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**THE NESTORIAN TREATISE PRESERVED IN LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM'S
CONTRA NESTORIANOS (CPG 6918): INTRODUCTION, EDITION AND ENGLISH
TRANSLATION**

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THE NESTORIAN TREATISE PRESERVED IN LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM'S *CONTRA NESTORIANOS* (CPG 6918): INTRODUCTION, EDITION AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Dirk Krausmüller, University of Vienna

Abstract

The Nestorian treatise preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem's *Contra Nestorianos* (CPG 6918) is the only surviving Nestorian Christological text in the Greek language that was written after the condemnation of Nestorius. It consists of self-contained arguments, mostly in the form of syllogisms, which are organised in eight books. The content can be easily reconstructed since Leontius of Jerusalem quotes each argument in full before refuting it. Only the last book is missing, either because Leontius did not get round to tackling it or because the manuscript containing Leontius' work was mutilated. This article will present an introduction, critical edition and English translation of the Treatise with annotations.

Keywords

Leontius of Jerusalem – Nestorian Treatise – *Contra Nestorianos* – Christology

Introduction

In the year 381 the Second Ecumenical Council declared that the godhead was three hypostases who shared one single nature and were therefore one God. This put an end to the controversies about the relationship between the divine Father and his Son and Spirit that had raged for more than half a century.¹ The number of those who rejected the settlement declined sharply in the following decades. Thus it could seem that the church was finally at peace. Yet this impression was deceptive because a new problem had arisen. The leading theologians of the time asked how one should conceive of the relationship between the second divine hypostasis, the Son or Word, and the human being Jesus, the flesh, that had been established through the incarnation. Two different approaches were developed, which have traditionally been called the Antiochene and Alexandrian Schools because in the late fourth and early fifth centuries most of their respective proponents were found in Syria and Egypt.²

The Antiochenes insisted on the difference between the Word and the flesh. They considered them to be two agents, which guided their reading of the Bible. They attributed 'high things' such as miracles to the Word and 'low things' such as sufferings to the flesh.

¹ See e. g. L. AYRES, *Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology*, New York 2004.

² For the following see B. E. DALEY, "Antioch and Alexandria: Christology as Reflection on God's presence in History," in F. MURPHY (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Christology*, Oxford 2015, 121-138. See also R. NORRIS, *Manhood and Christ: A Study in the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia*, Oxford 1963; and A. KOFISKY and S. RUZER, "Theodore of Mopsuestia on Progressive Revelation and Human Developments in Christ," *Revue biblique* 120 (2013): 570-595.

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By contrast, the Alexandrians claimed that both ‘high things’ and ‘low things’ must be predicated of a single agent, the Word. Accordingly, they would say that God suffered on the cross. This was dangerous ground since it appeared to negate the common notion that God was impassible by nature.³ Apart from a few extremists, nobody was prepared to go so far. Yet even so the Antiochenes were shocked. They came to the conclusion that the Alexandrians had to be blasphemers because they denied the transcendence of God. A second bone of contention was the status of the flesh. By attributing the ‘low things’ to it the Antiochenes accorded it a will of its own. This gave the impression as if sinlessness was an achievement of the flesh. The Alexandrians complained that such a belief nullified the salvation of humankind. For them no human being could be sinless. Accordingly, they argued that the Word did not permit the flesh to make moral judgements.

In the late 420s matters came to a head when the Syrian monk Nestorius was appointed patriarch of Constantinople.⁴ Due to his Antiochene background, he was greatly upset by the term ‘God-bearer’ that had come to be widely used for the Virgin Mary. He claimed that God could not have been born from a human being because he had an eternal existence. His criticism irked the powerful patriarch of Alexandria, Cyril, who came to the defense of the term. In the course of the controversy the two men developed conceptual frameworks that could support their views. Nestorius spoke of two separate human and divine natures and hypostases and declared that the incarnation had resulted in a *prosopon* of union, which was based on will and grace.⁵ By contrast, Cyril stated several times that there was only one nature and one hypostasis and that the union affected the being of the two components.⁶

At the Third Ecumenical Council in 431 Nestorius’ position was declared heretical. This meant that it could no longer be held with impunity. Yet this did not mean that the Antiochene School disappeared.⁷ In 451 it gained a new lease of life when the Fourth Ecumenical Council defined the Word and the flesh as two natures, which were united in one hypostasis. This formula was accepted by the majority of Antiochenes because it left room for interpretation. One could focus on the two natures and emphasise their difference, in particular since a synodal document, the so-called Tome of Leo, claimed that each nature did what was its own. Accordingly, Antiochenes such as the patriarch Gennadius of Constantinople felt justified in attacking Cyril.⁸ Yet by the beginning of the sixth century the situation had begun to change. Those who followed Cyril in speaking of one nature and one hypostasis, the Monophysites, claimed that the formula of Chalcedon was a vindication of Nestorius’ position. Stung by this criticism, some Chalcedonians

³ See J. M. HALLMAN, “The Seed of Fire: Divine Suffering in the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria and Nestorius of Constantinople,” *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 5 (1997): 369-392.

⁴ For the following see S. WESSEL, *Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and of a Heretic*, Oxford 2004, esp. 130-131.

⁵ See e.g. J. A. MCGUCKIN, “The Christology of Nestorius of Constantinople,” *The Patristic and Byzantine Review* 7 (1988): 93-129.

⁶ However, see H. VAN LOON, *The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria*, Leiden–Boston 2009.

⁷ See e.g. R. HÜBNER, “Die eine Person und die zwei Naturen,” in R. KANY (ed.), *Reinhold Hübner. Kirche und Dogma im Werden*, Tübingen 2017, 439-464.

⁸ See L. VAN ROMPAY, “Gennadius of Constantinople as a Representative of Antiochne Exegesis,” *Studia Patristica* 19 (1989): 400-402. See also J. DECLERCK, “Le patriarche Gennade de Constantinople (458-471) et un opuscule inédit contre les Nestoriens,” *Byzantion* 60 (1990): 130-144.

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proceeded to interpret their creed in the light of Cyril's teachings. They were met with fierce opposition by the Antiochenes. One of their number, Basil of Cilicia, wrote a lengthy treatise against John of Scythopolis whose theology was influenced by the Alexandrian patriarch.⁹ Yet eventually the Cyrillianists, or Neochalcedonians as they are often called, gained the upper hand. Now the emphasis was firmly on the one hypostasis. The culmination of this trend was the Fifth Ecumenical Council in the year 553. There the two foremost Antiochene theologians, Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, were condemned although they had already been dead for more than a century. This decision spelt the end of Antiochene Chalcedonianism. Its proponents, such as the monks of Palestine, had no choice but to distance themselves from their beliefs.¹⁰

It goes without saying that those Antiochenes who continued to subscribe to the teachings of Nestorius were in an even worse position. They had been persecuted by the Roman state and the official church ever since the year 431. Some of their number sought refuge in the Persian Empire where the situation was radically different. In the second half of the fifth century the Christians there adopted Theodore of Mopsuestia as their main Christological authority.¹¹ At the end of the sixth century one of their leaders, Babai the Great, spoke openly of two natures and two hypostases in the incarnated Word.¹² Yet this does not mean that there were no longer any Nestorians in the Roman Empire. Although most of their writings have disappeared we still have a lengthy treatise, which has survived in a refutation by the Chalcedonian theologian Leontius of Jerusalem where it is extensively quoted.¹³ Like Babai, its author defends a specifically Nestorian Christology and rejects the formula of Chalcedon.¹⁴ Since he also polemicises against the Fifth Ecumenical Council we can be certain that he was active after 553. His *floruit* can be inferred from a reference to a contemporary practice. In chapter III.8 he declares that the womb of the empress is crowned before she gives birth in the purple chamber, and adds that this is often the case. This rules out a date before 582 because Justinian, Justin II and Tiberius II had no children while they were in office. The reigns of Maurice (582-602) and Heraclius (610-641) are equally possible since both men had numerous offspring. Yet it can be argued that the treatise was written during the Persian occupation of the Eastern provinces of the Roman Empire in the second and third decades of the seventh century when there was no fear of persecution. This is all the more likely since Leontius of Jerusalem once refers to the sack of the holy city by the Persians.

⁹ See A. RIGOLO, *Christians in Conversation*, Oxford 2019, 197-199.

¹⁰ See D. HOMBERGEN, *The Second Origenist Controversy. A New Perspective on Cyril of Scythopolis' Monastic Biographies as Historical Sources for Sixth-Century Origenism*, Rome 2001, 180.

¹¹ See B. EBEID, "The Christology of the Church of the East: An Analysis of Christological Statements and Professions of Faith of the Official Synods of the Church of the East before A.D. 612," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 82 (2016): 353-402.

¹² See L. ABRAMOWSKI, "Babai der Große: Christologische Probleme und ihre Lösungen," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 41 (1975) 289-343.

¹³ On Leontius of Jerusalem see P. T. GRAY, "Through the Tunnel with Leontius of Jerusalem: the Sixth-Century Transformation of Theology," in P. ALLEN-E. M. JEFFREYS (ed.), *The Sixth Century, End or Beginning?* Brisbane 1996, 187-196; and D. KRAUSMÜLLER, "Human Souls as Consubstantial Sons of God: The Heterodox Anthropology of Leontius of Jerusalem," *Journal of Late Antique Religion and Culture* 4 (2010): 43-67.

¹⁴ For the following see D. KRAUSMÜLLER, "Leontius of Jerusalem, a Theologian of the 7th Century," *Journal of Theological Studies* 52 (2001): 637-657.

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The Nestorian Treatise

The treatise is of the utmost significance since it is the only surviving Nestorian Christological text in the Greek language that was written after the condemnation of Nestorius. It consisted of self-contained arguments, mostly in the form of syllogisms, which were organised in eight books.¹⁵ The content can be easily reconstructed since Leontius of Jerusalem quotes each argument in full before refuting it.¹⁶ Only the last book is missing, either because Leontius did not get round to tackling it or because the manuscript containing Leontius' work was mutilated. In his introduction Leontius gives a short summary of the topics:¹⁷

<p>Πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς σύνθεσιν τῆς θείας καὶ ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως δοξάζομεν.</p>	<p>First, that we (i.e. the Chalcedonians) do not correctly confess a composition of the divine and human natures.</p>
<p>Δεύτερον ὅτι δύο οὐσῶν τῶν ὑποστάσεων Χριστοῦ οὐ καλῶς καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔνωσιν γενέσθαι λέγομεν καὶ μίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν γινώσκομεν.</p>	<p>Second, that while there are two hypostases of Christ we wrongly say that a union according to hypostasis took place and recognise one hypostasis of him.</p>
<p>Καὶ τρίτον πάλιν ὅτι δύο ὄντων υἱῶν κακῶς ἓνα ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι υἱὸν τὸν Χριστόν.</p>	<p>Third again, that while there are two sons, we wrongly confess that Christ is one son.</p>
<p>Τέταρτον ὅτι ψευδῶς θεοτόκον τὴν ἁγίαν Παρθένον ὀνομάζομεν.</p>	<p>Fourth, that we wrongly call the holy Virgin 'God-bearer'.</p>
<p>Πέμπτον ὅτι μὴ ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον μόνον τῆ φύσει ἴσμεν Χριστὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ θεόν.</p>	<p>Fifth, that we know that Christ is not just a mere human being by nature but that he is also God.</p>
<p>Ἑκτον ὅτι μὴ θεοφόρον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ θεὸν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα ἴσμεν τὸν Λόγον.</p>	<p>Sixth, that we know that the Word (sic) is not a God-bearing human being but God who has become a human being.</p>
<p>Ἑβδομον ὅτι ἀθέσμως τὸν ἓνα τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος πεπονθέναι σαρκὶ κηρύττομεν.</p>	<p>Seventh, that we proclaim unlawfully that one of the Trinity has suffered through the flesh.</p>
<p>Ἐν ὀγδόῳ δὲ τῆς δυσσεβείας τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔνωσιν ἀρνούμενοι ἀσυστάτους τινὰς ἑτέρας τερατεύονται.</p>	<p>In the eighth (sc. book) of impiety, they deny the union according to hypostasis and conjure up some others that are inexistent.</p>

¹⁵ See. L. ABRAMOWSKI, "Ein nestorianischer Traktat bei Leontius of Jerusalem," in R. LAVENANT (ed.), *III. Symposium Syriacum*, Rome 1983, 43-55.

¹⁶ Leontius' treatise *Contra Nestorianos* can be read in full in A. MAI, *Scriptorum veterum nova collectio* 9. Rome 1837, 410-610, reprinted with a Latin translation in J.-P. MIGNE, *Patrologia Graeca* 86.1, Paris 1865, 1400-1768i.

¹⁷ See Codex Marcianus graecus Z.69, fol. 298v-299r.

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A Nestorian Christology

Through his insistence that the divine Word and the human being Jesus are two hypostases the author of the treatise reveals himself to be not just an Antiochene but a follower of Nestorius. Like Nestorius, he advocates a weak link between the Word and the flesh. In chapter II.34 and elsewhere he speaks of the one *prosopon* of union, which does not affect the two natures but is based on will and love. Thus it is not surprising that he fights the same battles.

In chapter IV.1 the Nestorian criticises his adversaries for claiming that Mary was God-bearer ‘strictly and in truth’. This qualification, which was added at the Council of Ephesus, had become necessary because the term ‘God-bearer’ was not unequivocal.¹⁸ As the Nestorian states in chapter IV.2 he could have accepted it since human beings can be called ‘gods’ because of the divine image. Yet it was clearly problematic since it gave the impression as if Mary was mother of God by nature. In chapters IV.7 and IV.8 the Nestorian declares that offspring must be of the same substance as the parent and then concludes that there are only two possible scenarios: either Mary was a goddess, which would be blasphemous, or she was a human being in which case the Word born from her was not God.

In chapter III.10 the Nestorian defends himself against the accusation that he teaches two sons.¹⁹ He objects that one can only count sons when they are born from the same parents. This, however, is not the case with the incarnation because the Word is son by nature and Christ is son by adoption. In chapter III.11 he illustrates his point with the case of Rachel. Rachel had adoptive sons from her servant-woman Bilha and sons that she herself had given birth to. Yet when the sons of Jacob are listed in Genesis only Rachel’s true sons are mentioned as hers.

In chapter I.44 the Nestorian counters the claim that he venerates a mere human being.²⁰ He contends that Christ was a special case because he was accorded a higher honour than other members of the human race. In order to support this claim he offers two arguments. In chapter III.7 he states that a gnat and an angel are both creatures but we would for this reason not say that they have the same honour. In chapter III.9 different types of sons of God are distinguished on a rising scale. All human beings are sons of God because of the divine image, the Israelites were more specifically sons of God because God had made a covenant with them and gave them the law, Christians are sons of God to an even greater degree since they are recipients of divine grace and promised sinlessness, and Christ is son of God in the same sense as other Christians but has additional honours since he was chosen from all human beings and given an incomparable name. This understanding of Christ’s status is radically different from the Chalcedonian and Monophysite view that Jesus was assumed into the divinity and therefore participates in the sonship of the Word.

In chapter I.19 the Nestorian author seeks to show that a connection through the will, love, grace and good pleasure of the Word can account for all that was known about Christ and that there was therefore no need for a union according to hypostasis as it was proposed by his adversaries. He avers that Christ’s miracles could not be considered proof of such a union since Jesus promised that greater ones would be performed by his Apostles who were mere human beings. Likewise, the Virgin birth and the sinlessness were no valid

¹⁸ See R. PRICE, “The Virgin as Theotokos at Ephesus (AD 431) and Earlier,” in Ch. MAUNDER, *The Oxford Handbook of Mary*, Oxford 2019, 67-77.

¹⁹ See WESSEL, *Cyril of Alexandria*, 157-158.

²⁰ See WESSEL, *Cyril of Alexandria*, 191.

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arguments because in Matthew 1:8 Mary is said to have become pregnant from the Holy Spirit and in 1 Timothy 3:16 Jesus is said to have been justified in the Spirit. This may give the impression that the Nestorian author simply substitutes the operations of the Spirit for the effects of hypostatic union. Yet this is not quite the case. Whereas Chalcedonians and Monophysites give the human being no share in the achievement of sinlessness the Nestorian author states clearly in chapter I.19 and once more in chapter I.47 that it was Jesus himself who avoided sinning while the Holy Spirit only provided support. Significantly, he exclaims that otherwise it would be meaningless to speak of sinlessness as an achievement. For him Jesus has an autonomous personality that developed over time. In chapter II.6 he considers entirely unproblematic the claim in Luke 2:52 that Jesus grew in wisdom, which had greatly incommodated Cyril.²¹ In chapter II.32 he says that only the Word is omniscient whereas Jesus is ignorant as it is attested in the Bible.

In other respects, too, the Bible is the Nestorian author's most potent weapon. He has a marked preference for the oldest layer of Christological statements. In chapter V.5 he quotes Acts 2:36 where Christ is said to have been made Lord and Christ by God. This allows him to argue that the lordship of Jesus is an honorary title for a creature and can therefore not be identified with the natural lordship of the divine Word. In chapters II.48 and V.3 he points out correctly that according to the Bible Christ was raised by God and did not raise himself as it was claimed by the Chalcedonians.

The Nestorian Contribution to the Christological debate

The issues that we have discussed so far were first raised around the time of the Council of Ephesus. Yet this does not mean that the Nestorian only rehashes old arguments. He shows himself fully *au fait* with more recent developments. In order to contextualise his contribution to the mature Christological discourse it is necessary to consider not only the Chalcedonians but also the Monophysites. The debate between these two sects began in earnest in the early sixth century when the Chalcedonian John of Caesarea clashed with the Monophysite Severus of Antioch. It then continued with contributions by Leontius of Byzantium and John Philoponus.²² It has already been suggested that the Chalcedonians modified their position in response to Monophysite criticism.²³ What has not yet been assessed is the impact of Nestorian arguments. In what follows I will show that they were trenchant enough to trouble Chalcedonian authors. Apart from the Nestorian who wrote in Greek and lived in the Roman Empire we need to consider the contribution of his contemporary Babai the Great. Although Babai lived in the Persian Empire and wrote in Syriac he was aware of the discussions going on across the border and responded to them.

The Independent Existence of the Flesh

The Chalcedonians had to show that the flesh was not an independent individual besides the Word because this would have destroyed the oneness of the incarnated Word,

²¹ See WESSEL, *Cyril of Alexandria*, 133-134.

²² See J. ZACHHUBER, *The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics. Patristic Philosophy from the Cappadocian Fathers to John of Damascus*, Oxford 2020, 119-167, 189-214.

²³ See A. GRILLMEIER, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche, II.2: Die Kirche von Konstantinopel im 6. Jahrhundert*, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1989, 143-149.

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which they sought to defend.²⁴ The most popular, and least sophisticated, argument was to claim that the flesh could not have a hypostasis of its own because it only came into existence at the moment of its union with the Word. It is first attested in John of Caesarea's treatise and is repeated in all later Chalcedonian texts (with the exception of Leontius of Byzantium who considers such a scenario to be at least possible).²⁵ Here, there was no disagreement with the Monophysites. Severus and his followers also denied the pre-existence of the flesh because they were if anything even more concerned about maintaining the oneness of the incarnated Word. The Nestorian challenges this consensus. In chapter II.20 he distinguishes between two ways in which the incarnation could have taken place. Either the human body was fashioned first, the soul was breathed into it afterwards, and the Word united himself with both body and soul in third place. Or the Word united himself first with the body and then breathed the soul into the body and into himself. He contends that only the first option can be correct because in the second option the body would mediate between the soul and the Word. Such a scenario would be impossible since a mediator must take a middle position between two extremes. This, however, could only be the soul, which is closer to the Word than the body. Both options presuppose a particular understanding of the formation of the embryo where the soul appears only after the body has been fully formed. We encounter it in Syriac Christianity but also in Aristotelian philosophy. The Nestorian recognises its potential for anti-Chalcedonian polemic. According to the first option, the body existed before the union with the Word, which means that it had a hypostasis of its own. The Nestorian concludes that one can therefore only speak of a looser union based on the good pleasure of the divinity. It might be said that this is a weak argument because the Chalcedonians could simply deny that in the embryo the body comes into existence before the soul. There was indeed an alternative theory, first proposed by Gregory of Nyssa, according to which the soul is present in the body from the moment of conception. Applied to the incarnation, it meant that the Word created both body and soul simultaneously when he united himself with them. Thus, it is not surprising that it was accepted by Chalcedonian authors and also by Severus. Yet matters were less straightforward than they might first seem. In the sixth century there were also Chalcedonians who claimed that in the embryo the body comes into existence before the soul. They thought that the presence of the soul at the moment of conception would imply that it had already existed before the body, which was a tenet of the Origenist heresy. This made it difficult for them to maintain a Chalcedonian Christology. Leontius of Jerusalem declared that the incarnation was categorically different from the coming-to-be of ordinary human beings and should be considered a miracle. The Nestorian was probably already aware of this 'solution' and had found a way to refute it. He quotes Hebrews 4:15 where Christ is said to be like us in all respects apart from sin. The excluded second option is also interesting. It is likely that some Chalcedonians believed that the Word united himself first with the body and then with the soul because it ruled out an independent pre-existence of the body. Significantly, however, the only text in which it is attested today is a treatise by Babai the Great. Babai considered the Nestorian's position to be heretical because it minimised the effects of the incarnation. There can be no doubt that the Nestorian brushed away such concerns because his sole aim was to destroy the Chalcedonian position.

²⁴ For the following see D. KRAUSMÜLLER, "Where embryology intersects with Christology: the viewpoints of Nestorian, Monophysite and Chalcedonian authors of the sixth to tenth centuries," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 113 (2020): 853-878.

²⁵ See B. E. DALEY, *Leontius of Byzantium. Complete Works*, Oxford 2017, 36.

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No hypostatic idioms

Denying that the flesh existed before the union with the Word was no doubt a popular argument. Yet it soon turned out that it alone could not prevent the human nature from becoming a separate hypostasis. The problems surfaced when John of Caesara applied to the incarnation the conceptual framework of a common nature/substance and individual hypostases that the Cappadocians had developed for the Trinity.²⁶ In principle, this was a clever move. It highlighted the fact that for the Monophysites the term ‘nature’ had different meanings in Trinitarian theology and in Christology: in the former case it denoted the species whereas in the latter case it denoted an individual. This made it easy to accuse them of inconsistency. Yet there were also serious drawbacks. According to the Cappadocians, the ‘addition’ of individual characteristics to a set of common properties constituted a hypostasis within a species. If the human nature had such characteristics it would have become a separate hypostasis even within the hypostasis of the Word. Significantly, this point is not made by Severus who in his Christological statements showed no interest in individual characteristics. In secondary literature it is therefore assumed that the Chalcedonians themselves became aware of the problem. Yet it is equally possible that others forced them to acknowledge it. In chapter II.21 the Nestorian pits Trinitarian theology against Christology. He states that the idiom ‘begotten’ distinguishes the Word from the Father and the Spirit and thus constitutes him straightway as a separate hypostasis. Then he points out that the birth from a Virgin distinguishes Jesus from all other human beings and must therefore also straightway constitute him as a hypostasis.

John’s solution was simply to deny that the flesh had individual characteristics. Leontius of Byzantium, too, once expresses this view. He compares the incarnated Word both with the other divine persons and with other human beings. He states that the Word is distinguished from the Father through the characteristic ‘begotten’ but he does then not say that the flesh is distinguished from his mother Mary through its characteristics. Instead, he juxtaposes Mary with the incarnated Word as a whole. This strange asymmetry becomes even odder when we see that Leontius creates an analogy with the human being. Here we find an exact parallel. Both the body and the soul of a human being are hypostases because they differ from the bodies and souls of other human beings. Significantly, in chapter II.15 the Nestorian makes the same point. He states that the body of Peter differed from the body of Paul, just as their souls differed from one another. This can only mean that both body and soul had hypostases of their own. Predictably, he then concludes that the same must then also apply to the incarnated Word. This remained a weakness of Chalcedonianism throughout the sixth century. A solution of sorts was only found after the Nestorian’s time. Then it was claimed that individuation alone did not bring about hypostases but that a further component was needed that gave reality to the individuated nature.²⁷ Interestingly, Severus never criticised the absence of individual characteristics in the flesh. By contrast, the Nestorian pounced on it. In chapter II.6 he points out that it flies in the face of the Biblical accounts, which present Jesus as an individual, and he adds that Mary was an individual and could therefore only have given birth to an individual.

²⁶ For the following see D. KRAUSMÜLLER, “Does the Flesh Possess Hypostatic Idioms, and If So, Why it is Then Not a Separate Hypostasis? On a Conceptual Problem of Late Patristic Christology,” *Scrinium* 15 (2019): 213-230.

²⁷ See ZACHHUBER, *Rise of Christian Theology*, 289, 310.

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Universal Natures in Christ

John made a distinction between the Word who was a hypostasis and the human nature, which lacked this status. Yet at the same time he declared that the incarnation was a union of two universal or common natures.²⁸ This led to conceptual problems because it was not clear what ‘common nature’ meant. Severus avers that it could only refer to the sum-total of all members of a species. Accordingly, he concludes that the entire divinity would have become incarnate in the entire human race. John complains that Severus wilfully misunderstood him. When he spoke of the whole nature he meant that the Word possessed the sum-total of properties that constitute the divinity. This is evidently a deflection from the actual problem. The real crux was that according to the Cappadocians the set of divine properties is found in all three persons without being divided up among them. This made it difficult to explain why the incarnation did not involve the three divine persons and in addition also the entire human race.

The Nestorian deals with this topic in chapter II.7. There he grants his Chalcedonian adversaries that they do not speak of the incarnation of the entire Trinity. Accordingly, his focus is exclusively on the human dimension. He distinguishes between a union of the Word with a particular human being and a union of the Word with the universal human being. In the former case he concludes that a particular human being is nothing else but a human hypostasis as the Nestorians had said all along. The latter case is, of course, the solution proposed by John. The Nestorian claims that if it were true the Word would have become incarnate in all human beings, including the Jews who sentenced and killed Jesus. Here we can see clearly that Monophysites and Nestorians used the same arguments when they attacked the Chalcedonians. Yet this is not all the Nestorian has to say. He mentions a second meaning of ‘universal human being’. It could denote a set of common human properties that the mind abstracts from the individuals and that therefore only exists as a concept in the mind. This was a potent argument because it gave the impression that the Chalcedonians were docetists who sought to nullify the reality of the incarnation.

This second argument was summed up in the formula ‘there is no nature that is *anhypostatos*’. Here *anhypostatos* has two meanings, ‘inexistent’ and ‘without hypostasis’. It is claimed that a nature can only be real when it is instantiated in a hypostasis.²⁹ Significantly, the formula is quoted both by Severus and by the Nestorian. This confirms Leontius of Byzantium’s claim that both sects used it in their polemic against the Chalcedonians.³⁰ It seems likely that it had originally been coined by the Nestorians since they alone spoke of a human nature and a human hypostasis. In response to it John had claimed that the universal human nature was not *anhypostatos* because it existed so-to-speak parasitically in the Word, which was constituted as a hypostasis through the idiom ‘begotten’. This argument, however, was rejected by both Monophysites and Nestorians. Therefore the Chalcedonians felt the need to shore up the ontological status of the human nature itself. One popular strategy was to reinterpret the formula ‘there is no nature that is *anhypostatos*’. It was claimed that the antonym of *anhypostatos* was not hypostasis but *enhyposstatos*, which conferred reality on the human

²⁸ See ZACHHUBER, *Rise of Christian Theology*, 195. See also D. KRAUSMÜLLER, “Properties participating in substance: the Trinitarian theology of Severus of Antioch and Damian of Alexandria,” *Journal of Late Antique Religion and Culture* 12 (2018): 15-29.

²⁹ See Ch. ERISMANN, “Non est natura sine persona. The Issue of Unsubstantiated Universals from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages,” in M. A. CAMERON-J. MARENBOON (ed.), *Methods and Methodologies. Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500*, Leiden-Boston 2011, 75-91.

³⁰ See DALEY, *Leontius of Byzantium*, 28-29.

Dirk Krausmüller, “The Nestorian Treatise Preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem’s *Contra Nestorianos* (CPG 6918),” *Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture* 17 (2023) 59-130;

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nature without turning it into a fully fledged hypostasis.³¹ This line of reasoning was known to the Nestorian who inveighs against it in chapter II.13. There he explains how the Chalcedonians defended their use of the term *enhypostatos*. Their first argument is a comparison with Trinitarian theology. They pointed out that in the Trinity one can speak of three substantial hypostases (*enousioi hypostaseis*) without assuming the existence of three substances (*ousiai*), and they concluded that one should then also be able to speak in Christology of two hypostatic substances (*enhypostatoi ousiai*) without speaking of two hypostases. The second argument is an analogy. A body can be called coloured (*enchromatistos*) but is not colour (*chroma*) and in the same way a substance can be called *enhypostatos* but is not hypostasis. The Nestorian complains bitterly that these are paralogsms based on a superficial similarity of terms, which are meant to confuse ordinary Christians. In the second case he presents a counter-argument: if colour equals hypostasis and it is found in a body a hypostasis is also found in a substance. The Nestorian ascribes these arguments to a group of Chalcedonians who called themselves ‘Cherubim’. Unfortunately, we do not know who these people were. Yet we can be certain that the two arguments already existed in the second quarter of the sixth century because Leontius of Byzantium juxtaposes *enousios* and *enhypostatos* on the one hand and shape (*schema*) and shaped (*enschematistos*) on the other.³² Significantly, however, Leontius does not develop the two arguments but adds a new definition of *enhypostatos*, which is borrowed from the philosophical discourse. This suggests that Nestorian criticism forced the Chalcedonians to rethink their arguments.

Composition and the Anthropological Paradigm

In order to show that the incarnated Word cannot be a single hypostasis, the Nestorian juxtaposes properties of the Word and of the flesh, such as uncreated and created in chapter I.26, or infinite and finite in chapter I.25, and then claims that they cannot co-exist in one and the same being. This is a traditional argument, which is already found in Nestorius’ writings and which had been passed down through the decades, eventually also making an appearance in Babai’s writings.³³ Yet it plays a relatively minor role in the Nestorian’s treatise. The focus is instead on the concept of ‘composition’, which had been employed by Cyril of Alexandria and later also by Severus.³⁴ In Chalcedonian texts it first appears in the first quarter of the sixth century. There the Monophysite formula of the ‘one composite nature’ is replaced with its Chalcedonian equivalent of the ‘one composite hypostasis’. The Nestorian declares that this was the official dogma of the Chalcedonian church. This can only be a reference to the Fifth Ecumenical Council of 553 where the concept of composition had been introduced as an orthodox alternative to looser types of union preferred by the Nestorians, such as ‘relation’ and ‘equality of honour’, which were condemned as heretical. This produced a Nestorian backlash. Babai the Great polemicalises against Emperor Justinian, declaring him to be the worst heretic of all times. Moreover, he seeks to show that defining the incarnation as a composition is

³¹ For the following see B. GLEEDE, *The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος from Origen to John of Damascus*, Leiden-Boston 2012, 127-131.

³² See D. KRAUSMÜLLER, “Making sense of the formula of Chalcedon: the Cappadocians and Aristotle in Leontius of Byzantium’s *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychnianos*,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 65 (2011): 484-513.

³³ See P. BRUNS, “Finitum non capax infiniti. Ein antiochenisches Axiom in der Inkarnationslehre Babais des Grossen,” *Oriens Christianus* 83 (1999): 46-71.

³⁴ For the following see D. KRAUSMÜLLER, “What is a Composite Hypostasis? Leontius of Jerusalem, Maximus the Confessor and the Nestorian Challenge,” forthcoming in *Scrinium*.

Dirk Krausmüller, “The Nestorian Treatise Preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem’s *Contra Nestorianos* (CPG 6918),” *Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture* 17 (2023) 59-130;

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not reconcilable with common notions about the divinity. Significantly, the Nestorian takes the same approach in the first book of his treatise. Both authors claim that in order to determine what ‘composition’ means one must consider all cases of compounds in the created order. They assert that from all these compounds one can derive a general rule to which there are no exceptions. Then they list the properties of the parts. In chapter I.2, for example, the Nestorian avers that all parts are circumscribed and that the Word can therefore not be a part since he is uncircumscribed. An almost identically worded argument is employed by Babai, which leaves no doubt that both authors make use of earlier texts. In fact, the earliest known source predates the Fifth Ecumenical Council. In the 520s the Chalcedonian author John Maxentius had claimed that only composition could prevent a Nestorian interpretation of the formula of Chalcedon. In his treatise he provides clear evidence for a debate even at this point. He lets a Nestorian say that every composition consists of parts and that parts are necessarily lesser than the whole, which would mean that the Word is lesser than the composite of Word and flesh. Significantly, the same argument is employed both by Babai and by the Nestorian. Thus we can conclude that there was a Nestorian discourse stretching through the whole sixth century and encompassing the Roman and Sasanian empires, despite the difference in language. The Chalcedonians found it difficult to respond. They could argue that composition in the case of the incarnation was of a different type from that in the created order. But then they could be accused of making arbitrary statements.

As we have seen the Nestorian and Babai formulate a general rule and then apply it to the specific case of the incarnation. Most arguments of the two authors, however, contain a further step. The general rule is illustrated with an example, the human compound. The result is that the incarnated Word cannot be compared with the human being.³⁵ This is not just an illustration. The way in which the general rule is phrased shows clearly that the Nestorian and Babai had the human being in mind all along. The Nestorian claims that the soul by necessity ceases to function when the body turns to sleep, and that it needs the body to learn and to do good deeds. The anthropology behind this statement is clear: the soul is dependent on the body, just as the body is dependent on the soul. This is an anthropology that goes back to the Syrians and possibly also to Aristotle.

Of course, these arguments could be countered through recourse to a different anthropology where the soul is not dependent on the body and can therefore be used as an analogy for the Word. Leontius of Byzantium, for example, makes this point with reference to Platonic philosophy. Yet the historical context must again be considered. At the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553 Origenism, which had once been tolerated, was officially declared to be heretical. As a consequence, many people were suspicious of Platonist notions about the soul. The Nestorian capitalises on this development. In chapter I.51 at the end of the first book he plays the heresiological card. He claims that according to ‘us’ Christians the soul is lesser than the whole human being whereas according to the pagans and Manichaeans it is greater. This juxtaposition is not as innocuous as it first may seem. Significantly, John Philoponus holds the view that is here attributed to the pagans and Manichaeans. The polemical character of the argument becomes even clearer when we consider how the Nestorian makes his case. He says that according to the Christians the soul remains the same after its separation from the body, being incapable of functioning without the organs of the body and therefore being in a deep sleep. By contrast, the pagans and Manichaeans claim that the soul is better on its own and perfectly self-sufficient, both before it is imprisoned in a body and also afterwards. The Nestorian

³⁵ For the following see D. KRAUSMÜLLER, “Conflicting anthropologies in the Christological discourse at the end of Late Antiquity: the case of Leontius of Jerusalem’s Nestorian adversary,” *The Journal of Theological Studies* 56 (2005): 413-447.

Dirk Krausmüller, “The Nestorian Treatise Preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem’s *Contra Nestorianos* (CPG 6918),” *Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture* 17 (2023) 59-130;

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insinuates that whoever believes in an active afterlife of the soul also believes in its pre-existence and is therefore not a Christian. Here again we need to consider the context, the witchhunt against the Origenists who were claimed to be pagans and Manichaeans. It is clear that enough people in the Chalcedonian church believed that the soul was dependent on the body, sharing an anti-Origenist outlook. The Nestorian could therefore give the impression that those who used the anthropological paradigm were in reality heretics and pagans. Significantly, later Chalcedonian authors such as Maximus rejected the anthropological paradigm as unsuitable. Normally it is thought that he himself came to this conclusion but it seems likely that he was pushed into that direction by the Nestorian objections.

Edition

The edition is based on the Codex Marcianus gr. Z.69 (coll. 501), 298v-400v (Diktyon 69540), which dates to the late thirteenth century. Three further witnesses, the Monacensis gr. 67 (Diktyon 44511), the Parisinus Suppl. Grec 1288 (Diktyon 53952), and the Vaticanus Pal. gr. 342 (Diktyon 66047), which date to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are not considered as they are *apographa* of the Codex Marcianus.³⁶ I have retained Mai's and Migne's numbering of the chapters although not all start with a quotation from the Nestorian treatise. This means that in a few cases the numbering is discontinuous.

[Λόγος Α']

Ἐγκαλοῦσι δ' οὖν ἡμῖν ὡς εἴρηται
πρωτίστως περὶ τῆς ὁμολογίας τῆς τῶν
φύσεων συνθέσεως ἐπὶ τοῦ δεσπότου ἡμῶν
Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ λέγουσι τάδε·

α'

Πᾶν ὅτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ, ἢ ὅλον ὅλω
συντίθεται, ἢ μέρος μέρει, ἢ μέρος ὅλω·
ἄλλως γὰρ σύνθεσιν λέγειν ἀδύνατον. Ὅλον
δὲ καὶ μέρος ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπεριγράφου οὐ
λέγεται. Οὐκ ἄρα συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ
ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀπερίγραφος ὑπάρχων. Εἰ
δὲ συνετέθη, καὶ ἑμμερῆς καὶ περιγραπτὸς
ἔστιν, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

[Book I]

**They rebuke us then, as has been said, first
of all for the confession of the composition of
the natures in our Lord Jesus Christ, the
God, and say this:**

1:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else is composed either as a whole with a whole or as a part with a part or as a part with a whole, for one cannot speak of composition in any other way. But in the case of the uncircumscribed one cannot speak of whole and part. Consequently, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us, since he is uncircumscribed. But if he has been composed, he consists of parts and is circumscribed, which is impious.

