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Neutrality and (anti-)Imperialism

Multinational propaganda competition in neutral Macau

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This chapter focuses on multinational propaganda competition in Macau, a small colonial territory in South China. This case attests to the importance of neutrality in understanding the Second World War as a truly global event, drawing attention to overlooked connections between Asia and Europe. The Portuguese-administered enclave was a commercial hub and refugee haven at the intersection of different imperial and nationalist interests. Chinese, Japanese and British representatives mobilized an intense propaganda campaign that aroused the complaints of the adversaries, while Portuguese authorities used neutrality to promote their colonial rule. This chapter considers practices of propaganda in neutral Macau during the Second World War in Asia (1937–45), with a particular focus on the use of rumours and printed media. Threats to the territory's neutral status were often a topic of propaganda activities, with different sides accusing their opponents of disrespecting neutrality, when the very existence of those activities – including on the part of Portuguese authorities – suggests that neutrality was far from strictly enforced. Overall, the chapter argues that imperialism and anti-imperialism are essential elements to understand practices of propaganda in neutral Macau and its limitations.

The propaganda apparatus of the Portuguese dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar and the twists and turns of its neutrality policy in Europe during the Second World War have merited considerable scholarly attention.¹ However, how people of different nationalities experienced Portuguese neutrality and how international propaganda operated in Portuguese colonial territories in Asia and Africa remain understudied.² Although there have been a few studies on wartime propaganda in East Asia, they did not delve into neutral colonial territories, apart from the International Settlement and the French Concession in Shanghai between the start of an all-out war between China and Japan in 1937 and the Japanese takeover of those territories starting in late 1941.³ Likewise, studies of neutrality in the Second World War tend to focus overwhelmingly on Europe. Attempts to consider practices of neutrality beyond it are relatively scarce and have mostly centred on Japanese diplomatic relations with

Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.⁴ Here, the focus will be on Portuguese-ruled Macau. The territory had been one of the smallest colonial outposts of the Portuguese Empire since the sixteenth century but sovereignty over it had been contested by successive Chinese authorities.

Macau's position in the Second World War

During the Second World War, Macau comprised a peninsula and two islands, with a total area of around 15 square kilometres; its economic and political relevance in Sino-foreign relations dwarfed by Hong Kong and several Chinese treaty ports since the nineteenth century (Figure 13.1). The occupation of the neighbouring British colony in December 1941 led to a temporary reversal of fortune. As the only foreign-ruled territory in China not occupied by Japan, Macau gained a fresh importance as the last neutral node connecting occupied and unoccupied areas in East Asia. It enabled the flow of people, information, currency and commodities not only between parts of China subject to different wartime jurisdictions but also permitting communications between Asia and Europe.

Despite being under Portuguese rule, different imperial and anti-imperialist interests framed Macau's experience of neutrality: it had strong connections to the British Empire, namely to Hong Kong, and to the Japanese Empire, expanding in South China and Southeast Asia at the time. It was also at the crossroads of competing Chinese forces: the Chinese Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek, leading the country's resistance against Japan; the Chinese Communist Party that had advocated a resistance policy even before Chiang; a number of Chinese guerrillas resisting Japan not firmly



Figure 13.1 Macau and Hong Kong. Royal Navy Intelligence Map, 1945. Courtesy Alamy.

affiliated with any of those parties and a myriad of collaborationist authorities. The most important of the latter was the Reorganized National Government (RNG) led by Wang Jingwei, a prominent Nationalist figure who defected from Chiang's wartime capital in 1938 to settle for peace with Japan.

As Jo Fox noted, in the Second World War, 'state propaganda circulated in a complex and unpredictable environment, alongside rumours, gossip, informal news networks and enemy propaganda, all of which affected the reception of particular appeals.'⁵ The examples from Macau addressed in this chapter concern propaganda of specific states but they were often ad hoc efforts, not necessarily centrally directed by major government institutions, and several of them can indeed be seen as relying on 'rumours, gossip and informal news networks'.

Like many other port cities in Asia, Macau had been a haven for diverse communities prior to the Second World War but the number of people arriving during the conflict was unprecedented. Macau's population almost trebled, rising to around half a million people. The multinational refugee influx intersected with propaganda activities: they were both participants and targets of Chinese, Japanese, British and Portuguese propaganda. Accusing adversaries of spreading propaganda in Macau was a common move by both Chinese and Japanese representatives who questioned the practice of neutrality in and around the territory to force the Portuguese colonial authorities into a collaborative position on their side, with varying degrees of success. The Portuguese authorities were not, however, the sole or even the primary target of propaganda activities by China and Japan in regard to Macau. Propaganda was mostly deployed by the belligerents to gather the support of Macau's wartime residents, the great majority of whom were Chinese.

