Early Interventions with Young People to Prevent the Onset of Extremism and Radicalisation: An Ethnographic Study

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Abstract

Despite growing concerns around the threat of extremism for young people and a corresponding push towards earlier opportunities for prevention, little is known about early interventions occurring before radicalisation has begun. Much existing research has focused on de-radicalisation programmes or policy frameworks such as the UK’s Prevent Strategy, but early intervention prevention practices are less well understood. Within the UK, little is known about how these practices are played out in Wales, though it represents a unique research site with a mixture of both devolved and non-devolved responsibilities for criminal justice and the safeguarding of young people.

This thesis is an ethnographic study of extremism and radicalisation prevention with young people in Wales. By studying the practices of early intervention, this research aims to understand the aspirations, organisation and conduct of extremism and radicalisation prevention work. The ethnographic fieldwork combined observations of interventions being delivered to young people, with semi-structured interviews with policymakers and practitioners. By examining early intervention activity in Wales, the thesis analyses the ways intervention practices are shaped by multiple, often competing, ways of framing young people.

The research found that, at the earliest point of extremism prevention, there are pressing questions about how ‘early’ is legitimate for interventions to go to prevent potential harms. Though the need to respond to extremism and associated vulnerabilities was widely recognised, policymakers and practitioners are faced with negotiating the risks of action and inaction: the potential for stigmatising young people with the very interventions designed to support them. The research also found practice adaptations including gendered aspects of delivery, innovations in responding to young people’s needs, and influences of Covid-19. Studying the interventions ethnographically revealed complexities in several areas, including competing safeguarding and policy frameworks in Wales, tensions between universal and more individualised provision, and barriers to accessing young people.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Shortly before the research proposal for this study was put together, a series of terror attacks took place across the UK. First, in March 2017, a hire car was driven into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge, killing and injuring many, before the attacker entered Parliament Square and fatally stabbed a police officer. Two months later in May, a bomb was detonated at a concert in Manchester Arena, with many victims being children. This trend continued into June, and within weeks there was a stabbing attack at Borough Market and London Bridge, shortly followed by a hire van being driven into worshippers outside Finsbury Park Mosque. The latter attack was perpetrated by a man from South Wales. The final attack of 2017 took place on a busy tube train in Parsons Green in September. It was against this backdrop that I first came across early intervention work taking place in schools in Wales. Here, in sessions led by youth workers, issues such as tolerance, extremism and terrorism were being explored and opened up for young people.

With an aim of understanding the objectives, aspirations, organisation and conduct of this form of prevention work, the focus of this thesis is upon early interventions designed to prevent extremism and radicalisation amongst young people in Wales. In studying the practices of early intervention, the research explores the complexities and challenges impacting the reality of extremism and radicalisation prevention in Wales. Specifically, the interventions of interest are those aiming to prevent the onset of these issues. Rather than being delivered once radicalisation has already occurred, they are (in theory) delivered before such ‘problems’ take hold. The research considers what early interventions exist, what happens during delivery, and what assumptions inform their design. An ethnographic approach has been adopted, comprising direct observations of interventions as they took place with young people aged 11-18, and semi-structured interviews with practitioners and policymakers. Fieldwork was carried out during the Covid-19 pandemic, and some of the impacts and disruptions to both the research and the interventions are also captured here.

In this context, the ultimate goal of intervention is to prevent terrorism by stopping extremist ideologies – both violent and non-violent – from influencing young people’s
beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. To take the UK government’s own view of the role of extremism prevention, “We know that terrorism is really a symptom; ideology is the root cause” (HMG, 2015:5). The assumption is that terrorism occurs only once an individual has been radicalised to the point where they believe in an extremist ideology. A similar sentiment is echoed in academic literature. For instance, as Peter Neumann concisely remarks, radicalisation is “what goes on before the bomb goes off” (2008:4). As such, while there is no singular or linear assessment of the relationship between extremism, radicalisation and terrorism, there is an inherent assumption that they are causally linked.

At the time of writing (and since February 2022), the threat to the UK (including Wales) from terrorism is ‘substantial’, meaning an attack is ‘likely’. As the threat escalates and de-escalates over time, this threat level changes and is kept under constant review by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. This includes threats from Islamist terrorism, as well as extreme far-right and Northern Irish terrorism (HMG, 2018). In Wales, the far-right has seen growing support and been a particular concern in recent years (Goodwin and Harris, 2013; Alessio, 2015). For instance, one of the co-founders of National Action, the first far-right group to be proscribed as a terror organisation, is from Swansea (Davies and Davies, 2023). More recently, Luca Benincasa, a 20-year-old from Cardiff, was convicted of membership of a banned neo-Nazi group (BBC, 2022). Other ideologies have also featured in the terrorism profile of Wales, however. For some years, the proscribed terror group al-Muhajiroun had a strong presence in Cardiff (Innes et al., 2017), and in 2013-4, three local young men, one aged 17, travelled to Syria to join the Islamist terror group Daesh (also known as Islamic State; BBC, 2014). One particularly relevant example in the context of this thesis is Lloyd Gunton, a teenager from south Wales who was planning to carry out an Islamist-inspired attack at a pop concert in Cardiff in the summer of 2017. While still attending school, he had set up a social media account encouraging support for Islamist terror groups and carried out online searches for methods of attack (BBC, 2017). Gunton was arrested on the day of the concert he planned to attack and found in possession of weapons and a martyrdom letter. He was later convicted in relation to five terror-related charges. At the same time, many recent attacks have been perpetrated by individuals already known to the security services, for instance Khuram Butt (London Bridge, 2017) and Usman Khan (Fishmongers’ Hall, 2019). With such threats featuring in the public consciousness, it is unsurprising that there has
been a push towards ‘doing more’ and ‘going further’ in the efforts to prevent terrorism (HMG, 2015:17).

1.1 The present study

Despite growing interest in utilising early interventions in the context of extremism and radicalisation, to address ‘root causes’ in order to prevent the onset of these problems, relatively little is known about what this looks like in practice. This is partly because research has often focused on de-radicalisation programmes, those aimed at individuals who have already engaged with extremist ideologies and/or been radicalised into extremist groups (for example Horgan, 2008; Silke, 2014). Alongside this, where radicalisation prevention has been the focus, research has often centred on the UK’s Prevent programme and strategy. Beginning in 2003, this is the formal programme for preventing and addressing support for terrorism (Cantle and Thomas, 2014). Individuals referred here may go on to the Channel programme, which provides more targeted and intensive support to those identified as ‘vulnerable’ to radicalisation (Home Office, 2021). In this case, academic discussion has often been directed towards the policy architecture of Prevent and public attitudes towards it, rather than its practical conduct and delivery (Innes et al., 2017). This is somewhat unsurprising given the highly politicised nature of the policy, including its explicit focus on Muslim communities in earlier iterations (see for example Mattsson and Säljö, 2018; Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). Yet, early interventions to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation go beyond the scope of Prevent.

This thesis aims to contribute to this field of academic study and policy debate by studying the early interventions taking place earlier, further ‘upstream’, than Prevent. In other words, the goal of these interventions is to prevent future radicalisation for non-radicalised individuals (Feddes and Gallucci, 2015). Sitting alongside this work, in many ways, is the Counter-Extremism Strategy, launched in 2015. This built on existing Prevent efforts but also broadened the definition of extremism by making connections with hatred, intolerance and

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1 Prevent sits within the wider counter-terrorism framework, CONTEST. Each of these is defined and discussed in more detail in a later section of this chapter, and in Chapter 4.
division. And, at a broader level, Community Cohesion work typically aims to address and prevent tensions between communities and prevent social exclusion (Cantle, 2001). Some of the crossovers in approaches here will be explored in later chapters, but the early interventions being studied in this research also go beyond cohesion, given their more individualised and small-group focus.

The interventions here can be summarised as predominantly universal (or to borrow the language of public health, primary), though some are also more targeted (secondary). Universal or primary prevention refers to interventions delivered to any young person, with the aim of building ‘resilience’ to extremist ideologies (Sjøen and Jore, 2019). Here, they go beyond the notions of shared cultural and social understandings related to Community Cohesion (Cantle, 2001), and instead discuss hate crime, grooming, extremism and radicalisation, for example. ‘Targeted’ or secondary prevention relates to interventions delivered to young people who had already said or done something ‘concerning’ which led to them being seen as ‘at risk’ (Sjøen and Jore, 2019). However, these individuals were not considered ‘serious enough’ to be referred to Prevent. For example, a small group of young people were placed on an intervention after making misogynistic, homophobic and transphobic comments.

To date, only a handful of studies about these specific kinds of early interventions have been published (for example Sjøen and Jore, 2019; Skiple, 2020; Aly et al., 2014; Feddes et al., 2015; Cifuentes et al., 2013). In addition, within the broader conversation around extremism prevention for young people, observations of interventions as they are delivered in practice are relatively rare (for example Lakhani and James, 2021; Busher et al., 2019). There are a couple of exceptions to this, one being a study of the ‘Tolerance Project’ with young people in Sweden (Skiple, 2020). In this research, Skiple observed multiple sessions of the project (which aimed to prevent far-right extremism), though only for one cohort. As there are some similarities between the early interventions in this study and the Swedish project, this will be discussed in more detail in the literature review (Chapter 2). The second relevant study was conducted by James (2020), who utilised participant observations in

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2 The Counter-Extremism Strategy is discussed in more detail later in this chapter and in Chapter 4.
further education settings (ages 16+). Like many studies of prevention, however, James’ research focused specifically on the Prevent framework. Overall, Sjøen and Jore (2019) argue that there is a general lack of primary research in the early intervention area. For Thomas (2016:182), the lack of attention in this space is a result of too much focus on surveillance “rather than educational processes that genuinely prevent youth attractions towards extremism and terrorism.”

In seeking greater understanding of the practices in Wales, this study reveals a complex landscape of extremism and radicalisation early intervention. Whilst aligning with broader policy frameworks of Prevent, Counter-Extremism and Community Cohesion in various ways, the early interventions also sit somewhat separately. Rather than responding to a clearly defined set of issues, the ‘problems’ are shifting, emerging and widening. Ideas and ideologies that were not previously seen as being linked to extremism are now a central concern for some of the interventions that feature in the forthcoming chapters. For the practitioners and policymakers involved in interventions, adapting to this changing landscape is essential. At the same time, they must negotiate the tensions and resistances that appear in practice, from gaining access to young people, to addressing potentially extremist attitudes where they are expressed by young people. In place of a sole focus on policy, then, the practices and real-world impacts of early interventions in Wales are key considerations.

This chapter provides an overview of the thesis. It begins by setting out the research questions, explaining the focus on Wales and young people, and providing some context about the ways in which Covid-19 impacted the study. It then provides an overview of the main contribution of the research, followed by a note on relevant policy and terminology. The discussion then turns to the structure of the thesis, and each chapter is outlined along with a summary of their contents.
1.2 Research aims and questions

As set out above, the primary aim of this research has been to gain an in-depth insight into the early interventions with young people in Wales undertaken to prevent extremism and radicalisation, including their objectives, aspirations, organisation and conduct. Three central research questions informed this study:

1. How are early interventions with young people to prevent extremist radicalisation organised and delivered in Wales?
2. Why are concepts of ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ being constructed in particular ways by practitioners, professionals and policymakers involved in the early interventions?
3. What are the implications of the research findings for theory, policy and practice?

While the rationale for studying the early interventions themselves has been set out above, it is also worth explicating two other elements featuring in the research questions: young people and Wales. Firstly, the focus in Wales has, in part, been about feasibility in terms of the scope of the research. However, Wales is also in a somewhat unique position when compared with the rest of the UK, making it an interesting research site in itself. This is because although many responsibilities relevant to intervention delivery are devolved, including education and youth justice, radicalisation and extremism issues are still reserved to central UK government, via the Home Office. In practice, this means devolved and non-devolved aspects must be managed together. In addition, when the research proposal behind this thesis was being put together, referrals to Prevent for far-right extremism in Wales had been growing (Home Office, 2023a). As a point of general interest, I was intrigued whether, at the earliest point of intervention, ideology-specific approaches were being used by practitioners, or if they were broader.

Second, when looking into this area in more depth, it became clear that young people are an interesting cohort in the context of extremism and radicalisation. Although the focus of this research is upon interventions taking place ‘pre-Prevent’, their prominence in Prevent referrals is difficult to ignore. Young people make up a significant proportion of referrals to
the programme, and of those who go on to receive specialist support through the Channel programme (in both England and Wales). In Wales specifically, almost 63% of the 272 Prevent referrals in 2021/22 were for individuals aged 20 and under (Home Office, 2023a). Then, of the 41 referrals who went on to be adopted as Channel cases, 78% were aged 20 and under. While such statistics are not entirely unproblematic and can be shaped in various ways by the definitions and decisions of ‘street-level’ implementers (Kitsuse and Cicourel, 1963), they do provide a useful indication of where concerns held by professionals have tended to lie.

1.2.1 Research context: Covid-19

Both the interventions and fieldwork were impacted in various ways by the Covid-19 pandemic between March 2020 and February 2022. Although the focus of this research is the organisation and delivery of early interventions to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation, not the impacts of Covid-19 itself, the significant implications of the pandemic cannot be ignored. Pandemic control measures introduced in Wales in response to the virus had a direct effect on interventions. Measures included: ‘stay at home’ advice and local/national lockdowns (which also included school closures); social distancing to reduce spreading; self-isolation periods; restrictions on visitors allowed to enter schools; and a requirement to wear masks/face coverings in certain places (Welsh Government, 2020; 2021). With this isolation, there were also implications for the prevalence and distribution of the ‘problem’ of extremism. This includes an increase in radical conspiracy theories and the use of online platforms by extremists, as explored in Chapter 5.

As well as disruptions to the day-to-day work of practitioners faced with these various measures, interventions were forced to either adapt or cease, and access to young people changed. Alongside last-minute cancellations and some interventions being paused completely, the shift to online delivery (using Microsoft Teams and Zoom in particular) was significant. This was because there was no previous precedent for interventions to be delivered in this way – until Covid-19, in-person delivery was the norm.
1.3 Contribution

Based on in-depth insights derived from ethnographic fieldwork, this thesis provides a contribution to our understanding of interventions sitting below the threshold for formal Prevent referrals. Somewhat blurred with but also sitting separately to Prevent and Community Cohesion, I will argue that the early interventions have emerged as a ‘pre-Prevent’ object. They have done so in response to multiple conditions, including a wider label of ‘extremism’ and the need to respond to new and shifting ideologies. At the same time, the ‘vulnerabilities’ seen as placing young people ‘at risk’ of extremism have also been linked to wider ‘deviance’ issues. This means that ‘pre-Prevent’ interventions are not only trying to prevent the onset of extremist ideas, but also wider harms for youth and young people. Rather than being a straightforward process of implementation and delivery, however, various challenges, tensions and compromises arose and shaped the course of interventions. With the contested and politicised nature of ‘extremism’, the thesis reflects on important questions raised about how far ‘upstream’ (i.e. early) is legitimate for these interventions to go, and how young people ought to be selected for this ‘prevention’ (Innes et al., 2017).

Despite the challenges of conducting research of this nature amidst ongoing Covid-19 restrictions, the ethnographic methods were particularly valuable in uncovering the complexities and challenges emerging in this area, some of which were unique to the circumstances of Covid-19 itself. This approach allowed me to enter the ‘world’ of extremism prevention in Wales and to gain insight into the definitions and interpretations of participants (Matza, 1969/2010). This reflects a view that early interventions and the activities within them are informed by policymakers’ and practitioners’ assumptions and constructions of extremism and radicalisation (Blumer, 1969). Taken together with concepts including stigma, identity, labelling and negotiation, which have assisted in analysing and making sense of the empirical data, this study provides in-depth insight into what ‘goes on’ in practice.
1.4 A note on policy and terminology

As set out above, while the connection between extremist ideologies, radicalisation and terrorism is presumed, it is worth clarifying the key terms here. Terrorism is defined by the UK’s Terrorism Act (2000) as: the use or threat of action designed to influence the government, or an international governmental organisation, or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. From an academic research perspective, an act can be labelled as ‘terrorism’ where three necessary conditions are present: the use of political violence (violence deployed in pursuit of a political objective), the use of communicative violence (communicating a message beyond immediate victims), and a relatively powerless group mobilising against a powerful adversary (Innes and Levi, 2017). The language of labelling is itself revealing here, as it foregrounds the subjectivity of ‘terrorism’. In this context of communication and political objectives, terrorism is designed to serve as a ‘signal event’ (Innes et al., 2017), communicating a message about the distribution and prevalence of risks within society (Innes, 2014).

Far from being a static concept, terrorism is contested and has evolved over time, both in terms of its definitions and defining characteristics (as documented by Rapoport 1984; 2008; and Laqueur, 1998). For instance, as a result of changing threats and methods of attack, the notion of ‘new terrorism’ is common in accounts from around the late 1990s (for example Laqueur, 1998; Hoffman, 1999). Yet, others argue the goals, means and organisation of modern terrorism are not necessarily so different to that which came before (Crenshaw, 2007). More broadly, pinpointing a satisfactory definition that distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violent action is difficult – “in practice, events cannot always be precisely categorised” (Crenshaw, 2000:406). Further adding to this complexity is that the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent extremism’ are often used interchangeably (for example Borum, 2011).

Radicalisation, then, is defined as the “processes by which people come to adopt beliefs that not only justify violence but compel it” (Borum, 2011:8). This notion of a process is commonplace within the large body of literature surrounding this concept (see for example
Since the early 2000s, interest in radicalisation has grown. While the term was rarely used previously, Sedgewick (2010) proposes the rise in the popularity of ‘radicalisation’ since around 2001 derives from growing concerns about terrorist influences on domestic populations (or ‘home-grown’ terrorism). Before this time, the term was seldom referred to in the press or academia but has since become institutionalised with the growth of counter-radicalisation strategies (Sedgewick, 2010). The third term to clarify here is ‘extremism’. However, ‘extreme’ depends on the socio-political ‘norm’ (Winter et al., 2020) because it is a relational concept meaning different things in different contexts (Schmid, 2014). Since 2011, it has been defined by the UK government as opposition to the ‘values’ of democracy, the rule of law and liberty, and calls for death of members of the armed forces, though the term remains contested (discussed in more detail below).

1.4.1 Key policy frameworks

In terms of responding to terrorism and extremism, there has been a mixed nature to the concerns for UK authorities, with understandings of the ‘problem’ shifting over the years. This has, in turn, shaped the policy framework – and the revisions to it – surrounding the current research. Historically, Northern Ireland-related terrorism, more specifically the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (and its offshoots), was considered a significant (if not the main) threat to the UK until the late 1990s (Andrew, 2021a). Yet, other threats were also present from the 1980s onwards, including: Libyan state-sponsored (Andrew, 2021b), animal liberation and far-right terrorism (Croft and Moore, 2010). For instance, David Copeland’s nail bombing attacks in Brixton, Spitalfields and Soho in 1999 were underpinned by his extreme far-right ideology, and saw him targeting London’s minority ethnic and LGBT communities. While there has been a growth in violence perpetrated by the extreme far-right more recently (Innes and Levi, 2017), ‘Islamist’ extremism was the threat cast as the most pressing for many years from the late 1990s. This was particularly so given the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001, and the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005. When the counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) was published in 2006, it was clear what the ‘problem’ was imagined to be: the aim of the strategy was “to reduce the risk from international terrorism” and there was little mention of domestic terrorism (HMG, 2006:1).
Prevent, introduced earlier in this chapter, is a key part of the UK’s response to these ‘problems’ and sits within CONTEST. As different iterations of the strategy have emerged, they have been informed by different understandings of the ‘threat’ and underpinned by different approaches. Initially, shaped by the ‘threats’ described above, ‘Prevent 1’ was heavily focused on Islamist extremism and Muslim communities (Thomas, 2020). Then, in 2011, following a review of the strategy, ‘Prevent 2’ took a less explicit focus on Muslim communities and pushed for a greater separation between Prevent’s counter-terrorism focus and broader community cohesion/integration work (Innes and Levi, 2017). Yet, at the same time, the strategy’s remit was broadened to include non-violent extremism as well as its violent counterpart. Extremism was therefore defined as opposition to fundamental British values (including democracy, the rule of law and liberty) and calls for death of members of the armed forces (HMG, 2011). Although ‘shared’ and ‘core’ values had been mentioned in the past (see for example HMG, 2008), this was the first time a clear focus on British values emerged. In 2015, preventing people from being drawn into terrorism was made a statutory ‘duty’ for specified authorities, including education and childcare, health and social care (Thomas, 2020). More recently, a review of the strategy (Shawcross, 2023), which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, has argued the focus should return to Islamist extremism, though whether and to what extent this view will be translated into policy is currently unknown.

Around the same time and also adopting the ‘fundamental values’ definition, the Counter-Extremism Strategy published in 2015 placed even greater emphasis on non-violent extremism. Sitting separately to Prevent but with clear overlaps, the strategy argued there was a need to “go further” to address such extremist ideologies (HMG, 2015:17). Referring to hatred, intolerance and division as key issues, there was a view that while not pressing enough for Prevent, these ‘problems’ were also in need of a response. In doing so, the strategy overlaps with Community Cohesion principles in many ways, but also takes a more specific approach to the ideologies which it argues are ‘attacking’ the fundamental values.

As will be discussed later in this thesis, some challenges arose for practitioners as a result of

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3 The notion ‘British’ values has been problematised (Davies, 2016; Elwick et al., 2020) and is discussed in Chapter 4.
these overlaps, effectively due to long-standing criticisms of Prevent for ‘spying’ on Muslim communities and framing them as ‘suspect’ (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Kundnani, 2009). As well as often being cited as a poor example of prevention in this context (for example Busher and Jerome, 2020; Harris-Hogan et al., 2016), the broader ‘reputation’ of Prevent has been impacted.

1.4.2 Ideological terminology within the thesis

As this discussion shows, counter-terrorism and extremism policy has repeatedly adapted and reacted to new threats as they have emerged. These developments, which include new ideologies such as misogynist ‘Incel’ extremism and conspiracy theories, will be examined in greater depth in later chapters. Before moving on to discuss the structure of this thesis, though, a further note on terminology is necessary. Specifically, ‘far-right’ and ‘Islamist’ are clarified below. Although this thesis explores extremism and radicalisation broadly, with no intention to focus on one ideological position or form of extremism over another, these terms feature throughout.

When referring to ‘far-right’ ideology or extremism, my use of the term is informed by Mulhall (2019) and Fielding (1981). I use ‘far-right’ to capture the perspective that is typically racist, homophobic and broadly anti-immigration (Mulhall, 2019). This involves an ethno-centric and nationalistic view (Fielding, 1981), where an in-group is seen as being under threat from an out-group or enemy (Mulhall, 2019). In the UK today, the out-group/enemy is often identified as Islam and Muslims, though in the past, this hatred was typically directed towards Jewish people – and sometimes still is. More extreme elements of the far-right include neo-Nazis.

‘Islamist’ is another term featuring throughout this thesis and is used to refer to the supremacist ideology which seeks to impose a global Caliphate (Islamic State), potentially through violence (Pantucci, 2011). Particularly owing to the issues emerging in relation to Prevent and its politicised framing of Muslim communities in the UK, the problems associated with this terminology are worth reflecting upon at the outset. Kramer (2003) describes how this, and other similar terms, may cause confusion and are seen as clumsy and unsatisfactory. For Karim, a key issue is that the vast majority of Muslims who hold their
religion as a source for peace and salvation are “lumped together with the few who see in it a rationale for their vengeful violence” (2014:170). Karim further argues that this leads to profiling and manipulation on racial/religious grounds and a perception that Islam as a whole is ‘the problem’. However, because a range of terms are used in the literature and legislation (for examples, see Kramer, 2003; CREST, 2017; Educate Against Hate, 2019; Karim, 2014), a decision was necessary. ‘Islamist’ has been selected on the basis that it is the term used within UK legislation and policy (HMG, 2011; 2015).

1.5 Structure of the thesis

In this final section, the structure of the thesis is outlined, together with a brief summary of each chapter. Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant multi-disciplinary literature, including from criminology, sociology and youth studies, contextualising the current research in the existing knowledge base and identifying areas for contribution. The chapter begins by defining the key concepts (and their challenges) within this thesis. It then moves on to critically discuss the problem of youth radicalisation and extremism, including how young people are constructed within academic and conceptual discussion. Current debates and research on early interventions are then reviewed. Interventions which are specifically designed to prevent extremism are considered first, including the limitations of current research, before broader early intervention approaches with young people are discussed.

Chapter 3 presents a detailed account of the ethnographic research. This includes an in-depth discussion of the chosen research design, which was informed by the symbolic interactionist perspective. The methods of data collection – participant observations and semi-structured interviews – and analysis are critically discussed, along with a rationale for their selection. Practical aspects of the fieldwork are also discussed, including sampling, access, ethics and consent procedures. As well as broader reflections on the fieldwork process, the methodology chapter provides a reflection on the ways in which Covid-19 shaped both the data collection and the early interventions at the centre of the research.
The first of the chapters using empirical data is Chapter 4. This is a ‘hybrid’ chapter, which combines a detailed review of key policies and strategies with a discussion of related empirical data. The overall aim being to contextualise the early interventions to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation in Wales, and to explore the social organisation of this prevention activity. The discussion therefore traces the development of the policy framework over the past two decades, including CONTEST, Prevent, Channel and the Counter-Extremism Strategy. In doing so, it highlights the various influences and ‘turning points’ in the evolution of ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ as policy issues. Throughout the chapter, empirical data is drawn upon to provide additional insight into the practice and experience of policy ‘on the ground’. The second half of the chapter focuses on activity in Wales specifically, including the organisations and actors involved. Here, the early interventions at the centre of this thesis will be introduced, with a summary of their aims and content, as well as a discussion of the referral pathways that lead young people to them.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 focus specifically on empirical data and findings from the interviews and observations. Each chapter focuses on a different aspect, though they can all broadly be described as relating to the organisation and delivery of early interventions. Within each chapter, data are presented and discussed alongside analysis and theory. In Chapter 5, three key elements are explored in depth: how interventions come to take place, what is happening in practice, and who is involved in their delivery. This chapter utilises Matza’s (1969/2010) concept of signification to explore how interventions denote certain ideologies and attitudes as ‘extreme’, how the extremism ‘label’ is being applied, and which wider issues are being accommodated and drawn into this ‘pre-Prevent’ space. Specific approaches to delivery are also explored in relation to meaningful contact, parental influence, and adaptations to working with young people, and the chapter illuminates some variations in intervention delivery by different practitioners.

Chapter 6 draws on the concepts of identity, stigma and labelling (Goffman, 1990a; Becker, 1963/2018) to make sense of practitioners’ and policymakers’ concerns and approaches within early interventions. This chapter highlights that wider concerns about stigmatisation separately aimed at Prevent also extend to earlier ‘upstream’ intervention, shaping the
approaches adopted by practitioners as they negotiate the issue in practice. The potential issues of divergence in the approaches of different practitioners are also explored. In analysing these approaches, the chapter highlights an underlying tension which sees young people necessarily labelled risky ‘potential extremists’ to be eligible to attend interventions, whilst practitioners simultaneously sought to avoid revealing this negative label to young people.

Chapter 7, the final empirical chapter, takes a step back to explore wider organisational elements of early intervention, specifically focusing on elements of negotiation (Strauss et al., 1964; Lipsky, 2010). Observations revealed disagreements and compromises between organisers and gatekeepers, including differences of opinion about whether and which young people were most in need of an intervention. These access negotiations, including tensions, resistances, and diversions between different agencies, occur at all levels of prevention (from the most universal to more targeted) and are explored in depth in this chapter. Through this discussion, the chapter also makes connections to the concepts of stigma and labelling, explored in the preceding chapter (Chapter 6).

Chapter 8 provides an overview of the key findings and contributions of the thesis, with some reflections on the ethnographic process and the value of this approach to the research. As well as answering the research questions, this final chapter sets out policy and practice implications, together with recommendations for future research.

1.6 Concluding remarks and reflections

When I am asked about the research that fills the following pages, a few different questions and assumptions tend to follow. When I explain the study is about interventions to prevent extremism with young people, I am often asked to which specific ideology I am referring, or met with an assumption that I must have spoken to radicalised young people about their radicalisation ‘journeys’. Another assumption is that the research is a criticism of the Prevent Strategy and Channel programme. While these are fair questions and assumptions and point to issues that would themselves likely make for interesting research projects, it
has been helpful throughout this process to remind myself (and others) what this study is not. It is not about a specific ideology, or about the process or journey of radicalisation. Neither is it about criticising the work and intentions of Prevent and Channel and the practitioners associated with them.

Instead, in the pages that follow, ethnographic evidence and insight is provided into the processes and practices of earlier forms of intervention, which take place ‘pre-Prevent’ and before extremism has set in. By studying the approaches to prevention, this thesis attempts to contribute to our understanding of the ‘problem’ of extremism as it relates to young people, how it has been changing, and the ways of responding to it.
Chapter 2: Perspectives on Youth Radicalisation and Early Intervention: A Literature Review

In this chapter, multiple literatures are brought together to provide an overview of key perspectives and arguments, as they relate to interventions with young people to prevent extremism and radicalisation. The discussion focuses upon academic debate and evidence, though policy will of course be a key aspect in this thesis. Due to the vast amount of literature and the complexity of the policy framework surrounding early interventions, however, the discussion of policy is reserved for a later chapter (Chapter 4). In the pages that follow, the key concepts drawn upon throughout the thesis will be explored, including: the ‘problems’ being prevented, extremism and radicalisation; young people’s identities and transitions to adulthood; and early intervention approaches. Throughout the discussion, gaps and limits in our understanding of particular aspects are highlighted where relevant, identifying several areas to which this study contributes.

To begin, as the term is referred to so frequently within this thesis, ‘early intervention’ is defined briefly, situating the interventions at the centre of this study within broader understandings of prevention. The chapter then turns to the first substantial discussion of the ‘problems’ being prevented, drawing on the literature around radicalised beliefs and actions to identify how these issues are currently understood. Following this, particular attention is given to the notion of youth radicalisation specifically. Here, key perspectives within the youth studies literature are drawn together with the radicalisation literature to set out why young people are constructed as ‘vulnerable’ in this context. Having considered the ‘problem’ of extremism for young people, the chapter then explores approaches to its prevention in greater depth, drawing upon early intervention examples and the techniques being used within them. Here and in places throughout the chapter, issues relating to the framing of young people as vulnerable and ‘at risk’ in the context of extremism and early interventions are highlighted.
2.1 What is early intervention?

As set out in Chapter 1, there is an inherent assumption in both policy and research that terrorism, radicalisation and extremism are linked. This is because radicalisation is argued to be the “processes by which people come to adopt beliefs that not only justify violence but compel it” (Borum, 2011:8), and such justifications of violence are often drawn into definitions of extremism (Pilkington, 2022). And more broadly, issues including racism and intolerance have been linked to extremism because tension/polarisation between different communities is believed to be a potential contributing factor (Pels and de Ruyter, 2012). In addition, racist language and low tolerance for diversity have also been linked to far-right extremism (Cifuentes et al., 2013). Areas of education such as democracy, citizenship and anti-racism have also been positioned as related to extremism prevention as a result of policy (Bussher et al., 2020). The idea behind early intervention in this context, then, is to prevent the onset of extremism by preventing the process of radicalisation from beginning.

From a public health perspective, early interventions may take three forms: primary, secondary and tertiary. Primary prevention aims to entirely prevent ‘problems’ (extremism) from occurring (Brantingham and Faust, 1976), and therefore relates to community- and population-wide approaches (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). Meanwhile, secondary prevention targets groups ‘at risk’ of certain problems (becoming extreme) to provide them with support (Hardy, 2022). And finally, tertiary prevention occurs after the ‘problem’ has set in with the aim of preventing further harm (Heath-Kelly, 2013). In this context, tertiary prevention would take place with individuals already radicalised, encouraging them to disengage from extremist groups and ‘de-radicalise’ (Heath-Kelly, 2013). Some difficulties have been identified in neatly applying this tripartite model to extremism interventions, as there may be crossovers which see programmes modelled as ‘primary prevention’ being delivered to groups who are considered ‘risky’ in some way (Hardy, 2022). However, the concepts are still helpful in categorising the early interventions within this study, and the model is often used in discussions around this issue.

In this study, the early interventions involve young people aged 11-18 and are predominantly set in schools, though there are also youth work and sports-based
interventions. In public health terms, most are primary interventions, delivered to large (20+) groups of young people universally where there are no specific risks. There are also some secondary interventions in this study, however, which are more targeted towards particular individuals and (smaller) groups. While some interventions in this study focused on preventing the onset of extremism and radicalisation specifically, others sought to address broader issues. This included, for example, racism, hate crime, misogyny, county lines and drugs, as well as discussions of behaviour, law and the police. This echoes Harris-Hogan et al.’s (2019) observation that approaches to preventing extremism have sometimes sought to tackle ‘root causes’, which can often be linked to other anti-social and ‘problem’ areas beyond extremism. At the same time, this differentiates them from other, more official means of preventative intervention, which are focused more explicitly on terrorism and radicalisation prevention, and delivered based on (perceived) vulnerabilities (HMG, 2020; Heath-Kelly, 2013). Before exploring perspectives and research on such early interventions, however, the ‘problems’ being responded to must first be defined.

2.2 The ‘problems’ being prevented: radicalisation and extremism

This section will begin by providing a detailed discussion of extremist radicalisation, given its centrality throughout this thesis. In doing so, it will draw upon contributions from criminology, psychology and political science. The discussion will then turn to youth radicalisation more specifically, drawing arguments from the youth studies literature together with radicalisation to explore this ‘problem’ in-depth.

As noted earlier, different acts are labelled and treated differently in this context as a result of different laws and processes of criminal justice (Innes and Levi, 2017). From Howard Becker’s perspective, “social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people” (1963/2018:9, original emphasis). In other words, the reality and consequences of the act itself are not in question, but ‘terrorism’ is a label applied to the action and the perpetrator (Becker, 2018). As a result, the explicit identification and labelling of acts or groups across time and space is
not a fixed or definite matter, and there may be variations (see for example Crenshaw, 2000; LaFree et al., 2010).

2.2.1 Radicalisation and extremism

With terrorism generally understood to be violence to advance political, ideological or religious objectives, radicalisation is typically positioned as the process leading to violent action and support for it. The willingness to use violence in pursuing such objectives has been described as a form of extremism, which is itself seen as developing as a result of radicalisation (Borum, 2011). There is some variation in the definitions of radicalisation – both legal and scholarly – utilised in recent years. Some, for example, are more focused upon group dynamics, while others place more emphasis upon processes of learning and identity (Borum, 2011). As such, some existing literature separates the radicalisation of ‘ideas’ (beliefs and views) from radicalisation to ‘action’ (including participation, membership of groups and violence), while some accounts consider them together.

This section explores key perspectives on radicalisation and extremism in more detail, including prominent contributions to our current understanding, firstly in relation to beliefs and values, then in relation to behaviours and actions. The discussion will provide context and insight into the early interventions to prevent the onset of these ‘problems’ by reviewing the assumptions that exist alongside the approaches. Rather than focusing on studies of radicalisation for specific ideologies, this section draws on findings across a range of ideological/extremist perspectives. The reason for this is two-fold: firstly, similarities have been identified between ideologies that appear distinct. For instance, Roose and Cook (2022) found that anger and resentment towards women have become key elements of extremist ideologies, including far-right, Islamist and Incel. Similarly, others have argued that far-right and Islamist extremists share an overly simplistic and dichotomous view of society (Ebner, 2017). While there are of course key differences, ignoring similarities and treating extremist ideologies as wholly distinct may not be entirely useful. In addition, as the early interventions of interest in this study are those designed to prevent the onset of extremism, they are not necessarily oriented towards specific ideologies.
2.2.2 Radicalisation of beliefs and values

Although radicalisation and terrorism are often conflated, Borum (2011) argues that the transition from radical thought to violent physical action is distinct from the initial process of radicalisation. This is because not all who are radicalised go on to engage in acts of violence (Borum, 2011). A similar distinction is made by Fielding (1981:224), who argues that ideology tells extremists that “their action is productive, goal-oriented, justified”. However, the individual and their decision to act remains essential in determining the outcomes: individual will, mediated by commitment, is what “gives life to the ideology” (Fielding, 1981:224). Within the literature in this specific area, a variety of terms are used, including beliefs, views, convictions, opinions and ideology, sometimes being used interchangeably (see Knott and Lee (2020) and Schuurman and Taylor (2018) for examples).

While there are countless competing definitions of radicalisation, the role of beliefs and views has often been emphasised. For instance, Knott and Lee (2020:2) describe it simply as “the adoption of extreme ideas and beliefs leading to violent behaviour.” John Horgan (2009) defines it as a social and psychological process leading to increased commitment to extremist religious or political ideology. However, Peter Neumann argues a rift lies between perspectives focusing on either beliefs or behaviours (2013). While scholars including Randy Borum and John Horgan have suggested that cognitive radicalisation is not necessarily the most important object of study – since holding extreme views does not guarantee extreme behaviour – Neumann strongly disagrees. Instead, addressing “the spread of ideologies and belief systems in certain places and at certain times” is essential in understanding why people become involved in terrorism (2013:881). Accordingly, Guhl (2018) argues that it would be difficult to identify extremists for whom beliefs and ideology did not play a role in their actions.

Knott and Lee (2020) share Neumann’s view on the importance of beliefs and views for understanding motivations and decision-making, simply stating “ideology matters” (2020:3). In their empirical example of a Japanese religion, Knott and Lee found that followers were seeking answers to questions, explanations for personal situations, remedies and the fulfilment of needs: the group’s ideology offered them this. Ideology should not be sidelined then, as the concept can assist in explaining how and why individuals are drawn into
extremism, which in turn leads some to prepare or carry out violent or terrorist acts (Knott and Lee, 2020). In other words, a redefinition of reality occurs in which new beliefs and values are adopted, supporting the (potential) transition to violence (Della Porta, 1995 cited in Knott and Lee, 2020).

Helpfully, McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) offer two pyramid models to illustrate how individuals might move from radical opinion to violent action. The first of these pyramids is most relevant to this discussion and is referred to as the ‘opinion radicalisation pyramid’. This contains four layers: neutral, sympathisers, justifiers and personal moral obligation. In accordance with the shape of a pyramid, those who find themselves at the bottom are typically in the largest number, while those at the top account for relatively few. Applied to Islamist extremism and the associated narrative, radicalism increases as the pyramid is ascended. At the base are Muslims who disagree with the entirety of the narrative. The second layer consists of those who sympathise with the notion of a Western war on Islam. In the third layer are those who sympathise with ‘jihadis’ defending Islam and see their actions as proportionate and justified. Last, at the very top of the pyramid, are those who perceive an individual duty to participate in action to defend Islam. The pyramid is used by McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) to illustrate how people can become increasingly radicalised (in thought) as they progressively adopt aspects of an ideology. This has also been described as a process of “transformative learning” (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010 cited in Borum, 2011:13).

Other perspectives include Bailey and Edwards’ (2017) ‘microradicalisations’, which signify small parts of what they perceive to be long radicalisation journeys. This could include, for example, anger towards perceived injustices or reciprocal radicalisation in opposition to conflicting viewpoints. Relating this to identity, Currie argues that groups present themselves as representative of local cultures and seek to protect the “indigenous identity” (2013:243). In view of this, such areas can become fertile grounds for propaganda and attempts to mobilise support (Currie, 2013), resonating with Bailey and Edwards’ argument.

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4 The second pyramid, the ‘action radicalisation pyramid’, outlines how people transition from doing nothing to engaging in political violence. It consists of: politically inert Muslims, activists, radicals and terrorists (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014).
above. Similar notions of reciprocal or cumulative radicalisation have been highlighted elsewhere, demonstrating how different ‘sides’ can motivate a response from the other (see Fielding, 1981; Ebner, 2017; Busher and Macklin, 2015). For example, in the aftermath of the murder of Lee Rigby by two Islamist extremists in London in 2013, the response from far-right groups included attacks on mosques and protest demonstrations (Busher and Macklin, 2015). Likewise, an attack at a London Mosque by Darren Osborne in 2017 was deployed by both far-right and Islamist extremists in support of their positions. The former used the event in celebration and to encourage further action, while the latter used it to promote the narrative of victimisation and anger (Ebner, 2017). These examples again point to there being similarities and convergences between different forms of extremism.

An important aspect to note here is gender, and some of the differences emerging in accounts of radicalisation for boys and girls, women and men. Women’s participation in terror groups is argued to have increased in recent years, as has the attention paid to it in the academic literature (Bloom, 2017; Brown, 2020). For instance, as well as involvement in ‘traditional’ terrorist activities including violence, other roles include recruitment and distributing propaganda (Huey and Witmer, 2016). In accounting for their involvement, Brown (2020) argues that notions of brainwashing often feature in relation to women and girls, and that radicalisation is often attributed to husbands or other recruiters. Brown is, however, critical of this minimisation of agency and denial of responsibility, themes that will be returned to later in this chapter.

2.2.3 Radicalisation to participation, membership and violence

Michael Kenney offers a useful bridge between the two areas of beliefs and action, describing how extremists “undergo a process of development in which they acquire beliefs, norms and values that legitimise violence” which “typically unfolds in the company of like-minded companions who learn from each other” (2020:57). Schuurman and Taylor (2018) echo this in their argument that motives for terrorist action are often multicausal and extend beyond the motivation or justification of beliefs and convictions alone. This points to commitment to terrorism not being a result of a sudden conversion, but a gradual process (Crenshaw, 2000), and one which is not necessarily linear (Guhl, 2018). As indicated by the discussion in the preceding section, studies have typically distinguished radicalised beliefs
and views from radicalised actions (Borum, 2011; Neumann, 2013). Much of the seminal literature in this field focuses on the process of joining groups, some of which will be reviewed below. Within this discussion, several key elements are highlighted, which will be referred to in later chapters of this thesis: the role of interaction with extremist others in the process of radicalisation; the importance of identity change and formation; and the impact of exclusion and humiliation.

Marc Sageman (2007) developed a four-part process of radicalisation to action, outlined in relation to Islamist extremists. Sageman’s ‘bunch of guys’ model provides a strongly group-oriented approach, though beliefs are also crucial to the process. The model consists of four recurring phases: moral outrage; interpretation; resonance with personal experiences; and mobilisation through networks. Within this, the sense of moral outrage develops in response to perceived moral violations such as killings, rapes and, at the time, the Iraq War. Outrage alone is not enough, however; it must be interpreted in such a way that a person can become radicalised in their thoughts (such as a unified Western ‘War against Islam’). Considered in combination with an individual’s personal and cultural factors, this determines whether the original issue resonates to provide a sense of personal involvement. Sageman (2007) argues that mobilisation by networks and kinship then leads some individuals beyond anger and frustration to becoming terrorists. Though in the past such mobilisation and contact took place face-to-face, this now increasingly takes place online, with the validation and assistance previously found with offline peers now frequently derived from interactions with people through social media (Sageman, 2007). Michael Kenney (2020) places similar emphasis on interactions in members’ progression towards terrorism. Describing how ‘novices’ progress, Kenney argues that learning from more experienced activists, who are observed and called upon for knowledge, facilitates a learning process akin to an “apprenticeship” (Kenney, 2020:60), echoing the criminological notion of differential association (Sutherland, 1947).

Another prominent theoretical framework is offered by Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004). From research focused on the UK-based Islamist group al-Muhajiroun, he provides a four-stage model. Its core stages are: (1) cognitive opening; (2) religious seeking; (3) frame alignment; and (4) socialisation. A cognitive opening may occur in response to some sort of crisis that
disturbs a person’s previous certainty in their beliefs. In response, people might seek religious meaning by undertaking research, speaking to family and friends, or being guided by members of the group. As the person is unlikely to be an expert in the religion, they are likely to accept explanations that can be aligned with their own frame of mind, such as local or emotional matters. Providing the first three stages are fulfilled, deeper socialisation (or resocialisation) can take place, where a person’s values become defined in accordance with those of the group in a process of identity construction (or reconstruction).

Referring to the case of Islamist extremism specifically, Post et al. (2014: 330) suggest the influential nature of the group in these processes stems from the way in which “recruiters consciously exploit the loneliness of individuals and convey a sense of belonging to a radical community of hatred.” Borum (2014) describes the power of the need people feel to belong, and the psychological vulnerability that results from its absence. In this sense, radicalisation is a social process, with the affinity for the group playing a crucial role in driving people towards the ideology. This effect is further exacerbated as new technologies of communication are increasingly incorporated by groups (Post et al., 2014).

Likewise, studies of far-right extremism have found group bonds to impact upon processes of radicalisation. For instance, Simi et al.’s (2016) findings resonate with Sageman’s (2007) description of group dynamics, whereby networks of people with common interests emerge, creating echo chambers where grievances are amplified and their bonds with one another are intensified. There is an appeal to comradery and support, and Simi et al.’s participants described feeling accepted and having a closeness in their bonds with others for the first time. Nigel Fielding’s (1981) study of the National Front also notes how becoming part of a ‘movement’ generates personal returns in the form of belonging to a group of like-minded others. Furthermore, those who are “treated as being outside the accepted political tradition” are pushed further into extremism (Fielding, 1981:127). Labelling sympathisers of the group as deviant increases their suspicion towards ‘outsiders’ and aggressively affirms a commitment to other members which is hard to erode, driving them deeper into their ‘deviant’ position. The important role of group dynamics in leading individuals to action is also reflected in Atran’s (2016) discussion of identity fusion. Here, once self-identity fuses with a collective group-identity, and when the group identity is linked to sacred values that
provide a collective sense of significance, there is more willingness to engage in extreme behaviour if the group is threatened. From this social identity theory perspective, group cohesion and emotional bonds are influential (Atran, 2016).

As well as models specifically developed in relation to radicalisation, various criminological theories have been more explicitly applied in attempting to understand the process leading to terrorist violence (LaFree and Freilich, 2016). Though criminology was relatively absent from the discussion of terrorism in the past, interest from researchers in this field has grown significantly in recent years (LaFree, 2021; Innes and Levi, 2017). Walklate and Mythen (2016), for instance, used a criminological lens in considering the circumstances of those involved in a terror attack in Paris in January 2015. Using the strain perspective, they refer to the collective, unjust ‘strains’ perceived as resulting from powerful others and (potentially) impacting individuals. Focusing on Islamic extremism specifically, Mythen et al. (2017:193) critique an explicit policy focus on Muslim communities, arguing that, coupled with “ruinous military policy, inter-generational experiences of racism and overzealous policing”, this has in fact created such ‘strains’ for some in the UK. LaFree and Freilich (2016) expand on this, suggesting this can lead to negative emotions including frustration and humiliation, as well as reducing the effectiveness of broader social control. In the context of terrorism, individuals exposed to these circumstances are considered vulnerable to engaging in such action, particularly those who have a predisposition towards violent extremism (Walklate and Mythen, 2016). Akin to Fielding’s (1981) account above, Walklate and Mythen suggest individuals may be pushed towards extreme groups, and the bonds and shared understandings they offer.

2.2.4 Radicalisation: critiques and developments
Having reviewed these key perspectives, it is also worth acknowledging the disagreements and developments in this field. Baker-Beall et al. (2014) offer a rather different stance on the concept of radicalisation and the notion of a process. They are particularly critical of prominent scholars’ focus on Muslim communities in their analyses. This is considered problematic and to have served to ‘other’ particular segments of the population on the basis of religion and ethnicity (Baker-Beall et al., 2014). They see the notion of a radicalisation ‘process’ as racially-biased and reductive (Baker-Beall et al., 2014). Relatedly,
the UK’s programme for preventing radicalisation has been the target of similar criticisms, as will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 4. While the concept of ‘process’ is commonplace in the academic literature (see for example Wiktorowicz, 2005; Crenshaw, 2000; Larsen, 2020; Silva, 2018), Baker-Beall et al. (2014) also challenge the lack of agreed definitions. They note contestations in the field and argue that accounts of such processes are neither objective nor neutral. Borum (2011:8) likewise acknowledges there is inherent complexity here because “different pathways and mechanisms operate in different ways for different people at different points in time and perhaps in different contexts”. While this does not in itself render the concept of radicalisation useless to this thesis, particularly given that it remains widely recognised across disciplines, it is worth acknowledging such debate.

More generally, there have also been substantial developments in the way individual behaviour has been accounted for in terrorism studies. In the past, some scholars attempted to associate personality disorders such as sociopathy, psychopathy, narcissism, and paranoia with terrorists (Silke, 1998), distinguishing terrorists from the wider population (Crenshaw, 2000). Taylor and Horgan (2006:586) describe the “intangible mentalistic concepts” associated with a focus on personality and “evil traits”. For instance, and among others, the terms “psychopathic killer” and “lunatic” can be found in the work of respected theorist Walter Laqueur (1998:170-171). However, Silke (1998) argues that the vast majority of such claims are not backed up by strong evidence, making them part of a misleading (former) trend. Such assumptions are based on anecdotal evidence including public statements, ‘exposés’ or autobiographical accounts: as a result, research along this line of enquiry is “sparse and of questionable validity” (Silke, 1998:62). Over time, however, scholars moved away from this individualistic psychological approach, increasingly appraising the role of groups and society in the radicalisation process, as discussed above (inter alia Kundnani, 2012; Silke, 1998; Crenshaw, 2000; Borum, 2011; Stern, 2014a).

2.3 Youth radicalisation

While many of the perspectives and accounts described above are influential in this field, they do not focus on the radicalisation of young people specifically. As Taylor (2018:56) put
it, in the past there has been “little literature that looks at violent extremism from the perspective of the threat to harm of individual children”. Given young people have a different set of experiences to adults (Cieslik and Simpson, 2013; Wyn, 2014), the relevance of some of the available literature to young people has been described as tenuous (Taylor, 2018). The aim of this section is therefore to bring the two bodies of literature together and to explore ‘youth radicalisation’. The section will begin by briefly summarising the key traditions within youth studies, cultures and transitions, before moving on to discuss what is currently ‘known’ regarding the radicalisation of children and young people. The section will conclude with a brief discussion of policy constructions of young people, noting the increasing concern that radicalisation prevention is leading to a securitisation of safeguarding practices (for example Coppock and McGovern, 2014).

2.3.1 Youth Studies: cultures and transitions

Numerous lenses offered by the main theoretical traditions of youth studies can assist in interpreting not only how young people may become radicalised, but also how preventative interventions may operate. ‘Youth’ refers to the phase that exists between dependent childhood and autonomous adulthood (Cieslik and Simpson, 2013). It is considered a socially constructed intermediary phase but is not biologically based (Muggleton, 2005). The sphere of youth studies is widely recognised to have two dominant traditions: the cultural perspective and the transitions perspective. The first is concerned with the emergence of social groups distinct from the mainstream culture, while the second focuses on young people’s transitions from childhood to adulthood. A common thread running throughout both perspectives is the relationship between structure (regular patterns of factors that enable or limit an individual) and agency (the capacity of that individual to act) (see Rigby et al., 2016 for further discussion of structure and agency). Though debate on this issue has been ongoing for some time, scholars in both cultures and transitions studies tend to agree that structure and agency should both be taken into account in studying young people’s lives, and can be complementary (Muggleton, 2005; Hollingworth, 2015; Furlong et al., 2011).

Often referred to as the ‘subcultural’ tradition, the youth cultures theoretical area has its roots in the University of Chicago’s sociological ‘Chicago School’ of the early 1900s, as well
as the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at Birmingham University (founded in 1964). The tradition focuses on the notion of subcultures as problem-solving devices: ‘status frustration’ felt by youth who had experienced educational failures and blocked futures could be alleviated by the opportunity to construct a viable identity within a subcultural group (Hollingworth, 2015; Muggleton, 2005). Research has explored the relationship between society/social change and cultural forms, practices and institutions (Shildrick, 2006). Subcultural groups in the 1950s and 60s (such as the teddy boys and skinheads) were predominantly understood by the CCCS to be working class youth’s collective responses to their conflicting and subordinated position in post-war society (Hodkinsson, 2016). From Chicago, the youth cultures perspective also includes Sykes and Matza’s (1957) notion of neutralisation in which they refer to the techniques used by young people when they make decisions about being delinquent. Another prominent theory and concept here, labelling, is explored in greater detail shortly (Becker, 2018; Matza, 1969/2010).

