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# An Analysis of Markos Eugenikos' *Syllogistic Chapters Against the Latins On the Holy Spirit's Procession from the Father Alone*

Ewan Davies | ORCID: 0009-0009-6487-9206

Cardiff University Cardiff, Cardiff, UK

daviesEO@cardiff.ac.uk

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## Abstract

I aim to demonstrate that Eugenikos' Trinitarian theology, especially concerning the doctrine of the Holy Spirit's procession, is strongly grounded in the Patristic and Medieval Hellenophone Trinitarian traditions. I especially examine one of Eugenikos' most important polemical works concerning this aspect of Trinitarian theology, his *Syllogistic Chapters Against the Latins on the Holy Spirit's Procession from the Father Alone*, which was likely produced between 1437 and 1438, as part of Markos' role as leader of a small group of experts commissioned by Emperor John VIII to prepare texts before to the Council of Ferrara-Florence. I show throughout this article that Markos commonly evoked the Church Fathers to support his arguments, including the Cappadocian Fathers, Ioannes Chrysostomos, Maximos the Confessor, Pseudo Dionysios, and Kyrillos of Alexandria. However, Markos also betrays a likely influence from Medieval Hellenophone polemicists against the filioque, including Photios, Niketas of Byzantium, Eustratios of Nicaea, and Nikolaos of Methone.

## Keywords

Markos Eugenikos Filioque Council of Ferrara-Florence

Markos Eugenikos (1392–1444) was one of the foremost Byzantine theologians during the fifteenth century, and was one of the leading members of the Byzantine Imperial contingent which met at the General Council held in Ferrara and then in Florence between 1438 and 1439. Amongst other things, this Council sought to restore ecclesiastical union between the Latin Church and the Byzantine Imperial Church after nearly four centuries of schism. While he was at first affirming of the notion of ecclesiastical reunion with the Latin Church, Markos gradually became opposed to this notion, particularly in the course of the proceedings of the Council of Ferrara-Florence, and he declined to subscribe to *Laetentur Caeli*, the bull of ecclesial union issued by the Council on July 6th, 1439. Following the Council, Markos became one of the principal opponents within the Hellenophone world to the Florentine Reunion, which was implemented by the Byzantine Emperor Ioannes VIII Palaiologos, but which disintegrated following the Ottoman Conquest of Constantinople in 1453, and the Florentine Reunion was formally revoked in a local synod held within Constantinople in c.1482–1484.<sup>1</sup>

In this article, I aim to demonstrate Eugenikos' Trinitarian theology, especially as it concerns the doctrine of the Holy Spirit's procession, has a strong basis in the Patristic and Medieval Hellenophone Trinitarian traditions. I especially examine one of Eugenikos' most important polemical works concerning this aspect of Trinitarian theology, his *Syllogistic Chapters Against the Latins on the Holy Spirit's Procession from the Father Alone*,<sup>2</sup> which was likely produced between 1437 and 1438, as part of Markos' role as leader of a small group of experts commissioned by Emperor John VIII to prepare texts, particularly relating to the *filioque*, Papal Primacy, and the distinction

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- 1 For further studies of Markos' life and work, particularly his involvement in the Council of Ferrara-Florence, see Nicholas Conostas, "Mark Eugenikos," in: Carmelo Giuseppe Conticello, Vassa Conticello, eds., *La théologie byzantine et sa tradition*, Vol. 2 of 2. Turnhout, 2002, pp. 411–475; Ewan Davies, "Mark of Ephesus (1392–1444): Revisiting the Sources on His Life and Work," *JLARC* 19:1 (2024), 18–54; Joseph Gill, *Personalities of the Council of Florence and Other Essays*. London, 1964, pp. 55–64; Venance Grumel, "Marc d'Éphèse. Vie – Écrits – Doctrine," *Estudios Franciscanos* 36 (1926), 425–448; Constantine Tsirpanlis, *Mark Eugenikos and the Council of Florence: A Historical Re-Evaluation of His Personality*. New York, 1979; Nikolaos P. Vasiliadis, *Ο Άγιος Μάρκος ὁ Εὐγενικός καὶ ἡ ἑνωσις τῶν Ἐκκλησιῶν*. Athens, 1972. For the Council of Constantinople of c.1482–1484, see *Concilium Constantinopolitanum*, a. 1484, in: Symeon Paschalidis, ed., *Concilium Oecumenicorum Generaliumque Decreta*, Vol. 4:1. Turnhout, 2016, pp. 225–228.
  - 2 See Markos Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica Adversus Latinos de Spiritu Sancti ex Solo Patre Processione*, Louis Petit, ed., PO 17. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1907, pp. 368–415.

between God's essence and His energies,<sup>3</sup> in the lead-up to the Council of Ferrara-Florence.<sup>4</sup>

Regarding the structure of the work, Markos employed a strongly logical format, whose nature I elucidate in this article. This method closely resembles the method of earlier polemical works against the *filioque* like those of Photios and Niketas of Byzantium's *Syllogistic Chapters Against the Latins*. I demonstrate the possible influence of such authors on Markos' own arguments below. The length of the 56 syllogistic arguments varies, but many of the main arguments address particular issues and can be analysed in their own right. Markos evidently believed that his syllogistic method was a potent one, as indicated by the fact that he produced a number of significant works under this method.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, I show throughout this article that Markos commonly evoked the Church Fathers to support his arguments. In particular, I show that some of the Fathers whom Markos frequently evoked to support his general defence of the doctrine of the Spirit's procession from the Father alone include the Cappadocian Fathers, Ioannes Chrysostomos, Maximos the Confessor, Pseudo-Dionysios, and Kyrillos of Alexandria. However, I also demonstrate that Markos also betrays a likely influence from several Medieval Hellenophone polemicists against the *filioque*, including Photios, Niketas of Byzantium, Eustratios of Nicaea, and Nikolaos of Methone.

- 3 Cf. Sylvestros Syropoulos, *Les mémoires du grand ecclésiarque de l'Église de Constantinople Sylvestre Syropoulos sur le Concile de Florence (1438–1439)*, III.10, ed. and French trans. by Vitalien Laurent. Paris, 1971, p. 170; Manuel of Corinth, *Manuelis Magni Rhetoris Liber de Marco*, ed. by Louis Petit. *PO* 17, p. 520; Alexander Schmemmann, "St. Mark of Ephesus and the Theological Conflicts in Byzantium," *svtq* 1 (1957), 11–24 (17).
- 4 John Monfasani, "The Pro-Latin Apologetics of the Greek Émigrés to Quattrocento Italy," in: Antonio Rigo, ed., *Byzantine Theology and Its Philosophical Background*. Turnhout, 2011, pp. 160–186 (167–168), posits that Markos had produced his *Syllogistic Chapters* and Georgios Scholarios had produced his *Response* to this work by 1438, as a result of their cooperation in this group, and that these texts are indicative of their research material. Cf. Georgios Scholarios, *Réponse aux Syllogismes de Marc d'Ephèse sur la procession de la Saint-Esprit*, Martin Jugie, Louis Petit, Xénophon Sidéridés, eds., *Oeuvres complètes*, Vol. 3. Paris, 1930, pp. 476–538. Davies, "Mark of Ephesus," 25. On Scholarios' life and work, cf. Marie-Hélène Blanchet, *Georges Gennadios Scholarios (vers 1400–vers 1472): Un intellectuel orthodoxe face à la disparition de L'Empire byzantine*. Paris, 2008.
- 5 See, e.g., Eugenikos, *Argumenta Decem Adversus Ignem Purgatorium*, Petit, ed., *PO* 17, pp. 422–425; Wilhelm Gass, ed., *Die Mystik des Nikolaus Cabasilas vom Leben in Christo*, Appendix 2: *Μάρκου ἀρχιεπισκόπου Ἐφέσου κεφάλαια συλλογιστικά κατὰ τῆς αἵρέσεως τῶν Ἀκινδυνιστῶν περὶ διακρίσεως θείας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας*. Leipzig: Alfred Lorentz, 1899, pp. 217–232. Cf. Michael Kunzler, "Die Florentiner Diskussion über das Filioque vom 14 März 1439 im Licht des Palamismus," *AHC* 21:2 (1989), 334–352, for an analysis of the background to the latter work.

Focusing now on Markos' arguments themselves, his first and key syllogism is that the Spirit's Personal mode of being is that He comes strictly from the Father. Markos used this notion to counter the doctrine that the Spirit eternally proceeds essentially from and has His existence comes from the Father and the Son as though from one origin/cause/principle.<sup>6</sup> Markos opposed this latter position on the basis that, on the one hand, it suggested that there are two intra-Trinitarian causes, while on the other hand, it obfuscates the Father's and Son's Personal properties (ιδιώματα). In his first argument, Markos recognised three doctrinal outcomes which Markos believed must be corollary to the Spirit proceeding from both the Father and the Son: Firstly, the Spirit proceeds from the *Persons* of the Father and Son. Secondly, the Spirit proceeds

6 This had been defined in *Concilium Lugdunense II* (1274), *Const. II*, Giuseppe Alberigo, Giuseppe A. Dossetti, Périclès-Pierre Joannou, Claudio Leonardi, Paulo Prodi, eds., *COD*. Bologna, 1973, p. 290, ll. 9–21. See Eustratios of Nicaea, *Ἐκθεσις τῆς γεγονυίας ἐνώπιον τοῦ Αὐτοκράτορος Κυρίου Ἀλεξίου τοῦ Κομνηνοῦ πρὸς Προσολάνον Ἀρχιεπίσκοπον Μεδιολάνων περὶ τῆς παναγίου Πνεύματος ἐκπορεύσεως, πρὸ τῶν ἀντιρρητικῶν ῥηθείσα*, Andronikos K. Demetrakopoulos, ed., *Εκκλησιαστικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη ἐμπεριέχουσα Ἑλλήνων θεολόγων συγγράμματα*, Vol. 1, Leipzig, 1866, p. 98, who alluded to this Latin position in his discourse with Archbishop Petrus Grossolanus of Milan in Constantinople in c.1112: "...ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐκ δύο ὡς ἐξ ἐνὸς διὰ τὸ οὐσίαν εἶναι μίαν Πατρός καὶ Υἱοῦ, πάλιν πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιθρομέθα. (...but even if [the Latins] speak of [the] two [Persons] as if they were one [i.e., one principle], since the essence of the Father and the Son is one, we will again oppose this.)" Peter Gemeinhardt, *Die Filioque-Kontroverse zwischen Ost- und Westkirche im Frühmittelalter*. Berlin, 2002, pp. 512–513. Likewise, Basil of Ohrid testified to this position when debating Anselm of Havelburg in 1154. Josef Schmidt, ed., *Des Basilii von Achrida, Erzbischofs von Thessalonich, bisher unedierte Dialoge. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des griechischen Schismas*. München, 1901, pp. 44, l. 19–45, l. 2. Gemeinhardt, *Filioque-Kontroverse*, p. 530, n. 61. One can find this principle in the *Tractatus Contra Graecos*, composed by an anonymous Dominican theologian in 1252. See *Tractatus Contra Graecos I*, ed. by Andrea Riedl. Turnhout, 2020, pp. 53, 119–54, 1134. This claim can be traced to Anselm of Canterbury, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, F. S. Schmitt, ed., *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, Vol. 2. Edinburgh, 1946, p. 204, ll. 17–20: "Nos non negamus nascentem aliquo modo procedere de illo de quo nascitur, et spiritum sanctum suo modo asserimus non quasi de duobus fontibus, sed vere de uno fonte procedere, ita tamen ut nomen nativitatis nec processio filii amittat nec spiritus sancti processio recipiat. (We do not deny that, in a certain way, the Son proceeds from the Father from whom He is begotten, and we posit the Holy Spirit proceeds in His own way not as though from two sources, but truly from one source, so that the Son's procession does not lose the name 'generation', nor does it become the Holy Spirit's procession.)" Gemeinhardt, *Filioque-Kontroverse*, p. 478, n. 313. However, some Later Medieval Hellenophone anti-filioquists opposed this view, arguing that it inevitably entails the introduction of two causes into the Trinity. See, e.g., Neilos Kabasilas, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti* 1.1.26, MS *Marcianus Graecus* 11.9, fols. 23<sup>v</sup>–24<sup>r</sup>. Konstantinos Liakouras, *Ἡ περὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος διδασκαλία τοῦ Νεῖλου Καβάσιλα*. Athens, 1997, pp. 258–259.

from the Father's and Son's common nature. Thirdly, the Spirit proceeds from the 'power of projection' common to the Father and Son.<sup>7</sup>

Markos countered each of these potential outcomes thus. Regarding the first outcome, Markos claimed that this outcome entails the existence of two intra-Trinitarian causes/principles/projectors', which would undermine the Father's status as the only intra-divine source.<sup>8</sup> Regarding the second outcome, Markos highlighted that this view does not have an historical antecedent, and it provides similar issues to the first outcome, given that any item that what emerges of the nature of multiple entities must emerge of their hypostases, which, according to Markos, are natures with their properties.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly,

7 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, cc. 1, 17, Petit, ed., *PO* 17, pp. 368, ll. 5–6, 369, ll. 1–11; 386, ll. 22–37, 387, ll. 1–16. Conostas, "Mark Eugenikos," pp. 441–442.

8 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.1, Petit, ed., p. 369, ll. 2–6: "Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὡς ἐκ δύο ὑποστάσεων, δύο ἀρχαὶ προδήλως καὶ δύο τὰ αἰτία ἐπὶ τῆς θείας Τριάδος καὶ δύο οἱ προβολεῖς, καὶ ἡ μοναρχία ἀνήρηται καὶ τὸ μόνον εἶναι πηγὴν τῆς ὑπερουσίας θεότητος τὸν Πατέρα. (But if [the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son] as though from two Hypostases, there will be two principles, causes, and projectors in the divine Trinity, and the [divine] monarchy and the notion that 'the Father is the only source of the beyond-essential Godhead' are abolished.)" Cf. Pseudo-Dionysios, *De Divinis Nominibus* 11.5, Beata Regina Suchla, ed., *Corpus Dionysiacum*, Vol. 1. Berlin/New York, 1990, p. 128, ll. 8–13.

9 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.1, Petit, ed., p. 369, ll. 6–14: "Εἰ δ' ὡς ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς αὐτῶν φύσεως, πρῶτον μὲν οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν ἤκουσται, δυοῖν ὑποστάσεων ἑτέραν ἐκπεφυκυῖαν ὑπόστασιν μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως ἔπειτα καὶ οὕτω πάλιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ περιεπεχθήσονται· ἡ γὰρ ὑπόστασις οὐδὲν ἑτερόν ἐστιν ἢ φύσις μετὰ τῶν ιδιωμάτων, ὥστε τὸ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως τινος ἢ τινων καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἢ τῶν ὑποστάσεων εἶναι ἀνάγκη... (But if [the Spirit's procession] is from their common nature, to begin, it has never been heard of until now, that when a [third] hypostasis comes forth from two hypostases, it is said to be not from them, but from the common nature. Therefore, we fall back to the initial position again. For a hypostasis is none other than a nature with properties. Thus, what is from the nature of this or that, it must also be from a hypostasis or hypostases.)" Previously, see (Pseudo-)Basil of Caesarea (Gregorios of Nyssa), *Letter* 38, Roy J. Deferrari, ed. and trans., *Letters*, Vol. 1 of 3: *Letters 1–58*. Cambridge, MA, 1926, p. 200: "Τοῦτο οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόστασις, οὐχ ἡ ἀόριστος τῆς οὐσίας ἔννοια, μηδεμίαν ἐκ τῆς κοινότητος τοῦ σηματομένου στάσιν εὐρίσκουσα, ἀλλ' ἡ τὸ κοινόν τε καὶ ἀπερίγραπτον ἐν τῷ τινὶ πράγματι διὰ τῶν ἐπιφαινομένων ιδιωμάτων παριστώσα καὶ περιγράφουσα..." English trans. from p. 201: "This, then, is subsistence or 'hypostasis' (person). It is, however, not the indefinite notion of 'ousia' (substance), which by reason of the generality of the term employed discloses no 'sistence'; it is the conception which, by means of the specific notes that it indicates, restricts and circumscribes in a particular thing what is general and uncircumscribed..." Ioannes Damaskenos, *Contra Jacobitas* 52, Bonifatius Kotter, ed., *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*, Vol. 4: *Liber de haeresibus. Opera polemica*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1981, p. 126, ll. 14–15: "Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπόστασις ἦτοι τὸ ἄτομον τῆς φύσεως φύσις, ἀλλὰ οὐ μόνον φύσις, ἀλλὰ μετὰ ιδιωμάτων... (For a hypostasis, i.e., an individual entity of [a given] nature, is a nature, but not solely a nature. it is a nature endowed with properties...)"

the Holy Spirit would absurdly cause and come forth from Himself, as He communes with His nature.<sup>10</sup>

Nevertheless, addressing the third potential outcome of the *filioque*, if the Holy Spirit comes forth from the common power to project of the Father and Son, one is led to inquire into the nature of this power: whether this power is the Father's and Son's common divine nature or another item? Assuming this power is the former, similar issues would emerge as those of the second outcome. Alternately, assuming this power is different to the common nature, those advocating the Spirit's dual procession have therefore impossibly enabled an item to be appended to God. Either way, the idea of the Spirit coming forth from a 'power of projection' cannot eschew the issue of there being two intra-Trinitarian causes. On this score, Markos claims that a human being begotten from a mother and father is either generated from the mother's and father's particular powers of generation, or it is begotten from a power of generation mutual to the two. In each instance, the person must come to be from two causes. Therefore, if He comes forth from the common 'projective power' of the Father and the Son, the Spirit would have two principles of His existence.<sup>11</sup>

10 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.1, p. 369, ll. 14–17: “πρὸς τῷ μὴδ’ ἀπλῶς εἶναι τῆς θείας φύσεως ἴδιον τὸ προβάλλειν· ἡ γὰρ ἂν καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα προέβαλλεν ἕτερον ἢ ἑαυτό, τῆς αὐτῆς κοινωνοῦν φύσεως. (Moreover, the property of projection does not simply belong to the divine nature. Otherwise the Spirit, given that He communes in the same [divine] nature, would project another as well as Himself.)” Constat, “Mark Eugenikos,” p. 442.

11 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.1, Petit, ed., pp. 369, l. 18–370, l. 5: “Εἰ δὲ ἐκ τῆς προβλητικῆς δυνάμεως, ζητητέον, τίς αὐτῇ ἢ προβλητικῇ δυνάμει, καὶ εἰ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν φύσιν ἢ ἡ αὐτή. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτῇ τῇ φύσει, πάλιν οἱ αὐτοὶ λόγοι τὰς αὐτὰς ἐπιφέροντες ἀτοπίας· εἰ δὲ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν φύσιν, ἥδη μὲν συνεχώρησαν ἕτερόν τι τῷ Θεῷ προσεῖναι τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως, ὅπερ ἐν ἄλλοις διαλεγόμενοι μᾶλλον ἂν ἔλαιντο τὰς γλώσσας προσέειναι ἢ ὡς ὁμολογούμενον δέξασθαι· ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἀτοπον, ἕτερον τι παρὰ τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἀποτελεστικὸν εἶναι φύσεως θείας εἴτ’ οὖν ὑποστάσεως; Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὕτω πάλιν τὰς δύο ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἐκφεύξονται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεννώμενον ἐκ τῆς γεννητικῆς αὐτῶν δυνάμεως πρόεισιν, ἡ δὲ τῆς γεννητικῆς δυνάμεως, ἣτις ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς κοινή, κἂν διαφέρῃ τοῖς τρόποις· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἥττον ἐκ δύο τέ ἐστιν ὑποστάσεων καὶ δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γενέσεως, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τις ὅλως ἀρνήσασθαι τοῦτο τολμήσειεν. Ὡστε καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, εἴπερ ἐκ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ πρόεισι διὰ τῆς προβλητικῆς δυνάμεως, δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔξει τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὑπάρξεως. (Finally, if [the Spirit proceeds] from the [common] projective power, it is asked what this projective power is, i.e., whether it is the same or different from the [divine] nature. However, if [this projective power] is the same as the [divine] nature, the same arguments lead to the same absurdities reemerging. But if [this power] is different from [the divine] nature, they [the Latins] already concede that something else exists in God apart from His nature, which, were they to dispute this with others, they would rather have their tongues tied than accept it as a matter of fact. Thus, is it not absurd to admit that there is something else apart from the divine nature, which perfects the divine nature or [the divine] Hypostasis? Indeed, even then, one could not evade there being two principles. For what is begotten of a father and

Seeking to overcome the imputation of the Spirit having two causes, Markos' opponents sought to account for how a plurality of principles could be or operate as a single principle. For instance, when they bring the cosmos into existence, the three divine Persons both act as one demiurgic power, according to which there is one cause and principle of the universe, not three. Likewise, one could posit that, with regards to the Spirit, the Father and Son act as one projective power. This would ostensibly overcome the issue of there being two intra-Trinitarian causes:

But it is said that creatures which come to be from the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit through their creative power are from one God and Creator, and they have one principle, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Thus, what prevents the Holy Spirit, while proceeding from the Father and Son as though from one God and projector, from also having one principle, the Father and the Son?<sup>12</sup>

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a mother comes forth from their [the father's] generating faculty of generating or through their [the mother's] generating faculty, which is common to both, although these differ in mode. However, [what is begotten] comes forth from two hypostases, and thereby had two generative principles, and no one would deny this entirely. Thus, the Holy Spirit, if He proceeds from the Father and the Son by a [common] projective power], will have two principles of His existence.)" See also *Capita Syllogistica*, c.40, pp. 407, l. 34–408, l. 14: "Ἦρετο μέ τις τῶν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐκπεσόντων καὶ τῶν Λατίνων ὑπερμαχοῦντων εἰ μὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ τινος διὰ τινος φυσικῶς προϊόν, αἴτιον ἔχει τὸ δι' οὐ πρόεισιν; Ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτὸν ἀντηρόμην, εἰ μὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ τινος διὰ τινος φυσικῶς προϊόν, δύο ἔχει τὰ αἴτια τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὑπάρξεως, τὸ τε ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' οὐ πρόεισι; Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνδρὸς διὰ γυναικὸς γεννώμενος, ὡς φησιν ὁ Ἀπόστολος, δύο ἔχει τὰ αἴτια, τὸν πατέρα δηλονότι καὶ τὴν μητέρα· καὶ ὁ Ἰσακὼς ἐκ τοῦ Ἀβραάμ διὰ τοῦ Ἰσαὰκ γεννηθεὶς, δύο ἔχει τὰ αἴτια, τὸ μὲν ἑγγιον, τὸ δὲ πορρώτερον, τὸν πατέρα δηλαδὴ καὶ τὸν πάππον. Εἰ οὖν τοῖς ἐξ ἡμῶν παραδείγμασι τὴν ἑαυτῶν κρατύνειν πειρῶνται θεολογίαν, ὁμολογεῖτωσαν καὶ τὰ δύο αἴτια καὶ τὰς δύο ἀρχάς, καὶ μὴ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπόμενα τοῖς οἰκείοις λόγοις ἀρνεῖσθωσαν. (One of those who had fallen away and who defends the Latins asked me whether everything that naturally comes forth from something through something does not have as its cause that through which it comes forth. Nevertheless, I subsequently inquired of them if everything that naturally comes forth from something through something else does not have two principles of its existence, i.e., one from which it comes forth and another through which it comes forth. For, as the Apostle says, a man, born from a man through a woman [Cf. 1 Cor. 11:12], has two causes, i.e., the father and mother; whereas Jacob, born of Abraham through Isaac, has two causes, one proximate, the other more remote, i.e., the father and grandfather. Therefore, if they wish to support their theology with examples drawn from what occurs amongst us, they should also confess two causes and two principles, and not reject what necessarily follows from their arguments.)" Constanas, "Mark Eugenikos," p. 442.

12 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.1, p. 370, ll. 6–14: "«Ἀλλ' ἡ κτίσις, φασίν, ἐκ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος οὐσα, διὰ τῆς δημιουργικῆς τούτων δυνάμεως ἐξ ἑνός τέ ἐστι Θεοῦ καὶ δημιουργοῦ, καὶ μιαν ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα. Τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ

Markos countered this attempt to analogise the Trinitarian Persons operating in common in the economy and the eternal relations between the divine Persons by highlighting that this assertion is Pneumatomachian in that it renders the Spirit as created.<sup>13</sup> Markos reasoned that if the Spirit and the cosmos are projected in similar modes, the Spirit must therefore be created. One could posit that items that creatures which were brought forth from a plurality of items by reason of creation come forth from a single principle. This principle pertains to the creation of the cosmos by all the Trinitarian Persons in common,<sup>14</sup> and of things which are created by humans. However, Markos claims that this axiom does not pertain to items that have a *natural* relation with their causes/principles/sources. Such items could not be dependent upon a plurality of causes as two different causes could not possibly share a single mode of producing items:

τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα ἐκ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ προερχόμενον ὡς ἐξ ενός τε εἶναι Θεοῦ καὶ προβολέως καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸν Υἱόν;» See also *Capita Syllogistica*, c.24, p. 393, ll. 7–17: “Ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς ἐν αἴτιον τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος οἱ Λατῖνοι φασιν. Ἐρωτήσωμεν οὖν αὐτούς· Ὡςπερ ὁ Πατὴρ μόνος ἐν αἴτιον τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς ἐν αἴτιον, ἢ ἄλλως; Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω φήσουσιν, ὁ δὲ Πατὴρ μόνος ἐν πρόσωπον, ἔσται καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς ἐν πρόσωπον καὶ συναλοιφῇ Σαβέλλειος ἐπεισῆλθεν. Εἰ δὲ ἄλλως μὲν ὁ Πατὴρ μόνος ἐν αἴτιον, ἄλλως δὲ ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς, μὴ λανθανέτωσαν ἑαυτούς δύο αἴτια καὶ ἀρχαὶ δύο, κὰν μὴ θέλωσιν, ἐπεισάγοντες. (The Latins claim that the Father and Son are one cause of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, let us inquire of them: If the Father alone is the one cause of the Holy Spirit, are the Father and Son one cause or not? For if they affirm thus, given that the Father alone is one Person, then the Father and Son together will also be one Person, and the confusion of Sabellios creeps in. Conversely, if they say the Father alone is the cause in one way, and the Father and Son in another way, let them be attentive to the fact that they are therefore latently introduce two causes and two principles, even if they wish otherwise.)” Conostas, “Mark Eugenikos,” p. 443.

