

THE UMP - A 'NEW' PARTY? FINDINGS FROM
RESEARCH IN TWO FEDERATIONS

PHD THESIS

OF

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Abstract

This thesis examines the *Union pour un Mouvement Populaire* (UMP) as a political party and an organisation through the examination of two party *fédérations*: Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines.

This is undertaken via a study of the groups within the UMP, as well as by developing a perspective on the history of conflict within the Centre-Right in the French Fifth Republic, retracing the formation of the UMP and conducting questionnaires and interviews with party activists in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines. The empirical fieldwork is examined within the broad framework of the party system literature. The UMP is a party that has formed out of a variety of political currents and traditions creating an internally diverse party, and this is examined through a look at the political families in the party and the party *fédérations* of Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines to get a view of the party at the point of time of the fieldwork.

The thesis examines the party in these two *fédérations* through the eyes of the party activists in order to understand the party at the base. This seeks to study what the party is on the ground in these *fédérations*: what groups exist within the party (both in terms of the former parties and political currents), what sort of organisation the UMP is, how the activists relate to the organisation, as well as the relationship between the lower levels of the party and the national party. This thesis seeks to answer the question: *What sort of party is the UMP as an organisation in these fédérations, in regards to institutions and what the party sees as its main goals, and what role does internal diversity have within the party?*

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Appendix: Declaration and statements

Declaration

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD.

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This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.

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Contents

1	Introduction	1
2	Political parties and party systems	23
3	Political families and the formation of the UMP	57
4	Case Study: Organisation in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines	97
5	Case Study: Political positioning and attitudes in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines	132
6	Case Study: Change and continuity in the UMP	169
7	Conclusion	187
	Bibliography	203
	Appendix	221
I	Maps of location of Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines	221
II	Tables of parties discussed in thesis and timelines of parties	223
III	Result tables of questionnaires	226
IV	Sample of questionnaire	246

Chapter 1

Introduction

This thesis examines the *Union pour un Mouvement Populaire* (UMP; henceforth UMP), the principal party of the right in France. It approaches its subject through the specific perspective of the members and engages in an empirical investigation of the party organisation in two *fédérations*, thereby renewing an older tradition in the study of French party politics. At the same time as a detailed empirical study, it addresses the broad approaches involved in the study of party politics. One such approach is the role of the previous history of the parties of the French Right: the formation of the party is understood in part in terms of its predecessor parties. This focus on historical genealogy leads us to explore the political groups that came to form the UMP, and their contribution to the organisation and the ideology of the Movement. We seek to understand what sort of party the UMP is, if indeed it is a party (rather than a Popular Movement or a coalition by another name). Is it a mere successor of the RPR or a new sort of formation? Is it a Gaullist party or more diverse than that? Is it a presidential party or not? These important questions are raised from the perspective of the party members: the core fieldwork for the thesis was conducted in the Île-de-France region in 2007. The main argument is that the UMP is a party that has been shaped in part by the legacy of its historical parties and this legacy can still be seen on the ground.

However, the UMP is also held together by the underlying beliefs of its members, as a conservative party, as well as by instrumental electoral imperatives. The thesis maps out the ways in which the UMP is similar and dissimilar to the parties that came together at its creation. The UMP is a relatively new party, so this thesis seeks to examine whether the party had become institutionalised at this point 2007, and how it had developed since 2002. The empirical fieldwork focuses on the activists, who are the main gauge of the real existence of the party on the ground. Without active members, there would either be no party or, at least, a much weaker one. Our case study of the UMP is interesting both in terms of debates about party factionalism and plurality, and more generally as a case study of the development of processes of institutionalisation in political parties.

This thesis explores what sort of party the UMP is, not just ideologically but also organisationally, looking at the institutions of the party and its operation in the *fédérations*. The UMP is an interesting case because it is a party that emerged from pre-existing parties, some with strong ideological and organisational traditions. It is not a completely new political movement, nor did it result only from a split within an existing party. The UMP is more mature than the typical new political party because of the stability represented by its diverse organisational traditions, which offset the strong ideological tensions that have been observed. If the UMP had only brought together the various groups of the Centre-Right and completely destroyed the organisational rules and structures of the RPR, UDF, and RPF, it is unlikely that the party could have survived for any considerable length of time. This would have changed the rules of engagement, possibly allowing for some groups to be marginalised. In this the ideological differences would likely have risen to the top in the process of developing new organisational rules. This is particularly important on the local level, as it is the local base that supports the running of the party; this base is the object of our two local case studies of

UMP members. One of our early hypotheses was that the UMP would be more mature than most new parties because of its degree of institutional continuity with the previous parties. Our research, by and large, confirmed that the UMP is a mature, stable party in the *fédérations* that were examined, in spite of its political diversity and newness.

Whilst there is no doubt that the Gaullists are the dominant group within the party, the UMP is not an exclusively Gaullist party, even though the RPR was the largest group to enter the Union, and another Gaullist party, the RPF, was locally strong in Hauts-de-Seine. The merger of Gaullists with former UDF politicians and members has added to the diversity that existed already to some extent within the RPR. This issue is explored in the thesis through revisiting the existing literature on the UMP, as well as through the case studies. We argue that this sort of political diversity is common for a political party of the UMP's size, as one can see with Left-wing counterparts in France, such as the *Parti Socialiste* (PS), as well as with the major parties of the European Right, such as the *Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands* (CDU) in Germany and the Conservative Party in Britain. This thesis explores how the UMP as an organisation copes with this diversity through two key dimensions: the institutions that the UMP has established and how party members in the *fédérations* feel about their party and specifically their view of how the UMP deals with its internal diversity.

This thesis examines the party through the eyes of the party members. This is different to exploring the party through solely the eyes of the elites, examining what the electorate thinks of the party or examining the party through what it does and says. The party members provide a perspective into the operation of the party that one cannot get from the examination of the electorate or through observing the party's actions alone. They differ from other groups because they are viewed as more ideological than those who do not actively participate in a

party. In addition, looking at the party members helps us to better understand the diversity of the party. We are interested in testing in the case study chapters the distinction between the ‘believers,’ and the ‘careerists’ within the party structure that is suggested in the literature review. As the group that is necessary for a party’s success, the party members can reveal a great deal about the operation of the party’s organisation. Beyond these advantages, one can see an ideological difference between the electorate, the party sympathisers, and the party members. For example, whilst large parts of the UMP identify themselves as Gaullist (about 42%),¹ much of the electorate has, in more recent years, seen Gaullism as not relevant to today’s politics.² Certainly, there are Gaullist influences on the politics of the day in France, even in the parties that do not claim Gaullist heritage, but many of the fundamentals of Gaullism have fallen out of favour. Even those on the Right have distanced themselves from parts of the Gaullist legacy; there was little opposition, for example, to the move by President Sarkozy to reintroduce French forces into the command structure of NATO.

This examination of a party through its members has a tradition that one can see in the study of both French parties and other European parties. One such example is the famous study in the French context of the PS by Henri Rey and Françoise Subileau.³ In this study, they examined the PS through the party activists, as well as undertaking a limited number of interviews. Providing views of the party by a survey of its membership proved highly fruitful in the study of the PS. The membership themselves reflected broader changes in the party, with the PS becoming less of a working class party and more of a socially diverse

¹Florence Haegel, “Le pluralisme à l’UMP structuration idéologique en et compétition interne,” in Florence Haegel (ed.) *Partis politiques et système partisan en France*, (Sciences Po, Paris: 2007), p. 247.

²Andrew Knapp, *Parties and the Party System in France: A Disconnected Democracy?*, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2004), pp. 242-243.

³Henri Rey and Françoise Subileau, *Les militants socialistes à l’épreuve du pouvoir*, (Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris: 1991).

party. The sociology of party activists is a leading concern in this sort of study; hence, writers such as Rey and Subileau are following a longer established trend when they examine the origins and the values of the party activists. Rey and Subileau demonstrated how sophisticated techniques, including questionnaires and interviews, could be used to examine the factions and political groups within the PS and compare the operation of the party in the different *départements* that were examined. Their study mainly focused on the membership, who they are and what they believe, rather than the additional party organisational component that is explored in this thesis, which expands on such research to better understand a party not just sociologically, but also as an organisation.

A similar study was carried out on the British Conservative party membership.⁴ In their book, Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd, and Jeremy Richardson examine the Conservative Party through the eyes of the party members in a fashion similar to Rey and Subileau, addressing the party in a number of areas. *True Blues* addresses the party through the origins of the members, that is: from what social groups they come. It also examines the roles of those within the party and what political beliefs they hold and the connections with their origins to better examine the party as an organisation. It also attempts to explain why the members joined the party, as well as offers some explanations for the falling party membership numbers in Britain. This older party struggling with a political system in declining political party participation is an interesting contrast to the UMP as a new party that has been successful in raising party numbers in the years after its formation.

The examination of the UMP as an organisation is approached systematically through each chapter of this thesis. The second chapter is a literature review of political parties and the party systems literature, which identifies the main approaches that are followed in the rest of the thesis to help place the UMP in the

⁴Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd, and Jeremy Richardson, *True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party Membership*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

wider context of a political party. The third chapter discusses the political families on the French Right, to understand the specifics of the French political system, as the UMP must operate within this system, why they have been separated in the past and why they have come to form the UMP today.

Moving on from the framework for the thesis, we come to the empirical study. The fourth chapter explores the field work focusing on the organisation in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines, and the fifth chapter presents the fieldwork on the political attitudes and placement of members in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines. These chapters examine whether there have been convergences in relation to the organisation of the party and/or the basic political beliefs of the party. This allows us to examine if in these *départements* the party has an UMP ideology or structure or if the party mirrors those of the RPR, UDF, and RPF or, most likely, something in between. The sixth chapter focuses on how the party has changed and on the ways it has changed, both through the eyes of the members from Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines and more generally. The final chapter is the conclusion tying these themes together and analysing the UMP as a political party through the lens of the party system literature and in historical comparison with other parties in French politics. The thesis also includes in the appendix a table of the parties that are discussed in this thesis, maps showing the location of Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines, a sample of the questionnaire, and tables with the results from the questionnaire to help the reader better follow the thesis.

The literature review chapter (Chapter 2) covers a variety of types of literature on parties and party systems to gain a context for the rest of the thesis. This examination is necessary for two reasons. First, one must frame this work in the context of already existing theories and understandings of political parties and the world in which they operate: this is not solely a study of French politics but contributes to our understanding of political parties more generally. In fact, we

set out to study the UMP as a political party operating within a party system that has had a major influence in shaping its development. Second, one needs to build a framework in which to examine the UMP. Without this background and framework, the research would be much less clear. It would be much harder to interpret the results of the study. Comparison with the broad party and party system literature allows a better understanding of the UMP and its contribution to the study of political parties in general. The chapter discusses literature ranging from the historical works of Maurice Duverger to more modern, neo-Institutionalist approaches. The chapter defines approaches towards institutions, party institutionalisation, factions in political parties, and party change and development. The study of factionalism is also important, because the UMP was formed from various political factions and former parties. It is also essential to have a framework for examining institutions to understand what effects there are on the party from its formation. We must also explore the role of institutions outside the party, the organisation of the UMP itself, and the unwritten rules the members brought with them from the predecessor parties. Through observing the UMP, the thesis captures both processes of internal cohesion and diversity and the structuring effects of the broader institutions on the formation and duration of political parties.

The next chapter first discusses the different political families that form the Centre-Right in France, then discusses the historical conflict of the Centre-Right in French politics in the Fifth Republic and the failed alliances that came before the UMP. Then three main explanations are offered for this coming together in the formation of the UMP. This exercise is carried out to better understand the dynamics between the different groups that make up the UMP and to suggest why before 2002 they had not been able to unite, in contrast to other major parties of the European Right like the CDU in Germany and the Conservative Party in

the UK. Historically there has been a wide range of groups that have manifested themselves both in ideological and leadership conflicts on the Centre-Right. First, it is necessary to understand who these groups are in order to understand where they fit into the political grouping of the UMP. Without this, it is more difficult to understand the conflicts that existed until 2002 and that played a large role in Right-wing disunity. It is also necessary to understand the conflicts of the Centre-Right since the creation of the Fifth Republic to understand why these differences were not set aside before then. Finally, it must be explained why they could overcome their differences in 2002, whilst they had failed repeatedly in the past. We lay emphasis upon the impetus developed over time, as well as on the capacity for a traumatic electoral event (the 2002 presidential election) to accelerate developments that had been gathering pace. Through explaining the party's creation, we also suggest that the history and the plural nature of the moderate Right have continued to have a major impact upon the UMP's development and formation.

The next three chapters (4–6) concern the fieldwork that was conducted in 2007. The fieldwork involved two case studies examined through a questionnaire and interviews in the *départements* of Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines, both of which are in the region of Île-de-France. With the restrictions of a PhD thesis, it was decided that it was best to limit this thesis to two case studies of two *départements* of the party. These *départements* were chosen mainly for their differing memberships in terms of political origins. While in geographic proximity, strongholds of the Right and well-off areas for the most part, the leadership and membership of the party come from different political origins. The different political origins were seen as most useful to better understand the factions within the party and how the organisation operates in spite of this. The comparative criteria thus involved selecting two *départements* in the Paris region with rather contrasting political

traditions, in order to identify how far the UMP remains shaped by its origins, and how convincingly it has become a distinct, new party. Both *départements* selected unlike neighbouring Seine-Saint Denis, for example are historically *départements* of the Right to be able to better test the institutionalisation of the party rather than dealing with the additional challenges of a weaker party. There now follows a brief presentation of the two *départements*.

Hauts-de-Seine has a strong record of voting for the Right, and more specifically the Gaullist parties. For example, the *Conseil général* of Hauts-de-Seine has been led by the various Gaullist Parties since its creation in 1967.⁵ This *fédération* was the stronghold of Charles Pasqua for many years, including his tenure as President of the *Conseil général* from 1973 to 1976 and 1988 to 2004. Hauts-de-Seine has also long been the domain of Nicolas Sarkozy, who was mayor of Neuilly-sur-Seine, the city where the party headquarters of this *département* are located, from 1983 to 2002⁶ and President of the *Conseil général* of Hauts-de-Seine from 2004 to 2007.⁷ These two figures give an interesting angle to the party in this *département*. There is not only an element of those coming from the *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR), the main Gaullist party before the creation of the UMP, and the new members from no previous party, but also members from the *Rassemblement pour la France* (RPF), the traditionalist and *souverainiste* Gaullist party of Charles Pasqua.⁸ Therefore, from this *fédération* one should expect to find a more negative attitude towards European integration than one would find in a less Gaullist *fédération*, in particular one that did not have an RPF presence. Furthermore,

⁵Conseil général des Hauts-de-Seine, *L'organisation administrative*, <http://www.hauts-de-seine.net/portal/site/hds/histoire-historique/conseil-general/1367/7a1ac3b524cf1010VgnVCM100000860aa8c0RCRD.vhtm>, Last accessed: 20 February 2008.

⁶*Découvrir Neuilly: Son histoire*, <http://www.ville-neuillysurseine.fr/1-13291-Son-histoire.php>, Last accessed: 20 February 2008.

⁷*Conseil général des Hauts-de-Seine*.

⁸RPF in this thesis will refer to this party of Charles Pasqua, not the Gaullist party *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* that existed in the Fourth Republic.

one would be likely to find a more sceptical view of globalisation and a more protective stance towards the impact of external influences. Since Hauts-de-Seine is more Gaullist in nature than some other *fédérations*, we conjectured that it was more likely to have a more secularist view than those *fédérations* under the influence of Christian Democratic forces and a more favourable view towards some sort of mixed economy. The fieldwork targeted these areas, amongst others, for questioning to see if these patterns do indeed exist. We would also expect there to be a more mature and relatively stable party structure, given the level of experience of members and the reputed political homogeneity in the Hauts-de-Seine *fédération*. Moreover, we would expect stability to be enhanced by the presence of key party leaders within this *département*, such as Pasqua and Sarkozy. The *département* is the richest in France, with many multinational businesses based there or with their French headquarters there, particularly in the areas along the far western Parisian border in *La Défense*. Therefore, one would expect Hauts-de-Seine to be to the Right, given its economic background, despite the fact that much of the *département* is urban.

The other focus of the case study was Yvelines. Yvelines is also a well-off *département*, but it is different to Hauts-de-Seine in a number of ways, both socially and in its political history. It is less urban, with the parts further away from Paris being quite rural. Most of the large companies are in the big cities of Yvelines and are closer to Paris, such as Versailles. This *département*, while for the most part historically to the Right like Hauts-de-Seine, has not been as dominated by the Gaullist parties. There has been a great deal of success for other groups like the *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF), and this has been reflected in the nature of the leadership and membership of the UMP in this *département*. Therefore, one would expect to find different attitudes than in Hauts-de-Seine. For example, because of the pro-European nature of the UDF and the absence

of the RPF, one would predict a more pro-European response than in Hauts-de-Seine. In addition, one would anticipate a more positive view of globalisation because of the common view of the UDF as a more 'liberal' party than the former RPR and RPF. However, because of the presence of the UDF members, one would also expect the UMP in Yvelines to have more Christian Democratic influences, especially with the presence of the social Catholic *Forum des Républicains Sociaux* (FRS), than one would find in Hauts-de-Seine and, therefore, more traditionalist views on moral issues. As a consequence of the social Gaullist presence in Yvelines, one would expect to find a stronger support for a mixed economy than in Hauts-de-Seine. Additionally, due to the presence of the UDF, one might also predict a less presidentialist view of government. Also, this *département* was chosen to see if a more diverse *fédération* would have different attitudes towards the organisation than the more homogenous Hauts-de-Seine. This provides the opportunity to explore how the UMP copes with this added pressure of internal diversity and the importance of a flexible structure and mature leadership.

The research was carried out as a series of questionnaires and interviews. The questionnaires in Hauts-de-Seine were administered in two ways, as part of an interview and by various groups within the party. They were given to people at various levels of the party, including elected officials, party officials, and regular party members. The interviewees were contacted through their local party offices, and these interviewees were solely party officials and elected officials. The research on Yvelines was approached in a different manner than in Hauts-de-Seine. Fewer questionnaires were completed than in Hauts-de-Seine, but many of the respondents in Yvelines were invited to explain any of their answers upon which they wished to expand. However, the questionnaires were relied upon to a lesser extent in Yvelines and mainly focused on the elites in this *département*. The different approaches were adopted in acknowledgement of the fact that reaching

members was more difficult in Yvelines than in Hauts-de-Seine, so a more qualitative approach was adopted.

However, some difficulties were encountered in the collecting of data for this thesis. It was conducted at the time of the run-up to the 2007 elections in France. This had its advantages and disadvantages. First, this means it was a time when more people were active within the party than there would be normally, as many party members who did not normally participate in the day-to-day affairs of the party became often active during election time. Second, the party tended to be more active, meeting more often and more regularly, than in non-election times. Nevertheless, it did present problems for a researcher as well. The party members may have felt they were too busy to participate in a study at this time and so been more likely not to respond as a result. They might have been more suspicious about the motivations of research at this time as they did not want their party to be portrayed in a negative light at this crucial time for a party.

As a result of this and the difficult nature of doing research on French parties in general, the response rate for the questionnaire was rather low, especially in Yvelines. There were 400 questionnaires sent out or given to be distributed on my behalf, 250 in Hauts-de-Seine and 150 in Yvelines, as it was easier to find contact points and addresses of local offices in Hauts-de-Seine. In total 32 were returned or conducted as interviews in Hauts-de-Seine and 14 in Yvelines. However, the sample was considered viable because in both *fédérations* the responses came from a variety of members, in terms and location of membership. In both *fédérations* a mix of locations and contact points was achieved. The research in Yvelines had to be more focused on the elite level due to difficulties in reaching contact points for the regular membership. It would have been ideal to have conducted more questionnaires and interviews, but in the context of research in this short time scale as an individual researcher, it was not possible to do so.

