a Mayoral Development Corporation (the LLDC), which placed control of the Olympic legacy in the hands of Conservative Mayor Johnson. Davis, along with a number of critics, argues that this represented a ‘substantial and lasting shift in power away from central government’ towards ‘a hybrid set of entities including cities, councils, local areas and, in this case, a kind of quango’ (Davis, 2019: 877-901), rather than to local people (see also Davoudi and Madanipour, 2015 and Brownill and Bradley, 2017). Hill also explores the problematic role of quasi-public organizations in...
shaping convergence and legacy, noting that changes in the LLDC leadership corresponded with the altering of the LLDC objectives, and in turn, the interpretation of convergence itself. Davis (2019) has suggested that Boris Johnson’s mayoralty (2008-2016) coincided with a crucial moment in legacy planning that marked a break from a localised focus on connecting and stitching the park to existing neighbourhoods and East London communities to an increased emphasis on a legacy for London as a whole.

The tension between the governance of legacy and the Host/Legacy Boroughs has remained an ongoing issue. Bernstock’s review of the composition of the LLDC Planning Committee found that membership of the Board comprised a mix of representation from the four legacy boroughs, and other appointed members from ‘business/planning backgrounds’ (Bernstock, 2020: 945), but a notable absence of community representatives. Her research demonstrated how local authorities were unable to shape decisions within their area, and were frustrated at the lack of progress on the delivery of a meaningful legacy for local communities, and felt that power should be transferred back to local authorities. Lock has highlighted the view of local authorities that ‘sitting at the table is essential, but just sitting at the table is different from delivery legacy’ (Lock, 2015: 75).

Both before and after the Games, governance structures must be understood as a critical factor in the determination of how legacy has evolved and materialised, and of its key beneficiaries. They are the site of the interplay between legacy defined as positive economic growth in host cities through the prioritisation of market actors, and legacy as ‘societal engagement and reciprocity’ (MacRury and Poynter, 2008: 2084). Furthermore, forms of delivery such as public/private partnerships mediated through contracts have had an impact on how legacy takes shape on the ground and can mean that legacy objectives become diluted.
As this chapter has shown, legacy governance has been characterised by complexity. Not only have there been a plethora of often overlapping agencies overseeing legacy but the remits and responsibilities of these have also been in perpetual flux. While some of the literature identifies advantages to this networked complexity, the majority points to its opaque, confusing, overly technocratic and ultimately exclusionary nature. Legacy governance has been contested, both by the Local Authorities who responded to their feeling of exclusion by setting up the Host/Legacy Boroughs Unit, and by community organizations which have called for more open and democratic structures to be created (Girginov, 2011, citing Morethangames, 2010). The literature also identifies how particular governance and delivery forms have enabled or disabled particular legacy outcomes. While some writers see spaces for manoeuvre opened up by the contradictions in governance structures (spaces which have been manipulated by groups such as TELCO), others argue that governance forms have facilitated the domination of market interests to dominate. Finally then, this review opens up questions as to the shape of future legacy governance in the next decade, following the upcoming reconfiguration of the LLDC and the possibility this presents to explore opportunities for more open, democratic and inclusionary governance systems in and around the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park.


STATE OF THE LEGACY

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

LUI TAM
Ken Livingstone’s ‘Five Legacy Commitments’, discussed in the first chapter of this review, established key promises for employment as part of London’s Olympic legacy. He was committed to ensuring ‘that local people gain work in Games-related jobs and that local companies win Games-related contracts’ during the Olympics themselves, and he also promised that, following the Olympics, the Games ‘will create 50,000 new jobs’ in the Lower Lea Valley, 11,000 of which would be within the boundaries of the Olympic Park (Mayor of London, 2008: 11-13).

Behind these promises was the wider goal of using the Olympics to regenerate an area negatively impacted by de-industrialisation in the late twentieth century, and effecting a transition to a post-industrial economy that would improve the prospects of local people and address deprivation. The academic literature that has addressed the employment legacy of the Games has therefore focused on the nature of this transition, on how it has been constructed in official discourses, how it can be interpreted in relation to the original promises, and what has actually been delivered through the development of the Olympic site over the last ten years (for example, see Duignan, 2016; Cohen and Watt, 2017; Duignan et al., 2019; Duignan, 2019; Vadiati, 2020).

Dating back to the early days of the Olympic planning process, when the site for the Games was being assembled for
redevelopment by the London Development Agency (LDA), this literature has grown over time. However, it is important to note that, at least in the academic context, less analysis has been devoted to employment and workspaces than to other aspects of the regeneration legacy, such as housing.

This section begins by looking at the nature of literature produced in response to the inception of the site redevelopment process and the Compulsory Purchase of the Olympic site between 2005 and 2007, and exploring what redevelopment and the long-term promise of regeneration meant for existing landscapes, uses, and people at that time. It goes on to explore academic analysis of the employment generated through the delivery of the Games, drawing on available academic commentaries and some official data. Finally, it looks at the more limited data and commentaries on the unfolding legacy of development related to employment on the site after 2012.

THE IMPACT OF LAND ASSEMBLY (2005–2007) ON EMPLOYMENT LEGACY

It may seem something of a contradiction that a development process predicated on generating an employment legacy from an Olympic Games should begin by comprehensively redeveloping an area devoted to employment. However, this is what the first stage of developing the Olympic Park entailed. In 2005, at the time the London Olympic bid was won, the designated Games site was largely a place of employment.

Two hundred and eighty-four businesses were accommodated across the 266 hectares of land that became a focus for compulsory purchase by the LDA, employing in the order of 5,000 people in total within a total commercial floor space at around 330,000 sq., as estimated in 2004 (LDA, 2004: 4219). Without exception, businesses fell into the use class ranges of

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B1 (c) (Light Industrial), B2 (General Industrial), and B8 (Distribution or Storage). They included a variety of manufacturing industries including clothing and textiles, food, printing, furniture, glass, concrete, and metal fabrication. Waste management and recycling firms, motor vehicle repairers, second-hand vehicle parts merchants, bus depots, and garages were prominent in the landscape, but there were also creative industries including scenery builders, wholesale suppliers of foods from all over the world, construction firms and cafés (Davies et al., 2017).

Many of the firms were Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs), two-thirds of which employed more than 10 people (Raco and Tunney 2010: 2077). Raco and Tunney paint a picture of relative stability in the business community, finding that ‘79 per cent had been on their sites for more than 5 years, with 20 per cent occupying their sites for 16–20 years’ (ibid: 2077).

Indeed, industry and employment had characterised occupation of the site since the nineteenth century (Davies et al., 2017). From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the growth of industry and the employment opportunities it offered were closely connected to the development of the adjacent working-class neighbourhoods where many of the industrial workers lived. Industries evolved continuously from that time up until 2005, with the range of firms corresponding to the evolution of London’s broader economy.

The interrogation of London 2012’s employment legacy begins with the observation that whatever long-term gains in employment are made through the Olympics and legacy development should be offset by the 5,000 odd jobs lost through the process of compulsory purchase of the site and displacement of all businesses and other occupants in order to free it up for redevelopment. The literature suggests that the experiences of those businesses subjected to relocation should also be understood as part of the employment legacy, not only the gains produced by Games-related employment and
long-term employment legacy post-2012. It also points to the intersection between regeneration objectives and the representation of the place as being in need of change. London’s Olympic bid, the legacy commitments, and the extensive documentation supporting the compulsory purchase order, all hinged on a representation of the site of the Games as poor, in decline, and partially derelict – an inevitable focus for development (Raco and Tunney, 2010; Davies et al., 2017).

Numerous implications for employment legacy linked to the displacement of the business community have been noted. These include the uneven impacts of displacement that ensued due to the differing capacity that firms had to negotiate settlements within the compulsory purchase order process. Even though some of these businesses had more than a century’s roots in the area, and disregarding any potential for them to thrive in the area by continuing to provide employment in a better way, forced displacement was inevitable in order to produce the vacant site required for the mega-event, especially in the short time-span of two years between the announcement of the successful bid in 2005, and the handover date for construction of the Olympic site (Evans, 2016: 37). Based on the accounts of these displaced companies, many felt that they were not allowed to ‘better themselves’ during the process. Further, many businesses, especially SMEs, suffered because of the uncertainty imposed by the prospect of relocation, and from financial losses during the process of moving and awaiting compensation. Some firms even ceased to exist (Evans, 2016; Davies et al., 2017: 199). As Ferm (2016) argues, the specific characteristics of local small businesses, such as their dependence on interpersonal relationships, markets, and networks within local areas, make them particularly vulnerable in the face of rapid and large-scale displacement. A report cited by Ferm on Olympic-driven regeneration in Hackney has identified it as one of the most prominent threats to the creative sector (Invest in Hackney, 2009, as cited in Ferm, 2016: 409).


While it is true that the Lower Lea Valley became a focus for ‘noxious’ industries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Davies et al., 2017 220), and that rates of deprivation (including levels of unemployment) were extremely high (Raco and Tunney, 2010 221), this negative story about the area became dominant at the time of the CPO, and was forwarded as part of the rationale for displacing existing businesses. Representations of the site as deprived and as a wasteland helped to justify the designation of this area as an ‘Opportunity Area’, i.e. as cheap land available for development (Gold and Gold, 2008 225; Davis, 2012 226; Evans, 2016 222; Ferm et al., 2022 227). Drawing parallels with the regeneration of East Manchester, Evans (2016 222) argues that replacing the predominantly industrial and manufacturing employment profile with ‘service-sector led regeneration’ not only disrupts long-existing working-class neighbourhoods, but may also stoke further negative feelings towards development within local communities by appearing to neglect or misunderstand the area’s industrial heritage and cultural memories. Moreover, according to Evans (2008 228), regeneration led by local authorities was already being planned and starting to unfold in the area regardless of whether the Olympics were to take place. Some of the businesses which had to leave to make way for the Olympic site lamented the loss of places in Stratford which they had thought secure because, from their perspectives, they had already just been ‘regenerated’ (Davies et al., 2017: 197 220).

This analysis speaks to broader issues of how regeneration is conducted, by whom and on behalf of whom. In turn, it raises significant questions about the potential of the Games to act as a ‘panacea for East Londoners’ employment problems’, in Vadiati’s words (2020: 99 229). It also raises questions as to how the displacement of local entrepreneurship to make way for the Games might impact on the capacity of Games-led regeneration to deliver employment benefits by 2030 for a community recognised in 2005 as deprived and experiencing high levels of worklessness.
EMPLOYMENT AND THE GAMES: WHAT WAS PROMISED AND WHAT RESULTED?

Amongst Livingstone’s ‘Five Legacy Commitments’ was the promise that employment opportunities would be created by the Games themselves. Besides the sheer number of jobs that government actors claimed would be generated, it was promised that a proportion of jobs associated with all aspects of the construction and delivery of the Games would be taken up by local people in the Host Boroughs. In an area blighted by deprivation and where the quality of employment had been low, it was anticipated that thousands of jobs and apprenticeships would be created. The Greater London Authority (GLA) promised that 1,500 businesses providing services relevant to the Games, from sports coaches to cooks and builders, would benefit from the training needed to bid for contracts.230 A scheme called ‘CompeteFor’ would then help them position themselves to win those contracts. Another initiative called ‘Cultivating Recovery’ would enable 200 people experiencing mental health issues to develop careers in landscaping and garden maintenance. ‘Personal Best’, in turn, would be a volunteering programme (in other words, unpaid) for those out of work to gain the necessary skills and experience to enter paid employment. What these commitments to connect locals to opportunities did not establish was exactly what proportion of jobs would be awarded to residents of the Host Boroughs. However, such figures were established in other contexts, such as the Construction Employer Accord, a project to get long-term economically inactive people into work.

This aspiration characterised all the recruitment activities of the main organisations – the London Development Agency (LDA), the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) and the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG) – in-

volved in employing people to prepare the Olympic site, construct the venues, provide training, deliver the mayoral commitments, and stage the Games. These, as Vadiati argues (2020: 60–61), shared a ‘mission’ to address structural issues of employment in the Host Boroughs, emphasising the intersections of skill and opportunity. Before its demise in 2010, the LDA anticipated the creation of up to 70,000 jobs, albeit largely temporary ones, in Olympic-related employment. Recruitment involved the establishment of quite complex assemblages of state and private-sector actors and organisations including the GLA, the three aforementioned organisations, a special Host Borough Partnership body, CLM, JobCentre Plus, the Skills Finding Agency, and a wide array of established local businesses (ibid: 62–63).