13 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.1, p. 370, ll. 16–17. One can also find this imputation in *Capita Syllogistica*, cc.45, 46, 56, pp. 410, ll. 24–25, 411, ll. 9–11, 415, ll. 3–4. For an insightful and fairly recent study of the fourth-century Pneumatomachian controversy, cf. Giulio Maspero, “Different Strategies of the Greek Fathers Against the Pneumatomachians,” *Vox Patrum* 68 (2018), 193–215.

14 Cf. *Capita Syllogistica*, c.41, p. 408, ll. 15–29, within which Markos highlighted the cosmos was created by the demiurgic will shared by all three divine Persons, not the divine essence or a particular Person. Thus, one could posit that the cosmos has a single cause: “Καὶ πῶς, φησὶν, ἡ κτίσις ἐκ Πατρὸς δι’ Υἱοῦ ἐν ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι τὸ εἶναι λαβοῦσα, οὐ τρία ἔχει τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ’ ἐν αἴτιον καὶ ἓνα δημιουργόν; - Ἡ κτίσις, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔφην, οὔτε ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας εἰρηται τοῦ Πατρὸς ἢ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, οὔτε μὴν ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς θελήσεως καὶ δυνάμεως, ἥτις ἐστὶ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ τῶν τριῶν· ὅθεν καὶ τὸν ἓνα Θεὸν αἴτιον ἔχει καὶ δημιουργόν. Τὸ δὲ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως εἰρηται τοῦ Πατρὸς· εἰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἐστὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καθ’ ὑμᾶς, δύο ὑποστάσεις αἰτίας ἔχον, δύο αἰτίας καὶ δύο ἀρχὰς ἔξει πάντως, εἰ μὴ μεθύομεν. Μὴ οὖν ἀνοικεῖοις παραδείγμασι χρῆσθε πάλιν· ἡ γὰρ κτίσις οὐ φυσικῶς, ἀλλὰ δημιουργικῶς ἐκ Θεοῦ.”

O good man, you save us from all trouble when you regard the Holy Spirit as a creature, and you openly declare yourself to be Pneumatomachian. For if creation comes forth from the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, what else will the Holy Spirit be but a creature? But I, conversely, turning this argument on its head, shall say more piously that, just as creation is [originated] in this way, the Holy Spirit is not [originate] as such. For although it is true that creation, having come into being from two or more [causes], may be said to have come into being from one [causes], in relation to the notion of creation, not only in the case of the Divine creation, in which there is one and the same counsel, will, wisdom, power, and activity, but also in the case of human creations and in our own [creation]. For the notion of art is one in its various aspects, and all the arts are one, and in this sense, that which comes into being from many [things] is, so to speak, derived from one [cause] and has a single principle. But no one would ever say that that which naturally derives its existence from two things comes wholly from one; for it is impossible for each [of these two things] to have the same mode of bringing items into being...<sup>15</sup>

Markos' Latin counterparts responded by accepting that the Spirit does come forth from the Father and from the Son in distinct ways, as He comes forth 'proximately/immediately' from the Father and 'remotely/mediately' from the Son. Additionally, the two principles of the Spirit (Father and Son) relate to one another in a manner that one of the principles, i.e., the Son, is subject to the other, thus acting as one principle. According to Markos' interlocutors, Gregorios of Nazianzus referred to this in his *Forty-Fifth Oration* when describing "the principle from the principle."<sup>16</sup>

15 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.1, p. 370, ll. 15–36: "Ἀπὸ ἡλλὰξας ἡμᾶς πραγμάτων, ὧ βέλτιστε, τοῖς κτίσμασι συντάξας τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον καὶ Πνευματομάχον καθαρώς ἑαυτὸν ἀποφίνας. Εἰ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἢ τε κτίσις ἐκ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ, τί γε ἄλλο ἢ κτίσμα τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον; Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοὶ τούναντίον ἀναστρέψας, εὐσεβεστέρως ἐρώ, ὡς ἐπείπερ ἡ κτίσις οὕτως, οὐχ οὕτω τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ δημιουργικῶς ἐκ δύο καὶ πολλῶν γενόμενον ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐξ ἐνὸς γεγονέναι πρὸς τὸν δημιουργικὸν ἀφορῶντας λόγον, οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῆς θείας δημιουργίας, καθ' ἣν μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ βουλὴ καὶ θελήσις καὶ σοφία καὶ δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς. Εἰς γὰρ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν διαφόροις τεχνίταις ὁ τεχνικὸς λόγος καὶ ἡ τεχνίται, ἐν εἰσι πάντες· καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν γενόμενον ἐξ ἐνὸς ἔστιν εἰπεῖν γενοέναι καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν. Τὸ δὲ φυσικῶς ἐκ δύο τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἔχον οὐκ ἂν τις ὅλως ἐξ ἐνὸς εἴποι ποτέ· καὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ εἶναι συμβάλλειν..." Constat, "Mark Eugenikos," p. 443.

16 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.1, Petit, ed., pp. 370, ll. 37–371, l. 7: "καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ Λατῖνοι λέγουσι, διάφορον εἶναι τὴν ἐκ Πατρὸς τοῦ Πνεύματος πρόοδον τῆς ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ τὴν μὲν

Before Markos, in his own *Syllogistic Chapters*, Niketas of Byzantium argued that the notion of the Son having a mediatory role in the Spirit's procession could not be sustained. Niketas maintained that all can accept that the Father, as the origin in the Godhead, is the cause of the Son and the Spirit, for the Son through generation, for the Spirit through procession. Thus, concerning causation, it is not permissible that the Father has anything in common with both the Son and Spirit. However, if one assumes that the Son also causes the Spirit, this means that the Son too, alongside the Father, is ascribed the property of causation. In this case, Niketas inquired, how could the Son share with the Father the characteristic of being a cause, which concurrently is understood to be a distinguishing feature of the Son's relation to the Father as the Son is also caused (through generation) by the Father. For Niketas, this leads to a logical contradiction.<sup>17</sup>

ἄμεσον εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἔμμεσον· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν ἐκφύγοιεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὰς δύο ἀρχάς, εἰ μὴ μέλοισιν ἐτέροις πλείοσιν ἀτόποις περιπεσεῖσθαι. «Καὶ τί κωλύει,» φασί, «δύο μὲν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, τὴν μέντοι ἐτέραν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τὴν ἐτέραν, ὥστε καὶ οὕτω μίαν εἶναι τὰς δύο; Τοῦτο δὲ που καὶ ὁ Θεολόγος Γρηγόριος εὐρηται λέγων· Ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή». (Thus, the Latins themselves concede that the Spirit comes forth in one manner from the Father, [and] in another manner from the Son, coming forth immediately from one, [and] mediately from the other. Therefore, they cannot evade there being two principles, unless they wish to lapse into many other absurdities. However, they say, what prevents there from being two principles, one nevertheless subject to the other such that there becomes one [principle] from the two? Gregorios the Theologian himself is found to have said in a certain place: 'The principle from the principle.')

"Gregorios of Nazianzus, *Oratio 45*, 9, PG 36, col. 633c. Cf. Constanas, "Mark Eugenikos," pp. 443–444.

- 17 Niketas of Byzantium, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.12, Hergenröther, ed., pp. 115–116: "Ἐτι εἰ ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ καθὼ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τοῦ παντός ἐστὶ τε καὶ λέγεται, ἡγουν κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον εἴτουν δημιουργικόν, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ παντός, εἴπερ εἰς θεὸς μετὰ πατρός ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ θεολογεῖται καὶ καλῶς παρὰ τῶν εὐσεβῶν πιστεύεται· ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα θεϊκὴ ἐνέργεια μία τις ἐστίν, ἐκ πατρὸς μὲν ἐφορμῶσα καὶ δι' υἱοῦ ἐνεργουμένη καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ τελειουμένη, ὅθεν καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐκ πατρὸς δι' υἱοῦ δεδημιούργηται καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ τὴν τελείωσιν ἔσχε· καὶ γὰρ δεῖ νοεῖν πρῶτον μὲν τὴν προκαταρκτικὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων τὸν πατέρα, τὴν δημιουργικὴν τὸν υἱόν, τὴν τελειωτικὴν τὸ πνεῦμα, ὥστε δηλοῦν· τὸ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ καθὼ αἰτία καὶ ἀρχὴ ἡγουν ποιητικὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ παντός καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πανάγιον πνεῦμα κοινωνεῖ· καθὼ δὲ αἰτία καὶ ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, τοῦτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀχρόνως καὶ ἀπαθῶς καὶ συναϊδίως προελθόντων, καὶ οἷον εἰπεῖν πηγὴν ὄντα τὸν θεὸν καὶ πατέρα καὶ ὥς ἐκ πηγῆς ἐκείθεν ἐνυποστάτως πηγάζοντα οὐ δημιουργικῶς (ἄπαγε τῆς ἀσεβείας) ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὥς γέννημα, τὸ δὲ ὥς πρόβλημα, διαστέλλεται δὲ καὶ διακρίνεται τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος διὰ τὰ ταῦτα αἰτιατῶς τὸ εἶναι ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχειν, τὸν μὲν γεννητῶς, τὸ δὲ ἐκπορευτῶς, τὸν δὲ θεὸν καὶ πατέρα ἀναιτίως καὶ ἀνάρχως τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα. Εἰ οὖν κατὰ τοῦτο δέδοκται τοῖς καλῶς καὶ εὐσεβῶς νοεῖν ἐθέλουσι περὶ τῶν θεαρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων ὁ πατὴρ καθὼ αἰτία καὶ ἀρχὴ φυσικὴ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐστὶ διαστελλόμενος καὶ διαιρούμενος, ἢ οὕτως εἶπω, ἀδιαιρέτως, οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ κατὰ ταῦτ' κοινωνεῖν τῷ υἱῷ καὶ τῷ πνεύματι· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν οἷς κοινωνεῖ τῷ υἱῷ καὶ τῷ πνεύματι οὐ πέφυκε τὸ παράπαν διαστέλλεσθαι

Within the broader context of the High and Late Medieval *filioque* controversies, some mid-to-late thirteenth century Hellenophone theologians more receptive to the dual procession attempted to overcome this principle by regarding the Spirit's sending by the Son as a property median between the essential and Hypostatic properties in the Godhead. For example, in his *First Antirrhetical Oration*, written to counter the *Tome* of the Synod of Blachernae of 1285,<sup>18</sup> Konstantinos Meliteniotes argued:

For if the Son does not by nature mediate between the Father and the Spirit, then He inevitably stands in opposition to the Father with regards to the Spirit, and the Only Begotten no longer remains in fact the Only Begotten, and the name "Spirit" is lost. There would also only be two brethren, the Spirit and the Son, and the Father would be the Father of both; and in this way, the monarchy the Trinity would not exist.<sup>19</sup>

Given this background, Markos called into question the idea of 'immediate/proximate' and 'mediate/remote' principles, that, according to Markos, could not function as a single principle because one is subject to the other. Instead, they would function as two as they are fundamentally distinct to one another.<sup>20</sup>

καὶ διαχωρίζεσθαι, οὕτως καὶ καθὸ τὴν διάκρισιν καὶ διαστολὴν πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἔχει ἀδύνατον κατὰ ταῦτὸ ἐπικοινωνεῖν. Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ἀποδεδείκται, ἀδύνατον τὸν υἱὸν αἵτιον εἶναι τοῦ πνεύματος, ἵνα ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐκπορευτῶς καθὼς καὶ ἐκ πατρὸς, ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει καθὸ ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ διακέκριται, κατ' ἐκεῖνο πάλιν ἐπικοινωνεῖν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πάντῃ ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀνακόλουθον, καὶ τὴν ἀντίφασιν συναληθεύειν, τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταῦτὸ ἡνωμένον καὶ διακεκριμένον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον ἐπὶ τινος τῶν ὄντων ταῦτα λέγειν, μήτι γε ἐπὶ τῶν θεαρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων οὐχ ἄρα τὸ πανάγιον πνεῦμα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύεται καθὼς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς."

18 For an in-depth study of Meliteniotes' two *Antirrhetical Orations*, see Theodoros Alexopoulos, *Der Ausgang des Thearchischen Geistes. Eine Untersuchung der Filioque-Frage anhand Photios' "Mystagogie", Konstantin Meliteniotes "Zwei Antirrhetic" und Augustins "De Trinitate"*. Göttingen, 2009, esp. pp. 45–53 for the historical background to the two works.

19 Konstantinos Meliteniotes, *Λόγος Α'*, Markos Orphanos, ed., *Κωνσταντίνου Μελιτηνιώτου Λόγοι ἀντιρρητικοὶ δύο, νῦν τὸ πρῶτον ἐκδιδόμενοι*. Athens, 1986, p. 144, ll. 4–9: "εἰ γὰρ οὐ μέσος ὁ υἱὸς φύσει τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, ἀντιδιήρηται κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνάγκην τῷ πνεύματι, καὶ ὁ μονογενὴς οὐ τῷ ὄντι μονογενὴς· ὅλωλε καὶ ἡ κλήσις οὐχ ἦττον τοῦ πνεύματος. Καὶ δύο λοιπόν, τὸ τε πνεῦμα καὶ ὁ υἱός, ἀδελφοί, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἀμφοτέρων πατὴρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ μοναδικὸν τῆς Τριάδος ἐκλείπει." Cf. Nikephoros Blemmydes, *Oratio II*, 11, Hugo Lämmer, ed., *Scriptorum Graeciae Orthodoxae: Bibliotheca Selecta*. Freiburg, 1864, p. 176; Ioannes XI Bekkos, *Refutatio Libri Photii de Processione Spiritus Sancti*, pg 141, cols. 727a–864b (745a–b, 800c–d).

20 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.1, Petit, ed., p. 371, ll. 8–16: "Εἰ οὕτω τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγεις, ὡς τὴν μὲν ἔγγιον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ πορρώτερον, οὐκ' οἶδ' εἰ μᾶλλον ἔσσονται μία διὰ τὸ ὑπάλληλοι εἶναι, ἢ καὶ μᾶλα δύο, διότι καὶ μᾶλα διάφοροι. Σκόπει δέ. Ἐκατέρα τούτων μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐτέρας καὶ

For instance, Markos rhetorically asked if anyone would claim Enoch came forth from Adam and Seth as a single principle?<sup>21</sup> While the two individuals could both be attributed with the causality of Enoch – Seth as the ‘proximate’ cause and Adam as the ‘remote’ cause – one would need to account for how these two individuals are truly one.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, Markos claimed that it would be blasphemous to ascribe the Spirit as having the Father as His ‘remote’ cause as this would render Him as the Father’s grandson.<sup>23</sup>

ἦττον, πῇ μὲν μάλλον, πῇ δ' ἦττον· ἡ μὲν ἔγγιον μάλλον ἀρχὴ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἔγγιον εἶναι, ἡ δὲ πορρώτερον μάλλον διὰ τὸ περιέχειν τὴν ἔγγιον. Αἱ οὖν οὕτω διάφοροι πῶς ἔσονται μία.”

21 Cf. Genesis 5:6.

22 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.1, Petit, ed., p. 371, ll. 16–19: “Τίς δ' ἂν εἴποι τὸν Ἀδὰμ καὶ τὸν Σῆθι μίαν ἀρχὴν τοῦ Ἐνὼς εἶναι; Καίτοι γε ἑκατέρως τούτων ἀρχή, ἡ μὲν ἔγγιον, ἡ δὲ πορρωτέρω. Πῶς οὖν αὗται μία.”

23 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.1, Petit, ed., p. 371, ll. 19–22: “Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἀνεκτὰ βλασφημοῦσιν, οὕτω τιθέντες τὸ Πνεῦμα πόρρω τῆς πατρικῆς ὑποστάσεως καὶ οἷον υἱωνὸν αὐτὸ λέγοντες;” Cf. *Capita Syllogistica*, c.19, pp. 388, l. 34–389, l. 15: “Ἐρώμεθα τοὺς Λατίνους· Εἰ πάντα τὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν ἔχειν βούλεσθε, διὰ τί μὴ καὶ Πατέρα τοῦτον ποιεῖτε; Ὅτι φασίν, ἀντίθεσιν ἔχει τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν· ἡ δὲ ἀντίθεσις διακρίνειν οἶδε τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ οὐχὶ συνάπτειν, ἵνα μὴ σύγχυσις ἐν αὐτοῖς γένηται. Εἰ οὖν ἡ ἀντίθεσις διακρίνει τὰ θεῖα πρόσωπα καθ' ὑμᾶς, ὧ σοφώτατοι, καὶ ἄμφω τὰ ἀντικείμενα συνελθεῖν ἐφ' ἑκάστου τούτων ἀδύνατον, οὐδ' ἄρα τὸ αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατὸν συνελεύσεται (καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἀντικείμενα), οὐδ' ὁ Υἱὸς αἰτιατὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ αἴτιος ἔσται, καθάπερ οὐδ' ὁ Υἱὸς αἰτιατὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ αἴτιος ἔσται, καθάπερ οὐδ' Υἱὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ Πατὴρ. Ἀλλὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο φήσουσιν; Ἦν ἂν καὶ Πατὴρ, εἰ εἶχε πρὸς ὃν ἀποδοθῇσεται. Τῆς ἀτοπίας! Πάλιν ἡμῖν ἐπανήκει τὸ καταγέλαστον ἐκεῖνο σόφισμα, καὶ ταῦτόν ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοῦτο λέγοντες, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἀποφαινόμενος πάντα ἄνθρωπον γεννητὸν εἶναι, ἔλεγεν ὡς ἦν ἂν καὶ ὁ Ἀδὰμ γεννητός, εἰ πατέρα εἶχεν. (Let us ask the Latins: If you wish to have the Son in whatever pertains to the Father, why do you not also make the Father the same? For, they say, that this would be opposed to the Son's nature; and such a distinction is one that distinguishes the Persons, not unite them, so that no confusion may emerge amongst them. If, then, opposition distinguishes the divine Persons according to you, O most wise ones, and it is impossible for both opposites to be united in each of them, nor, therefore, can cause and caused be united (for these also are opposites); nor can the Son be both caused and cause, just as the Son cannot be both the cause of the Father and the Father Himself, just as the Son cannot be both the Father and the Son. How, then, could they respond to this? He would be the Father, too, if he had someone to whom he would be subject. How absurd! Here again we have lapsed into that ridiculous sophistry. Those who argue in this way do the same thing as if one claimed that each man is born, and were also to say that Adam would have been born, had he had a father.”) *Capita Syllogistica*, c.42, p. 408, ll. 30–36: “Εἰ τὸν Υἱὸν προσεχὲς αἴτιον τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος λέγουσι, τὸν Πατέρα δὲ οὐ προσεχὲς, ταῦτα δὲ ἀντικείμενα, τὰ δ' ἀντικείμενα συνελθεῖν ἀδύνατον, οὐκ ἄρα ἔν αἴτιον ὁ Πατὴρ ἔσται καὶ ὁ Υἱός, ἀντικείμενα αἴτια ὄντα δύο ἄρα καὶ ποῦ τὰς δύο ἀρχὰς οἱ σχέτλιοι φεύζονται πανταχόθεν αὐτοῖς ἐπομέναι; (If they say that the Son is in fact the immediate cause of the Holy Spirit, but the Father is not, and since these [two] are opposites and opposites cannot coexist, then the Father and Son will not be one cause, as though they were opposing causes. Thus, there will be two

In arguing that the *filioque* entails that the Spirit would become the Father's grandson, one notices that Markos likely drew on a strong Hellenophone precedent. For example, in his *Thirty-First Oration*, the fifth 'Theological Oration', composed in c.379–381,<sup>24</sup> Gregorios of Nazianzus stated that, if the Spirit is begotten from the Son, God would evidently have a grandson. For Gregorios, this conclusion was absurd.<sup>25</sup> In his *Epistle to the Archbishop of Aquileia* from the early 880s, Photios I of Constantinople came to a similar conclusion when he argues that the *filioque* suggests an intra-Trinitarian order that involves a sequence of 'generations,' which would lead one to understand the Spirit as emanating from the begotten. This would consequently make the Spirit an offspring of the Son and the grandson of the Father (υἱώνος).<sup>26</sup>

Photios' argument was influential on subsequent Hellenophone anti-*filioquist* polemicists. For example, Niketas of Byzantium stated in his *Syllogistic Chapters*:

But if [the Spirit] also proceeds from the Son, it is necessary that the Son should require another Son in the revelation and communication of the Spirit from Him. But if this is the case, [the Spirit] becomes the son of the Son and thus is proven to be the grandson [of the Father].<sup>27</sup>

Likewise, in *Another Synthesis Against the Latins, Namely, Those Who Blaspheme the Holy Spirit by Saying that He Proceeds from the Son*, composed in the context of the Roman-Byzantine controversies of 1054, Niketas Stethatos used similar

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causes, and how will the fools flee from these two principles which surround them on all sides?)" Constatas, "Mark Eugenikos," p. 444.

24 See Paul Gallay, "Introduction," *Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 27–31*. Paris, 1978, pp. 10–15.

25 Gregorios of Nazianzus, *Discours 31*, 7, Paul Gallay, ed. and French trans. *Discours 27–31*, p. 288, 7–9: "Εἰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, πέφηνε, φησί, καὶ υἱώνος ἡμῖν Θεός· οὐ τί ἂν γένοιτο παραδοξότερον; (But if one also [says] He [the Spirit] is from the Son, to us would appear a grandson of God; What could be more superfluous?)"

26 *E.* 291, p. 143, 134–136: "εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν υἱὸς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ γεννήσεως πρόεισι, τὸ πνεῦμα δὲ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ δι' ἐκπορεύσεως, εἰς υἱωνοῦ τάξιν περιστήσεται. (For if the Son proceeds from the Father by generation, and the Spirit comes forth from the Son by procession, [the Spirit] would be ranked in the order of grandson.)" Similarly, in *Mystagogy* 62, in: Valerio Polidori, ed. and Italian trans., *Mistagogia del Santo Spirito*. Rome, 2018, p. 58, ll. 1–7, Photios argues that the Father is the Spirit's cause just as the Father is the Son's cause. However, Photios argues that if a 'babblers' stated that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and thus describes the Father and Son as the Spirit's remote and proximate causes, this would erroneously result in the divine essence being mutable and fluctuating.

27 Niketas of Byzantium, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.2, Hergenröther, ed., pp. 92–93: "ἐκπορεύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, ἀνάγκη δεῖσθαι τὸν υἱὸν ἐτέρου υἱοῦ ἐν τῇ φανερώσει καὶ μεταδώσει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πνεύματος· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τοῦ υἱοῦ υἱὸς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο υἱώνος ἀναφαινόμενος."

imagery when analysing the term ‘Spirit of Christ’ in the context of countering the *filioque*, stating:

But one can rightly say that the Spirit is [‘the Spirit’] of the Son’ and ‘of Christ’, given that He dwells in Him, is His fullness, exists [with Him], and is called [by Him], and is imparted through Him to those who are able to partake of Him. However, [the Spirit] is not from the Son, lest the Son be called the ‘father’ of the Spirit, nor the Father [called His] grandfather, nor the Spirit [the Father’s] grandson, and therefore their properties are rightly preserved without confusion and remain immutable, standing firm, if you will. [This is the case] so that the [Persons’] names also remain unaltered, and the Father alone is called ‘Father’ – and not two fathers – and the Son alone is called ‘Son’ – but not the Son of one, nor the Father of another – and the Spirit alone is called ‘Spirit’ – but this is not in the sense that there are two from the one Father, through whom they become two sons and brothers – for each [Person] has a unique name, distinct from the others, and there is no combination between them. And there is one God, no less than three nor is three parts, for there are neither three gods nor are there three partial divine essences, even though there are numerically three [Persons].<sup>28</sup>

Moreover, in his *Treatise Against Those Who Say that the Holy Spirit Proceeds from the Father and from the Son*, which was written against the background of the visit of Petrus Grossolanus, Archbishop of Milan, to Constantinople in c.1112, and the debates that took place therein under the auspices of Emperor Alexios I Komnenos,<sup>29</sup> Eustratios of Nicaea stated:

28 Niketas Stethatos, *Die Synthesis des Niketas Stethatos über das Filioque* 17.1–2, Anton Michel, ed., Humbert von Kerullarios, Vol. 2. Paderborn, 1930, p. 392, ll. 8–21: “ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν υἱοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ λέγοιτ’ ἂν εἰκότως τὸ πνεῦμα· ὡς καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ μένον καὶ πλήρωμα αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄν καὶ λεγόμενον, καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ τοῖς δυναμένοις μεταλαμβάνειν μεταδιδόμενον· ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ δὲ οὐχί, ἵνα μὴ καὶ πατὴρ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πνεύματος λεχθῇ μηδὲ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ πάππος μηδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἐγγονον καὶ οὕτω συγχεθῶσι καὶ κινήθωσιν αἱ ιδιότητες. ἃς ἀσυγχύτους δεῖ σώζεσθαι καὶ ἀκινήτους, ὡς εἶπειν, ἵστασθαι· ὅπως ἂν ἀκίνητα μένη καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ μόνος ἦ τε καὶ λέγηται πατὴρ ὁ πατὴρ - ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πατέρες - καὶ ἔτι μόνον υἱὸς ὁ υἱὸς - ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ μὲν υἱὸς, τοῦ δὲ πατὴρ - καὶ μόνον πνεῦμα καὶ τοῦτο μόνον τὸ πνεῦμα - ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὅτι δύο ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς πατρός, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ δύο υἱοὶ καὶ ἀδελφοί -. μοναδικὸν γὰρ ἔχει ἕκαστον καὶ ἀκοινωνήτον πρὸς τᾶλλα τὸ ἴδιον ὄνομα καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐκεῖ παρεμπίπτει συνδυασμός. καὶ θεὸς εἰς οὐχ ἦντον τὰ τρία ἢ ἕκαστον τῶν τριῶν, ὅτι μηδὲ τρεῖς θεοὶ μηδὲ μερικάι τινες τρεῖς οὐσίαι θεότητος, εἰ καὶ τρία τὰ ἀριθμούμενα.”