This method of a questionnaire addressed to party members in conjunction with elite interviews was deemed to be the most appropriate method to conduct this research. The aim of the questionnaire was to get a broad picture of the party in these *fédérations* by reaching a wider group than would be possible by just conducting interviews with party officials alone. The purpose of the interviews was to get a more in depth picture than one can get from a questionnaire alone, since questionnaires are limited in their scope of answers so that they may be codified later. Combining them helps to minimise the limitations of methods, allowing clear codification and some insights into why the respondents may have answered as they did. This follows in the tradition of understanding political parties through those who are active in them, that is the party on the ground – helping to understand the party from another angle than just studying party texts or the view from outside the party, giving a slightly different sort of result.

The method of a questionnaire and interviews was chosen to examine the *fédérations* because it was the best method to collect information about them as there is not much pre-existing information or resources available from this level of parties given the historical centralism of French politics. Mainly, the information about the political parties is available for the national level of the party, and this tends to be the object of most political research. The party produces most of its publicly available information at this level, including the strong moments of the party, such as its congresses and national debates. In addition, it is the national level that is the main focus of the media, limiting the data available for collection from this secondary resource. This information deficit makes the local, *départemental* and regional level of French parties more difficult to examine than the national level. Empirical and original research, of the sort presented in this thesis, is obtained through generating one's own data, a precondition to understanding the party on this level, as was done through the fieldwork of the

thesis.

The majority of these questionnaires were self-administered, which is ideal in some ways, preventing bias coming from the interviewer and making the respondents more willing to respond more honestly because they are not as afraid to respond in the way that they think, rather than the way they think the interviewer might want them to answer.⁹ For example, as I am not French, the respondents may not have felt comfortable answering or might have answered in a different way to the question about their feeling of whether there are too many immigrants in France when they were talking to a foreigner than they were able to do on their own or with a French interviewer.¹⁰ This is not to say that this method is flawless. Of course, there are problems with this method as well, primarily that of not being able to ask follow-up questions. This questionnaire was mainly focused on closed questions, which limits the sort of responses that can be given, so it may be difficult to understand why someone responded in the way that he or she did. Most of the respondents in Yvelines who were not interviewed were given the opportunity to explain any answers that they wished to expand upon, either to explain why they answered the way they did or to explain problems that they had with the question (i.e., the options of the answers did not really fit what they believed and what they thought would fit better). This helps to examine why the respondents as a whole answered the questions in the way that they did.

In addition, there is also the possibility that someone could fill out the questionnaire making up false answers or posing as members or people at whom the questionnaire was not aimed. As Burnham et al. point out,¹¹ it is unlikely that someone would bother to do something like this as it is that unconvincing anyone would benefit from doing this. The questionnaires were only given to or sent to

⁹Peter Burnham, Karin Gilland Lutz, Wyn Grant, and Zig Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics*, (Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills: 2008), p. 120.

¹⁰Il y a trop immigrés en France.

¹¹Burnham, et al., *Research Methods in Politics*, p. 120.

party offices and party officials, so it is unlikely that they would have passed the questionnaire on to those who were not members of the party itself. Therefore, the chances of the results of the questionnaire being deliberately sabotaged or modified with malicious intent are very unlikely.

Interviews can have benefits that one cannot get from questionnaires, especially self-administered questionnaires alone.¹² One is able to get further information from interviewees as to why they responded in a particular way to a question. Moreover, the meaning of the interview questions can be expanded upon in the case that the respondent does not fully understand what the question is asking. However, these advantages of interviews are offset by other disadvantages, including the interviewer's ability to influence the responses of the interviewee, either by asking leading follow-up questions, (behaviour that might lead the respondent to think that the interviewer is looking for one sort of answer) or because the interviewee does not want to be seen badly by the interviewer. These pressures can produce different types of answers to the questions than would have been given in a more neutral environment.

The questionnaire used in this thesis was developed with the help of Florence Haegel at the CEVIPOF in Paris. She developed a questionnaire to examine the UMP through a study of those who attended the party's congress in 2004, which was used in her work in "*Le pluralisme à l'UMP structuration idéologique en et competition interne.*" In this chapter of her book,¹³ she examines the pluralism of the UMP and the extent of the presence of different groups within the party, with regard to ideological groups, organisational loyalties and leadership loyalties. This approach helps to understand the nature of the UMP as a party with many origins, as a newly-created political party with diverse political currents. From the results and feedback from this questionnaire, we were able to determine what

¹²Burnham, et al., *Research Methods in Politics*, pp. 121-122.

¹³Haegel, "Le pluralisme à l'UMP structuration idéologique."

sort of questions from her questionnaire worked and which ones did not; this exercise was of major importance in determining the appropriateness of particular questions for my study of the UMP. In addition, new questions were developed in order to examine the areas that were removed from the Haegel questionnaire. A number of Haegel's original questions did not receive a good response rate and the respondents found them confusing. Moreover, given the rather different focus of my research, it was important to add some new questions in order to examine the party in additional areas: questions were added on the nature of the UMP organisation, as were questions about political attitudes to better understand the various political currents that exist within the party. This thesis owes a great debt of gratitude to Haegel. As her interest was primarily the national level, rather than based on the *fédérational* level, it was essential to complete the questionnaire with these new questions. The target audience of my questionnaire was also different: not activists attending the party's conference, but members involved in two party *fédérations*. For these reasons, the Haegel questionnaire had to be adapted to suit the focus of this thesis. On the other hand, collaborating with the leading expert on the UMP created considerable added value and allowed a more robust test of the questionnaire than would have been possible for a young researcher working alone.

When using questionnaires and interviews one must bear in mind that their results are only as accurate as the quality of the questionnaire and the truthfulness of the responses.¹⁴ One can reflect on pre-existing data to judge the strength and legitimacy of the responses and to try to understand the quality of the responses. In the case of this thesis, reflection on the degree of success of the Haegel questionnaire proved invaluable. Moreover, having access to the results of the Haegel survey allowed us to ensure not only that particular questions “worked,” but also to plan

¹⁴Burnham, et al., *Research Methods in Politics*, pp. 136-137.

with the expectation that the results would not be radically different (and to be aware of the need to offer convincing explanations in the event of results being radically different).

Party members at the level of the *fédérations* were chosen as the main object of this research.¹⁵ The members play an important role within the party, and this has increased over the years in the UMP and its predecessor parties for a few reasons. Firstly, the major parties in France have increased the level of internal democracy. This has given the members of the parties a new level of ability to influence the life of the party that they would not have had in the very top-down Gaullist parties of the past. For example, in the UMP, the leader of the party, as well as the presidential candidate, are directly elected by the membership of the party. Internal debates, which influence party policy, are open to all of the members of the party. Moreover, many debates have been moved to the Internet, which allows a wider group of the membership to participate within the affairs of the party not just those with the time and resources to travel.

Activists are also important because of their role in the running of the party; they are the ones who have the most direct contact with potential voters and are often responsible for organising the party on a daily basis, through hanging posters, distributing flyers and canvassing. They are necessary for energetic and effective campaigning. It is unlikely that those who are not ‘believers’ in the party or at least have no greater stake in the success of a party than a pay cheque during the elections would be willing to give their time and/or resources in the same way to ensure that the party was successful in elections, as well as help to preserve the ideological nature of the party. UMP members influence the daily running of the party, and its organisation. Their views need to be taken into account by the party leadership.

¹⁵Gérard Grunberg and Florence Haegel, *La France vers le bipartisme? : La présidentialisation du PS et de l'UMP*, (Sciences Po, Paris: 2007), pp. 46-49.

The UMP has changed the rules of interaction between the party members, adopting a more inclusive outlook.¹⁶ This has been done in different ways, especially by the use of the Internet to contact more members. As a general rule, the UMP has adapted the structures of the RPR, rather than those of the other constituent groups of the party. The other main founder party, the UDF, was always a far looser body than its Gaullist counterpart, one with a less effective organisation in a mass (rather than cadre) party. The party has also adapted to include those who are not interested in the party for more than the elections, and it allows limited membership for this purpose. This innovation has attracted more people to the party, with most of the new members joining the party because they can have a say in selecting the party's presidential candidate. The members generally view the ability to choose the leadership and the presidential candidates as important. However, as discussed earlier, the party needs committed activists, in addition to professional staff, to function properly both in terms of money, when there is not adequate public funding for parties, and time. Activists can also act as a counter-balance to the leadership of the party, and they provide future party elites.

The *fédérations* play a variety of roles within the UMP. One of the most important is connecting the local officials and the members with the national party. It is the body where local and constituency (*circonscription*) decisions are filtered up to those in the national party, especially in regards to dealing with the nominations for the candidates for elected offices. Furthermore, it is the level where much of the national information is transmitted to the lower levels, which is important in a rather centralised political system like that of France. It is also the level of the party which the members are connected in terms of the party bureaucracy. The membership is tied to the *fédération* in which they live, rather than a local or national party or, like in the UDF, a sub-group of the party.

¹⁶Grunberg and Haegel, *La France vers le bipartisme?*, pp. 49-56.

Therefore, explaining this level gives one a better understanding of the membership as a whole.

The purpose of this questionnaire was to better understand the party in these *fédérations*: the political attitudes of party members towards the organisation of the party, their activity within the party organisation and in other associations (both political and non-political), and where the party members come from politically all help to develop a deeper understanding of the UMP. The questionnaire addressed a number of questions on political attitudes, such as where the participants place themselves politically and what political current they come from. It asked standard questions on political attitudes, as well as some questions covering specific political issues. Some of the specific issues addressed in this questionnaire related to immigration, the role of women, Europe, *dirigisme*, the rights of homosexual couples, the role of the President, attitudes towards America in foreign policy, the 35-hour working week, and *participation*. There were also questions concerning the organisation of the party: whether the different levels of the party should be given more power, the levels of internal democracy of the party, the responsiveness of those in charge of the party to its members, and the views towards political diversity within the party. This gives us empirical knowledge about political participation, about why activists join and organise, and about the importance of getting one's beliefs into the party or coalition of government.

Apart from attitudes, the survey also sought to elucidate the nature and activities of the party members. Some questions addressed the positions held within the party and how much time was devoted to the party. Obtaining this information allowed us to compare those who are in positions of power in the party and those who are not, in terms of both ideology and understanding of the organisation. The survey also asked the members what groups, clubs, and associations they belong to, both those politically related (political clubs that

are associated with the party and non-associated groups) and those not directly related to political groups (humanitarian groups, professional groups, religious, cultural, and leisure activity groups). Finally, the questionnaire addressed the political background of the party members, what political parties and groups they were members of before joining the UMP and what roles they played in these parties and groups. Understanding the background of the members is especially important with the UMP since it is such a young party, drawing members from the former RPR party, the UDF, and the RPF, as well from the UMPs campaigns to attract those who have not previously been members of any political party.

To get the widest sample possible, the questionnaire targeted people on many levels of the party within these selected *fédérations*, from the *fédération* offices down to the offices of the party on the city level. In most cases, the survey was distributed on my behalf by the leadership. In the case of the Hauts-de-Seine *fédération*, the questionnaires were mainly distributed to the electoral districts to be completed through the office of the *fédération* because this was the easiest method with the presidential and legislative elections taking place during this period. Some of the questionnaires were also distributed via the party offices in the cities. The questionnaires in Yvelines were handed out at the level of the electoral districts only. The questionnaires and interviews came from both a random sample, coming from different districts within the *fédérations*, and through snowball contacts: it is difficult to target party members as a group and it is difficult to contact them without going through the party itself.

In addition to this questionnaire, elite interviews were conducted with people in the party organisation on different levels of the party: *fédérations*, districts, and cities. The interviews in Hauts-de-Seine were conducted with those with responsibilities on the level of *fédération* and the cities; the interviews in Yvelines were carried out with those on the *fédération* and district level. The interviews

were based on the questionnaire, with supplementary questions about roles in the party organisation, as well as follow-up questions from the questionnaire responses. These interviews were held to get a better understanding of the more general questionnaire results. Additionally, the interviews were used to get more information about the party, its organisation, how those in positions of power in the party think that it is run, and whether they would make changes to how the UMP is run. The thesis provides a new perspective on such important questions as how parties manage internal diversity and how organisational resources are key to party success.

The fieldwork chapters are broken down as follows: first a chapter on the organisation in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines, then a chapter on the political attitudes and placement in both *départements* and finally a short chapter examining change in the party both in the *fédérations* and more generally. The chapter on the organisation, Chapter 4, addresses the organisational questions to see how the members view the party and to understand where the members came from; this allows us to reflect on what sort of implications this may have for the organisation, how the party is run, and how well it incorporates the traditions of these parties. The chapter on political attitudes, Chapter 5, and placement addresses the parts of the questionnaire on political attitudes to better understand the factions that exist in the UMP in these *fédérations* and what differences may and may not exist between them. The change and continuity chapter, Chapter 6, focuses on the open question addressing change in the party as a way of seeing how the party members view the development of the party to this point and how the party has changed as a whole reflecting on the history of the party, recent developments, and the questionnaire results. We look first in depth at the results in both Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines before trying to draw some comparisons and broader conclusions about the party from surveying its base. This approach allows us an empirically

based insight into the different dimensions of the parties in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines and renews a bottom-up tradition of party studies.

The final chapter is the conclusion, which explores how the UMP has evolved in its short existence, and what further research could logically follow on from the thesis. This helps to frame where the thesis fits into the study of French politics, as well as where it fits to the more general study of political parties.

Chapter 2

Political parties and party systems

This chapter explores the literature on political parties and party systems and how it relates to this study on the UMP in France. Such an examination is valuable because it gives us a framework to help to understand the party: how it works, how it has developed, and why it has developed in the way that it has. The themes from this chapter are used in later chapters for better understanding the UMP. Since no party exists in a vacuum, the party system and institutions of the political system have a great deal of influence on the creation and evolution, as well as the structures, of a party. Therefore, to examine a single party, it is essential to examine party systems and institutions in general, as well as the individual party system of a country. This is especially important in understanding the UMP in that it is a relatively new party that has been formed from older parties with their own traditions. This will frame what the UMP is in terms of the party system and institutions, how factions in a party manifest themselves, and party organisation and development. Chapter 3 examines the French party system and the French Centre-Right parties past and present in greater depth, but first it is necessary to establish the general framework to be able to understand in what environment the UMP operates.

A party system encompasses not only the parties themselves, but many other factors and groups such as the electorate, the laws concerning the structure of government, and rules about party formation. The rules of a party, both formal and informal, also play a role in the way that the party interacts with the political system. There has been extensive literature on this subject that has focused on a number of areas; for instance, the effect of the electoral system, party formation and factions. This chapter gives an overview of many different perspectives on political parties and party systems. Taken from this will be three key themes:

1. What is the role of the party system and institutional context in explaining the formation and nature of the UMP and what effects does this have?
2. What is the role of factions and intra-party politics in the UMP?
3. What was the nature of the ‘fusion’ process of the party and how has this shaped the organisation?

This chapter then moves on to explain how some of this will be used later in this thesis; that is to say, what the implications are in the French and UMP contexts.

Party system and institutions

This section is in two parts. First, examining what party systems are. Second, it examines the effects of institutions on political parties. In particular it stresses the significance of France’s semi-presidential system of government. To be able to examine what the UMP is we need to have an understanding of the context it exists and works within to be able to better compare the UMP to parties both in the French context and in general. This is especially important in the French political system is different from the rest of Western Europe: semi-presidential, rather than parliamentary.

The structure of the party system in a particular country is in part determined by the electoral system and the number of parties that result, which does affect how parties can form. One of the first to describe this was Duverger.¹ Two-party systems are often a result of single-ballot, single-seat districts, which are dominant in the English-speaking countries with this system. This leads to a Left-Right dualism of the political system. Multi-partyism is often the result of a proportional representation (PR) system and simple-majority second-ballot systems.² The second-ballot system often favours more centrist parties because of the advantage in the second round, serving to remove the chances of the extremist parties, as can be seen in France with the FN in 2002, with the Left voting by and large for the only democratic candidate left, Jacques Chirac. PR systems have a tendency to nationalise politics more than other systems because of their disassociation with localities. The second ballot in France can also be seen to promote a sort of Left-Right bipolarism, as well as the domination of the main parties representing the Centre-Left and the Centre-Right. Voters of the more extreme parties in France are forced either to vote for the more moderate party in the second round from their side of the political spectrum or risk the ‘greater evil’ controlling government. The different effects of electoral systems can be seen in France with the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic. The Fourth Republic, with its PR system, led to a very unstable system because of weak coalitions and the presence of many strong anti-system parties, from the Communists, to the Gaullists and Poujadists.

Giovanni Sartori, like Duverger, examines parties by the number of parties in the system and their effects.³ He divides the systems into more types than

¹Maurice Duverger, Barbara and Robert North (trans.), *Political Parties*, (London: Lowe & Brydone Ltd, 1964), pp. 206-280.

²Duverger, *Political Parties*, pp. 376-393.

³Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and party systems: A Framework for analysis*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976) pp. 125-129.

Duverger, including seven groups: one-party system, hegemonic party system, predominant party system, two-party system, limited pluralism, extreme pluralism, and atomisation. One-party is the most extreme system, with no party competition allowed. Hegemonic party systems allow smaller parties, which are subordinate to the main party. Predominant party is where one party dominates, but the other parties are not dependent on the one party. Two-party systems have two parties that alternate in power. Limited pluralism has lower fragmentation, only up to five parties, and needs some form of coalition government. Extreme pluralism has higher fragmentation with more than five parties and stability. Atomisation occurs when there are multiple equal parties, which makes the job of counting viable parties pointless.⁴ Sartori helps to differentiate among these types not only by the numbers of parties but also by the ideological distance between the parties. Generally in a two-party system, the ideological distance is small so the moderates can be attracted to the parties. Thus, the ideological distance increases in a more polarised system, and those systems with the most ideological distance between the governmental parties tend to be those with the most parties. The French system could be best labelled as limited pluralism. There are several extreme parties in France that do receive a large number of votes, like the FN and the *Front de gauche*, but the ideological difference between the two largest parties is not as wide because of the electoral system and other institutions. This limited pluralism in the French case also encourages the creation of catch-all parties as there is a great deal of support generated around the more moderate parties of Left-Right split, increasing the role of bipolarisation of the French system.

In a system like France's, where the number of viable parties is restricted, there is an increased imperative to form a party that appeals to the widest range of voters possible, that is to say, a catch-all party.⁵ These parties have changed

⁴Sartori, *Parties and party systems*, pp. 126-140.

⁵Otto Kirchheimer, "The Catch-All Parties," in Peter Mair (ed.), *The West European Party*

their programmes in order to appeal to a wider audience, rather than just a narrow ideology, and moved more to emphasise winning elections. Whilst a party cannot cater to all groups in a society, it can bring in those who do not greatly conflict with its ideological basis without upsetting too many from its political base. National societal goals are values that these catch-all parties use to attract voters, as they reach the widest range of voters. Probably the best example of this type was the *Union pour la Nouvelle République* (UNR), which professed national purpose and unity, along with the rally point of Charles de Gaulle. This allowed it to catch much of the vote on the Right and more of the Left and Centre than previous Centre-Right parties in France. Nonetheless, these catch-all parties must be careful to not lose their appeal to their base, especially those from older parties, because they risk losing their electoral power in the future. To a certain extent, the catch-all parties do continue to have success, with examples like the UMP forming to encompass most of the democratic Right in France as well as parts of the Centre and making some appeals to more traditional Leftist ideas. The UMP as a party cannot rally in the same way to Sarkozy as the UNR did to de Gaulle because Sarkozy is not the same sort of charismatic figure as de Gaulle, but the UMP is able to rally to the more general political principles and to the point of backing a united presidential candidate.

