A ‘New Diplomatic History’ of Anglo-Japanese Relations: An Evaluation of British state, minor state and non-state actors, and their interactions with Japan, 1853-1902

By

Michael James Trull

A History & Welsh History PhD Thesis

Cardiff University

December 2023

Abstract:

Anglo-Japanese relations in the nineteenth century were far more complex and multilateral than previously implied. British diplomacy was not orchestrated and unilaterally controlled by a few high-ranking officials alone, but was in reality a collective development by a wide array of actors great and small. These actors all contributed to Japan's overall evolution from a colonised power to a formal ally in the eyes of Britain.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore some of those actors' actions and intentions, particularly those that have been largely overlooked or forgotten in previous historical studies. This thesis demonstrates how hundreds of individuals collectively contributed to the evolution of Anglo-Japanese relations. To achieve this, the thesis uses approaches and methodologies from New Diplomatic History to provide a broad coverage of various British state and non-state actors dealing with Japan during the nineteenth century, from the involvement of Parliament, the press, the Consular and Diplomatic Services, and the Royal Navy, to foreign and independent diplomatic actors hired ad hoc into Britain's employ.

Contents:

Acknowledgements:

I would like to thank the many people and organisations who have supported me during my doctoral studies at Cardiff University.

Firstly, I thank my supervisors Dr. Ian Rapley and Professor Clare Griffiths for their support, intellect, and limitless patience during my time at Cardiff University. Without them this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Professor Pippa Catterall and Dr. Anthony Gorst for motivating me to explore Anglo-Japanese history in the first place, Professor Robert Bickers for their experience and guidance, Dr. Adrian Howkins for introducing me to New Diplomatic History, and finally Dr. Robert Morton and Ian Ruxton for their vital expertise, support, and encouragement to actually visit the places I have written about.

Secondly, I thank the various funding bodies who have aided my research both abroad and at home during the past few years. In no particular order, I thank the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation, the British Association for Japanese Studies, the European Association for Japanese Studies, the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee, the Wickwar Educational Foundation, the Bill John Travel Scholarship, and Cardiff University itself. Without the invaluable assistance of these organisations, the completion of this thesis and its associated research activities would not have been possible.

Finally, I thank my friends and family, especially my parents, for putting up with my historical obsessions, near constant editing and proofreading, and research travels across the globe.

Thank you.

1. Introduction:

1. Japan, Britain, and Diplomacy:

How bright are the dreams of poetical fancies,
About ‘bowers of roses’ and ‘gardens of bliss!’
But we feel while we listen they are but romances
Of a world which exceedingly differs from this;
But whilst we here sigh for such pleasures ideal,
Lord Elgin is surely a fortunate man,
To have found out a land all substantial and real,
And fraught with such joys as the joys of Japan.

There are fruits, there are flowers, and pastures and gardens,
And a climate all genial and pleasant and clear,
The sun never scorches, the ice never hardens,
And November itself is not foggy like here.
A city of palaces splendid and spacious,
Three hundred proud princes (each of a clan),
Reside there, with courtiers in number capacious,
Who share with their ladies the joys of Japan.

But fine as the land is, and fair as the city,
The people themselves are more wonderful still:
No mendicants seek to excite you pity,
The voice of the ‘frozen-out gardener’ is still;
No Magistrates there in their Courts every morning,
A charge sheet of ‘drunk and disorderlies’ scan,
No husband hard labours three months as warning,
For beating his wife, ‘mid the joys of Japan.

No omnibus rivals drive tearing and swearing,
No insolent cabman surcharges his fee;

The Tea-House, instead of a Gin-palace glaring,
Invited in the arbour you'll come and take tea.
To benefit us and our future successors,
It really would be a most excellent plan,
If the Congress of Social Science Professors,
Should assemble next year 'mid the joys of Japan.[1]

Japan has long been the subject of exaggeration, fictionalisation, and romanticism, and during the nineteenth century these views could all be found in equal measure. Dr. D. B. Simmons summarised in his 1868 essay, 'Five Years in Japan', that until "…visited by Commodore Perry, in 1852, this distant country [Japan] was looked upon as a kind of dream-land, or as belonging to another world. Its distance, its self-imposed isolation, the mystery of its internal life and national existence, and the fact of its being the last land to be opened and explored by the enterprise and power of modern civilisation, awakened the liveliest interest in the breast of every lover of history, progress, and the development of human knowledge (*sic*)."[2] Such was the curiosity about a country supposedly far-removed from the world at large. In reality however, Japan was far more familiar and unsurprising, much to the glee of *Punch* who in the poem above, 'the Joys of Japan', poked fun at Japan's supposedly fantastical perfection. Lord Elgin's mission to negotiate one of the five unequal Ansei Treaties for Britain (the 'Treaty of Yedo') in 1858 revealed Japan to be not so different after all.[3] The Japan that foreign diplomats imagined, never existed or had not existed for centuries. Perceptions were either outdated, outmoded, or perhaps both; Japan was effectively a fictional place, an invention in the minds of those who wished to exploit it. Once opened in 1858 however, this fictional Japan soon shattered. Foreign diplomats found themselves facing similar dilemmas that they had experienced in other countries that had tried to resist imperial overtures. This understanding still took time to develop however, and was delayed by the substantial upheaval caused by the West's arrival and demands for trade, influence, and commerce. The opening of the treaty ports ushered in a new era for Japan that looked nothing like any period that had proceeded it.

[1] *Punch*, 13 November 1858, p. 195.
[2] *The Galaxy*: *Volume Five* (New York, Sheldon & Company, 1868), p. 606.
[3] H. Cortazzi, *Victorians in Japan: In and Around the Treaty Ports* (London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), p. XII.

> Now that the "seal" has been broken off, and Japan, like a bottle, has been opened to the world, we wonder if the "peace and happiness" will long continue "uninterrupted."[4]

Change begot change, creating difficulties from the onset. The idea of the 'Foreign Barbarian' now being in Japan put the ruling Shogunate under immense domestic pressure; riots, plots, assassinations, coups, economic instability, and the chance of war with one, two, or even all of the major Western treaty port powers were commonplace until the early 1870s. These domestic and foreign crises were consigned the Confucianist saying: *naiyū-gaikan* (内憂外患), literally meaning: 'troubles both at home and abroad'. To the Japanese their country was being torn apart, and the root cause of this upheaval were the Western powers.[5] Yet, a greater understanding of Japan was still needed if Western powers were to successfully exploit the country better than their peers. Western diplomats needed to escape the inaccurate and incomplete image of Japan often presented to them prior to the 1850s and do so quickly. Japan however, for the most part, had no such interest in being rediscovered and understood, finding itself to be a reluctant 'partner' in the Western imposed treaty port system. Japan would eventually become more interested in what the West might offer, but fear, distrust and isolation ruled many Japanese during these early years.

To understand this 'new' country, the Western powers needed an effective way to spread influence and gather intelligence. Each power achieved this (with different levels of success) by relying on their own diplomatic systems, usually bolstered by a supplementary Consular apparatus. To varying degrees most, if not all, Western powers had such a diplomatic system, but none had the diplomatic resources that Britain possessed. Not just the Foreign Secretary or Minister, not only the Minister Plenipotentiary or Ambassador in charge either, but the numerous actors who also made up the entire contingent of diplomatic staff at home and abroad, internal and external, official and unofficial.[6] It was they who often made the

---

[4] *Punch*, 18 December 1858, p. 251.

[5] This would of course change as the 1860s progressed, with anger moving towards the Bakufu for its weakness in dealing with foreigners and the treaty port system; See W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 41-97; See N. K. Stalker, *Japan: History and Culture from Classical to Cool* (Oakland, University of California Press, 2018), pp. 209-243.

[6] For example, Britain's system of Dutch interpreters and student interpreters was unlike anything any other power had at its disposal; only Prussia, later Germany, began utilising a similar system nearly a decade after Britain and on a much smaller scale (only two student interpreters); See Language and Diplomacy Chapter.

difference and helped shape and alter British foreign policy in Japan. It is these diverse and assorted individuals that draw my focus for this thesis. This understanding comes from the recently created 'New Diplomatic History'. Unlike the more traditional diplomatic history, New Diplomatic History puts forward two arguments for how historians should consider diplomatic history. Firstly, that the individual in diplomacy (this can be an individual, individuals or even wider groups) be brought back to the fore of diplomatic study, and secondly that when we do this, we consider various approaches and methodologies from across the humanities to further augment and improve our understanding of those same diplomatic actors. By doing so historians can avoid the trap of simply repeating the 'Great Men' of history trope that was so endemic to diplomatic history previously. In effect, forming a 'new' history of diplomacy. Thanks to New Diplomatic History I can better explain how exceptional Britain was in having so many differing actors significantly influence its diplomacy with Japan.

I have used New Diplomatic History to analyse various British diplomatic state and non-state actors who took part in Anglo-Japanese diplomacy from 1853-1902. However, the very phrase, Anglo-Japanese diplomacy, might suggest that this relationship was strictly binary. This is deeply misleading. The reality of relations during this period was far different. Anglo-Japanese diplomacy was collectively developed by a myriad of supporting groups, peoples, and nations. Ultimately, this thesis will illustrate how Britain's diplomacy with Japan was far more complex; undertaken by many actors who themselves carried over a multitude of influences, attitudes, ideas, and prejudices into their work. Groups of state actors such as Britain's Chargés d'Affaires in the Diplomatic Service and its interpreters within the Consular Service all affected diplomacy; sometimes individually and sometimes collectively. Non-state actors were similarly various, from the press growing their diplomatic influence, to 'independent' interpreters who made their skills available to multiple treaty port powers, including Britain. It is because of these groups of state and non-state actors, and indeed numerous others, that Britain and Japan steadily pursued a positive diplomatic relationship that overtime eventually led to the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. Whilst such a culmination was never a certainty, with both nations at times remaining aloof and/or contradictory to the other, the decades in which this diplomatic shift occurred was relatively quick. This was no accident however, for the variety and depth of British actors allowed Britain to significantly best its diplomatic rivals between 1853-1902. It is in these in-between decades that my research on various British actors focuses.

2. Historiography:

2.1. New Diplomatic History:

To fully augment our understanding of this thesis two historiographical fields must be better understood. Firstly, a more explicit consideration of New Diplomatic History and its more holistic approach that considers all views and facets of diplomacy overall, and secondly, an overview of Anglo-Japanese history and the more orthodox, but no less valuable, studies that populate it. Together, they chart a pathway towards a historical gap that I believe this thesis fills. New Diplomatic History itself is a long dreamed ideal from eight historians based within the field of diplomatic history, which in general has had its fair share of academic criticism.[7] Diplomatic history faced an almost constant crisis of credibility from the 1970s onwards, with historians and other academics bombarding the field with accusations that diplomatic history had somehow outlived its usefulness. This was primarily due to other parts of historical academia undergoing radical change through the development of cultural and social history, leaving diplomatic history to be perceived as somewhat traditionalist and backward.[8] L. Hunt stated that: "Historical sociology [had] become one of the most important subfields of sociology… [and] social history [had] overtaken political history as the most important area of research in history" by the 1980s.[9] What space was there left for a field like diplomatic history? The often quoted and overly harsh critique from G. M. Young, that "…diplomatic history is little more than the record of what one clerk said to another clerk", returned to prominence at this time once more.[10] Diplomatic history had gone from the highs of the 1950s-1960s, with seminal works like A. J. P. Taylor's *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, G. Mattingly's *Renaissance Diplomacy*, G. F. Kannan's *Russia Leaves the War* and *The Decision to Intervene*, W. LaFeber's *The New Empire*, D. C. Watt's *Personalities and*

[7] For a good summary of what diplomatic history entails see D. C. Watt, S. Adams, R. Bullen, K. Brauer & A. Iriye, 'What is Diplomatic History…?', in J. Gardiner, eds., *What is History Today?* (London, MacMillan Press, 1988), pp. 131-142.
[8] I understand that 'traditional' and 'backward' may seem pejorative/disrespectful, but diplomatic history truly was seen, and still is in some circles, in this rather exaggerated and negative light.
[9] L. Hunt, eds., *The New Cultural History* (London, University of California Press, 1989); A note on naming. To avoid gendering and maintain consistency throughout my thesis, all referenced individuals, predominantly academics etc., are referred to with their first and middle names via initials and their last name.
[10] G. M. Young, *Victorian England: Portrait of an Age* (London, Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 103.

Policies, and finally H. Butterfield & M. Wight's edited essay collection *Diplomatic Investigations: Essay's in the Theory of International Politics*, to being viewed as a less useful and perhaps even redundant field.[11] Historians like E. Kedourie, noting diplomatic history's downgraded status, described it in 1979 as "…an inferior kind of subject dealing with the surface of things…"[12] Historian C. S. Maier a year later referred to the history of international relations as merely 'marking time' and demoted diplomatic history to that of an awkward 'stepchild' of international relations, going on to point out its lack of transformative research when compared to other historical fields.[13] Diplomatic history did not become extinct despite all these rather terse censures however, weathering the storms of criticism directed at it. Clearly, diplomatic history was not a doomed and useless field or it would not have come back from the brink so readily.[14] The 1990s and 2000s bore the initial fruit of this survival, with academics pointing to the end of the Cold War globalising diplomatic history away from Eurocentric/Atlantic thinking, the diversification of the field from both what is studied and who studies it, and social and cultural histories impact finally filtering through.[15]

---

[11] See A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1954); See G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955); See G. F. Kannon, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: Russia Leaves the War* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1956); See G. F. Kannon, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: The Decision to Intervene* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1958); W. LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (London, Cornell University Press, 1963); See D. C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1965); See H. Butterfield & M. Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Relations* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1966).

[12] E. Kedourie, 'Historiography: From Clerk to Clerk: Writing Diplomatic History', *The American Scholar*, 48:4 (Autumn 1979), p. 502.

[13] See C. S. Maier, 'Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in Michael Kammen, eds., *The Past before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 355–387.

[14] For example, see G. T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, Little, Brown & Co, 1971); See P. Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981); See D. C. Watt, *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-1975* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984).

[15] See M. J. Hogan, 'SHAFR Presidential Address: The "Next Big Thing": The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age', *Diplomatic History*, 28:1 (January 2004), pp. 1-22; See B. G. Plummer, 'The Changing Face of Diplomatic History: A literature Review', *The History Teacher*, 38:3 (May 2005), pp. 385-400; See K. Schweizer & J. Black, 'The Value of Diplomatic History: A Case Study in the Historical Thought of Herbert Butterfield', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 17:3 (2006), pp. 617-631; See K. Schweizer & M. J. Schumann, 'The Revitalisation of Diplomatic History: Renewed Reflections', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 19:2 (2008), pp. 149-186; See M. Mösslang & T. Riotte, eds., *The Diplomats' World: A Cultural of Diplomacy, 1815-1914* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008); See T. W. Zeiler, 'The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field', *The Journal of American History*, 95:4 (March 2009), pp. 1053-1073.

Such works range from more traditional detailing's of diplomacy, to imperialism, nationalism, and the impact of themes like gender, sexuality and race upon diplomacy.[16] This slow march back into the historical fold as an accepted and appreciated field eventually culminated with various new initiatives to re-promote diplomatic history, like the creation of New Diplomatic History. Founded in 2011, New Diplomatic History was formed by eight historians who shared the view that diplomatic history needed to reassert professional diplomats as key subjects of historical study over international relations more generally.[17] It is this founding idea that has inspired various methodologies and approaches found in this thesis.[18]

This approach has been formulated and subsequently refined over years of successive conferences and the introduction of their own journal series, *Diplomatica*, in 2019.[19] Together they have heavily influenced my overall understanding of diplomatic history and the methodological approaches I have consequently chosen as a result. At Leiden in 2013 it was highlighted that there is not anything specifically 'new' about their work, just that these

---

[16] See A. Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994); See B. G. Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1996); See K. L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (Yale, Yale University Press, 1998); See N. Bilge Criss, *Istanbul Under Allied Occupation, 1913-1923* (London, Brill, 1999); See M. Gallichio, *Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895-1945* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2000); See A. J. Rotter, *Comrades At Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (London, Cornell University Press, 2000); See M. P. Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2000); See M. A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation & the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2001); See E. S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930* (London, Harvard University Press, 1999); See M. Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002); See M. MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002); See P. O. Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War 1: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919-1932* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[17] Namely, Houssine Alloul, Michael Auwers, Nevra Biltekin, Louis Clerc, Karen Gram-Skjoldager, Michael Jonas, Ariane Leendertz, and Ken Weisbrode; See G. Scott-Smith & K. Weisbrode, 'Editorial', *Diplomatica*, 1:1 (2019), pp. 1-4.
See T. G. Otte, 'The Inner Circle: What is Diplomatic History? (And Why We Should Study It): An Inaugural Lecture', *The Journal of the Historical Association*, 105:364 (January 2020), pp. 5-27.

[18] I thank Dr. A. Howkins for introducing me New Diplomatic History during my MA studies at the University of Bristol.

[19] Leiden, 2013; Copenhagen, 2017; Middelburg, 2018; Aarhus, 2021; Turku, 2023.

approaches and methodologies were mostly 'new' to diplomatic history.[20] That the 'new' is more accurately found in the multiplicity of approaches coalescing under a more greatly expanded history of diplomacy. Thus, New Diplomatic History was initially articulated by historian K. K. Patel, who posed that the multiple approaches now being applied could be placed into five broad categories:

> Scaffolding: 'The overt and official diplomacy that both creates and sets out the framework for private actors to then work in.'
> Duplicating: 'The dual use of both formal and informal diplomatic channels to achieve ones aims.'
> Uploading: 'The influence of domestic policy-making in international engagement.'
> Role Modelling: 'The impact of smaller states on particular diplomatic sectors.'
> Spearheading: 'The vanguard role of non-state actors in diplomacy.'[21]

These interpretations represent a whole flurry of recent scholarly activity. The topics of spearheading, scaffolding, and to a lesser extent duplicating, involving diplomatic actors and their various guises throughout history, has seen a renaissance thanks to approaches from New Diplomatic History and similarly minded academics.[22] The influence that this has had

---

[20] I would further add that the idea of looking at diplomatic actors who surrounded and supported the 'few great men' of diplomacy is not an entirely new approach either, just one substantially underused and quickly forgotten by historians and academics alike; See J. Fisher & A. Best, eds., *On the Fringes of Diplomacy: Influences on British Foreign Policy, 1800-1945* (Farnham, Ashgate, 2011).
[21] Leiden, 2013.
[22] For example, see J. Mori, *The Culture of Diplomacy: Britain in Europe, 1750-1830* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010); See H. McCarthy, *Women of the World: The Rise of the Female Diplomat* (London, Bloomsbury, 2014); See R. Mank, 'Reflections on the Role of Non-state Actors in Canada-Asia Relations', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 11 (2016), pp. 427-435; See S. J. Henders & M. M. Young, 'Other Diplomacies' of Non-state Actors: The Case of Canadian -Asian Relations', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 11 (2016), pp. 331-350; See K. J. Ayhan, 'The Boundaries of Public Diplomacy and Nonstate Actors: A Taxonomy of Perspectives', *International Studies Perspectives*, 20 (2019), pp. 63-83; See N. Uysal, 'The Rise of Diasporas as Adversarial Non-State Actors in Public Diplomacy: The Turkish Case', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 15 (2019), pp. 272-292; See S. de Schutter, 'A Global Approach to Local Problems? How to Write a Longer, Deeper, and Wider History of the International Year of Disabled Persons in Kenya', *Diplomatica*, 1 (2019), pp. 221-242; L. Badel, 'Diplomacy and the History of International Relations: Redefining a Conflictual Relationship', *Diplomatica*, 1 (2019), pp. 33-39; See B. Tremml-Werner & D. Goetze, 'A Multitude of Actors in Early Modern Diplomacy', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 23 (2019), pp. 407-422; See H. Ruël, 'Multinational Corporations as Diplomatic Actors: An Exploration of the Concept of Business Diplomacy', *Diplomatica*, 2 (2020), pp. 1-12; See J. Solana, 'The Case for 'Human Diplomacy', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 15 (2020), pp. 670-680; See F. T. Malit Jr & G. Tsourapas, 'Migration Diplomacy in the Gulf – Non-State Actors, Cross Border Mobility, and the

can also be found throughout this thesis, especially in the chapters on the British Chargés d'Affaires and interpreters in Japan. Through role modelling, research on more informal diplomatic histories, particularly in regards to so-described smaller states, has also become a popular topic of discussion. This has become more apparent during the COVID-19 Pandemic, Communist China's proactive 'Panda Diplomacy' and more aggressive diplomatic posturing overall, and the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War, where smaller states have had to successively revaluate and reorient their diplomacy so that they can remain relevant and/or unscathed.[23] Finally, through uploading, the significance of broader domestic policies, organisations and institutions, and their effect on diplomacy has also been more strongly considered by historians and academics alike. With the Asia-Pacific region drawing significant attention.[24] Works like these helped me reconsider who and what is involved with diplomacy more widely, and better understand how New Diplomatic History values diplomatic actors in all their surprising guises. For example, this helped me reconsider both Parliament and the press as diplomatic sub-actors; as diplomatic extensions of British diplomacy with their own influences like any other diplomatic actor at home in the Foreign Office or abroad in an embassy/legation. I have been influenced by all five of these categories in some shape or form and they remain critical to the understanding of all four of my chapters.[25]

Whilst important and certainly revolutionary for recent diplomatic historical study, to confine New Diplomatic History to these five categories alone is restrictive and misleading however,

---

United Arab Emirates', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 47:11 (2021), pp. 2556-2577; See M. Bouchet, 'Strengthening Foreign Policy through Subnational Diplomacy', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 17 (2022), pp. 96-108; See A. Popkova, 'Exploring Citizen Diplomacy's Local Impact: The Case of Global Ties Kalamazoo', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 17 (2022), pp. 248-276; See S. Erlandsson, *Personal Politics in the Postwar World: Western Diplomacy Behind the Scenes* (London, Bloomsbury, 2022); E. Conroy-Krutz, 'What is a Missionary Good For, Anyway?': Foreign Relations, Religion, and the Nineteenth Century', *Diplomatic History*, 46:3 (2022), pp. 433-461.

[23] For example, see D. F. Runde, 'Vaccine Diplomacy in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Importance of US Engagement', *Centre for Strategic and International Studies* (2021), pp. 1-6; See S. T. Lee, 'Vaccine Diplomacy: Nation Branding and China's COVID-19 Soft Power Play', *Place Branding and Diplomacy* (2021), pp. 1-15; See R. Herr, 'COVID 19 in the Pacific Island Commonwealth: Microstates Managing a Macro-Challenge', *The Round Table*, 110:1 (2021), pp. 138-148; See E. Brattberg, 'Middle Power Diplomacy in an Age of US-China Tensions', *The Washington Quarterly*, 44:1 (2021), pp. 219-238; See M. Cheng, 'The Ukraine Crisis: Causes, Conundrums and Consequences', *Journal of Social and Political Sciences*, 5:2 (2022), pp. 96-111.

[24] For example, see P. Millwood, '(Mis)conceptions of Domestic Politics in the US-China Reproachment, 1969-1978', *Diplomatic History*, 43:5 (2019), pp. 890-915; See H. Yoshimatsu, *Japan's Asian Diplomacy: Power Transition, Domestic Politics, and Diffusion of Ideas* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2021); See H. Kim, *South Korea's Foreign Aid: The Domestic Politics of Middle Power Diplomacy* (London, Routledge, 2021).

[25] Leiden, 2013.

for it alongside diplomatic history more widely has now expanded further by involving other developing fields of history as well. For example, to name a few: Environmental History, Religious History, Business Diplomacy, Digital History, the History of Medicine/Science, the History of Material Culture, and Urban History.[26] This rapid expansion since Leiden, combined with successive later conferences, has inadvertently helped solidify and develop New Diplomatic History into something that resembles more of a separate historical discipline in of itself. A testament to the continued revival and expansion of diplomatic history more widely. For example, at Copenhagen in 2017, questions revolved around how diplomacy has gone through many minor and major transformations, with I. Neumann discussing so-called 'tipping points', spurring debate around how linear a process diplomacy really is and how diplomatic actors helped shape those same processes.[27] For example, the arrival of permanent diplomatic representation between the Eastern and Western Christian

[26] For example, see G. Heefner, 'The Accidental Environmental Historian', *Diplomatic History,* 0:0 (2022), pp. 1-16; See E. Conroy-Krutz, 'What is a Missionary Good For, Anyway?', pp. 433-461; See H. Ruël, 'Multinational Corporations as Diplomatic Actors: An Exploration of the Concept of Business Diplomacy', pp. 1-12; See N. von Willigen, 'Business Diplomacy from an IR Perspective', *Diplomatica,* 2:1 (2020), pp. 13-19; See C. Antunes, 'Early Modern Business Diplomacy: An Appraisal', *Diplomatica,* 2:1 (2020), pp. 20-27; See D. Spry, ''From Delhi to Dili: Facebook Diplomacy by Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the Asia-Pacific', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* 15 (2020), pp. 93-125; See C. Klynge, M. Ekman & N. J. Waedegaard, 'Diplomacy in the Digital Age: Lessons from Denmark's TechPlomacy Initiative', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* 15 (2020), pp. 185-195; See L. Schemper, 'Science Diplomacy and the Making of the United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction', *Diplomatica,* 1:2 (2019), pp. 243-267; See P. A. Berkman, 'Science Diplomacy and Its Engine of Informed Decisionmaking: Operating through Our Global Pandemic with Humanity', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* 15 (2020), pp. 435-450; See T. Flink, 'Taking the Pulse of Science Diplomacy and Developing Practices of Valuation', *Science and Public Policy,* 49 (2022), pp. 191-200; See J. Dittmer, *Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy* (London, Duke University Press, 2017); See B. Tremml-Werner, L. Hellman & G. von Meersbergen, 'Introduction. Gift and Tribute in Early Modern Diplomacy: Afro-Eurasian Perspectives', *Diplomatica,* 2:2 (2020), pp. 185-200; See A. Bennett, 'British Material Diplomacy in Precolonial Uganda: The Gift Exchanges of John Hanning Speke, 1860-1863', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* 16 (2021), pp. 166-174; See I. B. Neumann, 'Diplomatic Gifts as Ordering Devices', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 16 (2021), pp. 186-194; See J. L. Manfredi-Sánchez, 'Urban Diplomacy: A Cosmopolitan Outlook', *Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, 3:4 (2018), pp. 1-90; See M. Acuto, A. Kosovac & K. Hartley, 'City Diplomacy: Another Generational Shift?', *Diplomatica,* 3:1 (2021), pp. 137-144; See H. Leira & B. de Carvalho, 'The Intercity Origins of Diplomacy: Consuls, Empires, and the Sea', *Diplomatica,* 3:1 (2021), pp. 147-156; See N. Santos, 'Towards a Conceptual Framework for City Diplomacy: a Practitioner's Perspective', *Diplomatica,* 3:1 (2021), pp 157-166; See E. Sevin, 'Bright Future for City Diplomacy and Soft Power', *Diplomatica,* 3:1 (2021), pp. 200-209; See A. Alejo, 'Diasporas as Actors in Urban Diplomacy', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* 17 (2022), pp. 138-150.

[27] Copenhagen, 2017; This has been further built upon by NDH scholars, for example, see C. M. Constantinou, J. Dittmer, M. Kuus, F. McConnell, S. O. Opondo & V. Pouliot, 'Thinking with Diplomacy: Within and Beyond Practice Theory', *International Political Sociological,* 15 (2021), pp. 559-587.

churches after 292AD, the emergence and subsequent evolution of diplomatic systems, and institutionalism. Neumann's argument generated significant debate, with points being made about how diplomacy's evolution has not been a steady constant; there have been dead ends and region/period specific off-shoots despite diplomacy's developmental progress. This has been quickly drawn upon in recent diplomatic historical scholarship as well. For example, R. F. Trager's thorough analysis of private diplomatic encounters amongst major and minor diplomatic incidents similarly shows how these 'tipping points' altered diplomacy over time.[28]

The ideas of Neumann are probably best seen in P. Cohrs most recent work, *The New Atlantic Order*, which details how international politics from 1860-1933, filled with 'tipping points', transformed diplomacy at apace.[29] For example, the disintegration of the Vienna system, global/imperial competition, Atlanticism, the First World War, and its various peace treaties. P. Cohrs emphasises that whilst modern diplomatic approaches, like New Diplomatic History, re-focus on certain actors or narrower fields, providing unique and alternative perspectives, such research can end up existing in a vacuum due to its specificity. That broader and more comprehensive (and perhaps more 'traditional') international and diplomatic histories should still therefore merit some of our attention. My own research has ultimately ended up being underpinned by such 'tipping points' too, and I have attempted to forge a third way that utilises the best of both worlds. These more minor and regional 'tipping points' brought about a whole multitude of changes to how British diplomacy was ultimately carried out in Japan and even elsewhere. From the more bilateral and specific events like the Arrow War in China or Britain's diplomatic spat with Brazil in the 1860s, to the more multilateral and overlapping diplomatic conundrums that involved Britain, Japan, and a swath of other powers like the *Maria Luz* incident in 1872. Whilst these 'tipping points' are not the overt focus of my thesis overall, their influence on Anglo-Japanese relations can still be felt throughout. They rear their head in several chapters, namely the Pluralistic, Geography, and Chargés d'Affaires chapters as greatly influential moments. New Diplomatic History may predominantly be about reasserting diplomatic actors, but clearly international relations at their most 'traditional' cannot remain entirely ignored or forgotten either. Subsequently, at

[28] See R. F. Trager, *Diplomacy: Communication and the Origins of International Order* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[29] See P. O. Cohrs, *The New Atlantic Order: The Transformation of International Politics, 1860-1933* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022).

Middelburg in 2018, the approach that most inspired me was N. Shimazu's research on the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955 and other works on 'place' and 'sociability' in diplomacy.[30] Her work, alongside historical geographer Fiona McConnell pointing out the lack of historical geography in diplomacy, whose other substantial research outputs also inspired me, provided the methodological basis for my Geographical chapter.[31] As can be seen by this whistlestop description of New Diplomatic History's development and influence on diplomatic history more widely, it is an evolving field with an increasingly global outreach. Thanks to New Diplomatic History the study of diplomacy has, in my view, successfully recovered from its perception of being both outdated and outmoded, and the many boons it has brought to other types of diplomatic history can be easily brought to Anglo-Japanese relations as well.

2.1. Anglo-Japanese History:

Britain has always had something to justify its diplomatic involvement with Japan, even despite Britain's primary interest in China. From the opening of Japan in 1858 for the chance of increased East Asian trade, the advantages of forcing Japan to embrace freer trade in the 1860s and 70s, the naval opportunities of the 1880s and 1890s, to the diplomatic and strategic ties of the early twentieth century. Of course, such interest was never a forgone conclusion, but considering Britain's global presence, alongside its heavy interests East of Suez, Britain always had a reason to be involved in Japan's affairs in hindsight. This period has seen vibrant study and research, with notable historians like W. G. Beasley, G. Fox, I. Nish, and more recently A. Best, all adding to our historical understanding of nineteenth century Japan's diplomatic relationships.[32] Overall, this area has seen many varied and unique works

[30] See N. Shimazu, 'Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955', *Modern Asian Studies*, 48:1 (2014), pp. 225-252; N. Shimazu, 'Places in Diplomacy', *Political Geography*, 31 (2012), pp. 335-36; See N. Shimazu, 'What is Sociability in Diplomacy?'', *Diplomatica*, 1:1 (2019), pp. 56-72.

[31] F. McConnell, 'Rethinking the Geographies of Diplomacy', *Diplomatica*, 1:1 (2019), pp. 46-55; Such was the interest in Shimazu's work that the idea of diplomatic sites or places as a basis for diplomatic research is now the main focus of New Diplomatic History's next conference at Turku in 2023. I was fortunate enough to chair a panel and present my own paper.

[32] See W. G. Beasley, *Great Britain and The Opening of Japan, 1834-1858* (London, Routledge, 1951); See W. G. Beasley, *Japan and the West in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Nationalism and the Origins of the Modern State* (London, Oxford University Press, 1971); See W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*; See W. G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994); See W. G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (London, Routledge, 2013); See G. Fox, *Britain and Japan, 1858-1883* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969); See I. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese*

in decades past, with vast edited collections being published from the mid-1990s onwards.[33] The most notable being A. Best and H. Cortazzi's edited collection on Britain's 'main' diplomats to Japan, the invaluable *Biographical Portraits* series, as well as J. E. Hoare's two volume edited collection of sources, articles and points of interest on all things treaty port Japan.[34] These texts promoted approaches that have become staple ideas within New Diplomatic History, and have aided the development of this thesis immeasurably.

Recently, historians researching relations up to the First World War have been looking at turning points of Anglo-Japanese history and wider Western interactions with Japan, such as the Namamugi Affair and the Bombardment of Kagoshima in 1863, the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Maria Luz incident in 1872, the First Sino-Japanese War 1894-95 and beyond, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and its subsequent iterations, and finally Japan's involvement in the First World War.[35] Biographical studies have seen a recent renaissance,

---

Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London, Athlone Press, 1966); See I. Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-1923* (London, Athlone Press, 1972); See A. Best, *British Engagement with Japan, 1854-1922: The Origins and Course of An Unlikely Alliance* (London, Routledge, 2021).

[33] See H. Cortazzi, I. Nish & J. E. Hoare, eds., *Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits, Ten Volumes* (London, Renaissance Books, 1995-2016); See A. Best & H. Cortazzi, eds., *British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1850-1990: Aspects of the Evolution of British Foreign Policy* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2018); See I. Nish & Y. Kibata, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2000); See I. Nish & Y. Kibata, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Volume 2: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1930-2000* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2000); See I. Gow, Y. Hirama & J. Chapman, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 3: The Military Dimension* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003); See J. E. Hunter & S. Sugiyama, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 4: Economic and Business Relations* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002); See G. Daniels & C. Tsuzuki, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 5: Social and Cultural Perspectives* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002); See A. Best, H. Cortazzi, & P. Kornicki, *British Royal and Imperial Japanese Relations, 1868-2018: 150 Years of Engagement, Association and Celebration* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2019).

[34] See H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004); See H. Cortazzi, I. Nish & J. E. Hoare, eds., *Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits, Ten Volumes*; See J. E. Hoare, eds., *Culture, Power and Politics in Treaty-Port Japan, 1854-1899, 2 Volumes* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2018).

[35] See R. S. G. Fletcher, *The Ghost of Namamugi: Charles Lenox Richardson and the Anglo-Satsuma War* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2019); See R. Hellyer & H. Fuess, eds., *The Meiji Restoration: Japan as a Global Nation* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020); See A. Ogawa & P. Seaton, eds., *New Frontiers in Japanese Studies* (London, Routledge, 2020); See J. L. Huffman, *The Rise and Revolution of Meiji Japan* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2019); See T. D. Amos & A. Ishii, eds., *Revisiting Japan's Restoration: New Approaches to the Study of the Meiji Transformation* (New York, Routledge, 2022); See R. S. G. Fletcher & R. Hellyer, eds., *Chronicling Westerners in Nineteenth-Century East Asia: Lives, Linkages, and Imperial Connections* (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2022); See I. Nish, *The History of Manchuria, 1840-1948: A Sino-Russo-Japanese*

with diplomats of various guises and travel writers alike receiving greater direct analysis and attention. It was these groundbreaking biographical studies by academics like R. Morton and K. Kanasaka that solidified my interest in Anglo-Japanese history and helped spark the idea for this thesis, aiding my discovery of New Diplomatic History years later.[36] We also cannot ignore recent popular and semi-academic works written about Anglo-Japanese relations either, with J. Denny's, *Respect and Consideration*, W. de lange's, *The Namamugi Incident,* and J. Provan's, *Wild East*, in particular, making great strides in bringing complex diplomatic, economic and social aspects of Anglo-Japanese ties into a more public and accessible light.[37] Truly, Anglo-Japanese history is an expanding field, reflective of the more positive trends occurring in wider diplomatic history, with its bilateral nature slowly giving way to more open-ended studies of Western involvement, collaboration, and confrontation in and with Japan. The pivot towards reviewing larger events, turning points, and more generalised Western-Japanese studies, combined with the fact that many Anglo-Japanese works are now becoming naturally outdated by passing decades, has allowed me to find historical gaps to inhabit. For example, G. Fox's book, *Britain and Japan, 1853-1883*, is a foundational work in Anglo-Japanese history, but its source material is limited to certain parts of the Foreign Office and does not consider resources such as the Hammond Papers. More generally, many works ignore various Consular Papers, personal notes, and several Parliamentary Papers as well. This reflects the more conventional focuses of diplomatic history, and thus the renewed interest in minor actors and alternate perspectives suggested by

---

Triangle, 2 Volumes (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2016); See A. Best, *British Engagement with Japan, 1854-1922*; See C. Heere, *Empire Ascendent: The British World, Race, and the Rise of Japan, 1894-1914* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020); See R. Hattori, *Japan at War and Peace: Shidehara Kijūrō and the Making of Modern Diplomacy* (Acton, Australia National University Press, 2021); See T. Minohara, T. Hon & E. Dawley, eds., *The Decade of the Great War: Japan and the Wider World in the 1910s* (Boston, Brill, 2014); See O. Frattolillo & A. Best, eds., *Japan and the Great War* (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).

[36] See R. Morton, *A. B. Mitford and the Birth of Japan as a Modern State* (London, Renaissance Books, 2017); R. Morton, *A Life of Sir Harry Parkes: British Minister to Japan, China and Korea, 1865-1885* (Folkestone, Renaissance Press, 2021); See R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock: First British Minister to Japan* (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, Awaiting Publication); See K. Kanasaka, *Isabella Bird and Japan: A Reassessment* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2017); See K. Kanasaka, *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan: Revisiting Isabella Bird* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2020); I would be remiss to not mention P. Barr's seminal work on Isabella Bird: see P. Barr, *A Curious Life for a Lady: The Story of Isabella Bird* (London, Penguin Classics, 1989).

[37] See J. Denny, *Respect and Consideration: Britain in Japan 1853-1868 and Beyond* (London, Radiance Press, 2011); See W. de Lange, *The Namamugi Incident: The Murder that Sparked a War* (N/A, TOYO Press, 2020); See J. Provan, *Wild East: The British in Japan, 1854-1868* (Stroud, Fonthill Media, 2020).

New Diplomatic History. In other words, there is room to reevaluate what we do and do not know about Anglo-Japanese relations over my period of study (1853-1902).

3. Structure:

This thesis is comprised of four chapters, each with a specific goal in mind. When combined they illustrate how numerous British state and non-state actors, minor and major, collectively impacted the development of Anglo-Japanese relations during the nineteenth century in various ways. Together they show that diplomacy between Britain and Japan was not binary or unilateral, but better described as a complex web of relations undertaken by multiple clusters of actors who were absolutely critical to its overall function and success. These actors ranged from the forgotten Chargés d'Affaires ensuring that there was always someone at the helm, the British Press and their growing diplomatic influence over Britain's foreign policy, to the many unsung interpreters who went on to become consuls and more across Japan to name a few. My thesis will illustrate how this assortment of actors jointly supported, influenced, and even outright led British diplomacy with Japan. My research into British actors engaging with both diplomacy and Japan is not an exhaustive overview of everyone involved however. There are many actors I do not have time or space to fully include, but whose diplomatic achievements and contributions should not be completely forgotten either, and as such they appear in several of my chapters. For example, the extended families of diplomatic officials, particularly women, British merchants and businesspeople, religious officials (predominantly Christian), various *o-yatoi* (foreigners working for the Japanese Government), and broader members of the (mostly) European foreign communities that inhabited the treaty ports. To varying degrees these 'minor' actors have similarly not had the level of study that they deserve, but perhaps the small inroads I have made and the progress of New Diplomatic History overall will help change this fact.

Our understanding of Anglo-Japanese relations will no longer be locked into the restricted idea that only a few British actors directed British policy at any one time, when in reality, it not only involved an everchanging group of diplomatic experts and officials, like Alcock and Parkes, but a far larger collective body of assorted characters supporting them from across the Diplomatic and Consular Services like Winchester, Watson, and Satow. These contributing actors all impacted the trajectory of British relations with Japan during the nineteenth

century. For example, without Parliament and the press's external diplomatic pressure on British relations with Japan, British foreign policy's shift towards neutrality and plurality would have never occurred so instantaneously or at all. Without the diplomatic development of the ship, transforming it from a simple transport carrier to a mobile legation, by Alcock, Neale, and most importantly Parkes, Britain's early diplomatic forays into Japan proper would have not only been less successful and swift, but virtually impossible to undertake. Without the Chargés d'Affaires like Neale, Winchester, Watson, and Paget for example, Anglo-Japanese relations would have ultimately stuttered and even stagnated. Without Britain's vast array of interpreters and their substantial development, an oddity among the treaty port powers, Britain's understanding of Japanese would have progressed significantly more slowly. This would have then impacted the Japan Consular Service's ability to expand and support Anglo-Japanese relations thereafter. Britain was able to draw upon this broad array of diplomatic actors (often inadvertently), as well as many others, in ways that other nations failed to consistently utilise (if at all). The press, Parliament, Foreign Office, Royal Navy, British Army, Merchant Navy, Civil Service, Diplomatic Service, Consular Service, Church of England, private member clubs, Royal Societies, Universities, and substantial industry with global economic interests, created a unique and vast diplomatic resource that Britain could use to its advantage over competing powers. With thousands of various diplomatic actors at its disposal, Anglo-Japanese diplomacy was furthered in multiple diverse ways. Britain's deepening relationship with Japan during this period was thus no accident. This thesis seeks to not only explain why this occurred, alongside the advantages Britain gained, but ultimately understand how these many aforementioned actors orchestrated and influenced this diplomatic development.

The four chapters are as follows. Firstly, a chapter on how Parliament and the press, as two pluralistic groups, collectively pressured the Government, the Foreign Office, and British diplomats in Japan, successfully forcing policy changes as diplomatic sub-actors in their own right. This was despite having no direct and overt role within Britain's diplomatic apparatus. The second chapter will discuss the role of the Chargés d'Affaires; a temporary role, one forgotten by historians, but unlike Parliament and the press a role fully integrated into Britain's Diplomatic Service. Here I will evaluate four individuals who took on the role and explain how their time in charge as major diplomatic actors in and of themselves significantly influenced Anglo-Japanese relations. The third chapter will consider a geographical approach to early Anglo-Japanese relations, showing how multiple actors successively used the ship to

augment their diplomacy. From a forgotten diplomatic role, the Chargés d'Affaires, to a forgotten diplomatic aid, the ship. Over time the ship transformed from being an obvious necessity for travel to a unique and integral diplomatic space that altered how Britain's diplomatic actors conducted their diplomacy with Japan. A renewed understanding of how they supported their own diplomatic efforts in the face of Japan's abnormal diplomatic geographies is needed if we are to better understand early Anglo-Japanese relations. In the final chapter I will discuss Britain's interpreters situated in Japan, including the famed E. Satow and W. G. Aston, and how their role as 'interpreters' betrays the expansive duties they performed within the Consular Service. All the diplomatic actors in the previous three chapters relied upon the Consular Service, especially the interpreters. Whilst Satow and Aston have deservedly bathed in the historical limelight, many other interpreters have fallen through the cracks and deserve greater analysis for their contributions to British diplomacy as they transformed into integral minor diplomats and more. These four chapters form the basis of my thesis, and will explain how British diplomacy in Japan was a far greater endeavour than otherwise implied, involving hundreds of interlinked actors from many walks of life, influencing negotiations, discussions, and exchanges.

2. Press and Parliament: Pluralistic Diplomacy and Anglo-Japanese Relations:

1. Introduction:

In late 1862 four Britons were attacked, one killed, by Samurai from the domain of Satsuma. In 1863 the Royal Navy, under orders from Edward St. John Neale, bombarded the domain's castle town, Kagoshima, in response. This was done after Satsuma's refusal to pay reparations and punish those responsible. The bombardment proved inconclusive however – while Kagoshima itself was largely destroyed, there were casualties on both sides – and it received strong condemnation from both Parliament and the press. The attack on Kagoshima became so infamous publicly that it showed how even the smallest matter abroad could become a serious political issue at home. The bombardment, though not an example of a completely independent action by a diplomat, showed how British policy and support could be reinterpreted, rightly or wrongly, by individuals on the ground. Furthermore, despite the negative reaction and subsequent government understanding of how military action against foreign powers could now be perceived domestically, issues over control remained. The next crisis in Japan, the 'bombardment of Shimonoseki' in 1864, which although not as widely reported or even as negatively viewed domestically as Kagoshima, was also not entirely approved by the government and again left British foreign policy in Japan in crisis. The bombardment of Shimonoseki involved a British diplomat, Sir Rutherford Alcock, attempting to gain government approval of a military action he thought necessary. Despite the Foreign Office remaining confused and unconvinced, the bombardment of the Shimonoseki Strait's coastline went ahead anyway, ultimately proving to be quite successful. This exchange made explicit the limits of the Foreign Office's power to effectively control its diplomats abroad in places like Japan. The impact of this was for the Foreign Office to place more emphasis on getting the right individuals in the right roles, with clearer limits and expectations, especially in Japan.

With Shimonoseki, Britain was lucky that it was not a repeat of Kagoshima (where a large urban centre was destroyed and civilians put at risk), but the memory of Kagoshima's substantial public fallout was still raw. State and non-state actors, like those in Parliament and the press, were becoming diplomatic sub-actors. They both had the power to shift and affect

British foreign policy. Diplomacy was becoming bigger, more complicated, and increasingly involved actors who, whilst having perhaps some influence before, now had a way to produce real pressure and change. The response to Kagoshima was just one example of this, but it was the culmination of long-held frustrations that sparked a change in 'who' could affect diplomacy. Given the substantially negative reaction that came about because of the bombardment of Kagoshima, it is understandable why the Foreign Office sought to place increased emphasis on control, stability, and cooperation in Japan. How successful this shift was in subsequent years is debatable, but it is clear that Parliament and the press's reaction to Kagoshima played a major role in altering Anglo-Japanese relations post-1863. To understand this change we must first consider the press and Parliament's role in two other events, namely the 'bombardment of Canton' in 1856 and the 'Christie Affair' in late 1862-63. The reaction of the press and Parliament to these two events, successive government's handling of them, and their timing, all played a role in the build-up towards Kagoshima, Shimonoseki, and Anglo-Japanese relations thereafter.

1.1. The Foreign Office and Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century:

The Foreign Office was founded after the administrative reforms of 1782. What was called the 'Northern Department' and the 'Southern Department' were reformed into the Foreign Office and the Home Office respectively. It was an autonomous ministry that often-snubbed other governmental departments and executed foreign policy independently, regardless of parliamentary or public opinion.[38] The Foreign Office's duties were (and largely remain to this day) to handle Britain's relationship with foreign powers, manage Britain's oversea interests, and ensure that the rights and interests of British subjects abroad were seen too. It was remarkably small; initially being made up of only fifteen individuals.[39] Even by 1848 the Foreign Office only had forty-four officials in its employ (only increasing to fifty-one by 1914), making it one of the smallest government departments.[40] Its minute size meant that its ability to deal with distant foreign crises was limited. Such difficulties abroad were further

[38] See W. Dawson, *William Cobden and Foreign Policy: A Critical Exposition with Special Reference to our Day and its Problems* (London, Routledge, 2019); See Z. S. Steiner, 'Elitism and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Office before the Great War', in B. J. C. McKercher and D. J. Moss, eds., *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939* (Edmonton, Alberta, 1984), pp. 19-55.
[39] Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 'The FCO: Policy, People and Places (1782-1995)', *History Notes*, 2 (1991), p. 1; See A. Seldon, The Foreign Office (London, HarperCollins Illustrated, 2000).
[40] T. G. Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 7.

intensified due to the organisational separation of the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic and Consular Services.[41] The Foreign Office included all of the various ministers and civil servants that directed Britain's foreign policy. The Diplomatic and Consular Services, although technically independent of the Foreign Office, were the governmental organisations made up of the various diplomats and support staff that put the Foreign Office's foreign policy into practice. This organisational structure did not always work smoothly due to logistical and technological problems however. For example, it was far easier for the Foreign Office to react to a developing situation in Europe than it was in East Asia with China and Japan or in South America with Brazil. The Foreign Office was of great importance to Britain and was (and remains) a key organ of government, but clearly despite its significance, faults, problems, and contradictions existed that damaged its overall effectiveness.

The nineteenth century was an increasingly globalised world where British and other 'Western' powers dominance had led to most nations being conquered or colonised. Some states, like China, Brazil, and Japan, escaped such direct domination and instead faced the indirect process of imperial control through diplomacy and coercion, becoming part of 'informal' empire.[42] This early globalisation of the world created opportunities and problems for diplomats all over, including those situated in Japan.[43] Diplomats in the nineteenth century were much freer to orchestrate their own diplomatic goals, especially so in the early-mid nineteenth century. The time it took for messages to travel between the Foreign Office and the extreme reaches of the world was considerable until the telegraph became more widespread.[44] It was only in 1870 that the telegraph finally connected Japan, from London to Nagasaki.[45] Prior to this technological marvel it would take months for a message to reach

[41] See R. A. Jones, *The British Diplomatic Service, 1815-1914* (Waterloo, CA, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983); In fact, they only unified in 1918, and even then some separate entities remained, like the Colonial and India Offices which would exist outside of the Foreign Office's purview for their entire existence, creating paradoxical overlaps in foreign policy management and friction over how policy should be carried out in certain parts of the world; Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 'The FCO: Policy, People and Places (1782-1995)', pp. 2-3.
[42] G. A. Barton & B. M. Bennett, 'Forestry as Foreign Policy: Anglo-Siamese Relations and the Origins of Britain's Informal Empire in the Teak Forests of Northern Siam, 1883-1925', *Itinerario*, 34:2 (2010), p. 67.
[43] P. J. Cain & A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: 1688-2015* (London, Routledge, 2016), pp. 974-979.
[44] O. Checkland, *Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 1868-1912* (London, Macmillan Press, 1989), pp. 51-53.
[45] J. Ahvenainen, *The Far Eastern Telegraphs: The History of Telegraphic Communications between the Far East, Europe, and America before the First World War* (Helsinki, Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1981), p. 207.

London from abroad; four months from Hong Kong, one to two months from Rio de Janeiro, and roughly four to five months from Japan.[46] This meant that British governments often found themselves retroactively agreeing with decisions that their diplomats (i.e. 'men on the spot') had made with little or any consultation beforehand.[47] The reason why certain individuals acted as 'men on the spot' so brazenly has been commonly defined as the 'tyranny of distance'.[48] In both Anglo-Chinese and Anglo-Japanese relations, diplomats often wielded immense diplomatic power.[49] Such power was short lived however, because as communications and other technologies developed to be both faster and more efficient, both public and private diplomatic interest only increased as well. Subsequent British governments grew conscious of the problems diplomats could cause if left unchecked or given, intentionally or unintentionally, too much free reign abroad. This new understanding of foreign policy from British governments was gradual, but with Anglo-Japanese relations this new understanding of foreign policy changed relatively quickly. Furthermore, the public interest in how Britain, a supposedly civilised and accountable nation, acted overseas also increased. People from all walks of life were increasingly intrigued by the new lands Britain was either acquiring or interacting with. Britons desired to be enthralled with tales, discussions and news of British heroism, leadership, and exploration around the world.[50]

This led to two key developments that impacted how British diplomacy was carried out. Firstly, the Victorian Press grew increasingly politicised and influential in both public and

---

[46] J. Y. Wong, *Deadly Dreams: Opium and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 67; M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 17; See J. Nicholls, 'The Impact of the Telegraph on Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy during the Nineteenth Century', *New Voices*, 3 (December 2009), pp. 1-22; See D. P. Nickles, *Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy* (London, Harvard University Press, 2003); See A. Knuesel, 'British Diplomacy and the Telegraph in Nineteenth Century China', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 18 (2007), pp. 517-537.

[47] The term 'man on the spot' originates from J. S. Galbraith in 1960; See J. S. Galbraith, 'The "Turbulent Frontier" as a Factor in British Expansion', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2:2 (January 1960), pp. 150-168; See R. D. Long, *The Man on the Spot: Essays on British Empire History (Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies, Number 31)* (London, Greenwood Press, 1995).

[48] See G. Blainey, *Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History* (Melbourne, Macmillan Press, 1982).

[49] See J. Y. Wong, 'The 'Arrow' Incident: A Reappraisal', *Modern Asian Studies*, 8:3 (1974), pp. 373-389; M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 108.

[50] S. L. Steinbach, *Understanding the Victorians: Politics, Culture and Society in Nineteenth Century Britain* (New York, Routledge, 2017), p. 65; See S. J. Potter, eds., *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain: Reporting the British Empire, 1857-1921* (Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2004).

political circles. This newfound importance of the press is best expressed by Abraham Hayward in the *Edinburgh Review* with his statement that "…we live and move and have our being in print."[51] This was an apt contemporary description of Victorian Britain which, as a society, was becoming enamoured with information and the primary basis for gaining such information was the written word. As Historian A. Lee stated, the British Press had ultimately become "…the most important single medium of the communication of ideas…" in Victorian Britain.[52] Such importance of course meant that public appetite for the press only increased.[53] Things came to a head with the popular demand that the various taxes and duties on paper and newspapers (termed the 'Taxes on Knowledge'; coming from the popularised phrase "A tax upon paper, is a tax on knowledge") be abolished.[54] During the 1850s and 1860s this was finally achieved, leading to a rapid expansion of the press.[55] C. Mitchell's *Newspaper Press Directory* listed a total of 1,764 periodical titles in 1864, but by 1887 this number had more than doubled to 3,597.[56]

However, besides the press's growing popularity, what links it to British foreign policy? The answer lies in the politicalisation of the press. Press across the country had varying political persuasions, be it due to financial backing or public support from a certain party or politician, an understanding that its readership desired a certain political viewpoint, or more simply due to its owners wanting the paper to reflect their own private political wishes.[57] This was not a static process either; it was not uncommon for political persuasions to alter over time. For example, *The Globe*, which began life as a broadly Whig-ish supporting paper (infamous for its scathing review of one of Disraeli's novels, sparking an intense rivalry) switched to the Conservatives after 1866 due to an ownership change.[58] Politicians and political parties alike were quick to take advantage of the press's increased circulation and use it to espouse support for themselves. For British diplomacy, this politicisation of the press meant that when the

---

[51] *The Edinburgh Review*, Vol. 77 (1848), p. 2.
[52] A. Lee, *The Origins of the Popular Press in England, 1855-1914* (London, Croom Helm Ltd, 1975), p. 18.
[53] See L. Brown, *Victorian News and Newspapers* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985).
[54] *The Edinburgh Review*, Vol. 62 (1836), pp. 126-131; See M. Hewitt, *The Dawn of the Cheap Press in Victorian Britain: The End of the 'Taxes on Knowledge', 1848-1869* (London, Bloomsbury, 2013).
[55] J. O. Baylen, 'The British Press, 1861-1918' in D. Griffiths, eds., *The Encyclopaedia of the British Press, 1422-1992* (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1992), p. 33.
[56] S. Eliot, *Some Patterns and Trends in British Publishing, 1800-1919* (London, Bibliographical Society, 1993), p. 202.
[57] S. Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain* (London, Fontana Press, 1990), pp. 1-2.
[58] H. W. Lucy, *Memories of Eight Parliaments* (London, Heinemann, 1908), p. 92; S. Koss, *Political Press in Britain*, pp. 45-46.

government faced an issue like a foreign crisis, regardless of how objectively successful or unsuccessful they were at dealing with it, they would then have to face the press with all its complex and varied political affiliations. All the political aspects of the press affected how strong or weak their support might be. The expanded circulation and popularity of the press alongside its politicised nature during the mid-nineteenth century meant that its power to influence diplomacy was somewhat inevitable. It had made British politics (and politicians themselves) far more accessible to the public than ever before.

Secondly, Members of Parliament (hereafter 'MP') and Lords, faced increasing pressures to discuss British foreign policy as Britain's global supremacy became more apparent (and more public).[59] Diplomacy, trade and empire were becoming more interlinked and important for many across Britain (imagined or otherwise). Diplomacy went hand in hand with empire in all its guises, be it through the idea that a larger empire made for a more powerful nation, or through the belief that empire equalled greater diplomatic prestige.[60] Trade and economic growth were also tied to empire, rightly or wrongly, truthfully or not, alongside diplomacy during this period.[61] British industrialists and merchants desired to produce and sell abroad and/or at home, and empire was part and parcel of this ideal.[62] Empire and diplomacy were further entwined due to ongoing free trade debates, even after the repeal of the Corn Laws in June 1846, with aggressive coercion (later supported by John Bowring) and peaceful (Christian-esque) logic (supported by Richard Cobden) greatly influencing the arguments of the day. The liberalisation of trade in Europe was an enterprise of persuasion, but elsewhere, in China for example, the argument was reduced to free trade via shot and shell.[63] Britain's growing imperialism alongside the developing importance of its global relations meant that

[59] See J. Lowe, *Britain and Foreign Affairs, 1815-1885: Europe and Overseas* (New York, Routledge, 2006).
[60] However, many of those that dealt with empire were certainly not considered diplomats by their contemporaries.
[61] It had long been suspected and later confirmed that much of the British Empire proved to be separated from the economy of the British metropole, with only certain sectors having very significant links and dependencies on empire (which of course alternated over time; expanding and contacting). To paraphrase M. W. Doyle, whilst the empire needed the metropole, in reality, the metropole did not necessarily need the empire; See M. W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 257-305.
[62] P. J. Cain & A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism*, pp. 193-322.
[63] See D. Todd, 'John Bowring and the Global Dissemination of Free Trade', *The Historical Journal*, 51:2 (June 2008), pp. 373-397; See A. Howe, *Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846-1946* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998).

diplomacy could not be left to the private purview of the Foreign Office.[64] Empire and Britain's foreign policy was now a significantly more politicised and public pressing issue, and as J. Darwin states, was forever backed by "…the chaotic pluralism of private and sub-imperial interests [of the nineteenth century]…"[65] It was thanks to these vested interests that empire and Britain's foreign policy played a role in everything from small debates on trade to major political events like general elections.[66] Thus, MPs' (and Lords') desire to wield influence over diplomacy and diplomats only escalated as imperial and diplomatic competition intensified.

1.2. Pluralistic Diplomacy and British Foreign Policy:

'Pluralistic' diplomacy is the concept that diplomatic policy can come from, directly or indirectly, more than one individual, group or institution: in this case, Parliament and the press, as well as the Foreign Office, Diplomatic and Consular Services, and other sources like the Royal Navy for example. Parliament had a complex relationship with diplomacy during the nineteenth century. MPs and Lords acted as diplomatic 'sub-actors' wielding either considerable, partial, or little direct control over foreign policy. This was not a fixed process either because elections, reshuffles, promotions, demotions, and retirements could all alter Parliament's makeup, continuously changing the power dynamics. This was not set in stone either however. Even an MP or Lord (or both in Lord Palmerston's case) appointed as Foreign Secretary could not be assured that they had absolute control. They could have interference from Cabinet and/or the Prime Minister (as Lord Clarendon and later Lord Russell, both Foreign Secretaries, under Lord Palmerston contended with) as well as increasing scrutiny from other MPs and Lords.[67] In fact, the most significant restraint on their freedom of action was the sovereign, Queen Victoria, particularly before the death of her husband, Prince Albert (1819-1861). The press had a comparatively more indirect and loose

[64] See T. G. Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind*.
[65] See J. Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion' *The English Historical Review*, 112:447 (June 1997), pp. 614-642.
[66] S. Smith, 'Imperial Policy' in D. Brown, G. Pentland & R. Crowcroft, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern British Political History, 1800-2000* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 508-525; L. Blaxill, 'Elections' in D. Brown, G. Pentland & R. Crowcroft, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern British Political History, 1800-2000* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 400-417; S. L. Steinbach, *Understanding the Victorians*, p. 35.
[67] For the sake of consistency and simplicity, I will be referring to British nobility by their most commonly associated titles.

association with diplomacy.[68] It was not explicitly a wide grouping of diplomatic sub-actors, though there are certainly examples which contradict this (think of *Times* journalists being used for diplomatic intelligence in Europe).[69] In the case of Anglo-Japanese relations the press was more of an outside (non-state) indirect force, a singular sub-actor in its entirety, that could influence private and public opinion of British foreign policy. The British Press during the eighteenth century could be described as an 'inconvenience' to diplomacy and by the early nineteenth century as more of a 'background influencer' of foreign policy, but by the Victorian period such descriptions are no longer appropriate.[70] The press may have had no specific or unified diplomatic aims or role in diplomacy overall, but the press's increasing popularity and subsequent politicisation meant that it had become a tool by which judgement could be passed on British actions abroad. In summary then, as J. Black has stated, whilst MP's and Lord's in Parliament were more 'episodic' and direct with their diplomatic influence, the press could be more consistent and indirect with theirs.[71] Both the press and Parliament are two groups that have not been granted the same level of study in regards to Anglo-Japanese diplomacy. To rectify this, I will look at the bombardment of Kagoshima and to a lesser extent, the Shimonoseki Campaign, as case studies.

2. China and Brazil in relation to Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy, 1856-1864: Action and Reaction:

2.1. Introduction:

At Kagoshima in 1863, British diplomat, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward St. John Neale, the Chargé d'Affaires (an interim position while Alcock was in London, from May 1862 – March 1864), was advised by the British Government to undertake military action if necessary:

---

[68] It can be easy to both overstate and understate the British Press's diplomatic power in the nineteenth century. For a more qualified discussion on why its diplomatic influence ebbed and flowed so significantly, see D. Brown, 'Diplomacy and the Fourth Estate: The Role of the Press in British Foreign Policy in the Age of Palmerston', in See J. Fisher & A. Best, eds., *On the Fringes of Diplomacy: Influences on British Foreign Policy, 1800-1945* (Farnham, Ashgate, 2011).

[69] T. Weller, *The Victorian information age: nineteenth century answers to today's information policy questions?* (9 June 2010) <http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/the-victorian-information-age-nineteenth-century-answers-to-todays-informat> [Accessed 25 March 2020].

[70] D. Brown, 'Diplomacy and the Fourth Estate', pp. 36-37.

[71] See J. Black, 'Parliament, the Press and Foreign Policy', *Parliamentary History*, 25:1 (2006), pp. 9-16.

You are instructed to ask as reparation from the Japanese Government: -

1. An ample and formal apology for the offense of permitting a murderous attack on British subjects and passing on a road open by Treaty to them.
2. The payment of £100,000, as a penalty on Japan for this offence.

Next you will demand from the Daimio Prince of Satsuma: -

1. The immediate trial and capital execution, in the presence of one or more of Her Majesty's naval officers, of the chief perpetrators of the murder of Mr. Richardson, and of the murderous assault upon the lady and gentlemen who accompanied him.
2. The payment of £25,000, to be distributed to the relations of the murdered man, and to those who escaped with their lives the swords of the assassins on that occasions.

If the Japanese Government should refuse the redress you are thus instructed to demand, you will inform thereof Admiral or Senior Naval Officer on the station, and you will call upon him to adopt such measures of reprisal or blockade, or of both, as he may judge best calculated to attain the end proposed… If the Daimio Satsuma should not immediately agree to and carry into effect the terms demanded of him, the Admiral should go with his own ship, and wish such others as he may think fit to take with him, or he should send a sufficient force to the territory of the Prince… The Admiral or Senior Naval Officer will be better able to judge than Her Majesty's Government can be, whether it will be most expedient to blockade this port, or whether it will be possible or advisable to shell the residence of the Prince.[72]

While the action that ensued, given the refusal of Satsuma to provide redress, was justifiable, the reaction from the press and from Parliament was extreme. The negative reaction was so significant that the British Government under Palmerston directed all its efforts to prevent events spiralling in such a way again. This was not to say that Britain would not demand redress should something similar occur, just that all proper diplomatic avenues would be exhausted first. Britain was to be more patient and diplomatic. This was easier said than done however, with the subsequent incident, Shimonoseki in 1864, highlighting the many

[72] Parliamentary Papers, Japan, No. 1, Russell to Neale, 24 December 1862 [Hereafter 'PP, Japan'].

remaining issues surrounding the tyranny of distance and the power of the man on the spot. The bombardment of Kagoshima that confirmed Parliament's diplomatic sub-actors and the press, as a collective non-state diplomatic sub-actor, influence upon diplomacy ebbed and flowed. While Shimonoseki did not generate the same level of interest that Kagoshima did, within Whitehall it reignited fears of a repeat flashpoint event, generating further development of the new framework of rules and expectations created after Kagoshima. However, before this can be fully understood, we must first consider separate incidents in China and Brazil. These two events helped formulate Parliament and the press's opinion on the later controversial actions of British diplomats in Japan.

2.2. The Chinese Context, 1856-1860:

Mid-nineteenth century Anglo-Chinese relations were not on friendly or equal of terms, with Britain often enforcing its wishes on China in the name of free trade.[73] This was predominantly achieved through Royal Navy ships patrolling the Chinese coastline; a constant reminder of British maritime and military superiority.[74] This was free trade at the point of a gun and not by China's consent; a direct contrast to the idea that free trade should be spread peacefully and by example.[75] It was only recently that Hong Kong had been ceded to Britain and the first five treaty ports were established after the First Opium War ended in 1842.[76] This victory rapidly expanded British involvement in East Asia. Britain sought to protect this newly found economic boon through diplomatic (and military) means. It was this same support that successive British governments struggled to control. This is represented, diplomatically anyway, by the Foreign Office's substantial budget.[77] In 1856 the Foreign Office, the Diplomatic Service, and the Consular Service cost over £229,610 alone, increasing to £256,389 a year later.[78] These budget rises were a symptom of the rising

[73] See P. W. Fay, *The Opium War, 1840-1842, Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forced Her Gates Ajar* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
[74] Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence relating to China, No. 131, Captain Elliot to Palmerston, 13 October 1838 [Hereafter 'PP, China'].
[75] See D. Todd, 'John Bowring and the Global Dissemination of Free Trade', pp. 373-397; See A. Howe, *Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846-1946*.
[76] The five other treaty ports being: Shanghai, Canton, Ningpo, Fuchow, and Amoy; See Parliamentary Papers, Treaty between Her Majesty and The Emperor of China, 29 August 1842 [Hereafter 'PP'].
[77] Whilst alone it was one of the largest department budgets, in the grand scheme of things it was a minuscule part of Britain's expenditure overall. Such was Britain's global power and reach.
[78] PP, Estimates & Civil Services, 31 March 1858.

number of increasingly large diplomatic missions abroad, consequently allowing for more men on the spot to appear. From this point of view the fight for control over British foreign policy seemed like a losing battle for British governments unless numerous changes were made. The events in China, and later Brazil and Japan, were all symptomatic of this diplomatic struggle.

This brings us to the Second Opium War, which lasted from 1856-1860 and only happened due to an incident involving a 'British' ship named the *Arrow* (hence the 'Arrow War').[79] A Chinese sailor was recognised as a 'pirate' aboard the *Arrow* and was subsequently arrested along with others at Canton (modern-day Guangzhou), despite the ship flying a British flag and thus technically not under Chinese jurisdiction.[80] The British acting-consul of Canton, Harry Parkes, was later physically struck after trying to free the arrested sailors himself. It was now perceived that China had insulted the British flag and by extension Britain.[81] The proposed military response to avenge these insults by the men on the spot in question, the fourth Governor of Hong Kong, Sir John Bowring, and Harry Parkes, could not be considered by the Foreign Office thanks to the time delay in communications.[82] This left Parkes and Bowring with the powerful ability to act with little restraint. Bowring viewed empire as a means of enlightening the less civilised to the ideas of free trade. Thus, if challenging the Chinese not only granted Britain redress, but also further undermined their protectionist ways, so be it.[83] Parkes himself called for Royal Navy support before the Chinese official in Canton (Commissioner Yeh) had even responded to his letter demanding recompense.[84] Military action occurred on 14 October after an ultimatum of forty-eight hours ended, but they could only seize a Chinese junk (which was ignored by Chinese authorities), for anything greater would need further approval from Hong Kong.[85] A conference was then held between Parkes, Bowring and Admiral Sir Michael Seymour (Commander of the China Squadron) on how to move forward. Parkes convinced the others to capture the 'barrier forts' along the Pearl River between Whampoa and Canton and that if this did not work, they

[79] J. Y. Wong, 'The 'Arrow' Incident: A Reappraisal', pp. 374-376.
[80] The legality of this is hotly debated, but many historians agree that the Chinese were perhaps more right than wrong; See J. Y. Wong, 'The 'Arrow' Incident: A Reappraisal', pp. 374-376.
[81] J. Y. Wong, 'The 'Arrow' Incident: A Reappraisal', pp. 376-380; See J. Y. Wong, 'Harry Parkes and the 'Arrow' War in China', *Modern Asian Studies*, 9:3 (1975), pp. 303-320.
[82] J. Y. Wong, *Deadly Dreams*, p. 67.
[83] See D. Todd, 'John Bowring and the Global Dissemination of Free Trade', pp. 387-397.
[84] The National Archives, FO 228/213/150, Parkes to Bowring, 8 October 1856 [Hereafter 'TNA'].
[85] J. Y. Wong, 'Harry Parkes and the 'Arrow' War in China', p. 305.

should then capture the city of Canton itself.[86] Bowring was cautious, but Parkes played on Royal Navy officers 'want' for action, playing up Chinese barbarity and the need for 'honourable' reprisals in separate letters to them.[87] The capturing of the forts and bombardment of Canton began on 23 October and lasted until 5 November 1856, incensing the local populace and creating all-out war in the region. Parkes overestimated the reach of the Royal Navy and underestimated the zealous Chinese defence of Canton. In January, Parkes wanted to request further support from Hong Kong, Singapore, and India, but Bowring and Seymour were cautious to avoid further escalation and disagreed.[88] The damage had been done however and what developed into the Second Opium War was retroactively approved of by Palmerston's first administration (1855-1857).[89] Such approval came at a cost and it was this cost that would have ramifications for Anglo-Japanese relations.

2.3. The Press and Parliament's Reaction:

The press's response to the Second Opium War was rather muted. It was considered an unjust and aggressive war unbecoming of Britain, a civilised nation. However, it was also deemed somewhat necessary given China's 'hostile' actions (irrespective of Britain's own hostility) towards foreigners and the wider world. *The Times*, a non-partisan, somewhat centrist, and prolific newspaper, embodied this view wholeheartedly. In early January the paper, rather naively, claimed that with *all* the facts now disclosed China had clearly 'violated' the existing treaty.[90] It admitted that there were issues surrounding Parkes's handling of the initial incident, but it devoted most of the piece on how 'half-civilised' China was and how Britain had no choice but military action.[91] *The Times* continued with this line of thinking in a later issue published on the same day. Stating that China's "…supercilious and insolent bearing…" on British subjects and interests were the prime causes of the brewing conflict.[92]

---

[86] PP, China, Enclosure 1 in No. 5, Consul Parkes to Sir J. Bowring, 23 October 1856; This was effectively a memorandum of the conference between Parkes, Bowring and Seymour; The decision to attack Canton was made with the full knowledge that civilian lives and property would be imperilled.
[87] TNA, FO 228/213/150, Parkes to Bowring, 8 October 1856.
[88] J. Y. Wong, 'Harry Parkes and the 'Arrow' War in China', pp. 306-308; PP, China, Enclosure 3 in No. 5, Consul Parkes to Sir J. Bowring, 22 October 1856.
[89] See G. S. Graham, *The China Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830-1860* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978); This was partly due to Palmerston's historical fondness of Bowring's foreign policy; See D. Todd, 'John Bowring and the Global Dissemination of Free Trade', pp. 373-397
[90] *The Times*, 2 January 1857, p. 6.
[91] *The Times*, 2 January 1857, p. 6.
[92] *The Times*, 2 January 1857, pp. 6-7.

These views from *The Times's* are surprising when you consider the extreme animosity they had towards Palmerston in previous years, especially from the 1830s to the early 1850s.[93] This change of heart can be explained by the papers rapprochement with Palmerston after he joined Lord Aberdeen's Administration as Home Secretary in 1852 (John Delane, the then editor of *The Times* was a great supporter and friend of Lord Aberdeen).[94] This rapprochement did last into the 1860s, but only when it suited Delane's personal interests. This led to a very cordial and profitable relationship for both Delane and Palmerston and disagreements were rare.[95]

Other newspapers viewed China similarly, namely, *The Quarterly Review, The Edinburgh Review* (partly), *The Spectator, The Standard, The Welshman, Aberdeen Journal, Reynold's Newspaper, Huddersfield Chronicle, The Morning Post,* and the *Dundee Courier*.[96] The Conservative leaning paper, *The Era*, summarises them all quite successfully by referencing another controversial overseas escapade in Persia:

> We must turn for the moment from Herat to Canton, from the faithless Persians to the piratical Chinese, and from the Treaty violated by the one country to the Treaty broken by the other. One thing is very evident, we think – that Eastern notions of the sanctity and respect with which international Treaties should be regarded are as lax, if not laxer, than those entertained by at least one of our northern neighbours whom we could name if we desired [i.e., Russia] (*sic*).[97]

The majority of the press here were either directly Conservative or at least Conservative leaning in their views, which is surprising seeing as the Conservatives were not the governing

---

[93] See L. Fenton, 'Origins of Animosity: Lord Palmerston and *The Times*, 1830-41', *Media History*, 16:4 (2010), pp. 365-378; *The Times*, *The History of the Times: "The Thunderer" in the Making, 1785-1841* (London, The Office of *The Times*, 1935), pp. 438-440.
[94] L. Fenton, *Palmerston and The Times: Foreign Policy, the Press and Public Opinion in Mid-Victorian Britain* (London, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), pp. 178-179.
[95] L. Fenton, *Palmerston and The Times*, pp. 204-205.
[96] *The Quarterly* Review, Vol. 102 (1857), p. 157; *The Edinburgh Review*, Vol. 105 (1857), p. 551; *The Spectator*, Vol. 30 (July-December 1857), p. 768; *The Standard*, 15 January 1857, p. 3; *The Welshman*, 2 January 1857, p. 5; *Aberdeen Journal*, 7 January 1857, p. 3; *Reynold's Newspaper*, 4 January 1857, p. 9; *Huddersfield Chronicle*, 10 January 1858, p. 4; *The Morning Post*, 7 January 1857, p. 4; *Dundee Courier*, 18 February 1857, p. 2.
[97] *The Era*, 11 January 1857, p. 8.

party.[98] This is perhaps representative of Palmerston's personal politics and his own jingoistic/opportunistic prime ministerial style; though a Whig/Liberal he held a Populist/Conservative supporting view of foreign policy (a harkening back to his former Tory roots perhaps).[99] It was thus in these press's interests to promote the conflict in a positive light in tandem with the government's aims regardless of any truth or political persuasion. Additionally, the leader of the Conservative Party, the Earl of Derby in the House of Lords, was not yet as adept as Palmerston at galvanising the press's support, which further explains the wider endorsement the China action received here, especially from the Conservative supporting/leaning press.[100] Derby was an exceptional public speaker, but often could not follow through on his political gains, earning him the nickname the 'Rupert of Debate'.[101]

The Radical and Liberal Press worked overtime in their questioning of events however. Most prominently the *Monmouthshire Merlin*, *The Daily News*, *The Morning Chronicle*, *Leeds Mercury*, *Manchester Times*, and the satirical magazine *Punch*.[102] All were filled with dismissive language about the reasoning behind Britain's reprisal against China and Palmerston's retroactive support. Some Conservative backing papers (correctly) doubted that the whole truth of the incident had been properly presented. A sign that despite Palmerston's aforementioned personal Conservative/Populist foreign policy, his actions and the actions of those diplomats supposedly under his control were still controversial (even in regard to a 'barbarous' nation like China).[103] For example, one of the most widely circulated papers in Ireland at the time, *The Belfast News-Letter*, a consistently Conservative newspaper, confessed that they were "…not yet prepared to express any decided opinion about it."[104] The

---

[98] Namely, *The Quarterly Review*, *The Standard*, *Aberdeen Journal*, *The Morning Post* and the *Dundee Courier*.
[99] A. J. P. Taylor, *History Today*, 1:7, July 1951 <https://www.historytoday.com/archive/british-prime-ministers-lord-palmerston> [Accessed 9 March 2020].
[100] P. Brighton, *Original Spin: Downing Street and the Press in Victorian Britain* (London, I.B. Tauris, 2016), p. 105.
[101] Named after Prince Rupert of the Rhine, Duke of Cumberland (1619-1682). It comes from a poem by Edward Bulwer-Lytton, later Lord Lytton, called *The New Timon*, which characterised Derby as 'aloof, impetuous, and a perennial juvenile'; A. Hawkins, *The Forgotten Prime Minister, the 14th Earl of Derby: Ascent, 1799-1851* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 4; See also A. Hawkins, *The Forgotten Prime Minister, the 14th Earl of Derby: Achievement, 1851-1869* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008).
[102] *Monmouthshire Merlin*, 3 January 1857, p. 4; *The Daily News*, 21 January 1857, p. 2; *The Morning Chronicle*, 31 March 1857, p. 2; *Leeds Mercury*, 8 January 1857, p. 2; *Manchester Times*, 28 February 1857, p. 5; *Punch*, 14 March 1857, p. 108.
[103] See M. E. Chamberlain, *Lord Palmerston* (Cardiff, GPC Books, 1987).
[104] *The Belfast News-Letter*, 12 January 1857, p. 2.

popular Conservative periodical, *John Bull*, similarly stated its hope that "…we shall be able to show clean hands in the matter."[105] Another Conservative paper in Wales, *The North Wales Chronicle and Advertiser for the Principality*, went further and stated that actions taken by British diplomats were 'unprofitable' and 'not warranted'.[106] Overall, the press were split relatively evenly, though along political lines thanks to Palmerston's conservative populism and Lord Derby's media ineptitude. The press's effect here was somewhat muted compared to Brazil and Kagoshima, for despite some backlash, no substantive avalanche of pressure materialised. However, they did bring the problem of diplomatic agents and their power to control foreign policy outside of government direction to the fore.[107] A precedent was set and it was now a matter of how long this sort of diplomatic procedure would be tolerated in the public eye, and as the events in Brazil and Kagoshima will show, it was not tolerated for long.

In comparison, what happened in Parliament was nothing short of a political storm. The main parliamentary reaction occurred in late February/early March through two debates: one in the House of Lords, lasting from 24 - 26 February, and one in the House of Commons, lasting from 26 February - 3 March. Both Conservative opposition MPs and Lords united with Whig/Liberal rebels in their condemnation of events still unfolding in China. China had created the opportunity for all of Palmerston's political opponents to coalesce, something that would be repeated the next time Palmerston's Administration became involved in a questionable foreign escapade. In the first Lords debate, the Conservative leader Earl Derby cleverly switched the 'roles' of China and Britain, emphasising that Britain was now the barbaric power acting irrationally:

> I am an advocate in a cause which I believe to be that of policy, of justice, and of humanity. I am an advocate for weakness against power, for perplexed and bewildered barbarism against the arrogant demands of overweening, self-styled civilization. I am an advocate for the feeble defencelessness of China against the overpowering might of Great Britain… Not only are all commercial operations put a stop to – but at this moment, without any warrant from the Crown, without

[105] *John Bull*, 3 January 1857, p. 8.
[106] *The North Wales Chronicle and Advertiser for the Principality*, 10 January 1857, p. 8.
[107] They made public the severe consequences that this could lead to (i.e., a war that would last for four years) irrespective of whether they supported or disavowed British diplomatic actors' actions or not.

> any declaration, you are in a state of actual war with China; and that war is carried on with a degree of aggravation and severity which do not usually accompany civilised warfare. You have had seizures of merchant junks; you have had the capture and destruction of the forts of a friendly Power; you have had a walled, but not a fortified, city battered with cannon, and stormed through what is termed a practicable breach; you have had a whole fleet of war junks seized by the superior power of this country; you have had private residences fired upon by order of a British Admiral; you have had a defenceless town bombarded and shelled by British men-of-war. I ask your Lordships, is this a state of things which you can justify to yourselves, one which Parliament can justify to the country, or which can be passed over in silence without demanding explanations, if they can be given, from the Ministry? And if no sufficient explanation be given, then I call upon your Lordships to stamp this state of things with your strongest reprobation and to denounce such conduct as unworthy of officials of the British Crown (*sic*).[108]

It was a compelling speech, receiving praise from a young William Gladstone, one of Derby's critics, who stated that it was a "…very powerful and admirable speech".[109] Many others voiced support for Derby's argument, including some long time Conservative lords (e.g., Lord Lyndhurst and Lord Carnarvon) and even many Whig/Liberal lords (i.e., Lord Grey) who rebelled against the government.[110] When it came to a vote, Derby's resolution criticising the government, was only defeated by a majority of thirty-six votes, which was certainly smaller than Palmerston would have liked. The 'grand onslaught', as diarist and Clerk to the Privy Council Charles Greville named it, had begun against Palmerston and it would not end in the Lords.[111]

---

[108] House of Lords, *Resolutions Moved Debate Adjourned* (24 February 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1155-1157) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed 10 March 2020].
[109] H. C. G. Mathew, eds., *The Gladstone Diaries: Volume V, 1855-1860* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 201.
[110] House of Lords, *Resolutions Moved Debate Adjourned* (24 February 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1212-1220 and 1233-1238) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed 10 March 2020]; House of Lords, *Resolutions Moved Debate Adjourned (Second Night)* (26 February 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1311-1321) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed 10 March 2020].
[111] C. Greville, *A Journal of the Reigns of King George IV, King William IV and Queen Victoria, Vol. 8* (London, Longman Green & Co., 1898), p. 93.

The House of Commons debates were sparked by Radical MP, William Cobden, whose negative view of British diplomacy and opinion that empire was contrary to the promotion of peaceable free trade was nothing new.[112] His speech's conclusion was particularly apt:

> I hope we shall not hear it said in this House – as it has been in another place [referencing the Lords, particularly Lord Cranworth's comments, the Lord Chancellor] – that these are barbarous people, and that you must deal with them by force. I tell you that if you attempt to deal thus with them, it will be a difficult matter, and one, too, that will be costly to the people of this country… Sir, are these people so barbarous that we should attempt to coerce them by force into granting what we wish? Here is an empire in which is the only relic of the oldest civilization of the world... You find them not as barbarians at home, where they cultivate all the arts and sciences, and where they have carried all, except one, to a point of perfection but little below our own – but that one is war… Now, there must be something in such a people deserving of respect. If in speaking of them we stigmatize them as barbarians, and threaten them with force because we say they are inaccessible to reason, it must be because we do not understand them; because their ways are not our ways, nor our ways theirs. Now, is not so venerable an empire as that deserving of some sympathy – at least of some justice – at the hands of conservative England? To the representatives of the people in this House I commend this question, with full confidence that they will do justice to that people (*sic*).[113]

Here Cobden emphasises China and Britain's similarities, focusing on how the Chinese are not as barbaric as popularly depicted (but only to a point) and that it is Britain who appears the more uncivilised. The emphasis here was as much about how barbaric this was for China as it was about how barbaric this made Britain appear to be. Cobden was soon seconded, and quickly found cross-party support. For example, Conservative MPs Sir James Graham, James

---

[112] See W. Dawson, *William Cobden*; D. Read, *Cobden and Bright: A Victorian Political Partnership* (London, Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd, 1967), pp. 132-137; J. Morley, *The Life of Richard Cobden, Vol. 2* (London, MacMillan and Co, 1908), pp. 165-172; D. Todd, 'John Bowring and the Global Dissemination of Free Trade', p. 387; See A. Howe, *Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846-1946*, pp. 70-110.

[113] House of Commons, *Resolutions Moved Debate Adjourned* (26 February 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1420-1421) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed 9 March 2020].

Whiteside, Samuel Warren, Sir Thomas Herbert, Benjamin Disraeli and even Whig/Liberal/Peelite politicians William Gladstone, Sir Thomas Erskine Perry, and Sidney Herbert to name a few. They all echoed similar arguments to Cobden, citing topics like legality, brutality, war without just cause, diplomatic accountability, the dangers of foreign entanglements, war weariness and other things.[114] According to D. Todd, most ministers were lukewarm about shielding Bowring (and Parkes) from criticism, with only Palmerston coming to his defence.[115] By the time a vote was called it was clear to Palmerston's Administration that the tide had turned, even despite the discussed support from many press outlets.

Parliament had had enough of Palmerston and the free reign he allowed himself and the Foreign Office over foreign affairs. The government was defeated by a slim majority of sixteen votes, eventually leading to his government's collapse and the General Election of 1857.[116] Palmerston may have still won that election by playing up British nationalism and jingoism (and his own public popularity), but across Parliament there was no longer significant appetite for letting British diplomats conduct themselves near autonomously, nor any sign of allowing any government accept their independent conduct abroad so readily. The dangers of diplomats orchestrating their own policy or choosing which 'bits' of British foreign policy to act on had become starkly apparent with the China affair. This only became more apparent as the war dragged on until 1860, climaxing with the infamous burning of the Summer Palace(s).[117] This event caused similar consternation and notoriety, and sparked further debates around violence towards foreign property and civilians.[118] All of which proved to be highly pertinent for the bombardment of Kagoshima. Again, in a similar vein to

---

[114] House of Commons, *Resolutions Moved Debate Adjourned* (26 February 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1456-1463) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed 9 March 2020]; House of Commons, *Resolutions Moved Debate Adjourned (Second Night)* (27 February 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1496-1503, 1518-1531, and 1565-1569) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed 9 March 2020]; House of Commons, *Resolutions Moved Debate (Third Night)* (2 March 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1667-1680) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed 9 March 2020]; House of Commons, *Resolutions Moved Debate (Fourth Night)* (3 March 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1787-1809 and 1834-1840) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed 9 March 2020].

[115] D. Todd, 'John Bowring and the Global Dissemination of Free Trade', pp. 395-396.

[116] W. D. Jones, *Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1956), p. 218.

[117] See PP, Treaties between Her Majesty and The Emperor of China with Rules for Trade and Tariff of Duties, 1861.

[118] See E. Ringmar, *Liberal Barbarism: The European Destruction of the Palace of the Emperor of China* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); *Leeds Mercury*, 11 December 1860, p. 2; *Shields Daily Gazette*, 3 January 1861, p. 4; *Illustrated Times*, 28 June 1862, p. 142.

the press's reaction to all of this, the parliamentary reaction had set a precedent for the future, although in a much more decisive way. I would say that the only reason things were not worse for Palmerston's Administration was that while China was ultimately recognised as a major power, it was still perceived as an uncivilised/semi-civilised nation, even despite opinions/speeches to the contrary. Thus, China was uncivilised enough to be ridiculed and bullied through gunboat diplomacy, but not insignificant enough that Britain could 'get away with it'.