29 On these debates, cf. Gemeinhardt, *Filioque-Kontroverse*, pp. 512–518; Venance Grumel, “Autour du Voyage du Pierre Grossolanus, archevêque de Milan, à Constantinople, en

But if you say that the Son is immediately traced the Father, [and] the Spirit, for His part, is immediately traced to the Son, and through Him, [is referred back] to the Father, for you, it will be the case that the Father is the immediate cause of the Son, and the Son in turn [is the immediate cause] of the Spirit, and the Father also [would be the mediate cause of the Spirit] through the Son. And to begin, the argument is found to be absurd, as has already been stated, in that He [the Spirit] proceeds from a secondary cause, but not from the same [cause] as the Son. It would thus from this reason follow that the Son is the son of the Father, and the Spirit is the son of the Son, and we would introduce great-grandfathers into the pre-eternal Trinity, as well as grandsons and great-grandsons – what could be more ridiculous than that?<sup>30</sup>

Subsequently, in his *Chapters Criticising the Novel Latin Doctrine that the Holy Spirit Proceeds from the Father and the Son*, likely composed in c.1136,<sup>31</sup> Nikolaos of Methone came to a similar conclusion regarding the *filioque* leading to the Spirit becoming the Father's grandson, arguing:

If the Son is from the Father, while the Spirit is from the Son, the Spirit is immediately relegated to the rank of grandson, and that which is from

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112. Notes d'histoire et de littérature," *ÉO* 32 (1933), 22–33; A. V. Barmin, "Евстратий Никейский о Filioque и его источники," *БТ. Юбилейный выпуск* 43–44 (2012), 357–366.
- 30 Eustratios of Nicaea, *Λόγος πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκπορεύεται*, Demetrakopoulos, ed., *Εκκλησιαστική Βιβλιοθήκη*, Vol. 1, pp. 27–71 (54–55): "Εἰ δὲ φῆς τὸν μὲν Υἱὸν προσεχῶς ἀναφέρεισθαι πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα, τό γε μὴν Πνεῦμα προσεχῶς πρὸς τὸν Υἱόν, δι' αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα, ἔσται σοι οὕτως ὁ μὲν Πατὴρ αἷτιος προσεχῶς τοῦ Υἱοῦ, οὗτος δ' αὖθις τοῦ Πνεύματος, διὰ δὲ μέσου τούτου καὶ ὁ Πατήρ. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἄποπον ἔψεται τῷ λόγῳ, ὃ δὴ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὡς ἐκ δευτέρου αἷτιου προηγμένῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῷ Υἱῷ. Ἐπειτα δόξειεν ἂν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου υἱὸς εἶναι ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Πατρὸς, υἱὸς δὲ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα, καὶ πάμπους ἐπὶ τῆς προανάρχου Τριάδος, καὶ υἰωνοῦς καὶ ἐγγόνους εἰσάξομεν, οὐ τί γένοιτ' ἂν γελοιότερον;" Gemeinhardt, *Filioque-Kontroverse*, p. 516, n. 20.
- 31 See Athanasios D. Angelou, "Introduction," in: *Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus' Elements of Theology: A Critical Edition with an Introduction on Nicholas' Life and Works*. Leiden, 1984, ix–lxxx (xxv–xxvii) who dated Nikolaos' work to c.1136. For further studies of Nikolaos' life and writings, cf. Angelou, "Nicholas of Methone: The Life and Works of a Twelfth-Century Bishop," in: Margaret Mullett, Roger Scott, eds., *Byzantium and the Classical Tradition*. Birmingham, 1981, pp. 143–148; Jozef Matula, "Nicholas of Methone," in: Henrik Lagerlund, ed., *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, 2nd ed. New York, 2020, pp. 1331–1334. For Nikolaos' engagement with Trinitarian theology, cf. Alessandra Bucossi, "12th-Century Philosophers and the Filioque: The Case of Nicholas of Methone's Corpus on the Procession of the Holy Spirit," in: Jonathan Greig, Joshua Robinson, Dragos Calma, eds., *Nicholas of Methone, Reader of Proclus in Byzantium*. Leiden/Boston, 2025, pp. 290–346.

the Son would not directly proceed from the Father, in that He proceeds directly from the begotten [Son] by the Father. Now if the Spirit also proceeds directly from the Father, for both the Son and the Spirit are directly produced in the same manner from the Father without any [other] mediation, one by generation, the other by procession, there would thus be the same cause, the Father, and He could be named both the direct and remote [cause] of the same Spirit.<sup>32</sup>

Given this background, I argue that Markos stood in line with an extensive Hellenophone tradition of positing that, for the Spirit to proceed from the Son also entails that the Spirit would become the Father's grandson.

Moreover, Markos' analogy of the Trinitarian relations to Adam-Seth-Enoch to defend his Photios' doctrine of the Spirit proceeding from the Father alone is closely connected to the earlier Hellenophone Trinitarian tradition. For instance, in his *Thirty-First Oration*, Gregorios of Nazianzus linked the principle of the human being in the image of God with the analogy of Adam, Eve, and Seth (rather than Abel). This analogy upheld the Son's and Spirit's distinct modes of origin and defended the Spirit's coessentiality with the Father and Son. Gregorios respectively defined Adam, Eve, and Seth as a 'figure of God (Πλάσμα Θεοῦ),' a 'section of the figure (Τμήμα τοῦ πλάσματος),' and 'begotten from both (Ἀμφοτέρων γέννημα).' Gregorios argued that these three states of being are not identical, but that these persons are nevertheless coessential. According to Gregorios, he did not intend to apply corporeal attributes like creation or segmentation to God. This is because, using the principle of analogy, no image (derived from creation) can fully represent the truth (of the inner life of God). However, responding to the objection that both Adam and Seth were begotten from Adam, Gregorios answered that one was 'sectioned,' the other 'begotten,' while both are one and the same in sharing human nature.

32 Nikolaos of Methone, *Κεφαλαιώδεις Ἐλεγχοὶ τοῦ παρὰ Λατίνους καινοφανοῦς δόγματος, τοῦ ὅτι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύεται*, c. 22, in: Demetrakopoulos, ed., *Ἐκκλησιαστικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη*, Vol. 1, pp. 359–395 (369): “εἰ μὲν ὁ Υἱὸς ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς, τὸ δὲ Πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, τάχα καὶ εἰς υἱωνοῦ τάξιν τὸ Πνεῦμα ὑπάγεται, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἀμέσως ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορεύοιτο τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀμέσως γεννωμένου ἐκπορευόμενον· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀμέσως (ἀμέσως γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ οὐ διὰ μέσου τινός καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς γεννᾶται καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκπορεύεται), τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν αἴτιον, ὁ Πατὴρ, καὶ προσεχὲς εἶναι καὶ πόρρω ῥηθεῖν τοῦ αὐτοῦ Πνεύματος.” Cf. Niketas of Thessalonica, *Dialogus V de Processione Spiritus Sancti*, in: Corrado Giorgetti, ed., *Niceta di Maronea e i suoi dialoghi sulla processione dello Spirito Santo. Un teologo greco precursore del dialogo ecumenico*. Rome, 1965, p. 98, ll. 69–70: “Ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, εἰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς, οὐκοῦν υἱὸς ἂν εἴη τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ υἱωνὸς τοῦ Πατρὸς; (But, by necessity, if [the Spirit] is from the Son and also from the Father, would He not then be the son of the son and the grandson of the Father?)”

Gregorios maintained that the Spirit is not begotten either, and being not begotten does not entail that He is not coessential with the Father and Son.<sup>33</sup>

Additionally, in his *Exposition of Faith*, Ioannes Damaskenos used this analogy when arguing that the Son of God's generation is distinct because no other entity is the Son of God. Ioannes argued that, while the Spirit proceeds from the Father, this coming forth is processional rather than generative, representing a distinct mode of existence. For Ioannes, this principle means that the Son possesses all the qualities of the Father, except for the property of 'unbegotten-ness.' However, these different modes of existence do not imply that the Father and Son differ in essence or dignity. Ioannes explained that this principle is exemplified by Adam, who is unbegotten because God formed him; by Seth, who is begotten as Adam's son; and Eve, who came forth – though not begotten – from Adam's rib. According to Ioannes, these persons are not different in nature since they are all humans. Nevertheless, they are distinguished by their modes of existence.<sup>34</sup> To summarise, I argue that the precedents examined in the current subsection demonstrate Photios' adherence to the preceding Hellenophone Trinitarian tradition concerning the application of the Adam-Eve-Abel analogy.

Following Ioannes Damaskenos, in *Amphilochia*, question 28, Photios similarly compared the Son and Spirit to Eve and Abel. Photios explained that while Eve was formed from Adam's rib, Abel was born from Eve. However, just as Eve's specific relation means she will never be considered a 'son' or 'daughter' of Adam, Abel's relation as 'son' is also transformed into another relation, like 'wife'. Therefore, just as Eve and Abel both originated from Adam but are not siblings, the Son and Spirit are also not brothers.<sup>35</sup>

Moving back on to Markos' arguments in the *Syllogistic Chapters*, engaging with the statement 'the principle from the principle' from Gregorios of Nazianzus' *Forty-Fifth Oration*, Markos explained that Gregorios did not write here of the Father's and Son's eternal relation of being. Rather, Gregorios was concerned with how the divine Hypostases relate to the economy. Thus understood, Markos believed that one should interpret Gregorios' statement to entail the 'Creator from Creator/Light from Light/God from God/Good from Good.

33 Gregorios of Nazianzus, *Discours 31*, 11, Gallay, ed. and trans., pp. 294, l. 1–296, l. 20. For further studies of Gregorios' use of this motif, cf. Alexander Golitzin, "Adam, Eve, and Seth: Pneumatological Reflections of an Unusual Image in Gregory of Nazianzus's Fifth Theological Oration," *ATR* 83 (2001): 537–546.

34 Ioannes Damaskenos, *Expositio Fidei* 1.8, Bonifatius Kotter, ed., *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskenos*, Vol. 2. Berlin, 1973, p. 23, 113–122.

35 Photios, *Amphilochia* 28, in: Basil Laourdas, L. G. Westerink, eds., *Epistulae et Amphilochia*, Vol. 4. Leipzig, 1984, p. 106, 37–42.

Markos explains that these are the Son shares these with the Father, being one God, Light, Goodness, and principle of creatures with Him.<sup>36</sup>

Evoking John 1:3, “All things were made through Him [the Son], and without Him nothing was made that was made,” Markos induced that what is not created is not from the Son nor through Him, and the Spirit is uncreated. Markos evoked an extract from Gregorios’ *Forty-Second Oration* to defend his understanding, as Gregorios wrote, “the without-principle, the principle, the one with the principle, are one God.”<sup>37</sup> Markos accentuated that Gregorios wrote “with the Principle” rather than “from...” thus suggesting that the Spirit proceeds alongside the Son being begotten from the Father without-origin.<sup>38</sup>

Moving on to Markos’ second syllogism, an additional key source of contention in the Latin-Byzantine controversies concerning the *filioque* was the claim attributed to Gregorios of Nyssa that the “Spirit proceeds from the Hypostasis of the Father.”<sup>39</sup> Markos believed that this phrase explicitly ratified his opposition to the *filioque*, as it reveals that it is the Father’s Personal property (ιδίωμα) to be the source and origin of the Spirit’s being.<sup>40</sup> Additionally, as he explains

36 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 1, p. 371, ll. 23–31, esp. 27–31: “Καίτοι γε «τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον» εἴρηται, καὶ «Πνεῦμα τὸ τῆς πατρικῆς ἐκπορευόμενον ὑποστάσεως». – Ἄλλ’ ὅπερ ὁ Θεολόγος εἶρηκε, πρὸς τὰ κτίσματα βλέπων εἶρηκε τοῦτο, καθάπερ ἂν εἴπε δημιουργὸν ἐκ δημιουργοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ φῶς ἐκ φωτός καὶ Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ· ἅπερ ἅπαντα μετὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὦν, εἰς ἐστὶ Θεὸς μετ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν φῶς καὶ ἀγαθὸς εἰς καὶ ἀρχὴ μία τῶν γεγόντων ἀπάντων.” Conostas, “Mark Eugenikos,” p. 444.

37 Gregorios of Nazianzus, *Discours 42, 15*, Jean Bernardi, ed. and French trans., *Discours 42–43*. Paris, 1992, p. 82, ll. 7–8.

38 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 1, pp. 371, l. 32–372, l. 11: “Πάντα γάρ, φησί, δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἐν ὃ γέγονεν. Ὡς ὁ μὴ γέγονεν, οὐκ ἐξ αὐτοῦ δῆπουθεν ὃν οὐδὲ δι’ αὐτοῦ· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. Ὅτι δ’ οὕτως ἔχει τὸ εἰρημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεολόγου, δῆλον ἐξ ὧν ἐν ἐτέροις φησὶν: «Ἀναρχον καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μετὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς, εἰς Θεός». Οὐκ εἶπε τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ μετὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάρχου δηλαδὴ προϊόν. Καίτοι γε εἰ ὅλως ἐφρόνει τοῦ Πνεύματος ἀρχὴν τὸν Υἱὸν, ποῦ ἂν μάλλον εἶρηκε τοῦτο, βιαίτοις πάντων ἀνθρώπων; Ἄλλ’ οὐθ’ οὕτως οὐθ’ ἑτερός τις πῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς θεολόγων τοῦτο φρονῶν φαίνεται, κἂν ὑμεῖς σοφίζόμενοι πάντα τὸν χρόνον καταναλώσητε.” Conostas, “Mark Eugenikos,” p. 444.

39 Petit, *PO* 17, 371c, highlighted that this text could not be found in Gregorios’ critically edited oeuvres. Cf. Bernard Pottier, *Dieu et la Christ selon Grégoire de Nysse*. Brussels, 1994, p. 357, who later argued that the statement cannot have come from Gregorios’ oeuvres. Nonetheless, it bears some resemblance to certain texts in Pseudo-Athanasios of Alexandria, *Sermo contra Latinos*, PG 28, cols. 828a–d; 832a.

40 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 2, p. 372, ll. 12–20: “«Πνεῦμα», φησὶν ὁ Νυσσαεὺς θεολόγος, «τὸ τῆς πατρικῆς ἐκπορευόμενον ὑποστάσεως». Εἰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ ὑποστάσεως ἐκπορεύεται, τί γε ἄλλο ἢ ἐκ δύο ἐκπορεύεται ὑποστάσεων; Τὸ δὲ ἐκ δύο ὑποστάσεων ἐκπορευόμενον τί γε ἄλλο ἢ δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὑπάρξεως; Οὐκ ἄρα Λατῖνοι τὴν δυαρχίαν ἐκφεύξονται, μέχρις ἂν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον εἶναι λέγωσιν.” See also *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 31, pp. 400, l. 32–401, l. 7: “Τρόπον ὑπάρξεως καὶ ιδιότητα τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος

in his fifteenth syllogism, Markos believed that such properties cannot be communicated between the Trinitarian Hypostases: In the same way that the Son's property of assuming a human nature cannot be communicated to the other two divine Persons, the Spirit's procession from the Father cannot be communicated to the Son.<sup>41</sup> Nonetheless, if, according to Markos' Latin counterparts

οἱ θεολόγοι φασὶν οὐ τὸ ἐκπορεύεσθαι ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεσθαι. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο τρόπος αὐτῷ ὑπάρξεως καὶ ἰδιότης ἐστὶ, τὸ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύεσθαι, ἢ μάτην αὐτῷ πρόσεστιν, ἢ προστίθῃσι τι τῇ ὑπάρξει, καὶ διπλὴν ποιεῖ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδιότητα, καὶ ἔστιν (εἰ τὸ ἴδιον ἀντιστρέφειν ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὸ οὐ ἔστιν ἴδιον, καὶ οὕτε πλεονάζειν οὕτε ἐλλείπειν) καὶ αὐτὸ διπλοῦν. Ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἄρα μόνου τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκπορεύεται. (The theologians assert that the Holy Spirit's mode of existence and property is not simply to proceed, but to proceed from the Father. However, if that is His mode of existence and property, that which is said to proceed from the Son either is attributed to Him obsoletely, or it adds something to His being, making his property twofold, and since a property must be reciprocated in that to which it belongs, so that it nothing is added or taken away from it, it also will be twofold. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone.)" Conostas, "Mark Eugenikos," p. 445.

- 41 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 15, p. 386, ll. 1–10: "Εἰ τιμιώτερον Θεῷ τὸ αἰτίῳ τῆς θεότητος εἶναι ἢ τὸ αἰτίῳ τῆς κτίσεως, πῶς τοῦ τιμιωτέρου Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ μὴ κοινωνοῦν κατὰ τοὺς Λατίνους τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔσται τῇ ἀξίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεότητι; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅλως μεταδοτὸν τὸ τῆς θεότητος αἰτίον, διὰ τί μὴ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τούτου μετείληφεν; Εἰ δ' ἀμετάδοτον ὅλως ὡς τοῦ Πατρὸς ἴδιον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀνάιτιον, οὐδ' ὁ Υἱὸς ἄρα τούτου μεθέξει κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον, εἰ καὶ μάλα τοῦτο Λατῖνοι βούλονται." (If it is more honourable for God to be the cause of divinity than to be the cause of creatures, how is it that the Holy Spirit, who according to the Latins does not partake of what is more honourable in the Father and the Son, is not therefore inferior [to them] in dignity and divinity? If being the cause of divinity is fully communicable, why does the Spirit not partake in this [property]? But if it is fully incommunicable, as it is a property of the Father – just as is the case in being without principle – the Son could not participate in [this property] either, even though the Latins wish otherwise." Cf. *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 18, pp. 387, l. 17–388, l. 33: "Τὰ τῷ Θεῷ προσόντα, κυρίως καὶ μόνως καὶ μόνῳ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ αἰεὶ καὶ πάντῃ προσεῖναι ὀφείλουσι, τὰ μὲν φυσικὰ καὶ κοινὰ, τοῖς τρισὶ προσώποις, τὰ δ' ὑποστατικὰ καὶ προσωπικὰ, τῶν τριῶν ἐκάστω· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει συμβεβηκός, οὐδὲν ἐπίκτητον οὐδ' ὕστερον προσγεγνημένον, οὐδὲν οὐ κυρίως καὶ μόνως. Καθάπερ οὖν ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς καὶ Θεὸς καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ δημιουργός, ἔτι δὲ ἀόρατος καὶ ἀθάνατος καὶ αἰδὶος ὁ Θεὸς λεγόμενος, μόνως τε καὶ κυρίως ὡς πρὸς τὴν κτίσιν ἅπαντα ταῦτα λέγεται (λέγει γὰρ ὁ Ἀπόστολος· Τῷ δὲ βασιλεῖ τῶν αἰώνων, ἀφθάρτῳ, ἀράτῳ, μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ· καὶ αἰδῖσι· Ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν, φῶς οἰκῶν ἀπρόσιτον), οὕτω καὶ ὅπερ ἂν λέγοιτο τῶν τριῶν ἕκαστον, μόνον τε καὶ κυρίως ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦθ' ὅπερ λέγεται. Πατὴρ γοῦν ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ μόνον καὶ μόνος καὶ κυρίως καὶ μόνως· Υἱὸς ὁ Υἱὸς καὶ μόνον καὶ μόνος καὶ κυρίως καὶ μόνως· καὶ Πνεῦμα ὁμοίως τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀνάιτιος ὁ Πατὴρ εἴτ' οὖν ἀγέννητος μόνον καὶ μόνος καὶ κυρίως καὶ μόνως, ἀλλὰ δὲ καὶ αἰτίος αἰδῖσι ὁμοίως· καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν προσώπων ἄρα μόνον αἰτιατὰ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ καὶ κυρίως καὶ μόνως. Δυσὶν γὰρ ὄντοιν αἰτίου καὶ αἰτιατοῦ, εἰ τὸ αἰτίον μόνος ὁ Πατὴρ ἔχει, τὸ αἰτιατὸν ἄρα μόνῳ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν προσώπων καὶ μόνον καὶ μόνως. Σκεπτέον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μόνον αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον λέγεται· μόνον γὰρ Πατὴρ ὁ Πατὴρ, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καὶ Υἱός, καὶ μόνον Υἱὸς ὁ Υἱός, ἀλλ' οὐ καὶ Πατὴρ, καὶ μόνον Πνεῦμα τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ἀλλ' οὐ καὶ Πατὴρ ἢ Υἱός, καὶ μόνον ἀνάιτιος ὁ Πατὴρ, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καὶ αἰτίαν ἔχων, οὕτω δὲ

maintained, the Pneumatic procession occurs from the Person of the Son, the Spirit must therefore come forth from two Persons. Thus, Markos maintained

καὶ μόνον αἴτιος, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰτιατός· καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν προσώπων ἄρα μόνον αἰτιατὰ καὶ οὐδὲν τούτων αἴτιον. Εἰ γὰρ τι τούτων καὶ αἴτιον εἴη, τὸ μόνον ἀναιρεθῆσεται, καὶ οὔτε μόνον καὶ κυρίως αἴτιον ἔσται, οὔτε μόνον καὶ κυρίως αἰτιατόν· οὐ τούναντίον ἀνάγκη· εἶναι προαποδεδεικται· Ἡ γὰρ ἀντίθεσις διακρίσεως αἰτία καὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λατίνους καὶ ἄμφω τὰ ἀντικείμενα συνδραμεῖν ἐφ' ἑνὸς τῶν θεαρχικῶν προσώπων ἀδύνατον· θάτερον γὰρ τούτων οὐ κυρίως ἔσται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως οὐδ' ἔσται. Τούτοις συμφωνεῖ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἁγίων ῥητά, τοῦ μὲν Δαμασκηνοῦ λέγοντος ἐν τοῖς Θεολογικοῖς κεφαλαίοις· «Μόνος αἴτιος ὁ Πατήρ»· Θεοδώρου δὲ τοῦ Στουδίτου ψάλλοντος· «Μόνου μονογενήτορ μονογενοῦς Υἱοῦ Πατὴρ, καὶ μόνον μόνου φῶς φωτὸς ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ μόνον μόνως μόνου Θεοῦ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα, Κυρίου Κύριον ὄντως ὄν». Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ αἴτιον ὁ Υἱὸς ἔξει, μόνον αἰτιατός ὀφείλων γε εἶναι καὶ μόνον Υἱός, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον μόνου μόνου Πνεύμα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρός. (Those things which are fitting for God must be fitting for Him solely and strictly, and only for His own self, and always and in every respect. Indeed, the natural and common attributes [must pertain] equally to the three Persons. However, the Hypostatic and Personal [attributes must pertain] to each one of the three. For there is nothing accidental [in Him], nothing gained nor acquired, nothing that does not solely and strictly belong to Him. Thus, when God is called good, wise, God, King, and Creator, and similarly invisible, immortal and eternal, all these things are referred to Him solely and strictly, as of one to whom they pertain, given that they are predicated of creatures in a secondary sense. (For the Apostle says: "To the King [who is] eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God" [1 Tim. 1:17]. And again: "...who alone is immortal and dwells in unapproachable light. [1 Tim. 6:16]") So also, whatever you say of any one of the three Persons is only stated of them solely and strictly relative to the other [Persons]. Thus, the Father is solely, only, strictly and singularly called 'Father'. Similarly, the Son is solely, only, strictly and singularly called 'Son'. Also, the Holy Spirit is solely called the 'Spirit'. Similarly, the Father is solely, only, strictly and singularly without-principle, i.e., He is solely, only, strictly, and singularly unbegotten, and is therefore also the only cause. Conversely, the other Persons are solely, only, strictly, and singularly from the cause. For if there are two, cause and caused, and if the Father alone is cause, then the caused must solely, only, strictly, and singularly be the other Persons. For one must consider that the term 'only' is always applied in relation to [another] object. For only the Father is Father, but not the Son also. Likewise, only the Son is Son, but not the Father also. Also, only the Holy Spirit is Spirit, and neither the Father nor Son. And the Father alone is uncaused, not having a cause, and thus He is the sole cause, and not from a cause. Thus, the other Persons will only be from a principle, so that neither of them is a principle. For if either of them [the Son and Spirit] were also a cause, that [one] cause would be dissolved, and it would no longer be considered as the sole, strict cause, contrary to what has been shown to be absolutely necessary above. For, as the Latins confess, opposition is the cause of distinction, and two opposites cannot coexist in one and the same divine Person. One of them would thereby not properly exist, and thus would not in any way exist. Of similar thinking to these [conclusions] are the statements of the saints, including the Damascene, who says in the chapters of his theological work, 'The Father alone is cause.' [Ioannes Damaskenos, *Expositio Fidei* 1.12b, Kotter, ed., p. 36, l. 57]. Likewise, Theodoros of Stoudion also sings: 'The Father is the Only-Begetter of the Only-Begotten Son, and the only light of the only light is the splendour, the only Holy Spirit of the only God is the Lord of Lords, He who

that this would entail that his Latin counterparts have attributed two principles to the Spirit and made the Trinity a 'dyarchy'. He explains in his eleventh syllogism:

However, those things which pertain to the divine nature are always expressed in the singular, while they are considered in three Persons, including 'God', 'Creator', 'King', 'Good', etc., (for we speak of one God, one Creator, one King, one Good, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit). Nevertheless, other [things] are always expressed in the plural, even though they are common to only two Persons, such as 'being caused' in relation to the Son and Holy Spirit: For we say that two are from a cause, not one. As this is the case, and because the Latins also ascribe divine causality to two Persons, i.e., the Father and the Son, let us ask them to which of these two they ascribe it. If they say it belongs to the latter [the two Persons], it will be clearly absurd, for there would be two causes, just as there would be two which are caused, and a dyarchy will therefore be affirmed and the most celebrated [divine] Monarchy will be dissolved. Nevertheless, if they say the former [the divine nature], one must first ask, in what way? For as they are both common and natural, they pertain equally to the three Persons. Thus, for this reason, they lapse into the same difficulty. For the one cause, by which he is generator and projector, i.e., the Father alone, is not numerically the same as the one cause through which He is projector alone, i.e., the Father and Son, as they themselves assert. Thus, there are two causes and two principles, and thereby a dyarchy fully surrounds them.<sup>42</sup>

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truly is.' [*Τῇ Ε' τῆς Γ' Ἐβδομάδος, Τριώδιον Κατανυκτικόν, περιέχον ἅπασαν τὴν ἀνήκουσαν αὐτῷ ἀκολουθίαν τῆς Ἁγίας καὶ Μεγάλης Τεσσαρακοστῆς*. Rome, 1879, p. 330] Thus, the Son cannot have the [property] of [being] a cause, as He must in fact be caused, and is the only Son, just as the Holy Spirit is the only Spirit of the one God and Father.)".

