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6	The Preference for Attitude Neutrality
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22 23 24	<i>Note</i> . Open data and syntax for all studies are available at <u>https://osf.io/d5n6v/?view_only=3495c22f84ce43c899132cdbe035a53b</u> . Materials are open in the online supplement (SOM).
25 26 27 28	<b>Conceptualization</b> : All authors; <b>Data Curation</b> : TIV; <b>Formal Analysis</b> : TIV, DIF; <b>Investigation</b> : All authors; <b>Methodology</b> : All authors; <b>Project Administration</b> : TIV; <b>Supervision</b> : LRF; <b>Validation</b> : DIF; <b>Visualization</b> : TIV, DIF; <b>Writing-Original</b> : TIV, DIF; <b>Writing-Review/editing</b> : All authors.
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#### Abstract

31 Much research has noted people's tendency toward extremity. This work has made it clear that 32 some people prefer to hold extreme views and might leave the impression that when biases and 33 preferences occur, they primarily favor extremity. In contract, in the current work, we examine 34 the possibility that some people prefer attitudinal neutrality across two pretesting samples, three 35 main studies, and two supplementary studies ( $N_{\text{total}} = 1,873$ ). The preference for neutrality is 36 distinguished from low preference for extremity, as well as from an interest in collecting 37 balanced information. We also show that the preference for neutrality is related to a sometimes 38 uncritical and biased pursuit of attitudinal neutrality, paralleling effects found in the attitude 39 extremity literature. The preference for neutrality is related to dispositional attitudinal neutrality 40 and ambivalence, political centrism, a preference for other people with neutral versus extreme 41 views, and biased responding to messages arbitrarily framed as "moderate" versus extreme. 42 Implications for politically polarized attitudes, persuasion, and intellectual humility are 43 discussed. The preference for neutrality may pose a substantial challenge for creating a shared 44 understanding of the world and addressing pressing social issues. 45 Keywords: attitudes; extremity; individual differences; neutrality; politics

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47 Public significance statement: Psychologists often caution the public that extreme attitudes 48 have negative consequences, and the media often promotes a "balanced" presentation of 49 information when presenting news stories. The public might reasonably interpret these 50 phenomena as suggesting that extreme attitudes are "bad" and moderate attitudes (neutrality) are 51 "good." In the present work we identify an individual difference, the *preference for neutrality*, 52 that reveals how one can be "excessively neutral" in a fashion somewhat parallel to excessive

- 53 extremity, with important consequences for both political and non-political thoughts and
- 54 opinions.
- 55 Manuscript Length: 12,950

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#### The Preference for Attitude Neutrality

57 "Everything in moderation, including moderation" – Oscar Wilde 58 Many social problems of our age—such as climate change, cancel culture and its 59 opponents, resistance to COVID-19 vaccination-are often understood to be issues of attitudinal 60 extremity. Much social science work has identified how people's psychological processes can 61 lead them to problematic positions of extremity, and how extreme attitudes bias information 62 processing (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Lord et al., 1979; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Tannenbaum, 1956), 63 enhance attitude-behavior consistency (Wilson et al., 1989), create resistance to persuasion 64 (Bassili, 1996), and drive polarized attitudes (Abelson, 1995; van Boven et al., 2012; Westfall et al., 2015). In short, extreme attitudes have been widely studied (also see Abelson, 1995; Brauer 65 66 et al., 1995; Buder et al., 2021; Judd & Johnson, 1981; Tannenbaum, 1956). Relatedly, 67 individual differences in the propensity to hold extreme attitudes has often been studied as 68 dogmatism (Hanson, 1973; Leone, 1989), social vigilantism (O'Dea et al., 2018), the need to 69 evaluate (Jarvis & Petty, 1996), low objectivism (Leone, 1996), and dispositional attitude 70 extremity (DeMarree et al., 2020, supplemental materials). This prior research is incredibly 71 valuable, and we agree that extremization and political polarization pose major threats to society 72 (e.g., Abelson, 1995; Pretus et al., 2023; Toner et al., 2013; van Boven et al., 2012; Zmigrod et 73 al., 2020). However, as noted in the epigraph above, paradoxically, excessive moderation might 74 be possible. For example, it is not clear that the optimal position for an individual or society to 75 take towards social problems like climate change, the civil rights of minoritized identities, or 76 taking COVID-19 vaccinations (or historically, towards slavery in the leadup to the American 77 Civil War), is a neutral attitude. Nonetheless, people may sometimes quite strongly prefer to 78 maintain neutrality across a diverse array of political and other attitude objects. We raise some 79 concerning findings about the likely problematic aspects of such an individual difference.

80 The preference for neutrality<sup>1</sup> is an epistemic position that commits some individuals to 81 holding neutral positions due to their perceived greater "truthfulness." Seeing neutral attitudes as 82 truer may also result in appraising neutrality as more functional, virtuous, and socially 83 acceptable. At high levels, the preference for neutrality may become an intellectually arrogant 84 and biased disposition towards attitudinally relevant information. Therefore, preference for 85 neutrality does not merely reflect low levels of the various extremity-motivation variables we 86 listed above because preference for neutrality is about the appeal of neutrality rather than the 87 lack of appeal of extremity. For example, people could be low on both motivations, and therefore 88 not think that holding neutral or holding extreme attitudes has special advantages. Alternatively, 89 people could theoretically be high on both constructs, if they recognize the value of holding both 90 extreme and neutral attitudes, holding a complex view of the value of different attitude positions. 91 Preference for neutrality also differs from an open-minded interest in collecting information from 92 "all sides" when forming attitudes, a hypothesis we test in the present work. Only preference for 93 neutrality entails seeing neutral positions as *superior* to non-neutral positions, whereas open-94 mindedness entails learning all possible information regardless of valence to arrive at the best 95 justified attitudinal position. Preference for neutrality also differs from low levels of extremity 96 bias in the response set literature (also see Simonson et al.'s, 2017, characterization of extremity 97 aversion as a "habit"), in that preference for neutrality involves a unified core of psychological 98 beliefs rather than a habit or avoidance of effortful responding. In short, we test whether some

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>We use the terms *preference for neutrality* and *preference for extremity* because we think "preference" captures the motivated nature of our constructs, and "neutrality" best captures the attitude goal that this disposition promotes. "Neutrality" is the antonym of "extremity" in the traditional attitudes literature (Abelson, 1995; Decker & Lord, 2022; deVries & Walker, 1987; Downing et al., 1992; Edwards & Ostrom, 1971; Thurstone, 1928), indicating an attitude position that avoids predominance of positive or negative reactions over the other. It does not presuppose controversy or the existence of defined sides, but simply characterizes a relative balance of positive and negative reactions, whether these reactions are few (indifference) or many (ambivalence).

people have sometimes powerful motivations to form and maintain neutral attitudes because theyjudge neutrality to be epistemically and functionally better than other attitude positions.

### 101 **1.1. Attitude Neutrality**

102 Attitudes are evaluations of objects (i.e., people, places, ideas) as good and/or bad (Eagly 103 & Chaiken, 1993; Fabrigar et al., 2010). Although positive and negative evaluations can be 104 conceptualized and measured independently (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Pittinsky et al., 1994), 105 attitudes are often conceptualized as falling on an evaluative dimension ranging from negativity 106 to positivity, and usually are represented as a single numerical value which is presumed to reflect 107 the valence and extremity of the evaluation. For example, an extremely positive attitude may be 108 represented with a positive score, an extremely negative attitude with a negative score, and a 109 neutral attitude with a moderate score near the conceptual midpoint (Abelson, 1995; Brauer et 110 al., 1995; Krosnick & Petty, 1995). Other conceptual definitions of neutral attitudes have been 111 offered. For example, neutral attitudes have sometimes been more narrowly defined as the 112 absence of positive/negative reactions (in contrast to ambivalence, the presence of both 113 positive/negative reactions; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1997). Neutrality has 114 also been proposed to be a property independent of attitudinal positivity and negativity, with 115 neutrality therefore characterized as the degree to which one feels indifferent about an object (Hu 116 & Gasper, 2022). Because in the present work we focus on people's beliefs and preferences 117 about neutrality, we favor the "common sense" notion of neutrality as non-extreme (near the 118 midpoint) evaluations (see Abelson, 1995), consistent with a lay understanding of the meaning of neutrality, and the majority of the attitudes literature.<sup>2</sup> 119

 $<sup>^2</sup>$  "Neutrality" is sometimes used to characterize related but distinct constructs, such as a refusal to take sides, or a middle-ground position between two defined sides. Refusing to take a side is a behavior rather than an attitudinal position, and social perceivers distinguish between sides-refusing people who hold genuinely middle-ground opinions versus are being strategic in their refusal (Silver & Shaw, 2022). In

120 In contrast to the conceptual simplicity of extreme attitudes (i.e., either positive or 121 negative reactions predominate over the other), neutral attitudes can entail several distinctive 122 attitudinal structures. A neutral attitude may arise: (a) from having a balanced large number of 123 positive and negative reactions, (b) from having a balanced small number of positive and 124 negative reactions, or (c) from a set of only neutral reactions towards an object (Edwards & 125 Ostrom, 1971). Attitudes scholars have focused on the first of these possibilities, an *ambivalent* 126 attitude, defined as the holding of both strong positive and negative attitudes towards the same 127 object (Kaplan, 1972; Scott, 1968; Thompson et al., 1995). Thus, psychologists have focused on 128 extremity even here, in that the well-studied concept of ambivalence is the form of neutrality 129 characterized by simultaneously holding extreme positive and negative reactions-whereas other 130 structures supporting neutrality may include a balanced absence of reactions. Ambivalent 131 attitudes are associated with "weakness": susceptibility to persuasion (Hodson et al., 2001; Maio 132 et al., 1996), and attenuated attitude-behavior consistency (Conner et al., 2002; Costarelli & 133 Colloca, 2004). People are usually motivated to avoid or reduce ambivalence (van Harreveld et 134 al., 2009; Nordgren et al., 2006). However, because ambivalence is an attitudinal structure that 135 produces neutrality (defined as near-midpoint attitudes), people high in preference for neutrality 136 may more often cultivate attitudinal ambivalence (thus seeking and becoming more neutral about

turn, "middle ground" opinions are strictly distinct from neutrality in that they refer to positions in a social distribution rather than necessarily to an equality of positive and negative reactions. However, the distinction often dissolves empirically because a middle-ground (socially average) opinion will generally be closer to evaluative neutrality than a non middle-ground (socially extreme) opinion. This is because the social "sides" in social conflicts like "abortion rights," "COVID-19 vaccine laws," or "Black Lives Matters" are defined by a preponderance of positive over negative versus negative over positive reactions to these topics, and thus non-neutral attitudes. The "middle-ground" position for each of these topics would imply a more equal ratio of positive and negative reactions, whether few or many, thus entailing relative evaluative neutrality.

