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Gerald R. Ford and the rejuvenation of Anglo-American Relations

Steve Marsh^a, Robert M. Hendershot^b and Tia Culley^c

^aDepartment of Politics and International Relations, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK; ^bDepartment of Social Sciences, Grand Rapids Community College, Michigan, USA; ^cSchool of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, Bristol University, Bristol, UK

ABSTRACT

The general thrust of scholarship on Anglo-American relations is that the years overseen by President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath were tension filled and that it was not until the Carter administration that matters returned to a firmer footing. While revisionist scholarship has challenged the extent of tensions between Heath and Nixon, the emphasis placed upon the Carter years in explaining the relationship's recovery has gone largely unchallenged. This article, however, argues that important elements of the recovery of Anglo-American relations had already begun during the Ford administration. President Ford helped restore confidence to personal relationships and reinvigorate key conduits of consultation and cooperation. He also proved more aware than his predecessor of how deepening interdependence foregrounded the importance of soft power and the intersection of cultural currents with executive diplomacy. By strengthening functional cooperation, tapping transatlantic cultural connections, and publicly rehearsing tropes of 'specialness' in UK-US relations, the Ford administration laid important foundations for a rejuvenated special relationship.

KEYWORDS

Anglo-American special relationship; functional; personal relationships; culture; performance

Gerald R. Ford has generally been painted as a well-meaning but limited President. Domestically he was beset by economic crisis, fallout from the Vietnam war, Watergate and a resurgent Congress. In foreign affairs he has often been portrayed as a follower of, if not subservient to, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.¹ And in terms of Anglo-American relations specifically, scholarship has paid Ford little attention.² Indeed, the most detailed consideration to date across the period 1968–79 maintains that Anglo-American relations remained troubled in the years immediately preceding Carter's election but 'progressively regained ground' during his presidency as Washington sought to re-engage its alliances in response to intensifying international challenges.³

The relative neglect of Ford's contribution to Anglo-American relations mirrors broader assessments of his presidency. In recent years, however, Ford has enjoyed a reputational resurgence amid controversy-driven contemporary debate about US presidencies and

CONTACT Steve Marsh  Marshsi@cardiff.ac.uk  Department of Politics and International Relations, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK

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a historical reconsideration of international relations during the 1970 s. For example, in 2018 Donald Rumsfeld, who served as Ford's Chief of Staff and Secretary of Defence, credited him with rescuing the presidency by restoring dignity to the Office and rebuilding public trust in its holder—a conclusion that echoed former US House Speaker 'Tip' O'Neill's description of Ford as being 'The right man at the right time who was able to put our nation back together again'.⁴ Meantime, a scholarly reconstruction of this decade as one of American resurgence has brought greater recognition of the Ford administration's achievements. For instance, works have emphasised the importance of Ford's conversion to multilateralism, his contribution to reviving the US economy and pushing industrial deregulation, and his commitment to the Helsinki Accords.⁵

Building on this broader reassessment of Ford's presidency, this article argues that it was Ford and his administration that laid the foundations of rejuvenation in the special relationship that then continued into the Carter years. To do this we apply Marsh's argument to consider the special relationship holistically through overlapping and mutually supportive domains of functional, cultural and performative relations.⁶ The functional relationship refers to intense Anglo-American cooperation in economic, military, nuclear and intelligence matters arising from calculations of mutual utility and supported by diplomatic relations of unusual informality, reflexivity, breadth and reciprocal trust. The cultural relationship encompasses the myriad state and non-state cultural connections between the UK and US that, drawing on Iriye's work, help enable 'the sharing and transmitting of consciousness within and across national boundaries'.⁷ And the performative relationship captures how the two countries routinely and publicly celebrate their special relationship and therein sustain its credibility and mythicity.

Our argument is developed in four sections. The first sets out the challenges that Ford faced within Anglo-American relations at the onset of his presidency. The second section examines how Ford invested in improving diplomatic relations between the two countries as a facilitator of improved functional cooperation and restoring credibility to American leadership. The next section uses the Cyprus crisis and Mason Defence Review, two key foreign policy challenges for Whitehall and Washington during Ford's presidency, to reveal how these improved diplomatic ties enabled better mutual understanding and cooperation. The final section demonstrates how Ford harnessed transatlantic cultural connections and set-piece public rehearsals of 'special' Anglo-American relations to promote awareness of, and restore energy to, the special relationship. By considering these functional, cultural and performative domains together, we show that improvements in Anglo-American relations cannot be understood solely through policy outcomes, but also depended upon the restoration of trust, habits of consultation, and public affirmations of the relationship itself.

An Anglo-American inheritance

Ford and his administration inherited a frayed Anglo-American relationship, albeit some accounts exaggerate the extent of wear and tear.⁸ It was also a relationship in transition, the Anglo-American condominium envisaged by Winston Churchill having been overtaken by Britain's relative decline, challenges to American power, and the emergence of a mixed actor international system that encouraged multilateralism. Nevertheless, the British still coveted the special relationship, and the Americans still

needed Britain as a capable and reliable ally. Reciprocal goodwill alone, however, could not tend wounds and evolve the special relationship such that it retained credibility in much changed circumstances. This would take understanding of the sources of discontent and measures to address them. Four of the most important problems concerned Anglo-American consultation, Britain's weakened international standing, neglect of the public face of the special relationship, and evolving challenges to US relative power and leadership.

A major traditional strength of the special relationship was the interweaving of Anglo-American bureaucracies and their capacity to connect political elites and specialist functional communities. However, this infrastructure depended upon extensive routine consultation, and it suffered badly once Nixon and Kissinger agglomerated foreign policy power in the White House and adopted a secretive policymaking style.⁹ The British found that traditional sources of American information became unreliable or simply dried up. For instance, in December 1973 the US Embassy in London was described as a 'busted flush'¹⁰ and in November 1971 Lord Cromer, British Ambassador to the US, discovered that British surprise at Nixon's opening to China was shared by the State Department, which 'had been in ignorance throughout' and actually 'working on an entirely opposite policy'.¹¹ Importantly, despair and frustration with Kissinger's style especially extended beyond the working levels of Anglo-American relations. In November 1971 Prime Minister Heath concluded that the 'present method of conducting foreign relations, political, military and economic, has completely undermined confidence in the United States and is threatening in all three spheres to damage the whole western world'.¹²

While the Nixon-Kissinger policy style weakened Anglo-American consultation and trust, even more significant challenges flowed from Britain's accelerating relative decline. Churchill's discursive conjuring of the special relationship in his 1946 Fulton speech offered a source of ontological security to the British people, a way to encourage privileged Anglo-American functional cooperation and a diplomatic construct through which to realise Britain's wartime decision to steer rather than balance American power.¹³ As an emergent superpower, the calculation for the US was much different. Immediately after the war there was little appetite for a Pax Anglo-Americana and some suspected that Churchill's call for a special relationship was an attempt to re-entangle the US in European affairs and buttress the British empire. This meant that when the US did begin to embrace the special relationship, its primary calculation was unsentimentally functional. Put bluntly, Britain assumed 'a special or preferred position' in US relations because 'the facts of the world situation require it'.¹⁴

Though Britain and the US subsequently collaborated in the construction and maintenance of a mythology of special relations, which in turn seeped into the practice and expectation of Anglo-American relations, for the US especially it was the relative utility of Britain that determined commitment to the special relationship. And in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Britain's usefulness potentially diminished. Decolonisation swept away vestiges of empire, economic weakness persisted, and British refusal to meet President Johnson's plea for deployment in Vietnam of even a 'platoon of bagpipers' caused much frustration in Washington.¹⁵ Similarly, the devaluation of sterling in 1967 generated US concern about Britain's capabilities as an ally and its readiness to offload upon American shoulders greater burdens in supporting the Bretton Woods system. Still worse was the Wilson government's decision to withdraw from East of Suez. This was bitterly opposed.

US Secretary of State Dean Rusk urged Foreign Secretary George Brown ‘for God’s sake, act like Britain’ and Johnson famously warned of grave consequences were the US left to ‘man the ramparts all alone’.¹⁶

Consequent American doubts about British capability drove reassessments of the special relationship.¹⁷ Some US officials felt it had become little but ‘sentimental terminology’.¹⁸ Similar speculation appeared in American media. For instance, in January 1969 *Newsweek* declared ‘the death and public burial of the “special relationship”’ upon the appointment of John Freeman, who had previously been critical of President Nixon, as UK Ambassador to the US.¹⁹ By the time Ford became President, the British economy especially was spiralling into crisis and it appeared that such sentiments might prove correct.²⁰ Indeed, in October 1974 the US Embassy in Britain concluded that ‘On present form Britain will not be able to play a world role that commands very much respect, nor will it be the kind of partner of the United States which is well placed to work with us to advance our common interests in Europe’.²¹

As American doubts about the functional benefits of cooperation with Britain grew, so also problems developed for the public face of the special relationship. Churchill infused the post-war special relationship with a mythical quality, blending interest and sentiment in ways designed for historical intention to seem natural and contingency to appear eternal—a semiological system read by the consumer as a factual system rather than as a system of values.²² Anglo-American elites had subsequently built upon this work. A communicative discourse established a shared language and ideational framework of special UK-US relations and a coordinative discourse sought ‘to persuade the public that the policy paradigm is necessary and appropriate’.²³ However, the survival of myths depends upon human animation, and in the case of the special relationship this meant both ritual public performance of ‘specialness’ and a modulated discourse such that the fact and system of values of Anglo-American relations remained credibly congruent. Britain’s relative decline rendered Churchill’s construction of a partnership of equals unsustainable and even undesirable given its potential to antagonise other allies. Concomitantly, US promiscuousness in using the term special relationship further weakened the original Churchillian claim to Anglo-American exclusivity.²⁴