Steven Wolinetz expands on Kirchheimer's theory of the appearance of catch-all parties as part of the weakening of ideology.⁶ Catch-all parties by seeking to expand their electorate begin to appeal less to ideology and more to the issues that are seen to appeal to the Centre. Catch-all parties have arisen since the development of increased fragmentation and increasing numbers of unattached voters. Parties in a consumer society treat voters more as consumers and therefore adjust their

System, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 50-60.

⁶Steven Wolinetz, "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems," in Peter Mair (ed.), *The West European Party System*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p 218-231.

messages to the time to ‘sell’ their parties to the voters. This movement to a more flexible catch-all party is harder to accomplish for older parties because past policy has an effect on the current system so any changes in policy might not be taken seriously by the electorate, and too dramatic moves could turn their traditional electorate away, whilst failing to bring in the new target group.

Additionally, new cleavages in society have developed with the weakening of the Left-Right divide, such as the post-materialism cleavage, and the new parties often take advantage of these new cleavages. It is often argued that the old divisions between the Gaullists and the non-Gaullist Centre and Right have broken down. This is discussed as one of the reasons for the formation of the UMP in the next chapter, as without the weakening of these divisions, it is unlikely the UMP would have been created. Furthermore, there has been also a great deal of growth of non-aligned ‘floating’ voters since the 1970s that has been ascribed to this weakening of social cleavages.⁷ This means a move away from the domination of traditional parties in systems where post-materialism has become more salient, such as in Germany with the growth of the Greens. However, these new cleavages in France have been more limited in party formation due to the electoral system and the semi-presidential nature of the political system. Instead, elements of this ‘new’ politics have been adopted in the major parties.

With these party system effects in mind, we can explore how parties compete with each other. Strom (1998) identified three types of party competition: contestability, conflict of interest and performance sensitivity.⁸ Contestability compares party systems using parallels to economic models of competition. In this model, competitiveness is defined in terms of how easy or difficult it is for a new

⁷Scott C. Flanagan and Russell J. Dalton “Models of Change,” in Peter Mair (ed.), *The West European Party System*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p 50-60.

⁸Kaare Strom, “Inter-Party Competition in Advanced Democracies” in Jan-Erik Lane (ed.), “Party Systems: Special Issue,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1989, pp. 278-300.

party to enter into the system. This depends on two factors: the electoral system and the party finance regulations. For example, single-vote 'first-past-the-post-systems' most restrict the ability of a new party to become a viable player in the system. Other parts of institutions can affect the electoral system; for instance, the level of economic development and political geography. The creation of the UMP was possible in the sense that it replaced the parties that existed before it, which enabled it to be successful as a new party in a party system that restricts the number of parties that can be electorally successful.

Conflict of interest sees party system competition as not only a conflict of the government and the opposition but as conflict within coalitions and with parties themselves.⁹ Policy is the result of these internal conflicts and their resulting solutions and is a system of co-operation for those in the coalition to resolve policy conflicts. One can measure the conflict of interest with alternation in the system, which is the shifting of government parties, and responsiveness, which is the greatest number of 'winners' in a given election.¹⁰ The greater the alternation and responsiveness, the increased role conflict of interest has in a system. This can be seen as policies which are typically from the UDF and the RPR converging over time, as well as the UMP's policy forming between the various factions of the party.

Performance sensitivity is not rooted in institutions but is grounded in electoral based competition.¹¹ The effect on electoral outcomes is dependent on the number of voters that can be persuaded to vote for a certain party and the likelihood of this happening. Performance sensitivity can be measured by closeness in the top two parties in representation and electoral volatility. Countries where there are two dominant parties have lower performance sensitivity, whilst countries that have

⁹Strom, "Inter-Party Competition in Advanced Democracies," p. 280.

¹⁰Strom, "Inter-Party Competition in Advanced Democracies," pp. 284-285.

¹¹Strom, "Inter-Party Competition in Advanced Democracies," pp. 280-286.

a number of small parties with none having a great deal of dominance over the others have a high amount of performance sensitivity. As the French system has two large major parties with a number of smaller surrounding parties, the only large-scale change in volatility can be vis-à-vis – the Socialists (with other Left or Centrist parties) or the UMP (with other Right and Centre parties). In the French system, it is unlikely that another party could take the place of the large parties, unless a split occurred within them or a new formation came out of them, like the UMP from the RPR, UDF and RPF.

Smith (1989) builds upon the performance sensitivity model and adds the role of social cleavages on the party system.¹² Social cleavages affect the electoral volatility of a system. For example, if the class cleavage in a country is particularly salient, it is not likely that someone who identifies himself as working class will vote for the party that represents bourgeois interests (or that he perceives as representing these interests). Additionally, the opposition puts pressure upon the party in government as a part of the performance sensitivity model; the coalition in government does not live in isolation from the opposition, and greater hostility towards the government can affect policy. This is something that restricts the possibilities of the UMP; as France still has a relatively strong Left-Right cleavage, this can be seen in the UMP with the conflict between the more social parts of the Gaullists and the conservative parts of Gaullism.

The UMP is not just affected by the institutions of the electoral system. We can also study the effects of the other institutions that make up the political system – so-called institutionalism.¹³ Institutions affect how political actors (individuals, as well as groupings of individuals, such as political parties and factions) behave.

¹²Gordon Smith, “A System Perspective on Party System Change” in Jan-Erik Lane (ed.), “Party Systems: Special Issue,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1989, pp. 349-363.

¹³James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering institutions: the organizational basis of politics*, (Free Press, New York: 1989).

For example, there are rules that affect how actors can act within a system, and these rules come from a variety of origins such as: ‘routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, and technologies,’ as well as ‘beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge that surround, elaborate, and contradict their roles and routines.’¹⁴ Routines are followed as ‘appropriate behaviour,’ rather than because they promote one’s self-interest and they make the functioning of politics more stable as in the rest of societal interactions.¹⁵ Rule change usually comes from external change, though it can develop over time as well. Some institutionalists take a similar stance on politics as rational choice in arguing that politicians are attracted to popular behaviour, and the way that one interprets politics is seeing what one wants to see.

Institutions have a ‘memory’ that affects how they act, in that they ‘remember’ past behaviours that frame current behaviour. Institutions are also affected by how well they have worked together in the past, as well as by trusting relations of groups within the institution. To a degree ‘large, powerful actors’ are more able to dictate their environment and require others to adapt to them. This institutional ‘memory’ is rather important in a party like the UMP as the parties and factions that formed it had a history of competition, as well as co-operation, and they brought their institutional cultures to the UMP.

This focus on institutions does not mean that the institutions are the only actors with influence; institutionalism also considers the effects of other influences such as the economy, culture and important events that can change the face of the system.¹⁶ These other factors can change what options are available within the structure outlined by the institution, making institutions fit into these political contexts. It is unlikely that two countries with the exact same electoral laws and

¹⁴March and Olsen, *Rediscovering institutions*, pp. 21-22.

¹⁵March and Olsen, *Rediscovering institutions*, pp. 22-55.

¹⁶André Kaiser, “Types of Democracy: From Classical to New Institutionalism,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 422.

political institutions would have the exact same types of parties because of these factors, even though it is more likely the party systems would be more similar than in two countries with radically different electoral laws and political institutions.

Another important institution for understanding the nature of the French political and party system is the presidency. The role of the directly-elected president was an institutional change that had been set out by de Gaulle in the attempt to weaken the grip of parties on the French system, as he viewed the domination of the parties as one of the key weaknesses of the Third and Fourth Republics. However, this presidentialisation of politics has led to stronger (and more disciplined, to a degree, on the Right) political parties, which has only increased over the years.¹⁷ One can see the importance of the party within the increasingly presidentialised system of France in the preparation for the presidential elections. In fact, the Gaullist parties would go on to be some of the most well organised and strongest party structures in France.

All of the French presidents and many of the candidates have come from the leadership (either as direct heads of the party or indirect leader) of their own party, allowing all of the party machinery to get behind them.¹⁸ If she or he is to get into office, the presidential candidate needs the support of the party for a variety of tasks: running the campaign throughout the nation, getting the signatures needed to be on the ballot, et cetera.¹⁹ This creates limits on who realistically can run for the presidency, even within the smaller parties which have little chance in winning the presidency. In fact, many of the smaller parties are dominated by their (potential) presidential candidates, creating even more consolidated parties.²⁰

¹⁷Christine Pütz, “La présidentialisation des partis français” in Florence Haegel, (ed.) *Partis politiques et système partisan en France*, (Sciences Po, Paris, 2007), pp. 323-324.

¹⁸Pütz, ‘La présidentialisation des partis français,’ pp. 334-345.

¹⁹David Hanley, “Party, Personality and Institutional Constraint: The French Presidential Election of 2007,” *Modern & Contemporary France*, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 423-439.

²⁰Ben Clift, “Dyarchic Presidentialization in a Presidentialized Polity: The French Fifth Republic” in Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (eds.), *The Presidentialization of Politics: A*

Parties have had to adapt to promote presidential candidates through the leadership of the party in the absence of charismatic figures like de Gaulle, as they come along in politics so rarely and often only in extraordinary times.²¹ Often those who want to become president try to conquer the party first, like the most recent example of Nicolas Sarkozy. He aimed for the leadership of the UMP, in spite of the UMP's original purpose being to rally to Jacques Chirac after the 2002 elections, and Sarkozy made the party his own to become the UMP's presidential candidate almost by default.²²

We must also consider what key features of the French political institutions might give parties incentives to behave in a certain way. One of the most important of these is the effects of the semi-presidential system. The semi-presidential system of France promotes a bipolar party system, meaning that the parties tend to be from the Left or Right.²³ Historically, this has formed the two largest parties, the Gaullists and the Socialists, and the smaller parties working in alliances around them, with the Gaullists and their allies dominating until 1981, when the Socialists were able to gain control with the help of the Communists. The presidential system also reinforces this bipolarism, forcing the smaller parties to accept one of the mainstream candidates at the second round of the presidential election at the latest or risk letting the 'greater evil' from the other side of the political spectrum into office.

This tendency towards bipolarism in the party system is seen by some as an Americanisation of French politics in that one of the factors in the two-party system is the presidential nature of the American system. This idea has been

Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005), p. 227.

²¹Hanley, "Party, Personality and Institutional Constraint," pp. 423-439.

²²Gilles Ivaldi, "Presidential Strategies, Models of Leadership and the Development of Parties in a Candidate-Centred Polity: The 2007 UMP and PS Presidential Nomination Campaigns," *French Politics*, 2007, vol. 5, p. 258.

²³Gérard Grunberg and Florence Haegel, *La France vers le bipartisme? : La présidentialisation du PS et de l'UMP*, (Sciences Po, Paris: 2007), pp. pp. 16-21 and 30-32.

furthered by elements of the French system that are ideas transferred in part from the American system, such as the adoption of ‘primaries’ by the larger parties to prevent a repeat of the FN’s success in the first round of 2002. Nevertheless, this should not be seen as a full transfer from the American model, as there are some important differences between the two principles. For example, the UMP primaries were far more limited in who could take part than the American primaries were: in the U.S. one does not need to be a member of the party to vote in that party’s primary, and in some states one only needs to register which party one wishes to vote for in the primary at the polling station on the day of voting, whereas in the UMP only party members had a voice. Additionally, the leadership of the parties in America rarely produces potential candidates for the presidency, and the bipolarism of the American system is more fixed because of its electoral system and political culture, not just its presidentialist nature.

This increased presidentialisation has some origins in the media’s role in French politics; Nicolas Sarkozy was able to put forward a very personalised version of his politics.²⁴ This moved the electorate and the media to focus on one man, the president or presidential candidate, rather than the party as a whole. Also, he promoted his role as president in regards to the reforms that he attempted and implied leadership of the party; for example, in the reforms of the presidency, he conducted the national council in such a way that he seemed to still be the party leader.²⁵ However, this sort of behaviour caused some in the party to view him negatively and to have concerns that he would try to take away the responsibilities of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to concentrate the power for the presidency for himself.²⁶ Because of this, some argued that the Prime Minister felt that

²⁴Grunberg and Haegel, *La France vers le bipartisme*, pp. 93-94.

²⁵Régine Lamothe, “L’UMP s’organise sous la “présidence morale” de Nicolas Sarkozy,” *AFP*, 5 July 2007, downloaded from Nexis UK.

²⁶Solenn de Royer, “Le duo exécutif cherche à s’accorder; Le dossier de la réforme des régimes spéciaux a provoqué les premières tensions publiques au sein de l’exécutif,” in *La Croix*, 13

Sarkozy did not respect his role as Prime Minister and approached the relationship in a way that undermined the Prime Minister.²⁷

French politics has the added institutional feature of ties to local offices in a way which is different from most countries.²⁸ Most of those in the National Assembly continue to hold other local offices, such as mayor and general and regional councillor, within the rules of the *cumul des mandats*. This means that those involved in the National Assembly are not only tied in with local politics, but they are also quite often away from the National Assembly, leaving the voting to the party leaders in Paris. These politicians have more access to party resources because of their multi-layered support, but this also gives the party more control of its members who hold elected office in terms of following the party line in national office. This was less the case with the Gaullists in their beginnings because the top-down nature of the party meant minimal local contacts, but over time, they have been able to insert themselves locally as the other parties have. The parties that joined the UMP from the UDF already had these local ties in the tradition of their parties so with the reinforcement of this element, the UMP has been able to follow this tradition of *cumul des mandats*.

Another institutional issue that the UMP faces is the issue of co-operation between the groups within the party and their political allies from the context of past conflict, and the fact that the groups are not used to working closely together. As March and Olsen argue, institutions, such as political parties, have ‘memories.’ There has been bitter conflict on the Centre-Right throughout the Fifth Republic, as Chapter 3 argues, and this can lead to additional tensions within the UMP.²⁹

September 2007, downloaded from Nexis UK.

²⁷Eric Mandonnet and Ludovic Vigogne, “Sarkozy-Fillon : Pourquoi ils se détestent,” *L’Express.fr*(Online), 15 May 2008, Available from: http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/pour-quoi-ils-se-detestent_501772.html, Last accessed: 17 August 2008.

²⁸Clift, “Dyarchic Presidentialization in a Presidentialized Polity,” p. 229.

²⁹March and Olsen, *Rediscovering institutions* pp. 40-44.

The trauma of the 2002 elections may have brought them together when they had failed in the past, but there are still deep divisions within the party, such as between the ‘conservative liberals’ and the Gaullists. The groups in the UMP and their allies not only have to overcome the negative past, but they must learn to work together after having been separated in the past and only accustomed to working together in forming electoral alliances from time to time. These limited electoral alliances were mainly for parliamentary elections and the second-round presidential elections, so this adds to the tension of seeking a common presidential candidate for the first-round election for such a wide range of political families as one finds within the UMP. For example, there has been conflict between the UMP and the coalition partner *Nouveau Centre* over the ‘economic shield.’³⁰ There have been further questions about how loyal those who opposed Sarkozy are to what is seen as his party. The party has adopted regulations for the recognition of sub-groups to help cope with these internal tensions.

The groups from the RPR and the UDF also have the issue of different internal cultures beyond the leadership and ideological struggles.³¹ Therefore, the UMP’s structure, especially on the local level, must be flexible enough to adapt to these pre-existing institutional structures. For some of the fieldwork that was conducted for the following chapters, there were indications that the national level and the structures to support the national-level elections are very homogenised. On the other hand, the local level has been allowed a great deal of freedom and can be rather heterogeneous; in both federations, the UMP adopted features of the dominant Centre-Right groups that dominated the areas before the creation of the UMP. Respecting local traditions helps to reduce some of the internal tension, but the UMP must be careful not to become as loosely associated as the UDF

³⁰Eric Hacquemand, “Droite: Bibilles dans la majorité présidentielle,” *Aujourd’hui en France*, 7 July 2007, p. 11.

³¹See Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 on the events leading up to the creation of the UMP and the case studies in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines.

was, which some see as part of the UDF's downfall, discussed in Chapter 3. The understanding of the party systems and the institution gives us an understanding of the larger system in which the UMP operates. Now we can examine the institutions within parties to understand how they affect the intra-party politics of the UMP.

Intra-party politics and the role of factions

As the UMP results from the fusion of several pre-existing parties, one of the larger of which itself had many sub-groups (the UDF), one expects that the UMP would have many active factions and subgroups. Factionalism is common within larger French parties, sometimes to the extent that a party is more of a loose federation than a party, as one saw with the UDF, which is examined further in Chapter 3.

Sartori explores the role of parties and the meaning that the parties and party systems give. He argues three hypotheses about parties: parties are different from factions; a party is 'part-of-a-whole,' meaning that it is a part of the system, but the system cannot be examined without these parts; and parties channel the expression of their supporters.³² Factions are sometimes seen negatively. Whilst some do have bad or selfish intentions, factions can perform necessary functions in a political system and in society. The main functions of parties are 'expression' of ideas, 'channelment' of these ideas, and 'communication'.³³ Communication is present in party systems, channelment is a less inclusive idea and occurs in all systems with party politics, and expression is the least inclusive idea and occurs only in systems with more than one independent party. Communication is something that happens outside of party systems — parties are not needed for this process, but without them it is, or can be, difficult to understand what political conflicts are about — and channelment and expression need parties. Factions can also help

³²Sartori, *Parties and party systems*, pp. 25-29.

³³Sartori, *Parties and party systems*, pp. 50-58.

with the expression and channelment of ideas by presenting these ideas in a more coherent way.

Sartori also focuses on the internal workings of a party as an important part of how parties and party systems work. He contends that in order to understand party systems one must also understand parties and to understand parties one must understand their subdivisions.³⁴ According to Sartori, there can be three types of groups within a party: fractions, factions, and tendencies. He makes the distinction between fractions and factions, stating that factions are negative groups that have formed in a party. While fractions are well organised and have a strong presence, they might be good or bad, unlike factions. One could argue that that some of the parties within the UDF became factions above the party by Sartori's definition that led to the splintering of the party and their departure to the UMP and the *Nouveau Centre*. These terms of faction and fraction are, however, controversial, especially in dealing with their application to non-English speaking countries.³⁵ *Fraction* in French is a very negative term and *faction* is more neutral, and as this is an examination of a French party, to avoid confusion the term fraction will not be used. Faction will be used for strongly organised groups, but not necessarily with this divisive possibility. Tendencies are more weakly organised groups within a party that may have no real organisation at all and be just a number of individuals within a party with a particular outlook. Political parties with a number of factions are highly fractionalised, by Sartori's definitions of the words, while parties with a number of tendencies have less visible and less salient divisions than those with a number of factions.

With this, there are two ideal types of the way that party members can organise: 'non-aligned partisans,' those who are independent and attached to

³⁴Sartori, *Parties and party systems*, pp. 71-75.

³⁵Alistair Cole, "Factionalism, the French Socialist Party and the Fifth Republic: An explanation of intra-party divisions," *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 17, pp. 77-94.

the party because they identify with the platform. In this ideal type, there are only tendencies and no real organised factions or fractions within the party. The other extreme is the ‘atomized party’ units, which are fragmented around several different factional leaders, as was the UDF, this leads to many different competing factions.³⁶ Both non-aligned partisans and atomised units can exist within a party and may play different roles at different levels of a party.

Sartori also classifies four divisions of sub-party units: organisational, motivational, ideological and Left-Right.³⁷ Organisational factions are formalised factions that have official structures, being organised or not does not exclude also being one of the three other types. The existence of other organised factions encourages other factions to officially organise. There are some factions within parties that seek ‘power for power’s sake’ or see that they can get some reward as a result of holding power, that is to say motivational factions. Whilst some factions in parties are essentially ideological, ideology is also often used as a mask for power-seeking factions. Ideological factions do not only raise the question of ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ ideology, but ideological groups are against more pragmatic groups. Sartori sees the Left-Right faction idea as weaker than the others because Left and Right are difficult terms to define, and perhaps one could just link it back to the ideological conflicts, rather than a real separate type of sub-unit. Factions can be ‘personal,’ based on one leader for the faction or a ‘coalition’ of factions with many leaders of small groups joined for a common purpose. There are examples of all of these types within the UMP, many are a combination of categories, which are discussed in the next chapter in more detail.

