THE NESTORIAN TREATISE PRESERVED IN LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM'S
CONTRA NESTORIANOS (CPG 6918): INTRODUCTION, EDITION AND ENGLISH
TRANSLATION

Dirk Krausmüller, University of Vienna

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Abstract
The Nestorian treatise preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem’s Contra Nestorianos (CPG 6918) is the only surviving Nestorian Christological text in the Greek language that was written after the condemnation of Nestorius. It consists of self-contained arguments, mostly in the form of syllogisms, which are organised in eight books. The content can be easily reconstructed since Leontius of Jerusalem quotes each argument in full before refuting it. Only the last book is missing, either because Leontius did not get round to tackling it or because the manuscript containing Leontius’ work was mutilated. This article will present an introduction, critical edition and English translation of the Treatise with annotations.

Keywords
Leontius of Jerusalem – Nestorian Treatise – Contra Nestorianos – Christology

Introduction
In the year 381 the Second Ecumenical Council declared that the godhead was three hypostases who shared one single nature and were therefore one God. This put an end to the controversies about the relationship between the divine Father and his Son and Spirit that had raged for more than half a century. ¹ The number of those who rejected the settlement declined sharply in the following decades. Thus it could seem that the church was finally at peace. Yet this impression was deceptive because a new problem had arisen. The leading theologians of the time asked how one should conceive of the relationship between the second divine hypostasis, the Son or Word, and the human being Jesus, the flesh, that had been established through the incarnation. Two different approaches were developed, which have traditionally been called the Antiochene and Alexandrian Schools because in the late fourth and early fifth centuries most of their respective proponents were found in Syria and Egypt.²

The Antiochenes insisted on the difference between the Word and the flesh. They considered them to be two agents, which guided their reading of the Bible. They attributed ‘high things’ such as miracles to the Word and ‘low things’ such as sufferings to the flesh.


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By contrast, the Alexandrians claimed that both ‘high things’ and ‘low things’ must be predicated of a single agent, the Word. Accordingly, they would say that God suffered on the cross. This was dangerous ground since it appeared to negate the common notion that God was impassible by nature. Apart from a few extremists, nobody was prepared to go so far. Yet even so the Antiochene were shocked. They came to the conclusion that the Alexandrians had to be blasphemers because they denied the transcendence of God. A second bone of contention was the status of the flesh. By attributing the ‘low things’ to it the Antiochene accorded it a will of its own. This gave the impression as if sinlessness was an achievement of the flesh. The Alexandrians complained that such a belief nullified the salvation of humankind. For them no human being could be sinless. Accordingly, they argued that the Word did not permit the flesh to make moral judgements.

In the late 420s matters came to a head when the Syrian monk Nestorius was appointed patriarch of Constantinople. Due to his Antiochene background, he was greatly upset by the term ‘God-bearer’ that had come to be widely used for the Virgin Mary. He claimed that God could not have been born from a human being because he had an eternal existence. His criticism irked the powerful patriarch of Alexandria, Cyril, who came to the defense of the term. In the course of the controversy the two men developed conceptual frameworks that could support their views. Nestorius spoke of two separate human and divine natures and hypostases and declared that the incarnation had resulted in a prosopon of union, which was based on will and grace. By contrast, Cyril stated several times that there was only one nature and one hypostasis and that the union affected the being of the two components.

At the Third Ecumenical Council in 431 Nestorius’ position was declared heretical. This meant that it could no longer be held with impunity. Yet this did not mean that the Antiochene School disappeared. In 451 it gained a new lease of life when the Fourth Ecumenical Council defined the Word and the flesh as two natures, which were united in one hypostasis. This formula was accepted by the majority of Antiochenes because it left room for interpretation. One could focus on the two natures and emphasize their difference, in particular since a synodal document, the so-called Tome of Leo, claimed that each nature did what was its own. Accordingly, Antiochenes such as the patriarch Gennadius of Constantinople felt justified in attacking Cyril. Yet by the beginning of the sixth century the situation had begun to change. Those who followed Cyril in speaking of one nature and one hypostasis, the Monophysites, claimed that the formula of Chalcedon was a vindication of Nestorius’ position. Stung by this criticism, some Chalcedonians

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6 However, see H. Van Loon, *The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria*, Leiden–Boston 2009.


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proceeded to interpret their creed in the light of Cyril’s teachings. They were met with fierce opposition by the Antiochenes. One of their number, Basil of Cilicia, wrote a lengthy treatise against John of Scythopolis whose theology was influenced by the Alexandrian patriarch. Yet eventually the Cyrillianists, or Neo-Chalcedonians as they are often called, gained the upper hand. Now the emphasis was firmly on the one hypostasis. The culmination of this trend was the Fifth Ecumenical Council in the year 553. There the two foremost Antiochene theologians, Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, were condemned although they had already been dead for more than a century. This decision spelt the end of Antiochene Chalcedonianism. Its proponents, such as the monks of Palestine, had no choice but to distance themselves from their beliefs.

It goes without saying that those Antiochenes who continued to subscribe to the teachings of Nestorius were in an even worse position. They had been persecuted by the Roman state and the official church ever since the year 431. Some of their number sought refuge in the Persian Empire where the situation was radically different. In the second half of the fifth century the Christians there adopted Theodore of Mopsuestia as their main Christological authority. At the end of the sixth century one of their leaders, Babai the Great, spoke openly of two natures and two hypostases in the incarnated Word. Yet this does not mean that there were no longer any Nestorians in the Roman Empire. Although most of their writings have disappeared we still have a lengthy treatise, which has survived in a refutation by the Chalcedonian theologian Leontius of Jerusalem where it is extensively quoted. Like Babai, its author defends a specifically Nestorian Christology and rejects the formula of Chalcedon. Since he also polemicises against the Fifth Ecumenical Council we can be certain that he was active after 553. His floruit can be inferred from a reference to a contemporary practice. In chapter III.8 he declares that the womb of the empress is crowned before she gives birth in the purple chamber, and adds that this is often the case. This rules out a date before 582 because Justinian, Justin II and Tiberius II had no children while they were in office. The reigns of Maurice (582-602) and Heraclius (610-641) are equally possible since both men had numerous offspring. Yet it can be argued that the treatise was written during the Persian occupation of the Eastern provinces of the Roman Empire in the second and third decades of the seventh century when there was no fear of persecution. This is all the more likely since Leontius of Jerusalem once refers to the sack of the holy city by the Persians.

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The Nestorian Treatise

The treatise is of the utmost significance since it is the only surviving Nestorian Christological text in the Greek language that was written after the condemnation of Nestorius. It consisted of self-contained arguments, mostly in the form of syllogisms, which were organised in eight books.\(^{15}\) The content can be easily reconstructed since Leontius of Jerusalem quotes each argument in full before refuting it.\(^{16}\) Only the last book is missing, either because Leontius did not get round to tackling it or because the manuscript containing Leontius’ work was mutilated. In his introduction Leontius gives a short summary of the topics:\(^{17}\)

First, that we (i.e. the Chalcedonians) do not correctly confess a composition of the divine and human natures.

Second, that while there are two hypostases of Christ we wrongly say that a union according to hypostasis took place and recognise one hypostasis of him.

Third again, that while there are two sons, we wrongly confess that Christ is one son.

Fourth, that we wrongly call the holy Virgin ‘God-bearer’.

Fifth, that we know that Christ is not just a mere human being by nature but that he is also God.

Sixth, that we know that the Word (sic) is not a God-bearing human being but God who has become a human being.

Seventh, that we proclaim unlawfully that one of the Trinity has suffered through the flesh.

In the eighth (sc. book) of impiety, they deny the union according to hypostasis and conjure up some others that are inexisten.

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17 See Codex Marcianus graecus Z.69, fol. 298v-299r.

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A Nestorian Christology

Through his insistence that the divine Word and the human being Jesus are two hypostases the author of the treatise reveals himself to be not just an Antiochene but a follower of Nestorius. Like Nestorius, he advocates a weak link between the Word and the flesh. In chapter II.34 and elsewhere he speaks of the one prosopon of union, which does not affect the two natures but is based on will and love. Thus it is not surprising that he fights the same battles.

In chapter IV.1 the Nestorian criticises his adversaries for claiming that Mary was God-bearer ‘strictly and in truth’. This qualification, which was added at the Council of Ephesus, had become necessary because the term ‘God-bearer’ was not unequivocal. As the Nestorian states in chapter IV.2 he could have accepted it since human beings can be called ‘gods’ because of the divine image. Yet it was clearly problematic since it gave the impression as if Mary was mother of God by nature. In chapters IV.7 and IV.8 the Nestorian declares that offspring must be of the same substance as the parent and then concludes that there are only two possible scenarios: either Mary was a goddess, which would be blasphemous, or she was a human being in which case the Word born from her was not God.

In chapter III.10 the Nestorian defends himself against the accusation that he teaches two sons. He objects that one can only count sons when they are born from the same parents. This, however, is not the case with the incarnation because the Word is son by nature and Christ is son by adoption. In chapter III.11 he illustrates his point with the case of Rachel. Rachel had adoptive sons from her servant-woman Bilha and sons that she herself had given birth to. Yet when the sons of Jacob are listed in Genesis only Rachel’s true sons are mentioned as hers.

In chapter I.44 the Nestorian counters the claim that he venerates a mere human being. He contends that Christ was a special case because he was accorded a higher honour than other members of the human race. In order to support this claim he offers two arguments. In chapter III.7 he states that a gnat and an angel are both creatures but we would for this reason not say that they have the same honour. In chapter III.9 different types of sons of God are distinguished on a rising scale. All human beings are sons of God because of the divine image, the Israelites were more specifically sons of God because God had made a covenant with them and gave them the law, Christians are sons of God to an even greater degree since they are recipients of divine grace and promised sinlessness, and Christ is son of God in the same sense as other Christians but has additional honours since he was chosen from all human beings and given an incomparable name. This understanding of Christ’s status is radically different from the Chalcedonian and Monophysite view that Jesus was assumed into the divinity and therefore participates in the sonship of the Word.

In chapter I.19 the Nestorian author seeks to show that a connection through the will, love, grace and good pleasure of the Word can account for all that was known about Christ and that there was therefore no need for a union according to hypostasis as it was proposed by his adversaries. He avers that Christ’s miracles could not be considered proof of such a union since Jesus promised that greater ones would be performed by his Apostles who were mere human beings. Likewise, the Virgin birth and the sinlessness were no valid

19 See Wessel, Cyril of Alexandria, 157-158.
20 See Wessel, Cyril of Alexandria, 191.
arguments because in Matthew 1:8 Mary is said to have become pregnant from the Holy Spirit and in 1 Timothy 3:16 Jesus is said to have been justified in the Spirit. This may give the impression that the Nestorian author simply substitutes the operations of the Spirit for the effects of hypostatic union. Yet this is not quite the case. Whereas Chalcedonians and Monophysites give the human being no share in the achievement of sinlessness the Nestorian author states clearly in chapter I.19 and once more in chapter I.47 that it was Jesus himself who avoided sinning while the Holy Spirit only provided support. Significantly, he exclaims that otherwise it would be meaningless to speak of sinlessness as an achievement. For him Jesus has an autonomous personality that developed over time. In chapter II.6 he considers entirely unproblematic the claim in Luke 2:52 that Jesus grew in wisdom, which had greatly incommodated Cyril.21 In chapter II.32 he says that only the Word is omniscient whereas Jesus is ignorant as it is attested in the Bible.

In other respects, too, the Bible is the Nestorian author’s most potent weapon. He has a marked preference for the oldest layer of Christological statements. In chapter V.5 he quotes Acts 2:36 where Christ is said to have been made Lord and Christ by God. This allows him to argue that the lordship of Jesus is an honorary title for a creature and can therefore not be identified with the natural lordship of the divine Word. In chapters II.48 and V.3 he points out correctly that according to the Bible Christ was raised by God and did not raise himself as it was claimed by the Chalcedonians.

The Nestorian Contribution to the Christological debate

The issues that we have discussed so far were first raised around the time of the Council of Ephesus. Yet this does not mean that the Nestorian only rehashes old arguments. He shows himself fully au fait with more recent developments. In order to contextualise his contribution to the mature Christological discourse it is necessary to consider not only the Chalcedonians but also the Monophysites. The debate between these two sects began in earnest in the early sixth century when the Chalcedonian John of Caesarea clashed with the Monophysite Severus of Antioch. It then continued with contributions by Leontius of Byzantium and John Philoponus.22 It has already been suggested that the Chalcedonians modified their position in response to Monophysite criticism.23 What has not yet been assessed is the impact of Nestorian arguments. In what follows I will show that they were trenchant enough to trouble Chalcedonian authors. Apart from the Nestorian who wrote in Greek and lived in the Roman Empire we need to consider the contribution of his contemporary Babai the Great. Although Babai lived in the Persian Empire and wrote in Syriac he was aware of the discussions going on across the border and responded to them.

The Independent Existence of the Flesh

The Chalcedonians had to show that the flesh was not an independent individual besides the Word because this would have destroyed the oneness of the incarnated Word.

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21 See WESSEL, Cyril of Alexandria, 133-134.
which they sought to defend. The most popular, and least sophisticated, argument was to claim that the flesh could not have a hypostasis of its own because it only came into existence at the moment of its union with the Word. It is first attested in John of Caesarea’s treatise and is repeated in all later Chalcedonian texts (with the exception of Leontius of Byzantium who considers such a scenario to be at least possible). Here, there was no disagreement with the Monophysites. Severus and his followers also denied the pre-existence of the flesh because they were if anything even more concerned about maintaining the oneness of the incarnated Word. The Nestorian challenges this consensus. In chapter II.20 he distinguishes between two ways in which the incarnation could have taken place. Either the human body was fashioned first, the soul was breathed into it afterwards, and the Word united himself with both body and soul in third place. Or the Word united himself first with the body and then breathed the soul into the body and into himself. He contends that only the first option can be correct because in the second option the body would mediate between the soul and the Word. Such a scenario would be impossible since a mediator must take a middle position between two extremes. This, however, could only be the soul, which is closer to the Word than the body. Both options presuppose a particular understanding of the formation of the embryo where the soul appears only after the body has been fully formed. We encounter it in Syriac Christianity but also in Aristotelian philosophy. The Nestorian recognises its potential for anti-Chalcedonian polemic. According to the first option, the body existed before the union with the Word, which means that it had a hypostasis of its own. The Nestorian concludes that one can therefore only speak of a looser union based on the good pleasure of the divinity. It might be said that this is a weak argument because the Chalcedonians could simply deny that in the embryo the body comes into existence before the soul. There was indeed an alternative theory, first proposed by Gregory of Nyssa, according to which the soul is present in the body from the moment of conception. Applied to the incarnation, it meant that the Word created both body and soul simultaneously when he united himself with them. Thus, it is not surprising that it was accepted by Chalcedonian authors and also by Severus. Yet matters were less straightforward than they might first seem. In the sixth century there were also Chalcedonians who claimed that in the embryo the body comes into existence before the soul. They thought that the presence of the soul at the moment of conception would imply that it had already existed before the body, which was a tenet of the Origenist heresy. This made it difficult for them to maintain a Chalcedonian Christology. Leontius of Jerusalem declared that the incarnation was categorically different from the coming-to-be of ordinary human beings and should be considered a miracle. The Nestorian was probably already aware of this ‘solution’ and had found a way to refute it. He quotes Hebrews 4:15 where Christ is said to be like us in all respects apart from sin. The excluded second option is also interesting. It is likely that some Chalcedonians believed that the Word united himself first with the body and then with the soul because it ruled out an independent pre-existence of the body. Significantly, however, the only text in which it is attested today is a treatise by Babai the Great. Babai considered the Nestorian’s position to be heretical because it minimised the effects of the incarnation. There can be no doubt that the Nestorian brushed away such concerns because his sole aim was to destroy the Chalcedonian position.

24 For the following see D. Krausmüller, “Where embryology intersects with Christology: the viewpoints of Nestorian, Monophysite and Chalcedonian authors of the sixth to tenth centuries,” Byzantinische Zeitschrift 113 (2020): 853-878.

No hypostatic idioms

Denying that the flesh existed before the union with the Word was no doubt a popular argument. Yet it soon turned out that it alone could not prevent the human nature from becoming a separate hypostasis. The problems surfaced when John of Caesara applied to the incarnation the conceptual framework of a common nature/substance and individual hypostases that the Cappadocians had developed for the Trinity. In principle, this was a clever move. It highlighted the fact that for the Monophysites the term ‘nature’ had different meanings in Trinitarian theology and in Christology: in the former case it denoted the species whereas in the latter case it denoted an individual. This made it easy to accuse them of inconsistency. Yet there were also serious drawbacks. According to the Cappadocians, the ‘addition’ of individual characteristics to a set of common properties constituted a hypostasis within a species. If the human nature had such characteristics it would have become a separate hypostasis even within the hypostasis of the Word. Significantly, this point is not made by Severus who in his Christological statements showed no interest in individual characteristics. In secondary literature it is therefore assumed that the Chalcedonians themselves became aware of the problem. Yet it is equally possible that others forced them to acknowledge it. In chapter II.21 the Nestorian pits Trinitarian theology against Christology. He states that the idiom ‘begotten’ distinguishes the Word from the Father and the Spirit and thus constitutes him straightway as a separate hypostasis. Then he points out that the birth from a Virgin distinguishes Jesus from all other human beings and must therefore also straightway constitute him as a hypostasis.

John’s solution was simply to deny that the flesh had individual characteristics. Leontius of Byzantium, too, once expresses this view. He compares the incarnated Word with the other divine persons and with other human beings. He states that the Word is distinguished from the Father through the characteristic ‘begotten’ but he does then not say that the flesh is distinguished from his mother Mary through its characteristics. Instead, he juxtaposes Mary with the incarnated Word as a whole. This strange asymmetry becomes even odder when we see that Leontius creates an analogy with the human being. Here we find an exact parallel. Both the body and the soul of a human being are hypostases because they differ from the bodies and souls of other human beings. Significantly, in chapter II.15 the Nestorian makes the same point. He states that the body of Peter differed from the body of Paul, just as their souls differed from one another. This can only mean that both body and soul had hypostases of their own. Predictably, he then concludes that the same must then also apply to the incarnated Word. This remained a weakness of Chalcedonianism throughout the sixth century. A solution of sorts was only found after the Nestorian’s time. Then it was claimed that individuation alone did not bring about hypostases but that a further component was needed that gave reality to the individuated nature. Interestingly, Severus never criticised the absence of individual characteristics in the flesh. By contrast, the Nestorian pounced on it. In chapter II.6 he points out that it flies in the face of the Biblical accounts, which present Jesus as an individual, and he adds that Mary was an individual and could therefore only have given birth to an individual.

27 See ZACHHUBER, Rise of Christian Theology, 289, 310.
**Universal Natures in Christ**

John made a distinction between the Word who was a hypostasis and the human nature, which lacked this status. Yet at the same time he declared that the incarnation was a union of two universal or common natures. This led to conceptual problems because it was not clear what ‘common nature’ meant. Severus avers that it could only refer to the sum-total of all members of a species. Accordingly, he concludes that the entire divinity would have become incarnate in the entire human race. John complains that Severus wilfully misunderstood him. When he spoke of the whole nature he meant that the Word possessed the sum-total of properties that constitute the divinity. This is evidently a deflection from the actual problem. The real crux was that according to the Cappadocians the set of divine properties is found in all three persons without being divided up among them. This made it difficult to explain why the incarnation did not involve the three divine persons and in addition also the entire human race.

