War and peace: hired troops and military aid in Byzantine and English treaties, c.900–1200

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ABSTRACT

The rulers of Byzantium and England are well known for their centralized nature and their active approach to diplomacy. Both powers often utilized treaties to bolster their military forces, and to undermine those of their foes. Of course, allegiance was not always clear-cut, with many powers having complex relations with their neighbours and the treaties catering to the conflicting obligations of those involved. This article focuses on the treaties of two of the most bureaucratic powers of the medieval world who have comparable treaty corpuses, utilizing the theme of military service to show that treaties were primarily pragmatic documents.

Military service is perhaps one of the most traditional sub-fields of medieval studies. Perusal of any library with a dedicated medieval section will provide ample works to explore. Despite this, there is a relative dearth of scholarship focusing on military service procured through treaties, perhaps partly due to the assumption that treaties were ultimately symbolic documents and thus not reflective of the pragmatic concerns of rulers. It is worth noting that the rulers of this period are often portrayed as having a duty to administer justice, a duty that combined a ruler’s legislative ability with their pragmatic and symbolic roles as dispensers of justice and keepers of peace. For both Patrick Wormald and Anthony Kaldellis, legislating domestic laws was a key part of the administration of justice for a ruler’s subjects, and was intertwined with the ideology of emperorship and kingship of the period. Just as a ruler had a duty to legislate domestically – to fulfil their ideological duty to their subjects as law makers – some scholars have seen this as an integral part of a ruler’s role as a peacemaker, both making peace domestically and making peace with other peoples through treaties. This has led many scholars to emphasize treaties’ role as symbolic documents. For instance, Gerd Althoff has argued that treaties detail obligations that could not be expressed in a symbolic manner, but ultimately are still a vital part of accounting for the wider symbolism and rituals of making peace in this period, often offsetting aspects of a particular ritual through treaty clauses, the former being a

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3 Ostrogorsky, ‘Hierarchical world order’.

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public display and the latter private. Therefore, when studying a treaty between Frederick Barbarossa and the Zähringen duke Berthold from 1152 in which the duke gave the German emperor some 1,000 troops in return for various lands, Althoff argued that such a treaty was highly unusual and perhaps not practical, as evidenced when this treaty was never fulfilled. While treaties certainly had symbolic and ideological importance, this has at times overshadowed the fact that they were fundamentally pragmatic documents, often implemented between the two parties involved. As the movement of military service is often one of the most ‘visible’ issues addressed in treaties, studying military service through the lens of treaties highlights that these were indeed pragmatic documents – while also filling a historiographical void by utilizing treaties to study military service. Several works have been produced regarding the hiring of foreign troops via alliance networks, with extensive scholarship having analysed the Anglo-Flemish treaties, for example. Similarly, the Rus’ treaties with Byzantium are well known for containing clauses on the hiring of Rus’ troops for use in the emperor’s armies. While these studies are certainly useful, the focus on a particular treaty, or on a few treaties between two particular parties, necessitates that the conclusions reached are limited in scope and cannot be applied more generally. Ideally, this could be done for the entire medieval world, but the survival rate of the treaty evidence significantly limits which peoples can be studied through such a comparison. For instance, the treaties of France have a particularly poor survival rate, as do the treaties of the German empire (at least prior to 1150), and there is a notable dearth of treaties from the Islamic world.

However, unlike many other contemporary powers, both England and Byzantium have ample written treaties for analysis, thus making them particularly apt for comparison. Byzantium is well known for its centralized and bureaucratic nature, and we have good evidence indicating that creating multiple copies of various documents, including treaties, was the norm for the administration of the empire. For instance, the 911 Byzantine-Rus’ treaty explicitly comments on this, and we have multiple copies of other Byzantine treaties, such as the 1169 Treaty of Genoa, made with the Genoese. There are approximately twenty-five treaties that have survived from Byzantium from this period. Similarly, England was one of the more centralized and bureaucratic powers of the medieval West already prior to the Norman conquest, a position that solidified after William the Conqueror’s invasion. There are approximately thirty-five treaties from England. Each of these entities has a significant number of treaties dedicated to the recruitment of foreign military forces, or lending their own military aid to an ally against a potential adversary. For instance, various treaties contracting military aid from Scandinavian powers and the counts of Flanders have survived from England, from the late tenth century to the late twelfth century. Similarly, Byzantine treaties contracting aid from the Rus’, the prince of Antioch and the Italian cities survive from the early tenth century to the late twelfth century. As a result, there are a plethora of treaties concerning the hiring of troops and the giving of military aid available for analysis from these case studies. This allows for an extensive comparative study of Byzantine and English treaties, from the earliest point from which there are enough treaties for

8 Here it is worth noting that I define a treaty as an inter-ruler or inter-people agreement where each party claims to represent their people on what would now be recognized as the ‘international’ stage. For a discussion of what a treaty was in the period under discussion in this article, see Benham, ‘Law or treaty?’, pp. 488–90. Also see J. Benham, International Law in Europe, 700–1200 (Manchester, 2002), pp. 19–20; and Morris, ‘Shared solutions’, pp. 2–6.
comparison, being c.900, while filling a gap in the historiography regarding treaties and peacemaking prior to c.1200.

This is not to say that there is no scholarship on the treaties of these entities at all, or indeed on medieval peacemaking and diplomacy more generally. Scholars such as Pierre Chaplais have done ample work on English diplomatic practice in this period, analysing the practicalities of making these documents. Similarly, the role of Byzantine envoys and the reception of embassies has been extensively analysed by Jonathan Shepard and more recently by Nicolas Drocourt. More specifically to the study of treaties, historians working on the relations of the Italian cities with Byzantium have often studied the resulting treaties, with David Abulafia, Gerald Day and Donald Nicol often drawing on the agreements between Byzantium and the various Italian cities, as well as Sicily, to describe a complex web of obligations and alliances between these various powers. More recently, Catherine Holmes has also written convincingly on Byzantine treaties and peacemaking with Islamic powers. In the last twenty years scholarship of medieval England has, likewise, increasingly taken a comparative approach to treaties. Both Richard Abels and Tom Lambert have admirably compared the Alfred-Guthrum Treaty with other pre-conquest treaties noting similarities in themes and approaches, particularly concerning redress. Despite this, it is only in the last ten years that scholarship has started to cast a wider net to analyse treaties between the various entities of the medieval world. Daphne Penna has written what must be acknowledged as the most in-depth and thorough work on Byzantine treaties, focusing on Byzantium and the Italian cities, but also at times drawing upon Byzantium's agreements with other entities, such as the Rus. This approach has allowed Penna to reveal common approaches and goals within Byzantium's treaties, but also comment on atypical methods utilized in some of these agreements. The most recent, and comprehensive, approach to the treaties of the medieval world is Jenny Benham's International Law in Europe, 700–1200, which explores some 200 treaties from across Europe, as well as the Mediterranean, the Steppe and the Islamic world. While all of the above works are staples for those who want to explore medieval treaties, none of them focus specifically on the movement of military services via treaty, or on these treaties being practical documents. This piece addresses this gap in the scholarship by analysing the treaties through the lens of military service to specifically highlight how these agreements were pragmatic documents.