Minnaert (2014) highlights some of the successes these organisations had in their endeavours to engage a diverse and more inclusive workforce, not only within the organisations but also sharing good practices with their contractors, including collaboration with training programmes. However she points out that inclusivity and diversity were defined or understood differently by these different organisations with consequences for evaluation of impacts and effectiveness. She shows that the ODA made good on its commitment to sponsor construction jobs and LOCOG did provide opportunities for local people and businesses, especially in services areas such as catering, cleaning, and security. But according to the Department of Culture, Media, and Sports (DCMS), only 23.5 per cent of staff directly employed by LOCOG, and 21 per cent of contractors working in Games-time roles, were resident in one of the six Host Boroughs, while 6.5 per cent of the volunteers recruited from across the UK lived in these areas’ (DCMS, 2012: 67). If this is the case, then logically the lion’s share of employment opportunities went to people from outside the Host Boroughs.

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231 CLM was a consortium of the engineering and construction companies CH2M Hill, Laing O’Rourke and Mace


The overall achievement of the employment-focused projects, according to Vadiati’s analysis, was the creation of around 70,000 jobs, far exceeding the jobs accommodated previously on the pre-Olympic site (Vadiati, 2020: 100). But Vadiati (ibid.) contends that some of the specific actions were ‘token’ gestures resulting in small gains, and that not all types of businesses or East London communities were equal beneficiaries. Vadiati also reveals that the job opportunities afforded to local communities were mostly ‘low-level’, ie low-paid, low-skilled, and with low prospects of upward career development. She reveals that for the ‘high-level’ jobs created in areas such as project management, planning, and design, the most important criteria were the suitability and capabilities of the candidates rather than whether they lived locally or not. In addition, there was no policy to encourage diversity and inclusivity among the ‘high-level’ employment opportunities. Further, she argues that, despite a strong focus on inclusion, local people and their employment needs, the employment legacy agendas and programmes typically avoided defining ‘target groups’ or who counted as ‘local’ (ibid: 72). This was surprising given the ‘super-diversity’ that characterises the demography of London, and particularly, of East London. She points out the racial or ethnic disparities that emerge in the matching of educational attainment with employment opportunity, where ethnic minorities are more likely to be over-educated for the lower-skilled or lower-paid jobs in which they become trapped. Ultimately, any lasting impact from ODA and LOCOG’s initiatives was challenged when these ‘sunset organisations’ were disbanded after the Games, and job opportunities directly connected to the Games came to an end.
EMPLOYMENT LEGACY AND REGENERATION: PROSPECTS OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT (2012-2030)

As stated in Ken Livingstone’s ‘Five Legacy Commitments’, the longer-term legacy of the Games was to be the creation of some 11,000 work opportunities on the Olympic Park, related not so much to the making of the Olympic Park and legacy neighbourhoods than to the quantum of development designated as employment use. Hence, they would be realised through the adaptation of retained sporting venues to create new public facilities, the creation of new employment zones as well as mixed-use areas encompassing live-work typologies and retail, and the addition of new elements of social infrastructure.

Much of the development which today creates, or will eventually create, employment opportunities across the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park (referred to as ‘the Park’ from hereafter) and within its ‘legacy communities’ can be traced back through the planning history of the site to the earliest legacy masterplans, including the ‘Legacy Masterplan Framework’ of 2008-2009 (Davis, 2012). This includes the conversion of the Olympic Press Centre and International Media Broadcast Centre (OPC/IMBC) into a new focus for education and employment, the retention and re-use of the Olympic venues, and the general aspiration to create a model of compact, mixed use, walkable urbanism across a series of new neighbourhoods. Also stemming from early urban design proposals is the provision of education infrastructure such as schools and nurseries which would create the means to educate and upskill future generations of East London workers.

As planned, workspaces distributed through the five legacy communities are typically diverse in nature, spanning a wide
range of use classes - encompassing office, wholesale and retail, transport, accommodation and food, broadcasting and communications, arts/entertainment, and other services (LLDC, 2020a). Overall, the site is more diverse in terms of land uses, and even employment uses, than in 2005. This reflects a policy of economic diversification rather than transition entirely away from industry. Through planning and design the result is an array of different types of buildings, densities, floorplates, sizes of units, and arrangements of space to appeal creatively to many different markets for workspace. Designs for the conversion of the OPC/IMBC, resulted in 2015 in Here East, a focus for digital, creative, and cultural industries. The Stratford Waterfront encompassing East Bank and UCL East, originally styled the Culture and Education Quarter, in turn will create a range of academic, cultural and commercial workspaces, (under construction at the time of writing). The estimated total number of jobs created as a result of the development of employment areas and workspaces across the Park by 2030 is 13,300 (ibid.).

Around the Park, the development of employment areas has proceeded apace since 2012, encompassing Chobham Farm, the huge shopping centre at Westfield Stratford City, and the International Quarter with its high-rise office buildings. But while the amount of workspace and number of jobs may seem impressive, these are clearly not opportunities for local people in and of themselves. Numerous efforts undertaken by the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) to promote access to jobs and training and placement programmes for local people have emerged since 2012, including the work of the Good Growth Hub. However emerging critique indicates that these programmes are small in scale or have time-limited benefit (Davis and Bernstock, 2019). The LLDC has also sought to promote diversity and inclusion among employers operating in the Park, setting standards for the representation as well as pay conditions of local people along with women, BAME and disabled people in the workforce (LLDC, 2012a).
A detailed analysis of the employment legacy is clearly needed as data sources on what has been achieved today against plans and promises are scant. Existing literature points merely to what some of the issues linked to employment legacy over the past ten years might be. Following Vadiati’s analysis, one of these issues is how a ‘local person’ is defined and how the broad range of specific groups within East London’s multicultural population is recognised under policies for diversity and inclusion (Vadiati, 2020). There is a need to trace definitions and explore how these have both shaped how target groups are identified but also potentially created new invisibilities. There is also of course, a need to evaluate the demographics of communities of employment in relation to the target numbers of employees specified in different categories.

The affordability of workplaces is another issue that appears to stand out for small and medium-sized industries, including some of the firms based on the site in 2005. Ferm (2014) points out that the general trajectory of change in the Olympic site and its fringes has been the loss of affordable art studio space. Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) note that, despite government discourses emphasising the significance of small businesses as key beneficiaries of the London legacy, numerous cases of displacement stemming from development-related gentrification can be identified across the Host Boroughs. Though yet untested, the potential for further exclusion of small and medium-sized cultural and creative industries is suggested by the ‘East Bank’ development, including ‘high-end’ cultural institutions such as the V&A, BBC, Sadler’s Wells, and higher education institutions such as UCL and the London College of Fashion. A scaled-back version of an earlier idea for an ambitious culture hub in the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, named Olympicopolis after its precursor Albertopolis in South Kensington, the project also risks furthering gentrification and exclusion of lower income populations from the area.
CONCLUSION

This section has provided a succinct review of the existing academic literature related to the employment and opportunities generated (or not) as part of the legacy of the London 2012 Olympics and, particularly, within the Olympic Host Boroughs in East London. The literature review has taken a broad historical approach encompassing research that addresses the industrial and development history of the area pre-dating any prospect of the London Olympics, through the preparation period leading up to the Games, during the Games and in their immediate aftermath, and finally as its evolved during the course of the last decade. The existing literature has pointed out that the 2012 Olympics acted as a disruptor to the ever-evolving development that already characterised the Lower Lea Valley. Businesses and local communities that had historic roots in the area were not necessarily considered as assets to the legacy of the regeneration programme. Instead, these communities were often mischaracterised in the planning phase of the legacy, leading to some of the failures that emerged in the delivery of tangible benefits to local communities. Furthermore, there was an inherent disconnect between the Games as a mega-event requiring fast-paced change and immediate outcomes, and the slower, more prolonged endeavour needed to address employment and other regeneration issues over the long term, which is reflected in the contrast between the direct employment and impact provided by the Games in 2012, and the subsequent evolution of the employment Legacies, including the disintegration of the employment and training programmes which had been established. Last but not least, the potential for further displacement caused by ongoing gentrification over the next decade deserves continuous scrutiny in future research.

This chapter was produced with specialist advice from Juliet Davis.
STATE OF THE LEGACY

HOUSING LEGACY

MARK SUSTR
This review of academic literature relating to the housing legacy of London 2012 seeks to highlight concepts, trends and outcomes identified in publications from 2004 onwards, alongside selected policy documents and data sources. A promise of new and affordable housing was one of the central drivers underpinning legacy, described in the candidature file as a ‘model of social inclusion’, which would be achieved through the ‘regeneration of an entire community for the direct benefit of everyone who lives there’ (Comité de Candidature Londres 2012, 2004: 19). This resonated with local communities given most of the Olympic boroughs scored highly on the government’s Index of Multiple Deprivation, of which poor housing conditions was an important indicator, including an acute problem with overcrowding (Bernstock, 2014; Brittain & Mataruna-Dos-Santos, 2017; Watt & Bernstock, 2017).

In 2011, research into housing trends raised affordability as a long-standing issue within Host Boroughs, due to a combination of factors, including a high proportion of low-income households and diminished social housing provision, coupled with expensive rents in the growing private rented sector. The housing charity Shelter rated Hackney, Waltham Forest, Tower Hamlets and Newham as amongst the top eight percent of very unaffordable boroughs in the country (Bernstock, 2014; Brittain & Mataruna-Dos-Santos, 2017; Watt & Bernstock, 2017). By 2015, the Growth Boroughs...
Unit claimed these figures had worsened (ibid. 245). However the perceived failure of London 2012 to deliver the legacy of inclusive and affordable housing originally promised in the bid is a key theme in the literature reviewed in the following sections, with authors including Bernstock and Watt emerging as perhaps the most prominent critics, and more recent attention focussing on racialised exclusion (e.g. Islam and Netto, 2020 246).

FRAMING HOUSING LEGACY: DEFINING AFFORDABILITY

As well as recognising an acute housing need, the proposed housing legacy was characterised in policy documents as part of a broader strategy intended to reverse what was described by the CPO Inspector as the ‘environmental, economic and social degradation of East London’ (Rose, 2006: 10 247). As previous chapters have highlighted, official narratives portrayed the development area as a wasteland in need of reinvention, in order to endorse the claim that the Olympic project would ‘transform the heart of East London’ – a statement included as one of the five Olympic promises featured in the Department of Culture, Media & Sport’s publications, as well as other official publicity documents (DCMS, 2007 248; Mahon, 2007 249; Poynter et al., 2015 250). This general consensus within policy publications revealed a broad coalition of state-led and city-wide institutions forwarding an inclusive vision of housing legacy. Gavin Poynter argued in 2012 that this was a tactical move designed to secure local and national support for the Games, satisfying the IOC’s condition for bidders that legacy should deliver long term benefits for host communities. He also frames it as a means of legitimising the use of the mega-event as a vehicle for massive urban renewal, and in this case for East London’s social transformation (Poynter, 2012 251). Inclusive narratives were also contained in the Can-
didate File, in which affordable housing for key workers and social housing for people in acute need were key proposals (Comité de Candidature Londres 2012, 2004241).

The literature demonstrates that early predictions for housing legacy were presented as both expansive and ambitious, yet they were also vague and changeable. During the lifetime of the development so far, housing priorities have fluctuated with different targets promised by different agencies and stakeholders responding to shifting economic, political and policy landscapes, as outlined in Part 1. Since the preparation of the Olympic Bid, three different governments under different political parties have influenced the direction of legacy, and so have three separate London mayors - all with divergent opinions around housing policy. These policies have also been shaped by a shifting financial landscape particularly since the aftermath of the 2008 economic downturn.

Nationally, the introduction by the Coalition Government in 2011 of a new ‘affordable rent’ definition, set at up to 80 percent of market rates, has largely superseded ‘social rent’ models whereby rents were pegged to median incomes - which historically translated to around 50–60 percent of market rents (Barton and Wilson, 2022252). The additional finance raised was intended to be reinvested in additional social housing. This was accompanied by a reduction in government subsidies for social housing developments and these policy changes have had a significant impact on rising housing costs and the types of ‘affordable’ housing supplied. Although there is no all-encompassing statutory affordable housing definition, the National Planning Policy Framework definitions are most commonly referred to and include social rent and a number of discounted intermediate rent and for sale products that make up ‘affordable’ quotas delivered by developers (ibid.252). The affordability of these is discussed later in this review.