2.4. The Brazilian Context, 1861-1863:

Brazil was a relatively young country, but crucially, like many nations in Central and South America during this period, was firmly tied to the British Empire (as part of Britain's 'informal' empire).[119] The price for Brazil's independence in 1822 was considerable due to demands from Portugal (as the chief 'loser') and Britain (as the chief 'mediator'). It included £2,000,000 (roughly £325,000,000 today) to Portugal, most favoured nation status for Britain, and additional 'special concessions' that made Brazil a *de facto* British Protectorate (until 1844 when Brazil refused to renew much of this relationship).[120] By the 1860s Brazil was the biggest market for British goods and finance in South America. In 1861 alone the value of British exports to Brazil was estimated at around £4,690,875; considerably more than any other South American nation and even more than some European states like Prussia, Portugal, and Spain.[121] Brazil was also a significant exporter to Britain; over a third of British raw cotton imports came from Brazil by the 1850s for example.[122] However, steadily increasing foreign and domestic competition led to decreased fortunes for British commerce

[119] See R. Miller, *Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London, Routledge, 1993); See A. K. Manchester, *British Pre-eminence in Brazil: A Study in European Expansion* (New York, Octagon Books, 1972); See R. A. Humphreys, 'British Merchants and South American Independence', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 51 (1965), pp. 151-174; See A. Thompson, 'Informal Empire? An Exploration in the History of Anglo-Argentine Relations, 1810-1914', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 24:2 (1992), pp. 419-436; See P. Winn, 'British Informal Empire in Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century', *Past & Present*, 73 (1976), pp. 100-126; See H. J. Heath, 'British Merchant Houses in Mexico, 1821-1860: Conforming Business Practices and Ethics', *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 73:2 (1993), pp. 261-290; See M. Brown, eds., *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008).
[120] J. H. Rodrigues, 'The Foundations of Brazil's Foreign Policy', *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 38:3 (July 1962), pp. 324-325.
[121] PP, Annual Statement of the Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British Possessions in the Year 1861, 1862.
[122] R. Hyam, *Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion* (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 56 & p. 60.

in Brazil. Many South American nations, including Brazil, also began introducing protectionist policies to develop their own wealth and industry. In other words, while they remained happy to accept British investment and finance, they were not so happy to be forced to buy British goods at inflated prices and export their own goods at deflated prices.[123] The Royal Navy's reach deterred any immediate changes, but nothing could stop such changes ultimately happening. This downturn of fortunes for British influence and trade led to concern and friction among British diplomats and ministers over how to properly react.[124] Despite this, nothing happened as British diplomacy in South America was not proactive. Diplomacy was often static due to the Foreign Office's apparent disinterest in the region and British diplomat's perception of the area as a 'graveyard' where your career perished.[125]

Tensions with Brazil had been simmering since the Aberdeen Act in 1845 as well. The act granted Royal Navy vessels authority to stop and search any ship suspected of carrying slaves and for ship owners to be tried in British courts.[126] This was widely seen as an affront to Brazilian sovereignty, which it was.[127] What came to be known as the 'Christie Affair' happened within this environment of increasing Anglo-Brazilian animosity.[128] In December 1862, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary (since 1859) to the Empire of Brazil, William Christie, a hubristic and somewhat domineering diplomat who had already frustrated the Brazilian Government over the slave trade issue, ordered a naval blockade of Rio de Janeiro by Rear-Admiral Richard Warren.[129] This was a reprisal for Brazil's failure to pay Britain compensation for the plundering of a British merchant vessel (and 'supposed' murder of some of its crew), *The Prince of Wales*, after it sank off the Brazilian coast in June 1861,

---

[123] L. Bethell, *Brazil: Essays on History and Politics* (London, Institute of Latin American Studies, 2018), pp. 71-75.
[124] R. Hyam, *Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914*, p. 61; See D. C. M. Platt, 'British diplomacy in Latin America since the emancipation', *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 21 (1967), pp. 21-44.
[125] R. Hyam, *Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914*, p. 61.
[126] See PP, Correspondence on the Slave Trade with Foreign Powers, 1844; See PP, Correspondence on the Slave Trade with Foreign Powers, 1845; See PP, Papers relating to the Convention between Great Britain and Brazil on Slave Trade, 23 July 1845.
[127] See L. Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970).
[128] The substantial lack of respect and hostility towards Lusophone (and Hispanophone) nations probably also played a role in British attitudes towards Brazil here. See the Chargés d'Affaires Chapter.
[129] L. Bethell, *Brazil: Essays on History and Politics*, p. 79; Available were the HMS *Forte*, HMS *Satellite*, HMS *Stromboli*, HMS *Curlew*, HMS *Ardent*, HMS *Doterel*, HMS *Sheldrake*, and the HMS *Spider* (it also assumed that the HMS *Leopard* and the HMS *Sutlej* were apparently there before being ordered elsewhere); Parliamentary Papers, Brazil, No. 71, Mr. Christie to Russell, 24 December 1862 [Hereafter, 'PP, Brazil'].

and for the 'alleged' mistreatment of some Royal Navy officers from the HMS *Forte* accused of misconduct in Rio de Janeiro in June 1862.[130] The Brazilian government ordered a thorough investigation of *The Prince of Wales* wreck and the circumstances surrounding the arrest of British sailors to satisfy everyone involved. Seven culprits were found concerning the wreck and Brazil made clear its intention to prosecute them. Regarding the Royal Navy officers, they gathered thirteen depositions which supported their argument that those officers had been drunk and disorderly (and when discovered to be British sailors, immediately released).[131] All of this was ignored by Christie when he reported his version of events to the Foreign Office, who then instructed him to use the Royal Navy and extract reprisals.[132] Here, Christie took advantage of the tyranny of distance as the man on the spot to grant himself power over the situation as he *saw* fit, completely ignoring Brazil's efforts to temper the situation. The affair only lasted for six days and resulted in only five seized Brazilian merchant ships because of Brazil's rapid acquiescence (which they did under extreme protest).[133] Brazil's resistance elsewhere went so far that they ceased all diplomatic relations with Britain in May 1863 (lasting until September 1865) however. It ultimately, by dual agreement from Brazil and Britain (with some mediation from Portugal), went into arbitration, with Belgium under King Leopold II deciding in Brazil's favour.[134]

2.5. The Press and Parliament's Reaction:

Some examples of the negative press reaction include *The Standard*, *The Times*, *Aberdeen Journal*, and *The Era*.[135] *The Times*, which although a centrist paper and somewhat 'approving' of the actions taken by the Foreign Office (but not Christie), wasted no time in discussing the dishonour in trying to coerce and bully a small civilised power like Brazil.[136] A line it took in order to appear critical, but remain somewhat supportive of Palmerston's Administration overall. The Conservative leaning, *Aberdeen Journal*, was dismissive of

[130] L. Bethell, *Brazil: Essays on History and Politics*, p. 79.
[131] PP, Brazil, No. 27, Mr. Christie to Russell, 5 May 1862; PP, Brazil, No. 45, Mr. Christie to Russell, 7 August 1862.
[132] PP, Brazil, No. 70, Mr. Christie to Russell, 15 December 1862.
[133] PP, Brazil, No. 72, Mr. Christie to Russell, 8 January 1863.
[134] L. Bethell, *Brazil: Essays on History and Politics*, p. 79.
[135] *The Standard*, 7 February 1863, p. 5; *The Standard*, 9 February 1863, p. 3; *The Standard*, 18 February 1863, p. 6; *The Standard*, 26 February 1863, p. 4; *The Times*, 1 June 1863, p. 8; *Aberdeen Journal*, 11 March 1863, p. 8; *The Era*, 15 February 1863, p. 9.
[136] *The Times*, 1 June 1863, p. 8.

certain MPs hounding the government's handling of events, but still found time to acknowledge that Russell's dealings with 'lesser powers' had adopted a worrying pattern of arrogance.[137] The Conservative-esque paper, *The Era*, went further and hoped that soon to be published foreign correspondence would show a disposition against Russell authorising any violence (they were to be disappointed).[138] It encapsulated negative press feeling towards the entire affair with its final remarks on how Brazil, a friendly power, employing significant British labour and capital, a 'liberal power' with a desire to self-improve, should have guaranteed Brazil the most considerate treatment from Britain regardless.[139] These three papers, and *The Standard*, had all broadly supported Palmerston's first Administration's handling of China, despite the more confusing and illegal characteristics of that event. Yet here, we see change, partly because another confusingly mishandled foreign dispute had occurred once more, but also due to the different circumstances surrounding Brazil when compared to China (with Brazil being more 'civilised' or 'westernised' by comparison).

There was some support for the government and William Christie from the press, namely, *The Welshman*, *Reynold's Newspaper* (somewhat neutral), *Huddersfield Chronicle* (also somewhat neutral), *Leeds Mercury*, *The Belfast News-Letter*, and *The Bradford Observer* (a Liberal paper with an extremely negative view of Brazil, its status, and racial makeup).[140] However, the predominant view was still profusely negative overall. For example, *The Cardiff Times* (Liberal leaning), *The Pembrokeshire Herald and General Advertiser* (Conservative), *Monmouthshire Merlin*, *The Morning Post* (though negative, was mainly indifferent), *The Daily News* (highlighted the commercial unhappiness with Christie), *York Herald* (Whig/Liberal leaning), *Liverpool Daily Post* (non-aligned politically), *Westmorland Gazette* (Conservative supporting; highly critical of the entire affair), *Liverpool Mercury* (Strongly Liberal), *Western Times* (Liberal; negative, but mainly neutral), *Examiner* (known for its radicalism pre-1865), and *Punch* magazine.[141]

---

[137] *Aberdeen Journal*, 11 March 1863, p. 8.
[138] PP, Brazil, No. 61, Russell to Mr. Christie, 4 November 1862; PP, Brazil, No. 62, Russell to Mr. Christie, 8 November 1862.
[139] *The Era*, 15 February 1863, p. 9.
[140] *The Welshman*, 13 February 1863, p. 3; *Reynold's Newspaper*, 7 June 1863, p. 2; *Huddersfield Chronicle*, 7 February 1863, p. 3; *Leeds Mercury*, 9 February 1963, p. 2; *The Bradford Observer*, 4 June 1863, p. 4.
[141] *The Cardiff Times*, 31 July 1863, p. 5; *The Pembrokeshire Herald and General Advertiser*, 13 February 1863, p. 4; *Monmouthshire Merlin*, 7 February 1863, p. 1; *The Morning Post*, 21 February 1863, p. 6; *The Morning Post*, 18 June 1863, p. 3; *The Morning Post*, 21 June 1863, p. 5; *The Daily News*, 9 February 1863, p. 3; *York Herald*, 6 June 1863, p. 11; *Liverpool Daily Post*, 15 April 1863, p.

The periodical *John Bull* summaries their disapproval with its particularly scathing view of the incident:

> Downing-street is as true as ever to its old character under a Palmerston and Russell Administration. Our Foreign Office is in its glory… Mr. Christie had applied for express instructions from his Government. So that this is not the case of a hot-headed Briton in a far-off country, who must be supported (as was said for Sir John Bowring)… However, Mr. Christie, we suspect, is just the right agent when a little bit of bullying is wanted… The Brazilian Government conducted itself throughout with the most praiseworthy calmness and moderation; and ultimately an arrangement was concluded… We can only say, that unless England promptly insists on repudiating the whole transaction, she will deserve to have her honour dragged through the dirt, at regularly recurring intervals, through the agency of a permanent Palmerston Administration (*sic*).[142]

Whilst permission to use force was not forthrightly given, Christie was instructed by Russell to extract compensation and technically therefore had the authority to punish Brazil should said compensation not be forthcoming (which he did).[143] A fact repeated by both Palmerston and Russell in Parliament as part of their defence of *their* British foreign policy.[144] Parliament's reaction was rather dismissive of this defence and due to the evolving nature of the affair, held several small debates during 1863. The Conservative opposition was highly critical and raised issues surrounding accountability. Lord Derby was concerned over how the Brazil Government's publications highlighted Brazilian innocence much more than what had been stated publicly by the British Government. He demanded that the promised publication of British documents be more forthcoming to back their opposing claims.[145] Once published

---

7; *Westmorland Gazette*, 14 February 1863, p. 2; *Liverpool Mercury*, 2 February 1863, p. 7; *Liverpool Mercury*, 13 March 1863, p. 6; *Western Times*, 8 March 1863, p. 1; *Examiner*, 14 March 1863, p. 162; *Punch*, 14 February 1863, p. 63; *Punch*, 28 February 1863, p. 82.

[142] *John Bull*, 7 February 1863, pp. 88-89.

[143] See. W. D. Christie, *Notes on Brazilian Questions* (London, MacMillan and CO, 1865).

[144] House of Commons, *Question* (7 May 1863, Vol. 170, Cols. 1304-1130) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 27 March 2020]; House of Lords, *Brazil – Papers Moved For* (19 June 1863, Vol. 171, Cols. 1137-1146) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 27 March 2020].

[145] House of Lords, *Brazil – Dispute with the Brazilian Government* (17 February 1863, Vol. 169, Cols. 367-372) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 3 April 2020].

things only worsened however. A former Lord Chancellor, Lord Chelmsford, in the Lords, questioned the Brazilian Government's liability and tore apart the compensation asked for by Britain. He raised the issue of the 'murdered' sailors being an accusation with little tangible evidence, noting further that despite this and their probable legal innocence in the matter, Brazil still acquiesced to pay Britain (under protest).[146] Russell's response was evasive and somewhat repetitive, with Chelmsford humorously interrupting him and garnering the intervention of Lord Malmesbury, who noted the differences between what he had seen in documents and heard in Russell's statements to the house.[147]

Parliamentary feeling is perhaps best described in a speech by Malmesbury from a previous debate in June:

> The pride of the English citizen should be that he belongs to a nation in the vanguard of civilization – a civilization founded on respect for municipal and international law. But, translated as the noble Viscount [Palmerston] translates it, it would appear "*Civis Romanus sum*" means I am an Englishman, and when abroad I mean to do what I like [referencing Palmerstons infamous *Don Pacifico* speech]… I will not for a moment believe what has been said by speakers in another place and by some of the newspapers, that the noble Earl has two measures – one for the weak and another for the strong. But assuming that he has only one measure, observe the danger we are in. If the policy of the noble Earl, as now exercised by some of his subordinates, were carried out on the coast of some powerful country, and suppose that one of our vessels were wrecked on the coast of a distant colony of France or Russia, if Mr. Christie, Mr. Vereker [Consul], and Admiral Warren were on the coast of Russia or France, what in that case would have happened? Why, inevitably there would have been war. We should now have had the cannon thundering at both ends of the Channel, If, therefore, the noble Earl has but one measure for all, see the risk we run of being brought into

[146] House of Lords, *Brazil – The "Prince of Wales" – Claim Of Compensation* (14 July 1863, Vol. 172, Cols. 731-738) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 3 April 2020].
[147] House of Lords, *Brazil – The "Prince of Wales" – Claim Of Compensation* (14 July 1863, Vol. 172, Cols. 738-747) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 3 April 2020].

> collision any day with some Great Power. I think, then, that the noble Earl has made a great mistake (*sic*).[148]

The treatment of Brazil, a minor power, was indeed terrible, and the Foreign Office's apparent laissez-faire attitude was concerning, but diplomats once again having greater power in decision making than they potentially should (and the British Government 'appearing' to be fine with that) was the key issue. Malmesbury's final comments, though perhaps more prophetic for another foreign crisis in the early twentieth century, certainly applied to Kagoshima as well. The affair was not anywhere near as damaging for Palmerston's Second Administration (1859-1865) as China was to his first, but it provoked memories of China and how British diplomats handled and understood British foreign policy. Brazil was eventually made more damaging due its poor timing however, with the bombardment of Kagoshima occurring not long after in August 1863. China, despite its 'barbarism', was deemed to be a largely innocent uncivilised/semi-civilised great power that Britain had taken advantage of, and Brazil, a *minor* power, had been poorly treated despite its civilised status. Consequently, with Britain then bombarding Japan, a minor (remote) *and* an uncivilised/semi-civilised nation, not long after events in Brazil and China, with no significant public/private role in British foreign policy, it is no wonder that backlash was so severe by comparison. Additionally, naval bombardments in years past had also made British society aware of the dangers that could arise when military matters collide with civilian ports and coastal cities. The naval bombardments of Copenhagen (1807), Barcelona (1842), Messina (1848), and Canton (1856-1857) had called into question its legality and if it was a justifiable and/or moral means of recourse.[149] In this context both Parliament and the press were now more sensitive to the fact that Britain was unable to effectively control how diplomats conducted British diplomacy abroad. The issue had been laid bare and could not be forgotten so easily.

---

[148] House of Lords, *Brazil – Papers Moved For* (19 June 1863, Vol. 171, Cols. 1132-1137) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 3 April 2020]; Also see G. Hicks, 'Don Pacifico, Democracy, and Danger: The Protectionist Party critique of British Foreign Policy, 1850-1852', *International History Review*, 26:3 (2004), pp. 515-540.

[149] *Chester Chronicle*, 27 November 1807, p. 5; *The Morning Chronicle*, 30 November 1842, p. 2; *Exeter and Plymouth Gazette*, 17 December 1842, p. 3; *Cheltenham Chronicle*, 22 December 1842, p.1; *Dundee Courier*, 2 February 1848, p. 1; *The Morning Chronicle*, 18 September 1848; p. 5; *Sheffield and Rotherham Independent*, 30 September 1848, p. 7; *Manchester Times*, 10 April 1849; *Leeds Mercury*, 30 December 1856, p. 2; *The Sheffield Daily Telegraph*, 31 December 1856, p. 2; *The Morning Chronicle*, 2 January 1857, p. 5; See E. Ringmar, *Liberal Barbarism: The European Destruction of the Palace of the Emperor of China*.

3. The Bombardment of Kagoshima, the Shimonoseki Campaign and British Foreign Policy in Japan after 1864:

3.1. Introduction:

The issues that arose from Kagoshima and Shimonoseki meant that British affairs in Japan had to radically change. Any sense of 'normality' that could be applied to Anglo-Japanese relations before 1863 could not be repeated. The bombardment of Kagoshima was the main event, which although nominally approved by the Foreign Office, was caused by events out of their control and orchestrated by the diplomat on the ground, Neale. Although 'successful' it created a storm in the press and in Parliament. The backlash was so strong that Britain's entire Japanese policy was called into doubt and in the aftermath of China and Brazil, it was clear that things needed to change. Russell decided that diplomats in Japan specifically needed to be on a shorter, tighter leash. Most diplomats, like Neale, understood this new directive and sought to frame their subsequent actions in light of this new policy. Some diplomats still tried to pursue diplomacy as they saw fit, despite understanding Russell's new directive. Alcock, retaking his position as senior diplomat in Japan from Neale, was guilty of this when he pushed for the bombardment of Shimonoseki. Again, although entirely successful (and in no way as controversial for Parliament and the press compared to Kagoshima) and arguably warranted, it created a problem for the Foreign Office. Despite Russell's repeated wishes that any kind of military reprisal be an extreme last resort, Alcock went ahead regardless. The effect of Shimonoseki was that it reaffirmed the previous changes made to British foreign policy in Japan by Kagoshima more forthrightly. From 1864 onwards diplomacy in Japan took on a more conciliatory and cooperative tone, a far cry from the diplomacy usually undertaken in some far-off corner of the globe.[150]

[150] This is not to say that Alcock was not conciliatory towards the Japanese, he was, in many respects, but that after 1864 this approach was stressed as the new norm. Parkes, although strident and occasionally domineering at times during his exchanges with the Japanese, accepted this diplomatic change. His more 'aggressive diplomacy' would appear post-1868.

3.2. The Namamugi Affair and the Bombardment of Kagoshima:

The bombardment of Kagoshima was caused by the 'Namamugi Affair' on 14 September 1862.[151] This incident occurred during several other high-profile attacks and murders of British and foreign personnel.[152] It involved three British merchants, and a merchant's sister-in-law, travelling along the Tōkaidō to visit the *Kawasaki Daishi* Temple.[153] This was the busiest road in Japan as it connected much of southern Japan directly to Edo (Tokyo).[154] Therefore, many southern Daimyō (feudal lords) used the *Tōkaidō* to get to their Edo residences.[155] Whilst travelling along the *Tōkaidō*, the four Britons encountered the regent and father (Prince Shimazu Hisamitsu) of the Daimyō of Satsuma (Prince Shimazu Tadayoshi) and his baggage train; they, on horseback, rode alongside the procession in the opposite direction until they reached the main body and moved to the side of the road. The four Britons were repeatedly motioned to dismount, but only did so when they reached the main body and moved aside.[156] There is much discussion about their lack of Japanese, knowledge of Japanese etiquette and/or culture, and Victorian disregard for local customs, especially around Richardson himself, but whatever the underlying causes the Satsuma response would inevitably be violent.[157] The prince's samurai retainers viewed the four

[151] I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon* (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1995), pp. 143-158.
[152] M. Asakawa, 'From Pupils to Partners' in I. Gow, Y. Hirama & J. Chapman, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 3: The Military Dimension* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2003), pp. 14-15; M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 91.
[153] Shōko Shūsei-kan, *Satsuei-Sensō 150-Nen – Mae no Hama no Sen* (Kagoshima, Shōko Shūsei-kan, 2013), pp. 15-17.
[154] The *de facto* capital of the Bakufu (the Japanese Government)/Tokugawa Shogunate.
[155] See J. Traganou, *The Tōkaidō Road: Travelling and Representation in Edo and Meiji Japan* (London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
[156] There are several differing, confused accounts over what they actually did, but this is the most commonly reported version of events.
[157] See A. Daniels, 'Murder, Misunderstandings, and Might. Mid-Nineteenth Century Confrontation between Britain and Satsuma', *研究紀要*, 34 (2003), pp. 143-154; In R. Morton's study of Alcock, he lists some of the encounters that Alcock and compatriot foreigners went through along the *Tōkaidō*, including one example involving Alcock and the Dutch Minister being pushed aside into a ditch by the Satsuma Daimyō's procession; R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, p. 95; There is also a great deal of discourse about Richardson himself and his not so diplomatic demeanour whilst in East Asia. For example, both Richardson's uncle and the then British Minister Plenipotentiary to China supposedly remembered him for his arrogance; See F. Reichert, "Mord in Namamugi," *Damals*, 45:3 (2013), pp. 66–69; Richardson was only in East Asia, like so many young men, to make his wealth. In Richardson's case, it was also to pay for his family and problematic father; R. S. G. Fletcher & R. Hellyer, eds., *Chronicling Westerners in Nineteenth-Century East Asia*, pp. 1-14; Also see R. S. G. Fletcher's magnificent recent book analysing Richardson and his related incidents; See R. S. G. Fletcher, *The Ghost of Namamugi*.

Britons actions as deeply disrespectful and exacted a just punishment according to their laws and traditions.[158] Three merchants, Charles Richardson, Woodthorpe Clark, and William Marshall, were wounded (Marshall's sister-in-law, Mrs Borradaile, went unharmed), one, Richardson, was severely wounded and fell while fleeing from his horse.[159] The prince subsequently gave permission for his samurai to 'complete the kill'.[160] The initial shock to this attack among the treaty ports, especially for Yokohama residents, was palpable.[161] Panic ensued and arms were found for what would have been an ill-thought-out venture looking for revenge, perhaps leading to all-out war, but to Neale's credit, he took his time, calmed tempers, and awaited instruction from the Foreign Office.[162] An immediate crisis had been adverted, but the danger of war still lingered.

Neale was informed to demand £100,000 from the Bakufu (roughly a third of their annual revenue) as compensation for failing to prevent Richardson's death. From Satsuma Britain demanded £25,000, a formal apology, and that the retainers responsible be executed in the presence of a British representative.[163] Russell also instructed Neale to use the China Squadron should either power prove unwilling to cooperate.[164] The Bakufu dangerously dithered, with Winchester in Yokohama informing Neale that war felt increasingly likely, but after five deadline extensions and the China Squadron's threat to Edo, they finally paid on 24 June 1863.[165] The Shogunate's reasoning for the delays, according to Eusden, the Japan Secretary, was that the Emperor had ordered them not to pay, that also they 'feared an

---

[158] See *kiri-sute gomen*, which translates literally as: "authorisation to cut and leave [the body of the victim]."
[159] H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan, 1862-1877: British Medical Pioneer* (London, The Athlone Press, 1985), p. 29.
[160] J. Denny, *Respect and Consideration*, p. 84; R. S. G. Fletcher, *The Ghost of Namamugi*, pp. 3-5; Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu* (Tokyo, Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 2004), pp. 154-159.
[161] The foreign community, especially in Yokohama, would remain shocked over Richardson's murder for some time. He would effectively become a martyr for them; See R. S. G. Fletcher, *The Ghost of Namamugi*, pp. 89-116.
[162] *The Japan Herald*, No. 83, 26 September 1863, p. 99.
[163] Satsuma was technically a semi-independent polity under the suzerainty of the Bakufu (and also the actual guilty party involved), thus the separate demands; I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 156.
[164] PP, Japan, No. 1, Russell to Neale, 24 December 1862.
[165] M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 96; I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 156; PP, Japan, Winchester to Neale, 4 May 1863; Interestingly, the first two extensions were granted after discussions with the American Minister Pruyn first, who the Japanese asked to mediate, supposedly because in the American Treaty with Japan, it required them to mediate with European powers on Japan's behalf if asked, and second, because of the French Admiral, who was able to temper British impatience; *The New York Times*, 6 July, p. 3; *The New York Times*, 12 July, p. 4.

outburst of public indignation' if they did not comply with the Emperor's order, and that the Shogun's own life would be forfeit.[166] The China Squadron's aforementioned appearance seems to have made much of these fears quickly moot however.

Satsuma ignored British demands however, thus, the China Squadron set sail for Kagoshima on 6 August.[167] The journey to Kagoshima was a fraught one, with only some unreliable charts available, the British fleet relied on a fisherman who had been their once aboard a British merchant ship, SS *Fiery Cross*.[168] When British ships finally arrived in Kinkō Bay, off the coast of Kagoshima and Sakurajima, they did so in the evening at 9pm on 11 August.[169] The next day Neale (alongside Vice-Admiral Augustus Kuper) and Satsuma's envoys began a tit for tat negotiation to work out each other's true intentions, with the British being the far more obvious to fathom. Negotiations eventually stalled and the British presented Satsuma with an ultimatum to accept British demands within twenty-four hours. After the deadline (14 August) passed, Neale ordered Kuper to take action that evening.[170] At dawn the next day whilst the flagship, the *Euryalus*, stayed anchored, the rest of the fleet seized several Satsuma merchant vessels as prizes. The foreign built, but Satsuma owned, merchant ships: *Sir George Grey* (青鷹丸; *seiyuu-maru*; 'Blue Hawk'), *Contest* (白鳳丸; *hakuhou-maru*; '(White Chinese) Phoenix'), and the *England* (天祐丸; *tenyuu-maru*; 'Divine Grace'), had an aggregate worth (cargo included) of around $305,000 in Mexican Silver Dollars.[171] This was achieved without any reaction as most of the Japanese aboard fled (only the *England* fought back, but with no success).[172] However, later at noon, Satsuma batteries opportunistically struck back just as a typhoon threatened to enter Kinkō Bay, catching the British unawares during inclement weather. Only the *Euryalus* was in range and suffered minor damage.[173] Surprised, Admiral Kuper ordered the *Havock* to burn their captured prizes in retaliation (Ernest Satow, a student interpreter, recalls that it was the *Argus*, *Coquette*, and

[166] I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 156; PP, Japan, Eusden to Neale, 20 June 1863.
[167] D. F. Rennie, *The British Arms in China and Japan: Peking 1860; Kagosima 1862* (London, Bradbury and Evans, 1864), p. 382.
[168] The ships involved included the: HMS *Euryalus*, HMS *Pearl*, HMS *Perseus*, HMS *Argus*, HMS *Coquette*, HMS *Racehorse*, and the gunboat HMS *Havock*.
[169] W. B. Rowbotham, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima, 15th August, 1863', *Royal United Services Institution*, 108:631 (1963), p. 277.
[170] J. Denny, *Respect and Consideration*, p. 185.
[171] J. Denny, *Respect and Consideration*, pp. 179-181; K. Sakuto, *Akebono no Shishi: Satsuma Ishin Hiroku, Satsuei-Sensō-Hen* (Kagoshima, Minamikata Shinsha, 2022), pp. 126-127.
[172] W. B. Rowbotham, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima', p. 277.
[173] W. B. Rowbotham, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima', p. 277.

the *Racehorse* that burned them).[174] The looting of these ships by sailors (and the legation staff present) wasted about an hour, with a further two hours lost because aboard the *Euryalus* the ammunition store door was covered in boxes full of Mexican Silver Dollars paid earlier by the Shogunate.[175] The fleet eventually formed a battle line and prepared to bombard Kagoshima.[176]

This was done despite barometer readings and the current inclement weather showing that a Typhoon was highly likely. Admiral Kuper decided he could not delay an attack further after the British flag had been insulted yet again.[177] Captain Josling of the *Euryalus* reportedly advised against fighting during turbulent weather and a coming storm, but was ignored.[178] The fleet proceeded to fire at Kagoshima and its coastal batteries. The poor weather meant that maintaining formation proved hopeless, leaving various ships to be singularly vulnerable at times. British forces were soon low on both ammunition and supplies, and hostilities ended at 4pm on 15 August, with only the HMS *Perseus* firing the 'occasional' rocket during the night. More ammunition than was necessary had to be used during the entire action because the heavier, larger Armstrong guns were fitted to gun carriages too small for them and soon collapsed when fired repeatedly (the same would happen at Shimonoseki).[179] Things were made more complex when a minor rescue operation had to be undertaken because the *Racehorse* had run aground opposite the northern battery.[180] All these problems and issues were compounded by the severe underestimation of Satsuma's defences. Kyushu was the 'frontline' of contact between Japan and the foreign barbarian, and this fact had only made defences stronger than most other coastal sites in Japan. Satsuma actually had a factory in Kagoshima that had some success in manufacturing better cannon, weapons, and ammunition, called the *Shūseikan* Factory (集成館工場), which the British destroyed during

---

[174] J. Denny, *Respect and Consideration*, p. 185.
[175] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan* (London, J. B. Lippincott & Co, 1921), p. 87.
[176] This was done with various cannonade and modern Armstrong artillery; including roundshot (probably with ringlets if used in the Armstrong Guns) and double shotted grape[shot] as well; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 38.
[177] W. B. Rowbotham, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima', p. 277; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18: Kaikoku to Bakumatsu Henkaku* (Tokyo, Kodansha, 2002), pp. 290-293.
[178] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 88-89.
[179] W. B. Rowbotham, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima', p. 278; However, their range, accuracy and firepower was still good enough that Armstrong Guns were not simply phased out or discarded; *Journal De Bruxelles*, 15 March 1864, p. 3; PP, Armstrong Guns, A "Copy of the Report of Admiral Kuper in reference to the Armstrong Guns in the Action of Simonosaki", War Office, May 1865.
[180] The HMS *Racehorse* needed the *Havock*, *Coquette* and Argus to get its engines going again and set sail. Surprisingly, it took no damage; W. B. Rowbotham, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima', p. 277.

the bombardment.[181] Overall, Kinkō Bay had eleven entrenched defensive batteries with a total of 87 guns and mortars; some of these guns were (bronze) cannons weighing up to 150-pounds, much larger than reported by the British at the time or after. These armaments were further augmented by Dutch influenced training and understanding of artillery weapons and the addition of several American made, modern gun pieces.[182]

The next day, on 16 August, after seeing Satsuma Japanese attempt to construct new batteries and commit to repairs, Kuper decided to attack again. Kagoshima was bombarded once more, with the island of Sakurajima also attacked (they also directly bombarded the Prince's Palace).[183] There were attempts by Satsuma to retaliate, but their batteries had now more or less been obliterated. The British fleet sailed out of Kinkō Bay by morning of the next day, 17 August, and returned to Yokohama on 24 August 1863.[184] Despite serious material damage to Kagoshima, burning much of the castle town, several warehouses, a nearby foundry and arsenal, and several Satsuma and Ryukyuan Junks (later burned by the *Havock after* the bombardment), only five Japanese perished (the British reported that four hundred had been killed and one thousand wounded; an overestimation).[185] British casualties

---

[181] K. Matsumoto, *Nihon no Kindai 1: Kaikoku Ishin, 1853-1871* (Tokyo, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2012), pp. 111-114.

[182] T. Okuda & C. H. N. James, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima by the British Fleet, August, 1863', *Royal United Services Institution*, 57:429 (1913), p. 1488; One of these cannons is currently on display outside the Yasukuni Museum (遊就館; Yūshūkan) in Tokyo; The British also accused the Americans of supplying the Japanese with arms, which the American Minister to Japan denied… with the addendum that it was not his right to police what American citizens could and could not sell abroad. In official documents Pruyn went to great lengths to disprove this fact, but arms *were* sold in some quantity and the British reported American guns and ammunition at Kagoshima. Paixham guns and other Western (Dutch influenced) guns were also present at Kagoshima; *The New York Times*, 15 August 1863, p. 4; *The New York Times*, 19 August 1863, p. 8; Document No. 22, Pruyn to Steward, 3 May 1863 in *United States Department of State Message of the President of the United States, and accompanying documents, to the two Houses of Congress, at the commencement of the first session of the thirty-eighth Congress, 1863, Part II* (Washington, D. C, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1863), pp. 1014-1030; *Chicago Tribune*, 22 August 1863, p.3; *De Noordbrabanter*, 5 November 1863, p. 3; Shōko Shūsei-kan, *Satsuei-Sensō 150-Nen,* p. 41 & pp. 47-51.

[183] W. B. Rowbotham, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima', p. 277.

[184] H. Cortazzi, 'The British Bombardment of Kagoshima, 1863, Admiral Sir L. Kuper and Lt. Colonel Neale', in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004), pp. 275-278; See P. Hore, eds., *Seapower Ashore: 200 Years of Royal Navy Operations on Land* (London, Chatham Publishing, 2001); H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 40.

[185] Dr. Willis describes an apocalyptic scene: "…[We] watch the dreadful conflagration of the shore, a great city in flames… The glare is so great that, though the night is one of the blackest, we can see to walk up and down our own deck with the greatest ease. It would be impossible to convey any adequate idea of the grandeur and magnificent splendour of the immense fire on shore. It kept one spellbound through a greater part of the night on the deck watching its magnificence… The town, the

numbered thirteen (some sources report only eleven) dead, including Captain Josling and Commander Wilmot of the HMS *Euryalus* who were decapitated by the same round shot (whilst standing 'next' to Admiral Kuper).[186] With a further fifty sailors and marines wounded.[187] The somewhat inconclusive result and changing domestic situation in Japan eventually led to renegotiations later in the year. Satsuma agreed to pay £25,000 (money borrowed from the Bakufu and never repaid) and agreed to punish the samurai involved (though they never actually followed through on this).[188] Overall, from what was a relatively minor incident (though not as minor as the initial incident in China), the Namamugi Affair, the bombardment of Kagoshima seems like an overreaction that was then unsatisfactorily carried out. Satsuma were not expected to retaliate, yet they did, twice. The British were able to cause considerable damage (and some casualties), but they themselves also lost men, including two high ranking Royal Navy officers. Britain also squandered the capture of merchant vessels, which together with their cargoes, were worth extortionately more than the demanded £25,000 (and what they demanded from the Bakufu). Kuper also did not try to land any Royal Marines to cement 'Britain's victory' and allay any concerns that Britain had wasted its time. Moreover, subsequent renegotiations were not pursued quickly enough, allowing the incident to appear unfinished, adding to the perception that it was a dramatic failure.[189] British casualties, wanton destruction of Japanese civilian property capturable or otherwise, and questionable military decisions, all heavily impacted the response to the bombardment back in Britain.[190] Neither the events in China or Brazil involved so many major complications by comparison. The memory of China and the ongoing issues with Brazil further complicated things for Palmerston who now had a *considerable* history of controversial foreign ventures.[191] Additionally, the aforementioned naval bombardments of

---

neighbouring factories and a number of large junks are one mass of flames. I could not help thinking to myself these are the awful realities of war, happy for those who know them by repute only."; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 40; W. B. Rowbotham, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima', p. 278;

[186] *The Illustrated London News*, 14 November 1863, p. 501.

[187] W. B. Rowbotham, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima', p. 278; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19: Kaikoku to Jōi* (Tokyo, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2006), pp. 310-315; Shōko Shūsei-kan, *Satsuei-Sensō 150-Nen*, pp. 19-27 & pp. 41-43.

[188] M. Asakawa, 'From Pupils to Partners', p. 15; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, pp. 315-316.

[189] I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 151-168.

[190] It has also deeply affected Japanese historiography of the event. Whilst British/foreign Historians tend to see it as an inconclusive result or a somewhat minor pyrrhic victory, some Japanese historians go as far as saying that it was an unexpected defeat; Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu*, pp. 31-34.

[191] In addition to China and Brazil see: the *Don Pacifico* Affair, issues with France and Spain (as Foreign Secretary and later as Prime Minister), support for Hungarian Constitutionalists in 1848 (as Foreign Secretary), his tact support for Italian Independence and Unification (as Foreign Secretary

cities like Barcelona, Messina, and Canton, would have also negatively shaped Briton's feelings towards Kagoshima's own bombardment. The stage was set.

3.3. The Press and Parliament's Reaction:

Parliament was considerably brutal in its judgement. Charles Buxton, a Liberal MP, brought forward a motion on 9 February 1864 criticising his own government's actions to the fullest. He stated that Kagoshima's bombardment was "…contrary to those usages of war which prevail among civilised nations…" and that this action had set "…a most disastrous precedent…" for Britain and other nations to mimic in the future.[192] The government was now having to defend its position from many of its own MPs, like what happened with China, but now on a grander scale.[193] There was heavy condemnation of Russell's policy of punishing both the Bakufu and Satsuma, despite Satsuma clearly being the aggressor and the Bakufu having next to no involvement.[194] Such condemnation was granted further weight thanks to the Lord Commissioners' speech only a few days before at the opening of Parliament, making the Queen's personal 'regret' of the military action clear to all.[195] A royal intervention, even in this limited form, was not something to ignore (especially with Palmerston's past friction with the crown).[196] Soon the British Government found itself defending its entire foreign policy in Japan, with even its prior dealings coming under heavy scrutiny. Buxton further stated that whilst Japanese laws might be considered 'shameful' by British standards, such laws should not have been flouted with such 'furious indignation' so readily (referring to the Namamugi Affair).[197] Additionally, Lord Edward Stanley (a future

---

and later Prime Minister), and relations with Denmark before and during the Second Schleswig War (as Prime Minister). All before or during the issues surrounding Kagoshima.

[192] House of Commons, *Bombardment of Kagosima. – Resolution* (9 February 1864, Vol. 173, Cols. 335-336) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 5 April 2020]; A sadly prophetic and accurate statement seeing as similar gunboat diplomacy would continue long into the twentieth century.

[193] House of Commons, *Bombardment of Kagosima. – Resolution* (9 February 1864, Vol. 173, Cols. 349-354, 357-359, 367-368, 371-395, and 396-403) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 5 April 2020].

[194] House of Commons, *Bombardment of Kagosima. – Resolution* (9 February 1864, Vol. 173, Cols. 351-354) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 5 April 2020].

[195] House of Commons, *Address to Her Majesty on the Lords Commissioners' Speech* (4 February 1864, Vol. 173, Cols. 76-77) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 5 April 2020].

[196] J. Ridley, *Lord Palmerston* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co, 1971), pp. 398-399; Although Palmerston would have likely personally brushed this limited criticism aside (limited because Queen Victoria was in mourning for Prince Albert and took less note of state affairs at this time).

[197] House of Commons, *Bombardment of Kagosima. – Resolution* (9 February 1864, Vol. 173, Cols. 343-345) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 5 April 2020].

Conservative Foreign Secretary) disputed the size of the indemnity, stating that such a substantial sum (totalling £125,000) would never be asked if a British subject was murdered in Europe.[198] Such costs are made more interesting when you factor in that the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service's budget had increased to around £292,358, not counting the refurbishment of two major embassies in Paris and Constantinople (another £5,229), and the construction of the Foreign Office we know today (costed at around £200,000).[199] It would not take much for an MP or Lord to start considering the extortionate sums being demanded from foreign countries was more about funding Foreign Office vanity projects than any concerns over reparations for diplomatic redress. Most foreign crises are, rather expectedly, poorly timed, but the fallout from Kagoshima was especially bad timing for the Foreign Office whose 'private' command of British foreign policy was now being questioned so severely that it brought into question, rightly or wrongly, its other departmental and diplomatic decisions.

The most damning comments came from Henry Liddell, a Conservative MP, who sympathised with the Japanese stating that "Japan had for 100 years been happy and prosperous in itself; but now, owing to the presence of foreigners, it was on the verge of a social revolution…"[200] With the Western powers already creating problems for the Japanese domestically, the British then worsening the situation and potentially threatening the expansion of British trade in Japan (the whole purpose for Britain's presence) did not proffer any support among the Conservative Opposition. Liddell also commented on the Emperor (known as the 'Mikado') and the possible ambiguity of the Shogun's authority:

> At present we had not ascertained exactly who the Mikado was, and in whose hands the supreme authority in Japan was lodged. They had talked of the authority exercised by the Tycoon; but supreme authority seemed to have been exercised over the Tycoon himself on a recent occasion… Surely the Government

[198] House of Commons, *Bombardment of Kagosima. – Resolution* (9 February 1864, Vol. 173, Cols. 361-363) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 5 April 2020].
[199] PP, Estimates & Civil Services, 31 March 1864.
[200] House of Commons, *Bombardment of Kagosima. – Resolution* (9 February 1864, Vol. 173, Cols. 370) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 5 April 2020].

> should acquaint themselves with the state of affairs in Japan before they attempted to frame a policy to guide them (*sic*)...[201]

The possibility that the Shogun was not the sole source of power in Japan was now becoming better understood.[202] Thus, the possibility that the treaties might not be recognised in parts of Japan or illegitimate altogether now existed, threatening to unravel the reasoning behind many diplomatic decisions in Japan like the bombardment of Kagoshima. This argument is a tale of two halves however, for it is quite understandable that British diplomats, the Foreign Office, and indeed the rest of the foreign powers, did not understand Japan's government and internal politics. Neale, Kuper, and Alcock were all equally perplexed by the *terra incognita* of Japan. Neale found himself frustrated by "…the great difficulty of obtaining any reliable information in [Japan]."[203] Kuper confessed to the Admiralty that the: "…total absence of reliable information as to what is taking place amongst the rival princes in the interior of Japan renders it very difficult to form an opinion as to our future position in this country."[204] Alcock honestly acknowledged that:

> After a three years residence, during which my whole time and thoughts were devoted to the one object of obtaining reliable information on the [Japanese] Government, state of parties and political condition of the people, I still feel embarrassed and perplexed with doubts on some of the most vital points.[205]

When you enter a country, trapped in peripheral ports, confronted with primarily xenophobic ruling classes, who speak one of the most difficult languages in the world, one can have plenty of sympathy with British officials over not really understanding Japanese domestic affairs.[206] However, given Europe's previous interaction with Japan several hundred years before and the experiences/knowledge of the Dutch which virtually all treaty port powers had leaned on to some degree anyway, at least *some* understanding of the Emperor's relationship

---

[201] House of Commons, *Bombardment of Kagosima. – Resolution* (9 February 1864, Vol. 173, Cols. 370) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 5 April 2020].
[202] G. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 117.
[203] TNA, FO 46/40, Neale to Major-General Brown, 12 May 1862.
[204] TNA, FO 46/40, Kuper to Admiralty, 13 July 1863.
[205] TNA, FO 46/37, Alcock to Foreign Office, 15 December 1863.
[206] Arguably, Yokohama and Edo were most certainly not peripheral, but you have to remember that Yokohama was still a new, developing port, and that much of Edo was off limits for years after it was deemed too dangerous for foreigners.

to the Bakufu should have been understood after being present in the country for years. This argument is strengthened by the fact that in 1862 *Blackwood's Magazine* had a piece published that quite effectively explained the relationship between the 'Tycoon' and the 'Mikado' or 'Spiritual Emperor'.[207] The Foreign Office both feared and agreed with Parliament's reprimands over not understanding the Japanese Emperor, thus, from this point onwards, gaining imperial acquiescence to the 1858 Ansei Treaties became a paramount diplomatic aim for future British diplomats.

Mirroring the bombardment of Kagoshima's many critiques in Parliament, some of the press like *The Times*, *The Quarterly Review*, *The Spectator* and *Punch* took a similarly harsh tone. *The Spectator* (famous then for its non-partisanship) questioned the whole point of the military operation, with its castigation of Kagoshima clear from its title: "Civilisation by Bombshells."[208] In another issue it suggested that Britain had lowered itself to that of a belligerent bully and a lesser power.[209] This latter opinion was repeated in *The Quarterly Review* who stated that Britain's treatment of weaker states was "…overbearing, exacting, pushing every right to the extremist limit, and where the very existence of a right is doubtful, cynically throwing the sword in the balance (*sic*)."[210] For *The Quarterly Review* such aggressive actions only expressed a prejudiced attitude from Britain towards minor powers. They even referenced Kagoshima alongside China and the bombardment of Canton and Brazil with the blockade of Rio de Janeiro.[211] *The Patriot* is another that also directly refers to Japan and Brazil as one and the same; a religious periodical founded by non-conformists after the Reform Bill, it was very consistent in its concern and condemnation of the entire affair.[212] The satirical magazine *Punch* took aim at Russell's statement that the burning down of Kagoshima was an unintentional consequence of the bombardment with its witty title "The Wind Did It."[213] The idea that the city was burned down by accident was also stated by Admiral Lord Clarence Paget, who was Secretary of the Admiralty at the time. Lord Paget

---

[207] See *Blackwood's Magazine, Vol. 91*, April 1862, pp. 424-433.
[208] *The Spectator*, 24 October 1863, p. 9.
[209] *The Spectator*, 7 November 1863, p. 6.
[210] *The Quarterly Review*, Vol. 115 (April 1864), p. 499.
[211] *The Quarterly Review*, Vol. 115 (April 1864), pp. 499-500.
[212] *The Patriot*, 7 July 1864, p. 436; *The Patriot*, 5 November 1863, p. 725; *The Patriot*, 3 December 1863, p.795; *The Patriot*, 3 December 1863, p. 795; *The Patriot*, 31 December 1863, p. 855; *The Patriot*, 7 January 1864, p. 9; *The Patriot*, 11 February 1864, p. 89; *The Patriot*, 3 March 1864, p. 136; *The Patriot*, 17 March 1864, p. 163; See J. N. Nicoll Cooper, 'Dissenters & National Journalism: "The Patriot" in the 1830s', *Victorian Periodicals Review*, 14:2 (Summer 1981), pp. 58-66.
[213] *Punch*, 5 December 1863, p. 231.

said to his constituents in Dover that Kuper had no choice because of the 'gale' blowing at the time of the bombardment (despite the fact that there was no need to rush such an action during a typhoon anyway).[214] Not the greatest of moments in Paget's illustrious career, which probably explains why his public defence of Japan and Kagoshima are not mentioned at all in his official biography.[215] When you consider that British ships effectively targeted the entire shoreline, with Kagoshima close behind, and the HMS *Perseus* then firing several 'rockets' during the night after the first bombardment, *directly* into the already burning castle town, "…adding new centres to the devouring flames", one can easily understand *Punch's* derision of Russell's explanation and *The Patriot's* contempt at Paget's excuse.[216] It was not helped that in another widely reported parliamentary session, the idea that it was the 'wind' was backtracked on.[217]

Richard Cobden wrote an open letter to the Mayor of Rochdale that was printed in several British papers, like *The Daily Telegraph*, stating his horror at the destruction of Kagoshima and that Britain should be remorseful of its actions.[218] An excerpt:

> …picture this great commercial *entrepot*, with all its contents, reduced in 48 hours to a heap of ashes; and then ask yourselves what great crime they had committed to bring on themselves this havoc and destruction. To our shame and confusion, the answer must be that this is the way in which Englishmen, under the command of Admiral Kuper and Colonel Neale, administer justice for the murder of an individual, one hundred miles away – of which crime the inhabitants of Kagoshima were as guiltless of all knowledge and complicity as your own neighbours in Rochdale… [At] all events, let us not forget that our moral power in the world is at stake; that if, as a people, we condone such crimes as those when perpetrated in our name by those whom, under Heaven, we are alone responsible, we shall only invite the scorn of mankind… (*sic*).[219]

---

[214] *The Patriot*, 26 November 1863, p. 772.
[215] See Sir O. Bart, eds., Lord C. E. Paget, *Autobiography and Journals of Admiral Lord Clarence E. Paget* (London, Chapman & Hall, 1896).
[216] H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 40; K. Sakuto, *Akebono no Shishi*, pp. 140-141.
[217] *The Patriot*, 17 December 1863, pp. 805-806.
[218] *The Daily Telegraph*, 9 November 1864, p. 5.
[219] *Lancaster Gazetter*, 14 November 1863, p. 6.

Whilst it contained some inaccuracies born out of Japan remaining largely unknown, it proved to be deeply damning and was popularly repeated thereafter.

The Times showed its disapproval of Kagoshima on several occasions despite its 'apparent' success.[220] It considered the loss of life (eleven killed and thirty-nine wounded, including two officers, according to its sources) to be too high for an operation where success was supposedly assured, stating that it was "…a sacrifice of superior officers which would have been considerable even for such actions as that of the Nile."[221] For *The Times* Kagoshima was such a disaster that not even the personal friendship between its editor (still Delane) and Palmerston could prevent its condemnation. Other negative appraisals were nationally widespread and politically diverse, for example: the *Dundee Courier*, *The Liverpool Daily Post*, *Examiner*, *Norfolk News* (Liberal), *Westmorland Gazette*, *Reynold's Newspaper*, *The Daily News*, *Cork Examiner* (Irish; Radical/Liberal), *Bath Chronicle* (Conservative leaning), *Liverpool Mercury*, *Chester Chronicle* (non-aligned), *York Herald*, *Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser* (Conservative), *Illustrated Times* (Liberal leaning), *The Welshman* (with a poignant article on the futility of military coercion and the dangers of sparking wider conflict and/or greater empire, which, in its view, was not something to be desired in Japan, China or elsewhere in Asia), *The North Wales Chronicle and Advertiser for the Principality*, and *The Standard*.[222] Even popular foreign press produced scathing criticisms, with newspapers and periodicals from the United States being particularly hostile.[223] *The New York Times* held nothing back with its main piece titled: "British

---

[220] *The Times*, 21 October 1863, p. 8-9; *The Times*, 29 October 1863, p. 9; *The Times*, 30 October 1863, p. 6; *The Times*, 6 February 1864, p. 9; *The Times*, 10 February 1864, p. 9; *The Times*, 11 February 1864, p. 9; *The Times*, 4 April 1864, pp. 8-9.
[221] *The Times*, 21 October 1863, p. 8.
[222] *Dundee Courier*, 30 October 1863, p. 3; *The Daily Liverpool Post*, 30 October 1863, p. 4; *Examiner*, 31 October 1863, p. 700; *Norfolk News*, 31 October 1863, p. 4; *Westmorland Gazette*, 31 October 1863, p. 4; *Reynold's Newspaper*, 1 November 1863, p. 5; *The Daily News*, 9 November 1863, p. 2; *Cork Examiner*, 3 November 1863, p. 3; *Cork Examiner*, 5 November 1863, p. 4; *Bath Chronicle*, 5 November 1863, p. 5; *Liverpool Mercury*, 5 November 1863, p. 6; *Chester Chronicle*, 7 November 1863, p. 8; *York Herald*, 16 January 1864, p. 8; *Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser*, 7 November 1863, p. 5; *Illustrated Times*, 7 November 1863, p. 294; *The Welshman*, 6 November 1863, p. 7; *The North Wales Chronicle and Advertiser for the Principality*, 7 November 1863, p. 3; *The Standard*, 30 October 1863, p. 4; *The Standard*, 2 November 1863, p. 3.
[223] *Le Constitutionel*, 29 November 1863, p. 1; *Aachener Zeitung*, 14 July 1863, p. 2; *Christian Advocate and Journal*, 26 November 1863, p. 378; *Christian Advocate and Journal*, 10 March 1864, p. 73; *New York Evangelist*, 10 September 1863, p. 1; *The Albion: A Journal of News, Politics and Literature*, 12 September 1863, p. 438; *The Albion: A Journal of News, Politics and Literature*, 21 November 1863, p. 559; *Advocate of Peace*, November/December 1863, p. 380; *The Continental Monthly; Devoted to Literature and National Policy*, September 1863, p. 333; *L'Indépendance Belge*,

Barbarity".[224] Even during the lead up to the attack on Kagoshima *The New York Times* questioned Britain's recent antagonistic and controversial foreign policy actions, with criticism of those in the British press who could not understand foreign concern and indignation.[225] One of the more witty responses to British aggression in Japan was a piece from the *Chicago Tribune* arguing that America should mimic Britain's neutrality towards the US Civil War; allowing Japan to be supplied with ships and arms from American businesses and ports, just as Britain was allowing the Confederate States to purchase weapons and vessels despite its neutrality.[226]

These interjections from the press were so damaging that Neale sent back another letter to the Foreign Office, detailing the 'facts' of Kagoshima, in addition to the various dispatches printed in the *London Gazette*, in order to gain some reprieve from the widespread backlash.[227] This was no minor publication, with over 14 pages devoted to Kagoshima including detailed excerpts from Russell, the Admiralty, and Neale himself; all designed to show Britain's righteous justifications. Whilst it did rectify some of the sensationalist facts spread by some, all it really did was prove that the torrent of criticism from Parliament and the press was a smoking gun for the Government and its foreign policy in Japan.[228] Not even the aid of some Palmerston supporting papers like *The Observer* and *The Globe* could allay the growing public anger.[229] Nor could the support from a few outlying newspapers help in any way, such as, *The Bradford Observer*, *Leeds Mercury*, *Huddersfield Chronicle*, *The Penny Illustrated Paper* (technically pro – but still fearful over the potential consequences of such brazen militarism), *Aberdeen Journal* (talked about Britain eventually having to

---

30 March 1864, p. 2; *Le Bien Public*, 15 February 1864, p. 2; *Vorarlberger Landes-Zeitung*, 5 November 1863, p. 3; *Het Amsterdamsche Handels-en Effectenblad*, 28 November 1863, p. 1; *La Libertad: Periódico Moderado*, 7 November 1863, p. 2; *La Discusion*, 8 November 1863, p. 3; *El Clamor Publico*, 8 November 1863, p. 2; *Gemeinde-Zeitung*, 16 February 1864, p. 111; *Mährischer Correspondent*, 25 May 1864, p. 1; *Oesterreichischer Soldatenfreund*, 4 May 1864, pp. 286-288.

[224] *The New York Times*, 24 November 1863, p. 4.

[225] *The Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science, and Art*, 15 August 1863, pp. 201-202; *The New York Times*, 28 August 1863, p. 4.

[226] *Chicago Tribune*, 5 August 1863, p. 2.

[227] TNA, FO 46/43/4, Neale to Russell, 16 January 1864; *London Gazette*, 30 October 1863, pp. 5123-5136.

[228] Unsurprisingly, the opinion of many British residents in Yokohama was one of surprise and contempt for the opinions of both Parliament and the press on the bombardment of Kagoshima. Dr. Willis spoke for many when he asked: 'Were the British ships of war to be fired upon and not return it?'; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 44.

[229] *The Observer*, 14 February 1864, p. 4; *The Globe*, 22 February 1864, p. 2; L. Fenton, 'Origins of Animosity', pp. 373-375.

'supplant' the native authorities; highly imperialistic), *The Morning Post*, and the *Monmouthshire Merlin*.[230] The Foreign Office needed to ensure that another Kagoshima was unrepeatable. There were also geopolitical concerns as well, for prior to Kagoshima a conflict with the Bakufu appeared likely until they finally paid their part of the indemnity.[231] Russell recognised that any military action in Japan could potentially escalate into war and that this could then damage Britain's premier position in East Asia.[232] As hinted at in *The Times* 'another China' was not something to be desired, with Kagoshima reaffirming this (especially at a time when Europe and North America were in flux).[233] Thus, the press's collective power as a non-state sub-actor, alongside various political sub-actors within Parliament, had successfully altered British foreign policy in Japan through their own reactions. The Foreign Office and its diplomats could no longer take diplomatic decisions alone in a vacuum; other diplomatic actors had finally entered the fray and forced drastic change.

3.4. The Bombardment of Shimonoseki and Kagoshima's Aftermath:

On January 11 1864 Russell outlined his new expectations to Neale:

> Her Majesty's Government trust that they may now look forward to British intercourse with Japan being carried on without giving occasion for future collision; It is their earnest desire that nothing should occur to interfere with peaceful commerce, and they are prepared to make full allowance for the peculiar character of the Japanese Government. In short, the employment of measures of coercion or retaliation could only be warranted, in their opinion, by the necessity of prompt interference for the protection of the lives and properties of British subjects, or for the vindication of the honour of the British flag if assailed by wanton attacks on the part of the Government or influential nobles… (*sic*).[234]

[230] *The Bradford Observer*, 22 October 1863, p. 4; *Leeds Mercury*, 30 October 1863, p. 2; *Huddersfield Chronicle*, 31 October 1863, p. 8; *The Penny Illustrated Paper*, 31 October 1863, p. 287; *Aberdeen Journal*, 4 November 1863, p. 8; *The Morning Post*, 5 November 1863, p. 4; *The Morning Post*, 9 February 1864, p. 4; *Monmouthshire Merlin*, 24 October 1863, p. 5.
[231] The other major treaty port powers expected a conflict, with the Swiss and the Dutch advising that it *was* going to happen by evacuating their citizens (the Swiss evacuated entirely, legation and all).
[232] M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 97.
[233] *The Times*, 30 October 1863, p. 6.
[234] PP, Japan, No. 76, Russell to Neale, 11 January 1864.

The emphasis was now on 'peaceful commerce' above all else, that Japan's 'peculiar government' be treated with more patience and consideration, and that ultimately, any military response in Japan be an absolute last resort under very specific circumstances. In other words, British diplomats would cooperate with Japan and the other treaty port powers to achieve (and protect) Britain's chief diplomatic aim, the expansion of Anglo-Japanese trade, without such an overt reliance on gunboat diplomacy (that might create conflict, threaten trade, and produce unwanted domestic issues at home). Neale accepted this directive as gospel, changing British policy in Japan drastically for the first time.[235] Understanding this, Neale painted a tranquil picture of Japan by discussing the peaceful expansion of British trade.[236] He extolled the "…steadily progressing and prosperous trade… ignored or altogether overlooked as it may be in Europe by those who are anxious or interested in events of a threatening character [i.e. Alcock]."[237] Neale's reports, particularly the care he took to explain how despite the ongoing Japanese civil unrest, Anglo-Bakufu relations were not in crisis, would have done much to allay Foreign Office concerns. Russell, wishing to avoid another foreign embarrassment, would have welcomed Neale's assurances and trade talk.[238]

Despite this change to Anglo-Japanese diplomacy and Neale's acquiescence, it did not take effect immediately. The unsanctioned bombardment of Shimonoseki still happened in reaction to Chōshū Domain's closure of the Shimonoseki Straits earlier in 1863.[239] Alcock considered the straits closure to be part of a larger Bakufu plot to disrupt trade and eventually oust Western powers altogether.[240] Alcock's fears are routed in the 'expulsion order' from the Imperial Court in Kyoto in December 1862, which the Bakufu 'officially' (and belatedly) accepted.[241] However, the Bakufu had no intention of acting on the expulsion order. To 'appear' like they were acting as imperially instructed, the Bakufu sent the Ikeda Mission to Europe to negotiate the closure of the treaty ports (knowing full well the futility of this venture).[242] In response the major powers issued a joint communique stating that they would

[235] PP, Japan, No. 15, Neale to Russell, 1 March 1864; Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu*, pp. 34-36.
[236] TNA, FO 46/37/150, Neale to Russell, 14 October 1863; TNA, FO 46/43/13, Neale to Russell, 6 February 1864.
[237] PP, Japan, No. 65, Neale to Russell, 11 September 1863.
[238] PP, Japan, No. 15, Neale to Russell, 1 March 1864.
[239] Chōshū was ruled by the Mōri Family.
[240] TNA, FO 46/43/5, Alcock to Russell, 28 March 1864.
[241] M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 98.
[242] G. Fox, *Britain and Japan,* pp. 125-126.

resort to force if any attempt at closing the treaty ports was made on 25 June 1863 (the day the Emperor chose for expulsion).[243] Chōshū Domain followed through however and began firing on foreign vessels passing through the Shimonoseki Straits immediately.[244] There were several high profile attacks over many months, involving American, French and Dutch ships. A lot of studies tend to undermine the importance of these events by quickly jumping to the bombardment of Shimonoseki itself, but these attacks need to be explained to better understand not only Alcock's own reasoning and panic, but how the other three foreign powers came to the same conclusions.

The American steamer, *Pembroke*, was fired upon without warning on 25 June 1863 whilst passing through the Shimonoseki Straits to get to Nagasaki. In this first instance, Chōshū's actions appear to be initially lacklustre. The *Pembroke* had weighed anchor because it was (rightly) believed that traversing the straits at night would be too dangerous. This was when things started to become strange; strange in the sense that the American sailors put up without a lot of suspicious behaviour before realising how much danger they were in. For example, a Chōshū owned, but Western made and armed barque passed and anchored not far from the steamer, with guns sounding around in the distance (range testing most likely), with various smaller vessels 'visiting' the *Pembroke*.[245] Things became stranger when the Chōshū vessel, formerly the *Lancefield*/*Saucefield*, had slipped closer and fired a shot that flew over the *Pembroke*, but this was taken as a simple warning gesture and nothing more.[246] Despite the fact that warning shots usually go far past the bow of a ship, no concern was given. It was only when the barque pulled up for a swift broadside, damaging the main mast in unison with Japanese battle cries of *sonnō jōi* (尊王攘夷; 'Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians'), and the sighting of another (western built) ship, formerly the *Lanrick*, heading to join the attack that the Americans realised what was happening.[247] In the ensuing chaos the steamer hastily made its way towards open sea (via the southern Bungo Strait).[248] As this happened

[243]Document No. 40, Pruyn to Steward, 24 June 1863 in *United States Department of State Message of the President of the United States, Documents, 1863, Part II*, pp. 1117-1124; W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, p. 196.
[244] A. M. Craig, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration* (Oxford, Lexington Books, 2000), pp. 199-201; See A. Craig, 'The Restoration Movement in Chōshō', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 18:2 (February, 1959), pp. 187-197; A. M. Craig states the 10 May as the chosen date of expulsion. This is not a mistake on their part, but the date using the Lunar Calendar, which Japan used until 1873.
[245] *Chicago Tribune*, 12 September 1863, p. 1.
[246] *The Patriot*, 24 September 1863, p. 627.
[247] Thankfully, the *Lanrick* was not able to engage during the attack.
[248] *The New York Times*, 9 September 1863, p. 1; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, p. 305.

before Britain's attack on Kagoshima, and in the aftermath of the Namamugi incident, it sparked a great deal of fear and shock within American circles:

> Thus, our flag is the first to be insulted by the Japanese, our commerce is the first to be interfered with, and all our old theories of Americans being a favoured nation by the Japanese falls to the ground.[249]

Next, a French dispatch (or aviso) vessel called the *Kien Chan* was attacked as it anchored in the channel a day later, drawing the ire of the French.[250] The next attack involved the Dutch warship *Medusa* on 11 July 1863, who, despite Franco-American warnings, attempted to sail through the straits unmolested and ascertain why the *Kien Chan* was attacked (for it was carrying Dutch diplomatic mail).[251]

There are many reasons why the Dutch elected to go through the Shimonoseki Straits at great risk.[252] Firstly, it was considered, by the Dutch Consul-General Dirk de Graeff van Polsbroek, and the Dutch Commander of the Medusa, François de Casembroot, that to change route now (after it had already been confirmed and made widely known) would only cause the Netherlands to lose face. This justification is an odd one considering how long the Netherlands put up with kowtowing before the Shogun and Deshima's strict entrapment. Secondly, a few days before departing, several officers from Chōshū visited the Medusa and were shown some naval drills. Thirdly, more officers from Chōshū then visited the Dutch Legation in Nagasaki, spoke to the Consul-General, and stated their thanks (and the Daimyō of Chōshū's personal appreciation) and high regard for the Dutch officers who had run the Nagasaki Naval School.[253] And lastly, the Shogunate Magistrate of Nagasaki declared that the attack on the *Pembroke* was a 'singular case of madness performed by drunk officers who made a mistake (and that all responsible would be beheaded)'.[254] So, there were signs from

---

[249] *The New York Times*, 9 September 1863, p. 1.
[250] G. R. Clark, W. O. Stevens, C. S. Alden & H. F. Krafft, *A Short History of the United States Navy* (London, J. B. LIPPINCOTT Company, 1910), p. 367; *The London & China Telegraph*, 14 September 1863, p. 456; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, pp. 357-360.
[251] *The London & China Telegraph*, 26 September 1863, pp. 479-480; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, p. 306.
[252] The Dutch Legation at this time was still in Nagasaki, so any passage to Yokohama would ultimately have to either go through the straits or around Japan's Pacific Coastline.
[253] *Sumatra-Courant*, 20 February 1864, pp. 3-4.
[254] *Sumatra-Courant*, 20 February 1864, pp. 3-4.

both Chōshū and the Shogunate over the Shimonoseki Straits that muddied the waters. However, none of these seem *that* reassuring in terms of outright clearing the straits of any danger.

It was further believed that Dutch-Japanese relations had been so peaceable for so long that no attack could possibly happen.[255] They were wrong. The *Medusa* obtained a Japanese pilot (a navigator) from the Governor of Nagasaki to aid its passage through the straits, and arrived on 11 July 1863.[256] Two shots were fired from shore batteries and eight from one of the Japanese brigs; no offence was taken however, as the Dutch mistook this as the Japanese version of a naval salute for arriving ships. The *Medusa* readied its own guns just in case, but it was believed that the Japanese would not dare act. Of course, the *Medusa* was subsequently caught in a three-way crossfire from both Chōshū shore batteries and their two western built ships.[257] Consul-General van Polsbroek paints a chaotic picture of how close the *Medusa* was to taking serious damage.[258] The Dutch were eventually able to escape south via the Bungo Channel. Interestingly, in a similar, but smaller, vain to the British Press's reaction to Kagoshima there was great concern and confusion over the *Medusa's* actions across the Netherlands and the wider Dutch Empire. There were questions around 'why' the Medusa 'had' to go through the straits, and why seeking retribution would probably prove foolhardy.[259]

The next conflict in the Shimonoseki Straits involved a small American sloop, the USS *Wyoming*, under a Captain McDougal, which attacked Chōshū's coastal defences in retaliation for damage done to the *Pembroke*.[260] The *Wyoming* anchored near the island of Himeshima on 15th of July and proceeded into the straits a day later. There were several warning shots fired, but quickly disregarded by the Americans. Upon entering the strait, the main batteries began firing, but the *Wyoming* ignored this and headed directly for the two

---

[255] G. R. Clark, W. O. Stevens, C. S. Alden & H. F. Krafft, *United States Navy*, p. 367.
[256] *The London & China Telegraph*, 26 September 1863, pp. 479-480.
[257] *The London & China Telegraph*, 26 September 1863, pp. 479-480.
[258] *Haarlemsche Courant*, 28 September 1863, p. 2; See also F. D. Casembroot, *De Medusa in de Wateren van Japan, in 1863 en 1864* (The Hague, De Gebroeders van Cleef, 1865).
[259] *Sumatra-Courant*, 20 February 1864, pp. 3-4; *Java-Bode: Nieuws, Handels- en Advertentieblad voor Nederlandsch-Indie*, 9 January 1864, p. 4; *Middelburgsche Courant*, 31 October 1863, p. 2.
[260] See R. E. Johnson, *Far Eastern Station: The US Navy in Asian Waters, 1800-1898* (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2013), pp. 114-123; *The Albion: A Journal of News, Politics and Literature*, 12 September 1863, p. 439; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, p. 305.

western built ships (the *Lancefield*/*Saucefield* and the *Lanrick*) anchored along the northern shore.[261] The *Wyoming* ceased firing at the coastal batteries and prepared to go in-between both vessels; choosing to fire on both at close range simultaneously. American accounts also point to a third ship, formerly the *Daniel Webster*, being present as well, causing significant tactical difficulties.[262] Overall, the battle went on for about an hour, but the *Wyoming* was able to sail around the straits (not through it) and cause damage to Chōshū defences (with all foreign-built ships seen to be sinking) at the cost of only four dead and seven wounded.[263] This was seen as a success and was actually quite impressive considering the *Wyoming* was only a six gunned sloop and was severely outgunned.[264] At this stage, events moved quickly, with attacks and retaliations only escalating the situation with Chōshū. This is further illustrated by the next confrontation involving the French and their retaliation for the attack on the *Kien Chan*. French Admiral Jaures, with the French warships *Semiramis* and *Tancrede*, set sail for the straits on 16th of July, and arrived on 20th. The French ships were largely unmolested and attacked the coastal batteries with great success.[265] The response from Chōshū defences was very muted and was possibly down to previous bombardments from the Dutch and the Americans taking their toll.[266] In light of the situation the French went one step further and landed roughly 250 marines and sailors to attack some of the remaining batteries by land. This proved successful and Admiral Jaures quickly decided that he had retaliated sufficiently.[267] Thus ending France's involvement with the straits for the time being. With the incidents leading to the bombardment of Kagoshima happening concurrently with these various Shimonoseki coastal skirmishes, one can understand Alcock's trepidation at watching these events evolve in quick succession from afar. In contrast to Alcock's concerns however, both Parliament, the press, and most of the British Legation, including Neale and Kuper, were

---

[261] *The Patriot*, 24 September 1863, p. 627; *Liverpool Albion*, 21 September 1863, p. 4.
[262] G. R. Clark, W. O. Stevens, C. S. Alden & H. F. Krafft, *United States Navy*, p. 370; E. S. Maclay, *A History of the United States Navy, From 1775 to 1901, Volume II* (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1901), pp. 387-396.
[263] *The London & China Telegraph*, 26 September 1863, p. 480; One of the wounded would later sadly die from his wounds.
[264] "Speaking of this action, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, in a private interview, said, 'Had that action occurred at any other time than during the US Civil War its fame would have been echoed all over the world.'"; E. S. Maclay, *A History of the United States Navy*, p. 396.
[265] They even had time to send a message to nearby village, Tanoura (田野浦), that they were under no threat.
[266] However, the French did not actually traverse through the Shimonoseki Straits entirely.
[267] *The London & China Telegraph*, 26 September 1863, p. 480; *Batavia Handelsblad*, 5 September 1863, p. 5; *Le Constitutionel*, 28 September 1863, p. 1.

entirely (and understandably) focused on Kagoshima thanks to Britain's primacy in that event.

This does put into question Alcock's remaining desire for further chastisement of Chōshū, especially when British involvement at this point was simply not needed or required.[268] This is especially true when you consider the Dutch and American naval expeditions, although foolhardy, still successfully caused damage, and that the French resoundingly asserted Western Naval dominance in its one-sided bombardment of Chōshū's coastline.[269] Moreover, Russell informed Neale of an Order in Council barring all British vessels from using the Seto Inland Sea in January 1864 anyway.[270] After the French it would also be the end of any substantial issues between the foreign powers and Chōshū for the time being, with the situation largely dying down until almost exactly a year later, with only a minor altercation involving an American merchant ship, the *Monitor*, bringing the strait's closure back to the fore. Rather than a substantial attack in the straits however, this was more of an opportunistic gambit taken by some of Chōshū's retainers. The *Monitor* was sailing to Nagasaki from Hakodate, but had not considered taking extra fuel in case they were delayed due to poor navigation and/or weather. Ultimately, the ship was hampered by poor weather and called at the coastal town of Fukugawa (sometimes spelt Fukawa, now part of Nagato City). They asked for some supplies and received a friendly reception. However, during the night the First Mate noticed movement along the shore at about four in the morning; successive volleys of musketry and gingal soon followed (twenty-seven hits were registered in total). Unfortunately for the town of Fukugawa, which was caught in the ensuing crossfire, the *Monitor's* two Parrot guns responded roughly twenty times, eviscerating much of the shoreline and buying time for their escape. The *Monitor* fled to the island of Tsushima and luckily received a much friendlier reception (with gifts even). They made it to Nagasaki a week later than expected

[268] Admiral Kuper did actually send the HMS *Coquette* through the Seto Inland Sea to make contact with the French ships, but the ship had strict orders to anchor at a point that was effectively in range of Shimonoseki's coastal batteries. This was suspicious and it is implied that Admiral Kuper perhaps hoped the *Coquette* would be fired upon, giving Britain a reason to be involved; P. J. Treat, 'The Return of the Shimonoseki Indemnity', *The Journal of Race Development*, 8:1 (July 1917), p. 4; *The London & China Telegraph*, 15 October 1863, p. 503; *Sumatra-Courant*, 20 February 1864, pp. 3-4.
[269] G. A. Ballard, *The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co, 1921), pp. 86- 93 & pp. 105-115.
[270] Not that a significant number of British merchant vessels used the route anyway; PP, Japan, No. 5, Russell to Neale, 11 January 1864; *London Gazette*, 8 January 1864, pp. 87-88.

and with only minor damage, but this small attack had brought Chōshū, its hostility towards foreigners, and the Shimonoseki Straits back to the fore.[271]

It would be these attacks and events that would steadily involve and unite America, France, and the Netherlands (and later the British at Alcock's insistence) into concerted action, setting the precedent for future 'allied' responses to Japanese imbroglios. However, there would be another nine months before Alcock was back in Japan and regardless of Chōshū's efforts, the Shogunate had clearly made its private position clear to the principal treaty port powers. They were against the expulsion order and quickly revealed privately that they had no intention of carrying it out (as proven by the Americans at one conference, and by the British and French at another), but for Alcock the order was the spark for what he believed to be an escalating crisis.[272] Chōshū's actions were their own and to be treated as such, but this did not alter Alcock's overall view of Japan, nor did it dissuade him from believing that action was necessary. By late March 1864 (not long after his return to Japan) Alcock moved quickly to discuss the expulsion order with Russell, implying that it was a *casus belli* that the Bakufu would soon act upon, despite all the evidence to the contrary.[273] It should be noted however, that in fairness to Alcock, there does seem to be some confusion and indecision from the Foreign Office about Shimonoseki, particularly around December 1863, with Russell later backtracking on his support for an armed action.[274] However, it seems that in light of Kagoshima and the ensuing fallout over 1864 from Parliament and the press, any consideration of British action at Shimonoseki was quickly off the table thereafter.

By May however, Alcock was practically begging Russell for permission to act, stating that: "Something must be done to stop this… plotting for our final expulsion and the rupture of all friendly relations, or the end will surely come."[275] He was less forthright to the then Permanent Under-Secretary for the Foreign Office, Edmund Hammond, but still thought

---

[271] *The London & China Telegraph*, 28 September 1864, p. 534; *The Japan Herald*, 6 August 1864, p. 339; *Chicago Tribune*, 5 November 1864, p. 3.
[272] Document 48, Hitotsubashi Keiki to the Kampaku (Takatsukasa Sukehiro), 9 July 1863 in W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853-1868* (London, Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 250-253; Document No. 43, Pruyn to Steward, 25 June 1863 in *United States Department of State Message of the President of the United States, Documents, 1863, Part II*, pp. 1122-1123; TNA, FO 46/35/111, Neale to Russell, 2 July 1863.
[273] TNA, FO 46/43/11, Alcock to Russell, 31 March 1864.
[274] TNA, FO 262/52, Russell to Alcock, 17 December 1863.
[275] TNA, FO 46/44/27, Alcock to Russell, 6 May 1864.

conflict was coming: "…we are slowly, but surely, drifting – not exactly into a war – but something very unlike Peace, and a conflict more or less partial, in which there must be a trial of strength (*sic*)."[276] For Alcock an attack on Chōshū was a pre-emptive strike, a preventative measure that spared Yokohama and other treaty ports from a potential attack he believed might be coming because of imperial expulsion. It did not help that Alcock had obtained documents detailing the Bakufu's meeting with the Emperor and Daimyō the month before and interpreted them as the absolute truth, even despite the Bakufu's private reassurances to multiple parties on two separate occasions, and the knowledge that the Shogunate was aware that it could not achieve victory in a war against the treaty port powers.[277] He also conveniently ignores the fact that the straits closure had for months not hampered British trade or interests, nor had any more attacks occurred (until the *Monitor*, but this was a minor engagement anyway).[278] Alcock makes his ultimate intent clear to Hammond irrespective of these facts:

> It only now remains to be determined whether it would be wiser by a judicious blow struck at the Daimios – Nagato to wit, to keep in check the violence of these princes, and put a stop to all further agitation of the question of our expulsion by showing them the hopelessness of the task – the futility of their preparations – and their utter incapability of resisting our disciplined forces; – or wait till they are ready to attack, and accept a catastrophe and a subsequent war, both of which may very certainly be counted upon – if we adopt a perfectly passive and expectant policy. If America, France and Holland are ready and willing to join their flags to crush the Prince of Nagato; – destroy his batteries, and open the inland sea (– no very difficult enterprise), I believe there would be a chance of ending at a single blow, all this agitation and bad faith, by humbling in the boldest of their number the whole faction of puissant Daimios, and scaring the Mikado and Tycoon out of all hostile combinations most effectually, for a time at least (*sic*).[279]

[276] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 26 May 1864.
[277] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 26 April 1864.
[278] PP, Japan, No. 65, Neale to Russell, 11 September 1863.
[279] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 26 April 1864.

Thus, in July 1864 Alcock secured a joint declaration that included Britain, America, France and the Netherlands, stating that only *concerted* and *limited* action in Japan would be carried out.[280] Alcock hoped that this would allay Russell's misgivings and eventually allow for his pre-emptive chastisement of Chōshū.[281] Alcock was likely further boosted by Russell's opposition to the Ikeda Mission now touring Europe as well (subsequent agreement from the Netherlands, Prussia and belatedly France to back Britain's opposition also probably helped). Alcock never ceased to discuss his outrage over the mission until its eventual return to Japan in August 1864.[282] The Ikeda Mission's aim of gaining foreign support for the closure of at least Yokohama, was for Alcock, an affront to his 'London Protocol' that he negotiated in 1862.[283] The protocol secured free trade in Yokohama, Hakodate and Nagasaki, and in exchange Britain ceded some of its previously negotiated treaty rights (including the opening of Osaka and Kyoto) until early 1868.[284] Alcock considered the Ikeda Mission proof of the Bakufu's continued support for foreign expulsion, despite growing evidence disproving this.

In late July 1864 Russell outlined to Alcock again that the British Government would not tolerate an attack on either the Bakufu or the Daimyō.[285] Given Kagoshima this was understandable and with diplomatic concerns over the ongoing US Civil War, the continuing Polish uprising against the Russians, and the Second Schleswig War (and the ongoing diplomatic embarrassment with Brazil), concern for Japan was limited at best.[286] Russell was already used to Alcock's sabre rattling towards Japan during his earlier tenure as Foreign Secretary. In one despatch, Russell stated that Alcock "…should not have threatened war… [or] we risk… earning a reputation for quarrelling with every nation in the East."[287] With Alcock's past reliance on military bluff and bluster, one can understand Russell's current

[280] PP, Japan, Enclosure 3 in No. 55, Memorandum signed by Alcock, Roches, Pruyn and van Polsbroek, 22 July 1864; Alcock was particularly pleased to get the Americans involved despite their ongoing civil war and "…invidious position in the East of peace apostles, always profiting by war at other people's cost (*sic*)."; TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 25 August 1864.
[281] Alcock had a history of organising international cooperation from his time as consul of Shanghai in the 1850s, particularly during the Taiping Rebellion.
[282] PP, Japan, No. 9, Russell to Cowley, 23 March 1864; PP, Japan, No. 14, Cowley to Russell, 22 April 1864; PP, Japan, No. 16, Ward to Russell, 27 April 1864; PP, Japan, No. 17, Russell to Alcock, 10 May 1864; PP, Japan, Enclosure 13 in No. 57, Alcock to Kuper, August 20 1864.
[283] PP, Japan, No. 6, Russell to Winchester, 9 June 1862; TNA, FO 46/26, London Protocol, 7 June 1862.
[284] PP, Japan, No. 6, Russell to Winchester, 9 June 1862.
[285] PP, Japan, No. 40, Russell to Alcock, 26 July 1864.
[286] M. E. Chamberlain, *'Pax Britannica'? British Foreign Policy, 1789-1914* (London, Pearson Education Limited, 1988), p. 150.
[287] TNA, FO 46/4, Russell to Alcock, 28 February 1860.

dismissal of Alcock's arguments for action, even more so with the wider diplomatic considerations occurring in the mid-1860s. Alcock also attempted to use a downturn in silk exports to gather support for his planned venture against Chōshū, playing on Neale's previous communications about the growth of Anglo-Japanese trade six months prior.[288] However, it made no sense that whilst the silk trade slumped, the tea and cotton trade continued unhindered. More problematic was that when Neale was spending his final months in charge earlier in the year the silk trade was booming despite the Shimonoseki Straits already being closed.[289] This downturn in the silk trade was more due to problematic tariffs and Bakufu interference restricting its sale (which by later 1863 had partially been rectified and only in some minor trouble again in July 1864 due to high domestic demand).[290]

Alcock's reports did not fit with Neale's previous despatches at all.[291] Thus, Russell decided against Alcock in early August 1864 again, informing him that as long as Osaka and Kyoto were closed to foreign trade, the closure of the Shimonoseki Straits was not a concern and emphasised that the Bakufu was now going to chastise Chōshū anyway (Imperial permission had been granted to punish Chōshū for rebellion).[292] Any reasoning to attack now seemed baseless from a British point of view; from the expulsion threat that never materialised to the hindered trade that was mostly fine, it is difficult to understand how Alcock believed that an imminent strike was still necessary. Humorously, whilst Russell was trying to dissuade him, Alcock wrote to Hammond asking that he speak to Russell about the need to strike Chōshū. Even at this late stage he was attempting to get Russell's agreement.[293] Ultimately, Alcock's staunch belief (alongside the acquiescence of the other powers) meant that in late August a

[288] TNA, FO 46/36/135, Neale to Russell, 11 September 1864.
[289] TNA, FO 46/43/34, Alcock to Russell, 28 March 1864; TNA, FO 46/43/7, Alcock to Russell, 29 March 1864; *The Japan Herald*, 16 July 1864, p. 1.
[290] *The Japan Herald*, Vol. 2, No. 83, 26 September 1863, p. 99; *The Japan Herald*, Vol. 2, No. 122, 25 June 1864, p. 315.
[291] It most likely did not help that Alcock was an incredibly over-zealous writer. He produced pages and pages of notes, letters and messages to the Foreign Office in handwriting that even by Victorian standards was hardly readable. It would not surprise me if half of Alcock's arguments ended up being lost in the overcrowded sprawl of writing scarcely fitting each page. In 1864, Dr. Willis humorously stated that: 'Our chief never loses a chance [to write] and you might as well-read Greek as the sort of scrawl he writes. He is very wordy and has the general vice of such, a want of perspicacity and the getting at the facts at once (*sic*).''; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 45.
[292] PP, Japan, No. 45, Russell to Alcock, 8 August 1864; M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 114.
[293] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 13 August 1864.

seventeen strong armada left for the Shimonoseki Straits.[294] Russell's final communique arrived too late, but given all the warnings and concerns that came before, it was hardly an excuse to act so suddenly.[295] The allied fleet began its bombardment on 5 September 1864 and was a success, with the Shimonoseki Straits fully opened at a limited cost.[296]

Despite its success, with the capture of all coastal batteries, Shimonoseki and surrounding villages being unscathed, the straits open to foreign commerce, and the genuine approval from the Bakufu that Chōshū had been weakened, Alcock was restationed from Japan back to China via a promotion and a doubling of his salary (an enormous wage of £6,000 per annum; £1000 more than the Prime Minister/Foreign Secretary, and £4000 more than Hammond).[297] The Foreign Office acknowledged the Alcock's success, but were understandably reluctant to offer any significant praise.[298] When you consider Alcock's initial plan was to follow up the Shimonoseki Campaign with an advance on Hyogo, Osaka, and Kyoto, the Foreign Office were right to be more alarmed than pleased.[299] Russell later made great efforts to retcon Alcock's earlier recall, stating that he should not view it as a comment on his actions and that he should return to Yokohama for now (Alcock was already in Ceylon by this point and refused to return to Japan).[300] For Alcock however, the damage was done: "I cannot say I

---

[294] TNA, FO 46/46, Mizuno Izumi no Kami to Russell, 27 October 1864; PP, Japan, No. 60, Romaine to Hammond, 17 November 1864.
[295] A. Best, *British Engagement with Japan, 1854-1922*.
[296] PP, Japan, No. 60, Romaine to Hammond, 17 November 1864; H. Cortazzi, 'Britain and Japan: did the diplomats make a difference?', *Asian* Affairs, 36:1 (2007), p. 57; The attack was almost thwarted on four occasions: firstly, by the fact that the four foreign powers could not agree on what to do, secondly, because the two Japanese Ambassadors who had toured Europe had agreed a new treaty with France to open the Seto Inland Sea (but this was disavowed by the Bakufu), thirdly, those same two diplomats also tried to negotiate with Chōshū directly via a British ship, but ultimately failed, and lastly because a desperate attempt by several Chōshū officials to make contact with the foreign fleet was turned away; A. M. Craig, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration*, pp. 231-236; *The Daily News*, 18 October 1864, p. 5; *The Daily News*, 26 October 1864, p. 3; *The Patriot*, 20 October 1864, p. 682; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, pp. 307-308; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, pp. 302-307; Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu*, pp. 36-37; *Liverpool Albion*, 14 November 1864, p. 10.
[297] TNA, PRO 30/22/101, Russell to Alcock, 16 March 1865; PP, Estimates & Civil Services, 25 July 1864.
[298] In China, 1848, Alcock blockaded over 1400 Rice Junks meant for Beijing with one Royal Navy ship and stopped payment of all duties in response to several missionaries being attacked. Whilst his only remaining option other than to do nothing (which George Bonham, the third Governor of Hong Kong, desired), Alcock performed this act without permission from the Foreign Office. Its success and Lord Palmerston's approval (as Foreign Secretary) meant that Alcock escaped reprimand. However, it was made clear to Alcock that this was to be a *one off*. Obviously, Alcock did not stick to that brief, thus the Foreign Office's muddled reaction to Shimonoseki that we see here; R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, pp. 51-52.
[299] TNA, FO 46/45, Alcock to Kuper, 18 August 1864.
[300] PP, Japan, No. 89, Russell to Alcock, 31 January 1865.

have received my recall without pain – but certainly without surprise."[301] Irrespective of the confused and successful outcome of Shimonoseki, both the press and Parliament appeared to be ignorant (it helped that Parliament closed in July for the summer break).[302] The press were somewhat confused and relaxed by the whole affair, which was probably due to the Shimonoseki Campaign's long nature, the fact that no civilians or 'neutral' population centres like Shimonoseki were chiefly targeted, and its eventual 'satisfactory' ending at a very limited cost. Thus, most periodicals and newspapers were varyingly neutral as a result, with only some negative reactions here and there.[303] Diplomatic difficulties in regards to Italy, the ongoing Second Schleswig War and US Civil War, also played a role in taking up greater interest amongst the press. The *Overland China Mail* probably best summaries Shimonoseki with its initial comment that it "…has not proved such a tough affair as that at Kagoshima."[304] The press breathed a sigh of relief.

Parliament was a little more active by comparison, with some grumblings from what Alcock derogatorily describes as the 'peace party' and the 'Manchester School of Politicians', mentioning Cobden and Lord Grey specifically; Cobden for being the most outspoken MP defending 'Japan' in a speech in the Commons on May 1 and Grey for his resolution on Alcock's prior actions introduced on 1 July in the Lords.[305] However, whilst named by Alcock as his primary critics, these indirect and direct condemnations actually came *before* the bombardment of Shimonoseki. This perhaps explains their apparent tameness when compared to Parliament's vicious dissection of Kagoshima, as well as Kagoshima's continued prominence. For example, Cobden's resolution, which was primarily about addressing affairs in China, briefly mentioned Japan:

---

[301] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 25 October 1864; For much of his career Alcock felt underappreciated for his successive actions in East Asia that, in his eyes, protected and maintained British influence and interests. Thus, his reaction here is unsurprising.
[302] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 12 September 1864.
[303] *Leeds Mercury*, 1 November 1864, p. 2; *Leicester Chronicle*, 26 November 1864, p. 2; *The Era*, 18 December 1864, p. 15; *The Daily News*, 24 February 1865, p. 5; *The Morning Post*, 24 February 1865, p. 5; *The Daily News*, 10 November 1864, p. 5; *The Patriot*, 20 October 1864, p. 671; *Dublin Evening Mail*, 21 November 1864, p. 2; *Consett Guardian*, 5 November 1864, p. 2; *Birmingham Daily Gazette*, 9 December 1864, p. 4; *Sleaford Gazette*, 10 December 1864, p. 4; *Fife Herald*, 15 December 1864, p. 2; *Overland China Mail*, 27 September 1864, p. 1259.
[304] *Overland China Mail*, 27 September 1864, p. 1259.
[305] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 12 September 1864; TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 25 October 1864; Note that this was a defence of Japan generally, and not a Daimyō like Chōshū.

> Now I want to know whether we are going to receive the Japanese Envoys [from the Second Japanese Embassy to Europe] in the same way as we received the Ambassadors who pleaded in the same manner with Lord Elgin… Are we to pursue the same course with respect to Japan? I trust not… We have had the death of one Englishman in Japan—Mr. Richard-son—and to avenge that we have thrown away the lives of many brave men (*sic*).[306]

Lord Grey's House of Lord's resolution gathered some support for his anti-Alcock position, namely from the Earl of Carnarvon and the Bishop of Oxford.[307] Seeing as Lord Grey suggested that if Alcock had repeated his actions (of entering a Daimyō owned mine) somewhere in Europe he would have been rightfully shot on the spot, I think we can forgive Alcock's singular aggravation towards him on this account.[308] This fact probably distracted Alcock from the more damaging remarks from the Bishop of Oxford, Samuel Wilberforce (the third son of William Wilberforce), who believed that Britain's (Alcock's) actions up to July 1864 had reduced Japan into an ungovernable state verging on anarchy.[309] Despite this chorus of criticism, the debate was short and limited. The resolution itself was comfortably voted down by thirty over eleven, a majority of nineteen.[310] Ironically, these resolutions were more significant than Parliament's reaction to Shimonoseki after it had occurred. Parliament, by early 1865 after it had been reconvened for the new year, was satisfied that relations with the Bakufu were intact.[311] Palmerston felt that Alcock's actions were vindicated by both "action and fact" when writing to Russell in March 1865.[312] A combination of luck, timing, and the fact that it was not against civilians, had made Alcock's concerted action acceptable and free from most criticism.

---

[306] House of Commons, *Affairs in China – Resolution* (1 May 1864, Vol. 175, Cols. 931-932) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 30 June 2022].
[307] House of Lords, *Japan – Resolutions* (1 July 1864, Vol. 176, Cols. 573-612) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 30 June 2022].
[308] House of Lords, *Japan – Resolutions* (1 July 1864, Vol. 176, Cols. 576-577) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 30 June 2022].
[309] House of Lords, *Japan – Resolutions* (1 July 1864, Vol. 176, Cols. 602-603) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 30 June 2022].
[310] House of Lords, *Japan – Resolutions* (1 July 1864, Vol. 176, Cols. 612) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 30 June 2022]; That eleven also included the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Charles Thomas Longley, not a minor figure by any means.
[311] House of Lords, *The Lords Commissioners' Speech* (7 February 1865, Vol. 177, Cols. 3-4) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 19 February 2022]; House of Commons, *Address to Her Majesty on the Lords Commissioners' Speech* (7 February 1865, Vol. 177, Cols. 41-43) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed on 19 February 2022].
[312] TNA, PRO 30/22/15D, Palmerston to Russell, 4 March 1865.

