



**News Values in International News: A  
Cross-Lingual Corpus-Assisted Discourse Study  
of the Arab Spring's Representations in Arabic  
and English Web-Based News by Al Jazeera  
and the BBC**

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**M.A. (Applied Linguistics)**

**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy**

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**September 2024**

## *Abstract*

In this thesis, I research comparative discursive practices in international web-based news media delivered in Arabic and English. I employ both cross-linguistic corpus linguistics (Vessey 2013; Taylor 2014) and discursive news values approach (Bednarek and Caple 2017) to investigate how reporting of the same events by the same news outlet in two languages may index different news values and may result in different or even contradictory representations of particular political and social actions and participants. This is of interest because it adds empirical support to the notion of ‘representation’ in the reporting of events (Hall 1980) and problematizes the notion that an individual news source has a coherent news story or stance. Using the News Values approach (Bednarek and Caple 2017), political and social actions and participants in the "Arab Spring" are examined in articles in Arabic and English from two international news outlets, Al-Jazeera and the BBC. An original contribution of this thesis is the development of a more culturally-sensitive series of New Values.

This evaluation-analysis of the cross-linguistic/cultural corpora also reveals a downscaling of news audience cultures in Al-Jazeera (delivered in Arabic) and Aljazeera English compared to the one-sided discursive practice of BBC News (delivered in English) and BBC Arabic. Both Aljazeera and the BBC offer evidence of how discourse features change to represent political and social participants in the “Arab Spring” from differing cross-linguistic/cultural perspectives.

## *Declaration*

This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated, and the thesis has not been edited by a third party beyond what is permitted by Cardiff University's Policy on the Use of Third Party Editors by Research Degree Students. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references. The views expressed are my own.

Banan Assiri.

## *Acknowledgement*

I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Michael Handford, for his unwavering support, guidance, and expertise in the field. His patience, understanding, and encouragement illuminated my path and kept my work on track. Mike's enthusiasm and support allowed me to pursue my ambitious plans and achieve my best throughout this project. Without his mentorship, completing this research would have been challenging.

I extend my heartfelt thanks to the staff at the Centre for Language and Communication Research at Cardiff University. Their support and the friendly academic environment were invaluable. Special thanks to the Postgraduate Managing Team, particularly Rhian Rattray, whose wise and serious handling of study issues and problems was instrumental in navigating my master's and doctoral journey.

To my family, whose encouraging words and support transcended the great distance between us, I am profoundly grateful. My father, Prof. Abdulrahman Assiri, instilled in me the value of education from a young age and inspired me to pursue higher studies. Millions of thanks may not be enough to express my gratitude. To my supportive sisters and brother, Rabab, Maison, Ameena, Roqaya, Jinan, and Muthanna, you are the stars of my life.

To my husband Aymen and my daughters, Yaman and Noran, my closest companions on this journey, your presence brought warmth and peace during the most challenging times. I cannot imagine this journey without you.

Lastly, I express my sincere gratitude to the Saudi Cultural Bureau in London and King Khalid University for their help and support.

## *Note on Transliteration and Translation*

This thesis deals with Arabic news items that have been translated into English. Given the linguistic focus of this research, it is crucial to clarify the approach to handling Arabic terms and names throughout the document.

### Transliteration System:

From Chapter 3 to 8, Arabic terms and names (including those of journalists, royalty, and authors) are transliterated into English using the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES<sup>1</sup>) transliteration system (see Appendix 1.1). However, certain words with accepted English spellings, such as "Mubarak" and "Muslim Brothers" are spelled according to English norms as per IJMES guidelines (Cambridge Core, 2022). Also, Arabic names (e.g., politicians, journalists, organisations) and terms derived from the data are also transliterated using the IJMES system. Also, names of countries, cities, and treaties are spelled according to their common English usage (e.g., Egypt, Bahrain).

Regarding the Translation Approach For quotations from Arabic data, a contextual rather than literal translation approach has been adopted to convey the intended meaning accurately. To ensure comprehensive translation, particularly for media discourse, the Professional Translation Tool Reverso<sup>2</sup> was consulted. This approach to translation considers not only the individual words but also their context, concordance lines, and extended texts, aligning with cultural translation principles rather than direct word-for-word translation.

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<sup>1</sup> Guidelines can be found at [http://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/IJMES\\_Translation\\_and\\_Transliteration\\_Guide.htm](http://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/IJMES_Translation_and_Transliteration_Guide.htm).

<sup>2</sup> <https://context.reverso.net/translation/>

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## *Abbreviations*

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CL: Corpus Linguistics

CADS: Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies

CACDS: Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Studies

DNVA: Discursive News Values Approach

ALJEN: Al-Jazeera English Corpus, composed of articles collected from Al-Jazeera English

ALJAR: Al-Jazeera Arabic Corpus, composed of articles collected from Al-Jazeera

BBCEN: BBC English Corpus, composed of articles collected from the BBC News

BBCAR: BBC Arabic Corpus, composed of articles collected from the BBC Arabic

## *Glossing Conventions*

*Italics* – Indicates original words and/or examples extracted from the English data and the English translation of Arabic data. Captions are italicised.

' ' – Indicates direct voices quoted in the data. " " – Indicates words quoted from the works cited.

*Italics* and **bold** – The unnumbered sections

# **Chapter One: Introduction and Background**

## **1.1. Introduction**

In this thesis, I investigate the newsworthiness of representations of the Arab Spring's participants and voices in the Arabic and English web-based news discourse of Al-Jazeera and the BBC, using a corpus-assisted discourse analysis approach. This chapter provides a brief background for the study, starting by explaining the background of the Arab Spring and the multidimensions of the influences of its events (Section 1.2). This is followed by an outline of the specific context of my study, focusing on the Arabic and English web-based news discourse of Al-Jazeera and BBC (Section 1.3). I discuss their influence, popularity and reputation as news sources during the Arab Spring. I then introduce readers to the News Values approach used in my study (Section 1.4), before providing a rationale for the study in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 provides an overview of the study's purposes, while Section 1.7 lays out the content and structure of the study, the research questions, and how these questions are addressed in the analytical chapters.

## **1.2. Background**

The Arab Spring, a series of uprisings and protests that spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa in the early 2010s, was of immense historical importance. In order to comprehend the relevance of this thesis, it is essential to first understand the context, key events and profound effects that the Arab Spring has had on the region. This section provides a concise overview of the Arab Spring by focusing on its historical context, pivotal moments and lasting consequences. According to Van Dijk (2009), explaining the context will reveal the environment or background for the individuals involved and the language used around them, which can aid in interpreting the text within this particular sociocultural context. In the following section, I provide a brief historical background of the Arab Spring events and discuss how they were influenced by media representations.

### **1.2.1 The Arab Spring: Origins, spread and consequences**

The term "Arab Spring" refers to a revolutionary wave of protests, demonstrations and civil unrest that spread across several countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, starting in December 2010 (Khondker 2011). These mass demonstrations and uprisings first emerged in Tunisia before they proliferated to other Arab nations, including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and Morocco (Dabashi 2012; Nepstad 2013). What began as relatively small, localised, peaceful protests grew into huge nationwide demonstrations, riots and even full-fledged civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen (Rosiny and Richter 2016).



The Arab Spring uprisings were sparked by widespread grievances over perceived economic stagnation, unemployment, corruption and political repression under the authoritarian rule of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds 2013). The self-immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in response to harassment from local authorities catalysed an explosion of anger that rapidly escalated into mass protests across Tunisian cities (Aarts et al. 2017). Dissatisfied educated youth mobilised through social media to voice frustrations over the lack of economic opportunities and political freedom, eventually forcing Ben Ali to flee into exile in January 2011 after 23 years in power (Howard and Hussain 2013).

Galvanised by events in Tunisia, Egyptian activists organised mass demonstrations in Cairo on 25 January 2011, demanding democratic reforms and venting long-simmering grievances regarding Hosni Mubarak's corrupt and autocratic rule, in place since 1981 (Skinner 2011). As protests grew, despite the violent crackdowns, the Egyptian army declined to suppress civilians in Tahrir Square, a pivotal decision that eroded Mubarak's authority (Anderson 2011; Aras and Yorulmazlar 2016). With international support wavering and unrest continuing, Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011 after nearly 30 years as president; thus, within a short span of a month, sustained popular mobilisation succeeded in unseating two long-entrenched dictators in Tunisia and Egypt (Brynen 2019). These seismic events sent shockwaves throughout the region, foreshadowing a wave of civil resistance and demands for reform that became known as the Arab Spring (Lynch 2013).

As a result of the ousting of leaders in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, Libyan protests escalated into an armed uprising against the authoritarian regime of Muammar Gaddafi (Anderson 2011; Pargeter 2016). As the result of an international military intervention approved by the UN, Gaddafi was toppled and killed in late 2011 (Gaub 2014). The post-Gaddafi political order in Libya collapsed in 2014 because of military control, rival governments and ongoing civil strife (Cole and McQuinn 2015). In 2018, rival factions agreed to the UN-mediated elections; however, violence and lawlessness continued to plague the country.

Bahrain protests erupted in February 2011, following the ousting of leaders in Tunisia and Egypt. Demonstrators demanded democratic reforms and criticised the Sunni monarchy's discrimination against the country's Shia majority (Ulrichsen 2012; Matthiesen 2013). Peaceful mass sit-ins were violently suppressed when Bahraini security forces forcibly cleared protest sites in the capital city in March 2011. Dozens were killed, and widespread torture and imprisonment of activists ensued (Nuruzzaman 2013). While an international commission outlined measures for reconciliation, the monarchy retained power, and systematic repression continued against dissent (Jones 2013). During Bahrain's uprising, tensions arose between Shia protesters and the Saudi-backed Sunni government. In addition, there were geopolitical sensitivities of neighbouring Gulf states regarding perceived Iranian influence over its Shiite population (Jones 2020).

Inspired by events elsewhere, pro-reform activists organised demonstrations in Morocco in February 2011, pressing King Mohammed VI for democratic changes (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012; Desrues 2013). The initial police crackdowns ended, and the King promised constitutional changes. A referendum in July 2011 approved amendments that gave more power to the prime minister and parliament. Although they fell short of full democratisation, protests secured a measured political opening without major violence or instability (Maghraoui 2013). However, the King retained control over the security forces and substantial political authority.

Although the monarchy did not share power with the opposition, the incremental reforms demonstrated resilience in the face of regional turmoil (Hissouf 2014; Maghraoui 2020).

In March 2011, the Syrian uprising began as part of the Arab Spring Movement, which swept across the Middle East and North Africa. The Assad regime responded to the initial protests with brutal crackdowns, resulting in an increasingly violent and prolonged civil war (Gelvin 2018). In 2018, Assad had largely quelled opposition and gained control over much of the country, despite some initial defections and losses. However, the civil war resulted in more than 500,000 civilian casualties, millions of refugees and immense destruction (Heydemann 2018). Despite the fact that Assad's regime appeared to have survived with the support of Russia and Iran, by the end of 2018, he remained an international pariah due to his violations of human rights (Heydemann 2020).

In Yemen, a pro-democracy movement also took place in 2011, sparked by a regional uprising against President Saleh. During protests that failed to reach an agreement regarding the transfer of power, the military split into factions, and tribal fighters supported opposition groups (Bonney 2011; Alwazir 2021). Following Saleh's negotiated resignation, the Gulf Cooperation Council<sup>3</sup> resigned in 2012. While Saleh's party remained influential, subsequent political transitions failed to resolve rifts between the Houthis, southern separatists, and other groups, resulting in an ongoing complex, multifaceted civil war involving Saudi and Iranian regional rivalry, which punished Yemeni citizens (Hill 2017; Day and Brehony 2020).

The Arab Spring also found resonance in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In early 2011, Jordanian citizens, inspired by the popular uprisings in neighbouring countries, took to the streets demanding political reforms, greater economic opportunities and an end to corruption. Protesters voiced their concerns over a wide range of issues, including rising unemployment, limited political freedoms and perceived inequalities within the socio-economic system (Yom 2015). The demonstrations, although not as large-scale or violent compared to other countries in the region, forced King Abdullah II to initiate political reforms and dismiss his government (Yitzhak 2018). While some reforms were implemented, such as amendments to the electoral law and enhanced representation for political parties, Jordan continued to face significant challenges in balancing political stability with citizens' demands for greater democracy and social justice (Beck and Hüser 2015).

Now that the historical context of the Arab Spring has been examined, I will now delve into a comprehensive discussion on the multidimensional impact of this transformative movement. Furthermore, I will explore how its events, circumstances and consequences have been interpreted and analysed across various academic disciplines.

### **1.2.2 The Arab Spring Uprisings: A watershed moment in contemporary Middle Eastern history**

The scale and impact of the Arab Spring uprisings mark a watershed moment in contemporary Middle Eastern history. The combination of mass mobilisation and civil conflict has triggered debates about the causal factors behind regional protest movements, as well as their

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<sup>3</sup> The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a political and economic alliance of six Arab countries in the Gulf region: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

ambivalent political legacy (Dalacoura 2012; Ketchley 2017). This uprising brought tremendous political and economic disruptions across the modern Arab world. By the end of 2013, long-standing authoritarian presidents in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen were forcibly removed from power amidst these protests (Sadiki 2017). Moreover, unrest sparked ongoing civil wars in Yemen, Syria and Libya, which resulted in thousands of deaths and millions of refugees (Gelvin, 2018; Fraihat and Yaseen 2020). Scholars point to a complex mix of economic grievances, political repression and cultural factors that helped fuel this regional wave of unrest and demands for democracy (Anderson 2011; Lynch, Freelon and Aday 2014; Kabel 2022).

In contemporary Middle Eastern historiography, the Arab Spring uprisings represent a significant turning point, given their breadth and enduring reverberations. While initial demonstrations embodied long-standing economic and political grievances against autocratic governance, their trajectories diverged drastically across national contexts, from incremental reforms to state fragmentation and protracted civil conflict (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds 2015; Bank and Busse 2021; Van, Hamme and Gana 2022). In addition, the convergence of mobilised popular support with persistent authoritarian control and external involvement gave rise to unpredictable and disordered consequences (Zemni 2016). Accordingly, assessments remain contested between scholars underscoring meaningful progress in accountability and responsive governance versus those emphasising continuities in authoritarian logic and sidelining of opposition voices (Abouzzohour 2021; Ottaway 2023). A decade on, the reverberations of the Arab Spring continued to catalyse both sobering and more optimistic analyses regarding the potential for progressive and indigenous change across the region (Ahmad 2020; Hinnebusch 2020). As protests resonated globally, their academic legacy seems destined to stimulate scholarly debate for years to come, given the multifaceted drivers and uneven aftermath of these seminal events.

The Arab Spring demonstrations and revolutions have been regarded as some of the world's most important events in the past two decades (Abushouk 2016). Furthermore, the Arab Spring uprisings represent one of the most significant events in the contemporary Middle East, spurring profound political transformation and attracting intense research attention across academic disciplines (Inbar 2013; Rand 2013; Horst, Jünemann and Rothe 2016). In particular, the Arab Spring refers to the wave of pro-democracy uprisings that began in late 2010 and continued through 2011, leading to the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, as well as significant protests in several other countries (Anderson 2011; Dabashi 2012). However, the aftermath of these uprisings—often termed the 'Arab Winter'—marks a period of political instability, civil wars, and authoritarian resurgence in various Arab Spring countries, particularly from 2013 onwards (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds 2015; Gelvin 2021). While the initial phase of the Arab Spring was characterised by mass mobilisation and calls for democracy, the Arab Winter saw the rise of counter-revolutions, military interventions, and prolonged conflicts, notably in Syria, Libya and Yemen (Said 2022). This distinction is essential for understanding the long-term implications of the Arab uprisings and their representation in media discourse.

Scholars have analysed the instrumental role of social media in enabling these mass "freedom" movements (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011; Khondker 2011; Lotan et al. 2011; Howard and Hussain 2013; Markham 2014; Kübler 2019), while also examining the complex economic grievances underpinning the unrest (Campante and Chor 2012; Malik and Awadallah 2013; Talani 2015; Grinin and Korotayev 2022). Comparative discourse analyses of Arab Spring reporting show how discrete national media environments shaped divergent news frames from

Chinese versus American outlets (Ha and Shin 2019) to Belgian newspapers versus television (Van Leuven, Deprez and Raeymaeckers 2014) and the European Union's first response to the Arab Spring events (Teti 2012). Additional research underscores protests' common calls for political change and democratisation, while noting variations in each domestic uprising (Anderson 2011; Dabashi 2012; Dalacoura 2012; Nepstad 2013, Ismail 2021). Ongoing civil conflicts and democratic reversal in numerous Arab Spring countries have further catalysed scholarly examinations of post-uprising trajectories (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds 2015; Gelvin 2021; Said 2022).

Now that a brief background on the Arab Spring uprisings and how their impact reverberated far beyond national borders has been provided, the next section (Section 1.3) will examine the extensive coverage and analysis of the Arab Spring in transnational media outlets. It will specifically explore how these media outlets propelled the historic events into global consciousness, sparking discussions and debates worldwide. Analysing the media representations of the Arab Spring events is crucial for this study, as it will provide insights into the news values and discourse employed by Al-Jazeera and the BBC in their coverage of these events, thus illuminating the role of language and framing in shaping public perception and understanding of the Arab Spring across different cultural contexts.

### **1.3 Transnational media representations of the Arab Spring**

The mass media played a crucial role in capturing the Arab Spring uprisings as they unfolded rapidly. As a result, media outlets with divergent ideological leanings presented conflicting narratives of the same events (Moussa 2017; Roy 2020). Despite state-sanctioned media serving as propaganda for embattled regimes, international broadcasters such as Al Jazeera, the BBC and CNN often presented counter-discourse, in reporting of events not limited to the Arab Spring. By amplifying issues downplayed by autocratic rulers, Al Jazeera arguably disrupts the dominant discourse of Middle Eastern state broadcasters (El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002; Abusalem 2007; Darwish 2009; Al-Ghazzi 2014). Even so, its coverage remained historically constrained by competing elite discourses (Fandy 2007). Furthermore, prominent Western media outlets like the BBC and CNN also presented information from an external vantage point, despite the fact that they were providing a view that was not offered by domestic outlets (Pintak 2006; Barkho and Richardson 2010; Barkho 2011; Amer 2017). Such contrasts highlight how media constitutes a site of ideological struggle to shape public narratives and legitimise particular belief systems (Van Dijk 1995). During the initial Arab Spring uprisings which toppled rulers in Tunisia and Egypt, the battle between Al Jazeera's professed alternative Arab perspective and the piling Anglo-American media discourse (e.g. the BBC and CNN) intensified, given immersive global attention (Abdelmoula 2015). Underpinning editorial decisions to emphasise or downplay certain actions, both Arab-based and Western-based networks put forth distinct inflections, despite addressing shared events, echoing wider debates over regional versus Western views on political conflicts (Seib 2012).

During the events of the Arab Spring, media organisations from diverse backgrounds provided extensive coverage of these events, emphasising certain narratives aligned with their respective ideological stances. Consequently, these outlets focused attention on some protestors' voices and actions while marginalising others, positioning themselves to support either governmental or anti-governmental factions in the unfolding conflicts (Robertson 2013; Alalawi

2015). However, to date, limited research has analysed the cross-lingual variations in framing and ideology within the same transnational news corporations' reporting on the Arab Spring.

Most scholarship examining Arab Spring coverage in transnational media has concentrated analysis instead on a single outlet, such as Al Jazeera (Figenschou 2013; Cherkaoui 2015; Cherribi 2017; Minardi and Auzan 2022). Some studies have compared framing between two or more transcultural news organisations, contrasting networks like Fox News and Al Jazeera (Alalawi 2015) or BBC, Al-Jazeera and CNN (Robertson 2013). Bruce (2014) took a visual analysis approach, evaluating images from five transnational Arab channels. Beyond English reportage, Ismail (2021) compared Arabic web content on the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt by Al Jazeera and the BBC. However, analysis disambiguating variations between linguistic versions and ideological divergence within singular transcultural news corporations remains underexplored.

This research focuses on the hidden tension between Arabic and English perspectives within transnational news outlets. Specifically, it examines how news values are constructed and compete within Qatari and British media as they cover the Arab Spring cross-lingually. Previous research has not deeply explored how different language services within the same news organisations frame issues differently. This study, thus, helps fill that gap by analysing news values embedded in the representations of Arab Spring participants and voices across both Arabic and English web-based content from Al-Jazeera and the BBC.

To sum up, the broader context of the Arab Spring, transnational media outlets such as Al Jazeera and the BBC played a crucial role in shaping public perception and providing comprehensive coverage of these significant events. Al Jazeera's extensive reporting and in-depth analysis, coupled with the BBC's international reach and reputation, positioned them as prominent voices in the coverage of the Arab Spring. In the following section (Section 1.3.1), I discuss the background of these two transnational outlets and explore their roles in the Arab Spring events.

### **1.3.1 Al-Jazeera and BBC as transcultural news resources**

The democratic uprisings of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt were influenced by various factors, with mass media playing a pivotal role in shaping the unfolding events (Malik and Awadallah 2013; Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheaffer 2013). The media's portrayal of these revolutions, coloured by their own ideologies and future projections, had a significant impact on subsequent uprisings across the Arab world. This study aims to examine how Arab and Western media outlets, specifically those from Qatar and Britain, reported on the various uprisings and events collectively known as the Arab Spring, which swept across numerous countries in the Middle East and North Africa from late 2010 onwards.

Al Jazeera, established in 1996, has emerged as a leading news network in the Arab world, despite facing numerous controversies. Based in Qatar, it pioneered round-the-clock news broadcasting in Arabic. Various polls and reports have consistently ranked Al Jazeera as the most popular Arab news channel, and it has garnered recognition from influential organisations (Ghareeb 2000; Miles 2010). Since its inception, Al Jazeera has adopted a distinctive approach and journalistic style that distinguishes it from government-controlled media in the Arab world. Drawing influence from Western journalism, the network has offered a contrasting perspective

(Cherkaoui 2014), addressing topics such as government corruption, human rights violations, political dissent, religious controversies and criticism of ruling monarchies or authoritarian regimes (Iskandar and El-Nawawy 2004). These subjects often encompass sensitive discussions about state policies, royal family matters and societal taboos typically avoided or censored in state-controlled media across much of the Arab world. Consequently, Arab governments have accused the network of being a CIA agent, serving American interests in the region (Zayani and Ayish 2006). Moreover, Al Jazeera has sparked controversy in the Western world, particularly following the 11 September terrorist attacks and its comprehensive coverage of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to US accusations of anti-Americanism and aiding terrorists (Pintak and Ginges 2008; Johnson and Fahmy 2010).

Al Jazeera launched its Arabic-language news website on 1 January 2001, following a beta version initiated in 1999. Since then, it has continued to serve as an information source for millions worldwide (Al Jazeera 2013). During the Arab Spring, Al Jazeera's online platform provided extensive coverage of unfolding events, witnessing a notable increase in page views and search attempts (Aouragh and Alexander 2011). As a result, the network has faced ongoing mistreatment from Arab governments. For instance, in Egypt, Al Jazeera was the sole Arab or Western news outlet whose journalists and offices were attacked, and its transmission disrupted by Egyptian authorities. In contrast, other prominent Arab and Western news outlets with a significant presence in Egypt, such as Al-Arabiya, CNN and the BBC, did not encounter similar challenges (Sultan 2013).

Following its meteoric rise as an Arabic-language network, Al Jazeera English (AJE) made its official debut on 15 November 2006, marking a milestone as the first English-language news channel to be headquartered in the Middle East. With primary broadcast hubs in Doha, London, Washington and Kuala Lumpur, AJE boasts an impressive workforce of over 1,200 staff members and 600 reporters, spread across 25 bureaus and representing more than 45 nationalities (Zghoul 2022). The network's ambitious goal is to reach 180 million households globally, as well as anyone with access to the internet (Seib 2008; El-Nawawy and Powers 2010; Figenschou 2010).

Many regarded AJE's founding circumstances as a major change in direction from its parent network. AJE explicitly branded itself "the voice of the South" from the beginning (Zghoul 2022). Parsons (2008) described it as the first Middle East-based news channel bringing news back to the West (cited in Powers and El-Nawawy 2009). As such, AJE was seen as an important player in balancing global information flows (Sakr 2007) by challenging Anglo-American news dominance and offering an alternative information source in one of the world's most geo-politically volatile regions (Thussu 2007). Unlike traditional offerings from CNN and the BBC, El-Nawawy and Powers (2010) argue AJE occupies a unique position of not being constrained by geopolitical or commercial interests, while having the resources, mandate and capacity to reach typically neglected worldwide audiences. This allows it to provide a fresh departure from established news outlets (Wessler and Adolphsen 2008).

When the Arab Spring uprisings erupted across the Middle East in 2010, AJE moved quickly to provide around-the-clock coverage of the rapidly unfolding events. Its bureaus and journalists were often first on the scene to broadcast images and reports out of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other nations to a captivated global audience. As political unrest swelled into revolutionary movements aimed at overthrowing longstanding authoritarian regimes, many

analysts credited AJE's penetrating and persistent reporting with galvanising protestors and helping drive the narratives of change (Seib 2012; El-Nawawy and Powers 2014).

AJE's coverage of the Arab Spring represented a pivotal moment for the young news network. Figenschou (2013) argues that AJE came of age during its Arab Spring reporting, gaining newfound global credibility and trust for presenting raw, real-time coverage directly from the frontlines of the protests. In nations where state-controlled media sought to suppress images of swelling demonstrations, AJE provided one of the few windows to the revolution. It bypassed efforts by regimes to restrict and censor social media platforms where activists were documenting the events. Some credit AJE as critical to the success of the Arab Spring movements themselves. As Seib (2012) concludes, "Al Jazeera English played an instrumental role that led to the changes that erupted like volcanoes throughout the Arab Middle East" (p. 1).

On the other hand, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is globally renowned as the world's largest media corporation, broadcasting to local British and international audiences via television, radio and internet since its founding in October 1922. With over 372 million weekly users worldwide in 2017, BBC operates 11 international channels through its 'BBC World Service' division, including BBC Arabic Television launched in 2008. Funded by the UK government, BBC Arabic provides news in Arabic across topics avoided by other Arab channels, including democracy, human rights, freedom of expression, minority rights, culture and social change (Jarrah 2008; Aly and Baumann 2013).

Though funded by the UK Foreign Office, BBC Arabic claims editorial independence from government influence over its Arabic content. However, critics argue that the BBC broadly serves as a mouthpiece for UK foreign policy interests, thus potentially exhibiting political bias (Aly and Baumann 2013). Unique from its Arab counterparts, BBC Arabic follows Western media traditions of impartiality, fairness and objectivity in its reporting style, while tailoring coverage to Arab audience interests and desires (Lahlali 2011; Al-Jaber and Gunter 2013).

Like Al Jazeera, BBC Arabic also targets audiences both inside and outside the Arab region, providing online access to TV and radio broadcasting. After 80 years broadcasting, in January 2018, BBC Arabic boasted 43 million weekly users globally (BBC 2018). During the 2011 Arab Spring, BBC Arabic grew dramatically from 21.6 million to 36.2 million viewers through 2012, cementing its status as a trusted news source across the Arab world (BBC 2018).

As protests swelled into revolutions toppling regimes in 2011, BBC Arabic correspondents reported live from the frontlines. Pintak (2023) credits BBC Arabic with providing vital protest coverage from locations where authoritarian regimes sought to restrict and censor social media documentation of growing demonstrations. By bypassing state censorship attempts, outlets like BBC Arabic enabled the broader Arab Spring movements (Pintak 2023).

Now that an overview of the background and role of two transnational news outlets, namely BBC and Al Jazeera, in the context of the Arab Spring events has been provided, Section 1.4 will delve into a discussion of the concept of News Values and its relevance to the construction of newsworthiness in these transnational news organisations. Furthermore, I will aim to explore how these news values can shed light on the cross-lingual Arab Spring news discourse of these transnational outlets. To begin, I will provide a brief section on the historical development of news values within journalism and discourse studies.

## 1.4 News values

Rather than purely objective reflections of reality, news reports inherently present selective reconstructions made meaningful through journalistic choices and processes (Bell 1991; Fowler 1991). Newsworthiness refers to the overall perceived significance or importance of an event that makes it suitable for media coverage, while news values are the specific criteria or qualities that contribute to this perceived significance (Bednarek & Caple, 2017). In other words, news values are the building blocks that help determine what is considered newsworthy. The determination of which occurrences, events, actors and issues to cover reflects a set of privileged news values - qualities that lend heightened newsworthiness. Stories deemed widely important and culturally resonant gain selection, while others are absent (Galtung and Ruge 1965). For instance, factors like significance to political elites, harmoniousness with cultural narratives and potential audience interest play key roles shaping such value judgements.

According to Bednarek and Caple (2017), the concept of news values is subject to varied interpretations amongst scholars. Whilst some researchers emphasise ethical considerations in reporting, such as balance and impartiality, others concentrate on professional norms related to appropriate structure and style in news production. Generally following Bednarek and Caple's (2017) conceptualisation of news values, this thesis views news values as emerging perceptions of importance and prominence that make specific topics, actors, and events more likely to be featured in news coverage. These perceptions also influence how much attention such content receives and how meaningful or relevant it appears to audiences within a particular sociocultural context.

Since Galtung and Ruge's (1965) seminal theorisation categorised factors enhancing events' selection as news, examination has expanded across material, cognitive, social and discursive dimensions. Materialist lenses of news values view events with particular features like extreme negativity or wide impact as dictating selection independently of journalistic choices and processes. Meanwhile, cognitive models consider news values influenced by individual reporters' intuitive judgements of audience appeal and resonance. In contrast, social frameworks alternatively position news values mainly as products of wider ideological assumptions and power structures embedded within a news outlet's surrounding cultural context (Fowler 1991).

Discursive approaches uniquely highlight how language and semiotic modes actively construct events' news value (Bednarek and Caple 2017, p. 42). For example, choices about wording, framing, imagery and structural emphasis can shape the perceived newsworthiness and salience of described events, issues and actors. Corpus linguistic techniques have proven fruitful for illuminating these processes, coding news texts to quantitatively examine how linguistic and structural choices emphasise or highlight events' culturally-situated prominence and importance during reporting (Bednarek and Caple 2012, 2014; Potts, Bednarek and Caple, 2015; Caple, Huan and Bednarek 2020).

In this thesis, the analysis adopts a Discursive News Value Approach (DNVA) centred on the linguistic construction of newsworthiness rather than pre-existing selection factors (Bednarek and Caple, 2017). Unlike material or cognitive models, DNVA holds that events and issues carry no abstract inherent news value outside of semiotic coverage. Instead, verbal and visual textual resources actively establish events as noteworthy and important for a given audience (Caple and Bednarek 2016.). The key question becomes how reporting linguistically shapes perceived



saliency through choices of style, rhetoric, framing and emphasis, not what abstract traits may predispose an event to coverage (Bednarek, Caple and Huan, 2021).

Analytically, Discourse-based News Values Analysis (DNVA) can involve manual close reading of relevant texts to clarify construction processes. However, researchers such as Potts, Bednarek and Caple (2015) used corpus methods with Australian media on climate change and carbon pricing to show how reporting linguistically constructed the issue as a game/battle between political actors rather than an environmental problem warranting policy solutions. Similarly, Makki (2019) demonstrated how Syrian war coverage amplified threats to Western interests over humanitarian concerns via lexical choices.

Bednarek and Caple (2014) quantitatively tracked increased news value attributed to celebrity stories in Australian media over time. They did this through changed patterns of evaluative language. Similar to those studies, this study focuses on computer-assisted corpus linguistic techniques, allowing systematic quantification of linguistic patterns across media coverage. Tracking preferential word choice, rhetorical framing and shifts in reporting style at scale can reveal how news value is semiotically constructed around events, issues and actors.

However, more research systematically applying Discursive News Values Approach cross-culturally and longitudinally is still needed to further test and refine theoretical tenets, as well as enhance external validity and generalisability (Bednarek and Caple 2017; Fruttaldo and Venuti 2017; Makki 2019, 2020; Caple, Huan and Bednarek, 2020; Huan 2023; Chen and Liu 2022, 2023a, 2013b; Yu and Liu 2023). For example, one of the under investigated efforts that I try to provide in this thesis is comparing findings from textual analysis of reporting on shared events and issues across media systems with differing cultural values. Such efforts could provide insights into the impact of media reporting on public opinion. This could also reveal differences in the ways in which media systems approach the same events in two or more than languages and to different cultured audiences. Additionally, it could provide a better understanding of how media systems shape public opinion over time through persistent event coverage spanning many years. Addressing such gaps will boost the explanatory robustness of news value models centred on linguistic (and semiotic) construction. To further elaborate on the aims and objectives of this research, the following two sections (Section 1.5 and Section 1.6) provide a comprehensive discussion of the rationale and purpose of this study, respectively.

## **1.5 Rationale of the study**

There are various rationales for conducting this study. Firstly, although media portrayals of the Arab Spring uprisings have been widely studied, most studies have focused on general representations of events rather than specifically examining how news participants and voices have been discursively constructed. This study expands the scope of previous work by applying a discursive news values approach to explore the differences and similarities in how Al Jazeera and the BBC framed event protagonists and sources across Arabic and English versions of news reporting. As Balmas and Sheaffer (2013) contend, a news values approach centred on sourcing and quotations reveals comprehensive aspects of the discursive construction of socio-political conflicts.

Secondly, this study significantly contributes to scholarly understanding by expanding the application of the Discursive News Values Approach into comparative multilingual news

discourse analysis. While past research has focused largely on monolingual contexts, this study tests and expands the framework's utility for examining transnational media reporting major conflicts across linguistic outputs targeting distinct audiences. As Cottle (2008) argues, analysing today's global news ecology requires addressing flows, contingencies and contestations between narratives targeting both domestic and international viewership.

Thirdly, over a decade later, the Arab Spring uprisings remain a highly relevant case for critical discourse analysis due to the complexity of narratives that emerged across regional and global contexts, as well as the lingering impacts reshaping politics across the Middle East and North Africa region. As Sakr (2013) explains, media coverage of revolutionary events like the Arab Spring illustrates the complex interplay between competing constructions of reality that develop. Tensions emerge between regional versus global media spheres, state-controlled versus citizen journalism models, and reporting tailored to different linguistic audiences. For example, Al Jazeera and the BBC crafted distinct narratives oriented towards either Arab-language or global English-language priorities, at times placing greater emphasis on Western policy implications versus local political transformations. Furthermore, regimes targeted by protests often sought to suppress independent coverage, while protestors actively documented events through social media channels. This study is able to capture these multifaceted tensions by comparing how news participants and voices were discursively positioned between Al Jazeera and the BBC's Arabic and English coverage over an extended timeframe. Analysis across the initial momentum of Arab Spring protests through the later chaos as optimism deteriorated enables a richer examination of the shifting narratives and rationales developed within each media and linguistic context.

## **1.6 Purpose of the study**

Utilising a Discursive News Values Approach, the core purpose of this study is to conduct a comparative discourse analysis of the English and Arabic portrayals of the Arab Spring uprisings across news articles from Al Jazeera and the BBC. The in-depth analysis aims to reveal the linguistic and ideological differences and similarities embedded within the news coverage between outlets and languages, focusing specifically on the discursive construction of news values, sources and participants when reporting in times of socio-political conflict.

More specifically, adopting a news values theoretical lens, this study examines how Al Jazeera and the BBC crafted narratives oriented towards either Arab-language or English-speaking global audiences that potentially emphasise different actors, events, rationales and interpretations surrounding the Arab Spring conflicts. By highlighting similarities and contrasts in the ideological assumptions and discursive choices shaping coverage, important insights emerge on how the outlets positioned the protests and subsequent events for their target viewership.

To enable this analysis, the study comparatively examines four corpora of news articles published respectively by the Al Jazeera Arabic, Al Jazeera English, BBC News and BBC Arabic online portals over an extensive timeframe. The coverage spans from 17 December 2010, marking Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation act which first catalysed mass protests, up until 17 February 2017 when revolutionary momentum had largely dissipated. Tracing portrayals longitudinally across these outlets provides a robust foundation for critically

deconstructing how narratives arced and diverged across time, region and political developments throughout key phases of the Arab Spring.

As media scholars like Balmas and Sheafer (2013) contend, unpacking the disparities and alignments underpinning such multifaceted news coverage of events like the Arab Spring offers vital analytical insights into the socio-political interests, positioning and power relations interwoven within contemporary media discourses globally.

## 1.7 Research questions, content and structure of the thesis

Considering the purpose of the study, the thesis attempts to answer the central question: How are news values constructed in representations of the Arab Spring in Arabic and English news discourse on Al Jazeera and the BBC? This will be addressed through the following three sub-questions:

1. How do Al Jazeera and the BBC construct news values in representations of Arab Spring participants in Arabic and English outlets?
2. How do Al Jazeera and the BBC construct news values in representations of Arab Spring voices in Arabic and English outlets?
3. What patterned meanings emerge through construction of news values in Arabic and English Arab Spring coverage on Al Jazeera and the BBC?

These questions examine how major news organisations discursively construct individuals and voices involved in the Arab Spring movements across their language platforms. The first question focuses on the overall representation of participants, whilst the second specifically addresses the presentation and prioritisation of perspectives from those directly involved in or affected by the events. The third inquiry aims to identify recurring themes and narratives arising from the news values employed in coverage of the Arab Spring, comparing Arabic and English language reporting. This research will employ comparative analysis of news content, examining factors such as language use, source selection, framing techniques and narrative structures in both networks' coverage.

The thesis comprises nine chapters including the introduction and conclusion. After introducing the thesis and research aims in Chapter One, Chapter Two reviews relevant literature across disciplines: news discourse analysis, representations of the Arab Spring, corpus linguistics, news values and cross-lingual studies. Chapter Three outlines the data and methodology, including data selection, corpus compilation and the cross-lingual discourse analysis approach. The analysis spans four chapters, starting with corpus analysis in Chapters Four and Five addressing the first and third research questions through cross-lingual news values analysis, categorising shared Arab Spring representations and relating findings to ideological implications. Chapters Six and Seven address the second and third questions through detailed corpus-assisted analysis of specific Arab Spring voices and voices representations in both networks, linking constructions of voice newsworthiness to ideological dimensions. Chapter Eight summarises findings and presents critical discussion of the analysis. Finally, the Conclusion provides a study summary, notes limitations and suggests future research directions.

## **Chapter Two: Overview of the Theory and Literature**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter reviews the literature relating to this study's interdisciplinary focus on examining the construction of news values in cross-cultural news discourse. The chapter is structured into three sections. Section 2.2 discusses four key dimensions of news discourse: producers/audience, social/cultural factors, financial factors, and regulations. This provides background information regarding how news selection and structure are influenced by various contextual elements. Section 2.3 surveys the main linguistic frameworks applied to analyse news texts. A review of analytical approaches is relevant to critically examining the suitability of theoretical and methodological frameworks for this study. Finally, in Section 2.4, the discursive news value approach is proposed as an integrative framework tailored to the research aims. By synthesising conceptual models and analytical tools, this review establishes a foundation for critically investigating the construction of news values across cultures from an innovative integrated perspective. Section 2.5 outlines the key theoretical contributions of this thesis, including the novel application of a critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach to cross-lingual and cross-cultural data and the utilisation of an integrated framework drawing on corpus linguistics and CDA models to enable a multilayered analysis attentive to textual, contextual, and social dimensions.

### **2.2 News media discourse**

News discourse is an integral part of contemporary society, shaping public opinion and understanding events worldwide (Bednarek and Caple 2012). Scholars from various disciplines have explored the complex nature of news discourse by offering diverse definitions that reflect its multifaceted constitution. This scholarly landscape of news discourse definitions is characterised by a range of perspectives, each providing unique insights into the elements that constitute news as a form of communication. Van Dijk (1988a), for instance, emphasizes the cognitive processes and social interactions underpinning news discourse, presenting it as a structured form of text that mediates societal information. Fairclough (1995) adopts an approach to examine how discourse practices are interwoven with social power relations and ideologies. Wodak (2001) looks at the relationship between news discourse and social change, investigating how particular discourse practices can establish and maintain social and power relations. These scholars have approached the study of news discourse from critical perspectives, examining the ways in which news media shape and are shaped by broader social, political, and ideological contexts. By contrast, Allan (2010) views news discourse as part of cultural processes, serving as a means by which society is informed and engages in dialogue about current events.

Among the various scholarly perspectives, it is argued here that Bednarek and Caple's (2012) work stands out for its comprehensive and multifaceted approach. Bednarek and Caple (2012) define news discourse as multimodal, encompassing several semiotic systems including

and beyond words, such as visuals. They analyse the practical use and impact of discourse, considering both language and imagery in the formation of news. This sets their approach apart from researchers who focus solely on language in examining news discourse (e.g., Van Dijk 1988a; Wodak 2001) or those who perceive discourse as a mere reflection rather than an active construction of news (e.g., Allan 2010).

In contrast, some scholars suggest that news media often serve to reinforce dominant cultural values and ideologies rather than actively challenging or shaping them. For example, Miller, a cultural studies scholar, argues in his book "Makeover Nation" that news media tend to reproduce existing power structures (Miller 2008). Similarly, Hamelink, a media scholar, suggests in his book "Media and Conflict: Escalating Evil" that news media often reflect and reinforce dominant narratives during times of conflict (Hamelink 2011).

It is worth noting that the landscape of news media discourse has undergone significant changes in recent years, with the growth of online platforms and social media. Tandoc, Lim and Ling (2018) highlighted how digital platforms have transformed news production and consumption, leading to changes in journalistic practices and audience engagement. Their research underscores the importance of considering the increasingly diverse landscape of news media to understand how information is constructed and disseminated in contemporary societies.

Bednarek and Caple (2012) also considered the distinction between mainstream news and alternative or specialist news. News can be categorised based on geographical scope, ranging from community-based and local to provincial, rural, regional, metropolitan, and national. Access to news is available through paid outlets, such as newspapers and blogs, and free outlets, such as web-based news. It is important to note that the primary focus of this study is the online news of transcontinental news outlets. The motivation and rationale for selecting this specific type of news discourse domain was driven by the increasing prominence and influence of transnational media in shaping global public opinion and discourse (Cottle, 2008). Transcontinental news outlets, with their wide reach and multi-lingual platforms, offer a unique opportunity to examine how international events are framed and presented to diverse audiences across cultural and linguistic boundaries. This focus allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how news values and discursive strategies are employed in a global context, particularly in relation to significant geopolitical events like the Arab Spring (Benson, 2013). Furthermore, the study of online news from these outlets reflects the growing shift towards digital platforms as primary sources of information for many audiences worldwide, thereby capturing contemporary trends in news consumption and dissemination (Newman et al., 2021).

In the following section (2.2.1), I review the literature concerning the dimensional factors that influence the construction of news discourse, providing a comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics at play in the creation and dissemination of news in the digital age.

### **2.2.1 The multidimensional factors of news discourse construction**

The various factors that influence news discourse can be classified into four separate dimensions: communicative (producer and audience), socio-cultural, financial and legal factors (Bednarek and Caple 2012). In the context of the current research regarding the BBC and Al-Jazeera's English and Arabic news discourse, certain structural and contextual factors are

particularly salient, given the complex transnational and cross-cultural nature of these organisations during a period of turbulent geopolitics (the Arab Spring years). Blumler and Gurevitch (2005) for instance, argue that media organisations work within a web of interlinked economic, political, cultural and ideological contexts which shape the news they produce. Similarly, Van Dijk (1988a) suggests that news discourse is influenced by ideological positions and structures of power which govern the functioning of media institutions. Bednarek and Caple's (2012)'s four factors that influence news discourse will be used to structure this section, incorporating other relevant research where appropriate. These four factors are 1) producer and audience roles; 2) social, cultural, and historical factors; 3) financial factors; and 4) the code of practice factors. In the following four subsections, each of these roles is discussed in light of this research news resource, namely Al-Jazeera and BBC, in their Arabic and English news outlets.

### **2.2.1.1 Producer and audience roles**

The roles of news producers and audiences are crucial factors that shape the construction and interpretation of news discourse. Producers make important choices regarding messaging, framing, and linguistic strategies, which fundamentally influence how news is created and consumed. At the same time, audiences actively engage with news content, interpreting it through their own perspectives and potentially influencing the types of stories that journalists practise.

Starting with the producer role, Cotter (2010, p 54) outlines the news production process which starts with news tips and follow-up interviews, followed by writing the story, editing, and finally adding the headline and determining story placement. It is worthy of note that a significant portion of what is encountered as 'news' is information that has been sourced from other reports or individuals (Bednarek and Caple 2012, p. 21). In addition, while there may be some variations in the roles played by individuals working in news production across different media such as print, television, online platforms and radio, the fundamental responsibilities in news editing remain relatively similar (Rau 2012). Also, whilst the specific job titles may differ among these media (Lamble 2011, cited in Bednarek and Caple, p.2), the essence of the tasks performed remains consistent.

News producers make important choices regarding messaging, framing and linguistic strategies regarding the use of language in news discourse and these production decisions fundamentally influence how news is constructed and consumed (Scollon 2014). In his research, Monsumova (2022) explores the use of language in news discourse through discourse analysis of texts from various media sources such as news agencies, newspapers, websites, TV and radio. He highlights the importance of accuracy, impartiality, comprehensiveness, and linguistic competence in news production. However, his analysis did not extensively cover the societal impact of various media.

Monsumova's emphasis on accuracy, impartiality, comprehensiveness, and linguistic competence in news production is particularly relevant to the present study, which analyses the cross-lingual news discourse of Al Jazeera and BBC in Arabic and English. These factors are crucial when considering the challenges faced by transnational media outlets catering to diverse audiences with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. However, Monsumova's limited analysis of the societal impact of various media highlights a gap in the existing literature that this study aims to address. By examining how Al Jazeera and BBC construct news values across their Arabic and English platforms, this research provides valuable insights into the complex interplay

between producer and audience roles in shaping the discourse of news in cross-cultural and multilingual contexts. Moreover, Monsumova's emphasis on the need to consider the audience's interpretation of news texts through their own worldview is particularly relevant to this study. As Al Jazeera and BBC cater to two distinct types of audiences for each outlet, the potential for message distortion and the importance of clear and concise language become even more critical. Also, the comparative analysis of the cross-lingual news discourse in these outlets contributes to a better understanding of how media organisations navigate the challenges of communicating effectively with diverse audiences while maintaining their editorial standards and cultural sensitivities. This study builds upon Monsumova's work by delving deeper into the societal impact of various media and the specific challenges faced by transnational news organisations in their efforts to engage with culturally and linguistically diverse audiences.

This leads on to the second factor influencing news discourse: the audience's role. Bell (1991, p.90-95) distinguished between different audience roles, including the target audience (those directly addressed), auditors (those expected but not targeted), overhearers (those not expected to be present), and eavesdroppers (those expected to be absent). Bell's Audience Referee Theory has significant implications for news discourse, and Bell (1991) illustrates this by exploring how the perceived audience influences the language used in news reports. He suggested that journalists construct their news stories with an 'audience referee' in mind, tailoring their language to fit the perceived expectations of that audience, even if they are not directly participating in the conversation. This is reflected in the framing, diction and structure of news reports. In addition, van Dijk (1988a) discusses this principle, stating that in news discourse, the representation of events is largely determined by perceived readership, making them metaphorical referees who shape the news narrative. The complexity and choice of language, therefore, become strategic tools that are manipulated to complement or contrast with the anticipated expectations of the audience, ensuring engagement and understanding.

The role of the audience in news has continually been discussed. Traditional viewpoints often categorise the audience as passive consumers of information, typically dismissing their possible power over setting news agendas (Ross and Nightingale 2003). This derives from the classic 'Hypodermic Needle' or 'Magic Bullet' Theory which posits that media messages are directly injected into the brains of a passive audience (Berger and Luckmann 2016). However, this perspective has been increasingly questioned in the contemporary literature. The advent of social media platforms and digital technologies has enabled audiences to directly interact with news and information, marking a shift from simply consuming news to engaging in it (Jenkins 2006).

Audiences are seen as being more active and influential because of their ability to curate, comment on and share news stories, thereby effectively shaping online public discourse in addition to influencing news agendas (Heikkilä and Ahva 2015). This phenomenon is underpinned by 'Uses and Gratifications' Theory which argues that audiences are not merely passive recipients but actively interact with media to fulfil their needs (Katz 1974).

In the era of 'citizen journalism' and 'prosumers' (consumers who are also producers), the role of the audience has been significantly transformed (Bruns 2005). This shift underscores recent studies indicating that audience feedback, especially on digital platforms, can directly influence the types of stories that journalists pursue (Newman et al. 2020).



However, this shift in audience role does not mean that the audience's influence over news agendas is always beneficial; concerns about 'echo chambers' and the spread of 'fake news' accentuate the potential risks (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Therefore, a critical understanding of the complex interplay among audiences, journalists, and media platforms remains a key research priority for media scholars.

In journalism and communication studies, the audience-centred approach to news discourse suggests that news organisations and journalists tailor the presentation and content of news to meet the needs, interests and expectations of their audiences. For example, according to Shoemaker and Reese (1996), news content is often influenced by the perceived interests and expectations of the audience, leading to a tailored framing of stories. The audience-centred approach directly links journalists utilising Audience Design Theory, where the audience's reaction and feedback directly shape the delivery of news. For instance, Tuchman (1978) reinforces the idea of tailoring news content to the audience, suggesting that news discourse is constructed through a 'news net' designed to capture the details most relevant to the perceived audience. Therefore, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) and Tuchman (1978) highlight the vital role played by audiences in shaping news discourse. The aim of the audience-based approach is to make news more relatable, engaging and ultimately consumable for the target audience.

In addition, recipients of media content develop an attachment when the text resonates with them, which occurs when the language used is comprehensible, when they feel acknowledged, and when the overall narrative aligns with their perspectives and attitudes (Cotter, 2015, p. 811). To further understand this idea, Hall's (1980) encoding/decoding model provides powerful insights. According to this model, both the producer and receiver of a text play a vital role in shaping its meaning. Producers encode their messages in ways that they think will be discernible to their intended audience, taking into account their assumptions about both language and cultural contexts. In contrast, these encoded messages are decoded by the audience based on their own personal experiences and social contexts, thereby possibly interpreting the message differently than the producer had anticipated.

This interplay between encoding and decoding resonates with the notion that the news discourse constructs a virtual audience. Similar to Hall's model, the imagined audience in news discourse emerges from the complex process of text interpretation where producers and receivers actively encode and decode messages. Hall's theoretical model thus substantiates the argument that the existence of an audience is constructed and brought to life through text and is not an entity that pre-exists. Although there is more room for interaction in online news media discourse, such as through comments or hashtags, the producers of news language still often work with a stereotyped image of their audience and imagine or expect particular types of viewers/readers (Bednarek and Caple 2012, p. 25). Similarly, the audience typically lacks direct face-to-face contact with the producers of the news stories they engage with and they may rely on specific perceptions of the news outlets or journalists.

To some extent, the target audience can be observed in the content of news discourse, whether through the choice of stories, language use or advertisements targeting different types of audiences. Producers may base their approach to addressing the target audience on information gathered from market research using methods such as an audience-centred approach or on potentially stereotypical 'imagined' assumptions they have about their audience (Bednarek and Caple 2012, p. 25).

In the context of cross-cultural and multilingual news outlets, such as BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera English, producer and audience roles significantly influence the construction of news discourse (Jaber and Baumann 2011; Al-Najjar 2009). These transnational media organisations cater to audiences with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds, which might affect the way news is produced and presented. Producers of BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera English are expected to navigate the complexities of creating content that resonates with their diverse audiences while maintaining their respective editorial standards and cultural sensitivities. This involves adapting the language, tone, and framing of news stories to suit the expectations and preferences of Arabic- and English-speaking audiences. Moreover, the cross-cultural nature of these news outlets means that producers may come from different cultural backgrounds, further influencing the production process. However, there is a limitation in the existing studies that comparatively examine the overlapping of cross-cultural and cross-lingual production and audience roles in transnational news outlets. This research gap highlights the need for more comprehensive investigations into how these complex dynamics shape the discourse of news in organisations such as BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera English.

My current research, which compares the news values constructions in Al Jazeera English and Al Jazeera Arabic on the one hand, and BBC News (English) and BBC Arabic on the other hand, contributes to addressing this gap in the literature. By examining how these transnational news outlets construct news values across their Arabic and English platforms, this thesis provides insights into the complex interplay between producer and audience roles in shaping the discourse of news in cross-cultural and multilingual contexts. This comparative analysis offers a valuable contribution to the understanding of the dynamics of news production and consumption in an increasingly globalised media landscape.

In the next section, the roles that society, culture and history play in the construction of news discourse are reviewed.

### **2.2.1.2 Social, cultural and historical factors in news discourse**

News discourse intrinsically reflects the societal context surrounding its construction, including the social norms, cultural beliefs and historical events that shape public consciousness (Van Dijk 2015). Two key ideological frameworks that have historically influenced representations of the Arab world in media discourse are Orientalism and Pan-Arabism.

Orientalism, as conceptualised by Edward Said (1978), refers to the West's systematic construction of the 'Orient' as an exotic, backward, and monolithic entity, reinforcing colonial power structures and Eurocentric superiority. This framework has influenced Western media portrayals of the Middle East, often reducing complex sociopolitical realities to stereotypes of authoritarianism, extremism, and cultural stagnation (Lockman 2004; Salaita 2011). Said's work underscores how knowledge production about the Arab world is often embedded in broader power asymmetries, shaping the lens through which Arab societies and political movements, including the Arab Spring, are framed in global media (Fawcett 2017). In contrast, Pan-Arabism emerged as a unifying ideological movement advocating for the political and cultural solidarity of Arab nations, particularly in response to colonial legacies and Western intervention in the region (Dawisha 2003; Khalidi 2010). Media institutions such as Al Jazeera have been instrumental in reviving Pan-Arabist narratives, fostering a shared regional identity, and

amplifying Arab perspectives in contrast to Western-dominated media landscapes (El Oifi 2005). The Arab Spring uprisings saw a resurgence of Pan-Arabist sentiment, as transnational media channels facilitated cross-border solidarity and the exchange of revolutionary discourse among Arab populations (Lynch 2012; Khamis and Vaughn 2013).

As Richardson (2007) summarises, news is not simply a neutral portrayal of newsworthy events but rather a complex narrative shaped by societal power dynamics and organisational structures. Several key factors relating to norms, values, inequalities and institutional pressures influence news content and coverage in both subtle and overt ways. At the same time, representational patterns evolve as cultural values shift, slowly destabilising existing power hierarchies tied to issues like gender, race, class and geography (Cottle 2000). For example, globally, advocacy for greater inclusion of women in positions of authority has increased their visibility in media coverage and expanded the range of empowered societal roles portrayed for women, although they remain underrepresented overall (Everbach 2013).

Historically, dominant institutional ideologies have privileged white, western-centric perspectives in the mainstream media, whilst marginalising disadvantaged voices (Harding 1998). However, the growth in non-western global media such as Al Jazeera marks an early departure from the Euro/western-centric news hegemony (Painter 2008). As Qatar's first global news network, Al Jazeera reacted to cultural critiques of western media hegemony over previously colonised regions to provide non-western-centric coverage (ibid). This historical positioning attentively shapes the framing of issues such as the 'War on Terror' and the Arab Spring, through local cultural lenses (Figenschou 2010).

However, public service broadcasters such as Al Jazeera, and the BBC, deal with inherent state-linked pressures regarding legitimacy, impartiality, national identity and public accountability which constrain journalistic autonomy (Cushion, Lewis and Callaghan 2017). These pressures stem from the broadcasters' reliance on state funding and their mandate to serve the public interest, which can sometimes conflict with the principles of independent journalism. As Zelizer, Boczkowski and Anderson (2021) note, journalists function within institutional relationships that influence news gathering priorities and coverage decisions in subtle ways through professional and cultural norms.

The complex relationship between societal circumstances and the formation of news discourse has been extensively studied in media and journalism research (Nerone and Barnhurst 1995; Barnhurst and Nerone 2002; Carey 2008). According to communication researchers such as Carey (2008), news is a representation of a specific perspective on the world. This perspective is influenced by cultural beliefs, arguments, power structures and historical changes that occur when news is created and shared. The relationship between media systems and journalistic norms is continually evolving, influenced by changes in ideology, politics and technology over time (Nerone and Barnhurst 1995).

An illustration of this is provided by Barnhurst and Nerone's (2002) notable historical examination which traces the evolution of news communication methods in relation to the increase in literacy rates, urbanisation and the development of transportation networks such as railways. This transformation has resulted in greater public access to and readership of news. The dominant news narratives of each era were influenced by ideological assumptions related to race, class, gender and imperial expansion. These beliefs shape the viewpoints and voices privileged in these accounts (Brookes 1995). Therefore, a significant body of research in the field of communication suggests that to analyse news discourse effectively, it is essential to consider the

various sociocultural and historical factors that influence the creation of messages, ranging from individual to structural levels (Shoemaker and Reese 2013).

Critical studies, such as Cottle (2000), have examined how systemic inequalities become entrenched within media systems over time. Cottle (2000) argues that analysing how structural inequities are incorporated into news outlets offers useful insight into the dominant cultural context. Based on this critical perspective, it remains imperative to study how the sociopolitical environments of international news sources such as Al Jazeera and the BBC shape their organisational aims and affect the potential for inclusive, critical journalism globally.

Continued scholarship from this critical cohort regarding the relationship between media systems and systemic inequality can further reveal the mechanisms by which dominant cultures and biases become naturalised. Scrutinising how marginalised groups are portrayed and represented in news narratives unpacks ideological assumptions embedded within media systems (Hall 2006). Such a critical orientation explores how certain voices and perspectives are amplified or suppressed according to the values and interests of those in power (Herman and Chomsky 2008). It also provides insight into how systemic bias is reproduced through media coverage over time, providing a vital counter-narrative to dominant media discourse (Van Dijk 2015).

In addition to social, cultural and historical factors, news discourse studies advocate examining how corporate and commercial pressures on mainstream news organisations can limit the diversity of views they present (McChesney 2008). The next section reviews and discusses the funding of news as an important factor in the construction of news discourse.

### **2.2.1.3 Funding of news**

Financial mechanisms that support news media operations have a significant influence on discourse production because institutions modify content to attract income sources (Richardson 2007). According to Ferguson et al. (2015), public service media such as the BBC have certain freedoms which offer some protection against commercial pressures. However, their freedom is still limited compared to that of independent networks because of their reliance on licence fees and government financing. On the other hand, Al Jazeera, although financially supported by the Qatari royal family as a means of public diplomacy, has adopted an independent editorial approach which protects it from certain political influences, thereby enabling impactful reporting (El-Nawawy and Powers 2010).

Nevertheless, the allocation of funds differs among various divisions of news organisations. For instance, BBC News prioritises its domestic public service responsibilities but there is a distinct financial situation for its World Service and World News divisions which serve overseas viewers and rely partially on advertising for funding (Shoemaker and Reese 2013). On the other hand, despite being state-supported, Al Jazeera English was specifically established for western-facing digital marketplaces with a strong emphasis on the market's financial priorities (Painter 2008, p.14).

Political economists argue that analysing news discourse requires consideration of the impact of different funding systems (public, private and mixed) within the broader media system. These funding approaches can influence news content by catering to the interests of media owners or specific audience segments (Picard and Pickard 2017). According to Shoemaker and

Reese (2013), examining the financial resources of news organisations can provide valuable insight into the underlying ideological beliefs that shape how information is presented at different levels of influence. This leads on to considering the final factor which is the code of practice for news institutions.

#### **2.2.1.4 Conduct guidelines in news media**

Media regulations and ethical standards significantly shape how news is presented by limiting journalists' independence (Croteau and Hoynes 2006). Public broadcasters such as the BBC and Al Jazeera operate within regulatory frameworks that differ in their public interest priorities, governance transparency and cultural perceptions as either a government 'mouthpiece' or an independent 'watchdog' (Hamada et al. 2019, p. 156). The BBC follows impartiality standards mandated by its Royal Charter and Editorial Guidelines enforced by the UK's Office of Communications (Ofcom<sup>4</sup>). More relevant to the current study, unlike most BBC outlets which are funded through television licence fees, the historical financing of the BBC World Service, operating as BBC Arabic and other languages, has been more variable. For decades, the World Service was funded through grant-in-aid from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, closely aligning the international arm with UK foreign policy aims (Evennett 2022; Johnston and Robertson 2019). However, since 2014, funding has transitioned to a hybrid model drawing from the licence fee along with continued Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) support (GOV.UK 2023).

Academics argue that this fragmentation of funding expands the influence exerted upon the BBC World Service, with the licence fee prioritising British public service values, while the FCDO injects government diplomatic interests (Smith 2022). Consequently, it could be argued that recent BBC Arabic coverage may exhibit conflicting orientations: criticising state allies on democracy and human rights matters to appeal to Arab-speaking audiences while broadly supporting western foreign policy to retain UK government backing. However, these tensions challenge the BBC World Service's attempts to balance its global purpose with domestic constraints in an increasingly polarised funding context (Marsh 2023). Therefore, Campbell and Smith (2023) argue that fluctuating funding not only affects the fiscal sustainability of the BBC's global operations but also has tangible implications for editorial independence and news discourse. For example, Cushion, Lewis and Callaghan (2017) argue that there are ongoing concerns about perceived cultural bias and excessive interference in BBC World Service policy, particularly regarding contentious decisions such as the censoring of a Gaza charity appeal.

Unlike the BBC and BBC World News which have faced funding-related threats to editorial independence, Al Jazeera has actively asserted its autonomy from the Qatari state to build its reputation as an independent news network since its founding in 1996 (El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002). However, academics continue to debate whether Al Jazeera retains full editorial independence from Qatar's monarchy. While overt interference is rare, some analyses reveal that Al Jazeera's coverage is subtly aligned with Qatari foreign policy aims in the Middle East and the implicit defence of the ruling regime against dissidents, thereby suggesting that news discourse can be influenced by political pressure (Figenschou 2010; Miles 2013).

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<sup>4</sup> Ofcom serves as the supervisory and competition body for communications industries within the UK. It oversees the operation of the television and radio sectors, landline telecommunications, mobile services, postal services, as well as managing the spectrum used by wireless devices.

During the Arab Spring protests, Al Jazeera enthusiastically covered anti-government movements in Libya and Syria but provided limited criticism of Qatar's own authoritarian governance compared to its regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Khoury 2013; Watkins 2020). This uneven, seemingly partisan coverage has prompted critics to argue that the network has not fully escaped the political interests of its royal founders, despite public commitments to editorial autonomy (El Issawi 2014). In this complex relationship between journalism and Qatari diplomacy, funding can be leveraged for political ends without direct interference (Samuel-Azran 2013).

Some scholars posit that Qatar's governmental policies allow Al Jazeera editorial freedom on issues that do not threaten the stability of the regime but subtly influence coverage of Qatari foreign policy and domestic politics to manage the nation's image (Seib 2012).

In addition, Qatar's small population limits the potential for domestic advertising revenue, leaving the network financially dependent on the ruling family for state funding. Thus, this economic reliance inherently constrains full independence, regardless of the stated editorial policies. Thus, Al-Jazeera continues to navigate how to balance its revolutionary news mission for Arab audiences with the implicit constraints of its unique ownership model compared with other global media outlets.

In summary, state-funded media models face complex challenges in terms of maintaining public accountability (Croteau and Hoynes 2006). These challenges involve balancing independent journalism, public diplomacy goals, commercial income priorities, and societal responsibility. In addition, whilst journalists aim for impartiality, their conventions and practices are influenced by intricate ideological assumptions which ultimately limit their range of perspectives (Shoemaker and Reese 2013). According to Croteau and Hoynes (2006), it is important to assess how policy and regulatory frameworks either enhance or restrict public discussion when analysing news discourse.

Understanding the historical, socio-cultural and financial contexts of news discourse is fundamentally beneficial for news discourse analysts (Bednarek and Caple 2012, p. 38). News media not only speak to, about and for their audience but also represent larger economic and political interests (Conboy 2013). The communicative and socio-historical aspects of news media allow analysts to appropriately justify datasets and accurately interpret them (Bednarek and Caple 2012). Specifically, incorporating context into the analysis helps to counter the criticism that news discourse analysts overlook pertinent social and historical factors in their work (Richardson 2007, p.158). By considering the historical, socio-cultural, and financial contexts of Al Jazeera and the BBC in this study, the analysis of their news discourse will be more comprehensive, allowing for a deeper understanding of the factors influencing their cross-lingual representations of the Arab Spring events.

The following section outlines the key analytical approaches used in this news discourse analysis. This overview focuses on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Corpus Linguistics, Cognitive Linguistics, and the News Values approach, which form the core methodological framework for this study. By summarising these relevant frameworks and models for news analysis, this section aims to illustrate the multifaceted nature of news discourse scholarship and prepare readers with an understanding of the analytical tools employed in this research.

This survey of news discourse analysis strategies emphasises how researchers in this interdisciplinary domain can combine qualitative and quantitative methods to unpack the complex meanings and impacts of news discourse. The integration of these approaches allows

for a comprehensive examination of both micro-linguistic features and macro-discursive patterns in news texts.

This overview specifically focuses on linguistic approaches to news discourse analysis rather than on wider methodologies from journalism studies, media analysis and communication research. The intention is to highlight modes of textual and discourse analysis of news from language- and linguistics-oriented perspectives that are directly relevant to this study's objectives. By focusing on these specific approaches, this study aims to provide a detailed and nuanced understanding of how language and linguistic features contribute to the construction of news values and representations in Al Jazeera and BBC's cross-lingual coverage of the Arab Spring events.

This focus allows for a more in-depth examination of the role of language in shaping news discourse, which is essential for uncovering the subtle differences and similarities in the way these events are portrayed across different languages and cultural contexts. The chosen language- and linguistics-oriented perspectives are well-suited to the research questions and objectives of this study, ensuring a targeted and comprehensive investigation of the cross-lingual news discourse surrounding the Arab Spring.

### **2.3 News discourse linguistic analysis approaches**

Linguistics offers a robust set of theoretical frameworks and methodological tools for analyzing the language of news. As a complex form of discourse, journalism exhibits distinctive linguistic patterns shaped by social functions, contexts, production processes, and conventions. A wide range of linguistics-oriented approaches have been applied to systematically investigate news discourse and unpack its meaning, revealing different dimensions such as stylistics, ideological means, and interactional dynamics. This section reviews key linguistically grounded perspectives that provide multidimensional insights into the complex interplay between text, context, social cognition, and power dynamics within news discourse.

The diversity of linguistic concepts underlines the value of analytic diversity in building an integrated understanding of news discourse analysis. In reviewing influential linguistic frameworks for analysing news discourse, the current study discusses and evaluates key approaches in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. These include critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics, which form core components of the analytical framework employed in this research. Although this thesis does not utilise fully all of the approaches mentioned, they are presented here to provide context and justification for the choice to adopt the Discourse of News Values framework (section 2.4). The integration of critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics with the Discourse of News Values approach allows for a comprehensive examination of both qualitative and quantitative aspects of news language, enabling a nuanced understanding of how news values are constructed and represented across different linguistic and cultural contexts. Discourse of News Values approach will be integrated in this study with elements from other relevant theories, such as the Protest Paradigm theory from critical cognitive linguistics, to provide a comprehensive analysis of the news discourse in question (for further details about the methodology and methods applied in this thesis, see Chapter Three).

It's worth noting that several other approaches, including Conversation Analysis, Systemic Functional Linguistics, and Stylistic and Pragmatic approaches, have also contributed significantly to the field of news discourse analysis. However, due to space constraints and the

specific focus of this thesis, these approaches are not covered in detail. Instead, this review concentrates on Critical Discourse Analysis, Corpus Linguistics, and the News Values approach, which are most directly relevant to the analytical framework employed in this study.

### **2.3.1 The critical discourse analysis approach**

The critical approach has become one of the most prominent methods in linguistics for the analysis of news discourse and is closely associated with the traditions of Critical Discourse Analysis (Flowerdew and Richardson 2017; Wodak and Meyer 2016). This critical tradition focuses on uncovering the power relations, ideologies and inequalities that may be covered in news texts. To do so, it looks beyond the texts themselves to consider the broader institutional and sociocultural context that shapes news production and consumption.

Critical news discourse analysis has been increasingly important in recent years, as it helps to uncover and address the ways in which language can perpetuate power imbalances and marginalization in society. In the context of this study, which focuses on the cross-lingual representations of the Arab Spring events in Al Jazeera and BBC news discourse in both Arabic and English, a critical approach is particularly relevant. As displayed in Chapter One, the Arab Spring was a series of pro-democracy uprisings that swept through several countries in the Middle East and North Africa, challenging existing power structures and leading to significant social and political changes in the region (Yom 2015). By examining how these events were portrayed in the news media across different languages, this study aims to shed light on the ideological underpinnings and potential biases in the coverage of these transformative events, and to investigate whether the ideologies embedded in news value constructions are identical or varied based on the target audience of each language service.

Previous studies have demonstrated the value of critical discourse analysis in exploring the linguistic representation of marginalised social groups, such as women (e.g., Mills and Mullany 2011; Alshahrani 2022), refugees and asylum seekers (e.g., KhosraviNik 2010; Serafis et al. 2020), and the parties involved in war and conflict (e.g., Wodak 2018; Wang and Ge 2020). These studies highlight the importance of examining specific linguistic devices, such as lexis, metaphor (Hart 2008; Musolff 2012; Budd et al. 2019), transitivity (Zhang 2014; Zakizadeh 2024), modality (Van Leeuwen 2014; Machin, Caldas-Coulthard and Milani 2016), and intertextuality (Str ath and Wodak 2009; Wodak 2011; Al-Hejin 2012; Guo 2019), in conveying ideology and shaping public perception.

Building on this rich body of research, this study applies a critical discourse analysis approach to investigate the cross-lingual representations of the Arab Spring events in Al Jazeera and BBC news discourse, comparing the Arabic and English language services of each institution. By doing so, it aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of how language can be used to construct and challenge power relations, particularly in the context of significant social and political upheavals, and to explore whether the ideologies conveyed through news value constructions are consistent or divergent across different language services catering to distinct audiences. The timeliness of this research lies in its potential to provide valuable insights into the role of multilingual news media in shaping public opinion and influencing the course of historical events, as well as its ability to inform more responsible and inclusive journalistic practices in an increasingly globalised and interconnected world.



In terms of the CDA methodology, CDA does not constitute a single unified approach or specify particular methods. As with other forms of critical social research, CDA aims to move beyond objective descriptions and explanations to adopt an openly political stance seeking social change through intellectual critique (Hart 2021). CDA researchers typically begin by identifying perceived social issues, such as inequality, and utilise various discourse analysis tools to demonstrate how patterns of language use help to perpetuate that problem (Fairclough 2003). Thus, critical perspectives can complement any discourse analytic approach, with many CDA studies explicitly criticising their data sources (Van Dijk 1993).

Although CDA offers significant insights into news discourse, various scholars have pointed out key methodological limitations. In particular, traditional CDA has been criticised for frequently depending on small text samples chosen based on the analyst's own preconceptions, which may limit its generalisability (Widdowson 2000). Furthermore, while close reading is valuable for in-depth analysis, it runs the risk of overlooking wider discursive patterns and may lack empirical validity due to the restricted scope of text samples (Mautner 2015).

To address these limitations, researchers have increasingly integrated corpus linguistic methods with CDA approaches (Baker et al. 2008; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008). This integration, which will be discussed in detail in Section 2.3, enables the systematic examination of linguistic patterns across larger datasets, revealing ideological representations that can be interpreted through CDA's critical theoretical lens. However, as Baker et al. (2008) emphasise, corpus analysis should be complemented by qualitative scrutiny and contextual sensitivity to ensure comprehensive understanding of the discourse.

This methodological consideration is particularly relevant to the current study of cross-lingual representations of the Arab Spring events. By combining corpus-assisted discourse analysis with qualitative examination of sociocultural and political contexts, this research aims to provide nuanced insights into how ideologies and power relations manifested in Al Jazeera and BBC's coverage across their Arabic and English language services. While ethnographic observation of news production processes, as recommended by Richardson (2007), falls outside this study's scope, the research design acknowledges the importance of situating textual analysis within broader institutional and cultural contexts.

Traditional CDA has been critiqued for often relied on small samples of texts selected according to the analyst's preconceptions, thus lacking generalisability (Widdowson 2000). CDA focuses on close reading risks missing broader patterns in discourse or lacking empirical validity (Mautner 2015). However, the integration of corpus linguistic methods (see Section 2.2.6) enables the examination of linguistic patterns across much larger datasets in a more systematic and comprehensive manner (Baker et al. 2008).

In recent decades, scholars have increasingly recognised the value of integrating corpus linguistics and CDA to critically analyse news discourse (Baker et al. 2008; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Mautner 2015). Corpus linguistics analysis of linguistic features in media text corpora can reveal ideological representations which can then be interpreted through the CDA's critical theoretical lens (Gabrielatos and Baker 2008). O'Halloran (2010) advocates combining corpus techniques such as collocation analysis with systemic functional linguistics to unpack

ideological meanings; while CDA foregrounds contextualisation, corpus techniques facilitate the analysis of broader discursive patterns across sources, genres and time periods (Mautner 2015).

As discussed above, one of the primary aims of this study is to explore patterned meanings, including those that reflect ideological positions, embedded in the construction of news values in the coverage of the Arab Spring in Arabic and English web-based news from Al Jazeera and the BBC. Consequently, this study draws on concepts and methods associated with a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach. The use of CDA as a methodological framework for analysing and interpreting news discourse is discussed further in Chapter Three (Section 3.2.2).

The following two subsections discuss relevant CDA concepts used to analysing news discourse that are considered part of CDA, as their conceptual orientations are particularly relevant to the theoretical and methodological framework of this study.

### **2.3.1.1 Intertextuality and Interdiscursivity as CDA Analytical Tools**

Intertextuality and interdiscursivity are fundamental aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and serve as key analytical tools within the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). Developed by Ruth Wodak and colleagues (Wodak 2001; Reisigl and Wodak 2009), DHA is a strand of CDA that focuses on the historical, socio-political, and intertextual contexts in which discourse is produced and interpreted. It aims to uncover the ways in which language is used to construct, legitimise, and sustain power relations, often through discursive strategies that naturalise ideological positions.

These tools enable researchers to examine how discourses are shaped by prior texts, genres, and socio-political contexts, revealing the linguistic mechanisms through which dominant ideologies are reproduced or contested. In DHA, intertextual and interdiscursive analysis plays a crucial role in uncovering how discourse constructs meaning across different communicative contexts, particularly in news media.

Intertextuality refers to the ways in which texts reference, allude to, or incorporate elements from other texts, establishing connections between past and present discourse. A key aspect of intertextuality is *recontextualisation*, where textual elements are selectively transferred from one context to another, often reshaped to fit new discursive frames. For instance, a journalist might quote a political figure in a way that alters the intended meaning by embedding it within a particular ideological or argumentative structure.

Interdiscursivity, on the other hand, examines how different discourses intersect and blend through shared topics, subtopics, and rhetorical strategies. News discourse on climate change, for example, may draw on economic or health discourses, merging distinct communicative domains to influence public perception. This interplay between discourses highlights how ideological positions are reinforced or negotiated in media narratives.

Within DHA, intertextual and interdiscursive analysis is particularly valuable in revealing how news discourse naturalises and legitimises dominant ideologies. Prior studies have demonstrated their ideological significance in shaping media representations. For instance, Richardson (2007) found that British newspapers reinforced negative portrayals of asylum seekers by intertextually invoking broader anti-immigrant narratives. Similarly, Mayr and Machin (2012) showed how

UK media reporting on immigration interdiscursively blended official statistics with populist rhetoric to advance anti-immigration discourses.

This study extends such analyses by applying intertextuality and interdiscursivity to a cross-lingual context, investigating the representations of the Arab Spring in Al Jazeera and the BBC news discourse across Arabic and English. While intertextuality has primarily been studied within single-language and monocultural contexts, its role in multilingual news discourse remains underexplored. By examining intertextual and interdiscursive patterns across linguistically and culturally distinct media outlets, this research aims to uncover how ideological positions are articulated and negotiated through cross-lingual news constructions.

The following section will discuss the Protest Paradigm as a concept widely used in the literature and relevant to this study for critically analysing news discourse, particularly the discourse surrounding protests in news media.