³⁶ See A. RIGO, "Niceta Byzantios, la sua opera e il monaco Evodio," in G. FIACCADORI, A. GATTI-S. MAROTTA (ed.), *In partibus Clivus. Scritti in onore di Giovanni Pugliese Carratelli*, Naples 2006, 147-182, esp. 153; and M. RICHARD, "Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance," *Mélanges de Science religieuse* 1 (1944): 35-88, esp. 41. For this reason the edition of Leontius' writings against the Monophysites is also based exclusively on the Codex Marcianus. Cf. P. T. GRAY, *Leontius of Jerusalem, Against the Monophysites, Testimonies of the Saints and Aporiae*, Oxford 2006.

Dirk Krausmüller, "The Nestorian Treatise Preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem's *Contra Nestorianos* (CPG 6918)," *Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture* 17 (2023) 59-130;

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β'

Πᾶν <ὅτι>οὖν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ, περιγραφτὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμμερές, καθὼς ἐδιδάχθη ἀνωτέρω. Πᾶν δὲ περιγραφτὸν καὶ ἐμμερές ἐτεροούσιον ἐστὶ τῷ ἀπλῷ καὶ ἀπεριγράφῳ. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐ συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁμοούσιος ὢν τῷ ἀπλῷ καὶ ἀπεριγράφῳ Πατρὶ· ἢ συντεθείς, ἐτεροούσιός ἐστι τῷ ἀπλῷ καὶ ἀπεριγράφῳ Πατρὶ, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

γ'

Πᾶν ὅτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ ἐτεροούσιον ἐστὶ τῷ ἀπλῷ καὶ ἀπεριγράφῳ Πατρὶ. Πᾶν δὲ ἐτεροούσιον τῷ ἀπλῷ καὶ ἀπεριγράφῳ Πατρὶ, οὐκ ἐστὶ κυρίως υἱὸς τοῦ ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀπεριγράφου Πατρὸς. Πᾶν τὸ ἄρα συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ οὐκ ἐστὶ κυρίως υἱὸς τοῦ ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀπεριγράφου Πατρὸς. Εἰ δὲ πᾶν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ οὐκ ἐστὶ κυρίως υἱὸς τοῦ ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀπεριγράφου Πατρὸς, οὐ συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, κυρίως ὑπάρχων Υἱὸς τοῦ Πατρὸς· ἢ συντεθείς, οὐ κυρίως ὑπάρχει τοῦ Πατρὸς υἱὸς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

δ'

Πᾶν ὅτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ καταχρηστικῶς πῶς λέγεται, εἴπερ καὶ λέγεται, υἱὸς τοῦ ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀπεριγράφου Πατρὸς. Πᾶν δὲ τὸ καταχρηστικῶς πῶς λεγόμενον υἱὸς τοῦ ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀπεριγράφου Πατρὸς, κυρίως κτίσμα τοῦ ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀπεριγράφου Πατρὸς ὑπάρχει. Πᾶν οὖν ἄρα τὸ συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ κυρίως κτίσμα τοῦ ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀπεριγράφου Πατρὸς ὑπάρχει. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἦ, οὐ συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς <Λόγος> τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, κτίστης ὑπάρχων τοῦ παντὸς καὶ οὐ κτίσμα τοῦ Πατρὸς· ἢ συντεθείς, κτίσμα ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀπεριγράφου, καὶ οὐχ υἱὸς κυρίως, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

2:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else is circumscribed and consists of parts, as has been taught above. But everything that is circumscribed and consists of parts is of a different substance from that which is simple and uncircumscribed. But if this is the case, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us, since he is of the same substance as the simple and uncircumscribed Father; or he has been composed, in which case he is of a different substance from the simple and uncircumscribed Father, which is impious.

3:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else, is of a different substance from the simple and uncircumscribed Father. But everything that is of a different substance from the simple and uncircumscribed Father, is not strictly a son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. Consequently, everything that is composed with something else is not strictly son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. But if everything that is composed with something else is not strictly son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us, since he is strictly Son of the Father; or he has been composed, in which case the God Word is not strictly son of the Father, which is impious.

4:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else is somehow abusively called son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father, if it is called thus at all. But everything that is somehow abusively called son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father, is strictly a creature of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. Everything, then, that is composed with something else is strictly a creature of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. But if this is the case, the God <Word> has not been composed with the human being taken from us, since he is the creator of the universe and not a creature of the Father; or he has been composed, in which case he is a creature of the simple and uncircumscribed one and not strictly a son, which is impious.

ε'

Πᾶσα οὐσία ἀπερίγραφος πανταχοῦ, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὑπάρχει ἀπερινοήτως, καθὸ οὐσία, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο ἴδιον ἀπεριγράφου. Πᾶν δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον, ἀλλοίως καὶ ἀλλοίως οὐ δύναται εἶναι ἐν τινι, καθὸ οὐσία· τὸ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ἀναιρετικόν ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀλλοίως καὶ ἀλλοίως. Πᾶσα ἄρα οὐσία ἀπερίγραφος οὐ δύναται ἀλλοίως καὶ ἀλλοίως εἶναι ἐν τινι, καθὸ οὐσία. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ζητητέον· ἄρα τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου περιγραπτὴν εἶναι φαμέν, ἢ ἀπερίγραπτον; Καὶ εἰ μὲν περιγραπτὴν εἵπομεν, πρόδηλον τὸ βλάσφημον. Εἰ δὲ ἀπερίγραφον, ἢ πᾶσι σύγκειται ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, ἢ οὐδενὶ σύγκειται ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου· ἀλλοίως γὰρ καὶ ἀλλοίως ἐν τινι οὐ δύναται εἶναι, καθὸ οὐσία, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπερίγραφος. Ὡμολόγηται δὲ ὅτι πᾶσιν οὐ σύγκειται. Οὐδὲ ἄρα τινὶ σύγκειται, καὶ ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ λέγοντες συγκεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου τῇ ἐξ ἡμῶν εἰς οἰκειαν αὐτοῦ φανέρωσιν ληφθείση σαρκί.

ς'

Πᾶν ὅτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ εἰς τὸ ἀποτελέσαι μίαν φύσιν ἢ καὶ ὑπόστασιν ζῶσαν, μέρος εὐρίσκεται ταύτης τῆς φύσεως ἢ καὶ ὑποστάσεως. Πᾶν δὲ μέρος μιᾶς φύσεως ἢ καὶ ὑποστάσεως ζώσης φυσικῇ ἀνάγκῃ συμπάσχει τῷ μέρει μεθ' οὗ τὴν τοιάνδε φύσιν ἢ καὶ ὑπόστασιν ζῶσαν ἀπετέλεσε. Μὴ θέλουσα δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ συμπάσχει τῷ σώματι, ὡς καὶ παύεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἐνεργειῶν ποτέ, τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν, μεθ' ὧν ἐνεργεῖ, βλαπτομένων. Ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ σῶμα φυσικῇ ἀνάγκῃ συντήκεται ταῖς λύπαις τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ταῖς μερίμναις. Τὸν δὲ Θεὸν Λόγον ἀνάγκῃ λέγειν συμπεπονθέναι τῇ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐμψύχῳ σαρκί, οὐ θέμις. Οὐκ ἄρα συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς μιᾶς φύσεως ἢ καὶ ὑποστάσεως σύστασιν. Εἰ δὲ συνετέθη, καὶ πέπονθεν ἀνάγκῃ, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

5:

Every uncircumscribed substance is *qua* substance incomprehensibly everywhere, both in each thing and in itself according to identity and sameness, since this is the property of the uncircumscribed. But everything that is in all things according to identity and sameness, cannot *qua* substance be in something in one way and in something else in another way, because sameness eliminates being in one way and in another way. Consequently, every uncircumscribed substance cannot *qua* substance be in something in one way and in something else in another way. But if this is the case, one must enquire: Do we say that the substance of the God Word is circumscribed or that it is uncircumscribed? And if we say that it is circumscribed, the blasphemy is evident. But if <we say that it is> uncircumscribed, <it is either the case that> the substance of the God Word is composed with all things or <it is the case that> the substance of the God Word is composed with nothing, because *qua* substance it cannot be in something in one way and in something else in another way, since it is uncircumscribed. But it is agreed that he is not composed with all things. Consequently, he is also not composed with one thing; and impious are those who say that the substance of the God Word is composed with the flesh that he has taken from us for his own manifestation.

6:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else so as to constitute one living nature or also hypostasis, is found to be a part of this nature or also hypostasis. But every part of one living nature or also hypostasis suffers by natural necessity with the part with which it has constituted such a living nature or also hypostasis. The soul suffers with the body against its will, so that it sometimes stops performing its own operations, when the parts of the body with which it operates are damaged. Likewise the body, too, by natural necessity wastes away with the sorrows and worries of the soul. But it is not lawful to say that the God Word suffers by necessity with the ensouled flesh taken from us. Consequently, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us in order to constitute one nature or also hypostasis. But if he has been composed, he also suffers by necessity, which is impious.

ζ'

Πᾶν ὅτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ πρὸς μιᾶς φύσεως <ἢ> καὶ ὑποστάσεως ζώσης σύστασιν μέρος δείκνυται τῆς ἀποτελεσθείσης φύσεως ἢ καὶ ὑποστάσεως. Πᾶν δὲ μέρος φύσεως ἢ καὶ ὑποστάσεως ζώσης δέεται πάντως τοῦ ᾧ συνετέθη μέρος πρὸς εὐεργεσίαν ἰδίαν. Δέεται γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς, θάτερον θατέρου πρὸς οἰκείαν εὐεργεσίαν, ἡ μὲν πρὸς μάθησιν τῶν θείων ἐντολῶν καὶ εὐαρέστησιν θείαν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν μετ' αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ὀρωμένων ἀπάντων κρείττονα τιμὴν ἔχειν. Τὸν δὲ Θεὸν Λόγον ὑπολαμβάνειν δέεσθαι τινος πρὸς οἰκείαν εὐεργεσίαν, οὐ θέμις. Οὐκ ἄρα συνετέθη τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς μιᾶς φύσεως ἢ ὑποστάσεως ζώσης σύστασιν. Εἰ δὲ συνετέθη, καὶ δέεται αὐτοῦ πρὸς οἰκείαν εὐεργεσίαν, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

η'

Πᾶν ὅτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ ἑτεροουσίῳ εἰς μιᾶς φύσεως ἢ <καὶ> ὑποστάσεως σύστασιν μέρος τῆς ἀποτελεσθείσης ἐξ αὐτῶν φύσεως δείκνυται. Πᾶν δὲ μέρος ἑτεροουσίον μιᾶς φύσεως ἢ καὶ ὑποστάσεως οὐ καλεῖται τῷ ὀνόματι ἐκείνου ᾧπερ σύγκειται. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γάρ, εἰ καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ καλεῖται τῷ τοῦ ὅλου ὀνόματι μετὰ προσθήκης τινὸς τοῦ ἔσω καὶ ἔξω, ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προσθήκης τοιαύδε. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους ποτὲ σημαίνεται, ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ τὰ μέρη τῶν ἐτέρων μερῶν οὐκ ἠξίωται τῶν ὀνομάτων· οὔτε γὰρ ψυχὴ σὰρξ καλεῖται, οὔτε σὰρξ ψυχὴ. Πᾶν ἄρα συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ ἑτεροουσίῳ εἰς μιᾶς φύσεως ἢ καὶ ὑποστάσεως σύστασιν οὐκ ἠξίωται τοῦ ἐτέρου μέρους τοῦ ὀνόματος. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἢ οὐ συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου λεγόμενος· ἢ συντεθείς, οὔτε αὐτὸς λέγεται υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν υἱὸς θεοῦ, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

θ'

Πᾶν ὅτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ εἰς τὸ ἀποτελέσαι μίαν φύσιν ἢ καὶ ὑπόστασιν

7:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else in order to constitute one living nature or also hypostasis is shown to be a part of the resulting nature or also hypostasis. But every part of a living nature or also hypostasis absolutely needs the part with which it has been composed, for its own benefit. For the soul needs the body and the body the soul, each one the other for its own benefit. For <the soul> needs <the body> in order to learn the divine commandments and to please God, and <the body> needs <the soul> in order to have life with it and a greater honour than all other visible things. But it is not lawful to assume that the God Word needs something for his own benefit. Consequently, he has not been composed with the human being taken from us so as to constitute one living nature or also hypostasis. But if he has been composed, he also needs <the human being> for his own benefit, which is impious.

8:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else of a different substance so as to constitute one nature or also hypostasis is shown to be a part of the nature that has resulted from them. But every part of a different substance belonging to one nature or also hypostasis is not called by the name of that with which it is composed. This is also the case with the human being, even if its parts are called by the name of the whole with the addition of 'inner' and 'outer' or not without such an addition. But even if the whole is sometimes indicated by the part, the parts are nevertheless not deemed worthy of the names of the other parts. For neither is the soul called flesh nor the flesh soul. Consequently, everything that is composed with something else of a different substance so as to constitute one nature or also hypostasis, is not deemed worthy of the name of the other part. But if this is the case, the God Word has either not been composed with the human being taken from us, as he is called son of man; or he has been composed, in which case he himself is not called son of man and that which is taken from us is not called Son of God, which is impious.

9:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else so as to constitute one nature or also hypostasis, is shown to be a part of the one

μέρος δεικνυται τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποτελουμένης μιᾶς φύσεως ἢ καὶ ὑποστάσεως. Πᾶν δὲ μέρος μιᾶς φύσεως ἢ καὶ ὑποστάσεως οὐκ οἶδε πῶς ἢ ποῦ ἢ πότε συνετέθη τῷ ᾧ ἔπερ συνετέθη, μήτι γε μετὰ ταῦτα ἀμυδρῶς πως μάθοι. Πᾶν ἄρα συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ εἰς τὸ ἀποτελέσαι μίαν φύσιν ἢ καὶ ὑπόστασιν οὐκ οἶδε πῶς ἢ ποῦ ἢ πότε συνετέθη τῷ ᾧ ἔπερ συνετέθη, μήτι γε μετὰ ταῦτα ἀμυδρῶς πως μάθοι. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἢ οὐ συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, πάντα ἐπιστάμενος καὶ μηδέποτε μηδὲν μανθάνων· ἢ συντεθείς, οὐκ οἶδε πῶς ἠνώθη τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

ι'

Εἰ σύνθετος ὁ δεσπότης Χριστός, καθά φασι, μέρος ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, καθά βούλεται τῶν συνθέτων ὁ νόμος. Πᾶν δὲ μέρος ἔλαττον κατὰ τι καθέστηκε τοῦ ἰδίου ὅλου. Ἐλάττων ἄρα τινὸς κατὰ τι ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος· οὐκ ἂν γὰρ εἴη μέρος, μὴ ἔλαττον ὄν τοῦ ὅλου. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ θεὸς ἀληθινὸς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ἐπεὶ τὸν ἀληθινὸν θεὸν οὐδενὸς ἐλάττονα λέγειν δυνατόν· ἀσύγκριτος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς πάμπαν καὶ ἀπαράβλητος. Ἡ γοῦν ὁμολογεῖταισαν φανερῶς τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινὸν θεὸν εἰδότας τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον ἐναντιότητα, ἢ παυσάσθωσαν σύνθετον ἡμῖν εἰσάγοντες οὐσίαν ἐκ τε τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καὶ τῆς ἐξ ἡμῶν σαρκὸς ἐμψύχου.

ια'

Πᾶσα μία φύσις ἢ καὶ ὑπόστασις συγκειμένη ἐκ μερῶν ἑτεροουσίων ἔχει τινὰς ἐνεργείας ἃς οὐδ' ὀπότερον ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε δύναται καθ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐνεργείας ἐκτελέσαι τινὶ τρόπῳ ποτέ. Οἷον ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δέονται ἀλλήλων εἰς τὸ καταρτίσαι πλοῖον, οἰκοδομῆσαι οἶκον, ὑφᾶναι χιτῶνα, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, ὅπερ ὡς εἶπον ἀδύνατον ἐνὶ αὐτῶν χωρὶς τῆς θατέρου συνεργίας ἐκτελέσαι δι' οὐδέποτε τρόπον. Εἰ τοίνυν μία φύσις ἢ μία ὑπόστασις ἀπετελέσθη ἐκ συνθέσεως, ὡς φασι, τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου πρὸς τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπον, εἰσι τινὲς ἐνεργεῖαι τῆς τοιαύτου φύσεως καὶ ὑποστάσεως, ἃς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος καθ' ἑαυτὸν

nature or also hypostasis that has resulted from them. But every part of one nature or also hypostasis does not know how or where or when it has been composed with that with which it has been composed, unless perhaps it gains a vague knowledge afterwards. Consequently, everything that is composed with something else so as to constitute one nature or also hypostasis does not know how or where or when it has been composed with that with which it has been composed, unless perhaps it gains a vague knowledge afterwards. But if this is the case, the God Word has either not been composed with the human being taken from us, as he knows everything and never learns anything <new>; or he has been composed, in which case he does not know how he has been united with the human being taken from us, which is impious.

10:

If the Lord Christ is composite, as they say, the God Word is a part, as the law of composites requires. But every part is in some respect lesser than its own whole. Consequently, the God Word would be in some respect lesser than something. For there cannot be a part if it is not lesser than the whole. But if this is the case, the God Word would also not be true God, since one cannot say that the true God is lesser than something. For God is entirely incomparable and matchless. Either let them declare openly that they are opposed to those who know that the God Word is true God; or let them desist from introducing a substance that is a composite of the God Word and the ensouled flesh taken from us.

11:

Every one nature or also hypostasis, which is composed of parts of different substance, has some operations that neither one of those from which it is constituted can in any way ever perform by itself and without the operation of the other. For example, soul and body need one another in order to construct a ship, to build a house, to weave a dress, and whatever else there is of this kind. One of them cannot do these things in any way whatsoever without the cooperation of the other, as I have said. If, then, one nature or one hypostasis has resulted from the composition of the God Word with the human being taken from us, as they say, there are some operations of such a nature or hypostasis that the God Word could not fulfill

οὐκ ἰδύνατο πληρῶσαι τινὶ τρόπῳ – τὸ δὲ μὴ δύνασθαι διχῶς λέγεται παρὰ τῆς θείας Γραφῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ· ἡ ὡς ἀδύνατον τὸν θεὸν ψεύσασθαι (cf. Hebrews 6:18), διὰ τὸ ἀπερίγραπτον, ἢ ὡς δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίαι μὴ δυνάμενα κατὰ συνείδησιν τελειῶσαι τὸν λατρεύοντα (Hebr. 9:9), διὰ τὸ ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀνέφικτον οἰασοῦν ἐνεργείας, εἰ δώσουσιν –, ἃς οὐ δυνάμενος ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος πληρῶσαι καθ' αὐτόν, τῆ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξετέλεσεν, ἢ ἀσθενῆ δεικνύουσι τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον, ἢ πεπραχότα τὰ ἀπρεπῆ. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὁ Πατὴρ ἀτονεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀποπλήρωσιν τῶν τοιῶνδε ἐνεργειῶν, μὴ συγκείμενος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο μειζῶν ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Πατρὸς, ὅπερ ἀσεβές. Εἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, πρόδηλον τὸ βλάσφημον· ὁ θεὸς γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀπρεπῶν διαπράττεται, οὔτε καθ' ἑαυτὸν οὔτε μεθ' ἑτέρου. Εἰ δὲ οὐδέτερον δοῦναι ὅσιον, οὐδὲ ἄρα οὐδὲ ἡ σύνθεσις γεγενῆται τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου.

ιβ'

Πᾶν ὅτιοῦν συγκείμενον ἐτέρῳ ἢ δι' ἑαυτὸ σύγκειται, ἢ δι' ἕτερον. Καὶ σύγκειται μὲν δι' ἑαυτό, οἷον ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι, δι' ἕτερον δέ, τὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκίας· δι' ἄνθρωπον γάρ. Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς Λόγος, οὔτε δι' ἑαυτὸν συγκίεται· ἀπροσδεῖς γάρ, οὔτε δι' ἕτερον· οὐ τινος γὰρ χείρων· ἐπεὶ πᾶν συγκείμενον ἐτέρῳ, οὐ δι' ἑαυτό, ἀλλὰ δι' ἕτερον, ἥττον ἐκείνου καθέστηκε δι' ὅπερ σύγκειται. Εἰ δὲ μήτε δι' ἑαυτόν, μήτε δι' ἕτερον συντεθήσεται ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ἀσύνθετος ἄρα καὶ τινὶ ποτὲ εἰς σύνθεσιν μὴ συντρέχων.

ιγ'

Πᾶν ὅτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ ἢ μένει ἐν τῇ συνθέσει τῇ πρὸς ὃ συνετέθη ἀδιαλύτως, ἢ οὐ μένει. Καὶ οὐ μένει μὲν, οἷον τὰ μέρη τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, μένει δέ, οἷον τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μετὰ τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀνάστασιν. Πᾶν δὲ τὸ μένον ἀδιαλύτως ἢ καὶ μὴ μένον

by himself in any way – for ‘cannot’ has two meanings in divine Scripture and in common usage, either that God cannot lie because of his being uncircumscribed, or that *gifts and sacrifices that cannot give the worshipper a perfect conscience*, because of the weakness and insufficiency of any such operation, if they will concede it – that the God Word could not fulfil by himself and would therefore accomplish through the operation of the human being. Then they show either that the God Word is weak, or that he has done something inappropriate. In the first case the Father would even now be too weak to perform such operations, since he is not composed with the human being taken from us, and in this respect the Son would be greater than the Father, which is impious. But in the second case the blasphemy is obvious. For God never does anything inappropriate, neither by himself nor together with something else. But if neither of the options is pious, it follows that the composition of the God Word with the human being taken from us did not happen.

12:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else is composed either for its own benefit or for the benefit of something else. And it is composed for its own benefit, as the soul with the body, or for the benefit of something else, as the parts of the house, for they are for the benefit of the human being. The God Word will not be composed for his own benefit, for he does not lack anything; nor will he be composed for the benefit of something else, for he is not worse than something else, since everything that is composed with something else, not for its own benefit but for the benefit of something else, is lesser than that for the benefit of which it is composed. But if the God Word will be composed neither for his own benefit nor for the benefit of something else, it follows that he is incomposite and never comes together with something else for the purpose of a composition.

13:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else either remains indissolubly in the composition with that with which it has been composed, or it does not remain. And it does not remain, like the parts of the irrational animals, or it remains, like the <parts> of the human beings after the resurrection from the

ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸν ᾧ συνετέθη συνθέσει, οὔτε ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ἐντεθέντα τῇ φύσει ὄρον ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ διαλύεται, οὔτε τῇ οἰκείᾳ δυνάμει μένει, ἀλλὰ τῇ κρείττονός τινος καὶ ὑπερβεβηκότος. Τοῦ δὲ Θεοῦ Λόγου εἶναι τινὰ κρείττονα δύναμιν, οὐ θέμις εἰπεῖν. Οὐκ ἄρα συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ· εἰ δὲ συνετέθη, ἢ οὐ μένει ἀδιαλύτως ἐν τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν συνθέσει, ἢ μένων, κρείττονός τινος δυνάμει μένει, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

ιδ'

Εἰ σύγκειται ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῇ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐμψύχῳ σαρκί, ὡς σύγκειται ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ σώματι, τῆς ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐμψύχου σαρκὸς καθευδούσης, εἴργεται ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῶν οἰκείων ἐνεργειῶν ἀβουλήτως, καθάπερ ἡ ψυχὴ παύεται τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τοῦ σώματος εἰς ὕπνον τρεπομένου. Εἰ δὲ μὴ σύγκειται ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῇ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐμψύχῳ σαρκί, ὡς σύγκειται ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ σώματι, σύγκειται δὲ ὄλως, δότωσαν ἡμῖν δεῖγμα τῆς συνθέσεως καθ' ἣν βούλονται συγκεῖσθαι τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ εὐποροῦσι τούτου, βεβαιούτωσαν τὸ λεγόμενον αὐτοῖς γραφικῇ μαρτυρίᾳ· πιστοτέρα γὰρ ἡμῖν αὕτη πάσης φυσικῆς ἀποδείξεως. Εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνῳ καὶ ταύτης ἀμοιροῦσιν, ἀμάρτυρον ἄρα τὸ λεγόμενον αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἀπόφανσις ψιλή, διὸ καὶ ἄδεικτον· τὸ γὰρ φυσικῶ λόγῳ μὴ δεικνύμενον καὶ γραφικῇ μαρτυρίᾳ μὴ βεβαιούμενον, πλάσμα τοῦ λέγοντος εἴη ἄν, καὶ τοῦτο ἀπίθανόν τε ἅμα καὶ ἀσεβές.

ιε'

Πᾶν ὁτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ εἰς μιᾶς φύσεως ἢ καὶ ὑποστάσεως ζώσης σύστασιν ἐξίσταται κατὰ τι τῶν ἐν οἷς ἦν πρὸ τῆς συνθέσεως. Πᾶν δὲ ἐξιστάμενον κατὰ τι τῶν ἐν οἷς ἦν ἢ κρείττον ἐαυτοῦ γίνεται κατ' αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο καθ' ὃ ἐξέστη τῶν ἐν οἷς ἦν, ἢ χεῖρον. Τὸν δὲ Θεὸν Λόγον γεγενῆσθαι ἐαυτοῦ κρείττονα ἢ χεῖρονα, οὐ θέμις εἰπεῖν. Οὐκ ἄρα συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, κρείττων ἢ χεῖρων ἐαυτοῦ μὴ

dead. But everything that remains indissolubly or does not remain in the composition with that with which it has been composed, either does not remain by itself but is dissolved according to the limit that the creator has put into the nature, or does not remain through its own power, but through that of a being that is greater and transcendent. But it is not lawful to say that there is some power greater than the God Word. Consequently, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us. But if he has been composed he either does not remain indissolubly in the composition with it; or he remains, in which case he remains through some higher power, which is impious.

14:

If the God Word is composed with the ensouled flesh taken from us, as the rational soul is composed with our body, and the ensouled flesh taken from us sleeps, the God Word will be prevented from performing his own operations against his will, just as the soul necessarily stops operating when the body turns to sleep. But if the God Word is not composed with the ensouled flesh taken from us, as the soul is composed with our body, but is composed nevertheless, let them give us an example of the composition according to which they wish the God Word to be composed with the human being taken from us. But if they cannot produce one, let them corroborate what they say through the witness of Scripture, because it is more trustworthy than all natural proof. But if they have neither the one nor the other, it follows that what they say is without witness, and an empty declaration, because it is unproven. For that which is not shown through the law of nature and not corroborated through the witness of Scripture would be a fabrication of the speaker, and this is unconvincing as well as impious.

15:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else so as to constitute one living nature or also hypostasis loses something of what it had before the composition. But everything that loses something of what it had becomes either greater than itself as regards that thing, which it had and then has lost, or worse. But it is not lawful to say that the God Word has become greater or worse than himself. Consequently, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken

γενόμενος. Εἰ δὲ συνετέθη, πρόεκοψεν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χειρόν, ὅπερ ἀσεβές· τῶν γὰρ χειρόνων ἄδεκτος ἡ θεία φύσις, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντὸς οὐτινοσοῦν κρείττων καθέστηκεν αὕτη, χορηγὸς ὑπάρχουσα ἀπάντων τῶν καλῶν, καὶ μὴ δεομένη τινός.

ις'

Πᾶν ὅτιοῦν ἐτέρῳ συντιθέμενον ἢ ἄγει τὸ ᾧ συντίθεται, ὡσπερ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα, ἢ ἄγεται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ὡσπερ τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ οὔτε ἄγει οὔτε ἄγεται, ὡσπερ τὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκίας. Πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐν συνθέσει ἀγόμενον ἢ μῆτε ἄγον μῆτε ἀγόμενον, τοῦτο πάντως ἄλογον τέ ἐστι καὶ ἄνουν, καθάπερ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκίας. Εἰ τοίνυν συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἢ ἄγει ἢ ἄγεται ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄγει, ἔσται ὁ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος ἄλογός τε καὶ ἄνους, ὅπερ ἀσεβές καὶ βλάστημα Ἀρείου τε καὶ Ἀπολιναρίου. Εἰ δὲ ἄγεται, τετράφθω τὸ ἐκ τούτου βλάσφημον εἰς κεφαλὴν τῶν συγκεῖσθαι λεγόντων τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ. Εἰ δὲ οὐδὲ ἄγει ὡς ἐν συνθέσει, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄλογον εἶναι τὸν κυριακὸν ἄνθρωπον, μὴδὲ πάλιν ἄγεται, διὰ τὸ ἐκ τούτου ὁμολογημένον βλάσφημον, οὐδὲ ἄρα οὐδὲ συνετέθη τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ· πᾶν γὰρ ὅτιοῦν συντιθέμενον ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἄγει ἢ ἄγεται ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο, καθῶς εἵπομεν.

ις'

Τὸ φύσει ἀπαθὲς παθητῷ συγκεῖσθαι οὐ δύναται· τῶν γὰρ εἰς τὸ σύνθετον γίνεσθαι φαινομένων ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς μετασχεῖν λέξομεν, ἢ μὴδὲ τὸ παθητὸν πεπονθένα, ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ὑπολάβοιμεν. Εἰ οὖν θεία φύσις ἦν ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι σώματι, ἄρα ἢ καὶ αὕτη οὐκ ἀπαθὴς μεμένηκεν, ἢ οὐδὲ ἡ σὰρξ ἀληθῶς πέπονθε.

ιη'

Τὸ συντεθῆναι τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ καθ' ὑμᾶς ἢ αὐτὸν μόνον εὐηργέτησεν, ἢ τὸν ᾧ συνετέθη ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἀμφοτέρους ἅμα, ἢ οὐδ' ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲ

from us, as he has not become greater or worse than himself. But if he has been composed, he has advanced either to what is greater or to what is worse, which is impious. For the divine nature is not receptive of what is worse, but is even greater than everything whatsoever, being the giver of all good things and not needing anything.

16:

Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else either leads that with which it is composed, as the soul the body, or is led by it, as the body by the soul, or neither leads nor is led, as the parts of the house. But everything which is led in a composition, or neither leads nor is led, is obviously without reason and without intellect, as the body and the parts of the house. If, then, the God Word has been composed with the human being taken from us, he either leads or is led or does neither the one nor the other. And if he leads, the human being taken from us will be without reason and without intellect, which is impious and the offspring of Arius and Apollinaris. But if he is led, the consequent blasphemy be on the head of those who say that the God Word is composed with the human being taken from us. But if he neither leads in the composition because the Lordly man is not without reason, nor is again led because it is agreed that what arises from it is blasphemous, it follows that he is not composed with the human being taken from us. For everything that is composed with something else either leads or is led or does neither the one nor the other, as we have said.

17:

That which cannot suffer by nature cannot be composed with something that can suffer. For of those which appear to be in the composite, we will either say that that which cannot suffer partakes <of suffering> or that even that which can suffer does not suffer, but we surmise that it only seems <to suffer>. If, then, a divine nature were in the suffering body, it would follow that it, too, did not remain free from suffering, or that even the flesh did not truly suffer.

18:

The composition of the God Word with the human being taken from us, which you posit, has benefited either him alone, or the human being with which he has been composed, or

ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς μόνους, ἢ θεὸν καὶ ἡμᾶς, τὸν δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἑαυτῷ συντεθέντα ἄνθρωπον οὐδαμῶς, ἢ αὐτόν τε καὶ ἡμᾶς ἅμα, ἢ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον, θεὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸν θεὸν εὐηργέτησεν, ἢ τὸν ὧ συντεθῆται ἄνθρωπον μόνον, ἢ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον κοινῶς, ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐκέτι, πῶς οὐ ψευδὲς τὸ δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν σεσαρκῶσθαι καὶ ἐνηθροπηκέναι τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν; Εἰ δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς μόνον, ἢ θεὸν καὶ ἡμᾶς, τὸν δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον οὐδαμῶς, πῶς οὐκ κρείττους ἡμεῖς βελτιωθέντες ἂν ἦμεν τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου, μηδαμῶς ἐκ τῆς δι' αὐτοῦ οἰκονομίας εὐεργετηθέντος; Οὐ γὰρ ἀνευδεῖς οὐδὲ ὁ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος παντάπασιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ κτιστός, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ παθητός καὶ φθαρτός ἦν κατὰ τοὺς σοφούς. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, πῶς οὐ προσδεῖς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος καθ' ἡμᾶς, καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον αὐτῷ συντεθέντα; Εἰ δὲ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον εὐηργέτησε τὸ συντεθῆναι τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ καθ' ἡμᾶς, θεὸν δὲ οὐδ' ὅλως, ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντα ἀνευδεῖς, ὁ βουλόμενος παρελθὼν λεγέτω ἡμῖν τί τὸ προσγεγόμενον εὐεργέτημα, ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τινὶ τῶν κτισμάτων ἐκ τῆς συνθέσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου, ὅπερ μὴ ἠδύνατο διαβαίνειν εἰς τε αὐτόν καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀνευ τῆς οὐσιώδους αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους συνθέσεως. Εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν εἰπεῖν – ἥρκει γὰρ ἡ μεσιτεία τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου ἢ τε εὐδοκία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καὶ τῆς τοιαύσδε συνθέσεως δίχα, καὶ ἡμῖν παραίτιον γενέσθαι παντὸς οὐτινοσοῦν εὐεργετήματος, καὶ αὐτὸν ἀποδείξαι πάλιν κρείττονα καὶ δεσπότην ἀπάσης ὁμοῦ τῆς κτίσεως, εἰς πρόσωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, οὐπὲρ οὐδὲν τιμιώτερον εἰς κτιστὴν φύσιν διαβαίνειν δυνάμενον –, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται περιττὴ καὶ εἰκαία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου πρὸς τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἐπιφημιζομένη σύνθεσις; Ἀλλ' εἰ μάτην τὲ καὶ εἰκῆ ποεῖ ὁ θεὸς οὐδέν, οὐδ' ἄρα συντεθῆται ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ.

both at the same time, or neither the one nor the other, but only us, or God and us, but in no way the human being taken from us, which has been composed with him, or him and us at the same time, or us and the human being taken from us, but not in no way God. But if it has benefited God or the human being with which he has been composed alone, or God and the human being together, but not us any more, how is it not a lie that our Lord Jesus Christ became flesh and a human being for us and for our salvation? But if <it has benefited> only us, or God and us, but in no way the human being taken from us, how would we not be greater, as having been improved, than the human being taken from us who has no way benefited from the dispensation that happened through it? For even the human being taken from us is certainly not one that does not need anything, since it is a creature, and indeed was capable of suffering and was corruptible according to the sages. But if <it has benefited> God and the human being taken from us and us, how would the God Word not be in need of something like us, and like the human being taken from us, which has been composed with him? But if according to you the composition of the God Word with the human being taken from us has benefited us and the human being taken from us, but not at all God, since he is entirely without need of something else, whoever wishes shall come forward and tell us what is the benefit that accrues either to the human being taken from us, or to one of the creatures, from the composition of the God Word and the human being taken from us, which could not be passed on to it and us without their substantial composition with each other. But if they cannot say anything – for the mediatorship of the human being taken from us and the good pleasure of the God Word would be sufficient even without such a composition as a cause for any benefit for us, and again as a proof that it is greater and Lord of the entire creation, as the person of the God Word, which is more valuable than anything that can be passed on to the created nature –, how will the notorious composition of the God Word with the human being taken from us not be superfluous and pointless. But if God does nothing that is idle and pointless, it follows that the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us.