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137 attitude topics, political positions, etc.). Despite the attention paid to ambivalence as a type of 138 neutral attitude, much less attention has been paid to neutrality per se (Hu & Gasper, 2022). 139 Although some research has examined extremity avoidance as a response style (e.g., 140 Simonson et al., 2017), this work usually concerns expressing neutrality as a satisficing habit. In 141 contrast, we view preference for neutrality as a genuine veneration of neutrality as a superior 142 position; these individuals do not merely express neutrality to avoid giving a thoughtful 143 response, but believe that neutrality is generally more valid. The present work probes this 144 research gap by testing people's preferences for attitude neutrality. 145 **1.2.** The Preference for Attitudinal Neutrality

146 Several motivational factors may lead people to pursue neutrality as a dispositional 147 tendency.<sup>3</sup> First, people may desire to hold neutral attitudes insofar as neutrality may feel like a 148 more epistemically defensible position. Often, a goal of efforts to address partisan animosity is 149 not just to get people to understand other perspectives, but also to moderate their attitudes 150 (Balietti et al., 2021; Tuller et al., 2015). Furthermore, mass media often presents social issues as 151 comprising two relatively balanced sides (even in cases where scientific consensus strongly 152 supports only one position; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2017; Dixon & Clarke, 2013; Koehler, 153 2016) which may train people to view neutral positions as more legitimate or scientifically 154 justified. These findings may suggest that people feel that neutral attitudes are easier to defend 155 than are extreme attitudes. This belief may lead neutrality preferring individuals to even like and 156 use information of a fixed valence more when that information is simply labeled as neutral, much

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In this section we draw both from research in which the potential desirability of attitudinal ambivalence *or* the desirability of neutrality has been studied. This is because research seldom disentangles whether people are actually pursuing ambivalence per se, or are pursuing neutrality with ambivalence merely people's means of obtaining a desired neutral position.

157 like liberals/conservatives prefer political policies arbitrarily labeled as liberal/conservative158 (Cohen, 2003).

159 Second, neutral attitudes may be beneficial for appearing socially desirable to others. 160 Anticipatory attitude change towards neutrality tends to occur when people anticipate social 161 interactions about the attitude topic (Hass & Mann, 1976; Tetlock et al., 1986), an effect at least 162 partially driven by self-presentational concerns (McFarland et al., 1984). For example, it can be 163 socially or epistemologically beneficial to express ambivalent feelings about controversial topics 164 (Pillaud et al., 2013; 2018; Reich & Wheeler, 2016). Indeed, people view others who express 165 ambivalence (vs unambivalence) about controversial topics as more competent (Pillaud et al., 166 2018) and can appreciate their willingness to acknowledge a different position than their 167 dominant one (Xu & Petty, 2022). Political parties that espouse moderate views are seen as more 168 willing to compromise and in turn are more effective, an important tactic when dealing with 169 divisive issues (Johns & Kölln, 2020). Importantly, such perceived competence is associated 170 with a perception that the attitude holder was likely to have weighed both sides of the issue in 171 coming to their neutral attitude (i.e., rather than simply assuming that a neutral attitude is 172 appropriate). High preference for neutrality may increase the tendency to evaluate ambivalent or 173 neutral others favorably (i.e., Pillaud et al., 2013, 2018) because seeing neutrality as 174 epistemically and morally superior should lead to a veneration of those who actually hold such 175 attitudes.

Believing that neutrality is epistemically and socially superior may lead high preference
for neutrality individuals to believe that attitudinal neutrality is unquestionably right. This differs
from a search for evaluatively balanced, issue relevant information. For instance, open-minded
people may seek information on both sides of an attitudinal issue (Stanovich & West, 1997).

This should help people form well considered, knowledge-based attitudes, be intellectually humble, and understand other people from a variety of perspectives. However, such openminded thinking is quite distinct from striving to reach a preordained neutral position as with the preference for neutrality in which a person has the goal to form and maintain a neutral position. Indeed, an interest in both sides should not necessarily produce attitudinal neutrality or ambivalence because it involves only *learning about* all sides of attitudinal conflicts, rather than internalizing each side.

#### 187 **1.3. The Present Research**

188 As the previous section suggested, various strands of psychological literature indicate 189 reasons people may want to hold neutral opinions. These possible benefits suggest that 190 preference for neutrality is conceptually distinguishable from simply lacking motivation to be 191 extreme and from a balanced search for all information on a topic across positive/negative 192 valence lines. Measurement and theory are intertwined in attitudes research (Ostrom, 1989). 193 Indeed, our interest in developing a self-report questionnaire concerning preferences for 194 neutrality and extremity also is a theoretical claim. Specifically, we are arguing that people not 195 only form attitudes about particular objects (e.g., "I really like social justice"; "I really dislike 196 nuclear power") but also evaluate those attitudes in terms of distinct metacognitive evaluative 197 standards (e.g., "I dislike having strong opinions [about social justice, nuclear power, and 198 anything else]"). Furthermore, we are arguing that people are sufficiently aware of those 199 metacognitive standards that they can self-report at least what attitudes they hold about certain 200 attitude positions. Indeed, although we were interested in developing a reliable, valid scale of the 201 attitude preferences, our theoretical interest in exploring how attitude preferences might guide 202 relevant person perception (Study 1), attitude structures (Study 2), and responses to persuasion 203 (Study 3) were paramount.

In the present work, we assessed the viability of separate individual difference constructs for the goals of cultivating neutral opinions (*preference for neutrality*), knowing both sides of attitude topics (*interest in both sides*), and the goal of holding extreme opinions (*preference for extremity*). We then tested how these attitude preferences showed unique associations with other individual difference variables, attitude structures, person perception effects, and responses to persuasive messages. Our hypotheses are summarized in Table 1.

#### 210 *1.3.1. Hypotheses*

211 Hypothesis 1 concerns the individual differences' links with a close-minded, 212 intellectually arrogant thinking style. Interest in both sides should be negatively associated with 213 this thinking style because these individuals are open-minded in their pursuit of information. 214 Preference for extremity and preference for neutrality, however, each should be positively related 215 to this thinking style because both posit a particular "state of reality" (i.e., extreme / neutral 216 opinions are more correct) rooted in one's core values and epistemic views. A novelty of the 217 present work is that just as holding extreme positions may entail an arrogant mindset (Lammers 218 et al., 2017; Toner et al., 2013), so too might a strong preference for neutral attitudes.

Hypothesis 2 concerns the preference for moderate action, moderate consumption, and middle-of-the-road judgments (Drolet et al., 2021). Although preference for neutrality is specific to attitudinal preferences, because it involves recognition of the value of non-extremity it should also be related to a general preference for moderation. Preference for extremity would likely be negatively related to moderation in that extreme attitudes may be seen as a lack of moderation.

Hypotheses 3-5 are connected, each concerning people's anticipated degree of intensely
evaluative thinking and attitude extremity. Hypothesis 3 focuses on the need to form strong,
extreme opinions as a dispositional personality style (i.e., the need to evaluate); Hypothesis 4

227	targets political extremity (i.e., having very left-wing or very right-wing attitudes about political
228	topics, landing one far from the political center); Hypothesis 5 targets dispositional attitude
229	extremity (i.e., tending to have near-the-endpoint attitudes about most objects). Whereas
230	preference for neutrality should be negatively related to all three of these phenomena because
231	these individuals should venerate and pursue attitudinal neutrality, preference for extremity
232	should be positively related to all three. Merely wanting information "on both sides" does not
233	have a clear connection to attitude extremity.

## **Table 1**

Hypothesized Relations Between Interest in Both Sides, Preference for Neutrality, Preference for Extremity, and Other Variables.

Hypothesis number	Other variable	Interest in both sides	Preference for neutrality	Preference for extremity
1	Close-minded, intellectually arrogant personality style	Negative	Positive	Positive
2	Moderation	No prediction	Positive	Negative
3	Need to evaluate	No prediction	Negative	Positive
4	Political extremity	No prediction	Negative	Positive
5	Dispositional attitude extremity	No prediction	Negative	Positive
6	Preference for attitude-neutral versus attitude-extreme others	No bias	Bias for neutral > extreme others	Bias for extreme > neutral others
7	Attitude ambivalence (structural and subjective).	No prediction	Positive	Negative
8	Persuasion from messages labeled as neutral over extreme.	No bias	Bias for neutral > extreme frame	Bias for extreme > neutral frame

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238	We further anticipate that our individual differences will influence how people view other
239	people based on those targets' tendencies towards neutrality or extremity (Hypothesis 6). People
240	with an interest in both sides should like both neutral and extreme attitude holders alike, because
241	both types of people can offer positive and negative information about topics (i.e., presumably
242	"neutrals" will offer both positive and negative, whereas "extremes" will at least offer one side).
243	However, for our preference variables, we anticipated bias effects: preference for neutrality
244	(preference for extremity) should relate to seeing other people as more moral, competent, and
245	likeable when those individuals have generally neutral (extreme) opinions.
246	Hypothesis 7 concerns attitudinal ambivalence. People high in preference for neutrality
247	should be more willing to be ambivalent because ambivalence is one attitude structure that
248	facilitates neutrality; thus, these individuals may be more structurally and subjectively
249	ambivalent. Preference for extremity should be negatively related to ambivalence for the
250	converse reason. Finally, people who eagerly seek information on both sides need not necessarily
251	internalize either type of information, and so may not be more or less ambivalent.
252	Finally, Hypothesis 8 concerns how people may react to persuasive messages that are
253	framed as neutral versus extreme. At least during attitude formation, people often may lack a
254	clear objective frame of reference for what attitude positions might be considered "extreme"
255	versus "neutral." Although people who simply want information on both sides should not be
256	lured by such framings because they value all information in an open-minded way, both of our
257	preference variables should react to such framings by showing preference effects (e.g., trusting
258	or internalizing such information more) insofar as it matches their attitudinal preferences.
250	

259 Ironically, then, the exact same messages might be accepted versus rejected by people high in

- 260 preference for neutrality (preference for extremity) just because it is labeled as a neutral
- 261 (extreme) viewpoint.
- 262 1.3.2. Transparency and Openness
- For all studies, we made data and syntax openly available at

<u>https://osf.io/d5n6v/?view\_only=3495c22f84ce43c899132cdbe035a53b</u>. Materials are open in
 the online supplement (SOM-2). We report all manipulations, and all measures throughout. We

266 explain how we determined our sample size for each study. The only data exclusions were in

267 Study 1, as reported. Studies were not preregistered. We obtained ethics approval for all studies

268 from the relevant institutions. For all studies we did not have specific expectations about effect

size, so we used time-based stopping rules, checking sample size after each academic semester

270 until a minimum sample was reached. However, we also provide sensitivity analyses to probe

what effect size range we were powered to detect (details in SOM-3). See SOM-5 for additionalJARS details.