The Nestorian deals with this topic in chapter II.7. There he grants his Chalcedonian adversaries that they do not speak of the incarnation of the entire Trinity. Accordingly, his focus is exclusively on the human dimension. He distinguishes between a union of the Word with a particular human being and a union of the Word with the universal human being. In the former case he concludes that a particular human being is nothing else but a human hypostasis as the Nestorians had said all along. The latter case is, of course, the solution proposed by John. The Nestorian claims that if it were true the Word would have become incarnate in all human beings, including the Jews who sentenced and killed Jesus. Here we can see clearly that Monophysites and Nestorians used the same arguments when they attacked the Chalcedonians. Yet this is not all the Nestorian has to say. He mentions a second meaning of ‘universal human being’. It could denote a set of common human properties that the mind abstracts from the individuals and that therefore only exists as a concept in the mind. This was a potent argument because it gave the impression that the Chalcedonians were docetists who sought to nullify the reality of the incarnation.

This second argument was summed up in the formula ‘there is no nature that is anhypostatos’. Here anhypostatos has two meanings, ‘inexistent’ and ‘without hypostasis’. It is claimed that a nature can only be real when it is instantiated in a hypostasis. Significantly, the formula is quoted both by Severus and by the Nestorian. This confirms Leontius of Byzantium’s claim that both sects used it in their polemic against the Chalcedonians. It seems likely that it had originally been coined by the Nestorians since they alone spoke of a human nature and a human hypostasis. In response to it John had claimed that the universal human nature was not anhypostatos because it existed so-to-speak parasitically in the Word, which was constituted as a hypostasis through the idiom ‘begotten’. This argument, however, was rejected by both Monophysites and Nestorians. Therefore the Chalcedonians felt the need to shore up the ontological status of the human nature itself. One popular strategy was to reinterpret the formula ‘there is no nature that is anhypostatos’. It was claimed that the antonym of anhypostatos was not hypostasis but enhypostatos, which conferred reality on the human

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This line of reasoning was known to the Nestorian who inveighs against it in chapter II.13. There he explains how the Chalcedonians defended their use of the term *enhypostatos*. Their first argument is a comparison with Trinitarian theology. They pointed out that in the Trinity one can speak of three substantial hypostases (*enousi hypostaseis*) without assuming the existence of three substances (*ousiai*), and they concluded that one one should then also be able to speak in Christology of two hypostatic substances (*enhypostatoi ousiai*) without speaking of two hypostases. The second argument is an analogy. A body can be called coloured (*enchromatistos*) but is not colour (*chroma*) and in the same way a substance can be called *enhypostatos* but is not hypostasis. The Nestorian complains bitterly that these are paralogisms based on a superficial similarity of terms, which are meant to confuse ordinary Christians. In the second case he presents a counter-argument: if colour equals hypostasis and it is found in a body a hypostasis is also found in a substance. The Nestorian ascribes these arguments to a group of Chalcedonians who called themselves ‘Cherubim’. Unfortunately, we do not know who these people were. Yet we can be certain that the two arguments already existed in the second quarter of the sixth century because Leontius of Byzantium juxtaposes *enousios* and *enhypostatos* on the one hand and shape (*schema*) and shaped (*enschematistos*) on the other. Significantly, however, Leontius does not develop the two arguments but adds a new definition of *enhypostatos*, which is borrowed from the philosophical discourse. This suggests that Nestorian criticism forced the Chalcedonians to rethink their arguments.

Composition and the Anthropological Paradigm

In order to show that the incarnated Word cannot be a single hypostasis, the Nestorian juxtaposes properties of the Word and of the flesh, such as uncreated and created in chapter I.26, or infinite and finite in chapter I.25, and then claims that they cannot co-exist in one and the same being. This is a traditional argument, which is already found in Nestorius’ writings and which had been passed down through the decades, eventually also making an appearance in Babai’s writings. Yet it plays a relatively minor role in the Nestorian’s treatise. The focus is instead on the concept of ‘composition’, which had been employed by Cyril of Alexandria and later also by Severus. In Chalcedonian texts it first appears in the first quarter of the sixth century. There the Monophysite formula of the ‘one composite nature’ is replaced with its Chalcedonian equivalent of the ‘one composite hypostasis’. The Nestorian declares that this was the official dogma of the Chalcedonian church. This can only be a reference to the Fifth Ecumenical Council of 553 where the concept of composition had been introduced as an orthodox alternative to looser types of union preferred by the Nestorians, such as ‘relation’ and ‘equality of honour’, which were condemned as heretical. This produced a Nestorian backlash. Babai the Great polemicsises against Emperor Justinian, declaring him to be the worst heretic of all times. Moreover, he seeks to show that defining the incarnation as a composition is

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31 For the following see B. GleeDe, *The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος from Origen to John of Damascus*, Leiden-Boston 2012, 127-131.
34 For the following see D. KRAUSMÜLLER, “What is a Composite Hypostasis? Leontius of Jerusalem, Maximus the Confessor and the Nestorian Challenge,” forthcoming in *Scrinium*.
not reconcilable with common notions about the divinity. Significantly, the Nestorian takes the same approach in the first book of his treatise. Both authors claim that in order to determine what ‘composition’ means one must consider all cases of compounds in the created order. They assert that from all these compounds one can derive a general rule to which there are no exceptions. Then they list the properties of the parts. In chapter I.2, for example, the Nestorian avers that all parts are circumscribed and that the Word can therefore not be a part since he is uncircumscribed. An almost identically worded argument is employed by Babai, which leaves no doubt that both authors make use of earlier texts. In fact, the earliest known source predates the Fifth Ecumenical Council. In the 520s the Chalcedonian author John Maxentius had claimed that only composition could prevent a Nestorian interpretation of the formula of Chalcedon. In his treatise he provides clear evidence for a debate even at this point. He lets a Nestorian say that every composition consists of parts and that parts are necessarily lesser than the whole, which would mean that the Word is lesser than the composite of Word and flesh. Significantly, the same argument is employed both by Babai and by the Nestorian. Thus we can conclude that there was a Nestorian discourse stretching through the whole sixth century and encompassing the Roman and Sasanian empires, despite the difference in language. The Chalcedonians found it difficult to respond. They could argue that composition in the case of the incarnation was of a different type from that in the created order. But then they could be accused of making arbitrary statements.

As we have seen the Nestorian and Babai formulate a general rule and then apply it to the specific case of the incarnation. Most arguments of the two authors, however, contain a further step. The general rule is illustrated with an example, the human compound. The result is that the incarnated Word cannot be compared with the human being. This is not just an illustration. The way in which the general rule is phrased shows clearly that the Nestorian and Babai had the human being in mind all along. The Nestorian claims that the soul by necessity ceases to function when the body turns to sleep, and that it needs the body to learn and to do good deeds. The anthropology behind this statement is clear: the soul is dependent on the body, just as the body is dependent on the soul. This is an anthropology that goes back to the Syrians and possibly also to Aristotle.

Of course, these arguments could be countered through recourse to a different anthropology where the soul is not dependent on the body and can therefore be used as an analogy for the Word. Leontius of Byzantium, for example, makes this point with reference to Platonic philosophy. Yet the historical context must again be considered. At the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553 Origenism, which had once been tolerated, was officially declared to be heretical. As a consequence, many people were suspicious of Platonist notions about the soul. The Nestorian capitalises on this development. In chapter I.51 at the end of the first book he plays the heresiological card. He claims that according to ‘us’ Christians the soul is lesser than the whole human being whereas according to the pagans and Manichaean it is greater. This juxtaposition is not as innocuous as it first may seem. Significantly, John Philoponus holds the view that is here attributed to the pagans and Manichaean. The polemical character of the argument becomes even clearer when we consider how the Nestorian makes his case. He says that according to the Christians the soul remains the same after its separation from the body, being incapable of functioning without the organs of the body and therefore being in a deep sleep. By contrast, the pagans and Manichaean claim that the soul is better on its own and perfectly self-sufficient, both before it is imprisoned in a body and also afterwards. The Nestorian

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35 For the following see D. Krausmüller, “Conflicting anthropologies in the Christological discourse at the end of Late Antiquity: the case of Leontius of Jerusalem’s Nestorian adversary,” The Journal of Theological Studies 56 (2005): 413-447.
insinuates that whoever believes in an active afterlife of the soul also believes in its pre-existence and is therefore not a Christian. Here again we need to consider the context, the witchhunt against the Origenists who were claimed to be pagans and Manichaean. It is clear that enough people in the Chalcedonian church believed that the soul was dependent on the body, sharing an anti-Origenist outlook. The Nestorian could therefore give the impression that those who used the anthropological paradigm were in reality heretics and pagans. Significantly, later Chalcedonian authors such as Maximus rejected the anthropological paradigm as unsuitable. Normally it is thought that he himself came to this conclusion but it seems likely that he was pushed into that direction by the Nestorian objections.

Edition

The edition is based on the Codex Marcianus gr. Z.69 (coll. 501), 298v-400v (Diktyon 69540), which dates to the late thirteenth century. Three further witnesses, the Monacensis gr. 67 (Diktyon 44511), the Parisinus Suppl. Grec 1288 (Diktyon 53952), and the Vaticanus Pal. gr. 342 (Diktyon 66047), which date to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are not considered as they are apographa of the Codex Marcianus.36 I have retained Mai’s and Migne’s numbering of the chapters although not all start with a quotation from the Nestorian treatise. This means that in a few cases the numbering is discontinuous.

β’: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else is circumscribed and consists of parts, as has been taught above. But everything that is circumscribed and consists of parts is of a different substance from that which is simple and uncircumscribed. But if this is the case, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us, since he is of the same substance as the simple and uncircumscribed Father; or he has been composed, in which case he is of a different substance from the simple and uncircumscribed Father, which is impious.

γ’: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else is of a different substance from the simple and uncircumscribed Father. But everything that is of a different substance from the simple and uncircumscribed Father, is not strictly a son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. Consequently, everything that is composed with something else is not strictly son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. But if everything that is composed with something else is not strictly son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us, since he is strictly Son of the Father; or he has been composed, in which case the God Word is not strictly son of the Father, which is impious.

δ’: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else is somehow abusively called son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father, if it is called thus at all. But everything that is somehow abusively called son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father, is strictly a creature of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. Everything, then, that is composed with something else is strictly a creature of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. But if this is the case, the God <Word> has not been composed with the human being taken from us, since he is the creator of the universe and not a creature of the Father; or he has been composed, in which case he is a creature of the simple and uncircumscribed one and not strictly a son, which is impious.
Every uncircumscribed substance is *qua* substance incomprehensibly everywhere, both in each thing and in itself according to identity and sameness, since this is the property of the uncircumscribed. But this is impious. Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else so as to constitute one living nature or also hypostasis, is found to be a part of this nature or also hypostasis. But every part of one living nature or also hypostasis suffers by natural necessity with the part with which it has constituted such a living nature or also hypostasis. The soul suffers with the body against its will, so that it sometimes stops performing its own operations, when the parts of the body with which it operates are damaged. Likewise the body, too, by natural necessity wastes away with the sorrows and worries of the soul. But it is not lawful to say that the Word suffers by necessity with the ensouled flesh taken from us. Consequently, the Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us in order to constitute one nature or also hypostasis. But if he has been composed, he also suffers by necessity, which is impious.
Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else in order to constitute one living nature or also hypostasis is shown to be a part of the resulting nature or also hypostasis. But every part of a living nature or also hypostasis absolutely needs the part with which it has been composed, for its own benefit. For the soul needs the body and the body the soul, each one the other for its own benefit. For the soul needs <the body> in order to learn the divine commandments and to please God, and the body needs <the soul> in order to have life with it and a greater honour than all other visible things. But it is not lawful to assume that the God Word needs something for his own benefit. Consequently, he has not been composed with the human being taken from us so as to constitute one living nature or also hypostasis. But if he has been composed, he also needs <the human being> for his own benefit, which is impious.
nature or also hypostasis that has resulted from

10: If the Lord Christ is composite, as they say, the God Word is a part, as the law of composites requires. But every part is in some respect lesser than its own whole. Consequently, the God Word would be in some respect lesser than something. For there cannot be a part if it is not lesser than the whole. But if this is the case, the God Word would also not be true God, since one cannot say that the true God is lesser than something. For God is entirely incomparable and matchless. Either let them decide openly that they are opposed to those who know that the God Word is true God; or let them desist from introducing a substance that is a composite of the God Word and the ensouled flesh taken from us.

11: Every one nature or also hypostasis, which is composed of parts of different substance, has some operations that neither one of those from which it is constituted can in any way ever perform by itself and without the operation of the other. For example, soul and body need one another in order to construct a ship, to build a house, to weave a dress, and whatever else there is of this kind. One of them cannot do these things in any way whatsoever without the cooperation of the other, as I have said. If, then, one nature or one hypostasis has resulted from the composition of the God Word with the human being taken from us, as they say, there are some operations of such a nature or hypostasis that the God Word could not fulfill.
οὐκ ἠδύνατο πληρῶσαι τινὶ τρόπῳ – τὸ δὲ μὴ
dύνασθαι διχῶς λέγεται παρὰ τῇ θείᾳ Γραφῇ
καὶ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ συνήθεις: ἢ ὡς ἀδύνατον τὸν
θεὸν γεύσασθαι (cf. Hebrews 6:18), διὰ τὸ
ἀπερίγραπτον, ἢ ὡς
δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίαι μὴ
dυνάμενα κατὰ συνείδησιν τελεῖσαι τὸν
λατρεύοντα (Hebr. 9:9), διὰ τὸ ἀσθενὲς καὶ
ἀνέφικτον οἰκεῖον ἐνεργείας, εἰ δύσοσιν –,
ἀς οὖν ἀδύναμος ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος πληρῶσαι
cαθ’ αὐτόν, τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐνεργείᾳ
ἐξετέλεσεν, ἢ ἀσθενῆ δεικνύουσι τὸν Θεὸν
Λόγον, ἢ πεπραχότα τὰ ἀπρεπῆ. Καὶ εἰ μὲν
τὸ πρῶτον, ἐτι καὶ νῦν ὁ Πατὴρ ἄτονεῖ πρὸς
tὴν ἁπατηρίαν τῶν τοιῶνδε ἐνεργειῶν,
μὴ συγκείσεται τῷ ἐκ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργεῖαν,
εἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, πρόδηλον τὸ
βλάσφημον· ὁ θεὸς γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀπρεπῶν
dιαπράττεται, οὔτε καθ’ ἑαυτὸν οὔτε μεθ’
ἑτέρου. Εἰ δὲ οὐδέτερον δοῦναι ὅσιον,
οὐδὲ ἡ σύνθεσις γεγένηται τοῦ Θεοῦ
Λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου.

ιβ’
Πᾶν ὁτιοῦν συγκείμενον ἑτέρῳ ἢ δι’ ἑαυτὸ
συγκείται, ἢ δι’ ἑτέρον. Καὶ συγκείται μὲν
dι’ ἑαυτὸ, οὖν ψυχή τῷ σώματι, δι’ ἑτέρον
dὲ, τὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκίας· δι’ ἑαυτὸ
συγκείται, οἷον ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι, δι’ ἑτέρον δὲ,
τὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκίας· δι’ ἑαυτὸ.

γ’
Πᾶν ὁτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἑτέρῳ ἢ μένει ἐν τῇ
συνθέσει τῇ πρὸς ὦ συνετέθη ἀδιαλύτως, ἢ
οὐ μένει. Καὶ οὐ μένει μὲν, οἷον τὰ μέρη τῶν
ἀλόγων ἀλόγων, μένει δὲ, οἷον τὰ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων, ἡ μχ μένει ἀλόγου

by himself in any way – for ‘cannot’ has two
meanings in divine Scripture and in common
usage, either that God cannot lie because of his
being uncircumscribed, or that gifts and
sacrifices that cannot give the worshipper a
perfect conscience, because of the weakness
and insufficiency of any such operation, if they
will concede it – that the God Word could not
fulfil by himself and would therefore
accomplish through the operation of the human
being. Then they show either that the God
Word is weak, or that he has done something
inappropriate. In the first case the Father would
even now be too weak to perform such
operations, since he is not composed with the
human being taken from us, and in this respect
the Son would be greater than the Father, which
is impious. But in the second case the
blasphemy is obvious. For God never does
anything inappropriate, neither by himself nor
together with something else. But if neither of
the options is pious, it follows that the
composition of the God Word with the human
being taken from us did not happen.

12:
Everything whatsoever that is composed with
something else is composed either for its own
benefit or for the benefit of something else.
And it is composed for its own benefit, as the
soul with the body, or for the benefit of
something else, as the parts of the house, for
they are for the benefit of the human being. The
God Word will not be composed for his own
benefit, for he does not lack anything; nor will
he be composed for the benefit of something
else, for he is not worse than something else,
since everything that is composed with
something else, not for its own benefit but for
the benefit of something else, is lesser than that
for the benefit of which it is composed. But if
the God Word will be composed neither for his
own benefit nor for the benefit of something
else, it follows that he is incomposite and never
comes together with something else for the
purpose of a composition.

13:
Everything whatsoever that is composed with
something else either remains indissolubly in
the composition with that with which it has
been composed, or it does not remain. And it
does not remain, like the parts of the irrational
animals, or it remains, like the <parts> of the
human beings after the resurrection from the
Everything that remains indissolubly or does not remain in the composition with that with which it has been composed, either does not remain by itself but is dissolved according to the limit that the creator has put into the nature, or does not remain through its own power, but through that of a being that is greater and transcendent. But it is not lawful to say that there is some power greater than the God Word. Consequently, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us. But if he has been composed he either does not remain indissolubly in the composition with it; or he remains, in which case he remains through some higher power, which is impious.

15:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else so as to constitute one living nature or also hypostasis loses something of what it had before the composition. But everything that loses something of what it had becomes either greater than itself as regards that thing, which it had and then has lost, or worse. But it is not lawful to say that the God Word has become greater or worse than himself. Consequently, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us.

14:

If the God Word is composed with the ensouled flesh taken from us, as the rational soul is composed with our body, and the ensouled flesh taken from us sleeps, the God Word will be prevented from performing his own operations against his will, just as the soul necessarily stops operating when the body turns to sleep. But if the God Word is not composed with the ensouled flesh taken from us, as the soul is composed with our body, but is composed nevertheless, let them give us an example of the composition according to which they wish the God Word to be composed with the human being taken from us. But if they cannot produce one, let them corroborate what they say through the witness of Scripture, because it is more trustworthy than all natural proof. But if they have neither the one nor the other, it follows that what they say is without witness, and an empty declaration, because it is unproven. For that which is not shown through the law of nature and not corroborated through the witness of Scripture would be a fabrication of the speaker, and this is unconvincing as well as impious.
γενόμενος. Εἰ δὲ συνετέθη, πρόσκοψεν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον, ήπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὅπερ ἀσεβές· τὸν γὰρ χειρόνον ἄδεκτος ή θεία φύσις.

16: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else either leads that with which it is composed, as the soul the body, or is led by it, as the body by the soul, or neither leads nor is led, as the parts of the house. But everything which is led in a composition, or which is not led, is obviously without reason and without intellect, as the body and the parts of the house. If, then, the God Word has been composed with the human being taken from us, he either leads or is led or does neither the one nor the other. And if he leads, the human being taken from us will be without reason and without intellect, which is impious and the offspring of Arius and Apollinaris. But if he is led, the consequent blasphemy be on the head of those who say that the God Word is composed with the human being taken from us. For everything that is composed with something else either leads or is led or does neither the one nor the other, as we have said.