ιθ'

Τὸ σῶμα κατ' οὐσίαν συγκαίμενον τῇ ψυχῇ κερδαίνει ἐκ ταύτης τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ Κυρίου συντεθὲν οὐσιωδῶς καθ' ὑμᾶς, εἶπατε τί προσεκτήσατο; Αἴσθησιν ἢ κίνησιν; Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα εἶχεν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς. Ἀλλ' ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν; Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀναστάσεως ἐσχηκέναι φατέ, καθὰ καὶ πάντες μέλλουσιν ἔχειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. Πῶς οὖν οὐ χείρων ἢ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς ψυχικῆς, εἶγε ἢ μὲν πολλῶν αὐτῷ μεταδίδωσιν, ἢ δὲ οὐδενὸς κρείττονος γνωρίσματος; Ἄρα δὲ μὴ τὸ ἄνευ σπορᾶς διαπεπλάσθαι φατέ; Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐνεργείας σύμβολον τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος, οὐκ οὐσιώδους συμπλοκῆς τοῦ Λόγου τεκμήριον· *πρὶν ἢ γὰρ συνελθεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐρέθη ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχουσα ἐκ Πνεύματος ἁγίου* (Mt. 1:18). Ἀλλὰ σημεῖα καὶ δυνάμεις; Ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων μείζονα ἐποίησαν οἱ ἀπόστολοι, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐπαγγελίαν (cf. Jn. 14:12). Ἀλλ' ἀξίαν καὶ δεσποτείαν, καὶ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα (Phil. 2:9) δοθὲν αὐτῷ; Καὶ τί ἐδόθη τοῦτο διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ κρείττον οὐσιώδους ἐνώσεως; Τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ; Καὶ τί κρείττονι ἠνώθη ὁ Λόγος; Ἀλλὰ σαρκὶ ἤγουν ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν; Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν ἰδοὺ τὸ τῆς ἀξίας ἀκούοντες ὄνομα δοθὲν αὐτῷ, τὴν φύσιν ἀντεισάγετε· δεύτερον δὲ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἀξίαν ἀσύγκριτον εἶναι τὴν ἔνωσιν τῆς ἐξ ἡμῶν σαρκὸς πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον, καὶ οὐ φυσικὴν σύνθεσιν ὑμεῖς ἀντιφέρεσθε· τρίτον εἰ ἢ ἀξία καὶ δεσποτεία τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οικείας οὐσίας πρόσεστιν αὐτῷ, θελήσεως, ἀγάπης ἄρα καὶ εὐδοκίας χάρισμα εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη, οὐκ οὐσιώδους ἐνώσεως δῶρημα, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν τῶν κατ' οὐσίαν ἠνωμένων ἀξίαν τινα καὶ δεσποτείαν δωρεῖται ὅπερ ἂν ἦνῶται. Ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον τοῦ κυριακοῦ ἀνθρώπου λέγουσι τεκμήριον τῆς οὐσιώδους πρὸς τὸν Λόγον ἐνώσεως; Καὶ πῶς ἐπὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἀναφέρει τοῦτο ἢ θεία γραφὴ λέγουσα· *ὃς διὰ Πνεύματος αἰώνιου ἑαυτὸν προσήνεγκεν ἁμωμον τῷ θεῷ* (Hebr. 9:14a), καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα Ἰησοῦ *καθαριεῖ τὴν συνείδησιν ἡμῶν ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων* (Hebr. 9:14b), καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ· *ἐδικαιώθη ἐν Πνεύματι* (1 Tim. 3:16); Οὐκοῦν τῷ Πνεύματι ἐν ᾧ δεδικαίωται καὶ οὐ τῷ Λόγῳ

19:

The body that is substantially composed with the soul, gains from it life and sense perception. But the body of the Lord that according to you is substantially composed, tell us what it gained. Sense perception or movement? But it had these from the soul. Dispassion and incorruptibility? But you say that it had these from the resurrection, as all human beings will once have them. How, then, is the substance of God not worse than that of the soul, if indeed the latter imparts to it many things whereas the former <imparts to it> no greater characteristic? Do you not say that it was fashioned without seed? But this is a sign of the operation of the Holy Spirit, and not an indication of the substantial intertwining of the Word. For *before they came together, she was found pregnant from the Holy Spirit*. Signs and powers? But the apostles performed greater ones than these, as the Lord himself had promised them. Rank and lordship and *the name greater than all names* that was given to it? And to whom has this been given through the substantial union, which brings about improvement? To the God Word? And with what greater being has the Word been united? But to the flesh, that is, the human being taken from us? Look! First first of all, when you hear of the name of honour that was given to him, you introduce the nature instead. Second, you oppose those who say that the union of the flesh taken from us with the God Word is an incomparable honour and not natural composition. Third, if the honour and lordship of the human being taken from us does not accrue to it from its own substance, it follows that it is necessarily a grace of willing, love and good pleasure and not a gift of substantial union, since none of the things that are substantially united bestows some honour and lordship on that with which it is united. But do they not say that the sinlessness of the Lordly human being is a sign of the substantial union with the Word? And how is it that divine Scripture attributes this to the Spirit when it says: *Who through the eternal Spirit offered up himself without blemish to God*, and the Spirit of Jesus *will purify our conscience from the dead works*? And elsewhere: *He was justified in the Spirit*. Therefore, <it was justified> through the Spirit in which it was justified and not through the Word in which it is by substance. Otherwise the achievement would

ἐν ᾧ τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν, ἔσται δὲ οὕτως καὶ οὐ προαιρετικόν, ἀλλ' οὐσιῶδες τὸ κατόρθωμα.

not derive from an act of willing but from substance.

κ'

Ὁ Λόγος ὁ θεῖος ἄτρεπτός ἐστι τὴν ὑπόστασιν ὡς καὶ τὴν φύσιν, ἢ οὐχί; Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐχί, οὐδὲ πάντῃ ἀπλοῦς οὐδὲ ἀφθαρτός, φασί, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ θεός. Ἔτι μὴν καὶ ὁ Πατήρ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐτέρως ὑφεστήκασι, τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπενεχθήσονται· δυνάμει γὰρ τρεπτοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰς ὑποστάσεις νοηθήσονται. Εἰ δέ γε διὰ τὸ ἐναργὲς τῆς ἀσεβείας πᾶς τις ὁμολογεῖ ἄτρεπτον καὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν τὸν Λόγον, πῶς ἐξ ἀπλῆς σύνθετον ἔξει τὴν ὑπόστασιν;

20:

Is the divine Word unchangeable in his hypostasis just as in his nature, or is he not? If, then, he is not, he is not completely simple or incorruptible [they say] but not even God. Furthermore, the Father and the Holy Spirit will be subjected to the same things if indeed they do not have another mode of hypostasis. For one will think that they, too, are potentially changeable as regards their hypostases. But if because of the obviousness of the impiety everyone confesses that the Word is unchangeable in his hypostasis, too, how would he have a hypostasis <that had changed> from simple to composite?

κα'

Πᾶν τὸ ἐκ διαφόρων μερῶν συγκείμενον ὅλον ἕτερόν τε ὁρᾶται καὶ ἐτέρως ὀνομάζεται παρὰ τὰ ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν. Εἰ οὖν ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου σύνθετος ὁ Χριστός, οὔτε θεὸς ἀληθῶς οὔτε ἄνθρωπος.

21:

Every whole that is composed from different parts is seen to be different and is named differently from the things from which it is. If, then, Christ is a composite of God and human being, he is neither truly God nor <truly> human being.

κβ'

Εἰ οὖν, φασί, καὶ ὑμεῖς φυσικὴν τὴν ἔνωσιν ὁμολογεῖτε, τί διαφέρεσθε πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Σεβήρον μίαν φύσιν λέγοντας Χριστοῦ; Πᾶσα γὰρ φυσικὴ ἔνωσις φύσιν τινὰ μίαν παρὰ τὰς ἐνωθείσας δείκνυσι· φύσις γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος μία ὡς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ πλείους, οὔτε ψυχῆς οὔτε σώματος μόνου, οὔτε ἄμφω τοὺς λόγους μόνους ἔχουσα τοὺς φυσικούς· τὸ γὰρ θνητὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν, οὔτε δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ οὔτε ἐν σώματι ἰδίᾳ ἐστί.

22:

If, then [they say] you, too, confess that the union is natural, how do you differ from the Severians who speak of one nature of Christ? For every natural union shows a nature besides the <natures> that have been united. For the human being *qua* human being is one nature and not many since it does not only have the natural definitions of the soul <alone> and of the body alone or of both alone. For 'mortal' is in the human being but is not specifically in the soul or in the body.

κγ'

Ἡ καθ' ὑπόστασιν σύνθεσις, εἴτουν τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ὑπὲρ φύσιν ἐστὶ τῆς θεότητος, ἢ παρὰ φύσιν, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν, εἴ γε ὄντως ἐστίν. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑπὲρ φύσιν αὕτη ἐστί, μείζονός τε δυνάμει ἔργον εἰς αὐτὴν γέγονε, καὶ εἰς τὸ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν ηὔξηθη, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῶς παντοδύναμος αὕτη, οὔτε πάντα λόγον ὑπερέχουσα. Εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν αὕτη ἐστί, χείρων τὲ αὐτῆς γέγονε, καὶ τρεπτὴ δέδεικται, καὶ πρὸς ὕφεισιν κατηνέχθη. Εἰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν αὕτη ἐστίν, οὔτε χάριτι ἢ σάρκωσις τοῦ Λόγου, οὔτε μόνου τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ

23:

The composition according to hypostasis, that is, of God with the human being, is either beyond the nature of the divinity or against its nature or according to its nature, if indeed it exists at all. But if <the composition> is beyond its nature, a greater power has acted upon it, and it has increased to what is beyond it, and it is not truly almighty, nor beyond all thought. But if <the composition> is against its nature, it has become worse than itself and been shown to be changeable and been brought down to a lower station. But if <the composition> is according to its nature, the incarnation of the Word is not an act of grace,

ἀγίου. Τί δὲ ἄρα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν οὔσα, πάλαι μὲν οὐκ ἐγένετο, νῦν δὲ ἐπράχθη, ὡς ἀτελοῦς τότε οὔσης τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖα νῦν προαχθείσης; Εἰ δὲ πάντα ἄτοπὰ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ θεοῦ, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων ἐνοῦσθαι φύσεις οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ ἀτόπως ἦνται ἢ οὐχ ἦνται, φησί, καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἢ θεία φύσις ἐτέρᾳ φύσει.

κδ'

Θεὸς ἀληθινὸς ὁ Λόγος, ἀπλῆν ἔχων οὐσίαν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Πατρὸς. Εἰ ἔχει οὖν τὴν σάρκα εἰς οὐσίαν, καθὼς τῷ Αἰγυπτίῳ δοκεῖ, τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἠλλοτριῶται, ὡσπερ τῆς φύσεως, οὕτως καὶ τῆς κλήσεως.

κε'

Ὁ Λόγος καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἄμετρος, ἡ σὰρξ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔμμετρος. Ὁ τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν θεοῦ καὶ σαρκὸς δογματίζων ἔνωσιν, ἢ τὸν θεὸν κάμπτει εἰς τὸ σύμμετρον τῆς σαρκὸς, ἢ τὴν σάρκα ἀποτείνει εἰς τὸ ἄμετρον τοῦ θεοῦ· μήτε γὰρ τούτου μήτε ἐκείνου γινομένου, ἀδύνατον σαρκὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἐνωθῆναι τὸν θεόν.

κς'

Ἄκτιστος τοῦ Λόγου ἢ ὑπόστασις, κτιστὴ τῆς σαρκὸς ἢ ὑπόστασις. Οὔτε ἡ σὰρξ ἀκτίστος δύναται ἐνωθῆναι τῷ Λόγῳ, οὔτε ὁ Λόγος κτιστῶς δύναται ἐνωθῆναι τῇ σαρκί. Κατὰ ποίαν οὖν ὑπόστασιν γέγονεν ἢ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔνωσις;

κζ'

Ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ ἀκτίστου καὶ τοῦ κτιστοῦ τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν φυσικῶς κωλύει ἔνωσιν. Ἡ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔνωσις θεοῦ καὶ σαρκὸς ἀκτίστου καὶ κτιστοῦ ἀναιρεῖ τὴν διαφορὰν. Ὁ ἄρα ἀναθεματίζων τοὺς μὴ ὁμολογοῦντας τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔνωσιν, τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας ἀκτίστου καὶ κτιστοῦ τὴν διαφορὰν ἀναθεματίζει.

and has not only happened to the Son, but also to the Father and the Holy Spirit. What then? Being according to nature, <the composition> had once not come to be but has now been produced, as if the nature had once been incomplete and has now been brought from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. But if all this is absurd in the case of God, and the natures cannot be united without them [he says], the divine nature is either united with another nature in an absurd manner or not united with it.

24:

The Word is true God, having a simple substance according to the substance of the Father. If, then, he has the flesh as substance, as the Egyptian opines, he has ceased being true <God> both as regards the nature and as regards the name.

25:

The Word is immeasurable in his hypostasis, the flesh is measurable in its hypostasis. Who puts forward the doctrine that God and the flesh have been united in a hypostasis either bends down God to the measurable flesh or stretches out the flesh to make it immeasurable like God. As neither this nor that happens, it is impossible for God to have been united with the flesh.

26:

The hypostasis of the Word is uncreated, the hypostasis of the flesh is created. Neither can the flesh have been united with the Word in an uncreated fashion nor can the Word have been united with the flesh in a created fashion. In what hypostasis has the union according to hypostasis then taken place?

27:

The difference between that which is uncreated and that which is created naturally prevents the union according to hypostasis. The union according to hypostasis of God and the flesh eliminates the difference between that which is uncreated and that which is created. It follows that whoever anathematizes those who do not confess the union according to hypostasis, anathematizes those who confess the difference between that which is uncreated and that which is created.

κη'

Εἰ ἦν εἶχεν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος χωρὶς ἐνώσεως ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν νῦν οὐκ ἔχει ὁ Λόγος, ἐτρέπη ἄρα ἢ τοῦ Λόγου ὑπόστασις. Τῆς δὲ τοῦ Λόγου ὑποστάσεως τραπέισης, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ὁ τῆς Τριάδος τραπήσεται λόγος.

κθ'

Κ ... τῶν θείων ὑποστάσεων ἂ ... εἰ δὲ σαρκικὰ ... ὥστε ὁ Λόγος οὐκέτι ὁ εἶς ...

λ'

Εἰ ἄλλη ἦν ἢ ὑπόστασις τοῦ Λόγου χωρὶς σαρκός, καὶ ἄλλη τοῦ Λόγου ἢ ὑπόστασις μετὰ τῆς ἰδίας σαρκός, καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄλλος ἦν ποτέ, καὶ ἄλλος μετὰ ταῦτα· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῇ ἐναλλαγῇ τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἢ ἐναλλαγῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὴν ὑπόστασιν.

λα'

Εἰ ἀμφοτέρᾳ ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεός, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἄμφω ἐστὶ, δῆλον ὅτι ὥσπερ οὐ φύσει θεὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ Λόγος φύσει ἄνθρωπος. Εἰ δὲ μὴ φύσει, οὐδ' ἄρα ὑποστάσει.

λβ'

Ἐγὼ εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἠλλοίωμαι (Mal. 3:6), βοᾷ ὁ θεός, σαρκὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἦνωται ὁ Λόγος, βοᾷ ὁ Αἰγύπιος. Ὁ δεχόμενος τὸν Κύριλλον ἀληθεύσαντα, ψεύστην ποιεῖ τὸν θεόν. Ὁ οὖν Λόγος ἄρα ἐνούμενος σαρκί, κἂν μένοι Λόγος, ἀλογοῦται, ἢ μὴ μένων Λόγος, κἂν οὐχ ἐνούται σαρκί, τότε ἠλλοίωται.

λγ'

Σὺ εἶ ὁ αὐτός (Ps. 102:27), βοᾷ ὁ προφήτης περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀντιβοᾷ ὁ Αἰγύπιος τῷ προφήτῃ τοῖς δόγμασιν, ὁ αὐτὸς οὐκ εἶ· γέγονας γὰρ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕτερος, ὃ οὐκ ἦς.

λδ'

Εἰ κατὰ τὴν ἄσαρκον ὑπόστασιν ὁμοούσιος ὁ Λόγος τῷ Πατρὶ, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἐνσαρκον ὑπόστασιν ἕτεροούσιος ὁ Λόγος τῷ Πατρὶ.

28:

If the Word now does not have his own hypostasis, which the God Word had without the union, it follows that the hypostasis of the Word has changed. But when the hypostasis of the Word has changed the definition of the Trinity will necessarily also have changed.

29:

.. of the divine hypostases ... but if fleshly ... so that the Word no longer the one ...

30:

If the hypostasis of the Word without the flesh is different from the hypostasis of the Word with his own flesh, the Word, too, was necessarily different once from what he was afterwards. For from the change of the hypostasis follows the change of the one who has the hypostasis.

31:

If the human being is both, human being and God, just as the God Word is also both, it is evident that as the human being is not God by nature, so the Word, too, is not a human being by nature. But if he is not by nature he is consequently also not by hypostasis.

32:

God shouts: *'I am and have not changed.'* The Egyptian shouts: *'The Word is united with the flesh in hypostasis.'* Whoever accepts that Cyril spoke the truth, makes God a liar. Consequently, the Word, when he is united with the flesh, either is made word-less even if he remains Word, or he does not remain Word in which case he is changed even if he is not united with the flesh.

33:

The prophet shouts about God: *'You are the same'*. The Egyptian shouts down the prophet with his doctrines: *'You are not the same. For you have become another in hypostasis, what you had not been.'*

34:

If the Word is of the same substance as the Father as regards his fleshless hypostasis, it is obvious that the Word is of a different substance from the Father as regards his fleshly hypostasis.

λε'

Εἰ μὴ ὑπόστασιν ἦν εἶχεν ἔχει ὁ Λόγος, οὐδὲ ἄρα αὐτός ἐστιν ὃ ἦν.

35:

If the Word does not have the hypostasis, which he had, he is consequently also not the same as he was.

λς'

Ἀξίαν καὶ αὐθεντίαν καὶ δυναστείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου δύναται ἔχειν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὸ τὴν τάξιν ἐπέχειν ὅλου τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἀδύνατον· κτιστός μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἄκτιστος δὲ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος.

36:

The human being can have the rank and the authority and the power of the God Word, and the hypostasis cannot have the position of the entire God Word, for the human being is created whereas the God Word is uncreated.

λζ'

Θεὸς καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα καθ' ἑνωσιν φυσικὴν οὔτε θεὸς οὔτε ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ.

37:

God and soul and body are in a natural union neither God nor human being.

λη'

Ὁ Αἰγύπτιος τὸ φυσικὸν ἀδύνατον δογματίζει καὶ τὸ οἰκονομικῶς δυνατὸν ἀναθεματίζει.

38:

The Egyptian puts forward the doctrine about nature, which is impossible, and anathematizes the dispensation, which is possible.

λθ'

Εἰ τὸ ἀκτίστως ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἢ ἀμηχανία τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἔῃ, καὶ τὸ κατ' οἰκονομίαν ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου τὴν ἀξίαν ὁ Αἰγύπτιος οὐκ ἔῃ, μεταξὺ ἄρα τῆς φύσεως καὶ τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε τὴν ὑπόστασιν οὔτε τὴν ἀξίαν.

39:

If the helplessness of nature does not let the human being have the hypostasis of the God Word in an uncreated manner, and the Egyptian does not let the human being have the rank of the God Word in the manner of the dispensation, it follows that between nature and the Egyptian the human being has nothing of the God Word, neither the hypostasis nor the rank.

μ'

Εἰ κατὰ τὴν συνουσίωσιν θεότητος καὶ σαρκὸς εἷς υἱὸς ὁ Υἱός, δηλὸν ὅτι πρὸ τῆς συνουσιώσεως οὐκ ἦν εἷς ὁ Λόγος οὔτε θεὸς οὔτε υἱός.

40:

If the Son is one son through the merging of the substances of divinity and flesh it is obvious that before the merging of the substances the Word was not one, neither God nor Son.

μα'

Ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος γνωμικῶς δύναται ἐνωθῆναι τῇ κτιστῇ φύσει, φυσικῶς δὲ οὐ δύναται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔκτισε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, οὔτε μεθαρμόζειν αὐτὴν εἰς ἑτέραν οὐσίαν δύναται.

41:

The God Word can be united with the created nature through will but cannot <be united> through nature. For he did not create his own nature nor can he transpose it into another nature.

μβ'

Εἰ τοῦ θεοῦ βουλευθέντος δέχεται αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις προσθήκην, δύναται ἄρα καὶ μείωσιν δέξασθαι βουλευθέντος αὐτοῦ. Εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον τὸ δεύτερον, ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον.

42:

If when God wishes his nature receives an addition, it can also receive a diminution when he wishes. But if the second is impossible, it follows that the first is also impossible.

μγ'

Εἰ ὁμοῦ θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός, δηλονότι ὁμοῦ δεσπόζει καὶ δεσπόζεται ὁ Χριστός. Εἰ δὲ ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ δεσπόζειν καὶ τοῦ δεσπόζεσθαι ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ θεοῦ ἄρα καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀναιρεῖται ἡ διαφορὰ.

μδ'

Εἰ ὁμοῦ θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός, ὁμότιμος ἄρα ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ θεῷ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμότιμος ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ θεῷ, δικαίως διαβάλλει ὁ Αἰγύπτιος τὴν συμπροσκύνησιν. Εἰ δὲ ὁμότιμος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμπροσκυνεῖται, καὶ ἀσεβεῖ ὁ Αἰγύπτιος ταύτην ἀναθεματίζων.

με'

Εἰ ἡ φύσει σὰρξ οὐκ ἔστιν ἑτέρου τινὸς παρὰ τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον φύσει, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, δηλονότι ὅτι ἑτέρου λόγου ἔστιν ἡ σὰρξ παρὰ τὸν φυσικῆ θεότητι Λόγον.

μς'

Εἰ ὅλως ἀποδέχη, ὦ Αἰγύπτιε, θεοῦ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ θεῖαν ἐνοίκησιν, παῦσαι θεοῦ καὶ σαρκὸς δογματίζων τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔνωσιν· ἀλλήλων γάρ εἰσιν ἀναιρετικαὶ ἡ ἐνοίκησις καὶ ἡ καθ' ὑπόστασιν φυσικὴ ἔνωσις.

μζ'

Εἰ τὸν παντοδύναμον φύσει Λόγον καὶ ἀναμάρτητον κοινωνὸν ἔσχεν ἡ σὰρξ τῆς ἰδίας ὑπάρξεως, πῶς αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀναμάρτητος λεγομένη; Ἡ ποία νίκη τῆσδε πρὸς τὴν κακίαν τοιόνδε λαβούση<ς> βοηθόν, ὃν οὐδὲ ἔστι νικηθῆναι; Τοῦδε γὰρ ἂν καὶ οὐ τῆσδε εἴη τὸ κατόρθωμα.

μη'

Πᾶν ἄπειρον φύσει περατῷ φύσει καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἐνοῦσθαι ἀδύνατον. Εἴτε γὰρ ἄπειρός ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὑπόστασις, δι' ὅλης διήκειν τὸ περατόν, ἤγουν ἡ σὰρξ, οὐ δύναται, εἴτε περατὴ εἴη, ὅλον περιέχειν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ φύσει ἄπειρον, ἤγουν τὸν Λόγον, οὐκ ἰσχύσει.

43:

If Christ is at the same time God and human being, it is evident that Christ rules and is ruled at the same time. But if the difference between ruling and being ruled does not exist in Christ, it follows that the difference between God and the human being is eliminated.

44:

If Christ is at the same time God and human being, it follows that the human being has the same honour as God. But if the human being does not have the same honour as God, the Egyptian justly maligns the co-veneration. But if it has the same honour, it is by necessity co-venerated, and the Egyptian is impious when he anathematizes <co-veneration>.

45:

If the flesh by nature does not belong to another one besides the God Word by nature, but to the God Word, it is obvious that the flesh belongs to another word besides the one who is Word by natural divinity.

46:

If you accept at all, Egyptian, the divine inhabitation of God in a human being, desist from putting forward the doctrine that God and the flesh are united in a hypostasis. For inhabitation and natural union in a hypostasis eliminate one another.

47:

If the flesh had the Word who is almighty by nature and sinless as a companion of its own existence, how would it be called sinless? Or what victory of it over evil would there be if it took such a helper who cannot be vanquished? For it would be the achievement of him and not of it.

48:

Everything that is infinite by nature cannot be united with what is finite by nature. For if the hypostasis from the two is infinite, what is finite, that is, the flesh, cannot pervade it completely. And if it is finite, it would not be able to contain in itself what is infinite by nature, that is, the Word.

μθ'

Ἡ σύνθεσις, φησίν, ἦν φατέ, ἡ φύσιν καινοτέραν ἐποίησε, καὶ τί μὴ καταδέχεσθε τοὺς μίξοφυσίτας; Ἡ ὑπόστασιν νεωτέραν, καὶ διὰ τί ἡμᾶς ἀποσείεσθε; Ἡ οὐδὲ φύσιν οὐδὲ ὑπόστασιν, καὶ μάτην γεγένηται.

ν'

Ἡ φυσικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ἔνωσις αὕτη, ἦν φατέ, τοῦ Λόγου καὶ τῆς σαρκός, καὶ τίνι διαφέρεσθε πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας ὁμοίαν πάντη εἶναι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν σύνθεσιν καὶ τὴν Χριστοῦ; Ἡ ὑποστατικὴ ἐστὶ, καὶ πῶς ἡμῖν οὐ συμφθέγγεσθε ὡς ἀγαπητοῦ πρὸς ἀγαπῶντα ἐξαιρέτως ταύτην δοξάζοντας; Ἡ οὐδὲ φυσικὴ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ὑποστατικὴ, καὶ τίς αὕτη εἶναι δοκεῖ ὑμῖν διασαφήσατε;

να'

Ἀνάγκη αὐτοὺς λέγειν τὸν Χριστὸν αὐτῶν τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ μόνας καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ μόνας, τουτέστι τῶν οικείων μερῶν ἀνὰ μέρος καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἐπινοουμένων, ἢ κρείττονα εἶναι κατὰ τι ἢ ἥττονα. Τὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων μέρη καθ' ἑαυτὰ καὶ χωρὶς τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα συνθέσεως ἐπινοούμενα, πάντως κατὰ τι ἢ κρείττονα ἢ ἥττονα εὐρίσκεται τοῦ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποτελέσματος, οἷον λίθοι καὶ ξύλα μέρη οἴκου ἢ τῆς ἐκκλησίας μέρη ἢ ναοῦ τοῦ ὑπὸ Σολομῶντος κτισθέντος, καὶ πρόδηλον ὅτι ἐκάτερον καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἥττον τοῦ ὅλου οἴκου, πάλιν ὑάκινθος, πορφύρα, κόκκινον κεκλωσμένον, βύσσος νενησμένη μέρη τοῦ καταπετάσματος τῆς σκηνῆς (cf. Ex. 26:31), καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον κατὰ μόνας ἔλαττον προδήλως τοῦ καταπετάσματος. Οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Κατὰ μὲν τοὺς Χριστιανούς κρείτων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ὅλον ζῶν, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἐπεὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐξοδὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν αὐτοκίνητον ἀδυνάτως ἔχει ὡς ἐν ὕπνῳ βαθυτάτῳ καὶ μὴδὲ ἑαυτὴν ἐπισταμένη διάγουσα καὶ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος πράξεων κατὰ τὴν θεϊὰν γραφὴν ἐκδεχομένη τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ἅστινας οὐκ ἐκφεύζεται τῷ χωρισμῷ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τὸ κρείττον προβαίνουσα οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τρεπομένη, ἵνα μὴ τὰ τῆς γραφῆς διαψευσθῇ (cf. 2 Cor. 5:10). Τούτοις δὲ ἔπεται, τῷ μὴδὲ ἐπὶ τὸ κρείττον λέγω μὴδὲ

49:

The composition [he says], of which you speak, has brought about either a novel nature, and why do you not accept the Mixers of Natures? Or a newer hypostasis, and why do you reject us? Or neither nature nor hypostasis, and it has happened in vain.

50:

Either this union of the Word and the flesh, of which you speak, is natural, and in what do you differ from those who say that the composition of the human being and that of Christ are exactly alike? Or it is hypostatic, and why do you not agree with us who especially put forward the doctrine that it is <a union> of the lover with the beloved? Or it is neither natural nor hypostatic, then clarify for us what it seems to be to you.

51:

It is necessary for them to say that this Christ of theirs is in some respect either greater or lesser than God alone and the human being alone, that is, when his own parts are considered apart and by themselves. For the parts of the products when considered by themselves and without the composition with each other, are definitely found to be in some respect either greater or lesser than the result from them. For example, stones and wood are parts of a house or of the church, or of the temple that was founded by Solomon, and it is obvious that each one by itself is lesser than the whole house. Again hyacinth, purple, spun scarlet, spun linen are parts of the curtain of the tabernacle, and each of them alone is obviously lesser than the curtain. Thus it is also the case with the human being. According to the Christians the human being, this whole living being, is greater than both the soul and the body, since after the departure of the soul from the body the soul, too, is incapable of self-moved operation, persevering as if in a very deep sleep, and not even knowing itself, and waiting for the requital of the deeds <that it performed> together with the body according to Scripture, which it will not escape through the separation from the body, neither progressing to what is better nor being changed to what is worse, lest Scripture be given the lie. From this, I mean, from changing neither for the better nor for the worse, it follows either that that utterly perfect and blessed state, which is expected in the resurrection, is already now in the nature, or

ἐπὶ τὸ χειρὸν τρέπεσθαι, ἢ τὸ παντέλειον ἐκεῖνο καὶ τὸ παμμακάριον, τὸ προσδοκώμενον ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει ἐνεῖναι τῇ φύσει ἤδη, ἢ τὸ πάντῃ ἡσυχάζειν τὸ λογικόν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν αὐτοπροαιρέτῳ βουλῇ κινούμενον μηδενὸς ἔχον ὅλως αἰσθησιν ἔστιν. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρότερον οὐδ' εἰσκεκόμισται, τοῦ θεοῦ κρεῖττον τι προβλεψαμένου περὶ ἡμῶν, ἵνα μὴ χωρὶς ἡμῶν οἱ πρότεροι τελειωθῶσι (Heb. 11:40). Τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα ἔστι. Καθ' ἡμᾶς οὖν τοὺς Χριστιανούς [οὐ] κρεῖττον ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν καθ' ἑαυτὰ θεωρουμένων δείκνυται. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Ἑλληνας καὶ τοὺς Μανιχαίους τοῦ μὲν σώματος κρεῖττων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἥττων τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴν καὶ προϋπάρχειν οἶδασι τοῦ σώματος, ἀνευθεῖ τὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεων καὶ πρὸ τῆς εἰς τὸ σῶμα καταπτώσεως, ὡς φασι, μηδὲν ἀγνοοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τούτου ἔξοδον ὡσαύτως. Ὅθεν καὶ ἥττονα οἶδασι αὐτῆς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆς χεῖρονα λέγουσι γενέσθαι διὰ τῆς ἐν τῷ σώματι φυλακῆς, ὡς φασι. Τοῦ δὲ σώματος νεκροῦ θεωρουμένου μετὰ τὴν διάζευξιν τῆς ψυχῆς πρόδηλον ὅτι κρεῖττον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα κρεῖττον ἑαυτοῦ θεωρεῖται πρὸ τοῦ χωρισμοῦ τοῦ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς πρὸς τὸ μετὰ τὸ χωρισθῆναι τῆς ψυχῆς. Συνέστηκεν ἄρα, ὡς ὅτι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν καθ' ἑαυτὰ θεωρουμένων, ἢ κρεῖττον ἔστι κατὰ τι ἢ ἥττων. Ὅθεν ἀνάγκη λέγειν καὶ τούτοις τὸν Χριστὸν αὐτῶν ἢ ἥττονα εἶναι ἢ κρεῖττονα κατὰ τι τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἐπινοουμένων, εἰ ὅλως ἐν ζῶον ἔστι κατ' αὐτοὺς ὁ Χριστὸς ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀποτελεσθέν. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν κρεῖττονα εἵποιεν, δεδώκασι τὸ ἀσεβές, τελειότερόν τι τοῦ θεοῦ φανταζόμενοι εἶναι, ὅπερ καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοὺς ὑπέρτατον. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐκ Θεοῦ Λόγου καὶ σαρκὸς ζῶον κρεῖττον κατὰ τι τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καθ' ἑαυτὸν νοουμένου, τοῦτο αὐτὸ κρεῖττον δηλονότι καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος μὴ συγκειμένων τῇ σαρκί, ἐπεὶ περ ἴσος ὁ Υἱὸς τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι. Καὶ ὁ τούτου κρεῖττων κατὰ τι, σαφές ὅτι καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου, εἰ δὲ ἥττων εἵποιεν τουτὶ τὸ ζῶον τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καθ' ἑαυτὸν θεωρουμένου, καὶ οὕτως ἀσεβοῦσι· τὸν Θεὸν γὰρ Λόγον

that the faculty of reasoning is completely at rest since there is nothing that is moved through self-willed counsel that has no sense perception of anything at all. But the former has not yet been introduced, since *God has envisaged something greater for us lest our forebears be perfected without us.*

Consequently, the second is the case.

According to us Christians, then, the human being is shown to be greater than its own parts when they are considered by themselves. But according to the pagans and Manichaeans the human being is greater than the body but lesser than the soul, for the following reason. For they know that the soul pre-exists the body and is not in need of the senses of the body and, as they say, knows everything before the fall into the body, but also after the departure from it likewise. Therefore they know that the human being is lesser than <the soul>, since as they say <the soul> also becomes worse than itself through the imprisonment in the body, as they say. Since the body itself is seen to be dead after the separation of the soul it is obvious that the human being is greater, since the body itself, too, is seen to be greater than itself before the separation from the soul when compared with its state after the separation from the soul. Consequently, it has been established that the result of its own parts when seen by themselves is in some respect either greater or lesser. Therefore it is necessary for them to say that that Christ of theirs is in some respect either lesser or greater than his own parts when considered by themselves, if at all Christ is according to them one living being that has resulted from God and the human being. But if they say that he is greater, they have admitted an impiety, since they imagine that there is something more perfect than God, which one must say is also higher than the Father and the Spirit. For if according to them the living being resulting from the God Word and the flesh is in some respects greater than the God Word when seen by himself, this same one is evidently greater than the Father and the Spirit who are not composed with the flesh, if indeed the Son is like the Father and the Spirit. And he who is greater than him is evidently also <greater> than the Father and the Holy Spirit. But if they say that this living being is lesser than the God Word when seen by himself, they are again impious. For they show that the God Word has become lesser than himself according to the myth about the soul of

ἤττονα ἑαυτοῦ δεικνύουσι γεγενῆσθαι κατὰ τὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ Μανιχαίων περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς μῦθον. Οὐκ ἂν γὰρ τὸ ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ σαρκὸς ζῶον ἤττον εὑρίσκεται τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ μόνας, εἰ μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἤττων ἑαυτοῦ γέγονεν.

[Λόγος Β']

Δευτέρας ἀσεβείας αὐτῶν ἔλεγχος λεγόντων δύο καὶ οὐ μίαν τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὴν σάρκωσιν τοῦ Λόγου οἰκονομίας ὁράσθαι.

α'

Σημαίνει, φασίν, ἡ ὑπόστασις ποτὲ μὲν τι ἐνούσιον, ὡς τό· *Μνήσθητι τίς μου ἡ ὑπόστασις* (Ps. 88:48), καὶ· *Χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ* (Heb. 1:3), ποτὲ δὲ ἀνούσιον τι, ὡς τό· *Ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ὑποστάσει τῆς καυχῆσεώς μου* (2 Cor. 11:17), ποτὲ δὲ τινῶν συνάθροισιν ὁμοιοῦντων, ὡς τό· *Ἐξῆλθον ἄνδρες ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῶν ἀλλοφύλων* (1 Κι. 13:23). Εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ τελευταῖον φασὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἀντὶ τοῦ ταυτοβουλίας καὶ ὁμογνωμοσύνης σημαίνει τῶν φύσεων, συγχωροῦσι δηλονότι κατὰ τὰ πρῶτα δύο λέγειν ἡμᾶς τὰς ὑποστάσεις τῶν δύο φύσεων. Εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον φασίν, ἀνούσιον τι βουλόμενοι δεῖξαι τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν φύσεων, οὐδὲ ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιοι. Εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον, εἰπάτωσαν τινὶ καθέστηκεν αὕτη ὁμοούσιος, τῇ τοῦ Δαυὶδ περὶ ἧς εἶπε· *Μνήσθητι τίς μου ἡ ὑπόστασις*, ἢ τῇ τοῦ Πατρὸς περὶ ἧς εἴρηται· *Χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ*; Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν τῇ τοῦ Πατρὸς, πῶς ἐκ δύο φύσεων συνέστηκεν, ἀπλῆς ὑπαρχούσης τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς; Δεῖ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν λόγον τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν νόησιν τὰς ὁμοουσίους λεγομένας ὑποστάσεις, ἐπεὶ λεγέτωσαν τί τὸ ὁμοούσιον. Εἰ δὲ μὴ τῇ τοῦ Πατρὸς, ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ Δαυὶδ, πῶς ἐκ δύο φύσεων λέγοντες αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστάναι βούλονται; Τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ τοῦ Δαυὶδ. Εἰ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο, πᾶσιν ἑτεροούσιος ὁ παρ' ὑμῶν εἰσαγόμενος υἱός, καὶ οὐδὲ ἡμῖν οὐδὲ τῇ ἀγία Τριάδι ὁμοούσιος. Εἰ δὲ λέγετε ἐκ μέρους καὶ τούτῳ κάκεινῳ ὁμοούσιος, γινώσκετε ὅτι τὰ ὁμοούσια οὐκ ἐκ μέρους θέλει ὁμοούσια εἶναι· τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ τούτῳ πάντα πᾶσιν ὁμοούσια ἔσται. Ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἐκ μέρους τούτῳ κάκεινῳ ὁμοούσιον, οὐδετέρου

the pagans and Manichaeans. For the living being from God and flesh would not be found lesser than God alone, if the God Word himself had not before become lesser than himself.