What Shimonoseki tells us is that the man on the spot still had agency. That potential success could still shield them from most recriminations and grant retroactive governmental support. However, what success meant for the man on the spot was certainly now an ever-thinning line. What was acceptable in China, Brazil, or even Japan several years ago was no longer achievable, with only the success (through concerted allied action), timing (with Parliament closing for the year roughly a month prior), and the lack of civilian death and destruction, shielding Shimonoseki from any serious Kagoshima-esque criticisms. In the end, *The Times* was the most vocal about Shimonoseki and plainly espoused its relief that Kagoshima and its ruination had not been repeated. A tempered, but worried appraisal, that was representative of most reactions to Shimonoseki.[313] In any event, Russell was quick to remind Alcock's replacement, Sir Harry Parkes, of the importance of following his guidelines properly and that fully independent actions were a risk not worth taking.[314] Parkes, despite his involvement with China, understood that this new directive was sacrosanct and direly sought after by the Foreign Office.[315] These changes to British diplomacy in Japan would not have been possible without the extreme outcry from both the press and Parliament over Kagoshima (and related foreign incidents like China and Brazil). Parliament and the press as diplomatic sub-actors had altered the parameters of how diplomacy could be carried out in Japan and introduced new expectations of how diplomats should understand British foreign policy.

4. Conclusion:

The widespread reaction from the press and Parliament to the bombardment of Kagoshima came from a build-up of continued frustrations over how diplomats abused their authority and often reinterpreted British foreign policy. China was a serious case; China was perceived as a barbarous and backward oriental power, but acknowledged as a significant nation, important in international affairs. Even with Palmerston's retroactive backing, Parks and Bowring had clearly acted without consultation or much thought over the potential ramifications of their

[313] *The Times*, 10 November 1864, p. 6.
[314] S. Lane-Poole & F. V. Dickens, *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes, KCB, GCMG, Sometime Her Majesty's Minister to China & Japan, Volume II* (London, Macmillan & Co, 1894), p. 3; PP, Japan, No. 42, Parkes to Russell, 30 June 1865; PP, Japan, No, 8, Russell to Parkes, 8 April 1865; PP, Japan, No, 8, Russell to Parkes, 8 April 1865.
[315] The new policy of effective neutrality and more 'verbal' diplomacy was ultimately highly successful for Britain in the years ahead, particularly with the Meiji Restoration in 1868 in hindsight.

actions. Back home the illegality and rapid development of events shocked some in the press and worried Parliament. Their fears were warranted for those actions led to a four-year war, which while ultimately successful for Britain, could have easily gone awry.[316] Brazil was a similar situation in terms of potentially escalating to war, but was much more like Kagoshima in that the diplomat in question, broadly speaking, acted under government direction. Ultimately, Christie's actions, once events developed outside of any direct Foreign Office control, were an additional embarrassment for Britain. While not entirely a direct example of a diplomat acting alone, it does show even with Foreign Office direction, diplomats could still reinterpret foreign policy. Events in Brazil eventually ended relatively peacefully, but it was all still a very public embarrassment and unnecessary distraction; another shock to the system for Parliament and the press. China may have been more serious, but it was merely the beginning and could be more easily explained away as a distant barbaric nation. For Brazil, a more civilised, westernised, and most crucially, a minor power, to be treated so similarly was an appalling step in direction for British foreign policy for many. These two events show the press and Parliament's growing influence over diplomacy as unique diplomatic sub-actors, but it was still early days. Kagoshima would be the decisive turning point.

The reactions to the incidents in China and Brazil were abundant, but nothing compared the public shock over Japan. The dramatic reaction of the press and Parliament to Kagoshima and the Foreign Office's response to Shimonoseki consequently paved the way for various changes in Anglo-Japanese diplomacy. No longer could diplomats act so unilaterally or expect to be given unspecific advice on what could or could not be done. They would receive clear aims that they would be *expected* to adhere to or face the consequences, irrespective of any successes that might occur (as Alcock technically achieved). The danger of diplomats escalating events through military action, setting worrying precedents to act improperly or unlawfully abroad, and the overall embarrassment and issues related to successive governments having to provide retroactive approval, could no longer be tolerated in Japan because of the widespread public fallout. This change, although caused by Kagoshima, was only confirmed by Shimonoseki and the Foreign Office's reaction to that event. It took a subsequent scare to finally push those new diplomatic expectations from the Foreign Office

[316] Given this was in the aftermath of the Crimean War (and with the Indian Uprising in 1857), its timing could not have been worse, and it could have been easily avoided.

to the fore. If China and Brazil were catalysts for Kagoshima (for Parliament and the press), then Kagoshima was the warning for Shimonoseki (for the Foreign Office). However, Shimonoseki did not receive the same scrutiny or attention that Kagoshima and previous events achieved, even though unlike Kagoshima, Shimonoseki was carried out without the Foreign Office's blessing. Its successful outcome, timing, and more overt military focus probably shunted any serious recriminations from occurring. Its success and apparent anonymity among the press and Parliament did not protect Alcock fully from the Foreign Office however, for although he was promoted, he was still reassigned from what was initially a recall.[317] Parliament and the press's power as diplomatic sub-actors may have not been fully utilised here, but the aftereffects of their influence could still be felt by the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office did not want a repeat of Kagoshima leading to a very public dissection of its actions and methods.

Whilst this change in how British diplomats could act towards the Japanese most certainly occurred because of cumulative pressure from the press and Parliament as diplomatic sub-actors, this same pressure and dissatisfaction did not seem to alter relations with other nations so quickly or necessarily in the same way. In Japan we see a change over two years, 1863-1864, but elsewhere it is difficult to pin down any sort of similar changes occurring in the same timeframe. This suggests that Parliament and the press's power and influence ebbed and flowed, reflecting their status as diplomatic sub-actors and non-state actors respectfully. This was probably influenced by power and monetary considerations; MP's had elections and constituents to worry about, and even the Lords still had wider party politics to be concerned with. The press ultimately answered to its readership and was thus subject to choosing topics and indeed points of view that it thought would chime to their readers mindsets (and wallets).[318] Popularity and overriding thoughts of the time also played a role in preventing diplomatic actors from outside the Foreign Office maintaining influence. Jingoistic ideals, social darwinism, European superiority, and imperialism all affected how certain actions were viewed and how much power Parliament and the press had to alter British foreign policy. For example, if we look at other nations, like China and Brazil once again, it can be said that irrespective of diplomatic successes/failures nothing really changed, at least not in

[317] PP, Japan, No. 50, Russell to Alcock, 25 August 1864.
[318] Of course, members of the House of Lords did not need to *personally* worry about elections and constituents due to their hereditary positions, but still shared MP's general concern about their political party's fortunes.

the same way as how things changed for diplomats in Japan.[319] For China especially (and indeed other parts of the world generally) diplomats acting as the man on the spot clearly continued, with other foreign issues occurring in the future between these countries and Britain as a consequence.[320]

However, whilst the diplomatic power of Parliament and the press was therefore haphazard and not so dramatically influential as perhaps wished by many at the time, for Japan and the future at least it shows a portent into how parliamentary democracy and the British media would only become further involved with diplomacy as time went on. With the Foreign Office's illusive, private grip on diplomacy slowly giving way to a broader collective of diplomatic agents and actors. Parliament and the press were no longer working at the margins, but now increasingly integral to the formulation, implementation, and judgement of Britain's foreign policy. In this light Kagoshima was an early marker, a minor signalling of the greater changes to both British society and diplomacy that now lay ahead. Overall, the impact of the press and Parliament grants us a better understanding of how Anglo-Japanese relations forms part of a larger global history, and that like many other bilateral relationships across the centuries, Anglo-Japanese relations cannot be viewed completely in a vacuum. It reaffirms once again that the use of other sources, not strictly diplomatic in nature, can prove useful for the study of diplomatic history as well. It also demonstrates that the power of diplomatic sub-actors, like MPs and Lords in Parliament, and outside, a more indirect non-state sub-actor, like the press, can prove to be both retroactively and actively influential in diplomacy and its conduct. For Japan they caused a complete reshuffling of what diplomats could and could not do in their diplomatic exchanges with the Japanese, creating a clear separation of how diplomacy was undertaken before and after 1863-1864.

[319] Anglo-Brazilian relations remained non-existent despite Parliament and the press's reaction until 1865.

[320] See the Yangzhou Riot which resulted in British military intervention orchestrated by Alcock *without* official approval. This event also received serious recriminations from the British Press and Parliament; PP, China, No. 2, Correspondence respecting the Attack on British Protestant Missionaries at Yang-Chow Foo, August 1868; PP, China, No. 3, Correspondence respecting Missionary Disturbances at Chee-Foo and Taiwan, 1869; PP, China, No. 8, Correspondence with Sir Rutherford Alcock respecting Missionaries at Hankow and State of Affairs at various Ports in China, 1869; PP, China, No. 9, Correspondence respecting Inland Residence of English Missionaries in China, 1870; PP, China, No. 10, Further Correspondence respecting the Attack on British Protestant Missionaries at Yang-Chow-Foo, August 1868.

3. The Chargés d'Affaires: A Forgotten Position in Anglo-Japanese Relations:

1. Introduction:

The position of Chargés d'Affaires during nineteenth century Anglo-Japanese relations was a complex posting. A modernising and globalising Japan provided constant challenges for British diplomats to consider. This role has not been given the same level of study that it merits however. Most are viewed as either unimportant or unsuccessful. Besides one individual, Edward St. John Neale, the others seem to have mostly fallen through the cracks of time, despite their (temporary) positions of power.[321] A Chargé d'Affaires was only used during the absence of the Minister Plenipotentiary. The role always technically existed, just under the different name of '(First) Secretary of Legation'. It was usually someone from the Diplomatic Service that filled the role, but sometimes due to events they had to look further down the diplomatic list. For example, Ralph Paget was only Third Secretary when he became Chargé d'Affaires under extenuating circumstances. Sometimes, the post of Chargés d'Affaires was filled by someone of a different rank from the Consular Service: Charles Alexander Winchester was only a consul and was made a Chargé d'Affaires twice due to the absence of Neale (i.e., the first choice). The role of Chargés d'Affaires covers two more specific terms: Chargés d'Affaires *ad interim* and Chargés d'Affaires *en pied*/Chargés d'Affaires *en titre*.[322] A Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* refers to a diplomat who takes charge of an embassy/legation whilst the official head diplomat (a Minister Plenipotentiary in our case) is absent/unavailable.[323] In this chapter I will examine four individuals who held this post in Japan from 1853-1902. I will review their past and how this affected their time in Japan, the events they dealt with, and then evaluate their contribution to Anglo-Japanese

---

[321] See H. Cortazzi, 'Lt. Colonel Edward St. John Neale, Chargé d'Affaires at Edo/Yokohama, 1862-1864', in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004), pp. 22-32.

[322] G. R. Berridge & A. James, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy* (New York, Palgrave, 2001), pp. 33-34.

[323] G. R. Berridge & A. James A, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*, p. 33; D. M. Malone, 'The Modern Diplomatic Mission', in A. E. Cooper, J. Heine & R. Thakur, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 122-123; A Chargé d'Affaires *en pied*/Chargé d'Affaires *en titre* refers to a diplomat placed in charge of a diplomatic mission that is neither an embassy nor a legation. During our period the British diplomatic mission in Japan was headed by a legation, thus we are only concerned with the first iteration of the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* mentioned.

relations as important diplomatic actors. Firstly, I will look at Lieutenant-Colonel Edward St. John Neale (May 1862 – March 1864), Dr. Charles Alexander Winchester (March – May 1862 and again from December 1864 – July 1865), Robert Grant Watson (May 1872 – March 1873), and finally Ralph Spencer Paget (June – August 1894). Overall, each of these Chargés d'Affaires proved to be highly competent and successful diplomats. They were each able to adapt to the diplomatic challenges they faced, proving that they were equal to the diplomatic betters they temporally replaced. The Chargés d'Affaires were a diplomatic resource that provided unique advantages to Anglo-Japanese relations and were a great credit to Britain's overall diplomatic apparatus. It was thanks to their efforts, and other Chargés d'Affaires, that Britain's diplomacy with Japan was able to progress so satisfactorily and continuously during the nineteenth century. An oddity among the treaty port powers.

1.1. The Four Case Studies:

Neale took charge for a considerable time whilst chief diplomat, Sir Rutherford Alcock, was in London helping the Foreign Secretary, Lord Russell, negotiate with the first Japanese mission to Europe.[324] Neale oversaw the escalation of Japanese attacks on Westerners and the deterioration of relations with the Bakufu. This culminated with the Namamugi Affair where a British subject was murdered by Satsuma samurai; failing to negotiate a settlement in response led to the bombardment of Kagoshima.[325] Despite its supposed success there was an extremely negative, bipartisan reaction from both Parliament and the press. The Foreign Office subsequently demanded that its diplomats take Japan's political 'peculiarity' into account. Neale accepted this change and adapted accordingly until Alcock's return from Britain.[326] Neale is tricky to judge overall. Opinions by contemporaries and historians alike have been more than mixed.[327] I lean towards a slightly more positive appraisal of Neale,

[324] H. Cortazzi, 'Sir Rutherford Alcock, Minister at Edo, 1858-1862', in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004), pp. 20-21; See H. Cortazzi, 'Alcock returns to Japan, 1864', in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004), pp. 33-38.
[325] J. Denny, *Respect and Consideration*, p. 84; PP, Japan, No. 1, Russell to Neale, 24 December 1862; M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 96; D. F. Rennie, *The British Arms in China and Japan*, p. 382; H. Cortazzi, 'The British Bombardment of Kagoshima, 1863, Admiral Sir L. Kuper and Lt. Colonel Neale', pp. 275-278; See P. Hore, eds., *Seapower Ashore*.
[326] TNA, FO 46/35/111, Neale to Russell, 2 July 1863; PP, Japan, No. 65, Neale to Russell, 11 September 1863; PP, Japan, No. 76, Russell to Neale, 11 January 1864.
[327] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 53-54 & pp. 84-89; H. Cortazzi, 'Lt. Colonel Edward St. John Neale, Chargé d'Affaires at Edo/Yokohama, 1862-1864', pp. 31-32.

feeling he was more the victim of Japan's 'uniqueness' and events than any actual poor diplomacy on his part. He may have been somewhat distant and occasionally ill-tempered, but he was also reserved and quite resourceful when required.

Winchester oversaw the legation in Japan twice. The first time (March – May 1862) was to cover for Alcock's absence until Neale's arrival in Japan. Neale was the Secretary of Legation and thus assumed the post of Chargé d'Affaires in Alcock's continued absence.[328] Winchester's second tenure occurred after Alcock was promoted and Sir Harry Parkes, Alcock's replacement, was still incoming.[329] Winchester's second term coincided with the Bakufu's decline as powers across Japan revaluated centuries old loyalties. During this growing uncertainty, various parties, domestic and foreign, desired Britain's support and favour. Winchester's strength to delay and deflect many key decisions without weakening Britain's position in Japan meant that his successor could enter the post unencumbered. His 'far-sighted' policy choices are only briefly alluded to in G. Daniels seminal work on Parkes.[330] Outside of this he is either unmentioned or a distant secondary actor. His role during this period was critical to the successful beginning of Parkes tenure as minister.

Watson's time in charge coincided with the 1872 *Maria Luz* incident where Chinese coolies were found ill-treated.[331] Japan later ruled this treatment and the coolie trade itself as illegal. This was an early test for Japanese foreign policy for Japan received many foreign protests.[332] Only Britain offered both *significant* and *overt* support to resist such pressures.[333] It was a moment of Japanese independent action and Anglo-Japanese cooperation on the international stage. Watson dealt with several other diplomatic issues during his tenure, like ensuring

---

[328] H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972*, p. 308.
[329] PP, Japan, No. 5, Winchester to Russell, 16 January 1865.
[330] G. Daniels, *Sir Harry Parkes, British Representative in Japan, 1865-1883* (Richmond, Japan Library, 1996), pp. 28-29.
[331] See I. R. Saveliev, 'Rescuing the Prisoners of the Maria Luz', in B. Edstrom, eds., *Turning Points in Japanese History* (London, Taylor & Francis, 2013); See S. J. Crawford, 'The "Maria Luz" Affair', *The Historian*, 46:4 (August 1984), pp. 583-596; See B. Mihalopoulos, 'Freedom, Slavery, and the Meiji Restoration: Revisiting the Maria Luz Incident', in See T. D. Amos & A. Ishii, eds., *Revisiting Japan's Restoration: New Approaches to the Study of the Meiji Transformation* (New York, Routledge, 2022), pp. 33-48.
[332] It is also a good example of the détente that existed between Britain and America on relations with Japan and on the global slave trade.
[333] D. Keene, *Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World: 1852-1912* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 216-218.

extraterritoriality's unfettered continuation and Christianity's liberalisation in Japan, but remains a largely forgotten figure for most Anglo-Japanese scholars.[334]

Finally, I will look at Paget and his short tenure as Chargé d'Affaires. Paget's time in charge was crucial because it coincided with the build-up and onset of the First-Sino-Japanese War.[335] War meant an upheaval of established relations and threatened British interests and possessions in the region. Securing these became Paget's chief aim. Paget is an interesting case study because there are accounts of him being highly competent and but also others which describe him more neutrally as nothing more than a junior diplomat; effectively useless.[336] Deciding which assessment appears correct will be my primary focus there.

1.2. A New Diplomatic History of Britain's Chargés d'Affaires in Japan:

While the main discussion will be about Neale's diplomatic success, his prominence in Anglo-Japanese relations is taken for granted. He is the exception when it comes to Chargés d'Affaires. The others, including, Winchester, Watson, and Paget, usually merit nothing more than a secondary mention in regards to a Minister Plenipotentiary or biographical note in the back of a book.[337] This exception appears to be due to the bombardment of Kagoshima. Neale also became a Companion of the Order of the Bath in November 1863.[338] This made him an exception among Chargés d'Affaires as most only received similar honours further along in their careers long after Japan.[339] His inclusion alongside other major British diplomats like Sir Harry Parkes and Hugh Fraser also comes from his longevity in the post (almost two years), which is quite significant given the Chargés d'Affaires temporary nature.[340] These are

[334] Not just in British histories of Japan either, but in Japanese as well; See T. Kobayashi, *19-Seiki Igirisu Gaikō to Higashi Ajia* (Tokyo, Sairyusha, 2012).
[335] See S. C. M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003).
[336] Č. Antić, *Ralph Paget: A Diplomat in Serbia* (Belgrade, Institute for Balkan Studies, 2006), pp. 18-21; H. Chi Man, '"They are a Little Afraid of the British Admiral" The China Squadron of the Royal Navy during the First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895', *International Bibliography of Military History*, 35 (2015), p. 98.
[337] See H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972*; B. Burke-Gaffney, *The Nagasaki British Consulate, 1859-1955* (United Kingdom, Flying Crane Press, 2019), p. 119.
[338] The fourth most senior and prestigious British Chivalric Order.
[339] H. Cortazzi, 'Lt. Colonel Edward St. John Neale, Chargé d'Affaires at Edo/Yokohama, 1862-1864', p. 22.
[340] Power Henry Le Poer Trench and Francis Richard Plunkett, two other Chargés d'Affaires, are also mentioned, but only due to them later becoming chief diplomat in Japan outright; H. Cortazzi, 'Power

understandable reasons for his unique inclusion, especially for historians who wish to focus on the more significant British diplomats and have to decide on a cut-off. For New Diplomatic History however, we do not have to make such a choice. I intend to reevaluate Neale and add to our understanding of him, yes, but I also desire to shed light on the role of being a Chargé d'Affaires in Japan and the others that occupied this post. I will reveal how all four of these diplomats proved to not only be competent covers for the Foreign Office in Japan, but also successfully contributed to the positive development of Anglo-Japanese relations. This chapter will show why both the role of Chargés d'Affaires and those who undertake it deserve greater study within nineteenth century Anglo-Japanese relations and beyond.

2. Edward St. John Neale: Strategically Incompetent or Tactfully Competent:

2.1. Why Neale?:

Neale's role in the bombardment of Kagoshima and its origins are well-documented elsewhere and shall not be repeated here. Thus, our study will begin with his tenure from the aftermath of Kagoshima until Alcock's return. We will cover his attempts to reconcile relations with both the Bakufu and Satsuma to promote trade and prove to the Foreign Office that all was well. I will evaluate whether such diplomatic efforts were successful, but first we must better understand his origins. Neale's birth has been difficult for previous writers to nail down, with estimates ranging from the late 1800s to the early 1810s.[341] Satow states he was about fifty-five when he arrived in Japan however, and an obituary mentions 1813, giving us the dates 1812-1813. This date discrepancy is down to his birth date (1812) and christening date (1813) being confused.[342] He was born in Madras to a Daniel Neale, who worked for the Madras Supreme Court (as part of the wider Madras Presidency Civil Service).[343] Neale did

---

Henry Le Poer Trench, Minister to Japan, 1894-1895', in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004), pp. 72-77; See E. Hertslet, *The Foreign Office List, 1888, forming a Complete British Diplomatic and Consular Handbook* (London, Harrison & Sons, 1888), p. 168.

[341] H. Cortazzi's own research notes the difficulties of trying to nail down his date of birth; Cortazzi, 'Lt. Colonel Edward St. John Neale, Chargé d'Affaires at Edo/Yokohama, 1862-1864', p. 22.

[342] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 30; *The Illustrated London News*, 23 February 1867, p. 195.

[343] *Government Gazette (India)*, 31 May 1810, p. 8; *Government Gazette (India)*, 31 December 1818, p. 4; *Government Gazette (India)*, 7 October 1819, p. 4; *Sun*, 10 January 1823, p. 4; F. A. Neale, 'Twenty-Seven Years of a Cosmopolite's Life', in *Tait's Edinburgh Magazine, Volume 24* (Edinburgh, Sutherland & Knox, 1857), pp. 100-101; India at this time was still under the British East

not stay in India however, and went to Britain aged 13 via the H. C. C. S. *Coldstream*, to continue his education.[344] Aged just 19 he joined a regiment of Scottish Fusiliers in September 1832 under Portuguese direction during the twilight of the so-named Liberal Wars (1832-1834).[345] Neale was present during the protracted Siege of Oporto and was apparently in command of a company in every action where British troops were involved.[346] Like many of his compatriots, Neale transferred over to the 'British Auxiliary Legion' in Spain to fight in the First Carlist War (fighting at Bilbao, St. Sebastian, Fuenterrabia, and Vittoria).[347] Neale served as Aide De Camp to Scotsman Brigadier-General Sir Charles Shaw (a veteran of Waterloo) who thought very highly of him:

> I have been very fortunate in getting O'Neale on my staff. He knows more of real warfare and of a soldier's life, than most men. He has been with me nearly four years, and although he did not get his company in Portugal, still I entrusted him there with a major's detachment, and he has always justified my confidence. I should tell you his real name is "Neale," the Chevalier de lima, by some freak in making out his commission in 1833, having put an O before it; and as Neale knows that he distinguished himself at Oporto with the O, he with a laudable military pride has a liking to it. But when he quits Spain, I have told him I shall un-O him (*sic*).[348]

He was undoubtedly an able commander, worthy of Satow's 'old warrior' description, for he was promoted several times and reached the rank of Lt. Colonel in January 1837.[349] He was even awarded for bravery during the battle of St. Sebastian in 1836 by Isabella II, the Queen

---

India Company, and was split into three 'presidencies': the Madras Presidency, the Bengal Presidency, and the Bombay Presidency (there was also the North-Western Provinces, which was supposed to be later transformed into the Agra Presidency during the early 1830s, but this never occurred).

[344] *Government Gazette (India)*, 19 January 1826, p. 11; *Government Gazette (India)*, 26 January 1826, p. 10.

[345] See H. Cortazzi, 'Lt. Colonel Edward St. John Neale, Chargé d'Affaires at Edo/Yokohama, 1862-1864', pp. 22-32.

[346] E. Hertslet, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1865, forming a Complete British Diplomatic and Consular Handbook* (London, Harrison, 1865), p. 126.

[347] See M. Lawrence, *Spain's First Carlist War, 1833-1840* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

[348] C. Shaw, *Personal Memoirs and Correspondence of Colonel Charles Shaw comprising a Narrative of the War for Constitutional Liberty in Portugal and Spain, from its commencement in 1831 to the dissolution of the British legion in 1837, Volume 2* (London, Colburn, 1837), p. 413.

[349] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 29.

of Spain.[350] His commanding officer, Brigadier-General Shaw, lauded his soldiery and bravery often in his personal memoirs.[351] Post-war, Neale left his military beginnings to go into diplomacy; he accompanied Colonel Hodges (later Sir George Lloyd), who was appointed Britain's Consul-General, to Serbia in May 1837.[352] He spent two years in the Principality of Serbia in Belgrade (1839-1841), as a junior diplomat (and took charge temporarily for eight months), then six years as a vice-consul in Alexandretta (1841-1847), and subsequently as the consul of Varna (Bulgaria), both in the Ottoman Empire (1847-1858).[353] During his time in Varna, Neale had to liaise with the Turkish military and civilian authorities, as well as the Royal Navy and the British Army who were both headquartered at Varna during the Crimean War. A substantial responsibility. He reported on the condition of the Turkish Army, provided vital intelligence, was attached to Omar Pasha's HQ for two months in 1853, and in May 1855 helped General Charles Frederick Havelock (in service to the Ottomans) raise another regiment of irregular cavalry.[354] Two years after the war Neale was briefly made consul of Patras in independent Greece (February 1858 - September 1858), and then consul of Bosnia (1858-1860) back in the Ottoman Empire.[355] He was subsequently promoted to the role of (First) Secretary of the Legation in China in 1860.[356] He was then transferred to Japan in 1862, again as (First) Secretary of the Legation/Chargé d'Affaires where he took charge during Alcock's absence.[357]

---

[350] He was also received the Spanish Royal Military Order of St. Ferdinand, 1st Class; E. Hertslet, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1865*, p. 126.
[351] C. Shaw, *Personal Memoirs and Correspondence of Colonel Charles Shaw, Volume 2*, p. 418 & pp. 569-575.
[352] E. Hertslet, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1865*, pp. 126-127; *London Gazette*, 31 January 1837, p. 233.
[353] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 29; *London Gazette*, 1 June 1847, p. 2007.
[354] E. Hertslet, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1865*, p. 127.
[355] *London Gazette*, 16 February 1858, p. 772; *London Gazette*, 12 October 1858, p. 4433.
[356] *London Gazette*, 6 January 1860, p. 37.
[357] H. Cortazzi, 'Lt. Colonel Edward St. John Neale, Chargé d'Affaires at Edo/Yokohama, 1862-1864', p. 23; See J. L. Cranmer-Byng, 'The Old British Legation at Peking, 1860-1959', *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, 3 (1963), pp. 60-87; It is interesting to note that Neale is briefly referred to as an attaché in 1862, though it is unclear whether this is a clerical error or an actual additional role he undertook. Perhaps it was a *very* temporary role before he became (First) Secretary of the Legation/Chargé d'Affaires.

2.2. Kagoshima's Impact and Britain's New Course:

The bombardment of Kagoshima caused substantial backlash from both the press and Parliament, forcing the Foreign Office to defend its policies and the actions of its diplomats more arduously than before. Attempts were made to explain the situation, with various despatches printed in the Government's editorial, the *London Gazette*, to show Britain's justifications.[358] This did little to alleviate pressure on the government, with Neale bearing the brunt of most criticism.[359] There was some defence of Neale from outside the Government, particularly in Japan. Dr. Willis, the doctor of the Legation, commented that Neale had negotiated "…with great forbearance…" despite his failure to achieve an amicable settlement.[360] The most surprising and ardent support Neale received was from the wider treaty port community however.[361] Ultimately, these defences achieved little, with Britain's foreign policy in Japan completely revaluated. Lord Russell, the Foreign Secretary, outlined this to Neale as a new directive to be *strictly* adhered too. Russell demanded 'peaceful intercourse' with Japan so that commerce could blossom. He further stated that Britain would take great exception to Japan's 'peculiar culture' and governance, and emphasised that any military action was a last resort.[362] Neale agreed with this change and went above and beyond to accommodate the Foreign Office's new expectations. Problematically though, in Kagoshima's aftermath tensions were running high with the Bakufu, the Shimonoseki Crisis was under way, and Alcock was effectively countermanding most, if not all, of Neale's recommendations to the Foreign Office. Despite these challenges however, Neale managed to turn the situation to his advantage.

The Shimonoseki Crisis was highly extended affair where Chōshū domain began firing on foreign shipping (American, French, and Dutch mainly) passing through the Shimonoseki Straits on 25 June 1863 (as discussed in the chapter on Parliament and the press). Chōshū was controlled by anti-foreign radicals and took no issue with firing on foreign shipping,

[358] TNA, FO 46/43/4, Neale to Russell, 16 January 1864; *London Gazette*, 30 October 1863, pp. 5123-5136.
[359] See Parliament and the press chapter for criticisms in Britain.
[360] H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 36.
[361] *The Japan Herald*, Vol. 2, No. 83, 26 September 1863, p. 99; *Overland China Mail*, 15 April 1864, p. 1215.
[362] PP, Japan, No. 76, Russell to Neale, 11 January 1864.

especially as the Emperor had decreed it.[363] The contrast between Neale's reaction in Japan and Alcock's reaction in Britain to the developing Shimonoseki Campaign is quite significant. Neale focused on what he understood, correctly, as the prime concern in Anglo-Japanese relations at this time: trade. He emphasised ongoing discussions with the Bakufu about potential tariff changes and the export of Japanese cotton and silk.[364] He was also performing follow-up negotiations with Satsuma to claim Britain's previously demanded £25,000 and the apprehension of Richardson's murderers and things went well.[365] Satsuma's turn around was a great surprise to many, but their sudden entrance into the treaty ports in the silk market was proof enough for many that they had caught the British 'shopkeeper' bug.[366] Satow argues that although there was some doubt over the genuine nature of Satsuma's climb down, the general good feeling being presented and desire for better relations (and trade) was enough and that Neale's acceptance of this was the correct course of action.[367] Indeed, the fact that Neale passed on Satsuma's request to purchase a warship of a similar design to the HMS *Perseus* (a Camelion-class sloop) further shows the obviously decreased animosity and new focus on equitable trade.[368] Neale himself later satisfactorily stated to Russell that: "Satsuma was, previous to the incident of Kagoshima, eager and clamorous for war with the foreigner; he is now for trade and peace."[369] Neale's handling of diplomacy in the aftermath of Kagoshima seems to show a rapid change in fortunes.[370] This hardly seems like the reckless diplomat depicted in the recriminations from Parliament and the press back in Britain, but someone who can achieve positive results for the Foreign Office. Despite this however, the expulsion order, the ensuing Shimonoseki Crisis and the general deteriorating nature of domestic Japanese affairs were certainly a problem that could still spiral out of

---

[363] A. M. Craig, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration*, pp. 199-201; TNA, FO 46/44/35, Alcock to Russell, 10 June 1864.
[364] TNA, FO 46/37/150, Neale to Russell, 14 October 1863; TNA, FO 46/43/13, Neale to Russell, 6 February 1864.
[365] TNA, FO 46/43/15, Neale to Russell, 9 February 1864.
[366] *Overland China Mail*, 29 April 1864, p. 4.
[367] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 93-94; Dr. Willis jingoistically believed that this was only because Satsuma had been beaten by Britain. He writes that: 'It is strange that the best friend of foreigners in Japan at present is the Prince of Satsuma and so would they all if we would only give them a good drubbing… Either the Japanese or we must be masters and I believe it is certainly better we should be so. We are more likely to use our power to a good use then these ignorant, proud and cruel people. There is a remedy for Japan and that is when the British bayonets crop Japanese swords'; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 46.
[368] PP, Japan, No. 75, Neale to Russell, 17 November 1863; PP, Japan, No. 1, Neale to Russell, 17 December 1863.
[369] PP, Japan, No. 15, Neale to Russell, 1 March 1864.
[370] I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 158-168.

control. The question remains therefore, how and why was Neale so calm? Was this simply an ignorant attitude; a focus on positive Anglo-Japanese relations and his successes alone to calm and distract Russell at the Foreign Office? Or was this more a sign of him showing tact and a level head thanks to his military background and previous diplomatic experience?

To know the answer, we must better understand the imperial expulsion order itself. Its origins come from discussions between the Imperial Court, the Bakufu and various Daimyō dating as far back as December 1862.[371] Despite the Bakufu fearing that such a command would cause a war they could not win, they feared losing the support of the Imperial Court more and so agreed to carry out expulsion.[372] The Bakufu dragged their feet however, ignoring the finalised nature of the 25 June 1863 deadline, they instead asked for the closure of the treaty ports. The Bakufu believed that this would make them look like they were complying with imperial wishes and anger the foreign powers *enough* (without causing a major rupture in relations) to show how futile the expulsion order was.[373] The opportunity to achieve this came about when the Bakufu were extricating themselves from the Namamugi Affair (and by extension Kagoshima as well) and paid Britain the £100,000 on 24 June 1863 (note, one day before expulsion). The Senior Councillors (chief Bakufu advisers) 'requested' that talks begin over the closing of the treaty ports.[374] At this time, for Neale, this was another frustrating development that could only sour relations further, but he remained calm overall. The Namamugi Affair had already raised tensions drastically and the Bakufu continuously dragging their feet over paying the actual demanded indemnity had only worsened things.[375] Neale's response to this through the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs is indicative of Anglo-Japanese relations pre-bombardment of Kagoshima:

---

[371] Document 40, Matsudaira Keiei to Bakufu, 4 December 1862 in W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, pp. 119-122.
[372] Document 41, Hitosubashi Keiki and others to the Imperial Court, 29 March 1863 in W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, p. 234; Document 47, Jisha-bugyō, machi-bugyō, and kanjō-bugyō to Bakufu, 21 June 1863 in W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, pp. 248-250.
[373] Document 48, Hitotsubashi Keiki to the Kampaku (Takatsukasa Sukehiro), 9 July 1863 in W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, pp. 250-253; Document 48 in W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, pp. 250-253.
[374] M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 100.
[375] TNA, FO 46/34/68, Neale to Russell, 11 May 1863; TNA, FO 46/35/93, Neale to Russell, 14 June 1863.

> The indiscreet communication now made through your Excellency is unparalleled in the history of all nations, civilised or uncivilised; that it is, in fact, a declaration of war by Japan itself against the whole of the Treaty Powers (*sic*).[376]

Neale was distracted with the expedition to Kagoshima, so despite the expulsion order the next day and Chōshū's effective blockade of the Shimonoseki Straits, only a joint statement from the treaty powers refuting expulsion was given on the same day.[377] Neale's contempt and concern were very quickly forgotten however. Thanks to two meetings the Bakufu had, one with the Americans and one with the French and the British. The American Minister reported that:

> We have been told by the governor of Kanagawa that there is no intention of enforcing these orders… At present, the government at Yedo [Edo], no doubt, honestly intend to preserve peaceful relations, and is fully aware of the extreme folly of attempting to carry the Kioto [Kyoto] decrees into effect (*sic*).[378]

Much the same was said in the meeting with France and Britain. With the Shogunate stating that they considered the order to be null and void.[379] Post-Kagoshima, Neale responded to the Bakufu's candid private discussions with the treaty powers as proof of relations returning to some form of acceptability. Thus, the 'indiscreet communication' was quickly forgotten. With this and Kagoshima completed, Neale stated that the current state of Japanese affairs in late 1863 were far better now than in previous years, extolling the "…steadily progressing and prosperous trade… ignored or altogether overlooked as it may be in Europe by those who are anxious or interested in events of a threatening character [referring to Alcock's 'back-seating' of his diplomacy]."[380] Satow notes that it was common gossip at the time that Neale thought little of Alcock, regarding him "…with no friendly feelings…", something that stemmed from their time fighting in Spain during the First Carlist War where they both

---

[376] PP, Japan, Enclosure 2 in No. 49, Neale to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, 24 June 1863.
[377] Document No. 40, Pruyn to Steward, 24 June 1863 in *United States Department of State Message of the President of the United States, Documents, 1863, Part II*, pp. 1117-1120.
[378] Document No. 43, Pruyn to Steward, 25 June 1863 in United States Department of State, *Documents, 1863, Part II*, pp. 1122-1123.
[379] TNA, FO 46/35/111, Neale to Russell, 2 July 1863.
[380] PP, Japan, No. 65, Neale to Russell, 11 September 1863.

fought under the command of Brigadier-General Shaw.[381] Neale's comment to Russell therefore appears to potentially be a further extension of this dislike for Alcock and their animosity towards each other. As early as 1863, with Japan's Ikeda Mission to Europe, Alcock did his best to countermand Neale and enforce his view that there was indeed a crisis erupting in Japan.[382] The mission's aims of trying to garner support for closure of at least Yokohama was an affront to his 'London Protocol' that he negotiated only two years previously.[383] Alcock's fury was in direct contrast to Neale's collected understanding and handling of events. This allowed him to be confident and informed enough to believe that even despite the Shimonoseki Crisis, Anglo-Japanese relations were not facing calamity overall. With relations pre-Kagoshima so incredibly dire, it is hard to disagree with Neale's thinking that diplomacy had since radically improved between Britain and Japan. Neale reacted to what was in front of him and acted accordingly. With the Bakufu suggesting expulsion, he responded in kind, with the Bakufu then privately stating such a thing was only said to save face, he adapted and again responded in kind. In this light Neale hardly sounds like a diplomat that was overly aggressive without cause, but someone who certainly allowed themselves the freedom to respond to the situation at hand, whatever that may have been. Here, Neale seems mature, tactful, and justified.

Despite a resolution agreed to by Britain, France, America, and the Netherlands that the Shimonoseki Straits be immediately reopened, things remained at a standstill.[384] Officially British involvement remained minimal thanks to Neale (and Russell through the Privy Council barring all British traffic through the straits), but this did not stop other British officials attempting to force a confrontation.[385] For example, Admiral Kuper, the then Command-in-Chief of the East Indies and China Station, sent a British ship to the Shimonoseki Straits (to communicate with the French Admiral) with the heavily implied hope that the ship would be fired upon and drag the British into the burgeoning conflict. Chōshū surprisingly did not take the bait however, and combined with Neale's caution,

---

[381] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 29; C. Shaw, *Personal Memoirs and Correspondence of Colonel Charles Shaw comprising a Narrative of the War for Constitutional Liberty in Portugal and Spain, from its commencement in 1831 to the dissolution of the British legion in 1837, Volume 1* (London, Colburn, 1837), pp. 447-450.
[382] Such was his purview as the Resident Minister, even if he was away from Japan in Britain.
[383] PP, Japan, No. 6, Russell to Winchester, 9 June 1862.
[384] Document No. 50, Pruyn to Steward, 25 July 1863 in United States Department of State, *Documents, 1863, Part II, pp. 1141-1142.*
[385] PP, Japan, No. 5, Russell to Neale, 11 January 1864; *London Gazette*, 8 January 1864, pp. 87-88.

Britain remained on the side-lines until Alcock's return.[386] The Americans, French and Dutch all separately retaliated, inflicting damage to Chōshū's coastal defences, but all failed to open the passage permanently.[387] This was post-Kagoshima's fallout so Russell would have appreciated Neale distancing Britain from any military involvement in regards to the straits. Neale emphasised that problems existed, yes, but not yet to the point where British trade was being seriously hindered. Not wishing to have another entanglement with a foreign power, Russell would have found Neale's reassurances and talk of trade no cause for alarm.[388] This hardly presents Neale as an aggressive and incompetent diplomat.

Alcock tried his best to achieve the exact opposite. He saw Shimonoseki as proof of the Bakufu wanting to finally oust the West from Japan (despite the Bakufu's effective non-involvement).[389] The Bakufu *did* want to expel foreigners from Japan, but had no agreed strategy, and what little they could agree on was that the expulsion order would be suicidal. This much was now obvious to the foreign powers, but Alcock ignored this. Alcock's attempts to convince Russell failed, but he still ended up going against Foreign Office directives with the bombardment of Shimonoseki, and subsequently gained a reluctant promotion to a post in China.[390] Neale's dedication and caution as a diplomat, contrasted with Alcock's desire to immediately react to events and accept almost nothing but his view (despite evidence to contrary), certainly makes Neale's appear more positive and steadfast. Though it must be said that this caution sometimes came at a cost, albeit a temporary one. Satow states that in the aftermath of the Namamugi incident Neale's alertness of how the situation might escalate into something more dangerous, like war, produced the unintended consequence of making him appear wary and detached from treaty port affairs in the eyes of the foreign (especially British) merchant community.[391] Whilst his caution did Neale a great

[386] P. J. Treat, 'The Return of the Shimonoseki Indemnity', p. 4.
[387] *The Japan Commercial News*, 24 July 1863, p. 1; PP, Japan, No. 61, Neale to Russell, 29 July 1863; *Sheffield Independent*, 3 October 1863, p. 1; *Southampton Herald*, 3 October 1863, p. 3; *Hereford Times*, 21 November 1863, p. 4.
[388] PP, Japan, No. 15, Neale to Russell, 1 March 1864.
[389] TNA, FO 46/43/5, Alcock to Russell, 28 March 1864.
[390] In fairness to Alcock, there was some confusion after one of Russell's letters stated that he was fine with Alcock potentially working in concert with other powers to clear the Shimonoseki Straits, but every message before and after adamantly stated that he not pursue military action; PP, Japan, No. 50, Russell to Alcock, 25 August 1864; PP, Japan, No. 89, Russell to Alcock, 31 January 1865.
[391] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 53-54.

service diplomatically with the Japanese and other powers, it seems that it often put him at odds with his own countrymen in Japan.[392]

This feeling was often mutual. British merchant communities were never exactly held in high regard or discussed so positively across the Diplomatic and Consular Services. The foreign community tended to create more problems than they solved for British diplomats, particularly when sailors and alcohol were also involved.[393] At least Neale's issue with the merchant community was misconstrued, unintentional, and temporary, making him underserving of some comments about his person from men like Dr. Willis who called him an 'old woman' and referred to his application of British foreign policy as 'pure supineness.'[394] Many in the foreign community came to Neale's aid in the aftermath of Kagoshima through the treaty port press. One such article emphasises Neale's patience and diplomatic caution, which in hindsight proved to be the difference between war and peace on several occasions. *The Japan Herald* produced an article that summarised popular feeling among the foreign (mainly British) community:

> None acquainted with recent affairs in Japan will fail to remember the differences of opinion between many members of this community and [Neale]…, or the severe strictness and hard words then used. [Neale], however has not treasured this up, and maligned and abused in retaliation. He has forgotten what he doubtless considered his personal wrong then suffered at their hands, and volunteers a statemen – honourable alike to him who makes and to those who receive – which we think the best answer to those who would in so wholesale and unjustifiable a manner as we have alluded to, speak of the British residents in Japan (*sic*).[395]

Alcock in his text, *The Capital of the Tycoon*, spoke of the merchant community in not the most 'diplomatic' way, causing all sorts of public relation issues down the road.[396] This was a

---

[392] I. Ruxton, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow (1843-1929): A Scholar-Diplomat in East Asia* (Lewiston, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), pp. 28-31.
[393] TNA, FO 46/7/20, Alcock to Gower, 21 November 1859; TNA, FO 46/7/6, Gower to Alcock, 29 February 1860.
[394] H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 30 & p. 72.
[395] *The Japan Herald*, Vol. 2, No. 83, 26 September 1863, p. 99.
[396] R. Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon: A Narrative of a three years' Residence in Japan, Volume 1* (London, Longman, Green & Co, 1863), pp. 251-254; In defence of Alcock, he had great cause to

continuation of his 'private' misgivings about the merchant community in China which were equally as undiplomatic (and shared by some at the Foreign Office) and repeated years later.[397] For example, in 1870 in a public report, opinions of the merchant community in Japan had not improved, with another diplomat, A. B. Mitford, complaining outright in front of a committee that the reason for the European lifestyle being so expensive in Japan was due to the merchant community inflating prices (this was actually true, but perhaps best said in a more private setting).[398] In this light Neale's temporary mishap with British merchants and the wider foreign community was hardly deserving by comparison. Nor should it be used to critique his diplomacy and time in charge when it created such limited problems for him, but issues for others like Alcock.

2.3. Conclusions:

Neale was undoubtedly an experienced diplomat by 1863. He was able to quickly marry Foreign Office demands with the situation on the ground in Japan. Kagoshima, though arguably a blot on his otherwise distinguished record, was not a complete disaster. The Foreign Office acknowledged this much and when British policy in Japan needed to change, he changed as well, rather successfully too. Upon Alcock's return, despite his own mania and confusion, Anglo-Japanese relations had greatly improved. Satsuma, a powerful and once stout anti-foreign Daimyō, was now one of Britain's closest Japanese contacts, both for information and for trade. This was shown by their *private* discussions over silk and later trades of a more military nature.[399] Relations with the Shogunate improved dramatically too, especially when you recall how dire pre-Kagoshima relations were. Things were not completely perfect, but both parties shared a desire to negotiate and improve ties.[400] Trade expanded with Neale's claim that it was "…satisfactory beyond all expectation" proving true.[401] Furthermore, irrespective of all this, Neale was still cautious enough to follow

despise many within the Merchant Community he was supposed to be aiding since his China days; Also see R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, pp. 100-103.

[397] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 6 May 1860; TNA, FO 391/1, Hammond to Alcock, 7 September 1868.

[398] PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.

[399] PP, Japan, No. 75, Alcock to Russell, 15 October 1864.

[400] PP, Japan, No. 12, Neale to Russell, 6 February 1864.

[401] PP, Japan, No. 15, Neale to Russell, 1 March 1864; PP, Japan, Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1865.

through on Russell's earlier advisement that Royal Marines be stationed in Yokohama for the protection of the city, its inhabitants and the diplomatic legations.[402] He liked to make great predictions and exaggerate his sway over getting the Japanese to follow British direction, perhaps too much, but he was pragmatic enough to hope for the best and prepare for the worst consistently, as shown by his tenure post-Namamugi.[403] With such pragmatism his predictions and sway often proved quite successful anyway, something that is hard to ignore when considering his overall contribution to Anglo-Japanese diplomacy. Another example of Neale's caution and calm would be his final dispatch where he recommends a more permanent transfer of some naval and military forces from China to Japan to act as a 'defensive policy' should British interests appear seriously frayed.[404] It was Alcock's energetic refusal to accept Neale's pragmatism that led him to do something like this advisement on a much larger scale, though certainly not as a 'defensive policy.'

Of course, Neale still had his faults and criticisms, but the question is did they ever interfere with his diplomacy? Though never said openly, both Neale and Alcock in correspondence to Russell took the time to repudiate and criticise the other for what they saw as overreaction (from Alcock) and inaction (from Neale).[405] For Neale, as aforementioned, aligning British foreign policy with the situation on the ground was more beneficial and the correct way to undertake diplomacy. However, for Alcock, aligning the situation on the ground with British foreign policy was the norm. Paradoxically, they were both relatively successful despite their differing diplomatic styles. The difference was that Neale garnered constant support and approval, even despite Kagoshima, which as the Foreign Office understood itself, was not entirely of his own making. Considering Neale's closest contemporary and boss, Alcock, Neale's achievements appear modestly successful and in line with a competent diplomat. While Neale received appreciation and interest, Alcock only garnered confusion and concern by comparison, even despite his successes.[406] Neale was supposed to return to Japan soon

[402] PP, Japan, No. 66, Russell to Neale, 18 November 1863; PP, Japan, No. 11, Neale to Russell, 30 January 1864.
[403] PP, Japan, No. 6, Neale to Russell, 31 December 1863; PP, Japan, No. 11, Neale to Russell, 30 January 1864; PP, Japan, No. 12, Neale to Russell, 6 February 1864.
[404] PP, Japan, No. 15, Neale to Russell, 1 March 1864.
[405] PP, Japan, No. 65, Neale to Russell, 11 September 1863; PP, Japan, No. 20, Alcock to Russell, 31 March 1864.
[406] It may appear that I am unduly harsh on Alcock, but I only make such comments in the context of the Shimonoseki Campaign and in comparison to Neale as Chargé d'Affaires. Elsewhere Alcock is not only competent, but surprisingly unlucky with his diplomatic career, with Parkes garnering all of the glory in early Anglo-Japanese relations. Alcock's diplomatic career is complex and I personally

after his secondment home in late 1864 and resume his role as Secretary of the Legation, but was passed over. Not because of any fault, but simply for health concerns.[407] He was later made Secretary of the Legation in Greece (April 1865 – August 1865), no doubt based off of his previous experience as consul in Patras.[408] He was then promoted again to lead a legation outright as Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General (equivalent in rank to Minister Plenipotentiary) in Ecuador (August 1865 – Until his death in 1866); all this not long after his time in Japan and all successive promotions.[409] Neale was clearly not viewed negatively by the Foreign Office overall.

Out of Neale's subordinates Satow was perhaps best placed to comment on his diplomacy, but Satow's discussions on Neale are decidedly mixed overall. On the one hand there exists great praise for the dedication Neale placed on his diplomatic endeavours, with Satow himself admitting that in hindsight, Neale always took the most logical and sound course of action for Anglo-Japanese relations, which I ultimately agree with.[410] It is clear Neale took an interest in Japanese affairs to make up for his initial deficiencies, made use of his subordinate's input into certain areas like trade and translation, and was highly dedicated to his work. His communiques, whilst not often succinct, were augmented by many enclosed letters with all available means of information to aid Russell's understanding of events and decisions. A good example exists in his early despatches discussing the second attack on the

---

believe it brought out his negative qualities more often than not. I personally find that his military, medical, and philanthropic careers outside of diplomacy were far more impressive and inspiring by comparison.

[407] H. Cortazzi, 'Lt. Colonel Edward St. John Neale, Chargé d'Affaires at Edo/Yokohama, 1862-1864', p. 22.

[408] *London Gazette*, 5 May, 1865, p. 2372.

[409] *London Gazette*, 29 August 1865, p. 4194; Neale's death was a somewhat charged affair in Ecuador. Britons were not yet allowed a Christian burial in Ecuador as no practicing Protestant could be buried there, so it was agreed that the body would be preserved for transport back to Britain. A burial procession was organised by local authorities and the various diplomatic representatives to the chosen temporary burial site, just outside the capital of Quito. However, the procession had to pass a courtyard of a Catholic Chapel and was stopped by the then Apostolic Delegate to Ecuador, Monsignor Francesco Tavani, who declared alongside some priests that the body of a heretic could not pass over consecrated ground. Neale's fellow diplomatic colleagues were furious and the Ecuadorian authorities protested greatly. It almost caused a minor riot, and armed officials had to keep everyday Ecuadorian citizens from attacking the Catholic Priests. The tense situation was only resolved when they tore down a nearby wall and proceeded across a field to the temporary burial site instead. It was intended to be temporary, but with the death of the American chief diplomat a few months later, it became a permanent burial site for expats. Which made Neale the first non-Catholic to be buried in Ecuador; *The Illustrated London News*, 23 February 1867, p. 195; *The Morning Post*, 27 February 1867, p. 6; See R. L. Gold, 'Problems of Protestantism in Ecuador, 1866-1873', *Journal of Church and State*, 12:1 (Winter 1970), pp. 59-77.

[410] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 54.

British legation in Edo. He provides a three-page update on his first two months in Japan and the attack which then has no less than 19 enclosed letters brimming with communiques, information, and advisories.[411] This is hardly the sign of a diplomat shrugging off his responsibilities or taking his position for granted.[412] However, there are also faults which Satow picks up on, like moving the legation back to Edo despite safety concerns (which led to a second attack and the death of two Britons), and his interference in the naval operation of Kagoshima. These criticisms were part of Satow's belief that Neale did not always "…understand the circumstances amongst which he was thrown…"[413] Satow also mentions Neale's somewhat military orientated approach to diplomacy leaving him with a reputation of having a short temper.[414] For example, Satow notes how in one meeting with the Japanese his officer-esque demeanour came across too much and implies that his queries appeared more as 'orders,' and that when these 'orders' went unheard his temper erupted (something Satow claims the Japanese actually took advantage of).[415] Given his military background none of this is all that surprising and while I do not doubt Satow's tough criticisms and insight, his admittance that overall, Neale was still the right 'diplomat' for the time speaks volumes.[416] Overall, I agree with Satow's mixed view, whilst Neale certainly had his hot-headed bouts of anger and military obstinance, he was a tact and loyal diplomat who carried out his work dutifully. Fundamentally, Neale was calm when needed and belligerent when required. For better or worse, Neale was still a soldier following orders, simply under a new guise. The *Overland China Mail* summarises my feelings on his character and diplomacy in a small article about his return to Britain in 1864:

> Colonel Neale was a man of different temperament, who thought less of own personal importance than of the actual interests of his country. Patient, dispassionate, and firm when firmness was called for, he was singularly well fitted for the duties entrusted to him… In our opinion it is so far to be regretted that he should have left Yokohama so soon, especially as he is succeeded by a Minister [Alcock] who is deficient in many of the qualities essential to the office

[411] PP, Japan, No. 29, Neale to Russell, 3 July 1862.
[412] Given his chief, Alcock, was prone to writing endless pages and pages of scrawled communiques in addition to enclosures etc., Neale's style was probably a breath of fresh air and a temporary reprieve for Lord Russell and the rest of the Foreign Office.
[413] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 47-49 & p. 30.
[414] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 47-49.
[415] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 69-71.
[416] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 53 & p. 93.

> he holds… [Neale] goes home to receive the deserved congratulations of his friends and of the British Government.[417]

3. Charles Alexander Winchester:

3.1. Decisions and Responsibilities:

Charles Winchester, the British consul at Yokohama, became Chargé d'Affaires for the second time (December 1864 – July 1865) after Alcock was promoted. Winchester was not actually Russell's first choice; Neale was ill and so Winchester was appointed instead (despite being from the Consular Service).[418] His position as consul at Yokohama, the principal treaty port, made him the natural choice whilst they found a replacement minister. The son and grandson of a Charles Winchester, he was the third in a line of successful Scotsman. He was the grandson to a builder and architect, owning property across Aberdeen, and the son of a prolific writer (active from 1802 to the mid-1870s) and Advocate (in the Scottish Legal System) who was a member of the Society of Advocates and the Freemasons (also in Aberdeen).[419] His father was a prominent Aberdonian as shown by an endearing obituary published after he died in 1880.[420] Born in Aberdeen (1820), Winchester studied Medicine at Edinburgh; his dissertation being on dysentery.[421] This led him to becoming an assistant surgeon aboard the HMS *Cornwallis* from October 1841, where his work on dysentery no doubt proved highly relevant. Aboard the *Cornwallis*, he bore witness to the end of the First Opium War and the signing of the Treaty of Nanking (Parkes was also onboard) in 1842.[422] For his military services in China, Winchester was awarded the war medal.[423] He then spent time in Hong Kong as the island's first colonial surgeon (1842-1843), but was then

---

[417] *Overland China Mail*, 15 April 1864, p. 1215.
[418] PP, Japan, No. 50, Russell to Alcock, 25 August 1864.
[419] J. A. Henderson, eds., *History of the Society of Advocates in Aberdeen* (Aberdeen, Milne & Hutchison, 1912), p. XV & pp. 376-377.
[420] *The Aberdeen Weekly Journal*, 3 April 1880, p. 6.
[421] *The Homeward Mail from India, China and the East*, 23 July 1883, p. 692; Miscellaneous, 'The Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal: Part III, Medical Intelligence', *University of Edinburgh*, 56 (October 1841), p. 567.
[422] *The Bucks Herald*, 27 November 1841, p. 6; *The Atlas*, 27 November 1841, p. 758; *The Globe*, 19 November 1841.
[423] E. Hertslet, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1876, forming a Complete British Diplomatic and Consular Handbook* (London, Harrison, 1876), p. 209.

sent to Amoy as the 'Amoy Medical Officer/Consular Surgeon' in October 1843.[424] Due to the severe lack of possible appointees present during the 1840s, it is not hard to see how a man with Winchester's medical knowledge soon found himself in the employ of the China Consular Service. It was also here that he became properly acquainted with Sir Harry Parkes, a future Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan.

Winchester was made a Second Assistant and Medical Officer in 1844, but thanks to many deaths and vacancies he became 'First Assistant to the Amoy Consulate' in 1852, and acting vice-consul of Whampoa in 1854.[425] According to historian J. K. Fairbank, Winchester was also made the Peruvian Vice-consul of Whampoa that same year.[426] Winchester also being a consular official for another nation was not an exception, but very much the norm. It should also be noted that in the year previously, he was elected as one of the Presidents of the Royal Medical Society based in Edinburgh (the second oldest Medical Society in Britain).[427] So, he was still in touch with his medical talents and interests, despite his new roles within the Consular Service. By 1855 he became the acting vice-consul of Amoy.[428] After which, Winchester began to make a name for himself in the eyes of the Foreign Office; the abhorrent coolie trade was now in full swing and for many stationed in the Far East a trafficking of people far worse than the recently ended Atlantic Slave Trade. Winchester took direct action alongside his consular peers in critiquing and actively opposing the practice.[429] From Amoy he was summarily sojourned to Ningpo as acting vice-consul in April 1855 after the resignation of consul J. A. T. Meadows.[430] Winchester was stationed at the port of Ningpo for

---

[424] See *The Friend of China*, 17 August 1843; See *The Friend of China*, 19 October 1843; TNA, FO 17/103, Pottinger to Aberdeen, 17 November 1845.
[425] P. D. Coates, *The China Consuls: British Consular Officers, 1843-1943* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 72; During this period Winchester attempted to learn Mandarin with a teacher. He made substantial progress with the written language; learning over 1400 hundred characters in 14 months. However, when it came to speaking, he found that nothing he said seemed to be understood and he gave up. Much like Japanese, the Chinese languages were not exactly for 'all' to easily learn; P. D. Coates, *The China Consuls*, p. 82; *The Overland China Mail*, 6 May 1854, p. 5.
[426] J. K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports,1842-1854, Volume 1* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 214.
[427] *The Scottish Press*, 9 December 1853, p. 5.
[428] Baptists, *The Baptist Magazine, Vol. 36* (London, Houlston & Stoneman, 1844), p. 523; See Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence with the Superintendent of British Trade in China, upon the Subject of Emigration from China, 1852-1853; See Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence upon the Subject of Emigration from China, 1853-1855.
[429] P. D. Coates, *The China Consuls*, p. 63.
[430] Meadows was suspended after causing a diplomatic incident involving the Qing Government, Chinese Pirates, and the Portuguese (with whom he was increasingly lusophobic). Meadows would go on to become a prominent member of the merchant community in Tientsin.

a year where he tried to return the port to more peaceable ways, but was then replaced by Meadow's more famous (and competent) brother, T. T. Meadows.[431] By 1856 he became vice-consul of Canton (with Parkes as chief consul) and temporarily acting consul (1859-1860) after a series of swaps and promotions.[432] His posting here was perhaps helped by his prior relationship to Parkes and the fact that he was still the Peruvian vice-consul of Whampoa, which was an island in the Pearl River delta, very close to Canton (and the chief anchorage of Canton). To have reached this point was no small feat for Winchester given his beginnings, how haphazard promotion was in the China Consular Service, and the fact that of the thirteen assistants appointed in 1843, by 1859, eight were now dead and three others forced into early retirement due to ill-health. Winchester had bucked the trend. His diligence as a consular official in China as well as his 'luck' to be one of the few men left standing had not gone unnoticed by the Foreign Office.[433]

Subsequently, Winchester would be moved to Japan; promoted to consul of Hakodate in 1861, acting-consul of Nagasaki in 1862, and then to consul of Yokohama in 1863.[434] Whilst technically a promotion from an unpaid vice-consulship to a paid consulship, Hakodate was a distant backwater by comparison. Winchester was therefore fortunate to be moved on quickly. By the time he was Chargé d'Affaires in 1864, it is safe to say that Winchester was highly experienced in East Asian diplomacy. Especially since besides being a consul for many years, he had been briefly Chargé d'Affaires in 1862 before when Alcock was helping Russell meet Shogunate envoys in Britain.[435] Winchester was eventually replaced by Neale that same year, but this replacement was not a comment on his ability, simply that this was a stop-gap measure whilst Neale, the desired Chargé d'Affaires, was on route to Japan.[436] Not

---

[431] P. D. Coates, *The China Consuls*, pp. 122-130; J. K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*, pp. 344-346.
[432] See Parliamentary Papers, Papers relating to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton with Appendix, 1856; See Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence respecting Emigration from Canton, 1859-1860; During the early stages of strife that would lead to the Arrow War, Winchester was almost killed by a falling wall during Chinese riots in city of Canton in 1856; P. D. Coates, *The China Consuls*, p. 105.
[433] P. D. Coates, *The China Consuls*, p. 96.
[434] *London Gazette*, 9 April 1861, p. 1492; *The Overland China Mail*, 29 May 1861, p. 942; B. Burke-Gaffney, *The Nagasaki British Consulate,* p. 119; *London Gazette*, 30 December 1862, p. 6583.
[435] PP, Japan, No. 7, Russell to Winchester, 26 May 1862; PP, Japan, No. 8, Russell to Winchester, 9 June 1862; PP, Japan, No. 12, Russell to Winchester, 9 June 1862; PP, Japan, No. 28, Russell to Winchester, 26 August 1862.
[436] PP, Japan, No. 29, Neale to Russell, 3 July 1862.

long after becoming Chargé d'Affaires a second time, Dr. Willis provided a personal appraisal of Winchester:

> Mr. Winchester is as fat as a pork butcher. He is a very good man and easy to get along with, with no pride or nonsense about him. He is passably clever, will do what he is ordered and nothing more. We all expect him to prove a pleasant and agreeable chief. I wish he may be left in charge, as I believe he is an honest conscientious man.[437]

Ignoring the physical description, this appears rather positive, but the comments about Winchester being nothing more than a simple man only capable of acting as ordered are very premature. He was ultimately quite the resourceful diplomat and would prove Dr. Willis incorrect. His second time as Chargé d'Affaires was far lengthier thanks to the time it took for Alcock's replacement, Parkes, to travel to Japan. In the meantime, Winchester faced a deteriorating situation thanks to declining Shogunate power and the growing brazenness of rival Daimyō. Winchester's predicament was that they (including the Foreign Office) all desired a clear and 'final decision' at a time when things were constantly in flux. The choice for Winchester was this: did he make these decisions with the understanding that he would not only have to wait months for approval/advice from the Foreign Office, but also burden his future boss (Parkes) with his successes and failures. Or did he try and attempt to delay and defer these major decisions without damaging Anglo-Japanese and wider treaty-power relations? This was the more difficult choice, but it was the choice he made. Winchester was able to make it a resounding success and laid the groundwork for his successor, Parkes, to begin his tenure swiftly and confidently.

3.2. Winchester, the Daimyō, and the Shogunate:

Winchester began as Chargé d'Affaires with little incident; commerce was buoyant and his contacts reported 'less' Japanese restrictions to trade. His opening comments in an early dispatch made this abundantly clear: "…no event of importance has occurred. My

[437] He also rather unkindly referred to Mrs Winchester as a 'Daiboots' (the Daibutsu at Kamakura; a 60ft giant Buddha). A legation nickname supposedly given because of her overbearing personality; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 48.

communications with the Japanese Government have been devoid of general interest."[438] Winchester's life as a consul had prepared him well and gained him many advantageous contacts amongst the British (and foreign) merchant community (and even some Japanese contacts too). Both Neale and Alcock's consistent deference to his knowledge about the silk trade in years prior shows some proof of this.[439] Thanks to Alcock's success at Shimonoseki, relations with Bakufu had improved, for the four-power chastisement of Chōshū had spared the Bakufu from any more embarrassment at being unable to censor Chōshū for their open rebellion.[440] However, there was an increase in illicit trade occurring between Western merchants and various Daimyō (especially anti-Bakufu Daimyō).[441]

This had the potential to unhinge the recent improvements in Anglo-Japanese relations for any Western trade with the Daimyō was outlawed by the Shogunate (who had effectively monopolised all foreign trade). Initially, Winchester took a very hard-line against such trade, but soon found that this achieved little for most arms and ammunition sales went unreported for obvious reasons.[442] Neale had already promised Satsuma that the British Government did not object to them acquiring a British built ship and why would he when the sole purpose of Britain's presence in Japan was economic exploitation. If Daimyō wanted to buy Western technology and arms then why should they not at least buy British? If Britain were to spend resources on trying to dissuade British merchants from taking part in such trade, not only would it prove virtually impossible to implement, but other powers and their merchants would simply move in and fill the void anyway.[443] Various Americans were already providing military aid (predominantly arms and 'soldiers of fortune' like General Burgevine) to Chōshū through various contacts in China.[444] The American Minister further informed Winchester that Chōshū had sent three envoys to the United States to agree terms (with the potential for them to travel to Britain as well).[445] Winchester had also confirmed that French,

[438] PP, Japan, No. 5, Winchester to Russell, 16 January 1865.
[439] PP, Japan, No. 4, Neale to Russell, 31 December 1863; PP, Japan, No. 59, Alcock to Russell, 7 September 1864; PP, Japan, No. 75, Alcock to Russell, 15 October 1864.
[440] See A. M. Craig, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration*.
[441] PP, Japan, No. 14, Winchester to Russell, 30 March 1865.
[442] TNA, FO 46/55/84, Winchester to Russell, 11 May 1865; PP, Japan, Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in China, Japan, and Siam, 1865.
[443] TNA, FO 46/55/80, Winchester to Russell, 9 May 1865.
[444] General Burgevine's time in Japan was decidedly brief and inconsequential however.
[445] PP, Japan, No. 28, Winchester to Russell, 11 May 1865.

Russian, and other vessels were engaged in the arms trade with Chōshū.[446] By April 1865 Satsuma had purchased a warship and 7,300 rifles through the British Merchant Thomas Glover (the largest foreign arms dealer) on behalf of Chōshō, and together with Chōshū, also petitioned the British for greater commercial relations altogether.[447] Many of these rifles, a mixture of (4300) Minie and (3000) Gewehr rifles purchased by Satsuma through the Kameyama Company (亀山社中) were delivered to Chōshū to aid them in their fight against the Shogunate later in 1866. Chōshū would go on to order fifteen Armstrong guns from Glover directly in 1865 as well.[448] Gunrunning was becoming more commonplace and a major point of contention between the Bakufu and foreign powers, but for Britain it was simply another form of trade to exploit.[449]

It was practically impossible for Winchester to think that such trade could or should be stymied, despite Russell informing him that Britain had cause to 'obviate' such unregulated and illicit trade (with a new Order in Council empowering Winchester to do so).[450] This was somewhat awkward as the British Government had previously shown openness towards Anglo-Daimyō trade, with Alcock not long after his recall also believing that a substantially upgraded relationship with the Daimyō was in Britain's interest.[451] This change was probably due to the Kagoshima and Shimonoseki altercations, but to reverse course so quickly would certainly be confusing and problematic on the ground. It did not help that Winchester had also noted the Shogunate's monopoly on foreign trade, and the friction it was sparking with other polities in Japan.[452] Thus, Winchester decided to let such trade unofficially continue, and crucially, left the British state aloof. This would allow Parkes the chance to decide on whether Britain should openly trade with the Daimyō or be more committed to stopping British subjects interacting with them in the first place. Simultaneously, Winchester also

---

[446] PP, Japan, No. 28, Winchester to Russell, 11 May 1865; The others were most likely an assortment of American, German, Dutch, and/or Portuguese vessels.
[447] TNA, FO 46/55/78, Winchester to Russell, 27 April 1865; G. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 153; See A. Tanaka, 'Chōshū-han ni okeru Keiō gunsei gaikoku', *The Shirin/Journal of History*, 42:1 (January 1959), pp. 104-124; H. Fuess, 'The Global Weapons Trade and the Meiji Restoration: Dispersion of Means of Violence in a World of Emerging Nation-States' in R. Hellyer & H. Fuess, eds., *The Meiji Restoration: Japan as a Global Nation* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020), pp. 91-92.
[448] K. Matsumoto, *Nihon no Kindai 1*, p. 273; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, pp. 412-413.
[449] C. Totman, *The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1980), p. 208.
[450] PP, Japan, No. 11, Russell to Winchester, 24 April 1865.
[451] See G. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, pp. 100-101, p. 106, p. 136 & p. 139; TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 25 August 1865.
[452] S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, p. 403.

began informing the Foreign Office of the Daimyō's commercial interest in trading with the West, and the opportunities that might come from accepting their trade.[453] The Foreign Office steadily began to come around, and by the time Parkes was chief diplomat was largely convinced.[454] The line given to the Shogunate was that officially Britain preferred dealing with only 'one power'.[455] The Bakufu accepted this, but ultimately even if they did not, there was nothing they could really do to prevent illicit Western-Daimyō trade anyway. Winchester's decision was certainly helped by the fact that the Japanese Foreign Minister, at a meeting in early May 1865, admitted that Chōshū and Satsuma were now openly pressing for the extension of foreign trade to their own ports and agents. Possibly realising the dangers of this admittance, the minister was quick to maintain that any contacts with the Daimyō were not only contrary to the treaty signed between Britain and Japan in 1858, but would "complicate matters, and be the cause of the ruin of the Tycoon [*sic*]." Winchester replied that in Britain's view there was nothing in the treaties preventing them from making separate treaties with the Daimyō if they so wished, especially seeing as the convention signed in 1862 (the London Protocol) was *supposed* to ensure that the Daimyō could now engage in treaty port trade.[456] A clear sign that Winchester wished to insinuate that although such 'official relationships' had not yet begun, if things did not improve for the Bakufu, then Britain might consider alternative options. He further warned that unless another port was opened (also part of the ongoing Shimonoseki Indemnity negotiations) by the Shogunate in the Seto Inland Sea the (southern) Daimyō might 'do it themselves'.[457] This was no idle comment either considering proposals from Chōshō, and other Daimyō along the Seto Inland Sea, to open themselves to trade with foreigners were sent to Britain in April 1865.[458] The decision to neither promote nor deny both current unofficial and potential official trade was key for Parkes and his later successful policy of establishing direct relations with many Daimyō across Japan. Which in turn was vital for Britain's success as a partner to the future Meiji Government.

---

[453] PP, Japan, No. 14, Winchester to Russell, 30 March 1865; PP, Japan, No. 28, Winchester to Russell, 11 May 1865.
[454] PP, Japan, No. 31, Russell to Winchester, 24 July 1865; PP, Japan, No. 36, Winchester to Russell, 26 May 1865; PP, Japan, No. 38, Russell to Parkes, 23 August 1865.
[455] PP, Japan, No. 36, Winchester to Russell, 26 May 1865.
[456] TNA, FO 46/26, London Protocol, 7 June 1862.
[457] PP, Japan, No. 28, Winchester to Russell, 11 May 1865; PP, Japan, No. 31, Russell to Winchester, 24 July 1865.
[458] TNA, FO 46/55/78, Winchester to Russell, 27 April 1865.

3.3. The Shimonoseki Indemnity:

The remainder of Winchester's term involved his steady stewardship over increasingly better Anglo-Japanese trade and the beginnings of the four power wrangling over the Shimonoseki Indemnity (payment of $3,000,000 Mexican silver dollars or the opening of another port within fifteen months) gained from the bombardment of Shimonoseki.[459] There were continuing talks over the indemnity's size and who should get what, but it is clear that no final decision on the indemnity had been made among the four powers by early-1865.[460] Winchester and the other governments accepted the Bakufu's initial indemnity payment and their desire to pay the indemnity in its entirety, but wisely reminded the Japanese that they still retained the right to reconsider the rest of the instalment in ways that were not monetary.[461] This decision by the four treaty powers paid off as the Bakufu later asked for a delay over the next payment in April.[462] Thus, Winchester and the other powers had their opening to continue negotiating over the indemnity. This was a blessing for Winchester as Britain (under the current indemnity agreement) was forced to accept the smallest share of the indemnity ($645,000 for Britain and $785,000 for the other three).[463] The reason for this was because of a Franco-Japanese Convention signed (but unratified) in 1864. This convention stipulated that $140,000 in reparations would be paid to France for Chōshū's attacks on French vessels passing through the Shimonoseki Straits.[464] This stipulation was simply copied over for the Dutch and the Americans for the *Pembroke*, *Medusa*, *Wyoming*, and the *Monitor*.[465]

---

[459] P. J. Treat, 'The Return of the Shimonoseki Indemnity', p. 1;.K. Yuzo, 'The Opening of Japan and the Meiji Restoration, 1837-72', in I. Nish & Y. Kibata eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930* (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000), pp. 77-78; M. Asakawa, 'Anglo-Japanese Military Relations, 1800-1900', in I. Gow, Y. Hirama and J. Chapman, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 3: The Military Dimension* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2003), pp. 15-16; PP, Japan, No. 28, Winchester to Russell, 11 May 1865; PP, Japan, No. 29, Winchester to Russell, 13 May 1864.
[460] PP, Japan, No. 16, Winchester to Russell, 12 April 1865.
[461] PP, Japan, No.18, Russell to Cowley, 21 June 1865; PP, Japan, No. 19, Cowley to Russell, 27 June 1865;
[462] P. J. Treat, 'The Return of the Shimonoseki Indemnity', p. 8.
[463] P. J. Treat, 'The Return of the Shimonoseki Indemnity', p. 9.
[464] *The New York Times*, 13 July 1864, p. 2.
[465] PP, Japan, No. 80, Alcock to Russell, 28 October 1864; PP, Japan, No. 32, Russell to Winchester, 26 July 1865.

This, rightly or wrongly, left the British at a monetary disadvantage, despite providing the most ships and the most soldiers for the bombardment of Shimonoseki.[466] However, this delay asked for by the Bakufu effectively reopened the entire affair, allowing Winchester to argue Britain's position once more. The multifaceted nature of the Shimonoseki Indemnity negotiations and the substantial sum involved meant that Russell himself had to do some legwork to aid Winchester's attempts to settle any differences. Thanks to Russell contacting the other powers more directly, the United States, France, and the Netherlands, he was able to put pressure on them to become more agreeable towards Britain's position on the indemnity.[467] In place of most or all the indemnity the Bakufu would open the ports of Hyogo (Kobe) and Osaka, and obtain the ratification of the Ansei Treaties by the Emperor. While it would be Parkes a few months later that would gain the support of the Americans (after concessions), the French (reluctantly), and the Dutch to act in concert and actually press upon the Japanese these aims, it was actually Winchester who came up with the idea and convinced Russell that this was the correct way forward back in April 1865.[468] In fact Winchester had been considering Britain's position on the Shimonoseki Indemnity since February 1865 (with Foreign Office backing).[469] Thus, by the time Parkes arrived in Japan in June 1865, the other powers had become far more amenable towards Britain's (Winchester's) preferred use of the indemnity, eventually leading to his successful allied naval expedition to Osaka in November 1865.[470]

Winchester's thinking here may seem contrary to my argument that he sought to delay/defer major decisions to not burden his future chief's options. This is however another example of Winchester's delay and deference tactics. The Shogunate wanted the treaty powers wishes on

---

[466] This was despite an initial general agreement that the indemnity be divided equally, even though Britain had supplied the most military vessels (and over 2,850 soldiers) for the bombardment. However, in fairness, no British vessels were attacked like ships from America, France, and the Netherlands were between 1863-1864.

[467] PP, Japan, No. 7, Russell to Bruce, 30 March 1865; PP, Japan, No. 20, Milbanke to Russell, 28 June 1865; PP, Japan, No. 26, Milbanke to Russell, 10 July 1865; PP, Japan, No. 30, Milbanke to Russell, 17 July 1865; PP, Japan, No. 31, Russell to Winchester, 24 July 1865.

[468] TNA, FO 46/57/59, Parkes to Russell, 30 October 1865; E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 142-143.

[469] PP, Japan, No. 10, Winchester to Russell, 15 February 1865; PP, Japan, No. 12, Winchester to Russell, 28 February 1865; PP, Japan, No. 13, Russell to Winchester, 4 May 1865; PP, Japan, No. 14, Winchester to Russell, 30 March 1865; PP, Japan, No. 16, Winchester to Russell, 12 April 1865; PP, Japan, No. 22, Winchester to Russell, 25 April 1865.

[470] PP, Japan, No. 66, Parkes to Russell, 30 October 1865; PP, Japan, No. 72, Parkes to Russell, 14 November 1865.

the indemnity to be made clear sooner rather than later, but the treaty powers themselves did not yet have a concerted position, so Winchester, in agreement with Russell and the other powers deferred *that* decision and left the Bakufu with no answer. Whilst he then actively proposed to Russell what Britain should ask from the Japanese and worked with him to gain the other treaty powers support, this was never an attempt to really control policy or make a final decision. He suggested and Russell agreed. It might have failed or it might have worked, it is only thanks to hindsight that we know that in the near future Parkes was able to convince the Americans, French and the Dutch that the British (Winchester) way was the right way.[471] Winchester, thanks to his perseverance in understanding what could be gained for Britain from renegotiating the indemnity, supplied Parkes with the means to further British goals in Japan during his tenure. In other words, Parkes's initial successes were just as much Winchester's successes because of his planning and deference.

Parkes was constantly informed of Japanese affairs (i.e., Winchester's actions) through Russell until he took his post as Minister Plenipotentiary.[472] Winchester would have also been up to date on his future chief's arrival, and knowing this knew not to engage with how this indemnity policy could be potentially executed, leaving Parkes (and Russell) room to manoeuvre however they saw fit.[473] With the unpredictable nature of domestic Japanese affairs and the immense communication lag between Britain and Japan, any tying down or direct commitment in British policy could have been disastrous. Winchester's final foray as Chargé d'Affaires was to head up the British delegation to a meeting with the Americans, French, and the Dutch. They discussed what precautions should be taken considering the Bakufu's second military expedition against Chōshū to ensure foreign trade remained unhindered through the Seto Inland Sea.[474] This final meeting along with its communique to Whitehall is pretty telling of Winchesters entire term as temporary chief. He confirmed Britain's neutrality (effectively non-commitment to anything but the continued status-quo) and continued Russell's preferred belief that working in concert with the other treaty powers

[471] TNA, FO 46/57/59, Parkes to Russell, 30 October 1865.
[472] PP, Japan, No. 8, Russell to Parkes, 8 April 1865; PP, Japan, No. 9, Russell to Parkes, 8 April 1865; PP, Japan, No. 42, Parkes to Russell, 30 August 1865.
[473] I think we can infer that Parkes and Winchester's previous experience of working together in China also informed Winchester's decision making in Japan. In other words, he had some idea of what his future chief expected of him.
[474] PP, Japan, No. 39, Winchester to Russell, 23 June 1865.

was the best way to promote Britain's interests. These were all positive diplomatic developments for Anglo-Japanese relations that Parkes would later capitalise on.

3.3. Conclusions:

Unlike his predecessor, Alcock, Winchester was never met with anything else but constant approval from the Foreign Office.[475] His tenure was never mired by scandal or calamity like Neale's was either (albeit not entirely Neale's fault). He also managed to move around difficult issues like the illegal ongoing Western-Daimyō trade to the point that neither the Bakufu nor the Foreign Office could entrap him, endangering both his position and Anglo-Japanese relations. This meant that his successor, Parkes, was able to tackle the issue unencumbered by previous decisions that might have proved constricting. Which in hindsight proved highly beneficial, especially when we consider Parkes's various discussions with Daimyō from across the Japanese political spectrum months and years later. Thanks to Winchester, Britain was able to effectively hedge its bets with all major parties involved, increase its trade and political clout, and advance Anglo-Japanese diplomacy unhindered. Winchester's role in priming this opportunity cannot be ignored or understated. Additionally, Winchester's involvement in sorting out the Shimonoseki Indemnity was also vitally important. Thanks to Winchester, and substantial help from Russell, the groundwork that established Britain's final position on the indemnity was established. He began convincing the other involved powers that the British position was the right position to take, leading to the concerted action led by Parkes mere months later. As Satow admits, it was quickly forgotten that it was Winchester and not Parkes who prepared this course of action.[476] Unlike Neale, we do not have many opinions about Winchester. However, Russell, Satow, and even Dr. Willis, in their official capacities seem to have nothing but satisfaction with his duties as Chargé d'Affaires. What is perhaps more telling of Winchester's successful time in charge is that after being relieved as Chargé d'Affaires, instead of returning to the Yokohama Consulship, he was quickly promoted to the Consulate of Shanghai in 1865, the pre-eminent posting of China; a post he would hold until his retirement in 1868 (a year after his wife had sadly died).[477]

[475] PP, Japan, No. 13, Russell to Winchester, 4 May 1865; PP, Japan, No. 31, Russell to Winchester, 24 July 1865; PP, Japan, No. 41, Russell to Winchester, 30 August 1865.
[476] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 142.
[477] *London Gazette*, 11 April 1865, p. 1987; Winchester himself died in 1883; *The Homeward Mail from India, China and the East*, 23 July 1883, p. 629; *The Standard*, 22 August 1883, p. 7.

4. Robert Grant Watson:

4.1. Watson's Origins:

Like Neale and Winchester, Watson's career did not begin in the diplomatic world, but with the military.[478] Watson was born in 1834, Forres, Scotland, as the son of Robina Jean Watson and Robert Watson; a successful Town Clerk and Banker (with numerous other roles).[479] Watson himself attended the local Forres Academy, which is still going strong to this very day. He excelled at classics, languages and geography, winning various accolades for his efforts (a portent into his future academic and career interests).[480] In 1850 Watson entered the East India Company Military Seminary at Addiscombe.[481] He was a cadet at the famous military college from 1851 until 1853.[482] Watson would have been instructed in Mathematics, Fortification, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Latin, French, Hindustani, Civil/Military/Lithographic Drawing and Surveying, and in the construction of mortar-beds and artillery gun-carriages.[483] Watson graduated as an infantryman, and served in the Bombay Army in the Second European Regiment (later the 106th Regiment of Foot (Bombay Light Infantry) from 1853 at the age of 19.[484] His father would sadly pass away in 1855, meaning Watson understandably returned home on extended leave.[485] He eventually submitted an application to re-join his regiment in February 1856 after seeing to his family's

---

[478] C. Mackie, *A Directory of British Diplomats* (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2014), p. 208.
[479] *Russell's Morayshire Register and Elgin & Forres Directory, for 1844* (Elgin, Alex Russell, 1844), pp. 34, 59, 62, 177, 185, 188, 191-193; *Russell's Morayshire Register and Elgin & Forres Directory, for 1847* (Elgin, Alex Russell, 1847), p. 34, p. 59, p. 112, p. 188, p. 194, p. 196, p. 199 & pp. 202-204; *Russell's Morayshire Register and Elgin & Forres Directory, for 1850* (Elgin, Alex Russell, 1850), p. 86, pp. 137-138, p. 205, p. 210, p. 213 & pp. 215-217; *Russell's Morayshire Register and Elgin & Forres Directory, for 1852* (Elgin, Alex Russell, 1852), p. 84, p. 99, p. 136, p. 200, p. 205, p. 207 & pp. 209-210; *Elgin Courier*, 26 January 1855, p. 3.
[480] *Forres, Elgin, and Nairn Gazette, Northern Review and Advertiser*, 7 July 1847, pp. 2-3; *Forres, Elgin, and Nairn Gazette, Northern Review and Advertiser*, 8 July 1848, p. 3; *Forres, Elgin, and Nairn Gazette, Northern Review and Advertiser*, 7 July 1849, p. 2.
[481] British Library, Cadet Papers (1789-1860) and Cadet Registers ((1775-1860), L/MIL/9/224 f.245.
[482] H. M. Vibart, *Addiscombe: Its Heroes and Men of Note* (Westminster, Archibald Constable and Co, 1894), p. 695.
[483] J. M. Bourne, 'The East India Company's Military Seminary, Addiscombe, 1809-1858', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 57:232 (Winter 1979), p. 208.
[484] *Home News for India, China, and the Colonies*, 24 June 1853, p. 375;
[485] *Elgin Courier*, 26 January 1855, p. 3; *Home News for India, China, and the Colonies*, 26 September 1855, p. 632; *Home News for India, China, and the Colonies*, 26 August 1856, p. 639.

affairs.[486] That same month he was ordered to make his way to Bushehr (Bushire to the British at the time) via Marseilles, Constantinople, Asia Minor, along the Tigris to Baghdad and Persia. This journey sparked his deep interest in the Middle-East, with stops at Nineveh and Babylon further cementing this (he also took notes and measurements for the Royal Geographical Society). He linked up with his regiment in May and for his fortitude he was placed at the service of Charles Murray, the Minister Plenipotentiary, in Persia (with 'a very handsome salary').[487] His service must have been satisfactory for he was also later promoted to the rank of lieutenant in November 1856.[488] However, with the Indian Uprising of 1857, this work in Persia had to be put on hold.[489] Watson was attached to General Sir James Outram, 'the Bayard of India', and his general staff in May 1857, later taking part in Outram's campaigns in central (Mahratta) India.[490]

Watson's diplomatic promise was not forgotten and he became a paid attaché in April 1859 (situated in Tehran, Persia) under Sir Henry Rawlinson after the Indian uprising was quelled.[491] We can assume he left his previous regiment, due to his future attachment to the Bombay Staff Corps established in 1861.[492] The point of these renewed corps within the British Army (for India was now under British oversight and no longer the East India Company) was to allow officers serving in India the opportunity to take up political and civil appointments. Watson made full use of this opportunity whilst being an attaché, and was eventually made a Second Secretary to the Legation in Tehran in October 1862.[493] He was

---

[486] *Home News for India, China, and the Colonies*, 10 February 1856, p. 109; *Home News for India, China, and the Colonies*, 26 February 1867, p. 155.
[487] *Forres, Elgin, and Nairn Gazette, Northern Review and Advertiser*, 4 March 1857, p. 3; *Elgin Courant, and Morayshire Advertiser*, 3 July 1857, p. 6.
[488] *London Gazette*, 13 January 1863, p. 220.
[489] See S. David, *The Indian Mutiny* (London, Penguin Books, 2002).
[490] *Civil & Military Gazette*, 26 November 1892, pp. 5-6.
[491] H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972*, p. 308; *Edinburgh Evening Courant*, 17 December 1859, p. 4.
[492] Alongside Bombay, there was also staff corps for Bengal and Madras.
[493] *The Bombay Gazette Overland Mail*, 27 November 1861, p. 5; *London Gazette*, 18 November 1862, p. 5455; In fact, many attaches in the Diplomatic Service were promoted into permanent Second Secretaries at this time. This occurred after various debates over the nature of attaches, the fact that they were unpaid, and often worked without a fixed timeframe or remit. All current attaches at that time were thus promoted and all future attaches functioned under a new set of rules; *Naval and Military Gazette and Weekly Chronicle of the United Service*, 22 November 1862, p. 747; House of Commons, *The Diplomatic Service* (4 July 1862, Vol. 167, Cols. 1431-1444) < See Bibliography for Link > [Accessed 8 April 2024]; Also see PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic Service: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, 23 July 1861.

kept busy during this time as a minor diplomat in Persia, with appointments and missions across the Middle-East, from Constantinople, the Caucasus, to parts of the wider Persosphere.[494] We can assume he performed his duties admirably from the fact that he was promoted again to the rank of captain (June 1865).[495] He would formerly end his military career with his resignation in December 1865 however. From at least 1865 onwards, Watson was also now a member of the eminent St. James's Club in London; a club founded by Lord Granville (a future Foreign Secretary who Watson would later serve under) and Sardinian Minister to the Court of St. James, Marchese d'Azeglio, for diplomats and associated individuals in 1857.[496] It was here that he would write some of his book on the history of Persia.[497] Watson was appointed as Second Secretary of the Legation in Constantinople, but this move was rescinded and he worked in the Foreign Office.[498] In 1866 he was transferred to South America, becoming the Second Secretary of the Legation to the Argentine Republic (Argentina) and Paraguay.[499] During his first year he was situated in Buenos Aires where he travelled around the Santa Fe region from May 1866, the Patagonia region to visit a Welsh colony there in June 1866, and was also seconded to observe the Paraguay War (probably due to his previous military and attaché experience) for a time.[500] In his second year he was moved to the Rio de Janeiro Legation from January 1867.[501] Here he explored the Minas Gerais region.[502] After his two-year stint in South America he was recalled to Europe and sent to Constantinople in January 1869, and was eventually appointed (and promoted) to the position of (First) Secretary of the Legation to Greece in Athens. A posting that lasted from 1870-1872.[503] With Greece, Watson began his career as a constant

---

[494] *The Academy: A Weekly Review of Literature, Science, and Art*, 17 May 1884, pp. 342-343; *Civil & Military Gazette*, 26 November 1892, pp. 5-6.
[495] H. G. Hart, *The New Annual Army List, and Militia List, for 1866* (London, John Murray, 1866), p. 492; *Home News for India, China, and the Colonies*, 26 October 1865, p. 19.
[496] See C. Graves, *Leather Armchairs: The Chivas Regal Book of London Clubs* (London, Cassell & Co, 1963).
[497] See R. G. Watson, *A History of Persia* (London, Smith, Elder and Co, 1866).
[498] E. Hertslet, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1881, forming a Complete British Diplomatic and Consular Handbook* (London, Harrison, 1881), p. 201.
[499] R. G. Watson, *Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial Period, Volume 1* (London, Trübner & Co, 1884), p. IX; It should be noted that since 1853 this Legation was responsible for both the Argentine Republic and Paraguay, hence the duality you see here.
[500] This Welsh colony, *Y Wladfa*, literally 'the colony' was only founded a year before in 1865; See G. Williams, *The Desert and the Dream: A Study of Welsh Colonisation in Chubut, 1865-1915* (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1975).
[501] *Liverpool Albion*, 4 February 1867, p. 7.
[502] R. G. Watson, *Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial Period, Volume 1*, pp. IX-X.
[503] *London Gazette*, 4 February 1870, p. 137; C. Mackie, *A Directory of British Diplomats*, p. 208.

number two diplomat; the Secretary of a Legation and Chargé d'Affaires. His next posting after Greece would be his year in Japan, May 1872 – March 1873.