The party structures and the political system in which parties operate both influence the way that factionalisation occurs.³⁸ For example, if party statutes

³⁶Sartori, *Parties and party systems*, pp. 75-76.

³⁷Sartori, *Parties and party systems*, pp. 76-93

³⁸Sartori, *Parties and party systems*, pp. 95-106.

forbid factions, factions might not be apparent and will not be set up publicly. The party statutes can actively encourage sub-group formation, as in the UMP, with the *mouvements* and *personnes morales associées*. Pure PR systems tend to more factionalisation than in non-PR systems because the more flexible electoral system rewards factionalisation. Factionalism is not necessarily bad, as it shows that there is some degree of democracy within parties and prevents the creation of monolithic parties. It is probably necessary in a party like the UMP to have the factions officially recognised to allow the party to interact more fully, as there are many sub-groups within the party due to its internal diversity.

Belloni and Beller seek to define factions in a ‘flexible’ way, due to the fact that there is disagreement about what the term actually means, as a ‘relatively organised group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for more power advantages within the larger group of which it is part.’³⁹ From this, they identify three types of factions.⁴⁰ The first, ‘faction cliques or tendencies,’ are with a common interest, be it ideological, personal, or other, but which are not formally organised. This type of faction (the clique or tendency) is not as long-lived as the other types, does not usually have many regularised rules and procedures, and normally only exists in an ad-hoc form. The second type, ‘personal, client-type’ are well-organised groups that are linked to the leader of the group and are usually structured from the top-down, as the relationship between the members and the leader discourages other models. This type can be divided further into those groups that only allow for a small, controlled membership and those that are ‘more public.’ These groups are longer lasting than the first type but not as long-term as the final type in that they usually

³⁹Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, “Party and Faction: Modes of Political Competition,” in Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller (ed.), *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective*, (Oxford: American Bibliographical Centre-Clio Press, 1978), p. 419.

⁴⁰Belloni and Beller, “Party and Faction,” pp. 419-430.

do not outlast the leader. Finally, ‘institutionalized or organizational factions’ are the most formalised type of faction, in terms of procedures and rules, and usually are more democratic in their structure than the other types. These groups have formalised membership and generally recruit widely for new members.

Factions are created for a number of reasons.⁴¹ They may come out of cultural norms, in cases in which divisiveness plays a key cultural role or from political causes. One of the main causes for this grouping is the role of patronage, and therefore factions can be attractive to political elites. Factions can also have their origins in the structural characteristics of the party, such as ideological diversity, a merger of previous parties, party flexibility, and the use of PR within the party. Certainly, these structural causes have a role in faction creation in the UMP as a party that was formed from other parties and factions; its ideological diversity and the party structures also encourage the formation of groups within the party. Factionalism is common within French parties, and factions have been able to flourish within the UMP because of the circumstance in which it formed.

The study of political factions has produced other critical approaches.⁴² For example, factions are part of the political power game within parties. It is hard to see these interactions as an outside observer. A researcher will always have to keep in mind that a lot of the important roles of sub-groups are hidden from those who are not actively involved in the party. A study of the impact and trade-offs of ‘group-forming’ and ‘group-joining’ would help better understand why people join such groups and could lead to insights into how the factions work within a party and how these correspond to the joining and formation of parties.

There are a variety of issues that affect how and what sort of factions form in a party.⁴³ One such factor is the political culture and background of a country, as

⁴¹Belloni and Beller, “Party and Faction,” pp. 430-437.

⁴²Maor, *Political Parties & Party Systems*, pp. 147-150.

⁴³David Hine, “Factionalism in West European parties: A framework for analysis” in *West*

discussed above. In a country without a strong Far Right presence in a conservative party, there is no need for an anti-Far Right group to form, whereas in a country with such a recent past it is more likely to form. The party system can have an effect. Multi-party systems are more factionalised, but the parties and factions must deal with the implications of coalition politics as well. Factions can spring out of a single-issue that is dominating a political system. An elite-centred faction may appear strong from the outside, but in fact it may have little power at the grassroots level. Party structures themselves may influence the role of factions. Political cleavages can also play a role in which sort of factions form, for example, the religion-state cleavage in the UMP with the *Forum des Républicains Sociaux* (FRS). This is not a strong cleavage in most of France, and that is why it is necessary for such groups to be a faction of a party, rather than a fully independent political party, if they wish to reach electoral office.

To provide a framework to better explain the UMP in regards to factions, in particular in the next chapter, we will use this typology in the rest of the thesis:

Type of faction	Description of type
Factions above party	Factions that have become more important than the party structures in themselves
Organisational factions	Factions that exist around a particular organisation or institution of the party
Motivational factions	Factions that seek to gain power, often the shortest lived type of faction
Ideological factions	Factions surrounding a particular ideology, often a longer lasting type
Left-Right factions	Factions surrounding a particular part of the political spectrum, often a longer lasting type
Personal factions	Factions based around a single person or small group of personalities, rarely outlive a personal career, but longer lived than motivational factions

The variability in the saliency of factions can be examined through the institution of the political system and of the party itself.

European Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1982, pp. 36-53.

Beyond factions, we can examine how intra-party conflict manifests. Michael Laver developed the conflict of interest model for intra-party competition.⁴⁴ He explains three views of intra-party competition by looking at how one can view a party. The first way that he says that one can view a party is as a coalition of politicians. However, this is problematic because parties in general are quite stable, and most politicians do not change parties. Additionally, the number of potential combinations parties could have would be difficult to examine. One could also view parties as coalitions of factions within a party, but the problem he identifies with this view is that factions in some countries are more stable than others, and in some nations it can be more difficult to identify what factions exist within parties. He explains that one can also view a party as a policy based coalition, which avoids the large numbers of the first view, and the difficulty of identifying the factions in the second view. Nonetheless, in this view one sees a party as more of a unitary actor, which may be an oversimplification, as parties have many different layers of interests. It is quite useful in a party like the UMP, which came from older parties which were made up of many factions themselves, to understand the party as a coalition of factions, as many of the previous structures continue on and play an important role in the interaction within the party. This is not say that there is constant conflict between the factions, but there is certainly some tension between them when it comes to decisions on leadership and the direction of party policy.

From these accounts, we ought to deduce the logic of reasoning in terms of many levels of support for parties: electors, supporters and militants.⁴⁵ Electors only give support at the voting booth, supporters have deeper sympathies for the party but are not necessarily active within the party, and militants are active party members who carry out party functions. This means the militants have the

⁴⁴Michael Laver, "Party Competition and Party System Change" in Jan-Erik Lane (ed.), "Party Systems: Special Issue," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1989, pp. 301-324.

⁴⁵Duverger, *Political Parties*, pp. 90-122.

greatest influence on what the party is. This study of the UMP focuses on those who are active in the party because they are those who have the most influence on the structure and direction of the party. As the UMP has its origins in conservative and liberal parties, they bring their form of hierarchy into the party and play a key role in laying the foundations of what the UMP is.

Party types, organisation, fusion and change

As this thesis seeks to understand the UMP as a party that represents a change in formation from the old RPR, RPF, and UDF, this next section will focus on the role of organisations in a party and how parties change and develop.

What sort of party is the UMP and how might it be situated in the context of our understanding of party types? Such a question requires us to look back at some of the most important writings on parties. Maurice Duverger is a good place to start, Duverger identified the typical parties when they appeared in political development.⁴⁶ The first type, the elite parties, developed in the nineteenth century. This kind of party, corresponding to some conservative and liberal parties, took the form of a cadre party, with caucuses and a limited recruiting of party members. Caucuses are from the ‘middle class’ style party and consist of small groups, which focus on the quality of membership, and are mainly focused on winning elections.⁴⁷ These parties were not overtly ideological, exist more for electoral purposes and have clear leadership. Cadre parties are based on structure, not size, and quality of membership is what counts above all. Therefore, mass recruitment in cadre parties tends to be unimportant.⁴⁸

The next stage in the development of parties was the mass parties, which were, by and large, the continental Socialist parties. In comparison to the middle

⁴⁶Duverger, *Political Parties*.

⁴⁷Duverger, *Political Parties*, pp. 23-26.

⁴⁸Duverger, *Political Parties*, pp. 62-80.

class parties, these parties tried to recruit as many members as possible, and the party funding came from membership fees. They had branches rather than caucuses, a separation of powers within the party, and placed importance on ideology. Branches are more decentralised and more open than caucuses in the sense that they are aimed at the masses, rather than a select elite and are more open to discussion.⁴⁹ Branches are also more permanent than the caucuses and meet with greater regularity and provide more interaction with the leadership than in caucuses and tend to be more democratic in nature. Mass parties actively seek to gain as many members as possible. Mass parties have formal processes for memberships and seek to give their members a political education. The final type of party that Duverger identifies is the highly centralised one of the communists and the fascists. Duverger also identified some parties that are between these three categories. Christian Democrats, Labour parties, and Agrarian parties generally fall in between the first two categories with their structures and membership; this is, where we would also place the UMP. The branch formation is the type that is most close to what one finds in the UMP, as there is not limited recruiting, and regular party members are able to participate though the elite do continue to play an important role. It is this difference with the role of the party that makes the UMP, even in its attempts to reach higher party numbers, not a true mass party, because the party does not seek to be an educational organisation, and because the UMP does not rely on membership fees alone for income. The UMP, however, does not limit its membership in the way that a cadre party does so one would classify the UMP somewhere between these categories, together most present-day parties in Europe.

Parties have developed further from these three main categories, argues by more recent literature. The development of the catch-all party has showed a different

⁴⁹Duverger, *Political Parties*, pp. 23-26.

sort of structure than the mass and cadre parties, developing a party with a wide appeal that do not necessary have functions of the mass parties such as the political education of its members. However, even today parties see these models as a sort of ideal type, and seek legitimacy by trying at least to appear like a mass party. This aim to bring in elements of a mass party can also be seen in the case of the UMP, which brought together several political factions and parties for further legitimisation of the party and its electoral success, as well in its attempts to bring in new members were not previously engaged in party politics to the party through the use of new media and the Internet.

Duverger makes a further distinction between direct and indirect membership.⁵⁰ Direct membership is where the members of a party directly sign up and pay dues. Conversely, indirect membership is where people become party members through an association with other groups, such as trade unions and Friendly Societies. The UMP has direct membership; one becomes a member through the party itself, rather than via non-political organisations. Additionally, for the groups that retain elements of independence within the party, it is not necessary for these groups to become members of the UMP, unlike like the traditional relationship of trade unions and socialist parties.

Angelo Panebianco offers a different perspective on the formation of party. In his model of party development, he argues that political parties move through different stages of development, showing some of the characteristics of the different models of parties at different stages.⁵¹ Political parties go through a first phase at their creation, which he calls the 'genesis', and in this phase, the party has come together to pursue a common goal, normally a particular ideology, and resembles more of a 'social movement type.' The second phase is institutionalisation, where

⁵⁰Duverger, *Political Parties*, pp. 6-14.

⁵¹Angelo Panebianco, Marc Silver (trans.), *Political parties: organization and power*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) pp. 3-24.

a party must contest elections, face the realities of the political system and begin to move away from this overtly ideological stage. The final stage is the 'system of interests' where the party has come to have the goal of survival with ideology subordinated, and the party has matured. In this stage the party has become professionalised, with those in power becoming more concerned with maintaining their position. This is not to say that ideology is unimportant; if a party completely abandons ideology, it will lose credibility and will be working against its own survival. This is interesting to see in the context of a party like the UMP, which was formed from previous parties so brought some institutional culture to the party and a party that formed out the process of elections, rather than having to forge completely new institutions and rules. This means that the UMP is a party that is by its nature different from Panebianco's model, as some of this institutionalisation had already taken place in the parties that came to form the UMP, leading to a more mature organisation for a relatively young party.

Political power involves a degree of exchange between the governed and those who govern; to gain power, one has to submit oneself to a degree, offering to adopt certain policies, committing to certain positions, et cetera.⁵² This exchange is not limited to just those in a party and those who vote for the party. Party members must be given incentives (ideological or material) to join and stay in the party as well, and while one might join for one group of incentives, one might profit from others. With this, Panebianco divides party members into 'believers' and 'careerists'. 'Believers' put an emphasis on the official ideological goals of the party and keep the party from straying too far from its principles. 'Careerists' tend to be the future leaders of the party due their ability to compromise more than those who are just 'believers'. There tend to be more 'believers' than 'careerists' in the party, which also helps with stability because the leadership is not under constant

⁵²Panebianco, *Political parties*, pp. 24-30.

threat of rising members. The ‘believers’ are more ideologically extreme than the electorate and the ‘careerists’, but they have a strong effect on the direction of the party so it is useful to understand that they believe, as we will examine in Chapters 4–6.

Generally, parties are run by a ‘dominant coalition,’ which is the main leadership; this group does not usually have absolute power within the party.⁵³ In fact, most parties’ structures allow for many groups to have a certain degree of influence; it is quite difficult for the national leadership to hold the power solely. The power of the dominant coalition is dependent on ‘its degree of internal cohesion, its degree of stability, and the party’s organizational power map.’⁵⁴ Most parties have some additional factions or at least tendencies that mean that the dominant coalition cannot run the party without the views of other groups being considered. Factions are better organised and more powerful than tendencies, but both can exercise some influence.

Panebianco argues that whilst that there are differences in parties, there are also general patterns within certain kinds of parties.⁵⁵ These patterns come from factors such as the construction of the organisation and organs of the party and their development, which help to determine whether the party is centralised or decentralised or whether local parties have autonomy. For example, liberal and conservative parties are usually created internally, by those within the party, and socialist and communist parties tend to be created externally. However, the internal creation of the liberal and conservative parties does not mean that they are the same; liberal parties tend to be diffuse and are constructed normally with a network of local notables. On the other hand, conservative parties tend to be centralised, top-down parties, as the Gaullist parties were historically, and the

⁵³Panebianco, *Political parties*, pp. 37-38.

⁵⁴Panebianco, *Political parties*, p. 38.

⁵⁵Panebianco, *Political parties*, pp. 50-53.

UMP is still to a degree.

Panebianco also makes the further distinction between parties that were founded for the purposes of a charismatic leader versus those that were not, arguing that these parties have a different pattern than the other types.⁵⁶ For example, the Gaullist party was founded for de Gaulle's use, and he commanded much more control than other typical party leaders. He could impose his decisions on the party, while those with 'situational charisma' would still have to negotiate with other members of their party. Michels makes the point that charismatic leaders can be from any political movement, not just the extremes or anti-system parties as is sometimes portrayed.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, many of the parties that Michels describes that were not anti-system or extremist would probably fall under the 'situational charisma' category, rather than be charismatic parties as Panebianco describes them.

Panebianco argues that these factors help to determine how institutionalised a party will become.⁵⁸ There are two factors in measuring the degree of institutionalisation of a party: the degree of freedom the organisation has from its environment, and the degree of systemness, 'the degree of interdependence of its internal sectors.'⁵⁹ There are four types of parties that emerge from looking at the institutionalisation of parties.⁶⁰ The first are those parties with strong institutionalisation and external legitimisation, which is typical in communist parties. The second are the parties with weak institutionalisation and external legitimisation, which he states is typical of labour parties and some religious parties. The third type has internal legitimisation and strong institutionalisation, in which he classifies Duverger's 'internal

⁵⁶Panebianco, *Political parties*, pp. 50-55.

⁵⁷Roberto Michels, "Some Reflections on the Sociological Character of Political Parties", *The American Political Science Review*, Nov. 1927, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 753-772.

⁵⁸Panebianco, *Political parties*, pp. 55-68.

⁵⁹Panebianco, *Political parties*, p. 55.

⁶⁰Panebianco, *Political parties*, pp. 64-65.

created' conservative parties, such as the British Conservative Party. The final type has internal legitimisation but weak institutionalisation, parties created as a federation of other older parties, such as the *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (SFIO) and the *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (CDU). Charismatic parties are an exception to these rules since they have a different form of creation than non-charismatic parties and can have weak or strong institutionalisation depending on the specific party. The UMP would best fit into the internal legitimisation and strong institutionalisation type, as that the party does not receive legitimisation from an outside source and, despite all of its factions, is not a federation of factions on the national level like the CDU.

Governmental parties develop differently than those born in opposition because of the advantage of having the state bureaucracy with which to work. Panebianco examines this through a few examples.⁶¹ The UMP is not a party that was a totally new creation at its formation, mirroring in some ways the formation of the CDU, and the old rules of the previous parties help to give a framework for this new party in which to operate, especially at the initial transitional time. The primary imperative of the party became preserving power for the Centre-Right. The national structure of the party quickly became a strong centralised structure, as the French presidential system enforces a national homogeneity. The UMP may be in part seen as a catch-all party, which has a record of success in French elections because of the wide number of ideologies it encompasses, which may make it more difficult to address which part of the cleavage structure the party could represent. However, the local party is more adaptable in that the groups that made up the party of the past are able to focus on the local specificities, such as local political currents and the role of local personalities, which pre-date the UMP, as is explored in the field work chapters.

⁶¹Panebianco, *Political parties*, pp. 113-172.

The UNR was different as it was created for the use of de Gaulle.⁶² It was created as an ‘anti-party movement’ to rally to de Gaulle, which allowed many groups to enter into the UNR. The party was dominated by de Gaulle and his inner circle with strict party discipline. The *fédérations* were dominated by the central party, and trusted leaders were installed to ensure control. There was not a large group of local notables in the first years of the Gaullist movement, and the elections tended to be ‘nationalized.’ The local party was limited by restricted membership, furthering the national nature of the party. The Gaullist movement moved on after de Gaulle to establish itself more locally, and the local party became more independent to reflect the different nature of local politics in the French political system.

Panebianco argues that major organisational change in parties mainly comes from outside forces.⁶³ He sets out three main stages of change. The first stage of change is strong environmental pressures upon the party and its leadership, such as an electoral defeat. After this challenge presents itself, there is a discrediting of the old order in the party, and a shift in the leadership to form a new order. Finally, the new leadership of the party changes the structure to try to better equip the party and make it more competitive, for example, changing the rules and redefining the goals of a party. This can be seen in the formation of the UMP and is discussed in the chapters following, with the increasing pressure from the Far Right with the FN becoming more of a player in the political system, and the party’s subsequent development.

Additionally, one must remember that the UMP is a formation of previously existing parties; Panebianco identifies parties that formed in circumstances similar to the UMP as differing from typical ‘conservative’ parties. This probably places the UMP between them and parties like the CDU in Germany. Whilst one

⁶²Panebianco, *Political parties*, p. v

⁶³Panebianco, *Political parties*, pp. 242-244.

would expect the party to be internally created, the UMP most likely has weak institutionalisation according to this theory; at least one would not expect a strictly top-down party as in many other conservative parties. From the view of those in the party who participated in this research, the national party is fairly centralised; however, the local party has a fairly large degree of power to act as it sees fit. It may be useful to consider the fact that the UMP was born as a party of government, rather than one that was dealing with opposition, and its formation was not fully established and clarified before it ran an election and took office.

Panbianco implies that wide-scale change within political parties is difficult. However, catch-all parties have been able to develop in spite of institutions that are generally opposed to systematic change. It is necessary for such parties to adapt to the ever-changing environment, especially if the party is ‘vote-seeking and attempting to address the ‘middle ground.’⁶⁴ According to Harmel (2002), there are three approaches to examining party change: Duverger’s and Kirchheimer’s ‘system-level trends,’ ‘life cycle’ approach of Michels and Panbianco, or the ‘discrete change’ proposed by Duverger, Kirchheimer, Katz and Mair. One can examine the way that parties develop in phases, starting with a social movement, then a ‘growth phase’ bringing a larger membership, an ‘organisational phase’ in which the party becomes more formalised, and, finally, the ‘institutionalization phase’ when it becomes a true party.