The second tradition in youth research, the study of transitions between childhood and adulthood (though not bounded to a specific age), views ‘transition’ as a useful overarching concept and metaphor for the study of youth (MacDonald et al., 2001; Furlong et al., 2006; Wyn, 2014). In exploring ‘successful’ transitions, a range of aspects are covered – research has tended to focus on the economic (school to work), though other milestones include moving out from parents’ homes and starting a family (Geldens et al., 2011; Hoolachan et al., 2017). MacDonald et al. (2001) argue that the study of youth transitions does not presume anything about individual experience: rather, it acknowledges its unpredictability and dependence on wider contextual factors. This includes de-industrialisation and its impacts on poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion (MacDonald and Marsh, 2004), and how this in turn resulted in decreased labour market participation and increased dependency on parents or welfare support (Wyn, 2014). Key milestones are achieved later (Murray and Gayle, 2012), and the boundaries between youth and adulthood have become increasingly blurred as transitions have become characterised as extended and arrested (Wyn, 2014). This has been termed ‘emerging adulthood’ (Wyn, 2014; Arnett, 2015; Hoolachan et al., 2017).
2.3.2 The radicalisation of young people

In the following discussion of youth radicalisation, aspects of youth cultures and transitions introduced above will be used and brought together with accounts of radicalisation. Though they are primarily presented separately for clarity in the following discussion, the two youth studies perspectives complement each other in many ways (Wyn, 2014). Marked by a sometimes-hostile divide (Furlong et al., 2011; Furlong, 2015), there have been ongoing calls for the integration of the two traditions to better reflect the reality of young people’s lives (MacDonald, 2011; Hodkinson, 2016; Woodman and Bennett, 2015). As such, where relevant, connections between the two traditions are also noted below.

Sieckelinck (2016) contends that interest in youth extremism and radicalisation has grown dramatically as a result of the high numbers of young people leaving their Western countries of residence in order to join and support the violent jihad of the Islamic State. Interestingly, this in itself may have implications for the ways in which radicalisation is framed in policy and practice: as Hallett (2017) argues, the terminology and definitions used in policy frameworks have implications for the ways in which problems are responded to. In this instance, the concerns relating to young people supporting and travelling to join terrorists abroad may have contributed to the increased focus on understanding their radicalisation. Accordingly, Hallett (2017) argues that terms – such as radicalisation – are historically situated and conceptually loaded with assumptions. Harris-Hogan et al. (2019) acknowledge a similar issue, noting that rising referral numbers for young people do not necessarily mean there is a threat in all cases. However, due to the disproportionately large impact of any instance of terrorism, they argue that any numbers provide a cause for concern and therefore warrant investigation.

2.3.3 Radicalised ‘extremist’ identities

Identity is one concept that has been drawn on heavily in discussions of radicalisation, particularly in the case of youth (Sieckelinck, 2016; see also Coppock and McGovern, 2014; Wiktorowicz, 2004). For instance, Ferguson and McAuley (2021) consider identity to play a central role in processes of radicalisation (and de-radicalisation or disengagement). In particular, for a young person feeling uncertain about their place in the world, extremist groups may provide more certainty and belonging (Ferguson and McAuley, 2021; Pels and
de Ruyter, 2012). This is not necessarily a linear process, however, and may involve young people drifting in and out of far-right ‘circles’ (Miller-Idriss and Pilkington, 2017). This relates to the way identities are negotiated through interaction as they are recognised and responded to by others (Stone, 2016). Some accounts of this process have also made connections with home and family life, for instance in terms of trauma. Here, radicalisation is positioned as a potential consequence of young people experiencing a sense of alienation from their parents and wider family circles (Spalek, 2016). Such a “quest for identity” has therefore been suggested as a possible cause for derailment among young people, where needs may be met by extremist groups (Sieckelinck, 2016:5). In view of this, for a young person who has a “battered life” with poor prospects and in which they are already involved in deviance or criminality, Sieckelinck argues the jump may be short to joining or fighting for an extremist/terrorist organisation (2016:4). This has often been referred to as an identity ‘crisis’ (Lynch, 2013). Brown (2020) argues that in many such accounts of radicalised identities, gendered characterisations have emerged. This is because some view radicalisation as stemming from a crisis of masculinity, caused by males feeling disempowered and therefore emasculated and ‘feminised’. According to these accounts, terrorist violence appeals as a way of restoring masculinity (Brown, 2020).

In many ways, these accounts of radicalisation echo the youth cultures perspective discussed earlier. While subcultures are not inherently negative, the issue here is that young people feeling confused or as though they do not belong may be vulnerable to those seeking to radicalise them into joining their cause. Joining such an extremist (subcultural) group may appear to young people as a chance to construct a meaningful identity (Hollingworth, 2015; Muggleton, 2005). Yet in doing so, they may become further marginalised and labelled deviant. For Howard Becker (2018), this labelling happens to young people who deviate from the norms and expected behaviours of the dominant culture and therefore become ‘outsiders.’ Matza (2010) argues this can take over a person’s entire identity: once labelled, rather than being a person who happens to have committed a deviant act, their identity shifts towards becoming a representation of deviancy. Others may then treat the deviant identity as controlling and overriding, discounting all other aspects of the person’s identity and excluding them from participation in conventional activities. This,
Matza (2010) warns, may become self-fulfilling, shaping the person into the image others have of them – in this case, an extremist.

McDonald (2011) points to issues of identity for Muslim young people as a factor of concern in terms of vulnerability, particularly as counter-terrorism policy (see Chapter 4) became more focused on al-Qaeda (AQ) ‘Islamist’ terrorism. As the violence was constructed as intrinsically connected to Islam, Muslim young people’s beliefs and identities were associated with violence, and they were “viewed, interpreted and experienced through a securitised lens of suspicion and stigma” (McDonald, 2011:179). Lynch (2013) makes a similar argument, suggesting that when young Muslims’ perceptions of global injustices mirror their personal experiences of injustice locally, they become increasingly vulnerable to extremist positions. As a result of such political discourse, policy and legislative measures, Muslim communities are argued to have become a new ‘suspect’ community (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009).

Faced with structural forces in this way, which have been linked with alienation and marginalisation, the youth cultures perspective would suggest young people must then inhabit and negotiate “various multiple identities in different spaces” (Harries et al., 2016:179). In practice, Pilkington and Acik (2020) argue this has impacted on young people and the classroom environment, both in terms of interactions with teachers and more generally through Islamophobic incidents elsewhere. For instance, following a terror attack in Paris, a heated debate ensued with a teacher because students expressed their frustration that victims of terror attacks in the Middle East did not get the same attention as those in Europe. The school subsequently created a policy to prevent such controversial issues arising in discussion (Pilkington and Acik, 2020), potentially exacerbating the marginalisation associated with feeling ‘suspect’.

2.3.4 Transitions and turning points towards (or away from) extremism

Other authors have also connected such uncertainty around identity to particular turning points. For instance, in a study of far-right extremists, distinct events that instigated feelings of hate were significant ‘push factors’ towards joining extremist groups (Simi et al., 2016). One example related to a young male who perceived hypocrisy by his college when they...
permitted a ‘gay pride’ march but refused a ‘white pride’ march – he became disillusioned and started to “look into stuff” (2016:101). More broadly in studies of transitions to adulthood, MacDonald et al. (2001) note the significance of turning points – positive or negative – for the young people they studied. Their participants highlighted how interaction with certain adults could be linked to their current situations, as a result of them ‘turning’ the course of their lives at a particular point in time. For instance, ‘Anthony’ described how support from his probation officer helped him to move away from drugs, while for ‘Holly’, the loss of her father, coupled with a lack of subsequent emotional support, led to a negative turn in her transition. Such events have also been described as exogenous, chance trigger points (Laub et al., 1998).

Denzin also utilises the concept of turning points, terming them ‘epiphanies’, where marks are left on people’s lives as a result of certain interactional experiences and moments (1989). Like MacDonald, Denzin argues they may be positive or negative in their impact but notes that people always give meaning to them retrospectively as they retell their experience in stories. Different forms of epiphany exist, including ‘minor epiphanies’, problematic moments in a relationship or aspect of life, as well as ‘representative events’, where there is a reaction to cumulative experience (Denzin, 1989). Applied to extremism and radicalisation, small moments of interaction leading to tension or anger towards another group may cumulate over a long period of time, echoing Bailey and Edwards’ (2017) notion of microradicalisations.

These accounts highlight the significant temporal element present in identity formation: in the context of radicalisation, this can both be applied to a young person’s journey towards extremism, as well as the timing of interventions designed to steer them away from such views and actions. Taken together with the (sub)cultural perspective to assist in situating their experiences, one example of a young person’s turning point could be the negative experience of being labelled ‘extremist’. Where this leads to feelings of marginalisation from mainstream society, it is possible to see how young people may be pushed or pulled towards, or more deeply into, extremist groups and ideas. More specifically gender-based characterisations of radicalisation have also pointed towards moments of trauma as a factor
in the radicalisation process for women and girls, though their framing as irrational and incapable of making a rational choice has been criticised (Brown, 2020).

More broadly, beyond specific turning points, accounts of radicalisation and terrorist actions have also used the criminal careers perspective (Horgan and Taylor, 2016). It is to the sequence of offences during (part of) an individual’s lifetime that the term ‘criminal career’ refers (Farrington, 1992). This perspective has been associated with ‘risk’ in the sense that certain conditions are seen as potentially increasing the chance that individuals will embark on such a career (Rodermond and Thijs, 2022). This could include a lack of education and other criminal offending. In one study of far-right extremists, for example, childhood risk factors and conduct problems in adolescence (around ages 10-18) were found to precede extremist involvement (Simi et al., 2016). In other words, these conditions/factors incrementally increased young people’s susceptibility to extremism. Based on this, Simi et al. propose that the importance of ideology may follow entry into and membership of extremist groups rather than driving it, at least for their participants. As such, their familiarity with the ideology developed over time, as they learnt from other members of the group.

Relatedly, the role of parents in the onset of extremism and radicalisation has also been explored. While some have suggested parents are only rarely a direct cause of radicalisation (Sieckelinck, 2016), others have expressed greater concern. For instance, one judicial decision in the UK describes the indoctrination and infection of children with thoughts of terrorism by their parents in the family home (Taylor, 2018). This is based on the assumption that family members can shape young peoples’ radical ideas, and together with friendship networks, facilitate their recruitment to extremist organisations (Spalek, 2016). As a result, it is possible that early intervention activity in this area is indeed addressing views influenced in some way by parents. Looked at in another way, where parents’ own racist or extremist beliefs are known to agencies such as schools, this might make their children appear as more suitable targets of intervention, based on such assumptions about socialisation (Skiple, 2018).
In terms of the broader response to extremist beliefs being associated with parents, this has been treated as a child protection issue by the courts in the sense it may cause ‘harm’ to young people (Taylor, 2018). For Taylor, the challenge for those dealing with child protection issues of this nature lies not in cases of physical danger (i.e. travel) but in cases of alleged ‘harm’ due to influence from parents and the beliefs they hold. However, the notions of harm and child protection have also been criticised in that they have become securitised (Taylor, 2018; Haugstvedt and Tuastad, 2021). This means, for instance, that professionals such as social workers are pushed more towards controlling the young people they work with, rather than empowering and supporting them (Haugstvedt and Tuastad, 2021). In Taylor’s view, the terminology used in conceptualising the ‘harm’ caused by exposure to extremist ideology means children sit at “an uncomfortable juxtaposition: as victims, vulnerable to radicalisation; and as a threat, creating security risks and fragmented communities” (2018:45).

2.3.5 Language: grooming and vulnerability

As the involvement of child protection professionals might suggest, the language of ‘grooming’ has become more common in both political and academic discussion of extremist radicalisation (and youth crime more broadly (see Bui and Deakin, 2021)). However, Stanley and Guru (2015) argue that this might conflate the thinking around psychological sexual abuse and radicalisation risk. This has led to a “blurring” of safeguarding and security within the Prevent Duty, whereby children are positioned as both ‘at risk’ and ‘risky’ (Taylor, 2018:45-46; Coppock and McGovern, 2014). In accounts of safeguarding policy (and literature) more broadly, there is also a suggestion that there are different criteria for boys and girls. For instance, boys’ offending or antisocial behaviour may be more of a concern than their ‘vulnerability’ to forms of exploitation (Hallett et al., 2019a). To borrow Taylor’s terms above, they may therefore be seen as more active and ‘risky’ subjects than ‘at risk’ (Hallett, 2017). On the contrary, Brown (2020) argues girls are seen as having less responsibility and agency. Others have also highlighted an assumption that ‘at risk’ boys need firm and strict guidance to keep them on the right path (Mattsson et al., 2016), again suggesting a potentially greater lens of suspicion being applied. This issue of risk and security will be returned to in later chapters in considering whether and to what
extent this framing (including gendered aspects) exists at the ‘earlier’ pre-Prevent stage of intervention in Wales.

As highlighted earlier, such interactions with and responses to young people can be significant. The issue with these constructions and positioning of young people as ‘risky’ and ‘at risk’ is the potentially negative implications for their identity. The Birmingham ‘Trojan Horse’ scandal is an illustrative example of this, which came about as a result of allegations of an Islamist conspiracy to radicalise children in schools (Awan, 2014). Based on an anonymous letter sent to Birmingham City Council, the claim was of a plot to take over local schools by Islamist extremists. Though the authenticity of the original letter containing the allegations has since been questioned (see for example Thomas, 2016), the nature of the allegations led to a strong counter-terror-based response. In a study involving teachers, community leaders, governors and young people, concerns were raised about the implications of labelling children as ‘extremists’ in this case (Awan, 2014). It was felt that “lazy” assumptions had been made, and people were left feeling anxious and under official suspicion (Awan, 2014:39).

Although the concerns described above arose in relation to the specific case of ‘Trojan Horse’, the issue of labelling young people within responses to (potential) extremism is nonetheless interesting. Furthermore, another example of shifting policy attention has emerged in relation to mental health and autism. In 2021, Jonathan Hall QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation argued that a “staggeringly high” number of people with autism are referred to Prevent (Grierson, 2021). While some research suggests that characteristics associated with autism may be relevant, such as information seeking to reduce anxiety, the strength of this relationship remains contested and unclear (Woodbury-Smith et al., 2022). There has been stronger criticism, however, of the implication that autism is a factor in radicalisation, and a concern about the potential stigmatisation of vulnerable individuals (Moseley, 2021). Taken together with the arguments in this section about the lens of suspicion and ‘risk’ (Taylor, 2018), even where they are not based on overt suspicion and referral, it is worth considering the way young people are framed by and within interventions.
2.3.6 Challenges and research limitations

As alluded to previously, one issue with many prominent theoretical models in the field of radicalisation is that they do not relate directly to the life experiences of young people of interest in this thesis, aged 11-18 years old. For instance, a study of Muslim ‘youth’ by Lynch (2013) was based on participants in an adult age range of 18-25. Relatedly, although Silke (2008:105) asserts that most people who join terrorist organisations are “teenagers and people in their early twenties”, he does not define specific age ranges. Similarly, Coppock and McGovern (2014) argue that Marc Sageman places particular emphasis on peer groups and friendships in the case of young people; again, however, no specific age range is provided (Coppock and McGovern, 2014). As a result, relatively little is known about extremism and radicalisation for young people specifically. By considering how the ‘problem’ of extremism is constructed in relation to young people specifically, this study aims to contribute to our understanding in this area.

Meanwhile, within the field of youth studies, there has been increasing emphasis on attending to the experiences of ‘ordinary’ young people (Woodman, 2013). Studies of subcultures and transitions have both been challenged for their focus on a relatively narrow demographic. For instance, studying only the most disadvantaged youth is argued to have created a “missing middle” of those ‘above’ the most disadvantaged (MacDonald, 2011:432). As they are in the majority, Shildrick and MacDonald (2006) argue that ignoring such ‘average’ young people could produce a distorted and incomplete picture of youth cultures. However, a shift has indeed begun towards exploring the transitions experienced by wider demographics (for example Hoolachan et al., 2017; Woodman and Wyn, 2015). Attending to this, the intention of this study is not to focus on interventions for one specific demographic or form of extremism. Rather, the interventions are delivered to young people from a range of backgrounds and with a range of views. It is to such interventions that the discussion now turns.
2.4 Current early interventions to prevent (the onset of) extremism and radicalisation

Preventive early interventions, including those discussed in the following chapters of this thesis, can be helpfully understood in terms of the public health model of prevention. This approach to prevention, put simply, aims to reduce risk factors and increase protective factors for a young person (Early Intervention Foundation, 2022; Brouillette-Alarie et al., 2022). Bellis and Hardcastle (2019) argue this early intervention approach to extremism and radicalisation is promising, both in terms of preventing terrorist violence specifically, and in offering a more holistic way of working. In this section, the public health model will first be discussed in more detail, before moving on to explore some specific examples and studies of intervention practices. In doing so, the discussion will highlight key assumptions (and gaps) in relation to preventing the onset of extremism and radicalisation, including when interventions should be used, and how they should be approached.

2.4.1 Early intervention: universal and targeted, primary and secondary

Within the public health model, there are three levels of intervention: tertiary, secondary and primary. Tertiary prevention is less applicable here, as this relates to individuals who are already radicalised and must therefore be supported to ‘exit’ extremist networks (de-radicalisation and disengagement). One international example of such a programme is the Countering Violent Extremism Early Intervention Programme in Australia – although it is an ‘early intervention’, its aim is facilitating disengagement from (existing) violent extremism (Harris-Hogan, 2020). Secondary and primary prevention, however, are more relevant. Secondary interventions are those pre-emptively working with the most ‘at risk’ young people, those who are expressing support for an extremist ideology or have connections to an extremist group (or both) (Harris-Hogan, 2020). Primary interventions are further ‘upstream’ and universal, aiming to prevent the emergence of conditions, behaviours or attitudes that may facilitate radicalisation (Harris-Hogan, 2020). They are typically designed to increase resilience by educating individuals about issues relating to violent extremism, in turn preventing the emergence of a ‘breeding ground’ for radicalisation (Gielen, 2019; Harris-Hogan et al., 2019).
Using this model, primary prevention is particularly relevant in preventing the onset of extremism; as Feddes and Gallucci (2015) describe it, preventing future radicalisation for non-radicalised individuals. This level of intervention has also been described as “general safeguarding” (Gielen, 2019:1157). As elaborated in Chapter 4, formal Prevent interventions typically operate at the tertiary or secondary level of prevention, working with individuals who have already been engaging with an ideology/group. Whereas the early interventions at the centre of this thesis attend to a wider audience and address wider issues. According to Bellis and Hardcastle (2019) primary/universal interventions in the extremism and radicalisation space are typically focused on adolescents and often delivered in education and community settings. One reason for this offered by Aly et al. (2014:370) is that education interventions to build cognitive resilience are “a vital component of a comprehensive countering violent extremism approach.”

Feddes et al. (2015) argue that the value of early, preventative interventions derives from how they reduce the risk of creating negative social identities, which, through feelings of anger and exclusion, could potentially result in an attraction to violent ideology. This assumption can be linked to an empirical example in the Netherlands, which found a connection between feelings of relative deprivation among Muslim adolescents and positive attitudes towards ideology-based violence (Feddes et al., 2015). Instead, the primary/universal approach that targets broader populations avoids stigmatising and isolating individuals/specific communities (Bellis and Hardcastle, 2019). In addition, this approach attends to difficulties in identifying those most ‘at risk’, who may be missed by targeted interventions, and avoids deficit-based approaches that carry a sense of young people needing to be ‘improved’ (Bellis and Hardcastle, 2019; Stanley and Guru, 2015).

2.4.2 Preventative interventions and practices

Below, interventions from Sweden, Australia, the Netherlands, and the UK are summarised as examples. Within the following discussion, the assumptions being made within intervention design in terms of the tools for preventing extremism – such as having open conversation about beliefs – are also highlighted.
Earlier, in the introduction (Chapter 1), the study of a Swedish early intervention was noted when referring to the relatively uncommon use of observations within this context. The intervention at the centre of Skiple’s (2018; 2020) study was the ‘Tolerance Project’, aimed at 14- and 15-year-olds considered ‘at risk’ of participating in far-right, extremist, or racist organisations. Delivered by schoolteachers across 7-13 sessions throughout the school year (Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2019), a significant amount of the project’s content relates to the Holocaust (Skiple, 2020). Although the approach aligns with general preventive strategies of anti-racist education and increasing citizenship which exist within Nordic countries, it also differs in the sense that the intervention is targeted towards certain groups of young people. Rather than being a ‘universal’ programme, then, the project targets a school or a collection of schools, and then opens to applications from pupils (RAN, 2019; Skiple, 2020). As will be shown in later chapters, the ‘Project for Girls’ in the present study operated in a similar way.

An interesting feature of the Tolerance Project is the emphasis on social structures around young people, underpinned by an assumption that parents, teachers and peers can influence young people in a positive way that prevents extremism (Skiple, 2020). It therefore aims to mix ‘at risk’ and ‘tolerant’ youth and asks parents to read their children’s work. Skiple (2018) does, however, warn of the potentially stigmatising effects of such interventions, depending on the way they are targeted. In this instance, as the project was not focused solely on a particular ‘at risk’ cohort this was not seen as such an issue, though it would be worthwhile exploring this potential for stigma further within other interventions with different approaches to targeting young people. In addition, while Skiple’s use of observation was helpful in revealing issues and practice challenges, the study concerns only one cohort of one intervention. Expanding this to look at a range of interventions and multiple cohorts would allow comparisons and deeper insights, including in terms of the different ideologies and issues being addressed, as well as different practitioners and their interactions with young people.

Another school-based intervention is ‘Beyond Bali’, a programme aimed at 15-16-year-olds in Australia (Aly et al., 2014). Cognitive behaviour and knowledge-based approaches were used across its five modules with the aim of building social resilience by, for example, raising
awareness of extremism and developing students’ critical thinking skills. The programme design was also informed by evidence that passively engaging students is not effective in this context – instead students must use self-reflection and “critically assess their own beliefs and values and reconstruct their assumptions” (2014:377). Other interventions, such as the ‘Zak’ tool trialled (on a small-scale) in comprehensive schools in the UK, have given a central role to discussion (Reeves and Sheriyar, 2015). The ‘mode’ of delivery in ‘Zak’ was a clickable timeline, which expanded and prompted discussion around certain events in the radicalisation ‘journey’, reflecting the recent developments in social media communications and technology. Together, the examples here foreground the importance of young people being open and reflexive, considering their own ideas as well as ideas from different perspectives. O’Donnell (2016) also stresses the need for practitioners to set ground rules, however, as a way of managing young people’s expectations about what they can share.

Returning to the Australian example, the programme was later evaluated based on feedback from teachers and students, collected using questionnaires and discussions. Aly et al. (2014) argue that the programme achieved a certain degree success in that it: built students’ resilience; created empathy with victims; and developed students’ self-efficacy in resisting extremist influences.

Another European example is provided within Feddes et al.’s (2015) evaluation of an early intervention programme delivered in the Netherlands. As will be shown below, the positive framing of this programme is clear, the purpose being to increase young people’s resilience to radicalisation. The primary aims of the programme were to strengthen self-esteem, and increase agency, perspective taking skills and empathy. These were informed by existing evidence that, for instance, increased empathy and perspective are related to reduced prejudice and stereotyping. It is worth noting that the focus on strengths and skills in building resilience to radicalisation is in contrast to the negative, deficit-based framing criticised by Bellis and Hardcastle (2019) in the preceding section. The programme’s 46 participants were split into groups of around 15 adolescents (described as potentially vulnerable to radicalisation and aged 14-23) worked with certified trainers.

The first part of the Dutch programme addressed participants’ self-esteem by attempting to help them find employment, internships or education. The second and third parts of the
programme dealt more specifically with critical thinking and judgements, and participants were asked to reflect on how they might approach conflict and their own understanding of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviour in relation to wider society. Overall, the authors argue that the resilience training programme increased self-reported agency, and to a smaller (but still statistically significant) extent, also increased reported self-esteem, empathy and perspective taking. As this suggests, and like Aly et al. (2014), Feddes et al. (2015) evaluated the outcomes of the training based on a self-report questionnaire. While the findings of this study are useful to note here, some have critiqued this method of data collection on the basis that respondents may lie or conceal information (see Farrington, 1999 for example). In this study, qualitative methods of data collection may have provided an opportunity to gain a deeper insight into young people’s experiences of the interventions, and/or their interactions and engagement within them (this will be explored further in Chapter 3).

A more targeted project, the ‘Think Project’, was delivered by a youth organisation in Wales to disengaged youth who were seen as vulnerable to far-right extremism (Cifuentes et al., 2013). The project was designed to give young people facts about race, religion and migration, and then use these facts to challenge racism and stereotypes to build their resilience to extremism. Increasing confidence was an additional goal of the project, echoing youth work approaches more generally (Sanders et al., 2015). There were a series of half-day workshops with two groups of ten young people, covering topics such as identity, media, asylum seekers and extremism (Cifuentes et al., 2013). Workshops were delivered by two youth workers: leading the sessions was a Muslim with a non-white Welsh background, who was supported by a white-Welsh worker. This was highlighted as an important element within the pilot study, as it provided young people with an opportunity to meet and build a bond with a Muslim, thereby challenging prejudices they held. Within the sessions, practical tasks and open debate were utilised, the latter being considered particularly important; as well as allowing young people to share their views and ask anything, this also provided an opportunity for those views to be challenged (Cifuentes et al., 2013). The notion for young people being able to ‘ask anything’ is important here, because while open discussion within interventions has already been highlighted, this also points to the response to young people’s openness. With this in mind, positive, open-minded and empathic approaches to
intervention have been highlighted, specifically in terms of creating an atmosphere of trust (Ponsot et al., 2017).

While the discussion of the examples above provides some insight into programme design, there is another intervention component worth considering: practitioners. The potential differences in the approaches used by practitioners within early interventions have been highlighted by a number of authors. In schools specifically, Taylor and Soni (2017) suggest any staff involved must encourage honest discussions where pupils can actively explore views and attitudes, discussing and critiquing radical viewpoints. Similarly, Sjøen and Jore (2019) argue approaches should be bottom-up, actively engaging young people rather than instructing them on what knowledge and values they should hold. One potential challenge in the school setting specifically is that teachers may feel uncertain about how to respond to extremist views and may silence such discussions (Flensner and von der Lippe, 2019; similarly shown by Pilkington and Acik, 2020). Yet as highlighted above, open discussion provides the space for practitioners to prevent radicalisation by addressing young people’s potentially ‘extremist’ views (Cifuentes et al., 2013).

Another issue highlighted in relation to practitioners is that interventions delivered by agencies such as the police may be an issue for groups with lower levels trust in societal institutions (Bjørø and Gjelsvik, 2015). Instead, youth workers, religious leaders, community elders and former extremists are argued to be better suited and more likely to succeed. However, there may be a tension for youth workers between the need for credibility and trust with communities, and the extent to which they engage with securitised practices in the field of extremism, which may inadvertently be stigmatising (McDonald, 2011). Bjørø and Gjelsvik also suggest further research is needed to address why particular types of people would be more effective in implementing interventions than others, and what effect personal qualities and relations have on outcomes. This issue is particularly significant given the role of charismatic leaders in the process of radicalisation (Hofmann and Dawson, 2014). There is therefore a need to better understand whether and how different approaches are deployed by different practitioners, and how different approaches might impact the ways young people engage with interventions.
2.4.3 Early interventions beyond extremism

Although the above examples, as well as discussions by Bellis and Hardcastle (2019) and Koehler (2015), provide some useful evidence, Feddes and Gallucci (2015) argue that there is a general lack of clarity regarding the impact of prevention programmes, the underlying mechanisms involved in their implementation, and the economic costs associated with them. Aly et al. (2014:370) found literature in the specific area of extremism and radicalisation prevention to be “scant and underdeveloped”, and Sjøen and Jore (2019) found a general lack of primary research. However, the techniques and approaches adopted in early interventions with young people more broadly are well documented and worth noting given the potential overlaps between extremism and other issues such as gangs and criminality (Dandurand, 2015).

Resilience has been defined as a process of positive adaptation when faced with difficulties, trauma or adversity (Schoon and Bynner, 2003). For young people, resilience is considered to include feelings of confidence and connectedness, and emphasises the importance of primary prevention, before the onset of ‘problems.’ The ‘risk’ framing, discussed earlier, is also present (and often critiqued) in accounts of resilience, whereby efforts are made to increase protective factors to mitigate the impacts of adverse experiences, particularly for young people ‘at risk’ (Bottrell, 2007; Healy, 2013). The concept has been applied to youth offending, for instance, and one study (cited by Bui and Deakin, 2021) compared ‘resilient’ and vulnerable young people. The findings suggested that vulnerable people who were confronted with few or no risk factors for offending still engaged in offending, while resilient young people exposed to risk factors were able to withstand them. Though the concept has been described by some as “fuzzy” (Stephens and Sieckelinck, 2020:144), some examples of practices to promote resilience include a safe environment to debate sensitive issues, developing critical thinking skills, and citizenship education to increase ‘resilience’ to exclusionary worldviews (Stephens and Sieckelinck, 2020).

Another approach to promoting resilience is adopting strengths- or asset-based approaches, particularly for those previously engaged in deviance/crime and subsequently in the desistance process (Healy, 2013). Rather than focusing on negative actions from the past, there is a view to a young person’s positive future. Such an approach contrasts with deficit-
models, constructing young people as resources to be developed rather than objects to be ‘fixed’ (Sanders et al., 2015; Guerra and Bradshaw, 2008). One specific example of this way of working is Positive Youth Development (PYD), which recognises ‘youth’ as a phase where unique skills and interests – such as sport – grow, and can then be used as assets to support young people (Guerra and Bradshaw, 2008). Encouraging them to talk about their interests also helps convey to young people a sense that practitioners care about them and that they deserve to be cared for, contrasting the idea of them being a ‘bad person’ (Kirkwood, 2021). Such an approach is believed to help prevent a stigmatised, spoiled identity from forming (Braithwaite, 1989; Goffman, 1990a). PYD also recognises agency and young people’s ability to make choices (Lerner et al., 2011), which has been identified as important in contact with practitioners more broadly (Hallett, 2016). The greater emphasis on strengths and assets also means PYD-based interventions can be used with any young person, not only those seen as most ‘at risk’ (Edwards et al., 2007). While the early interventions of interest in this study are often delivered to young people not necessarily seen as ‘at risk’ in any particular way, it is currently unclear to what extent such strengths-based and positive (or negative) approaches are used by practitioners in this ‘pre-Prevent’ context. Gaining insight into interactions if and when positive approaches are used would be beneficial in understanding the role of such techniques in extremism prevention (Deakin et al., 2022).

2.4.4 Critiques of early intervention approaches

Though policy interest in early interventions has continued to grow in recent years (Solomon and Blyth, 2008; Case and Haines, 2015a), critiques remain. They pivot around securitisation of the agenda at the expense of alternative treatments, and a lack of compelling evidence as to what actually works and is ‘effective’. In this final section, an overview of key criticisms is provided.

As alluded to elsewhere in this chapter, among the assumptions underpinning early interventions is the framing of young people as a group likely to be involved in criminality (Martin et al., 2007). A sense of this group being threatening or posing a risk (Goldson, 2008) goes hand in hand with this, conveying mistrust and anxiety regarding young people’s capacity to make a successful transition to adulthood (Kelly, 2003). This has also been described as a precautionary logic responding pre-emptively to ‘at risk’ young people
(Crawford, 2008). In light of the issues of identity discussed earlier in this chapter, this framing becomes potentially problematic, particularly for young people’s sense of self and the extent to which they feel excluded from the mainstream. As well as an accusation that young people’s agency is ignored by this approach (Lewis et al., 2017), early interventions have also been described as ‘creeping criminalisation’ (Solomon and Blyth, 2008). In the context of exploitation, for example, research suggests a focus on addressing young people’s risky behaviour through interventions may convey a message that they are inherently a ‘problem’ (Hallett et al., 2019b). Together, these criticisms point to the potential for negative labels to be attached (and revealed) to young people, (re)producing stigma (Deakin et al., 2022) and reinforcing existing problems. While some may oppose early interventions entirely for this reason, others suggest staff training and experience may help to avoid poor experiences or examples from emerging (Harris-Hogan et al., 2019), again pointing to the importance of facilitators.

In addition, beyond practical difficulties that may arise in early interventions – such as school-based programmes relying on attendance, despite poor attendance being a common issue for those ‘at risk’ of youth violence (Maxwell and Corliss, 2020) – specific questions have also been raised in terms of evidence. Case and Haines (2015a) query the evidence and evaluation of early intervention impact, noting the difficulty in measuring ‘prevention.’ Indeed, in the context of radicalisation prevention specifically, the challenge of demonstrating causal links between early interventions and prevention has contributed to a limited evidence base (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016; Harris-Hogan et al., 2019). One suggestion for this is that priority is often given to the most imminent (physical) threats, which makes gaining support for implementing early interventions difficult (Bellis and Hardcastle, 2019). Meanwhile, Bjørøg and Gjelsvik (2015) suggest the effects of a specific measure are impossible to isolate without controlling for all other conditions and employing a control group. Yet such an evaluation would be artificial, practically challenging, and establishing control groups could be ethically indefensible when interventions are designed to prevent extremism and radicalisation (Bjørøg and Gjelsvik, 2015). While some have challenged the use of early interventions on the basis of this limited evidence, they continue to have a place within policy and practice as the ‘social problem’ of extremism is ongoing and in need of a response. As such, while there may be limits to experimental measures of prevention
effectiveness, there is scope to increase our understanding of intervention delivery and design in other ways. These possibilities have been highlighted throughout this chapter and are summarised below.

2.6 Concluding remarks

This chapter has provided a review of the literature in several key areas of relevance to this thesis: extremism and radicalisation, youth studies and early intervention. In doing so, the chapter has identified current understandings of the ‘problem’ of extremism and approaches to its prevention, as well as highlighting particular elements, tensions and gaps to be explored in further detail in this thesis. After briefly defining what is meant by early intervention in this context at the beginning of the discussion, each of the key areas was considered in depth and with links drawn between them, beginning with radicalisation. As this part of the chapter showed, radicalised beliefs and values are a considered a key ingredient of journeys towards violent terrorist action (Knott and Lee, 2020). Such beliefs may be influenced by interactions with extremists, or by interactions with mainstream society which lead to feelings of exclusion. As will be shown within the empirical discussions, similar understandings of extremism were held by the participants within this study.

For young people, as they are transitioning towards adulthood and developing their sense of purpose and identity, there are particular concerns around their vulnerability and ‘risk’ in relation to extremism. This makes young people’s extreme beliefs a suitable object of control by intervention and prevention, though framing young people in this way has been problematised (Coppock and McGovern, 2014; Solomon and Blyth, 2008). For instance, the chapter highlighted the concern that interventions may stigmatise young people if targeting and viewing them with suspicion (Skiple, 2020). An additional issue in this context, as will be highlighted by the discussion of policy in Chapter 4, is that discussion of this issue in the UK is often dominated by the Prevent Strategy and the accusations of spying and suspicion associated with it. While the focus of this thesis is upon ‘pre-Prevent’ interventions taking
place before extremism has ‘set in’, the implications of this wider context are worth exploring in further depth.

Although the literature in the area of extremism prevention with young people has been described as limited (Sjøen and Jore, 2019), some examples were identified and explored in this chapter. The discussion included a consideration of the approaches being used within these interventions. For instance, open discussion about beliefs and strengths-based approaches both appear to be useful aspects (for example O’Donnell, 2016; Feddes et al., 2015). Yet, there are also limits to this understanding, with less known about how much approaches to intervention vary among different practitioners. It is also unclear to what extent the approaches impact young people’s engagement with extremism interventions. Relatedly, a number of studies used self-report questionnaires to evaluate young people’s perceptions of interventions. While such feedback is useful, directly observing their interactions and engagement would be valuable and provide deeper insight into the operation of early interventions.

By studying and making comparisons between multiple early interventions, delivered to multiple cohorts of young people and by different kinds of practitioners, this study will be able to shed greater light on these issues. As such, the thesis now turns to a discussion of methodology and the research process, setting out how the ‘pre-Prevent’ early interventions were studied.
Chapter 3: Methodology and Fieldwork

The aim of this chapter is to set out the methodological approach of this research. The chapter discusses the ethnographic approach adopted, access negotiations, the methods of data collection, participants, analysis, and ethical considerations. My reflections on the research process are interspersed throughout the chapter. Fieldwork took place between March 2020 and February 2022. Readers will observe it began just prior to the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in the UK; the significant impacts of the global health crisis upon this study are also outlined in this chapter.

3.1 Research design: ethnography and the naturalistic approach

Owing to the focus on preventative interventions for young people in Wales, and an interest in understanding how extremism and radicalisation are constructed by practitioners and policymakers, a qualitative ethnographic approach was chosen. In line with the interpretive view that people attach meanings to their situations and interactions with others, the study sought familiarity with the participants’ own meanings and experiences (Goffman, 1989) using participant observation and semi-structured interviews. While positivist researchers using approaches modelled on the traditional sciences (biology, chemistry, physics) would critique such an approach, ethnographers contend that it is their ‘naturalist’ approach that remains true to the phenomenon under study (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Matza, 2010). This is because, rather than controlling or eliminating extraneous factors, ethnography emphasises the interplay between situated variables within natural environments (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982). In this case, the ‘natural environment’ is the early interventions, as they are delivered to young people.

Naturalism is particularly informed by ideas that may collectively be termed ‘interpretivism’: symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and hermeneutics (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Symbolic interactionism developed out of the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago in the early 1900’s (Rock, 1979). From this view, early interventions are informed by assumptions, understandings, definitions and constructions of
radicalisation held by policymakers and practitioners. Accessing these meanings is essential to understand people’s behaviours (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Rock, 2011). In other words, people cannot be studied without attending to their distinctively human features and community context, conceptually and methodologically (Prus, 1996). Whereas physical scientists study objects that are non-interpreting, the social sciences require a methodology with sensitivity to the human capacity for symbolic interaction (Prus, 1996). The naturalistic, ethnographic approach supports this, allowing researchers to see situations as they are perceived and experienced by the actor, to observe what the actor takes into account, and how they interpret this (Schwandt, 1998). In turn this can, for example, show how processes, mechanisms, and practices interlock to facilitate certain policies and social organisation (Hall and McGinty, 2002).

Within this approach to research, then, there is both an acknowledgement of a ‘reality’ which exists and can be observed (early intervention practices), as well as an appreciation of subjectivity (understandings of extremism and radicalisation which shape those practices) (Matza, 2010). Direct and naturalistic contact with the ‘world’ of interest – through ethnography – is considered essential to appreciate and maintain its integrity (Matza, 2010). That ‘truth’ can be derived from immediate experiences of such a social ‘reality’ is based on an epistemological position that characterises immediate experience as essential (Rock, 1979). As such, both Matza (2010) and Rock (1979) emphasise the importance of providing faithful accounts of phenomena from ethnography, conveying the flow and order of human lived experience. In this study, the naturalistic approach allows an exploration of how people behave within their efforts to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation, as well as how they account for their actions and assumptions in what they disclose.

As Rock argues, the persuasiveness of ethnographic accounts will be judged based on their “correspondence with the sentiments and responses evoked by active participation in the social world” (1979:20). This reflects the inductive approach of this research, where conceptual frameworks were modified and shaped through ongoing interactions with the social world to inform the explanations for that world (Schwandt, 1998). While certain issues and problems informed the research design, there are no specific hypotheses or a predetermined research design (Strauss et al., 1964).
This reflects how the course of research is neither linear nor all encompassing. Denzin (1979) argues that a fragmented organisation cannot be studied in its entirety. Participants exist and interact in different social worlds, and thus have fragmented views. Each has unique histories and social relationships, which means there is a lack of common understanding to unite participants. Instead, the researcher hopes to gather an array of data from observations, interviews and documents at various levels that when taken together form the core activities, participants and situations of the organisation (Denzin, 1979). This reflects the “process of discovery” (Denzin, 1979:63) within this research, with concepts, ideas and issues – including unexpected ones – emerging throughout fieldwork (Strauss et al., 1964). Before discussing this fieldwork activity, studies of organisations and the ethnographic approach are discussed in more detail.

3.1.1 Symbolic interactionism: development and the study of organisations

With understandings and conceptualisations of human life grounded in the day-to-day practices and experiences of those being studied (Prus, 1996), research of this nature is “open-ended, provisional and uncertain of its final outcome” (Rock, 2011:9). The ‘objects’ of study vary, but the study of organisations has been a significant area of interest for symbolic interactionists. Studies have included medical hospitals, psychiatric institutions and school districts. While in some cases, the specific ‘objects’ of study have been single organisations, it has been argued that ‘systems’ can also be studied, exploring how different arenas of activity interlock in terms of administrative, professional and political patterns and negotiations (Strauss et al., 1964). As Fine (1984) suggests, such negotiations are present in any system that involves individuals representing a group in their dealings with others. The prevention of extremism and radicalisation within policy and practice arenas is viewed in this way here, with various practices, activities and interorganisational interactions.

Particularly important in the course of research in the organisational context is access to pertinent data that reveals innerworkings, though these may be kept out of sight (Hughes, 1971). Actors in positions of authority may be unwilling to share the most pertinent data, even though they encouraged the study in the first place (Hughes, 1971). Matza (2010) similarly referred to researchers being deceived by participants in the view they are
permitted to see. The participant-observer role is essential in this sense, as it can be made understandable and acceptable to those being observed, who may or may not be shielding the information needed (Hughes, 1971). In the present study, the naturalistic approach facilitated a better understanding of the social processes and events at the core of the system (Denzin, 1979) and the dynamic nature of the analysis reflected human experience (Hall, 1987). Rather than a catalogue of definitive assertions about the relations of particular aspects of participants’ lives or worlds, the outcome of research of this nature is a set of sensitising concepts and a list of questions (Chapoulie, 1987).

Owing to this, researchers must ask questions about how structures are changed or maintained over time, with the dynamic nature of the social world including changes in people, attitudes and beliefs (Dennis et al., 2013). For instance, Strauss et al. (1964) discuss organisational change and the negotiated order, arguing that there are some stable elements of organisational order as well as more fleeting working arrangements. Such an approach facilitates discovery of the everyday negotiative processes that take place, revealing how people with different backgrounds, motives and ideologies can work together (Strauss et al., 1964). Although some actions and roles are regular and stable (such as a customer/staff interaction in a shop), Dennis et al. (2013) identify some as more complex: in the case of extremism intervention activity, there are decisions involving courses of action, the evaluation of pros and cons, and where different people are involved, this of course involves different interpretations. The different perspectives, realities, cultures and knowledges mediate the policy (Hall and McGinty, 2002).

3.1.2 Ethnography and the ethnographic approach

Ethnography then, goes hand-in-hand with the symbolic interactionist perspective and naturalistic study of phenomena. Such an approach captures the character of the ‘world’ (Rock, 2011) and produces insight into “the real operating factors in group life, and the real interaction and relations between factors” (Blumer, 1969:138).

For this study, two main data collection methods were utilised: participant observation and semi-structured interviews. The goal was to observe the preventative interventions in their natural setting, as they were being delivered to young people, to capture their contents and
delivery techniques, as well as the interactions between those present. Observations also provided opportunities to carry out unstructured interviews with practitioners in the field between intervention sessions. The semi-structured interviews with informed informants (Campbell, 1955) provided an additional space where policymakers and practitioners could reflect at length on the early interventions of interest, and to shed light on their assumptions about extremism and radicalisation. It was also possible to make connections between the two sets of data, both in terms of the analysis and during fieldwork itself: for instance, if an issue was described one way during interview but looked entirely different as it was observed in practice. At times, then, observational fieldnotes provided more richness than talking (Dabney and Brookman, 2018), and combining the two added depth to the analysis overall (Fielding and Fielding, 1986).

The nuances and complexities of ethnographic fieldwork – and indeed, qualitative approaches in general – are realised in Duneier’s (2002:1573) conception of sociology as a “combat sport”. Responding to sustained criticism of ethnography from Wacquant (2002), Duneier makes a number of assertions about his approach to (urban) ethnography. He argues that “real” ethnographic work must make “trade-offs” and that there is no universal ‘best way’ of balancing such decisions (2002:1574). Rather than questioning whether choices should be made by researchers, Duneier argues that they are inherent in the ethnographic approach. They might include: whether to romanticise or condemn participants; undertaking and collating many thinner observations or undertaking fewer thick ones; and whether to bring political agendas or a blank slate to the field (Duneier, 2002). Accordingly, many decisions had to be made during the course of the present project, not least, how to approach the field in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. ‘The field’ was fundamentally changed: much of the activity had moved online and was no longer accessible in the same way. This presented numerous practical and ethical challenges. In particular, I re-considered consent procedures and, at times, whether to completely re-imagine the research design and/or questions in order to make data collection possible. The outcome was a blend of online and in-person fieldwork, discussed in detail in the following sections.
With this in mind, the present research reflects Herbert Blumer’s cyclical exploration and inspection approach: the exploration process was modified as the collected data was inspected. As Hammersley and Atkinson (2007:3) put it, ethnographers gather “whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry.” The process of this research involved some stages of interview-only data collection or participant observation-only data collection, while at other stages, data collection using the two methods was simultaneous. For instance, although fieldwork originally began with participant observations in March 2020, in adapting to the disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, interviews then became the focus. Subsequently, over half of the interviews took place before it was possible to begin participant observation again. This became a valuable way of working: as issues and themes began emerging through observations, they could be explored in depth in later interviews and vice versa.

A further area of complexity emerges when reflecting on the character of an ethnography carried out in the context of the ‘social world’ of early interventions, given this ‘world’ is quite structured in nature. It involves practitioners going into schools and education settings on particular days, at particular times, and for particular amounts of time. In some ways, then, my approach could be described as a form of ‘appointment ethnography’ (Copes et al., 2021) in the sense that my ethnographic fieldwork took place on set dates and times. This departs from the ‘traditional’ image of ethnography as being based upon deep and sustained immersion, such as that portrayed by many well-known and traditional anthropological texts, which have seen researchers travelling great distances to immerse themselves in new cultures day-and-night for years at a time (Hammersley, 2006; for example Malinowski, 1922; Evans-Pritchard, 1937). It could be argued, then, that because I was not with participants for days or months at a time, and could sometimes be in the field for 1-2 hour blocks, the study does not sufficiently meet the ‘criteria’ needed to term it an ‘ethnography’. Hammersley (2006) recognises this tension, arguing that many recent ethnographic studies in the social sciences do not necessarily meet the more anthropological definition involving around-the-clock participation, often over several years. Yet more recent ethnographies maintain “the importance of studying at first hand what people say and do” (Hammersley, 2006:4, original emphasis). Accordingly, my approach was specifically organised around the reality of the interventions and the practitioners involved
in them (Rock, 1979; Schwandt, 1998), reflecting that there are different ways of doing ethnographic work, and methods can and should be configured according to the research situation (Duneier, 2002). The aim was to gather any data that could be illuminating and insightful (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), and the value of the collection of observations and interviews lies in their correspondence with the social world of interest (Duneier, 2002; Rock, 1979). This commitment to studying action in context is a feature shared by all ethnographies (Duneier, 2002), including the present study.

3.1.3 Evaluating ethnography

Credibility, the extent to which research findings can be considered trustworthy and plausible, is a key consideration when appraising research (Tracy, 2010). In relation to this, Spencer et al. (2003:59) critically discuss what is often considered the “holy trinity” of evaluation criteria: validity, reliability and objectivity. In the same discussion, they also include generalisability, questioning to what degree research findings can be considered representative of an issue more widely. Validity may be summarised as whether (or not) an instrument measures what it is supposed to, and whether (or not) a particular proposition can be made (Spencer et al., 2003). Reliability relates to the extent to which research can be replicated, and objectivity to the involvement of the researcher in the setting and whether they can be separated from the research (Spencer et al., 2003). The relevance of these criteria, traditionally applied to quantitative research, is a contested issue in qualitative circles, with Northcote (2012:100) for instance terming them “mismatched”. Patton (2014) argues that because the relative strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative research differ, the credibility of each approach hinges on different factors. There has been a mixed response to this which has seen some reject the concepts entirely, while others have adapted them (Lincoln, 1995; Spencer et al., 2003).

While some methods may be more suitable than others in particular research contexts, Lincoln et al. (2018:239) state that no single method or compilation of methods “is the royal road to ultimate knowledge.” Recognising the diversity and complexity of participants and contexts, qualitative researchers work within the boundaries and contexts of their research settings rather than following strict guidelines for selecting their methodologies (Northcote, 2012). The value of the qualitative approach is that it offers depth, openness and detail in
relation to the meanings and practices underpinning radicalisation prevention (Patton, 2014). Within the naturalistic approach, it would be impossible to precisely reconstruct the unique situations captured by the data collection process, which would be a traditional measure of reliability (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982). However, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a clear account of how the research was conducted, demonstrating the processes and analysis that underpin the findings presented in the following chapters (Spencer et al., 2003). This includes details of access, my level of participation and immersion, my fieldnote practices, as well as discussion of the challenges and twists encountered along the way (Tracy, 2010). This kind of methodological transparency increases the auditability and dependability of research (Spencer et al., 2003), and the credibility of ethnography more specifically (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982).

A related aspect of achieving credibility is reflexivity (Tracy, 2010; Northcote, 2012), also referred to as critical subjectivity (Lincoln, 1995). Patton (2014:130-1) describes this as “an ongoing examination of what I know and how I know it”, emphasising self-awareness. This is of particular significance here, because in the ethnographic approach, the self of the researcher is used as a tool to explore the social world and its processes (Rock, 1979). Reflexivity reminds the researcher to be conscious of influences on their own perspective and voice, as well as on those of participants (Patton, 2014; May, 1993). Fully insulating research from wider society and the biography of the researcher may be difficult; yet, by engaging in reflexivity and recognising and questioning our assumptions, it is reasonable to assume we are able to describe phenomena as they are, not merely how we perceive and would like them to be (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Reflexivity is interspersed throughout the discussion in this chapter.

As noted above, generalising findings across space and time, from smaller populations to larger populations based on statistically representative samples has traditionally been held as a key measure of success (Patton, 2014). Although statistical generalisations may not be possible from a qualitative study such as this, findings can still be transferred and useful in other settings and situations (Tracy, 2010; Patton, 2014). The aim is “comparability and translatability of findings” as opposed to transference to issues or groups not studied (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982:34). In addition, Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) argue that
ethnographers seek to respect the particularity of the cases they study in drawing their conclusions. By linking their findings to wider populations through showing typical or atypical cases, or using their thick descriptions to understand new situations of interest, ethnographers are still able to produce useful conclusions (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). In the findings and conclusion chapters, by providing rich descriptions of the interventions in Wales, as well as the negotiations and challenges associated with them, implications for other settings and wider policy are discussed.

3.2 Accessing the field

For the purposes of this research, the ‘field’ included both physical and virtual spaces. For the participant observations, this predominantly meant the sites of the interventions themselves, which were occasionally virtual, particularly at the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic. At the outset of the research, it was not entirely clear what or where the specific sites would be, but this was revealed in an iterative way after contacting gatekeepers. All interviews were conducted remotely, either via Microsoft Teams, Zoom or telephone. Access to the field was gradually negotiated over the months leading up to the beginning of the research, with relationships and expectations carefully managed throughout. During the planning stages of the research, I contacted three key gatekeepers who were in positions to facilitate further contacts and resources (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007): an officer from the WJEC (Welsh exam board), a manager from a charity working with young people, and an experienced youth worker. Further to this, key contacts in policing and policy were also aware of the proposed research and kept updated, with some of them becoming gatekeepers once the research began. Meetings with gatekeepers and contacts held in November 2019, once the research was underway, were instrumental in firming up the research plan and access, as well as in sharing wider contacts. These included schools across Wales and education workers carrying out relevant work who eventually featured in the research.