273

#### 2. Study 1

274 In Study 1 we developed items to constitute three main attitude preference factors (i.e., 275 interest in both sides, preference for neutrality, and preference for extremity). Our first goal was 276 therefore to determine whether three such factors emerged. Our second goal was to probe the 277 unique nomological networks of our constructs (Hypotheses 1-4) and general patterns of attitude 278 extremity versus neutrality (Hypothesis 5). Third, we examined person perception effects. That 279 is, given profiles of people characterized as having a tendency towards extreme or neutral 280 opinions, we tested whether attitude preferences predicted evaluations of these targets as moral, 281 competent, and/or overall good (versus immoral, incompetent, and bad; Hypothesis 6). 282 2.1. Method

## 283 2.1.1. Participants

284	For Study 1, we collected data for two semesters towards a minimum sample of 400,
285	selected because to reduce fatigue, some measures we only had about half of participants
286	complete (see below). We recruited $N = 643$ Canadian undergraduate students to complete this
287	study online for partial course credit (gender: 80.7% women, 16.0% men, 1.6% non-binary, 1.7%
288	missing; $M_{age} = 19.2$ , $SD_{age} = 4.2$ ; ethnicity: 77.0% White, 18.7% Asian, 3.3% Indigenous, 2.6%
289	Black, 2.5% Latinx, 3.7% other; 59.7% liberal, 23.0% moderate, 17.3% conservative), after
290	removing 51 participants who complete none of our attitude preference scale items and thus
291	could not affect our results. Otherwise, participants were not removed in any studies. Study 1 has
292	80% power to find effects of $r >  .07 $ to $ .11 $ depending on the analysis, comparing favorably to
293	average effect sizes in social psychology ( $r_{\text{mean}} = .21$ , Richard et al., 2003).
294	In Study 1, we refer briefly to results from two Supplementary Samples that are described
295	more comprehensively in the Supplement (SOM4–5). We included Supplementary Sample 1 ( $N$
296	= 350 American Prolific participants) to obtain a more politically balanced (less left-leaning)
297	sample for our analyses concerning political orientation in section 2.2.3, and Supplementary
298	Sample 2 ( $N = 185$ UK University students) to compare attitudes preferences against trait
299	ambivalence (Schneider et al., 2021) in section 2.2.2.

300 2.1.2. Procedure

Participants first completed a series of six profile evaluations. For each participant, three profiles were presented of targets with generally neutral attitudes (e.g., "Charlie has moderate opinions on virtually everything," "Charlie rarely [has] a strong opinion"), and another three profiles with generally extreme attitudes (e.g., "Charlie sees everything in the extreme," "Charlie is someone that is pretty extreme"). We took steps to avoid confounding extremity of opinions

with being outspoken; for instance, one neutral profile states that one character "always speaks 306 307 his mind about his centrism." Additionally, all profiles were supplemented with generically 308 positive information (e.g., "engages energetically with his school work") to mask our hypothesis. 309 We also avoided implying that the opinions in question were exclusively political or exclusively 310 about 'high stakes' topics by either talking about several attitude objects that the target evaluated 311 ("From his opinions that pepperoni is the ultimate pizza topping, to his...views on fossil fuels 312 and climate change"), and/or by stating that the character has this disposition in a global way 313 (e.g., "he sees nothing in the extreme"). To avoid confounding names, gender, or profile 314 information with neutrality versus extremity of opinions, we created two between-participant set 315 conditions, randomly assigning participants to one of these. For instance, half of participants read 316 about a highly neutral-opinionated Robyn, and half read about a highly extreme-opinionated 317 Robyn.

318 Next, participants completed the attitude preference questionnaire, described below, with 319 items presented in randomized order. Finally, participants completed a subset of six measures 320 from a large pool of possible questionnaires. We used this questionnaire subsetting method to 321 protect against satisficing or fatigue. The questionnaire pool consisted of the measures listed in 322 Table 2, as well as the dispositional attitudes measure (DAM; Hepler & Albarracin, 2013), and a 323 modified DAM consisting of 16 politically important, controversial, and left/right polarized 324 attitude objects ("abortion," "Black Lives Matter," "Cancel culture," "Laws mandating COVID 325 vaccines," "Quotas for hiring women in STEM fields," etc.). The order of these measures was 326 randomized, and item orders were randomized within each scale.

327 2.1.3. Materials

328	For each profile, participants rated their overarching opinion of the target person with
329	eight unipolar items, each rated from 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("definitely"; Crites et al., 1994). These
330	items consisted of both positive (e.g., "good," "like") and negative adjectives (e.g., "bad,"
331	"dislike"). Participant responses to each target had $Ms = 4.34-4.81$ and $SDs = .97-1.13$ and
332	demonstrated good reliability ( $\alpha$ 's = .91–.93). Additionally, participants rated a series of items
333	(Wojciszke et al., 1998) assessing how morally good the target seemed (e.g., "fair," "truthful,"
334	"righteous") and how competent (e.g., "clever," "efficient," "gifted"), with labeled endpoints 0
335	(not at all) to 6 (definitely) but rescored 1-7 for interpretative ease. Participant responses to the
336	moral items had $Ms = 4.36-4.93$ and $SDs = .97-1.10$ , and responses to the competency items
337	with $Ms = 4.42-5.19$ , $SDs = .93-1.05$ .

338 Our attitude preferences scale consisted of 52 items that were developed across several 339 rounds of piloting, and intended to capture preferences for particular attitude positions (i.e., extreme, neutral) versus seeking information on both sides.<sup>4</sup> Items covered perceived advantages 340 341 of holding a particular position, reactions to others holding a particular position, preferences for 342 having a particular type of position, etc. (see SOM-2). Each item was rated 1 (Strongly disagree), 343 2 (Somewhat disagree), 3 (Neither agree nor disagree), 4 (Somewhat agree), or 5 (Strongly 344 agree). We randomized item order.

#### 345 For the questionnaire block, see Table 1 for the list of measures. These questionnaires 346 were designed to map onto hypotheses 1-3. We also included several scales about attitude-347 relevant social interactions for exploratory reasons; for example, probing whether people higher 348 in preference for neutrality were more likely to self-censor in avoidance of disputes, or self-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> We ran two pilot studies (Ns = 131, 118) to begin the process of refining items before conducting the primary studies. Details are in SOM-1.

349 monitor (shift their attitudes to match people around them). Additional scale descriptives appear
350 in SOM-3 for all studies (Table S3-6a, S3-6b, and S3-6c).

351 2.2. Results

#### 352 2.2.1. Factor Analyses

353 For all three studies, we ran exploratory factor analyses using an identical set of 354 statistical/interpretative procedures. We followed exploratory factor analysis procedures as 355 outlined by Fabrigar and Wegener (2011), and considered multiple desiderata when evaluating 356 possible factor solutions, including a scree plot of the reduced eigenvalue matrix, fit (RMSEA; 357 Browne & Cudeck, 1992), parallel analysis performance, interpretability of resulting factors, and 358 the number of items loading substantially and uniquely on common factors. Extractions were 359 performed using maximum likelihood, and solutions with 2+ factors were rotated using direct 360 oblimin, meaning that factors were permitted but not forced to be correlated with one another 361 (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2011). For brevity's sake, the full statistics are available in SOM-3. All samples found three-factor solutions the most viable, additionally finding good absolute fit for a 362 363 three-factor solution.

364 In Sample 1, three common factors emerged which were labeled interest in both sides (14 365 items, M = 4.14, SD = .56), preference for neutrality (21 items, M = 2.92, SD = .70), and 366 preference for extremity (four items, M = 2.70, SD = .93; see Table S3-2 in the online 367 supplement). This shows some initial evidence that our proposed psychological distinctions 368 might represent distinct psychological constructs. Sample 2 added new items and discarded 369 poorly-loading items as explained later; Sample 3 retained Sample 2's items. Given that all three 370 studies support a three-factor structure, these analyses support the intended psychometric 371 performance of our attitude preference scale.

372	In Study 1, three common factors emerged which were labeled interest in both sides (14
373	items, $M = 4.14$ , $SD = .56$ ), preference for neutrality (21 items, $M = 2.92$ , $SD = .70$ ), and
374	preference for extremity (4 items, $M = 2.70$ , $SD = .93$ ; see SOM-2 in the online supplement).
375	These items were used for all Study 1 analyses concerning attitude preferences. This shows some
376	initial evidence that our proposed psychological distinctions might represent distinct
377	psychological constructs. Study 2 added new items and discarded poorly-loading items as
378	explained later; Study 3 then retained Study 2's items. Given that all three studies (and Pretesting
379	2) support a three-factor structure, these analyses support the intended psychometric performance
380	of our attitude preference scale.
381	Because Study 2 introduced changed items compared to Study 3, we only ran a
382	confirmatory factor analysis for Study 3; details are in SOM-3, but the three-factor model
383	showed good fit on most indicators (RMSR = .07, RMSEA = .05 [.05, .06], but TLI = .81), with
384	consistently strong item-factor loadings.
385	2.2.2. Associations with Other Constructs
386	Table 2 presents associations between the attitude preferences and other individual
387	differences. See supplementary Table S3-6 for the complete zero-order correlation matrix. A few
388	macro-comments broadly characterize the results: (a) interest in both sides has a dramatically
389	different nomological network from preference for neutrality, and these unique networks are
390	consistent with our hypotheses from Table 1, and (b) preference for neutrality's correlation
391	patterns are not simply the opposite of preference for extremity's.
392	First, preference for neutrality appears distinct from the interest in both sides in
393	hypothesized ways. As per Hypothesis 1, people high in interest in both sides were more
394	intellectually humble; open-minded in general, about politics and religion; higher in curiosity,

395 non-dogmatic, with more enjoyment of thinking. Preference for neutrality was related with less 396 intellectual humility (although not dogmatism), and less need for cognition. These opposite 397 loadings suggest that whereas interest in both sides reflects an epistemically open strategy, 398 preference for neutrality is epistemically arrogant and unintellectual. As hypothesized, extremity 399 preferring people were more dogmatic and close-minded, and less intellectually humble. This 400 provides initial evidence that both "preferences" show some parallelism, although the effects for 401 extremity preference are somewhat stronger and more robust. Turning to Hypothesis 2, as predicted, moderation was correlated positively with 402 preference for neutrality<sup>5</sup>; but to our surprise, moderation positively linked with preference for 403 404 extremity, albeit very weakly. Interest in both sides was only weakly linked with moderation. 405 As per Hypothesis 3, preference for neutrality was lower in need to evaluate. This makes 406 sense because the need to evaluate scale includes items referring both to a desire to evaluate at 407 all (e.g., "I form opinions about everything"), and an aversion to neutrality (e.g., "It bothers me 408 to remain neutral"). We would nonetheless argue that preference for neutrality may imply a kind

409 of need to evaluate, in the more restrictive sense of a need to form opinions that are neutral (i.e.,

410 neither very positive nor very negative), but based on the traditional conceptualization of the

411 need to evaluate this correlation is unsurprising. Preference for extremity was positively related,

412 again conforming to our predictions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> These constructs are nonetheless distinct, as the SOM-2 zero-sum matrix makes clear. For example, we suggested earlier that preference for neutrality has attitudinal relevance, and indeed preference for neutrality but not moderation was negatively linked to the need to evaluate. Preference for neutrality was negatively related to the need for cognition whereas moderation was positively related.