His takeover of the British Legation in Japan was not a smooth handing over of power. Parkes was on leave back in Britain and had left his diplomatic duties in the care of Francis Ottiwell Adams, another Secretary of the Legation/Chargé d'Affaires (a post he had held since 1868).[504] However, Adams was transferred to serve in Berlin in February 1872 and his health was radically declining too. Watson did not leave for Japan from San Francisco until the 1 May 1872. His late arrival on 24 May meant that a swift 'hello and goodbye' changeover of diplomats occurred the day after.[505] Before we go further it is safe to say that Watson was not only well travelled, but was certainly a learned and curious man. He wrote several books, including a two-volume set of histories on the South American Colonial Period (published in 1884) and was the senior editor of Murray's Handbook of Greece (1872).[506] He also wrote a history of Persia until 1858, which despite its age and Victorian sensibilities, is surprisingly qualified. It includes a wide variety of source material, both British and Persian (he was actually critiqued for using Persian sources by reviewers…).[507] In light of all this, Watson comes across as a diplomat who was seen as not only very good at being a secondary to support and even lead when needs arise, but as a character who could cope with a wide array of settings and problems. If we use hindsight once more, his postings after Japan further support this idea. He continued his role as Secretary of the Legation/Chargé d'Affaires in Denmark (1873-1874), the USA (1874-1876), Portugal (1876), and Sweden (1876-1879).[508] Rectifying relations with Denmark (still sour after the Second Schleswig War) and the United States (where relations remained strained thanks to Canada and the US Civil War) were highly sought after by Britain and simultaneously difficult tasks too approach (when more senior diplomats were indisposed). Watson was, in effect, someone the Foreign Office clearly considered a safe pair of hands who could deal with Japan as it developed from its secluded peculiarity to a place of Western perceived modernity in Parkes's absence.

---

[504] *London Gazette*, 10 January 1868, p. 103.
[505] *London Gazette*, 27 February 1872, p. 767; H. Cortazzi, eds., *Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume 7* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2010), p. 106.
[506] R. G. Watson, *Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial Period, 2 Volumes*; See R. G. Watson, eds., *A Handbook for Travellers in Greece* (London, John Murray, 1872).
[507] See R. G. Watson, *A History of Persia*.
[508] C. Mackie, *A Directory of British Diplomats*, p. 208.

4.2. Watson's Year:

Watson officially assumed responsibility for the legation on May 25 1872.[509] The then Foreign Secretary in charge was Lord Granville; a man who would build a reputation of forbearance while in post. Lord Granville had the Foreign Office draw up dossiers on various parts of the world he was not directly familiar with. He would then intimate himself with these unfamiliar places, like Japan, and then further content himself to trust the advice and knowledge of 'men on the spot' like Parkes and eventually Watson too.[510] Thus, Watson was given a relatively free hand in Japan. His time in charge was an eventful one and when looking through his various despatches back to Whitehall you cannot help but consider the sheer number of issues he was having to constantly deal with. All diplomats in Japan, particularly during these formative years, faced difficulties. Watson however, faced a continuous barrage of problems up until Parkes returned in March 1873.[511] These problems can all be collectively linked to one central issue and that was Japan's changing place in the wider world. As Japan steadily grew into the Meiji nation-state it would ultimately become, it constantly jarred with the Bakufu Era Ansei Treaties. As more and more nations established their 'own' Ansei Treaties with Japan, the already complex multilateral nature of the treaty ports became even more difficult to manage. Not including the five original 'Ansei Powers', namely, America, the Netherlands, Russia, Britain, and France. An additional eleven powers (technically more) subsequently established similar treaties before 1870.[512] Suddenly there were more players and this had a massive impact on how Anglo-Japanese relations developed. Watson's stint in charge is a perfect example of the greater international complexities British diplomats would now face in Japan until the end of the century.

To better understand this, we will split up Watson's workload into two parts; minor and major. This is not to say that the minor developments in Anglo-Japanese relations during Watson's tenure were unimportant, just that the *Maria Luz* incident was, in my view, the

[509] TNA, FO 46/153/96, Adams to Granville, 25 May 1872; TNA, FO 46/153/1, Watson to Granville, 25 May 1872.
[510] A. Cobbing, 'Lord Granville, 1815-1891', in A. Best & H. Cortazzi, eds., *British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1850-1990: Aspects of the Evolution of British Foreign Policy* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2018), p. 43.
[511] TNA, FO 46/166/1, Parkes to Granville, 31 March 1873.
[512] In order: Portugal, Prussia, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Sweden-Norway, Spain, the North German Confederation, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Hawaii.

major event that best represents how global and more complex both treaty port and Anglo-Japanese relations were becoming during his tenure. The incident itself involved a Peruvian vessel, the *Maria Luz*, captained by Ricardo Hereira, taking port at Yokohama due to her seaworthiness being compromised by a storm in July 1872.[513] It had left Macao and was making its way to Peru; an unfortunately common and arduous destination for Chinese indentured labourers (more than a 100,000 were transported to Peru alone by 1874).[514] The coolie trade had long been discussed and acknowledged as a vice that was spiralling towards one day surpassing the Atlantic Slave Trade in scope and horror.[515] Besides Peru, which was considered to be the most brutal of endpoints for a coolie, one common destination was Havana, Cuba, where more than 120,000 Chinese peoples were brought to by 1873.[516] The abolition of slavery and the slave trade by many states during the nineteenth century, combined with the rapid expansion of sugar plantations had caused demand for coolies, and consequently profits, to skyrocket.[517] Even at the coolie trade's midpoint, the time of the *Maria Luz* incident, it was big business across the Pacific, the Americas, and distant colonies. The *Maria Luz*'s Captain and crew therefore had great interest in the protection of not only their ship, but their increasingly valuable 'cargo' as well. With Yokohama being a Western treaty port, it could provide the infrastructure needed to repair a ship like the *Maria Luz* and make her seaworthy again, but fortunately for the Chinese onboard, it also provided opportunities to escape. Not long after taking port, one coolie was able to escape to a nearby ship, the HMS *Iron Duke* (Audacious-Class Ironclad and flagship of the China Squadron),

---

[513] S. J. Crawford, 'The "Maria Luz" Affair', p. 584.
[514] These labourers aboard the *Maria Luz* were part of an ongoing trade (1840s-1920s) that involved peoples from Asia and Africa being recruited to work in the labour exhausted New World. The contracts that tied these peoples to work in the America's were almost always, in effect, a form of slavery; B. Mihalopoulos, 'Rethinking the *Maria Luz* Incident: Methodological cosmopolitanism in Meiji Japan', in A. Ogawa & P. Seaton, eds., *New Frontiers in Japanese Studies* (London, Routledge, 2020), pp. 24-25; E. Young, *Alien Nation: Chinese migration in the Americas from the coolie era through World War II* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2014), pp. 32-34; See M. Jung, '"Coolies": Race, Nation, and Empire in the Age of Emancipation', *American Quarterly*, 57:3 (September 2005), pp. 677-701; *The Times*, 9 November 1872, p. 10.
[515] *Caledonian Mercury*, 22 May 1857, p. 4; *The Daily News*, 26 January 1857, p. 2; *Shipping and Mercantile Gazette*, 3 May 1872, p. 5; *Overland China Mail*, 29 May 1868, p. 94.
[516] L. W. Bergad, 'Slavery in Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1804 to Abolition', in D. Eltis, S. L. Engerman, S. Drescher & D. Richardson, eds., *The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Volume 4: 1804-2016* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 114; The Chinese called the trade the 'Piglet Sale'; P. Crossley, 'Dependency and Coercion in East Asia Labor, 1800-1949', in D. Eltis, S. L. Engerman, S. Drescher & D. Richardson, eds., *The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Volume 4: 1804-2016* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 549.
[517] P. Crossley, 'Dependency and Coercion in East Asia Labor, 1800-1949', p. 549.

who then turned him over to the Japanese authorities.[518] He pleaded for help, both for himself and the two hundred and thirty others (men and boys) still aboard. Nothing came of this besides some mild admonishment for the captain of the *Maria Luz*.[519]

However, shortly after, another coolie escaped to the HMS *Iron Duke* and spoke of the horrible treatment he and others had received. Watson appears to be greatly aggrieved at his condition and had also heard of the brutal treatment that the first escapee received upon his return from Japanese authorities.[520] The then British Government considered the coolie trade to be abhorrent and nothing short of slavery, and had passed the Chinese Passenger Act in 1855 which stipulated tough punishments for involvement in the illegal employment of Chinese peoples.[521] This was largely in reaction to the fact that since the First Opium War, British commerce had effectively taken up the mantle of the coolie trade.[522] This was eventually followed by a Hong Kong Emigration Ordinance in 1870, which stipulated that no 'Chinese Passenger Ship' could leave port without a licence from the Governor.[523] Parliament was consistently updated about the conditions of the trade, including Macau's involvement, both before and after the *Maria Luz* incident. So, it is safe to assume that Granville, being a man of preparation, as well as Watson, would have been well aware of the trade and Britain's stance towards it.[524] In light of all this and the second escapee, Watson assembled a boarding party and quickly discovered the terrible conditions aboard the *Maria Luz*. This event displayed a lot of on-the-spot thinking on Watson's part, for it was a huge gamble to test extraterritoriality this way and to unilaterally force himself aboard a foreign (Peruvian) ship. Watson knew that he had little authority to do anything to a ship whose jurisdiction fell out of British hands. Despite this, Watson states his feelings of deep 'responsibility' after seeing the conditions of the Chinese coolies and decided to formally request that the Japanese act in August 1872.[525]

---

[518] TNA, FO 46/155/113, Watson to Granville, 24 September 1872.
[519] This only involved the Japanese verbally admonishing the Peruvian captain and asking that he look after his 'indentured labourers' better.
[520] TNA, FO 46/155/113, Watson to Granville, 24 September 1872.
[521] I. R. Saveliev, 'Rescuing the Prisoners of the Maria Luz', p. 71; Winchester's first stint in China also shows how previous British diplomats tried to stymie and prevent the coolie trade.
[522] P. Crossley, 'Dependency and Coercion in East Asia Labor, 1800-1949', p. 549.
[523] *Overland China Mail*, 10 May 1870, p.76.
[524] Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence respecting the Emigration of Chinese coolies from Macao, 1871 [Hereafter "PP, Macau"]. PP, Macao, 1872.
[525] TNA, FO 46/155/68, Watson to Granville, 4 August 1872; TNA, FO 46/155/113, Watson to Granville, 24 September 1872; Document No. 243, DeLong to Fish, 27 September 1872 in *Executive Documents printed by order of the House of Representatives, 1872-1873* (Washington, D. C, U.S.

Watson's interference is a complex problem to address. There are three intersecting reasons that might explain why Watson took this risk. Firstly, that Watson felt dutybound to aid and help stamp out a trade which Britain saw in the same vein as the chattel slavery of the Atlantic Slave Trade. This is the simplest and most difficult to judge of the three reasons, but the horrors and many naval tragedies that had occurred were publicly and globally known, and could have influenced Watson's thinking on humanitarian grounds. For example, between 1845 and 1872 the *Overland China Mail* recorded over thirty-eight naval disasters and incidents involving Chinese coolies alone.[526] Perhaps the fear of yet another avoidable disaster associated with the coolie trade, a trade so negatively viewed by Britain, was impossible to ignore for Watson. Secondly, the idea that Watson felt forced to help due to the situation, prior scandals and calamities in the Far East involving the coolie trade, and the discomforting fact that Britain had still not fully extricated itself from it. Of the thirty-eight coolie trade related incidents detailed by the *Overland China Mail*, fifteen of the ships involved were British.[527] An overwhelming majority and a key source of scandal and embarrassment for successive British governments. So, to not act could have potentially been the bigger risk for Watson to take, even considering Britain's more peripheral involvement with the *Maria Luz*. It is no coincidence that after the *Maria Luz*, British documents concerning the coolie trade moved towards stopping British involvement, accidental or otherwise, with the trade as had happened at Yokohama.[528] The Foreign Office and the Government of the day clearly did not want a repeat situation, regardless of the *Maria Luz* incident's outcome.

The last potential reason is lingering Lusophobia/Hispanophobia that appeared to be far more prevalent than one might think. It is quite telling that in much of the press at the time, there appears to be considerable xenophobia towards Portugal and Spain (and related nations like Peru). It ranges from the outright ludicrous to serious acts of violence. For example, in regards to Spain there was the odd (and relevant) case of a Spanish Warship *Narvaez*

Government Printing Office, 1873), pp. 525-553; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 20: Meiji-shin* (Tokyo, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2006), pp. 340-344.

[526] *Overland China Mail*, 8 January 1874, p. 7.

[527] *Overland China Mail*, 8 January 1874, p. 7.

[528] Parliamentary Papers, Papers relating to the Measures taken to prevent the fitting out of ships at Hong Kong for the Macao coolie Trade, July 1873.

attempting to make port at Nagasaki in 1864.[529] The Japanese strenuously protested, for Spain at this time was not a treaty port power in Japan, but the Spanish effectively bullied their way past them. To the foreign community it appeared that the Japanese were only angrier because of their apparent singular hatred for the Spanish, and not for the more realistic and understandable reason of their sovereignty being so flippantly bulldozed over.[530] In the absence of any evidence for Japan hating Spain more vigorously than any other of the foreign powers (and the general disdain for the 'foreign barbarian' at the time), I see this more as projection of Western attitudes and opinions onto the Japanese themselves. Portugal had a larger presence in the Far East because of its control of Macao, and it was for this reason that it received greater interest and criticism. The *Overland China Mail* is filled with a litany of articles about Portugal, Macao and the coolie trade, all of which paint a rather distasteful picture.[531] The most damning of which came in 1864:

> It is hard that Portuguese greatness should have come to this; that Lusitanian chivalry should have sunk so low; that even hope itself is dim, when the vilest office to be performed on earth are committed to the charge of this fallen nation. We have not the slightest expectation of interrupting this thriving but disreputable Callao Trade. It is essential that those engaged in it should be lost to all sense of shame; and, such being the case, we cannot hope to awaken within them a sense of self-respect. But we have the opportunity offered to us by Livingstone of pointing a moral and showing how a once haughty and noble race may eventually sink to the lowest depths of infamy.[532]

Another article later commented that there was "…little distinction between the Lusitanian Hero and the Chinese Scoundrel" (after a piracy incident).[533] In Japan in particular there were incidents involving Portuguese subjects and examples of Lusophobia (an attack in Kobe for example).[534] Perhaps the prejudices of the Far East foreign communities about Portugal, its

---

[529] *The Japan Herald*, 6 August 1864, p. 339; *Army and Navy Gazette*, 3 September 1864, p. 566; *Glasgow Courier*, 15 September 1864, p. 5.
[530] *The Japan Herald*, 6 August 1864, p. 339.
[531] *Overland China Mail*, 15 December 1868, pp. 203-204; *Overland China Mail*, 29 May 1868, p. 94; *Overland China Mail*, 17 November 1868, p. 187.
[532] *Overland China Mail*, 15 April 1864, p. 1215.
[533] *Overland China Mail*, 28 August 1865, pp. 2-3.
[534] *The Hiogo News*, 19 January 1870, p. 22; Such events were likely fanned by earlier events involving Portuguese subjects. One such event being the murder of a Chinese servant, who the then

involvement with the coolie trade (182,000 Chinese Labourers from Macao from 1864-1874 alone), and link to the *Maria Luz* played a role in Watson's decision making.[535] Peru being a Hispanic nation, a former Spanish colony, also therefore received some prejudice. Spain and Peru, like Portugal, were often derided as lesser powers from a bygone era, whose presence in East Asia and the wider global system was now only an annoyance. This is perhaps best explained by yet another *Overland China Mail* piece that talks about the 'deterioration of the Latin races', with a particular focus on Portugal and Spain.[536] Lord Stanley once compared a Portuguese Prime Minister to a disappointed child.[537] Lord Clarendon in 1866 suggested that Spain had more in common with an Oriental or African state; i.e., an uncivilised nation.[538] A good summary of how Portugal, Spain, and their related romance countries were commonly seen can be found in the American periodical *The Nation*:

> The Romanic Family consists mainly of nations that have passed the zenith of their glory. Some of them show evident marks of decay, if not of incurable rottenness. Such are Spain and Portugal, which, after centuries of world-wide fame and power, have nearly succumbed to the internal infection of bigotry, pride, and luxury, combining to produce an unparalleled system of royal and clerical despotism. Their former colonies, now independent states, founded on a substratum of an inferior race, seem to be decrepit in their very infancy.[539]

Peru suffered from similar anti-Hispanic opinions, though for slightly different reasons. Peru had a history of instability since its independence, which further prejudiced the country in the eyes of British officials and the wider public.[540] Peru was not only in the limelight as a destination for the coolie trade post-1850, but was also part of a foreign imbroglio in 1870 involving the very public detention of two British merchant vessels transporting 'Guano'

British Consul for Kanagawa, Captain Vyse, claimed counted as a British subject and notified all British subjects that they should arm themselves against Portuguese subjects and others who might do them harm. This was quickly reversed after Alcock swiftly rejected his notification with great concern; *The Times,* 10 April 1860, p. 8.

[535] P. Crossley, 'Dependency and Coercion in East Asia Labor, 1800-1949', p. 550.

[536] *Overland China Mail,* 15 April 1864, pp. 1214-1215.

[537] W. Paget, *Scenes and Memoirs* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912), p. 136.

[538] C. J. Barret, 'After Palmerston: Britain and the Iberian Peninsula, 1865-76', *The English Review,* 430:109 (February 1994), p. 76.

[539] *The Nation: Volume VI* (E. L. Godkin & Co, 1868), p. 388.

[540] See W. M. Mathew, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade: Peru, 1820-1870', *The Economic History Review,* 3:21 (December 1968), pp. 562-579.

(which was used to revolutionise British agriculture).[541] A somewhat similar incident involving sovereignty, ships, Britain, and Peru; a very close coincidence to the *Maria Luz* incident. Overall, it is entirely probable that these surprisingly prevalent prejudices also influenced Watson's decision to intervene. Watson may have desired to continue Britain's 'progressive' march against nations from a bygone era still taking part in immoral acts like the coolie trade, and then take credit for doing so in the eyes of the Foreign Office.[542]

Ultimately, given the multitude of sources, I lean towards it being a broad concoction of all three reasons. Watson himself plays up how the coolies had sought asylum aboard the HMS *Iron Duke*, and he, being the British representative, was duty bound to aid them, especially when it was British officers who had inadvertently handed back previous escapees to lives of 'torture and slavery.'[543] Many British diplomats of this period often took a conciliatory approach (like Alcock) to make their actions appear more in line with policy or less 'problematic' for the Foreign Office to accept, but Watson does seem genuinely pained that British subjects, officers and himself included, had aided a form of slavery, even if by accident. Whilst there is some genuine regret here, a lot of this description and reasoning is meant to get the Foreign Office onboard with his somewhat rash decision. Watson may have been more academically inclined than many, able to take in multiple points of view that sometimes included the colonised as well as the coloniser, but he was also an explorer, more than capable of a bit of Victorian daring-do and ultimately a man of his time. This can be seen in his career choices, travels and immense protestations that Emperor Meiji did not receive him *standing up/face uncovered*.[544] Whatever the true motives of Watson's involvement, Britain was involved, and faced potential hurdles from the onset.

---

[541] *The Sheffield Daily Telegraph*, 19 February 1870, p. 8; *The Manchester Courier and General Advertiser*, 28 April 1870, p. 5; *Shields Gazette and Daily Telegraph*, 28 April 1870, p. 3; See W. M. Mathew, 'Peru and the British Guano Market, 1840-1870', *The Economic History Review*, 1:23 (April 1970), pp. 112-128.

[542] Whilst ignoring the fact that despite this 'high ground', Britain was still engaged in a great many abhorrent, unethical, and immoral things at home and abroad. When thinking about East Asia alone, the vast and destructive Opium Trade springs to mind.

[543] TNA, FO 46/155/133, Watson to Granville, 24 September 1872.

[544] TNA, FO 46/154/28, Watson to Granville, 8 June 1872; TNA, FO 46/154/31, Watson to Granville, 10 June 1872; Document 252, Shepard to Fish, 16 June 1872 in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1872, Part I* (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1872), pp. 322-323; Emperor Meiji (1852-1912) was his posthumous name as per Japanese tradition. His name during his reign was Emperor Mutsuhito.

Despite coming from Macao, which was under Portuguese rule, the *Maria Luz* was under the Peruvian flag with a Peruvian Captain. Problematically, Peru had no formal relations with Japan and had made an agreement with the United States that the American diplomat *in situ* would represent them. Thankfully for Watson however, this complication was made moot quickly due to America's refusal to help. The United States Chargé d'Affaires, Charles Shepard (previously Consul for Edo/Tokyo in April 1869 and now Consul for Kanagawa (i.e. Yokohama) since January 1871), responded very negatively to Peru's request.[545] He cited the United States Statute of 1862 that prohibited any American *and* foreign citizens from involving themselves with the coolie trade in any way within US jurisdiction.[546] Covertly, Shepard also provided tact and private support for Watson, sharing his disdain for the trade and also placing pressure on the Japanese to act as well.[547] All of which was positively received by the then American Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, and then dubiously interrupted when Charles DeLong (US Minister to Japan 1869-1873) later returned after accompanying the Iwakura Mission to America, replacing Shepard.[548] DeLong, despite the US laws against the coolie trade, eventually involved himself as the Peruvian representative much to the confusion of the Japanese (with little effect in hindsight it must be said however).[549] Fish was angered, but despite this DeLong somehow remained in post for almost another year.[550] Watson did well to cultivate support from the Americans, who, at this time, still had somewhat frigid relations with the British in the aftermath of the American Civil War.[551] Watson certainly got lucky that the American position was already pretty well

---

[545] The Senate of the United States of America, *Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America, From March 5, 1869, to March 3, 1871, Volume 17* (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 152 & p. 619.
[546] National Archives Catalogue, Department of State, Volume 2: Japan: July 2, 1872 – August 30, 1880, No. 55, Shepard to Fish, 20 July 1872 [Hereafter 'NAC'].
[547] S. J. Crawford, 'The "Maria Luz" Affair', pp. 585-586; *Gaimushō*, Japanese Foreign Affairs Document Digital Archive, Vol. 5, *Meiji* 5/1872 (Tokyo, *Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyōkai*, 1953), p. 420 <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/5.html> [Accessed 10 January 2021]; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 20*, p. 341.
[548] Document No. 241, Fish to DeLong, 20 August 1872 in *Executive Documents printed by order of the House of Representatives, 1872-1873*, pp. 524-525; Document No. 242, DeLong to Fish, 3 September 1872 in *Executive Documents printed by order of the House of Representatives, 1872-1873*, p. 524.
[549] Document No. 243, DeLong to Fish, 27 September 1872 in *Executive Documents printed by order of the House of Representatives, 1872-1873*, pp. 525-553; Document No. 245, DeLong to Fish, 21 November 1872 in *Executive Documents printed by order of the House of Representatives, 1872-1873*, pp. 555-563.
[550] Document No. 246, Fish to DeLong, 5 December 1872 in *Executive Documents printed by order of the House of Representatives, 1872-1873*, pp. 563-564.
[551] See R. E. Long, *In the Shadow of the Alabama: The British Foreign Office and the American Civil War* (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2015); See T. Bingham, 'The Alabama Claims

aligned with the one he had taken, and that DeLong's reversal of Shepard's Anglo-Japanese support was strongly rebuked back in Washington.[552] Yet, you cannot doubt the commitment Watson took in pursuing the *Maria Luz*. It was a gamble, the Americans becoming involved could have been an unwanted complication for the Foreign Office given their frigid relations. Watson may have been aware of the American position around the coolie trade, he may have not, but the American alignment only aided his mission to get the Japanese to take responsibility. Whilst the potential reasoning as to why Watson got involved make this look more like a calculated gamble, here, with the luck of American support Watson's actions appear more as a blind leap that so far was still paying off. This 'luck' as I categorise it would continue as reactions to the incident progressed and expanded.

The treaty port system in Japan was meant to once again force equality among the treaty powers and empower imperial collaboration against the colonised. This event ticked all the boxes for upsetting this status-quo however. Britain and America were technically working together, but in support of Japan instead. Almost every other treaty port power saw it as a flagrant violation of extraterritorially and refuted the claim that it should fall within Japan's jurisdiction.[553] What had begun as a humanitarian action had quickly spiralled into something

---

Arbitration', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 54:1 (January 2005), pp. 1-25; See J. Libby, 'Hamilton Fish and the Origins of Anglo-American Solidarity', *Mid America*, 76:3 (1994), pp. 205–226; See *Papers Relating to the Treaty of Washington, 5 Volumes* (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1872).

[552] It perhaps helped that America was still a minor diplomatic player in Japan in the aftermath of the US Civil War.

[553] Japanese documents from the 17 August 1872 suggest that Yokohama Consul's from Portugal, Germany, America (it is unclear if they abstained on this occasion or not, but I assume yes), Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark shared a loose consensus that Japan did not have the authority to intervene; *Gaimushō*, Japanese Foreign Affairs Document Digital Archive, Vol. 5, *Meiji* 5/1872 (Tokyo, *Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyōkai*, 1953), p. 443 <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/5.html> [Accessed 9 January 2021]; Later, on 29 August 1872, another meeting of Yokohama Consuls was held. Representing Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, America, and Britain. The United States abstained and Britain put its full support behind Japan. Denmark, Portugal, Italy, and Germany agreed to the German Consul's protests against Japan. It is unclear how the Netherlands involved themselves at this time, but Dutch Newspapers of the period imply that there was some public sympathy for Japan; *Java-Bode: Nieuws, Handels- en Advertentieblad voor Nederlandsch-Indie*, 29 May, p. 4; *Delftsche Courant*, 1 November 1872, p. 2; For France specifically, nothing is mentioned in R. Sims great work on French Diplomacy and Japan, but Japanese historians seem to indicate that the French protested alongside Prussia and Portugal; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 20*, p. 341; See R. Sims, *French Policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan* (Richmond, Japan Library, 1998); *Gaimushō*, Japanese Foreign Affairs Document Digital Archive, Vol. 5, *Meiji* 5/1872 (Tokyo, *Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyōkai*, 1953), pp. 461-464 <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/5.html> [Accessed 10 January 2021]; NAC, Department of State, Volume 2: Japan: July 2, 1872 – August 30, 1880, No. 306, DeLong to Fish, 21 November 1872.

far larger. Thankfully again for Watson, it was agreed, but not ratified (another reason for the widespread foreign angst), previously in 1867 by Britain, France, America, Prussia, and the Netherlands that the Governor of Kanagawa (with Western aid from at least two consuls) would exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction over all non-treaty subjects/citizens.[554] The other foreign powers protested, but they at best had the opportunity to only advise and at worst remain hapless onlookers. Portugal showed this best through the Portuguese Governor of Macao (who was also Minister to Japan) and his antagonistic protests to the Japanese Government (the Far Eastern Portuguese press were similarly livid).[555] All of which was shown privately to Watson by the Japanese and came to absolute naught.[556] After many discussions and deliberations in court the Japanese declared, much to the gratitude of Watson, that due to humanitarian grounds and the fact that Peru had no treaty with Japan, the coolies' contracts were null and void. They were now free men and the Peruvian Captain was forced to leave Japan without his ship and cargo in late 1872.[557] Despite the dubious reasoning behind his involvement and the risks involved, Watson had gotten the outcome he wanted. Not only was this another stoppage of the coolie trade, something that he and his government viewed as another form of slavery, but it had also simultaneously improved relations with the Japanese, Americans, and the Chinese to some degree.[558] A diplomatic achievement.

Even despite British fears that Peru would respond with a military flotilla headed by the Peruvian Ironclad *Independencia* (they would actually arrive on a lone American mail steamer) to begin negotiations for a treaty and a reopening of the *Maria Luz* case, no negative impact could be felt for either Britain or Japan. It certainly helped that Watson had the *Iron Duke* stationed in Yokohama whilst the Peruvian-Japanese treaty was being negotiated to provide 'moral' support.[559] If anything both parties probably felt emboldened, Britain with its belief in being the pre-eminent power of the world with certain responsibilities, like stopping/policing the coolie trade, and Japan, who for the first time had shown both

---

[554] S. J. Crawford, 'The "Maria Luz" Affair', p. 587.
[555] *Gazeta de Macau e Timor*, 22 October 1872, p. 1; *Gazeta de Macau e Timor*, 30 December 1873, p. 2.
[556] TNA, FO 46/155/109, Watson to Granville, 17 September 1872.
[557] TNA, FO 46/155/133, Watson to Granville, 24 September 1872.
[558] The Chinese Government furnished a Gold Medal for the Royal Navy officer in charge of the boarding party, Captain William Arthur, and thanked the British Government for their support and involvement with the *Maria Luz*; TNA, FO 46/166/60, Watson to Granville, 7 March 1873.
[559] TNA, FO 46/165/10, Watson to Granville, 17 January 1873; TNA, FO 46/165/15, Watson to Granville, 21 January 1873; TNA, FO 46/165/20, Watson to Granville, 27 January 1873; TNA, FO 46/165/51, Watson to Granville, 9 February 1873.

diplomatic and judicial independence on the world stage.[560] The whole affair would be finally settled in 1875. Tsar Alexander II of Russia, as arbiter, declared that Japan had acted lawfully.[561] Watson would have had no idea the impact his decision to act and support the Japanese would have. It must have been a positive point of his career and contributed to his future postings, particularly his future appointment in the United States (and perhaps in Portugal as well). Whilst the outcomes could not have been more positive for Watson, this was still a diplomatic gamble that just happened to pay off. However, there is reason to believe that another prior event influenced Watson's decision making, at least once Britain was involved. Perhaps then, the diplomatic risk involved was more than equitable, especially when you consider the possible reasons Watson got Britain involved (and consider the actual outcomes).

The *Maria Luz* incident was always something that was going to happen in treaty port Japan. When you have a complex system of international relations, half set on several agreements that overlap with a variety of ports, regions and nations, and the other half based around the often vague, but repeated idea of 'precedent', it was only a matter of time before something like this happened. There were warning signs too. Prior to the *Maria Luz* incident and during Watson's tenure, a Tunisian ship, the *Zadkia*, made port in Yokohama.[562] Tunisia did not have a treaty with Japan and while a nation in of itself, it was technically under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, who also had no treaty with Japan. Watson was informed by the British Consul at Yokohama, Russell Robertson, that to make matters more complex, the ship had departed originally from Glasgow and was crewed mainly by British sailors, who of course would fall under the British treaty with Japan. The ship's ownership, Tunisian, British, or indeed another power, was under scrutiny long before it got anywhere near Japan as well. Matters only got worse when legal proceedings were introduced based on the ship's delayed voyage to Japan (by four months) and serious debts.[563] There was no real mechanism to deal with such a convoluted question of sovereignty. The key message for Watson from all this

[560] On balance however, an argument could be made that Japan simply went along with the British (and the Americans), putting question marks over their diplomatic 'independence'.
[561] Interestingly, the Tsar initially refused to arbitrate on the basis that it was already clear and proven that Peru was at fault; *The Morning Post*, 29 January 1874, p. 5; The Tsar was perhaps influenced by his own emancipation of over twenty-three million serfs over a decade before; See D. V. Botsman, 'Freedom without Slavery? "Coolies," Prostitutes, and Outcasts in Meiji Japan's "Emancipation Moment"', *The American Historical Review*, 116:5 (December 2011), pp. 1323-1347.
[562] TNA, FO 46/154/22, Watson to Granville, 6 June 1872.
[563] TNA, FO 46/154/22, Watson to Granville, 6 June 1872.

was that ultimately, through the confusion, the Japanese took charge and compromise was the order of the day. As M. Penn states, the Japanese wanted to follow the path of least resistance to not upset the major Western powers, as can be seen with their positive treatment of all British subjects involved, but also to ensure that their own sovereign rights were respected.[564] Watson would have certainly recalled this event in relation to the *Maria Luz* and what followed.

The advent of more treaty powers was clearly causing diplomatic issues to become compounded. Relations in treaty port Japan were rarely bilateral and the early 1870s were no different. Some other multilateral aspects of Watson's tenure included: Russo-Japanese negotiations (particularly over the Northern Pacific), agreement with the French to cooperate with each other in relation to Japan (it is unclear if this included the *Maria Luz* incident for they were relatively silent during the whole affair, though perhaps their silence was part of this), Sino-Japanese (treaty) negotiations, Sino-Korean diplomacy (led to the *Seikanron* debates of 1873 over a proposed invasion of Korea), Japanese annexation of the Ryukyu Islands (now Okinawa), Watson assuming diplomatic representation for Austria-Hungary in Japan, multilateral talks with Japan on legalising Christian practice and the opening up Japan's interior.[565] Of all these issues that Watson had to contend with, the legalisation of Christianity in Japan was the greatest feather in his diplomatic cap.[566] Some of the worst anti-Christian atrocities in Japan had occurred in the latter 1860s (known as the Fourth Persecution), and pressure from the foreign community and other Western powers had now

---

[564] I highly recommend you read M. Penn's paper on the 'Zadkia' if you are interested in this odd, but fascinating piece of history; M. Penn, 'First Contact: The Story of the Zadkia', *Japanese Studies*, 24:3 (2004), p. 321.

[565] TNA, FO 46/154/36, Watson to Granville, 17 June 1872; TNA, FO 46/154/45, Watson to Granville, 24 June 1872; TNA, FO 46/154/63, Watson to Granville, 30 July 1872; TNA, FO 46/155/69, Watson to Granville, 4 August 1872; TNA, FO 46/155/117, Watson to Granville, 30 September 1872; TNA, FO 46/165/48, Watson to Granville, 22 February 1873; TNA, FO 46/166/64, Watson to Granville, 7 March 1873; TNA, FO 46/166/68, Watson to Granville, 8 March 1872; TNA, FO 46/166/79, Watson to Granville, 9 March 1872; TNA, FO 46/155/73, Watson to Granville, 9 August 1872; TNA, FO 46/165/41, Watson to Granville, 19 February 1873; TNA, FO 46/156/132, Watson to Granville, 22 October 1872; TNA, FO 46/156/130, Watson to Granville, 20 October 1872; TNA, FO 46/156/164, Watson to Granville, 11 December 1872; TNA, FO 46/154/44, Watson to Granville, 24 June 1872; TNA, FO 46/165/47, Watson to Granville, 22 February 1873; TNA, FO 46/165/53, Watson to Granville, 24 February 1873; TNA, FO 46/165/54, Watson to Granville, 24 February 1873; TNA, FO 46/166/63, Watson to Granville, 7 March 1873; TNA, FO 46/166/73, Watson to Granville, 10 March 1873; TNA, FO 46/166/74, Watson to Granville, 11 March 1873.

[566] Watson cannot take all the credit however, Parkes and the French in particular also put the Japanese under a lot of pressure to liberalise their religious laws.

reached fever pitch.[567] Success here (by cooperating with the other treaty port powers) definitely improved his standing. Another key point of concern for Watson were ongoing Italian-Japanese discussions. For both nations, the silk industry was a key part of their economies and their overall economic development.[568] However, in the years after Japan's opening to Western trade there was a serious downturn in European silk production, combined with a rapid rise in demand from Europe.[569] A disease called 'pebrine' was decimating European sericultural crops; the disease had been around since the 1820s, but from the 1850s it was radically destroying European silk production.[570] Japan had been a great exporter of silk since its opening, so European interest was always going to eventually find its way east.[571] The previous Chargé d'Affaires, Francis Ottiwell Adams, and Parkes before him, supplied their own dossiers and reports in 1870 on the expanding Japanese silk trade in the light of these changes to the global silk trade.[572] Thus, Watson himself would have probably had some decent awareness of the silk trade in Japan and its global potential.

The European silk trade's collapse was a great boon to Japan (and Asia more widely) to take advantage of, but for Italy (and many other European nations) this was a disaster.[573] It was in this context that the Italians and the Japanese began talking to each other (the Italian Minister, Count Fe d'Orsi, informed Watson of these talks beginning himself).[574] The Italians wanted to get access to Japan's raw silk production without the meddling and go-betweens that existed in the treaty ports. Italian trade and influence at these ports was limited and any access that could be more direct and outside of the major treaty port powers influence was a massive bonus. The issue for Watson was that Japan's price for interior access was too high: an end to some of Italy's extraterritoriality rights. Italy was so desperate for the opportunity to access Japan's interior for silk, that they were more than willing to agree to such

---

[567] *The Hiogo News*, 2 February 1870, p. 39; *The Hiogo News*, 9 February 1870, p. 46; See Y. Kataoka, *Urakami shi-ban kuzure Meiji seifu no kirishitan danatsu* (Tokyo, Chikuma shobō, 2019).
[568] D. Ma, 'The Modern Silk Road: The Global Raw-Silk Trade Market, 1850-1930', *The Journal of Economic History*, 56:2 (June, 1996), p. 331.
[569] As early as 1863, French newspapers were commenting on Japan's silk; *Le Petit Journal*, 14 September 1863, p. 2.
[570] D. Ma, 'The Modern Silk Road', p. 332.
[571] K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, pp. 286-287.
[572] Parliamentary Papers, Further Paper respecting Silk Culture in Japan, 1870; Parliamentary Papers, Further Report from Mr. Adams, Secretary to Her Majesty's Legation in Japan, on Silk Culture in Japan, 1870.
[573] See A. J. H. Latham & H. Kawakatsu, eds., *Japanese Industrialisation, and the Asian Economy* (London, Routledge, 1994).
[574] TNA, FO 46/153/10, Watson to Granville, 31 May 1872.

significant demands. Watson understood the benefits that access to Japan's interior could bring, but also knew the dangers of Japan taking advantage of such bilateral talks to steadily erode extraterritoriality.[575] Watson kept tabs on the talks throughout and eventually, in concert with other powers, highjacked Italian-Japanese talks with broader multilateral discussions after the Italians updated them on what they had tentatively agreed too. By July 1872, the Italians had gained permits for their silk merchants to travel inland which led to Britain and Germany to invoke the most favoured nation clauses from their own treaties (with France and the United States later obtaining their own permits).[576] The aim here was to either halt proceedings as they were or alter them so that whatever the Italian's might have gained alone was now universal with the caveat that extraterritorialities integrity was safely protected.[577] Subsequently all talks, when Watson was in charge, were completely multilateral. No official bilateral discussions or side deals were made and Japan eventually granted foreigners the right to travel across Japan (with strict conditions) without any weakening of extraterritoriality via a passport system in 1874.[578] Thanks to Watson's attentiveness, his chief, Parkes, was able to return and seamlessly begin pressuring the Japanese for wider, universal access to the interior.[579] It would be discussions like this, protecting extraterritoriality, fearing any bilateral movement with Japan that would make up much of Anglo-Japanese relations well into the 1890s, when Britain finally agreed to negotiate an end to the unequal treaties.[580] Whilst Japan may have been somewhat 'less' violent and 'more' stable to deal with for Watson, the complications that treaty port relations had brought did not allow him any diplomatic respite.

---

[575] TNA, FO 46/165/33, Watson to Granville, 10 February 1872.
[576] It also helped that Italo-Japanese talks on silk trade was basically an open secret across the treaty ports and the wider treaty port press. In 1869 the Italians even launched an expedition into Japan's interior to ascertain the quality of Japanese silk; *The Hiogo & Osaka Herald*, 14 August 1869, p. 254.
[577] TNA, FO 46/165/52, Watson to Granville, 22 February 1872.
[578] TNA, FO 46/166/63, Watson to Granville, 7 March 1873; TNA, FO 46/166/73, Watson to Granville, 10 March 1873; TNA, FO 46/166/74, Watson to Granville, 11 March 1873; TNA, FO 262/255/140, Parkes to Granville, 3 August 1874; It was agreed that Foreigners could only travel inland for health, academic, scientific, or tourist reasons, and not for trade. Much to the chagrin of Parkes and the other Foreign Representatives.
[579] It helped that Parkes was coordinating back in Britain with the Iwakura Mission and the Foreign Office.
[580] See I. Nish, 'Japan Reverses the Unequal Treaties: The Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894', *Journal of Oriental Studies*, 13:2 (1975), pp. 137–146.

4.3. Conclusions:

Like Neale and Winchester before him, Watson had to deal with the uniqueness and peculiarities of treaty port diplomacy in Japan. However, the addition of more treaty port nations and a larger foreign community combined to form a complex web of frustratingly problematic relations where multiple powers often had to be satisfied for many bilateral networks, like Anglo-Japanese relations, to move forward unabated. Watson had to navigate this and, in my eyes, performed quite successfully despite the many diplomatic footfalls he faced. His background, not only his military one, but his diplomatic background in Persia and South America, all developing nations with foreign countries competing for influence, adequately prepared him for Japan. From a professional standpoint he never gave Lord Granville cause for concern and although Granville was certainly happy to defer to his diplomats in many parts of the world, he was by no means a lax or uninformed Foreign Secretary. He would have expected his trusting approach towards 'experts' on the ground to handle British interests and garner either continuity or dividends for Britain, and Watson certainly did well in that department. He took a significant risk with the *Maria Luz*, but it was a risk that thankfully panned out. Furthermore, his boss, Parkes, despite one official spat around the creation of what is now the British Embassy in Tokyo, kept a very professional opinion of Watson and made no comment against his person. Parkes was closed when it came to his personal opinions about many things, but when it came to his professional opinion, as R. Morton has stated, if something or someone was to the detriment of his job or Britain, he would certainly have made it known to the Foreign Office privately.[581] Despite dining together in June 1872, Watson is not mentioned by Satow in his diaries. Satow was then on one of his many travels around central and southern Japan (for much of Watson's tenure), so they probably did not interact much.[582] It would seem that colleagues did not think ill of his tenure in charge overall. Watson's future after Japan is another testament to his handling of Anglo-Japanese relations. He went on to serve in Denmark, America, Portugal, and Sweden. These nations were all of a higher standing in the diplomatic service than a posting in Japan. Watson's time in Japan was an important stepping stone for his overall career. Japan propelled him on an upward trajectory that never let up until his retirement. Whilst the *Maria*

[581] The Japan Society, Online Book Launch for *A Life of Sir Harry Parkes* by R. Morton <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5VWeeNANEE> [Accessed 14 November 2020].
[582] I. Ruxton, *A Diplomat in Japan Part II: The Diaries of Ernest Satow, 1870-1883* (Morrisville, Lulu Press, 2009), p. 57 & pp. 56-98.

Luz was a substantial gamble, it paid off, and in addition to his other tasks, Watson's overall contribution to the positive development of Anglo-Japanese relations cannot be seriously faulted.

5. Ralph Spencer Paget: Useless, Unfortunate, or Indispensable?

5.1. Paget's background:

Ralph Paget's diplomatic career was unlike any of the Chargés d'Affaires before him. He came from a family that had been part of the British aristocracy for hundreds of years.[583] In the nineteenth century alone, Paget had a great uncle who commanded the cavalry at Waterloo, another uncle who was a distinguished naval officer and politician during the mid-nineteenth century, a father who was a diplomat (Secretary of the Legation in Greece, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Prussia, Minister to Saxony, Denmark, Portugal, Minister/Ambassador to Italy, and Ambassador to Austria-Hungary) and member of Queen Victoria's Privy Council, and a grandfather who was a diplomat as well (Secretary of the Legation in Prussia, envoy to Bavaria, and Minister to the Two Sicilies, and the Austrian Empire).[584] Born on 26 November 1864, Paget attended Eton College from 1877 to 1882.[585] His childhood was rich thanks to his family's aristocratic connections and wealth. Paget spent time all over Europe, from Scotland to Italy.[586] He was well versed in European languages, winning the Prince Consort's Award for German whilst at Eton, and later studied abroad. He probably studied Oriental Philology seeing as he was later described as being a Turkish and Arabic Scholar.[587] Given his family background, education, and affinity for languages, it is not surprising that he ended up following the diplomatic path. He was twenty-four when he was nominated as an attaché in Vienna (April 1888) under the watchful eye of his own father who was Ambassador.[588] In 1889 he was posted to Egypt where he served under Sir Evelyn

[583] An Anglo-Welsh Family. They are all descendants of William Paget, 1st Baron Paget (1506-1563), who served under Henry VIII, Edward IV, and Mary I. In the eighteenth century the Paget family was elevated further after being granted the Marquess of Anglesey by George III. It is a title they still hold today; the current holder carried the standard of Wales at the 2023 Coronation.
[584] C. Mackie, *A Directory of British Diplomats*, pp. 379-380.
[585] Č. Antić, *Ralph Paget: A Diplomat in Serbia*, p. 17.
[586] See W. Paget, *Scenes and Memoirs*.
[587] *The Eton Register, Part IV, 1871-1880: Compiled for the Old Etonian Association* (Eton, Spottiswoode & Co., 1907), p. 140; *The Times*, 15 August 1913, p. 6.
[588] *The Times*, 13 May 1940, p. 9.

Baring, Consul-General, where it is implied that he learned a great deal about administration. Paget was also granted an extra allowance for his knowledge of Arabic in June 1890 and later promoted from an attaché to a Third Secretary in July 1890.[589]

A year later he was temporarily posted to the then new British protectorate of Zanzibar in 1891 where he helped promote the "…first beginnings of European Civilisation in the East of Africa."[590] A harmless and complimentary statement then perhaps, but now brings deep concern over what 'civilisation' exactly entailed. He then had a brief stay in Washington D.C. from June 1892. However, by June 1893, he found himself in Tokyo as Third Secretary of the Legation.[591] To have gotten this far within the Diplomatic Service as only Third Secretary is, in part, a testament to his diplomatic background and trust in his skills. However, it does appear like some aristocratic nepotism granted him several advantages over his peers in terms of postings.[592] His posting to Japan was helped by Japan's increased diplomatic importance, but also because the 'East' remained difficult to staff due to its distance and climate (causing illness).[593] Paget was forced into the limelight after the death Hugh Fraser in June 1894.[594] Fraser had succeeded Sir Francis Richard Plunkett (1884-1887) as Minister Plenipotentiary and was well liked by the Japanese. He had helped a great deal during negotiations over the repealing of Britain's unequal treaty with Japan.[595] Whilst his death did not impact that stage of Anglo-Japanese relations, it certainly occurred at an inopportune time. Sino-Japanese relations had been deteriorating fast; the First Sino-Japanese War was on the horizon.[596] Furthermore, John Harrington Gubbins, the Japanese Secretary, and Paget's diplomatic senior, was back in London working on treaty revision.[597] Thus, Paget was left to steady the diplomatic ship whilst a successor to Fraser travelled to Japan (the 'tyranny of distance' in

---

[589] E. Hertslet, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1895, forming a Complete British Diplomatic and Consular Handbook* (London, Harrison & Sons, 1895), p. 175; *The Times*, 13 May 1940, p. 9; *London Gazette*, 27 January 1891, p. 479.
[590] *The Times*, 13 May 1940, p. 9.
[591] *The Times*, 13 May 1940, p. 9; During this time, he also inherited £30,000 and large estates from a family friend in Florence, Italy; *The Illustrated London News*, 16 April 1892, p. 500.
[592] It certainly helps when your family were friends with much of Europe's aristocracy and the British Royal Family in particular, from Queen Victoria to the Prince and Princess of Wales; See W. Paget, *Scenes and Memoirs*.
[593] Though still not as bad as China and Southeast Asia.
[594] TNA, FO 46/435/59, Paget to Kimberley, 9 June 1894.
[595] See H. Cortazzi, 'Hugh Fraser, Minister to Japan, 1889-1894', in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004), pp. 63-71.
[596] See S. C. M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War*.
[597] See I. Nish, 'John Harrington Gubbins, 1852-1929' in I. Nish, eds., *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits,* Volume *2* (Richmond, Japan Library, 1997), pp. 107-119.

action again). Despite the surprising circumstances that led to his brief time in charge, Paget contributed stability and a semblance of continuity to British relations with Japan at a time when diplomacy was starting to fail in some quarters.

5.2. The Foreign Office and British Government in 1894:

Paget took control during the interim from June to August 1894 as Chargé d'Affaires.[598] An incredibly short time in charge, but a critical juncture in Anglo-Japanese relations for a Sino-Japanese War had the potential to shift/damage the frail status-quo established between the regional powers. Before we can discuss Paget's tenure, two things need to be understood. Firstly, the context surrounding British foreign policy in the 1890s and the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Kimberley, and subsequently, the current historical opinions about Paget and his short tenure. Historian, T. G. Otte, states that Kimberley is a British politician that has fallen into obscurity.[599] Kimberley, whilst present in every Liberal government from 1852 to 1895, is certainly not high on the list of well-known Victorian politicians. He was a competent 'manager of diplomacy' and, like Granville, preferred to defer to experienced diplomats.[600] Future Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, who was then Parliamentary Under-Secretary to Kimberley at the Foreign Office, described Kimberley as deeply knowledgeable and that he was:

> …concise, definite, and clear… He was devoted to the work of his office, absolutely free of all egotism in transacting it, a chief who would trust and never throw over or let down a subordinate.[601]

Kimberley's understanding of foreign policy was much the same as it had been for decades; to avoid unnecessary entanglements and maintain a balance among the Great Powers.[602] His most important task whilst Foreign Secretary (1894-1895) was dealing with the First Sino-Japanese War. The war and its outcomes are not important here, but Kimberley's perceptions

[598] TNA, FO 46/435/59, Paget to Kimberley, 9 June 1894.
[599] T. G. Otte, 'Earl of Kimberley (1826-1902) and Japan', in H. Cortazzi, eds., *Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume 10* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2016), pp. 208-209.
[600] T. G. Otte, 'Earl of Kimberley', p. 210.
[601] E. Grey, *Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916* (New York, Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), pp. 17-18.
[602] T. G. Otte, 'Earl of Kimberley', p. 210.

of East Asia in the lead up to the conflict are. He viewed Asia like many of his contemporaries; seeing Japan as a surprising anomaly, but 'oriental' nonetheless.[603] British policy in East Asia revolved around China and the status-quo, but rising Sino-Japanese tensions threatened this. If China won, it might become more assertive towards other foreign powers. If Japan won, it would not only upset the region's balance of power, but provide the Russians with an opportunity and excuse to act.[604] Furthermore, the Liberal Government at the time was not exactly functional; torn by factions and an intense rivalry between the Prime Minister, Lord Rosebery and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir William Harcourt.[605] With such political infighting, Britain could ill-afford a foreign escapade. A terrible consequence of this was the initial muted British reaction to the Armenian Massacres in the mid-1890s. The leading Liberal politicians were only able to denounce the Ottomans and speak of action *after* they had been forced from office.[606] If the then British Government could not formulate a uniform policy towards that event, they surely could not conjure one for a Sino-Japanese War. Kimberley believed that he needed to either at best try to halt the rapid decline of relations between China and Japan, or at worst, if this failed, ensure that during the conflict British interests were unharmed. With hindsight we know that the initial intention of avoiding war was a futile effort, and with unilateral action out of the question, international cooperation was tabled. There was little appetite from other powers, like Russia and Germany, for that either however.[607] The only option left was to perform a damage limitation exercise and maintain Britain's interests. This is the context that the Foreign Office found itself in 1894-1895.

5.3. Opinions on Paget

It was in this light that Paget had to conduct diplomacy with the Japanese over the next few months. Now, in terms of the scholarship that surrounds Paget and his time in Japan in charge, there is disagreement regarding his performance. On the one hand we have the rather

---

[603] T. G. Otte, 'Earl of Kimberley', p. 210.
[604] See A. Skřivan, Sr & A. Skřivan, Jr, 'Great Powers and the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895', *Prague Papers on the History of International Relations*, 2 (2015), pp. 16-44.
[605] D. Leonard, *Nineteenth-Century British Premiers: Pitt to Rosebery* (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 333-336.
[606] M. S. Haniamp, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 61-62.
[607] See G. Martel, *Imperial Diplomacy: Rosebery and the Failure of Foreign Policy* (Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986).

lukewarm and dismissive opinion of H. Chi Man who states that Paget was only a junior diplomat who could achieve little to stop Japan from going to war.[608] While perhaps a true statement, it forgets that by the time Paget was in charge, 'stopping Japan' was effectively a fool's errand anyway. If the Foreign Office had failed to drum up any support for such an effort, then what was Paget expected to possibly achieve in a few months after being saddled with command because of his chief's untimely death? Paget opted for the more achievable, and in my opinion, correct goal of gaining Japan's confidence and assurances that British interests and possessions in China would be secure (with subsequent approval from the Foreign Office and cooperation from his opposing number in China). This fits the more positive line that Historian Č. Antić takes who describes a diplomat that successfully shouldered responsibilities well above his station in the absence of experienced superiors (something he would repeat again a few months later, though not as Chargé d'Affaires on that occasion).[609]

5.4. Paget in Charge:

Paget had the unenviable task of trying to salvage some sort of diplomatic reprieve from a quickly deteriorating situation in East Asia. His first task was to confirm the state of relations to Kimberley and await instructions on how to progress. Given that one of his earliest reports was on the Japanese dispatch of troops to Korea to 'safeguard' Japanese interests during the Donhak Peasant Rebellion (but really in response to the Chinese), this task was made easier.[610] With various Korean elements involved, Chinese troops being sent at the behest of the Korean (Joeson) State, and the spectre of Russian interests in the Korean peninsula ever-present, it is not hard to see why Paget watched and reported developments so closely.[611] He is keen to point out the escalation of Japan's involvement and that the sheer number of unknowns, hearsay and rumours about the ongoing situation in Korea leave Britain with little room to manoeuvre. He also communicates that the involvement of Japanese troops proved incredibly popular amongst the Japanese populace and that to remove them or deescalate

[608] H. Chi Man, '"They are a Little Afraid of the British Admiral" The China Squadron of the Royal Navy during the First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895', p. 98.
[609] Č. Antić, *Ralph Paget: A Diplomat in Serbia*, p. 17.
[610] A. Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 25-26.
[611] TNA, FO 46/435/63, Paget to Kimberley, 11 June 1894.

Japan's involvement was now politically unpalatable.[612] Paget does well to summarise what was happening to a Foreign Secretary unfamiliar with the region.

Japan and China soon began discussing the future of Korea, but it was clear that Japan would not settle for less than it demanded. Whilst the Japanese were keen to emphasise that they had absolutely no interest in harming the independence of Korea, reminding Paget that it was their prime interest just as much it was for China, and that any direct control over Korea would in fact be an 'encumbrance' to Japan, they also stated that the current proposals (from China) as being ideas they of course 'naturally' reject however.[613] If their respective positions were so similar, Korea's safeguarding, then how come the proposals between China and Japan turned out so different? Whilst we have hindsight to play with here, and I do believe the Japanese at this stage that annexation was not their prime concern (in the immediate short-term at least), they were certainly interested in controlling Korean affairs more than at present; desiring preferential or equal control, access and influence across the peninsula. This desire becomes plainer when the Japanese offer up, in my eyes, over the top assurances of avoiding 'complications' with China. A promise that given the circumstances and their refusal to dilute their proposals and/or withdraw troops they most certainly could not keep.[614] They even pressed upon Paget to encourage British diplomats in Peking to repeat Japan's position as a basis for negotiation. Again, if both parties desired some form of Korean independence (though both also desired either extending or maintain their control of Korea too), then why would Japan want its position emphasised if it was seemingly so similar to that of China's already?[615] Paget does seem ignorant to these facts at this stage, but then it was never his place to comment on anything like this before. Paget seems open to Japan's overtures simply because it could mean a pathway to an amicable solution that would be both popular and useful to the Foreign Office. However, in the context of competence and the two aforementioned opinions, I can understand how this could be interpreted as a minor diplomat being taken advantage of and simply becoming a diplomatic echo chamber for the Japanese.

---

[612] TNA, FO 46/435/64, Paget to Kimberley, 21 June 1894.
[613] TNA, FO 46/435/67, Paget to Kimberley, 29 June 1894.
[614] TNA, FO 46/435/67, Paget to Kimberley, 29 June 1894; *London Gazette*, 22 April 1892, p. 2360; For his services as dual Minister to both China and Korea he was 'promoted' and made Ambassador to Russia, and awarded a KCMG: Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (An upgrade from being a Companion/Third Grade); *London Gazette*, 11 June 1895, p. 3315; *Edinburgh Gazette*, 19 November 1895, p. 1457.
[615] TNA, FO 46/435/67, Paget to Kimberley, 29 June 1894.

Paget received tacit approval from the Foreign Office however, with the Minister at Peking, Sir Nicholas Roderick O'Conor (1892-1895), soon following through (it helped that O'Conor was also the Minister responsible for Korea simultaneously).[616] Again, I do not consider this as an instance of young inexperience on Paget's part, but more a sign of prudent diplomacy. For the involvement of the British in this way did have a positive effect. Alongside British inclusion came information. Most information before this was based off rumour, outside information from the Japanese (who were obviously less than happy to talk about their true intentions) and other diplomats, such as British consuls or even information from other foreign dignitaries (like the Russian Minister to Japan) who could often gather little current or reliable intelligence.[617] Now, Paget and others could provide Kimberley with a better idea of what was happening. To summarise, Paget hoped that China and Japan could come to a 'good agreement', but thanks to O'Conor's inclusion he now (and by extension Kimberley) knew why, despite Japan's statements to the contrary, China and Japan actually had differing positions on Korea. O'Conor informed Paget of the state of play in China, noting that certain language was best avoided, like that of 'suzerainty' for example. The fear was, rightly so, that the ideas of Chinese 'suzerainty' over a dependent Korea and Japanese 'influence' over an independent Korea were not reconcilable positions and this was communicated by Paget to the Japanese.[618] In fact problems to that affect occurred anyway, making this point that much clearer to the British that China and Japan were becoming increasingly irreconcilable. A misunderstanding happened whereby the Japanese thought that Paget had stated, outright, that full Korean independence was acceptable to China as a basis for negotiation. Paget states, with a witness, the acting Japanese Secretary Alfred Wileman, and technically the backing of O'Conor, that he did not inform the Japanese of this and in fact took great pains to inform them of the dangers involved if they did not deviate from this position.[619] The Japanese repeated their assurances that they would do everything they possibly could to avoid conflict with China; that they had 'no hostile intentions' (something that Kimberley has humorously underlined and put a large question mark next too, clearly unimpressed by such assurances).[620] Paget did well to cooperate with British diplomatic colleagues abroad and

---

[616] TNA, FO 46/436/68, Paget to Kimberley, 8 July 1894; E. Hertslet, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1895*, pp. 172-173.
[617] TNA, FO 46/436/68, Paget to Kimberley, 8 July 1894.
[618] TNA, FO 46/436/68, Paget to Kimberley, 8 July 1894.
[619] TNA, FO 46/436/68, Paget to Kimberley, 8 July 1894; Alfred Ernest Wileman (1860-1929) was a British interpreter in Japan, consul across Japan and Formosa, and finally Consul-General of the Philippines; E. Hertslet, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1895*, p. 223.
[620] TNA, FO 46/436/68, Paget to Kimberley, 8 July 1894.

acted quickly to avoid a potential misunderstanding with the Japanese that could have had dire consequences. Here, Paget appears calm and competent as opposed to a junior diplomat in way over his head.

Paget goes on to recall his discussions with the Japanese, O'Conor, and the Russian Minister to Japan. The story he depicts is one of increasing doubt over Japanese intentions, but continued professionalism in maintaining his support for advising Japan on how to best go about discussions with China that would avoid unnecessary obstructions to peace.[621] In my view Paget now realised that there was not much he could achieve in regards to convincing the Japanese to 'alter' their negotiating position that could lead to peace. Something that only becomes clearer when the Japanese inform him of their more recent demands to the Chinese. Paget instantly responded and explains how some of these demands would be completely unacceptable.[622] Now, again, this might be seen as part and parcel of him being an inexperienced diplomat that 'failed' to dissuade or adequately influence the Japanese. I instead see a diplomat simply acting as he thought he should, pursuing diplomacy within his purview, and being completely aware of when that same diplomacy became exhausted. Further discussions were presented with hiccups, talks of secret understandings between Japan and Russia, and renewed demands from Japan to Korea after being left unimpressed by Chinese proposals.[623] This was a situation that instead of becoming slowly diffused was rapidly escalating. Paget ultimately gave up on trying to influence the Japanese and started sounding warnings about what war would mean for Japan if any more 'unreasonable demands' or 'hasty action' was taken.[624] Given the precarious position of the then Liberal British Government, such considerations from Paget would have been leapt on by Kimberly. It is therefore unsurprising that Kimberley subsequently instructed Paget to begin talking to the Japanese about safeguarding British interests in East Asia instead, mainly in regards to Shanghai, but also Hong Kong and other places in wider East Asia.[625] Paget, despite his

[621] TNA, FO 46/436/68, Paget to Kimberley, 8 July 1894.
[622] TNA, FO 46/436/68, Paget to Kimberley, 8 July 1894.
[623] TNA, FO 46/436/68, Paget to Kimberley, 8 July 1894; TNA, FO 46/435/70, Paget to Kimberley, 10 July 1894; TNA, FO 46/435/72, Paget to Kimberley, 15 July 1894; TNA, FO 46/435/73, Paget to Kimberley, 16 July 1894.
[624] TNA, FO 46/435/77, Paget to Kimberley, 24 July 1894.
[625] TNA, FO 46/435/78, Paget to Kimberley, 25 July 1894; This reorientation proved highly pertinent after the garbled *Kowshing* incident. Several Japanese warships fired upon a British merchant ship temporarily chartered by the Chinese. After being forced to follow a Japanese warship the Chinese soldiers aboard mutinied and wished to return to China. After seeing no other choice, the British seamen took their chance to jump overboard when they could, but many were shot by the Chinese

youth and limited experience, had correctly determined what the best course of action was for British foreign policy before the Foreign Office did, saving valuable time and effort.

5.5. Conclusions:

The pessimist would see this change as an example of failure and inexperience, but I see it in a completely different light. Paget had pre-empted the Foreign Secretary, which is not exactly a sign of diplomatic failure in any respect. Paget attempted to influence the Japanese Government and when it became plain how near impossible this was, he altered course to not only something else, but something much more achievable given his position. How could he be expected to successfully influence the Japanese whilst being a junior diplomat with little high-level diplomatic experience? It was his mission to try, yes, but to expect anymore or criticise him for eventually failing that is unfair. The best support for this argument is that Kimberley approves Paget's reports and later instructs him to change tactics fully anyway. Kimberley acknowledged Paget's efforts; if he did not then he easily could have instructed a more experienced consular official in Japan or diplomat from nearby China to take over. Yes, there were some time and travel constraints, but if Paget was perceived to be acting so badly as an interim diplomat it was not outside the realm of possibility that Kimberley could have replaced him in some short-term fashion (they would not have had the foresight to know how quickly war came about). The fact that he did not and was actually promoted after this short stint as Chargé d'Affaires to Second Secretary, in my view, speaks volumes.[626] Furthermore, when Fraser's successor, Power Henry Le Poer Trench, who despite only just arriving to post was forced to return to Britain with an illness, Paget availed himself again, as the First Secretary, Gerard Lowther, the new Chargé d'Affaires, was not thought to carry much influence among the Japanese and so relied on Paget and others for advice.[627] Paget spent most of his career in Japan working under the eminent Satow, where he appears much used

---

before being rescued by the Japanese warships. The Japanese then fired on the *Kowshing*, thus the technicality of firing on a British ship. Thankfully, the incident diffused as quickly as it came about, but this was too late for those that had sadly already perished; See D. Howland, 'The Sinking of S. S. Kowshing: International Law, Diplomacy, and the Sino-Japanese War', *Modern Asian Studies*, 42:4 (July 2008), pp. 673-703.

[626] *The Times*, 15 August 1913, p. 6.

[627] Č. Antić, *Ralph Paget: A Diplomat in Serbia*, p. 17; N. Brailey, 'Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trials of a Diplomat in the Age of High Imperialism', *The Historical Journal*, 35:1 (March 1992), pp. 127-128; I. Ruxton, 'Sir Ernest Satow, Minister in Japan, 1895-1900', in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004), p. 79.

and appreciated by staff and visitors alike.[628] Such promotions and reliance do not come from nowhere. Overall, I feel that Paget was not some useless, young, out of his depth diplomat who failed to do what was expected of him. Paget availed himself well under difficult circumstances. He was pragmatic enough to know when it was in Britain's best interest to shift position. The support of Kimberley and subsequent actions in Japan only add to the idea that Paget acted well during his time as Chargé d'Affaires. For Paget it was a positive step in what would be a long and distinguished career, reflective of both his talents and diplomatic pedigree.

6. Conclusion:

Overall, through Neale, Winchester, Watson, and Paget, we have witnessed a wide cross-section of what the role of a Chargé d'Affaires entailed in nineteenth century Japan. The role went far beyond the official definition of a simple cover diplomat. It involved immense risk, pressures, and responsibilities. The Chargé d'Affaires allowed Britain to pursue diplomacy with Japan in an unbroken way; relations could be promoted consistently without any pause, negation, or weakness. A significant advantage for Britain in Japan during this period. Through Neale we have the prime exception: a well-known Chargé d'Affaires. He was involved with one of the most threatening foreign escapades on Japanese soil and enjoyed an extended stay in charge. His temper sometimes landed him in hot water, but his overall composure successfully salvaged Anglo-Japanese relations from the doldrums. With Winchester we have a truly forgotten diplomat, who as Satow even admits, was more important to Anglo-Japanese relations in the mid-1860s than remembered.[629] Winchester carved a path through the quagmire of a deteriorating Bakufu, without constraining Britain's diplomatic options in the long-term. It was truly a pivotal time and because of Winchester's actions, Britain would remain the paramount power Japan looked too, even after the Shogunate disintegrated. Watson was a man whose diplomatic career was never a certainty. From Scotland to the Indian Army, across the Levant and South America, he made the most of the opportunities in front of him. In Japan he took risks, but calculated risks that paid off.

---

[628] See I. Ruxton, *The Correspondence of Sir Ernest Satow while he was British Minister in Japan (1895-1900) from the Satow Papers held at The National Archives, Kew, Vol. I-IV* (Independently Published, 2020).

[629] Specifically, Winchester's ideas and initial negotiations over the Shimonoseki Indemnity (which Satow admits he was not aware of at the time); E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 142-143.

Through Watson the Foreign Office gained the perfect secondary diplomat who espoused British (Victorian) values and stuck to British foreign policy no matter where it led him.

Paget was a Chargé d'Affaires, but only a Third Secretary, with not a lot of experience in East Asia. Winchester was similarly thrown in at the deep end, but he was a highly experienced consul whose entire career had been situated in the Far East. Paget performed well given the circumstances and was able to help ensure British interests went reasonably unscathed as a result. All were successful and competent diplomats in their respective eras and all were promoted post-Japan. For these individuals Japan ended up being a stepping stone towards more important posts. Be it in China, the America's or back in Europe. They all successfully allowed Anglo-Japanese relations to remain positive and amicable at times when relations could easily have become frayed or worse. The positive additions these individuals made to Anglo-Japanese relations overall cannot be ignored any longer. The Chargés d'Affaires were not simply cover diplomats espousing their predecessors' diplomatic ideals or the incumbent's philosophy. They all had their own agency, their own talents, their own faults, and crucially their own ideas of how Anglo-Japanese diplomacy should be pursued. What this illustrates is that Chargés d'Affaires were of a comparable diplomatic level to their chiefs, despite often coming from 'lesser' diplomatic or even consular backgrounds. A Chargé d'Affaires could handle the same stresses and difficulties that their superiors could, which Britain was a vital resource to draw upon. They are undeserving of being largely ignored and forgotten in the wider Anglo-Japanese scholarship of the nineteenth century. These four Chargés d'Affaires display how even 'lesser' diplomats can heavily affect and impact diplomacy in ways both surprising and familiar.

4. Space and Place in Geography and Diplomacy in Anglo-Japanese Relations:

1. Introduction:

If we are to better understand the many actors who undertook diplomacy, we must expand our methodological outlook and consider other approaches far removed from normal diplomatic historical study. Diplomacy finds itself being subject to many varying factors, like geography for example. However, Geographer Fiona McConnell has stated that "…a distinct historical geography approach to the study of diplomacy has yet to emerge."[630] I seek to rectify this and show how the 'where' impacted how actors undertook British diplomacy in Japan. I will use what was probably the most important feature in Anglo-Japanese diplomacy, the ship, to show how geography heavily influenced the development of British and Japanese relations in Japan. Through the medium of the Royal Navy ship, tense negotiations, formal meetings, and accidental encounters frequently took place.[631] In this way the ship became a critical site for developing Anglo-Japanese relations for successive British diplomats. In order to understand this development more clearly however, I will be utilising the methodology of space and place.[632] For this chapter place and space will be used to analyse how the ship progressively became more diplomatic over time; it will show how the ship diplomatically affected places it inhabited and how diplomatic spaces formed aboard. In an academic setting, place concerns the overall makeup of the locations we are discussing; their physical landscape and geographical identity, which can be natural or unnatural. So, for ships in the context of place we would be discussing the littoral landscape it finds itself in. With space we refer to the ship's specific characteristics that might influence diplomatic dealings. These things are usually manmade and unnatural. So, again, for ships, we can consider their class, function, mission, and crew. I understand the ship as an encompassing space that includes

[630] F. McConnell, 'Rethinking the Geographies of Diplomacy', pp. 47-49.
[631] Note, I will follow the recent convention in not gendering ships as female despite the traditional and romanticist background of doing such. The gendering of ships is not relevant or appropriate in an academic text. The only exception(s) will be from nineteenth century contemporaries and their writings.
[632] I developed my own interpretation of these terms from my wider reading on geography and diplomacy. For more in-depth information on how these terms are used elsewhere in diplomatic history; See N. Shimazu, 'Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955', pp. 225–252; N. Shimazu, 'Places in Diplomacy', pp. 335–336.

everyone and everything within it.[633] Through the use of the twin concepts of space and place I will show how diplomatic actors transformed the ship from a military backer of diplomacy to a complex mobile legation that could easily position itself wherever needed.

The ship is somewhat misunderstood and overlooked in historical study overall. Their status as objects means that their perception has often been limited to a method of transportation that connects point A with point B.[634] M. Foucault suggested that the ship be seen only as "…a floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself…"[635] Effectively nowhere, with even the passage between points A and B being a useless watery expanse, completely absent of both interest and history.[636] In fact, very little of the ship has gone beyond its effective use as a transporter methodologically speaking, with only the outdated view of the ship being another Western way of diffusing civilisation to the rest of the world.[637] Such views appear rather symptomatic of how the ship's larger role in history has been somewhat simplified overall. Some recent ground in addressing the ship (and the waters it traverses) has been made by geographers and historians alike however.[638] Furthermore, by refocusing on various bodies of water, academics within the recently formed 'Blue Humanities' movement have begun to reconsider the ship's importance to our past, present,

[633] For example, if we consider a ship docked in port. The port and the surrounding landscape would be under the umbrella of place. The ship itself and everything within would be under the concept of space.
[634] M. Foucault & J. Miskowiec, 'Of Other Spaces', *Diacritics*, 16:1 (Spring 1986), pp. 23-24.
[635] M. Foucault & J. Miskowiec, 'Of Other Spaces', p. 27.
[636] See M. Dusinberre, *Mooring the Global Archive: A Japanese Ship and its Migrant Histories* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2023), pp. 43-44.
[637] G. Basalla, 'The Spread of Western Science', *Science*, 156:3775 (May 1967), p. 620; See M. Dusinberre, *Mooring the Global Archive*, p. 13.
[638] See J. Pugh, 'The Relational Turn in Island Geographies: Bringing Together Island, Sea and Ship Relations and the case of landship', *Social & Cultural Geography*, 17:8 (2016), pp. 1040-1059; See W. Hasty & K. Peters, 'The Ship in Geography and the Geographies of Ships', *Geography Compass*, 6:11 (2012), pp. 660-676; See A. Anim-Addo, W. Hasty & K. Peters, 'The Mobilities of Ships and Shipped Mobilities', *Mobilities*, 9:3 (2014), pp. 337-349; See J. Anderson & K. Peters, eds., *Water Worlds: Human Geographies in the Ocean* (Farnham, Ashgate, 2014); See P. E. Steinberg, 'Of Other Seas: Metaphors and Materialises in Maritime Regions', *Atlantic Studies*, 10:2 (2013), pp. 156-169; See P. E. Steinberg, 'Navigating to Multiple Horizons: Toward a Geography of Open Space', *The Professional Geographer*, 51:3 (1999), pp. 366-375; See W. Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom* (London, Belknap Press, 2013); See H. Blum, 'The Prospect of Oriental Studies', *PMLA*, 125:3 (May 2010), pp. 670-677; See W. Jeffery Bolster, 'Opportunities in the Marine Environmental History', *Environmental History*, 11:3 (July 2006), pp. 567-597; See P. Lindbaugh & M. Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston, Beacon Press, 2000); See E. Jones, 'Space, Sound, and Sedition on the Royal Navy Ship, 1756-1815', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 70 (2020), pp. 65-73; See D. Lambert, L. Martins & M. Ogborn, 'Currents, Visions, and Voyages: Historical Geographies of the Sea', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 32 (2006), pp. 479-493.

and future.[639] Leading 'Blue Humanities' scholar, S. Mentz, admits however that its first focus is on water and humanity's direct relationship with it, with ideas about the ship and its use remaining out of frame as academics currently seek to understand the overall scope of the 'Blue Humanities'.[640] Additionally, as M. Dusinberre and R. Wenzlhuemer explain, various academics also still tend to see the ship as only an object moving through an environment, instead of considering the possibility that they are historical environments too.[641] Dusinberre and Wenzlhuemer suggest approaching the ship through the idea of transit, and how this then fits with ideas around connections and mobility.[642] Transit, mobility, and connections ask questions of where the ship is going, why is it going, and what is it carrying. These might seem rather self-explanatory but these questions are simply not asked enough when it comes to the ship, especially when the oceans, seas and rivers that they navigate seem so much larger and important. Recently, the Blue Humanities has made great efforts to reassert the ship's rightful maritime status, an oceanic aspect worthy of greater study, but compared to other mobile inventions like the train, plane, and car, this work is still incomplete.[643] Unlike the ship, the train, plane, and car are mobile inventions that have had considerably more study by comparison.[644] I would argue that outside of (naval) warfare, piracy, shipwrecks, shipping,

---

[639] See P. E. Steinberg, *The Social Construction of the Ocean* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001); See S. Liebich & L. Publicover, eds., *Shipboard Literary Cultures: Reading, Writing, and Performing at Sea* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2021); See S. Mentz, 'Ice/Water/Vapor', in J. J. Cohen & S. Foote, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Environmental Humanities* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. 185-198; See E. Probyn, K. Johnston & N. Lee, eds., *Sustaining Seas: Oceanic Space and the Politics of Care* (London, Rowman & Littlefield, 2020); See I. Braverman, eds., *Laws of the Sea: Interdisciplinary Currents* (London, Routledge, 2023); See C. Rouliè & C. Egerer, *Water Law: Practice, Place, and Poetics* (London, Routledge, 2022); See L. Attala, *How Water Makes Us Human: Engagements with the Materiality of Water* (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2019); See H. M. Rozwadowski, *Vast Expanses: A History of the Oceans* (London, Reaktion Books Ltd, 2018); See S. Mentz, eds., *An Introduction to the Blue Humanities* (London, Routledge, 2024).

[640] I would like to thank S. Mentz for making the time to talk to me about the Blue Humanities and his very honest (and helpful) admittance that the ship (understandably) remains secondary for the time being in most oceanic studies.

[641] M. Dusinberre & R. Wenzlhuemer, 'Editorial – Being in Transit: Ships and Global Incompatibilities', *Journal of Global History*, 11:2 (2016), p. 156.

[642] M. Dusinberre & R. Wenzlhuemer, 'Editorial – Being in Transit', pp. 158-162.

[643] See C. Jowitt, C. Lambert & S. Mentz, eds., *The Routledge Companion to Marine and Maritime Worlds, 1400-1800* (London, Routledge, 2020); See S. Mentz, *Ocean* (London, Bloomsbury Press, 2020).

[644] For example, see G. Verstraete, 'Railroading America: Towards a Material Study of the Nation', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 19:5/6 (2002), pp. 145-159; See J. C. T. Baker, 'Mobility, Tropicality and Landscape: the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway, 1881-1939', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 44 (2014), pp. 133-144; See J. Decker, 'Lines in the Sand: Railways and the Archipelago of Colonial Territorialisation in German Southwest Africa, 1897-1914', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 70 (2020), pp. 74-87; See P. Adey, 'Aeromobilities: Geographies, Subjects and Vision', *Geography*

and slavery, the more common and positive actions carried out by the ship like transits, trades and exchanges are less considered by comparison, especially in diplomatic terms.[645] To paraphrase S. Sivasundaram, A. Bashford, and D. Armitage, the former themes that the ship more popularly inhabits, also described as imperial, military, and national maritime historiography, ignore the complexity of how the ship mediates between humanity and the sea, or (more significantly for this chapter) how the ship acts as a site for working out power relations.[646] The 'ship in transit' was where historical actors experienced a plethora of tragedies and triumphs, and in the globalising nineteenth century its importance in power relations only intensified diplomatically. To relegate its role to just another considered part of a wider oceanic environment during this period of increasing fluidity would be a mistake. Therefore, I have understood the 'ship in transit' for this chapter as a focus on the Royal Navy ship's literal use and fluidity across early Anglo-Japanese relations. I will illustrate how the ship progressed away from a purely military vessel, to a conveyer of diplomats and enforcer of diplomacy, and finally into a mobile legation. Thanks to Sir Harry Parkes's realisation of the Royal Navy ship's diplomatic potential, the ship as a mobile legation would accelerate and improve British diplomacy across Japan in ways not otherwise possible.

1.1. Japan's Geography and the Treaty Ports:

The oceans surrounding the Japanese archipelago have always had a major impact on its historical development. From the nation's emergence as a multi-island state under Yamato rule, to the early nineteenth century under the Tokugawa Shogunate, the ocean acted as a maritime bulwark against foreign incursion.[647] Japan entered a self-imposed seclusion from

---

Compass, 2:5 (2008), pp. 1318-1336; See M. Sheller & J. Urry, 'The City and the Car', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*', 24:4 (December 2000), pp. 737-757; See P. Merriman, 'Automobility and the Geographies of the Car', *Geography Compass*, 3:2 (2009), pp. 586-599; See M. John Law, ''The Car Indispensable': the Hidden Influence of the Car in Inter-War Suburban London', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 38 (2012), pp. 424-433.

[645] For example, see M. Rediker, *The Slave Ship: A Human History* (London, John Murray Publishers, 2007); See D. Leggett & R. Dunn, eds., *Re-inventing the Ship: Science, Technology and the Maritime World, 1800-1918* (London, Routledge, 2016); See S. Mentz, *Shipwreck Modernity: Ecologies of Globalisation, 1550-1719* (London, University of Minnesota Press, 2015).

[646] S. Sivasundaram, A. Bashford & D. Armitage, *Oceanic Histories* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 11-12.

[647] M. W. Meyer, *Japan: A Concise History, Fourth Edition* (Plymouth, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), p. 53; See K. Henshall, *A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower, Third Edition* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

most, but not all, of the outside world in the 1600s, intensifying its isolation.[648] Japan still had some interest in the outside world however. D. Keene states that by the eighteenth-century no other non-Western state knew more about European civilisation. [649] Indeed, the Americans during Commodore Perry's mission to Japan were shocked at how specific some questions were. For example: "…what part [of the United States do you come from] Washington, New York, Boston? [*sic*]"[650] Japan's seclusion was a paradox in that firstly, for most of the seclusion period it was never a strict formal policy, and two, Japan still maintained (controlled) relationships with several nations, but it was 'official' policy and was mostly adhered to. By the early nineteenth century this policy became stricter in reaction to new interest from foreign powers. The sea may have been acted as a substantial barrier for a long time, but with Western expansion becoming more global, the sea was no longer an inhibitor of foreign influence, but now a great attracter of Westerners to Japanese shores. The first British breaking of Japan's oceanic bulwark occurred in 1808 when the HMS *Phaeton* entered Nagasaki Harbour looking for Dutch shipping to raid. The *Phaeton* sailed around the harbour unopposed, causing an immediate review of all Japanese coastal defences.[651] Western trade in East Asia was booming, yet access to Japan was limited to the Dutch who at this time were a Napoleonic puppet kingdom, hence the British interest in disrupting trade there.[652] Economic interest from the West around Japan's seas then came in the form of whaling. Once shore-based whaling had become unprofitable, or more accurately impossible due to overfishing, Western Whalers set their eyes further afield.[653] This interest was helped

[648] There were various formal and informal exceptions. Notably the Dutch and the Chinese at Nagasaki, various indigenous peoples in the far north of Japan (around Hokkaido) like the Ainu, and the Koreans at Tsushima; See R. L. Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640-1868* (London, Harvard University Press, 2009).
[649] D. Keene, *The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830* (London, Routledge, 2011), p. 81.
[650] *New York Daily Tribune*, 4 November 1853, p. 3.
[651] See P. E. Eckel, 'Challenges to Dutch Monopoly of Japanese Trade During the Wars of Napoleon', *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, 1:2 (1942), pp. 173-179; See N. Wilson, 'Tokugawa Defence Redux: Organisational Failure in the "Phaeton" Incident of 1808', *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 36:1 (2010), pp. 1-32; W. G. Aston, 'His Majesty's ship 'Phaeton' at Nagasaki' in the Asiatic Society of Japan, eds., *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan: Volume 7* (Yokohama, The Asiatic Society of Japan, 1879), pp. 329-344 Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu*, pp. 14-16.
[652] See A. Chulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2014).
[653] J. K. Arch, *Bringing Whales Ashore: Oceans and the Environment of Early Modern Japan* (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2018), p. 7; See B. C. Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do For Me: The American Whaleman in the Nineteenth Century* (Kentucky, University of Kentucky Press, 2009).

by the increasing prominence of trade with China and the growing number of accessible coaling ports in the region.[654]

British Whalers had some informal contact along the Japanese coastline during the 1820s, sparking even tougher anti-foreign measures by the ruling Tokugawa Government, but this had next to no impact on Western interest in Japan itself.[655] For example, in 1822 the (formerly HMS) *Saracen* anchored at Uraga for a very brief resupply during its travels in the Pacific.[656] By 1820, American Whalers had discovered how plentiful Japanese waters were for whaling; including nearby areas like Kamchatka in 1843 and the Okhotsk Sea in 1847.[657] However, without access to safe harbour in the form of Japanese ports and fair treatment for potential castaways, stricken ships, and vessels in need of resupply, these bountiful seas would remain off limits for most of the American Whaling fleet. If the United States wanted to compete with the European powers growing mercantile influence in East Asia, it needed preferential access to Japan for its whaling fleets and other expanding commercial interests. These Pacific and East Asian commercial interests had grown in tandem with the United States's increasing influence along the Western Coast of North America. For example, the Adams-Onis Treaty in 1819, American migration to the West Coast from the 1830s onwards, the United States Exploring Expedition (1838-1842; also known as the 'Wilkes Expedition'), the Oregon Treaty in 1846, California's dubious succession from Mexico and accession into the United States as a territory in 1846, victory in the Mexican-American War in 1848, and the 1849 Gold Rush, all greatly strengthened America's presence and trade in the region.[658]

As US influence in the Pacific steadily expanded in tandem, interest in establishing safer sea routes to China and the wider Pacific also grew.[659] Japan's isolated animosity was seen as a barrier to these aims, and only increased US desires to establish formal ties. China was the more important nation for all Western powers involved in the region; an importance that

---

[654] K. Henshall, *A History of Japan*, pp. 68-70.
[655] See D. L. Howell, 'Foreign Encounters and Informal Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan', *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 40:2 (Summer 2014), pp. 295-327.
[656] K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, pp. 121-122.
[657] E. J. Dollin, *Leviathan: The History of Whaling in America* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2008), p. 262; This was mainly thanks to the Tsushima and Kuroshiro Currents; See J. Arch, 'Nineteenth-Century Japanese Whaling and Early Territorial Expansion in the Pacific', *RCC Perspectives: New Histories of Pacific Whaling*, 5 (2019), pp. 57-64.
[658] See W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, pp. 87-88.
[659] This led to diplomatic efforts such as the Treaty of Wanghia with China in 1844 for example.

meant that any initiative to open Japan from nations like Britain, Russia, and others, soon fell away as they secured Chinese trade by other means, leaving only the United States interested in securing a safe, independent platform from which it could springboard into China and the rest of the North Pacific.[660] It was for this reason that President Andrew Jackson sent agents to China in 1832 to negotiate a treaty with Japan, but this collapsed without issue due to the death of the head negotiator.[661] This failed venture would be the last official American attempt to open Japan for fourteen years, but this did not end unofficial contacts. In 1837, an American merchant vessel, the *Morrison*, commissioned as part of an American missionary effort, attempted to make contact, but was forced away by cannon fire when it tried to enter the Uraga Channel.[662] Another key point of contact occurred when the American Whaling ship, the *Manhattan*, rescued some Japanese castaways and returned them in 1845.[663] Although officially a pleasant meeting, the Japanese were quick to get the *Manhattan* to leave; so much so that on the day of its departure, when the prevailing winds prevented the ship from sailing, the Japanese used five hundred small boats to forcefully tow the boat out to sea instead.[664]

Clearly, what had been a great boon to Japanese isolation, the sea, had now been turned against them thanks to the technological growth of the ship and the ever-growing demands of Western economic expansion. Contact, whilst limited and not what the Japanese desired, was certainly becoming more common. Thus, little by little Japan's watery isolation was becoming frayed at the edges. Situated in the middle of all these coastal meetings between East and West, was the arrival the British merchant ship *Cyprus* in 1830. Taken over by mutineers in 1829, the ship arrived off the coast of the town of Mugi in Shikoku. The

---

[660] See W. G. Beasley, 'The Foreign Threat and the Opening of the Ports', in M. B. Jansen, eds., *The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 5: The Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 259-307.
[661] W. G. Beasley, 'The Foreign Threat and the Opening of the Ports', pp. 267-268.
[662] W. G. Beasley, 'Japanese Castaways and British Interpreters', *Monumenta Nipponica*, 46:1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 92-94; L. M. Cullen, *A History of Japan, 1582-1941: Internal and External Worlds* (London, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 158; See C. W. King, *The Claims of Japan and Malaysia upon Christendom: Exhibited in Notes of Voyages made in 1837, from Canton, in the Ship Morrison and Brig Himmaleh, Two Volumes* (New York, E. French, 1839); K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, pp. 122-123 Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu*, pp. 19-22
[663] See M. Cooper, *Manhattan [Ship's Logbook] of Sag Harbour, N. Y., on Voyage,* 8 November 1843 -14 October 1846.
[664] E. J. Dollin, *Leviathan*, pp. 275-277.

mutineers desperately needed supplies but were aggressively turned away by local samurai.[665] The implication of these visits to Japanese shores during this period were all intensified by the First Opium War, 1839-1842. For Japan, China was a superpower (大国; *taikoku*), so its utter humiliation at the hands of the British was deeply concerning. This was especially true for Tokugawa Nariaki, who believed that as China's 'first' little brother, Japan would be next on Britain's list.[666] This reaction to the Opium War would prove decisive for Japan's future relationship with foreign vessels. On the one hand it forced a rapid development of Japan's military capability, with even the import of Western weaponry through the Netherlands (such as mortars and Dutch made Gewehr rifles). However, it also led to the 1841-1843 Tenpō Reforms (which involved reinforcing Edo) and the 'Order of the Provision of Firewood and Water' (薪水給与令; *shinsui kyuuyo-rei*). This order ended the 1825 law that ordered all coastal Daimyō to use force to repel any foreign vessels if necessary.[667] The expectation was that this change would reduce any chance of foreigners having a *casus belli* to attack/invade Japan and whilst that aim was achieved, it did little to quell foreign interest and activity around Japanese shores.