### **2.3.1.2 Protest paradigm**

The protest paradigm represents a significant theoretical framework in media studies and critical discourse analysis, elucidating how mainstream news outlets systematically construct narratives around protests and social movements (Chan and Lee 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1999). First conceptualised by Chan and Lee (1984), this paradigm illuminates the tendency of mainstream media to emphasise violence, disruption and arrests in protest coverage, whilst marginalising substantive grievances and demands. This framing stems from ideological biases embedded within media ownership structures, institutional routines and an over-reliance on official sources (Di Cicco 2010).

Situated within Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the protest paradigm framework shows how linguistic choices contribute to delegitimising protesters, trivialising their demands and foregrounding conflict rather than underlying social issues (Boykoff 2006; Teune 2007). Through systematic analysis of discursive strategies including lexical choices, syntactic structures and evaluative language scholars have documented how media discourse shapes public perception of protest movements (Van Dijk 1998; Fairclough 2003). Empirical studies across various contexts and movements have consistently demonstrated the paradigm's prevalence (Boyle et al. 2012).

The cognitive linguistic perspective enriches this analytical framework by examining the conceptual underpinnings of these discursive patterns. Through investigation of metaphorical mappings, frame evocation and mental schemata, cognitive linguists demonstrate how media discourse influences audience interpretation of protests (Lakoff 2004; Charteris-Black 2018). For instance, metaphorical constructions of protests as 'chaos' or 'threats', coupled with frames that privilege violence over civic engagement, serve to reinforce institutional narratives and shape public attitudes (Entman 1993; Wodak and Meyer 2016).

Whilst content analyses have documented these patterns quantitatively, critical discourse analysts move beyond surface-level content counting to examine how delegitimising frames manifest through specific linguistic choices that activate particular cognitive models (Van Dijk 2015). This micro-level critical linguistic analysis provides crucial insight into the construction

of meaning within the dominant protest paradigm (Hart 2018), showing the subtle mechanisms through which media discourse can reproduce existing power relations.

For instance, Van Dijk (1988b) demonstrates how the selective quoting of official sources rather than activists reproduces power imbalances linguistically. Metaphor analysis shows the conceptual projections of protests as chaotic or futile (Hart 2013a). A corpus-assisted study by Cárdenas-Neira and Pérez-Arredondo (2021) illustrates this dynamic in Chilean media coverage of student protests (2011-2013), where analysis of 1,526 mainstream news reports showed systematic criminalisation of student protesters. Their findings demonstrated how traditional media outlets reinforced hegemonic representations through selective source attribution, while students used social media platforms to contest these delegitimising portrayals and reframe the educational conflict through counter-hegemonic discourse.

In addition, Hart (2015) analysed how different types of verbs encode different image schemas and viewpoints in news reports about violence during political protests. Transitive verbs (e.g., 'attack' and 'strike') represent the protest events with an asymmetry image schema, profiling one party's forceful action against another. This construes the social perception of protests as violent conflict initiated by aggressive protesters. Reciprocal verbs (e.g., 'clash' and 'confront') represent the event with a symmetry image schema, distributing the force and action between the involved parties. This diffuses responsibility for violence during protests.

Follow-up research by Hart (2018) confirmed that these verbs have ideological effects on the perceptions of the audience. Transitive verbs increase perceptions of protests as violent and protesters as aggressive, whereas reciprocal verbs reduce such perceptions. The analysis shows how subtle differences in image schemas and construals encoded in verb types systematically shape the social cognition of protests in accordance with the media's ideological biases.

In the context of the current study, which investigates the cross-lingual representations of the Arab Spring events in Al Jazeera and BBC news discourse, the cognitive linguistic approach and the protest paradigm are particularly relevant. The Arab Spring protests were a series of pro-democracy uprisings that challenged existing power structures in the Middle East and North Africa, making them a prime target for ideologically biased media coverage. By examining how these events were framed in news discourse across different languages and cultural contexts, this study aims to uncover the linguistic and discursive strategies employed in the construction of news values and the representation of protesters and their demands.

In a recent paper, Hart (2023) analysed the frames and framing of two newspapers' coverage of protesters removing the statue of Edward Colston during a Black Lives Matter protest in Bristol in 2020. While both news articles correspond to the 'protest paradigm' by focusing on the destructive act rather than the motivations behind it, there were key differences in how they linguistically construed the events. For example, for the first event of removing the statue, the MailOnline used verbs including "tear down" which emphasised the damage, construing it as a causal interaction. Meanwhile, the Guardians' use of "pull down" placed greater emphasis on changes in orientation and suggests that the act required less force.

In his analysis of how the newspapers reported on the transportation of the statue, Hart (2023) notes that the Guardian's use of the verb "roll" focuses on the manner of motion, suggesting a more neutral and descriptive account of the event. In contrast, the MailOnline's choice of verbs such as "throw" and "dump" implies a sense of carelessness and disregard for the statue, effectively depoliticizing the act by framing it as a mere act of vandalism rather than a

politically motivated action. This difference in verb choice highlights how subtle linguistic variations can contribute to the overall framing of the event and the protesters' actions, reflecting the ideological stances of the respective news outlets. Hart's (2023) paper claims that the ideological stances of both newspapers are evident in their lexical choices, especially their use of metaphors. The Guardian headline used the word "topple" which evokes revolutionary framing, whereas the MailOnline's construal sought to present it as mere criminal vandalism. This critical cognitive linguistic analysis uncovers how linguistic construal operations and conceptual frames can encode ideological biases in news discourse.

While Hart (2023) provides an insightful cognitive CDA of how the media frames social movements, particularly through metaphorical framing such as the war frame, a limitation is that his analysis is based entirely on UK news coverage of UK-based movements. The data gathered from UK media outlets about UK political and social protests makes it difficult to generalise these findings more broadly to media coverage of social/political movements in other national and cultural contexts beyond the UK.

The prominence of war metaphors in delegitimising the coverage of protests may reflect particular aspects of British history, politics and media ideologies. Other societies may have different dominant linguistic and metaphorical frames that serve similar or different protest paradigm functions when their media covers local social movements. Additional cross-cultural comparative evidence and data from non-UK media outlets and protest movements are needed before claims can be made regarding the generalisability of the war frame or other cognitive-discursive patterns identified in Hart's (2023) UK-focused study.

While Hart's approach offers a productive model for critically analysing the media framing of protests, it is necessary to demonstrate caution with regards to universalising and over-generalising these findings. Further cognitive CDA of the international media coverage of social movements in diverse linguistic and sociocultural settings is required to determine what patterns manifest universally versus what may be nation- or culture-specific phenomena.

This criticism is particularly relevant to the current study, as it focuses on the media coverage of the Arab Spring events in the Middle East and North Africa, a context that differs significantly from the UK in terms of its linguistic, cultural, and political landscape. While Hart's approach offers valuable insights into the cognitive-discursive patterns that may shape the framing of protests, it is necessary to exercise caution when applying these findings to the analysis of Al Jazeera and BBC news discourse on the Arab Spring. To address this limitation, the current study will employ a cross-lingual and comparative approach, examining the representations of the Arab Spring events in both Arabic and English language news services. By doing so, it aims to identify the linguistic and discursive strategies that may be specific to each language and cultural context, as well as those that may manifest universally across different media outlets and societies. Furthermore, the relevance of this study lies in its potential to contribute to the ongoing scholarly discussions on the role of media in shaping public perceptions of social and political movements, particularly in the context of the Arab Spring and its aftermath. By critically engaging with the cognitive linguistic approach and the protest paradigm, while also acknowledging and addressing their limitations, this study seeks to provide a more context-sensitive understanding of how news discourse may reproduce or challenge dominant ideologies and power relations in the representation and framing of the Arab Spring events.

To summarise, through the preceding sections, I have surveyed various approaches to analysing news discourse, each offering unique insights and perspectives. However, while these approaches, rooted in the field of linguistics, have been applied to news discourse as a type of text, they may not fully address the specific aims and requirements of the current study. For instance, the critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach provides valuable tools for examining the ideological underpinnings and power relations embedded in news discourse. However, its primary focus on uncovering and challenging dominant ideologies may not adequately capture the nuances of how news values are constructed and negotiated within news texts. Similarly, the cognitive linguistic approach, particularly the protest paradigm, offers important insights into how media portrayals of socio-political movements can delegitimize activist activities based on ideological biases. Yet, its emphasis on the framing of protests and social movements may not fully encompass the broader range of news values and their discursive construction across different types of news stories.

Given the limitations of these approaches in addressing the specific focus of this study, an inclusive and targeted approach is necessary. The discursive news values approach (DNVA) emerges as a compelling framework that bridges the fields of journalism and linguistics. Designed specifically to examine news values, a key aspect of news discourse, the DNVA offers a comprehensive and cross-disciplinary perspective that combines multiple discursive lenses. By adopting the DNVA, this study aims to build upon the rich research tradition of discourse analysis in news discourse while also tailoring the analytical framework to the specific data and research questions at hand. The DNVA's targeted focus on news values construction allows for a more in-depth analysis of how these values are discursively negotiated and realised within news texts. Moreover, the DNVA's cross-disciplinary nature, drawing from both journalism and linguistics, ensures that the analysis is grounded in a thorough understanding of the journalistic practices and conventions that shape news discourse, while also leveraging the analytical tools and insights provided by linguistic approaches.

### **2.3.2 The corpus linguistic approach**

Corpus linguistics utilises computational tools and statistical methods to analyse patterns in language use and discourse (McEnery and Hardie 2011). Corpus-based analysis of news discourse examines large datasets of news texts to identify frequent linguistic features such as words, phrases and grammar structures (Baker, 2023). This facilitated the analysis of extensive news data and highlighted widespread discourse patterns. For instance, Biber and James (2009) used corpus techniques to demonstrate lexical and grammatical differences between speech- and writing-based registers, with news discourse being more closely aligned with the latter. Baker (2010) proposed combining corpus linguistics with CDA to leverage computational power while retaining a critical examination of contexts. This "corpus-assisted discourse studies" approach moves iteratively between corpus data and qualitative analysis to study discursive practices in news texts (Baker 2009).

Computational tools such as AntConc, Wordsmith, and LancesBox enable faster, large-scale corpus analysis than manual qualitative methods (Baker 2023c). However, some argue that computational approaches risk decontextualising texts and over-emphasising frequencies relative to qualitative insights (Wodak and Meyer 2016).

Corpus-based research has utilised news datasets to critically examine the representations of marginalised racial and ethnic groups in media discourse. For instance, Baker and Levon (2015) analysed a large British newspaper corpus about masculinity using both corpus linguistic tools and qualitative analysis. They revealed that their corpus analysis identified a discourse prosody surrounding Black men as suspected or actual criminals, evidenced through collocates such as 'accused', 'custody', 'rape', 'prison', 'confessed' and 'gang'. Their analysis demonstrated that Black men were additionally constructed as physically imposing or impressive through the frequent collocate 'tall'. The qualitative analysis noted a related construction of Black men as violent, alongside an overemphasis on physicality. Both analytical approaches identified common stereotypical representations of Black men, whilst acknowledging the discrimination they faced. Regarding Asian men, both analytical approaches identified constructions centred on sexual grooming, wherein such men were characterised as engaging in sexual and other violent behaviour towards underage white women. The qualitative analysis observed that 'In these texts, themes of violence are markedly present, including discussion of Asian Men's "raping," "beating" and "torturing" young women', whilst the corpus analysis highlighted instances where "groom/grooming" collocates with Asian men who are described as grooming (typically white) teenage girls for sex (Baker and Levon (2015) .

Similarly, Baker et al. (2013) used collocates and keywords in a newspaper Islam corpus to expose gender biases. They found that references to Muslim women outnumbered those to Muslim men, with the veil being the primary characterisation of Muslim women. Through computational analysis of lexical patterns, the researchers critically uncovered discriminatory gendered portrayals of Muslim women in negative, prejudiced reports about their appearance.

These examples demonstrate how corpus linguistic techniques can systematically unveil widespread biased discourses and problematic representations in large news datasets. Combining the computational power of corpus tools with critical perspectives offers significant potential to critically expose and challenge the dominant ideological assumptions coded within news discourse (e.g., Baker 2012; Baker and Vessey 2018; Partington 2015; Taylor 2014; Taylor and Marchi, 2018; Taylor and Fante 2020; Vessey 2013; AlShahrani 2022).

However, Baker et al. (2008) argued that corpus linguistics analysis should be complemented by critical qualitative scrutiny and sensitivity to context. In addition to corpus linguistics tools, researchers are encouraged to explore the integration of the ethnographic observation of news production with corpus-assisted discourse analysis to better situate texts in sociocultural contexts (Richardson 2007). Baker et al.'s (2008) argument for complementing corpus linguistics analysis with critical qualitative scrutiny and sensitivity to context is particularly relevant to this study, which aims to investigate the cross-lingual representations of the Arab Spring events in Al Jazeera and BBC news discourse. By combining corpus-assisted discourse analysis with a qualitative examination of the sociocultural and political contexts in which these news texts were produced, this research seeks to provide a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the ideologies and power relations embedded in the coverage of these transformative events.

Overall, corpus linguistics significantly enhances the scope and rigour of news discourse research by facilitating the examination of extensive datasets. Integrating this computational power with qualitative critical analysis offers a fertile approach for studying minute textual patterns alongside the broader contexts that shape news.

### 2.3.3 Integration of CDA and Corpus Linguistics

Having established the foundations of CDA and its relevant analytical concepts (section 2.31), including *interdiscursivity*, *intertextuality* (section 2.3.1.1) and the *protest paradigm* (2.3.1.2), as well as the corpus linguistics approach, both particularly relevant to examining cross-lingual representations of the Arab Spring events, the following section examines how the integration of these approaches enhances critical analysis of news discourse. This integration is especially valuable for the current study's investigation of Al Jazeera's and the BBC's coverage across Arabic and English language web-based news, as it enables systematic analysis of larger datasets whilst maintaining the critical perspective necessary to uncover ideological patterns in news value construction.

The integration of corpus linguistics with CDA has emerged as a particularly powerful approach for analysing news discourse. This combination addresses the limitations of each method whilst leveraging their respective strengths. As Baker et al. (2008) and Gabrielatos and Baker (2008) demonstrate, corpus linguistics techniques can reveal ideological representations in media text corpora, which can then be interpreted through CDA's critical theoretical lens. This synergy enables researchers to identify systematic patterns across large datasets whilst maintaining a critical focus on context and power relations.

O'Halloran (2010) particularly advocates for combining corpus techniques, such as collocation analysis, with systemic functional linguistics to unpack ideological meanings. Whilst CDA foregrounds contextualisation, corpus techniques facilitate the analysis of broader discursive patterns across sources, genres, and time periods (Mautner, 2015). This integrated approach has proved especially valuable in uncovering patterns of representation in news discourse. For instance, Baker et al. (2008) and Baker and Levon (2015) employed this combined methodology to analyse representations of masculinity in British newspapers. Through an analysis of frequent collocates, they showed systematic patterns of negative lexical associations that perpetuated problematic discourses.

Similarly, Baker et al. (2013) demonstrated the effectiveness of this integrated approach through a detailed analysis of gender representations in British newspaper coverage of Islam. Their corpus analysis identified specific linguistic patterns: the word 'Muslim' collocated with 'women' five times more frequently than with 'men', while words related to clothing (particularly 'veil', 'headscarf', and 'burqa') appeared among the top 20 collocates of 'Muslim women'. The study found that 'Muslim women' were predominantly represented as passive subjects through syntactic choices, often appearing as objects rather than agents in most of the sentences analysed. Quantitative keyword analysis showed that descriptions of Muslim women's dress occurred three times more often than references to their professional or educational achievements. These statistical patterns, when examined qualitatively, illuminated how news discourse systematically foregrounded Muslim women's appearance while minimising their agency and accomplishments. Such findings demonstrate how corpus linguistic techniques, combined with critical discourse analysis, can quantifiably document patterns of biased representation across large-scale news datasets.

However, researchers emphasise the importance of maintaining a balance between computational and qualitative approaches. Baker et al. (2008) argue that corpus linguistics analysis must be



complemented by critical qualitative scrutiny and sensitivity to context. This ensures that quantitative patterns are interpreted within their broader sociocultural frameworks. Richardson (2007) further suggests integrating ethnographic observation of news production with corpus-assisted discourse analysis to better situate texts in their institutional contexts.

For the current study examining cross-lingual representations of the Arab Spring, this integrated approach offers several advantages. It enables a systematic comparison of coverage across Arabic and English-language services whilst maintaining attention to the sociocultural and political contexts that shaped news production. By combining corpus-assisted discourse analysis with qualitative examination, this research aims to provide a comprehensive insight into how ideologies and power relations manifested in coverage of these transformative events.

Looking ahead, this integration of approaches continues to evolve. Researchers are developing increasingly sophisticated methods for combining computational analysis with critical perspectives (e.g. Baker, 2012; Baker & Vessey, 2018; Partington, 2015; Taylor & Marchi, 2018). These developments suggest promising directions for future research in cross-lingual news discourse analysis, particularly in understanding how language choices reflect and reinforce power relations across different cultural and linguistic contexts.

Whilst the integration of CDA and corpus linguistics provides robust analytical tools for examining news discourse, this study's specific focus on news values construction requires a more targeted theoretical framework. Building on these theoretical and methodological foundations, the following section examines the Discursive News Values Approach (DNVA), which offers a specialised framework for analysing how news values are constructed and negotiated within news texts. This approach draws upon both critical and corpus-based methods whilst specifically addressing the journalistic dimensions of news discourse construction.

In the following section, a detailed theoretical and applied overview of the DNVA will be provided, laying the groundwork for the empirical analysis of news values constructed in news discourse, which will be conducted in Chapter Three. By focusing on this inclusive and targeted approach, the current study aims to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of how news values are discursively constructed and negotiated within the specific context of the Arab Spring events, as reported by Al Jazeera and the BBC in their Arabic and English news services.

## **2.4 The discursive news values approach**

The notion of news values or newsworthiness is rooted in journalism and communication studies. It has been characterised as a fundamental element that influences the selection of news content (Palmer 2000; Conley Lamb 2006). For instance, Tuchman (1973) defined news values as the framework through which news practitioners shape and reshape social realities in news coverage by establishing the context within which social phenomena are perceived and defined. Bell (1991) interprets news values as standards that guide news professionals to make informed decisions during news selection. Richardson (2007) observed that news values serve as the criteria employed by journalists to determine, organise and prioritise the gathering and

production of news content. Other linguistics scholars have broadened the concept of news values beyond mere content, viewing it as a process of constructing language. Cotter (2010) emphasised the role of news values in guiding practitioners in the creation of a news language. Bell (1991; 1995) underscored the significance of news values in shaping news discourse, pointing out journalists' frequent use of language to amplify and optimise news values. While these researchers provide valuable insights into the role of news values in shaping news content and discourse, their approaches do not offer a structured framework for close linguistic analysis of how news values are discursively constructed and negotiated within news texts.

However, there is a news value approach that crosses disciplinary boundaries by combining linguistics and journalism perspectives. Originally applied by Galtung and Ruge (1965), Bednarek and Caple (2012b; 2013; 2014; 2017) introduced a discursive construction of news values (DNVA) that investigates how news is chosen and developed in discourse. However, unlike Galtung and Ruge who view news values as pre-existing 'factors' that make events newsworthy, DNVA views news values as being actively constructed through linguistic and other semiotic choices within the discourse (Bednarek and Caple 2017, p. 30). Furthermore, whereas Galtung and Ruge focused on news content, DNVA examines the role of linguistic and visual communication in establishing values.

Thus, it can be said that DNVA regards news values as products of discourse, encompassing all semiotic elements involved in news construction (Caple and Bednarek 2016; Bednarek and Caple 2014; Bednarek and Caple 2017). Furthermore, they argue that news values reflect the ideological dimensions of journalists who are influenced by the societal power dynamics that influence the construction of news discourse (Bednarek and Caple 2014). As previously mentioned, their discursive approach to news values examines diverse semiotic choices in the construction of news discourse concerning the establishment of news values within the text (Caple and Bednarek 2016). By employing this discursive perspective, the DNVA framework facilitates a thorough examination of newsworthiness by delving into the various resources utilised in journalists' mental processes during news construction (Bednarek and Caple 2012a).

As previously mentioned, DNVA is cross-disciplinary in its theoretical foundations, combining linguistics and journalism studies. The theorists behind DNVA came from both fields: Bednarek from linguistics and Caple from journalism. DNVA also incorporates aspects of other DA approaches, as previously discussed. For example, DNVA perceives the establishment of a news event through specific news values as a type of framing – an idea drawn from cognitive linguistics. It also considers the notions of interdiscursivity and intertextuality from the discourse historical approach as the news value of consonance (for a detailed terminology of DNVA news values, see Chapter Three).

Furthermore, DNVA theoretically addresses one area that has been overlooked in critical analyses of news discourse as a mental representation of language users. For instance, most CDA approaches focus more directly on the relationship between news and society (Van Dijk 2018). However, in his recent work, Van Dijk (2023) argued from a sociolinguistic perspective that discourse and social structures are fundamentally different. Accordingly, news values, which define the mental representations of individuals (news producers) and groups (audiences), are an important link between the two (Van Dijk 2018). Thus, van Dijk advocates taking mental construction seriously through a socio-cognitive approach characterised by the discourse-cognition-society triangle framework (Van Dijk 2018). This perspective has influenced recent

critical discourse analyses of news to focus on exploring newsworthiness. For instance, Bevitori and Johnson (2017) investigated mainstream press portrayals of migration as adaptation to climate change, while Huan (2018) analysed Chinese journalists' newsworthiness judgements in selecting news actors in hard news on risk events. However, while interpreting results in terms of news values, these studies only examined limited discourse aspects rather than taking a comprehensive discursive approach. Bevitori and Johnson (2017) diachronically explored risk/resilience meaning patterns in newspapers, and Huan (2018) examined the lexicographic patterns and semantic features, but neither study fully addressed the complex discursive construction and negotiation of news values within the texts.

In terms of its multicultural and multilingual feasibility, to a greater extent than previous news values linguistic approaches (Bell 1991; Cotter 2010), DNVA has proven to be culturally versatile and facilitates the analysis of differences in cross-cultural and cross-lingual comparative analyses. This is likely because DNVA incorporates news values that go beyond the values or factors associated with news writing and selection; rather, the news values in DNVA are tied to cultural dimensions such as positivity, negativity, eliteness and consonance (for details about DNVA news value labels, see Chapter Three). For example, what is viewed as positive and negative news differs according to cultural values and norms. Eliteness refers to the prominence and power of news actors which differ across cultures. Consonance relates to intertextuality with the previous discourse, drawing on culture-specific narratives and ideologies. By accounting for these “socio-culturally assigned” values (Bednarek and Caple 2017, p. 42), DNVA can effectively uncover micro- and macro-levels in news construction across different cultural contexts. The framework’s openness to cultural variation in news values makes it well suited for comparative research and providing insight into how journalistic norms and practices manifest differently across societies.

Previous studies applying the DNVA framework in global contexts can be categorised into three main types. The first includes studies analysing non-English news discourse using DNVA. For instance, Makki (2019) examined the construction of news values in ‘crime reports’ in two Iranian/Farsi newspapers. Meanwhile, Guo et al. (2022) and Guo, Mast and Vosters (2024) analysed how state-sponsored versus market-oriented presses in China constructed newsworthiness when reporting a terrorist attacks. Fatah, Omar and Zamri (2022) explored religion as a new aspect of the Malaysian media’s coverage of Covid-19 vaccines. The second category involves studies investigating English-language news discourse produced in non-English contexts using DNVA. For example, He and Caple (2020) examined the construal of negativity and positivity through evaluative resources across verbal and visual modes in English news in China. Zhang and Caple (2021) analysed news values in English-language reporting of the Chinese tennis player Li Na across outlets from China, Britain, Australia and the US.

The third category of DNVA studies compares the news value construction of the same events across different cross-lingual and cross-cultural news discourses. Pioneering work was conducted by Caple, Huan and Bednarek (2020) who undertook a multimodal comparison of national day coverage in the Chinese and Australian press. By examining China and Australia, they provide insight into Chinese DNVA and extend the approach's adoption globally across distinct cultures.

Similarly, Zhang and Cheung (2022) compared coverage of the Covid-19 pandemic and explained how sociocultural contexts and outbreak severity shaped reports in the Chinese and US press. From a global perspective, Yu and Liu (2023) investigated Covid-19 representations in US

and Chinese outlets, reflecting long-standing political tensions. Their DNVA showed differentiated ‘othering’ coverage - each paper depicted the pandemic as being less negative domestically versus the situation abroad. This supports the view that domestic crises tend to be framed more positively than foreign crises, thereby reflecting the influence of nationalism.

Beyond linguistic analysis, Chen and Yu (2023a) examined the visual flood coverage in US and Chinese photo galleries. Across ~1500 images, both highlighted negativity, impact, personalisation and superlativeness for ‘their’ floods. However, the presentation of ‘our’ floods differed: US coverage foregrounded the negativity, impact and personalisation of domestic floods, whereas Chinese coverage emphasised negativity, positivity, personalisation and superlativeness for Chinese floods.

In summary, comparisons of DNVA patterns in the cross-lingual, cross-cultural reporting of shared events provide insight into subtle constructions of newsworthiness based on nationalist and ideological influences. This growing body of global research demonstrates DNVA's versatility for revealing how journalists from diverse societies frame 'self' and 'other' differently. This is particularly relevant to the current study, which aims to investigate how Al Jazeera and BBC, as transnational news organisations, construct and negotiate news values in their Arabic and English news discourse surrounding the Arab Spring events. By applying the DNVA to this specific context, the study seeks to uncover potential differences and similarities in the discursive framing of the events, participants, and voices across the two languages and cultural contexts, thereby contributing to a deeper understanding of how nationalist and ideological factors may shape the construction of newsworthiness in global news coverage of major socio-political transformations.

Attia's (2022) application of the DNVA to the Arabic news discourse covering civil war and terrorism is particularly relevant to the current study's context of analysing Arabic language reporting of the Arab Spring uprisings. Attia (2022) pioneered the application of the DNVA to Arabic-speaking news discourse, specifically the coverage of civil war and terrorism. Through corpus-assisted discourse analysis integrating DNVA, Attia highlighted ideological representations and compared frequency distributions and story content across the Arabic and English versions of Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, the BBC and CNN. Attia found similar directions in story content and certain differences in frequency distributions when reporting war and terrorism across media outlets. Furthermore, the findings from corpus linguistic analysis (collocation, concordance) and DNVA results (especially regarding negativity, impact and eliteness) emphasised violent language, the portrayal of terrorism as the norm and potentially manipulating the audience's understanding.

A key contribution of Attia's (2022) study was the selection of the complex Libyan conflict which transformed into a multi-layered civil war with competing ideologies, eventually represented as terrorism in the media. Methodologically, collocation analysis retrieved story content and integrated corpus techniques using DNVA analysis. Corpus analysis demonstrated how the three media sets followed similar directions, while DNVA explored constructed news values with keyword, collocation and concordance analyses emphasising negativity and eliteness.

However, while the study compared the findings to Caple et al.'s (2020) DNVA of national day coverage, the contexts differed significantly. Coverage of wars and terrorism is expected to be more negative than celebratory national day reporting. Comparing news values construction across such disparate events seemingly offers limited utility. More illuminating

cross-cultural comparisons could potentially be made by examining DNVA patterns in Western versus Arab media coverage of the same Libyan conflict. Nevertheless, Attia's pioneering diachronic application of DNVA to Arabic news discourse provides a valuable analytical framework for future research examining the Arabic media using this approach.

Attia and Romero-Trillo (2022) also applied the DNVA framework to explore similarities and differences in the media representations of the events of Egypt's revolution between 2011 and 2015. Similar to Attia (2022), they examined the Arabic and English versions of Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, the BBC and CNN. Their frequency analysis revealed similarities across Arab and Western media outlets with low topic frequencies overall. However, the English versions of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya exhibited higher frequencies over the five-year period. Story content analysis also revealed shared coverage of political/protest events and negative/violent ideology across media categories, as evidenced by the application of DNVA.

However, while identifying some broad patterns, Attia and Romero-Trillo (2022) did not provide an in-depth examination of cross-cultural differences in the construction of specific news values such as consonance across the Arabic and English versions of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. Given the DNVA's premise that news values are discursively constructed, comparing linguistic and semiotic choices around consonance may have illuminated cross-cultural variances in intertextuality and cultural narratives. Mere frequency comparisons do not fully capture how journalists from different cultures linguistically frame events based on news values. More granular DNVA of the bilingual corpus could have enhanced our understanding of how ideological biases manifest differently in Arabic and English coverage.

In summary, the DNVA provides direct insight into the current research, focusing on the construction of Arab Spring representations across linguistic and cultural contexts. DNVA's systematic framework for revealing newsworthiness across news resources makes it well suited as the primary analytical approach for the current study. Integration with other methods such as corpus linguistics and CDA elements will strengthen the analysis, as further detailed in Chapter Three. The following section summarises the theoretical context of the current study.

## **2.5 The current study's theoretical contribution**

The current research makes two notable contributions to the existing body of knowledge concerning news discourse analysis. First, it applies a context- and genre-specific discourse analysis approach (DNVA) to a cross-lingual Arabic-English dataset. Involving cultural aspects in such cross-lingual comparisons is valuable, and frameworks such as DNVA enable cross-cultural analysis by providing signposting tools discursively employed across cultures and languages.

However, this study differs from previous research in several key aspects. Unlike Attia and Romero-Trillo (2022), who did not provide an in-depth examination of cross-cultural differences in the construction of specific news values such as consonance across the Arabic and English versions of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, the current study aims to delve deeper into the discursive construction of news values. By comparing linguistic choices around specific news values, such as consonance, this study seeks to illuminate cross-cultural variances in intertextuality and cultural narratives, going beyond mere frequency comparisons to capture how journalists from different cultures linguistically frame events based on news values.

Furthermore, while Attia (2022) focused on Al Jazeera's cross-lingual coverage of the Libyan conflict, the present study expands the scope by examining both Al Jazeera and BBC's coverage of the broader Arab Spring events. This allows for more illuminating cross-cultural comparisons, not only between Arabic and English language services within each organisation but also between Western and Arab media outlets. By investigating DNVA patterns across these diverse contexts, the study aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how cultural and ideological factors shape the discursive construction of newsworthiness in global news coverage of major socio-political transformations.

Second, applying DNVA to international and cross-lingual news discourse within the same media outlet allows for an examination of Fairclough's (1995) multidimensional levels of discourse. Fairclough's dialectical-relational framework views discourse in three dimensions: (1) text, referring to linguistic features, such as grammar and vocabulary; (2) discursive practices, referring to production and interpretation; and (3) sociocultural practices, referring to situational and institutional contexts.

This thesis integrates DNVA with corpus linguistics and CDA models such as interdiscursivity, intertextuality, and the protest paradigm to comprehensively analyse and understand the target discourse across textual, contextual, and social dimensions. In this way, the thesis enhances DNVA from merely studying discourse as a discursive practice to viewing it as a sociocultural practice (Fairclough 1995). Applying an integrated CDA approach to cross-lingual and cross-cultural data enables a multilayered investigation of how sociocultural contexts shape linguistic patterns and discursive practices within news outlets. This is expected to constitute an inclusive, multidimensional discourse analysis that is attentive to textual features, as well as production, interpretation, and societal contexts.

By incorporating these innovative aspects, the current study not only builds upon the existing research but also contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the discursive construction of news values across languages, cultures, and media organisations. This approach is particularly relevant in the context of the Arab Spring events, as it allows for a deeper exploration of how cultural and ideological factors may influence the framing of these transformative events in global news discourse.

## **2.6 Summary**

This chapter has discussed two main topics related to the news discourse. First, it outlined the multifunctional dimensions of news discourse, including factors related to audiences, producers, culture, society, economics and law. This highlighted the complex and interconnected nature of news as a form of communication.

Second, the chapter reviewed the various linguistic approaches that have been developed and applied to analyse news discourse from different perspectives. As the discussion showed, these approaches sometimes overlap in their theoretical foundations and methodological applications to news text. Moreover, researchers often combine multiple approaches such as using corpus linguistic tools within a CDA framework. This methodological synergy, known as corpus-assisted discourse study, illustrates the interdisciplinary nature of news discourse scholarship.

One approach that received particular attention was the DNVA framework which assumes a cross-disciplinary perspective, drawing on both journalism studies and linguistics. The framework was specifically designed to examine news values constructed through discourse, thereby making it well suited to the focus of the current research. As outlined in the first chapter, the research questions require ideological similarities and differences to be revealed between cross-lingual and cross-cultural news coverage of Arab Spring events. To achieve this, the current study applies corpus linguistics to the analysis of Arabic and English news. Additionally, incorporating aspects of critical discourse approaches such as interdiscursivity and intertextuality within the DNVA framework will enable the examination of how news values are constructed to frame events differently across linguistic and cultural contexts. Thus, the multifaceted literature reviewed in this chapter provides the theoretical basis for the analytical approach detailed in the next chapter.

## Chapter three: Data and Methods

This study analyses two sets of cross-lingual specialised corpora, which consist of a substantial collection of tightly-defined, related texts (McEnery and Xiao 2007). While not exceptionally large by some corpus-linguistics standards, the size of the corpora is significant and appropriate for the scope of this research. The aim is to examine how Aljazeera and BBC News construct news values in their representations of Arab Spring participants and their voices across Arabic and English web-based news outlets. The research investigates the construction of news values in these representations and the patterned meanings that emerge from these constructions in the context of Arab Spring news coverage by the two media organisations. In this chapter, I explain the methods of data collection and cleaning (section 3.1), the methods of analysis, techniques, and tools applied (section 3.2), and finally, the steps and presentation of analysis (section 3.3).

### 3.1 Data collection, cleaning and corpus designing

All articles were gathered online from the four official news websites: Al-Jazeera English,<sup>5</sup> Aljazeera (in Arabic),<sup>6</sup> BBC News,<sup>7</sup> and BBC Arabic.<sup>8</sup> The decision to collect data directly from those four official websites over other digital news collections (such as Nexis UK) was guided by the fact that data from BBC Arabic, BBC News and Aljazeera<sup>9</sup> was absent from those collections. On all four news websites, news articles on the Arab Spring were collected using the SEARCH box in the top right-hand corner of the news pages.<sup>10</sup> The keywords used to look for the data on those four official websites are shown in Table 3.1 below.

Name of corpus	ALJEN	ALJAR	BBCEN	BBCAR
The research keywords	“Arab Spring”	الربيع العربي Al-rābī Al-Arābī	“Arab Spring” “Arab Spring”	الربيع العربي Al-rābī Al-Arābī

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/>

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/>

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news>

<sup>88</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/arabic>

<sup>9</sup> In Nexis UK, at the time of data collection for this thesis (January–October 2018), Al-Jazeera English news data was available from January 2015 onwards. However, the target data for this thesis spanned a period beyond that, covering December 2010 to January 2017.

<sup>10</sup> At the time of data collection (2017–2018), it was possible to search for news texts on the BBC Arabic official website. However, the search box was removed in 2022.



		(Arab Spring)	“Arab Revolution” “Arab revolutions”	(Arab Spring) الثورات العربية Al-thāwrāt al-ārabīa ثورة الياسمين (Jasmine Revolution) Thāwrāt al-yāsamēn الأحداث العربية (Arabic world’s events) Al-ahdāth al-arābiā
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*Table 3.1 The keywords used to look for the data on the four official websites*

The keywords searched for in each corpus were decided by (1) the flexibility of the news website;<sup>11</sup> and (2) the availability of news texts that discuss the Arab Spring events rather than finding keywords in irrelevant news texts (such as news about sports or the arts). To clarify, on two of the official websites, namely Aljazeera English and Al-Jazeera (in Arabic), it was possible to find the relevant assigned number of Arab Spring news texts by entering only one research key term (see Table 3.1). On the other hand, I had to try more than one key research term (as shown in Table 3.1) in the process of finding relevant news texts on the BBC News (in English) and BBC Arabic websites. This might be due to the prominence of the term “Arab Spring” in Aljazeera English and Al-Jazeera (in Arabic) web-based news compared to BBC News (in English) and BBC Arabic, where other terms such as ‘Arab protests’ or ‘Arab demonstrations’ were used.

To collect the data, a series of searching sessions were conducted on each website. The Al-Jazeera English and Al-Jazeera (Arabic) websites proved to be more researcher friendly. Using these websites, I could save my research session and easily refer back to the research keywords in subsequent data collection sessions by refreshing the same webpage window. However, the process of collecting data was less straightforward when it came to the remaining web-based news sites, namely BBC News and BBC Arabic. In my experience, BBC Arabic's official website posed

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<sup>11</sup> In Aljazeera English and Al-Jazeera (in Arabic) official websites, I only used one keyword and ended up gathering several hundred news texts. On the other hand, on the BBC News (in English) and BBC Arabic official websites, I had to use more keywords to obtain the assigned number of news texts (104 news texts in each corpus).

challenges due to what I perceived as lower user-friendliness, making it more difficult to navigate and locate relevant articles for the study. Throughout the search process, I had to continuously repeat the same steps. This could be attributed to the website's low efficiency.

The sampling frame (the list of inclusion items in the collected news texts) of the texts chosen to be included in the four sub-corpora involved articles meeting the following parameters:

1. In this thesis, the news texts should have appeared in the 'News' section of the sources' websites. Although the specialised custom corpora employed in this thesis are made up of a variety of text types from the 'News' section (including editorials, news reports and written interviews), those texts belong to the same news events: Arab Spring event reporting.

2. News texts were included in the corpora if they addressed Arab Spring events (involving actions/participants). Thus, all the collected news texts were read individually to ensure their relevance to the research aim (namely, their representations of the Arab Spring movements, actions and participants). Articles related to other Arab Spring areas, such as its influence on sport and the arts, were excluded. The socio-political nature of the Arab Spring movements, however, did sometimes make it sometimes to recognise the inevitably blurred boundaries between what should and should not be included, which is why other researchers were consulted.<sup>12</sup>

3. News texts should have been published during the defined time frame between 1/1/2011 and 30/12/2017. This period covers the spark of the Arab Spring events, which began in late 2010 and unfolded throughout 2011, leading to the overthrow of several governments. It also includes the subsequent phase often referred to as the 'Arab Winter,' marked by political instability, counter-revolutions, and prolonged conflicts from 2013 onwards. The six-year period provided sufficient data for the methodology to be effectively applied and the research questions answered

4. The sampling unit (the singular value within a sample corpus (see Potts 2015)) of each included text was a single article, including a headline, dateline, publication date, an image byline (although not included in this thesis data analysis), the name of the writer and the main content of the news text. Thus, the included news text should include three *essential* components: (1) Headline (articulates what the news story is about); (2) Byline (displays who wrote the news story); and (3) Body (includes more information and details about the story). The news text's Lead (about a five-word line after the headline, delivers the most important parts of the news story) and the Ending (presents something to think about) are desirable, but not obligatory. In some data sources, namely Al-Jazeera (in Arabic) and BBC Arabic, many keyword research results consisted merely of a line containing the assigned term, followed by a video extracted from the main news television channels. Due to the focus of this study on written news content and the aim to maintain a balanced comparison between the cross-lingual outlets, search results from Al-Jazeera (in Arabic) and BBC Arabic that primarily consisted of brief lines of text followed by videos extracted from their main television channels were excluded from the data collection process.

In collecting data related to the "Arab Spring" events, a manual approach was adopted for copying and pasting relevant news texts from the four websites, rather than directly saving

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<sup>12</sup> My supervisor, Prof. Michael Handford, was my main advisor during this step. I also sought advice from Alaa AlGhamdi and Anfal Almarshad, who were pursuing their PhDs at Cardiff University during my data collection period.

results pages as plain text. This method was employed to circumvent the inclusion of extraneous content such as menus and links to other pages, which could potentially skew the research findings. The selected texts were individually saved as .txt files.

Subsequently, the content of these files underwent annotation and organisation. This process involved appending the publication date of each news text to all four mini corpora, incorporating metalinguistic information such as the period of the news event and the nationality of the writer. This additional data was included to facilitate the analysis of linguistic features that might evolve over time or vary based on the author's background. For example, this approach allows for the examination of changes in specific terminology, sentence structures, or rhetorical devices as events unfold or differ depending on the writer's cultural context.

I started the data collection process (displayed above) from the Al-Jazeera English website, followed by Al-Jazeera's (in Arabic) website. I then gathered news texts from the BBC News and BBC Arabic' official websites. At the beginning, the target number of news texts to be collected from each website (out of the four) was 250 "Arab Spring" news texts (250 X 4 =1000 news texts in total). This number of news texts was available on Al-Jazeera English and Arabic, as well as BBC News but not on BBC Arabic. Thus, I decided to minimise the number of texts collected from the three former news websites, based on the total number of texts I could retrieve from the BBC Arabic website (namely 104 news texts). This alteration ensured parity across the four sub-corpora, with 290,444 words in 416 texts from four web-based news outlets.

<b>Name of the sub-corpus</b>	<b>ALJ EN</b>	<b>ALJAR</b>	<b>BBC EN</b>	<b>BBCAR</b>
<b>The total number of words</b>	96,9 10	57,020	68,45 9	71,055

*Table 3.2 The total number of words in each sub-corpus*

The word counts of each corpus are displayed in Table 3.2 above. It is also noticeable from Table 3.2 that the word counts in ALJEN are double those found in ALJAR. On the other hand, BBCEN and BBCAR are quite similar in their word counts. This might be due to differences in news texts' editing and publishing guidelines and criteria between those news outlets. I noted that Al-Jazeera (in Arabic) and BBC (in Arabic) have a common style of news text, consisting of a title and a paragraph (one or two sentences), followed by a video clip exported from the main news outlet's TV channel. As the news texts were not in the same news format (which was the target format of this thesis, i.e., news texts) and there was no way to separate the video clips from the text, it was impossible to include them in the data. As a result, manually searching for similar news texts that did meet the criteria for the target news text format across the four news outlets' websites was necessary, albeit time-consuming.

To sum up, to ensure representativeness and balance, the four specialised corpora were collected based on a comprehensive sampling of data using extra-linguistic (time, space of the events, type of news texts) and linguistic criteria. The linguistic criteria included the incorporation of nodes (see the searched keywords in Tables 3.1) scanning and reading each included text, and indicating whether it contained references to Arab Spring events. Then, those

collected.txt files were uploaded into Sketch Engine<sup>13</sup> (Kilgarriff et al. 2004, 2014) as separate files where computerised aspects of Corpus Linguistics analysis could be carried out. The four compiled mini corpora (named as ALJEN, ALJAR, BBCEN and BBCAR) were uploaded into Sketch Engine as separate corpora to provide a balanced, representative picture of “Arab Spring” participants and to provide me with adequate tools to conduct my cross-lingual analysis (BBCEN versus BBCAR and ALJEN versus ALJAR) in order to answer the research questions. Further discussion about Sketch Engine as a corpus-based tool and the rationale for its selection as the main data analysis software in this thesis can be found in section 3.2.4.2. In the following section, the methodology and procedure followed when analysing the cross-lingual collected corpora will be outlined.

### **3.2 Methodology and procedure**

The methodology and procedure used to analyse my data were chosen and designed specifically for the purpose of investigating how Aljazeera and BBC News construct news values in their representations of Arab Spring participants and their voices in Arabic and English web-based news outlets, and to uncover the patterned meanings formed through the construction of news values in the Arab Spring news coverage by these two media outlets. The methodology and procedures are designed for three purposes, which I discuss in more detail in the subsequent paragraphs: (1) to effectively analyse a relatively large amount of data; (2) to systematically compare and contrast the similarities and differences across English and Arabic languages; (3) and to comprehensively identify and interpret the major trends, as well as the in-depth meanings and patterns, within the collected cross-lingual corpora.

Concerning the first point, media discourse scholars such as Bell (1991, p. 103) and Fairclough (2013b, p. 11) have emphasised the necessity of substantial data quantities to obtain representative findings. Fowler (1991, p. 89) argues that media research should be grounded in comprehensive data samples, given the relatively repetitive and often ideological nature of media language within and across outlets. Consequently, the methodology must draw upon a sufficiently large data sample to account for the two languages used across different media outlets.

As for the second point, previous studies on BBC and Al Jazeera news discourse have indicated significant differences between Arabic and English news discourse (e.g., Tawfiq and Ghani 2015; Samuel-Azran et al. 2016). Thus, the chosen methodology must be capable of addressing these cross-linguistic and cross-cultural differences or potential similarities. A more detailed discussion on how these analytical concepts were implemented in this thesis can be found later in this chapter (section 3.2.1).

Finally, Regarding the third sub-point, the in-depth analysis of textual and discursive underlying meanings (such as ideologies) necessitates multifunctional analytical approaches (Thompson and Hunston 2000, p.8). Such dynamic methodologies are crucial in examining cross-lingual texts (Taylor and Fante 2020; Vessey 2024). This is due to the complex nature of these meanings, which can be expressed in different ways within discourse generally, and particularly in media discourse (Vessey 2013). Underlying meanings, including ideologies in discourse, may

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<sup>13</sup> Sketch Engine is a corpus-based data analysis software platform. More information is available at: <https://www.sketchengine.eu>.

also be 'concealed' and embedded (Van Dijk 2000, p.9). Thus, the chosen methodology for this thesis must be capable of accounting for the various ways in which such underlying meanings may manifest in cross-lingual and cross-cultural corpora.

In summary, given that theory and methods are inextricably linked, the research methods in this thesis were selected "according to how the research object is constructed" (Fairclough 2013a, p. 225). Thus, based on the theoretical concepts outlined in Chapter Two (section 2.3) and the current context of the data (cross-lingual English and Arabic web-based news on the "Arab Spring"), the methodology chosen for analysis was a combination of (1) cross-linguistic corpus-assisted (critical) discourse studies (CL-CADS) (Vessey 2013; Taylor 2014); and (2) discursive news values analysis (DNVA) (Bednarek and Caple, 2017). The theoretical foundations and application of those two joint methods are outlined in the following sections (3.2.1 and 3.2.2). Following that, in section 3.3.3, the detailed analysis procedure conducted in this thesis is outlined.

### **3.2.1 Cross-Linguistic corpus-assisted discourse studies**

As discussed in Chapter Two, a growing amount of attention has been paid to the combination of (critical) discourse analysis (CDA) and corpus linguistics in the last two decades. According to the latest research, this combination can provide a more complete picture of how language constructs social reality and power relations (Martínez Lirola 2021). Moreover, using (critical) discourse analysis and corpus linguistics in combination (as pioneered by leading researchers such as Partington, Duguid and Taylor 2013; Mautner, 2022; Baker, 2023) draws upon different methodological traditions and theoretical assumptions about analysing language. Thus, CADS is considered as an inclusive methodology because it negotiates the inflexibilities of the qualitative and quantitative demands in research practice (Taylor and Fante, 2020, p. 30). In other words, by integrating corpus linguistics and (critical) discourse analysis methods, researchers can reveal more patterned meanings in the considered discourse. Media discourse (including news) in particular is one of the main genres that requires such a triangulating methodology. Fairclough (1989) observes that the "effects of power in media is cumulative" and repetitive and "[a] single text on its own is quite insignificant" (p. 54). Thus, corpus linguistics provides researchers with an approach to tackle the "cumulative nature" of media discourse, particularly the study of words that tend to be together (collocations), including the contextual meaning and evaluative potentials beyond such associated words (Taylor and Fante, 2020).

The other half of CADS, namely (critical) discourse studies<sup>14</sup>, offers discourse analysts both theory and method to explore the target texts. Theoretically, (critical) discourse studies in particular provide researchers with assumptions and hypotheses about how language works, as well as the dialectical relationship between language and society and related dynamics, such as power and ideologies. Methodologically, (critical) discourse studies enhance corpus linguistic

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<sup>14</sup> It is important to note that within the field of corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS), the emphasis on the 'critical' aspect varies. Some scholars, such as Paul Baker (e.g. Baker et al., 2008; Baker, 2012), explicitly align their work with critical discourse analysis (CDA), prioritising the investigation of power dynamics, ideologies, and social issues. Others, such as Alan Partington (e.g. Partington, 2003; Partington, Duguid, and Taylor, 2013), focus more on the descriptive and interpretative aspects of discourse analysis, without necessarily adopting an overtly critical approach. Despite these differences, both strands of CADS share a commitment to combining corpus linguistics and discourse analysis to uncover patterns and meanings in language use.

findings by offering resources for classifying and interpreting language features (Marchi and Taylor, 2018, p. 3).

Regarding the term 'cross-linguistic corpus-assisted discourse studies' (CL-CADS for short) (used in Partington, Duguid and Taylor 2013), the principles and methods associated with this approach have been applied within the general methodology of corpus linguistics. The CL-CADS approach was employed in papers stemming from the European Union-funded project, IntUne (Bayley and Williams, 2012), which ran from 2005 to 2009 and explored the theme of citizenship across four European countries. However, a more specialised area of CL-CADS has recently emerged through the work of Vessey (2013) and Taylor (2014). Vessey (2013) examined nationalism and language ideology in the English and French press in Canada, whilst Taylor (2014) undertook a comparative study of immigration discourse in British and Italian newspapers. These studies exemplify the growing application and refinement of CL-CADS in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural media analysis.

Although the term 'cross-linguistic corpus-assisted discourse studies' (employed in Partington, Duguid and Taylor 2013) has been recently coined, its underlying concept has been practised within the broader methodology of corpus linguistics. Notable studies include Jaworska and Krishnamurthy's (2012) examination of feminist discourse in a substantial corpus of German and British newspaper data, and Freake, Gentil and Sheyholislami's (2011) bilingual CADS analysis of identities in Quebec. Additionally, in translation studies, Granger (2003) constructed their contrastive analysis research using a CADS approach.

However, these cross-lingual CADS studies lacked comparative research into discourse at the level of social practice and representations (Moschonas and Spitzmulle 2010). Vessey (2013) and Taylor (2014) were thus pioneers in incorporating a cross-linguistic component into the CADS combination, both theoretically and methodologically. This cross-linguistic approach was founded on research in translation theory, contrastive analysis and language pedagogy. The result of this integration is CL-CADS, a more comprehensive framework for analysing cross-linguistic and cross-cultural discourse.

CL-CADS proves to be a valuable method for examining the cross-lingual data in this thesis, as its various components allow for a (relatively) large cross-lingual quantity of data to be viewed both holistically and in detail. Corpus linguistics, for instance, can provide overviews of an entire corpus through quantitative procedures (such as frequency lists, keywords, collocations and Word Sketches<sup>15</sup>) and qualitative procedures (such as concordance lines) that reveal the main linguistic patterns, suggesting major ways in which topics are debated. This approach enables a comprehensive analysis of the data, allowing for both broad trends and subtle details to be identified and examined. The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods within CL-CADS provides a robust framework for investigating cross-linguistic and cross-cultural discourse patterns in media coverage.

On the other hand, (critical) discourse analytic methods are used in CL-CADS to uncover and analyse the ways in which underlying patterns, such as ideologies, are hidden and embedded in the discourse (Bell 1991, p. 65). Moreover, (critical) discourse studies in CL-CADS offer both theoretical and methodological methods in exploring how languages work in societies according

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<sup>15</sup> For more details on the corpus linguistics tools used, see Section 3.2.4.2.

to a set of assumptions. In other words, the integration of (critical) discourse studies provides the researcher with assumptions to extend the analysis to both lexical and above-lexical levels (Taylor and Fante 2020). At the lexical level, this integration enables the examination of individual words and their meanings, such as investigating the use of specific terms like 'protesters' or 'rebels' to describe participants in the Arab Spring. Above the lexical level, it allows for the analysis of larger linguistic structures, such as exploring how sentences or paragraphs are constructed to convey particular representations or ideologies. Accordingly, in this thesis, as the findings need to be compared across languages to account for differences between Arabic and English "Arab Spring" news texts in the study data, the cross-linguistic approach is integral to both the corpus linguistics component and the (critical) discourse analytic component of the analysis. Ultimately, each element of the cross-linguistic corpus-assisted (critical) discourse analysis approach is interdependent and essential for a comprehensive understanding of the study data.

Before discussing the other part of the cross-linguistic corpus-assisted (critical) discourse analysis approach, namely the news values approach, it is essential to address the challenges associated with the application of this methodology. In the following section (3.2.2), I will delve into the potential challenges that may arise when applying cross-linguistic corpus-assisted (critical) discourse studies' approach.

### **3.2.2 Cross-linguistic corpus-assisted (critical) discourse studies procedures and challenges**

Taylor (2014) and Taylor and Fante (2020) suggest that research employing cross-linguistic corpus-assisted (critical) discourse studies typically falls into four categories. The first category comprises studies that explicitly examine language differences and similarities. For instance, Murphy (2005) investigates lexico-grammatical markers of attribution in comparable corpora of Italian and English opinion articles. Such studies focus on language itself and its genre conventions, with findings like Sanz's (2011) comparative study of authorial voice in English and Spanish offering practical implications for translation and pedagogy.

The second category encompasses comparative cultural keyword or discourse keyword studies. These adopt a more lexicological approach to reveal how specific words or phrases are used across languages and cultures. Examples include Murphy's (2011) comparison of 'humanitarian' and 'umanitario' in British English and contemporary Italian, and Baker and Vessey's (2018) study comparing keywords in English and French Islamist extremist corpora to determine similarities and differences in terrorists' linguistic strategies and themes across languages.

The third category of cross-linguistic studies primarily focuses on cultural comparisons rather than on the languages themselves. In these studies, the multilingual nature of the corpora is not central to the main research aim. Moschonas and Spitzmulle's (2010) comparative study of language ideology in Greek and German newspapers, analysing 160 news articles discussing language in media, exemplifies this approach. The current research, which examines the bilingual representation of "Arab Spring" news articles in Al Jazeera and BBC News, also falls within this category.

The fourth type of CL-CADS studies involves comparisons of multiple languages due to their inherent presence in the research data. Freake, Gentil and Sheyholislami's (2011) work

illustrates this approach. They examined French and English discursive constructions of belonging and nationalism in Quebec, where both languages are spoken. Their study analysed a corpus of public consultation briefs in English and French submitted to the Bouchard Taylor Commission. The resulting corpus contained 2.7 million tokens, with 95 per cent in French and 5 per cent in English. In this case, analysing the discursive construction of all texts in both languages was essential to include all voices represented in the data.

Cross-linguistic investigations offer valuable insights from linguistic, social and cultural perspectives. However, analysing two or more languages presents various challenges (Vessey 2013; Taylor 2014; Taylor and Fante 2020). A primary difficulty lies in selecting research terms with equivalent meanings across languages, particularly when choosing comparable search terms for collocation analysis (Taylor 2014). This cross-linguistic challenge can be mitigated by identifying functional equivalence for search terms through examining meanings in context (Vessey 2013; Taylor 2014). Additionally, considering the evaluative meanings of terms in each language is crucial. If significant differences in evaluative meanings exist between two or more items, they cannot be considered complete translation equivalents (Taylor 2014).

Researchers across various language pairs have supported this notion. Examples include Sardinha's (2000) work on English and Portuguese, Xiao, McEnery and Qian's (2006) study of English and Chinese, Munday's (2011) research on English and Spanish, and Vessey's (2013) investigation of English and French. These studies underscore the complexity of establishing true equivalence across languages and highlight the need for careful consideration of linguistic and cultural nuances in cross-linguistic research. In this thesis, the analysis considers Arabic and English and applies the evaluative meanings criterion in selecting equivalents in different stages of the research, starting with the collection of data on research terms, frequency lists, keywords and collocations and finishing with the drilling-down analysis of (extended) concordances and (if required) full texts using a (critical) discourse analysis approach (DNVA).

The use of DNVA in my study can be considered a critical discourse analysis approach, as Bednarek and Caple (2017) argue that DNVA is inherently critical in its principles. They state that 'the analysis of news values can be an additional tool for critical discourse analysis' because it examines how news discourse constructs newsworthiness through language' (Bednarek and Caple 2014, cited in Bednarek and Caple 2017, p. 45). DNVA incorporates tools such as consonance, which enables the examination of how news values are constructed and reinforced through the repetition of certain language features across texts. By applying DNVA to the cross-lingual discourse of the same news outlets, this study investigates the patterned meanings and ideologies that emerge from the analysis of news values, which is one of the central research questions guiding this work. This approach allows for a critical exploration of how language is employed to shape representations and reinforce particular worldviews, thus aligning with the aims of critical discourse analysis. Consequently, the application of DNVA in this cross-lingual context can be regarded as a critical approach to discourse analysis, as it seeks to uncover the underlying power structures and ideologies that influence the construction of news discourse, addressing a key objective of this study.

Second, regarding the presentations of analysis outcomes in cross-linguistic studies, a key obstacle appears in the process of translating these findings into the language familiar to the research audience, typically one of the languages under investigation. Researchers engaged in cross-linguistic studies must make informed decisions at various stages of presenting and discussing their findings on the appropriate approach to translation, be it literal, functional or a



combination of both ways. In a study examining how racism is portrayed in the UK and Italian press (Partington, Duguid and Taylor 2013), a significant term that frequently appeared alongside the Italian word for 'racism' (*razzismo*) was '*strisciante*'. This word can be translated literally into English as 'creeping' or 'crawling', but a more accurate representation of its intended meaning would be 'underlying' or 'covert'. The choice of translation affects the metaphorical implication of the original term, but it may also complicate understanding for English-speaking readers seeking a literal translation.

In the translation methodology of the research, multiple strategies were employed to tackle the challenge of translating data from Arabic to English. Firstly, I opted to use Reverso's online translation service,<sup>16</sup> which specialises in providing accredited translations specifically in the realm of news discourse. This choice facilitated access to accurate translations of words and expressions, helping to effectively convey the intended meaning. Additionally, to gain further insights into the nuances of translating news-related content, a valuable Arabic reference authored by a journalist who had experience working at both the BBC and Al Jazeera news institutions was consulted (Hajjawi 2014). This reference likely offered valuable guidance and expertise regarding the specific challenges involved in translating news discourse from Arabic to English. Moreover, an active role was taken in considering the contextual meanings associated with words and expressions during the translation process. For instance, the Arabic word 'شهيد' (*shāhēd*) was translated as 'martyr' in contexts where it referred to individuals who had died for a cause, while in other contexts, it was translated as 'victim' to convey the sense of a person who had suffered or died unjustly (Brakho 2008). This careful attention to detail greatly contributed to accurately transferring the intended meaning to the reader, thus ensuring a faithful representation of the original content.

Overall, this research approach brought together a range of strategies, including the use of online translation services, consultation of a reliable Arabic reference, consideration of contextual meanings and guidance from the supervisor. These collective efforts highlight the strong commitment to overcoming the translation challenge and achieving reliable and accurate translations of Arabic news discourse into English.

The third issue is that in the context of translated data, a noteworthy matter relates to the use of KWIC (Keyword in Context) style concordance lines, which are essential for effectively presenting patterns when conducting corpus linguistics analysis (Taylor 2014). The translated versions of the nodes (specific words under investigation) may potentially overlook the precise patterns of co-occurrence, and the word order within each translated concordance line might not be consistent. Consequently, in this research, an inclusive translation approach for the Arabic-to-English concordance lines was adopted. The Arabic lines were represented as complete sentences, ensuring that sentences containing the search word were fully displayed. Within the employed corpus linguistic analysis tools, such as Sketch Engine, there is a choice of displaying concordances in either KWIC style or as full sentences. Longer sentences were not truncated, but were presented across multiple lines. Consequently, it became possible to translate the

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<sup>16</sup> <https://context.reverso.net/translation/arabic-english/>

concordance lines, showcasing the co-occurrence of the search word within the main text in the form of sentences.

One of the challenging steps in designing the application of CL-CADS in this thesis was deciding on the most appropriate critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach to compare and contrast how Al Jazeera and BBC news construct Arab Spring participants and voices as newsworthy in both the Arabic and English versions.

Apart from the cross-lingual features of the collected data, it is important to give attention to several other overlapping aspects:

1. Cross-culture aspects of the news text sources: British-based news outlets (BBC and BBC Arabic) and Qatari-based news outlets (Al-Jazeera and Al-Jazeera English).
2. Target audiences: BBC Arabic and Al-Jazeera target Arabic-speaking audiences, while BBC News and Al-Jazeera English cater to English-speaking audiences.
3. The juxtaposition of the news source itself, including discourse makers as institutions and news writers/translators, with the target audience, encompassing both Arabic-speaking and English-speaking audiences.

Therefore, I considered an approach that is capable of analysing cross-lingual and cross-cultural discursive constructions of news texts produced by the same news outlets, namely the BBC and Al Jazeera. To clarify, my goal was to examine the similarities or differences in the discursive construction of newsworthiness in Arab Spring news texts across both Arabic and English versions of Arab-based (Al Jazeera) and British-based (the BBC) news outlets. After examining various critical discourse analysis approaches (as discussed in Reflection at the end of this thesis), I found the Discursive News Value Approach (DNVA for short) (Bednarek and Caple 2017) to be the most appropriate methodology for exploring my cross-lingual data samples in a constructive and practical manner. This is due to the attractive features of DNVA, which I will discuss in the next section (3.2.3).

### 3.2.3 Discursive news values approach theoretical applications

News values can be described in many different ways, but “in essence it defines what is newsworthy” (Bednarek and Caple 2014, p. 136). As discussed systematically in Chapter Two, the DNVA is a developed CDA approach that perceives news values “*as existing in and constructed through* discourse” [italicised and in bold in the original text] (Bednarek and Caple 2014, p. 137). Unlike other CDA approaches, such a genre-specialised approach enables the analyst to consider the news values, which have been noticeably neglected by most CDA researchers (Bednarek and Caple 2014). Additionally, a discursive construction perspective of news values allows the researcher to figure out how ideologies are (re)produced and power is embedded in news discourse. Bednarek and Caple (2014) argue that the news value system is ideological in that it reinforces other ideologies as well as defining what is newsworthy. To give an example, they reflect on a CDA study finding by Richardson (2007). Richardson (2007) found that news coverage about developing countries focused on negative actions such as war, disaster and conflict. Such a representation, according to Bednarek and Caple (2014), “presents a narrow-

preconceived view of these countries” (p. 137), especially when other countries are not emphasised in the same way.

As outlined in Chapter Two, DNVA as a linguistic approach developed by Bednarek and Caple (2012a, 2012b, 2014, 2017) originally follows Galtung and Ruge (1965) for analysing *newsworthiness* in news discourse. In DNVA, news values are said to determine what makes the news, and the focus of this approach is “on answering the question *why* events make it into the news media” (Potts, Bednarek and Caple 2015, p. 150). To study news values, different perspectives have been explored by researchers, including material, cognitive, social and discursive perspectives (Bednarek 2016; Bednarek and Caple 2017; Bednarek et al. 2021). A material perspective views news values as integral to events and separate from the process of news production (Galtung and Ruge 1965). In terms of the cognitive perspective, journalists judge news values based on their subjective viewpoints (Bell 1991; Schultz 2007; Harcup and O’Neill 2017). Furthermore, news values are viewed from a social perspective as reflections of political, economic and ideological perspectives (Van Dijk 1988a; Fowler 1991). Lastly, the discursive perspective emphasises the role of language and semiotic modes in the construction of news values (Bednarek and Caple 2014, 2017). This discursive perspective is represented by the Discursive News Values Analysis (DNVA) approach, which focuses on how news values are constructed and communicated through various linguistic and semiotic resources in news discourse.

To clarify, the cognitive perspective argues that news values are based on the journalist’s personal experiences and beliefs. The social perspective suggests that news values can be seen as a reflection of power dynamics in society. However, the discursive perspective (DNVA) emphasises the role of language and other semiotic modes (such as images) in the creation of news values and suggests that the language used to describe events shapes their interpretation. In other words, with a discursive perspective, DNVA identifies what news values are emphasised and how each news value is constructed discursively in news reports.

Consequently, in my thesis and as a result of the following, I applied the discursive approach (DNVA) to my data to examine the constructed news values:

1. Relevance to the research questions concerning the construction of values rather than the selection or implication of those values on the target audience.
2. DNVA deals with semiotics, which includes language, which is the medium for this research.
3. In terms of methods application, there is flexibility in the application of the text-based news values that DNVA includes, as well as its applicability to media content that is multilingual and multicultural (as shown in relatively recent research, such as Caple, Huan and Bednarek (2020, 2021) and Huan (2023).
4. The DNVA analytical approach fits well with corpus linguistics methods (as shown in previous research, such as Potts, Bednarek and Caple (2015), Bednarek and Caple (2017) and Caple, Huan and Bednarek (2020).
5. From a critical discourse analysis perspective, the discourse on news values emphasises power relations and the privileges and marginalisation of certain news stories’ participants and voices in news production.
6. The analytical approach of DNVA demonstrates inclusivity towards multiple levels of analysis. Specifically, news values are regarded as being constructed

through discourse, aligning with Mast and Temmerman's (2021) notion that news values serve as 'cues' in the social and gatekeeping construction of news discourse.

In the next section (3.2.4), the methodological application of the DNVA approach is discussed and displayed.

### 3.2.4 Methodological applications of the discursive news values approach

There are eleven key news values identified by DNVA, including personalisation, eliteness, timeliness, proximity, impact, negativity, positivity, consonance, superlativeness, unexpectedness (or novelty) and aesthetic appeal (Bednarek and Caple 2017; Caple, Huan and Bednarek 2020). The first ten news values apply to both text-based and multimodal news data, whereas the latter news value (Aesthetic Appeal) only applies to news photography (Caple, 2018a, 2019; Caple, Huan and Bednarek 2020; Bednarek, Caple and Huan 2021). Table 3.3 below presents a description of each value and its linguistic devices taken from the analysed corpora. It is worth stating that I am following Bednarek and Caple (2017, pp. 53-66) and Caple, Huan and Bednarek (2020, pp. 9-17) in their inclusion and description of (text-based) news values.<sup>17</sup>

News Values	How they are constructed	Linguistic devices
Consonance	The news participant/voice is constructed with (stereo)typical aspects (related to individual news participants, social groups, organisations or countries).	The use of stereotypes or preconceptions; assessment of expectedness/typicality ( <i>typically, famous of</i> ); comparisons to the past (comparing Arab Spring to historical movements such as French Revolution); references to the audience's traditions or knowledge ( <i>well-known, familiar</i> ). The ideological categorisation of news participants ( <i>Shia-led protesters, Sunni-led government</i> )
Elitess	The inclusion of fame, or high-status news participants/voices (including but not limited to the people, countries, social groups or institutions involved).	Several status markers, including role labels ( <i>names of journalists, academics and experts</i> ); adjectives indicating status ( <i>the Nobel Prize winner, top diplomats</i> ); recognised names (of politicians such as <i>Mubarak, Bin Ali, Obama</i> ). Countries/organisations as participants in the news events (such as <i>USA, UK, United Nations</i> etc.)

<sup>17</sup> Aesthetic Appeal, or the value of being aesthetically appealing, is not included in this research as it is primarily applied to visual resources (Bednarek and Caple, 2017, p. 66).

Impact	The news participant/voice is constructed as having significant effects or consequences (not restricted to impact on the target audience). It can be positive or negative or both at the same time.	Assessments of significance (historical, crucial, momentous); the representations of outcomes of events, including abstract, material and mental effects and their actual and non-actual significance (for example, the impact of the Arab Spring on the economy and the lives of the citizens).
Negativity	The news participant/voice/events is constructed negatively.	References to negative attitude/emotions ( <i>fear, condemn, insecurity</i> ); negative evaluative language ( <i>distressing</i> ); negative lexicon ( <i>conflict, damage, death, killing</i> ); descriptions of negative behaviours ( <i>riotous</i> ).
Positivity	The news participant/voice is constructed positively	References to positive attitude/emotions ( <i>joy, celebration of freedom</i> ); positive evaluative language ( <i>bright future</i> ); positive lexicon ( <i>win, help</i> ); descriptions of positive behaviours ( <i>brave</i> ).
Personalisation	The news participant/voice is constructed as having ‘human’ face or personal aspects such as eyewitnesses, storytellers.	Referring to ordinary people, their emotions and their experiences (for example, quoting the mother of a protester murdered during the protest); employing news participants/sources of ‘everyday’ spoken language/accent, such as transliterating the lexicon (in Arabic) of participants into English news texts (e.g. “ <i>Ashaab yurid isqat an-nizam</i> ” became the unifying rallying cry throughout the region.)
Proximity	The news participant/voice is constructed as geographically or culturally close to (the target audience).	Explicit references to places or nationalities near the target audience (the United Kingdom, USA, Canada or Europe for English-speaking audiences, and the Middle East and North Africa region for Arab-speaking audiences). By using descriptive words, generic place names and adjectives ( <i>the Arab world, the British-educated president</i> ) and inclusive first-person plural pronouns ( <i>our Arab world</i> ), references to the audience’s nation or community are made. The participants/sources of news use geographical lexicon (transliterating Arabic lexicon into English-language news texts) as well as accents and cultural references ( <i>niqab, Shia</i> ).
Superlativeness	The news participant/voice is constructed as having a high	Quantifiers ( <i>thousands, hundreds, tonnes</i> ); intensified lexis ( <i>smashed to death</i> ); metaphor and simile ( <i>a foreign fuelled, the last Pharaoh of Egypt</i> ); comparison

	intensity or a wide scope.	( <i>the largest protest</i> ); time/distance or related lexis ( <i>already, only/just hours/days after</i> ).
Timeliness	News participants and voices are constructed in relation to the news text's publication date: currently, recently, currently occurring, about to occur.	References to time ( <i>yesterday's, two days ago, today, within days, now</i> ); present and present perfect ( <i>the government is facing a significant challenge due to Salafist violence and this needs a delicate balance</i> ); implicit time references through lexis ( <i>protests continue, ongoing demonstrations, has begun to</i> ); reference to current trends, seasonality, change/newness ( <i>for the first time, a new elected president</i> ).
Unexpectedness	The news participant/voice is constructed with unexpectedness.	A descriptive lexis to evaluate unexpectedness ( <i>strange, shocking, different</i> ), references to surprise or expectations, or unusual events ( <i>the Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with Israel is surprising</i> ); comparisons to indicate unusuality ( <i>first time since...</i> ).

*Table 3.3 A summary of news values, definitions and examples from my corpora of linguistics devices (adapted from Bednarek and Caple 2017 and Caple, Huan and Bednarek 2020).*

When determining news values methodologically, researchers have employed corpus linguistics as the primary integrated approach (e.g. Potts, Bednarek and Caple 2015; Huan, 2016; Bednarek and Caple, 2017; Bednarek, Caple and Huan 2021). Potts, Bednarek and Caple (2015), for example, integrated corpus linguistics techniques into language analysis of news values. Bednarek and Caple (2014, 2017), Caple (2018a, 2018b), and Bednarek, Caple and Huan (2021) expanded upon language analysis by integrating corpus linguistic techniques with the examination of other semiotic modes, such as photography, in discourse analysis. This integrated approach is referred to as Corpus-Assisted Multimodal Discourse Analysis (CAMDA).

Caple, Huan and Bednarek (2020) and Bednarek, Caple and Huan (2021) further developed the Discursive News Values Analysis (DNVA) approach by extending its application to multilingual news discourse. In their 2020 book, they employed a cross-linguistic Corpus-Assisted Multimodal Discourse Analysis (CAMDA) approach, which involved comparing data in English and Chinese and analysing both verbal and visual elements in news texts. This extension of DNVA to multilingual and multimodal contexts demonstrates the adaptability and versatility of the approach in investigating news values across different languages and semiotic modes.

Building upon the methodological foundations laid by previous researchers, my research will focus specifically on the analysis of textual news data within the framework of DNVA. I aim

to contribute to the methodological approach by delving into the construction of specific news items, namely news participants and voices.

The decision to focus on Arab Spring participants and their voices as the primary data for analysis in this cross-lingual study using DNVA is not only justified but crucial, given the crucial role these elements play in shaping the narrative and framing of the events. Participants and voices are fundamental to the construction of news values, serving as the principal actors and sources of information in news stories. By systematically examining how Arab Spring participants and their voices are represented and constructed in news discourse across different languages, this study offers invaluable insights into the underlying meanings, power structures, and cultural perspectives that influence the portrayal of these key news elements.

This approach is particularly significant in the context of the Arab Spring, a series of momentous political events that reverberated across the Arab world and beyond. The voices of protesters, political leaders, and ordinary citizens were at the heart of these uprisings, making their representation in news media a critical area of study. By focusing on these specific aspects, I aim to uncover the comprehensive ways in which news values are constructed in the language and discourse of news articles.

Moreover, this cross-lingual analysis allows for a unique comparative perspective, highlighting how linguistic and cultural differences may influence the construction of news values. It enables us to explore whether the same events and voices are framed differently for Arabic and English-speaking audiences, potentially revealing biases, priorities, and assumptions embedded in the news discourse of each language.

In essence, this focused examination of participants and voices in Arab Spring coverage provides a window into the complex interplay between language, culture, and news values, offering valuable insights that can inform both media studies and our broader understanding of how significant political events are communicated across linguistic boundaries.

By employing the DNVA framework in this context, we can systematically analyse how news values such as negativity, eliteness, personalisation, and others are discursively constructed through the representation of Arab Spring participants and their voices. This approach not only contributes to our understanding of media coverage of the Arab Spring but also advances the field of cross-lingual news discourse analysis more broadly.

Moreover, my research hopes to make significant contributions to the application of DNVA in the context of cross-lingual discursive practices in international news. While DNVA has been previously employed to study multilingual news discourse in English and Chinese, its application to other languages, particularly Arabic, has been understudied. By extending the application of DNVA to Arabic news discourse practices, my research will open up new avenues for exploring the interaction between news values and language features in a multilingual context.

In this thesis, empirical investigations are carried out using a carefully curated corpus of Arabic and English news texts. Through the systematic analysis of this multilingual data, I attempt to identify patterns and trends that shed light on how news values are constructed and communicated in both English and Arabic news discourse. This not only contributes to the existing body of literature on news values but also enhances our understanding of the unique linguistic characteristics and discursive practices within the Arabic news landscape.

Overall, my research not only deepens our understanding of news values through the lens of DNVA, but also expands the methodological boundaries in several key ways. Firstly, it

focuses on the textual analysis of news participants and voices, providing an examination of how these elements contribute to the construction of news values. Secondly, it extends the application of DNVA to understudied multilingual data, specifically Arabic news discourse practices. Most importantly, this study addresses a significant gap in current research by examining how the same news corporation represents identical news events across different languages. By comparing the construction of news values in Arabic and English coverage of the Arab Spring by the same media outlets, this research offers unique insights into the cross-linguistic strategies employed by international news organisations. This approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how news values are shaped and potentially altered when presented to different linguistic audiences, even within the same media institution.

In the next section (3.2.4.1), I will elaborate on the comprehensive integration of Discourse News Values Analysis (DNVA) within both Arabic and English corpora.

### **3.2.5 The incorporation of DNVA's ten news values into the cross-linguistic data**

In order to examine cross-linguistic data, specifically the Arabic and English news texts analysed in this study, it is crucial to incorporate the ten values of the Discursive News Value Approach (DNVA) while considering certain foundational aspects. Firstly, it is important to acknowledge a significant observation made by Bednarek and Caple (2017), who propose that DNVA does not perceive news values as fixed or objective criteria. According to Bednarek and Caple (2017, p. 229), news values should not be approached as an automatic checklist. Instead, they emphasise that news values are formulated and established through discursive practices within news organisations. In addition, close attention needs to be paid to the meaning potential of the linguistic resources employed within a news article, alongside the intended audience and the specific temporal and spatial context of the news event.

To assist me in figuring out the discursive construction of these values' "potential pointers" (as labelled in Bednarek and Caple 2014, p. 145), I adopt the methodological integration of Corpus Linguistics tools (such as frequency lists, keywords, word sketches (collocates) and concordances) to the approach of DNVA (following the methodological approach adopted by Potts, Bednarek and Caple (2016) and Bednarek and Caple (2021)). Further details regarding the corpus linguistics methods used in this thesis will be discussed later in section 3.2.4.2.

Secondly, because those ten news values are "deliberately broad," more digging in the discourse analysis can be required by researchers (Caple, Huan and Bednarek 2020, p. 7). In other words, the construction of those values is not always straightforward from just a single or several terminologies, and more in-text and beyond text analysis is required. Thus, I treated the news texts in my corpora as a continuum where those values are expected to be constructed discursively. In terms of methods, I used corpus linguistics tools such as Word Sketch (a word collocations window) and Concordances (more detail about these corpus linguistics tools is discussed in the following section).