**Table 2** 

415 Correlations Between Attitude Preferences and Other Individual Differences (Study 1)

Measure	M (SD)	Citation	Interest in Both Sides	Preference for Neutrality	Preference for Extremity
Interest in Both Sides	4.14 (.56)			<u> </u>	2
Preference for Neutrality	2.92 (.70)		.01		
Preference for Extremity	2.70 (.93)		21***	.18***	
Need to Evaluate	3.07 (.53)	Jarvis & Petty (1996)	.03	33***	.33***
Intellectual Humility	3.56 (.48)	Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse (2016)	.40***	21***	50***
Dogmatism	4.32 (.70)	White et al. (2019)	41***	.07	.42***
Need for Cognition	3.13 (.55)	Cacioppo & Petty (1982)	.23***	12*	10
Curiosity	4.63 (.55)	Kashdan et al. (2018)	.39***	01	.10
Willingness to Self-Censor	3.21 (.68)	Hayes et al. (2005)	06	.20***	10
Self-monitoring	4.33 (.63)	Lennox & Wolfe (1984)	.41***	06	07
Moderation	4.18 (.91)	Drolet et al. (2021)	.15*	.53***	.14*
OMC General	4.79 (.92)	Price et al. (2015)	.43***	06	41***
OMC Politics	4.89 (1.02)	As above	.43***	08	19**
OMC Religion	5.09 (1.24)	As above	.35***	.11	20**
Need for Closure	3.60 (.29)	Webster & Kruglanski (1994)	.03	.11	.20**
Political extremity	1.99 (2.50)	Squared term of centered political position $x = x = 0.1 + x = 0.01$	.01	08*	.11**

*Note.* OMC indicates open-minded cognition. \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001

418 Exploratory associations with the scales of attitude-relevant social dispositions were also 419 intriguing. People higher in interest in both sides were uniquely higher on self-monitoring, 420 suggesting a greater tendency to express attitudes consistent with people around with them. 421 However, individuals higher in preference for neutrality were uniquely higher on the willingness 422 to self-censor, indicating a greater tendency to silence themselves when exposed to counter-423 attitudinal others. One interpretation is that knowing "both sides" of social issues makes it easier 424 for people high in interest in both sides to express shared beliefs with other people, whereas 425 preference for neutrality permits no such flexibility-these individuals identify with their neutral 426 attitudes, and self-censor when exposed to people with strongly positive or negative views. 427 Finally, in a secondary analysis, we wanted to test for associations between the attitudes 428 preferences and trait ambivalence, which represents people's dispositional experiences of 429 subjective ambivalence (Schneider et al., 2021; Hohnsbehn et al., 2022). Our prediction would 430 follow from Hypothesis 7: we would expect the preference for neutrality (extremity) to be 431 positively (negatively) related to trait ambivalence. Supplementary Sample 2 examines this 432 question, as we fully detail in SOM-5. Congruent with our hypothesis, we found a modest positive association between preference for neutrality and trait ambivalence, r(183) = .30, p < .00433 434 .001. We did not find an association between preference for extremity and trait ambivalence, 435 r(183) = -.01, p = .876. Finally, we found an unexpected but weak association of interest in both sides with trait ambivalence, r(183) = .17, p = .022. 436

437 2.2.3. Political Beliefs

Hypothesis 4 suggested that preference for neutrality should be more common towards
the political center, whereas preference for extremity should be linked with more political
extremity. Both patterns emerged, albeit somewhat weakly (see Table 2). The pattern can be

viewed in greater detail in Figure 1a: interest in both sides is unrelated to politics, but preference
for neutrality has a "reverse-U" shape (most politically centrist), and preference for extremity has
a crude "U" shape (more politically extremist).
Some of these associations may have been weakened statistically by our left-leaning
student sample, as suggested by the inflated standard error bars on the right side of Figure 1a

446 (i.e., due to having so few conservatives among our undergraduates). We collected a


447 supplementary sample of 350 US Prolific workers which balanced the political distribution (see


448 SOM-4 for more detail, and Figure 1b). As seen in Figure 1b, preference for neutrality was again

449 related to more political centrism and preference for extremity to more political extremism.

## 450 Figure 1a

#### 451








454 *Note.* Error bars indicate standard errors. Higher X-axis scores (political orientation scored 1–7)

455 reflect more conservative political beliefs. Higher Y-axis scores (attitude preference subscales

456 each scored 1–5) reflect more of each attitude preference (see legend).

## 457 Figure 1b



458 Political Associations with Attitude Preferences (Supplementary Data 1, American Prolific).



460 *Note.* Error bars indicate standard errors. Higher X-axis scores (political orientation scored 1–7)

461 reflect more conservative political beliefs. Higher Y-axis scores (attitude preference subscales

462 each scored 1–5) reflect more of each attitude preference (see legend).

463	Neutrality preference was positively related to political conservatism in Study 1, but as
464	we discuss in SOM-3 and SOM-4, this was eliminated in the more politically balanced
465	supplementary sample.
466	2.2.4. Dispositional Attitude Structures

Study 1 participants also completed the dispositional attitudes scale, a measure capturing 467 468 dispositional tendencies in preferring to hold positive vs. negative attitudes (Hepler & 469 Albarracin, 2013). Unlike the original scoring, we appraised how far from the conceptual 470 midpoint each participants' rating was of each object, as a measure of general attitude extremity. 471 Table 3 shows two regression analyses, in each of which one of the dispositional attitude indices 472 was regressed on all three attitude preferences. The first analysis examined the original sixteen 473 DAM items which concern non-controversial items like "bicycle." The second analysis 474 examined sixteen more controversial items like "abortion." We anticipated that people preferring 475 neutrality (extremity) should have non-extreme (extreme) attitudes.

## **Table 3**

## 478 Attitude Preferences Relate to Dispositional Attitude Extremity (Study 1)

	Interest in Both Sides					Preference for Neutrality					Preference for Extremity					Model Statistics			
	b	r	SE	t	р	b	r	SE	t	р	b	r	SE	t	р	F	р	$R^2$	
Dependent variable: Dispositional Attitude Extremity (Non- controversial)	.28	.31	.05	5.61	<.001	.00	.00	.04	08	.938	.05	.07	.03	1.36	.177	10.57	<.001	.10	
Dependent variable: Dispositional Attitude Extremity (Controversial)	.28	.30	.05	5.56	<.001	07	09	.04	-1.66	.097	.07	.13	.03	2.33	.021	11.11	<.001	.10	

481 For the non-controversial and again for the controversial objects, we found that interest in 482 both sides was related to having more extreme opinions on both object sets. This is at least 483 congruent with our theorizing that people interested in learning both sides should not 484 automatically default into neutrality, but it was interesting that these individuals had substantially 485 *more* extreme attitudes. One possibility is that these individuals are thinking more extensively 486 about attitudinal issues (i.e., congruent with their heightened curiosity and need for cognition). 487 Interestingly, then, despite these people also being more open-minded, their increased attention 488 to both sides of attitudinal issues may lead to more extreme views either because they 489 nonetheless showed biases like confirmation bias and motivated skepticism (Dawson et al., 2002; 490 Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Edwards & Smith, 1996; Kunda, 1987). Indeed, when people think more 491 (vs less) about attitude-relevant topics, they tend to show larger confirmation biases (Knobloch-492 Westerwick et al., 2020) and more attitude polarization (Clarkson et al., 2011; Tesser & Conlee, 493 1975). Stanovich and Toplak (2023) also have noted that open-minded thinking is not 494 consistently related to reductions in the sorts of myside biases that fuel attitude polarization. 495 In contrast, however, those high in preference for neutrality showed a marginal decrease 496 in attitudinal extremity as we had predicted, at least for the controversial objects. Finally, people 497 high in preference for extremity reported more extreme opinions for controversial objects, 498 confirming our expectations.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Our controversial objects differed substantially from the non-controversial original DAM items, as we tested through a series of paired-samples *t*-tests. We would expect controversial objects to be associated with more polarization and variance. First, opinions were on average further from the conceptual midpoint for the controversial (M = 1.61, SD = .52) versus non-controversial objects (M = 1.41, SD = .49), t(126) = 3.51, p < .001, d = .31 [.13, .49]. Second, people's opinions drifted further from the item-level medians for the controversial (M = 1.43, SD = .41) than for the non-controversial objects (M = 1.29, SD = .39), t(126) = 4.56, p < .001, d = .40 [.22, .58]. We did not have predictions for how our novel constructs would map onto overall liking of the attitude objects, but these analyses are provided in the supplemental Table S2-6 for interested readers.

499

## 2.2.5. Personality Profile Evaluations

500 Finally, we examined participants' evaluations of targets who were globally inclined 501 towards attitudinal neutrality or extremity. People with neutrality (extremity) preferences should 502 like the neutral (extreme) targets, and perhaps dislike the extreme (neutral targets). These 503 patterns are key to our claim that both preferences represent core identity concerns, prompting 504 in-group/out-group thinking towards people who fulfill/reject these attitudinal preferences. In 505 contrast, interest in both sides should not predict much preference for extremists or neutrals. We 506 performed regression analyses as displayed in Table 4. Each used overall attitudes towards 507 targets as the dependent variable, but SOM-3 contains similar regressions using target morality 508 and target competence as dependent variables, reaching very similar conclusions.

509 We first regressed ratings of the non-extreme targets onto our three attitude preferences, 510 then regressed ratings of the extreme targets onto the same predictors (first two data rows of 511 Table 4). Finally, we calculated the difference between evaluations of the two target sets (e.g., 512 attitudes towards the three extreme targets minus attitudes towards the three non-extreme 513 targets), and again regressed this onto our predictors (third data row). We found that interest in 514 both sides and preference for neutrality were both linked with more liking of the neutral profiles 515 (first data row), whereas preference for extremity was linked with less liking of these targets. 516 However, when examining opinions of extreme-attitude targets (second data row), interest in 517 both sides was marginally positive, suggesting that these individuals would like all profiles more, 518 whereas preference for neutrality was not linked to positive evaluations of these targets. 519 Preference for extremity was positively linked to judgments of the extreme targets, as 520 hypothesized. Finally, we examined the difference scores to reveal how much pro or anti-521 extremity bias each attitude preference predicted (third data row). We found that whereas interest

in both sides was related only to a marginal bias against extreme-attitude targets, preference for
 neutrality was related to a strong anti-extremist bias, and preference for extremity was related to
 a strong pro-extremist bias.

525 Because we were interested in testing whether interest in both sides differs from 526 neutrality preference, we wanted to test whether interest in both sides' marginally anti-extremist 527 bias and preference for neutrality's significantly anti-extremist bias were significantly different 528 from one another. We used the car package (Fox & Weisberg, 2019) in R (R Core Team, 2022) 529 to test the (in)equality of these regression coefficients using an F-test. Indeed, preference for 530 neutrality was *more* negatively related to extremist attitudes than was interest in both sides, F(1, 1)(610) = 4.10, p = .043. This again demonstrates that preference for neutrality accounts for 531 532 variance that is not captured by an open-minded interest in both sides, this time concerning the 533 evaluations of other people. Furthermore, these results demonstrate individual differences 534 moderating established effects in which either neutral/moderate or ambivalent people are 535 evaluated differently than their extreme attitude-holding counterparts (e.g., Goldenburg et al., 536 2023; Han et al., 2023; Johns & Kölln, 2020; Pillaud et al., 2013, 2018; Siev et al., 2024; 537 Toribio-Flórez et al., 2020).