All of this meant that in the early 1970s the special relationship badly needed public promotion and discursive remodulation.²⁵ However, French sensitivities especially inclined the Heath government to downplay the special relationship while it negotiated Britain’s EC membership. Also, by the time Ford became President, the most important set piece opportunities for public rehearsal of the special relationship, Anglo-American summit meetings, had become conspicuous by their absence. Heath’s last summit with Nixon came in February 1973, before the serious transatlantic tensions of that year. When the Wilson government entered office determined to rekindle Anglo-American relations, expectations for a summit were high—including in the Nixon White House.²⁶ But again, a summit did not materialise. With Nixon embroiled in Watergate, Prime Minister Harold Wilson elected to wait out the President’s overtures until overtaken by his eventual resignation.²⁷

Finally, in terms of evolving challenges to US relative power and ability to direct the Western Alliance, the most important of these for Anglo-American relations came not from the Soviet Union but from Western Europe. First, West European countries, Britain included, felt a reduced threat from Moscow and a keener desire than the US to engage

with the Soviet bloc. Hence, for instance, West Germany embraced Ostpolitik and the British played a leading role in developing the Helsinki Accords.²⁸ In this context US domestic political demands for rebalancing contributions to NATO were a particularly hard sell.²⁹ Second, collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the oil crisis occasioned by the 1973 Yom Kippur war demonstrated both relative shifts in economic power and deepening transatlantic interdependencies. American 'empire by invitation' in Europe was over.³⁰ The transatlantic bargain needed renegotiation, especially as the EC became more integrated and ambitious. But this process would be potentially painful and complicated for all concerned, not least for Britain which finally became a Community member in 1973 and needed to balance carefully its European and US relationships.

Anglo-American relations consequently became ensnared in the wider transatlantic tensions of the early 1970s. The 'Year of Europe', announced unilaterally in April 1973 by Kissinger, resulted in controversy and friction rather than rejuvenation of the Atlantic Alliance.³¹ Later that year the US disrupted Anglo-American intelligence cooperation in protest at British policy during the Yom Kippur war,³² and coordinated EC sponsorship of the Euro-Arab dialogue provoked considerable American bitterness.³³ Subsequently, in March 1974, Nixon warned publicly of a need for 'organic cooperation' where American commitments to be maintained in Europe.³⁴ Moreover, underlying these specific tensions British officials detected a fundamental shift in American thinking. Traditional American acceptance of Europe becoming a more effective power centre, long grounded in abstract and intellectual reasoning, no longer seemed sufficient 'to provide the degree of tolerance necessary to understand why the Europeans might sometimes pursue objectives at variance with the United States'.³⁵ Also, while this in principle placed a premium on British cooperation in encouraging an outward looking and US-friendly EC, some American officials worried instead that declining British power and EC membership might together help drive Britain 'toward a grasping little Englandism and a not so splendid isolationism, which could be damaging for us as well as for them'.³⁶

Ford's Anglo-American inheritance was thus a testing one. Though the Nixon administration enjoyed in its last months a warming of relations with the Wilson government, the fundamental problems for Anglo-American cooperation arising from its policymaking style remained.³⁷ The special relationship had also lost its public lustre, being played down by the Heath government and struggling subsequently for overt celebration. American doubts about Britain's utility and fidelity as an ally had increased, as had concern for the direction of wider transatlantic relations. And Britain's immediate prospects appeared grim, assailed abroad by thorny problems including war in Cyprus and racial tension in Rhodesia, and beset at home by economic disarray that threatened also to exacerbate global financial turmoil and drive further cuts in British defence spending, capabilities and overseas commitments. If Ford were to find Anglo-American accommodation and return vitality to the special relationship, he would need all his renowned skills as a congressman and, unbeknown to him, to exceed British expectations of his calibre as a President.³⁸

Diplomatic relations

Academics debate the importance of personal relationships to the international relations of states, the core question being whether agency or structure determine priorities and

policies. At the extreme, Waltz famously argued that individuals are of little import for state behaviour is driven by a system of international forces beyond their control.³⁹ Few scholars are so deterministic, but functionalist accounts of Anglo-American relations nevertheless often emphasise a mutual utility calculus of power and interest to the point of marginalising the significance of personal relationships to decision-making.⁴⁰ Conversely, memoirs of politicians and policymakers frequently take a contrary view, including Winston Churchill in his famous admission that 'No lover ever studied every whim of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt'.⁴¹ And while self-serving motivations undoubtedly pervade autobiographies, archival records are similarly replete with references to the perceived importance of particular individuals and relationships.

In recent times greater recognition has been accorded to the influence of personal relations in international diplomacy,⁴² and this is particularly important in understanding Ford's efforts to inject greater vitality and purpose into Anglo-American relations. Kissinger once observed that 'The ease and informality of the Anglo-American partnership has been a source of wonder—and no little resentment—to third countries'.⁴³ But why was this the case? A shared language is an obvious advantage, negating the need for and risks of translation and facilitating non-verbal communication. Just as importantly, as John T. Masefield, Deputy Head of the British Planning Staff, argued in August 1975, this shared language encouraged 'common thought processes'.⁴⁴ Indeed, H.C. Allen once argued that many of the parallels in British and American history reflect mutual influence or similar responses to shared circumstances, but 'cannot possibly be ascribed merely to coincidence'.⁴⁵

Certainly, the Great Rapprochement, for example, owed much to recognition of shared values and similar assumptions.⁴⁶ However, by the time of Ford's presidency, more than ideas bound the US and Britain. Catalysed by extensive interaction afforded by the Second World War, complex webs of personal relationships developed, and developed through, bureaucratic interpenetration, epistemic communities and communities of practice, resulting in a dense intermeshing of UK and US external affairs at multiple levels and domains of exchange. This facilitated mutual learning and problem solving, and personal relationships helped consolidate especially close cooperation.⁴⁷ Furthermore, these relationships continually shaped expectation. They reaffirmed and evolved Anglo-American habits of cooperation, shared norms, *modus operandi*, and similar world views—and in doing so also impeded the intellectual and practical development of alternatives to Anglo-American cooperation.⁴⁸

Kissinger later maintained that British officials' exceptional trustworthiness and wisdom inclined successive American leaders to see self-interest in consulting before taking major decisions. Ironically, given his role in the Nixon White House, he also identified a pattern of Anglo-American consultation 'so matter-of-factly intimate that it became psychologically impossible to ignore British views ... [and with] meetings so regular that autonomous American action somehow came to seem to violate club rules ...'.⁴⁹ The evident challenge for Ford was therefore to re-open channels of communication that had atrophied and encourage personal relationships that could renew British confidence in American leadership and the value attributed in Washington to the special relationship.

Within this task, Ford's general leadership style was important in two respects. First, driven by the nature of key international challenges, need to restore legitimacy to US leadership, and personal disposition towards wider discussion, Ford slowly broke with the

Nixon-Kissinger emphasis on bilateralism in favour of multilateral diplomacy. This, together with Britain's disproportionate soft power making it a key interlocutor across many issues, increased Anglo-American interaction opportunity. Ford and a wider array of US officials than hitherto came into more regular and prominent contact with their British counterparts—be it in international organisations and their wings or in cooperating to deliver new initiatives, including launch of the G6 at Rambouillet in November 1975. And this, in turn, placed an added premium upon the importance of personal relationships and habits of cooperation.

Second, Ford assumed Office with a public pledge to 'have a candid administration'⁵⁰ and a private insistence on seeing more people than Nixon did.⁵¹ This more open style brought organisational changes, notably the appointment on 24 September 1974 of Donald Rumsfeld to a new post of White House Coordinator—a move welcomed by the British for Rumsfeld was an additional possible conduit to US foreign policy and a 'powerful voice close to the President' sympathetic to good relations with Western Europe.⁵² It also slowly began to reduce Kissinger's dominance over the formulation and execution of American foreign policy, which in turn opened more channels of communication.