Furthermore, the third point to consider is the importance of context in this thesis, specifically focusing on the Arab Spring news dataset. The approach of DNVA acknowledges that the social, cultural and political contexts surrounding a news event/story have a significant impact on the assigned news values (Bednarek and Caple 2016, 2017; Caple, Huan and Bednarek 2020). Bednarek and Caple (2017) claim that "the notion of target reading" and the target readers are essential concepts in applying DNVA. They provide an example of news reporting the killing of



Osama Bin Laden and how it is recognised as constructed with a positivity value in their data based on the ideal reader “who agrees with the preferred meaning that this action is positive and to be celebrated” (p. 67).

In light of this, during the analysis of news value pointers, I acknowledge the cross-lingual and cross-cultural characteristics and variations in news production, considering the different news sources (BBC and Al Jazeera) as well as the linguistic and cultural backgrounds of the audience (Arabic and English speaking). By recognising these contextual factors (language and culture of the target audience), I aim to capture a comprehensive understanding of the discursive construction of news values within my corpora. It is important to reiterate that, for the purpose of maintaining control over variables, I opted to examine a comparable event across different languages within the same news sources. Specifically, a comparative analysis was conducted between the discursive construction of news values in BBCEN and BBCAR, while also investigating the discursive news values in ALJEN and ALJAR. To prompt my searching and in-text understanding of the news values pointers’ construction, I follow Vesssey (2013), Taylor (2014) and Taylor and Fante (2020) in their methods and reflections of using corpus tools to assist their cross-lingual and cross-cultural analysis approach (CL-CADS), as discussed earlier in section 3.2.1.

The fourth aspect worth considering is that DNVA is “socio-culturally assigned” rather than “natural” or “inherent” (Bednarek and Caple 2017, p. 51). Additionally, most applications of this approach have been based on English language news, with a few exceptions such as Caple, Huan and Bednarek (2020) and Bednarek, Caple and Huan (2022). Consequently, Bednarek and Caple (2017, p. 65) propose that the exploration of alternative discursive practices and the questioning of dominant power dynamics in news discourse construction can lead to alternative news values.

In my corpora, when applying DNVA to cross-lingual/cultural news from the same news resources, alternative news values become possible, considering the mutual variations between the sources and the target audiences of the BBC (Arabic and English) and Al-Jazeera (in Arabic and English).

In the following section (Section 3.2.4.2), I will discuss the corpus linguistics tools I selected to assess and enhance the application of DNVA on the cross-lingual/cultural corpora analysis.

### **3.2.5.1 The methodological integration of corpus linguistics tools into DNVA approach**

#### **a) Corpus approach**

As discussed in Chapter Two, various computer programs employ standardised procedures to establish prominence within a corpus, thereby determining what is salient and meaningful. While Hunston and Thompson (2006, p. 3) assert that there is no definitive methodology for conducting corpus analysis, certain tools have become predominant (Vessey 2013). The analysis in this thesis utilises Sketch Engine, a corpus linguistics program that incorporates four principal functions. These are Word List (a frequency tool), Keywords (identifying the most prominent words in the corpora), Word Sketch (N-grams and collocations), and Concordance Lines. Notably, Sketch Engine employs a unique method for calculating

keywords, diverging from the statistical significance approach used by many other software programs. This method, which will be elaborated upon later in this document, involves comparing a target corpus to a reference corpus to identify 'typical' words, or keywords. These corpus linguistics tools, each serving a distinct purpose in the analysis process, will be examined in detail in the subsequent sections. Their combined use allows for a comprehensive exploration of linguistic patterns and significant features within the corpora, providing a robust foundation for discourse analysis.

### **b) Sketch Engine tools: An overview**

Separated four text corpora comprising 290,444 words from four sources was uploaded and analysed using Sketch Engine software (Kilgariff et al. 2004), which offers a range of linguistic analysis techniques, such as collocation, keyword identification and concordance line exploration.

Sketch Engine was chosen as the primary tool for this research due to its diverse range of techniques that enable the identification, calculation and characterisation of linguistic elements used to represent participants, voices and the news values constructed in news events in both Arabic and English news texts. By employing these methods, I am able to analyse the data comprehensively. While relevant to all research questions, the use of these tools plays a particularly crucial role in addressing the initial and third research questions. These questions specifically focus on identifying news participants and voices within the dataset, as well as the news values constructed through their representations.

### **c) Reference corpora**

In order to generate keywords, the corpora being analysed need to be compared to larger reference corpora. In this cross-lingual study, I compare the English target corpus (AJEN and BBCEN) to the reference corpus called Sketch Engine's English web 2013 (enTenTen13). I chose the English web 2013 (enTenTen13) because it is a large, general-purpose corpus collected from the internet. It contains a substantial amount of English language usage, with approximately 19 billion tokens collected in 2013.

Whilst more recent versions of the enTenTen corpus exist, I selected the 2013 version for several reasons:

1. Temporal relevance: The 2013 corpus aligns more closely with the time period of the Arab Spring events and their immediate aftermath, which is the focus of this study.
2. Consistency with the timeframe of the target corpus: The AJEN and BBCEN corpora primarily contain texts from the early 2010s, making the 2013 reference corpus a suitable contemporary comparison.
3. Stability and established use: The 2013 version has been widely used in linguistic research, providing a stable and well-understood baseline for comparison.
4. Avoiding anachronisms: Using a more recent corpus might introduce language patterns or topics that were not prevalent during the period of the target corpus, potentially skewing the analysis.

Similarly, I compare the Arabic target corpus (ALJAR and BBCAR) to the reference corpora called Sketch Engine's Arabic web 2013 (arTenTen12), which contains around 7.4 billion tokens.

Despite the difference between the size of the two corpora, both English and Arabic reference corpora belong to the TenTen corpus family, which consists of web corpora created using a specialised technology designed to gather linguistically valuable content (Kilgarriff et al. 2004). Moreover, the data collected in both reference corpora is selected based on linguistic analysis needs, taking into consideration factors such as eliminating duplicate texts and excluding unwanted content like advertisements and post comments found on the web (Jakubíček et al. 2013).

#### **d) Wordlists**

The Word List tool in Sketch Engine calculates the frequency of all words within a corpus, ranking them from most to least frequent. This frequency list reveals the lexical choices made or avoided by the discourse producer (writer or speaker). In corpus linguistics literature, researchers typically focus on the most frequent items, as frequency is generally assumed to indicate importance (Stubbs 1996). Gries (2008, p. 403) posits that frequency data can unveil "cognitive entrenchment", reflecting how words are embedded in the mind of the speaker or writer within a community. Frequency lists are often the initial statistical step in corpus linguistics (Baker, 2008; Gries, 2008). Particularly in studies examining ideological representations in media, frequent words and phrases may highlight the prominence of certain topics and the ways in which they are discussed.

This approach provides a quantitative foundation for identifying key themes and linguistic patterns within the corpora, offering valuable insights into the discourse strategies employed in media coverage. By analysing these frequent items, researchers can begin to uncover underlying ideological perspectives and framing techniques used in the representation of events.

Therefore, in this study, to answer the first research question, the top 200 frequent words (200 X 4 = 800 frequent words) are collected. Then, the four lists are examined to extract the frequent words that refer to news participants. Following that, the frequent participants are categorised as 'pointers' of the constructed news values.

While frequency lists are a crucial tool in Corpus Linguistics, they can be potentially misleading (Sinclair 1996, p. 80). Focusing solely on the most frequent words may result in overlooking less frequent, yet equally relevant, terms. Ideological content in discourse is not always evident from obviously loaded words or repeated phrases, but can be embedded in assumptions (Vessey 2013). For instance, if a news article presumes that an "Arab Spring" protester's political or religious stance is central to their characterisation, this assumption may be rarely explicitly stated, being already presumed in the audience's mind.

Baker et al. (2008) and Mautner (2009) caution against an over-reliance on frequency, as it may lead to overlooked findings. Frequent words might result in decontextualisation or oversimplification of corpus data (Freake, Gentil and Sheyholislami 2011; Vessey 2013).

However, certain practices can mitigate the misapplication of frequency lists. Baker (2010) suggests deriving frequency meanings from concordance lines rather than frequency lists to establish the relevance of examples. This contextual investigation can help establish the

discourse meaning of specific words and their relevance to research objectives (Baker 2010, p. 6).

In summary, frequency lists remain an essential tool in identifying news reorientation texts, revealing prominent trends through repetition or embedding through low frequency or absence. In this research, the frequent use of 'revolutions, ثورات (thāwrāt)' in Al Jazeera English and Arabic news texts, contrasted with its absence in BBC English and Arabic texts, may indicate divergent perspectives on the "Arab Spring" movements between these news outlets.

#### e) **Keywords**

Generally, the term 'keyword' is used to refer to an important word in some context (Scott 2010, p. 137). In the field of Corpus Linguistics (CL), however, the meaning of 'keyword' is slightly different. In CL, keywords are defined as words that characterise a corpus in comparison to a larger specialised or general corpus (Scott 2010; Baker et al. 2008; Baker 2012). It is about the frequency of occurrence, not only high frequencies but also unusual frequencies in comparison to a reference corpus (Scott 2010).

There are various tools used for corpus linguistics analysis, such as WMatrix, AntConc and WordSmith. These tools examine the keyness of words within a corpus by comparing their proportion to the overall lexical content and applying a log-likelihood test to determine their statistical significance. Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff et al. 2014), in particular, calculates a word's keyness score based on a specific formula, analysing thousands of words from authentic texts.

To compile individual Arabic and English keyword lists, Arabic and English reference corpora are required; however, as shown above (in the reference corpora section), the two available cross-lingual reference corpora of same-size and similar register proved impossible to find due to the limitations of the available Arabic-language reference corpora. Thus, to ensure comparability between the two languages, two references from the same family were used, namely English web 2013 (enTenTen13) and Arabic web 2013 (arTenTen12).

With these two reference corpora, Sketch Engine is used to derive keyword lists in Arabic and English and the top 200 keywords for each list (200 X 4=800) are examined using collocate (word sketch window) and concordance analysis. It is worth remembering that such methods were established within corpus-assisted discourse studies (such as Baker 2006 and Partington 2008) and recently in cross-lingual corpus-assisted discourse studies (Baker and Vessey 2018; Baker, Vessey and McEnery 2021).

The keyword calculations focus on words with atypical frequency or scarcity, effectively highlighting terms that distinguish the primary corpus from the reference corpus. This approach to keyness analysis is particularly valuable as it helps identify words that may carry significant ideological weight within the discourse community. As Vessey (2013) argues, the calculation of keyness enables analysts to pinpoint words that potentially serve explicit ideological functions in the society where the discourse is produced and consumed. By emphasizing these distinctive linguistic features, keyness analysis provides a robust foundation for exploring the underlying ideological structures and societal values reflected in the corpora.

In addition, keywords serve the purpose of revealing the 'aboutness' of a discourse and uncovering salient themes in a target corpus (Scott, 2010). However, it is important to note the limitations of keywords as individual tools. They should be used in combination with other tools and approached with caution, as the selection from lengthy keyword lists can be subjective (Baker,

2006). Keywords in this context serve as a starting point for building arguments rather than drawing conclusions. Stubbs (2010, p. 23) suggests that keywords in corpus linguistics should be viewed as "the tips of icebergs: pointers to complex lexical objects which represent the shared beliefs and values of a culture."

However, cross-linguistic keyword analysis presents certain challenges. Freake, Gentil and Sheyholislami (2011) and Vessey (2013) highlight methodological issues when conducting keyword analysis in a cross-lingual corpus, such as the impossibility of directly comparing keywords in the same language. Freake, Gentil and Sheyholislami (2011, p. 30) note that when a word's keyness differs from its translation in another language, it's difficult to determine whether this is due to significant differences between the focus corpora or differences between the reference corpora. They suggest consulting multiple reference corpora in both languages and comparing keyness rankings in each. While this approach may reveal some salient keywords with considerable confidence, Scott (2010, p. 51) cautions that the order of items in keyword sets 'is not certain ...and [may not] reflect their importance'. This underscores the need for careful interpretation of keyword data, particularly in cross-linguistic studies, and the importance of complementing keyword analysis with other corpus linguistics tools and qualitative analysis. Therefore, as discussed above, in this research, keyness is determined by consulting similar Arabic and English corpora in terms of their genre and content focus. While the Arabic reference corpus is currently smaller than its English counterpart due to the relative scarcity of large-scale Arabic linguistic resources, this approach still provides valuable insights. The use of genre-matched corpora, even with size disparities, allows for meaningful cross-linguistic comparison, as the shared thematic focus helps mitigate potential biases introduced by size differences. This method enables a comprehensive exploration of keyword significance across languages, acknowledging the current limitations in Arabic corpus linguistics while maximizing the analytical potential of available resources.

Additionally, in this research, the choice of keywords from the four sub-corpora keyword lists is based on their relevance to the first research question. While lexical and functional words are included in the keyword list, functional words are excluded due to the morphological differences between Arabic and English. To clarify, a distinction exists between English and Arabic functional words in terms of their morphological construction. English functional words, including pronouns, are formed as free morphemes, which means they appear as separate words. On the other hand, Arabic functional morphemes, such as pronouns, are typically bound morphemes that are attached to verbs or names. Consequently, it is expected that the machine will recognise and identify salient functional keywords predominantly within English-language sub-corpora, namely ALJEN and BBCEN, rather than within the Arabic ones, namely ALJAR and BBCAR.

Overall, the analysis of keywords might be considered as limited when analysed in isolation and more beneficial when included as an indicator of the aboutness and main thematic structures of the corpora. However, keywords are significant in this thesis as they contribute to understanding the construction of news values in the representations of "Arab Spring" participants and address the first research question.

## f) Word Sketch (collocate)

Word Sketch, a feature in Sketch Engine<sup>18</sup>, offers a condensed overview of a linguistic item's characteristics, encompassing its associations and implied meanings. This tool organises related words by their grammatical functions, such as those acting as verbal objects, subjects or modifiers. Besides being efficient, it allows users to visualise links between search terms and various grammatical elements, indicating their prevalence and proximity to the focal term.

Additionally, Sketch Engine provides an enhanced function for visually comparing sketched words. The Word Sketch difference tool contrasts two terms by examining their associated words and grouping them based on grammatical relationships. This approach can streamline the analysis process, reducing the need to scrutinise numerous concordance lines, as key information is accessible on a single screen. Researchers can thus identify word clusters and reveal multi-word expressions that appear together as fixed or semi-fixed semantic units (Archer 2012).

Linguistic studies have proposed theories about the mental connections between frequently co-occurring words and the cognitive processes of language producers. Whilst many of these theories relate to language education, Hoey (2007) suggests that the strength of word relationships, as determined by collocation frequency, inclines language producers to use words in specific expressions to convey meaning. This is because speakers and writers have an implicit understanding of contextual and co-textual usage, leading them to anticipate what typically accompanies a target term (Morley and Partington 2009, p. 148). Stubbs (1996) and Morley and Partington (2009) argue that these presumptions about discourse norms are part of a cultural assimilation process through which language users learn to communicate effectively and comprehend their interlocutors.

The strength of the relationship between words can be determined by their proximity to a search term, as Stubbs (2001) argues that closer positioning indicates a stronger connection. However, the process of selecting words for detailed analysis through Word Sketch requires careful consideration. Handford (2010) suggests that the chosen words should be representative, meeting one or more of the following criteria:

1. High frequency in the corpus
2. Statistical significance
3. Cultural relevance or function
4. Recommendation from previous studies as salient for investigation

By adhering to these criteria, researchers can ensure that the selected words are meaningful and relevant to the study at hand. In the context of this research, the collocations and units of meaning revealed in the Word Sketch window will serve as crucial reference points. These linguistic patterns will be used to conduct a cross-lingual comparative analysis, focusing on how newsworthiness is constructed in the representation of Arab Spring participants and their voices across different language contexts. This approach allows for a systematic examination of how language choices contribute to the representations of the selected participants and voices in the data, potentially revealing subtle differences or similarities in news value construction between languages and media outlets.

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<sup>18</sup> See Appendix 1.2 for an image of an example of a Word Sketch Window in the Sketch Engine tool.

## **g) Concordances**

According to Sinclair (1991), concordance refers to “a collection of the occurrences of a word - form, each in its textual environment. In its simplest form, it is an index. Each word – form is indexed, and a reference is given to the place of each occurrence in a text” (p. 32). These occurrences are presented alongside the surrounding words on both sides of the term. This approach is valuable for examining and comparing recurring language practices at the lexical and grammatical level (Handford 2010). By investigating this language level, I can make inferences about the pointers of the constructed news values around frequent or key news participants and specific voices. To clarify, understanding how news participants or voices are evaluated and positioned in discourse allows me to infer their constructed newsworthiness. Additionally, examining the co-occurrence of specific word combinations (participants or voices) in concordance lines provides a deeper understanding of the constructed news values of a word within the co-text. The concordance-lines method is also flexible, allowing for further exploration of the language surrounding the node word (participant or voice) if more context is required. This can be achieved by expanding the concordance line to display the discourse surrounding the target word.

To sum up, the corpus linguistics tools displayed above provide numerous functions that allow me to determine how the newsworthiness of target words (news participants or voices) is constructed in the four cross-lingual sub-corpora. These tools help me identify whether these constructions are dominant or marginalised within the collected corpus. Additionally, because the DNVA is an approach that facilitates evaluation, these corpus linguistics tools will enable me to address the final research question about patterns of evaluative meanings and ideologies in the four sub-corpora. I can determine whether these patterns and ideologies are similar or different across the cross-lingual representations of the same news institutions by analysing their repeated co-text. Exploring these collocational angles on the data could have significant implications for understanding the construction of newsworthiness in participant and voice representations, as well as the related ideological meanings in cross-lingual news on the “Arab Spring”.

Furthermore, in conducting corpus linguistic analysis and using corpus linguistics tools, it is crucial to interpret and elucidate the observed patterns within their text-internal context. This is accomplished by examining the concordance lines in which these patterns co-occur, as mentioned by Qian (2010, p. 39). This qualitative analysis plays a fundamental role as quantitative measures alone do not possess the ability to offer explanations, as pointed out by Mautner (2009, p. 45). The subsequent section of this discussion will outline the various stages of analysis and the presentation of data.

### **3.3 Stages of data analysis and presentations:**

#### **3.3.1 STEP I: Finding and categorising the newsworthiness of Arab Spring participants**

The first step in the analysis is corpus linguistic analysis, which will present statistical quantitative information and give an initial idea of the constructed news values in the collected four sub-corpora. This will be achieved with the help of frequency and keywords methods. Using Sketch Engine corpus tools, as stated above, I will first identify the main constructed news values by producing frequency lists and keywords. The top 200 frequent words (200 X 4 = 800 frequent words) and 200 keywords (200 X 4 = 800) will be collected.

In this study, both frequency lists and keywords are employed to identify key participants in news discourse, as each method offers unique advantages. Frequency lists allow for the identification of the most common terms across the entire corpus, providing an overview of the prevalent themes and topics. However, using frequency lists alone can overlook less frequent, yet contextually significant, terms that may play a crucial role in the representation of key participants (Baker 2023). In contrast, keywords terms that appear disproportionately in a particular corpus compared to a reference corpus (Scott and Tribble, 2007) offer a more nuanced understanding of the specific terms that highlight participants' roles and their significance within the news discourse. Relying solely on frequency lists or keywords would limit the study by either missing out on critical context-specific terms or by overemphasising generic terms that do not fully capture the ideologically charged language used to represent key participants. By combining both methods, this study ensures a more comprehensive identification of participants and allows for a deeper understanding of their representation across different news contexts.

Then, the four frequent lists will be examined manually to extract the frequent word that refer to Arab Spring news' participants. The lexical density of each frequent participant will be calculated to address the unbalanced lexicon size between the cross-lingual corpora, especially between ALJEN (97, 910 words) and ALJAR (57, 020 words). Then, those frequent and key participants will be categorised as 'pointers' of the ten constructed news values (previously displayed in Table 3.2). This preliminary news values' categorisation will help in identifying the frequent and salient news participants in the four corpora and lead to having an initial idea about the constructed newsworthiness of their representations. To illustrate the complexity of this analytical process, I consider how a single lexical item can point to multiple news values simultaneously. For instance, the word 'Tunisian' in the phrase 'Tunisian street vendor' can function as a pointer to different news values: it signals Geographical Distance/Cultural Proximity (by identifying a specific nationality and geographical location), Impact (by emphasising the significance of events relating to Tunisia within the Arab Spring context), and Personalisation (by helping to construct an individual identity). Similarly, when 'Tunisian' appears in phrases like 'Tunisian revolution' or 'Tunisian protests', it can additionally point to Proximity (by indicating the national scale of the events). This multi-layered approach to categorisation acknowledges that news values are often interlinked and that a single lexical choice can contribute to the construction of multiple dimensions of newsworthiness simultaneously.

### **3.3.2 STEP II: Comparing cross-lingual frequent participants**

After extracting the lists of frequencies and keywords from the four corpora, a comparative analysis will be conducted to explore the shared participants between the Arabic and English news texts of the same news. Specifically, I compare ALJEN and ALJAR on one hand, and BBCEN and BBCAR on the other. This approach of comparing the Arabic and English versions from the same news outlet, rather than comparing languages across different outlets, allows for a more focused examination of how the same events and participants are represented across languages within each organisation's distinct linguistic and cultural contexts. This analysis aims to examine the co-textual meanings in detail by displaying collocations using the Word Sketch Window tool in Sketch Engine, along with the extended concordance lines. Through this extensive analysis, I aim to explore how these shared and frequently occurring news participants contribute to the discursive construction of news values, directly addressing the first research question of this study: How do



Aljazeera and BBC News construct news values in the representations of Arab Spring participants in their Arabic and English web-based news outlets? Additionally, addressing the third research question, I will investigate what patterned meanings are formed through the construction of news values in Arabic and English Arab Spring's news by Al Jazeera and the BBC. This comprehensive approach will provide insights into how news values are linguistically realised across different language versions of the same news organisation and reveal any emerging patterns or shared meanings in their construction.

### **3.3.3 STEP III: The Arab Spring voices' news values construction**

To address the fifth and sixth research questions about the Arab Spring' voices newsworthiness construction (see Chapter Five and Seven), I will use specific methods of voices' selection, extraction and analysis. Due to the extensive nature of the collected data, including all voices and their attribution in the corpora would be unattainable. Therefore, I will focus on two specific categories of voices in news discourse, as identified by Bednarek (2016): para-linguistic and illocutionary forces' expressions.

The selection of these two categories and the exclusion of others is primarily driven by several factors. Firstly, the constraints of space within my thesis necessitate narrowing down the focus. Additionally, considering the large timeframe of the collected data spanning from 2011 to 2017 and the complex nature of the data, which encompasses diverse settings and participants from different countries, a more targeted approach is warranted. Furthermore, the choice of para-linguistic and illocutionary forces' expressions is grounded in three main considerations. Firstly, within the context of Arab Spring news, it is expected that the voices of protesters and governments would be reported under these two categories. Secondly, insights from previous scholarly works on news values' construction of voices, cited in Bednarek et al. (2020) and Bednarek (2016), inform this selection. Lastly, valuable input from the analysis steps will be conducted in Chapters Four and Six of my research, where I observed these categorised voices while assessing the constructed newsworthiness of frequent and key participants in Arab Spring news.

To extract the target data from the corpora based on the previous step, I will use the Word Search tool in Sketch Engine to search for co-occurrences of each voice expression in the corpora. From there, I will extract the concordance lines for each voice, ensuring that the context of each line is displayed and accounted for. This approach allows for a nuanced discussion that incorporates the specifics of each Arab Spring country and its news event participants, placing them within their appropriate context. This step has been undertaken because the findings from Chapter Four and Six revealed a distinct news values construction, including patterns and ideologies based on the country involved in the Arab Spring. Moreover, such an approach aims to avoid overgeneralisations wherever possible. Subsequently, I will conduct a detailed analysis of the news values construction by examining the (extended) concordances of these cross-lingual news voices.

### **3.3.4 STEP IV: Analysing patterned discursive practices and meanings: Unveiling ideologies through the construction of news values**

The preceding stages of corpus analysis and in-depth examination of the discursive construction of news values by participants and voices are anticipated to yield various patterned discursive practices, including interdiscursivity and intertextuality (for a more detailed account of

CDA discursive practices, please refer to Chapter Two, section 2.2.2). Moreover, this process is expected to unveil different meanings, such as ideologies. To address the final research question of this study, the patterned discursive practices and meanings observed during the previous phase of analysing the construction of news values are further scrutinised and deliberated alongside pertinent literature in Chapter Eight, which serves as the discussion chapter.

### 3.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have explored two significant components of my study: data and methodology. Within the data section, I have outlined the process of data selection, collection sampling and corpus building. Moving on to the methodology part, I have discussed three key points: the methods and approaches used for data analysis, the challenges encountered and the procedure for implementing these approaches.

By establishing the methodology design, the subsequent four chapters will focus on employing these methods to conduct my analysis. Specifically, the next two chapters will centre around corpus analysis, aiming to pinpoint and identify the news participants involved in the Arab Spring. Additionally, I will investigate the constructed news values within their cross-lingual representations in BBC and Al Jazeera. The table below (Table 3.4) summarizes the methodological steps and indicates which steps are employed to answer each specific research question. This overview provides a clear roadmap of how the analysis will unfold and how each methodological component contributes to addressing the research's core inquiries.

Research Questions	Methods	Where?
<p><b>1. How do Al Jazeera and the BBC construct news values in the representations of Arab Spring participants in Arabic and English outlets?</b></p>	<p>1.1 The participants are extracted from the 200 frequent and 200 keyword lists from all four corpora (ALJAR, ALJEN, BBCEN, and BBCAR) using Sketch Engine.</p> <p>1.2 The participants found in the lists are categorised based on their constructed news values (personalisation, eliteness, etc.).</p> <p>1.3 The shared participants' Word Sketch and Concordances between the Arab and English corpora (ALJEN vs. ALJAR and BBCEN vs.</p>	<p><b>Chapter Four and Chapter Five</b></p>

	BBCAR) are analysed using DNVA.	
<b>2. How do Al Jazeera and the BBC construct news values in the representations of Arab Spring voices in Arabic and English outlets?</b>	<p>1.1 Two types of voices were selected with specific chosen lexicons based on the literature on voices in news and the relevance to the research context and genre (News of protests/News of the Arab Spring): a. Paralinguistic Expression Voices. (cheer, chant, cry, shout, and scream) b. Illocutionary force utterances. (promise, threaten, and denounce)</p> <p>1.2 The concordance lines of the Arabic and English voices are analysed and compared across the transnational news corpora (ALJEN vs. ALJAR and BBCEN vs. BBCAR) using DNVA.</p>	<b>Chapter Six and Chapter Seven</b>

<p><b>3. What are the patterned discursive practices and ideologies formed through the construction of news values in Arab and English Arab Spring news in Al Jazeera and the BBC?</b></p>	<p>The patterned discursive strategies, such as Interdiscursivity and intertextuality, and ideologies such as Pan-Arabism and Orientalism views found in analysis steps 1.3 and 3.2, are further analysed and discussed with references to relevant literature.</p>	<p><b>Chapter Four, Chapter Five, Chapter Six, Chapter Seven, and Chapter Eight</b></p>
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*Table 3.4 Methodological Overview: Aligning Analytical Procedures with Research Questions*

## Chapter Four. The Representations and the Discursive Constructed Newsworthiness of Arab Spring's News Participants in ALJEN and ALJAR

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates how the news participants during the Arab Spring are represented in ALJAR and ALJEN. As mentioned in the methodology (see Chapter Three), both ALJEN and ALJAR belong to the same news institution but deliver news cross-lingually, namely, in English on ALJEN and in Arabic on ALJAR. In the current research, a comparison is made between the same news institution resources across languages to examine the extent to which linguistic representations and discursive newsworthiness vary depending on the language of the news. This chapter examines how news participants in the events of the Arab Spring are represented, and whether the constructed newsworthiness of these participants' representations varies between ALJEN and ALJAR.

As discussed in Chapter Three, the term 'participant' refers to the human/individual and the institutional entities such as *protestors, activists, politicians, governmental institutions, regimes* and *journalists* who participated in Arab Spring news events. Throughout this chapter, the aim is to investigate the participants in the collected corpora, specifically focusing on Al Jazeera's cross-lingual data. This analysis seeks to answer the following research questions pertaining to Al Jazeera's coverage:

1. How does Al Jazeera construct news values in the representations of Arab Spring participants across its Arabic and English outlets?
2. What patterned meanings are formed through the construction of news values in Al Jazeera's Arab Spring news coverage in Arabic and English?

To address these questions, the first step involves generating a related frequency list, keyword list, collocations (Word Sketch Windows), and concordance lines using Sketch Engine. The generated data are then presented, translated (from Arabic to English in ALJAR), and analysed using the News Values Approach (Bednarek and Caple 2017). This chapter is divided into two parts for better organisation and clarity. In each section, the findings are compared and further investigated across the two corpora (ALJEN and ALJAR).

The first part includes two sections: section (4.2) presents the analysis of (1) frequent participants in Arab Spring News and (2) key participants in Arab Spring News (Section 4.2). The second section (Section 4.3), the presentation of the findings:

- 1) Displaying the selected 'participants' extracted from the frequency lists in ALJEN and ALJAR.
- 2) Representing the lexical density of each frequent participant to address the unbalanced lexicon size between ALJEN (97, 910) and ALJAR (57, 020).
- 3) Displaying the constructed News Values (Bednarek and Caple, 2017), namely personalisation, eliteness, consonance, negativity, positivity, negativity,

timeliness, proximity, impact, superlativeness and unexpectedness (for more details about news values, see Chapter Three).

4) Conducting a comparative analysis of news values (Section 4.2.1) for three shared participants (Arab, people, and government) between ALJEN and ALJAR to examine their co-textual meanings in detail by displaying the collocations (via the Word Sketch Window tool in Sketch Engine) and (extended) concordance lines. In the second part of this chapter (Section 4.4), the findings are as follows:

- 1) Selected participants and from the ALJEN and ALJAR keyword lists.
- 2) Presented News Values' categorisation of those' participants;
- 3) A further comparative analysis of the shared participants between ALJEN and ALJAR was conducted to examine their co-textual meaning by looking at their concordance lines.

## 4.2 Frequent participants in Arab Spring news in ALJEN and ALJAR

As displayed in Chapter Three (Section 3.2), the top 200 most frequent words (see Appendix 2) used in ALJAR and ALJEN were extracted and examined using Sketch Engine to discover the relevant participants. Out of the 200 words, the participants with the highest frequencies in the two cross-lingual corpora were eight in ALJEN and ten in ALJAR, as shown in Table 4.1 below. It is worth noting that when reading Table 4.1, the definite article 'the' (أل in ALJAR) has a broader range of uses in Arabic than in English. In Arabic, it is often used in situations in which English uses an indefinite article. Additionally, morphologically, آل (ال) in Arabic is always attached to a noun, and it cannot be distinguished as a separate morpheme by machines. Therefore, the presence of 'the' in the ALJAR lists in Table 4.1 does not have any impact on the linguistic comparisons between ALJAR and ALJEN.

News Values	The Frequent Social Actor Lemmas in ALJEN with their raw frequencies (N 8)	The Lexical Density (Per 10,000 words)	The Frequent Social Actor Words in ALJAR (translated into English) with their raw frequencies (N 10)	The lexical density (Per 10,000 words)
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Personalisation	People (493)	.35	50	(The) People الناس/الشعب/شعب Ālnās/ālshaāb (72)	12.62
	Protest (359)	.66	36		
Proximity	Arab (340)	.72	34	The Arabs العربي/العرب (ā)ārāb(i) (17)	36.47
Eliteness	Govern ment (363)	.07	37	(The) Government(s) الحكومة/الحكومات/حكومة مؤسسة/حكومات (ā) hūkūmā(t) (195)	34.19
	Opposi tion (242)	.71	24	(The) Regime(s) النظام/نظام/الانظمة/انظمة مؤسسة (ā)nīdhām (170)	29.81
				(The) President(s) الرئيس/رئيس/الرؤساء/ رؤساء (ā)rāēs/(ā)rūāsā	28.93

			(165)		
e	Regim (220)	.46	22	(The) Forces قوات/القوات (āl)qūāt (94)	16.48
				The Opposition المعارضة ālmūārādhā (68)	11.92
nt	Preside (156)	.93	15	(The) Party الحزب/حزب (āl) hīzb (77)	13.50
	Police (112)	.43	11	The Security الأمن ālāmn (65)	11.39
	(74) (Muha mmed (3), Mohammed (23), Muhammad (9), Mohammed (3)  Moha med (34).	36	7.	Muhammed محمد (49)	8.59

Table 4.1 Arab Spring frequent news participants in ALJEN and ALJAR



As presented in Table 4.1 above, the shared constructed news values of the Arab Spring participants in ALJEN and ALJAR are personalisation, proximity, and eliteness. Also, personalisation is the most populated category for shared participants in ALJAR and ALJEN (*protesters* in ALJEN and *people* in both ALJEN and ALJAR).

In the case of ALJAR, determining the established news value of *Muhammed* (محمد) required a preliminary examination of the identity or individuals to whom the name *Muhammed* refers. By looking at 49 concordances of *Muhammed* (محمد), it co-occurs frequently (17 times) as *Muhammed Morsi*<sup>19</sup> (مرسي محمد) and as *Muhammed Bouazizi* (محمد البوعزيزي) (five times). The remaining concordance lines of *Muhammed* (محمد) in ALJAR refer to individual politicians, writers, witnesses and activists whose first name is *Muhammed*, such as *King Muhammed VI* الملك محمد الخامس, *Muhammed ElBaradei* محمد البرادعي and *Muhammed Badawi* محمد بدوي. Thus, *Muhammed* (محمد) is characterised here based on its concordance lines in ALJAR as co-constructed with eliteness.

It can be said that the absence of *Muhammed* as a frequent participant name in ALJEN might be due to the variant English language pronunciation and transcriptions of the Arabic name محمد (*Muhammed, Muhammad, Mohammed, Mohammad, Mohamed* and *Mohammad*). Thus, the calculation of such variations by the corpus tool as different forms of the same lemma is not possible, because they are recognised by the machine as different words. Looking back to the frequency of the different forms of the personal name *Muhammed* in ALJEN, it can be seen that the total number of co-occurrences of the five forms was 74 (*Muhammed* (3), *Mohammed* (23), *Muhammad* (9), *Mohammed* (3) and *Mohamed* (34)).

In the following section, (Section 4.2.1), the findings summarised in Table 4.1 are discussed in more detail. Specifically, the three frequent shared participants in both ALJAR and ALJEN, namely *people* (الناس/الشعب al-nās/alshāb), *Arab* (عرب/عربي) and *Government* (الحكومة/الحكومات al-hkūmah/āt), are further analysed by looking closer into their Word Sketch and (extended) concordance lines in both ALJEN and ALJAR. As shown in Table 4.1 above, most of the shared participants between ALJEN and ALJAR are foregrounded with both personalisation and eliteness, possibly because of the context of the news (namely revolutions) where both people ‘on the street’ such as *protesters, demonstrators*, and people in power such as *presidents, opposition, and regime*, might be expected to be frequently included in the news texts. The shared participants between ALJEN and ALJAR constructed with eliteness are *president* (الرئيس al-rāeēs), *government* (الحكومة al-hkūmah), *opposition* (المعارضة al-muārādh), *regime* (النظام in al-ndhām) and *security* (الأمن al-amn). Due to space limitations in the current research, only one participant constructed with eliteness, one with personalisation, and one with proximity shared between ALJEN and ALJAR were analysed further to address this chapter’s first research question regarding the linguistic and discursive news value construction of such participants’ representations. Thus, in the following section, the news participants, namely *government* (الحكومة al-hkūmah), *people* (الناس/الشعب al-nās/alshaāb) and *Arabs* (العرب/ي al-arab/i) are analysed further by looking at their concordance lines in both ALJEN and ALJAR.

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<sup>19</sup> Muhammad Morsi was the ousted Egyptian president (2012–2013).

#### 4.2.1 People in ALJEN and الناس/الشعب *alnās/alshāb* in ALJAR as frequent news participant in ALJAR and ALJEN

The word list (see Table 4.1) shows that the most frequent participants in ALJEN are people with a lexical density of 50.32 per 10,000 words. In comparison, the total lexical density of الناس/الشعب (the two equivalents of people in Arabic) in ALJAR is 11.57 per 10,000 words. The difference in the concordance lines of people between ALJEN and ALJAR might not reflect more personalisation constructions in ALJEN compared to ALJAR. Rather, this difference might refer to the naming strategies that are used in ALJAR in the representations of participants constructed with personalisation in Arab Spring events, such as naming people by their collective nationalities (such as مصريين Egyptians, تونسيين Tunisians) or involving them as individuals with their actual names. In the following two sections, the co-occurrence analysis of people in both ALJEN (4.2.1.1) and ALJAR (4.2.1.2) is presented.

##### 4.2.1.1 People as frequent participant in ALJEN

To examine how *people* are represented in ALJEN, the Word Sketch Window was investigated to examine the frequent collocations of *people* (for more details about the function of Word Sketch in Sketch Engine and why it is used in this research, see Chapter Three, Section 3.3). Figure 4.1 shows that *people* in ALJEN are frequently modified as *youths*. The collocate *people* + *youth* might be considered a construction of a sub-category of personalisation which is named here as ‘socio-cultural categorisation’ and refers to the identification of *people* in Arab Spring events as *youths* who seek the right to live with dignity and opportunities. This sub-category of personalisation is an original contribution of the current research, contributing to the ten original new values (Bednarek and Caple, 2017) when applied to current cross-lingual news texts. Further details regarding this contribution to news value theory and practice are discussed in Chapter Eight.

To support the argument of the construction of the socio-cultural categorisation of *youth* in the Arab Spring in ALJEN, an additional corpus-based enquiry was undertaken. This involves analysing the concordance lines of *youth* in ALJEN to identify any similarities or differences in the construction of news values. The 75 co-occurrences of *youth* in ALJEN show that some patterned meanings co-occurred with *the youth* in ALJEN. The concordance lines of *youth* (see Appendix 3) reveal how ALJEN constructs *youth* in the Arab Spring with positivity as the founders and guardians of the Arab Spring movement who challenged the monarchies and authorities. Additionally, the concordance lines of *youth* show their co-occurrence with *unemployed* (2) and *unemployment* (3). The collocate *youth* + *unemployment* in ALJEN might be used to represent the motives and demands of *youth* which include better life and job opportunities. Chapter Eight explores the implications of such a discursive practice of ALJEN, specifically in relation to how protesters are portrayed as *youths* who demand a secure future. This representation can be considered as a legitimisation of such movements and a challenge to ‘protester paradigm’ theory (Lee & Chan, 2010) where the focus shifts from representing the appearances and actions of protests to the demands and voice of those protesters.

In addition to personalisation (subtype: socio-cultural categorisation), Figure 4.1 shows that *people* in ALJEN are constructed with proximity because it co-occurs with different national identifications (*Tunisian, Yemeni, Egyptian, Syrian, Bahraini and Palestinian*). Additionally, the collocates *people + want* and *people + demand* reflect the frequent references to the voices of the people and intensify the construction of personalisation. Positivity is seen as another constructed value of *people* in ALJEN, namely in the co-occurrence of collocates, such as *awake* and *power*. It is also worth noting that ALJEN constructs *people* with the positivity value as *pioneers* of change. However, when co-occurring as a receiver of action, *people* are constructed as a receiver of negativity (*youth + people killed/have killed*). In the next section (Section 4.2.1.2), *people*'s equivalents (*ālnās* الشعب *alshāb*) in ALJAR's analysis steps and findings are considered.




Figure 4.1 Word Sketch of *people* in ALJEN

#### 4.2.2 *alnās/alshāb* (people) as frequent news participant in ALJAR

As shown in Table 4.1 above, *people* equivalents in ALJAR are two words: *alnās* and *alshāb*. The decision to include and calculate the total frequencies of these two equivalents as a single Arab Spring participant was based on their functions and the interchangeable use of both terms in Arabic journalistic practice. Taylor and Del Fante (2020) indicate that in building and analysing cross-lingual corpora, the functionality of equivalence must be “operationalised in a replicable and transparent manner” (p. 35) (for more detail regarding the process of equivalence decision-making in this research, see Chapter 3).

Regarding the 66 concordance lines of الشعب/الناس al-nās/alshaāb (people) in ALJAR, there are some similarities in their newsworthiness' construction, with their equivalent in ALJEN displayed in Section 4.2.1.1. The Word Sketch windows of those *people*'s equivalents, al-nās and alshaāb (see Appendix 4 for the Word Sketch windows) shows how the voice of الشعب/الناس al-nās/alshaāb (people) is frequently represented as a collocate with the verbs يريد *jurēd* (want), ينتفض *yntāfidh* (revolt), يحافظ *yūhāfid* (keep) and يستعيد *yāstāēd* (take back). Moreover, the frequent collocate الشعب + يريد (people + want) is considered to be part of the following well-known Arab Spring slogan; الشعب يريد اسقاط النظام، which translates as: 'people want the downfall of the regime.' However, out of the 66 concordances, there were only three concordance lines for such slogans in ALJAR. Thus, it can be said that in ALJAR, the verbs co-collocate with the participant الشعب/الناس al-nās/alshaāb (people) reveal the meanings of self-determination and emancipation.

Regarding the constructed news values, because the Word Sketch does not reveal more about the constructed newsworthiness associated with الشعب/الناس al-nās/alshaāb (people), the complete 66 concordance lines were manually analysed. In those lines, ALJAR constructs الشعب *alshaāb* (people) in Arab Spring events with positivity and impact as a unified, effective power against the former regimes, as follows:

4.1 على قلب رجل واحد الشعب

Translation: **People** are single-heartedly united

4.2 ثار الشعب على المنظومة القديمة

Translation: **People** revolted against the long-standing system

4.3 يستعيد صلاحياته الشعب

Translation: **People** take back their powers from the former government

4.4 الشعب يحافظ على ديمومة التغيير

Translation: **People** can keep the changes going

Also, the concordances of الشعب/الناس *alshaāb/alnaās* (people) in ALJAR indicate two patterns of proximity construction, namely the collocates; الشعب+اللسطيني *alshaāb+alfālāstīnī* (*Palestinian + people*) and الشعب/الناس/التونسي/ الشعب *alshaāb+altūnūsī/shaāb+tūnīs* (*Tunisia (Tunisian)+ people*). In the following two sections (Sections 4.2.1.2.1 and 4.2.1.2.2), the news value constructions found in these two collocates' representations are displayed. Such an extended analysis of the patterns found in the collocates is included here because of their direct input to the last research questions.

#### 4.2.2.1 Palestinian people in ALJAR

Starting with the first collocate, as shown in Table 4.2 below, the extracted (extended) concordance lines illustrate how الشعب/اللسطيني *alshaāb+alfālāstīnī* (*Palestinian + people*) is

foregrounded with proximity as well as consonance, namely the Question of Palestine<sup>20</sup>. In addition, ALJAR uses the two collocates *Palestinian + people* and *Arab + people* interchangeably. Such interdiscursivity arguably represents the Arab Spring with the Pan-Arabism concept as an embodiment of freedom for Arabs concerning their geopolitical issues (including the Question of Palestine).

Similarly, in line 3 (see Table 4.2), the interdiscursive inclusion of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in the context of the Arab Spring events and international supporters of the Arab Spring, who historically disagreed with those wars, such as Chavis's position regarding Arab issues, is constructed with positivity.

In addition, Line 3 (Table 4.2) shows that *people* are replaced with *Palestinians*, and *Lebanon* is represented as a country. This may reveal how ALJAR represents the conflict between Palestine and Israel as a confrontation between *people* (the Palestinian) and an occupying *entity* (Israel). Additionally, the assimilation between *Chavis* and *Nasser* in their nationalist stances might reveal the ideology behind nationalism/Arabism, as practiced by ALJAR in its representation of the Arab Spring. Such representations of the Question of Palestine as the cause of Arab people and the unified status of Arabs are in accordance with other findings which reflect the stances and ideology of pan-Arabism in ALJAR (in the current chapter and Chapter Six). In addition, the line of *Palestinian + people* in Table 4.2 (line 2) represents the option of violent confrontation against the *occupier* (Israel) as a legitimate action. Moreover, this discursive strategy of direct legitimation may not be found in ALJEN when representing *Palestine + people*. However, owing to the limitations of current research data, such an argument is difficult to prove. Nevertheless, previous research on the context of news coverage of Palestine-Israel in Aljazeera Arabic and Aljazeera English (Barkho, 2010) shows how in Aljazeera Arabic, greater voice is given to the Palestinian argument and more legitimation discursive strategies are used to describe the Palestinian sides' actions and participants, such as *martyrs* and *resistance*, whereas Israelis are typically referred to as *occupiers* who *attack*. In Chapter Eight, the interdiscursivity of the Question of Palestine as a frequently constructed consonance in ALJAR and the related Pan-Arabist ideologies revealed in such practices are discussed in detail.

Finally, both impact and negativity are constructed with Arab regimes and international powers' disappointment and failed positions regarding the *Arab/Palestinian people* (line 1 in Table 4.2). Such findings are in accordance with similar findings in ALJAR (in this chapter and Chapter Six), where Arab regimes and international powers are represented as agents of conflict against the Arab people.

1. من جهته اقر مدير " المركز الدولي ل العدالة الانتقالية " ديفيد تولبرت بوجود معايير مزدوجة لدى بعض المنظمات الدولية والحقوقية مثل ما هي الحالة ب القضية الحقوقية ل الشعب الفلسطيني، لكن ه اشار الى " تخاذل دول المنطقة في بعض القضايا الحقوقية ل شعوب عربية مثل ما يحدث في سوريا حاليا شان ها في ذلك شان قوى دولية وعالمية"

<sup>20</sup> The term 'Question of Palestine' encapsulates the ongoing political and territorial dispute between Israelis and Palestinians, primarily centred on the land of historic Palestine.

Translation: *For his part, the director of the International Centre for Transitional Justice, David Tolbert, admitted that there is a contradiction in some international human rights organisations' views regarding the human rights issue of the **Palestinian people**. However, he pointed to the 'failure situation of the Arab countries regarding some human rights issues of Arab people, such as the situation currently happening in Syria.' This includes international and global powers.*

2. صدر مركز الزيتونة ل الدراسات والاستشارات -ومقره بيروت- تقدير ه الاستراتيجي (73) بعنوان " افاق المقاومة الشعبية في الضفة الغربية ", والذي يدرس في ه خيارات الشعب الفلسطيني ب اللجوء ل المقاومة السلمية الشعبية كريف ل المقاومة المسلحة وليس بديلا عن ها وتعرف الدراسة مصطلح المقاومة الشعبية " ب التبني الشعبي الواسع والانخراط المباشر ل مختلف فئات الشعب في المواجهة المباشرة مع المحتل ب مختلف الوسائل، والمشاركة الفاعلة ل هم في تحقيق التطلعات الوطنية الفلسطينية "

Translation: *Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, which is located in Beirut, issued its strategic assessment (73) under the title "The Prospects of Popular Resistance in the West Bank," in which it studies the options of the **Palestinian people** to resort to a peaceful, popular resistance as an auxiliary to armed resistance rather than as a substitution. The study defines the term 'popular resistance' as "wide popular direct involvement from the people in various groups in direct confrontation with the occupier by various means, and their active participation in achieving Palestinian national aspirations."*

3. ويبدو ان شافيز سار على نهج عبد الناصر في هذا الإطار معلنا عدا ه الواضح ل سياسات الولايات المتحدة في العالم ومعارضته حربها في افغانستان والعراق، كذلك انتقاداته المستمرة للاعتداءات التي تشن ها اسرائيل على الشعب الفلسطيني وعلى لبنان.

Translation: *It appears that Chavez followed Nasser's path in this context, declaring his clear enmity to the foreign policies of the United States (US) and his opposition to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as his continuous criticism of the attacks launched by Israel against the **Palestinian people and Lebanon.***

Table 4.2 The three extended concordance lines of the collocate *Palestinian + people* in ALJAR

#### 4.2.2.2 Tunisian people in ALJAR

Moving to the second collocate, as shown in Table 4.3 below, the extended concordance lines of the *الشعب + التونسي/ الناس/ الشعب في تونس* (Tunisia (Tunisian)+ people). In line 1 of Table 4.3 which contains a voice of an Ennahda party member (Abdelfattah Mourou), the values that are constructed are personalisation (*people* [2], *society*, *revolution*), eliteness (*Islamists*, *defunct regimes*), and consonance (*the colonists*). The *Islamists* are evaluated (by Mourou) as *good governors* who can provide *people* and *society* with inclusive change (culturally, intellectually, and politically). On the other hand, the other eliteness-constructed participants, namely *regimes*, are represented with Negatively (as reported by Mourou) as *defunct* and *intimidating people* from the *Islamists* who (the *Islamists*) prevented the *colonisers* from ruling Tunisia. In such representations, *people* in Tunisian are depicted as receivers of the actions of both *Islamists* and/or the *former government* (Bin Ali regime) rather than actors in the events of the Arab Spring.

1. الواقع الصعب الذي ينتظر الاسلاميين ل تحقيق الحكم الرشيد في تونس، وهو امر عزاه الى تخويف الانظمة البائدة شعوبها من الاسلام والاسلاميين طوال خمسين عاما، الامر الذي يفرض على هم تقديم برنامج مدني يقنع المواطنين ب ان الاسلاميين يعملون ل صالح المجتمع والشعب. وأكد مورو ان مهمة الثورات العربية ليست مقتصرة على تغيير الواقع الظاهر للعيان، بل تمتد ل احداث تحول ثقافي وفكري من واقع قديم قلب الحقائق وبدلها، مشيرا الى ان الاسلاميين لا يطمعون في السلطة، بل في تغيير العقليات التي حكمت المستعمر

Translation: *Difficulty awaits the Islamists to achieve good governance in Tunisia, which he (Abdelfattah Mourou) attributed to the defunct regimes, intimidating their people from Islam and Islamists for 50 years. Therefore, Islamists are required to present a civilian programme to convince people that the Islamists work for both society and the people. Mourou emphasised that the task of the Arab revolutions is not limited to changing what is visible to the naked eye but extends to a cultural and intellectual transformation from an old reality and overturned and replaced facts, pointing out that Islamists do not need power. Rather, according to Mourou, Islamists recognise their role in changing the mentality that enabled the coloniser to rule the country.*

2. منذ البداية لم تظهر فرنسا ثقة في الاحزاب الحاكمة او الشعب التونسي

Translation: *From the beginning, France did not show confidence in the ruling parties and the Tunisian people.*

3. ومنذ انتخابات اكتوبر / تشرين الاول تجاهل المسؤولون الفرنسيون صراحة اختيارات الشعب التونسي

Translation: *Since the elections of last October, French officials have openly ignored the **people's** choices in Tunisia.*

Table 4.3 The extended concordance lines of the collocate Tunisia + people

Furthermore, Table 4.3 above highlights the emphasis on consonance in the first line, where the historical colonisation of Tunisia is referenced within the framework of the Arab Spring (specifically, the French colonialism of Tunisia). This can be understood as an example of interdiscursivity, a concept explained in more depth in Chapter Three of the current study (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). In addition to the interdiscursivity of the French as a ‘historical colonist’ in the context of Tunisian’s Arab Spring, in lines 2 and 3 of Table 4.3, France (eliteness constructed) as an official entity is discursively constructed with negativity and timeliness. France, as a participant in the Tunisian Arab Spring, is represented as providing *people* during the events of the Arab Spring with nothing but disappointment. Looking back at the extended texts of lines 2 and 3, they co-occur as part of a comment by the news reporter following a speech by a French official on the events of the Arab Spring, as displayed and translated below:

4.5 أعلن وزير الداخلية الفرنسي مانويل فالس ان تونس لم تكن نموذجا للربيع العربي بسبب "دكتاتورية ها الفاشية الاسلامية " ب قيادة جماعة الاخوان المسلمين والسلفيين التي شكلت تهديدا ل الحقوق والحريات في بلد يبعد ساعتين فقط ب الطائرة عن فرنسا واطاف ان فرنسا لم تتمكن من التغاضي عن هذا الامر وستدعم العلمانيين والحداثيين ضد من اسماهم " الظلاميين

Translation: *French Interior Minister Manuel Fals announced that Tunisia was not a model for the Arab Spring because of the ‘Islamic fascist dictatorship’ that was led by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists which threatens the rights and freedoms of a country that is just two hours away by plane from France. He added that France was unable to overlook this matter and will support the secularists and modernists against those he called “the obscurantists”.*

In line 4 of Table 4.3, the ideology of imperialism is discursively constructed in Fals’s quotes (*Islamic fascist, threat to rights and freedoms in a country that is just two hours away by plane from France, obscurantists*). This direct representation of such ideology towards the *people* who started to revolt for their freedom might be considered discursively as ‘moral panic<sup>21</sup>’ by ALJAR. Further discussion about colonialism memory as moral panic and constructed consonance in ALJAR’s representation of the Arab Spring news is examined in detail in Chapter Eight with supporting evidence from the relevant empirical literature. In the following section, an analysis of the second shared participant that frequently co-occurs in both ALJAR and ALJEN, namely, *Arabs*, is presented.

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<sup>21</sup> Moral panic is a sociological concept introduced by Cohen (1980), referring to the fear that someone or something poses a threat to society’s values and interests.



### 4.3.1 *Arabs* as Arab Spring news' participants in ALJEN

The second shared participant, which is frequently represented in Arab Spring news in both ALJEN and ALJAR, is *the Arab*. As can be seen in Table 4.1 below, the possible constructed values of Arab can be both personalisation (sub-category: socio-cultural categorisation) and proximity. Such overlapping of expected news value construction of *Arab* might refer to the word composition itself. *Arab* as a word may refer to multi-identifiers, such as *people, places, and entities*. To establish the co-occurrences that refer to *Arab* as a news participant in ALJEN, the Word Sketch Window of the 408 co-occurrences of *Arab* in ALJEN was retrieved and analysed (see Appendix 5). According to the Word Sketch, *Arab(s)* co-occurred only 68 times as a noun. Furthermore, by analysing these concordance lines of *Arab* categorised as nouns in ALJEN, *Arab* co-occurs only 10 times as an ethnic categorisation (personalisation: socio-cultural categorisation), as can be seen in Table 4.4 below. The other 58 instances of *Arab* co-occur as modifiers of non-human entities, such as the *Arab Spring, Arab League, Arab World, and Arab Emirates*. In the next section, further analysis of the discursive construction of news value in the 10 co-occurrences of *Arab* as a news participant in ALJEN is demonstrated.

1. *A year after US troops left, sectarian friction, as well as tension over land and oil between **Arabs** and ethnic Kurds*
2. *It was this global network, with young **Arabs** in the lead*
3. *It is about time that **Arabs** stood unequivocally with the Bahraini people who contributed to the Arab Spring*
4. *(and he had his allies on this matter among the leading **Arab** and non-Arab “left”) categorically denounced the Iranian uprising*
5. *Justice for the Palestinian people was a central concern for their group, and one that brought **Arabs** together across religious or sectarian lines*
6. *Organisers estimated that 3,500 people, mainly Kurds, protested in Amouda, and up to 4,000 marched in Qamishli, including **Arabs** and members of Syria's Christian Assyrian sect*
7. *There are 180 million young **Arabs** across the region with common goals and a common language*
8. *And in these schools, Syrian residents of the Golan are taught that they are Druze, not **Arab***

9. *They are trying to make us feel like we are something different than the other Arabs*

10. *Arabs of all generations are also expressing their sentiments online – not only congratulating Tunisians but also calling for similar movements in their own countries.*

Table 4.4 The co-occurrences of Arab as an Ethnic identifier of participants in ALJEN

As can be seen in Table 4.4 above, *Arabs* represent the ethnic identity of people who are a part of other people with other ethnic identities in the *Arab world*, such as the *Kurds* and *Christian Assyrian*. Such identity-diverse *people* are constructed with both personalisation and positivity because across generations in their movement of the Arab Spring, they were standing together and putting aside their differences.

In lines 5, 8, and 9 from Table 4.4, consonance is constructed in the indexing of Palestine's Question. It is worth noting that consonance constructions in these lines are not based on audience expectations or predication, as framed by Bednarek and Caple (2017). Rather, ALJEN constructs consonance as a challenge to the mainstream stereotypical perceptions of Arabs based on the literature (See Chapter Eight for more details). Thus, it is recognised here as a counter-consonance rather than consonance. To clarify, *Arab* and *Israeli* conflicts in Palestine and beyond (Golan<sup>22</sup>) are represented by ALJEN in Arab Spring news as historical and ongoing issues that bring *Arabs together across religious or sectarian lines*. This practice of interdiscursivity might reflect the underlying ideology of Pan-Arabism in ALJEN, where Arab nationalism is considered their united political, historical, and sociocultural identity.

In Chapter Eight, Pan-Arabism indicators found in ALJEN are discussed and interpreted with reference to the relevant empirical literature. In Section 4.2.2.4, the analysis of the news value construction found in the representations of *Arabs* as news participants is displayed and compared to ALJEN's findings.

### 4.3.2 Arabs in ALJAR

Similar to the findings from ALJEN, when examining the concordance lines for ALJAR, it is observed that out of the 24 co-occurrences where the words *عربي/عرب* *Arāb/Arabī* appeared, only seven of them are related to the ethnic identification of a news participant. This information is presented in Table 4.5 below.

1. لا خوف على مسيحيي الشرق على الاطلاق من اخوانهم المسلمين مضيفا انه مواطن عربي سوري مسيحي مثل المواطن السوري العربي المسلم

<sup>22</sup> The Golan is a part of Syria that was occupied by Israel following the Arab-Israeli war in 1967.

<p>Translation: <i>There is no fear of the Christians of the East at all from their Muslim brothers, adding that a Syrian Arab citizen and a Syrian Arab Muslim citizen are alike.</i></p>
<p>2. الرئيس التونسي زين العابدين بن علي (81 عاما) هو اول ديكتاتور عربي تسقط سلطته، كان يتمتع بحياة باذخة</p> <p>Translated: <i>Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, aged 81 who was the first Arab dictator overthrown, enjoyed a lavish life.</i></p>
<p>3. وتجسدت في تونس ومصر لنصل الى نتيجة مفادها ان العرب مثلنا وأنا مثلهم</p> <p>Translated: <i>From what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, we (the Chinese) reached the conclusion that we and Arabs are alike.</i></p>
<p>4. العاصمة السورية دمشق- على مر تاريخها: العرب والاشوريون والكرد</p> <p>Translated: <i>The Syrian capital Damascus - Throughout its history: Arabs, Assyrians and Kurds.</i></p>
<p>5. والعرب الذين انهوا الاستعمار السياسي</p> <p>Translated: <i>The Arabs who ended the political colonisation.</i></p>
<p>6. لكن الكثير من العرب، اخذوا على شافيز انه لم يغير من صداقته الوثيقة مع العقيد الليبي</p> <p>Translation: <i>Chávez's close friendship with the Libyan colonel was not accepted by many Arabs.</i></p>
<p>7. منادية الشباب اللبناني ب الا يكرر اخطاء اقرانه العرب، التي تسببت في افشال ثوراتهم قانلة لهم " أسقطوا طانفيتكم " وناشدتهم ب الا يتقوا في " رجل دين او رجل عسكر "</p> <p>Translation: <i>She asks Lebanon's youth not to repeat the mistakes of their Arab peers which caused their revolutions to fail, saying to them: 'fight your sectarianism' and appealing to them not to trust 'a cleric or a military man.'</i></p>

Table 4.5 The concordance lines of عربي/عرب Arāb/Arabī (Arabic/Arab/s') in ALJAR

As with ALJEN, ALJAR represents عربي/عرب Arāb/Arabī (Arabs) with positivity as part of their diverse and multi-ethnic/religious society. Additionally, the concordance lines of *Arabs* as news participants in ALJAR, as displayed in Table 4.5 above, show how they are constructed in proximity and impact. Proximity is constructed by referring to another distant society/country (China and Venezuela), which may enhance the construction of two news values, namely positivity and impact, where the significance of the Arab Spring movement is shown through its effect and consequences of ‘ending political colonisations’ and encouraging other nations to have similar movements. In addition, unexpectedness might be considered as being constructed here by the inclusion of *unexpected* ‘external participants’, such as *the Chinese* and *Chávez*, to add newsworthiness to Arab Spring news to maximise the influence of such a movement.

Furthermore, consonance is foregrounded in line 7 (see Table 4.5) of the *Arabs* co-occurrence, where a voice is reported advising *Arabs* to avoid sectarianism and ‘never trust a cleric or military man.’ Consonance is constructed by comparing what happened during similar events (Bednarek and Caple, 2014). In addition, the interdiscursivity of *clerics* and *military* as threats to the Arab Spring movement might reveal how such movements are represented in ALJAR. In ALJAR, the Arab Spring is represented as people’s action and suggests that any religious or power interference will result in failure.

Thus, both ALJEN and ALJAR, in their representations of Arabs as news participants in Arab Spring events, construct Arabs with positivity as part of a diverse community. However, ALJEN and ALJAR differ in the construction of consonance. While ALJAR constructs consonance by comparing one event to another in its representation of Arabs, ALJEN represents Arabs as a united, integrated community with a shared history and future which can be regarded as a counter-consonance. In other words, Arab representations in ALJEN might be recognised as a counterpractice to the dominant representations of Arabs in mainstream Western media. Further discussion and interpretations of ALJEN’s practice of challenging the value of consonance are presented in Chapter Eight. In Section 4.3.3, an analysis of the shared participants in the Arab Spring news between ALJEN and ALJAR, namely, the government, is presented.

### 4.3.3 Government as a news participant in ALJEN

As shown in Table 4.1, which compares the frequent Arab Spring news participants in ALJEN and ALJAR, *government* and its equivalent in ALJAR الحكومة/ات (al)hukūmā/āt are frequent participants constructed with eliteness and with similar lexical density, namely 37.07 and 34.19 per 10,000 words, respectively. Starting with ALJEN, analysing *government’s* Word Sketch (see Appendix 6) and the extended concordance lines in ALJEN reveals that *government* is frequently constructed with timeliness because it is modified by ‘transition’ words such as *next*, *caretaker* and *transitional*. This might be due to the context of the Arab Spring, where the movements resulted in governmental changes in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya.

Also, in ALJEN, *government* as an entity is constructed with negativity because it co-occurs with verbs such as *blamed*, *removed*, *dissolved*, *accused*, *urged* and *toppled*. Additionally, negativity is constructed in nouns modified by governments, such as *government corruption*, *government crackdown*, *government repression*, *government troops*, and *government sniper*.

Proximity is another co-constructed value in ALJEN, because *governments* are referred to by their national identities, such as *Yemeni*, *Syrian*, and *Moroccan*. Additionally, the proximity co-construction in ALJEN goes beyond Arab Spring *governments* to external governments, namely *Western*, *US*, *French*, and *European* governments. Such a collocate (*Western/(US)/(French)/(European) +government*) is deemed significant and can provide valuable insights into two aspects: the representations of news *participants* and the constructed newsworthiness associated with those representations (refer to Section 4.1). To delve deeper into this analysis, concordance lines were examined, as shown in Figure 4.2. It is apparent from Figure 4.2 that such *governments* in ALJEN are constructed with negativity and impact. Moreover, consonance is constructed in indexing the Western historical colonialism of the Arab world. Bednarek and Caple (2017) find that consonance is constructed in news discourse by comparing what happened with similar events in the past, which, in this case, is the French and British colonisation of certain Arab countries during the previous century. In Chapter Eight, the consonance construction and the interdiscursivity of the ‘colonisation history of Arab countries’ found in ALJEN’s representation of Arab Spring participants are discussed.



Figure 4.2 Concordance lines of the Western government in ALJEN

#### 4.3.4 Government as a news participant in ALJAR

For ALJAR, the single and plural forms of government in Arabic (*hukūmā/hukūmāāt*), as well as with the indefinite article *āl* (the) and without it (*alhukūmā/alhukūmāt*), are searched separately, and all are included in the total frequency of government as a news participant in the Arab Spring (see Chapter Three for more details about the process of searching equivalents in the current research). Following that, the four Word Sketch Windows and the concordance lines of 1) *الحكومة/حكومة* *alhukūmā* (the) government (183) and 2) *الحكومات/حكومات* *ālhukūmā/āt* (the) governments (12) are retrieved and analysed to examine the co-constructed news values. As with the ALJEN findings above, the Word Sketches of *الحكومة/حكومة* *ālhukūmā*'s (the) government(s) show how such news participants are co-constructed with: 1) Timeliness, where it is preceded by time-span adjectives *المقبلة* *ālmūkbiḥ* (future), *الحالية* *ālhālīyāh* (current), *الجديدة* *ālġādīdāh* (new), *الانتقالية/الموقته* *āl-entīkālīyāh* (interim); 2) Negativity, where it preceded by adjectives such as *المستبد* *ālmustābīdāh* (oppressive) or *عاجزة* *āġīzāh* (failing); and 3) Proximity where it is

proceeded by the names of countries such as التونسية *āltūnīsyāh* (Tunisian), المغربية *ālmāghrbīāh* (Moroccan), البحرينية *ālbāhrāynīāh* (Bahraini), المصرية *ālmīsrīyāh* (Egyptian), اليمنية *ālyāmānyāh* (Yemeni) or الفرنسية *ālfārānsyāh* (French).

Also, Word Sketch windows of الحكومة *alḥukūmā* (the) *government* show that the collocate التونسية + الحكومة (Tunisian + government) is the most frequent collocate represented in ALJAR (10 times). To investigate the discursive and linguistic news value construction of the representations of the collocate التونسية + الحكومة (Tunisian + government) as a news participant, the 5 concordance lines of its co-occurrences in ALJAR are displayed in Table 4.6 below and then analysed.

<p>1. وان الحكومة التونسية " رات فيها موقفا غير ودي ل تونس</p> <p>Translation: <i>The <b>Tunisian government</b> 'views the French political situation as unfriendly to Tunisia.</i></p>
<p>2. وقال ان باريس اصيبت ب خيبة امل من احجام الحكومة التونسية عن القيام بمزايدات</p> <p>Translation: <i>He said that Paris had been disappointed by the reluctance of the <b>Tunisian government.</b></i></p>
<p>3. والحكومة التونسية اصدرت بيانات تعارض التدخل الاجنبي.</p> <p>Translation: <i>The <b>Tunisian government</b> issued statements opposing foreign intervention.</i></p>
<p>4. يذكر ان الحكومة التونسية زمن حكم الرئيس السابق نيكولا ساركوزي الذي تربطه علاقة صداقة شخصية وثيقة ب بن علي، لم تكن من مساندي " ثورة الحرية والكرامة "</p> <p>Translation: <i>It is noteworthy that under the rule of former President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has a close personal relationship with Ben Ali, the <b>Tunisian government</b> did not support the 'revolution of freedom and dignity.'</i></p>
<p>5. وكان رئيس الحكومة التونسية أكد الجمعة تمسكه ب تشكيل حكومة كفاءات غير حزبية</p> <p>Translation: <i>On Friday, the <b>Tunisian prime minister</b> confirmed his commitment to forming a government of non-partisan competencies.</i></p>

Table 4.6 The concordance lines of the co-occurrences of the frequent collocate الحكومة (Tunisian government) in ALJAR

The concordance lines in Table 4.6 above show how *Tunisian governments* are depicted with negativity and positivity, depending on whether they are overthrown or post-Arab Spring. The pre-Arab Spring government is represented as rich while its people live in poverty, whereas the new post-revolution government is depicted as pluralistic and composed of different political parties. Additionally, Table 4.6 shows that the voice of the post-Arab Spring Tunisian government is constructed with consonance. In other words, France is interdiscursively represented as ‘a foreign interferer’ and an overthrown government ally that the post-Arab Spring governments face. This representation of France as a political entity is in accordance with other findings in ALJAR (see Section 4.2.1.2.2) where France is interdiscursively represented in the news concerning the Arab Spring as ‘a historical colonist’ and ‘a current foreign interferer’ that the elected post-Arab Spring governments, especially Muslim Brotherhood-based governments, are confronting and challenging. In Chapter Eight, the interdiscursive combination between Arab Spring news and the history of colonialism (especially French) in ALJAR are discussed. Meanwhile, in Section 4.3, the second part of the current chapter’s findings, namely Arab Spring news participants found in ALJEN and ALJAR keyword lists, is presented in light of the first research question stated in the first part of this chapter (see Section 4.1).

#### 4.4 Key Participants in Arab Spring news in ALJEN and ALJAR

In this section, the participants that appear more frequently in the ALJEN and ALJAR corpora than in the reference corpus (see Chapter Three, section 3.2.4.2 for more details) are identified using keywords in Sketch Engine. To conduct the analysis, Arab Spring news participants were extracted from the two Arabic and English 200-keyword-lists (see Appendix 7) and then categorised according to their constructed news value, as shown in Table 4.7 below.

The assignment of these participants’ news values was decided either by their direct meaning, such as proximity and personalisation (for instance, for ‘Sudanese’), or by looking further to their concordance lines, such as first or last names, to determine whether they are journalists, politicians, activists, witnesses, or ordinary people. The participants underlined in Table 4.7 are categorised as constructing more than one value simultaneously, such as personalisation and proximity for Bahraini and Syrian participants. Compared to the findings from the Frequency Lists analysed in the first part of this chapter (see Section 4.2), more news participants are found in the keyword lists in ALJEN and ALJAR. Thus, in this section, further analysis to examine the newsworthiness construction in the co-occurrences (by looking at concordance lines) of those participants in ALJEN and ALJAR is based on their initial news value categorisation labels presented in Table 4.7 below, namely participants constructed with eliteness (in Section 4.3.1), personalisation and proximity (Section 4.3.2), and consonance (Section 4.3.3).

News Value	ALJEN social actors/actions	ALJAR
Eliteness	(Journalists/reporters/writers)	بلعيد- السبسي- ترمب- مرسين- حفتر- الجبالي- شافيز- السبسي- بوست- نت-

	<p><i>Bishara-Marwan-jazeera-rabab- Dickey- Marwa- Bassiouni-Iryani- AJ (Aljazeera).</i></p> <p><b>(Presidents/politicians)</b></p> <p>Saleh- Nasrallah- Salman (Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa)- Elmahdy- Ennahda- Al-Bashir- Al-Assad- Assad-Bashir- Ahmar- Mubarak- Hadi- Bashar- Brahimi- Belaid- Abidine- Gaddafi- Maliki- Zine- regime- opposition- wefaq- monarchy- Al-ahmar - Emir- al-Khalifa- Ikhwan- Umma- Hosni- Islah- Khalif- Royalist - Rajab- Nasser- Morsi- Sheikh- Saudi-led- Marzouki- Shafik- Khamenei- Almaliki- Salah- Mutlaq- Nafi- Al-Qaeda</p>	<p>الغنوشي- ووتش- فريدمان- المرزوقي- مورو- غارديان- الصحيفة غولديبيرغ</p> <p>Translated keywords: <b>(Journalists/reporters/writer)</b></p> <p>Post- the Guardian- the Newspaper- Goldberg- Thomas L. Friedman</p> <p><b>(Presidents/politicians)</b></p> <p>Balied- Essesi- Tump- Mursi- Haftar- Jebali- Chávez- Essebsi- Ghannouchi- Marzouki- Mourou</p>
<p>Personalisation</p>	<p>Protester- <u>Tunisian</u>- <u>Bahraini</u>- uprising- demonstrator- <u>Yemini</u>- protest- <u>Sudanese</u>- Bouazizi- <u>Syrian</u>- activist- revolt- revolution- demonstration- chant- narrators- <u>Lebanese</u>- <u>Libyan</u>- Shakir- Jordanian- protestor- <u>Arabs</u>- Ibrahim- Essam- <u>Palestinian</u>- <u>Egyptian</u>- <u>Kurd</u></p> <p>Al-khawaja- Mathlouthi- Shalabi</p>	<p>الاحتجاجات- بحرينيين- ثورات- إصلاحات- احتجاجات- محتجون- محتجين - هتافات- المحتجون- مظاهرات- مظاهرة- المظاهرة- البوعزيزي- الثورات- متظاهرون- متظاهرين</p> <p>Translated keywords:</p> <p>The protests- Bahrainis- Revolutions-</p> <p>Reforms- protests- protestors*- chants- the protesters- demonstrations- demonstration- the demonstration- Bouazizi- the revolutions- demonstrators- demonstrators**-</p>
<p>Proximity</p>	<p>Tunisian- Bahraini- Yemini- Sudanese- Syrian- Jordanian- Palestinian- Egyptian- Arabs- Kurd- Libyan</p>	<p>العربي- التونسيين- الأمازيغية</p> <p>Translated keywords:</p> <p>The Arab- The Tunisian- Barbers</p>



e	Consonanc	Shia- anti-government- Sunni- Sectarian- Sunni- Islamist- Shia-led- non-violent- Druze- Naksa- Sunni-ruled- Nakba- Hafez- Alwaites- Sectarianism- Umma- nepotism- Islamist-led- pan-Arabism- Anti-regime- Intifada-	اليساري- السلفيون  <b>Translated keywords:</b> The Salafist - leftists
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Table 4.7 The key participants with their news values pointers in ALJEN and ALJAR

#### 4.4.1 Key participants constructed with eliteness in ALJEN and ALJAR

As shown in Table 4.7 above, both ALJAR and ALJEN have two types of eliteness constructed participants: journalistic and political participants. Journalistic key participants in ALJEN are individual Arab speaking journalists and reporters (*Bishara, Marwan, Rabab, Marwa, Bassiouni, Iryani*), an ‘overseas’ journalist (*Dickey*) and an institutional news resource (*Aljazeera*). On the other hand, ALJAR has two key international institutional news resources: eliteness constructed key participants (*Washington Post - The Guardian*) and two Americans, a journalist (*Mark Goldberg*) and a political author (*Thomas L. Friedman*). The absence of Arabic-speaking journalists from ALJAR might be due to the familiarity of their names in the reference corpus (for more details about the reference corpus used in this research, see Chapter Three, Section 3.2).

The second group of key participants, constructed with eliteness in both ALJAR and ALJEN, is composed of political names. In ALJEN, the key political participants can be classified as follows:

1. Pre-Arab Spring countries’ presidents (Saleh- Al-Bashir- Al-Assad- Mubarak- Bashar- Ghaddafi- Hosni- Abdine and Maliki)
2. Post-Arab Spring politicians and political parties (Ennahda- Belaid- Marzouki- Ahmar- Hadi- Brahimi- Islah- Ikhwan- Morsi - Mutalk- Nafi)
3. Gulf monarchy names (Salman, Khalifa bin Salman, Khalifa, monarchy- Emir- al-Khalifa- royalist- Saudi-led - Shaikh)
4. Non-Arab Spring politicians (Rajab- Khamenei, and Nasrallah)

On the other hand, in ALJAR, the key political participants constructed with eliteness can only be categorised as non-Arab Spring politicians (*Trump, Chavis, and Kerry*) and post-Arab Spring politicians (*Balied, Essesi, Jebali, Essebsi, Ghannouchi, Marzouki, Mourou, Morsi, and Haftar*). This might be due to the familiarity of the pre-Arab Spring presidents’ names with the reference corpora. It is worth noting that most of the key participants (7 out of 10) in the Arab

Spring constructed with eliteness in ALJAR were based in Tunisia (post-Arab Spring politicians). In contrast, ALJEN includes both overthrown and post-Arab Spring political individuals and entities. The other observation that can be made from Table 4.7 for ALJAR is the name of the Muslim Brotherhood movement's political leaders (*Mursi* from Egypt and *Jebali*, *Ghannouchi*, and *Mourou* in Tunisia).

In ALJEN, the parties in Arab Spring countries that are part of such movements are more common, namely, *Ennahda* (in Tunisia), *Islah* (in Bahrain, Yemen, and Kuwait), *Umma* (in Sudan), and *Ikhwan* (the Arabic name of the Muslim Brotherhood). The inclusion of these socio-political leaders and groups might reflect their key presence as *participants* in the news about Arab Spring events in ALJEN. To examine how the Muslim Brotherhood was represented as a newsworthy participant in the events of the Arab Spring in ALJEN, a corpus-informed investigation was conducted, which is presented in the following section.