539 Attitude Preferences Relate to Opinions of Target People Based on Targets' Attitudinal Dispositions (Study 1)

Dependent Variable	Intere	est in b	oth sic	les		Prefe	erence for	or neut	rality			Prefe	rence for	extremity	I			Model Statistics		
	b	r	SE	t	р	b	r	SE	t	р	b	r	SE	t	р	F	р	$R^2$		
Attitudes Towards Neutrals	.24	.17	.06	4.43	<.001	.24	.21	.04	5.50	<.001	17	20	.03	-5.23	<.001	27.29	<.001	.12		
Attitude Towards Extremists	.11	.08	.06	1.96	.051	07	06	.05	-1.48	.139	.19	.22	.04	5.50	<.001	10.36	<.001	.05		
Relative Pro- Extremist Bias (Attitude)	13	- .07	.07	-1.96	.051	31	21	.05	-5.77	<.001	.37	.33	.04	8.98	<.001	38.30	<.001	.16		

540 541

#### 542 **2.3. Discussion**

543 The patterns shown by people who want to learn about both sides of issues differed 544 detectably from the patterns shown by people who have neutrality preferences. These differences 545 manifested in numerous ways: (a) unique factors emerged in factor analysis, consistent with the 546 idea that these are conceptually distinct; (b) resultant factors showed near-zero associations with 547 one another; (c) interest in both sides and preference for neutrality showed unique nomological 548 networks in connecting with attitude-relevant constructs (need to evaluate, need for cognition), 549 interpersonal constructs (self-censorship, self-monitoring), and more; (d) only preference for 550 neutrality was related to political centrism; (e) interest in both sides and preference for neutrality 551 showed different patterns of attitude structure, such that only interest in both sides predicted 552 more extreme opinions; and (f) interest in both sides and preference for neutrality showed 553 different patterns of evaluating people based on those targets' attitude patterns.

In short, Study 1 established the conceptual novelty of preference for neutrality, and supported most claims raised as Hypotheses 1–6. At high levels, preference for neutrality connects with other individual difference factors, shapes attitude structures, connects with political views, and guides social judgment.

558 Study 1 also validated the attitude preference scales. That people higher in the preference 559 for neutrality (extremity) were each more intellectually arrogant, had overall less (more) extreme 560 attitudes, were less (more) politically extreme, viewed neutral others more (less) favorably, all 561 supports the validity of these critical novel measures. Similarly, that the interest in both sides 562 was positively related to open-minded cognition, intellectual humility, and the need for 563 cognition, and negatively related to dogmatism, supports the validity of that subscale.

564

**3. Study 2** 

565 Study 1 supported our theorizing about how a preference for neutrality exists independent 566 from an even-handed interest in "both sides" of attitudinal conflicts and from (low) preference 567 for extremity. In Study 2 we explored other aspects of attitude structure more extensively. For 568 example, the attitude measures used in Study 1 consisted of bipolar scales (e.g., rating 569 "genetically modified organisms" from negative to positive) which made it impossible to 570 examine participants' tendencies to have ambivalent (i.e., co-present positive and negative) 571 opinions. Importantly, because ambivalence is one of several attitude structure types that can 572 generate neutrality, people who prefer neutrality might be more willing to cultivate structural 573 attitudinal ambivalence and feel ambivalent; people who prefer extremity should presumably 574 avoid ambivalence and find it particularly aversive (Hypothesis 7). Interest in both sides also 575 should link with less ambivalence: we have already observed that these individuals have more 576 extreme attitudes in Study 1, and familiarity with both sides of issues may facilitate rather than 577 inhibit polarization into strong attitude positions.

578 Another limitation of Study 1 was that preference for extremity was represented by only 579 four items. To improve our measurement of the attitude preferences in general, we generated a 580 substantial number of new items, resulting in a revised scale with 17 interest in both sides, 18 581 preference for neutrality, and 15 preference for extremity items (listed in SOM-2).

582 **3.1. Method** 

#### 583 3.1.1. Participants

We recruited 109 Prolific workers from the United Kingdom, compensating them £1.50 for 15 minutes of time. We selected the sample size based on budgetary constraints. Participants were 70.6% White, 7.3% Asian, 6.4% mixed 5.5% Black, 2.8% Other;  $M_{age} = 37.7$ ,  $SD_{age} = 14.4$ ; 58.4% were women, 37.6% men, 3.0% non-binary/third gender, 1% did not answer. No favorably to Richard et al.'s (2003) average effect size in social psychology (r = .21 or  $R^2 = .04$ ).

591 3.1.2. Procedure and Materials

588

589

592 Participants rated 10 attitude objects, ranging from commonplace brands and objects (the 593 company Apple, vaping, electric cars, McDonalds, hairless cats) to politically important and 594 controversial but not generally left/right polarized issues (veganism, genetically modified 595 organisms, nuclear power, universal basic income, and capitalism). We randomized order of 596 object presentation. First, participants rated the 10 objects in terms of their positive and negative 597 characteristics, with positive/negative ratings in counterbalanced order. We asked participants to 598 rate the object's positive aspects, while ignoring all negative aspects, on a scale from 1 (not at all 599 *positive*) to 11 (*very positive*). We separately asked participants to rate the object's negative 600 aspects, while ignoring all positive aspects, on a scale from 1 (not at all negative) to 11 (very 601 *negative*). Structural ambivalence of each object could be calculated using the Griffin formula, 602 (Positives – Negatives)/2 – ABS(Positives – Negatives), as described by Thompson et al. (1995). 603 Participants structural ambivalence scores had Ms = -.37 - 2.42, SDs = 3.52 - 4.02. 604 Second, participants viewed the 10 objects one at a time, and rated several subjective 605 ambivalence items (from Priester & Petty, 1996): to what extent object made them feel conflict 606 (1 = feel no conflict at all; 11 = feel maximum conflict), confusion (1 = feel no confusion at all; 607 11 = feel maximum confusion, indecision (1 = feel no indecision at all; 11 = feel maximum)608 *indecision*), and mixed reactions (1 = completely one-sided; 11 = completely mixed reactions).

609 These variables were averaged together such that higher scores indicated more felt ambivalence.

610 Participants felt ambivalence scores had Ms = 2.98-5.01 and SDs = 2.07-2.73 and good

611 reliabilities  $\alpha s = .89-.94$ .

Finally, participants completed our revised (50-item) attitude preferences scale. As demonstrated in SOM-3, this item pool again produced clear evidence of a three-factor scale, with scales reflecting preference for neutrality (18 items; M = 2.76, SD = .73,  $\alpha = .93$ ), interest in both sides (17 items; M = 4.15, SD = .60,  $\alpha = .93$ ), and preference for extremity (15 items; M =2.81, SD = .75,  $\alpha = .92$ ). These same subscales were used in Study 3, both supplementary studies, and are the final version of the scale.

618 **3.2. Results** 

## 619 3.2.1. Attitude Preferences as Predictors of Structural Ambivalence

620 We used multilevel models to assess how the attitude preferences were related to 621 structural ambivalence across the 10 objects, because object-level ratings (n = 1,008) were nested 622 within respondents (N = 101 for this analysis). A random slopes model failed to converge, so we 623 used a random intercepts model. Regressing structural ambivalence on all three attitude preferences, we found that interest in both sides was unrelated to structural ambivalence, B = -.45624  $[-1.11, .20], t(97) = -1.37, p = .175, R^2_c = .00$ . However, preference for neutrality was related to 625 marginally more structural ambivalence, B = .54 [-.01, 1.08], t(97) = 1.95, p = .055,  $R^2_c = .01$ , 626 627 consistent with our reasoning. This can be seen in Figure 2a, where each colored line indicates 628 one attitude object; more preference for neutrality, at least marginally, relates to more 629 ambivalence across topics. Finally, preference for extremity was related to significantly less structural ambivalence, B = -.57 [-1.10, -.04], t(97) = -2.13, p = .035,  $R^2_c = .02$ , also consistent 630 631 with our reasoning. This can be seen by the downward-sloping lines in Figure 2b.


## THE PREFERENCE FOR ATTITUDE NEUTRALITY

632 Figure 2a

633

635

634 Association of Preference for Neutrality and Structural Ambivalence Across 10 Attitude Objects




Note. Individual lines represent object-specific associations of the variables noted above. "GMOs": Genetically Modified Organisms.
"UBI": Universal Basic Income. X-axis scores are grand-mean centered. Higher Y-axis scores represent more structural ambivalence
and are calculated through the Griffin formula (i.e., a difference score in which relatively dissimilar degrees of positive/negative
reactions decrease measured ambivalence, and more overall reactions increase ambivalence).


## THE PREFERENCE FOR ATTITUDE NEUTRALITY

## 640 Figure 2b

641 Association of Preference for Extremity and Structural Ambivalence Across 10 Attitude Objects



642



646 reactions decrease measured ambivalence, and more overall reactions increase ambivalence).

### 647 3.2.2. Attitude Preferences as Predictors of Subjective Ambivalence

648 We re-ran the analysis from the previous subsection, but analysing subjective 649 ambivalence instead of structural ambivalence. Preference for neutrality was hypothesized and 650 found to be connected with more subjective ambivalence, B = .56 [.16, .96], t(97) = 2.80, p =.006,  $R^2_c = .03$ . Once again this is seen with reasonable consistency across objects, as depicted in 651 652 Figure 3a's consistently positive slopes, suggesting solid connections between higher preference 653 for neutrality and higher felt ambivalence per object. This fulfills our expectation that people 654 who prefer neutrality regularly feel mixed about attitude objects. Unlike for structural 655 ambivalence, interest in both sides was hypothesized and found to be related to less subjective ambivalence, B = -.54 [-1.02, -.06], t(97) = -2.25, p = .027,  $R^2_c = .01$ . This is shown in Figure 3b, 656 657 where the connection between interest in both sides and reduced subjective ambivalence is also 658 quite consistent across objects. Finally, preference for extremity was unrelated to subjective ambivalence, B = .03 [-.35, .42], t(97) = .18, p = .861,  $R^2_c = .00$ . 659 660 These effects were very consistent when permitting slopes to be random across people 661 (i.e., so that people could vary in their association of attitude preference to subjective 662 ambivalence), the model for which converged this time:  $B_{\text{both-sides}} = -.64 [-1.11, -.18], t(97) = -$ 


663 2.75, p = .007,  $R^2_c = .01$ ;  $B_{neutrality-preference} = .56 [.17, .95]$ , t(97) = 2.86, p = .005,  $R^2_c = .03$ ;


664  $B_{\text{extremity-preference}} = .16 [-.22, .53], t(97) = .82, p = .413, R^2_c = .00.$ 

## THE PREFERENCE FOR ATTITUDE NEUTRALITY




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



- 670 "UBI": Universal Basic Income. X-axis scores are grand-mean centered and trace participants' "preference for neutrality" scores.
- 671 Higher Y-axis scores represent greater subjective ambivalence (e.g., feeling torn, divided about the object).

## THE PREFERENCE FOR ATTITUDE NEUTRALITY












*Note.* Individual lines represent object-specific associations of the variables noted above. "GMOs": Genetically Modified Organisms.