At the very onset of his administration Ford declined Kissinger's suggestion that, as had been the case with Nixon, all papers for the President be channelled through him to prevent what he called colleagues making an 'end run'.⁵³ As Ford gained confidence in foreign policy, Kissinger occasionally found himself having to yield to Presidential preference, notably on Africa policy, and, more generally, operating within a less permissive environment. In October 1975, for instance, he conceded of Ford to close advisors that 'I can't talk things past him at a meeting. We have got to do a memo that I send to him ... The memo must have the pros and cons. It must not say, "You will now agree with my position: yes—no". ... You have got to tell him what the arguments of the various agencies are'.⁵⁴ The following month, in the so-called Halloween Massacre, Ford went further, separating the offices of Secretary of State and National Security Adviser and appointing Brent Scowcroft to the latter post. While Foreign Secretary James Callaghan telephoned Kissinger empathetically upon hearing the news,⁵⁵ overall the British considered Ford's Cabinet reshuffle positive for Anglo-American relations. As Secretary of State, Kissinger would remain highly influential but also be tempered by constraints from White House staff.⁵⁶ At the same time, Scowcroft's appointment especially would 'correct the present imbalance in the presentation of conflicting advice to the President'⁵⁷ and expose Ford to a wider range of opinions on foreign policy.⁵⁸

When it came to Anglo-American relations directly, Ford immediately sought to restore the expectation of consultation at the highest levels. On 9 August he sent Wilson a letter laden with traditional special relationship verbiage, opened the prospect of an early meeting, and, harkening back to the halcyon days of Churchill's correspondence with Presidents Roosevelt and Eisenhower, emphasised that 'in addition to the intimate contact that is normally maintained between our governments, I want very much to continue the practice of direct and confidential communication with you ...'.⁵⁹ Five days later, in a telephone conversation with Wilson, Ford again expressed hope of a face-to-face 'close personal discussion' and emphasised that 'If we work together, we can do a great deal better'.⁶⁰ Meantime, Ford, Kissinger and then Deputy Assistant NSA Scowcroft all seized on a visit by

Callaghan to Washington in September to praise him for 'the excellent relationship and superb cooperation between our two governments'⁶¹ and to 'set the correct tone for the next steps on the major issues before the United States and Europe'.⁶² Britain's Ambassador to Washington, Peter Ramsbotham, reported subsequently that these talks were positive, held in a 'very friendly and relaxed atmosphere',⁶³ and augured well for good personal relations between Ford and Callaghan, which did indeed eventuate.⁶⁴

When Ford and Wilson finally met for a bilateral summit in January 1975, US preparations demonstrated clear determination to set a positive tone for and expectations of Anglo-American relations. For instance, Kissinger advised Ramsbotham ahead of the summit that 'This is almost a family visit. We don't need to worry about an agenda. We will talk about anything'.⁶⁵ Ford, too, emphasised intimate and free flowing consultation at the summit. When Wilson asked where they should start, Ford responded 'Anywhere at all'.⁶⁶ Ford was also keen to emphasise the special quality of relations—privately and publicly. Hence, during a toast to Wilson, he invoked particular bonds of shared language and 'common background of understanding' to argue that 'behind these few words lie volumes of thought and experience which do not need to be articulated, and of course, this is a priceless asset to both our nations and our enduring friendship'.⁶⁷ Similarly, in his public welcoming remarks to Wilson on 30 January, he hailed Britain as not only 'one of America's truest allies and oldest friends' but also one that was imbued in the fabric of American life itself: 'Any student of American history and American culture knows how significant is our common heritage ... the very roots of our democratic political system and of our concepts of liberty and government are to be found in Britain'.⁶⁸

As a public affirmation of special relations, the summit was a success, not least because the British were reciprocally keen to make it so. Hence, for example, Wilson publicly stressed that meetings between British and American leaders were rooted in historical tradition and argued that their characteristic 'informality and friendship' helped ensure that major international challenges would be addressed with confidence and determination.⁶⁹ Just as importantly, the Ford administration reaped rewards in consolidating personal relationships. Wilson subsequently told the British Cabinet that he and Callaghan had 'quickly established an excellent rapport with President Ford'.⁷⁰ Ramsbotham noted similarly both Wilson's 'easy relationship' with Kissinger and that he was so impressed by Ford's 'calm, relaxed and assured manner' that the Prime Minister thought that he 'might surprise us all yet, as a President in the Truman mould'.⁷¹

Meantime Ford made appointments that helped directly restore vitality to traditional sources of Anglo-American consultation stymied by the Nixon administration. The most obvious example was the US Embassy in London. Here Ford invested unusual energy and personal prestige in selecting replacements for Ambassador Walter Annenberg, a Nixon political appointee with a reputation amongst British officials and media alike for being at best ineffective.⁷² Once Annenberg retired in October 1974, British media detected newfound determination to 'get the Embassy to operate as it should, developing contacts with the movers and shakers of the country',⁷³ and Ford's selection of Elliot Richardson as Annenberg's successor underscored this commitment. A former US Secretary of Defence and Attorney General, Richardson carried much greater gravitas than his predecessor and was regarded by British officials as 'openly Anglophile'.⁷⁴ Tellingly, the White House rarely issued

messages to accompany announcements of Ambassadorial nominations but Ford chose to introduce Richardson publicly as his choice.⁷⁵ The appointment and the message behind it were well received by British media and elites. *The Guardian* called it a 'subtle compliment to Britain'⁷⁶ and Kissinger reported to Ford that the British viewed it as a clear indication of the personal importance you attach to the best possible relations with the United Kingdom'.⁷⁷

When, after 12 months, Richardson returned to Washington to become Secretary of Commerce, Ford again ensured a quality appointment to the Court of St James—Anne Armstrong. She was a shrewd choice, rated 'first class'⁷⁸ by Kissinger and beloved by the British press⁷⁹ to a point of being labelled 'the most romantic diplomat that America has ever had'.⁸⁰ Just as he had with Richardson, Ford publicly underscored the importance he attached to Armstrong's appointment. On 14 January 1976, he introduced her as Ambassador-designate to the press and held a Q&A session in the Oval Office. On 19 February he also attended Armstrong's swearing-in ceremony. He used this occasion to publicly herald Anglo-American relations as being 'as good as they ever have been'.⁸¹ Perhaps more importantly, his attendance at the ceremony alongside Chief Justice Berger was so unusual that Armstrong was able to draw public attention to this in her arrival statement as Ambassador in the UK: 'I think that the importance the President of the United States attaches to my appointment was underscored by the fact he broke a precedent and officiated at my swearing-in himself recently—something we couldn't find had happened before in history'.⁸²

Ford's investment in personal relations and the re-opening of conduits of Anglo-American exchange emphasised the perceived importance of agency within the special relationship. Concomitantly, his progressive conversion to multilateralism further broadened the scope of potential Anglo-American diplomatic cooperation and Britain's relative utility to the US. In addition, while Kissinger remained a pivotal figure in US foreign policy, Ford did reduce his monopoly over access, information flow, and policy advice, thereby creating more opportunities for the British to make their voices heard and to potentially influence American policies. Cumulatively these changes helped slowly restore confidence in Anglo-American consultation, and Ford's willingness to publicly affirm the special relationship earned much appreciation in London. Furthermore, and crucially, these attitudinal and organisational changes did not simply improve the tone of Anglo-American relations. Rather, as the subsequent sections demonstrate, they filtered through the policy and working levels of Anglo-American relations to the benefit of functional cooperation and the harnessing of cultural ties to renewal of the special relationship.

Functional cooperation

In January 1975 Winston Lord, Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, told Kissinger that 'At the risk of carrying coals to Newcastle . . . British support counts as much today—and in some ways more—than in the past'.⁸³ This was despite and because of Britain's relative decline. Britain's soft power was substantial, its economy was still important, it remained America's most capable military, intelligence and security partner, and, with the possible exception of France, was the only US ally with 'something of a world view and at least gives us another hand to clap against'.⁸⁴ Equally, were Britain to respond to relative decline by cutting defence spending, this risked transferring more

burdens to American shoulders, encouraging other NATO countries to follow suit, and antagonising US Congressional opinion that already favoured a rebalancing of transatlantic burden sharing. Furthermore, should the British economy implode, then putative American economic recovery would likely be wiped out and the international economy plunged into renewed crisis.

Two interrelated examples suffice to demonstrate how investment in diplomatic relations helped smooth functional cooperation and evolve its conduct: the Cyprus crisis and the Mason Defence Review. The former was an ongoing problem that immediately deteriorated as Ford assumed office. Under the 1960 Treaty of Nicosia, Britain had granted Cyprus independence subject to maintaining rights to a military presence on the island and establishing a guarantorship, along with Greece and Turkey, of the country's security, independence, and territorial integrity. Trouble flared almost immediately as Greek-Cypriots favoured *Enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) whilst Turkish-Cypriots desired *Taksim* (partition of the island).⁸⁵ The consequent 'Green-Line' established by deployment of a United Nations Force smothered tensions⁸⁶ but in July 1974 these reignited dramatically when Turkish forces invaded Cyprus in response to a Greek Junta-backed coup aiming for *Enosis*.