[Book II]

Refutation of the second impiety of them who say that the hypostasis, which results from the dispensation through the incarnation of the Word, is two and not one.

1:

'Hypostasis' [they say] means sometimes something that has substance, as in: *Remember what is my hypostasis*, and: *Imprint of his hypostasis*, sometimes something that does not have substance, as in: *In this hypostasis of my boasting*, and sometimes the gathering of some people who are of like mind, as in: *Men went out from the hypostasis of the gentiles*. If, then, opting for the last meaning, they use 'hypostasis' instead of unity of will and likeness of mind of the natures, they obviously permit us to speak of two hypostases of the two natures in the first sense. But if they opt for the second meaning, wishing to show that the result from both natures is something without substance, they do not even deserve a reply. But if <they opt for> the first meaning, let them say: With which <hypostasis> is <the hypostasis of the Son> of like substance? With <the hypostasis> of David about which he said: '*Remember what is my hypostasis*', or with that of the Father about which is said: '*Imprint of his hypostasis*'? But if <the hypostasis of the Son is of like substance> with <the hypostasis> of the Father, how is it constituted from two natures, when that of the Father is simple, for the hypostases that are called substances must have the same definition of substance and share the same concept. So let them say what is that which is of like substance. If <the hypostasis of the Son> is not <of like substance> with <the hypostasis> of the Father but with that of David, how do those who say that it is from two natures not wish that it is constituted from soul and body, for such is <the hypostasis> of David? And if it is neither this nor that, the Son whom you introduce differs in substance from all, and is neither of like substance with us nor of like substance with the holy Trinity. But if you say that he is of like substance partly with

δύναται εἶναι υἱός, ἐπεὶ δείξατέ τι ἐκ μέρους
ὑπάρχον ὁμοούσιον διαφοροῖς, καὶ γινόμενον
τούτου κάκεινου υἱόν.

β'

Ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἢ μέρος ἐστὶ ταύτης τῆς
ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἢ ὅλον. Εἰ μὲν οὖν
μέρος, αὐτὴ δὲ υἱός, μέρος τοῦ υἱοῦ ὁ Θεὸς
Λόγος. Οὐκοῦν δύο ἡμισυ πρὸ τῆς
ἐνανθρωπήσεως ἢ Τριάς. Εἰ δὲ τὸ ὅλον, οὐκ
ἦν ἄρα πρὸ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως ὁ Θεὸς
Λόγος, ἐπεὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸ τῶν μερῶν
γενήσεται· μέρος γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου ἢ γενομένη
προσφάτως σάρξ.

γ'

Εἰ ὅλον ταυτησί τῆς ὑποστάσεως ὁ Θεὸς
Λόγος, φησί, ἐκ τίνος ἄρα συναναπληροῦται,
εἶπατε. Τοῦ γὰρ Θεοῦ Λόγου Θεὸς Λόγος
οὐκ ἐστὶ μέρος, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν ἑαυτοῦ μέρος
εἶναι λέγεται.

δ'

Εἰ ἐκ μερῶν τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ
ὁμοούσιος ἢ ὑπόστασις Χριστοῦ, τὰ μέρη
αὐτῆς ταῦτα ἐνούσια ἐστὶν ἢ ἀνούσια; Ἄλλ'
εἰ μὲν ἀνούσια, πῶς ὁμοούσια τοῖς ἐνούσιαις;
Εἰ δὲ ἐνούσια, πῶς οὐκ οὐσίας μέρη
καθέστηκε; Πᾶν γὰρ μέρος ἐνούσιον, οὐσίας
μέρος κυρίως καὶ οὐχ ὑποστάσεως, ἐπεὶ περ
οὐκ ἐκ τῶν οὐσιωδῶν ἢ ὑπόστασις ὡς
ὑπόστασις χαρακτηρίζεται, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν
ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ λευκότητος, σιμότητος καὶ
τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θείας οὐσίας ἀπὸ
τρόπου ὑπάρξεως, καθ' ὃν ἢ μὲν γεννητικῶς,
ἢ δὲ γεγεννημένως, ἢ δὲ ἐκπορευτικῶς. Πῶς
οὖν καὶ δύο τελείας λέγοντες τὰς οὐσίας, ἐπεὶ
οὐκ οὐσίας μέρη λέγετε, ὡς ἐκ μερῶν φατὲ
τὴν ὑπόστασιν;

the one and <partly with> the other, learn that
things of like substance do not wish to be partly
of like substance, because by that definition all
would be of like substance with all. Indeed, that
which is of like substance partly with the one
and <partly with> the other, can be the son of
neither. So show us something that is partly of
like substance with different things, and comes
to be a son of the one and of the other.

2:

The God Word is either a part of this hypostasis
of Christ, or the whole. If, then, he is a part,
and <the hypostasis> is the Son, the God Word
is a part of the Son. Therefore, the Trinity is
two and a half before the inhumanation. But if
he is the whole, it follows that the God Word
did not exist before the inhumanation, since
<otherwise> the whole would come to be
before the parts. For a part of the whole is the
flesh that has recently come to be.

3:

If the God Word is the whole of this hypostasis
[he says], tell us by what it is completed. For
the God Word will not be part of the God
Word, since nothing is said to be a part of
itself.

4:

If the hypostasis of Christ is of like substance
partly with the Father and <partly> with the
mother, are these parts of it substantial or
without substance? But if they are without
substance, how can they be of like substance
with those that are substantial? But if they are
substantial, how can they not be parts of
substance? For each substantial part is strictly
speaking a part of substance and not of
hypostasis, since the hypostasis *qua* hypostasis
is not characterised through substantial
<properties> but in the case of human beings
through whiteness, snubnosedness and other
things of that kind, and in the case of the divine
substance through the mode of existence,
according to which one <exists> as begetter,
one <exists> as begotten and one <exists> as
proceeding. How, then, do you speak of two
complete substances, when you do not call
them parts of substance, and say that the
hypostasis is <constituted> from parts?

ε'

Εἰ ἐκ μέρους ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ ἐκ μέρους ὁμοούσιος τῷ Δαυὶδ ἢ παρ' ὑμῖν ὑπόστασις, εἰπέ τὰ μέρη ταῦτα, καθ' ἃ καὶ τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Δαυὶδ ἐστὶν ὁμοούσια· θεὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ἕτερόν τι; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἕτερόν τι, εἰπέ τί τοῦτο. Εἰ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔχων ἰδικὴν ὑπόστασιν παρὰ τὸν Δαυὶδ ᾧ ἐστὶν ὁμοούσιος, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἔχει ἰδικὴν ὑπόστασιν παρὰ τὸν Πατέρα ᾧ ἐστὶν ὁμοούσιος· τὸ γὰρ ἀνυπόστατον τῷ ἐνυποστάτῳ ὁμοούσιον ποτὲ οὐκ ἂν λεχθεῖη. Εἰ τοίνυν μία ὑπόστασις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, καὶ αὕτη τελεία καὶ ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρὶ, ὁ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἀνυπόστατός ἐστι καὶ μέχρι ψιλῆς τῆς φωνῆς λεγόμενος, ἢ ἐνυπόστατος καὶ αὐτὸς τελείαν ἔχων τὴν ὑπόστασιν καθὼς ἄνθρωπος. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀνυπόστατος, περιττὸν τὸ ὁμοούσιον αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ Δαυίδ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀνυπόστατον ἐνυποστάτῳ καθέστηκεν ὁμοούσιον. Εἰ δὲ ἐνυπόστατον, δικαίως μὲν ὁμοούσιος λεχθήσεται τῷ Δαυίδ· καθόλου γὰρ ὑπόστασις ὑποστάσει λέγεται ὁμοούσιος, οἰκίησεται δὲ ὑμῶν τὸ σόφισμα τὸ μὴ λέγειν δύο ὑποστάσεις βουλομένων τὰς δύο φύσεις τοῦ τε Θεοῦ Λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου λέγειν.

σ'

Ἐρωτῶμεν πάλιν, διακρίνατε τὸ λεγόμενον ἡμῖν. Εἶπατε τί τὸ σημαινόμενον ὑφ' ὑμῶν δι' ἐκάστης φύσεως τοῦ παρ' ὑμῶν λεγομένου θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου· ὁ τίς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ἢ ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἡ ἅγια Τριάς, ἢ ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ἢ ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἡ ἅγια Τριάς. Ἀλλ' ὅτι Τριάδα μὴ βούλεσθε σημαίνειν μετὰ τοῦ καθόλου λεγομένου ἀνθρώπου, οὔτε μὴ μετὰ τοῦ ἰδικοῦ τινος, πρόδηλοι καθεστήκατε, ἐκ τοῦ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἕνα λέγειν τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος τὸν σταυρωθέντα καὶ παθόντα. Λείπεται οὖν λέγειν ὑμᾶς τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον καὶ ἢ τὸν καθόλου λεγόμενον ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἰδικόν τινα ἄνθρωπον λέγοιτε σημαίνειν διὰ τῆς μιᾶς φύσεως καὶ οὐ πάντα ἄνθρωπον. Εἶπατε οὖν τίνι διαφέρει ὁ ἰδικὸς ἄνθρωπος τοῦ παντός ἀνθρώπου; Ἡ πρόδηλον ὅτι μόνῃ τῇ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ. Πῶς οὖν οὐ δύο

5:

If your hypostasis is partly of like substance with the Father and partly of like substance with David, name these parts through which it is of like substance with the Father and with David? Are they God and the human being, or something else? But if they are something else, state what they are. But if they are God and the human being, the human being will not have its own hypostasis besides David with whom it is of like substance, just as the God Word, too, has his own hypostasis besides the Father with whom he is of like substance. For what is without hypostasis could never be said to be of like substance with that which is hypostatic. If, then, there is one hypostasis of the God Word and it is complete and of like substance with the Father, the human being taken from us is either without hypostasis and is spoken of as a mere utterance, or it is hypostatic and has itself a complete hypostasis *qua* human being. But if it is without hypostasis, it is superfluous <to say> that it is of like substance with David, for nothing without hypostasis is of like nature with what is hypostatic. But if it is hypostatic, it will justly be called of like substance with David, for generally it is said that a hypostasis is of like substance with <another> hypostasis. And gone will the sophism of you who do not wish to speak of two hypostases but speak of two natures of the God Word and of the human being taken from us.

6:

We ask again: Distinguish for us what you say, tell us what you mean by each nature of your so-called God and human being! Is it the individual human being and the God Word, or the universal human being and the holy Trinity, or the universal human being and the God Word, or an individual human being and the holy Trinity? But it is clear that you do not want it to mean the Trinity with the so-called universal human being or indeed with an individual one, because you call the one who has been crucified and has suffered one of the Trinity. It, then, remains for you to say that by the one nature you mean the God Word and either the so-called universal human being or an individual human being and not every human being. Tell us, then, in what does the individual human being differ from every human being? It is obvious that <it differs> only in the hypostasis and the person. Why, then, do you not say that there are two persons

φατὲ πρόσωπα καὶ ὑποστάσεις, δύο φύσεις λέγοντες ἐπὶ σημασία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καὶ ἑνός τινος ἀνθρώπου; Εἰ δὲ τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον ἐθέλοιτε λέγειν, ἢ ἐννοία λαμβάνετε τοῦτον τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὸν ἀποματτόμενοι τῆς οὐσίας ἐκ τῶν καθέκαστα, καὶ νοήσει κατέχοντες αὐτὸν ἄνευ τῆς ὑποκειμένης οὐσίας τούτῳ λέγοντες ἐνηθροπικῆναι τὸν θεόν, ἢ αὐτὰ πάντα τὰ καθέκαστα ὑπάρξει ἰδία συνάγοντες, ὅποτε αὐτὸ πᾶσι σεσαρκῶσθαι δογματίζετε τὸν ἕνα τῆς τριάδος. Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, πῶς οὐ ψιλῆ τῆ ἐννοία καὶ οὐκ ὑπάρξει οὐσιώδει λέγετε γεγενῆσθαι τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν τοῦ Κυρίου; Εἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ἐνηθροπικῶς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος καὶ ἀσεβέσι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοῖς καὶ προτελευτήσασιν καὶ ἐσομένοις ἀνθρώποις; Ὅπερ ἀσεβῆς καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας λέγειν σοφίας. Εἰ δὲ ἄλλως ἐθέλοιτε τὸ καθόλου ἄνθρωπον ὑποθέσθαι κατὰ τοὺς παρεισφέροντας τὰς λεγομένας ιδέας, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἔξει χώραν ἢ ἐνανθρώπησις. Ἴνα γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ παρήσω, σῶμα τὸ ἐκ Μαρίας ἐκεῖνου μέρος εἶναι λέγειν ὀρθῶς οὐ δυνατόν. Πῶς δὲ οὐ φανήσεσθε προδηλότατα τῇ γραφῇ μαχόμενοι, ἕνα ἐξ ἡμῶν διδασκουσῆ εἶναι τὸν κυριακὸν ἄνθρωπον; *Βίβλος γάρ, φησί, γενέσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, υἱοῦ Δαυὶδ, υἱοῦ Ἀβραάμ* (Mt. 1:1). *Καί· Πρόδηλον ὅτι ἐξ Ἰούδα ἀνατέταλκεν ὁ Κύριος* (Heb. 7:14). *Καί· Τὸν ἄνδρα Μαρίας ἐξ ἧς ἐγεννήθη Ἰησοῦς ὁ λεγόμενος Χριστός* (Mt. 1:16). *Καί· Ἰησοῦν τὸν Ναζωραῖον, ἄνδρα ἀποδεδειγμένον ἀπὸ θεοῦ εἰς ὑμᾶς, δυνάμεσι καὶ τέρασι καὶ σημείοις οἷς ἐποίησε δι' αὐτοῦ ὁ θεὸς ἐν μέσῳ ὑμῶν, καθὼς καὶ αὐτοὶ οἴδατε* (Acts 2:22). *Τοὺς μὲν οὖν χρόνους τῆς ἀγνοίας ὑπεριδὼν ὁ θεὸς τανῦν παραγγέλλει τοῖς πᾶσι πανταχοῦ μετανοεῖν, καθότι ἔστησεν ἡμέραν ἐν ἧ ἔμελλει κρίνειν τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾧ ὥρισε πίστιν παρασχῶν πᾶσιν, ἀναστήσας αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν* (Acts 17:30-31). *Καί· Ὅσπερ δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ὁ θάνατος, οὕτως καὶ δι' ἀνθρώπου ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκομεν, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ πάντες ζωοποιηθήσομεθα* (1 Cor. 15:21-22). *Καί· Εἷς ὁ θεός, εἷς μεσίτης θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων, ἄνθρωπος Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς* (1 Tim. 2:5). *Καί· Ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς προέκοπτεν ἡλικία καὶ σοφία καὶ χάριτι παρὰ θεῶ καὶ*

and hypostases, since you speak of two natures when you refer to the God Word and one single human being? But if you wish to speak of the universal human being, you either comprehend it in thought, deriving it through abstraction from the substance of the individuals and holding it in the mind, without the underlying substance, and saying that God has been become human through it. Or you bring together all individuals in their own existence, when you put forward the doctrine that the one of the Trinity has incarnated in all. And if the first <option applies> how do you not say that the inhumanation of the Lord happened in mere thought and not in substantial existence? But if the second <option applies>, how will the God Word not have become human in blasphemers and sinners and in human beings who had died before and who will come to be, which is impious even for your wisdom to say. But if you wish to understand the universal human being in another way, according to those who introduce the so-called ideas, the inhumanation will even so not be possible. For in order that I pass over the rest, it is not possible to say correctly that the body taken from Mary is a part of it. How will you not appear most evidently to contradict Scripture, which teaches that the Lordly human being is one of us? For it says: *Book of the genealogy of Jesus Christ, son of David, son of Abraham*. And: *It is obvious that the Lord has risen from Judah*. And: *The husband of Mary from whom was born Jesus the so-called Christ*. And: *Jesus of Nazareth, a man who was shown to us from God, through powers and portents and signs, which God performed through him in our midst, as you, too, know. Having overlooked the days of ignorance, God now announces to all everywhere to repent. Because he has appointed a day on which he will judge the world in righteousness, through a man whom he appointed, giving assurance to all, having raised him from the dead*. And: *As through one human being death, through a human being resurrection of the dead. For as we all die in Adam, we will all be vivified in Christ*. And: *One God, one mediator between God and human beings, the human being Jesus*. And: *Jesus advanced in age and wisdom and grace before God and human beings*. And: *The child grew and was strengthened, being filled with wisdom, and the grace of God was with him*. And: *The Lord our God will raise up a prophet for you from your brothers like me*. And: *You*

ἀνθρώποις (Lk. 2:52). Καί· Τὸ παιδίον
 ἠϋζανε καὶ ἐκραταιοῦτο πληρούμενον σοφίας,
 καὶ χάρις θεοῦ ἦν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ (Lk. 2:40). Καί·
 Προφήτην ὑμῖν ἀναστήσει Κύριος ὁ θεὸς
 ἡμῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ὑμῶν ὡς ἐμέ (Acts
 7:37). Καί· Σὺ ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα κατὰ τὴν
 τάξιν Μελχισεδέκ (Heb. 7:17). Ἄρα οὖν
 πάντα ταῦτα καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἄπειρα ὄντα,
 παρὰ τῆ ἀγίᾳ γραφῇ δύνασθε λέγειν περὶ
 ἐκάστου ἀνθρώπου τῶν καθέκαστα λελέχθαι;
 Καὶ πῶς δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν πάντας ἀνθρώπους
 ἐκ σπέρματος εἶναι Ἀβραάμ, καὶ τούτου οὐ
 παντός, ἀλλὰ φυλῆς Ἰούδα, καὶ ταύτης οὐχ
 ὅλης, ἀλλ’ ἐξ οἴκου Δαυΐδ, καὶ τούτου οὐ
 παντός, ἀλλὰ Μαρίας τῆς Παρθένου; Ἄρα
 οὖν εἴποιτε ἂν καὶ Καϊάφαν ἐκ Μαρίας
 γεγενῆσθαι τῆς Παρθένου; Καὶ οὗτος γὰρ εἷς
 ἐστὶ τῶν καθέκαστα ἀνθρώπων. Ἄρα γὰρ καὶ
 τὴν Μαρῖαν ἄνθρωπον εἴποιτε εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ
 ἄνθρωπον; Ἄλλ’ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἄνθρωπον,
 εἶπατε τί τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχει. Εἰ δὲ
 ἄνθρωπον, καὶ πῶς τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον
 αὕτη γεγέννηκε, πολλάς μὲν ἀνθρώπων
 γενεὰς ἔχουσα πρὸ αὐτῆς, πολλάς δὲ καὶ μετ’
 αὐτῆς; Ἡ πῶς τὸ καθόλου τι τῶν καθόλου
 γεννήσειεν; Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἄνδρα δύνασθε
 τὴν σύμπασαν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ
 γυναῖκα· τὸ ἄνθρωπος γὰρ κοινὸν τούτων
 κάκεινων, τὸ ἀνήρ δὲ καὶ τὸ γύναιον
 διακριτικὰ καθέστηκε τῆς ἐν τῇ κοινῇ φύσει
 διαφορᾶς. Πῶς δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο οὐ σαφές, ὅτι
 ὡσπερ εἷς τῶν πάντων καὶ πρῶτος τῆς θνητῆς
 καταστάσεως ὁ Ἀδάμ, δι’ οὗ πάντες ὅμοιοι
 γεγόναμεν θνητοὶ κατὰ φύσιν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ
 Χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα εἷς ἐστὶ τῶν πάντων
 καὶ ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ἐν ἀθανασίᾳ διαγωγῆς, δι’
 οὗ πάντες κατ’ αὐτὸν τῆς ἀθανάτου ζωῆς ἐν
 καθέξει γινόμεθα; Καὶ ὅτι εἷς ἄνθρωπος
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεοῦ μεσίτης; Πῶς γὰρ οἱ
 πάντες ἑαυτοῖς μεσιτεύουσιν; Ἡ πῶς πάντες
 παρ’ ἑαυτοῖς χάριτι καὶ σοφίᾳ προκόψαιεν;
 Οἱ πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄωροι κοιμῶνται, ἐπὶ τὴν
 τελείαν ἡλικίαν μὴ προκόποντες, καὶ ἄλλοι
 πάλιν πλεῖστοι ἀνοίας εἰσὶν ἀνάμεστοι καὶ
 ἀσεβείας, οὐχὶ δὲ σοφίας καὶ χάριτος θεοῦ
 τῆς ἐπ’ αὐτούς. Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ προφήται
 πάντες κατὰ Μωϋσέα οὐδὲ ἱερεῖς κατὰ
 Μελχισεδέκ, ἐπεὶ ὦρα ὑμᾶς καὶ τὴν
 ἱερωσύνην τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων καὶ τὰς
 μαντείας τὰς παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησι, προφητείας
 ὀνομάζειν Μωσαϊκὰς καὶ ἱερωσύνας
 Χριστιανικάς, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

*will be priest forever according to the order of
 Melchisedec.* All this, then, and uncountable
 other passages of the kind in holy Scripture you
 can quote, which are said about a particular
 human being of the individuals. And how can
 one say that all human beings are from the seed
 of Abraham, and not from all of it but from the
 tribe of Judah, and not from all of it but from
 the house of David, and not from all of it but
 from Mary the Virgin? Would you perhaps say
 that Caiaphas, too, was born from Mary the
 Virgin? For he is also one of the individuals.
 Would you call Mary, too, a human being or
 not a human being? But if <she is> not a
 human being, tell us what she is by substance?
 But if <she is> a human being, how could she
 have given birth to the universal human being
 when there were many generations of human
 beings before her, and many have come after
 her. But you cannot even call the entire nature
 ‘man’, since <one cannot call it> woman either.
 The term ‘human being’ is common to the ones
 and the others, whereas ‘man’ and ‘woman’
 distinguish the difference in the common
 nature. How is the other <point> not also clear:
 Just as Adam through whom we have all
 become mortal as regards our nature, is one of
 all and first of the mortal condition, so Christ
 through whom we all acquire immortal life like
 him, is one of all as regards the flesh and leader
 of the conduct in immortality. And one human
 being is mediator between human beings and
 God. For how would all be their own
 mediators? Or how would all by themselves
 advance in grace and wisdom? For many die
 before their time, and do not advance to the
 complete age, and others again are full of
 madness and impiety, but not wisdom and
 grace of God over them. But indeed nor are all
 prophets like Moses or priests like
 Melchisedec. Have a care that you do not call
 the priesthood of the idolaters and the magic of
 the pagans Mosaic prophecies and Christian
 priesthoods, which is impious.

ζ'

Εἰ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ ὑπέστη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔχει ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, πῶς εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔφυ, ἔχει φύσιν ἰδίαν ὁ ἄνθρωπος; Καὶ εἰ ἔχει φύσιν ἰδίαν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, πῶς οὐχ ἔξει καὶ ὑπόστασιν; Ἡ ἔστω φύς ἔξω πού τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, ὑποστὰς δὲ ὕστερον ἐν αὐτῷ, πῶς δὲ καὶ φύσις τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου πρὸ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῆς ἰδίας;

η'

Εἰ ὅλως ὑπέστη ὁ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῷ θεῷ, πῶς οὐκ ἔρρωται καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόστασις τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου; Καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔρρωται καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόστασις τοῦ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ, πῶς οὐχὶ ἀπόλωλεν ὑποστᾶσα ἢ οὐδὲ ὅλως τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑπέστη;

θ'

Εἰ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ λέγεις ὑφεςτάναί τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον, πῶς αὐτῷ τῷ ὑφεςτάναί, οὐχ ὑπόστασιν δηλοῖς ἔχειν τὸν ὑποστάντα;

ι'

Εἰ ὑπέστη μὲν ὁ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ὑπόστασιν, πῶς οὐκ ἐναντία δογματίζεις, ἀνυπόστατον τὸν ὑφεςτηκότα λέγων;

ια'

Εἰ ἡ Πέτρου ψυχὴ ἕτερα ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν Παύλου, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἢ φύσει καὶ ὑποστάσει ἕτερον, ὡς ὁ οὐρανὸς τῆς γῆς, ἢ ὑποστᾶσει πάντως, ὡς ὁ Πατὴρ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, πῶς οὐχὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει, ἢ πάντως τῇ ὑποστάσει, διαφέρει ἡ ψυχὴ Πέτρου τῆς Παύλου; Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πῶς οὐκ ἔχει ὑπόστασιν ἐκάστου ἢ ψυχὴ καθ' ἣν διαφέρει τῆς ἑτέρου, ἢ τῶν τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἢ οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς;

7:

If the human being does not have its own hypostasis because the human being gained hypostasis in the God Word, how <can it be that> the human being has its own nature if it gained nature in <the God Word>? And if the human being has its own nature, how will it not also have its hypostasis? If we put the case that it gained nature outside the God Word, but gained hypostasis in him, how does the nature of the human being taken from us exist before its own hypostasis?

8:

If the human being gained hypostasis in God at all, how is the hypostasis of the human being taken from us not alive and well in the hypostasis of the God Word? And if the hypostasis of the human being taken from us is not alive and well in the God Word, how <is it> not <the case> that it has disappeared after it had gained hypostasis or that it has not at all gained hypostasis in the first place?

9:

If you say that the human being taken from us gained hypostasis in the God Word, how do you not indicate that that which has gained hypostasis has a hypostasis through the very fact of its gaining hypostasis?

10:

If the human being taken from us gained hypostasis but does not have a hypostasis, how do you not put forward contradictory doctrines, calling without hypostasis the one that has gained hypostasis?

11:

If the soul of Peter is different from that of Paul, and what is different is different in nature and in hypostasis, as the heaven <differs> from the earth, or at least in hypostasis, as the Father <differs> from the Son, how does the soul of Peter not differ from that of Paul in nature and hypostasis or at least in hypostasis? But if this is so, why does the soul of each <human being> not have a hypostasis through which it differs from <the soul> of another <human being>, either of those that have the same substance, or <of those> who do not have the same substance?

ιβ'

Εἰ κατὰ φύσιν μηδὲν διαφέρει τὸ σῶμα Πέτρου τοῦ σώματος Παύλου, πῶς ἂν καθ' ὑπόστασιν οὐ διαφέρει; Εἰ δὲ μηδὲ καθ' ὑπόστασιν διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μήτε τῇ φύσει μήτε τῇ ὑποστάσει διαφέρον, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη κατὰ πάντα, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου ἐν τῷ σῶμα καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν κατὰ πάντα, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον;

ιδ'

Ἐκ τοῦ δὲ φληναφεῖν καὶ δοκεῖν τι λέγειν τοῖς παρεστηκόσιν ἀπαιτούμενοι φύσιν δεῖξαι ἀνυπόστατον, παρέχουσι μὲν νῶτα τῷ αἰτοῦντι, λέγουσι δὲ ὅτι ὄντως φύσις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνυπόστατος· ἐνυποστάτους γὰρ φαμέν τὰς οὐσίας καὶ ἡμεῖς, φασίν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶ τι ἐνυπόστατον, τοῦτο καὶ ὑπόστασις, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει οὐκ εἶ τι ἐνούσιον, τοῦτο καὶ οὐσία, ἐπεὶ ἰδοὺ τὰς τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος ὑποστάσεις φαμέν τρεῖς εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ἐνούσιους, καὶ οὐ λέγομεν πρὸς ταῖς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις καὶ τρεῖς οὐσίας, καίπερ ἐνούσιον ἐπιστάμενοι τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἐκάστην. Εἰ τοίνυν ἔστι λέγειν, φαμέν, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ἐνούσιους ἐν μιᾷ οὐσίᾳ, ἐνδέχεται δηλονότι καὶ φύσεις λέγειν ἐνυποστάτους δύο ἐν μιᾷ ὑποστάσει, καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲ φύσιν ἀνυπόστατον φαμέν, οὐδὲ δύο ὑποστάσεις τὰς δύο φύσεις δογματίζομεν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἀνούσιους φαμέν τὰς τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος ὑποστάσεις, οὐδὲ εἰς τρεῖς οὐσίας τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις διαιροῦμεν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, φασί, καὶ ἄλλως ἐγχρωμάτιστον λέγοντες σῶμα, οὐ ταῦτ' ἴσμεν τῷ χρώματι τὸ σῶμα· οὐκ εἶ τι γὰρ ἐγχρωμάτιστον, τοῦτο ἤδη καὶ χρῶμα, οὕτως οὖν οὐκ εἶ τι ἐνυπόστατον, τοῦτο ἤδη καὶ ὑπόστασις. Περιττὸν ἄρα, φασί, τὸ λεγόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸν λέγοντα δύο φύσεις ἢ ἀνυποστάτους αὐτὰς ἢ μίαν αὐτῶν λέγειν, ἢ πάντως καὶ δύο ὑποστάσεις, ἐπεὶ μὴ ὑπόστασις τὸ ἐνυπόστατον ὡς ἐδείξαμεν. Ταῦτα τοιγαροῦν ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς παρεστηκότας φενακίζοντες ἔλεγον, ἄνω τὴν ὀφρῦν ἔχοντες, καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀπὸ Χερουβὶμ ἐαυτοὺς ὀνομάζοντες. Ὅρα δὲ σὺ αὐτὸς ὅπως δι' ὧν εἰρήκασι τὰ οἰκεῖα κατέσκαψαν, ἢ ἀγνοοῦντες δι' ἄγνοιαν οἰκεῖαν, ἢ χλευάζοντες τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἀπείρους ὄντας τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ὁμοίτητι λέξεων παρακρούμενοι. Εἰ ἀναλογεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν σώματι ἢ φύσει, τῷ δὲ χρώματι ἢ ὑπόστασις,

12:

If the body of Peter differs in nothing from the body of Paul as regards nature, how would it not differ as regards hypostasis? And if it does not differ as regards hypostasis, and that which differs neither in nature nor in hypostasis is in all respects identical, how would Peter and Paul not have in all respects one and the same body, which is impossible?

13:

Since they babble and seem to say something to those who stand by, when they are asked to show a nature without hypostasis, they turn their backs to those who ask and say that truly there is no nature that is without hypostasis, for we, too, call the substances hypostatic, they say, but <it is not the case that> if something is hypostatic it is also a hypostasis, just as perhaps if something is substantial it is not also a substance. Look, we say that the hypostases of the holy Trinity are three and that they are substantial, and we do not say that there are three substances besides the three hypostases, although we know that each of the hypostases is substantial. If, then, one can say, we say, that there are three substantial hypostases in one substance, one can evidently also say that there are two hypostatic natures in one hypostasis. And thus we do not say that there is a nature without hypostasis, nor do we put forward as doctrine that the two natures are two hypostases, just as we say that the hypostases of the holy Trinity are not without substance, and do not divide the three hypostases into three substances. But indeed, they say, we also say that the body is coloured, but we know that the body is not identical with the colour. For just as something that is coloured is not immediately also colour, thus something that is hypostatic is not immediately also hypostasis. They say that what <we> say is superfluous, and it is not necessary that those who speak of two natures call both of them or one of them without hypostasis, or indeed also two hypostases, since hypostatic is not hypostasis as we have shown. This, then, they say, hoodwinking the bystanders, being supercilious, and therefore calling themselves after the Cherubim. See for yourself how they undermine their own position through what they say, either because they are ignorant through their own ignorance, or in order to mock the listeners who are inexperienced in such matters, and mislead them through the

καὶ λέγουσιν ἐνυποστάτους τὰς φύσεις, ὡςπερ οὖν τὰ σώματα ἐγχρωμάτιστα, ἀνάγκη ἔνθα ἐστὶ ἐνυπόστατος φύσις, καὶ ὑπόστασιν εἶναι, ὡςπερ οὖν καὶ χρῶμα ἐνθα σῶμα ἐγχρωμάτιστον· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοῆσαι φύσιν ἐνυπόστατον ἄνευ ὑποστάσεως. Εἰ οὖν τῇ φύσει ἀναγκαίως διενήνοχέ τι καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει, ἐπιδειξάτωσάν μοι τι διαφέρον μὲν τῇ φύσει, μὴ διαφέρον δὲ τῇ ὑποστάσει, καὶ μὴ βουκολείτωσαν τοὺς ἀπλουστέρους, ὁμοίωτη φράσεων αὐτοὺς παραλογιζόμενοι, τῷ λέγειν εἰ ἔστιν ὑπόστασις ἐνούσιος μὲν οὐχ ἑτεροούσιος δέ, ἔστι καὶ φύσις ἐνυπόστατος μὲν οὐχ ἑτεροὑπόστατος δέ· ψευδὲς γὰρ τὸ τελευταῖον, ἐπεὶπερ εἶ τι ἑτεροούσιον, τοῦτο πάντως καὶ ἑτεροὑπόστατον. Εἰ τοίνυν διαφέρουσιν αἱ φύσεις ἀλλήλων, κατὰ φύσιν διαφέρουσι, διαφέρουσι δηλονότι καὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν, καὶ εἰ διαφορὰν φύσεων ἐπὶ μιᾶς φύσεως λέγεσθαι ἀδύνατον, ἀμήχανον ἄρα καὶ διαφορὰν ὑποστάσεων εἶναι ἐπὶ μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ὑποστάσεως.

ιδ' Ἀλλά, φασίν, ἰδοὺ ὁ ἄνθρωπος δύο μὲν φύσεις ἐστὶ, μία δὲ ὑπόστασις, καὶ φανερόν ἐκ τούτου, ὅτι δυνατόν ἐν μιᾷ ὑποστάσει δύο φύσεις εἶναι. Πάλιν τερθρεία λόγων, πάλιν μάχη δογμάτων, πάλιν ἐναντιότης ῥημάτων, καὶ σοφίσματα προδήλου ψυχῆς ἀγνώμονος. Τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ δύο φύσεις λέγουσι καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ πάλιν οὐδεμίαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ μακάριοι ἦμεν ἀκούοντες δύο φύσεις, μίαν ὑπόστασιν, ἢ νῦν διδασκόμενοι λέγειν δύο φύσεις, οὐδεμίαν δὲ ὑπόστασιν. Πάλιν γὰρ τὸν Χριστὸν λέγουσι τρεῖς φύσεις καὶ δύο ὑποστάσεις, καὶ δύο φύσεις καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν μὴ κατορθώσαντες λέγειν, τρεῖς ἤδη δογματίζουσι φύσεις ἐν μιᾷ ὑποστάσει. Καὶ ἄκουε ταῦτα πῶς. Εἰ δύο φύσεων ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως, εἴληπται δὲ οὗτος καὶ ἦνωται τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ, πῶς οὐ τρεῖς φύσεις, δύο ληφθεῖσαι, μία δὲ λαβοῦσα; Καὶ πῶς οὐ δύο ὑποστάσεις, ἢ τε λαβοῦσα καὶ ἢ ληφθεῖσα; Εἰ δὲ δύο φύσεων ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως, πῶς οὐ μία φύσις ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἀνυπόστατος ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὃν

similarity of the terms. For if nature corresponds to body, and hypostasis to colour, and they say that the natures are hypostatic, just as the bodies are coloured, it is necessary that there is a hypostasis where there is a hypostatic nature, just as <there is> also colour where there is a coloured body. For one cannot conceive of a hypostatic nature without a hypostasis. If, then, something necessarily differs in nature and in hypostasis, let them show me something that is different in nature but not different in hypostasis. And let them not beguile the simpler ones and mislead them through the similarity of the phrases, by saying that if there is a hypostasis, which is substantial but not of a different substance, there is also a nature, which is hypostatic but not of a different hypostasis. For the last is wrong, since something that is of a different substance, is definitely also of a different hypostasis. If, then, the natures differ from one another, they differ in nature and they obviously also differ in hypostasis. And if it is impossible to speak of a difference of natures in one nature, it follows that it is also impossible for a difference of hypostases to exist in one and the same hypostasis.