Various other attempts to 'open' Japan from the Americans occurred in the early-mid 1800s, like Commodore James Biddle's brief stay in the Uraga Channel with the USS *Columbus* and the USS *Vincennes* in 1846.[668] Biddle was given official sanction to see if trade could be established with Japan, but he was ordered to take great care in dealing with the Japanese. He was refused a meeting on land and instead met briefly aboard a Shogunate vessel.[669] This early effort at US-Japanese diplomacy also came to naught however.[670] It would still be interest from American Whaling in Japan's seas that finally gave impetus for a more official

---

[665] Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu*, p. 19; See D. C. S. Sissons, 'The Voyage of the *Cyprus*', *The Journal of Pacific History*, 43:2 (2008), pp. 253-265.
[666] K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, pp. 142-143.
[667] K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, pp. 142-143.
[668] This was just after Biddle had exchanged ratifications of the Treaty of Wanghia with China in December 1845. The idea was to test the waters and see if Japan would agree to something similar.
[669] Biddle was actually assaulted by a samurai whilst onboard the Shogunate's ship due to a misunderstanding, forcing him to return to his ship out of understandable fear. This failed meeting aboard ship would be one of the reasons that Perry so adamantly demanded that he would only accept a meeting on land for formal talks; J. S. Sewall, *The Logbook of the Captain's Clerk: Adventures in the China Seas*, eds., A. P. Dudden (Chicago, The Lakeside Press, R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1995), pp. XXXIV-XXXV, p. XLIX & p. LVI.
[670] See J. van Sant, P. Maugh & Y. Sugita, eds., *Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan Relations* (Lanham, The Scarecrow Press, 2007); See S. B. Luce, 'Commodore Biddle's Visit to Japan in 1846', *Proceedings*, 31:115 (July 1905), pp. 556-563.

and forthright showing.[671] After the *Manhattan*, came the *Lagoda*, another American Whaling vessel.[672] Some sailors decided to desert the ship over their abusive captain. Japan proved to be far worse however. After ten months of imprisonment in torrid conditions they were subsequently rescued by the USS *Preble* at Nagasaki in 1849.[673] *Preble's* report highlighted Japanese cruelty and recommended more official relations so that this situation did not happen again.[674] The *Lagoda* and the *Preble* made clear the need to finally address Japan's isolated hostility and barrier to increased East Asian trade opportunities. Thus, we come to the famous Perry Mission in 1852-53 and his subsequent return in 1854.[675] Perry used his fleet of modern steamships, partially equipped with Paixhans guns (the first naval cannon able to fire explosive shells), to express every kind of intimidation because he felt that the approach of previous encounters had been too friendly.[676] This stance surprised the Japanese; contemporary writers state how Japanese junks tried to escape the fleet as it edged closer to Edo through the Uraga Channel and relay popular descriptions of the fleet being "as large as mountains".[677] This should not have been a complete surprise to all however, for the Japanese were informed of America's intentions the year before by the Dutch.[678] There was distrust on both sides over each other's intentions, but eventually formalities were exchanged and the Japanese deliberated over America's demands.[679] Upon Perry's second visit in 1854, with an even more impressive fleet, the Japanese begrudgingly accepted every demand made of them, with only the matter of 'where' diplomatic formalities would finally be exchanged

---

[671] See J. S. Sewall, *The Logbook of the Captain's Clerk: Adventures in the China Seas*.
[672] See C. M. Drury, 'Early American Contacts with the Japanese', *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 36:4 (October 1945), pp. 319-330.
[673] E. J. Dollin, *Leviathan*, pp. 277-278.
[674] P. B. Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods, Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan* (New York, Viking, 1990), p. 29.
[675] See F. L. Hawks & M. C. Perry, *Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, performed in the years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M. C. Perry, United States Navy, by order of the Government of the United States, Three Volumes* (Washington, United States Congress, 1856).
[676] W. McOmie, *The Opening of Japan, 1853-1855: A Comparative Study of the American, British, Dutch and Russian Naval Expeditions to Compel the Tokugawa Shogunate to Conclude Treaties and Open Ports to their Ships* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2006), p. 91; Perry's fleet was made up of the *USS Mississippi, USS Saratoga, USS Plymouth,* and the *USS Susquehanna*.
[677] S. W. Williams, *A Journal of the Perry Expedition, 1853-1854* (Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, 1910), p. 47; J. W. Spalding, *Japan and around the World: An Account of Three Visits to the Japanese Empire* (New York, Redfield, 1855), p. 144; K. Minami, *Ishin Zenya no Edo Shomin* (Tokyo, Rekishi Shinsho, 1980), p. 22.
[678] W. McOmie, *The Opening of Japan*, p. 92.
[679] W. McOmie, *The Opening of Japan*, pp. 230-239; Perry refused to meet with anyone unless they were of a suitable rank and stated that if this demand was not quickly met, he would resort to force if necessary; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, p. 171.

being the last outstanding issue.[680] The second visit was largely overshadowed by the formidable fleet that Perry brought with him. The Americans came in nine ships of three kinds, three modern steamers armed with Paixhan and Parrot guns, three ageing sloops and frigates (but still impressive by Japanese standards), and three supply ships to carry extra supplies, gifts, personnel, and weapons.[681] Perry used this fleet at every stage as a diplomatic battering ram to dictate terms to the Japanese. Whenever the Japanese protested that they could not agree to his demands or meet him where he wished along the Japanese coastline, the threat of the fleet sailing ever closer to Edo was used.[682] This proved to be very successful, with the fleet an ever-present reminder of how outclassed the Japanese were militarily, and for the Americans a great source of superiority and strength that they could continuously rely upon during negotiations.[683] The use of the ship by the Americans was a sign of things to come for Japan, but this militaristic use to back up diplomacy would eventually alter over time in the context of British diplomacy. Thanks to the American use of the ship the 'Convention of Kanagawa' was signed on 31 March 1854, opening the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate.[684]

In that same year the Japanese accepted more treaties. In the background to the Crimean War, Russia and Britain desired safe ports to aid their attacks on one another, so both sent 'naval' missions to Japan to negotiate. Thanks to Admiral Stirling, Britain signed the 'Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty' in October 1854, opening Nagasaki and Hakodate (to a limited degree).[685] The aforementioned Bowring was supposed to lead this mission to Japan, but was unavailable. This perhaps explains why this treaty was not as extensive as the Russian one.[686]

---

[680] W. McOmie, *The Opening of Japan*, pp. 269-270.
[681] G. H. Preble, *The Opening of Japan: A Diary of Discovery in the Far East, 1853-1856* (Norman, Oklahoma University Press, 1962), pp. 116-117; The three steamers were the *USS Mississippi*, *USS Powhatan*, and the *USS Susquehanna*. The three sloops/frigates were the *USS Saratoga*, *USS Lexington*, and the *USS Macedonian*. The three supply ships were the *USS Vandalia*, *USS Southampton*, and the *USS Supply*.
[682] W. McOmie, *The Opening of Japan*, pp. 228-275.
[683] When you consider the static and mostly aged coastal defences of Japan, combined with the common practice of using 'Dungaree Forts' (sham military defences), the Japanese must have been worried. The problem with such a strategy is that nearer one gets to shore, the easier it is to deduce the bluff.
[684] Document 8, Convention between the USA and Japan, 31 March 1854 in W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, pp. 119-122; M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, pp. 17-18; Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu*, p. 24.
[685] See J. M. Tronson, *Personal Narrative of a Voyage to Japan, Kamtschatka, Siberia, Tartary, and various parts of coast of China; HMS Barracouta* (London, Smith, Elder & Co, 1859).
[686] See G. Fox, 'The Anglo-Japanese Convention of 1854', *Pacific Historical Review*, 10:4 (1941), pp. 411-434.

Russia signed the 'Treaty of Shimoda' in February 1854, opening Nagasaki, Shimoda, and Hakodate (more extensively than the British treaty).[687] This was not the first British nor Russian contact with Japan however.[688] Like the Americans there had been various failed and/or unofficial forms of contact with Japan in years prior. In addition to the *Phaeton* in 1808 and the *Saracen* in 1822 there was the HMS *Samarang* in 1845. The *Samarang* called at Nagasaki to conduct surveys, managing to successfully go about its business unhindered.[689] Russia's interactions with Japan were more frequent by comparison, with initial contact coming from the Laksman Expedition in 1792 and the Rezanov Expedition in 1804 (both 'eventually' taking place at, or at least near, Nagasaki).[690] Subsequent Russo-Japanese meetings were tense and sometimes violent affairs, with only the treaty in 1854 moving relations into a more positive direction.[691] Again, the Russians and the British used the ship to back up their diplomacy, though, on this occasion not as strongly as the Americans it has to be said. With these treaties the Bakufu had conceded much, but Western appetite for greater concessions would only grow.

The Western ship's superiority in the 1840s during the Opium War and as a threat during negotiations with Japan during the 1850s led to an understandable fascination with these ships across Japan. For example, the Tokugawa (technically) commissioned the *Phoenix* (鳳凰丸; *hōō-maru*) out of Uraga (in 1849) in response to Biddle's foray into Japanese waters in 1846.[692] In the next decade we have the Russian frigate, *Diana*, which took part in the 1854 negotiations, and was sunk after the Tōkai Earthquake caused a tsunami. The Japanese, with surviving Russian sailors, then built a replacement ship, the *Heda*. So successful was this

[687] See J. J. Stephan, 'The Crimean War and the Far East', *Modern Asian Studies*, 3:3 (1969), pp. 257-277; P. E. Eckel, 'The Crimean War and Japan', *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, 3:2 (1944), p. 111; TNA, FO 46/1/15, Convention for Regulating the Admission of British Ships into the Ports of Japan, 14 October 1854; G. Fox, 'The Anglo-Japanese Convention of 1854', pp. 418-419; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, pp. 198-200; Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu*, pp. 18-19 & pp. 41-55.
[688] See W. G. Beasley, *Great Britain and The Opening of Japan.*
[689] W. G. Beasley, 'Japanese Castaways and British Interpreters', p. 92; See E. Belcher, *Narrative of the Voyage of HMS Samarang, 1843-1846, Two Volumes* (London, Reeve, Benhem, and Reeve, 1848).
[690] I. Mitchiko, 'The Legacy of the 18th and 19th Centuries: From Hierarchal and Ethnocentric Foreign Relations to a Western Model of Equal International Relations', in D. V. Streltsov & S. Nobuo, eds., *A History of Russo-Japanese Relations: Over Two Centuries of Cooperation and Competition* (Boston, Brill, 2019), pp. 3-6; I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 74-81.
[691] I. Mitchiko, 'The Legacy of the 18th and 19th Centuries', pp. 5-12; Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu*, pp. 26-27.
[692] W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, pp. 74-78.

construction that the Tokugawa Shogunate ordered six copies.[693] The other, more obvious nation, that the Japanese relied upon was the Dutch. First, came the *Vision* (観光丸; *kankō-maru*), a gift from the Dutch King in 1855, and then the *Unyielding* (咸臨丸; *kanrin-maru*) which was ordered in 1853 and delivered in 1857. These ships were later used for travel and training by the Shogunate. The Daimyō were also interested in the ship; with Satsuma constructing the *Shōhei* (昇平丸; *shōhei-maru*) and Mito building the *Morning Sun* (旭日丸; *asahi-maru*).[694] The nineteenth century Western ship's power was something that Japan desired to tap into after witnessing it run rampant across East Asia.[695] The issue was time however. Nineteenth century naval technological development was only intensifying; all these vessels ended up becoming obsolete by the time they were delivered or built. It would not be until the 1860s that this would change, with greater expertise beginning to filter into Japan and more direct access to purchase current, modern vessels steadily shrinking the technological gap. These deficiencies and nurturing naval interests would only accelerate after the signing of the five Ansei Treaties in 1858.[696] It would be Britain that would both help this interest along thanks to its own use and abuse of the Royal Navy ship, and its eventual transformation into a mobile legation.

[693] K. Matsumoto, *Nihon no Kindai 1*, pp. 88-90; *The Illustrated News*, 5 January 1856, p. 13; *The Morning Post*, 5 June 1854, p. 5.
[694] K. Matsumoto, *Nihon no Kindai 1*, pp. 96-103; W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, pp. 74-78.
[695] Satsuma would construct the first domestic built steamship, with Uwajima building the second.
[696] The five Ansei Treaties: The Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Japan, 29 July, 1858; The Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the Netherlands and Japan, 18 August 1858; The Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Russia and Japan, 19 August 1858; The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 26 August, 1858; The Treaty of Amity and Commerce between France and Japan, 9 October 1858.

Fig.1: Japan's Treaty Ports and Capital(s).

These five treaties opened Japan and established foreign extraterritoriality much like China.[697] The first of the five treaties was pioneered by Consul-General Townsend Harris, who, supported by Perry's previous success, used Russia's advance into the Pacific from the north and Britain's advance east from China to intimidate Japan.[698] Harris won out and negotiated the opening of the treaty ports and exterritoriality. The five open ports were Yokohama (meant to be Kanagawa), Hakodate, Nagasaki, Hyogo (Kobe) and Niigata (the last two ports opening was heavily delayed however).[699] These ports reshaped the diplomatic

[697] All the other treaties, British, French, Russian, and the Netherlands, were effectively based off of the American one; See Document 28: Treaty between the USA and Japan, 29 July 1858 in W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, pp. 183-189; Parliamentary Papers, Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce between Her Majesty and the Tycoon of Japan, 28 August 1858, 1860.
[698] K. Matsumoto, *Nihon no Kindai 1*, p. 142; Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu*, pp. 27-28.
[699] The treaty port was meant to be at Kanagawa, but the Japanese set up shop further south in the small fishing village of Yokohama. The Americans and Japanese used Kanagawa and Yokohama interchangeably, something that was done on purpose by the Japanese. Technically, as Yokohama was part of Kanagawa, this site was not actually in contradiction to the signed treaty. This site was actually preferred by many of the merchants anyway and so all powers, excluding the Americans, accepted Yokohama as the better option. The Americans refused to officially acknowledge the change to

landscape of Japan, including its space and place, having a significant impact on how the West interreacted with it geographically (limiting their access to Japan's interior and key cities like Osaka and Kyoto). Western diplomats were either trapped in their enclosed legations in Edo, or had to go to a meeting place designated by the Japanese instead. Japan could dictate the 'where' more easily when it came to 'official' diplomacy and 'legal' trade. The whole point of these ports from a Japanese perspective was damage control; to limit Western influence and commercial progress, and to ensure that the Shogunate alone reaped any potential rewards.[700] In practice this proved very difficult for the Japanese to manage however. Anti-foreign violence escalated so much (between 1858-1862) that the chief Western diplomats in Edo retreated to the only place they could, Yokohama, the most major treaty port and closest to the capital, and the ship, their primary source of mobility and military power.[701]

Yokohama was still, in Westerner's eyes, a dangerous and ultimately Japanese conceived diplomatic setting, which meant that only the ship remained as an entirely Western curated space for diplomacy. The Shogunate's attempt to entrap and frustrate Westerners made the ship even more critical than it already was. The absence of safe travel outside the treaty ports and with the Japanese interior officially sealed, ironically made Japan's coasts both more vulnerable and valuable to Western interests. This was part of the almost constant Western interest in establishing naval bases and new treaty ports across Japan. The ship was already important, Japan is an island nation, but the circumstances meant that the ship's importance was only magnified. With the Western powers having enough shipping and steamships capable of reaching the Far East, the ship was perfectly placed to take on the roles of trade, transport, power, and diplomacy across Japan after attempts by the Shogunate to limit Western exploitation came to naught.[702] We have seen the ship's effect in the West's initial

---

Yokohama for several years after; TNA, FO 46/2/20, Malmesbury to Alcock, 6 October 1859; TNA, FO 46/2/36, Malmesbury to Alcock, 10 November 1859; TNA, FO 46/2/43, Malmesbury to Alcock, 3 December 1859.

[700] Whilst covering a significantly larger area, this practice was not too dissimilar to how the Dutch were enclosed at Deshima at Nagasaki.

[701] Nagasaki and Hakodate still held consulates, but due to their distance and isolation were not tempting targets by comparison. Yokohama itself was vulnerable, but considering its capture or destruction would rouse an incredibly destructive response from the Western powers, any gains the Japanese might have made would have been quickly nullified.

[702] See A. Lambert, *Battleships in Transition: The Creation of the Steam Battlefleet, 1815-1860* (London, Conway Maritime Press, 1984); See L. Pascali, 'The Wind of Change', *The American Economic Review*, 107:9 (September 2017), pp. 2821-2854; The Shogunate even exposed itself to the

interactions with Japan and the reasons for its growing significance, but this was still a limited showing of what the ship would ultimately become diplomatically.

Given the importance of the ship to Western diplomacy and its integral role to the development of the treaty ports through trade and transport, it is important to first understand two things, particularly in regards to early Anglo-Japanese relations. Firstly, the ship's importance meant that an interest in naval anchorage was constantly on the mind of British diplomats. They wished to both improve their already dominant naval position in East Asia and prevent others from chipping away at this advantage. This could mean a concession like Hong Kong or a more rudimentary base built out of an already established position, like a treaty port. The former was much harder to achieve unnoticed as the Russian's discovered when they tried to occupy Tsushima.[703] The latter however was far more common, with warships stationed across the treaty ports to be called upon where needed. Furthermore, it was common for such naval stationing to be matched or shadowed by other powers. A Royal Navy ship would often 'run into' a fellow foreign vessel sent to see what they were doing.[704] Naval power had to be seen, not only as a warning to other foreign powers, but to remind the Japanese of the Royal Navy's powerful reach. Britain needed the region to be peaceable so that trade could flourish and its network of Royal Navy stations would not be overly strained. This is demonstrated by Alcock at Tsushima trying to maintain the status-quo and Lieutenant-Colonel Edward St. John Neale and the bombardment of Kagoshima in showing off the Royal Navy's military potential to the Japanese. These were limited affairs for the ship diplomatically however. It would be Sir Harry Parkes that would later transform the ship into a mobile legation.

Western ship early on to the treaty port powers by relying on Western shipping to deliver messages as far south as Nagasaki. Thank you, Professor Asami Sawai, for bringing this to my attention.

[703] TNA, FO 46/7/15, Alcock to Russell, 21 February 1860.

[704] For example, in 1867, the French ship, *La Place*, appeared unexpectedly at Hakodate. Admiral Keppel surmises that part of their mission was probably just to see what the British were up too. H. Keppel, *A Sailor's Life Under Four Sovereigns, Volume 3* (London, MacMillan, 1899), p. 162.

Fig. 2: Key Locations in Japan's Coastal Waters.

Secondly, the positioning of the treaty ports and desire for greater economic access (exploitation) of Japan meant that Japan's Inland Sea was highly coveted. It was a key domestic naval route and because of this the Bakufu tried to limit any foreign presence there. Nagasaki was isolated and Hyogo's (and later Osaka's) opening was greatly delayed, leaving much of southern Honshu isolated and Japan's interior better protected. This was mostly by design, for the much of the south was ruled by *tozama* Daimyō ('outside Daimyō'), who were (mostly) not favoured by the Shogunate for historical and familial reasons. The British, particularly under Parkes, understood the Seto Inland Sea's economic potential and used the ship to make substantial gains for British diplomacy there. I will use Alcock at Tsushima, Neale at Kagoshima, and Parkes's later use of the ship as case studies to understand how the ship's diplomatic role altered in Japan over time, from something militaristic and negative, to something more balanced and positive.

2. Alcock and the Tsushima Incident:

2.1 Space and Place at Tsushima:

Tsushima's strategic position between Korea and Japan, with its natural deep-water ports, has meant that it has occupied many major historical roles.[705] Its importance was quickly noticed by Britain and Russia during the mid-nineteenth century too, becoming another part of the 'Great Game'.[706] Tsushima became yet another flashpoint between the two rival empires, leading to the Tsushima incident of 1861.[707] The Russians occupied Tsushima with the intention of turning it into a strategic naval base to strengthen their position in East Asia and the Northern Pacific. Russia's naval and wider trade influence was stymied by a severe lack of warm water ports, so Tsushima would greatly help in this regard, particularly as a military port.[708] Britain, realising this, worked with the Shogunate to stop the Russians from completing their occupation. Tsushima is our first real sight of the Royal Navy ship being used for diplomatic ends, though at this stage only as a blunt instrument to ward off the Russians. It is easy to be critical of this, but this was what commonly worked at the time for many major powers, including Britain. You could bully or coerce a smaller power or have what we see here, a simple show of force to help maintain the status-quo. Given Japan's small status and the distance of Tsushima from any major or direct British interest, it is not surprising therefore that Britain leaned into what had worked in the past. Thus, why we see the limited, more military role of the ship here in British diplomacy.

Tsushima was ruled by the Sō family; a *tozama* Daimyō. Despite this fact, they had a close relationship with the Shogunate. Their amicable relations were thanks to Tsushima's importance in Japanese-Korean diplomacy ongoing since the fifteenth century (日朝関係史;

---

[705] The island is now technically three islands after having two separate canals constructed. One in the medieval period and one in the late nineteenth-early twentieth century; Tsushima was the initial staging grounds for many invasions of both Japan and Korea and the site of a major nearby naval battle that ended the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5.
[706] See R. L. Hellyer, *Defining Engagement*, pp. 207-234; M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, pp. 77-82; See T. Yamamoto's PhD Thesis for a more complete bibliography: '*Balance of favour: the emergence of territorial boundaries around Japan, 1861-1875*', *The London School of Economics and Political Science* (2015), pp. 1-225; For Russians the phrase: 'Tournament of Shadows' was supposedly more popular.
[707] See I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 81-96.
[708] I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 82-83.

nichō kankei-shi).[709] It was an unofficial relationship that involved limited, but beneficial, trade. Both countries were technically isolated from the world; Korea as a tributary to China and Japan with its aforementioned seclusion. However, both countries were happy to let this trade continue because the opposite would only be to the detriment of both parties.[710] With the onset of the Ansei Treaties, the Bakufu and Sō foresaw foreign interest in Tsushima and prepared accordingly.[711] Britian too, not long after the Crimean War's end, was quick to understand the potential dangers Russia posed to Japan. In a memorandum to Alcock, the British Consul-General and later Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan, Lord Malmesbury outlined that he was to use every means necessary, short of promising actual British help, to persuade the Japanese to not cede any territory to Russia.[712] Consequently, Alcock (and future British diplomats) kept a close eye on Russian movements and theorised potential ways to counter. One example was Alcock's report that Britain could possibly occupy Tsushima. Alcock assumed that Russia was posturing to take Ezo (now Hokkaido) and its surrounding islands and islets. [713] This assumption came from two places. Firstly, from direct warnings from the Foreign Office the year previously and secondly Russia's actions in the region up to this point.[714] The Treaty of Aigun (1858) garnered Russia roughly 600,000km^2 between the Stanovoy Range and the Amur River from China, and the Convention of Peking (1860) gained the rest of Outer Manchuria along the Pacific Coast (leading to the establishment of Vladivostok).[715] In this light, Britain's concerns were warranted and perhaps occupying Tsushima in response would be prudent. Ezo, also known as Ezochi (and later as Hokkaido) to the Japanese, was a relatively unknown land loosely administered by various

[709] K. Shōji, 'Japan and East Asia', in K. Yamamura, eds., *The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 3: Medieval Japan* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 441-445; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, pp. 148-151, pp. 293-296.
[710] N. Wilson, *Defensive Positions: The Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan* (London, Harvard University Press, 2015), pp. 12-13; J. B. Lewis, *Frontier Contact between Chosŏn Korea and Tokugawa Japan* (London, RouteledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 218.
[711] V. Shmagin, 'They Fear Us, yet Cling to Us: Russian Negotiations with Tsushima Domain Officials during the 1861 Tsushima Incident', *The International History Review* 39:3 (2017), pp. 526-527.
[712] TNA, FO 46/2, Malmesbury to Alcock, 1 March 1859.
[713] TNA, FO 46/7/15, Alcock to Russell, 21 February 1860; Hokkaido was often referred to as Yezo in British documents (and sometimes as Jesso, Yezzo, Yesso and Yeso); Yezo was just a different way of transliterating the Japanese word Ezo. Ezo later gave way to Hokkaido after it was renamed by the Japanese.
[714] TNA, FO 262/1, Malmsbury to Alcock, March 1859.
[715] A. Wood, *Russia's Frozen Frontier: A History of Siberia and the Russian Far East, 1581-1991* (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), pp. 93-94; See G. Lenson, *The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959).

Daimyō affiliated with the Shogunate.[716] It was inhabited by the Ainu, but was increasingly being developed by the Japanese (and later fully colonised).[717] The Japanese feared that the Russians had an interest in conquering Ezo.[718] This fear was shared by Alcock (and later Parkes), further fuelling his earlier idea that Britain should occupy Tsushima. Alcock implied to the Foreign Office that Russia would transform Hakodate into its own 'Gibraltar' of the North Pacific and argued that Britain should then occupy Tsushima as another 'Malta' to counter.[719] Alcock based his opinions off of British hydrographical surveys completed by the HMS *Acteon*, which although done with the agreement of the Shogunate was much opposed by Tsushima officials.[720] It did not help that the *Acteon* demanded supplies like oxen, even though all of the ox on the island were bred for ploughing. The Tsushima officials eventually gave in creating a furore among the local farmer and samurai classes.[721] Tsushima subsequently requested that they refrain from going ashore during their subsequent visits, but this was completely ignored, with shore parties going to villages across the island.[722] Despite all the bother Britain caused Tsushima's residents, it was only viewed as a potential response to a Russian occupation of Hakodate. After visiting Hakodate for research, I can understand Alcock's reasoning; with Mt. Hakodate on the city's southern edge, with two large defensible deep bays on either side, all overlooking the Tsugaru Straits, it truly could have been made into 'another Gibraltar'. However, in March 1861 Russia moved on Tsushima and not Hokkaido (ironically partly in reaction to Britain's surveys and rumours of a potential British occupation).[723] Tsushima was chosen because Russia believed the island to be the most

---

[716] It was known literally as the 'Land of the Ezo' or 'Land of the Barbarian'; See M. Sakata, 'The Transformation of Hokkaido from Penal Colony to Homeland Territory', *International Review of Social History*, 63:S26 (June 2018), pp. 109-130.

[717] See A. B. Irish, *A History of Ethnic Transition and Development on Japan's Northern Island* (London, McFarland & Company, 2009); See M. Ishihara, eds., *Ainu kara mita Hokkaidō 150-Nen* (Tokyo, Hokkaido University Press, 2009).

[718] G. Lenson, *The Russian Push Toward Japan*, pp. 158-176.

[719] TNA, FO 46/7/15, Alcock to Russell, 21 February 1860.

[720] R. L. Hellyer, *Defining Engagement*, pp. 171-175; L. S. Dawson, *Memoirs of Hydrography: Part II, 1830-1885* (Eastbourne, Imperial Library, 1885), p. 141; See W. Blakeney, *On the Coasts of Cathay and Cipango Forty Years Ago: A Record of Surveying Service in the China Yellow and Japan Seas and on the Seaboard of Korea and Manchuria* (London, Elliot Stock, 1902).

[721] I. Kazuya, *Roshiajin no mita Bakumatsu Nihon* (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2009), p. 155.

[722] I. Kazuya, *Roshiajin no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 156.

[723] The Russians targeted Tsushima because of rumours that Britain had told the Shogunate that in exchange for Tsushima, they would give a guarantee to keep the rest of Japan out of Russian hands. Or, if this was not acceptable, make Tsushima an independent polity under British suzerainty, a minor protectorate. The HMS *Acteon*'s surveys only seemed to add weight to these rumours; H. J. Moeshart, 'The Russian Occupation of Tsushima: A Stepping-stone to British Leadership in Japan', in I. Neary, eds., *Leaders and Leadership in Japan* (London, Routledge, 1996), pp. 67-68; I. Kazuya, *Roshiajin no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 156.

valuable strategic location available when compared to Hakodate and Avina/Aniwa Bay in Sakhalin. It could not accept the same denial of strategic bases that had occurred in Europe. Russia believed Japan's neutrality to be something soon ignored by other powers and decided to make the first move.[724] A Russian corvette, the *Posadnik* ('*Lander*'), with 360 men aboard, sailing from Nagasaki, stopped at Tsushima under the pretext of repairing its hull. They arrived on 1 March 1861. Problematically however, Tsushima was a microcosm of wider political schisms currently going on in Japan, so there was considerable indecision regarding Russian requests to stay and conduct repairs. The Russians grew frustrated and soon demanded landing rights and refused to leave; another Russian ship, the *Nayezdnik* ('*Rider*'), with 170 men aboard, arrived on 27 March 1861, making clear Russia's true intentions.[725] All of this was an illegal act under the Ansei Treaties which stipulated strict most favoured nation clauses and forbade anyone from forcefully entering a non-treaty port unless under *extreme* duress. A minor crisis ensued.

From the onset, whilst being discussed in diplomatic circles, the strategic nature of Tsushima meant that it quickly became a military concern. Britain could not allow Tsushima's capture by the Russians, giving them an advantageous East Asian naval base, and setting a dangerous precedent for other powers as well.[726] The talk of Maltas and Gibraltars and the fact that the Russians had already made the first move before any diplomacy began made negotiation moot. The ship was already being relegated away from diplomacy, leaving little room for any diplomatic space to form in the first place. Alcock wrote again in light of the Russians occupying Tsushima. He calmly espoused the strategic advantages Tsushima had (most likely to emphasise the need for action against Russia): "…fertile soil, small but industrious population, a fine climate and numerous land-locked and excellent harbours, situated right in the fairway to China… [*sic*]."[727] In the meantime, the Russians established themselves on Tsushima, constructing a hospital, officer's quarters, a chartroom, a kitchen, several

[724] I. Kazuya, *Roshiajin no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 157; There seems to have been an internal Russian conflict between the Foreign Ministry's desire to have peaceful relations with Japan, and the Russian Navy's more hawkish nature to acquire a Pacific naval base; See I. Kazuya, *Roshiajin no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 160-161.
[725] M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 77; I. Kazuya, *Roshiajin no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 154 & pp. 170-171.
[726] Other powers were either weak and/or disinterested in getting involved in the Tsushima incident. France was more concerned with its Italian efforts and the Americans had just begun the bloodiest conflict in their history, the US Civil War.
[727] TNA, FO 46/13/36, Alcock to Russell, August 2 1861.

blacksmiths and carpentries, a resupply warehouse with livestock enclosures and a water well, and a pier for docking smaller ships.[728] In the ensuing kerfuffle and protests at Russia's continued presence, two Tsushima residents were killed in May, leaving Tsushima effectively at Russia's mercy.[729] Russia wished to negotiate with the Sō daimyō quickly and directly to reduce any outside entanglements or interference.[730] This never happened however, as Tsushima effectively pursued a 'policy of absence' after their initial confused reaction. Whenever the Russians demanded to meet, the Tsushima Japanese came up with excuses like official/lord X was ill, busy with important matters, undergoing a religious ritual or ceremony, or just 'away'.[731] Obviously, the Russians could not negotiate alone.[732] Russia also misunderstood the Tsushima-Bakufu relationship within Japan's feudal system. Thus, their attempts to detach Tsushima as an independent polity were always doomed to fail.[733] Russia's experience on Tsushima contrasts with how a similar 'Japanese' polity was treated by the Americans, the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa).[734] The Ryukyu's had a much looser relationship with Japan than Tsushima, but the differences in success were stark. The Russians could not negotiate with or threaten anyone (and had Britain and Japan to consider too), but in contrast the Americans were able to quickly force a direct meeting with Ryukyu officials and later the Regent. Without any other power to interfere, the Americans could pursue whatever policy they desired at pace.[735] The final Ryukyu protest was met with Perry threatening to bring two hundred men the next day and occupy Shuri Castle (their seat of government).[736] The failure to achieve the same sort of rapid diplomatic detachment at Tsushima, which had served the Americans so well at the Ryukyu's (albeit for the Americans, detachment was not so much achieved as found), significantly derailed Russian plans, allowing for Bakufu involvement.[737]

---

[728] TNA, ADM 1/57/62/266, Hope to Paget, 29 August 1861; I. Kazuya, *Roshiajin no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 175-176.
[729] I. Kazuya, *Roshiajin no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 154.
[730] I. Kazuya, *Roshiajin no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 158-160.
[731] This became a popular and somewhat successful diplomatic tactic from Japan. Interpreter Ernest Satow provides another example of this tactic, noting the number of times a key official was supposedly 'ill' during negotiations at Osaka in 1865; E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 153.
[732] This did come at a cost however, eventually a clash occurred which reportedly led to the death of a farmer and the suicide of a samurai; M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, pp. 79-80.
[733] V. Shmagin, 'They Fear Us, yet Cling to Us', pp. 522-523; See V. Shmagin, 'They Fear Us, yet Cling to Us', pp. 521-545, for what the Russians and Tsushima officials got up to in terms of stalled negotiations and tense stand offs.
[734] Also known as the Lew Chew or Loochoo Islands.
[735] W. McOmie, *The Opening of Japan*, pp. 171-190.
[736] F. L. Hawks & M. C. Perry, *Narrative*, p. 278.
[737] M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 77.

The Bakufu used their knowledge of Anglo-Russian rivalry and Britain's desire to maintain Japan's integrity for its own selfish interests to intervene on Tsushima's behalf.[738] The Bakufu were quick to gain Britain's aid given the Anglo-Russian rivalry and the fact that Alcock greatly approved of how the Bakufu had handled the situation so far.[739] In a meeting with Shogunate officials, Alcock was impressed that they suggested opening a treaty port on Tsushima to neutralise it (he disagreed with the idea, but liked that the Bakufu were open to taking such liberal measures).[740] With this side Anglo-Japanese diplomacy the ship was allowed to finally become involved. However, any potential negotiation still remained difficult. Any chance for a diplomatic space to form aboard ship depended on Russian willingness to both stay on the island in the face of Britain (and Japan) and/or negotiate with the British in the first place. The British had internally agreed (between Alcock and Sir James Hope, the then Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies and China Squadron) that working with the Bakufu to maintain Japan's integrity (especially at the expense of the Russians) was key to maintaining the treaty ports and foreign trade.[741] It was decided to send two ships to Tsushima with Laurence Oliphant, the First Secretary of the Legation, onboard (he was onboard anyway due to medical needs; two birds with one stone as it were).[742] He was commissioned to eject the Russians from Tsushima primarily because Alcock was presently absent.[743] The Royal Navy force eventually arrived, but with Russo-Tsushima negotiations stalling, the Russians were left with little choice but to bow to pressure and leave (on 19 September 1861).[744] With the Russians ejected, no diplomatic space aboard ship developed. Tsushima ultimately became a distant extension of the 'Great Game', preventing the ship from developing beyond expectation.[745]

---

[738] M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 80.
[739] TNA, FO 881/1054/2, Alcock to Russell, 28 October 1861.
[740] See T. Hōya, 'Ōrukokku wa Tsushima Senryō wo Iwanakattaka', *Rekishigaku Kenkyū* 796 (2004), pp. 16-21; Y. Jūbishi, *Oguri Kōzuki no Shi* (Tokyo, Daichi Shuppansha, 1929), p. 160.
[741] V. Shmagin, 'They Fear Us, yet Cling to Us', p. 528.
[742] Oliphant was attacked by a xenophobic samurai and injured in July 1861. Armed only with a whip he fought off his attacker, but was injured in doing so. He was sent aboard ship to recover under the care of the HMS *Ringdove's* surgeon.
[743] M. Oliphant, *Memoir of the Life of Laurence Oliphant and of Alice Oliphant, His Wife, Volume 1* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1891), pp. 252-267.
[744] TNA, FO 410/2/10, Hope to Birilev, 28 August 1861; TNA, FO 410/2/10, Hope to Likhatchov, 5 September 1861; M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 82.
[745] The British had later assured the Russians that they had no interest in occupying Tsushima, allaying their fears after they left the island.

2.2. Conclusions:

This was the first serious instance of ships being used in Japan for diplomatic means outside of their potential threat during the initial foreign treaties. This was a deeply limited showing of how useful the ship could be to Anglo-Japanese relations in terms of space and place however. There are several reasons as to why this was the case; most Royal Navy ships were stationed along the China Coast and nearer India. Sparing ships for Japan at this time was thus limited, so the fact that Alcock was able to get two ships, the HMS *Ringdove* and the HMS *Encounter*, at such short notice was nothing short of a miracle.[746] The *Ringdove* was a small craft of the Vigilant-class with a compliment of 90 people, and was originally designed for the Black and Baltic Sea's shallow regions during the Crimean War, but only entered service after it ended. It might have appeared impressive to the Japanese, but to the Russians it would not have been something to consider *that* seriously alone.[747] The bigger threat was the *Encounter*, with nearly double the compliment (180 people) and more guns (14 guns). Admiral Hope was also aboard, showing how seriously the Tsushima incident was taken by the British.[748] Overall however, this was only a token showing to remind the Russians of Britain's (naval) power. In all likelihood, Oliphant would have gone ashore to negotiate with the Russians anyway given the fear of a 'barbaric surprise attack' applied more to the Japanese than to other Western powers. Moreover, Tsushima, even with its strategic nature, was an outlier and not a place of real importance in the new treaty port system. Nor was the Sō family a powerful clan close to the Bakufu or a significant agitator against them. In other words, whilst Russian activity at Tsushima was dangerous, Russia's actions in the context of the 'Great Game' were not surprising or important enough to warrant a more serious response. Furthermore, given the great power relationship between Britain and Russia it would not really have been expected for negotiations to centre on a Royal Navy ship/Tsushima instead of the London/St. Petersburg dynamic. Ultimately, the Russians did

[746] W. G. Beasley, 'From Conflict to Co-operation: British Naval Surveying in Japanese Waters, 1845-82', in I. Nish & Y. Kibata, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930* (London, MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000), p. 88; S. P. Oliver, *On and Off Duty, Being Leaves from an Officer's Notebook* (London, W. H. Allen & Co, 1881), p. 66.
[747] R. Gardner, eds., *Conway's: All The Worlds Fighting Ships, 1860-1905* (London, Conway Maritime Press, 1979), p. 108.
[748] S. P. Oliver, *On and Off Duty*, p. 66; The fact that he went along in the *Encounter* (with its 14 guns) and not the flagship, the frigate HMS *Imperieuse* (with its 51 guns) show's how difficult it was to get ships from China at this time.

not attempt to stay on the island after their failed attempts to engage with local officials. This was a deeply limited showing of the ship for the reasons I have mentioned, but Tsushima was still a sign of the future. The ship may have not progressed to a point where diplomatic space could have formed aboard to benefit Anglo-Japanese relations specifically, but its involvement still led to a successful outcome regardless. It would only be a matter of time before a more critical diplomatic issue arose for Britain (and Japan) in a more important place, consequently requiring not only a more important diplomatic space, like larger ships or perhaps even a squadron, but for an actual naval diplomatic space to form in the first place.

3. The Bombardment of Kagoshima:

3.1. Negotiations on the *Euryalus*:

The intricacies of the bombardment of Kagoshima (1863) and its outcomes are not important here and are discussed elsewhere, but the immediate runup to the actual bombardment is of great interest to the ship's diplomatic transformation in early Anglo-Japanese relations. Due to an attack on British subjects (leading to one death, Charles Richardson), the Namamugi incident, Britain sent ultimatums to the Bakufu and Satsuma Domain (whose samurai carried out the attack).[749] The Bakufu extricated themselves, eventually, from the whole affair. However, Satsuma refused any contact and the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Russell, instructed Neale, the Chargé d'Affaires, to use force to either gain reparations or enact punishment against Satsuma.[750] Neale assembled a substantial flotilla with vessels from China seconded to Japan. Involved were the: HMS *Euryalus* (a screw frigate with a compliment of 515 men), HMS *Pearl* (a Corvette), HMS *Perseus* (a Camelion-class sloop/Corvette), HMS *Argus* (a paddle-sloop), HMS *Coquette* (Vigilant-class), HMS *Racehorse* (a small gun-vessel), and the HMS *Havock* (an Albacore-class gunboat).[751] The *Euryalus* was a screw frigate, one of the last laid down in the 1850s before it was discovered that if any greater armament was wanted, a composite/iron hull was needed. Despite this, it remained a heavily armed ship, equipped with Armstrong Guns, a steam engine, and was powerful enough to be Admiral Kuper's flagship. This ship would not only have been impressive to the Japanese, but to other treaty port powers as well. The *Pearl* and the

[749] I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 143-151.
[750] PP, Japan, No. 1, Russell to Neale, 24 December 1862.
[751] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863.

Coquette were designed for the Crimean War, and were intended for the Black Sea and the Baltic. In other words, more coastal actions, perfect for Japan. The *Perseus* was by far the most modern ship, only being launched in 1862. The remaining ships were all smaller supporting vessels. This flotilla assembled matched the Royal Navy's Far Eastern needs. It needed vessels that could cover rivers, coasts, and the seas due to the sheer variety of waters present.[752] Overall, this was a formidable showing that involved a wide assortment of vessels and nearly 1000 sailors and marines. Despite this fleet, Neale was instructed to negotiate with Satsuma before considering a military solution to Britain's grievances. In other words, a diplomatic space aboard ship was finally given a chance to be created and seeing as it had nowhere else to develop (unlike Tsushima), it was highly likely that such a space would either form onshore near Kagoshima or aboard a Royal Navy ship.

Not long after Britain's flotilla arrived, British and Satsuma officials met aboard the East Indies and China Squadron flagship, the *Euryalus*, after Satsuma offers of meeting onshore near Kagoshima were refused (this came after a barrage of inquiries over the fleet's intent the day prior).[753] British thinking was, understandably, that their flotilla was their advantage. Neale, made it clear to Whitehall that everyone involved had extreme reservations about going ashore.[754] This was influenced by a general belief in Japanese/East Asian duplicity, and the memory of Richardson's brutal murder. This decision is even more interesting when you consider the lengths that Perry went to ensure that an onshore diplomatic meeting was held.[755] This difference was due to differing priorities. The Americans desired to undermine Japanese seclusion and having negotiations take place on land, effectively allowing themselves onshore before any talks occurred, helped achieve this. In contrast, for Britain the Kagoshima mission was purely a punitive action and not part of a wider diplomatic goal. As far as Neale and Admiral Kuper were concerned, Britain had been insultingly ignored thus far, leaving no reason for them to go ashore anyway.[756] Moreover, whilst anchored Royal Navy ships were not only an intimidating force that could act as diplomatic leverage, but also

[752] R. Gardner, eds., *Conway's*, p. 43, p. 54, pp. 106-107; J. J. Colledge & B. Warlow, *Ships of the Royal Navy: The Complete Record of all Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy from the 15th Century to the Present* (London, Chatham Publishing, 2006), p. 19 & p. 284.
[753] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863; See H. Cortazzi, 'The British Bombardment of Kagoshima, 1863, Admiral Sir L. Kuper and Lt. Colonel Neale', pp. 271-280.
[754] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863.
[755] W. McOmie, *The Opening of Japan*, pp. 101-117 & pp. 269-270.
[756] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863.

as a guarantor of safety during negotiations. Ashore Britain lost these advantages.[757] It was now inevitable that a diplomatic space would soon form aboard ship. Satsuma then sent a third vessel to treat with British officials on the flagship. However, this next meeting was a tenser affair and one might not attach the word 'diplomatic' to the space in question. The chief Satsuma official asked to see Neale, which was agreed too. The official then demanded that he be accompanied by forty samurai retainers. This was also agreed too. Given the number of ships, their presence in the bay, armament, and noise, and the general anxiousness the Japanese must have had themselves, it not surprising that this was demanded. To say they must have been severely intimidated by the British presence would be an understatement. The Satsuma entourage went aboard the *Euryalus* with the caveat that rows of Royal Marines were placed across its decks as a precaution.[758] This combination once again mirrors a meeting between Perry and the Japanese when they finally acceded to an onshore meeting, both with heavily armed soldiers.[759]

This show of strength aboard the flagship would put any negotiator under pressure and it showed. Neale noted how the head official appeared on edge; nerves that were exacerbated further by the sudden arrival of more Satsuma samurai and when one of the official's retainers claimed to speak for the Prince of Satsuma instead.[760] *Euryalus's* enclosed cabin was a small, foreign, and completely alien space for the Japanese, compounded by Neale, Admiral Kuper, and the sound of drills and sailors going about their business on deck above. This was a British controlled space and for the Japanese a hostile one. Neale reports the official initially in charge was under the "…utmost agitation and confusion", and that when more Satsuma retainers arrived, he aimlessly walked in and out of the cabin until finally

---

[757] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863; E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 84-85; H. Cortazzi, 'The British Bombardment of Kagoshima', p. 273.
[758] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 85.
[759] W. McOmie, *The Opening of Japan*, pp. 118-121; J. S. Sewall, *The Logbook of the Captain's Clerk* (Maine, Bangor, 1905), p. 156; J. W. Spalding, *Japan and around the World*, p. 153-155; B. Taylor, *India, China, and Japan, in the Year 1853* (New York, G. P. Putton & Co., 1855), pp. 425-429; In fact, unknown to the Americans, beneath the raised floor where the meeting was taking place were several hidden samurai in case Perry and his men attacked; S. E. Morrison, *"Old Bruin": The Life of Commodore Mathew C. Perry, 1794-1858* (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1967), p. 333.
[760] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863; Satow guesses that these extra retainers were either simple reinforcements or there to provide new orders to counteract any pre-emptive strike that had been secretly planned; E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 85; Japanese sources seem to corroborate this fact, as does the somewhat humorous Watermelon Merchant tale which in Japan has become a popular retold tale of the 'Anglo-Satsuma War'; Shōko Shūsei-kan, *Satsuei-Sensō 150-Nen*, p. 23.

announcing that there was something wrong with his own orders.[761] Negotiations were not helped when eighty-one Satsuma samurai posed as local Japanese (西瓜売り; *suika-uri*; 'Watermelon merchants') in seven small boats to scout the British fleet (and potentially back up the Satsuma negotiating party should things turn violent). Nor did it help that at the very first instance of communication, Satsuma played for time by saying their Daimyō was ill and was currently recuperating several miles way at an onsen.[762] It was also awkward that Satsuma's official reply to Britain's demands, despite supposedly having interpreters themselves, was eventually delivered to Neale only in Japanese and not with a Dutch copy at the very least. The British saw these as Japanese delaying tactics, which was probably correct, but the hostility of the diplomatic space Satsuma found themselves in was clearly exacerbating any pre-existing tensions and distrust.[763] Satsuma had based its negotiation premise on the British coming ashore, especially since they had built a meeting site onshore for this purpose (another mirror to the Perry Mission).[764] When Britain outright refused this Japanese-built space the Japanese were then forced into entering a diplomatic space where they had zero control and next to no preparation for. Their only plan was a near suicidal attempt to board and take control of the British flagship (because every other idea had either been turned down for being cowardly or neutralised by Britain's naval superiority). With a fleet behind Neale, with the aim of extracting some sort of penance if given the 'wrong' answer, the Japanese could not outright refuse to go aboard the *Euryalus* either, especially after making their intent to have some sort of diplomacy so clear with their initial overtures. Satsuma were effectively forced into this British dominated space, thus why we see so much confusion on their part. With no confidence from Satsuma and next to no trust from Britain, the diplomatic space onboard the *Euryalus* had gone as far as it could. There was little ground, if any, for a more positive and neutral diplomatic space to form that could lead to more substantial negotiations.[765] Unsurprisingly therefore, things ended with little actual discussion. Britain questioned their delays and confusion, reminding them of what could happen if the Japanese proved ignorant (real or otherwise) and evaded their questions further, and that was that.[766]

---

[761] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863.
[762] A hot spring.
[763] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863.
[764] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863.
[765] This whole event was made tenser by the fact that Satsuma had now retrained most of its shore batteries on the fleet whilst discussions were ongoing. This was not unnoticed by the British either.
[766] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, pp. 310-315.

The ship also weakened Satsuma's sense of place in Britain's diplomatic favour as well. Thanks to the ship the entire area's perception changed, further exacerbating British (self-believed and military) superiority and Japanese insecurity. This was part of Neale's reliance on the ship primarily as a military tool and not as a diplomatic site. For example, Kinkō Bay had been filled with Japanese junks and three recently purchased Western merchant ships, surrounded by a few wooden-built fishing villages and old shrines, with only Kagoshima, its aged fortifications around the bay, and its coastal cannons itself appearing significant. Even when compared to only a small fleet of Royal Navy ships this picture radically changes from its coastal picture of shrines, villages and (what was then only) the smoking island volcano of Sakurajima nearby, to a place that was now vulnerable and static. Satsuma were keenly aware of the gap in military capability even before the British fleet had even arrived; with only Kagoshima (Tsurumaru) Castle, a small, crumbling coastal fortress available if Britain were to destroy all its static batteries. Here, the mobility of the 'ship in transit', as well as their military potential, severely weakened Satsuma's sense of place. Britain controlled the when and the where and the Japanese were left uncomfortably rigid. This weakening is made clearer in the ensuing diplomacy between Britain and Satsuma by Admiral Kuper, who, during the interview's interlude stated that:

> The settlement of this matter can no longer be delayed. Kagosima is at my mercy; hostilities once commenced, your town will be destroyed, and I shall stop your trade both here and at the Loo-Choo Islands (*sic*).[767]

With the Royal Navy superiority in both space and place secured, combined with the breakdown of communication and lack of trust, negotiations came to a halt, with the bombardment taking place soon after.[768] The impact of the ship's impressive advantages it gave Britain militarily, but also diplomatically, became more apparent when after Anglo-Satsuma relations improved, Satsuma engaged in trade talks for British made military vessels (a Camelion-class sloop like the HMS *Perseus* seen at Kagoshima).[769] Satsuma had witnessed

[767] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863.
[768] M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, pp. 97-98.
[769] PP, Japan, No. 75, Neale to Russell, 17 November 1863; PP, Japan, No. 1, Neale to Russell, 17 December 1863.

what British naval power could achieve and now wanted to share in its superiority for their own ends.[770]

3.2. Conclusions:

The ship, in the case of the *Euryalus*, as the sole site of diplomatic space allowed for Britain to control the narrative of negotiations, firstly, through its destructive potential, secondly for its nature as a secure bastion to negotiate from safely, and lastly for its use as the main site of direct diplomacy between Japanese and British officials under guard and in complete authority. With no ability to influence the space around them or undertake diplomacy in a less negative and more neutral space, the Japanese had little agency to affect events. By reading Neale's despatches, he was clearly a frustrated diplomat, agitated by Satsuma's evasiveness and apparent confusion. He reacted by emphasising that whilst hostilities had not yet been resorted too, any more delays would not be tolerated.[771] The ship gave overwhelming impetus to both Neale's frustrations and demands. The space created aboard ship meant that Neale, rightly or wrongly, could ignore Satsuma's position almost entirely. British officials dictated where they would conduct diplomacy and then controlled what would be discussed, which whilst not surprising as the stronger diplomatic party, without the ship as their bastion and position of strength this overwhelmingly beneficial diplomatic space could not have formed. This was the initial negative consequence of the ship achieving this role as a mobile diplomatic space. As at Tsushima, the Royal Navy ship's primary locus as a warship was still negatively superseding its diplomatic use. This was partly by design of course, but also due to how the diplomat in charge, Neale, considered that the ship's role at Kagoshima. It was not an enhancer of diplomacy or even an asset of diplomacy, but there as a punitive threat should diplomacy fail, which it did. The ship was not chosen to be a specific diplomatic site for a purpose, but more down to British distrust of going ashore to Satsuma's diplomatic backyard. The ship's diplomatic power clearly went beyond the creation of a British controlled diplomatic space however, for it transformed the entire landscape and surroundings of Kinkō Bay into a place of relative weakness for Neale to exploit. The power imbalance between Britain and Satsuma would have probably occurred ashore as well, but never to the same extreme extent as aboard ship. Kagoshima was yet another innumerable example of most, if

[770] S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, pp. 315-316.
[771] PP, Japan, No. 63, Neale to Russell, 26 August 1863.

not all, meetings between a Western/Modern power and their perceived polar opposites. The ship personified and exaggerated their cultural differences and the technological superiority of, in this case, the British against the Japanese, mirroring D. W. Clayton's statement that ships were simultaneously "…bastions of power and islands of cultural difference."[772] Although the ship was finally able to be used as a diplomatic space, it was not a pleasant or planned affair, with the ship's greater diplomatic potential ultimately side-lined and outpaced by events once again.

4. Sir Harry Parkes and the Ship:

4.1. Introduction:

At Tsushima things misfired before the ship even had a chance to develop, and at Kagoshima events meant that any deviation from a military showing to a more diplomatic solution was nigh impossible.[773] It would only be after 1865 that Sir Harry Parkes would truly realise the Royal Navy ship's diplomatic advantages. He did so on two connected occasions. Firstly, alongside other powers, he exerted pressure on the Shogunate via the ship to open previously promised treaty ports, and secondly, he used the ship as a transporter and representative of diplomacy in a whirlwind tour of various Japanese Daimyō. This allowed him to traverse across Japan and make considerable diplomatic progress. This first occasion was like Neale's use of the ship in 1863 (though with the ship's military function seriously downplayed by comparison), but this was more of a test for what was to come. The second occasion saw the use of the ship develop further; as a way to outmanoeuvre competing powers for influence across Japan by becoming a mobile legation. Throughout each of these two instances we see the ship become a crucial diplomatic space where it could then radically affect British diplomacy for the better. The ship became both a physical and symbolic archetype of British diplomacy as a result.

[772] D. W. Clayton, *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2000), p. 153.
[773] Though the Tsushima incident itself (and Kagoshima to an extent) were successful overall.

4.2. Parkes and Imperial Ratification:

Upon arriving in Japan (1865), Russell updated Parkes on Japan's current predicaments, namely, the weakening Bakufu, and the confusion surrounding imperial ratification and the Shimonoseki Indemnity (worth around $3,000,000 Mexican Silver Dollars). Russell instructed Parkes that Britain preferred the expansion of trade over simply having the indemnity, but would ultimately accept his judgement.[774] The indemnity was the result of the Shimonoseki Campaign 1863-1864, where British, French, American and Dutch ships bombarded Chōshū Domain's coastline in response to attacks on foreign shipping.[775] There were some efforts made to avert the conflict before the bombardment of Shimonoseki took place, with some factional elements within Chōshū fully aware of the probable futility of trying to fight the Western powers. It did not help that a large amount of Chōshū's revenue came from lending money to transport companies using the Shimonoseki Straits since the 1840s, something that had now depreciated as a result of the Shimonoseki Campaign.[776] Plenty of pleas, discussions, and negotiations were had within Chōshū, but the one thing they did not have plenty of was time. A small boat carrying Chōshū negotiators to the foreign fleet did not make it in time to deliver their request for peaceful negotiations (though this would have probably proved futile as Admiral Kuper made it clear that any interviews aboard ship were to be refused after the experience of Kagoshima).[777] The bombardment occurred and no diplomatic space formed aboard ship. Chōshū ultimately surrendered, agreeing to all of the four treaty powers demands, but the Bakufu took on Chōshū's financial obligations (the indemnity).[778] The four powers were not content however, the French, whilst successfully getting agreement to increase the indemnity from two to three million, were challenged by

[774] PP, Japan, No. 38, Russell to Parkes, 23 August 1865; P. J. Treat, 'The Return of the Shimonoseki Indemnity', p. 1.
[775] K. Yuzo, 'The Opening of Japan and the Meiji Restoration, 1837-72', pp. 77-78; M. Asakawa, 'Anglo-Japanese Military Relations, 1800-1900', pp. 15-16; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, pp. 302-308; Y. Masaru, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu*, pp. 36-37.
[776] K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, p. 163.
[777] A. M. Craig, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration*, pp. 231-236; *Liverpool Albion*, 14 November 1864, p. 10.
[778] P. J. Treat, 'The Return of the Shimonoseki Indemnity', p. 7; M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 114; E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 117; I have not been able to personally corroborate this fully, but it seems that this was in addition to £10,000 for the initial attack on the *Pembroke* in 1863, and the Shogunate's judgement that Chōshū's servants (420 men and 215 women and children) should be executed and the Daimyō's two palaces razed; *Chicago Tribune*, 30 January 1864, p. 1; *The Irish Times and Daily Advertiser*, 12 December 1864, p. 4; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, pp. 320-326.

American indecision and the British hope that part of the indemnity might be waived in exchange for another treaty port opening. It was eventually decided to accept the money for now and hold onto it until they received further instructions.[779] This decision was made temporarily moot by the Shogunate's announcement that it would pay all it owed.[780] They later asked for a delay however, allowing the foreign powers to deliberate over the indemnity once again.[781] It was the Foreign Office and one of Parkes's predecessors, Charles Winchester, a Chargé d'Affaires, that came up with the idea of exchanging the indemnity for other concessions, helping lay the groundwork to shift the other powers positions (mainly the Dutch and the French).[782] Parkes subsequently adopted this idea and moved forward with Britain's preferred outcome to the Shimonoseki Indemnity.

Britain proposed that two thirds of the indemnity be waived, that Hyogo (Kobe) and Osaka be opened to foreign trade before 1868, and that Emperor Kōmei ratify the Ansei Treaties.[783] It was summarily agreed (without the Americans, who prophetically could not see the Japanese agreeing to an early opening of Osaka and Hyogo) on 26 October 1865 that an allied naval force should descend upon Osaka where the majority of Bakufu officials were now located (to chastise Chōshū for its rebellions).[784] Satow suggests that the Dutch were joined at the hip with Britain, that Parkes had them "…in his pocket", and would or could not disagree with his overtures, and that the French, whilst initially aloof, consigned themselves to following Britain's lead after some inducement.[785] However, evidence elsewhere paints a radically different picture. The Dutch were certainly more independently minded than Satow suggests, with them unilaterally agreeing with a French position on one occasion and holding their own

[779] PP, Japan, No. 53, Parkes to Russell, 25 August 1865.
[780] P. J. Treat, 'The Return of the Shimonoseki Indemnity', pp. 7-8; PP, Japan, No. 57, Parkes to Russell, 12 September 1865.
[781] PP, Japan, No. 66, Parkes to Russell, 30 October 1865.
[782] Not the first proposal to use a Naval force either, for example, the American Minister Pruyn in 1863 and Alcock and Winchester in 1864; E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 142-143; PP, Japan, No. 10, Winchester to Russell, 15 February 1865; PP, Japan, No. 12, Winchester to Russell, 28 February 1865; PP, Japan, No. 13, Russell to Winchester, 4 May 1865; PP, Japan, No. 14, Winchester to Russell, 30 March 1865; PP, Japan, No. 16, Winchester to Russell, 12 April 1865; PP, Japan, No. 22, Winchester to Russell, 25 April 1865; Document No. 45, Pruyn to Steward, 24 June 1863 in *United States Department of State Message of the President of the United States, Documents, 1863, Part II*, p. 1125; TNA, FO 46/52/10, Russell to Parkes, 23 August 1865.
[783] I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 183-184; Emperor Kōmei (1831-1876) was his posthumous name as per Japanese tradition. His name during his reign was Emperor Osahito.
[784] PP, Japan, No. 66, Parkes to Russell, 30 October 1865.
[785] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 143.

opinion on another (during the wrangling over the Shimonoseki Indemnity).[786] Their shift to Britain's position seems more about sharing British opinions on greater peaceful commerce and the diplomacy of Lord Russell more than anything else.[787] As for the French, being aloof was by design. This aloofness was one such example of support. Through Roches, France backed the Shogunate, and to this end ensured all manner of support was given to them.[788] Roches later sought to temper Parkes's demands and privately advise the Shogunate on how to proceed. He did this by conveniently falling ill when negotiations were about to begin aboard the *Princess Royal* and making a miraculous recovery when talks appeared to be breaking down to moderate Parkes's position and agree a compromise.[789] Historian I. Kanae argues that Roches also feared that if he did not support Parkes's plan to open Hyogo and Osaka, it might mean the opening of Shimonoseki and Kagoshima, weakening the Shogunate, and strengthening the more pro-British Daimyō.[790] In other words, Roches, rightly in my view, calculated that it was better to influence Britain's position as a supporter instead of an outsider, in order to prop up the Shogunate as best they could. After 1865, French support was an open secret, with Parkes airing his fears over the growing Tokugawa-Bonaparte Entente to the Foreign Office many times.[791] Indeed, Anglo-French rivalry in Japan had been present since 1864, intensifying after the arrival of Roches, and would not abate until the Meiji Restoration.[792] Any agreement that Parkes won from the other three treaty port powers clearly came with strings attached; be it through compromise (America), negotiation

---

[786] M. Medzini, *French Policy in Japan during the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 31-31 & pp. 42-44; PP, Japan, No, 17, Sir J. Milbank to Russell, 9 August 1864; PP, Japan, No. 26, Sir J. Milbanke to Russell, 10 July 1865; PP, Japan, No. 30, Sir. J. Milbanke to Russell, 17 July 1865; PP, Japan, No. 33, Sir J. Milbanke to Russell, 26 July 1865; PP, Japan, No. 53, Parkes to Russell, 25 August 1865.

[787] PP, Japan, No. 26, Sir J. Milbanke to Russell, 10 July 1865; PP, Japan, No. 53, Parkes to Russell, 25 August 1865.

[788] See R. Sims, *French Policy*; See M. Medzini, *French Policy in Japan*; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, pp. 431-433.

[789] R. Sims, *French Policy*, p. 50; Whilst not overtly mentioned by Parkes, Roches is clearly not present when talks occur: See TNA, FO 46/58/69, Parkes to Russell, 28 November 1865. Parkes also fails to mention Roches's role in helping draft the final agreement when negotiations went sideways at one point.

[790] I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 185.

[791] TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 27 June 1866; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 19 July 1866; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 14 August 1866; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 2 September 1866; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 12 September 1866; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 29 September 1866; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 17 October 1866; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 16 January 1867; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 16 March 1867; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 30 March 1867; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, pp. 436-438 & pp. 445-451.

[792] M. Medzini, *French Policy*, pp. 71-134; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, p. 448; I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 233.

(Netherlands), or a (not so) hidden agenda (France). Agreeing to use the ship in an allied fleet to perform a diplomatic task in support of diplomatic actors at Hyogo/Osaka somehow took more diplomatic leverage than agreeing to bombard Shimonoseki. What this shows us is that unlike the Shimonoseki Campaign, Osaka was a less concerted effort and more at Britain's behest.

Despite the diplomatic wrangling, Britain won out. A joint memorandum was signed after the American minister returned; as America remained sceptical of forcing Japan to open new ports in leu of the indemnity, the four powers accepted that the choice of whether to open ports earlier and waive the indemnity, or opening the ports later and continuing the indemnity, belonged to the Shogunate.[793] This was all positively received by the Foreign Office.[794] The ship was finally primed to take on a diplomatic space in Anglo-Japanese relations once again. On November 4 1865 the HMS *Princess Royal* (Second-Rate Ship of the Line), HMS *Leopard* (Wooden hulled paddle frigate), HMS *Pelorus* (Pearl-class Corvette), HMS *Bouncer* (An Albacore-class Gunboat), the French ships *Guerrière* (Dryade-class Frigate), *Dupleix* (a Corvette), and *Kien Chan* (a lightly armed aviso steamer bought in China), and the Dutch ship *Zoutman* (Djambi-class Corvette), carrying foreign diplomats (the Americans onboard British vessels) arrived at Osaka and negotiations began.[795] Parkes emphasised that the force would have:

> …a beneficial effect both on the Daimyō's who surround the Court of Kyoto, and have had little opportunity of satisfying themselves of our power and also on the people generally of that vicinity whom it is well to begin to accustom to the sight of foreign visitors.[796]

This intimidating naval force understandably irked the Foreign Office however. With the *Arrow* incident, Kagoshima, and Shimonoseki all in recent memory, the Foreign Office assumed the worst. Parkes was quick to assuage such fears by emphasising that the fleet was a bluff.[797] This was the truth. Parkes had already emphasised the diplomatic and peaceful

[793] PP, Japan, No. 66, Parkes to Russell, 30 October 1865.
[794] PP, Japan, No. 70, Clarendon to Parkes, 1 January 1866; I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 186.
[795] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 143-144; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, pp. 404-406.
[796] TNA, FO 46/57/59, Parkes to Russell, 30 October 1865.
[797] TNA, FO 46/58, Russell to Parkes, 25 November 1865.

focus of the fleet to Admiral King.[798] Parkes only intended to use the fleet to help expedite negotiations at Osaka and act as a form of public/people's diplomacy that would reveal British/foreign power to the Japanese masses; something highly desired in a region that might soon become home to a treaty port or two.[799] This unofficial diplomacy proved to be quite successful. Various Daimyō sent representatives to meet 'privately' onboard in order to establish for themselves what was happening in Osaka. A ship Captain from Satsuma and his officers were even treated onboard the *Princess Royal*.[800] It established unofficial dialogue with a variety of non-state actors that would later prove useful (namely Aizu, Higo, and Satsuma).[801] Many Japanese were allowed to interact and go aboard ship too, familiarising themselves with the so-called 'foreign barbarians'. Parkes's use of the allied fleet here mirrors Perry and his fleet's grand, but benign, passage through the Uraga Channel towards Edo in order to impress upon the Japanese population America's technological prestige.[802] Parkes's allied flotilla recreated an area of diplomatic space to dictate from. The ship transformed into a bastion of diplomacy, though on this occasion, not only for official diplomatic dealings, but for some successful unofficial diplomacy as well, allowing other Japanese actors to enter Britain's diplomatic space, many for the first time.

Led by the *Princess Royal*, the small fleet was under the overall command of Admiral George King, the then Commander-in-Chief of what was now called the China Station (changed in 1865). Like Neale's British flotilla, this allied fleet was a formidable sight, but would have held an even greater number of sailors, marines, and others onboard, closer to the 1500 mark.[803] It would have been impressive to witness this allied fleet enter the Seto Inland Sea, only the second fleet to do so, and surround Osaka. All these vessels, save perhaps the *Kien Chan*, would have once again seemed technologically superior and impressive to the

---

[798] I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 187-188; PP, Japan, No. 66, Parkes to Russell, 26 October 1865.
[799] PP, Japan, No. 74, Parkes to Russell, 17 November 1865; TNA, FO 46/58, Parkes to Hammond, 18 November 1865; According to Daniels, Parkes went to great lengths to make the Bakufu halt their policy of making Japanese visits to foreign ships illegal as part of this aim; See G. Daniels, *Sir Harry Parkes, British Representative in Japan, 1865-1883*, p. 44.
[800] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 149-150.
[801] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 151; Aizu were ruled by the Matsudaira Family, Higo by the Hosokawa Family, and Satsuma by the aforementioned Shimazu Family.
[802] F. L. Hawks & M. C. Perry, *Narrative*, pp. 232-236, p. 303.
[803] Satow claims that this fleet was less imposing than the one at Kagoshima, but given his inconsistent noting of their armaments in his own recollections and the fact that more sailors, marines, and ships were involved, two of them substantial frigates (double of what was at Kagoshima), I find this hard to believe; E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 143-144.

Japanese; their might was duly noted and feared.[804] The Japanese had purchased some merchant shipping as seen in 1863 with Satsuma, but their more significant naval purchases came later (1866-1868). These were still small vessels due to Japan's limited purchasing power however. The largest vessel purchased during this period from Britain only weighed 500 tonnes.[805] Even if we consider a minor British ship from the fleet at Osaka, the differences in power and technology between the West and Japan remained stark. The HMS *Pelorus* was fast, travelling almost 300 miles a day if needed. It was also armed with a modern 68-pound gun fitted into its bow, enough to significantly dwarf most Japanese (Shogunate) cannons.[806] The *Pelorus's* tonnage was around 2,327; more than four times the largest vessel bought by the Japanese (post-1865). This staggering level of naval superiority would have therefore affected the areas place in Japan's diplomatic geography. The Western fleet's presence only intensified the city's existing vulnerabilities however. Japanese castles and defences actually declined over the Edo/Tokugawa period, both in terms of their number and their defensive effectiveness. This was mainly due to the cost of maintaining such defences (especially in peacetime) and the susceptibility these defences had to Japan's geological and weather systems.[807] They became less about actual defence and more about symbolising power to the masses.[808] Osaka Castle and its adjoining barricades were all victims of this process.[809] In terms of place, Osaka was now a weak point in Japan's coastal armour; a place of weakness that only intensified the draw of the diplomatic space now forming aboard ship.

---

[804] For example, during an imperial conference with many Daimyō and court officials discussing imperial ratification of the Ansei Treaties after the West, under Parkes's direction, had made their demands at Osaka, Prince Nakagawa warned that should foreign demands be refused, the whole region from Hyogo to Kyoto would be in flames, and that even the imperial throne and Ise Shrine would be at risk. He stated that he could only see these disasters before him and had a major impact on proceedings. The West's military might over Japan was not to be ignored; D. Keene, *Emperor of Japan*, p. 87.

[805] Parliamentary Papers, Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in China, Japan, and Siam, 1866-1868 [Hereafter, PP, Commercial Reports, 1866-1868].

[806] C. Bridge, *Some Recollections* (London, John Murray, 1918), pp. 161-165; Japanese cannon were still based in the six-eight pounder region for the most part, and would only reach modern ten pounders with explosive rounds as the overall norm by 1876; N. Perrin, *Giving up the Gun: Japan's Reversion to the Sword, 1543-1879* (Boston, David. R. Godine, 1979), pp. 71-73.

[807] O. Benesch & R. Zwigenberg, *Japan's Castles: Citadels of Modernity in War and Peace* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 24-25.

[808] W. H. Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan* (London, Routledge, 1996), pp. 105-106.

[809] M. Hinago, *Japanese Castles* (Tokyo, Kodansha, 1986), p. 153; Moreover, it was also common for the Japanese to use so-called 'Dungaree Forts' (sham military defences) to artificially inflate the effectiveness of their coastal defences. Vulnerable ports like Osaka, Tokyo, and Nagasaki were not immune to this strategy.

Despite Dr. Willis's description of Osaka being "…the most uninteresting city in the world," Osaka was Japan's commercial capital.[810] A significant amount of domestic Japanese trade passed through Osaka, especially southern Japanese trade, thus explaining why Western powers desired its opening. [811] The Bakufu feared that any nearby treaty port would only benefit the 'uncontrolled' Japanese merchant community and the southern Daimyō, threatening their own foreign trade monopoly.[812] Moreover, Osaka's closeness to Kyoto, the seat of the Emperor and the 'old' capital, meant that it had to be denied to the Western Powers. It did not help that the allied fleet made a great showing of arming its guns and appearing battle ready as it anchored off of Osaka's shore unopposed however.[813] Like at Kagoshima, the Japanese were immediately on the backfoot diplomatically. The Shogunate either allowed them ashore, which they ultimately did, and acquiesce to a foreign presence in the very place they wished to be free of foreign influence, forcing their hand before talks had begun, incurring wrath from many domestic Japanese elements that wished the 'foreign barbarian' gone. Or they went aboard the allied ships, which they did as well, and suffer through a foreign space where they held little to no intelligence, control, or power. While much more peaceable than Kagoshima, the ship was still very much a negative diplomatic space, where the foreign representatives led by Parkes could prod and poke Shogunate officials for information and concessions. The best example of this came during the second meeting aboard the *Princess Royal* on 14 November. Such was the stress of the first meeting, the original negotiator was now unavailable due to illness… (Parkes saw this as a lie and another ploy to play for time).[814] To summarise the second meeting, Parkes, feeling frustrated and confused about the Shogunate's assertions that it could not simply open Hyogo and Osaka due to the Emperor, began openly asserting that if this was the whole truth then the Shogun would effectively be like any other Daimyō in Japan; if the Shogunate wants to be recognised as the sole leading polity of Japan, then it should take whatever steps are

---

[810] H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 83. A. B. Mitford in contrast quite liked Osaka, stating that despite its architectural hideousness, it was commercial, industrial, and felt far safer than Edo; R. Morton, *A. B. Mitford*, pp. 45-46.
[811] See W. B. Hauser, 'Osaka: A Commercial City in Tokugawa Japan', *Urbanism: Past & Present*, 5 (Winter 1977-1978), pp. 23-32 & pp. 35-36; See J. L. McClain & W. Osamu, eds., *Osaka: The Merchants' Capital of Early Modern Japan* (London, Cornell University Press, 1999); W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, pp. 41-43; See E. S. Crawcour, 'Changes in Japanese Commerce in the Tokugawa Period', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 22:4 (August 1963, pp. 387-400;
[812] M. R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p. 37.
[813] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 145.
[814] PP, Japan, No. 74, Parkes to Russell, 17 November 1865.

necessary to comply. According to I. Kanae the Shogunate's diplomats were left lost for words.[815] Just as Satsuma was neutralised at Kagoshima by the ship, so to was the Shogunate at Osaka. Obviously, without the ship this would not have been possible regardless, but the circumstances surrounding Western exclusion from Japan's interior and the dangers that existed both within and outside the treaty ports, meant that the ship was the *only* viable option.[816]

Any diplomat could have recognised this, as Perry and Neale did, but the difference was that they performed their diplomacy for reasons beyond the ship itself. Perry wanted to go ashore and Neale wanted to stay aboard ship for their own diplomatic reasons. The ship provided diplomatic benefits, yes, but not from any actual adaptation or direction on Perry and Neale's part. Parkes was first to have the means to see past the Royal Navy ship's literal functions: transportation and military might. He realised that if used properly, these functions could instead have a direct effect on Anglo-Japanese diplomacy. For example, at Osaka the diplomats could go ashore or stay aboard ship; both happened, but both were great opportunities that the ship made possible. Ashore they not only gained a diplomatic victory, but had the knowledge that they had a fleet to further empower themselves and potentially enforce their demands. Aboard ship they held a position of control and privacy; a diplomatic space firmly under a foreign thumb. At this stage, Parke's more diplomatic utilisation of the ship was still in its infancy however. Whilst he was developing a more viable diplomatic space aboard ship, the ship's military might still hold an important role (even as a bluff) in exerting pressure. Just as Kagoshima's weakness to the ship were exposed, Osaka's were too. Osaka Castle and Osaka's other various ageing coastal defences and cannon, whilst visually impressive, would have appeared vulnerable and defensively static to the hundreds of modern and mobile ship-based cannons (91 aboard the HMS *Princess Royal* alone) the allied flotilla possessed. As much as Parkes may have wanted to settle affairs more diplomatically, Japanese antagonism towards foreigners and tactful resistance to Western imperialism meant that a more forceful hand was needed. For the weakening Shogunate there was no alternative, they would have to talk on the treaty port powers terms regardless of the locale. The ship had

[815] I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 195-196; PP, Japan, No. 74, Parkes to Russell, 17 November 1865.
[816] Both within and outside the treaty port boundaries, murders and attacks were a common occurrence in Edo era Japan for foreigners.

forced the Japanese to take notice of the treaty power's demands in a way that would have not otherwise been possible.

Negotiations took the form of various interviews and discussions, involving a chaotic criss-crossing between land and ship.[817] However, despite various delays, resignations, sackings, and backroom wrangling on the part of the Japanese, the determination of the foreign representatives won out. The fleet's presence in the background no doubt reminding the Japanese what was at stake should the treaty powers receive the 'wrong' answer. This fear was probably further exacerbated by Parkes's veiled threats that implied force was still an active option; that the foreign representatives would be "…free to act as we may judge convenient."[818] Satow also states that when talks were at their most strained the port of Osaka virtually emptied, with all merchant, Daimyō, and Shogunate shipping hastily extricating themselves to another part of Japan, fearing and knowing what hostilities with the Western fleet would bring. Such an action only makes plainer the affect the ship had on diplomacy; everyone knew what the consequences could be and that the foreign representatives headed by Parkes had more than the means at their disposal to destroy Osaka's coastline quite easily.[819] By 24 November the Bakufu received agreement for Imperial ratification (but not actually ratification outright…), promised tariff renegotiations, and promised to pay the indemnity in full anyway (after refusing the opening of any new treaty ports prior to 1868 however, abiding by the London Protocol in 1862).[820] The sudden threat of force at Osaka may have caused havoc in internal Japanese affairs, but for the foreign powers and Britain it had proved a fruitful practice.[821] The ship had once more acted as a diplomatic space. Not only was the ship a base of diplomacy that could provide safety and threats of force to reinforce British/foreign negotiations once more, but now it was clearly a conduit of diplomacy as well.

---

[817] PP, Japan, No. 74, Parkes to Russell, 17 November 1865; Document 61, Uchita Naka-no-suke to Kampaku (Nijō Nariaki), 16 November 1865 in W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, pp. 296-297; E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 143-154.
[818] PP, Japan, No. 79, Parkes to Russell, 28 November 1865.
[819] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 158.
[820] TNA, FO 46/58/69, Parkes to Russell, 28 November 1865; PP, Japan, No. 77, Parkes to Russell, November 25 1865.
[821] PP, Japan, No. 79, Mikado's Sanction of the Treaties, and Gorogio's [Rōjū) Engagement for its Promulgation, 28 November 1865; Document 66, Imperial Court to Bakufu, 22 November 1865 in W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, p. 304.

Thanks to the ship foreign diplomats were able to sidestep Edo and the Shogunate's attempts to delay and deflect foreign demands; because of the ship, Britain especially, could put pressure on the Bakufu where needed almost anywhere.[822] The ship could act as mobile space for British diplomacy, unconstrained by the dangers of Japan's interior and unrestricted by the diplomatic segregation of the treaty ports spread across the country. Furthermore, Parkes's unofficial minor aim of achieving some broader public diplomacy was successfully completed with British sailors and marines interacting with Japanese civilians ashore and aboard ship. Not only did this go on without incident, but it had the benefit of promoting British power and good feeling among the Japanese.[823] For Parkes to use Royal Navy ships as the primary locale of diplomatic space for some public/unofficial diplomacy alongside the more official diplomacy was a stroke of genius.[824] As Parkes himself stated at a dinner celebrating the successful negotiations onboard the *Princess Royal* in a toast to Admiral King:

> …but after all, it was you who did it, Admiral, for without you and your magnificent ship, we should not have made the slightest impression.[825]

4.3. Parkes and the Daimyō:

From the mid-1860s to the abolition of the Han (Daimyō) in 1871, Britain was engaged in various private diplomatic engagements with several Japanese polities (the Daimyō). Some of these were associated with the official Japanese Government, the Bakufu, some were neutral parties worried about their survival, and others were part of a burgeoning anti-Bakafu alliance. Initially, this was a delicate tightrope to walk for contact with these polities was technically illegal under the Ansei treaties signed in 1858, which established Western relations with the Bakufu as the sole government of Japan. To engage in such unofficial diplomacy with the Daimyō was completely contrary to this and Britain's primary diplomatic preference of dealing with only *one* power.[826] Thanks to some groundwork laid by Neale,

[822] The significant exception being Kyoto.
[823] TNA, FO 46/58, Parkes to Hammond, 18 November 1865.
[824] There was some prior precedent for this. Parkes had used the same idea during Anglo-Siamese negotiations in 1855 with King Mongkut. Talks were carried out by Bowring and Parkes together; See R. Morton, *A Life of Sir Harry Parkes*, pp. 57-72; PP, Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Her Majesty and The Kings of Siam, with an Agreement Supplementary thereto, 1857.
[825] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 154.
[826] PP, Japan, No. 36, Winchester to Russell, 26 May 1865.

Winchester, and finally Parkes, these relations with various Daimyō were fruitfully cultivated and eventually encouraged. Soon this unofficial diplomacy was transformed into more official diplomacy. Not only did this create new diplomatic opportunities for Anglo-Japanese relations, but it allowed for a new radical diplomatic geography to form across Japan as well. Parkes had already tested the waters at Osaka, but now the ship could take on an even greater role for British diplomacy. Now, it would finally be used not as a weapon to encourage fear and submission, but as a space solely for positive, equal diplomatic exchange. It was Parkes's desire to better contact the Daimyō that would spur the ship's transformation into a mobile legation.

4.4. Who were the Daimyō?:

Fig. 3: Locations of Relevant Daimyō.

Not all of Japan was directly ruled by the Tokugawa Bakufu. Most of Japan was ruled by the Daimyō (Japanese feudal lords), who, to varying degrees, were effectively semi-independent states. Overall, there were roughly 260-280 domains of varying sizes and types ruled by the

Daimyō.[827] They can be split into two groups, the *tozama* and the *fudai*. The *tozama* or 'outside' Daimyō were mainly in southwestern Japan. They were defined as Daimyō who had not been formal allies of the Tokugawa prior to the Battle of Sekigahara, and thus included those loyal, neutral or even opposed. For example, Tsushima, Satsuma, Chōshū, and many others were all *tozama* Daimyō. The majority of domains were ruled by *tozama* Daimyō. The other Daimyō, the *fudai*, were the Tokugawa's leading allies (and sometimes family members in the case of *shinpan*/*gosanke* Daimyō, a further subcategory).[828] They were widely dispersed, but many could be found in central (Kantō and Kansai) and northeastern (Tōhoku) Japan. For example, Aizu, Ogasawara, Mito, Owari, Hikone, Wakayama, and Sakura were all *fudai* (or also *shinpan*) Daimyō. The Daimyō's geographical positioning meant that their importance and interests varied greatly from place to place. The British interacted with Daimyō who were implacably opposed to the Bakufu, with some who simply wanted Western technology and trade, with neutral parties (albeit usually temporarily neutral), and also talked to Daimyō who fully supported the Shogunate. The possibility of developing Anglo-Daimyō relations as a result of Britain's Sea Power and, as discussed, Japan's long coastline, was now perfectly primed.

4.4. Space and Place in Anglo-Daimyō Relations:

Expanded Anglo-Daimyō relations were able to happen for three reasons. Firstly, thanks to the neutrality of Charles Winchester, a consul and Chargé d'Affaires. Winchester faced pressure to halt trade and interactions with various Daimyō from many directions, but thanks to his resistance the door for expanding Anglo-Daimyō relations was left open for his successor, Parkes. Secondly, Parkes was increasingly aware of the opportunities that improved Anglo-Daimyō relations could bring to Britain's position in Japan. As early as June 1865, in Nagasaki, during Parkes's first foray on Japanese soil, he met with famous British merchant, Thomas Blake Glover, and expressed his feelings of desperate support for the Shogunate. Glover's response was telling: "You do not know it, but the future of Japan is in the hands of the southern Daimyō. Japan's future depends on them."[829] Furthermore, during negotiations at Osaka with the Shogunate, various Daimyō 'privately' visited the allied

[827] L. M. Cullen, *A History of Japan, 1582-1941*, pp. 7-8.
[828] See H. Bolitho, *Treasures Among Men: The Fudai Daimyo in Tokugawa Japan* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1975).
[829] A. McKay, *Scottish Samurai: Thomas Blake Glover 1838-1911* (Edinburgh, Canongate, 1993), p. 53.

flotilla in order to gather their own intelligence. Agents from the (pro-Shogunate) Aizu, (anti-Shogunate) Higo, and Satsuma domains were the most prominent.[830] From early on in his tenure Parkes was aware that there might be alternatives for British diplomacy in Japan.[831] Lastly, the sounding out of Britain by Satsuma agents, namely Matsuki Kōan (later Japan's Foreign Minister, named Terashima Munenori), beginning in early 1866 cannot be ignored. Through its agents, Satsuma successfully brought itself, and the Daimyō overall, to the Foreign Office's full attention. Satsuma showed its personal interest in engaging with the West, stating that any previous hostility was primarily due to the Shogunate's monopolisation of foreign trade.[832] Parkes's opportunity to settle this issue came about quickly in 1866 during negotiations over the new Tariff convention.[833] Parkes helped secure articles, VIII, IX and X, which proved highly significant. They effectively ended the Shogunate's foreign trade monopoly that excluded all Japanese from foreign travel and now allowed them to buy (naval vessels were specifically mentioned) and/or sell at any open treaty port.[834] In Parkes's own words:

> The present convention if faithfully carried out should surely remove the complaints of Satsuma that the Tycoon refuses the Daimios their fair share in the trade [with the treaty port powers]…(*sic*).[835]

Whilst difficulties presented themselves from both the Bakufu and other treaty port powers, specifically the French, who did not wish for any foreign-Daimyō diplomacy (part of their pro-Shogunate agenda), the new convention was signed on 25 June 1866.[836] It helped that later, the new Foreign Secretary (1866-1868), Lord Stanley, shared Parkes's view that having

---

[830] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 151.
[831] It also helped that Parkes had not so subtlety hinted at desiring Parkes to find out more about the current domestic situation of Japan, including the Daimyō; PP, Japan, No. 38, Russell to Parkes, 23 August 1865.
[832] TNA, FO 46/63, Hammond to Parkes, 26 March 1866; TNA, FO 46/63, Hammond to Parkes, 26 April 1866.
[833] TNA, FO 46/68, Parkes to Hammond, 29 May 1868; TNA, FO 46/68, Parkes to Hammond, 14 June 1866.
[834] PP, Japan, No. 1, Parkes to Clarendon, 27 June 1866; TNA, FO 46/68, Parkes to Hammond, 27 June 1866; PP, Japan, No. 2, Stanley to Parkes, 31 August 1866.
[835] TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 27 June 1866.
[836] TNA, FO 46/65/18, Parkes to Clarendon, 31 January 1866; W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, pp. 78-79; TNA, FO 46/ 67, Parkes to Hammond, 28 February 1866; TNA, FO 46/68, Parkes to Hammond, 28 April 1866; TNA, FO 46/68/73, Parkes to Clarendon, 28 April 1866; TNA, FO 46/68/81, Parkes to Clarendon, 14 May, 1866; TNA, FO 46/68/99, Parkes to Clarendon, 27 June 1866; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 27 June 1866.

relations with the Daimyō, as well as the Bakufu, would be advantageous.[837] Combined with this convention the ship would thrust those Daimyō willing to engage with Britain into the Western diplomatic world; a 'boundary crossing' that would equalise the standing of Britain's diplomatic officials and the Daimyō in ways not possible elsewhere.[838]

The results of this achievement were substantial for Parkes. The French, Americans, and Dutch, all failed to appreciate what could be achieved by such direct and overt talks with various Japanese lords besides the Shogunate.[839] The French in particular, to paraphrase Parkes in a letter to the Foreign Office, had a unique interest, more than any other treaty power, in the "…maintenance of the Tycoon's supremacy…"[840] This left only the British proactively interested in pursuing improved relations with the Daimyō. Of course, the ship was once again needed to support such diplomacy. Like at Osaka and Kagoshima the ship would again become a diplomatic space for various meetings and discussions, altering Japan's diplomatic landscape to Britain's advantage. However, it would also go well beyond this, becoming a mobile legation, an embassy that could move to wherever needed within days or weeks. It could split up or unify, it could both send and receive officials, it could leave and go whenever it pleased. It provided a diplomatic fluidity to British diplomats who, in a country like Bakumatsu Era Japan, really needed such movement to get around Japan's natural and unnatural obstructions. The treaty ports were designed to be controlled spaces and places that allowed equal opportunity for trade among the treaty powers, and while this prevented a rush of imperialism, the treaty ports were also a compromise with the Japanese. The treaty ports allowed the Japanese to fight for control over diplomatic space and effectively have a say in the when and where a sense of diplomatic place occurred. Diplomatic mobilities were to be put under a controlled set of motions, where legations would be static (in Edo/Yokohama) and any meetings with Japanese officials could be on

[837] TNA, FO 46/70/137, Parkes to Stanley, 2 September 1866; TNA, FO 262/124, Stanley to Parkes, 28 November 1867.
[838] See W. Hasty & K. Peters, 'The Ship in Geography', pp. 663-664; See R. Gomperts, 'Women on Waves: Where Next for the Abortion Boat?', *Reproductive Health Matters*, 10:19 (2002), pp. 180-183.
[839] Document 19, Portman to Steward, 22 April 1866 in *United States Department of State, Executive documents printed by order of the House of Representatives, during the second session of the thirty-ninth Congress, 1866-67, Part II* (Washington, D. C, US Government Printing Office, 1866-67), pp. 204-205; W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, pp. 78-79; TNA, FO 46/55/107, Winchester to Russell, 7 June 1865; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 27 June 1866; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 19 July 1866.
[840] TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 19 July 1866.

Bakufu terms. The ship and its own fluid mobility smashed this control. Additionally, the static 'temple' legations were not popular among the foreign diplomatic community either.[841] They were too hot in the summer, too cold in the winter, and effectively open buildings, with no way of adequately securing privacy or defending them from attack.[842] By comparison the ship was a friendly and familiar space, so its use as a mobile legation was not a drastic or unwelcome change to adapt to. Moreover, even in transit the ship still influenced diplomacy, but now it was no longer about simply acting as a space from which diplomats could feel more secure and control negotiation narratives better from. Nor was it a simple matter of being a 'threat' to back up British diplomacy either. Combined with Parkes's intention of increasing ties, the ship was now, much like HMY *Britannia* of the twentieth century, needed to promote trade and good relations. It was a space that could be used to demonstrate and/or entertain, rather than to threaten or belittle the Japanese. Now, more subliminal diplomacy could happen, allowing for Japanese non-state actors, the Daimyō and their retainers, to mimic the state diplomacy ongoing between the Shogunate and the foreign powers, further legitimising themselves in the eyes of Britain, who could then further its own aims of economic exploitation and informal empire. The ship was now not only a more comfortable diplomatic space for the Japanese, but also for the British as well, allowing for state actors outside of Parkes and other main diplomatic staff to play a greater role.