Britain and the US perceived similar risks. Greek and/or Turkish contributions to NATO could be lost, as might Britain's sovereign base areas (SBAs) in Cyprus—Akrotiri and Dhekelia—that housed vitally important defence facilities, including American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and signals intelligence. NATO's southern flank, viewed in Washington especially as weak, might deteriorate further. And there was potential for Soviet gains or even intervention. USSR-Turkish relations were already improving, Turkey receiving more Soviet aid than any other developing world country, and when the Kremlin issued a military alert Kissinger quizzed Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on the veracity of a rumoured Soviet deployment to restore order.⁸⁷

Britain and America therefore agreed on the need to prevent war between Greece and Turkey, keep Turkey aligned with the West, safeguard NATO's southern flank, and prevent Soviet interference.⁸⁸ They also recognised that time pressure to secure a ceasefire and subsequent settlement arose from events on the ground and the scheduled USSR assumption of the chair of the UN Security Council in August 1974 from which the Soviets might attempt mediation of the crisis.⁸⁹ Initially Callaghan and Kissinger successfully led cooperation in securing from Turkey and Greece a temporary ceasefire and commitment to peace discussions at a Summit in Geneva in late July. However, once the Geneva talks stalemated and on 9 August the Turkish delegation intimated a second round of military action in Cyprus, familiar problems of consultation and coordination arose. Callaghan sought support for a coordinated UK-UN-US military operation to deter Turkey,⁹⁰ Kissinger demurred for reasons including risk of a military exchange with a NATO ally,⁹¹ and both sides resorted to rival independent strategies to prevent Turkey's military invasion. The British still intimated military action against Turkey, threatening on 10 August to increase Phantom aircraft and Gurkha troops in Cyprus and warning of their readiness to respond to Turkish provocation.⁹² Meantime, though, Kissinger secretly cooperated with Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit to devise a 'cantonal solution' for Cyprus that could be presented to Greek delegates at Geneva.⁹³ Bitter recrimination ensued as both sides uncovered the other's policies. Callaghan rejected the cantonal solution and castigated Kissinger for playing Britain as 'a dummy in the

middle' between the US and Turkey.⁹⁴ Kissinger bemoaned Callaghan's 'predilection for "playing" with soldiers'⁹⁵ and warned that America would not rescue Britain if it continued to provoke Turkey and 'rattle the saber'.⁹⁶ When the Turks called Britain's bluff and launched a second major offensive in Cyprus on 14 August, British prestige was badly damaged—as was willpower to lead mediation efforts and retain commitments in Cyprus.⁹⁷

The Cyprus crisis therefore exposed both the strengths and limitations of the existing Anglo-American relationship. Functional cooperation remained extensive, but problems of consultation, differing strategic priorities, and Kissinger's preference for conducting diplomacy through highly personalised channels all persisted. As President for less than a week, Ford therefore inherited seriously strained Anglo-American relations, a possible foreign policy disaster in the Mediterranean, and potential spillover into the ongoing Mason Defence Review, about which disquieting rumours had previously emerged regarding the SBAs in Cyprus. Convinced that rebuilding British faith in American leadership was essential and determined to 'calm down our British friends a bit', Ford moved immediately to complement Kissinger's diplomacy with direct presidential engagement at the highest political level.⁹⁸

On 14 August he called Callaghan and Wilson separately. In both conversations he expressed appreciation of British efforts, sympathised with British grievances, and promised his administration's support in handling Cyprus. This diplomatic gesture soothed frustration and opened opportunity for Wilson to urge creation of a 'very close' crisis channel with Ford that would allow senior level British officials to 'exchange views' freely with White House staff.⁹⁹ Meantime Callaghan asked for greater empathy within Washington about the difficulties Britain faced in its relative decline. Washington should pay heed to British counsel and, if events turned sour, understand British angst: 'Seriously, we welcome your leadership', Callaghan assured. 'We'll kick when we get it but if you just listen to us a bit- we'll be alright'. Ford promised encouragingly not to be 'thin-skinned'.¹⁰⁰

Keen to reset relations with the Ford administration, the British responded positively. Wilson promised Ford that the British would 'let the dust settle' and not hastily withdraw from their SBAs in Cyprus,¹⁰¹ and on 27 August the British government agreed to accommodate American desires by giving 'one last heave' at resolving the crisis by chairing another round of Greek-Turkish negotiations at Geneva.¹⁰² The context was unpromising. The Soviets were now chairing the UN Security Council and the Ford administration was trapped between the Greek and Turkish causes. Failure to prevent the Turkish invasions of Cyprus, together with Turkey using arms provided by the US, persuaded Greece to withdraw from NATO's military command structure on 15 August.¹⁰³ Amid violent protests in Nicosia the American Ambassador in Cyprus, Roger Davies, was assassinated,¹⁰⁴ and a vocal Greek diaspora in the US began lobbying Congress to prohibit the supply of weapons and military aid to Turkey. This, in turn, prompted Turkish officials to warn that any such Congressional action could jeopardise US bases in Turkey, including those used by NATO, and thereby raised the possibility, too, of the Soviets providing for Turkish defence needs instead.¹⁰⁵ In addition, in late September, Ecevit's government collapsed and was replaced by a weak caretaker government that feared being overthrown were it to make concessions over Cyprus. That same month the House of Representatives adopted the Rosenthal-Du Point amendment to the Continuing Appropriations Bill for the fiscal year 1975, which provided for the termination

of US military equipment and aid material to Turkey from February 1976 until the President certified that Turkey had made 'substantial progress' in resolving the Cyprus crisis.¹⁰⁶

Disaster was averted in part by Anglo-American policy consultation, coordination and burden sharing, with the crux of this cooperation deriving from an unexpected reversal of British and American influence vis-à-vis Turkey. The Ford administration sought to head-off Congressional action by securing Turkish concessions sufficient to meet the mandated threshold of 'substantial progress'. However, such concessions would be politically dangerous for Turkey's government, as would be cooperation with the US given the virulence of Turkish anti-American sentiment.¹⁰⁷ The British, though, were free of such popular Turkish resentment, and had endeared themselves to Ankara by sheltering in the SBAs some 10,000 displaced Turkish-Cypriots.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, as the conditions of these displaced peoples deteriorated, London had some leverage with Ankara for British cooperation would be needed to secure their safe transport to the Turkish-Cypriot side of the island.¹⁰⁹

The Wilson government duly conditioned transfer of the refugees upon Turkish concessions over Cyprus. This effectively forced Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes and Turkish-Cypriot Vice President Denktash to explore crisis solutions with Kissinger at the October UN General Assembly meeting in New York and again at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels in December, this time with Greek-Cypriot delegates too.¹¹⁰ British tactics were not risk free. Denktash threatened sanctions upon the SBAs and media was critical of worsening camp conditions there. Nevertheless, only once Kissinger confirmed that the new Greek-Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides and Denktash had agreed to hold bilateral talks about Cyprus in the New Year did Whitehall agree to transfer the refugees.¹¹¹ Moreover, the British took care to announce this move in a manner supportive of the Ford administration's needs. On 19 December it issued a 14-day notice for Clerides and Denktash to organise transfer of the refugees from the SBAs, which as Callaghan explained to Kissinger was designed to extract greater flexibility during the upcoming New Year discussions. The plan reaped rewards. One week before the Congressional deadline, Turkey agreed to remove a 1,000-man brigade from Cyprus.¹¹²

Ultimately Congress judged that this Turkish concession and initiation of peace talks did not constitute 'substantial progress' and set in motion serious strategic losses to the US and intractable positions on Cyprus. On 13 February 1975 Turkey declared the north-eastern tier of Cyprus to be the Turkish Cypriot State, required closure of US bases in Turkey by July 1975, and conditioned any talks with the US over Cyprus upon lifting of the embargo.¹¹³ Nevertheless, improving Anglo-American consultation under Ford's leadership had facilitated better cooperation when trying to make progress on Cyprus and forestall the mandated embargo. Equally, when their efforts failed, senior officials on both sides of the Atlantic demonstrated none of the frustration, duplicity or resentment that had been displayed previously at Geneva. Instead, Congress bore the brunt of much ire. Furthermore, even in these constrained circumstances Ford and Wilson developed a plan for Britain to take over from the US supply to Turkey of military arms and equipment. This was formalised through a UK-Turkey trade deal in May 1975,¹¹⁴ and further damage limitation was achieved when, as American bases in Turkey closed in July, agreement was struck such that those with broader NATO activities remained available.¹¹⁵

Cyprus was an imperial hangover for Britain and once it slipped into long-term stalemate, Washington and London could be relatively content with both the outcome

and the improved quality of Anglo-American cooperation. Concomitantly, though, the Mason Defence Review potentially struck at the heart of mutual utility within functional relations. Facing economic crisis, inheriting a contracted British global footprint, committed to the social contract and welfare spending, and incurring additional foreign exchange costs from overseas obligations of £1 billion a year,¹¹⁶ the defence budget was an obvious government target for spending cuts. Indeed, Heath's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, had already cut defence spending by £178 million, the Wilson government committed in March 1974 to reducing the cost of defence as a proportion of national resources,¹¹⁷ and Chancellor of the Exchequer Healey's first budget that month slashed a further £50 million from defence whilst simultaneously introducing food subsidies and increasing old age pension and social security benefit payments.¹¹⁸ Not surprising, then, that in June 1974 Winston Lord advised British officials that the US was 'frankly apprehensive' about the Review and that potential defence cuts constituted the principal caveat in the warmth of their welcome to the Wilson government.¹¹⁹

By the time Ford became President, the Mason Defence Review was well underway. Of particular importance was that the Defence Review Steering Committee (DRSC), chaired by Cabinet Secretary Sir John Hunt, had established a key concept as it sought to identify potential cuts, namely the Critical Level. This constituted the minimum level of spending necessary to maintain the credibility of NATO strategy and the confidence of allies,¹²⁰ beyond which Ministers must judge based on foreign affairs implications for non-NATO commitments.¹²¹ What this translated to was outlined by the International Secretaries in October 1974: 'Our overall objective is to ensure that the outcome of the Defence Review inflicts minimum damage to Anglo/American relations and the important transatlantic defence link'.¹²² This meant that the British always planned to consult the US to manage American fears and help clarify priorities, establish common ground and avoid unwelcome shocks in Washington upon conclusion of the process.¹²³ However, Ford's arrival injected an additional consideration. As Callaghan told Wilson on 23 August 1974, 'This consultation with the Americans will be even more important now as an example of the way we hope to develop Anglo-American relations under Mr Ford ...'¹²⁴

The Ford administration accepted British defence cuts were inevitable. It also recognised political risks were it to be overly critical of these. Wilson was a proven ally and his lead would be important in the promised referendum on British membership of the EC, which the US strongly favoured. But he was politically vulnerable, leading a minority government and susceptible to pressure from trade unions and a strong left-wing faction within the Labour Party—from which, were he to fall, it was quite possible a successor Prime Minister could emerge who was much less friendly to the US and to British defence capabilities. In this context the Ford administration devised a damage control exercise based on three interrelated approaches. First, it needed to impress upon London its strong opposition to cuts in hope of minimising them. Second, it would try to steer cuts into areas least damaging to NATO and US interests. Third, it would need to help manage impressions of British defence cuts to mitigate negative impact in Congress and NATO—especially important given popular pressure on defence expenditure, the ongoing Cyprus crisis and deep concern for the Alliance's southern flank. All of this, however, depended on quality communication and consultation with British officials, which in turn depended upon restoring confidence in American leadership sufficient to enable the privileged and intimate exchanges normally characteristic of the special relationship.