#### 4.4.1.1 Muslim Brotherhood (or Ikhwan as transcribed directly from Arabic) as news participant in ALJEN and ALJAR

Ikhwan (the Muslim Brotherhood) is a transnational religiopolitical organisation that was founded in 1928 and was elected as a caretaker government after the 2011 Arab Spring protests in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. To determine more about the overlapped constructed news values of such *participants*' representations, the concordance lines of 'Muslim Brotherhood' in ALJEN and ALJAR were examined. The words *Ikhwan* and *Brotherhood* co-occur in ALJEN 6 and 24 times respectively, compared to only 21 co-occurrences of الإخوان [*Ikhwān* / Brotherhood] in ALJAR. As stated in Chapter Three, the English equivalents of the Arab Spring participants' names vary between a translation of the meaning of names (such as the English translation *Muslim Brotherhood* as equivalent to الإخوان) or a direct transcription of them as pronounced originally in Arabic (so *Ikhwan* for الإخوان). Although the Muslim Brotherhood movement has different names for its affiliates in the nations, it operates in as a socio-political party such as *Ikhwan* in Egypt and *Ennahda* in Tunisia, in this section, only the term الإخوان [*al-Ikhwan* / Brotherhood] is searched further in ALJAR. This decision was made to ensure a balanced comparison between ALJAR and ALJEN in their representation of the Arab Spring participants.

Looking at the six concordance lines in ALJEN (see Figure 4.3), it appears that *Ikhwan* is constructed with negativity because it co-occurs with evaluative words, such as *gambling/gamblers* and *non-licenced*. However, by referring to the extended text of such *Ikhwan* concordance lines, it appears that they co-occurred in solo news text. Thus, it may be difficult to generalise the evaluative meaning of *Ikhwan* as an untrustworthy and incompetent group in ALJEN beyond that text.

Looking at the 26 concordance lines of *Brotherhood*, they are constructed with impact when represented as a *large* political group in Arab Spring countries such as Jordan and Egypt, as shown in the following lines:

4.6 *The Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan's largest opposition group, has renewed calls for King*

4.7 *The Muslim Brotherhood, the country's largest opposition group*

	Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
1		doc#0 ↗ the revolution a single candidate. </s></s>	I have excluded an <b>ikhwan</b>	candidate from this for one reason: that was the gamble and the
2		doc#0 m the outset to extinguish the revolutionary flame. </s></s>	The <b>ikhwan</b>	and the main political stakeholders, understandably, sought sec
3		doc#0 rte to rescue whatever is left of Egypt's revolution. </s></s>	The <b>ikhwan</b>	gambled first when they decided to run for the presidency; and
4		doc#0 having control of constitution-framing. </s></s>	Downsizing the <b>ikhwan</b>	The Muslim Brotherhood, despite a history of struggle and gooc
5		doc#0 at is today playing into the hands of the old guard. </s></s>	The <b>ikhwan</b>	, in particular being a non-licensed organisation, may be targete
6		doc#0 tatus, but also fighting back for lost privileges. </s></s>	Like the <b>ikhwan</b>	, SCAF has gambled - and gamblers lose some of the time. </s>

Figure 4.3 The concordances of *Ikhwan* in ALJEN

4.8 ***Muslim Brotherhood***, Jordan's most powerful opposition group

4.9 ***Muslim Brotherhood***, the group that propelled President Mohamed Morsi into power

In addition, impact is constructed by directly quoting voices from members of such socio-political groups along with their positions:

4.10 *Hammam Said, leader of the **Muslim Brotherhood**, told the demonstrators*

4.11 *The **Brotherhood** has said it will boycott the election in protest*

Also, *Brotherhood* is constructed with impact because it co-occurred as a target of the coup, military forces, and an external conspirator in Egypt:

4.12 *They seem to have flattened the **Muslim Brotherhood** with a fatal blow*

4.13 *Many a "conspirator" against the **Muslim Brotherhood***

4.14 *Downsizing the *Ikhwan*, the **Muslim Brotherhood**, despite a history of struggle and good intentions to serve people*

4.15 *The **Muslim Brotherhood** whose members were often victimised by the state*

4.16 *Military attack on the city that aimed to quash the **Muslim Brotherhood**.*

As in ALJEN, the 21 co-occurrences of *the Brotherhood* in ALJAR (see Table 4.8 below) are co-constructed with impact as a socio-political group in Arab Spring societies who came to power through democratic elections and were targeted with violence by another social actor (military coup).

1. نظمت جماعة الإخوان المسلمين في الاردن وكيانات عشائرية مختلفة مظاهرة حاشدة اليوم الجمعة لمطالبة الملك عبد الله الثاني بوقف الاعتقالات السياسية وإطلاق سراح المعتقلين السياسيين

Translation: *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and various tribal entities organised a mass demonstration today, on Friday, demanding King Abdullah II stop political arrests and release political detainees.*

2. ضاع المشروع كله بعد ان ظن محمد مرسي انه يستطيع القيام ب مهمة بناء البديل لوحده، فكان الإخوان المسلمون اول الضحايا

Translation: *The whole project was lost after Mohamed Morsi thought that he could undertake the task of building the alternative alone. **The Muslim Brotherhood** was the first victim.*

3. ففي مصر كان الجيش الرفض ل التوريث والذي استثمر هبة الشارع المصري في ثورة يناير 2011 بعد اكتسابها زخما ب دخول الإخوان، وعاد العسكر ل تصدر المشهد بعد " مصيدة كبيرة " نصبوها ل الثورة ورموزها، واحتكروا القرار.

Translation: *The Egyptian revolution of January 2011 gained momentum with the entry of the **Brotherhood** and the military returned to the forefront of the scene after a "big trap" they set for the revolution and its symbols and monopolised the decision.*

4. كما اشار الكاتب الى رضا الرئيس الاميركي باراك اوباما والى محبته الحذرة لاستمرار الثورات العربية، مضيفا ان المفاجأة تكمن في ان لدى الإخوان المسلمين ب مصر علاقات مع اسرائيل وانها تعتبر أفضل من تلك التي تقيمها انقرة مع تل ابيب.

Translation: *The writer also referred to the US President Barack Obama's satisfaction and his cautious love for the continuation of the Arab revolutions, adding that the surprise is the fact that the **Muslim Brotherhood** in Egypt has relations with Israel, and they are considered better than the relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv.*

5. اشارت الكاتبة الى الدور المنظم الذي يلعبه الاخوان المسلمون في مصر، و الى امكانية تنظيمهم للمظاهرات و استقطابهم للجماهير، و الى تمكن النوادي الرياضية كذلك من استقطاب الجماهير في الشارع، و قالت انه لا يوجد نخب بديلة اخرى في البلاد.

Translation: *The writer referred to the organised role played by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the ability to organise demonstrations and attract the masses. The writer added that the **Muslim Brotherhood** has the ability to organise sports clubs that attract the people in the street and said that there are no other alternative elites in the country.*

6. يضيف ان أفضل امل الان يكمن في حل شبيه ب ذلك الذي طبق في مصر ويتمثل في قيام حكومة ب قيادة الاخوان المسلمين

Translation: *Maghrawi adds that the best hope in Syria now lies in a solution similar to the one that was implemented in Egypt, which is the establishment of a government led by the **Muslim Brotherhood**.*

Table 4.8 Translated extended concordance lines of الاخوان al-Ikhwān (Brotherhood) in ALJAR

As can be seen in Table 4.8 above, in the first three extended lines, the representations of *الأخوان* al-Ikhwān (the Brotherhood) are constructed with impact and positivity. *Brotherhood* is represented as a movement group that leads protests for justice and political freedom and their presence in the revolution was *زخم* *zākhīm* (momentum). Furthermore, in line 4 of Table 4.8 above, *Brotherhood* is constructed with both positivity (considered better than the relationship between Ankara and Tel Aviv) and unexpectedness (surprise). In addition, counter-consonance can be considered here as a constructed value because the Muslim Brotherhood is represented as inclusive and non-conservative in its political relations, such as its relationship with Israel. In other words, because the Muslim Brotherhood is perceived as a conservative political movement in the Arab world, the representation of its inclusive political policy with Israel was unexpected. Thus, based on the representations from the lines extracted and translated above, the Brotherhood as a political party is constructed in ALJAR with positivity as an example of a post-Arab Spring moderate elected government. It should be noted that such representations and evaluative language are reported by both Arabic and non-Arabic resources, where both proximity and positivity are co-constructed to include regional and international voices regarding the role of the *Muslim Brotherhood* in Arab Spring protests. In Chapter Eight, this finding is discussed and interpreted in detail with reference to the relevant literature regarding the framing and representation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Al-Jazeera.

#### 4.4.2 Key participants constructed with personalisation and proximity in ALJAR and ALJEN

As can be seen in Table 4.8 above, in ALJEN more than ALJAR, key Arab Spring participants are constructed with both personalisation and proximity (*Tunisian, Bahraini, Yemini, Syrian, Lebanese, Libyan, Palestinian, Egyptian, and Kurd*). This co-construction of personalisation and proximity values might reflect the way in which ALJEN represents the participants in the Arab Spring events by referring to their geographical proximities. However, the absence of constructing participants with proximity in ALJAR (except *التونسيين (The Tunisian), البربر (Berbers), البحرينيين (Bahrainis)*) might be related to 1) another finding; ALJAR frequently represents Arab Spring events as a cross-border movement that spread across the Arab world, rather than referring to them relative to a specific nation; or 2) their high frequency in the reference corpus. It is worth noting that no concordance lines are analysed further in this subsection (4.3.2) because there are very few key participants shared between ALJAR and ALJEN constructed with personalisation and proximity, namely only *Tunisian*.

#### 4.4.3 Key participants constructed with consonance in ALJEN and ALJAR

As can be seen from Table 4.8 above, ALJAR has only two key participants constructed with consonance, namely *السلفيين (the Salafist)* and *اليساريين (the leftists)*. In representing *السلفيين (the Salafist)*, in nine out of 11 concordance lines, such participants are constructed with impact and negativity (*violent/violence, unrest, mistrust, sowing the seeds of mistrust among secularist and moderate Islamists, suspected of assassinating, attacking embassies and consulates, burning and demolishing shrines, biggest damage, advocate violence or jihadists, radicalisms*). In addition, there is an underling pattern of representing such groups (the Salafist) as part of the politics and society in Tunisia, who are divided in terms of their tolerance of violence into three groups (see line 4.22): 1) the Salafist official political party (which was recently established); 2) the non-violent safelists; and 3) violence-advocates or Jihadists. The latter is represented with negativity as a small group in a small group (line 4.19) that was not anticipated to cause violence or disturb democracy in Tunisia. Finally, the action taken by the elected government in Tunisia (Ennahda) regarding the Salafists, which entailed opening dialogue with them, is constructed with positivity in accordance with other ALJAR findings of constructing Ennahda (the post-Arab Spring government in Tunisia who are recognised as the Brotherhood's affiliate in Tunisia). However, such action is represented as being faced negatively (perceived as appeasement) by political opponents in Tunisia (who are described as Leftists and Secularists):

4.17 مجموعة قليلة العدد ف ان هم يتسببون في اضطرابات ويزرعون انه رغم ان السلفيين  
بذور عدم الثقة وسط العلمانيين والاسلاميين المعتدلين على حد سواء

Translation: *Although Salafists are a small group, they cause unrest and sowing the seeds of mistrust among secularists and moderate Islamists.*

ان السلفيين ضمن المشتبه ب هم في اغتيال شكري بلعيد في تونس، والهجوم على 4.18 السفارات والقنصليات في تونس وليبيا ومصر، وحرق وهدم المزارات

Translation: *Salafists are among those suspected of assassinating Shukri Belaid in Tunisia; attacking embassies and consulates in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt; and burning and demolishing shrines.*

ونقلت الصحيفة عن منصف المرزوقي رئيس تونس قوله في محاضرة بلندن العام 4.19 الماضي ان هم لم يتخيلوا ان خطورة السلفيين وعنف هم س يصلان الى هذا الحد، " هم اقلية صغيرة داخل اقلية صغيرة

Translation: *Moncef Marzouki, president of Tunisia, was quoted as saying in a lecture in London last year that they did not imagine that the danger posed by Salafists and violence would reach this point; they are a small minority within a small minority.*

حركة النهضة التونسية المشاركة في الحكم اصبحت تواجه تحديا كبيرا جراء 4.20 عنف السلفيين

Translation: *Tunisia's Ennahda movement in power faces major challenges because of Salafist's violence.*

وان تونس تعرضت لأكبر امازتها منذ ثورة 2011 " ب سبب عنف السلفيين وقتل 4.21 شكري بلعيد

Translation: *Tunisia has suffered the greatest damage since the 2011 revolution due to the violence of Salafists and the killing of Shukri Belaid.*

وقالت ان السلفيين ينقسمون الى ثلاث فرق واسعة في تونس على سبيل المثال: الحركات 4.22 السياسية الصغيرة الجديدة التي تشكلت خلال الاشهر الماضية، والسلفيون الذين يرفضون العنف، والسلفيون الذين يتبنون العنف او الجهاديون

Translation: *The newspaper said that Salafists are divided into three large groups in Tunisia: the new small political movements formed over the past months, Salafists who reject violence, and Salafists who advocate violence or jihadists.*

ذكرت ان حركة النهضة التونسية المشاركة في الحكم اصبحت تواجه تحديا كبيرا جراء 4.23 عنف السلفيين، وهذا يحتاج من ها الى توازن دقيق

Translation: *The Tunisian Ennahda movement participating in the government is facing a significant challenge due to the Salafist's violence, which needs a delicate balance.*

ف الضغط الشديد سيساهم في تطرف الدائرة الاوسع من السلفيين كما حدث خلال فترة 4.24 الرئيس المخلوع زين العابدين بن علي

Translation: *The intense pressure will contribute to the radicalisation of the wider circle of **Salafists**, as happened during the period of ousted President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.*

4.25 وأثرت حركة النهضة الحوار مع السلفيين الذين يرفضون العنف. وقد ادت هذه السياسة الى صدور اتهامات من المعارضين اليساريين والعلمانيين ضد الحركة ب انها تنتهج اسلوبا مهادنا، او تسمح سرا بممارسة العنف ضد الخصوم السياسيين مثل شكري بلعيد

Translation: *Ennahda has opted for dialogue with **Salafists**, who reject violence. This policy has led to accusations by left-wing and secular opponents of Ennahda, claiming that such a step is considered as pursuing a threatening approach or secretly allowing violence against political opponents, such as the Shukri Belaid.*

Similar to *the Salafist*, the other key participant in ALJAR, *the Leftist* is represented with eliteness and negativity. Lines 4.26 and 4.27 represent the Leftist as part of the intellectuals in the Arab world (including *secularists, Islamists, and nationalists*) who could not achieve what people on the ground realised through their actions (line 4.26) and as an obstacle to inclusive politics in Tunisia. In addition, in representing the revolutionary actions of the people versus the intellectuals (including the *left-wing intellectuals*), in line 4.26, ALJAR constructs such actions (*of people*) with personalisation, positivity, impact and superlativeness (*unarmed and disadvantaged youths who managed to overthrow a repressive regime in a record time, revolted with bare breasts, empty pockets, and hearts full of heroic generosity and love for life and unlimited pleasure*):

4.26 في تأكيد تضحيات شباب اعزل ومحروم تمكن من الاطاحة ب نظام قمعي في زمن قياسي لم يتوقعه الكثير من المثقفين اليساريين والعلمانيين والاسلاميين والقوميين، الذين انهزموا بينما ثار البسطاء ب الصدور العارية و الجيوب الفارغة و القلوب المليئة ب السخاء البطولي و النابضة بالحب ل الحياة و المتعة غير المحدودة

Translation: *In confirming the sacrifices of the unarmed and disadvantaged youths who managed to overthrow a repressive regime in record time, many **left-wing intellectuals, secularists, Islamists, and nationalists** were defeated, while the simple ones revolted with bare breasts, empty pockets, and hearts full of heroic generosity, love for life, and unlimited pleasure.*

4.27 الذين يرفضون العنف. وقد ادت هذه السياسة أثرت حركة النهضة الحوار مع السلفيين والعلمانيين ضد الحركة ب انها تنتهج اسلوبا مهادنا، او الى صدور اتهامات من المعارضين اليساريين تسمح سرا بممارسة العنف ضد الخصوم السياسيين مثل شكري بلعيد

Translation: *Ennahda opted for a dialogue with **Salafists** who rejected violence. This policy has led to accusations by **left-wing and secular opponents** against Ennahda, claiming that such a step is considered as pursuing a threatening approach or secretly allowing violence against political opponents, such as Shukri Belaid.*



Such representations of people versus those who were in power before the Arab Spring revolution, including politicians and intellectuals from different ideological perspectives, are in accordance with other findings in ALJAR of constructing people with positivity and impact and legitimating their revolutionary actions and demands during the events of the Arab Spring. In Chapter Eight, such patterns and constructing personalisation with positivity versus eliteness with negativity in ALJAR with their implications are discussed, with reference to relevant literature on Al-Jazeera representations of the Arab Spring.

On the other hand, as seen in Table 4.7 above, in ALJEN, the participants constructed with a consonance are those constructed by their religious dominations (both protesters (*Shia, Sunni, Druze, Alawites*) and governments (*Shia-led, Sunni-ruled*)). Such a denomination of people and government found in ALJEN might be considered a consonance construction because it is in accordance with the mainstream media's representations of such sects in the Arab world (Abdo 2017). In Sections 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2, the underlying linguistic patterns and constructed newsworthiness of *Shia* and *Sunni* are addressed.

#### 4.4.3.1 *Shia* as a key participant in ALJEN

To scrutinise the Arab Spring's participants described as *Shia* in ALJEN, the nouns modified by 'Shia' (see Figure 4.4) were retrieved from Word Sketch window tool<sup>23</sup> (See Appendix 8) and analysed by looking closely at their concordance lines (61 out of 87 co-occurrences of *Shia* are used as modifiers of nouns). Interestingly, *Shia* as a modifier is primarily used in Arab Spring events in Bahrain (found in 53 out of 61 concordance lines), and the remaining concordance lines are based in the Lebanon (five concordance lines) and Yemini contexts (one concordance line).

By closely reading the concordance lines of the nouns modified by *Shia*, there is a pattern of constructing *Shia* in the Bahraini context with proximity (*Shia villages, Shia area, and Shia neighbourhood*). In addition, the collocates *Shia+majority* and *Shia+groups* and *shia+faction* are repeatedly used to refer to the demographic categorisation of people in Bahrain. Such collocates might help answer this chapter's question regarding how the Arab Spring participants' news values are constructed (here in Bahrain). The frequent co-construction of the Bahraini protesters with both proximity (*village, areas*) and consonance (the denomination of protesters as *Shia, Shia Muslims*) might be interpreted as representing the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain as a sectarian movement rather than a human rights movement. This misrepresentation of the Bahraini Arab Spring movement in ALJEN is further discussed in Chapter Eight (section 8.2.6).

In terms of the other patterns of the constructed news values found in the concordance lines of *Shia* in the Bahraini context, besides consonance (the use of the word *Shia* as a modifier of protesters and movement), personalisation (sub-type: socio-cultural categorisation) is constructed by representing the demands of those protesters (see the underlined words in Table 4.9 below). However, as can be seen in Table 4.9, such protesters' demands are preceded by expressions such as *what they call; they claim that they have not provided economic opportunities*. Such formulaic expressions, namely, *they called* and *they claim*, might be

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<sup>23</sup> The Word Sketch window is used here due to the relatively high frequency of the word 'Shia' in ALJEN, where it co-occurs in 87 concordance lines.

perceived with a meaning of uncertainty or doubtfulness and that consequently constructs negativity.

1. <i><b>Shia Bahrainis</b> march against 'repression.'</i>
2. <i>Thousands of <b>Shia</b> in Bahrain took to the streets south of the capital Manama to protest against what they called repression of the opposition.</i>
3. <i>They marched in the <b>Shia area</b> of Bilad al-Qadim on Friday, waving the flag of the Gulf state and chanting slogans calling for jailed members of the opposition to be released.</i>
4. <i><b>Shia factions</b> who began an Arab Spring-inspired uprising in early 2011 to seek greater political rights.</i>
5. <i>Under the banner "Democracy is our right," the crowds marched in the <b>Shia area</b> of Aali south of the capital, waving Bahraini flags and chanting anti-monarchy slogans on Friday.</i>
6. <i>Protesters, mostly from the Sunni-ruled kingdom's disenfranchised <b>Shia majority</b>, have clamoured for a true constitutional monarchy, better access to jobs and an end to sectarian discrimination.</i>
7. <i>Nightly clashes. <b>Shia Muslims</b> make up the majority of Bahrain's population but they have long been ruled by a Sunni dynasty which they claim has not provided economic opportunities.</i>
8. <i>But the main demands of the Bahraini opposition revolved around equality and a restoration of parliamentary life - although a pro-Iranian <b>Shia group</b> did call for Tehran's rule to be extended to the tiny country.</i>

Table 4.9 The concordance lines of Shia constructed with consonance and personalisation in ALJEN

Furthermore, *Shia* protesters in Bahrain are constructed with negativity when represented as a party to a regional Shia/Sunni political dispute by supporting and being supported by Iran against their Bahraini *Sunni-led* government supported by *Sunni* governments (such as in Saudi Arabia) and their allies such as the US (see Table 4.9 above).

Thus, it can be seen from *Shia*'s concordance lines in Table 4.10 below that beside proximity, negativity represents the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain from being a movement of people calling for their social and political rights within their country into a conspiracy motivated by political ideologies and external agendas.

1. <i>Saudi and other Gulf troops were deployed in Bahrain to help the Western-backed Sunni monarchy quell a wave of anti-government protests demanding a greater role for the country's <b>Shia majority</b>.</i>
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<p>2. <i>Bahrain, where the US Navy's Fifth Fleet is based, was rocked by month-long pro-democracy protests led by the kingdom's <b>Shia majority</b> in early 2011 that were crushed with the help of Saudi-led GCC troops.</i></p>
<p>3. <i>But in a wider context, the silence, or at least the lack of adequate solidarity with Bahraini revolutionaries, is indicative "of fear" of the Iranian and <b>Shia influence</b> on the predominantly Sunni Arab world.</i></p>
<p>4. <i>Mass demonstrations in Bahrain, headquarters of the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, has been in turmoil since mass demonstrations started at the height of Arab Spring unrest last year, led by its <b>Shia Muslim majority</b>.</i></p>
<p>5. <i>Bahrain and Saudi Arabia accuse Iran of fomenting the unrest in the island kingdom and among Saudi Arabia's <b>Shia Muslim minority</b>, most of whom live in a province situated next to Bahrain.</i></p>
<p>6. <i>Critics say neither Bahrain nor Washington has done enough to foster democratic reforms in the Gulf nation. Street battles between security forces and protesters still flare up almost every day in the predominantly <b>Shia villages</b> around the capital.</i></p>
<p>7. <i>The Gulf states made sure to portray the protests as a sectarian <b>Shia plot</b> in order to obscure the Bahraini movement's political message of justice and equality.</i></p>
<p>8. <i>That is not to say that there are no pro-Iranian <b>Shia voices</b> in Bahrain that contributed to protests.</i></p>
<p>9. <i>Al-Manar television, run by the Lebanese <b>Shia Hezbollah movement</b>, as well as some Iraqi (Shia) stations - were the only channels that gave considerable coverage to the protests in Bahrain.</i></p>
<p>10. <i>Iran, a leading <b>Shia country</b>, has repeatedly denounced the Bahraini government's crackdown on the Shia - while Saudi Arabia has remained Bahrain's closest ally.</i></p>
<p>11. <i>The Arab Spring exposes Nasrallah's hypocrisy. The <b>Shia leader</b> is happy to support protesters in Bahrain and Egypt but he won't criticise Syria's violent crackdown.</i></p>

*Table 4.10 The concordance lines of Shia in ALJEN that construct proximity and negativity*

Besides representing the movement in Bahrain as a sectarian movement fuelled by external political and ideological actors such as Iran, negativity is constructed in the concordance lines of Shia in ALJEN by representing the Shia protestors in Bahrain as violent (see the concordance lines in Table 4.11 below). In addition, the Shia activists and movement (Al-Wefaq) in Bahrain are constructed with negativity as disturbing the path of dialogue and reconciliation talks introduced by the government.

1. <i>Five police officers were wounded when an explosive device went off during clashes with opposition protesters in the <b>Shia village</b> of Dair, north of Manama.</i>
2. <i>Starting early in the morning, the mostly young demonstrators blocked roads leading into scores of <b>Shia villages</b> to prevent security forces from entering.</i>
3. <i>Al Wefaq and the other main <b>Shia factions</b> opened talks with government officials and Sunni envoys last week but some hard-line Shia groups oppose dialogue.</i>
4. <i>Bahraini security forces have clashed with protesters opposed to Bahrain's controversial Grand Prix in mainly <b>Shia villages</b>, despite increasing security for the start of practice sessions.</i>
5. <i>The decision by the <b>Shia groups</b> closes one of the main channels for dialogue.</i>
6. <i>Bahrain's <b>Shia groups</b> quit reconciliation talks. Participation suspended after the arrest of senior member of the opposition bloc for allegedly instigating violence.</i>
7. <i>Repeated rounds of political talks have failed to significantly close the rifts between the Sunni establishment and <b>Shia factions</b> who began an Arab Spring-inspired uprising in early 2011 to seek greater political rights.</i>

*Table 4.11 The concordance lines of Shia in ALJEN that construct personalisation and negativity*

However, it is important to highlight that within ALJEN, there are three instances of concordance lines featuring the term "Shia". In these instances, representations of protesters in Bahrain are depicted using personalisation and positivity, emphasising that their protests are not driven by ideological motives. Additionally, the concordance lines address the issue of sectarianism in the media's portrayal of Arab Spring in Bahrain. They highlighted the human impact of these events on the lives of individuals in Bahrain and beyond, suggesting that the media misrepresented the situation.

*4.28 The organisers of the earlier protests were originally young people who did not necessarily belong to predominantly **Shia** opposition parties.*

*4.29 Thus, it became easier for distorted presentations of Bahrain's movement to influence segments of the public who feared what was presented as **Shia Sectarianism**.*

*4.30 The misrepresentation of events in Bahrain further deepened the Sunni-Shia divide, because Shias in Lebanon and Iraq, for example, have become bitter over the lack of coverage of what they view as **Shia grievances** in Bahrain.*

Finally, the actions of the government and the Bahraini police against the Shia protesters were constructed with negativity and impact as extensively aggressive and violent, as shown in the concordance lines presented in Table 4.12 below.

<p>1. <i>Police fired stun grenades at the demonstrators during the clashes in the mainly <b>Shia neighbourhoods</b> surrounding the capital, Manama.</i></p>
<p>2. <i>'Systematic policy.' The main <b>Shia</b> opposition <b>group</b>, Al Wefaq, said 35 protesters were wounded in the clashes, including three critically, in what it called a "systematic policy carried out under high, official orders to use violence against peaceful pro-democracy protesters."</i></p>
<p>3. <i>The government was also under fire for destroying <b>Shia mosques</b>, intimidating schoolgirls, torturing medical workers and the mass sackings of predominantly Shia workers.</i></p>
<p>4. <i>Riot police were seen chasing protesters away from entrances to the key highway and back into the largely <b>Shia-Muslim communities</b> that line the road.</i></p>
<p>5. <i>According to the government-sponsored Independent Commission of Inquiry, which on Wednesday released its report into the Spring crackdown on a mostly <b>Shia uprising</b>, Bahraini security forces used "excessive force" and tortured detainees.</i></p>
<p>6. <i>The election will fill 18 parliamentary seats made vacant when the country's main <b>Shia</b> opposition <b>party</b> stepped down six months ago in protest at an earlier violent government crackdown on demonstrations.</i></p>

*Table 4.12 Concordance lines of Shia that construct the Bahraini government and police with negativity and impact*

In Section 4.3.3.2, the other denomination word representation and constructed newsworthiness found in ALJEN's keyword list, namely *Sunni*, are analysed.

#### 4.4.3.2 *Sunnis* as key participants in ALJEN

As shown above (see Table 4.6, Section 4.3), *Sunnis* is one of the keywords found in ALJEN that constructs consonance. *Sunni* is found in 21 concordance lines in ALJEN, and the Arab Spring’s context for most of the news events of the concordance lines is Iraq. Looking at the concordance lines, there are three main patterns of *sunnis* representations. The first pattern is the representation of the Sunnis in Iraq as receivers of the Shia-led government’s sectarian actions.

In such representations, Iraq’s Shia-led government is co-constructed with negativity and impact (*targeted by the Shia-led government, the imprisonment of Sunnis, marginalisation and discrimination against Sunnis, side-lining of Sunnis, refusing to share power and depriving the religious minority of equal rights, and denouncing the allegedly sectarian policies of PM Nouri al-Maliki*) (see Table 4.13 below). In addition, as seen in concordance lines 8 and 9 in Table 4.13, the political laws (terrorism laws) introduced by the Shia-led government in Iraq are represented as an action against the Sunnis.

1. <i>Protesting against the imprisonment of <b>Sunnis</b>.</i>
2. <i>The <b>Sunnis</b> have been targeted by the Shia-led government.</i>
3. <i>They also want an end to what they say is marginalisation and discrimination against <b>Sunnis</b>.</i>
4. <i>Around 3,000 demonstrators took to the streets to denounce what they called the side-lining of <b>Sunnis</b>.</i>
5. <i>Many <b>Sunnis</b> accuse Maliki of refusing to share power and depriving the religious minority of equal rights.</i>
6. <i>Iraqi <b>Sunnis</b> block trade routes in a new protest. Tens of thousands of protesters gather in Anbar province to denounce the allegedly sectarian policies of PM Nouri al-Maliki.</i>
7. <i>Sectarian tension. The case is exacerbating tensions with Iraq's <b>Sunnis</b> who see the detentions as politically motivated.</i>
8. <i>They held banners demanding that <b>Sunnis</b>’ rights be respected and calling for the release of Sunni prisoners in Iraqi jails.</i>
9. <i>Activists want changes to laws on terrorism that they say penalise <b>Sunnis</b>.</i>

10. *Demands so far focus on the anti-terrorism laws which **Sunnis** say are being used against them.*

*Table 4.13 Concordance lines of Sunnis in ALJEN as receivers of sectarian actions by the Shia-led government*

The other pattern found in Sunnis' concordance lines in ALJEN is the representation of Iraq as an external factor in the Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq and beyond. In such representations, in addition to consonance (Shia and Sunni conflict), proximity (Iraq, Bahrain) is co-constructed:

*4.31 thousands of Iraqi **Sunnis** have taken to the streets and blocked a main highway over the past week in protest against Shia Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki whom they accuse of discriminating against them and being under the sway of non-Arab neighbour Iran.*

*4.32 Sunnis' rights beyond Iraq, namely in Bahrain: It also mentioned instances of aggression against the **Sunnis** of Bahrain as well as foreign workers.*

To summarise the analysis of *Sunnis* and *Shia* as keywords constructed with consonance, they are represented differently and co-constructed with variable news values. Starting with the dominant context, *the Shia* and *Sunni* concordance lines are primarily found in the Bahraini and Iraqi Arab Spring contexts, respectively. In addition, from a newsworthiness perspective, *Shia* protesters and activists in Bahrain are represented with negativity and impact as being violent and disturbing the path of dialogue. On the other hand, in representing the Sunnis in Iraq, the Shia-led government is the participant who is constructed with negativity and impact (secretaries and targeting Sunnis both politically and socially). Further discussion regarding such findings and other similar results concerning the representations of Shia and Sunni in ALJEN are presented in Chapter Eight (section 8.2.6) with reference to the literature.

## 4.5 Summary

### 4.5.1 Of methods

This chapter aimed to examine how news participants involved in the Arab Spring events are portrayed and whether the constructed newsworthiness of these participants' representations differs between ALJEN and ALJAR. The comparative analysis provides insights into how the language used in news reporting influences the representations of news participants and their perceived newsworthiness in the context of the Arab Spring. The main corpus linguistic methods utilised were frequency and keyword lists to identify Arab Spring news participants. Extended newsworthiness analysis of the shared frequent participants in both corpora was conducted by examining their collocates and (extended) concordance lines, particularly in ALJAR, due to the limitations of linguistic information in the Arabic Word Sketch compared to English.

### 4.5.2 Of findings

The analysis reveals general patterns in both corpora. ALJEN and ALJAR construct Arabs as frequent Arab Spring participants with positivity as part of a diverse community. However, they differ in constructing consonance. While ALJAR represents consonance by comparing events, ALJEN portrays Arabs as a united, integrated community with shared history and future - a counter-consonance to dominated Western media representations of Arabs.

Similarly, in both corpora, governments are constructed with negativity, impact and consonance, indexing the Western historical colonialism of the Arab world.

Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood was a key participant in both corpora, constructed with both impact and positivity.

One interesting finding was the consonance and negativity construction of the Arab Spring events in Bahrain as a sectarian movement in ALJEN. Also, the analysis reveals ALJAR's ideologies, such as Arabism and interdiscursive practices, frequently indexing Palestine and Western political/historical colonisation. Finally, the findings contribute to DNVA by considering further subcategorisation of some news values, namely personalisation and consonance in the Arabic and English news discourse of Al-Jazeera. These key findings, including the construction of news values, ideological perspectives, and contributions to DNVA, will be revisited and further elaborated in Chapter Eight, where they will be integrated with the broader analysis and implications of the study.



## **Chapter Five: The Representations and the Discursive Constructed Newsworthiness of Arab Spring's News Participants in BBCEN and BBCAR**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter investigates BBCEN's and BBCAR's representations of Arab Spring participants. More specifically, this chapter aims to reveal the construction of news values by news participants. As discussed in Chapter Three, to examine the news participants' representations and the constructed newsworthiness in the collected corpora, frequency and keyness lists were generated and categorised based on their news value category. The concordance lines of the shared frequent and/or key participants between BBCEN and BBCAR are then discussed to reveal the linguistic patterns and overlapping discursive news value constructions in the Arabic and English versions. Thus, this chapter seeks to answer the BBC part of the first and third research questions:

1. How does BBC construct news values in the representations of Arab Spring participants across its Arabic and English outlets?
2. What patterned meanings are formed through the construction of news values in BBC's Arab Spring news coverage in Arabic and English?

By examining these questions, this chapter aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of how BBC, as a major international news organisation, constructs news values and adopts patterned meanings across its Arabic and English language services in the context of Arab Spring's reporting.

It is worth repeating that, like ALJAR, ALJEN, BBCEN, and BBCAR, the corpora consist of collections of web-based news texts that originally belonged to the same news institution, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), but deliver news cross-lingually: namely, in English on BBCEN and in Arabic on BBCAR. Thus, in the current study, a comparison was made between the same news institution resources across languages to establish the similarities and differences between linguistic representations and discursive newsworthiness based on the language of the news. This study contributes significantly to the field of research by comparing the news values of multilingual news discourses on international events, specifically focusing on the Arab Spring. By analysing how news values are constructed and manifested in both Arabic and English language coverage by major international news organisations like BBC, this research provides unique insights into the complexities of cross-linguistic news reporting. It sheds light on how cultural, linguistic, and institutional factors influence the representations and newsworthiness construction of global events across different language platforms within the same news organisation.

In this chapter, the list of frequent participants in both the BBCEN and BBCAR corpora was selected from the raw frequency lists generated by Sketch Engine. The selected participants were classified based on their newsworthiness. Because constructing a specific news value is not always recognised from a single word (Bednarek and Caple, 2017), close reading of the

concordances of those participants and occasionally sections of the original texts was frequently undertaken. In other words, if the categorisation of frequent or key participants is not directly recognised by looking at it with the ‘naked eye’ or a word can be categorised under more than one news value category, the (extended) concordance lines of the shared participants were examined to ensure the actual classification based on the ‘co-text’ meaning (the language immediately surrounding the frequent and/or key news participants). After displaying and discussing the frequency and keywords based on their constructed news values, the analysis moves on to describe and discuss the shared participants found in the Frequency and Keyword lists.

To display the findings and analysis, this chapter comprises two main parts: frequent participants in Arab Spring News (section 5.2) and key participants in Arab Spring News (section 5.3). In each section, the findings are compared and further investigated across the two corpora (BBCEN and BBCAR).

In the first part (Section 4.2), the findings are presented as follows:

- 1) The selected participants were extracted from the frequency lists of the BBCEN and BBCAR.
- 2) The constructed News Values (Bednarek and Caple, 2017), namely personalisation, eliteness, consonance, negativity, positivity, timeliness, proximity, impact, superlativeness, and unexpectedness, are displayed (for more details about news values, see Chapter Three).
- 3) Comparative analysis of news values (see Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 5.2.3) for three shared participants (government, president, and women) between BBCEN and BBCAR to examine their co-textual meanings in detail by displaying the collocations (via the Word Sketch window tool in Sketch Engine) and the (extended) concordance lines<sup>24</sup>.

In the second part of this chapter (Section 5.3), the findings are as follows.

- 1) Selected participants and from the BBCEN and BBCAR keyword lists.
- 2) Presented News Values’ categorisation of participants
- 3) Further comparative analysis of the news value construction of similar and different key participants between BBCEN and BBCAR to examine their co-textual meaning by examining their concordance lines.

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<sup>24</sup> In this study, (extended) concordances are used in some findings to provide a more comprehensive context for the analysed keywords. While traditional KWIC (Key Word in Context) concordances typically display a limited number of words on either side of the keyword, extended concordances offer a broader view of the surrounding text. This approach is particularly valuable in news discourse analysis, where understanding the full context of a statement or description is essential. Extended concordances facilitate a more nuanced interpretation of how news values are constructed and how participants are represented within the broader narrative structure of news articles. This method aligns with Baker et al.’s (2008) recommendation for a more contextual approach in corpus-assisted discourse studies, enabling a deeper exploration of discursive patterns and meanings beyond individual word occurrences.

## 5.2 Frequent participants in Arab Spring News

As discussed in Chapter Three, single-word frequency lists are chosen for comparison between BBCEN and BBCAR rather than multi-word frequency lists because of the morphological differences between Arabic and English. In Table 5.1 below, the participants found in both the Arabic and English raw frequency lists are displayed and classified according to their newsworthiness. As expected, the majority of the frequent participants in both corpora (BBCEN and BBCAR) construct either eliteness, personalisation, or proximity (see Appendix 10 for the full frequency wordlists). The frequent construction of proximity refers to the nature of the collected data which concerns the events of the Arab Spring, where different settings and participants are expected to repeatedly co-occur. Nevertheless, the fact that participants constructed with news values other than negativity, positivity, and impact are not present does not imply their absence from the included news texts. The construction of these news values is anticipated to be evident in the forthcoming analysis of concordance lines for frequently mentioned participants, including those associated with negativity, positivity, and impact.

News value	BBCEN frequencies	BBCAR Frequencies
<b>Eliteness</b>	Government (185), President (165), Security (122), Forces (102)	(the)President الرئيس/الرئيس (209), (The) newspaper الصحيفة/صحيفة (172), The government الحكومة/الحكومة (137), The regime النظام (94), 78), The dissent المعارضة (77), The United المتحدة (77) including: United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, United States, United Nations <sup>25</sup>
<b>Personalisation</b>	Arab (373), People (228), (Women/Woman) 103	Arab (العربي) (332), Arabic العربية (252), The Woman المرأة (90), The youth الشباب (76)

*Table 5.1 Frequent participants and the news values' pointers in BBCEN and BBCAR (the shared news participants are highlighted)*

In Table 5.1 above, the English translation of frequently occurring Arabic lexical words often includes the definite article “the”, as in *الحكومة* (the government). This reflects

<sup>25</sup> *The United* constructs eliteness here, as it is used as an entity based on its concordance lines (see Appendix 11).

morphological differences between English and Arabic (see Chapter Three for further details). In BBCAR, when the same lexical item is found with the definite article, the (ال *āl*) and without it such as صحيفة and الصحيفة (the newspaper and newspaper), they are counted as one frequent participant.

It is apparent from Table 5.1 above that the BBCAR news participants list includes more variable eliteness than their BBCEN equivalent, including press (الصحيفة *āl*)sahēfa (the newspaper) and overseas eliteness, such as the United Kingdom, United States and United Nations. This difference between BBCEN and BBCAR in terms of frequent news participants might reflect how such participants (namely, newspapers) are typically represented in the news in BBCAR as a source of knowledge where the news is re-reported. By reading the 172 concordance lines of الصحيفة (*āl*)sahēfā (the) newspaper in BBCAR, the newspaper refers to overseas newspapers, mainly British-based newspapers such as *The Guardian*, *The Times*, *The Independent*, *The Sunday Telegraph*, and *The Daily Telegraph*.

These findings of referencing overseas voices in reporting the news of the Arab Spring to an Arab-speaking audience might be considered here as producer-proximity, where the geographical and cultural proximity of the audience is replaced by the geographical and cultural nearness of the news outlet, namely the BBC. This inversion of the proximity value may be found in BBCAR due to the influence of the BBC's main outlet policy of publishing written news texts. Further discussion follows in Chapter Eight on the producer-proximity found in BBCAR with reference to the literature.

Table 5.1 above shows the shared participants between BBCEN and BBCAR: *president* (الرئيس/الرئيسة *āl*)rāīs in BBCAR), *government* (الحكومة *āl*hūkūmāh in BBCAR) and *women/woman* (امرأة/النساء *āl*mārāh/*āl*nīsā in BBCAR). Thus, such participants are investigated in Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, and 5.2.4, by examining their Word Sketch and concordance lines to determine the linguistic and discursive patterns that might reflect the newsworthiness of such participants. For more information about the function of the Word Sketch tool in Sketch Engine (collocations window), why and how it is read and used in this research (see Chapter Three, section 8.2.6).

### 5.2.1 Government as a frequent news participant in BBCEN and BBCAR

As shown in Table 5.1 above, one of the two shared participants associated with eliteness in both BBCEN and BBCAR is the government, referred to in Arabic as الحكومة (*al*-hūkūmāt), with lexical densities of 27.2 and 19.28 per 10,000 words, respectively. In BBCEN, *government's* Word Sketch shows a construction of consonance by frequent referencing of *governments* through those governments' ideological stances: *Islamic-led* (5), *Shia-led* (2), *Sunni-led* (2), *secularist-led* (2), *moderate* (2) and *non-partisan* (2). Furthermore, *the government* is constructed with timeliness because it is referred to by the time status: *new* (8), *current* (3), *caretaker* (3), and *salvation* (2). Furthermore, *the government* is constructed with positivity because it co-occurs with positive evaluative modifiers such as *unity* (2), *effective* (2), *coalition* (5), and *union* (2). Moreover, in terms of proximity, *the government* co-occurred with both collective national identity (*Saudi* (4), *Algerian* (3), *Syrian* (3), and *Tunisian* (2)) and overseas collective identity modifiers (*Western* (3) and *European* (4)).

Similarly, the Word Sketch in the BBCAR shows that *government* is frequently constructed with proximity, as modified by the collective national identity: سوريا *Syrian* (6), ليبيا *Libyan* (5), السودان *Sudanese* (3), تونس *Tunisian* (3) and البحرين *Bahraini* (2) and the overseas

collective identity: *بريطانية* *British* (6) and *أمريكية* *American* (2). Also, timeliness is another constructed value by referring to the time status of government in BBCAR (*الحالية* *alḥālīyah* (current) (3) and *الجديدة* *aljadīdah* (new) (2).

Thus, in terms of the eliteness construction of *government*, BBCAR and BBCEN shared the construction of *government* with proximity (both national and overseas *governments*) and timeliness (referring to the time status of the *government*). However, BBCEN includes one more news value in representing *the government* as a news participant, namely consonance, by referring to *governments'* religious denominations such as *Shia* and *Sunni*. The co-construction of eliteness and consonance of *Government/s* found in BBCEN might refer to how such governments are stereotypically represented in Western media as sectarian governments (such as Islamists, Shia, and Sunni). In Chapter Eight, this finding of the co-construction of eliteness with consonance and similar instances of the sectarian groupings of participants in the Arab Spring events in the BBC, such as governments, are critically discussed in light of the related literature.

To reveal more about the news values constructed with the representation of *government*, further analysis of the Word Sketch window information was conducted to look at the co-constructed news values via collocates alongside the concordance lines (see Chapter Three for further details about the display and mechanism of using Word Sketch in the current research).

In BBCEN, the frequent verbs (actions) that co-occur with 'government' as the subject (actor) are *be* (22), *have* (21), *say* (7), *deny* (3), *continue* (3), and *make* (3). A close reading of the top two (*government + be* and *government + have*) was conducted from the groups' collocates (*government + actions [verbs]*). Starting from the collocate *government + be* (see Appendix 12), most of the left words describing the actions by or towards *government* are constructed with negativity (such as *unstable*, *untrustworthy*, *violent*, *in trouble*, *overthrown*, *warned*, *suffering*, *worrying*, *struggling*, *subject to much criticism*, *revenge*, *accused*, and *way out of the current impasse*.)

Similarly, from the concordance lines of the collocate *government+ have* (see Appendix 13), there are 17 out of 22 concordance lines of *government + have* that are constructed with negativity as failing, people neglecting, violent, and demanding *government*. Only five out of the 22 concordance lines of the collocate *government + have* indicate that the government is constructed with positivity as having developmental plans/actions which are *drafted anti-terror law*, *introduced several programs to benefits*, *has successfully managed the current crisis*, *has recently pledged to implement major development*, and *has announced several measures to impose*.

However, by extending the concordance of those concordance lines, four of the five show that positive governmental plans/actions had been followed by contrasting negative statements, such as:

5.1 *Previously, the government had introduced several programmes to benefit the youth, including low-interest loans for opening a business and affordable housing. But in a recent interview, an Algerian official described the government's actions as 'a circus,' saying it is 'doing everything to avoid angering the people.'*

5.2 *The government has had success managing the current crisis but it has to do more.*

5.3 The **government** has recently pledged to implement major development projects in Rif. **However**, continuing demonstrations show that there is little trust in these promises.

This shift in evaluation can be explained by Partington (2015), who called it *embedded evaluation*. In other words, a balance between positivity and negativity is simultaneously created in the text. However, Partington (2015) claims that this two-sided evaluation has potentially one cohesive message. Here, it is argued that, as can be seen from the previous concordances of *government + be*, the main evaluation value is negativity (the Arab Spring *government* is untrustworthy).

In BBCAR, the Word Sketch of *حكومة* (āl)hūkūmah (*government*) does not show how frequently or systematically this term is used as it does for BBCEN, as shown above. As discussed in Chapter Three, this might be due to the morphological differences between Arabic and English. Thus, alternative steps were taken to decipher the represented actions of *الحكومة* (*government*). First, the collocations of *الحكومة* (āl)hūkūmah (*government*) were calculated, extracted and analysed (in Sketch Engine). The range of collocations chosen was -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 KWIC 1 2 3 4 5.<sup>26</sup> The results show that frequent collocates with *government* as actions were قال (said), *يقول* (is saying), *ترفض* (refuses), *تنفي* (deny), *تواجه* (faces trouble) and *تطالب* (demands). Then the concordance lines of *government + actions* (*الحكومة + تطالب/تواجه/تنفي/ترفض/تقول*) were extracted (as shown in Figure 5.1) and analysed. Therefore, the seven lines show that the only news value construction established is consonance in the presentation of the Bahraini royal family as *Sunni* (*أسرة آل خليفة السنية*).

Such a categorisation of a news event participant (*government*) as *Sunni* might be interpreted as a sectionalisation of the Arab Spring event in Bahrain. In other words, representing the government of Bahrain by referring to their confessional affiliation might represent the Arab Spring's protests in Bahrain as a confrontation between *the Sunnis* and *Shias* rather than a movement by people demanding their rights. This construction of consonance regarding sectarianism in the Arab world might be found in BBCAR because of the influence of the main outlet (BBC News) and the practice of the direct translation of the news from the English language, with limited consideration of the differences in the sociocultural backgrounds of the audience. The content in BBCAR may be translated from the original English-language news without significant adjustments to the sociocultural background of the Arabic-speaking audience. This lack of consideration for the audience's specific sociocultural context is referred to here as producer-consonance. The implication here is that the translation process may not adequately account for the nuances, sensitivities, and sociocultural differences of Arabic-speaking audiences. As a result, the construction of consonance regarding sectarianism in the Arab world may be influenced by these factors, potentially leading to a particular narrative or framing of the issue in the BBCAR.

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<sup>26</sup> In the field of Corpus Linguistics, the term 'KWIC' stands for Key Word in Context, with 'الحكومة' (āl)hūkūmah' being the specific keyword. The numerical values accompanying the KWIC display indicate the number of words included before and after the keyword in the context.

This finding contributes to the news value approach (Bednarek & Caple 2017). In Chapter Eight, there is a further discussion of how such a reference of *governments* as ideologically driven can be considered as a consonance value in BBCEN rather than in BBCAR and how such representation is influenced by the dominating representation of Arabs and the Arab world in the Western media. In Section 5.2.2, analysis of the second shared frequent participant constructed with eliteness in BBCEN and BBCAR, namely *president* (الرئيس alrāēs) is considered.



Figure 5.1 'government' collocates' concordance lines in BBCAR with translation

### 5.2.1 *President as a frequent participant in BBCEN and BBCAR*

Both BBCEN and BBCAR have *President* and its Arabic equivalent الرئيس (āl-rāēs) as one of the most frequent *participants* in their wordlists with 24.10 and 29.41 lexical densities per 10,000 words, respectively. Sketch Engine windows in both BBCEN and BBCAR show that *president* and its Arabic equivalent الرئيس ((āl)rāēs) co-occurred as collocates with Arab Spring' countries<sup>27</sup> and non-Arab Spring countries' presidents. In BBCAR, *president* co-collocates with مرسى Morsi (15), مبارك Hosni Mubarak (11), باراك أوباما Barak Obama (10), بن علي Bin Ali (9), صالح Saleh (8), بوتفليقة Bouteflika (2), هادي Hadi (4), المرزوقي al-Marzouki (4), الأوكراني Ukrainian (3), التركي Turkish (1), ناصر Nasser (1), احمدى نجاد Ahmadinejad (3), and عباس Abbas (2).

Similarly, in BBCEN, *president* collocates are *al-Assad/Assad* (23), *Saleh* (18), *Mubarak* (15), *Bin Ali* (7), *Bouteflika* (3), *Obama* (3), *Ahmadinejad* (3), *Essebsi* (3), *Abbas* (3), *Morsi* (3), *Trump* (2), and *Marzouki* (2). These collocates demonstrate how both corpora include similar collocates of *presidents*, but not all of them have the same frequency. For example, the collocates *President + Morsi* and *President + Mubarak* are more frequent in BBCAR than their equivalents in BBCEN. In addition, *Obama + President* is a distinct BBCAR frequent collocate compared with only three co-occurrences in BBCEN, possibly referring to how Obama is represented. In addition, his representations might be frequent in BBC Arabic during the Arab Spring events. Similarly, the relatively high frequency of the collocate *Assad/al-Assad + President*, which is twice as frequent in BBCEN than its equivalent in BBCAR, suggests frequent (re)presentation of *al-Assad* in BBCEN as a *president*. This might be interpreted as a (re)legitimation of his status during the Arab Spring events despite the Syrians' demands and sacrifices made for their freedom.

It is important to note that the presence of the frequent collocates in both corpora (the named presidents) and the absence of the collocates of *president + the names of other presidents* in the Arab Spring regimes might be due to the various titles used to refer to them, such as kings (in Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait) and sheikhs (Bahrain and Kuwait). However, the absence of Ghaddafi from the frequent collocate *president + name* is worth further investigation to ascertain how he was referred to in both BBCEN and BBCAR.

In BBCAR, from his 71 concordance lines, *القذافي* (Gaddafi) co-occurs with *العقيد القذافي* (the Colonel + Gaddafi) and *الزعيم القذافي* (the Leader + Gaddafi) 12 and seven times, respectively. The remaining concordances of *القذافي* (Gaddafi) show that he is represented without titles. In BBCEN, *Gaddafi* co-occurs only 12 times as *Col/Colonel + Gaddafi* out of 38 co-occurrences, and the remaining 26 *Ghaddafi* are used without titles. This distinction between BBCAR and BBCEN in depicting Ghaddafi might refer to the audience's perception of him, where he is known by his military rank. In addition, the representation of *Ghaddafi* without titles such as *president* might be an attempt to degrade his status because of his dictatorship in both BBCEN and BBCAR.

In terms of the newsworthiness constructed in the representations of the Arab and non-Arab countries' *presidents*, in BBCEN, Word Sketch shows that some news values constructed in the modifiers co-occurred with *the president*, namely proximity (also consonance) (*Western-*

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<sup>27</sup> The term 'Arab Spring countries' refers to the nations where the main protests took place, namely Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Syria, and Jordan.



*educated* (al-Assad)), timeliness and negativity (*long-serving* and *ousted long-time president* (Ali Abdullah Saleh), *authoritarian president* (Zine Bin Ali)). On the other hand, timeliness values are constructed with post-Arab Spring elected *presidents* using modifiers such as *new*, *future*, *current*, and *former*.

In BBCAR, the frequent collocates of *الرئيس* *presidents* (analysed manually from the full list of the 131 concordance lines because it was not applicable via the Word Sketch window) are constructed with negativity, *الإطاحة بالرئيس* (overthrown president), *تنحي الرئيس* (departed president), *عزل الرئيس* (impeached president), proximity *الرئيس المصري* (Egyptian President), *الرئيس التونسي* (Tunisian President), *الرئيس الجزائري* (Algerian President), *الرئيس الأمريكي* (American President), *الرئيس السوري* (Syrian President), *الرئيس الأوكراني* (Ukrainian president), and timeliness *السابق* (the former president). Interestingly, when the *president* is preceded by a collective national identity (Egyptian, Tunisian), it refers to a pre-Arab Spring president, although the data included cover two post-Arab Spring presidents in both Tunisia and Egypt. This might be because the post-Arab Spring presidents were not referred to in the data as solo presidents but rather as part of an elected government ((al)hükümāh *الحكومة*).

In Section 5.2.4, an analysis of the last frequent participant in BBCEN and BBCAR (*women*) is presented.

### 5.2.2 Woman in BBCEN and المرأة *ālmārāh* in BBCAR as a frequent Arab Spring participant

As seen in Table 5.1, *woman* (*المرأة/النساء* in BBCAR) was a frequent participant in both BBCAR and BBCEN with a lexical density of 12.66 and 14.60 per 10,000 words, respectively. By analysing the concordance lines of *المرأة/النساء* (*ālmārāh/ālnīsā*) (woman/women (in BBCAR, they appear to co-occur within two main meaning patterns. The first pattern is ‘women’s rights’ in the Arab World and how Arab women ‘struggle’ to overcome the discrimination they experience, as shown in the two extended and translated concordance lines:

5.4 يبدأ التمييز ضد المرأة في المجتمعات العربية في رحم الام، فمنذ اللحظة التي تعرف فيها 5.4  
'الام جنس الجنين'

Translation: *Discrimination against women in Arab societies begins when a mother knows the sex of her baby.*

5.5 المرأة المصرية " السيئ ل الغاية وعزا الاستطلاع احتلال مصر المرتبة الاخيرة لوضع 5.5  
" حسب رأي الخبراء في معظم مجالات احترام حقوق المرأة

Translation: *According to the women's rights poll, Egypt ranked 'extremely bad' in respecting women's rights, according to experts.*

The second pattern is the activism of women in organising, attending, and inspiring Arab Spring movements, which met with social and political neglect after the Arab Spring, as shown in the following two extended and translated concordance lines:

5.6 كان للنساء حضور بارز في الثورات العربية الاخيرة, من تونس الى مصر الى البحرين 5.6  
الى سوريا

ولكن حين وصلت بعض الثورات مرحلة " كطف الثمار وجدت المرأة نفس ها مغيبة ومجفة،

Translation: *Women had a prominent presence in the recent Arab revolutions, from Tunisia to Egypt to Bahrain to Syria, but when some of the revolutions reached the stage of 'picking fruits', women found themselves absent.*

5.7 لم تحصل المرأة المصرية الا على 8 مقاعد في مجلس الشعب المنتخب من أصل 498 مقعدا

Translation: *Egyptian women won only eight of the 498 seats in the People's Assembly.*

It can be seen from the above concordance lines (5.4-5.7) that the representations of *المرأة* *ālmārāh* (woman) in BBCAR is constructed with negativity and impact. Producer-consonance is foregrounded in the representation of 'Arab women' in the Arab Spring events as victims which is in accordance with the stereotypical representation of 'Arab women' in mainstream Western media (Karimullah 2020; Al-Hejin 2015). This is considered an example of producer-consonance because it suggests that these stereotypical portrayals are perpetuated or amplified when news or media content is translated or adapted from its original context to cater to a different audience or language.

Similar to BBCAR, the representation of *women* in BBCEN is constructed with negativity and impact. By looking at the concordance lines of *woman* in BBCEN (e.g. 5.8), *woman* is represented as *struggle[ing] to reap the benefits of the Arab Spring, even though they were at the forefront of the demonstrations:*

5.8 'Egypt has not provided **women** with the basic freedoms.'

Furthermore, there was a pattern of consonance construction in the concordance lines of *the women* in the BBCEN. Women are represented as 'victims' of social injustice and as people who 'receive' very limited or no rights. In addition, as demonstrated in concordance lines 5.9-5.14, consonance is constructed in the representation of *women* in terms of their appearance and social life (the way they are dressed, poor education, and marriage):

5.9 'When you take a walk in the streets of Sanaa, the **women** you see are covered in black from head-to-toe.'

5.10 'The majority of **women** are illiterate, and more than half get married before the age of 18.'

5.11 'At a Saudi cultural festival, Men and **women** are kept apart at events.'

5.12 'Statistically, the odds are against her and that is not just because she is young but also because she is a **woman**.'

5.13 'In a country where political parties are banned, and half the adult population (women) are not allowed to drive.'

5.14 'Until now, a non-Muslim man who wished to marry a Tunisian Muslim **woman** had to convert to Islam.'

The findings of the construction of (producer) consonance in the representations of *women* in BBCAR and BBCEN are discussed and interpreted with reference to the relevant literature in Chapter Eight. In the following section, Arab Spring participants extracted from the Keyword Lists in both BBCEN and BBCAR are displayed and analysed.

### 5.3 Arab Spring's Key participants in BBEN and BBCAR

As stated in Chapter Three, the key Arab Spring participants are those who appear more frequently in the BBCEN and BBCAR corpora than in the reference corpus (see Chapter Three for more details). Thus, Arab Spring news participants were extracted from the two Arabic and English 200 keyword lists in Sketch Engine and then categorised according to their constructed news value, as shown in Table 5.2 below. These participants' news values assigned to their news values' pointers are decided either by their direct meaning, such as proximity for Bahraini, or by looking further to their concordance lines (co-text meaning), such as first or last names, to determine whether they are journalists, politicians, activists, witnesses, or ordinary people. The participants underlined in Table 5.2 below are categorised as constructing more than one value simultaneously, such as personalisation and proximity for participants such as *Bahraini* and *Syrian*.

Compared to the findings from the Frequency Lists analysed in the first part of this chapter (see Section 5.2), more news participants were found in the keyword lists in BBCEN and BBCAR. Thus, in this section, further analysis is undertaken to examine the newsworthiness construction in the co-occurrences (by looking at concordance lines) of those participants in BBCEN and BBCAR based on their initial news value categorisation labels displayed in Table 5.2 below, namely participants constructed with eliteness (see Section 5.3.1), personalisation and proximity (see Section 5.3.2), consonance (see Section 5.3.3) and finally positivity and negativity (see Section 5.3.4).

News value	Related keywords	Related keywords
<b>Eliteness</b>	<p><b>1. Arab Spring Politicians/activists</b></p> <p>Saleh</p> <p>Ennahda</p> <p>Zine</p> <p>Mubarak</p> <p>Belaid</p> <p>Gaddafi</p> <p>Brahmi (a Tunisian politician)</p> <p>Hosni</p>	<p><b>1. Arab Spring Politicians/activists</b></p> <p>(اميرة) ناشطة اجتماعية</p> <p>Ameera (a Tunisian activist)</p> <p>مرسي</p> <p>Morsi</p> <p>بلعيد</p> <p>Belaid</p> <p>داعش</p> <p><u>Daesh</u><sup>28</sup></p>

<sup>28</sup> The Arabic abbreviation for ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) is داعش (Da'ish or Dā'ish), which stands for الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام (al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-'Irāq wa-al-Shām).

	<p>Zifzafi (Moroccan activist)</p> <p>Nasser</p> <p>Bashar</p> <p>Chokri</p> <p>Waad (Bahraini Opposition Group)</p> <p>Muammar</p> <p>Abdullah (Ali Abdullah Saleh and King Abdullah)</p> <p>Essebsi</p> <p>Eltahawy (Arab female writer)</p> <p>Brotherhood</p> <p>Assad</p> <p>Sheikh</p> <p>Mahmoud (Abbas and Ahmadinejad)</p> <p>Hamad</p> <p>Qassim (Shaik Qassim)</p> <p>Mohsin (Yemeni General)</p> <p>Ali (Bin Ali and Ali Abdullah Saleh)</p> <p>Morsi</p> <p>Shaaban (a spokeswomen of the Opposition groups in Syria)</p> <p>Marzouki</p> <p><b>2. Overseas human rights institutions</b></p> <p>Amnesty</p> <p><u>Femen (a Ukrainian Feminist Group)</u></p>	<p>الاكاديميا</p> <p>Academia/Academics</p> <p><b>2. Overseas Journalists/politicians (shared with proximity value (proximity of Producer))</b></p> <p><u>الغارديان</u> <i>The Guardian</i></p> <p><u>الأنديبندنت</u> <i>The Independent</i></p> <p><u>الفائينشال</u> <i>The Financial Times</i></p> <p><u>الصنداى</u> <i>The Sunday Times</i></p> <p><u>الاوزرفر</u> <i>The Observer</i></p> <p>واتش (هيومن رايت واتش) Watch Human Rights</p> <p>موغابي Mugabe</p> <p>اندرو اغلييان Andrew Gilligan (a BBC journalist)</p> <p>جيرمي بوين Jeremy Bowen</p> <p>تومس كوك (مالك شركة سياحة بريطانية) Thomas Cook (tourism company in the UK)</p> <p><u>الدليميل</u> <u>The Daily Mail</u></p> <p><u>تيليفراف</u> The Telegraph</p> <p>رفسانجاني Rafsanjani (Iranian politician)</p>
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		<p>(ويليم هينغ (سياسي بريطاني  William Hague (British politician)  (كاسينوف (سياسي روسي  Kasimov (a Russian politician mentioned in a translated news article from <i>The Sunday Telegraph</i>.)</p>
<b>Personalisation</b>	<p>Tunisian  Bouazizi  <u>Muhamed</u>  Fikri (Mouhcine a Tunisian fishmonger who was killed by the security forces)  Bahraini  Hamza (a Syrian child)  Yemeni  Libyans  Demonstrators  Libyan  Neema (a Yemeni girl)  Palestinians  Deeb (an Egyptian hip hop artist)  <u>Mohammed</u>  Fishmonger</p>	<p>(العكري (طبيب بحريني  Al-Akri (A Bahraini doctor)</p>
<b>Proximity</b>	<p><b>1. Arab Spring's proximity</b>  Tunisia  Syrian</p>	<b>Not Found</b>
<b>Negativity</b>	<b><u>Shabiha</u></b>	<p>داعش  <u>Daesh</u>  ليليت  <u>Lilith</u>  (The myth of Lilith is used in the news article to figuratively describe the</p>

		situation of women in the Arab Spring)
<b>Impact</b>	<b><u>Shabiha</u></b>	<u>داعش</u> <u>Daesh</u>
<b>Consonance</b>	Shia Islamist Jihadist Secularist Sunni Sectarian <b><u>Nakba</u></b> <b><u>Sunnis</u></b>	لاجئة Female refugee ليليث Lilith أحمد أبو ختالة Ahmed Abu Khattala (an incarcerated Libyan who participated in the 2012 Benghazi attack on the American diplomatic mission at Benghazi in which the American Ambassador and three other Americans were killed)

Table 5.2 Key Arab Spring's participants in BBCEN and BBCAR and their allocated news values

### 5.3.1 Key participants constructed with eliteness in BBCEN and BBCAR

As show in Table 5.2 above, the participants in BBCEN who are constructed with eliteness are overthrown Arab presidents (such as *Saleh, Zine, Gaddafi*) and post-Arab Spring political parties/politicians' names (*Ennahda, Belaid, Brahmi, Chokri, Essebsi, Marzouki, Brotherhood, Morsi, Shabaan*). Most of these post-Arab Spring participants (six out of the nine) were based in Tunisia which might be due to the number of changes in the country after the Arab Spring compared to other Arab Spring countries and the frequent Tunisian Arab Spring events in the BBCEN data. Thus, such political names are more frequently found in news than in reference corpora. In addition, two activists' names are found (see Table 5.2 above) as key participants constructed with eliteness: *Zifzafi* (a Moroccan activist) and *Eltahawy* (an Egyptian writer and activist).

While the BBCEN eliteness constructed keywords refer primarily to the Arab Spring participants as presidents, politicians, or activists, Table 5.2 above shows that in BBCAR, the keywords are mainly newspapers from the UK, such as *The Guardian, The Independent, The Financial Times, The Sunday Times, and The Observer*. Such BBCAR findings are in accordance with others displayed in this chapter (see Section 5.2), where the British press is a frequent participant in Arab Spring News. Frequent indexing quotes from various British newspapers might reveal how such newspapers are represented as resources of Arab Spring news events to

Arab-speaking audiences. In addition to the UK newspapers being eliteness-constructed resources, the BBCAR keywords list includes the names of British journalists and politicians (*Andrew Gilligan, Jeremy Bowen and William Hague*).

Alongside the eliteness construction of these British newspapers and people, producer-proximity was constructed. The construction of producer-proximity found in BBCAR might refer to the political, economic, and policy context of the BBC Arabic service and, more specifically, its relationship with its funders, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. However, such discursive practice might also be considered a form of 'imperialism', whereby multicultural news is continually derived from a powerful monocultural resource. Further discussion and interpretations of producer-proximity construction in BBCAR follow in Chapter Eight with reference to the literature.

One of the key participants that constructs eliteness in BBCEN (see Table 5.2 above) is the key participant *Nasser*. By referring to Nasser's concordance lines, of the 22 co-occurrences of *Nasser*, 12 concordance lines refer to Gamal Abdul Nasser, who served as the second President of Egypt after World War II (from 1954 until his death in 1970). Referring to the wider context of the 12 concordance lines of *Nasser*, they co-occurred in two news articles concerning secularism and Islamism in the Arab World, especially in Egypt, and were published on 13 July 2011 and 9 August 2011.

As can be seen in Figure 5.2 below, the 11 concordance lines of *Nasser* represent him as a historical reference to the current situation in Egypt after the Arab Spring between the Muslim Brotherhood and the remnants of the previous regime were also represented in those concordance lines. Such an interdiscursive practice in the representations of *Nasser* in BBCEN can be considered a consonance construction. According to Bednarek and Caple (2017, p. 158), the comparison of events with others in the past and the establishment of current happenings as similar is one of the linguistic devices of consonance. The next section discusses the findings of the key participants in BBCEN and BBCAR constructed with personalisation (see Table 5.2 above).

### 5.3.2 Personalised key participants

In terms of the key participants foregrounded with personalisation, BBCEN included both collectively identified participants (*Libyans and Palestinians*) and the names of individual participants (*Bouazizi, Fikri, Hamza, Neema*)<sup>29</sup>. It can be seen from Table 5.2 above that there was an absence of participants constructed with personalisation in BBCAR compared to the BBCEN keyword list. This absence might be due to what is anticipated and discussed in Chapter Three regarding the influence of the context of the data on the keyword list findings. To illustrate, there is an expected imbalance between the corpora findings of the key participants constructed with personalisation in BBCAR compared to BBCEN because of the context of the data included, where the Arab Spring participants (who are expected to be called by with Arabic names) might not be identified by Sketch Engine as keywords compared to BBC English because of the similarity between ordinary Arabic names in BBCAR and the reference corpora. Thus, the

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<sup>29</sup> The classification of these participants as ordinary people (human-faced participants in the events) is based on a close reading of their extended concordance lines.

BBCEN findings were taken as a source of comparison for the representation of the constructed personalisation value.

1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 itain and France created nation states after World War I.</s><s> Nasser championed the dream of a pan-Arab union of states Writing in th
2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 s al-Ahram newspaper and an adviser to President Gamal Abdel Nasser , "should never halt at frontiers, but should carry her message ac
3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 jst three years later.</s><s>One of the causes of the failure was Nasser's insistence on Egypt being the dominant force in the union.</s><s>
4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 ope of Arab unity.</s><s>The pan-Arab secularism espoused by Nasser and others was exposed as an impotent force.</s><s>From then
5	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 yid Qutb, tortured in prison by the military government of Colonel Nasser and eventually killed in 1966.</s><s>Ever since, there has been
6	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 t analyst 13 July 2011 Muhammad Naguib (R) with Gamal Abdul Nasser in Cairo, 15 August 1953 Nearly 60 years ago, the Egyptian milit
7	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 <s><s>Then our achievement would be nothing," Maj Gamal Abdel Nasser told a meeting of army officers and Muslim Brotherhood leaders (
8	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 and Muslim Brotherhood leaders on 29 December 1952.</s><s> Nasser was discussing the future of political transition in Egypt after the .
9	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 cers' Movement, that overthrew King Farouk and eventually saw Nasser installed as Egypt's president.</s><s>The rest of the story is well
10	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood supported the decision of Nasser and his Revolutionary Command Council to ban all political partic
11	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 at, of course, was an enormous miscalculation.</s><s>By 1954, Nasser and his clique dominated the army and had ousted pro-democrac
12	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	doc#0 the role of the working-class, young, radical and charismatic Maj Nasser is the 75-year-old Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi.</s>

Figure 5.2 The Concordances of Nasser in BBCEN

This step of comparison has limitations in terms of prioritising one piece of cross-lingual data over another (see Chapter Three for details about the limitations of cross-lingual corpus linguistics studies). However, owing to the importance of the findings of participants constructed with personalisation in BBCEN, such a comparison method was taken by the researcher. To clarify, to compare the Arabic and English representations of the four personalisation-constructed participants, their concordance lines in BBCEN and their equivalents in BBCAR were analysed. The selection of these four participants was based on their direct relevance to the Arab Spring events as human-faced news event participants, namely *Bouazizi*, *Mouhcine Fikri*, *Hamza Al-Khatib*, and *Neema*.

The first three participants constructed with personalisation in BBCEN were those who were killed during the Arab Spring. First, *Bouazizi*, a street vendor, was considered to be a catalyst for the Arab Spring in Tunisia and beyond. He set himself on fire on 17 December 2010. *Bouazizi*, as a key participant, co-occurred 31 times in BBCEN and six times in BBCAR. Both BBCEN and BBCAR represent *Bouazizi* (البوعزيزي/بوعزيزي) as an initiator of the Arab Spring movement (positivity) and identify him by his job as a *street vendor* (بائع الشارع *bāē ālshārī* in BBCAR).



Similarly, *Mouhcine Fikri* is represented in BBCEN (co-occurring 15 times) and BBCAR (co-occurring 7 times) as a *Moroccan fishmonger* who died tragically after being crushed by a refuse lorry, which outraged the demonstrators. In BBCEN, as displayed in Figure 5.3, positivity is constructed in the protestors' display of solidarity with Fikri's family, as shown in line 13 in Figure 5.3 (*everyone feels crushed by that garbage truck*). Also, most of Fikri's concordance lines in BBCEN linguistically represent his death as a tragic accident that occurred when he jumped into the refuse lorry to get his fishing tools, and only one concordance line (line 5 in Figure 5.3) indicates the Moroccan security forces' act of killing by ordering the truck to crush Fikri when he jumped. Thus, the action of killing *Fikri* by the police appears to be de-represented by naming it as *death* rather than *killing*. Thus, negativity is constructed in Fikri's death rather than the government's action of killing.

Similarly, as shown in Figure 5.4, while in BBCAR فكري (*Fikri*) co-occurred with مقتل/مصرع (both mean *killing*), the actor of the killing (الشرطة the police) is absent (in 6 out of 7 concordance lines) and when الشرطة (*the police*) are mentioned (line 7), it is to voice the police's rejection of the accusation of killing *Fikri* by ordering the refuse lorry's driver to crush him to death.

	Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
1	doc#0 manslaughter and forgery of public documents.	Fishmonger Mouhcine	Fikri	died on Friday after climbing into a rubbish lorry to retrieve 500kg (80 stone) of
2	doc#0 so far been released on bail.	Police had confiscated and destroyed Mr	Fikri's	swordfish because it is not allowed to be fished at this time of the year, accordi
3	doc#0 ass protest in the capital, Rabat, on Sunday	The death of fish-seller Mouhcine	Fikri's	has triggered outrage on the streets and online as his story resonates with pec
4	doc#0 anger on display.	Video circulating on social media appears to show Mr	Fikri	jumping into the back of the refuse lorry to retrieve his fish, before being crushi
5	doc#0 is said a security officer ordered the truck driver to start the compactor with Mr	Fikri	inside.	The phrase "crush the hell out of him" began trending on social
6	doc#0 nce (COP22) is expected to start in the city.	But the father of Mouhcine	Fikri	has urged protestors to remain calm, saying he was confident the perpetrators
7	doc#0 al-Hoceima	The protests were triggered by the death of fishmonger Mouhcine	Fikri	, who was crushed to death by a rubbish truck as he tried to rescue his produc
8	doc#0 ers have called for the release of well-known activist Nasser Zefzafi	Mouhcine	Fikri	was trying to rescue his stock, which the police wanted to confiscate.
9	doc#0 tests were called by some activists last October to protest against the death of	Fikri	.	As the demonstrations have snowballed, corruption and unemployeme
10	doc#0 Moroccan government sought to control the widespread resentment following	Fikri's	death.	King Mohammed ordered officials to visit al-Hoceima to calm the
11	doc#0 rry trying to retrieve fish confiscated by police.	The death of Mouhcine	Fikri	in the northern town of Al-Hoceima on Friday drew widespread anger on social
12	doc#0 ng uprisings.	Morocco's King Mohamed has ordered officials to visit Mr	Fikri's	family.
13	doc#0 ;, an activist in the town of Imzouren where a protest followed the funeral of Mr	Fikri	.	"Everyone feels crushed by that garbage truck here." Protest
14	doc#0 of this scale are unusual in Morocco	Police had confiscated and destroyed Mr	Fikri's	swordfish because it is not allowed to be fished at this time of the year, accordi
15	doc#0 Moroccan media.	Video circulating on social media appears to show Mr	Fikri	jumping into the back of the refuse lorry to retrieve his fish, before being crushi

Figure 5.3 Fikri's concordance lines in BBCEN

<input type="checkbox"/> Details	sentence
1 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	<S>41> مظاهرات في المغرب ل اليوم الرابع على التوالي احتجاجا على مصرع بائع السمك محسن فكري :: 1 نوفمبر 2016 تواصل الاحتجاجات في المغرب على مقتل بائع السمك احتشد الاف المغاربة في الشوارع مجددا يوم الاثنين احتجاجا على مصرع بائع سمك " سحفا " في شاحنة ل القمامة بعد ان صادرت الشرطة سمك ه . </S>
2 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	<S> و ادى مصرع محسن فكري في بلدة الحسيمة شمالي المغرب الى اندلاع احتجاجات ل اربعة ايام على التوالي . </S>
3 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	<S> و يجب ان يبدأ ذلك ب تطهير المؤسسات العامة من الفاسدين " . و اعاد مقتل فكري الى الازهان حدث بائع الفاكهة التونسي محمد ب وعزيزي الذي اضرم النار في نفس ه و كان ذلك شرارة انطلاق ما يعرف ب الربيع العربي . </S>
4 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	<S> و في محاولة ل احتواء التوتر , امر العاهل المغربي محمد السادس , الذي يقوم حاليا ب جولة في افريقيا , وزير الداخلية ان يزور اسرة فكري و ان يقدم ل ها العزاء الملكي . </S>
5 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	<S> و صادرت الشرطة اسمك فكري , ل ان سمك ابو سيف الذي كان يبيع ه يمنع صيده في هذا الوقت من العام , حسب ما قالت وسائل الاعلام المغربية . </S>
6 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	<S> و يظهر تسجيل ب الفيديو انتشار على شبكات التواصل الاجتماعي فكري يقفز داخل شاحنة القمامة ل استعادة السمك قبل ان يقتل سحفا . </S>
7 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	<S> و اتهم نشطاء ضباط الشرطة ب اصدار اوامر ل العاملين في سيارة القمامة ب طحن فكري , و لكن الشرطة المغربية نفت الاتهامات في بيان . </S>

Figure 5.4 فكري (Fikri) concordance lines in BBCAR

<input type="checkbox"/> Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
1 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	rotests and the brutal response of the authorities there. </s></s>	Hamza	Ali Al Katib was allegedly tortured and murdered by government
2 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	nich forms part of the current government. </s></s>	Hamza	al-Khatib a symbol of uprising By Jim MuirBBC News, Beirut 1 Ji
3 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	r-old boy from a village near the southern city of Deraa. </s></s>	Hamza	Ali al-Khatib took part in a demonstration on 29 April that ended
4 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	arratives as to what happened between then and 21 May, when	Hamza's	body was handed over to his family. </s></s> The official account
5 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	rian state TV after his death became a cause celebre, was that	Hamza	was hit by three bullets at the Saida complex and died on the sp
6 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	own. </s></s> 'Tortured to death' But the account that has turned	Hamza	al-Khatib into an iconic figure for the Syrian revolution, and made
7 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	name known around the world, is very different. </s></s> It says	Hamza	was captured and tortured to death by security forces, and that v
8 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	ion, as well as bullet wounds. </s></s> We are all the mothers of	Hamza	al-KhatibSlogan used at vigils Gruesome video footage of the bc
9 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	trieve the body, the family had to sign a paper promising to bury	Hamza's	remains immediately and keep quiet about it. </s></s> Credible s
10 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	count insisted that the discoloration and other unusual signs on	Hamza's	body were the natural consequence of death several weeks prev
11 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	it displacements or cuts". </s></s> Whatever the truth about how	Hamza	al-Khatib perished, his death has reverberated around Syria and
12 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	ins of needing a new focal point or symbol to spur it on. </s></s>	Hamza's	picture has been raised at demonstrations in many towns, and a
13 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	ils by women holding placards saying "We are all the mothers of	Hamza	al-Khatib". </s></s> Facebook pages have been dedicated to his
14 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	bling to try to limit the damage. </s></s> President Assad invited	Hamza's	father and family to talks in Damascus on Tuesday, and promise
15 <input type="checkbox"/> doc#0	id concern. </s></s> The Syrian state media are also referring to	Hamza	as a "martyr", a rare point of agreement with activists and the op

Figure 5.5 Concordance line of Hamza in BBC English

The third key participant foregrounded with personalisation is *Hamza Al-Khatib*, a 13-year-old Syrian boy who was killed while in the custody of the Syrian regime in Deraa on 25 May 2011. *Hamza* co-occurred 15 times in BBCEN; 14 of them co-occurred in one news article titled *Syria unrest: Hamza al-Khatib, a symbol of the uprising*. As shown in Figure 5.5, there is a pattern of positivity construction that represents Hamza as a symbol of the uprising in Syria. In addition, Hamza is represented as unifying different parties in Syria, including the government and activists who agreed on his martyrdom. However, the brutal killing of the child appears to be de-represented in the lines by using words such as ‘allegedly tortured and murdered,’ ‘his death became a cause celebre’ and ‘whatever the truth about how Hamza al-Khatib perished.’ Eliteness is also constructed in Hamza’s concordance line, but this is controversial. Although Hamza was ‘allegedly’ killed by the Syrian governmental forces, President al-Assad invited Hamza’s father and family to talk in Damascus.