- 42 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 11, p. 383, ll. 15–40: "Τῶν προσόντων τῇ θεῇ φύσει τὰ μὲν ἐνικῶς μόνον αἰεὶ λέγεται, κἂν τοῖς τρισὶ προσώποις ἐνθεωρῇται, καθάπερ τὸ Θεὸς καὶ δημιουργὸς καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον· εἰς γὰρ Θεὸς λέγομεν καὶ εἰς δημιουργὸς καὶ εἰς βασιλεὺς καὶ εἰς ἀγαθός, ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον· τὰ δὲ πληθοντικῶς αἰεὶ, κἂν τοῖς δυσὶ μόνοις, ὡς τὸ αἰτιατὸν ἐπὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ Πνεύματος· δύο γὰρ τὰ αἰτιατὰ καὶ οὐχ ἓν λέγομεν. – Τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων, ἐπειδὴ περ Λατίνοι καὶ τὸ τῆς θεότητος αἴτιον δυσὶ προσώποις, τῷ Πατρὶ τε καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ, νέμουσιν, ἐρώμεθα τοῦτοις, ὁποῖα τῶν εἰρημένων μερίδι τοῦτο συντάττουσιν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τῇ δευτέρᾳ φήσουσιν, αὐτόθεν δῆλον τὸ ἄποπον· δύο γὰρ ἔσται τὰ αἰτία, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ αἰτιατὰ δύο, καὶ οὕτως ἡ δυαρχία πάροδον ἔξει καὶ τὸ πολυύμνητον τῆς μοναρχίας ἐκποδὼν γενήσεται. Εἰ δὲ τῇ προτέρᾳ, πρῶτον μὲν πῶς; ἐκεῖνα γὰρ κοινὰ τε καὶ φυσικὰ καὶ τοῖς τρισὶ προσώποις ὁμοίως ὑπάρχοντα. Ἐπειτα καὶ οὕτω πάλιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ περιεγενήσονται· τὸ γὰρ ἐν αἴτιον ἢ γεννήτωρ καὶ προβολεὺς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ Πατὴρ μόνος, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτόν ἀριθμῶ τῷ ἐνὶ αἰτίῳ

One notices here too that Markos drew on a long Hellenophone precedent of arguing that the *filioque* leads to the absurd conclusion that the ‘Monarchy’ of the Father would be dissolved into a ‘dyarchy/polyarchy’. For example, in his *Encyclical Epistle to the Eastern Patriarchs* of 867, Photios continued by positing that the *filioque* implies that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, the unoriginated first cause, and also from a second cause, the Son, who is not without origin. Therefore, this Person is both a cause and caused, which blurs the distinction of the Spirit both in terms of order (τάξις) and relation of origin. By dividing the Spirit this way, one would believe in a Quaternity or an infinite regression of Hypostases, not a Trinity.<sup>43</sup>

Likewise, in his *Epistle to the Archbishop of Aquileia*, Photios claims that the *filioque* entails that the divine Monarchy would be divided as there would be two principles rather than one, and indeed only a single ‘product’:

Certainly, two principles will be concurrently introduced in the Trinity, and the [Father’s] monarchy in the Trinity will immediately disappear as useless. For it is clear that for those who speak as such [the Spirit proceeds from the Son], they proclaim two causes, wherefrom the one cause is divided into two causes – let [this] blasphemy fall on their heads.<sup>44</sup>

ἢ προβολεὺς μόνον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ ὁ Υἱός, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν. Δύο ἄρα καὶ οὕτω τὰ αἷτια καὶ ἀρχαὶ δύο, καὶ ἡ δυαρχία πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς περιίσταται.” Constat, “Mark Eugenikos,” p. 445.

43 Photios, *Epistula* 2, in: Laourdas, Westerink, eds., *Epistulae et Amphilochia*, Vol. 1. Leipzig, 1983, p. 46, 169–174: “Ἐτι δέ, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱὸς γεγέννηται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύεται, τίς ἡ καινοτομία τοῦ πνεύματος, μὴ καὶ ἕτερόν τι αὐτοῦ ἐκπορεύσθαι; ὡς συνάγεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνων θεομάχων γνώμην μὴ τρεῖς, ἀλλὰ τέσσαρας τὰς ὑποστάσεις, μᾶλλον δ’ ἀπίρους, τῆς τετάρτης αὐτοῖς ἄλλην προβαλλούσης, κάκεινης πάλιν ἐτέραν, μέχρις ἂν εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πολυπλήθειαν ἐκπέσωσιν; (If the Son is begotten of the Father, while the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, what [sort of] innovation could be conceived regarding the Spirit? Would it be that something else comes forth from Him [the Spirit]? Then, according to this God-fighting view, there would not be three, but four, or indeed, an infinite number of hypostases, in that from the fourth hypostasis another would proceed, and from this [hypostasis] another, to the degree where they descend to pagan polytheism.)” Trans. from Ewan Davies, “The Influence of Eulogios, Patriarch of Alexandria’s Insights in the *Bibliotheca*, Codex 230, on Photios, Patriarch of Constantinople,” *Scrinium* 22 (2026), 1–48 (25). Photios later reproduced this argument in *Mystagogy* 37, Polidori, ed., p. 36, ll. 1–6. Theodoros Alexopoulos, *Photios’ Von Konstantinopel Mystagogie des Heiligen Geistes: Übersetzung und Theologischer Kommentar*. Berlin/Boston, 2022, pp. 146–147; Tia Kolbaba, *Inventing Latin Heretics. Byzantines and the Filioque in the Ninth Century*. Kalamazoo, 2008, p. 71. Cf. *Epistula* 2, p. 45, 139–140.

44 Photios, *Epistula* 291, in: Laourdas, Westerink, eds., *Epistulae et Amphilochia*, Vol. 3. Leipzig, 1985, p. 143, 119–123: “...δύο πάντως καὶ ἀρχαὶ συνεισέρχονται καὶ ἡ ἐν τῇ τριάδι μοναρχία φροῦδος οἰχίσηται. δύο γὰρ φανερώς τοῖς οὕτω λέγουσι τὰ αἷτια συνανακηρύσσεται, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἡ μία

Following Photios, the argument that the *filioque* would lead to the divine Monarchy being dissolved into a ‘dyarchy/polyarchy’ was appropriated by several Hellenophone anti-filioquist polemicists. For example, in his *Syllogistic Chapters*, Niketas of Byzantium stated:

But if, on the one hand, the Son is the Spirit’s cause in an uncaused manner, then in the supernatural and beyond-essential Trinity, there will be two Hypostases which are origins that are without-origin in terms of their cause, and for this reason there will be two origins and two causes, and thereby both the highly-lauded principle of the [divine] Monarchy would be lost and the various gods worshipped by the [Ancient] Greeks would be restored, but also the Spirit will be the only one of all entities that has a diverse origin.<sup>45</sup>

Likewise, in his *Seventh Oration on the Holy Spirit*, delivered on the Monday after Pentecost in an unspecified year during his reign, the Byzantine Emperor Leo VI stated:

Nor does it [John 16:14-15] mean what the current innovation of those who introduce the new concept of the Spirit intends, for the words ‘to receive’ to mean that the Son projects the Spirit. They [Leo’s Latin interlocutors] attempt to transform the one principle into a polyarchy, and I do not know where they got this idea from, whether in order to locate the Son in the Spirit’s position, in order to make the Father a co-cause in the Spirit’s projection, or so that they may also remove the Father from this [the Spirit’s projection].<sup>46</sup>

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ἀρχὴ εἰς δύο ἀρχάς - τρέποιτο δὲ τὸ βλάσφημον εἰς τὰς τῶν αἰτίων κεφαλὰς - συνδιασχίζεται.” Cf. *Mys.* 9, Polidori, ed., p. 10, ll. 3–4.

45 Niketas of Byzantium, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 6, Hergenröther, ed., pp. 103–104: “ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἀναιτίως (ὁ υἱὸς αἴτιος τοῦ πνεύματος), ἔσονται ἐν τῇ ὑπερφυεῖ καὶ ὑπερουσίῳ τριάδι δύο ἀρχικαὶ καὶ ἀναρχοὶ κατ’ αἰτίαν ὑποστάσεις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δύο ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἵτια καὶ τὸ σεβαζόμενον τῆς μοναρχίας κράτος ἀπόλλυται καὶ ἡ πολυπληθία τῶν σεβομένων παρ’ Ἑλλήσιν θεῶν συνεισφύσσεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἔσται μόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων πολυάρχων ἀρχὴν ἔχον.”

46 Leo VI, *Λόγος Ζ’*, Theodora Antonopoulou, ed., *Homiliae*. Turnhout, 2008, p. 91, 253–256: “Οὐκουν οὐδ’ ὅπερ ἡ νῦν νεωτεροποιία τῶν καινὴν εἰσαγόντων ὑπαρξιν τοῦ Πνεύματος βούλεται, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ λαμβάνειν τὸ Πνεῦμα τὴν προβολὴν σημαίνει τὰ ῥήματα. Οὐ τὴν μίαν ἀρχὴν κακῶς εἰς πολυαρχίαν μετατάττειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, οὐκ οἶδα πόθεν ἐπὶ ταύτην ἐλθόντες τὴν ὑπόληψιν, πότερον ἢ ἐν τῷ καθιστάναι τὸν Υἱὸν εἰς τὴν τοῦ Πνεύματος πρόδον, συναίτιον ποιήσωσι τῷ Πατρὶ τῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος προβολῆς, ἢ ἵνα καὶ τὸν Πατέρα τοῦτο ἀφαιρήσωνται.” For analyses of Leo’s homilies, see Theodora Antonopoulou, *The Homilies of the Emperor Leo VI*. Leiden/New York/Cologne, 1997, esp. pp. 272–274, for the relationship between Leo’s homilies

Subsequently, in his *Chapters Criticising the Novel Latin Doctrine that the Holy Spirit Proceeds from the Father and the Son*, Nikolaos of Methone employs similar imagery vis-à-vis the Trinity becoming a polyarchy or polytheistic like the ‘Greeks (Pagans)’ when refuting the *filioque*: Nikolaos works on the basis of his conclusion that, in order for the *filioque* to not make the Spirit inferior to the Father and the Son, the Spirit must also share a property with the Father, as the Son does in being the projector of the Spirit, namely, to generate the Son.<sup>47</sup> Thus, Nikolaos claims that, because the Son cannot be caused by the Spirit, for the purpose of upholding the sameness of power and honour in the Trinity, his Latin counterparts should accept that another item comes forth from the Spirit rather than the Son, that itself would be connatural and of the same power as the Spirit. However, for Nikolaos, this conclusion entails that a series of divine Hypostases would come forth from each of the preceding one that has come forth, and lead to the Latins exceeding ‘Greek’ polytheism.<sup>48</sup>

As these examples demonstrate, Markos’ conclusions regarding the Spirit coming forth from the Persons of the Father and the Son dissolving the divine Monarchy into a ‘dyarchy’ have a strong precedence in the preceding Hellenophone Trinitarian tradition following Photios. Markos offered a further syllogistic argument intended to discern and draw distinctions between the divine Hypostases and their relations. While both the Son and Spirit mutually emerge *from* the Father, one could not call the Spirit a ‘son’. Markos explains that this is the case as these two Persons are distinct in terms of the ‘modes of being’ proper to each, according to which the Holy Spirit does not come forth from the Father by way of generation, as does the Son. Thus, if the two Persons come forth a single cause, one of these Persons is the Son, whereas the second Person is not. Accordingly, these Persons are evidently distinct in terms of their mode of coming forth from the Father, as both are ‘caused’ from the Father as

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with Photios’ works; Louis Petit, “Note sur les homélies de Léon le Sage,” *RÉB* 3–4 (1900), 245–249; Meredith L. D. Riedel, *Leo VI and the Transformation of Byzantine Christian Identity. Writings of an Unexpected Emperor*. Cambridge, 2018, pp. 137–153; D. Serruys, “Les homélies de Léon le sage,” *BZ* 12 (1903), 167–170.

47 See Nikolaos of Methone *Κεφαλαιώδεις ἔλεγχοι*, c. 7, Demetrakopoulos, ed., p. 363.

48 Nikolaos of Methone, *Κεφαλαιώδεις ἔλεγχοι*, c. 8, Demetrakopoulos, ed., pp. 363–364: “Ἡ εἰ μὴ τὸν Υἱόν, ἀλλ’ ἕτερόν τι δοτέον ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἢ γεννᾶσθαι ἢ ἐκπορεύεσθαι, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκείνων ἐκάτερον, ἵνα καὶ ἰσότημα τάχα καὶ ἰσοδύναμα φυλαχθῇ, ὁμοφυεῖς ἂν εἴη καὶ ἰσοδύναμον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος προαγόμενον τῷ τεπροάγοντι καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ὧν τοῦτο προήκται· οὐκ ἔτι ἄρατριάς, ἀλλὰ τετράς ἔσται τὸ πρεσβευόμενον, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς ἅπειρον αἱ ὑποστάσεις οὕτω γε προχωρήσουσιν, αἰετὴς τῆς προαγομένης τῇ προαγωγῇ τῆς αὐτῆς οὕσης φύσεως καὶ δυνάμεως, ἵνα καὶ τὴν ἑλληνικὴν πολυθεϊαν οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα δοξάζοντες παρελάσωσιν.” Bucossi, “12th-Century Philosophers,” pp. 323–324.

‘cause’.<sup>49</sup> Nonetheless, in relation to one another, the Son and Spirit oppose one another as there is a dichotomy between ‘Sonship’ and ‘non-Sonship’.<sup>50</sup>

I have already highlighted that Markos’ Trinitarian theology distinguished those properties which pertain to the divine essence and the particular, incommunicable properties of the divine Persons. However, Markos accused his Latin counterparts of eschewing theological axioms which have been ubiquitously accepted in the Church through the ages for a theologoumenon. According to Eugenikos, such axioms include drawing a distinction between those attributes which are shared by the three divine Hypostases in common, and those ‘particular’ to a given Hypostasis.

To provide some context to this distinction between ‘common’ and ‘particular’ properties, in his *Encyclical Epistle to the Eastern Patriarchs*, Photios also argues that all items which are not common (κοινὸν) to the entire Trinity must pertain to one specific (ἴδιον) Hypostasis. For Photios, this distinction is necessary to safeguard intra-Trinitarian unity. As Photios explains, his Latin counterparts understood the Spirit’s procession to involve the Father and Son together, this principle must mean that the Spirit, being the third divine Hypostasis, shares this same property with the other two Hypostases, and thus proceeds and comes forth from Himself. However, for Photios, it is logically impossible that the Spirit could originate from Himself.<sup>51</sup>

49 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 3, p. 373, ll. 1–3: “πρὸς μὲν τὸν Πατέρα τῷ τῆς σχέσεως διακρίνονται λόγῳ καὶ ὡς αἰτιατὰ πρὸς αἴτιον ἔχουσι...” See also Pseudo-Athanasios of Alexandria, *Quaestiones Aliae* 11, PG 28, col. 784c: “αἰτιός ἐστι μόνος ὁ Πατήρ· τὰ δὲ αἰτιατὰ δύο, ὁ Υἱὸς καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα. (The Father is the sole cause; but there are two ‘caused’, the Son and Spirit.)”

50 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 3, p. 373, ll. 3–4: “πρὸς ἄλληλα δὲ, τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἀντιθέσει...” Conostas, “Mark Eugenikos,” pp. 445–446.

51 Photios, *Epistula* 2, p. 46, 181–199: “Χωρὶς δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων, εἰ πᾶν ὅπερ μὴ ἐστὶ κοινὸν τῆς παντοκρατορικῆς καὶ ὁμοουσιῦς καὶ ὑπερφυῶς τριάδος ἐνός ἐστὶ μόνου τῶν τριῶν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος προβολὴ κοινὸν τῶν τριῶν, ἐνός ἄρα ἐστὶν μόνου τῶν τριῶν. πότερον οὖν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς φήσουσιν ἐκπορεύεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα; καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἐξομῶσονται τὴν φιλίαν αὐτοῖς καὶ καινὴν μυσταγωγίαν; εἰ δ’ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ, τί μὴ κατ’ ἀρχᾶς ἐθάρρησαν αὐτῶν ὅλην ἐκκαλύψαι τὴν θεομαχίαν, ὡς οὐ μόνον τὸν υἱὸν εἰς τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος προβολὴν ἐγκαθιστῶσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν πατὸς ταύτην ἀφαιροῦνται; οἷς ἀκόλουθον δὴπου καὶ τὴν γέννησιν τῇ προβολῇ συμμετατιθέντας μηδὲ τὸν υἱὸν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλὰ τὸν πατέρα τερατολογεῖν ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ γεγενῆσθαι, ἵνα μὴ τῶν δυσσεβούντων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν μαινομένων ὧσιν πρωτοστάται. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἅπαν, ὃ θεωρεῖται καὶ λέγεται ἐν τῇ παναγίᾳ καὶ ὁμοφυσίᾳ καὶ ὑπερουσίᾳ τριάδι, ἢ κοινόν ἐστι πάντως ἢ ἐνός καὶ μόνου τῶν τριῶν, ἢ δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος προβολὴ οὔτε κοινόν ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὡς οὐτοί φασι ἐνός καὶ μόνου τινός, ὡς δὲ ἡμῖν εἴη, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἐκείνων τρέποιο τοὺς βλάσφημον κεφαλὰς, οὐκ ἄρα ὅλως ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ζωαρχικῇ καὶ παντελείᾳ τριάδι ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος προβολή.” Alexopoulos, *Mystagogie*, p. 148; Kolbaba, *Inventing*, pp. 71–72. Cf. Photios, *Mystagogia* 36, Polidori, ed., pp. 34, l. 1–36, l. 13.

Photios aimed to distinguish the properties related to God's essence, like incorporeality or dominion, from those attributed to each Hypostasis. If the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, the property of procession is transformed into a property of the divine essence, meaning that it is shared equally by all three Hypostases. Therefore, the Spirit would need to originate from Himself. By assigning a property (that is not truly Hypostatic because it does not pertain to a specific Hypostasis, and is not common since only two of the three Hypostases share it) to the first two Persons but not the third, the Spirit becomes subordinate to the other two Persons.<sup>52</sup>

Photios' argumentation is important because the distinction between common and particular properties in the Trinity became a fundamental axiom for subsequent Eastern orthodox opponents to the *filioque*. For example, in his *Treatise Against Those Who Say that the Holy Spirit Proceeds from the Father and from the Son*, Eustratios of Nicaea stated:

Everything that is perceived in the Holy Trinity is perceived either as something common to the three Hypostases or as something peculiar to one of them. But there is nothing that two of them have in common, so that causation is either particular to one Hypostasis or common to all three. With regards to creatures and servants, causation is common to all three Persons, but with regards to [the relations of the three Persons to one another], it pertains to the Father alone.<sup>53</sup>

Likewise, in his *Chapters Criticising the Novel Latin Doctrine that the Holy Spirit Proceeds from the Father and the Son*, Nikolaos of Methone stated:

52 Photios, *Epistula* 2, p. 44, 132–138: “εἰ πάντα τὰ κοινὰ πατρός καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος πάντως ὑπάρχει κοινά, ὡς τὸ θεός, τὸ βασιλεύς, τὸ κύριος, τὸ δημιουργός, τὸ παντοκράτωρ, τὸ ὑπερούσιον, τὸ ἀπλοῦν, τὸ ἀσχημάτιστον, τὸ ἀσώματον, τὸ ἀόρατον, ἀπλῶς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, κοινὸν δὲ πατρός καὶ υἱοῦ ἢ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐξ αὐτῶν πρόοδος, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἄρα ἐκπορευθήσεται τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἀρχὴ ἔσται αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα καὶ αἰτιατόν. (If everything that the Father, Son and Spirit have in common is common to Them in all manners, like being God, King, Lord, Creator, Almighty, beyond-essentiality, [absolute] simplicity, without form, incorporeality, invisibility and in a simple manner all other things. However, [if] the Spirit's coming forth is common to the Father and Son, the Spirit would thus come forth from Himself, and would be His own cause and concurrently cause and caused.)” Kolbaba, *Inventing*, p. 68.

53 Eustratios of Nicaea, *Λόγος πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκπορεύεται*, Demetrakopoulos, ed., *Ἐκκλησιαστικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη*, Vol. 1, p. 58: “πάν ὅτι οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος λαμβανόμενον, ἢ κοινὸν τῶν τριῶν ὑποστάσεων λαμβάνεται, ἢ ὡς ἴδιον μιᾶς ἐξ αὐτῶν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστιν, ὃ τῶν δύο κοινὸν λαμβάνεται, ὥστε καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἢ ἐνὸς ἔσται ἴδιον ἢ κοινῶς τῶν τριῶν. Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰ κτιστὰ καὶ τὰ δοῦλα κοινὸν τῶν τριῶν, πρὸς ἄλληλα δὲ μόνου τοῦ Πατρὸς.”

If the Spirit's projection is common to all three [Persons], it would be of the Spirit Himself, and the Spirit would therefore proceed from Himself and be its own principle and cause, and concurrently cause and caused, which even the Greek myths did not invent.<sup>54</sup>

Having understood this background to Markos' distinction between common and particular properties, Markos describes in his *Syllogistic Chapters* how his Latin counterparts conversely believed that certain properties are 'particularly' held by *one* Hypostasis, other properties shared by two Hypostases are referred to as 'common', and certain properties shared equally by the three Hypostases are referred to as 'most common'. Therefore, the Son and Spirit have the 'common' property of having their existence 'of (ἐκ)' the Father. However, the Father and Son have the 'common' property of 'sending/flowing forth/gushing forth' the Spirit, that each exemplify the eternal coming forth of the Spirit from these two Hypostases.<sup>55</sup>

- 54 Nikolaos of Methone, *Κεφαλαιώδεις ἐλεγχοί*, c. 11, Demetrakopoulos, ed., p. 364–365: “Ἡ τοῖνυν τοῦ Πνεύματος προβολή εἰ μὲν κοινή τῶν τριῶν εἶναι δοθεῖν, εἴη ἂν καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πνεύματος, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἄρα ἐκπορευθήσεται τὸ Πνεῦμα καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον ἔσται αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα καὶ αἰτιατόν, ὅπερ οὐδ’ οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀνεπλάσαντο μῦθοι.” Moreover, cf. *Edictum Pseudosynodi Constantinopolitanae* [1054], Cornelius Will, ed., *Acta et scripta quae de controversiis ecclesiae graecae et latinae saeculo undecimo composita extant*. Leipzig/Marburg, 1861, p. 160, ll. 13–16; Tia Kolbaba, “Byzantine Anti-Latin Texts and the Byzantine “Anthological Mentality”,” in: Alessandra Bucossi, Anna Calia, eds., *Contra Latinos et Adversus Graecos. The Separation between Rome and Constantinople from the Ninth to the Fifteenth Century*. Leuven/Paris/Bristol, 2020, pp. 183–198 (198).
- 55 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 4, p. 373, ll. 10–30: “Οἱ Λατῖνοι μὴ θέλοντες ἐπεσθαι τοῖς κοινῇ παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογουμέναις τῆς θεολογίας ἀρχαῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρας ἐπινοοῦντες αὐτοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόθεσιν συντεινούσας, οὐ καθάπερ ἡμεῖς διαιροῦσι τὰ τῷ Θεῷ προσόντα, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λέγοντες εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἴδια τῶν θεαρχικῶν προσώπων, ἀλλ’ ἕτερόν τινα καινότερον τρόπον τὰ μὲν ἴδιά φασιν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κοινὰ, τὰ δὲ κοινότατα· τὰ μὲν ἐνὶ προσώπῳ προσόντα λέγοντες ἴδια· τὰ δὲ δυσὶ, κοινὰ· τὰ δ’ ὁμοῦ τοῖς τρισί, κοινότατα. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀσυνήθη ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς Λατίνοις συνήθως κεκαινοτόμηται, δῆλον ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν φωνῶν. Ἀλλ’ ἰδωμεν καὶ τίνα ἐστίν, ἃ φασιν εἶναι κοινὰ καὶ οὐχὶ κοινότατα. Τῷ μὲν Υἱῷ καὶ Πνεύματι λέγουσιν εἶναι κοινὸν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς εἶναι, δηλαδὴ τὸ αἰτιατόν, καὶ διὰ καὶ τὸ πέμπεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὁμόστοιχα· τῷ δὲ Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ, τὸ πέμπειν τὸ Πνεῦμα καὶ προχεῖν καὶ πηγάζειν, καὶ εἶ τι τοιοῦτον, οἷς ταῦτόν εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ προβάλλειν οὐσιωδῶς τὸ Πνεῦμα. (The Latins, unwilling to follow universally accepted theological principles, but formulating others from which they defend their own cause, distinguish those things which pertain to God in a different manner from us, saying that some things are common, while others are proper to the divine Persons. However, by another novel method, they say that some things are particular, others are common, and others are most common. In particular, they call those things that pertain to one Person ‘proper’, those that pertain to two [Persons] ‘common’, and those that pertain to all three [Persons] together ‘most common’. Indeed, it is clear from these terms that they are unusual and were recently formulated by the Latins in their own fashion. Nonetheless, let us see which of their so-called ‘common’ things are not ‘most common’.