During the Second World War, the Chinese Nationalists and Communists were, at least in theory, working together in the so-called Second United Front against Japan. In Macau both parties tapped into a popular sentiment against Japanese aggression that prevailed among the majority of the population – unsurprisingly, given that many were fleeing the violence of the Japanese invasion. Since the early stages of the war, Macau was a site of Chinese resistance activities, including fund-raising campaigns that involved associations of people from all walks of life, including women; different religious groups and commercial, artistic and educational circles.⁶ Activities in Macau were part of regional and transnational efforts to support Chinese resistance. That global reach was sustained by migratory circuits, not only of communities long established overseas but also of people recently displaced by the war.

In tandem with practices in mainland China, visual and performative arts were used as propaganda in Macau to rally support for Chinese resistance. These included motion pictures such as *Kangzhan teji* [War of Resistance Special, 1938]; art exhibitions, namely those of the refugee painter Gao Jianfu; and theatre performances like the famous resistance play *Fangxia nide bianzi* [Put Down Your Whip], among others.⁷ The two most important Chinese daily newspapers in wartime Macau, the *Dazhongbao* (*Tai Chong Po/Diário para Todos*) [translating as 'Popular Newspaper'] and the *Huaqiao ribao* (*Wah Kiou Po/Jornal Va Kio*) ['Overseas Chinese Daily'], which remain in print to this day, began publication in 1933 (two years after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria) and November 1937, respectively, and had a pro-resistance stance.⁸

Public expressions of Chinese support for resistance were not, however, totally unrestricted. Japanese pressure to curb what they saw as Chinese propaganda that violated official neutrality was constant. Japanese representatives frequently admonished the Portuguese authorities for allowing such activities and demanded that they put an end to them. Chinese newspapers initially defied censorship by printing blank squares or an 'X' where characters of sensitive passages would have stood, making it clear to readers that their message was being silenced.⁹ As the Japanese invasion of China progressed with speed and brutality, it became increasingly difficult for Chinese pro-resistance activities to take place in the open, though they continued underground or within relatively safe spaces such as schools – dozens of which had relocated from mainland China to Macau during the war. There, visual propaganda was combined with sonic one, such as by singing songs supporting the resistance.¹⁰

Foreign propaganda, invasion rumours and newspapers

Japanese agents attempted to woo the Portuguese authorities to their side with promises of favouring them against the British in Hong Kong and of turning the territory into a major commercial hub for Japanese and Portuguese products. They sought to attract local colonial officials' compliance by teasing them with suggestions that projects that had been considered before the war, such as a railway linking Macau and Guangzhou (Canton), might now go ahead.¹¹ Japanese pressure over Portuguese authorities in Macau grew as the war years moved on, anchored in supply blockades, demands for permitting the operation of Japanese agents in Macau and ceding vessels and other materials. Artur Tamagnini de Barbosa, governor of Macau during the first years of the war, was relatively more open to Japanese pressures, sending the police to search Chinese offices, schools and companies which Japanese agents believed were being used by the Chinese resistance, as well to censor the Chinese press to remove articles critical of Japan.¹² Barbosa's successor was Gabriel Maurício Teixeira, who had a more complex interaction with Japan. Although he also bowed to Japanese demands to avoid a formal occupation, he ended up subtly allowing some Allied resistance activities in the territory.¹³

Japanese agents also used tactics that Allied powers deployed with authorities in Lisbon,¹⁴ including flattering officials with invitations for special events and awarding decorations. A particularly high-profile case pertained Captain Carlos Gorgulho, the Macau police commander, who was invited to go to Japan in February 1939. Accompanied by a Japanese intelligence agent, Gorgulho visited ministries and received a decoration, an Order of the Rising Sun – 5th Class.¹⁵ The Macau authorities had their own objectives for the trip, but this chapter will concentrate on its propaganda value for Japan.

Gorgulho's fifteen-day trip, which enjoyed extensive press coverage in different languages, was accompanied by false news, originating in the Japanese press, that Portugal would make a series of concessions to and sign agreements with Japan. These concessions included recognizing Manchukuo, the Japanese-controlled colony-like 'state' that had been established on the site of three occupied Chinese Northeastern

provinces in 1932.¹⁶ Gorgulho had no authority to agree to such things, and virtually none of them materialized, but the controversial trip harnessed international attention, drawing concern among Chinese, British and French observers about the potential dangers of a pro-Japanese Portuguese neutrality. The Portuguese government denied the existence of such negotiations, and, interestingly, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also distanced itself from these reports, suggesting that Gorgulho's trip had been the sole responsibility of military circles,¹⁷ which hints at the existence of competing civilian and military forces within Japan.