## سوريا: دعوة للتظاهر في سبت "الشهيد" حمزة الخطيب

28 مايو/ أيار 2011

أعلن رئيس المنظمة الوطنية لحقوق الانسان في سوريا اليوم أن اثني عشر شخصا قتلوا بنيران قوات الأمن أثناء مشاركتهم في تظاهرات جمعة حماة الديار أمس. جاء هذا فيما دعا نشطاء سوريون عبر مواقع الكترونية الى تظاهرات اليوم في مختلف المدن السورية تنديدا بالقمع الدموي للتظاهرات, واطلقوا عليها "ثورة سبت الشهيد حمزة الخطيب. وهو الطفل البالغ من العمر ثلاث عشرة سنة وتوفي الاربعاء الماضي تحت التعذيب ومثل بجثته حسب النشطاء.

Figure 5.6 Screenshot of the news report of Hamza al-Khateeb on BBC Arabic

On the other hand, *Hamza*’s name is absent from the BBCAR. However, by referring to the official site of BBC Arabic<sup>30</sup>, هشام الخطيب (Hisham AL khatib) was searched and only one short news report that was published on a similar date was found. BBC Arabic’s Hisham news report is displayed in Figure 5.6 and translated by the researcher as follows:

**5.15 Title: Syria: Call to demonstrate on Saturday for the "martyr" Hamza Al-Khatib May 28, 2011**

***The head of the National Organisation for Human Rights in Syria announced today that twelve people were killed by security forces while participating in the Friday protests of***

<sup>30</sup> This step involves examining data beyond the collected corpora (BBCAR) to support the comparison between BBCEN and BBCAR.

*the ‘Homeland Protectors’ yesterday. This came as Syrian activists called on social media for demonstrations today in various Syrian cities to condemn the bloody suppression of the demonstrations and called it the ‘Saturday revolution of the martyr Hamzah Al-Khatib.’ Hamza was a thirteen-year-old child who died last Wednesday under torture, and his corpse was mutilated, according to the activists.*

Hence, it can be seen that the representation of Hamza’s story in BBCEN is constructed with an impact rather than its version in the story found on the BBC Arabic website, where his story is merely summarised in a single line as an activist’s narrative. However, it can be said that in both BBC Arabic’s official website story and BBCEN, Hamza’s story is (de)represented, and such a discursive construction of his story might be interpreted as a normalisation of the violence and brutality of the Syrian regime’s actions against people during the Syrian revolution. This finding is further discussed and interpreted in Chapter Eight with reference to the relevant literature on BBC representations of the Syrian Arab Spring.

The last key participant constructed with personalisation is *Neema*, who is a Yemeni girl. Her story was found in BBCEN as part of an article about the role of Yemeni women in the Arab Spring. *Neema*, her mum’s and a Yemeni activist’s voice are reported in the representation of *Neema*’s story, as shown in *Neema*’s (extended) concordance lines displayed in Table 5.3 below.

<p>1. <i>‘I didn't want to get married and they made me do it anyway.’ Neema Abdullah, 14.</i></p>
<p>2. <i>‘I asked Neema if she was angry at her parents. She nodded. “I didn't want to get married and they made me do it anyway. They shouldn't have given us away when they knew what would happen to us; that we would suffer, ”’ Neema says emphatically.</i></p>
<p>3. <i>‘Those people who come to marry me or my sisters, they know we are poor. And they know that my parents will not do anything to stop it. And we end up being damaged’ (Neema’s voice).</i></p>
<p>4. <i>‘I don't want to get married. I want to finish school and become a doctor. I don't want to suffer like my sisters,’ Neema Abdullah tells me.</i></p>
<p>5. <i>‘Neema, the youngest, was married off to her cousin because the family owed a rich uncle \$250’ (£150).</i></p>
<p>6. <i>‘Part of the reason why women took to the streets in 2011 was to help those like Neema and her sisters; voiceless women who live in poverty and have no access to education. But in this deeply traditional and tribal country, progress is slow. “This problem could have been solved quite easily had there been political will” says Ms Mashhour.’</i></p>

7. *'Neema's mother, who has 10 children in total, sat next to her and was very assertive when I asked her why she married off her daughters when they were still so young. "We needed the money!" she explained. "We had to marry her off to repay our debts. We are very poor and my husband is sick. What do you want him to do? Beg on the street?"'*

Table 5.3 The (extended) concordance lines of "Neema" as a key news participant in BBCEN

It can be seen from Table 5.3 above that *Neema's* story representation in BBCEN constructs personalisation, unexpectedness, negativity and impact. Also, such a representation of the issue of a 'child bride' in Yemen, as mentioned in BBCEN, constructs consonance, where such an issue about Arab women is expected to be represented because it satisfies the mainstream Western media's stereotypical representations of Arab women. The co-construction of both unexpectedness and consonance values in the same news is unfamiliar in newsworthiness research because they are considered opposites (Bednarek and Caple, 2017). Such co-construction of both unexpectedness and consonance in BBCEN might refer to 1) the context of the news story, 2) the writer's connection to the news story culture, and 3) the target audience and the institutional ideology of translating news from Arabic to English. This triangulation of factors is present in the version of *Neema's* story, in which the writer (Shaima Khalil), an Arabic-speaking journalist, works for BBC News in Sanaa, and she wrote this story for an English-speaking audience. The news writer constructs unexpectedness when providing details about the story, such as the exact amount of debt in dollars and pounds, *Neema's* age, and the number of children *Neema's* mother has (*she has 10 children*). Bednarek (2014, p 137) indicates that the constant construction of unexpectedness and superlativeness in the news of the non-western world in the western media can be regarded as a practice of 'normal us versus the "exotic" them.'

Interestingly, the news article covering *Neema's* story has its equivalents in BBCAR which was written by the same writer (Shaimaa Khalil) and published on the same day (18<sup>th</sup> December 2013). It is difficult to determine which of the two articles is the main which is the translated one. This is because of the different representations found in both, including the selection of lexis (see Appendix 14). Regarding *Neema's* story, its linguistic representation in BBCAR is quite different from its equivalent in BBCEN. To clarify, the story found in BBCAR is summarised in as:

5.15 و لكن عائلة أم آمنة لا تطمح للكثير، فقط ما يكفيها للعيش بكرامة. اضطرت أم آمنة لتزويج بناتها الثلاث دون سن الخامسة عشر لتسديد ديون الأسرة.

Translation: *But the family of Amna's mother does not want too much, just what is enough to live with dignity. Um Amna was forced to marry her three daughters under the age of 15 to pay off their family's debts.*

5.16 ابنتها الأصغر نعمة تقول أنها لا تريد الزواج الآن فهي تريد أن تكمل دراستها التي حرمت منها. " لا يجب أن يزوجوني وأنا صغيرة. حدث ذلك لأخواتي وتعذبوا كثيرا، لا أريد أن أمر بنفس التجربة "

Translated: *Her youngest daughter, Neema, says that she does not want to marry now because she wants to complete the studies that she has been denied. 'They should not marry me when I was young. This happened to my sisters and they suffered a lot. I do not want to go through the same experience.'*

وتقول أم آمنة " لا نملك المال كان علي فعل ذلك لأسدد ديون العائلة، على الأقل حين 5.17  
"ستجد من يكفلها تنزوج نعمة"

Translated: *Um Amna says, 'We do not have the money. I had to pay off my family's debt. At least when she marries Neema, she will find someone to sponsor her.'*

As seen from the above lines, Neema's story is discussed only briefly in BBCAR compared with the lengthy discussion and details found in BBCEN. In addition to the differences in word length between the BBCAR and BBCEN versions, Neema's story in BBCAR is narrated from the perspective of Neema's family, mainly her mother. By contrast, Neema's story in BBCEN is narrated mainly from Neema's perspective, and the mother is quoted only once. She (the mother) is constructed with negativity as assertive when the journalist/writer of the article tries to talk to her daughter. These different representations of the Arabic and English versions of Neema's story written by the same Arab-speaking writer are discussed further in Chapter Eight, with reference to the relevant literature in which Hassan (2014) argues is a domestication of discourse (Hassan, 2014). To clarify, in his study of Arab writers' discursive representations in their literary words (immigrant Arab writers), he notes that when those writers write in English about their culture, they are influenced by orientalist stances and confirm the audience's dominant representation of self and other rather than challenging such stereotypes. Hassan (2014) argues this is due to the perceived possibility of censorship. From a newsworthiness perspective, such a discursive practice is considered consonance construction. In the current example of Neema's story, the writer discursively constructed consonance in the English version rather than the Arabic version to satisfy the stereotypes of Arab women in mainstream Western media. It is worth noting that this example is different from the other found in BBCAR, where producer-consonance (BBCEN's audience consonance) is constructed for the Arab-speaking audience (In BBCAR). In Chapter Eight, the (Producer) consonance construction found in both BBCEN and BBCEN (including this example) is interpreted and discussed in light of the relevant empirical literature.

## 1.2 Summary

### 1.2.1 Of Methods

This chapter scrutinises the portrayal of Arab Spring participants in BBCEN and BBCAR, primarily aiming to uncover their constructed news values. The analysis revealed the linguistic and discursive strategies used in BBC's news coverage of the Arab Spring across languages, shedding light on the constructed news values and portrayals.

To maintain analytical balance, methods such as selecting frequent collocates to examine constructed government values in BBCEN were used. In BBCAR, additional tools were employed because Word Lists did not sufficiently reveal co-constructed values, such as positivity and negativity. Moreover, frequent words suggested further investigation into

important context-based findings beyond Sketch Engine's BBCAR and BBCEN frequent word lists.

The chapter highlights limitations in Arabic lemma searching in Sketch Engine, where singular and plural forms of BBCAR's frequent participants were not calculated as singular lexical density. To uncover this, a manual calculation of singular and plural participant forms as singular densities was performed.

Furthermore, data beyond the corpora (BBCAR) were searched to support the BBCEN-BBCAR comparison by checking BBC Arabic's website for a specific key participant found in BBCEN.

### **1.2.2 Of Findings:**

Key findings from frequent and key Arab Spring participants suggest both BBCEN and BBCAR co-construct some participants like 'government' with eliteness, timeliness and consonance (ideological/religious affiliation). Additionally, women emerged as frequent participants in both corpora, co-constructed with personalisation (human face of the Arab Spring) and consonance by representing them per Western media mainstream as victims. This was also found in the keyword analysis. BBCAR's consonance here is recognised as producer-consonance, originating from BBCEN's audience consonance. Another BBCAR sub-categorised value was producer-proximity, representing British-based newspapers, politicians, and journalists in Arab Spring news.

Thus, the findings contribute to DNVA by considering further subcategorisation of some news values (consonance and proximity) in the cross-lingual BBC discourse context.

## Chapter Six: The Discursive News Values in the Representations of the Voices of News Participants' in ALJEN and ALJAR

### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates how participants' voices in the news during the Arab Spring were represented in ALJEN and ALJAR. As mentioned in the methodology (see Chapter Three), both ALJEN and ALJAR belong to the same news institution but deliver news cross-lingually, namely, in English on ALJEN and in Arabic on ALJAR. In the current research, a comparison is made between the same news institution resources across languages to examine the extent to which linguistic representations and discursive newsworthiness vary depending on the language of the news. The chapter therefore explores how news participants' voices in the events of the Arab Spring are represented, and whether the constructed newsworthiness of the voices of those participants' representations differs across ALJEN and ALJAR.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, the term 'voice' in this thesis pertains to quoted speech in news texts, including both direct and indirect quotes from participants involved in the news events of the Arab Spring. Within news discourse, various forms of citing or reporting expressions exist (Bednarek, 2016). The sub-categories mentioned include neutral, illocutionary, declarative, discourse signalling, and paralinguistic attributing expressions (Bednarek, 2006b; Caldas-Coulthardt, 1994). Paralinguistic attributing expressions convey details on the prosodic or paralinguistic elements of speech, such as voice tone or accompanying non-verbal actions, like shouting or crying (Bednarek, 2016). Illocutionary attributing expressions refer to the speaker's intention or the aim and impact of the speech act, such as making a demand, giving a promise, or issuing a threat (Bednarek, 2016). The voices' expressions analysed in this chapter are divided into two types, namely paralinguistic and illocutionary force expressions. Under each expression category, there are cross-lingual expressions, which are 'chant' (yūradid يردد), 'cheer' (yāhtif يهتف), 'scream' (yāsēh يصيح, yāsrūkh يصرخ) and 'cry' (yābki يبكي) which are considered as paralinguistic expressions, and 'threaten' (yūhadid يهدد) and 'promise' (yāēd يعد) and 'denounce' (yūnādīd يندد) which are regarded as illocutionary force expressions. As explained in Chapter Three, the choice to focus on these particular expressions of voice was driven by the context of the data, which emphasised the voices of protesters and governments in the news coverage of the Arab Spring. Thus, throughout this chapter, the aim is to investigate these voices in the collected corpora and answer the following research question and its associated sub-questions:

Q2: How are the news values discursively constructed in the cross-lingual representations of the participants' voices in Arab Spring events in ALJEN and ALJAR

1. Whose voice?
2. What has been reported?
3. What are the constructed news values?

To address this question, along with its sub-questions, I initially collected the concordance lines of the nominated voice expressions related to paralinguistic and illocutionary forces (as shown above) from ALJEN and ALJAR using Sketch Engine tools (Word Sketch). I



then translated the Arabic lines into English in the case of ALJAR and, if relevant, arranged the concordance lines according to the specific settings of the Arab Spring, such as Tunisia and Egypt. Next, I looked at their co-text meaning in their (extended) concordance lines using the News Values Approach (Bednarek and Caple 2017). It is worth noting that, following Bednarek and Caple (2017) and Bednarek et al. (2020), the ten news values (eliteness, personalisation, consonance, proximity, superlativeness, negativity (or positivity), impact, timeliness, and unexpectedness) are not used as checklists. Rather, the analysis of the voices starts by examining the linguistic representations of the voiced participants and their voices, and then such representations are explained in light of the nine news values. The findings from the previous ALJEN and ALJAR (Chapter Four) suggest a variation in the construction of some news values (such as counter-consonance in ALJEN), thus, I took such findings in consideration when analysing the voices of the news participants in this chapter.

To display the findings, this chapter comprises two main parts: paralinguistic expressions (Section 6.2) and illocutionary force expressions (Section 6.3). The findings of the assigned voices under those two main parts are displayed as sub-sections (such as *6.3.1 chanting voices in ALJEN*, *7.3.2 chanting voices in ALJAR*), compared, and further investigated across the two corpora (ALJEN and ALJAR). Finally, the Arabic equivalent terms of the voice's expressions are both typed in Arabic and Romanised to make it easier for the reader to follow. In addition, when displaying examples from both ALJEN and ALJAR in the analysis, they were numbered in a sequence across the corpora (for example, 7.1, 7.2). The targeted expression is typed in bold and underlined to make it easier for the reader to find and follow.

## **6.2 Para-linguistic Reporting Expression in ALJEN and ALJAR**

The paralinguistic reporting expressions in this chapter refer to the voices that hold paralinguistic meanings, such as crying and chanting (Bednarek, 2006; Caldas-Coulthardt, 1994, cited in Bednarek 2016, p. 32). As mentioned above, such specific expressions have been chosen because of their relevance to the context of the collected corpora, namely Arab Spring movements, where expressions such as chanting and cheering are expected to be predominant due to the nature of the protests, demonstrations, and public gatherings that characterised these events. Thus, five expressions were selected for analysis in ALJEN and ALJAR, namely, *cheer*, *chant*, *cry*, *shout*, and *scream*, and their equivalents in Arabic (see Table 6.1 below). All forms of voices as verbs were included to include all possible equivalents of those voices in ALJAR (see Table 6.1). This step was necessary because of the unavailability of searching for the voice expression word as a lemma and including all its forms in the corpora because of the limitations in Sketch Engine's ability to identify Arabic word forms as a lemma (see Appendix 1.2 for two screenshots of the Word Sketch window's search in both ALJAR and ALJEN).

In Table 6.1 below, the inclusion of the co-occurrence times of voice expressions signifies whether they are found across the two corpora (ALJEN and ALJAR) rather than comparing their frequencies. The concordance lines of these paralinguistic expressions are displayed and discussed in the following sections, considering the research questions (presented in Section 6.1).

Categorisations of reporting expressions	Aljazeera English reporting expression (co-occurrences)	Aljazeera Arabic
Para-linguistic feature	<p><b>Cheer</b> (2)</p> <p><b>Chant</b> (49)</p> <p><b>Shout</b> (29)</p> <p><b>Cry</b> (6)</p> <p><b>Scream</b> (2)</p>	<p><b>Equivalents of ‘cheer’ (7)</b></p> <p>(3) هتف hātaf</p> <p>(0) هتفت hātaft</p> <p>(4) هتفوا hātafū</p> <p><b>Equivalents of ‘chant’ (13)</b></p> <p>(4) ردد raddād</p> <p>(3) رددت raddādt</p> <p>(6) رددوا raddadū</p> <p><b>Equivalents of ‘cry’</b></p> <p>بكي، بكت، يبكون، تبكي (0)</p> <p>Bakā, bakāt, yabkhōn, tabkē</p> <p><b>Equivalents of ‘shout’ and ‘scream’</b></p> <p>صرخ، يصرخون، (0) صرخت</p> <p>Śrakh, yaśrkhōn, śarakhat</p>

Table 6.1 Para-linguistic reporting expressions with frequencies in ALJEN and ALJAR

### 6.2.1 *Cheering in ALJEN*

In ALJEN, the two co-occurrences of the reporting speech *cheer* are constructed with personalisation, positivity, impact and superlativeness. To clarify, the ‘typical’ protest in the Arab Spring is represented as a festival where there are *lights, banners, flags* and *loudspeakers* and *people sing and cheer lyrics* that are *clever or humorous*. In the extended concordance line (6.1), the voices of *people* are reported as *cheering* and *crying* out in happiness when overthrowing Mubarak. Although *the Pharaoh* appears relevant to the context of the news line ‘The Pharaoh as an ancient ruler in Egypt’, it can be analysed here as a metaphor that reflects the ‘deep state’ of Mubarak’s government that lasted for approximately 30 years. In addition, the Pharaoh metaphor might hold the meaning of a ‘fresh start’ for people after the fall of their Pharaoh. Such figurative meanings driven by the stories of Pharaoh and Moses in historical and religious stories can be considered a practice of interdiscursivity. Such a practice might be used in ALJEN to represent overthrowing Mubarak as a sacred event, not only for Egypt but, *in a very real sense, the world*.

6.1 *And so, standing in Tahrir Square amid hundreds of thousands of people **cheering** and crying in the fall of Egypt's last Pharaoh, Egypt's revolution had become, in a very real sense, the world's.*

6.2 *Each demonstration is led by a hateef who sings songs and is **cheered** if the lyrics are clever or humorous.*

In the second line (6.2), cheering is represented as the voice of demonstrators in the Arab Spring protests protocol. It can be noted that the naming of a person who leads singing and chanting in protests is enclosed as a transcription of its origin in the Arabic language. In Translation Theory, the practice of enclosing words might be due to the notion of ‘untranslatability’ or ‘non-equivalency’ due to the uniqueness of specific words. Such practice might be due to cultural or social differences between the source language and the target language (for more details, see Kashgary 2011). Nevertheless, in line 6.2, the use of the Arabic word *hāteef* within ALJEN could serve another discursive purpose, which is the transculturation of the Arab Spring events. In essence, rather than simply translating the actions of the participant in the event, ALJEN employs intertextual references by utilising Arabic naming terminology for such news participants, thereby preserving the sociocultural elements of the news event.

### 6.2.2 *Cheering in ALJAR*

In ALJAR, the equivalent lexis forms of cheer occur seven times. Four out of the seven concordance lines of cheer refer to protesters’ voices in Egypt and they were *cheering* against the coups (الانقلاب). Although it appears beyond the scope of the focus of the current research, it is worth noting that the collocate (يهتفون+ضد) cheer+against might be an anomalous collocation in the English language. According to this research, the Reference Corpora (TenTen en) *cheer* as a paralinguistic expression of crowds co-occurs with words that show approval or encouragement. This cross-lingual difference between English and Arabic words pragmatically might refer to how *cheer* and *chant* are two different expressions used interchangeably in the Arabic news discourse covering protests or demonstration voices.

Here, in ALJAR, the anti-coup protesters' chanting voice constructs personalisation and proximity, protesting across different cities and parts of Egypt (such as *Algeeza*, *Nasr*, *Sharabiah*, and *Zaitonah*).

In terms of what is voiced, such protesters are constructed with personalisation and proximity as having cheered detainees, including the ousted president (Mohammed Morsi). In addition, the cheering of protesters goes beyond Egypt's political situation because protesters cheered for Jerusalem and Palestine, as shown in the following (translated) extended concordance line:

كان المصريون يخرجون ب الملايين من المساجد والجامعات هاتفين ب اسم القدس، 6.3  
تتقدمهم قيادات ورموز لحركات اسلامية وقومية، لكن الامر انقلب منذ الانقلاب قبل اربعة اعام

Translation: *The Egyptians come out in their millions from mosques and universities, **cheering** the name of Jerusalem, led by leaders and symbols from Islamic and national movements, but this has been reversed since the coup four years ago.*

In line 6.3, the interdiscursive use of Palestine and Jerusalem in the context of Egyptian protests can be considered consonance construction. This means that incorporating the chanting or discussion of the Palestinian question serves the purpose of aligning the audience's existing beliefs about the interconnectedness of Arab issues. In Chapter Four, the CL findings show how consonance is repeatedly constructed in representations of the Arab Spring by ALJAR as a movement for all Arabs and all people seeking self-determination in the Arab World. For instance, the Palestinian/Israeli conflict is repeatedly and interdiscursively found in representations of Arab Spring events. Such a finding might be considered evidence of a pan-Arabist ideology co-construction in ALJAR. The pan-Arabism construction in ALJAR might also be explained as consonance because it reflects the general audience's historical and cultural background and preconceptions of the Arab World as an integrated socio-cultural place. In Chapter Eight (Discussion Chapter), ALJAR's consonance construction in the representations of the unity of the Arab World and the Palestine/Israeli conflict is discussed in detail with reference to the literature.

### 6.2.3 Chanting in ALJEN

The Word Sketch window of *chant* shows that from the 57 concordance lines of the word *chant* in ALJEN, 48 were used as verbs, and only eight co-occurrences of *chant* were used as nouns (see Appendix 9 for Word Sketch of 'chant' in ALJEN). To establish the utterers of the chanted voice, the Word Sketch window was viewed. According to the Word Sketch window, the verb *chant* in ALJEN co-occurs before the noun *slogans* (13), and the most frequent subjects which proceeded with chants were *protesters* (9), *demonstrators* (6), and *crowds* (2). In the following sections, the concordance lines of *chants* in ALJEN are analysed based on the Arab Spring country of the included chants to limit the generalisation of the findings regarding who voiced the chants and the constructed newsworthiness of the utterers and the utterances.

In Bahrain, the chant utterers were represented as the *Shia majority*, *Shia protesters*, *crowds*, *demonstrators*, and *mourners* who chanted anti-monarchy slogans against the minority head (*King bin Isa al-Khalifa and his uncle*). The slogans that the protesters chanted are directly quoted as follows:

6.4 “*Democracy is our right.*”

6.5 “*You have no legitimacy.*”

6.6 “*The people want the fall of the regime.*”

6.7 “*Down Hamad.*”

6.8 “*Leave, you are a murderer.*”

In addition, the Bahraini protesters were portrayed in ALJEN as angry chanted the following slogans directly quoted as:

6.9 “*Your race is a crime.*”

6.10 “*Our police are Pakistani.*”

6.11 “*The police are crazy.*”

In line 6.9, the race referred to is the Bahrain Formula One Grand Prix, an international event held in Bahrain, despite large protests. Therefore, protesters are represented in this line (6.9) as opposed to the racing event, because it is a sign that their movement is being ignored and represents an attempt by the government to improve its image on the world stage. In addition, the language of the chants quoted in the above lines has imperative verbs (*down, leave*) directed to the Bahraini King (named in line 6.7 by his first name *Hamad*) and a direct negative adjective for both the king and the police (*murder, crazy*). Also, police-related chants (in lines 6.10 and 6.11) oppose the government's hiring of Pakistanis in the Bahraini National Guard and criticise the king for his attempts to change Bahrain's demography through the sectarian nationalisation of people based on their denomination (Sunnis).

It can be seen from the reported chants above that the Bahraini protests are constructed with consonance, negativity, and impact as sectarian protests between protesters who are from the Shia majority against the minority Sunni government. Therefore, such representations of Bahraini protesters' chants in ALJEN might influence the perception of Bahrainis' protests and their protesters' demands from being a people movement to being perceived as a sectarian movement. In Chapter Eight, this finding and others in Chapter Four (see Section 3.4.4.1) concerning the consonance, negativity and impact co-constructed representation of Bahraini Arab Spring protesters are discussed, with reference to the literature.

In Tunisia, the chanting covered in ALJEN was both from before and after the protests of 2011, from the time of the overthrowing of ex-president Bin Ali, and after the post-revolution elected government. Starting with the 2011 revolution, protesters are reported *chanting* slogans which were directly quoted and included protesters' demands in Tunisia and beyond which construct personalisation and proximity:

6.12 “*Get lost.*”

6.13 “*Good riddance.*”

6.14 “*We will continue our fight.*”

6.15 “*Work is right.*”

6.16 “*Work, freedom and dignity.*”

6.17 “*The people want to return Palestine.*”

The first two chants (6.17 and 6.18) are well-known slogans of the Tunisia Revolution which Tunisians chanted after Bin Ali was toppled on 14<sup>th</sup> January 2011. The next three chants (6.19, 6.20, and 6.21) represent the protesters’ demands from their revolution against Bin Ali during the weeks before his ousting, which were their right to be free and find employment. The final slogan (6.22) recalled the avenue of *Habib Borgeba* (Tunisia) and *Tahrir Square* (Egypt) in early 2011: ‘*People want to overthrow the regime*’ (proximity). In addition, the chanting of the slogan “The people want to return Palestine” by the protesters in Tunisia refers to the demands of the protesters beyond being Tunisians (overthrowing their dictator) to their demands as part of a large area, namely returning Palestine to the Palestinians. Such chanting may signal how Tunisian and Egyptian protesters are represented in ALJEN as protesters who perceive their revolutions as cross-board movements that have spread to all people in the Arab world. In the lines of *Tunisia+chant*, besides personalisation, such chanted slogans and chant representations construct proximity (beyond Tunisia), positivity (in the slogans’ wording such as *dignity*, *freedom*), and consonance (the intertextuality of slogans from other Arab Springs’ movements and the interdiscursivity of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict).

Second, ALJEN represents the chants of the protests after the event of Bin Ali’s overthrow and the election of the new government (Ennahda):

6.18 “*The government must fall.*”

6.19 “*Enough with Ghannouchi.*”

6.20 “*Ennahda go.*”

6.21 “*The people want a new revolution.*”

6.22 “*The people want to bring down the regime.*”

The protesters who chanted such slogans were depicted as *Ennahda opponents*. Such representations might be read as a background of personalisation and a foregrounding of eliteness. In other words, such protesters are represented in ALJEN as supporters of the government opposition, who demand political changes rather than ordinary people. Thus, although the protesters’ voices are reported directly and appear to be constructed with personalisation, the representation found in the extended concordance lines around that chant reflects how such protesters’ claims are politically motivated and, thus, construct eliteness.

In Morocco, another North African Arab Spring country, people were represented in ALJEN (Figure 6.1) as chanting against corruption, sharp price increases, and the release of jailed activists. In addition, protesters chanted slogans criticising Morocco’s Prime Minister Abdeliah Benkirare and waving anti-government flags. In such voice representations, personalisation is established, and eliteness and negativity are co-constructed. Moreover, proximity was constructed to represent other protestors’ chants in different Moroccan cities. Such protests were represented as having supporters of the reform’s vote (a reform suggested by the government in response to early protests).

	Details	sentence
1	doc#0	<>In Casablanca, Morocco's largest city, nearly 1,000 people gathered, <b>chanting</b> anti-corruption slogans, denouncing the sharp rise in prices, and calling for the release of jailed activists, a witness said.</>
2	doc#0	<>Around 300 people gathered near the main boulevard in Rabat, the capital, <b>chanting</b> slogans criticising Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, and waving anti-government banners, AFP correspondents reported.</>
3	doc#0	<>The Tangier demonstrators <b>chanted</b> "We are not voting because we are not cattle" as about 200 police officers, equipped with metal riot shields, helmets and truncheons, cordoned off the demonstration site.</>
4	doc#0	<>Led by dozens of Muslim clerics and students of Islamic schools, the backers of the reform <b>chanted</b> "We have one king, Mohammed VI.</>
5	doc#0	<>Opponents of the reform <b>chanted</b> slogans including "Majesty is for God only", "Long live the people" and "Enough with corruption, you brought the country disgrace.</>
6	doc#0	<> Continuing protests The demonstration filled Rabat's central Muhammed V Avenue as protesters <b>chanted</b> "freedom" while clapping in rhythm.</>
7	doc#0	<>More than 6,000 protesters rallied in Morocco's main economic hub Casablanca on Sunday, <b>chanting</b> "For Dignity and Freedom.</>
8	doc#0	<>In the capital Rabat, about a thousand protesters marched through the city centre <b>chanting</b> "Dignity.</>
9	doc#0	<>Protesters <b>chanted</b> : "Down with despotism.</>
10	doc#0	<>At midday, a pro-monarchy rally on Muhammad V Avenue in front of the parliament <b>chanted</b> slogans supporting the king, with many attendees holding his portrait.</>

Figure 6.1 The concordance lines of chant in the Moroccan's context<sup>31</sup>

By looking at the concordances<sup>32</sup> shown in Figure 6.1, and their extended lines, one of the chants is directly quoted as:

6.23 *"We have one King, Muhammed IV!"*

By looking back at the extended text, the utterers of this reported chant (6.23) are constructed with superlativeness, consonance and eliteness (*dozens of Muslim clerics and students of Islamic schools* who had been brought to the site of protest by government buses).

On the other hand, the chanting of anti-government slogans and opponents of the vote were constructed with personalisation and positivity (lines from 6.24 to 6.30):

6.24 *"We are not voting because we are not cattle."*

6.25 *"Majesty is for God only."*

<sup>31</sup> Concordance lines are presented in sentence style rather than the traditional KWIC format to provide fuller context and enhance readability.

<sup>32</sup> Displaying the concordance lines in sentence format enables a better understanding of the contextual factors that influence the meaning and significance of the target voice.

6.26 “*Long life with people.*”

6.27 “*Enough with corruption, you brought the country disgrace.*”

6.28 “*We want freedom and dignity.*”

6.29 “*Down with despotism.*”

6.30 “*Peace, peace, freedom is coming.*”

By looking at the extended concordances of these chants, utterers who were anti-reform protesters were also constructed with superlativeness (*at least 3,000 people, more than 6,000 protesters, about a thousand*) and proximity (*Ribat, Casablanca*). Thus, it is apparent that variable news values are constructed by both supporters and opponents of reforms in Morocco. Pro-reform protesters and voices were constructed in ALJEN with both eliteness and consonance as ideologically motivated protesters. On the other hand, the direct quoting of the words of chants (*we, peace, freedom, dignity*) and representations of Moroccan reform opponents in ALJEN are constructed with personalisation, positivity, superlativeness, and proximity.

Jordan’s protests were constructed in ALJEN with eliteness (organised by the *Islamic Action Front, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood*) and personalisation and proximity (chanted the circulating cry of the Arab Spring “*the people want the downfall of regime*” and other ‘Jordanian-situated’ slogans). The directly quoted chanted slogans of such protests are as follows.

6.31 “*The people want the downfall of the regime.*”

6.32 “*Go down Abdullah, go down.*”

6.33 “*Listen Abdullah, the people demand freedom.*”

6.34 “*The role of people is coming.*”

It can be seen from the directly reported chants of protesters led by Muslim Brotherhood officials that King Abdullah was referred to by his first name (Abdullah in 6.32 and 6.33) and without his title of King. Such a practice of removing the monarchy from the sacred realm and ignoring titles might reflect these protests’ republicanism. In other words, such chants construct King Abdullah as part of the system (a monarchy in Jordan) that abstracts people and prevents them from being the centre of their political system. It can be seen from such representations that in the context of the Jordanian Arab Spring, eliteness is constructed differently based on the targeted constructed news participants. To clarify, on the one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood’s eliteness is co-constructed with personalisation, whereas King Abdullah is co-constructed in the protesters’ chants with eliteness and negativity.

#### **6.2.4 Chanting in ALJAR**

Like ALJEN, ALJAR’s chant as a paralinguistic expression of protesters’ voices occurred in the contexts of Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain. In Morocco, the chanting voice referred to protesters who were constructed with eliteness as *members of the 20th February Group* consisting of *activists, jurists, and unionists*. The slogans chanted by those protesters were



constructed with personalisation and impact (they were calling for *more profound political reform and criticised the high cost of living*). In addition, there was a slogan in which the word *regime* in the Arab Spring slogan “the people want the fall of the regime” was substituted with two words: *corruption* and *despotism* (line 6.35).

" الشعب يريد اسقاط الفساد والاستبداد " 6.35

Translation: “*The people want the fall of corruption and despotism.*”

It is worth noting that such demands included in the chants represent the Arab Spring movement in Morocco as a revolution of reform, rather than a revolution to overthrow the regime by force. Hence, positivity was constructed.

In Egypt, chanting protesters were constructed with proximity to more than one city. The chanted slogans were constructed with eliteness and negativity ( رحيل ما سموه حكم العسكر وعودة ) الشرعية الدستورية (translated: against what they called the military coup, the return of constitutional legitimacy). Personalisation was constructed in a chant of the protesters demanding the release of detainees (Translated: الإفراج عن المعتقلين). Furthermore, consonance and proximity were constructed in the Egyptian protesters’ chant concerning the official Egyptian position towards Israeli aggression in Gaza (موقف السياسيين المصريين من العدوان الإسرائيلي على غزة). The finding that coverage on the Arab Spring protests, particularly in Egypt and earlier in Tunisia (in ALJEN), frequently referenced and established connections with the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in line with other findings presented in this chapter and Chapter Four. These examinations also revealed that the discourse of ALJAR and ALJEN often interconnected these two separate sociopolitical issues and events, thereby establishing consonance. The consonance construction of the Palestine-Israeli conflict within the context of the Arab Spring demonstrations is further examined in Chapter Eight, with specific reference to the literature in that chapter.

In Bahrain, and in accordance with the ALJEN findings above (line 6.23), the protesters were constructed with eliteness rather than personalisation as *the supporters of the Bahraini Opposition* (مناصرين للمعارضة البحرينية). To clarify, the protests in Bahrain were represented in ALJAR as politically motivated rather than a human-faced movement. Such protesters’ chants were also constructed with eliteness (indirectly reported as demanding *democratic transformation* and *the dismissal of Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa*). Such findings of representing the Bahraini Arab Spring movement with less personalisation construction (compared to those in other settings of the Arab Spring) is in accordance with others in the current chapter and in Chapter Four and is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight.

Finally, in Jordan, the chants reported by the " علي العهد " (Translation: On the covenant’s) protestors in ALJAR (lines from 6.36 to 6.39) were to some extent different from the Jordanian protesting chants found in ALJEN above (see Section 6.2.3):

لا ولاء ولا انتماء إلا لرب السماء 6.36

Translation: “*There is no loyalty or belonging except to the Lord of Heaven.*”

6.37 الله أكبر على الظالم

Translation: “*Allah is the greatest on the injustice.*”

6.38 الله أكبر على الفاسد

Translation: “*Allah is the greatest on the corruption.*”

6.39 ليه يا ظالم ليه؟ احنا نموت وانت تعيش

Translation: “*Tell us Oppressive, why? You are living while we die!*”

The chants reported in ALJAR have more religious wordings than those reported in ALJEN, which can be considered the construction of consonance. This construction of consonance may reflect the audience’s cultural considerations in Aljazeera news outlets (Arabic-speaking audiences). In other words, ALJAR appears to be aware of what the audience (Arabic speakers) expects to hear in news about the Arab Spring and other regions’ political and social events. On the other hand, in ALJEN, where the audience’s scope is presumed to be more culturally diverse and universal, more general socio-cultural aspects are considered, such as the reported chants demanding political change from a monarchy to democracy. In his ethnographic research on both the Arabic and English language versions of Aljazeera, Barkho (2010) indicates that the discursive role of Aljazeera Arabic is to ‘respond to the social, cultural and religious needs of the region in which it is more influential - in the Middle East and North Africa’ (p. 128). Chapter Eight further discusses the consonance construction found in ALJAR and ALJEN and the socio-cultural consideration of the audience. The findings of the third para-linguistic feature reporting expression, namely shout in both ALJEN and ALJAR, are displayed in the next section.

### 6.2.5 *Shouting in ALJEN*

As with chanting but with stronger emotions (especially anger and sadness), paralinguistic features reporting *shout* expression have been found in the ALJEN corpora. By looking closely at the extended concordance lines (see Figure 6.2) of the verb *shout*, we can see it constructed with personalisation and proximity because it co-occurs as an action of *protesters*, *people*, *crowd*, and *demonstrators* in Sudan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Iraq, and Shouting Hills in the occupied Golan Heights. Moreover, it can be seen from shout’s concordance lines that the verb *shout* in ALJEN is constructed with negativity because it frequently co-occurs with words that have negative emotions (*anger* and *unfairness*).

To establish more about the newsworthiness construction, the concordance lines are categorised and displayed based on the country of the event where shout is reported to avoid generalisations (in terms of the proximity construction of the reported expression across the Arab Spring countries).

Starting with Sudan, after protesters were murdered, including Salah Mudathir, a 28-year-old pharmacologist who was shot dead during a protest, people shouting was constructed with personalisation and positivity, as follows:

6.40 “*Freedom, freedom.*”

6.41 *"A million Salah for a new dawn!"*

6.42 *"Killing of a student is the killing of a nation."*

6.43 *"Peace, Justice, Freedom."*

It was reported that what prompted the demonstrations was *the inflation spread around the country* (eliteness and negativity). However, another shouting voice with a distinct perspective and more personalisation construction was represented which was the voice of a named pro-regime woman (*Tahani*) who ALJEN described as *one of the hardcore supporters*, whose *faith in the rolling party is still solid and unquestionable*. In her reported shouted quotes, the Sudanese government is constructed with positivity as Tahani moves the blame from *governments* to *journalists* who, according to her, ignore the Sudanese government's supporting actions and fan the flames of unrest (in lines 6.44 and 6.45):

6.44 *"Stop asking questions about the protests and whether we support the government's actions."*

6.45 *"You journalists are just trying to stir trouble. Can't you see the government is trying to help people by selling goods at discounted prices at this market?"*

It can be seen that the two reported shouting voices in Sudan events are constructed with personalisation (a group of demonstrators and a named woman). However, they convey different final messages regarding their human demands. The inclusion of such distinct voices from the protesters might distract the audience from the essential issue of the Sudanese regime's corruption and protesters' demands.

In Tunisia, the largest post-revolution protesters were constructed with superlativeness (tens of thousands). These protesters were depicted in ALJEN as supporters of the country's Islamist-led government (eliteness and consonance), and they were shouting against the call to overthrow the post-Arab Spring elected government (the Ennahda Party):

6.46 *"No to coups, yes to elections."*

Such representations of protesters and their slogans might be perceived as a positivity construction of the Ennahda government because many people consider Ennahda a legitimate government, and any other political change demands are negativity constructed: a *coup*.

Moving from North Africa to one of the main Middle Eastern Arab Spring countries, Syria, where protester shouts were reported:

6.47 *"Your turn is coming, doctor."*

In this slogan, protesters referred to President Bashar al-Assad, who held a degree in ophthalmology and came to power in a reshuffle following his father's death (Hafiz al-Assad).

1	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 on Friday. </s></s> "Freedom! </s></s> Freedom! </s></s>" they <b>shouted</b> , according to the witnesses. </s></s> "A million Salah for a new
2	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 of the largest demonstrations since the 2011 revolution. </s></s> <b>Shouting</b> , "No to coups, yes to elections", supporters of the ruling Ennah
3	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 ine calendar, witnesses said. </s></s> "Down with Hamad," they <b>shouted</b> in reference to the king, who heads a Sunni minority regime in th
4	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 r Iran. </s></s> "Leave! </s></s> Leave! </s></s>" the protesters <b>shouted</b> at Mutlaq, who has actually been a frequent critic of Maliki. </s></s>
5	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 ant. </s></s> "The people want the fall of the regime," protesters <b>shouted</b> , in a call last heard in Sudan in June and July when scattered a
6	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 ing students is the killing of the nation! </s></s> " demonstrators <b>shouted</b> as they converged on the capital's main public bus terminal, the
7	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 said. </s></s> "Peace, justice, freedom! </s></s>" the protesters <b>shouted</b> . </s></s> About 100 demonstrators walked three kilometres from
8	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 ime. </s></s> Prices are spiking and Abdullah gambles," people <b>shouted</b> . </s></s> The Muslim Brotherhood, the country's largest opposit
9	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 sts and whether we support the government's actions," Tahany <b>shouted</b> as some journalists tried talking to people who were shopping at
10	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 he flames with shirts and water. </s></s> People could be heard <b>shouting</b> "medic" and "bring water quickly". </s></s> Israeli newspaper Ha
11	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 neck. </s></s> "Look at how they treat us, look at this! </s></s>" <b>shouted</b> an older man, banging a cane on the ground. </s></s> Most of th
12	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 democracy activists. </s></s> Al Jazeera documentary, Bahrain: <b>Shouting</b> in the Dark "A number of rioters and vandals had been arrested
13	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 </s></s> NR: Demonstrations are more than just people meeting and <b>shouting</b> slogans. </s></s> Organisers meet activists to plan the time and
14	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi fell they <b>shouted</b> "your turn is coming oh Dr! </s></s>" referring to President Bash
15	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 carrying pictures of Assad and Syrian flags. </s></s> They also <b>shouted</b> slogans warning the European Union not to intervene in their co
16	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 d threw stones at vehicles trying to pass through. </s></s> They <b>shouted</b> : "Allahu Akbar" (God is greatest), and "We will die for Allah! </s></s>
17	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 lozen pro-government demonstrators confronted the protesters, <b>shouting</b> and throwing stones before police intervened. </s></s> At least t
18	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 kingdom, no doubt, will see the hidden hand of Tehran and will <b>shout</b> that message to the rooftops. </s></s> But unless the US is in a
19	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 ever, were brutally attacked by the police even though they kept <b>shouting</b> "selmya" -non-violent demonstration. </s></s> Asser and anothe
20	<input type="checkbox"/>	① doc#0 other side. </s></s> In the earliest days of the occupation, they <b>shouted</b> , hence the name Shouting Hill. </s></s> Later on, they took to u

Figure 6.2 Concordance lines of shout as a verb in ALJEN

Calling al-Assad with his professional title indicates how such protesters discursively threatened al-Assad by shifting his identity from presidency to proficiency. This discursive strategy can be seen as a form of personalisation, as it redirects the focus from al-Assad's position of power to his individual capabilities. By doing so, protesters aim to undermine his authority and portray him as vulnerable or fallible. Here, the protesters warned al-Assad that he was the next, after the presidents of Tunisia (Bin Ali), Egypt (Mubarak) and Libya (al-Khadafi) fell.

In Syria, but in the *occupied* Golan Heights, ALJEN indexed the historical tragic story of 'Shouting Hills' and its people in the news of the Arab Spring in Syria:

6.48 "Because the Israeli occupation has torn many of the area's households into two - some 120,000 Arabs were driven from their homes in the Golan during and after the 1967 war - families sometimes gather here on the weekends to talk with relatives on the other side. In the earliest days of their occupation, they **shouted**; hence, the name Shouting Hill. Subsequently, they used bullhorns. Today some of the protesters hold binoculars. They scan the crowd in Syria, looking for their loved ones."

This interdiscursivity practice of indexing the Golan story and bringing history to the current news story might legitimise Syrian people's actions against their current government which was part of that historical event. In other words, ALJEN invoked emotions in its audience by constructing consonance by linking the current tragedy of the people in Syria (under the threat of the al-Assad regime) to their historical tragedy with the Israeli occupation of the Golan

Heights. In addition, depicting Israel as an occupier might be considered consonance backgrounding. To clarify, the representation of Israel as an occupier might be different from what is expected by the audience and what is represented in the mainstream Western media of Israel as a legitimate country. Thus, counter-consonance is constructed. These findings regarding the challenge of what is expected and the background of consonance in terms of Israel and the Arab/Palestinian conflicts are in accordance with others in this research (see Chapter Four). Chapter Eight (discussion chapter) discusses ALJEN's counter-consonance in its interdiscursive representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Moving to Egyptian protesters' shouting voices, who were described in ALJEN as *peaceful* (positivity) but *brutally attacked by the police* (eliteness and negativity):

6.49 *'Seylmya, Seylmya'* (non-violent demonstrations).

It can be seen from the above shouted quote (6.49) that ALJEN transcribed the Arabic wordings (*seylmya*) of the slogan, followed by the English translation. This intertextuality is recognised in translation studies as a foreignization of the translated text. Venuti (1996, cited in Paloposki, 2011) was the original contributor to domestication and foreignisation in translation. In terms of the discursive function of such practices, *seylmya* might be quoted directly as it sounds in Arabic because of its poetic function as a signal word, considering the genre of the word, namely, protesting slogans. In other words, the effect of the *seylmya* might be eliminated by translating the slogan. Thus, ALJEN's choice to report the words of protesters' slogans from Arabic to English as they sound initially, followed by a translation, can be seen as preserving and trans-culturing the socio-cultural components of the protesters' voices. Thus, the voices of Egyptian protests are constructed through personalisation. This practice of discursively transculturing Arab Spring events to the English language audience is a pattern in ALJEN and might reflect the role of Aljazeera English as a non-Western international reporter of Arab region events, such as the Arab Spring. Further discussion follows in Chapter Eight of the pattern of transcultural representations found in ALJEN. The findings regarding the last two paralinguistic force expressions (*cry* and *scream*) found in ALJEN (not found in ALJAR) are displayed in the following two sections (Sections 6.2.6 and 6.2.7).

### 6.2.6 *Crying in ALJEN*

All five co-occurrences of *cry* co-occurred in ALJEN as a voice of groups such as *administrators/crowds/people* who were *chanting/echoing* the '*unifying rallying cry*' of the Arab Spring. Personalisation, impact, and positivity are constructed in the *cries*' concordance lines (6.50 and 6.51) because such groups express their solidarity as people to each other by singing the Arab Spring slogan:

6.50 *Crying the rallying cry of the Arab Spring uprisings that have shaken the Middle East and toppled leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.*

6.51 *"Ash-shaab yurid isqat an-nizam" or "the people want the downfall of the regime" became the unifying rallying cry across the region as the "days of rage" overtook yet more countries.*

Also, those extractions of *cry* (6.51 and 6.52) constructed proximity by including the broad geographical landscape of the Arab Spring and represented it as a borderless movement that ‘challenged the sanctity of state borders’ (Bayeh & Baltos 2019).

It can be seen that the same practice (foreignization) found in Section 6.2.5 (line 6.49) is used again in line 6.51. To clarify, in line 6.51, ALJEN intertextually transcribed in English the Arabic slogan (as it sounds), followed by English translation. In Chapter Eight, such intertextuality practices in ALJEN are discussed and interpreted in light of relevant literature.

As mentioned above, most of the co-occurrences of *cry* in ALJEN referred to group expressions. However, the only concordance line where crying referred to a solo voice in ALJEN was the following:

6.52 “*Hassan Nasrallah,*” according to an Al Jazeera report on 25<sup>th</sup> May 2011, has called on Syrians to support President Bashar al-Assad and enter into dialogue with the government to end weeks of ongoing protests across Syria. This is a very different ***cry*** than when the democratic uprising in Iran started in June 2009 and Nasrallah readily dismissed and ridiculed it as an American plot.

In this example, eliteness and negativity were constructed when representing the voice of a Lebanese religious political leader, *Nasrallah*. In addition, negativity and consonance are constructed by showing Nasrallah’s contradictory or, as he is described in the news text as being a *hypocrite* in his positions regarding the people’s protests/protesting in the area, by being more tolerant of Syrian protesters than Iranians, as he shared a similar ideological (religious) orientation with the latter’s government/regime. To summarise, crying voices in the Arab Spring are constructed in ALJEN with personalisation, proximity and positivity when they refer to groups of people or protesters. However, voices constructed with eliteness are constructed with negativity. In the following section, an analysis of another voice and reporting expression in ALJEN, namely *scream*, is considered.

### 6.2.7 *Screaming in ALJEN*

The last paralinguistic reporting expression extracted from ALJEN is *scream* which occurred in two concordance lines. The first co-occurrence of *scream* was similar to most of the previous para-linguistic expressions (namely, *cry* and *shout*), expressing the voice of a group of protesters demanding their freedom. However, the second example of a scream is found in the following extended line (line 6.53):

6.53 “*The cruel and gruesome torture and murder of Hamza al-Khateeb was still in the offing, where "in the hands of President Bashar al-Assad's security forces," as reported by Al Jazeera, the 13-year-old boy's "humanity [was] degraded to nothing more than a lump of flesh to beat, burn, torture and defile, until the **screaming** stopped at last.*”

Looking at the extended line of 6.53, the story was a translated report by Aljazeera (the leading news channel delivered in Arabic), and the reported voice was the voice of a child victim (Hamzah al-Khateeb). According to this report, Hamzah al-Khateeb was brutally murdered by Assad’s Security Forces. Therefore, more than one news value is constructed for this example.

Both negativity and impact are constructed when describing the story of child-killing (*cruel, gruesome, murder, degraded humanity, torture, defile, beat, and burn*). Personalisation is also constructed by indicating the victim's name, age, gender, and eliteness in identifying the killers as Assad's forces. According to Muller (2002), media representation of children in political contexts is 'to create an imperative statement' (p.36). In other words, the inclusion of stories of suffering helps increase the prominence and impact of the hostile act of one of the news story actors. Thus, in this example, ALJEN, representing the voice of a murdered Syrian child, left an imperative statement in the mind of its audience regarding the brutality and unfair practices of Assad's regime against the people and their children in Syria. Thus, although the screaming voice was not found in the ALJAR corpora, it was found in ALJEN, as reported in Aljazeera Arabic. This might be due to the medium used by Aljazeera Arabic to deliver the report, namely, as a visual report on the TV rather than a written one.

To summarize the findings from section 6.2, the analysis of paralinguistic expressions in the voices of Arab Spring participants revealed similarities in the construction of newsworthiness between ALJEN and ALJAR. Both ALJEN and ALJAR portrayed the Arab Spring participants' voices using personalisation, proximity, and positivity. Furthermore, distinctive paralinguistic expressions are found in ALJEN, which are based on the specific setting of the Arab Spring. These include the construction of negativity, impact, and consonance in the voices of Bahrain's participants, which may influence the perception of protests and their demands. Moreover, the voiced participants and voices in the context of Tunisia are constructed differently depending on whether they are the pre-Arab Spring government or the post-Arab Spring government.

Additionally, the findings indicate a pattern of consonance in ALJAR, as Palestine and Jerusalem are repeatedly used in the context of Egyptian and Tunisian protests, illustrating that the Arab Spring is seen as a movement for all Arabs seeking self-determination in ALJAR. Similar consonance constructions are found in ALJEN, where the Question of Palestine is frequently interdiscursively practiced, with a subcategory identified as counter-consonance .

In Section 6.3, the findings for the second part of the voice reporting expressions investigated in this chapter, namely, Illocutionary force utterance, are presented.

### **6.3 Illocutionary force utterances in ALJEN and ALJAR**

As discussed in Chapter Three, illocutionary force utterances refer to the speaker's intention and 'entitlement' to perform the act such as promising, advising or warning (Sbisà 2001, p.1801). Such voice expression analysis is included in the current study because of 1) the relevance of those expressions to the context of the research (Arab Spring), and 2) the direct contribution of such expression analysis in answering the second research questions about the voices of news participants and the constructed news values of such voices. Thus, to look for specific expressions, three reporting expressions are chosen to be investigated as an illocutionary force utterance in Arab Spring news texts, namely *promise, threaten* and *denounce* and their Arabic equivalents (عد و waād, خوف khāwāf, ندد ndād) (see Table 6.2 below). As discussed in Chapter Three (3.3.3), the three specific voice expressions were chosen based on previous research on the construction of voices and news values (Bednarek, 2016) and the relevance of such expressions in the context of the Arab Spring.

As shown in Table 6.2 below, two of the three illocutionary force expressions (promise and threaten) are more commonly found in ALJEN than in ALJAR<sup>33</sup>. This may be due to the difference in the lexicon sizes of ALJEN and ALJAR.

However, *denounce*, as an illocutionary force utterance, is more commonly found in ALJAR and ALJEN.

Although the investigated expressions (*promise*, *threaten*, and *denounce*) are expected to be constructed with eliteness due to the variations in the participants constructed with eliteness in ALJEN and ALJAR (as found in Chapter Four and the current chapter), it is vital that the utterers of such expressions are analysed. Thus, in the following sections, the concordance lines (and extended texts, if needed) of these expressions are investigated in ALJAR and ALJEN to answer the research questions regarding voiced utterers, voice reported, and constructed news values.

<p><b>Illocutionary force</b></p>	<p><i>Promise</i> (13) <i>Threaten</i> (24) <i>Denounce</i> (13)</p>	<p><b>Equivalent of ‘promise’ (3)</b>  (3)wāād وعد (0)wāādt وعدت  <b>Equivalent of ‘threaten’ (13)</b>  (10) حذر hāthār / (2) خوف khāwāf / (0) خوفت khāwāft (1) حذرت hāthārt  <b>Equivalent of ‘denounce’ (11)</b> نددت nādādt / ندد Nādād</p>
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Table 6.2 Forms and frequencies of the three investigated illocutionary forces in ALJEN and ALJAR

### 6.3.1 Arab Spring’s Promises in ALJEN

Based on the concordance lines of *promise* as a verb in ALJEN, the voices refer to subjects who are considered official speakers such as the opposition party in Tunisia (*The National Salvation Front*), presidents/governments (*Abdelaziz Bouteflika* (Algeria), the *King of Bahrain*, *Saleh* (Yamen), *Assad* (Syria) and *Marouf Bakhit* (the new Prime Minister in Jordan). In addition, the utterers of *promises* included external officials, namely, *Obama* and *Nasrallah*.

<sup>33</sup> Although different forms of the equivalents of the target illocutionary force expressions have been searched.



Regarding constructed newsworthiness, the concordance lines that hold the *promises* of the ex-presidents in Tunisia and Yemen (*Bin Ali, Salah*) and the ongoing *al-Assad* are constructed with eliteness, negativity, and impact, as their promises' concordance lines reveal how these *promises* were not maintained. In Algeria, the Abdelaziz Bouteflika regime (which was *accused of being the most repressive*) failed to deliver the *promised modest political reforms*.

However, in Bahrain, the King's and government's *promises* of reform were represented as being met by the opposition supporters' 'promises of days of rage' and violent actions. Thus, similar to previous findings in ALJEN (see Section 6.2), eliteness, impact, and negativity are co-constructed in the representation of the protesters' construction in Bahrain's Arab Spring, who are depicted as *opposition supporters* (in lines 6.54 and 6.55):

6.54 *But the commission did blame the opposition for rejecting Crown Prince Salman's peace plan in March and for inflicting violence on both Sunnis and foreign workers. Intent on securing a key arms deal with the US, the king has committed to reforms and **promised** to replace officials who committed wrongdoing.*

6.55 *The government has also **promised** a code of conduct for the security forces.*

Such examples of constructing protesters in Bahrain with negativity (violent actions) and, conversely, constructing the Bahraini government with positivity (announcing and conducting reform) are distinct from other Arab Spring countries' representations in ALJEN. In other words, whereas in the Arab Spring (Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria) the representations of governments (especially pre-Arab Spring governments) are constructed with negativity and protesters with positivity, the opposite construction is found in Bahrain.

In Tunisia, the political opposition party called the National Salvation Front *promised to maintain pressure* on the post-revolution government (Ennahda party) after the *murder* of a member of the opposition (Mohamed Brahmi). Therefore, ALJEN constructed the *promises* voice of such opposition (eliteness) with negativity as *accusations* against the *elected government after the revolution*. In this example, it can be seen that the evaluation values (negativity and positivity) of the participants were constructed with eliteness (especially those from the opposition party) in the Tunisian context after the Arab Spring.

In Syria's revolution context, besides the failed *promises* made by the regime, two non-Syrian political voices made different *promises*, namely the US president (*Obama*) and the Lebanese political leader (*Hasan Nasrallah*). When Obama said he *was appalled for the Syrian government's use of violence against its people*, he promised to work with others to isolate President Bashar al-Assad. On the other hand, Nasrallah, in his *defense of Bashar al-Assad's murderous regime in Syria... asked Syrians for patience... and promised Assad would reform*. In addition to their reported contradictory *promises* regarding Assad's political fate, their words construct news values differently. While Nasrallah prioritised al-Assad's promised reform (eliteness and positivity), Obama focused more on the human face and the prominence of the people in Syria (personalisation and impact).

As shown above, examples from the Syrian context of *promises*' voices show the complexity of the eliteness construction in the representations of participants in Arab Spring

news. As previously discussed, this complexity might be due to the context of the news itself (Arab Spring events), where dynamic changes in power and diverse types of elites (such as overseas presidents) are involved in the collected news text (ALJEN).

Finally, the last concordance line of using *promise* as an illocutionary force expression is found in an “Arab Spring” news editorial written by Mark LeVine<sup>34</sup> (a professor of modern Middle Eastern history at the University of California). Mark LeVine shows interdiscursively how the situation and the ‘promised social reforms’ in the Arab Spring were like the 1967 non-violent protesters in America led by Martin Luther King. In this assimilation of the two revolutionary movements regarding the ultimate danger of choosing violence over a peaceful protest, LeVine cited quotes from Kings’ 1967 classic, *Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?*

6.56 *The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral, begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy. Instead of diminishing evil, it multiplies it... adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars.*

6.57 *“We are confronted with the fierce urgency of now... This may well be mankind’s last chance to choose between chaos or community.*

More than one news value was contracted when indexing Martin Luther King’s story and speech, namely eliteness, personalisation (community), proximity (American context to the English-speaking reader), timeliness (1967), and negativity (violence, weakness, darkness). In addition, assimilation between the two events might be considered a consonance construction. In other words, the combination between the two events might contribute to two meanings: 1) representing the current event (Arab Spring movement) as a ‘freedom’ and ‘dignity’ as the historical event (1967 movement), and 2) the recommendations of people conducting such current movements to learn from this history and avoid the violence to realise their ‘promised social reform.’

In the next subsection, the findings of ‘promises’ voices in ALJAR are discussed.

### 6.3.2 Arab Spring Promises in ALJAR

Unlike ALJEN, two of the three concordance lines of وعد *Wāād* (promise) in ALJAR are in the Palestinian and Israeli conflict context and refer to the promises of Trump to move the US embassy to Jerusalem. Moreover, the concordance lines of Trump’s promises have another voice as a named member of the Salafi group in Egypt and a direct quotation of his viewpoint about such promises, as shown in the following extended concordance line:

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<sup>34</sup> The author’s name is included here due to its direct relevance to the analysis of the targeted news line (see Chapter Three for more details on the analysis methods applied in this study).

6.58 المتحدث ب اسم الجبهة السلفية خالد سعيد يرى ان وعد ترمب جاء بعد مئة عام من وعد بلفور 6.58 كتوقيت متعمد يعني اتصال حلقات المؤامرة لا انفصالها، لظنها ان الحركة الاسلامية في اضعف مراحلها، و بعد ان اطمأنت لتواطؤ حكام العرب و تسليم مقدرات شعوبهم و بلادهم للأميركيين و الاسرائيليين

Translation: *The spokesman for the Salafist Front, Khaled Saeed, believes that Trump's **promise** came a hundred years after the Balfour Declaration "as a deliberate timing that means the conspiracy episodes are connected, because Trump thought the Islamic movement is at its weakest stage, and after he was reassured that of Arab rulers colluded and handing over the future of their people and their country to the Americans and the Israelis.*

Although line 6.58 does not appear to be directly related to the events of the Arab Spring because it considers the Palestinian/Israeli conflict event (the promise of moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem) by referring to the original text, this voice's line (line 6.85) is reported in a news report about a 'Jerusalem protest' in Cairo. In this report, ALJAR covered protests in Egypt after the coup in 2013 and how security forces faced protests with violence, including protests that condemned Trump's promise. It can be seen from this line and the elaborate context behind it that ALJAR constructs Trump's promise with consonance, negativity, eliteness and proximity. In other words, Trump, Israel, and governments in the Arab world are represented as working against people in the Arab world (including Egyptians and Palestinians). The findings of the co-construction of Arab regimes and Western governments with eliteness and negativity as against People and consonance in the indexing of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict in Arab Spring events are similar to other findings in ALJAR in this chapter (see Section 6.2) and others in Chapter Four (section 4.2.1.1).

In Chapter Eight, the construction of eliteness in participants and their voices in both ALJEN and ALJAR are discussed and interpreted in light of the relevant literature. The following section presents the findings of the second illocutionary force-reporting expression, namely, *threaten*.

### 6.3.3 Threatening voices in ALJEN

As shown in Table 6.2 above, the second investigation of the illocutionary force expression in this chapter is *threaten*. To ensure that this verb expression was used in the context of reporting the voices of Arab Spring participants, the concordance lines of threatening words were scanned. By examining the concordance lines of *threat* as a verb in ALJEN, the use of *threats* in ALJEN varied pragmatically. In ALJEN, *threaten* is used as: 1) a depiction of actions in the Arab Spring such as medically threatening, threatening circumstances, and 2) as an illocutionary force expression of participants such as *the Jordanian government threatened to act seriously against violence*. Because this analysis chapter focuses on the voices and constructed newsworthiness in such voices, only concordance lines that include *threaten* as an illocutionary force expression of news participants (human voices) are included. Thus, out of the 24 occurrences, seven were excluded because threatening was not used as an illocutionary force expression in those lines (see Appendix 15). In the remaining 17 co-occurrences, the diverse geographic spread of threatening in Arab Spring news stories includes Tunisia, Iraq, Jordan,

Sudan, Syria, Israel, and GCC countries. Thus, as discussed in Chapter Three, when more than one Arab Spring country is found in the target concordance lines, these countries are considered in the analysis to limit the generalisability of the findings.

Starting with Bahrain, the illocutionary force expression *threats* had been used as an act by the *Bahraini authorities* (eliteness) against *anti-government activists* (eliteness):

6.59 *Bahraini authorities have stepped up pressure on anti-government activists ahead of the elections, **threatening** those who use social media and websites to urge acts of dissent with jail.*

In this instance, unlike previous findings in ALJEN (discussed in Section 6.2 and earlier in Chapter Four), the Bahraini authorities are portrayed negatively, depicted as acting violently and threatening activists who used social media to voice their demands for reform. In another concordance line, consistent with previous findings (see Section 6.2 and Chapter Four, Section 4), consonance is established through the labelling of protesters in Bahrain as Shia, as demonstrated in line 6.60.

6.60 *Clashes in Bahrain ahead of F1 race Violence comes as protesters **threaten** to disrupt this weekend's Formula One Grand Prix with 'days of rage.' 20<sup>th</sup> April 2012, Bahraini security forces have clashed with protesters against Bahrain's controversial Grand Prix in mainly Shia villages.*

It is worth noting that the portrayal of the voices of both the government and protesters in Bahrain as threatening each other and the presence of words such as *clashes*, and *Shia villages* might have contributed to the misrepresentation of the Arab Spring movement in Bahrain as a violent and sectarian movement.

In the context of Jordan's Arab Spring, *threaten* as an illocutionary force expression is found in the following extended concordance line:

6.61 *Authorities have **threatened** to crack down on those who incite violence during protests with an 'iron fist,' while opposition groups have pledged to continue demonstrations in the kingdom.*

In line (6.61), the Jordanian authorities (eliteness) are constructed with negativity as threatening Jordanians (personalisation). In addition, the voice of the opposition (eliteness), who promised to continue protests, was reported. Such practices of reporting multiple voices constructed with eliteness in the same news story (here in the same line) might be due to the nature of the news events, namely the Arab Spring, where different voices constructed with eliteness (such as *government*, *opposition*, and *activists*) are expected to be represented. From newsworthiness perspectives, both voices refer to participants constructed with eliteness. However, the authorities' voice in Jordan is discursively constructed with negativity as threatening to act cruelly, compared to the construction of positivity for the opposition who are keen to continue such demonstrations. This example (and similar others above and in Chapter Four) of the sub-variation of eliteness construction of participants and their voices in ALJEN might refer to the nature of the Arab Spring context, where the power distribution was experiencing dynamic changes.

In Sudan, the threatening voice is constructed with eliteness and proximity because it refers to President Omar al-Bashir, who had already dismissed the opposition's calls for an Arab Spring-style uprising in Africa and:

6.62 *Threatening that "a burning hot summer" awaits his enemies.*

In line 6.62, the voice was given to al-Bashir to express his dismissal and threatening approach towards the Arab Spring movement in Sudan and to describe such protesters as the *opposition* and *enemies* rather than people who were protesting for their rights. Thus, in such voice representation, the Arab Spring protests in Sudan were constructed with eliteness, rather than being represented as a human-faced movement (personalisation is backgrounded). In addition, the direct quotation of al-Bashir's figurative language "a burning hot summer" might be interpreted as legitimising violent actions against Sudanese protesters (his enemies). This finding of voiced participants in the Arab Spring in Sudan is in line with others in Chapter Four (section 4.3.1), where the eliteness constructed participants in ALJEN are constructed with impact and less negativity compared to other governments in other Arab Spring settings.

In Syria's Arab Spring context, *threats* were used to express acts of violence against female activists:

6.63 *In Damascus and private universities, I have met many female activists and organisers, including Alawites and Druze. Some have been arrested or threatened.*

In line 6.63, the threatening voice is reported without referring to the person who is threatening. Instead, receivers of such threats (female activists and organisers) are included. This absence of the source of the threat might be due to the complexity of the political situation or the power distribution in Syria's Arab Spring, including regime, opposition, and external intervention. According to constructed newsworthiness, personalisation (*female activists and organisers*), consonance (*Alawites and Druze*), and impact and negativity (*arrested or threatened*) were constructed. It can also be seen from the previous line (6.63) and its surrounding context (by looking at the extended line) that ALJEN includes information about how Syrian women from different ideological backgrounds communicated with each other during the protests (*liberals are always welcomed when they visit more conservative opposition strongholds*). In such representations, ALJEN constructs unexpectedness (*women in demonstrations cover their faces, not out of tradition but to protect their identities*) and challenges the value of consonance (Sectarianism in Syria). Also, positivity is constructed when representing the solidarity between Syrian protesters who are socially/culturally characterised as liberal and conservative. Thus, it can be said that in representing protesters in Syria, ALJEN constructed protesters with personalisation and positivity. In addition, the West's media consonance construction of protesters' representations, especially women and sectarianism, which includes the co-construction of negativity, is challenged. Furthermore, positivity is constructed by representing people in Syria with solidarity and coexistence. This is an important finding because it contributes to the re-conceptualisation of News Value theory and its application in cross-cultural and cross-lingual contexts (non-Western English news discourse). In other words, it is interesting to find that ALJEN challenges the construction of consonance,

namely Western media's stereotypical representations of women and sectarianism in the Arab world. Further discussion follows in Chapter Eight (section 8.2.2).

Section 6.3.3 presents the threatening expression findings as an illocutionary force expression in ALJAR (6.3.4).

### 6.3.4 Threatening voices in ALJAR

Compared to the co-occurrences of the illocutionary force expression *threaten* in ALJEN (17 times), only three co-occurrences were found in ALJAR. The Arab Spring's settings of *threatening* co-occurrences were Tunisia and Syria.

In Tunisia, two *threatening* voices refer to the post-Arab Spring Tunisian Prime Minister (Hamadi Jebali):

من ناحية ثانية هدد رئيس الوزراء التونسي ب الاستقالة ما لم يقبل حزبه وأحزاب اخرى اقتراحاته 6.64 باختيار حكومة مؤقتة من التكنوقراط.

Translation: *The Tunisian Prime Minister threatened to resign unless his party and other parties accepted his proposals to choose an interim government of technocrats.*"

"فيما هدد رئيس الوزراء التونسي حمادي جبالي اليوم السبت ب الاستقالة ما لم يقبل حزبه حزب 6.65 حركة النهضة واحزاب اخرى اقتراحاته اختيار حكومة مؤقتة من التكنوقراط.

Translation: *On Saturday, Tunisian Prime Minister Hammadi Jebali threatened to resign unless his party, the Ennahda Movement, and other parties accepted his proposals to choose an interim government of technocrats.*

In both threatening co-occurrences, eliteness (Jebali, Ennahda, parties, government of technocrats), impact and negativity (resign) were constructed. However, threatening as an illocutionary force expression in those two lines (6.64 and 6.65) was within the government and has no clear human-faced impact or personalisation compared to the co-occurrences of threatening in ALJEN above, where it is linked directly to the people and has a consonance such as Islamist government and secularist opposition. This difference between ALJEN and ALJAR might reflect how the domestic political crisis in Tunisia was represented by Arabic-speaking Aljazeera audiences with less sectarian rhetoric than the English version (Aljazeera English).

The third and last co-occurrence of threatening in ALJAR were found as a voice of external participants,<sup>35</sup> namely the US and Russia, against the war crimes of al-Assad's regime:

وارتكب النظام -وفق تقارير متواترة- أعنف المجازر هذا العام، ومثلت مجزرة الغوطين 6.66 في اب الماضي أكثر وأعنف مجزرة راح ضحية ها نحو 1500 معظم هم من الاطفال والنساء، وهي المجزرة التي هددت واشنطن على اثرها بعملية عسكرية ضد النظام، قبل ان يعقد الطرفان -بوساطة روسية- صفقة توقف العمل العسكري، و تسلم بموجبها دمشق أسلحتها الكيميائية.

<sup>35</sup> An external participant refers to an actor in Arab Spring news who is considered socially and politically distant from the Arab Spring events.

Translation: *According to persistent reports, Syrian regime committed the most violent massacres this year. One of them was the massacre of Ghouta on 21st of last August which represented the most violent massacre in which 1,500 people had been killed, most of whom were children and women. As an action, Washington **threatened** to conduct a military operation against the regime before the two sides (Washington and Damascus), through Russian mediation, concluded a deal stopping any military action, and Damascus surrendered its chemical weapons.*

Although the values of personalisation, superlativeness, negativity and impact are constructed in line 6.66 (1,500 people, most of whom were women and children, were killed in the massacre), the focus of threatening as an illusionary force expression is constructed with eliteness (Washington, Syrian regime, and Russia). This line also shows how such crimes went unpunished because of political agreements between internal and external powers in Syria. This line's co-constructed news values, namely eliteness, negativity, and proximity of the external participants in the event of the Arab Spring, are in line with other findings in the Syrian context.

In the following section, the findings of the final illocutionary force expression, 'denounce', are discussed.

### **6.3.5 Denouncing in ALJEN**

As shown in Table 6.2 above, the illocutionary force expression (denounce) co-occurred 13 times in ALJEN. Looking at the concordance lines of denounce, the voiced utterers vary and include politicians, demonstrators, protestors, activists' groups, lawyers, and countries such as Iran. In addition, denouncing expressions were found in more than one Arab Spring setting, including Sudan, Bahrain, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia.

In Sudan, the voice of denouncing refers to Osman Taha, the First Vice President of Sudan, during the first stages of the Arab Spring (from July 2011 to December 2013). Taha was reported as denouncing the violence during the protests in Sudan. By looking at the surrounding context of this news line, it is apparent that the voice of denouncing was the statement from the First Vice President reported by the official Sudanese newspapers, which were the only five newspapers to reach kiosks that day due to the 24-hour Internet blackout. According to the news report, other newspapers in Sudan at that time were either prevented from publishing by security agents or had decided not to print in protest at the state's attempts to steer the coverage.

In this example, the denouncing expression of Osama Taha (eliteness) was opposed to the acts of violence in protests (negativity and impact). However, this statement did not address the actors in that violence, either police/governmental forces or protesters. The absence/exclusion of actors of violence in protests might reflect the dominant group's opinions and values about the movements in Sudan and how violent acts are found because of those protests (by co-occurring with it as *violence* and *protests*). Fairclough (2003, p.149) claims that "there are many motivations for exclusion, such as redundancy or irrelevance, but exclusion may be politically or socially significant". In this context, the absence of violent actors from the discourse surrounding protests suggests that the dominant group may seek to downplay or distance themselves from the association between violence and protest movements in Sudan. By excluding these actors, the dominant group can shape the narrative in a way that aligns with their own perspectives and maintains a favourable perception of the protests. Further discussion of the patterns of eliteness

foregrounding and personalisation backgrounding in representing Arab Spring participants and voices in Sudan in ALJEN are discussed and interpreted with reference to the relevant literature (see Chapter Eight).