Throughout the entire fieldwork process, access was negotiated and renegotiated over time (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Clearing fieldwork with class teachers and headteachers
and ensuring the appropriate consent procedures were in place took some time. Crucially, and as the above description indicates, many separate organisations are involved in the delivery of interventions in Wales. Conscious that policing is often a more ‘closed’ area to researchers (Brookman, 2015), I approached this access negotiation with particular care, taking time and preparing a short one-page research briefing to answer any questions (see Appendix 1). The flexible nature of the ethnographic approach, which is initially exploratory (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), supported the management of the ongoing relationships required to complete the fieldwork. It also allowed flexibility in response to the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic, which saw interventions heavily disrupted: they either stopped, were postponed, or moved online. For the few that were conducted online, this presented new challenges in relation to access and obtaining consent. This was possible in some cases, but not all. Then, even when interventions began taking place in-person again, access was sometimes impossible due to individual school’s policies limiting visitors (from around September 2020 to April 2021).

New and unexpected challenges also emerged, such as a very last-minute lateral flow test that needed to be taken to enter a school, something that was not communicated in advance by the organisers. As a result, I found myself sitting in my car in the school’s car park, taking a test just as the session was about to begin. Additionally, in the online environment, connectivity issues somewhat changed the way I interacted as an interviewer. Obvious body language and verbal responses became more important, in case participants thought I’d frozen. The potential for awkwardness without face-to-face contact, combined with the lack of body language in online research has been noted elsewhere (for example Adams-Hutcheon and Longhurst, 2017).

3.3 Data collection: Participant observation

Fieldwork began with participant observations in March 2020, and the final observation took place in February 2022. Observing the interventions taking place in real-time and in their natural settings provided rich insight, not only into the interactions and dynamics between young people and facilitators, but also the practicalities that sit alongside such
prevention work. The primary focus was the preventative interventions themselves, although some additional meetings and training sessions were also observed where relevant, helping to build a more thorough picture. In total, 70 hours were spent observing with practitioners and young people, both online and in-person. A summary of the observations is provided in Table 1, including the number of sessions and cohorts observed, as well as total hours observing each intervention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Local/national</th>
<th>Age range</th>
<th>Total sessions observed</th>
<th>Number of cohorts observed</th>
<th>Number of young people</th>
<th>Fieldwork dates</th>
<th>Total hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-racism workshop (in-person)</td>
<td>One-off sessions</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>16-17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11-24</td>
<td>March 2020</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for Girls (online)</td>
<td>12x weekly sessions</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>16-17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12-28</td>
<td>November 2020-March 2021</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Extremism lesson (in-person)</td>
<td>One-off session</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>13-14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19-25</td>
<td>May 2021</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony programme (training session, online)</td>
<td>One-off session (for teachers)</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>June 2021</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for Boys (in-person with 1x online)</td>
<td>4x weekly sessions</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>13-16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2-9</td>
<td>October 2021-February 2022</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Summary of intervention observations

As the table indicates, for the one-off sessions (anti-racism workshops and police extremism lessons), interventions were observed in full. The training session for teachers delivering the Harmony programme was also a one-off and observed in full, though the Harmony programme itself takes place over multiple lessons. Meanwhile, for the projects delivered over multiple weeks, individual sessions were observed in full. However, three sessions of the Project for Girls were not observed: I missed the first two sessions as I began observing in the third week the project and missed one other session due to scheduling issues. The
Project for Boys, on the other hand, provided an opportunity to observe an intervention in its entirety and with all four cohorts taking part.

The goal was to observe as wide a variety of interventions as possible, and despite disruptions, a range of interventions and cohorts were still captured. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed discussion of intervention content and routes of referral into programmes, but for the purposes of this chapter, they can be summarised as follows:

- **Anti-racism workshops** – sessions lasting around one hour are run in schools across Wales by trained facilitators, focusing on racism, prejudice and hate crime. A number of facilitators work for the charity, but they deliver sessions individually, with group sizes between 11 to 24 in those observed.
- **Project for Girls** – a 12-week project delivered online and designed to educate girls aged 16-17 on various risks and safety issues including radicalisation, grooming, online safety and politics. Attendance ranged with between 12 and 28 girls present across the observed sessions. The main facilitator was an ex-police officer, though she was also supported by another facilitator who managed the chat and controlled the screen sharing.
- **Police Extremism lesson** – a short film and lesson plan designed by staff and officers in counter-terrorism policing based around the fictional radicalisation of two young people in Wales. Sessions lasted around an hour and were delivered in comprehensive schools around Wales, with the number of young people between 19 and 25 in the sessions I observed. One local school-based police officer facilitated each lesson.
- **Harmony programme** – a programme specifically covering extremism and radicalisation across multiple sessions and delivered by individual classroom teachers (having been trained by the designers of the programme). There are different programme options with between 4 and 25 hour-long lessons, with cohorts depending on class size.
- **Project for Boys** – 4-week project designed to explore issues including radicalisation, county lines, gangs, and drugs, delivered by one specialist youth worker. Most
sessions were run by the same practitioner, Craig, though a different youth worker, Dom, took his place for one session per cohort. This was because Dom’s experience was predominantly around supporting young people with substance misuse issues, and so he took the relevant session. The project was targeted towards small groups of boys aged 13-16 who had been referred by teachers and/or support workers, with between 2 and 9 boys in each session across the cohorts.

A purposive sampling approach was deployed when identifying interventions to observe. At the beginning of the research, I was already aware of some interventions, including youth work projects and sessions in schools. Additional early interventions were identified as the research commenced, resulting in the list above. Some were being delivered nationally, while others were more localised. In addition, some were universal in that they were delivered widely to whole classes, while others were more targeted and based on concerns about certain young people. They were all considered early forms of prevention, however, because they were taking place at a pre-Prevent referral stage.

Due to disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, some interventions were significantly disrupted and were not possible to observe in situ, such as youth work projects. Those running the interventions were interviewed, however, and they discussed their perceptions and experiences at length. Similarly, despite multiple provisional dates being agreed with teachers at various points during the fieldwork, last minute isolations or restrictions on school visitors amid rising infection rates disrupted plans to observe the Harmony programme. The virtual training sessions for teachers were insightful in terms of the content being delivered to young people in Wales, though it was a shame to not be able to observe them in practice. This was again supplemented by interviews with practitioners and teachers who had designed and delivered the programme.

The experience of beginning fieldwork is captured by Goffman (1989:130): “There is a freshness cycle when moving into the field. The first day you'll see more than you'll ever see again. And you'll see things that you won't see again.” The first day in each of the settings provided new and unusual experiences, with lots to observe and take in, including the physical (or in some cases virtual) settings, the young people, the facilitators, their
interactions, and the content of the interventions. My role was typically that of participant-as-observer (Gold, 1958) as I was openly present as a researcher, but was often invited to participate in activities by facilitators. Some involved me to a lesser degree though, only including me in their introductions and very little else, in which case I became more of an observer-as-participant or complete observer (Gold, 1958). Managing these roles was an important learning experience as the fieldwork began, and I had to balance being a participant immersed enough to understand meaning and social processes, but also marginal enough as an observer to appreciate what could be taken for granted (Rock, 1979).

To capture what I observed, I predominantly made fieldnotes by hand in a notebook, typing them up in detail after each session to provide full, narrative accounts of the interactions I observed. To begin, my observations (and therefore my fieldnotes) were informed by my research questions, though over time, as new issues began to emerge and analytical ideas developed, my notes became increasingly focused (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). While observing interventions, I paid close attention to both the facilitators and the young people. This included the content of the interventions, the modes used to deliver them (e.g. slide shows, videos), the techniques used by facilitators, the ways they moved around the room, and how they interacted with young people and involved them in the sessions. I also considered how the young people responded to the interventions, observing how they behaved, their body language, their interactions with the facilitator and amongst themselves. The time before and after sessions also provided opportunities for conversations with facilitators about various aspects relating to interventions, which were a form of unstructured interviews (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007).

As I was an overt observer, I did not try to hide my note taking completely, but I did try to minimise disruption or interference with the intervention (Emerson et al., 2011). I kept in mind Rock’s (1979:203) discussion of the issue of participants having “anxieties” about the intentions of an observer. I was also conscious that constantly looking down at my notepad would interrupt my observations. In practice, this meant that I took brief jotted notes capturing key points about aspects such as delivery-style and tone, as well as any comments from the young people. This helped to maintain detail and accuracy but in a way that preserved my relations with the facilitators and young people (Emerson et al., 2011).
links to the importance of establishing rapport with participants, which Rock (2011) argues is essential, owing to the ongoing interaction between participants and researchers. In order to see and hear something of the life of a social group, it is essential to build up trust, confidence and friendship (Rock, 2011).

With this in mind, there were certain moments in the field where I paused taking fieldnotes, either to participate in activities or because a young person was recounting something personal. For instance, when one young person began telling a story about his brother being attacked, worried it might make him feel awkward to see me jotting things down, I made it clear that I was listening and not taking notes by closing my notebook. Then, once the conversation moved onto something else, I made quick notes about his story to jog my memory later on. At the end of every day in the field, when I came to write up the fieldnotes, I added much more detail and narrative to create full accounts from the brief jotted points I had. I did this as soon as I could before observations could fade from my memory, maximising the level of detail I could recall (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). It is these detailed narrative fieldnotes which feature in the following chapters of this thesis.

Over time, I came to be trusted by the gatekeepers and participants I was involved with for the longest periods. Particularly when it came to the Project for Boys groups, because they knew I’d been observing closely and jotting notes during sessions, the organisers always asked me for feedback about sessions when recapping in their regular catch-up meetings. I was often asked to remind them of names (which I could sometimes remember) and the facilitator sometimes clarified pieces of information with me, such as young people’s back stories. I was happy to help, but remained conscious that my role had ‘changed’ and I had in some ways become part of the project ‘team’ and, to some extent, the decisions being made. Similar experiences of becoming involved in this ‘process’ have been reported by other field researchers (for example see van Maanen, 2003; Brookman, 2015). Delamont (2016) argues that as field relations develop it is normal for fieldworkers to make themselves ‘useful’ in such ways, but they should also be aware of their role and maintain the reflexive attitude throughout. I was also conscious of the impression I gave to young people and did not want my presence to feel overly formal or awkward. One of the ways I managed this was through my appearance, and I dressed in relaxed clothing whenever I was
observing to reduce any feeling of “sharp differences” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:67). For instance, I wore jeans, jumpers and trainers that were not too dissimilar to those worn by young people (van Maanen, 1991).

In responding to the Covid-19 pandemic and shifts in delivery methods for interventions, some observations took place virtually, either via Microsoft Teams (referred to herein as Teams) or Zoom. Although the environment itself had shifted, the observations were still naturalistic in that they took place in the interventions’ ‘natural’ settings. Virtual observations did feel quite different to those that took place in person, however, with new and unfamiliar things to observe. Tummons et al. (2015:14) argue that changes in the traditional notions of fieldwork reflects that methodology is “compelled to change by and in response to the social worlds” it attempts to illuminate, as well as the technological affordances offered to researchers. The ‘social world’ included new and unfamiliar aspects such as screen sharing, cameras and microphones being turned on and off, views into young people’s homes, verbal as well as chat box interactions, and connectivity issues. By watching, listening, asking questions and reflecting on emerging issues, I gradually got a better sense of the interventions, the participants and their interactions (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). For instance, some young people joined sessions late or dropped out halfway through, and many kept their cameras off, so they were not visible. After my first online observation experience where I noted these new behaviours, I paid more attention to them and reflected on what they might mean in terms of engagement.

To develop a greater degree of familiarity and capture a wider range/sample of events (Goffman, 1989), wherever possible, interventions were observed multiple times. For one-off/single session interventions, this meant multiple observations with different cohorts, which was possible in the case of the anti-racism workshops and police Extremism lessons. For the Project for Boys which ran over multiple weeks, the whole intervention was observed with four different cohorts. Further, planning meetings for the Project for Boys were also observed, where practitioners reflected on past sessions and discussed plans for future sessions and cohorts. This opportunity arose naturally, and the meetings added much value and insight. They revealed the complexities of delivering interventions, particularly during a pandemic, while negotiating with multiple stakeholders and their competing
viewpoints on, for instance, who should or should not attend an intervention. This links to Rock’s (1979) argument that participant observation is pivotal in interactionism: in this case, the approach was essential in uncovering the messiness that underlies the implementation of policy and the delivery of interventions. This theme is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

3.4 Data collection: Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews were selected as a data collection method to capture the perspectives of practitioners with relevant experience and knowledge of both radicalisation and early interventions for its prevention. In total, 28 interviews lasting on average 1 hour 10 minutes (between 40 minutes and 2 hours) were conducted between May 2020 and February 2022 (see Table 2 overleaf). Guided by a broad list of questions and prompts, the interviews provided an opportunity to gain insight into participants’ understandings and experiences and generated rich qualitative data. Informed by the interactionist perspective, meaning was of central interest owing to its impact on the way people see, act towards, and talk about objects (Blumer, 1969). Within interview interactions, participants place definitions on their experiences, with the act of recounting being an act of interpretation (Innes, 2004). As participants deconstruct their practices and experiences, they engage in a sense-making process, unpacking their beliefs and actions and presenting them to the interviewer (Innes, 2004).

Rubin and Rubin (2012) argue that qualitative interviews offer richness and depth, enabling researchers to explore their participants’ experiences and to see things from their perspective. The semi-structured nature of the interviews meant that participants were able to take our conversations in directions I had not expected. Some raised entirely new issues while others reflected on particular issues in more depth than their fellow participants. Rather than solely relying on my own fixed set of questions, the more flexible structure of the conversations was responsive to the meanings and experiences of the participants. Because of the space to actively respond to participants’ answers (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015), it was also possible to ask probes and follow-up questions to gain precision and
clarity (Arksey and Knight, 1999). With meaning and interpretation being central in qualitative research, the ability to clarify in this way is valuable in ensuring participants’ voices are not misrepresented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Youth work</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Zoom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James</td>
<td>Education work</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
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<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike</td>
<td>Education work</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>Zoom</td>
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<td>Kevin</td>
<td>Local authority</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>Police</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Teams</td>
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<td>Tony</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue</td>
<td>Campaigns</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Zoom</td>
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<td>Gary</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Teams</td>
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<td>Jess</td>
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<td>F</td>
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<td>F</td>
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<td>Zoom</td>
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</table>

Table 2: Summary of interviews and participants

A purposive sample (Punch, 2005; Patton, 2014) of 28 well-informed actors (Blumer, 1969; Campbell, 1955) took part in the interviews. They were selected specifically because of their involvement in the prevention of extremism and radicalisation in Wales, with some holding specific roles relating to Prevent, or other ‘pre-Prevent’ work with young people. The sample can broadly be described as ‘practitioners and policymakers’ (and will often be referred to as such when discussing the interviews), though the list of roles is more
extensive, including: police officers and staff, policymakers/actors, teachers, education workers, support workers and youth workers. The inclusion of a variety of roles and sectors was also part of the purposive sampling, as it meant participants were able to offer a range of perspectives and experiences to this research.

All interviews were carried out remotely, either via Teams (N=10), Zoom (N=11) or telephone (N=7), depending on participant preference and accessibility. The vast majority of participants had their cameras on during video interviews, with only a couple turning them off due to connectivity or software issues. Where possible, these video-based calls were the preferred medium as they offered (virtual) face-to-face communication, which Archibald et al. (2019), among others, found helped in promoting natural and relaxed conversation. Typically, in-person interviews are characterised as the “gold standard” of communication (Howlett, 2021:4). However, while online tools were already growing in popularity before the Covid-19 pandemic, their use became a necessity for many researchers who were forced to adapt. One of the main challenges associated with online tools is connectivity issues (as noted by Meskell et al., 2021) with the solution in this case typically being to switch to the telephone or rearranging for another time if participants had availability. Telephone interviews have also been carefully considered as a method, with some suggesting, for instance, that while subtleties associated with physical interaction may be lost, telephone interviews help the researcher to avoid imposing contextual information on the data (Hanna, 2012). Pragmatically, the key benefit of interviewing remotely was that it made data collection possible during a time when face-to-face contact was not (see also Davies et al., 2020).

Almost all interviews were recorded using a Dictaphone to ensure participants’ voices were transcribed securely but with accuracy (Back, 2010). This involved placing the Dictaphone near the laptop or phone (which was on ‘loudspeaker’). The only interview not recorded was with Sam, who was relatively new to her role: while Sam was happy to participate, she was nervous about a recording being made. I suggested that I could take detailed notes, capturing as much of our conversation as possible, and she was happy to proceed.
At the beginning of each interview, participants were reminded of the research and its aims, then asked opening questions about their roles and backgrounds. Being “conversations with a purpose” (Burgess, 1984:102), as participants reflected on these opening questions and discussed their roles and responsibilities, they were guided towards the broad topics/themes of interest contained in the interview schedule (see Appendix 2). Participants were asked about their understandings of and roles in relation to extremism and its prevention. The elements involved in various interventions with young people were unpicked, with participants asked to describe the objectives, target audience, delivery settings, contents, and modes, and to provide examples from their practice. There were also opportunities for participants to reflect on the meaning of ‘effectiveness’ in this context and whether there were particular enablers or challenges when delivering interventions. Some provided large amounts of rich data, particularly those who had worked in the area for some years and were keen to share their experiences. Also, given the interviews first commenced in May 2020, participants were also asked to reflect on the potential implications of Covid-19 for young people’s (risk of) radicalisation.

Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) argue that interviews are actually quite a bizarre form of social interaction: a stranger is willing to tell someone else about their life, things that they would not normally reveal, simply because the interviewer presents themselves as a researcher. While participants being surprisingly open may appear strange to outsiders of the interaction, important groundwork and rapport building underpinned every interview in this study. I had informal exchanges with participants (via telephone/video calls or email) in the lead up to interviews, giving them a sense of what the research was about and answering any questions they had. Further, for participants holding senior roles in their organisations and who may be considered ‘elite’ (Harvey, 2011), more time was set aside to build the rapport needed to access to their ‘worlds’. More widely, pre-interview conversations and meetings with stakeholders, as well as the two days of participant observation that took place pre-lockdown in March 2020, were all helpful in informing the approach taken to each interview. Having observed one intervention with multiple groups of young people and discussed aspects of various other interventions informally, I became more familiar with the social worlds of my participants, which helped when formulating the questions and themes I
planned to cover during their interviews (discussed similarly in relation to survey questions by Cicourel, 1964).

In some ways, the remote setting sometimes added to the challenge of putting participants at ease and building initial rapport, particularly in the earlier interviews, where the shift to remote meetings and video calls was still new for most people. This concern has been reflected in discussions of maintaining relationships and trust at a distance in recent literature (see for instance Nind et al., 2021 and Archibald et al., 2019). At the same time, though, this also served as a talking point in itself: the strangeness of the situation was something I shared with participants and was often a useful way to open our interactions. Then, over time, remote meetings became more ‘normal’: Self (2021) notes that as participants have become more familiar and are increasingly using online tools in their everyday lives, they are likely to feel more relaxed.

During interviews, rapport continued developing and growing, and Goffman’s (1990b) ‘impression management’ is a useful conceptualisation in considering these interactions. For instance, if negative feelings arise on the part of the interviewer, they will typically be covered up (Cicourel, 1964). Gerson and Horowitz (2002) similarly reflect on the need to put aside moral judgement within an interview to understand the other person. Equally, the participant may take part in a similar impression management process, hiding what might be considered hostile or unfavourable and only sharing what they consider necessary (Cicourel, 1964). Relatedly, Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) argue that while the interviewer does not have to intentionally exert power, participants may tell the interviewer what they think (s)he wants to hear. Power has also been identified in the process of transforming accounts and experiences into writing such as this (Smith, 2002). With this in mind, researcher awareness and reflexivity on the role of power is key.

3.5 Analysis

While this section has been separated from the preceding two on observations and interviews, this is for the purposes of clarity and not to imply they were distinct processes.
The analysis of the data began as they were being collected, aligning with Becker’s sequential analysis approach (1970). This inductive approach meant that conceptual ideas and hypotheses were generated during the study. Becker and Geer (1982) argue that researchers seeking to understand aspects of organisations and local circumstances typically assume they do not know enough before entering the field to specify the problems and concepts that will be most fruitful to study. Being flexible and adaptive to situations, the nature of ethnographic fieldwork means that it allows for unexpected discoveries to be made and followed up (Becker and Geer, 1982). Accordingly, four stages of analysis took place: selection and definition of problems and concepts; checking the frequency and distribution of phenomena; construction of social system models; and final analysis and presentation of findings. In outlining these stages below, the finding relating to ‘safe spaces’ is used.

The first stage of Becker’s (1970) analysis involves the selection and definition of concepts, problems and indicators. The data are used to speculate about possibilities, though the exploratory nature means ideas may be discarded at later stages. Becker also makes a number of suggestions for assessing evidence as it is gathered in the field, including: an awareness of the credibility of participants and their unique perspective; differentiating between statements participants make voluntarily/unprompted and those they make prompted by the observer’s questions; and recognising the role of the observer in the group. To take an example from the study findings, when discussing approaches to interventions, the notion of a non-judgemental and safe ‘space’ was highlighted repeatedly. This appeared to be an interesting aspect of prevention as its mention was prompted by a general interview question rather than a specific query about ‘safe spaces’, and was discussed by participants from different policy and practice backgrounds.

Secondly, Becker argues the researcher must discover which of the concepts, problems and indicators identified in the first stage should be pursued as major foci of the research. This might depend on the number of items of evidence (i.e. how many participants are in agreement about something) but also the kinds of evidence, and whether something was described by a participant and later observed in practice. Returning to the concept of ‘safe space’, this was originally highlighted in early interviews. However, as the study progressed,
it continued to emerge, both within observations and across further interviews. It was interesting that practitioners placed such emphasis on making young people feel ‘safe’ and as though they were able to be open and honest, and I decided to explore this more. This stage was also informed by Katz’s (2001; 2002) arguments about luminous data and its use in explaining phenomena. One example is a problem or event that seemed strange and enigmatic prompted further consideration and investigation (Katz, 2001). For instance, during one observation of the Project for Boys, a young person disclosed that they had, in the past, transported drugs for someone on their estate. The boy’s honesty came as a surprise to both me and the practitioner in the sense that he felt able to be so open about criminal activity within the intervention. This example was particularly useful when considering the impacts of practitioners’ approaches on young people’s engagement and led to further inquiry to understand ‘why’ this was the case (Katz, 2001), as outlined below.

Third, once findings have been thoroughly investigated, Becker suggests a model be designed to account for their connections and interrelations with other aspects within the study. This might include, for instance, statements about the importance and influence of particular concepts, or making connections between phenomena discovered in the field and theoretical perspectives. In the case of ‘safe spaces’, connections were made with concepts of identity and stigma during analysis (Matza, 2010; Goffman, 1991), which supported the interpretation of the practices described and adopted by practitioners. This third stage also includes a search for negative or contradictory cases to inform the model. In the current example, this included considering the practices of some practitioners who did not take such a clearly non-judgemental approach to their delivery, and how this shaped their interactions with young people.

Lastly in Becker’s analysis, after the fieldwork has finished, the models are checked and rebuilt accordingly. Alternative ideas are considered, as well as the extent to which they are supported by the data. Using the example of ‘safe spaces’, both the interactions observed within interventions and the accounts shared by practitioners suggest that the impression given to young people about whether they are ‘safe’ or going to be judged within an intervention is important. Within a wider discussion of the implications of early interventions for identity and stigma, this example is explored in greater depth in Chapter 6.
As this discussion shows, although research has traditionally separated data collection and analysis, in field research, the analysis takes place simultaneously with and complementary to data collection (Burgess, 1982). A useful tool to support this process was the research diary I used throughout. This was a place to keep analytic notes and thoughts on the research as it progressed, as well as reflections on my own thoughts and feelings (Coffey, 1999). This element of reflexivity was essential as it allowed me to keep track of concepts and themes, as well as recording the experience and challenges of fieldwork itself (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). As new aspects or problems of interest emerged from the observations and interviews, they could be noted, compared and then explored in more depth as the research progressed.

NVivo, a software package for qualitative data, was used as an aid throughout the analysis. This was a place to store all transcripts and fieldnotes and enabled searching across them, as well as somewhere to record ideas and themes as they emerged, complementing the sequential analysis process as decisions were made about concepts and data. In total, there were 28 interview transcripts and 38 fieldnote documents. The research diary was not digitised to include in the NVivo file, but it was used and referred to throughout the process. Where interview quotations and fieldnotes are presented and discussed in the following chapters, the different forms of data are identified and differentiated from my own words. For interview data, italic font has been used with quotation marks in-text, or with indentations for longer quotations, as well as references to participants’ names. Fieldnote extracts use the same font, but have primarily been indented to distinguish them from other text, with references to the specific fieldnotes entries. Shorter fieldnote extracts (such as phrases) have not been indented but are also identified using references to the specific fieldnote entries. Quotation marks are only used within fieldnotes where I was able to record participants’ exact words.
3.6 Ethical considerations and procedures

An application for ethical approval was made at the end of November 2019 to the School of Social Sciences (Cardiff University) Research Ethics Committee. Relationships with key gatekeepers and other contacts were already established and the application process was a useful exercise in firming up the research plan and creating a clear workflow. Approval was initially granted in December 2019, though the approach and methodology were subject to ongoing review throughout the fieldwork process. This was also an important aspect of adapting the research to the Covid-19 pandemic, as outlined below. The following provides a discussion of informed consent procedures, anonymity and confidentiality, and ‘harm.’ The section closes with some reflections on my position as a researcher during this time.

3.6.1 Consent procedures

Informed consent was a key consideration in this research. Participants were made aware of the objectives and nature of the research, based on which they could freely give consent to take part (Norris, 1993). I also made all participants aware that they were free to withdraw from the research at any time. This was the case for all of the semi-structured interviews. Participants were provided with information sheets and consent forms ahead of interviews (see Appendix 3 for a copy of this form) and encouraged to ask any questions they had before signing. They were then reminded of the purposes of the research and their right to withdraw at any time at the beginning of the interview. Some participants did not return a signed consent form, but all gave their informed consent verbally (and, indeed, had ‘attended’ the virtual interviews or answered my phone call).

Throughout the fieldwork, facilitators who were being observed delivering interventions were approached about the possibility of observing sometime in advance of their session. This was both to ensure there was enough time to make relevant arrangements with the settings in which they would be delivering (i.e. schools and colleges), as well as giving them time to decide. They were provided with information sheets and consent forms (see Appendix 4 for a copy of this), though not all chose to return them.
All young people who took part in observations were provided with age-appropriate information sheets and consent forms containing the details of the research (Parsons et al., 2016). For observations that took place with young people aged over 16 (but under 18), in line with the application for ethical approval, the young people were able to consent on their own behalf. In order to ensure they had time to make an informed decision about whether they wanted to participate, information sheets and opt-in consent forms were provided around a week in advance of sessions. The sheets explained that because the intervention was being delivered by a separate organisation, any young person who did not wish to participate in the research would still be able to participate in the session but would not be included in my fieldnotes (see Appendix 5 for a copy of the form).

However, as described elsewhere in this chapter, the Covid-19 pandemic significantly disrupted the fieldwork just after it began. After a few months, as it began looking likely that in-person fieldwork might resume, I took the decision to amend and resubmit my ethics application, changing from opt-in to opt-out consent for young people (and parents/guardians for those under 16) (see Appendix 6 and 7 for copies of these forms). The primary reason for the change was that, originally, I had planned to conduct group conversations with young people and was therefore using one opt-in consent form to cover both observations and group conversations. However, I felt that asking young people to take additional time out of lessons when they had already missed a lot of school during lockdown was problematic. There were also practical issues of social distancing as well as difficulties predicting whether children would be absent and/or isolating, and so the group conversations were abandoned. This was a difficult decision because I had hoped to use the groups to gain insight into whether the interventions had resonated with young people, and which aspects were most memorable. Instead, I placed greater emphasis on observing the way young people interacted with the sessions in order that their perspective was still included as much as possible. I focused on their interactions with facilitators as well as each other, and their behaviours, reactions, and body language. I felt that as long as parents and young people were given enough time – around a week – to read through and make informed choices about participation in the observation, opt-out consent would be sufficient. At the start of the observation sessions, I also asked facilitators to remind the young people that I was there to understand what they were being taught about. This also
meant I did not need to rely on schools collecting consent forms back in whilst working in their already challenging circumstances, which may have led to further delays.

The revised ethics application was submitted in November 2020 and approved in January 2021. For future sessions, this meant young people and their parents/guardians only needed to return the forms if they wished to opt-out (no one did this). As an additional response to the Covid-19 pandemic, Cardiff University introduced new risk assessment procedures for all face-to-face fieldwork. This included consideration of what safety measures (such as social distancing, mask wearing and hand sanitisation) would be in place to protect everyone present during fieldwork – including participants and myself. An application for the risk assessment was made in May 2021 with the approval received the following day. Together with the updated ethical approval, I was then able to recommence in-person fieldwork.

3.6.2 Anonymity and confidentiality

Participants were informed that they would be made anonymous and reassured their personal information would be kept confidential. This included information that would make them identifiable indirectly, including organisation names or descriptions that made their identities obvious. Although some personal characteristics, such as the age and gender of facilitators, were recorded in case they became interesting when exploring how young people interacted during interventions, these are not attributable to individuals.

In practice, this meant that no names were recorded in jotted fieldnotes, and participants were given pseudonyms once the fieldnotes were recorded in more detail following sessions. As with fieldnotes, names of people and organisations provided during interviews were changed in transcripts, either to pseudonyms or replaced with ‘[name]’ or ‘[organisation name]’ if irrelevant. This means that where quotations from the data are used or participants are referred to by name in the remaining chapters of this thesis, only pseudonyms are included. Audio recordings from the interviews were retained securely on an encrypted laptop. All data collected and produced by this research will be destroyed in accordance with the Data Protection Act, which includes recordings, transcriptions and notes.
3.6.3 Protecting participants and myself from harm

Harm is an important consideration for all research, particularly that involving children and young people (Kennan and Dolan, 2017). In this case ‘harm’ primarily related to discomfort in that the participants potentially feeling like they were being ‘tested’ or watched in the observations. To mitigate this, facilitators were reminded that they were the experts, and the purpose was not to test their ability, while young people were reminded that I was interested in what they were being told or shown and what they thought about it. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, I also took fieldnotes with participants in mind, trying to avoid making them feel awkward or like everything they said was being noted down. In the case of interviews, there was a chance that sensitive topics would arise during conversations, though the risk of participants being harmed in these cases was minimal given it would have been part of their everyday work. I nonetheless compiled information from support organisations that could have been shared if required.

Owing to the nature of the interventions and their links to extremism, drugs and gangs among other things, there was a possibility that young people might disclose involvement in illegal activity to me. The information sheets provided in advance of sessions stated that if participants disclosed anything that indicated (potential) harm to themselves or someone else, that I would have to inform someone. In addition, in the event that any other concerns such as child protection issues came up, I planned to report them to the designated safeguarding person of the setting as quickly as possible, within 24 hours. This only happened once, with the boy who disclosed his involvement in ‘running’ drugs on his local estate. Concerned by this, at the end of the session, I checked with a teacher (who was present at the back of the room) that she had heard the comment; she had, and said the school were aware of the issue. I also mentioned the disclosure to the intervention organisers on a call the following day, and they also confirmed the school’s awareness.

As well as clear concerns relating to harm and safety, fieldwork also brought the potential of experiencing distress (either relating to the topic or the demanding nature of fieldwork). To manage and mitigate this, I made sure I had a network of people to support me throughout.
This included my supervising team, my partner, and a research colleague who were all available if I felt I needed to ‘decompress’ and reflect on my experience in the field.

### 3.6.4 Reflections on positionality

Reflecting on my position as a researcher during this time, it is worth restating that there were multiple different ‘groups’ of participants in this study: young people and adults. Within these ‘groups’, there were also some differences. For example, some young people had been specifically referred in order to attend interventions, while others had not. Accordingly, the sizes of the groups could vary widely, from 2-28. In addition, adult participants had a mixture of professional backgrounds and expertise. In this context, I was conscious that my position as a white Welsh female from an academic institution could impact the way participants interacted, both with me and in my company. This reflects that the actions and presence of researchers are not isolated and may therefore impact data collection and analysis (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). With this in mind, I carefully considered how I would introduce myself and my research to the different groups.

When meeting young people for the first time, I introduced myself as a student. Although some power differential is inevitable in this scenario (El Gemayel and Salema, 2023), I was hoping to minimise any impression of power, emphasising that I was there to learn. I also emphasised that I was interested in the practitioners and the topics they would be talking about during the sessions. I typically sat towards the back or the side of the room during in-person observations, trying to minimise the sense of my presence as much as possible. There were times, however, where I became more involved as practitioners invited me to take part in activities and to share personal information, such as my favourite food or restaurant and whether I had been to a Welsh-language school. I found I had some things in common with young people, and by sharing this information, they got to know me a little better. There was also a chance that because I was a new and unfamiliar face, young people may have decided to ‘show off’ or ‘act up’ by being loud and joking around. This did not happen, however, and as I was always with a practitioner, I was never the only new or external person entering a session.
In relation to the adult participants, I was similarly conscious that my presence as a researcher (during both observations and interviews) could have an impact. In light of this, I once again emphasised that I was there to learn from them and not to judge, pointing to their expertise as practitioners and policymakers involved in the interventions. At times and with some groups, particularly police, I also reflected on previous experiences of fieldwork as I sought to present myself as a credible researcher, given the typically ‘closed’ nature of their social world (Brookman, 2015). I did, however, remain open to the idea that participants may still have chosen to present selected accounts to me, perhaps omitting or modifying certain elements (Hughes, 1971; Matza, 2010) and kept this in mind during analysis.

3.7 Concluding remarks

This chapter has provided a detailed methodological account of this ethnographic study of early interventions with young people to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation. The study is interested in the organisation and delivery of early interventions in Wales, as well as the insights they can give about the way the ‘problem’ of extremism is being constructed by practitioners and policymakers. Combining observations and interviews within an ethnographic approach therefore offered the opportunity to develop a rich and detailed picture of these interventions, capturing not only the practices and ‘realities’ of interventions, but also the accounts of those involved. As will be shown in the following chapters, ethnographic insights gained from ‘being there’ with participants (Rock, 1979; Matza, 2010) proved invaluable to this study. As such, the chapter provides transparent insight into the fieldwork process.

In the following chapter, the focus turns to the social organisation of the early interventions at the centre of this thesis. The chapter aims to provide context to the interventions by setting out the landscape in Wales, beginning with an exploration of key policy developments, including in relation to Prevent, Counter-Extremism and, to some extent, Community Cohesion. Within this discussion, empirical data are used to provide additional commentary on the Welsh policy context. In the second half of the chapter, the activities of
Welsh stakeholders are summarised, and the early interventions operating in Wales are described in greater detail, informed by insights from the field.
Chapter 4: The Social Organisation of Prevent and Extremism Prevention in Wales

Reflecting on Prevent approaches more broadly, Craig said “it’s cross vulnerabilities.” He explained that, in his view, a lot of time had been wasted in the past focusing on one thing, one issue or vulnerability, rather than the intersecting issues affecting young people. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys planning meeting, 08/02/2022)

A key finding of this study is that early interventions to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation are not typically focused on single issues. Instead, they variably aim to respond to prejudice, prevent racism, keep young people safe and prevent exploitation, as well as to prevent extremism more specifically. The principal aim of this chapter is therefore to contextualise such early interventions designed to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation in Wales. It does so by setting out the policy landscape framing them, including the strategies and policies, significant events and turning points, and the array of actors and agencies involved in their organisation and delivery.

Academic and policy debates have often tended to focus on the Prevent Strategy. However, notwithstanding its role and importance within this policy and practice landscape, Prevent is not the only relevant development or policy when considering early interventions. In particular, the Counter-Extremism Strategy of 2015 is also of significance. This ‘hybrid’ chapter, which includes a discussion of both policy and empirical data, draws out the complexities of the social organisation underpinning extremism prevention in Wales. As well as introducing and situating the interventions themselves, the policy discussion within this chapter highlights several issues that re-emerge in later chapters. As Biggs argues, “policies not only respond to social ills, they also consecrate them. They contribute to the constellation of ideas and evidence that create the problem itself” (2001:304-5). By exploring the policies and the actions they inform, this will provide insight into the constructions of the ‘problem’ being addressed.
Beginning with a discussion of key events in UK policy terms, the evolution of Prevent and other policies, and their associated interventions will be outlined. This includes the Counter Terrorism Strategy, the Channel Programme and the Counter-Extremism Strategy. In tracing these developments, influences from the recent and more distant past can be seen impacting current practices. After identifying key policy moments, the chapter will consider how young people are being positioned within the most recent developments, and the ways in which this may be problematic. Discussion will then turn to the Welsh operational context specifically, outlining how such national UK policies apply in light of devolution, and specifying the actors and agencies involved in Wales’ efforts to prevent extremism and radicalisation. The chapter concludes by summarising this social organisation in terms of how each of the early interventions in Wales fits within the policy landscape, including who organises, funds and delivers them, the problems they aim to address, and young people’s routes of referral into programmes.

As will be illustrated, many practical negotiations, compromises and decisions are involved in the process of implementing formal policies into practice. This contrasts the ‘textbook’ view of policy as common-sensical, mechanical and linear (Hall and McGinty, 2002; Colebatch, 2009). Such negotiation is ongoing, includes constraints, and is characterised by interruptions, reversals and reforms (Maines, 1977). Without considering the contexts and social organisation surrounding them (Hall, 1987), understanding Prevent and Counter-Extremism is impossible.

4.1 UK policy trajectory: CONTEST and the inception of Prevent

The evolution of this area of policy, that has changed in response to a series of events, can be tracked over time. Capturing the multi-dimensional nature of this ‘problem’, Innes et al. (2017) argue that there have been regular adaptations as the perceived risks of radicalisation have shifted. At a glance, Table 3 below provides an overview of the following discussion. Highlighting key moments and events in the timeline, this foregrounds the continuously changing and evolving nature of this policy area. Although early intervention to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation goes beyond the remit of Prevent, as the
As the table shows, the Prevent Strategy has been the dominant policy object. As such, and as will be shown in this chapter, it has many overlaps and has shaped much of the discourse around prevention in this early intervention context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2000 | Terrorism Act 2000 | Consolidated anti-terrorism powers, making permanent a number of formerly temporary powers, creating new ones, and updating the definition of terrorism. Key points:  
  - Definition widened to include domestic terrorism (in addition to Northern Irish and international terrorism), and religious and ideological motivations (in addition to political motives).  
  - New powers included stop and search without suspicion, proscription of terrorist organisations and membership of them. |
| 2001 | 9/11 | Attacks on multiple sites in the US by al-Qaeda, significant impact on counterterrorism in the UK. President George Bush launched the ‘war on terror’ in response, and Prime Minister Tony Blair supported him. |
| 2003 | Inception of CONTEST | Created under Tony Blair’s Labour government and included the four Ps: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. Designed to be a comprehensive response to the threat of terrorism. |
| 2005 | 7/7 | Four near-simultaneous bombings on the Tube and bus network in London by British al-Qaeda-linked/inspired terrorists, which brought home the risk of ‘homegrown’ terrorism. |
| 2006 | CONTEST 1 | Policy document explicitly focused on Islamist extremism and Muslim communities, reflecting the prominent threat of the time and the recent 7/7 attacks. Many references to radicalisation in this document. |
| 2007 | Prevent 1 begins | The iteration referred to as ‘Prevent 1’ begins in 2007, with a heavy focus on local communities and localised risks. Funding for Prevent work allocated to areas based on the proportion (and later size) of their Muslim population.  
  Channel pilot begins | Originally piloted in two sites, providing multi-agency support at an early stage to people identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. |
| 2008 | Prevent Strategy published | Full details of the Prevent strategy published.  
  Channel pilot rolled out more widely | Channel pilot rolled out to a total of 11 sites. |
<p>| 2009 | CONTEST 2 | Systematic revision in 2008 led to the publication of this in 2009. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Review of Prevent Strategy</td>
<td>New Coalition government announced a review of Prevent, which went on to inform Prevent 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Prevent Strategy published – Prevent 2 begins</td>
<td>Systematic revision, with emphasis on Prevent being designed to tackle all forms of extremism (not only Islamist-related). Also, less focus on communities, with Prevent centralised to the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism. Prevent Priority Areas introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Channel roll-out</td>
<td>Channel rolled out nationally across England and Wales.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Lee Rigby attack</td>
<td>Fusilier Lee Rigby was attacked and killed outside his barracks in London. The event led to significant backlash and protests by far-right groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Prevent Duty (Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015)</td>
<td>Placed a statutory duty on specified authorities (including schools and universities) to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Multiple terror attacks across the UK</td>
<td>Multiple terror attacks took place: Westminster Bridge (March 22\textsuperscript{nd}); Manchester Arena (May 22\textsuperscript{nd}); London Bridge (June 3\textsuperscript{rd}); Finsbury Park Mosque (June 19\textsuperscript{th}); Parsons Green (September 15\textsuperscript{th}).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>CONTEST 3</td>
<td>New strategy included updates to the objectives of Prevent, referring to safeguarding and early intervention for those most at risk of radicalisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Fishmongers’ Hall attack</td>
<td>A convicted terrorist, Usman Khan, carried out an attack at a rehabilitation conference in Fishmongers’ Hall, London, in November.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Plymouth Attack</td>
<td>Jake Davison carried out an attack in Plymouth and was later found to be a subscriber to ‘Incel’ ideology, expressing misogynistic views.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019-2023</td>
<td>Independent Review of Prevent (Shawcross)</td>
<td>Long-awaited review (delayed several times) criticised the direction of Prevent in many ways, including there being too much emphasis on far-right extremism and general ‘vulnerabilities’, and too many Prevent-funded projects not clearly focused on radicalisation and terrorism.</td>
</tr>
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Table 3: Key moments and events – Prevent and other policy timeline

4.1.1 Terrorism in the UK: pre-CONTEST

Today, the Prevent Strategy sits within the UK’s wider counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST. Pre-dating this comprehensive strategy, however, various other responses were in place.
For instance, multiple pieces of legislation were enacted in response to the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism, more specifically the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its offshoots during ‘the Troubles’. Here, bombing campaigns by the IRA in the early 1970s led to the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, which proscribed the group and made supporting it illegal. The 1990s then saw developments in the terror ‘threat’. Although in 1995, MI5 advised that the threat from a world-wide network of Islamist extremists was overexaggerated by the press, just three years later, Osama bin Laden was named as a threat in one of their own reports (Andrew, 2021c). Al-Qaeda (AQ) carried out their first major attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and security concerns grew in relation to the group (Andrew, 2021c).

Morgan and de Londras (2018) argue that when Tony Blair’s New Labour government came to power in 1997, Northern Ireland was the primary focus for counterterrorism. The new government sought to create stable and more generally applicable legislation in place of the corpus of Northern Ireland-specific legislation that existed previously. Three years later, the Terrorism Act 2000 consolidated the UK’s anti-terrorism powers, as well as updating the definition of ‘terrorism’. The definition was widened to include domestic terrorism (Northern Irish and international terrorism were already listed), and religious and ideological motivations were added to the political motives outlined in previous legislation (Lord Carlile, 2007).

With concerns growing about the threat from AQ, shortly after the Act came into force, the first Islamist explosives factory in the UK was detected in Birmingham in November 2000 (Andrew, 2021c). Less than a year later, the September 11th (9/11) attacks targeting multiple sites in the US took place, with long lasting ripple effects in the UK (Innes, 2014). Though terrorist attacks had been linked to AQ from at least 1993 (Thiel, 2009), the scale of 9/11 was unprecedented. Describing the effects of the 9/11 terror attacks, MI5’s Director General characterised the events as a “watershed” moment, with major loss of life, property and economic damage, as well as a demonstration of AQ’s ability to attack on such scale.

5 ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland were caused by conflict between ‘loyalists’ who wanted Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom and ‘republicans’ who wanted a unified Republic of Ireland.
(Manningham-Buller, 2003). In response, policymakers in the US envisaged a ‘war on terror’ focused on a single threat: Islamist AQ terrorism (Croft and Moore, 2010).

The ‘war on terror’ then informed the UK’s approach, overlaid with existing culture and practice (Croft and Moore, 2010; Lambert, 2011). As part of the new counterterrorism approach, controversial invasions took place alongside the US in Afghanistan and Iraq (Seldon, 2007). Critics of the ‘war on terror’ argue it resulted in the exact values targeted by terrorists – human rights and the rule of law – being “corroded” as new approaches and pieces of legislation curbed freedoms and liberties (Landmann, 2007:77). Similarly, some of the UK’s legislation around this time (specifically the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001) has been characterised as “repressive”, arguably weakening democracy rather than enhancing it (Mythen and Walklate, 2006: 390). Taken together, this suggests that, at times, policy may be at odds with its own objectives.

4.1.2 CONTEST

At its inception in the early 2000s, the UK government’s counterterrorism strategy was designed to be a comprehensive operational response to the threat of terrorism (Omand, 2010). ‘CONTEST’, as it became known, was adopted by the government in 2003, though details of the strategy were not published for another three years. In the meantime, four near simultaneous explosions were carried out on the Underground and bus network in London on the 7th of July 2005 (7/7), killing 52 and injuring hundreds more. The attack was carried out by AQ-affiliated terrorists, though it has been suggested that the men appear to have had little contact with AQ networks (Thiel, 2009). Importantly, the events “brought home the risk of suicide attacks by British citizens” (HMG, 2006:3). Within the strategy document published the year following 7/7, CONTEST’s clear focus was reducing “the risk from international terrorism” (HMG, 2006:1). Individuals using a distorted interpretation of Islam were described as being the principal threat (HMG, 2006), providing a clear indication of what the terrorism ‘problem’ was perceived to be.

Within CONTEST are four interrelated pillars, each with key aims: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. According to the 2006 CONTEST strategy, Prevent is concerned with reducing radicalisation by challenging extremist ideologies, deterring those who encourage terrorism,
and tackling structural problems that may contribute to radicalisation. Pursue is focused on detecting and disrupting terrorists and their operations. The Protect strand is concerned with reducing the UK’s vulnerability to the threat by improving measures such as border security and safety in crowded places, and the Prepare strand seeks to ensure the UK is prepared and capable of responding in the event of an attack.

While CONTEST included all four ‘Ps’ in 2003, Prevent was the least developed aspect: the original focus was upon the immediate threat to life, rather than understanding the causes of radicalisation (HMG, 2009a). However, when the strategy was published in 2006, it emphasised the importance of the Prevent strand in the effort to counter terrorism (HMG, 2006). Heath-Kelly (2017:300) argues this sought to fill the “knowledge and policy vacuum” left by 7/7, where the government were thrown into a search for ways to prevent more suicide bombers. In the Prevent section of CONTEST, the government’s focus is clear – they refer to the radicalisation risks within “certain offshoots” of Muslim communities, for instance (HMG, 2006:6). Within the strategy, the language of ‘radicalisation’ holds a strong presence, whereas it was previously used relatively little, and not once in the Terrorism Act 2000. With growing concern around ‘home-grown’ terrorism and greater focus on counter-terrorism and prevention strategies, the term has become institutionalised (Sedgewick, 2010). In addition, the radicalisation discourse is seen as enabling pre-emptive governance and security to be performed (Heath-Kelly, 2013).

In the wake of 7/7, community-led ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ working groups were established by the Home Office, and some of their recommendations are said to have informed the 2006 strategy (HMG, 2006). Representatives of Muslim communities were engaged and consulted on issues such as young people, education and community security (HMG, 2009a). Recommendations included, for example, updating hate crime categorisation and enabling influential Islamic scholars to tackle extremist interpretations of Islam (Preventing Extremism Together Working Groups, 2005). There are mixed accounts about the kinds of people engaged during this period, however. According to a Communities and Local Government Committee report, many of those invited were Islamists, described as believing Islamic law is the only suitable form of governance (House of Commons, 2010). Yet it has been argued elsewhere that Islamists (and Salafis) were seen as too extreme, and so
those invited were in fact ‘moderates’ who would likely support the government’s actions (Lambert, 2011). For Lambert, the value of the Salafis and Islamist in this context was that they had specific experience and expertise of tackling AQ propaganda. This made their support and opposition to violence valuable in the fight against violent extremism, and more credible to those at risk of radicalisation of their religious views. This disagreement is interesting because it conveys the tension between different stakeholders in terms of which approaches are most effective.

4.1.3 Prevent 1
Although Prevent was an existing strand of the counterterrorism strategy by the time of 7/7 and the release of the CONTEST strategy in 2006, it is the iteration that ran between 2007 and 2011 that became known as ‘Prevent 1’ (Busher et al., 2017). Underpinning this version was the assumption that attacks (and plots) could be directly linked to faith communities, and that those communities could therefore be mobilised to protect against this kind of extremism (Thomas, 2020). Several participants in this study had been involved, to varying degrees, in Prevent work for some years, and their reflections provide insight into its trajectory. For example, May recounted her first impression of the strategy, and her words reflect the kinds of criticisms that emerged widely:

*I think the first time I read the Prevent Strategy though, the early, the Labour version of it, I was mortified… It’s horrendous. It had a very strong focus on Muslim communities, didn’t it?* (May, local authority)

As the post-7/7 ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ groups suggest, the strategy aimed for a community-led approach to prevention based on winning hearts and minds by empowering local, grass-roots groups and communities (Lakhani, 2012). Thus, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) took responsibility for the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ campaign in 2007 (House of Commons, 2010). With DCLG also responsible for Community Cohesion work, the localised approaches of Prevent 1 echoed cohesion principles in some ways (Jabri, 2009). Here, Community Cohesion refers to situations in which common social and cultural commitments unite individuals, such as common values, shared understandings and mutual respect (Cantle, 2001). Yet, the explicit focus on Muslim
communities, rather than cross-community aspects, was at odds with cohesion (Thomas, 2016). Heath-Kelly (2017:298) argues that this “localised imagination of extremism risk” used public health rationales and criminal prevention models based on notions of proximity and contagion, hence the focus on Muslim communities. The approach was organised around promoting shared values, supporting local solutions, building civic capacity and leadership, and strengthening the role of faith leaders and institutions (DCLG, 2007a).

Looking back over these policy developments, Jonathan Simon’s (2007) notion of ‘governing through crime’, more specifically ‘governing through terror’, can be applied to the policies and practices that developed in response to events during this period. Simon (2007) argues that the major legislative responses to 9/11 in particular were to increase law enforcement and prosecution powers to much of what was already being done, but with fewer opportunities for legal challenge. Through this lens, governing through crime/terror is not a proximate or proportionate response to the problem, rather a trend in which the problem has become a strategic issue with new opportunities for governance and power expansion, in which responses are underpinned by political motivations. With concerns about security and risk, increases in control measures and rhetoric support a greater sense of security (Innes, 2004).

With the focus of Prevent 1 firmly upon Muslim communities, crude demographic data were used to guide the allocation of programme funding to areas purely depending on the proportion (and later size) of their Muslim population, ultimately leading to accusations of stigmatisation and unfair targeting (Busher et al., 2017).6 There were also allegations that Prevent was being used to spy on Muslim communities (HMG, 2011). For instance, in the areas of Washwood Heath and Sparkbrook of Birmingham, both with large Muslim populations, over 200 ‘spy cameras’ were installed as part of ‘Project Champion’ (Awan, 2011). The project, designed to encircle and track the movements of those entering and leaving the neighbourhoods, was halted after being subjected to heavy criticism (Fussey, 2013; Awan, 2011). Elsewhere, community members interviewed by Lakhani (2012) felt that

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6 The areas were previously referred to as ‘priority local authorities’ and received funds from the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund’ (DCLG, 2007b).
local projects geared towards Muslims had connotations with terrorism. This legacy is important to note because the reputational impacts, both for Prevent and earlier ‘pre-Prevent’ extremism prevention work, have been long lasting and will be called upon in later empirical chapters.