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The chart at Table 2 illustrates Bernstock’s research into Olympic housing legacy promises and policy commitments, revealing a complex history of housing targets that were often opaque and difficult to track. Beyond the conversion of the Athletes Village to East Village (phases 1 and 2), there were five additional residential neighbourhoods planned on the Park: Chobham Manor, Eastwick, Sweetwater, Stratford Waterfront, and Pudding Mill/Bridgewater Triangle, presently at different stages of development or completion and all falling within the boundary of the Legacy Communities Scheme Masterplan, which was developed in 2011 and is due to complete by 2031 (OPLC, 2011253). Additionally, it was anticipated that there would be an acceleration of residential development within the Lower Lea Valley beyond the Park, mentioned by Lord Coe, although these represented an aspiration rather than a definite commitment.

As part of the Convergence Agenda, initiated in 2007 by the Host Boroughs with the aim of raising living standards in line with the rest of London by 2030, there was also a stated intention to deliver 50,000 new homes within the Host Boroughs by 2015 of which 12,000 were to be affordable (London’s Growth Boroughs, 2009254, 2011255). The provision of decent affordable housing was considered an important part of the Convergence strategy, however Bernstock argues this should not be conflated with the Olympic legacy development, because the Strategic Regeneration Framework assessed progress by counting the number of new homes built in the legacy boroughs rather than in the legacy area. Therefore it is difficult to establish a causal link between housing that has been developed as a result of the Games and housing that has been built in the borough, while Cohen and Watt propose that convergence should be understood simply as a means of assessing the broad legacy aims (Cohen and Watt, 2017256).
Table 02: London’s Housing Legacy: promises and policy commitments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London Candidate File 2004 257</td>
<td>The Olympic Park will provide local people with significant improvements. Including housing. Importantly the Olympic Village will become a new desirable and sustainable residential community with 3,600 new units. (London Candidate File 2004: 21). 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical Charter signed by Sebastian Coe, John Biggs and TELCO 258</td>
<td>100 CLT Homes enshrined in charter. Letter to TELCO from GLA setting out a commitment to 50% affordable housing on the park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Plan 2004 259</td>
<td>Set out an aspiration of 50% affordable housing on all new developments 70% Social Rent: 30% Intermediate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone 2007, to IOC Progress Review 260</td>
<td>‘Not only can we look forward to the Games in 2012 but also to a new era for East London with 21st Century transport links, a huge increase in the number of new affordable homes built in the area’. 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coe, S. (2007)261 referring to the impact on the Lower Lea Valley</td>
<td>The regeneration will create 30,000–40,000 more homes in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Plan 2008 Election of Mayor Boris Johnson 262</td>
<td>Affordable housing commitments at city wide level are revised downwards. The tenure mix is amended to 60% social rent: 40% Intermediate housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Park Legacy Masterplanning Framework 2010 263</td>
<td>Sets out plans for 35–40% affordable housing on five neighbourhoods on the Olympic Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy Communities Scheme approved 2012 264</td>
<td>Set out plans for five new neighbourhoods on the Park that includes a commitment to a minimum of 20% and a maximum of 35% affordable housing on the Park in five new neighbourhoods with up to 6670 units on the park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy Communities Scheme amended in 2013 265</td>
<td>The development of two neighbourhoods is accelerated and overall levels of affordable housing are cut from 48% and 43% to 30%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLDC Local Plan 2015–2031 266</td>
<td>Sets out a commitment to 35% affordable housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 – Election of new Mayor Sadiq Khan 267</td>
<td>Mayor Khan sets out a commitment to increase levels of affordable housing on the Olympic Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLDC Revised Local Plan 2020 267</td>
<td>The revised plan sets out a commitment to 35% affordable housing and 50% on public land.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bernstock, P. (2014)
Housing development at East Village has a complicated history. In 2007 it was agreed that the Athletes Village should be built on the Stratford City site to take advantage of an existing Planning Consent. This planning consent had a lower level of affordable housing (30%) than London Plan requirements (50%) reflecting a desire by the London Borough of Newham to develop a predominance of market housing on this site, justified by a desire to retain professional groups in the area and rebalance what they perceived as an oversupply of social rented housing in Stratford. In 2007 the construction and development of the Village was put out to tender to build around 4,200 units with 30% affordable housing. However, the contractor experienced problems capitalising the scheme and the government took over the scheme and decided to cut the number of market units at that time.

Read about the Ethical Charter here:
## Table 03: Affordable housing at East Village (former Athletes Village)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF SCHEME</th>
<th>NUMBER OF UNITS</th>
<th>NUMBER/TYPE AND PERCENTAGE OF MARKET UNITS</th>
<th>NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF AFFORDABLE UNITS</th>
<th>TENURE MIX OF AFFORDABLE UNITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Village (phase one)</td>
<td>2818</td>
<td>1439 (51%)</td>
<td>1379 (49%)</td>
<td>49% (675) social/affordable rent and 51% intermediate (704)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Village (phase two)</td>
<td>1432</td>
<td>1424 (97%)</td>
<td>48 (3%)</td>
<td>100% social/affordable rent (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Village Total Scheme including phase one and two</td>
<td>4250</td>
<td>2863 (67%)</td>
<td>1427 (33%)</td>
<td>51% (723) social/affordable rent and 49% intermediate (704)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bernstock and Watt (2017) and LLDC (2022)
In 2010 the government put out a tender to purchase the 1,439 market units with six plots of land (with planning consent) and the freehold. In 2011 this was awarded to QDD (Qatari Diar, which markets the Village under the Get Living London brand). Its plans were to develop the scheme as a long term private rental scheme and, at the time of writing, it was in the process of developing the remaining plots. This means that when the scheme is complete overall levels of affordable housing will decline from 49% to 33% and the proportion of social/affordable rent will be 51%, which is below the Local Plan requirement that all new schemes should include 60% of housing for social/affordable rent. One key issue that has emerged at East Village is the unaffordability of much of what is described as affordable housing including the 704 intermediate housing units at East Village, and in particular the 356 units available at discounted rent. These are discount market rent units, commonly offered at 70% or 80% of market rents, and therefore these products have increased in cost in line with rental values, leading to a campaign for a genuinely affordable test on intermediate housing products (Watt and Bernstock, 2017). A two-bedroom rental in the private element of the scheme costs between £2,400 to £2,700 per calendar month.

Table 4 provides an overview of the number and type of housing built on the first four of the five new neighbourhoods planned for the park after East Village. Across these four neighbourhoods, most housing is market housing (66%) and 34% is described as affordable. A closer look at the type of housing built indicates that the largest proportion of affordable housing (53%) is for affordable/social rent. This is significantly below the 60% recommended in the LLDC’s local plan.

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It is worth briefly reviewing some of the key changes on these different neighbourhoods as they provide an insight into the evolving story of affordable housing on the park. The first neighbourhood, Chobham Manor, was initially to have included a slightly lower level of affordable housing (28%) rationalised by the high levels of affordable housing at East Village. However, in 2019 off-site S106 contributions were used to increase the level to 35%. The table shows that intermediate housing constitutes 43% of all housing at Chobham Manor. The intermediate housing is all shared ownership housing and concerns have been raised about the genuine affordability of these units.

### Table 04: Affordable housing on first four neighbourhoods on the park

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF NEIGHBOURHOOD</th>
<th>NUMBER OF UNITS</th>
<th>NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF MARKET UNITS</th>
<th>NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF AFFORDABLE UNITS</th>
<th>TENURE MIX OF AFFORDABLE UNITS</th>
<th>NOTABLE CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chobham Manor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood One</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>556 (65%)</td>
<td>303 (35%)</td>
<td>56:44 Affordable (171)</td>
<td>AH Increased from 28% to 35% in 2019 using an off site S106 contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intermediate (132)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Wick and SweetWater Neighbourhoods Two and Three</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>1224 (66%)</td>
<td>618 (34%)</td>
<td>56:44 Affordable (171)</td>
<td>Two key changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intermediate (132)</td>
<td>AH decreased in 2013 and increased in 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratford Waterfront</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100% Intermediate</td>
<td>Cuts to levels of housing overall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Four</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>390 (65%)</td>
<td>210 (35%)</td>
<td>Shared Ownership (210)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total to date</td>
<td>3301</td>
<td>2170 (66%)</td>
<td>1131 (34%)</td>
<td>53:47 Affordable (600)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intermediate (533)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bernstock, P. (2022)
ity of this housing as a minimum household income of £69,000 is required to purchase a share of a two-bedroom property with a total market value of £620,000 (Bernstock, 2022); this is substantially higher than the £29,000 median household income for households in the legacy boroughs. It has resulted in a campaign for a genuinely affordable housing test on all new housing on the park (TELCO, 2020), which would link housing affordability to local incomes in the legacy boroughs.

The second and third neighbourhoods at East Wick and Sweetwater have also been revised. In the original LCS scheme it was assumed these neighbourhoods would include 48% and 43% affordable housing respectively. In 2013 the scheme was accelerated, and overall levels of affordable housing cut to 30%. The first phase of housing that became available at East Wick in 2021 included a very small proportion of housing for social/affordable rent (18 units) and a much larger number of shared ownership units (98). However, subsequent phases will now include a much greater proportion of housing for social/affordable rent, with a tenure mix of 69:31 Social rent: Intermediate housing. Interestingly, the type of intermediate housing has also been modified in subsequent phases with shared ownership housing replaced by discounted market rent.

The fourth neighbourhood at Stratford Waterfront is now under development and again varies significantly from the plans set out in the Legacy Communities scheme. There have been two key variations: the first is a significant reduction in the 1687 units of housing planned, in order to accommodate the Culture and Education Quarter. The second is that the scheme does not follow the Site Wide Housing Strategy on tenure mix or comply with the Local Plan, as it includes only shared ownership housing. The type of affordable housing was compromised because of the need to take a lower receipt for the land.

Plans are evolving for the final neighbourhood, however, at this point it is fair to conclude that whilst levels of affordable

270
Bernstock, P. (2022)
Key facts about London’s Olympic Housing Legacy, Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363368576_Key_Facts_about_London%27s_Olympic_Housing_Legacy_2022_-_Copy_1

271
The East London Citizens Organisation TELCO (2020)
London’s Olympic Housing Legacy: Time for a New Deal. [Video]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9a0RQkspPRk
housing are improving, they are well below expectations. The next table (Table 5) provides an overview of all homes delivered across the whole legacy area and includes housing at East Village and Chobham Manor. Across the whole area, 29% of housing was affordable and the majority of housing built was intermediate.

**Table 05: Homes delivered within the LLDC Area 2012 – 2022**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF HOMES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MARKET HOMES</th>
<th>NUMBER AND PROPORTION OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING</th>
<th>TYPE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11,380</td>
<td>6092 (71%)</td>
<td>3288 (29%)</td>
<td>46:54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1542 Social/Affordable rent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1746 Intermediate)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: LDC Planning Monitoring Report and Infrastructure Funding Statement, July 2022*

**EXPLAINING THE GAP BETWEEN AFFORDABLE LEGACY PROMISE AND AFFORDABLE LEGACY OUTCOMES**

As is clear from an analysis of housing delivery there is a gap between affordable housing commitment and affordable housing outcomes (Bernstock, 2014, 2020; Watt and Bernstock, 2017). In the first instance, despite a commitment to ‘regenerate the area for the entire benefit of everyone that lives there’, and evidence that what was desperately needed was very low-cost housing for rent, the plan was always to build a predominance of market housing aimed at attracting new communities to the area. This was underpinned by the philosophy of ‘mixed communities’ and the creation of
what are sometimes described as ‘socially balanced communities’, as opposed to responding to housing need. Nevertheless, this would have been a positive outcome had 50% affordable housing been achieved.

Outcomes were determined by a clash of aspirations between the GLA and the policy of the London Borough of Newham at the time. The latter was keen to attract professional groups into the area and specifically included a lower proportion of affordable housing on the Stratford City site, i.e. 30% instead of the 50% aspiration in the London Plan. This was to address what was perceived as an over-supply of socially rented housing and the desire to attract/retain professional groups in the area, reflecting a longstanding antipathy towards social housing estates – and their residents – which were blamed for creating ‘ghettos of worklessness’ and high levels of ‘benefit dependency’ (Watt and Bernstock, 2017: 102).