17: That which cannot suffer by nature cannot be composed with something that can suffer. For of those which appear to be in the composite, we will either say that that which cannot suffer partakes <of suffering> or that even that which can suffer does not suffer, but we surmise that it only seems <to suffer>. If, then, a divine nature were in the suffering body, it would follow that it, too, did not remain free from suffering, or that even the flesh did not truly suffer.

18: The composition of the God Word with the human being taken from us, which you posit, has benefited either him alone, or the human being with which he has been composed, or from us, as he has not become greater or worse than himself. But if he has been composed, he has advanced either to what is greater or to what is worse, which is impious. For the divine nature is not receptive of what is worse, but is even greater than everything whatsoever, being the giver of all good things and not needing anything.

Dirk Krausmüller, “The Nestorian Treatise Preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem’s Contra Nestorianos (CPG 6918),” *Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture* 17 (2023) 59-130; DOI: https://doi.org/10.18573/jlarc.141
ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτούς μόνους, ἢ θεόν καὶ ἡμᾶς, τὸν δὲ εἰς ἡμῶν εὐηργέτην ἄνθρωπον, αὐτὸν τε καὶ ἡμᾶς ἃμα, ἢ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον, θεόν δὲ οὐδέ ὅλως. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸν θεόν εὐηργέτητε, ἢ τὸν ὁ συντεθέν ἄνθρωπον μόνον, ὢ τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον κοινῶς, ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐκέτι, πῶς οὐ ψευδὲς τὸ δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν συνετέθηντο; ἢ τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τὸν ἅμα, ἢ αὐτὸν τε καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἢ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον κοινῶς, ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐκέτι, πῶς οὐ ψευδὲς τὸ δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν συνετέθηντο; ἢ τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον κοινῶς, ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐκέτι, πῶς οὐ ψευδὲς τὸ δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν συνετέθηντο; οὕ γὰρ ἀνενδεής οὐδὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς μόνον, ἢ θεόν καὶ ἡμᾶς, τὸν δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον εὐηργέτητε, ἢ τὰ τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπου, μηδὲν εἰς τής ἡμετέρας σωτηρίας εὐεργετήσατο. Οὕ γὰρ τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον εὐηργέτητε, ἢ τὰ τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπου, μηδὲν εἰς τής ἡμετέρας σωτηρίας εὐεργετήσατο. Οὕ γὰρ τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον εὐηργέτητε, ἢ τὰ τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπου, μηδὲν εἰς τής ἡμετέρας σωτηρίας εὐεργετήσατο. Οὕ γὰρ τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον εὐηργέτητε, ἢ τὰ τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπου, μηδὲν εἰς τής ἡμετέρας σωτηρίας εὐεργετήσατο.
The body that is substantially composed with the soul, gains from it life and sense perception. But the body of the Lord that according to you is substantially composed, tell us what it gained. Sense perception or movement? But it had these from the soul. Dispassion and incorruptibility? But you say that it had these from the resurrection, as all human beings will once have them. How, then, is the substance of God not worse than that of the soul, if indeed the latter imparts to it many things whereas the former no greater characteristic? Do you not say that it was fashioned without seed? But this is a sign of the operation of the Holy Spirit, and not an indication of the substantial intertwining of the Word. For before they came together, she was found pregnant from the Holy Spirit. Signs and powers? But the apostles performed greater ones than these, as the Lord himself had promised them. Rank and lordship and the name greater than all names that was given to it? And to whom has this been given through the Word? And with what greater being has the Word been united? But to the flesh, that is, the human being taken from us? Look! First, when you hear of the name of honour that was given to him, you introduce the nature instead. Second, you oppose those who say that the union of the flesh taken from us with the God Word is an incomparable honour and not natural composition. Third, if the honour and lordship of the human being taken from us does not accrue to it from its own substance, it follows that it is necessarily a grace of willing, love and good pleasure and not a gift of substantial union, since none of the things that are substantially united bestows some honour and lordship on that with which it is united. But do they not say that the sinlessness of the Lordly human being is a sign of the substantial union with the Word? And how is it that divine Scripture attributes this to the Spirit when it says: Who through the eternal Spirit offered up himself without blemish to God, and the Spirit of Jesus will purify our conscience from the dead works? And elsewhere: He was justified in the Spirit. Therefore, it was justified through the Spirit in which it was justified and not through the Word in which it is by substance. Otherwise the achievement would
κ’ Ὁ Λόγος ὁ θεῖος ἄτρεπτός ἐστι τὴν ὑπόστασιν ὡς καὶ τὴν φύσιν, ἢ οὐχ; Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐχὶ, οὐδὲ πάντη ἄξον δὲ ἀρθαρτός, φασὶ, ἢ οὐδὲ θέος. Ἐτὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἄτροπον, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐπεξερωθήσονται: δυνάμει γὰρ γὰρ τρεπτοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰς υποστάσεις νοηθῆσαν. Εἰ δὲ γε διὰ τὸ ἐναργές τῆς àσβεσίας πᾶς τις ὁμολογεῖ ἄτρεπτον καὶ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν τὸν Λόγον, πώς εἴπετε σύνθετον ἐξεῖ τὴν ὑπόστασιν;

κβ’ Εἰ οὖν, φασί, καὶ ὑμεῖς φυσικὴν τὴν ἕνωσιν ἐπικαίρετε, τί διαφέρεσθε πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Σεβῆρον μίαν φύσιν λέγοντας Χριστοῦ; Πᾶσα γὰρ φυσικὴ ἕνωσις φύσιν τινὰ μίαν παρὰ τὰς ἑνωθείσας δείκνυσι· φύσις γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος μία ὡς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ πλεῖος, οὔτε ψυχῆς οὔτε σώματος μόνου, οὔτε ἄμφω τοὺς λόγους μόνους ἑξούσια τοὺς φυσικοὺς· τὸ γὰρ θνητὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ μέν, οὔτε δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ οὔτε ἐν σώματι ίδια ἐστὶ.

κγ’ Η καθ’ ὑπόστασιν σύνθεσις, εἴτε τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ὑπέρ φύσιν ἐστὶ τῆς θεότητος, ἢ παρὰ φύσιν, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν, εἰ γε άντως ἐστίν. Αλλ’ εἰ μὲν ὑπέρ φύσιν αὐτὴ ἐστί, μείζων τές δυνάμεως ἐργον εἰς αὐτὴν γέγονε, καὶ εἰς τὸ ὑπέρ αὐτὴν ἡμεζήθη, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῶς παντοδύναμος αὐτή, οὔτε πάντα λόγων ᾧρέχοντα. Εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτὴ ἐστί, χείρων τε αὐτῆς γέγονε, καὶ τρεπτῇ δύναται, καὶ πρὸς ὑπέρ κατανεῖσθη. Εἰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴ ἐστίν, οὔτε χάριτι ἢ σάρκωσις τοῦ Λόγου, οὔτε μόνου τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ

20: Is the divine Word unchangeable in his hypostasis just as in his nature, or is he not? If, then, he is not, he is not completely simple or incorruptible [they say] but not even God. Furthermore, the Father and the Holy Spirit will be subjected to the same things if indeed they do not have another mode of hypostasis. For one will think that they, too, are potentially changeable as regards their hypostases. But if because of the obviousness of the impiety everyone confesses that the Word is unchangeable in his hypostasis, too, how would he have a hypostasis <that had changed> from simple to composite?

21: Every whole that is composed from different parts is seen to be different and is named differently from the things from which it is. If, then, Christ is a composite of God and human being, he is neither truly God nor <truly> human being.

22: If, then [they say] you, too, confess that the union is natural, how do you differ from the Severians who speak of one nature of Christ? For every natural union shows a nature besides the <natures> that have been united. For the human being qua human being is one nature and not many since it does not only have the natural definitions of the soul <alone> and of the body alone or of both alone. For ‘mortal’ is in the human being but is not specifically in the soul or in the body.

23: The composition according to hypostasis, that is, of God with the human being, is either beyond the nature of the divinity or against its nature or according to its nature, if indeed it exists at all. But if <the composition> is beyond its nature, a greater power has acted upon it, and it has increased to what is beyond it, and it is not truly almighty, nor beyond all thought. But if <the composition> is against its nature, it has become worse than itself and been shown to be changeable and been brought down to a lower station. But if <the composition> is according to its nature, the incarnation of the Word is not an act of grace,
and has not only happened to the Son, but also to the Father and the Holy Spirit. What then? Being according to nature, <the composition> had once not come to be but has now been produced, as if the nature had once been incomplete and has now been brought from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. But if all this is absurd in the case of God, and the natures cannot be united without them [he says], the divine nature is either united with another nature in an absurd manner or not united with it.

24: The Word is true God, having a simple substance according to the substance of the Father. If, then, he has the flesh as substance, as the Egyptian opines, he has ceased being true <God> both as regards the nature and as regards the name.

25: The Word is immeasurable in his hypostasis, the flesh is measurable in its hypostasis. Who puts forward the doctrine that God and the flesh have been united in a hypostasis either bends down God to the measurable flesh or stretches out the flesh to make it immeasurable like God. As neither this nor that happens, it is impossible for God to have been united with the flesh.

26: The hypostasis of the Word is uncreated, the hypostasis of the flesh is created. Neither can the flesh have been united with the Word in an uncreated fashion nor can the Word have been united with the flesh in a created fashion. In what hypostasis has the union according to hypostasis then taken place?

27: The difference between that which is uncreated and that which is created naturally prevents the union according to hypostasis. The union according to hypostasis of God and the flesh eliminates the difference between that which is uncreated and that which is created. It follows that whoever anathematises those who do not confess the union according to hypostasis, anathematises those who confess the difference between that which is uncreated and that which is created.
κη' 
Εἰ ἦν εἰξεν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος χωρὶς ἑνώσεως ἴδιαν ὑπόστασιν νῦν οὐκ ἔχει ὁ Λόγος, ἐτράπτη ἄρα ἡ τοῦ Λόγου ὑπόστασις. Τῆς δὲ τοῦ Λόγου ὑπόστασεως τραπείτης, εἶ ἀνάγκης καὶ ὁ τῆς Τριάδος τραπῆσται λόγος.

κθ' 
Κ ... τῶν θείων ὑποστάσεων ἀ ... εἰ δὲ σαρκικὰ ἀ ... ὡστε ὁ Λόγος οὐκέτι ἐξ ... 

κλ' 
Εἰ ἄλλη ἦν ἡ ὑπόστασις τοῦ Λόγου χωρὶς σαρκός, καὶ ἄλλη τοῦ Λόγου ἡ ὑπόστασις μετὰ τῆς ἴδιας σαρκός, καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἄλλης ἦν ποτὲ, καὶ ἄλλος μετὰ τὰ ταῦτα· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῇ ἐναλλαγῇ τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἡ ἐναλλαγή τοῦ ἔχοντος τὴν ὑπόστασιν.

κλβ' 
Εἰ κατὰ τὴν ἄσαρκον ὑπόστασιν ὁμοούσιος ὁ Λόγος τῷ Πατρί, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἐνσάρκως ὑπόστασιν ἑτεροούσιος ὁ Λόγος τῷ Πατρί.

κλδ' 
Εἰ κατὰ τὴν ἄσαρκον ὑπόστασιν ὁμοούσιος ὁ Λόγος τῷ Πατρί, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἐνσάρκως ὑπόστασιν ἑτεροούσιος ὁ Λόγος τῷ Πατρί.
If the Word does not have the hypostasis, which he had, he is consequently also not the same as he was.

The human being can have the rank and the authority and the power of the God Word, and the hypostasis cannot have the position of the entire God Word, for the human being is created whereas the God Word is uncreated.

God and soul and body are in a natural union neither God nor human being.

The Egyptian puts forward the doctrine about nature, which is impossible, and anathematizes the dispensation, which is possible.

If the helplessness of nature does not let the human being have the hypostasis of the God Word in an uncreated manner, and the Egyptian does not let the human being have the rank of the God Word in the manner of the dispensation, it follows that between nature and the Egyptian human being has nothing of the God Word, neither the hypostasis nor the rank.

If the Son is one son through the merging of the substances of divinity and flesh it is obvious that before the merging of the substances the Word was not one, neither God nor Son.

The God Word can be united with the created nature through will but cannot <be united> through nature. For he did not create his own nature nor can he transpose it into another nature.

If when God wishes his nature receives an addition, it can also receive a diminution when he wishes. But if the second is impossible, it follows that the first is also impossible.
If Christ is at the same time God and human being, it is evident that Christ rules and is ruled at the same time. But if the difference between ruling and being ruled does not exist in Christ, it follows that the difference between God and the human being is eliminated.

If Christ is at the same time God and human being, it follows that the human being has the same honour as God. But if the human being does not have the same honour as God, the Egyptian justly maligns the co-veneration. But if it has the same honour, it is by necessity co-venerated, and the Egyptian is impious when he anathematises co-veneration.

If you accept at all, Egyptian, the divine inhabitation of God in a human being, desist from putting forward the doctrine that God and the flesh are united in a hypostasis. For inhabitation and natural union in a hypostasis eliminate one another.

If the flesh by nature does not belong to another one besides the God Word by nature, but to the God Word, it is obvious that the flesh belongs to another word besides the one who is Word by natural divinity.

If the flesh had the Word who is almighty by nature and sinless as a companion of its own existence, how would it be called sinless? Or what victory of it over evil would there be if it took such a helper who cannot be vanquished? For it would be the achievement of him and not of it.

Everything that is infinite by nature cannot be united with what is finite by nature. For if the hypostasis from the two is infinite, what is finite, that is, the flesh, cannot pervade it completely. And if it is finite, it would not be able to contain in itself what is infinite by nature, that is, the Word.
μὴ'
Ἡ σύνθεσις, φησίν, ἢν φατέ, ἢ φύσιν καινοτέραν ἐποίησε, καὶ τί μὴ καταδέχεσθε τοὺς μιξοφυσίτας; Ἡ ύπόστασιν νεωτέραν, καὶ διὰ τί ἡμᾶς ἀποσείεσθε; Ἡ οὐδὲ φύσιν οὐδὲ ύπόστασιν, καὶ μάτην γεγένηται;

ν’
Ἡ φυσική ἐστιν ἡ ἕνωσις αὕτη, τοῦ Λόγου καὶ τῆς σαρκός, καὶ τίνι διαφέρεσθε πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αὐτούς; Ό τι οὐδέ φυσικὴ οὐδὲ ύποστατική, καὶ τίς αὕτη εἶναι δοκεῖ ὑμῖν διασαφήνει;

α’
Ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς λέγειν τὸν Χριστὸν αὐτῶν τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ μόνας καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ μόνας, τοῦτος τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν ἀνὰ μέρος καθ’ ἑαυτὰ ἐπινοούμενος, ἢ κρείττονα εἶναι κατὰ τί ἢ ήττονα. Τὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων μέρη καθ’ ἑαυτὰ, ἢ κρείττων, ἢ ἥττων, εὑρίσκεται τοῦ εἷς αὐτῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων, οἷον λίθοι καὶ ξύλα μέρη οἴκου ἢ τῆς ἐκκλησίας μέρη ἢ ναοῦ τοῦ ὑπὸ Σολομῶντος κτισθέντος, καὶ πρόδηλον ὅτι ἑκάτερον καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ἡττον τοῦ ὅλου οἴκου, πάλιν ὑάκινθος, πορφύρα, κόκκινον κεκλωσμένον, βύσσος, πτωσμένη μέρη τοῦ καταπετάσματος τῆς σκηνῆς (cf. Ex. 26:31), καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον κατὰ μόνας ἔλαττον προδήλως τοῦ καταπετάσματος. Οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Κατὰ μὲν τοὺς Χριστιανοὺς κρείττων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, αὐτὸ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ ἄνθρωπον κατὰ μόνας, καθ’ ἑαυτὸ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον λέγω μηδὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ τῷ Χριστῷ κατὰ μόνας καθ’ ἑαυτὸ.
ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τρέπεσθαι, ἢ τὸ παντελεῖον ἐκεῖνο καὶ τὸ παμμακάριον, τὸ προσδοκώμενον ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει ἐνεῖναι τῇ φύσει ἢ, ἢ τὸ πάντῃ ἡσυχάζειν τὸ λογικόν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν αὐτοπροαιρέτως βουληθεὶς κινούμενον μηδὲν ἓχον ὅλως σισθήσαν ἐστιν. Αλλὰ τὸ πρότερον οὐδὲ εἰσκεκόμισται, τοῦ θεοῦ κρεῖττόν τι προβλεψαμένου περὶ ἡμῶν, ἵνα μὴ χωρὶς ἡμῶν οἱ πρότεροι τελειωθῶσι (Heb. 11:40). Τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα ἔστι. Καθ' ἡμᾶς οὖν τοὺς Χριστιανοὺς οὐ κρεῖττον ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν καθ' ἑαυτὰ θεωρουμένων δείκνυται. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ τοὺς Μανιχαίους τοῦ μὲν σώματος κρεῖττων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἥττων τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴν καὶ προϋπάρχειν οἴδασι τοῦ σώματος, ἀνενδεῆ τὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεων καὶ πρὸ τῆς εἰς τὸ σῶμα καταπτώσεως, ὥς φασί, μηδὲν ἀγνοοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τούτου ἔξοδον ὡσαύτως. Ὅθεν καὶ ἥττονα οἴδασιν αὐτῆς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆς χείρονα λέγουσι γενέσθαι διὰ τῆς ἐν τῷ σώματι φυλακῆς, ὥς φασί. Τοῦ δὲ σώματος νεκροῦ θεωρουμένου μετά τὴν διάζευξιν τῆς ψυχῆς πρόδηλον ὅτι κρεῖττων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα κρεῖττον ἑαυτοῦ θεωρεῖται πρὸ τοῦ χωρισμοῦ τοῦ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς πρὸς τὸ μετὰ τὸ χωρισθῆναι τῆς ψυχῆς. Συνέστηκεν οὖν ὡς ὅτι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν καθ' ἑαυτὰ θεωρουμένων, ἢ κρεῖττον ἐστι κατὰ τι ἢ ἥττον. Ὅθεν ἀνάγκη λέγειν καὶ τούτοις τὸν Χριστὸν ἢ ἥττονα εἶναι ἢ κρείττονα κατὰ τι τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἐπινοοῦμεν, εἰ ὅλως ζῶον ἐστί κατ' αὐτοὺς ὁ Χριστὸς ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀποτελεσθέν. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν κρείττονα εἴποιεν, δεδώκασι τὸ ἀσεβές, τελειότερόν τι τοῦ θεοῦ φανταζόμενοι εἶναι, ὅπερ καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοὺς ὑπέρτατον. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐκ Θεοῦ Λόγου καθ' ἑαυτὸν νοουμένον, τοῦτο κρεῖττον δηλονότι κατὰ τι τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος μὴ συγκειμένων τῇ σαρκὶ, ἐπείπερ ἴσος ὁ Υἱὸς τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι. Καὶ ὁ τούτων κρείττων κατὰ τι, σαφὲς ὅτι καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου, εἰ δὲ ἦττον εἶποιεν τοτι τὸ ζῶον τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καθ' ἑαυτῶν θεωρουμένου, καὶ οὕτως ἰσαβεβοῦσι· τῶν Θεόν γὰρ Λόγον that the faculty of reasoning is completely at rest since there is nothing that is moved through self-willed counsel that has no sense perception of anything at all. But the former has not yet been introduced, since God has envisaged something greater for us lest our forebears be perfected without us. Consequently, the second is the case. Accordingly, it is necessary for them to say that that Christ of theirs is in some respect either greater or lesser. Therefore it is necessary for them to say that Christ of theirs is in some respect either lesser or greater than his own parts when considered by themselves. But according to the pagans and Manichaens the human being is greater than the body but lesser than the soul, for the following reason. For they know that the soul pre-exists the body and is not in need of the senses of the body and, as they say, knows everything before the fall into the body, but also after the departure from it likewise. Therefore they know that the human being is lesser than <the soul>, since as they say <the soul> also becomes worse than itself through the imprisonment in the sin, as they say. Since the body itself is seen to be dead after the separation of the soul it is obvious that the human being is greater, since the body itself, too, is seen to be greater than itself before the separation from the soul when compared with its state after the separation from the soul. Consequently, it has been established that the result of its own parts when seen by themselves is in some respect either greater or lesser. Therefore it is necessary for them to say that that Christ of theirs is in some respect either lesser or greater than his own parts when considered by themselves, if at all Christ is according to them one living being that has resulted from God and the human being. But if they say that he is greater, they have admitted an impiety, since they imagine that there is something more perfect than God, which one must say is also higher than the Father and the Spirit. For if according to them the living being resulting from the God Word and the flesh is in some respects greater than the God Word when seen by himself, this same one is evidently greater than the Father and the Spirit who are not composed with the flesh, if indeed the Son is like the Father and the Spirit. And he who is greater than him is evidently also <greater> than the Father and the Holy Spirit. But if they say that this living being is lesser than the God Word when seen by himself, they are again impious. For they show that the God Word has become lesser than himself according to the myth about the soul of
δὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ κατὰ μόνας, εἰ μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἥττων ἑαυτοῦ γέγονεν.