Unlike Sudan, in Morocco, the denouncing voices of *pro-reform* protesters and demonstrators were found five times in the corpora. The denouncing voice is constructed with personalisation, superlativeness and proximity and refers to *thousands of protesters* who took to the streets in more than one city in Morocco against the new constitution vote because such a constitution would enhance the king's power (eliteness and negativity). In addition, in reporting the protesters' voices, the figurative language used negatively evaluates the uselessness of the new constitution (*window-dressing*):

6.67 *The February 20 Movement, a pro-reform group, had called for a boycott of the vote, **denouncing** the new constitution as a superficial gesture that would leave the king's power intact and stave off real change.*

6.68 *Morocco protesters reject reform vote and February 20 Movement **denounces** 98 per cent support for Friday's referendum as a sham.*

6.69 *The February 20 Movement, which has organised months of demonstrations calling for reforms in the Arab world's oldest reigning monarchy, has **denounced** the new constitution as window-dressing.*

In Iraq's protests, protesters were constructed with consonance as *Sunni*, and their denouncing voice was against the *sectarian* government led by al-Maliki. Al-Maliki's government is constructed with eliteness, impact and negativity.

6.70 *During Friday's protests in the northern city of Mosul, around 3,000 demonstrators took to the streets to **denounce** what they called the sidelining of Sunnis.*

6.71 *Iraq Sunnis block trade routes in new protest. Tens of thousands of protesters gather in Anbar province to **denounce** allegedly sectarian policies of PM Nouri al-Maliki.*

Another similar representation of the Arab Spring protests as a movement of one dominant social sect against a government led by another social minority sect was in Bahrain:

6.72 *Police stayed away from Friday's demonstration as protesters **denounced** King Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa and Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, his uncle.*

6.73 *Iran, a leading Shia country, has repeatedly **denounced** the Bahraini government's crackdown on the Shia - while Saudi Arabia has remained Bahrain's closest ally.*

The second line (6.73) of the denouncing voices in Bahrain's Arab Spring is constructed with eliteness and proximity, as they refer to two countries: Iran and Saudi Arabia. The inclusion of these countries' voices and actions added evidence to consonance construction in the ideological representation of Bahrain's protests as a sectarian clash between Shia and Sunni in



Bahrain and beyond, rather than Bahraini people who seek their rights just like protesters in other Arab Spring counties.

In the following section, denounce as a voice expression is investigated in ALJAR to establish the similarities and differences in voice constructions between ALJEN and ALJAR.

### 6.3.6 Denouncing voices in ALJAR

In ALJAR, the illusionary force expression (denounce) was used to report the voices of individuals and groups in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. In Egypt, two of the denouncing voices are called anti-coup demonstrators who are described in the news text as holding the picture of the deposed elected president, Mohammed Morsi and the 'Rabia Sign' ( يحملون صورة الرئيس المنتخب (المخلوع محمد مرسي وعلامة رابعة). Those protesters were denouncing "the price rise policies of the government as it is harmful to people who are in need" (تضر بالفقراء ومحدودي الدخل) and demanding the release of detainees (الإفراج عن المعتقلين). The other denouncing voice refers to Egyptian demonstrators who denounced "the Israeli aggression posed in Gaza" (العدوان الإسرائيلي على غزة). Thus, it can be said that in the Egyptian context, the protesters' voice of denouncing ALJAR is co-constructed with both personalisation (human-faced demands) and eliteness (political demands) as anti-coup demonstrators and the depiction of their raising of the ousted president (Mursi). The presence of protesters as denouncing in the news might be considered the empowerment of such people's voices. Furthermore, consonance is constructed in the indexing of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict in the news of the Arab Spring in Egypt by depicting demonstrators' voices denouncing Israeli aggression. This practice is found to be a frequent pattern in (interdiscursive indexing of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict).

The sole individual denouncing voice in Egypt in ALJAR refers to "an academic and a founder of the 6th of April movement Izz al-Din Fashi" (اكاديمي ومؤسس حركة السادس من ابريل عز (الدين فاشي). In his denouncing voice, eliteness, negativity and impact are constructed as he denounced the "prejudices and narrow-minded policies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt" (تعنت الإخوان المسلمين في مصر بأرائهم و "اختفاء" الحوار وسوء الإدارة) and asked for "an inclusive national agreement that satisfies all, including those who are not in the government" (اتفاقا وطنيا على أساس (قواعد ثابتة تطمئن من هم خارج السلطة والمتخوفين من التهميش).

In Bahrain, the denouncing voice is constructed with eliteness because it refers to the government, namely, the Minister of Information (Samira Rajab) and the government's spokenwomen. Samira, in her interview with the AFP (Agence France-Presse: French Media Agency), *denounced* the 'foreign fuel' (وقود خارجي) (a metaphor referring to external interference) in Bahrain's 'crisis' and confirmed that the "government's doors are always open to discussion to reach to an agreement" (أبواب الحوار مفتوحة للوصول إلى توافقات).

It can be seen that, unlike Egypt, in Bahrain, the denouncing voice is that of the government; thus, eliteness is foregrounded. Also, the voice of the Bahraini government constructs *Shia* protesters with negativity as formed for the external agenda (Iran). Furthermore, the government in Bahrain is constructed with positivity by representing it as welcoming and ready to negotiate. These findings are in accordance with other ALJAR findings in Chapter Four, where in Bahraini contexts, protesters are constructed with negativity (violent action and conspiracy with Iran), whereas the government is constructed with positivity (proposing political and social reforms). In Chapter Eight, such patterns of negativity and positivity construction

among the Bahraini Arab Spring participants and voice representation are discussed with reference to the empirical literature.

In Tunisia, an angry voice constructed with eliteness refers to the country's outgoing president (Hamdi Jabali, who was the Prime Minister of Tunisia from 2011 to 2013). The Denouncing voice from Hamdi Jabali was against the French Minister of the Interior's (Manuel Valls) statement regarding Tunisia as a country after the Arab Spring. Manuel reported saying that "Tunisia has not been a model for the Arab Spring because of its Islamic fascist dictatorship" ("تونس لم تكن نموذجا للربيع العربي بسبب دكتاتورياتها الفاشية الإسلامية"). Hamdi denounced such "flagrant interference" (التدخل السافر) in Tunisia's internal affairs and the Tunisian government received such a statement as an unfriendly act.

In Hamdi Jabali's denouncing voice, proximity (France), eliteness (Manuel Valls), and negativity (flagrant interference) were constructed. Furthermore, in this example of Tunisian denouncing, consonance was constructed when representing French officials' statements as an imperialistic practice. Such consonance and negativity foregrounding found in Western officials' representations are in accordance with other ALJAR findings in Chapter Four. Chapter Eight discusses and interprets this discursive practice of constructing consonance in Western officials' representations in Arab Spring news in ALJAR with reference to the relevant literature.

Also, in Tunisia, three concordance lines hold the denouncing voice of Rashid Ghannouchi who constructed with eliteness (referring to his position in the Ennahda Political Party) and consonance (described as "The Islamic leader" (الزعيم الاسلامي)). In all three concordance lines, Ghannouchi denounced the killing of the opposition party member (Chokri Belaid) and emphasised that Belaid was not the only member who had been a victim of the series of assassinations. Rather, there were others, such as two Sheikhs from Tablighi Jamaat (a non-political religious group in Tunisia) and a figure from the Constitutional Party (one of the main political groups in Tunisia). Along these lines, Ghannouchi tried to push away the rumours raised by the opposition's demonstrations by representing the killing of Belaid as a repetitive act that affected all Tunisians from all parties. Thus, in his denouncing voice, Ghannouchi deconstructs eliteness and constructs personalisation, negativity and impact by shifting the appraisal of Chokri Belaid's assassination from being a political issue (Ennahda's responsibility). Rather, he constructs the event of assassination with personalisation and represents it as a national issue that affects all Tunisians.

In ALJAR, the sources of denouncing voices refer to news participants constructed with eliteness (government officials) in Tunisia (post-Arab Spring government) and Bahrain (spokespersons of the government). However, in Egypt, the power to denounce voices is given to protesters who demand better human rights and living conditions. This finding is in accordance with others regarding the eliteness co-construction in Bahrain and Tunisia, where more voices and positivity constructions are found in government representations. Such findings are discussed and interpreted with reference to the literature in Chapter Eight.

## 6.4 Summary

This chapter investigates how news participants' voices in the events of the Arab Spring were represented by two news resources, ALJEN and ALJAR, which belong to the same news institution but deliver news in different languages (English and Arabic, respectively). This chapter compares the linguistic representations and discursive newsworthiness of the voices of

participants across the two languages to examine the extent to which they vary. The chapter focuses on paralinguistic and illocutionary force expressions of voice, such as chanting, cheering, crying, and denouncing which are considered expressions of participants' emotions and opinions.

The analysis reveals several key findings regarding the construction of news values in ALJEN and ALJAR's coverage of voices in the Arab Spring events. Divergences emerge in reporting on Bahrain's protests. In ALJEN these are constructed with consonance, negativity and impact as sectarian Shia-Sunni struggles, whereas protesters garner eliteness over personalisation. By contrast, ALJAR emphasizes protesters' grievances over poor conditions and rights. ALJAR also exhibits more religious rhetoric in recounting protest chants than ALJEN does, reflecting consonance differences. ALJEN adopts a more universalist tone, intensifying personalisation by transcribing Arabic chants. Its representation of certain groups like Ennhada may construe positivity, where their political change demands could be seen as Negative by some audiences. Challenging mainstream Western media, ALJEN's references to Israel as occupier construct counter-consonance. This backgrounding of expected consonance reflects the differing Arab/Palestinian conflict perceptions of its diverse audience. Notably, ALJEN uniquely constructs the Bahraini government with positivity via reform promises, unlike other Arab Spring regimes. Sudanese and Bahraini governments also garner voice and eliteness, while Bahraini protesters gain negativity as sectarian. Both corpora reveal interdiscursive indexing of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, ALJEN constructs unexpectedness in representing Syrian women and coexistence in Syria. Meanwhile ALJAR spotlights protesters' calls for rights, largely avoiding sectarianism.

In summary, the analysis reveals ALJEN and ALJAR's similar and different news values constructions, with interdiscursive practices and dissimilarities reflecting their differing Arabic and English audiences.

## Chapter Seven: The Discursive News Values in the Representations of the Voices of News Participants' in BBCEN and BBCAR

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates how the *participants' voices* in the news during the Arab Spring were represented in BBCEN and BBCAR. As mentioned in the methodology (see Chapter Three), both BBCEN and BBCAR belong to the same news institution but deliver news cross-lingually, namely, in English on BBCEN and in Arabic on BBCAR. In the current thesis, as noted in earlier chapters, a comparison is made between the same news institution resources across languages to examine the extent to which linguistic representations and discursive newsworthiness vary depending on the language of the news. The chapter therefore establishes how news participants' voices in the events of the Arab Spring are represented, and whether the constructed newsworthiness of the voices of those participants' representations differs across BBCEN and BBCAR.

As discussed in Chapter Three, the term 'voice' in the context of the current study refers to reported speeches in news texts, such as directed and undirected quotes from participants in the Arab Spring news events. The voice expressions analysed in this chapter are divided into two types: paralinguistic and illocutionary force expressions. Under each expression category, there are cross-lingual expressions which are 'chant', 'cheer', 'scream' and 'cry' as paralinguistic expressions, and 'threaten', 'promise' and 'denounce' as illocutionary force expressions. As discussed in Chapter Three, the selection of these specific voice expression types was motivated by the context of the data (the events of the Arab Spring, where the voices of protesters and governments are expected to be represented). Thus, throughout this chapter, the aim is to investigate these voices in the collected corpora and answer the remaining part of the second research question and related sub-questions:

2. How are the news values discursively constructed in the cross-lingual representations of the participants' voices during the Arab Spring events in BBCEN and BBCAR?
  - a. Whose voice?
  - b. What has been reported?
  - c. What are the constructed news values?

To answer this question (including its sub-questions), the following steps were followed.

1. The concordance lines of the assigned paralinguistic and illocutionary force's voice expressions (displayed above) are collected from BBCEN and BBCAR using Sketch Engine's corpus linguistics tool online program and translated (from Arabic to English in BBCAR) and (if applicable) organised based on the Arab Spring event's setting of the voice to avoid generalisation.

2. The analysis of the participants' voices is presented in this chapter by looking at their co-text meaning in their (extended) concordance lines using the News Values Approach (Bednarek and Caple 2017). It is worth noting that following Bednarek and Caple (2017) and Bednarek et al. (2020), the ten news values (eliteness,

personalisation, consonance, proximity, superlativeness, negativity (or positivity), impact, timeliness, and unexpectedness) are not used as a checklist. Rather, the analysis of voices starts by examining the linguistic representations of the voiced participants and their voices, and then such representations are explained in light of the nine news values. Additionally, because some findings from the previous BBCAR and BBCEN (Chapter Five) suggest a variation in the construction of two news values (namely, producer-proximity and producer-consonance in BBCAR), such findings were considered when analysing the voices of the news participants in this chapter.

To display the findings and analysis, this chapter comprises two main parts: Paralinguistic Expressions (Section 7.2) and Illocutionary Force Expressions (Section 7.3). The findings of the assigned voices under these two main parts are displayed as sub-sections (e.g., 7.3.1 *chanting voices in BBCEN*, 7.3.2 *Chanting voices in BBCAR*), compared, and further investigated across the two corpora (BBCEN and BBCAR).

Notably, owing to the relatively small frequencies of voice expressions found in both BBCEN and BBCAR, the main corpus tool used to analyse the voice representations and the constructed newsworthiness in this chapter are lists of the concordance lines of the target expressions. In addition, extended text was included when needed.

Finally, the voice expression equivalent terms in Arabic are both written in Arabic and Romanised to make it easier for the reader to follow. When displaying examples from both BBCEN and BBCAR in the analysis text (data examples are in italics, either within the analysis lines or as separate lines), they are numbered in a sequence across the corpora (for example, 7.1, 7.2...). The targeted expression is in bold and underlined to make it easier for readers to find and follow.

## 7.2 Paralinguistic expressions in BBCEN and BBCAR

As discussed in Chapter Six (ALJEN and ALJAR Arab Spring participants' voices), paralinguistic expressions in the media are those reporting expressions that indicate paralinguistic aspects of the utterances (Bednarek 2006, p. 58) such as cheering or shouting. The para-linguistic reporting expressions namely *cheer*, *chant*, *cry* and *shout* and *scream* and their equivalents in Arabic *yahtif* (يهتف), *yuradid* (يردد), *yabki* (يبكي), *yaseeh* (يصيح) and *yasrough* (يصرخ) are analysed to establish what the voices of the participants are in BBCEN and BBCAR and the news values constructed in them. The selection of these expressions is based on their relevance to the research context, namely, the Arab Spring as a socio-political event where the voices of protesters are expected to be represented (e.g. chants, cheers, and crying).

In the following section, each paralinguistic expression's concordance lines are discussed in light of this question regarding the voices of the participants of the Arab Spring events (see Section 7.1). The newsworthiness (Bednarek and Caple 2017) of the representations of these voices has also been discussed. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the context of each concordance line is considered when discussing the findings, considering the specifics of each Arab Spring country, including its news event participants, to avoid overgeneralisation, wherever possible.

### 7.2.1 Chanting voices in BBCEN

In BBCEN, the paralinguistic expression *chant* appeared 15 times, compared to 10 occurrences of its equivalent *yuradid*<sup>36</sup> (يردد, ردد, رددت, تردد) in BBCAR. As shown in Table 7.1 below, the shared settings for chants in both corpora are Tunisia, Egypt, and Gaza. In addition, the frequently voiced participants and the news values with *chants* in the BBCEN corpora are protesters and personalisation, respectively.

Corpus	Settings	Spoken participants	Related news values
BBCEN	Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Algeria and Gaza	Protesters	Personalisation
BBCAR	Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Gaza and the West Bank	Protests, Marches Participants, Salafists, Ordinary Muslims, Bearded, Youths, Shia, Copts	Personalisation, Personalisation Socio-cultural Categorisation)

Table 7.1 ‘Chant’ as a paralinguistic reporting expression in BBCEN and BBCAR.

In the following section, the 15 concordance lines of *chant* in BBCEN are analysed. As shown in Table 7.2 below, 15 concordance lines in the form of sentences are displayed and numbered to make it easier to refer back to the analysis.

In the first three concordance lines in Table 7.2 below (lines 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3), *chant* co-occurred as an expression of *protesters* in Tunisia. In the first concordance line (7.1, Table 7.2), *protesters* chanting expressed *dissatisfaction* with the two governments. The naming of those governments in BBCEN was based on their ideological orientations, namely *secularist-led government* and *Islamist-led administration*, rather than their official political names (*Nidaa Tunis* and *Ennahda*).

In the following two concordance lines (7.2 and 7.3) the ‘chanting’ is represented figuratively as the *stirring stanza* that started in Tunisia and spread to other Arab countries (*Egypt and beyond*). This ‘chant’ metaphor (in line 7.2) shows the solidarity between Arab Spring countries’ *protesters* in their movements during the years of the Arab Spring. Further evidence of the ‘solidarity’ between Arab Spring protesters is found in line 7.3 where the protesters in Tahrir Square (Egypt) chanted Anti-Ghaddafi slogans.

<sup>36</sup> As discussed in Chapter Three, different forms of voice expressions (verbs) were searched in the Arabic-language corpora due to the limitations of verb lemmatisation in Arabic within Sketch Engine.

In lines 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3, besides the personalisation (*we, protesters*), superlativeness (*momentous*), timeliness (*Nearly three years ago, was chanted*), proximity (Egypt and beyond), eliteness and negativity (Anti-Gaddafi) are constructed in the representation of Arab Spring protesters' cross-border chanting for shared demands for reform and a better life (*'we want the downfall of regimes'*). Moreover, eliteness, consonance, and negativity were constructed to represent Tunisia's current and previous governments.

<p><i>7.1 Protesters <b>chanted</b> about their dissatisfaction with both the current secularist-led government and the previous Islamist-led administration, blaming them for letting the attack happen.</i></p>
<p><i>7.2 Nearly three years ago, this stirring stanza was <b>chanted</b> on the streets of Tunisia and echoed in Egypt and beyond as the momentous events known as the Arab Spring unfolded.</i></p>
<p><i>7.3 Even the <b>chanting</b> was the same: "We want the downfall of the regime!"</i></p>
<p><i>7.4 Anti-Gaddafi protesters <b>chant</b> slogans in Egypt's Tahrir Square.</i></p>
<p><i>7.5 Protesters <b>chanting</b> in the street in the northern Moroccan city of Al-Hoceima after the death of a fishmonger.</i></p>
<p><i>7.6 Demonstrators in al-Hoceima expressed support for Mr Zefzafi who took to the streets to <b>chant</b> "the state is corrupt" and "we are all Zefzafi," the AFP news agency reported.</i></p>
<p><i>7.7 <b>Chanting</b> protesters crowd the streets during a demonstration against corruption, repression and unemployment in the northern city of al-Hoceima.</i></p>
<p><i>7.8 Protesters in al-Hoceima have been <b>chanting</b> slogans against corruption and unemployment.</i></p>
<p><i>7.9 BBC Arabic's Mohammad Osman in Khartoum says that around 500 people took to the streets of Jabra, an area in the southern part of Khartoum, <b>chanting</b> "peaceful, peaceful" to stress their non-violent nature.</i></p>

<p><b>7.10</b> Egyptian protesters <b>chant</b> anti-government slogans in Tahrir Square in Cairo. Five months after Hosni Mubarak left power, many worry Egypt's revolution may be stalling. "The very time that millions of Egyptians were celebrating their freedom was the moment I lost my freedom".</p>
<p><b>7.11</b> On one side of the campus, young women in a vibrant range of coloured headscarves and bling sunglasses <b>chanted</b> for unity. On the other side, young men rode on each other's shoulders, waving Palestinian flags.</p>
<p><b>7.12</b> Arbeen Syrian protesters burn the image of Bashar al-Assad. A crowd is filmed burning President Assad's picture <b>chanting</b> "Leave!"</p>
<p><b>7.13</b> One YouTube video from Friday shows protesters <b>chanting</b> "Freedom, no fear after today."</p>
<p><b>7.14</b> "Revolution, revolution. Rise up Hauran" <b>chanted</b> the mourners in Deraa, administrative capital of the strategic Hauran plateau, as they marched behind simple wooden coffins of Wissam Ayyash and Mahmoud al-Jawabra. "God, Syria, freedom. Whoever kills his own people is a traitor" they were quoted as saying by Reuters news agency.</p>
<p><b>7.15</b> Algerian protesters <b>chant</b> slogans during a demonstration in Algiers.</p>

Table 7.2 Concordance lines of chant in BBCEN

In the subsequent four concordance lines of Table 7.2 above (7.4, 7.5, 7.6, and 7.8), the expression 'chant' is found in the Moroccan context. Such lines construct superlativeness (*thousands of large-scale protesters*), proximity (*Al Hoceima*), and timeliness (*1 November 2016 and 28th May 2017*). The demands of these protesters are constructed with personalisation (condemning the death of *a fishmonger/fish seller*, the arrest of activists, corruption, and unemployment).

In addition, by looking at the extended context of concordance line 7.4 (Table 7.2), the *fishmonger/fish seller* whom the protesters chanted about was killed by Moroccan security forces. The formulaic language used in BBCEN to express the killing (*the death of a fishmonger*) might be seen as a normalisation of the killing by calling it 'death' and backgrounding the actor of that killing. However, in the same news article, the expression 'crushed to death' was used to



intensify the representation of the Moroccan government's violence against ordinary people and to justify protesters' demands for change. The representation of the protesters' demands is also found in the direct reported voice from protesters who quoted the words of a prisoned activist, Mr. Zefzafi (in line 7.6, Table 7.2). Thus, eliteness is deconstructed and personalisation is foregrounded in the presentation of Moroccan protesters' chanting voices.

In covering Sudanese protests' chants (as shown in concordance line 7.9, Table 7.2), BBCEN constructs such movements with positivity when quoting the protesters' chanting slogan "peaceful, peaceful." In addition, both superlativeness (*around 500*) and personalisation are foregrounded by showing the human face of the protest and referring to protesters as *people*. However, the protesting socio-political demands are de-represented in their reported chants; rather, the focus is on quantifying them and evaluating their act in the field of protesting as *non-violent in their nature*.

In line 7.10 (see Table 7.2 above), the protesters are constructed with proximity (*Egyptian protesters, Tahrir Square*), and their *chants* are constructed with eliteness (*anti-government slogans*). In addition, by looking at the extended context around concordance line 7.10 (see Table 7.2) and the description of the protesters' chants, another voice was reported. This solo voiced participant is constructed in BBCEN with personalisation because it refers to an Egyptian woman, a 20-year-old Salwa Hoseini. The voice of Salwa is constructed with negativity and consonance by comparing her freedom situation (as an Egyptian woman) to millions of Egyptians. Salwa's voice is in line with stereotypes about women's (constrained) freedom in the Arab world, including Egypt.

Similarly, the following line (line 7.11) shows BBCEN personalisation and consonance construction in female voices in the Arab Spring (here in Gaza). The caption of these women's appearances (*young women in a vibrant range of coloured headscarves and bling sunglasses*) and how they were on one side of the university building and the young men were on the other side constructs the consonance and, in accordance with the stereotypical representations of Arab women's appearance and the two sexes socially interact in the Arab World. From lines 7.10 and 7.11, it can be seen that, in BBCEN, the representation of women as Arab Spring news event participants and their reported voices are constructed with personalisation (the human face of the story), negativity and consonance (the media representation of Arab women in the West). In Chapter Eight, this underlying pattern is discussed in detail along with other supporting findings from Chapter Five and is interpreted considering the related arguments in the literature.

In the following concordance lines (7.11, 7.12, and 7.13), Syrian protesters' chants are constructed with positivity by representing these chants as direct ("*Leave!*", "*Freedom, no fear after today*", "*Revolution, revolution. Rise up Hauran*"<sup>37</sup> and "*God, Syria, freedom. Whoever kills his own people is a traitor*"). In such chants, protesters construct al-Assad with negativity and impact. In addition, by directly quoting the protesters' chants, it can be seen that their demands are to be free and have better living conditions. In addition, the lexicon of these slogans features certain words that reflect how they perceive and legitimise their movement by calling it a revolution and uniting between three words (*God, Syria, and Freedom*). Because slogans 'reveal something about the contentious processes of meaning-making within movements that produce them' (Colla 2013, p.38), it is important to refer back to the original slogan (in Arabic).

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<sup>37</sup> A city in the Hauran region of southern Syria.

Doing so revealed that the original slogan was taken directly from a famous song ( " الله، سوريا، حرية وبس", *Allah, Sorya, Hurriah Wa 'bas*" and the literal translation is: Only Allah, Syria and Freedom). This slogan can be recognized as a reflection of how the people are positioning themselves and their movement as a divine, nationalistic, and democratic revolution. It also demonstrates the intertextuality of their voices, as they incorporate religious, patriotic, and democratic discourses into their protest language. Additionally, the inclusion of such a culture-specific slogan in BBCEN (as reported by Reuters' agency) might be considered as a construction of the consonance news value, while also serving as an example of how intertextual elements from protesters' voices are integrated into the Arab Spring event's coverage. In Chapter Eight, such patterned practices in representing protesters' culture-specific slogans are discussed and interpreted further in light of the literature.

Negativity is another value constructed through the representation of the angry actions of protesters (burning President Assad's picture) and sadness (mourners). In addition, by looking at the surrounding context (by extending the concordance lines in Sketch Engine), BBCEN described the Syrians' chants as *insults at President Bashar al-Assad and other snipers* and *very vocal*. In such examples of protest-chanting, the focus is shifted from what the protesters want (their demands and why they are protesting) to the description of their chanting (what they are doing). Smith et al. (2001) claim that featuring protesters' violence and arrests tends to result in biased coverage concentrating on the protests' events rather than the underlying issues. In Chapter Eight, this shift of protester presentation from their demands to their acts is discussed in relation to Protest paradigm theory which examines how the media can marginalise protests by drawing attention away from the concerns raised by such movements.

In the following section, the chanting and cheering voices in BBCAR are analysed.

### 7.2.2 'Chant' and 'Cheer' voices in BBCAR

As displayed in Table 7.1 at the beginning of this chapter, *the chants* co-occur in BBCAR in ten concordance lines. However, due to the interchangeable meaning between the expressions 'cheer' (يهتف) and 'chant' (يردد) in Arabic and the fact that 'cheer' (يهتف) is only found in one concordance line in BBCAR, the analysis of both expressions is included in the same sub-section (7.2.2).

The only concordance line of *cheer* expression in BBCAR was in the news article titled: 'A protest marches against the killing of Osama Bin Laden showing solidarity with the Arab revolutions.'<sup>38</sup> In this line, the 'chant' voice of the protesters are constructed with consonance because they are described as a *group of Salafis and ordinary Muslims* who protested in front of the American Embassy in Cairo after the killing of Osama Bin Laden by American forces (see Figure 7.2). Although Salafism<sup>39</sup> is part of the socio-political culture of Egypt, the naming strategy 'ordinary Muslim' (Muslim A'adi مسلم عادي) is unusual in Arabic socio-cultural discourse and might be a translated term from the original language of the news text (English).

<sup>38</sup> The news headline is included in the concordance line due to its essential contribution to the analysis.

<sup>39</sup> Salafism is an Islamic reformist movement that emerged in Egypt in the late 19th century in response to Western European imperialism. It advocates for a return to what it considers the pure practice of Islam based on the example of the Salaf (early Muslim predecessors).




Figure 7.1 Screenshot of the extended concordance line of cheering voice (يهتف yāhtf) in BBCAR

The translation of the chanting slogans reported in the extended concordance line shown in figure 7.1 is as follows.

- 7.1 “Osama, Osama, on the Path of God”
- 7.2 “He is not a terrorist”
- 7.3 “The people want the martyr Osama”
- 7.4 “He lived as a hero and died as a martyr”

In these concordance lines, the representations link this extremists’ protest, and the Arab Spring protests, possibly because this protest occurred at the same time as the Arab Spring protests. In addition, such representations can be interpreted from an interdiscursivity perspective. As discussed earlier, Interdiscursivity as discursive practice refers to “the use of elements in one discourse and social practice which carry institutional and social meanings from other discourses and social practices” (Candlin & Maley 1997, p. 212). Thus, this interdiscursive representation of extremist protests as part of the Arab Spring events holds a conventional meaning, namely the hostility, aggressiveness, and extremism characteristics of such a movement and thus constructs it with negativity. To clarify, such practices of interdiscursivity of extremists’ protests and chants in representations affect the perceptions of the peaceful and non-ideological synchronous movement of the Arab Spring.

Similar to the representations of the Salafi Protesters’ ‘cheering’ above, one ‘chanting’ concordance line in BBCAR constructs the representations of the chanting protesters with consonance and superlativeness:

7.5 (ردد مئات الشبان الملتحين شعارات تطالب ب الحرية)

Translation: *hundreds of bearded youths chanted freedom slogans*

The consonance construction is realised in the description of protesters as being *bearded* (mūltahēn ملتحين) which has a socio-cultural reference in Islamic and Arab culture, where wearing beards signifies men as religious/conservatives. Thus, referring to protesters as bearded represents their sociocultural identity as religious or conservative. Looking at the extended context of this concordance line, the protest was called and organised by a socio-political party in

Jordan, namely the Muslim Brotherhood<sup>40</sup>. Thus, the description of the protesters as ‘bearded youths’ indicates to the reader how those protests are not for all people with diverse socio-cultural orientations but dominated by ideology-oriented groups, namely Islamists. As mentioned above, such patterns of Arab Spring protest representations in BBCAR might influence the perceptions of such movements as specific social factions or conservatively arranged demonstrations rather than movements involving the general population.

The remaining co-occurrences of chanting as a reporting expression in BBCAR were based in Tunisia (3), Bahrain (3), Kuwait (1), Egypt (1), and Palestine (1). In Tunisia, protesters’ chants were:

7.6 " تونس حرة "

Translation: "*Tunisia is Free*"

7.7 " وداعا للدكتاتورية "

Translation: "*Goodbye Dictatorship*"

7.8 " مرحبا بالحرية "

Translation: "*Welcome to Freedom*"

In such chants, both positivity and impact are constructed in terms of the Arab Spring’s influence on freedom in Tunisia. In Bahrain, the protesters who ‘chanted’ are constructed with consonance as *Shia*, and the protesters who chanted slogans are constructed with eliteness (political demands) to ask for democracy, the release of political detainees, and the resignation of the Bahraini Prime Minister.

Similar to the consonance construction of protesters as ‘Shia’ in Bahrain, Egyptian protesters are categorised in BBCAR as Copts (akbāt قباط), who chant:

7.9 " بالروح، بالدم نفديك يا بابا "

Translation: "*We sacrifice our soul and blood for you, Pope*"

7.10 " كلنا فداك يا كنيسة "

Translation: "*We scarify ourselves for you, Church*"

7.11 " مسلم + مسيحي = مصري "

Translation: "*Muslim + Christian = Egyptian*"

In addition to the personalisation construction in expressing their attachment to their religion, Copt protesters construct their slogans with positivity when forming their national identity with the other religious component in Egypt (Muslims).

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<sup>40</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) is a transnational Islamist movement founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, combining religious, social, and political objectives.

In the Kuwaiti context, where protests were constructed with superlativeness when described in BBCAR as the largest in Kuwait history, more than a hundred thousand protesters chanted:

7.12 "لن نسمح لك"

Translation: "We won't allow you"

In this slogan and its extended text, the protesters construct their voice with personalisation when expressing their unwillingness to accept the government's political actions against the "Bedoun" (a stateless minority in Kuwait) and the arrest of activists such as Muslim Albarak.

In Palestine, the voice of *participants* in *protest marches* in the West Bank and Gaza is represented as they 'chant' slogans confirming their right to return to their home (referring to the 'Nakbah' Day<sup>41</sup>). In the same line, such demands for rights are represented with eliteness (as the main point of contention between the Israeli and Palestinian sides), consonance, personalisation and proximity (how millions of Palestinians who live in refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan are waiting for the day when they can return):

7.13 ورفع المشاركون في هذه المسيرات اعلام فلسطين، ورددوا شعارات تؤكد على  
لديارهم، اذ لا يزال ملايين من الفلسطينيين يعيشون في مخيمات اللاجئين في الاردن حقمهم في العودة  
وسورية ولبنان، ويطالبون ب حق العودة، وهو ما يعد أحد أبرز نقاط الخلاف بين الجانبين الاسرائيلي  
والفلسطيني

Translation: "The participants in these marches raised Palestinian flags and **chanted** slogans affirming their right to return to their homes, as millions of Palestinians still live in refugee camps in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and they demand the right to return which is one of the main points of contention between the Israeli and Palestinian sides."

It is important to highlight that the connection between these protest marches and the historical backdrop of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in BBCAR can be understood through an interdiscursive lens. The interdiscursive portrayal of the longstanding and ongoing relations between Israel and Palestine serves to provide insight into the grievances expressed by protesters, as it relates directly to the target audience (Arabs). This conflict holds significant importance and constitutes a substantial part of the socio-political history and culture of Arab audiences, making it a pertinent topic for discussion and analysis.

In summary, it can be said that in both BBCEN and BBCAR, protesters' chants are represented from the different settings of the Arab Spring movements. While BBCEN referred to the chanters as protesters in most of the settings, BBCAR used more socio-political and religious characterisations of them such as 'Salafists,' 'Shia,' 'Copts,' and 'bearded youths.' This characterisation of protesters might refer to the audience's social and cultural proximity to the news context (the Arab Spring). In other words, because the main audience of BBCAR is expected to be those living in Arab Spring countries, such representations are influenced by the sociocultural structures of those societies. These characteristics are much more specific because

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<sup>41</sup> Nakba Day (from Arabic: النكبة, al-Nakba, 'the Catastrophe') commemorates the displacement of approximately 700,000 Palestinians following the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948.

the assumed background knowledge of the readers will be aware of these differences. By contrast, BBCEN may not assume that readers are aware, for example, that Copt refers to a Christian group in Egypt. This point might be supported by the frequent construction of consonance in the concordance lines of ‘chant’ in BBCAR, where issues such as Shia and Copts minorities and Israeli/Palestinian conflicts are represented within the context of the Arab Spring. In BBCEN, consonance and negativity are constructed when reporting the ‘chant’ and voices of Arab women, which is in accordance with the Western stereotypical representation of Arab women. Debbagh (2012) stated that international media often portrays men from specific Eastern nations, particularly those in the Arab Middle East, in dominant or hegemonic positions, exhibiting superiority and being burdened with responsibility. Conversely, women are depicted as having secondary status, primarily assigned to domestic duties. In Chapter Eight, In the Discussion Chapter, this finding will be analysed further to explore how the BBC's representation of gender roles in the Arab Spring protests may reinforce or challenge these stereotypical portrayals, and the potential implications of such representations on the audience's understanding and perception of gender dynamics in the Arab world.

In the following section, the findings of another paralinguistic voice, namely ‘shouting’ is displayed.

### 7.2.3 ‘Shouting’ voices in BBCEN

The paralinguistic expression *shout* in BBCEN co-occurs in four concordance lines regarding Arab Spring event news in Tunisia (3) and Saudi Arabia (1). Starting with Tunisia, the ‘shouting’ voices are constructed with personalisation because they refer to *unemployed graduates, crowds, and people*. The voices of those news participants are constructed with personalisation, elitence, and impact (their voice demands jobs that the government resigns, and those responsible for killing people and protesters are held accountable):

7.14 *Unemployed graduates shout slogans during a demonstration urging the government to provide them with job opportunities, in Tunis*

7.15 *On a cold rainy day, Placards rise from angry crowds thronging the streets of the capital. In Arabic they shout "Erhal" (Leave!). In French it's "Degage."*

7.16 *“No member of our family could believe he was dead; it was a big, big surprise. But it was also a surprise to see all these people with Mohamed's big picture taking to the streets and shouting his name and crying.”*

It is worth noting that the representation of protesters’ shouting voice in both Arabic and French can be understood as an intertextual practice. Looking at the extended text of line 7.15 above, *French* also mentions:

7.17 *Charming French cafes along the boulevard are full, mainly with unemployed young men. On a cold rainy day, a commemoration for a trade union leader quickly descends into a political protest.*

It can be seen from this extended line (7.17) that French influence on Tunisian life is indexed. In such interdiscursivity practice, both proximity and consonance are constructed. To

clarify, due to the cultural nearness of the French to the audience, proximity is established. Furthermore, consonance is constructed in the interdiscursivity of France as an influencer of Tunisian life, as a culture that is present in their movement. Such consonance construction in indexing the cultural influence of France on the Tunisians can be considered an Orientalist<sup>42</sup> practice. To clarify, this finding of representing the French cultural manifestations (*luxury French cafes, Boulevard and “Degage”*) on the Tunisian protesters (who are represented as *mainly unemployed young men*) is in accordance with Orientalist discourse, particularly the Orientalist idea of a static Orient compared to the active and modern West (Said, 1978). Furthermore, such representations and consonance construction is in accordance with the stereotype of the Orient’s continual need for the ‘modern’ West to jump to democracy.

The remaining *shouting* concordance line (7.16) in BBCEN is part of a narration of Saudi women explaining women’s socio-political status and suffering in Saudi Arabia:

7.18 *And as a woman, your appearance alone is enough to get you into trouble. “I was **shouted** at by a man from the notorious religious police, the Organisation for the Prevention of Vice and the Promotion of Virtue, who claimed that my abaya (woman's robe) was not fastened properly”.*

In this extended concordance line, personalisation (*Saudi women*), eliteness (*religious police*), and negativity (*to get in trouble*) are foregrounded. Consonance is constructed here because this story of female oppression is in accordance with the representation of Arab women, particularly Saudi women, in Western media. Middle Eastern Arabs, especially Saudi women, have frequently been portrayed in Western media as oppressed and passive (Alqunayir 2019; Guta and Karolak 2015), along with the portrayal of the conservative and male guardianship system in Saudi Arabia.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, similar to the finding above (line 7.15 and its extended text in line 7.17), such representation and consonance construction can be interpreted considering Orientalism theory (Said, 1975, 1997). Here, the representation of the shouting voice of Saudi women can be regarded as being influenced by the Orient’s representations of Arab women as victims and oppressed.

In the following two sections (7.2.4 and 7.2.3), the analysis of news values includes an examination of the last two BBCEN paralinguistic expressions, namely screaming and crying.

#### 7.2.4 ‘Scream’ in BBCEN

The two concordance lines (7.19 and 7.20) of *scream* in BBCEN are quoted from a narrative by Mohammed Bouazizi’s mother (the person recognised as a catalyst of the Tunisian Revolution):

7.19 *The other three agents also started beating him. Mohamed was crying, **screaming** and pleading with them but they wouldn't stop.*

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<sup>42</sup> Orientalism, as theorised by Edward Said (1978), refers to a Western construct that represents and depicts the Arab world through a colonial lens based on stereotypical and essentialist assumptions about Arab peoples and cultures.

<sup>43</sup> This concordance line is from an article published on 30 May 2014, prior to significant political reforms regarding women's rights and empowerment in Saudi Arabia.

7.20 Only solution, Mohamed asked to see the governor, but the police prevented him from entering the building. Again, he pleaded, cried and **screamed** but still they refused. All the doors closed before him.

Here, personalisation is foregrounded in the representation of Bouazizi's screaming voice, narrated by his mother. On the other hand, eliteness (*three agents, the governor, the police*), negativity and impact (*started beating him, prevented him from entering the building, still they refused*) are foregrounded in reporting the actions of the police and the governmental agents against Bouazizi's screaming voice.

### 7.2.5 'Cry' in BBCEN

Similar to the previous paralinguistic expression (*scream*), six out of seven co-occurrences of *crying* in BBCEN are found in the story of Muhammad Bouazizi, as narrated by his mother. As seen in Figure 7.3, the first four concordance lines of 'cry' are reported as voices of Bouazizi in his interaction with the police and governmental forces, where personalisation (*crying pleading, pleaded, screamed*) is constructed.




Figure 7.2 Concordance lines of 'cry' in BBCEN

Similarly, personalisation and impact are also foregrounded in the fifth concordance line (see Figure 7.2) because it holds the suffering and grieving voice of Mohammed's family after his death. Similarly, when reporting the people 'crying' in the sixth concurrence line (see Figure 7.2), personalisation (*people crying*), positivity and impact (*it was a surprise*) are constructed in representing the inspiration of the people's solidarity with Muhammed and his family.



The remaining concordance line (line 7 in Figure 7.3) of the crying voice in BBCEN is also found in the representation of the story of a Tunisian son who is constructed with negativity and impact as a *radicalised young fighter* who joined the *Islamist rebels in Syria*. The concordance line (line 7 in Figure 7.3) reports the *heart-broken mother's voice crying* when she looks at her son's picture. In addition to constructing the mother's voice with personalisation (*her only son*), proximity, negativity and unexpectedness are also constructed in this story of a Tunisian fighter who travels abroad to fight in another country (Syria). In the following section, the analysis of screaming and crying voice equivalents in BBCAR is presented.

### 7.2.6 'Scream' (yasrukḥ (يصرخ) in BBCAR

The paralinguistic expressions, 'scream' (yasrukḥ (يصرخ) is found in four concordance lines in BBCAR:

7.21 في وجه مشعل بنبرة ملؤها الغضب تصرخ

"وماذا تقولون لأولئك الجنود الذين يقتلون"

"تفكيركم غير صحيح"

Translation: *She screamed furiously at Zohair Mashal<sup>44</sup> in the press conference room. The woman was questioning while screaming at Mashal by saying: What do you think about the soldiers who are killed? You are wrong.*

7.22 وتصرخ بانها من بنغازي وأنها تعرضت للاغتصاب الجماعي من قبل عناصر امنية، وحاولت عرض قصتها قبل ان يقتادها مسؤولون الى الخارج ب القوة

Translation: *She screamed that she is from Benghazi and that she had been gang-raped by Qaddafi's security agents. She tried to present her story before being forced out of security.*

التي بدأت تصرخ وتقاومهم قائلة ان ها تريد من الصحفيين رؤية " وحشية نظام القذافي بأنفسهم 7.23

Translation: *She started screaming and resisting, saying that she wanted the journalists to see "the brutality of the Gaddafi regime."*

Remarkably, the voiced participants in all the concordance lines of 'scream' referred to women, where consonance is constructed. To clarify, representing women as screaming in news events is in accordance with the stereotypical representation of women in the Arab media as weak and vulnerable (Al-Malki et al. 2012). It can also be seen from these lines that the setting for all women's 'screaming' voices is journalistic.

In the first concordance line (line 7.21), the paralinguistic expression scream (tasrukḥ (تصرخ) co-occurs two times. The representation of the voiced participant in this line is constructed

<sup>44</sup> Zohair Mishal is quoted in the article as a self-identified 'field leader of the Popular Movement' who had been released from prison two weeks before the interview.

with eliteness because it refers to a woman who is represented in BBCAR by referring to her job as a journalist in the Public Authority for Syrian Radio and Television, rather than her name. Also, negativity is constructed in the representations of such voiced participant as a “furious journalist” (In Arabic: صحفية غاضبة). Regarding voice, this woman’s reported questions and comments are constructed with eliteness (politically oriented questions), criticising the ideology of Mishaal (a member of an opposition party) in his political thoughts and opinions about the revolution in Syria as a member of the opposition. It is worthy of note that the expression reported (تفكيركم غير صحيح, the literal translation is “your way of thinking is wrong”) as being said by this journalist is not common in the Arabic language (more specifically in Modern Standard Arabic that is used in journalism). However, by referring to the extended text of this line, this concordance line (line 7.21) is found in *The Sunday Telegraph* news report titled, “The Turning Point in Syria” (الصنڨاي تليغراف: نقطة التحول في سوريا). Thus, the news stories here were translated from a British newspaper source, and the reported voice was translated into Arabic from English. This finding is in accordance with others in Chapter Five, where Western (especially British) newspapers were key resources in the representation of Arab Spring news. From a critical perspective, the findings from BBCAR, indicating a significant dependence on external sources for news coverage, could align with the stereotypical portrayal of Western news sources as being more independent and reliable. This practice of relying on British-based media found in BBCAR might also be a form of internalized Orientalist discourse, where the perspectives and narratives of the West are privileged over those of the Arab world (Said, 1978). Consequently, this construction may involve the commencing of sub-news values, namely producer-consonance<sup>45</sup> and producer-proximity<sup>46</sup>.

Similarly, the other two concordance lines of screaming voice in BBCAR (lines 7.22 and 7.23) refer to an unnamed woman who entered a press conference room in Tripoli (Libya) in the presence of attending foreign journalists (producer-proximity). This woman screamed and expressed her anger toward the journalists because (according to the extended concordances and the full news text, See Appendix 16) she would like her voice to be heard about the brutality of the Khaddaffi regime. In such a voice representation, impact, eliteness and negativity are constructed to represent the violence of the Gaddafi regime and its effect on the lives of people in Libya. On the other hand, personalisation (a woman) and eliteness (foreign journalists) were constructed. Furthermore, by referring back to the extended text, similar to the previous concordance line (line 7.21), this story has been reported and translated from the British newspaper *The Observer*. Thus, producer-proximity is constructed. In addition, producer-consonance can be considered a constructed news value because the representations of such women’s voices are in accordance with Orientalism’s stereotypical representations of Arab women’s oppression and vulnerability, and the need for the West to rescue them (Said 1978). Such findings of BBCAR representations and news value construction of the Arab Spring news participants and voices from a Western perspective are discussed with reference to the literature in Chapter Eight.

To summarise the findings from section 7.2, the examination of paralinguistic expressions in the representations of Arab Spring participants revealed similarities between

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<sup>45</sup> The term 'producer-consonance' refers to the cultural consonance of the news source (the BBC as a British-based news organisation) rather than that of its target audience (Arabic-speaking consumers).

<sup>46</sup> The term 'producer-proximity' refers to the cultural and geographical proximity of the news source (the BBC as a British-based news organisation) rather than that of its target audience (Arabic-speaking consumers).

BBCEN and BBCAR. Notably, the analysis revealed that personalisation and proximity are significant factors employed by both news outlets to depict Arab Spring participants. Furthermore, the construction of superlativeness is prevalent in BBCEN, highlighting the frequent emphasis on the number of voiced protesters such as cheers and chants. Additionally, it is apparent that the BBCEN highlights the violent actions of the protest participants during the Arab Spring events across various settings rather than giving prominence to their demands. This emphasis on violence overshadows the portrayal of their grievances by BBCEN.

Regarding female voices, the findings revealed a consistent pattern of the co-construction of personalisation and consonance in both BBCEN and BBCAR. Furthermore, shared patterns of personalisation and consonance were observed in representations of Arab Spring participants as Shia, Salafists, and Islamists by both BBCEN and BBCAR. These findings potentially indicate the presence of shared ideologies underlying the portrayal of Arab Spring News. The reason behind the similarities in newsworthiness construction between BBCEN and BBCAR could be attributed to BBCAR's reliance on translated Western news resources, as mentioned in this chapter and other references in Chapter Five. Further interpretation of these findings is presented in Chapter Eight.

### 7.3 Illocutionary force expressions in BBCEN and BBCAR

As stated in Chapter Six, the illocutionary force expressions examined in this thesis refer to acts that show the presence of the voice creator in the text and “make explicit the speaker’s (assumed) purpose” (Bednarek 2006, p. 57). Thus, the included illocutionary expressions are the same as those analysed in Chapter Six (see Chapter Six, Section 6.3), namely ‘promise’, ‘threaten’ and ‘denounce’ and their equivalents in the Arabic language: ‘ya’eid’ (يعد), ‘yohdid’ (يهدد) and ‘yunadid’ (ينادي). The co-occurrence concordance lines in BBCEN and BBCAR are discussed in the following sections.

#### 7.3.1 Promising voices in BBCEN

There are 14 co-occurrences of ‘promise’ in BBCEN. By reading such concordance lines, they co-occurred in various Arab Spring settings and included different voiced participants. Thus, such concordances are first categorised based on their Arab Spring setting (see Table 7.3 below) to maintain the focus of analysis of the voices and voiced participants and limit the generalisability of the findings.

Arab Spring setting	<i>Promise (extended) concordance lines</i>
General Arab Spring events	<p>1. <i>The Arab Spring <b>promised</b> much, but thus far it has achieved little.</i></p> <p>2. <i>If that fails to happen, the <b>promise</b> of the Arab Spring will be unfulfilled.</i></p>

<p>Tunisia</p>	<p>3. The government of <b>Ennahda</b> is on its last legs these days after it failed to achieve its electoral <b>promises</b> starting from reaching a final draft of the constitution to improving the economic situation.</p> <p>4. After elections to a constituent assembly, the winning <b>Ennahda</b> party - though allied to the Muslim Brotherhood - <b>promised</b> to be inclusive and brought in several liberal elements into its interim administration.</p> <p>5. Yusra Ghannouchi, <b>Ennahda's</b> international spokeswoman: Two years ago, Tunisia's revolution for freedom and dignity was inspirational, sparking the <b>promise</b> of an Arab Spring.</p>
<p>Tunisian refugees in Italy</p>	<p>6. <b>Mr Berlusconi</b> flew to Lampedusa in late March and <b>promised</b> to move the migrants to the mainland. The arrival of the migrants has also created problems at the heart of Europe.</p> <p>7. Along with a string of <b>promises</b> to buy a house in Lampedusa, build a golf course and plant trees (he has not yet done any of these), <b>he</b> did <b>promise</b> to send large ships to remove migrants to the mainland.</p>
<p>Egypt</p>	<p>8. The protesters are demanding greater political and economic change, and accuse both President Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist movement to which he belongs, of betraying the <b>promises</b> of the revolution.</p>
<p>Syria</p>	<p>9. We met the president and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They <b>promised</b> to give us our land back, but they haven't kept their word.</p>

	<p>10. <i>President Bashar al-Assad and his Baathist government have come up with a wide range of conciliatory decisions and <b>promises</b> that look good on paper.</i></p> <p>11. <i>President Assad invited Hamza's father and family to talks in Damascus on Tuesday and <b>promised</b> a full investigation into the death.</i></p>
Yemen	<p>12. <i>According to a Yemeni journalist who follows the balatija closely, the Saleh regime used poor youths from marginalised areas and brought them to the capital, Sanaa, to suppress dissent. In return, they received a daily wage, a meal and the <b>promise</b> of being hired by the security forces later.</i></p>
Morocco	<p>13. <i>"It's the first time in Morocco that the king was openly criticised, and they didn't shoot people," says Maati Monjib, a political historian at the university of Rabat. Instead, the monarchy's response was to <b>promise</b> changes including rights guarantees and more powers for the parliament.</i></p> <p>14. <i>The government has recently pledged to implement major development projects in Rif. However, continuing demonstrations show that there is little trust in these <b>promises</b>.</i></p>

Table 7.3 Concordance lines of promise in BBCEN

It can be seen from Table 7.3 above that the first two occurrences of *promise* in BBCEN are preceded by 'Arab Spring,' which functions as the subject of the verb 'promise'. In such lines, negativity and impact are constructed to represent the outcomes of the Arab Spring revolution.

In the following three concordances (lines 3, 4 and 5 in Table 7.3), the expression 'promise' co-occurs as a voice of the Tunisian post-Arab Spring elected government (the Ennahda Party). In the first two concordances (lines 3 and 4 in Table 7.3), Ennahda's (the post-

revolution government) ‘promises’ of inclusiveness and economic reform representation are constructed with negativity and impact (*is on its last legs, failed to achieve its electoral promises*) in terms of their fulfilment. Furthermore, consonance is constructed by portraying Ennahda as making promises to be inclusive despite its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood (line 4 in Table 7.3). In such representations and consonance construction, the positivity construction of Ennahda’s promises (to be inclusive and brought in several liberal elements into its interim administration) is backgrounded by the indexing of Ennahda’s affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is noteworthy that the Muslim Brotherhood as a participant in the Arab Spring is constructed with negativity, in contrast with Ennahda’s promises of inclusiveness. Because this finding is similar to others in BBCEN, further discussion follows in Chapter Eight regarding the construction of negativity and consonance in the representations of the Muslim Brotherhood as a participant in the Arab Spring in BBCEN.

In the third setting of *promises* in BBCEN (see Table 7.3), elements of eliteness and proximity (geographical) appear to be constructed when reporting the voice of the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, who made promises regarding Tunisian migrants after the Arab Spring events in Tunisia. In these specific instances (lines 6 and 7 in Table 7.3), the Tunisian migrants in Italy seem to be represented as objects (*moved, removed*), which may contribute to constructing negativity. An examination of the extended text of these ‘promising’ concordances suggests that they occur in an article titled: "Italy's Lampedusa left in crisis after Arab Spring" where the Tunisian migrants appear to be represented as part of a crisis stemming from the Arab Spring. Based on previous research, such potentially dehumanising language in news reporting about migrants/immigrants could potentially lead to negative responses and attitudes towards these groups (Utych 2018; Esses, Medianu and Lawson 2012). These observations appear to align with findings in Chapter Five, where negativity emerged as one of the main news values that seemed to be constructed in the representations of Arab Spring events in the BBCEN.

In the Egyptian Context (line 8 of Table 7.3), the voice of promise refers to revolution which is represented as having been betrayed by the Muslim Brotherhood and President Mohammed Morsi. In this line, there is personalisation (*protesters are demanding greater political and economic change*), eliteness (*Mursi, Muslim Brotherhood*), and impact and negativity (*accusing, betraying the promises of the revolution*). Consonance is constructed in the indexing of the Muslim Brotherhood as an affiliation with President Mohammed Morsi (*the Islamist movement to which he belongs*).

In Syria, the voice of *promises* refers to the Syrian president (Bashar al-Assad) (lines 9 and 10). In line 9 (see Table 7.3), the *promises* made by Assad and his government are constructed with negativity (*look good on paper*). Consonance is also constructed when referring to al-Assad’s government as *Baathist*. In line 10, al-Assad and his promises are constructed with eliteness, impact and positivity (*invited Hamza's father and family to talks, **promised** a full investigation*). However, this line refers to *Hamza*, a 13-year-old child tortured by al-Assad’s security forces. Thus, this line distances al-Assad from the action of Hamza’s murder and further represents the ‘killing’ of Hamza as a *death* to be *investigated*.

In the Yemeni context (line 12, Table 7.3), the promising voice of *being hired by the security forces late* refers to the *Saleh regime*, who made promises to poor *youths from marginalised areas* to use them *to suppress dissent*. Thus, in such a promising line, personalisation is foregrounded in representing the story of the illegal exploits of the youths by the Yemeni president (Salah). Also, eliteness (Saleh regime, Yemeni journalist) is co-constructed

with negativity and impact. Meanwhile, unexpectedness can be seen as constructed values in the Arabic transliteration of the Arab Spring's political and cultural name (*balatija*) which referred to 'thugs' who were hired by the embattled leaders in Arab Spring countries (such as Egypt, Syria and Yemen) to illegally attack and disperse protesters. By referring to the full-text article of this line, the role of those thugs is represented (named *balatija* in Yemen, *baltagia* in Egypt, *Shabiha* in Syria, and *rubata* in Sudan) in the battle between the regimes and the protesters/activists and how this naming became part of the Arab Spring lexicon.

The last context of the concordance lines of *promise* in BBCEN is Morocco where two *promise* concordance lines are found (lines 13 and 14 in Table 7.3). Line 13 refers to a Moroccan academic quote on the progress made in terms of freedom of speech and human rights in Morocco. In this academic voice, the *promise of change, including rights guarantees and more powers for parliament*, refers to the *monarchy* after the Arab Spring movement in Morocco. The constructed values in line 13 (see Table 7.3) are eliteness (*Maati Monjib, a political historian at the University of Raba, the king, monarchy's*), positivity, and impact (*they did not shoot people, changes, rights guarantees, and more powers for the parliament*).

However, in the second line of 'promise' in the Moroccan context (line 14 in Table 7.3), the *promises* made by the government (eliteness) are constructed with negativity (*continuing demonstrations show that there is little trust in these promises*). Furthermore, personalisation and positivity are foregrounded in representing the reactions of *Rif people* and *Barbers* to such promises and how people, namely Berbers, *became increasingly vocal about their longstanding grievances*.

Thus, it can be said that in the Moroccan context in BBCEN, the promises made by the government and the King were represented as being perceived with positivity construction when evaluated by the eliteness constructed voice (a political historian at the University of Rabat) but with negativity when evaluated by the personalisation constructed voice (Rif people and Barbers). The next section analyses the promising voices found in BBCAR.

### 7.3.2 Promising voices in BBCAR

The only concordance line of promising (*yaeid* يعد) found in the BBCAR refers to Oman's Sultan Qaboos who is represented as a Sultan who made socio-political changes:

لقد اقال السلطان 12 وزيرا ورفع الحد الادنى ل الاجور ووعده ب توفير 50 ألف منصب  
عمل 7.24

Translation: *The Sultan dismissed 12 ministers, raised the minimum wage and **promised** to create 50,000 jobs.*

The response to changes in Oman followed the 2011 Omani protests as part of the revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring. In this line, eliteness and positivity are constructed when reporting the response of Oman's sultan. Additionally, the impact is foregrounded in the presentation of positive changes in salaries and job opportunities.

In the next two sections (7.3.3 and 7.3.4), the second illocutionary voice expression, namely *threaten*, is considered.

### 7.3.3 Threatening voices in BBCEN

In BBCEN, ‘threaten’ as a verb co-occurs in 11 concordance lines. Due to the variable Arab Spring contexts of such concordances, they are initially categorised based on their settings (Arab Spring countries, as shown in Table 7.4 below). Then, the voiced and voice representations and constructed newsworthiness of each setting are discussed separately to focus on the analysis and limit any generalisation.

Arab Spring setting	Concordance lines of <i>threaten</i>
Bahrain, Syria and Yemen and Arab Spring in general	<p>1. <i>The Bahrain, Syrian and Yemeni rulers are potentially the next leaders whose grip on power may be <b>threatened</b> by the Arab Spring.</i></p> <p>2. <i>The spirit of assertive demands for rights and freedoms swept the region and <b>threatened</b> its dictators.</i></p>
Tunisia	<p>3. <i>Economic 'winter' <b>threatens</b> Tunisia's Spring.</i></p> <p>4. <i>The assassination of two prominent left-wing politicians <b>threatened</b> to spill over into a broad civil <b>conflict</b>. The <b>murders</b> were taken as a sign that the <b>Islamists</b> in the country would <b>stop at nothing</b> to achieve political dominance. The <b>anti-Islamist opposition</b> walked out of the constitutional assembly.”</i></p> <p>5. <i>Belaid had warned there was a climate of <b>systematic violence</b> sweeping across the country and <b>threatening</b> the revolution's many gains.</i></p> <p>6. <i>It (Ennahda Party) had <b>threatened</b> to vote against the government if it was not given cabinet posts.</i></p>



<p>Morocco</p>	<p>7. <i>Nasser Zefzafi will be tried for "<b>threatening</b> national security," prosecutors say.</i></p>
<p>Gaza</p>	<p>8. <i>Armed men who said they were from Hamas's internal security forces raided the offices of the Reuters news agency as well as CNN and the Japanese broadcaster NHK. At the Reuters office, one journalist was beaten on the arm with an iron bar. Another was <b>threatened</b> with being thrown out of the window from the ninth floor.</i></p>
<p>Bahrain</p>	<p>9. <i>On the government side, the fear in the streets is matched by a deep alarm that the whole system of tribal family rule is <b>threatened</b>. And Saudi Arabia, linked to Bahrain by a causeway running west, has a powerful stake in the status quo.</i></p>
<p>Egypt</p>	<p>10. <i>The senior generals who took over from Mr Mubarak said they would not use violence against protesters but still made <b>threatening</b> noises against "division and disobedience" and urged citizens to confront misleading rumours."</i></p>
<p>Syria</p>	<p>11. <i>Under pressure from events in the southern city of Deraa that are <b>threatening</b> to spiral out of control, President Bashar al-Assad and his Baathist</i></p>

	<p><i>government have come up with a wide range of conciliatory decisions and promises that look good on paper.</i></p>
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*Table 7.4 Concordance lines of threaten as a verb in the BBCEN and their Arab Spring setting*

In the first concordance line (line 1 in Table 7.4 above), the threatening expression represents how the governments in three countries (Bahrain, Syrian, and Yemen) are *threatened* by the Arab Spring revolutions and how such movements had already overthrown some of those dictators. Besides eliteness (*leaders whose grip on power*), proximity (*Bahrain, Syrian and Yemeni*), timeliness (*the next*) and impact (*threatened by the Arab Spring*) are foregrounded in this *threaten* concordance line.

In the next context of *threaten* (lines 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Table 7.4 above), namely, the Tunisian Arab Spring, negativity and impact are constructed in the representations of the threats in post-Arab Spring socio-political life. The sources of *threat* represented are the economic situation, assassinations of politicians, and violence in Tunisia. Moreover, in such lines, the *threateners* in the Tunisian post-Arab Spring era are represented as *Islamists* who are obsessed with being in power. In addition, the opposition is named anti-Islamists in line 4 (see Table 7.4 above). Thus, consonance, impact and negativity are foregrounded in the representation of the post-Arab Spring government in Tunisia as Islamists who threaten the Tunisian revolution as well as people’s security and rights which is in accordance with the negative representation of Islam and Islamists in Western media. This finding aligns with previous research that has documented the prevalence of stereotypical portrayals of Muslims in Western news media (Richardson, 2004; Poole, 2009; Baker et al., 2013; Baker 2023), often framing Islam and Islamists as a threat to Western values, democracy, and security.

In the Moroccan setting (line 7 in Table 7.4), *threaten* is found in a direct quote by prosecutors about an activist named *Nasser Zefzafi*, who was arrested on suspicion of being responsible for organising protests. Eliteness (*prosecutors*) and personalisation (*Nasser Zefzafi*) were constructed. In addition, in the reported prosecutors, negativity and impact are foregrounded in the representation of the Moroccan prosecutors’ argument about organising protests posing a threat to national security in Morocco.

In the context of Gaza (line 8 in Table 7.4), the ‘threatening’ voice in this line refers to Hamas’s security forces, which are constructed with eliteness and negativity. Hamas’ security forces are represented as violent against *illegal* protests, human rights activists, and global news journalists. In addition, proximity and unexpectedness are foregrounded in the naming of journalists’ institutions (CNN and Reuters) and the description of the violent act against Reuters journalists. In the Bahraini context (line 9 in Table 7.4), the Arab Spring protests are represented as a ‘threat’ to the governments’ tribal systems in other Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia. In addition to the negativity and eliteness values, the proximity value was also constructed to represent the political influence of the Arab Spring protests.

In the Egyptian context (line 10 in Table 7.4), the voice of the threat refers to the senior generals who admit *threatening* against "division and disobedience." In this line representation, eliteness (*Mubarak, senior generals*), timeliness (*took over*), and positivity (*they would not use violence against protesters*) were constructed. On the other hand, personalisation is foregrounded as being threatened to not disobey and *confront misleading rumours*.

In the final context, namely Syria (line 11 in Table 7.4), the 'threatening' voice refers to Deraa City's demonstrators who were protesting against Assad and his government. Eliteness, consonance (*Baathist government*) negativity (the idiom: *look good on paper*) are constructed in the representation of Assad's government and their reactions to the demonstrators (look good on paper)<sup>47</sup>.

In the following section, the representations and constructed newsworthiness of threatening in BBCAR are presented.

### 7.3.4 Threatening voices in BBCAR

'Threaten' as an illocutionary force expression in its equivalent in Arabic (هدد Hadad-Nadad) co-occurred only two times in BBCA:

وقد هدد هذا الزخم الدبلوماسي والسياسي التركي بأن تبدو دول كبيرة في الجامعة العربية على  
7.25 رأسها مصر والمملكة العربية السعودية ب مظهر المتفرج على قضايا المنطقة.

Translation: *The Turkish political and logistical role **threatens** the sovereignty of countries, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.*

وقد هددت إيران مرارا ب تعطيل الملاحة في الخليج عبر اغلاق المضيق المذكور،  
7.26 وذلك إذا تحول النزاع في شان برنامج طهران النووي الى صراع مسلح

Translation: *Iran **threatened** many times to disturb naval operations in Gulf waters if the situation regarding its nuclear programme turned into an armed conflict.*

Interestingly, unlike what is found in BBCEN, the threatening voices in these two BBCAR concordance lines (lines 7.25 and 7.26) refer to two external news participants, namely the Turkish and Iranian political and logistic roles in the Arab world. In both concordance lines, proximity (Geographical) and negativity are constructed. However, by looking at the extended line of Turkey's threat, it is apparent that negativity is foregrounded in Turkey's political agenda, whereas positivity and personalisation are constructed in their logistic role in dealing with Syrian refugees during the Arab Spring.

In the following two sections, the final illocutionary force expression representations and newsworthiness in both BBCEN and BBCAR are considered.

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<sup>47</sup> The representations and newsworthiness of this concordance line are analysed in Section 7.3.1 (see line 9 in Table 7.3).

### 7.3.5 Denouncing voices in BBCEN

The last occurrence of the illocutionary expression *denounce* appears three times in BBCEN. As shown in Figure 7.4, the Arab Spring's settings for these denounce concordance lines were Bahrain, Iraq, and Tunisia. In Bahrain and Iraq, personalisation is foregrounded as the reported 'denouncing' voices referred to human rights groups and protesters, respectively. Similarly, consonance is constructed when displaying the demands of those voices by using the *Shia* and *Sunni* categorisation. In the third concordance line (see Figure 7.4), voice refers to *thousands of people* who denounced violent acts in Tunisia where personalisation, superlativeness and negativity values are constructed.

The next section (Section 7.3.2) presents the *denouncing* voices found in BBCAR.

CQL [lempos\_lc="denounce-v"] \* 3  
38.52 per million tokens • 0.0039%

Details sentence

- 1 doc#0 <>Three Bahraini rights groups have also **denounced** the recent Shia arrests.</>
- 2 doc#0 <>The protesters were calling for the resignation of Shia Prime Minister Nouri Maliki and **denouncing** the authorities for allegedly targeting the minority Sunni community.</>
- 3 doc#0 <>On Friday thousands of people took part in a protests after the the biggest trade union, UGTT, called a general strike to **denounce** general "terrorism, violence and murders".</>

Figure 7.3 'Denouncing' concordance's in BBCEN

### 7.3.6 'Denounce' in BBC Arabic

In BBC Arabic, 'denounce' equivalents in Arabic are found in four concordance lines: one refers to an Egyptian setting and the remaining three to Bahraini settings:

7.26 ونبدأ من صحيفة الجمهورية المصرية، التي نشرت مقالا ل محمد فودة ندد فيها ب الدعوات " المضللة " التي تطالب ب التظاهر في يوم ذكرى الثورة، قائلا انها دعوات " تنادي ب مظاهرات تخريبية يصطدم خلال ها المخربون مع الشعب ومع رجال الشرطة، وتراق دماء غالية علي شعبنا العظيم المتجه ب كل قوة الان الي البناء والتنمية "

Translation: *An Egyptian journalist named Mohammed Fodah in his Article published in the Al Gomhuria Newspaper threatened the "misleading" calls to protest which he called a "subversive demonstration"*

7.27 وحمل آخرون لوحات ولافتات تندد بالفساد والنفوذ الواسع ل جهاز الامن في الحياة اليومية.

Translation: *Others carried banners **denouncing** corruption and the interference of governmental security services in people's daily lives (Bahrain)*

7.28 وكان عشرات الاف البحرينيين قد شاركوا يوم الجمعة الماضي في احتجاجات مناوئة للحكومة في اول تظاهرة مرخصة رسميا من قبل السلطات المختصة منذ يونيو / حزيران الماضي، وقد ردوا هتافات تندد ب الاسرة الحاكمة ورفعوا صور ناشطين معتقلين وطالبوا ب إطلاق سراحهم

Translation: *Last Friday, tens of thousands of Bahrainis participated in anti-government protests in the first officially authorised demonstration since last June and they chanted slogans **denouncing** the ruling family and held pictures of detained activists and demanded their release*

تشهد البحرين احتجاجات شعبية تندد ب " التهميش السياسي والاقتصادي " وفي 22 من أغسطس 7.29 اب الماضي رشق محتجون الشرطة ب القنابل الحارقة وبالجمرة خلال جنازة محتج مراهق قتلته الشرطة ب الرصاص

Translation: *Bahraini protests **denounced** the "political and economic marginalisation." On August 22, protesters threw petrol bombs and stones at the police during the funeral of a teenager who was shot dead by the police*

In the first concordance line, the personalisation (name of the writer *Muhammed Fodah*) and eliteness (*an Egyptian journalist voice*) are foregrounded. In addition, the calling of protests is represented with negativity and impact values based on quotes from an Egyptian writer.

In the following three 'denouncing' concordance lines (lines 7.27, 7.28 and 7.28), the denouncers in all three lines were Bahraini protesters (personalisation) opposed to the corruption and violence of their government (eliteness, impact and negativity). Timeliness is also foregrounded in the representation of protesters' actions and demands (*22 August, since June*).

In summary, illocutionary voices (*promise, threaten, denounce*) are more prominent in BBCEN compared to BBCAR. For instance, while BBCAR features one promise voice in Oman and two threatening voices referring to external actors (Turkey and Iran), BBCEN exhibits a more diverse range of illocutionary voices. In BBCAR, Turkey's representation is marked by a contrast between negativity associated with its political agenda and positivity and personalisation in its logistic role in addressing the Syrian refugee crisis. Additionally, BBCAR foregrounds personalisation, eliteness, impact, negativity, and timeliness in its representation of Bahraini protesters denouncing government corruption and violence.

The analysis of BBCEN's coverage of the Arab Spring reveals several notable patterns in the construction of news values and the representation of illocutionary voices in Arab Spring events. Firstly, the representation of Ennahda in Tunisia highlights a tension between positivity, as seen in their promises of inclusiveness and liberal reforms, and negativity, which is ultimately foregrounded through the indexing of their affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. This finding, along with the consistent indexing of the Muslim Brotherhood as an affiliation of President Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, suggests a broader trend in BBCEN's coverage, where Islamist news participants are represented with consonance and negativity. Furthermore,

BBCEN's coverage of immigration as a result of the Arab Spring events, particularly in the case of Tunisian migrants in Italy, constructs negativity by representing migrants as objects and portraying them as a crisis.

In the Discussion Chapter, these findings will be further interpreted and contextualised within the broader framework of news value construction and media representation. The chapter (Chapter Eight) will delve into the implications of BBCEN's representation of Islamist actors, considering how this may contribute to or reinforce existing problematic portrayals of Muslims and Islam in Western media. The discussion will also address the potential consequences of BBCEN's negative portrayal of the Arab Spring's consequences, such as immigration and its related issues, including financial implications and the rights of minorities.

#### **7.4 Summary**

This chapter explored the representation of participants' voices during the Arab Spring on BBCEN (English) and BBCAR (Arabic) news channels, both of which belong to the same news institution. This study compares language-specific representations to examine how linguistic representations and voice newsworthiness vary between languages. This chapter focuses on the analysis of paralinguistic and illocutionary force expressions such as chants, cheers, screams, cries, threats, and promises. This research aims to investigate the construction of news values in the cross-lingual representations of participants' voices and addresses sub-questions related to the voices' source, reported content, and the constructed news values. The analysis involved the collection of concordance lines from both channels and their translation, if necessary. This is followed by an examination of co-textual meaning using the News Values Approach. The findings and analysis are presented in two main sections: paralinguistic and illocutionary force expression. The results were compared across the two corpora. Due to voice expressions' limited frequency, the main tool for analysis was an organised list of concordance lines supplemented with extended text when required. BBCEN and BBCAR showed similar newsworthiness constructs such as personalisation, proximity, and superlativeness. Eliteness, negativity and impact were constructed in governments' illocutionary voices in most Arab Spring events such as Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Interestingly, the findings showed similar consonance values in both BBCEN and BBCAR, although they were directed at different audiences. Therefore, I refer to BBCAR consonance as producer-consonance, in which the other audience's consonance is imposed on the BBCAR audience.

The next chapter, the Discussion Chapter, will provide a comprehensive analysis and interpretation of the findings from Chapters Five to Seven. It will investigate the implications of the results, situating them within the broader context of news value construction, and media representation and framing. The Discussion Chapter will explore the similarities and differences between the Arabic and English corpora of BBC (BBCEN and BBCAR) and Aljazeera (ALJEN and ALJAR) in their representation of the Arab Spring participants and voices, and will examine the potential factors influencing these variations, such as target audiences, socio-political contexts, and editorial stances.

## Chapter Eight: Discussion

### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a discussion and interpretation of the key findings of the previous four chapters. It situates the findings within the broader theoretical framework of the Discursive News Values approach (Bednarek and Caple 2017) while extending this approach by identifying new subcategories of news values that emerge in the specific socio-cultural contexts of Al Jazeera and the BBC's cross-lingual news discourse. The analysis reveals both similarities and differences in how news values are discursively constructed across the four news outlets, reflecting the complex interplay of language, culture, ideology and institutional contexts in shaping media representations of the Arab Spring and addressing the following three research questions:

1. How do Aljazeera and BBC News construct news values in the representations of Arab Spring participants in their Arabic and English Web-based news outlets?
2. How do Aljazeera and BBC News construct news values in the representation of Arab Spring participants' voices in their Arabic and English Web-based news outlets?
3. What are the patterned meanings formed through the construction of news values in Arab and English Arab Spring news on Al Jazeera and the BBC?

The key patterns identified include the use of 'socio-cultural categorisation' as an extension of personalisation in ALJEN, the construction of 'counter-consonance' in ALJEN's representations of Arabs and governments, the reliance on elitence and sectarian framing in BBCAR's coverage, and the prevalence of gendered stereotypes and Orientalist discourse across the outlets. Notably, the analysis also reveals the emergence of 'producer-proximity' and 'producer-consonance' in BBCAR which highlight the influence of the English-language audience's expectations and assumptions on Arabic-language news content.

By critically examining these discursive practices and their implications, this chapter aims to contribute to a richer understanding of how news values were strategically deployed to shape narratives and perceptions of the Arab Spring among diverse global audiences in transcultural news outlets.

This chapter is organised into five main sections. The first three sections focus on findings related to Al Jazeera English (ALJEN) and Al Jazeera Arabic (ALJAR), addressing all three research questions. The remaining two sections discuss the findings pertaining to BBC English (BBCEN) and BBC Arabic (BBCAR), also addressing the three research questions. This structure allows for a more focused and in-depth analysis of each news organisation while also facilitating comparisons between their English and Arabic outlets. Furthermore, this organisation recognises the distinct institutional, cultural and linguistic contexts of Al Jazeera and the BBC which may influence the discursive construction of news values in the coverage of the Arab Spring.

## **8.2 News values construction of the Arab Spring's participants in ALJEN and ALJAR**

This section discusses Chapter Four's investigation of the discursive construction of news values through the representation of participants in the Al Jazeera ALJEN and ALJAR coverage of the Arab Spring. By comparing linguistic representations and discursive newsworthiness across the two cross-lingual corpora, the analysis uncovered potential variations in the portrayal of news participants. The analysis focused on the key participants who were extracted from the corpora using a corpus tool Sketch Engine (see Chapter Three for more details). Employing the News Values Approach (Bednarek and Caple 2017), the analysis examined the co-text meaning of the selected expressions in their (extended) concordance lines to answer the research question: How are the news values discursively constructed in the cross-lingual representations of the participants in Arab Spring events in ALJEN and ALJAR? In the following sub-sections, the main findings, including the introduction of new sub-values such as socio-cultural categorisation and counter-consonance, are discussed.

### **8.2.1 Socio-cultural categorisation in ALJEN and ALJAR**

As stated in Chapter Four, both ALJEN and ALJAR co-construct frequently shared participants like 'people' with personalisation, proximity. This suggests that the representation of people-faced participants in the Arab Spring news is influenced by their geographical relevance and individual stories. However, notable differences exist in terms of how these news values are constructed. ALJEN constructs a sub-category of personalisation which I call 'socio-cultural categorisation' by representing protesters as youths seeking dignity and opportunities. This contributes to the discursive news values analysis (DNVA) approach (Bednarek and Caple 2017) by demonstrating how news values can be constructed through specific linguistic and discursive strategies that reflect the socio-cultural context of the news event and the target audience. The identification of 'socio-cultural categorisation' as a sub-category of personalisation in ALJEN emphasises the importance of considering variations in the discursive construction of news values across different media outlets and socio-cultural contexts. This finding also underscores the potential of the DNVA approach to reveal the complex interplay between language, culture and ideology in the representation of social and political events in the media.