678 Higher Y-axis scores represent greater subjective ambivalence (e.g., feeling torn, divided about the object).

41

### 679 **3.3. Discussion**

680 Study 2's more precise examination of attitude structure yielded some interesting 681 discoveries about attitude preferences. First, it provided a double dissociation between interest in 682 both sides (which was related to less subjective ambivalence) versus preference for neutrality 683 (which was related to more subjective ambivalence), confirming Hypothesis 7. This makes sense 684 because people with an interest in both sides of topics have no reason to feel more conflicted and 685 torn about issues, because they do not necessarily internalize the positives and negatives of 686 attitude objects-they examine all possible information about topics, and presumably show the 687 same biases that most people show when weighing and integrating this information into 688 attitudinal structures (Dawson et al., 2002; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Edwards & Smith, 1996; 689 Kunda, 1987). Indeed, we know from Study 1 that people high in interest in both sides tend 690 towards more extreme opinions, and so it is unsurprising that they feel lower amounts of 691 confusion and indecision. In strong distinction, people who prefer neutrality have more co-692 present positive and negative reactions across many attitude objects, so it follows that they are 693 also feel more ambivalent.

694

### 4. Study 3

In Study 3, we wanted to examine whether attitude preferences contribute to the psychological processes underlying persuasion. This study builds on Studies 1–2 by testing whether preference for neutrality will guide responses to persuasive content, such that people high in preference for neutrality may be more likely to internalize information when that information is framed as "neutral." Furthermore, it develops the idea that preference for neutrality is an intellectually arrogant drive for neutrality (Hypothesis 1) by probing whether these individuals will be more persuaded by any information when it is flagged as neutral or

### THE PREFERENCE FOR ATTITUDE NEUTRALITY

moderate *regardless of the actual valence of the information* (Hypothesis 8). This test can provide additional evidence that preference for neutrality is a fundamental commitment by showing a preference for information labeled as fulfilling the attitudinal goal, just as conservatives/liberals prefer information labeled as conservative/liberal even when the policy itself remains unchanged (Cohen, 2003). Ironically, this preference may not always lead to neutral attitudes, as we will demonstrate.

708 To do this, we introduced participants to an unfamiliar attitude object, lemphurs (an 709 ostensibly real animal), and asked for their initial opinions about it. Then we exposed 710 participants to different versions of an argument about why lemphurs are good creatures, which 711 held all information constant, but merely labeled the argument's source as being "moderate," 712 "extreme," or neither. In this way, we could examine whether the mere labeling of the source of 713 information as conforming to people's attitude preferences could shape whether they accepted 714 that information. That is, we hoped to create circumstances in which matching of information to 715 recipients' underlying preferences might instigate a bias favoring persuasion (Luttrell et al., 716 2021; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Teeny et al., 2021). This study is also relevant to Hypothesis 6 717 because participants' judgments of a speaker whose position is arbitrarily labeled as extreme or 718 neutral may depend on the participants' preference for neutrality or extremity.

719 **4.1. Method** 

### 720 4.1.1. Participants

We followed a time-based rule: recruitment for two academic semesters, with a goal of reaching 100 participants for each of the three between-subject conditions. We stopped after the second semester, having reached approximately this number: 274. No participants were removed. We have 80% power to find (expected) crossover interactions with simple slopes of r = +.25 and

-.25 (see SOM-3 for details), slightly falling short of Richard et al.'s (2003) average effect size in social psychology. We recruited students from a Northern UK university to participate online for course credit; 67.4% were White, 24.4% Asian, .8% Black, and 7.4% mixed;  $M_{age} = 19.6$ ,  $SD_{age}$ = 2.3; 82.4% women, 15.6% men, 1.2% non-binary/third gender, .8% preferred not to answer.

729 *4.1.2. Procedure* 

730 In Study 3, we wanted to maximize the opportunity for our constructs to demonstrate 731 their persuasive influence, so we introduced participants to an unfamiliar object, an ostensibly 732 real creature called a lemphur (a common paradigm in persuasion psychology; Fabrigar & Petty, 733 1999; Guyer et al., 2018; Haddock et al., 2008; Rocklage & Fazio, 2015; See et al., 2013). We 734 asked all participants to evaluate lemphurs, "even if you have not heard of them before," on eight 735 items from Crites et al., 1994 (items rated 1 = not at all to 9 = definitely; M = 1.36, SD = 2.48,  $\alpha$ 736 = .94; order randomized). Four items were positive, four negative; we subtracted their negative 737 from their positive reactions to form an attitudes index.

738 Next, we asked participants to read some positive information about lemphurs, describing 739 lemphurs' high intelligence, low mortality rate, nutritious meat, et cetera. All participants 740 received identical information about lemphurs, always provided by "Mr. Brown," a "hobbyist 741 who maintains a blog about lemphurs." We framed it this way to make Mr. Brown's credibility 742 somewhat ambiguous, so that the matching of the message's framing to the recipients' 743 personality could hopefully exert a persuasive influence. Despite the information being held 744 constant, we randomly assigned participants to one of three between-participant framing 745 conditions. In the control condition, participants simply learned that Mr. Brown "is interested in 746 [lemphurs]. In the neutrality condition, we told participants that Mr. Brown "has very moderate 747 opinions about lemphurs" (emphasis in original). In the extremity condition, we told participants

### THE PREFERENCE FOR ATTITUDE NEUTRALITY

that Mr. Brown "has <u>very extreme opinions</u> about lemphurs" (emphasis in original). Thus, the
neutrality and extremity conditions' texts differed on only a single word, with the remaining 415
words remaining consistent (99.8% content overlap).

751 Once participants read the passage, we asked them to rate lemphurs again on the attitude 752 items that they previously completed (M = 4.18, SD = 2.37,  $\alpha = .95$ ). We also asked them to rate 753 the writer on a series of moral and competence evaluations as per Study 1 (Wojciszke et al., 754 1998;  $M_{\text{morality}} = 4.42$ , SD = .95,  $\alpha = .86$ ;  $M_{\text{competence}} = 4.65$ , SD = .91,  $\alpha = .85$ ). Finally, we had them complete the attitude preferences scale ( $M_{\text{prefneutral}} = 2.91$ , SD = .63;  $M_{\text{bothsides}} = 4.25$ , SD =755 756 .51;  $M_{\text{extpref}} = 2.66$ , SD = .59;  $\alpha = .92 - .94$ ). Because preference for neutrality promotes a biased 757 preference for neutral over extremist others (Hypothesis 6, Study 1), and a reduced tendency to 758 hold extreme attitudes (Hypothesis 4-5, Study 1), we reasoned that preference for neutrality 759 should increase positive evaluations and persuasion by arguments when they are framed as 760 neutral versus extremist. The reverse should occur for preference for extremity.

761 **4.2. Results** 

### 762 4.2.1. Persuasion Effects

We hypothesized that people would be more persuaded when a persuasive message was merely labeled as fulfilling their attitude preferences (Hypothesis 8). To this effect, we regressed several dependent variables onto a contrast code representing the degree to which the framing suggested extremity versus neutrality (neutrality label = -0.5, control group = 0, extremity label = +0.5), the three attitude preferences, and all possible two-way interactions between the contrast code and the attitude preferences. Table 5 shows the effects from this regression analysis and the
 analyses corresponding to the next two subsections.<sup>7</sup>


770 First, we found that interest in both sides was related to more persuasion; this effect was 771 not moderated by framing, and so is consistent with our conception of interest in both sides 772 motivating an openness to all types of novel information. Also, unsurprisingly, pre-persuasion 773 attitudes were associated with post-persuasion attitudes. More crucial was an interaction between 774 preference for neutrality and framing. The influence of the extreme versus neutral label yielded 775 no persuasive effect when people were low in preference for neutrality (-1 SD), B = .13, SE =.47, t(229) = .27, p = .785, but it significantly reduced persuasion at high (+1 SD) levels of 776 777 preference for neutrality, B = -1.25, SE = .49, t(229) = -2.55, p = .012. Ironically, as the green 778 "extremity frame" slope line in Figure 4a demonstrates, high preference for neutrality people (on 779 the right) were much less neutral (specifically, they were more negative) than were moderate 780 preference for neutrality people (in the center) given an extremity-framed message.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Adding a second contrast code contrasting control (+.50) versus the two frame conditions (-.25, -.25) as a main and interactive effect (with the attitude preference measures) had no meaningful effect on the hypothesized results (see open syntax), so to reduce Table 5's complexity we used this simpler analysis.

# **Table 5**


Regression Analyses of Attitude Preferences and Framing Predicting Post-Persuasion Outcomes (Study 3)

	Dependent Variable: Persuasion				Dependent Variable: Perceived morality				Dependent Variable: Perceived competence						
	В	r	SE	t	р	В	r	SE	t	р	В	r	SE	t	р
A. Framing contrast (high = extreme)	56	10	.34	-1.65	.100	23	10	.15	-1.56	.121	15	07	.14	-1.07	.284
B. Interest in both sides	1.61	.34	.27	5.88	<.001	.29	.15	.12	2.42	.016	.32	.18	.11	2.80	.005
C. Preference for neutrality	29	08	.22	-1.32	.188	.01	.01	.10	.15	.885	.05	.03	.09	.49	.626
D. Preference for extremity	24	06	.25	-1.00	.321	.24	.15	.11	2.31	.022	.26	.16	.10	2.52	.012
AXB	08	01	.66	12	.902	43	10	.29	-1.49	.138	27	06	.28	96	.339
AXC	-1.08	12	.53	-2.04	.042	48	13	.23	-2.08	.039	46	13	.22	-2.10	.037
A X D	49	05	.58	83	.406	16	04	.25	63	.527	03	01	.24	12	.908
E. Time-1 measure of attitude	.30 .31 .06 5.41 <.001				<.001	N/A				N/A					
Model fit statistics	<i>F</i> (8, 2 .24	29) = 9	9.10, p	<i>v</i> < .001	$, R^2 =$	F(7, 2	235) = 2	2.61, p	= .013, <i>F</i>	$R^2 = .07$	F(7, 2	235) = 2	.65, <i>p</i> =	= .012, <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	= .07






# 788 Effects of Message Framing and Preference for Neutrality on Persuasion (Study 3)



789

*Note.* Shaded region represents 95% confidence intervals. X-axis scores trace participants' preference for neutrality and are centered




792 persuasion.

793 Figure 4b


## 794

# 795 Effects of Message Framing and Preference for Neutrality on Moral Judgments (Study 3)







797 Note. Shaded region represents 95% confidence intervals. X-axis scores trace participants' preference for neutrality and are centered



799 Figure 4c







802

803 Note. Shaded region represents 95% confidence intervals. X-axis scores trace participants' preference for neutrality and are centered

804 around zero. Y-axis scores represent judgments of the message writer's competence; higher scores suggest more positive views.