Bernstock (2014) notes that there was never a substantial budget for post-Games legacy (less than £4 million) with the vast majority of investment (£9 billion) spent on hosting the Games. Moreover, as is well documented it was initially anticipated that the Games would cost £2.2 billion and when the budget almost quadrupled it required further lending that would need to be paid back after the Games. This meant that the LLDC inherited significant debts which resulted in compromises over levels of affordable housing. This was clearly illustrated in the Legacy Communities Scheme where it was argued that there would now be a collar (20%) and cap (35%) on affordable housing, reflecting a significant drift away from the very optimistic pledges made in 2005.

The policy context also changed considerably. Bernstock (2014) highlights that the Games were conceived in a context of significant resource, but implemented against a backdrop of austerity, with cuts to affordable housing budgets and reforms to the welfare system. This included a cap on benefits budgets and more significantly changes to affordable housing itself and the replacement of the social rent model with the affordable rent model, with rents pegged at up to 80 per cent.
cent of market rents. Shelter (2013) highlights an important dilemma when assessing the Olympics’ housing and regeneration legacy, which is the difficulty of separating out those trends directly resulting from the Games from those which have occurred as a result of broader policy shifts, notably national housing and welfare policies under the 2010–15 Coalition Government including the 2011 Localism Act. This wider policy context, especially the introduction of the ‘affordable rent’ model in 2010, has undoubtedly made it more difficult to deliver affordable housing in high-value areas, in particular larger family housing that is urgently needed in East London.

There is also the changing political context of three London mayors, each of whom responded differently to affordable housing obligations (Bernstock, 2020). For example, whilst Ken Livingstone set out some clear aspirations, they were not enshrined by any legal agreements. Under Boris Johnson’s mayoralty there were considerable cuts in affordable housing, reflected in amendments to the LCS and then cuts to these plans at Eastwick and Sweetwater. Since 2016 Sadiq Khan has introduced amendments to increase affordable housing. Watt and Bernstock (2017) and Bernstock (2020) also highlight that affordable housing built on the Park and surrounding areas is not genuinely affordable to those in housing need in the legacy boroughs.

THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING TARGETS

Planning gain mechanisms such as section 106 agreements can require developers to deliver not only affordable housing, but also community infrastructure or financial contributions towards this. However, through an analysis of planning permissions awarded on fringe sites bordering the Olympic Park, Bernstock & Poynter detailed the watering down of these obligations after 2009. They discovered planning authorities were agreeing reduced affordable housing quotas and financial contributions, which decreased council receipts,
and warned that the precedence given to market sale and rental housing risked achieving the goal of convergence simply through population change and gentrification, rather than prioritising affordable homes for existing communities (Bernstock & Poynter, 2012; London’s Growth Boroughs, 2011). By charting the shifting terrain of planning gain and the weakening commitment to affordable housing targets, Bernstock concluded as early as 2013 that there was an urgent need for revised strategies if the original legacy ambitions were to be achieved. As can also be seen in Table 2, her work has documented the downward trajectory of these targets.

By drawing on interview material, ethnographic studies and an analysis of planning documents, Cecil Sagoe has contributed to this debate, concluding that contemporary English planning operates as a system of governmentality in relation to the LLDC’s housing and regeneration plans. He identified policy agendas, governance structures and actors that shaped the production of the Corporation’s Adopted Local Plan (Sagoe, 2018). In relation to the LLDC’s affordable housing plans, he highlights conflicting national, metropolitan, local and neighbourhood interests that have shaped them, and concludes that English planning systems privilege neoliberal policy agendas that prioritise financial profit over social need. He cites Viability Assessments as a good example of this, describing how they are used to mobilise consensus over the LLDC’s preferred affordable housing targets, and are afforded an unquestionable legitimacy when used to justify reducing affordable housing quotas (Sagoe, 2017; Sagoe, 2018). Sagoe further explored the LLDC’s formulation of its first local plan in 2015 and the inherent tensions between the LLDC’s role as planning authority and landowner, leading to the need to maximise returns on the sale of land at the same time as delivering a meaningful affordable housing legacy. He argues this resulted in a lower requirement for affordable housing despite the extensive housing need in the area (ibid.).

Bernstock assesses the extent to which the growth dependent planning paradigm (a key policy assumption underpinning commitments around affordable housing provision) has gen-
erated a meaningful housing legacy. She offers a longitudinal analysis that forensically examines the role of planning in leveraging affordable housing contributions between 2000 and 2017 within the LLDC area (Bernstock, 2020). The methodology includes analysis of planning applications, ethnographic observation of the LLDC’s planning committee and semi-structured interviews. She demonstrates that between 2012 and 2017, there was significant private sector interest in building new housing in the LLDC area. However, just 19% of this was affordable housing and just 52% was social/affordable rent. It is argued that a combination of rising land values and cuts to housing grant have crowded out RSL’s who had traditionally played an important role in providing genuinely affordable housing in the area and has resulted in private developers arguing that they are unable to make meaningful affordable housing contributions because of viability concerns. The article also offers insights into why reforms to the Supplementary Planning Guidance in 2016 intended to increase levels of affordable housing have resulted in an increase in intermediate housing rather than much needed housing for social/affordable rent. The findings highlight the inadequacies of the Growth Dependent Planning Paradigm that assume that the state can lever ‘trickle down’ benefits for local communities and that rising/optimum land values are desirable. In the case of London 2012, public sector investment has ‘trickled up’ benefiting private developers and those able to access exclusive housing on the park (Bernstock, 2020).

DEFINING AFFORDABILITY AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING

The introduction in 2011 of the so-called ‘affordable rent’ model, defined as up to 80 percent of market rate, has contributed to the shortage of truly affordable homes. Replacing the ‘social rent’ definition, and together with an array of other discounted ‘affordable housing’ products including intermediate rent, living rent and shared ownership, these make up
‘affordable’ quotas delivered by developers. Critics point out that these products both obscure the true level of affordable housing provided, and give a false impression of their affordability. Since many of these products are pegged to market rates rather than median earnings, in areas with spiralling housing costs, these products are still unaffordable to those on medium or low-incomes – a conclusion reached by The Affordable Housing Commission 2020 and reported in a recent House of Commons Research Briefing where the use of the term ‘affordable’ in relation to housing, was also considered to be ambiguous (Barton & Wilson, 2022).

In an article for the Guardian newspaper, Oliver Wainwright claimed that in 2022 the number of homes delivered as part of the Olympic legacy is approximately 13,000 of which only 11% are truly affordable to locals on average wages; he states that in the four Host Boroughs that straddle the Olympic Park, there are over 75,000 households on waiting lists for council housing which is why many East Londoners regard the legacy as a massive betrayal (Wainwright, 2022). Most new homes are for higher income residents and have encouraged the inward migration of these groups to the area, a policy encouraged by Newham council which has been eager to attract wealthier residents to the area, fuelling a changing demographic which is leading to the displacement of lower income households (ibid; Bernstock, 2014).

This supports Watt & Bernstock’s examination of the Olympic effect on existing communities in Host Boroughs, especially those in greatest housing need. Using quantitative ethnographic and documentary data they cover a range of issues including post Games housing costs, projected levels of affordable housing, homelessness and overcrowding, community displacement out of the borough and the negative effects of Stratford’s expanding private rented and buy to let sectors. They conclude there has been considerable slippage between the original inclusive policy intentions and actual outcomes, with generally worsening living conditions for those at the bottom of the housing system (Watt & Bernstock, 2017).

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281 Barton, C. and Wilson, W. (2022)
What is affordable housing?
Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7747/

282 Wainwright, O. (2022)
“A massive betrayal”: how London’s Olympic legacy was sold out’, The Guardian, 30 June. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jun/30/a-massive-betrayal-how-londons-olympic-legacy-was-sold-out

283 Bernstock, P. (2014)

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Displacement and Social Exclusion

Beginning with the Seoul Olympics in 1988, Rocha and Xiao reviewed the impact of subsequent Olympic Games on urban populations and identified similar patterns of ‘legacy’ displacement that contradict United Nations Sustainable Goals for mega-events and their host cities. They found that the frequency of displacement relates to the scale of these projects and the urgency of their realisation (Rocha and Xiao, 2022).

Olympic researchers have identified different types of displacement and studied both its causes and those affected by it. Through a longitudinal study of planning and development of the London Olympics between 2005 and 2019, Davis and Bernstock investigated different forms of residential and employment displacement that involved the state and market in several ways. They described the first wave as direct or ‘benevolent’ displacement involving the state-led removal of 450 residential tenants from the Clay’s Lane estate, 286 businesses from their workspaces and the eviction of travellers from two permanent caravan sites. They found these evictions were partly to enable the Games to take place on the park, but along with Andrew Smith, claimed they were also necessary to de-risk the area by removing its ‘post-industrial’ stigma in the hope this would help uplift land values for future capital investment (Smith, 2014a; Davis & Bernstock, 2019).

Based on interviews and survey research conducted between 2011 and 2012, Bernstock tracked the relocation of the Clay’s Lane tenants and the traveller communities organised by the LDA - focusing on how these moves were managed with respect to available advice, support, and choices for those affected. Although outcomes were mixed for both communities, the research concluded legacy benefits to the wider community were given greater priority in the process than the needs of those displaced (Bernstock, 2014). Related research by Craig Hatcher explored the use of Compulsory Purchase
Orders to assemble land for the Olympic development and its effect on the Clays Lane tenants. He concluded that ‘exchange value’ was privileged over ‘use value’ and since the wish of many tenants to be rehoused together was refused, this demonstrated that the ‘community legacies’ publicised to win the bid were not respected evenly (Hatcher, 2012).

Following on from direct displacement from the Park, Davis and Bernstock identified later waves as exclusionary displacement, given new residential and employment offers targeted the inward migration of professional and elite groups. Using case studies including the East Village and Here East, they demonstrated workspaces no longer served the original industries and much of the new housing priced poorer residents out (Davis & Bernstock, 2019).

Watt explored the causes of displacement of low-income East Londoners through the experiences of both young people living in temporary housing and residents of the Carpenters Estate, at the time, and still currently, facing demolition. He showed the role regeneration, state-led gentrification and reduced social housing played in their housing precarity, including the risk of relocation from their neighbourhood (Watt, 2013). In later qualitative research, Watt focused on lone East London mothers in similar circumstances threatened with or experiencing relocation outside London in south-east England. He argued that the causes of their displacement included a lack of social housing, austerity welfare cutbacks and the effects of the Olympics’ regeneration, and concluded that the Olympic promise to enfranchise these women’s lives had not been realised (Watt, 2018).

Kennelly and Watt (2011) drew comparisons between earlier research findings in the Olympic host city of Vancouver and London and contested the idea of a positive legacy for low-income or homeless youths. They showed how claims that the Games would benefit young people contrasted with representations offered by the young people themselves. In a similar study drawing on photo-journals created by margin-
alised young people in Newham, Kennelly & Watt (2012) found participant responses were mixed. Whilst better neighbourhood resources and the opportunities these might bring were welcomed, some feared having to move away. Feelings of exclusion or no longer belonging were also noted, due to a changing environment targeted at more affluent incomers, and suggesting negative impacts from gentrification.

In 2022, the continuing impacts of racialised exclusion from social and economic opportunity, including lack of access to affordable housing and overcrowding among racialised minority groups in the post-Olympic boroughs, has been shown by Islam and Netto to correlate with the uneven impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and its disproportionate effects on those same communities (Islam and Netto, 2020). She represents the devastation brought by the pandemic as the de facto legacy of socio-structural exclusion which has intensified during the decade of Olympic legacy due to gentrification, despite the improvement in local housing stock.

EMERGING NEIGHBOURHOODS: EAST VILLAGE

There is a small literature on housing at East Village. Bernstock’s 2014 discussion of East Village identifies some real strengths including the architectural design and focus on building a new community. However, she identifies some key tensions linked to the preference given to the deserving poor, ie ex-military personnel, those with disabilities, and those in work, under the social housing allocation policy. Watt and Bernstock (2017) note that whilst this scheme includes 675 much needed social rented homes they do not replace the 425 tenancies lost and the 327 public housing units (mainly in Newham) used to rehouse these residents, and that the intermediate affordable homes are not genuinely affordable (see Table 2 and discussion). Shelter (2013) observed that the intermediate rents on one-bedroom flats in the East Village,
set at 80 per cent of market rent, would demand 52 per cent, 46 per cent and 41 per cent of median wages in Hackney, Newham and Tower Hamlets respectively: ‘[...] 80% of market rent is beyond the reach of most East Londoners’ (Shelter, 2013: 7).