In addition, this extended value of personalisation can be regarded as a challenge to the 'protest paradigm' (Lee and Chan 2010) by focusing on protesters' demands rather than their appearances and actions (for further details see Chapter Two). The protest paradigm refers to the tendency of the mainstream media to marginalise and delegitimise social protests by emphasising the dramatic, disruptive and confrontational aspects of events while downplaying or ignoring the underlying grievances and goals of the protesters (McLeod and Hertog 1999). This framing strategy often leads to protesters being depicted as deviant, irrational, or dangerous, thereby diminishing public support and sympathy for their causes (Gitlin, 2003). However, by employing 'socio-cultural categorisation' as a sub-category of personalisation, ALJEN provides a more sympathetic portrayal of Arab Spring protesters, emphasising their youth, aspirations and demands for dignity and opportunities. This framing strategy can be regarded as a form of



‘counter-framing’ (Entman 2004) which challenges the dominant narratives and assumptions of the protest paradigm by offering alternative perspectives and interpretations of events.

Moreover, by focusing on the socio-cultural characteristics and motivations of the protesters, ALJEN's coverage may contribute to the ‘humanisation’ of the Arab Spring uprisings, fostering a sense of identification and solidarity among the audience (Chouliaraki 2006). This approach contrasts with the dehumanising and delegitimising tendencies of the protest paradigm which often reduces protesters to stereotypical and negative images (Hart 2023; McLeod and Hertog 1999).

This finding is significant because it demonstrates how ALJEN actively disrupts dominant narratives about protesters in the mainstream media (Gitlin 2003) and provides a well-defined representation of their motivations and goals. By challenging the protest paradigm and offering a more sympathetic and humanising portrayal of the Arab Spring protesters, ALJEN's coverage may contribute to a positive understanding and appreciation of the complex social, political and economic factors driving uprisings.

In the following section, the construction of consonance in ALJAR and other extended news values found in ALJEN in the Arab Spring’s participants’ representations (namely ‘counter-consonance’) are discussed.

### **8.2.2 Consonance and ‘counter-consonance’ in representing Arabs in ALJAR and ALJEN**

The findings regarding the construction of news values associated with ‘Arabs’ as frequent participants in both ALJAR and ALJEN demonstrate similarities and differences. Both outlets represent Arabs with positivity and impact, portraying them as part of a diverse and multiethnic/religious society. This representation aligns with the concept of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983), in which media outlets play a crucial role in shaping a collective identity and fostering a sense of belonging among their audiences.

This notion of an ‘imagined audience’ was further explored by Matthews and Habsi (2018) who examined how Al Jazeera Arabic news professionals visualise their Arab news audience and how this visualisation influences their ideas about newsworthiness and an ideal news agenda. The study reveals that Al Jazeera's journalists construct their Arab news consumers as being heterogeneous in character and origin, sharing a common 'mindset' and experiencing a sense of voicelessness. These understandings play a crucial role in shaping journalists' news-making practices, including their efforts to prioritise stories that demonstrate relevance or interest to these imagined news consumers, as well as stories that address their perceived 'powerlessness' in the Arab region.

ALJAR primarily caters to Arab audiences and constructs Arabs as news participants through the values of proximity, impact and consonance. As shown in Table 4.5 in Chapter Four (see Section 4.3.2), the concordance lines of ‘Arabs’ in ALJAR's coverage demonstrate a sense of closeness and relevance to the Arab community. ALJAR constructs consonance by comparing events in the Arab world, such as the example of Tunisian protesters chanting the same slogans as those heard in Egypt's Tahrir Square. This finding and approach to co-constructing consonance-proximity-impact values is consistent with the findings of Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2014) who argued that the media tends to construct events in ways that resonate with their target

audience's cultural background and experiences. Furthermore, Zayani (2019) specifically notes that Al-Jazeera tends to have a more localized and contextualized approach to news reporting. This supports my observation of ALJAR's emphasis on proximity and consonance in its coverage of Arab Spring events, as it tailors its reporting to the specific context and interests of its Arab audience.

By emphasising the impact of the Arab Spring movement on the lives of Arabs and their shared experiences, ALJAR creates a sense of immediacy and personal connections with its audience. This approach aligns with ALJAR's role as a regional news provider and aims to create a shared narrative that resonates with the aspirations and concerns of the Arab public (El Jammal 2012). By foregrounding the voices and experiences of Arabs in its coverage, ALJAR constructs a sense of both consonance and proximity (Bednarek and Caple 2017) that reflects the cultural and social proximity of events to their target audience.

On the other hand, ALJEN's coverage of the Arab Spring can be regarded as an attempt to challenge the dominant Western media narratives and provide an alternative perspective that is more attuned to the realities and concerns of the Arab world (Elmasry et al. 2013). By emphasising the agency and resilience of Arabs in the face of political and social upheaval, ALJEN contributes to the construction of a counter-hegemonic discourse that seeks to reclaim the narrative of the Arab Spring from external actors (Lynch 2014).

Furthermore, ALJEN constructs consonance by indexing the question of Palestine and representing Arabs as a united community with a shared history and future. Nevertheless, the consonance constructed in ALJEN does not fully align with the definition provided by Bednarek and Caple (2017) who state that consonance is constructed when the event or actors in news discourse are discursively constructed as “(stereo)typical [by referring] to stereotypical attributes or preconceptions; assessments of expectedness/typicality; similarity with past; explicit references to general knowledge traditions” (p. 79). In the case of ALJEN, references to events are not based on the audience's preconceptions but rather on the consonance of the actors in the news, specifically Arabs.

Furthermore, ALJEN goes beyond simply constructing the consonance of the participants in news events; it actively reverses the stereotypical references to Arabs commonly found in the Western media. Consequently, the current study proposes an extension of the consonance news value within the framework of DNVA when applied to non-Western media outlets such as Al-Jazeera. This extended notion of consonance, which I term ‘counter-consonance,’ accounts for the discursive strategies employed by outlets such as ALJEN to challenge dominant narratives and stereotypes about news event participants.

In other words, in ALJEN, this ‘counter-consonance’s’ value manifests in its construction of a shared Arab identity and experience, particularly through its coverage of the Palestinian issue. By consistently highlighting the Palestinian struggle and framing it as a unifying cause for Arabs, ALJEN created a narrative that resonates with its target audience and asserts a distinct Arab perspective (Elmasry 2009; Barkho 2011). By referring to the literature, ALJEN has been noted for its efforts to counter dominant Western narratives and provide alternative perspectives, especially when it comes to the representation of Arabs and the Arab world (Barkho 2011; Figschou 2010; Powers 2012). This is often referred to as ‘contra-flow’ or ‘reverse flow’ in media studies, where media content from the Global South challenges the hegemony of the Western media discourse (Thussu 2007). ALJEN’s approach and this constructed news value

(counter-consonance) stands in contrast to the often fragmented and conflicting representation of Arabs in the Western media which tends to emphasise divisions and differences within the Arab world (Said 2008; Karim 2003). By asserting a shared Arab identity and experience, ALJEN engages in a form of 'counter-consonance' which challenges these dominant representations and provides an alternative news value construction.

In the next section, the findings of counter-consonance value in the representations of the government participants in the Arab Spring in both ALJEN and ALJAR are discussed and interpreted in light of the literature.

### **8.2.3 Counter-consonance and the indexing of historical colonialism in ALJEN**

Both ALJEN and ALJAR construct the frequent participant 'government' with timeliness, negativity and proximity in their coverage of the Arab Spring. However, similar to the discussion above, ALJEN distinguishes itself by the construction of counter-consonance which involves interdiscursively indexing the historical colonialism of the Arab world by Western governments. As noted in the preceding section, this finding is similar to those of other studies concerning ALJEN news such as Barkho (2010) and Figenschou (2010). Both studies clarify how Al Jazeera frames and represents Arab socio-political issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and they underscore the significance of the historical context of the Arab World in shaping news discourse.

In addition, Aouragh (2012) and Dabashi (2012) demonstrate how ALJEN (Al Jazeera English) situates the Arab Spring within a broader historical narrative of resistance to Western domination and interference in the Arab world. Thus, the construction of counter-consonance in ALJEN might resonate with audiences, not necessarily limited to the Arab world, who are critical of Western interventionism and neo-colonialism in the region. This approach acknowledges ongoing struggles for self-determination and autonomy in the Arab world (Al-Najjar 2009; Powers 2012).

Similar to the above discussion, ALJEN's construction of counter-consonance in this context serves to challenge dominant Western narratives which often depict the Arab Spring as a series of isolated events or a struggle between pro-democracy protesters and authoritarian regimes (Bebawi 2016; Matar 2012). Instead, by linking uprisings to the historical experience of colonialism, ALJEN encourages viewers to understand the Arab Spring as part of a longer trajectory of resistance against external domination and interference (Al-Ghazzi 2014; Abdelmoula 2012).

Moreover, by highlighting the role of Western governments in preserving neocolonial relationships with the Arab world, ALJEN's representation of such governments is in accordance with other studies. For example, Cherkaoui (2014) and Elmasry et al. (2013) reported that ALJEN exposed the contradictions and double standards inherent in Western foreign policy discourses which claim to support democracy and human rights while simultaneously undermining the sovereignty and self-determination of Arab nations.

Thus, the construction of counter-consonance in ALJEN's coverage of the Arab Spring represents a powerful discursive strategy for challenging hegemonic narratives and promoting alternative perspectives about the region's socio-political realities. Moreover, by indexing the historical context of colonialism and situating the uprisings within a broader struggle for

liberation and self-determination, ALJEN contributes to a more critical understanding of the Arab Spring and its significance in the Arab world and beyond (Alalawi 2015; Afzal and Harun 2020).

As such, the concept of counter-consonance's value, as demonstrated in ALJEN's coverage, offers a valuable analytical tool for examining how non-Western media outlets such as Al Jazeera construct discursive news values in the representation of events and issues that are often distorted or misrepresented in dominant Western media discourses.

In the next section, another key finding of both ALJEN and ALJAR's news value construction of the Arab Spring's participants, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, is discussed.

#### **8.2.4 Muslim Brotherhood in ALJAR and ALJEN**

Another interesting finding in Chapter Four was the news values construction of the key participant, namely the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood, a significant Islamist movement founded in Egypt in 1928 that has influenced political Islam across the Arab world, emerged as a key participant in both outlets' coverage. It was constructed with impact and positivity as a socio-political group targeted by violence, despite winning democratic elections. This discursive construction was reported by other researchers who provided insight into how both ALJAR and ALJEN cover the Muslim Brotherhood and its role in the Arab Spring (e.g., Al-Anani 2015; Mohammed-Ali and Noha 2016).

Marzouq (2022) reported that ALJAR and ALJEN articles consistently defend the Muslim Brotherhood and criticise their opponents, albeit using different mythical narratives tailored to the social and cultural values of their respective target audiences. He argued that this strategic construction resonates with the collective psyche of each outlet's viewership. Notably, ALJAR appears to be more focused on attacking anti-Muslim Brotherhood social actors than on explicitly defending the Muslim Brotherhood. This tendency is more pronounced in ALJAR than in ALJEN and is particularly evident in opinion articles rather than in straight news stories (Marzouq 2022).

Thus, the findings of the current study, supported by previous research concerning ALJAR and ALJEN, suggest that Al Jazeera may be more sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood than other political groups in the Arab World. This observation is consistent with previous research examining Al Jazeera's coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood and referred to Al-Jazeera's relationship with the Qatari government. Cherribi (2017) argues that the positive representation of the Muslim Brotherhood on Al Jazeera can be attributed to Qatar's political stance and the channel's editorial line. This perspective is shared by other scholars who have studied Al Jazeera's coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, Cherkaoui (2014) notes that Al Jazeera has been accused of promoting the Muslim Brotherhood's agenda because of its favourable coverage of the group.

In addition, as discussed in Chapter Two, the relationship between Al Jazeera and the Qatari government has been a subject of academic enquiry. As Fandy (2007) points out, Al Jazeera is funded by the Qatari government which has historically supported the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, financial and political backing may influence the channel's editorial stance towards the group. El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002) further suggest that Al Jazeera's

coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood is shaped by Qatar's foreign policy objectives which have included supporting Islamist movements in the region.

However, it is important to note that Al Jazeera's coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood has not been monolithic. As Khalil and Kraidy (2017) argued, Al Jazeera's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood has been complex and multifaceted, with the channel providing a platform for both supporters and critics of the group. Nonetheless, the overall tendency of Al Jazeera to present a more favourable construction of the Muslim Brotherhood compared to other media outlets in the region remains beyond the scope and focus of the current study, one that is grounded in the broader political and ideological context of the Arab world.

In the next section, another finding of ALJEN's distinctive consonance construction in the representation of the Arab Spring's participants as Sunni and Shia is discussed.

### **8.2.5 'Protesters' in ALJAR but 'Shia' in ALJEN**

Another interesting finding presented in Chapter Four was that unlike ALJAR, which refers to participants in the Bahraini Arab Spring context as 'demonstrators,' ALJEN constructs consonance by denominating participants based on their religious affiliations (Shia, Sunni). In ALJEN, Shia protesters in Bahrain are co-constructed with proximity, negativity and impact as part of a sectarian movement, whereas Sunnis in Iraq are represented as the recipients of the Shia-led government's sectarian actions. This finding aligns with research on sectarian framing in media coverage of the Arab Spring, including the ALJEN news discourse (Abdo 2017).

This consonance value construction found in the representation of Bahraini and Iraqi protests in ALJEN can be problematic because it reduces complex political and social issues to simplistic religious binaries and circulates divisive narratives (Matthiesen 2013). According to AlShehabi (2019), the framing of the Bahraini uprising as a Shia-led movement against the Sunni government obscures the broader demands for political reform and social justice that motivated protests. Similarly, the representation of the Sunnis in Iraq as victims of sectarian violence perpetrated by the Shia-led government overlooks the complex power dynamics and political rivalries that have shaped the country's post-invasion trajectory (Haddad 2014).

Moreover, sectarian framing in ALJEN may also reflect the geopolitical interests and alignments of different actors in the region, including Qatar, Iran and Saudi Arabia (Mabon 2019, 2020). As Gengler (2013) notes, the Bahraini government has long portrayed the uprising as a Shia-led, Iran-backed plot to destabilise the country, a narrative amplified by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. By adopting a sectarian representation, ALJEN may inadvertently reinforce this narrative and contribute to the polarisation of public opinion along religious lines.

In addition, the difference between ALJAR and ALJEN in terms of the news value construction of participants in the Bahraini uprising raised questions about the editorial priorities and target audiences of the two outlets. As Al-Rawi (2015) argued, ALJEN's sectarian framing may reflect a desire to appeal to a more international audience by emphasising the religious dimensions of the conflict. Ultimately, sectarian representation of the Bahraini uprising and its participants in ALJEN underscores the challenges of covering complex political and social movements in a highly charged regional context. As Lynch (2012) notes, the Arab Spring uprisings have been marked by a proliferation of competing narratives and frames, each reflecting the interests and agendas of different actors. By reducing these events to a simplistic

Shia-Sunni binary, news discourse such as that found in ALJEN risks obscuring the deeper issues at stake and contributing to the further polarisation of the region along sectarian lines.

To summarise, this discussion of the findings of the first and third research questions for both ALJEN and ALJAR contributes to a better understanding of how news values are constructed in the cross-lingual context of Al Jazeera and how they interact with dominant narratives in the coverage of the Arab Spring. The analysis reveals both similarities and differences between ALJEN and ALJAR, suggesting that the language and culture of both outlets and audiences play a role in shaping news values in their news discourse. The construction of 'socio-cultural categorisation' in ALJAR expands the DNVA approach, while the 'counter-consonance' in ALJEN's representation of Arabs provides a counterpoint to dominant Western media representations. The representation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the indexing of historical colonialism contribute to the understanding of Al Jazeera's news value construction of these issues, while the representation of Shia and Sunni participants aligns with research on sectarian framing in the media coverage of the Arab Spring.

However, it is important to critically examine these findings and consider the limitations and potential biases of Al-Jazeera's coverage. As stated in Chapter Two, as a state-funded media outlet based in Qatar, Al Jazeera is not immune to political influence and editorial bias (Cherribi 2017; Cherkaoui 2014). For example, the positive discursive construction of the Muslim Brotherhood may reflect Qatar's political stance and support for the group. Similarly, the sectarian framing of Shia and Sunni participants may have been influenced by regional geopolitical interests and rivals (Mabon 2019). However, it is crucial to situate these findings within the broader political and social context of the Arab world and consider how Al Jazeera's coverage may be shaped by various factors, including ownership, funding and editorial policies (El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002).

Furthermore, while the analysis reveals some counter-hegemonic discourses in ALJEN such as 'counter-consonance' in the representation of Arabs, it is important to recognise that ALJEN is not a monolithic entity and that its coverage may vary depending on the specific issue, context and journalist, as found in the previous research (e.g., Figenschou 2010; Al-Najjar 2009). Thus, future research could explore these variations in more depth and examine how Al Jazeera's coverage compares to other media outlets in the region and beyond.

Section 8.3 discusses the findings concerning the second research question which focuses on how ALJEN and ALJAR construct news values through the voices and sources featured in their coverage of the Arab Spring.

### **8.3 ALJEN and ALJAR's news value construction of Arab Spring voices**

This section discusses the investigation into the discursive construction of news values through the representation of participants' voices in the ALJEN and ALJAR coverage of the Arab Spring. By comparing linguistic representations and discursive newsworthiness across the two languages, the analysis revealed potential variations in the portrayal of news participants' voices. The analysis focused on two types of voice expressions: paralinguistic expressions such as 'chant' (yūradid (يردد)), 'cheer' (yāhtif (يهتف)), 'scream' (yāsēh (يصيح), yāsrukh (يصرخ)) and 'cry' (yābki (يبكي)), and illocutionary force expressions, including 'threaten' (yūhadid (يهدد)), 'promise' (yāēd (يعد)) and 'denounce' (yūnādīd (يندد)). Employing the News Values Approach (Bednarek and Caple 2017)

and considering the findings from Chapter Four, the analysis examined the co-text meaning of the selected expressions in their (extended) concordance lines to answer the research question: How are the news values discursively constructed in the cross-lingual representations of the participants' voices in the Arab Spring events in ALJEN and ALJAR? Additionally, this section will address the third research question, exploring the patterned meanings formed through the construction of news values in Arabic and English Arab Spring news on Al Jazeera. The findings are presented in two main sections: paralinguistic expressions and illocutionary force expressions, with sub-sections comparing the assigned voices across the two corpora. These findings lay the groundwork for the discussion of the cross-lingual representation of participants' voices and their constructed newsworthiness in the context of the Arab Spring coverage by Al Jazeera.

### **8.3.1 Discursive construction of news values in paralinguistic voices of Arab Spring protesters in ALJEN and ALJAR**

The analysis of paralinguistic expressions in the voices of Arab Spring participants revealed both similarities and differences in the discursive construction of news values between ALJEN and ALJAR. Both news outlets employ personalisation, proximity and positivity in their portrayals of protesters' paralinguistic voices. This finding is in accordance with other studies which found that ALJEN tends to focus on sufferers in news events and promotes a sense of closeness and support for their causes (Chouliaraki 2006; Zhang and Luther 2020).

However, the analysis showed that the construction of news values varied depending on the specific country context and target audience of each news outlet. For instance, in Egypt, ALJEN reports voices as cheering and crying out in happiness when overthrowing Mubarak, using the Pharaoh metaphor to reflect the 'deep state' and a 'fresh start.' This discursive construction has been discussed by other researchers such as Fornaciari (2012), who claims that this practice of ALJEN resonates with the outlet's international audience, who may be less familiar with the complexities of Egyptian politics.

On the other hand, ALJAR demonstrates a distinct approach in its coverage of Egyptian protests' paralinguistic voices by frequently referencing the Palestine-Israeli conflict. This editorial choice establishes consonance, a news value that relates to the familiarity and alignment of events with the audience's expectations and beliefs (Bednarek and Caple 2017). By drawing parallels between the Egyptian uprising and the ongoing struggles in Palestine, ALJAR appeals to the shared cultural and political concerns of its predominantly Arab readership.

This discursive practice of referencing the 'question of Palestine' is not unique to ALJAR's coverage of the Egyptian protests. Several studies have identified similar patterns in Al Jazeera's broader coverage of Middle Eastern affairs. Barkho (2008; 2011) and Alalawi (2015) argue that Al Jazeera consistently expresses events from an Arab-supportive perspective, particularly when reporting on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Arab Spring uprisings.

Barkho's (2008) comparative analysis of Al Jazeera and CNN's coverage of the Second Palestinian Intifada reveals that Al Jazeera's reporting was more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, framing the conflict as a struggle for liberation against Israeli occupation. Similarly, Alalawi (2015) examines Al Jazeera's coverage of the Arab Spring and finds that the network's

reporting was generally supportive of protesters and their demands for political change, often portraying the uprisings as a unified Arab movement against oppression.

By consistently referencing the Palestine-Israeli conflict in its coverage of the Egyptian protests, ALJAR not only established consonance but also reinforced its position as a champion of Arab causes. Through this discursive practice, ALJAR fosters a sense of shared identity and solidarity among its Arab audience, emphasising the interconnectedness of struggles across the region.

The following section discusses how ALJEN and ALJAR presented different narratives in their coverage of the voices and perspectives of Bahraini protesters during the Arab Spring. The discussion highlights the divergent news value construction taken by these two news outlets in their reports on the sectarian aspects of the protests in Bahrain.

### **8.3.2 Divergent sectarian narratives: ALJEN and ALJAR's coverage of Bahraini protesters' voices**

The representation of Bahraini protesters' paralinguistic voices differed significantly between the two outlets. ALJEN constructed voices with consonance, negativity and impact, portraying protests as sectarian between the Shia majority and the Sunni minority government. This framing may influence international perceptions of the legitimacy and nature of the protests (Matthiesen 2013). Conversely, ALJAR constructed protesters with eliteness rather than personalisation, representing the protests as politically motivated rather than a human-faced movement, which may align more closely with the outlet's editorial stance and the interests of its Qatari government funders (Abdul-Nabi 2015).

The coverage and framing of the Arab Spring by Al Jazeera's different language channels, particularly in relation to the Bahraini uprising, has been a subject of scholarly attention. For example, Abdul-Nabi's (2022) research corroborates and expands upon the analysis of ALJEN and ALJAR's portrayal of Bahraini protesters during the Arab Spring. Abdul-Nabi (2022) examines the coverage of the Bahraini uprising by ALJAR and ALJEN during the Saudi military intervention in 2011, using framing theory and the Peace Journalism Model. The study found that while both channels predominantly used war journalism framing, there were significant differences between the two outlets. ALJEN included more peace journalism (PJ) frames in its news and features than ALJAR. This finding aligns with the analysis of ALJEN's coverage which constructed protesters' voices with consonance, negativity and impact, portraying the protests as sectarian between the Shia majority and Sunni minority governments. In contrast, ALJAR relied more heavily on pro-Qatar and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sources, whereas ALJEN predominantly featured human rights organisations. This difference in sourcing corresponds with the analysis of ALJAR's coverage which constructed protesters with eliteness rather than personalisation, representing the protests as politically motivated rather than a human-faced movement. Moreover, the study found that ALJAR largely legitimised the presence of Saudi troops in Manama, whereas ALJEN delegitimised their presence, stating that they were deployed to quell protesters. This distinction further supports the analysis of ALJAR's coverage as being more closely aligned with the political interests of the GCC, whereas ALJEN sought to provide a more critical perspective on the role of external actors in suppressing the uprising. In addition, Abdul-Nabi (2022) argues that the lack of PJ frames in ALJAR's coverage



led to the framing of the Bahraini uprising as a sectarian conflict between the Shia and Sunni populations, which resonates with the analysis of ALJAR's construction of eliteness and political motivation in the representation of the protesters. Conversely, the greater presence of PJ frames in ALJEN helped counter the sectarian narrative, exposing violations by Saudi troops and giving voice to marginalised protesters, aligning with the analysis of ALJEN's construction of consonance, negativity and impact in the voices of Bahraini protesters.

### **8.3.3 Navigating contradictions and limitations: ALJEN, ALJAR and the distinctive case of Morocco's Arab Spring**

In Morocco, ALJEN constructed pro-reform protesters' voices with eliteness and consonance, whereas reform opponents were constructed with personalisation, positivity, superlativeness and proximity. This contradiction in representation may reflect the outlet's attempt to balance competing narratives with its international audience (El Issawi 2014). ALJAR, on the other hand, consistently constructed protesters with eliteness as members of the 20th February Group and their slogans with personalisation and impact, suggesting a more unified outlining of the movement in Morocco.

It is worthy of note that Morocco's Arab Spring is considered to be a unique case among the various Arab countries that witnessed uprisings during that period. According to Cherribi (2017), "Al Jazeera did little to change Morocco during the Arab Spring" (p. 183). This observation suggests that, despite the differences in the discursive construction of news values between ALJEN and ALJAR, the overall impact of Al Jazeera's coverage on the Moroccan uprising was limited.

Various factors may have contributed to this limited impact. First, Morocco's political system (a constitutional monarchy) differs from the republics and absolute monarchies of the other Arab countries. This difference may have influenced how protesters' demands were discursively constructed and perceived by both the Moroccan public and the international community (Benchenna and Marchetti 2020). Second, the Moroccan regime's response to protests, which included a combination of concessions and repression, may have mitigated the potential for more radical changes (Molina 2011).

### **8.3.4 Ideological leanings and audience considerations: Comparing ALJEN and ALJAR's news values construction of Jordanian protesters' voices**

The construction of news values in the voices of Jordanian protesters during the Arab Spring varies significantly between ALJEN and ALJAR, reflecting the outlets' different discursive constructions of political dynamics and attempts to appeal to their respective audiences. In ALJEN's coverage, the co-construction of the Muslim Brotherhood's eliteness with personalisation suggests an attempt to humanise the organisation and its role in protests. This construction may resonate with ALJEN's international audience who may be less familiar with the intricacies of Jordanian politics and the Muslim Brotherhood's historical role in the country (Lynch 2014). By presenting the Muslim Brotherhood as both an elite political actor and a

relatable human presence, ALJEN's coverage may foster a better understanding of the group's participation in protests (El-Nawawy and Elmasry 2015).

On the other hand, ALJEN's co-construction of King Abdullah with eliteness and negativity in the protesters' chants suggests a more critical stance towards the monarchy. This deviates from the traditional representation of the Jordanian monarchy as a stabilising force in the region and as an ally of Western powers (Yom 2013). By highlighting the protesters' negative sentiments towards the king, ALJEN's coverage may challenge dominant narratives and provide a platform for alternative perspectives on Jordan's political system (Alalawi 2015).

In contrast, ALJAR's coverage of the Jordanian protests featured chants with more religious wordings, constructing consonance and reflecting the audience's cultural considerations. To clarify, ALJAR incorporates more religious wordings in the reported chants, potentially catering to the cultural considerations of its Arabic-speaking audience. This finding aligns with Barkho's (2010) ethnographic research which emphasises the discursive role of ALJAR in responding to the region's social, cultural and religious needs. The use of religious language in ALJAR's coverage of the Arab Spring can be understood as a form of 'cultural resonance' (Gamson 1992), whereby the framing of events and actors is aligned with the pre-existing beliefs, values and narratives of the target audience.

In addition, this news value instruction aligns with ALJAR's ideological leanings and the target audience of Arabic-speaking viewers who may be more attuned to the role of religion in political discourse (Cherribi 2017). The emphasis on religious language in the protesters' chants may also reflect the broader context of the Arab Spring emphasised by ALJAR. This broader context has been discussed by Bayat (2013) and Cherribi (2017) who expressed how the Arab Spring is characterised by a revival of Islamic political movements and a challenge to secular authoritarian regimes.

Moreover, the use of religious wordings in ALJAR's coverage of the Jordanian protests, particularly in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood's role in organising the demonstrations, may serve to legitimise the Muslim Brotherhood as a socio-political actor and construct them with positivity as a more suitable leadership alternative for Arabs in the post-revolutionary landscape. In other words, by employing religious language and Islamic symbolism, ALJAR constructs a narrative that aligns the Muslim Brotherhood's actions and demands with Islamic values and social justice principles.

It is worthy of note that the positive representation of the Muslim Brotherhood in ALJAR's coverage of the Jordanian protests is consistent with the network's alleged sympathetic stance towards the organisation, as claimed by researchers such as El-Nawawy and Elmasry (2015). In addition, as discussed earlier in this chapter, several previous studies stated that ALJAR exhibited favourable bias towards the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in its coverage of the Arab Spring uprisings (e.g., Cherribi 2017). Cherribi (2017) discusses how this favourable bias has been attributed to Qatar's political stance and Al Jazeera's editorial line, which has been regarded as being supportive of Islamist movements in the region. Thus, by providing a platform for the Muslim Brotherhood and legitimising their role in the Arab Spring protests through the use of religious wordings, ALJAR contributes to the construction of a positive image of the organisation as a viable political alternative in the post-Arab Spring era (Bayat 2013).

In conclusion, the discursive construction of news values in the paralinguistic voices of Arab Spring protesters reveals complex interactions between country-specific contexts, the target audience, and the editorial stances of ALJEN and ALJAR. While both outlets employ similar

news values to humanise protesters and foster proximity, they diverge in their discursive constructive values of specific movements and political dynamics, reflecting their distinct roles as international and regional news providers. Bednarek and Caple (2017) argue that news values are not fixed or universal but are shaped by the social, cultural and political contexts in which news organisations operate. Thus, these findings contribute to our understanding of how news values are strategically deployed to shape narratives and appeal to different audiences in news event coverage.

The following section discusses the findings regarding how news values were constructed in relation to governmental illocutionary expressions in ALJEN and ALJAR's coverage of the Arab Spring.

### **8.3.5 Government voices in ALJEN as ALJAR**

The representation of illocutionary expressions such as promises and threats also varies across news outlets. In ALJEN, promises by Arab Spring presidents and politicians are constructed with eliteness, negativity and impact, underscoring the failure to deliver commitments. This finding suggests that ALJEN employed a critical stance towards the pronouncements of political elites, highlighting the inconsistency between their rhetorical commitments and actual performance. By constructing promises by Arab Spring presidents and politicians with eliteness, negativity and impact, ALJEN appears to question the credibility and sincerity of these actors by constructing their voices as hollow and unreliable. This representation is consistent with the findings of Entman (2004) who argues that the selection and salience of certain aspects of a perceived reality in news promotes a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation. Moreover, the association of political elites' promises with negativity and impact in ALJEN's coverage can be seen as a form of 'diagnostic framing' (Silver 1997), whereby the news outlet identifies and attributes blame for the grievances and injustices driving the Arab Spring uprisings. By highlighting the failure of presidents and politicians to deliver on their commitments, ALJEN discursively constructs such governments as being responsible for the unmet expectations and frustrations of protesters, thus legitimising and intensifying the demands for change.

However, similar to other findings in ALJEN, the portrayal of Bahraini protesters as opposition supporters, coupled with the representation of the government's promises of reform, deviates from the general trend of constructing pre-Arab Spring governments with negativity and protesters with positivity. This finding suggests a more complex and indecisive news values construction of the Bahraini uprising in ALJEN, one that does not neatly conform to the binary opposition between authoritarian regimes and democratic protesters. The representation of Bahraini protesters as opposition supporters, rather than as popular activists or ordinary citizens, can be understood as a form of 'boundary framing' (Silver 1997), whereby the news outlet defines the scope and identity of the protest movement. By associating protesters with established opposition groups, ALJEN depicts the Bahraini uprising as a partisan or ideological struggle rather than as a broad-based popular revolt against authoritarianism.

Furthermore, the portrayal of the Bahraini government's promises of reform, alongside the representation of protesters as opposition supporters, suggests a more negotiated and contested construction of the uprising. Such discursive construction aligns with the concept of

‘frame alignment processes’ (Snow et al. 1986), whereby social movements seek to bridge, amplify, extend or transform existing frames to mobilise support and legitimacy.

Thus, the divergent discursive construction of promises and threats in ALJEN's coverage of the Arab Spring uprisings highlights the complex and dynamic nature of media representation in the context of political contention. While ALJEN generally employs a critical and oppositional stance towards the pronouncements of political elites, the case of Bahrain demonstrates the potential for more ambivalent and negotiated news values, reflecting the specific political, social and cultural conditions of each country.

### **8.3.6 Syrian illocutionary voices and complexities in ALJEN**

The complexity of the eliteness construction is evident in the voices in the Syrian context where the voices of external actors such as Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, and Barack Obama, the US President at the time, prioritise different aspects of the conflict. ALJEN's representation of threatening voices in Syria highlights the absence of the threat's source, potentially because of the intricate political situation and power dynamics. This finding suggests that ALJEN navigated the complex geopolitical landscape of the Syrian conflict by strategically framing the threats and challenges faced by protesters and activists. The absence of the threat's source in ALJEN's coverage can be understood as a form of ‘strategic ambiguity’ (Goodall Trethewey and McDonald 2006), whereby the news outlet deliberately leaves room for multiple interpretations and avoids directly attributing responsibility for the threats. This approach found in ALJEN may reflect the sensitive and high-stakes nature of the Syrian conflict, as well as the potential risks and consequences of assigning blame to specific actors or factions.

Moreover, the emphasis on personalisation, consonance, impact and negativity in the portrayal of the threat's recipients, particularly female activists and organisers, aligns with the concept of ‘gendered framing’ (Nacos 2007). By highlighting the vulnerability and victimisation of women in the Syrian uprising, ALJEN may seek to evoke emotional responses and moral outrage among its audience, thereby generating sympathy and support for the protesters' causes. In addition, the gendered framing of threats and violence in ALJEN's coverage of the Syrian conflict is consistent with the findings of Sjoberg and Gentry (2007) who argued that media representations of women in war and conflict often rely on essentialist and stereotypical notions of femininity, victimhood and passivity. By emphasising the threats faced by female activists and organisers, ALJEN may inadvertently reinforce these gendered tropes, even if it seeks to denounce the violence and repression of the Syrian regime.

### **8.3.7 The interplay of eliteness, positivity and consonance in ALJAR's coverage of Bahraini and Tunisian voices**

One of the interesting findings in Chapter Five was the difference in denouncing voices’ attribution between ALJEN and ALJAR, which can reveal the distinct news value construction employed by each news outlet. ALJEN constructs the voice of denunciation for both eliteness-constructed participants (in Sudan and Bahrain) and personalisation-constructed participants (in Morocco and Iraq). In contrast, ALJAR primarily attributes denouncing voices to eliteness-

constructed participants, specifically government officials in Tunisia and Bahrain. This finding suggests that ALJAR employs a more institutional and official discursive construction of denunciation, focusing on the statements and positions of political elites and authorities in both Bahrain and post-revolution Tunisia, particularly among Ennahda officials.

The privileging of eliteness-constructed participants in ALJAR's attribution of denouncing voices of both Bahraini and post-revolution Tunisian governments can be regarded as a form of 'indexing' (Bennett 1990). Indexing theory posits that news outlets tend to rely on the perspectives and interpretations of established power holders and institutions, reflecting the range of voices and viewpoints expressed by these elite sources (Livingston and Bennett 2003). This approach may reflect ALJAR's positioning in both governments and their adherence to official narratives and power structures. The favouring of eliteness-value-constructed voices in both the Bahraini and post-Arab Spring Tunisian governments is supported by other findings in ALJAR where the eliteness of such participants is co-constructed with positivity.

Additionally, the construction of consonance in ALJAR's coverage further reinforces this argument. In the case of Bahrain, ALJAR constructs consonance by giving more voices to the Bahraini government, thereby emphasising the official narrative and legitimising the government's actions and policies. This selective representation of voices aligns with the eliteness-value-construction and contributes to a more favourable portrayal of the Bahraini government. Similarly, in the Tunisian context, ALJAR constructs consonance by presenting the Ennahda Party as an opponent of Western interference in Tunisia. This value construction positions the Ennahda Party as a defender of Tunisian sovereignty and interests while simultaneously delegitimising Western involvement in the country's affairs. By selectively amplifying the voices that oppose Western interference, ALJAR creates a consonant narrative that aligns with the eliteness-positivity-value-construction Ennahda Party in Tunisia.

However, in the Egyptian context, ALJAR empowers protesters to demand better human rights and living conditions with the power to denounce. This finding suggests a more personalised construction of the Egyptian uprising, one that foregrounds the agency and legitimacy of protesters and social movements. The attribution of denouncing voices to protesters in ALJAR's coverage of the Egyptian uprising aligns with the concept of 'citizen journalism' (Allan and Thorsen 2009) which emphasises the participation and empowerment of ordinary citizens in the production and dissemination of news and information. By giving voice to the denunciations of protesters, ALJAR engages in 'motivational framing' (Benford and Snow 2000) which aims to inspire and legitimise collective action by emphasising the urgency and efficacy of the protesters' cause.

To summarise, the findings of illocutionary voices in ALJEN and ALJAR demonstrate the strategic and dynamic nature of news value construction in the context of the Arab Spring. While both outlets navigate the complexities of the Arab Spring through similar and distinctive news values constructions, they ultimately contribute to the contested narratives and power relations shaping public understanding of the uprisings. The analysis highlights the importance of examining the interplay between audience perception, outlets' ideological orientations and political contexts in the construction of illocutionary voices in Arab Spring events.

In Sections 8.4 and 8.5, the findings regarding BBCEN and BBCAR presented in Chapters Five and Seven are discussed.

## **8.4 Construction of news values in the representation of Arab Spring participants in BBCEN and BBCAR**

The analysis of frequent and key Arab Spring participants in BBCEN and BBCAR reveals several important findings that address the second part of the first research question: How do BBCEN and BBCAR construct news values in the representations of Arab Spring participants in their Arabic and English Web-based news outlets? Furthermore, this analysis will address the third research question by examining how the construction of news values in BBC's Arabic and English coverage of the Arab Spring contributes to the formation of patterned meanings across languages.

Firstly, both BBCEN and BBCAR co-construct participants like 'government' with eliteness, timeliness and consonance (ideological/religious affiliation). This finding suggests that the representation of key political participants in the Arab Spring outlets is influenced by their prominent status, the temporal relevance of their actions and their alignment with existing cultural expectations or stereotypes. This emphasis on eliteness and the representation of political actors based on ideological/religious affiliations connects to broader discussions regarding how the media represent conflicts and political events in the Arab world (Aouragh 2012; Baum and Zhukov 2015). The BBC's representations of Arab governments and political figures have been criticised for perpetuating simplistic narratives and failing to provide adequate context (Miladi 2006; Al-Najjar 2009). However, it is important to consider the challenges faced by journalists when covering complex and rapidly evolving events such as the Arab Spring as well as the institutional constraints and editorial policies that shape news production (Cottle 2011; Harcup and O'Neill 2017).

Second, women emerged as frequent participants in both BBC corpora, co-constructed with personalisation and consonance, by representing them as victims. This finding highlights how the representation of women in the Arab Spring is shaped by news values that emphasise individual stories and reinforce dominant Western narratives of Arab women. This aligns with research regarding how the Western media, including the BBC, represents Arab women (e.g., Al-Hejin 2015; Karimullah 2020), highlighting the persistence of stereotypes and simplified narratives. Such representations have been criticised for overlooking the complexity and diversity of Arab women's experiences and perpetuating Orientalist discourses (Abu-Lughod 2020). It is important to consider how these representations may influence the public's perceptions and understanding of Arab women's agency and their role in the Arab Spring (Allam 2018).

Third, BBCAR exhibited a sub-categorised news value (producer-consonance) originating from BBCEN's audience consonance. This suggests that Arabic language news content is influenced by the assumptions and expectations of English-language audiences, potentially leading to the perpetuation of stereotypes or simplified narratives. This concept of producer-consonance relates to Hassan's (2014) idea of the 'domestication of discourse,' whereby Arab writers' discursive representations in English are influenced by orientalist stances and confirm dominant audience expectations rather than challenging stereotypes. This finding aligns with research into the BBC Arabic role in promoting British soft power and its tendency to

prioritise British perspectives and interests (Hill and Alshaer 2010; Alshaer 2014). However, it is important to consider the potential for resistance and counter-hegemonic discourses within BBCAR as well as the agency of individual journalists and editors in shaping news content (Dajani 2006; Lahlali 2011).

Finally, BBCAR also demonstrated a sub-categorised news value (producer-proximity) representing British-based newspapers, politicians and journalists in Arab Spring news. This finding indicates that Arabic-language news is shaped by the institutional and cultural context, prioritising British perspectives and sources. This aligns with research on BBCAR's institutional constraints and its relationship with the British government and foreign policy objectives (Ayish 2008; Hill and Alshaer 2010). The frequency of British sources and perspectives in BBCAR's coverage of the Arab Spring has been noted in previous studies (Ismail 2021). However, it is important to consider the potential for bias and the marginalisation of local voices and perspectives in this context, as discussed in previous research concerning BBCAR, such as Barkho (2008) and Dajani (2006).

These findings contribute to the DNVA approach by considering further sub-categorisation of news values such as consonance and proximity in the specific context of cross-lingual BBC discourse. This observation is important because it reveals how news values manifest differently depending on the language, audience and institutional context of news production. These findings are expected to provide a better understanding of how news values are constructed in cross-lingual contexts and how they can perpetuate or challenge dominant narratives about the Arab world and its people. Situating these findings within the broader literature on the BBC and Arab representations of events in the Middle East (e.g., Barkho 2008; 2011) contributes to ongoing debates regarding the media's role in shaping public discourse and perceptions of the Arab world among both Arabic-speaking and international audiences.

However, it is important to critically examine these findings and consider the limitations and potential biases of the BBC coverage. As a public service broadcaster with a global reach, the BBC is not immune to political influence or editorial bias (Born 2011; Flood et al. 2011). The BBC's coverage of the Arab Spring in both Arabic and English may be shaped by various factors, including its institutional culture, funding model and its relationship with the British government (Aitken 2007; Alshaer 2014). Moreover, the BBC's role in promoting British soft power and public diplomacy has been subject to critical scrutiny (Hill and Alshaer 2010). It is important to situate these findings within the broader political and social context of the Arab world and consider how BBC coverage may be shaped by these factors.

Furthermore, while the analysis reveals some differences between BBCEN and BBCAR in their construction of news values, it is important to recognise that these outlets are part of the same institutional framework and may be subject to the similar editorial policies and practices (Barkho 2008; Lahlali 2011; Jaber and Baumann 2011). Future research could explore these similarities and differences in greater details and examine how the BBC's coverage compares with other media outlets in the region and beyond. Additionally, it would be useful to consider the reception and interpretation of BBC news among Arab audiences, as well as the potential for alternative and counter-hegemonic discourses within cross-lingual BBC news coverage.

In conclusion, the analysis of news value construction in the representation of Arab Spring participants in BBCEN and BBCAR provides valuable insights into how these outlets discursively constructed news values to represent frequent and key participants. The findings contribute to the existing body of literature concerning discursive news value analysis, media framing of conflicts and protests, and the roles of language and audiences in shaping news discourse. However, it is important to critically examine these findings and consider the broader political and social context in which the BBC operates in both languages. By doing so, it is possible to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the complex and dynamic nature of the media's coverage of the Arab Spring and its implications for public discourse and understanding of the events. Future research could build on these findings by exploring the production, circulation and reception of BBC news in the Arab world, as well as examining alternative and counter-hegemonic discourses within and beyond the BBC.

The following section discusses the findings for the second and third research questions, examining both the discursively constructed news values in Arab Spring voices in BBCEN and BBCAR, and the patterned meanings that emerge from these constructions across the Arabic and English language versions.

### **8.5 Construction of news values in the representations of Arab Spring voices by BBCEN and BBCAR**

The analysis of paralinguistic and illocutionary expressions in the voices of Arab Spring participants revealed notable patterns in the construction of news values across BBCEN and BBCAR. The analysis revealed similarities in the construction of personalisation and proximity in depicting the Arab Spring participants. This finding suggests that both news outlets employ discursive strategies that emphasise the human dimension of uprisings and seek to establish a sense of connection and relevance for their respective audiences. The use of personalisation in BBCEN and BBCAR's coverage aligns with the concept of 'human interest framing' (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000) which focuses on the personal stories, experiences and emotions of individuals involved in newsworthy events. By highlighting the human faces and voices of Arab Spring participants, both news outlets may aim to generate empathy, identification and engagement among their audience.

Similarly, the construction of proximity in BBCEN can be understood as a form of 'localisation' (Clausen 2004), whereby news outlets seek to make the distant and complex events of the Arab Spring more relatable and meaningful to their audiences. This approach may involve emphasising the geographical, cultural or political ties between the Arab Spring countries and the news outlets' target audiences. However, analysis of BBCAR reveals that the discourse on paralinguistic voices in the Arab Spring is constructed with proximity that is more relevant to the BBCEN audience's proximity. This finding contrasts with the construction of paralinguistic voices in BBCEN which aligns with the proximity of its audience.

From a critical perspective, the findings from BBCAR indicating a significant dependence on external sources for news coverage could align with the stereotypical portrayal of Western news sources as being more independent and reliable. This practice of relying on British-based media found in BBCAR might also be a form of internalised Orientalist discourse



in which the perspectives and narratives of the West are prioritised over those of the Arab world (Said 1978). Consequently, this construction is considered in the current study as a commencing of sub-news values in DNVA when applied to the BBC's cross-lingual news, namely, producer-consonance and producer-proximity.

Thus, the contrasting practices of BBCAR and BBCEN in constructing paralinguistic voices highlight the complex dynamics of news production and dissemination in cross-cultural and cross-linguistic media landscapes. While BBCEN appears to prioritise the proximity and consonance of its own audience, BBCAR's reliance on external sources and privileging of Western perspectives may reflect an internalised Orientalist discourse which shapes its news value construction.

However, BBCEN places greater emphasis on superlativeness, highlighting the number of voiced protesters, and tends to focus on the violent actions of those participating in protests rather than their demands. This finding suggests that BBCEN employs a more sensationalist and conflict-oriented framing of the Arab Spring uprisings, potentially prioritising drama over substantive analysis and context.

The emphasis on superlativeness and violence in BBCEN's coverage aligns with the concept of the 'protest paradigm' (Chan and Lee 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1999) which posits that media coverage of social protests tends to focus on the dramatic, disruptive and confrontational aspects of the events, while marginalising or delegitimising the protesters' grievances and goals. This discursive approach may reflect BBCEN's institutional and ideological biases as well as its orientation towards a Western audience which may be more attuned to sensationalist and conflict-driven narratives. Moreover, the focus on violence in BBCEN's coverage of the Arab Spring uprisings may contribute to the 'protest paradigm's' delegitimization of social movements by portraying them as irrational, dangerous or extremist (McLeod and Hertog 1999). These representations can have significant implications for public perceptions and support for protesters' causes, as well as for the overall trajectory and outcomes of the uprisings.

### **8.5.1 The construction of personalisation and (producer) consonance of female voices in BBCEN and BBCAR**

The analysis in Chapter Seven comparing the representation of Arab women in BBCEN and BBCAR during the Arab Spring found that both news outlets consistently constructed women's voices with personalisation and consonance and employed gendered representations that reinforced traditional and stereotypical notions of women's roles and identities. In BBCAR, this discursive construction strategy resonates with the cultural understanding and stereotypical perceptions of Arab women and religious dynamics in the Middle East that are common among Western audiences. Through these representations, BBCEN maintains a sense of familiarity and reinforces the existing narratives to which their English-speaking audience is accustomed.

However, this consonance value construction may not resonate with the Arab audience of BBCAR who are presented with news about their community. The Arab audience, with their inherent understanding of the complexities of society, may find these representations oversimplified, stereotypical or even misaligned with their lived experiences. This discrepancy in news value construction can be termed 'producer-consonance' in BBCAR, similar to the

previously identified ‘producer-proximity.’ producer-consonance refers to the tendency of BBCAR to construct news values that are more in line with the expectations and perceptions of the producers themselves, rather than those of the target Arab audience.

This finding is consistent with the results of several other studies that examined the representation of Arab women in the international media, including BBC news discourse in both Arabic and English. For example, Al-Hejin (2015) conducted a discourse analysis of the BBC’s news coverage of Muslim women and found that the news outlet employed semantic macrostructures which reinforced stereotypical representations of Muslim women as oppressed and in need of liberation. Similarly, Al-Hasni (2022) evaluated international mediated public diplomacy efforts to promote women’s rights in the Arab world through an in-depth analysis of social media content from the BBC, Aljazeera, Al-Arabiya, Russia Today and France24. This study found that these media outlets often reinforced traditional gender roles and stereotypes in their coverage of Arab women. Alshahrani (2022) also examined the representation of Saudi women in BBC News discourse using a corpus-assisted critical intersectional approach. This study found that the BBC’s coverage of Saudi women often relied on stereotypical and essentialist representations which failed to capture the complexity and diversity of their experiences. Finally, Sakr (2002) analysed the representation of women in the Arab media over a decade of change and found that while women were increasingly visible in the media, they were still often portrayed in stereotypical and limited roles. Collectively, these studies suggest that the findings in Chapter Seven regarding the gendered framing strategies employed by both BBCEN and BBCAR in their coverage of Arab women during the Arab Spring are consistent with a broader pattern of stereotypical and essentialist representations of Arab women in the international media, including the BBC.

The co-construction of personalisation and consonance in BBCEN and BBCAR’s representation of female voices aligns with the concept of ‘gender-specific framing’ (Lind and Salo 2002) which highlights how the media’s coverage of women often relies on conventional and essentialist notions of femininity such as emotionality, passivity and victimhood. By emphasising the personal stories and experiences of women in the Arab Spring uprisings and reinforcing cultural and religious stereotypes, both news outlets may inadvertently marginalise or depoliticise women’s agency and participation.

### **8.5.2 The construction of personalisation and (producer) consonance of Shia, Salafists and Islamists’ voices in BBCEN and BBCAR**

Shared patterns of personalisation and (producer) consonance are also observed in the representation of Arab Spring participants as Shia, Salafists and Islamists. This finding suggests that BBCEN and BBCAR employ ‘ideological framing’ (Shoemaker and Reese 1996) in their coverage of the uprisings by categorising and labelling participants according to their religious or sectarian affiliations.

The ideological representations of Arab Spring participants in BBCEN and BBCAR’s coverage may reflect the news outlets’ institutional and cultural biases as well as their reliance on Western-centric and Orientalist discourses which tend to view the Middle East through the lens of religious and sectarian conflicts (Said 1978). This discursive construction approach can

have significant implications for the public's understanding and perception of the complex social, political and economic factors driving the Arab Spring uprisings.

The consistent co-construction of personalisation and consonance (or producer-consonance in the case of BBCAR) in the representations of women's voices and religious affiliations of participants in the Arab Spring events by both BBCEN and BBCAR, as demonstrated in Chapter Seven, can be attributed to the editorial and translation policies employed by the BBC. These policies play a crucial role in shaping news values and the framing of events across the BBC's multiple language services, including English and Arabic (Jaber and Baumann 2011). The influence of these policies on the construction of news values becomes particularly evident when examining the coverage of the Arab Spring's voices in BBCEN and BBCAR because these two services cater to audiences with distinct cultural backgrounds and linguistic preferences.

The influence of editing and translation policies on the construction of news values in BBCAR is further supported by Pan and Liao (2021) who argue that news translation as a discursive practice is conditioned by the socio-cultural norms of the target readership while reinforcing power relations in its original form when moving from one language to another. In the case of BBCAR, the process of translation may be influenced by the perceived expectations and cultural norms of the Arabic-speaking audience, leading to the reinforcement of producer-proximity and producer-consonance in the translated news content.

However, Jaber and Baumann (2011) analysed the BBC World Service's coverage of the Middle East. They note that there are instances of 'exoticisation' in the news featured on the BBCAR service, such as referring to the 2003 Gulf War as 'the American invasion' (al ghazwah al amrikiyah) rather than using more neutral terms such as 'the American-led invasion' or 'the 2003 invasion' which are commonly used by other news channels. This linguistic choice may reflect an attempt to cater to the perceived preferences and sensitivities of Arabic-speaking audiences but it also highlights the role of translation in shaping the framing and representation of events.

The examples provided by Jaber and Baumann (2011) and the theoretical framework proposed by Pan and Liao (2021) underscore the complex interplay between translation, cultural considerations and power dynamics in the production of news at BBCAR. As the BBCAR service navigates the challenges of serving its target audience while maintaining its institutional identity, its translation practices may contribute to the exoticisation of news and reinforcement of Western perspectives, ultimately shaping the construction of news values in its coverage of the Arab Spring.

To summarise, the findings regarding BBCAR's extended news values contribute to the discursive news values approach (Bednarek and Caple 2017) by demonstrating how news values are constructed differently in cross-lingual news produced by the same outlet for audiences with distinct cultures and languages. This finding also highlights the importance of considering the target audience's cultural background and expectations when analysing news value construction in international media outlets that deliver news to diverse audiences. In addition, such findings raise questions about the potential impact that such discrepancies have on the reception of and trust in the news outlet among its various target audiences. Furthermore, the current research provides insight into how media organisations navigate the challenges of serving multiple audiences that have different cultural backgrounds and expectations. This emphasises the need for media outlets to be attuned to the cultural perspectives of their diverse audiences to ensure

accurate, inclusive and representative reporting. In other words, the current study aims to open up avenues for future research regarding the implications of such discrepancies in news value construction on audience engagement, trust and the overall effectiveness of cross-cultural communication in international media.

### **8.5.3 Illocutionary voices' news values of Islamist participants and Tunisian migrants in BBCEN**

The findings presented in Chapter Seven reveal significant differences in the representation of illocutionary voices between BBCEN and BBCAR, with BBCEN featuring notably more instances. While this disparity may be attributed to limitations in BBCAR-collected corpora, the constructed news values in BBCEN's coverage warrant further analysis. This section argues that BBCEN's representation of Islamist participants and Tunisian migrants in the context of the Arab Spring uprisings contributes to the reinforcement of the securitisation of immigration in the Western media.

BBCEN's coverage of Islamist actors such as Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is characterised by the construction of consonance and negativity, despite these groups' promises of inclusiveness and liberal reforms. This representation reflects broader patterns of media bias in Western coverage of Islamic political movements (Navarro 2010; Sheehi 2010; Suryandari and Arifin 2021), where news discourse often exhibits prejudiced or hostile attitudes towards Islam and Muslims. By emphasising the religious and ideological aspects of Islamist movements whilst downplaying their political and social agendas, BBCEN's coverage may contribute to a process of 'othering' in the context of the Arab Spring uprisings (Said 1978), reinforcing established patterns of representation in Western media discourse. Moreover, despite their promises of reform, this negative construction of Islamist participants may reflect BBCEN's scepticism and bias against Islamic political movements, as well as its adherence to Western-centric notions of secularism and liberalism (Mullin 2010).

Furthermore, BBCEN's coverage of Tunisian migrants in Italy in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings employs 'threat framing' (Benson 2013) by constructing negativity, representing migrants as objects and their arrival as a crisis. This representation aligns with the concept of 'othering' (Said 1978) which involves the discursive construction of immigrants and refugees as fundamentally different, inferior or threatening to the host society. By dehumanising and depersonalising migrants, BBCEN may contribute to the creation of a moral panic (Cohen 1972) around immigration, thereby legitimising restrictive and exclusionary policies and practices. This negative construction of Tunisian migrants also reflects BBCEN's adherence to 'hierarchies of deservingness' (Chauvin and Garcés-Masareñas 2014) which prioritises certain groups of migrants over others based on their perceived economic, social or cultural value. Consequently, BBCEN's coverage may reinforce existing power dynamics and inequalities, as well as contributing to the marginalisation and stigmatisation of immigrant communities.

The representation of Tunisian immigration as a crisis in BBCEN's coverage aligns with the concept of 'securitisation' (Buzan et al. 1998) which refers to the process by which political actors frame certain issues as existential threats to the state or society to justify extraordinary measures and interventions. By emphasising the negative effects and risks associated with Tunisian migrants in Italy, BBCEN may contribute to the securitisation of immigration, thereby

shaping public perceptions and policy responses to human mobility in the context of the Arab Spring uprisings.

In conclusion, BBCEN's representation of Islamist participants and Tunisian migrants in the coverage of the Arab Spring uprisings reveals patterns that align with existing Western media discourses about Islamic political movements and migration. By constructing Islamist actors through frames of consonance and negativity and employing threat-based narratives in the representation of Tunisian migrants, BBCEN's coverage may reinforce processes of 'othering' and contribute to heightened public concern around immigration. These findings highlight potential limitations in Western media representations and underscore the need for more nuanced and contextualised coverage of complex political and social phenomena such as the Arab Spring uprisings and their aftermath.

## 8.6 Summary

This chapter has critically examined the discursive construction of news values in the representations of Arab Spring participants and their voices across Al Jazeera and BBC's Arabic and English news outlets. By situating the findings within the DNVA approach and considering the broader socio-cultural, political and institutional contexts of news organisations, the analysis reveals the complex and dynamic ways in which language, culture and ideology intersect to shape media narratives of the Arab Spring.

The key contributions of the current study include the identification of new subcategories of values such as 'socio-cultural categorisation,' 'counter-consonance,' 'producer-consonance' and 'producer-proximity' which extend the DNVA framework and emphasise the importance of considering the specific contexts and audiences of cross-lingual news discourse. The emergence of 'producer-proximity' and 'producer-consonance' in BBCAR underscores the influence of the English-language audience's expectations and assumptions about Arabic-language news content, potentially leading to the perpetuation of stereotypes or simplified narratives. The analysis also underscores the persistence of Orientalist discourse, gendered stereotypes and ideological biases in the media coverage of the Arab Spring, even as outlets navigate their roles as international and regional news providers.

However, it is important to critically reflect on the limitations and potential biases of Al Jazeera and the coverage of the BBC, as well as the methodological constraints of the current study. Future research could explore the production, circulation and reception of these news narratives among diverse audiences and examine alternative and counter-hegemonic discourses within and beyond these media outlets.

Ultimately, by providing insight into the discursive construction of news values in cross-lingual media representations of pivotal events such as the Arab Spring, the current study seeks to contribute to a more critical and reflexive understanding of the power of language and media in shaping public discourse and perceptions of the Arab world. As such, it underscores the need for journalists, academics and audiences alike to remain attuned to the complex dynamics of news production and representation in an increasingly globalised and multilingual media landscape whilst also considering the potential impact that catering to the expectations and assumptions of dominant language audiences has on the representation of events and issues in other languages.

## Chapter Nine: Conclusion

### 9.1 Introduction

This thesis investigates the newsworthiness of representations of the Arab Spring's participants and voices in the Arabic and English web-based news discourse of Al-Jazeera and the BBC. The study employs a Cross-lingual Corpus-assisted Discourse Study (CCDS) approach, combining corpus linguistics with discourse analysis to examine cross-lingual and cross-cultural news coverage of Arab Spring events.

At the core of this research is the application of the Discursive News Values Analysis (DNVA) framework, which serves as the primary discourse analysis approach. DNVA, with its cross-disciplinary perspective drawing on both journalism studies and linguistics, is particularly well-suited for examining how news values are constructed through discourse across different linguistic and cultural contexts.

The study's foundation lies in understanding the multifunctional dimensions of news discourse, including factors related to audiences, producers, culture, society, economics, and law. This comprehensive approach highlights the complex and interconnected nature of news as a form of communication. By integrating corpus linguistics with DNVA, the research leverages the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, allowing for a robust analysis of large-scale textual data while maintaining a nuanced understanding of discursive practices.

This methodological synergy enables the examination of how news values are constructed to frame events differently across Arabic and English news outlets. The cross-lingual aspect of the study is particularly significant, as it allows for the comparison of news value construction in two linguistically and culturally distinct contexts, providing insights into how language and culture influence news representation.

This conclusion chapter will synthesize the key findings of the research, presenting a comprehensive summary of how Al-Jazeera and BBC, in both their Arabic and English outlets, constructed news values in their coverage of the Arab Spring. Following this summary, the chapter will outline the original contributions of this study to the fields of cross-lingual discourse analysis, media studies, and corpus-assisted research. It will then address the limitations encountered during the research process, providing a critical reflection on the study's scope and methodological challenges, particularly those related to cross-lingual corpus analysis. Finally, the chapter will conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for future research, suggesting potential avenues for further investigation in the areas of cross-lingual news discourse analysis and the application of the DNVA framework to diverse cultural and linguistic contexts.

Through this structure, the conclusion aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the study's outcomes, its significance in the broader field of cross-lingual news discourse analysis, and its potential to inform future research in this dynamic and evolving area of study.

## 9.2 Summary of Findings

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of how Al Jazeera (ALJEN and ALJAR) and BBC (BBCEN and BBCAR) construct news values in their coverage of the Arab Spring, focusing on participants and voices. The research reveals both similarities and significant differences across languages and outlets, offering valuable insights into cross-cultural news production and consumption.

**Representation of Arabs and Construction of Consonance:** Both Al Jazeera outlets consistently portray Arabs as frequent and positive participants in the Arab Spring events, representing them as part of a diverse community. However, they diverge in their construction of consonance. ALJAR builds consonance by comparing events, while ALJEN portrays Arabs as a united community with shared history and future, effectively creating a counter-consonance to dominant Western media representations. This difference highlights the nuanced approaches taken by the same network to cater to different linguistic audiences.

**Analysis of Participants' Voices:** The study's examination of paralinguistic and illocutionary force expressions reveals subtle yet significant differences in reporting. For instance, in covering Bahrain's protests, ALJEN constructs them with consonance, negativity, and impact as sectarian Shia-Sunni struggles, while ALJAR emphasises protesters' grievances over poor conditions and rights. ALJEN adopts a more universalist tone, intensifying personalisation by transcribing Arabic chants, while ALJAR exhibits more religious rhetoric in recounting protest chants. These differences demonstrate how language choice influences the framing and emotional resonance of news stories for different audiences.

**Government and Political Group Representation:** Both Al Jazeera outlets construct governments with negativity, impact, and consonance, often indexing historical Western colonialism in the Arab world. The Muslim Brotherhood emerges as a key participant in both corpora, constructed with both impact and positivity. Notably, ALJEN uniquely constructs the Bahraini government with positivity via reform promises, unlike other Arab Spring regimes. This finding highlights the complexity of political representation in cross-linguistic news coverage.

**BBC's Coverage Patterns:** For BBC, both BBCEN and BBCAR showed similarities in constructing news values such as eliteness, timeliness, and consonance for participants like 'government'. Women emerged as frequent participants in both corpora, co-constructed with personalisation and consonance, often portrayed as victims, aligning with mainstream Western media representations. This finding was consistent across frequent word and keyword analyses, suggesting a more uniform approach to news construction across BBC's linguistic outlets.

**Audience-Specific Framing:** Interestingly, BBCAR exhibited what can be termed as 'producer-consonance', originating from BBCEN's audience consonance, and 'producer-proximity', representing British-based sources in Arab Spring news. This phenomenon reveals how news organisations adapt their coverage to different audience expectations and cultural backgrounds, sometimes leading to the transference of one audience's perspective onto another.

**Voice Analysis and News Values:** The analysis of participants' voices revealed similar newsworthiness constructs such as personalisation, proximity, and superlativeness across both BBC outlets. Governments' illocutionary voices in events like Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco were consistently constructed with eliteness, negativity, and impact. Notably, while BBCEN and BBCAR showed similar consonance values, they were directed at different audiences. This led to

the identification of 'producer-consonance' in BBCAR, where the other audience's consonance is imposed on the BBCAR audience, a finding that has significant implications for understanding cross-cultural news adaptation.

**Interdiscursive Practices and Unexpected Representations:** Interdiscursive practices are evident in both Al Jazeera corpora, with frequent references to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, ALJEN's backgrounding of expected consonance in this context reflects the differing perceptions of its diverse audience. ALJEN also constructs unexpectedness in representing Syrian women and coexistence in Syria, while ALJAR focuses more on protesters' calls for rights, largely avoiding sectarianism. These findings demonstrate how news outlets connect current events to ongoing regional issues and how they may challenge or reinforce existing narratives depending on their target audience.

In conclusion, this study offers vital insights into how international media construct and represent major political events like the Arab Spring, revealing the significant influence of linguistic, cultural and audience-specific factors on news representation. The following sections will discuss the original contributions of this research, acknowledge its limitations and explore the implications for media practitioners, policymakers and researchers in international journalism and multilingual news production. These discussions will underscore the significance of this work in advancing our understanding of cross-cultural news adaptation and the role of multilingual news organisations in shaping global narratives.

### 9.3 Original Contribution:

This study makes several significant contributions to the fields of Discursive News Values Analysis (DNVA), cross-lingual discourse analysis, and media studies:

1. Application of DNVA to Arabic news data: This research expands the application of DNVA to Arabic language media, enriching a field previously limited to a small number of languages. By doing so, it provides valuable insights into how news values operate in Arabic-language media, filling a gap in the existing literature. Figure 9.1 illustrates the proposed extension of the original DNVA approach by Bednarek and Caple (2017), highlighting the new subcategories of news values identified in this study. The extended values (**producer-consonance**, **counter-consonance**, **producer-proximity**<sup>48</sup>, and **socio-cultural categorisation**) are written in bold in the figure to emphasize these novel contributions to the DNVA framework.

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<sup>48</sup> Producer-proximity is presented alongside audience-proximity in the figure to offer a comprehensive view of proximity as a news value in cross-lingual contexts. While this thesis focuses on producer-proximity, particularly in BBCAR's coverage, the inclusion of audience-proximity acknowledges how news values may be constructed in relation to the target audience's geographical or cultural proximity to events. This dual representation provides insights into cross-lingual news adaptation and suggests directions for future research into audience-oriented news value construction.






Figure 9.1 Extension of the Discursive News Values Analysis (DNVA) Framework in Cross-lingual News Discourse

2. Cross-lingual comparison framework: The study presents a unique framework for comparing news discourse across languages, specifically between Arabic and English versions of Al Jazeera and BBC. This approach reveals the complex dynamics where language, culture, and events intersect in news production and representation.

3. Identification of new news value subcategories: The research extends the DNVA framework by identifying new subcategories of news values such as 'socio-cultural categorisation,' 'producer-consonance,' 'producer-consonance,' and 'producer-proximity'. These additions emphasize the importance of considering specific contexts and audiences in multilingual news environments.

4. Methodological innovation: The study proposes a novel mixed-method approach to analyse cross-lingual news discourse, combining corpus linguistics with critical discourse analysis in a way that has not been widely applied to Arabic-English comparisons before. This methodology addresses the unique challenges of comparing news values across languages with significantly different morphological structures. Specifically: a) It develops a tailored process for identifying and analysing news values in Arabic texts using corpus linguistic tools, accounting for the language's rich morphology and complex word formation patterns. b) It introduces a systematic framework for mapping and comparing news values across Arabic and English corpora, enabling direct cross-linguistic analysis of discursive constructions. c) The study integrates quantitative corpus findings with qualitative critical discourse analysis in a cyclical, iterative process, allowing for a more comprehensive

interpretation of cross-lingual news value construction. This approach not only bridges the gap between computational and critical methods in news discourse analysis but also provides a replicable model for future cross-lingual studies involving Arabic and other morphologically complex languages.

5. Insights into media representation of the Arab Spring: By focusing on the coverage of the Arab Spring, the research provides valuable insights into how significant political events are constructed and represented across languages and cultures in international news media. For example: a) The study reveals how Al Jazeera English (ALJEN) and Al Jazeera Arabic (ALJAR) framed the Bahraini protests differently. ALJEN constructed the events with consonance, negativity and impact as sectarian Shia-Sunni struggles, whilst ALJAR emphasised protesters' grievances over poor conditions and rights. This contrast demonstrates how the same events can be interpreted and presented differently based on perceived audience interests and cultural contexts. b) Another striking example is the representation of women in the Arab Spring coverage. The BBC outlets frequently portrayed women as victims, aligning with mainstream Western media representations. In contrast, ALJEN constructed unexpectedness in its representation of Syrian women, potentially challenging stereotypes. This difference highlights how news organisations can either reinforce or challenge existing narratives depending on their approach and target audience. These examples illustrate how the study sheds light on the complex ways in which international media construct and represent major political events like the Arab Spring, revealing the influence of linguistic, cultural and audience-specific factors on news representation

6. Contribution to understanding cross-cultural news production: This study makes a significant contribution to our understanding of cross-cultural news production, particularly in the context of multilingual news organisations. It reveals the complex ways in which news outlets adapt their reporting for different linguistic audiences, with far-reaching implications for the representation of events and issues across languages. The research demonstrates that news organisations do not simply translate content from one language to another, but rather engage in a nuanced process of cultural and linguistic adaptation. This adaptation process is influenced by various factors: a) Audience expectations: The study shows how outlets like BBC Arabic (BBCAR) exhibit 'producer-consonance', originating from BBC English's (BBCEN) audience consonance. This suggests that the expectations of the dominant language audience (in this case, English) can shape the framing of news in other languages. b) Cultural framing: Al Jazeera English (ALJEN) and Al Jazeera Arabic (ALJAR) show distinct approaches in their coverage. ALJEN adopts a more universalist tone and constructs Arabs as a united community with a shared history and future, creating a counter-narrative to dominant Western representations. This indicates a conscious effort to challenge stereotypes and provide alternative perspectives for an international audience. c) Linguistic choices: The study reveals how language choice influences the emotional resonance of news stories. For instance, ALJEN intensifies personalisation by transcribing Arabic chants, whilst ALJAR uses more religious rhetoric. These choices reflect an understanding of the cultural and linguistic nuances of their respective audiences. d) Event interpretation: The coverage of Bahrain's protests demonstrates how the same events can be framed differently for different audiences. ALJEN constructs the protests with consonance, negativity, and impact as sectarian Shia-Sunni struggles, whilst ALJAR emphasises protesters' grievances over poor conditions and rights. This shows how news organisations tailor their narrative based on

perceived audience interests and cultural contexts. e) Historical contextualisation: Both Al Jazeera outlets often index historical Western colonialism when discussing Arab governments. This practice of providing historical context may differ across languages, reflecting assumptions about the background knowledge of different audience groups. f) Representation of key actors: The study's findings on the portrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood and women across different outlets and languages reveal how news organisations navigate complex political and social issues for diverse audiences. g) Interdiscursive practices: The frequent references to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in Al Jazeera's Arab Spring coverage demonstrate how news outlets connect current events to ongoing regional issues, potentially differing in emphasis across languages. These findings have significant implications for our understanding of news production and consumption in a globalised, multilingual media landscape. They suggest that the process of adapting news for different linguistic audiences goes beyond mere translation, involving complex decisions about framing, context, and emphasis. This adaptation process can potentially reinforce or challenge existing narratives and stereotypes, depending on the approach taken by the news organisation.

Moreover, the study's identification of phenomena like 'producer-consonance' in BBCAR, where one audience's consonance is imposed on another, raises important questions about the power dynamics in multilingual news production. It suggests that dominant language audiences may indirectly influence the news representation for other language groups, potentially leading to a homogenisation of news narratives across languages. This research provides a foundation for future studies in cross-lingual media analysis, offering a methodology for examining how news values are constructed across languages and cultures. It also opens up new avenues for investigating the ethical implications of cross-cultural news adaptation and the role of multilingual news organisations in shaping global narratives. By inspecting these complexities, the study makes a crucial contribution to our understanding of how news is produced and consumed in an increasingly interconnected world. It challenges simplistic notions of news translation and highlights the need for comprehensive, culturally sensitive approaches to multilingual news production.

#### **9.4 Limitations of the Study**

While this study makes significant contributions to the field of cross-lingual news discourse analysis, it is important to acknowledge several limitations that influenced the scope and depth of the research. These limitations not only affected the current study but also point to areas for improvement in future research:

1. Methodological challenges with Arabic language processing: The study faced significant difficulties in Arabic lemma searching using Sketch Engine, necessitating manual calculations for BBCAR. This limitation stems from the complex morphological structure of Arabic, which poses unique challenges for corpus linguistic tools primarily designed for English and other Indo-European languages.
2. Balancing data extraction between Arabic and English: To create a balance between Arabic and English data extraction, the Word Sketch tool was utilised. While this approach provided some consistency, it didn't fully capture the richness of

Arabic morphology. More comprehensive tools, such as Lemma frequent word lists, which could have provided deeper insights, were not available for Arabic in Sketch Engine at the time of the study.

3. **Imbalance in personalisation construction:** An expected imbalance emerged between the corpora findings of key participants constructed with personalisation in BBCAR compared to BBCEN. This discrepancy arose due to the nature of the included data and the similarity between ordinary Arabic names in BBCAR and the reference corpora, potentially skewing the identification of keywords.

4. **Pronoun analysis limitations:** The study faced challenges in comparing pronouns between Arabic and English corpora. The exclusion of pronouns in BBCEN and the different formulation of pronouns in Arabic (where they are often attached to verbs) affected the comparative analysis, potentially limiting insights into personalisation across languages.

5. **Exclusion of multimodal analysis:** To maintain methodological consistency, the study did not include multimodal analysis of visual elements such as images. This exclusion may have limited the depth of analysis, particularly in understanding how visual elements contribute to news value construction.

6. **Temporal snapshot:** The results observed may represent a specific period of consolidated counterrevolutionary suppression in the countries studied. Different patterns might have been observed if the study had encompassed a broader timeframe, such as including data from 2011 or 2013.

7. **Space constraints:** Due to limitations in the scope of the study, some potentially insightful comparisons, such as the analysis of 'government' as a singular versus plural term, were not included in the final analysis.

8. **Corpus tool limitations for Arabic:** The study was constrained by the limitations of available corpus tools for Arabic. While efforts were made to adapt and compensate for these limitations, the lack of sophisticated Arabic-specific corpus linguistic tools may have affected the depth and breadth of the analysis.

## **9.5 Suggestions for further studies**

1. **Future research in the field of Discursive News Values Analysis (DNVA),** particularly in cross-lingual contexts, offers numerous promising avenues for exploration.

2. **Building on this study's findings,** subsequent investigations could focus on developing and using more sophisticated Arabic language processing tools to address current challenges in corpus analysis.

3. **Expanding the scope of data collection to encompass a wider range of news sources (such as visuals) and time periods** would provide a more comprehensive understanding of news discourse across languages and cultures.

4. **Future studies could investigate deeper into the production, circulation, and reception of news narratives among diverse audiences, while also examining alternative and counter-hegemonic discourses within and beyond the studied media outlets.**

5. Investigating structural and stylistic differences between Arabic and English versions of news outlets like Al Jazeera and BBC, potentially using methods beyond corpus tools, could reveal important cultural and political influences on news reporting.
6. Incorporating multimodal analysis, including visual elements, would offer a more holistic understanding of news discourse.
7. Longitudinal studies examining how news values and discursive constructions evolve over time, particularly during different phases of significant events like the Arab Spring, could provide valuable insights into the dynamic nature of news discourse.
8. Further exploration of the newly identified subcategories of news values (such as 'socio-cultural categorisation,' 'reverso-consonance,' 'producer-consonance,' and 'producer-proximity') in various contexts and media outlets would enhance our understanding of these concepts.
9. Studying how BBC and Al Jazeera construct news values in their cross-lingual coverage of events outside the Arab world, such as the Black Lives Matter movement or climate change protests, could help determine the broader applicability of the extended values found in this research.
10. Comparative studies of news value construction by different multilingual news organisations beyond BBC and Al Jazeera could further illuminate the complex interplay between organisational culture, target audience, and linguistic choices in news production.

These diverse research directions would significantly contribute to advancing our understanding of news discourse in multilingual and multicultural contexts, building upon the methodological approach and findings of this study.

### *Reflection on My PhD Journey*

At the outset of my PhD, I was captivated by the interplay between news, culture, and perception. As an international student in the UK, where news consumption is ingrained in daily life, I found myself increasingly curious about how people interpret various news stories and events, both in the UK and about my home country, Saudi Arabia. The socio-political changes occurring during my early years in the UK, including the second wave of the Arab Spring, the Black Lives Matter movement, and the COVID-19 pandemic, further piqued my interest in how international news is shaped for diverse audiences across different languages and cultures.

My research journey was far from linear. Initially inspired by sociolinguistic scales and audience design theories, I found myself drawn to more critically-based approaches as I delved deeper into my data on political and social changes. This led me to explore the Discourse Historical Approach and Social Actor theory. However, it was while preparing to teach a course on Understanding Communication that I discovered the News Values approach, which ultimately became the cornerstone of my research. This theory provided me with a mechanism to analyse how news values are culturally bound, a framework I found applicable even beyond my research data.

Throughout this process, I faced several challenges, primarily cultural in nature. Analysing news discourse delivered in two cultures, one of which was relatively new to me, required immersing myself in British culture through various means. Whilst initially daunting, this immersion proved to be an enriching experience. The COVID-19 pandemic and the birth of my daughter during this time presented additional obstacles, but also opportunities for growth and resilience.