It is important to note how the treaties have survived, as to work on these agreements without duly reflecting on this could warp our impressions of Byzantine and English treaty-making practice. Indeed, Benham has noted more generally that between the various chronicles of the medieval period, there are more than a thousand narrative mentions and accounts of treaties being made, but only a fraction of these have survived in written form. Thus, we are certainly dealing with a surviving minority of treaties for both case studies. For instance, the majority of the identified Byzantine treaty corpus survives in the archives of the Italian cities, being sixteen of the entire corpus of twenty-five treaties. This is useful, as the Italian cities often lent the empire military aid in return for trade privileges. However, while we know relations between Byzantium and these cities were plentiful,
it is unlikely that the vast majority of Byzantine treaties were made with these peoples, particularly when one accounts for the privation of treaties made with Byzantium’s neighbours from the Islamic world, as well as a complete absence of any treaty made between Byzantium and the Bulgars, one of their most frequent adversaries in the early period. This probably reflects Byzantium being host to a number of destructive invasions, such as that of 1204, as well as the Italian cities motivation for preserving these treaties, as these often granted them privileged trading rights. This is by no means a unique issue for the Byzantine corpus. The English corpus overwhelmingly focuses on treaties with their French counterpart, and various agreements denoting the English kings’ relationships with other peoples, often specifically noting the kings of France as a likely common enemy. However, narrative evidence notes multiple treaty-making interactions with England’s insula neighbours, many of which have left no surviving documentary evidence. For instance, only two treaties with a king of Scots, one with a Welsh prince and one with an Irish king are now available for study, despite multiple chronicles detailing various peacemaking events that seemingly report treaties being made. While the Byzantine and English corpuses have been preserved for different reasons – the former largely to preserve the trade privileges of the Italian cities in the empire, and the latter to document the English kings’ relationship with France and English efforts to undermine their French counterparts – ultimately many of them still concern military service. This highlights just how important this issue was to the rulers of the medieval world, which is still evident in both entities’ treaty corpuses despite only a fraction of each entities’ treaties surviving.

We must also understand that these treaties do not differentiate between themselves formally. For instance, there is no treaty that labels itself as a ‘military aid treaty’, at least from these case studies. This article has therefore highlighted particular examples of military service within each entity’s treaty corpus as a whole, dividing the treaties between the methods used to gain military aid, rather than applying retrospective labels that are not apparent in the treaties themselves. Thus, this article will showcase the practical nature of treaties, by analysing how and why rulers enlisted military service and aid through these agreements, giving focus to an underutilized genre of evidence from the medieval world.

The earliest English treaty that concerns the hiring of troops, which is typical of one way in which military service was provided, is the 994 Treaty of Andover, between Æthelred and the leaders of a Scandinavian army.19 This took place during a time of increased raiding activity, and for every year from the year 991 to the year that the Treaty of Andover was made, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle notes Scandinavian raids.20 The Scandinavian army, led by Olaf Tryggvasson, Jostein and Guthmund, having failed to take London in 994, went on to make a treaty with Æthelred.21 After the initial clause states that a general peace was made between the two parties, the treaty immediately outlines the duties of the army while serving in England: ‘If any fleet harry England, we are to have the help of them all; and we must supply them with food as long as they are with us’.22 The treaty even provides a legal framework for the army to follow while serving in England and pays the hired army £22,000 in gold and silver.23 It would be a mistake to think that the payment was necessarily made in solely cash. As Timothy Reuter has argued, payment in kind appears to have been common in large parts of the medieval West throughout the ninth century, payment for military service often being in the form of silks, gold and silver, horses and arms, as well as more ‘basic pay’ in terms of food, accommodation and clothing, and at times even land.24 Given that other treaties (albeit later

21 Dumville and others, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, vii, s.a. 991–4.
23 Treaty of Andover, cc. 1.1–7.2.
24 T. Reuter, ‘Plunder and tribute in the Carolingian empire’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, xxxv (1985), 76–85. It should be noted that Reuter states it is possible that arms and horses were part of the basic pay of soldiers, as they were required for their profession (Reuter, ‘Plunder and tribute’, p. 84).
examples such as the 1163 Anglo-Flemish Treaty of Dover), contract military service but have surrounding documents indicating payment was made in kind, in the form of land, the payment in the Treaty of Andover may also have been made in kind, or in a combination of cash and other goods.²⁵ This is not to say the payment in the Treaty of Andover was definitively made in kind, but that payment for military service was often flexible in this period, and that we should keep this in mind when analysing payment for military service via treaty, be it with cash, in kind or a mixture of the two. Other treaties could be more explicit in this. For example, the 1155 Treaty of Genoa, made by a Byzantine envoy on behalf of the Emperor Manuel with the Consuls of Genoa, states, ‘If the Genoese [were] present in His Majesty’s (Emperor Manuel’s) territory and any person or persons should make an attack or initiate a siege in that area, any Genoese who are there will defend and protect those lands in good faith and without deceit.’²⁶ As part of the reward for this service, the Genoese were to receive a trading station and quays in Constantinople, similar to those that the Pisans possessed.²⁷ Furthermore, the treaty also sets out the legal framework that the Genoese were to follow while within Byzantium, specifically stating that they were to be treated in the same way the Pisans were.²⁸ We should not assume that either of these treaties is concerned solely with supplying military aid based either on land or sea, rather than both land and naval-based military aid. The Treaty of Andover is clear on this, as clauses 2–3.2 explicitly acknowledging the contracted army’s presence on both land and sea.²⁹ The 1155 Treaty of Genoa is less explicit, but the reputation of the Genoese as sailors, combined with the treaty being renewed and expanded in 1169 with several clauses highlighting how naval aid was to be given, imply heavily that the 1155 treaty was not solely concerned with land-based military service.³⁰ Despite the 1155 Treaty of Genoa explicitly stating payment was to be made in land, and the 994 Treaty of Andover stating only that £22,000 in gold and silver was paid, perhaps in kind, the methods used to secure military support mirror one another. Each ruler invited a population to live within their territory, provided a legal framework for the foreign population to interact with the ‘local’ population, while the foreign population was to bolster the employing ruler’s troops and be paid by the employer in some form.

Similarly, the Byzantine-Rus’ treaty of 911, made between Emperor Leo VI and the Rus’ prince Oleg and seemingly renewing and enhancing a peace made in 907, contains clauses on the hiring of Rus’ troops for service in Byzantium. For instance, one such clause states:

Whenever you find it necessary to declare war, or when you are conducting a campaign, providing any Russes desirous of honouring your Emperor come at any time and wish to remain in his service, they shall be permitted in this respect to act according to their desire.³¹

This might seem as if there were only a small amount of Rus’ serving the emperor, as the above clause seems to imply that Rus’ were hired on a ‘one-to-one’ basis, rather than en masse as in the Treaty of Andover and the 1155 Genoese treaty. However, other clauses make it clear that there were sufficient Rus’ employed by the emperor that legislation had to ensure that their presence in the empire was catered to. For instance, the treaty has various clauses legislating on violence and theft between the Rus’ and Byzantine subjects.³² There is even a particular clause on what was to happen to the property of Rus’ troops who died while in imperial service:

With respect to the Russes professionally engaged in Greece under the orders of the Christian Emperor, if any of them dies without setting his property in order and has no kinsfolk there, his
estate shall be returned to his distant relatives in Rus'. But if he makes some disposition of his goods, the person whom he has designated in writing as his heir shall receive the property of which he thus disposed.  