Partly due to the extensive publicity and high expectations attached to East Village and the other new neighbourhoods in and around the Olympic Park, they have attracted an emerging body of critical attention. For example, Crockett, Cohen and Humphry focused on the experience of young people studying or living there, exploring ways in which they could be more actively involved in its transformation (Crockett et al., 2016). Humphry broadened her own research through a photographic essay that explored the lived experience of East Village residents, and disputed what she described as the Olympic hype that East Village is ‘the best new place to live’, concluding that at the time that it was an area struggling to find its own meaning (Humphry, 2017). In other work, she explored how the lives of social tenants in the East Village were being shaped by forms of neoliberalism embedded into housing allocation policy. As housing providers face increased financial risks due to reduced public subsidies, they welcome tenants with what she termed ‘enhanced consumer identities’ to shift the risks from landlord to tenant. Simply put, tenants able to afford better material lifestyles, were seen as more self-reliant and were prioritised over those most in housing need, which she claimed exacerbated inequalities between working class factions (Humphry, 2020). This concurred with Watt and Bernstock’s research highlighting the exclusionary nature of Newham Council’s social housing allocation policy (Watt and Bernstock, 2017).

Moore and Woodcraft’s research shows, through a series of interviews with residents, that the neighbourhood has yet to create inclusive opportunities for existing communities and that the development-led mechanisms intended to generate prosperity for all are in tension with this legacy goal (Moore and Woodcraft, 2019). Although living in such a high-quality environment gave the residents a sense of prosperity, the
trade-off was a high cost of living that many felt was unsustainable. Some employed a variety of strategies to afford the costs, such as various forms of subletting or moving apartments to chase rental promotions, whilst others accepted that their residency would be short-lived. In other research on homebuyers in the Olympic Park, Woodcraft’s ethnographic account of show apartments drew on Gell’s notion of the aesthetic trap to argue that they are an illusory device that drive property development and mortgage-finance industries, whilst disguising and normalising the financial risks homebuyers are exposed to (Woodcraft, 2020).

Using both qualitative and quantitative techniques, Corcillo also explored the trajectory of emerging Olympic neighbourhoods by mapping the development of the East village. Through a social spatial analysis of its housing, neighbourhood facilities and semi-private and public space, he concluded that the stated ambition of a socially mixed neighbourhood is yet to be realised in practice. Building on Anna Minton’s work around the privatisation of public space, he described how the combination of private security guards, employed to patrol the ‘public’ realm and defensive gated housing built to ‘secured by design’ standards, encourage what he termed ‘mixophobia’ between different tenures (Minton, 2012; Corcillo, 2021).

He stated that this is compounded by the implementation of socially divisive management policies that valorise the preferences of the white middle class community over those of the working class or BAME communities which make up most of Newham’s resident population, and that this is reflected in the venues and shops that are permitted.
CONCLUSION

This review has sought to highlight the primary academic and policy literature concerned with housing legacy. It identifies official narratives that portrayed the Olympic regeneration as an opportunity to reverse the historic deprivation of Stratford and the neighbouring Host Boroughs, ostensibly for the benefit of all that live there. It demonstrates that promises of new and affordable housing were a key component of this, to address a clear and acute housing need. By tracking the shifting terrain of housing promises against outcomes so far, the literature shows a dwindling commitment to affordable housing targets and the inclusive policy intentions originally stated in the bid documents and subsequent publicity drives. It highlights the clear tensions between reconciling a market-led approach to affordable housing delivery with actual housing need, and the inadequacy of existing mechanisms to realise this.

The literature also demonstrates a significant counter legacy of community displacement and exclusion, with generally worsening living conditions for marginalised and racialised communities at the bottom end of the housing system. If this imbalance is to be redressed to achieve the original ambitions of inclusive mixed communities in neighbourhoods still to be built in and around the Olympic Park, the ongoing literature must explore alternative ways to achieve this. There appears to be no comprehensive literature examining alternative ways in which affordable housing targets could be increased or inclusive housing allocation and management policies introduced, which may be useful avenues to explore. There also appears to be no detailed study of the homeless community who are under-represented in the literature generally, given the surge in the numbers of rough sleepers in Stratford since the Olympics, and a relative lack of attention to the issue of racialised unequal access to housing which demands further attention.

This chapter was produced with specialist advice from Penny Bernstock and Anna Minton
STATE OF THE LEGACY

A NEW URBAN PARK

JASON KATZ
This section reviews the literature evaluating the delivery and evolution of the Olympic legacy promise to create the ‘largest new urban park in Europe for 150 years’ (Mayor of London, 2008: 15) in East London. It follows the formulation and transformation of the plans for the parklands within the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park development site in relation to the evolution of its discursive framing from the original vision for a green park for public use, to the more commercial orientation of the site’s current development. We begin by tracing the different visions for the delivery and subdivision of the parklands, invoking the longer history of imaginaries involving the spatial transformation of the Lea Valley, as well as the problematic demarcation of the ‘island site’ of the Olympic Park as an urban park and subsequent designation as a destination for arts and culture and tourism. This begins with the original Olympic promise to create a linear park in the Lea Valley as a centrepiece of London 2012’s sustainability legacy (Girginov and Hills, 2009), and the legacy commitment to regenerate East London. This narrative is framed in context with proposed and existing ways in which the management, monitoring, and use of the Park shifted in the post-Games period, with a specific focus on the privatisation, touristification, and securitisation of the Park. The chapter concludes with the current literature on local community and institutional politics concerned with the present and future use, management, and transformation of the parklands according to the timescales of development outlined by the legacy agenda.
DESIGNING THE PARK

From the outset, the Five Legacy Commitments (Mayor of London, 2008) underlined the importance of the Olympic parklands in relation to positive social and health outcomes for East Londoners, through improved access to open space, and as part of the promised transformation of the heart of East London:

‘People in East London have particularly poor access to open space. The Olympic Games will transform this situation by creating a world-class park that unites the area’s extraordinary series of waterways, marshes and open spaces. East London’s new network of green public spaces connected to town centres and public transport will help to establish opportunities for the highest quality residential, leisure and working environments – all planned around walking and cycling routes’ (ibid: 14).

To meet this vision, the 2007 planning permission for the development of the Olympic site required the delivery of 102 hectares of open parklands. According to the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) parklands director, a key principle of the regeneration planning process was to ‘start with a park’ (Hopkins and Neal, 2012). One of the pre-Games planning documents for the legacy planning process reads:

‘at its heart would be the new 500-acre Olympic Park containing the major sporting facilities and set in 1500 acres stretching from Hackney Marshes down to the Thames. It would be one of the largest new parks seen in Europe for 200 years’ (Vision for the Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2004; cited in Smith, 2014b: 2).

Indeed, the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park (QEOP) is the first park to be built in London since the 19th century. During the pre-Games planning process up until the staging of the Olympic Games for London 2012 a key task was laying the groundwork for the post-Olympic legacy. As such, the planning process for the parklands was focused on ensuring that the parklands would be a legacy asset for East London.


the Olympic Games, it was called the Olympic Park but was later renamed to commemorate the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth II in 2012. Belying its name, the QEOP is not part of the Royal Parks System, despite a failed campaign by Newham Mayor Robin Wales for designated Royal Park status (Minton, 2012a: 14). This is a substantive difference; the QEOP is privately owned and managed (see the Governance section of this review for details), rather than run by the Royal Parks Agency, which otherwise manages the collection of eight landmark parks around London, including Hyde Park, Regent’s Park and Richmond Park which were placed into public ownership from the land holdings of Queen Victoria in 1851 under the Crown Lands Act and after the Great Exhibition opened in the same year. Aside from some qualifying remarks made by Minton (ibid. 306), direct comparisons between the Royal Parks and the Olympic Park’s exceptional status as a quasi-private park are infrequent in the academic literature (although see Gardner, 2022 for an analysis of Hyde Park and the 1851 Great Exhibition’s Crystal Palace in relation to the history of London’s mega events, including the 2012 Olympics). Comparisons between the QEOP and other Royal Parks are common in the popular press and promotional literature, with critical comparisons made in the Guardian (eg. Wainwright, 2022), while the Olympic Park’s marketing narrative focuses instead on highlighting positive similarities between the Olympic Park and its predecessors among the Royal Parks of London.

Much of the literature describing the existing amenities, uses, and features of the Park comes from promotional materials published by official governing bodies like the LLDC, or design firms involved in the project, like Hargreaves Associates, which led the design for the 274-acre parklands that formed the centrepiece for the London Games.

Within the academic literature, there is an apparent disconnect between works that take a normative approach to eval-
uating outcomes in the Park’s delivery of Olympic promises, and the literature that offers a positive analysis of the material design and development of physical features of the Park. Understandably, this difference falls broadly along disciplinary lines. There are few examples within the landscape architecture and engineering analysis of the Park that acknowledge the contested history of the site, carefully documented by scholars working in the social sciences. While broadly adopting marketing narratives of the Olympic Park as the context for their studies, literature from civil engineering and landscape architecture journals have been some of the only descriptive works explaining the Olympic Park’s material development, reviewing the extensive soil remediation process in detail (Apted et al., 2013), the implementation of biosolar roofs and their potential to host biodiverse habitats (Nash et al., 2016), and the delivery process of the parklands and waterways (Hopkins et al., 2011), which are among the landmark successes of the parkland remediation process and attest to its sustainability credentials. Conversely, there is little analysis from the more critical policy and social sciences literature that approaches this analysis of the creation of the parklands, including the extensive soil remediation process that was successfully undertaken ahead of the Games, and the extensive biodiversity measures taken in the parklands (notable exceptions include the archaeological work of Gardner, 2013, and the industrial, social, and political archive of the Groundbreakers project from the Livingmaps Network).

While the successful transformation of contaminated industrial land into biodiverse and wild parklands on and around the QEOPI island site has been lauded, it is worth noting that early ambitions related to parkland connectivity in the Lower Lea Valley, positioning the Olympic Park as part of a broader ‘green park project’ (Hoolachan, 2014, Smith, 2014b), were scaled back from its original vision. This history is absent from contemporary institutional narratives of the Olympic Park development. A ‘linear park’ had earlier been proposed.


313 Livingmaps Network (2022) Groundbreakers Guide (PDF) Available at: https://www.livingmaps.org/groundbreakers-resources


in the 2004 London Plan, into which the Olympic Bid was integrated.\(^\text{316}\) The 2008 iteration of the London Plan states that: ‘Realising the potential of the unique landscape of the LLV (Lower Lea Valley) is a central part of the vision for the future of the area – the four miles of waterways criss-crossing the valley will be revitalised, and in many places incorporated into the new park network which will extend the Lea Valley Park right to the Thames. This new linear Park will function as a key element of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic masterplan’ (Mayor of London, 2008: 318\(^\text{317}\)).

This is the initial promise of a grand new green park, the first in London since the Victorian era. Smith (2014b\(^\text{318}\)) however notes that the initial park design was more of a rhetorical hook to capture the attention of the International Olympic Committee than an actual plan. Smith maintains that the ‘purposes of the envisioning (of the green park) were clear: the project needed to bring a sceptical press and parliament onside’ following the failure of other mega-project deliveries – such as the National Stadium project in Wembley, part of the abortive bid for the 2007 World Athletics Championship – and that, due to the scale and ambition of an Olympic bid, ‘in this climate, one way to justify public expenditure was [for the London Olympic bid team] to promise a park’ (Smith 2014b: 3\(^\text{318}\)).

Gold and Gold note that ‘legacy promises made at the bidding stage have no more than indicative status and [...] can be quickly discarded and reconfigured’ (Gold and Gold, 2017: 29\(^\text{319}\)). However, in the case of the QEOP, the architects commissioned to design the masterplan for the site were asked to produce a version that could go ahead without the Games, on the basis that London was highly unlikely to win the bid (Wainwright, 2022\(^\text{308}\)). As a result, many changes to the subsequent design of the Park that were required to accommodate the Games, including the scale of the hard infrastructure necessary for circulation, servicing and security, would later present barriers to its legacy redevelopment as an open green space intended for community benefit.
Through Mann’s analysis of historical representations of regeneration projects for the Lea Valley, we see in the 2003 Olympic Masterplan Vision for the Park an ‘image of harmonious complexity and flowing mobility’ (Mann, 2014: 303320), wherein paths, stadiums and supporting buildings all follow the same syntax of leaf forms and segmental vaults, a generative geometrical order binding small and large together in a territorial web. This is contrasted with the 2008 redevelopment plan wherein ‘released from the straitjacket of geometric unity, the site is now also divided in use and character, between an ecological northern half and an active, events-focused southern half’ (ibid: 304320). In an Olympic impact study published by the University of East London, Viehoff (2015321) stresses the importance of evaluating the ‘natural landscape’ of the North Park and the ‘festival space’ of the South Park separately. Elsewhere, it is written that ‘the North Park has been promoted as a calmer, more locally oriented place, with the South Park earmarked as the events/destination zone [...] it might be better understood as an international destination with an adjoining local park’ (Smith, 2014b: 15318; see Figure 02 on page 109 for the Park map).