4.2 The Channel programme

Within the timeline of Prevent 1, the Channel programme was introduced and piloted in a growing number of areas. For some time, although the existence of the programme was known, little was stated publicly about how it worked, and only in recent years has this become more clear. According to the government (HMG, 2020:7) “Channel focuses on providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.” It has been described elsewhere as a mentoring/support programme for individuals considered at risk of radicalisation, where multi-agency stakeholders (such as education and health) determine who should be offered support (Innes et al., 2017). Examples of measures that could be put in place include theological intervention, counselling, and engaging with an individual’s wider support networks (HMG, 2009b). Participation is voluntary, meaning those referred are able to refuse and/or cease to engage. Preston and Lambeth were used as the original pilot sites in 2007 (Kundnani, 2009), before the programme was expanded to a total of 11 sites (including Cardiff) in 2008, and ultimately rolled out across the UK in April 2012. Early on, one interviewee had a designated Channel role in Wales and noted that there were, as with any policy (Spicker, 2014), some initial issues in implementation, describing processes as “quite clunky” (Kevin, local authority).

A number of interviewees helpfully provided insight into the general Prevent and Channel referral process (which continues today). Figure 1 below, taken from the 2018 CONTEST strategy, also provides an overview of this process. Referrals firstly go to the police, where they are “deconflicted” in terms of involvement in any other ongoing operations (Darren, police) through checks on the Police National Computer. Gary (police) explained this is because “What we don't want to do is stifle an ongoing investigation, and the police are the
only agency who can decipher that.” Cases are then allocated to police officers, who determine whether they are suitable for Prevent and the most appropriate course of action. Within this, Gary said there are two possible courses of action: if there are any counterterrorism or crime-related concerns, the case will be “police-led”; if there are no such concerns and “it’s more of a Prevent safeguarding concern, then we’ll always look to push that towards Channel” (Gary, police). Darren (police) echoed this: “your prime aim would be to move that into Channel.” In reality, not all referrals go on to receive interventions, as the police may decide no further action is required, and Channel panels may decide not to offer support.

Figure 1: The referral process into Channel (HMG, 2018).

The reason for favouring Channel is its multi-agency nature with the involvement of various stakeholders who can collectively design a support plan. As Tony (police) noted, “I would never say there’s a defined list [of partners], it’s whatever the individual requires support with.” Examples of partners noted by interviewees include health, education, housing, and
social work. In some cases, the course of action chosen in Channel might include theological or ideological intervention, in which case Home Office-funded “intervention providers who are experts in different topics” are used (Darren, police). While another interviewee was broadly positive about Channel interventions, however, she also noted that “they can be quite costly” (Claire, police). She felt this was particularly the case where individuals become overly “reliant” on the intervention providers, even after their intended work was complete. This unintended consequence is clearly at odds with the aims set out by the policy narrative around the Channel programme.

4.3 Developments: CONTEST 2 and Prevent 2

In 2009, an updated CONTEST strategy (‘CONTEST 2’) was released. There was also a subtle change in one of Prevent’s central objectives: from “to support individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism”, the objective became “to support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment or who have already been recruited by violent extremists” (Hirschfield et al., 2012:6). This shift towards the language of ‘vulnerability’ signals the growing interest in earlier prevention.

Prevent then saw substantial change under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government elected in 2010 (led by David Cameron). In his independent review of Prevent commissioned by the new government, Lord Carlile advised that there was “serious work to be done in relation to Northern Ireland-related terrorism and extreme right-wing terrorism” (HMG, 2011:4). Accordingly, ‘Prevent 2’, revealed in 2011, made clear that all forms of terrorism would be addressed, not only that which is AQ-related, though the strategy does also note that resources would be allocated based on the threat posed. Prevent 2 also placed a new emphasis on non-violent extremism, defining extremism as opposition to fundamental British values (including democracy, the rule of law and liberty) and calls for death of members of the armed forces. The strategy argued that the way some ideologies draw on ideas espoused by apparently non-violent organisations (i.e. those not outwardly practicing or endorsing violence) had not been recognised previously.
Another notable change within the new strategy document was the use of ‘safeguarding’ language. Although ‘vulnerability’ was a term used in the past, the new emphasis on safeguarding and “protecting vulnerable people” (HMG, 2011:108) in Prevent 2 suggests a shift in the way radicalisation vulnerability and risk were being understood, as well as the role imagined for those preventing it. Indeed, under this second iteration of Prevent, there was greater emphasis on identifying and diverting individuals through the growing Channel programme (Thomas, 2020). This policy language (Alcock, 2010) is also suggestive of how individual responsibility was being understood in relation to extremism and radicalisation at the time. In this case, with the emphasis on ‘protection’ and the need for intervention, the implication is that those who may be radicalised are defenceless against the extremists praying on them if they do not receive support from authorities.

At this time, Prevent was centralised in the Office for Security and Counterterrorism (OSCT) in order to simplify its delivery and reduce the funding for community engagement activities. While some saw the previous community-based approaches as beneficial in terms of early extremism prevention, the government view was that there had been too much focus on ‘cohesion’ (Thomas, 2016). Although this was presented as a move away from the localised imagination of extremism risk, ‘risk’ did still inform delivery, with ‘hotspots’ of highest vulnerability receiving funding for Prevent activities (Heath-Kelly, 2017). Rather than using “simple demographics” to prioritise funding, a new process was created where other information and policing indicators of terrorist activity would be aggregated to determine ‘Prevent Priority Areas’ (HMG, 2011:97). As such, rather than the previous 70 under the old strategy, there were 25 Priority Areas in 2011.

Priority Areas had Home Office funds made available to them (on a grant basis) for activities that addressed ‘relevant risks’. While this meant interventions could go beyond the individualised support for referrals to Prevent and Channel, they were supposed to be focused. The new strategy made clear that Prevent-funded projects should be explicitly about terrorism or extremism in their content, targeting those most vulnerable to terrorism and radicalisation. A distinction from cohesion efforts was made, with the strategy stating

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7 This move was in line with the Coalition’s economic austerity agenda.
that funding should not be used for wider social objectives. Alongside this, the allegations of spying that were aimed at Prevent 1’s approaches were acknowledged but denied in the new strategy, where it states that no evidence of spying was found. Criticisms continued under Prevent 2, however, arguing that racial profiling was still being used to inform the delivery of preventative interventions and resilience-building work (Heath-Kelly, 2017).

4.4 The Prevent ‘Duty’

As cohesion and the role of the residential community were deemphasised under ‘Prevent 2’, the administration of Prevent was shifted towards whole-of-population institutions such as schools and universities (Heath-Kelly, 2017). Some of the most significant changes to Prevent came about through the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (which was introduced under the Coalition government that became the Conservative government later the same year, also led by David Cameron). This expanded Prevent by placing a duty on specified authorities to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism (commonly referred to as ‘the Duty’). Creating such a statutory requirement for this responded to the resistance across sectors, including health and education, stemming from Prevent’s problematic reputation. Thomas (2020) attributes this to a series of key events, which led to questions about the effectiveness of Prevent, between 2012 and 2014: the murder of Lee Rigby by two known extremists in 2013; growing fears about reciprocal radicalisation between the far right and Islamist extremists; and significant numbers of people travelling to Syria to join Daesh. With these events pushing concerns about Prevent ‘up’ the agenda (Birkland, 2007), the Duty was the governmental response.

The authorities subject to the new legal obligation (which still stands in 2023), included local government, criminal justice, education and childcare, health and social care, and police. In practice, this meant educators and other professionals were responsibilised for preventing radicalisation (Zedner, 2007), significantly increasing the scale and reach of Prevent (following its previous downsizing in 2011; Thomas, 2020). Accordingly, Heath-Kelly (2017) argues that with this shift towards managing contingency and risk, the Duty supports a whole-of-population surveillance approach. For Morgan and de Londras (2018:213),
meanwhile, this imagination of prevention as a duty for state agencies reflects the idea that communities need to be protected from harm, and that intervention is for the good of the population. This is an important development in terms how young people are positioned in this space, and is a move that accords with the increasing emphasis on preventing extremism and radicalisation as ‘safeguarding’.

For schools, specific guidance came from the Department for Education (DfE). Firstly, this required staff to be able to identify young people vulnerable to radicalisation and know how to respond. Secondly, the guidance stated that schools could support prevention by building “pupils’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values and enabling them to challenge extremist views” (DfE, 2015:3). Expanding on the values listed in the 2011 strategy, they now included mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. This saw anti-racism included in teaching in response to the Duty (Haugstvedt and Tuastad, 2021). Implementation was supported by a DVD training programme named ‘Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent’ (widely referred to as ‘WRAP’). Interestingly, however, Kevin (local authority) noted “the delivery of that was a bit knee jerk in a lot of areas” resulting in “horror stories” and places “ticking a box” about the number of people trained. A four-year-old Muslim girl who was referred to Prevent after her pronunciation of ‘cucumber’ was mistaken for ‘cooker bomb’ was one high-profile example widely reported in the media (Thomas, 2020).

While some have described the duty as surprising and unprecedented (Thomas, 2020), the DfE (2015) strongly emphasised that it was no different to actions already being taken by many schools. They recommended that protecting children from radicalisation should be considered part of “wider safeguarding duties” as it is “similar in nature to protecting children from other harms (e.g. drugs, gangs, neglect, sexual exploitation)” (DfE, 2015:5). The guidance also argued that the “duty is entirely consistent with schools’ and childcare providers’ existing responsibilities and should not be burdensome” (DfE, 2015:5). The narrative in this policy document suggests a concern that the duty would be met with hostility if it were seen as placing more demand on teachers’ time. Other concerns emerging at the time included the securitisation of educational spaces, the us-vs-them connotations of ‘fundamental British values’, and the potentially stigmatising effects for young British
Muslims (O’Donnell, 2016; Busher et al., 2020; Lewis, 2020). Thus, further highlighting the complexity and resistance that can emerge in the process of translating policy into practice (Hall and McGinty, 2002).

4.4.1 Young people, ‘risk’ and ‘safeguarding’

As the trend of enhanced legal powers has continued from 9/11 onwards in response to the threat in the UK, Innes et al. (2017) argue this is underpinned by a need for politicians to be seen to be ‘doing something’. Reaching for new legislation, they suggest, has now “become an almost ritualised part of the societal response” to attacks (Innes et al., 2017:257). Within the developments, there has been an integration of terms such as ‘grooming’ and ‘safeguarding’ in the radicalisation discourse. This has been done explicitly in Wales, where radicalisation, in accordance with the devolved government’s responsibilities, has been defined as a safeguarding issue sitting within a children’s rights framework (Wales Safeguarding Procedures, 2022; discussed in detail in section 4.7).

In terms of the broader UK policy shift towards ‘safeguarding’ rhetoric, there have been critiques in the academic literature. Stanley and Guru (2015) caution that this might conflate psychological thinking around sexual abuse and radicalisation risk, potentially leading to a moral panic where families are subject to increasing surveillance and intervention ‘just in case’. Taylor also suggests that there has been a “blurring” of safeguarding and security within the Prevent Duty, whereby children are positioned as both ‘at risk’ and ‘risky’ (2018:45-46), as in other areas of youth policy (see also Bancroft and Wilson (2007) for example, who discuss how policy practice means young people’s resilience may be downplayed in favour of viewing their agency as risky). Within these positionings, some are characterised as ‘at risk’ potential future terrorists through persuasion and vulnerability, while others are characterised as ‘risky’ extreme/radical subjects who prey on the weak (Heath-Kelly, 2013). Heath-Kelly argues that collectively, Muslim communities are framed as ‘at risk’ and vulnerable, with this having “the paradoxical effect of also securitisling them concerning what they might produce” (2013:405, original emphasis).

The use of safeguarding and vulnerability language has been linked to the neo-liberal governmentality to manage risk, and therefore control such ‘risky’ childhoods (Coppock and
McGovern, 2014). Within this, there is a pre-emptive logic informing Prevent (and Channel) where professionals’ responses are based on an expectation that people will commit criminal – in this case terrorist – acts (Coppock and McGovern, 2014). In this sense, young people become caught in both criminalising and safeguarding spaces. A similar argument has been applied more widely, with Bancroft and Wilson (2007) arguing that this policy framing of risk has the potential to stigmatise young people. According to Matza (2010) to be labelled as something – as (or at risk of becoming) extremist or radicalised – may change the person’s identity and their meaning in the eyes of others. This was a concern shared by a number of participants from different backgrounds, and is a theme explored in depth in Chapter 6.

Coppock and McGovern (2014) characterise this as the securitisation of administrative discourses around child protection, which are deployed to justify the interventionist ethos and surveillance practices. As a result, they argue that British Muslim youth in particular are depicted as suspects, yet in need of being saved. Meanwhile, Thomas (2016) describes the analogy of terrorism as a ‘disease’ that is transmitted through exposure to extreme Islamist ideologies and those perpetuating them, which any young Muslim could ‘catch’ – resulting in a permanent scrutiny placed on young Muslims (which also echoes Heath-Kelly’s (2017) notion of contagion in relation to Prevent 1). In practice, some argue this has led to pupils being scared to speak freely and worries (among young people) that the emphasis on ‘fundamental British values’ could lead to feelings of marginalisation (Davies, 2016; Elwick et al., 2020).

4.5 The Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015

Just a few months following the introduction of the Prevent duty, the government also released the Counter-Extremism Strategy (HMG, 2015). Though officially sitting separately to CONTEST and Prevent, the strategy intended to build on the existing work, urging: “we must go further” to address non-violent extremist ideology, not only its violent counterpart (HMG, 2015:17). However, as noted earlier, this shift towards non-violent extremism was something ‘Prevent 2’ already claimed to be doing in 2011. ‘Going further’, then, suggests a
view that the existing ‘non-violent extremism’ definition needed to be expanded. In 2017, the Commission for Countering Extremism was established to support this area of work, and posts were also created for ‘Community Coordinators for Counter Extremism’, with two based in Welsh local authorities. Though the strategy itself notes that UK Government would work with the Welsh Government to determine how it would be applied to devolved matters, the creation of these posts demonstrates it did have an impact.

At the time of its publication, the strategy stated, “we have seen extremists operating at an unprecedented pace and scale, seeking to divide our communities and cause great harm” (2015:7). Making reference to the threat of the Islamic State and the “sophisticated efforts of extremists to groom and radicalise young British people” (2015:6), the strategy positions itself as a necessary response. All forms of extremism are considered harmful, according to the strategy, with Islamist extremism and extreme right-wing/neo-Nazi groups named specifically. Hatred, intolerance and division are all positioned as being related to extremism, particularly in terms of the ways they may be exploited by extremists to create tension. Far-right extremists are specifically discussed in relation to this issue, and linked to white supremacy, racism and Islamophobia. Throughout the strategy, clear and subtle links are made between such extremist ideas, radicalisation and the potential for terrorism (and other issues, including hate crime). This is interesting, as it conveys that from 2015, ‘earlier’ or more ‘upstream’ forms of extremism were being framed by policy as a serious and legitimate concern requiring a response.

Referring to the “spectrum” of this work, Kevin (local authority) distinguished this counter-extremism work from Prevent by explaining:

[They] look at all of the hateful extreme narratives out there, which include the non-violent ones as well. So, those ones which may enable a steppingstone into the violent extremist narratives (Kevin, local authority).

The strategy is also somewhat reminiscent of the first iteration of Prevent. This is due to the strong community focus, which presents in two ways. Firstly, there is a strong emphasis on the need to strengthen community cohesion to counteract the division and intolerance
being used by extremists. Secondly, the strategy states that “wherever possible, we will act locally” referring to the power of local actors in helping to prevent extremism (HMG, 2015:17). This is interesting in that it demonstrates a clear example of Prevent somewhat shifting back towards old ideas over time, with policy not necessarily being linear or sequential (Jann and Wegrich, 2007).

4.6 CONTEST, Prevent and Counter-Extremism in 2023

More recent developments include the new CONTEST strategy released in 2018, which included updates to the objectives of Prevent. Alongside objectives relating to tackling the causes of radicalisation, responding to ideological terrorism, and supporting disengagement and rehabilitation for (former) terrorists, the second objective is worth highlighting: “safeguard and support those most at risk of radicalisation through early intervention, identifying them and offering support” (HMG, 2018:31). Here, the terms ‘safeguard’ and ‘early intervention’ show there has been a continuing shift towards safeguarding logics.

On the whole, this area of UK policy is internationally recognised and has been fraught with debate (Harris-Hogan et al., 2019). Taking the developments discussed thus far together, including the changes in policy and strategy, extremism and radicalisation are currently being understood as relating to a multitude of ideologies. Over time, this has been increasingly moving towards a construction of extremism that overlaps with other issues, including racism, intolerance and hate crime. While shifts in the earlier 2010s sought to separate Prevent from such wider issues and any overlaps with Community Cohesion, others have argued that this has only served to further securitise these issues (Thomas, 2016). As a result, young people are placed in a space where they are seen as being ‘at risk’, vulnerable and in need of protection, but also a ‘risky’ potential threat to security and viewed with suspicion. This is not a static area of policy, however, and the Independent Review of the Prevent Strategy released in February 2023 suggests further changes may occur in the near future.
The review was announced at the beginning of 2019, but the initial reviewer, Lord Carlile, stepped down in December 2019. The review was subsequently undertaken by William Shawcross, an appointment that was itself criticised by campaigners who argued he has expressed Islamophobic views in the past (Elgot and Dodd, 2022). A key argument within the lengthy review is that Prevent has been too focused on far-right extremism despite Islamist extremism being a greater threat (Shawcross, 2023). In turn, this is argued to have led to missed opportunities to prevent terrorism and radicalisation, and unfair scrutiny being placed on certain viewpoints. Shawcross (2023:7) attributes this to a “double standard” of different thresholds being in place for different ideologies (with a lower tolerance for ‘right-wing’ ideology). Another notable area of criticism comes in relation to community-based projects which aim to increase resilience to extremism in ‘non-specific’ ways (such as promoting tolerance, reducing feelings of marginalisation and addressing social problems such as drug abuse). The review argues they are “too far removed from Prevent’s key objectives” (Shawcross, 2023:27). Relatedly, there is a strong criticism of the language of ‘vulnerability’, questioning whether ‘vulnerable’ individuals are at a clear risk of radicalisation, or whether their vulnerability is more generalised.

Within the review, there are also interesting contradictions. For instance, at times the review argues that the thresholds for Prevent intervention should be more clearly related to the risk of terrorism across ideologies (and a higher threshold specifically for far-right ideology). Yet, it also suggests non-violent extremism sitting below the terrorism threshold may still be “hospitable” to violent extremism, and should therefore be taken more seriously (Shawcross, 2023:119). While the practice implications of this review are yet to become clear at the time of writing, the government’s response has been positive and there is a suggestion that changes in line with the review will be carried out within a year (HMG, 2023).

4.6.1 Prevent referrals and categories

As noted above, Prevent funding was originally crudely allocated to areas on the basis of the size of the Muslim population. The allocation was not informed by any particular risk assessment about the risks of radicalisation in certain areas (Kundnani, 2009), although this was later changed after 2011 to include aggregated data. Many have argued that from the
outset, the Prevent programme has been based on a problematic set of assumptions about the risks associated with a particular community (see Taylor, 2018; Awan, 2014 for further discussions). Thus, while referrals to the UK government’s Prevent programme provide some indication of the state of radicalisation in the UK, the figures must be viewed against this historical policy backdrop.

Impacts of the changing policy landscape outlined previously can be seen when comparing data across different years. Taking the most recent figures, in England and Wales from April 2021 to March 2022, there were a total of 6,406 referrals to Prevent: of these, 1,027 were for Islamist extremism, 1,309 were for right wing extremism, 100 were for ‘other extremism’ and 3,970 were for a ‘mixed, unstable or unclear ideology’ (Home Office, 2023a). These figures can be compared with data from the same period in 2015-16, where there were a total of 7,631 referrals to Prevent: 4,997 for Islamist extremism, 759 for right wing extremism, 702 for ‘other’ extremism and 1,173 for ‘unspecified’ (Home Office, 2016). Of note is that these older figures with a much greater proportion of Islamist referrals came around the time that public attention was concentrated heavily on the number of individuals travelling to join Daesh in Syria (Awan and Guru, 2016). Interestingly, as they were around the time the statutory duty was first introduced, they perhaps reflect the “horror stories” referred to by Kevin (local authority). This is despite the clear emphasis on all forms of extremism expressed in the Prevent Strategy four years before, and broader, seemingly growing concerns around the far-right (Innes and Levi, 2017).

The inclusion of the ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ category is also of note because as the data show, this accounts for the largest proportion of referrals received in recent years. The way that labels and definitions are applied to different kinds of extremism is significant from an interactionist perspective (Blumer, 1969). Blumer argues that although institutions (in this case, the UK government) use stabilised meanings during their activities, in the face of new situations or experiences, new definitions may be formulated. This broader ‘mixed, unstable

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8 Note: the latter category in the statistics changed from ‘unspecified’ to ‘mixed, unstable or unclear ideology’ during the time between these figures. The suggestion is that the new category provides a clearer definition (Home Office, 2020). The most recent data also includes a list of sub-categories for ‘mixed, unstable or unclear ideology’ (see Home Office (2023a) for further detail).
or unclear’ category is interesting as it suggests an inherent difficulty in defining some forms of extremism within the existing system of classification that they are provided, even by professionals whose work relates to Prevent (this issue is explored in further detail in the following section). The inclusion of the category also accords with the tone of the Counter-Extremism Strategy, and the idea of ‘going further’ to address non-violent extremism.

A number of other issues are associated with the use of official statistics, as highlighted by Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963). Applying their arguments, the rates of radicalisation suggested by Prevent statistics are products of the actions taken by persons in the social system which define, classify and record certain behaviours as ‘extreme’ or ‘radicalised’ (or on a path towards radicalisation). Rates of radicalisation are therefore viewed as a dependant variable; the rate being constructed by societal reactions to certain forms of behaviour (Kitsuse and Cicourel, 1963). In simple terms, Prevent legislation contains particular definitions of radicalisation, and the ways in which the definitions are applied will determine how many cases are generated. Margaret Crenshaw (2000) makes a similar assertion that radicalisation discourses are shaped by policy frameworks and understandings, inevitably impacting data sources. With the Prevent review arguing for a shift in focus away from far-right extremism (Shawcross, 2023), this may read to a future reduction in those referral numbers.

4.7 Prevent and Counter-Extremism in Wales

Having outlined the development of the Prevent and counter-extremism frameworks in the UK, it is useful to consider the setup in Wales specifically. Given policy implementation involves local agencies, likely encountering various compromises, constraints and decisions by stakeholders, practice typically differs from the ‘administrative’ idea of policy (Lipsky, 2010; Spicker, 2014; Colebatch, 2009). This section will therefore briefly set out how these policies and strategies have been translated into practice in Wales.

Although Wales is a devolved nation, the Home Secretary (UK government) still has oversight of policing and Wales is part of the same legal jurisdiction as England, meaning
CONTEST, Prevent and Counter-Extremism still apply as above. However, with devolved powers in some policy areas such as education and health, wider legislation can be passed in Wales that may impact Prevent, adding complexity to the policy’s delivery (HMG, 2011). As such, the CONTEST and Extremism Board Wales, co-chaired by Welsh Government and Counter Terrorism Policing Wales, was established to provide leadership on CONTEST in Wales (Kilpatrick, 2018). The Board’s membership includes the chairs of the regional CONTEST boards across Wales (which oversee local implementation of CONTEST) as well as key partners, and it is supported by senior officials from the Home Office (Kilpatrick, 2018).

As alluded to earlier (section 4.4.1), safeguarding in Wales is a devolved issue. The Wales Safeguarding Procedures (2022), which support the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014, explicitly position radicalisation within children’s safeguarding. Although guidance relating to young people’s radicalisation in England does also refer to safeguarding, there is a clearer and more direct focus on processes sitting within the Prevent Duty. For instance, guidance from the North and South of Tyne Safeguarding Children Partnership (2023) directs practitioners’ concerns to safeguarding leads, who will then discuss concerns with police. In other cases, guidance refers directly to the ‘NOTICE, CHECK and SHARE’ process. In this process, a behaviour change or vulnerability is noticed by a practitioner, then checked with the Prevent contact in police, and subsequently shared through a safeguarding form and highlighted as a ‘Prevent concern’ (see North Yorkshire Community Safety Partnership, 2023). The nature of this approach has also been underscored in relation to Shamima Begum, who was 15 years old when she left the UK and travelled to Syria to join Daesh in 2015. With concerns emerging about the failures of child protection procedures in preventing her from travelling, the Association of Child Protection Professionals (2022) argues a more child-centred, social welfare response may have been more effective in recognising and responding to her exploitation. It is this latter child-centred approach based on children’s rights that drives Welsh practice guidance for radicalisation (Wales Safeguarding Procedures, 2022).

The Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 is rooted in co-production and rights. With a focus on well-being, this draws attention to care and support needs, which are explicitly mentioned in safeguarding guidance. Within this framework, child-centred
practice is a core principle. Radicalisation is explicitly set within this frame, and the significant harm it causes to children is unambiguously highlighted (Wales Safeguarding Procedures, 2022). Good practice involves treating children as ‘children first’, and practitioners are urged to consider care and support needs of children at risk of radicalisation in the same way they would for any other child (Wales Safeguarding Procedures, 2022). As noted above, there is a slightly different picture in England with responses to young people affected by or experiencing radicalisation (and criminal exploitation) aligned with frameworks set by the Home Office. Positioned more within a criminal justice and risk management frame, increased oversight and surveillance are seen as important. This brings a greater emphasis on young people’s deficits and risks, rather than strengths (Drakeford, 2010). Here, ‘risk’ may be seen as a pathologising term that places responsibility with young people and implies imminent danger, but an emphasis on vulnerability removes this blame and instead provides space for more caring support or protection (Bui and Deakin, 2021). This reveals an inherent complexity and tension in Wales, because although responsibility for radicalisation prevention ultimately lies with the UK Home Office and its powers over criminal justice, Welsh children-first and rights-based safeguarding practice stands in contrast to this.

For some time, Prevent sat within wider Community Cohesion efforts in Wales (HMG, 2011) demonstrating the relationship between the two areas, though it later moved to sit within Community Safety (Robinson et al., 2013). As of March 2012, Wales also has one Prevent Priority Area that receives support and resourcing: Cardiff (Hetherington, 2013). Although Prevent and its related duties and responsibilities still apply across all areas of Wales, as a Prevent Priority Area, Cardiff additionally has its own Home Office-funded Prevent Coordinator who sits within the local authority.⁹ Counter-Terrorism Policing Wales (CTP Wales, formerly the ‘Wales Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit’) was established in 2006 and its remit covers international and domestic terrorism and extremism. Within the Prevent and Channel referral processes outlined earlier, CTP Wales is the police department

⁹ If the recommendations of the Prevent review (Shawcross, 2023) are implemented this funding model may change. The review argues that in Wales specifically, there have been disconnects between the Home Office, Welsh Government and local authorities, as well as a view that too much funding has been focused on Cardiff, rather than other areas of Wales.
that receives Prevent referrals and actions them as appropriate (i.e. retain, dismiss or pass the cases onto the Channel panel). CTP Wales also have responsibility for the other three areas of CONTEST; Pursue, Protect and Prepare.

Prevent referral data for Wales in 2021-22 show there were 272 referrals in total. There were greater concerns regarding right wing extremism than Islamist extremism, with 53 referrals for extreme right wing, compared with 18 for Islamist extremism. There were also 2 referrals for ‘other extremism’ and 199 for ‘mixed, unstable, or unclear ideology’ (Home Office, 2023a). Then, in terms of those going on to be supported through the Channel programme, 18 were extreme right-wing, 1 was Islamist, and 21 were ‘mixed, unstable or unclear ideology’ (Home Office, 2023a). As these figures show, the number of individuals getting Channel support is much lower than the original number of Prevent referrals. While this is inevitably shaped by the decisions made by various professionals tasked with responding to referrals, the dominance of far-right and ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ ideologies is notable.

With such a large proportion of referrals being ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ ideologies, the data also raise questions about what exactly falls into this category. The Home Office (2023a) recently provided a list of seven sub-categories for this area of concern: Conflicted; No specific extremism issue; High CT risk but no ideology present; Vulnerability present but no ideology or CT risk; No risk, vulnerability or ideology present; School massacre; Incel. Yet with so few going on to be adopted as Channel cases, it is worth considering how this significant proportion of referrals could be addressed and supported. Owing to the nature of Prevent and its involving of numerous different organisations and actors, there were varying interpretations from participants in this study (Lipsky, 2010) leading to some tensions and disagreements. Similar situations have been observed elsewhere, for instance in Strauss et al.’s (1964) study, where standards of judgement sometimes differed widely between different actors in a hospital. This meant that some perceived certain patients to have made progress while others believed they were getting worse. Specific issues relating ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ as a specific category of concern, including disagreements between stakeholders about the seriousness and levels of risk for those individuals, are discussed in Chapter 7.
As noted earlier, following the publication of the Counter-Extremism Strategy (2015), posts were created for ‘Community Coordinators for Counter Extremism’, two of whom are based in Wales. During fieldwork, they sat within the Cohesion/Community Safety teams in two different local authorities.\textsuperscript{10} Jill (local authority) described the role, explaining that it is \textit{“essentially bringing people together to talk about things that tend to divide us.”} She added that the coordinators work under the banner of \textit{“strengthening communities and bringing people together to kind of create a community cohesion which hopefully will lead to countering extremism.”} As suggested by these overlaps, community safety and cohesion are also seen as playing a role in preventing extremism and radicalisation. Describing the remit of this work within one local authority, Mel outlined how she supports asylum seekers and refugees, addresses equality and participation issues, monitors community tensions, and generally deals with \textit{“day-to-day community safety issues”} such as knife crime and domestic violence. In addition, her work also looks to address issues of division through \textit{“resilience building, facilitating social contact”} where people from \textit{“perceivedly different communities”} are brought together to \textit{“find that common ground”} (Mel, local authority). For Mel, this upstream work to reduce social exclusion was an essential aspect of preventing extremism, echoing the Counter-Extremism Strategy’s emphasis on inclusion and cohesion.

4.8 Early intervention activity in Wales

Moving beyond the policy framework, this section describes the early intervention activity in Wales captured by this study. The discussion introduces the organisations and their roles in Wales, including the various ‘targeted’ and ‘universal’ interventions, and explores what is meant by these terms. As discussed in outlining public health models of prevention in the literature review (Chapter 2), universal interventions delivered to any young person constitute ‘primary’ prevention, while more targeted interventions are a form of ‘secondary’ prevention (Harris-Hogan, 2020). This section draws on both observations of practice, as

\textsuperscript{10} These roles have since changed, and there are no longer specific Community Coordinators for Countering Extremism. Both practitioners based in Wales maintained their involvement in community cohesion work after changing roles, however, and the 2015 Counter-Extremism Strategy is still in place at the time of writing.
well as accounts from interviewees about further interventions (such as youth work and sports-based interventions) they have been involved in as policymakers or practitioners. As will be shown, there are many different stakeholders involved in preventing extremism and radicalisation in Wales. This can lead to overlaps in the work being carried out, and in some cases, tensions where there are different views of what is ‘best’, both for young people and in terms of prevention. This issue, as well as wider aspects of organisation and delivery, are discussed in greater depth in later chapters. After the main discussion in this section, a table is included to summarise the interventions being considered in this thesis, distinguishing between those observed directly and those captured by interviews (Table 4).

Among the organisations and individuals involved in prevention in Wales, some are more explicitly ‘Prevent’ than others. Interventions operate in a similar way, with some more ‘official’ than others, and many taking place informally. According to South Wales Police (2021), for instance, those involved in Prevent work itself include: police, local authorities, schools and colleges, faith leaders, community groups (including youth groups), and voluntary services. In terms of extremism prevention more broadly, the present research has also highlighted some further examples, including: sports clubs, ‘autism specialists’, charities and freelance practitioners. For the purposes of this thesis, formal Channel interventions are not included, as the focus is on interventions taking place ‘pre-Prevent’. There is some discussion of work with Channel referrals in later chapters, however, as insights from an autism specialist about her approaches to young people on the autism spectrum are also relevant to earlier prevention. This array of actors and agencies points to some of the complexities in the social organisation of extremism and radicalisation prevention, which will be explored further in Chapter 7. Of note here though is that with the actors coming from different organisational cultures, different interpretations of situations are inherent in the course of prevention (Fine, 1984). As one interviewee remarked, “there’s a big Venn diagram here” (Ash, youth worker) of individuals, organisations and perspectives.

4.8.1 ‘Official’ Prevent work

The Prevent policing team sitting in CTP Wales was described as being quite small in comparison to other areas in the UK, with around eight Prevent officers, two sergeants and
some additional supporting officers and staff. The boundaries of different policing remits were outlined to some extent, though interviewees noted that it could sometimes be quite hard to clearly distinguish between the remit of Pursue and Prevent. Using a pyramid analogy, Kevin (local authority) explained “right at the bottom should be equality diversity, then next should be cohesion, then counter-extremism, then Prevent, then Pursue.” Yet, Darren (police) suggested that “the interface between Pursue and Prevent is the difficult one.” Attempting to delineate this, Tony (police) explained that Pursue should be looking at individuals who are in the “attack planning phase” while Prevent works on “the first piece of information or intelligence that indicates that someone is becoming radicalised or has got extreme views.” Where Prevent cases are deemed to need support, other agencies and specialists, such as an autism specialist and Home Office intervention providers, can then be engaged as required. Claire (police) explained that referrals in Wales typically fall on a wide spectrum, and:

> We get people who are so far along the sort of the path of radicalisation, they’re almost in the sort of realms of Pursue, and almost on the sort of boundary of committing you know, an act of terrorism or actually stepping into the criminal threshold (Claire, police).

As highlighted earlier, Prevent and Channel ‘officially’ position themselves as being ‘early’ interventions. However, this quote contrasts that position, suggesting that at least some referrals are more serious and advanced in radicalisation terms.

Summarising the role of a Prevent Coordinator, May (local authority) explained it was to ensure an area “meets its statutory duties in terms of Prevent” which includes aspects such as the running of the Channel Panel. The Prevent team within a local authority includes the coordinator, an education officer (who works specifically with schools and other education settings) and a community engagement officer. The police and local authority Prevent teams work closely together as well as with others, ensuring that all relevant information is gathered: “Prevent teams are encouraged to link in with their cohesion teams ... there are hate crime officers everywhere and we talk with them, we can review the hate crimes”
(Darren, police). This demonstrates the way in which extremism and radicalisation prevention is seen to overlap with other areas – in this example, hate crime.

In addition, preventative projects are regularly organised by the local authority Prevent team which “match up to the threat and risk” profile (May, local authority). These are a mix of universal (delivered to all school pupils) and more targeted (delivered to areas or groups with special need) interventions. For instance, funding was used to provide assemblies about extremism and violence in local schools (a universal intervention). One of the interventions observed for this research was the Project for Boys, targeted towards specific individuals aged 13-15 who had expressed views or behaviours that raised extremism concerns for their schools. The project involved multiple small-group sessions with the aim of increasing the young people’s awareness of, and resilience to, extremism and wider issues including gangs, county lines and knife crime. Another example was a leadership programme, the Project for Girls, aimed at ages 16-17. The separation of boys and girls in this way is interesting because it implies gender is an organising variable of some kind in the context of more targeted early interventions. Though safeguarding and extremism policy do not explicitly differentiate in gender terms, the separation of these interventions perhaps reflects a broader view that boys and girls are different in terms of vulnerability or risk (Rivera and Bonita, 2015; Brown, 2020), an issue that will be returned to in Chapter 5.

For the girls, the project was described by an organiser as aiming to ‘build the girls’ leadership skills, but also trying to keep them safe at the same time’ (Fieldnotes, Project for Girls, 19/11/2020). It did so by building their knowledge and understanding of a range of topics. This included terrorism, but also online safety, grooming, politics and sexism, with the view that “the more they understand around the topic, the better it is” (May, local authority). A typical example of how such a range of topics was tied into the interventions is found in the following fieldnote extract:

Aimee (the facilitator) asked “Does anyone have any thoughts on what’s happened with Trump and the Capitol?” The girls posted their answers in the chat, and with around 10 in total, they included “different treatment when it was BLM” and “they’re terrorists but no one is calling them that.” Sharing some of her own
thoughts in response, Aimee noted that the events had been linked to the far-right, and linking back to her own police experience, said she wondered whether the intelligence had been wrong. She then started talking more broadly about potential impacts that might be seen in Wales, saying there are concerns that young people here might join those kinds of organisations. (Fieldnotes, Project for Girls, 14/01/2021)

The intervention was somewhat targeted towards specific schools/colleges, though it was advertised and open to any girls who applied. It could be argued then, that the interventions were not targeted towards those who were ‘most vulnerable’ to radicalisation and terrorism, as the existing Prevent Strategy (HMG, 2011) states. This is not to say, however, that the project was not a ‘success’ and beneficial for the girls who attended. Rather, it demonstrates the lack of linearity in translating policy ‘visions’ into practice. Both the Project for Boys and the Project for Girls are explored in greater detail in later chapters, particularly in the ways they were not always specifically related to extremism issues and some gender-based differences in delivery.

4.8.2 Counter-Extremism and cohesion

Two Community Coordinators for Counter-Extremism sit within local authorities and are associated with community safety and cohesion. Their role is “looking at more broader aspects” than Prevent, who “will focus on somebody who’s heading into that criminal space” (Kevin, local authority). Kevin provided an illustrative example of work of this nature relating to the far-right reaction to the Penally refugee camps in west Wales around September 2020.11 As the events started, Kevin described “a certain group” active on YouTube straightaway, posting videos of the refugees. The Coordinator’s work then involved “countering those narratives on a broad scale ... it’s throwing a net really and working with groups as opposed to individuals. So building resilience against those narratives.”

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11 As a former military base in Penally, Pembrokeshire, began being used to house asylum seekers during their claims process, extremist groups started protesting outside and posting YouTube videos. See BBC News (2020) for example.
Like the Prevent team, the Coordinators also run projects in their areas. This includes ‘school twinning’, which pairs schools from areas with different demographics (e.g. South Wales Valleys and inner-city) and runs activities where young people can meet each other and take part in activities together. Another counter-extremism project brought young people from across an area together to discuss and identify cohesion issues concerning them: emerging themes included “race, religion, cultural beliefs, faith and understanding different communities” (Jill, local authority). Similar projects are also carried out by the cohesion teams specifically, such as football matches between young people from communities where there have previously been tensions (as described by Mel, local authority). While policy frameworks have separated cohesion and Prevent work in official terms, in the sphere of earlier ‘pre-Prevent’ interventions aiming to prevent the onset of extremism, there are overlaps in activities. Although some contend that the focus should remain on more clearly terrorism-related issues (Shawcross, 2023), others have argued the two areas are complementary (Thomas, 2016).

While “there should be a sterile gap between counter extremism and Prevent” (Kevin, local authority), interviewees discussed how in practice the two can often be confused. Jill said “there are sceptics with the role because [it has] the words ‘counter extremism’” and Kevin similarly described how “the wording of things confuses the community … partners still refer to [it] as Prevent.” As Mel (local authority) explained, although “there are synergies” between cohesion/Counter-Extremism work and Prevent, the departments try to remain separate because they do not want “the community to think if they’re engaging with our Cohesion team that they’re actually speaking to a Prevent officer”. Concerns such as this relate to the allegations of Prevent as a mechanism for spying, and the stigmatisation and labelling of certain communities as outlined previously. This is notable because it demonstrates the resistance being faced by practitioners, and how this then shapes their activity and approaches (explored further in Chapter 7).

4.8.3 Curriculum and other school-based interventions
In line with the 2015 Prevent Duty, schools in Wales are required to have due regard to the prevention of radicalisation. As well as fulfilling their role through traditional safeguarding methods (i.e. referring young people to Prevent where staff/teachers identify signs of
radicalisation), various aspects of the curriculum also function as pre-Prevent ‘upstream’ extremism and radicalisation prevention. The ‘Harmony’ project is one example of this in Wales and is available at Key Stage 2 (ages 7-11, Y3-6 primary school), Key Stage 3 (ages 11-14, Y7-9 secondary school) and Key Stage 4 (ages 14-16, GCSE, Y10-11 secondary school). The project’s concept first emerged in response to the events of 9/11, as relationships between diverse groups of pupils in one school were “catastrophically impacted” and efforts were made to address the issues in school assemblies (Steve, education worker). Steve explained that the project then officially “came into being in 2008” and has grown substantially in the years since. It educates pupils about extremism and intolerance while building on their critical thinking skills over multiple lessons. The project is not a compulsory part of the curriculum, but schools can opt to deliver it to their pupils. For instance, the project can now be done as part of the GCSE Welsh Baccalaureate course: to date, Steve estimates around 150 schools have run the project with their pupils at this level.

Similarly, some charities also operate in a similar capacity, delivering workshops in both primary and secondary schools across Wales. One anti-racism intervention was observed for the current study. Here, education workers run one-off sessions about racism and hatred, challenging stereotypes and educating pupils of different ages about terminology. An important aspect emerging within these sessions was encouraging greater confidence in young people to discuss these issues more openly, for example:

Mike moved on to talk about skin colour around 30 mins into the session. He asked the students what was in the room when they arrived – trying to get them to say they saw a black man. He joked and made fun of the awkwardness that surrounds ‘black’ by acting out what it would be like if people talked about ‘white’ in the same way. (Fieldnotes, anti-racism workshop, 05/03/2020)

This intervention takes an educative approach to informing young people about these issues, doing so in a way that overlaps with the aims of policy, particularly the Counter-Extremism Strategy. In addition, there is a police-designed lesson to educate young people in Wales about extremism and radicalisation, based on the knowledge of counter-terrorism officers. This intervention was also observed in the current study as it was delivered to
secondary school pupils by a police officer (in uniform). Based on a video about two young people becoming extremists, pupils are encouraged to discuss the causes and influences in their radicalisation.

4.8.4 Youth work and sports clubs
The important function of youth work (including through sports) in the upstream prevention of extremism has also been highlighted in the course of this research. This includes both specific projects/interventions delivered to groups of young people, as well as casual interactions between youth workers and young people. While youth groups are listed as a Prevent partner in official channels, this work can also be informal and somewhat isolated from Prevent (as explored in detail in Chapter 7). As the following examples show, for practitioners working in this capacity, there was a noticeably strong emphasis on supportive approaches, and being positive and empowering in their framing. This accords with the needs-focused safeguarding framing of this issue in Welsh guidance (Wales Safeguarding Procedures, 2022). For instance, one project was developed to target young people across Wales who were vulnerable to extremism and/or exploitation and needed help building their resilience. The project addressed a range of areas, from “soft things” such as self-esteem and confidence to more serious issues such as violence (Aled, youth worker).

Running alongside the more general areas of work were specialist areas that could be called upon when a need was identified: as Aled explained, “that might be far right extremism, that might be religious Muslim extremism, that might be child sexual exploitation.” Some youth work also involved constructively challenging and speaking to young people about the challenges they might face in future, in a bid to increase their resilience and awareness (Lewys, youth worker). Interviewees explained that, due to the nature of the third sector with lots of short and fixed term contracts, once certain projects end, their work often gets repackaged into new projects.

Similar to youth work in many ways are the sports clubs and coaches that run projects for young people. Though not always specifically targeting young people vulnerable to being radicalised, there were crossovers in the nature of the support and resilience work being carried out, as extremism risks and vulnerabilities were perceived to overlap with other issues at the earlier point of intervention (e.g. county lines). Some coaches interviewed for
this project did also have experience with young people who needed specific help in relation to radicalisation and extremism, some through group project sessions and others through one-to-one support. At one boxing club, for instance, a family in need of support with their son were referred by a third-party organisation, and the coaches were able to support with “unpicking that narrative and that personal grievance” (Oscar, local authority). Boxing sessions were also identified as an effective place to support young people expressing racist attitudes, for example, and training was seen as a useful tool for supporting individuals in overcoming their vulnerabilities, “working with them out of that funnel” (Luke, support worker/coach).

4.9 Summarising early interventions in Wales

Table 4 (below) provides a summary of the interventions discovered and explored as part of this research that feature in later chapters. This includes the names of the interventions, how they were captured (observation or interviews), organisers, who they were delivered by, and which issue(s) they primarily sought to address. Owing to the ‘pre-Prevent’ and earlier intervention focus of this thesis, the table does not include formal Channel interventions (and providers), which only come about as a result of Prevent referrals. The only exception to this is the work of Wendy, the autism specialist, who predominantly worked with Prevent referrals (though not exclusively). Her account has been included here and throughout this thesis, as the techniques and approaches she highlighted could be used with other young people. This section briefly summarises the routes of referral into all other early interventions included in the table and the following chapters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Name</strong></th>
<th><strong>Method</strong></th>
<th><strong>Targeted or universal?</strong></th>
<th><strong>Organiser</strong></th>
<th><strong>Delivered by...</strong></th>
<th><strong>Topics or issue being addressed</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-racism workshops</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Charity/schools/local authorities</td>
<td>Education workers</td>
<td>Racism, hate crime, prejudice, intolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police extremism lesson</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Police and schools</td>
<td>Police officer</td>
<td>Extremism and radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony project</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Extremism, radicalisation and terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for Girls</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>Local authority</td>
<td>Ex-police officer</td>
<td>Radicalisation, grooming, online safety, police/policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project for Boys</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>Local authority</td>
<td>Youth/support workers</td>
<td>Extremism, gangs, county lines, drugs, racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxing projects</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Universal and targeted</td>
<td>Boxing clubs</td>
<td>Youth/support workers</td>
<td>Broad and varied; could include extremism, anti-social behaviour, violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth work</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Universal and targeted</td>
<td>Youth clubs/organisations</td>
<td>Youth workers</td>
<td>Broad and varied; could include extremism, racism, hate crime, exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School twinning</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Local authority Counter-Extremism</td>
<td>Counter-Extremism Coordinator</td>
<td>Cohesion, division, culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion-extremism projects</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Local authority Counter-Extremism</td>
<td>Counter-Extremism Coordinator</td>
<td>Cohesion, division, culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autism specialist’s intervention</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>Prevent</td>
<td>Autism specialist</td>
<td>Extremism, racism, intense interests, friendships, loneliness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Summary of early interventions (organisation and funding)
In the case of the anti-racism workshops, the police extremism lessons and the ‘Harmony’ project, there are no ‘referrals’ as such, because they are universal interventions and primary forms of prevention. Rather, schools, and in some cases local authorities, choose whether or not to engage with these programmes (an issue discussed in more depth in Chapter 7). The school twinning and cohesion-extremism projects worked in similar ways, with no direct referrals, but instead offered to schools and local youth groups. These projects were, however, designed with local communities in mind, and the organisers sought to use them to address specific issues such as prejudice and intolerance.

In the Project for Girls, the local authority team approached some local sixth forms (schools) and colleges. They then opened the project to applications from girls who were interested in attending, but said they had hoped to get girls from a diverse range of backgrounds. The Project for Boys was organised by the same team but operated on a targeted basis, only working with boys who had been referred in by a range of professionals from police, schools and youth justice agencies. In the following chapter, the specific events which led to the boys’ referrals will be discussed in more depth, but they can be summarised as being early-stage extremism and Prevent issues. Both the Project for Girls and the Project for Boys, then, were secondary forms of prevention as they were more targeted towards ‘at risk’ young people (particularly the latter).

Boxing projects and youth work interventions were a mixture of universal (primary) and targeted (secondary). They both provided various spaces and sessions that were open for any young people to attend with or without referrals. However, they were also receptive to referrals from professionals (including those from schools and police) as well as parents, where there were specific concerns about young people. In these cases, young people could be referred onto early interventions being run by these organisations, which typically addressed a mixture of issues including anti-social behaviour, violence, exploitation, racism and extremism, rather than being focused on singular areas of concern.
4.10 Concluding remarks

This chapter has highlighted a range of defining tensions being repeatedly renegotiated by policymakers and practitioners operating in extremism prevention in Wales. As Maines (1977) argues, to properly understand key policies and their impact on practice, the social organisational matrices in which they are negotiated and take place must first be understood. Recurring and competing issues highlighted by this chapter include whether focus should be upon terrorism or extremist ideas and, related to this, which particular ideologies or types of terror are most ‘threatening’. Challenges in categorising different ideological ‘threats’ have also been highlighted, as well as in how young people are being identified for ‘targeted’ and ‘universal’ interventions in Wales. In the case of two specific interventions, the Project for Boys and Project for Girls, gender also emerges as an important variable in delivery, and will be explored further in Chapter 5. More broadly, the chapter has revealed a tension in different responses to extremism from the UK and Welsh Government-levels. Interesting complexities therefore emerge in the way young people are framed in this context, given various relevant responsibilities are divided across two the nations. The backdrop here is a number of significant moments surrounding extremism and radicalisation prevention – including the criticisms of spying and stigmatisation – since the inception of Prevent in 2003.

Having traced key developments, the chapter has situated and introduced the range of early interventions considered within the scope of this research. In the following chapters, two key arguments presented here will reappear and be explored in greater depth. Firstly, the notion of young people being placed in a space that is both safeguarding and securitising them is the subject of Chapter 6. Secondly, with the wide range of practitioners and organisations involved in prevention comes an array of perspectives and approaches. Chapter 7 explores the consequences of this, and the tensions, frictions and resistances that can sometimes result. Before embarking on these discussions however, the following chapter examines the delivery of ‘pre-Prevent’ prevention efforts in more depth. This includes how ‘problems’ of extremism and radicalisation are being understood within the early interventions designed to prevent them from setting in, as well as the approaches and innovations being used, and some variations between practitioners.
Chapter 5: Prevent and Prevention: The Delivery of Early Interventions in Wales

This study focuses on early interventions to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation in Wales and is specifically interested in those delivered prior to official Prevent/Channel referral or intervention. Having explored the policy context to interventions in Wales in the preceding chapter, this chapter focuses on their delivery and conduct. In the sections that follow, I will set out how interventions come to take place, what is happening in practice (including the principles and approaches used by practitioners), and who is delivering the interventions. By presenting data relating to each of these three broad categories – how, what and who – the aim of this chapter is to explore the way extremism and radicalisation are understood by practitioners and policymakers, with consideration of factors mediating intervention delivery. As such, the discussion in this chapter contributes to both the first and second research questions. The discussion also introduces elements and features of early intervention that will be revisited in the two remaining findings chapters.

In the following discussion, I argue that ‘upstream’, early interventions to prevent extremism and radicalisation go beyond the typical scope of Prevent in its official form. Here, ‘upstream’ is used to refer to interventions taking place before extremist or radicalised attitudes (or behaviours) have become embedded for a young person. As they seek to prevent wider issues or ‘risks’ that fall in the space between safeguarding and criminal justice such as county lines (criminal exploitation), the ‘upstream’ interventions construct extremism and radicalisation as being interlinked with these wider issues. As a result, the label and ‘net’ of extremism widens, drawing in new issues and creating space for ‘pre-Prevent’ interventions. Both Prevent and the early interventions operating around it are also shaped and influenced by the evolving extremist-related ‘threats’ seen to be impacting young people, including Incel extremism and conspiracy theories, as well as wider criminal issues such as county lines. Having considered these developments, some of the specific techniques and approaches used by practitioners will be explored as they relate to four areas: meaningful contact, parent influence, responses to neurodiversity, and gender.
Finally, this chapter introduces the issue of who delivers interventions, highlighting the ways practitioners from different backgrounds diverge in their approaches.

5.1 How: Signifying, defining, and preventing

David Matza’s (1969/2010) notion of ‘signification’ describes the way certain behaviours, activities, and persons become signified as deviant. This has become a function of the state and encompasses several elements including banning (casting a behaviour as prohibited), apprehension (intervention and correction), and penalisation (punishment). By marking out certain activities, as well as attitudes and beliefs, in the present case, as ‘deviant’, this makes them “suitable objects of surveillance and control” by the state (Matza, 2010:145). Here, by labelling particular ideologies as undesirable and certain attitudes as concerning, Prevent and the related early interventions perform ‘signification work’.