[Book II]

Refutation of the second impiety of them who say that the hypostasis, which results from the dispensation through the incarnation of the Word, is two and not one.

1: ‘Hypostasis’ [they say] means sometimes something that has substance, as in: Remember what is my hypostasis, and: Imprint of his hypostasis, sometimes something that does not have substance, as in: In this hypostasis of my boasting, and sometimes the gathering of some people who are of like mind, as in: Men went out from the hypostasis of the gentiles. If, then, opting for the last meaning, they use ‘hypostasis’ instead of unity of will and likeness of mind of the natures, they obviously permit us to speak of two hypostases of the two natures in the first sense. But if they opt for the second meaning, wishing to show that the result from both natures is something without substance, they do not even deserve a reply. But if <they opt for> the first meaning, let them say: With which <hypostasis> is <the hypostasis of the Son> of like substance? With <the hypostasis> of David about which he said: ‘Remember what is my hypostasis’, or with that of the Father about which is said: ‘Imprint of his hypostasis’? But if <the hypostasis of the Son is of like substance> with <the hypostasis> of the Father, how is it constituted from two natures, when that of the Father is simple, for the hypostases that are called substances must have the same definition of substance and share the same concept. So let them say what is that which is of like substance. If <the hypostasis of the Son> is not <of like substance> partly with <the hypostasis> of the Father but with that of David, do those who say that it is from two natures not wish that it is constituted from soul and body, for such is <the hypostasis> of David? And if it is neither this nor that, the Son whom you introduce differs in substance from all, and is neither of like substance with us nor of like substance with the holy Trinity. But if you say that he is of like substance partly with
δόναται εἶναι υἱὸς, ἐπεὶ δείξατε τι ἐκ μέρους ὑπάρχον ὡμοούσιον διαφόροις, καὶ γινόμενον τοῦτού κάκεινον υἱόν.

2: The God Word is either a part of this hypostasis of Christ, or the whole. If, then, he is a part, and <the hypostasis> is the Son, the God Word is a part of the Son. Therefore, the Trinity is two and a half before the inhumanation. But if he is the whole, it follows that the God Word did not exist before the inhumanation, since <otherwise> the whole would come to be before the parts. For a part of the whole is the flesh that has recently come to be.

3: If the God Word is the whole of this hypostasis [he says], tell us by what it is completed. For the God Word will not be part of the God Word, since nothing is said to be a part of itself.

4: If the hypostasis of Christ is of like substance partly with the Father and <partly> with the mother, are these parts of it substantial or without substance? But if they are without substance, how can they be of like substance with those that are substantial? But if they are substantial, how can they not be parts of substance? For each substantial part is strictly speaking a part of substance and not of hypostasis, since the hypostasis qua hypostasis is not characterised through substantial <properties> but in the case of human beings through whiteness, snubnosedness and other things of that kind, and in the case of the divine substance through the mode of existence, according to which one <exists> as begetter, one <exists> as begotten and one <exists> as proceeding. How, then, do you speak of two complete substances, when you do not call them parts of substance, and say that the hypostasis is <constituted> from parts?
If your hypostasis is partly of like substance with the Father and partly of like substance with David, name these parts through which it is of like substance with the Father and with David? Are they God and the human being, or something else? But if they are something else, state what they are. But if they are God and the human being, the human being will not have its own hypostasis besides David with whom it is of like substance, just as the God Word, too, has his own hypostasis besides the Father with whom he is of like substance. For what is without hypostasis could never be said to be of like substance with that which is hypostatic. If, then, there is one hypostasis of the God Word and it is complete and of like substance with the Father, the human being taken from us is either without hypostasis and is spoken of as a mere utterance, or it is hypostatic and has itself a complete hypostasis qua human being. But if it is without hypostasis, it is superfluous to say that it is of like substance with David, for generally it is said that a hypostasis is of like substance with another hypostasis. And gone will the sophism of you who do not wish to speak of two hypostases but speak of two natures of the God Word and of the human being taken from us.

We ask again: Distinguish for us what you say, tell us what you mean by each nature of your so-called God and human being! Is it the individual human being and the God Word, or the universal human being and the holy Trinity, or the universal human being and the God Word, or an individual human being and the holy Trinity? But it is clear that you do not want it to mean the Trinity with the so-called universal human being or indeed with an individual one, because you call the one who has been crucified and has suffered one of the Trinity. It, then, remains for you to say that by the one nature you mean the God Word and either the so-called universal human being or an individual human being and not every human being. Tell us, then, in what does the individual human being differ from every human being? It is obvious that only in the hypostasis and the person. Why, then, do you not say that there are two persons?

Dirk Krausmüller, “The Nestorian Treatise Preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem’s Contra Nestorianos (CPG 6918),” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 17 (2023) 59-130; DOI: https://doi.org/10.18573/jlarc.141
φατέ πρόσωπα και ὑποστάσεις, δύο φύσεις λέγοντες ἐπὶ σημασία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καὶ ἕνος τινος ἀνθρώπου; Εἰ δὲ τὸν καθόλου ἀνθρώπουν ἐθέλοιτε λέγειν, ἢ ἐννοία λαμβάνεται τοῦτον τὸ λόγῳ αὐτον ἀποματτόμενοι τῆς οὐσίας ἐκ τῶν καθέκαστα, καὶ νοθείη κατέγοντες αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποστάσεις, ἡμαρτωλοῖς καὶ προτελευτήσασι καὶ Ἀβραὰμ ἑνὸς τινος ἀνθρώπου; Εἰ δὲ τὸν καθόλου γενέσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, υἱοῦ Δαυΐδ, υἱοῦ τὸν κυριακὸν ἄνθρωπον; εἰθανθρωπηκὼς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος καὶ ἀσεβέσι Ἰούδα ἀνατέταλκεν ὁ Κύριος ψιλῇ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρξει οὐσιώδει ἄνθρωπον ἐθέλοιτε λέγειν, ἢ ἐννοίᾳ ἱδέας, καὶ οὕτως οὐχ ἕξει χώραν ἡ σῶμα τὸ ἐκ Μαρίας ἐκείνου μέρος εἶναι φανήσεσθε προδηλότατα τῇ γραφῇ ἐσομένοις ἀνθρώποις; Ὅπερ ἀσεβὲς καὶ τῆς Κυρίου; Εἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται Ἰησοῦς ὁ λεγόμενος Χριστός Καί...
ἀνθρώποις (Lk. 2:52). Καί· Τὸ παιδίον ἦξαν καὶ ἐκράταιον πληροφόρουν σοφίας, καὶ χάρις θεοῦ ἦν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶ (Lk. 2:40). Καί· Προφήτην ἤμιν ἀναστήσει Κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἴμων ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἴμων ὡς ἴμε (Acts 7:37). Καί· Σὺ ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισιδέκ (Heb. 7:17). Ἀρα οὖν πάντα ταῦτα καὶ ὡς ταῦτα ἄπειρα ὄντα, παρὰ τῇ ἁγίᾳ γραφῇ δύνασθε λέγειν περὶ ἑκάστου ἀνθρώπου τῶν καθέκαστα λελέχθαι; Καί· πῶς δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς σπέρματος ἴμε Ἀβραάμ, καὶ τούτου οὐ σπέρματος, ἀλλὰ φυλῆς Ἰούδα, καὶ τούτου οὐ τῆς Παρθένου; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, εἴπατε τί τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχει. Εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ πῶς τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον αὕτη γεγέννηκε, πολλὰς μὲν ἄνθρωπων γενεὰς ἔχουσα πρὸ αὐτῆς, πολλὰς δὲ κατὰ τὴν τάξιν ἄπειρα ὄντα, παρὰ τῇ ἁγίᾳ γραφῇ δύνασθε λέγειν περὶ ἑκάστου ἀνθρώπου τῶν καθέκαστα λελέχθαι; Καί· πῶς δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς σπέρματος ἴμε Ἀβραάμ, καὶ τούτου οὐ σπέρματος, ἀλλὰ φυλῆς Ἰούδα, καὶ τούτου οὐ τῆς Παρθένου; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, εἴπατε τί τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχει. Εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ πῶς τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον αὕτη γεγέννηκε, πολλὰς μὲν ἄνθρωπων γενεὰς ἔχουσα πρὸ αὐτῆς, πολλὰς δὲ κατὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀπήπτο. Καὶ πῶς δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς σπέρματος ἴμε, καὶ χάρις θεοῦ ἦν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἄλλο εἰς οἶκον Δαυΐδ, καὶ τούτου οὐ παντός, ἀλλὰ Μαρίας τῆς Παρθένου; Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ προφῆται ὡς Μωϋσέα, οὐδὲ ἱερεῖς ὡς Μελχισεδέκ, ἐπεὶ ὥρα ὑμᾶς καὶ τὴν ἱερωσύνην τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων καὶ τὰς μαντείας τὰς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, προφητείας οὐκ ἕτοιΜασιαϊκὰς καὶ ἱερωσύνας Χριστιανικὰς, ἄπερ ἄμφι.
ζ′
Εἰ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ ὑπέστη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔχει ὑπόστασιν ἰδιαν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, πῶς εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔρρωται, ἔχει φύσιν ὑπόστασιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος; Καὶ εἰ ἔχει φύσιν ἰδιαν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, πῶς οὐχ ἔχει καὶ ὑπόστασιν; Ἡ ἑστίον φυσιν ξέρον ποιεῖ τὸν Θεοῦ Λόγον, ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἢτορον ἐν αὐτῷ, πῶς δὲ καὶ φύσις τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον πρὸ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῆς ἱδιας;

η′
Εἰ ἔχει ἵματιν ὑπόστασιν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, πῶς οὐκ ἔστω φύσιν ἰδιαν καὶ ὑπόστασιν τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου; Καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐρρωσται καὶ ἐστιν ἡ ὑπόστασις τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον ἐν τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ, πῶς οὐχ ἐπολυκεται ὑπόστασιν ἢ οὐδὲ ὑπὸ ἐκτῆς τῆς ἱδιας ἤπειρη ὑπόστη.

θ′
Εἰ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ λέγεσθαι φύσειν ὑφεστάναι τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον, πῶς αὐτότι ἐφεστάναι, οὐχ ὑπόστασιν ἵματιν ἐχειν τὸν ὑποστάντα;

ι′
Εἰ ἐφέστη μὲν ἐπὶ ηθῶν ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ὑπόστασιν, πῶς οὐκ έναντίον δογματιζεις, ἱσοποστατον τὴν ὑφεστήκοτα λέγων;

ια′
Εἰ ἴῃ Πέτρου ψυχὴ ἐτέρα ἐστιν παρὰ τὴν Παύλου, τὸ δὲ ἐτέρου ή φύσει καὶ ὑποστάσει ἐτερον, ὡς ὁ οὐρανὸς τῆς γῆς, ή ὑποστάσει πάντως, ὡς ὁ Πατὴρ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, πῶς οὐκ ἐτέρον ψυχη τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει, διαφέρει η ψυχὴ Πέτρου τῆς Παύλου; Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ, πῶς οὐκ ἔχει ὑποστασιν ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ καθ᾽ ἴνα διαφέρει τῆς ἐτέρου, ἤ τῶν τῆς αὐτῆς ψυχῆς ή οὖ τῆς αὐτῆς;

7: If the human being does not have its own hypostasis because the human being gained hypostasis in the God Word, how <can it be that> the human being has its own nature if it gained nature in <the God Word>? And if the human being has its own nature, how will it not also have its hypostasis? If we put the case that it gained nature outside the God Word, but gained hypostasis in him, how does the nature of the human being taken from us exist before its own hypostasis?

8: If the human being gained hypostasis in God at all, how is the hypostasis of the human being taken from us not alive and well in the hypostasis of the God Word? And if the hypostasis of the human being taken from us is not alive and well in the God Word, how <is it> not <the case> that it has disappeared after it had gained hypostasis or that it has not at all gained hypostasis in the first place?

9: If you say that the human being taken from us gained hypostasis in the God Word, how do you not indicate that that which has gained hypostasis has a hypostasis through the very fact of its gaining hypostasis?

10: If the human being taken from us gained hypostasis but does not have a hypostasis, how do you not put forward contradictory doctrines, calling without hypostasis the one that has gained hypostasis?

11: If the soul of Peter is different from that of Paul, and what is different is different in nature and in hypostasis, as the heaven <differs> from the earth, or at least in hypostasis, as the Father <differs> from the Son, how does the soul of Peter not differ from that of Paul in nature and hypostasis or at least in hypostasis? But if this is so, why does the soul of each <human being> not have a hypostasis through which it differs from <the soul> of another <human being>, either of those that have the same substance, or <of those> who do not have the same substance?
If the body of Peter differs in nothing from the body of Paul as regards nature, how would it not differ as regards hypostasis? And if it does not differ as regards hypostasis, and that which differs neither in nature nor in hypostasis is in all respects identical, how would Peter and Paul not have in all respects one and the same body, which is impossible?

Since they babble and seem to say something to those who stand by, when they are asked to show a nature without hypostasis, they turn their backs to those who ask and say that truly there is no nature that is without hypostasis, for we, too, call the substances hypostatic, they say, but <it is not the case that> if something is hypostatic it is also a hypostasis, just as perhaps if something is substantial it is not also a substance. Look, we say that the hypostases of the holy Trinity are three and that they are substantial, and we do not say that there are three substances besides the three hypostases, although we know that each of the hypostases is substantial. If, then, one can say, we say, that there are three substantial hypostases in one substance, one can evidently also say that there are two hypostatic natures in one hypostasis. And thus we do not say that there are three hypostases, nor do we put forward as doctrine that the two natures are two hypostases, just as we say that the hypostases of the holy Trinity are not without substance, and do not divide the three hypostases into three substances. But indeed, they say, we also say that the body is coloured, but we know that the body is not identical with the colour. For just as something that is coloured is not immediately also colour, thus something that is hypostatic is not immediately also hypostasis. They say that what <we> say is superfluous, and it is not necessary that those who speak of two natures call both of them or one of them without hypostasis, or indeed also two hypostases, since hypostatic is not hypostasis as we have shown. This, then, they say, hoodwinking the bystanders, being supercilious, and therefore calling themselves after the Cherubim. See for yourself how they undermine their own position through what they say, either because they are ignorant through their own ignorance, or in order to mock the listeners who are inexperienced in such matters, and mislead them through the...
καὶ λέγουσιν ἐνυποστάτους τὰς φύσεις, ὡσπερ ὁν ἡ σώματα ἐγχρωμάτιστα, ἀνάγκη ἐνθὰ ἐστὶ ἐνυποστάτους φύσεις, καὶ ὑπόστασιν εἶναι, ὡσπερ ὁν καὶ χρώμα ἐνθὰ σώμα ἐγχρωμάτιστον· ὡστε γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοήσαι φύσιν ἐνυποστάτουν ἄνευ ὑποστάσεως. Εἰ ὁν τῇ φύσει ἀναγκαῖος διενήνωξε τι καὶ τῇ ὑπόστασιν, ἐπιδεικτῶσαν μοι τί διαφέρον μὲν τῇ φύσει, μὴ διαφέρον δὲ τῇ ὑπόστασιν, καὶ μὴ βουκολεύσαν τοὺς ἄπλουστέρους, ὥστιν ἐνυπόστατος φύσις, καὶ ὑπόστασιν εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ χρῶμα ἐνθὰ σῶμα ἐγχρωμάτιστον· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοῆσαι φύσιν ἐνυπόστατον ἄνευ ὑποστάσεως. Εἰ ὁν τῇ ὑπόστασιν ἀναγκαῖος διενήνωξε τι καὶ τῇ ὑπόστασιν, ἐπιδεικτῶσαν μοι τί διαφέρον μὲν τῇ ὑπόστασιν, μὴ διαφέρον δὲ τῇ φύσει, καὶ μὴ βουκολεύσαν τοὺς ἄπλουστέρους, ὥστε καὶ χρῶμα ἐνθὰ σῶμα ἐγχρωμάτιστον· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοῆσαι ὑπόστασιν ἄνευ φύσεως. Εἰ ὁν δὴ καὶ τῇ ὑπόστασιν ἀναγκαῖος διενήνωξε τι καὶ τῇ φύσει, ἐπιδεικτῶσαν μοι τί διαφέρον μὲν τῇ φύσει, μὴ διαφέρον δὲ τῇ ὑπόστασιν, καὶ μὴ βουκολεύσαν τοὺς ἄπλουστέρους, ὥστε καὶ χρῶμα ἐνθὰ σῶμα ἐγχρωμάτιστον· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοῆσαι φύσιν ἐνυπόστατον ἄνευ ὑποστάσεως. Εἰ ὁν δὴ καὶ τῇ φύσει ἀναγκαῖος διενήνωξε τι καὶ τῇ ὑπόστασιν, ἐπιδεικτῶσαν μοι τί διαφέρον μὲν τῇ φύσει, μὴ διαφέρον δὲ τῇ ὑπόστασιν, καὶ μὴ βουκολεύσαν τοὺς ἄπλουστέρους, ὥστε καὶ χρῶμα ἐνθὰ σῶμα ἐγχρωμάτιστον· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοῆσαι ὑπόστασιν ἄνευ φύσεως.