Portuguese neutrality was far from a stable guarantee. Japanese forces had few qualms in occupying the then Portuguese colony of Timor (now East Timor), following an Allied landing in the territory that had itself not had the prior authorization by the Portuguese authorities, during the assault on European colonial territories in Southeast Asia. The Timor case was perceived by contemporary observers as a warning to what could happen to Macau if resistance to Japan became too daring, an outcome that neither the Allied powers nor the Portuguese wanted.¹⁸

Thus, the threat of a Japanese occupation of Macau was ever present during the war years and invasion rumours from unclear sources emerged several times.¹⁹ To those living in the enclave or following events there from afar, a formal invasion by Japan seemed a very likely possibility, particularly after the occupation, from late 1941, of other colonial territories in Asia that had had stronger defence capabilities, such as Hong Kong and Singapore. In Portugal, foreign reports of these rumours were monitored and censored.²⁰

Invasion rumours exploiting Portuguese colonial anxieties illustrate how anti-imperialism was an important dimension of wartime propaganda. For pro-resistance Chinese, noting how easily Portuguese neutrality could be overrun exposed the fragility of colonial rule. In the 1940s, news reports from unoccupied China occasionally mentioned the risk of an imminent invasion of Macau and at one time even announced Teixeira's death – that had not actually happened.²¹ Some of these Chinese reports had a global circulation, from Michigan to Vichy France.²²

After the fall of Hong Kong in December 1941, the British Consulate in Macau also became active in propaganda, prompting more complaints by Japanese and their Chinese collaborators against Allied – namely Chinese and British – activities in the enclave. The British Consul, John Reeves, oversaw a numerous and multinational community of refugees, and he was engaged in intelligence gathering, as well as pro-Allied propaganda. This included the founding of the *Macau Tribune*, an English-language newspaper that, in Reeves' words, 'was an attempt to get the Allied point of view more prominently placed before the public.'²³ Although support for Allied resistance was significant in Macau, there were limits to its expression. During the fall of Hong Kong, the Governor suspended three Chinese newspapers for publishing anti-Japanese news and fired the Chinese censor who had let them pass.²⁴ When Macau was bombed by Allied planes in 1945 – allegedly by mistake – the supportive tone of newspaper reports was so obvious that the local Portuguese authorities, acting without Lisbon's prior approval, forced the *Macau Tribune* to shut down, although a replacement with the same editorial team was later created.²⁵ Censorship of pro-Allied reports – both in Chinese and English – demonstrates a degree of collaboration with Japan.

There are a few interesting mentions of Asia in joint Axis propaganda aimed at readers of Portuguese outside of Macau, such as an article about China and Hong Kong published in the Portuguese-language version of the German illustrated magazine *Signal*.²⁶ This piece praised the assistance that Japan had given to supposedly bring order to China, critiquing the negative influence of Western imperialism in both mainland China and Hong Kong and representing the Japanese occupation as a force for good. But given that colonial rule was precisely what Portuguese authorities desired to see maintained in Macau, it is unlikely that this was regarded very favourably by Portuguese metropolitan policymakers for whom Japan's pan-Asian propaganda was not welcome. The maintenance of Macau under Portuguese rule had the potential to become an embarrassment for Japanese pan-Asian propaganda, making a mockery of Japan's claims to be helping fellow Asians free themselves from European and American rule. Therefore, Japanese propaganda that mentioned Portugal emphasized not its status as a European imperial power but Japan's supposed respect for Macau's neutrality, chastising Chinese and British elements for imperilling that status quo.²⁷ A more immediate objective was to sway the Chinese population in favour of Wang Jingwei's RNG.

Unlike Lisbon, Macau was not of major concern to Germany or Italy, and the only Axis power with a consulate in Macau was Japan. Axis propaganda in Macau essentially meant Japanese propaganda or activities by the Chinese collaborationist authorities of the RNG. A wartime propaganda endeavour that served both was another fresh newspaper, the *Xi'nan ribao* (*See Nan Jeh Pao*) ['Southwest Daily'], a pro-Japanese Chinese-language newspaper published in Macau from 1942 until the end of the war. Copies of pro-Wang Jingwei or pro-Japanese propaganda newspapers from Hong Kong, such as the Chinese-language *Nanhua ribao* (*South China Daily News*), the Japanese-language *Honkon Nippō* ['Hong Kong Daily'] or the English-language *Hongkong News*, would have also reached Macau, although their effectiveness was likely as weak there as it was in Hong Kong.²⁸