Although in Wales, radicalisation is positioned as a safeguarding issue with a strong focus on children’s rights and needs (see Chapter 4), the overarching policy framework sits within the remit of the UK Home Office. Prevent, by association with terrorism in the sense that its intention is to avoid it, closely interacts with criminal legislation. In practice, this means the early interventions are caught between both spaces. Under Prevent, professionals are employed by the state to oversee this and perform specific roles in response to the subjects that have been defined as ‘Prevent concerns’. They include, for instance, police officers who review and determine pathways for referrals as and when they are received, and all actors involved in the delivery of Prevent interact with policing in some way. Together with its obvious connotations of terrorism, Prevent is therefore signified as an issue with criminal implications, which in turn informs the approach taken by interventions. A similar argument can also be applied to early interventions that are not directly delivered/funded by Prevent. Though less tightly bound to legal or policing frameworks, they also signify an issue (such as racism) and then try to prevent it, along with its negative consequences. The processes identified by Matza – banning, apprehension and penalisation – can all be detected in the preventative interventions studied here, as outlined below.
5.1.1 Signification and early interventions

Universal/non-targeted and more targeted early interventions have both been observed by this research. They can be differentiated based on their audiences and purpose: universal interventions, or ‘primary’ prevention in public health terms, are delivered to larger cohorts of 20-30 young people in classrooms and similar settings and are designed to prevent the onset of issues through education and open discussion. Some of those captured by this research include: the Harmony programme, anti-racism workshops, police extremism lessons, school twinning projects and local authority engagement activities. Targeted interventions (‘secondary’ prevention) work in a similar way but are delivered to smaller cohorts, typically working with individuals who have done something that has triggered ‘concern’ for professionals around them. As such, they focus on countering particular behaviours and ideas expressed by young people that are identified as being (potentially) problematic. The Project for Boys and some youth work and sports-based interventions can be included in this category. The Project for Girls sat somewhere in between these two categories, advertised to specific colleges but open to anyone who wanted to engage from those settings. Matza’s (2010) conception of signification can be applied to both types of interventions, as will be explored below.

A universal intervention responding to attitudes – such as racism and prejudice – in this sense signifies them to be unacceptable and attempts to contribute to the eradication of them. For instance, the history and origins of different terminologies were discussed in interventions designed to prevent racism and extremism, and the issues with them explicated to young people. The purpose being to indicate that they should not hold or express these attitudes. The motivation for including anti-racism work in this study is that within the wider body of literature in this area, explored in Chapter 2, connections have been made between racism and extremism (Pels and de Ruyter, 2012; Cifuentes et al., 2013). Also, in practice, schools have been found to have made their own connections with topics including anti-racism and citizenship by teaching them in response to their obligations under the Prevent Duty (Haugstvedt and Tuastad, 2021). In broader policy terms, the connections between anti-racism and extremism prevention (and even Prevent) can be linked to notions of Community Cohesion, as well as the greater emphasis placed on tolerance and hate by the Counter-Extremism Strategy (2015).
Signification can, however, be applied more clearly in relation to targeted early interventions. In order to be included on a targeted intervention, young people must first behave (including sharing ideas) in a way that has been signified as a Prevent-related issue at multiple levels (policy, intervention organisers, and professionals making referrals). Initially, the actor who first labels a young person’s behaviours or ideas, thereby signifying them as problematic, would be the professional initiating the referral such as a teacher. While their perceptions may be shaped by policy, they must exercise their discretion in applying the labels. Most of the boys in group 1 of the Project for Boys, for example, were referred following repeated verbal incidents involving misogyny and transphobia that were reported by a group of female pupils at their school. The school consulted with the local Prevent team, who felt that while the boys may not have been serious enough for referral through the Channel process, their attitudes needed to be addressed, thus confirming the initial signification by the school. In other words, the boys’ views may have left them vulnerable to being radicalised, and so they were directed to an intervention that supplemented the existing ones (Cohen, 1985). Another example is a youth work project that was specifically designed to address far-right views with young people. After collaborating with local education settings, young people who were identified as ‘vulnerable’ were selected for the project. The work was summarised as “educating them about the people they hate” (Dave, youth worker).

Viewed from Matza’s (2010) perspective, the examples capture the first and second elements of signification: a young person behaves in a way that is bedevilled and prohibited; then, in being caught, they are apprehended and seen as warranting intervention. Matza interprets this process as a ‘putting down’, derogation or stigmatisation of a young person, warning that their deficiencies may be exposed, and a person may be humiliated. On occasion, in the Project for Boys intervention, and therefore the potential for stigmatisation, was widened to include certain friends, suggesting peer influence was perceived to be important by those making the referrals. Penalisation is the final aspect of signification identified by Matza, and targeted early intervention programmes may be viewed in this sense because they are programmes that only certain people are recommended to attend (though they can refuse to engage, as discussed later in this chapter). According to Matza, a
risk for young people cast in this way is that their identity may become dominated by the label attached to them. The negative implications of this have been well documented elsewhere (see for instance, Goffman, 1990a) and will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 6.

Field observations also provided insight into the way issues were characterised by targeted interventions. For instance, during Craig’s (youth/support worker) sessions of the Project for Boys and Aimee’s (former police) sessions of the Project for Girls, the focus was not solely on extremism or radicalisation, despite the funding originating from Prevent bids for Home Office grant money. Drugs, gangs, online safety, county lines and grooming were all among the issues included alongside extremism and radicalisation. In this sense, through Matza’s lens, the interventions signified the original issue of extremism as linked to broader vulnerabilities that could also contribute to other risks. While official Prevent legislation does not include these wider issues in its definitions (and such issues of grooming and gangs do not fit neatly into the scope of Community Cohesion either), it seems those tasked with commissioning upstream, early interventions do see these spaces as intersecting in some way. The implication appears to be that young people who may be vulnerable to one risk/harm are vulnerable to all risks/harms. The expansion of interventions in Wales in this way is interesting and may be linked to the greater emphasis on a safeguarding approach.

Guerra and Bradshaw (2008) would consider this a positive development in intervention implementation. Among other criticisms of risk rehearsed in Chapter 2, they argue that in the past, risk-driven approaches led to interventions being developed for separate problems, ignoring the commonalities between different issues or ‘problem behaviours.’ Instead, more holistic interventions identifying shared risk, protective and promotive factors across multiple issues are considered beneficial (Guerra and Bradshaw, 2008). Ash’s (youth worker) perspective accords with this:

*I’m trying to work on a model to articulate it, is lots of different triangles and the antecedent is quite similar early on. One may end up with self-harming; one may end up with, you know, a gang membership; one may end up by being trafficked. One*
may end up by being involved in extremism. One may end up by just not having a happy or fulfilling life. At this lower level, they all deserve equal attention.

Similarly, when discussing the use of the Prevent framework to prevent the onset of such wider issues, Oscar (local authority) questioned, “where else are they [young people] gonna go?” This highlights an interesting aspect of translating policy into practice, because while such issues may not have been officially deemed ‘Prevent concerns’, they have become an area of interest for work on the ground, almost as ‘pre-Prevent’ issues.

5.1.2 New ‘threats’ and extremist concerns: Incels, conspiracy theories and Covid-19

Alongside the seemingly growing range of issues being associated with ‘extremism’, practitioners and policymakers also perceived new ideologies to be emerging, and Incel ideology and conspiracy theories (QAnon) were two they discussed specifically. Recent referrals to the Prevent programme reviewed in Chapter 3 reflect this trend. With fieldwork carried out during the Covid-19 pandemic, it is also worth noting here that this trend was potentially significant in two ways. Firstly, Darren (police) noted shifts in ideology: “we’ve got lots of material on how different extremist groups are taking advantage of that, and they’re weaving pandemic points into their ideologies.” As will be explored below, established conspiracy theories were seen to be doing just that. Secondly, in relation to processes of radicalisation more generally, participants from across a range of roles and organisations (including youth work, education, police and policy) highlighted the substantial increase in time being spent online by young people. As the following discussion notes, the Internet plays a vital role in both Incel ideology and conspiracy theories.

The first ‘new’ ideology considered in this section is ‘Incel’ or ‘involuntary celibate’, a set of beliefs which directs anger and misogyny towards women.\(^\text{12}\) While the latest version of the Prevent Strategy (HMG, 2011) and other related guidance (for example Channel Duty

\(^{12}\) O’Malley et al. (2020:3) describe Incel ideology as a movement predominantly operating online where sympathisers discuss the “difficulties in seeking and succeeding in sexual relationships.” Their celibacy is perceived to be involuntary, a result of their lack of agency, and this has led to the expression of conspiratorial and highly misogynistic views favourable toward violence against women in retaliation. It has been argued that those who consider themselves ‘incels’ are typically young men, predominantly in the 18-25 age group (O’Malley et al., 2020).
guidance from 2020 (HMG, 2020)) state that ‘all’ forms of terrorism are concerns, Islamist-inspired, far-right and Northern Ireland-related terrorism are the only ones named explicitly. Indeed, Darren, who had worked in Prevent policing for some years, suggested that counter-terrorism networks were not set up with ‘Incel’ and gender specific issues in mind. Yet he had seen a notable increase in the number of people asking about the threat from Incels, particularly in the aftermath of an attack in Plymouth in August 2021. In the attack, Jake Davison killed five people and was later found to have posted online videos referring to Incel ideology, as well as his own social isolation, in the lead up to his actions (BBC, 2021). The impacts of this shift were observed during fieldwork autumn 2021: as noted earlier in this chapter, the expression of misogynistic beliefs by a group of year 9 boys led to their referral to the Project for Boys early intervention programme.

Like Darren, Oscar (local authority) argued that referrals linked to gender-related issues had increased noticeably during the previous year (the interview took place in December 2020). Oscar added that some young people had been heard openly saying things like ‘I’m an Incel’ to their friends. Whether serious or not, their knowledge of the ideology/movement was a source for concern for practitioners. In addition, Darren (police) had seen a growing number of requests for Intervention Providers specialising in Incel-related issues. While the recently released review of Prevent (Shawcross, 2023) has pushed back on the view that Incel extremism is a counter-terrorism matter, participants in this study did express concern, and the emphasis on responding to the issue has been growing (Hoffman et al., 2020). Darren (police) felt that neat ideology labels and existing systems for categorisation were being tested by such developments: “old categories are being challenged by the pick and mix ideologies.” He described misogynistic strands and ideas, such as those expressed by the young people on the Project for Boys intervention, as being “woven into classic ideologies” (Darren, police). This indicates that the ‘extremism’ label is being applied more widely, at least by those working closely with young people.

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13 For the first time, in 2023, the Home Office released Prevent referral figures with the ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ ideology category broken down, including a sub-category for Incel ideology.
Conspiracy theories, specifically QAnon conspiracies, was the second area of ideological development highlighted by participants. As suggested by Oscar’s account below, QAnon is a relatively new conspiracy theory, emerging in 2017 (Amarasingam and Argentino, 2020). It argues a faction of paedophiles and cannibals “controls world governments and the media” (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2021:142), and the theory continues to evolve with new events as they emerge. In relation to Covid-19, some supporters suggested that 5G masts were causing the illness (Tuters and Knight, 2020), while others alleged that the virus was created to harm Donald Trump’s (Republican) presidency and support Joe Biden (the Democratic Party candidate) to win the 2020 election (Amarasingam and Argentino, 2020). Oscar felt similar tactics were being used by and across different conspiracy theories, with various world events positioned as evidence to their claims:

If you said ‘what’s QAnon?’ to us in 17/18, we wouldn’t have known. Now, looking back, you can see what they were doing with Pizzagate is the same that they’re doing with Save Our Children. ... So it’s that’s the difference this time is they had a ready-made audience that wasn’t going anywhere and wasn’t doing anything and was only allowed out for an hour at a time. So you just had all the time in the world to go with it. And that was the same with 5G and now Save Our Children as well. So yeah, it’s just... it’s on the periphery of our space, but we acknowledge that it’s sort of, it is coming into it and it is kind of falling into our kind of remit as well. (Oscar, local authority)

At a more local level, in Wales, Oscar argued he had seen conspiracy theories using “more and more kind of anti-Welsh Assembly propaganda narrative alongside the YES Cymru stuff.” While it was acknowledged that the examples typically fall outside of Prevent’s traditional remit, they were nonetheless impacting on Prevent-related work. As indicated by Darren’s

14 ‘Pizzagate’ refers to the conspiracy theory centred on a pizza restaurant and a faction of Democratic Party leaders (including Hilary Clinton). Emerging in 2016, the theory’s suggestion was that the leaders were carrying out ritual Satanic abuse of children at the restaurant in Washington DC (Bleakley, 2021).

15 ‘Save Our Children’ is another conspiracy theory linked to QAnon and Pizzagate that has resulted in protests in the UK. Among supporters, there is strong suspicion of the establishment and a belief that elites are committing crimes against children without consequences (Sardarizadeh, 2020).
police) discussion of Incels above, extremist ideologies are not static, and may shift over time, in turn presenting new risks to young people. This reiterates the importance of ensuring early interventions are current and responsive to such wider, contextual issues, even where they fall outside of those explicitly defined as ‘Prevent’ matters.

Taken together, these examples point to the way understandings of radicalisation and ‘extremist’ ideology have been changing. The signification of conspiracy theories and Incel ideology as concerning and in need of intervention is something that has developed more recently. For those involved in preventing the onset of extremism and radicalisation, however, the findings suggest practice is preceding policy and has already started evolving in response to these shifts. This is both in terms of practice by front-line professionals identifying ‘problematic’ behaviours or ideas and referring young people for support, and in terms of the interventions being designed and made available.

5.2 What: Techniques and approaches to prevention

As well as responding to multiple issues within interventions, a number of other delivery approaches and adaptations were identified by this study. These include meaningful contact, concerns over the influence of parents’ and guardians’ views on young people, adjustments to young people’s diverse needs and gender-based practice differences. Each provides further insight into assumptions about the nature of extremism and radicalisation that are shaping practice and are discussed in turn below.

5.2.1 Contact

A number of interviewees referred to the role of ‘contact’ in preventing extremism. While some referred to the concept more specifically than others, it was clear that contact with people from different backgrounds (cultural, religious, or ethnic) was widely considered to be a useful aspect of interventions. Mel (local authority) summarised these aspects of her team’s work as connecting different groups to create “mutual understanding, sympathy, empathy” and to show different communities that they “actually face very similar issues.” Aled (youth worker) described the opportunities for meaningful interaction organised by the
project he worked on. The project, which sought to deconstruct far-right ideas, specifically
based itself around “trying to fill in relationships and trying to create meaningful
communication and meaningful interaction between different people” rather than lecturing
young people. They organised visits to mosques as well as opportunities for “young people
of different communities and backgrounds” to work together and discuss their shared
challenges (Aled, youth worker). Connor (youth/support worker) similarly referred to people
learning from one another in an environment with a diverse range of people, in this case a
boxing gym. He also described programmes he was planning to run in partnership with
boxing clubs in the Welsh Valleys. From past experience, he felt such approaches could
“break the barriers” and that “it makes communities work together ... it makes each other
understand each other’s culture and each other’s diversity” (Connor, youth/support worker).

For Gordon Allport, contact such as this is a key aspect of prejudice and its prevention.
Allport’s (1954) intergroup contact theory offers an explanation for the activities and
impacts being described by participants above. The theory posits that prejudice and
intolerance can be reduced under certain conditions of contact between majority and
minority groups (Hodson, 2011). For instance, acquaintance with and knowledge of an
outgroup is likely to contribute to a reduction in prejudice. Activities may include social
travel – visiting new places or living with others – or intercultural education, where role
playing someone from a minority group may increase sympathy for the group. This speaks,
for instance, to Aled’s above description of the contact between youths holding far-right
views and Muslim communities that was facilitated in his work. Key to this perspective are
situations demanding equal status and common goals (Imperato et al., 2021). A scenario
described by Dave (youth worker) is illustrative here: a trip to a kebab restaurant with a
vulnerable young person who was becoming increasingly sympathetic towards the far-right.
The young person was a member of the National Front, and in Dave’s words “all I did with
him was bought him a kebab ‘cause I saw he was hungry.”¹⁶ The food they were consuming
and enjoying was in fact Halal, something the young person would have been opposed to,
but Dave only revealed this information after they had finished. The approach was based on
creating equal status in the sense that they were eating and enjoying the same meal

¹⁶ The National Front (or NF) is a British far-right nationalist party (Fielding, 1981).
together, in the same restaurant, rather than confronting the young person’s views directly (Hodson, 2011).

School-based interventions, which primarily take the form of workshops and lessons centring around topics including racism and extremism, also reflect the concept of meaningful contact, though possibly to a lesser degree. While there was traditionally an emphasis on involvement and immersion in an activity or community within contact theory (Allport, 1954), the informational approach is not necessarily redundant and can be valuable in the long-term. While not targeted towards ‘high-risk’ individuals, school-based interventions can create enlightened citizens, sowing doubt about any existing prejudiced beliefs (Allport, 1954) and preventing the onset of extremist views. In the racism prevention interventions observed in this research, for example, young people are presented with facts and statistics about issues including ethnicity, racism, immigration, Islamophobia; Allport would describe this as direct intercultural education.

Across the interventions observed in this study, practitioners were from a range of ethnic backgrounds: some were white-Welsh, while others were of Caribbean, Indian, and mixed heritage, for example. A notable difference between the way practitioners delivered interventions was that those who came from ethnic minority backgrounds often shared stories based on their own life experiences. For instance, Mike (education worker), whose family were from the Caribbean, shared stories about being forced to clean football changing rooms by other players as a child, explaining that they would ‘tell him off for making other players look bad if he played better than them’ (Fieldnotes, anti-racism workshop, 05/03/2020). Similarly, Craig (youth worker), whose parents were from Ireland and the Caribbean, reflected on more recent examples when explaining prejudice to a group of boys:

Craig recounted a story about rushing to board a train while carrying a large bag. He explained the way people had looked at him and moved away when he sat down. Craig asked the boys what they thought it meant: one suggested racism. Another was surprised, and quickly asked “what, terrorism?” and Craig agreed. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys, group 1 11/12/2021)
Sharing such personal stories may have helped to support the educational or informational aspects of the interventions, demonstrating the way prejudice, racism and extremism tangibly impact individuals. From the contact perspective, intervention practitioners from minority backgrounds provides a form of contact and acquaintance for young people, potentially enhancing the effects of educational intervention (Allport, 1954).

Kevin (local authority) was especially familiar with the contact hypothesis: he discussed the concept in detail and was enthusiastic about using it to inform his approaches. This may have been shaped by his previous career in policing, where he spent many years working in an inner-city area, building relationships between the local police and a predominantly Muslim community. In particular, Kevin had been working with contacts in two specific mosques for over two decades and described how his approach had developed over time. He talked about the visits he had organised for young people where they were able to “ask anything ... don’t matter how daft the question sounds, they can ask and it’s really thorough” (Kevin, local authority). This eventually evolved into a school twinning programme between schools across the Welsh Valleys and Cardiff, where young people from different schools were paired up based on their interests/commonalities (for example, family pets), later meeting up and taking part in activities. Young people from the twinned schools, which differed in terms of their demographics and diversity, teamed up to play sports and took educational trips to different parts of Cardiff, learning about history, migration and democracy. Kevin felt this form of contact was beneficial in multiple ways, as it meant he could:

... bring kids together so they all play on the same team. So, we get kids from different areas coming, so again, we’re addressing extremism at a very basic level. And also then, we’re looking at gang issues as well, which sadly are around, you know, territorial issues ... (Kevin, local authority)

Kevin’s project speaks to multiple elements identified by Allport (1954): as well as increasing understanding about each other’s cultures and backgrounds, the young people worked
together, which Kevin hoped would increase their empathy towards one another while reducing any uncertainties they may have previously felt.

5.2.2 Parental influence

During our discussion about the meaningful contact work, however, Kevin (local authority) referred to barriers he had encountered from parents. He described issues within two particular schools, one in Rhondda Cynon Taff and one in Caerphilly, both located in the south Wales valleys. Of the young people in the two schools, 25% in Rhondda Cynon Taff and 20% in Caerphilly were not allowed to attend a mosque trip because their parents or guardians objected. This rate of rejection from parents had initially been as high as 50% in one school, though some came around to the idea after the teacher explained the aims of the visit to them individually. Reasons cited by Kevin included “we don’t want him being influenced by another religion” ‘we don’t trust Muslims.”” Traces of Allport’s ideas about the causes of prejudice can be found in Kevin’s words, particularly the idea of fear and anxiety towards those who are unfamiliar. The potential influence of parents'/guardians’ views have also been recognised in radicalisation terms (Taylor, 2018; Spalek, 2016; Sikkens et al., 2017), and evidence has been found of a relationship between “extreme right-wing convictions of parents and those of their children” (Pels and de Ruyter, 2012). Indeed, as he described the Islamophobic views of some of the young people he had worked with, Kevin said that “that fear was coming from the parents, and that anti-Islam narrative.”

Another example of the implications of parents’ and guardians’ prejudices for young people emerged in relation to the Project for Boys. In group 1, where the incident of transphobic and misogynistic comments had led to boys being referred to the intervention, one of the parents refused to allow his son to take part. Just as the first session was about to begin, a teacher described who would and would not be attending the project:

The teacher explained that one other boy had a dad who didn’t see such an issue in his son’s behaviour, and therefore didn’t see a need for him to engage with the intervention. (Project for boys, group 1 15/10/2021)
In this case, the dad became a direct barrier to the intervention, and his refusal to consent had a direct impact on his son, as he was not allowed to participate. The dad’s perspective of the situation is suggestive of his own views – by his not seeing a problem with his son’s comments, this points to him sharing or sympathising with the misogynistic, transphobic view. The teacher’s frustration was clear, but as an intervention that required consent from parents and guardians, he was unable to do anything.

The idea of parents and guardians influencing young people was also discussed by several other interviewees. Describing one intervention she had recently organised, which brought together young people from across a city to discuss local issues, Jill (local authority) explained that one young person had “right leaning views” and believed certain right-wing stereotypes. After expressing these in front of other young people, the practitioners encouraged him to open up and reflect on them:

“It was an interesting one because a lot of what he was saying was ‘well, my dad says that’ and ‘well I- my dad told me that’ and ‘Dad says that this’. And we once we sort of drilled down to ‘what do you think?’ like ‘let’s just put dad’s views aside, what are your views? And can you explain dad’s views in your own mind, you know, can you put that in your own words?’ And so that was really interesting that he sort of came to realise that a lot of what he was saying was repeated information, you know? (Jill, local authority)

Jill added that this interaction led to a wider conversation with all the young people, in which they were encouraged to reflect on whether they were simply repeating what they’d heard elsewhere or had considered their own perspective critically. Influence from adults was also discussed by Luke (youth/support worker), Mel (local authority) and James (education worker). While they did not provide direct intervention examples like Jill, their accounts convey their beliefs that parents and guardians (and wider family) may be a factor in young people developing prejudiced views:

“But that’s a systemic issue within that community, because that’s not- a young person hasn’t woken up, seen her seen a mixed-race kid and thought ‘well, I’m gonna
pick on him’ necessarily. That’s come from like, what their parents say and you know, their grandparents say. (Luke, youth/support worker)

... it would be really unfortunate if, you know, for all those children that they might then, you know, inherit and carry that perspective around our Muslim community because they’d heard it at home. (Mel, local authority)

There’s a number of kids going at each other, ‘dad said he stole my job because he came from Poland’ or something and kids having a fight in school. You could pick what’s happening from certain newspaper headlines kind of thing. (James, education worker)

These accounts provide insight into the way practitioners construct radicalisation and extremism, particularly in terms of the ‘upstream’ influences for young people that may create an opening for extreme beliefs to begin and develop. Some practitioners – like Kevin and Jill (both local authority) – delivered early interventions with this in mind, identifying opportunities to question and counter views they felt may have come from parents.

5.2.3 Neurodiversity

Another area of consideration for practitioners related to young people’s perceived needs, specifically the unique needs of those on the autism spectrum.¹⁷ For those who had been identified as already holding or expressing extreme and/or radicalised views, there were a few particularly interesting examples. Although less ‘early’ than most of the interventions in this thesis, the insights about practice are valuable and could be implemented at any stage of intervention. The examples below foreground the perceived importance of adapting to individuals and their needs (for a discussion of individualised support, see Bury et al., 2019).

As part of a new approach in Wales, Wendy, an autism specialist, was involved with supporting individuals with autism (young people and adults) who had become Prevent referrals. Some of the practical techniques she used included letting them lead during initial

¹⁷ The purpose of this section is not to imply any relationship between autism and extremism or terrorism. Rather, the aim is to highlight adaptations by practitioners and techniques they consider effective when working with young people on the autism spectrum.
sessions – which doubled up as an opportunity for her to identify underlying issues – and indirectly challenging behaviours:

*I mean, for me, I think the technique that I use the most is ... being more passive in the first few sessions. So, you know you want to kind of give them that sense that the floor is theirs. And you’re also observing them then and kind of thinking about how they feel, what had happened to lead up to this, that kind of thing.* (Wendy, support worker)

... so rather than saying ‘don’t do it.’ It's like, ‘well, you know it’s great to do it, but just, you know, you’ve got to choose your subject haven’t you? And you know, audience and purpose’ and things like that. And it's amazing how I think you can tackle someone's behaviour if you don’t directly challenge them and say ‘you can’t do it. You won’t. No’ sort of thing, isn’t it? (Wendy, support worker)

In at least one instance, Wendy had also worked alongside an Intervention Provider (IP) to support a boy with far-right and anti-Muslim views. Owing to the complexity of the case, she explained that she focused on his emotional well-being and understanding of his autism, while the IP focused on the ideological issues more specifically, because in her words, “I don’t have the knowledge to do that.” In this instance, Wendy’s approach was used to complement the more traditional work of Prevent.

Involving Wendy in this kind of support for referrals was part of a new approach in Wales, which came about in response to problems emerging in ‘traditional’ pathways for Prevent referrals. For people on the autism spectrum, the police were finding that interventions could often be ineffective – and even counterproductive – because:

... some people who are autistic can be, you know quite sort of fixated on issues and can become so fixated on those interventions that they start researching more and more in preparation for the next interview or next visit. Which is having the adverse effect, the opposite effect, to what we want. ... You’re almost fuelling it further and they will come up with more and more ideas to challenge the intervention provider
for the next visit to say why they’re wrong and ‘no in World War 2 this happened and
Hitler was right because of this reason!’ (Claire, police)

So, in direct conflict with the aims of Prevent and its interventions, using the customary
approach in interventions with young people on the autism spectrum could potentially
serve to further entrench their views. This is important, given the proportion of Prevent
referrals for individuals with autism has been highlighted as a concern (Grierson, 2021).
Reflecting on this in more depth, Wendy explained how confrontation might be experienced
by someone on the autism spectrum:

Very often parents and you know all intervention providers or other people, they will
become emotional in their reaction to those views. And they will use emotional
language or social language around challenging them, so ‘how you feel’s disgusting,
how you feel makes me upset … you could be a danger to other people.’ Do you see?
All of those things are emotional or social. For an autistic person, they’re not always
able to take that on board. (Wendy, support worker/specialist)

As the quotations above suggest, such unintended consequences had been seen in multiple
cases in Wales, which ultimately led the police to start working with Wendy. It was hoped
that by using specialist approaches, the counterproductive outcomes could be avoided.
Tony (police) described Wendy as taking “a person-centred approach to an individual’s
complex needs.” He argued that other approaches that treated ideology “in isolation” were
problematic because they failed to deal with the issues underpinning behaviours (Tony,
police). Aled (youth worker) shared similar concerns about Prevent interventions being used
for young people with autism, arguing they were often not suitable. Instead, he felt that his
organisation’s youth work model could provide the “softer and more specialised, nuanced”
approach that young people needed. This led to what Aled described as a “tension”
between his organisation and the local Prevent team, which is considered in more detail in
Chapter 7.

As the discussion above suggests, the interviewees here all shared the view that
interventions ought to be adapted to respond to the uniqueness of individuals. Engaging
Wendy (support worker/specialist) as a practitioner to work with young people showing signs of extremism and/or radicalisation was one such example of these adaptations in Wales. As a result, in her first year in the Prevent-related role, Wendy explained she had worked with over 20 people closely and advised police on around 40 other cases. Of those Wendy supported, most were young, male, and related to far-right extremism: “two thirds of cases are youngsters, they’re boys in the main, and they’re boys with far-right views in the main.”

5.2.4 Gendered responses and delivery

While Wendy worked on a one-to-one basis with young people, her comment about their gender links to a separate but noteworthy aspect of interventions for larger groups: that some were delivered to boys and girls separately. While this was not the case for the universal interventions observed within this study, namely the anti-racism workshops and police extremism lessons, it was for the targeted interventions. Specifically, the Project for Boys and the Project for Girls, as their names suggest, used gender as one of their organising criteria. Though the reasoning behind this was never explicitly revealed by those involved in organising the interventions, it is still worth exploring the differences between the projects and their contents. Also of note is that the projects were delivered by different practitioners: Aimee, an ex-female police officer worked with the girls, and Craig, a male youth/support worker worked with the boys. The characteristics of different practitioners who facilitated interventions will be explored shortly, though for now, the discussion turns to the ways gender appeared to shape interventions.

On the Project for Girls, participants were aged 16-17 and had signed up to the voluntary (online) programme after it was advertised to specific schools and colleges in the area. Meanwhile, the boys were aged 13-15 and had been referred to the programme, which meant there was an age difference of around 2-3 years between the two cohorts, as well as different levels of ‘risk’ associated with them. As noted earlier in this chapter, both interventions covered multiple topics and issues, some of which they shared. These included radicalisation, extremism, grooming, online safety, racism, hate crime and law. However, they also diverged to some extent, with the Project for Boys spending a lot of time discussing county lines, gangs and drugs, and the Project for Girls discussing policing, politics
and foreign policy, and experiences of sexism. While this may have been informed by the tangible vulnerabilities for each group and/or perceptions about ‘age-appropriate’ content, this is still worth questioning. For instance, some of the boys in group 2 of the Project for Boys were refugees from Syria, having experienced war and been forced to flee via Lebanon. Yet foreign policy and government intervention abroad was not discussed in the intervention, when this would perhaps have been a good opportunity to explore the boys’ understandings of the issue. This is particularly relevant given foreign policy is often a source of frustration that can be exploited by extremist groups in radicalising and recruiting new members (Spalek and Lambert, 2008; Sageman, 2008; Brady and Marsden, 2021). As such, it is unclear why this topic, to take it as an example, was seen as relevant to the girls, but not to the boys.

Perhaps this difference could be accounted for by the distinctive risks and issues that led to the boys being on the project. In other words, the interventions were designed to address the most pressing issues facing the young people engaged in each of the projects. Yet, even where there were convergences in the topics covered in the interventions, the narrative could sometimes be different. Sexting provided the most pronounced example of this. In one session of the Project for Girls, Aimee, the practitioner, asked the girls about their understanding of ‘sexting’. After briefly explaining the law relating to sexting, there was a kind of warning:

Aimee told the girls to think about the strength of a relationship and how they would feel if their relationship ended. “Lots of relationships don’t last when you’re this age, so bear that in mind,” she said. “Do you really want that image left with someone in the future?”

Referring to bullet points on her slideshow, Aimee explained some of the potential outcomes if the recipient of an intimate photo were to share it with others. These included police involvement and the action potentially being treated as harassment. “If you don’t know the person, don’t do it,” Aimee then said simply. She also

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18 NSPCC defines ‘sexting’ as the sharing of nude images with another person (NSPCC, 2022).
cautioned the girls that a person might try to make them feel good to “manipulate” them into sharing photos. (Fieldnotes, Project for Girls, 03/12/2020)

Those attending the Project for Boys were also warned about the implications of sexting, though this warning took another form. As Craig, the practitioner, began telling a story about online grooming and explained that those looking to exploit young people are patient, he segued briefly into sexting:

Craig spent some time highlighting the issues associated with the sharing of “explicit images” on social media. He made it clear that if the boys were to receive an image from someone underage, that they could end up on the sex offender register. Craig asked whether the boys knew what this was, and they all said they did. Noting that this involved conditions like having to sign on at police stations and not being able to live in certain places, Craig emphasised the longer-term consequences of this. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys, group 2, 26/11/2021)

Thus, while girls were warned about sharing their own images, boys were warned about receiving them. While girls were warned they might be manipulated or come to regret sharing their images if a relationship were to break down, boys were warned about being on the sex offender register and the conditions they would be subjected to.

Some contributors to the debate around differences in criminal justice responses have suggested that boys’ delinquency is often simply seen as bad behaviour linked to immaturity or rebellion, while girls’ ‘gendered vulnerabilities’ see them experiencing more protective interventions (Sharpe and Geltshorpe, 2015). More specifically, Brown (2013) argues counter-radicalisation programmes are situated within wider discourses around deviant youth masculinities. Descriptions of the two cohorts attending respective interventions echo these arguments in some ways. For the Project for Girls:

_We’re not saying that those girls there are going to be scooped up and taken to the next war zone, but there’s a potential that they could, and the more they understand around the topic, the better it is._ (Local authority actor)
Meanwhile, the Project for Boys was “more targeted, we are going to try and look at young men that could go down the gang route, serious organised crime route as well” (local authority actor). Two small phrases are interesting here: while the girls could be “scooped up” by others, the boys might “go down” routes. Though subtle, this positions girls as having less power than boys in determining their course of action. It suggests the boys have greater control and can make a choice about whether to engage in extremism or gang activity, while the girls are framed as having less control and less culpability (Mallicoat, 2007; Jackson et al., 2021). Brown (2020) points to this framing in terrorism discourse more generally, with a refusal to link self-aware devotion to a cause to female participation in violence, despite it being used to explain men’s actions. This differential framing of boys and girls has also been found in other policy areas, specifically in relation to sexual harm and exploitation. There, boys’ vulnerabilities may be missed as they are more likely to be constructed as offenders than in need of support (see Hallett, 2017; Hallett et al., 2019a). Thus, while the Projects for Boys and Girls did arguably have different issues to respond to, based on their respective cohorts, the framing of certain issues were suggestive of underlying, gendered assumptions about young people.

5.3 Who: Practitioners and differences between intervention facilitators

The third and final aspect of intervention delivery that will be considered here is the practitioners themselves and the differences between them in their delivery styles. Fieldwork included observations of interventions being delivered by: youth and support workers, teachers, education workers and police officers (one former, one serving). Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that some practitioners used personal stories about their experiences of racism and prejudice, but the significance of the individual practitioner goes further. As well as reporting (in interviews) differing levels of confidence in addressing such issues as extremism and radicalisation with young people, practitioners shared their views about different types of providers. There were also observable differences between certain practitioners – youth workers and (ex)police officers in particular. In multiple ways then, the question of who is best placed to deliver early interventions came to the fore in this
research, impacting whether the ‘vision’ of a successful intervention was fulfilled. This is considered in more detail in the two sections below, firstly in relation to teachers and schools, then in relation to police officers.

5.3.1 Teachers and schools

Ella and Carla were both teachers who had been trained to facilitate the Harmony project, the education intervention delivered across multiple lessons. As well as using pre-designed, evidence-based resources, teachers who delivered Harmony had to attend training designed by the programme creators. This training included each lesson of the project being laid out in detail, talks from police and experts in issues such as online safety, and demonstration videos. Having been involved with the programme, Ella and Carla reflected on how confident they felt in delivering content related to extremism, radicalisation and related topics:

*I don't know whether it was because I was so early in my career or whether it was because of the Harmony programme, but I didn’t feel as confident as I do since I've had the Harmony training in delivering the extremism and terrorism lessons.* (Ella, teacher)

For Ella, having received the training and resources for the Harmony programme, delivering lessons about extremism and terrorism was no longer an issue. While Carla (teaching) also felt comfortable delivering this content, she did identify an unavoidable limitation:

*Sometimes it’s different, just physically the person standing up in front of them you know? I mean the kids know that I’m just delivering lessons, don’t they? But when we have someone from outside, they know it’s perhaps an expert in the field or someone like that.* (Carla, teacher)

So, while Carla felt able and comfortable in delivering lessons about extremism, she felt there were still differences in the way young people responded to her. Because they knew her as their Personal and Social Education (PSE) teacher, she perceived differences compared to when an external practitioner came to deliver an intervention. For example,
describing a youth worker she had observed in the past, Carla said he’d “been in prison … was full of tattoos … I think they quite liked talking to him. … They were kind of, wanting to push him as well, I mean on that drugs theme.” As well as responding well to him, the young people ‘pushed’ the youth worker on the topic of drugs by asking lots of questions, something Carla did not feel they did with her. While it is impossible to know whether this was a result of the individual youth worker, his personality and background, or because he was not a teacher at the school, it is clear the interaction seemed different from Carla’s perspective.

The notion of using practitioners with lived experience was also discussed by Darren (police), though he instead highlighted a particular nervousness from officials when the experience related to extremism specifically. Using the example of an ex-member of a far-right extremist group, he described “the Home Office’s concern that actually, Billy the 5-a-side teacher might say he’s out of Combat 18, but actually is still active” (Darren, police). Thus, while practitioners with lived experience may offer an engaging perspective for young people, this is overshadowed by the perceived ‘risk’ posed by such individuals. This is perhaps underpinned by the argument that ‘de-radicalisation’, in the sense of a permanent change and a definite reduction in ideological support, is not likely (Horgan, 2008). Rather, “Once an individual has sought out and engaged in terrorism, it is altogether unlikely that that individual can be “turned” or “de-programmed”” (Braddock, 2014:62). Meanwhile, with schools like Carla’s using practitioners with experience of drugs and prison, this suggests the ‘risk’ they pose is not considered as great as that of those with a history of extremism, implying a longevity to the ‘extremist’ status or label (Becker, 2018).

Other interviewees reflected on their experiences of working with teachers, reporting quite different levels of confidence to those recounted by Ella and Carla above. For instance, Steve (education worker), who had developed the Harmony programme, found a significant “fear” held by teachers in the early days of the programme was “what happens if I am challenged by a Muslim pupil about an aspect of the Quran where I am not qualified in anyway shape or form to answer?” Instead of asking teachers to deal with this, Steve agreed they could invite another of the programme’s original contributors, an Imam, into the classroom to answer the young people’s questions. Other interviewees also perceived a
sense of fear and anxiety among teachers, something they felt was ongoing at the time of their interviews in 2020:

> And what you find often is the schools are ... quite anxious around this. It's a kind of topic and a subject area that they, you know, people don't want to get it wrong. So you often find yourself kind of reassuring them ... you don't want it to be a sort of knee-jerk reaction, because that's when you get circumstances where people are possibly referred into this space that don't need to be referred into this space. (Oscar, local authority)

> And I think this is the issue that gets lost, often it’s interpreted as a... you know, we’ll get teachers coming and thinking they’re going to be trained into being James Bond. That they’re going to run down the corridor and wrestle someone to the ground just before... because so much is... is the fear. (Ash, youth worker)

As more experienced practitioners, Oscar and Ash were sympathetic to the worries of getting something wrong, missing an opportunity to refer a young person for support, or being forced to intervene physically. Yet, Oscar (local authority) went on to emphasise the importance of maintaining a balance, because when young people were needlessly referred to Prevent, “that's when you get the kind of negative connotations around what Prevent is doing, what Prevent aims to be doing, those sorts of things.” These ‘negative connotations’, as discussed in Chapter 4, have led to mistrust in the Prevent Strategy and associated interventions. Of note here, however, is the implication that teachers do not always feel comfortable in responding where there are concerns about extremism and radicalisation. One suggestion is that the terminology and discourse around this issue of preventing potential risks can be confusing to professionals (van de Weert and Eijkman, 2019). While practitioners like Oscar were available to support schools and teachers through referral processes, this does suggest that not all teachers would be effective intervention providers.

5.3.2 Police officers

Another difference in practitioners was highlighted by observations of interventions delivered by those with experience of policing, either as former or serving officers. There
was a noticeable difference in the way they delivered interventions in comparison to other practitioners, such as youth and education workers. Specifically, there was less ‘back and forth’ interaction and less emphasis on young people asking and responding to questions. That is not to say that young people were not given any space to speak, but with the interventions being less ‘chatty’ and relational, this conveyed a greater sense of formality. In the Project for Girls, for instance, the former police officer delivering the intervention often covered a large volume of content, particularly in the session dedicated to terrorism. Consequently, this gave the impression that the emphasis was predominantly on conveying information and being educational. While this may have been exacerbated by the intervention being delivered online, even where there were opportunities for deeper interaction, they were sometimes brushed over:

As she began talking about the influence of social media, Aimee, the practitioner, mentioned the New Zealand attack. She referred to the attacker (Brenton Tarrant) streaming footage of the attack live online, and asked “Who is viewing it? How does that make you feel?” But these questions seemed to be rhetorical as she carried on talking without waiting for answers. (Fieldnotes, Project for Girls, 19/11/2020)

Further, much of the interaction in the Project for Girls took place in the text chat, something that was sometimes encouraged by the facilitator. Thus, rather than discussing issues in depth, the girls mostly answered high level questions like “Why is learning about terrorism important?” with quick comments in the chat: “Relevant; Learn the signs; Awareness; Be critical when watching the news; Social media harms; Consequences” (Fieldnotes, Project for Girls, 19/11/2020). Coupled with the few opportunities given to them to ask questions or raise their own concerns, this gave an overall impression that open and honest conversation with the girls was not a priority for the intervention. However, in a later session of the same intervention, one of the girls did in fact ask a question (posted in the chat): “Why/how was the Iraq War allowed to happen?” (Fieldnotes, Project for Girls, 14/01/2021). The facilitator responded by sharing some personal reflections and then moved on. Yet, with at least some of the girls evidently aware of foreign policy issues, this would perhaps have been a good opportunity for a more open discussion to take place. In turn, this may have provided the facilitator with an opportunity to identify – and address –
extremist views or influences among the girls. This aspect of prevention will be revisited in the discussion of ‘safe spaces’ in Chapter 6.

A similar approach was used in the police extremism lesson, delivered by a serving police officer. Here, young people were quiet and the session felt quite formal – on most occasions, for example, they raised their hands to answer a question. This contrasted with sessions of the Project for Boys (delivered by a youth worker) and the anti-racism workshops (delivered by education workers), where there was more light-heartedness and informal chat. One of the most evident differences between the extremism lesson and other interventions was that the opportunity for young people to respond to questions was limited:

The officer asked, “who is affected by terrorism?” Someone mumbled in reply, but it didn’t seem like the officer heard as she replied herself: “all of us.” She went on, saying that we generally live in a safe place, but wanted to hear “how do you feel about news of terrorism? How does it make you feel?” There was very little time for anyone to respond, however, as she only left a gap of a couple of seconds before suggesting anxious, scared and like it “could have been you.” (Fieldnotes, police extremism lesson, 07/05/2021)

After they had watched the second part of the video, some questions were put on the board that asked about certain aspects of the story. Although the officer read them out, for instance what evidence there was that the boys had been radicalised, she answered them herself. Rather than opening up space for comments or ideas from the young people, they became a sort of recap of the story. (Fieldnotes, police extremism lesson, 06/05/2021)

By delivering the questions in this way, they were almost rhetorical, because young people got such little time to reply. This contrasted some of the original intentions for the intervention: the idea was that it would be “an introductory piece, to start a wider conversation ... it kind of opens the subject ... you can go different ways with it” (Tony, police). Young people “giving their opinions and having opportunity to talk about things”
(Carla, teaching) was something their teacher, who had also been present during the intervention, had hoped to see as well. She was somewhat sympathetic, though, suggesting that the lack of discussion may have been caused by the officer’s limited time with the young people:

I feel sometimes I wanna draw more out of the kids and give them more time to discuss. But I mean she’s not a teacher, she’s got a time limit as well with the PowerPoint, it’ll last an hour. But with me, if it didn’t, if I wanted to go over to the next lesson I could, couldn’t I? (Carla, teaching)

While police officers may have the necessary knowledge and confidence to deliver such interventions, this inevitably sits alongside their responsibility to surveil (Henshall, 2018), maintain moral order (Ilan, 2018) and protect the weak from the predatory (Reiner, 2010). This differs to the responsibilities of other practitioners, such as youth and support workers, a sense also captured by a youth worker:

I guess a teacher, primarily might see a pupil first, a police officer might see a criminal first, where a doctor might see a patient first, whereas a youth worker will always see a young person. (Todd, youth worker)

With the police approach likely dominated by their protective, crime prevention perspective, this may not be conducive to young people opening up and sharing their thoughts honestly – possibly because of the way police officers approach the interaction, or because young people do not feel able to disclose things to them. This is important, because the notion of open conversation was considered a key aspect of prevention by many participants in this study. The value of this openness has also been recognised elsewhere (Thomas and Henri, 2011; Thomas, 2016) and is explored in more detail in the following chapter.
5.4 Concluding remarks

This chapter has explored three central aspects of delivery: how interventions happen, what is happening within them, and who is delivering them. It has highlighted how certain ideologies, beliefs and attitudes are signified as deviant (or ‘undesirable’) by Prevent and related interventions. Young people then become suitable objects for control through such interventions (Matza, 2010), both universal and targeted. However, rather than aligning exclusively with definitions contained within the Prevent and Counter-Extremism Strategies, the ‘pre-Prevent’ early interventions and the practitioners involved in their delivery construct connections to wider ‘risks’ and issues including county lines, drugs and gangs. There was also a suggestion of ‘guilt by association’ in one case, with some friends of referrals also drawn into an intervention, the Project for Boys, even though they were not referred themselves. On the whole, the multiple elements of signification highlighted by this chapter suggest that in practice, the definition of extremism is changing. It is becoming broader and the ‘problem’ is seen to intersect with broader ‘vulnerabilities’ for young people, widening the scope and reach of early interventions in turn.

Examples were found of interventions adapting to respond to new and emerging extremist threats considered to be affecting young people, including Incel ideology, QAnon and other conspiracy theories. Contrary to linear notions of policy implementation (Hall and McGinty, 2002), this innovative ‘on the ground’ practice was, in a sense, ‘ahead’ of policy. Other adaptations within interventions included some gendered elements of delivery, as well as innovation in interventions for individuals on the autism spectrum, recognising the limitations of ‘traditional’ approaches. Finally, this chapter highlighted some of the ways that practitioners’ interactions with young people were shaped by the different approaches, delivery styles, and levels of confidence they brought to their role. This issue will be developed further in the following chapter, where concerns about potentially negative impacts of certain approaches and different relationship dynamics between practitioners and young people are explored in more detail.
Chapter 6: Practitioner Approaches to Identity and Relationships in Early Interventions

This chapter returns to how early interventions to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation are delivered in Wales. In the sections that follow, practitioners’ accounts of identity and stigma will be considered, and the ways this shaped their approach to early intervention delivery are explored. Previous research has shown that young people may experience feelings of stigmatisation as a result of interventions (Deakin et al., 2020; 2022), and many participants echoed this sentiment. By using ethnographic insights to explore practitioners’ negotiation of these issues, the following discussion will highlight the complexities of how this plays out in practice. In doing so, this chapter will argue that practitioners operated with matters of identity in mind, shaping their early intervention practices accordingly, including adopting techniques to avoid stigmatising or embarrassing young people. It is worth noting here that while observations of young people’s engagement and interactions with practitioners provided some insight into their perspective on this issue, the focus of this chapter is upon practice.

As set out previously, signification is the process engaged in identifying certain ideologies and attitudes as problematic and therefore worthy of early intervention. However, practitioners referred to the potentially negative implications that flow from the imposition of the label of being a problem – embarrassment, humiliation, stigmatisation – for young people and their identities (Matza, 2010). While similar criticisms have been made of official Prevent policy in the past, this chapter will develop our understanding by showing that such concerns also extend to the earliest points of ‘pre-Prevent’ intervention. In order to make sense of these concerns, I will draw on Goffman’s ideas of identity and stigma (1990a; 1990b) as well as the concept of labelling (Matza, 2010). After beginning with a discussion of practitioners’ perceptions of stigma, this chapter moves on to discuss their approaches to managing this in practice. It will then consider practitioners’ use of positive approaches and efforts to create ‘safe spaces’ for young people within interventions. Lastly, there will be a discussion of relationships and power dynamics between practitioners and young people, and how they may impact early interventions.
An underlying issue within this chapter is the notion of ‘risk’, in that interventions were of course taking place with young people, a social category that has often been constructed in terms of ‘risk’. Although, as will be explored, practitioners sought to avoid negative framing with young people, there was a sense of youth ‘as’ risk, given it was something the early interventions were themselves contingent on (as discussed in the earlier review of the literature in Chapter 2). The issue and language of ‘risk’ is not taken for granted here. ‘Youth’ as a phase is one that prompts anxiety and suspicion, which has led to young people being framed simultaneously as ‘at risk’ as well as ‘risky’ across a number of different policy domains (see for example Hallett, 2017). In this case, young people are considered vulnerable to extremism and being radicalised, whilst also being viewed with some suspicion. Throughout this chapter, I intend to show the paradoxical tension between practitioners’ desire to avoid stigma, but the necessary labelling of young people as ‘risky’ and problematic in some sense in order to justify working with them.

6.1 The role of identity and stigma in early interventions

Though practitioners did not always refer to stigma explicitly, it is a useful concept for organising the analysis and understanding their practices as they relate to the prevention of extremism and radicalisation. Many of the sentiments expressed by participants can be related to the premise that a young person’s identity and sense of self are developed as a result of their social interactions with others (Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1990a). In this sense, the actions and attitudes of others (such as practitioners) can influence a young person’s identity, negatively or positively, and stigmatising characteristics can potentially be revealed (Scott, 2011). This is important, given radicalisation is often attributed to a flawed sense of identity (for example Borum, 2004; Stern, 2014b; Lynch, 2013). This section begins by introducing concerns raised by practitioners about the potentially negative impressions given to young people, before moving on to consider stigmatised youth identities in more detail. The discussion then turns to techniques for avoiding stigmatisation, firstly as they were described by practitioners, and then as they were observed in practice.
6.1.1 The impression of being a ‘bad person’

In the context of extremism and radicalisation early interventions, participants indicated concerns about the impression given to young people when they attended an intervention, and how this might impact them negatively. Indeed, existing evidence regarding early interventions for youth more broadly suggests negative experiences may lead to feelings of status loss, exclusion and anger (Deakin et al., 2020). In conversations between sessions that I recorded in fieldnotes, Craig (youth/support worker) discussed his avoidance of negative connotations in his work with young people. Those who attended Craig’s school-based Project for Boys sessions, both in terms of those I had observed and others he discussed, were typically present as a result of particular issues or incidents. As detailed in Chapters 4 and 5, in the sessions I observed, many of the boys were referred after incidents of misogynistic and transphobic comments. The incidents were considered ‘risky’, to themselves or society or perhaps both, and in need of being addressed. However, Craig explained that he wanted to avoid making young people feel like they were in sessions designed for “bad people” (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys group 1, 19/11/2021). Careful management of interaction with young people was necessary, then, in order to manage the threat of this problematic ‘status’ being revealed to them.

Separately, a police officer (Debbie) voiced a similar opinion to Craig following an extremism lesson we happened to observe together. Delivered by a different officer, the session itself had raised concerns for Debbie:

Debbie thought there could have been more discussion in the session, and reflecting on her own teaching background, she said she’d hoped to see more engagement from the young people. She also felt the content was presented as “if you think this, you’re an extremist or radicalised.” If any of the young people shared those views/thoughts, she was concerned they’d feel “bad, like they’re a bad person, like they’re an extremist.” That doesn’t really open up conversation, she thought. (Fieldnotes, police extremism lesson, 07/05/2021)

The narrative throughout the intervention itself was clearly opposing any form of prejudiced or extreme beliefs, repeatedly linking them to radicalisation and framing them as
undesirable. Though the intervention was not based on any existing incidents or concerns (it was universal rather than targeted), and while young people may not have been individually labelled or called out for being ‘extremist’ during the lesson, Debbie still felt that this delivery approach may have impacted them negatively. This also highlights a separate issue introduced in the previous chapter: with their priority being to keep young people safe and prevent offences, police do not have as much freedom to explore these issues as other practitioners, such as youth workers. The clear-cut sense of ‘if you think this, you’re an extremist’ perceived by Debbie is perhaps an artefact of this. Importantly though, the key concern here was that young people may have internalised the idea of their ‘badness’ based on the intervention (Jenkins, 2014; Becker, 2018).