4.5. Britain and the Daimyō:

Contacts with the Daimyō were plentiful for Britain in the lead up to this shift in diplomacy. Britain of course had contact, negative and later positive, with Satsuma and Chōshū since 1863 thanks to the bombardment of Kagoshima and the Shimonoseki Campaign. They also had some unofficial contact with Aizu and Higo during Parkes's negotiations at Osaka in 1865. All these clans, in the aftermath of Parkes's concessions gained in the 1866 Tariff Convention, would make contact with Britain again, with the ship taking centre stage. Prior to July 1866, when the first of such post-convention travels took place, Parkes travelled to Nagasaki after negotiating the Tariff Convention at Edo, calling on various Daimyō offices in

[841] Almost all legations and many consulates were housed in former Buddhist temples adapted for foreign use; See M. Paske-Smith, *Western Barbarians in Japan and Formosa in Tokugawa Days, 1603-1868* (Kobe, J. L. Thompson & Co, 1930).
[842] One contemporary talks of the Japanese guards selling 'peep holes' to gawk at the foreigners, whilst also reporting on their every move and word; P. Barr, *The Coming of the Barbarians: A Story of Western Settlement in Japan, 1853-1870* (London, Penguin Books, 1988), pp. 74-75.

order to enquire about having more official discussions.[843] Whilst negotiating with the Shogunate at Edo, Parkes, under difficulty, tried to meet with various Daimyō representatives and agents there, but most, save for Satsuma, were afraid of drawing the wrath of Shogunate officials. This awkwardness only confirmed to Parkes the necessity of meeting the Daimyō nearer their own domains unfettered, which the ship could easily allow for.[844] Before the Tariff Convention was even finalised Parkes had become aware of Satsuma and Chōshū's interest to meet with him. Thus, as soon as the convention was signed, he headed south to Nagasaki. It was here that he met with Admiral King and received Satsuma's official invitation.[845] Whilst at Nagasaki, Parkes was also invited by Uwajima and would visit them immediately after Satsuma.[846] Parkes sailed for Kagoshima aboard the HMS *Salamis* (a despatch vessel), alongside the flagship, HMS *Princess Royal*, and the HMS *Serpent* (a converted Cormorant-class).[847] As aforementioned the *Princess Royal* was an impressive vessel. A modern ship of the line that had a crew of around 850, over 91 guns and a company or two of Royal Marines.[848] If you wanted a ship to show of British power and prestige then this was the one you wanted.[849] So cemented was Parkes's idea of the 'mobile legation' that he personally emphasised the need to bring the flagship, the *Princess Royal*, to Kagoshima in order to impress the local Japanese, nobility and commoner alike.[850] The *Salamis* and *Serpent* were also brought to Kagoshima, which whilst considerably smaller, had their own diplomatic uses as well. Both wooden, but still equipped with advanced technology, their smaller size and specific uses would appear much more affordable to the Japanese should they want an example of a ship that they could purchase. As a despatch vessel the *Salamis*

---

[843] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 160; TNA, FO 46/70/130, Parkes to Clarendon, 13 August 1866.
[844] TNA, FO 46/68, Parkes to Hammond, 16 May 1866.
[845] TNA, FO 46/68, Parkes to Hammond, 28 April 1866 TNA, FO 46/68, Parkes to Hammond, 27 June 1866; The invitation was delivered by one Niro Giobu, one of Satsuma's highest ranking samurai retainers, and a sign of how much importance Satsuma attached improving direct ties with Britain; I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 272.
[846] TNA, FO 46/69/106, Parkes to Clarendon, 25 July 1866; There were some concerns about how the Shogunate would react, with Uwajima especially requesting that the Magistrate of Nagasaki be informed and permission asked. This would all prove to be unnecessary in part due to the Shogunate's waning power and Parkes's concessions; I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 292-294.
[847] TNA, FO 46/69/121, Parkes to Clarendon, 2 August 1866.
[848] R. Gardner, eds., *Conway's*, p. 3; A. Lambert, *Battleships*, p. 131.
[849] R. Morton suggests that when it came to impressive vessels, Parkes had a knack for knowing what he wanted. He and the French Minister Roches did not wish to be outdone by the other and would often parade themselves on powerful Western ships to the Japanese during this period; R. Morton, *A Life of Sir Harry Parkes*, p. 137 & pp. 139-140.
[850] TNA, FO 46/69/72, Parkes to King, 14 July 1866.

was fast, a use that for the Japanese could prove mightily attractive in terms of trade and travel.[851] The *Serpent*, as a survey ship, had its cartographic uses, which given Japan's difficult seas and dangerous coastline, also had its attraction.[852] Additionally, as a Cormorant-class vessel, its intended armament was designed for shore bombardment, which again would be useful considering Japan's island nature. These ships would be used again and again for such diplomatic escapades with the Daimyō and their impact on the Japanese would prove significant for Britain.

Nearing arrival at Kagoshima, Parkes's small flotilla was led into Kinkō Bay by a Satsuma steamship.[853] The next day the British anchored closer to Kagoshima in preparation for the diplomatic festivities; naval salutes were exchanged with the firing of cannons.[854] This was a marked change from the last time Royal Navy ships and Kagoshima's coastal cannons met. Naval ceremony took centre stage; a sign of things to come. Visits between officials were initially traded, with Parkes and his cohort given a tour of Kagoshima and the Satsuma Japanese shown the *Princess Royal*. Satsuma's nobility were described as being very excitable, and made their strong desire to see the flagship personally early on, which was agreed too.[855] There was no negative space aboard ship, simply a positive space to which Satsuma Japanese could explore, question and mingle with British sailors and officials alike. Parkes states that Satsuma hoped Britain had forgiven and forgot the murder of Richardson, which thankfully, Parkes and others mostly reciprocated.[856] A banquet was held later and Satsuma showed off some of their troops being drilled in the 'European Style'. The images of military drills, gift exchanges, banquets and tours of various sorts remarkably mimic the more official diplomacy that Britain and Parkes were far more accustomed too. Whilst not entirely surprising, this does show that the British were more than willing to recognise Daimyō as a polity diplomatically equal to the Shogunate (if not politically equal). Surprisingly, many

---

[851] *The Times*, 10 July 1861, p. 12; *The Times*, 27 June 1864, p. 9; *The Times*, 2 January 1866, p. 7.
[852] *The Times*, 1 November 1860, p. 12; *The Times*, 2 February 1861, p. 8; R. Gardner, eds., *Conway's*, p. 109; A. Preston & J. Major, *Send a Gunboat: The Victorian Navy and Supremacy at Sea* (London, Conway Maritime Press, 2007), p. 157; R. Wingfield & D. Lyon, *The Sail and Steam Navy List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy, 1815-1889* (London, Chatham Publishing, 2004), pp. 218-223.
[853] TNA, FO 46/69/106, Parkes to Clarendon, 2 August 1866.
[854] TNA, FO 46/69/106, Parkes to Clarendon, 2 August 1866.
[855] TNA, FO 46/69/106, Parkes to Clarendon, 2 August 1866.
[856] The one standout British official who had no wish to 'forgive and forget' was Dr. Willis who detested the very fact that he was in the same room as Richardson's 'murderer': "For my own part, I feel contaminated by contact with a murderer on convivial terms."; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, pp. 76-77.

among the British camp were allowed to travel ashore and explore (albeit with an escort), and the British allowed the Japanese the same trust, with many Japanese going aboard Royal Navy ships once again.[857] Parkes notes the many positives of the private conversations being had. Most notably the substantial intelligence that was gained about how Osaka in 1865 was interpreted behind the scenes and the Shogunate's wrangling with the Imperial Court.[858] Certainly, a more amicable diplomatic space and place across Kagoshima and the Royal Navy vessels now existed if such frank discussions were being had. This would prove to be the norm for most Anglo-Daimyō meetings going forward. Moreover, the ship must have made a positive impression for it was not long before all the leading men of the Shimazu family were shown aboard the *Princess Royal*. They were provided a regal welcome with gun salutes, given a full tour, and allowed to see the ship drilled and undergo some target practice. Parkes extolls how they 'lauded' the vessel and were deeply impressed, no doubt pleased that in the first instance of Anglo-Daimyō diplomacy he had fought for and lauded himself was going so well.[859] The ship, once more, was paying dividends for Anglo-Japanese diplomacy by impressing upon Satsuma what sort of economic, diplomatic, and military potential could be gained through intercourse with the West and from Britain in particular. From military intimidation to diplomatic posturing. Not only was the ship once again a focal point for diplomatic space, but it was now also a method of public diplomacy and soft power for Kagoshima locals and Satsuma aristocrats alike.

Parkes subsequently made good on the Daimyō of Uwajima's invitation (an offshoot of the Date family).[860] Uwajima was a new quantity for Parkes to contend with. They had no previous dealings save for the knowledge that the family ruling here was famous for its more liberal outlook; particularly from one of its ex-Daimyō who had argued back in 1858 that Japan *should* open to foreign countries. This was greatly disagreed with by his predecessor and successor, but all agreed that some form of Western engagement was necessary.[861] Furthermore, Uwajima was also the second domain to domestically build a small steamship (after Satsuma) in 1859-1860, so their interest in Britain's burgeoning naval diplomacy did

[857] TNA, FO 46/69/121, Parkes to Clarendon, 2 August 1866.
[858] TNA, FO 46/69, Parkes to Hammond, 2 August 1866.
[859] TNA, FO 46/69/121, Parkes to Clarendon, 2 August 1866; S. Konishi, *Nihon no Rekishi 19*, pp. 426-430.
[860] Uwajima-shi Bunka Kyōkai, *Meiji Ishin to Uwajima: Uwajima no Jinbutsu* (Uwajima, Uwajima-shi Bunka Kyōkai, 2022), pp, 37-41.
[861] TNA, FO 46/70/130, Parkes to Clarendon, 13 August 1866; Uwajima-shi Bunka Kyōkai, *Meiji Ishin to Uwajima*, p. 15.

not appear from nowhere.[862] King arrived first and recorded that he had an even more impressive reception than at Kagoshima, with Parkes arriving a few days later.[863] Again greeted by a steamship to help them navigate their way to Uwajima, for it was even more little-known than Kagoshima, Parkes's states that they were soon surrounded by boats and curious onlookers.[864] The Daimyō, alongside some of his advisers and servants were almost immediately given a personal tour of the *Princess Royal* due to the prince's eagerness (after various Uwajima officers had relayed letters of welcome the day before).[865] It did not take long, for example, for intelligence and opinions on Japan's current political issues to be exchanged, with the Daimyō voicing his opinion that Japan should be a federal state under the Emperor, and that he and other Daimyō were increasingly suspicious of the Franco-Tokugawa détente.[866] The ship provided a diplomatic space for both official, public discussions and more unofficial, private discussions simultaneously. Parkes stated overall that the *Princess Royal* was soon crowded by Japanese on all decks, and that the Prince of Uwajima and his officers spent: "…the great part of each day onboard inspecting guns and machinery and putting innumerable questions on military and naval [and] scientific subjects."[867]

Parkes extolled the surprisingly inclusive treatment they received. He stated that himself, his wife, other officials, Admiral King, and many officers (and later sailors) were introduced to grandparents and children during the initial reception in view of Britain's ships, ceremonial gift exchanges, and subsequent banquet.[868] He was particularly impressed by the introduction of the Daimyō's wife as usually the meeting of one's spouse with foreigners was seriously

[862] Uwajima-shi Bunka Kyōkai, *Meiji Ishin to Uwajima*, p. 15.
[863] TNA, FO 46/70/130, Parkes to Clarendon, 13 August 1866.
[864] TNA, FO 46/70/130, Parkes to Clarendon, 13 August 1866.
[865] Uwajima-shi Bunka Kyōkai, *Meiji Ishin to Uwajima*, p. 38; J. Black, *Young Japan: Yokohama & Yedo. A Narrative of the Settlement and City from the Signing of the Treaties in 1858, to the Close of the Year 1879. With a Glance at the Progress of Japan during a Period of Twenty-One Years, Volume 2* (London, Trubner & Co, 1880), p. 5.
[866] Uwajima-shi Bunka Kyōkai, *Meiji Ishin to Uwajima*, p. 40; The anti-French comments like this (and others) from Uwajima are potentially examples of the Daimyō attempting to use Anglo-French animosity and imperial competition to impress and flatter the British. Or maybe because of their anti-French nature, Parkes and others simply picked up on those comments more.
[867] TNA, FO 46/70/130, Parkes to Clarendon, 13 August 1866.
[868] Parkes thanks his wife, Fanny Parkes and one of his daughters, for helping lift some diplomatic barriers as well here. A reminder of the prominent diplomatic role that diplomat's wives (and children) often played in diplomacy; TNA, FO 46/69, Parkes to Hammond, 14 August 1866.

frowned upon.[869] The ruling family had clearly done its Western homework to impress the British and ensure that similar diplomatic feeling was both appreciated and reciprocated.[870] For example, one legation member present, Dr. Willis, noted that it was a much more trusting event, with more palatable food presented, greater freedom to mingle, and more entertainment provided. These proceedings signified a level of trust that even surpassed that of Satsuma, greatly impressing Parkes and other British officials.[871] Dr. Willis's description of the end of proceedings is perhaps the most interesting however. The British were escorted at night under a procession of lantern lights back towards the anchored Royal Navy ships, granting an almost religious and other worldly view of where the British had come from; the ship and the ocean.[872] Even with the impressive Uwajima festivities ashore, the ship was the grand backdrop for both the beginning to Anglo-Uwajima relations and their finale. Whilst it seems the ship definitely had a significant impact here on ties with Uwajima, it could be somewhat overstated given the already more liberal view this ruling family had.[873] However, the significance of the official and unofficial diplomacy that the ship was used for here most certainly played a role in developing positive relations.[874] It is not a coincidence that the Uwajima Daimyō allowed British vessels to call at Uwajima Bay when asked and would be one of several clans who would go on to purchase Western built vessels (as would Satsuma).[875] Parkes's trip to Uwajima was actually cut short due to the arrival of a Typhoon; so upset at the early end of diplomatic festivities, Date Munenari, the *de facto* ruler of Uwajima, begged for the British flag/Naval Ensign, which was happily gifted not by Parkes,

---

[869] It was also next to impossible because of the Tokugawa policy of *Sankin-Kōtai*, which required all Daimyō to spend half of the year living in Edo. Officially, it helped centralise the power structure of Japan, but unofficially, it allowed the Tokugawa Shogunate to have easy access to potential familial hostages should the need arise. Due to the dangers and expense of travel, many spouses were simply left in Edo all the time. The law was ended in 1862, allowing for Japanese nobility to become more localised and involved with their domains and people; See I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, p. 296.

[870] TNA, FO 46/70/130, Parkes to Clarendon, 13 August 1866; I. Kanae, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, pp. 295-296.

[871] Parkes did well to leave out the part where one of the British Captains fell into the water whilst riding a horse (as the initial reception/procession was to be on horseback), so the captain had to change his uniform before the Japanese arrived; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 78.

[872] H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, pp. 78-79.

[873] It should be said that Parkes notes that they already have several hundred Enfield Rifles, so they must have had some unofficial contact with Britain through the treaty ports via agents or another Daimyō at some point prior to this meeting as well.

[874] The impact of Britain's visit cannot be understated here. Even beer bottles discarded overboard by British sailors were happily collected up and kept as beloved family heirlooms by Uwajima locals; See Uwajima-shi Bunka Kyōkai, *Meiji Ishin to Uwajima*, p. 38.

[875] TNA, FO 46/70/130, Parkes to Clarendon, 13 August 1866; See PP, Commercial Reports, 1866-1868.

but by Admiral King.[876] In response Parkes was also presented with a new Uwajima naval ensign.[877] The ship as a mobile legation had left its mark as the diplomatic centrepiece. The ship's usage to create some subliminal diplomacy at Uwajima allowed for an atmosphere for cordial relations to develop. As a space it had become a site of positive curiosity; a mutual point of interest for discussion that relations could then bounce from. Uwajima, thanks to the ship, was now probably the most positive Anglo-Japanese diplomatic relationship. The fact that notes, one described as 'amusing', were being shared between the legation at Yokohama and Uwajima many weeks later show how cordial an impression Parkes's diplomatic efforts had left.[878] Parkes's overall success at Kagoshima and Uwajima is further underlined by his discovery of Roches's response to Satsuma agents in Nagasaki in mid-August 1866. Roches apparently lectured them on the "necessity of [their] obedience to the Tycoon", that France was a loyal ally of the Shogunate, and that France was going to send the Shogun two French-built ironclads consequently (Roches later told Parkes that this last point was only said in jest to Satsuma, with no threat implied…).[879] The French did not want their chosen 'ally' in Japan to be undermined. Obviously, the French were not a neutral party vis-à-vis the Shogunate-Daimyō struggle, but clearly Parkes's positive Anglo-Daimyō relations was going well enough to be causing concern. This further illustrates the significant impact that Parkes and his mobile legation was having at altering and improving Britain's diplomatic position in Japan.

Parkes quickly made good on these contacts and soon expanded on them. He sent both Satow and King on various fact-finding missions to help assess the Japanese political situation. Of course, thanks to the ship, this was easily done and provided another opportunity to expose less travelled parts of Japan to British diplomacy. Parkes's recent diplomatic success gained the Foreign Office's approval, with "…all intercourse with the Daimyō… to be

---

[876] TNA, FO 46/70/130, Parkes to Clarendon, 13 August 1866; This flag is still in possession of the Date Family to this day, and is currently under the care of the Uwajima Date Cultural Preservation Association (宇和島伊達文化保存会蔵); Uwajima-shi Bunka Kyōkai, *Meiji Ishin to Uwajima*, pp, 38-40.

[877] Uwajima-shi Bunka Kyōkai, *Meiji Ishin to Uwajima*, p. 39.

[878] This cordiality was continually reciprocated, with Mitford positively recalling how gracious and sympathetic to Western views Uwajima were; A. B. Mitford, *The Garter Mission to Japan* (London, Macmillan, 1906), p. 246; This mutual respect was probably why the *de facto* Daimyō of Uwajima, Date Munenari, was made head of the Japanese Foreign Office in 1868 and entertained the King of Hawaii in Japan's first ever state visit in 1881.

[879] TNA, FO 46/69, Parkes to Hammond, 14 August 1866; C. Totman talks of this event further, noting that it was actually at the behest of the Shogunate who feared Britain was directly supplying Chōshū with arms; C. Totman, *The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868*, pp. 251-254.

encouraged…"[880] They each headed to Nagasaki, however post-Nagasaki, Satow would return via the HMS *Argus* and call upon Kagoshima and Uwajima once more, and King would separately meet with the Daimyō of Chikuzen and Chōshū.[881] While at Nagasaki Satow met some retainers from Uwajima who, whilst providing information on Japan's current political climate, once again espoused the great benefit Parkes's visit had had. They coincidentally named the "…ingenuity in the construction of ships…" as one positive note.[882] Talks at Kagoshima went positively, as they did at Uwajima as well.[883] Most of what was encountered is not relevant here, but once more, thanks to the ship as a conduit of diplomacy in this case, the positive diplomacy that Parkes had established months prior was improved further. Admiral King, with the *Princess Royal* and the *Serpent*, then met with Chikuzen in Hakata Bay (Fukuoka City). The Chikuzen Daimyō was shown the ship undertaking gunnery practice and various drills, with the Daimyō and his ministers apparently taking great delight in this. Interpreter W. G. Aston stated that they refused to leave until every part of the ship had been inspected.[884] A stark contrast to when Satsuma's retainers were cornered within the cabin of the *Euryalus* in 1863. The difference between a negative diplomatic space and a positive one. With Chōshū at Mitajiri port, they repeated these exercises and received similar results, with officials there expressing a desire to acquire British military equipment, medical knowledge (the hiring of surgeons), and the most stressed, "…someone competent to teach navigation."[885] Chōshū were evidently just as eager to make use of Britain's naval diplomatic displays as Britain was, responding quite positively to what was being offered.[886] Furthermore, the use of the ship as a diplomatic space was also more literally useful, as the palace at Mitajiri was relatively tiny.[887] With Chōshū we see the ship forming a positive

[880] TNA, FO 46/67, Hammond to Parkes, 28 February 1867.
[881] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 167; TNA, FO 46/72/208, Parkes to Stanley, 15 December 1866; TNA, FO 46/79/34, Parkes to Stanley, 1 March 1867.
[882] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 168; It should be noted that Satow also made contact with various agents from Tosa and Higo.
[883] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 170-180; The opening of Uwajima as a port to foreign trade was discussed. They had apparently been negotiating with the French on this matter, but they commented how they did not like the French (and their pro-Tokugawa ties) and would prefer if Britain took the lead in such talks.
[884] TNA, FO 46/79/34, Parkes to Stanley, 1 March 1867.
[885] TNA, FO 46/79/34, Parkes to Stanley, 1 March 1867; The opening of Shimonoseki to foreign trade was also discussed; E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 185-186.
[886] They even asked if they could send presents to Queen Victoria; TNA, FO 46/79/34, Parkes to Stanley, 1 March 1867.
[887] Chōshū ruled a relatively large domain creating financial, administrative, and infrastructural problems. It's 'capital', Hagi, was on the other side of Yamagata and not enroute to Yokohama along the Seto Inland Sea. Many of Chōshū's points of power were therefore decentralised and scattered across the coastline.

diplomatic space in both instances; it was not just a transporter of diplomacy as seen with Satow and others, but an purveyor of diplomacy too. Britain could effectively 'show off' the ship to the Japanese to create a positive point for cordial diplomacy to start from. British power, technology and civility were all on display to impress. In fact, the only real disappointment for King was that his ships were not fully available for some more substantial public/unofficial diplomacy as well, with only the Chōshū and Chikuzen Princes, immediate family and ministers being entertained onboard.[888] Clearly, the use of the ship, although slightly different and perhaps not as extensive as hoped, was still providing significant diplomatic dividends for Britain in Japan.

Things did not end their however, for the Shogun invited all of the foreign representatives to a reception at Osaka.[889] Dropped off at Hyogo by the *Argus*, Satow and others headed to Osaka to meetup with Parkes and the foreign representatives. At Osaka were the *Princess Royal*, *Serpent*, *Basilisk* (a wooden paddle-sloop), and the HMS *Firm* (a gunboat).[890] Here, the ship repeated its role as a functionary of both official and unofficial diplomacy, providing an entry point for relations between Britain and Japan to be expediated. The benefits of Parkes discussions with various Daimyō through the ship was again bearing fruit at Osaka, with interest and gratitude from various Daimyō and even the Bakufu over his recent mobile diplomacy.[891] Uwajima and Satsuma provided information on the current situation vis-à-vis Daimyō-Bakufu relations, privately detailing information about meetings the British would otherwise have little if any knowledge of.[892] The Bakufu's interest was in response to Parkes's positive overtures towards many Daimyō. Evidently, Parkes's rapid advance for Britain was making waves across Japan's domestic sphere. Moreover, despite the more official sideshow with the Shogun's invitation to the foreign representatives, some more unofficial Anglo-Daimyō relations went ahead as well. A small private meeting between Satow and some retainers from Aizu was built on, intentionally or not, into a diplomatic errand with the ship at the fore. The Aizu retainers wished to see a British vessel of war and

[888] TNA, FO 46/79/34, Parkes to Stanley, 1 March 1867.
[889] Parkes hesitated to go, but after discussions with the Americans and Dutch decided in favour of it (note the French initial absence, having made other plans); TNA, FO 46/80/71, Parkes to Stanley, 14 April 1867; TNA, FO 46/80/92, Parkes to Stanley, 12 June 1867; TNA, FO 46/81/122, Parkes to Stanley, 10 July 1867.
[890] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 185.
[891] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 190-191.
[892] TNA, FO 46/80/92, Parkes to Stanley, 12 June 1867.

were given an invitation to see the *Basilisk*.[893] The ship, even in its capacity as more of a sideshow to more official diplomacy here, as transport to Osaka and a tool to enhance some unexpected diplomacy with Aizu, still provided many benefits to Britain diplomatically. The ship had expanded beyond its expected role once more.

Later, the ship would prove its diplomatic worth again. It would be used to show off British power in a show of public diplomacy that would allow positive diplomatic spaces to develop. Parkes was invited to visit Chōshū, and Satow and Mitford were invited to visit Satsuma at their convenience.[894] It is interesting to see how quickly such good relations developed when compared to those with the Shogunate. The shifting political climate that had occurred since Japan's opening helped significantly, but I believe that the Daimyō's desire to connect with foreign nations for their own (military and economic) ends and the way Britain used the ship to help foster this certainly helped expediate things. Whatever the reason, such positive Anglo-Daimyō diplomacy had an effect on relations with the Shogunate, as seen at Osaka. Satow implies that it was because the Shogunate did not want to 'lose' Britain to the Daimyō and I tend to agree with him for the timing is more than pertinent.[895] After the Daimyō visits, negotiations discussing the problems of opening Niigata took place with the Shogunate. Parkes and a British cadre involving Satow and Mitford went on a fact-finding mission to Niigata, Sado Island and finally Nanao, to see if alternative ports could be found or a compromise considered before any further negotiation.[896] A small flotilla comprising of the *Serpent*, *Salamis*, and the *Basilisk* eventually met up at Niigata and talks ensued. This part of the trip is not of consequence here, but it should be noted that the ship was relegated to its past existence, as a strict enforcer and bastion of British diplomacy. This was Bakafu controlled land, and although relations with the Shogunate were taking a more pleasant tone, this was a forced objective and was not entirely genuine. The atmosphere at both Niigata and Sado was therefore obstructive.[897] Here, no diplomatic space aboard ship could form, because despite the more welcoming and more neutral use of the ship diplomatically, there simply was no interest from Shogunate officials to engage constructively. At Nanao talks with representatives from the Daimyō of Kaga were held aboard ship, but again took on a similar

[893] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 191; TNA, FO 46/80/92, Parkes to Stanley, 12 June 1867.
[894] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 190.
[895] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 228.
[896] TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 22 July 1867; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 18 August 1867.
[897] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 231-235.

tone.[898] This was predominantly because opening the port of Nanao would mean relinquishing it to the Bakufu.[899] The ship was certainly more neutral diplomatically, for the officials were abundantly aware of Parkes fact-finding intentions, but more cordial discussions on the level of Satsuma, Chōshū and Uwajima never developed between the two sides.[900]

Perhaps this shows us that the ship, whilst still important in Anglo-Japanese diplomacy, had a limited reach when such powers did not wish for any engagement. In that negative diplomatic sense, it could only ever be used as an enforcer of British diplomacy, as it was at Kagoshima in 1863 and Osaka in 1865, with its diplomatic space only being used as a form of authoritative control for Britain to then exploit. Other trips to various Daimyō occurred in later 1867 and even beyond, but these took on more unique elements that hinder their relevance here. The trip to Awa Domain (under the Hachisuka Family) was hampered by poor weather and its suddenness; although they were promised that the HMS *Ocean* (a Prince-Consort class ironclad) and the HMS *Rodney* (a 90 gun frigate) would call them later.[901] Inclement weather obviously makes sailing harder and, in some circumstances, more dangerous, but the fact that at Awa it relegated the ship to being practically obsolete is another sign that the ship, whilst taking on an increasingly important role around Japanese shores, still had its own technical limitations. After Awa they subsequently travelled to Tosa Domain, their primary destination, in order to discuss some murders allegedly perpetrated by Tosa retainers alongside some Shogunate officials, and was thus, predominantly, more of an investigative affair and more positive diplomacy was somewhat limited.[902] This points to an understanding that under some circumstances the ship, like weather and outside diplomatic concerns, can still be diplomatically immobilised at times. What we learn from these subsequent trips is that the ship was not only an effecter of British diplomacy, but was itself

---

[898] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 235-236; TNA, FO 46/81/138, Parkes to Stanley, 22 July 1867; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 18 August 1867.
[899] Kaga/Kanazawa (under the Maeda Family) was the largest and probably richest of the Daimyō. Any damage to that position, like the surrendering of an important port city, would be heavily resisted. Thus, the refusal of the Daimyō to even entertain the British; See W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*; They also tried to meet with the Daimyō of Echizen (under the Matsudaira Family), but they proved to be one of the most anti-foreign Daimyō, preventing any successful contact at all, let alone aboard ship.
[900] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 236-237.
[901] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 264.
[902] TNA, FO 46/81/152, Parkes to Stanley, 11 September 1867; TNA, FO 46/81/163, Parkes to Stanley, 15 September 1867; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 11 September 1867; Tosa Domain was ruled by the Yamauchi Family.

also affected by wider diplomatic relations. Its function whilst dramatically changed to suit Anglo-Japanese relations, was also subject to the requirements of those diplomatic relations. Which of course ebbed and flowed with the particularly Japanese polity Britain was dealing with at any one time.

4.6. Conclusions:

Parkes transformed the ship into a new diplomatic beast for Japan to tackle. On the one hand you had the more traditional gunboat diplomacy where the ship, although allowed to form a diplomatic space, was still a negative and British dominated space, as it had been when used by Neale before. At Osaka in 1865 the ship remained predominantly a space from which Parkes could project British power and influence and render the surrounding place as vulnerable. In this setting, the ship was a blunt instrument of the 'civilised' to abuse against the 'uncivilised'; as was the nineteenth century norm.[903] However, after Osaka Anglo-Daimyō relations improved, and as they did, the ship increasingly played a new and crucial role that went above the obvious boon of easy transport across Japan as a nation made up of nearly seven thousand islands. The ship was no longer just a simple transporter of diplomacy: it, in effect, became a mobile legation where Parkes and his subordinates could project diplomacy in a way not seen in Japan before. It was used as a diplomatic space to expand upon, create a positive atmosphere, and effectively sell British power and commerce abroad. It allowed Daimyō to easily mimic the more official diplomacy that was originally closed off for them, making their own overtures to the British much more palatable to accept. This was a nineteenth century example of soft power being used to its fullest effect. Anglo-Daimyō relations were a unique diversion from the usual state-to-state diplomacy that Britain usually preferred, but thanks to the ship this alternative not only proved viable, but something deeply advantageous. If we stick to a strictly naval standpoint, it is no coincidence that Satsuma, Chōshū and others, including the Shogunate as well, went on to buy substantial amounts of British vessels (among many other things) for military and commercial use.[904]

[903] See J. Cable, *The Political Influence of Naval Force in History* (London, MacMillan Press, 1998), pp. 54-98; In fact, gunboat diplomacy remained common practice well into 1980s; See J. Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979: Political Application of Limited Naval Force* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981).
[904] See PP, Commercial Reports, 1866-1868.

5. Conclusion:

The ship developed diplomatically over time for Britain. However, considering Japan's island nature, with foreigners hemmed into the treaty ports, it was only a matter of time before the ship grew in stature. It was stunted at first, with China's importance preventing any major supply of vessels and the inter-foreign diplomatic situation preventing the creation of any diplomatic space. This changed with Neale at Kagoshima in 1863 however, for it was this event where we see the ship become a projector of British diplomacy for the first time in Japan. It created a comfortable diplomatic space for British actors to control all the agency of any subsequent negotiations. In a sense the ship in of itself became the very agency that was so sort after, connecting two worlds, two places, that otherwise would never meet through its own diplomatic space. The Japanese on the other hand were left to face a completely hostile diplomatic space that prevented them from garnering any equal foothold. Britain's control over said diplomatic space proved so strong that through the ship it nullified much of the Japanese's (albeit small) advantages, namely, their coastal cannons and protected bay. Without a more positive and reciprocal atmosphere, negotiations ended in stalemate and Britain sought military action. At Kagoshima we see the severe consequences that overwhelming British military power and diplomacy could have on a polity like Satsuma. We see something similar from Parkes at Osaka in 1865, but thankfully with some positive diplomatic development as well. The ship created a strong bulwark for British negotiators to project from; they could advance and retreat at will, forcing the Japanese to talk when and where it suited them. Whilst not as tense as the negotiations at Kagoshima, a somewhat hostile environment and diplomatic space and place still formed for the Japanese. The ship threatened Osaka both militarily and diplomatically in a way the Japanese struggled to deal with. Parkes was able to safely and comfortably pursue his varied diplomatic agenda, which included talks with the Shogunate, Daimyō, and intercourse with locals, all of which went positively from a British perspective. Whilst being used more diplomatically than at Kagoshima, there was still a strong military element; the threat of force, which arguably tainted the diplomatic power it had. This was technically a great boon to British diplomacy, for it allowed for Britain to more easily 'dictate' than negotiate, but arguably this military angle prevented any further diplomatic development of the ship as a more useful long-term space for British diplomacy in Japan.

It cannot be a coincidence that the significant breakthrough for the ship and its role as a British diplomatic space was when the active military element was largely left behind. Through Anglo-Daimyō relations the ship came to the diplomatic fore once again, but this time in a much more impressive and substantial way. Aboard ship a more positive diplomatic space was created that allowed for both British and Japanese diplomatic actors to converse and understand each other. Relations took on a positive subliminal outlook from the onset, allowing for a more equal and pleasant diplomatic space to be created. So positive was this space that the ship's impact on Daimyō's sense of place was relegated out of existence; it was no longer an important consideration because any hostility and fear was now irrelevant. For Britain this meant new partners, new sources of information, and new opportunities for commerce. Thanks to the ship Anglo-Daimyō relations took off in a way that would otherwise never have existed under other circumstances. We see that when the ship was not present or so crucial such similar talks with Shogunate (and some Daimyō too) were often obstructive, non-committal or barely positive. The ship now allowed for a neutral diplomatic space that showed off British weaponry, technology, civilities and contact that could not be found so readily elsewhere for many new Japanese actors. It had become an impressive mobile legation that provided Britain, and Parkes especially, with unique advantages over other treaty port powers and even the Shogunate itself. The boon of having such well-received relations with many Daimyō, many of whom made up various factions of the imperial camp, cannot be understated in how it subsequently aided Britain diplomatically after the onset of the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Whilst all these boons cannot be denied the ship's diplomatic use as a mobile legation did not last. The sad irony of this is, much like Parliament and the press's reaction to Kagoshima in 1863, is that this appears to be more an exception than a new rule for wider British diplomacy in East Asia. After the Meiji Restoration the interior was (eventually) opened and the Daimyō 'voluntarily' disbanded, and the country became markedly safer over time. The need for the ship as a mobile legation became largely obsolete. Nor was this example taken further afield in East Asia, with gunboat diplomacy and all its imperialist overtones remaining the norm.[905] In fact, the use of the ship via gunboat diplomacy instead stayed common long into late twentieth century.[906] So whilst the ship afforded British actors a diplomatic space that overall, it could ill-afford to not have

[905] There is currently research being done by Dr. E. de Lange on Royal Navy diplomacy with Algiers during the 1830s and how ships were used as diplomatic locales, so there perhaps some overlap and continuity with other British diplomatic actors further afield. I would like to thank Dr. E. de Lange for his time and advice.
[906] See J. Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*.

during early Anglo-Japanese relations, wider events in Japan prevented any widespread repetition of the mobile legation specifically. However, the ship's diplomatic function was still continued in new ways that also improved and augmented Anglo-Japanese relations over time. For example, during the Duke of Edinburgh's visit in 1869, the yearly visits from the Commander-in-Chief of the China Squadron to Yokohama, and the growing naval cooperation between the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy until the twentieth century.[907] So whilst the mobile legation died with the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, the ship as a diplomatic advantage continued long after. Ultimately, during early Anglo-Japanese relations, the ship afforded Britain's diplomats a diplomatic space that it could not live without. The agency and subsequent boons it provided were the difference in not only changing Anglo-Japanese relations for the better, but also in ensuring that Britain remained Japan's preferred international partner for decades to come.

[907] See A. Best, H. Cortazzi, & P. Kornicki, *British Royal and Imperial Japanese Relations, 1868-2018*; See H. Ion, 'Yokohama for the British in the Late Nineteenth Century: A Hub for Imperial Defence and a Node of Influence for Change', in T. G. Otte's, eds., *British World Policy and the Projection of Global Power, 1830-1960* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019); See D. C. Evans & M. R. Peattie, *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941* (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1997).

5. Language and Diplomacy in Anglo-Japanese Relations:

1. Introduction:

Student interpreters and interpreters in the Japan Consular Service were the core of Britain's diplomatic presence in Japan. Not only were they relied upon for their translation and interpretation expertise, but for their understanding of Japan's cultural quirks and norms. Beyond this, they were also considered to be the future of the service. The role of student interpreters and interpreters was a key and expansive position that thanks to Japan's disparities, distance, and difficulties, was full of opportunities. However, these opportunities were limited and haphazard at first. It was not until the Japanese Consular Service became increasingly professionalised from the mid-1860s onwards that this changed. Suddenly, the quality and number of interpreters not only radically increased but expanded into other, more important, roles as well. This chapter seeks to better qualify the role itself by analysing those who took on the role, what they did, the issues at work, the aforementioned opportunities they received, and what this all meant for Anglo-Japanese relations. I will discuss how interpreters were not simply more specialised civil servants in the service of major diplomatic actors, but eventually all minor diplomatic actors themselves. As interpreters alone, it was more about individual successes in order to become a minor diplomat of note, but once interpreters became entrenched in the wider Consular Service as consuls etc., overcoming problems with merit, health, nationality, and availability, they were all collectively transformed into 'minor diplomats' integral to Anglo-Japanese relations. They may have been from the Consular Service and thus officially very much not diplomats, but the particulars of the Far East and their development in Japan meant that they were effectively, albeit minor, diplomats in all but name. Their role and number dramatically increased and were unlike any other foreign diplomatic apparatus in Japan for decades. This happened because of the peculiarities and limitations of Japan; being a consular official in the Far East was considerably different to other consular postings, coming with greater difficulties and responsibilities. To illustrate how interpreters became more integral minor diplomats over time, from individuals to a collective body, this chapter will explain their development. From their selection, examination, studies, to their promotions to consuls and more, I will show how interpreters became more than the sum of their parts.

1.1. Interpretation and Translation, Past and Present:

Despite supposedly being the world's 'second oldest profession' the study of interpretation and translation has surprisingly only grown in the last sixty years.[908] Interest from academics has increased as interpretation as a profession developed more concretely after the World Wars.[909] Prior to the 1990s and early 2000s, the study of interpreters and translators had been largely ignored by most historians however.[910] Yet, as R. Roland points out, there are reasons for this. Many historians stuck to key figures and events, meaning that individuals who undertook the role of interpreter and/or translator were often overlooked.[911] This explains why so little research has been proffered about not only Britain's interpreters in Japan, but interpreters more widely as well.[912] Moreover, interpreters often came from so-defined 'lesser social-positions' throughout history; forgotten 'subcastes' who acted as intermediaries that were often the 'wrong' gender, class, religion and/or ethnicity.[913] There are many clear examples of this from Ancient Rome, the Ottoman Empire, Colonial Africa, India, and Mexico, and recently Modern Britain, where various individuals and groups that straddled different realms and nations acquired a unique, but often dangerous role as interpreters because of their minority status.[914] At times, this minority status could be something

[908] G. M. Shreve, 'Translation at the Millennium: Prospects for the Evolution of a Profession', in P. A. Schmitt, eds., *Paradigmenwechsel in der Translation: Festschrift für Albrecht Neubert zum 70. Gerburtstag* (Tübingen, Stauffenburg, 2000), p. 219; C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, 'Introduction' in C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, eds., *Researching Translation and Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2016), p. 1.
[909] See F. Pöchhacker, 'Evolution of Interpreting Research', in H. Mikkelson & R. Jourdenais, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2015), pp. 62-76.
[910] See C. Rundle, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Translation History* (London, Routledge, 2022); See H. Mikkelson & R. Jourdenais, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2015); See M. Salama-Carr, 'Introduction: Special Issue on the History of Translation & Interpreting', *Translation & Interpreting*, 11:2 (2019), pp. 1-4.
[911] R. A. Roland, *Interpreters as Diplomats: A Diplomatic History of the Role of Interpreters in World Politics* (Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1999), p. 8.
[912] Outside of E. Satow and W. G. Aston.
[913] M. Bowen, D. Bowen, F. Kaufmann & I. Kurtz, 'Interpreters and the Making of History', in J. Delisle & J. Woodsworth, eds., *Translators Through History: Revised Edition* (Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2012), pp. 247-248.
[914] See D. Peretz, 'The Roman Interpreter and His Diplomatic and Military Roles', *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, 55:4 (2006), pp. 451-470; See R. Mairs, '"Translator, Traditor": The Interpreter as Traitor in Classical Tradition', *Greece & Rome*, 58:1 (April 2011), pp. 64-81; See E. Natalie Rothman, 'Interpreting Dragomans: Boundaries and Crossings in the Early Modern Mediterranean', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 51:3 (October 2009), pp. 771-800; See B. N. Lawrance, E. L. Osborn & R. L. Roberts, eds., *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2015); See G. Goodwin, 'A Trustworthy Interpreter between Rulers and Ruled: Behramji Malabari, Colonial and Cultural Interpreter in Nineteenth Century British India', *Social History*, 38:1 (2013), pp. 1-25; See Y.

additionally gained by just becoming an interpreter as well; a crossing of sorts that leaves you in no man's land whereby you are distrusted by those you left behind and your new employers simultaneously. Britain is filled with examples of this, from using Japanese Castaways and Dutch interpreters in Anglo-Japanese relations to relying on Iraqi and Afghan interpreters as local go-betweens in our recent Middle Eastern Conflicts. Theoretically speaking, this fits with how interpreters have been more widely historically conceptualised outside of the strict confines of interpretation; intermediary, mediator, gatekeeper, non-person, outsider, middleman, collaborator, and even traitor.[915] All of these further emphasise the 'otherness' that interpreters face.[916] When it came to past historians, writers, chroniclers, copyists, and scribes, only one thing usually mattered: the message and not the messenger or the original writer and not the reproduction. Even when such an interest has existed, for many historical periods the sources simply did not survive. Even the names of translators and interpreters were often considered seldom worth recording, making many historical studies problematic.[917] Translators, at least, partially buck the trend of being largely forgotten compared to interpreters however. Interpreters lack historical heritage whereas translators do not. The orality of interpretation means that its history quickly fades, but the written nature of translation means that its history is more lasting.[918] However, some seminal works have broken these historical predeterminations about translators and interpreters alike. For example, for translation, J. Delisle and J. Woodsworth's *Translators Through History* and A. Pym's *Method in Translation History*, and in terms of interpretation, we have D. Bowen & M. Bowen's *Interpreting: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow*.[919] Such works sparked an uptick in translation and interpretation studies popularity during the last twenty years from historians and wider academia.[920] This recent scholarly explosion largely mimics the even more recent New Diplomatic Historical approach to diplomatic history, with academics taking methodologies and approaches from the wider humanities and cultural studies to enhance

---

Yannakakis, *Native Intermediaries, Indian Identities, and Local Rule in Colonial Oaxaca* (London, Duke University Press, 2008).

[915] C. Wadensjö, *Interpreting as Interaction* (London, Longman, 1998), p. 61.

[916] See C. Wadensjö, *Interpreting as Interaction*, pp. 61-80.

[917] R. A. Roland, *Interpreters as Diplomats*, p. 8.

[918] See M. Bowen, D. Bowen, F. Kaufmann & I. Kurtz, 'Interpreters and the Making of History', pp. 247-284.

[919] See J. Delisle & J. Woodsworth, eds., *Translators Through History: Revised Edition* (Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2012); See A. Pym, *Method in Translation History* (London, Routledge, 1998); See D. Bowen & M. Bowen, eds., *Interpreting: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, ATA Series, Volume 4* (Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1990).

[920] M. M. F. Sánchez, 'History and Historiography' in C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, eds., *Researching Translation and Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2016), p. 101.

their own research into interpretation and translation.[921] The study of interpretation and translation has therefore developed into something that is highly fluid, global, and interdisciplinary.[922]

Those within the discipline of interpretation and translation studies are also increasingly aware of the widening, recent interest coming from historians and the benefits such cross-fertilisation can bring to both disciplines. Historical studies of interpretation and translation have broadened to consider more global, professional, colonial, military, and diplomatic histories.[923] Military and diplomatic histories have made recent leaps by considering new primary sources, specifically interpreter's own testimonies.[924] This can be most explicitly seen in H. Harrison's fantastic book, *The Perils of Interpreting*, which re-emphasises communication via interpretation and translation through a more complete use of various primary sources.[925] This is something I have mimicked by referring to famous interpreter Ernest Satow's diary (and I. Ruxton's edited versions) for example.[926] Academics studies are now undertaking much broader historical research, like national histories, international projects, oral histories, and historical studies on the many agents involved in the process of disseminating translated texts; that the translators, as well as their aids and publishers, are *themselves* worthy of direct study just as much as *what* they were translating.[927] In this chapter, I apply this approach similarly to my own understanding of Britain's interpreters in Japan. Their interpretive role was key for Britain, their subsequent expanded roles within the Japan Consular Service a necessity for the Foreign Office, but their individuality, backgrounds and quirks are also just as historically important in aiding our overall

---

[921] C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, 'Introduction', p. 1; See V. Dastyar, *Dictionary of Research Methodologies in Translation and Interpreting Studies* (Tabriz, Zaban Academic Publishing, 2017); See S. B. Hale & J. Napier, *Research Methods in Interpreting: A Practical Resource* (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013); See G. Saldanha & S. O'Brien, *Research Methodologies in Translation Studies* (London, Routledge, 2014).
[922] C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, 'Exploring Translation and Interpreting' in C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, eds., *Researching Translation and Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2016), pp. 7-8.
[923] M. M. F. Sánchez, 'History and Historiography', p. 101.
[924] See M. M. F. Sánchez, 'A Bilingual Officer Remembers Korea: A Closer Look at Untrained Interpreters in the Korean War', in H. Footitt & M. Kelly, eds., *Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation and Peace Building* (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), pp. 115-130; See L. R. Rosendo, 'Rethinking the Interpreter's Agency in Wartime: A Portrait of Gottlieb Fuchs', *Translation & Interpretation*, 11:2 (2019), pp. 58-68.
[925] See H. Harrison, *The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators between Qing China and the British Empire* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2021).
[926] See I. Ruxton, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow*.
[927] M. M. F. Sánchez, 'History and Historiography', p. 101; C. O'Sullivan, 'Introduction: Rethinking methods in translation history', *Translation Studies*, 5:2 (2012), p. 131.

understanding of their impact on British Diplomacy in Japan as well.[928] It was from this varied individuality that would eventually, after some trial and error, that a high standard of interpreters in Japan was created, eventually becoming a collective asset that buttressed Anglo-Japanese relations for the rest of the period.

For historians more specifically, how interpreters/translators have been recognised and understood has shifted over time. C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer point to their long-time roles as "neutral conduits of information". Where their simple association with language somehow demeaned them in the eyes of many of their compatriots in diplomatic, legal, and medical fields.[929] Their diminishment was enshrined during the early modern period whereby translators especially were reduced to mere 'imitators' of others work; reflecting societal anxieties over 'who' controls meaning as R. Sela-Sheffy states.[930] This idea can be seen best in the Italian proverb: *traduttore, traditore* – 'translator, traitor'. With the acknowledgement that the translator can never be truly faithful to the original, there is distrust over what their 'replication' entails.[931] However, by the mid-twentieth century their role, the interpreter especially in this case, had altered into something that was now focused less on direct accurate interpretation, and now on producing an interpretation that is as faithful as possible to what was being conveyed.[932] Their role had become less of a literal messenger and more of an integral aid to others understanding of what was being said.[933] Interpretation is now readily recognised for its deeply beneficial role in wider society, and whilst translation has perhaps decreased in terms of its recognition, it is still both professionalised and integral overall. However, what present historiography has largely forgotten and under researched is our period of study: the long nineteenth century.[934] Clearly, between the early modern period

[928] In a similar fashion to other aforementioned microstudies; M. M. F. Sánchez, 'History and Historiography', p. 101.
[929] C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, 'Introduction', p. 8; See C. Wadensjö, *Interpreting as Interaction*, pp. 73-76.
[930] See R. Sela-Sheffy, 'Profession, identity, and status', in C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, eds., *Researching Translation and Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2016), pp. 131-145.
[931] See A. Löpez, 'Chapter 10: Traduttore, Traditore – Translator, Traitor', *Counterpoints*, 343 (2008), pp. 141-147.
[932] C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, 'Introduction', p. 8.
[933] For more on the historiography of interpreting in the Twentieth Century: See O. Furmanek, 'Professionalization of Interpreters' in C. A. Chapelle, eds., *The Encyclopaedia of Applied Linguistics* (New Jersey, Blackwell Publishing, 2013), pp. 4865-4693; See J. Baigorri-Jalón, 'The History of the Interpreting Profession', in H. Mikkelson & R. Jourdenais, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2015), pp. 11-28.
[934] J. Baigorri-Jalón, 'The History of the Interpreting Profession', pp. 18-19.

and the mid-twentieth century a marked change occurred.[935] My own research on British interpreters in Japan sheds some light on this 'missed' middling era for interpretation and translation. Within Britain's diplomatic circles in Japan at least, there was growing recognition of their integral importance. Not only from their primary professional involvement, but from their prospective advancement within the Japan Consular Service as well. I will therefore not only highlight the growing collective importance of Britain's interpreters in Japan, but also further our understanding of how the role of an interpreter/translator was viewed changed during the nineteenth century as well.

2. Interpreters and Student Interpreters in the Japan Consular Service:

2.1. Who were they?:

Interpreters can be defined loosely as persons who 'interpret' speech, usually orally. However, for our interpreters in Japan this is somewhat misleading. This definition, whilst correct, neglects to mention the written translation that they also undertook. This is usually understood to be done by 'translators', but interpreters within the Japan Consular Service performed both simultaneously. Translation was seen as the less important and prestigious of the two modes of work, perhaps explaining why we historians readily accept the Foreign Office's nomenclature. Their origins can be drawn from the more recent China Consular Service and its student interpretive system, as well as the older Levant Consular Service and its early nineteenth century creation of 'British Dragomans' (replacing the original 'foreign Dragomans' who were usually Italian, Armenian, or Greek for example).[936] The student interpreters themselves all had similar backgrounds thanks to the qualification demands of the Civil Service and the Foreign Office.[937] Namely, that they all had to be no more than twenty years old, a recent university graduate, and of course, British-born.[938] They were required to have skills in orthography (spelling), handwriting, the 'four first rules' of arithmetic, and

[935] There are thankfully exceptions to every rule,
[936] See J. K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*; G. R. Berridge, *British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the present: A Study in the Evolution of the Resident Embassy* (Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), pp. 49-74.
[937] TNA, FO 46/9, Civil Service Comments about Examinations and Qualifications, 16 February 1860.
[938] TNA, FO 46/5, Hammond to D. Munro, 12 January 1858; D. C. M. Platt, *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825* (London, Longman, 1971), p. 185.

have 'above average' intelligence.[939] They were also expected to understand at least two of the following: the 'first four books' of Euclid (predominantly geometry), Latin and French translation, and Modern Geography.[940] These qualifications remained largely unchanged until 1882. Student interpreters could now be between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, be duly qualified in respect of *both* health and character, and had to be unmarried.[941] These 1882 changes were made in respect to the problems the Japan (and wider Far Eastern) Service had with poor health, poor character, and familial and/or marital issues.[942] M. Dohmen for example, a Dutch interpreter, found himself asking for a leave of absence with extensions, salary increases and payment for additional costs like travel to visit his ill wife in the Netherlands (Charles Winchester even lent him money).[943] The Foreign Office was accommodating, but only to a point. It accepted these problems during the formative years, but during the 1870s staffing problems and costs had become unacceptable. When combined with other problems, like the long travel time, those asking for normal leave, and the many on sick leave due to Japan's climate, you can understand why the Foreign Office sought firm change.[944] The 1882 also altered what optional qualifications could be accepted by the Civil Service. These included critical précis (the ability to summarise texts), German, and some understanding of Mercantile and Criminal Law.[945] In 1896 another revision occurred, including an amended age range, eighteen to twenty-nine, but only if you were already under the Foreign Office/Diplomatic/Consular Service umbrella, and Italian was also added to the optional qualifications.[946]

The legal aspect might appear odd given that this is an examination for the role of student interpreter, but Foreign Office views of these individuals had radically changed by 1882 due

---

[939] The 'four first rules' being: addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.
[940] TNA, FO 46/9, Sir John Lefevre to Hammond, 31 January 1860.
[941] TNA, FO 46/277, H. Mann to Lord Tenterden, 13 May 1881; TNA, FO 46/294/678, H. Mann to Lord Tenterden, 19 April 1882.
[942] These things plagued the entire Far Eastern Service.
[943] TNA, FO 46/131, Dohmen to Hammond, 18 August 1870; TNA, FO 46/146, Dohmen to Hammond, 4 April 1871; TNA, FO 46/146, Dohmen to Hammond, 28 April 1871; TNA, FO 46/146, Dohmen to F. B. Alston, 7 June 1871; Marriage for East Asian diplomats and consular officials was a difficult one, with Parkes himself describing it as the: '…fearful thorns to eastern domestic life'; R. Morton, *A Life of Sir Harry Parkes*, p. 183.
[944] TNA, FO 46/146, Dohmen to Hammond, 7 June 1871; TNA, FO, 46/146, Dohmen to Lord Granville, 5 October 1871.
[945] TNA, FO 46/277, H. Mann to Lord Tenterden, 13 May 1881; TNA, FO 46/294/678, H. Mann to Lord Tenterden, 19 April 1882.
[946] TNA, FO 83/1486, Regulations for the Joint Examination, 1896.

to realties on the ground. They had not just been interpreters, but, advisers, accountants, clerks, consuls and legal experts; greater vetting and investment was now needed. Finally, once Japanese had become more discernible (and learnable), Japanese language examinations were also conducted in Japan, especially for higher ranked interpreters and some consulships. For example, Sir Harry Parkes outlines the examination in 1873: they had to be able to converse 'freely and intelligibly' in technical subjects that were likely to arise during talks with various Japanese authorities, and be able to translate official/semi-official documents and despatches without aid or the assistance of a teacher. Finally, and most curiously, they had to able to report on a 'practical' Japan specific subject as well.[947] The example I use here is from John Carey Hall's examination. He was originally a student interpreter, but after serving as acting vice-consul in the recently renamed city of Tokyo (1869), Hyogo and Osaka (1871), and Tokyo again (1871), he wished to move further up the ladder of the Japan Consular Service by taking the Japanese examination. He passed, pursued better postings, and had a successful legal career thereafter.[948] These examinations were a successful way for the Foreign Office to further vet the service and allow qualified linguistic personnel to deservedly rise up through the ranks.

Examinations for Japan became more demanding due to the language becoming more accessible/acquirable and the need for more qualified individuals however, but with this complexity came standardisation. Not only was the net widened for potential applicants, but the examination itself became more consistent too. It did not become easier, far from it, but compared to earlier years it must have been simpler for later applicants to know what was expected of them. There was certainly a higher chance that a successful applicant might fail earlier on; leeway was given to some by both the Civil Service and the Foreign Office to applicants due to personal/nepotistic connections and the desire to simply get them signed off

[947] TNA, FO 46/186/6, Parkes to Robertson, 20 May 1873.
[948] Of his future major successes, he was made Assistant Japanese Secretary in 1882, acting Assistant Japanese Secretary in 1884, Acting-Assistant Judge of Shanghai in 1888, Consul at Hakodate and Niigata (1888), Tamsui (1896), Hyogo and Osaka (1896-1902/1903), and later Consul-General of Yokohama from 1902/1903-1911. Of his peers, Hall achieved much by comparison. In 1902 he was made a companion of the Imperial Service Order (ISO); J. McCabe, *A Biographical Dictionary of Modern Rationalists* (London, Watts & Co, 1920), p. 321 (127); TNA, FO 46/186, F. O. Adam's to Hall, 11 October 1871; TNA, FO 46/146/2, F. B. Alston to Hall, 28 November 1871; *London Gazette*, 30 November 1888, p. 6879; *London Gazette*, 13 March 1896, p. 1680; *London Gazette*, 9 October 1896, p. 5541; *London Gazette*, 13 August 1897, p. 4547; *London Gazette*, 26 April 1901, p. 2856; *London Gazette*, 18 September 1903, p. 5784; See G. E. P. Hertslet, P. C. Rice & H. H. Quarmby, eds., *The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book for 1921* (London, Harrison & Sons, 1921), p. 362.

to Japan as quickly as possible (due to the aforementioned staffing shortages). In other words, they desired interpreters so much during the early years that the restrictive examination pool was effectively warped to suit the service's desperate needs. Two case studies illustrate this perfectly: Robertson and Lowder. R. Robertson not only passed his examination with flying colours, but went on to have a stellar career in Japan.[949] Robertson was promoted five times, eventually landing the coveted consulship of Yokohama, earning him great leeway and respect from ministers and the Foreign Office alike.[950] It 'helped' that his father was the first consul at Canton and a good friend of Parkes, Robertson's chief, but Robertson excelled regardless.[951] He eventually became a judge in the early 1880s and died in post.[952] Robertson, despite his origins was perhaps a fortunate case for the Foreign Office, who despite how he might have gotten the application due to his personal connections, still managed to fulfil his duties admirably. Conversely, J. F. Lowder struggled despite showing similar promise and having comparable personal connections. His mother (Lucy Lowder, later widow, and then wife to Sir Rutherford Alcock in 1862) solicited a position for him in the Far East from Alcock in 1859.[953] However, he failed to pass his first examination in 1860 which he and his mother blamed on illness.[954] He managed, through pleas from his former teachers and doctor (after his initial request for a retake was refused), to secure a retake and pass that same year.[955] With Lowder we actually have discussions about how he was examined (the first time). Puzzlingly, the Foreign Office seemingly tried to fit the examination to Lowder's strengths; ignoring the point of whether he was qualified or not.[956] It is likely that Lowder

[949] TNA, FO 46/9, Robertson to Hammond, 7 February 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Hammond to Robertson, 1 March 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Certificate from Civil Services Commission. 1 March 1860; Robertson to Hammond, 5 March 1860.
[950] TNA, FO 46/306, Enslie to Earl Granville, 15 October 1883; *London Gazette*, 22 February 1870, p. 964; *London Gazette*, 4 October 1870, p. 4345; *London Gazette*, 16 June 1871, p. 2793.
[951] J. E. Hoare, 'Britain's Japan Consular Service, 1859-1941', in I. Nish, eds., *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume 2* (Richmond, Japan Library, 1997), p. 100.
[952] TNA, FO 46/234, Quin to the Marquis of Salisbury, 24 December 1878.
[953] TNA, FO 46/7, Lucy Lowder to Alcock, 8 October 1859.
[954] Ironically, he failed the language portions of the examination, namely Latin and French; TNA, FO 46/9, L. Lowder to Hammond, 6 February 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Hammond to L. Lowder, 10 February 1860.
[955] TNA, FO 46/9, Hammond to Lowder & Robertson, 4 February 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Lowder to Hammond, 1 March 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Lowder to Hammond, 17 March 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Certificate from Civil Service Commission, 3 March 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Hammond to Lowder, 21 March 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Hammond to Lowder, 20 March 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Civil Service Commission to Hammond, 21 May 1860; TNA, FO 46/5, Second Certificate from Civil Service Commission, 24 May 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, L. Lowder to Hammond, 7 June 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Hammond to Lowder, 7 June 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Lowder to Hammond, 9 June 1860.
[956] TNA, FO 46/9, G. A. Jacob to Hammond, 1 February 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Hammond to G. A. Jacob, 1 February 1860.

only got this far due to his late father's connections with Alcock, the then chief British diplomat to Japan and future stepfather.[957]

When compared to Robertson, Lowder did not make the most of the opportunities afforded to him.[958] He was vice-consul of Hyogo and Osaka (based in Osaka) in early 1868 (much to the annoyance of Satow), later acting-consul, and then received a quick promotion to consul of Niigata in 1869 (at the very young age of twenty-five), but was rarely in post due to time allowed back home (1870-1872) and his subsequent resignation to become an *o-yatoi*.[959] A position that J. E. Hoare states was not only suggested by Lowder to the Japanese, but taken because it allowed him to pay off his debts quicker than his consular salary.[960] The Foreign Office was not fond of Lowder's career change.[961] Nepotism came with baggage as it often does, but the nature of both British foreign services and the Foreign Office, and the need for filled positions in the Far East meant that any teething problems as a result could be somewhat overlooked. In hindsight many of the problems seen during the early years can be rooted back to the Foreign Office hiring individuals less qualified and/or suited, explaining why examinations were then later altered so radically. Besides Robertson and Lowder, the other student interpreters were made up of Ernest Satow, probably the most famous of all the student interpreters, R. A Jamieson (who left once he arrived in Shanghai to become a newspaper proprietor), and later J. J. Enslie.[962] Not the best of starts in terms of recruitment, with only Satow, and to an extent Robertson, proving themselves invaluable. As minor actors of diplomacy go, it would be Satow and the Dutch interpreters who would do most of the heavy lifting during the early 1860s thanks to the failings of the initial examinations.[963]

---

[957] J. E. Hoare, 'John Frederick Lowder (1843-1902): Consul, Counsel, and *o-yatoi*', in H. Cortazzi, eds., *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume 10* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2016), p. 300.
[958] Though it must be said that out of the three Lowder son's he was the 'least' disappointing…
[959] *London Gazette*, 10 January 1868, p. 103; *Edinburgh Gazette*, 6 March 1868, pp. 261-262; *London Gazette*, 26 February 1869, p. 1383; *London Gazette*, 20 July 1869, p. 4063; *London Gazette*, 17 August 1886, p. 4008; Lowder became an *o-yatoi*, which was a foreign employee of the Japanese Government; for which he received a pension in 1888 and the Order of the Rising Sun, Fourth Class in 1886.
[960] R. Morton points to the salary being more than double than what he received before; R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, p. 128.
[961] J. E. Hoare, 'John Frederick Lowder (1843-1902): Consul, Counsel, and *o-yatoi*', pp. 300-301.
[962] TNA, FO 46/26, Jamieson to Neale, 2 September 1862; TNA, FO 46/26, Hammond to Jamieson, 10 November 1862; TNA, FO 46/9, J. J. Enslie to Lord Malmesbury, 28 December 1860.
[963] With W. G. Aston later coming to the fore.

The Foreign Office was able to live with the less than positive intake of student interpreters, by additionally hiring several Dutch interpreters (due to Dutch being the primary European language adequately understood by the Japanese).[964] This was hardly a shock as Britain's experiences with Japan linguistically up to this point had always been in Dutch, for example, in the 1854 British treaty with Japan during the Crimean War the British and the Japanese used Janus Curtius, the last *Opperhoofd* (literally 'Headman') of the Dutch trading post in Dejima, Nagasaki, as an intermediary.[965] As W. G. Beasley states, this left ample room for many misinterpretations to occur.[966] Understandably therefore, this method was not the first choice for Britain, who attempted to utilise what little knowledge it had of the Japanese language through some of its own China interpreters (which went severely underused) and some Japanese castaways; one such castaway, Otokichi (an employee of Dent & Co out of Shanghai), was only employed during some meetings, as he could not read or write *Kanji* and his *Kana* skills were less than adequate.[967] Thus, Dutch begrudgingly became the accepted option. This preference was repeated during Lord Elgin's Mission to Japan in 1858 to conclude Britain's Unequal Ansei Treaty. Here, they relied on a Henry Heusken. Lawrence Oliphant describes him as the secretary of Townsend Harris; the chief US interpreter in Japan who then also aided British negotiations.[968] The British thought very highly of him, potentially soothing any previous worries they had about relying on Dutch.[969] The castaway option was explored once more, but for Britain it was mostly slim pickings. The most effective castaways plied their services with the Americans, but one accepted, 'Denkichi' or

---

[964] See A. Chulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*.
[965] See H. J. Moeshart, 'The Conclusion of the First Dutch Treaty with Japan', *Crossroads*, 5 (Autumn 1997), <http://www.uwosh.edu/home_pages/faculty_staff/earns/moeshart.html> [Accessed 25 October 2021]; W. G. Beasley, 'The Language Problem in the Anglo-Japanese Negotiations of 1854', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, 13:3 (1950), pp. 749-750.
[966] W. G. Beasley, 'The Language Problem', pp. 749-750; Worryingly, the interpretative process that involved Dutch used in the 1860s was not much more advanced than what was seen here.
[967] W. G. Beasley, 'The Language Problem', pp. 747-749; Another castaway was briefly used, Rikimatsu, in 1854, but his services were negligible due to Admiral Stirling's preference for Dutch anyway; W. G. Beasley, 'Japanese Castaways and British Interpreters', pp. 94-96; K. Inoue, *Nihon no Rekishi 18*, pp. 122-123.
[968] L. Oliphant, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the years 1857, '58, '59* (New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1860), p. 344; *The New York Times*, 25 June 1860, p. 2.
[969] L. Oliphant, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, p. 355; TNA, FO 46/5, Hammond to Heusken, 1 May 1859; See also R. H. Hesselink, 'The Assassination of Henry Heusken', *Monumenta Nipponica*, 49:3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 331-351.

'Dan' to the British.[970] He took to European style too well however, angering many Japanese. Alcock interpreted this anger as resentment for translating Shogunate documents and intelligence and not his foreign looking demeanour. Ultimately, he was cut down in 1860 by ronin (rogue/masterless samurai).[971] This, combined with the arrival of a young von Siebold, meant that Britain's reliance on Dutch continued unabated.

Those recruited included: A. Annesley (a former Royal Navy midshipman), C. F. Myburgh (Cape Dutch and a doctor), F. M. Cowan (an English teacher, lawyer, and adept linguist), the problematic R. Eusden ('Japan Secretary' until 1866 and positively useless), and M. Dohmen (formerly a supercargo and Dutch interpreter for France in Japan).[972] A. von Siebold was employed as a 'supernumerary interpreter' (due to the death of Cowan and Denkitchi in 1860) alongside M. O. Flowers (who served in the British Consulate at Amsterdam) after the Foreign Office quickly realised the need for more interpreters in 1860 and 1861.[973] The idea was that whilst the Dutch interpreters covered the initial linguistic teething problems, the student interpreters would study Japanese, eventually allowing for more seamless interpretations and translations, and the phasing out of individuals who were either not entirely wedded to Britain or as linguistically useful.[974] The temporary solution of using

---

[970] Sometimes alternatively spelt 'Dankichi' also; W. G. Beasley, 'Japanese Castaways and British Interpreters', pp. 96-97.

[971] K. Plummer, *The Shogun's Reluctant Ambassadors: Japanese Sea Drifters in the North Pacific* (Oregon, Oregon Historical Society, 1991), p. 201 & pp. 207-208; R. Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon, Vol. 1*, p. 294.

[972] TNA, FO 46/5, Hammond to Mr. Hunt, 7 February 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, Hammond to Cowan, 24 February 1859; E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 30; B. Burke-Gaffney, 'George S. Morrison and Japan's first British consulate at Nagasaki', in R. S. G. Fletcher & R. Hellyer, eds., *Chronicling Westerners in Nineteenth-Century East Asia: Lives, Linkages, and Imperial Connections* (London, Bloomsbury Collections, 2022), p. 47; Besides Myburgh, von Siebold, and Dohmen, they were all British subjects. Despite this fact however, many were seen as problematic and 'half alien'.

[973] J. E. Hoare, 'Britain's Japan Consular Service, 1859-1941', p. 96; von Siebold was well spoken in Japanese having grown up in the country alongside his father, a famous Japanologist, Phillip Franz von Siebold (1796-1866); I. Ruxton, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow*, pp. 25-26; Cowan died along with 120-200 other men when the HMS *Camilla* sank during a typhoon whilst heading to Yokohama from Hakodate. It was reportedly seen striking a rock from a distant Prussian Ship-of-War in early September 1860; *Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle*, 29 December 1860, p. 4; *The Western Daily Press*, 31 December 1860, p. 3; *The Illustrated London News*, 5 January 1861, p. 7; *The Newcastle Daily Journal*, 16 January 1861, p. 3; *The Morning Post*, 14 February 1861, p. 4; *The Times*, 14 February 1861, p. 9; As R. Morton states, Alcock rather heartlessly commented that his death was: "…not a loss to the service, except in the sense of a temporary deficiency – for I confess I had no trust in him."; R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, p. 91; This seems overly harsh seeing as Cowan barely had time to make an impact before his death and was apparently fluent in over fourteen languages.

[974] It would be several years before this was achieved however, and like many of the Dutch interpreters, not all of the British student interpreters proved to be *that* wedded to the service either.

Dutch interpreters alongside student interpreters meant that the number accepted was limited; one for each treaty port (in theory) and one for the legation, with several qualified Dutch interpreters either flatly rejected or (in Myburgh's brother's case) told they would be kept 'in mind' should a vacancy arise.[975] There was even an example of a British Dutch interpreter stationed in the Netherlands being rejected, such was the limited space and high qualifications required (and the somewhat lateness of his enquiry).[976] The role of student interpreter was even more sort after; most likely due to the numerous inquiries sent to Britain's universities (and the aforementioned nepotism). At least fourteen candidates were rejected due to their simply being no vacancy present in 1859 alone.[977] Such contention for entering the service, let alone for rank and position, was part and parcel of Victorian Britain's Diplomatic and Consular Services.

This use of a 'linguistic intermediary' via Dutch interpreters was not a new or foreign concept. The interesting peculiarity here was that the intermediaries were not solely bilingual natives or nearby foreigners familiar with Japan and/or Japanese (like China etc.), but the Dutch, thanks to their (albeit soon ending) trade position in Japan granting them not only a monopoly in trade, but on translation and interpretation as well.[978] The exception in all of this was the initial aforementioned use of Japanese castaways who, although almost certainly limited in their linguistic abilities, were still considered somewhat useful. For example, twelve Japanese seamen were picked up by a British Merchant ship, the *Caribbean*, whilst enroute to San Francisco from Hong Kong. These individuals were eventually brought back to Hong Kong and handed over to Sir John Bowring, the newly appointed Governor, who,

---

[975] TNA, FO 46/5, D. Druin to Malmesbury, 25 January 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, E. Abraham to Hammond, 29 January 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, Hammond to E. Abraham, 29 January 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, Hammond to Myburgh, 5 December 1859.

[976] TNA, FO 46/9, C. H. Gunn to Hammond 4 February 1860; TNA, FO 46/9, Hammond to C. H. Gunn, 8 February 1860.

[977] TNA, FO 46/5, Hammond to D. Munro, 12 January 1858; TNA, FO 46/5, Hammond to H. Robinson, 3 February 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, Hammond to Mr. Hatton, 10 February 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, Hammond to W. Kirby, 21 February 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, D. Hammond to Hammond, 21 February 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, Mr. Mathew to Hammond, 21 February 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, J. Gibbons to Hammond, 21 February 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, Macdonald to Hammond, 21 February 1859; Macdonald was later accepted as a student interpreter; TNA, FO 46/5, Mr. Scott to Hammond, 21 February 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, Hammond to J. Gibbons, Mr. Hue, and Mr. Hinahan, 22 February 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, Mr. Davies to Hammond, 24 February 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, Mr. Royce to Hammond, 2 March 1859.

[978] See R. Law, 'The English Interpreters in Dahomey, 1843-1852', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 44:5 (2016), pp. 730-751; Not to mention Japan's own familiarity with Dutch: *Rangaku* Studies.

given Britain's former actions in regards to castaways would have attempted to see if they were of some use before their repatriation.[979] While the use of Dutch interpreters inevitably outlasted the use of native Japanese, their existence within the service eventually became minor too and practically non-existent by 1870. With both the use of Japanese subjects and Dutch interpreters being either unsatisfactory or unsuitable long-term solutions, it is rather self-explanatory as to why the Foreign Office bet so much on the development of British student interpreters. For the aforementioned R. Robertson, J. F. Lowder, E. Satow, and J. J. Enslie being among the first student interpreters to enter Japan and it would be some years before they grew into what was intended. Their future success meant that they would be soon followed by, W. G. Aston, J. O'Driscoll, J. C. Hall, J. H. Longford, H. S. Wilkinson, T. R. H. McClatchie (a nephew of Parkes), J. H. Gubbins, J. Troup, J. J. Quin, L. W. Küchler, A. M. Chalmers, H. A. C. Bonar, and W. J. Kenny. This is by no means an exhaustive list of *all* of Britain's interpreters, especially as this thesis halts at 1902, but these will be the interpreters I primarily refer to throughout this chapter.[980]

3. Interpretation, Translation and Linguistics in Anglo-Japanese Relations:

3.1 What did they do?:

The language focus of interpreters meant that they had a prime seat for promotion in the Japan Consular Service. For many being an interpreter was a stepping off point to better things, a primer for that highly desired, better paid posting. However, without spending too much time explaining the obvious, interpretation and translation were clearly key exercises for Britain's diplomatic objectives in Japan. Without them, progress would be minimal or reliant on the success (and failure) of other states linguistic abilities.[981] In this context, the lengths that Britain went to gain a linguistic foothold with several Dutch interpreters, and to then subsequently develop British interpreters of Japanese as well, appear completely understandable. However, the question remains, what did interpreters do in Japan? This question has been somewhat passed over in wider studies. There are inspiring exceptions,

[979] TNA, FO 46/5, Malmesbury to the Treasury, 24 February 1859; TNA, FO 46/5, M. F. Rogers to the Immigration Office, 17 March 1859.
[980] And sadly, some will be missed due to time and research constraints beyond my control.
[981] In the early days interpreters and linguistic experts were traded and shared around like valuable items. The aforementioned Henry Heusken is a prime example of this.

namely, W. G. Beasley's analysis of language issues and misunderstandings in Anglo-Japanese negotiations in the early 1850s and A. Daniels study of Anglo-Satsuma relations in 1863.[982] Both bodies of work situate language in a wider diplomatic framework and explain further the problems that come up when there was no proper effort at correctly comprehending Japanese by both official diplomats and civilians. We also have J. E. Hoare's short summary of interpreters during the formative years, which serves as an excellent primer for students and academics alike.[983] I shall first consider; what interpreters did, how did they did it, and what this meant for British diplomacy in Japan. I will explain how as interpreters alone, they were broadly mediocre, with only some able to use their linguistic talents to rise above the rest as minor diplomats during the early years of Anglo-Japanese relations. Namely, Satow and von Siebold.

3.2 Learning Japanese as a Student Interpreter:

Initially, language training, whilst deemed a necessary priority, was seriously underthought. There was a correct understanding that Japanese and Chinese shared similarities, so several interpreters were sent there.[984] Satow learned hundreds of Chinese Characters and had even started studying Manchu, but his stay and that of his fellow interpreters was cut short because they were so urgently needed in Japan.[985] Satow implies that this was probably a blessing because Chinese was ultimately "…no more indispensable than that of Latin is to a person who wishes to acquire Italian or Spanish."[986] However, it is still surprising that Chinese was not more seriously considered as another intermediary language like Dutch, especially when much of the Japanese nobility and merchant classes had an understanding of Chinese (as Morrison and Mitford later discovered).[987] Although Britain probably could not spare any Chinese interpreters, they could have still used a native Chinese interpreter instead, or better

[982] See W. G. Beasley, 'The Language Problem', pp. 746-758; See A. Daniels, 'Murder, Misunderstandings, and Might. Mid-Nineteenth Century Confrontation between Britain and Satsuma', pp. 143-154.
[983] See J. E. Hoare, 'Britain's Japan Consular Service, 1859-1941', pp. 94-106.
[984] They had to stop on the way to Japan in Hong Kong anyway.
[985] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 18.
[986] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 18; Mitford, speaking in 1870, states something similar, but perhaps overstates the impact any knowledge of Chinese would have for a new, budding interpreter (probably warped by his own experiences of using Chinese with the Japanese aristocracy); PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.
[987]See R. Morton, *A. B. Mitford*.

yet, a British merchant who had acquired the language through time in China on a temporary basis. Mitford states years later that many merchants used Chinese as a means to muddle through dealings with the Japanese, with Chinese middlemen often tasked with sealing the deal.[988] Interestingly, it did not take long for some merchants to develop their own knowledge of Japanese anyway. William Keswick for example, a head of Jardine Matheson Company, was stated by British botanist Robert Fortune, to be in:

> …daily communication with merchants from all parts of the country, and as he had considerable knowledge of the language, his means of acquiring information of this kind were greatly superior to my own.[989]

However, the frosty relationship Alcock and others had with the merchant community during the early 1860s meant that any use of the merchant community's language skills was nigh impossible.[990] Merchants were not the only ignored party either. Many women situated in East Asia because of their families had learned Chinese (and later Japanese), but due to their gender were never seriously considered.[991] Chinese's potential can be seen early at Nagasaki in 1859, with the then consul George Morrison relying on a Japanese-Chinese interpreter with remarkable success.[992] Morrison informed Alcock that "…without him [his interpreter] I should be utterly helpless."[993] Why Alcock did not try to make better use of Chinese after Morrison's success is down to the lack of personnel. In Japan he lacked interpreters who spoke Chinese in any significant way and the Chinese Consular Service, understandably, did not wish to part with any of its own interpreters. This does still leave the potential for other Chinese speakers however, even if Chinese's use in Edo/Yokohama would not have been as significant as at Nagasaki. So, despite Chinese not helping Britain's interpreters learn Japanese, it was clearly a missed opportunity interpretive wise. If it was promoted in a similar

---

[988] PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.
[989] R. Fortune, *Yedo and Peking: A Narrative of A Journey to the Capitals of Japan and China* (London, John Murray, 1863), p. 282.
[990] Things were so bad at one point with Alcock, that several British merchants had a better relationship with the French Minister Bellecourt during this period than he did; R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, p. 99.
[991] For example, Amy Lowder (1847-1924), Alcock's step-daughter, was so good at Chinese that according to Alcock she was outpacing the actual student interpreters on the Foreign Office's payroll in China; TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 12 May 1866.
[992] Morrison himself could speak Chinese and there was a sizeable Chinese community for him to rely on in Nagasaki as well.
[993] TNA, FO 46/8, G. Morrison to Alcock, 13 October 1859.

fashion to Dutch as yet another linguistic stop-gap measure, perhaps greater gains could have been made, with more individual interpreters then rising to the fore as useful minor diplomats. Another missed opportunity, though not on the same level as Chinese, was the use of Japanese castaways, but as mentioned previously this linguistic angle quickly came to naught.[994] All of these issues forced Britain to accept Dutch as the primary, albeit temporary, diplomatic *lingua franca* of Anglo-Japanese relations. For the student interpreters it would be their only reprieve whilst they attempted to learn the ins and outs of what remains one of the most difficult languages to master.[995] Consequently, after arriving in Japan in 1860 from Hong Kong, Robertson and Satow were forced to develop their own methods of learning Japanese from scratch, and hope their petitions for educational funds were accepted quickly. This did not happen.

Learning Japanese was therefore slow going. Study aids such as books and teachers were few and far between. Satow found that most existing works on Japanese were either impossibly expensive to acquire, deeply inaccurate, or still in early development.[996] He was able to acquire some pages from the book, *Colloquial Japanese*, being worked on by American Missionary S. R. Brown.[997] Alcock too, published his own works in 1861 and 1863 on the Japanese language. However, given Alcock had little Japanese knowledge and his rather verbose writing style, I am not sure these works offered much educational help.[998] Despite being held up by so-called clerical work, the then chief in charge, Neale, acquiesced to Satow and Robertson having access to private rooms and lessons to encourage their Japanese learning.[999] Study time was still limited however, with Satow despising this aspect of being an interpreter the most. In a letter to W. G. Aston, another interpreter, he later

---

[994] As aforementioned earlier in this chapter, the Japanese castaway option was briefly explored twice, but came to nothing after the first batch proved inadequate and the one castaway Britain was able to employ the second time around, Dankichi, was murdered in 1860 anyway.
[995] The US State Department considers Japanese to be a category V language, one of the hardest languages to master. From personal experience and discussion with colleagues and peers, Japanese is certainly one of the hardest languages to learn for English speakers.
[996] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 55.
[997] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 55; S. R. Brown, *Colloquial Japanese or Conversational Sentences and Dialogues in English and Japanese, together with an English-Japanese Index to serve as a Vocabulary, and an Introduction on the Grammatical Structure of the Language* (Shanghai, Presbyterian Mission Press, 1863).
[998] See R. Alcock, *Elements of Japanese Grammar for the Use of Beginners* (Shanghai, 1861); See R. Alcock, *Familiar Dialogues in Japanese with English and French Translations for the use of students* (Paris, Benjamin Ruprat; London: Trübner, 1863); Mitford was far less polite in his scathing reviews A. B. Mitford, *Memories, Vol. I* (London, Hutchinson, 1915), p. 358.
[999] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 56.

sympathetically concluded that he "…quite shared your [Aston's] feeling of disgust with Japan. For a least a year before I left, I had ceased to take any interest in the work."[1000] Clerical work was still 'doing Japanese' in many ways, but simply copying documents over and over would understandably dull anyone's interest. Brown would teach Satow and Robertson twice a week and they were able to eventually get a 'native teacher' at the Foreign Office's expense. This 'native teacher' was not actually a teacher and could obviously not understand any English; he was simply someone they could attempt to communicate with.[1001] Unsurprisingly therefore, Satow states his greatest success came from Brown and his classes. From Brown he grasped Japanese grammar and speaking quite successfully.[1002] Eventually they were able to hire Takaoka Kaname, a doctor, replacing their previous native teacher.[1003] Satow also occasionally made use of a samurai named Kobayashi Kotaro as a tutor.[1004] Clearly, Japanese was not only a difficult language to learn, but was a difficult language to *begin* studying. With hindsight we can say that this seemed to have little effect on proceedings, with Satow's zeal, Robertsons intelligence, and the Dutch interpreters (the 'middlemen' according to Satow), mainly von Siebold, all carrying the weight of interpretation and translation 'well' enough.[1005] At this stage it was still mainly particular individuals holding the interpretive fort, with Satow eventually becoming the rising star.

Satow discusses his lessons with Takaoka considerably; the copying, repetition and memorising of Japanese. Activities that even modern Japanese learners would find all too familiar. Satow's progress was considerable, with his first competent foray into translation coming about in June 1863. A note from the Shogun written in the epistolary style was translated from Dutch by Eusden and from Japanese by von Siebold and Satow into English.[1006] Alcock, before he returned in to Japan in 1864, wrote a memorandum on Japan in

---

[1000] I. Ruxton, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow*, p. 97.
[1001] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 56-57; Interestingly, Satow notes he was let down several times by the fact that said 'native teacher' would simply not show up again, or that he would end up conned out of his money by his 'boy' when sent to fetch supplies for his language learning ('boy' being a common term for 'servant'); H. Atkinson, *Revised and Enlarged Edition of Exercises in the Yokohama Dialect* (Yokohama, Japan Gazette Office, 1879), p. 19.
[1002] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 57.
[1003] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 57.
[1004] Kotaro was under the employ of Dr. Willis to learn English, but Willis also used him as his own Japanese-language aide and given Willis's friendship with Satow. it is not unreasonable to assume Kotaro came in handy for Satow as well; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 54.
[1005] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 58.
[1006] See J. P. Lamers, *Treaties on Epistolary Style: João Rodriquez on the Noble Art of Writing Japanese Letters* (Michigan, University of Michigan, 2002); E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 58.

December 1863, demanding that several issues be addressed before he returned. Among many other things, Alcock demanded an increased budget for acquiring Japanese materials, namely political information (effectively doubling as learning materials) and better student interpreters (the heavy reliance on Dutch proved vexing for Alcock).[1007] In effect the Foreign Office, despite its best efforts at preparing men for life in Japan had provided too few with little actual talent and/or qualifications. Alcock needed better, but despite his pleas no new interpreters appeared to replicate either Satow or von Siebold. For Alcock, they were the two members that the service *must not* lose, with von Siebold's potential loss alone deemed 'irreparable'. Alcock actually recommended being more meritocratic, using promotion and higher salaries to ensure their 'loyalty'.[1008] Alcock sorely needed them both, for despite his pleas, the Foreign Office failed to provide better language support and interpreters in the short-term, with Alcock having nothing but hope and good intentions that those he had and got would just 'get better' somehow.[1009] In a letter about one of his step-sons, Windsor Lowder, Alcock nonchalantly comments that most of the student interpreters' English skills were very lacking upon arrival; difficulties with one's native tongue does not bode well for learning another, substantially more difficult language.[1010] In this context, I. Ruxton's opinion that Satow's pairing with von Siebold was the best British/foreign interpretative team at this time is hard to disagree with.[1011] The setbacks of not having enough time, materials, and adequate teaching to learn, widened the gap between interpreters, with the more resourceful rising above the rest who remained stunted and politely forever described as simply 'promising'. This explains the greater individual successes that we see during these formative years, compared to the more collective operation that we see later. It is unsurprising therefore that Satow was heavily relied upon and was first to really begin surpassing the Dutch interpreters.[1012]

[1007] TNA, FO 46/37, Alcock to Foreign Office, 15 December 1863.
[1008] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 17 March 1864.
[1009] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 21 May 1865; TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 21 June 1865.
[1010] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 21 June 1865.
[1011] I. Ruxton, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow*, p. 25 & p. 51.
[1012] However, it was not until 1865 that Satow was promoted, and then again in Autumn 1866 to Japanese Secretary by Parkes (where he was moved from the Yokohama Consular Office to the Legation building proper); E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 165.

It would only be the arrival and experience of Sir Harry Parkes in 1865, himself beginning his career as a 'mere' interpreter in China, that things would improve.[1013] Dutch was used less, more time was allocated for Japanese study, and the Foreign Office actually listened to his linguistic requests and considerations.[1014] Parkes had little patience for the linguistic shortcomings of the Dutch interpreters and was quick to seek new interpreters. The only exception was von Siebold, who, in Parkes's eyes, despite being an 'admirable oral interpreter', was quite behind Satow in regards to translation.[1015] The new student interpreters were not only more successful from the onset, but better trained on the ground thanks to the experiences of Satow, Robertson, and von Siebold (when the others were absent). In the late 1860s he was able to secure Foreign Office support for four more student interpreters as a reserve to better cope with the constant absences due to illness/leave and the increasing workloads of Japan's consular postings.[1016] Parkes's desire was to have the new interpreters, Quin and Hodges in this case, study for at least two years (under Satow's tutelage) before attending to greater consular duties.[1017] A far cry from their treatment in earlier years.[1018] In the latter 1860s, we still see a reliance on select individuals, but we also witness others quickly entering the fray, like Aston, Wilkinson, Troup, and MacDonald (and the addition of diplomat A. B. Mitford as extra support), replacing the previously 'promising' but ultimately counterproductive individuals that proceeded them. The lack of more forthright and successful support from Parkes's predecessors had left Britain's interpretive practices heavily reliant on key individuals instead of helping create a broader body of linguistic support across the country. Parkes's interpreter background made him keenly aware of these linguistic shortcomings and the problems it could create, so his actions are not at all surprising. Parkes rightly realised that for Anglo-Japanese relations to be more successful and more dominant, more competent staff were needed.

[1013] Mitford implies that Parkes was a 'mere parrot' when speaking about Parkes's interpretive abilities. Mitford compares Parkes to a 'head waiter' and nothing more because of his lack of 'intellectual' interpretative abilities, and sole reliance on being a linguistic oralist; A. B. Mitford, *Memories, Vol. I*, p. 94; S. Lane-Poole & F. V. Dickens, *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes*, p. 133.
[1014] TNA, FO 46/68, Parkes to Hammond, 28 April 1866; TNA, FO 46/69, Parkes to Hammond, 16 December 1866; TNA, FO 46/69, Parkes to Hammond, 18 January 1867.
[1015] TNA, FO 46/82, Parkes to Hammond, 30 January 1868.
[1016] TNA, FO 46/69, Parkes to Hammond, 18 January 1867.
[1017] TNA, FO 46/82, Parkes to Hammond, 21 May 1869; TNA FO 46/82, Parkes to Hammond, 16 December 1867.
[1018] TNA, FO 46/82, Parkes to Hammond, 15 October 1867; TNA FO 46/82, Parkes to Hammond, 16 December 1867.

Overall, learning Japanese was heavily dependent on one's perseverance to study the problematic language and hampered by failures to more adequately support Japanese learning from 1858-1865. This would change, with eventually more 'modern' and useful textbooks appearing (with Foreign Office encouragement) and a growth in the academic study of the Japanese language, significantly easing future student interpreters learning. For example, Aston's work, *A Grammar of the Japanese Written Language*, first published in 1872 and subsequently again, expanded and revised several times over, B. H. Chamberlain's book, *A Simplified Grammar of the Japanese Language*, published in 1886, and the Asiatic Society of Japan's founding in 1872 (of whom Satow and Aston were later presidents).[1019] Moreover, as aforementioned, from the early 1870s onwards, a detailed Japanese language examination was introduced to better gauge ones understanding of the language more forthrightly.[1020] With these developments some early interpreters fell by the wayside, with the newer breed of interpreters being far better trained due to easier access to both time and materials, the most prominent casualties being the 'middlemen' Dutch interpreters, but such a change was needed. For British diplomats during these formative years, they all, to some extent, recognised the importance of language learning, Alcock and his China recommendation (and his own 'efforts' to learn Japanese, which he thought would act as a good example), Neale and his acquiescence to more time, space, and funds, Alcock's renewed pleas for linguistic support, and Parkes's greater understanding and sympathy of interpreter's needs. However, this was all too late for those like Satow and Robertson who had to partake in the early epoch of Anglo-Japanese relations through some substantial trial and error. The groundwork laid by Alcock (and to a lesser extent Neale) and his appreciation for how important interpreters were to the Foreign Office played a role, but it was Parkes's additional support that finally allowed for greater recognition. The singular successes of men like Satow, Robertson, and von Siebold would be built upon and used more wisely. Their difficulties and experiences transformed how Japanese would later be attained and how such attainment would then be better supported by the Foreign Office in the future. Thus, even the individualism seen among interpreters initially was soon made extinct; collectivised under a larger, more successful Japanese Consular Service that Parkes understood was desperately needed.

[1019] See W. G. Aston, *Grammar of the Japanese Written Language, Third Edition* (London, Luzac & Co, 1904); TNA, FO 46/146, Aston to Hammond, 23 June 1871; TNA, FO 46/146, Aston to Hammond, 5 July 1871; TNA, FO 46/146, Aston to Hammond, 24 October 1871; B. H. Chamberlain, *A Simplified Grammar of the Japanese Language* (Yokohama, Kelly & Walsh, 1886).
[1020] TNA, FO 46/186/6, Parkes to Robertson, 20 May 1873.