The *Hongkong News* was, in fact, a vehicle for Japanese propaganda targeting Macau. In February 1941, the newspaper sponsored an event at the Japanese Consulate to 'promot[e] more friendly relations between Japan and Macao, or Portugal'.²⁹ The gathering started with an address by the manager of the *Honkon Nippō* and among its participants was the influential head of the Macau Economic Services, Pedro José Lobo. After the occupation of the British colony, the *Hongkong News* set up a Macau branch at 101–103 Praia Grande and featured a regular section entitled 'News from Macao' that covered social events and living conditions in the neutral enclave.³⁰ Especially from 1943 onwards, its Macau reports often cited the *Xi'nan ribao*. One of them shows how this newspaper linked its pro-Japanese and pro-RNG propagandistic aims with relief activities, themselves an arena for competition between opposing sides. One telling example of the desperate lengths to which the *Xi'nan ribao* went to increase its circulation was in early August 1943 when it gave two thousand copies to children who, for three days, were able to sell them for charity. The hope was that in the future, 'the public would buy their daily paper from these children' so they could make a living this way.³¹ In an environment of increasing material scarcity, the fact that this propaganda newspaper had thousands of copies to spare suggests it was hardly

a sought-after publication. At the same time, portraying child labour as a 'positive' charitable activity exposes the level of poverty experienced in Macau in the early 1940s and how those wretched conditions could themselves be exploited for certain propaganda activities. Like in Hong Kong, there were also modest efforts to expand Japanese-language learning in Macau during the early 1940s, including rewarding attendance of a local Japanese school with food.³²

As the wartime newspapers such as the *Macau Tribune* or the *Xi'nan ribao* attest, the press was a key medium for propaganda in Macau. However, like many other aspects in the territory, it was marked by a strange combination of colonial control and unregulated freedom. On the one hand, newspapers were subject to censorship, which was quite heavy-handed against anti-Japanese reports; on the other hand, coverage could be quite eclectic as newspapers seemingly drew a lot of their content not directly from press agencies – nor even from Lisbon – but from listening to news on private radios.³³ For example, readers of *A Voz de Macau* ['The Voice of Macau'], the main Portuguese-language daily in Macau, could consume unlicensed news from both sides. In the final year of the conflict, news on the Allied victories against Japan appeared next to Japanese reports saying the opposite.

The importance of the press for propaganda activities in Macau was likely due to three factors. One was the relatively high rate of basic literacy when compared to other Portuguese-ruled territories.³⁴ Another was the centrality of the press for Chinese international propaganda efforts, and the culture of using the press naturally spilled over into Macau. In fact, the architect of Chiang Kai-shek's English-language propaganda system was a journalist, Hollington Tong (Dong Xianguang).³⁵ A third factor was the technical know-how behind printed media, with Macanese typographical expertise having long been prominent in Macau and other colonial port cities in Asia.³⁶

The press played an important role in Chinese propaganda around one of the most daring challenges to Macau's neutrality, the *Sai-On* incident. In August 1943, the *Sai-On*, a British steamer full of refugees (including many Allied civilians) that had been moored in the enclave since the fall of Hong Kong, was hijacked by a group of collaborators working with support from Japanese naval forces. Despite the interesting coincidence that this attack happened in the same month that the Portuguese government agreed to cede basing rights in the Azores to the British – considered a decisive turning point towards a more pro-Allied neutrality – the attack on the *Sai-On* had the hallmarks of other ad hoc maverick actions launched in and around Macau during the war years by members of the Japanese military and their Chinese collaborators.

Chinese Nationalist authorities were quick to capitalize on the propaganda value of the incident, which exposed Japanese disregard for a neutral territory as well as Portuguese impotence to challenge such abuse. Chinese reports on the dramatic event inflated the number of people aboard the ship and reported casualties among Portuguese police that had not actually occurred.³⁷ The Chinese Central News Agency report was reproduced in other parts of the world, in news items that repeated its exaggerated data (Figure 13.2).³⁸ This did not strike outside observers as amiss: after all, very un-neutral things had been happening in Macau since the start of the war. Pro-Japanese media also used news channels to get its narrative on the *Sai-On* case and



Figure 13.2 The *Dundee Courier* report on the *Sai-On* case, reproducing the exaggerated information from the Chinese Central News Agency in Chongqing, 30 August 1943. Used with kind permission by DC Thomson & Co. Ltd.

events in Timor across, defending Japan's role in 'rescuing' the victims from the 'pirates' and 'bandits' and taking the opportunity to denounce Allied reports as propaganda and to portray the Azores agreement as a violation of Portuguese neutrality by the United Kingdom and the United States.³⁹