My PhD journey has significantly evolved my thinking about different cultures and approaches to discourse analysis. It has honed my skills in using corpus tools and communicating research findings, providing me with invaluable personal and professional experiences in understanding communication at both individual and institutional levels.

Collaboration has been a crucial aspect of my journey. My supervisor's unwavering support, insightful suggestions, and encouraging words were instrumental in guiding me through the challenges of doctoral research. Additionally, presenting at multiple conferences and symposia allowed me to engage with scholars from around the world, some of whose work I had long admired. These experiences not only helped me situate my research within the broader fields of corpus-assisted discourse studies and cross-lingual media discourse studies but also provided fresh perspectives and inspiration.

One of the most profound lessons I've learnt is that research is akin to sculpture – a multidimensional process requiring patience, persistence, and continuous refinement. This journey has not only shaped my future research interests, particularly in applying discourse analysis theories across different cultural contexts, but has also deepened my understanding of the potential and limitations of these theories.

In conclusion, my PhD journey has been transformative, both personally and professionally. It has equipped me with the skills, knowledge, and perspective to contribute meaningfully to the field of discourse analysis and cross-cultural communication. As I reflect on this journey, I am reminded that the true value of a PhD lies not just in the final thesis, but in the intellectual growth and resilience cultivated along the way – a foundation that will undoubtedly shape my future academic and professional endeavours.

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## Appendix 1.1 Transliteration system (Ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu, 2022)

### IJMES TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM FOR ARABIC, PERSIAN, AND TURKISH

#### CONSONANTS

A = Arabic, P = Persian, O'T = Ottoman Turkish, M'T = Modern Turkish

	A	P	O'T	M'T		A	P	O'T	M'T		A	P	O'T	M'T
ء	ˀ	ˀ	ˀ	—	ز	z	z	z	z	ك	k	k or g	k or n̄	k or n
ب	b	b	b	b or p	ژ	—	zh	j	j				or y	or y
پ	—	p	p	p	س	s	s	s	s				or ğ	or ğ
ت	t	t	t	t	ش	sh	sh	ş	ş	گ	—	g	g	g
ث	th	ṯ	ṯ	s	ص	ṣ	ṣ	ş	s	ل	l	l	l	l
ج	j	j	c	c	ض	ḍ	ẓ	ẓ	z	م	m	m	m	m
چ	—	ch	ç	ç	ط	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	t	ن	n	n	n	n
ح	h	ḥ	ḥ	h	ظ	ẓ	ẓ	z	z	ه	h	h	h <sup>1</sup>	h
خ	kh	kh	h	h	ع	ˁ	ˁ	ˁ		و	w	v or u	v	v
د	d	d	d	d	غ	gh	gh	g or ğ	g or ğ	ي	y	y	y	y
ذ	dh	ẓ	ẓ	z	ف	f	f	f	f	ة	a <sup>2</sup>			
ر	r	r	r	r	ق	q	q	k	k	ال	ˁ <sup>3</sup>			

<sup>1</sup> When h is not final. <sup>2</sup> In construct state: al. <sup>3</sup> For the article, al- and -l-.

#### VOWELS

	ARABIC AND PERSIAN	OTTOMAN AND MODERN TURKISH
<i>Long</i>	ا or آ ā	ā
	و ū	ū
	ي ī	ī
		} words of Arabic and Persian origin only
<i>Doubled</i>	آئـ iy (final form ī)	iy (final form ī)
	ؤـ uv (final form ū)	uvv
<i>Diphthongs</i>	أـ au or aw	ev
	آئـ ai or ay	ey
<i>Short</i>	ا a	a or e
	و u	u or ü / o or ö
	ي i	i or ī

For Ottoman Turkish, authors may either transliterate or use the modern Turkish orthography.

## **Appendix 1.2 List of Study Data Sources**

**ALJEN data:**

[ALJEN Texts.pdf](#)

**ALJAR data:**

[ALJAR Texts.pdf](#)

**BBCEN data:**

[BBCEN texts.pdf](#)

**BBCAR data:**

[BBCAR texts.pdf](#)

## Appendix 1.3: Searching Words in Arabic and English in Sketch Engine

WORD SKETCH   

BASIC

ADVANCED

AS A LIST

ABOUT

Search ?

Query

GO

WORD SKETCH   

BASIC

ADVANCED

AS A LIST

ABOUT

Search ?

lemma

GO

## Appendix 2: The 200 Most Frequent Words in ALJEN and ALJAR

Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency
1 the	7,147	51 his	230	101 out	130	151 like	82
2 ,	5,028	52 political	226	102 syrian	128	152 say	82
3 .	4,358	53 one	226	103 bahrain	125	153 well	82
4 of	3,310	54 which	225	104 military	124	154 during	81
5 and	2,731	55 revolution	220	105 can	123	155 before	81
6 to	2,626	56 security	218	106 rights	122	156 how	81
7 in	2,389	57 police	216	107 tunisia	121	157 media	80
8 a	2,018	58 against	212	108 since	121	158 being	80
9 "	1,874	59 its	208	109 state	120	159 under	78
10 that	1,097	60 after	202	110 two	119	160 shia	78
11 is	932	61 country	196	111 into	118	161 city	77
12 for	884	62 what	190	112 do	116	162 very	77
13 on	875	63 '	188	113 our	113	163 king	77
14 it	689	64 forces	183	114 demonstrators	111	164 just	76
15 by	657	65 's	179	115 because	110	165 several	75
16 have	639	66 ?	178	116 first	109	166 yemen	75
17 with	632	67 regime	178	117 uprising	108	167 international	74
18 as	606	68 when	178	118 even	108	168 least	74
19 are	576	69 other	177	119 killed	106	169 national	74
20 was	527	70 would	169	120 told	106	170 way	73
21 has	501	71 egypt	166	121 capital	104	171 party	73
22 they	490	72 also	165	122 time	103	172 still	73
23 not	482	73 about	165	123 most	101	173 main	73
24 people	472	74 us	163	124 only	100	174 square	73
25 said	453	75 all	158	125 sudan	99	175 foreign	72
26 were	429	76 than	154	126 thousands	99	176 part	72
27 from	426	77 you	154	127 change	99	177 saleh	72
28 but	424	78 activists	153	128 across	94	178 end	72
29 their	405	79 al	152	129 human	93	179 friday	71
30 arab	399	80 so	152	130 2011	93	180 gas	71
31 :	391	81 protest	151	131 day	92	181 used	71
32 at	385	82 president	151	132 think	90	182 libya	70
33 this	382	83 spring	150	133 did	90	183 [	70
34 we	377	84 new	149	134 )	89	184 jazeera	70
35 an	376	85 syria	146	135 between	89	185 countries	70
36 protests	369	86 many	145	136 (	89	186 support	69
37 been	349	87 power	141	137 these	88	187 ]	69
38 be	341	88 movement	141	138 may	88	188 such	69
39 protesters	334	89 some	141	139 groups	87	189 marwan	68
40 -	322	90 over	140	140 years	86	190 called	68
41 government	304	91 them	139	141 could	86	191 country's	68
42 he	300	92 now	139	142 last	85	192 freedom	67
43 who	298	93 if	137	143 all	85	193 went	67

44	i	273
45	will	256
46	or	248
47	more	240
48	opposition	238
49	had	234
50	there	231

94	where	136
95	world	136
96	no	135
97	violence	133
98	n't	133
99	demonstrations	132
100	up	131

144	region	85
145	while	85
146	streets	83
147	those	83
148	down	82
149	any	82
150	year	82

194	gulf	67
195	peaceful	66
196	bishara	66
197	months	65
198	week	65
199	tear	65
200	february	65



## word (10,322 items | 62,505 total frequency)

Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency
1 و	4,092	51 س	88	101 الاردن	48	151 ..	39
2 في	1,973	52 النظام	86	102 اخرى	47	152 الي	38
3 ,	1,883	53 حركة	84	103 يقول	47	153 مطاهرات	38
4 ب	1,656	54 كل	84	104 العمل	47	154 التونسية	38
5 ل	1,471	55 بعض	84	105 الشعب	47	155 الاسلامية	37
6 ان	1,274	56 قبل	83	106 الحراك	47	156 صالح	37
7 من	1,159	57 (	83	107 سدد	47	157 قتل	36
8 .	1,138	58 غير	80	108 اي	47	158 الازمة	36
9 ها	1,128	59 قوات	79	109 !	46	159 اول	36
10 ه	1,032	60 حديث	77	110 الماضي	46	160 مثل	36
11 "	791	61 فبراير	76	111 الوطني	45	161 اجل	36
12 على	641	62 الدولة	76	112 رغم	45	162 الحرية	36
13 الي	574	63 ضد	76	113 المغرب	44	163 الجمعة	36
14 ما	444	64 اليوم	73	114 امام	44	164 منطقة	35
15 هم	444	65 السياسية	72	115 نسبية	44	165 المظاهرات	35
16 التي	374	66 منذ	72	116 حين	44	166 العذف	35
17 عن	356	67 نا	71	117 وسط	44	167 النهضة	35
18 ف	271	68 السياسي	71	118 ظل	43	168 الانتخابات	35
19 لا	258	69 العربية	71	119 حالة	43	169 الشلح	35
20 ".	239	70 ",	69	120 السابق	43	170 اكد	35
21 الذي	220	71 عبد	68	121 عندد	43	171 بلعيد	35
22 مع	201	72 الجزيرة	68	122 الكاتب	43	172 ايضا	34
23 العربي	184	73 نفس	67	123 الشعبية	43	173 وزير	34
24 بعد	182	74 ليبيا	66	124 نظام	43	174 الوضع	34
25 الثورة	180	75 الحركة	65	125 عدم	43	175 الانسان	34
26 هذه	180	76 الامن	65	126 هناك	42	176 يرى	34
27 بين	177	77 حتى	62	127 عدد	42	177 حسب	34
28 لم	157	78 رديس	61	128 شكل	42	178 المعتقلين	34
29 ذلك	151	79 اكثر	60	129 تلك	42	179 كما	34
30 هذا	143	80 سوريا	59	130 المتظاهرين	42	180 التغيير	33
31 هو	141	81 )	59	131 دول	42	181 المرأة	33
32 لكن	138	82 المنطقة	59	132 مدينة	42	182 العراق	33
33 الربيع	135	83 حكومة	58	133 الا	41	183 ثورات	33
34 ك	133	84 حقوق	58	134 تحقيق	41	184 التقرير	33

35 تونس	131	85 نحو	57	135 سياسية	41	185 البرلمان	33
36 مصر	129	86 العالم	57	136 السلطة	41	186 العدالة	33
37 قد	129	87 اليمن	56	137 الامنية	40	187 مرسي	33
38 الحكومة	125	88 هي	56	138 مما	40	188 الشرطة	33
39 قال	123	89 ثورة	55	139 البحرين	40	189 الثاني	33
40 البلاد	120	90 المعارضة	54	140 الدول	40	190 المتحدة	32
41 او	116	91 نت	54	141 الله	40	191 دعت	32
42 /	113	92 اضاف	54	142 اما	40	192 السلطات	32
43 كان	112	93 العاصمة	53	143 التونسي	39	193 الداخلية	32
44 علي	100	94 الثورات	53	144 :	39	194 الشباب	32
45 خلال	99	95 الذين	51	145 امس	39	195 الاولى	32
46 الرئيس	98	96 قالت	50	146 المصري	39	196 المدينة	32
47 كانت	97	97 2011	49	147 تنظيم	39	197 الاول	31
48 الاحتجاجات	94	98 حزب	49	148 احد	39	198 الامر	31
49 العام	94	99 محمد	49	149 لن	39	199 يمكن	31
50 عام	92	100 %	48	150 20	39	200 التنمية	31



## Appendix 3: Screenshots of Concordance Lines (as Sentences) for *youth* in ALJEN Corpus

CQL [lempos\_lc="youth-n"] • 75  
668.69 per million tokens • 0.067%



	Details	sentence
1	doc#0	<s>Syria's democratic reconstruction, whenever that may be, is bound to face similar challenges. 4- Islamists are looking increasingly to be on the defensive, and Tunisia, with the Ennahda Party still able to pull strings, is the only site of struggle against a hodgepodge of remnants from the old regime emerging as serious contenders for power. 5- Arab <b>youth</b> led and made the revolutions, yet across the board, ailing and old figures (Beji Caid Essebsi in Tunisia, Hazem Beblawi in Egypt) and parties are reaping the political benefits, ascending to the helm and clinging to power at all cost (President Marzouki in Tunisia). 6- Arab revolutions are now kept in check by conservative regional powers.</s>
2	doc#0	<s>Yet, the quest for electoral democracy has been the route to upward mobility for the new elites whose quest for "existence" and self-affirmation may have distracted them from the main objectives that led the Arab <b>youth</b> to reject corrupt and dynastic systems.</s>
3	doc#0	<s>In transition and revolution Bouazizi's act of self-immolation in December 2010, inspired Arab <b>youth</b> and the resulting meme today, manifests itself through all kinds of revolutionary ideas, practices and symbolisms for freedom across a vast human and geographical Arab Spring space and founded a manifesto for dissidence by ordinary citizens.</s>
4	doc#0	<s>By coming together across diverse geographies, political, socio-economic and cultural realities, Arab <b>youths</b> set the region ablaze to affirm one thing: the rejection of living "a big lie" (Havel's words) as constructed in the official transcripts of the ousted regimes.</s>
5	doc#0	<s> <b>Youth</b> activists and doctors at a Khartoum hospital have told The Associated Press news agency that at least 100 people died since protests first broke out on Monday.</s>
6	doc#0	<s>Clashes erupted in Shia-populated villages around Manama on Thursday evening when riot police intervened to disperse demonstrations called by the opposition February 14 Coalition <b>youth</b> group, witnesses said.</s>
7	doc#0	<s>Friday's peaceful demonstration in the capital, Amman, drew nearly 2,000 people, including <b>youth</b> activists and Muslim Brotherhood members, united in the election boycott and in demands that King Abdullah II cede some of his powers.</s>
8	doc#0	<s>Many Sudanese <b>youth</b> think that this is the moment that change will come.</s>
9	doc#0	<s>Al Jazeera spoke to several of these <b>youth</b> who support the protests.</s>
10	doc#0	<s>Voters are most likely going this time to exercise their right as never before: the <b>youth's</b> revolution is at stake - not simply the fate of a few candidates, parties or political elites.</s>
11	doc#0	<s>SCAF's fight with the Islamists is one thing - however, its fight with the <b>youth</b> of Egypt and the revolution is something else.</s>
12	doc#0	<s> <b>Youth</b> unemployment is at over 40 per cent.</s>
13	doc#0	<s>"Days of rage' The February 14 <b>Youth</b> Movement had called on social networking sites for "three days of rage" to coincide with the event.</s>
14	doc#0	<s>Mohammed Al-Maskati, president of Bahrain <b>Youth</b> Society for Human Rights, told Al Jazeera the mood in Manama in the run-up to Sunday's race was one of "anger".</s>
15	doc#0	<s>While some groups include families, the overwhelming majority are <b>youths</b> , especially those who had been involved in the uprising and are escaping potential detention.</s>
16	doc#0	<s>The Assad regime, they say, is eager to rid the country of its problematic <b>youth</b> .</s>

17	doc#0	<s>You are witnessing the downfall of the Assad dynasty; we, on the other hand, witnessed its rise and the height of its tyranny," Salma told the <b>youths</b> , as she thought back to her years in Damascus.</s>
18	doc#0	<s>The rise of Damascus Among the <b>youth</b> present was Marwa al-Ghamian, whose loud chants stirred the otherwise quiet streets of the Hariqa neighbourhood on that first day of the revolution.</s>
19	doc#0	<s>At the detention of teenage anti-regime graffiti artists, younger relatives of Mohamed's and locally known <b>youths</b> , it was unthinkable for the close-knit community to remain silent.</s>
20	doc#0	<s>The <b>youths</b> , however, had not witnessed that episode in Syrian history and proved more fearless than the older generation.</s>
21	doc#0	<s>Added to the mix of challenges are the country's dwindling water and oil reserves, a rapidly expanding population of unemployed <b>youth</b> and ongoing conflicts with Yemen's opposition - including the Houthis, northern Shia rebels who have fought a long-running battle against the government, and the Southern Movement, a secessionist group in the south.</s>
22	doc#0	<s>Karman, who has led demonstrations calling for change in the capital, Sanaa, for years, dedicated her victory in October to the " <b>youth</b> of the Arab Spring" and the "memories of the martyrs".</s>
23	doc#0	<s>"We will build our country with peace [and] I give this award for all the <b>youth</b> in the Arab world - in Egypt, in Libya, Syria and Yemen.</s>
24	doc#0	<s>All the <b>youth</b> and women, this is a victory for our demand for citizenship and human rights," she told Al Jazeera in October.</s>
25	doc#0	<s>Likewise, the national lawyers' union was a driving force in the uprising, with its members standing side-by-side, the country's <b>youth</b> began to demand social justice and political freedom.</s>
26	doc#0	<s>"We will continue with our protests ... even if thousands of our <b>youth</b> are killed.</s>
27	doc#0	<s>According to a letter from Yemen's <b>youth</b> movement to the United Nations, sent earlier this month, at least 861 people have been killed and more than 25,000 wounded since mass protests against Saleh's rule began earlier in the year.</s>
28	doc#0	<s>Dr Noman said that Yemeni <b>youth</b> activists had called on the international community to provide them with medical aid, but that they had received no response.</s>
29	doc#0	<s>As early as February 14, Bahraini <b>youth</b> followed the example of their peers in other Arab countries by staging protests and sit-ins demanding constitutional and political reforms.</s>
30	doc#0	<s>They did not rise as Shia but as <b>youth</b> who wanted to have a say on their fate through active political participation.</s>
31	doc#0	<s>Bahrain's Tahrir Square Like many people in Bahrain, the <b>youth</b> activists felt cheated by the regime which agreed to political reforms, included in the NAC.</s>
32	doc#0	<s>Shortly after the beginning of protests the mainly Shia opposition parties took over but endorsed the same demands - set forward by the <b>youth</b> - for a new constitution that would shift most powers into the hands of elected officials.</s>
33	doc#0	<s>'Yemeni <b>youth</b> are guarding the revolution' As disparate groups compete for influence in post-Saleh era, young protesters hold the balance of power. by Amel Ahmed 11 Jun 2011 President Saleh once compared his rule to "dancing on the heads of snakes".</s>
34	doc#0	<s>They had a score to settle with Saleh but they did not dare to confront him directly until the <b>youth</b> took to the streets.</s>
35	doc#0	<s>The <b>youth</b> were the playing field.</s>
36	doc#0	<s>According to Salah al Sharafi, founder of the Union of Movements for Independent <b>Youth</b> , Islah is attempting to control the movement.</s>
37	doc#0	<s>" Enter the <b>youth</b> movement Where does this messy, convoluted equation leave the opposition youth?</s>
38	doc#0	<s>" Enter the youth movement Where does this messy, convoluted equation leave the opposition <b>youth</b> ?</s>

39	doc#0	<s>The <b>youth</b> will continue the revolution for as long as need be.</s>
40	doc#0	<s>The tribe will try to claim power but the <b>youth</b> know what they want and will not rest until they attain all their rights.</s>
41	doc#0	<s>Iryani is more optimistic, believing the <b>youth</b> movement will not stand in the way if the general political community comes to a resolution.</s>
42	doc#0	<s>" Despite the past few violent weeks, Iryani believes the <b>youth</b> are still in charge of the uprising and maintains that the military wing is limited in its authority.</s>
43	doc#0	<s>I do not think the <b>youth</b> will be dominated or intimidated by these tribal and military forces.</s>
44	doc#0	<s>For their part, the <b>youth</b> have succeeded in bringing together different factions under one banner, something that Saleh, Yemen's only leader in modern history, has never succeeded in doing - without feeling like he was "dancing on the heads of snakes".</s>
45	doc#0	<s>The Lebanese army stopped a group of 20 <b>youths</b> who made it to the border town of Kfar Kila.</s>
46	doc#0	<s>There was also violence on the Israeli side of the border in Majdal Shams on Sunday evening, as Druze and Palestinians <b>youths</b> clashed with Israeli security forces.</s>
47	doc#0	<s>Members of a pan-Arab nationalist <b>youth</b> group in the seaside city of Saida told Al Jazeera that justice for the Palestinian people was a central concern for their group, and one that brought Arabs together across religious or sectarian lines.</s>
48	doc#0	<s>Clashes in the town between rival tribal factions began late on Friday after an altercation between two <b>youths</b> .</s>
49	doc#0	<s>A credible <b>youth</b> movement is developing here, capable of coordinating a series of protests over three punishing days, and spilling into three neighbouring countries.</s>
50	doc#0	<s>The as-yet unnamed <b>youth</b> movement, which first came to prominence through a series of public hunger strikes for unity, has worked hard to establish connections that cut across barriers of class, religion, political allegiance and geography.</s>
51	doc#0	<s>Over the past fortnight, several prominent activists from the <b>youth</b> movement were arrested by the PA, revealing the split loyalties which still plague the Palestinian government.</s>
52	doc#0	<s>Fadi Quran, one of the <b>youth</b> movement's senior figures, defined success by progress.</s>
53	doc#0	<s>" Before the event, the movement had convened seminars to educate <b>youths</b> on strategies of non-violent resistance, as well as providing advice on how to cope with police brutality.</s>
54	doc#0	<s>The inexperienced <b>youth</b> movement will face sabotage attempts from inside and out, yet support is growing for their progressive, pluralist values, even within the more conservative villages and refugee camps.</s>
55	doc#0	<s>Our interviewees are: Ahmed Maher, founder of the 6 April <b>Youth</b> Movement, Egypt; Mohamed Arafat, from Egypt's Social Deomocratic Party; Shaeera Amin, former deputy director of Nile TV; Hugh Miles, author of Al Jazeera - How Arab TV News Challenged the World Narrator: Six upheavels in five months have rocked the Arab world.</s>
56	doc#0	<s>But first we recall the beginnings of the Arab spring and the role of the <b>youth</b> in making it all happen.</s>
57	doc#0	<s>Nada Dhaif: A student force is managed by thousands of <b>youths</b> march spring.</s>
58	doc#0	<s>Narrator: And in Jordan the <b>youth</b> are challenging the monarchy.</s>
59	doc#0	<s>I am part of a peaceful <b>youth</b> students revolution.</s>
60	doc#0	<s>Marwan Bishara: Rabab as we've seen in the report, there's no doubt that <b>youth</b> have led this movement in the Arab world.</s>
61	doc#0	<s>The problem is that the construct does not only stop at making it, you know, a <b>youth</b> revolution but the youth is

	being constructed along a quintessential middle class line.</s>
62	doc#0 <s>The problem is that the construct does not only stop at making it, you know, a youth revolution but the <b>youth</b> is being constructed along a quintessential middle class line.</s>
63	doc#0 <s>Marwan Bishara: But for some were the middle class <b>youth</b> leading?</s>
64	doc#0 <s>So it's the <b>youth</b> unemployment, half educated youth and yet the young people have been watching satellite television, see how other people live, seen consumerism and wanting the sort of freedoms and the economic benefits which other people have in other parts of the world.</s>
65	doc#0 <s>So it's the youth unemployment, half educated <b>youth</b> and yet the young people have been watching satellite television, see how other people live, seen consumerism and wanting the sort of freedoms and the economic benefits which other people have in other parts of the world.</s>
66	doc#0 <s>A lot of people, or especially a lot of Americans, who will say you know, look Egypt had its problems but it had this huge <b>youth</b> bulge, has huge unemployment problems and at least it had an economy that was growing six, seven per cent a year even in 2008, 2009, at the height of a global recession.</s>
67	doc#0 <s>Marwan Bishara: So what you're saying is that <b>youth</b> are not exactly the biggest disaster when in fact they could be the best potential for building a nation.</s>
68	doc#0 <s>Christopher Seale: I think everybody was saying this, there's this <b>youth</b> bulge, there's this unemployment problem, but I don't think before these revolutions anybody understood how well connected this new generation was to each other and to the rest of the world.</s>
69	doc#0 <s>Hugh Miles: What would happen is <b>youths</b> in Tunisia for example would film things with their mobile phone and they would upload it to a video sharing website and then Al Jazeera would find it and then they would broadcast this.</s>
70	doc#0 <s>Christopher Dickey: I think Israel may have a lot of concerns about this but I think in terms of the push, in terms of the yes a lot of the organisers have organised for perhaps to help Palestinian or anti occupation maybe but I think it is absolutely irrelevant to the <b>youth</b> movement that we're seeing.</s>
71	doc#0 <s>Marwan Bishara: Do you not think that <b>youth</b> movement was pretty much critical if not condemning of all Israeli practices?</s>
72	doc#0 <s>One of the organisation's goals is to reinforce the <b>youth's</b> identification with Syria.</s>
73	doc#0 <s>On the surface, the wave of protests that has swept Tunisia for the past two weeks were provoked by the dire situation of unemployed <b>youth</b> in the country, which has one of the highest literacy rates in the Arab world yet suffers from 30% youth unemployment.</s>
74	doc#0 <s>On the surface, the wave of protests that has swept Tunisia for the past two weeks were provoked by the dire situation of unemployed youth in the country, which has one of the highest literacy rates in the Arab world yet suffers from 30% <b>youth</b> unemployment.</s>
75	doc#0 <s>There is only so long this strategy will last in the face of growing demands for accountability, and a rising <b>youth</b> population clamouring for economic opportunities and political expression.</s>

## Appendix 4: Screenshots of Word Sketch Windows for 'alnās' and 'alshāb' (Arabic Equivalents of 'People' in English) in ALJAR Corpus

### noun\_right

<b>دفة</b>	على تولي ادارة دفة التغيير و اقناع الناس ب
<b>اقناع</b>	دفة التغيير و اقناع الناس ب
<b>التغيير</b>	تولي ادارة دفة التغيير و اقناع الناس ب
<b>تهجير</b>	تهجير الناس
<b>التضييق</b>	التضييق على الناس
<b>اجتياح</b>	اجتياح الساحة و تهجير الناس
<b>مفاد</b>	مفاد ها ان الناس
<b>تخويف</b>	تخويف السلطة ل الناس
<b>بهجة</b>	بهجة لا تأتي يتحدث الناس
<b>اعطاء</b>	اعطاء فرصة ل الناس
<b>شريحة</b>	شريحة من الناس
<b>فرصة</b>	فرصة ل الناس

### verb\_left

<b>يصرون</b>	الناس يصرون
<b>تستنج</b>	الناس كي تقارن و تستنج
<b>تقارن</b>	الناس كي تقارن
<b>انصرفت</b>	الناس عيش هم , انصرفت
<b>ادت</b>	الناس , و ادت
<b>كانت</b>	الناس كانت

noun\_left

<b>قوله</b>
-الناس مجددا بحسب قوله
<b>البراءة</b>
الناس كانت منتظرة احكام البراءة
<b>التوقيت</b>
الناس على نواياهم " . التوقيت
<b>احكام</b>
الناس كانت منتظرة احكام
<b>عيش</b>
الناس عيش
<b>منتظرة</b>
الناس كانت منتظرة
<b>الاقتراب</b>
الناس من الاقتراب
<b>مجددا</b>
الناس مجددا
<b>كثافة</b>
الناس , و لكن كثافة
<b>نواياهم</b>
الناس على نواياهم
<b>بحسب-</b>
الناس مجددا
<b>قبول</b>
الناس ب قبول

adj\_left

<b>رافض</b>
الناس بين مزيد و رافض
<b>معينة</b>
الناس في لحظة معينة

verb\_right

<b>ينصرف</b>
ينصرف عن ها الناس
<b>تقين</b>
تقين الناس
<b>تسمع</b>
تسمع ه شريحة من الناس
<b>انقسم</b>
انقسم الناس
<b>تنغص</b>
تنغص على الناس
<b>تعقل</b>
تعقل الناس
<b>طوقت</b>
طوقت المنطقة و منعت الناس
<b>يتظاهرون</b>
يتظاهرون امام الناس
<b>منعت</b>
منعت الناس
<b>يعير</b>
يعير عن الناس
<b>يتحدث</b>
يتحدث الناس
<b>تاتي</b>
تاتي يتحدث الناس

Word Sketch

### nextleft

<b>ب</b>
التغيير و اقتناع الناس ب
<b>و</b>
الناس , و
<b>من</b>
الناس من
<b>يصرون</b>
الناس يصرون
<b>عيش</b>
الناس عيش
<b>مجددا</b>
الناس مجددا
<b>يوما</b>
الناس يوما
<b>كي</b>
الناس كي
<b>كانت</b>
الناس كانت
<b>بين</b>
الناس بين
<b>عن</b>
الناس عن
<b>على</b>
الناس على

### nextright

<b>اقتناع</b>
دفة التغيير و اقتناع الناس ب
<b>على</b>
على الناس
<b>ل</b>
ل الناس
<b>تقنين</b>
تقنين الناس
<b>انقسم</b>
انقسم الناس
<b>تهجير</b>
تهجير الناس
<b>تعتقل</b>
تعتقل الناس
<b>منعت</b>
منعت الناس
<b>يتحدث</b>
يتحدث الناس
<b>امام</b>
امام الناس
<b>بين</b>
بين الناس
<b>عن</b>
عن الناس

### adj\_right

<b>شعبيا</b>
شعبيا يعبر عن الناس
<b>الماضية</b>
الماضية ب التضييق على الناس
<b>العام</b>
العام و تنغص على الناس

noun\_right

<b>اختيارات</b>
المسؤولون الفرنسيون صراحة اختيارات الشعب ب تقديم الدعم
<b>المسؤولون</b>
تشرين الاول تجاهل المسؤولون الفرنسيون صراحة اختيارات الشعب ب تقديم الدعم
<b>فئات</b>
مختلف فئات الشعب
<b>صراحة</b>
تجاهل المسؤولون الفرنسيون صراحة اختيارات الشعب ب تقديم الدعم
<b>اساس</b>
تسوية سياسية على اساس ان معظم الشعب يريد الاستقرار لا
<b>لغة</b>
الى تغليب لغة الحوار بين ابناء الشعب المصري , مؤكدة
<b>الاحزاب</b>
فرنسا ثقة في الاحزاب الحاكمة او الشعب التونسي . و
<b>ابناء</b>
لغة الحوار بين ابناء الشعب المصري , مؤكدة
<b>حق</b>
حق جميع اطراف الشعب
<b>الاسد</b>
الاسد في مساعدة الشعب
<b>مطالب</b>
مطالب الشعب
<b>الحوار</b>
الى تغليب لغة الحوار بين ابناء الشعب المصري , مؤكدة

verb\_left

<b>يريد</b>
اساس ان معظم الشعب يريد الاستقرار لا الفوضى
<b>لكن</b>
الشعب , لكن
<b>ينتفض</b>
الشعب الذي ينتفض
<b>ينزلق</b>
الشعب التونسي س ينزلق
<b>يحافظ</b>
الشعب ان يحافظ
<b>يستعيد</b>
الشعب الاردني س يستعيد
<b>اتهمو</b>
الشعب الاردني بعد ان اتهمو
<b>تصالحت</b>
الشعب و تصالحت
<b>يامل</b>
الشعب " . و يامل
<b>يستعد</b>
الشعب الجزائري -الذي كان يستعد
<b>دعا</b>
الشعب " . و دعا
<b>وصف</b>
الشعب " ك ما وصف



noun\_left

<b>تقديم</b>
الفرنسيون صراحة اختيارات الشعب ب تقديم الدعم اللوجستي و
<b>الدعم</b>
الفرنسيون صراحة اختيارات الشعب ب تقديم الدعم اللوجستي و المعاملة
<b>اسقاط</b>
الشعب يريد اسقاط النظام
<b>الاستقرار</b>
اساس ان معظم الشعب يريد الاستقرار لا الفوضى
<b>رفض</b>
الحوار بين ابناء الشعب المصري , مؤكدة رفض ها الكامل ل
<b>الفوضى</b>
اساس ان معظم الشعب يريد الاستقرار لا الفوضى
<b>النظام</b>
الشعب يريد اسقاط النظام
<b>هدوى</b>
الشعب ان يحافظ على هدوى
<b>صلاحية</b>
الشعب الاردني س يستعيد صلاحية
<b>التكشف</b>
الشعب المصري من التكشف
<b>سلميا</b>
الشعب الذي ينتفض سلميا
<b>تحدي</b>
الشعب التونسي في تحدي

verb\_right

<b>يهدا</b>
يهدا هذا الشعب
<b>امست</b>
امست " الشعب
<b>تكتمل</b>
تكتمل و ان الشعب
<b>تشن</b>
تشن ها اسرائيل على الشعب
<b>اتهمو</b>
اتهمو ه باهانة الشعب
<b>يدرس</b>
يدرس في ه خيارات الشعب
<b>تلقت</b>
تلقت ها ثورة الشعب
<b>تكلف</b>
تكلف الشعب
<b>ثار</b>
ثار علي ها الشعب
<b>تزيد</b>
تزيد من وحدة الشعب
<b>تخضع</b>
تخضع لارادة الشعب
<b>يهدف</b>
يهدف الى ترهيب الشعب

## adj\_left

<b>المصري</b> الحوار بين ابناء الشعب المصري , مؤكدة رفض
<b>التونسي</b> الاحزاب الحاكمة او الشعب التونسي . و منذ
<b>الفلسطيني</b> الشعب الفلسطيني
<b>اللوجستي</b> الفرنسيون صراحة اختيارات الشعب ب تقديم الدعم اللوجستي و المعاملة التفضيلية
<b>الليبي</b> الشعب الليبي ب
<b>الاردني</b> الشعب الاردني
<b>محاذا</b> الشعب ( البرلمان ) محاذا
<b>المباشرة</b> الشعب في المواجهة المباشرة
<b>الكثير</b> الشعب المصري الكثير
<b>الجزائري</b> الشعب الجزائري
<b>السوري</b> الشعب السوري
<b>الديمقراطية</b> الشعب " . الامازيغية و الديمقراطية

## nextleft

,
الشعب , و
<b>يريد</b> اساس ان معظم الشعب يريد الاستقرار لا الفضي
<b>المصري</b> الحوار بين ابناء الشعب المصري , مؤكدة رفض
<b>التونسي</b> الاحزاب الحاكمة او الشعب التونسي . و منذ
<b>الفلسطيني</b> الشعب الفلسطيني
"
الشعب " . و
<b>ب</b> الفرنسيون صراحة اختيارات الشعب ب تقديم الدعم اللوجستي
<b>و</b> الشعب و
<b>الليبي</b> الشعب الليبي ب
<b>الاردني</b> الشعب الاردني
*
الشعب
<b>الجزائري</b> الشعب الجزائري

## adj\_right

<b>الحاكمة</b>
ثقة في الاحزاب الحاكمة او الشعب التونسي . و
<b>الفرنسيون</b>
الاول تجاهل المسؤولون الفرنسيون صراحة اختيارات الشعب ب تقديم الدعم
<b>انتقالية</b>
انتقالية مؤقتة تخضع لارادة الشعب
<b>الجماعية</b>
الجماعية ل الشعب
<b>الحقيقية</b>
الحقيقية ل الشعب
<b>مؤقتة</b>
مؤقتة تخضع لارادة الشعب
<b>حقيقية</b>
حقيقية تمثل الشعب
<b>المباشر</b>
المباشر ل مختلف فئات الشعب
<b>الحقوقية</b>
الحقوقية ل الشعب
<b>مختلف</b>
مختلف فئات الشعب
<b>اليمنية</b>
اليمنية قد دعت الشعب
<b>الاجتماعية</b>
الاجتماعية ل عموم الشعب

## nextright

<b>ل</b>
ل الشعب
<b>اختيارات</b>
المسؤولون الفرنسيون صراحة اختيارات الشعب ب تقديم الدعم
"
الشعب يريد اسقاط النظام
<b>فئات</b>
مختلف فئات الشعب
<b>معظم</b>
على اساس ان معظم الشعب يريد الاستقرار لا
<b>ابناء</b>
لغة الحوار بين ابناء الشعب المصري , مؤكدة
<b>مطالب</b>
مطالب الشعب
<b>او</b>
في الاحزاب الحاكمة او الشعب التونسي . و
<b>على</b>
على الشعب
<b>اطياف</b>
اطياف الشعب
<b>لارادة</b>
لارادة الشعب
<b>تكلف</b>
تكلف الشعب

## adv\_right

<b>كلما</b>
كلما توحد الشعب
<b>ايضا</b>
ايضا شعار " الشعب
<b>حيث</b>
حيث يقع مجلس نواب الشعب

## conj

<b>تصالحت</b>
الشعب و تصالحت
<b>حقوق</b>
الشعب و حقوق
<b>لا</b>
الشعب و لا

## Appendix 5: Screenshots of Word Sketch Windows for *Arab* in ALJEN Corpus

*Arab* as adjective 340×

### modifiers of "Arab"

<b>not</b>	1
not Arab	

### nouns modified by "Arab"

<b>spring</b>	83
the Arab Spring	
<b>world</b>	73
in the Arab world	
<b>uprising</b>	18
the Arab Spring uprisings	
<b>country</b>	18
other Arab countries	
<b>revolution</b>	12
Arab revolution	
<b>revolt</b>	9
the Arab Spring revolts	
<b>state</b>	6
other Arab Spring states	
<b>nation</b>	5
the Arab nation	
<b>protest</b>	7
Arab Spring protests	
<b>identity</b>	4
Arab identity	
<b>youth</b>	4
Arab youth	
<b>region</b>	4
the Arab region	

### "Arab" and/or ...

<b>other</b>	15
other Arab countries	
<b>spring-inspired</b>	5
Arab Spring-inspired protests	
<b>embattled</b>	2
Embattled Arab	
<b>so-called</b>	2
so-called Arab Spring	
<b>western</b>	2
Western and Arab	
<b>new</b>	2
new Arab	
<b>magnificent</b>	1
magnificent Arab	
<b>nationalist</b>	1
Arab nationalist	
<b>satellite</b>	1
satellite Arab	
<b>controlled</b>	1
controlled Arab	
<b>collective</b>	1
collective Arab	
<b>rich</b>	1
rich Arab	

## Appendix 6: Screenshots of *government* Concordance Lines in the ALJEN Corpus



CQL government + be • 22  
282.47 per million tokens • 0.028%

	Details	sentence
1	doc#0	<s>Mohamed Morsi, a leading member of the Muslim brotherhood, was elected as president in June 2012, but following mass protests his <b>government was</b> overthrown by the army a year later.</s>
2	doc#0	<s>Members of the <b>government have been</b> warned to stay away.</s>
3	doc#0	<s>His <b>government is</b> suffering from an overdose of new challenges this year.</s>
4	doc#0	<s>The abusive practices being employed by the Saudi Arabian <b>government are</b> worryingly similar to those which they have long used against people accused of terrorist offences.</s>
5	doc#0	<s>"While the arguments used to justify this wide-ranging crackdown may be different, the abusive practices being employed by the Saudi Arabian <b>government are</b> worryingly similar to those which they have long used against people accused of terrorist offences," he said.</s>
6	doc#0	<s>"Rather than deal with legitimate demands, the <b>government is</b> taking the easy route and blaming everything on a conspiracy by the Iranians," said the activist, who asked not to be named for fear of repercussions.</s>
7	doc#0	<s>In pressing for the United Nations to recognise their statehood - with or without a peace treaty with Israel - the Palestinians appear finally to have hit upon a strategy with which the Israeli <b>government is</b> struggling to cope.</s>
8	doc#0	<s>You know a <b>government is</b> in trouble when it is scared of the coinage.</s>
9	doc#0	<s>The ruler, King Abdullah, in a series of announcements over the past few weeks, says his <b>government is</b> going to spend an unprecedented amount of money, more than Pound60bn (\$100bn) and counting, on social programmes - raising public sector salaries, providing increased state aid to help people buy houses, and benefits, for the first time, for the country's burgeoning number of unemployed people.</s>
10	doc#0	<s>The Algerian <b>government is</b> working to prevent North Africa's revolutionary tide from reaching its shores.</s>
11	doc#0	<s>Whilst the <b>government is</b> the subject of much criticism, there have been no protests against King Mohammed VI . The demonstrators are also calling for the release of detainees, including well-known activist Naser Zefzafi, who is deemed the leader of the so-called al-Hirak al-Shabi (Popular Movement).</s>
12	doc#0	<s>Only two countries, Egypt and Tunisia, have actually got rid of their rulers and yet many Egyptians complain their interim <b>government is</b> little better.</s>
13	doc#0	<s>An uneasy 'national dialogue' is getting underway to heal the rifts but reformers even within the <b>government</b> have so far <b>been</b> outmanoeuvred by hardliners.</s>
14	doc#0	<s>Meanwhile, amidst signs that the Syrian economy is faltering, European Union <b>governments are</b> set to consider even tougher sanctions - the 11th round of economic measures to pressure the Syrian authorities.</s>
15	doc#0	<s>In recent weeks, Iraqi security forces have reportedly arrested hundreds of alleged al-Qaeda members in and around Baghdad as part of a campaign the Shia-led <b>government is</b> calling "Revenge for the martyrs".</s>
16	doc#0	<s>In recent weeks, Iraqi security forces have reportedly arrested hundreds of alleged al-Qaeda members in and around Baghdad as part of a campaign the Shia-led <b>government is</b> calling "Revenge for the martyrs".</s>
17	doc#0	<s>The <b>government has been</b> accused of human rights abuses but insurgents have recently launched attacks on police.</s>
18	doc#0	<s>Meanwhile, amidst signs that the Syrian economy is faltering, European Union <b>governments are</b> set to consider even tougher sanctions - the 11th round of economic measures to pressure the Syrian authorities.</s>
19	doc#0	<s>'Not a terrorist' Aziza found out about her son's fate last month when the Syrian government released a second

	list of foreign fighters, who they say had sneaked into the country to support the "terrorists" - a catch-all term that the <b>government</b> has <b>been</b> using to describe the rebels since the start of the revolution-turned-conflict more than two years ago.</s>
20	doc#0 <s>" Dialogue Tunisia's Islamist-led coalition <b>government is</b> widely accused by the secular opposition of turning a blind eye to the rise in jihadists.</s>
21	doc#0 <s>Yusra Ghannouchi says creating an inclusive politics necessarily takes longer However, demands for the dissolution of the ANC (constituent assembly) or calls for the resignation of the <b>government are</b> not the way out of the current impasse.</s>
22	doc#0 <s>Mehdi Said says Ennahda is only paying lip service to democracy We do not accept the solution the Ennahda <b>government is</b> working towards, because we believe that any such government formed from or that includes Ennahda will not differ from one formed after the assassination of the Chokri Belaid, the ANC member who was assassinated earlier this year in February.</s>

## Appendix 7: Top 200 Key Words in ALJEN and ALJAR

Lemma	Frequency?		Lemma	Frequency?	
	Focus	Reference		Focus	Reference
1 bishara	66	1,671	68 gaddafi	23	33,776
2 marwan	68	4,142	69 islamist	49	97,925
3 saleh	96	16,386	70 abdullah	31	54,008
4 jazeera	94	19,629	71 salma	12	7,206
5 protester	359	139,618	72 al-wefaq	9	497
6 tunisian	90	21,217	73 bouzid	9	640
7 bahrain	164	59,238	74 maliki	13	10,916
8 tunisia	141	57,356	75 afp	32	60,948
9 bahraini	55	9,039	76 hassan	27	48,338
10 manama	42	3,556	77 revolt	42	89,234
11 uprising	160	82,125	78 baluch	9	1,531
12 sanaa	41	4,374	79 zine	18	25,676
13 shia	87	35,726	80 regime	220	569,064
14 seale	38	3,309	81 hama	17	23,343
15 demonstrator	115	57,688	82 alawite	10	4,538
16 anti-government	54	15,833	83 revolution	253	667,090
17 rabab	30	471	84 egypt	191	500,252
18 yemen	105	63,508	85 opposition	242	644,509
19 tahrir	42	12,054	86 ali	97	246,705
20 nasrallah	34	6,265	87 tanboura	8	5
21 khartoum	53	23,150	88 shia-led	8	164
22 el-mahdi	26	106	89 demonstration	168	456,224
23 tunis	37	11,453	90 al-khawaja	8	398
24 yemeni	45	18,943	91 clash	82	212,326
25 ennahda	25	2,400	92 non-violent	18	29,196
26 pro-democracy	31	8,743	93 wefaq	8	564
27 crackdown	64	44,049	94 tens	11	9,186
28 al-bashir	25	4,483	95 anbar	9	4,505
29 arab	408	438,019	96 morocco	42	103,867
30 dickey	31	15,336	97 topple	27	60,016
31 protest	543	681,343	98 monarchy	25	54,539
32 al-assad	33	20,574	99 druze	9	5,397
33 sudanese	45	38,133	100 sidi	9	5,857
34 bouazizi	17	1,448	101 iryani	7	20
35 syrian	161	206,068	102 mathlouthi	7	64
36 rabat	21	7,298	103 naksa	7	128

[https://app.sketchengine.eu/#keywords?corpname=user%2FAssiriB...&useterms=1&w\\_itemsPerPage=50&include\\_nonwords=0&n\\_attr=lemma](https://app.sketchengine.eu/#keywords?corpname=user%2FAssiriB...&useterms=1&w_itemsPerPage=50&include_nonwords=0&n_attr=lemma)

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y

37	assad	68	74,438
38	sunni	53	54,547
39	bashir	27	16,793
40	sudan	123	162,460
41	ahmar	15	533
42	golan	23	12,973
43	sectarian	42	42,658
44	mubarak	45	47,670
45	homs	20	8,832
46	hadi	18	5,775
47	bashar	32	29,803
48	damascus	47	62,372
49	marwa	13	1,346
50	hamad	16	6,874
51	sunnis	20	14,905
52	unrest	47	70,902
53	brahmi	13	3,549
54	mohamed	34	48,430
55	belaid	11	647
56	mohsen	12	3,003
57	abidine	11	950
58	sit-in	16	13,277
59	repression	37	60,284
60	syria	160	338,149
61	qalandia	10	300
62	nr	21	25,703
63	bassiouni	10	603
64	libya	74	150,117
65	scaf	11	3,318
66	activist	198	448,664
67	daraa	10	1,782
104	sunni-ruled	7	155
105	monder	7	211
106	negm	7	276
107	kasserine	7	521
108	shalabi	7	548
109	nakba	8	3,867
110	al-ahmar	7	630
111	emir	11	14,221
112	chant	57	167,410
113	deraa	7	1,020
114	al-khalifa	7	1,297
115	ikhwan	7	1,574
116	omar	24	60,326
117	khaled	10	12,684
118	hosni	10	13,340
119	aj	21	53,570
120	austerity	27	75,460
121	clampdown	7	3,441
122	detain	38	117,739
123	abdel	9	10,939
124	maray	6	53
125	hafez	7	4,006
126	mutlaq	6	279
127	islah	6	978
128	khalifa	10	16,684
129	nafi	6	1,097
130	casablanca	11	20,623
131	disperse	35	115,022
132	cairo	31	99,917
133	royalist	8	9,267
134	autocrat	7	5,347

Lemma	Frequency?	
	Focus	Reference
135	wau	6 1,823
136	alawites	6 2,194
137	narrator	26 83,839
138	algeria	17 47,520
139	saudi	60 224,600
140	libyan	20 60,131
141	rajab	6 2,609
142	amman	10 19,586
143	nasser	9 15,719
144	sectarianism	7 7,403
145	umma	6 3,222
146	kasbah	6 3,365
147	lebanese	20 63,333
148	self-immolation	6 3,583
149	downfall	19 60,147
150	morsi	13 34,279



151 metlaoui	5	29
152 al-amari	5	39
153 sheikh	18	58,331
154 saudi-led	5	151
155 spring-inspired	5	159
156 ez-zor	5	202
157 sakhir	5	298
158 nepotism	7	9,338
159 islamist-led	5	411
160 habib	7	9,565
161 pan-arabism	5	628
162 jordanian	10	23,684
163 protestor	13	37,614
164 marzouki	5	802
165 shafik	5	904
166 taiz	5	908
167 ahmed	20	70,918
168 snc	6	5,764
169 arabs	20	71,265
170 erupt	27	104,432
171 ibrahim	13	38,808
172 essam	5	1,384
173 agitator	7	10,826
174 palestinian	71	312,923
175 egyptian	71	313,919
176 anti-regime	5	1,799
177 arabia	39	166,749
178 khamenei	7	11,862
179 amin	8	16,732
180 darfur	13	41,180
181 bloc	16	56,146
182 neighbourhood	36	154,385
183 ramadi	5	2,385
184 repressive	10	27,274
185 intifada	7	12,684
186 kurd	12	37,867
187 al-maliki	6	7,961
188 mohammed	23	95,194
189 autocratic	7	13,914
190 marginalisation	5	3,698
191 adnan	6	8,884
192 nouri	5	3,990
193 salah	6	9,562
194 dissident	11	36,244
195 shalit	5	4,436
196 kuwait	18	73,783
197 coup	24	105,784
198 al-qaeda	14	54,772
199 ousted	5	5,515
200 al-janadi	4	22

## Appendix 8: Screenshots of Word Sketch Windows for Shia in ALJEN

### "shia" and/or ...

#### nouns modified by "shia"

<b>majority</b>	7
Shia Muslim majority	
<b>village</b>	6
Shia villages	
<b>group</b>	8
Shia groups	
<b>population</b>	2
Shia populations	
<b>faction</b>	2
Shia factions	
<b>party</b>	5
Shia opposition parties	
<b>community</b>	2
Shia community	
<b>neighbourhood</b>	2
Shia neighbourhoods	
<b>area</b>	2
marched in the Shia area of	
<b>sectarianism</b>	1
Shia sectarianism	
<b>influence</b>	1
Shia influence	
<b>leader</b>	2
Shia leaders	

#### verbs with "shia" as object

<b>convict</b>	1
Shias convicted	
<b>speak</b>	1
spoke two bona fide Shias	
<b>charge</b>	1
Shia charged	
<b>name</b>	1
named a Shia	
<b>include</b>	1
include Shia	
<b>be</b>	1
are Shias	

#### verbs with "shia" as subject

<b>account</b>	1
Shias account	
<b>fear</b>	1
Shias fear	
<b>rise</b>	1
Shia rose	

<b>sunnis</b>	2
Sunnis , Shia	
<b>being</b>	1
Shias , human beings	
<b>kurds</b>	1
Shia and Kurds	
<b>muslim</b>	1
Muslims , Shias	
<b>mousavi</b>	1
Shias , Mir Hossein Mousavi	
<b>al-maliki</b>	1
al-Maliki , the Shia	
<b>wefaq</b>	1
Wefaq , the main Shia	
<b>sunni</b>	1
Sunni and Shia	
<b>member</b>	1
Shia and Sunni members	

#### prepositional phrases

... of "shia"	3
"shia" in ...	2
... as "shia"	2
... on "shia"	1
... in "shia"	1
... for "shia"	1
... by "shia"	1
... against "shia"	1

#### possessors of "shia"

<b>iraq</b>	1
Iraq's majority Shia	
<b>country</b>	1
country's majority Shia	

#### pronominal possessors of "shia"

<b>our</b>	1
Our own Shia	
<b>its</b>	1
its Shias	

shia as noun 87×

**modifiers of "shia"**

<b>majority</b>	2
majority Shia	
<b>fide</b>	1
fide Shias	
<b>bona</b>	1
bona fide Shias	
<b>iranian-backed</b>	1
Iranian-backed sectarian Shia	
<b>sunnis</b>	1
Sunnis , Shia	
<b>cent</b>	1
cent Shia	
<b>muslim</b>	1
Muslims , Shias	
<b>sectarian</b>	1
sectarian Shia	
<b>own</b>	1
own Shia	
<b>main</b>	1
main Shia	
<b>many</b>	1
Many Shias	

## Appendix 9: Screenshots of Word Sketch Windows for chant in ALJEN Corpus

### modifiers of "chant"

<b>spontaneously</b>	1
spontaneously chanted	
<b>there</b>	2
week , demonstrators there chanted the Arab Spring	
<b>also</b>	2
also chanted	

### objects of "chant"

<b>slogan</b>	13
chanting slogans	
<b>crowd</b>	2
chanted the crowd	
<b>refrain</b>	1
chanting a refrain	
<b>dozen</b>	1
chanted dozens	
<b>thousand</b>	1
chanted thousands	
<b>man</b>	1
men chanted	
<b>protester</b>	1
protesters chanted	

### subjects of "chant"

<b>demonstrator</b>	6
the week , demonstrators there chanted the Arab Spring	
<b>reform</b>	2
of the reform chanted	
<b>protester</b>	9
protesters chanted	
<b>kurds</b>	1
Kurds spontaneously chanted	
<b>centre</b>	1
centre chanting	
<b>parliament</b>	1
parliament chanted	
<b>mourner</b>	1
mourners chanted	
<b>area</b>	1
areas chanting	
<b>crowd</b>	1
crowd chanted	
<b>student</b>	1
students chanted	
<b>protest</b>	1
protests chanting	
<b>people</b>	1
people chanted	

### prepositional phrases

"chant" as ...	2
"chant" on ...	1
"chant" in ...	1

### particles after "chant"

<b>along</b>	1
chanting along	

### pronominal subjects of "chant"

<b>they</b>	1
they chanted	

### usage patterns

<b>in passive</b>	3
-------------------	---

## Appendix 10: The Wordlists of Most Frequent Words in BBCEN and BBCAR Corpus

Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency
1 the	4,699	51 president	165	101 (	93	151 shia	60
2 ,	3,209	52 egypt	161	102 n't	92	152 young	60
3 .	3,088	53 syria	161	103 do	88	153 streets	60
4 of	2,147	54 country	157	104 protest	86	154 any	59
5 in	1,933	55 its	153	105 could	86	155 opposition	58
6 and	1,760	56 more	152	106 year	86	156 my	58
7 to	1,726	57 which	151	107 where	85	157 syrian	57
8 a	1,479	58 all	148	108 most	85	158 under	56
9 "	852	59 protests	148	109 state	83	159 only	55
10 is	793	60 one	148	110 change	83	160 him	54
11 that	735	61 or	145	111 saudi	83	161 her	54
12 for	599	62 after	139	112 women	83	162 way	53
13 have	552	63 2011	137	113 two	82	163 see	53
14 it	547	64 protesters	137	114 into	81	164 before	52
15 on	530	65 would	132	115 those	80	165 months	52
16 are	476	66 also	131	116 being	79	166 these	52
17 has	452	67 says	129	117 you	78	167 egyptian	52
18 by	422	68 many	125	118 us	78	168 last	52
19 -	417	69 years	122	119 police	78	169 mohamed	52
20 was	412	70 out	122	120 's	77	170 because	51
21 but	405	71 security	122	121 first	76	171 did	51
22 arab	373	72 revolution	121	122 killed	76	172 freedom	51
23 as	358	73 when	120	123 region	75	173 family	51
24 not	351	74 some	117	124 time	74	174 news	51
25 with	349	75 now	115	125 even	73	175 islamist	51
26 they	339	76 no	109	126 our	73	176 then	50
27 been	304	77 middle	108	127 israel	72	177 long	50
28 be	302	78 east	105	128 violence	72	178 made	50
29 from	294	79 since	105	129 still	72	179 across	49
30 their	286	80 than	104	130 regime	71	180 end	49
31 at	275	81 world	102	131 democracy	70	181 activists	49
32 were	252	82 forces	102	132 tunisian	70	182 city	49
33 we	245	83 over	102	133 just	69	183 military	49
34 an	233	84 may	101	134 death	68	184 palestinian	49
35 people	228	85 mr	101	135 bbc	67	185 war	48
36 he	227	86 new	101	136 bahrain	67	186 day	48
37 this	219	87 ?	101	137 say	67	187 national	48
38 his	218	88 about	100	138 between	66	188 demonstrations	48
39 :	203	89 them	100	139 ali	66	189 ben	47
40 will	193	90 what	99	140 elections	65	190 muslim	47
41 had	192	91 against	99	141 she	64	191 part	47
42 who	192	92 up	99	142 during	63	192 me	47
43 there	190	93 other	99	143 countries	63	193 how	46

44	government	185	94	so	95	144	back	63	194	uprisings	46
45	i	185	95	libya	95	145	rights	63	195	get	46
46	said	184	96	like	95	146	uprising	62	196	same	45
47	spring	178	97	can	95	147	square	61	197	minister	45
48	tunisia	171	98	)	94	148	much	60	198	saleh	45
49	'	170	99	if	94	149	yemen	60	199	three	45
50	political	165	100	power	93	150	told	60	200	popular	45

# word (11,071 items | 77,899 total frequency)

Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency
1 و	4,267	51 بي	119	101 ضد	74	151 يوم	49
2 في	2,708	52 الدول	117	102 الي	72	152 العنف	49
3 ,	1,884	53 البلاد	116	103 حتى	72	153 حقوق	48
4 ب	1,852	54 ليبيا	112	104 القذافي	71	154 المجتمع	48
5 ل	1,804	55 يقول	112	105 البحرين	71	155 اضاف	48
6 .	1,724	56 هي	112	106 هل	71	156 ايران	47
7 ان	1,665	57 الحكومة	109	107 احمد	70	157 شهدت	47
8 من	1,641	58 بعض	109	108 الشرق	69	158 شكل	47
9 ها	1,371	59 هناك	108	109 السلطة	69	159 المصرية	47
10 "	1,276	60 او	107	110 احد	68	160 الملك	47
11 ه	1,245	61 اليمن	106	111 اي	67	161 دون	46
12 على	968	62 قبل	106	112 مثل	64	162 اخر	46
13 الي	775	63 السعودية	106	113 الاوسط	64	163 التونسي	46
14 التي	579	64 منذ	106	114 اما	64	164 انتخابات	46
15 هم	492	65 غير	105	115 السلطات	63	165 حول	46
16 ما	462	66 كل	105	116 الجيش	62	166 المئة	46
17 عن	382	67 بن	104	117 نظام	62	167 2011	46
18 ف	368	68 الاحتجاجات	103	118 اذا	61	168 بل	45
19 .	352	69 الماضي	101	119 تحقيق	60	169 قطر	45
20 العربي	330	70 خلال	97	120 لن	60	170 التغيير	45
21 الذي	281	71 المنطقة	95	121 قالت	60	171 الاولى	45
22 مع	281	72 عام	95	122 ليس	59	172 العرب	45
23 بعد	256	73 النظام	94	123 الله	58	173 الاسد	44
24 العربية	252	74 حيث	93	124 يكون	58	174 حكم	44
25 لا	239	75 تلك	93	125 الان	58	175 تكون	44
26 لكن	229	76 -	92	126 اميرة	57	176 امام	44
27 لم	228	77 دول	91	127 الامن	57	177 عدم	44
28 قد	222	78 المرأة	90	128 الجامعة	57	178 سي	44
29 بين	217	79 سوريا	89	129 .	56	179 النساء	43
30 كان	216	80 صحيفة	87	130 صالح	56	180 المتظاهرين	43
31 الربيع	213	81 ,	86	131 عدد	56	181 الحرية	43
32 ذلك	196	82 اخرى	85	132 سبب	55	182 ايضا	43
33 س	187	83 الصحيفة	85	133 اسرائيل	55	183 (	42
34 ك	181	84 اكثر	85	134 الثانى	55	184 المصرى	42



35	هذه	166	85	نفس	84	135	محمد	54	185	عنوان	41
36	علي	163	86	الا	83	136	هما	54	186	عبر	41
37	هو	162	87	الديمقراطية	81	137	يمكن	54	187	يرى	41
38	كانت	150	88	ثورات	80	138	التقرير	54	188	الولايات	41
39	:	148	89	الانتخابات	80	139	::	54	189	السوري	41
40	هذا	144	90	تقول	80	140	ثورة	53	190	اذ	41
41	/	142	91	عبد	79	141	سورية	53	191	تغيير	40
42	مصر	140	92	رئيس	78	142	البرلمان	53	192	مبارك	40
43	العالم	140	93	السياسية	78	143	العمل	51	193	اول	39
44	?	134	94	المعارضة	77	144	نحو	51	194	تحت	39
45	الثورات	131	95	المتحدة	77	145	اليوم	51	195	تشهد	39
46	الرئيس	131	96	عند	76	146	احتجاجات	51	196	الدولة	39
47	قال	131	97	الشباب	76	147	الكاتب	51	197	الامريكي	39
48	تونس	130	98	العام	76	148	الامريكية	50	198	الغارديان	38
49	نا	127	99	السياسي	74	149	الشرطة	49	199	السابق	38
50	الثورة	126	100	الذين	74	150	قوات	49	200	الدولية	38

## Appendix 11: Screenshots of Word Sketch Windows for *almūtahidah* (Arabic for 'United') in ALJAR Corpus

التحدة as 77x ...

🔍 ⬇️ 👁️ = ⓘ ⚙️ ☆

verb_left	verb_right	noun_left	noun_right	adj_left	adj_right
<b>يشغل</b> ... التصفي ب الولايات المتحدة السبسي يشغل مواقع التواصل بعد	<b>أوردت</b> ... يستند الرقم الذي أوردت ه لجنة الامم التحدة الاقتصادية و الاجتماعية	<b>تقييم</b> ... التحدة ارسال بعتة ل تقييم	<b>الولايات</b> ... الولايات المتحدة	<b>الاجتماعية</b> ... ه لجنة الامم المتحدة الاقتصادية و الاجتماعية ل غرب اسيا	<b>النصفي</b> ... في انتخابات التجديد التصفي ب الولايات المتحدة السبسي يشغل مواقع
<b>كلف</b> ... الامم المتحدة : الربيع العربي كلف المنطقة	<b>تتمتع</b> ... و الفعلة الذي تتمتع ب ه الولايات المتحدة في العالم اليوم	<b>السبسي</b> ... التصفي ب الولايات المتحدة السبسي يشغل مواقع التواصل	<b>الامم</b> ... الامم المتحدة	<b>الاقتصادية</b> ... ه لجنة الامم المتحدة الاقتصادية و الاجتماعية ل	<b>التابعة</b> ... التابعة ل الامم المتحدة
<b>قالت</b> ... العلاج في الولايات المتحدة التي قالت ان مدة ناشيرة	<b>اعلنت</b> ... اعلنت دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة	<b>بعثة</b> ... التحدة ارسال بعتة	<b>الامارات</b> ... دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة	<b>الامريكية</b> ... الولايات المتحدة الامريكية	<b>تابعة</b> ... قالت وكالة تابعة ل الامم المتحدة في تقرير ل
	<b>قال</b> ... قال كامبيرون ان الامم المتحدة	<b>مواقع</b> ... التصفي ب الولايات المتحدة السبسي يشغل مواقع التواصل بعد تصريحه	<b>الجمعية</b> ... الجمعية العامة ل الامم المتحدة	<b>الماضي</b> ... التحدة العام الماضي	<b>العامة</b> ... الجمعية العامة ل الامم المتحدة
		<b>مدة</b> ... العلاج في الولايات المتحدة التي قالت ان مدة ناشيرة اقامة ه	<b>التجديد</b> ... التطورات في انتخابات التجديد التصفي ب الولايات المتحدة السبسي يشغل مواقع	<b>العربي</b> ... الامم المتحدة : الربيع العربي كلف المنطقة	<b>العربية</b> ... دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة
		<b>مارس</b> ... التحدة يوم 8 مارس	<b>العلاج</b> ... و يتلقى صالغ العلاج في الولايات المتحدة التي قالت ان		
		<b>التواصل</b> ... التصفي ب الولايات المتحدة السبسي يشغل مواقع التواصل بعد تصريحه ه	<b>لجنة</b> ... الذي أوردت ه لجنة الامم المتحدة الاقتصادية و الاجتماعية		
		<b>اليوم</b> ... ب ه الولايات المتحدة في العالم اليوم الذي اصبح عالم	<b>كامبيرون</b> ... كامبيرون بحث الامم المتحدة		
		<b>العنف</b> ... التحدة ل مواجهة العنف	<b>وكالة</b> ... عالمية , قالت وكالة تابعة ل الامم المتحدة في تقرير ل		
		<b>العام</b> ... التحدة العام	<b>قرار</b> ... قرار الامم المتحدة		
		<b>تابعة ل الامم</b> ... Microsoft Word	<b>بريطانيا</b> ... بريطانيا و الولايات المتحدة		

## Appendix 12: Screenshots of Concordance Lines for the Collocation *government + be* in BBCEN Corpus

CQL *government + be* • 22  
282.47 per million tokens • 0.028%

	Details	sentence
1	doc#0	<s>Mohamed Morsi, a leading member of the Muslim brotherhood, was elected as president in June 2012, but following mass protests his <b>government was</b> overthrown by the army a year later.</s>
2	doc#0	<s>Members of the <b>government have been</b> warned to stay away.</s>
3	doc#0	<s>His <b>government is</b> suffering from an overdose of new challenges this year.</s>
4	doc#0	<s>The abusive practices being employed by the Saudi Arabian <b>government are</b> worryingly similar to those which they have long used against people accused of terrorist offences.</s>
5	doc#0	<s>"While the arguments used to justify this wide-ranging crackdown may be different, the abusive practices being employed by the Saudi Arabian <b>government are</b> worryingly similar to those which they have long used against people accused of terrorist offences," he said.</s>
6	doc#0	<s>"Rather than deal with legitimate demands, the <b>government is</b> taking the easy route and blaming everything on a conspiracy by the Iranians," said the activist, who asked not to be named for fear of repercussions.</s>
7	doc#0	<s>In pressing for the United Nations to recognise their statehood - with or without a peace treaty with Israel - the Palestinians appear finally to have hit upon a strategy with which the Israeli <b>government is</b> struggling to cope.</s>
8	doc#0	<s>You know a <b>government is</b> in trouble when it is scared of the coinage.</s>
9	doc#0	<s>The ruler, King Abdullah, in a series of announcements over the past few weeks, says his <b>government is</b> going to spend an unprecedented amount of money, more than Pound60bn (\$100bn) and counting, on social programmes - raising public sector salaries, providing increased state aid to help people buy houses, and benefits, for the first time, for the country's burgeoning number of unemployed people.</s>
10	doc#0	<s>The Algerian <b>government is</b> working to prevent North Africa's revolutionary tide from reaching its shores.</s>
11	doc#0	<s>Whilst the <b>government is</b> the subject of much criticism, there have been no protests against King Mohammed VI . The demonstrators are also calling for the release of detainees, including well-known activist Naser Zefzafi, who is deemed the leader of the so-called al-Hirak al-Shabi (Popular Movement).</s>
12	doc#0	<s>Only two countries, Egypt and Tunisia, have actually got rid of their rulers and yet many Egyptians complain their interim <b>government is</b> little better.</s>
13	doc#0	<s>An uneasy 'national dialogue' is getting underway to heal the rifts but reformers even within the <b>government</b> have so far <b>been</b> outmanoeuvred by hardliners.</s>
14	doc#0	<s>Meanwhile, amidst signs that the Syrian economy is faltering, European Union <b>governments are</b> set to consider even tougher sanctions - the 11th round of economic measures to pressure the Syrian authorities.</s>
15	doc#0	<s>In recent weeks, Iraqi security forces have reportedly arrested hundreds of alleged al-Qaeda members in and around Baghdad as part of a campaign the Shia-led <b>government is</b> calling "Revenge for the martyrs".</s>
16	doc#0	<s>In recent weeks, Iraqi security forces have reportedly arrested hundreds of alleged al-Qaeda members in and around Baghdad as part of a campaign the Shia-led <b>government is</b> calling "Revenge for the martyrs".</s>
17	doc#0	<s>The <b>government has been</b> accused of human rights abuses but insurgents have recently launched attacks on police.</s>
18	doc#0	<s>Meanwhile, amidst signs that the Syrian economy is faltering, European Union <b>governments are</b> set to consider even tougher sanctions - the 11th round of economic measures to pressure the Syrian authorities.</s>
19	doc#0	<s>'Not a terrorist' Aziza found out about her son's fate last month when the Syrian government released a second

	list of foreign fighters, who they say had sneaked into the country to support the "terrorists" - a catch-all term that the <b>government</b> has <b>been</b> using to describe the rebels since the start of the revolution-turned-conflict more than two years ago.</s>
20	doc#0 <s>" Dialogue Tunisia's Islamist-led coalition <b>government is</b> widely accused by the secular opposition of turning a blind eye to the rise in jihadists.</s>
21	doc#0 <s>Yusra Ghannouchi says creating an inclusive politics necessarily takes longer However, demands for the dissolution of the ANC (constituent assembly) or calls for the resignation of the <b>government are</b> not the way out of the current impasse.</s>
22	doc#0 <s>Mehdi Said says Ennahda is only paying lip service to democracy We do not accept the solution the Ennahda <b>government is</b> working towards, because we believe that any such government formed from or that includes Ennahda will not differ from one formed after the assassination of the Chokri Belaid, the ANC member who was assassinated earlier this year in February.</s>

## Appendix 13: Screenshots of Concordance Lines for the Collocation *government + have* in BBCEN Corpus

CQL government + have • 22  
282.47 per million tokens • 0.028%



	Details	sentence
1	doc#0	<s>In countries where political transitions have occurred, new <b>governments have</b> not made economic reforms required to address "the issues that led to unrest in the first place", the report says.</s>
2	doc#0	<s>Members of the <b>government have</b> been warned to stay away.</s>
3	doc#0	<s>Philip Luther, Amnesty International The report says that since February, when sporadic demonstrations began - in defiance of a permanent national ban on protests - the Saudi <b>government has</b> carried out a crackdown that has included the arrest of mainly Shia Muslims in the restive Eastern Province.</s>
4	doc#0	<s>Amnesty says the <b>government has</b> drafted an anti-terror law that would effectively criminalise dissent as a "terrorist crime" and allow extended detention without charge or trial.</s>
5	doc#0	<s>Previously, the <b>government had</b> introduced several programmes to benefit the youth, including low-interest loans for opening a business and affordable housing.</s>
6	doc#0	<s>Lessons from Libya An Algerian market vendor sells vegetables to a woman in Algiers (Archive shot)Image copyright AFP Image caption In some areas, police have been told to stop collecting taxes from shopkeepers But concessions, appeasement and reforms are not the only means the <b>government has</b> used to fend off threats of revolutionary change.</s>
7	doc#0	<s>The <b>government has</b> had success managing the current crisis but it has to do more.</s>
8	doc#0	<s>The <b>government has had</b> success managing the current crisis but it has to do more.</s>
9	doc#0	<s>"This <b>government has</b> forgotten us...</s>
10	doc#0	<s>" Prime Minister Habib Essid, who cut short a visit to Europe to deal with the protests, has said his <b>government has</b> no "magic wand" with which to tackle unemployment.</s>
11	doc#0	<s>The <b>government has</b> recently pledged to implement major development projects in Rif.</s>
12	doc#0	<s>An uneasy 'national dialogue' is getting underway to heal the rifts but reformers even within the <b>government have</b> so far been outmanoeuvred by hardliners.</s>
13	doc#0	<s>The <b>government has</b> continued its brutal crackdown on protesters calling for President Bashar al-Assad to step down.</s>
14	doc#0	<s>The <b>government has</b> been accused of human rights abuses but insurgents have recently launched attacks on police.</s>
15	doc#0	<s>The Saudi <b>government has</b> so far declined to comment, but the senior official, who did not want to be named, confirmed the existence of the draft law and did not dispute the clauses contained in it.</s>
16	doc#0	<s>The <b>government have</b> exhausted them with new taxes.</s>
17	doc#0	<s>By Jim MuirBBC News 24 March 2011 Under pressure from events in the southern city of Deraa that are threatening to spiral out of control, President Bashar al-Assad and his Baathist <b>government have</b> come up with a wide range of conciliatory decisions and promises that look good on paper.</s>
18	doc#0	<s>The <b>government has</b> rejected the allegations, instead naming a Salafist radical, Boubaker Hakim, as the main suspect.</s>
19	doc#0	<s>'Not a terrorist' Aziza found out about her son's fate last month when the Syrian government released a second list of foreign fighters, who they say had sneaked into the country to support the "terrorists" - a catch-all term that the

		<b>government has</b> been using to describe the rebels since the start of the revolution-turned-conflict more than two years ago.</s>
20	doc#0	<s>Arrests The <b>government has</b> announced several measures to improve the situation in Syria in the wake of the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt that toppled the presidents of those countries.</s>
21	doc#0	<s>The absence of effective central <b>government has</b> left a vacuum.</s>
22	doc#0	<s>The <b>government has</b> indeed, thanks to extensive dialogue in recent months, succeeded in reaching significant agreements on all the key points regarding the drafting of the constitution, the electoral law and the remaining timetable.</s>

**Appendix 14: Links to *Neema* News Story on BBC News and BBC Arabic Official Websites**

BBC News: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25347428>

BBC Arabic: [https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/12/131218\\_yemen\\_women](https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/12/131218_yemen_women)

## Appendix 15: Screenshots of Concordance Lines for *threatening* in ALJEN Corpus

CQL [lempos\_lc="threaten-v"] • 24
⚡

213.98 per million tokens • 0.021% i

	Details	Left context	KWIC	Right context
1	doc#0	ce a trial-run of the kind of political conservatism that	<b>threatens</b>	bottom-up democratic change in the wider Arab worl
2	doc#0	l government step down and end a political deadlock	<b>threatening</b>	the North African country's fledgling democracy.</s>
3	doc#0	olitical control, elections and a new constitution now	<b>threatens</b>	transition and economic growth in a country once se
4	doc#0	n over land and oil between Arabs and ethnic Kurds,	<b>threaten</b>	renewed unrest and are hampering efforts to repair t
5	doc#0	odyguards of Sunni Finance Minister Rafia al-Issawi,	<b>threatening</b>	to plunge Iraq deeper into political turmoil.</s><s>"T
6	doc#0	'ather, King Hussein, died 1999.</s><s>Crackdowns	<b>threatened</b>	Jordanian authorities have threatened to crack down
7	doc#0	>Crackdowns threatened Jordanian authorities have	<b>threatened</b>	to crack down on those who incite violence during pr
8	doc#0	'an Arab Spring-style uprising in the African country,	<b>threatening</b>	that "a burning hot summer" awaits his enemies.</s>
9	doc#0	irs and arresting activists to stop the movement from	<b>threatening</b>	the state.</s><s>Social media activists are preparin
10	doc#0	at do not bode well for Egypt's bifurcated polity, now	<b>threatened</b>	with uncertainty, sclerosis and the potential for violen
11	doc#0	>But, despite widespread street protests that initially	<b>threatened</b>	to spark a Tunisian or Egyptian style revolt, an exp
12	doc#0	nents, media and even the United Nations, of the life	<b>threatening</b>	circumstances confronting Halalheh or Diab, let alon
13	doc#0	NGOs and hardhearted refusals to transfer medically	<b>threatened</b>	strikers to civilian hospitals - where they could receiv
14	doc#0	rain ahead of F1 race Violence comes as protesters	<b>threaten</b>	to disrupt this weekend's Formula One Grand Prix wi
15	doc#0	ites and Druze.</s><s>Some have been arrested or	<b>threatened</b>	.</s><s>Some female activists wear the hijab (heads
16	doc#0	ional peace movement were being held hostage and	<b>threatened</b>	with decapitation by insurgents, whose own brutality
17	doc#0	d from the Arab Spring, this would-be revolution has	<b>threatened</b>	traditional monarchies with the spectre of democrati
18	doc#0	on anti-government activists ahead of the elections,	<b>threatening</b>	those who use social media and websites to urge ac
19	doc#0	ses that are not only impeding effective solidarity, but	<b>threaten</b>	to tear up some Arab uprisings.</s><s>Part of the pr
20	doc#0	ort to the people of Gaza, which is perfectly legal and	<b>threatens</b>	no citizen anywhere.</s><s>And the US governmen
21	doc#0	d us who are trying to break through our borders and	<b>threaten</b>	our community and our citizens.</s><s>We will not a
22	doc#0	able to police the event with a comfort that was only	<b>threatened</b>	when the wind changed direction and blew their own
23	doc#0	system was torn down, was palpably felt as Gaddafi	<b>threatened</b>	merciless violence against pro-democracy activists.<
24	doc#0	:a Pahlavi, the late shah of Iran, when popular anger	<b>threatened</b>	the country's stability.</s><s>The Arabs are listenin



**Appendix 16: URL of Complete News Article Regarding Women Screaming Incident on BBC Arabic Website**

[https://www.bbc.com/arabic/inthepress/2011/03/110326\\_press\\_27\\_march](https://www.bbc.com/arabic/inthepress/2011/03/110326_press_27_march)