Katz and Mair identify a further change of political parties themselves coming from the development of catch-all parties from mass parties, i.e. system-level development identified by Kirchheimer, in that catch-all parties are developing into ‘cartel parties’ in which they become in some ways more like the original cadre parties with the elites of Duverger and small membership but additionally

⁶⁴Robert Harmel, “Party Organizational Change: Competing Explanations?” in Kurt Richard Luther and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.), *Political Parties in the New Europe: Political and analytical challenges*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 119-142.

become ‘semi-state agents.’⁶⁵ This is a reaction to a decline in party numbers in most democratic nations, as the catch-all parties do not have the ability to recruit that they had in the past and need to develop in a way that they can carry out necessary party activities without the participation of a large membership. It was argued by Harmel and Janda that the most dramatic change comes from external pressures, such as the loss of an election, especially several elections, in this evolution in the character in parties. One can therefore argue that both internal and external pressures are what drive party change, rather than just one or the other. This can be seen in the case of the French Right in the 1980s, as in the past they were pressured to work more closely together because of the more cohesive Left under Mitterrand and because of the rise of the FN, but the conflicts between the leadership prevented the more radical change of forming a single, united party.

Finally, Rosa Mulé argues that parties themselves can be viewed as small political systems.⁶⁶ The leaders of a political party and their challengers affect policy outcomes, and leaders seek to keep their position by rewarding their followers with policies and compromising with their challengers. The way a party’s resources are controlled also has an effect on party structure and the running of the party. If internal opposition to the leadership has significant control of the party’s resources, the party leader might find it hard to act against the internal opposition’s stance. Voters and the leadership are not the only ones who affect policy outcomes; the leadership must also appeal to the party members, who often have the strongest policy demands and are more concerned with ideology than other groups within the party.

The UMP’s internal structure in itself has had an effect on how the party operates. Both of the largest parties in France, the PS and the UMP, have

⁶⁵Harmel, “Party Organizational Change.”

⁶⁶Rosa Mulé, *Political Parties, Games and Redistribution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 42-48.

undergone a great deal of democratisation of their structures, which Sarkozy within the UMP has been able to use in his favour.⁶⁷ This democratisation has also been viewed by the members as one of the key improvements that have occurred within the party since its creation and, as discussed earlier in this chapter, this is important for the legitimacy of the party. Such reforms have included the increased direct participation of the party members with the introduction of primary elections for the French presidency, the direct election of the head of the UMP (something that developed in the RPR but continued with the UMP), and the involvement in intra-party policy decisions (moving from just the National Council of the party to the membership getting a voice on the ‘policy priorities’ of the party).

Conclusion

From this literature review, there are three main themes which are focused upon in the thesis. First, this thesis examines the theme of how the UMP as a party is affected by the political and party systems in which it operates and which plays a role in its formation, organisation, and behaviour. The French political context provides a different political system than in other Western European countries due to factors like its semi-presidential system, the electoral system and other unique French structures. These institutions create pressures that bring a focus on the presidency and the relative independence of local politics. The French political culture also has a great effect on the parties because of its hostility to parties, the general public seeing them as divisive, restricting the membership of the party, and forming different types of parties that are not found in countries with stronger membership numbers.

The second is understanding factions and other subdivisions in the party,

⁶⁷Ivaldi, “Presidential Strategies, Models of Leadership,” pp. 262-264.

how they function in the party, and what this means for the party as a unit of examination. This is explored through the chapter on political families in the UMP, through the examination of the history of these movements and their place in the party today. This is also explored in the fieldwork chapters, which map the existence of these factions and chart the view of those in the organisation towards them. The UMP is a party that has had to adapt to the fact that it was formed from several groups, both from various parties and from various factions of these pre-existing parties. The party statutes recognise the need for the existence of sub-groups within the party to address these sub-groups and tendencies. There are two principal types of structures in the party that are official sub-groups to address groups of different origins: “*personnes morales associées*,” which are more independent groups and have their origins in pre-existing parties, primarily from the UDF, and “*mouvements*,” which are more integrated in the party and come mainly from factions in the previous parties. These types of sub-groups and examples of them are examined in greater detail in the following chapter.

The third theme addresses how the UMP as an organisation is shaped and affected by its history, formation, and development. The UMP is different from a party that was formed as a new creation, due to its history and its creation out of previously existing political parties. It must reconcile pre-existing institutional cultures and rules in a logical way and in a way that can fit the different groups within the party. These last two factors are examined by looking at the history of the Centre-Right in the Fifth Republic and formation of the UMP, as well as how the members perceive the party's actions and the operation of the party organisation. These themes serve as a general framework in trying to better understand the UMP and political parties as a group.

This chapter has focused, as one of the three key themes it has identified, in the high factionalisation of the party that is in part due to the nature of the UMP as a

party that came together from, or “fused,” many existing parties. However, much of the factionalisation also came from within the former RPR itself, the largest party in the formation of the new UMP party. The party has factions and political groups from the former DL, which are very liberal and more *dirigiste* Gaullists in conflict with the more religious FRS and secular *Parti Radical*. The UMP is not only made from factions of ideology, but also from leadership type factions as well. Some of the factions are more institutionalised and more independent due to the differences between the *personnes morales associées* and *mouvements*. The factions provide a way for the various groups within the party to better communicate their political ideas and goals to the wider party, which helps in the cohesiveness of the party because the group do not feel as marginalised. The UMP can be seen as a catch-all party with its appeal to the many different factions that have come to make it up, still focusing on a large membership unlike a cartel party. As we will see from the field work in chapters 4, 5, and 6, the membership still believes that this element of large recruitment is important and legitimises the party’s existence. We will also see the members’ understanding the UMP as a presidential party.

Chapter 3

Political families and the formation of the UMP

Following on from the framework of analysis defined in the previous chapter, we will now endeavour to set out the context for the study by observing party factions and their origins, the systemic pressures pushing for the creation of the UMP, and the institutional pressures that favoured the formation of a unified party. We will also emphasise the importance of a specific crisis – the 2002 presidential election – in terms of accelerating a longer-term historical process. We focus on the various political families that came together to form the *Union pour un Mouvement Populaire* (UMP) and past attempts to create a single Centre-Right party in France, as well as some of the reasons that the UMP formed at the time that it did in the face of these past failures. The UMP was formed not only out of the *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) but also from various other, smaller parties, mainly those that had broken away from the *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF). This presented challenges for the UMP as a cohesive party with some very contrasting groups having to work together, such as the Radical Party, the party that helped to shape the *laïque* nature of the French state, and the social Catholic party of *Forum des républicains sociaux* (FRS) of Christine Boutin, as well as the sovereigntist groups like those of *Debout*

la République of Nicolas Dupont-Aignan and the *Rassemblement pour la France* (RPF) of Charles Pasqua, and the more pro-European groups like *Convention Démocrate* and *Société en Mouvement*. Beyond the ideological factions, there were also pre-existing leadership conflicts within the Centre-Right and the Right which are now in the UMP.

The chapter will address the pre-existing factions from the RPR and the UDF and the groups that entered the party with the creation of the UMP, and the other factions that have manifested themselves since then. This is approached with an examination of some examples of the two types of bodies that are recognised by the party statutes: *personnes morales associées* and *mouvements*.¹ After the examination of these various groups, the second section of the chapter addresses some of the previous attempts since the creation of the Fifth Republic to present a united Centre-Right, both by alliance-making and by creation of a quasi-party. The main focus of this section is on the coalitions and alliances starting from the Gaullists under de Gaulle and the two unsuccessful attempts to create a united Centre-Right party after the 1989 European election and the 1997 legislative election. These episodes demonstrated that the factionalisation of the Centre-Right remained in the face of institutional pressures of the French political system. This is to better understand the context the UMP operates within, rather than providing an in-depth explanation of why the UMP formed. This is because the aim of this thesis is primarily to understand how the UMP had developed by 2007 as an institution, rather than why it came together as a party in 2002.

In the light of these past conflicts, the final section of the chapter examines some of the reasons why the majority of the Centre-Right was able to come together to form a united party in 2002. This section of the chapter focuses on three main

¹Florence Haegel, “Le pluralisme à l’UMP structuration idéologique en et compétition interne,” in Florence Haegel (ed.) *Partis politiques et système partisan en France*, (Sciences Po, Paris: 2007), pp. 232-233.

issues identified as key stepping stones toward the creation of the united Centre-Right party: the weakening of the UDF, the convergence of the Gaullist and the non-Gaullist Centre-Right and, finally, the rise of the *Front national* (FN) and the success of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 2002 presidential elections. These factors had been developing well before the creation of the UMP; however, before the creation of the UMP there was not enough impetus to unite the Centre-Right before the creation of the UMP beyond simple electoral alliances and cooperation. As Harmel argues,² it is often a shock that is needed to make real change. An examination of these factors helps to explain the institutional pressures that fostered the formation of the UMP. These factors, combined with the results of the 2002 presidential elections, created a new sense of urgency amongst many of those that joined the UMP to set aside their differences for a guarantee of electoral success so that the united Centre-Right could not suffer the same fate as the disunited Left.

Political families and groups of the UMP

To understand the UMP, we must also understand the ideological groups that comprise it. The political traditions of the French Right were first identified by René Remond.³ He placed the Right into three historical traditions dating from the 19th century: Legitimism, Orléanism, and Bonapartism. Legitimism belongs to the counter-revolutionary tradition and is the furthest to the Right. This tradition has been more marginalised than Orléanism and Bonapartism. The next type, Orléanism, are the modern-day economic liberals, this is to say the former UDF and some parts of the former RPR, which are bourgeois in nature, rather than populist. Bonapartism is the final type, of which he classifies Gaullism

²Robert Harmel, “Party Organizational Change: Competing Explanations?” in Kurt Richard Luther and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.), *Political Parties in the New Europe: Political and analytical challenges*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 119-142.

³René Rémond, *Les droites en France*, (Editions Aubier Montaigne, Paris, 1982).

as the modern inheritor. Bonapartism is more openly populist and depends on a charismatic leader to help its support levels. Since the Orléanist tradition has been seen to overlap both the former UDF and RPR, this can be also seen as convergence of French Right since de Gaulle left the Gaullist movement. According to this definition, the UMP is probably in between Orléanism and Bonapartism as that they are openly populist, but they do not have the type of charismatic leadership like that of de Gaulle. These broader groups are internally diverse in nature, which we can see from the many factions and tendencies that are part of the UMP.

Following from the framework presented in chapter two, one interpretation of the UMP is as a coalition of factions. Understanding the origins of the component units of the UMP is essential in order to address one of our key questions: is the UMP really just an extension of the old RPR with the addition of a few new much smaller groups and does this explain its contemporary fragility? We address the general factions and tendencies, as well as specific groups as active examples of these general sub-groups.⁴ This is done while keeping in mind that many of these groups do not publish figures on membership numbers, as well as the fact that as outsiders we cannot see the full impact of these sub-groups on the party as Maor argues.⁵ First, this analysis of the factions of the UMP will start with those groups that came from the RPR, as this was the largest of the groups that came to form the UMP. The bulk of the members of the UMP who identified themselves with an ideological current, rather than a specific group, categorised themselves as either Gaullist or liberal.⁶ From the results of a questionnaire for participants of a UMP congress in 2004, Haegel breaks the

⁴Tables of the groups and parties discussed this chapter can be found in the appendix on pages 215-219.

⁵Moshe Maor, *Political Parties & Party Systems : Comparative Approaches & the British Experience*, (London: Routledge, 1997).

⁶Florence Haegel, "Le pluralisme à l'UMP," pp. 244-247.

membership into ideological groups, the largest of these groups being the Gaullists (excluding social and Left Gaullists) with 34.3%, social and Left Gaullists 7.6%, liberals 33.5%, Centrists 11.4%, sovereignists/nationalists 7.4%, Christians 2.5%, and others 3.3%. The Gaullist identification is primarily from the RPR, whilst the liberals most likely come from a combination of the UDF and the RPR. Most of the other groups also came from a combination of the UDF and RPR, with the sovereigntist/nationalist element most likely to have a strong influence of the RPF of Pasqua and those from the RPR. However, these are just the general tendencies of the various groups that make up the UMP, and there is no single overarching Gaullist, liberal, Centrist, nationalist, sovereignist, or Christian group within the UMP that contains all of the members of a certain tendency, following from the parties that existed before the UMP. This would be impractical because there are many different views of what these terms mean, as well as conflicts over loyalty to a particular leader of a faction, which leads to further factionalisation of the party. Therefore, this section focuses on some of the groups that officially exist rather than the tendencies, as one can more clearly understand the ideology and goals of these official groupings.

The strength of the Gaullist tendency in the UMP should not be surprising given that the RPR labelled itself as Gaullist and used much of the same sort of symbolism as the Gaullist parties that existed before its creation. However, as many have argued, Gaullism is not a clear concept and has been used to mean everything from the historical Gaullism of the French Resistance to the former Socialist Jean-Pierre Chevènement in his party *Mouvement républicain et citoyen*, to the more traditional view of the Gaullists as a Right-wing movement that is generally Euro-sceptic to more pro-European movements embracing the EU. Gaullism sought to appeal to a broad base and was quite successful in this, especially in the beginning of the Fifth Republic when it was at the height of its

electoral success, and this can be seen as part of the confusion over the term.⁷

The early Gaullist parties of the Fifth Republic were able to attract the votes of both the Left and the Right of the political spectrum as a sort of catch-all party, Kirchheimer⁸ identifying the *Union pour la Nouvelle République* (UNR) as the typical example of this new type of party that he identified. The party did not seek out only one social group for a target electorate but was directed towards reaching all voters. It generally appealed to ideas of national independence, ‘the authority of the State, the unity of the French and the leadership of de Gaulle.’⁹ Gaullism has a central point of pragmatism, rather than ties to one sort of economic policy. Only certain things could not be compromised on, such as national unity, but these points were often ambiguous in meaning, typical of a catch-all party. De Gaulle believed that it is was necessary for the stability of the nation to keep social inequality under control; however, he did not pursue the same sort of economic policy that the French Left promoted. Instead, De Gaulle adopted a primarily mixed economic policy.¹⁰ Furthermore, this idea of taking the “best” from all ideologies has remained a theme throughout the history of the Gaullist movement, though not in all parts of the Gaullist movements, especially in more recent years. For the reason of plurality within the movement itself, this chapter will not seek to define what Gaullism is or is not today or historically more than these very general principles, but the definition of Gaullism, for the purposes of examining this tendency, is based on the groups within the UMP that label themselves as Gaullist and their view of Gaullism, both from past movements and political clubs and associations that are connected to the UMP.

⁷Andrew Knapp, *Gaullism Since de Gaulle*, (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot: 1994), pp. 141-145.

⁸Otto Kirchheimer, “The Catch-All Parties,” in Peter Mair (ed.), *The West European Party System*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 50-60.

⁹Knapp, *Gaullism Since de Gaulle*, p. 4.

¹⁰Knapp, *Gaullism Since de Gaulle*, pp. 422-436.

Gaullism, historically, was associated with Keynesian-style economics, and the liberal movements within those groups that labelled themselves as Gaullist did not gain real influence within the movement until the 1980s. Neo-liberalism had been popular not only amongst the Gaullists, but in France in general, and as the idea gained more ground, it spread amongst some Gaullists. However, it should not be forgotten that even before that era, there had been conflict between the more Left-wing Gaullists like Jacques Chaban-Delmas and the more Right-wing ones such as Georges Pompidou.¹¹ There was also the separation of the Left Gaullists, *Union démocratique du travail* (UDT) and the mainstream Gaullists of the UNR even at the beginning of the Fifth Republic, representing factions of the Left-Right origins.¹² The development of conflict between the Left and Right of the party with the more traditional forces, like Philippe Séguin, and the new liberal forces, like Édouard Balladur, took hold with the growth of economic neoliberalism in the 1980s.¹³ Séguin saw Gaullism as a movement for ‘Republican values’, for protection from EU integration, and for protection of the public sector, and put importance on a social economic policy focusing on issues, such as keeping down unemployment. This strand of Gaullism is more social than that of Balladur but still opposed to the Socialists and does not promote interventionist beliefs as far to the Left of the Socialists under Mitterrand. The more liberal Gaullism, which is sometimes labelled Conservative liberal, has come to be associated with Balladur’s supporters, and later Nicolas Sarkozy as he rose to power. This is not only an ideological group; it also developed as a group that is associated with certain personalities, (Balladur and later Sarkozy), like those that were associated with other charismatic leaders in the past.

¹¹Knapp, *Gaullism Since de Gaulle*, pp. 15-26.

¹²Jean-Charles Brisard & Patrice Pinard, *Enquête au coeur du RPR*, (J. Grancher, Paris: 1996), p. 201.

¹³David Bell, *Parties and democracy in France: parties under presidentialism*, (Ashgate, Aldershot: 2000) pp. 64-75.

Like the UMP, the previous Gaullist parties had some version of political clubs and movements representing smaller factions and groups within the party.¹⁴ Some of these groups continue on in the UMP today as *mouvements* (movements), which are allowed to associate with the party by the party statutes, which has led to a variety of groups forming clubs or associations for their particular currents.¹⁵ Whilst these *mouvements* are part of the party structure, they do not have representation in the party hierarchy, unlike some other parties that have official acknowledged structures, such as the *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (CDU) in Germany. However, it does help to promote a more democratic structure, as Sartori argues¹⁶. We can examine the types of factions that exist in the UMP through the typology we identified on page 42 in Chapter 2.

The recognition of *mouvements* was done in order to protect the smaller groups within the party that might feel threatened by the larger currents in the party and feel that they did not have a way to express their political beliefs without such organisations. One of such clubs that was originally created in the RPR and continues in the UMP today is *Club 89*, which was instrumental in forming the policy of the RPR and was closely associated with Chirac and his loyalists, and remains close to this current within the party today. Often those associated with Chirac and his supporters, such as this group, have been labelled as neo-Gaullist to show the difference between them and the Gaullists under de Gaulle, making this, like many factions in the UMP, both an ideological and a personal faction. Another group stemming from political groups in the RPR is the *Club de l'Horloge*, which was more to the Right of *Club 89*.¹⁷ The club associates itself with the republican

¹⁴Knapp, *Gaullism Since de Gaulle*, pp. 200-208.

¹⁵Florence Haegel, "Le pluralisme à l'UMP," pp. 232-233 and UMP, *Les nouveaux statuts de l'UMP*, (Online), Available from: <http://www.u-m-p.org/site/upload/statuts/statuts.pdf> Last accessed: 15 May 2008.

¹⁶Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and party systems: A Framework for analysis*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976)

¹⁷Club de l'Horloge, Available from: <http://www.clubdelhorloge.fr/index.php>, Last

Right and is for more privatisation of the economy, as well as being robust in its opposition to the Left and Far Left.

In addition to movements and clubs that formed in the RPR, a variety of such groups has been created since the formation of the UMP. From the traditions of the Left Gaullists, *Club Nouveau Siècle* has formed to protect its vision of Gaullism.¹⁸ Like the Left Gaullists of the past, it focuses on the social aspects of Gaullism, in particular issues like *participation*, and opposition to pure liberalism and unregulated free markets. In addition, the social Gaullists have groups such as *Dialogue et Démocratie*, which is strong in Yvelines and also focuses on the social aspects of Gaullism and *participation*.¹⁹ These factions representing factions based on the Left-Right model of a faction.

Further groups that have origins in the RPR and the parties that broke from the RPR are the *souverainiste* groups like *Debout la République* (DLR) and *Nation et progrès*. DLR is a *souverainiste* Gaullist party, formerly a movement of the UMP, led by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan and was originally part of the UMP, but split with the UMP in 2007.²⁰ This split can be related to the ongoing conflict of leadership between Dupont-Aignan and Sarkozy, which manifested again with Dupont-Aignan refusing to recognise Sarkozy as the sole UMP presidential candidate in 2007 and continuing his own campaign. He argued for this action because he felt that the move for primaries was against the Gaullist institution of the presidency where anyone could become president of the Republic, not only a representative of a party.²¹ This shows that the DLR was both a personal and ideological faction. *Nation et progrès* is associated closely with DLR and the

accessed: 16 May 2008.