14:

But [they say], look, the human being is two natures but one hypostasis. And from this it is obvious that there can be two natures in one hypostasis. Again verbal hair-splitting, again struggle about doctrines, again contradiction of terms, and sophisms of an obviously ill-judging soul! They say that the same human being is both two natures and one hypostasis, and again no hypostasis, and we would be blessed if we heard of two natures and one hypostasis rather than now being taught to say two natures and no hypostasis. For again they say that Christ is three natures and two hypostases. And not having managed to say two natures and one hypostasis they put forward the doctrine that there are three natures in one hypostasis. And hear how this is so! If the human being <consists> of two natures and one hypostasis, and it has been taken and united with the God Word, how are there not three natures, two that are assumed and one that assumes? And how are there not two hypostases, one that assumes and one that is assumed? If Christ <consists> of two natures and one hypostasis, how is the human being not one nature, and the human being is without hypostasis, of whom they have

δύο φύσεις ἔλεγον πρώην; Καὶ τίς ὑποίσει
τοσαύτην ἐναντιότητα δογματίζειν;

ιε'

Εἰ διαφέρει καθ' ὑπόστασιν τὸ σῶμα Πέτρου
τοῦ σώματος Παύλου, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται καὶ τὸ
σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑπόστασιν ἔχον; Εἰ ἡ
ψυχὴ Πέτρου ἔχει ὑπόστασιν ὡς Πέτρου καὶ
φύσιν, καὶ τὸ σῶμα Πέτρου ἔχει ὑπόστασιν
ὡς Πέτρου καὶ φύσιν, δύο δὲ φύσεις ὁ
Πέτρος διὰ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, πῶς οὐ δύο καὶ
ὑποστάσεις ὁ Πέτρος διὰ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα; Εἰ
δὲ δύο φύσεις ἡ ψυχὴ Πέτρου καὶ τὸ σῶμα,
καὶ δύο ὑποστάσεις ἡ ψυχὴ Πέτρου καὶ τὸ
σῶμα, πῶς οὐ ψευδὲς τὸ δύο φύσεις λέγειν
τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν;

ις'

Τριῶν ὄντων ὁμολογουμένων προσώπων τῶν
θείων, τὸ ῥαπισθέν, φησί, ποῖον εἶναι λέγετε;
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Λόγου, ἐπεὶ ὁμοούσιον τῷ
Πατρὶ, ἔσται καὶ ὁ Πατήρ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα
ὁρατὸς καὶ ἀπτὸς καὶ πληκτὸς καὶ ἔγχρονος
καὶ παθητὸς ἀπλῶς, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρων
ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει· τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ ῥαπισθέν
πρόσωπον. Εἰ δὲ ἕτερον ἔστι τὸ ῥαπισθέν,
ἡγουν τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πρόσωπον, παρὰ τὰ
τῆς ἀγίας Τριάδος τρία, πῶς οὐ δύο πρόσωπα
τοῦ τε Λόγου τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος τῆς Τριάδος καὶ
τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ὑμεῖς διδάτε;

ιζ'

Εἰ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, φησί, τὰ πάντα πληροῖ καὶ
τοῖς πᾶσιν πάρεστιν ἀοράτως τῇ ὑπόστασει,
ὁ δὲ ὁρώμενος Χριστὸς μήτρα τε καὶ φάτνη
καὶ οἴκῳ περιώριστο τὴν ὑπόστασιν πρὸ τῆς
ἀγίας ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ
τήνδε περιγράφεται τόποις, κατὰ τό·
Ἐπορεύθη εἰς οὐρανοῦς (cf. Mk. 16:19), καί·
Ὅν δεῖ οὐρανὸν δεῖξασθαι (Acts 3:21) καί·
Οὕτως ἐλεύσεται, ὃν τρόπον ἐθεάσασθε αὐτὸν
πορευόμενον εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν (Acts 1:11),
πῶς οὐ θατέρα μὲν ὁρατὴ καὶ περιγραπτὴ
ὑπόστασις, θατέρα δὲ ἀόρατος καὶ
ἀπερίγραπτος ἐστι;

said before that it has two natures. And who
will bear to put forward such contradictory
doctrines?

15:

If the body of Peter differs from the body of
Paul as regards hypostasis, how will it not be
<the case> that the body of the human being,
too, has a hypostasis? If the soul of Peter has a
hypostasis and a nature insofar as it is Peter's,
and the body of Peter has a hypostasis and a
nature insofar as it is Peter's, and Peter is two
natures because of the soul and the body, how
will Peter not also be two hypostases because
of the soul and the body? But if the soul and the
body of Peter are two natures, and the soul and
the body of Peter are two hypostases, how is it
not a lie that the human being is two natures
and one hypostasis?

16:

Since it is agreed that there are three divine
persons (here in the sense of 'faces'), which
one [he says] do you say is the one that has
been beaten? If it is that of the Word who is of
like substance with the Father, it follows that
the Father and the Spirit can also be seen and
touched and beaten and be subjected to time
and in short <they can> suffer, and they differ
in nothing from our nature. For such is the face
that has been beaten. But if that which has been
beaten is a different person, that is, that of
Christ, besides the three <persons> of the holy
Trinity, how will you not concede that there are
two persons, of the Word who is one of the
Trinity, and of Christ?

17:

The God Word [he says] fills everything, and is
near all things invisibly in his hypostasis, and
the visible Christ is circumscribed as regards
his hypostasis in the womb and in the manger
and in the house before his holy resurrection,
and is circumscribed by places even after it,
according to the verses: *He went to heaven*,
and: *The heaven must receive him*, and: *He will
come thus, in the way you have seen him go to
heaven*. If this is so, how is not one a visible
and circumscribed hypostasis whereas the other
is an invisible and not circumscribed one?

ιθ'

Πᾶσα φύσις, φασί, διὰ τῶν ὑποστάσεων αὐτῆς ἐγνωσταί· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οἶδεν ἰππότητα μὴ γνοῦς ἰδικῶς τόνδε τινὰ καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἵππον, ὁμοίως οὐδὲ αἰγότητα, ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος κοινὸν ἢ ἰδικόν. Εἰ οὖν δύο τὰς φύσεις ἴστε Χριστοῦ, δῆλον ὡς τὰς ὑποστάσεις τούτων προεγνώκατε.

κ'

Πάντα τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ ὁρῶνται· ὁμοιώθη γὰρ ἡμῖν κατὰ πάντα χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας (Hebr. 4:15). Ἡ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν γέννησις ἡμῶν προὑπάρχουσαν ἔχει τὴν διάπλασιν τῆς ἐνώσεως αὐτῶν τῆς πρὸς ψυχᾶς. Ἀνάγκη οὖν ὑποστάντος τοῦ σώματος τοῦ κυριακοῦ πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἰδίαν ἔχειν ὑπόστασιν, εἴτα ἐμπνευσθεῖση αὐτῷ ψυχῇ, ἐν τρίτοις καὶ τῷ Λόγῳ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἐνωθῆναι, δύο ὑποστάσεων συναφθειςδῶν ἀλλήλαις, ὅπερ ζητητέον πῶς ἔσται, καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ μόνον γίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλῳ πλὴν τῷ κατ' εὐδοκίαν μόνην, ἢ τῷ σώματι προήνωτο ὁ Λόγος, καὶ ὕστερον [ὑστερον] ἐπέπνευσεν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν ζῶσαν, οὐ διὰ μέσης ψυχῆς σαρκὶ ὁ Λόγος ἦνωται, ἀλλὰ διὰ μέσης σαρκὸς μᾶλλον τῇ ψυχῇ ἦνώθη, ὅπερ ἄθεσμον· διὰ γὰρ τῶν οἰκειοτέρων καὶ ἐγγυτέρων τοῖς πορρωτέρω συνάπτεται τι.

κα'

Εἰ τοῖς ιδιώμασιν αὐτοῦ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος διακρινόμενος τοῦ ὁμοουσίου αὐτοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ Πνεύματος, ὑπόστασις εὐθὺς νοεῖται, καὶ τοῖς ιδιώμασιν αὐτῆς ἄρα ἢ σὰρξ αὐτοῦ τυχὸν τῷ ἄνευ ἁμαρτίας ἐκ Παρθένου προελθεῖν καὶ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε τῶν ὁμοουσίων αὐτῆ πάντων διακεκριμένη εὐθὺς καὶ ἥδε ὑπόστασις νοηθεῖη. Ἐπεὶ οὖν μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῦ Λόγου τὲ καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς τὰ ιδιώματα, οὐδὲ αἱ ὑποστάσεις ἄρα. Πῶς οὖν μία ὑπόστασις ὑμῖν ἢ τῶν δύο τὲ φύσεων καὶ διττῶς διακεκριμένων ἐκ τῶν ὁμοφυῶν λελόγισται;

κβ'

Εἰ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐλλιπὲς ἔχειν τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν Χριστοῦ, φησί, παρὰ τὴν

19:

Every nature [they say] is known through its hypostases, for no-one knows horseness if he does not know individually this or that horse, and the same applies to goatness, or another common or specific species. If, then, you know two natures of Christ, it is evident that you have known their hypostases before.

20:

All that makes up our nature is also seen in Christ, for *he became like us in all respects apart from sin*. In our natural birth the formation <of the body> precedes the union with the soul. Since the Lordly body gained hypostasis before the soul, it is necessary <that one of two things happened>. Either it had a hypostasis of its own, and then the soul was breathed into it, and in third place it was united with the Word in hypostasis, so that two hypostases were connected with one another. <In this case> one must ask how this will be, and in what way it can only happen, for it can happen in no other way than through good pleasure alone. Or the Word united itself with the body beforehand and later breathed the living soul into himself and the flesh. <In this case> the Word would not have been united with the flesh through the mediation of the soul but would rather have been united with the soul through the mediation of the flesh, which is unlawful, for something is connected with that which is further away from it through that which is closer and nearer.

21:

When the God Word is distinguished through his properties from the Father and the Spirit who are of like substance with him, he is immediately thought of as a hypostasis. If this is so, it follows that the flesh, too, is immediately thought of as a hypostasis, when it is distinguished from all that are of like substance, for example, through the coming-forth from a Virgin without sin. Since, then, the properties of the Word and the flesh are not the same, it follows that neither are their hypostases. How, then, can you conceive of one hypostasis, which <consists> of two natures that are doubly distinguished from those of like nature?

22:

If since the human nature of Christ [he says] is lacking in nothing when compared with the

φύσιν τῶν καθέκαστα ἀνθρώπων,
προσαριθμεῖτε καὶ αὐτήν τῇ τῆς θεότητος
φύσει, τί δὴ ἄρα μηδὲν ἐλλειπούσης παρὰ
τὰς ὑποστάσεις τῶν καθέκαστα ἀνθρώπων
καὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης,
οὐ προσαριθμεῖτε καὶ αὐτήν τῇ ὑποστάσει
τοῦ Λόγου καὶ δύο φατέ καὶ τὰς ὑποστάσεις
τοῦ Λόγου;

κγ'

Ἡ ὑπόχρονος φύσις, φασίν, αἰδίου οὐχ ἔξει
ὑπόστασιν, ὡςπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἔμπαλιν. Ἡ
οὖν ἀνυπόστατον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν
ἀνθρωπείαν Χριστοῦ φύσιν, ἢ καὶ ὑπόχρονον
ἔχειν αὐτὴν δέον ὑπόστασιν, ὥστε δύο εἶεν
πάντως αὐτῷ ἢ τε τοῦ Λόγου αἰδίου καὶ ἢ τῆς
σαρκὸς ὑπόχρονος.

κδ'

Ἡ οὐδὲν σύνθετον, φασίν, ἐν Χριστῷ, ἢ καὶ
φύσις καὶ ὑπόστασις, ἢ φύσις μὲν ἀπλῆ,
ὑπόστασις δὲ σύνθετος, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν φύσις
μὲν σύνθετος, ὑπόστασις δὲ ἀπλῆ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν
πάντα ἀπλᾶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ψευδῶς σύνθεσιν
ὀνομάζετε ἐπ' αὐτοῦ, εἰ δὲ ἢ τε φύσις καὶ
ὑπόστασις αὐτοῦ σύνθετοι, τί δὴ ἄρα τοὺς
Σεβηρίτας ἀποσείεσθε; Εἰ δὲ αἱ φύσεις μὲν
ἀπλαῖ, ἢ δὲ ὑπόστασις σύνθετος ὑμῖν δοκεῖ,
ἐπειτέρ ἀπλῆ ὑπόστασις εἶναι ἢ τοῦ Λόγου
ὁμολόγηται, ὑμῖν δὲ σύνθετος εἶναι ἢ τοῦ
Χριστοῦ λέγεται, δύο ἄρα ὑποστάσεις εἰσὶ
σαφῶς, ἢ τε τοῦ Λόγου καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

κε'

Ὁ μὴ διαιρῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὰς ὑποστάσεις,
οὐ δύναται λέγειν τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὰ μὲν
θεότητι, τὰ δὲ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ πάντα σαρκί ὅσα
καὶ θεότητι, καὶ πάντα θεότητι ὅσα καὶ
σαρκί.

κς'

Εἰ οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱ ὑποστάσεις κατὰ φύσιν
διηρημέναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἠνωμένοι,
ὅταν ἀκούω τῆς γραφῆς λεγούσης τὸν
Χριστὸν ἕνα ἄνθρωπον (cf. Rom. 5:19), τί με
χρὴ νοεῖν, μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν, ἢ
ἤμισυ μιᾶς οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστάσεως μιᾶς;

nature of the individual human beings, you
count it separately from the nature of the
divinity, why do you not count the human
hypostasis separately from the hypostasis of the
Word when it is lacking in nothing when
compared with the hypostases of individual
human beings, and do not say that there are
also two hypostases of the Word?

23:

The temporal nature [they say] will not have an
eternal hypostasis, just as the opposite is also
true. It is, then, necessary that either the human
nature of Christ is without hypostasis, or it is
necessary that the hypostasis is temporal.
Consequently, there would be two
<hypostases> in <Christ>, the eternal one of
the Word, and the temporal one of the flesh.

24:

Either there is nothing composite in Christ
[they say] or both nature and hypostasis <are
composite>, or the nature is simple, but the
hypostasis is composite, or vice versa the
nature is composite but the hypostasis is
simple. If, then, everything in him is simple,
you speak fraudulently about composition in
his case, but if both nature and hypostasis are
composite, why do you reject the Severians? If
you are of the opinion that the natures are
simple but the hypostasis is composite, since it
is agreed that the hypostasis of the Word is
simple, and you say that that of Christ is
composite, it follows that there are clearly two
hypostases, that of the Word and that of Christ.

25:

He who does not divide the hypostases of
Christ, cannot say that in Christ some things
belong to the divinity and some things belong
to the flesh, but <must say that> all that
belongs to the divinity will also belong to the
flesh and all that belongs to the flesh must also
belong to the divinity.

26:

If the hypostases are not separated by nature,
and united as regards hypostasis, when I hear
Scripture say that Christ is one human being,
what should I think: one substance and one
hypostasis, or half of one substance and of one
hypostasis?

κζ'

Εἰ οὐκ εἰσὶ διηρημένοι θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ φύσιν αἱ ὑποστάσεις, δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε χωρὶς ἀνθρώπου θεὸς ὁ θεός, οὔτε χωρὶς θεοῦ ἀνθρώπος ὁ ἀνθρώπος.

27:

If the hypostases of God and the human being are not separated by nature, it is obvious that God is not God without the human being, and the human being is not human being without God.

κη'

Ἵν ἐν τῇ ἐνώσει οὐ μένουσιν αἱ ὑποστάσεις φυσικῶς διηρημένοι, τούτων ἡ ἐνωσις φύσεώς ἐστιν ἀλλοίωσις.

28:

If the hypostases do not remain naturally separated in the union, their union is a change of nature.

κθ'

Ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκουσίως ἡνωμένων οὐδαμῶς ἐναντιοῦται τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς ἐνώσεως ἡ διαίρεσις τῶν ὑποστάσεων.

29:

In the case of those that are voluntarily united the separation of the hypostases in no way contradicts the mode of union.

λ'

Ὁ μὴ διαιρῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τὰς ὑποστάσεις, ἐκ τῆς Τριάδος διαιρεῖ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὴν μονάδα· Τριάδα γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν τριῶν ἀπλῶν ὑποστάσεων, οὐ δύο ἡμισυ ὑποστάσεων.

30:

He who does not separate the hypostases of Christ as regards nature, separates the monad of the Son from the triad, for we confess a triad of three simple hypostases, not of two and a half hypostases.

λα'

Εἰ τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν ὑποστάσεων οὐκ ἐφύλαττεν ἡ φυσικὴ ἐνωσις, οὐδὲ ἄρα τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον ἐφύλαττεν ὅπερ ἦν, οὐδὲ τὸν ἀνθρώπον ὅπερ ἐγένεε.

31:

If the natural union does not preserve the separation of the hypostases, it follows that it also does not preserve the God Word, what he had been, nor the human being, what he became.

λβ'

Εἰ μένει ἡ γνῶσις τῆς θείας ὑποστάσεως τῆ θεότητι, καὶ μένει ἡ ἀγνοία τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῆ σαρκί, πῶς τὰ τῶν ὑποστάσεων μένει διηρημένα, καὶ αἱ ὑποστάσεις οὐ μένουσι διηρημένοι.

32:

If the knowledge of the divine hypostasis remains with the divinity and the ignorance of the human being remains with the flesh, how can <it be the case that the characteristics> of the hypostases remain separated and the hypostases do not remain separated?

λγ'

Ἐν πρόσωπον ἀπρόσιτον θεοῦ ἐκ φύσεως· Οὐδεὶς γάρ, φησί, ὄψεται τὸ πρόσωπόν μου καὶ ζήσεται (Ex. 33:20), καὶ ἐν πρόσωπον ἐμπτυόμενον ἀνθρώπου· Καὶ ἐνέπτυσαν γάρ, φησί, εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ (Mt. 26:67). Εἰ ἐν πρόσωπον Χριστοῦ ἐστὶν ἐξ ἐνώσεως, ἄρα ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἀπρόσιτον πρόσωπον καὶ τὸ ἐμπτυόμενον πρόσωπον.

33:

There is one inaccessible person (here in the sense of 'face') of God from nature, for he says: *No-one will see my face and live*, and there is one person of the human being that is spat on, for he says: *And they spat on his face*. If there is one person of Christ from the union, it follows that it has in itself the person that is inaccessible and the face that is spat on.

λδ'

Τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως ἐν, ἀλλὰ ἐκ φύσεως, τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως

34:

The person of the God Word is one not from the union but from nature, the person of Christ is one from the union, for if the one person of the God Word were from the union, as is that of

ἔστιν ἓν. Εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως ἦν τὸ ἐν πρόσωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, ὥσπερ τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, δῆλον ὅτι πρὶν γένηται ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἐν πρόσωπον, οὐκ εἶχε τὸ ἐν πρόσωπον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Χριστός.

λε'

Εἰ ἔστιν ὁ Λόγος ὃ ἦν, καὶ ἔστιν ὃ γέγονεν, ἦν μὲν θεός, γέγονε δὲ ἄνθρωπος, ἐν ἐνὶ προσώπῳ τοῦ Λόγου οὐ δύναται εἶναι ἀμφοτέρα· ὅλος γὰρ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, φύσιν ἔχων ἀνθρώπου καὶ πρόσωπον.

λς'

Τὸ φύσει Υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ φύσει υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ὑποστάσεώς ἐστιν ὀνόματα, ὧν χωρὶς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὀρθῶς ὁμολογεῖν τὸν Χριστιανισμόν, καὶ ἀμφοτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ Χριστῷ ὁμολογεῖται, οὐκ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ ἀμφοτέρα.

λζ'

Ἡ δύο ὑποστάσεων ἐστιν ὄνομα ὁ Λόγος, τῆς ἀποιήτου Κυρίου καὶ τῆς πεποιημένης Κυρίου, ἡ δύο ἡμίσεων τῆς μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ ἐνὸς Κυρίου, οὐδεὶς δὲ γίνεται κατὰ χάριν, ὃ ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν.

λη'

Εἰ θεότητι θεὸς ὁ Λόγος, καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι ἄνθρωπος ὁ Λόγος, ἐν δυσὶν ἄρα ὑποστάσεσιν ἐστὶν ὁ Λόγος Υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν δυσὶ φύσεσι θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος.

λθ'

Εἰ μίαν ἔχει ὁ Λόγος ὑπόστασιν ἀποιήτον καὶ μίαν πεποιημένην, ὁ ἀναιρῶν τῶν ὑποστάσεων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀναιρεῖ τοῦ Λόγου τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἢ τὴν ἀποιήτον ἢ τὴν πεποιημένην.

μ'

Εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδικῶς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου τὸ μὴ εἶναι γεννηθέντα ἐξ ἑτέρας οὐσίας ἢ ὑποστάσεως πλὴν τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς σαρκός, ἔσται ἄρα καὶ ἡ σὰρξ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας μόνης τοῦ Πατρὸς, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος.

Christ, it is obvious that the God Word would not have had the one person before he became one person, just as Christ did not <have it>.

35:

If the Word is what he was, and is what he became, <and> he was God and became human being, both cannot be in the one person of the Word, for he became a complete human being, having the nature and the person of a human being.

36:

'Son of God by nature' and 'Son of Man by nature' are names of the hypostasis, without which it is not possible to confess the Christian faith correctly, and both are confessed in the one Christ, not both in either one.

37:

Either 'Word' is the name of two hypostases, of the unmade one of the Lord and of the made one of the Lord, or <it is the name> of two halves of the one hypostasis of the one Lord. But nothing can become by grace what it is by nature.

38:

If the Word is God through <his> divinity, and the Word is human being through <his> humanity, it follows that the Word is in two hypostases Son of God and Son of Man, just as he is also God and human being in two natures.

39:

If the Word has one unmade hypostasis and one that has been made, he who eliminates the number of the hypostases eliminates the hypostasis of the Word, either the unmade one or the one that has been made.

40:

If not being begotten from another substance or hypostasis than that of the Father is the specific <characteristic> not <only> of the God Word, but also of the flesh, it follows that the flesh is also only from the substance of the Father, just as is also the God Word.

μα'

Εἰ ὅταν ἡ θεία γραφή τὸν Χριστὸν ἓνα καλῆ ἄνθρωπον (cf. Rom. 5:19), μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καλεῖ αὐτὸν ἓνα ἄνθρωπον, δῆλον ὅτι ἡμισυ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶν ὁ θεός.

μβ'

Ὁ ὁμολογῶν τὸν Χριστὸν ὁμοῦ θεὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ μὴ λέγων τὸν Χριστὸν ὁμοῦ ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον, τὴν ἰδίαν ἀναιρεῖ ὁμολογίαν.

μγ'

Εἰ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος ὁ Λόγος, δῆλον ὅτι τις ἄνθρωπος· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, μὴν ὢν τις ἄνθρωπος. Ὁ δὲ τις ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου ὑπόστασις. Ἡ οὖν δύο ὑποστάσεις Χριστοῦ, ἡ ἢ τοῦ Λόγου ἐξέλιπεν.

μδ'

Εἰ ἔμεινεν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ὃ ἦν, καὶ γέγονεν ὃ οὐκ ἦν, δῆλον ὅτι ἔμεινεν ἄσαρκος τὴν οὐσίαν ὃ καὶ ἦν.

με'

Ἡ σὰρξ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τινὸς ἀνθρώπου φύσει παρὰ τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον ἑτέρου ὄντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ τῆς σαρκὸς δημιουργὸς καὶ θεὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐστὶ δημιουργὸς καὶ θεός.

μς'

Ὁ σάρκα μὲν ἔχων καὶ ψυχὴν λογικὴν, ἄνθρωπον δὲ μὴ ἔχων, ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ μόνος. Ὁ δὲ ἔχων σάρκα καὶ ψυχὴν, ἔχων δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἕτερός ἐστι παρὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Καὶ ὁ Θεὸς οὖν Λόγος, εἰ σάρκα ἔχει ἐψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔχει καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

μζ'

Εἰ ἐν ἄτομον, φησί, ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστὸς μόνον, ἢ μονοειδές τι ἢ τῶν ὑπὸ εἶδος πάντως· ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ ἔνι, ἢ οὖν τί ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶδος, ἢ ὑπὸ ποῖον εἶδος ἐστὶ λέγετε;

μη'

Εἰ αὐτός, φησὶν, ὁ ἑαυτὸν ἐγείρας Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ ἐγερεθείς, ἔδει αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν·

41:

If when divine Scripture calls Christ one human being, it calls him one human being together with God, it is obvious that God is half of one human being.

42:

He who confesses that Christ is at the same time God and human being, and does not say that at the same time Christ is one and another, destroys his own confession.

43:

If the Word became human being, it is obvious that it is a certain human being, for a human being does not exist if it is not a certain human being. But a certain human being is a hypostasis of a human being. There are, then, either two hypostases of Christ, or the hypostasis of the Word has disappeared.

44:

If the God Word remained what he was, and became what he was not, it is obvious that he remained fleshless in <his> substance, what he also was.

45:

If the flesh is not of a certain human being, which is something else by nature besides the God Word, but is of God, it is obvious that the creator and God of the flesh is also the creator and God of the God Word.

46:

He who has flesh and a rational soul but does not have a human being, is only a human being. But he who has flesh and soul and also has a human being, is other than the human being. The God Word, then, has by necessity also the human being, if he has a flesh that is endowed with a rational soul.

47:

If [he says] Christ is one individual only, he is definitely either a species consisting of one <item>, or belongs to those that fall under a <common> species, for it cannot be otherwise. Tell us, then, either what is his species, or under which species he falls.

48:

If [he says] Christ is one who has raised himself from the dead and was raised, he

Λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον, καὶ ἐν ἡμέραις τρισὶν ἐγερεθήσομαι (cf. Jn 2:19).

μθ'

Ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς (Col. 2:9), δηλονότι ἐν τῷ προονομασθέντι Χριστῷ, εἴρηται τῷ Ἀποστόλῳ. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἕτερον φύσει τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος παρὰ Χριστόν, εἴπερ ἕτερον τὸ ἐν τινι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, καὶ τὸ κατοικοῦν πρὸς τὸ κατοικούμενον; Τοιοῦτον γοῦν ἐστι καὶ τό· Θεὸς ἦν ἐν Χριστῷ (2 Cor. 5:19).

[Λόγος Γ']

Τρίτης ἀσεβείας αὐτῶν ἔλεγχος δύο υἱοὺς εἶδέναι κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν βουλομένων.

α'

Εἰ μὴ τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον ἡμιῶν ἴστε, φασί, καὶ ἀτελεῖ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι υἱόν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἔμψυχον σάρκα εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι υἱὸν ἀπλήρωτον νομίζετε, πῶς κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τῶνδε ἓνα υἱὸν ἀποτελεῖσθαι φατέ μόνον; Τοῦτο γὰρ ὡς ἐλλιπῶς ὄντος ἐκατέρου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι υἱόν, ὁρᾶται, καὶ ὡς τελειωθέντος τοῦ τε Λόγου ὑπὸ τῆς σαρκὸς εἰς τὸ εἶναι υἱόν, καὶ τελειώσαντος καὶ αὐτοῦ ταύτην εἰς τόδε. Διὸ καὶ δεόμενον αὐτῆς πρὸς τόδε, καὶ δεομένην αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο, ὁμοίως παριστάνετε· μέρος γὰρ μέρους, καθὼς μέρος, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμότιμα ἐστὶν ὑμῖν τάδε, τὰ ἐπίσης ἀλλήλων πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ δεόμενα σαφῶς.

β'

Ὁ κυρίως υἱὸς ὅλος ἐστὶ τοῦ γεννήσαντος υἱός· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ μέρους ὃν ἐκ τινος λέγεται τοῦδε υἱός, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατὴρ ἐστὶν ὁ μέρος μόνον αἴτιος, καὶ οὐ τοῦ ὅλου. Ἀμέλει ὅλου τοῦ ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος ζώου λεγομένου υἱοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ συμβῆ τούτου τὸ ἐν μέρος χωρὶς θατέρου τῆς μητρός ἐξελεθεῖν, ἐξάμβλωμα καὶ οὐχ υἱὸν ἔθος ἡμῖν ὀνομάζειν, ἔκτρωσίν τε καὶ οὐ γέννησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτου. Εἰ οὖν ἐκ μέρους Υἱὸν θεοῦ καὶ ἐκ μέρους υἱὸν ἀνθρώπου φατέ τὸν Χριστόν, δηλον ὡς οὐδὲ τοῦ πατρὸς κυρίως οὐδὲ τῆς μητρός. Τίνος οὖν ἐστὶ φύσει υἱός, λέγετε ἡμῖν.

should have said: *Destroy this temple, and I will be raised in three days.*

49:

The Apostle said that *the whole fullness of the divinity resides in him bodily*, that is, in the aforementioned Christ. How, then, is the fullness of divinity not different in nature from Christ, if indeed that which is in something is different from that in which it is, and residing is different from being residence? Such, then, is <the saying>: *God was in Christ.*

[Book III]

Refutation of the third impiety of them who wish to know two sons in the dispensation.

1:

If you know that the God Word is not a half-son [they say] and is not incomplete as regards his being Son, and if you furthermore think that the ensouled flesh taken from us is not incomplete as regards its being son, how do you say that only one Son resulted from these two through composition? For this can be seen when either one is incomplete as regards being son, and when the Word is completed by the flesh so as to be Son, and completes <the flesh> so as to be <son>. Therefore, you make the case that <the Word> needs <the flesh> in order to be this, and likewise <the flesh> needs <the Word> in order to be that. For a part *qua* part does not differ from another part. Therefore, you consider them to be of like honour, since they clearly need one another in like manner for the same <reason>.

2:

A son in the strict sense is wholly the son of him who has begotten him, for nothing that is partly from something is called its son, and <it is> also not <the case that> a father is cause of a part and not of a whole. Indeed, the whole living being, which is made up of rational soul and body, is called son of a human being. And if it happens that one part of it leaves the womb without the other, it is in such a case customary to speak of a dead fetus and not of a son, and of a miscarriage and not of a birth. If, then, you say that Christ is partly Son of God and partly Son of Man, it is obvious that he is in the strict sense <son> neither of the father nor of the mother. Tell us, then, whose son he is by nature?

γ'

Εἰ ἐκ μέρους ὁ Χριστὸς ὑμῶν Υἱὸς θεοῦ, καὶ ἐκ μέρους ἄρα θεὸς δηλονότι, καὶ οὐχ ὅλος, ἡμίθεος ἄρα.

δ'

Διὰ τὸδε μὴ λέγειν ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ζῶον καὶ μίαν ὁλότητα υἱοῦ μόνην ἐκ θείας τὲ καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης εἶναι φύσεως ἅμα, διότι πάντα υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον ὀραῖσθαι ἀνάγκη τοῖς τίκτουςιν, ἀνελλιπῆ τε καὶ ἀπέριττον ἔχειν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς φύντας αὐτὸν τῆς οὐσίας ὁμοιότητα. Ὁ Χριστὸς δὲ ὑμῶν ὁ θεοῦ τὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου υἱὸς καὶ θεοῦ πλεῖον, καὶ ἀνθρώπου περισσόν τι ἔχει. Πῶς οὖν ὄντως καὶ υἱὸς τούτων ἔσται, ὁ μὴ πάντη ὁμοίος αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν;

ε'

Εἰ οὖν φύσει ἐστὶν Υἱὸς θεοῦ ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ οὐ κατὰ χάριν υἱοθεσίας ἠξιώται, φασί, πῶς εἴρηται ὅτι· *Πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἢ χάρις καὶ ἡ δωρεὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐν χάριτι τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς περιέσσευσεν* (Rom. 5:15); *Καὶ ὅτι· Ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ ὁ θεὸς ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα* (Phil. 2:9). *Καί· Ὁ μὴ ἐαυτῷ δὲ λαβὼν τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κληθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀαρὼν* (cf. Hebr. 5:4); *Τί ἐστὶν οὗτος ὁ Χριστός, εἶπατε.*

ς'

Ἄλλά, φασίν, εἰ μὴ οἰκονομικῶς εἴρηται, ὡς ἂν εἴποιτε ὑμεῖς φεύγοντες τὴν ἀκριβῆ τῶν σημαιομένων ἐξέτασιν, καὶ εἰ μὴ οὐκ ἔχει κυρίαν τὴν ἔκβασιν ἢ παραβολῆ ἢ ἀλληγορίᾳ ἢ φαντασίᾳ ἢ δοκίσει, καὶ κατὰ κενῆς κείται ὡς πρὸς ὑπόνοιαν μόνον τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς τὰ λεγόμενα, τίς ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς ὃς ἔμαθε καὶ ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθε τὴν ὑπακοήν, ὁ καὶ δεήσεις καὶ ἰκετηρίας μετὰ κραυγῆς καὶ δακρύων προσενέγκας καὶ εἰσακουσθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας, καὶ τελειωθεὶς (Hebr. 5:7-9) καὶ σταυρωθεὶς καὶ ταφείς, καὶ ὃν ἠγειρεν ὁ θεὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν (Acts 3:15), καὶ ὁ ὑψωθείς καὶ δοξασθεὶς καὶ τὰ λοιπά· οὐτε γὰρ ἴδια τοῦ Λόγου τάδε, τίς τολμήσει μὴ δαιμονῶν καταφάσκειν, οὔτε σὺν ἐτέρῳ ὄντος.

3:

If your Christ is Son of God, it clearly follows that he is partly God and not wholly. Consequently, he is a half-god.

4:

When we do not say that there is one and the same living being and only one whole of a son, from a divine and a human nature together, it is for this reason: It is necessary that every son is seen to be of like substance with his parents and to have a similarity of substance with the parents, where there is nothing missing and nothing superfluous. But your Christ who is Son of God and Man has <something> more than God and something more than the human being. How will he, then, truly be their son if he is not completely like them in nature?

5:

If Christ is by nature Son of God and not deemed worthy of adoption according to grace [they say], how is it said: *How much more did God's grace and gift, in the grace of one human being, Jesus Christ, overflow to the many*, and: *God bestowed on him a name above all names*, and: *Who took the honour not for himself but was called by God just as also Aaron?* Tell us what this Christ is?

6:

But [they say] if it does not denote the dispensation, as you might say in order to avoid an exact examination of the meanings, and if it does not have an outcome in the strict sense, <but happened> through a parable or allegory or in imagination or seeming, and <if> what is said is idle talk and only creates an impression in the listeners, who is the son *who learned obedience through his sufferings, he who also offered up entreaties and supplications with crying and tears, and was heard because of his piety, and who has been completed and crucified and buried, and whom God raised from the dead and who was elevated and glorified and the like?* For no-one who is not possessed would say that these are either the properties of the Word <alone> or of <the Word> when he is together with something else.

ζ'

Υἷον μὲν, φησί, τοῦ θεοῦ φύσει τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον μόνον, τὸν ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ φαιμέν, τὸν δὲ Χριστὸν Υἷον μὲν θεοῦ προσαγορευέσθαι χάριτι λέγομεν, ὅμοιον δὲ εἶναι <ἡμῖν> τῇ φύσει, οὐ διὰ τὸδε δὲ καὶ ὁμότιμον αὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἤδη παριστάνομεν υἷον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς χάρισμα υἰοθεσίας ἐλάβομεν παρὰ θεοῦ, καὶ χάριτι ἐσμὲν τέκνα θεοῦ, καὶ κληρονόμοι θεοῦ, καὶ συγκληρονόμοι αὐτοῦ Χριστοῦ (cf. Rom. 8:17). Καὶ τῶν ὁμοίως γὰρ λεγομένων πολλάκις ἄφατος εὐρίσκεται διαφορὰ: κυρίως γὰρ καὶ κτίσματα ὅ τε κώνωψ καὶ ὁ ἄγγελος ἄμφω ὁμοίως λέγεται, καὶ οὐ παρὰ τὸδε ὅμοια ἐστί· πολὺ γὰρ τὸ διάφορον αὐτῶν. Οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θέσει διαφόρων υἷων θεοῦ καὶ χάριτι νοητέον· πλείονος γὰρ τιμῆς ἡξίωται ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ παρὰ Μωϋσῆ τὸν μέγαν ἐν προφήταις, καθόσον πλείονα τιμὴν ἔχει τοῦ οἴκου ὁ κατασκευάσας αὐτόν.

η'

Τί οὖν, φησί, ἐν τοῖς ὁμοουσίοις οὐκ ἔστι διαφορὰ χρυσοῦ τυχόν τοῦ μετάλλου πρὸς μόλιβδον ἢ πρὸς ὄστρακον, καὶ τοῦ βαπτιστοῦ Ἰωάννου πρὸς τὸν προδότην Ἰούδαν;

θ'

Ἐρρηθήσαν γάρ, φασίν, υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἐν τῷ· *Ἐγὼ εἶπον, θεοὶ ἐστε καὶ υἱοὶ ὑψίστου πάντες* (Ps. 81:6), διὰ τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ. Ἐκλήθησαν δὲ υἱοὶ θεοῦ πάλιν καὶ οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι κατὰ τό· *Υἱοὺς ἐγέννησα καὶ ὑψωσα, αὐτοὶ δὲ με ἠθέτησαν* (Is. 1:2), ἐπὶ οικειώσει θεοῦ καὶ παρὰ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔθνη πρὸς ἀναμαρτησίαν παιδαγωγούμενοι, καὶ εὐσεβεῖν διδασκόμενοι· εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια· *Ἡ διαθήκη γὰρ αὐτοῦ, φησί, τοῦ δηλῶσαι αὐτοῖς* (Ps. 25:14), καί· *Λύχνος τοῖς ποσίν μου ὁ νόμος σου* (Ps. 119:105), καί· *Ὁ ἀπαγγέλλων, φησί, τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τῷ Ἰακώβ, δικαιώματα καὶ κρίματα αὐτοῦ τῷ Ἰσραὴλ* (Ps. 147:19). Οὐκ ἐποίησεν οὕτως παντὶ ἔθνει. Ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ εἰ καὶ φόβῳ τοῦ νόμου καὶ οὐ προαιρέσει ἐδικαιοπράγουν, ἀλλ' ὅμως τῆς ἀξίας ἐπικουρίας τῶν δικαίως βιούντων ἀπήλανον. Καὶ ἀπλῶς ἐπὶ γῆς ὡς οἶόν τε μιμεῖσθαι θεὸν μεθοδεύομενοι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ ἀναμαρτητῷ βίῳ, υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐκλήθησαν. Ἄλλ'

7:

We call 'Son of God by nature' [he says] the God Word alone who is of like substance with the Father, and we say that Christ is called Son of God by grace <and> is like <us> by nature. But we do not for this reason already present the Son as <one who> is of like honour with us, insofar as we, too, have received the grace of adoption from God, and are by grace children of God and inheritors of God and co-inheritors of Christ himself. For often there is found an ineffable difference between things that are said to be alike. Strictly speaking, the gnat and the angel are both likewise called creatures and they are not alike beyond that, for there is a great difference between them. Thus, then, one must also think in the case of the different sons of God by adoption and by grace. For Christ is deemed worthy of a greater honour, compared with Moses who is great among prophets, insofar as the one who has built the house has greater honour than it.