Ἀλλὰ, φασίν, ἰδοὺ ὁ ἄνθρωπος δύο μὲν φύσεις ἐστί, μία δὲ ὑπόστασις, καὶ φανερὸν ἐκ τούτου, ὅτι δυνατὸν ἐν μιᾷ ὑποστάσει δύο φύσεις εἶναι. Πάλιν γὰρ τὸν Χριστὸν λέγουσι τρεῖς φύσεις καὶ δύο ὑποστάσεις, καὶ δύο φύσεις καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν μὴ κατορθώσαντες λέγειν, τρεῖς ἤδη δογματίζουσι φύσεις ἐν μιᾷ ὑποστάσει. Καὶ ἀκούε ταῦτα πῶς. Εἰ δύο φύσεων ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως, εἴληπται δὲ οὗτος καὶ ἥνωται τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ, πῶς οὐ τρεῖς φύσεις, δύο ληφθεῖσαι, μία δὲ λαβοῦσα; Καὶ πῶς οὐ δύο ὑποστάσεις, ἥ τε λαβοῦσα καὶ ἡ ληφθεῖσα; Εἰ δὲ δύο φύσεων ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως, πῶς οὐ μία φύσις, ὃν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἀνυπόστατος ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὃν ἰδ'
δύο φύσεις ἐξελέγον πρώην; Καὶ τὶς ὑποίσει τοσαύτην ἐναντιότητα δογματιζεῖν;

15: If the body of Peter differs from the body of Paul as regards hypostasis, how will it not be <the case> that the body of the human being, too, has a hypostasis? If the soul of Peter has a hypostasis and a nature insofar as it is Peter’s, and the body of Peter has a hypostasis and a nature insofar as it is Peter’s, and Peter is two natures because of the soul and the body, how will Peter not also be two hypostases because of the soul and the body? But if the soul and the body of Peter are two natures, and the soul and the body of Peter are two hypostases, how is it not a lie that the human being is two natures and one hypostasis?

16: Since it is agreed that there are three divine persons (here in the sense of ‘faces’), which one [he says] do you say is the one that has been beaten? If it is that of the Word who is of like substance with the Father, it follows that the Father and the Spirit can also be seen and touched and beaten and be subjected to time and in short <they can> suffer, and they differ in nothing from our nature. For such is the face that has been beaten. But if that which has been beaten is a different person, that is, that of Christ, besides the three <persons> of the holy Trinity, how will you not concede that there are two persons, of the Word who is one of the Trinity, and of Christ?

17: The God Word [he says] fills everything, and is near all things invisibly in his hypostasis, and the visible Christ is circumscribed as regards his hypostasis in the womb and in the manger and in the house before his holy resurrection, and is circumscribed by places even after it, according to the verses: He went to heaven, and: The heaven must receive him, and: He will come thus, in the way you have seen him go to heaven. If this is so, how is not one a visible and circumscribed hypostasis whereas the other is an invisible and not circumscribed one?


19: Every nature [they say] is known through its hypostases, for no-one knows horseness if he does not know individually this or that horse, and the same applies to goatness, or another common or specific species. If, then, you know two natures of Christ, it is evident that you have known their hypostases before.

20: All that makes up our nature is also seen in Christ, for he became like us in all respects apart from sin. In our natural birth the formation <of the body> precedes the union with the soul. Since the Lordly body gained hypostasis before the soul, it is necessary <that one of two things happened>. Either it had a hypostasis of its own, and then the soul was breathed into it, and in third place it was united with the Word in hypostasis, so that two hypostases were connected with one another. <In this case> one must ask how this will be, and in what way it can only happen, for it can happen in no other way than through good pleasure alone. Or the Word united itself with the body beforehand and later breathed the living soul into himself and the flesh. <In this case> the Word would not have been united with the flesh through the mediation of the soul but would rather have been united with the soul through the mediation of the flesh, which is unlawful, for something is connected with that which is further away from it through that which is closer and nearer.

21: When the God Word is distinguished through his properties from the Father and the Spirit who are of like substance with him, he is immediately thought of as a hypostasis. If this is so, it follows that the flesh, too, is immediately thought of as a hypostasis of him. Since, then, the properties of the Word and the flesh are not the same, it follows that neither are their hypostases. How, then, can you conceive of one hypostasis, which <consists> of two natures that are doubly distinguished from those of like nature?

22: If since the human nature of Christ [he says] is lacking in nothing when compared with the
nature of the individual human beings, you count it separately from the nature of the divinity, why do you not count the human hypostasis separately from the hypostasis of the Word when it is lacking in nothing when compared with the hypostases of individual human beings, and do not say that there are also two hypostases of the Word?

23: The temporal nature [they say] will not have an eternal hypostasis, just as the opposite is also true. It is, then, necessary that either the human nature of Christ is without hypostasis, or it is necessary that the hypostasis is temporal. Consequently, there would be two hypostases in Christ, the eternal one of the Word, and the temporal one of the flesh.

24: Either there is nothing composite in Christ [they say] or both nature and hypostasis are composite, or the nature is simple, but the hypostasis is composite, or vice versa the nature is composite but the hypostasis is simple. If, then, everything in him is simple, you speak fraudulently about composition in his case, but if both nature and hypostasis are composite, why do you reject the Severians? If you are of the opinion that the natures are simple but the hypostasis is composite, since it is agreed that the hypostasis of the Word is simple, and you say that that of Christ is composite, it follows that there are clearly two hypostases, that of the Word and that of Christ.

25: He who does not divide the hypostases of Christ, cannot say that in Christ some things belong to the divinity and some things belong to the flesh, but must say that all that belongs to the divinity will also belong to the flesh and all that belongs to the flesh must also belong to the divinity.

26: If the hypostases are not separated by nature, and united as regards hypostasis, when I hear Scripture say that Christ is one human being, what should I think: one substance and one hypostasis, or half of one substance and of one hypostasis?
κζ'
Εἰ οὐκ εἰσὶ διῃρημέναι θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ φύσιν αἱ υποστάσεις, δήλον ὅτι οὔτε χωρὶς υποστάσεις θεός ὁ θεός, οὔτε χωρὶς θεοῦ ἀνθρώπος ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

κη'
Ὡν ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει οὐ μένουσιν αἱ υποστάσεις φυσικῶς διηρημέναι, τούτοισι η ἑνώσεις φύσεώς ἐστιν ἀλλοίωσις.

κθ'
Ἔπι τῶν ἑκουσίων ἡμών οὐδαμῶς ἐναντιοῦται τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς ἑνώσεως ἡ διαίρεσις τῶν υποστάσεων.

κθς'
Ὁ μὴ διαιρῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τὰς υποστάσεις, ἐκ τῆς Τριάδος διαιρεῖ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὴν μοναδία· Τριάδα γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν τριῶν ἁπλῶν υποστάσεων, οὐ δύο ἡμισε ὑποστάσεων.

και'
Εἰ τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν υποστάσεων οὐκ ἐφύλαττεν ἡ φυσικὴ ἑνώσις, οὐδὲ ἄρα τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον ἐφύλαττεν ὅπερ ἦν, οὐδὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅπερ γέγονε.

κης'
Ἐπὶ τῶν ἑκουσίων ἡμῶν οὐδαμῶς ἐναντιοῦται τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς ἑνώσεως ἡ διαίρεσις τῶν υποστάσεων.

κθς'
Εἰ μένει ἡ γνώσις τῆς θείας υποστάσεως τῇ θεότητι, καὶ μένει ἡ ἄγνοια τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῇ σαρκί, πῶς τὰ τῶν υποστάσεων μένει διηρημένα, καὶ αἱ υποστάσεις οὐ μένουσι διηρημέναι.

κθς'
Ἐν πρόσωπον ἀπρόσιτον θεοῦ ἐκ φύσεως· Οὐδεδείς γὰρ, φησί, ὅγεται τὸ πρόσωπον μοῦ καὶ ζήσαται (Ex. 33:20), καὶ ἐν πρόσωπων ἐμπιστεύμουν ἀνθρώπου. Καὶ ἐνυπτιεύατο γὰρ, φησί, εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ (Mt. 26:67). Εἰ ἐν πρόσωπων Χριστοῦ ἐστιν ἐξ ἑνώσεως, ἢρα ἐχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἀπρόσιτον πρόσωπον καὶ τὸ ἐμπιστεύμουν πρόσωπον.

κδ'
Τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου οὐκ ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς ἑνώσεως ἐν, ἀλλὰ ἐκ φύσεως, τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκ τῆς ἑνώσεως

27: If the hypostases of God and the human being are not separated by nature, it is obvious that God is not God without the human being, and the human being is not human being without God.

28: If the hypostases do not remain naturally separated in their union, their union is a change of nature.

29: In the case of those that are voluntarily united the separation of the hypostases in no way contradicts the mode of union.

30: He who does not separate the hypostases of Christ as regards nature, separates the monad of the Son from the triad, for we confess a triad of three simple hypostases, not of two and a half hypostases.

31: If the natural union does not preserve the separation of the hypostases, it follows that it also does not preserve the God Word, what he had been, nor the human being, what he became.

32: If the knowledge of the divine hypostasis remains with the divinity and the ignorance of the human being remains with the flesh, how can <it be the case that the characteristics> of the hypostases remain separated and the hypostases do not remain separated?

33: There is one inaccessible person (here in the sense of ‘face’) of God from nature, for he says: No-one will see my face and live, and there is one person of the human being that is spat on, for he says: And they spat on his face. If there is one person of Christ from the union, it follows that it has in itself the person that is inaccessible and the face that is spat on.

34: The person of the God Word is one not from the union but from nature, the person of Christ is one from the union, for if the one person of the God Word were from the union, as is that of
Estin en. Ei gar ek tis enwseos hen to en prousiovan tov Theou Logou, oispe to tov Christoiv, deilou oti prin genetai o Theos Logos en prousiopon, ouk exhe to en prousiopon, oispe oude Christos.

35:
If the Word is what he was, and is what he became, <and> he was God and became human being, both cannot be in the one person of the Word, for he became a complete human being, having the nature and the person of a human being.

36:
‘Son of God by nature’ and ‘Son of Man by nature’ are names of the hypostasis, without which it is not possible to confess the Christian faith correctly, and both are confessed in the one Christ, not both in either one.

37:
Either ‘Word’ is the name of two hypostases, of the unmade one of the Lord and of the made one of the Lord, or <it is the name> of two halves of the one hypostasis of the one Lord. But nothing can become by grace what it is by nature.

38:
If the Word is God through <his> divinity, and the Word is human being through <his> humanity, it follows that the Word is in two hypostases Son of God and Son of Man, just as he is also God and human being in two natures.

39:
If the Word has one unmade hypostasis and one that has been made, he who eliminates the number of the hypostases eliminates the hypostasis of the Word, either the unmade one or the one that has been made.

40:
If not being begotten from another substance or hypostasis than that of the Father is the specific <characteristic> not <only> of the God Word, but also of the flesh, it follows that the flesh is also only from the substance of the Father, just as is also the God Word.
μα’
Εἰ ὅταν ἡ θεία γραφὴ τὸν Χριστὸν ἕνα καλὴν ἄνθρωπον (cf. Rom. 5:19), μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καλεῖ αὐτὸν ἕνα ἄνθρωπον, δήλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς τοῦ ἐνός ἄνθρωπου ἐστίν ὁ θεὸς.

μβ’
Ὁ ὀμολογών τὸν Χριστὸν ὁμοίως θεοῦ καὶ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ μὴ λέγων τὸν Χριστὸν ὁμοίως ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἄνθρωπον, τῆν ἰδιὰν ἀναιρεῖ ὀμολογίαν.

μγ’
Εἰ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος ὁ Λόγος, δῆλον ὅτι τὶς ἄνθρωποι· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, μὴν ὢν τὶς ἄνθρωποι. Ὁ δὲ τὶς ἄνθρωποι ἄνθρωποι ὑπόστασις. Ἡ οὖν δύο ὑποστάσεις Χριστοῦ, ἢ ἠ τοῦ Λόγου ἐξέλισσεν.

μδ’
Εἰ ἔμεινεν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ὃ ἦν, καὶ γέγονεν ὃ οὐκ ἦν, δῆλον ὅτι ἐμεῖσθαι τὴν σαρκῆς ὁ παρὰ τὸν Θεὸν ἔστει ἄσαρκος ὃ καὶ ἦν.

με’
Ἡ σάρξ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος φύσει παρὰ τὸν Θεόν Λόγον ἑτέρον ὄντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, δήλον ὅτι ὁ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀνθρώπου ὑπόστασις καὶ θεοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐστί ὀμολογίας καὶ θεοῦ.

μζ’
Εἰ ἓν ἄτομον, φησί, ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστὸς μόνον, ἢ μονοειδές τι ἢ τῶν ὑπὸ εἶδος πάντως· ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ ἔνι, ἢ οὖν τί ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶδος, ἢ ὡς ποῖον εἶδος ἐστὶ λέγεται;

μη’
Εἰ αὐτὸς, φησίν, ὁ ἐστιν Ἠσαΐας Ἐρίμας Ἐρίμας Ἐρίμας Ἐρίμας Ἐρίμας Ἐρίμας, ἐδει αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν.
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should have said: Destroy this temple, and I will be raised in three days.

49:
The Apostle said that the whole fullness of the divinity resides in him bodily, that is, in the aforementioned Christ. How, then, is the fullness of divinity not different in nature from Christ, if indeed that which is in something is different from that in which it is, and residing is different from being residence? Such, then, is <the saying>: God was in Christ.

[Book III]
Refutation of the third impiety of them who wish to know two sons in the dispensation.

1:
If you know that the God Word is not a half-son [they say] and is not incomplete as regards his being Son, and if you furthermore think that the ensouled flesh taken from us is not incomplete as regards its being son, how do you say that only one Son resulted from these two through composition? For this can be seen when either one is incomplete as regards being son, and when the Word is completed by the flesh so as to be Son, and completes <the flesh> so as to be <son>. Therefore, you make the case that <the Word> needs <the flesh> in order to be this, and likewise <the flesh> needs <the Word> in order to be that. For a part qua part does not differ from another part. Therefore, you consider them to be of like honour, since they clearly need one another in like manner for the same <reason>.

2:
A son in the strict sense is wholly the son of him who has begotten him, for nothing that is partly from something is called its son, and <it is> also not <the case that> a father is cause of a part and not of a whole. Indeed, the whole living being, which is made up of rational soul and body, is called son of a human being. And if it happens that one part of it leaves the womb without the other, it is in such a case customary to speak of a dead fetus and not of a son, and of a miscarriage and not of a birth. If, then, you say that Christ is partly Son of God and partly Son of Man, it is obvious that he is in the strict sense <son> neither of the father nor of the mother. Tell us, then, whose son he is by nature?
3: If your Christ is Son of God, it clearly follows that he is partly God and not wholly. Consequently, he is a half-God.

4: When we do not say that there is one and the same living being and only one whole of a son, from a divine and a human nature together, it is for this reason: It is necessary that every son is seen to be of like substance with his parents and to have a similarity of substance with the parents, where there is nothing missing and nothing superfluous. But your Christ who is Son of God and Man has <something> more than God and something more than the human being. How will he, then, truly be their son if he is not completely like them in nature?

5: If Christ is by nature Son of God and not deemed worthy of adoption according to grace [they say], how is it said: How much more did God’s grace and gift, in the grace of one human being, Jesus Christ, overflow to the many, and: God bestowed on him a name above all names, and: Who took the honour not for himself but was called by God just as also Aaron? Tell us what this Christ is?

6: But [they say] if it does not denote the dispensation, as you might say in order to avoid an exact examination of the meanings, and if it does not have an outcome in the strict sense, <but happened> through a parable or allegory or in imagination or seeming, and <if> what is said is idle talk and only creates an impression in the listeners, who is the son who learned obedience through his sufferings, he who also offered up entreaties and supplications with crying and tears, and was heard because of his piety, and who has been completed and crucified and buried, and whom God raised from the dead and who was elevated and glorified and the like? For no-one who is not possessed would say that these are either the properties of the Word <alone> or of <the Word> when he is together with something else.
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7: We call ‘Son of God by nature’ [he says] the God Word alone who is of like substance with the Father, and we say that Christ is called Son of God by grace <and> is like <us> by nature. But we do not for this reason already present the Son as <one who> is of like honour with us, insofar as we, too, have received the grace of adoption from God, and are by grace children of God and inheritors of God and co-inheritors of Christ himself. For often there is found an ineffable difference between things that are said to be alike. Strictly speaking, the gnat and the angel are both likewise called creatures and they are not alike beyond that, for there is a great difference between them. Thus, then, one must also think in the case of the different sons of God by adoption and by grace. For Christ is deemed worthy of a greater honour, compared with Moses who is great among prophets, insofar as the one who has built the house has greater honour than it.

8: What then [he says]? Is there not a difference between things of like substance, as for example, between the metal gold and lead or clay, and between John the Baptist and Judas the betrayer?

9: For all human beings [they say] have been called sons of God, in the verse: I have said: You are gods and sons of the most high, because of the divine image. But the Jews have again been called sons of God according to the verse: I have begotten sons and have elevated them but they have rejected me, because of their familiarity with God. And they have been educated to be sinless more than the other nations and have been taught to be pious. For Scripture bears witness to that: For his testament, it says, and: Your law is a light for my feet, and: He announces, it says, his word to Jacob, righteousnesses and judgements to Israel. He has not done so to every people. Even if they did what is right out of fear of the law and not willingly, they nevertheless enjoyed the fitting help that comes to those who live in righteousness. And in short, they were guided by <the law> to imitate God on earth as far as it was possible, through a righteous and sinless life, and were thus called sons of God. Nevertheless, they were again capable of sinning, since they had a changeable
Οὗτος δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἡμετέροις πᾶσιν καὶ ἕτερα ἔχει ἴδια χαρίσματα, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ὁ κυριακὸς ἄνθρωπος υἱὸς θεοῦ, κατὰ τὸ· Ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα, πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι ἐκ πάντων Καὶ υἱὸς ὑψίστου κληθήσεται μονογενὴς τῷ Πατρὶ ἐρρήθη (cf. Jn. 1:18). Ἐξαιρέτοι, ἐν οἷς ὅμοιος ἡμῖν ὢν καὶ λέγεται ἐλευθερία. Οὔτως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἥδε. Ἐκλήθη δὲ, φησί, εἶναι πώποτε· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη λέγεται ἰδίως ὡς καὶ δουλείας ἐνοχήν, ταύτην δὲ ἡμετέρα υἱοθεσία τῆς ἐκείνων προὔχει καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι

Mάστιγες πολλαὶ τοῦ ἁμαρτωλοῦ (8:15b), ὅπερ ἐκείνη λέγειν οὐ τετόλμηκε ὃτι ἀπεκδεχόμεθα, ἤγουν τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν, τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν ἔτι οὐδενὶ. Τοσοῦτον γοῦν ἡ ἀπολήψει τῆς υἱοθεσίας ἡμῶν ἐξερευνήθη καὶ κατὰ τάδε παρὰ τὸν ποτὲ Ἰσραήλ, υἱὸν καὶ οἰκογένεια τοῦ σάλου ἢσυχίας, τοσοῦτος ως καὶ ἀμώμους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ (cf. Col. 1:22) ἐν ᾧ ζωῆς ἡμῶν ἠκομισθή μεταβολὴν τῆς ἀρχής τοῦ αἰῶνος, καὶ τοιούτῳ γοῦν ἡ ἀναστασία ἀμώμης κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν Πατέρα, ἐν τῇ ἀπολήψει τῆς υἱοθεσίας ἀγάπῃ προωρίσθημεν εἰς υἱοθεσίαν θεοῦ, καὶ ἀμώμους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ, ὡς καὶ ἀμώμους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν Πατέρα, ἐν τῇ ἀπολήψει τῆς υἱοθεσίας ἀγάπῃ προωρίσθημεν εἰς υἱοθεσίαν θεοῦ, καὶ ἀμώμους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ.
ὁρατῶν καὶ ἀοράτων κτισμάτων ἀφώρισται καὶ ἐξείλεκται ἅμα τῷ εἶναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι υἱὸς ἀξίαν λαβών χάριτι, ὥσπερ εἴ τις υἱὸς βασιλέως ἐπὶ πορφύρᾳ τεχθεὶς ἢ ἐπὶ κυούμενος ἐν μήτρᾳ στεφθεὶς διαζωννυμένης τὸν στέφανον τῆς μητρός, ὧπερ γίνεται πάλλακς. Καὶ οὕτως ἡνώθη τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ ἀπὸ πρώτης αὐτοῦ κτίσεως, καὶ υἱὸς ὀνομάσθη, οὐ διὰ τὴν καθ’ ἡμᾶς υἱοθεσίαν, αλλὰ ως συνημμένος τῷ Λόγῳ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου φανέρωσιν, καὶ αὐτοῦ πρόσωπον ἐπέχων, αὐτοῦ τὴν τιμήν, αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀξίαν φέρων. Καί· Ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ θεοῦ (Hebr. 1:12), ὑπεράνω πάσης ἐξουσίας καὶ κυριότητος καὶ δυνάμεως, ὄνομα λαβὼν μεῖζον παντὸς ὀνόματος ὀνομαζομένου οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι (Eph. 1:21), ἵνα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ πᾶν γόνυ κάμψῃ ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καταχθονίων (Phil. 2:10). Πάντα γὰρ ἁπλῶς ὑπέταξεν ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ (1 Cor. 15:27), καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τῷ θείῳ Λόγῳ, οὗ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐπέχει, καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου, τῷ Πατρὶ τῷ ἀχωρίστῳ αὐτοῦ, ἅμα τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ. Καὶ οὕτω μεσιτεύει θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώποις (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5). Τούτων δὲ οὐδὲν πλέον αὐτῷ ποτὲ παρέξουσιν οἱ συνθέσει λέγοντες τοῦ Λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὸν Χριστὸν ὑφεστάναι. Εἰ δὲ τούτων ἀσύγκριτος τῶν υἱοθεσιῶν ἡ παράθεσις, πῶς φασὶν ὅτι ὁμότιμον ἡμῖν φαμὲν τὸν Χριστόν; Διότι οὐ φύσει υἱόν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸν θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ χάριτι υἱοτεθεῖσθαι δοξάζομεν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ υἱοὺς λέγεσθαι, οὔτε τὸ χάριτι υἱοτεθεῖσθαι, τοὺς τε ἀνθρώπους πάντας καὶ τοὺς Ἰουδαίους καὶ τοὺς Χριστιανοὺς καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν ἐν ὀλίγῳ ή παρὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν ὡς δέδεικται.