¹⁸Florence Haegel, “Le pluralisme à l’UMP,” pp. 240- 242.

¹⁹Yveline Dialogue et Démocratie, 2002-2004, “Yveline Dialogue et Démocratie”, Numbers 1 and 4, Rambouillet.

²⁰Debout la République, Available from: <http://www.debout-la-republique.fr/> Last accessed: 16 May 2008.

²¹Florence Haegel, “Le pluralisme à l’UMP,” pp. 252-253.

RPF. Both of the groups are strongly Euro-sceptic and emphasise the importance of protecting the sovereignty of France against Europe and globalisation.

The UDF was also made up of various groups which adopted very different positions. However, the groups within the UDF were more entrenched due to the structures of the UDF which limited direct membership of the party. One example was the conflict between the *Centre des démocrates sociaux* (CDS) under François Bayrou and *Parti Républicain* (PR, later *Démocratie Libérale*, DL) of Alain Madelin that developed in 1995, repeating again with DL refusing to dissolve into the new UDF in 1998.²² These groups struggled for the leadership of the UDF, in part due to their different ideologies, as well as their leadership loyalties and organisational issues. Bayrou and the CDS were generally considered centrists and Christian Democrats; this should be clarified to mean Christian Democracy in the more typical tradition in France, that is to say that the CDS was not a confessional party, unlike the Christian Democrats in many other European countries, but one that took ideas from social Catholic teachings, like those of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP). On the other hand, Madelin and his supporters were strongly liberal with libertarian leanings, calling for the rollback of the state throughout, and sometimes labelled as “French Reaganites” for their economic views. The PR was founded by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and was a party of small business owners and small farmers, later becoming liberal in the mid 1970s so there is a liberal tradition within this group of the UDF. The PR was certainly not as liberal in the beginning as it became eventually with its evolution into the DL. The DL finally left the UDF, later joining the UMP, which came to shape a large part of the liberal grouping in the form of the political club *Cercles libéraux* within the UMP.²³ In this association it has promoted the removal of what it sees as unnecessary restrictions that hinder the economy and business and promoted

²²Bell, *Parties and democracy in France*, pp. 88-121

²³Florence Haegel, “Le pluralisme à l’UMP,” pp. 238-240.

education, rather than economic redistribution and the welfare state, as the key to equality.²⁴

Other liberal groups within the UMP are the *Convention Démocrate*, *La Droite Libre* and *Droite libérale-chrétienne*. The *Parti Populaire pour la Démocratie Française* (PPDF) was another of the founding groups of the UMP that had been part of the UDF, forming the associated movement *Convention Démocrate*.²⁵ The PPDF was a Giscardian centrist-liberal party with strong support for Jacques Chirac, with its leader being the foreign minister in his government in 1995.²⁶ This group of liberals did form part of the New UDF, which resulted in some of its members leaving the party for the DL, those who did not wish to be absorbed into a larger party. *La Droite Libre* is a Right liberal party that opposes interference of the State in the economy, centralisation of the State, reforms to the welfare state, and opposes communitarianism, sometimes with quite strong Right-wing rhetoric..²⁷ It has worked with DLR in the past because it also disagrees with how Sarkozy came to become leader of the party and because of similar views on the issue of communitarianism. Moreover, both opposed the entrance of Turkey into the EU and have some shared Euro-sceptic stances.²⁸ *Droite libérale-chrétienne* is a group that was originally part of the UDF but was expelled from the party when its leader Charles Millon worked with the FN on regional elections. The party has continued to have some tendencies towards the Far Right because of its past

²⁴Cercles libéraux, *Les défis du 21e siècle*, (Online), Available from: <http://www.cerclesliberaux.com/newsite/newcercles/rubrique=3.html>, Last accessed: 16 May 2008.

²⁵Hervé de Charette, *Osons le débat !*, (Online), Available from: <http://www.convention-democrate.fr/Definition%20v2.pdf>, Last accessed: 15 May 2008. and Convention Démocrate, *Qu'est-ce que la Convention Démocrate ?*, (Online), Available from: <http://www.convention-democrate.fr/Definition.pdf>, Last accessed: 15 May 2008.

²⁶Andrew Knapp, "What's left of the French Right? The RPR and the UDF from conquest to humiliation, 1993-1998", *West European Politics*, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 109-139.

²⁷La Droite libre, *Argumentaire politique de la Droite libre : Une droite décomplexée pour une France forte*, (Online), Available from: <http://www.ladroitelibre.com/pages/qui-sommes-nous.html>, Last accessed: 16 May 2008.

²⁸Florence Haegel, "Le pluralisme à l'UMP," pp. 252-253.

associations but this is only a minor group within this party.²⁹

Beyond the liberals, there is a grouping of those who define themselves simply as centrists from the UDF groups within the UMP, one of which is the *Société en Mouvement* of Gilles de Robien.³⁰ This is heavily linked with *Nouveau centre*, as well as the UMP, bringing together the two coalition partners in closer connection with those in this part of the ex-UDF party and the UMP. The group argues for a mix of social policy and promoting small businesses to shape the economy and, like many groups from the former UDF, they are pro-European.

Another centrist group that has joined the UMP from the UDF is the Radical Party.³¹ Whilst they were important historically, helping in the shaping of the French *laïque* State, they have been weakened since the complication of their main aims and further weakened during the Fifth Republic due to the internal divisions. They have their origins in anti-clericalism and republicanism and were responsible for instituting much of the secularisation of the French State. The Radicals split in 1972 into the Left and Right factions, further marginalising them, the Left making alliances with the Socialists and the Right with the UDF, and later leaving the UDF for the UMP. The Radical Party benefits from being one of the *personnes morales associées* (associated bodies). This means that they have greater autonomy within the UMP than the groups that have been absorbed into the party and only have the clubs or groups within the structures of the party itself. This gives these *personnes morales associées* more powers than *mouvements*, such as drawing up their own political platforms. However, they still receive the benefits of being part of the UMP, such as being able to run under the UMP banner and take part in UMP

²⁹Daniel Navrot, "Rhône-Alpes : la droite et les droites-échec des millionistes et versatilité électorale du FN," *Outre-Terre : Revue française de géopolitique*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 55-59.

³⁰Société et Mouvement, Available from: <http://www.societeenmouvement.org>, Last accessed: 16 May 2008.

³¹Bell, *Parties and democracy in France*, pp. 122-126.

decisions.³² These groups are more independent than those of the *mouvements*. This creates a sort of organisational faction, on top of the ideological faction with the centre being the Radical Party.

Other such associated parties include the FRS, the *Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans* (CNI) and the RPF. The FRS, originally part of the UDF, is led by Christine Boutin.³³ The FRS, in contrast to the Radicals, is a social Catholic party, and unlike some of the parties with Christian Democratic influences in France, it does focus heavily on religious and moral issues such as opposing abortion, euthanasia, and homosexual marriage. It also focuses on a number of social issues like affordable housing, economic redistribution, and protecting families in the social Catholic tradition in Europe, and has its roots in Yvelines. The CNI is a small Conservative liberal party that is generally more Euro-sceptic than many of the other groups within the UMP, and historically it has worked with the various Gaullist parties.³⁴ It advocates strong stances on crime and is economically liberal. The CNI has moved towards the Right over the years, and it is generally considered to the Right of the rest of the UMP, in part because of those from the FN and other Far Right parties joining in more recent years. It advocates strong stances on crime and is economically liberal.³⁵ It is also quite a small group within the party. The RPF is a *souverainiste* Gaullist party headed by Charles Pasqua, who left the RPR on the issue of the European Union. The party makes appeals to traditional Gaullism and to Euro-scepticism, having worked with

³²Florence Haegel, "Le pluralisme à l'UMP," pp. 235-237.

³³Forum des républicaine sociaux, Available from: <http://www.frs-ladroitehumaine.fr/>, Last Accessed: 15 May 2008.

³⁴CNI, *Accueil*, (Online), Available from: <http://www.cni.asso.fr/Private/Accueil.htm>, Last accessed: 15 May 2008. and David R. Cameron, "The Dynamics of Presidential Coalition Formation in France: From Gaullism to Giscardism," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 253-279.

³⁵Georges Ubbiali, "Towards the Institutionalisation of Prejudice?," in *New Xenophobia in Europe*, Bernd Baumgartl & Adrian Favell (eds.), (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 1995), p. 122.

other Euro-sceptic parties like the MPF of de Villiers. The RPF remains strong within Hauts-de-Seine, the traditional stronghold of Charles Pasqua, though the RPF is weaker in other parts of the country.

In addition to these mainly ideological groups, there are groups which surround certain personalities within the party; in Haegel's survey, 25.6% of the respondents associated themselves with a person, rather than an ideological group or organisation.³⁶ These show a different sort of faction as categorised by Sartori and identified in our typology of factions in the previous chapter, the division between ideological and personal factions. These groups are less stable because they usually only last as long as their leader(s), but this type of faction is especially important in the context of the presidentialised Fifth Republic and the competition between rival presidential cliques. As mentioned above, many within the UMP associate themselves with Sarkozy, with his takeover of the party; this was especially the case with the new members who came to the UMP without previously being a member of a political party. One of the main conflicts early in the UMP was between those who supported Chirac and those who supported Sarkozy. Some argue that the UMP was in fact a presidential party created for Jacques Chirac but became a presidential party for Nicolas Sarkozy. Sarkozy is often associated with the Conservative liberalism of Balladur and Chirac with the neo-Gaullism movement; however, those who did not necessarily associate themselves with these movements also rallied to these leaders.

The largest leadership groups were around Sarkozy and the former supporters of Chirac, though mainly as non-official factions; there are some smaller official groups, such as *France.9* of François Fillon and *Nouvelle République* of Michel Barnier.³⁷ The *France.9* describes itself as a club of reflection for key current political issues, generally those that are focused on by the government and has

³⁶Florence Haegel, "Le pluralisme à l'UMP," p. 244.

³⁷Florence Haegel, "Le pluralisme à l'UMP," p. 242.

a youth association based in several universities and a limited membership for the main group, which is reviewed by its president François Fillon.³⁸ This group existed before Fillon became Prime Minister, but it is interesting because it gave Fillon support beyond the party and the government itself. However, these smaller personal factions are often also more closely associated with one of the ideological groups, such as the *souverainiste* movements and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan and Charles Pasqua. Also, leadership conflicts prevented the whole of the UDF joining the UMP, precluding the creation of a fully united party of the Centre and Centre-Right. François Bayrou, whilst being part of the group that wanted a united list in 1989, rejected joining the UMP. Some of those from the CDS, Bayrou's group within the UDF, chose to join the UMP or the UMP's coalition partner, the *Nouveau centre*, but many from this group also remained loyal and joined his new party, *Mouvement Démocrate* (MoDem). There are also those who associated themselves with past leaders from the UDF and RPR, besides those who label themselves as Gaullist, such as Raymond Barre, showing the effects of leaders beyond their time in politics.

The UMP as a party not only allows for those factions which existed before the creation of the UMP, it also allows for new factions, as one can see in particular with some the personality factions and tendencies of the party. This diversity is important in a party like the UMP because it allows the UMP to represent many groups and the factions and tendencies that they represent within the UMP. This is true for those who had been members of the RPR, RPF, and UDF, as well for the members who had not previously been in a political party.

The sub-groups within the UMP are generally simply factions or tendencies; that is to say that most of the groups do not pose a direct threat to split the party

³⁸François Fillon, *Le blog de François Fillon*, Available from: <http://www.blog-fillon.com/categorie-475306.html>, Last accessed: 20 September 2008. and France.9 Jeunes, *France.9 Jeunes*, Available from: <http://france9lille.levillage.org/joomla/index.php>, Last accessed: 20 September 2008.

nor are they factions above the party. There are strong, more independent groups, in particular those parties that are *personnes morales associées*, even though these associated parties create their own platforms, much in the way that other completely independent parties do. Not all of those that are just *mouvements* are weaker; this depends on the group/split that they represent. However, it is generally the case that they are weaker because they are a different sort of organisation than a party. It is possible for the *mouvements* to become parties, as the case of the DLR demonstrates, but most of the *mouvements* do not seem inclined to take such dramatic steps. Both the *mouvements* and *personnes morales associées* are creatures of the UMP and important parts of the structure of the party in the sense that they are recognised by the party and their status helps them communicate with the party, and they get some of their legitimacy through this. This is beneficial not only to these sub-groups, but to the party as well, as the groups function as a member of the party, rather than a potential rival to the party. Generally, they fall into groups organised around certain leaders and/or ideological factions, and these quite often overlap, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The *mouvements* and *personnes morales associées* are not as powerful as the official sub-groups in some parties, like those in the CDU that have votes in party policy, or like those in the former UDF that were dominated by the factions and parties within it. This diversity brings the UMP more towards the type of a catch-all party, rather than a more limited ideological party, as it has to appeal to some very different political interests.

Conflict on the Centre-Right before 2002

With this degree of pluralism on the French Right, not just in terms of ideology but also in terms of organisation and personal loyalties, it is not difficult to imagine the sort of issues that arose from attempting to create a united Right in France

during the Fifth Republic. The alliances, when they did happen, took the form of coalitions and electoral alliances, rather than united parties or unions of the parties, but even these were uneasy at most times. Nevertheless, there were some prior attempts at a united party of the Centre-Right, but all attempts before the UMP failed. The alliances were strongest between the various elements of the Right during the years under de Gaulle, but this was in part because of the dependence of the other Centre-Right parties on the more powerful Gaullist parties for power. These alliances and their downfalls are the primary focus of this section, but it will also examine the attempt in 1989 that was probably one of the more serious attempts at creating a new united Right, as well as the attempt in 1998 that helped to lead to the formation of the UMP.

The largest party on the Right in the Fifth Republic before the UMP was the Gaullist party under de Gaulle. He was able to draw in many forces on the Right for a party with wide ranging support over a variety of groups.³⁹ This is not to say that the Gaullists were the only group on the Right, nor that they were liked by all of the other groups of the Right. Those on the Far Right generally opposed de Gaulle for issues such as granting independence to Algeria and his opposition to Vichy, as did some elements on the moderate Right, even those which were dependent on the Gaullist party, due to issues like foreign policy and economic policy. However, these other moderate parties were marginalised as a whole whilst de Gaulle was in power and only became more important during Pompidou's presidency, later being able to establish themselves in higher positions of power with the help of the Gaullists.

The UDF and the Centrist parties which preceded it were often in a difficult position because it was difficult to find what the Centre stances ought to be and they often lacked the more structured organisation of the other parties, in

³⁹Andrew Knapp, *Parties and the Party System in France: A Disconnected Democracy?*, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2004), pp. 76-77.

particular of the highly top-down Gaullists.⁴⁰ Their leaders often did well in the polls; however, this usually only translated to power when in coalition or co-operation with another group, rather than having their own major electoral success. One example of this cooperation was with the RI, one of the main parties of the Centre-Right that would later join the UDF, and some of the Gaullists uniting for the elections in 1974 to support Giscard d'Estaing, but this unity was limited as Chaban-Delmas still ran as a Gaullist candidate. However, many from the UDR did back Giscard d'Estaing over Chaban-Delmas in this election.⁴¹ Chirac and those who supported Giscard d'Estaing argued that he was the better candidate, and it was necessary to support him to prevent a Socialist government. However, the Gaullist 'Barons' (those who had long been in the Gaullist party, many historical Gaullists) saw Chirac as a traitor for this action for taking support away from the UDR in favour of a non-Gaullist, showing that the personal and ideological conflicts even at this time of co-operation were still important in parts of the parties.⁴² Without the support of many of the UDR, it would have been unlikely that Giscard d'Estaing would have had this success. There were always some similarities in policies between the Gaullist and non-Gaullist Right, and often it was more institutional questions separating the parties which made co-operation difficult. It should be remembered that these groups must also overcome the historical memory of conflict to have co-operation.

Even this co-operation between the Gaullists and the Centrist parties fell apart in 1976 with Chirac's creation of the RPR to reassert the party independence from the RI.⁴³ This was a result of the difficulties with the coalition of the Giscardiens and the Gaullists in government, in both personal and ideological terms. In

⁴⁰Bell, *Parties and democracy in France*, pp. 81-88.

⁴¹Knapp, *Gaullism Since de Gaulle* pp. 44-46.

⁴²Eric Branca, *Le roman de la droite : 1974-1998 : chronique d'un échec*, (JC Lattés, Paris: 1998), p. 53.

⁴³Knapp, *Gaullism Since de Gaulle* pp. 46-66.

addition, Chirac also took the decision to stand down as Giscard d'Estaing's prime minister, as he felt that he did not really have any power. After this point, many of the Gaullists rallied to Chirac, even those who had been unhappy with Chirac's stance on the 1974 election, weakening the position of Giscard d'Estaing.⁴⁴ The parties continued to work together on many issues during the Giscard d'Estaing presidency, but increasingly the Gaullists reasserted their independence.⁴⁵

The RPR moved towards a more pro-market stance and away from Europe. Chirac saw the chance for the 1979 European elections to show the real differences between the UDF and the RPR by returning to the traditional Gaullist stance of national sovereignty. This was a forewarning of the 1981 election, when Chirac ran as RPR candidate for the presidency and refused to back Giscard d'Estaing in the second round, choosing opposition over subordination to Giscard d'Estaing and the UDF. Giscard d'Estaing lost not only because he did not strike a balance of a coalition with the Gaullists but also because he was seen as not doing enough on the economy by many groups, like the Gaullists and other groups on the Right, and because the Left was united under Mitterrand unlike past leaders of the Left.⁴⁶

Though the Gaullists had in the past had difficulties with the UDF and its predecessors, as the RPR moved the Gaullist movement more towards neo-liberalism, co-operation between the UDF and the RPR began to grow again in the 1980s.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, this step was also short-lived, and the turn away from liberalism became more dramatic after the failure of the RPR to win the presidential election in 1988, again moving towards more traditional Gaullist stances on the economy, especially with the leadership of Séguin and Pasqua, both personally opposed to many parts of the things that represented the non-Gaullist Centre-Right. Nevertheless, this signalled more of an acceptance of a larger variety of

⁴⁴Branca, *Le roman de la droite*, pp. 73-74.

⁴⁵Knapp, *Gaullism Since de Gaulle* pp. 55-57.

⁴⁶Branca, *Le roman de la droite*, p. 17.

⁴⁷Knapp, *Gaullism Since de Gaulle* p. 83.

views within the neo-Gaullists, led at the time by Jacques Chirac. This would help to open up the RPR and the Centre-Right as whole for more co-operation and led to more opportunities for working more closely. Moreover, this would lead to the official recognition of ‘currents’ within the RPR, laying some of the framework for the organisations which would come into being in the UMP.⁴⁸

In the spring of 1989, a group from the UDF and the RPR came together in order to create a united opposition against the Left for the EU elections, an initiative which would not come to fruition.⁴⁹ Those who tried to organise this saw it as the best chance to unite the Centre and Centre-Right, as a sort of party like the CDU in Germany so that they would be poised to win the next legislative and presidential elections.⁵⁰ They wanted to achieve this by promoting younger people in the parties for a common list so that those who did not have as much political and personal baggage with the leadership could make a list, under which it would be easier to unite. There were many reasons behind the attempt for a united opposition, some just interested in pushing aside the Left, but others with more self-interested reasons. For example, this can also be seen in part as an attempt to remove Giscard d’Estaing from the leadership of the UDF, especially by the Chirac supporters from the RPR, who wanted him out of the way for Chirac’s future run in 1995. However, those supporters of Chirac did not want to be seen as the ones trying to get rid of Giscard d’Estaing because of the history between the two men, which would more than likely cause Giscard d’Estaing to resist this united opposition party.⁵¹

Many of those on the Left of the RPR saw this union as a way of preventing

⁴⁸Florence Haegel, “Le pluralisme à l’UMP.”