Markos countered this Latin position by maintaining that being begotten and procession are irreducible, and they cannot be truncated into 'caused'. For Markos, generation and procession are the Son's and Spirit's respective particular, Personal properties, and they are incommunicable and irreducible to one another. Apart from the Son and Spirit having their principle of existence from the Father, respectively being generate and proceeding from Him, they do not share anything in common in terms of their relations with the Father given that the Son and Spirit are distinct from the Father and from one another in virtue of these two modes of coming-to-be:

If, when speaking of God, being caused referred to something other than being begotten and proceeding, one would be right to say that this is common to those two Persons [the Son and Spirit]. But if, however, we cannot even conceive of either of them as being caused without the mode of origin being understood (for one is caused by generation, the other by procession), this then entails that to be caused signifies, there is one term 'being caused', but there are two things: that which [comes forth by] generation, and that which [comes forth by] procession. And we ascribe these properties to each [the Son and Spirit]. Thus, those two persons have nothing else in common in relation to the Father, excluding their respective properties, through which they are distinguished both from the Father and from each other.<sup>56</sup>

Markos made a similar argument in his fourteenth syllogism, stating:

If to be caused pertains differently to the Son and to the Spirit (for generation pertains to one, and procession to the other), and if, according to the Fathers, a difference entails number, then there will certainly be two which are caused, i.e., the Son and Spirit. In this same way, if divine

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And they say that it is common to the Son and the Spirit to be from the Father, i.e., to be caused, to be sent from Him, and other things of the same kind. However, [those things which are 'common'] to the Father and the Son [include] to send, flow forth and gush forth the Spirit, and anything of that sort. They assert that such terms refer to the same thing as the essential projection of the Spirit.)" Conostas, "Mark Eugenikos," p. 446.

<sup>56</sup> Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 4, pp. 373, l. 31–374, l. 2: "Εἰ μὲν τὸ αἰτιατὸν ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ γεννητὸν καὶ ἐκπορευτὸν ἐδήλου περὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενον, εἶχεν ἂν χώραν κοινὸν τοῖς δυοῖς τοῦτο λέγειν· εἰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ' ἐπινοία λαβεῖν τὸ αἰτιατὸν ἐφ' ἑκατέρου τούτων ἄνευ τοῦ τρόπου (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν αἰτιατὸν γεννητῶς, τὸ δ' ἐκπορευτῶς), φωνὴ μὲν ἐστὶ μία τὸ αἰτιατὸν, πράγματα δὲ δύο τὸ γεννητὸν τε καὶ ἐκπορευτὸν· αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἴδια λέγομεν ἑκατέρου τούτων. Οὐκ ἄρα τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τοῖς δυοῖς ὑπάρχει πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα παρὰ τὰ ἴδια τούτων, ἅπερ αὐτὰ καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς διακρίνουσι καὶ ἀλλήλων."

causality does not equally pertain to the Father and Son (for the one is generator and projector, the other simply projector), there will certainly be two divine causes given that, according to the theologians, difference is the cause of number, that is, of duality.<sup>57</sup>

It is clear that, in these arguments, Markos drew on the long Hellenophone tradition of positing that the particular properties of the divine Persons are incommunicable to one another. For example, in the *Third Oration on the Lord's Prayer*, which aimed to interpret the Lord's Prayer from an anti-Pneumatomachian perspective,<sup>58</sup> Gregorios of Nyssa argued that each divine Hypostasis' properties are incommunicable. Gregorios explained that the Father's Hypostatic property is not transferrable to the Son nor the Spirit. Likewise, neither the Son's nor the Spirit's properties could be transferred to another Hypostasis:

if the Son is united to the Father by nature, while through the identity of the activities the Holy Spirit has been shown to be not foreign to the nature of the Son, it follows the nature of the Holy Trinity has been shown to be single – since the specific distinctive feature observed in them is not confused in the case of each of the hypostases, nor are the identifying signs swapped among them, such that the mark of the paternal hypostasis is transferred to the Son or the Spirit or, again, the Son's is applied to one of the aforementioned ones, or the distinctive feature of the Spirit appears in the Father and the Son.<sup>59</sup>

57 *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 14, p. 385, ll. 22–31: “Εἰ τὸ αἰτιατὸν διαφόρως ὑπάρχει τῷ Υἱῷ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι (τὸ μὲν γὰρ γεννητὸν, τὸ δ' ἐκπορευτὸν), ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ κατὰ τοὺς Πατέρας ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτῇ συνεισάγει, δύο ἄρα τὰ αἰτιατά, ὁ Υἱὸς καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα· κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον εἰ τὸ τῆς θεότητος αἴτιον διαφόρως Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ πρόσκειται (ὁ μὲν γὰρ γεννήτωρ καὶ προβολεὺς, ὁ δὲ προβολεὺς μόνον), δύο ἔσται τὰ τῆς θεότητος αἴτια, τῇ διαφορᾷ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἐπομένου, τουτέστι τῆς δυάδος, κατὰ τὴν τῶν θεολόγων ἀπόφασιν.”

58 Giulio Maspero, “The Trinitarian Reading of the Lord's Prayer: The Third Homily,” Matthieu Cassin, Hélène Grelier-Deneux, Françoise Vinel, eds., *Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Our Father. An English Translation with Commentary and Supporting Studies* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2021), pp. 326–354 (326–327). For further scholarship concerning the work's provenance and authenticity, cf. Mathieu Cassin, “De la composition des Homélies sur le Notre Père à leurs lectures byzantines,” in: Matthieu Cassin, Hélène Grelier-Deneux, Françoise Vinel, eds., *Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Our Father. An English Translation with Commentary and Supporting Studies Proceedings of the 14th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa* (Paris, 4–7 September 2018). Leiden/Boston, 2018, pp. 61–106.

59 Gregorios of Nyssa, *Oratio III de Oratione Dominica*, in: Johannes F. Callahan, ed., *Gregorii Nysseni Opera* 7:2. Leiden/New York/Cologne, 1992, p. 42, ll. 4–12: “εἰ τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ὁ υἱὸς ἦνεται, τῆς δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ φύσεως διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν οὐκ ἀλλότριον ἀπεδείχθη τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, μία κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἀποδέδεικται τῇ ἀγίας τριάδος ἡ φύσις, οὐ συγχεομένης ἐφ' ἑκάστης τῶν ὑποστάσεων τῆς κατ' ἐξάρετον ἐπιθεωρουμένης αὐταῖς ιδιότητος οὐδὲ τῶν

According to Gregorios, this is because the incommunicable distinction between the Hypostatic properties is regarded in the common (divine) nature.<sup>60</sup> For Gregorios, the Father's property is being without-cause.<sup>61</sup>

However, this does not pertain to the Son nor Spirit, who are both caused, one through generation, the other procession, citing John 16:28 and 15:26, respectively, to support this point.<sup>62</sup> For Gregorios, being caused could not pertain to the Father.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, given that being 'not-unbegotten' pertains to both the Son and Spirit, Gregorios attempted to discern what distinguishes the Son and Spirit to properly differentiate what is common and what is proper.<sup>64</sup> Here, Gregorios argued that the Son's property, in light of John 1:14, is being 'the only-begotten.'<sup>65</sup>

Following Gregorios of Nyssa, in *On the Divine Names*, Pseudo-Dionysios provided a further precedent for Markos' doctrine. In Chapter Two, Pseudo-Dionysios addressed the nature of union and distinction in the Godhead. Herein, he clearly distinguished natural and hypostatic properties. Like Gregorios of Nyssa, the former pertain to the common and united divine essence.<sup>66</sup> These include the "beyond-essence reality, the beyond-godly Godhead, the beyond-good goodness..."<sup>67</sup>

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γνωρισμάτων ἐκ ἀλλήλοις ἀλλασομένων ὥστε τὸ σημεῖον τῆς πατρικῆς ὑποστάσεως ἐπὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἢ τὸ πνεῦμα μετενεχθῆναι, ἢ τοῦ υἱοῦ πάλιν ἐνὶ τῶν προκειμένων ἐφαρμοσθῆναι, ἢ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ιδιότητα τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῷ υἱῷ ἐπιφαίνεσθαι." Andrew Radde-Gallewitz, English trans. in: Cassin, Grelier-Deneux, Vinel, eds., *Our Father*, p. 135.

60 Gregorios of Nyssa, *Oratio III de Oratione Dominica*, p. 42, ll. 12–14: "ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ κοινότητι τῆς φύσεως ἀκονιώντος ἡ τῶν ἰδιαζόντων θεωρεῖται διάκρισις." *Homily 3*, Radde-Gallewitz, trans., p. 135: "No, in the commonality of the nature one observes an incommunicable differentiation of properties."

61 Gregorios of Nyssa, *Oratio III de Oratione Dominica*, p. 42, l. 14: "ἴδιον τοῦ πατρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐξ αἰτίου εἶναι..."

62 *ORDOD III*, p. 42, ll. 15–19: "τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος. ὁ τε γὰρ υἱὸς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐξῆλθεν, καθὼς φησιν ἡ γραφή, καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται." *Homily 3*, Radde-Gallewitz, trans., p. 135: "Proper to the Father is to exist from no cause; one cannot perceive the same in the case of the Son and the Spirit. For the Son 'comes from the Father' as the Scripture says, and the Spirit is 'from God' and 'proceeds from the Father.'"

63 Gregorios of Nyssa, *Oratio III de Oratione Dominica*, p. 42, ll. 19–21.

64 Gregorios of Nyssa, *Oratio III de Oratione Dominica*, p. 42, ll. 21–25.

65 Gregorios of Nyssa, *Oratio III de Oratione Dominica*, p. 42, ll. 26–27: "ὁ γὰρ μονογενὴς υἱὸς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς παρὰ τῆς ἁγίας γραφῆς ὀνομάζεται, καὶ μέχρι τούτου ὁ λόγος ἴστησιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἰδίωμα." *Homily 3*, Radde-Gallewitz, trans., p. 135: "For the Only-begotten is named Son 'from the Father' by the holy Scripture, and up to this point the text confirms his property."

66 Pseudo-Dionysios, *De Divinis Nominibus* 11.4, Suchla, ed., p. 126, ll. 14–15.

67 Pseudo-Dionysios, *De Divinis Nominibus* 11.4, Suchla, ed., p. 126, ll. 15–17: "ὑπερούσιος ὕπαρξις, ἡ ὑπέρθεος θεότης, ἡ ὑπεράγαθος ἀγαθότης, ἡ πάντων ἐπέκεινα τῆς ἐπέκεινα πάντων ὄλης ιδιότητος ταυτότης ἡ ὑπὲρ ἐναρχίαν ἐνοτήης..."

Conversely, Hypostatic properties ground the distinctions in the Godhead. For Pseudo-Dionysios, these are the distinct names of the Father, Son and Spirit, which are untransferable and not held in common between the divine Hypostases.<sup>68</sup> Thus, the Hypostases have ‘their own (ἰδικῶς)’ property, through which they are clearly and absolutely distinct from one another as they are mysteriously united in distinction and distinguished in unity.<sup>69</sup> The union of hypostases is perfect and without mixture or confusion,<sup>70</sup> as each Hypostasis inheres unconfused and distinct in this perfect union through the incommunicable property exclusively held by each.<sup>71</sup> Thus, the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father. Only the Father’s Hypostasis, described by Pseudo-Dionysios as the one source of the beyond-essence Godhead, is thereby the source of intra-Trinitarian distinction.<sup>72</sup> This is because, to uphold these intra-divine distinctions, each Hypostasis preserves its own particular property without confusion or mixture.<sup>73</sup>

Following Pseudo-Dionysios, Ioannes Damaskenos employed this reasoning in his *Exposition*: “The Father is Father and not Son. The Son is the Son and not the Father. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit and not the Father nor the Son.” This is because the property (ιδιότης) of each is immutable.<sup>74</sup>

Subsequently, as Photios describes in the *Mystagogy*, Chapter 46, being generate solely pertains to the communication of existence to the Son, as each Person is mysteriously connected in an inseparable communion with the other Persons according to nature. However, by reason of the Hypostasis, the immutable character of each Person’s properties is preserved with the distinction between the Hypostases precluding any confusion between them. Indeed, just as being in communion in virtue of nature precludes any division or fraction in God, so too do the properties distinguishing each Person preclude any mixture or confusion between the Persons.<sup>75</sup>

68 Pseudo-Dionysios, *De Divinis Nominibus* 11.4, Suchla, ed., p. 125, ll. 19–21.

69 Cf. Pseudo-Dionysios, *De Divinis Nominibus* 11.3, p. 127, ll. 5–7.

70 Pseudo-Dionysios, *De Divinis Nominibus* 11.4, pp. 127, l. 16–128, l. 1.

71 Pseudo-Dionysios, *De Divinis Nominibus* 11.5, p. 128, ll. 8–11.

72 Pseudo-Dionysios, *De Divinis Nominibus* 11.5, p. 128, ll. 11–12.

73 Pseudo-Dionysios, *De Divinis Nominibus* 11.5, p. 128, ll. 12–13.

74 Ioannes Damaskenos, *Expositio Fidei* 77, Kotter, ed., p. 174, ll. 4–5: “Πατήρ ὁ πατήρ καὶ οὐχ υἱός, υἱός ὁ υἱός καὶ οὐ πατήρ, πνεῦμα ἅγιον τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ οὐ πατήρ οὐδὲ υἱός· ἡ γὰρ ιδιότης ἀκίνητος. (The Father is the Father and not the Son, the Son is the Son and not the Father, the Spirit is the Holy Spirit and not the Father nor the Son; for [these names] are the immutable property [of each divine Hypostasis].)” See Theodoros Alexopoulos, “Τὸ ἀμετάπτωτο – ἀκίνητο τῶν ὑποστατικῶν ιδιωμάτων στὸν ἱερό Φῶτιο, στοὺς Καππαδόκες Πατέρες καὶ στὰ Ἀρεοπαγίτικα ἔργα,” *Θεολογία* 78:1 (2007), 241–263.

75 Photios, *Mystagogy* 46, Polidori, ed., p. 42, ll. 5–11.

Following Photios, in his twelfth century treatise, *Against the Latins on the Doctrine that the Spirit Proceeds from the Father and Does Not Also Proceed from the Son*, Nikolaos of Methone similarly emphasised the incommunicability of the Personal properties between the divine Hypostases, stating:

Will we then give this characteristic property of the Father, which is the bringing forth from himself of the Son and the Spirit through theogony, also to one of those from him, or, since for each of the two – both with the other and with the Father – the specific character is not communicable, will we also so maintain the characteristic property of the Father as incommunicable with those who are from him, so that it is also an essentially characteristic property?<sup>76</sup>

Given this background, I argue that Markos' application of the principle of the incommunicability of the Hypostatic properties has a firm basis in the preceding Hellenophone theological tradition.

In his fourth syllogism, Markos addressed the notion of the Spirit being 'sent' by positing that one should not interpret this term to entail that the Spirit comes-to-be eternally from the Son. Rather, the term refers to the 'benevolence (εὐδοκία)' of God,<sup>77</sup> and to all of creation being 'offered' before its first cause.<sup>78</sup>

76 Nikolaos of Methone, *Λόγος πρὸς τοὺς Λατίνους περὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐ μὴν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύεται*, Konstantinos Simonides, ed., *Ὁρθοδόξων Ἑλλήνων θεολογικαὶ γραφαὶ τέσσαρες*. London, 1858, pp. 1–39 (6, l. 27–7, l. 2): "Πότερον οὖν τὸ πατρικὸν τοῦ τοῦ ἰδῖωμα, ὅπερ ἦν τὸ προάγειν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ θεογόνως τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα, δώσωμεν καὶ τῷ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ὥσπερ τούτων ἐκάτερον πρὸς τε θάτερον καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα ἀκοινώτητος ἢ ἰδιότητος ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τῷ Πατρὶ ἀκοινώνητον πρὸς τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ διατηρήσωμεν τὸ ἰδῖωμα, ἵνα καὶ ὄντως ἰδῖωμα ᾖ;" English trans. from Bucossi, "12th-Century Philosophers," p. 312, with modifications.

77 Here, Markos evoked Gregorios of Nazianzus, *Discours* 38, 15, Claudio Moreschini, ed., Paul Gallay, French trans., *Discours 38–41*. Paris, 1990, p. 138, ll. 1–5: "Ἀπεστάλη μὲν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄνθρωπος· διπλοὺς γὰρ ἦν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐκοπίασε καὶ ἐπείνησε καὶ ἐδίψησε καὶ ἡγωνίασε καὶ ἐδάκρυσε νόμῳ σώματος· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὡς Θεός, τί τοῦτο; Τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀποστολὴν εἶναι νόμισον."

78 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 4, p. 374, ll. 2–6: "Τὸ δὲ δὴ πέμπεσθαι καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον μάλιστα μὲν τὴν εὐδοκίαν δηλοῖ, κατὰ τὸν θεολόγον Γρηγόριον, καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν τὰ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀναφέρεσθαι πάντα, καὶ ἵνα μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀντίθεσι." Constan, "Mark Eugenikos," p. 447. The notion of a 'common benevolence (κοινὴ εὐδοκία)' as a way of distinguishing the Spirit being 'sent' from the Spirit's procession was also discussed by Markos' contemporaries and close associates, Ioseph Bryennios, *Λόγος ΙΗ' Περὶ τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος*, in: Eugenios Boulgaris, ed., *Ἰωσήφ μοναχοῦ τοῦ Βρυεννίου τὰ εὐρεθέντα*, Vol. 1, Leipzig, 1768, p. 344; Georgios Scholarios, *Traité II sur le procession du Saint-Esprit*, in: Jugie, Sidéridès, Petit, eds., *Oeuvres Complètes*, Vol. 2. Paris, 1929, p. 327, l. 5–12; *Réponse aux Syllogismes de Marc d'Ephèse sur la procession de la Saint-Esprit*, in: Petit, Sidéridès, Petit, eds., *Oeuvres*

The Spirit being sent here evidently assumes spatio-temporal distance as being sent presumes that the Spirit is being sent to someone/somewhere, for example. These characteristics could not be attributed to the Godhead, which transcends time. Thus, insofar as the Spirit being sent entails temporal motion, the Father and Son could not share this 'sending' as a common property vis-à-vis the Spirit. Conversely, the Son and Spirit both bear the property of 'being sent' as the two Persons are sent from the Father into creation. As He is uncaused and without-principle, the Father is the sole cause of being, as He is uncaused and without-principle. Conversely, whereas the Son and Spirit both come to be from the Father, there are no shared properties between the Father and Son which the Spirit does not also bear.<sup>79</sup> Markos evoked Pseudo-Dionysios the

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*Complètes*, Vol. 3, p. 515, l. 13–32, in reference to the above passage from Gregorios of Nazianzus' *Thirty-Eighth Oration*. This distinction has a basis in Nikolaos of Methone, p. 374: "...τῷ μὲν γάρ, Ὅταν ἔλθῃ, εἰπεῖν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐδήλωσε τοῦ Πνεύματος καὶ τὸ αὐτοκίνητον· τῷ δὲ εἰπεῖν, Πέμψω ὑμῖν παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς, τὴν τε ταυτοβουλίαν τῆς ὅλης Τριάδος καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ κοινὸν ἔδειξε θέλημα· κἀνταῦθα γὰρ τὴν εὐδοκίαν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀποστολὴν εἶναι νομιστέον, ὥς ἂν εἰ εἶπεν, ὅτι ἐλεύσεται κατὰ κοινὴν εὐδοκίαν καὶ θέλησιν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἅμα· ὅθεν καὶ ἡ πρόοδος αὐτοῦ παριστᾷ..." English trans. from Bucossi, "12th-Century Philosophers," p. 331, with modifications: "By saying 'when He [the Spirit] comes' [John 15:26], [Christ] made clear the Spirit's free will and 'free movement', but by saying 'I will send [him to] you from the Father', He showed the identity of the will of the entire Triad and the one, shared desire: from there indeed it must be understood that his good will and that of the Father are the sending forth, as He said that [the Spirit] will come according to a common good-will, [according to] His and the Father's intention, together and simultaneously, from which his emanation also occurs..."

- 79 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 4, pp. 374, l. 7–375, l. 4: "Ἐπειτα καὶ χρονικὸν ὄν καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ διὰ τι γινόμενον, οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως προσλογίζοιτο τοῖς θεοῖς ἰδιώμασιν ἀνάρχους τε καὶ αἰδίους ὀφείλουσιν εἶναι. Τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τοῦ πέμπειν ἐφοῦμεν· ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ χρονικὸν ὄν καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ διὰ τι γινόμενον, οὐκ ἂν εὐλόγως ὡς ἴδιον τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ πρὸς τὸ Πνεῦμα δοθεῖν· πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ταῦτόν εἶναι τῇ ἀνάρχῳ καὶ ἀναίτιῳ προόδῳ τοῦ Πνεύματος. Ἐπειτ' οὐδὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ πέμπειν ἀφήρηται· καὶ δῆλον ἐξ ὧν ὁ προφήτης φησὶν ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ Υἱοῦ λέγων· Κύριος ἀπέσταλκέ με καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ. Εἰ δὲ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀπεστάλθαι παρὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος λέγεται, πόθεν δῆλον; ἢ δεῖξον, ἢ μὴ κατασοφίζου. Καίτοιγε ὁ θεὸς Χρυσόστομος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος λόγῳ παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς εἰρημένον τοῦτο δείκνυσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν τῆς Ἱσκαίου προφητείας ῥημάτων καὶ τοῦτον ἀπεστάλθαι παρὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος διατείνεται. Κοινότηατον ἄρα τὸ πέμπειν, καὶ οὐχὶ κοινόν, ὡς δοκεῖ τοῖς Λατίνοις. Οὐδ' ἄρα τὸ προβάλλειν αἰδίως τὸ Πνεῦμα κοινόν ἐστι Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τῷ μὲν Υἱῷ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι θαυμαστόν οὐδέν, εἴ τι κοινὸν ὑπάρχει πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀρχὴ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναρχὸς καὶ ἀναίτιος· οἱ δ' ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι τὸν Πατέρα καὶ ἅμφοι. (Moreover, one should not ascribe to the divine properties what pertains to a certain time, for a certain purpose and reason, as they are without beginning and eternal. This also pertains to the [Spirit's] 'sending', as being something which pertains to a certain time, for a certain purpose and reason, it would not be reasonable to ascribe it as a Personal property of the Father and Son vis-à-vis the Spirit, let alone to the Spirit's without-beginning and uncaused coming forth. Moreover, the Spirit is not deprived of the power to send, as is evident from what

Areopagite's *On the Divine Names* and Gregorios of Nazianzus' *Thirty-Fourth Oration* to defend this view. Pseudo-Dionysios stated:

As the divine word declares, what is common to the Father and Son is also common and proper to the Holy Spirit...<sup>80</sup>

Moreover, Gregorios of Nazianzus stated:

All that the Father has, the Son has also, except for [being the] cause; all that the Son had, the Spirit has, except for generation...<sup>81</sup>

After providing this theological groundwork, Markos further addressed the doctrine of the divine Persons being 'sent'. Markos highlighted that the Father was manifested in the Old Testament, whereas the Son's manifestation took place in the New Testament. The Son's manifestation is synonymous with the Son being 'sent' by the Father in creation. However, it was necessary for the Spirit to be manifest after the Son, and in this sense the former is described as 'sent', namely, He is manifested by the already-revealed Father and the Son. Accordingly, it was only possible for humankind to come to 'know' and be

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the Prophet says on behalf of the Son: "The Lord sent me and his Spirit." [Isaiah 48:16 LXX] But if you say that, in His humanity, the Son was sent by the Spirit, how is this evident? Either show it, or do not sophistically debate it. Moreover, in his *Oration on the Holy Spirit*, holy Chrysostomos demonstrates from the very words of Isaiah's Prophecy that the verse is ascribed to the Father, and contends that he was sent by the Son and Spirit. Therefore, to send is 'most common', and not 'common', as the Latins believe. Thus, neither is the Holy Spirit's eternal projection common to the Father and Son. Moreover, it is by no means surprising that what is common to the Son and Spirit should be fitting vis-à-vis the Father, for He is not only the principle, but is also without-principle and without-cause. However, they both have the Father as their principle.)" Conostas, "Mark Eugenikos," p. 447.