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## 805 4.2.2. Evaluations of the Writer

806 Finally, we examine evaluations made of the writer. Some of these effects parallel the 807 persuasion effects we detected in section 4.2.1, in that just like interest in both sides was related 808 to more persuasion, interest in both sides also was related to an increased perception that the 809 source was more moral and competent, regardless of framing. Additionally, just as preference for 810 neutrality was related to less persuasion given an extreme-labeled vs moderation-labeled source, 811 preference for neutrality was related to disparagement of the source on both moral and 812 competence dimensions in the same pattern (see Table 5, and Figures 4b-4c). This effect can 813 also be seen as a replication of Study 1 (Hypothesis 6): preference for neutrality relates to more 814 (less) liking of neutral (extremist) others. Specifically, at low levels of preference for neutrality (-815 1 SD), people did not see the source as more/less moral, B = .07, SE = .20, t(235) = .37, p = .715, 816 or competent, B = .14, SE = .19, t(235) = .73, p = .466, based on framing. However, at high 817 levels of preference for neutrality (+1 SD), people saw an extremism-labeled source as less 818 moral, B = -.53, SE = .21, t(235) = -2.51, p = .013, and less competent, B = -.44, SE = .20, t(235)819 = -2.19, p = .030, based on the single word "extreme" versus "moderate" used to frame that 820 target person.

### 821 **4.3. Discussion**

Hypothesis 8 was supported with higher preference for neutrality linked to more positive receptions of information framed as coming from a moderate versus extremist, not only in terms of moral and competence evaluations of the source labeled as such, but also in terms of persuasion to messages framed this way. This result is also interesting because the message was precisely identical in the various framing conditions. Such an effect shows the biased nature of preference for neutrality in that the mere label of neutrality is sufficient to drive substantial

828 persuasion differences. Although of secondary importance compared to preference for neutrality, 829 we were surprised that a parallel framing effect did not emerge for preference for extremity as 830 hypothesized. This could simply represent a Type II error, but another possible interpretation is 831 that preference for extremity is not as responsive to mere labels of 'neutrality' and 'extremity' 832 and instead requires information to be genuinely extreme. Alternatively, consistent with the 833 stronger effects on attitude extremity for controversial versus non-controversial topics in Study 834 1, preference for extremity may more strongly predict reactions to controversial topics, a 835 category that lemphurs would not fall into.

People high in preference for neutrality reacted so negatively to the extremity framed information that they ended up with less neutral (specifically, negative) attitudes than low preference for neutrality people in this condition. Because the persuasive message always offered positively-valenced information, these negative attitudes may have reflected a rejection of the "extreme" source's arguments—ironically, such an extreme rejection that they ended up less attitudinally neutral than people who prefer neutrality less.

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### 5. General Discussion

### 843 **5.1. Summary**

Across three main and two supplementary studies, testing eight hypotheses, we examined distinct psychological orientations people have towards particular attitude positions, and how these orientations to attitude positions may have important implications for their reactions to other people, objects, and information. We found evidence for three independent constructs: a desire for learning about both sides of a topic, a preference for neutral opinions, and a preference for extreme opinions. These multiple motivations regarding attitude positions were distinct from one another and uniquely related to biased perceptions of others, the processing of evaluative

851 information, patterns of attitude position and structure, and more. We examined these constructs 852 across multiple types of test (correlations with established measures in Study 1, associations with 853 sets of attitude objects in Study 2, a persuasion paradigm in Study 3). Furthermore, the attitude 854 objects represented across studies were diverse; some were politically trivial, uncontroversial, 855 and non-polarized (Study 1's original DAM measure; Study 3's lemphur), others were politically 856 important and controversial but not clearly left-wing/right-wing polarized (Study 2's objects like 857 GMOs, nuclear power), and others were politically important, controversial, and polarized 858 (Study 1's objects like abortion, BLM, quotas for women in STEM, abortion). 859 The first major theoretical advance is demonstrating that there are people who strongly 860 prefer neutrality. We found evidence that these people are low in intellectual humility and are 861 relatively disinterested in thinking. Their relatively neutral attitudes and high degree of structural 862 and subjective ambivalence demonstrate successful cultivation of their desired attitude positions. 863 They also showed a biased preference when evaluating others, holding positive views of others 864 with more neutral positions, paralleling patterns typically associated with attitude-extreme 865 individuals (van der Pligt et al., 1983). They engaged in biased information processing about a 866 novel attitude object in which persuasive content arbitrarily framed as neutral (vs extreme) was 867 more compelling to them. People preferring neutrality also were more likely to be political 868 centrist in two samples. In sum, the neutrality preferences are linked with successful, relatively 869 uncritical pursuit of neutrality.

Notably, preference for neutrality differed starkly from the concept of open-minded
interest in learning about multiple sides in attitude controversies. The latter group was openminded, curious, and intellectually humble, seeking to understand each topic by learning
information regardless of valence or opposition to their views. Interestingly, this open-minded

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gathering of information did not lead people to consistently take neutral positions. Those who scored high versus low on interest in both sides actually had more extreme attitude positions and felt less ambivalent. This makes sense given that open-minded thinkers were also likely to enjoy thinking more (i.e., higher on need for cognition): people tend to polarize when they think

878 extensively about attitude objects, even when trying to be unbiased (Lord et al., 1984).

879 Finally, the notion that some people prefer extremity is relatively less novel, but it 880 nevertheless was important to demonstrate that preference for neutrality was not simply the 881 inverse of extremity preference, which we demonstrate across several outcomes. Extremity 882 preferring people exhibit patterns resembling past work concerning dogmatism (Hanson, 1973), 883 the need to evaluate (Jarvis & Petty, 1996), and studies of attitude extremity per se. They 884 expressed a desire to form strong, extreme evaluations, and we found that they had more extreme 885 and less ambivalent attitudes. We found evidence that they were less intellectually humble and 886 more close-minded, suggesting an inflexible stance on these extreme positions. Those high on 887 preference for extremity were dogged in their desire to form strong evaluations and this was 888 reflected in a biased preference for attitude-extremists over attitude-neutrals. These findings echo 889 the bulk of the literature, which identifies those with extreme attitudes as having strong attitudes 890 (Abelson, 1995), distrustful of contrary information (Gunther, 1988), judgmental of counter-891 attitudinal others (van der Pligt et al., 1983), personally identifying with their extreme attitudes 892 (Westfall & Van Boven, 2015), and prone to further polarization (Miller et al., 1993).

## 893 **5.2. Implications and Future Directions**

894 5.2.1. Preference for Neutrality

895 One major contribution of this work is preference for neutrality itself, an individual
896 difference variable which intriguingly reveals how an excessive preference for attitude neutrality

can, perhaps ironically, become a close-minded form of intellectual arrogance itself. Although 897 898 we agree that polarization concerning a range of important social issues is a serious and 899 potentially growing problem in the Western world (Abelson, 1995; van Boven et al., 2012), we 900 also think it is important not to overlook an unquestioned attraction to middle positions. There is 901 nothing wrong with holding neutral attitudes in themselves, but many of our findings concerning 902 preference for neutrality (i.e., a deep, uncritical belief that neutral positions are globally superior) 903 may raise concerns. Rather than reflecting curious open-mindedness or the mere lack of an 904 opinion, it represents a strong, a priori view of what is true, which also skews evaluations of 905 other kinds of attitude-holders. Neutrality in the face of evidence that clearly supports one side 906 over the other may prevent people from addressing major social issues. Given that only Study 1 907 assessed politically polarized topics specifically, however, future data applying attitude 908 preferences to political polarization will be helpful in testing this possibility.

909 One interesting possibility is that these patterns stem from a moralized stance towards 910 neutrality in which neutrality becomes a tribal identity commitment, like the group identities 911 fostered through political identities (Clark et al., 2019; Graham et al., 2012; Sowell, 2002). 912 Several preference for neutrality items assert neutrality's moral superiority (e.g., "striving to 913 remain neutral on most topics is a virtuous stance"; "...taking a neutral stance is often an act of 914 bravery"). Studies 1 and 3 assessed this moral conviction indirectly through its effects on 915 perceptions of others. We had reasoned that since our neutrality and extremity preferring 916 participants seemed to believe that holding neutral (extreme) attitudes is virtuous, this would bias 917 the ways that they encountered new people and information. Indeed, perceived morality is a key 918 component of impression formation (e.g., Brambilla et al., 2012, 2021) and so seeing other 919 people as violating a moral principle ("thou shalt hold neutral attitudes") should and did greatly

920 impact perceptions of others. Accordingly, Study 1 revealed that preference for neutrality 921 positively relates to a valuing of moderation as a general moral value, evidenced by a strong anti-922 extremist bias and a strong preference for neutral attitude holders (Drolet et al., 2021). This is 923 interesting because moral attitudes are usually more extreme (e.g., Skitka et al., 2005), but 924 people high in preference for neutrality judge others as immoral for not holding *neutral* stances. 925 Future connections of our constructs to the attitude extremity literature could be 926 productive. For example, past work suggests that people sometimes process persuasive passages 927 more carefully when they contain linguistic markers suggesting attitude extremity (e.g., "she 928 detested him" versus "she didn't like him"; Craig & Blankenship, 2011, p. 291; also see 929 Blankenship & Craig, 2011). This increased processing encompasses both more persuasive 930 benefit of strong over weak arguments, and more behavioral intentions formed in connection 931 with resulting attitudes. The most likely connection with our constructs is that preferences for 932 neutrality (extremity) will simply prompt more rejection (acceptance) of messages that include 933 more linguistic cues of extremity. This result would be almost a conceptual replication of the 934 present Study 3. However, under other circumstances it may be that preferences for neutrality 935 (extremity) will attenuate (amplify) the processing benefit cued by linguistic extremity markers. 936 That is, our attitude preferences may lead people to be more cognitively engaged by messages 937 whose linguistic markers match rather than mismatch their preferences. A broad literature on 938 message matching effects (for a review, see Teeny et al., 2021) delineates conditions under 939 which such matching of linguistic style to recipient attitudinal preference might produce 940 directional bias effects versus processing effects. Relatedly, extreme (vs non extreme) attitude-941 holders have distinct linguistic characteristics (e.g., more confident, more "you" pronouns; Van

Swol et al., 2016); it would be interesting know if attitude preferences are responsive even tothese more indirect cues of a source's attitude extremity.

944 We have generally focused on drawbacks of preference for neutrality, but future work 945 could examine some positive aspects of this construct. In an increasingly polarized political 946 environment (Gidron et al., 2019; Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021), the preference for neutrality 947 may be helpful in moderating people's likelihood of polarizing. This may be particularly 948 important when faced with meaning threats (e.g., mortality threat) because such threats motivate 949 people to embrace their underlying ideologies (McGregor et al., 2010) as a means of buffering 950 against these threats. This typically results in polarization (i.e., McGregor et al., 2013) but 951 preference for neutrality might relate to depolarization under the same conditions (because for 952 neutrality-preferring people, neutrality is their ideology). Furthermore, preference for neutrality 953 might reduce the tendency for groups to split into polarized camps when debating (e.g., Bail et 954 al., 2018) insofar as polarizing is antithetical to maintaining neutrality.