Mann (2014320) emphasises that the Olympic Games is not the first regeneration initiative to take place around the Stratford site, placing it within a history of the Lea Valley which is characterised by frequent transformation and reimagination: ‘if we look carefully at the earlier visions of the Lea, and explore their historical circumstances, the invisible forces and the historically accumulated character of the site become clearer’ (Mann 2014: 304320). To Davis (2012322) the Olympic Park plan at this stage recalls the 1944 London Plan of Patrick Abercrombie, with roots in 19th century progressive ideals about access to nature. While the LLDC have developed an anodyne, unitary narrative for the Park’s development, presented on the website for the QEOP323 and reproduced in corporate-sponsored reports on the Park’s development (NLA, 2022324), the vision and promises for the Olympic Park have

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323 Available at: www.queenelizabetholympicpark.co.uk

changed dramatically over the course of the legacy planning process.

According to the Five Legacy Commitments document drafted under Mayor Ken Livingstone (GLA, 2008), the Olympic Park project would ‘create 102 hectares of open space in legacy, providing new habitats for a range of wildlife and plants, wetland areas, open riverbanks and grassland’ (ibid: 18). This commitment became legally binding when it was included in the 2007 planning permission for the Park. Through all the iterations of legacy planning surrounding the Olympic parklands, the delivery of ‘102 hectares of open space’ within the 266-hectare site in East London has consistently been taken as the legal requirement for the Olympic promise related to the delivery of the Park. The Olympic Park’s website claims that the island site of the QEOP is larger, at 560 acres, than Hyde Park (360 acres) (LLDC, 2020b). However, this overall assessment of the Park’s size is misleading, since just a portion of the land measuring 102 acres is designated as Metropolitan Open Land under the 2007 Planning Approval. As we will see later in the case of Leyton Marshes and the Manor allotments, this land has been encroached on, and continues to be threatened by a ‘creeping urbanism’ (see Smith, 2021; cit. Hancox, 2019). This finding is corroborated in the literature’s focus on the differing treatment of the North and South sections of the Park (see Figure 02 for a map of the Park).

The literature shows how this shift towards a focus on the Park as a cultural destination, provider of venues, and anchor for a new knowledge economy was shaped by tension within the legacy promises between an ‘open city approach’ and the need to deliver concrete results ahead of the Olympic Games (Davis, 2014a). This ‘open city approach’ to planning Olympic legacy, in committing to the uncertainty of long term planning, is necessarily contingent and flexible. Davis discusses how the architectural design of venues and parklands aimed from the outset to integrate ‘potential long-term re-use strat-
Figure 02: *Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park Map*, reproduced courtesy of LLDC.
egies several years before the Games actually took place’, in order to avert the threat of white elephant projects of past Olympics (Davis, 2014a: 326).

However, from the beginning of the Olympic legacy planning process after London won the Olympiad in 2005, securitization of the ‘island site’ of the Olympic Park (Coaffee et al., 2011; Goldby and Heward, 2013; Fussey et al., 2016) influenced both the spatial planning approach and the social regeneration objectives of Olympic investment (Thornley, 2012), as well as the sustainability agenda (Girginov and Hills, 2009). The time-scales of regeneration extending over multiple decades meant that the interpretation and application of the legacy promises in practice shifted during different periods, and it is from this complex temporal and governance assemblage that the plans for the Olympic parklands emerged.

**STRATEGY FOR RE-USE OF THE PARK AFTER THE GAMES**

Common thematic strands within the literature address how the different considerations around development of the Park, including sustainability, regeneration, and securitisation, evolved and complicated the original planning process, resulting in what might be viewed as a compromised legacy promise, particularly due to the security needs and scale of the Games that required the QEOP be treated as a tightly bounded island site (Coaffee et al., 2011; Goldby and Heward, 2013; Fussey et al., 2016). Despite the intention to ‘stitch’ the landscape into the wider site in the two years after the Games, the academic literature finds that the Park remains physically isolated and as a result underused by the local community. This has further compromised the legacy promises made around improved health and social outcomes and created a disjunction in historical continuity and place at-
tachment through the erasure of a pre-existing local heritage and identity located in and around the site of the Park (Davis, 2020). Its replacement by a new narrative of top-down placemaking focused on arts and culture and embodied in the East Bank development (Campkin and Melhuish, 2017; Cohen in Melhuish et al., 2022) is a key theme emerging from the literature on the subsequent re-use of the Park.

Gold and Gold (2017: 24) state, ‘once the bid was accepted in 2005, the planning process worked, first, to clear a site that was far from being a tabula rasa [...] and, secondly, to map out a future that explicitly built on both legacy and sustainability principles’. As Campkin and Melhuish (2017) outline, a new heritage narrative built on the tabula rasa of the Stratford site was created by the park developers, beginning in 2006 with the Stratford Cultural Commission and accelerating with the Olympicopolis plan. Official narratives of the Park highlight the pressure on, and success of, the Olympic Development Agency (ODA) in delivering the Games within the timeline of the Games ahead of 2012, which demanded an empty site for redevelopment. However, projects such as the Groundbreakers initiative highlight the friction, erasure, and displacement involved in the development of the Olympic site and ‘hetero-chronicities and spatial dislocations that make the history of this site so richly interesting’ (Cohen in Melhuish et al., 2022: 195).

A retrospective of the influence of the historicising process of regeneration of the Olympic Park was recently published by Gardner in a larger collection (Melhuish et al., 2022) of critical heritage studies which makes legible and summarizes a decade’s worth of scholarship that critiques the regeneration narrative and impact of the Games. From this position, the edited volume moves to analyse emerging institutional presences within the ‘new urban context’ of the Park, usefully presenting an authoritative, critical historiological account of the placemaking narratives associated with the regeneration

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of the area and highlighting the role of universities as actors in these processes.

As Gardner outlines, ‘the ODA’s work included: the clearance of nearly all existing structures; the remediation of contaminated ground and watercourses; and construction of permanent and temporary stadia, an International Media Centre and the Athletes’ Village. This was accompanied by new infrastructure that included river walls, bridges, two combined heat-power stations and numerous other facilities’ (Gardner, 2022: 160341) [see the Governance section of this report for a review of the governing bodies involved with the QEOP]. Dealing with this pre-Olympic legacy required vast acts of environmental intervention ‘the washing of 2 million tons of soil; the burying of some watercourses and the ‘daylighting’ of others; the treatment of groundwater; the relocation of people and animals; and the eradication of invasive species, such as Japanese Knotweed’ (ibid: 175341). Following the successful acquisition and remediation of land, The London Development Agency (LDA) committed 102 hectares to Metropolitan Open Land, and 50 to venues, roads, rivers, and utilities, leaving only 78 hectares of land available for mixed-use development. Constituting less than a third of the total area, this land was placed under significant pressure to deliver financial returns to pay for the land purchase (Davis, 2012: 224, Fig 7.1342).

Following the financial crisis of 2008, and the austerity of the post-Games period, the LLDC searched for new funding vehicles for the post-Games removal and re-use of post-Games materials and temporary facilities, the conversion of the Athletes village into market housing, and the landscaping and maintenance of the Olympic parklands and waterways. As Smith writes, ‘in London, as the post-Games period approached, so did the reality of developing and managing a large site. At this stage, plans were made to address the original objectives but also to impress investors – to fund the development of the park and to pay back the money bor-
rowed to purchase, remediate, and redevelop land. In a culture of cost-saving and income generation, sustainability initiatives and social legacy projects tend to be neglected’ (Smith, 2014b: 18). The use of the Park as a development asset was previously recognised by the entrepreneurial planning powers designing the Park; in 2008, the ODA noted in their original design principles for the Park that ‘the lush green setting will also help to drive land value and investor interest in development sites’ (ODA, 2007, cited in Smith, 2014b: 18).

To meet the financing needs for Park maintenance, former Mayor Boris Johnson revealed his administration’s plans for the first iteration of the current Cultural and Education District, called Olympicopolis in a homage to the original South Kensington arts district Albertopolis, noting that the QEOP project must ‘move beyond the old preconceptions about the future of the Park – essentially that we would build infill housing around the venues. It is now clear that this would be to miss a historic opportunity to accelerate the transformation of East London and to deliver a significant economic boost to the UK’ (Evening Standard, 2013 cited in Gold and Gold, 2017: 26).

As Gold and Gold note, ‘The creation of Olympicopolis would, in effect, represent an approach to leveraging development that looks Janus-like to the past and future. The new Cultural and Education Quarter refers to the same marriage of science, education and the arts that underpinned its South Kensington predecessor’ (Gold and Gold 2017: 27). The plan for Olympicopolis involved five central London institutions all ‘moving eastward’: University College London (UCL East) the University of the Arts (consolidating the campuses of the London College of Fashion), the Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A E20), Sadler’s Wells (contemporary dance theatre) and the Smithsonian Institution (Washington DC), which will share gallery space with the V&A.
With the transition to the scaled-back East Bank project under Mayor Sadiq Khan, we see a draw-down of the ambitions for spectacle on the site. In the language used by former Mayor Johnson about the Olympicopolis vision, related to ‘build[ing] infill housing around the venues’ we see the first suggestions of a ‘creeping urbanism’ (Hancox, 2019 [346], cited in Smith, 2021: 707 [347]) and the London-wide development phenomenon of the ‘creep[ing] of pseudo-public space’ in the popular press, with reference to the Olympic Park (Shenker, 2017 [348]). This was scrutinised during the year following the QEOP’s re-opening by Ferreri and Trogal in relation to securitisation and the Park’s ‘architecture of spectacle’ (Ferreri and Trogal, 2018: 513 [349]).

USES AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE PARK

The Park was opened in two stages after the Games: the north of the QEOP on 29 July 2013 and the south of the QEOP on 5 April 2014. Within the QEOP, are ‘6.5km of waterways, approximately 26 acres of woods with over 13,000 trees in the Park and at least 60 species of bird and 250 species of insect inhabit the Park’ (LLDC, 2020b: 3 [350]). The Park and its buildings have won or been nominated for more than 60 industry awards and as of the most recent tally (2020), there have been more than 34 million visits to the parklands, venues, and events.

There is limited critique within the architectural trade journals of the use of the parklands, the integration of the parklands into the wider East London context, or the continued securitisation of the site long after the Games. Notable critical exceptions to this include the special issue of Architectural Research Quarterly magazine in December 2014, edited by Juliet Davis, which included ‘a cross-disciplinary range of authors who ask questions of the role of design in generating and shaping the
processes of materialising sustainable regeneration agendas and visions, and of the politics of designed change’ (Davis, 2014b: 300). From this collection, Davis (2014a), Hoolachan (2014), Mann (2014), and Smith (2014b), previously cited, offer incisive analysis of the Olympic Park design specifically.

In the more recent literature, Smith and McGillivray (2020) notes the increase in applications for large-scale ticketed events in Royal Parks (he includes the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park in his study although it is not officially a Royal Park) and the opportunity to clear and use its hard infrastructure and security apparatus in the Park. This is strongly contested by local Friends of the Park (Smith and Vodicka, 2020). Ahead of the Games, Coaffee et al. (2011) expressed concern that one of the legacies of the Olympic Park Fence (OPF) will be the retention of London 2012’s aggressive security regime. In a piece on the OPF, Gardner (2013) asks ‘if the Games and legacy organisers’ commitment to sustainability include reusing its 900 cameras elsewhere?’ (Gardner, 2013: 15). Taken together, these findings support Coaffee et al.’s statement that ‘defence of the spectacle has become the prominent feature of Olympic planning’ and this remains true in post-Olympic planning and its ‘security legacy’ (Coaffee et al., 2011: 3319). According to Ferreri, ‘what is being secured now’ in the post-Games period ‘is the appearance and experience of the area, and particularly of the Park, as a ‘risk-free’ space. In this, a security infrastructure previously geared towards preventing and responding to threats such as terrorism, has been transformed into a mechanism for surveilling the more mundane perceived ‘threats’ of inappropriate images, behaviours and activities’ (Ferreri and Trogal, 2018: 518).