Portuguese colonial propaganda

The major belligerents operating in South China questioned Portuguese neutrality by insisting that enemy propaganda activities were taking place in Macau, which, of course, was largely true. Certainly, propaganda was not a monopoly of the belligerents. The Portuguese authorities repeated their mantra of 'strict neutrality' – when the realities on the ground were far from it – which can be seen as a form of propaganda used to dispel accusations of collaboration with Japan. The ultimate goal of this was the continuation of Portuguese colonial rule over Macau. This was a hard balancing act when China was one of the major Allies, especially after the Nationalists had won a major victory in the 1943 treaties with Britain and the United States that negotiated the end of extraterritoriality and the abolition of foreign concessions, including the Shanghai International Settlement.⁴⁰

The Portuguese-language press in Macau, as in Portugal, was subject to a tight censorship regime. It rarely published any meaningful news about Portugal's relations

with Japan or with China, nor indeed anything substantial about Macau's situation beyond pieces on festive events, refugee relief or local government edicts. The limited amount of information allowed to be released to the general public had clear propagandistic undertones. *A Voz de Macau* included its fair share of colonial propaganda, particularly evident on occasions such as national holidays or on anniversaries of the rule of Salazar or of the Governor of Macau, culminating in an overblown piece on Macau's collective 'debt' to the latter published in the immediate aftermath of the war.⁴¹

Salazar's Estado Novo (New State) regime capitalized on neutrality to affirm its imperial project, as the monumental propaganda event that was the Portuguese World Exhibition in 1940 so patently illustrates.⁴² In Macau, colonial propaganda could also take on a significant scale, namely the erection of two large bronze statues to two controversial nineteenth-century figures associated with the consolidation of Portuguese rule, Governor João Maria Ferreira do Amaral and Colonel Vicente Nicolau de Mesquita, who were regarded by local Chinese as imperialist aggressors (see Figure 13.3). One scholar interpreted the placing of these statues in central locations as a way 'to secure the territory's neutrality through the means of re-affirming a Portuguese identity'.⁴³ However, the line between affirming neutrality and affirming colonial rule was a blurred one. During the war, with Chinese anti-imperialist energies concentrated on resisting Japan, such public displays of Portuguese colonial might could unfold virtually unchallenged, even if they were not welcomed.⁴⁴

In Portuguese propaganda in and about Macau, neutrality and colonialism were entangled as if one justified the other. The fact that Macau became a haven for



Figure 13.3 The Ferreira do Amaral statue in Macau, undated. Courtesy Alamy.

hundreds of thousands of refugees was used by the local authorities to promote their supposedly benevolent colonial rule, even if the refugees' experience in Macau was far more complex. For example, among many refugees that came to Macau during the war were Chinese school teachers and students, many of whom were supporters of Chinese resistance efforts. Despite not interfering much with their activities, the Macau authorities sought to force Chinese schools (mostly private) to adopt a series of school workbooks whose bilingual covers celebrated Macau heritage sites and images of 'Sino-Portuguese friendship'.⁴⁵ These were vague enough to be palatable to both Chinese resistance and to the collaborationist authorities controlling areas around Macau; for instance, using the figure of Sun Yat-sen, who was venerated as 'founding father' of the Chinese Republic in areas under Chiang and those under Wang, and who had briefly lived in Macau. Still, those workbooks were not welcomed by all, and schools remained important sites for nurturing support for the Chinese resistance, something that could also be subtly expressed in exercise books – as evidenced by surviving examples.⁴⁶ Material expressions publicizing Sino-Portuguese harmony such as the planned school workbooks should not obscure the fact that Portugal and China had very different aims for the war and for the future of Macau. In the post-war period, the abuses of Portuguese neutrality in Macau would be used by Chinese critics to call for the return of the territory to Chinese sovereignty.

Conclusion

During the war years, and especially so after the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, Macau's status as a neutral colonial territory offered opportunities for different propaganda activities. In these, imperialist and anti-imperialist motivations intersected in complex ways. For the Chinese Nationalists and Communists fighting against Japan, their struggle was one against imperial aggression and for national liberation, but their target was then Japan, not European powers. The rhetoric of Asian liberation was also central to Japanese propaganda during the war, but in Macau, pan-Asian ideals clashed with the reality that Japanese forces were comfortable with Portuguese neutrality, providing that it did not interfere with their activities. Hence, Axis propaganda in Macau focused not on Portuguese colonialism, but mostly on trying to curb Allied resistance among the local population and harness support for the RNG.