955 Indeed, the social consequences of preference for neutrality might be intriguing. Because 956 neutrality preferring people are more ambivalent and less extreme, they might be able to 957 moderate between polarized camps by representing a compromise position. Preference for 958 neutrality may also moderate groupthink effects (Janis, 1972; Janis & Mann, 1977) by 959 influencing the group's perception of information. A consistent neutrality motivation might help 960 to reduce this tendency for groups to increasingly favor ideas without due criticism. Perhaps 961 relatedly, neutrality preferring people might prefer neutral emotions (Gasper et al., 2019) and 962 engage in mood regulation efforts (Larsen, 2000) to maintain emotional equanimity, which might 963 affect group interactions by cooling off the hot emotions that commonly emerge in debates 964 (Wollebæk et al., 2019).

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### 965 5.2.2. Meta-attitudes

966 Ostrom (1989) argued that attitude theory and measurement are intertwined. In the 967 present case, the fact that people vary meaningfully in their attitudes about their attitudes—and 968 that such variance can be validly measured –signals something theoretically noteworthy about 969 the nature of attitudes. Specifically, the present findings reveal an interesting form of attitudinal 970 metacognition, in that preferences for extremity or neutrality entails evaluating one's evaluations 971 (Petty, 2006; Petty et al., 2007). For instance, the preference for neutrality involves a sometimes 972 strong liking of attitude positions that avoid liking and disliking. Furthermore, our findings 973 reveal that people can be at least aware of what these metacognitive standards. Desiring an 974 attitude which is other than what one currently holds is common (DeMarree & Rios, 2014), but 975 research on these desires usually examines people's desires to like/dislike specific attitude 976 objects (DeMarree et al., 2014, 2017; Vaughan-Johnston et al., 2023). In contrast, in the present 977 work we highlight more global metacognitions about one's (and others') attitudes. 978 We propose that overarching preferences towards particular attitude positions (held

across attitude objects in general) can be considered *meta-attitudes*, in that they characterize
attitudes towards attitudinal positions and structures. For instance, preference for neutrality
involves a very positive attitude towards neutral attitudes, and preference for extremity a very
positive attitude towards extreme attitudes. Thus, these two constructs capture attitudes towards *attitude positions*. The interest in both sides is distinct because it suggests an attitude towards
certain *attitude bases*; specifically, positive attitude towards attitudes formed from high
information across multiple valences.

We think the notion of meta-attitudes is helpful to organize thinking about individualdifferences in the attitudes literature. Meta-attitudes have been studied at least indirectly. For

988 example, the need for affect (Maio & Esses, 2001) and need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1984; 989 Petty et al., 2009) may be viewed as relatively direct measures of people's preferences for 990 distinct types of *attitude content* (with important consequences for persuasion: Haddock et al., 991 2008; also see See et al., 2008, 2013). High (low) self-monitors are known to gravitate towards 992 social-adjustive (utilitarian) information (Shavitt et al., 1992), and can thus be viewed as 993 indirectly capturing individual difference variance in meta-attitudes for attitude functions. 994 Furthermore, DeMarree and colleagues (2020) found that the desire to pursue high-certainty 995 attitudes is stable across objects and scenarios, possibly suggesting individual differences in 996 meta-attitudes concerning one type of attitude strength. 997 Studying meta-attitudes more explicitly, as in the present work, may be useful because it 998 may highlight constructs that have not yet been studied. For example, some individuals tend to 999 have more positive or negative attitudes towards objects in general (Hepler & Albarracín, 2013), 1000 but we are not aware of research concerning people's attitudes towards positive or negative 1001 attitudes. Yet such a construct would follow logically from a meta-attitudes perspective because 1002 attitude positivity and negativity are elements of attitude position, just like neutrality and 1003 extremity. People who prefer positivity/negativity might differ interestingly from those who just 1004 happen to have positive/negative attitudes (as examined by Hepler & Albarracín, 2013) in that 1005 only the former should strongly pursue new positive/negative information. Both constructs might 1006 relate to preferring other people with positive/negative attitudes, but for different reasons. For 1007 those who prefer positivity/negativity, this would reflect an evaluation of how well other people 1008 fulfill one's own standards; for those who simply have many positive/negative attitudes, it would 1009 reflect homophily (Ertug et al., 2022; McPherson et al., 2001).

1010 One additional direction of note would involve combining meta-attitudinal properties. 1011 For example, an anonymous reviewer suggested that it would be useful to understand whether 1012 some people pursue neutrality or extremity for (e.g.) epistemic versus social reasons, or through 1013 more heuristic versus systematic elaboration. Our present preference for neutrality and extremity 1014 scales employ items that straddle attitude function dimensions, such as preference for neutrality 1015 items that reference value-based, social, epistemic, and utilitarian advantages of neutrality. 1016 However, future work that investigates how people prioritize and weight multiple of the above-1017 noted dimensions (function, position, content, strength) could lead to a range of theoretical 1018 novelties. For example, does a preference for neutrality predicated in different functions, or 1019 combined with varying motivation to maximize attitude certainty, influence information 1020 processing differently? Relatedly, some people might be higher or lower in their commitment to 1021 generally neutral or extreme attitudes, just as people vary in their commitment to specific desired 1022 attitudes positions (DeMarree et al., 2017). Past research suggests that high versus low 1023 commitment to constructs can increase the predictive validity of those constructs (DeMarree et 1024 al., 2017; Petty et al., 1995; Shoots-Reinhard et al., 2014).

1025 An exciting future research direction concerns the antecedents of preference for neutrality 1026 and meta-attitudes more broadly. We suspect that many variables may contribute to these beliefs 1027 arising within people. At the macroenvironmental level, journalists and other media personalities 1028 sometimes implicitly suggest that "the truth must lie in the middle" by giving equal speaking 1029 time even to epistemically unequal scientific sides (O'Connor & Weatherall, 2019; Oreskes & 1030 Conway, 2011), potentially encouraging a preference for neutrality. Microenvironmental factors 1031 like parenting styles also could contribute to attitude preferences. Past work has focused on 1032 parental influences on developing political reasoning and morality, often with a focus on roots of

political radicalization (Altemeyer, 1996; McClosky & Chong, 1985), so understanding how
parenting may foster a comparatively strong enthusiasm for neutrality would be enlightening.
Finally, past researchers have shown that attitude positions can be heritable (Olson et al., 2001);
an intriguing future research direction would explore whether meta-attitudes are at least
somewhat genetically mediated.

### 1038 **5.3. Limitations and Constraints on Generality**

1039 One possible objection to this set of findings is that we did not explicitly assess 1040 satisficing or disinterest in social topics, which could offer an alternative explanation for our 1041 results. For instance, some people might not really have cultivated attitudes towards most 1042 attitude objects, and might be described as holding inconsequential "nonattitudes" (see, e.g., 1043 Converse, 1974). These individuals might then default to neutral attitude responding as a form of 1044 satisficing, such as giving an uncommitted middle response as a default answer, potentially 1045 explaining the association of preference for neutrality with lower extremity and possibly higher 1046 ambivalence. The problem with this objection is that satisficing should not result in major 1047 consequences beyond selecting middlemost options. In other words, if some participants were 1048 simply satisficing they should not show any preference for an author or message that is 1049 arbitrarily labeled as "moderate" versus "extreme." Similarly, if people were simply holders of 1050 non-attitudes they should hold very weak and inconsequential attitudes and should be highly 1051 susceptible to persuasion regardless of message framing. Instead, we find that the 1052 characterization of others is especially consequential for those with a preference for neutrality 1053 (Study 1 and 3). We might also expect preference for neutrality to be negatively related to 1054 curiosity if they are simply disinterested in social topics, but instead Study 1 shows a near-zero 1055 association. This constellation of effects is therefore important because it suggests that these

meta-attitudes about global attitude positions are not simply a set of response patterns or the
absence of an attitude. Indeed, we think that our meta-attitudinal constructs carry important
implications for interpersonal dynamics and negotiation, information pursuit and processing,
self-perception, and beyond.
Our samples were primarily composed of young adult women in Study 1 and 3 (Study 2

1061 was only 58% women, with an average age of 38). Our conception of attitude preferences does 1062 not suggest any constraints on generalisability across these dimensions, and our data do not 1063 support any robust gender-based differences (and gender added as an interactive covariate was 1064 seldom significant and did not change any analyses meaningfully; see SOM-3). We did find that 1065 older participants in the only study with meaningful age variation (Study 2) were higher in 1066 interest in both sides, r(99) = .26, p = .010, and lower in the preference for extremity, r(99) = -.24, p = .014, but not different in preference for neutrality, r(99) = .04, p = .691. Future research, 1067 1068 possibly with representative sampling, might better probe whether these demographic factors 1069 meaningfully change the psychological influences of our constructs.

1070 Furthermore, our samples are overwhelmingly from Western cultures and our effects may 1071 require nuanced theoretical thinking to apply to non-Western populations. Preference for 1072 neutrality may initially sound like a philosophical orientation similar to dialectic or Zhongyong 1073 thinking, a common Confucian orientation to the world which places value on maintaining 1074 thoughts which are not extreme (Chiu, 2000; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). However, an 1075 important difference is that "dialecticism predisposes people to more openly consider attitude-1076 relevant information regardless of its valence" (Luttrell et al., 2022, p. 828), which if anything 1077 makes dialecticism more comparable to our interest in both sides construct. Given research 1078 suggesting that dialecticism is associated with a reduction of depressive symptoms and enhanced

subjective well-being for those who engage in this form of thinking (Yang et al., 2016), we look
forward to future work examining how dialecticism is related to interest in both sides and
preference for neutrality.

1082 Another possible constraint is whether attitude preferences are equally applicable for 1083 controversial and non-controversial attitude objects. In principle, we think the attitudes 1084 preferences are relevant for both sorts of objects. In Study 1, although preference for neutrality 1085 was associated with less attitudinal extremity towards controversial objects and more political 1086 centrism, it was not related to extremity for non-controversial objects. In Study 2, preference for 1087 neutrality again related to attitude structures for a mostly controversial set of objects. However, 1088 in Study 3, attitude preferences related to attitudes towards lemphurs, which were not 1089 characterised as controversial. Thus, it is unclear if objects must be controversial for attitude 1090 preferences to capture variance in them. We interpret that the Study 1 discrepancy between 1091 controversial and non-controversial objects is attributable to a measurement difference-1092 controversial objects by definition produce more variable attitudes, whereas non-controversial 1093 objects may have range restriction issues. Across the studies as a whole, it seems that attitude 1094 preferences have a broad utility that encompasses more controversial and less controversial 1095 issues.

### 1096 **5.4. Conclusion**

1097 Our present studies provide some interesting and often concerning observations about the 1098 preference for neutrality. For example, despite their elevated ambivalence about a range of 1099 topics, those who most strongly prefer neutrality appear low in intellectual humility; dislike other 1100 people with pronounced, non-neutral views, and see themselves as self-censoring to deal with 1101 disagreement; and reject information that is arbitrarily labeled as extreme versus moderate. This

1102	constellation of findings represents, in our view, a potential hazard to the wellbeing of
1103	deliberative democracies, in which we might hope citizens will exchange opinions with a
1104	genuine curiosity about others' viewpoints, and engage with perspectives different from their
1105	own. At least in its strongest form, then, "motivated neutrality" can be concerning in many of the
1106	same ways that political extremity is concerning. We hope the present findings stimulate future
1107	research and discussion about how to best address the most problematic extremes of neutrality.

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