6.1.2 Stigmatised youth identities

Negative identity, stigma, and the risk of embarrassing a young person were concerns for many interview respondents in the present study. Despite the range of sectors and roles from which respondents came, they shared the view that being associated with Prevent, or any other pre-Prevent interventions that were even vaguely linked to the theme of radicalisation, could potentially harm young people. It was felt this could be in terms of their own self-perception or the perceptions of them held by others. Goffman’s discussion of mortification and spoiled identities is helpful in making sense of these concerns. In Goffman’s (1990a) view, personal identity refers to the way individuals can be differentiated from others based on a continuous record of social facts. When in interactions with others, Goffman argues that these become social identities that are presented and managed. It is possible, however, that a person may become stigmatised, and their identity ‘spoiled’ because an undesirable attribute is revealed during an interaction (Williams, 2000). Components of this stigmatisation include labelling, stereotyping, separation, status loss and discrimination (Link and Phelan, 2001).

Ash (youth worker) described the problematic nature of interventions he saw as “loaded with suspicion” because he felt they could push young people away, towards communities that shared the very views that interventions were designed to address. This reveals a paradox faced by practitioners, where the interventions themselves might reinforce the very
problem they are trying to solve. Aled (youth worker) was not unlike Ash, and he discussed his own concerns about the impacts of some approaches on young people:

*And that is a very sort of dangerous thing to do, because even when you’re trying to help, you can also be harming by kind of cementing and demonising and criminalising young people from any background before really they’ve ever been sort of, guilty of anything at all.* (Aled, youth worker)

Prevent-associated interventions had a particular tendency to do this according to Aled, who saw them as “pathologising” young people. Mel (local authority) discussed concerns she had heard and acknowledged about “people getting the extremism tag attached to them” as a result of referrals to Prevent (and Channel), which she described as having “stigmas and concerns” associated with it. These stigmas and ‘tags’ of extremism could be viewed as pieces of information that make a person discreditable, marking them out as different (Scott, 2015). Using Goffman’s theatrical metaphor, through the front presented to others, a discreditable person can conceal their stigma by hiding it ‘backstage’ and controlling the information they share appropriately (Goffman, 1990b; Quinton, 2020). However, if the information is revealed to others and they begin to experience humiliation and degradations, the young person’s sense of self may be mortified and the beliefs they have about themselves changed (Goffman, 1991). The concern for some respondents, as indicated in the quotations above, was that as soon as the information has been revealed and a young person is treated as ‘an extremist’ or ‘at risk’ of becoming one, the damage to their sense of self is ‘done’. As well as changing how others perceive them, practitioners in this study worried that stigma might be internalised by a young person. This is significant, given evidence to suggest that feelings of stigmatisation can lead to increased support for terrorist grievances (for instance Williamson et al., 2020). The aims of interventions, then, could be at odds with their outcomes. It seems these concerns were also shared by professionals seeking support for young people, influencing their decisions about where to turn: Dave (youth worker) explained, “*I had a high volume [of referrals], because I would take those young people but I wouldn’t criminalise them.*”
The significance of identity and its processes of formation are well documented in the youth studies literature. From the perspective focused on transitions to adulthood, identity is seen to undergo developments and turning points throughout the youth phase (see for example MacDonald et al., 2001) which may be transformed – negatively or positively – based on certain experiences (Hodkinson and Sparkes, 1997). Developing their sense of identity is a key and ongoing part of a young person’s transition to adulthood (Arnett, 2015; McMahon and Jump, 2017). Focusing more specifically on social and cultural aspects, other perspectives on youth see identities as being negotiated for use with different groups (Harries et al., 2016). Matza (2010) argues that attaching a negative label to a young person may have implications for the way they see themselves: if a negative identity is formed, this in turn risks distancing them from mainstream society (Feddes et al., 2015). Applying these concepts in the context of radicalisation, van de Weert and Eijkman (2019) argue that young people may be more open to extremism and radicalisation given they are in this process of forming their identity. One perspective suggests, for example, that if young people are struggling with identity issues and feelings of injustice, then encountering an extremist ideology purporting to answer their questions can create an ‘opening’ or receptivity to the new extremist ideas (van de Weert and Eijkman, 2019; Wiktorowicz, 2004). Returning to the concept of stigmatisation, Williamson et al. (2020) argue that stigma can lead to the loss of a sense of belonging, which can in turn increase the risk of radicalisation for those disenfranchised youth.

6.2 Techniques for avoiding stigmatisation

In managing the inherent tension between the need to intervene with ‘risky’ and ‘at risk’ young people whilst avoiding stigma and negativity, both in terms of how young people were perceived by others and in the sense of internalised stigma, practitioners employed a range of approaches. Whilst they did not necessarily attribute their efforts directly to concerns about stigma, the concept is useful in exploring and interpreting their words and practices. Ash (youth worker) argued there was a need to “tread relatively carefully, because it’s somebody’s entire identity, you don’t want to erode it.” He suggested that it would be better to frame any challenges as an offer of alternative perspectives, rather than taking a
more directly critical approach to young people: “we’re just saying, look... there’s this as well.” Similarly, Wendy (support worker/specialist) described her practice with young people on the autism spectrum. In place of challenging them directly, Wendy used storytelling as well as phrases like “I recently read in the paper, I don’t know if you heard” as a way of presenting ideas indirectly along narrative lines. She also described a mirroring technique:

*When he said something that lined up with values that I wanted to kind of bring him towards ... I was like ‘yes!’ And then when he potentially articulates views that are contrary to that ... I’d go ‘yeah, but it’s like you said before, we really should respect other people’s perspective’ yeah? So I’d be using his words back to him to challenge him.* (Wendy, support worker/specialist)

In addition, Wendy actively avoided techniques that rested on social or emotional language. For instance, she had heard people saying “you make me feel upset” and “you could be a danger to other people”, but explained that those emotional statements simply cast guilt and shame on a person and could be overwhelming for them.

One of the techniques described for classrooms with larger groups – which is neatly summarised by its name – was “challenging the idea, not the person” (James, education worker). Jess, another education worker from the same organisation, noted some specific ways of doing this, such as by saying “I’ve heard” or “it might be something that other people are thinking, let’s look at it.” Jess said that these techniques helped her to avoid targeting or pointing fingers at individual young people, again alluding to a shared sentiment of preventing embarrassment. In this context, if Jess did target individuals in front of classrooms full of young people, this would directly reveal their attitude or behaviour as racist or extremist and therefore discredit them publicly. An added issue here, in ideological terms, is young people may become more defensive of their views if they are criticised in this way, strengthening their commitment to them (Fielding, 1981).
6.2.1 Practitioners’ responses to ‘issues’: insights from observations

An awareness of the risk of stigmatisation was also suggested by practitioners’ responses to incidental ‘issues’ that arose during interventions, such as when young people made comments that were seen as concerning in some way. This was observed in both universal and more targeted sessions. In one session about racism and prejudice, delivered by Mike (education worker) to a group of 13 college students, a smaller group of four boys were joking about their heritage. All of them said that their families were from Somalia, but one of the boys had lighter skin and the others began saying that he was from Yemen. The boy protested, but the others continued. Mike saw this as an issue, given that mocking someone’s nationality would be a form of racism, and so he tried to address it:

Mike noticed the one boy’s frustration and started questioning why they were saying it, trying to show them that it could be problematic. It would be confusing for other people, he explained, and just adds to the challenge of getting other people to be aware of racism and what is or isn’t acceptable to say. The boys couldn’t see why it might be a problem and were saying it’s fine because they’re friends and “it’s banter.” Mike was quite mellow and was smiling a little as he spoke, but said his point was that if someone else said it to them, then they wouldn’t find it funny and therefore it’s a problem – the boys replied, “but that’s different.” Mike became a bit more serious, pulling up a chair and sitting backwards on it to face them. Sitting in a way that was open to everyone else in the class, he explained that joking about things like heritage could offend some people. His tone stayed relatively positive and it wasn’t overly harsh, but he seemed adamant that they should hear his perspective. (Fieldnotes, anti-racism workshop, 05/03/2020)

In this interaction, Mike felt compelled to challenge the boys for poking fun at someone’s nationality, yet he was attempting to do so softly. He seemed to be balancing the need he felt to address the boys’ comments to help them understand the implications, but without letting the tone become punitive or seem like a ‘telling off’. Had he challenged the boys more directly, this might have caused them embarrassment in front of their peers in the room, or at least created some awkwardness. When reflecting on this session in more detail in an interview a few weeks later, he said he used the chair to try and mitigate the “power
and to keep the tone conversational rather than having a clash. He also mentioned changing the topic quickly, saying he was trying to return to the sense of “playfulness” he’d sought to create in the session. Although Mike did not explicitly mention identity or stigma, this scenario does suggest an awareness of the way in which the interaction could have become problematic for the young people. There is also a possibility that the interaction could have become problematic for Mike here, too. Had he taken a harsher approach, the conversation with the boys might have become more challenging and confrontational, which would have disrupted both the intervention and Mike’s rapport with them. Instead, by keeping his tone relatively light, Mike avoided the confrontation.

In one of the more targeted sessions, in this case a programme being delivered to a group of nine boys in year 9, Craig (youth/support worker), the facilitator, was running an activity which asked the young people to decide who should be given lifejackets on a sinking boat. He had explained to me outside the session that there were no right or wrong answers, but that he wanted to get a sense of the boys’ moral perspectives. Some background to the events in this school is useful to note here: concerns were initially raised with the local authority Prevent team because the group were making homophobic and misogynistic comments and linking them to their religion, as well as separating themselves from others in the school to some extent. This had worried the school and ultimately led to Craig’s presence (in a ‘pre-Prevent’ capacity). When Craig showed a card with the words ‘a dog’ all of the boys walked over to the side of the room that indicated they would not provide a lifejacket (which Craig had named ‘hell no’). As he usually did, he asked why and:

... when one of the boys said “dogs are haram” a few of the others laughed. While Craig also laughed initially, he told him he couldn’t “just say that” because it was a fatwa, and so he couldn’t take it upon himself to declare one. The boy accepted this and laughed, saying instead that he simply didn’t like dogs. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys, group 2, 12/11/2021)

With ‘haram’ meaning something forbidden by God in Islam, Craig clearly saw the comment as an issue, perhaps as ‘risky’ in the context of religious extremism. This was a brief but insightful exchange because although Craig raised the issue and was able to get the boy to
offer a different explanation, the tone of the session itself did not change or feel awkward. Although the boy was addressed directly by Craig, his response indicated that it did not affect him adversely: he smiled at the time and carried on contributing throughout the rest of the session. By negotiating the response in a way that avoided awkwardness, Craig did not make the comment seem like a serious or obvious error in front of the boy’s friends and therefore avoided discrediting him (Goffman, 1990a). Together with other comments Craig made about identity when young people were not present, this also points to an intention to avoid embarrassing young people on a personal level. As the earlier discussion of spoiled identities indicates, a young person’s sense of self may be changed and impacted negatively if they are revealed to be deviant or to have an undesirable attribute (Roschelle and Kaufman, 2004; Williams, 2000). That is not to say that issues and behaviours should not be addressed during early interventions, but it does foreground the importance of doing so in a way that avoids the kind of stigmatisation and marginalisation that has been linked to the onset of radicalisation (Williamson et al., 2020; Feddes et al., 2015).

6.3 Pro-social identities and safe spaces

As alluded to above, many practitioners reported and were observed actively trying to ensure discreditable young people did not become discredited (Goffman, 1990b). Though the interventions were premised on the idea that young people were ‘risky’ or ‘at risk’ of extremism and radicalisation in some way, practitioners stayed away from this framing. As well as refraining from negative language or embarrassing them, practitioners used positive language and framing with young people, often alluding to their agency. It is to these positive and pro-social techniques that the chapter now turns, followed by a discussion of the ‘safe spaces’ practitioners sought to create, as well some practical challenges that arose in managing such spaces.

6.3.1 Positive and pro-social approaches

Many of the approaches observed across interventions were grounded in positivity, using empowering, hopeful language and praising young people. For instance, during one (virtual) Project for Girls session, one young person asked for advice about an argument she was
having with a friend. After hearing him mocking Asian people, she told him his language was racist, but he responded by saying she was being overly sensitive. Just as the girl was asking for advice from the facilitator about whether she was in the wrong, the other girls started replying in the chat and the facilitator praised them:

More and more messages were coming into the chat, with other girls telling her she was right, and the language was definitely racist. Aimee, the facilitator, had a quick look and was reading them out, saying it was making her “so proud” to see the comments and how much the girls had taken on board from the project. (Fieldnotes, Project for Girls, 28/01/2021)

Some practitioners were positive in other ways, turning attention to young people’s hobbies and interests in sports for instance. Craig, in delivering the Project for Boys, and Mike, in delivering anti-racism workshops, both showed an interest in the sports the boys played and how they were doing. For instance, at the end of an anti-racism workshop, Mike (education worker) discussed football training with a group of four boys, telling them they were welcome to attend training with his team if they were interested (Fieldnotes, anti-racism workshop, 05/03/2020). Similarly, after finding out two of the boys in one session played rugby, Craig chatted to them about their next matches and different results from recent weeks (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys, group 1, 19/11/2021). Though difficult to measure direct impacts of sports in this context, evidence from de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes is promising. Engaging in sports has the potential to increase self-esteem and social skills, increasing sense of community and enabling more positive outlooks on the future (Richardson et al., 2017). More broadly, focusing on young people’s positive attributes and strengths in this way, a common approach in youth work (Sanders et al., 2015; Guerra and Bradshaw, 2008), contrasts the construction of young people as vulnerable objects without agency, defined almost wholly by their ‘risks’ and ‘needs’ (Brown et al., 2017; Hallett, 2016; 2017). This operates as a non-stigmatising approach, rather than one that gives young people a sense that they are seen as a ‘bad person’ (Kirkwood, 2021).

Depending on the way interventions are presented to young people, they will get a certain impression of the situation (Andersen, 2014). Where young people are treated as having
little agency, they can experience interventions as humiliating rather than empowering (Andersen, 2014). On the other hand, positioning young people as having an ability to change is more positive, and was another approach used by practitioners and observed in the present study, particularly in the Project for Boys. Though he typically focused on the future, Craig did ask two groups why they thought they were able to be well behaved in the sessions with him, and yet seemed to struggle in their school lessons. This had two functions, both in positively complementing them on their behaviour, yet at the same time encouraging them to reflect on how they could improve in future:

Craig began speaking to them about what had led to them being present on the programme in the first place, and they were all watching him closely. “I don’t understand why you’re here. You’re great young people,” he said. One of the boys mumbled “mmm” in agreement. “Why can’t you lift that energy into maths and English?” asked Craig, and after a short pause one boy replied “dunno.” Craig said he thought they had been the “best versions” of themselves when they were in the sessions with him, asking why they thought that was. The responses varied from “the way you speak” and “the stuff we learn about” to “get out of maths”. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys, group 2, 03/12/2021)

Craig asked whether they were each doing their “personal bests” in school. One boy replied “hmmm... not my best.” Pressed by Craig, he said he’d been in “better sets” in the past (meaning class groups of higher ability). Another boy said “dunno” but when Craig asked whether he’d previously done better, he confirmed that he had. Turning to them all, Craig asked why they thought this change had happened, suggesting it may have been because of puberty or things outside of school. One boy said “having days off” and another agreed, adding “messing around in class.” Craig seemed surprised, saying he’d never seen them mess around in his sessions. He said they were pleasant, always took part and had been great. One of the boys explained this was because “when someone gives me respect, I give it back.” (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys, group 1, 19/11/2021)
Although previous behaviours and issues were subtly acknowledged, they were not framed as representative of the boys’ entire identities. In doing so, this can be seen as Craig negotiating the paradox of the intervention: the boys were present because they had behaved in a ‘problematic’ way that Craig needed to address; yet he had to do so in a way that did not confirm their problematic status. This re-framing is akin to Braithwaite and Mugford’s (1994:141) notion of a “good lad who has strayed into bad ways.” Such an approach helps to prevent a stigmatised, spoiled identity from forming (Braithwaite, 1989). This again crosses over with positive, strengths-based youth work practices, specifically in the recognition of young people’s “abilities to make choices and bear responsibility” (Lerner et al., 2011:51). In their contact with practitioners, young people being recognised as a ‘full’ person with agency is as important as feeling genuinely cared about and supported (Hallett, 2016). In accordance with this literature, an emphasis on agency was common across Craig’s sessions, for instance: “Craig said that he felt like all the boys had the ability to not be there. “Am I right?” he asked, and all the boys agreed” (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys, group 1, 15/10/2021).

6.3.2 ‘Safe spaces’

Each of the examples discussed thus far can be linked to the notion of ‘safe space’ captured by both interviews and observations. Nine of the 28 interviewees referred to safe spaces and both the police extremism lesson and Project for Boys practitioners explicitly used the term. Interviewees variably described them as places where young people could “let off steam” (Gary, police) and “voice grievance” (Steve, education worker). Laura (youth/support worker) discussed the gym environment she worked in as somewhere they could “offer that safe space for that offloading”. Overall, there was consensus that this was positive, and general agreement that an intervention with such a ‘space’ would be more successful than one where young people felt scared and judged. Being non-judgemental and open to listening to young people’s thoughts were considered important elements by practitioners and are also recognised in academic discussion (Kisfalvi and Oliver, 2015; Holley and Steiner, 2005). This is important as feelings (or fears) of judgement can lead to a lack of trust from young people and an unwillingness to seek support (Hallett, 2016). As Luke (support worker) put it:
But if you can give them those channels where they can speak to someone who’s trusted, they can feel safe in a space, then it does make a difference.

Interviewees positioned ‘safe spaces’ in opposition to criminalising or stigmatising spaces. Referring to scenarios involving young people who have extremist thoughts, Claire (police), for instance, argued that they need to “feel that they’re in a safe space to have that conversation with someone without being criminalised for it.” Steve (education worker), who had designed school courses to educate young people about extremism, also worried about the barriers that a “fear of being reprimanded” could erect. For Jess (education worker), this carried implications for young people’s engagement: “if you’re labelling people, they’re less likely to engage with education.” In this sense, even if a young person held views that an intervention sought to change, this still required careful management. Thomas and Henri (2011) found similar issues in their study of anti-racism approaches in education. Despite experiencing anti-racist practice through a range of institutions (school, police, youth workers), they found that many young people still held racist views. Thomas and Henri argue that, as a result of their views not sitting well within the anti-racist framework, young people were excluded from opportunities to explore the appropriateness of their views. In its place, they argue that creating an atmosphere of openness would allow young people to explore their prejudices “without fear of chastisement” (Thomas and Henri, 2011:82). Within a ‘moral code’ approach to anti-racism, which frames anyone not expressing anti-racist attitudes as ‘racist’, they also argue that young people’s identities are put at risk (Thomas and Henri, 2011); an outcome that would, again, be at odds with the aims of the pre-Prevent interventions at the centre of this thesis.

The concept of ‘safe space’ has, however, been problematised. Despite government advice stating that schools should provide a safe space for young people to learn about terrorism and extremism, Ramsay (2017) argues that Prevent itself subverts this, securitising the discussion of these issues. For Ramsay, this means it is “the very students who are ‘vulnerable to radicalisation’ who are likely to be most cautious about the expression of their ideas” (2017:152). A similar view is shared by O’Donnell (2016), who sees the overarching policy framework as potentially silencing young people rather than exploring the issues they are experiencing. The implication here is that the ‘safe space’ is restricted,
and that if young people go ‘too far’ in the way they talk about issues or the attitudes they reveal, they may be reprimanded in some way – perhaps by being referred to the kinds of early interventions studied here. Related concerns were also raised by the second facilitator of the Project for Boys, Dom, following one session:

Dom said he felt schools were an awkward space for these kinds of sessions sometimes. He said he worried about young people facing consequences from the teachers if they disclosed things like drug use or extremist ideas, and he didn’t want to be responsible for the young people getting in trouble. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys, group 3, 09/02/2022)

The suggestion here is that teachers might have a different tolerance for disclosures than Dom, or a different way of dealing with them that would likely conflict with Dom’s youth work-based approach. In this sense, the safety of the ‘space’ is bounded by who is present. Were a police officer to deliver the Project for Boys, for example, and hear the kinds of comments and disclosures that emerged in relation to county lines and extremism, that would potentially trigger investigative and referral processes. A youth worker, on the other hand, may have a higher threshold for what might constitute a referral onwards, or a different interpretation of ‘risk’. Within certain roles, then, there is less ‘space’ to be able to explore these issues with young people owing to more focus on reducing their ‘risky’ behaviours.

6.3.3 The realities of creating and managing ‘safe spaces’

Despite efforts to create ‘safe spaces’, one incident described by an interviewee highlights the complexity of managing these kinds of sessions. Sam (education worker) discussed an uncomfortable situation she had observed while shadowing when she first started in her role. In a session about racism, which was being delivered virtually, one pupil said that the Black Lives Matter movement was about “people who think only their lives matter.” This was significant because the sentiment is seen to dismiss racism, and one associated with white supremacy, racism and far-right nationalism (Stollznow, 2021). The practitioner who was facilitating the session asked whether anyone else had any thoughts, and another pupil wearing a headscarf said that she was hurt by the comments. The facilitator then moved the
session on, leaving Sam feeling confused: she said while she understood the idea of “giving pupils their space” to speak about such issues, this should not continue to be the case at the point where something needs to be addressed. This points again to the idea of a restricted safe space, where the ‘emotional space’ of others (the right to not be subject to racism) is breached. Given different young people will have different experiences of a discussion, this raises the question of ‘safe for who?’ (Flensner and von der Lippe, 2019).

One possible explanation of the way this was managed is that the facilitator felt underprepared to engage in dialogue in the situation, with confidence and skills a key ingredient in the context of anti-racist and anti-extremist education (Thomas, 2016) as discussed in the preceding chapter. However, Sam’s example suggests there may be problems associated with an approach that focuses too much on avoiding confrontation or embarrassment, specifically where this is done over and above responding to racist issues. In some ways, this almost creates ‘too much’ space, and in terms of where a safe space should ‘end’, this was Sam’s limit. However, this again indicates a paradox in prevention work, because it suggests that it is in fact possible for young people to get things ‘wrong’ when they explore their ideas, even in a ‘safe space’. Owing to the risk of young people becoming stigmatised depending on how interactions are managed, one suggestion is that ‘safe spaces’ should provide a critical space for ideas to be explored, including controversial ones like that described above. While this does not mean ideas are shut down, it does mean they can be considered carefully (Flensner and von der Lippe, 2019; Thomas, 2016). Within a preventative intervention then, being a ‘safe space’ to explore potentially problematic views also means being a ‘space’ for those views to be changed or shifted.

On another occasion, in a Project for Boys session with a larger group, the ‘safe’ atmosphere was almost lost when some of the boys laughed at something, and Craig felt it was inappropriate:

On the next slide, Craig showed around 60-80 images of young people’s faces, saying that they were the reason for us all being there. There were quite a few sniggers from the boys at this point. Craig responded to this immediately: he said he knew that a lot of them had a “rep” outside the room and that the boys around them
knew them, but that the young people on the screen had died. “If that makes you
snigger, you need to check yourself or I’ll check you,” he said. They needed to show
some respect when discussing these issues, Craig explained, but if they couldn’t do
that then “maybe this isn’t the place for you.” (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys, Group 2,
12/11/2021)

This occurred near the beginning of their first session, and it felt as though the boys were
not taking it seriously. It is not entirely surprising that young people would push and test
their boundaries with practitioners, but it was clear their disrespect had crossed the line in
terms of the sense of safety Craig wanted to create. This response was the most serious and
blunt Craig had been across any of the sessions I observed, and the atmosphere felt quite
awkward. The authoritative tone, based on Craig’s generally non-judgemental demeanour
when delivering interventions, seemed to be something he usually avoided. In marking out
their response as inappropriate and in breach of what he expected of the boys during the
sessions, Craig asserted a clear boundary. Doing so could have been humiliating or
downgrading for the boys, as their role and the limit of what they could say within the
sessions was made clear to them (Goffman, 1991). At the same time, though, letting the
boys know their boundaries was part of Craig’s approach to creating the ‘safe space’ for all,
even in their early interactions. In negotiating this situation, Craig did not target the boys
individually and their positive engagement in the latter part of the session (as well as during
later sessions) did not suggest that the confrontation was damaging. Both examples above
(the Black Lives Matter-related comment and the boundary setting by Craig) highlight the
ongoing and complex process of managing behaviour in a pre-Prevent space that should,
according to many participants in this research, provide a sense of safety. The ‘correct’ way
to do so is not articulated explicitly to practitioners – rather it is negotiated in practice,
shaped by the practitioner, the situation, and the audience.

6.4 Relationships and rapport in early interventions

Another aspect repeatedly highlighted by participants across different contexts was the
significance of relationships with young people. In this section, insights from both interviews
and observations are combined to explore three main issues: the role of positive relationships, power disparities with certain professionals, and compromises by practitioners in order to maintain positive relationships.

6.4.1 Positive relationships

In line with positive approaches to interactions with young people, good relationships were widely held to be a key ingredient of a ‘successful’ early interventions. This not only related to the trust between practitioners and young people, but also their contribution to positive change. One interviewee linked this to the idea of ‘safe space’:

... it's that development of trust and relationships that will allow that person the opportunity [to say things] within what you can define as a safe space, ‘I’m not here to judge you, I’m not here to report you, I’m not here to phone the police’ (Steve, education worker)

A similar sentiment was shared by others, who discussed the role of good relationships in intervention delivery. Jess, for instance, felt interventions could be more impactful when relationships were already built:

it’s like a lot of that was building that rapport as well ... it’s something that is massively underrated, but actually if you’re going to have any impact, building that relationship first ... that’s sometimes how you’ve got to reach people. (Jess, education worker)

Caring, trusted relationships have been identified as a key ingredient for change and positive outcomes, both in terms of interventions for young people labelled ‘at risk’ and in relation to safeguarding issues more broadly (for example Deakin et al., 2022; Hallett et al., 2019a). Another interviewee worried that relationships could go in one of two directions, however, either in favour of extremism or in favour of the interventions. In Lewys’ eyes, those with the strongest relationships would be able to have the most influence over young people:
If someone likes someone, they will listen, they will engage, if you don’t like someone you won’t go out of your way, you won’t do things ... You know, if I go to someone, you can break down the religion to them, and say you know ‘this is not right’. But it doesn’t matter if the person they like, the person they’ve got a relationship with, is telling them ‘no, this is how you do it’. (Lewys, youth worker)

Lewys’ words echo findings from other studies, which have found influence and learning stemming from relationships in extremist networks (Kenney, 2020). From an early intervention perspective then, establishing and maintaining strong rapport with young people is essential if practitioners are to have a positive impact. As well as the non-judgemental delivery and use of empowering language discussed earlier, the building of these relationships was supported in other ways. Specifically, during the Project for Boys sessions, the frequent use of cultural references and slang seemed to create common ground. Terms used across the sessions by the two practitioners, Craig and Dom, included ‘ops’ (referring to gang opposition) and ‘pagans’ (someone who is not affiliated with a gang), ‘drip’ (clothing), ‘shotting’ (selling drugs) and ‘food’ (drugs). Rather than using them in a tokenistic way though, it was evident that both practitioners had a good understanding of the terms they were using, and the boys responded well to this. Using the terms in this way also served to differentiate Craig and Dom from the teachers in the different school environments, changing their power dynamic with the boys. For instance, Craig was able to joke with the boys when their teachers looked confused after he’d played a rap video in one session (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys, group 3 02/02/2022). He went on to ask the boys to explain the various terms to the teachers, much to the boys’ amusement. At the close of every run of the programme, Craig gave the boys in each cohort a short evaluation form to complete. I was able to see the forms collected from Group 2, where one comment from a young person captured the sense of their relationship: “Craig is jokes.”

Specific challenges to such rapport building did, however, emerge in relation to Covid-19. As noted elsewhere, as a direct result of pandemic restrictions, the Project for Girls was delivered solely online, via Zoom. Despite a high number of initial sign-ups to the programme, around 36-40, the average number of attendees across the eight sessions I observed was 22, with the busiest session having 28 girls attending and the quietest only 12.
Very few girls turned their cameras on, and very rarely did anyone use their microphones to communicate, predominantly relying on the chat function (something encouraged by the practitioners in some sessions). Of particular note here is that Aimee (ex-police), the main practitioner, said she found online delivery more challenging than in-person. She added “It’s also harder to gauge reactions online than in-person, even when cameras are on” (Fieldnotes, Project for Girls, 03/12/2020). In many ways, then, by removing the capacity for face-to-face interaction, Covid-19 changed the way practitioners communicated and worked with young people. As this chapter has shown, building good rapport, trusting relationships, and having honest discussions about difficult topics were all valued and sought after by practitioners, yet the challenges of doing so were amplified under these circumstances.

6.4.2 Power disparity and disclosures

Power dynamics in interactions with young people was an element highlighted by a few interviewees, though they focused on the ways unequal power could be a potential barrier. This disparity is worth highlighting here, given power has been positioned as an essential component of stigmatisation (Link and Phelan, 2001). Beyond having less authority than adults in general, young people are typically constructed as being ‘at risk’ and ‘vulnerable’ and therefore inherently less powerful (Jackson and Scott, 2009). Youth workers Aled and Lewys felt there were different ways of approaching this that either amplified or reduced the disparity. Unsurprisingly, in building relationships with young people, both youth workers felt it important to reduce this. Lewys (youth worker) explained this in relation to engagement: “If people go in and say ‘I’m the powerful one here, you’re my subject, this is how we’re gonna work’, that doesn’t work. People switch off.” More specifically, Aled perceived the use of theological or ideological figures (such as Imams) in interventions to be problematic:

So you know with Prevent stuff, they’ll bring in an Imam. And this Imam comes with so much institutional, educational and religious authority, and they sit down with the young person, a young person hasn’t got space to disagree, hasn’t got space to communicate, to talk back. And even if they are invited to [respond], that power disparity is there, they were asked to. (Aled, youth worker)
The format described here by Lewys and Aled echoes the earlier discussion of another intervention, which clearly positioned certain beliefs as ‘bad’. Firstly, young people might be embarrassed and reluctant to share their thoughts openly in this scenario, which as this chapter has already highlighted, is not conducive to an effective early intervention. Furthermore, faced by someone positioning their perspective as the only correct and moral one, the issue is that rather than having an opportunity to reflect on their attitudes or behaviour, young people may simply feel judged in the situation (Thomas and Henri, 2011; Deakin et al., 2022). If they were to feel a sense of stigma rather than support from the practitioner, the intervention could be counterproductive.

Just as a religious figure carries power in the situation described above, teachers in the school environment also have power in interactions with young people. Teachers’ presence in the interventions varied across observations, and quite often, practitioners were left alone with young people. However, in some of Craig’s sessions with group 3 for the Project for Boys, large numbers of teaching and support staff were present. For instance, at one point in the third session, there were four boys and six teachers (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys group 3, 02/02/2022). The ratio of teachers to boys was most disproportionate in the first session, where there were only two boys present, but four teachers in the room at all times. As he was about to begin this session, Craig expressed concern about the impact it might have:

The boys arrived just before 09:15. There were only two of them, and they had two additional teachers with them. While we were originally told we could expect four boys, this now meant that, in total, there were two boys, four staff, me and Craig in the session. As they were getting settled and Craig and I were chatting quietly, he turned to me and expressed his concern that “we won’t get disclosures” because there were so many staff in the room. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys group 3, 19/01/2022)

The notion of ‘disclosures’ is itself interesting here. Disclosures are positioned by Craig as the outcome being sought by interventions, which in turn suggests they have a role in extremism prevention taking place pre-Prevent. Another interviewee, Todd (youth worker),
referred to ‘disclosures’ in a similar way when describing the impact of youth work approaches on interactions with practitioners: this “quite often will lead to a more trusting relationship and potential … for disclosures around these issues.” This points back to the earlier discussion of safe space, where honesty from young people was seen as an opportunity to explore – and potentially challenge – their beliefs and experiences. Evidently for Craig, this was an essential part of the intervention he was delivering, but one that might have been impeded by what appeared to be ‘overstaffing’. Overall, the session was on the quieter side compared to others I observed, and one boy was noticeably more reserved than the other. Although other factors might have influenced the interaction, such as some existing dynamic between the boys or Craig (and myself) being unfamiliar, it is nevertheless interesting that the teachers were considered by Craig to be a barrier. This can perhaps be attributed to the power usually held by teachers to silence such discussions (Flensner and von der Lippe, 2019).

Another example of this occurred when a session of the Project for Boys was delivered online after being rescheduled due to illness (suspected Covid-19). With the support of a teacher at the school, who had logged into the computer and set up the Microsoft Teams call, Craig (youth/support worker) was still able to deliver remotely. The session was delivered just shy of two weeks following their first in-person session, where the boys had been chatty and had contributed throughout, either making general comments, responding to questions Craig asked, or posing random questions to Craig themselves (asking where he was from, for example). But whereas the interaction was more informal and fluid in-person, as Craig (youth/support worker) reflected at the end of the online session, it was “a different dynamic” when done through a laptop. The following exchange captured in fieldnotes provides an example:

As he explained that people could have different perceptions of reality, Craig linked this back to the idea of postcodes that young people may feel that they belong to, and how this in turn influences their perceptions of local events and individuals. He again asked for their opinions, adding “I want to hear your voices.” But the boys stayed quiet. Through the webcam picture I could see that some of them looked like
they were thinking about what to say, but they seemed reluctant and were looking down a lot. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys, 04/11/2021)

In the previous session, even if they had no answer, some of the boys would still reply ‘don’t know’, yet they stayed quiet on this occasion. Saying he wanted to hear their voices seemed to be Craig’s subtle way of nudging the boys to reply, but it was ineffective, and the pause was a little awkward. Although this did not persist throughout the entire session and they did occasionally answer, this was noticeably different to their in-person interactions. The specific reason for the difference was not clear. It may just have been that the boys were fatigued by online lessons and workshops at this point, given they would have experienced so many of them as a result of Covid-19. Another possible explanation, however, is that with the teacher present, sitting closely near the boys throughout the virtual session to control the computer, the boys may not have been comfortable answering Craig honestly. Although a teacher had been dropping in and out of the first session, they had sat at the back of the room. In this situation though, they were sitting directly alongside the boys, potentially impacting how they felt about disclosing information.

6.4.3 Compromise in maintaining relationships
As well as negotiating power dynamics to build and maintain relationships between young people and practitioners, other considerations were made. For one organisation, the need to preserve relationships meant refusing to engage with a local authority extremism intervention. Before exploring the reasons for this refusal, it is first worth outlining the intervention and the local authority’s intentions. The organisation, which supported young people through sport, had built close relationship with the local Traveller community over the course of many years. As a result, the local authority approached them to be part of the early intervention, which was based around increased sport and support services for young people. The local authority’s motivation for delivering this intervention with the Traveller community specifically was not clear. Based on comments made by local authority interviewees and Laura, a support worker at the organisation, it seems the concern may have been about vulnerability more generally. For instance, discussing similarities between extremism and county lines, Laura said “It's the same process, people not feeling like a need
is being met with them and finding it elsewhere.” Similarly, Kevin spoke about extremism and gang issues together:

So, we get kids from different areas coming, so again, we’re addressing extremism at a very basic level. And also then, we’re looking at gang issues as well, which sadly, are around. You know, territorial issues … (Kevin, local authority)

An alternative explanation may be that the local authority was concerned about the feeling of marginalisation often reported by members of the Traveller community (see for instance Bhopal, 2011), viewing it through a safeguarding lens. As exclusion and marginalisation have been linked to radicalisation (Feddes et al., 2015), they may have perceived the young people to be ‘at risk’ and vulnerable, seeing the early intervention as an opportunity to reduce that risk.

Returning to the proposed early intervention, Laura felt that her organisation’s involvement could damage their relationships with the community:

... as a club we looked at it, we decided to not get involved because we've already got a really good relationship with the Traveller community. Boxing is a massive part of Traveller culture, and I can understand why Kevin would want us to be involved, because boxing is their thing. But at the same time for us, we wouldn’t want them to see that we’re trying to intervene in what they’re doing, because that would cause massive tension. ... They don’t claim free school meals because they see it as a weakness, so they’re certainly not going to want an organisation telling them that they are failing their children. (Laura, youth/support worker)

Laura’s language in this quotation is telling: while she had a good relationship with the local authority and understood their intentions, she was conscious of the impression that could be given to the community. At an organisational level, although this would not have been an official Prevent intervention, there is a sense of being tainted by associating with any agency dealing with extremism and radicalisation. While the local authority may not have had any specific concerns about extremism and the young people, Laura felt the community would
perceive this differently and see it as a negative label – “failing their children” – being attached to them (Goffman, 1990a). The impression Laura got of “failing” suggests that young people were seen as performing or behaving poorly, and that parents were not seen to be doing enough to support them. Wanting to avoid any strain or tension in her relationship with the community, given she saw it as beneficial to the existing work she was carrying out, Laura did not allow the intervention to take place.

In the above example, it seemed that no matter how the intervention was presented, Laura saw the projection of a negative impression as a clear risk. However, this was not the case for every aspect of her work. Laura did, in fact, engage with the local authority in some ways, but she was careful to manage the information being revealed to young people. Specifically, when young people had stopped engaging with other services, Laura’s organisation was sometimes contacted by social workers:

> So we’ve had to report back to social workers, their attendance and how they look and all the rest of it whilst keeping quiet because we didn’t want them [young people] to know that we knew [what they had going on], because we didn’t want them to stop engaging with us.

This suggests Laura saw young people as purposely attempting to conceal their ‘risky’ activities from her organisation (Goffman, 1990b). The situated nature of interaction is important to note here, as young people considered what information could be revealed and what should be hidden when they interacted with Laura and her colleagues. Perhaps in this context, young people felt a sense of shame or embarrassment attached to their activities outside of Laura’s organisation, and so made an effort to hide them (Smith et al., 2022). Laura worried that if they were to find out the information had been revealed by some other agency, this would have damaged the young people’s engagement. Recognising this potentially negative impact on the young people, Laura performed her own act of concealment, hiding her interactions with other agencies. This again points to complex negotiations being undertaken by practitioners as they interact with young people in the intervention space.
6.5 Concluding remarks

As rehearsed in the opening of this chapter, inherent within the intervention process was that young people were already labelled as vulnerable, ‘at risk’ and ‘risky’ in relation to extremism and radicalisation. Being present on interventions first required young people to be positioned in this way, in order that pre-Prevent interventions had a target audience. Yet, by managing the information they revealed as they worked with young people, practitioners were attempting to stop them becoming aware of their discreditable ‘at risk/risky’ status (Goffman, 1990b; 1991). This is of particular relevance in the context of radicalisation: not only do labelled and stigmatised identities carry exclusionary implications (Becker, 2018), but young people who become disenfranchised have also been shown to be more supportive of terrorist grievances (Williamson et al., 2020). It would be counterproductive, then, if stigma and negative labelling were to be a feature of early interventions aiming to prevent extremism and radicalisation from setting in.

As such, practitioners delivering both universal and more targeted interventions discussed and were observed using a range of practices that could be understood in relation to young people’s sense of identity. The concepts of stigma and labelling were useful because they enabled me to explore the assumptions being made by practitioners in depth. This included the ways that potentially stigmatising situations were managed and avoided, and the actively positive approaches that encouraged young people’s strengths and agency. A further component discussed by practitioners was the notion of creating a ‘safe space’. Allowing young people to explore their beliefs and grievances was considered a key aspect of ‘effective’ interventions by participants, a finding echoed by Deakin et al.’s (2022) recent study of interventions with ‘at risk’ and ‘troubled’ young people. The authors found that interventions producing positive outcomes featured trusted relationships with adults, in which young people could express themselves without fear of judgement or shame.

In some ways, the practices accord with Braithwaite’s (1989) notion of disintegrative or reintegrative shaming, where disintegrative shaming relates to the stigmatisation processes practitioners sought to avoid, and reintegrative shaming relates to the gestures of reacceptance they made to young people. One notable difference, however, is that
Braithwaite focused on deviant behaviours, whereas most of the ‘risks’ and concerns about young people in the present study were their values and ideas. This highlights a unique aspect of early intervention work in the sense that it is not just a young person’s acts which can become stigmatising for them, but also their thoughts.

Thus, despite the desire to avoid stigmatising young people, practitioners’ practices were ultimately framed by the overall ‘problem’ of extremism and Prevent-related concerns. Within this particular context, O’Donnell (2016) argues the ‘vulnerable individual’ has become synonymous with the (potentially) ‘dangerous individual’. They were operating within what has been described as a ‘securitised’ space (Thomas, 2016), where advice for schools, for instance, has included being alert to young people seeking answers to grievances or their discussions around perceived persecution (Coppock and McGovern, 2014). Yet, allowing young people the opportunity to explore and consider these very grievances and beliefs, without stigmatisation or criminalisation, was considered an important aspect of early intervention by practitioners. This highlights a paradox being continually negotiated in early intervention work, because in labelling young people’s behaviours and attitudes as ‘risks’ or ‘signs’ of extremism/radicalisation, the very efforts to prevent the onset of and tackle these issues may confirm their problematic status. As well as shaping practitioners’ approaches to intervention delivery, these criticisms and concerns also led to resistance and tensions. This in turn impacted intervention organisation, leading to a range of negotiations to access and reach young people. It is to the theme of negotiation that the discussion now turns, in the final empirical chapter of this thesis.
Chapter 7: Negotiations in Early Intervention Organisation and Delivery

Far from being smooth endeavours, early interventions encountered a range of resistances and frictions throughout organisation and delivery. In turn, this impacted the ability of interventions and their practitioners to reach young people, resulting in various compromises, diversions and tensions. The aim of this chapter is to explore the resistances and frictions that emerged on-the-ground in Wales and the ways intervention providers negotiated and responded to them. As in earlier chapters, interactionist concepts and authors will be drawn upon to assist in interpreting the data, including negotiation (Strauss et al., 1964; Lipsky, 2010), social organisation (Fine, 1984; Hall and McGinty, 2002) and labelling (Becker, 2018; Cicourel, 1995).

The chapter is organised into four sections, with each representing a different example of negotiation. Across the spectrum of early interventions, from universal, ‘primary’ interventions taking place with any young person, to more targeted ‘secondary’ interventions stemming from Prevent queries and referrals, access first had to be negotiated by practitioners. Facilitators and organisers were faced with various issues impacting the access their interventions had to young people: gatekeepers, resistance, denials, disagreements and diversions.

Using extended fieldnotes and analytical commentary to identify key moments, the first section provides an in-depth discussion of a specific negotiation to gain access to a group of young people. This saw the intervention organisers ‘pitching’ the Project for Boys to two deputy heads acting as gatekeepers. The second section takes a step back to look across various forms of denial and resistance to early interventions, including from schools, local authorities and even police. The third section considers disagreements between agencies about the seriousness (or ‘threat’) of referrals for extremism, and thus whether they should be given access to support. The fourth and final section of this chapter explores the alternative referral mechanisms, which saw some young people diverted towards informal support for extremism, rather than ‘official’ agencies. While the focus of this thesis remains
on early interventions to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation predominantly sitting in the ‘pre-Prevent’ space, in places the discussion in this chapter relates to Prevent more specifically; this will be highlighted where relevant.

7.1 Negotiating access to young people: ‘pitching’ an intervention to gatekeepers

As set out in the earlier summary of interventions provided at the end of Chapter 4, young people who received the Project for Boys intervention were referred based on particular ‘concerns’ about their behaviour or beliefs. In this sense, the Project for Boys was a targeted or ‘secondary’ intervention for ‘at risk’ young people. In the early days of organising the Project for Boys, the local authority Prevent team approached the local Youth Justice Service (YJS) and police. Having already received some referrals to the project from schools, they also wanted to reach further young people:

The team encouraged the other agencies to refer young people they felt could benefit from the project, and a list of names was compiled by the local authority. The reasons these particular boys were originally referred by their case managers were somewhat blurry. However, rather than being based on any extremist or terror-related convictions or arrests, the referrals broadly related to ‘vulnerability’ to exploitation, including extremist, county lines, and gang exploitation. When I later questioned Oscar, one of the organisers from the local authority, about this, he said the project “addresses the sections of the Prevent agenda we need to address” and referred to the mixed/unstable/unclear category of radicalisation.

With this in mind, the plan was to run sessions with the YJS and police referrals during the evening. However, as a result of various obstacles for the YJS/police group – including one boy refusing to engage, one going ‘AWOL’, one breaching his license conditions, and two others clashing about not wanting to be in the same room as each other – this idea of an evening session was scrapped. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys planning call, 08/10/2021)
This early disruption to the project demonstrates the lack of linearity in translating intervention plans into practice, particularly when competing with wider issues faced by young people – in this case, the criminal justice system. In a meeting in October 2021, the local authority team described their disappointment at this turn of events, having assumed that when they received the list of names from the YJS and police, the boys had already agreed to engage (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys organiser meeting, 14/10/2021). This example also shows that such contingencies and complexities are present and challenging, even for policy actors working directly with Prevent. In turn, the notion and narrative of Prevent as an all-powerful and authoritarian policy object (see for example Dathan, 2023) is called into question; rather than interventions having unrestricted access to all young people, there were obstacles impeding their reach. This emerged as a recurring issue and is explored in greater depth below.

In responding to this early disruption, the local authority took a two-pronged approach. Firstly, throughout autumn 2021, separate sessions were run during the day with two local comprehensive schools where concerns about Prevent-related issues had been raised previously; the sessions took place once per week for four weeks. Secondly, still determined to find another way to reach at least some of the YJS and police boys, the local authority decided to approach their schools, with a view to starting the project in January 2022. Both schools were local alternative provision settings, Alternative Provision 1 (AP1) and Alternative Provision 2 (AP2).

In December 2021, I was present in a virtual meeting where some negotiations took place. The purpose of the meeting, conducted via Microsoft Teams, was to organise sessions in AP1 and AP2. Present in the virtual meeting were two local authority actors (Oscar and Kelly), the main project facilitator (Craig), the deputy heads of the two settings and myself. Everyone had their cameras on.

Oscar began by describing Craig’s work as being part of their Home Office grant funded Prevent projects, which was run in a similar way to the [violence and extremism] sessions delivered in the schools some months ago. He outlined Craig’s work in schools where there had either been Prevent referrals or Prevent queries.
and extremism-related issues in recent months. Oscar explained that they had tried to also work with boys referred to the project by the police and Youth Justice Service (YJS) a few months earlier, but due to various issues such as licence breaches, they didn’t manage to see them. Briefly, he shared the reasons that they were looking to go into the present settings: AP1 because of a recent ‘Prevent query’ from there that went in to be considered by Channel (due to comments related to Hitler), and AP2 because some of the original YJS/police boys were pupils there, so they wanted to try and reach them that way. Oscar was enthusiastic about the intervention, saying he’d seen other boys engage well with Craig. Kelly nodded in agreement.

At this point it struck me that my expectations of the meeting were quite different to what was unfolding. I had arrived at the meeting thinking that both settings were already on board with the project, and so expected the meeting to be more logistical, discussing aspects such as dates, times and room requirements. However, it was transpiring that the meeting was more of a ‘pitch’ to the schools, to try and get them to see the project’s value and allow some of their pupils to attend.

(Fieldnotes, Project for Boys organiser meeting 13/12/2021)

As the meeting continued, it became clear that each of the deputy heads was in-fact a gatekeeper to the boys attending their settings and were not necessarily ‘on-side’. Access therefore hinged upon the local authority’s and Craig’s abilities to answer a range of questions and clarifications posed by the gatekeepers:

The deputy head of AP2, Mr Jones, asked about Craig’s background, and Craig explained that he had worked in prisons and with young offenders, in different education settings including PRUs, and delivered work in around six regions of the UK. Craig gave some description of the sessions, saying they covered different themes each week: rather than being limited to radicalisation and extremism, he emphasised that they also covered issues such as county lines and gangs. Mr Jones mentioned knife crime, and Craig agreed that it was something he could also cover alongside the other topics. As he was not fond of the idea of “parachuting in” and then leaving the boys, Craig explained that the programme included a closing activity
(such as go-karting) which doubled-up as an opportunity to revisit them. Both deputy heads visibly nodded as Craig explained this.

Mr Williams, AP1’s deputy head, asked if Craig typically did the intervention with year 10 or 11 boys. Though he had been running it with year 9s, Craig said he felt the issues he covered were common across all the years, meaning it could be delivered to any of them. Mr Jones pressed a little at this point, asking more questions about the content and structure, saying that he was just ensuring his boys would want to engage with Craig. He said he felt the boys needed to hear the content, but that he, as deputy head, would need to consider and clarify the group he would be willing to send on the intervention.

Mr Jones began listing some names for Oscar (from the local authority team), suggesting he would be familiar with them. However, Oscar restated that they would like Craig to work with the boys they originally had referred from the YJS and police. He repeated that because the boys kept breaking their licence conditions, making it impossible to reach them originally, the team were exploring how they could get to them another way, which brought them to the schools. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys organiser meeting 13/12/2021)

As the discussion captured in the above extract indicates, implementing the intervention and gaining access to the desired groups was not straightforward. The local authority team were faced with Mr Jones’ concern about how worthwhile the intervention would be, having to convince him that the ‘target’ group from the YJS and police would want to engage with Craig. But the names being suggested by Mr Jones were different, and together with Oscar’s restating of the desired group, this conveys the negotiative tone of the meeting. This continued, and though not directly disagreeing, Mr Jones’ repeated references to other boys (an ‘outreach group’ that he thought could benefit most) indicated subtle disagreement with Oscar’s view:

As the meeting went on, Mr Jones expressed some concerns about the location of the intervention, suggesting it might be better to try working with the boys he had in
mind off site, because they would be less disturbed than if they were in school.
Oscar said the plan was for Craig to come to the school, but Mr Jones emphasised that the boys he was talking about didn’t want to be in school and currently weren’t attending, arguing that if the intervention was delivered on site then it might hinder its success. “Knowing them, they might not turn up or will walk away,” Mr Jones explained, adding that the “outreach group” – the group of boys he was planning to send – were the individuals who “need it most.” (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys organiser meeting 13/12/2021)

It is worth restating here that the ‘outreach group’ being referred to by Mr Jones in this extract is different to the YJS and police referrals being suggested by Oscar. The boys Oscar wanted to reach were attending school, and could have been seen on the school site, whereas the group Mr Jones had in mind did not attend school, and would therefore need to be reached in another setting. At this point, the power of the school as an actor in determining the eventual recipients of an intervention became clear. The reasons for their differing perceptions were less clear, however, and could be down to multiple factors. For instance, Mr Jones may have already ‘given up’ on the YJS and police referrals. Alternatively, as a result of struggling to engage the ‘outreach group’ using his existing approaches, Mr Jones may have seen more value in using the intervention with this group than with the YJS and police group. As the latter were at least attending his alternative provision setting, the reluctance from the ‘outreach group’ to attend school may have been the bigger ‘risk’ indicator for Mr Jones. The negotiations continued:

In response to Mr Jones’ suggestions, Oscar proposed a local leisure centre that he’d used before because he knew there was a classroom space, as well as breakout spaces with pool tables. Mr Jones agreed that would be suitable, and after being questioned by Craig about the feasibility of this plan, Mr Jones explained that AP2 sent out a minibus every day. The driver’s job being to wake the boys up, get them on the bus, get them a Greggs and bring them to school (or another setting away from the school site) – or in this case, the leisure centre.
The conversation then turned to the dates, times of day and session durations that would be most suitable for the boys. Mr Williams and Mr Jones both agreed that 90 minutes would work for their cohorts. Listing some of the names he had in mind (which included the Prevent query), Mr Williams said the boys would be in around 9-10.30am on a Wednesday, adding that they were usually more engaged in the mornings. Mr Jones agreed with this sentiment, saying he didn’t think there would be much engagement from his boys in the afternoon, but that a session between 12-1pm could work at a stretch. Oscar suggested that with the first session being 9-10.30am with Mr Williams’ boys, allowing time at the end for questions as well as some travel time between sites, an 11.30am start with Mr Jones’ boys would work. Everyone agreed this was feasible.