8:

What then [he says]? Is there not a difference between things of like substance, as for example, between the metal gold and lead or clay, and between John the Baptist and Judas the betrayer?

9:

For all human beings [they say] have been called sons of God, in the verse: *I have said: You are gods and sons of the most high*, because of the divine image. But the Jews have again been called sons of God according to the verse: *I have begotten sons and have elevated them but they have rejected me*, because of their familiarity with God. And they have been educated to be sinless more than the other nations and have been taught to be pious. For Scripture bears witness to that: *For his testament, it says, is to tell them*, and: *Your law is a light for my feet*, and: *He announces, it says, his word to Jacob, righteousneses and judgements to Israel*. He has not done so to every people. Even if they did what is right out of fear of the law and not willingly, they nevertheless enjoyed the fitting help that comes to those who live in righteousness. And in short, they were guided by <the law> to imitate God on earth as far as it was possible, through a righteous and sinless life, and were thus called sons of God. Nevertheless, they were again capable of sinning, since they had a changeable

ὅμως οὗτοι καὶ τὸ ἀμαρτεῖν ἐπεδέχοντο πάλιν, τρεπτῆς ἔτι φύσεως ὑπάρχοντες. Ὅπερ οὖν καὶ πολλάκις ἔργοις ἠλέγχθησαν κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον· *Αὐτοὶ δέ με ἠθέτησαν*. Καὶ θανάτῳ δὲ δηλαδὴ καὶ πληγαῖς καὶ τιμωρίαις ἐντεῦθεν ὑπέκειντο. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ κέντρον τοῦ θανάτου ἡ ἀμαρτία (1 Cor. 15:56), καὶ· *Μάστιγες πολλαὶ τοῦ ἀμαρτωλοῦ* (Ps. 32:10). Οὕτως μὲν οὖν καὶ οὗτοι. Ἐλέχθημεν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χριστιανοὶ υἱοὶ θεοῦ, κατὰ τὸ· *Πάντες γὰρ υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστέ, διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* (Gal. 3:26). Ἡμεῖς οὖν πρὸς τῷ διὰ τῶν λόγων παιδεύεσθαι τὸ ἀναμάρτητον, καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τὸ γράμμα διὰ Πνεύματος δικαιοσύνην διδασκόμεθα θεοῦ, καὶ ἐπὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἀθανασίᾳ ἐκλήθημεν καὶ ἀτρεψία ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν, τιμωρίαν οὐκέτι δεδιότες, οὐ μεταβολὴν τῆς διαδεξομένης μακαρίας ζωῆς, πόνων ἐλευθεροὶ καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦ σκότους ἐσόμενοι, ἐν οὐρανίῳ τὲ πολιτεία βιώσοντες· εἰς γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς *ἀγίους καὶ ἀμώμους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ* (cf. Col. 1:22) ἐν ἀγάπῃ προωρίσθημεν εἰς υἰοθεσίαν θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἔχειν τὴν πρὸς τὸν οὐράνιον ἡμῶν Πατέρα, ἐν τῇ ἀπολήψει τῆς υἰοθεσίας ἣς ἀπεκδεχόμεθα, ἡγουν τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν, τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν ἔτι οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ ἔχοντες, διὸ οὐδὲ θνήσκειν πεφυκότες λοιπόν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μηδὲ δυνάμει εἶναι δεκτικούς τῶν κακῶν τὴν φύσιν ὑπεραρθέντες. Ὅσον οὖν ἐξομοιούμεθα θεῷ κατὰ τὰδε παρὰ τὸν ποτὲ Ἰσραήλ, υἱὸν καὶ αὐτὸν κληθέντα, δηλον. Τοσοῦτον γοῦν ἡ ἡμετέρα υἰοθεσία τῆς ἐκείνων προὔχει καὶ ἐν τοσοῦτοις, ὡς καὶ πνεῦμα δουλείας ἐκείνην λέγεσθαι *εἰς φόβον* (Rom. 8:15a) καὶ ζυγοῦ δουλείας ἐνοχὴν, ταύτην δὲ πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας *ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ κράζειν· Ἀββᾶ ὁ Πατήρ* (Rom. 8:15b), ὅπερ ἐκείνη λέγειν οὐ τετόλμηκε πώποτε· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη λέγεται ἰδίως ἐλευθερία ἢ Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς ἠλευθέρωσεν. Οὕτως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡδε. Ἐκλήθη δέ, φησί, καὶ ὁ κυριακὸς ἄνθρωπος υἱὸς θεοῦ, κατὰ τὸ· *Καὶ υἱὸς ὑψίστου κληθήσεται* (Lc. 1:32). Οὗτος δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἡμετέροις πᾶσιν ἐξαιρέτοις, ἐν οἷς ὁμοῖος ἡμῖν ὢν καὶ λέγεται εἶναι ὁ πρωτότοκος ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς (Rom. 8:29) τῷ κοινῷ πάντων Πατρὶ θεῷ, καὶ ἕτερα ἔχει ἴδια χαρίσματα, ἐξ ὧν καὶ μονογενὴς τῷ Πατρὶ ἐρρήθη (cf. Jn. 1:18). Ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα, πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι ἐκ πάντων

nature. For this they were often rebuked in deeds, according to the word: *But they have rejected me*. And therefore they were obviously subjected to death and plagues and punishments for *sin is the goad of death*, and: *Many lashings for the sinner*. Thus, then, is their case. But we Christians, too, have been called sons of God, according to the verse: *You are all sons of God because of your faith in Christ Jesus*. We, then, are not only taught sinlessness through words but are also taught through the Spirit the righteousness of God that goes beyond the word, and we have been called to freedom and immortality and unchangeability from the resurrection of the dead, no longer fearing punishment nor change of the blessed life that will receive us, free from toils and the rulers of the world of darkness, as we will live a heavenly life. For we have been preordained for adoption by God in love *so as to be holy and blameless before him*, and to have likeness to our heavenly Father, in receiving adoption which we await, that is, redemption of our body, and we will be in no way capable of sinning any more. Therefore, dying is not in our nature but we will not even have the potential to perform evil deeds as we have overcome the nature. It is thus obvious that in that respect we become like God to a greater degree than Israel of old, which was also called son. Our adoption, then, excels theirs so much and in so many things. Theirs was called *a spirit of servitude* through fear and the subjection to the yoke of servitude, whereas ours is *a spirit of adoption*, so that we can cry: *Abba, Father*, which theirs never dared. And this is specifically called freedom through which Christ has set us free. Thus, then, is this. But [he says] son of God was also called the Lordly human being, according to the verse: *And he will be called a son of the most high*. He not only had all our privileges in which he was similar to us and is said to be *the first-born among many brothers* of God, the common father of all, but he also had other special graces, for which he was also called only-begotten by the Father. And these are, first, that he was chosen and selected from all visible and invisible creatures and at the moment of his coming-to-be received by grace the rank of being son, just as a son of an emperor who is born in the purple or while still being an embryo is crowned in the womb when the crown is wrapped around the mother, as it often happens. And thus he was united with the God

ὀρατῶν καὶ ἀοράτων κτισμάτων ἀφώρισται καὶ ἐξείλεκται ἅμα τῷ εἶναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι υἱὸς ἀξίαν λαβὼν χάριτι, ὡσπερ εἶ τις υἱὸς βασιλέως ἐπὶ πορφύρα τεχθεὶς ἢ ἔτι κυούμενος ἐν μήτρᾳ στεφθεὶς διαζωννυμένης τὸν στέφανον τῆς μητρὸς, ὅπερ γίνεται πολλακίς. Καὶ οὕτως ἠνώθη τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ ἀπὸ πρώτης αὐτοῦ κτίσεως, καὶ υἱὸς ὀνομάσθη, οὐ διὰ τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς υἰοθεσίαν, ἀλλ' ὡς συνημμένος τῷ Λόγῳ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου φανέρωσιν, καὶ αὐτοῦ πρόσωπον ἐπέχων, αὐτοῦ τὴν τιμὴν, αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀξίαν φέρων. Καί· Ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ θεοῦ (Hebr. 1:12), ὑπεράνω πάσης ἐξουσίας καὶ κυριότητος καὶ δυνάμεως, ὄνομα λαβὼν μείζον παντὸς ὀνόματος ὀνομαζομένου οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι (Eph. 1:21), ἵνα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ πάντων γόνων κάμψῃ ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ καταχθονίων (Phil. 2:10). Πάντα γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὑπέταξεν ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ (1 Cor. 15:27), καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τῷ θείῳ Λόγῳ, οὗ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐπέχει, καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου, τῷ Πατρὶ τῷ ἀχωρίστῳ αὐτοῦ, ἅμα τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἀγίῳ. Καὶ οὕτω μεσιτεύει θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώποις (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5). Τούτων δὲ οὐδὲν πλέον αὐτῷ ποτὲ παρέξουσιν οἱ συνθέσει λέγοντες τοῦ Λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὸν Χριστὸν ὑφεστάναι. Εἰ δὲ τούτων ἀσύγκριτος τῶν υἰοθεσιῶν ἢ παράθεσις, πῶς φασὶν ὅτι ὁμότιμον ἡμῖν φαμὲν τὸν Χριστόν; Διότι οὐ φύσει υἱόν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸν θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ χάριτι υἰοθετεῖσθαι δοξάζομεν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ υἱὸς λέγεσθαι, οὐδὲ τὸ χάριτι υἰοθετεῖσθαι, τοὺς τε ἀνθρώπους πάντας καὶ τοὺς Ἰουδαίους καὶ τοὺς Χριστιανούς καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἢ παρὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν ὡς δέδεικται.

ι'
Εἰ τοὺς δύο υἱούς, φησί, κατὰ φύσιν ἐλέγομεν εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ ἄμφω κατὰ χάριν, ὄντως καλῶς ἂν ἡμῖν δύο λέγειν υἱὸς θεοῦ συνήγετε· υἱὸς γὰρ δύο ἢ πλείους τηνικαῦτα λέγει ἢ ἀγία γραφή, ἠνίκα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶψαν πάντες οἱ συναριθμούμενοι καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τρόπον, εἴτ' οὖν φύσει, ἢ θέσει ἄμφω γεγεννημένοι αὐτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἀδελφοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλων δύνασθαι λέγειν. Οὕτως γοῦν καὶ εἴρηται ἡ μήτηρ τῶν δύο υἱῶν Ζεβεδαίου (cf. Mt. 20:20), καὶ ἐν τῇ γενέσει· Τῷ δὲ Ἰωσήφ ἐγένοντο υἱοὶ δύο

Word from the first moment of his creation, and was called son, not because of adoption like us, but because he was conjoined with the Word for his own manifestation, and had his person, and bore his honour, his rank. And: *He sat at the right hand of God, above all authority and dominion and power*, having received a name that is greater than all names that are being given, not only in this world but <also> in that to come, so that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow in heaven and on earth and under the earth. For in sum, he laid everything at his feet, both from this one through the divine Word, whose person he bears, and from that one through the Father who is inseparable from him, together with the Holy Spirit. And thus he mediates between God and human beings. Those who say that Christ gained hypostasis through the composition of the Word and the human being cannot ever give him anything more. If the comparison of these adoptions is incomparable, how do they say that we say that Christ is of like honour with us? Because we confess that he is not Son of God by nature but that he has been adopted by grace. For the fact that all human beings and the Jews and the Christians and Christ are called sons and that they are adopted by grace, <shows that there is> not a little difference according to a higher and a lower degree, as has been shown.

10:
If we said [he says] that there are two sons from God by nature, or that both are <sons> by grace, you would justly conclude for us that we speak of two sons of God. For holy Scripture speaks of two or more sons then when all who are counted together are from the same <parents> in the same way and manner, that is, when both have come to be theirs by nature or by adoption, so that one can call them brothers of each other. Thus, then, one speaks of the mother of the two sons of Zebedaeus, and in Genesis: *Joseph had two sons, and Ruben said to his father: Kill my two sons if I do not bring*

(Gen. 41:50). Καί· *Εἶπε Ρουβὶμ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ· Τοὺς δύο υἱούς μου ἀπόκτεινον, ἐὰν μὴ ἀγάγω αὐτὸν πρὸς σέ* (Gen. 42:37), τουτέστι τὸν Βενιαμίν. Καὶ παρὰ τῷ Ἀποστόλῳ πάλιν γέγραπται ὅτι· *Ἀβραὰμ δύο υἱούς ἔσχεν*. Ἐνθα οὖν δύο ἢ πολλοὶ υἱοὶ καὶ ἀδελφοὶ εἰρηναί, καὶ πρωτοτόκια καὶ ὑστεροτόκια λέγεται ὡς ἐν Ἡσαῦ καὶ Ἰακώβ (cf. Gen. 25:32-33). Εἰ οὖν φύσει τὸν τε Λόγον καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν ἔφημεν ἐκ θεοῦ, ἢ χάριτι ἄμφω, καλῶς ἂν ἐλογίζεσθε ἡμᾶς· ἔδει γὰρ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς λέγεσθαι αὐτοὺς δύο ὄντας, καὶ θάτερον πρωτότοκον καὶ πρεσβύτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ μὴ δίδυμοι. Εἰ δὲ ὁ μὲν θέσει, ὁ δὲ φύσει ἐστί, καὶ ἑτέρου μὲν φύσει, ἑτέρου δὲ θέσει ὁ Χριστὸς υἱός, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει χώραν ἢ τῶν δύο υἱῶν συναρίθμησις.

ια'
Ἄλλ' ἰδοῦ, φησίν, ἐπὶ ταῖς δύο αἰτίαις οἱ φύσει υἱοὶ Βάλλας τῆς παιδίσκης Ῥαχήλ καὶ υἱοὶ Ῥαχήλ εἰσὶ θέσει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπλεόνασεν ἀριθμῷ, καθὼς εἴρηται ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῷ Ἰακώβ· *Εἴσελθε πρὸς τὴν παιδίσκην μου, καὶ τέξετα ἐπὶ τῶν γονάτων μου καὶ τεκνοποιήσομαι καγὼ ἐξ αὐτῆς* (Gen. 30:3). Καὶ πάλιν· *Ἐκρινέ μοι ὁ θεός, καὶ ἐπήκουσε τῆς φωνῆς μου, καὶ ἔδωκέ μοι υἱόν· διὰ τοῦτο ἐκάλεσε τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Δάν* (Gen. 30:6). Τέτοκε δὲ καὶ αὕτη φύσει τὸν Ἰωσήφ καὶ Βενιαμίν. Καὶ οὐ διὰ τὸδε τέσσαρες υἱοὶ τῆς Ῥαχήλ, ἐκ τῶν ἰβ' πατριαρχῶν εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμοῦνται καὶ οἱ θέσει υἱοί.

ιβ'
Πολλάκις τὰ διάφορα τῇ φύσει ἐνὶ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται, καὶ μιᾶς τιμῆς ἠξίωται, δύο δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως νοεῖται· σῶμα γὰρ πιστευόμενον εἶναι τὴν τε ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸν ἅγιον ἄρτον, καὶ τὸ σταυρωθέν, καίτοι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἕκαστον τούτων, καὶ ὅμως οὐ διὰ τὸδε τρία σώματα λέγειν Χριστοῦ εἰσπρατόμεθα.

ιγ'
Ἄλλ' οὔτε δύο σφραγίδας, φησί, λέγομεν τὸ ἀρχέτυπον καὶ τὸν τύπον, ἀλλὰ μίαν, καίτοι ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον εἰδότες τῷ ἀριθμῷ.

ιδ'
Τί οὖν, φησί, δύο λόγοι εἰσίν, ὃ τε λεγόμενος καὶ ὁ ἀκούμενος;

him back to you, that is, Benjamin. And the Apostle writes again: *Abraham had two sons*. Where, then, mention is made of two or more sons and brothers, we speak of both first-born and later-born as in the case of Esau and Jacob. If, then, we had said that the Word and Christ are from God, both by nature or <both> by grace, you would present us with a valid argument. For they would need to be called brothers when they are two and one would need to be called first-born and older, if they are not twins. But if the one is <son> by adoption and the other <is son> by nature and Christ is son of one by nature and son of the other by adoption, it is obvious that there is no room for the counting together of the two sons.

11:
But see [he says], in the two causes the sons by nature of Bilha the servant-woman of Rachel are sons of Rachel by adoption, and they do not add to the number, as has been said by her to Jacob: *Go in to my servant-woman and she will give birth on my knees and I will have a child from her*. And again: *God judged me and heard my voice, and he gave me a son, for this reason she called him Dan by name*. But she also gave birth to Joseph and Benjamin by nature. And there are not for this reason four sons of Rachel among the twelve patriarchs, because the sons by adoption are not counted.

12:
Those that are different by nature are often called with one single name, and are deemed worthy of one honour, but they are not at all thought to be two. For we believe that the church and the holy bread and what has been crucified is a body although each of them is different, and nevertheless we are for this reason not forced to speak of three bodies of Christ.

13:
Nor [he says] do we call the archetype and the imprint two seals but one, although they are different in number.

14:
What, then [he says]? Are the spoken and the heard word two words?

[Λόγος Δ']

**Τετάρτης αὐτῶν ἀσεβείας ἔλεγχος
παραιτουμένων λέγειν θεοτόκον τὴν ἁγίαν
Παρθένον.**

α'

Θέα γοῦν αὐτὸς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνθύμημα κεκρυμμένον τῶν μίαν λεγόντων τὴν ὑπόστασιν Χριστοῦ, καὶ σύνθεσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου πρὸς τὴν σάρκα. Τί γὰρ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ἐν τῇ θεοτόκῳ φωνῇ, προστιθεμένου μάλιστα αὐτοῖς τοῦ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει κεχωρισμένον εὐρήκαμεν· ἀπροσδιορίστως γὰρ λεγομένου τοῦ θεοτόκου, ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ ὀνόματος πολλαχῶς λεγομένου, σχέσει πως τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐσεβὲς διασάφησιν ἔχει, νυνὶ δὲ τοῦ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν προσκειμένου τῇ φωνῇ, πάσης ἀσεβείας καὶ ἀπερικαλύπτου βλασφημίας αὐτὴν ἀνεπλήρωσαν. Ὅμως ἐρωτητέον αὐτούς, τί βούλεται αὐτοῖς ἢ τοιάδε ὀνομασία, καὶ κατὰ ποίαν αὐτοῖς ἔννοιαν ἐξείληπται; Ἄρα, ὡς φαμέν, ἀρρενοτόκον ἢ θηλυτόκον γυναῖκα, τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀρρενας ἢ θήλεα τίκτειν, οὕτως αὐτοὶ λέγουσι θεοτόκον τὴν ἁγίαν Μαρίαν, θεοὺς αὐτὴν πεφυκυῖαν τίκτειν διὰ τῆς τοιαύδε λέξεως σημαίνοντες; Καὶ ποίους θεοὺς ἐγέννησεν, εἰπάτωσαν, καὶ τὸ ἀγνοούμενον διδασκέτωσαν. Ἡ ὅτι θεὸν ἐγέννησεν; Εἰ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαξ τοῦτο ἐθέλουσι σημάειν, διὰ τοῦ οὕτως ὀνομάζειν τὴν Παρθένον, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδαμεν εἰ δύναται τοῦτο δηλῶσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον σχῆμα τοῦ ὀνόματος.

β'

Τοῦ θεοῦ ὀνόματος, φασί, πολλαχῶς λεγομένου παρὰ τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ, οἶον· Ἐπεὶ περ εἷς θεὸς ὃς δικαιοῦσιν περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως καὶ ἀκροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως (Rom. 3:30), καὶ πάλιν· Ὁ θεὸς ἔστι ἐν συναγωγῇ θεῶν, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ θεοῦ διακρινεῖ (Ps. 81:1), καὶ αὐθις· Ὡσπερ θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί (1 Cor. 8:5), κατὰ ποῖον ἐξήλειπται σημαίνονμενον αὐτοῖς ἐνταῦθα τὸ θεοῦ ὄνομα ἐπὶ τῆς θεοτόκου; Κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον ὅπερ ἐστὶ φύσει λέγειν θεόν, ἢ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον τουτέστι θέσει, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τρίτον ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδές. Ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ὕστερον οὐκ ἂν εἶποιεν, οὐδὲ εἰ δαίμονες γένοιτο. Ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον λέγοιεν, ἴστωσαν

[Book IV]

**Refutation of the fourth impiety of them who
refuse to say that the holy Virgin is God-
bearer.**

1:

Look for yourself that in what follows, too, there is concealed the same argument of those who say that the hypostasis of Christ is one and that the God Word is composed with the flesh. For what can one find in the term 'god-bearer', especially when 'strictly and in truth' is added by them, but this very thing, which we have found to be separated in the composition? For when one speaks of 'god-bearer' without qualification, it can through some kind of relation be given a clarification that makes it orthodox, since the term 'god' has many meanings. But now that 'strictly and in truth' is added to the term, they have filled it with impiety and barefaced blasphemy. Nevertheless, one must ask them what they wish such a term to mean, and in what sense it is understood by them. Do they call the holy Mary 'god-bearer' as we say that a male-bearing and female-bearing woman is one who is wont to give birth to males and females, and indicate by such a term that she habitually gives birth to gods? And let them say what manner of gods she gave birth to and teach us what we do not know! Is it that she has given birth to God? Even if they wish it to indicate this once and for all by their naming the Virgin in this way, we do not know if such a manner of speech can express this.

2:

The term 'god' [they say] has different meanings in divine Scripture, as for example: *Since there is one God who will justify the circumcised by faith and the foreskin through faith*, and: *God stood in the assembly of gods, he will judge gods in their midst*, and again: *As there are many gods and many lords*. In what sense do they understand the term 'god' here in the case of 'god-bearer'? In the first sense, which is to speak of God by nature, or in the second sense, which is <to speak of god> by adoption, or in the third sense, which is a lie? But in the last sense they would not call her thus, not even if they became demons. But if they call her thus in the second sense, let them know that god by adoption has been called in

ὅτι θεὸς θέσει οὐκ ἄγγελος, οὐκ ἄλογον ζῶον, οὐ τί τῶν κτισμάτων ἐλέχθη παρὰ τῆς θείας γραφῆς ποτέ, ἢ ἄνθρωπος μόνος. Ἀνθρωποτόκον οὖν φασὶ τὴν Παρθένον φύσει; Ἄλλ' ἐπιλέλησμαι τῆς προσθήκης τοῦ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν· τὸ γὰρ κυρίως παρείληπται αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ δηλώσει τοῦ τὸν φύσει θεὸν γεγεννηκέναι τὴν Παρθένον. Ἄλλ' εἰ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ ἀντίκειται τοῖς κοινοῖς ὁμολογήμασιν, ἴδωμεν. Ὅμολογοῦσι γὰρ ἄτρεπτον εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν τῶν κοινῶν πατέρων τῆς ἐν Νικαίᾳ λέγω συνόδου, ὁ δὲ ἄτρεπτος καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος οὔτε χειρῶν ἑαυτοῦ γενήσεται, οὔτε κρείττων, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μένει, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενος, αἰδῖος ὢν, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐκ ὢν, ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι μὴ δεξάμενος. Θεασάμεθα γοῦν εἰ μὴ λύσει γέννησις ἐκ γυναικὸς κατηγορούμενη τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἢ τὸ αἰδῖον αὐτοῦ ἢ τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον καὶ καθόλου τὰ προσόντα αὐτῷ καὶ ὁμολογούμενα παρ' ἡμῶν κοινῶς ὡς θεῶ καὶ τῶν ἀπάντων ποιητῆ.

γ'
 Πᾶσα γέννησις ἐγνωσμένη τῆς θείας γραφῆς ἢ τῆς ὑπάρξεως αὐτῆς καθέστηκεν αἰτία τοῦ λεγομένου γεγεννησθαι, οἷον· *Ἀβραὰμ ἐγέννησε τὸν Ἰσαὰκ* (Mt. 1:2), ἢ οὐ τῆς ὑπάρξεως αὐτῆς καθέστηκεν αἰτία, οἷον ὁ Ἀπόστολος ἐγέννησε τοὺς Κορινθίους, κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον· *Ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐγέννησα* (1 Cor. 4:15). Τῆς δὲ αἰτίας τοῦ εἶναι γινομένης γενέσεως, ἢ μὲν συνυπάρχειν ποιεῖ τὸ γεννώμενον τῷ γεννῶντι, ἢ δὲ μεθυπάρχειν. Συνυπάρχει μὲν γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ Πατρὶ γεννηθεὶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ, μεθυπάρχει δὲ τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ ὁ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ εἰ τις τοιοῦτος. Τῆς δὲ μὴ τοῦ εἶναι γινομένης αἰτίας τοῦ γεννωμένου, ἢ μὲν κρείττονα ἑαυτοῦ δείκνυσι τὸν γεννώμενον, ἢ δὲ χειρόνα, καὶ κρείττονα μὲν οἷον· *Ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτὸν ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, οἳ οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν* (Jn. 1:12-13), χειρόνα δὲ οἷον· *Γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν, τίς ὑμῖν ὑπέδειξεν φυγεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς μελλούσης ὀργῆς* (Mt. 3:7); Κατὰ ποίαν οὖν γέννησιν γεγεννησθαι τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον ἐκ γυναικὸς φασί; Κατὰ τὴν τὸ εἶναι διδοῦσαν τῷ

divine Scripture not the angel, not the irrational animal, not any other creature, but the human being alone. Will they, then, call the Virgin human-bearer by nature? But I have forgotten the addition of 'strictly and in truth'! For 'strictly' is understood by them in such a way that it indicates that the Virgin gave birth to God by nature. But let us see if this is possible and does not contradict the common tenets of our faith. For they confess that the God Word is unchangeable and unalterable, according to the decree of our common fathers, that is, <those> of the synod in Nicaea. But he who is unchangeable and unalterable will not become worse or better than himself, but always remains in the same state without alteration since he is eternal and has never not been nor obtained a beginning of his being. Let us see, then, if the birth from a woman, when it is said of the God Word, will not destroy his eternal or unalterable <existence>, and in general, what belongs to him and is commonly confessed by us <about him> as God and creator of all.

3:

Every birth (or: begetting) that is known to divine Scripture is either cause of the existence itself of that which is said to have been born, as: *Abraham begat Isaac*, or not cause of the existence itself, as the Apostle begat the Corinthians, according to the verse: *For I have begotten you in Christ Jesus through the Gospel*. In the case of the coming-to-be that becomes the beginning of being, one <type> makes the offspring come into existence simultaneously with the begetter, and <the other type makes it> come into existence afterwards. For the God Word came to be simultaneously with the Father by whom he was begotten, whereas Isaac came into existence later than Abraham, or whoever else there is of this kind. But <in the case of the coming-to-be> that is not cause for the being of the offspring, one <type> shows that the offspring becomes greater than itself and the other <type> worse, greater as in: *All those who have received him, he has given to them the power to be children of God, who have been begotten not from blood nor from the will of the flesh nor from the will of a man but from God*, and worse as in: *Generation of vipers, who has shown you to flee the coming wrath?* Through what birth, then, do they say that the God Word

γεννωμένω; Οὐκοῦν οὐκ αἰδίος ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος· οὐδεμία γὰρ τοιαύτη γέννησις προϋπάρχειν οἶδε τὸν γεννώμενον τοῦ γεννῶντος, τὸ δὲ μὴ προϋπάρχον τοῦ μὴ αἰδίου οὐκ αἰδίον, ὅπερ ἀσεβὲς λέγειν ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου. Ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν μὴ τὸ εἶναι διδοῦσαν τῷ γεννωμένῳ φασὶ γεγενῆσθαι; Τρεπτὸς οὐκοῦν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἀναλλοίωτος, ἐπεὶ πᾶσα τοιαύτη γέννησις ἢ κρείττονα ἢ χείρονα δείκνυσι τὸν γεννώμενον, ὁ δὲ κρείττων ἢ χείρων ἑαυτοῦ γινόμενος διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης μεταβολῆς δηλονότι τρεπτὸς ἐλέγχεται ὢν καὶ ἀλλοιωτός. Εἰ δὲ [οὐ] τρεπτὸς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, οὔτε οὐκ αἰδίος. Οὐκ ἄρα κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐγεννήθη ἐκ γυναικὸς οὐδὲ ὄλως κατηγορεῖσθαι δύναται γέννησις ἐκ γυναικὸς κατὰ τὴν γραφικὴν διάνοιαν.

δ'

Εἰ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἢ ἐκ Πατρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου γέννησις ἐστίν, οὐ κυρίως καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἢ ἐκ γυναικὸς ἐπιφημιζομένη τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου γέννησις, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὅμοια. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ πρότερον, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον.

ε'

Εἰ ἡ γέννησις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐκ Πατρὸς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οὐσα παρήλακται τῆς ἐπιφημιζομένης αὐτοῦ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐκ γυναικὸς, ἀνάγκη δὲ πᾶσα ὢν ὁ τόκος ὁ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν παρήλακται, τούτων καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν παρηλλάχθαι, ἀνάγκη ἄρα πᾶσα παραλλάττειν τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν, διὰ τὸ παρηλλάχθαι ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοὺς τοκετοὺς τοὺς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν. Εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ παρήλακται ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος κατ' οὐσίαν, οὐδενὶ ἔσται κατ' οὐσίαν ὅμοιος, οὐδὲ τῷ Πατρὶ ἄρα καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ, ὅπερ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ ὁμοούσιον.

ς'

Εἰ τὸ γεγονὸς καθὸ γέγονε γενέσθαι πάλιν ἀμήχανον, καὶ τὸ αἰδίως ὄν πάλιν ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀμήχανον. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρότερον ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα.

was born from a woman? Through that which gives being to the offspring? In that case the God Word would not be eternal, for there is no such birth where the offspring comes into existence before the begetter. But that which does not exist before the eternal one is not eternal, which to say about the God Word is impious. But they say that he was born through a birth that does not give the offspring its existence? Consequently, the God Word is changeable and not unalterable, since all such begetting shows the offspring to be greater or worse. But he who becomes greater or worse than himself is obviously found to be changeable and alterable through such a change. But if the God Word is changeable, he is also not eternal. Consequently, he was not born from a woman 'strictly and in truth' nor can birth from a woman be said <of him> at all according to the sense of Scripture.

4:

If the begetting of the God Word from the Father happened 'strictly and in truth', the supposed birth of the God Word from a woman did not happen 'strictly and in truth', since they are not alike. But if the former is the case, the latter is not.

5:

If the begetting of the God Word from the Father, which happened 'in truth', differs from his supposed <birth> 'in truth' from a woman, and it is necessary that those whose birth 'in truth' is different are also different in substance, it follows that the God Word himself differs from himself in substance, because in him the births 'in truth' are different. But if the God Word himself differs from himself in substance, he will be similar in substance to nobody. Consequently, he will also not <be similar> to the Father and the Holy Spirit, which eliminates their being of like substance.

6:

If it is impossible that that, which has come to be insofar as it has come to be, comes to be again, it is also impossible that that which is eternal <comes to be> again from a woman. But the former is true, and consequently also the second.

ζ'

Εἰ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐτέχθη κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς Παρθένου, ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ τικτόμενα οὕτως ὅμοια εἶναι κατ' οὐσίαν τοῖς τίκτουσιν, ἢ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἄνθρωπος τὴν οὐσίαν, ἢ ἡ Παρθένος θεὸς τὴν οὐσίαν. Ἄλλ' ἐκάτερον ἐπίσης ἀσεβὲς καὶ ἀδύνατον. Οὐκ ἄρα ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐτέχθη κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς Παρθένου.

η'

Εἰ μήτηρ τοῦ θεοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἡ Παρθένος, υἱὸς κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῆς Παρθένου ὁ θεός. Εἰ υἱὸς τῆς Παρθένου κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὁ θεός, ἢ ὅμοιος τῇ μητρὶ ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιος. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ὅμοιος, οὐ θεός, εἰ δὲ οὐχ ὅμοιος, οὐχ υἱός.

θ'

Ἦ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐκ Παρθένου κατ' ἀλήθειαν γέννησις ἢ πάθος αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἢ πάθος καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἢ οὔτε πάθος οὔτε ἐνέργεια. Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν πάθος φαίνεται, πρόδηλος ἢ ἀσέβεια· τοῦ γὰρ γεγεννημένου τὸ πάθος, γεγέννηται δὲ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ καθ' ὑμᾶς, τῆς οὐσίας ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ πάθος. Εἰ δὲ ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ὁ θεὸς οὐ τῷ εἶναι αὐτῷ, τουτέστιν οὐ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ τῷ θέλῃν, τοῦ θέλῃν ἄρα τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ γέννησις. Εἰ δὲ πάθος καὶ ἐνέργεια, πεπονθὼς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἐνεργήσας δὲ τῷ θέλῃν γεγέννηται. Γεγέννηται ἄρα καὶ ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ θέλῃν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ μὲν παθοῦσα, τὸ δὲ δρᾶσαν. Εἰ δὲ οὔτε πάθος οὔτε ἐνέργεια, οὔτε ἡ οὐσία οὔτε τὸ θέλῃν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθη, εἰπέ τί τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθη, οὗ γεννηθέντος, κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὁ θεὸς ἐγεννήθη.

ι'

Εἰ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐτέχθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου, καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐτέχθη ἐξ αὐτῆς ἡ σὰρξ ἢ θνητὴ καὶ φθαρτὴ καὶ ἐνψυχωμένη ψυχῇ λογικῇ καὶ νοεῖᾳ, ἢ ἡ σὰρξ προϋπάρχει τῆς Παρθένου, ἢ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος μεθ' ὑπάρχει τῆς Παρθένου, ὅπερ ἄτοπον ἐκάτερον.

7:

If the substance of the God Word has been born 'in truth' from the substance of the Virgin, and it is necessary that those who have been born in this way are similar in substance to the parents, the God Word is either a human being in substance or the Virgin is a god in substance. But both is equally impious and impossible. Consequently, the substance of the God Word has not been born 'in truth' from the substance of the Virgin.

8:

If the Virgin is 'in truth' mother of God, God is 'in truth' son of the Virgin. If God is 'in truth' son of the Virgin, he is either similar to the mother or he is not similar. And if he is similar, he is not God, but if he is not similar, he is not son.

9:

The birth 'in truth' of the God Word from the Virgin is either something he suffers, or an activity of his, or both something he suffers and an activity of his, or neither something he suffers nor an activity of his. But if it appears to be a suffering, the impiety is obvious, for the suffering belongs to him who has been born, and according to you the substance of God has been born, which means that the suffering belongs to the substance of God. But if it is an activity, and God acts not through his being, that is, not through his substance, but only through his will, it follows that the birth of the substance of God is from the will. But if it is both a suffering and an activity, he has been born suffering through his substance but acting through his will. Consequently, both the substance and the will of God have been born, the one suffering and the other acting. But if it is neither suffering nor activity, neither the substance nor the will of God have been born. Tell me what of God has been born, through whose birth God has been born 'strictly and in truth'.

10:

If the God Word has been born from the Virgin 'strictly and in truth', and the flesh has been born from her 'strictly and in truth', which is mortal and corruptible and endowed with a rational and intellectual soul, <it is> either <the case that> the flesh exists before the Virgin or <it is the case that> the God Word exists after the Virgin, both of which is absurd.

ια'

Εἰ τόκος ὁ τῆς σαρκὸς τόκος τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τῆς σαρκὸς εἶναι ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ. Εἰ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι τοῦτο, ἀσεβὲς ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀμήχανον, οὐκ ἄρα ὁ τόκος τῆς σαρκὸς τόκος ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ.