This is backed by the secondary literature. Certainly, both Jonathan Shepard and Georgios Theotokis have noted the Rus’ presence in the empire probably dates to the ninth century, Theotokis in particular noting that Rus’ troops may have been provided by earlier treaties that have not survived.  

The 911 treaty later clarifies that this also covers Rus’ merchants and other travellers, but it seems likely to be aimed at the Rus’ engaged in military service in Byzantium. Given that the clause refers to Rus’ who do not have kin in Byzantium, it seems probable there were also Rus’ who had settled in Byzantium as hired troops, and also had families (perhaps with the locals). Once again, a treaty has hired a people for military service, in part by settling said people in the realm of the ruler they were serving. Although payment is not addressed in the treaty (presumably this being done outside of the treaty), the Byzantine-Rus’ treaty of 911 in conjunction with the Treaty of Andover and the Treaty of Genoa (1155) evidence that settling a people within one’s realm was a common approach to expand a ruler’s military might. 

The Treaty of Devol (1108) takes this further. The treaty is preserved in the Alexiad and was made eleven years after Alexios I had attempted to bind Bohemond and other leaders of the first crusade to the reconquest of Byzantine lands, and after Bohemond had taken the former Byzantine city of Antioch for himself.  

It is important to note that the treaty was made after Bohemond’s failed siege of Dyrhachium, Bohemond’s army having been harried by disease and surrounded by the forces and allies of Alexios. As a result, the treaty attempts to incorporate both Bohemond’s Antiochene lands and his followers into Byzantium’s imperial structures, and specifically has Bohemond swear to give Alexios military support. For instance, Bohemond promises to take arms against any of the emperor’s enemies and to go wherever the emperor would order him to go. It further states Bohemond, and his men and territory, were to become a part of the empire, with Bohemond even becoming the liegeman (Λίγειον ἀνεργοσην) of Alexios. 

While there are no clauses establishing a legal framework for Bohemond’s men interacting with other subjects of the empire, this is perhaps expected, as Bohemond and his men effectively became fellow imperial subjects through the treaty. In return for their service, Bohemond was paid an annual ‘talent’ (παλαντα) of 200 pounds of the Emperor Michael, a likely reference to Alexios’s predecessor, Michael VII Doukas, and his lands were recognized by the Byzantine emperor. This was a very practical way of enlisting foreign troops for military aid. Other treaties often had a period of notice in which the aid would be provided. By utilizing a population already present in their lands, rulers could be quick to respond to any threat, or even deter an enemy from attacking altogether. Having a foreign population living within a ruler’s territory was thus both a simple and pragmatic way for a ruler to bolster their own forces.

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33 Treaty of Constantinople (911), p. 68.
36 Commène, Alexiade, ii, 114–17.
38 Treaty of Devol, p. 126.
40 Treaty of Devol, pp. 136–7. Leib has argued that this particular reference to Doukas reflects the monetary crisis of Alexios’s reign, resulting in lower grade coinage (Treaty of Devol, pp. 136–7 n. 4). While this is of interest in and of itself, it is particularly comparable to the 1074 Treaty of Constantinople between Robert Guiscard, duke of Sicily, and Emperor Michael Doukas (see n. 35 above). The treaty proposes Guiscard be the enemy of Doukas’s enemies and fight with the emperor’s forces whenever the emperor required him to do so, in return for a wage of 200 pounds. See ‘Chrisovul imperatora Michaila VII Duki’, p. 142.
Utilizing a foreign community living within a ruler’s lands did have complications and these were recognized within the treaties, which provided the legal framework for these foreign communities while they lived in a ruler’s realm. For instance, the ‘Treaty of Andover’ has clauses on how to proceed if one of the hired troops kills an English subject, or vice versa, clause 5 stating, ‘If an Englishman slays a Dane, a freeman a freeman, he is to pay for him with 25 pounds, or the actual slayer is to be surrendered; and the Dane is to do the same for an Englishman, if he slays one’. The treaties with the Italian cities also foresaw conflict between their subjects. The 1155 Treaty of Genoa states that the Genoese in the empire were to be treated, if they committed offences, in a similar way to the Pisans. The treaty clarifies the specifics of this, stating:

So if a Genoese commits an offence against His Majesty or His Majesty’s subjects, the consuls of the commune of Genoa will be bound in good faith to do what justice requires once they have been notified by the Lord Emperor, just as the consuls of the Pisans are under an obligation to render him justice.

Indeed, later treaties highlight that at times relations between the Genoese of the empire and the subjects of Byzantium were strained. Particularly, the first of two treaties dating to 1170 with the Genoese, being the Treaty of Constantinople I, which states:

However, it will not be permitted [for] those who dwell in the great city or in other regions of the empire, [for] the Genoese to take up arms against any men of Romania with evil contemplation and intention.

This perhaps reflects the ongoing tensions not only between the Genoese living in the empire and Byzantine subjects, but also with other foreign communities the emperors utilized for military aid who also had a significant presence within the empire. After all, Genoa was a relative latecomer to gaining a quarter in Constantinople, compared to its Venetian and Pisan neighbours. Evidently, as highlighted in the plethora of treaties with the other Italian communes, prior to the first Genoese treaty of 1155, the Venetian and Pisan presence in Byzantium was significant. While both Venice and Pisa were granted privileges in return for military service, it is apparent that the increasing number of Venetians, Pisans and later Genoese in the empire caused strained community relations within Constantinople. The rivalry between these communities in Byzantium is well documented and exploded into violence in 1162, when the Venetians and Pisans in Constantinople attacked the Genoese quarter. Indeed, the tension between these communities, which were a major aspect of Byzantium’s diplomatic approach to increase its military might, continued throughout the twelfth century. This violence was not solely inflicted by these foreign communities upon one another, but also inflicted upon them by the residents of Byzantium, as shown in the 1182 Latin massacre.

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incident the citizens of Constantinople were encouraged by the rebellious Andronikous, who was attempting to overthrow the deceased Emperor Manuel’s infant son and Manuel’s widow, Maria of Antioch, to turn on their Latin neighbours. This resulted in the death and expulsion of the Genoese, Pisan and Venetian communities from the city. Therefore, it is clear that being overly reliant on foreign communities living within one’s own realm came with associated problems and could result in tensions between different communities.