Ford's early investment in improving diplomatic relations reaped rewards, helped undoubtedly by the Wilson government's reciprocal desire and its anxiety about American reactions to the Defence Review. At the end of October Wilson proposed to Ford that a small British team visit Washington to discuss conclusions of the Review 'in the strictest confidence'.¹²⁵ These talks fell firmly in the Anglo-American tradition of frank and informal exchange. First, the British were rightly 'extremely sensitive' about these consultations, not least because they preceded any others, including with NATO Secretary General Luns, and both sides duly worked to maintain their secrecy.¹²⁶ Second, the discussions were of a quality different to those the British anticipated with other allies, being more wide-ranging and covering some details that would not be disclosed to fellow NATO countries.¹²⁷ Third, exchanges were, indeed, full and frank. On 12 November, Sir John Hunt and Chief of Defence Staff Sir Michael Carver outlined British thinking in two meetings. The first was with William Colby, Head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Senior White House Advisor Robert Hartman, Kissinger, Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counsellor at the State Department. The Americans had apparently forecast around 80% of British conclusions¹²⁸ but Kissinger's reaction was still reportedly 'explosive' and contained 'a remarkable stream of expletives'.¹²⁹ He expressed 'deep concern' that Britain would no longer be able to intervene in low intensity conflicts beyond NATO and 'forcefully made point' that the Soviets would interpret proposed withdrawal from Cyprus as 'a serious weakening in the western strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean'. Schlesinger echoed this fear in the context of planned withdrawal also from Malta.¹³⁰ Subsequently, in a meeting at the Pentagon, the Americans also opposed British withdrawal from Masirah for weakening capacity to respond to a number of Indian Ocean scenarios.¹³¹

Kissinger later told Ford of these talks that 'To their credit, the British consulted fully and frankly with us in November before submitting the results of their Review to Parliament'.¹³² But at the time it was important to fight a rearguard action, regardless of there being little sign of 'give' in the British position.¹³³ Kissinger recommended application of pressure through personal and institutional channels. First, Ford should press Wilson directly to ameliorate cuts within final Cabinet deliberations. Second, the Departments of State and Defence would send 'More specific comments'¹³⁴ in the hope that sufficient leverage remained to provoke reconsideration especially of intervention forces and the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean base areas.¹³⁵ This was part of steering cuts into the least damaging avenues. Ford concurred and wrote Wilson imploring reconsideration of withdrawal from Cyprus and emphasising that the Soviets would be emboldened were the US left as the 'only check' on their ambitions outside of the immediate NATO area.¹³⁶ Alongside this, on 18 November the State Department used the reviving Embassy in London to inform Sir John Hunt of 'serious concerns' that British plans would degrade NATO's ability to reinforce its southern flank especially, exacerbate public and parliamentary pressures on spending elsewhere in NATO, and that viability of the 1971 Five Power Defence Arrangement depended upon preserving UK naval and air facilities in Singapore.¹³⁷

The details lie beyond the scope of this article but American pressure and further negotiations did result in British row-back on cuts and some collaboration in sustaining key assets—including a continued presence in Gibraltar, American subsidies for retaining the SBAs in Cyprus and facilities in Singapore, agreement to co-develop

Diego Garcia, a phased withdrawal from Malta, and an eventual exit from Masirah that the British negotiated sensitively with the Americans. More important for this article, though, is to understand the mechanics of this pressure. First, improving the quality of Anglo-American interaction and consultation allowed the Ford administration to discern key 'friends' and 'foes' within the British government as it debated defence spending. Who could they work with to defend spending, and who could they help to weaken or outflank? This speaks to the importance of personal relationships and herein it became evident that cultivating ties with Callaghan, Hunt and Defence Secretary Roy Mason, would be important. The same applied to Ambassador Ramsbotham, who was sensitive to American opinion and important in how the Ford administration's concerns were framed to London. It is telling, therefore, that in addition to close relations with Callaghan, Kissinger developed a personal relationship of 'warmth and mutual respect' with Hunt. Similarly, a good relationship developed between Schlesinger and Ramsbotham, aided by a shared interest in bird-watching, and Mason progressively became seen as a 'good friend' of the US.¹³⁸

Second, as the Ford administration came to understand the key players in the defence debate, so it worked to shape a conducive environment for those who most wanted to retain British capabilities to the maximum possible. Strong representations of objections at the highest diplomatic levels, such as Ford's letter to Wilson, obviously sent warning of potential Anglo-American trouble ahead. This strengthened the hand of defenders of the defence budget. It also put on notice less supportive Cabinet members because US importance to Britain stretched into realms beyond defence—of which at the time economics was particularly significant given the parlous state of British finances. Equally, through consultation the Ford administration could, by identifying priorities if not red lines, indicate sensitivity to British constraints and areas of potential compromise. This was politically shrewd to assist defenders of the budget and to guard against inflaming anti-Americanism in the Labour Party, which could in turn further constrain Wilson's scope for manoeuvre.

When a final Cabinet decision was made on the budget, it is revealing that Wilson's primary justification was drafted by Hunt and based on the argument that 'we have gone to the limit of what is tolerable with them [Americans].'¹³⁹ It is also important to note that both sides then worked to impression manage the Review. For example, the British undertook to liaise over their proposed statement on cuts to the House of Commons to 'clear language on a number of points'.¹⁴⁰ They also engaged in an extensive round of consultation with other NATO countries, meaning that it was not until May 1975 that Mason finally introduced the Defence White Paper to Parliament. These, Ambassador Richardson helpfully reported, 'had reduced some of the negative impact of the cuts.'¹⁴¹

The Ford administration and the British Labour governments obviously faced many more challenges, some of them, such as the energy crisis and collapse of sterling, being even more difficult than Cyprus and the Defence Review. However, for the purposes of this article they suffice to demonstrate how Ford's investment in improving personal and diplomatic relations paid dividends in the functional domains of Anglo-American relations. Badly fractured relations in Cyprus were healed quickly enough that Britain and the US cooperated sufficiently to subdue the crisis, prevent war between Greece and Turkey, and to some extent circumvent damage done by Congress to US-Turkish relations by having Britain provide Ankara with arms instead of the US. As for the Mason Review, the

Ford administration secured important concessions in British defence cuts and successfully prevented a crisis in NATO. Crucially, too, it reaped value in doing so from the cultivation of particular personal relationships, including those with Callaghan, Mason and Hunt, who it facilitated in protecting defence expenditure as best possible.

Culture and performance

Scholars such as Akira Iriye and Alexander Wendt suggest that a more thorough understanding of causation emerges by placing the hard realities of geopolitics into context with the cultural discourses shaping identity and imagination.¹⁴² Equally, those discourses are shaped by circumstances present and constructions of the past. And as memory-studies scholarship has established, there is a correlation between group cohesion and shared narratives that function less as factual records than as bodies of belief guiding public expectation.¹⁴³ The special relationship is a case in point. Churchill's construction of it in 1946 combined geopolitical motivation of new threats to world peace with a celebration of Anglo-American cultural connection and a strategic exercise in remembering and forgetting such that the special relationship acquired a mythical quality. Shared cultural discourses and common value systems helped develop the 'common cast of mind' that facilitated functional cooperation, contributed to Anglo-American soft power, and encouraged a lockstep evolution of British and American societies through a transmission belt of ideas and shared experiences.¹⁴⁴ It is for this reason that historians such as Michael Howard have argued that the special relationship must be seen 'not as one between leaders or even elites, but between the societies which produce those leaders'.¹⁴⁵

Anglo-American cultural connections were remarkably dense by the 1970s. Shared language, mounting media circulation, educational exchange, and particularly the rapid expansion of popular culture fostered notions of familiarity and common purpose that extended beyond official diplomacy.¹⁴⁶ Concomitantly, these connections were marked by profound shifts, including movements for gender equality, sexual liberation, economic strain, and widespread doubts about political authority. These experiences unfolded in Britain and the US in close dialogue, fostering shared patterns of change and reinforcing perceptions of a common worldview. And this, coupled with the political and economic challenges both countries faced, accorded the cultural and performative dimensions of the special relationship particular importance as means through which partnership, legitimacy, and continuity could be publicly sustained.