ιβ'

Εἰ τὰ τίκοντα πρὸς τὰ τίκοντα κατ' οὐσίαν παραλλάττει, καὶ τὰ τικτόμενα πρὸς τὰ τικτόμενα ἀνάγκη πᾶσα κατ' οὐσίαν παραλλάττει. Καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, πῶς τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τῆς Παρθένου κατ' οὐσίαν παραλλαττόντων, οὐ παραλλάττει ἀνάγκη τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν, ἀμφοτέρων ὑπάρχοντα κατὰ ἀλήθειαν υἱόν; Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν παραλλάττειν λέγειν τὸν πάσης ἀπλότητος ἐπέκεινα, πάσης ἐκστάσεως ἐστὶν ἐπέκεινα.

ιγ'

Εἰ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐγεννήθη ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς, καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοούσιος αὐτῷ πάντη κατ' οὐσίαν, καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐγεννήθη ἐκ γυναικὸς ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, καὶ ἔστιν ἀνόμιος αὕτη πάντη κατ' οὐσίαν, οὐ τὸ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γεννηθῆναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ, τὸ ποιοῦν πάντη ὅμοια κατ' οὐσίαν τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς τίκτουσιν, ἀλλὰ τι ἕτερον, ὅπερ οὐδὲ ἐπινοῆσαι δυνατόν.

ιδ'

Εἰ ἐγεννήθη ὁ Υἱὸς ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς κατὰ θεότητα, καὶ σώζει τὴν κατ' οὐσίαν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιότητα, ἐγεννήθη δὲ καθ' ὑμᾶς ὁμοίως ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου κατὰ θεότητα, σώζειν ἀνάγκη τὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν κατ' οὐσίαν ὁμοιότητα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔξει πάντως καὶ ἡ Παρθένος τὴν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν καὶ Πατέρα κατ' οὐσίαν ὁμοιότητα· τὰ γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ ὅμοια καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ὅμοια.

ιε'

Πᾶν τὸ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τίκτον αἴτιον τοῦ τικτομένου, οὐδὲν δὲ αἴτιον τοῦ τικτομένου νεώτερον τοῦ τικτομένου. Οὐδὲν οὖν οὐ νεώτερον τοῦ τικτομένου

11:

If the birth of the flesh is 'in truth' a birth of God, the being of the flesh is also 'in truth' the being of God. But if <to speak of> being and being such-like is impious and impossible, it follows that the birth of the flesh is not 'in truth' a birth of God.

12:

If the parents are different from each other in substance, it is necessary that their offspring also differs in substance from each other. And if this is so, how <is it> not <the case that> when the Father and the Virgin differ in substance from one another, the God Word necessarily also differs in substance from himself, as he would be son 'in truth' of both? But to say that he who is utterly simple differs in substance from himself is utter madness.

13:

If the substance of the God Word has been begotten 'strictly and in truth' from the substance of the Father, and is by substance completely of like substance with him, and the substance of the God Word has been born 'strictly and in truth' from a woman, and she is completely unlike <him> in substance, <it is> not <the case that> the substance is born 'strictly and in truth' from the substance, which makes the offspring completely alike to the parents, but <it is> something else, which one cannot even imagine.

14:

If the Son has been begotten from the Father as regards his divinity, and preserves the similarity in substance to him, and according to you the Son has likewise been born from the Virgin as regards his divinity, he must preserve the similarity with her in substance as regards his divinity. But if this is the case, the Virgin, too, will have similarity in substance with the God and Father. For those that are similar to the same thing are also similar to each other.

15:

Everything that gives birth 'strictly and in truth' is cause of the offspring, but no cause of the offspring is younger than the offspring. Nothing, then, that is not younger than its offspring is a creature of its offspring.

δημιούργημα τοῦ τικτομένου. Οὐδὲν ἄρα
κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τίκτον
δημιούργημα τοῦ τικτομένου.

ις'

Πᾶν τὸ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τικτόμενον
τὸ εἶναι ἔχει ἐκ τοῦ τίκτοντος. Οὐδὲν δὲ τὸ
εἶναι ἔχον ἐκ τοῦ τίκτοντος, πρὸ τοῦ οἰκείου
τόκου ἐστίν. Οὐδὲν ἄρα κυρίως καὶ κατὰ
ἀλήθειαν τικτόμενον πρὸ τοῦ οἰκείου τόκου
ἐστί.

ιζ'

Τὸ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τικτόμενον εἰ
ἐν χρόνῳ τίκεται, δυνάμει μόνον ἐστίν ἐν τῷ
τίκτοντι πρὸ τῆς ἰδίας συλλήψεως, ὡς ἐν τῇ
τοῦ Ἀβραάμ ὁσφύϊ ὁ Λευί (cf. Hebr. 7:10).
Τὸ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον ἐν τῷ τίκτοντι ὄν ἀρχὴν
λαμβάνει τοῦ εἶναι ἐν τῷ τίκτοντι. Τὸ κυρίως
ἄρα καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τικτόμενον εἰ ἐν
χρόνῳ τίκεται, ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι λαμβάνει ἐν
τῷ τίκτοντι.

ιη'

Εἰ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐτέχθη ὁ Θεὸς
Λόγος ἐκ γυναικός, ἢ ὁ τεχθεὶς ὑπὸ χρόνον ἢ
ἢ γυνὴ ὑπὲρ χρόνον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε θεὸς ὑπὸ
χρόνον οὔτε γυνὴ ὑπὲρ χρόνον. Οὐκ ἄρα
κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐτέχθη ὁ θεὸς ἐκ
γυναικός.

ιθ'

Εἰ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν υἱὸς τῆς Παρθένου ὁ Θεὸς
Λόγος, τοῦτο ἔσται κατ' οὐσίαν, ὅπερ ἐστίν
ἢ τεκοῦσα, αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶ ζῶον λογικὸν
θνητόν. Καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα καθ' ὑμᾶς ζῶον
λογικὸν θνητόν ἔσται.

κ'

Ἀλλά, φησὶν, οὐ ψυχοτόκον, ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπο-
τόκον φαιμέν τὴν γεννώσαν ἄνθρωπον. Τί
οὖν μὴ καὶ ὑμεῖς Χριστοτόκον μᾶλλον
λέγετε;

κα'

Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οὖν, φησί, μὴ ἀνθρωποτόκος
ὑμῖν ἤπερ θεοτόκος δοκεῖ;

κβ'

Εἰ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἐτέχθη ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου, ἐν
χρόνῳ ἐτέχθη, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ

Consequently, nothing that gives birth 'strictly
and in truth' is a creature of the offspring.

16:

Everything that is born 'strictly and in truth'
has its being from its parent. But nothing that
has its being from its parent exists before its
own birth. Consequently, nothing that is born
'strictly and in truth' exists before its birth.

17:

Everything that is born 'strictly and in truth', if
it is born in time, is only potentially in the
parent before its conception, as Levi was in the
loins of Abraham. But that which exists only
potentially in its parent, has the beginning of its
existence in its parent. Consequently, that
which is born 'strictly and in truth', if it is born
in time, has the beginning of being in its parent.

18:

If the God Word has been born 'strictly and in
truth' from a woman, <it is> either <the case
that> he who has been born is subjected to time
or <it is the case that> the woman is beyond
time. But indeed, God is not subjected to time
nor is the woman beyond time. Consequently,
God is not born 'strictly and in truth' from a
woman.

19:

If the God Word is 'in truth' son of the Virgin,
he will be in substance what is the one who has
given birth to him. But she is a rational mortal
animal. Consequently, God, too, will according
to you be a rational mortal animal.

20:

But [he says], we call <a woman> who has
given birth to a human being not a soul-bearer
but a human-bearer. Why, then, do you, too,
not rather call her Christ-bearer?

21:

But why [he says] are you not of the opinion
that she is a human-bearer rather than a god-
bearer?

22:

If the God Word has been born from the
Virgin, he has been born in time, but

τικτόμενον χρόνου πρὸς τελείωσιν δεῖται. Εἰ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου ἐτέχθη, χρόνου πρὸς τελείωσιν ἐδεήθη.

κγ'

Εἰ ἔνθα ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ἐκεῖ ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀδιαίρετον, ἦν δὲ ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ τῆς Παρθένου καθ' ὑμᾶς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος κατ' οὐσίαν, ἦν ἄρα ἡ Τριάς ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ τῆς Παρθένου.

κδ'

Εἰ ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ τῆς Παρθένου ἡ Τριάς κατ' οὐσίαν, ἐγεννήθη δὲ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος κατ' οὐσίαν ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου, ἡ Τριάς ἄρα ἐγεννήθη ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου.

κε'

Πᾶς τόκος ἐγνωσμένος τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ ἐκ τῶν πάντη ἀνομοίων ἀνόμοια τίκτων, ἐπαίνου τὸ τίκτον ἢ ψόγου δείκνυσιν ἄξιον, ἐπαίνου μὲν ὡς· *Διὰ τὸν φόβον σου, κύριε, ἐν γαστρὶ ἐλάβομεν καὶ ἐτέκομεν* (Is. 26:18), ψόγου δὲ ὡς τό· *Ἰδοὺ ὠδίνησεν ἀδικίαν, συνέλαβε πόνον, καὶ ἔτεκεν ἀνομίαν* (Ps. 7:14). Πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐπαινούμενον ἢ ψεγόμενον ἐν τῷ τίκτειν ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ τικτόμενον τίκτει. Πᾶς ἄρα τόκος γινωσκόμενος τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ ἐκ τῶν πάντη ἀνομοίων ἀνόμοια τίκτων ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τίκτει τὸ τικτόμενον.

κς'

Εἰ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἐτέχθη ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου, πᾶν δὲ τὸ τικτόμενον ἢ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τίκεται τοῦ τίκτοντος, ἢ ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τικτόμενον τὸ εἶναι πάντως ἔχει ἐκ τοῦ τίκτοντος, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως, πῆ μὲν τὸ εἶναι ἔχει ἐκ τοῦ τίκτοντος, πῆ δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι, εἴπατε πόθεν βούλεσθε τετέχθαι τὸν θεόν, ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς Παρθένου ἢ ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως; Ὅποτερον γὰρ αὐτῶν εἴπητε, τὸ συναγόμενον δῆλον.

κζ'

Εἰ ἐγεννήθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς, καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοῖος

everything that is born in time needs time for its completion. Consequently, if God has been born from the Virgin, he has needed time for his completion.

23:

If where the God Word is, the Father and the Holy Spirit also are, because of the indivisibility of the substance, and the God Word was according to you in the womb of the Virgin, it follows that the Trinity was in the womb of the Virgin.

24:

If the Trinity was in the womb of the Virgin as regards its substance, and the God Word has been born from the Virgin as regards his substance, it follows that the Trinity has been born from the Virgin.

25:

Every birth known to divine Scripture, which gives birth to those that are unlike, from those that are completely unlike, shows the parent to be worthy of praise or blame, of praise as in: *Because of the fear of you, Lord, we have conceived in the womb and given birth*, and of blame as in: *See, he was in travail with unrighteousness, he conceived toil and gave birth to lawlessness*. And all that is praised or blamed in giving birth gives birth to its offspring from the will and not from the substance. Consequently, every birth known to divine Scripture, which gives birth to those that are unlike, from those that are completely unlike, gives birth to the offspring from the will and not from the substance.

26:

If the God Word was born from the Virgin, and everything that is born is born either from the substance of the parent, or from the will, and *<if>* that which is born from the substance certainly has its being from the parent, whereas that which is born from will has from the parent sometimes its being, and sometimes a certain manner of being, tell us: From what do you wish God to have been born, from the substance of the Virgin or from the will? Whichever of them you say, the conclusion is clear.

27:

If the God Word has been begotten 'strictly and in truth' from the Father, and is like him in

αὐτῷ κατ' οὐσίαν, καὶ εἰ ἐγεννήθη ὁ αὐτὸς ἐκ μητρὸς κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἀνόμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει ὑπὸ ὁμοίων κατ' οὐσίαν ἢ ἀνομοίων γεννᾶσθαι. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοια διενεχθήσεται πρὸς ἄλληλα κατ' οὐσίαν. Ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ ἦν, καὶ τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γεννηθέντα, εἶναι αὐτῷ κατ' οὐσίαν ἀνόμοιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀδύνατα καὶ τῆς ὑποθέσεως αὐτῶν ἄξια.

κη'

Εἰ τὸ αἰδίως ὄν ὕστερον γεννᾶται κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, καὶ τὸ μηδὲ ὄλως ὄν ἐνεργεῖα μὴ ὄν γίνεται κατὰ ἀλήθειαν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ δεῦτερον ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἄρα.

κθ'

Εἰ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἤδη ὄντα γενέσθαι νῦν ἀδύνατον, τὸν τούτων δημιουργὸν πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐκ Πατρὸς γεγεννημένον ἐπ' ἐσχάτων γεννηθῆναι ἀδυνατώτατον.

λ'

Εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὴν χθὲς γενέσθαι αὔριον, ἐνδεχέσθω καὶ τὸν ὄντα αἰδίως τεχθῆναι ἐπ' ἐσχάτων. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀμήχανον, καὶ τὸ δεῦτερον κατ' ἐπίτασιν.

λα'

Εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον μὴ ὄν ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ γεννηθὲν ἢ ποιηθὲν, ἐνδεχέσθω καὶ τὸ αἰδίως ὄν ὕστερον κατ' ἀλήθειαν γεννηθῆναι. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρότερον ἀμήχανον, καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἄρα.

λβ'

Τὸ ἄνωθεν γεννώμενον (cf. Jn. 3:3), τουτέστι δευτέρῳ γεννήσει, ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ Πνεύματος (Jn. 3:5) ἢ καὶ διὰ διδασκαλίας γεννᾶται, τὸ δὲ οὕτως γεννώμενον εἰς υἰοθεσίαν γεννᾶται, τὸ δὲ εἰς υἰοθεσίαν γεννώμενον ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας οὐ γεννᾶται τοῦ γεννῶντος. Τὸ ἄνωθεν ἄρα γεννώμενον οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας γεννᾶται τοῦ γεννῶντος.

λγ'

Εἰ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐγεννήθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη

substance, and if the same one has been born 'strictly and in truth' from the mother, and she is unlike <her> in substance, there is no difference between birth from those that are like in substance and <birth from> those that are unlike. And if this is the case, not even those that are unlike will differ from one another in substance. If this were possible, the God Word, too, who has been begotten 'in truth' from the Father would in substance be unlike him. But all this is impossible and worthy of their supposition.

28:

If that which exists eternally is born 'in truth', that which never existed at all in actuality comes to be 'in truth'. But if the second is impossible so is consequently also the first.

29:

If it is impossible that the heaven and the earth and all that is in them, which already exist, now come to be, it is completely impossible that their creator who was born from the Father before the ages has been born in the last days.

30:

If it is possible that yesterday becomes tomorrow, let it also be possible that the one who exists eternally has been born in the last days. But the first is impossible and the second is even more impossible.

31:

If it is possible that that which was not before, exists afterwards, without being born or made, let it also be possible that that which exists eternally has been born later 'in truth'. But the former is impossible, and consequently also the latter.

32:

That which has been born from above, that is, through a second birth, is born *from water and Spirit*, or through teaching, and that which is born thus is born to adoption, and that which is born to adoption is not born from the substance of the parent. Consequently, what is born from above is not born from the substance of the parent.

33:

If the God Word has been born 'strictly and in truth' from the Virgin, and she is unlike <him>,

άνομοιος, καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐγεννήθη ὁ αὐτὸς ἐκ Πατρὸς, τί κωλύει εἶναι αὐτὸν καὶ τῷ Πατρὶ ἀνόμοιον, μήτε τῶν γεννήσεων κατ' εἶδος παραλλαττουσῶν μήτε τοῦ γεννωμένου καθάπαξ.

λδ'

Εἰ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἐγεννήθη κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου, πᾶσα δὲ γέννησις μὴ ψεγομένη, ἢ τε τὸ εἶναι διδοῦσα τῷ τικτομένῳ καὶ ἢ μὴ διδοῦσα, ἴσον κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ γεννῶντος ἔχει τὸ γεννώμενον, ἢ ἔλαττον, ἴσον μὲν ὡς τό· *Ἐγέννησε κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτοῦ* (Gen. 5:3), καί· *Ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐγέννησα* (1 Cor. 4:15), ἔλαττον δὲ ὡς ἡ τῶν πιστῶν ἐκ θεοῦ γέννησις, κρεῖττον δὲ οὐδεμία, ἢ ἴσος ἄρα κατ' οὐσίαν ὁ θεὸς τῆς Παρθένου, ἢ ἐλάττων. Ἄλλ' ἐκάτερα δυσσεβῆ, οὐκ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐγεννήθη ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου.

λε'

Εἰ ὁ τόκος ἐκ τῶν πάντη ὁμοίων ἀληθινός, ὃς κατ' οὐσίαν τικτων ὅμοια τῶν τικτόντων κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐστίν, ὁ πάντη ἀνόμοια τικτων κατ' οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τόκος· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία οὐ συναληθεύουσι ποτέ.

λς'

Εἰ ἄσαρκός τε καὶ ἄτρεπτος ὁ Λόγος κατὰ φυσικὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον, φησί, πῶς ἔσται σεσαρκωμένος ὁ αὐτὸς μένων ἄτρεπτος; Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ τρεπόμενος λέγοιτο ἂν ἔτι ἄτρεπτος μεῖναι. Εἴτε οὖν οὐχ ὁ θεὸς σὰρξ γέγονεν, οὐ θεοτόκος ἢ τεκοῦσα τὴν σάρκα, εἴτε αὐτὸς γέγονεν, οὐ θεὸς λοιπὸν ὁ μὴ ἄτρεπτος, οὐδ' ἄρα θεοτόκος οὐδαμῶς ἢ τοῦ τρεπτοῦ μήτηρ.

λζ'

Ἴδου καὶ κατὰ τὰς ὑμετέρας ὑποθέσεις καὶ κατασκευάς, καὶ ἐκ μέρους καὶ κατὰ τι ἔξεστιν ὀνομάζειν τινὸς τινὰ μητέρα. Πῶς οὖν εἰ μὴ ἄσαρκον γεννηθῆναι θεὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς δοξάζετε, λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἀνθρωποτόκον καὶ ἐκ μέρους ταύτην Παρθένον ἀντιφέρεσθε, τὸ θεοτόκος ὄνομα μόνον αὐτῇ κατ' ἐξάιρετον ἀποκληρώσαντες, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Χριστοτόκον ἐκ

and the same one has been begotten 'strictly and in truth' from the Father, what prevents him from being unlike the Father as well, since the births do not differ in kind nor indeed does the one who has been born once and for all.

34:

If the God Word has been born 'strictly and in truth' from the Virgin, and in every blameless birth, which either gives being to the offspring or does not give it, the offspring is the same in substance as the parent, or lesser, the same as in: *He begat according to his form*, and: *For I have begotten you in Christ Jesus through the Gospel*, and lesser as the birth of the faithful from God, but never greater, it follows that God is the same in substance as the Virgin or lesser. But both is impious. Consequently, God has not been born from the Virgin 'in truth'.

35:

If the birth from those that are completely alike is a true <birth>, which gives birth in substance to those that are like those who give birth 'in truth', the <birth> that gives birth to those that are unlike from those that are alike is not a birth 'in truth'. For the opposites are not equally true.

36:

If the Word is fleshless and unchangeable according to his natural definition [he says], how will the same one become enfleshed when he remains unchangeable? For thus he would be said to remain still unchanged when he is changed. Either God has not become flesh <in which case> the one who gave birth to the flesh is not a god-bearer, or he himself became <flesh>, <in which case> he is henceforth not God since he is not unchangeable, nor is then the mother of the changeable one in any way a god-bearer.

37:

See, according to your suppositions and supporting arguments, it is permissible to call someone a mother of someone in part and in one respect. If you do not confess that a fleshless God has been born from her, why, then, do you object when we say that the Virgin is human-bearer in part, and <why do you> attribute specifically to her only the name 'god-bearer', and do not accept those who say that

τοῦ ὅλου φάσκοντας αὐτὴν οἰκειότερον
κατεδέχεσθε.

λη'

Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος (Jn. 1:1), γέγονεν
ἄνθρωπος. Εἰ θεοτόκος ἢ Παρθένος, δηλὸν
ὅτι οὐ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, ἔστι μήτηρ ἢ Παρθένος,
οὐχὶ οὐ γέγονεν. Εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔχει
μητέρα, τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μητέρα μὴ ἔχοντος,
οὐδὲ ἄρα ὁ Λόγος δύναται ἔχειν μητέρα.

λθ'

Κατὰ μὲν τὸν προφήτην τὸ Ἐμμανουήλ
ὄνομα (cf. Is. 7:14) σημείου ἐστὶν ὄνομα τοῦ
ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου τῷ οἴκῳ Δαυὶδ τικτομένου
τὲ καὶ διδομένου, κατὰ δὲ τὸν Αἰγύπτιον τοῦ
δοτῆρος τοῦ σημείου θεοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ
Ἐμμανουήλ.

μ'

Τῶν τικτομένων ἢ φύσις θεοῦ ὀνόμασιν
οὐδαμοῦ παραδηλοῦται· τὰ γὰρ θετὰ
ὀνόματα τῶν τῆ φύσει συμβαινόντων ἔστι
σημαντικά, τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ Ἐμμανουήλ
ὄνομα, ἅτε θετὸν ὄνομα. Οὐ τὴν φύσιν οὖν
δηλοῖ τοῦ λαβόντος τοῦ Ἐμμανουήλ ἢ
κλησίς κατὰ τὸν Αἰγύπτιον, ἀλλὰ θεοῦ τὴν
συμαχίαν εἶναι μετὰ τῶν εἰληφότων τὸ
Ἐμμανουήλ εἰς σημεῖον ἐκείνης.

μα'

Εἰ διὰ τοῦτο θεοτόκος ἢ Παρθένος, ὅτι τὸν
ἀληθινὸν θεὸν ἐγέννησε, καὶ ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἄρα
θεὸς διὰ τοῦτο ἀληθινὸς θεός, ἐπειδὴ
παρθενογέννητος.

μβ'

Εἰ κατὰ τὴν εἰς σάρκα τροπὴν γέγονε σὰρξ ὁ
Λόγος, δηλὸν ὅτι ὁ Λόγος ἔχει δημιουργὸν
καὶ μητέρα. Εἰ δὲ χωρὶς τροπῆς γέγονε σὰρξ
ὁ Λόγος, πῶς μὴ τρεπόμενος ὁ Λόγος ὡς
τρεπόμενος πλάττεται καὶ τίκτεται.

μγ'

Τὰ μὴ τῆς θεότητος τοῦ Λόγου, ταῦτα οὐδὲ
τοῦ Λόγου. Πῶς τοίνυν ὁ Αἰγύπτιος
δευτέραν ἀρχὴν γεννήσεως τῆ μὲν τοῦ Λόγου
θεότητι οὐ δίδωσι, τῷ δὲ Θεῷ Λόγῳ δίδωσι;

more specifically she is 'Christ-bearer' from
the whole.

38:

The Word was God, he became a human being.
If the Virgin is 'god-bearer' it is obvious that
the Virgin is mother of what the Word was and
not of what he became. But if he has a mother
because of the human being, and the human
being does not have a mother, it follows that
the Word, too, cannot have a mother.

39:

According to the prophet the name 'Emmanuel'
is a name of the sign of the one who has been
born and given from the Virgin to the house of
David, but according to the Egyptian
'Emmanuel' is the name of God, the giver of
the sign.

40:

The nature of the offspring is never indicated
through conventional names. For the
conventional names are indicators of that which
accedes to the nature. Such is also the name
'Emmanuel' because it is a conventional name.
The appellation 'Emmanuel', then, does not
indicate the nature of the one who took it, as
the Egyptian thinks, but <it indicates> that the
help of God is with those who have taken
'Emmanuel' as its sign.

41:

If the Virgin is god-bearer for the reason that
she has given birth to the true God, the true
God would for the same reason be true God
because he is Virgin-born.

42:

If the Word became flesh by changing into the
flesh, it is evident that the Word has a creator
and a mother, but if the Word became flesh
without change, how is the Word who is not
changed fashioned and born as if he were
changed?

43:

That which does not belong to the divinity of
the Word also does not belong to the Word.
How, then, does the Egyptian not attribute a
second beginning through birth to the divinity
of the Word but does attribute it to the God
Word?

μδ'

Τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον χωρίσας ὁ Αἰγύπτιος τῆς θεότητος, αὐτὸν μὲν ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου δογματίζει σαρκικῶς τικτόμενον, τὴν δὲ αὐτοῦ θεότητα ὑποβάλλειν τῇ αὐτῇ σαρκικῇ γεννήσει, ἣ ὑπέβαλε τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον, ἐσχάτης εἶναι μανίας λέγει.

με'

Εἰ τῇ θεότητι θεὸς ὁ Λόγος, καὶ τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι ἄνθρωπος ὁ Λόγος, πῶς ὁ ἐστὶ τῇ σαρκὶ οὐ τίκεται ὁ Λόγος, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐστὶ τῇ θεότητι; Δογματίζει γὰρ τὸ θεοτόκος ὁ Αἰγύπτιος καὶ τοὺς λέγοντας τὸ ἀνθρωποτόκος ἀναθεματίζει.

μζ'

Τὴν τοῦ νόμου διάταξιν περὶ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ τῶν τικτομένων ἦν ἐπλήρωσεν ἡ Παρθένος ἀνάγνωθι, καὶ μάθε. Θεὸν ἐκαθάρισεν ὁ νόμος κελεύων ἃ ἔφη, καὶ ἡ Παρθένος πληροῦσα αὐτά, ἦ ἄνθρωπον; Ἐὰν γὰρ σπερματισθῇ γυνή, φησὶν ὁ νόμος, καὶ τέκη ἄρσεν, ἔστω ἀκάθαρτος ἑπτὰ ἡμέρας κατὰ τὰς ἡμέρας τῆς ἀφόδρου τοῦ αἵματος αὐτῆς, καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας καθιεῖται ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτῆς τῷ καθαρῷ, αὕτη παντὸς ἀγίου οὐχ ἄπτεται, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἁγιαστήριον οὐκ εἰσελεύσεται, ἕως ἂν πληρωθῶσιν αἱ ἡμέραι τῆς καθάρσεως αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν πληρωθῶσιν αἱ ἡμέραι τῆς καθάρσεως αὐτῆς, οἶσει ἀμνὸν ἄμωμον ἢ δύο νεοσσοὺς περιστερᾶς εἰς τὴν θύραν τῆς σκηνῆς τοῦ μαρτυρίου, καὶ ποιήσει ὁ ἱερεὺς τὸ μὲν περὶ ἁμαρτίας, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀλοκαύτωσιν, καὶ καθαρῶσει αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τῆς πηγῆς τοῦ αἵματος αὐτῆς (Lev. 12:2-7), καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα εἰσελεύσεται εἰς τὸ ἅγιον. Ὅτι δὲ ἐπλήρωσεν ἡ Παρθένος αὐτὴν τὴν διάταξιν, μαρτυρεῖ Λουκᾶς ὁ εὐαγγελιστὴς λέγων· Καὶ πληρώσαντες, φησί, τὰς ἡμέρας τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ αὐτῶν, ἀνήνεγκαν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν παραστήσαι αὐτὸν τῷ Κυρίῳ, καὶ τοῦ δοῦναι δύο νεοσσοὺς περιστερῶν (cf. Lc. 2:22-24).

μζ'

Πανταχοῦ ἡ σύλληψις καὶ ὁ τόκος τὸν οὐκ ὄντα ἄγει εἰς γέννησιν, ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ τὸν Αἰγύπτιον οὐ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐγέννησεν ἡ Παρθένος, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀληθινὸν θεόν, δηλον ὅτι τὸν οὐκ ὄντα ἐγέννησε. Καὶ εἰ ὁ νεόπλαστος καὶ νεότοκος καὶ νεόκλητος ὁ

44:

The Egyptian who separates the God Word from the divinity, puts forward the doctrine that he was born fleshly from the Virgin but does not subject his divinity to a fleshly birth whereas he subjects the God Word <to it>, which [he says] is the utmost madness.

45:

If the Word is God through the divinity and the Word is human being through the humanity, how is the Word not born as that which he is through the flesh, but as that which he is through the divinity? For the Egyptian puts forward the doctrine of the 'god-bearer' and anathematizes those who say 'human-bearer'.

46:

Read the command of the law about the purification of those who have been born, which the Virgin fulfilled, and learn! Did the law, which orders what it has said, and the Virgin who fulfilled it purify God or a human being? *If a woman has conceived seed, says the law, and born a male child, she shall be unclean seven days; according to the days of her menstrual blood. And she shall sit in her pure blood for thirty-three days; she shall touch no holy thing nor come into the sanctuary, until the days of her purification are fulfilled. And when the days of her purification are fulfilled she shall bring a spotless lamb or two young pigeons to the door of the tabernacle of the witness. And the priest shall make a sin offering and a burnt offering, and he shall purify her from the source of her blood, and afterwards she shall enter the holy.* That the Virgin fulfilled this command is testified by the Evangelist Luke who says: And having completed the days of their purification, Joseph and Mary took him to Jerusalem to present him to the Lord and to give two young pigeons.

47:

Everywhere <it is the case that> the conception and the birth bring forth to birth one who does not exist, but if according to the Egyptian the Virgin did not give birth to a human being, but to the true God, it is evident that she has given birth to one who had not yet existed. And if the one who is newly-fashioned and newly-born

αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ θεός, ἐκ ἀνάγκης καὶ νέος θεός. Καὶ ἡ μὲν θεία γραφή βοᾷ· *Μὴ ἔστω σοι θεὸς πρόσφατος* (Ps. 80:10), ὁ δὲ Αἰγύπτιος ἀντιβοᾷ· Ἔστω, καὶ τοὺς μὴ λέγοντας εἶναι θεὸν πρόσφατον ἀναθεματίζει.

μη’
Ὁ μὴ ὁμολογῶν τὴν Παρθένον Χριστοτόκον οὐδὲ τὸν Χριστὸν ὁμολογεῖ ὅπερ ἐστί· προοίμιον γὰρ τῶν περὶ Χριστοῦ λόγων, ἡ γέννησις ἢ ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου.

μθ’
Θεοτόκον τὴν μητέρα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ λέγειν ἡμεῖς οὐκ αὐθεντήσομεν, τῆς ἀγίας γραφῆς οὐδαμοῦ αὐτὴν οὕτω προσαγορευούσης, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τῶν τη’ πατέρων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ ἀγγέλου λέγοντος τοῖς ποιμέσιν· *Ἐτέχθη ὑμῖν σήμερον Χριστὸς κύριος* (Lk. 2:11), καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον· *Βίβλος γενέσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (Mt. 1:1), καὶ τό· *Νῦν δέ με θέλετε ἀποκτεῖναι ἄνθρωπον ὃς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὑμῖν λελάληκα* (Jn. 8:40), ἀνθρωποτόκον φύσει καὶ ἀξία Χριστοτόκον αὐτὴν φάμεν, ὃ μὴ παρελάβομεν οὐ νομοθετοῦντες προπετῶς καθ’ ὑμᾶς.

[Λόγος Ε’]
Πέμπτης αὐτῶν ἀσεβείας ἔκφρασις ἀνέδην τὴν φυσικὴν θεότητα ἀρνούμενων Χριστοῦ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν.

α’
Πότε οὖν, φασί, τὸ ὅλον ἴστε Χριστοῦ θεόν; Εὐθύς ἀπὸ τοῦ τόκου; Ἡ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν; Εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ γεννήσεως εὐθύς, καὶ ἀπαθῆ ἄρα καὶ ἀθάνατον αἰεῖ ἴστε τὸν Χριστόν. Τίς οὖν ἔπαθε καὶ ἀπέθανε καὶ ἐτάφη καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὑπέστη, εἰ μὴ φαντασία ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ Χριστοῦ. Εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἀπὸ τόκου ἦν τὸ ὅλον Χριστοῦ θεός ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἦν καθ’ ὑμᾶς ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὅλος θεός ὁ Λόγος.

β’
Καὶ πῶς εἰ ἐν Χριστῷ ὁ ζῶν Λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστίν, εἴρηται τῷ Ἀποστόλῳ περὶ Χριστοῦ ὅτι καὶ ἀπέθανε καὶ ἐτάφη, καὶ ὅτι ἀνέστη ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ κατὰ τὰς γραφάς (1 Cor. 15:3-4); Ἡμῖν τε πῶς παραβάλλεται πάλιν ἐν τῷ· *Εἰ γὰρ νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται, οὐδὲ Χριστὸς*

and newly-called is also God, he is necessarily also a new God. And divine Scripture shouts: *Let there be for you no recent God*, whereas the Egyptian shouts in turn: ‘Let there be!’, and anathematizes those who do not say that there is a recent God.

48:
He who does not confess that the Virgin is a ‘Christ-bearer’ does not confess what Christ is either. For the birth from the Virgin is the beginning of the words about Christ.

49:
We will not call the mother of Jesus ‘god-bearer’ from our own authority, since holy Scripture nowhere calls her thus, nor the 318 fathers, but in keeping with the uttering of the angel who says to the shepherds: *Today the Lord Christ has been born*, and according to the verses: *Book of the genealogy of Jesus Christ*, and: *Now you want to kill me, a human being who has told you the truth*, we say that she is Christ-bearer in nature and rank, and do not rashly legislate what we have not received, as you do.

[Book V]
Demonstration of the fifth impiety of them who straightway deny the natural divinity of Christ, our true God.

1:
When [he says] do you know that the whole of Christ is God? After the resurrection? For if immediately from birth, you know Christ to be always impassible and immortal. Who, then, suffered and died and was buried and endured the rest of the human condition, if that which is said about Christ is not <merely> imagined? But if the whole of Christ is not God from the birth from the beginning there will according to you have been a time when the Word was not the whole God.

2:
And if the living Word of God is in Christ how is it that the Apostle said about Christ that he *died and was buried, and that he rose on the third day according to Scripture*? How is he not again compared with us in the verse: *If the dead are not raised Christ, too, has not been raised*. This is an obvious testimony that he

ἐγγήγερται (1 Cor. 15:16); Δῆλον γὰρ ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς νεκρὸς καθ' ἡμᾶς γενόμενος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μαρτυρεῖται τάδε.

γ'

Τί οὖν, φησίν, οὐ προφανέστατα εἴρηται περὶ Χριστοῦ, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνέστη, καὶ οὐκ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ὅτι διὰ τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος γενομένην αὐτοῦ ἀνάστασιν ἐκ νεκρῶν ὠρίσθη Υἱὸς Θεοῦ; Πῶς οὖν λέλεκται: Ὁν δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἤγειρεν, οὐκ εἶδε διαφθοράν (Acts 13:37), καὶ: Τοῦ ὀρισθέντος Υἱοῦ Θεοῦ κατὰ Πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν (Rom. 1:4);

δ'

Ἄλλ' οἱ τὸν ἀπόστολον καὶ ἀρχιερέα, φησί, τῆς πίστεως ἡμῶν μὴ κατανοοῦντες, καθὼς Παῦλος ἐντέλλεται ὑμῖν (cf. Hebr. 3:1), εἶπατε. Ποῖον ἴσθε ἱερέα ταυτοφυῆ τῷ ἱερατευομένῳ ποτέ; Ἡ τίνα ἀπόστολον οὐχ ὑποταγμένον τῷ ἀποστείλαντι αὐτόν; Ἡ οὖν ὁ Λόγος ὢν, περὶ οὗ τάδε εἴρηται, αὐτὸς ἡττων ἐστὶ φύσει καὶ τάξει τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς Ἀρείφ δοκεῖ; Ἡ εἰ ἐκεῖνος μὴ ἔστιν, ἕτερόν τινα παρὰ τὸν Λόγον αὐτόν εἶναι δεήσει, τὸν λειτουργόν τε καὶ διάκονον θεοῦ (cf. Hebr. 8:2) νοούμενον ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ Λόγου.

ε'

Δεδόσθω γάρ, φησί, κατὰ συνδρομὴν εἶναι καθ' ὑμᾶς καὶ θεὸς ὁ αὐτὸς Χριστός, ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς τί ὑμῖν εἶναι δοκεῖ; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸν Λόγον καὶ σάρκα ἐρεῖτε· εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁμοίως θεός, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ αἰεὶ ὁ Χριστὸς θεός· τὸν γὰρ Ἰησοῦν, ὃν φατέ θεόν, τοῦτον καὶ κύριον καὶ Χριστὸν ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησε (Acts 2:36), σαφῶς εἴρηται. Οὐχ ὁ ἦν οὖν ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἴτουν κύριος, τοῦτο γέγονε ποιηθεὶς Χριστὸς καὶ κύριος· οὐδεὶς γὰρ γίνεται ὁ ἔστιν. Οὐδ' ἄρα οὖν θεὸς αἰεὶ ἔστιν ὁ Ἰησοῦς, ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ κύριός ἐστιν. Εἰ δὲ ὁ μὲν Ἰησοῦς ἄνθρωπος, ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς θεὸς ὑμῖν νοεῖται, ἢ μόνον θεὸς ἔσται ὡσπερ ὁ Λόγος, καὶ ἔσται καὶ ὁ Λόγος Χριστὸς καὶ πρὸ τῆς σαρκώσεως, ἢ θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος τις ἕτερος παρὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν καὶ ἔσονται δύο ἄνθρωποι, μετὰ τὴν ποίησιν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐν αὐτῷ φαινόμενοι, ὧν ὁ μὲν σύνθετος τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ὡς φατε, ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς ποιητὸς Χριστός. Εἰ δὲ Χριστός, θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὄντως νοεῖται, καὶ οὕτως ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐπίκτητον

himself died as we do and <experienced> the rest.