Having these foreign troops living within a ruler’s own territory was one way military service was provided. However, it was not the only strategy that rulers employed to secure military aid. The Anglo-Flemish treaties of Dover are some of the best studied of the treaties examined in this article and provide one of the alternatives. Each focuses on the counts of Flanders providing troops for the English kings. The 1101 treaty, made between the king of England Henry I and Robert II, the count of Flanders, was traditionally thought to have been made with Henry’s brother, Robert, the duke of Normandy, in mind. The duke of Normandy, after all, had been planning to invade England in the spring of 1101, and the treaty seemingly anticipates Henry’s own lords rebelling and a conflict in Normandy. However, the treaty does not explicitly name Robert of Normandy as an enemy, as will be discussed later. For now, we should simply note that the treaty also states that if Henry I summons Robert of Flanders for aid, Robert will provide 1,000 troops led by himself within forty days, in return for a payment of £500. Similarly, the 1187 Treaty of Constantinople made between Emperor Isaac II Angelos and the Venetians also contracts military aid from abroad. The 1187 treaty is often seen as an attempt to further restore Byzantine-Venetian relations after the disruption of 1171, when the Emperor Manuel had ordered the arrest of all the Venetians of the empire and the confiscation of their goods. The treaty has the Venetians promise to aid Byzantium. If the empire was attacked by a fleet of 40 to 100 ships, the Venetians were to send just as many within six months of being notified. The 1198 Venetian treaty renewed this commitment. This is clearly a different approach to the Treaty of Andover and Treaty of Genoa (1155), aid being hired directly from a community living abroad, but perhaps reflects the additional preparation needed for the equipment and transport necessary for the Venetian and Flemish treaties. The 1101 Treaty of Dover specifically states that each of the 1,000 troops provided was to have three horses, while large parts of the 1187 Venetian treaty concern the commissioning of Venetian ships and crews to aid Byzantium in the event of an attack. However, both the 1101 and 1187 treaties have contingency ‘work around’ clauses to ensure any delay in providing this service is minimal. The 1187 treaty for instance, states that if there is no time to notify the Venetians, the emperor was free to enlist troops from the Venetians already in the empire, up to three-quarters of the population:

if on account of any trouble [grauamen] they [the Venetians] failed to come from Venice within the specified time with such galleys, all the Venetians found in Romania must enter into the service of their [Byzantine] Imperial fleet, three out of four, as previously established, along with the appropriate wage [roga].

This ‘workaround’ functions much like the 1155 Treaty of Genoa, enlisting from the population living in imperial territory. The 1101 treaty takes a different approach, stating that if Count Robert cannot aid the English king himself, he will send his troops while he remains in Flanders. This difference

50 Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 106–8; and Day, Genoa’s Response to Byzantium, p. 28.
51 For a discussion of these, see E. Oksanen, Flanders and the Anglo-Norman World, 1066–1216 (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 54–81.
52 Benham, ‘Law or treaty?’, pp. 491–2; and Ganshof, ‘Note sur le premier traité’, pp. 249–50.
53 Chaplais, Diplomatic Documents, i. 1–4 (hereafter Treaty of Dover (1101)), at pp. 1–2.
55 For more on this, see Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 111–14; and Penna, Byzantine Imperial Acts, pp. 46–7.
59 ‘Item, si ob aliquod grauamen nequieuerint huiusmodi galee secundum prelixium terminum uenire Venetia, debent in seruitium stoli Imperii eorum ingredi omnes inuenti in Romania Venetici, de quatuor tres, secundum quod superius statuum est, cum et manifesta roga’ (Treaty of Constantinople (1187), pp. 196–9).
60 Treaty of Dover (1101), p. 2.
perhaps highlights the network of obligations that the Anglo-Flemish treaty traversed, the count of Flanders being the liegeman of the French king. Despite these different approaches, these treaties reflect practical concerns, such as the necessary time needed to procure equipment. Indeed, while the time window provided did have its downsides, such as the military service needed not necessarily being ready to aid the contracting party, rulers implemented clauses to minimize the risk that no aid was provided whatsoever. Again, these agreements reflect the practical concerns of rulers and took pragmatic steps to avoid any potential problems with the service provided, whether that was utilizing a foreign population living domestically, as in the Treaty of Andover, the 1155 Genoa treaty and the Treaty of Devol, or hiring a force from abroad with a strict time window and ensuring the treaty contained ‘work around’ clauses, as in the 1187 Venetian treaty and the 1101 Treaty of Dover.

This divide, between foreign troops being employed from foreign communities within a ruler’s realm and troops being employed from abroad, can perhaps explain why some of these agreements are so specific regarding the number of troops provided by the contracted party, while others are quite vague. The Treaty of Andover simply states that if anyone attacks England, the English are to have the help of ‘them all’, presumably being the entirety of the contracted army.61 Similarly, the 1155 Treaty of Genoa makes no explicit reference to the numbers the Genoese were to provide, stating only that any Genoese present in an imperial territory under attack will aid in its defence.62 Additionally, the Treaty of Devol restates several times that Bohemond will come with his men whenever the emperor was in need, but gives no estimate as to how many men would be provided.63 By contrast, the 1101 Treaty of Dover specifically has the count of Flanders provide 1,000 men, and the 1187 Venetian treaty has the number of ships correspond to the number attacking Byzantium (between 40 and 100), each crewed with 140 men.64 By being non-specific regarding the numbers of troops to be provided, the treaties allowed for flexibility in responding to any threat. For instance, the emperor was unlikely to call for the entirety of Bohemond’s forces to deal with a small raid, nor would Æthelred need the entirety of the hired army to deal with a minor threat. By contrast, the Treaty of Dover (1101) and the 1187 Venetian treaty deals with specific numbers to be provided, as to transport troops over a larger distance meant larger numbers of troops had to be moved for such a service to be worthwhile.65 The transportation of military forces was an expensive operation, even when done by sea, which was by far the most efficient way of moving a large number of troops over a considerable distance.66 Contracting military service from abroad therefore necessitated that rulers be specific concerning the number of contracted soldiers, to ensure the potential costs involved in transportation were worthwhile. Thus, these treaties reflected the distances between the parties involved, and the logistic necessities involved, which were recognized as potential problems and dealt with in the treaty.