3.3 Interpreting and Translating Japanese as an Interpreter for Britain in Japan:

So, whilst we now have an understanding of how Japanese was studied and how hard it was to learn, we now come to how this was put into practice in aid of British diplomacy. Interpreting was a tricky business, even with languages other than Japanese. In Britain, even by the 1870s, there was no way of adequately preparing for Japanese (and even Chinese), with only the famous Parisian *Collège de France* under the highly respected sinologist Stanislas Julien (Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg reportedly had some academics with 'some' knowledge of either Chinese, Japanese or both, but nothing substantial).[1021] Going to the Far East and to Japan was the only way to not only be an interpreter in Japanese, obviously, but also, rather problematically, the only way to start learning as well. To literally learn on the job. This could be seen as rather self-defeating and even somewhat incompetent, but at this time Britain was the only treaty port power with such an interpreting programme/system like this anyway. No other power had the same large number of active interpreters; only Prussia by mid-1870 started fielding student interpreters, only two of them, in the same way that Britain did.[1022] Britain's operation was clearly problematic, especially before 1865 as we have seen, but it was leaps and bounds ahead of the other treaty port powers. Its difficulty was further exacerbated by Japan's own social/extra-linguistic cues, which although not something that abnormal or surprising to encounter, it was still something that needed to be additionally addressed at varying points.

Interpretation for Britain improved despite these faults and additional considerations, or at least, worked quickly enough to meet its obligations however. The early uptake from students like Satow, Robertson, and later Aston, certainly point to this fact. Moreover, to reinforce the development of Britain's student interpreters and help smooth over the early conversations between Britain and Japan, interpreters were put into pairs when on any specific assignment, one Dutch interpreter and one student interpreter; pairs were often chosen from the same station (treaty port) so some familiarity would be present in order to ease cooperation (and prevent serious logistical headaches). This practice became less common as student interpreters grasp of Japanese improved and reliance on Dutch as an intermediary language

[1021] PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.
[1022] PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.

decreased, but this pairing system worked well in the meantime (barring illness and/or availability). The most famous example would be Satow and von Siebold's pairing. They had a positive working relationship (and friendship), both were talented at Japanese, and were often called upon for their exceptional linguistic skills. For example, at the bombardment of Kagoshima in 1863 they both provided their services to Neale during the tense negotiations. Despite Satow being the junior student interpreter, he would have probably taken on most, if not all, of the interpretive duties, with von Siebold playing more of a supportive translation role. Satsuma attempts at delay by handing their diplomatic messages only in Japanese, despite having both their own interpreters ashore, were successfully ignored thanks to them.[1023] Furthermore, their interpretive abilities successfully allowed Neale to query and pressure the Satsuma messengers that had come aboard the flagship with immediacy.[1024] The efficiency of their communication gave great impetus to British diplomacy at a time when speedy diplomacy was a luxury. Together they garnered considerable expertise and praise as time went on; at Osaka in 1865 from Parkes for example.[1025] Indeed, despite Satow's regrets about their non-existent friendship outside of the professional sphere, it was Parkes who promoted him to Japanese Secretary of the Legation in Autumn 1866.[1026] Satow, as well as Aston and Wilkinson, received rapturous praise when Parkes went to Osaka again in 1867 after a summoning of foreign representatives by the Shogun.[1027] Evidently, British interpreting developed relatively successfully despite its rocky beginnings, and allowed Britain and its diplomats to comfortably complete their duties without much issue. The opportunity for misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and indeed unintentional diplomatic slothfulness was still rife however, especially when there were so many underqualified and not so linguistically gifted (with Japanese) interpreters around in early Anglo-Japanese relations. The rapid success of the few, like Satow, overcame many of the individual inadequacies initially found among student and Dutch interpreters alike, but now we can see the profession showed signs of growth with newer faces like Aston and Wilkinson drawing both praise and experience.

[1023] Fletcher and MacDonald were also present as supporting interpreters and according to Alcock availed themselves quite well; TNA, FO 46/37, Alcock to Hammond, 8 November 1863.
[1024] TNA, FO 46/36/126, Neale to Russel, 26 August 1863.
[1025] I. Ruxton, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow*, p. 51;
[1026] Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 165; Satow Papers, TNA, PRO 30/33/1/1, Stanley to Satow, 8 February 1868.
[1027] TNA, FO 46/80/92, Parkes to Stanley, 12 June 1867.

Satow was often at the centre of things when it came to interpreting for Britain's chief diplomats. Another popular pairing, one of Parkes's favourites, was Satow with A. B. Mitford.[1028] Interestingly, Mitford was not an 'official' interpreter, but was often placed alongside Satow in the latter 1860s.[1029] He was however, a very clever and adept linguist, using his Chinese skills to speak with many Japanese nobles and learned Japanese 'on the job' unlike many of his non-interpreter peers.[1030] This pairing was probably due to Satow and Mitford's impressive dual take up of the language, but also the lessening need to rely on the Dutch interpreters, the best of which were either now performing duties abroad (von Siebold) or preferred at Britain's consulates. Parkes had an eye for diplomatic intelligence and Satow had many Japanese contacts due to this interpreting skills (Mitford too).[1031] Satow's interpreting abilities were certainly advanced by the late 1860s. His travels across the coast and parts of Japan's interior from 1865-1867 for example are testament to this fact.[1032] He had to interpret in varyingly different locales with differing Japanese nobility and peoples; quite the feat, even for someone in Satow's position. F. O. Adams, a Chargé d'Affaires, in the early 1870s, was so enamoured and grateful of Satow's skills in his testimonies to the Foreign Office that Lord Granville felt the need to pass on the Foreign Office's own appreciation.[1033] Satow's (and to a lesser extent von Siebold's) educational and practical expertise they had with Japanese was now being shared with the newer flock of student interpreters to great effect. The leadership of the few, alongside the general progress of time, meant that the Japan Consular Service was only growing in competence and opportunity. Soon, the patchy and haphazard 1860s would give way to a more competent, coherent, and collectivised effort that made the Japan Consular Service one of the most professionalised diplomatic bodies of its kind. This achievement was still a long way off however.

Satow is our primary example of how, at this level of the Consular Service, the interpreters were no more than a loose batch of individuals forced to struggle in a new and foreign land

---

[1028] TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 17 October 1866; See R. Morton, *A. B. Mitford*; Mitford was actually moved to Japan at the behest of Alcock because he believed Mitford was becoming too friendly with his step-daughter, Amy. This worked out well because Parkes soon could not do without him; R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, pp. 168-169.
[1029] I. Ruxton, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow*, pp. 52-58.
[1030] The Foreign Office, unlike Alcock, did not afford him in any extras or specific praise however; R. Morton, *A. B. Mitford*, p. VIII.
[1031] TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 14 February 1867.
[1032] See E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*.
[1033] Satow Papers, TNA, PRO 33/33/1/1, Watson to Satow, 9 September 1872.

with next to no help. Satow was ahead of the rest, with only von Siebold, Aston, and Robertson close behind. The rest were a mixed bag who, no doubt (mostly) intelligent and (mostly) dutiful, were simply not up to studying Japanese and working in Japan specifically. The teething problems that came with learning Japanese did not visibly impact Britain's interpreting abilities in the long-term however, even despite some miscommunications and the varying quality of Britain's chosen interpreters. For example, the mannerisms and temperaments of the officials and diplomats they interpreted for often proved to be at odds with their own position as an intermediary. In other words, making their job harder than it already was. One prominent example being Satow and Neale. Satow states that Neale's temper was awkward to interpret, not only because the Japanese could clearly see Neale's anger, but also the fact that attempting to transform Neale's rage into a more palatable response to the more timid and respectable Japanese only added to Satow's workload and embarrassment.[1034] Putting 'son of a gun' into Japanese was not an exact process that you want to be forced into for example (especially if you were the Dutch interpreter and potentially unfamiliar with English colloquialisms in the first place).[1035] Japanese was and remains a difficult language, so having to try and interpret whilst your chief acts less than diplomatic was not ideal. Perhaps trying to interpret foreign mannerisms and frustrations with Japanese politeness and (Bakufu-official) obstruction proved too much of an additional task, thus why many of the initial intake of interpreters remained so woefully inept. This viewpoint, whilst possibly too sympathetic, is backed by the fact that whilst some breakthroughs technically made Japanese 'easier' to interpret, in reality the gains were either superficial or simply counterproductive.

Unsurprisingly, Dutch was one such breakthrough. The long-standing relationship between the Netherlands and Japan softened some interpretative difficulties.[1036] For example, during Lord Elgin's arrival at Nagasaki in 1858 to negotiate Britain's Ansei Treaty. Japanese officials were said to have hurried aboard 'speaking Dutch' which no one present was prepared for.[1037] Overall, talks went smoothly enough, if not slowly, with the most major

[1034] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 70; Neale was apparently nothing compared to Parkes's
[1035] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 70.
[1036] See G. K. Goodman, *Japan and the Dutch, 1600-1853* (London, Routledge, 2000); See L. Cullen, *Early Japanese Trade, Administration and Interactions with the West* (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2020).
[1037] It did not help that the Japanese still predominantly spoke a seventeenth/eighteenth century derivation of Dutch however; R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, p. 86; L. Oliphant, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, p. 306.

point of confusion being over the Japanese understanding of Lord Elgin's titles.[1038] This explains the aforementioned reliance on Heusken, the Dutch-American interpreter who found himself working for a variety of nations during their negotiations; America, Britain, and Prussia from 1858 until his murder in 1861.[1039] Britain may have sought to wean themselves off Dutch interpreters over time, but their contributions towards interpretation and the enhancement of Britain's (and other powers) effectiveness during the early years cannot be ignored. Heusken alone was described as invaluable during Lord Elgin's efforts to sign a treaty with Japan.[1040] Such an understanding is a reminder that language, much like diplomacy, also does not exist in a vacuum. Understandably, given the requirements that interpreters needed to be assessed fit for the role, language knowledge was demanded, so this was likely something that the Foreign Office did not consider it lacked in any way. For example, Satow's French services were drawn upon during the height of Franco-Tokugawa cooperation and Anglo-French rivalry for influence in Japan.[1041] Von Siebold's time in Paris to 'spy' on the Tokugawa diplomatic mission to France and gauge Franco-Japanese relations is another example.[1042] Britain's access to multiple linguists with multiple languages, especially Dutch, was only a boon to developing Anglo-Japanese relations. It was breakthrough that smoothed over the initial diplomatic 'shock' between far-flung nations and granted time for Britain to form a more dedicated understanding of the Japanese Language in the long-term.

However, whilst Dutch was able to grease over the linguistic pitfalls of opening diplomacy between two distant and alien lands, it can be easy to overstate how Dutch made

---

[1038] P. Barr, *The Coming of the Barbarians*, pp. 74-75; This can be misleading and imply that negotiations were easy. The truth was that Lord Elgin, and the other foreign diplomats, were greatly helped by Townsend Harris's footwork in establishing his initial treaty with Japan in the first place. It was thanks to his efforts that the rest followed so simply by comparison.
[1039] See R. H. Hesselink, 'The Assassination of Henry Heusken', pp. 331-351.
[1040] P. Barr, *The Coming of the Barbarians*, pp. 73-77.
[1041] Satow Papers, TNA, PRO 30/33/1/2, Translation of French Proposal to Tokugawa Court, 7 November 1865.
[1042] TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 26 January 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 28 January 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 28 January 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 11 February 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 12/13 March 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 26 March 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 22 May 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 28 January 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 28 January 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 11 February 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 12/13 March 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 26 March 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 22 May 1868.

interpretation easier. It helped, it was a useful stop-gap, but I emphasise that only in the early years was it actually beneficial and only to a point. Through Satow we quickly understand why Britain's reliance on Dutch was temporary. For example, during one discussion with the Japanese in Edo, he details how early interpretation was done during early Anglo-Japanese diplomatic meetings. These interpreter pairs, Satow and von Siebold in this case, would work alongside a pair of Japanese interpreters. Satow would speak English and von Siebold after in Dutch. One of the Japanese interpreters would then speak in Dutch and the other in Japanese. A four-way process involving a trifecta of languages.[1043] Alcock deplored this laboured procedure of interpretation, describing it as "…a process which I fear secures the evaporation of any spirit or essential truth."[1044] In addition to the linguistic misunderstandings that arose, Satow states that the Japanese often took advantage of the inordinate amount of time it took to interpret and effectively 'play dumb', so that they had to go through the process all over again.[1045] This was a common tactic by the Japanese, and one of the reasons they were happy to rely on Dutch as their Western language of choice. Dutch was a useful tool, but was certainly a temporary measure due to the imperfect practicalities that came with it. The impracticality of relying on Dutch perhaps explains why almost all of the Dutch interpreters individually fell behind, with only von Siebold, excelling to that of a crucial minor diplomat because of his excellent linguistic ability.

Another more humorous example of a linguistic breakthrough would be successive discussions about the weather and health. It is somehow very British, yet very Japanese to talk about the weather in such a constant fashion. Satow describes the two topics as *de rigueur* which implies that their discussion was required by etiquette (almost ritualistic in its common repetition).[1046] Admiral Henry Keppel, then Commander of the China Squadron, describes it in less linguistic terms as simply a common occurrence to be taken for granted. That: "Conversation commenced, as in all civilised places, about the weather."[1047] He mentions the 'usual commonplace conversation' about the weather again later, though with the addition of discussing their ages and "how well we all looked".[1048] The weather and

[1043] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 70; PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.
[1044] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 1 September 1860.
[1045] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 70.
[1046] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 69.
[1047] H. Keppel, *A Sailor's Life Under Four Sovereigns, Volume 3*, p. 149.
[1048] H. Keppel, *A Sailor's Life*, p. 169.

health topics were part of a shared understanding, a politeness that helped initiate and intimate conversation. For interpreters like Satow such things were gold dust. Not only did they help expediate pleasant relations and thereby create a positive atmosphere for diplomacy, they too would make interpreting easier. Much like greetings, which are also a common repeatable (understandably), if the topics of weather and health are put into that category as well, they become an expected adage that can be remembered and easily prepared for. The details of the weather and health perhaps further suggest why the gap between interpreters was initially so large, with some able to aptly adapt this small advantage more seamlessly than others. Of course, mistakes were inevitable and only the experience of interpreting, trial and error, would effectively iron out any kinks. For example, when Satow was brought to Edo by Neale for a meeting with some of the Shogun's Ministers. He was able to point out that it was *infra dig* or unbecoming of a Foreign Representative to refer to his Japanese counterpart with a polite-suffix when speaking of them indirectly.[1049] With experience came practice and with time came learning, but during these early years only some of Britain's interpreters were able to take up Japanese quickly. Too many were not able to meet the demands made of them, even despite some minor linguistic breakthroughs, and considering how difficult a language Japanese is and was, let alone for European speakers, it is unsurprising that the majority of the initial interpreters fell by the wayside. The difficulties that surrounded learning and interpreting Japanese, combined with the sheer lack of support available from the Foreign Office who wish to achieve as much as possible with as little money as possible, interpreters were always doomed to be a more fluid assortment of individuals, with only some rising to that of important minor diplomats early on.

In terms of translating, it appears that it was much more laboured process and the less important of the two tasks as time went on, especially in terms of perception. Interpreters were expected to translate documents, notes, memorandums that crossed their desk at will, and with such a common task expected of them a significant number of translated materials were produced on a multitude of topics. This included geographical translations, historical translations, private letters, papers and Daimyō/Government notifications, and (burgeoning) Japanese newspapers.[1050] Translation of information gained at the treaty ports and elsewhere

[1049] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 69.
[1050] Satow Papers, TNA, PRO, 30/33/1/3, Geography of Japan, 1871; Satow Papers, TNA, PRO, 30/33/1/3, Synoptical Tables of Japanese Chronology, 1870; Satow Papers, TNA, PRO, 30/33/1/4, Nishimura Papers, 1869-1871; Satow Papers, TNA, PRO, 30/33/1/4, Notification of the Satsuma-Han, 1869; Satow Papers, TNA, PRO, 30/33/1/4, No. 16 of the Yedo News, Undated.

that seemed pertinent was also carried out, but a more consistent reliance on British interpreters over the Dutch interpreters for translation of serious documents had to wait.[1051] It would be wise to assume that the written expertise of Britain's interpreters mostly outpaced their interpretation ability in the early years given how much emphasis was placed on translation. However, problems, both unexpected and understandable, naturally arose to challenge the process of translation as well. For example, this was prior to any significant attempt at standardising the written Japanese Language, namely its *hiragana*, *katakana*, and *Kanji* scripts. [1052] Interpreters had to learn, or at least understand, multiple variations of *kana* (the Japanese phonetic writing system) and additionally learn several handwriting styles (which were appropriate for different formalities).[1053] To recognise and translate one script was hard enough, but to then add on various other iterations and versions only impresses on us the difficulties that would have cropped up during these formative years.[1054] Whilst the student interpreters spent considerable time translating official documents, such as diplomatic notes and letters for example, it was still carried mainly out by Dutch interpreters by 1863.[1055] Dutch interpreters would have had to rely on going from Japanese – Dutch – English, which does present concerning ideas about potential miscommunication once again.[1056] It was a significant assumption that their general translation skills were above that of the student interpreters simply because they spoke and read Dutch. The previous examples, which were translated by Eusden, someone whose linguistic ability was constantly questioned by Satow, and the aforementioned debates around some of the Dutch interpreter's language abilities like Annesley and Dohmen only add to this fact.[1057] Moreover, the Japanese understanding of Dutch in hindsight presented its own challenges. It may have been the *de facto* Western *lingua franca* for the Japanese, but they often struggled to translate new terms, words and

[1051] TNA, FO 46/34/18, Enslie to Neale, 4 April 1863; TNA, FO 46/34/72, Neale to Russell, 13 My 1863;
[1052] See N. Gottlieb, *Language and the Modern State: The Reform of Written Japanese* (London, Routledge, 1991); See C. Seeley, *A History of Writing in Japan* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2000).
[1053] In fact, the copying of such scripts was among their first tasks when learning the language.
[1054] TNA, FO, 46/7/6, Introduction to Japanese, 1860.
[1055] TNA, FO 46/33/15, Neale to Japanese Ministers, 11 April 1863; TNA, FO 46/33/15, Japanese Ministers to Neale, 12 April 1863; TNA, FO 46/35/93, Neale to Russell, 14 June 1863.
[1056] The Japanese themselves faced a similar issue and often complained that even after they translated British notices or letters, they still could not understand them. Alcock's overly lengthy and discursive writings did not help matters, with both the Shogun and the French complaining about how long translations would take; R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, pp. 86-88.
[1057] I. Ruxton, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow*, p. 93; The death of Cowan, a promising Dutch interpreter, certainly did not help.

expressions that were completely foreign/alien to them.[1058] Again, this shows us how the Dutch interpreters, despite being a needed stop-gap, were at times not as useful in reality, thus helping explain why many of them were quickly individually side-lined.

However, clearly again no major rupture from any mistranslation occurred to heavily impact Anglo-Japanese relations overall. As the actual aims of translation was not about a perfect literal translation, but more a 'faithful rendering' of what had been said, the room for serious mistranslation was probably quite low and only decreased over time anyway.[1059] Translation may have been the more minor and mundane of the two primary roles of the interpreter, but it was a necessary and continuous process that had to be maintained. This maintenance certainly proved viable as after 1863 the reliance on the Dutch interpreters alone began to fade and by 1870 was obsolete, pointing to an increasing cadre of British student interpreters whose translation ability was more than capable.[1060] In other words the student interpreters, alongside their newer arrivals, were less individually successful at studying Japanese, and now more collectively capable. This growing ability is best shown with a specific example of a somewhat mundane, yet highly pertinent and important problem that came up when British interpreters were translating documents and texts was the Queen Victoria issue. In particular the proper translation of 'Her Majesty the Queen'.

The document is undated but we can assume it was written by Satow between 1865-1868, for it mentions both the 'Tycoon' (i.e., the Shogun) and the Emperor of Japan as relevant parties. If we consider his edited recollections of the period, *A Diplomat in Japan*, it gives us an even tighter range of November 1866 – December 1866 after he became Japanese Secretary in Autumn 1866.[1061] In this document Satow points out that Japanese interpreters' own translation of 'Her Majesty the Queen' and our passive acceptance of their translation in their own writings as well is, in his Victorian diplomatic eyes, as simply unacceptable. Namely, 女王 (*joō*) and 殿下 (*denka*), the former meaning 'Queen' and the latter meaning 'His/Her Highness', describing both as 'evenly inappropriate'. He goes into great detail showing the

[1058] See M. J. Heijdra, 'Polyglot Translators: Chinese, Dutch, and Japanese in the Introduction of Western Learning in Tokugawa Japan', in P. W. Kroll & A. Hoffstädt, eds., *At the Shores of the Sky: Asian Studies for Albert Hoffstädt* (Boston, Brill, 2020).
[1059] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 59.
[1060] PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.
[1061] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 161-167.

ins and outs of why such words were chosen and their related offshoots, but the gist of the matter is that these titles suggest 'an inferior sovereign' like 'Luikui' (Anglicised version of *Luiqui*; the Ryukyu Islands) or Korea. In his view, 皇帝 (*kōtei*) should be used as the equivalent for queen in the future. To have such a discussion about the many words for sovereign, ruler, emperor/empress, king in Japanese and some of their Chinese equivalents certainly speaks too Satow's language skills at the very least.[1062] This was a memorandum for other interpreters under his tutelage and considering the detailed extent that Satow goes to explain himself we can rightly assume that understanding of Japanese translation had at least improved. With Satow at the helm a collective body of more competent interpreters was forming.

4. Beyond Interpretation and Translation within the Consular Service

4.1. What did this entail?:

With the development of interpretation and translation steadily moving forward, and the overall cadre of British interpreters improving, we now come to what happened next. Student interpreters had far greater opportunities within the Japan Consular Service than just becoming a full-fledged interpreter, something that only expanded as the quality of interpreters grew in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Promotion was not only encouraged, but expected, as was the development of interpreter's skills outside their primary role of interpretation and translation.[1063] As we saw with Robertson and Lowder, and to a lesser extent with the Dutch interpreters, with the early intake of student interpreters and interpreters this proved to be problematic process. Not all were equally qualified to be interpreters, let alone hold posts of greater responsibility. Promotion and movement around Japan did not follow any discernible pattern that we today would recognise as something strictly meritocratic and/or fair. Opportunities for permanent and/or successive promotions simply did not exist in the Japan Consular Service; in letters to the Foreign Office, even Alcock admitted that he understood why many felt frustrated and considered leaving for

[1062] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 165; Satow Papers, TNA, PRO 30/33/1/2, Consideration of the Proposition to be used as a Translation of "Her Majesty the Queen' into Japanese,
[1063] Interpreters by 1870 went through three grades: Third Assistant, Second Assistant, First Assistant, and then were subsequently available to become a Vice-Consul and then a Consul; PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.

greener pastures.[1064] Additionally, interpersonal relationships and the private opinions of one's chief diplomat and the Foreign Office also played a role in the decision making.[1065] For example, due to Alcock's second marriage to Lucy Lowder he became step-father to four children; children who he attempted to aid, but to paraphrase R. Morton, would prove ultimately disappointing.[1066] Windsor Lowder (1841-1897) worked in an unofficial capacity as an assistant/interpreter in both Japan and China through the help of Alcock, but any official standing was blunted by the protestations of the Foreign Office and Windsor's own failures to pass any language examinations (namely, the Chinese exam).[1067] George Lowder (1844-1880) tried and failed to join the Consular Service by failing the Civil Service entrance exam.[1068] The aforementioned Frederick Lowder (1843-1903) was the most fortunate and successful of the three brothers.[1069] This was nepotism at its nineteenth century finest.[1070] From the Alcock-Lowder family situation we can see that the meritocracy of the service could be haphazard. The extremes and needs of the Far East only exacerbated this fact. Japan was a difficult place to garner long-term postings due to its distance and ability to make almost every official ill enough to return home with leave extensions.[1071] It is quite staggering how ill-health affected the service in Japan, with several promoted interpreters requesting extended leave at the advice of doctors.[1072] Robertson, early on in his time in Japan, needed

---

[1064] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 17 March 1864.
[1065] TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 21 January 1867.
[1066] R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, p. 126.
[1067] TNA, FO 46/4, Alcock to Russell, 24 September 1859; TNA, FO 46/47, Alcock to Russell, 15 November 1864; TNA, FO 46/52, Russell to Alcock, 26 January 1865; TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 9 May 1865; TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 6 July 1865.
[1068] TNA, FO 17/555, Alcock to Clarendon, 4 January 1870.
[1069] F. Lowder grew deeply frustrated by his lack of promotion. Despite only being the job for a few years and still very much a junior, he sent an 'ultimatum' to the Foreign Office demanding promotion or else he would leave the service. Suffice to say, this did not go down well, but this did not preclude him from promotion years later, drawing scorn from more senior interpreters like Satow; R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, p. 128.
[1070] Windsor and George might have failed to get into the Far East Consular Service, but Alcock stepped in for them again by getting them work as assistants in the Supreme Court of Shanghai. Both, again, could not hold those jobs. Windsor due to illness and George due to alcoholism; R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, pp. 127-128.
[1071] This was not helped by the fact that despite the British experience with poor health in China, a doctor was not appointed to the Japan Legation at first. The assumption was that they could rely on Dutch medical practitioners (and Alcock, which did actually happen…) when they were there; R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, p. 76; Dr. Willis did not arrive at Yokohama until June 1862; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, pp. 20-21.
[1072] Smallpox (despite the spread of vaccination), Malaria, Rabies (or Hydrophobia as it was called then), the 'Pox' and the 'Clap', Cholera, Measles, Diarrhoea, and Dysentery were all common. With medicine and medical instruments to treat these conditions and problems also in very short supply due to their expense to import and acquire; H. Cortazzi, 'Yokohama: Frontier Town, 1859-1866', *Asian*

three months to recover after suffering from dysenteric diarrhoea (he was later forced to return home due to his wife's alcoholism according to R. Morton).[1073] In 1865, Dutch interpreter Myburgh (who was in fact a Doctor of Medicine) stated that he was 'compelled' to leave Japan because of his 'precarious' health and that despite a marked improvement whilst in Britain, he was still strongly recommended to not return to his duties.[1074] He later died in 1868. The 1870s were particularly tough for the interpreters, with Troup in 1874, Dohmen and Enslie in 1877, and Annesley and Robertson again in 1878, and later Kenny in 1888, all requesting extensions due to exceptionally poor health.[1075] W. G. Aston, another famous interpreter, was actually forced to retire early at forty-eight (in 1889) due to persistent ill-health, despite his promising foray into the Diplomatic Service as Minister to Korea and return to Japan as Secretary of the Legation in 1885.[1076] He continued with his scholarly work on Japan and the Japanese, but his intermittent poor health stayed with him for the rest of his life.[1077]

This extended to rest of the service as well.[1078] One minor diplomats' health got so bad that he retired outright like Aston.[1079] Illness was so rampant that between 1866-69 four consular

Affairs, 17:1 (1986), p. 10; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, pp. 59-65; The stress and loneliness also meant that alcoholism was rife.

[1073] R. Morton, *Sir Rutherford Alcock*, p. 92; TNA, FO 46/37, Alcock to Hammond, 8 November 1863.

[1074] TNA, FO 46/59, Myburgh to Russell, 4 April 1865.

[1075] TNA, FO 46/186, Troup to Lord Derby, 3 June 1874; TNA, FO 46/186, Dohmen to F. B. Alston, 31 August 1877; TNA, FO 46/186, Dohmen to Lord Tenterden, 22 August 1877; TNA, FO 46/234, Dohmen to Lord Tenterden, 19 February 1878; TNA, FO 46/186, Enslie to Lord Derby, 3 April 1877; TNA, FO 46/234, Annesley to Lord Derby, 10 January 1878; TNA, FO 46/234, Robertson to Tenterden, 14 January 1878; TNA, FO 46/383, F. B. Alston to Kenny, 22 June 1888.

[1076] P. F. Kornicki, 'William George Aston (1841-1911)', in H. Cortazzi & G. Daniels, eds., *Britain and Japan, 1859-1991: Themes and Personalities* (London, Routledge, 1991), p. 66; TNA, FO 46/383, Aston to Lord Salisbury, 7 November 1888; D. C. Gilman, H. T. Peck, F. M. Colby, eds., *The New International Encyclopaedia, Volume 2* (New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1905), p. 166; *London Gazette*, 9 May 1882, p. 2146; *London Gazette*, 11 June 1886, p. 2798; *London Gazette*, 25 May 1889, p. 2875.

[1077] J. C. Hall, 'Eulogy upon W. G. Aston C.M.G., D. Litt', *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. 38:5 (1912), pp. IV–VI; *The Times*, 27 November 1911, p. 11; *The Times*, 4 December 1911, p. 11.

[1078] TNA, FO 46/84, Schmid to Lord Stanley, 26 June 1867; TNA, FO 46/186, Schmid to Lord Derby, 25 April 1874; TNA, FO 46/186, Lord Tenterden to Schmid, 27 April 1874; TNA, FO 46/ 186, Lord Tenterden to Schmid, 14 May 1874; TNA, FO 46/402, Wileman to P. Currie, 3 December 1890.

[1079] TNA, FO 46/118, Walsh to Hammond, 13 November 1869; TNA, FO 46/131, Walsh to Hammond, 7 July 1870; TNA, FO 46/146, Walsh to Hammond, 22 February 1871; TNA, FO 46/146, Walsh to Hammond, 8 March 1871; TNA, FO 46/306, Hodges to P. W. Currie, 29 October 1883.

officers (and a wife) died.[1080] Mental health too was also a silent killer, with the most despairing example being the suicide of student interpreter, Owen Alexander Vidal, who shot himself at the young age of twenty-six in March 1867.[1081] Satow alludes to Vidal's chronic liver pains being a reason for his suicide, but this seems extreme seeing as he had lived such pains for years in Siam and China previously.[1082] Parkes's statement that the threat of violence towards foreigners in Japan was a constant worry of Vidal's, with Willis's comments that he was "…a discontented unsocial man… and always in the worst spirits…" points towards poor mental health, which in my view is a more reasonable reason for why he sadly took his own life.[1083] Vidal was stationed across the Far Eastern Service, first in Siam, then China, and finally Japan, and supposedly did not find such posts bearable, which probably contributed to his poor physical and mental health. When you consider the severe heat, poor health and loneliness that often came with these postings, the only thing that I find surprising is that there were not more suicides like Vidal's.[1084]

J. E. Hoare states that majority of those in the Japan Consular Service left well before the expected age of retirement (seventy and later lowered to sixty-five) due to ill-health and sheer exhaustion (adding extra years of superannuation to the public expense).[1085] The silver lining from such rampant ill-health and other absences meant that there were sometimes greater random chances for promotion, albeit mostly on an 'acting' basis, but still a chance to prove oneself. For example, with Dohmen's first foray into a consulship, he was appointed vice-consul at Tokyo in August 1871.[1086] Dohmen was out of the country on leave however,

---

[1080] H. Cortazzi, 'Yokohama: Frontier Town, 1859-1866', p. 10; China was also just as unforgiving when it came to mortality; See P.D. Coates, *The China Consuls*; In 1858, Alcock stated that on average a consul would die every three years in China; See PP, Report from the Select Committee on Consular Service and Appointments, 27 July 1858.

[1081] He was incredibly talented and came recommended by the University of Oxford; no doubt he would have been a great boon to the Foreign Office had he not chosen to prematurely end his life. It was his 'Oxford First' that actually netted him a Job in China in 1863 (after gaining acceptance for a post Siam in 1862); P. D. Coates, *The China Consuls*, p. 78 & p. 507.

[1082] Dr. Willis's diagnosis of 'temporary insanity' as the cause of Vidal's death was a common formulation at the time. Until the Suicide Act (1961), suicide was criminalised. So, by saying 'temporary insanity' instead, Vidal would still be eligible for a Christian burial.

[1083] TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 14 February 1867; H. Cortazzi, *Dr. Willis in Japan*, p. 81.

[1084] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 194; I. Ruxton, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow*, p. 63.

[1085] J. E. Hoare, 'Britain's Japan Consular Service, 1859-1941', pp. 103-104; L. Sterry, *Victorian Women Travellers in Meiji Japan: Discovering a 'New' Land* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2009), p. 62; O. Checkland, *Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 1868-1912*, p. 6.

[1086] TNA, FO 46/146, F. B. Alston to Dohmen, 17 August 1871; *London Gazette*, 5 September 1871, p. 3869.

creating a temporary vacancy. Hall was able to become acting vice-consul whilst Dohmen was away, granting him the opportunity to gain consulship experience.[1087] It was then Hall, not Dohmen, who proceeded to have a stellar consular career. This comparison between Dohmen and Hall is very representative of how the Consular Service operated in Japan. For minor actors to increase their contribution towards British diplomacy in Japan they needed just as much luck (and good health) as skill to even get their foot in the door.

Problematic vacancies were therefore 'patched' by temporarily pseudo-promoting interpreters (and others) into open positions. This improved the situation over time, but it was not a smooth transition, with many interpreters feeling aggrieved that they were passed over or not given the same opportunities as others. Alcock on his way out from Japan wrote about the difficulties of working out who to promote in 1865:

> …I am only sorry for poor Fletcher. He is not brilliant, but very hard working, and has deserved well by steady plodding. I wish he could be made a first assistant at one of the Consulates – say Kanagawa, even if it be without any immediate increase of salary. It would prevent heartburning; and after five (or six years) service it is not very much for a young man to gain. If Myburgh should be made Secretary in Neale's place – and Eusden Consul – though Flowers would no doubt feel much disappointed, he could not well complain except upon the ground of his former long services in Europe – as Eusden is some three years his senior in Japan. Truth to say neither Eusden, Flowers nor Enslie are all that could be desired for the Chief Consulate in Japan, nor for any of them – but they are there, and must be turned to account under good surveillance (*sic*).[1088]

These promotion problems never relented and it is not a coincidence that it was mainly to do with the Dutch; their otherness and lack of Japanese put most of them at the back of the queue. For Dohmen, it took a decade to receive a promotion to a consulship (albeit an unpaid vice-consulship).[1089] The reasoning for this was simple, he had not picked up the Japanese language quickly or accurately enough.[1090] He was sympathetically suggested for the post of

[1087] TNA, FO 46/146/2, F. B. Alston to Hall, 28 November 1871.
[1088] TNA FO 46/45, Alcock to Hammond, 21 May 1865.
[1089] It should be noted that all vice-consulships went unwaged.
[1090] TNA, FO 46/131, Hammond to Dohmen, 28 January 1870.

vice-consul of Edo by Parkes in early 1867, with Parkes asking if his nationality prohibited promotion. Parkes argued that his Dutch would still prove useful in Edo and that because it was only a vice-consulship, Dohmen's lack of legal expertise was a non-issue.[1091] Parkes's recommendations fell on deaf ears however. This, somewhat cruelly, brings us to the partially deaf Annesley, another feeling aggrieved over his non-promotion. Dohmen was so incensed that he wrote in 1878 to Lord Derby, the then Foreign Secretary, accusing Parkes of withholding promotion from him. Dohmen had been acting-consul for Nagasaki (for Britain and Austria) and the ports of Osaka and Hyogo (whilst also conducting legal duties there) for roughly three years and three months.[1092] He had been vice-consul for Osaka and Hyogo since July 1869.[1093] He points out that Lord Granville, a previous Foreign Secretary, stated that obtainment of the Japanese language was key to obtaining any promotion and yet, in his words, there had been interpreters with little or no Japanese skill, who had been promoted.[1094]

Dohmen's first 'victim' was a fellow Dutch interpreter, Flowers. It is unclear what Flower's Japanese ability was, but Alcock once described him as being more akin to that of a child than an experienced consular officer.[1095] So, his language ability may have been wanting. Regardless, it must have been beyond frustrating to have a junior (albeit of only less than two years) be your boss at both your postings (and one where you acted as consul in his absence).[1096] Flowers had also held the sought-after post of Yokohama, despite being Annesley's junior.[1097] Annesley was equally frustrated about the student interpreter who replaced Flowers at Nagasaki, Troup. Starting in 1863, Troup went on to hold many consular postings and be involved with the consular courts.[1098] Annesley reports that Troup had not "passed in the Japanese Language", but given the circumstances of the Far East, it was perfectly normal for not everyone to have had a formal examination, but be familiar/good enough at the native tongue.[1099] Examinations had to be planned and formally taken, which

[1091] TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 21 January 1867.
[1092] TNA, FO 46/234, Annesley to Lord Derby, 16 February 1878.
[1093] *London Gazette*, 20 July 1869, p. 4063.
[1094] TNA, FO 46/234, Annesley to Lord Derby, 16 February 1878.
[1095] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 29 August 1861.
[1096] *London Gazette*, 17 August 1877, p. 4796.
[1097] TNA, FO 46/58, Parkes to Hammond, 30 December 1865.
[1098] He was made acting consul of Niigata in 1869, then transferred to Nagasaki, as a consul, in 1877. Then he was moved to Hyogo and Osaka in 1882 and then back to Yokohama in 1888. He became Consul-General for Kanagawa and Assistant Judge of the British Court in Japan in 1896. He retired two years later in 1898.
[1099] Satow and von Siebold never had to take a formal examination because it did not exist yet, and by the time it did exist, was not considered necessary.

could take months (as it did with Hall four years prior).[1100] Troup had probably obtained enough knowledge of Japanese, among other qualities (which Annesley himself notes as another prerequisite for promotion), to earn his postings.[1101] It is difficult to gauge language ability with so little source material to go on, but given Parkes's professional nature and own experiences with languages during his China days, I think assuming Troup was capable is a fair assumption to make.

In my view, Annesley was looked over on account of his own interpretive issues, alongside the fact that he was originally a Dutch interpreter, which whilst was not a strict preventor of promotion was certainly a major limiting factor.[1102] Not to mention the fact that Annesley being deaf made him practically useless at anything beyond being "…a mere scribe".[1103] It is easy to feel sorry for Annesley, as he was in service to Britain long before Japan's opening, but throwing your fellow interpreters under the bus who were in reality (mostly) promoted for good reasons was not a good look. Dohmen, whose language ability cut off avenues for him, also had issues with his Dutch background and was held up until his naturalisation was finalised.[1104] This implies that nationality was indeed important and played a role in hampering the opportunities of some Dutch interpreters like Dohmen. This seems probable as there was considerable criticism over the appointment of 'foreigners' as British consuls during the nineteenth century (part of the wider barrage of criticism of the Consular Service).[1105] In 1867 Parkes suggested Dohmen be made the legation's accountant, but by July he quickly reneged on that idea, realising "…that it would be an advantage if all the officers of the Legation were diplomatic, and that there might be some disadvantage in

[1100] TNA, FO 46/186, Hall to Parkes, 25 March 1871; TNA, FO 46/186, Hall to Robertson, 17 May 1873; TNA, FO 46/186, Robertson to Hall, 17 May 1873; TNA, FO 46/186, Robertson to Hall, 20 May 1873; TNA, FO 46/186/6, Parkes to Robertson, 20 May 1873; TNA, FO 46/183, Hall to Robertson, 21 May 1873; TNA, FO 46/183, Wilkinson to Hall, 12 August 1873.
[1101] TNA, FO 46/234, Annesley to Lord Derby, 16 February 1878.
[1102] Annesley was also deaf to an extent, which was probably due to his past in the Royal Navy. Not the best quality for an interpreter to have; TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 22 September 1861.
[1103] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 22 September 1861.
[1104] TNA, FO 46/131, Dohmen to Lord Granville, 21 November 1870; TNA, FO 46/146, F. B. Alston to Dohmen, 17 August 1871; *London Gazette*, 5 September 1871, p. 3869; Parkes suggests that his language ability was still one of the best out of all the Dutch interpreters however, second only to Myburgh; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 15 October 1867.
[1105] D. C. M. Platt, 'The Role of the British Consular Service in Overseas Trade, 1825-1914', *The Economic History Review*, 15:3 (1963), p. 497; See J. McDermott, 'The British Foreign Office and its German Consuls Before 1914', *The Journal of Modern History*, 50:1 (March 1978), pp. 1001-1034; P. Byrd, 'Regional and Functional Specialisation in the British Consular Service', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 7:1 (1972), p. 134.

having an alien in the Chancery."[1106] This mimics earlier qualms Alcock had about the promotion of Dutch interpreters in 1865 as well: "Flowers has much improved, and of the three would undoubtedly make himself the most popular, for both the others [Myburgh and Eusden] are looked upon by their communities as half Dutchmen and aliens (*sic*)."[1107] In Annesley's case, it appears that it was his interpretive troubles that inhibited his promotion in Japan. This is given greater credence considering the Foreign Office placated him with a consulship on the French island of Réunion off the coast of Madagascar.[1108] A posting that hardly seems like a 'reward' or a 'promotion'.[1109]

This was not entirely exclusive to the Dutch however, the less fortunate student interpreters who did not take to Japanese arguably faired much worse. Enslie also struggled with promotion. Enslie had been an interpreter since 1861 and was therefore an 'old hand' by the time of his complaint in 1883. He was stationed at Hakodate from 1861-1868 as an interpreter.[1110] His time here was deeply mired by the fact that he took part in a cover up of stolen Ainu bones undertaken by British residents. Not something the Foreign Office took kindly too.[1111] He was made acting-vice consul at Hyogo and Osaka not long after and then sent to Niigata in the same role in November 1871.[1112] During the 1870s he also took on leave, partly for health reasons it seems, but predominantly to undertake legal studies. The break lasted from at least late 1873 to 1877.[1113] Whilst such legal studies would be a boon to his qualifications; to halt your progress when you are barely on the consular ladder would have surely not only stunted one's own growth, but allowed opportunities for others to catch both the Chief's and the Foreign Office's eye in the meantime. When competition for a small set of positions was so high and meritocracy not always strictly adhered to, such opportunities were seldom worth giving up, even to undertake legal studies to improve your record. Enslie's grievances are laid out extensively in forty-nine pages to Lord Granville. It

[1106] In this case 'alien' refers to Dohmen's nationality and membership to the Consular Service; TNA, FO 391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 22 July 1867.
[1107] TNA FO 46/45, Alcock to Hammond, 21 May 1865.
[1108] *London Gazette*, 20 December 1878, p. 7279.
[1109] Four years later he was eventually sent to be Britain's consul for the State of Maine in Portland. A marked improvement, but still by the wayside; *London Gazette*, 12 December 1882, p. 6320.
[1110] H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972*, p. 304.
[1111] See J. E. Hoare, 'Mr. Enslie's Grievances: The Consul, the Ainu and the Bones', *Japan Society of London Bulletin*, 78 (March 1976), pp. 14-19.
[1112] TNA, FO 46/186, F. O. Adam's to Hall, 11 October 1871.
[1113] TNA, FO 46/186, Enslie to Lord Tenterden, 2 November 1875; TNA, FO 46/224, Enslie to Lord Derby, 22 January 1877; TNA, FO 46/224, Enslie to Lord Derby, 3 April 1977.

seems being made vice-consul in Hakodate in April 1882 was the final catalyst for this letter.[1114] Osaka, Niigata and Hakodate were not treaty ports of note, and being an unpaid vice-consul, acting or otherwise, added insult to injury.

Enslie clearly expected more. Enslie names several of his juniors, including Robertson, Flowers and five others who had become interpreters/assistants, vice-consuls and subsequently consuls as well. On average, whilst he was promoted twice (once only temporarily), for those seven it had taken eight years and three months to be promoted to vice-consul, and for five of those seven, only nine years and ten months to become a consul.[1115] Enslie then adds the number of permanent and temporary promotions that others have gone through compared to his own.[1116] Enslie's letter paints a picture of extreme disappointment at being left by the wayside despite his efforts. I point to the Ainu bones debacle and the long-break he took in the 1870s as the primary inhibitors of his advancement, but also naming colleagues like Robertson, who excelled in Japan does seem counterproductive. Additionally, whilst we have no direct evidence to besmirch Enslie's language/interpretive abilities, Alcock in 1865 does imply that his skills as a consular official overall were rather lacking.[1117] Of the three mentioned, Enslie was the lucky one given his damaged record, extended break and subsequent legal entanglement with the Foreign Office (he tried, and failed, to sue the Foreign Office for £13,000 in damages).[1118] Eventually, he was made vice-consul of Hakodate and Niigata a few months later in 1884. However, his groans (and luck) did eventually land him the consulship of Nagasaki in 1886 and then Hyogo and Osaka in 1888, where he died in post.[1119] It is not a coincidence that of the three mentioned, Enslie, the only student interpreter, received the best treatment. Enslie, Annesley, and Dohmen's problems and complaints reaffirm that opportunity in Japan was not without its complexities. Ability and availability were not the only considerations, with favouritism, nationality/otherness, and prior transgressions also helping decide one's consular journey.

[1114] *London Gazette*, 9 May 1882, p. 2156.
[1115] Enslie is quick to point out how everyone named earns considerably more than he does.
[1116] TNA, FO 46/306, Enslie to Lord Granville, 15 October 1883.
[1117] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 21 May 1865.
[1118] I. Ruxton, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow*, pp. 153-154; Considering Enslie's superior, Captain Vyse, formerly Consul at Hakodate and later Consul at Yokohama/Kanagawa was forced to resign for his role in the Ainu bone robbery, he was lucky to remain in the service; J. E. Hoare, 'Britain's Japan Consular Service, 1859-1941', p. 96.
[1119] *London Gazette*, 25 March 1884, p. 1404; *London Gazette*, 23 July 1886, p. 3564; *London Gazette*, 30 November 1888, p. 6879.

Not moving higher up within the Consular Service, beyond being an interpreter in our case, was definitely not an inhibitor of being a successful minor actor, nor did it preclude an individual from becoming a significant diplomatic actor outright, just look at Satow, but for some it did prevent them from ever grasping an opportunity to be something more integral to British diplomacy in Japan. The early intake of interpreters were left behind by the difficulties of adapting to the 'newness' of Japan, something that many of their future peers did not face in the same way.

Many were still able to move up the ladder however, and becoming a consul was the most common pathway of promotion as a 'more important' minor diplomatic actor. The only major exception to this rule was the aforementioned Satow, whose language abilities made him critically important irrespective of his career journey. Satow, whilst promoted to the role of Japanese Secretary in Autumn 1866 (confirmed in late 1867), the most senior interpreting position (equal in rank to a consul), turned down an opportunity to exchange that posting for a consulship only two years later.[1120] He ultimately preferred to keep his role at the centre of diplomacy, rather than at the periphery; especially considering the port offered was Niigata, the youngest and weakest of the treaty ports.[1121] He was disappointed not to have gotten the consulship of Hyogo and Osaka before, and saw Niigata as a grim prospect by comparison.[1122] For Satow this decision proved to the right one in hindsight, for besides himself, only W. G. Aston, who accepted the consular path, was able to eventually head into the Diplomatic Service as well.[1123] A lesser exception to this would be J. H. Gubbins, who, starting in 1871 as a student interpreter, effectively became Satow's successor (as English Secretary in 1883 and Japanese Secretary in 1889) and also never took on a consulate posting.[1124] Of the interpreters and student interpreters mentioned, the number of those eventually promoted into the role of consul or another associated role include A. Annesley, C. F. Myburgh, R. Eusden, M. Dohmen, M. O. Flowers, R. Robertson. J. F. Lowder, J. J. Enslie, W. G. Aston, J. C. Hall, J. H. Longford, H. S. Wilkinson, T. R. H. McClatchie, J. Troup, J. J. Quin, A. M. Chalmers, H. A. C. Bonar, W. J. Kenny, and H. G. Parlett. The fact that the majority held a consular post, an integral, but at times, adjunct role in diplomacy is

[1120] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 165 & p. 294; TNA, FO 46/118, Hammond to Satow, 28 June 1869.
[1121] TNA, FO 46/118, Satow to Hammond, 30 June 1869.
[1122] TNA, FO 46/82, Parkes to Hammond, 30 January 1868.
[1123] Within the Japan Consular Service.
[1124] See I. Nish, 'John Harrington Gubbins, 1852-1929', pp. 107-119.

why the majority of interpreters ended up remaining minor actors. Collectively their contributions were vital, but individually supplementary overall. This was due to the varying degrees of competence one might find within the Consular Service previously described.[1125] Consuls, much like interpreters, were yet another collective body of minor actors needed to support British diplomacy in Japan, but ultimately their success or failure, unless absolute, was not detrimental to the development of Anglo-Japanese relations.

When it comes to defining a consul's functions, we are aided by an 1859 review into consular fees discussed in Parliament.[1126] Consular costs and expenditure were a constant feature of the Consular Service, its high expense was justified by its use and supportive role of the more important Diplomatic Service (and by extension the Foreign Office). In this review the key official functions of a consul, as Parliament saw them, were as follows: Notarial duties, duties connected with shipping, and state services (within a select consular district, usually run from a post in a major city and/or port).[1127] Now whilst this is a succinct definition of what consuls did, it not only underestimates what the role entailed in practice, it also ignores the difficulties and stigma that came with the Consular Service. Whilst attached to the Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Office, the Consular Service was a separate entity.[1128] Consuls had separate clubs, separate uniforms (laced with silver when their diplomatic cousins had gold), often lesser housing and/or consular buildings, much less respect, usually less pay, and worse opportunities; in practically every way consuls were stratified into a lower status under the Diplomatic Service.[1129] D. C. M. Platt states that the consular-diplomatic separation was an extreme extension of the rigid Victorian class system and it is hard to disagree with him.[1130] British Diplomat, Sir Andrew Ryan, reflected on the Consular Service as being "…distinctly of a lesser breed…" and afflicted with "…*Morbus Consularis*…", the 'disease of consular rank'. A frank and not exactly positive appraisal of a

[1125] Though this certainly improved as time went on and the service became more professionalised more widely.
[1126] PP, Report to Malmesbury on Mr. Murray's Plan for the Revision of Consular Fees, July 1859.
[1127] PP, Report to Malmesbury on Mr. Murray's Plan for the Revision of Consular Fees, July 1859.
[1128] D. C. M. Platt, *The Cinderella Service*, pp. 1-2.
[1129] Such was the problematic conditions surrounding the Consular Service, that Jamieson, the interpreter that never was, before even heading to Japan, resigned to start a newspaper company in Hong Kong because according to Satow it would afford him a greater future than the Consular Service could provide; E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 20; D. C. M. Platt, *The Cinderella Service*, pp. 27-30; Admittedly, this is also a massive generalisation. There were instances and examples that bucked this negative trend, for example, the Consulate of Shanghai was a very grand and prestigious residence.
[1130] D. C. M. Platt, *The Cinderella Service*, pp. 2-4.

service he was formerly a part of.[1131] Thus, despite Britain's student interpreters in Japan being primarily from the British (and Irish) middle classes, origins which actually buck the general interpreter trend of being mostly from ostracised groups, they were still hindered by their professional standing within the lesser perceived Consular Service anyway.[1132] However, interpreters in the Far East at least, in a later report published in 1870, were clearly held in higher regard that those in similar fields, like the 'Dragomans' in the Levant Consular Service for example.[1133]

After nearly three decades of witnessing interpreter's work in the Far East, by 1870 their contributions towards developing British diplomatic priorities in that region was far better understood. Their collective importance to every interaction with Japan was transforming them into minor diplomats at pace. They were not only becoming intimate with Japanese, but with Japan itself, thus promoting them into consuls was the natural next step; an outsider would have little knowledge or ability to handle such a posting. Hence, whilst it was a tall order for someone from the Consular Service, like an interpreter, to move into the Diplomatic Service, it was more possible in Japan as Satow and Aston proved. The Foreign Office acknowledged the peculiarities of East Asia meant that the likelihood for former consuls to become a diplomat in the Diplomatic Service at Peking (Beijing) and Tokyo (and later Seoul) was not only possible, but preferred.[1134] Alcock and Parkes were both elevated into the Diplomatic Service in this way previously. The aforementioned Aston eventually went on to enter the Diplomatic Service as Consul-General of Korea.[1135] The combination of Japan, China and Siam allowed for some cross-appointments as well, with Winchester rewarded with a promotion to the consulate of Shanghai for example.[1136] Lord Derby himself also suggested that despite the 'insurmountable barrier' that many deserving consular officials faced when trying to rise into the Diplomatic Service, the Far Eastern Consular Service bucks

[1131] A. Ryan, *The Last of the Dragomans* (London, Geoffrey Bles, 1951), p. 27 & p. 48.
[1132] One might argue that the Irish would count as a marginalised class, and their inclusion proves that the interpreter still belonged to those long ostracised in wider societies. I think this argument is strong, but the high likelihood that these Irishmen were of Anglo-Irish (protestant) stock might supersede this idea.
[1133] PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.
[1134] PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.
[1135] P. F. Kornicki, 'William George Aston (1841-1911)', pp. 66-67; PP, Japan, Despatch from Her Majesty's Minister in Japan forwarding a Report on Corea, February 1883.
[1136] *London Gazette*, 11 April 1865, p. 1987.

that trend. He claimed it to be an 'understood thing' that consuls who perform well in those nations, "…owing to the peculiar nature of the service [in those nations], [where] other diplomatists know very little, may fairly look forward to the mission at Pekin, or to the mission at Japan (*sic*)."[1137] In other words, becoming a minor actor or more was not an insurmountable task like in other versions of the British Consular Service. Opportunity may have still been haphazard and recognition poor, but at least it was greater than many other similar postings the world over. The 'peculiarities' of the Far East and Japan more specifically created a need for more specialised individuals; a need that proved to be a perfect opportunity for interpreters to advance.

In regards to its function, the consul had to be 'everything'; it was a much more varied role than Parliament's brief description of it in 1859. Samuel Vines, a consul based in Para in Brazil (February 1852 – November 1857) stated to Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon that a consular official "…includes many of the duties of the Statesman, the Magistrate, the Lawyer, the Notary, the Merchant, the Accountant, the Geologist, the Naturalist, the Linguist, and indeed the man of science generally…" He provides a more positive appraisal of the consul: "…it demands a clearness of head, a determination of mind, and a prudence of action, greater perhaps than in any other profession…"[1138] In an 1856 'consular manual', we find the best summary of the difficulties, practicalities and agency that a consul possessed as a minor actor in the mid-nineteenth century:

> In what department of the Civil Service is there so much required as of a Consul – and this, when he is in many instances far from his native land, and those from whom he might otherwise obtain counsel and advice? Placed too in a position wherein he must promptly manifest the possession of firmness – a firmness well based on that proper amount of self-reliance resulting alone from a virtuous and manly confidence that he possesses the necessary qualifications for the performance of the duties of his office – duties no less than identical with those of a clergyman, a lawyer, diplomatist, notary, merchant, shipowner, and all the

[1137] PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.
[1138] *London Gazette*, 2 March 1852, p. 671; *London Gazette*, 24 November 1857, p. 4003.
TNA, FO 83/180, Vines to Lord Clarendon, 15 November 1856.

> persons acting directly, or as agents for others, in the management of... innumerable affairs…[1139]

You cannot disagree with Vines and Tuson's assessment considering the variety of people who entered the Consular Service and the roles they ended up performing. One consular duty that they both understate however, is the role of the informant. Even before gaining a consulship, interpreters, thanks to their knowledge in both the language and culture, as well as their links across Japan through their teachers and counterparts, were often used to report intelligence wherever possible.

Satow, as one of the best interpreters who both Alcock and Parkes relied upon, was sent across Japan on exploratory missions of its interior and distant coasts.[1140] Alcock described his translation of Japanese documents and acquisition of intelligence as: "…indefatigable and invaluable."[1141] Satow was not alone in being a valuable intelligence asset, with von Siebold and Troup are two further examples of how interpreters were used as intelligence gatherers. In 1868 von Siebold proved instrumental in aiding Britain's knowledge of Japan's burgeoning foreign affairs. In one instance translating the Russo-Japanese Treaty (respecting Karafuto/Sakhalin), and in another, being situated in France to keep an eye on the Tokugawa's dealings with the French.[1142] It was because of his revelations about the purchase of French Chassepot Rifles (despite Japanese denials), and France's reaction to the Shogunate's collapse, that Britain was aware of any of this.[1143] Britain was very annoyed over the Shogunate's ties to the French, with the Shogunate themselves self-aware that they should

---

[1139] E. W. A. Tuson, *The British Consul's Manual: Being A Practical Guide for Consuls, The Merchant, Shipowner, and Master Mariner, in all their Consular Transactions* (London, Longman & Co, 1856), p. VI.
[1140] See E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*; See I. Ruxton, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow*; See I. Ruxton, *A Diplomat in Japan Part II*.
[1141] TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 12 September 1864.
[1142] TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 26 January 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 28 January 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 28 January 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 11 February 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 12/13 March 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 26 March 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 22 May 1868.
[1143] TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 28 January 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 28 January 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 11 February 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 12/13 March 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 26 March 1868; TNA, FO 46/100, von Siebold to Hammond, 22 May 1868.

try to shield their Francophilia from Britain, so his intelligence here was vital.[1144] Perhaps less prestigiously, Troup went on a trip around Niigata (to assess the treaty port and its consular needs).[1145] The gathering of such intel was crucial, especially when the purchase of certain books, maps, and lists of Daimyō/Government Officials by foreigners was strictly prohibited.[1146] This sort of intelligence gathering continued when they became consuls as yet another key part of what was clearly a deeply multifaceted role. For example, in the 1880s and 1890s, consuls based in Yokohama and Nagasaki began reporting on the size, compliment, and movement of the developing Imperial Japanese Navy (and sometimes foreign vessels of war too).[1147] Interpreters were prepared for the greater consular roles that would one day be available to them through practice and various shadowing practices. In other words, thanks to Japan's uniqueness and the separate opportunities it provided, interpreters were perhaps always likely to become more involved, integral, minor diplomatic actors.

With so many consular roles, like intelligence gathering, Platt's description of how varied consuls were is unsurprising; the dandies, the explorers, the archaeologists, the soldiers, the men of letters/intellectuals all found work within the Consular Service.[1148] However, Britain's consuls in Japan were primarily made up of former interpreters, something markedly different to the vividly vibrant norm seen elsewhere. This difference was once again down to the 'peculiarities' of Japan and East Asia. Whilst you were clearly in with a better chance of becoming a consul in Japan, that greater opportunity came with greater expectation. To quote Lord Derby again:

> There are consulships and consulships. In China and in the East, a consul is, to a great extent, engaged in what would be elsewhere called diplomatic business… [In] South America, the consuls general have a great deal of diplomatic work upon their hands. In Europe, at great trading posts, the consular duty is quite distinct from the diplomatic… I think that a consul who had distinguished

[1144] See M. D. Ericson, 'The Bakufu Looks Abroad. The 1865 Mission to France', *Monumenta Nipponica*, 34:4 (Winter, 1979), pp. 383-407; R. Sims, *French Policy*, pp. 55-60.
[1145] PP, Japan, Report of a Tour in Japan by Mr. Troup, 16 June to 1 July 1870.
[1146] E. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*, p. 67.
[1147] TNA, FO 46/323/8, Hall to Earl Granville, 21 May, 1884; TNA, FO 46/323/5, Robertson to Earl Granville, 4 June 1884; TNA, FO 46/323/11, Hall to Earl Granville, 5 September 1884; TNA, FO 46/402, Longford to Lord Salisbury, 10 May 1890.
[1148] D. C. M. Platt, *The Cinderella Service*, p. 21.

> himself, say at an Eastern post might very well be rewarded by a mission; I see no objection to that (*sic*).[1149]

The Consular Service may have been frowned upon by many in the Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Office, but its occupational objectives and importance was an absolute necessity for places like Japan as Derby makes clear.[1150] The preference of promoting interpreters into consulships in Japan, consuls with far greater responsibilities than norm, further emphasises how interpreters transformed into more important minor diplomats over time.

Being a consular official in Japan was not straightforward however, as like many other postings there was a hierarchy. Some consulships were more prestigious than others, contributing to the many fierce grumblings seen from Dohmen, Annesley and Enslie previously; accusing their Chief and the Foreign Office of only providing spare scraps from the consular dinner table. There were five treaty ports: Yokohama (also referred to as Kanagawa; interchangeably so), Nagasaki, Hakodate, Hyogo (Kobe) and Osaka (always together in a single district), and Niigata. Later, Edo/Tokyo was added as a treaty port, technically, but in practice it was a fairly limited setting for consular activity. Niigata was the lowest ranked. Its port was ill-equipped for Western shipping and it was not exactly a spectacular entrepôt for trade into Japan either. To quote a report from Eusden, then Consul at Hakodate, "…the grand hopes we had at the close of 1867 of increased trade, in the opening of Hiogo, Osaka, and Neegata, have not been realised (*sic*)."[1151] By 1875 things had not improved, with the then consul stating that imports and exports remained low, decreasing from the year before. There were only thirteen foreign nationals in the port; some *o-yatoi* and missionaries, but only two merchants.[1152] The low status of the port meant that posting was not always filled and was often symbolically granted alongside the posting of Hakodate.

Hakodate was the next treaty port in terms of ranking. It was strategically important, a developing colonial port, but until the 1890s it was slow going. It also lacked the prestige and

---

[1149] PP, Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.
[1150] Platt suggests that they were probably only second to the Indian Civil Service by the 1890s; D. C. M. Platt, *The Cinderella Service*, p. 185.
[1151] PP, Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1868.
[1152] PP, Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1871; PP, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1875.

importance that the other treaty ports had (save for Niigata).[1153] By the 1890s, Hokkaido had been colonised, and Hakodate expanded, with the local pelagic seal trade bringing prominence to the port.[1154] This is was still not enough to compete with the other treaty ports however, and was ultimately too little to late seeing as exterritoriality ended in 1899. Hakodate's absent importance is typified by the fact that it was demoted to that of a vice-consulate after 1882.[1155] It was only raised to a full consul when joined with Niigata in an enlarged-dual consular district or the consular official in question was also given northern Honshu alongside Hokkaido to oversee as well (namely, Aomori, Akita, and Iwate prefectures).[1156] The addition of specific prefectures to a consular treaty port like Hakodate was not uncommon in late nineteenth century Japan.[1157] Nagasaki was the middle ground in terms of rankings. It had the historical prestige that the other ports lacked, as well as being a major entrepot for Western trade. From 1871 to 1880, Nagasaki was consistently above the other treaty ports, and sometimes even Hyogo, in terms of export and import value.[1158] However, the 1870s was also a problematic time to be the consul in charge. The foreign community was split between the Dutch/older foreign community and the newer treaty port community due to universal hatred of the consular run council to the point that each had their own city municipal council (which also despised each other…).[1159] Despite this fact, in the

---

[1153] H. Cortazzi, *Victorians in Japan*, p. 50.
[1154] Satow Papers, TNA, PRO 30/33, Bonar to Satow, 24 June 1896.
[1155] J. E. Hoare, *Japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements* (Folkestone, Japan Library, 1994), pp. 18-20, p. 72.
[1156] *London Gazette*, 23 July 1886, p. 3564; *London Gazette*, 30 November 1888, p. 6879; PP, Report for the Year 1888 on the Trade of Hakodate, August 1889; PP, Report for the Year 1889 on the Trade of Hakodate, July 1890; PP, Report for the Year 1890 on the Trade of Hakodate, July 1891; PP, Report for the Year 1893 on the Trade of the Consular District of Hakodate, 1894; PP, Report for the Year 1894 on the Trade of Hakodate, 1895; *London Gazette*, 13 March 1896, p. 1680; *London Gazette*, 9 October 1896, p. 5541; *London Gazette*, 5 February 1897, p. 692; *London Gazette*, 30 September 1898, p. 5734*; London Gazette*, 26 April 1901, p. 2856.
[1157] At Satow's recommendation, eventually a British Consulate was opened in Shimonoseki in 1901 with similar prefectural jurisdiction as a replacement. You can visit the site of this Consulate today.
[1158] PP, Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1871; PP, Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1872; PP, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1873; PP, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1874; PP, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1875; PP, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1876; PP, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1877; PP, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1878; PP, No. 1 & No. 2, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1879; PP, No. 1 & No. 2, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1880.
[1159] Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture: *Nagasaki Express*, 5 November 1870; *Nagasaki Express*, 3 July 1872; *Nagasaki Express*, 6 July 1872; *Nagasaki Express*, 17 July 1872; *Nagasaki Express*, 31 August 1872; *Nagasaki Express*, 14 September 1872; See B. Burke-Gaffney, *The Nagasaki British Consulate, 1859-1955*.

rankings of the Japan Consular Service, it was a good position to gain if you were an interpreter wishing to take on a more serious appointment. Whilst certainly ranked higher than Osaka and later Tokyo, and definitely more important commercially and geographically than Niigata and Hakodate, the ever-increasing volumes of trade passing through Hyogo and Yokohama meant that it never took on greater importance.[1160] By 1883, Daniel Pidgeon, an engineer in the city at the time, described Nagasaki as being a 'dead port' devoid of all commerce and life alike.[1161] Nagasaki relied on its prestige and naval focus (construction and freight) to keep the port-city afloat, with only the later Russo-Japanese War and First World War delaying its steady decline.[1162]

After Niigata, Hakodate, and Nagasaki, came the ports of Hyogo (renamed Kobe in 1889) and Osaka. Whilst prominent then for Japan's domestic trade and undeniably crucial to global trade today, these ports did not hold the same equal importance in the nineteenth century. Hyogo was an important port and posting for British trade, but Osaka was not for most of the period (despite its later moniker: 'Manchester of the Orient').[1163] Their dual-consular status was consistent throughout the period, unlike Hakodate and Niigata, making the posting certainly unique and challenging in its own way. Like most consular postings, there was a consul and a vice-consul, however in this case the consul was situated at Hyogo and the vice-consul at Osaka. This separation meant that the vice-consul at Osaka had the run of the port, and acted with much more independence than their compatriot vice-consuls (save for perhaps Hakodate when it was relegated). This created an interesting dynamic between the consul and vice-consul, for whilst technically subservient to the consul at Hyogo, they were, in effect, running the entire Osaka district alone. This independence meant that it was a good position to give to upcoming interpreters a chance to get further into the service, such as J. J. Quin, J. H. Longford, and W. J. Kenny (particularly from the 1880s onwards), and 'problematic' interpreters who needed to be given some semblance of a promotion without actually being given one, like Annesley.[1164] The later Tokyo consulate, usually a vice-consulate, opened in

[1160] This change in economic fortunes for Nagasaki was something long predicted; See H. S. Williams, *Tales of Foreign Settlements in Japan* (Clarendon, Tuttle Publishing, 2012).
[1161] D. Pidgeon, *An Engineer's Holiday: Or Notes of a Round Trip from Long 0 to 0* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co, 1883), p. 309.
[1162] See B. Burke-Gaffney, *The Nagasaki British Consulate*.
[1163] *The Times*, 24 June 1988, p. 33.
[1164] *London Gazette*, 22 June 1883, p. 3205; *London Gazette*, 23 July 1886, p. 3564; *London Gazette*, 21 April 1896, p. 2388; *London Gazette*, 20 July 1869, p. 4063.

1869 and acted in a similar fashion to Osaka's vice-consulate.[1165] With the legation at Yokohama close by and eventually moved back to Tokyo anyway, the consulate was a minor position that could provide interpreters with experience (the post was sometimes combined with Yokohama like Niigata and Hakodate, but usually just left absent).[1166] Finally, we have Yokohama, the principal treaty port because of its prime geographical location; an open Pacific Bay for Western shipping and close to Tokyo. Until the 1870s it housed most of the foreign legations after Tokyo was deemed too unsafe during the demise of the Bakufu. In terms of trade, Yokohama's overall trade volume consumed beat all the others combined and was repeatedly reaching twenty-million dollars' worth of exports and roughly fifteen-million in imports by the early 1870s.[1167] According to J. E. Hoare, by 1879 some 15,000 sailors and seamen were passing through Yokohama, with 3000 residing ashore at any one time (most being British).[1168] Yokohama was the posting everyone coveted in order to show off their credentials in handling a major post, and perhaps then move on to greater things beyond the Consular Service. The movement of interpreters into consular roles within Japan's treaty port hierarchy shows us how they, whilst becoming more important minor diplomats collectively, also sometimes lost the opportunity to stand out individually. Once a consul that opportunity became stymied, with your location limiting your individual opportunity more so than previously where your linguistic talents could still stand out. In this light we can understand why Satow sought to stay outside the consular system unless a golden posting appeared, lest he risk his status as an important minor diplomatic actor heading for greener pastures.

After consular duties, the next most common feature in the progression of interpreters within the service was legal in nature. Law, with its heavy reliance on precise language (English and Japanese), combined with interpreter's academic backgrounds, was a perfect pairing that only cemented their collective importance as minor diplomats in Anglo-Japanese relations further. Judicial exterritoriality was a common feature of nineteenth century Western Imperialism, with Algeria, Tunisia, Zanzibar, Tonga, Madagascar, Samoa, the Congo, Korea, Morocco,

---

[1165] H. Cortazzi, *Victorians in Japan*, p. 93.
[1166] The decision to move back to Tokyo, came after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The final decision came from Parkes in 1871 after surveying many potential sites. The chosen land was acquired in April 1872 and construction was completed in December 1874. The new legation was moved into in 1875. The modern British Embassy is based on the same site.
[1167] PP, Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1871; PP, Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1872; PP, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1873.
[1168] J. E. Hoare, 'Britain's Japan Consular Service, 1859-1941', p. 101.

Tripoli, the Ottoman Empire, Siam (Thailand), Egypt, Persia, China and of course Japan all coerced, usually forcefully, into accepting legal privileges for Western persons whilst in their countries.[1169] In the 1880s there were forty-four foreign (including roughly six British) judicial courts operating extraterritorially in Japan alone).[1170] As defined by T. Kayaoğlu, legal imperialism was the extension of an imperial state's legal authority into another state, limiting that same state's legal authority over the imperial state's people, commercial interests, and security.[1171] The setting up of the British consular courts took time. Only Alcock's introduction of the 'Rules and Regulations for the Peace, Order, and Good Government of British Subjects within the Dominions of the Tycoon of Japan' in November 1861 provided any sort of serious attempt to set some legal boundaries in the meantime.[1172] At this time the consular judicial process was an ad hoc system with no consistency or permanency. For example, a brief description of Captain Vyse's first Consular Court in 1860 shows how ramshackle things were forced to be given their limited resources. It concerned the shooting of a dog. "The dining-room was turned into a court of justice…" Space was also in short supply because most of Yokohama's foreign community had come 'to see the fun'.[1173] It was only until a series of two Orders in Council (1865 and 1878 respectively) that Britain's legal extraterritorial jurisdiction in Japan was formerly created, with support set aside for its function and expansion like other British extraterritorial courts around the world.[1174]

The 1865 Order established the civil jurisdictions between consular districts within both China and Japan, and created the separation and seniority of China over Japan.[1175] Sir Edmund Hornby was appointed judge first to the Supreme Court of China and Japan in 1865

[1169] R. T. Chang, *The Justice of the Western Consular Courts in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Westport, Greenword Press, 1984), p. 3; T. Kayaoğlu, *Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Exterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 5; See P. Cassel, *Grounds of Judgement: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth Century China and Japan* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 85-95, for a summary of how Japan viewed and understood legal extraterritoriality.
[1170] T. Kayaoğlu, *Legal Imperialism*, p. 1.
[1171] T. Kayaoğlu, *Legal Imperialism*, p. 6.
[1172] M. Paske-Smith, *Western Barbarians in Japan*, pp. 250-251.
[1173] E. B. de Fonblanque, *Niphon and Pe-chi-li; or, Two Years in Japan and Northern China* (London, Saunders, Otley, and Co, 1863), p. 63.
[1174] *London Gazette*, 28 April 1865, pp. 2240-2255; *London Gazette*, 23 August 1878, pp. 4767-4769.
[1175] One example of this seniority would be that the Supreme Court based in Shanghai would preside over any case where property/goods involved were worth more than $1500 and/or a Japanese consular court had an insufficient jury list; *London Gazette*, 28 April 1865, p. 2245.

and quickly discovered that legal work in Japan, primarily at Yokohama, was more significant than expected.[1176] By 1868, Hornby recommended a separate court for Japan. The death of the then Yokohama Consul, L. Fletcher, and the acting-consul, Robertson's absence only expediated this recommendation.[1177] Hornby and Parkes both asked the Foreign Office permission to establish a separate court to deal with the backlog.[1178] Their request was partially met in 1870 with the creation of a Yokohama Court under the current system; an ad hoc arrangement.[1179] The 1878 Order finally established a separate Court of Japan in Yokohama, with an appointed Judge and the sitting consul as an Assistant Judge, effectively severing most of the seniority the Supreme Court in Shanghai had.[1180] There were further amendments made in 1884 and 1886 which separated China and Japan further, and also took Korea into account.[1181] With the end of exterritoriality agreed in 1895, abolished in 1899, the Court of Japan tried its last case in early 1900.[1182] During its active period, many former interpreters were involved with the Court of Japan due to their consular duties. For example, H. S. Wilkinson, J. F. Lowder, J. J. Enslie, R. Robertson, J. Troup, J. H. Longford, T. R. H. McClatchie, J. H. Gubbins, J. C. Hall, H. A. C. Bonar, and W. J. Kenny.[1183] There were

---

[1176] TNA, FO 17/433, Hornby to Russell, 11 September 1865; See Sir E. Hornby, *Sir Edmund Hornby: An Autobiography* (London, Constable & Co Ltd, 1929); C. Roberts, *The British Courts and Extra-territoriality in Japan, 1859-1899* (Boston, Global Oriental, 2014), p. 21; The sheer quantity of work was so much that he considered spending three months a year in Yokohama alone. Hornby was originally stationed in Constantinople and was an early proponent of professionalising the Consular Service.

[1177] C. Roberts, *The British Courts*, p. 21; (Former student interpreter) L. Fletcher's death may have expediated things, but how much help he would have proffered alive is suspect anyway., for he was an alcoholic according to Alcock; TNA, FO 391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 22 September 1861; Furthermore, Frederick James Barnard, one of the first British lawyers in Japan, arriving in 1867, considered Fletcher to be 'utterly incompetent' in fulfilling his legal duties as a consul; C. Roberts, 'British Lawyers in Japan, 1859-1899', in H. Cortazzi, eds., *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume VIII* (London, Global Oriental, 2013), p. 149 & p. 158.

[1178] C. Roberts, *The British Courts*, p. 21; TNA, FO 881/1749, Hornby to Lord Clarendon, 23 October 1869.

[1179] This was not to be confused with the Kanagawa Court, the consular court for the Yokohama Consular District; C. Roberts, *The British Courts*, p. 23; TNA, FO 17/637, Hornby to Lord Granville, 17 September 1872.

[1180] *London Gazette*, 23 August 1878, p. 4768.

[1181] *London Gazette*, 1 July 1884, pp. 2991-2993; *London Gazette*, 6 April 1886, pp. 1655-1656.

[1182] *Kobe Weekly Chronicle*, 17 January 1900, p. 47; This was recognised by two further Orders in Council in 1899 and 1900 respectively; *London Gazette*, 17 October 1899, pp. 6234-6235; *London Gazette*, 9 March 1900, p. 1618.

[1183] All of them took advantage of home leave to undertake their studies, which often, rather curiously, allowed some to extend their time away from Japan considerably (and receive some salary, usually half-pay, despite not being in post). They predominantly studied British Common Law and Roman Civil Law; TNA, FO, 46/131, Wilkinson to Lord Granville, 15 November 1870; TNA, FO 46/234, Robertson to Lord Tenterden, 14 January 1878; TNA, FO 46/234, Longford to Lord Tenterden, 15 July 1878; Gubbins to Sir Julian Pauncefote, 6 July 1881; TNA, FO 46/277, Hall to Lord Tenterden,

teething problems, with Alcock stating to Myburgh in 1864 that the significant judicial powers granted to consuls would never be given to so many untrained persons under normal circumstances.[1184] Problems with untrained personnel were largely addressed by the 1870s however, with most consuls appointed to Yokohama and elsewhere being qualified lawyers thereafter.[1185] Again, this fits with the idea that although the 1860s were largely an individually haphazard affair, by the 1870s the Japan Consular Service had collectively improved already. A remarkable turnaround.

Their legal expertise was often only utilised when they became a consul or were transferred to the British Court for Japan. Some acted as judges, assistant judges or crown advocates, for example Robertson (1881-1883), Hall (1888-1889) Wilkinson (1894-1895), and Troup (1896-1898).[1186] Outside of the four above, most acted as legal aids within their own consular districts. Besides the aforementioned teething problems, things went smoothly, with very few decisions reversed on appeal.[1187] Interpreters Wilkinson and Satow went the furthest in terms of legal application. Wilkinson eventually became a full-time consular judge in the British Court of Japan (1897-1900) and Satow, during a sabbatical away from British diplomacy in the 1880s, became a qualified barrister (though he never made use of this in Japan to my

---

20 January 1881; TNA, FO 46/277, Hall to Lord Tenterden, 20 June 1881; TNA, FO 46/277, McClatchie to Pauncefote, 29 April 1881; TNA, FO 46/277, McClatchie to Lord Granville, 9 May 1881; TNA, FO 46/373, Bonar to Pauncefote, 4 July 1887; TNA, FO 46/383, Kenny to Pauncefote, 27 February 1888.

[1184] TNA, FO 796/26, Alcock to Myburgh, 10 February 1864.

[1185] C. Roberts, *The British Courts*, pp. 75-84.

[1186] TNA, FO 656/39, Hornby to Sir Nicholas John Hannen, 13 September 1872; TNA, FO 46/234, Robertson to Lord Tenterden, 14 January 1878; TNA, FO 46/234, Rennie to Lord Salisbury, 24 December 1878; TNA, FO 46/294, F. B. Alston to C. S. Conrad, 19 September 1882; TNA, FO 46/323, Robertson to Lord Granville, 26 April 1884; Robertson died in-post in 1888; TNA, FO 46/277, Hall to Lord Tenterden, 20 January 1881; TNA, FO 46/277, Hall to Lord Tenterden, 20 June 1881; J. E. Hoare, 'John Carey Hall (1864-1926): A Career in Japan and the Japan Consular Service', in H. Cortazzi, eds., *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume 10* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2016), p. 278; Hall had always been interested and involved in legal works. He actually married the daughter of C. W. Goodwin, the Assistant Judge of the Supreme Court for China and Japan in March 1876; C. Roberts, *The British Courts*, p. 53; Hall was later appointed Acting-Assistant Judge in Shanghai, 1888. Despite his legal expertise and experience it was considered to be impossible for him to be promoted further over the heads of his peers; TNA, FO 17/1072, Robert Anderson Mowat to Lord Salisbury, 17 April 1888; C. Roberts, *The British Courts*, p. 57; TNA, FO, 46/131, Wilkinson to Lord Granville, 15 November 1870; TNA, FO 46/159, Wilkinson to Parkes, 15 January 1872; TNA, FO 46/277, J. Holms to Lord Tenterden, 1 December 1881; *London Gazette*, 10 January 1881, p. 93 ; Wilkinson was Acting Assistant Judge from 1879-1880 and was then a Crown Advocate (similar in position and rank to a Colonial Attorney General) from 1882-1897; R. T. Chang, *The Justice of the Western Consular Courts*, p. 8; TNA, FO 656/76, Wilkinson to Hannen, 20 January 1894; *London Gazette*, 13 August 1897, p. 4547; *London Gazette*, 13 September 1898, p. 5734.

[1187] C. Roberts, *The British Courts*, p. 76.

knowledge).[1188] R. T. Chang claims that such was the high standard of legal qualifications and the manner in which British consular officials conducted themselves, that the Japanese exempted the British from their condemnation of foreign legal counsel.[1189] Once more, it would seem that the ill-prepared consular staff, namely the interpreters (but others as well), of the 1860s were mostly long gone. When we consider the academic backgrounds of the interpreters and the fact that undertaking legal training required a vastly different set of skills to learning Japanese, this is hardly surprising. With the additional legal dimension, interpreters further cemented themselves within the Consular Service as minor diplomats. Without them as both a stop-gap and as a developing caste of legal adjuncts and experts, British extraterritoriality, let alone diplomacy, would not have been able to function.

5. Conclusion:

The work of an interpreter, that of interpretation and translation, was the most important facet of their work, but we cannot forget the pathways that their linguistic services in Japan forged for them. Britain's interpreters were initially defined by their linguistic merits, allowing some to individually shine and grow in importance. Not all interpreters were equal however, with many unsuited or underqualified to competently fulfil the role during the early years of 1858-1865. However, being a 'bad' interpreter was mostly shielded by the initial reliance on Dutch interpreters, the fact that some individuals rose so staggeringly far above the rest (like Satow and eventually von Siebold), and that within years a new cohort of replacements was already on the way.[1190] Interpreters were an investment, but Britain's unprepared entry into Japan meant that merit and promotion was a haphazard process based on more on one's health, availability and favouritism. Interpreters were important, critical even, but not collectively so as minor diplomats at this early stage. During the 1860s a reliance on individuals who excelled far above their peers was what saved the Japanese Consular Service. Their collective importance only increased once they started becoming consuls and lawyers alongside an improved understanding of Japanese. This was also thanks to those same excelling individuals of the 1860s like Satow however. Their experiences and subsequent training of new interpreters, combined with Neale and Alcock's attempts at improving their lot, Parkes's

[1188] R. T. Chang, *The Justice of the Western Consular Courts*, pp. 6-8; *London Gazette*, 3 December 1897, p. 7282.
[1189] R. T. Chang, *The Justice of the Western Consular Courts*, pp. 7-8.
[1190] Even then however, as we have seen, the Dutch interpreters were not entirely perfect either.

understanding of what interpreters also needed, and the Foreign Office's eventual acquiescence to this, all played a significant role in their career development. Unlike many historical interpreters before them, they did not significantly originate from ostracised backgrounds. For our interpreters it was the internal barriers of the Civil Service; the rigid segregation of the Consular Service (as the lesser) and the Diplomatic Service (as the superior). However, Japan provided an opportunity to blur that divide and allowed interpreters, who improved as time went on regardless, to then flourish in a more divergent and important Consular Service. By the 1870s, they were vital to British diplomacy once they were well established across Japan; universally they were more akin to minor diplomats in their sister Diplomatic Service then their fellow Consular servicemen elsewhere in the world. They transformed from a loose cabal of varyingly qualified individuals who, despite many initial teething problems surrounding promotion, nationality, illness, and merit, eventually turned into an important group of minor diplomats who heavily supported Anglo-Japanese diplomacy as consuls and more. This was duly required due to the demanding nature of a posting in Japan and the countries own changing peculiarities, from a feudal semi-decentralised state, to a modernising centralising nation. As consuls in East Asia, they were tasked with far more duties more akin to the Diplomatic Service than would have been seen in places like Europe, the Middle East, and even most of the America's. They were intelligence agents, trade experts, legal aids, community representatives, and of course diplomats outright. Britain's diplomatic needs in Japan eventually created a highly dependable collective body of minor diplomats that ensured British foreign policy could work as desired, and would last successfully until the beginning of the Second World War for the West in Asia in 1941.

6. Conclusion:

1. British Actors and Japan:

From Britain's first foray into Japan to the cusp of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, British actors, great and small, played a multitude of diplomatic roles that collectively aided Britain's diplomacy in Japan. From the disregarded Chargés d'Affaires to the varied interpreters, from Parliament and the press allowing for hundreds of individuals to assume varying diplomatic roles, to the Royal Navy ship becoming a base for hundreds more to become diplomatic actors, many for the first time. All these people and more, many of whom I have sadly not had the luxury of time to research or discuss further, substantially contributed to the progress and development of Anglo-Japanese relations. From diplomat's wives and daughters, arms dealers and merchants, various *o-yatoi,* to reverends and treaty port press editors. Whilst my research did not expand on these diplomatic actors more significantly, and only touched on some of them, they too, contributed to Anglo-Japanese diplomacy's fruitful development. The number of actors therefore involved with British diplomacy was far larger and more expansive than my research overtly implies, with thousands of state and non-state actors all contributing in some shape or form. The large and (slowly) evolving Diplomatic and Consular services, combined with actors from Parliament and the press, the Royal Navy, and aforementioned others, whose own depth and resources could further buttress and augment diplomacy in East Asia, were powerful assets for Britain to draw upon over its diplomatic competitors. The implications of this are enormous, for it not only explains Britain's near diplomatic dominance in Japan and wider East Asia, but it also potentially illuminates how Britain had so much diplomatic success elsewhere around the globe during this period.

New Diplomatic History and its focus on the individual, and the groups they were subsequently then apart of, has allowed me to not only study forgotten parts of British diplomacy in Japan, but further understand how Britain became the most dominant and advantaged foreign power in Japan's diplomatic affairs. For this thesis I have made use of pluralistic approaches, geographical methodologies, prosopographical analysis, as well as approaches from linguistic, interpretive, and translation studies, to augment my diplomatic historical research. We started with Parliament and the press, who became domestic extensions of diplomacy. MP's and Lords in Parliament became diplomatic sub-actors with

ever-changing power and influence that ebbed and flowed with each election, reshuffle, and crisis. During our period of study, the mid-nineteenth century, their power was only intensifying as the Foreign Office's private grip on foreign policy began to wane due to Britain's growing global, imperial stature. Diplomacy's ever-expanding importance meant that it could be left to a select paranoid few. Things came to ahead after successive crises, mishandled events, and unnecessary wars put the Foreign Office under an increasingly parliamentary (and public) microscope. Therefore, parliamentary sub-actors were now entering the fray; becoming involved in diplomacy more overtly than before and adding new diplomatic advantages.

These changes in Parliament coincided with the widespread explosion of newspapers, magazines, and journals across Britain and abroad, which provided, with varying degrees of success and accuracy, public access to British diplomatic actions abroad like never before. Parliament too was now more 'accessible' to be judged and even influenced by 'public' pressures and interests through the press. With its growing readership and wider publication, the press were now also more diplomatically active. Though more as a non-state 'singular' sub-actor in their case. The press was not a singular force with a unified opinion or sense of purpose when it came to diplomacy, but it had become a significant conduit of public pressure that could pass censure on British diplomacy in far off corners of the world. Through incidents in China and Brazil, both groups interest in foreign affairs had only intensified. So, when the Bombardment of Kagoshima occurred in 1863, with all its fanfare, problems, and excess, the stage was set for the two groups to act upon their growing diplomatic power. Unfortunately for the government and the Foreign Office, these sub-actors did not have a positive impact, but a negative one; both effectively vilified British actions in Japan, putting immense pressure on other British diplomatic actors at home and abroad. So strong was the current of criticism that the Foreign Office (and Neale) were forced to change course in Japan, admitting defeat to these new diplomatic sub-actors. Their diplomatic power did not wane either, with the Shimonoseki Campaign lasting from 1863-1864 garnering some concern and interest due to its unsanctioned ending, the bombardment of Shimonoseki. Though not as widely reported as Kagoshima or substantially criticised, it still drew some disdain and fear that Britain had caused yet another foreign escapade. So strong was this fear, that even without a repeat of Parliament and the press's reaction to Kagoshima, the Foreign Office pre-emptively acted and took steps to sanction the diplomat in charge, Alcock, for his actions. The Shimonoseki Campaign's success and Alcock's Far East popularity, quickly

meant that the Foreign Office was forced to reevaluate however. Alcock refused to return to Japan after he had been treated so poorly and was transferred to China (with better pay and conditions). All of this was a confusing mess that the Foreign Office did not want to have repeated. The Foreign Office now feared, more so than ever, the damage that MPs, Lords, and the press could deal as diplomatic sub-actors. They had a power that could not be easily combatted or ignored. With Kagoshima and related events, we are provided with an omen of how British parliamentary democracy, and what would develop into the modern British Media, would increase its interaction, control, and influence in Britain's Foreign Affairs. This added hundreds, if not thousands, of new domestic diplomatic actors into consideration, with Anglo-Japanese relations in the 1860s only illustrating this fact perfectly. China, Brazil, and finally Japan, all signified that a great diplomatic change had occurred and that more diplomatic actors were now present.

My second chapter diverts away from unexpected diplomatic actors to ones largely forgotten in Japan: Britain's Chargés d'Affaires. Through four case studies on Neale, Winchester, Watson, and Paget, we better understand how their personalities, backgrounds, and decisions greatly affected the trajectory of Anglo-Japanese relations. That they are group deserving of greater historical study because of the substantial diplomatic power and influence they often wielded, even if it was on a temporary basis. In Neale we have the dramatic exception to the rule. The man that everyone thinks of when they hear Chargés d'Affaires and Japan. His exceptionalism comes from his longevity and his role in the bombardment of Kagoshima. Ironically however, despite his prominence in wider Anglo-Japanese scholarship, he has not been studied more significantly, and has not been considered in the wider context of Britain's Chargés d'Affaires. He was a complicated man, his temper sometimes affecting his diplomacy, but overall, he showed great restraint and perseverance in Japan at a time when war looked likely on several occasions. Next, we looked at Winchester, a doctor turned diplomat, with swathes of experience across China and later also Japan. His contribution to Anglo-Japanese relations was to lay the groundwork for Sir Harry Parkes's arrival as chief diplomat; buying time and planning ahead to provide the freedom to act unencumbered. These important contributions were overlooked and largely forgotten, but thankfully for Winchester, not unnoticed by the Foreign Office who rewarded him for his service as Chargé d'Affaires.