Within this task, it is important to note that Ford was attuned to the potential utility of Anglo-American cultural connections to image management, public messaging, and popular appeal. For example, by the mid-1970s, British popular music occupied a central place in US cultural life and British bands enjoyed a much larger share of America's music market than those of any other foreign nation.¹⁴⁷ In this context, Ford's friendly Oval Office meetings with George Harrison in December 1974 and Peter Frampton in September 1976 were an evident attempt to tap into a shared Anglo-American cultural vocabulary, particularly among younger audiences who were more thoroughly immersed in a shared Anglo-American musical culture than any generation before.¹⁴⁸ Ford's willingness to engage publicly with such figures reinforced his accessible image. He even seized upon his time with Harrison to promote his Whip Inflation Now

(WIN) campaign by affixing a WIN button to the former Beatle's jacket.¹⁴⁹ In this way, Ford proved more politically and diplomatically perspicacious than his predecessor; just a few years earlier the Nixon administration had harassed and sought to deport another former Beatle, John Lennon, because of his anti-war opinions.¹⁵⁰

Ford was also sensitive to how debates about gender roles and political representation, driven by second-wave feminism, were reshaping public life in Britain and the US.¹⁵¹ Although unfolding differently in each country, they generated shared questions about modernity and political authority.¹⁵² In Britain, for example, the emergence of Margaret Thatcher as leader of the Conservative Party in 1975 attracted transatlantic attention not only because of her policy positions, but because her leadership intersected with broader cultural discussions about gender and power.¹⁵³ With political relationships becoming increasingly mediated through cultural as well as strategic lenses, Ford quickly invited Thatcher to the White House—and in doing so also reinforced perceptions of parallel political evolution being driven by the UK and US experiencing a shared landscape of social change. Indeed, Ford doubled down on this intersection of cultural currents with executive diplomacy through his subsequent nomination of Anne Armstrong as the first female US Ambassador to Britain. While her gender was hardly Armstrong's only qualification, the White House was nevertheless conscious that her posting would be timely in signalling tandem Anglo-American progress towards more equal societies.¹⁵⁴

As these examples indicate, Ford recognised the utility of Anglo-American cultural interpenetration for both personal political goals and Executive diplomacy. He also, though, had to consider, and capitalise upon, a long history of Anglo-American performance of special relations where shared assumptions and affinities, sustained through cultural connections, created conditions in which more explicit performances of partnership could resonate widely. As aforementioned, when energising diplomatic relations Ford invested in the long tradition of Anglo-American summitry and its associated verbiage of special relations. But there were other avenues, too, with potentially wider reach, such as commemorative performances, precedents for which ranged from early twentieth-century celebrations of Lincoln and Roosevelt in Britain to mass-mediated rituals of wartime remembrance.¹⁵⁵ And in this context Ford was fortuitous, the American Bicentennial falling in 1976. This celebratory event provided opportunity to mobilise cultural resources consciously and at scale, translating diffuse familiarity and affinity into public affirmation of the special relationship and, in turn, securing Ford and his administration visible affirmation that the US remained embedded within a community of shared values and reliable allies at a moment when American leadership appeared strained. Moreover, a prominent British role in the Bicentennial promised to be particularly impactful on American citizens given that polling indicated greater US esteem for Britain than for any of the other major European allies.¹⁵⁶

An added advantage for Ford was that British officials were acutely aware of the circumstances confronting his administration and equally keen to use the Bicentennial to reinforce the special relationship. Indeed, Ambassador Richardson noted in August 1975 that 'From the perspective of London, the bicentennial seems almost a joint Anglo-American event'.¹⁵⁷ Under the guidance of the British Bicentennial Liaison Committee (BBLC), a special group within the FCO, the British sought to utilise cultural diplomacy to convert the bicentennial of the Revolutionary War into a celebration of shared Anglo-American heritage and the modern special relationship.

Any commemorations of the conflict itself were to be used to 'show how this evolved into a joint victory for English-speaking people on both sides of the Atlantic'.¹⁵⁸ Also, effective British participation in the Bicentennial would serve British and American interests by reinforcing narratives of continuity and legitimacy and shaping how the special relationship was publicly understood during Ford's presidency.¹⁵⁹ Consequently cultural exchanges and programmes needed to 'result in great benefit to Anglo-US relations'¹⁶⁰ and official gifts should generate 'an unconscious influence on the American public's attitude towards this country [Britain]'.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, the bicentennial offered opportunity to promote the special relationship as a model for the wider world. According to Ambassador Armstrong, 'the fundamental principles that our two countries believe in - - peace, democracy, individual liberty and well-being - - I can't think of a finer time than the Bicentennial to remind ourselves of the value of these things that are as precious today as they were 200 years ago, and also an appropriate way to hold them up and to exemplify them as a promise to other nations'.¹⁶²

Ford invested personally in the Bicentennial at home and abroad. For example, when the US sent its bicentennial 'World of Franklin and Jefferson' exhibit to London in September 1975, the President personally selected the members of the American delegation, including Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, who would be present at its grand opening. The British FCO duly noted that this indicated both the importance attributed to British participation in the bicentennial celebrations and the promotion of his potential running mate's 'political image' in the US as the 1976-election cycle drew near.¹⁶³ Similarly, when Ambassador Ramsbotham raised the possibility in December 1974 of Queen Elizabeth II visiting the US during the Bicentennial, Kissinger felt 'It would come at a good point in our relationship' and Ford was so delighted that he initially mused that it would be 'rather appropriate' were she to visit on 4 July, US Independence Day.¹⁶⁴ Ultimately the Ford administration opted instead to hold the state dinner for the Queen and her husband, Prince Phillip, on 7 July, still firmly within the most symbolic and intense period of festivities.

Britain's Bicentennial presence was extended by a broad programme of cultural exchange that circulated Anglo-American narratives widely and by the careful selection of gifts to the American people. Two of the most important of these were the Bicentennial Bell and a copy of the Magna Carta. The former, a gift to the city of Philadelphia, was an exact reproduction of the original Liberty Bell cast by the same English company that produced the first bell over 200 years earlier. The Bell symbolised shared Anglo-American history and values. Every symbolic aspect and publicity opportunity was conscientiously calculated.¹⁶⁵ When officials in Philadelphia requested a message be added to the bell's surface, the phrase chosen was 'Let Freedom Ring'. This had the particular merit of being the last line of 'My Country 'tis of Thee', which, as the BBLC pointed out, is sung to the same tune as 'God Save the Queen'.¹⁶⁶ Maximum exposure of the gift's symbolism was achieved when Queen Elizabeth II herself issued the bell's first peal in Philadelphia. In this way, the Bell's presentation and display helped embed Anglo-American narratives within popular experience. As for the Magna Carta, this was Britain's 'centrepiece gift' and was originally solicited by John Warner, the Director of the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration. As he explained to the BBLC in early 1975, the Magna Carta would be perfect because it related to 'the foundation of the United States as a democracy' and 'was

the British document best known and most revered by Americans', which would make it 'a continuous attraction for a large number of American viewers from all walks of life'.¹⁶⁷

The BBLC readily agreed because the Magna Carta represented all the key elements of Anglo-American connection they sought to highlight: it represented freedom, liberty, and rights, major components of American identity being celebrated in 1976; it symbolised a deep connection between the allies that predated the Revolutionary War; and its presence in the US for the year seemed appropriate and generous.¹⁶⁸ Reciprocally, for the Ford administration, the presence of Magna Carta not only promoted Anglo-American relations but also offered a visible affirmation of constitutional legitimacy at a time when confidence in executive authority required careful rebuilding. A grand reception ceremony took place when the loaned document, officially a gift from Parliament to Congress, arrived at the US Capitol in 1976. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Carl Albert, hailed the document as 'the first expression of the idea of liberty under the law and of limitation of arbitrary powers of government' and stated that its arrival was the 'most significant part of our Bicentennial celebration'.¹⁶⁹ Ultimately more than five million visitors viewed the historic document before it was returned in June 1977.¹⁷⁰

However, it was Ford's hosting of state visit for Queen Elizabeth II in July 1976 that constituted the most concentrated and symbolically consequential performance of Anglo-American relations during his presidency. Occurring at the height of the Bicentennial year, the visit translated the broader patterns of cultural familiarity and public affirmation cultivated across 1976 into a single, highly visible event centred on the British and American heads of state. White House preparations emphasised scale, choreography, and media impact, with particular attention devoted to the state dinner on 7 July, which became the focal point of the visit. This was an event of exceptional visibility. Guest lists were carefully constructed to ensure that Washington elites, Hollywood icons and pop stars would stand out in the audience of some 224 guests, underscoring the glamour of the occasion.¹⁷¹ PBS was permitted to make this the first state dinner broadcast live on American television, as well as via satellite to Britain.¹⁷² Media coverage emphasised both the formality of the setting and the breadth of its appeal, presenting the dinner as a defining moment of the Bicentennial year. For the Ford administration, the presence of the Queen transformed a diplomatic ritual into an international affirmation of partnership, reinforcing also the presidency's association with stability and continuity.

The language deployed during the dinner reinforced these themes. Notably, the American Revolution receded into the background of this exchange, eclipsed by the memory of wartime cooperation and Anglo-American solidarity. In his toast to Queen Elizabeth II, Ford explained that the 'ties that bind us together have, through two world wars, served as a bulwark in the defense of liberty and the dignity of man himself'. The Queen in turn, as Anglo-American leaders had done for decades, emphasised the 'interdependence' of the alliance, explaining that 'today, no nation can stand alone. We depend, as never before, upon each other'.¹⁷³ They also spoke to the future of Anglo-American relations. The President proclaimed that the special relationship would remain a fixture of international diplomacy: 'In our third century, I know that the United Kingdom will be on our side and the United States will be on your side'. Like Ford, the Queen also stressed the stability and mutual advantages of the special relationship: 'One thing is certain, and that is the strength and permanence of Anglo-American friendship.