While these treaties certainly made provisions for the hiring of these foreign troops, one might wonder whether these agreements were actually called upon. Of course, the supporting evidence surrounding these treaties varies substantially between each document, which impacts our ability to say with certainty if these treaties were enacted. For instance, the Treaty of Devol is well studied, and also has enough surrounding evidence for us to know it was not called upon or even enforced.67 Famously, Bohemond never returned to Antioch and thus did not fulfil the terms of the treaty. However, as Jonathan Harris has argued, this may not indicate that Bohemond reneged on the terms of the treaty, but rather reflect Bohemond’s inability to return to Antioch.68 Even if Bohemond did avoid returning simply to spite the Byzantine emperor, as some scholars have suggested, this highlights how serious the act of making a treaty was – Bohemond effectively having to exile himself from his own realm in order to not fulfil the terms of the treaty.69 Another tricky example is the Treaty of Andover,
which simply does not have the surrounding sources to indicate it was necessarily called upon, but one can see Æthelred’s military activity in the following years as potentially reflecting his forces being strengthened by the treaty. We know for a fact that the 1155 Treaty of Genoa was almost certainly not called upon, the Emperor Manuel famously being quite indecisive with regard to actually ratifying the terms of the agreement. However, the treaty does seem to have formed the basis of later Genoese treaties. Given that the Byzantine emperors continued to make treaties with the Genoese, as well as Pisa and Venice, asking for military aid in return for trading privileges, the latter of which were certainly granted by the rulers of Byzantium, it would be odd to continue making these agreements if the negotiated military service simply was not intended to be called upon or provided. Certainly, we know that other Byzantine treaties with the Italian cities were called upon. For instance, in response to Roger II of Sicily seizing Corfu, Emperor Manuel made the 1147 Treaty of Constantinople, enlisting Venetian aid in dislodging the Sicilians. Manuel seemed to be so impressed by the Venetians’ swift response that he made another in 1148, granting further privileges. The joint Byzantine-Venetian campaign is described in depth by Nikatas Choniates, highlighting that these treaties were indeed practical documents. Although it is unclear whether the various treaties of Dover were ever called upon by the English kings for military aid, the additional document accompanying the 1163 treaty shows how the Flemish troops were to be paid, thus evidencing these agreements were intended to be enacted and were indeed practical. Furthermore, given that the treaties are continually renewed – Elijas Oksanen highlighting that a plethora of other Anglo-Flemish treaties seem to have been made c.1156, c.1168, 1175, 1180 and 1182, which have unfortunately not survived in addition to the 1101, 1110 and 1169 treaties – it would be curious that so much effort was made to renew these treaties if they did not serve as practical ways of bolstering the kings of England’s forces. Additionally, Flemish troops’ presence in England is testified by William of Malmesbury in the early period, and in particular William notes that the count of Flanders, Baldwin V, and his son Baldwin VI both enjoyed a pension of 300 silver marks from William the Conqueror. Oksanen has further suggested that the Anglo-Flemish treaties simply formalized the early Anglo-Norman practice of hiring Flemish troops, or renewed potentially earlier treaties that simply have not survived. Certainly, there continued to be a considerable presence of Flemish troops within English forces into the later period, which in combination with the continued renewal of these treaties strongly suggests that these treaties were being called upon, even if the particular treaties being called upon are not the specific surviving examples from 1101, 1110 and 1169. It therefore seems likely that the treaties were pragmatic agreements, addressing the practical concerns of rulers who were attempting to augment their forces by appealing to their neighbours, and were intended to be implemented between the two parties.

One might wonder whether these agreements were effected by the hypothetical foes service would be given against – the targets listed within these treaties were often quite general, but do at times note potential enemies. Benham has noted that possible enemies are sometimes named within treaties, as well as the hypothetical areas of service. She focuses on the 1101 Treaty of Dover, which has clauses with an explicit geographical focus, mentioning England, Normandy and Maine specifically. Additionally, the treaty names English magnates and the king of France as likely enemies. However, Benham and François Ganshof have each noted that the true target of this treaty was in all likelihood Henry I’s brother, Robert of Normandy, who was planning to invade England in the spring of 1101.
While this is a clear example of treaties naming specific potential enemies and areas of conflict, this is perhaps overemphasized by the scholarship.\textsuperscript{83} For instance, the main enemy cited by both Benham and Ganshof in the 1101 Treaty of Dover, Duke Robert of Normandy, as noted earlier is not actually named in the treaty at all.\textsuperscript{84} This agreement is clearly made against a plethora of hypothetical enemies. For instance, Benham and Ganshof each additionally highlight that the 1101 Treaty of Dover also states that the count of Flanders is to give aid ‘against all men that may be able to live and die’.\textsuperscript{85} It is thus perhaps best to view the 1101 Treaty of Dover as naming some likely enemies, specifically being the king of France and any rebellious English magnet, but being against all potential enemies. This would thus safeguard the kings of England from any hypothetical enemies.

Other treaties also refer explicitly to where military service might be needed, and who a prospective enemy might be, but also detail that aid would be given against any enemy. For instance, the 945 Byzantine-Rus’ treaty, seemingly made after a Rus’ attack on Byzantium, has Constantine VII request the Rus’ prince Igor to protect the Kherson district, specifically singling out the ‘Black Bulgarians’ as likely aggressors.\textsuperscript{86} Additionally, the Treaty of Devol highlights that Bohemond would have to wage war on his nephew Tancred, if Tancred did not accept the treaty.\textsuperscript{87} However, both these examples also imply aid would be given against any enemy. The 945 Rus’ treaty, states the Rus’ would provide soldiers against Byzantium’s enemies, without any limiting clause on who these enemies might be.\textsuperscript{88} Similarly, the Treaty of Devol has Bohemond state he will fight on behalf of Emperor Alexios anywhere throughout Alexios’s empire.\textsuperscript{89} While some treaties, such as the 1101 Treaty of Dover, the 945 Rus’ treaty and the Treaty of Devol, mention specific enemies, they also state that aid is to be given against all adversaries, effectively making these clauses redundant and allowing the treaties to be more flexible in their coverage of would-be enemies.

Rulers clearly noted the conflicting obligations between different parties and recognized that respecting existing commitments to third parties was a factor in hiring foreign troops via treaties. As noted above, the 1101 Treaty of Dover names the French king Philip I as a potential invader of England and Normandy, and also states that English rebellious barons may be the target of the hired Flemish forces.\textsuperscript{90} However, the count of Flanders was allowed some exemptions to this if his service to the king of England conflicted with his service to the king of France – the king of France being his liege lord.\textsuperscript{91} Specifically, if the French king invaded Normandy and summoned Robert for support, Robert was to support the French king with only twenty men, but send the remaining 980 to support Henry I.\textsuperscript{92} This recognizes the responsibilities of the count of Flanders and includes them in the treaty.\textsuperscript{93}

Similarly, the complex relationships between entities that had military aspirations and interests in the Italian peninsula, such as Sicily, the Italian cities, Byzantium and the German empire, are frequently alluded to within the treaties. For example, the 1187 Treaty of Constantinople states that the Venetian navy would not serve against the ‘king of the Germans’, being the German emperor.\textsuperscript{94} Nor would it serve against the king of Sicily, unless he was shown to be the aggressor.\textsuperscript{95} Additionally, Byzantium was to come to the defence of Venice against any hostile attack.\textsuperscript{96} However, the treaty explicitly

\textsuperscript{83} Benham, ‘Law or treaty?’, pp. 491–2; Benham, International Law in Europe, pp. 63–4; and Ganshof, ‘Note sur le premier traité’, pp. 249–50.

\textsuperscript{84} Benham, ‘Law or treaty?’, pp. 491–2; and Ganshof, ‘Note sur le premier traité’, pp. 249–50.

\textsuperscript{85} Benham, ‘Law or treaty?’, pp. 491–2; and Ganshof, ‘Note sur le premier traité’, p. 249.

\textsuperscript{86} Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, Russian Primary Chronicle, pp. 73–8 (hereafter Treaty of Constantinople (945)), at p. 76.

\textsuperscript{87} Treaty of Devol, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{88} Treaty of Constantinople (945), p. 76.

\textsuperscript{89} Treaty of Devol, p. 128.

\textsuperscript{90} Treaty of Dover (1101), pp. 1–2. For more on this, see Benham, ‘Law or treaty’, pp. 491–2.

\textsuperscript{91} Treaty of Dover (1101), pp. 1–3. It must also be noted that the kings of France were also the liege lords of the English kings in this period. However, as we shall see, this does not seem to have prevented the kings of England from acting against their liege lords in the treaty-making arena, or indeed on the battlefield.