If we said [he says] that there are two sons from God by nature, or that both are <sons> by grace, you would justly conclude for us that we speak of two sons of God. For holy Scripture speaks of two or more sons then when all who are counted together are from the same <parents> in the same way and manner, that is, when both have come to be theirs by nature or by adoption, so that one can call them brothers of each other. Thus, then, one speaks of the mother of the two sons of Zebedaeus, and in Genesis: Joseph had two sons, and Ruben said to his father: Kill my two sons if I do not bring...
(Gen. 41:50). Kai· Ἐπεὶ ἐποῆθη τῷ πατρὶ αὐτῶν. Τοὺς δύο ὦν ὠινοι ὑμῖν ἀπόκτεινον, ἵνα μὴ ἀγάγη αὐτῶν πρὸς σέ (Gen. 42:37), τοῦτο τὸν Βενιαμίν. Καὶ παρά τὸ Ἀποστόλῳ πάλιν γέγραπται ὅτι: Ἀβραὰμ δυο υἱοὺς ἔσχεν. 106


πα’ Ἀλλ’ ἰδού, φησίν, ἐπὶ ταῖς δύο αἰτίαις οἱ φύσει υἱοὶ Βάλλας τῆς παιδίσκης Ῥαχήλ καὶ υἱοὶ Ῥαχήλ εἰσὶ θέσει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπλεόνασεν ἀριθμῷ, καθὼς εἴρηται ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῷ Ἰακώβ· Εἴσελθε πρὸς τὴν παιδίσκην μου, καὶ τεκνοποιήσομαι κἀγὼ ἐξ αὐτῆς (Gen. 30:3). Καὶ πάλιν· Ἐκρίνε μοι ὁ θεός, καὶ ἐπήκουσε τῆς φωνῆς μου, καὶ ἔδωκέ μοι υἱόν· διὰ τοῦτο ἐκάλεσε τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Δάν (Gen. 30:6). Τέτοκε δὲ καὶ αὕτη φύσει τὸν Ἰωσὴφ καὶ Βενιαμίν. Καὶ οὐ διὰ τόδε τέσσαρα υἱοὶ τῆς Ῥαχήλ, ἐκ τῶν ιβ’ πατριαρχῶν εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμοῦνται καὶ οἱ θέσει υἱοί.

ιβ’ Πολλάκις τὰ διάφορα τῇ φύσει ἑνὶ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται, καὶ μιᾶς τιμῆς ἠξίωται, δύο δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως νοεῖται· σῶμα γὰρ πιστεύομεν εἶναι τὴν τε ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸν ἅγιον ἄρτον, καίτοι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἕκαστον τοῦτων, καίτοι οὐ διὰ τόδε τρία σώματα λέγειν Χριστοῦ εἰσπραττόμεθα.

ιγ’ Αλλ’ οὔτε δύο σφραγῖδας, φησίν, λέγομεν τὸ ἀρχέτυπον καὶ τὸν τύπον, ἀλλὰ μίαν, καίτοι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἕκαστον τούτων, καίτοι οὐ διὰ τόδε τρία σώματα λέγειν Χριστοῦ εἰσπραττόμεθα.

ιδ’ Τί οὖν, φησίν, δύο λόγιοι εἰσίν, ὁ τε λεγόμενος καὶ ὁ ἀκονύμονος;
[Αόγος Δ']

Τετάρτης αὐτῶν ἀσεβείας ἔλεγχος παρατεθοῦσαν λέγειν θεοτόκον τὴν ἁγίαν Παρθένον.

α'

Θέα γοῦν αὐτῶς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνθύμημα κεκρυμμένον τῶν μίαν λεγόντων τὴν ὑπόστασιν Χριστοῦ, καὶ σύνθεσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου πρὸς τὴν σάρκα. Τί γὰρ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ἐν τῇ θεοτόκος φωνῇ, προστιθεμένου μάλιστα αὐτοῖς τοῦ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει κεχωρισμένον εὑρήκαμεν· ἀπροσδιορίστως γὰρ λεγομένου τοῦ θεοτόκος, ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ ὀνόματος πολλαχῶς λεγομένου, σχέσει πως τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐσεβὲς διασάφησιν ἔχει, νυνὶ δὲ τοῦ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν προσκειμένου τῇ φωνῇ, πάσης ἀσεβείας καὶ ἀπερικαλύπτου βλασφημίας αὐτὴν ἀνεπλήρωσαν. Ὅμως ἐρωτητέον αὐτούς, τί βούλεται αὐτοῖς ἡ τοιάδε ὀνομασία, καὶ κατὰ ποίαν αὐτοῖς ἐξείληπται; Ἆρα, ὡς φαμέν, ἀρρενοτόκον ἢ θηλυτόκον γυναῖκα, τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἄρρενας ἢ θήλεα τίκτειν, οὕτως αὐτοὶ λέγουσι θεοτόκον τὴν ἁγίαν Μαρίαν, θεοὺς αὐτήν πεφυκυῖαν τίκτειν διὰ τῆς τοιᾶσδε λέξεως σημαίνοντες; Καὶ ποίους θεοὺς ἐγέννησεν, εἰπάτωσαν, καὶ τὸ ἁγνοούμενον διδασκέτωσαν. Ἦ ὅτι θεὸν ἐγέννησεν; Εἰ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαξ τοῦτο ἐθέλουσι σημᾶναι, διὰ τοῦ οὕτως ὀνομάζειν τὴν Παρθένον, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἴδαμεν εἰ δύναται τοῦτο δηλώσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον σχῆμα τοῦ ὄνόματος.

β'

Τοῦ θεοῦ ὀνόματος, φασί, πολλαχῶς λεγομένου παρὰ τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ, οἷον· Ἐπείπερ εἰς θεός δὲ δικαιώσει περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως καὶ ἀκροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως (Rom. 3:30), καὶ πάλιν· Ὁ θεὸς ἐστὶν ἐν συναγωγῇ θεῶν, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ θεοὺς διακρινεῖ (Ps. 81:1), καὶ αὖθις· Ὄσπερ θεοὶ πολλοί καὶ κύριοι πολλοί (1 Cor. 8:5), κατὰ ποιόν ἐξῆλεπται σημαινόμενον αὐτοῖς ἐνέπαθα τὸ θεόν ὁμόνα ἐπὶ τῆς θεοτόκου; Κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον ὅπερ ἐστὶν φίλες λέγειν θεον, ἢ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον τούτο ἑπείπερ, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τρίτον ὅπερ ἐστὶν τὸ φιλεῖς. Αὐτὰ κατὰ τὸ ὀστρόν οὐκ ἔστω, οὐδὲ εἰ δεῖμονες τένην τούτου. Αὐτὰ ἢ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον λέγουν, ἢ ἰστώσαιν

[Book IV]

Refutation of the fourth impiety of them who refuse to say that the holy Virgin is God-bearer.

1:

Look for yourself that in what follows, too, there is concealed the same argument of those who say that the hypostasis of Christ is one and that the God Word is composed with the flesh. For what can one find in the term ‘god-bearer’, especially when ‘strictly and in truth’ is added by them, but this very thing, which we have found to be separated in the composition? For when one speaks of ‘god-bearer’ without qualification, it can through some kind of relation be given a clarification that makes it orthodox, since the term ‘god’ has many meanings. But now that ‘strictly and in truth’ is added to the term, they have filled it with impiety and barefaced blasphemy. Nevertheless, one must ask them what they wish such a term to mean, and in what sense it is understood by them. Do they call the holy Mary ‘god-bearer’ as we say that a male-bearing and female-bearing woman is one who is wont to give birth to males and females, and indicate by such a term that she habitually gives birth to gods? And let them say what manner of gods she gave birth to and teach us what we do not know! Is it that she has given birth to God? Even if they wish it to indicate this once and for all by their naming the Virgin in this way, we do not know if such a manner of speech can express this.

2:

The term ‘god’ [they say] has different meanings in divine Scripture, as for example: Since there is one God who will justify the circumcision by faith and the foreskin through faith, and: God stood in the assembly of gods, he will judge gods in their midst, and again: As there are many gods and many lords. In what sense do they understand the term ‘god’ here in the case of ‘god-bearer’? In the first sense, which is to speak of God by nature, or in the second sense, which is <to speak of god> by adoption, or in the third sense, which is a lie? But in the last sense they would not call her thus, not even if they became demons. But if they call her thus in the second sense, let them know that God by adoption has been called in
ὅτι θεός θέσει οὐκ ἄγγελος, οὐκ ἄλογον ζῶον, οὐ τὶ τῶν κτισμάτων ἐλέχθη παρὰ τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ ποτέ, ἢ ἄνθρωπος μόνος. ὁμολογοῦσι γὰρ ἄτρεπτον εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον κατὰ τὴν τὸν φύσει θεὸν γεγεννήκεναι τὴν Παρθένον. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ ἀντίκειται τοῖς κοινοῖς ὁμολογήμασιν, ἴδωμεν. Θεασώμεθα γοῦν εἰ μὴ λύσει γέννησις ἐκ γυναικὸς κατηγορούμενη τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἢ τὸ ἀΐδιον αὐτοῦ ἢ τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον καθόλου τὰ προσόντα αὐτῷ καὶ ὡς θεῷ καὶ τῶν ἁπάντων ποιητῇ.

3: Every birth (or: begetting) that is known to divine Scripture not the angel, not the irrational animal, not any other creature, but the human being alone. Will they, then, call the Virgin human-bearer by nature? But I have forgotten the addition of ‘strictly and in truth!’ For ‘strictly’ is understood by them in such a way that it indicates that the Virgin gave birth to God by nature. But let us see if this is possible and does not contradict the common tenets of our faith. For they confess that the God Word is unchangeable and unalterable, according to the decree of our common fathers, that is, <those> of the synod in Nicaea. But he who is unchangeable and unalterable will not become worse or better than himself, but always remains in the same state without alteration since he is eternal and has never been nor obtained a beginning of his being. Let us see, then, if the birth from a woman, when it is said of the God Word, will not destroy his eternal or unalterable <existence>, and in general, what belongs to him and is commonly confessed by us <about him> as God and creator of all.

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THE NESTORIAN TREATISE

Dirk Krausmüller, “The Nestorian Treatise Preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem’s Contra Nestorianos (CPG 6918),” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 17 (2023) 59-130; DOI: https://doi.org/10.18573/jlarc.141

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γεννωμένῳ; Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἀδίος ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος· οὐδεμιὰ γὰρ τοιαύτη γέννησις προϋπάρχειν οὐδὲ τὸν γεννώμενον τοῦ γεννόντος, τὸ δὲ μὴ προϋπάρχον τοῦ μὴ ἀδίον οὐκ ἀδίος, ὅπερ ἀσεβὲς λέγειν ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου. Αὐλὰ κατὰ τὴν μή τὸ εἶναι διόδουσιν τὸ γεννώμενον φασὶ γεγεννῆσθαι; Τρεπτός οὐκοῦν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἀναλλοίωτός, ἐπεὶ πάσα τοιαύτη γέννησις ἢ κρείττων ἢ χείρων ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται διὰ τῆς τοιᾶσδε μεταβολῆς δηλονότι τρεπτὸς ἔλεγχεται ὢν καὶ ἀλλοιωτός. Εἰ δὲ [οὐ] τρεπτὸς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, οὐκ ἄρα κυρίως κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐγεννήθη ἐκ γυναικὸς οὐδὲ ὅλως κατηγορεῖσθαι δύναται γέννησις ἐκ γυναικὸς κατὰ τὴν γραφικὴν διάνοιαν. δ’

Εἰ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἡ ἐκ Πατρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου γέννησίς ἐστι, οὐ κυρίως καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἡ ἐκ γυναικός ἐπιφημιζομένη τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου γέννησις, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὅμοιαι. Ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν τὸ πρότερο, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον.

Εἰ ἡ γέννησις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐκ Πατρὸς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν παρήλλακται τῆς ἐπιφημιζομένης αὐτοῦ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐκ γυναικος, ἁνάγκη δὲ πάσα ὧν οὐκ ὁ τόκος ἢ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν παρηλλάχθαι, τούτων καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν παρηλλάχθαι, ἀνάγκη ἄρα πάσα παραλλάσσειν τὸν Θεοῦ Λόγου αὐτὸν κατ’ οὐσίαν, διὰ τὸ παραλλάσσει ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ τοὺς τοκετοὺς τοὺς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν. Εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς ἐαυτοῦ παρηλλάχθαι εἰς ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ἄρα κατ’ οὐσίαν, οὐδὲν ἔσται κατ’ οὐσίαν ὀμοίως, οὐδὲ τὸ Πατρὶ ἄρα καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ ἁγίου, ὧν ἀναφορᾷ τὸ ὁμοούσιον.

Εἰ τὸ γεγονὸς καθὸ γέγονε γενέσθαι πάλιν ἀμήχανον, καὶ τὸ αἰώνιον ὄν πάλιν ἐκ γυναικος ἀμήχανον. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρότερον ἀληθῶς, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα.

Εἰ τὸ γεγονὸς ἐκ Πατρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀμήχανον. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρότερον ἀληθῶς, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα. 4:

If the begetting of the God Word from the Father happened ‘strictly and in truth’, the supposed birth of the God Word from a woman did not happen ‘strictly and in truth’, since they are not alike. But if the former is the case, the latter is not.

Εἰ τὸ γεγονὸς καθὸ γέγονε γενέσθαι πάλιν ἀμήχανον, καὶ τὸ αἰώνιον ὄν πάλιν ἐκ γυναικος ἀμήχανον. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρότερον ἀληθῶς, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα. 5:

If the begetting of the God Word from the Father, which happened ‘in truth’, differs from his supposed ‘birth’ ‘in truth’ from a woman, and it is necessary that those whose birth ‘in truth’ is different are also different in substance, it follows that the God Word himself differs from himself in substance, because in him the births ‘in truth’ are different. But if the God Word himself differs from himself in substance, he will be similar in substance to nobody. Consequently, he will also not <be similar> to the Father and the Holy Spirit, which eliminates their being of like substance.

Εἰ τὸ γεγονὸς καθὸ γέγονε γενέσθαι πάλιν ἀμήχανον, καὶ τὸ αἰώνιον ὄν πάλιν ἐκ γυναικος ἀμήχανον. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρότερον ἀληθῶς, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα. 6:

If it is impossible that that, which has come to be insofar as it has come to be, comes to be again, it is also impossible that that which is eternal <comes to be> again from a woman. But the former is true, and consequently also the second.
ζ'  
Εἰ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐτέχθη κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς Παρθένου, ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ τικτόμενα στίς ὁμοιαία ἐμαίνει κατ' οὐσίαν τοὺς τικτουσίν, ἢ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἀνθρώπος τὴν οὐσίαν, ἢ Παρθένος θεός τὴν οὐσίαν. Ἀλλ' ἑκάτερον ἐπίσης ὁσίος καὶ ἀδύνατον. Οὖκ ἀρα ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐτέχθη κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς Παρθένου.

η'  
Εἰ μήτηρ τοῦ θεοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἡ Παρθένος, υἱὸς κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῆς Παρθένου ὁ θεός. Εἰ υἱὸς τῆς Παρθένου κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὁ θεός, ἢ δυσμός τῇ μητρὶ ἢ υἱὸς δυσμός. Καὶ εἰ μὲν δυσμός, οὐθεδε, εἰ δὲ οὐθεδε, οὐθεδε υἱὸς.

θ'  
Ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐκ Παρθένου κατ' ἀλήθειαν γέννησις ἢ πάθος ἡπάθος ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἢ πάθος καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἢ οὔτε πάθος Ῥοτε ἐνέργεια. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάθος φαίνεται, πρόδηλος ἡ ἀσέβεια, τοῦ γὰρ γεγεννημένου τὸ πάθος, γεγέννηται δὲ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ καθ' ὑμᾶς, τῆς οὐσίας ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ πάθος. Εἰ δὲ ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ὁ θεὸς οὐ τῷ εἶναι αὐτῷ, τοῦ γὰρ γεγεννημένου τὸ πάθος, ἔνεργηται ἦν ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ γέννησις. Εἰ δὲ ἐνεργεῖ ἀλλὰ ἀλλοθρείᾳ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς τικτούσιν, τὸν θεόν τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ θέλειν γεγέννηται. Γεγέννηται ἄρα καὶ ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ θέλειν τοῦ θεοῦ, μένουσα, ἔνεργηται ἦν τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ γέννησις, ἐπεὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ εὐγνωμοσπονσική ὅσιος οὐθεδε κατά ἀλήθειαν ἐγεννηθή.