⁴⁹Gilles Bresson & Jean-Michel Thénard, *Les 21 jours qui ébranlerent la droite*, (Grasset Et Fasquelle, Paris: 1989).

⁵⁰Bresson & Thénard, *Les 21 jours qui ébranlerent*, pp. 50 & 123.

⁵¹Bresson & Thénard, *Les 21 jours qui ébranlerent*, p. 114.

the RPR moving further to the Right, by uniting it with the Centre.⁵² Whilst those who led this movement were quite convinced that they could make it work, there were some problems that eventually led to the collapse of this move towards a united opposition to the Left. One of the major problems was the distrust between the leadership of the UDF and the RPR, especially between Giscard d'Estaing and Chirac. As Giscard d'Estaing blamed Chirac for his loss in the second round of the presidential elections in 1981, he was wary of the motives of Chirac and his supporters. Eventually, Chirac and his supporters agreed to go along with the principle of the united list for the elections, but Giscard d'Estaing refused, even in the face of the polls that showed that the public wanted such a united list, because of his suspicions of Chirac and his supporters. He was also convinced that Mitterrand was so unwell that he would not make it until the end of his term and wanted to be ready to run for president when Mitterrand was forced to stand down or passed away. This led to the divergence of the two parties, in spite of their shared opposition to the Socialist government.

The RPR and the UDF began to run into further difficulties again in the early 1990s with the issue of the Maastricht Treaty.⁵³ The UDF was generally for the Treaty, and the RPR against; however, both parties were divided over the issue, internally and externally. The supporters of Philippe de Villiers broke from the UDF over the issue, with most of the rest of the party supporting the Treaty. The RPR was even further divided by the issue: Chirac supporting the treaty, the official party line remained neutral in an attempt to prevent damage to the party, and most of the party, in fact, was opposed to Maastricht. There were concerns that joining the Euro would negatively affect French sovereignty and that Europe was growing more powerful than it should. This meant that more traditional Gaullists in the RPR felt threatened by the Treaty, with some actively campaigning

⁵²Bresson & Thénard, *Les 21 jours qui ébranlerent*, p. 100.

⁵³Brisard & Pinard, *Enquête au coeur du RPR*, pp. 60-63.

against it, despite the party's official stance of neutrality. This conflict showed that some of the conflicts within the parties were more salient than those between the Gaullists and the non-Gaullist Centre-Right.

The electoral alliances between RPR and UDF also led to further divisions in some cases, such as divisions that arose with the 1995 presidential election.⁵⁴ In the run-up to this election, two potential presidential candidates emerged from the RPR for the presidency, Balladur and Chirac. The main support for Balladur came from the UDF, and Chirac's base was more from within the RPR itself; this support of Balladur from the UDF was because of the similarity of his Conservative liberalism to their beliefs. Balladur, because of his cross-party support and holding the office of prime minister at the time, was the favourite to win at the beginning of the race. Nevertheless, Chirac was able to win the first round ahead of Balladur because he was better at campaigning and appealed more strongly to his base. This forced Balladur and his supporters to back Chirac in the second round so that the Socialists would not return to government again. However, this late backing of Chirac meant that Balladur and his supporters were marginalised, even though they were part of the governing party and coalition. This election was also the beginning of open tensions between Nicolas Sarkozy, who was a rising star at the time, and Chirac, with Sarkozy supporting the more ideologically similar Conservative liberal against Chirac. Sarkozy, up until this time, was generally seen as a protégé of Chirac, and his support of Balladur would signal the beginning of the rivalry of the two men. Only minor parts of Balladur's policies were initially put into place under this government, though they were more liberal than those laid out in the platform, helping to reinforce these divisions, and Sarkozy lost his position as Minister of the Budget as a punishment. Sarkozy only returned to the top of the party after the election defeat in 1997 and then only for short periods

⁵⁴Brisard & Pinard, *Enquête au coeur du RPR*, pp. 74-97.

until the creation of the UMP.

There would be yet another attempt for union of the Centre-Right in 1998.⁵⁵ The group that was meant to unite under the label, *Alliance pour la France*, was led by two of those involved in the 1989 attempt at unity, Philippe Séguin and François Léotard. This attempt followed the disastrous dissolution of the National Assembly in 1997. As in 1989 there was the external pressure of electoral failure, which is often viewed as the strongest pressure for real party change. The leaders of the various political families did not trust each other, especially after the damage from the conflict of the 1995 presidential elections, the supporters of Chirac having not yet forgiven Balladur and the liberals. Of course, this failure should reflect the fact that real party change is not possible without the party's willingness to change. As Harmel discusses⁵⁶, party change does not come solely from the outside pressures in democratic systems, and most in the positions of power in these parties in 1998 did not want this level of change. In fact, not only did this attempt fail, but the Right moved towards greater internal conflict for other reasons at the same time as the Alliance, with the DL breaking from the UDF, taking about one third of the members and most of the liberal part of the party with them.

Why the UMP was created

Moving on from this section, this chapter shall now examine how the UMP was able to form in the face of these past divisions. Pressures for convergence had been building over time, but the final shock that came with the 'success' of the FN in 2002 helped to make the Centre-Right realise that they had enough common interests and similarities to create this united party, in spite of their years of internal fighting.

⁵⁵Jim Cordell, "Unity and Plurality in the French Right," *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 10, no. 2, p. 196.

⁵⁶Harmel, "Party Organizational Change".

The weakening of the UDF

Some commentators for many years had considered the UDF a party that was held together on borrowed time, created as an opposition to the Gaullist movement on the Centre-Right, mainly depending on the leadership of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to give the party some sort of figurehead and direction. The leadership of Giscard d'Estaing did help to keep the leadership and ideological conflicts mostly at bay through most of his reign as the leader of the UDF. However, the identities of the various groups were able to develop and strengthen in the 'country club' confederal formation of the UDF. The weakness of the organisation of the UDF was part of its strength as a party with many strong currents; the organisational structure made it easier to convince the diverse groups to work together.

Furthermore, the weak organisation also promoted deeper factions in the party. There were few direct members of the party, which incited the leadership of the individual factions to raise further personal issues on top of the ideological ones. This allowed, and even promoted, the hardening of the different ideologies and created deep leadership conflicts within the UDF which might not have existed otherwise, showing the negative factionalism that can develop in parties when it is permitted, creating factions above party, which shows the potential destructive effects of this type of faction discussed in Chapter 2.⁵⁷ It would be this split in ideology, particularly between the Christian Democrats and the liberals, as well as the issues of dealing with the FN, which would lead to the weakening and the eventual split of the UDF. The biggest difference in ideology and in leadership within the party was between the *Parti républicain* (PR) and *Centre des démocrates sociaux* (CDS), representing the liberals and the Christian Democrats respectively, especially in relation to economic and moral issues. This is not to say

⁵⁷Nicolas Sauger, "The UDF in the 1990s: the break up of a party confederation" in Jocelyn A. J. Evans (ed.), *The French party system*, (Manchester University Press, Manchester: 2003), pp. 108-110.

that there was total discord between the members of the UDF; there was certainly some agreement on specific issues within the majority of the UDF like the policy towards Europe, decentralisation and the role of the State. The UDF would eventually begin to fall apart in the lead-up to and aftermath of the departure of its long-time leader Giscard d'Estaing, with many parties become in effect factions above party, meaning that they were more important than the continued existence of the UDF. The development of the New UDF, aiming to create a united party (rather than a confederation of parties) to calm internal conflicts, led to the rejection of the changed party by those who did not gain leadership in the new formation.

There was a minor split in the party a few years before the departure of Giscard d'Estaing with Philippe de Villiers and his creation of the *Mouvement pour la France* (MPF) after the issue of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. However, this anti-European integration strand of the UDF was quite small within this mainly pro-European party, especially in comparison to the other divisions that would come to the surface later in the 1990s. In the 1995 presidential election, the UDF was split as a party in relation to which candidate to support, and many of the members of the UDF backed Édouard Balladur. However, their leader, Giscard d'Estaing backed Jacques Chirac in the hope of having some influence on him, but as a weakened leader he had no real influence over Chirac or the rest of the Gaullists.⁵⁸ Furthermore, it demonstrated his lack of understanding of his own group within the UDF, for the PR, which for the large part saw Balladur as 'one of them,' with his more liberal platform, opposed Chirac's strongly traditional Gaullist platform. Those who supported Balladur wanted to call primaries to select the candidate who the UDF would support, assuming that Balladur would win easily and marginalise Giscard d'Estaing for his choice of backing Chirac.

⁵⁸Bell, *Parties and democracy in France*, pp. 87-88 and 114-117.

When the time came for the party to be taken over from Giscard d'Estaing, the divisions in the UDF would really begin to show with the change in the parties that formed the UDF fighting for the leadership and the creation of the New UDF. The transition from leadership began with the election of Gilles de Robien, a supporter of François Léotard, as the leader of the UDF National Assembly group.⁵⁹ In the election for the head of the UDF after Giscard d'Estaing's departure, the UDF chose Léotard as the new president of the party against Alain Madelin by a very large margin. The election of Léotard over Madelin showed how weak Giscard d'Estaing had become even in his own party, as the former president had backed Madelin as his successor. Léotard changed the structure of his own group of the UDF, the PR, by allowing the members to be part of one party only, meaning many of the members of the PR who had been part of the PPDF as well had to choose the group of which they wished to remain a member. The UDF would turn on Léotard shortly after taking the leadership of the party, however. He was criticised for having worked too closely with the RPR in the past and suspected of not wanting to retain the independence of the party. Above all, he was wounded by a number of political scandals.⁶⁰

Léotard's rise was accompanied by a change of leadership of the main groups within the UDF, with François Bayrou at the head of the *Force démocrate* (FD), formerly the CDS, and Madelin for the PR, which he would rebrand as the *Démocratie Libérale* (DL), with Bayrou eventually heading the New UDF after Léotard quit. Léotard, in the attempt to calm the growing tensions between the groups, proposed the fusion of the groups that made up the UDF.⁶¹ However, the weak leadership of the UDF made this difficult, with many wishing for the old structure to remain so that they could retain their power, and resulted in more

⁵⁹Bell, *Parties and democracy in France*, pp. 88-90 and 118.

⁶⁰Knapp, *Parties and the Party System*, p. 227.

⁶¹Bell, *Parties and democracy in France*, p. 96.

problems for the UDF, rather than less. This, coupled with the fact that the *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) was weakened after the failure of 1997, reducing the need for protection against the Gaullists, would later lead to the split of the *La droite* and DL from the UDF.⁶² Whilst the group *La droite*, later the *Droite libérale-chrétienne*, was not very large, and mainly from the Rhône-Alpes region of its leader Charles Millon, the split of the DL had a major impact. *La droite* split over the issue of working with the FN, as it felt that this was the only way to have success in their region, whilst most of the rest of the UDF opposed this. This played itself out with the 1998 regional elections when Millon and his supporters decided to work with the FN to attain power, in spite of the criticism of much of the UDF. This resulted in these members being expelled from the UDF, and they later founded *La droite*.⁶³ The DL left due to the fact it did not wish to become part of the more integrated structure of the New UDF, a party which they accused of being “defunct.”⁶⁴ Madelin also opposed the expulsion of those who chose to work with the FN in the 1998 regional election.⁶⁵ The split of the DL allowed those behind Madelin to express more clearly a very liberal stance and identity.⁶⁶ The result of the split of the DL for the UDF served to strengthen the Christian Democrats as the largest group remaining in the New UDF. The DL’s split from the UDF forced it to work more closely with the RPR in order to succeed in gaining power.

The split of the UDF did not mean that the parties that had made up the UDF stopped working together in the opposition, but weakened the ability of the

⁶²Knapp, *Parties and the Party System*, pp. 220-222.

⁶³William M. Downs, “The front national as kingmaker...again: France’s regional elections of 15 March 1998,” *Regional & Federal Studies*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 130-132.

⁶⁴Bell, *Parties and democracy in France*, p. 96.

⁶⁵Marie-Ange Michelet, “La Bio,” Available from: <http://www.alainmadelin.com/biographie/index.html>, Last accessed: 3 March 2010.

⁶⁶Sauger, “The UDF in the 1990s,” pp. 107-113.

UDF to work together as a unit within the Centre-Right.⁶⁷ However, the New UDF, as a more centrist party without the DL and *La droite*, saw the option of working more closely with the Socialists, but this was still a limited option, in part due to the historical opposition to the parties of the Left. Furthermore, the non-Gaullist Centre-Right without the UDF, which had protected the identity of the non-Gaullist Centre-Right for over twenty years, was not able to stand alone, and this made it easier to accept going along with the Gaullists in the formation of the UMP.⁶⁸

The convergence of the Gaullist and the non-Gaullist Centre-Right

One of the main reasons for conflict on the Centre-Right was the separation of the Gaullists and the non-Gaullists. This division can be connected to organisational and leadership conflicts, as well as ideological ones. Over the course of the Fifth Republic, the Gaullists and the non-Gaullist Centre-Right had moved to similar policy positions, and this increased under the leadership of Jacques Chirac and through the increasing influence of the Conservative liberals of Balladur and later Sarkozy, softening their positions on a number of issues and on the organisational style.⁶⁹ This helped to reduce conflict within the French Centre-Right, leaving deeper co-operation a real possibility. The view of the public of Gaullism as not a relevant term to the politics of the day came along with the weakening of the principle of the Gaullism in the parties with Gaullist origins, mainly only those who are in the 'Gaullist' parties seeing Gaullism as an important concept today.⁷⁰ This

⁶⁷Sauger, "The UDF in the 1990s" pp. 108-111.

⁶⁸Knapp, *Parties and the Party System*, p. 221 and Sauger, "The UDF in the 1990s," pp. 107-113.

⁶⁹Andrew Knapp, "From the Gaullist movement to the president's party," in Jocelyn A. J. Evans, (ed.) *The French party system*, (Manchester University Press: Manchester; 2003), pp. 121-125.

⁷⁰Knapp, *Parties and the Party System*, pp. 242-243.

could also be part of the general dealignment of parties discussed by Wolinetz.⁷¹

One of the major areas of conflict between the Gaullists and the rest of the moderate Right was that of European integration. The Gaullists had a semi-hostile stance towards European integration, and de Gaulle had backed the idea of a 'Europe of the Nations,' rather than a close union and certainly not a federal Europe. The Gaullists, over time, have changed their opinion on this issue frequently, at times using Euro-scepticism as a stick to beat the UDF and at other times embracing further integration or at least quietly putting into place European policy with which they have supposedly disagreed. This can be seen in part of the internal conflicts over Europe within the movement, as well as a change in attitudes. De Gaulle himself viewed European integration with suspicion, only acceptable when it worked in France's favour, especially showing hostility when the British showed interest in joining, seeing this as a way to American domination of Europe and loss of French influence. However, his prime minister, Georges Pompidou, was more positive towards Europe and did not see the UK as a threat, and signalled a softening of Gaullist policy towards Europe when he became president. Chirac has changed his view on Europe throughout his political career, generally becoming more open to Europe as his career moved on. He became very Euro-sceptic in the early 1980s, then went on to support the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, breaking the link between sovereignty and currency, something which de Gaulle said that could not be unlinked.⁷² Some of those in the Gaullist movement began to view European co-operation as necessary to protect French interests; therefore, they needed to ensure that their interests were protected through Europe. Nevertheless, the moves towards Europe, whilst bringing the RPR nearer to the UDF, also alienated some of the core supporters

⁷¹Steven Wolinetz, "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems," in Peter Mair (ed.), *The West European Party System*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p 218-231.

⁷²Knapp, "From the Gaullist movement," p. 125.

of the Gaullist movement, causing the split of Charles Pasqua and his new party, the *Rassemblement pour la France* (RPF), with the RPR's support of the Treaty of Amsterdam.⁷³

Another area of conflict was the role of the State in the economy; a large part of the liberal wing of the non-Gaullist parties did not share the same taste for *dirigisme* that the Gaullists did. De Gaulle supported a mixed economy in France, pushing forward social policies to ensure that social inequalities were kept in check and conservative policies like keeping inflation low to strengthen the French economy. Again, Pompidou would move away from some of de Gaulle's stances, opposing many of the social aspects; he looked at the Left Gaullists and Social Gaullists like his prime minister, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, as misguided, and Pompidou opposed ideas like *participation*. The leadership of the Gaullist movement took a strong neo-liberal turn with the RPR in 1981 under the leadership of Chirac.⁷⁴ Whilst the Gaullists turned away from neo-liberalism shortly after this, especially after losing the election in 1988, the liberals within the Gaullist party continued to gain support within the movement, and the Gaullist movement's positive view towards *dirigisme* of the Gaullist movement was further weakened.

Knapp argues that the split on many stances, especially social and moral issues, at the time of the creation of the UMP was stronger within the parties of the Centre-Right than between the different parties, making it easier for the parties to join forces.⁷⁵ This could be seen within the RPR on issues like Europe, state interference in the economy, and the rights of homosexuals dividing the membership quite strongly, some members of the RPR agreeing with some from the UDF on some issues, rather than with those within their own party. This means that the cleavages that formed the split between the parties were growing

⁷³Knapp, *Parties and the Party System*, p. 242.

⁷⁴Knapp, "From the Gaullist movement," p.125.

⁷⁵Knapp, "From the Gaullist movement."

weaker, and some of the internal splits had become more salient than the divisions that originally separated the parties.

A further area of conflict between these political families was the role of the leader of the party and the leader of the State. The non-Gaullist parties did not place the same level of importance on an individual leader of a party as the Gaullists did. However, this emphasis was not as strong in the Gaullist movement after General de Gaulle left the presidency. The party became weaker in its support of the leader and more undisciplined under Pompidou.⁷⁶ This would become more evident with the conflict for the presidency in 1995. The UDF and its predecessor parties viewed the office of the popularly elected president less positively than in the Gaullist tradition. When finally they did get into the presidency with Giscard d'Estaing in 1974, they made no attempts to change this aspect of the French Constitution, and Giscard d'Estaing fully embraced it at times. The Gaullists would also loosen their stance on their view of the dominance of the President and opposition to cohabitation as something that undermines the supremacy of the President, entering into cohabitation with the Socialists as Chirac and Balladur as PM and later with the Socialists as Lionel Jospin as PM.

There were differences over preferred party structures as well: the UDF and its predecessors did not see the need for a top-down party structure of the traditional Gaullist type. This party structure differed from the weak party of notables upon which the UDF was based.⁷⁷ The Gaullist parties formed in this way due to Gaullism's history and how the Gaullists had sprung from the Resistance, creating both a tradition of hierarchy and loyalty, as well as a spirit of rebellion.⁷⁸ This continued from the Gaullist parties of de Gaulle through the RPR, but the structures of the RPR became weakened over time due to scandals and the

⁷⁶Cordell, "Unity and Plurality in the French Right," p. 194.

⁷⁷Knapp, "From the Gaullist movement," pp. 122-127.

⁷⁸Knapp, *Parties and the Party System*, pp. 258-259.

stronger expression of the currents within the party. The RPR would also allow more democracy within the party structure than in previous Gaullist parties and eventually would even allow the recognition of the political ‘currents’ within the party.⁷⁹ The structure of the party was dealt a further blow with the conflict for the presidency in 1995, with Balladur and Chirac running from the same party, splitting the support of both the RPR and UDF. The failed legislative election of 1997 deepened divisions within as much as between parties. In 1995, Chirac was elected on a strongly Gaullist platform created by Philippe Séguin; however, the policy put in place by Juppé’s government was more liberal and much closer to what Balladur had stood on than was Séguin’s platform.⁸⁰ This, along with the rejection of the reforms in 1997, signalled that Gaullism had become mainly rhetoric for the party leadership, rather than a series of policies to be put into place. Gaullism no longer provided an obstacle to an eventual uniting of the families of the French Right. Moreover, the danger represented by the Far Right FN represented another force pushing for greater co-operation between the parties.