Pleased with the plan, Mr Williams said that in addition to the ‘Prevent query’ referred to earlier (the boy who had made comments related to Hitler), he had some year 10s in mind who were “on the cusp” that he wanted to send along too, meaning there would be around 5-6 boys in total. Explaining his reluctance to send any more than six boys for behaviour reasons (he said that they could get rowdy), Mr Williams said he would only be putting forward those who could really benefit from the intervention. Meanwhile, Mr Jones had year 9s, 10s and 11s in mind, once again emphasising that they were boys who attended his setting because they wouldn’t go to mainstream school. Craig reassured them both that he had worked in PRUs and with the gangs unit in a prison before, so was confident he could handle it. As they discussed this, Oscar repeated that he wanted to capture those young people they couldn’t reach through YJS/police before by going through the schools. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys organiser meeting 13/12/2021)

Two aspects are worth noting from this extract: first is Mr Jones’ emphasis on reaching the ‘outreach group’ with the intervention, and second is Mr Williams’ mention of the Prevent query. As the meeting went on and as noted above, there seemed to be a subtle tension lying between Mr Jones’ perception of which boys would derive the most benefit from the intervention, and the local authority’s original target group. Despite Oscar’s repeated references to the YJS and police boys who were referred to the project previously, as deputy
head, Mr Jones had power in determining to which boys the intervention would be granted access. In contrast, Mr Williams showed no resistance as he referenced the Prevent query specified by Oscar, expressing a clear intention to place him on the intervention, meaning there was no need for Oscar to keep restating anything about this boy.

After both deputy heads left the Teams call, Oscar said he needed to try and work out logistics for January and began discussing the transport between the sites with Craig. I could see Kelly getting confused and I felt the same, so I asked him to clarify what he had in mind. Oscar explained that he wanted to run one session with AP1 boys, and two sessions with the AP2 boys. This was because while Oscar was confident the ‘Prevent query’ would be present in the intervention sessions at AP1 (with Mr Williams), he was envisaging having to run two separate sessions at AP2 to reach all the boys. Given Mr Jones had been so focused on the “outreach group”, Oscar thought they might have to see the YJS/police boys separately. Yet, it didn’t seem like Mr Jones was aware of this because Oscar hadn’t brought it up directly in the meeting. (Fieldnotes, Project for Boys organiser meeting 13/12/2021)

Entering the alternative provision settings yielded multiple points of negotiation and compromise, as the different actors, each with their own expertise, sought to have their say. In practice, and as demonstrated in the extended fieldnote extract, this required the local authority team and Craig (the facilitator) to ‘sell’ the project to the deputy heads – both of whom had questions. They sought to clarify aspects of the content as well as Craig’s background, with one expressing uncertainty early on about whether his boys would want to engage at all. Within these institutional-level negotiations, the deputy heads had the power to negotiate the terms of entry – not only in terms of engaging with the intervention in principle, but also who they would be willing to put forward to attend.

These negotiations were underpinned by two definitions of individuals of concern: boys in the original YJS/police/Prevent target group who were the ‘desired’ audience for the local authority organisers, and those imagined by the deputy heads to be most suitable. As can be seen in the extracts above, throughout the meeting, Oscar made numerous references to the boys that he wanted to see attending the intervention. While Mr Williams was not
resistant to Oscar’s direction, Mr Jones had a different group of boys in mind, and it seemed there was some tension in the access he was willing to grant. This tension became more pronounced once the deputy heads had left the meeting and Oscar suggested potentially running another session in order to still access the YJS/police referrals from Mr Jones’ school. As it transpired, only one session each was run with AP1 and AP2, but even discussing this without Mr Jones’ presence suggested it was something they might not be able to agree on. Elsewhere, these kinds of competing interpretations have been found to be commonplace. In the course of patients’ treatment at psychiatric institutions, Strauss et al. (1964) found some psychotherapists were unable to get patients access to the ward of their choice because other professionals may have judged them inappropriate. They argued that respective standards of judgement can differ widely among professionals (Strauss et al., 1964), something which is echoed by the tensions between the local authority team and Mr Jones.

A month later on the 18th of January 2022, the day before the first session, the organisers clarified with both Mr Jones and Mr Williams that the sessions would still be going ahead with the cohorts discussed previously. The names of two boys identified by the YJS/police were specifically mentioned to Mr Jones. However, neither were present the following day, and in fact, neither attended any session across the whole project. This was not because the boys chose not to attend, but because they were not put forward at all by Mr Jones, who instead chose to only grant access to the other ‘outreach group’. In contrast, the ‘Prevent query’ (the boy who had made comments about Hitler) from Mr Williams’ setting, AP1, was put forward and did attend the whole project. As such, these negotiations show that there can be different levels of resistance from different actors. Specifically in this example, the tension and frictions between Mr Jones and the Prevent team impacted the work it was possible to carry out. Even though the YJS and police boys in Mr Jones’ setting were ‘eligible’ for the Project for Boys and met the criteria for inclusion, the access was still blocked. In practice, then, these kinds of disagreements may lead to compromises or gaps in who can be reached.

Further, this case highlights the complexity of accessing young people of concern: rather than being a top-down, powerful entity, those organising interventions of this nature
require the collaboration and co-operation from schools and educators in order to reach those considered to need their support. In this way, the “discretionary actions of public employees” – the deputy heads in this case – directly impacted practical delivery (Lipsky, 2010:3). Their decisions about whether to allow access to young people and who was most in need of the intervention echoes Lipsky’s (2010:83) description of policy consisting of “the accretion of many low-level decisions”. Though the deputy heads were not employed directly by Prevent, their decisions were still influential, because “the routines and categories developed for processing those decisions effectively determine policy” (Lipsky, 2010:83).

This negotiation example from the Project for Boys challenges the traditional notion of policy, which Hall and McGinty (2002) argue does not account for the way settings can influence the process. Instead, they argue that policy is multi-level and involves linked processes and contextual groundings (Hall and McGinty, 2002). Moving beyond this specific case study, the following section provides a broader view of negotiating access to young people, drawing on resistance and denial occurring in relation to both primary/universal and secondary/targeted interventions.

7.2 Denials and resistances from different directions

Whereas the first section of this chapter (7.1) focused on the barriers for a more targeted intervention, this section includes a discussion of both universal (primary prevention) and more targeted interventions (secondary prevention). The discussion will demonstrate that resistance and negotiations do not only exist at the ‘top’ end of prevention, where specific concerns have been identified, rather they run throughout.

Several interviewees reported degrees of resistance and denial they had experienced in relation to the interventions they had delivered. As rehearsed in Chapter 5, parents are one example of a barrier to interventions, as they had the power to refuse consent for their child(ren) to engage. In the example of educational mosque visits described by Kevin (local authority), parents’ prejudices appeared to motivate their objections, the same prejudice
the interventions sought to prevent. Beyond parents, however, other varied sources of resistance were also present, including teachers, schools, local authorities and even police. As a result, access to young people was impeded somewhat, as the accounts below illustrate using a range of practitioner perspectives.

7.2.1 Misunderstanding the ‘problem’
On a broad level, public narratives and sentiment around extremism-related issues were suggested as a factor contributing to general resistance to interventions. For Ash (youth worker), designing interventions with an emphasis on critical thinking had become increasingly challenging:

... especially in recent years ... when you've got media and government literally painting with very, very broad strokes about immigrants, immigration and stuff, for example, you know? (Ash, youth worker)

Jess shared a similar view, finding that racism was often seen as being more of an issue in places other than the UK. People would respond to her with denials such as “‘it’s something that happens in America; it’s not something that happens here’” (Jess, education worker). This was also echoed by Steve, who discussed his experience in an all-Wales policy role, which he held until 2019. He described some of the responses he received when he tried to engage education settings around the topic of radicalisation:

Well I mean what is absolutely destructive, is some of the responses I had in [the role] where one could say, some people who should know better ... would say ‘we don't have that problem here’. And when I would then pause and say ‘well what is that problem?’ then you still had a hankering of ‘well extremism equals Islam, equals we don't have any Muslims living here and therefore we don't have that problem’.
(Steve, education worker)

Together, these accounts suggest that broader narratives and public opinion can present barriers, both in terms of initial access being granted and the salience of messages embedded within early interventions. Specifically, the bias and ‘hankering’ described by
Steve echoes the critiques of early iterations of Prevent policy for strongly associating radicalisation with Muslim communities, as discussed in Chapter 4. While the policy later broadened to emphasise all forms of extremism (at least in principle), the Prevent review has called for the focus to return to Islamist ideology; a suggestion the current Home Secretary has responded to positively (Shawcross, 2023; HMG, 2023). It seems this underlying narrative may have served as a barrier to engagement with such intervention/prevention work, owing to a perception that it is irrelevant or ‘someone else’s problem.’

7.2.2 Denying the ‘problem’
Participants involved in the ‘upstream’ anti-racism work (primary prevention) disclosed similar issues. As the examples below demonstrate, resistance and reluctance to engage with interventions exists even at the level of general prevention. In this case, the denials and resistances were sometimes direct and other times more indirect, such as an inability to see something as a problem. This variably involved teachers, schools and council executives:

_There’s been some examples where the teachers themselves... either they’re oblivious or not able to see the experience of another in their classroom. There was one with a Chinese child in a class ... his nickname was very racist in terms of, ‘ching chong’ or something the other children would call him. And [the teacher] assumed that that was a nickname and that was ok. They would pull their eyes, in terms of when people would talk about that child, and that would happen in the classroom._ (James, education worker)

_I think sometimes you get a school that is massively on board, want to do everything they can to prevent and challenge racism. Sometimes you’ll get a school that sees that there is no problem whatsoever, and they worry that if you go in, and you talk about racism, you’ll stir up issues that aren’t there._ (Jess, education worker)

Similar accusations of schools in Wales denying and ignoring racism were also made separately by a charity in 2022 (see report by Morgan, 2022). The accounts of the participants in this study indicate that racism is differentially perceived, with implications for
the way it is addressed with young people. More specifically in terms of the racism directed towards the Chinese pupil described above, while this would not necessarily warrant a referral to Prevent (for the other children), it is curious that there was no response from the teacher as it speaks directly to the Counter-Extremism agenda/strategy. One possible explanation for these various denials is a fear teachers will be left to address emotional reactions or polarisation if they are provoked (Pace, 2019). Another issue in this area, which has been raised in the context of relationships and sexuality education more specifically, is the competing perceptions about how sensitive or controversial issues should be framed and presented to young people (Waling et al., 2020; Renold et al., 2021).

James, quoted above, was the educational coordinator for the anti-racism workshops, and therefore had regular contact with local authorities. In the following extract he described another instance of denial:

> And we had these discussions then with the council, local authority, our concerns that the teachers were obviously concerned and they’d come across [racist comments] a number of times, and concerned themselves which flagged up. And it ended up, that local authority didn’t fund our work … there was a lot of denial from the chief executive of that council … People won’t push the subject if they don’t care about it. This is not a blame, it’s just a different worldview, and if you don’t see or experience racism then why should you care about it? In a blinded way kind of thing. (James, education worker)

Just as there were negotiations with gatekeepers in order to access the individuals of most concern in the Project for Boys, these examples suggest a similar issue exists for more universal interventions. This reflects the argument that any system which involves individuals representing a group in their dealings (and interactions) with others will involve negotiation (Fine, 1984; Goffman, 1990b). Perceptions of issues (in this case, racism), either in terms of how severe they are thought to be or receptivity to the idea that they exist at all, determines how issues are addressed within organisations and the access granted to those delivering interventions.
7.2.3 Fear of labelling

One factor that may have contributed to this reluctance was a fear of ‘labels’ being put to schools who did engage with interventions. A previous evaluation of projects designed to prevent extremism, including those delivered in schools, found a similar hesitation based on the potential implication that schools had a ‘problem’ (Hirschfield et al., 2012). Just as practitioners had concerns about the potentially stigmatising effects of interventions for young people on an individual level, then, some also feared interventions could create issues on the level of broader, organisational reputation. Participants in this study shared their experiences:

_The issue with schools is, you know they want anti-racist workshops, but they don’t want to be seen as a racist school._ (Mike, education worker)

_Sometimes schools can be scared of [sharing stories] because they’re not sure- that idea of a label of racism that can be put on a school can be a fear for a number of other reasons, and something we have come across._ (James, education worker)

_No real reason why we targeted that school. And this is the problem we’ve got is, if you start reporting on these [extremism prevention] projects all of a sudden someone will say, ‘oh, right so there must be a problem in that area.’_ (Kevin, local authority)

As these quotations suggest, labelling is the result of reactions from others (Becker, 2018). In this case, interventions being present in schools might have led people to assume there were racism or extremism problems, even if there were none – in Becker’s terms, this would mean schools were ‘falsely accused’. On the other hand, where problems were indeed present and revealed as such, schools would be ‘pure deviants.’ Whilst it could be argued that engaging with interventions is in itself a positive action, in either situation, Becker argues that once negative labels have been attached, there are reputational implications and impacts on public identity. A school’s ‘status’ as racist and/or extremist could then become dominant (Becker, 2018).
7.2.4 Resistance and misinterpretation

Related to the concept of labelling is a surprising example of resistance described by support worker Connor, which involved tensions with local police that needed to be addressed. Though the example is somewhat different to those described elsewhere in this section, it brings an interesting misinterpretation to light. When the boxing club he ran was still relatively new and just beginning its work with local young people (targeted support for ‘at risk’ young people), Connor did not feel the police understood their positive intentions and tried to disrupt their work:

> But with the stop and searches, with this and that, with kids trying to attend the boxing club at the same time they get stopped, on their way to the boxing club. So things like that, we know it affects the boys, you know. ... I contacted the [police force], I said ‘listen, this is not the case. Come over. See what we’re trying to do, see what we’re doing’ and that. (Connor, support worker)

Though Connor had successfully gained some access to young people, the subsequent police stop and search activity threatened to take this away: even if they did not stop the intervention directly, there was a risk that young people would be deterred from attending as a result of the treatment and suspicion. Connor’s choice of words about the implications of this suspicion – “we know how it affects the boys” – echoes the above discussion of labelling. As well as the day-to-day disruption caused by the police activity, there were concerns about how young people’s self-image could be damaged by this suspicion (Becker, 2018). As discussed in Chapter 6, Matza (2010) argues that being treated in this kind of negative way can have implications for the way young people see themselves. Connor went on to explain that his decision to contact the police was a considered a bold one, due to longstanding tensions with and mistrust of the police within his community. Yet, as a result, the relationship was dramatically improved, and the local inspector then regularly attended the gym to train and get to know the community. Confronting the issue and engaging in this negotiation proved to be essential in the implementation of the intervention.

Taken together, these examples foreground the nuances of intervention, revealing the ways in which certain perceptions can impede access. As a result of these denials and resistances
to early intervention, access to young people can be blocked. In these cases, young people may be prevented from engaging with interventions, even when they are arguably most needed.

7.3 Inter-agency disagreement over ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ referrals

Negotiation – and tension – could also be found between local authority and police actors in relation to ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ concerns and/or referrals. These particular referrals fell at the ‘later’ end of the intervention scale (firmly ‘secondary’ prevention), concerning young people who could potentially have received official Prevent intervention providers. At the end of our interview, one local authority member suggested that they had sometimes had issues in getting the police Prevent team to take these kinds of non-specific referrals seriously. This in turn meant that getting young people onto suitable interventions was inhibited. Although the interviewee asked not to be recorded when discussing this issue, they said they were happy for me to make notes and outlined two examples that had been concerning them. Their pseudonym and interview date have been removed for additional anonymity:

*The team got a referral in for a “young lad” in May 2020 who had been searching “ISIS beheadings” and had a “crazy Instagram page” showing images of them. He came in as an Islamist referral, but it turned out he had loads going on at home, and the ideology wasn’t really that clear. So, changed to a mixed/unstable/unclear ideology – he was actually more fascinated with violence. The concern was that if someone online were to say to him ‘you can do it’, he would actually take action. ... The police wanted to close this case because there was no clear ideology – but the interviewee said “I was like NO! It doesn’t matter!”* (Local authority actor)

The interviewee’s frustration was clear here, as they expressed their disbelief at the police response. From the above account, it seems that different actors held different thresholds for intervention: for the local authority actor, behaviours (fascination with violence, internet searches and Instagram posts) were sufficiently serious, while for the police it was more
dependent upon the young person’s underlying motivation. Though the actors shared the same set of criteria relating to young people, they interpreted them differently.

These different perceptions of the way issues relate to radicalisation may be accounted for by the different organisational cultures and professional perspectives, and their approaches to (and tolerance of) ‘risk’ (Haugstvedt and Tuastad, 2021; Madriaza et al., 2017). This perhaps goes some way to explaining the significant drop off between the numbers of referrals to Prevent and later adoptions by Channel for support. Across all ideologies in Wales, the percentage of referrals adopted by Channel is quite low: 16% in 2020-21 and 15% in 2021-22. This percentage is, however, consistently lower again for ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ referrals. For instance, in 2020-21 (Home Office, 2023a), there were 120 referrals under this category in Wales, though only 10 were eventually adopted at Channel, or just over 8%. In 2021-22, there were 199 referrals, with 21 adopted at Channel (or just shy of 11%) (Home Office, 2023a). As highlighted in Chapter 4, police play a key role in decisions about whether Prevent referrals go onto be considered by Channel at all (by screening and assessing for vulnerability (HMG, 2018)). Although the interpretation of the local authority actor in this example could be seen as a product of a widening label of extremism, this was somewhat inhibited by the police response, an example of how tensions and disagreements may emerge between different actors (Haugstvedt and Tuastad, 2021).

Despite being guided by the same policy and set of definitions about mixed, unstable and unclear ideology, they had different interpretations. This is perhaps unsurprising, due to the high level of discretion associated with policing (Lipsky, 2010). While it may be taken for granted that the work and decisions of these actors, all working in the same Prevent space, will “more or less conform to what is expected of them” as set out in policy (Lipsky, 2010:16), this account suggests otherwise. The local authority interviewee went on:

In another example, a young person was talking about burning people in petrol stations and he was obsessed with killing people. He was also ASD, in a special school, and vulnerable in other ways. The police were saying “he hasn’t really got an ideology” – but the interviewee said their response was “get it in [to Channel]!”
The interviewee said their role [in the local authority team] can be quite frustrating because although they can tell schools to put the referral in, they’re not the gatekeeper so can’t guarantee it’ll get through. And even if they get it through that ‘hoop’, the partners around the [Channel panel] table are different, and they might go in a different direction with it. The interviewee said their personal attitude is “I just think this person needs to be safeguarded” whereas CTSO’s [counter terrorism security officer] come at it from an ideology-driven perspective. The interviewee thinks this is because police have a police response – they look at things as police. (Local authority actor)

For this practitioner, the two young people posed realistic threats: although their ideologies were not clear cut, their behaviours and attitudes made them vulnerable. As a result, the interviewee felt they needed access to immediate support – support the police could facilitate, were they on board. Yet, given police were not on board and the practitioner felt other suitable support was limited, the concern in these examples was about what might happen to the young people and the risk they would act on their views. Cicourel (1995) suggests that police decisions about cases may be constrained for various reasons, including more pressing matters, ambiguities or contingencies, such as ‘getting the job done’. He argues that these contingencies permeate all decision-making, which is suggested by the local authority actor to some extent when they say “they look at things as police.” This is also captured by Lipsky’s (2010:19) statement that “If everything receives priority, nothing does.” Applying this argument, the Prevent police receiving these ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ referrals would not only be dealing with the complex nature of the human subjects, but also having to make decisions rapidly with often limited information (Lipsky, 2010). As a result, the way Prevent is implemented on-the-ground may not reflect the original policy objectives. This might help to explain why, in this context, specific ideologies (far right or Islamist) may be considered more pressing or actionable to those tasked with the decision-making, even though ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ ideologies are also specified within policy. In this sense, the inclusion (or exclusion) criteria for interventions may be working well for ‘obvious’ cases with clear ideologies, but less so for others.
This tension was, however, contrasted somewhat by interviewees from the police as they described their approach to different kinds of referrals. For instance, Gary suggested that cases where a single, clear ideological or theological issue was not evident could still go on to be assessed and given support by Channel:

> And on other occasions, Channel may say, ‘well actually, there’s no need to look at theological, this person just needs a hobby, or some assistance with education.’ So the Channel can assist in that. And there’s so many vulnerabilities you could talk about, touch on, it could be drugs, county lines, mental health. So, professionals will decide what's the best way to help this individual. (Gary, police)

For this to happen, the police would have to receive the case and agree that it needed to be referred to Channel. With Gary’s mention of a range of issues (county lines and mental health for example), this contradicts the ideologically-driven experience described by the local authority interviewee. Similarly, when asked about how varied referrals could be in terms of how advanced the radicalisation was, Claire described a desire to work with every case:

> Yeah, yeah, absolutely we get ones that you know very early on in the process of radicalisation, sometimes so, so far early on, sometimes people think ‘oh actually it's not suitable for Prevent.’ But I always err on the side of caution and I want to take everything into Prevent, just because we've got far better chance of success if we work with somebody early on. (Claire, police)

On the other hand, another interviewee also based in the police, Darren, seemed to be aware of issues in their response to different referrals. Like other interviewees, he suggested that ideology plays a varied role in his view and differentiated between types of referrals: “this internal anger thing that's finding a place to come out, rather than necessarily ‘oh my word, that’s such a powerful ideology’” (Darren, police). However, he also suggested that more generally, the police may have responded to referrals differently where they lacked a specific ideology:
But then you’ve also got, you know, the various Islamist causes, understand that theology, and then you’ve got the extreme far-right with the battle of the races, all that kind of stuff. We tend to focus on that, and it is right that we have had a lot of individuals you really need to address through the ideologies. But I think, and it might be something to do with speed of it, you know individuals who have had adverse childhood experiences, often domestic violence, and they are volatile. And it’s kind of the violence and extremism that appeals rather than the cause. So, I don’t know how great we’ve been at … that. (Darren, police)

There is a suggestion towards the end of this quotation that the response to referrals with less clear ideologies may not have been effective or ‘great’, despite the individuals finding extremism appealing. This tension is curious, as it again indicates competing interpretations and approaches to risk, even among those working in the statutory Prevent space. The ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ category of referrals sits alongside ‘far right’ and ‘Islamist’ ideologies under the Prevent Strategy, yet these accounts suggest there are challenges in operationalising and responding to the categories in practice.

Labels and definitions matter and are influential in determining human action (Becker, 2018; Matza, 2010; Goffman, 1991). The issues described above would tend to suggest that the current definitions are not working in practice if ‘mixed, unstable or unclear ideology’ cases are so hard to act upon. As noted in Chapter 4, an interesting development here is that, for the first time, the most recent Prevent figures (Home Office, 2023a) have provided sub-categories: Conflicted; No specific extremism issue; High CT risk but no ideology present; Vulnerability present but no ideology or CT risk; No risk, vulnerability or Ideology Present; School massacre; Incel; Unspecified. Yet, Cicourel (1995) argues that fitting cases to neat categories is a key aspect of police decision-making, and although a category (and sub-categories) has been reserved for them in Prevent legislation, challenges appear to remain. This discussion also highlights tensions and differences in interpretations by different actors in this extremism intervention space, even for those working relatively closely at the formal end of Prevent (Strauss et al., 1964). With the discussion in Chapter 5 highlighting expansion in understandings of extremism, and earlier opportunities for prevention in response, it is
interesting to find that the police response may not be adapting in the same way, creating a sense of ‘push back’ on the widening net.

Referrals sitting on this ‘cusp’ of Prevent are also particularly interesting in terms of the scope of early intervention. The cases described by the local authority interviewee, for example, may be considered beyond the support available through the ‘pre-Prevent’ early interventions observed for the present study, but also limited in terms of their access to more formal support mechanisms provided by Prevent and Channel. For instance, arranging support for young people with clear far right or Islamist ideologies may seem more straightforward, given there are intervention providers who specialise in these ideologies – in Lipsky’s terms, this might allow police decision-makers to feel “they are optimizing their use of resources” (Lipsky, 2010:152). However, it might also be that the beliefs held by the young people in the examples above are not seen as ‘extreme’, rather a normal part of society (Moynihan, 1993). Most recently, the review of the Prevent Strategy has argued the net of Prevent has been going too wide, drawing in those with views that are not sufficiently problematic to warrant the ‘radicalisation’ label (Shawcross, 2023). As a result, there is a push from Shawcross for Prevent to be re-focused on clear ideologies posing a serious terrorist threat. This perception of severity may be shared by police officers, perhaps those with whom the local authority actor disagreed. This foregrounds the way different perspectives influence the way actors within organisations operate (Strauss et al., 1964), and how barriers can once again emerge.

7.4 Alternative referral mechanisms and informal diversions for support

Moving beyond the kinds of access negotiations highlighted above, this chapter now turns to a discussion of alternative routes of referral, which saw some young people deliberately diverted away from official agencies for support. It emerged that some participants – youth workers in particular – had been consulted regarding cases on the more serious end of the early intervention ‘scale’. Indeed, some of the cases discussed below clearly fall within the scope of Prevent as it is described in strategy documents (and beyond the primary/secondary form of prevention studied here), but apparently never came to the
official attention of authorities. In access terms, Prevent authorities were denied access (often unknowingly), while other agencies were invited in. These can be termed ‘alternative referral mechanisms.’ Various reasons for them were offered by participants, as well as views on why, according to their professional judgement (Hallett et al., 2019a; Lipsky, 2010), such alternative support to Prevent might sometimes be more suitable for young people. Taken together, this suggests that the process of directing referrals is not smooth in practice. There are tensions between the actors working in this space, who must navigate the complex policy landscape, as well as inter-agency competition for referrals.

As outlined in Chapter 4, a multitude of organisations and actors operate in the Welsh Prevent space, some in more official policy capacities (such as police and local authorities), while others usually operate separately from Prevent (for instance youth workers and sports clubs). Across the board, however, participants with various roles described being contacted and/or receiving referrals for specific concerns relating to radicalisation and extremism. Most surprising were the accounts from those operating separately from Prevent in which they described concerning cases that had been referred directly to them in place of the government programme. In these instances, those professionals who had concerns about young people, such as teachers and civil society organisations, referred them to youth workers for ongoing support. Being attracted to and taken in by a narrative, or feeling there was some validity to an extremist narrative were given as examples of things that led to referrals into one youth organisation. One participant light-heartedly said “this little boy from Swansea, I think I had more referrals across Wales than Prevent” (Dave, youth worker), claiming to have saved the figures as proof within his own records. In another instance, an education worker delivering anti-racism workshops was consulted about one individual’s racist and Islamophobic behaviour and asked to provide support. In this case, the young person “was showing quite extreme views, would cross the street when he saw Muslim people, or in the school would not sit near a Muslim” (James, education worker). Support of this nature was beyond the usual scope of the intervention however, which was a form of primary prevention and universal by design, rather than being intended to provide individualised support relating to specific issues.
However, this form of activity sometimes led to tensions with Prevent teams: “they felt that the [youth project] was hoovering up referrals that should have gone to Prevent” (Aled, youth worker). This language conveys a sense of ownership and competition for referrals that can likely be tied back to the Prevent Strategy itself, with the way in which risk is conceptualised and how the role of Prevent/Channel is defined. While some might see the motivation to accept these referrals as being associated with funding in some way (if it were a way for such a third sector organisation to boost their resources), Aled felt there were two particular issues justifying his and his organisation’s actions. Firstly, Aled argued that the organisation had very clear criteria and “red flags” which would qualify their cases for referrals onto Prevent, noting however that they were not “necessarily engaging along those same lines” as Prevent officials in terms of their interpretations of risk. The second issue for Aled was “if we weren’t there it wouldn’t necessarily go to Prevent anyway” due to people’s lack of trust and/or confidence in terms of referring. Though he was mindful of the tensions associated with accepting referrals, the implication here was that if Aled and his colleagues did not help, a young person may not have been supported. As the study of social organisation has found, policy must be navigated and negotiated in its implementation (Hall and McGinty, 2002), and it appears these differing interpretations about levels of risk may be a product of these processes. In the process of intervention, as people and organisations attempt to fulfil the goal of helping a young person, constraints, ambiguities and conflicts arise (Hall, 1972). Hall argues this is because overall goals – in this case, preventing radicalisation – are mediated by personal and subgroup goals. In the case of referrals being directed elsewhere, those making referrals and those accepting them had conflicting goals to those working within the official Prevent space.

Furthermore, Aled (youth worker) disclosed a particularly interesting issue, which was relevant to multiple cases he had had referred to him. This stood out, as the cases he described could potentially have had legal repercussions if they had been directed towards the traditional Prevent channels. To use the language of public health approaches again, the examples below were pushing the boundaries of the secondary-tertiary prevention space, as will be shown. According to Aled, his organisation received “quite a few referrals” for people who were on the autism spectrum. Aled went on to say that the referrals included “criminal violations” and “stuff that could have got them a criminal record”. Attributing this
to individuals who became fixated on groups such as ISIS and Combat 18 out of intense curiosity, Aled noted that he’d worked with people who were “downloaded stuff which isn’t meant to be downloaded”, specifically mentioning “violent videos” and forums. The referral of such cases to youth workers is particularly interesting given activity of this kind would be considered possession of terrorist material, and could therefore lead to investigative involvement from Pursue and, subsequently, convictions for terrorism (online and document-related charges are common for young people arrested in relation to terrorism; Hall, 2023). Some might argue that Aled’s referrals should go to Prevent for that very reason, and this could be characterised as an example of the “hoovering in” he described above. For Aled, though, the alternative routes of referral which brought the young people to his organisation were beneficial: he felt that harm would be caused to the young people if criminal justice interventions were used even though, in his view, they did not have any genuine terrorist intentions. This accords with the broader ‘children first, offenders second’ approach in Wales, which positions criminal justice sanctions for young people as a last resort (Jones and Wyn Jones, 2022). Instead, in order to help them understand why downloading such content was not acceptable, the young people “just needed someone to explain carefully in a safe environment with someone they trust, some more red lines and areas of concern” (Aled, youth worker).

Overall, the approach of those providing this alternative support was argued to be holistic, and while specific ideological points may have been addressed, the focus was upon helping young people to build stronger relationships and networks of “safety nets” (Aled, youth worker) in order to prevent future issues. For James (education worker) who was asked about the young person showing Islamophobic behaviour, the approach involved asking lots of questions and clarifying the extent of his views. James explained that although the boy’s understanding of Islam was vague, “his views were quite extreme”.

While describing their experiences, participants offered various reasons that people may have chosen to refer away from Prevent. This included:

*I’ve had people referred to me from Prevent and people referred to me before Prevent, ‘cause they don’t think it’s... or it’s not so much like they don’t want to, they...*
wanna check to see if they should. ... And then some people say they definitely don’t wanna refer to Prevent in fear of that person being... yeah (Lewys, youth worker).

Lewys raises an interesting issue just as he trails off in this quotation: that some people simply do not want to refer to Prevent. This reluctance was also reported by other participants, including James (education worker), who described the context of his meeting with the boy at school: “at the time there was a lot of scepticism around Prevent and the type of support and stuff.” Concerns about Prevent, its aims and objectives are well documented (as discussed in Chapter 4), and it is notable that those making referrals were taken in by them. The ubiquitous criticisms of Prevent as a policy object in turn impacted the practical multi-agency work happening on-the-ground. In other words, Prevent’s reputation had very real consequences for the support young people received, its ‘overriding status’ as untrustworthy affecting the way others interacted with it (Becker, 2018). The suggestion that there is a lack of trust and confidence even among those bound by the Prevent Duty19 indicates a lack of cohesiveness in the system, which supports the argument that translating policy into practice is subject to various forms of negotiation.

In addition, Dave (youth worker) suggested “you know what it is, cases aren’t serious enough to be ringing the system.” Dave’s words are insightful in two ways. Firstly, they indicate a reluctance to involve the authorities unnecessarily, suggesting actors face a dilemma: how much they ought to pre-empt radicalisation and extremism in order to successfully prevent it. This discretionary decision-making has implications for the throughput of cases in the system. Referring young people away from Prevent becomes a trade-off, ensuring young people receive support without official government attention. By using their discretion in this way, the decisions taken by those making referrals impact the practical outcomes for young people (Lipsky, 2010). Secondly, the way Dave refers to Prevent as ‘the system’ conveys some hostility and negative connotations. During our interview, it became clear that Dave does not hold an overly positive view of Prevent

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19 As discussed in Chapter 4, the duty for specified authorities to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, introduced by the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
himself, yet he felt strongly about helping people in any way he could. Describing one instance where someone called him to ask for help in the middle of the night, he said:

[Prevent] pay somebody from another area very good money to come down, and they go back. Whereas me, I’m in my area, you can ring me anytime. If you’re a National Fronter and you self-harm- which one did, he rang me 3 or 4 o’clock in the morning, and then I’ll pick it up. Because your life is important to me. (Dave, youth worker)

As the above quotation indicates, Dave did not feel that his commitment to supporting young people was mirrored by official Prevent workers, highlighting a tension between local provision and the national programme. Other participants shared a similar view, perceiving themselves to be better placed to provide support in some cases, with youth workers particularly willing to take on referrals that might otherwise have gone to Prevent. For instance, Aled (youth worker) described his “soft youth work approach” focused on specific areas young people could be supported (such as confidence or resilience building). Contrasting this with the potential for criminalising or pathologising young people, a concern explored in the preceding chapter, Aled said he “definitely felt that our model was safer for young people than Prevent.” As the discussion in this section has shown, there were practical implications of such suspicions around the impact of preventive interventions on identity, seeing young people directed towards alternative mechanisms of support. In Aled’s experience, this occurred when they might otherwise have been supported through official Prevent channels (or perhaps should have been in the view of Prevent actors). The difference of views and disagreement between actors and organisations becomes a factor in negotiations (Fine, 1984).

Taken together, these alternative referral mechanisms indicate a system that is neither smooth nor cohesive. For those looking to find support for young people, a range of considerations were involved in determining who would ultimately provide it and what interventions young people would receive. If they did not feel comfortable with formal Prevent referrals, alternative routes and informal diversions became the preferred way to secure interventions to support young people. This led them to the practitioners operating
in the ‘pre-Prevent’ sphere captured by this research, illuminating the subtleties and trade-offs present in decision-making for actors intending to prevent harm. Although the alternative forms of intervention complied with official Prevent policy in the sense they shared its aims, they do suggest some degree of subversion by the actors involved. Crucially, this highlights the consequences of suspicions, tensions and competing interpretations in relation to Prevent as a policy object.

7.5 Concluding remarks

Through an exploration of negotiation in intervention organisation and delivery, this chapter has highlighted several repeating and competing tensions. Disagreements between local authority and police actors about the ‘severity’ of referrals with mixed or unclear ideologies not only highlight issues of discretion (Lipsky, 2010), but also the challenges of responding to different categories of extremism and ideological labels. Though the net of intervention has widened to include new ideologies and wider harms, in practice, the extent to which extremist ideas receive a response is complex and subject to discretion. In some ways, the net is narrowed as schools use their power to block access to young people, or as practitioners use alternative referral mechanisms and divert young people for support away from ‘official’ agencies. Regulating this throughput of work in terms of how many young people enter the ‘system’ may be related to resources and ensuring priority can be given to cases where required (Cicourel, 1995; Lipsky, 2010). More interesting, however, is the insight this provides into the varied perceptions, practices and values that had to be negotiated to deliver interventions to young people in Wales. Negotiations occurred at all levels of translating policy into practice (Hall and McGinty, 2002), pointing towards a complex, contingent, and contested process of extremism and radicalisation prevention.

While the focus of this research has been upon ‘pre-Prevent’ interventions, the prominence of the Prevent programme and its problematic status (Becker, 2018) was also impactful. Previously explored in relation to young people’s identities the preceding chapter, the discussion here has shown how concerns around stigma and negative labelling as a result of early interventions were also influential at an organisational level. The significance here is
that gaining access to young people was challenging and, at times, entirely blocked because of concerns around how organisations (and young people) would be ‘labelled’ through their engagement with interventions. For those actors seeking support for young people, there was a need to balance this with a concern that programmes could be harmful in some way (the notion that a ‘cure can harm’ (McCord, 2003)). This was not just an issue at the more ‘extreme’ end of individual referrals directly into the Prevent programme, but also at the level of primary, universal prevention, pointing to the material and practical implications of an area of work with such a problematic public reputation.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

Extremism in Wales has not waned during the time since commencing this research. Recently, multiple incidents of racist graffiti occurred in south Wales, with Swastikas, Hitler references and explicitly racist terms left in locations in Port Talbot and Cardiff (BBC, 2022; Ahmed, 2022). Two teenage boys were arrested following this incident in Port Talbot (see BBC, 2022), and with the Nazi references in both incidents, the links to extremism are again clear. This was followed by the sentencing of 20-year-old Luca Benincasa from Cardiff, who pled guilty to possessing terrorist materials and being a member of a neo-Nazi organisation. He was also found to have been encouraging individuals as young as 14 to join the group (Davies and Davies, 2023). Similar issues are reflected across the rest of the UK, with recent cases including the charging of a 15-year-old from Buckingham for possession of an explosive substance (see BBC, 2023), and the conviction of another teen who committed his first terror offence aged 13 (Holden, 2022).

Framed by such issues and concerns, this thesis has explored early interventions with young people in Wales to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation. It has examined the organisation and conduct of the interventions and what they reveal about how extremism and young people are constructed by practitioners and policymakers involved in its prevention. While much of the existing literature has focused on de-radicalisation efforts or programmes (for example Koehler and Horgan, 2016; Schmidt, 2020; Silke and Veldhuis, 2017), and debates around prevention in the UK have predominantly been preoccupied with the Prevent programme, little attention has been paid to earlier, ‘upstream’ prevention practices taking place ‘pre-Prevent’. It was this gap which the present research set out to address, adopting a specific focus on interventions with young people in Wales.

With the evolving nature of extremism and the promise of early intervention, the thesis has addressed the need to better understand how these intersect. By studying early interventions ethnographically, observing them as they were being delivered to young people, the research offers both an original and important contribution to our current understanding, by illuminating how early prevention is both designed and delivered. This
includes how the ‘problem’ of extremism is imagined within policy, and how this is mediated and realised in practice, based on the ways in which practitioners approach interventions and how young people respond to them. Interviews with practitioners and policymakers also provided a space to better understand their approaches, and how they were shaped by their beliefs about extremism and how best to prevent it. The analysis has drawn upon the concepts of labelling, stigma, identity and negotiation to assist in understanding what was ‘going on’ in practice, and how the complexities, tensions, and frictions revealed by the research could be interpreted. This chapter offers a summary of the main research findings before proceeding to discuss the main contributions to knowledge, policy and practice, and research.

This study’s key contribution to knowledge is that, at these early stages of prevention, counter-extremism and Prevent-related work are not solely responding to radicalisation for clear ideologies. Rather, young people have broad vulnerabilities, and ‘fuzzy’ boundaries mean extremism is constructed as just one possible outcome amongst a number of possible harms (harms that are both instigated by young people and to which they are subject). From this, the net of early intervention widens both in terms of the ‘problems’ being prevented, and the young people it draws in. Practitioners, in both the observations of their practice and their own accounts, also positioned stigma and negative identity as issues that may serve to increase a young person’s vulnerability to extremism (and other issues including exploitation and violence). Practitioners’ approaches to the delivery of prevention interventions were therefore explicitly modified to avoid stigmatising young people, which was seen as a real risk. This reveals a circularity, where interventions can themselves form part of the ‘risk’ to which they are attempting to respond, leaving practitioners to negotiate the potential harms of both action and inaction. Yet with many different actors and agencies involved in early interventions in Wales, there are wide ranging perspectives, values and practices in operation. Certain actors, such as schools, also hold significant power in this context. Negotiating the complexities, resistances and frictions that arose from this was therefore an ongoing part of organising and delivering early interventions. To complicate matters further, the Covid-19 pandemic significantly impacted both the interventions and the research. Though the focus of this thesis remains on the interventions themselves, the
difficulties presented by Covid-19 and the ways in which this exacerbated other challenges have also been considered.

Though there are overlaps with the aims and activities of the Prevent Strategy, the early interventions at the centre of this thesis sit almost entirely in the ‘pre-Prevent’ space. While they are legitimated in many ways by the aims of the Prevent Strategy, the research has shown that they often take place under the ‘radar’ of Prevent and are, at times, somewhat subversive, raising questions about the positioning of such programmes within policy. As will be shown in this chapter, most of the early interventions studied here concern a much wider audience than Prevent (in public health terms, they are predominantly ‘primary’, with some ‘secondary’ prevention). However, Prevent police did occasionally have a role at this early stage, with CTP Wales officers designing an extremism lesson for example, blurring the boundaries between the different areas of work. And while many of the ideologies and issues at the centre of the interventions echo the Counter-Extremism Strategy of 2015 and overlap with aspects Community Cohesion, others go beyond them.

Alongside this discussion, the politicisation of Prevent is hard to ignore, and Chapter 4 recounted some of the many criticisms and concerns that have emerged since the inception of the policy in 2003. The intention of this thesis has therefore been to provide a balanced and evidence-based perspective on the values, practices and issues shaping the early prevention of extremism and radicalisation in Wales.

8.1 Summary of research findings

Underpinning the study were three central research questions. Though the answers to these questions are woven throughout the preceding empirical discussions, they are brought together in this chapter:

1. How are early interventions with young people to prevent extremist radicalisation organised and delivered in Wales?
2. Why are concepts of ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ being constructed in particular ways by practitioners, professionals and policymakers involved in the early interventions?

3. What are the implications of the research findings for theory, policy and practice?

Chapter 4 explored the social organisation of extremism prevention in Wales, reviewing the interplay of policies, strategies and intervention activities by different organisations and actors. Following this, Chapter 5 focused on three aspects of delivery: how interventions came to take place, what was happening within them, and who was delivering them. The next empirically-led chapter (6) took a closer look at the issue of young people’s identity and practitioners’ concerns about stigmatising and labelling them. This chapter also highlighted a paradoxical tension: the need to frame young people as ‘risky’ or ‘at risk’ in order to get them access to an intervention, but to simultaneously protect young people from some of the consequences that flow from such labelling processes by concealing the ‘at risk/risky’ frame. In the final empirical discussion in Chapter 7, the various tensions and elements of negotiation involved in getting access to young people were discussed. This section summarises the key findings in relation to the first two research questions.

Both elements of the first research question, organisation and delivery, are answered in different ways across the four empirical chapters. Observations and interviews revealed a general emphasis on positive, non-judgemental styles and developing trusting relationships with young people subject to interventions. This approach was considered ‘effective’ in the early intervention context, and often included, for example, relational and informal interactions with young people. Particularly on ‘the Project for Boys’, the practitioners used slang and cultural references throughout their sessions. Rather than delivering interventions ‘to’ young people, this conveyed a sense of working ‘with’ them as they sought to find commonality. Relatedly, the study found some differences in interventions for boys and girls, with an indication that boys were framed as having more agency and responsibility.

There was also provision being developed for neurodivergent young people in Wales, which saw an autism specialist becoming involved in supporting individuals referred to Prevent, providing a new form of intervention.
There were some divergences in the approaches taken by practitioners with different backgrounds. Specifically, the relational and conversational approach was adopted by some practitioners (youth and support workers) more than others (current and former police officers). In sessions delivered by the latter, the interventions felt more formal and structured, being delivered ‘to’ young people with less time to ask and answer questions and more focus on providing information. For example, questions posed to young people in those sessions were often quickly answered by the (former) police officers themselves or were quite closed questions, which did not prompt much discussion from/with the young people. This may be an issue of individual personalities, but there are notable underlying differences for these practitioners in terms of their professional contexts and how they subsequently view and enact their roles and responsibilities. Youth workers and others often have longer term relationships with young people and more flexibility in their approaches, but for police officers, crime prevention and protecting the vulnerable are central. Differences underpinning the framing of young people by these different practitioners may go some way to explaining the varying emphasis on relational or protective approaches observed in delivery.

On the organisation of early interventions in Wales, the research showed multiple stakeholders are involved, which can in turn complicate the process of gaining access to young people. This included disagreements over which young people were most ‘in need’ of an intervention, and whether the ‘signs’ of radicalisation or extremism being displayed were serious enough to warrant any intervention at all. Fears from schools that they could be labelled ‘extremist’ or ‘racist’ if they allowed early interventions to take place also led to resistance and reluctance to engage. Rather than being a seamless enterprise, then, the organisation of early interventions was at times subject to a range of tensions and frictions from different directions, consistent with the findings of multi-agency partnership working more broadly (Crawford and Jones, 1995). This was particularly the case given the stakeholders involved at all levels in these processes of organisation had certain degrees of discretion in their roles, some with more power than others, and could therefore influence the course of interventions (Lipsky, 2010).
As alluded to by the second research question, one of the reasons for focusing this research on the early interventions was that they could provide insight into the way the ‘problems’ were being understood, based on the efforts to prevent them. The first key finding in relation to this question was that the vulnerabilities placing young people ‘at risk’ of extremism and radicalisation also placed them at risk of other potential harms or issues. This includes grooming for exploitation and involvement in county lines and gang activity. Rather than constructing radicalisation as a clearly bounded or isolated issue, at the earliest stages of intervention (primary and secondary prevention), practitioners and policymakers saw connections to these wider concerns, and designed interventions accordingly. The research also indicated the nature of the extremism ‘threat’ understood to be facing young people. New movements and ideologies, particularly those with a strong online presence such as ‘Incels’ and QAnon were seen as presenting new challenges requiring adaptation from interventions. Whereas these issues were not significant areas of concern in the past, this study has shown that they now inform both Prevent referrals and early interventions. Practitioners and policymakers both felt this issue was further exacerbated during the ‘lockdown effect’ of Covid-19. They felt extremists and conspiracy theorists capitalised on the captive audiences of young people they discovered spending vast amounts of time online while isolated during lockdowns. This ‘lockdown effect’ suggests measures put in place to mitigate the harms of Covid-19 may have inadvertently contributed to the harms of extremism (McCord, 2003).

As well as the broader issues and ideologies being considered within early interventions, the observations and interviews also revealed some of the perceived causes of extremism and radicalisation. Broadly speaking, these were parents’ attitudes (and prejudices) and stigma. Firstly, interviewees shared a few concerns about parents’ prejudice, including their resistance to interventions such as mosque visits, as well as things said in the home, and the ways these (sometimes hateful) attitudes could influence young people. Secondly, practitioners were concerned about the ways young people could become stigmatised as a result of interactions during interventions. Stigma in this sense related to the idea that their position as a (potential) extremist might be revealed in the interventions in a variety of

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20 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of ‘Incel’ (‘Involuntary Celibate’) ideology and QAnon conspiracy.
ways. This was because a young person must first be seen as being an extremist and ‘risky’, or vulnerable and ‘at risk’ of becoming an extremist in future. For some practitioners, the worry was that young people may feel alienated and pushed further towards extremism.

Given the perception that stigma plays a role in extremism and radicalisation, this again highlights the need to consider how interventions are framed and practiced. Accordingly, many of them sought to foster a sense of ‘safe space’ for open and honest conversations with young people, where they could share their beliefs without being labelled or embarrassed in front of others. In this sense, the positive and non-judgemental delivery aspects (described in answering the first research question above) were deployed to mitigate the ‘risk’ of stigmatising young people. This was not without its challenges, though, and facilitating this ‘safe’ environment required careful management and ‘boundary setting’ to work effectively in practice.

8.2 Early intervention and Extremism: Contribution to knowledge

In the pages that follow, the key findings of this research are drawn together. First, the series of resistances and frictions that exist ‘upstream’ of Prevent, which thread together the chapters of this thesis, are identified. The discussion then turns to the notion of ‘net-widening’ and ‘deepening’ and how this relates to the ‘pre-Prevent’ interventions underpinning this thesis. In doing so, this discussion contributes to our understanding of how ‘extremism’ and ‘early interventions’ change over time, as well as highlighting the potential risks of applying the extremism ‘label’ to young people.

8.2.1 Resistances and frictions

Cutting across every empirical chapter of this thesis are recurring resistances and frictions. This research has developed a more in-depth understanding of the need to negotiate, adapt and compromise, an ongoing feature of organising and delivering early interventions. This includes frictions related to the discourses, shifts and tensions surrounding the early interventions undertaken in Wales, as divergences and competing policy directions emerge between the UK and Welsh Government, and the practitioners operating under their
respective authorities. Negotiation also featured in a number of delivery elements, including responding to the evolving threat, gendered aspects of delivery suggesting different risks were being managed, and new approaches emerging as practitioners adapted to referrals for young people with autism.

Detailed observations and interview accounts of access negotiations revealed the power of resistance from different actors, specifically schools. This can determine the course of interventions, and the actions of teachers and schools was found to wholly restrict access to young people in some cases. This could be explained by a simple difference of professional opinion about who requires interventions the most and what is ‘best’ for young people, but it could also be seen as an example of schools demonstrating their autonomy. In this sense, they took a stance which distanced them from wider policy/government structures, thereby maintaining (or creating) a sense of independence (Goffman, 1991). More broadly, even at the earliest stage of prevention, many practitioners considered stigma to be a potential outcome of interventions, pointing to another source of friction. Overall, this provides a clear sense of complexity ‘on the ground’, with policy subjected to various pushes and pulls in different directions.

Resistance and friction exist at every level of translating policy (and strategy) into practice, and at every level of prevention. Despite being underpinned by a shared ‘mandate’ – in this case, to prevent the onset of extremism and radicalisation – different issues, judgements and approaches emerge, thus creating a negotiated order (Strauss et al., 1963; 1964). This is particularly the case when considering the specific actions of practitioners and professionals, which shape the end result of policies as they are implemented (Lipsky, 2010). With Wales as the research site, there are additional issues relating to devolution (Commission on Justice in Wales, 2019; Jones and Wyn Jones, 2022) with practitioners and policymakers forced to operate across reserved and devolved competences relating to extremism (at the UK level) and safeguarding policy (at a Welsh Government level). This friction becomes even more pronounced when the ‘issue’ – extremism prevention – is so complex and contested. As this thesis has shown, ‘extremism’ is a shifting problem. It is neither easily nor universally understood, meaning different things to different people
(Strauss et al., 1964). In this sense, extremism prevention work is ineluctably politically and ideologically inflected.

Particularly at an early point of intervention, the attitudes being problematised and ‘prevented’ (such as misogyny) may not be seen as anywhere near ‘extremist’ by some. Its contested nature means negotiation is necessary because of the lack of agreement about what the problem really ‘is’. This complexity was exacerbated by the exogenous shock of Covid-19, which shifted both narratives and interactions and saw emerging theories about the causes of the pandemic being adopted and promoted by conspiracy and far-right groups (Morelock and Narita, 2022). An added complication is that although there can sometimes be similarities, many forms of extremism are quite distinct, yet they all share the same ‘extremism’ label. For example, far-right and Islamist extremists have, in the past, converged and discussed the same issues. This includes using images of the young refugee, Alan Kurdi, who drowned after a boat capsized which he and others were using to flee ISIS (Vis and Goriunova, 2015). For ISIS, this was an opportunity to criticise those fleeing their territory (Vis and Goriunova, 2015), while for the far-right, the image was “staged” to encourage sympathy for illegal migrants (Ibrahim, 2018:6). As this shows, these two perspectives are polarised, strongly opposing (and sometimes feeding off) one another’s narratives.21 Frameworks and understandings of extremism prevention are therefore adapted to respond to these differences. At the same time, working with young people is intrinsically challenging, because they are human beings with unique characteristics, needs and vulnerabilities. All these frictions are therefore being managed whilst practitioners simultaneously manage the threat of stigmatising and labelling young people ‘extremists’.