As this chapter has shown, frequent invasion rumours reflect the uncertainty of Macau's neutral status, complaints against and exposés of un-neutral actions illustrate how that status was frequently challenged by opposing belligerents, but also how it was creatively used by different actors for their own aims. The active engagement with the press – be it through newly founded newspapers, reports in pre-existing publications or the use of censorship – demonstrates how a global propaganda war in Asia could be fought in the multilingual media pages of a small colonial territory and even spillover to the propaganda media distributed further afield. The maintenance of neutrality in Macau mattered to several different constituencies, from governments of opposing powers to family members of refugees living in different parts of the world.

The case of Macau, a small enclave that drew the attention of different belligerents, attests to the importance of imperialism and anti-imperialism when considering propaganda practices in neutral territories in Asia. It also demonstrates how assessing the opportunities and challenges of neutrality beyond Europe is essential to understanding the Second World War from a global perspective, as well as the enduring appeal of policies of neutrality by some colonial powers in the post-war period of emerging Cold War and decolonization.

Notes

- Research for this chapter was funded by a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship.
- 1 António José Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra: 1941–1945* (Lisbon: Vega, 1991); Fernando Rosas, 'Portuguese Neutrality in the Second World War', in *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*, ed. Neville Wylie (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001), 268–83; Irene Flunser Pimentel, *Espíões em Portugal durante a II Guerra Mundial* (Lisbon: Esfera dos Livros, 2013); Cláudia Ninhos, *Portugal e os Nazis: Histórias e Segredos de uma Aliança* (Lisbon: Esfera dos Livros, 2017). On propaganda, see, for example: António José Telo, *Propaganda e Guerra Secreta Em Portugal, 1939–1945* (Lisbon: Perspectivas e Realidades, 1990); Luís Reis Torgal (ed.), *O Cinema sob o Olhar de Salazar* (Lisbon: Temas & Debates, 2001); José Luís Garcia, Tânia Alves and Yves Léonard (ed.), *Salazar, o Estado Novo e os Media* (Lisbon: Edições 70, 2017); Edward Corse, *A Battle for Neutral Europe: British Cultural Propaganda during the Second World War* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), which covers Portugal as well as Spain, Sweden and Turkey.
 - 2 It would be interesting to assess the extent to which the overlap of Allied, Axis and Portuguese colonial propaganda dynamics in the case of Macau bears any similarities to what happened in Goa or Mozambique, places that were also significantly shaped by British interests.
 - 3 Barak Kushner, *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda* (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 2006); Shuge Wei, *News under Fire: China's Propaganda against Japan in the English-Language Press, 1928–1941* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017); on Shanghai, see, for example: Wen-hsin Yeh (ed.), *Wartime Shanghai* (London: Routledge, 1998). See also Chapter 8 of this volume, which considers propaganda relating to the French Empire by the Vichy regime.
 - 4 Florentino Rodao, *Franco y el imperio japonés: Imágenes y propaganda en tiempos de guerra* (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 2002); Pascal Lottaz, 'Neutral States and Wartime Japan: The Diplomacy of Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland toward the Empire', Doctoral thesis (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, 2018); Pascal Lottaz and Ingemar Ottosson, *Sweden, Japan, and the Long Second World War, 1931–1945* (London: Routledge, 2021).
 - 5 Jo Fox, 'The Propaganda War', in *The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Volume II: Politics and Ideology*, ed. Richard J. B. Bosworth and Joseph A. Maiolo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 92.
 - 6 Fei Chengkang, *Aomen sibai nian* (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1988), 417–20; Iok Lan Fu Barreto (ed.), *Macau during the Sino-Japanese War* (Macau: Cultural Institute and Museum of Macao, 2002), 98–137.