- 80 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 4, p. 375, ll. 4–7: "Οὐ γὰρ ἐφίησι τοῦτο Διονύσιος ὁ μέγας διαπρύσιον κεκραγῶς· «Τὰ κοινὰ Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ, καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι κοινωνικῶς καὶ ἡνωμένως ὁ θεαρχικὸς ἀνατίθησι λόγος.»" Markos paraphrased Pseudo-Dionysios, *De Divinis Nominibus* 11.1, Suchla, ed., p. 124, ll. 6–11: "Καὶ αὖθις, ὅσα ἐστι τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ, τῷ θεαρχικῷ πνεύματι κοινωνικῶς καὶ ἡνωμένως ἀνατίθησι τὰς θεουργίας, τὸ σέβας, τὴν πηγαίαν καὶ ἀνέκλειπτον αἰτίαν καὶ διαμονὴν τῶν ἀγαθοπρεπῶν δώρων. Καὶ οὐδένα τῶν ἐν τοῖς θείοις λογίοις ἀδιαστρόφοις ἐννοίαις ἐντεθραμμένων οἶμαι πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντερεῖν, ὅτι τὰ θεοπρεπῆ πάντα τῇ ὅλῃ θεαρχίᾳ πρόσεστι κατὰ τὸν θεοτελῆ λόγον."
- 81 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 4, p. 375, ll. 7–10: "Καὶ ὁ Θεολόγος Γρηγόριος· «Πάντα ὅσα ὁ Πατὴρ, τοῦ Υἱοῦ, πλὴν τῆς αἰτίας· πάντα ὅσα ὁ Υἱός, τοῦ Πνεύματος, πλὴν τῆς γεννήσεως.»" Gregorios of Nazianzus, *Discours* 34, 10, Claudio Moreschini, ed., Paul Gallay, French trans., in: *Discours* 32–37. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1985, p. 216, ll. 14–15.

given and receive the Holy Spirit after the Father revealed the Son through the Incarnation in Christ.<sup>82</sup> Markos rhetorically asked:

For what other sending and mission is there from God, who is omnipresent and immutable? That is why he says: “If I go, I will send Him [the Spirit] to you.”<sup>83</sup> But this does not necessarily refer to the [Spirit’s] eternal coming forth. For He is not saying, ‘If I do not go, I will not send the Paraclete, and if I go, then I will project Him’, but instead, “if I am taken away from your sight, I will reveal His grace and power to you.”<sup>84</sup>

In addition, Markos maintained that motion, being a characteristic of material entities, is foreign to the divinity. Thus, if motion is attributed to the Son being ‘sent’, this could strictly refer to the Son’s corporeal manifestation in creation. Nonetheless, the Spirit being sent could strictly refer, not to His Person, but to His ‘energy’ and ‘grace’. His Person. Markos evoked Ioannes Chrysostomos’ *Thirty-Second Oration on the Gospel of John* to defend this claim:

Scripture sometimes calls the Spirit’s grace ‘fire’, and sometimes ‘water’, showing that such names do not refer to the [divine] essence, but to the [divine] energy.<sup>85</sup>

82 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 4, p. 375, ll. 11–20: “Ἐτι περὶ τῆς ἀποστολῆς ἀκριβέστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. Ἐγνωστο μὲν ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν τῇ παλαιᾷ Διαθήκῃ· ἔδει δὲ καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν γνωσθῆναι ἐν τῇ καινῇ. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τὸν Υἱὸν ἀπεστάλθαι, τὸ οἰοῖναι πεφανερῶσθαι παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς εἰς τὸν κόσμον. Πάλιν τοῦ Υἱοῦ γνωσθέντος, ἔδει γνωσθῆναι καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. Διὰ τοῦτο παρὰ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ τῶν ἡδὴ προεγνωσμένων ἀπεστάλθαι λέγεται, τουτέστι πεφανερῶσθαι...”

83 John 16:7.

84 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 4, p. 375, ll. 20–28: “τίς γὰρ ἐτέρα πέμψις καὶ ἀποστολὴ Θεοῦ τοῦ πανταχοῦ παρόντος καὶ μηδαμοῦ μεταβαίνοντος; Διὰ τοῦτό φησιν· Ἐάν πορευθῶ, πέμψω αὐτὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ τὴν αἰδιον πρόοδον δηλοῖ πάντως· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅτι, «ἐάν ἐγὼ μὴ ἀπέλθω, οὐ προβαλῶ τὸν Παράκλητον, ἐάν δὲ πορευθῶ, τότε προβαλῶ», ἀλλ’ ὅτι, «ἐάν αὐτὸς ἐξ ὀφθαλμῶν ὑμῶν γένωμαι, νῆν ἐκεῖνου χάριν καὶ δύναμιν ὑμῖν φανερῶσω.” Conostas, “Mark Eugenikos,” pp. 447–448.

85 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 4, p. 376, ll. 2–7: “Ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσα ἐκείνης αὕτη, μάρτυς ὁ θεὸς Χρυσόστομος ἐν ταῖς εἰς τὸ κατὰ Ἰωάννην ὁμλίαις οὕτω λέγων· «Τοῦ Πνεύματος τὴν χάριν ἢ Γραφὴ ποτὲ μὲν πῦρ, ποτὲ δὲ ὕδωρ καλεῖ, δεικνύσα, ὅτι οὐκ οὐσίας ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείας.»” Ioannes Chrysostomos, *Homilia xxxii in Ioannem*, PG 59, col. 183a. In *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 8, p. 378, ll. 31–34, Markos evoked the Spirit being ‘breathed’ by Christ after His Resurrection as a defence of the Spirit’s procession from the Son. Markos responded to this assertion by positing that the Spirit’s essence was not given by Christ, in virtue of Chrysostomos’ exegesis in his *Eighty-Sixth Oration on the Gospel of John*, which posits that this breathing instead refers to the Spirit’s ‘ineffable grace’, ‘energy’, and ‘variegated gift’ being given to the Apostles. See Ioannes Chrysostomos, *Homilia lxxxvi in Ioannem*, PG 59, col. 471. Conostas, “Mark Eugenikos,” p. 448 and n. 108.

Having quoted this passage, Markos explains:

The term ‘Spirit’ here refers to the energy; for this is what is distributed and sent forth; and it is sent forth from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit, being common to the Trinity, or rather one and the same.<sup>86</sup>

Connected with the manifestation of the Spirit following those of the Father and Son in salvation history is the trend within the Medieval Latin tradition to rank the Trinitarian Hypostases in an order, which correlates to their mode of origin. Evoking the notion that, following the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit is ranked third, in his sixth syllogism, Markos describes how his Latin counterparts maintained that He accordingly comes forth from both the Father and Son in a graded manner.<sup>87</sup> Markos countered this argument by opposing the idea that the Trinitarian Persons are orderable or numerable, as the divinity exceeds such numeracy:

In fact, distinguished men, I would have said to them [the Latins], if the Son is second to the Father (for that is what [their] relation demands), and nothing else is involved, what could the Holy Spirit in fact be if not third? For He will clearly not be first. However, the Son must be second. Thus, the Holy Spirit is third, for he brings to fulfilment the blessed Trinity. For this reason, in my view, this order is also commonly used by theologians, so that the Spirit, if placed after the Father, is not believed to be the Son. For when they speak simply, they also have no need for the order.

Indeed, in his forty-third syllogism, Markos later denounced such ordering in the Trinity as ‘Origenist’:

86 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 4, p. 376, ll. 7–12: “Πνεῦμα ἐνταῦθα τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν λέγει· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ μεριζομένη αὕτη τοιγαροῦν καὶ ἡ πεμπομένη· πέμπεται δὲ παρὰ Πατρός δι’ Υἱοῦ ἐν ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι, κοινῇ τῆς Τριάδος οὕσα, μᾶλλον δὲ μία καὶ ἡ αὕτη.” Constat, “Mark Eugenikos,” p. 448. While Petit’s edition considers this passage to be part of the passage from Chrysostomos’ *Thirty-Second Oration on John*, as this passage cannot be discerned in Chrysostomos’ works, Petit’s argument is improbable.

87 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 6, p. 376, ll. 29–36: “Οἱ Λατῖνοι τὸ τρίτον εἶναι μετὰ τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ὡς ὁμολογούμενον ἔχοντες, ἐκ τῆς τάξεως ταύτης οἴονται δεῖκνυσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκπορεύεσθαι. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ τάξιν εἶχε, φασί, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν κατὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν σχέσιν, οὐκ ἂν ἐλέγετο τρίτον, οὐδὲ ἐξῆς μετ’ αὐτόν. (While the Latins confess that the Holy Spirit is third after the Father and Son, they aim to show that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son from this order. For, they say, if He did not also have a relation to the Son, by which He is referred to Him, He would not be called third, nor would He [the Spirit] come after Him [the Son].)”

The Latins, in describing a proximate and non-proximate cause [of the Spirit] in relation to the Father and the Son, establish a first, second, and third in a certain and necessary order of nature, [and] clearly separate the Holy Spirit [by a certain interval] from the Father, introducing degrees and gradations into the Holy Trinity, by asserting that the Father is in fact greater than the Son, and the Son greater than the Holy Spirit. However, let them learn from the Fifth General Council that these were the views of Origen: For the blessed Emperor Justinian says these things in his treatise on the subject: “He who, before all others, blasphemed against the Holy and Coessential Trinity Itself, dared to say that the Father is greater than the Son, and the Son greater than the Holy Spirit.”<sup>88</sup> Thus, in the same treatise, [Justinian] calls him [Origen] a polytheist. And rightly so, for Gregorios the Theologian says: “For us there is one God, since there is one divinity and all that proceeds from Him is referred to the One.”<sup>89</sup> If, then, those who trace all things back to one believe in one God, those who do not refer the two [Persons, i.e., the Son and Spirit] to one [the Father], but refer one [the Spirit] to two [the Father and Son], clearly do not believe in one God, but in many [gods], and what more do they reproach the Greeks [i.e., the Pagans] for?<sup>90</sup>

Returning to his sixth syllogism, Markos goes on to quote a passage from the *Commentary on Genesis 24:2*, “Put Your Hand Under My Thigh,” traditionally attributed to Ioannes Chrysostomos, but which was likely composed by Severian of Gabala, which states: “For the Holy Trinity has no order, not because

88 Justinian I, *Liber Adversus Originem*, pg 86, col. 947b–c. This work was composed in the lead-up to the Synod of Constantinople of 543, which condemned Origenism. Cf. Marius Tela, “Origenism in the Vision of Emperor Justinian I (527–565),” *International Journal of Orthodox Theology* 13:1 (2022), 28–56 (41).

89 Gregorios of Nazianzus, *Discours* 31, 14, Galloway, Jourjon, ed. and French trans., *Discours* 27–31, p. 302, 2–3.

90 *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 43, pp. 409, ll. 1–23: “Οἱ Λατῖνοι προσεχῆς καὶ οὐ προσεχῆς αἴτιον ἐπὶ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ λέγοντες καὶ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον φυσικῇ τινὶ τάξει καὶ ἀναγκαίᾳ, δῆλον ὅτι διίστῳσι τοῦ Πατρὸς τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα καὶ βαθμοὺς καὶ ὑποβάσεις εἰσάγουσιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος, καὶ τὸν μὲν Πατέρα μείζονα τοῦ Υἱοῦ λέγουσι, τὸν δὲ Υἱόν, τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος. Ἀλλ’ ἀκούετσαν τῆς πέμπτης συνόδου τῶν οἰκουμενικῶν, ὅτι ταῦτα τοῦ Ἰωριγένους εἰσὶ δόγματα· λέγει γὰρ ὁ αἰδῖμος βασιλεὺς Ἰουστινιανὸς ἐν τῷ κατ’ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ περὶ αὐτοῦ τάδε: «Ὅστις πρὸ πάντων εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἁγίαν καὶ ὁμοούσιον Τριάδα βλασφημήσας, ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν, τὸν μὲν Πατέρα μείζονα εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ, τὸν δὲ Υἱόν, τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος». Ὅθεν καὶ πολὺ θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ φησί. Καὶ εἰκότως λέγει γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεολόγος Γρηγόριος: «Ἡμῖν εἰς Θεός, ὅτι μία θεότης καὶ πρὸς ἕν τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει». Εἰ τοίνυν οἱ πρὸς ἕν τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀναφέροντες εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν πιστεύουσιν, οἱ μὴ πρὸς ἕν τὰ δύο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν ἀναφέροντες πρὸς τὰ δύο, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ εἰς ἕνα Θεόν, ἀλλ’ εἰς πολλοὺς πιστεύουσι καὶ τί ἔτι τοῖς Ἕλλησι μέμφονται.”

it is without-order, but because it is beyond order.”<sup>91</sup> Subsequently, Markos quotes a passage from Gregorios of Nazianzus’ *Thirty-Fourth Oration: On the Arrival of the Egyptians*, which was delivered in Constantinople in May 380.<sup>92</sup> The quoted passage states: “[The Trinity] is before-number, enumerated, and beyond number.”<sup>93</sup> Accordingly, Markos rhetorically asks:

Thus, what does order provide you to establish your case, if it is not necessary that whatever is referred to something in order should also originate from the same [thing]?

- 91 Pseudo-Ioannes Chrysostomos [Severian of Gabala], *In Illud Abrahae Dictum, Pone Manum Tuam Sur Femur Meum* (Gen. 24:2), PG 56, col. 555. Constan, “Mark Eugenikos,” pp. 448–449. Likewise, see Basil of Caesarea, CE 111.1, Bernard Sesboüé, Georges-Matthieu de Durand, Louis Doutreleau, eds., Vol. 2: *Œuvres II–III. SC 305* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1983), p. 146, ll. 24–30. This Basilian passage would become a significant point of departure between the Latin and Byzantine Churches during the Later Medieval Period due to the variant nature of the Latin translations of *Against Eunomios*, Book 111. Cf. Jan van Dieten, ‘Zur Diskussion des Filioque auf dem Konzil von Florenz,’ *Byzantinische Σύμμεικτα* 16 (2008): 217–282 (232–238, 244–247); Joseph Gill, *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge: CUP, 1959), pp. 195–196; Christiaan Kappes, ‘The Filioque, Thomas de Aquino Byzantinus, and Ps.-Basil’s Contra Eunomium: Mark Eugenikos and John Montenero, OP, at the Council of Florence (1439),’ *Eastern Churches Journal* 26 (2019): 141–193 (142–144); Jacob van Sickel, “How Difficulties in Transmitting the Texts of Basil’s *Adversus Eunomium* 3.1 and Maximus’ *Letter to Marinus* Led to the Rise and Fall of Ferrara-Florence,” Kenneth Steinhauser, Scott Dermer Edwin, eds., *The Use of Textual Criticism for the Interpretation of Patristic Texts* (Lewiston: Mellen Press, 2013), pp. 431–450. Cf. Cf. M. S. Troiano, ‘Il concetto di numerazione delle ipostasi in Basilio di Cesarea,’ VC 24 (1987): 337–352. See also Photios’ exposition of Iobios the Monk in *Bibliotheca*, Codex 222, in: *Biblioteca*, Vol. 2 of 2, ed. by Nunzio Bianchi and Claudio Schiano, Italian trans. by Stefan Micunco. Pisa, 2021, Vol. 2, p. 344: “Ἐδει δὲ τὸν βίον, ἐν ᾧ πατέρες παῖδας φύουσι, τὸν Θεὸν καὶ πατέρα προ τεταγμένον γινώσκεισθαι τοῦ υἱοῦ, οὐ τῆς τριάδος τὴν τάξιν ἀπαιτούσης (ποῦ γὰρ τάξις, ἔνθα τὸ ἴσον ἀπαράλλακτον;) ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ κατ’ οἰκονομίαν τάξεως τοὺς πατέρας τιμᾶσθαι παρὰ τῶν παίδων παραίνουσης.” Ewan Davies, ‘The *Οἰκονομικὴ Πραγματεία* of Iobios the Monk (*Bibl. cod. 222*) A Key Influence on the Thought of Photios, Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople,’ *Scrinium* 21(1) (2025), 274–319 (315–316). Gregorios Palamas also counteracted the notion that there is any kind of intra-Trinitarian order, arguing that the Trinity transcends such orders. See Gregorios Palamas, *Λόγος Α' Ἀποδεικτικός* 33, in: *Ἱερογρίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα*, Vol. 1, ed. by Panagiotis Christou. Thessalonica, 2010, p. 61, ll. 19–21. Cf. Davies, “*Οἰκονομικὴ Πραγματεία*,” 316, n. 182; Mikonja Knežević, “The Order (τάξις) of Persons of the Holy Trinity in Apodictic Treatises of Gregory Palamas,” *Philotheos* 12 (2012), pp. 84–102.
- 92 See Moreschini, “Introduction,” in: Moreschini, ed., Gallay, French trans., *Discours* 32–37, pp. 29–31, who describes how the oration was delivered in response to Egyptian corn-fleet sailors bypassing local Arian churches in Constantinople in order to worship at his church, the Anastasia.
- 93 Cf. Gregorios of Nazianzus, *Discours* 34, 15, Moreschini, ed., Gallay, French trans., *Discours* 32–37, p. 224, 1–6.

To defend his argument, Markos continues to quote a passage from *Epistle 38: On the Difference Between Essence and Hypostasis*, which was traditionally attributed to Basil of Caesarea, but scholars more recently have ascribed this work to Gregorios of Nyssa,<sup>94</sup> which states:

For the Holy Spirit, from whom the outpouring of all goodness flows on creatures as though from a fountain, does in fact depend on the Son, with whom He is inseparably united. However, He has His existence from the Father, from whom He also proceeds. This is His distinct Hypostatic property, namely, that He is known after the Son and with Him, and that He subsists from the Father.<sup>95</sup>

In virtue of this passage, Markos asks:

Do you hear what that expounder of heavenly things says? [(Pseudo-)Basil] says, “He depends on the Son,” that is, He closely follows Him, not because He proceeds from Him, but because He is conceived as having His origin immediately from the Father together with Him [the Son].

Markos then goes on to quote two passages ascribed to Gregorios of Nyssa’s *On Not Three Gods to Ablabios*, likely composed c.390.<sup>96</sup> The first passage states:

the interposition of the Son preserves for Him the status of being the Only-Begotten and does not exclude the Spirit from His natural relation to the Father.

94 Cf. Giulio Maspero, Mirko Degli Espositi, Dario Benedetto, “Who Wrote Basil’s *Epistula 38*? A Possible Answer Through Quantitative Analysis,” Johan Leemans, Matthieu Cassin, eds., *Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium III. An English Translation with Commentary and Supporting Studies* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 579–594.

95 (Pseudo-)Basil of Caesarea, *Letter 38*, Roy J. Deferrari, ed. and trans., *Letters*, Vol. 1: *Letters 1–58* (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1926), p. 206.

96 For further studies of this work, its provenance, and its importance in the history of Trinitarian theology, see Lewis Ayres, “On Not Three Gods: Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology,” *Nicaea and Its Legacy* (Oxford: OUP, 2004), pp. 344–363; Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium*, pp. 212–214; G. Isayé, “L’Unité de l’opération divine dans les écrits trinitaires de saint Grégoire de Nysse,” *RSR* 27 (1937), 422–39; Marksches, “Gibt es eine einheitliche ‘kappadozische Trinitätstheologie’?” pp. 74–76; Andrew Radde-Gallewitz, “Gregory of Nyssa and the Three Gods Problem: Activity and Etymology in *To Ablabius*,” Anna Marmodoro, Neil B. McLynn, eds., *Exploring Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical, Theological, and Historical Studies* (Oxford: OUP, 2018), pp. 199–219.

The second passage, does not explicitly appear in Gregorios' work, but closely resembles the passage from Pseudo-Basil quoted above, states:

His [the Spirit's] distinguishing sign is that He is known after the Son and with Him, and that He subsists from the Father.<sup>97</sup>

Markos then rhetorically concluded, "What could be said more lucidly or clearly than these words? What could be more in accord with our view?"<sup>98</sup>

Subsequently, in his seventh argument, Markos sought to elucidate the nature of the Son-Spirit relation. Markos addressed the controverted term, 'Spirit of the Son',<sup>99</sup> by accepting that in addition to being called this term, the Spirit is also proper to the Son and not foreign from Him. However, Markos believed that these facts do not entail that the Spirit proceeds from the Son. Markos highlighted that Kyrillos of Alexandria stated in his Epistle to Ioannes, Patriarch of Antioch, from January 433, that, in terms of essence, the Spirit is not foreign to the Son. Markos maintained that this is the case not as a result of the former being 'caused' in some sense by the Person of the Son.<sup>100</sup> Moreover,

97 Gregorios of Nyssa, *Quod Non Sint Tres Dei*, Müller, ed., GNO 3(1), p. 56, ll. 8–10.

98 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 6, pp. 376, l. 36–378, l. 3: "Ἀλλ' ὦ γενναῖοι, φαίην ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς, εἰ μετὰ τὸν Πατέρα δεύτερος ὁ Υἱὸς (τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ σχέσις ἀπαιτεῖ), καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι μετὰ τὸν Πατέρα δεύτερος δὲ ὁ Υἱὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τρίτον ἄρα τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, εἴπερ ἐστὶ συμπληρωτικὸν τῆς μακαρίας Τριάδος ἐκεῖνης. Διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἡ τάξις, οἶμαι, τοῖς θεολόγοις παρεῖληπται, ἵνα μὴ Υἱὸς νομισθῇ μετὰ τὸν Πατέρα ταττόμενον· ἄλλως γὰρ καὶ ἀναίρουσι τὴν τάξιν. «Οὐκ ἔχει γὰρ, φασί, τάξιν ἡ ἅγια Τριάς, οὐχ ὡς ἄτακτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑπὲρ τάξιν». Καὶ αὖθις· «Τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ προαριθμοῦνται καὶ συναριθμοῦνται καὶ ὑπαριθμοῦνται». Τί οὖν ὑμῖν ἡ τάξις συντελεῖ πρὸς τὴν ὑμετέραν ὑπόθεσιν, εἰ μὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐχόμενόν τινος κατὰ τάξιν, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν ἀνάγκη; Φέρε δὴ καὶ τὸν μέγαν ὑμῖν προβῶμεν Βασιλείον, ἵν' εἰδῶμεν οἷα περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου φθέγγεται. «Ἐπειδὴ» φησὶ «τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ἀφ' οὗ πᾶσα ἐπὶ τὴν κτίσιν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν χορηγία πηγάζει, τοῦ Υἱοῦ μὲν ἡρτηται ᾧ ἀδιαστάτως συγκαταλαμβάνεται, τῆς δὲ τοῦ Πατρὸς αἰτίας ἐξηκόμενον ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ὅθεν καὶ ἐκπορεύεται, τοῦτο γνωριστικὸν τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ιδιότητος σημεῖον ἔχει, τὸ μετὰ τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ γνωρίζεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑφεστάναι». Ἀκούεις τοῦ οὐρανοφάντορος, οἷα λέγει; Τοῦ Υἱοῦ, φησὶν, ἡρτηται, τούτεστιν ἔχεται, οὐχ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐκπορεύεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι σὺν αὐτῷ ἀδιαστάτως ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἔχον καταλαμβάνεται, «τῆς τοῦ Μονογενοῦς μεσιτείας», ὁ φησὶν ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Γρηγόριος ὁ τῆς Νύσσης, «καὶ ἑαυτῷ τὸ μονογενὲς φυλαττούσης καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τῆς φυσικῆς πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα σχέσεως μὴ ἀπαλλοτριούσης». Καὶ πάλιν· «Γνωριστικὸν σημεῖον ἔχει», φησὶ, «τὸ μετὰ τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ γνωρίζεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑφεστάναι». Τούτων τί ἂν γένοιτο λευκότερον ἢ σαφέστερον ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν δόξαν ὁμοφωνότερον."