\textsuperscript{92} Treaty of Dover (1101), pp. 2–3. Also see commentary on this in Oksanen, Flanders and the Anglo-Norman World, pp. 73–5; and Ganshof, ‘Note sur le premier traité’, pp. 250–1.

\textsuperscript{93} Benham argues that this reflects that well-defined obligations had to account for such third-party obligations to avoid breaches of the treaty and to ensure that rulers could continue to maintain as many relationships with different people as possible (Benham, International Law in Europe, pp. 30–1).

\textsuperscript{94} ‘regem Alemannie’ (Treaty of Constantinople (1187), p. 199). This reflects the Venetian obligations to the German emperor being renewed in 1177 (Die Urkunden Friedrichs I, 1168–1180, ed. H. Appelt (4 vols., Hanover, 1985), iii. 207–8).

\textsuperscript{95} Treaty of Constantinople (1187), p. 199.

\textsuperscript{96} Treaty of Constantinople (1187), pp. 202–3.
states that if the king of Sicily attacked Venice due to the aid given by the Venetians to Byzantium, the emperor Isaac would act as he saw best. While this might seem ‘unfair’ to the Venetians, they may well have thought it unlikely the Sicilian king would attack Venice for serving Byzantium at all, even if the Venetians served Byzantium directly against the Sicilian forces. The 1175 treaty between the Venetians and William II, king of Sicily, explicitly states that all Venetians and their assets would be safe within the lands and sea of William, bar the Venetians serving the Byzantine emperor. That the treaty between the Sicilians and the Venetians is explicitly referred to within the 1187 Treaty of Constantinople, even stating that the Venetian-Sicilian treaty would expire in seven years and nine months, shows that it is likely the Byzantine-Venetian treaty was made with the Sicilian treaty in mind. Thus the Venetians appear confident that they need not fear Sicilian attack. Furthermore, the 1198 Treaty of Constantinople, made by Emperor Alexios III Angelos after the Venetian treaty with Sicily expired, no longer exempted the Venetians from service against the Sicilian king. Indeed, while this certainly reflects the Venetian-Sicilian treaty expiring, it may also reflect a potential strengthening of relations between Byzantium and Venice, before the dramatic decline leading to the events of 1204, as the treaty also explicitly states:

In such a manner and in such order the Venetians will aid and defend Romania against every man crowned and uncrowned, and any people wanting to harm Romania, as stated above; and against the king of Germany [regem Alemannie] himself.

When this is compared to the 1187 Byzantine-Venetian treaty, which has clauses exempting the Venetians from service against the king of Sicily and the German emperor, it seems Alexios III hoped to strengthen Byzantium’s military might through Venice and was wary of his Sicilian and German counterparts.

Navigating this complex web of relations and obligations within the Italian peninsula seems to have rulers utilizing the military services of different Italian cities with specific enemies in mind. For example, if we continue to analyse the relations of the Byzantine emperors and the kings from Sicily and the Italian cities, it speaks volumes that the Byzantine emperors consistently appealed to the Venetians for aid in combating the Sicilians and other Norman states in Southern Italy. Traditionally, this has been framed as the Venetians fearing Sicilian control of the Adriatic, and preferring potential Byzantine control of the sea due to the lucrative trade privileges that the Venetians enjoyed in Constantinople, and later much of the Byzantine Empire. While this is certainly a factor, Venice’s position as arguably the premier naval power on the Adriatic, as well as their relative tardiness in gaining trade privileges in Sicilian territory (unlike their Genoese rivals, and to a lesser extent the Pisans), meant they were the premium partner for any Byzantine action against the Sicilian kings. Indeed, it is quite telling that Byzantium never enlisted the Genoese in a proactive campaign against the Sicilians, enlisting their aid only defensively, as in the 1155 treaty, particularly given that the Genoese were the earliest of the northern Italian cities to gain trading privileges in Sicily. The Sicilian kings even acted to prevent

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98 ‘In regno nostro et in reliqua terra et mare potestatis nostre Dux Venetie et Venetici salvi et securi erunt per terram et mare in personis suis et eorum pecunia de hominibus nostris et stolio nostro et galeis nostris, exceptis cursulibus et illis, qui contra regnum nostrum egerint, et exceptis illis, qui fuerint in auxilio Imperatoris Constantinopolitani ad defendendum ejus Imperium in galeis illis’ (Tafel and Thomas, Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, i. 173). Clearly, the practical nature of treaties recognized that the men of one community or people could at times be found on both sides of a conflict.
100 Treaty of Constantinople (1198), p. 126.
102 Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, p. 85; and Abulafia, Two Italies, pp. 54–5.
103 Abulafia, Two Italies, pp. 54–5.
104 The Genoese seem to have had privileges in Sicily from 1116. Venice’s consistent aid to Byzantium against the Sicilians (in 1082, 1108 and 1148) cannot have helped in gaining privileges in Sicily. For the 1082 treaty, see the Treaty of Constantinople (1082), pp. 51–2; and Comnène, Alexiade, iii. 53–4. For the 1148 treaty, see Tafel and Thomas, Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, i. 109.
105 Treaty of Genoa (1155). It must also be noted that, even in the 1155 treaty, the Sicilians are not specified. For Genoa’s privileges in Sicily, see I diplomi greci ed arabi di Sicilia, ed. S. Cusa (2 vols., Palermo, 1868), i. 359.
Byzantium, and other powers, from utilizing the Genoese against Sicily, the Sicilian-Genoese treaty of 1156 explicitly prohibiting the Genoese from lending their fleet to any enemies of the Sicilian king.\textsuperscript{106} Given Byzantium’s consistent use of the navies of the Italian city states, it seems likely Byzantium was one of these enemies. With this in mind, rulers clearly chose whom to call upon for particular military service while taking into account the existing obligations, and loyalties, of their possible partners. More generally the practical nature of treaties recognized that the men of one community or people could at times be found on both sides of a conflict, and that in a world where alliance networks were often complex, allegiance was not clear-cut.

Unsurprisingly, similar networks were utilized and navigated by the kings of England. I have already touched on the 1101 Treaty of Dover recognizing the count of Flanders’s commitments to the king of France, but still allowing for aid to be sent to Henry I.\textsuperscript{107} However, we have a substantial body of treaties made by the English kings that evidence them actively building a network of rulers against their French counterparts more generally. Although these treaties tend to be vague commitments of allegiance, they still evidence appeals for military aid and show the active approach English kings took to building a wide network of potential allies. For instance, the 1197 Treaty of Andeli between Richard I and Baldwin IX, count of Flanders, made during growing tensions between England and France, has the two become allies and undermines the French king, Philip Augustus, stating that neither party was to make peace with Philip without the other.\textsuperscript{108} However, the Treaty of Andeli (1197) and the Treaty of Dover (1101) clearly undermined the power of the French king, who was after all the liege lord of the counts of Flanders.\textsuperscript{109} The French king was also technically the liege lord of the kings of England, but this does not seem to have hindered the ability of English rulers to act against their liege lord through treaties. Indeed, King John saw the Anglo-Flemish relationship as so important that he renewed the Anglo-Flemish relationship via treaty in the first year of his reign, which again seemingly targets the king of France.\textsuperscript{110} John also made another treaty in that same year, with Renaud de Dammartin, count of Boulogne, another of the French king’s liegemen.\textsuperscript{111} This treaty again reiterates that neither party was to make peace with the French king, and that they would aid each other when either of them was in conflict with the French ruler:

\begin{quote}
And \textit{[if]} the king of France afterward wars with one or the other, it was agreed that the said king of England and the count should bestow mutual aid and assistance to one another, as best they will be able.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