This discursive shift from a green park intended to improve quality of life for residents in East London and address the convergence gap, to a new urban park of cultural spectacle,
clarifies the context for the discrepancy in how the outcomes of the Park and its uses have been evaluated. A positive participant evaluation of the uses of the Park was conducted by Azzali (2017) who found that the northern section was well utilised by families with children, while the southern section was more used by athletes. Snaith (2015) however, has assessed that the impact of park landscaping and green space on health outcomes is subject to cultural difference, noting first, that the users of both the northern and the southern parklands are whiter and wealthier compared to the proportional demographics of the greater area. Snaith concludes that ‘cultural consciousness’ both in the production of park space and future event programming is necessary for the parklands to have the desired positive effects for the local community that they were designed for (ibid. 2015: 237).

**FUTURE USES AND TERRITORIAL CONTESTATIONS**

This chapter has provided a succinct review of the contested histories and legacies of the imaginaries surrounding the Olympic Park, notably its evolution from a component of a larger linear park, to the uses of the discourse around remediation of the site in order to reinforce narratives around wasteland regeneration, through the development of a managed cultural regeneration project and the development of a tourist-orientated destination or ‘theme park’ post-Olympic Games, and the enduring spatial and social infrastructures left over from the ‘Games time’ that mediate experiences of the Park today. As Davis (2014b) reminds us, legacy development is by its very nature subject to a re-imagining process. In the critical literature, two moments are recorded as inflection points in the re-imagining of the Park; the first is the pre-Games redevelopment, and the second is the cultural turn with the development of Olympicopolis after the Games, which also involved the subtle re-articulation of the logic towards profit generation for the Park.
From the literature, we can highlight five persistent and emergent issues with the Olympic Park, including the lasting and indeterminate nature of the securitization of the Park (Ferreri and Trogal, 2018); the quasi-private, urban aspects of the Park’s management and planning designation that threaten an ‘encroaching urbanism’ in the northern section of the Park’s parklands; the persisting tension between the notion of the Olympic Park as a new urban neighbourhood that is a net benefit to London PLC, and the failure to make the Park itself an asset to long-term residents of East London (Snaith, 2015); the upcoming reconfiguration of the LLDC, and the implications for the continued operations of the underfunded cultural infrastructure and community institutions born from the Olympic legacy (Campkin and Melhuish, 2017); and tensions and opportunity surrounding the new ‘knowledge economy’ driven by central London institutions on the East Bank (ibid. 2017, Melhuish, 2020; Cohen, 2022 and Gardner, 2022). In the last five years, there has been a notable decline in academic focus on the Park itself, even as its continuing development has been discussed in the popular press, most notably by Wainwright (2013, 2018, 2022).

Critical perspectives in the literature find the realisation of the QEOP to be a betrayal of the green park promise outlined at the outset of the legacy planning process as one that would benefit communities in East London. This is reflected by a shift in the metrics evaluating the success of the Park away from measurement of health outcomes for East Londoners, and towards the measurement of footfall and profit generated by the QEOP as an asset for London as a whole.

Within this critical context, the physical remediation of the parklands is rightly celebrated within the landscape architecture and design literature, even if it is uncritical of the social and political context and implications of these material design interventions. In recognising this, Gardner (2022) contributes a perspective that reminds us that these objectives are...
not mutually exclusive, and it would be possible for industry narratives and academic discourses from architecture, design, and civil engineering to laud the successes of the design interventions and delivery of the parklands while remaining attuned to the broader critical context of the parklands. One possible area of future research is the poor execution of the ‘stitching together’ of the Park in the 2012 - 2014 period which has been extensively criticised through artistic interventions in Hackney Wick and Fish Island (Marerro-Guillamón and Powell, 2012) but this has so far received little attention either in landscape design discourses or the broader academic literature.

There are several authors, Smith included (2021), who are properly historicising the development of the Park within the changing narrative of the legacy development process but are also situating themselves in the unfolding present of the Park. Melhuish et al. (2022: 6) examine ‘how can universities work in collaboration with different people at material sites to curate the urban environment and produce the cities – and universities – of the future, co-producing new urban imaginaries?’ Melhuish (2020) argues that universities are increasingly drawing on an urban and cosmopolitan, rather than nationalist, model of identity which can be applied to the new development by UCL on the south lawn site of the QEOP (a site previously earmarked for housing). She writes that ‘as cosmopolitan communities of practice, property owners and institutional developers, universities are well placed to facilitate that encounter with difference and intermixing capable of promoting a “civic culture from the interactions of multiple publics” which Sandercock called for in the cosmopolis’ (Melhuish 2020: 12, citing Sandercock, 1997: 186-187). However, in practice, competing interests and heritage narratives produced between the corporate university and academics (see Cohen; Gardner, in Melhuish, et al., 2022) can complicate this cosmopolitan model. Recognising this, Melhuish notes that ‘many in those surrounding local communities have...
objected to LLDC’s and UCL’s re-writing of the area’s urban heritage, the erasure of its industrial past and the effects of gentrification that they anticipate will define its future identity and lead to their own exclusion [...] ultimately, the UCL East project makes little reference either to its historic (industrial) or more recent (Olympic) past and social identity, in favour of a focus on a projected shared ‘future’ heritage, embodied in the buildings of the new campus and the activities they will host, as a new powerhouse for London’ (Melhuish et al., 2022: 36).

The very nature of the legacy planning process invites contestation and a continual remaking. If the post-2012 transformation of the Park resulted in the shift towards cultural transformation and heritage in the area, what does the post-2022 transformation of the Park look like? The opening of the UCL East campus on the one hand could signal the further entrenchment of an institutional arrangement in the Park, but on the other hand, the presence of several critical elements could result in the re-territorialisation of the parklands again.

As Davis (2014a; 2019) continues to remind us, timescales of development are ever changing during the legacy process, and there is another decade left in the official legacy timeline. To this end, Davis and Groves (2019) have developed an argument about assemblage thinking and how it relates to the planning and politics surrounding spatial transformation in the Park. They note the indeterminacy with which legacy planning is offered. This indeterminacy was recognised by a longstanding range of artist interventions in the Olympic site throughout the development process. Many of these interventions are identified in The Art of Dissent: Adventures in London’s Olympic State (Marerro-Guillamon and Powell, 2012). This is a point made by Smith (2014b), in the context of the post-2012 changes when he frames the commercialisation of the Park as a ‘re-territorialisation’ of the Park along cultural heritage lines.
Brown and Brown (2018) offer a propositional framework to answer the question of territorial change in the Olympic Park, reimagining ‘landscape as an assemblage practice’, which provides a perspective from which to approach the QEOP as a ‘complex physical and technological re-assembly project in different modes’ (ibid: 40). They argue that ‘the Park has a double life as the primary site of the XXX [30th] Olympiad and Paralympics and, post-Olympics, as a long-term socio-economic catalyst for East London. But to succeed as a catalyst, the re-assemblage must sustain enough centrifugal, de-territorializing force to effect new socio-material assemblies’ (ibid: 40).

Allen and Cochrane (2014) find a similar ‘detrimentalising force’ in a topological politics of the Olympic Games that ‘runs alongside a territorially-based politics yet helps us to come to terms with a changing political landscape where the city as a political arena is not only part of a wider set of political geographies, but is continually defined and redefined by decision makers, interest groups and coalitions in a co-present fashion’ (ibid: 1620). Within this analysis, they cite two community activist conflicts contesting the perceived misuse of land in the QEOP (among other housing protests outside the scope of this section): the case of the Save Leyton Marshes campaign (now active as Save Lea Marshes) which argued against the development of previously designated Metropolitan Open Land that was overridden by the legacy planning process, and additional protests against the removal of the Manor Garden Allotments. Allen and Cochrane (ibid: 1617) write that ‘what is remarkable is the way that the experiences of those involved have been picked up as part of a continuing critique of ‘legacy’ claims for the Olympics and the associated regeneration industry, as part of a much wider political challenge’.
While it is important to situate contemporary analysis of the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park within the context of its present development and the knowledge economy that has emerged at the site, it is possible that the increased critical capacity of the University presence in the Park, posited by Campkin and Melhuish (2017) and reinforced by Melhuish (2020) and Melhuish et al. (2022) can legitimise the topological politics (Allen and Cochrane, 2014) of community groups who are seeking to reterritorialise the Park according to the original promises of the new green public open space planned for the post-Olympic site. Recalling Davis (2014b), we can note that in the context of the Olympic Games, ‘the realisation of the promise of sustainable regeneration is [...] reliant on the formulation of an ethical approach to what and to whom it is made, and not only on the prescription of specific outcomes which may or may not prove deliverable or effective’ (ibid: 300).

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This chapter was produced with specialist advice from Clare Melhuish
POSTSCRIPT

REFRAMING LEGACIES

Saffron Woodcraft & Joseph Cook
As stated in the introduction to this review and demonstrated in the diversity and depth of texts referenced in the previous five sections, London 2012 and its aftermath have generated more academic papers than any Olympic host city before or since. This phenomenon of the London Games acting as a spur to write was not only limited to the academy, but extended into the wider public, with some dubbing the event ‘the first social media Olympics’.

THE FIRST SOCIAL MEDIA OLYMPICS

Whilst the Beijing 2008 Games took place in a world still getting used to the idea of the hashtag, the two weeks of sport in London drew over 150 million tweets (Fitzgerald, 2012), more than both the 2012 US Election and Superbowl combined. The density of opinion on the Twittersphere was of such potency that on day one the International Olympic Committee’s head of communications issued a plea for spectators to stop (Miah, 2012: 41), with the internet usage by those lining the streets throttling the GPS signal tracking athletes’ bikes along the cycling road race. Fearing that this rise in public comment on the Games challenged their careful image control, the IOC issued a four-page guideline document for how athletes were to use social media (IOC, 2011), and LOCOG Chair Sebastian Coe spoke to the press about his theory of ‘a close correlation between the number of tweets at competitive times and the

Scan through these millions of tweets, and like much of the press around mega-events, it is difficult to break through the celebrations of the opening ceremony and key sporting moments, to find the experiences of locals living their lives on the periphery of the ‘greatest show on earth’. One attempt at using social media as a tool for democratised urban writing was the #citizencurators project led by Peter Ride of the University of Westminster, and Hilary Young, Digital Curator at the Museum of London (MoL).

Gathering over 8000 tweets, later archived by the MoL, posts featuring the hashtag, written by a diverse range of regular contributors and locals, present a story of a population torn between frustration and celebration, from photos of handmade signs by residents begging Olympic workers to stop using their road as a rat run, to stories of local businesses, having employed additional staff and extended their opening hours, experiencing an unanticipated low turnout of extra customers that the Olympics had promised to provide.


For the traditional media also, the Games proved bountiful material. Analysis by Lancaster University of over 93 million words of UK national newspaper reporting and 35 million words of global press reporting found that, amongst other things, the Games ‘shifted discussion of East London away from what seemed to be an almost exclusively negative discussion focused upon poverty and welfare dependence towards a more positive discussion focused upon regeneration and investment’ (McEnery et al. 2013: 2).

The power of #TeamGB on the Twitterverse and the overriding print media narrative of East London as a new hub for investment are two examples of how the power of top-down narrative-making can side-line the voices of average citizens caught in the middle of powerful political and financial tides. The power of the Olympics as a tool for narrative-making was clearly used effectively and purposefully: the Main Press Centre being the first venue open for business in the Olympic Park, and Seb Coe welcoming 5800 members of the press to London, offering them ‘state of the art facilities so they can tell the extraordinary stories that [would] come out of the Games’ (Degun, 2012).

BEYOND ACADEMIA

Throughout this review we’ve seen how the issue of legacy is often a point of friction between that which is said to have happened, or said to be in the process of happening, and that which is actually evident in the lived experiences of those affected by change (or a lack of it). Legacy promises have been fluid and definitions of what is meant by ‘local’, ‘community’, ‘affordable’ and ‘inclusive’ ambiguous, making it challenging to isolate the effects of Olympic regeneration from longer-term trajectories of change and to make robust claims about the real impacts on people who have spent much, or all, of their lives in East London. This review focuses on summarizing...
academic writing about London 2012 and legacy. Yet, there is a wealth of community-led and community-based work – research, writing, film, photography, poetry, and many other creative outputs – documenting the aspirations and realities of legacy, regeneration, and economic transformation for long-term residents. Some of this work has developed from community-university partnerships, such as the accounts in the University of East London Olympic Archive that contrast community and official narratives of legacy, where the former centred on sporting triumph and regeneration success, the latter centred on unaffordable housing and limited support for local business and communities. Yet much is led by independent researchers, artists, community-based networks, voluntary and public sector organisations working directly with residents from diverse backgrounds, such as work by Living Maps.392 This work represents a critical contribution to knowledge about the multiple legacies of London 2012, and of urban regeneration more widely, and reflects a long-established history of community-led research in East London. Without the benefit of the digital libraries, citation databases, and archives that streamline the sourcing of academic writing, this rich and significant body of work is not always easy to locate. Arguably, a review that curates this body of independent community-led and community-based work, and summarizes key themes and findings – just as this report set out to collate academic writing on legacy in one place – would constitute a critical counterpoint to official narratives of legacy and an important source of insight for policy and planning decisions in the decade ahead.