ι'  
Εἰ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐτέχθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος κατὰ ἀλήθειαν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς Παρθένου, καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐτέχθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς Παρθένου, καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς Παρθένου, ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος μεθυπαρχεῖ τῆς Παρθένου, ὁπερ ἠτοπον ἐκατερον.
11: If the birth of the flesh is ‘in truth’ a birth of God, the being of the flesh is also ‘in truth’ the being of God. But if <to speak of> being and being such-like is impious and impossible, it follows that the birth of the flesh is not ‘in truth’ a birth of God.

12: If the parents are different from each other in substance, it is necessary that their offspring also differs in substance from each other. And if this is so, how <is it> not <the case that> when the Father and the Virgin differ in substance from one another, the God Word necessarily also differs in substance from himself, as he would be son ‘in truth’ of both? But to say that he who is utterly simple differs in substance from himself is utter madness.

13: If the substance of the God Word has been begotten ‘strictly and in truth’ from the substance of the Father, and is by substance completely of like substance with him, and the substance of the God Word has been born ‘strictly and in truth’ from a woman, and she is completely unlike <him> in substance, <it is> not <the case that> the substance is born ‘strictly and in truth’ from the substance, which makes the offspring completely alike to the parents, but <it is> something else, which one cannot even imagine.

14: If the Son has been begotten from the Father as regards his divinity, and preserves the similarity in substance to him, and according to you the Son has likewise been born from the Virgin as regards his divinity, he must preserve the similarity with her in substance as regards his divinity. But if this is the case, the Virgin, too, will have similarity in substance with the God and Father. For those that are similar to the same thing are also similar to each other.
δημιουργημα του τικτομενου. Ουδεν αρα κυριος και κατα αλληθειαν τικτον
dημιουργημα του τικτομενου.

16: Everything that is born ‘strictly and in truth’ has its being from its parent. But nothing that has its being from its parent exists before its own birth. Consequently, nothing that is born ‘strictly and in truth’ exists before its birth.

17: Everything that is born ‘strictly and in truth’, if it is born in time, is only potentially in the parent before its conception, as Levi was in the loins of Abraham. But that which exists only potentially in its parent, has the beginning of its existence in its parent. Consequently, that which is born ‘strictly and in truth’, if it is born in time, has the beginning of being in its parent.

18: If the God Word has been born ‘strictly and in truth’ from a woman, <it is> either <the case that> he who has been born is subjected to time or <it is the case that> the woman is beyond time. But indeed, God is not subjected to time nor is the woman beyond time. Consequently, God is not born ‘strictly and in truth’ from a woman.

19: If the God Word is ‘in truth’ son of the Virgin, he will be in substance what is the one who has given birth to him. But she is a rational mortal animal. Consequently, God, too, will according to you be a rational mortal animal.

20: But [he says], we call <a woman> who has given birth to a human being not a soul-bearer but a human-bearer. Why, then, do you, too, not rather call her Christ-bearer?

21: But why [he says] are you not of the opinion that she is a human-bearer rather than a god-bearer?

22: If the God Word has been born from the Virgin, he has been born in time, but
τικτόμενον χρόνου πρὸς τελείωσιν δεῖται. Εἰ
ὁ θεὸς ἄρα ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου ἐτέχθη, χρόνου
πρὸς τελείωσιν ἐδείηθη.

κγ’
Εἰ ἐνθὰ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ἐκεῖ ὁ Πατήρ καὶ τὸ
Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας
ἀδιαίρετον, ἦν δὲ ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ τῆς Παρθένου
καθ’ ὑμᾶς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος κατ’ οὐσίαν, ἦν ἄρα
ἡ Τριὰς ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ τῆς Παρθένου.

κδ’
Εἰ ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ τῆς Παρθένου ἡ Τριὰς κατ’
οὐσίαν, ἐγεννήθη δὲ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος κατ’
οὐσίαν ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου, ἦν ἄρα
ἡ Τριὰς ἐγεννήθη ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου.

κε’
Πᾶς τόκος ἐγνωσμένος τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ ἐκ τῶν
πάντῃ ἀνομοίων ἀνόμοια τίκτων, ἐπαίνου τὸ
τίκτον ἢ ψόγου δείκνυσιν ἄξιον, ἐπαίνου μὲν
ὡς·
Διὰ τὸν φόβον σου, κύριε, ἐν γαστρὶ
ἐλάβομεν καὶ ἐτέκομεν
(Is. 26:18), ψόγου δὲ
ὡς τό·
Ἰδοὺ ὠδίνησεν ἀδικίαν, συνέλαβε
πόνον, καὶ ἔτεκεν ἀνομίαν
(Ps. 7:14). Πᾶν δὲ
τὸ ἐπαινούμενον ἢ ψεγόμενον ἐν τῷ τίκτει
ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ
τικτόμενον τίκτει. Πᾶς ἄρα τόκος
γινωσκόμενος τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ ἐκ τῶν πάντῃ
ἀνομοίων ἀνόμοια τίκτων ἐκ τῆς
προαιρέσεως καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τίκτει τὸ
tikto'me'non.

κζ’
Εἰ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἐτέχθη ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου,
pán de to tikto'me'non h ek tis οu'sia'tas
tikteta'to to tikto'nto's, h ek tis
proai'rese'wos, kai to ek tis οu'sia'tas
tikteta'me'non to einai panta'tos xei ek to
ntikto'nto's, to de ek tis proai'rese'wos, phe me'n
to einai xei ek to tikto'nto's, phe de to
touin'de einai, eipate po'dhen bo'ule'se'te
tetex'thai ton theon, ek tis οu'sia'tas tis
Parthenou h ek tis proai'rese'wos: Opotero'n
gar ou'ton eip'the, to suvag'ou'me'non de'lon.

κζ’
Εἰ ἐγεννήθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος κυρίως καὶ κατὰ
ἀλήθειαν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός, καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοιος
everything that is born in time needs time for
its completion. Consequently, if God has been
born from the Virgin, he has needed time for
his completion.

23: If where the God Word is, the Father and the
Holy Spirit also are, because of the
indivisibility of the substance, and the God
Word was according to you in the womb of the
Virgin, it follows that the Trinity was in the
womb of the Virgin.

24: If the Trinity was in the womb of the Virgin as
regards its substance, and the God Word has
been born from the Virgin as regards his
substance, it follows that the Trinity has been
born from the Virgin.

25: Every birth known to divine Scripture, which
gives birth to those that are unlike, from those
that are completely unlike, shows the parent to
be worthy of praise or blame, of praise as in:
Because of the fear of you, Lord, we have
conceived in the womb and given birth, and of
blame as in: See, he was in travail with
unrighteousness, he conceived toil and gave
birth to lawlessness. And all that is praised or
blamed in giving birth gives birth to its
offspring from the will and not from the
substance. Consequently, every birth known to
divine Scripture, which gives birth to those that
are unlike, from those that are completely
unlike, gives birth to the offspring from the will
and not from the substance.

26: If the God Word was born from the Virgin, and
everything that is born is born either from the
substance of the parent, or from the will, and
that which is born from the substance
certainly has its being from the parent, whereas
that which is born from will has from the parent
sometimes its being, and sometimes a certain
manner of being, tell us: From what do you
wish God to have been born, from the
substance of the Virgin or from the will?
Whichever of them you say, the conclusion is
clear.

27: If the God Word has been begotten ‘strictly and
in truth’ from the Father, and is like him in

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autō kat' ousiān, kai ei ēgennήθη ō autōs ēk
mētrōs kuroi kai kata' álētheinai, kai ēstin
autē anómioi kast' ousiān, oudein diapherei
upō omoiōn kast' ousiān h anomoiōn
genvnsiē. Ei de touto, oude ta anōmioa
diavgenhsetai prõs ἄλλημα kast' ousiān.
'Enedexhimenon de òn, kai tōn Theon Lōgon ēk
tou Patrōs kata' álētheian genvhei̇nta, eînai
autō kast' ousiān anómioi, alλa panta
ádunata kai tīs upohēseωs autōn ēzia.

κη'  
Ei to' aiōdios on òsteron genv̄iatai kata' 
alētheian, kai to mēde òloos ón enerechēi mē
ðn gínetai kata' álētheian. Ei de to deuterōn
ádunatōn, kai to prōton ēra.

κθ'  
Ei ton oūp̄an gαι τηn gēn kai panta tā ēn
autōs ē οn̄ta genvē̄sia ὑ̄n aðunatōn, tōn
poutōn ÷hmiliourγh̄n prõ tōn aiōnōn ēk
Patrōs genvē̄sian é̄p' ἐ̄skatōn
genvē̄siai aðunatōt̄atōn.

λ'  
Ei en̄dē̄chetai tīn chlēs genvē̄sia aðurion,
en̄dē̄chēth̄a kai tōn ōn̄ta aiōdios teghē̄̄niai ἐ̄p' 
ἐ̄skatōn. Allā to prōton ē̄m̄hᾱnan, kai to
deuterōn kast' épītasiai.

λα'  
Ei en̄dē̄chetai tō prōterōn mē ò̄n̄st̄erōn
ēīnai mē ̄gē̄nusiē̄n h psōbhēn, en̄dē̄chē̄siōn kai
tō aiōdios ò̄n̄st̄erōn kast' álē̄theian
genvē̄siai. Allā to prōterōn ē̄m̄hᾱnan,
και to ò̄n̄st̄erōn ēra.

λβ'  
Tō ã̄nov̄hen genvē̄sian (cf. Jn. 3:3), toūtē̄si
deīr̄a genvē̄sia, ȭz ȭðatōs kai Πν̄̄ε̄̄mū̄atos
(Jn. 3:5) h kai diā̄ ðī̄dā̄skal̄iā genvē̄siai, tō̄
de ȭðatōs genvē̄sian eis ȭ̄ thú̄̄siaī̄ genvē̄̄siai,
tō̄ de eis ȭ̄ thú̄̄siaī̄ genvē̄̄sian eks ȭ̄ thú̄̄siaī̄
ê̄ tō ̄s ȭ̄ thú̄̄siaī̄ ȭ̄ gē̄̄nē̄̄sthaī̄ tō̄̄ genvē̄̄sian. Tō̄
a oūv̄̄ ̄n̄ārī̄ gē̄n̄v̄̄mēn ̄oūk̄̄ ek ̄t̄̄h̄̄ ̄s ̄ȭ̄ thū̄siaī̄
genvē̄̄siaī̄ tō̄̄ genvē̄̄sian.

λγ'  
Ei kuriosk kaī̄ kata' álētheian ēḡn̄nē̄sthē ̄ō
Theon Lōgon ̄ek ̄tīs Pārhē̄̄nu, kaī̄ é̄s̄̄tin autē̄
substance, and if the same one has been born 'strictly and in truth' from the mother, and she
is unlike <her> in substance, there is no
difference between birth from those that are
like in substance and <birth from> those that
are unlike. And if this is the case, not even
those that are unlike will differ from one
another in substance. If this were possible, the
God Word, too, who has been begotten ‘in
truth’ from the Father would in substance be
unlike him. But all this is impossible and
worthy of their supposition.

28:  
If that which exists eternally is born ‘in truth’,
that which never existed at all in actuality
comes to be ‘in truth’. But if the second is
impossible so is consequently also the first.

29:  
If it is impossible that the heaven and the earth
and all that is in them, which already exist, now
come to be, it is completely impossible that
their creator who was born from the Father
before the ages has been born in the last days.

30:  
If it is possible that yesterday becomes
tomorrow, let it also be possible that the one
who exists eternally has been born in the last
days. But the first is impossible and the second
is even more impossible.

31:  
If it is possible that that which was not before,
exists afterwards, without being born or made,
let it also be possible that which which exists
eternally has been born later ‘in truth’. But the
former is impossible, and consequently also the
latter.

32:  
That which has been born from above, that is,
through a second birth, is born from water and
Spirit, or through teaching, and that which is
born thus is born to adoption, and that which is
born to adoption is not born from the substance
of the parent. Consequently, what is born from
above is not born from the substance of the
parent.

33:  
If the God Word has been born ‘strictly and in
truth’ from the Virgin, and she is unlike <him>,

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ἀνόμοιος, καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐγεννήθη ὁ αὐτὸς ἐκ Πατρός, τί κωλύει εἶναι αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν Πατρὶ ἀνόμοιον, μήτε τῶν γεννήσεων κατ’ εἶδος παραλλαττούσων μήτε τοῦ γεννωμένου καθάπαξ.

34:
If the God Word has been born 'strictly and in truth' from the Virgin, and in every blameless birth, which either gives being to the offspring or does not give it, the offspring is the same in substance as the parent, or lesser, the same as in: He begat according to his form, and: For I have begotten you in Christ Jesus through the Gospel, and lesser as the birth of the faithful from God, but never greater, it follows that God is the same in substance as the Virgin or lesser. But both is impious. Consequently, God has not been born from the Virgin 'in truth'.

35:
If the birth from those that are completely alike is a true <birth>, which gives birth in substance to those that are like those who give birth 'in truth', the <birth> that gives birth to those that are unlike from those that are alike is not a birth 'in truth'. For the opposites are not equally true.

36:
If the Word is fleshless and unchangeable according to his natural definition [he says], how will the same one become enfleshed when he remains unchangeable? For thus he would be said to remain still unchanged when he is changed. Either God has not become flesh <in which case> the one who gave birth to the flesh is not a god-bearer, or he himself became <flesh>, <in which case> he is henceforth not God since he is not unchangeable, nor is then the mother of the changeable one in any way a god-bearer.

37:
See, according to your suppositions and supporting arguments, it is permissible to call someone a mother of someone in part and in one respect. If you do not confess that a fleshless God has been born from her, why, then, do you object when we say that the Virgin is human-bearer in part, and <why do you> attribute specifically to her only the name 'god-bearer', and do not accept those who say that...
The Word was God, he became a human being. If the Virgin is ‘god-bearer’ it is obvious that the Virgin is mother of what the Word was and not of what he became. But if he has a mother because of the human being, and the human being does not have a mother, it follows that the Word, too, cannot have a mother.

According to the prophet the name ‘Emmanuel’ is a name of the sign of the one who has been born and given from the Virgin to the house of David, but according to the Egyptian ‘Emmanuel’ is the name of God, the giver of the sign.

The nature of the offspring is never indicated through conventional names. For the conventional names are indicators of that which accedes to the nature. Such is also the name ‘Emmanuel’ because it is a conventional name. The appellation ‘Emmanuel’, then, does not indicate the nature of the one who took it, as the Egyptian thinks, but it indicates that the help of God is with those who have taken ‘Emmanuel’ as its sign.

If the Virgin is god-bearer for the reason that she has given birth to the true God, the true God would for the same reason be true God because he is Virgin-born.

If the Word became flesh by changing into the flesh, it is evident that the Word has a creator and a mother, but if the Word became flesh without change, how is the Word who is not changed fashioned and born as if he were changed?

That which does not belong to the divinity of the Word also does not belong to the Word. How, then, does the Egyptian not attribute a second beginning through birth to the divinity of the Word but does attribute it to the God Word?
Τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον χωρίσας ὁ Αἰγύπτιος τῆς θεότητος, αὐτὸν μὲν ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου δογματίζει σαρκικῶς τικτόμενον, τὴν δὲ αὐτοῦ θεότητα υποβάλλειν τῇ αὐτή σαρκικῇ γεννήσει, ἢ ὑπεβάλε τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον, ἐσχάτης εἶναι μανίας λέγει.

44: The Egyptian who separates the God Word from the divinity, puts forward the doctrine that he was born fleshly from the Virgin but does not subject his divinity to a fleshly birth whereas he subjects the God Word <to it>, which [he says] is the utmost madness.

45: If the Word is God through the divinity and the Word is human being through the humanity, how is the Word not born as that which he is through the flesh, but as that which he is through the divinity? For the Egyptian puts forward the doctrine of the ‘god-bearer’ and anathematises those who say ‘human-bearer’.

46: Read the command of the law about the purification of those who have been born, which the Virgin fulfilled, and learn! Did the law, which orders what it has said, and the Virgin who fulfilled it purify God or a human being? If a woman has conceived seed, says the law, and born a male child, she shall be unclean seven days; according to the days of her menstrual blood. And she shall sit in her pure blood for thirty-three days; she shall touch no holy thing nor come into the sanctuary, until the days of her purification are fulfilled. And when the days of her purification are fulfilled she shall bring a spotless lamb or two young pidgeons to the door of the tabernacle of the witness. And the priest shall make a sin offering and a burnt offering, and he shall purify her from the source of her blood, and afterwards she shall enter the holy. That the Virgin fulfilled this command is testified by the Evangelist Luke who says: And having completed the days of their purification, Joseph and Mary took him to Jerusalem to present him to the Lord and to give two young pigeons.

47: Everywhere <it is the case that> the conception and the birth bring forth to birth one who does not exist, but if according to the Egyptian the Virgin did not give birth to a human being, but to the true God, it is evident that she has given birth to one who had not yet existed. And if the one who is newly-fashioned and newly-born...
48: He who does not confess that the Virgin is a ‘Christ-bearer’ does not confess what Christ is either. For the birth from the Virgin is the beginning of the words about Christ.

49: We will not call the mother of Jesus ‘god-bearer’ from our own authority, since holy Scripture nowhere calls her thus, nor the 318 fathers, but in keeping with the uttering of the angel who says to the shepherds: Today the Lord Christ has been born, and according to the verses: Book of the genealogy of Jesus Christ, and: Now you want to kill me, a human being who has told you the truth, we say that she is Christ-bearer in nature and rank, and do not rashly legislate what we have not received, as you do.

[Book V]
Demonstration of the fifth impiety of them who straightway deny the natural divinity of Christ, our true God.

1: When [he says] do you know that the whole of Christ is God? After the resurrection? For if immediately from birth, you know Christ to be always impassible and immortal. Who, then, suffered and died and was buried and endured the rest of the human condition, if that which is said about Christ is not <merely> imagined? But if the whole of Christ is not God from the birth from the beginning there will according to you have been a time when the Word was not the whole God.

2: And if the living Word of God is in Christ how is it that the Apostle said about Christ that he died and was buried, and that he rose on the third day according to Scripture? How is he not again compared with us in the verse: If the dead are not raised Christ, too, has not been raised. This is an obvious testimony that he and newly-called is also God, he is necessarily also a new God. And divine Scripture shouts: Let there be for you no recent God, whereas the Egyptian shouts in turn: ‘Let there be!’; and anathematises those who do not say that there is a recent God.
ἐγήγερται (1 Cor. 15:16); Δήλον γὰρ ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς νεκρός καθ’ ἡμᾶς γενόμενος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μαρτυρεῖτα τάδε.

3: What then [he says]? Is it not said most clearly about Christ that he rose by God, and not by himself, and that he was appointed Son of God because of his resurrection from the dead, which happened through the Holy Spirit? How, then, is it said: He whom God raised did not see corruption, and: Of the Son of God who has been appointed through a spirit of holiness from the resurrection from the dead.

4: But you [he says] who do not recognise the apostle and archpriest of our faith as Paul enjoins us, tell us: What priest do you know who is ever of the same nature as that which is officiated? Or what apostle who is not subjected to the one who has sent him? Or is it the Word, then, about whom this is said, which would make him lesser in nature and rank than God, as Arius opines? If it is not him, it will be necessary that there is another one besides the Word, who is considered to be a minister and servant of God through the operation of the Word.