The phrasing ‘mutual aid and assistance’ (\textit{mutuum subsidium et auxilium}) in particular is interesting as it is effectively repeated in the Treaty of Andeli (1197) and the 1199 treaty between King John and the count of Flanders.\textsuperscript{113} Such intertextuality is not necessarily surprising, particularly given the close temporal proximity of these treaties and that both treaties are between English kings and the counts of Flanders. However, this does evidence a clear attempt to navigate and utilize the complex network of allegiances surrounding the English kings to undermine their French counterparts, and to gain military support from the French king’s own liegemen. Such was the threat posed by these agreements that Philip eventually forced John to cease aiding any of the French king’s liegemen that wished Philip harm, singling out the count of Flanders in particular, at the Treaty of Le Goulet.\textsuperscript{114} This clearly evidences that the French king was keenly aware of the networks made against him. Indeed, Philip seems to have

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{106} C.D.R.G., i. 339–41; and Abulafia, \textit{Two Italies}, p. 91.  \\
\footnote{107} \textit{Treaty of Dover (1101)}, pp. 2–3.  \\
\footnote{109} Indeed, this is apparent in the 1110 and the 1163 treaties of Dover as well. See Chaplais, \textit{Diplomatic Documents}, i. 5–7, 8–13.  \\
\footnote{110} Acta Publica, ed. G.1. P. \\
\footnote{111} Treaty with Baldwin (1199)).  \\
\footnote{112} \textit{Rex Angliae pacem aut treugam cum rege Franciae non faciet, nec facere poterit absque voluntate et assensu praedicti Regis Angliae ... et Rex Franciae postmodum alterutri gueraret, convenit quod dicti Rex Angliae et comes ad mutuum subsidium et auxilium sibi invicem conferendum, prout melius poterunt’ (\textit{Treaty of Andeli (1199)}, p. 77).  \\
\footnote{113} Chaplais, \textit{English Medieval Diplomatic Practice}, ii. 466; and \textit{Treaty with Baldwin (1199)}, p. 77.  \\
\end{footnotes}
used such schemes himself. For instance, John, when acting as count of Mortain at the Treaty of Paris in 1193, acted against his brother, King Richard, stating he would not send men to aid the English king.\(^{115}\)

Conspiring with Henry II’s various sons seems to have become the textbook strategy of the French kings during the latter half of the twelfth century, the Angevin kings just as often finding themselves the victims as the victor when it came to wooing their opponents’ liegemen and allies.\(^{116}\)

The English kings were also involved in networks that targeted leaders other than the kings of France. For instance, the 1185 Treaty of Najac, between Richard, at the time count of Poitiers, and the king of Aragon, confirms that each party would support the other. However, the likely aggressor listed is not the French king, but Raymond, count of St. Giles, each party stating that they would make no treaty with Raymond, and that the two involved parties would aid each other against the count. If they could not lead their men themselves against the count of St. Giles, they would send 200 men to aid the other party.\(^{117}\) The aid given here is particularly interesting, specifically listing the number of troops each party was to provide the other due to the treaty, cementing the idea that this was a practical way for rulers to safeguard themselves and draw upon support from beyond their own means. It is also of interest that King John, in 1201, made a treaty with the king of Navarre, stating:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{We swear and confirm that, in good faith and without any deceit, we will give to the same king [being John] advice and assistance in every way, according to our power, in person as through our men and faithful, and with our money against all men.}\quad &\quad \text{\textnormal{\cite{118}}}\end{align*}
\]

Here, the support offered extends beyond simply military support in terms of troops, by including advice and even additional resources, perhaps financial aid, to help John in any conflict. Indeed, the terms auxilium et consilium (‘assistance and advice’) are staples of alliance treaties, generally noting vague obligations of support between two powers. These treaties still respected the obligations of the parties involved. For example, the aforementioned Treaty of Chinon touches upon the obligations of the king of Navarre, the treaty clarifying that John would receive aid against all men ‘only the king of Morocco excepted’.\(^{119}\) Clearly, this elaborate web of relationships that stretched from England, across France and into the Iberian peninsula, even touching the Islamic world of Iberia and North Africa, was a necessary tool utilized by the rulers this network included, and both recognized and took advantage of the commitments of various rulers to help secure military service and aid in potential conflicts.

These intricate obligations that rulers had to navigate while making treaties touch upon another factor, that of limiting possible military aid to potentially hostile parties. Most commonly, this appears in the form of a clause restricting aid be given to the enemies by one or both of the parties involved. For instance, as noted earlier, the 1156 Genoese-Sicilian treaty limits the Genoese from lending their navy to any who would do the king of Sicily harm.\(^{120}\) Additionally, the Treaty of Le Goulet, between King John and Philip Augustus, states specifically that John was not to aid the count of Flanders, or any of the other liegemen of the king of France, if these liegemen attempted to cause any harm to the French king.\(^{121}\) This clause has, quite rightly, been viewed in light of the Anglo-Flemish Treaty of Andeli (1197), as well as the 1199 treaty between John and Count Baldwin, both of which state that the rulers involved would provide military service and aid for the other.\(^{122}\)

\(^{115}\) He\textit{terns et Charters of John of Lord of Ireland and Count of Mortain}, ed. N. Vincent, forthcoming (hereafter \textit{Treaty of Paris}).


\(^{117}\) ‘Convenientes siquidem ambo ad invicem data hinc inde fide et osculo receptor quod alter alterum iuvet bona fide et sine fraude et sine omni malo ingenio contra Raimundum comitem Sancti Egidii, ita quod neuer nostrorum treugas, pacem, concordiam, sive aliquam compositionem cum eo faciat, ab hodierna die in antea, sine alterius consilio, assensu et voluntate, convenimus etiam ad invicem quod ambo guerrejambus eundem comitem Raimundum per nos et per homines nostros. Et si alter nostrorum vel ambo defuerimus, uteque ex parte sua per se transmittat et habeat in ipsa guerra CC milites armatos, pro hac iuque amicitia et concordia’ (R. Benjamin, ‘A forty years war: Toulouse and the Plantagenets, 1156–86’, \textit{Historical Research}, lxi (1988), 270–85, at p. 283).

\(^{118}\) ‘Juramus et firmamus quod, bona fide et sine omni fraude, dabimus eidem Regi consilium et auxilium modis omnibus, pro posse nostro, tam per nos ipsos quam per homines et fideles nostros, et cum pecunia nostra contra omnes homines’ (Rymer and Sanderson, \textit{Acta Publica}, i. 85; hereafter \textit{Treaty of Chinon}).

\(^{119}\) ‘solo Rege Moroccorum excepto’ (\textit{Treaty of Chinon, p. 85}).