- 7 Lin Faqin and Wang Xi (eds), *Gudao yingxiang: Aomen yu kangRi zhanzheng tuzhi* (Guangzhou: Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2015), 99; Barreto, *Macau*, 92–7; Ralph Croizier, *Art and Revolution in Modern China: The Lingnan (Cantonese) School of Painting, 1906–1951* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 153; Helena F. S. Lopes, ‘Wartime Education at the Crossroads of Empires: The Relocation of Schools to Macao during the Second World War, 1937–1945’, *Twentieth-Century China* 46, no. 2 (2021): 135.
- 8 Hong Kong University Library (HKUL), PR82/068 Personal Papers of Sir Lindsay Tasman Ride MF230701 (Roll 18), Kweilin Intelligence Summary no. 69, 6 October 1944, Section III (Miscellaneous), sheet 19, Macao Press (hereafter referred to as ‘Kweilin Intelligence Summary’); Barreto, *Macau*, 86–7.
- 9 Barreto, *Macau*, 84–5; Henrique Rola da Silva, *A Imprensa Chinesa de Macau* (Macao: Gabinete de Comunicação Social do Governo de Macau, 1991), 69. Similar practices occurred in British-ruled Hong Kong. On this, see Michael Ng, *Political Censorship in British Hong Kong: Freedom of Expression and the Law (1842–1997)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), chapter 2.
- 10 Barreto, *Macau*, 75.
- 11 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, Portugal (hereafter ANTT), Arquivo Oliveira Salazar (hereafter AOS), UL-10A1, cx. 767, Artur Tamagnini de Barbosa to Francisco José Vieira Machado, 16 December 1938.
- 12 ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, Barbosa to Machado, 13 September 1939; Lopes, ‘Wartime Education’, 146.
- 13 ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, Gabriel Maurício Teixeira, governor of Macau, to Machado, 10 December 1941; Helena F. S. Lopes, *Neutrality and Collaboration in South China: Macau during the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), chapter 5.
- 14 Alexandre Moreli, ‘The War of Seduction: The Anglo-American Struggle to Engage with the Portuguese Ruling Elite (1943–1948)’, *The International History Review* 40, no. 3 (2018): 654–82.
- 15 Archives of Macau, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/17164, Condecoração concedida por Sua Majestade o Imperador do Japão, ao capitão Carlos de Sousa Gorgulho, 1939.
- 16 ‘Makao seichō waga ho ni kyōryoku–Nippo teikei no ryōkai naru–Konshū made ni jitsugen sen’, *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 March 1939 and ‘Co-Operation of Japan and Portugal Seen’, *The Shanghai Times*, 2 March 1939, clippings in Arquivo Histórico Diplomático (hereafter AHD), 2P, A48, M217; ‘Japan and Macao–Understanding Reached in Tokyo’, *The South China Morning Post*, 2 March 1939, 13; ‘Un journal japonais annonce la conclusion d’un accord nippon-portugais’, *Le Journal de Shanghai*, 2 March 1939, 6.
- 17 AHD, 2P, A48, M217, Antero Carreiro de Freitas, Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo, to Salazar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 3 and 4 March 1939; Salazar to Portuguese legation in Shanghai, 6 March 1939; Salazar to Portuguese legation in London, 13 March 1939.
- 18 The UK National Archives (hereafter TNA), Foreign Office files (hereafter FO) 371/46199, ‘Portuguese Possessions in Asia and Oceania’, 5 June 1944, 12; ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768. Teixeira to Machado, 7 June 1944; Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra*, vol. 1, 61 and vol. 2, 209.
- 19 ‘Macao Rumours’, *The South China Morning Post*, 3 April 1940, 12; ‘O desmentido oficial dos rumores de ocupação de Macau’, *A Voz de Macau*, 26 December 1941, 5; ‘Macao Governor’s Views’, *The South China Morning Post*, 21 October 1945, 3.