5: Let us concede [he says] that the same Christ is also God through a coming together as you think, but who do you think Jesus is? For you will not say that he is Word and flesh. For if he is likewise God, it is obvious that Christ is not always God. For the Jesus whom you call God is the one whom God made both Lord and Christ, as it is clearly stated. What Jesus was, that is, Lord, he did not become when he was made Christ and Lord, for nobody becomes what he is. Consequently, then, Jesus is not always God, since he is not Lord either. But if Jesus is a human being, and you consider Christ to be God, he will either be only God like the Word, and the Word will be Christ even before the incarnation, or he will be God and another human being besides Jesus, and there will be two human beings appearing in him, after Jesus has been made Christ, of which one will have a composite hypostasis as you say, and Jesus will be a Christ who has been made. But if he is Christ, he will truly be thought of as God and human being, and thus Jesus will have taken an adventitious humanity and the divinity of himself died as we do and <experienced> the rest.
Christ, and Christ will show himself to have become three human beings and two Gods, or it will be thought that Jesus is divided into God and a human being, as a Christ who has been made.

6: Divine Scripture calls Christ one God and one human being and one Christ. But the one God is one by nature, and likewise also the one human being. But the one Christ is one Christ according to the voluntary union of God with the human being.

7: God made Jesus Lord and Christ. Where do you put the God Word, Egyptian? Is he a Lord who makes or a Lord who is made? Answer the question without making distinctions of your own!

8: If Christ participated in flesh and blood as we do, it is obvious that Christ is a human being through our nature. If, then, he participates in the same and in like manner, he is definitely entirely of the same nature only, as the others who participated in the same.

9: If the Father is once Father of the God Word alone and once Father and God, it follows either that the Father has advanced to a higher state, or that the Son has been reduced to a lesser state.

10: If Christ is at the same time God and human being, and God is not God of the human being, it is evident that they are not to one another what they are said to be, that is, neither is God a God for the human being nor is the human being a human being for God.

11: Holy Scripture calls Christ minister of the saints, and each minister of God evidently serves his God. And if the matters of the law are a shadow of the matters of grace, and the law had a minister in the shadow, it is evident that it also has a minister in grace.
12: If the God Word does not rule over the head, he does not rule over the whole body either. If the God Word is Lord of the church, he is by necessity also Lord of the head of the church.

13: If the God Word is not God and ruler of Christ, it is evident that Christ is also not the temple of the God Word. But if Jesus is the temple of the God Word, it is necessary that the God Word is also his God and ruler.

14: If everything has not only come to be through the Word but still comes to be, it is obvious that Jesus, too, has become Lord and Christ through the God Word, and that the Word is the God and ruler over all things <that came to be> through him.

15: Without being ruled by God a human being cannot fulfill the obedience <owed to him> or become sinless through the keeping of the law.

16: If the verse: The Lord your Lord anointed you does not refer to the human being, which is honoured through the anointing of the Spirit, but to the God Word, his anointer would have anointed him to dishonour, since he has greater things in his own nature than he has received through the anointing. For everyone who is anointed is anointed so as to receive some things that he cannot have in his nature.

17: Those who say that the God Word is the God and ruler of Christ do not say this from themselves but when they say it they obey the teaching of the Holy Spirit <which has been revealed> through prophets and apostles, and also of Christ himself. For [they say] David and Peter the Apostle said to him: I have seen the Lord always before me, and the Saviour himself <said>: My God, my God, why have you forsaken me, and: The Spirit of the Lord over me, and the prophet <said>: The God, your God has anointed you.
He who anathematises those who say that Jesus was glorified by the Spirit, anathematises those who say that Jesus was anointed by the Spirit.

If Jesus has not taken the ability to operate from the Spirit, as the Egyptian teaches, for what purpose did the Father give him the Spirit? For he says: The Father gives the Spirit without measure. For the Father loves the Son and has given everything in his hand.

The flesh of the Lord is believed to be life-giving because it was made life-giving by the God Word. For otherwise it cannot be life-giving.

There is no human being if it is not a certain human being, and God who assumes the human being assumes a certain human being, who is a human being by nature and beyond a human being because of the assumption.

It is written that the sanctifier, that is, Christ, and those who are sanctified are all from one, namely from God, for which reason he is not ashamed to call them brothers, when he says: I will announce your name to my brothers, and again: Since the children have partaken of blood and flesh he, too, has participated in the same likewise.

If he who was in the form of God lowered and emptied himself into the form of the servant is the same as the one who was exceedingly elevated and to whom God gave the name above all names, it follows that the Word has afterwards by grace what he had by nature before.

Nobody has ever seen God. If, then, the one who was seen on earth whose glory they have seen as of an only-begotten from the Father, is himself God by nature, how is true what has been confessed before?
25: If the Word appropriates all the <properties> of the flesh and the flesh is deemed worthy of all the <properties> of the Word, it follows <that he appropriates> being from nothing, which is a natural <characteristic> of the flesh, and being changeable and visible and being contained in a place. But even if someone conceded this, how would the flesh partake of the opposites. For what is visible is not invisible and what is changeable is not unchangeable.

26: If Christ is God by nature, how does he say on the cross: My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? For he is not God of him who is thought of as God. It, then, follows clearly that he who says that God is his God is a human being by nature.

27: If the demons knew that Jesus was God by nature [he says], why did they say: I adjure you by God that you do not torment us.

28: If the flesh is flesh and not divinity, since the divinity has not been changed into flesh, nor again completes the substance of the flesh, how is the human being, too, not for the same reason human being and not the divinity?

29: If the flesh is flesh and not the divinity, the human being is human being and not the divinity.

30: If the flesh is flesh and not the divinity, and the human being is no longer a human being and not the divinity, tell me what of the flesh is the divinity and what of the human being is the divinity?

31: If the divinity is that of the human being, what the divinity is of the flesh, and the flesh is different from the divinity, for it is flesh and not the divinity, how is the human being not also different from the divinity, since he is human being and not the divinity?
λβ’
Εἰ τῆς σαρκὸς μὲν μέρος οὐκ ἦν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου μέρος ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἀρειανίζεις ἢ ἀπολιναρίζεις;

λγ’
Εἰ ώσπερ μέρος οὐκ ἦστι τῆς σαρκὸς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, οὕτως οὐδὲ μέρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, πῶς οὐχ ἐπερ οὐς ἄνθρωπος παρὰ τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον, ὡσπερ οὐν καὶ ἐπερ οὐς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος παρὰ τὴν σάρκα· ὁ Λόγος γὰρ θεὸς ἦστι καὶ οὐ σάρξ, ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ἡ σάρξ σάρξ ἦστι καὶ οὐ θεότης;

32:
If the God Word was not a part of the flesh, but was a part of the human being, how are you not a follower of Arius and Apollinaris?

33:
If as the God Word is not a part of the flesh he is also not a part of the human being, how is the human being not different from the God Word, just as the God Word is different from the flesh, for the Word is God and not flesh, just as the flesh is also flesh and not the divinity?

[Λόγος Σ’]
Ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ ἀσεβείας δεῖξις θεοφόρον ἀνθρώπων καὶ οὐ θεὸν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα λεγόντων τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν.

α’
Εἰ στολὴν ἔχει ὁ Λόγος τὴν σάρκα, κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον αὐτῷ διὰ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ περὶ Εἰρ. (Gen. 49:11), δῆλον ὅτι ὁ ἀναθεματίζων τὸν λέγοντα θεοφόρον ἄνθρωπον τὸν Χριστόν, πρὸ τὸ λέγοντος τὸν φοροῦντα ἀναθεματίζει.

β’
Τὸ· Θεὸς ἦν ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ (cf. 1 Jn. 5:11), τοιάτα τὸ εἰρημένον μὴ τὸν Λόγον λέγειν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὡς ὁ φορῶν ἐν τῷ φορουμένῳ. Οὐδ’ ἄλλως ἄρα δύναται ὁ θεὸς εἶναι ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ.

γ’
Ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἑκουσίου ἑνώσεως τὴν ἑνύπαρξιν οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ· εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐνυπάρχει, οὐδὲ ἥνωται.

δ’
Εἰ μὴ εἰς ναὸν ἢ φόρημα ἔχει ὁ Λόγος τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰς οὐσίαν ἔχει, ὁ δὲ λαμβάνων τὴν σάρκα εἰς οὐσίαν τοῦ Χριστοῦ, αὔξησιν ποιεῖ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ, τρέπων καὶ ἀλλοιῶν αὐτὴν εἰς ἕτερον.

ε’
Εἰ θεοφόρον ἀνθρώπων εἰπεῖν τῶν Χριστῶν ἀτοποίησε· διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς πῶς ἁρμὸν ὀνομάζειν τῶν Χριστῶν ἀνθρώπων, θεοσεβέρων ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἀνθυποστάρκτων θεον;
ς' Εἰ ὥσπερ ἦν πρὸ τοῦ σαρκωθῆναι ὁ Λόγος εἷς θεὸς καὶ εἷς Υἱός, οὕτως καὶ μετὰ τὴν σάρκωσιν, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν σάρκα εἰς φόρημα ἔχει καὶ ναόν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς μέρος οὐσίας.

ζ' Εἰ μὴ θεοφόρος ἄνθρωπος ο Ἑραρθός, οὐδ' ἄρα ἄνθρωπος οὗτος ἔστιν ὁ Ἑραρθός ὁ ἀκοῦον τὴν ἀλλήλην τῷ θεῷ· Τί μή γάρ, φησί, ζητεῖτε ἀποκτείναι ἄνθρωπον ὃς τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ τὸν Θεόν (Jn. 8:40).

η' Ὅ κωλύων τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ, κωλύει τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ ὅρισθαι ὡς Ἰησοῦν Λόγον.

Θ' Εἰ οὐκ ἔστι Χριστὸς ὁ ἐνεργῶν ὡς θεὸς καὶ ἐνεργούμενος ὡς ἄνθρωπος, οὐδ' ἄρα ἐνεργῶν μόνον ἔστιν ο Χριστὸς ὁ ἐνεργούμενον.

ι' Ἀλλά μὲν καὶ Ἀθανάσιος, φησί, ὃν οὐ παραιτεῖσθε, ἐν τῷ περὶ ἐνανθρωπήσεως λέγει· Κατασκευάζει ἑαυτῷ ναὸν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἰδιοποιεῖται τοῦτο ὥσπερ ὄργανον, ἐν αὐτῷ γνωριζόμενος καὶ ἐνοικῶν, καὶ πάλιν· Τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ναὸν καὶ σωστικὸν ὄργανον προσάγων ἀντίψυχον ὑπὲρ πάντων.

[Λόγος Ζ'] Ἐβοίμοσι ἀπιστίας ἀπότου στηλίτευσις διαμεμφόεν τοῖς λέγουσι τὸν ἕνα τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος πεπονθέναι σαρκί.

α' Πῶς λέγετε, φασίν, ἕνα τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος πεπονθέναι σαρκί; Εἰ γὰρ οὐ τρεῖς θεούς, ἀλλ' ὑποστάσεις φατέ, ἀκόλουθον ἕνα λέγειν, ἢ μίαν τῆς τριάδος, ἀφοράντας πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἢ τὸ πρόσωπον, καὶ μὴ ἕνα· πρὸς θεοὺς γὰρ ἢ πατέρας ἢ υἱοὺς τοῦτο ἀποδίδεται ἀρρενικῶς λεγόμενο, διότι οὐδέ ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαρατηρήτως τῇ χρήσει

6: If the Word is one God and one Son after the incarnation as he is before the incarnation, it is obvious that he has the flesh as garment and temple, and not as a part of <his> substance.

7: If Christ is not a God-bearing human being, it follows that Christ who hears the truth from God is not a human being. For he says: What do you seek to kill me, a human being who has told you the truth which I heard from the Father?

8: He who prevents the God Word from acting in Jesus, prevents the human being from being seen as the God Word.

9: If the one who acts as God and is acted upon as a human being is not Christ, it follows that Christ is either only one who acts or <only> one who is acted upon.

10: But Athanasius [he says] whom you do not reject, says in <his treatise> about the inhumanation: He fashions the body as a temple for himself, and makes it his own as an instrument, being recognised in it and dwelling in <it>, and again: He who offers his temple and salvific instrument as ransom for all.

[Book 7] Seventh demonstration of the impiety of them who rebuke those who say that the one of the Trinity suffered through the flesh.

1: How do you say [he says] that one (masculine) of the holy Trinity suffered through the flesh? If you do not speak of three Gods but of <three> hypostases, it follows that you speak of one (neuter) or one (feminine) of the Trinity, taking into view the hypostasis (feminine) or the person (neuter), and not of one (masculine). For the masculine refers to gods or fathers or sons, for which reason you do not bear to speak
λέγειν τὸν Χριστὸν ὃν ὁμολογεῖτε ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, ἀνέχεσθε.

β’
Εἰ ἡ ἁγία Τριὰς ἁπαθής, ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς παθητός, εἰς δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστὸς τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος, ἢ καί ἡ ἁγία Τριὰς παθητή, ἢ ὁ Χριστὸς σὺς εἰς τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος. Εἰ δὲ προσθήτε τὸ σαρκὶ, τὸ τοιῶσδε πάσχειν οὐκ ἔλευθεροι πάθως, ὡσπερ ἂν καὶ εἴη τις τοιῶσδε πεπνῖχθαι τινά, οὐκ ἔλευθεροι τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ τοῦ πεπνῖχθαι τὸν περὶ οὗ εἴηται.

γ’
Εἰ φάσκοιεν τὸ ἔπαθε σαρκὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν, ἐναντίως ἑαυτοῖς τοῦτο λέγουσιν· εἰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν καθ’ ἣν ἔπαθεν ὁ Θεός Λόγος κατ’ αὐτούς, οὐκ ἰδίαν ἄλλοτριον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴδιον ἀλλότριον, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἀλλότριον ἀντὶ τοῦ ὄντος παθητοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν καὶ εἴηται τῷ οὗτος οὗτος καθ’ ἣν ἐστιν ἰδιότι, οὐκ ἰδιότι ἀλλότριον ἡ οὐσία καθ’ ἣν ἐστιν ἰδιότι, οὐ μόνον δύο οὐσίας λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύο πρόσωπα· τοῦ τε Θεοῦ Λόγου ἕν, καὶ ἓν ἐκείνου οὗτινός ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία καθ’ ἣν ἐστιν ἰδιότι τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος· τίνος γὰρ ἢ δηλονότι ἀνθρώπου; Ὁ δὲ τὶς ἄνθρωπος πρόσωπο.

δ’
Εἰ τὸ εἷς τῆς Τριάδος λεγόμενον, κοινὸν τῆς θεότητος καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος Χριστοῦ ἐστίν, ἢ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐστὶ κοινὸν τῷ Πατρί καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι, ἢ καθ’ ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον πῶς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀποτελουμένου Λόγου ἑνός. Ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν πάντων ἄλλου ὄντος οὐσίαν καθ’ ἣν ἔπαθεν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος κατ’ αὐτούς, οὐκ ἵδιον ἀλλότριον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴδιον ἀλλότριον, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἀλλότριον ἀντὶ τοῦ ὄντος παθητοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν καὶ εἴηται τῷ οὗτος οὗτος καθ’ ἣν ἐστιν ἰδιότι, οὐκ ἰδιότι ἀλλότριον ἡ οὐσία καθ’ ἣν ἐστιν ἰδιότι, οὐ μόνον δύο οὐσίας λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύο πρόσωπα, τοῦ τε Θεοῦ Λόγου ἕν, καὶ ἓν ἐκείνου οὗτινός ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία καθ’ ἣν ἐστιν ἰδιότι. Εἰ δὲ ὡς ὅλον ἐκ μερῶν τὸ εἷς τῆς Τριάδος λέγετε, ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος καθ’ ἑαυτὸν, ἥμισυ ἑνὸς τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος ἔσται. Εἰ δὲ ἄρα καὶ ἰδιότι δεῖ λέγειν ἐκ δύο, καὶ τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸ Πνεύματα λέγοντες, εἰς μονάδων εἶναι τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος τὸν λόγον δεδώκατε.

2:
If the holy Trinity is impassible and Christ is passible, and Christ is one of the holy Trinity, <it follows that> either the holy Trinity is passible, or Christ is not one of the holy Trinity. But if you add ‘he suffered through the flesh’, suffering in such a manner does not free him from suffering, just as when one says that someone was strangled in a particular manner, this does not free the one about whom this is said from suffering or being strangled.

3:
If they say that he suffered through the flesh instead of in his own substance, they contradict themselves with their statements. For if they say that according to them that substance in which the God Word suffered is not his own <substance>, lest they confess that he is passible in his nature, and <if> what is not one’s own is that of another, and what is of another belongs to another besides that of which it is not its own, they speak not only of two substances but also of two persons, one of the God Word, and one of that to which the substance belongs in which the God Word suffered. Of whom if not obviously the human being? But a certain human being is a person.

4:
If what is called ‘one of the Trinity’ is common to the divinity and the humanity of Christ, it is according to the same account either common with the Father and the Spirit, or it is according to different accounts †how of the one Word that has resulted from both. † And if the commonality is according to the same <account>, how is the flesh first of all not of like substance with the Word, and the divinity is then <not> a tetrad? But if the Word shares according to one <account> and the flesh according to another with the Father and the Spirit, how do you not introduce two natures of the holy Trinity? But if you say that ‘one of the Trinity’ is a whole from parts, the God Word by himself will be half of one of the holy Trinity. If, then, one must call him of like substance from two, you concede that the holy Trinity consists of six monads, when you speak of the Father and the Spirit.
If ‘one of the Trinity’ is indicated from the divinity and the flesh, how will the flesh not belong to the Trinity, but if the holy Trinity is in one respect a monad, the flesh will not also belong to the monad, but if the flesh belongs to the monad, and it is created, how is the monad uncreated?

If ‘one of the Trinity’ is made up of the divinity and the flesh, and the Trinity is confessed to be impassible, how will the divinity and the flesh not be impassible? But if it is impassible, who is it that has suffered for us? And what is that which is called passible before the resurrection?

If ‘one of the Trinity’ is made up of the divinity and the flesh, how will the one of the Trinity not be a human being, just as he is God, and be of like substance with the mother as he is of like substance with the Father? And if this is the case, how will the one of the Trinity not be one of the human nature just as he is one of the Trinity? Is he of the Trinity both according to the divinity and according to the flesh? How, then, will he not be also of the human nature, both according to the divinity and according to the flesh?

According to this logic lets us examine also the expression ‘God suffered through the flesh’, and the Word and Christ and the Son. For either these names include the two in their meaning, or not. If, then, they do not include <them>, they will posit that the flesh is without substance, or that the Word <is without substance>, or that either one is instrument or agent. But if each of the natures includes the two, the aforementioned absurdities will be attributed to them.

If the Word did not suffer through the flesh according to substance, it is obvious that he suffered insubstantially, but if <he suffered> insubstantially, he did not suffer, for the sufferings are strictly of the substance.

See [they say] when your father Cyril who says that the God Word suffered through the flesh

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was asked how this was possible, he explained time and again that he suffered through appropriation of his flesh that suffers by nature. If, then, God who truly remained in it was possible through appropriation of the one who suffered from the Jews, it follows that the God in him was only born through appropriation of the one who was born from a woman. It, then, follows that the Jews are not in truth killers of God, even if they are said to be, and that the Virgin is not god-bearer, even if she is said to be, for that he appropriated that which suffers or is born does not already mean that he suffered or was born.

11: Suffering through another one [he says] who suffers it not even possible in the case of those who are passible by nature. For the suffering is only seen in the one in which it has happened, not through the one through which it happened nor in which it was. <It is not> much more <the case that> the Word who is impassible is not said correctly by those who are pious to have suffered through the flesh?

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