\(^{120}\) C.D.R.G., i. 339–41.

\(^{121}\) \textit{Treaty of Le Goulet}, p. 151.

\(^{122}\) Chaplain, \textit{English Medieval Diplomatic Practice}, ii. 466; and \textit{Treaty with Baldwin}, p. 77.
less attention is that this clause is repeated, with Philip promising not to aid any of John’s liegemen who mean to do John harm. This could have referred to any number of John’s subjects, but perhaps the leading suspect is Arthur of Brittany, or at least those that supported the child duke, who had previously been a part of Philip’s court, as the treaty states that John was to receive Arthur as his liegeman. Both Maurice Powicke and Wilfred Warren, while giving sound analysis of the treaty and its context, have noted Arthur was to be John’s liegeman. However, each of them notes only that John was to cease encouraging the counts of Flanders to disobey the king of France, and do not note that the French king is to reciprocate this obligation with regard to John’s own vassals. Indeed, Powicke in particular sees the treaty as solely isolating John from allies, and ignores the fact that Philip Augustus swore a similar clause. Although John eventually lost most of his continental holdings, to attribute this to a clause isolating John from the counts of Flanders while ignoring that the French king swore the same to John is to interpret the Treaty of Le Goulet through the lens of hindsight without giving due diligence to the treaty’s clauses. Indeed, we can even see these clauses as renewing the commitment of King Richard and King Philip not to accept the liegemen of one another, as stated in the Treaty of Louviers. We can also see the 1193 Treaty of Paris between John, acting as count of Mortain, and Philip Augustus, as a good example of cutting off potential aid. Here, John swears that he will hold land from the king of England but will not be compelled to enter service on behalf of Richard, and will send Richard only as many men as he would send during peace time. In other words, Philip reduced the effectiveness of Richard’s forces, by ensuring that one of Richard’s liegemen would send inadequate help to any potential summons. Thus, it is certain that both Byzantine and English rulers acted to restrict the military aid and service that could be offered to their rebellious liegemen, cementing their power over their vassals and nullifying a threat to their rule. Restricting military aid and service to another power was an effective tool within a ruler’s diplomatic arsenal, and was just as important as acquiring military service.

To conclude, it is clear that the rulers of both Byzantium and England, and the rulers that dealt with them, were keenly aware of the realities of hiring troops to bolster their own forces, and the practicalities that had to be considered in doing so. Rulers utilized foreign troops living both domestically and abroad, with clauses covering a variety of scenarios to ensure military aid could be acquired in a variety of circumstances. At times rulers anticipated particular enemies, but largely sought aid against all potential enemies, foreseeing that conflict might come from unforeseen parties. Perhaps most importantly, leaders recognized that the hired party would have their own obligations to other rulers, and this is accounted for within the treaties. Both Byzantine and English leaders even attempted to restrict the potential manpower that other rulers had access to, by prohibiting the hiring of particular parties in future conflicts. Ultimately, this shows awareness and foresight rarely attributed to the rulers of the middle ages, backed by an extensive legal infrastructure. Furthermore, it highlights that treaties were not purely symbolic. They consistently address practical issues rulers faced in the peacemaking arena, such as navigating the diplomatic obligations of the parties involved. Clearly, the attention to logistical detail within treaties and their proximity to their immediate political environment and context demonstrates that they were pragmatic and actionable documents. Thus for both the Byzantine emperors and the English kings, these treaties reflected their political ambitions.

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Footnotes:
123 Treaty of Le Goulet, p. 151.
125 Powicke, Loss of Normandy, pp. 135–8; and Warren, King John, pp. 54–6.
126 Powicke, Loss of Normandy, p. 140.
128 Chaplais, Diplomatic Documents, i. 18.
129 ‘Quod si non posset, consilium eius esset quod huiusmodi pacem facerem, scilicet quod eam terram quam habere poteram pro pace a rege Anglie ita eam tenearem ab eo quod pro nulla causa venirem ad submisionem eius, sed semper per aduocatum aut per nuncium absens agere vel responderem et tantum ibi facerem per aduocatum aut per nuncium meum aut ad aquirendum aut ad perdendum; ’tanquam si ibi presens essem, nec compellerer ire in exercitum vel in equitationem sed mitteter tot milites quot ordinatum fuerit in pace, quando pax fiet’ (Treaty of Paris).
and goals while also highlighting approaches to fulfil them. These treaties provided a means towards these aims in and of themselves, by which rulers could realize their aims, be they in hiring troops for the waging of war, attracting potential allies through tactful diplomacy, or hindering potential aid to an enemy. Fundamentally, treaties were pragmatic documents, providing a strategic pathway to pursue a particular goal within the arenas of both war and peace wherever one was in the medieval world.

### APPENDIX

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original language</td>
<td>Latin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Richard I, king of England, and Baldwin IX, count of Flanders, 1197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original language</td>
<td>Latin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>John, king of England, and Renaud de Dammartin, count of Boulogne, 1199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original language</td>
<td>Latin and Old English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty of Chinon</td>
<td>Acta Publica, i. 85.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Original language</td>
<td>Latin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>John I, king of England, and Sancho VII, king of Navarre, 1201</td>
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<tr>
<td>Original language</td>
<td>Old East Slavic</td>
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<td>Participants</td>
<td>Leo VI, emperor of Byzantium, and Oleg, prince of the Rus’, 911</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty of Constantinople (945)</td>
<td>Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, Russian Primary Chronicle, pp. 73–8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original language</td>
<td>Old East Slavic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Constantine VII, emperor of Byzantium, and Igor, prince of the Rus’, 945</td>
</tr>
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<td>English translation</td>
<td>Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, Russian Primary Chronicle, pp. 73–8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original language</td>
<td>Latin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Manuel I Komnenos, emperor of Byzantium, and the doge of the Venetians, 1147</td>
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<td>Treaty</td>
<td>Original language</td>
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<td>Treaty</td>
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<td>Treaty of Le Goulet</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Participants: Manuel I Komnenos, emperor of Byzantium, and the consuls of the Genoese, 1169</td>
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<td>205–7.</td>
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<td>Treaty of Louviers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Participants: John, king of England, and Philip Augustus, king of France, 1200</td>
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<td>508–12.</td>
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<td>Treaty of Najac</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Participants: Richard I, king of England, and Philip Augustus, king of France, 1196</td>
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<td></td>
<td>English translation: R. Benjamin, 'A forty years war: Toulouse and the Plantagenets, 1156–96',</td>
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<td>Treaty of Paris</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Participants: Richard, count of Poitiers and son of the king of England, and Alphonso II, king</td>
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<td></td>
<td>of Aragon, 1185</td>
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<td></td>
<td>English translation: The Letters and Charters of John Lord of Ireland and Count of Mortain, ed.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>N. Vincent, forthcoming.</td>
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<td>283–5.</td>
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<td>Treaty with Baldwin</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Participants: John, count of Mortain, and Philip Augustus, king of France, 1193</td>
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<td>English translation: Rymer and Sanderson, Acta Publica, i. 77.</td>
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<td>77.</td>
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<td>Treaty of Paris</td>
<td>John, count of Mortain, and Philip Augustus, king of France, 1193</td>
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