It has grown and prospered down the years. It has brought with it benefits beyond measure to our peoples. May it long continue to flourish for the sake of both our countries and for the greater good of mankind'.¹⁷⁴

This framing helped situate American renewal within a transatlantic context, reinforcing the idea that the US had been most effective when acting alongside trusted friends. International credibility remained central to American foreign policy even as the means of sustaining it increasingly relied on symbolism and public affirmation. It also reaffirmed the mythology of the special relationship, with Anglo-American partnership remaining seemingly both natural and eternal. In fact, the following day Ford underscored this by symbolically connecting Anglo-American relations present with those past. Specifically, he accompanied the Queen to a service at the Washington National Cathedral where the building's new 'Churchill Porch' was dedicated in memory of the former British Prime Minister and honorary American citizen. During the ceremony, workmen lowered a 1,000-year-old stone from London's Westminster Abbey as Reverend Francis B. Sayre preached about the special relationship: 'We put that English stone in yon western entrance which is our tribute and memorial to Sir Winston Churchill, who in the blood of his parentage was rooted on either side of the sea and whose dauntless defense of liberty was our glory and our salvation on both sides of the Atlantic'.¹⁷⁵ Afterwards, thousands of onlookers cheered as President Ford led Queen Elizabeth II down the front steps of the cathedral, sensing,¹⁷⁶ if not consciously understanding, a reaffirmation of the special relationship that was crafted carefully from a merging of memories of wartime alliance, a performance of shared religious culture and an invocation of the relationship's most important and famous historical figure.

Overall, the Bicentennial year and the Queen's state visit demonstrated two important things about culture and performance to the special relationship. First, they could operate as durable instruments, rather than as episodic embellishments, of Anglo-American diplomacy and in the preservation of the special relationship. The Ford administration strategically calibrated these tools so that the performances of 1976 aligned historical narrative, symbolic gesture, and executive posture in ways that addressed the immediate demands of political repair while also establishing enduring patterns of Anglo-American representation. For example, the language deployed in 1976, the symbolism of shared sacrifice, and the use of highly visible ceremonial moments to affirm partnership became increasingly familiar features of Anglo-American diplomacy, shaping how cooperation was later publicly narrated.¹⁷⁷ In this sense, Ford's presidency marked not an interlude of drift but a moment in which the performative elements of the special relationship were revised.

Second, culture and performance could spill over constructively into the functional domain of the special relationship. For instance, cultural connections shaped expectations about cooperation and leadership, eased elite interaction, and sustained public assumptions of partnership. Hence in the summer of 1976, though the UK was experiencing its worst economic crisis in decades and the pound had reached a record low against the dollar in June,¹⁷⁸ the dominant representations of Britain in American media emphasised their shared history, values, and partnership. This created a window of goodwill to negotiate Anglo-American differences and a response, however temporary, to FCO fears that the US 'will increasingly be more influenced by the views of other nations unless we can dispel the gloomy views and forecasts of Britain which are currently widespread in the United States'.¹⁷⁹ It also helped Ford discursively ease Britain into a category of being the most special of America's special relationships, regardless of its present weaknesses. This

better reflected the global distribution of power and mirrored British efforts, driven by need to balance their Atlantic and European relationships, to recast Anglo-American relations as being special but not exclusive.

Conclusion

Ford's administration was brief, but it proved pivotal in restoring confidence not only in the American presidency after Watergate and Vietnam but also in Anglo-American relations. Indeed, towards the end of Ford's time in Office, Prime Minister Callaghan predicted that 'history will be generous for the way in which he [Ford] steadied a troubled nation through very difficult times and gave it back the self-confidence and self-respect that is vital to the well-being of the world'.¹⁸⁰ This judgement has been slow to manifest, but in terms of Anglo-American relations at least it is now clear both that Ford did much more to rejuvenate them than hitherto credited and that by examining the special relationship through a lens of mutually supportive functional, cultural and performative domains, this rejuvenation cannot be understood solely through shifts in strategic interests or policy outcomes. It also depended upon the restoration of trust, consultation, symbolic affirmation, and shared habits of cooperation.

Arguably Ford's most important contribution stemmed from his beliefs in personal relationships and a more open policy style than his predecessor. This was vital to UK-US relations because it helped restore meaningful consultation and cooperation to the multiple layers of their entwined bureaucracies. Herein Ford deserves much credit, for example, for his personal investment in restoring the credibility and utility of the US Embassy in London. Similarly, administrative changes weakened Kissinger's dominance over foreign policy without losing his talents—something much valued by the British, who regarded him generally as a good friend, but whose working practices sometimes generated much confusion and frustration. Some Anglo-American disagreements inevitably persisted but by restoring habits of consultation, confidence, and mutual accommodation these could be managed more constructively.

The investments in personal relationships clearly paid dividends in the functional domains of Anglo-American relations. Ford knew that Britain's parlous economic condition rendered defence cuts inevitable. The task was to minimise these overall and ensure that all critical capabilities were preserved as best possible. It is evident that in doing this the Ford administration developed *de facto* collusion with key British officials who it identified as sympathetic to defence spending. Herein Hunt, Mason and Callaghan were key in London, as in Washington was how Ramsbotham reported US opinions. Expressions of strong US opposition to cuts and warnings for Anglo-American relations gave these officials traction in internal debates. Indications of US priorities and possibilities to burdenshare gave them issues on which they might concede without damaging UK-US relations. As for Cyprus, relations between Kissinger and Callaghan were particularly important, and Ford was instrumental in calming their tensions in mid-August 1974 – both directly and because his honeymoon period in office was one the British wanted to capitalise upon to reset Anglo-American relations. While a solution was not forthcoming, both sides were relatively content in how they ultimately cooperated to minimise damage to the Alliance caused by both the conflict and Congress.

Finally, Ford understood the growing importance of soft power and of culture in political life, including the Anglo-American special relationship. His invitation of Thatcher to the White House and appointment of Armstrong as Ambassador to London reflected an appreciation of shifting ideas about gender roles and political representation. Similarly, he appreciated that hosting Peter Frampton and George Harrison at the White House might appeal especially to younger voters who were most immersed in a shared Anglo-American musical culture. However, it is his use of the Bicentennial that was most important to the special relationship. Ford used cultural diplomacy and public performance to help establish a repertoire through which to reaffirm the special relationship. In doing so he helped create a more favourable public environment for continued cooperation during a politically sensitive period. He also contributed to a discursive shift away from exclusive Anglo-American relations of the past to their being the most special of America's special relationships. As Ford and Queen Elizabeth II testified, their quality was undiminished, Britain remained embedded in the fabric of America, and the special relationship would continue as an exemplar to the wider world.

Notes

1. Hersh, *The Price of Power*; and Isaacson, *Kissinger*, 643.
2. Scholarly neglect of Ford is broadly evidenced in studies of Anglo-American relations during the 1970s. Histories of the Labour governments of Harold Wilson (March 1974–March 1976) and James Callaghan (March 1976–May 1979) understandably focus primarily on Britain's domestic political and economic challenges, including renegotiation of membership of the European Communities (EC) and the 1976 International Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis; see, for example, Burk and Cairncross, *Goodbye Great Britain*; Dell, *A Hard Pounding*; Wass, *Decline to Fall*; Hickson and Seldon, eds., *New Labour, Old Labour*; Crines and Hickson, eds., *Harold Wilson*; Beckett, *When the Lights Went Out*; Holmes, *The Labour Government, 1974–79*; Black, Pemberton, and Thane, eds., *Reassessing 1970s Britain*. Studies of Anglo-American relations, meanwhile, have concentrated predominantly on the breakdown of relations under Nixon, the Carter administration's approach to the alliance, or the Reagan–Thatcher relationship; e.g. Scott, *Allies Apart*; Petersen, *Richard Nixon, Great Britain and the Anglo-American Alignment*; Hynes, *The Year That Never Was*; Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher*; Cooper, *Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan*; Aldous, *Reagan and Thatcher*; Wapshott, *Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher*; Treharne, *Reagan and Thatcher's Special Relationship*. Broader surveys likewise devote comparatively little attention to the Ford administration; see, for example, McKercher, *Britain, America, and the Special Relationship*; Cooper, *The Politics of Diplomacy*; Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*; Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations*; and Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century*.
3. Robb, *A Strained Partnership*, 11, 12.
4. Rumsfeld, *When the Centre Held*, xii–xiii; and O'Neill cited in The Hill: A lesson in bipartisan-ship from former President Ford | U.S. House of Representatives
5. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism*, 179; See also Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed*; Mieczkowski, *Gerald Ford*; and Culley and Marsh, "Steering the Unwieldy Barge."
6. Marsh, "Re-imaging in Search of 'Specialness.'"
7. Iriye, "Culture and International History," 215; and Hendershot and Marsh eds, *Culture Matters*.
8. For revisionist perspectives see Rossback, *Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship*; Hill and Lord, "The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government"; and Spelling, "Edward Heath and Anglo–American Relations."