99 Cf. Galatians 4:6.

100 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 7, p. 378, ll. 4–24: "Πολύ τι δοκεῖ συμβάλλεσθαι τοῖς Λατίνοις πρὸς τὴν οἰκειάν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ λέγεσθαι τοῦ Υἱοῦ Πνεῦμα τὸ Πνεῦμα ἅγιον· ἐγὼ δὲ προσθήσω τούτῳ καὶ ὅτι ἴδιον τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀλλότριον τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὅμοια. Ἀφ' οὗν διὰ ταῦτα

Markos described how, in *On the Holy Spirit*, composed in 375 and addressed to Amphilochios, Bishop of Iconium, for the purpose of defending the coessentiality of the Spirit in the Trinity against Pneumatomachianism,<sup>101</sup> Basil the Great states that the term ‘Spirit of Christ’ describes the affinity between the Son and Spirit in terms of their nature.<sup>102</sup> Accordingly, when the Spirit is described as being “of the Son,” this is not describing the Spirit’s mode of

καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐκπορεύεται; Ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἑάσει τοῦτο πρῶτον μὲν Θεοδῶρητος, βλάσφημόν τε καὶ δυσσεβῆ τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν ἡγούμενος· ἔπειτα καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ θεϊότατος Κύριλλος ἐν οἷς φησί· «Κατ’ οὐδέν᾽ αὖτε τρόπον σαλεύεσθαι ἀνεχόμεθα τὴν ὀρίσθεισαν παρὰ τῶν Πατέρων πίστιν ἣτιν τὸ τῆς πίστεως σύμβολον, οὕτε μὴν ἐπιτρέπομεν ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ἑτέροις λέξιν γοῦν μίαν ἀμείψαι τῶν ἐγκειμένων ἐκέισε· οὐ γὰρ ἦσαν αὐτοὶ οἱ λαλοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ὃ ἐκπορεύεται μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς, ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἀλλότριον τοῦ Υἱοῦ κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον». Ἀκούεις κατὰ τίνα λόγον τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα λέγεται καὶ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀλλότριον; Κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας, φησί, λόγον, ὡς ὁμοούσιον αὐτῷ δηλονότι. (It seems to contribute greatly to the Latins’ own position that the Holy Spirit is called ‘the Spirit of the Son.’ Nonetheless, I will add that the same Spirit is said to be proper to the Son and not foreign to the Son, and whatever else is similar to these. Does He therefore also proceed from the same? But, to begin, this was not allowed by Theodoret, who considered this to be a blasphemous and impious view [Cf. Kyrillos of Alexandria, *Apologeticus Contra Theodoretum*, ACO 1.1.6, pp. 133, l. 5–134, l. 15]. Subsequently, [it was also considered as such] by the most holy Cyril himself, who said: “We will not in any way tolerate any deviation from the faith established by the Fathers, i.e., the Symbol of Faith. or do we permit ourselves or others to alter even a single word of what is set down there. For it was not they who spoke, but the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from God the Father, yet is not foreign to the Son in terms of essence.” Do you hear how it is said that the Spirit is of the Son, and is both His own and not foreign to Him? He says, “According to the reason of the essence, that is to say, as coessential with the Son.”) Cf. Kyrillos of Alexandria, *Epistula ad Iohannem Antiochem*, Schwartz, ed., ACO 1.1.4, p. 19, ll. 23–26. Constan, “Mark Eugenikos,” p. 449.

101 Cf. Yves Courtonne, ed. and trans., *Saint Basile. Lettres*, Vol. 3. Paris, 1966, p. 8; Paul Fedwick, “A Chronology of Basil,” in: Paul Fedwick, ed., *Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic: A Sixteen-Hundredth Anniversary Symposium*, Vol. 1. Rome, 1979, pp. 3–20 (16–17); John Joseph Whitty, “Reading Basil of Caesarea’s *On the Holy Spirit* as Apology: Reassessing the Influence of Eustathius of Sebaste on the Treatise,” VC 77:4 (2022), 353–374 (358).

102 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 7, p. 378, ll. 24–30: “Λέγει δὲ καὶ ὁ μέγας Βασίλειος ἐν τῷ ιη’ τῶν πρὸς Ἀμφιλόχιον· «Πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ λέγεται ὡς ὡκειωμένον κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ». Τίνα τοίνυν ἐξηγητὴν ἔτι βελτίονα τῶν ἀποστολικῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ῥημάτων δεξόμεθα παρὰ τοὺς θεοῦς τουτουοὺ διδασκάλους; (But Basil the Great also says in the eighteenth chapter to Amphilochios [of Iconium]: ‘And He is called the ‘Spirit of Christ’, as though [He is] united to Him [the Son] according to nature.’ What more excellent interpreters of the Apostles’ words and of their own words shall we look for, if not these divine theologians?)” Cf. Constan, “Mark Eugenikos,” p. 449. Basil of Caesarea, *Sur le Saint Esprit* xviii.46, ed. and French trans. by Benoît Pruche. Paris, 1968, p. 410, 10–11. For Basil’s Trinitarian theology more broadly, see esp. Stephen M. Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea: A Synthesis of Greek Thought and Biblical Truth*. Washington, D.C., 2007.

coming forth from the Son. Rather, it describes the close connection between the two Persons, who are united in sharing in the divine essence.

Markos further claimed that one could describe the Son and Spirit as having an image-based relation, and defences of the Spirit's procession from the Son were put forward by highlighting that He is described as Christ's "image".<sup>103</sup> Markos countered these pro-filioquist arguments by positing that it is not always the case that the entity which an image (in nature or art) depicts is the cause of this image. Thus, while the Son is described by the Apostle Paul as the Father's "Image" in Colossians 1:15, one should not interpret this statement in terms of the Father causing the Son, but in terms of the Son being manifested in the image of His Father, as exemplified by Christ's statement in John 14:9, "Anyone who has seen Me has seen the Father." Moreover, while He is in the Son's image, the Spirit is not an image insofar as the Son is one of the Spirit's ontological causes. Rather, this is the case as it is through the Holy Spirit that humanity is given knowledge of the Son, as Paul describes in 1 Corinthians 12:3, "no one can say 'Jesus is Lord' except in the Holy Spirit." Likewise, when Christ describes in John 16:14 that the Spirit would "receive what is Mine", Markos highlighted that Ioannes Chrysostomos describes in his *Seventy-Eighth Oration on the Gospel of John* that this entails that the Holy Spirit would take on and bring to completion Christ's activity, similar to how the Son took on and completed the Father's activity. Accordingly, the Holy Spirit appropriates and perfects the Father's continuing activity in the Son. In this sense, the Spirit is the Son's 'image' because the Spirit declares and glorifies the Son, and assumes, sustains, and completes the Son's activity:

Again, they [those who support the *filioque*] invoke the Holy Spirit as the 'Image of the Son' to support their doctrine. To this we say that there is no need at all, whether in art or in nature, for an image to have what it depicts as its cause. For while the Son is said to be the 'Image of the Father', it is not insofar as He [the Son] relates to Him [the Father] as cause, but insofar as He represents and depicts Him in Himself, as He says to Philip at a certain point, "He who has seen Me has seen the Father".<sup>104</sup> Thus, the Holy Spirit is the 'Image of the Son' not insofar as He is the Spirit's cause,

103 On this, cf. Athanasios of Alexandria, *Epistula 1 ad Serapionem* 24.7–8, in: Dietmar Wyrwa, Kyriakos Savvidis, eds., *Athanasius Werke*, Vol. 11: *Epistula 1–IV ad Serapionem*. Berlin, 2010, p. 512, ll. 28–35; (Pseudo-)Basil of Caesarea, *Adversus Eunomium* 5, PG 29, col. 724c; Gregorios Thaumaturgos, *Expositio Fidei*, PG 10, col. 985a; Ioannes Damaskenos, *Expositio Fidei* 13, Bonifatius Kotter, ed., *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskenos*, Vol. 2. Berlin, 1973, p. 40, 75–76.

104 John 14:9.

but insofar as the Son could not otherwise be known except through the Holy Spirit. For [the Apostle Paul] says, “no one can say that Jesus is ‘Lord’ except by the Holy Spirit”.<sup>105</sup> And then [Christ says], “[the Spirit] will glorify Me, for He will take of what is Mine and declare it to you”.<sup>106</sup> The divine Chrysostomos explains this, stating: “That is, He [the Spirit] will declare to you what is in harmony with My words. For what is Mine is the Father’s. Through declaring of what is the Father’s to you, He will declare it from what is Mine”.<sup>107</sup> For just as the Son, having come to fulfil the Old Law, namely, to perfect it and add what was lacking in it because of the weakness of the hearers, thus glorified the Father who gave this Law (For He says, “I have glorified You on earth, I have finished the work You gave Me to do” [John 17:4]), so too does the Holy Spirit accomplish the Son’s work. [Christ says to His Apostles] “I have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. However, when He, the Spirit of Truth, comes, He will guide you into all truth: for He will not speak of Himself, but whatever He hears, He will speak, and He will tell you of things to come”.<sup>108</sup> He says, “He will take and declare to you from what is Mine”,<sup>109</sup> namely, that which is lacking. And this is the same work as the Father’s work, for [Christ says] “all that the Father has is Mine”.<sup>110</sup> Therefore, the Holy Spirit is the Image of the Son insofar as He declares what belongs to the Son and glorifies the Son, receiving from His work and perfecting it, just as Christ Himself accomplished the Father’s work.<sup>111</sup>

105 1 Cor. 12:3.

106 John 16:14.

107 See Ioannes Chrysostomos, *Homilia LXXVIII [LXXVII] ad Joannem*, PG 59, col. 423c.

108 John 16:12–14.

109 John 16:14.

110 John 16:15.

111 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 9, pp. 379, l. 23–380, l. 31: “Πάλιν τὸ εἰκόνα λέγεσθαι τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον εἰς συνηγορίαν ἔλκουσι τοῦ οἰκείου δόγματος. Λέγομεν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο, ὡς οὐ πάντως ἀνάγκη τὴν εἰκόνα τὸ εἰκονιζόμενον αἴτιον ἔχειν, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῆς τέχνης, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῆς φύσεως. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ Υἱὸς εἰκὼν τοῦ Πατρὸς λέγεται, οὐ τοσοῦτον ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν κατ’ αἰτίαν ἀναφερόμενος, ὅσον ὡς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν Πατέρα προδεικνύς καὶ εἰκονίζων, ὡς πού φησι πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον· ‘Ὁ ἑωρακὼς ἐμέ, ἑώρακε τὸν Πατέρα. Εἰκὼν τοίνυν καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, οὐχ ὡς αἰτίου αὐτοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὴ οἶόν τε γινῶναι τὸν Υἱὸν ἐτέρωθεν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος. Οἶδεις γὰρ, φησί, δύναται εἰπεῖν Κύριον Ἰησοῦν, εἰ μὴ ἐν Πνεύματι ἁγίῳ. Καὶ αὖθις· ‘Ἐκεῖνος ἐμέ δοξάσει, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν.’ ‘Ὅπερ ὁ θεῖος Χρυσόστομος ἐξηγούμενος, «Τουτέστι», φησί, «συνωδὰ τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἔρει· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐμὰ ἐστὶ τὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ Πατρὸς ἔρει, ἐκ τῶν ἐμῶν ἔρει». Καθάπερ γὰρ ὁ Υἱὸς ἐλθὼν εἰς τὸ πληρῶσαι τὸν παλαιὸν νόμον, τουτέστι τελειῶσαι καὶ προσθεῖναι τὰ παραλειμμένα διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀκούοντων ἀσθένειαν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὸν Πατέρα ἐδόξεσε τὸν τὸν νόμον ἐκεῖνον θέμενον (‘Εγὼ γὰρ σε, φησίν, ἐδόξασα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, τὸ ἔργον ἐτελείωσα, ὃ δέδωκάς μοι ἵνα ποιήσω), οὕτω καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον τὸ τοῦ

In addition to the above argument, Markos described how his Latin counterparts sought to overcome the claim that the doctrine of the Spirit's dual procession is a theological novelty by positing that the statement "through the Son (διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ)" is identical to the statement 'from (ἐκ) the Son. Markos rejected this argument, and having analysed how 'from (ἐκ)' and 'through (διὰ)' were employed in Scripture, he posited that such prepositions are strictly synonymous in terms of the economy.<sup>112</sup> Conversely, if the Holy Spirit is described as essentially coming forth 'from the Father (ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς),' this procession occurs 'through the Son (διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ)'. Nevertheless, Markos maintained that this term does not entail that the Spirit's Hypostatic existence is derived from the Son. Rather, the term describes the manner in which the Spirit is manifested given that, because the Father gives the Son Himself, the Son is not apart from or different to the Father.<sup>113</sup>

Υἱοῦ ἔργον ἐτελείωσεν αὐθις· Πολλὰ γάρ, φησίν, ἔχω λέγειν ὑμῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύνασθε βασιτάζειν ἄρτι· ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ ἐκεῖνος, τὸ Πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας, ὁδηγήσει ὑμᾶς εἰς πάσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν· οὐ γὰρ λαλήσει ἄρ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἂν ἀκούσῃ, λαλήσει, καὶ τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν. Ἐκεῖνος ἐμέ δοξάσει, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ λήψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν. Ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ, φησίν, ἔργον τὰς ἀφορμάς λήψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν, τὰ λειπόμενα δηλονότι· ὁ ἔργον ταυτόν ἐστι τῷ τοῦ Πατρὸς· Πάντα γὰρ ὅσα ἔχει ὁ Πατήρ, ἐμὰ ἐστι. Διὰ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ εἰκὼν τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, διὰ τὸ ἀναγγέλλειν τὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν δοξάζειν, ἐκ τοῦ ἔργου αὐτοῦ λαμβάνον καὶ τελειοῦν αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς." Constan, "Mark Eugenikos," pp. 449–450.

112 See Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 10, p. 380, ll. 32–38: "Ἐτι τὸ διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ προῖεναι ἢ ἐκπορεύεσθαι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον εἰς ταυτὸν ἄγουσι τῷ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, τὴν διὰ λέγοντες ἰσοδυναμεῖν τῇ ἐκ παρὰ τῇ Γραφῇ. Ἐνθα μὲν οὖν ἰσοδυναμεῖ, περὶ δημιουργίας ὁ λόγος, ὅτε καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐπὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τίθεται. Πάντα γὰρ, φησί, δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο. (They believe that the notions that the Holy Spirit proceeds from/ex the Son or through/per the Son signify the same thing in Scripture. In fact, 'through/per' is the same [with from/ex] when speaking of creation, particularly when this term is used to the Son separately to the Father. For example, they say that, "All things were made through Him." [John 1:3])"

113 Cf. Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 20, pp. 389, l. 16–390, l. 11: "Φασὶν οἱ Λατῖνοι μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἐπὶ τῶν θείων προσώπων τὴν διὰ τῆς ἐκ παρὰ τῇ Γραφῇ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δι' Υἱοῦ προῖεναι λέγεσθαι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον εἰς τὸ ἐξ Υἱοῦ μεταφέρουσιν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπαιτήσωμεν αὐτοὺς ἀγκαίως ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξαι, εἰ καὶ διὰ Πατρὸς προῖεναι ἢ ἐκπορεύεσθαι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον εὐρηγὰι που φερόμενον. Εἰ γὰρ ταῦτόν καὶ ἀδιάφορον ἦν, ἔδει καὶ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς κτίσεως εὐρίθαι, πολλὰ τοῦ Παύλου ἀπόστολος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ διὰ θελήματος Θεοῦ· καὶ πάλιν Παῦλος ἀπόστολος οὐκ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ διὰ Θεοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ· καὶ πάλιν· Ἐκτὴσάμην ἄνθρωπον διὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ· καὶ πάλιν· Οὐχὶ διὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἢ διασάφῃς αὐτῶν ἐστιν; Ὅλως δὲ εἰ μὲν πάντα τὰ περὶ τοῦ θείου λεγόμενα Πνεύματος πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν ὁμοίως ἀνεφέρατο, εἶχεν ἂν χώραν λοιποποιεῖν ἅπαντα καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἑκατέρου ὁμοίως ὁμολογεῖν πρόοδον· εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν τῷ Πατρὶ ἰδίως, τὰ δὲ τῷ Υἱῷ νενέμῃται, τὰ δ' ἀμφοτέροις ἐπίσης, μὴ μιγνύτωσαν ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα· δι' Υἱοῦ προῖεναι λέγεται, δι' Υἱοῦ χορηγεῖσθαι τῇ κτίσει, ἐν Υἱῷ μένειν, ἐν Υἱῷ ἀναπαύεσθαι, οὔτε δὲ διὰ Πατρὸς προῖεναι, οὔτε διὰ Πατρὸς χορηγεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἐν Πατρὶ μένειν, οὔτε ἐν Πατρὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεσθαι. Λεγέσθω τοιγαροῦν τὰ κεκηρυγμένα, καὶ τὰ σεσηγμένα σιγάσθω, καὶ τὸ ἐξ Υἱοῦ

Nonetheless, the Spirit's procession is never described apart from the Father. Instead, He is said to come forth the Father through the Son. Thus, it is clear that the phrase 'through the Son' refers to something other than 'from the Son'. In fact, [the term] does not indeed describe [the Spirit's] procession, but [His] impartation [in salvation history]. For Ioannes Damaskenos states, "We indeed call the Spirit the 'Spirit of the Son', but we do not say [He is] 'from the Son'. Instead, we confess that He is manifested through the Son and through Him is imparted to us."<sup>114</sup> This distinction clearly exhibits that the phrase 'through the Son' refers to something completely different from the meaning it is given by the Latins. And if [this phrase] was sometimes said concerning the Spirit's essential procession, we again call on the theologians to interpret their own words. In his work *Against Eunomios*, Gregorios of Nyssa states: "The Holy Spirit is understood conjointly with the Son, without being regarded as posterior to the Son, so that the Only Begotten is never conceived without the Spirit. Instead, He also has His principle of existence from the God of all, from whom the Only Begotten Light illuminates through the true Light."<sup>115</sup> Here, the term 'without being regarded as posterior'

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τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκπορεύεσθαι ὡς ἔκφυλόν τε καὶ ἀηθες ἀπεσκορακίσθω. (When speaking of the divine Persons, the Latins claim that there is no distinction in Scripture between the prepositions through/per and from/ex, and thus, when it says that the Holy Spirit proceeds through/per the Son, they interchange the words and say He proceeds from/ex the Son. Nevertheless, we shall demand of them to clearly exhibit whether they have not also discovered at another place that the Holy Spirit proceeds or comes forth through/per the Father. For if both expressions were of equal weight and interchangeably used, this also should have been said, just as it is found in other places when creation is being addressed: "Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ, through the will of God." [2 Cor. 1:1; Eph. 1:1; 2 Tim. 1:1] And again, "Paul, an Apostle, not from men, nor through men, but through God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ." [Gal. 1:1] And at another point, "I brought forth a man through God." [Gen. 4:1 LXX] And again, "Is their revelation not through God?" [Gen. 40:8 LXX] In short, if whatever is said of the divine Spirit was equally referred to the Father and the Son, we should ascribe everything equally to both, and profess the procession from both alike; but if some things are attributed separately to the Father, others to the Son, and others equally to both, let us not confuse all these terms. It is indeed said that [the Spirit] proceeds through the Son, [that He] is granted through the Son to creatures, [that He] abides in the Son, [and] rests in the Son. However, He does not proceed through the Father, nor is He granted through the Father, nor does He abide in the Father, nor rest in the Father, but [it is said] that He proceeds from the Father. Thus, let those things be declared which have been handed down. But let those which have been passed over in silence be passed by, and let that statement, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, be banished as something foreign and rejected.)"

114 I. Dam., *EF* 1.8, Kotter, ed., pp. 30, 290–31, 292.

115 Gregorios of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 1.378, Jaeger, ed., *GNO* 1, p. 138, ll. 9–15.

is the same in meaning as ‘through the Son’, which Gregorios clearly described as equivalent to ‘with the Son’ in another place, writing, “Through Him and with Him, before any empty or non-hypostatic notion arises, the Holy Spirit proceeds.”<sup>116</sup> When explicating the saying of the Apostle, ‘so that now the manifold wisdom of God might be made known to the principalities and powers through the Church,’ Chrysostomos<sup>117</sup> understood ‘through the Church’ rather than ‘with the Church,’ for it was not the Church which taught the angels [about divine things].<sup>118</sup>

Accordingly, the term ‘through’ denotes the Son’s mediatory role, and Gregorios of Nyssa states in his work *Why There Are Not Three Gods* that this term upholds the Son’s status as the only-begotten and does not exclude the Spirit having a natural relation to the Father.<sup>119</sup> Markos argued that, regarding the Son, Gregorios thus stated He is generate “proximately from the First [i.e., the Father]” insofar as the Son is begotten of the Father. Nonetheless, Gregorios stated of the Spirit “through the proximate [i.e., the Son] from the first,” and not that He came forth “not proximately.”<sup>120</sup> Thus, according to Markos:

116 Gregorios of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 1.378, Jaeger, ed., *GNO* 1, p. 138, ll. 7–9.

117 See Ioannes Chrysostomos, *Homilia VII in Epistolam ad Ephesios*, PG 62, col. 49d.

118 See Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c.10, pp. 380, l. 38–381, l. 31: “Ἡ δὲ τοῦ Πνεύματος πρόοδος οὐδέποτε ἄνευ τοῦ Πατρὸς τίθεται, ἀλλ’ ἐκ Πατρὸς φασὶ δι’ Υἱοῦ. Δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτερό τι τὸ δι’ Υἱοῦ καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐξ Υἱοῦ σημαίνει. Καίτοι γε οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως τοῦτο λέγεται. Λέγει γὰρ ὁ Δαμασκηνὸς Ἰωάννης· «Πνεῦμα Υἱοῦ λέγομεν, ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ δὲ οὐ λέγομεν· δι’ Υἱοῦ δὲ φανεροῦσθαι καὶ μεταδίδοσθαι ἡμῖν ὁμολογοῦμεν». Αὐτὴ ἡ διαστολὴ προδήλως ἕτερόν τι τὸ δι’ Υἱοῦ παρ’ ὃ βούλονται Λατῖνοι καθαρῶς ἀποφαίνεται. Εἰ δὲ ποτε καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσιώδους εἰρηται τοῦτο προόδου τοῦ Πνεύματος, πάλιν αὐτοὺς τοὺς θεολόγους ἐξηγητὰς ἐαυτῶν καλέσωμεν. Λέγει γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Εὐνόμιον ὁ θεῖος Γρηγόριος ὁ τῆς Νύσσης· «Τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ συνημμένως καταλαμβάνεται, οὐχ ὑπερῖζον κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν μετὰ τὸν Υἱόν, ὡς ποτε τὸν Μονογενὴ διῆχα τοῦ Πνεύματος νοηθῆναι, ἀλλ’ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ Θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχον τοῦ εἶναι, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ μονογενὲς ἐστὶ φῶς, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ φωτὸς ἐκλάμψαν». Ἐν τούτοις σαφῶς τὸ μὴ ὑπερῖζειν κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ δηλοῦν βούλεται, ταυτὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν μετὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ὅπερ ἐν ἄλλοις διαρῆδην φησί· «Δι’ αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ μετ’ αὐτοῦ, πρὶν τι κενὸν καὶ ἀνυπόστατον παρεμπεσεῖν νόημα, τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκπορεύεται». Καὶ ὁ Χρυσορρήμων δὲ ἐξηγούμενος τὸ ἀποστολικὸν ἐκεῖνο ῥήτόν· “Ἵνα γνωρισθῇ νῦν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διὰ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ἡ πολυποίκιλος σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸ διὰ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ἀντὶ τοῦ μετὰ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ἐξέλαβεν· οὐ γὰρ δι’ ἡ Ἐκκλησία τοὺς ἀγγέλους ἐδίδαξεν.” Constat, “Mark Eugenikos,” p. 450.

119 Gregorios of Nyssa, *Quod Non Sint Tres Dei*, Müller, ed., *GNO* 3(1), p. 56, ll. 5–10.

120 See Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 10, pp. 381, l. 32–382, l. 7: “Οὕτως οὖν κἀναναῦθα τὸ διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ληπτέον· ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως· Ἐπεὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσιωδῶς ἐκπορεύεσθαι λέγεται, ἵνα μὴ Υἱὸς ἕτερος νομισθῇ (καὶ γὰρ ὁ Πατὴρ πρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν ἀποδίδοται), διὰ τοῦτο τὸ δι’ Υἱοῦ παρείληπται, τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ μεσιτείας, ὃ φησιν αὖθις ὁ ἱερὸς Γρηγόριος ἐν ἐτέροις· «καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ μονογενὲς φυλαττούσης καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τῆς φυσικῆς πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα σχέσεως μὴ

And this [statement], as has been said, signifies the communion and the coherence [between the Son and Spirit], and that they come forth from the Father with equal honour and from the same nature. Thus, if the Father was called ‘projector’, the Spirit would be proximate to the projector, and the Son, through Him who is proximate to the projector, i.e., the Spirit, as both come forth jointly and with equal honour from the Father.<sup>121</sup>

Thus, for Markos, the term ‘through the Son’ offers no backing to the Latins in establishing their doctrine of the Spirit’s procession. Indeed, he argues the use of this preposition it betrays the contrary. Markos continues by citing a passage from Maximos the Confessor’s Epistle to Marinos, a Presbyter in Cyprus, from c.645-646,<sup>122</sup> which states:

The Synodical Epistle of the most holy Pope of the present day was not addressed by the citizens of the Imperial City [Constantinople] in all of the chapters you mentioned, but only in two, one of which regarded theology, i.e., that he said the Spirit proceeds from the Son also, and the other [chapter] regarding the economy, i.e., that he said the Lord was not without original sin insofar as it concerns His humanity. Concerning the

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ἀπειργούσης». Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ προσεχῶς μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τὸν Υἱὸν φησιν ἐν ἑτέροις, ὡς Υἱὸν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς δηλονότι· τὸ δὲ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον οὐκ εἶπεν οὐ προσεχῶς (οὕτω γὰρ ὑστερίζον ἔσται κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν), ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου... (When the Holy Spirit is said to proceed essentially from the Father, the addition of ‘through the Son’ ensures that He is not considered to be another Son, (for the Father is attributed to the Son), for this reason the phrase ‘through the Son’ is omitted, in virtue of the Son’s mediation, as holy Gregorios states elsewhere, “[the mediation of the Son], while preserving for Himself [the Son] the status of being Only-Begotten, does not preclude the Spirit from having a natural relation to the Father.” For this reason, he first refers to the Son in relation to others, i.e., as the Son of the Father; but he did not speak of the Holy Spirit in the same way (for then He would be inferior in being), but ‘through the proximate from the first!’)”

121 See Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 10, p. 382, ll. 7–14: “τοῦτο δὲ τὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ ἀλληλουχίαν, ὡς εἴρηται, παριστᾷ, καὶ τὸ ὁμοτίμως καὶ ὁμοφυῶς ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς προῖέναι. Οὕτω γὰρ εἰ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐλέγετο προβολεύς, τὸ μὲν Πνεῦμα προσεχῶς ἂν ᾦν ἐκ τοῦ προβολέως, τουτέστι τοῦ Πνεύματος, ἐπεὶπερ ὁμοτίμως ἄμφω καὶ συνημένως ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς προΐασιν.” Constan, “Mark Eugenikos,” p. 450.