8.2.2 Expanding interventions

The need to negotiate the broad and shifting threat of extremism can be accounted for by the notion of net-widening and deepening. With the allure of ‘the earlier the better’ in interventions (Solomon and Blyth, 2008), the breadth of issues and harms being associated with extremism has grown, as has the range and reach of prevention efforts in response to

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21 This is just one example using two forms of extremism. As noted in the review of the literature in Chapter 2, other commonalities across extremist ideologies (Islamist, far-right and Incel) include the use of gender, misogyny and male supremacy within narratives (Roose and Cook, 2022).
them. Taking Cohen’s (1985) view, changes in the size and density of this social control ‘net’ can be seen in three ways. Firstly, the net widens because there is an increase in the number of young people being drawn into the system in the first place. The net also becomes denser with an increase in the overall intensity of intervention, meaning young people are subject to levels of intervention they may not have previously received. Finally, with new early intervention programmes supplementing rather than replacing the original set of control mechanisms, these different nets contribute to the overall expanding net.

With more interventions available and a push towards preventing crime and deviance through alternative routes, new populations are drawn into the net of social control (Cohen, 1979). And as young people are ‘scooped up’ earlier, the net deepens. In the present case, with the growing political emphasis on preventing extremism (particularly given the framing of extremism as a precursor to terrorism (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2021)), the appeal of early interventions has understandably grown.

As rehearsed in the opening of this chapter, this research has highlighted a new ‘pre-Prevent’ object emerging in practice in this space. This points to recurring patterns of expansion and contraction in interventions of this nature. Expansion occurs as interventions creep earlier and, given the view that de-radicalisation is difficult (Braddock, 2014), there is a temptation to move further towards primary prevention. Without clear boundaries, this ‘fuzzy’ pre-Prevent object also draws in wider issues of violence and exploitation. Yet there is also contraction at times, with early intervention less popular or less favourable; the Shawcross review (2023) provides the most recent example of a push away from this. Defining tensions in this policy area also exist, and with concerns about the legitimacy and (potentially) stigmatising nature of interventions, resistance from different actors can also contribute to contraction. In other words, fewer young people referred, or fewer interventions on offer.

In terms of the policy overlap, if there were a spectrum with Community Cohesion sitting at one end and Prevent at the other, pre-Prevent activity and interventions almost sit in between. Although it can be difficult to delineate the areas of Cohesion and Prevent, particularly given Prevent in Wales previously sat within wider Community Cohesion efforts (HMG, 2011), there are differences. Moreover, the Prevent Strategy of 2011 explicitly
differentiates between the two, asserting they may coordinate but should be distinct. As well as overlapping with both Prevent and Cohesion, the Counter-Extremism Strategy is also echoed by pre-Prevent work in many ways, but there are also differences. Community Cohesion deals with community-level issues and tensions, with the aim of increasing trust and relationships between different groups and improving understandings of different cultures (Wales Safer Communities Network, 2022). Cohesion can be seen creeping into elements of some universal pre-Prevent interventions. For instance, educational approaches to improve understanding and increasing contact with other communities clearly echo the Community Cohesion aims above. Yet the issues being addressed are often more specific and serious – racism, hate crime, extremism, radicalisation – and go beyond cohesion as it is currently defined. Further, within these interventions, young people who make racist or other ‘problematic’ comments can become seen as ‘potential extremists’ who require a specific, individualised response not typical of Cohesion.

Prevent, on the other hand, is explicitly about terrorism, radicalisation and extremist ideologies. While some have argued that Prevent and Community Cohesion are in fact complementary, with elements of cohesion required for an effective Prevent framework (Thomas, 2016), the two have, officially, been differentiated. Now, Prevent work predominantly involves specific Intervention Providers working with individuals most in need of their support, who are already (on their way to) being radicalised. Indeed, one of the innovative practice examples identified by this research was in this Prevent context, with specific support provided to young people on the autism spectrum. Here, policing practitioners had recognised the need for additional expert support for some individuals. To a lesser extent, Prevent work can also involve local projects explicitly addressing terrorism and extremism and targeted towards the ‘most vulnerable’ (HMG, 2011). The latest version of CONTEST does also refer to Prevent as “tackling the causes of radicalisation”, using an example of workshops for young people that aim to “challenge extremist narratives, including on theological grounds” (HMG, 2018:33-4). But the range of issues being countered by pre-Prevent interventions is typically broader, including misogyny, homophobia and transphobia. In addition, there are also non-extremist matters of deviance in relation to violence, drugs county lines and gangs being discussed, which are not issues under the Counter-Extremism Strategy either. There was some ‘official’ Prevent
involvement in terms of funding certain early interventions, the Project for Boys and the
Project for Girls for example. However, the projects were not wholly focused on extremism
or terrorism. In addition, Prevent officials were not always present and were not always able
to secure access to the ‘most vulnerable’ young people they had identified (as discussed in
Chapter 7), meaning the interventions were not entirely aligned with the vision set out in
policy (HMG, 2011).

To take Cohen’s view, the issue with these ‘pre-Prevent’ early interventions as ‘alternatives’
is that by widening and deepening the net of extremism prevention, young people are still
being ‘processed’ and recorded by the system, including those who may not have been
processed at all in the past. Previously, young people would either have been processed
formally (referred to Prevent and supported through the Channel programme) or screened
out of the system completely (rejected by Prevent or not referred in the first place).
Whereas now, early interventions have become a third option for those making and/or
processing referrals, seeing young people screened out of formal processing, but still
processed through the early intervention programmes (Cohen, 1985).

This growth and expansion in early intervention is not an issue unique to extremism or to
Wales, and recent years have seen generally increasing surveillance of young people under
the guise of protection (Acik et al., 2018; Deakin et al., 2022). ‘Upstream’ intervention
becomes appealing when viewed as “nearly everyone could do with a little ‘help’” (Cohen,
1985:54). With narratives around safeguarding often framing young people as ‘at risk’ and
‘risky’ in a number of ways, there has been a growth in social interventions. These
interventions, like the Projects for Girls and Boys described in this thesis, are positioned as
responding to general ‘grooming’ and address multiple issues, including gangs and sexual
exploitation. One possibility is that with youth service provision shrinking in recent years
(Interim Youth Work Board Wales, 2021), their traditional work is being picked up in some
ways in this ‘pre-Prevent’ space. What makes extremism and radicalisation different, of
course, is their (potential) outcome. Using the 9/11 attacks in the US as an example, Innes
(2001) argues that such events draw upon and reinforce the existing fears about crime and
its control, which underpin the already widening net described by Cohen. In this sense,
demanding new and adapted measures becomes a way for those in power to demonstrate
the strength of their response to the symbolic and emotional threat of terrorism (Innes, 2001). This ‘control creep’ (Innes, 2001) may go some way to explaining the increasingly early point of intervention. Doing so earlier may help to foster feelings of security for the public and give them a sense of issues being taken seriously.

Another possible explanation is the specific ‘Welsh’ framing of extremism and radicalisation. Although widening interventions have also been seen in England (Deakin et al., 2022), there are some specific policy-based differences between the two nations: as explored in Chapter 4, radicalisation is explicitly positioned as a safeguarding issue in its good practice guide, part of the Wales Safeguarding Procedures (2022). The ‘all-encompassing’ intervention approach described above, which sees wider issues of exploitation and violence drawn in, may therefore be further driven this lean towards safeguarding and needs-based approaches driven by the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014. In other words, it may be that wider issues are increasingly being responded to in extremism interventions in Wales because of the focus on young people’s needs. In this context, there is an emphasis on vulnerability and harm prevention, which is conducive to early intervention approaches. There is also an emphasis on child-centred and rights-based approaches, rather than their risks and ‘riskiness’, contrasting the more securitised framing of such issues in England (Goldson, 2005; Drakeford, 2010), which raises questions about how ‘best’ to position young people as they enter the ‘system’ of intervention. While the need for early interventions remains, this discussion highlights the tension between the policy rhetoric and direction in the two nations, in turn impacting practitioners and the young people they work with.

8.2.3 Expanding ‘extremism’

This expansion in early intervention closely interacts with – and can perhaps be attributed to – the expansion of the label of extremism. This study demonstrated a lack of clarity or agreement in this regard, and found that with violent behaviours becoming more prevalent, the ‘fuzzy’ boundaries of extremism mean such wider harms are drawn in relatively easily. The practitioners and policymakers interviewed in this study also spoke of the new ideologies and narratives they were encountering in their work, such as conspiracy theories. Yet, conspiracy theories have long been circulating in society. It is curious, then, that they
now cause concern for those working in Prevent and counter-extremism and are seen as (at least potentially) overlapping with their ‘remit’. This expansion could be explained by practice and/or policy now having a better understanding of the causes of radicalisation. Or, perhaps in response to failures in prevention, or as a result of extremism issues being exacerbated by the ‘lockdown effect’ of isolated young people, there is now a push to do more and act earlier (Innes, 2001). For instance, Jake Davison’s shootings in Plymouth occurred after he’d posted YouTube videos about ‘Incel’ ideology and been referred to Prevent years earlier. For policy and practice to do ‘more’, such ideas first need to be understood as ‘extremist ideologies.’ Whatever the reason, it is noteworthy that the label has expanded in this way, meaning conspiracy theories are now signified as a ‘threat’ (Matza, 2010). It appears this view has been imparted not only from policy(makers) to intervention practitioners, but also to those making referrals in the first place, including teachers, for example.

As a result, ‘extremism’ could be seen as a woolly or imprecise term. It is sometimes prefixed with ‘violent’ or ‘non-violent’, though not always, and not in this thesis. Clearly, it is thought to be linked to radicalisation and counter-terrorism, but the further ‘upstream’ and early we look, the less clear it becomes. Perspectives which go against ‘fundamental’ or ‘British values’ in the UK – democracy, rule of law, respect for other faiths and cultures – have sometimes been described as extremist, though this conceptualisation is broad, and the term ‘British values’ has itself been problematised and described as being too vague (Lowe, 2017). This study also revealed some gender-based differences in constructions of extremism, with boys framed as having more agency than girls for example, though the reasons for this did not seem clearly defined. ‘Woolly’ could also be used to describe ‘early intervention’ in the sense that it is not always clear what the term means or when is ‘early enough’, though it is widely used and has become a buzzword of sorts. Prevent, for instance, presents the Channel programme as an early intervention, though in the examples the Home Office provides of the cases supported through the programme, some of them appear quite ‘late’ and already radicalised. For instance, they describe the case of a boy who was “seen handing out leaflets promoting a website containing extremist, homophobic and violent material” (Home Office, 2018). Perhaps this was considered ‘early’ by Prevent practitioners because it was the first time the person had been involved with them directly,
given he was not picked up sooner. Nonetheless, as he was already taking part in activities, it is perhaps better to imagine this as a terrorism early intervention, rather than an extremism or radicalisation early intervention.

There is no doubt the extremism ‘label’ (Becker, 2018) is gradually being applied to new issues, bringing them into the early intervention space. And as more issues are labelled and engaged with in this way, the more visible they will be to practitioners and policymakers. Five years ago, Prevent, as an overall area of work, was not concerned with many of the ‘extremism’ issues discussed in this thesis, at least openly, such as Incels and other conspiracy theories. To an even lesser extent were they (openly) concerned with issues of county lines and sexual exploitation. Now, though, concerns about these broader issues are increasingly shaping intervention projects and practices and the audiences they attend to in the fuzzy pre-Prevent space, widening the social control net as they do so.

8.2.4 The ‘action/inaction conundrum’: issues with expanding extremism interventions

Widening (and deepening) the net of early intervention (and extremism) in this way is not unproblematic. It is difficult to know the ‘right’ point for intervention, not only in terms of being most effective, but also legitimate and appropriate. In some ways, early interventions can be framed as diverting young people away from official Prevent interventions, and the associated connotations of surveillance and securitisation. Yet, true diversion would fully divert them from the ‘system’, whereas young people still come into the system when placed on an early intervention (Cohen, 1985). While this is not necessarily a bad thing given interventions may be helpful and are well-intended, it does still expose them to ‘the system’ and all its potentially negative consequences. Indeed, in reviewing evidence from a range of interventions with young people, McCord (2003) found several examples of seemingly promising programmes that had unexpected and harmful effects on their participants. These effects were reflected in outcomes including further deviance and longer-term conviction rates (McCord, 2003). As well as potential ‘harms’ of this nature, there is also a possibility, even at such early stages of prevention, of stigmatising young people during interactions. From their study of exploitation, for instance, Hallett et al. (2019b) warn that interventions focused on ‘risks’ and ‘risky behaviour’ may convey to young people a sense that they themselves are a ‘problem’.
Practitioners, therefore, face what can be described as an ‘action/inaction conundrum’. One the one hand, the action of intervention risks stigmatising young people. On the other, the decision not to intervene can result in missed opportunities to provide vital support to them. Faced with this conundrum, practitioners must negotiate the risks of both action and inaction. Owing to these issues, Solomon and Blyth (2008:2) have described early interventions as “creeping criminalisation”. With such frictions in mind, early intervention delivery becomes even more important to get right. Net-widening was inhibited to some extent by the disruption of Covid-19, which saw interventions’ access to young people being restricted and fewer referrals coming through to Prevent and other early intervention providers. Yet, at the same time, perceptions of the extremism ‘threat’ also changed among practitioners and policymakers, with new issues being drawn into the ‘net’.

It is worth noting here that practitioners are actively trying to manage these issues based on what they believe is best for young people, as demonstrated by their negotiations in implementing interventions (Strauss et al., 1964). As Chapter 6 in particular showed, many are conscious of stigma and negative labels and thus practice in a way that (they hope) prevents this, modifying their policy implementation as they do so. Their intentions are ultimately good, and their accounts and practices show they care about and support young people. In line with Cohen (1979), the motivation behind early intervention is likely based on compassion and being helpful. But with the expanding extremism label and the potential to stigmatise or alienate young people, depending on the way interventions are framed (Skipple, 2020; Harris-Hogan et al., 2019), it is important to draw attention to the way this net has been widening. This is even more so the case given the evidence linking feelings of stigmatisation and alienation to radicalisation (for example Williamson et al., 2020).

8.3 Implications for policy and practice

Throughout this thesis, the discussion has shown that translating policy into practice is not a straightforward task. However, beyond academic discussions of how nets have widened and new problems are negotiated and drawn in, it also highlights a series of dilemmas for
practitioners and policymakers ‘doing’ this pre-Prevent work. This section begins by setting out the key policy and practice findings of this research, before moving on to discuss implications and recommendations. As has already been noted, the mixture of devolved and non-devolved responsibilities in Wales, and the tensions and differences that creates in approaches, makes the situation unique. Work with young people in England is directed to assessment of risk and risk-averse interventions – albeit underpinned by a view of young people as inherently vulnerable – and therefore practice is focused on increased oversight and ‘containing’ issues, whereas in Wales, there is more emphasis on children’s rights and attention to addressing young people’s care and support needs (see for example Morgan, 2021). This includes a ‘children first, offenders second’ approach in the context of youth justice in Wales (Case and Haines, 2015b; Jones and Wyn Jones, 2022). The tension here, however, is that wider frameworks relating to extremism – Prevent and Counter-Extremism policies – are reserved to the UK government-level. Such differences between nations could be seen as limiting the generalisability of this study. However, many of the issues highlighted here, such as disagreements over referrals and implementation differences, are likely to emerge within any system involving actors with discretion (Lipsky, 2010; Strauss et al., 1964). As a result, though they may not directly or perfectly translate to other nations, the lessons and recommendations do still have a degree of transferability.

One notable challenge that emerged from the research, perhaps surprisingly, was that access to young people for early intervention providers could be problematic in a few different ways. Firstly, access was not automatically granted, and organisers were faced with negotiations to reach young people. The reasons for this included concerns from schools that they would be labelled and seen by others as ‘extremist’ or ‘racist’ if they allowed interventions to take place with their pupils. In one case (explored in Chapter 7), there were different perceptions held by local authority organisers and a deputy headteacher about whether and which young people most needed an intervention. As a result, the deputy headteacher became a gatekeeper with the power to deny access and therefore dictate which young people to put forward. Relatedly, there were sometimes disagreements over the seriousness of referrals for extremism, even among ‘officials’ working under the same remit and with the same categories from the Prevent Strategy. Secondly, parents could also become a barrier to interventions when, as a result of their
own beliefs (and prejudices), they did not consent to their children participating in interventions. Though consent was not always required for early interventions, it was for visits to mosques and for the Project for Boys, as both impacted the young people’s usual school days.

Further, some professionals with concerns about young people being radicalised and becoming extremist intentionally directed their concerns away from Prevent. This was a result of their suspicions and reservations about the programme, including aspects such as young people being criminalised. Instead, young people were being redirected towards youth work organisations operating in the ‘pre-Prevent’ space, which in a sense served to deny access to ‘official’ agencies, therefore creating some tension and serving as an example of soft subversion. This also demonstrates that the long-standing concerns about the Prevent programme have had a direct impact on practice and therefore the support young people receive.

While the discussion thus far has broadly argued that there are complexities in the process of translating policy into practice, one specific example provides a clear illustration of this. Among the early interventions considered by this research was a police extremism lesson designed by officers working within counter-terrorism policing. During an interview, one of the officers shared their ‘vision’ of the intervention as being to prompt a wider conversation about extremism. But, when the intervention was run in practice, the officer facilitating allowed little time for conversation or discussion, meaning the delivery looked quite different to the plan. This also connects to the broader questions raised in Chapters 5 and 6 about who is best placed to deliver early interventions to young people. While practitioners having different styles is somewhat inevitable and not an inherently negative thing, the example above shows that their approaches can have a significant impact on the intervention itself.

8.3.1 Policy and practice recommendations

Based on these conclusions, there are a number of key considerations for policy and practice to support the ‘vision’ of a successful intervention in becoming reality. Given many different young people are drawn into and processed by interventions, there is a broader
issue concerning investment in early interventions in Wales. As practitioners and policymakers expressed in this study, the friction here is that because young people must first be labelled an extremism ‘risk’ to receive interventions, there is a danger of stigmatising them and causing further issues. This is the ‘action/inaction conundrum’ facing practitioners. And while the net of pre-Prevent intervention has widened to include other harms and issues outside of extremism, young people are still being processed by a system that is securitised in many ways, even though practitioners themselves may adopt a more safeguarding-inflected approach. While not necessarily a causal relationship, this expansion of early intervention has occurred in a context where funding to youth services has been cut in recent years. As such, there is a need for research to address whether greater investment in broader youth work interventions (and community programmes) to support young people would resolve this tension. That is, interventions that do not require referrals for extremism or radicalisation concerns, which can also address harms and support needs for young people. This would be supported by the ambitions of the Well-Being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, which emphasises the importance of cohesive, safe communities, as well as the role of prevention in achieving this (Welsh Government, 2015). While some young people will still require specific support for extremism-related attitudes or behaviours in future, this research showed that not all young people drawn into the existing ‘net’ did. Understanding whether improved resources for more universal programmes could prevent such wide processing of young people through the ‘extremism’ lens will be an important step towards potential policy change.

The ways policymakers and practitioners frame interventions to outside audiences matter. Where there is suspicion or resistance, part of the implementation might involve working with stakeholders (including parents) to assure them of the aims of interventions. For the practitioners organising the mosque visits, for example, engaging with parents who refused consent and explaining to them the purpose of the visits in more detail did lead to some changing their minds. This in turn meant that young people who would otherwise have missed out on the intervention were able to attend. It would be worthwhile for practitioners (and policymakers) to allow time to do this, because while it may be impossible to address every concern for every stakeholder and parent, this research did find some positive outcomes and successes.
In terms of practice, adapting to new extremist threats and ideologies is essential. While expanding the label of extremism can be criticised in some ways, as highlighted in the earlier discussion of net-widening, it would be wrong to assume extremism is a static phenomenon. As extremists evolve and find new issues to exploit and new approaches to radicalising young people, interventions should respond. This may involve simple updates rather than substantial change, such as practitioners using timely examples in their discussion with young people. Increasing young people’s understanding and awareness of how extremists might frame issues in order to radicalise them would support prevention. At the time of writing, one example of this might be the ‘small boats’ issue (in the English Channel) and the ways it is being used within extreme far-right narratives against immigration.22

Further recommendations relate to the styles of practitioners. This research has highlighted the perceived benefits of youth work principles that are non-judgemental, strengths-based, involve good rapport and relationships with young people, and create ‘safe spaces’ for honest discussion around sensitive issues. Rather than criminalising, stigmatising or labelling young people as ‘extremists’, with all the connotations and risks associated with it, practitioners valued more positive approaches and considered them a key ingredient of successful extremism interventions. This complements the Wales Safeguarding Procedures (2022) and has been echoed by studies of young people’s own perceptions of early interventions more broadly (Deakin et al., 2022). Practitioners should therefore have an awareness of the potentially stigmatising effects of interventions and the importance of avoiding this. As discussed in Chapter 6, allowing young people to explore their prejudices without fear of punishment (Thomas and Henri, 2011) plays an important role in prevention. Rather than closing down the conversation, young people feeling comfortable enough to disclose their extremist thoughts or grievances provides practitioners with opportunities to help them question their views. Policymakers and practitioners should utilise such youth work principles when both designing and delivering interventions.

22 Voice of Wales, a far-right group whose YouTube channel was permanently removed after being accused of racism (Cooper, 2021), is just one example of a group posting about these issues.
This also points to the skills and confidence of practitioners. Interviews revealed differing levels of confidence among those involved in interventions. Yet, if encouraging young people to be open and honest about their views is an important aspect of the ‘vision’ of prevention, practitioners should be prepared to manage any potential conflicts that may arise. For example, Chapter 6 explored the account of an interviewee who’d been in a session where a comment with racist connotations, which had also upset another young person, was left unaddressed by the practitioner. While stigmatising the young person who made the comment would be unhelpful, there was a need to respond. For policymakers and others involved in organising interventions, this highlights the importance of ensuring practitioners are properly equipped with the skills and confidence to deal with such issues (Thomas, 2016).

Finally, the last recommendation relates to who should deliver interventions. As noted earlier, there were some differences in the styles and approaches taken by different practitioners as they interacted with young people. Youth work practitioners took a chattier approach with more interaction and discussion than police officers, for example. Given ‘disclosures’ from young people about their views were positioned as a desirable outcome of interventions, having good levels of interaction would appear to be an important aspect. Thus, in designing interventions, the cultures of organisations and practitioners should be considered. For instance, at the earliest point of intervention, when young people are unlikely to have done anything wrong or crossed a line into extremism, police officers may not be best suited to the task of delivery. With their traditional responsibilities being to protect vulnerable people from harm and prevent criminal offences, particularly violence (Brookman and Innes, 2013), this may hinder the openness conversations and sense of ‘safe space’. Youth and similar support workers, on the other hand, have greater flexibility whilst still being able to safeguard young people, and their approach lends itself to the aims and objectives of these early interventions. For those involved in designing and organising early interventions, then, the question of who delivers is an essential one. Policymakers (and practitioners) should be mindful of organisational cultures and roles when making these choices, as they will likely play a role in determining how interventions look when they are being implemented.
8.4 Research implications

From this thesis, there are a number of implications for current and future research. In many ways, the findings set out in the preceding chapters, and the subsequent recommendations made in the present chapter, were made possible by the ethnographic approach adopted. By studying the early interventions naturalistically, being present as they were delivered to young people, and in some cases as access negotiations took place, new and unexpected insights have emerged. Although it is impossible to predict every aspect or interaction that may be important in understanding a ‘problem’, the value of ethnographic observation lies in spending time with participants, increasing the likelihood that such aspects will reveal themselves (Brookman, 2015). As well as producing a picture of early interventions that is rich and in-depth, of particular note then are the aspects that would otherwise have been missed if a different approach was taken. Two specific examples are worth noting.

Firstly, the access negotiations between Prevent actors and two schools, described in more detail in Chapter 7, were both surprising and illuminating. Mid-way through the observations of the Project for Boys, I attended a planning meeting which, unbeknownst to me beforehand, was about ‘pitching’ the intervention to the deputy headteachers of the schools. To see the organisers having to work to collaborate with these gatekeepers was surprising. Rather than being authoritarian figures able to enter the schools unrestricted and dispense the intervention to whichever boys they wished, the organisers were subject to some degree of resistance. In a position of power, the gatekeepers had the ability to either grant or deny access, and to decide the terms of entry, as well as which boys they were willing to put forward for the intervention. Within the negotiated order of prevention, this example demonstrated how respective standards of judgements can differ between stakeholders (Strauss et al., 1964). This is a significant finding because it contrasts the portrayal of Prevent as a coercive force demanding compliance from education and other public sectors, or as a force ‘deployed’ through these sectors without resistance (for example Thomas, 2020; Alexander, 2019; Heath-Kelly, 2017). Instead, it paints it as a negotiation and collaboration between partners, particularly where early interventions are concerned.
The second example relates to the police extremism lesson. As discussed in the preceding section, the vision of the intervention, described by an interviewee, did not necessarily translate into practice. With little space for young people to discuss issues or provide answers to questions, the intention for the intervention to prompt a wider and deeper conversation about extremism was not realised. Discovering this has highlighted the significant role of the practitioner in determining the course of interventions, which has informed the associated recommendations for policy and practice outlined above. As well as foregrounding the value of observing phenomena naturalistically and in ‘high resolution’ detail, this example also demonstrates the benefit of using multiple, complementary methods to produce a more thorough and complete picture. Utilising this approach across the entire study meant the observations were enriched by the accounts of practitioners and policymakers, who were provided with an opportunity to reflect on their approaches and understandings at length.

Adopting this ethnographic approach involved making some key decisions that are also worth reflecting upon here. First is the sampling of interventions and interviewees. Two main aspects shaped the inclusion of interventions in this study: the aim of capturing a mixture of universal and targeted interventions, coupled with their availability (which ones were running and accessible) for observation during fieldwork. The Covid-19 pandemic limited observation of interventions to some extent, either because interventions were paused, or access to settings was impossible, or both. However, it was still possible to conduct in-depth observations a sample of both universal and more targeted interventions, the delivery and organisation of which have been compared in the preceding chapters. Relatedly, the interviewees who took part in this study came from a wide range of roles and backgrounds, including policing, policy, charities, youth work, teaching, and specialist support work. The diverse perspectives and accounts of these ‘informed informants’ have contributed greatly to the discussion of extremism and radicalisation, and the approaches to prevention in Wales. At times, their views converged and complemented each other, while at others they were in conflict, revealing tensions in understandings.
Some early intervention work with young people takes place incidentally and informally on a localised level, such as one-to-one youth work. Coupled with limitations on time and resource, and disruptions caused by Covid-19, it was impossible to capture every single early intervention taking place across Wales within the scope of this PhD research. However, by including the varied accounts of the informed informants who participated in the interviews, a more complete picture was built. This was because over a third of interviewees had been involved in designing and/or delivering other interventions that were not observed, and so their experiences complemented the existing observations. This meant that beyond the five early interventions studied in-depth, observed naturalistically on multiple occasions, this research has also benefitted from insights into many more interventions, and thus a greater range of practices.

8.4.1 Towards a future research agenda

A key contribution of the research is the more territorially refined analysis of the ‘problem’ of extremism and its prevention in Wales. To date, our understanding in this area has been lacking, and the implications of different cross-border approaches to extremism and radicalisation has not received a great deal of attention. Discussion often takes place at an ‘England and Wales’ or ‘Great Britain’ level, missing intricacies that exist on a national, regional or local level. Furthermore, official data published on the use of the Terrorism Act, an important resource for understanding the scale of the ‘problem’, does not provide any regional or force-level breakdown (Home Office, 2023b). Future research should attend to these territorial differences and seek to contribute towards the growing number of studies attempting to develop a “more fine-grained” analysis and understanding of criminal justice policy and practice (Garland, 2018:13).

In terms of specific aspects of prevention that emerged as interesting in this thesis, there is scope for future research to investigate them in greater depth. Beyond capturing the interventions that were impossible to observe here, for instance the youth work that was paused and some interventions in schools where access was limited as a result of Covid-19, future studies could take a closer look at age and gender. The discussion in Chapter 5 pointed towards gender, and possibly age, differences in the approaches and content in the Project for Boys and the Project for Girls. While this was an interesting finding and has been
considered in this thesis, future research could investigate this further to better understand the reasoning and implications of these differences. This would involve identifying and comparing interventions for boys and girls that are delivered to the same age group and use the same inclusion criteria.

A third research recommendation relates to the positive, agency-focused and youth work-informed techniques used by many practitioners. To better understand the implications of these approaches in the context of extremism and radicalisation prevention, future studies would explore them in greater depth, and with a focus on capturing young people’s perceptions. As discussed in Chapter 6, young people were observed responding positively to these approaches, engaging with both the content and practitioners delivering it. Issues related to Covid-19 meant it was not possible to speak directly to young people during the study, and while care was taken to include their perspective by observing the ways they engaged and interacted, future research would seek a more direct contribution. As such, a more in-depth study of youth work-informed techniques utilised within extremism early interventions would involve speaking to young people. The aim would be to understand their experiences of attending the interventions, considering aspects such as how they made them feel, as well as their levels of engagement in the sessions.

The final recommendation for future research is a methodological one. Though there are some exceptions (for example James, 2020; Skiple, 2020), ethnographic studies utilising observation as a method in the context of Prevent and counter-extremism are relatively rare. Yet, without gaining an understanding of the situations and challenges facing those working ‘on the ground’, including such unexpected examples as those outlined above, making useful recommendations to policy and practice becomes difficult. If research is not in touch with everyday ‘goings on’, particularly in an area of policy fraught with debate and criticism, then findings are unlikely to resonate in a meaningful way with the experiences of practitioners and policymakers. Future studies would therefore benefit from adopting an

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23 For a more detailed discussion of the implications of Covid-19 for access, see Methodology (Chapter 3).
ethnographic approach, or at least complementing other methods with ethnographic elements.

8.5 Future considerations and reflections

In setting out the empirical findings of this study, several broader issues and challenges have come to light and are interrogated as this thesis comes to a close. In terms of both policy and practice, the following are, in some way, likely to shape the landscape of early intervention for extremism and radicalisation in Wales.

First, any changes in the overarching policy framework and context are significant. As Chapter 4 set out, Prevent itself is not a static object, and there have now been multiple, distinguishable iterations.\(^{24}\) This policy framework also exists alongside, and interacts with, Counter-Extremism policies and strategies. Shifts or changes in these areas – such as new strategies or new leading figures with particular visions for prevention – appear to be on their way. This kind of re-appraisal in policy will impact the early intervention work on the ground (Strauss et al., 1964), shaping the nature and extent of the ‘problems’ interventions address. For instance, the previous Commissioner for Countering Extremism was, until 2021, advocating for the definition of extremism to be broadened to ‘hateful extremism’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2021). This definition applied the extremism ‘label’ to further issues and had closer ties to early ‘upstream’ intervention efforts. However, the development of this since appears to have stopped, with a new Commissioner for Countering Extremism taking office. Despite many areas of work being devolved to Wales – such as education and youth services – Prevent and policing are non-devolved responsibilities, meaning such changes at a policy level still have implications for practitioners and their practice in Wales. At the same time, there is a possibility of further devolution for services including probation and youth justice (Jones and Wyn Jones, 2022), and with the existing safeguarding approaches and ‘children first, offenders second’ positive

\(^{24}\) At the time of writing, there have been two to three iterations, depending on whether the introduction of the Duty in 2015 is seen as the third.
framing in Wales (Case and Haines, 2015b), this may also lead to changes in the way interventions are designed.

Another change potentially comes in relation to the Independent Reviewer of the Prevent Strategy, William Shawcross. As discussed in Chapter 4, Shawcross (2023) was critical of the way Prevent’s focus had been shifting towards far-right extremism in the years leading up to his review, and he recommended that the focus return to Islamist threats. It is unsurprising that such changes, the latest in a succession, should come given Prevent is a highly political object, and they will likely have implications for the issues being explored within this thesis. In some ways, the review echoed the empirical findings of this study in its argument that wider issues have been drawn in and labelled ‘extremism’ as a result of growth in non-specific ideologies. However, Shawcross was directly critical of this, arguing that Prevent should neither be responding to general vulnerabilities nor delivering work that is Community Cohesion-based. Instead, and in the language of the review itself, Prevent is framed as an area reserved only for the most serious and pressing ‘threats’ (Shawcross, 2023). In other words, only those individuals who are labelled as the ‘riskiest’ and most significantly threatening to national security will be supported by Prevent.

This raises two issues: firstly, the implications for young people’s identities, and secondly, the impacts for and of Prevent’s reputation. This study, and others discussed within it, have highlighted the potential to stigmatise young people as a result of any intervention, depending on the way they are delivered and framed. Coupled with Prevent’s existing reputation for securitising young people, if Shawcross’ desire to focus more explicitly on ‘threatening’ individuals is fulfilled, then the potential stigmatisation for these individuals appears greater. This would likely create further issues for Prevent’s reputation, and might lead to more alternative referrals with more young people being diverted away from Prevent and its negative labels, towards the kinds of pre-Prevent early interventions explored here. Alternatively, focus could be shifted ‘downstream’, leading to fewer interventions that are more intensive and targeted. In light of this recent framing, regardless of who will be delivering early interventions adjacent to Prevent in future, the issue of how they are delivered remains important; the empirical findings around techniques to avoid stigma and labelling are of use.
More broadly, and as this thesis has argued, extremism and radicalisation are not static issues, and the responses to them must adapt accordingly if they are to support young people effectively. While it is important to be cautious of how wide the net of prevention and label of ‘extremism’ are cast, it is also important that new and emerging extremist threats are not ignored. This is particularly so in relation to the category of ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ ideology. While the Shawcross review (2023) was highly critical of this category, based on the view that ‘Incels’ and other forms of mixed ideologies are frequently not ‘threats’ in terrorism terms, it was a key concern for the participants in this study. Their perceptions of such threats are supported by definitions that apply the terrorism label to the threat of violence, as well as actual violence, and emphasise the political or ideological goals (Hoffman, 2017). As well as the apparently Incel-motivated attack in Plymouth in 2021, the ‘mixed, unstable or unclear’ category has seen large increases in referrals in recent years. From 1,173 in 2015/16, referrals to this Prevent category across England and Wales have grown to 3,970 in 2021/22, and the number of cases going on to be discussed and adopted by Channel panels has also grown year-on-year (Home Office, 2023a).

The most recent development in this area relates to Andrew Tate, whose strong internet presence and extreme misogynistic stance has been influencing young boys (Quinn, 2023). With this in mind, and particularly in light of the impacts of Covid-19, the contours of extremism have been changing. Capturing the significant impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic in this way is one of the main contributions of this research. Online extremism and radicalisation issues have changed and accelerated, which is coupled with young people having had a different set of experiences and interactions, not only with education and other sectors, but also their peers. Moving forward, the ways this problem has morphed (and continues to do so) will be an essential consideration for policymakers and practitioners in designing responses to it.
8.6 Concluding comments

The delivery and organisation of extremism and radicalisation prevention is a process involving multiple layers of negotiation, shifts and resistance. Discovering the extent and impact of these issues has been facilitated by the ethnographic approach. With debate and research in this context often heavily focused on official Prevent referrals and actors, this study has provided new insights into the early interventions sitting beyond the boundaries of Prevent. It has sought to provide a glimpse into both the visions and realities of earlier, more ‘upstream’, ‘pre-Prevent’ interventions with young people in Wales. In turn, this evidence base can inform future policy, practice and research.

As this thesis has shown, preventing the onset of extremism and radicalisation crosses multiple policy arenas, Community Cohesion, Counter-Extremism and Prevent, rather than fitting neatly within one. It is also subject to barriers, resistance and negotiations. There is a clear need for interventions, and at this early stage, prevention efforts are responding to evolving ideologies as well as wider issues not limited to extremism. In this sense, young people are constructed as being ‘at risk’ of multiple ‘problems’ found within the chapters of this thesis, from racism to county lines, and extremism to sexual exploitation. The net of ‘pre-Prevent’ early intervention therefore widens, both in terms of the problems they respond to as well as the young people they can support. Yet with extremism prevention operating in this way, it is essential that practitioners and policymakers are aware of the potential to stigmatise and label young people within their interactions. Faced with the risks of both courses of action playing against each other, their ability to manage this ‘action/inaction conundrum’ in practice is likely to be a key ingredient in achieving the ‘vision’ of successful extremism prevention.
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Appendices

Appendix 1: Research brief (autumn 2021)

Bethan Davies – PhD project brief

Topic / working title: Preventative approaches to radicalisation and extremism in Wales.

Overview: This project is interested in early interventions run with young people across Wales, supporting the prevention of radicalisation. This may or may not include vulnerable young people. The early interventions of interest here include workshops and small group / one-to-one youth work designed to increase understanding and reduce stigma around issues such as prejudice, as well as increasing resilience and critical thinking skills. This includes work by Prevent, charities, youth organisations and some aspects of the curriculum in Wales.

Main research aims / questions:
1. What are the different interventions, techniques and delivery modes used to prevent the radicalisation of young people? How and when are they used, and by whom?
2. How is the radicalisation of young people constructed by preventative interventions?
3. What are the implications of the research findings for theory, policy and practice?

Methods: The research involves two main methods: observations and interviews.
- There will be at least 20 observations, which will involve attending the interventions (i.e. workshops) and observing aspects such as how they are run, what sort of content and modes of delivery are used, and how the information is received by the young people.
- There will be around 30 interviews with practitioners working in this field. These will be used to capture a more in-depth picture of the specific techniques, modes and content used in interventions. Interviewees will be selected from, for instance, the education sector, law enforcement, youth groups, charities and religious organisations.
- Originally, the plan was also to include some guided group conversations (similar to focus groups) with young people who attended interventions, but this aspect has been heavily disrupted by the Coronavirus pandemic.

A note on consent: Ethical approval for this research has been granted by the School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University. As part of this, there is a rigorous consent procedure in place for all participants, which will be administered and managed by myself as the researcher (including all liaison with schools etc. as required).

Timeline: Fieldwork began in March 2020 and was expected to take around 12-18 months, although this was disrupted by the pandemic. However, a large number of interviews and observations have since been carried out and the fieldwork will now be wrapped up around February-March 2022.

Funding: This project is funded under the Economic and Social Research Council. For further information, please visit: https://walesdtp.ac.uk/profile/davies-bethan/

Contact:
Mob:
Email: DaviesBA1@cardiff.ac.uk
Appendix 2: Interview schedule

Who are you? What is your current role? What is your background?

What does ‘radicalisation’ mean to you?
  • ‘Extremism’?

What does the idea of radicalisation/extremism prevention mean to you?
  • What does it entail? What does it address?

How would you describe your involvement with interventions / preventing extremism/radicalisation?

What ‘intervention’ (or session, workshop etc.) do you deliver?
  • What is the topic?
  • What is the aim / what is it designed to do? (e.g. prevention? Address ideologies? Specific ideological focus (far-right/far-left/Islamist)?)
  • Who are the target audience?

How is the intervention delivered?
  • Setting
  • Medium
  • Content
  • Techniques/approaches
  • How are interventions received?

In your opinion and experience, what makes an intervention effective?
  • Do some interventions work better than others in preventing radicalisation? Why?

Covid-19 – has this impacted your work in any way?

Do you work/have you worked with Prevent? (i.e. receive funding / take referrals from them?)

Lastly, is there anyone else you think I should speak to?
Appendix 3: Participant information sheet and consent form (interviews, adults)

**Early interventions to prevent the radicalisation of young people in Wales: PhD research**

You are being invited to take part in this research project. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being undertaken and what it will involve. Thank you for reading this.

1. **What is the purpose of this research project?**
The purpose of this research is to understand the early interventions being delivered to young people in Wales aged 11-18, which help to increase their resilience and critical thinking skills, helping to prevent radicalisation. The research will consider how interventions are delivered, what techniques, content and modes of delivery are used, and how young people respond to the interventions.

2. **Why have I been invited to take part?**
You have been invited because you are a relevant professional and/or are involved in the delivery of interventions (or have been in the past).

3. **What will taking part involve?**
You are being invited to participate in an interview to discuss your experience around the topic area, and your thoughts on how interventions fit with wider issues of radicalisation and extremism. The interview will take around an hour (or less, depending on time), and (with your permission) will be audio recorded to help with transcription and analysis at a later date.

4. **What are the possible benefits or risks of taking part?**
Your contribution to this research will be invaluable in supporting understandings around how early interventions to prevent radicalisation are used, why they are used, and the significance of their role in wider counter-extremism efforts. There are no serious risks associated with taking part in this research, as your participation will be kept confidential and your details anonymised.

5. **Do I have to take part?**
No, your participation in this research project is entirely voluntary and it is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part, once you are happy that you understand everything you need to know, I would ask you sign the consent form below. If you decide not to take part, you do not have to explain your reasons. You are also free to withdraw your consent to participate in the research project at any time, without giving a reason, even after signing the consent form.

6. **Will my taking part in this research project be kept confidential?**
Yes, all information collected from (or about) you during the research project will be kept confidential and any personal information you provide will be managed in accordance with data protection legislation (see below).

7. **What will happen to my data during and after the research?**
The main personal data collected during this research will be the information contained in
the written consent form, which will be stored securely within the University. This will be
retained for 5 years and may be accessed by the researcher and, where necessary, by
members of the University’s governance and audit teams or by regulatory authorities. All
other personal information collected by the researcher (e.g. your name, contact
information) will be protected by using numerical codes.

The findings from this research will be written up to inform the final PhD thesis, and may be
used in publications, e.g. for academic journals, in the future. This will not be linked back to
you personally however, as only pseudonyms will be used in any future writing.

8. What if there is a problem?
If you wish to complain or have grounds for concerns about any aspect of the manner in
which you have been approached or treated during the course of this research, please
contact the School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, 029 2087 5179.

9. Funding
This research is part of a PhD scholarship funded by the Economic and Social Research
Council.

10. Who has reviewed this research project?
This research project has been reviewed and approved by the School of Social Sciences’
Research Ethics Committee, at Cardiff University.

11. Further information and contact details
Should you have any questions relating to this research project, please contact me on the
following:

Bethan Davies, DaviesBA1@cardiff.ac.uk

Thank you for considering taking part in this research project. If you decide to participate,
you will be given a copy of this Participant Information Sheet and a consent form to keep
for your records.
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Early interventions to prevent the radicalisation of young people in Wales: PhD research

Contact: Bethan Davies, DaviesBA1@cardiff.ac.uk

YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY IS VOLUNTARY

Please circle (or delete as appropriate) in response to the following:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>YES / NO</th>
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<td>I am happy to participate in an interview.</td>
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<td>I am happy for the interview to be audio recorded.</td>
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Signature: ____________________________________________ Date: _________________

(Electronic signature is acceptable)
Appendix 4: Participant information sheet and consent form (observations and interviews, adults)

**Early interventions to prevent the radicalisation of young people in Wales: PhD research**

You are being invited to take part in this research project. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being undertaken and what it will involve. Thank you for reading this.

1. **What is the purpose of this research project?**
The purpose of this research is to understand the early interventions being delivered to young people in Wales aged 11-18, which help to prevent radicalisation. The research will consider how interventions are delivered, what techniques, content and modes of delivery are used, and how young people respond to the interventions.

2. **Why have I been invited to take part?**
You have been invited because you are a relevant professional and are delivering interventions (e.g. lessons or workshops).

3. **What will taking part involve?**
Taking part will involve being observed delivering your usual session (possibly via recording or virtually). This will help me to learn about the intervention itself, but also how the young people respond and interact with it.

You might also be invited to participate in an interview at a later date, to discuss the intervention you deliver and your thoughts on how it fits with wider issues of radicalisation and extremism. The interview would take around an hour, and (with your permission) would be audio recorded to help with transcription and analysis at a later date.

4. **What are the possible benefits or risks of taking part?**
Your contribution to this research will be invaluable in supporting understandings around how early interventions to prevent radicalisation are used, why they are used, and the significance of their role in wider counter-extremism efforts. There are no serious risks associated with taking part in this research, as your participation will be kept confidential and your details anonymised.

5. **Do I have to take part?**
No, your participation in this research project is entirely voluntary and it is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part, once you are happy that you understand everything you need to know, I would ask you sign the attached consent form. If you decide not to take part, you do not have to explain your reasons. You are also free to withdraw your consent to participate in the research project at any time, without giving a reason, even after signing the consent form.

6. **Will my taking part in this research project be kept confidential?**
Yes, all information collected from (or about) you during the research project will be kept confidential and any personal information you provide will be managed in accordance with data protection legislation (see below).

7. What will happen to my data during and after the research?
The main personal data collected during this research will be the information contained in the written consent form, which will be stored securely within the University. This will be retained for 5 years and may be accessed by the researcher and, where necessary, by members of the University’s governance and audit teams or by regulatory authorities. All other personal information collected by the researcher (e.g. your name, contact information) will be protected by using numerical codes.

The findings from this research will be written up to inform the final PhD thesis, and may be used in publications, e.g. for academic journals, in the future. This will not be linked back to you personally however, as only pseudonyms will be used in any future writing.

8. What if there is a problem?
If you wish to complain or have grounds for concerns about any aspect of the manner in which you have been approached or treated during the course of this research, please contact the School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, 029 2087 5179.

9. Funding
This research is part of a PhD scholarship funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.

10. Who has reviewed this research project?
This research project has been reviewed and approved by the School of Social Sciences’ Research Ethics Committee, at Cardiff University.

11. Further information and contact details
Should you have any questions relating to this research project, please contact me on the following:

Bethan Davies, DaviesBA1@cardiff.ac.uk

Thank you for considering taking part in this research project. If you decide to participate, you will be given a copy of this Participant Information Sheet and a consent form to keep for your records.
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Early interventions to prevent the radicalisation of young people in Wales: PhD research

Contact: Bethan Davies, DaviesBA1@cardiff.ac.uk

YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY IS VOLUNTARY

Please circle in response to the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>I consent to being observed during the workshop(s) / lesson(s).</strong></th>
<th>YES / NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I would be happy to participate in a future interview.</strong></td>
<td>YES / NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I would be happy for the interview to be audio recorded.</strong></td>
<td>YES / NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signature: ___________________________________ Date: _______________
Appendix 5: Participant information sheet and consent form (observations, college students)

**Early interventions to prevent the radicalisation of young people in Wales: PhD research**

I am a PhD student interested in workshops being delivered to young people in Wales, with the aim of increasing understanding around issues such as racism and equality. This is part of a wider PhD research project exploring the prevention of radicalisation.

1. **Taking part**
   This research involves observations of workshops being run by a charity, where you will be present.

2. **Does I have to take part?**
   No, you do not have to take part if you don’t want to. I will be present during the lesson / workshop that will be taking place, but I will not include you in any of my notes. You can also change your mind about taking part at any time without explaining your reason(s), and it will not affect you in any way.

3. **Are there any possible benefits or risks of taking part?**
   Your contribution to this research will be invaluable in understanding how early interventions link with the prevention of radicalisation. There are no realistic risks associated with taking part.

4. **What will happen to the data?**
   All information collected will be kept confidential. Confidentiality would only be breached if you disclosed a risk of harm to yourself or someone else. The only personal data collected during this research will be the information contained in the written consent form, which will be stored securely. This research will inform the final PhD thesis.

5. **What if there is a problem?**
   If you wish to complain or have grounds for concerns about any aspect of the manner in which you have been approached or treated during the course of this research, please contact the School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, 029 2087 5179.

6. **Funders and review**
   The research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and has been reviewed and approved by the School of Social Sciences’ Research Ethics Committee, Cardiff University. I also have a valid and up-to-date DBS check.

7. **Further information and contact details**
   Should you have any questions relating to this research project, you may contact me via the following:

   Bethan Davies, DaviesBA1@cardiff.ac.uk
CONSENT FORM

Early interventions to prevent the radicalisation of young people in Wales: PhD research

Contact: Bethan Davies, DaviesBA1@cardiff.ac.uk

YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY IS VOLUNTARY

Please tick if you agree:

I agree to be observed as part of the lesson / workshop.

First name: _______________________________________________

Signature:____________________________________ Date: ____________________
Appendix 6: Participant information sheet and opt-out consent form (observations, parents)

Early interventions to prevent the radicalisation of young people in Wales: PhD research

I am a PhD student interested in workshops being delivered to young people in Wales, with the aim of increasing understanding around issues such as racism and extremism. This is part of a wider PhD research project exploring the prevention of radicalisation.

1. Taking part
This research includes observations of lessons that cover the topic of extremism while they are being delivered in schools, where your child will be present. The research is interested in the lesson’s content/delivery and what the children think about it.

2. Does my child have to take part?
No, your child's participation in this research project is voluntary. If they/you do not wish to take part, you can indicate this on the opt-out form overleaf. You do not have to explain any reasons for not taking part and it will not affect them in any way. Your child is also free to withdraw their consent to participate at any time, without giving a reason.

3. Are there any possible benefits or risks of taking part?
Your child’s contribution to this research will be invaluable in understanding how early interventions link with the prevention of radicalisation and extremism.

4. What will happen to the data?
This research will inform the final PhD thesis, but all information collected will be kept confidential. Confidentiality would only be breached if your child disclosed a risk of harm to themselves or someone else. No personal data will be collected during this research unless the opt-out consent form is returned. (In this case, the information will be stored securely. This will be retained for five years and may be accessed by the researcher and, where necessary, by members of the University’s governance and audit teams or by regulatory authorities.)

5. What if there is a problem?
If you wish to complain or have grounds for concerns about any aspect of the manner in which you have been approached or treated during the course of this research, please contact the School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, 029 2087 5179.

6. Funders and review
The research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and has been reviewed and approved by the School of Social Sciences’ Research Ethics Committee, Cardiff University. The researcher has a valid and up-to-date DBS check.

7. Further information and contact details
Should you have any questions relating to this research project, you may contact me via the following:

Bethan Davies, DaviesBA1@cardiff.ac.uk
OPT-OUT CONSENT

Early interventions to prevent the radicalisation of young people in Wales: PhD research

Contact: Bethan Davies, DaviesBA1@cardiff.ac.uk

YOUR CHILD’S PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY IS VOLUNTARY

If you (or your child) do not wish for them to be included in the observation notes taken during the lesson, please indicate by ticking below. They will still receive the lesson as planned, but for all intents and purposes they will be ‘invisible’ when the researcher is taking notes.

I do not consent to my child being observed during their lesson.

Child’s name: _____________________________________________________

Parent / guardian’s signature: ___________________________ Date: _______________
Appendix 7: Participant information sheet and consent form (observations, young people)

INFORMATION FOR CHILDREN

Early interventions to prevent the radicalisation of young people in Wales: PhD research

I would like to ask you to take part in a research study. Before you decide, it is important for you to understand what the study is about and what will happen to you if you take part. Please read this leaflet carefully and ask me about anything that you do not understand.

What is the research for?
This research is part of my PhD, where I am aiming to understand how schools and youth workers are trying to improve understandings around issues like racism and equality. I'm working with children across Wales, studying some of their workshops and lessons. This is part of a bigger project about how we can prevent radicalisation.

Why have I been asked to take part?
You are aged between 11 and 18, and as part of your education, you will attend a relevant lesson or workshop.

What will happen if I take part?
My main focus is on the lesson/workshop, what you are being taught, and how you are being taught it, and so I will be in the room observing this.

What will happen to my data?
This will be a part of my final piece of work for the PhD. The only data that will be personal to you is if you and your guardian fill in the opt-out consent form, but this information will be kept confidential and stored safely.

Why is this research important?
Taking part in this research will help me to understand how your education links to preventing radicalisation, which is an important problem for the police and government at the moment.

Do I have to take part?
No, you do not have to take part if you don’t want to. I will be present during the lesson/workshop that will be taking place, but I will not include you in any of my notes. You can also change your mind about taking part at any time without saying why.

If you have any questions about this, you can contact me at any time:
Bethan Davies
DaviesBA1@cardiff.ac.uk

Thank you for reading this information leaflet.