9. Bundy, *A Tangled Web*; Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*; and Siniver, *Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign Policy Making*.
10. Handwritten note, December 28, 1973, FCO 82/435, United Kingdom National Archives (UKNA); and See also Spelling, "A Reputation for Parsimony to Uphold," 200.
11. Cromer to FCO, c. November 13, 1971, PREM 15/712, 10763422, UKNA.
12. Draft memo by Heath for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (not sent), November 6, 1971, PREM 15/712, 10763422, UKNA.
13. "The Essentials of an American Policy," March 21, 1944, FO 371/38523, UKNA.
14. H.R. Labouisse Jr. to Perkins, February 27, 1950, 4, Box 2768, RG 59, United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
15. Wilson, *A Personal Record*, 264.
16. Message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson, January 11, 1968, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. xxii, Western Europe, document 289.
17. See, for instance, To: The Secretary Through: S/S From INR—Thomas L. Hughes February 7, 1968, Subject: What Now for Britain? Wilson's Visit and Britain's Future, in Colman, "Communication," 350–60.
18. Bruce to Rusk, Folder: UK memos. Vol. xi, 4/67 – 6/67, Box 210–12, NSF Country File, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.
19. Alsop, "Death of an Alliance," *Newsweek*, January 6, 1969, FCO 63/348, UKNA.
20. Burke and Cairncross, "Good-bye Great Britain"; Dell, *A Hard Pounding*; and Beckett, *When the Lights Went Out*.
21. "A Declining Great Britain and the Anglo-American Relationship," US Embassy London, October 8, 1974, NARA, AAD. <https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=233682&dt=2474&dl=1345>.
22. Barthes, *Mythologies*; and Marsh, "Anglo-American Relations and the Past Present," 310–40.
23. Schmidt, "Democracy and Discourse," 285.
24. Presidents from Harry S. Truman to Barack Obama invoked U.S. special relationships with 22 countries other than the U.K. Written evidence submitted by Dr Andrew Mumford, TIA0002 – Evidence on Indispensable allies: US, NATO and UK Defence relations, <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/81597/html/>.
25. Marsh, "Public faces," 1–22.
26. Minute by A.A. Acland, March 5, 1974, PREM 16/291, UKNA; and Antony Acland (FCO) to Martin Charteris (Buckingham Palace), July 12, 1974, PREM 16/291, UKNA.
27. RT Armstrong (Downing Street) to Antony Acland (FCO), July 15, 1974, PREM 16/291, UKNA.
28. Hebel, *Britain, Détente, and the Helsinki CSCE*; Juneau, "The Limits of Linkage," 277–97; and Niedhart, "The Federal Republic's Ostpolitik," 289–311.
29. Sloan, "Managing the NATO alliance," 396–406.
30. Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe*; Schulz and Schwartz, *The Strained Alliance*; and Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration.
31. Scott, *Allies Apart*, 140–65; Hamilton, "Britain, France, and America's Year of Europe," 871–95; and Nichter, *Richard Nixon and Europe*.
32. Aldrich, *GCHQ*, 288–92.
33. Douglas Home to Kissinger, November 29, 1973, United Kingdom (12) 11/1/73 – 12/30/73, Box 26, Kissinger—Scowcroft West Wing Files 1969–76, National Security Advisor, Gerald Ford Library (GFL); and Miller, "The Euro-Arab Dialogue," 936–59.
34. Memo by Antony Acland, March 25, 1974, PREM 16/419, UKNA; and Richard Sykes to Brimelow, April 2, 1974, PREM 16/419, UKNA.
35. Ramsbotham to FCO, March 25, 1974, PREM 16/419, UKNA. Larres, *Uncertain Allies*.
36. Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Notes on the British: The Wilson Visit, January 29, 1975, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, volume e–15, part 2, 754.
37. Marsh, "Wilson, Callaghan and the Management of Anglo-American Relations," 26–51.

38. "President Ford," undated, T 354/406, UKNA; "United States: Annual Review for 1974," Ramsbotham to Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 31 December 1974, FCO 82/536, UKNA.
39. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.
40. Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*; Bartlett, *The Special Relationship*; and Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy*.
41. Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. 8, *Never Despair*, 415.
42. Reiners, "The Power of Interpersonal Relationships," 252–70; Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies*; and Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy*.
43. Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy," speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in commemoration of the Bicentenary of the Office of the Foreign Secretary, May 10, 1982. http://www.larouche.pub.com/other/2002/2901_kissinger.html.
44. "European/American relations," JT Masefield (Planning Staff) to McNally, August 8, 1975, FCO 82/558, UKNA.
45. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States*, 120.
46. Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement*; and Burton, *British-American Diplomacy*.
47. Dickie, "'Special' No More," 5.
48. Edward Heath, speech at Westminster, Salt Lake City, May 25, 1975, folder: James Callaghan, Box 275, Papers of Elliot Richardson, Library of Congress; Owen, "Britain and the United States," 63; and Ryan, "Culture and Re-membering," 243–70.
49. Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power*, 154; and Kissinger, *White House Years*, 90–91.
50. Cited in Perlstein, *Invisible Bridge*, 279.
51. Bush, *All the Best*, 196.
52. Ramsbotham to FCO, December 24, 1974, FCO 82/418, UKNA.
53. Memorandum of Conversation participants: Date and Time: Place: President Ford, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Tuesday, August 13, 1974, National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection, GFL, <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552748.pdf>.
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55. Ramsbotham to Callaghan, November 24, 1975, FCO 82/541, UKNA.
56. Greenstock minute, December 2, 1975, FCO 82/555, UKNA. Kissinger also noted of Rumsfeld's move that "The guy that cut me up inside this building isn't going to cut me up any less in Defence." Telcon Kissinger and Simon, November 3, 1975, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB263/19751103-simon.pdf>.
57. Ramsbotham to FCO, November 4, 1975; FCO 82/540, UKNA.
58. Schmitz, *Brent Scowcroft*, 42–60; and Sparrow, *The Strategist*.
59. Ford to Wilson, August 9, 1974, PREM 16/292, UKNA; Kissinger Memorandum for the Vice President, NSA Presidential Transition File, GFL. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0353/1555891.pdf>.
60. President Ford, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Wednesday, August 14, 1974, National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection, GFL. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552749.pdf>.
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64. The closeness of Ford's relationship with Callaghan is widely referenced in the literature. For instance: Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, 94; Morgan, *Callaghan*, 438–39; and Carter, "Gerald Ford," 252–54.
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66. Memorandum of conversation, 11am to 12.50 pm, January 30, 1975, 1/17/74 – 1/31/75, file United Kingdom (19), Box 26, West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Kissinger—Scowcroft, NSA files, GFL.
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69. Wilson cited in Fred Emery, "White House fetes Mr Wilson," *The Times*, January 31, 1975, 4.
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77. Kissinger to Ford, undated, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 6, FO 2/CO 160, GFL.
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80. Cited in "Anne Armstrong" *The Telegraph*, July 31, 2008, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/2481470/Anne-Armstrong.html>.
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84. Spiers to Lord, January 31, 1975, Folder: Ronald Spiers, Box 294, Papers of Elliot Richardson, Library of Congress.
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86. "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey," 5 June 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 54.
87. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin), July 15, 1974, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Vol. 30, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, 83.

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90. "Hardline attitudes by Turkey," 10 August 1974, Memorandum by Warburton, FCO 9/2151, UKNA.
91. Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger to assistant secretary Hartman, August 10, 1974, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing office Files, 1969–1977, Box 8, Cyprus (34), 8/11/74, GFL; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 228.
92. Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, 351.
93. The constitutional settlement was based upon five well defined Turkish-Cypriot regions constituting 32.5% of the island.
94. "The Geneva Conference on Cyprus," August 11, 1974, Record of Telephone Conversation between James Callaghan and Joseph Sisco, FCO 9/1922, UKNA.
95. Message from Secretary of State for Assistant Secretary Hartman, August 10, 1974, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 8 Cyprus (3) 8/11/74, GFL.
96. "From Kissinger for Assistant Secretary Hartman," August 10, 1974, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 8, Cyprus (34), GFL.
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98. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, August 10, 1974, *FRUS*, Vol. XXX, 127.
99. Record of a Telephone Conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States, August 14, 1974, PREM 16/20, UKNA.
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105. See, for instance, Memorandum of Conversation, February 3, 1975, National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation, Box 9, GFL, 3.
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107. "The Secretary's Breakfast meeting with Gunes," September 30, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files 1974–1977, Box 21, USUN (State Department Telegrams to Secstate, NODIS) 2, GFL.
108. "British Policy on Cyprus: July to September 1974," January 14, 1976, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Southern European Department, Callaghan Box 142, Cyprus July/Aug 1975, Foreign Office, Cyprus, Bodleian Library; Asmussen, *War in Cyprus*, 268.
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114. "Extract from Meeting PM/PRES Ford," May 30, 1975, PREM 16/321, UKNA; "Brief for the Prime Minister's Meeting with Dr Schlesinger- the State of the Alliance," September 24, 1975, PREM 16/733, UKNA.
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122. Note by the Secretaries "International Consultation," October 18, 1974, Annex 1 – Consultation with the Americans, draft steering brief, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, CAB 148/145, UKNA.
123. Record of Conversation between Secretary of the Cabinet and the American Secretary of State at State Dept, April 26, 1974, PREM 16/27, UKNA.
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129. Mainwaring and Aldrich, "The Secret Empire," 54–71.
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