122 On dating, cf. Marek Jankowiak, Phil Booth, “A New Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor,” in: Pauline Allen, Bronwen Neil, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor*. Oxford, 2015, p. 19–77 (49); Jean-Claude Larchet, “Introduction,” in: Jean-Claude Larchet, Emmanuel Ponsoye, eds., *Saint Maxime le Confesseur: Opuscules théologiques et polémiques*. Paris, 1998, pp. 7–108 (76); Polycarp Sherwood, *An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor*. Rome, 1952, p. 54.

first [chapter], they [those of Constantinople] referenced statements from the Roman Fathers and Cyril of Alexandria in his *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, wherefrom it is exemplified that they did not make the Son the cause of the Spirit's procession (for they acknowledge the Father as the sole cause of the Son by generation and the Spirit by procession), but instead they indicated that the Spirit proceeds through the Son, thus exhibiting the shared essence [of the Son and Spirit] and the lack of any difference in [their] nature."<sup>123</sup>

On the basis of this passage, Markos claims:

The Latins act against the illustrious Maximos here. For along with the Romans, and indeed the Pope, of his age, he interchanges the term 'from' with 'through' and says that this indicates the lack of any essential difference [between the Persons]. Nonetheless, forsaking the statements of the Fathers and treating them with indifference, the Latins regard 'through/per the Son' as the same in meaning to 'from/ex the Son', ascribing to the Son causality of the Spirit, which the Fathers clearly rejected. What could be more shameless than this contention?<sup>124</sup>

In his thirty-fourth syllogism, Markos makes similar claims regarding the equality of the Son and Spirit in having the Father as their cause, stating:

<sup>123</sup> See Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 10, pp. 382, l. 14–383, l. 3: “Οὐκ ἄρα πλέον οὐδὲν ἔσται Λατίνοις ἐκ τῆς διὰ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν. Ὅτι δὲ καὶ τούναντίον ἐστὶν ἅπαν ἥπερ ἐκεῖνοι βούλονται, παρίτω ἄλλιν ἡμῖν μαρτυρήσων ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας μάρτυς καὶ ὁμολογητὴς ὁ θεοτάτος Μάξιμος. Λέγει γὰρ οὗτος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Μαρίνον Κύπρου πρεσβύτερον ἐπιστολῇ τοιάδε· «Τῶν τοῦ νῦν ἀγιωτάτου πάπα συνοδικῶν οὐκ ἐν τοσούτοις, ὅσοις γεγράφατε, κεφαλαίοις οἱ τῆς βασιλίδος πόλεως ἐπελαβοντο, δυσὶ δὲ μόνοις, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὑπάρχει περὶ θεολογίας, ὅτιπερ εἶπε τὸν Κύριον μὴ δίχα τῆς προπατορικῆς ἀμαρτίας εἶναι ὡς ἄνθρωπον. Καὶ τοῦ μὲν πρώτου ῥήσεις παρήγαγον Ῥωμαίων πατέρων καὶ Κυρίλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας ἐκ τῆς πονηθείσης αὐτῷ πραγματείας εἰς τὸν ἅγιον Ἰωάννην τὸν εὐαγγελιστήν, ἐξ ὧν οὐκ αἰτίαν τὸν Υἱὸν ποιούντας τῆς τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἐκπορεύσεως σφὰς αὐτοὺς ἀπέδειξαν (μῖαν γὰρ ἴσασιν Υἱοῦ καὶ Πνεύματος τὸν Πατέρα αἰτίαν, τοῦ μὲν κατὰ γέννησιν, τοῦ δὲ κατ' ἐκπόρευσιν), ἀλλ' ἵνα τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ προιέναι δηλώσωσι, καὶ ταύτην τὸ συναφὲς τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἀπαράλλακτον παραστήσωσιν.» Maximos the Confessor, *Epistola ad Domnum Marinum Cypri Presbyterum*, PG 91, cols. 133d–136b.

<sup>124</sup> See Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 10, p. 383, ll. 3–14: “Ἐνταῦθα τὴν ἐναντίαν ὥσπερ ἐπί- τηδες οἱ Λατίνοι τῷ μεγίστῳ Μαξίμῳ βαδίζουσιν. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τῶν τότε Ῥωμαίων καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάπα τὴν ἐκ πρὸς τὴν διὰ μεταφέρει, καὶ ταύτην τὸ συναφὲς τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἀπαράλλακτον παριστᾶν βούλεται· οἱ δὲ μικρὸν ἡγούμενοι τὸ μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς Πατράσιν, ἂν μὴ καὶ τάναντία φρονῶσι, τὸ δι' Υἱοῦ ταῦτὸν ἡγούναι τῷ ἐξ Υἱοῦ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ Πνεύματος τῷ Υἱῷ διδῶσιν, ἥς ἐκεῖνοι καθάπαξ αὐτὸν ἀφείλοντο. Τί ἂν γένοιτο ταύτης τῆς μάχης ἀναισχυντότερον.”

Those who agree with the Latins ask us if the Father projects the Holy Spirit with or without His power and wisdom, presuming that if we reject one [of these alternatives], we posit the other. For if the Son is the wisdom and power of the Father, the Father would in fact project the Holy Spirit with the Son, and not do so alone. Moreover, we affirm that the Father projects the Holy Spirit with the Son, with the Word, wisdom, and power, as the Holy Fathers say, for the Holy Spirit proceeds with the Word, accompanying and revealing Him, so that the Word is not without the Spirit, and the Spirit does not proceed without the Word. Nonetheless, this [fact] does not entail that the Son is the cause of the Spirit's existence, just as the Spirit is not the Son's cause, for it is impossible for things that concurrently come forth from the same source to be the causes of the others. Thus, the Holy Spirit does not need to proceed from the Son just as He proceeds from the Father. If this was so, the Spirit would not be different to creatures, which were also made by God's Word, wisdom, and power. In fact, "through Him, all things were made, and without Him nothing was made that has been made."<sup>125</sup> Therefore, it is not necessary to say that what is not made exists through Him [the Son]. Additionally, the Son is not as much the Father's wisdom and power as He is the Son and Word. The Son is the Word of the Father, but the Father is not the Son nor the Word (as the Son is traced to the Father, and the Word is traced to the one speaking [the Word]). Nonetheless, wisdom and power belong to the Father in such a way that they are also His own wisdom and power, and not merely that of the wise and powerful. Wisdom is of wisdom, and power of power, as God is of God and light of light. The Father is called 'wisdom' and 'power' because in Him is all wisdom and power, as though He was the archetype of the image. However, as no one learned in Scripture would reject, the Holy Spirit is no less wisdom and power. These names are essential and common to the divine Persons, as holy Augustine exemplifies in his work *On the Trinity*.<sup>126</sup> Therefore, as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as wisdom and power proceed from wisdom and power, it is futile and vain to inquire if the Father projects the Holy Spirit with His wisdom and power, unless one seeks to transmute this into a notion of creatures, as Scripture says, "The Lord founded

<sup>125</sup> John 1:3.

<sup>126</sup> See Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII.1, in: W. J. Mountain, F. Glorie, eds., *De Trinitate Libri XV*, Vol. 1: *Libri I–XII*. Turnhout, 1968, pp. 244, 1–245, 55. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (ST) I, q. 39, a. 5, ad. 1, Editio Leonina, Vol. 4. Rome, 1888, p. 405.

the earth in wisdom, and by understanding He prepared the Heavens.”<sup>127</sup> Additionally, the Father does not require the support of wisdom or power for the Spirit’s procession to come to be, just as He does not require the support of the Son’s generation or of any of the divine powers. As the theologians state, this pertains to creatures. Thus, both the Son and Holy Spirit equally and immediately come forth from the Father’s essence, the Son with the Spirit. However, neither [the Son nor Spirit come forth] from the other and are not dependent on the other in any way.<sup>128</sup>

Evoking Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 36, a. 2, in his thirteenth syllogism, Markos highlighted that, for Aquinas, the divine Hypostases are distinct strictly according to the opposition of relations [of origin].<sup>129</sup> In this sense, the

127 Proverbs 3:9.

128 *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 34, pp. 402, l. 20–404, l. 5: “Ερωτώσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ τὰ Λατίνων φρονούντες, εἰ μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως καὶ σοφίας ὁ Πατήρ προβάλλει τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ἢ ἀσάφως καὶ ἀδυνάτως, ἢ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ φεύγοντες τὸ πρῶτον ἀποκρινόμεθα. πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἡμᾶς ἀπαγάγωσι δόξαν, ὅτι εἰ σοφία καὶ δύναμις τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐστὶν ὁ Υἱός, μετὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἄρα προβάλλει τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ὁ Πατήρ, καὶ οὐ μόνος αὐτός. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μετὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ προβάλλει τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ὁ Πατήρ, εἴτ’ οὖν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς ἀρνησόμεθα· συμπρόεισι γὰρ τῷ Λόγῳ κατὰ τοὺς θεῖους Πατέρας τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον καὶ συμπαρομαρτεῖ καὶ συναναφαίνει αὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε Λόγος ἐστὶν ἄνευ Πνεύματος, οὔτε τὸ Πνεῦμα πρόεισι ἄνευ τοῦ Λόγου. Πλὴν οὐχ οὕτως, ὥστε καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν αἵτιον τῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος ὑπάρξεως εἶναι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ Υἱοῦ αἵτιον· τὰ γὰρ ὁμοῦ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἐκ τινος προϊόντα, καὶ ἀλλήλων αἵτια εἶναι ἀδύνατον. Οὐ τοῖνυν εἰ μετὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ πρόεισι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ προϊέναι ἀνάγκη τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον· εἰ δὲ μή, τῶν κτισμάτων οὐδὲν διοίσει τῶν διὰ λόγου Θεοῦ καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ σοφίας γεγεννημένων· Πάντα γὰρ, φησί, δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν, ὃ γέγονεν. Ὁ ἄρα μὴ γέγονεν, οὐδὲ δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν ἀνάγκη. Ἐπειτα οὐχ οὕτω σοφία καὶ δύναμις τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐστὶν ὁ Υἱός, ὡς Υἱὸς ἢ Λόγος· Υἱὸς μὲν γὰρ καὶ Λόγος οὕτως ἐστὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς, ὡς μὴ ὄντος αὐτοῦ Υἱοῦ μηδὲ Λόγου (πρὸς τὸν πατέρα γὰρ ὁ υἱὸς ἀναφέρεται καὶ πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα ὁ λόγος)· σοφία δὲ καὶ δύναμις οὕτως ἐστὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς, ὡς καὶ αὐτοῦ σοφίας καὶ δυνάμεως ὄντος καὶ οὐ σοφοῦ καὶ δυνατοῦ μόνον· σοφία γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐκ σοφίας καὶ δύναμις, ὡς ὅλην αὐτοῦ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχων, ὡς ἂν εἰκὼν ἀρχετύπου. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον οὐδὲν ἦττον σοφία καὶ δύναμις· καὶ τούτῳ γε οὐδεὶς ἀντερεῖ τῶν τὰς Γραφὰς εἰδόντων, καὶ ὅτι κοινὰ καὶ οὐσιώδη τῶν θείων εἰσὶ προσώπων ταυτὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ὁ θεὸς δὲ Ἀβουστίνος ἐν τῷ περὶ Τριάδος βιβλίῳ τούτοις συμμαρτυρεῖ. Εἰ τοῖνυν σοφία καὶ δύναμις ἐκ σοφίας καὶ δυνάμεως τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. περιττόν ἐστι καὶ μάταιον ἐρωτᾶν, εἰ μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας καὶ δυνάμεως ὁ Πατήρ προβάλλει τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, εἰ μὴ τις αὐτὸ κτίσμα βούλοιο κατασκευάζειν, καθάπερ εἴρηται· Ὁ Θεὸς τῇ σοφίᾳ ἐθεμελίωσε τὴν γῆν, ἡτοίμασε δὲ οὐρανούς ἐν φρονήσει. Ἀλλ’ οὔτε διὰ μέσης σοφίας καὶ δυνάμεως ὁ Πατήρ ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐκπόρευσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Υἱοῦ γέννησιν, οὔτε διὰ μέσης θεότητος ὅλως· τῶν γὰρ κτισμάτων ἴδιον τὸ τοιοῦτον οἱ θεολόγοι φασίν. Ἀμέσως ἄρα καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐπίσης ἄμφω προῖασιν ὁ Υἱὸς καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, καὶ μετ’ ἀλλήλων μὲν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀλλήλων δὲ οὐδ’ ὅλως ἐκ θατέρου θάτερον.”

129 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 13, p. 384, ll. 8–14: “Θωμάς ὁ τῶν Λατίνων διδάσκαλος ἀξίων μιᾷ τῶν ἀντιθέσεων ἀνάγκην εἶναι τὰ θεαρχικὰ πρόσωπα διακρίνεσθαι ἐπειδὴ (φησὶν) ἡ ὕλική διάκρισις ἐν τοῖς θείοις χώραν οὐκ ἔχει, τὴν κατὰ σχέσιν ἀντίθεσιν βούλεται μόνην εἶναι

fatherhood of the Father and the procession (ἐκπόρευσις) of the Spirit entail an opposition of relations, which thereby distinguish the two Persons. Likewise, according to this axiom, the Son and Spirit could not be rightly distinct from each other if the Spirit did not also come forth from the Son.

Conversely, Markos posited that his Hellenophone predecessors distinguished the divine Hypostases through “opposition of contradiction”.<sup>130</sup> According to this doctrine, Personal distinctions are grounded in the particular, incommunicable properties and modes of existence of the divine Persons, i.e., the Father being unbegotten, the Son being begotten, and the Spirit proceeding (from the Father). The principal ‘opposition of contradiction’ pertains between the ‘uncaused’ Father, and the ‘caused’ Son and Spirit. The Son and Spirit are distinct, as perfect products of the Father, from Him, and are also distinct to each other according to their mode of origin from the Father, i.e., generation and procession respectively. Thus, causation, which is conceived as the foundation of the relations between the divine Hypostases, is all that is needed to distinguish between them:

To begin, it is clear that in the divinity, any Person’s mode of subsistence is enough to distinguish them from the others. Additionally, the

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τὴν διακρίνουσαν, ὡς ἐτέρας τῶν ἀντιθέσεων οὐκ ἔχουσης χώραν. (Thomas, the Doctor of the Latins, posits that there must be some opposition to distinguish the divine Persons – because, he says, that material distinctions do not pertain to the divinity – [and so] he seeks to make relations of opposition the only basis for distinguishing the Persons, since no other opposition is plausible.)” Aquinas, *ST* 1, q. 36, a. 2, Editio Leonina, Vol. 4, pp. 376–378. For Aquinas’ Pneumatology, cf. Yves Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, Vol. 3, trans. by David Smith. London, 1983, pp. 116–124; Gilles Emery, “La procession du Saint-Esprit a Filio chez S. Thomas d’Aquin,” *RT* 96 (1996), 531–574; Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas*. Oxford, 2010, esp. pp. 269–297, for the *filioque*; Venance Grumel, “St Thomas et la doctrine des Grecs sur la procession du Saint-Esprit,” *EO* 25 (1926), 257–280; Jaroslav Pelikan, “The Doctrine of the *Filioque* in Thomas Aquinas and Its Patristic Antecedents. An Analysis of *Summa Theologiae*, Part I, Question 36,” Étienne Gilson, ed., *St Thomas Aquinas (1274–1974). Commemorative Studies*, Vol. 1. Toronto, 1974, pp. 315–336; Hans Christian Schmidbaur, *Personarum Trinitas. Die trinitarische Gotteslehre des heiligen Thomas von Aquin*. St Ottilien, 1995; Timothy Smith, *Thomas Aquinas’ Trinitarian Theology: A Study in Theological Method*. Washington, D. C., 2003; Paul Vanier, *Théologie trinitaire chez St Thomas d’Aquin. Évolution du concept d’action notionnelle*. Montreal, 1953; Paul Vanier, “La relation trinitaire dans la Somme théologique de St Thomas d’Aquin,” *SE* 1 (1948), 143–159.

130 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 13, p. 384, ll. 14–17: “Δεικτέον οὖν ἡμῖν, ὡς μᾶλλον ἰκανὴ πρὸς διάκρισιν ἡ τῶν ἀντιθέσεων ἀντιφατικὴ, καὶ ταύτῃ μόνῃ κατὰ τοὺς θεολόγους ἀλλήλων πάντα τὰ θεῖα πρόσωπα διακρίνονται. (Thus, it must be shown that the opposition of contradiction is more suitable for distinguishing them [the divine Persons], as all theologians agree that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other strictly according to this kind of opposition.)”

theologians establish the modes of being of the divine Persons as unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding – or, more generally, as either being uncaused or being caused. As it is clear, these modes are mutually opposed in contradiction. For to be caused and uncaused are contradictory. Therefore, the Father is distinguished from the Son and the Spirit by this opposition of contradiction. Likewise, the Son and the Spirit are distinguished from each other by their own particular modes of being. For to originate through generation and to originate not through generation but through procession are modes of being mutually opposed in contradiction. Gregorios the Theologian affirms this regarding the Spirit: “[He] proceeds from the Father, but not in the mode of the Son; for [He] does not [come forth] through generation, but through procession.”<sup>131</sup> Thus, this distinction of contradiction is fully consonant both with truth itself and with the consensus of all the theologians. It is certainly appropriate for distinguishing each of the divine Persons. The distinction introduced by Thomas [Aquinas] as the only appropriate one, i.e., the distinction of relation, in fact separates the Father from those who come forth from Him, i.e., the Son and the Spirit. Nonetheless, [this distinction] does not in any way distinguish the other Persons [i.e., the Son and Spirit] from each other. For neither of them is the cause of the other. Additionally, this distinction is not known to have been applied by any theologian [prior to Aquinas], but is wholly contrary to their teaching. Damaskenos states, “The Father alone is cause.”<sup>132</sup> Likewise, Gregorios of Nyssa says, “And again, we acknowledge another distinction of that which is caused.”<sup>133</sup> He refers her to a different distinction to that which pertains between a cause and caused. Lastly, the illustrious Pseudo-Dionysios claims it is completely impious to state or conceive anything outside of what is proclaimed in the Holy Scriptures, which have been given to us by God.<sup>134</sup>

131 Gregorios of Nazianzus, *Discours* 39, 12, Moreschini, ed., Galloway, French trans., *Discours* 38–41, p. 174, ll. 14–16.

132 Ioannes Damaskenos, *EF* 1.12b, Kotter, ed., p. 36, 57.

133 Gregorios of Nyssa, *Quod Non Sint Tres Dei*, Müller, ed., *GNO* 3(1), p. 56, ll. 4–5.

134 Eugenikos, *Capita Syllogistica*, c. 13, pp. 384, l. 18–385, l. 21: “Πρώτων μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖνον δῆλον ἐπὶ τῶν θείων, ὡς ὁ ἐκάστου τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόπος αὐταρκέστατος πρὸς τὴν ἀφ’ ἐτέρου διακρίσιν τρόπους δὲ ὑπάρξεως ἐπὶ τῶν θείων προσώπων οἱ θεολόγοι τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ τὸ γεννητὸν καὶ τὸ ἐκπορευτὸν λέγουσιν, ἥτοι καθολικώτερον φάναι, τὸ ἀναίτιον καὶ τὸ αἰτιατόν, ἅπερ ἀλλήλοις δῆλον ὡς ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντίκεινται· τὸ γὰρ ἔχον αἰτίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχον αἰτίαν, ἀντίφασις. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πατὴρ Υἱοῦ καὶ Πνεύματος τούτοις ἀντιφατικῶς διακρίνεται, ὁ δὲ Υἱὸς καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα πρὸς ἄλληλα, τοῖς τῶν οἰκείων αὐθις ὑπάρξεων γεννητῶς ἀλλ’ ἐκπορευτῶς, τρόποι τε ὑπάρξεων ἐπὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντίκεινται· καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος ὁ Θεολόγος Γρηγόριος λέγει· «Προῖόν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς, οὐχ υἱικῶς δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ γεννητῶς, ἀλλ’

To provide some concluding remarks regarding the contents of Markos' *Syllogistic Chapters*, I have shown that Markos commonly evoked the Church Fathers to support his defence of the doctrine of the Spirit's procession from the Father alone, including the Cappadocian Fathers, Ioannes Chrysostomos, Maximos the Confessor, Pseudo-Dionysios, and Kyrillos of Alexandria. However, I have also exhibited that Markos also betrays a likely influence from several Medieval Hellenophone polemicists against the *filioque*, including Photios, Niketas of Byzantium, Eustratios of Nicaea, and Nikolaos of Methone.

Additionally, I have shown that, against the teaching that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, Eugenikos maintained throughout his treatise that the Spirit's Personal mode of being solely comes from the Father, who is the only intra-divine caused, in contradistinction to the Son and Spirit, who are both caused. Given these axioms, Markos believed that to argue that the Son is also a cause of the Spirit would lead to there being two principles in the Godhead, and would undermine the Father's Personal distinction through obfuscating this property with that of the Son.

Moreover, Markos called into question any endeavour to posit one source/cause/principle of intra-divine life by interweaving the sole cause – the Father – with one of the caused – the Son, whether through distinguishing between 'mediate' and 'immediate' causes or by claiming that one of these causes is subject to the other. Additionally, Markos' counterparts had likewise posited that if the three Trinitarian Persons created the cosmos as a single principle in a way that did not compromise their Personhood, the Father and Son likewise could act in the Pneumatic procession as a single principle in a way that did not compromise their distinct Personhood. I have shown that Markos countered this claim, making significant recourse to the works of the Cappadocian Fathers, especially those which counter Eunomianism, by emphasising that the Son and Spirit being eternally caused by the Father, which is His Hypostatic Property is distinct to the cosmos being caused by the will of the three Trinitarian Persons in common. From Markos' perspective, his Latin counterparts' framework denigrated the Spirit as a creature.

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ἐκπορευτῶς». Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάκρισις κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν οὖσα καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σύμφωνος καὶ τοῖς θεολόγοις ἅπασι, καὶ πάντα τὰ θεῖα πρόσωπα δύναται διακρίνειν· ἦν δὲ εἰσάγει· Θωμᾶς ὡς μόνην ἱκανὴν οὖσαν, τὴν κατὰ σχέσιν λέγω, τὸν μὲν Πατέρα τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ προελθόντων Υἱοῦ καὶ Πνεύματος διακρίνει, τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν προσώπων ἀλλήλων οὐδ' ὅπως οὖν· οὐδὲ φαίνεται ταύτην οὐδεὶς τῶν θεολόγων τὴν διάκρισιν εἰρηκῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦναντίον ἅπαν. «Μόνος γὰρ αἷτιος ὁ Πατήρ», φησὶν ὁ Δαμασκηνός· καὶ ὁ Νύσσης Γρηγόριος· «Τοῦ ἐξ αἰτίας ὄντος πάλιν ἄλλην διαφορὰν ἐννοοῦμεν». Ἄλλην φησὶ παρὰ τὴν εἰρημένην· ἡ δὲ ἦν κατὰ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ αἷτιατὸν δηλονότι. Καθόλου δὲ οὐ τολμητέον εἰπεῖν ἢ ἐννοῆσαι παρὰ τὰ θειωδῶς ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν λογίων ἐκπεφασμένα, Διονύσιος ὁ κλεινὸς ἀποφαίνεται.» Constan, "Mark Eugenikos," pp. 450–451.

In the Council of Florence's Definition of Faith, *Laetentur Caeli*, promulgated on July 6th, 1439, the Latin and Byzantine Fathers affirmed the identify of the terms 'from/through' in relation to the Spirit coming forth by the Son, claiming that these two terms were distinct manners of articulating orthodox theology.<sup>135</sup> Conversely, Markos posited that one could only synonymise 'from' and 'through' the Son according to the salvific economy, or when one is describing the activity of the Spirit in creation being revealed through Him. Nonetheless, one could not identify the two terms according to the Spirit's eternal mode of coming forth. At other points, Markos identified the clause 'through the Son (διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ)' with 'with the Son (μετὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ)', thereby indicating that, alongside the Spirit comes forth alongside the Son from the Father – the former through procession, the latter by generation. Evoking a range of authentic and pseudepigraphal passages from the Church Fathers, Markos sought to exhibit that the Hellenophone Patristic tradition did not have a precedent for positing the Pneumatic procession 'through/per' the Father or 'from/ex' the Son. Rather, these Fathers stated that He proceeds 'from/ex' the Father and 'through/per' the Son. Therefore, when the Spirit is said to be 'through the Son', this does not entail that the Son is a cause of the Spirit's existence. Rather, it refers to the Son having a mediatory function through/with which the Spirit is made manifest and granted to humankind.

135 Cf. *Concilium Florentinum, Sessio VI, Definitio Fidei, COD*, pp. 502, l. 31–503, l. 6: "In nomine igitur sancte Trinitatis Patris, Filii et Spiritus sancti, hoc sacro universali approbante Florentino concilio, diffinimus ut hec fidei veritas ab omnibus christianis credatur et suscipiatur, sicque omnes profiteantur, quod Spiritus sanctus ex Patre et Filio eternaliter est, et essentiam suam suumque esse subsistens habet ex Patre simul et Filio, et ex utroque eternaliter tanquam ab uno principio et unica spiratione procedit, declarantes quod id, quod sancti doctores et patres dicunt, ex Patre per Filium procedere Spiritum sanctum, ad hanc intelligentiam tendit, ut per hoc significetur Filium quoque esse, secundum Grecos quidem causam, secundum Latinos vero principium subsistentie Spiritus sancti, sicut et Patrem."