- 20 See files in ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.
- 21 ANTT AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, Teixeira to Machado, 14 October 1943.
- 22 'Débarquement japonais près de Macao', *Le Petit Journal*, 24 March 1942, 3; TNA, WO 208/730, 'Portuguese Take a Back Seat in Macao', 21 April 1942; 'Portuguese Disarmed', *San Francisco Chronicle*, 6 July 1943, 14; 'Jap Threat to Portuguese', *Derby Evening Telegraph*, 8 September 1943, 8; 'Flashes of Late News', *The Ypsilanti Daily Press*, 8 September 1943, 1; 'Japan and Macao-Reported Threat to Portugal', *The Times*, 9 September 1943, 3; 'New Jap Threat', *San Francisco Chronicle*, 9 September 1943, 5; clippings from Brazilian press reports sent with dispatch from the Portuguese ambassador in Rio de Janeiro to Salazar, 20 September 1943, available in AHD, 2P, A48, M221.
- 23 John Pownall Reeves, *The Lone Flag: Memoir of the British Consul in Macao during World War II* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014), 38.
- 24 ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, Teixeira to Machado, 26 December 1941.
- 25 TNA, FO 371/46199, Ronald Campbell, Ambassador in Lisbon, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, 14 March 1945, and Campbell to Winston Churchill, 30 June 1945.
- 26 'Filhos do Céu: A China Espera Gosar de Ordem', *Sinal* 3, no. 5 (March 1942): 27–30. For a more general review of *Signal*, see Chapter 14 of this volume by João Arthur Ciciliato Franzolin.
- 27 'Aomen dangju sang xinbinkuang bi rang kangRi fenzi Rifang yanzhong kangyi fenkai yichang', *Guangdong xunbao*, 13 September 1939, available in AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129; ANTT, AOS, NE-7B, Pt. 40, Note on conversation with the Japanese minister, 23 March 1945.
- 28 On the *Nanhua ribao*, see Lawrence M. W. Chiu, 'The "South China Daily News" and Wang Jingwei's Peace Movement, 1939–41', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch* 50 (2010): 343–70; on the *Honkon Nippō*, see Wilson Wai Shing Lee, 'Honkon Nippō and Hong Kong-Japan Relations: Re-examining the Geopolitical Position of Colonial Hong Kong in East Asia before the End of World War II', in *Asian Cities: Colonial to Global*, ed. Gregory Bracken (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 125–42. According to Philip Snow, the *Hongkong News* 'became the [occupation] regime's leading vehicle for appealing to the English-speaking Asians, from the Anglicized Chinese and Eurasian gentry to the ordinary Eurasians and Indians' in Hong Kong. See Philip Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 97.
- 29 AHD, 2P, A48, M221, 'Talks on Japan and Macao sponsored by H.K. News', *The Hongkong News*, 26 January 1941, 1, 6, clipping sent with despatch from Francisco Paulo de Vasconcellos Soares, Chargé of the Portuguese Consulate in Hong Kong to Salazar, 1 February 1941.
- 30 See, for example, *The Hongkong News*, 19 February 1943, 2.
- 31 'News from Macao', *The Hongkong News*, 3 August 1943, 3.
- 32 Lopes, 'Wartime Education', 147–8.
- 33 HKUL, Kweilin Intelligence Summary.
- 34 In 1929, then governor of Macau Artur Tamagnini de Barbosa stated that 'Macao is perhaps the only Portuguese land where one can say there are no illiterates'. See Barbosa, 'O Governo de Macau', *Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias* 5, no. 53 (1929): 17. This achievement was certainly not due to Portuguese rule, whose state-funded schools mainly catered for the Portuguese and Macanese residents, not the majority Chinese population.

- 35 Shuge Wei, 'News as a Weapon: Hollington Tong and the Formation of the Guomindang Centralized Foreign Propaganda System, 1937–1938', *Twentieth-Century China* 39, no. 2 (2014): 118–43.
- 36 Hoi-to Wong, 'Interport Printing Enterprise: Macanese Printing Networks in Chinese Treaty Ports', in *Treaty Ports in Modern China: Law, Land and Power*, ed. Robert Bickers and Isabella Jackson (London: Routledge, 2016), 139–57.
- 37 Guoshiguan (Academia Historica, Taiwan), Waijiaobu, 020000023906A, Putaoya za juan, Central News Agency, 'Japanese Forcibly Seize British Ship in Macao', 29 August 1943. Portuguese policemen had actually stood by while the ship was taken away.
- 38 'Japs Shoot Portuguese: British Steamer Seized at Macao', *Dundee Courier*, 30 August 1943, 2; 'Japs Take Small Ship From Portuguese Force', *Wilmington Morning Star*, 30 August 1943, 8.
- 39 'Murder of Portuguese in Timor', *The Hongkong News*, 3 December 1943, 3; 'Portuguese Denial', *The Hongkong News*, 5 December 1943, 2.
- 40 On the diplomatic successes of Nationalist China as a member of the Allies, see Hans van de Ven, *China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China, 1937–1952* (London: Profile Books, 2017), 172–8.
- 41 'Uma dívida a pagar', *Renascimento*, 21 August 1945, 1, 4.
- 42 David Corkill and José Carlos Pina Almeida, 'Commemoration and Propaganda in Salazar's Portugal: The Mundo Português Exposition of 1940', *Journal of Contemporary History* 44, no. 3 (2009): 381–99.
- 43 Paula Morais, 'Macao's Urban Transformation 1927–1949: The Significance of Sino-Portuguese Foreign Relations in the Urban Form', in *Constructing the Colonized Land: Entwined Perspectives of East Asia Around WWII*, ed. Izumi Kuroishi (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), 155.
- 44 João de Pina-Cabral, *Between China and Europe: Person, Culture and Emotion in Macao* (London: Continuum, 2002), 68–70. Chinese opposition to these statues is well illustrated by what happened to them in later decades: one was forcibly removed by a crowd of demonstrators in December 1966 during events connected, in part, to the Chinese Cultural Revolution; the other was dismantled and shipped back to Portugal in the 1990s, before Macau's handover, at the request of the director of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.
- 45 Maria José Peixoto Braga, *Macau Durante a II Guerra Mundial: Sociedade, Educação Física e Desporto* (Macau: Centro de Publicações Universidade de Macau, 2003), 258–62.
- 46 See school notebooks with resistance iconography on their covers in Lin and Wang, *Gudao yingxiang*, 97.