3:

What then [he says]? Is it not said most clearly about Christ that he rose by God, and not by himself, and that he was appointed Son of God because of his resurrection from the dead, which happened through the Holy Spirit? How, then, is it said: *He whom God raised did not see corruption*, and: *Of the Son of God who has been appointed through a spirit of holiness from the resurrection from the dead*.

4:

But you [he says] who do not recognise the apostle and archpriest of our faith as Paul enjoins us, tell us: What priest do you know who is ever of the same nature as that which is officiated? Or what apostle who is not subjected to the one who has sent him? Or is it the Word, then, about whom this is said, <which would make him> lesser in nature and rank than God, as Arius opines? If it is not him, it will be necessary that there is another one besides the Word, who is considered to be a minister and servant of God through the operation of the Word.

5:

Let us concede [he says] that the same Christ is also God through a coming together as you think, but who do you think Jesus is? For you will not say that he is Word and flesh. For if he is likewise God, it is obvious that Christ is not always God. For the Jesus whom you call God <is the one> whom *God made both Lord and Christ*, as it is clearly stated. What Jesus was, that is, Lord, he did not become when he was made Christ and Lord, for nobody becomes what he is. Consequently, then, Jesus is not always God, since he is not Lord either. But if Jesus is a human being, and you consider Christ to be God, he will either be only God like the Word, and the Word will be Christ even before the incarnation, or he will be God and another human being besides Jesus, and there will be two human beings appearing in him, after Jesus has been made Christ, of which one will have a composite hypostasis as you say, and Jesus will be a Christ who has been made. But if he is Christ, he will truly be thought of as God and human being, and thus Jesus will have taken an adventitious humanity and the divinity of

ἀνθρωπότητα λαβὼν καὶ θεότητα τὴν Χριστοῦ, τρεῖς μὲν ἄνθρωπους, δύο δὲ θεοὺς εἶναι ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδείξεται Χριστὸς γενόμενος, ἢ εἰς θεὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον μερισθῆναι ὁ Ἰησοῦς λογισθήσεται, ποιηθεὶς Χριστός.

ζ'
Αἱ θεῖαι γραφαὶ τὸν Χριστὸν καλοῦσι, καὶ ἓνα θεὸν καὶ ἓνα ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἓνα Χριστόν. Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν εἷς θεὸς κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν εἷς, ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ εἷς ἄνθρωπος. Ὁ δὲ εἷς Χριστὸς κατὰ τὴν ἐκούσιον ἔνωσιν θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπὸν ἐστὶν εἷς Χριστός.

ζ'
Κύριον καὶ Χριστὸν ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν Ἰησοῦν (cf. Acts 2:36). Ποῦ τάσσεις τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον, ὃ Αἰγύπτιε, ποιῶντα κύριον ἢ ποιούμενον κύριον; Μὴ ποιῶν ἰδικὰς διανομὰς ἀπόκριναι πρὸς τὴν ἐρώτησιν.

η'
Εἰ παραπλησίως ἡμῖν κεκοινώνηκε σαρκὸς καὶ αἵματος ὁ Χριστός (cf. Hebrews 2:14), δῆλον ὅτι φύσει τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός. Εἴ τι οὖν τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὡσαύτως κοινωνεῖ, πάντως καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ πάντη φύσεως καὶ μόνης τῶν ἐτέρων τῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ συμμετασχόντων.

θ'
Εἰ ὁ Πατὴρ ποτὲ μὲν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου μόνου Πατὴρ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ Πατὴρ καὶ θεός, ἢ ἄρα εἰς τὸ μείζον προέκοψεν ὁ Πατὴρ, ἢ εἰς τὸ ἔλαττον κατεβιβάσθη ὁ Υἱός.

ι'
Εἰ ὁμοῦ θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς θεὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀλλήλοις ὅπερ λέγονται, τουτέστιν οὔτε θεὸς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ θεός, οὔτε ἄνθρωπος τῷ θεῷ ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

ια'
Λειτουργὸν τῶν ἁγίων τὸν Χριστὸν ὀνομάζει ἢ ἁγία γραφή (cf. Heb. 8:2), καὶ πᾶς λειτουργὸς τοῦ θεοῦ δηλονότι τῷ θεῷ αὐτοῦ λειτουργεῖ. Καὶ εἰ τὰ τοῦ νόμου σκιά ἦν τῶν ἐν τῇ χάριτι (cf. Hebr. 10:1), ἐν δὲ τῇ σκιά εἶχεν ὁ νόμος λειτουργόν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῇ χάριτι ἔχει λειτουργόν.

Christ, and Christ will show himself to have become three human beings and two Gods, or it will be thought that Jesus is divided into God and a human being, as a Christ who has been made.

6:
Divine Scripture calls Christ one God and one human being and one Christ. But the one God is one by nature, and likewise also the one human being. But the one Christ is one Christ according to the voluntary union of God with the human being.

7:
God made Jesus Lord and Christ. Where do you put the God Word, Egyptian? Is he a Lord who makes or a Lord who is made? Answer the question without making distinctions of your own!

8:
If Christ participated in flesh and blood as we do, it is obvious that Christ is a human being through our nature. If, then, he participates in the same and in like manner, he is definitely entirely of the same nature only, as the others who participated in the same.

9:
If the Father is once Father of the God Word alone and once Father and God, it follows either that the Father has advanced to a higher state, or that the Son has been reduced to a lesser state.

10:
If Christ is at the same time God and human being, and God is not God of the human being, it is evident that they are not to one another what they are said to be, that is, neither is God a God for the human being nor is the human being a human being for God.

11:
Holy Scripture calls Christ minister of the saints, and each minister of God evidently serves his God. And if the matters of the law are a shadow of the matters of grace, and the law had a minister in the shadow, it is evident that it also has a minister in grace.

ιβ'

Εἰ τῆς κεφαλῆς οὐ δεσπόζει ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, οὐδ' ἄρα ὅλου τοῦ σώματος δεσπόζει. Εἰ δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας κύριος ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐστὶ κύριος.

12:

If the God Word does not rule over the head, he does not rule over the whole body either. If the God Word is Lord of the church, he is by necessity also Lord of the head of the church.

ιγ'

Εἰ μὴ θεὸς καὶ δεσπότης τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ ναὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ὁ Χριστός. Εἰ δὲ ναὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἦ ὁ Ἰησοῦς, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ θεὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ δεσπότης ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος.

13:

If the God Word is not God and ruler of Christ, it is evident that Christ is also not the temple of the God Word. But if Jesus is the temple of the God Word, it is necessary that the God Word is also his God and ruler.

ιδ'

Εἰ πάντα διὰ τοῦ Λόγου οὐ μόνον γέγονεν (cf. Jn. 1:3), ἀλλὰ καὶ γίνεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ κύριος καὶ Χριστὸς διὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐγένετο, πάντων δὲ τῶν δι' αὐτοῦ θεὸς καὶ δεσπότης ὁ Λόγος.

14:

If everything has not only come to be through the Word but still comes to be, it is obvious that Jesus, too, has become Lord and Christ through the God Word, and that the Word is the God and ruler over all things <that came to be> through him.

ιε'

Χωρὶς τοῦ δεσπόζεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὑπακοὴν πληρῶσαι, ἢ ἀναμάρτητον γενέσθαι τῆ τοῦ νόμου φυλακῆ ἀδύνατον ἀνθρώπων.

15:

Without being ruled by God a human being cannot fulfill the obedience <owed to him> or become sinless through the keeping of the law.

ις'

Τό· Ἐχριστέ σε ὁ θεὸς ὁ θεός σου (Ps. 44:8), εἰ μὴ τὸν ἄνθρωπον λέγει τῆ χρίσει τοῦ Πνεύματος τιμώμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον, πρὸς ἀτιμίαν αὐτὸν ἔχρισεν ὁ χρίσας αὐτόν, μείζονα ὧν ἔλαβε διὰ τῆς χρίσεως ἔχοντα ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ χριόμενος χρίεται ἵνα λάβῃ τινὰ ἃ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἔχειν οὐ δύναται.

16:

If the verse: *The Lord your Lord anointed you* does not refer to the human being, which is honoured through the anointing of the Spirit, but to the God Word, his anointer would have anointed him to dishonour, since he has greater things in his own nature than he has received through the anointing. For everyone who is anointed is anointed so as to receive some things that he cannot have in his nature.

ιζ'

Οἱ λέγοντες θεὸν ἢ δεσπότην τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον οὐκ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῆ τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου διδασκαλίᾳ τῆ διὰ τῶν προφητῶν τε καὶ ἀποστόλων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πειθόμενοι λέγουσι· Δαυὶδ γάρ, φασί, καὶ Πέτρος ὁ ἀπόστολος εἶρηκεν εἰς αὐτόν· Προωρώμην τὸν κύριον ἐνώπιόν μου διαπαντός (Ps. 15:8, Acts 2:25), καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ σωτήρ· Θεέ μου, θεέ μου, ἵνα τί με ἐγκατέλιπες (Mt. 27:46), καί· Πνεῦμα κυρίου ἐπ' ἐμέ (Lk. 4:18), καὶ ὁ προφήτης· Ἐχριστέ σε ὁ θεὸς ὁ θεός σου (Ps. 44:8).

17:

Those who say that the God Word is the God and ruler of Christ do not say this from themselves but when they say it they obey the teaching of the Holy Spirit <which has been revealed> through prophets and apostles, and also of Christ himself. For [they say] David and Peter the Apostle said to him: *I have seen the Lord always before me*, and the Saviour himself <said>: *My God, my God, why have you forsaken me*, and: *The Spirit of the Lord over me*, and the prophet <said>: *The God, your God has anointed you*.

ιη'

Ὁ ἀναθεματίζων τοὺς λέγοντας τὸν Ἰησοῦν παρὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος δεδοξάσθαι (cf. Jn. 16:14), ἀναθεματίζει τοὺς λέγοντας τὸν Ἰησοῦν κεχρίσθαι τῷ Πνεύματι.

ιθ'

Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἔλαβεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς, καθὰ διδάσκει ὁ Αἰγύπτιος, τὸ ἐνεργεῖν δύνασθαι, τίνος ἔνεκεν δέδωκεν αὐτῷ ὁ Πατήρ τὸ Πνεῦμα; Οὐ μέτρῳ γάρ, φησί, δίδωσιν ὁ Πατήρ τὸ Πνεῦμα· ὁ γὰρ Πατήρ ἀγαπᾷ τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ πάντα δέδωκεν ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ (Jn 3:34-35).

κ'

Ζωοποιός ἐστι τοῦ κυρίου ἢ σὰρξ πιστευομένη ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐζωοποιήθη· ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ ἐστι ζωοποιός.

κα'

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος μὴ ὢν τις ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὁ λαμβάνων τὸν ἄνθρωπον θεὸς τινὰ ἄνθρωπον λαμβάνει, τὸν διὰ μὲν τὴν φύσιν ὄντα ἄνθρωπον, διὰ δὲ τὴν λήψιν ὄντα ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον.

κβ'

Γέγραπται ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἀγιάζων, ἤγουν Χριστός, καὶ οἱ ἀγιαζόμενοι ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντες (Hebr. 2:11), δηλαδή ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, δι' ἣν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ ἐπαισχύνεται αὐτοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καλεῖν λέγων· Ἀπαγγελῶ τὸ ὄνομά σου τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς μου (Hebr. 2:12), καὶ πάλιν· Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ παιδία κεκοινωνήκεν αἵματος καὶ σαρκός, καὶ αὐτὸς παρακλησίως μετέσχε τῶν αὐτῶν (Hebr. 2:14).

κγ'

Εἰ αὐτὸς ὁ ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων ἐταπεινώθη κενώσας ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὴν τοῦ δούλου μορφήν (cf. Phil. 2:5-8), οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ὑπερψωθεὶς καὶ ᾧ ἐχαρίσατο ὁ θεὸς ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα (cf. Phil. 2:9), ἄρα γε ὁ κατὰ φύσιν εἶχεν ὁ Λόγος, ὕστερον κατὰ χάριν ἔσχε.

κδ'

Θεὸν οὐδεὶς εἶώρακε πώποτε (Jn 1:18). Εἰ οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ γῆς ὀφθεῖς οὗ τὴν δόξαν ἐθεάσαντο ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ Πατρός (cf. Jn. 1:14), αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ φύσει θεός, πῶς ἀληθὲς τὸ προομολογούμενον.

18:

He who anathematizes those who say that Jesus was glorified by the Spirit, anathematizes those who say that Jesus was anointed by the Spirit.

19:

If Jesus has not taken the ability to operate from the Spirit, as the Egyptian teaches, for what purpose did the Father give him the Spirit? For he says: *The Father gives the Spirit without measure. For the Father loves the Son and has given everything in his hand.*

20:

The flesh of the Lord is believed to be life-giving because it was made life-giving by the God Word. For otherwise it cannot be life-giving.

21:

There is no human being if it is not a certain human being, and God who assumes the human being assumes a certain human being, who is a human being by nature and beyond a human being because of the assumption.

22:

It is written that *the sanctifier*, that is, Christ, and those who are sanctified are all from one, namely from God, for which reason he is not ashamed to call them brothers, when he says: *I will announce your name to my brothers*, and again: *Since the children have partaken of blood and flesh he, too, has participated in the same likewise.*

23:

If he who was *in the form of God* lowered and *emptied himself* into the *form of the servant* is the same as the one who was exceedingly elevated and to whom God gave *the name above all names*, it follows that the Word has afterwards by grace what he had by nature <before>.

24:

Nobody has ever seen God. If, then, the one who was seen on earth whose glory they have seen as of an *only-begotten from the Father*, is himself God by nature, how is true what has been confessed before?

κε'

Εἰ πάντα οικειοῦται τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς ἴδια ὁ Λόγος, καὶ πάντων ἡξιώται τῶν τοῦ Λόγου ἢ σὰρξ, ἄρα γε καὶ τὸ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων εἶναι ὃ ἐστὶ τῆς σαρκὸς φυσικόν, καὶ τὸ τρεπτὸς εἶναι καὶ ὁρατὸς εἶναι καὶ τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτά τις δοῖη, πῶς καὶ ἡ σὰρξ τῶν ἐναντίων μεταλήψεται; Ἡ γὰρ ὁρατὴ οὐκ ἀόρατος, καὶ ἡ τρεπτὴ οὐκ ἄτρεπτος.

25:

If the Word appropriates all the <properties> of the flesh and the flesh is deemed worthy of all the <properties> of the Word, it follows <that he appropriates> being from nothing, which is a natural <characteristic> of the flesh, and being changeable and visible and being contained in a place. But even if someone conceded this, how would the flesh partake of the opposites. For what is visible is not invisible and what is changeable is not unchangeable.

κς'

Εἰ φύσει θεὸς ὁ Χριστός, πῶς λέγει ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ· *Θεέ μου, θεέ μου, ἵνα τί με ἐγκατέλιπες* (Mt. 27:46); Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐστὶ θεοῦ θεὸς φύσει νοουμένου. Ἄρα οὖν φύσει ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων ἑαυτοῦ θεὸν τὸν θεὸν σαφῶς.

26:

If Christ is God by nature, how does he say on the cross: *My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?* For he is not God of him who is thought of as God. It, then, follows clearly that he who says that God is his God is a human being by nature.

κζ'

Εἰ φύσει θεὸν εἶναι ᾗδει τὸν Ἰησοῦν τὰ δαιμόνια, φησί, πῶς ἔλεγεν· *Ἐξορκίζω σε τὸν θεὸν ἵνα μὴ βασανίσῃς ἡμᾶς* (Mk. 5:7).

27:

If the demons knew that Jesus was God by nature [he says], why did they say: *I adjure you by God that you do not torment us.*

κη'

Εἰ ἡ σὰρξ σὰρξ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ θεότης, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἐτρέπη ἢ θεότης εἰς σάρκα, μηδὲ πάλιν συναναπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς σαρκός, πῶς διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν οὐχὶ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ θεότης;

28:

If the flesh is flesh and not divinity, since the divinity has not been changed into flesh, nor again completes the substance of the flesh, how is the human being, too, not for the same reason human being and not the divinity?

κθ'

Εἰ ἡ μὲν σὰρξ σὰρξ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ θεότης, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ θεότης.

29:

If the flesh is flesh and not the divinity, the human being is human being and not the divinity.

λ'

Εἰ ἡ σὰρξ σὰρξ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ θεότης, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐκέτι ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ θεότης, εἰπέ τί μὲν τῆς σαρκὸς ἢ θεότης, τί δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ θεότης;

30:

If the flesh is flesh and not the divinity, and the human being is no longer a human being and not the divinity, tell me what of the flesh is the divinity and what of the human being is the divinity?

λα'

Εἰ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς σαρκὸς ἢ θεότης, τοῦτό ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ θεότης, ἕτερα δὲ ἢ σὰρξ παρὰ τὴν θεότητα· σὰρξ γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ θεότης, πῶς οὐχ ἕτερος καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος παρὰ τὴν θεότητα, ἐπεὶτερ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ θεότης;

31:

If the divinity is that of the human being, what the divinity is of the flesh, and the flesh is different from the divinity, for it is flesh and not the divinity, how is the human being not also different from the divinity, since he is human being and not the divinity?

λβ'

Εἰ τῆς σαρκὸς μὲν μέρος οὐκ ἦν ὁ Θεὸς
Λόγος, τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου μέρος ἦν, πῶς οὐκ
ἀρειανίζεις ἢ ἀπολιναρίζεις;

λγ'

Εἰ ὡσπερ μέρος οὐκ ἐστὶ τῆς σαρκὸς ὁ Θεὸς
Λόγος, οὕτως οὐδὲ μέρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, πῶς
οὐχ ἕτερος ὁ ἀνθρώπος παρὰ τὸν Θεὸν
Λόγον, ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ἕτερος ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος
παρὰ τὴν σάρκα· ὁ Λόγος γὰρ θεὸς ἐστὶ καὶ
οὐ σὰρξ, ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ἡ σὰρξ σὰρξ ἐστὶ
καὶ οὐ θεότης;

[Λόγος Σ']

**Ἔκτης αὐτῶν ἀσεβείας δεῖξις θεοφόρον
ἄνθρωπον καὶ οὐ θεὸν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα
λεπόντων τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν
Χριστόν.**

α'

Εἰ στολήν ἔχει ὁ Λόγος τὴν σάρκα, κατὰ τὸ
εἰρημένον αὐτῷ διὰ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ περὶ
ἑαυτοῦ· *Πλυνεῖ ἐν οἴνῳ τὴν στολήν αὐτοῦ*
(Gen. 49:11), δηλὸν ὅτι ὁ ἀναθεματίζων τὸν
λέγοντα θεοφόρον ἄνθρωπον τὸν Χριστόν,
πρὸ τοῦ λέγοντος τὸν φοροῦντα
ἀναθεματίζει.

β'

Τό· Θεὸς ἦν ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ (cf. 1 Jn. 5:11),
ἴκατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον μὴ ἴ τὸν Λόγον λέγειν
εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὡς ὁ φορῶν ἐν τῷ
φορομένῳ. Οὐδ' ἄλλως ἄρα δύναται ὁ θεὸς
εἶναι ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ.

γ'

Ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἐκουσίου ἐνώσεως τὴν
ἐνύπαρξιν οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ· εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐνυπάρχει,
οὐδὲ ἦνεται.

δ'

Εἰ μὴ εἰς ναὸν ἢ φόρημα ἔχει ὁ Λόγος τὸν
ἄνθρωπον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰς οὐσίαν ἔχει, ὁ δὲ
λαμβάνων τὴν σάρκα εἰς οὐσίαν τοῦ
Χριστοῦ, αὐξήσιν ποιεῖ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ,
τρέπων καὶ ἀλλοιῶν αὐτὴν εἰς ἕτερον.

ε'

Εἰ θεοφόρον ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν τὸν Χριστόν
ἄτοπον, δίδαξον ἡμᾶς πῶς χρὴ ὀνομάζειν τὸν
Χριστόν ἄνθρωπον, θεόσαρκον ἄνθρωπον ἢ
ἀνθρωπόσαρκον θεόν;

32:

If the God Word was not a part of the flesh, but
was a part of the human being, how are you not
a follower of Arius and Apollinaris?

33:

If as the God Word is not a part of the flesh he
is also not a part of the human being, how is the
human being not different from the God Word,
just as the God Word is different from the
flesh, for the Word is God and not flesh, just as
the flesh is also flesh and not the divinity?

[Book VI]

**Demonstration of the sixth impiety of them
who say that our Lord Jesus Christ is not
God who has been inhumanated.**

1:

If the Word has the flesh as a garment,
according to what is said by him about himself
through his words: *He will wash his garment in
wine*, it is obvious that he who anathematizes
those who say that Christ is a God-bearing
human being, anathematizes before them him
who wore it.

2:

The <statement>: *God was in the Son* †says
that† the Word is †not† in a human being, as he
who wears is in that which is worn. It follows
that God cannot be in Christ in any other way.

3:

The manner of the voluntary union does not
eliminate being-in. For if he is not in
<something>, he has not been united either.

4:

If the Word does not have the human being as
temple or garment, he has it necessarily as
substance, but he who takes the flesh to mean
the substance of Christ, increases the substance
of the Son, changing and altering it into
something else.

5:

If it is absurd to call Christ a God-bearing
human being, teach us how one must call Christ
a human being? A human being whose flesh is
divine or a God whose flesh is human?

ζ'

Εἰ ὡσπερ ἦν πρὸ τοῦ σαρκωθῆναι ὁ Λόγος εἷς θεὸς καὶ εἷς Υἱός, οὕτως καὶ μετὰ τὴν σάρκωσιν, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν σάρκα εἰς φόρημα ἔχει καὶ ναόν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς μέρος οὐσίας.

ζ'

Εἰ μὴ θεοφόρος ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός, οὐδ' ἄρα ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός ὁ ἀκούων τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ· *Τί με γάρ, φησί, ζητεῖτε ἀποκτεῖναι ἄνθρωπον ὃς τὴν ἀλήθειαν λελάληκα ἣν ἤκουσα παρὰ τοῦ Πατρός* (Jn. 8:40).

η'

Ὁ κωλύων τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ, κωλύει τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ ὁραῖσθαι ὡς Θεὸν Λόγον.

θ'

Εἰ οὐκ ἔστι Χριστός ὁ ἐνεργῶν ὡς θεὸς καὶ ἐνεργούμενος ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ἄρα ἐνεργῶν μόνον ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός ἢ ἐνεργούμενον.

ι'

Ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ Ἀθανάσιος, φησί, ὃν οὐ παραιτεῖσθε, ἐν τῷ περὶ ἐνανθρωπήσεως λέγει· Κατασκευάζει ἑαυτῷ ναὸν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἰδιοποιεῖται τοῦτο ὡσπερ ὄργανον, ἐν αὐτῷ γνωριζόμενος καὶ ἐνοικῶν, καὶ πάλιν· Τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ναὸν καὶ σωστικὸν ὄργανον προσάγων ἀντίψυχον ὑπὲρ πάντων.³⁷

[Λόγος Ζ']

Ἑβδομος ἀπιστίας αὐτῶν στηλίτευσις διαμεμφομένων τοῖς λέγουσι τὸν ἕνα τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος πεπονθέναι σαρκί.

α'

Πῶς λέγετε, φασίν, ἕνα τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος πεπονθέναι σαρκί; Εἰ γὰρ οὐ τρεῖς θεοὺς, ἀλλ' ὑποστάσεις φατέ, ἀκόλουθον ἐν λέγειν, ἢ μίαν τῆς τριάδος, ἀφορῶντας πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἢ τὸ πρόσωπον, καὶ μὴ ἕνα· πρὸς θεοὺς γὰρ ἢ πατέρας ἢ υἱοὺς τοῦτο ἀποδίδεται ἀρρενικῶς λεγόμενον, διότι οὐδὲ ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαρτηρήτως τῇ χρήσει

6:

If the Word is one God and one Son after the incarnation as he is before the incarnation, it is obvious that he has the flesh as garment and temple, and not as a part of <his> substance.

7:

If Christ is not a God-bearing human being, it follows that Christ who hears the truth from God is not a human being. For he says: *What do you seek to kill me, a human being who has told you the truth which I heard from the Father?*

8:

He who prevents the God Word from acting in Jesus, prevents the human being from being seen as the God Word.

9:

If the one who acts as God and is acted upon as a human being is not Christ, it follows that Christ is either only one who acts or <only> one who is acted upon.

10:

But Athanasius [he says] whom you do not reject, says in <his treatise> about the inhumanation: He fashions the body as a temple for himself, and makes it his own as an instrument, being recognised in it and dwelling in <it>, and again: He who offers his temple and salvific instrument as ransom for all.

[Book 7]

Seventh demonstration of the impiety of them who rebuke those who say that the one of the Trinity suffered through the flesh.

1:

How do you say [he says] that one (masculine) of the holy Trinity suffered through the flesh? If you do not speak of three Gods but of <three> hypostases, it follows that you speak of one (neuter) or one (feminine) of the Trinity, taking into view the hypostasis (feminine) or the person (neuter), and not of one (masculine). For the masculine refers to gods or fathers or sons, for which reason you do not bear to speak

³⁷ Athanasius of Alexandria, *De incarnatione Verbi*, 8, 9, ed. Ch. KANNENGISSER, Athanase d'Alexandrie, Sur l'Incarnation du Verbe. Introduction, texte critique, traduction, notes et index (*Sources Chrétiennes* 199). Paris 1973, 292.28-29, 294-296.13-14.

Dirk Krausmüller, "The Nestorian Treatise Preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem's *Contra Nestorianos* (CPG 6918)," *Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture* 17 (2023) 59-130;

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.18573/jlarc.141>

λέγειν τὸν Χριστὸν ὄν ὁμολογεῖτε ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, ἀνέχεσθε.

β'

Εἰ ἡ ἁγία Τριάς ἀπαθής, ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς παθητός, εἰς δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστὸς τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος, ἢ καὶ ἡ ἁγία Τριάς παθητή, ἢ ὁ Χριστὸς οὐχ εἰς τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος. Εἰ δὲ προσθῆτε τὸ σαρκὶ πέπονθε, τὸ τοιῶσδε πάσχειν οὐκ ἐλευθεροῖ πάθους, ὡσπερ ἂν καὶ εἴποι τις τοιῶσδε πεπνῆχθαι τινά, οὐκ ἐλευθεροῖ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ τοῦ πεπνῆχθαι τὸν περὶ οὗ εἴρηται.

γ'

Εἰ φάσκοιεν τὸ ἔπαθε σαρκὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν, ἐναντίως ἑαυτοῖς τοῦτο λέγουσιν· εἰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκείνην καθ' ἣν ἔπαθεν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος κατ' αὐτούς, οὐκ ἰδίαν αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν, ἵνα μὴ παθητὸν κατ' οὐσίαν ὁμολογήσωσι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴδιον ἀλλότριον, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον ἄλλου τινὸς παρ' ἐκεῖνο οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον, οὐ μόνον δύο οὐσίας λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύο πρόσωπα, τοῦ τε Θεοῦ Λόγου ἕν, καὶ ἕν ἐκεῖνου οὐτινὸς ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία καθ' ἣν πέπονθεν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος· τίνος γὰρ ἢ δηλονότι ἀνθρώπου; Ὁ δὲ τις ἀνθρώπος πρόσωπον.

δ'

Εἰ τὸ εἶς τῆς Τριάδος λεγόμενον, κοινὸν τῆς θεότητος καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος Χριστοῦ ἐστίν, ἢ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐστὶ κοινὸν τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι, ἢ καθ' ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον ἢ πῶς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀποτελουμένου Λόγου ἐνός†. Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἢ κοινωνία, πρῶτον μὲν πῶς οὐχ ὁμοούσιος ἢ σὰρξ τῷ Λόγῳ, εἶτα δὲ καὶ τετράς οὐ Τριάς τὸ θεῖον. Εἰ δὲ καθ' ἕτερον κοινωνεῖ ὁ Λόγος καὶ καθ' ἕτερον ἢ σὰρξ τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ Πνεύματι, πῶς οὐ δύο τὰς φύσεις τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος εἰσάγετε; Εἰ δὲ ὡς ὅλον ἐκ μερῶν τὸ εἰς τῆς Τριάδος λέγετε, ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ἡμῖς ἐνός τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος ἐστὶν. Εἰ δὲ ἄρα καὶ ὁμοούσιον δεῖ λέγειν ἐκ δύο, καὶ τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα λέγοντες, ἐξ μονάδων εἶναι τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος τὸν λόγον δεδώκατε.

of one and the other (masculine) without reservation in reference to Christ whom you confess to be one and another (neuter).

2:

If the holy Trinity is impassible and Christ is passible, and Christ is one of the holy Trinity, <it follows that> either the holy Trinity is passible, or Christ is not one of the holy Trinity. But if you add 'he suffered through the flesh', suffering in such a manner does not free him from suffering, just as when one says that someone was strangled in a particular manner, this does not free the one about whom this is said from suffering or being strangled.

3:

If they say that he suffered through the flesh instead of in his own substance, they contradict themselves with their statements. For if they say that according to them that substance in which the God Word suffered is not his own <substance>, lest they confess that he is passible in his nature, and <if> what is not one's own is that of another, and what is of another belongs to another one besides that of which it is not its own, they speak not only of two substances but also of two persons, one of the God Word, and one of that to which the substance belongs in which the God Word suffered. Of whom if not obviously the human being? But a certain human being is a person.

4:

If what is called 'one of the Trinity' is common to the divinity and the humanity of Christ, it is according to the same account either common with the Father and the Spirit, or it is according to different accounts †how of the one Word that has resulted from both.† And if the commonality is according to the same <account>, how is the flesh first of all not of like substance with the Word, and the divinity is then <not> a tetrad? But if the Word shares according to one <account> and the flesh according to another with the Father and the Spirit, how do you not introduce two natures of the holy Trinity? But if you say that 'one of the Trinity' is a whole from parts, the God Word by himself will be half of one of the holy Trinity. If, then, one must call him of like substance from two, you concede that the holy Trinity consists of six monads, when you speak of the Father and the Spirit.

ε'

Εἰ τὸ εἶς τῆς Τριάδος ἐκ θεότητος καὶ σαρκὸς σημαίνεται, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται τῆς Τριάδος καὶ ἡ σὰρξ, εἰ δὲ ἡ ἅγια Τριάς κατὰ τι μονάς ἐστι, οὐκ ἔσται καὶ τῆς μονάδος ἡ σὰρξ, εἰ δὲ τῆς μονάδος ἡ σὰρξ, κτιστὴ δὲ αὕτη, πῶς ἄκτιστος ἡ μονάς;

ς'

Εἰ τὸ εἶς τῆς Τριάδος ἐκ θεότητος καὶ σαρκὸς ἀναπληροῦται, ἀπαθὴς δὲ ἡ Τριάς ὠμολόγηται, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ἀπαθὴς ἡ θεότης καὶ ἡ σὰρξ; Εἰ δὲ ἀπαθὴς, τίς ὁ παθὼν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν; Καὶ τί τὸ λεγόμενον παθητὸν πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως;

ζ'

Εἰ τὸ εἶς τῆς Τριάδος ἐκ θεότητος καὶ σαρκὸς ἀναπληροῦται, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ὁ εἶς τῆς Τριάδος ὡσπερ θεὸς οὕτως καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὡς ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρὶ οὕτως ὁμοούσιος καὶ τῇ μητρὶ; Καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ὁ εἶς τῆς Τριάδος ὡσπερ εἶς τῆς Τριάδος, οὕτως καὶ εἶς τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως; Ἔστι δὲ τῆς Τριάδος καὶ κατὰ θεότητα καὶ κατὰ τὴν σάρκα; Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔσται καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως, καὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα καὶ κατὰ σάρκα;

η'

Κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀκολουθίαν καὶ τὸ θεὸς πέπονθε σαρκί, καὶ ὁ Λόγος καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς ἐξεταστέον· ἢ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα τῇ σημασίᾳ τὰ δύο, ἢ οὐ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐ περιλαμβάνει, ἢ ἀνούσιον δώσουσι τὴν σάρκα, ἢ τὸν Λόγον, ἢ ὄργανον ἢ ἐργάτην θάτερον. Εἰ δὲ περιλαμβάνει τὰ δύο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ εἰρημένα ἄτοπα αὐτοῖς ἐπαχθήσονται.

θ'

Εἰ κατ' οὐσίαν οὐκ ἔπασχεν ὁ Λόγος τῇ σαρκί, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνουσίως ἔπασχεν, εἰ δὲ ἀνουσίως, οὐδὲ ἔπαθεν· οὐσίας γὰρ τὰ πάθη κυρίως.

ι'

Ἰδού, φασίν, ὁ ὑμέτερος πατὴρ Κύριλλος τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον πεπονθέναι σαρκὶ λέγων, καὶ

5:

If 'one of the Trinity' is indicated from the divinity and the flesh, how will the flesh not belong to the Trinity, but if the holy Trinity is in one respect a monad, the flesh will not also belong to the monad, but if the flesh belongs to the monad, and it is created, how is the monad uncreated?

6:

If 'one of the Trinity' is made up of the divinity and the flesh, and the Trinity is confessed to be impassible, how will the divinity and the flesh not be impassible? But if it is impassible, who is it that has suffered for us? And what is that which is called passible before the resurrection?

7:

If 'one of the Trinity' is made up of the divinity and the flesh, how will the one of the Trinity not be a human being, just as he is God, and be of like substance with the mother as he is of like substance with the Father? And if this is the case, how will the one of the Trinity not be one of the human nature just as he is one of the Trinity? Is he of the Trinity both according to the divinity and according to the flesh? How, then, will he not be also of the human nature, both according to the divinity and according to the flesh?

8:

According to this logic lets us examine also the expression 'God suffered through the flesh', and the Word and Christ and the Son. For either these names include the two in their meaning, or not. If, then, they do not include <them>, they will posit that the flesh is without substance, or that the Word <is without substance>, or that either one is instrument or agent. But if each of the natures includes the two, the aforementioned absurdities will be attributed to them.

9:

If the Word did not suffer through the flesh according to substance, it is obvious that he suffered insubstantially, but if <he suffered> insubstantially, he did not suffer, for the sufferings are strictly of the substance.

10:

See [they say] when your father Cyril who says that the God Word suffered through the flesh

τοῦτο πῶς φησὶ δυνατόν εἶναι ἀπαιτηθεῖς, κατ' οἰκειώσιν τῆς πεπονθυίας φύσει σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀπολογεῖται. Εἰ οὖν τῇ οἰκειώσει τοῦ παθόντος ὑπὸ Ἰουδαίων παθητὸς ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ μένων ἀληθῶς, ἄρα γε καὶ τῇ οἰκειώσει τοῦ γεννηθέντος ἐκ γυναικὸς γεννητὸς ἐξ αὐτῆς ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ θεὸς μόνον. Οὐκ ἄρα οὖν ἀληθῶς νοοῦνται θεοκτόνοι Ἰουδαῖοι (cf. 1 Cor. 2:8), εἰ καὶ λέγονται, οὐδὲ θεοτόκος ἡ Παρθένος, εἰ καὶ λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ τὸ οἰκειοῦσθαι τὸ πάσχον ἢ τὸ γεννώμενον ἤδη παθεῖν ἢ γεννηθῆναι ἔστι.

ια'

Δι' ἐτέρου πάσχειν, φησὶ, πεπονθότος οὐδέ τι τῶν φύσει παθητῶν δυνατόν· αὐτὸ γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάθος, ἐν ᾧ γέγονεν, ὁρᾶται μόνον, οὔτε δὲ δι' οὗ γέγονεν αὐτῷ οὔτε ὡς ἔνεστιν. Πόσῳ οὖν μᾶλλον ὁ ἀπαθὴς Λόγος οὐκ ὁρθῶς σαρκὶ λέγοιτο παθεῖν τοῖς εὐσεβοῦσιν;

was asked how this was possible, he explained time and again that he suffered through appropriation of his flesh that suffers by nature. If, then, God who truly remained in it was passible through appropriation of the one who suffered from the Jews, it follows that the God in him was only born through appropriation of the one who was born from a woman. It, then, follows that the Jews are not in truth killers of God, even if they are said to be, and that the Virgin is not god-bearer, even if she is said to be, for that he appropriated that which suffers or is born does not already mean that he suffered or was born.

11:

Suffering through another one [he says] who suffers it not even possible in the case of those who are passible by nature. For the suffering is only seen in the one in which it has happened, not through the one through which it happened nor in which it was. <It is not> much more <the case that> the Word who is impassible is not said correctly by those who are pious to have suffered through the flesh?

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