We then moved into the early 1870s with Watson, a soldier-explorer turned diplomat and prolific writer, who faced a myriad of diplomatic challenges. All of which signified how complex and difficult treaty port relations had now become by the 1870s. Watson's tenure pivoted around the *Maria Luz* incident, and whilst Watson's reasons for intervening were potentially dubious, was the morally right thing to do. It was a gamble, but Watson pulled it off whilst juggling many other diplomatic issues, enhancing Britain's relationship with not only Japan, but others as well. For Watson, Japan was the next step in his busy diplomatic career; a place where he could pool his previous experience across the Levant and South America, and show the Foreign Office he could take on greater things. Japan ended up being a springboard for promotion was not unique to Watson, but Watson's stark career change post-Japan is arguably the most obvious. Finally, we come to Paget and the twilight of the long Victorian Era. Paget was a young, aspiring diplomat who had some serious aristocratic pedigree behind him, helping propel his career from strength to strength. Unfortunately for Paget however, early on in his career he was put into a truly unwanted situation for any diplomat: a looming foreign conflict and a government at home in disarray. Of course, no war is inevitable, but by the time Paget was forced to take on the role of Chargé d'Affaires, war between Japan and China appeared virtually unavoidable. Despite this, Paget proved that age and experience are not always everything one needs, he went to great lengths to encourage Japan towards peace at the behest of the Foreign Office. He even cooperated with colleagues in China in order to try and work on some sort of concerted pathway to peace. Paget soon realised that this was not a diplomatic fight he could win however, and instead switched tactics to secure Japan's agreement that the conflict would not interfere with British interests in the region. By doing so, Paget pre-empted the Foreign Office orders to do the very same by several weeks. Paget acted above and beyond expectations. He managed to impress upon Japan Britain's preferred diplomatic position at no cost to their relations. Moreover, Britain's positive relationship with Japan went unhindered and its position in East Asia whilst beginning to be threatened by other Western powers, had gained some mild reprieve.
Together these four Chargés d'Affaires illustrate perfectly why it has been a great loss to Anglo-Japanese scholarship that they have not been looked at more vigorously. They had substantial agency to direct and effect Britain's relationship with Japan across the nineteenth century, and thankfully, these four chosen all did so in positive ways for both parties. They were more than simple cover diplomats or secondary actors. They were unique actors who all contributed to Anglo-Japanese relations; another set of actors who collectively aided and supported British diplomacy in Japan.

Thirdly, I discussed the use of the Royal Naval ship in early Anglo-Japanese relations, and how its steady transition from a weapon of war to a mobile legation allowed for multiple diplomatic actors to improve their diplomacy, and for others to come to the diplomatic fore in ways not previously possible, like sailors, interpreters, doctors, marines, officers, and other minor diplomats. It also improved the chief diplomat in charge's own diplomatic position, granting him a diplomatic gravitas in a way that was just not viable previously. This diplomatic evolution of the ship took time to suit British diplomacy in Japan however. At Tsushima in 1861, Kagoshima in 1863, and also Shimonoseki in 1864, the ship was limited to its military function to make British diplomacy more threatening, more demanding, and sometimes more deadly. The ship was never allowed to develop its own diplomatic space, or effect its sense of place; the littoral landscape that surrounded it in a more neutral, positive, and ultimately more 'diplomatic' way. With Japan's natural and unnatural obstructions this was perhaps always inevitable, but the arrival of Sir Harry Parkes in 1865 finally sparked a dramatic shift of fortunes. An opportunity to experiment with the ship diplomatically that might help Parkes adapt to the new Foreign Office desire for more peaceable relations with Japan. In the aftermath of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki they wanted no more controversial, or potentially war sparking, military confrontations. Parkes therefore intended to pursue a dual policy of neutrality and plurality. To talk with everyone and side with no one until it became diplomatically prudent to do so. To achieve this, he needed to repair and maintain relations with the Shogunate and attempt to better engage with the Daimyō. Parkes first tested the waters at Osaka in 1865, where an allied flotilla had come to negotiate with the Shogunate on some outstanding issues related to the Shimonoseki Indemnity. Here, Parkes took the opportunity to engage with the wider Japanese populace and nobility to see what success could be had. Parkes soon got his answer, with several Daimyō and their retainers taking advantage of Parkes's interest and hospitality. The diplomatic role of the ship had finally changed and been developed purposefully thanks to Parkes's initiative. With this success Parkes moved quickly to make sure it was not wasted. He forced the Shogunate to grant concessions to the Daimyō and went to Nagasaki to remind everyone of Britain's interest (and ability) to engage positively. From 1866 through to 1867, Parkes, Satow, Admiral King, and others were able to rapidly meet with Satsuma, Uwajima, Chōshū, and Chikuzen thanks to the ship. It was a now fully transformed into a mobile legation. A diplomatic centrepiece for banquets, negotiation, and flattery that was more comfortable for all involved. Thanks to this oceanic diplomacy, Britain was able to gather intelligence,

contacts, and increase its diplomatic clout tenfold. No other power had the diplomatic plurality that Britain had gained by late 1867, allowing Parkes the freedom to remain largely untethered to both Japan's factions and events. The development of the ship in early Anglo-Japanese relations in this way created a positive diplomatic space and place for British actors to improve and enhance their own diplomacy. The Royal Navy's impressive presence in East Asia was no longer simply a military advantage, but now also a diplomatic one. For Parkes it had become a vital diplomatic resource to exploit at the expense of other foreign powers in Japan.

Lastly, we have Britain's student interpreters and their involvement and integration into the wider Japanese Consular Service. Scholarly study of Britain's interpreters has been mixed, with focus on some more heavily weighted than others. However, what has not been looked at in any great detail is their development from haphazard interpreters into more competent consular officials, like consuls, assistants, and legal experts; from a set of disorganised individuals, to a collective grouping of capable diplomatic actors. The study of interpreters (and translators) has been neglected for far too long. Firstly, by academics more widely, and secondly by historians in particular. There are some understandable reasons for this, like a lack of sources, which does help us comprehend why some British interpreters in Japan have been researched more than others.[1191] However, considering how integral they were to Britain's diplomatic efforts, it is still surprising that their development has not received greater interest. Britain's interpretative efforts began awkwardly, with British Merchants, British interpreters in China, and women all ignored from the onset, greatly limiting Britain's ability to adequately prepare and staff Japan properly. Some recompense was achieved through the reliance on Japanese Castaways and Dutch interpreters, but even this came with failures and drawbacks. The student interpreters themselves were also of varying quality, with desperation, nepotism, and other factors all playing their part.

It took time for successive diplomats, like Neale, Alcock, and Parkes, to understand their needs and for the Foreign Office to answer those same diplomats' pleas for more support for their interpreters as well. Fortunately, some rose to the challenge in the meantime, buying some much-needed linguistic reprieve. For example, Satow, Robertson, and von Siebold, were all able to support British diplomacy for years until better trained and better suited

[1191] Something that I myself can also not ultimately escape from.

persons arrived in Japan. For early Anglo-Japanese relations, the interpreters were more akin to a motley crew; talent existed in unassuming and random ways, allowing for only certain individuals to shine through. This was a substantial problem for diplomats in Japan and for the Foreign Office, but they did deal with it. The student interpreters were meant to be a long-term investment and if they wanted to collect the dividends it needed to improve the situation. Eventually towards the latter 1860s and the 1870s we see a change; the Dutch interpreters were edged out and the less capable among the Japanese Consular Service were steadily replaced by newly promoted British interpreters. Their greater and better experience with the Japanese language thanks to better learning materials and men like Satow and von Siebold meant that the quality of the service radically evolved. British Consular and Legal duties all improved for the better, with selection, examination, promotional pathways all made clearer and more stable as time went on. Consequently, former British interpreters could be found across Britain's postings in Japan. It had become the norm and it is quite incredible to see the turnaround in fortunes the Japanese Consular Service had from haphazard doldrums of the late 1850s and early 1860s, to the more competent, larger, and experienced service we see develop thereafter.[1192] The Foreign Office and Britain's diplomats had moved away from overly relying on select individuals who excelled, and could now rely on the collective group of the Japanese Consular Service to oversee its broader diplomatic aims in Japan.

These four chapters illustrate how many individuals and groups contributed to the development and work of British diplomacy in Japan. Many of these actors have been overlooked, forgotten, or simply unnoticed, but they all effected Anglo-Japanese diplomacy in their own way as my research clearly shows. The implications of this are substantial for not only Anglo-Japanese relations, but for the study of wider diplomatic relations with Japan, and British relations with the rest of the world. They remind us that there are other avenues available to us as historians to better understand diplomatic history; be it through a more general consideration of sources not often relied upon for diplomatic histories, or more specific studies of select actors or roles that are usually pushed to the side. All this not only helps us understand the complexities of Anglo-Japanese relations more fully, but it further cements the merits and strengths of New Diplomatic History as well. With its emphasis on utilising methodologies and approaches from disciplines usually far removed from diplomatic history, I have found that my research has expanded far beyond what I initially thought

[1192] Lasting long into the twentieth century.

possible. This in turn has allowed me to contribute to the strengthening trend for diplomatic historians to begin re-examining diplomatic relations on both a macro and micro scale. At a time when the history of outlying states and peoples alike is finally being re-evaluated, the varied and widespread contributions that multiple state and non-state, unofficial and official, actors made to Anglo-Japanese relations significantly adds to our understanding of wider, global histories beyond entirely Eurocentric norms. As is sometimes ignored, even today, British diplomacy extended beyond the confines of Europe and the North Atlantic, with forgotten diplomats and officials alike, at home and abroad, playing key roles in shaping British foreign policy in a variety of settings. Japan was no different in this regard. Through New Diplomatic History and its approaches, it is clear that when it comes to diplomacy there is far more than meets the eye, with Anglo-Japanese relations here being a small window into what is becoming a more mature and innovative field.

Bibliography:

Primary Sources:

British, Foreign & Treaty Port Press:

A:

Aachener Zeitung

Aberdeen Journal

The Aberdeen Weekly Journal

The Academy: A Weekly Review of Literature, Science, and Art

Advocate of Peace

The Albion: A Journal of News, Politics and Literature

Het Amsterdamsche Handels-en Effectenblad

Army and Navy Gazette

The Atlas

B:

Batavia Handelsblad

Bath Chronicle

The Belfast News-Letter

Le Bien Public

Birmingham Daily Gazette

Blackwood's Magazine

The Bombay Gazette Overland Mail

The Bradford Observer

The Bucks Herald

C:

Caledonian Mercury

The Cardiff Times

Cheltenham Chronicle

Chester Chronicle

Chicago Tribune

Christian Advocate and Journal

Civil & Military Gazette

El Clamor Publico

The Continental Monthly: Devoted to Literature and National Policy

Consett Guardian

Le Constitutionel

Cork Examiner

D:

The Daily Liverpool Post

The Daily News

The Daily Telegraph

Delftsche Courant

La Discusion

Dublin Evening Mail

Dundee Courier

E:

Edinburgh Evening Courant

Edinburgh Gazette

The Edinburgh Review

Elgin Courant, and Morayshire Advertiser

Elgin Courier

The Era

Examiner

Exeter and Plymouth Gazette

F:

Fife Herald

Forres, Elgin, and Nairn Gazette, Northern Review and Advertiser

The Friend of China

G:

Gazeta de Macau e Timor

Gemeinde-Zeitung

Glasgow Courier

The Globe

Government Gazette (India)

H:

Haarlemsche Courant

Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle

Hereford Times

The Hiogo & Osaka Herald

The Hiogo News

Home News for India, China, and the Colonies

The Homeward Mail from India, China and the East

Huddersfield Chronicle

I:

The Illustrated London News

Illustrated Times

L'Indépendance Belge

The Irish Times and Daily Advertiser

J:

The Japan Commercial News

The Japan Herald

Java-Bode: Nieuws, Handels- en Advertentieblad voor Nederlandsch-Indie

John Bull

Journal De Bruxelles

K:

Kobe Weekly Chronicle

L:

Lancaster Gazetter

Leeds Mercury

Leicester Chronicle

La Libertad: Periódico Moderado

Liverpool Albion

Liverpool Daily Post

Liverpool Mercury

The London & China Telegraph

London Gazette

M:

Mährischer Correspondent

The Manchester Courier and General Advertiser

Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser

Manchester Times

Middelburgsche Courant

Monmouthshire Merlin

The Morning Chronicle

The Morning Post

N:

Nagasaki Express

Naval and Military Gazette and Weekly Chronicle of the United Service

The Newcastle Daily Journal

New York Daily Tribune

New York Evangelist

The New York Times

De Noordbrabanter

Norfolk News

The North Wales Chronicle and Advertiser for the Principality

O:

The Observer

Oesterreichischer Soldatenfreund

Overland China Mail

P:

The Patriot

The Pembrokeshire Herald and General Advertiser

The Penny Illustrated Paper

Le Petit Journal

Punch

Q:

The Quarterly Review

R:

Reynold's Newspaper

S:

The Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science, and Art

The Scottish Press

The Sheffield Daily Telegraph

Sheffield Independent

Sheffield and Rotherham Independent

Shields Daily Gazette

Shields Gazette and Daily Telegraph

Shipping and Mercantile Gazette

Sleaford Gazette

Southampton Herald

The Spectator

The Standard

Sumatra-Courant

Sun

T:

The Times

U:

V:

Vorarlberger Landes-Zeitung

W:

The Welshman

The Western Daily Press

Western Times

Westmorland Gazette

X:

Y:

York Herald

Z:

Parliamentary Papers:

Documents concerning Britain:

Estimates & Civil Services, 31 March 1858.

Report from the Select Committee on Consular Service and Appointments, 27 July 1858.

Report to Lord Malmesbury on Mr. Murray's Plan for the Revision of Consular Fees, July 1859.

Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic Service: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, 23 July 1861.

Annual Statement of the Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British Possessions in the Year 1861, 1862.

Estimates & Civil Services, 31 March 1864.

Estimates & Civil Services, 25 July 1864.

Armstrong Guns, A "Copy of the Report of Admiral Kuper in reference to the Armstrong Guns in the Action of Simonosaki", War Office, May 1865.

Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and Appendix, July 1870.

Documents concerning China:

Correspondence relating to China, 1840.

Treaty between Her Majesty and The Emperor of China, 29 August 1842.

Correspondence with the Superintendent of British Trade in China, upon the Subject of Emigration from China, 1852-1853.

Correspondence upon the Subject of Emigration from China, 1853-1855.

Papers relating to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton with Appendix, 1856.

Papers relating to the proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton with appendix, 1857.

Further Papers relating to the proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton, 1857.

Correspondence respecting Emigration from Canton, 1859-1860.

Treaties between Her Majesty and The Emperor of China with Rules for Trade and Tariff of Duties, 1861.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in China, Japan, and Siam, 1865.

Correspondence respecting the Attack on British Protestant Missionaries at Yang-Chow Foo, August 1868.

Further Correspondence respecting the Attack on British Protestant Missionaries at Yang-Chow-Foo, August 1868.

Correspondence respecting Missionary Disturbances at Chee-Foo and Taiwan, 1869.

Correspondence with Sir Rutherford Alcock respecting Missionaries at Hankow and State of Affairs at various Ports in China, 1869.

Correspondence respecting Inland Residence of English Missionaries in China, 1870.

Documents concerning the Slave Trade and Brazil:

Correspondence on the Slave Trade with Foreign Powers, 1844.

Correspondence on the Slave Trade with Foreign Powers, 1845.

Papers relating to the Convention between Great Britain and Brazil on Slave Trade, 23 July 1845.

Documents concerning Brazil:

Correspondence respecting the plunder of the wreck of the British barque "Prince of Wales;" and the ill-treatment of officers of Her Majesty's Ship "Forte."

Documents concerning Siam:

Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Her Majesty and The Kings of Siam, with an Agreement Supplementary thereto, 1857.

Documents concerning Japan:

Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce between Her Majesty and the Tycoon of Japan, 28 August 1858, 1860.

Correspondence respecting Affairs in Japan (Attack on British Legation), 1860-1866.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1865.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in China, Japan, and Siam, 1866-1868.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1868.

Further Paper respecting Silk Culture in Japan, 1870

Further Report from Mr. Adams, Secretary to Her Majesty's Legation in Japan, on Silk Culture in Japan, 1870.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1871.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1872.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1873.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1874.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1875.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1875.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1876.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1877.

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1878.

No. 1 & No. 2, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1879.

No. 1 & No. 2, Commercial Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in Japan, 1880.

Despatch from Her Majesty's Minister in Japan forwarding a Report on Corea, February 1883.

Report for the Year 1888 on the Trade of Hakodate, August 1889.

Report for the Year 1889 on the Trade of Hakodate, July 1890.

Report for the Year 1890 on the Trade of Hakodate, July 1891.

Report for the Year 1893 on the Trade of the Consular District of Hakodate, 1894.

Report for the Year 1894 on the Trade of Hakodate, 1895.

Documents concerning Macau and the Coolie Trade:

Correspondence respecting the Emigration of Chinese coolies from Macao, 1871.

Correspondence respecting the Emigration of Chinese coolies from Macao, 1872.

Papers relating to the Measures taken to prevent the fitting out of ships at Hong Kong for the Macao coolie Trade, July 1873.

The British Library:

British Library, East India Company, Cadet Papers (1789-1860) and Cadet Registers (1775-1860).

The National Archives:

FO 17 – Foreign Office: Political and Other Departments: General Correspondence before 1906, China.

PRO 30/22 – Lord John Russell Papers.

PRO 30/33 - Satow Papers.

FO 46 – Foreign Office: Political and Other Departments: General Correspondence before 1906, Japan.

FO 83 – Foreign and Commonwealth Office and predecessors: Political and Other Departments: General Correspondence before 1906, Great Britain and General.

FO 228 – Foreign Office: Consulates and Legation, China: General Correspondence, Series I.

FO 262 - Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Embassy and Consulates, Japan: General Correspondence.

FO 391 – Hammond Papers.

FO 410 – Foreign Office: Confidential Print: Japan, 1854-1970.

FO 656 - Foreign Office: Supreme Court, Shanghai, China: General Correspondence.

FO 881 – Foreign Office: Confidential Print (Numerical Series), 1827-1914.

US National Archives (Catalogue):

Department of State – Volume 2: Japan: July, 1872 – August 30, 1880.

Published Primary Sources:

Cooper, M, *Manhattan [Ship's Logbook] of Sag Harbour, N. Y., on Voyage,* 8 November 1843 -14 October 1846.

Beasley, W. G, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853-1868* (London, Oxford University Press, 1955).

United States Department of State Message of the President of the United States, and accompanying documents, to the two Houses of Congress, at the commencement of the first session of the thirty-eighth Congress, 1863, Part II (Washington, D. C, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1863).

United States Department of State, Executive documents printed by order of the House of Representatives, during the second session of the thirty-ninth Congress, 1866-67, Part II (Washington, D. C, US Government Printing Office, 1866-67).

The Senate of the United States of America, *Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America, From March 5, 1869, to March 3, 1871, Volume 17* (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1901).

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1872, Part I (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1872).

Papers Relating to the Treaty of Washington, 5 Volumes (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1872).

Executive Documents printed by order of the House of Representatives, 1872-1873 (Washington, D. C, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1873).

Hansard:

House of Lords, *Resolutions Moved Debate Adjourned* (24 February 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1155-1245) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1857-02-24/debates/4abe5440-58e0-4871-

a221-a1630f3fe92a/ResolutionsMovedDebateAdjourned?highlight=china#contribution-60563f54-d4da-43da-ae50-1200c0761dc0>*

House of Lords, *Resolutions Moved Debate Adjourned (Second Night)* (26 February 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1310-1385) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1857-02-26/debates/1fa50cd2-3cf8-490e-ab43-e1f185d8d0c9/ResolutionsMovedResumedDebate(SecondNight)?highlight=china#contribution-770c42a5-ab37-4146-b58e-7323d4004515>*

House of Commons, *Resolutions Moved Debate Adjourned* (26 February 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1392-1485) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1857-02-26/debates/826b96df-a312-41dc-99a2-492c78544d7b/ResolutionsMovedDebateAdjourned?highlight=china#contribution-9ba5688d-e08f-410a-a154-3e845b1eec01>*

House of Commons, *Resolutions Moved Debate Adjourned (Second Night)* (27 February 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1495-1585) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1857-02-27/debates/ec09d110-fbac-480c-b7b9-47c71485dcee/ResolutionMovedResumedDebate(SecondNight)?highlight=china#contribution-a9b2bdff-d9cb-49d9-8287-1f12cfae6aae>*

House of Commons, *Resolutions Moved Debate (Third Night)* (2 March 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1589-1684) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1857-03-02/debates/cf87bcc1-3971-4f21-9b08-cd33686ca7f3/ResolutionMovedResumedDebate(ThirdNight)?highlight=china#contribution-87338162-440d-4ff4-8ec0-460fca83d094>*

House of Commons, *Resolutions Moved Debate (Fourth Night)* (3 March 1857, Vol. 144, Cols. 1726-1846) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1857-03-03/debates/c4d9b7b5-9c47-45a4-8ef2-c3d413ccd0c7/ResolutionMovedResumedDebate(FourthNight)?highlight=china#contribution-b677142f-1332-4949-b632-3605656d7bf8>*

House of Lords, *Brazil – Dispute with the Brazilian Government* (17 February 1863, Vol. 169, Cols. 367-373) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1863-02-17/debates/43ca6d3d-36c1-4412-94ff-ae23b8717b28/Brazil%E2%80%94DisputeWithTheBrazilianGovernment>*

House of Commons, *Question* (7 May 1863, Vol. 170, Cols. 1303-1135) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1863-05-07/debates/72529466-a4d6-4d3c-b47e-f1e7a01c4a8d/Question?highlight=brazil#contribution-e86254ee-e2d3-4173-b15c-a88541baf25a>*

House of Commons, *The Diplomatic Service* (4 July 1862, Vol. 167, Cols. 1431-1444) < https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1862-07-04/debates/49faf588-79f1-4562-9014-7ccc1fc1dba7/TheDiplomaticService >*

House of Lords, *Brazil – Papers Moved For* (19 June 1863, Vol. 171, Cols. 1118-1162) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1863-06-19/debates/930cd0d2-9239-4d27-a982-85068517ba88/Brazil%E2%80%94PapersMovedFor>*

House of Lords, *Brazil – The "Prince of Wales" – Claim Of Compensation* (14 July 1863, Vol. 172, Cols. 731-747) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1863-07-14/debates/61eb038a-91b7-4279-b2ff-ce44e62a0b01/Brazil%E2%80%94ThePrinceOfWales%E2%80%94ClaimOfCompensation>*

House of Commons, *Address to Her Majesty on the Lords Commissioners' Speech* (4 February 1864, Vol. 173, Cols. 74-159) <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1864/feb/04/address-to-her-majesty-on-the-lords>*

House of Commons, *Bombardment of Kagosima. – Resolution* (9 February 1864, Vol. 173, Cols. 335-424) <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1864/feb/09/kagosima-japan-bombardment-of-kagosima>*

House of Commons, *Affairs in China – Resolution* (1 May 1864, Vol. 175, Cols. 916-980) < https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1864/may/31/affairs-of-china-resolution#S3V0175P0_18640531_HOC_32>*

House of Lords, *Japan – Resolutions* (1 July 1864, Vol. 176, Cols. 573-612) <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1864/jul/01/japan-resolutions>*

House of Lords, *The Lords Commissioners' Speech* (7 February 1865, Vol. 177, Cols. 3-4) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1865-02-07/debates/84751160-8f88-446c-9015-8b7e92b384bc/TheLordsCommissionersSpeech?highlight=japan#contribution-6767d1ce-62fe-440a-bd5a-3187fb192080>*

House of Commons, *Address to Her Majesty on the Lords Commissioners' Speech* (7 February 1865, Vol. 177, Cols. 41-43) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1865-02-07/debates/45c4e1fb-a70e-49a6-8c13-4083dedc75da/AddressToHerMajestyOnTheLordsCommissionersSpeech?highlight=japan#contribution-f185821a-ae8a-40bd-8d2a-472959556613>*

Secondary Sources:

A:

Acuto, M, A. Kosovac & K. Hartley, 'City Diplomacy: Another Generational Shift?', *Diplomatica*, 3:1 (2021), pp. 137-144.

Adey, P, 'Aeromobilities: Geographies, Subjects and Vision', *Geography Compass*, 2:5 (2008), pp. 1318-1336.

Ahvenainen, J, *The Far Eastern Telegraphs: The History of Telegraphic Communications between the Far East, Europe, and America before the First World War* (Helsinki, Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1981).

Alcock, R, *Elements of Japanese Grammar for the Use of Beginners* (Shanghai, 1861).

Alcock, R, *Familiar Dialogues in Japanese with English and French Translations for the use of students* (Paris, Benjamin Ruprat; London: Trübner, 1863).

Alcock, R, *The Capital of the Tycoon: A Narrative of a Three Years' Residence in Japan, Two Volumes* (London, Longman, Green & Co, 1863).

Alejo, A, 'Diasporas as Actors in Urban Diplomacy', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 17 (2022), pp. 138-150.

Allison, G. T, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, Little, Brown & Co, 1971).

Amos, T. D, & Ishii, A, eds., *Revisiting Japan's Restoration: New Approaches to the Study of the Meiji Transformation* (New York, Routledge, 2022).

Anderson, J, & Peters, K, eds., *Water Worlds: Human Geographies in the Ocean* (Farnham, Ashgate, 2014).

Angelelli, C. V, & Baer, B. J, 'Introduction' in C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, eds., *Researching Translation and Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2016).

Angelelli, C. V, & Baer, B. J, 'Exploring Translation and Interpreting' in C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, eds., *Researching Translation and Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2016).

Anim-Addo, A, Hasty, W, & Peters, K, 'The Mobilities of Ships and Shipped Mobilities', *Mobilities*, 9:3 (2014), pp. 337-349.

Antić, Č, *Ralph Paget: A Diplomat in Serbia* (Belgrade, Institute for Balkan Studies, 2006).

Antunes, C, 'Early Modern Business Diplomacy: An Appraisal', *Diplomatica*, 2:1 (2020), pp. 20-27.

Arch, J. K, *Bringing Whales Ashore: Oceans and the Environment of Early Modern Japan* (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2018).

Arch, J, 'Nineteenth-Century Japanese Whaling and Early Territorial Expansion in the Pacific', *RCC Perspectives: New Histories of Pacific Whaling*, 5 (2019), pp. 57-64.

Asakawa, M 'From Pupils to Partners' in I. Gow, Y. Hirama & J. Chapman, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 3: The Military Dimension* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2003).

Asakawa, M, 'Anglo-Japanese Military Relations, 1800-1900', in I. Gow, Y. Hirama and J. Chapman, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 3: The Military Dimension* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2003).

Aston, W. G, 'His Majesty's ship 'Phaeton' at Nagasaki' in the Asiatic Society of Japan, eds., *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan: Volume 7* (Yokohama, The Asiatic Society of Japan, 1879).

Atkinson, H, *Revised and Enlarged Edition of Exercises in the Yokohama Dialect* (Yokohama, Japan Gazette Office, 1879).

Attala, L, *How Water Makes Us Human: Engagements with the Materiality of Water* (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2019).

Auslin, M. R, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2004).

Ayhan, K. J, 'The Boundaries of Public Diplomacy and Nonstate Actors: A Taxonomy of Perspectives', *International Studies Perspectives*, 20 (2019), pp. 63-83.

B:

Badel, L, 'Diplomacy and the History of International Relations: Redefining a Conflictual Relationship', *Diplomatica*, 1 (2019), pp. 33-39.

Baigorri-Jalón, J, 'The History of the Interpreting Profession', in H. Mikkelson & R. Jourdenais, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2015).

Baker, J. C. T, 'Mobility, Tropicality and Landscape: the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway, 1881-1939', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 44 (2014), pp. 133-144.

Ballard, G. A, *The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co, 1921).

Baptists, *The Baptist Magazine, Vol. 36* (London, Houlston & Stoneman, 1844).

Barr, P, *The Coming of the Barbarians: A Story of Western Settlement in Japan, 1853-1870* (London, Penguin Books, 1988).

Barr, P, *A Curious Life for a Lady: The Story of Isabella Bird* (London, Penguin Classics, 1989).

Barret, C. J, 'After Palmerston: Britain and the Iberian Peninsula, 1865-76', *The English Review*, 430:109 (February 1994), pp. 74-78.

Bart, Sir O, eds., Lord C. E. Paget, *Autobiography and Journals of Admiral Lord Clarence E. Paget* (London, Chapman & Hall, 1896).

Barton, G. A & Bennett, B. M, 'Forestry as Foreign Policy: Anglo-Siamese Relations and the Origins of Britain's Informal Empire in the Teak Forests of Northern Siam, 1883-1925', *Itinerario*, 34:2 (2010), pp. 65-86.

Basalla, G, 'The Spread of Western Science', *Science*, 156:3775 (May 1967), pp. 611–22.

Baylen, J. O, 'The British Press, 1861-1918' in D. Griffiths, eds., *The Encyclopaedia of the British Press, 1422-1992* (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1992).

Beasley, W. G, 'The Language Problem in the Anglo-Japanese Negotiations of 1854', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, 13:3 (1950), pp. 746-758.

Beasley, W. G, *Great Britain and The Opening of Japan, 1834-1858* (London, Routledge, 1951).

Beasley, W. G, *Japan and the West in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Nationalism and the Origins of the Modern State* (London, Oxford University Press, 1971).

Beasley, W. G, *The Meiji Restoration* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972).

Beasley, W. G, 'The Foreign Threat and the Opening of the Ports', in M. B. Jansen, eds., *The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 5: The Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Beasley, W. G, 'Japanese Castaways and British Interpreters', *Monumenta Nipponica*, 46:1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 91-103.

Beasley, W. G, *Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994).

Beasley, W. G, 'From Conflict to Co-operation: British Naval Surveying in Japanese Waters, 1845-82', in I. Nish & Y. Kibata, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930* (London, MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000).

Beasley, W. G, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (London, Routledge, 2013).

Belcher, E, *Narrative of the Voyage of HMS Samarang, 1843-1846, Two Volumes* (London, Reeve, Benhem, and Reeve, 1848).

Benesch, O, & Zwigenberg, R, *Japan's Castles: Citadels of Modernity in War and Peace* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Bennett, A, 'British Material Diplomacy in Precolonial Uganda: The Gift Exchanges of John Hanning Speke, 1860-1863', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* 16 (2021), pp. 166-174.

Bergad, L. W, 'Slavery in Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1804 to Abolition', in D. Eltis, S. L. Engerman, S. Drescher & D. Richardson, eds., *The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Volume 4: 1804-2016* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Berkman, P. A, 'Science Diplomacy and Its Engine of Informed Decisionmaking: Operating through Our Global Pandemic with Humanity', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 15 (2020), pp. 435-450.

Berridge, G. R, & James, A, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy* (New York, Palgrave, 2001).

Berridge, G. R, *British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the present: A Study in the Evolution of the Resident Embassy* (Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009).

Best, A, Cortazzi, H, & Kornicki, P, *British Royal and Imperial Japanese Relations, 1868-2018: 150 Years of Engagement, Association and Celebration* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2019).

Best, A, *British Engagement with Japan, 1854-1922: The Origins and Course of An Unlikely Alliance* (London, Routledge, 2021).

Bethell, L, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970).

Bethell, L, *Brazil: Essays on History and Politics* (London, Institute of Latin American Studies, 2018).

Bilge Criss, N, *Istanbul Under Allied Occupation, 1913-1923* (London, Brill, 1999).

Bingham, T, 'The Alabama Claims Arbitration', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 54:1 (January 2005), pp. 1-25.

Black, J, *Young Japan: Yokohama & Yedo. A Narrative of the Settlement and City from the Signing of the Treaties in 1858, to the Close of the Year 1879. With a Glance at the Progress of Japan during a Period of Twenty-One Years, Two Volumes* (London, Trubner & Co, 1880).

Black, J, 'Parliament, the Press and Foreign Policy', *Parliamentary History*, 25:1 (2006), pp. 9-16.

Blainey, G, *Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History* (Melbourne, Macmillan Press, 1982).

Blakeney, W, *On the Coasts of Cathay and Cipango Forty Years Ago: A Record of Surveying Service in the China Yellow and Japan Seas and on the Seaboard of Korea and Manchuria* (London, Elliot Stock, 1902).

Blaxill, L, 'Elections' in D. Brown, G. Pentland & R. Crowcroft, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern British Political History, 1800-2000* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018).

Blum, H, 'The Prospect of Oriental Studies', *PMLA*, 125:3 (May 2010), pp. 670-677.

Bolitho, H, *Treasures Among Men: The Fudai Daimyo in Tokugawa Japan* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1975).

Botsman, D. V, 'Freedom without Slavery? "Coolies," Prostitutes, and Outcasts in Meiji Japan's "Emancipation Moment"', *The American Historical Review*, 116:5 (December 2011), pp. 1323-1347.

Bouchet, M, 'Strengthening Foreign Policy through Subnational Diplomacy', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 17 (2022), pp. 96-108.

Bourne, J. M, 'The East India Company's Military Seminary, Addiscombe, 1809-1858', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 57:232 (Winter 1979), pp. 206-222.

Bowen, D, & Bowen, M, eds., *Interpreting: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, ATA Series, Volume 4* (Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1990).

Bowen, M, Bowen, D, Kaufmann, F, & Kurtz, I, 'Interpreters and the Making of History', in J. Delisle & J. Woodsworth, eds., *Translators Through History: Revised Edition* (Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2012).

Bradley, M. P, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

Brailey, N, 'Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trials of a Diplomat in the Age of High Imperialism', *The Historical Journal*, 35:1 (March 1992), pp. 115-150.

Brattberg, E, 'Middle Power Diplomacy in an Age of US-China Tensions', *The Washington Quarterly*, 44:1 (2021), pp. 219-238.

Braverman, I, eds., *Laws of the Sea: Interdisciplinary Currents* (London, Routledge, 2023).

Bridge, C, *Some Recollections* (London, John Murray, 1918).

Brighton, P, *Original Spin: Downing Street and the Press in Victorian Britain* (London, I.B. Tauris, 2016).

Brown, D, 'Diplomacy and the Fourth Estate: The Role of the Press in British Foreign Policy in the Age of Palmerston', in See J. Fisher & A. Best, eds., *On the Fringes of Diplomacy: Influences on British Foreign Policy, 1800-1945* (Farnham, Ashgate, 2011).

Brown, L, *Victorian News and Newspapers* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985).

Brown, M, eds., *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008).

Brown, S. R, *Colloquial Japanese or Conversational Sentences and Dialogues in English and Japanese, together with an English-Japanese Index to serve as a Vocabulary, and an Introduction on the Grammatical Structure of the Language* (Shanghai, Presbyterian Mission Press, 1863).

Burke-Gaffney, B, *The Nagasaki British Consulate, 1859-1955* (United Kingdom, Flying Crane Press, 2019).

Burke-Gaffney, B, 'George S. Morrison and Japan's first British consulate at Nagasaki', in R. S. G. Fletcher & R. Hellyer, eds., *Chronicling Westerners in Nineteenth-Century East Asia: Lives, Linkages, and Imperial Connections* (London, Bloomsbury Collections, 2022).

Busch, B. C, *Whaling Will Never Do For Me: The American Whaleman in the Nineteenth Century* (Kentucky, University of Kentucky Press, 2009).

Butterfield, H, & Wight, M, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Relations* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1966).

Byrd, P, 'Regional and Functional Specialisation in the British Consular Service', *Journal of Contemporary History,* 7:1 (1972), pp. 127-145.

C:

Cable, J, *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979: Political Application of Limited Naval Force* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981).

Cable, J, *The Political Influence of Naval Force in History* (London, MacMillan Press, 1998).

Cain, P. J & Hopkins, A. G, *British Imperialism: 1688-2015* (London, Routledge, 2016).

Casembroot, F. D, *De Medusa in de Wateren van Japan, in 1863 en 1864* (The Hague, De Gebroeders van Cleef, 1865).

Cassel, P, *Grounds of Judgement: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth Century China and Japan* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012).

Chamberlain, B. H, *A Simplified Grammar of the Japanese Language* (Yokohama, Kelly & Walsh, 1886).

Chamberlain, M. E, *Lord Palmerston* (Cardiff, GPC Books, 1987).

Chamberlain, M. E, *'Pax Britannica'? British Foreign Policy, 1789-1914* (London, Pearson Education Limited, 1988).

Chang, R. T, *The Justice of the Western Consular Courts in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Westport, Greenword Press, 1984).

Checkland, O, *Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 1868-1912* (London, Macmillan Press, 1989).

Cheng, M, 'The Ukraine Crisis: Causes, Conundrums and Consequences', *Journal of Social and Political Sciences*, 5:2 (2022), pp. 96-111.

Chi Man, H, '"They are a Little Afraid of the British Admiral" The China Squadron of the Royal Navy during the First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895', *International Bibliography of Military History*, 35 (2015), pp. 93-118.

Christie, W. D, *Notes on Brazilian Questions* (London, MacMillan and CO, 1865).

Chulow, A, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2014).

Clark, G. R, Stevens, W. O, Alden, C. S & Krafft, H. F, *A Short History of the United States Navy* (London, J. B. LIPPINCOTT Company, 1910).

Clayton, D. W, *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2000).

Coaldrake, W. H, *Architecture and Authority in Japan* (London, Routledge, 1996).

Coates, P. D, *The China Consuls: British Consular Officers, 1843-1943* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988).

Cobbing, A, 'Lord Granville, 1815-1891', in A. Best & H. Cortazzi, eds., *British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1850-1990: Aspects of the Evolution of British Foreign Policy* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2018).

Cohrs, P. O, *The Unfinished Peace after World War 1: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919-1932* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Cohrs, P. O. *The New Atlantic Order: The Transformation of International Politics, 1860-1933* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022).

Colledge, J. J, & Warlow, B, *Ships of the Royal Navy: The Complete Record of all Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy from the 15th Century to the Present* (London, Chatham Publishing, 2006).

Connelly, M, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002).

Conroy-Krutz, E, 'What is a Missionary Good For, Anyway?': Foreign Relations, Religion, and the Nineteenth Century', *Diplomatic History*, 46:3 (2022), pp. 433-461.

Constantinou, C. M, Dittmer, J, Kuus, M, McConnell, F, Opondo, S. O, & Pouliot, V, 'Thinking with Diplomacy: Within and Beyond Practice Theory', *International Political Sociological*, 15 (2021), pp. 559-587.

Cortazzi, H, *Dr. Willis in Japan, 1862-1877: British Medical Pioneer* (London, The Athlone Press, 1985).

Cortazzi, H, 'Yokohama: Frontier Town, 1859-1866', *Asian Affairs*, 17:1 (1986), pp. 3-17.

Cortazzi, H, Nish, I, Lowe, P, & Hoare, J. E, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004).

Cortazzi, H, 'The British Bombardment of Kagoshima, 1863, Admiral Sir L. Kuper and Lt. Colonel Neale', in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004).

Cortazzi, H, ‘Lt. Colonel Edward St. John Neale, Chargé d’Affaires at Edo/Yokohama, 1862-1864’, in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004).

Cortazzi, H, ‘Sir Rutherford Alcock, Minister at Edo, 1858-1862’, in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004).

Cortazzi, H, ‘Alcock returns to Japan, 1864’, in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004).

Cortazzi, H, ‘Power Henry Le Poer Trench, Minister to Japan, 1894-1895’, in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004).

Cortazzi, H, ‘Hugh Fraser, Minister to Japan, 1889-1894’, in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004).

Cortazzi, H, ‘Britain and Japan: did the diplomats make a difference?’, *Asian* Affairs, 36:1 (2007), pp. 54-66.

Cortazzi, H, *Victorians in Japan: In and Around the Treaty Ports* (London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013).

Cortazzi, H, Nish, I, & Hoare, J. E, eds., *Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits, Ten Volumes* (London, Renaissance Books, 1995-2016).

Craig, A, ‘The Restoration Movement in Chōshō’, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 18:2 (February, 1959), pp. 187-197.

Craig, A. M, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration* (Oxford, Lexington Books, 2000).

Cranmer-Byng, J. L, 'The Old British Legation at Peking, 1860-1959', *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, 3 (1963), pp. 60-87.

Crawcour, E. S, 'Changes in Japanese Commerce in the Tokugawa Period', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 22:4 (August 1963, pp. 387-400.

Crawford, S. J, 'The "Maria Luz" Affair', *The Historian*, 46:4 (August 1984), pp. 583-596.

Crossley, P, 'Dependency and Coercion in East Asia Labor, 1800-1949', in D. Eltis, S. L. Engerman, S. Drescher & D. Richardson, eds., *The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Volume 4: 1804-2016* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Cullen, L. M, *A History of Japan, 1582-1941: Internal and External Worlds* (London, Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Cullen, L, *Early Japanese Trade, Administration and Interactions with the West* (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2020).

D:

Daniels, A, 'Murder, Misunderstandings, and Might. Mid-Nineteenth Century Confrontation between Britain and Satsuma', *研究紀要*, 34 (2003), pp. 143-154.

Daniels, G, *Sir Harry Parkes, British Representative in Japan, 1865-1883* (Richmond, Japan Library, 1996).

Daniels, G, & Tsuzuki, C, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 5: Social and Cultural Perspectives* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).

Darwin, J, 'Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion' *The English Historical Review*, 112:447 (June 1997), pp. 614-642.

Dastyar, V, *Dictionary of Research Methodologies in Translation and Interpreting Studies* (Tabriz, Zaban Academic Publishing, 2017).

David, S, *The Indian Mutiny* (London, Penguin Books, 2002).

Dawson, L. S, *Memoirs of Hydrography: Part II, 1830-1885* (Eastbourne, Imperial Library, 1885).

Dawson, W, *William Cobden and Foreign Policy: A Critical Exposition with Special Reference to our Day and its Problems* (London, Routledge, 2019).

de Lange, W, *The Namamugi Incident: The Murder that Sparked a War* (N/A, TOYO Press, 2020).

de Schutter, S, 'A Global Approach to Local Problems? How to Write a Longer, Deeper, and Wider History of the International Year of Disabled Persons in Kenya', *Diplomatica*, 1 (2019), pp. 221-242.

Decker, J, 'Lines in the Sand: Railways and the Archipelago of Colonial Territorialisation in German Southwest Africa, 1897-1914', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 70 (2020), pp. 74-87.

Deighton, A, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994).

Delisle, J, & Woodsworth, J, eds., *Translators Through History: Revised Edition* (Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2012).

Denny, J, *Respect and Consideration: Britain in Japan 1853-1868 and Beyond* (London, Radiance Press, 2011).

Dittmer, J, *Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy* (London, Duke University Press, 2017).

Dollin, E. J, *Leviathan: The History of Whaling in America* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2008).

Doyle, M. W, *Empires* (Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press, 1986).

Drury, C. M, 'Early American Contacts with the Japanese', *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 36:4 (October 1945), pp. 319-330.

Dusinberre, M, & Wenzlhuemer, R, 'Editorial – Being in Transit: Ships and Global Incompatibilities', *Journal of Global History*, 11:2 (2016), pp. 155-162.

Dusinberre, M, *Mooring the Global Archive: A Japanese Ship and its Migrant Histories* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2023).

E:

Eckel, P. E, 'Challenges to Dutch Monopoly of Japanese Trade During the Wars of Napoleon', *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, 1:2 (1942), pp. 173-179.

Eckel, P. E, 'The Crimean War and Japan', *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, 3:2 (1944), pp. 109-118.

Eliot, S, *Some Patterns and Trends in British Publishing, 1800-1919* (London, Bibliographical Society, 1993).

Ericson, M. D, 'The Bakufu Looks Abroad. The 1865 Mission to France', *Monumenta Nipponica*, 34:4 (Winter, 1979), pp. 383-407.

Erlandsson, S, *Personal Politics in the Postwar World: Western Diplomacy Behind the Scenes* (London, Bloomsbury, 2022).

The Eton Register, *Part IV, 1871-1880: Compiled for the Old Etonian Association* (Eton, Spottiswoode & Co., 1907).

Evans, D. C, & Peattie, M. R, *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941* (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1997).

F:

Fairbank, J. K, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports,1842-1854, Volume 1* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953).

Fay, P. W, *The Opium War, 1840-1842, Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forced Her Gates Ajar* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

Fenton, L, 'Origins of Animosity: Lord Palmerston and *The Times*, 1830-41', *Media History*, 16:4 (2010), pp. 365-378.

Fenton, L, *Palmerston and The Times: Foreign Policy, the Press and Public Opinion in Mid-Victorian Britain* (London, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012).

Fisher, J, & Best, A, eds., *On the Fringes of Diplomacy: Influences on British Foreign Policy, 1800-1945* (Farnham, Ashgate, 2011).

Fletcher, R. S. G, *The Ghost of Namamugi: Charles Lenox Richardson and the Anglo-Satsuma War* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2019).

Fletcher, R. S. G, & Hellyer, R, eds., *Chronicling Westerners in Nineteenth-Century East Asia: Lives, Linkages, and Imperial Connections* (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2022).

Flink, T, 'Taking the Pulse of Science Diplomacy and Developing Practices of Valuation', *Science and Public Policy*, 49 (2022), pp. 191-200.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 'The FCO: Policy, People and Places (1782-1995)', *History Notes*, 2 (1991), pp. 1-43.

Fortune, R, *Yedo and Peking: A Narrative of A Journey to the Capitals of Japan and China* (London, John Murray, 1863).

Foucault, M, & Miskowiec, J, 'Of Other Spaces', *Diacritics*, 16:1 (Spring 1986), pp. 22-27.

Fox, G, 'The Anglo-Japanese Convention of 1854', *Pacific Historical Review*, 10:4 (1941), pp. 411-434.

Fox, G, *Britain and Japan, 1858-1883* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969).

Frattolillo, O, & Best, A, eds., *Japan and the Great War* (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).

Fuess, H, 'The Global Weapons Trade and the Meiji Restoration: Dispersion of Means of Violence in a World of Emerging Nation-States' in R. Hellyer & H. Fuess, eds., *The Meiji Restoration: Japan as a Global Nation* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020).

Furmanek, O, 'Professionalization of Interpreters' in C. A. Chapelle, eds., *The Encyclopaedia of Applied Linguistics* (New Jersey, Blackwell Publishing, 2013).

G:

The Galaxy: *Volume Five* (New York, Sheldon & Company, 1868).

Galbraith, J. S, 'The "Turbulent Frontier" as a Factor in British Expansion', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2:2 (January 1960), pp. 150-168.

Gallichio, M, *Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895-1945* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

Gardner, R, eds., *Conway's: All The Worlds Fighting Ships, 1860-1905* (London, Conway Maritime Press, 1979).

Gilman, D. C, Peck, H. T, Colby, F. M, eds., *The New International Encyclopaedia, Volume 2* (New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1905).

Graham, G. S, *The China Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830-1860* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978).

Graves, C, *Leather Armchairs: The Chivas Regal Book of London Clubs* (London, Cassell & Co, 1963).

Greville, C, *A Journal of the Reigns of King George IV, King William IV and Queen Victoria, Vol. 8* (London, Longman Green & Co., 1898).

Grey, E, *Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916* (New York, Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925).

Gold, R. L, 'Problems of Protestantism in Ecuador, 1866-1873', *Journal of Church and State*, 12:1 (Winter 1970), pp. 59-77.

Gomperts, R, 'Women on Waves: Where Next for the Abortion Boat?', *Reproductive Health Matters*, 10:19 (2002), pp. 180-183.

Goodman, G. K, *Japan and the Dutch, 1600-1853* (London, Routledge, 2000).

Goodwin, G, 'A Trustworthy Interpreter between Rulers and Ruled: Behramji Malabari, Colonial and Cultural Interpreter in Nineteenth Century British India', *Social History*, 38:1 (2013), pp. 1-25.

Gottlieb, N, *Language and the Modern State: The Reform of Written Japanese* (London, Routledge, 1991).

Gow, I, Hirama, Y, & Chapman, J, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 3: The Military Dimension* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003).

H:

Hale, S. B, & Napier, J, *Research Methods in Interpreting: A Practical Resource* (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).

Hall, J. C, 'Eulogy upon W. G. Aston C.M.G., D. Litt', *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. 38:5 (1912), pp. IV–VI.

Haniamp, M. S, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995).

Harrison, H, *The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators between Qing China and the British Empire* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2021).

Hart, H. G, *The New Annual Army List, and Militia List, for 1866* (London, John Murray, 1866).

Hasty, W, & Peters, K, 'The Ship in Geography and the Geographies of Ships', *Geography Compass*, 6:11 (2012), pp. 660-676.

Hattori, R, *Japan at War and Peace: Shidehara Kijūrō and the Making of Modern Diplomacy* (Acton, Australia National University Press, 2021).

Hauser, W. B, 'Osaka: A Commercial City in Tokugawa Japan', *Urbanism: Past & Present*, 5 (Winter 1977-1978), pp. 23-32 & 35-36.

Hawkins, A, *The Forgotten Prime Minister, the 14th Earl of Derby: Ascent, 1799-1851* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007).

Hawkins, A, *The Forgotten Prime Minister, the 14th Earl of Derby: Achievement, 1851-1869* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008).

Hawks, F. L, & Perry, M. C, *Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, performed in the years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M. C. Perry, United States Navy, by order of the Government of the United States, Three Volumes* (Washington, United States Congress, 1856).

Heath, H. J, 'British Merchant Houses in Mexico, 1821-1860: Conforming Business Practices and Ethics', *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 73:2 (1993), pp. 261-290.

Heefner, G, 'The Accidental Environmental Historian', *Diplomatic History*, 0:0 (2022), pp. 1-16.

Heere, C, *Empire Ascendent: The British World, Race, and the Rise of Japan, 1894-1914* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020).

Heijdra, M. J, 'Polyglot Translators: Chinese, Dutch, and Japanese in the Introduction of Western Learning in Tokugawa Japan', in P. W. Kroll & A. Hoffstädt, eds., *At the Shores of the Sky: Asian Studies for Albert Hoffstädt* (Boston, Brill, 2020).

Hellyer, R. L, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640-1868* (London, Harvard University Press, 2009).

Hellyer, R, & Fuess, H, eds., *The Meiji Restoration: Japan as a Global Nation* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020).

Henders, S. J, & Young, M. M, 'Other Diplomacies' of Non-state Actors: The Case of Canadian -Asian Relations', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 11 (2016), pp. 331-350.

Henderson, J. A, eds., *History of the Society of Advocates in Aberdeen* (Aberdeen, Milne & Hutchison, 1912).

Henshall, K, *A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower, Third Edition* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

Herr, R, 'COVID 19 in the Pacific Island Commonwealth: Microstates Managing a Macro-Challenge', *The Round Table,* 110:1 (2021), pp. 138-148.

Hertslet, E, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1865, forming a Complete British Diplomatic and Consular Handbook* (London, Harrison, 1865).

Hertslet, E, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1876, forming a Complete British Diplomatic and Consular Handbook* (London, Harrison, 1876).

Hertslet, E, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1881, forming a Complete British Diplomatic and Consular Handbook* (London, Harrison, 1881).

Hertslet, E, *The Foreign Office List, 1888, forming a Complete British Diplomatic and Consular Handbook* (London, Harrison & Sons, 1888).

Hertslet, E, eds., *The Foreign Office List, 1895, forming a Complete British Diplomatic and Consular Handbook* (London, Harrison & Sons, 1895).

Hertslet, G. E. P, Rice, P. C, & Quarmby, H. H, eds., *The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book for 1921* (London, Harrison & Sons, 1921).

Hesselink, R. H, 'The Assassination of Henry Heusken', *Monumenta Nipponica*, 49:3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 331-351.

Hewitt, M, *The Dawn of the Cheap Press in Victorian Britain: The End of the 'Taxes on Knowledge', 1848-1869* (London, Bloomsbury, 2013).

Hicks, G, 'Don Pacifico, Democracy, and Danger: The Protectionist Party critique of British Foreign Policy, 1850-1852', *International History Review*, 26:3 (2004), pp. 515-540.

Hoare, J. E, 'Mr. Enslie's Grievances: The Consul, the Ainu and the Bones', *Japan Society of London Bulletin*, 78 (March 1976), pp. 14-19.

Hoare, J. E, *Japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements* (Folkestone, Japan Library, 1994).

Hoare, J. E, 'Britain's Japan Consular Service, 1859-1941', in I. Nish, eds., *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume 2* (Richmond, Japan Library, 1997).

Hoare, J. E, 'John Carey Hall (1864-1926): A Career in Japan and the Japan Consular Service', in H. Cortazzi, eds., *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume 10* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2016).

Hoare, J. E, 'John Frederick Lowder (1843-1902): Consul, Counsel, and *o-yatoi*', in H. Cortazzi, eds., *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume 10* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2016).

Hoare, J. E, eds., *Culture, Power and Politics in Treaty-Port Japan, 1854-1899, 2 Volumes* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2018).

Hogan, M. J, 'SHAFR Presidential Address: The "Next Big Thing": The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age', *Diplomatic History*, 28:1 (January 2004), pp. 1-22.

Hoganson, K. L, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (Yale, Yale University Press, 1998).

Hore, P, eds., *Seapower Ashore: 200 Years of Royal Navy Operations on Land* (London, Chatham Publishing, 2001).

Hornby, Sir E, *Sir Edmund Hornby: An Autobiography* (London, Constable & Co Ltd, 1929).

Howe, A, *Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846-1946* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998).

Howell, D. L, 'Foreign Encounters and Informal Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan', *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 40:2 (Summer 2014), pp. 295-327.

Howland, D, 'The Sinking of S. S. Kowshing: International Law, Diplomacy, and the Sino-Japanese War', *Modern Asian Studies*, 42:4 (July 2008), pp. 673-703.

Hōya, T, 'Ōrukokku wa Tsushima Senryō wo Iwanakattaka', *Rekishigaku Kenkyū* 796 (2004), pp. 16-21.

Huffman, J. L, *The Rise and Revolution of Meiji Japan* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2019).

Humphreys, R. A, 'British Merchants and South American Independence', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 51 (1965), pp. 151-174.

Hunt, L, eds., *The New Cultural History* (London, University of California Press, 1989).

Hunter, J. E, & Sugiyama, S, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume 4: Economic and Business Relations* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).

Hyam, R, *Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion* (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).

I:

Inoue, K, *Nihon no Rekishi 18: Kaikoku to Bakumatsu Henkaku* (Tokyo, Kodansha, 2002).

Inoue, K, *Nihon no Rekishi 20: Meiji-shin* (Tokyo, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2006).

Ion, H, 'Yokohama for the British in the Late Nineteenth Century: A Hub for Imperial Defence and a Node of Influence for Change', in T. G. Otte's, eds., *British World Policy and the Projection of Global Power, 1830-1960* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Irish, A. B, *A History of Ethnic Transition and Development on Japan's Northern Island* (London, McFarland & Company, 2009).

Ishihara, M, eds., *Ainu kara mita Hokkaidō 150-Nen* (Tokyo, Hokkaido University Press, 2009).

J:

Jeffery Bolster, W, 'Opportunities in the Marine Environmental History', *Environmental History*, 11:3 (July 2006), pp. 567-597.

John Law, M, ''The Car Indispensable': the Hidden Influence of the Car in Inter-War Suburban London', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 38 (2012), pp. 424-433.

Johnson, R. E, *Far Eastern Station: The US Navy in Asian Waters, 1800-1898* (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2013).

Johnson, W, *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom* (London, Belknap Press, 2013).

Jones, E, ‘Space, Sound, and Sedition on the Royal Navy Ship, 1756-1815’, *Journal of Historical Geography*, 70 (2020), pp. 65-73.

Jones, R. A, *The British Diplomatic Service, 1815-1914* (Waterloo, CA, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983).

Jones, W. D, *Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1956).

Jowitt, C, Lambert, C, & Mentz, S, eds., *The Routledge Companion to Marine and Maritime Worlds, 1400-1800* (London, Routledge, 2020).

Jung, M, ‘“Coolies”: Race, Nation, and Empire in the Age of Emancipation’, *American Quarterly*, 57:3 (September 2005), pp. 677-701.

Jūbishi, Y, *Oguri Kōzuki no Shi* (Tokyo, Daichi Shuppansha, 1929).

K:

Kanae, I, *Eikoku Gaikōkan no mita Bakumatsu Nihon* (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1995).

Kanasaka, K, *Isabella Bird and Japan: A Reassessment* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2017).

Kanasaka, K, *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan: Revisiting Isabella Bird* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2020).

Kannon, G. F, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: Russia Leaves the War* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1956).

Kannon, G. F, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: The Decision to Intervene* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1958).

Kataoka, Y, *Urakami shi-ban kuzure Meiji seifu no kirishitan danatsu* (Tokyo, Chikuma shobō, 2019).

Kayaoğlu, T, *Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Exterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Kazuya, I, *Roshiajin no mita Bakumatsu Nihon* (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2009).

Kedourie, E, 'Historiography: From Clerk to Clerk: Writing Diplomatic History', *The American Scholar*, 48:4 (Autumn 1979), pp. 502-512.

Keene, D, *Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World: 1852-1912* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2002).

Keene, D, *The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830* (London, Routledge, 2011).

Kennedy, P, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981).

Keppel, H, *A Sailor's Life Under Four Sovereigns, Volume 3* (London, MacMillan, 1899).

Kim, H, *South Korea's Foreign Aid: The Domestic Politics of Middle Power Diplomacy* (London, Routledge, 2021).

King, C. W, *The Claims of Japan and Malaysia upon Christendom: Exhibited in Notes of Voyages made in 1837, from Canton, in the Ship Morrison and Brig Himmaleh, Two Volumes* (New York, E. French, 1839).

Klynge, C, Ekman, M, & Waedegaard, N. J, 'Diplomacy in the Digital Age: Lessons from Denmark's TechPlomacy Initiative', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 15 (2020), pp. 185-195.

Knuesel, A, 'British Diplomacy and the Telegraph in Nineteenth Century China', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 18 (2007), pp. 517-537.

Kobayashi, T, *19-Seiki Igirisu Gaikō to Higashi Ajia* (Tokyo, Sairyusha, 2012).

Konishi, S, *Nihon no Rekishi 19: Kaikoku to Jōi* (Tokyo, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2006).

Kornicki, P. F, 'William George Aston (1841-1911)', in H. Cortazzi & G. Daniels, eds., *Britain and Japan, 1859-1991: Themes and Personalities* (London, Routledge, 1991).

Koss, S, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain* (London, Fontana Press, 1990).

L:

LaFeber, W, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (London, Cornell University Press, 1963).

Lambert, A, *Battleships in Transition: The Creation of the Steam Battlefleet, 1815-1860* (London, Conway Maritime Press, 1984).

Lambert, D, Martins, L, & Ogborn, M, 'Currents, Visions, and Voyages: Historical Geographies of the Sea', *Journal of Historical Geography,* 32 (2006), pp. 479-493.

Lamers, J. P, *Treaties on Epistolary Style: João Rodriquez on the Noble Art of Writing Japanese Letters* (Michigan, University of Michigan, 2002).

Lane-Poole, S & Dickens, F. V, *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes, KCB, GCMG, Sometime Her Majesty's Minister to China & Japan, Volume II* (London, Macmillan & Co, 1894).

Latham, A. J. H, & Kawakatsu, H, eds., *Japanese Industrialisation, and the Asian Economy* (London, Routledge, 1994).

Law, R, 'The English Interpreters in Dahomey, 1843-1852', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 44:5 (2016), pp. 730-751.

Lawrance, B. N, Osborn, E. L, & Roberts, R. L, eds., *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2015).

Lawrence, M, *Spain's First Carlist War, 1833-1840* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

Lee, A, *The Origins of the Popular Press in England, 1855-1914* (London, Croom Helm Ltd, 1975).

Lee, S. T, 'Vaccine Diplomacy: Nation Branding and China's COVID-19 Soft Power Play', *Place Branding and Diplomacy* (2021), pp. 1-15.

Leggett, D, & Dunn, R, eds., *Re-inventing the Ship: Science, Technology and the Maritime World, 1800-1918* (London, Routledge, 2016).

Leira, H, & de Carvalho, B, 'The Intercity Origins of Diplomacy: Consuls, Empires, and the Sea', *Diplomatica*, 3:1 (2021), pp. 147-156.

Lenson, G, *The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959).

Leonard, D, *Nineteenth-Century British Premiers: Pitt to Rosebery* (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

Lewis, J. B, *Frontier Contact between Chosŏn Korea and Tokugawa Japan* (London, RouteledgeCurzon, 2003).

Libby, J, 'Hamilton Fish and the Origins of Anglo-American Solidarity', *Mid America*, 76:3 (1994), pp. 205–226.

Liebich, S & Publicover, L, eds., *Shipboard Literary Cultures: Reading, Writing, and Performing at Sea* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2021).

Lindbaugh, P, & Rediker, M, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston, Beacon Press, 2000).

Long, R. D, *The Man on the Spot: Essays on British Empire History (Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies, Number 31)* (London, Greenwood Press, 1995).

Long, R. E *In the Shadow of the Alabama: The British Foreign Office and the American Civil War* (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2015).

Löpez, A, 'Chapter 10: Traduttore, Traditore – Translator, Traitor', *Counterpoints*, 343 (2008), pp. 141-147.

Lowe, J, *Britain and Foreign Affairs, 1815-1885: Europe and Overseas* (New York, Routledge, 2006).

Luce, S. B, 'Commodore Biddle's Visit to Japan in 1846', *Proceedings*, 31:115 (July 1905), pp. 556-563.

Lucy, H. W, *Memories of Eight Parliaments* (London, Heinemann, 1908).

M:

Ma, D, 'The Modern Silk Road: The Global Raw-Silk Trade Market, 1850-1930', *The Journal of Economic History*, 56:2 (June, 1996), pp. 330-355.

Mackie, C, *A Directory of British Diplomats* (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2014).

Maclay, E. S, *A History of the United States Navy, From 1775 to 1901, Volume II* (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1901).

MacMillan, M, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002).

Maier, C. S, 'Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in Michael Kammen, eds., *The Past before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1980).

Mairs, R, '"Translator, Traditor": The Interpreter as Traitor in Classical Tradition', *Greece & Rome*, 58:1 (April 2011), pp. 64-81.

Malit Jr, F. T, & Tsourapas, G, 'Migration Diplomacy in the Gulf – Non-State Actors, Cross Border Mobility, and the United Arab Emirates', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 47:11 (2021), pp. 2556-2577.

Malone, D. M, 'The Modern Diplomatic Mission', in A. E. Cooper, J. Heine & R. Thakur, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013).

Manchester, A. K, *British Pre-eminence in Brazil: A Study in European Expansion* (New York, Octagon Books, 1972).

Manfredi-Sánchez, J. L, 'Urban Diplomacy: A Cosmopolitan Outlook', *Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, 3:4 (2018), pp. 1-90.

Mank, R, 'Reflections on the Role of Non-state Actors in Canada-Asia Relations', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 11 (2016), pp. 427-435.

Martel, G, *Imperial Diplomacy: Rosebery and the Failure of Foreign Policy* (Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986).

Masaru, Y, *Igirisu Shinshi no Bakumatsu* (Tokyo, Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 2004).

Mathew, W. M, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade: Peru, 1820-1870', *The Economic History Review*, 3:21 (December 1968), pp. 562-579.

Mathew, W. M, 'Peru and the British Guano Market, 1840-1870', *The Economic History Review*, 1:23 (April 1970), pp. 112-128.

Mathew, H. C. G, eds., *The Gladstone Diaries: Volume V, 1855-1860* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978).

Matsumoto, K, *Nihon no Kindai 1: Kaikoku Ishin, 1853-1871* (Tokyo, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2012).

Mattingly, G, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955).

McCabe, J, *A Biographical Dictionary of Modern Rationalists* (London, Watts & Co, 1920).

McCarthy, H, *Women of the World: The Rise of the Female Diplomat* (London, Bloomsbury, 2014).

McClain, J. L, & Osamu, W, eds., *Osaka: The Merchants' Capital of Early Modern Japan* (London, Cornell University Press, 1999).

McConnell, F, 'Rethinking the Geographies of Diplomacy', *Diplomatica*, 1:1 (2019), pp. 46-55.

McDermott, J, 'The British Foreign Office and its German Consuls Before 1914', *The Journal of Modern History*, 50:1 (March 1978), pp. 1001-1034.

McKay, A, *Scottish Samurai: Thomas Blake Glover 1838-1911* (Edinburgh, Canongate, 1993).

McOmie, W, *The Opening of Japan, 1853-1855: A Comparative Study of the American, British, Dutch and Russian Naval Expeditions to Compel the Tokugawa Shogunate to Conclude Treaties and Open Ports to their Ships* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2006).

Medzini, M, *French Policy in Japan during the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1971).

Mentz, S, *Shipwreck Modernity: Ecologies of Globalisation, 1550-1719* (London, University of Minnesota Press, 2015).

Mentz, S, *Ocean* (London, Bloomsbury Press, 2020).

Mentz, S, ‘Ice/Water/Vapor’, in J. J. Cohen & S. Foote, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Environmental Humanities* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021).

Mentz, S, eds., *An Introduction to the Blue Humanities* (London, Routledge, 2024).

Merriman, P, ‘Automobility and the Geographies of the Car’, *Geography Compass*, 3:2 (2009), pp. 586-599.

Meyer, M. W, *Japan: A Concise History, Fourth Edition* (Plymouth, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009).

Mihalopoulos, B, ‘Rethinking the *Maria Luz* Incident: Methodological cosmopolitanism in Meiji Japan’, in A. Ogawa & P. Seaton, eds., *New Frontiers in Japanese Studies* (London, Routledge, 2020).

Mihalopoulos, B, ‘Freedom, Slavery, and the Meiji Restoration: Revisiting the Maria Luz Incident’, in See T. D. Amos & A. Ishii, eds., *Revisiting Japan’s Restoration: New Approaches to the Study of the Meiji Transformation* (New York, Routledge, 2022).

Mikkelson, H, & Jourdenais, R, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2015).

Miller, R, *Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London, Routledge, 1993).

Millwood, P, ‘(Mis)conceptions of Domestic Politics in the US-China Reproachment, 1969-1978’, *Diplomatic History*, 43:5 (2019), pp. 890-915.

Minami, K, *Ishin Zenya no Edo Shomin* (Tokyo, Rekishi Shinsho, 1980).

Minohara, T, Hon, T, & Dawley, E, eds., *The Decade of the Great War: Japan and the Wider World in the 1910s* (Boston, Brill, 2014).

Miscellaneous, 'The Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal: Part III, Medical Intelligence', *University of Edinburgh*, 56 (October 1841), pp. 301-571.

Mitchiko, I, 'The Legacy of the 18th and 19th Centuries: From Hierarchal and Ethnocentric Foreign Relations to a Western Model of Equal International Relations', in D. V. Streltsov & S. Nobuo, eds., *A History of Russo-Japanese Relations: Over Two Centuries of Cooperation and Competition* (Boston, Brill, 2019).

Mitford, A. B, *The Garter Mission to Japan* (London, Macmillan, 1906).

Mitford, A. B, *Memories, Vol. I* (London, Hutchinson, 1915).

Moeshart, H. J, 'The Russian Occupation of Tsushima: A Stepping-stone to British Leadership in Japan', in I. Neary, eds., *Leaders and Leadership in Japan* (London, Routledge, 1996).

Mori, J, *The Culture of Diplomacy: Britain in Europe, 1750-1830* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010).

Morley, J, *The Life of Richard Cobden, Vol. 2* (London, MacMillan and Co, 1908).

Morrison, S. E, *"Old Bruin": The Life of Commodore Mathew C. Perry, 1794-1858* (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1967).

Morton, R, *A. B. Mitford and the Birth of Japan as a Modern State* (London, Renaissance Books, 2017).

Morton, R, *A Life of Sir Harry Parkes: British Minister to Japan, China and Korea, 1865-1885* (Folkestone, Renaissance Press, 2021).

Morton, R, *Sir Rutherford Alcock: First British Minister to Japan* (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, Awaiting Publication).

Mösslang, M & Riotte, T, eds., *The Diplomats' World: A Cultural of Diplomacy, 1815-1914* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008).

N:

Natalie Rothman, E, 'Interpreting Dragomans: Boundaries and Crossings in the Early Modern Mediterranean', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 51:3 (October 2009), pp. 771-800.

The Nation: Volume VI (E. L. Godkin & Co, 1868).

Neale, F. A, 'Twenty-Seven Years of a Cosmopolite's Life', in *Tait's Edinburgh Magazine, Volume 24* (Edinburgh, Sutherland & Knox, 1857).

Neumann, I. B, 'Diplomatic Gifts as Ordering Devices', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 16 (2021), pp. 186-194.

Nicholls, J, 'The Impact of the Telegraph on Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy during the Nineteenth Century', *New Voices*, 3 (December 2009), pp. 1-22.

Nickles, D. P, *Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy* (London, Harvard University Press, 2003).

Nicoll Cooper, J. N, 'Dissenters & National Journalism: "The Patriot" in the 1830s', *Victorian Periodicals Review*, 14:2 (Summer 1981), pp. 58-66.

Nish, I, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907* (London, Athlone Press, 1966).

Nish, I, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-1923* (London, Athlone Press, 1972).

Nish, I, 'Japan Reverses the Unequal Treaties: The Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894', *Journal of Oriental Studies*, 13:2 (1975), pp. 137–146. #

Nish, I, 'John Harrington Gubbins, 1852-1929' in I. Nish, eds., *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume 2* (Richmond, Japan Library, 1997).

Nish, I, & Kibata, Y, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2000).

Nish, I, & Kibata, Y, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Volume 2: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1930-2000* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2000).

Nish, I, *The History of Manchuria, 1840-1948: A Sino-Russo-Japanese Triangle, 2 Volumes* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2016).

O:

Ogawa, A, & Seaton, P, eds., *New Frontiers in Japanese Studies* (London, Routledge, 2020).

Okuda, T, & James, C. H. N, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima by the British Fleet, August, 1863', *Royal United Services Institution*, 57:429 (1913), pp. 1485-1493.

Oliphant, L, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the years 1857, '58, '59* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1860).

Oliphant, M, *Memoir of the Life of Laurence Oliphant and of Alice Oliphant, His Wife, Volume 1* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1891).

Oliver, S. P, *On and Off Duty, Being Leaves from an Officer's Notebook* (London, W. H. Allen & Co, 1881).

O'Sullivan, C, 'Introduction: Rethinking methods in translation history', *Translation Studies*, 5:2 (2012), pp. 131-138.

Otte, T. G, *The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Otte, T. G, 'Earl of Kimberley (1826-1902) and Japan', in H. Cortazzi, eds., *Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume 10* (Folkestone, Renaissance Books, 2016).

Otte, T. G, 'The Inner Circle: What is Diplomatic History? (And Why We Should Study It): An Inaugural Lecture', *The Journal of the Historical Association*, 105:364 (January 2020), pp. 5-27.

P:

Paget, W, *Scenes and Memoirs* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912).

Paine, S. C. M, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Pascali, L, 'The Wind of Change', *The American Economic Review*, 107:9 (September 2017), pp. 2821-2854.

Paske-Smith, M, *Western Barbarians in Japan and Formosa in Tokugawa Days, 1603-1868* (Kobe, J. L. Thompson & Co, 1930).

Penn, M, 'First Contact: The Story of the Zadkia', *Japanese Studies*, 24:3 (2004), pp. 315-326.

Peretz, D, 'The Roman Interpreter and His Diplomatic and Military Roles', *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, 55:4 (2006), pp. 451-470.

Perrin, N, *Giving up the Gun: Japan's Reversion to the Sword, 1543-1879* (Boston, David. R. Godine, 1979).

Pidgeon, D, *An Engineer's Holiday: Or Notes of a Round Trip from Long 0 to 0* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co, 1883).

Platt, D. C. M, 'The Role of the British Consular Service in Overseas Trade, 1825-1914', *The Economic History Review*, 15:3 (1963), pp. 494-512.

Platt, D. C. M, 'British diplomacy in Latin America since the emancipation', *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 21 (1967), pp. 21-44.

Platt, D. C. M, *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825* (London, Longman, 1971).

Plummer, B. G, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

Plummer, B. G, 'The Changing Face of Diplomatic History: A literature Review', *The History Teacher*, 38:3 (May 2005), pp. 385-400.

Plummer, K, *The Shogun's Reluctant Ambassadors: Japanese Sea Drifters in the North Pacific* (Oregon, Oregon Historical Society, 1991).

Pöchhacker, F, 'Evolution of Interpreting Research', in H. Mikkelson & R. Jourdenais, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2015).

Popkova, A, 'Exploring Citizen Diplomacy's Local Impact: The Case of Global Ties Kalamazoo', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 17 (2022), pp. 248-276.

Potter, S. J, eds., *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain: Reporting the British Empire, 1857-1921* (Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2004).

Preston, A, & Major, J, *Send a Gunboat: The Victorian Navy and Supremacy at Sea* (London, Conway Maritime Press, 2007).

Probyn, E, Johnston, K, & Lee, N, eds., *Sustaining Seas: Oceanic Space and the Politics of Care* (London, Rowman & Littlefield, 2020).

Provan, J, *Wild East: The British in Japan, 1854-1868* (Stroud, Fonthill Media, 2020).

Pugh, J, 'The Relational Turn in Island Geographies: Bringing Together Island, Sea and Ship Relations and the case of landship', *Social & Cultural Geography*, 17:8 (2016), pp. 1040-1059.

Pym, A, *Method in Translation History* (London, Routledge, 1998).

Q:

R:

Read, D, *Cobden and Bright: A Victorian Political Partnership* (London, Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd, 1967).

Rediker, M, *The Slave Ship: A Human History* (London, John Murray Publishers, 2007).

Reichert, F, "Mord in Namamugi," *Damals*, 45:3 (2013), pp. 66–69.

Renda, M. A, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation & the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

Rennie, D. F, *The British Arms in China and Japan: Peking 1860; Kagosima 1862* (London, Bradbury and Evans, 1864).

Ridley, J, *Lord Palmerston* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co, 1971).

Ringmar, E, *Liberal Barbarism: The European Destruction of the Palace of the Emperor of China* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Roberts, C, 'British Lawyers in Japan, 1859-1899', in H. Cortazzi, eds., *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume VIII* (London, Global Oriental, 2013).

Roberts, C, *The British Courts and Extra-territoriality in Japan, 1859-1899* (Boston, Global Oriental, 2014).

Rodrigues, J. H, 'The Foundations of Brazil's Foreign Policy', *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 38:3 (July 1962), pp. 324-325.

Roland, R. A, *Interpreters as Diplomats: A Diplomatic History of the Role of Interpreters in World Politics* (Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1999).

Rosenberg, E. S, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930* (London, Harvard University Press, 1999).

Rosendo, L. R, 'Rethinking the Interpreter's Agency in Wartime: A Portrait of Gottlieb Fuchs', *Translation & Interpretation*, 11:2 (2019), pp. 58-68.

Rotter, A. J, *Comrades At Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (London, Cornell University Press, 2000).

Rouliè, C, & Egerer, C, *Water Law: Practice, Place, and Poetics* (London, Routledge, 2022).

Rowbotham, W. B, 'The Bombardment of Kagoshima, 15th August, 1863', *Royal United Services Institution*, 108:631 (1963), pp. 273-278.

Rozwadowski, H. M, *Vast Expanses: A History of the Oceans* (London, Reaktion Books Ltd, 2018).

Ruël, H, 'Multinational Corporations as Diplomatic Actors: An Exploration of the Concept of Business Diplomacy', *Diplomatica*, 2 (2020), pp. 1-12.

Runde, D. F, 'Vaccine Diplomacy in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Importance of US Engagement', *Centre for Strategic and International Studies* (2021), pp. 1-6.

Rundle, C, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Translation History* (London, Routledge, 2022).

Russell's Morayshire Register and Elgin & Forres Directory, for 1844 (Elgin, Alex Russell, 1844).

Russell's Morayshire Register and Elgin & Forres Directory, for 1847 (Elgin, Alex Russell, 1847).

Russell's Morayshire Register and Elgin & Forres Directory, for 1850 (Elgin, Alex Russell, 1850).

Russell's Morayshire Register and Elgin & Forres Directory, for 1852 (Elgin, Alex Russell, 1852).

Ruxton, I, *The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow (1843-1929): A Scholar-Diplomat in East Asia* (Lewiston, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998).

Ruxton, I, 'Sir Ernest Satow, Minister in Japan, 1895-1900', in H. Cortazzi, I. Nish, P. Lowe & J. E. Hoare, eds., *British Envoys in Japan, 1859-1972* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2004).

Ruxton, I, *A Diplomat in Japan Part II: The Diaries of Ernest Satow, 1870-1883* (Morrisville, Lulu Press, 2009).

Ruxton, I, *The Correspondence of Sir Ernest Satow while he was British Minister in Japan (1895-1900) from the Satow Papers held at The National Archives, Kew, Vol. I-IV* (Independently Published, 2020).

Ryan, A, *The Last of the Dragomans* (London, Geoffrey Bles, 1951).

S:

Sakata, M, 'The Transformation of Hokkaido from Penal Colony to Homeland Territory', *International Review of Social History*, 63:S26 (June 2018), pp. 109-130.

Sakuto, K, *Akebono no Shishi: Satsuma Ishin Hiroku, Satsuei-Sensō-Hen* (Kagoshima, Minamikata Shinsha, 2022).

Salama-Carr, M, 'Introduction: Special Issue on the History of Translation & Interpreting', *Translation & Interpreting*, 11:2 (2019), pp. 1-4.

Saldanha, G, & O'Brien, S, *Research Methodologies in Translation Studies* (London, Routledge, 2014).

Sánchez, M. M. F, 'A Bilingual Officer Remembers Korea: A Closer Look at Untrained Interpreters in the Korean War', in H. Footitt & M. Kelly, eds., *Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation and Peace Building* (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012).

Sánchez, M. M. F, 'History and Historiography' in C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, eds., *Researching Translation and Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2016).

Santos, N, 'Towards a Conceptual Framework for City Diplomacy: a Practitioner's Perspective', *Diplomatica*, 3:1 (2021), pp 157-166.

Satow, E, *A Diplomat in Japan* (London, J. B. Lippincott & Co, 1921).

Saveliev, I. R, 'Rescuing the Prisoners of the Maria Luz', in B. Edstrom, eds., *Turning Points in Japanese History* (London, Taylor & Francis, 2013).

Schemper, L, 'Science Diplomacy and the Making of the United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction', *Diplomatica*, 1:2 (2019), pp. 243-267.

Schmid, A, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2002).

Schweizer, K, & Black, J, 'The Value of Diplomatic History: A Case Study in the Historical Thought of Herbert Butterfield', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 17:3 (2006), pp. 617-631.

Schweizer, K, & Schumann, M. J, 'The Revitalisation of Diplomatic History: Renewed Reflections', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 19:2 (2008), pp. 149-186.

Scott-Smith, G, & Weisbrode, K, 'Editorial', *Diplomatica*, 1:1 (2019), pp. 1-4.

Seeley, C, *A History of Writing in Japan* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2000).

Sela-Sheffy, R, ‘Profession, identity, and status’, in C. V. Angelelli & B. J. Baer, eds., *Researching Translation and Interpreting* (London, Routledge, 2016).

Seldon, A, *The Foreign Office* (London, HarperCollins Illustrated, 2000).

Sevin, E, ‘Bright Future for City Diplomacy and Soft Power’, *Diplomatica*, 3:1 (2021), pp. 200-209.

Sewall, J. S, *The Logbook of the Captain’s Clerk* (Maine, Bangor, 1905).

Sewall, J. S, *The Logbook of the Captain's Clerk: Adventures in the China Seas*, eds., A. P. Dudden (Chicago, The Lakeside Press, R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1995).

Sims, R, *French Policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan* (Richmond, Japan Library, 1998).

Sissons, D. C. S, ‘The Voyage of the *Cyprus*’, *The Journal of Pacific History*, 43:2 (2008), pp. 253-265.

Sivasundaram, S, Bashford, A, & Armitage, D, *Oceanic Histories* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018).

Shaw, C, *Personal Memoirs and Correspondence of Colonel Charles Shaw comprising a Narrative of the War for Constitutional Liberty in Portugal and Spain, from its commencement in 1831 to the dissolution of the British legion in 1837, Volume 1 & 2* (London, Colburn, 1837).

Sheller, M, & Urry, J, ‘The City and the Car’, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*’, 24:4 (December 2000), pp. 737-757.

Shimazu, N, ‘Places in Diplomacy’, *Political Geography*, 31 (2012), pp. 335–336.

Shimazu, N, ‘Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955’, *Modern Asian Studies*, 48:1 (2014), pp. 225–252.

Shimazu, N, ‘What is Sociability in Diplomacy?’’, *Diplomatica*, 1:1 (2019), pp. 56-72.

Shmagin, V, ‘They Fear Us, yet Cling to Us: Russian Negotiations with Tsushima Domain Officials during the 1861 Tsushima Incident’, *The International History Review* 39:3 (2017), pp. 521-545.

Shōji, K, ‘Japan and East Asia’, in K. Yamamura, eds., *The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 3: Medieval Japan* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Shōko Shūsei-kan, *Satsuei-Sensō 150-Nen – Mae no Hama no Sen* (Kagoshima, Shōko Shūsei-kan, 2013).

Shreve, G. M, ‘Translation at the Millennium: Prospects for the Evolution of a Profession’, in P. A. Schmitt, eds., *Paradigmenwechsel in der Translation: Festschrift für Albrecht Neubert zum 70. Gerburtstag* (Tübingen, Stauffenburg, 2000).

Skřivan, Sr, A, & Skřivan, Jr, A, ‘Great Powers and the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895’, *Prague Papers on the History of International Relations*, 2 (2015), pp. 16-44.

Smith, S, ‘Imperial Policy’ in D. Brown, G. Pentland & R. Crowcroft, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern British Political History, 1800-2000* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018).

Solana, J, ‘The Case for ‘Human Diplomacy’, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 15 (2020), pp. 670-680.

Spalding, J. W, *Japan and around the World: An Account of Three Visits to the Japanese Empire* (New York, Redfield, 1855).

Spry, D, ‘’From Delhi to Dili: Facebook Diplomacy by Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the Asia-Pacific’, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 15 (2020), pp. 93-125.

Stalker, N. K, *Japan: History and Culture from Classical to Cool* (Oakland, University of California Press, 2018).

Steinbach, S. L, *Understanding the Victorians: Politics, Culture and Society in Nineteenth Century Britain* (New York, Routledge, 2017).

Steinberg, P. E, 'Navigating to Multiple Horizons: Toward a Geography of Open Space', *The Professional Geographer*, 51:3 (1999), pp. 366-375.

Steinberg, P. E, *The Social Construction of the Ocean* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Steinberg, P. E, 'Of Other Seas: Metaphors and Materialises in Maritime Regions', *Atlantic Studies*, 10:2 (2013), pp. 156-169.

Steiner, Z. S, 'Elitism and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Office before the Great War', in B. J. C. McKercher and D. J. Moss, eds., *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939* (Edmonton, Alberta, 1984).

Stephan, J. J, 'The Crimean War and the Far East', *Modern Asian Studies*, 3:3 (1969), pp. 257-277.

Sterry, L, *Victorian Women Travellers in Meiji Japan: Discovering a 'New' Land* (Folkestone, Global Oriental, 2009).

T:

Tanaka, A, 'Chōshū-han ni okeru Keiō gunsei gaikoku', *The Shirin/Journal of History*, 42:1 (January 1959), pp. 104-124.

Taylor, A. J. P, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1954).

Taylor, B, *India, China, and Japan, in the Year 1853* (New York, G. P. Putton & Co., 1855).

The Times, *The History of the Times: "The Thunderer" in the Making, 1785-1841* (London, The Office of *The Times*, 1935).

Thompson, A, 'Informal Empire? An Exploration in the History of Anglo-Argentine Relations, 1810-1914', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 24:2 (1992), pp. 419-436.

Todd, D, 'John Bowring and the Global Dissemination of Free Trade', *The Historical Journal*, 51:2 (June 2008), pp. 373-397.

Totman, C. *The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1980).

Traganou, J, *The Tōkaidō Road: Travelling and Representation in Edo and Meiji Japan* (London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).

Trager, R. F, *Diplomacy: Communication and the Origins of International Order* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Treat, P. J, 'The Return of the Shimonoseki Indemnity', *The Journal of Race Development*, 8:1 (July 1917), pp. 1-12.

Tremml-Werner, B, & Goetze, D, 'A Multitude of Actors in Early Modern Diplomacy', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 23 (2019), pp. 407-422.

Tremml-Werner, B, Hellman, L, & von Meersbergen, G, 'Introduction. Gift and Tribute in Early Modern Diplomacy: Afro-Eurasian Perspectives', *Diplomatica*, 2:2 (2020), pp. 185-200.

Tronson, J. M, *Personal Narrative of a Voyage to Japan, Kamtschatka, Siberia, Tartary, and various parts of coast of China; HMS Barracouta* (London, Smith, Elder & Co, 1859).

Tuson, E. W. A, *The British Consul's Manual: Being A Practical Guide for Consuls, The Merchant, Shipowner, and Master Mariner, in all their Consular Transactions* (London, Longman & Co, 1856).

U:

Uwajima-shi Bunka Kyōkai, *Meiji Ishin to Uwajima: Uwajima no Jinbutsu* (Uwajima, Uwajima-shi Bunka Kyōkai, 2022).

Uysal, N, 'The Rise of Diasporas as Adversarial Non-State Actors in Public Diplomacy: The Turkish Case', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 15 (2019), pp. 272-292.

V:

van Sant, J, Maugh, P, & Sugita, Y, eds., *Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan Relations* (Lanham, The Scarecrow Press, 2007).

Verstraete, G, 'Railroading America: Towards a Material Study of the Nation', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 19:5/6 (2002), pp. 145-159.

Vibart, H. M, *Addiscombe: Its Heroes and Men of Note* (Westminster, Archibald Constable and Co, 1894).

von Willigen, N, 'Business Diplomacy from an IR Perspective', *Diplomatica*, 2:1 (2020), pp. 13-19.

W:

Wadensjö, C, *Interpreting as Interaction* (London, Longman, 1998).

Watson, R. G, *A History of Persia* (London, Smith, Elder and Co, 1866).

Watson, R. G, eds., *A Handbook for Travellers in Greece* (London, John Murray, 1872).

Watson, R. G, *Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial Period, 2 Volumes* (London, Trübner & Co, 1884).

Watt, D. C, *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1965).

Watt, D. C, *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-1975* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984).

Watt, D. C, Adams, S, Bullen, R, Brauer, K, & Iriye, A, 'What is Diplomatic History…?', in J. Gardiner, eds., *What is History Today?* (London, MacMillan Press, 1988).

Wilde, O, 'The Decay of Lying' in J. T. Knowles, eds., *The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 25, January – June 1889* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co, 1889).

Wiley, P. B, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods, Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan* (New York, Viking, 1990).

Williams, G, *The Desert and the Dream: A Study of Welsh Colonisation in Chubut, 1865-1915* (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1975).

Williams, H. S, *Tales of Foreign Settlements in Japan* (Clarendon, Tuttle Publishing, 2012).

Williams, S. W, *A Journal of the Perry Expedition, 1853-1854* (Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, 1910).

Wilson, N, 'Tokugawa Defence Redux: Organisational Failure in the "Phaeton" Incident of 1808', *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 36:1 (2010), pp. 1-32.

Wilson, N, *Defensive Positions: The Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan* (London, Harvard University Press, 2015).

Wingfield, R, & Lyon, D, *The Sail and Steam Navy List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy, 1815-1889* (London, Chatham Publishing, 2004).

Winn, P, 'British Informal Empire in Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century', *Past & Present*, 73 (1976), pp. 100-126.

Wood, A, *Russia's Frozen Frontier: A History of Siberia and the Russian Far East, 1581-1991* (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).

Wong, J. Y, 'The 'Arrow' Incident: A Reappraisal', *Modern Asian Studies*, 8:3 (1974), pp. 373-389.

Wong, J. Y, 'Harry Parkes and the 'Arrow' War in China', *Modern Asian Studies*, 9:3 (1975), pp. 303-320.

Wong, J. Y, *Deadly Dreams: Opium and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).

X:

Y:

Yamamoto, T, 'Balance of favour: the emergence of territorial boundaries around Japan, 1861-1875', *The London School of Economics and Political Science* (2015), pp. 1-225.

Yannakakis, Y, *Native Intermediaries, Indian Identities, and Local Rule in Colonial Oaxaca* (London, Duke University Press, 2008).

Yoshimatsu, H, *Japan's Asian Diplomacy: Power Transition, Domestic Politics, and Diffusion of Ideas* (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2021).

Young, E, *Alien Nation: Chinese migration in the Americas from the coolie era through World War II* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2014).

Young, G. M, *Victorian England: Portrait of an Age* (London, Oxford University Press, 1936).

Yuzo, K, 'The Opening of Japan and the Meiji Restoration, 1837-72', in I. Nish & Y. Kibata eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930* (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000).

Z:

Zeiler, T. W, 'The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field', *The Journal of American History*, 95:4 (March 2009), pp. 1053-1073.

Websites:

A. J. P. Taylor, *History Today*, 1:7, July 1951 <https://www.historytoday.com/archive/british-prime-ministers-lord-palmerston>*

Gaimushō, Japanese Foreign Affairs Document Digital Archive, Vol. 5, Meiji 5/1872 (Tokyo, Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyōkai, 1953) <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/5.html>*

H. J. Moeshart, 'The Conclusion of the First Dutch Treaty with Japan', *Crossroads*, 5 (Autumn 1997), <http://www.uwosh.edu/home_pages/faculty_staff/earns/moeshart.html>*

The Japan Society, Online Book Launch for *A Life of Sir Harry Parkes* by R. Morton <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5VWeeNANEE>*

T. Weller, *The Victorian information age: nineteenth century answers to today's information policy questi,ons?* (9 June 2010) <http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/the-victorian-information-age-nineteenth-century-answers-to-todays-informat>*