In September 2022, the team behind this review hosted a 2-day conference in the former Olympic Media Centre393 (since rebranded as Here East) where a decade before Seb Coe invited the Olympic press corps to tell the extraordinary stories of the London 2012 Games. The goal of the conference was to bring multiple voices, perspectives, and experiences to bear on the question of London 2012’s legacies. Academics – ex-

392 Livingmaps Network (2022) Groundbreakers Guide (PDF). Available at: https://www.livingmaps.org/groundbreakers-resources

393 The Olympic Media Centre was comprised of the International Broadcast Centre (IBC) and the Main Press Centre (MPC) mentioned on page 126.
experienced and new – community activists, community-based researchers, East London residents, artists, politicians, local authority officers, and built environment professionals took part, sharing work included in this review and new projects.\textsuperscript{394}

From the beginning of the conference concerns with race, class, economic inclusion, and genuinely affordable housing were evident in presentations and discussion. At Timber Lodge, the opening Question Time with elected Mayor of Newham, Rokhsana Fiaz, elected Mayor of Hackney, Philip Glanville, Caroline Rouse from Compost London, and Jake Heitland from SHIFT, the new inclusive innovation district in the Olympic Park, started the debate by interrogating statistics about Convergence legacy promises\textsuperscript{395} on employment growth, health, and crime. Chris Paddock from PRD shared analysis of high-level patterns of change in the Olympic Host Boroughs over the past decade\textsuperscript{396} drawing on data from the Office of National Statistics - including the new Census - to argue that although the economic picture has improved, there has been little progress to improve outcomes relating to specific deep-rooted challenges such as health and crime. For example, since 2011, the population in the Olympic Growth Boroughs has grown by 132,000 people – a 12.3% increase compared to the London average of 7.7%\textsuperscript{397}; the number of jobs has increased by 10% since 2015 (the London average is 4\%)\textsuperscript{398}; Stratford has the second highest employment growth of any of London’s Opportunity Areas after Kings Cross\textsuperscript{398}; the area covering the London Stadium, Aquatic Centre and East Bank experienced the highest proportional increase in jobs, with 150% growth between 2015-2022 (+750 jobs)\textsuperscript{398}; and the percentage of economically active people in employment went from 6.2% below the London average to 1% above it (54\% vs 53\% respectively, in 2021\textsuperscript{396}). However, job growth has not translated into improvements in job quality. Since 2005, the proportion of Growth Borough jobs paying less than the London Living Wage has almost doubled and is now 6\% higher than the London average; the number of jobs in low-paying sectors has

\textsuperscript{394} Click here to see more outputs from our State of the Legacy conference in September 2022.


\textsuperscript{397} Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2022) Population and household estimates, England and Wales: Census 2021. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/census

\textsuperscript{398} Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2022) Business register and employment survey. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/surveys/informationforbusinesses/businesssurveys/businessregisterandemploymentsurvey
increased by 8% since 2015, compared to 2% in London as a whole. In-work poverty has increased; this is reflected in the number of children living in absolute low-income households, which has grown by 11% since 2014. Income after housing costs is 12% lower in the Growth Boroughs than the London average. Renting privately across the Growth Boroughs went from 21% in 2007 to 29% in 2020.396

At the 10th anniversary of the Games, this headline data provides valuable insights about high-level patterns of change in East London. However, as the Question Time speakers identified, these changes – both positive and negative – are not evenly distributed among the population. Long-standing, structural inequalities – race, class, socio-economic background – powerfully shape the economic realities and opportunities of residents. Headline data at the Borough level shows how poverty, insecurity, and deprivation remain spatially concentrated, yet raise new questions about population change, gentrification, and who benefits and how from changes to East London’s physical, economic, and social landscape. The speakers called for new forms of evidence that foreground the lived realities of people in East London, with greater focus on questions of race, ethnicity, class, culture, and how they intersect with access to affordable housing and the new, high-quality jobs being created in the Olympic Park.

These debates reflect, in a different form, the tensions between promises and outcomes discussed in this review. Differential legacies, with attention to the ways that race, class, socio-economic background shape access to job opportunities, economic inclusion, health outcomes, and a voice for communities in assessing legacy outcomes and setting future priorities, were carried throughout the conference presentations and dialogues. Presentations by Denise Evans-Barr (People’s Empowerment Alliance for Custom House - PEACH) and artist Jessie Brennan, and by Terry Regan and Twinkle Jayakumar – citizen scientists, activists, and Newham residents
– contextualised these issues and argued for the urgency and importance of community-led research and regeneration. Luke Billingham from Hackney Quest gave a powerful, personal account of the hopes, disappointments, and experiences of a generation of young people growing-up in Hackney Wick in the shadow of Olympic regeneration. Many speakers discussed legacy as part of much larger cultural challenges, including Dr Joy White’s examination of the violence endured by young black people in East London, and their sonic resilience, resistance and creativity in the form of grime and drill music – a theme that Büşra Turan Tüylüoğlu echoed in her research on cultural creativity in Waltham Forest. And the impacts of London 2012 were put into perspective by Prof Eduardo Nobre, who has written on the legacy of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil, who joined us for the two days.

For us, as co-organisers of the conference, clear questions and priorities around race, class, participation, affordable housing, and inclusive economies, are emerging for the next decade of Olympic legacy research, as are collaborations and methods that bring academic researchers, communities, policymakers, and other stakeholders together in the hope that the gaps identified in the review and conference can be bridged.

THE NEXT DECADE OF LEGACY

While this review focuses on published academic writing about London’s Olympic legacy, we will end this postscript with a discussion of as-yet unpublished research findings from a new study tracking how legacy regeneration shapes the prosperity of households in East London over the next decade. Prosperity in East London 2021-2031 has been co-designed over a number of years with citizen social scientists – long-term East London residents trained and employed to work as researchers in their neighbourhoods – and voluntary
sector, local authority, and regeneration stakeholders from the public and private sectors. The study aims to address two key questions, discussed in the review and at the conference, about who has the power to determine what legacy is and how outcomes are defined and measured, and to interrogate at a hyper-local level who benefits and how from legacy and wider regeneration investments in the Olympic Growth Boroughs. Building on qualitative research carried out in 2015 and 2017 by citizen social scientists involving residents, community networks, and voluntary sector groups from Hackney Wick, East Village, Stratford, Canning Town, Bow, and Heath (Woodcraft and Anderson, 2019⁴⁰³), Prosperity in East London 2021–2031 uses an alternative set of success measures that reflect the priorities and lived experiences of local communities to evaluate legacy outcomes. The goal is to shift the evidence and knowledge used to make decisions about economic development, regeneration planning, and social policy in East London in the next decade, foregrounding the lived realities of residents. For example, where different waves of legacy promises focus on job growth and employment, residents identify livelihood security as the foundation of their prosperity: encompassing secure and good quality work, secure and genuinely affordable housing, access to public transport and childcare, food and energy security, and financial and digital inclusion, as the key dimensions and measures of a secure livelihood.

Focusing on 15 local areas in and on the fringes of the Olympic Park, and around the Royal Docks, Poplar Riverside and Barking Riverside, Prosperity in East London 2021–2031 will look at how people from different socio-economic backgrounds and living in different neighbourhoods are affected by regeneration, asking ‘Who benefits and how?’ and ‘What are the obstacles facing different groups?’ The 15 areas in the study include established neighbourhoods – places where households experience multiple forms of deprivation and inequality – and ‘new’ mixed-income neighbourhoods, places
where new housing development and job opportunities are attracting new residents. *Prosperity in East London 2021-2031* combines a survey of 4,000 households in the 15 areas, representing 7,700 residents, and qualitative research led by citizen social scientists. Data will be collected in three waves over the decade, with the first round of fieldwork running from September 2021 to June 2022. The first survey results, to be released by the end of 2022, will look in detail at livelihood security. However, preliminary analysis reinforces the urgency of interrogating legacy outcomes in relation to race, ethnicity, and class, with income levels, debt burdens, the proportion of weekly income being spent on utilities and transport, job satisfaction, and ability to pay household bills showing marked differences across ethnic groups and across different localities. Black households, for example, are twice as likely to be unable to stay up to date with household bills than Asian households. People from black and mixed ethnic groups in the hyper-local study sites work longer hours and report lower incomes than other groups, with significant variation across the study sites. Full results on livelihood security, including analysis of housing affordability, job security and satisfaction, and attitudes towards the social and economic outcomes of legacy, will be published by the end of this year, as will work by citizen social scientists documenting stories from their neighbourhoods about lived obstacles to prosperity.

As we enter the second decade of London’s Olympic legacy, we hope this review reinforces to readers the continuing importance of critical, collaborative, and genuinely trans-disciplinary urban research to continue to interrogate the outcomes of regeneration in East London, and to develop new policy-relevant knowledge with and for communities.
Some of the over 150 attendees and speakers who joined us at the State of the Legacy Conference.

Above: Terry Regan and Twinkle Jayakumar (citizen scientists, activists, and Newham residents)

Left: Hannah Caller (FocusE15)

Below: Kyarna Morris (Immediate Theatre)

We are extremely grateful to everyone that contributed to the conference, more info on which can be found at:

https://www.ucl.ac.uk/urban-lab/publications/2022/sep/state-legacy-decade-olympic-regeneration
A consortium comprised of engineering, construction and consultancy companies CH2M Hill, Laing O’Rourke and Mace. CLM was appointed by the Olympic Delivery Authority to manage delivery of the Olympic Park and its associated infrastructure.

Compulsory Purchase Order. Compulsory purchase is a legal mechanism by which certain bodies (known as ‘acquiring authorities’) can acquire land without the consent of the owner.

Department for Culture, Media and Sport. A Department of His Majesty’s Government, with responsibility for culture and sport in England, and some aspects of the media throughout the UK. Prior to 1997 this was known as the Department of National Heritage, and from 2017 was renamed to Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.

The postcode district of London for the site of the 2012 Olympics.

Foreign Direct Investment. An ownership stake in a foreign company or project made by an investor, company, or government from another country.

Greater London Authority. The devolved regional governance body of Greater London, consisting of the executive mayoralty and the 25-member London Assembly.

International Olympic Committee. The governing body of the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and of the worldwide ‘Olympic Movement’.

Legacy Communities Scheme. Also known as the Legacy masterplan, a scheme created by the London Legacy Development Corporation. The LCS Planning Application was submitted to in September 2011.

London Development Agency. Between July 2000 and 2012 the LDA was the regional development agency for the London region, a functional body of the Greater London Authority.

Lower Lea Valley. The southern end of the valley formed by the River Lea, the Lower Lea Valley was the primary location of the 2012 Olympic Games.

London Legacy Development Corporation. Organisation formed in 2012 as a mayoral development corporation to replace the Olympic Park Legacy Company.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>LOCOG</td>
<td>London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games. LOCOG was established between the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Mayor of London, and the British Olympic Association to oversee the planning and development of the London Games.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Mayoral Development Corporation, a statutory body created to accelerate the regeneration of a defined area.</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Olympic Delivery Authority. A non-departmental public body of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, responsible for ensuring the delivery of venues, infrastructure and legacy for the 2012 London Games.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLC</td>
<td>Olympic Park Legacy Company. Established in 2009 by the Mayor of London and Government as the company responsible for the long-term planning, development, management and maintenance of the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park. Replaced by the LLDC in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QEOP</td>
<td>Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park. Sporting complex and public park in Stratford, Hackney Wick, Leyton and Bow, in East London. It was purpose-built for the 2012 Summer Olympics and Paralympics. Simply called the ‘Olympic Park’ until 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Size Enterprise. Defined by the UK government as any business employing fewer than 250 employees and an annual turnover under €50 million.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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