The rise of the FN and the success of Le Pen in the 2002 presidential elections

The most obvious reason for the formation of the UMP, given the timing of its creation, is probably the rise of the FN and its shock success in the 2002 presidential elections. Authors like Panebianco see electoral losses and pressures as the strongest of external pressures on political parties. Certainly, there were talks about a united Centre-Right party before these elections and pressures from the FN, as discussed earlier in this chapter, but there was still disunity amongst the many candidates from the Centre-Right running for presidency, in spite of these talks. The shock of the FN entering the second round probably served to

⁷⁹Knapp, *Parties and the Party System*, p. 259.

⁸⁰Bell, *Parties and democracy in France*, p. 55.

bring into line those who were unsure if they wanted to be part of such a party and united some of those other presidential candidates and their supporters behind this new party. This was not the first time that the FN had had such strong electoral success, but this was the first time one of the major parties was excluded from the second round of the presidential election because of the FN. The FN had had success in the past at the disadvantage of the Centre-Right, but at these times the Centre-Right was not willing to unite because of its internal struggles. This shows that electoral pressures alone do not force party change, but those within the party must want change, as Harmel argues.⁸¹ It helped to transform what was just a possible electoral alliance of the *Union en Mouvement* (UEM), perhaps a weak party, into a real political party.⁸² This was, perhaps, an overestimation of the power of the FN by those on the Right, but it made it easier to unite the various currents when there was a common enemy in the FN to fight.

The FN, as a Far Right party, is nothing new in France. There have been many Far Right parties throughout French history, but the FN was the first to have real long-term electoral success. The FN has been around since 1972; however, the FN did not gain real electoral influence until the 1980s under the leadership of Le Pen. As a general trend on national level elections, the FN since the 1980s grew in its percentage of the votes until the elections of 2007. This turn away from the FN was most likely due to the high turnout and the fear of Le Pen getting through to the second round again, so reducing the FN to its true core voters in 2007. There is also a convincing argument that Sarkozy “stole” the FN vote with his tough rhetoric in 2007. However, the FN still has quite a large voting block, polling over 3.8 million on the first round in 2007.⁸³

⁸¹Harmel, “Party Organizational Change”.

⁸²Cordell, “Unity and Plurality in the French Right,” p. 197.

⁸³Conseil Constitutionnel, *Élection présidentielle 2002*, Available from: <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/dossier/presidentielles/2002/documents/tour1/resultat1.htm>, Last accessed: 16 June 2008. and Conseil Constitutionnel, *Élection*

The FN was able to gain success in France through a variety of means. It was able to exploit issues on which the mainstream parties were perceived as weak, feeding the negative views of the parties in the system and softening their image from typical Far Right parties over time. The FN used issues that people felt affected their lives, bringing many issues back to the question of the economy, crime, and identity. They would do this by using immigrants and their descendants as scapegoats, blaming them for everything from unemployment, disease, and violent crime to the weakening of France's position in the world.⁸⁴ Other ideas associated with the FN were to try to promote the growth of the native French population as a solution to reducing the immigrant population by opposing abortion, and emphasising a return to the traditional role of women to increase the native French birth rate. These positions by the FN gained in popularity because of the view that the Socialist government of the time was doing little about these issues, especially with the widening economic problems in the 1980s.⁸⁵ In fact, the Socialists would regularly underestimate how much power the FN could have over their own electorate; in a similar way the Right would overestimate the FN's effects.⁸⁶ The introduction of proportional representation as an attempt to protect more of the Socialist power in the National Assembly in the 1986 elections also allowed the FN access to the system and raised the issue of how the moderate Right should deal with the FN, in regards to electoral alliances.⁸⁷ This, in addition to some of the mainstream Right adopting parts of the FN's anti-immigrant rhetoric, was seen to help the FN grow because its message was

présidentielle 2007, Available from: <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/dossier/presidentielles/2007/documents/tour1/resultats.htm>, Last accessed: 16 June 2008.

⁸⁴Jonathan Marcus, *The National Front and French Politics: The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen*, (MacMillan Press Ltd., Houndmills: 1995), pp. 100-130.

⁸⁵Knapp, *Parties and the Party System*, pp. 293-294.

⁸⁶Jens Rydgren, "Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family," *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 44, pp. 420-431.

⁸⁷Marcus, *The National Front and French Politics*, pp. 131-132.

legitimised by the ‘mainstream’ parties. Therefore, it did not help the Right as they hoped to take votes away from the FN, because they were not seen as acting to solve “the problems” of immigration to those to which the FN appealed.

The FN has been able to adopt a different image from the Far Right of the past in France. Le Pen was not one of the collaborators of the Second World War but joined the Poujadist movement and the *Algerie Française*, fighting in Algeria to prevent its independence, so had the experience of the Far Right of the past without the taint of Vichy.⁸⁸ The FN attempted to appear as a mass party, portraying itself as mainstream, rather than an extremist party. The party adopted a face that made it different from a fascist party, not having the typical uniforms and militias that are usually associated with fascist-style Far Right parties. There are some appeals to these ideas of militias in the party, but they are not an official part of the FN.⁸⁹ In more recent years, the FN has been able to move on from just being the party of Le Pen, developing its own identity, giving the party a real possibility of long-term existence after Le Pen retires; however, like many of the parties in France, as this has developed, the problems of balancing the factions within the party have increased, making a real prediction about the FN’s future more difficult than on the surface of electoral trends.⁹⁰ This can be seen with the last three presidential elections, with the FN being able to top the weak Socialists of the day in 2002, falling about 6% into fourth place in the election in 2007, and rising above its result of 2002 but remaining 10% behind the two major parties in 2012.⁹¹ Even if the FN has not been near the results of the major parties in the

⁸⁸Knapp, *Parties and the Party System*, p. 292.

⁸⁹Jim Wolfreys, “Neither Right Nor Left? Towards an Integrated Analysis of Front National,” in Nicolas Atkin, & Frank Tallett, (eds.) *The Right in France: from Revolution to Le Pen*, (I.B. Tauris, London: 2003) pp. 269-270.

⁹⁰Catherine Frieschi, “Jean-Marie Le Pen and the Front National: Crisis and Recovery,” in John Gaffney, (ed.) *The French Presidential and Legislative Elections of 2002*, (Ashgate, Aldershot: 2004), pp. 171-178.

⁹¹Résultats électoraux en France, Available from: http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_votre_service/elections/resultats, Last accessed: 9 July 2012.

last two elections, this does not mean that it is not a threat, especially with the percentage increase and an increase in number of FN votes in the last election.

Certainly, the FN is not the only non-mainstream party that has had success in France in recent years. In fact, the Left has been struggling with the Far Left as well, which can be seen in part of its failure in the 2002 presidential elections. This is even in the face of the collapse of the vote of the *Parti communiste français* (PCF) from its highs in the first thirty years of the Fifth Republic, but this has meant the development of multiple Far Left parties, making it harder to form deals electorally with the mainstream Left. The mainstream party candidates in the first round of the 1981 presidential election gained 72.17% of the vote, declining to 70.57% in 1988, and 62.72% of the vote in 1995.⁹² This can also be seen in the fall in votes for governmental parties in the legislative elections as well from 83.08% of the vote in 1981 down to 64.10% in 1995. It is also important to note that the FN has performed better in presidential elections with poor turnouts, showing further disillusionment with the parties of the system.⁹³ The trend for voter abstention and voided ballots has been increasing in the elections since the 1970s.⁹⁴ In the first round of the 1978 legislative elections, 19% of voters abstained or voided their ballots, 25% in 1986, 35% in 1993, 38% in 2002, and up to 41% of the voters in the 2007 elections. The FN and the other non-mainstream parties have been able to take advantage of the fact that voters have lost confidence in politicians of the

⁹²Cordell, "Unity and Plurality in the French Right," p. 192. and Knapp, *Parties and the Party System*, pp. 129-130.

⁹³Antoine Auberger, "The National Front Vote and Turnout in the French Presidential Elections," *French Politics*, 2008, vol. 6, pp. 94-100.

⁹⁴Yves Mény, "The Reconstruction and De-Construction of the French Party System," in Gregory Flynn (ed.), *Remaking the Hexagon: The New France in the New Europe*, (Westview Press, Inc., Boulder 1995), pp. 189-191. and Assemblée nationale, *Élections législatives 9 et 16 juin 2002*, Available from: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/resultats.asp>, Last accessed: 16 June 2008. and Ministère de l'Intérieur, *Législatives 2007 : France entière*, Available from: http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_votre_service/elections/resultats/accueil-resultats/downloadFile/attachedFile_2/Leg_07_FE_METRO_OM.xls, Last accessed: 16 June 2008.

governmental parties, both Left and Right, making those outside the system more appealing, and the two-ballot system ensures their votes are not ‘wasted’ on a group that is unlikely to wield power.⁹⁵

There was a great deal of conflict within the RPR and the UDF on how to deal with the FN. Within both parties there were those who argued that they must work with the FN in elections, as it would be better than having another Socialist government, especially with the consideration of the Communists being in coalition with the Socialists as the ‘greater evil.’⁹⁶ The alliances with the FN started as a local issue and became an issue of national conflict within the parties. The CDS was the group in the UDF that was mostly opposed to working with the FN because of its strong opposition to the stances of the FN and the historical legacy of the CDS. However, those who argued for electoral alliances with the FN were concerned about alienating FN voters and therefore losing the support of the FN voters in the second-round elections where the FN voters would have to abstain or vote for a mainstream party. This debate came to a head in the UDF in the late 1990s, a time when the party was already having internal pressures, especially as those who were in favour with the FN were in the regions where they were more under threat from the FN. This was the case in Rhône-Alpes with Charles Millon in 1998, who was eventually expelled from the UDF and formed a new party, which would eventually join the UMP. Over time, opinion in the moderate Right moved away from the idea of electoral alliances with the FN, as it became apparent the FN’s success was not dwindling like most of the other Far Right parties of the past, and therefore it was a real danger, so parties moved towards containment of the FN, rather than working with it.

⁹⁵Colette Ysmal, “The Presidential and Legislative Elections of 2002: An Analysis of the Results,” in John Gaffney, (ed.) *The French Presidential and Legislative Elections of 2002*, (Ashgate, Aldershot: 2004), pp. 60-65.

⁹⁶Marcus, *The National Front and French Politics*, pp. 132-148.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this brief history demonstrates some of the issues of creating a united Centre-Right. These coalitions, alliances, and attempted unions failed in part because of ideological conflict within the Centre and Centre-Right, but also because personal conflicts led to their downfall. The polls repeatedly showed the desire of voters on the Centre and Right to have a united front, rather than the more ideologically limited plurality of parties. Some observers point to this lack of unity as a reason for dissatisfaction with the UDF and the RPR amongst Centre-Right voters before the creation of the UMP.⁹⁷ There needed to be further catalysts to make the UMP possible, as voter preferences were not enough, as there was no major threat to their power from the Left or Far Right. The UMP has addressed the fact that the plurality of the Right must be recognised and not marginalised for the party to have a chance at survival. The enshrinement of *personnes morales associées* and *mouvements* allows for the expression of the plurality of the Right, both in terms of ideology and leadership loyalties. This probably makes the chances of the party having some longevity higher than with a weak coalition, an alliance of the groups, or the suppression of these various groups in a united party, as the UMP tries to avoid a repeat of the mistakes of both the RPR and UDF in dealing with plurality. It should be noted that these many different groups do not mean instability necessarily, as only a few of these groups can be regarded as factions above party, meaning they became more important to those who were part of them than the UDF itself.⁹⁸ Ideological plurality can be seen as a strong point for the UMP, allowing for a wider range of members and politicians from different backgrounds, as well as attracting a wider range of voters, especially with the maturity of the party in mind. This shows that UMP factions promote a degree of

⁹⁷Cordell, "Unity and Plurality in the French Right," p. 193.

⁹⁸Florence Haegel, "Le pluralisme à l'UMP," p. 250.

democracy within the party, as Sartori discusses. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will go on to examine some of these groups in the UMP on the ground in the case studies in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines and explore some of the reasons the UMP was able to come into formation when it did.

Whilst the UMP was able to form out of the circumstances that had been building for some time, they were only fully solidified with the shock of the first round of the 2002 presidential elections. This put the united Right as the UMP in a very favourable position, helping to promote positive feelings towards this united formation. Chirac was suddenly the only candidate for whom it was possible to vote outside the Far Right.⁹⁹ Even the Left was forced to rally behind Chirac for the second round of the presidential elections, making it awkward for it to re-organise its supporters for the legislative elections. This and the dissatisfaction of cohabitation made for a landslide victory for the newly created UMP, then named *Union pour la majorité présidentielle*, at the time emphasising this rallying to Chirac as the president and his partners, and against cohabitation.

This unity and the success that came with it created a new optimism amongst the party and the Centre-Right, uniting for the first time under Chirac. The party then turned towards Sarkozy, first as the party leader taking over for the ineligible Alain Juppé, then the UMP presidential candidate via the primaries, which were only ignored by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan of the *Debout la République*, with most groups within the UMP showing respect for the structures of this new party. Finally, Sarkozy became president after a decent win and the return of the UMP in the National Assembly. The next three chapters are devoted to the case studies in the Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines to examine the party in these *fédérations* in the run-up to the 2007 election and briefly afterwards to better understand the party

⁹⁹Joseph Szarka, "Election Dynamics, Party System Change and Regime Evolution in the 2002 Elections," in John Gaffney, (ed.) *The French Presidential and Legislative Elections of 2002*, (Ashgate, Aldershot: 2004), pp. 278-287.

at the time. This is done to examine the organisation of the party and to what extent we can see the differences between the groups that came to form the UMP, in terms of both organisational and institutional beliefs and political ideology.

Chapter 4

Case Study: Organisation in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines

This chapter is the first of three exploring fieldwork that was conducted in the *départements* of Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines during 2007. This first chapter is on the organisation of the party in these *fédérations*, the second focuses on the political positions and attitudes of the party, and the third addresses the changes which have occurred in the party and the wider implications of this study for the party in these two *fédérations*. These *fédérations* were chosen to provide a contrast in membership, while conducting research from a base in *Île-de-France*. Hauts-de-Seine has a strong record of voting for Gaullist and other Right-wing parties. Moreover, many of those in influential positions in the party come from Hauts-de-Seine. However, the most important reason for choosing this *département* was the strength of the Gaullist parties over the other Centre/Centre-Right parties which preceded the UMP, in order to see where these movements fit into the new party. Yvelines, however, is more diverse in its origins; in fact, many of its members came from the UDF and the many parties which split from it. It has been strongly Centre-Right like Hauts-de-Seine, but with different political currents in addition to Gaullism. These features were examined in further depth in the introduction of this thesis and will be touched on in relation to the responses to the questionnaires

and interviews in these chapters.

This study of the party of the *fédérations* allowed us to look at the party through the eyes of the activists. We undertook an investigation into the different origins of party activists in two *fédérations*, in an attempt to understand the role of factions and tendencies within the party. The activists play an important role in the party. They help to protect the beliefs of the party, by providing support for the party (as long as it stays with its ideology). They also provide a pool of talent and a potential leadership of the party in the future. The activists do much of the day-to-day work of keeping the party alive.

This study examines the *fédérations* as a way of understanding the individual members, the factions to which they belong, and, through this, their organisational interests. The factions play a role in the ideology as well as the organisation of the party. Even at the grass-roots level, there are usually a variety of groups representing different standpoints in the party and (depending on how well organised they are), sometimes mirroring the larger regional or national factions. Different factions can control the party at the local or *fédérational* level. As local level politics are usually more flexible and based on local issues, the potential for division is less pronounced. Activists are no less deep believing on this level, but direct co-operation with other ideological groups and factions is more often necessary on the local level for a functioning party. This can present itself as well in the organisational culture of the party.

The RPR's institutional culture was quite different from that of the UDF, which means that, at least in areas with more former UDF presence, one would expect a more flexible institutional culture, rather than the mainly top-down one of the Gaullists. In the former UDF, factional politics took the form of groups based around a person or specific ideology, whereas the Gaullists were more centralised around an idea, with only a couple of key national figures at a time.

In the case of the UMP, new party members add a new dimension to existing groups. Newcomers can provide an important balance for those who might be less willing or able to adapt to a very different institutional culture; this could be helpful in creating a new culture of the party. However, this also depends on the dominance of a pre-existing group in the party; a well rooted local group will most likely continue to lead the party in a local area, especially in the face of the new inexperienced members.

There were seven main sections of this questionnaire:

- when the members joined the party and their previous party membership
- responsibilities in the party and electoral mandates
- views of the organisation of the party
- other organisations to which the members belong
- political placement
- questions on specific issues to better understand the political placement and differences within the party
- demographic questions

There was also an open question to give the members the opportunity to share their views on how the party has developed and changed since its creation and what they feel the causes might be for these changes. The interviews which supplemented the questionnaires also contained additional follow-up questions about the party organisation to gauge the understanding of how the party works from those who are active in its organisation.

The questions were ordered with a view to obtaining basic information on the background of UMP members first. This was done in order to understand the

origins of the members, and to better relate these origins to the later questions. Let us recall that the UMP is a party which came together from more than one previous party and many political currents; questioning members about their origins allows the researcher to understand what differences exist between these parties and which potential differences do not really exist. These questions were put in a logical format: the first questions we asked concerned members' political origins, followed by questions relating to their political placement and attitudes. In the questionnaire, some of the questions on the organisation and political attitudes were intermingled and reversed; this was in order to prevent the respondent feeling that she or he had to respond in a certain way due to one question leading directly into another. For instance, the survey did not group all of the questions on one group of political attitudes all together. Of course, some of the questions on related topics came one after the other, but the choice was made to avoid whole sections following from each other. However, many of the organisational questions were kept together because of the different style of questioning making it difficult to move them around.

The questionnaires were administered in two ways in Hauts-de-Seine, either as part of an interview or by being distributed to various groups, such as the office of the *fédération*, parliamentary offices and party offices of a selection of towns and cities. They were given to people at various levels of the party, elected officials, party officials, and regular party members. The interviewees were contacted through their local offices and were only party officials and/or elected officials. As explained in some detail in the introduction, the focus on the fieldwork conducted in Yvelines was approached in a different manner to that in Hauts-de-Seine. Fewer questionnaires were conducted in Yvelines than in Hauts-de-Seine, and the focus in Yvelines was more on the elites. This was done for two main reasons: first, practically, it is easier to find and make contacts with those higher in the party;

and second, the elites of Yvelines do reflect the diversity of the origins of the party as well as the regular members. In both *fédérations*, the respondents were invited to explain any of their answers that they wished to expand upon in the closed questions.

In spite of the different nature of the responses, it is still possible to look at the results between these two *fédérations* in comparison. The more in-depth results of Yvelines are complimentary to those of Hauts-de-Seine, helping to understand more clearly why the respondents answered in the way they did. This method was adopted in Yvelines to help combat the fact that early in the research it was obvious that it would be more difficult to get an adequate response rate. It was easier to find contacts for Hauts-de-Seine to begin with and develop further contacts as a result. However, the research was conducted in both *fédérations* in such a way as to reach the widest group available, making the results still relevant despite the low response rates in some areas. The results of these questionnaires and interviews are presented at the end of the thesis in tables showing only the responses to the questions rather than listing the individual responses separately for each questionnaire. This is done to keep the respondents as anonymous as possible, especially as some of the respondents made it clear that they would only be willing to take part in this study if the responses were kept anonymous. They feared being recognised by others if the full list of responses were to be given, in particular the data about how and when they joined the party and the demographic data.

There were some difficulties in conducting this fieldwork. One of the most obvious problems was the time the research was carried out; in the lead-up to the 2007 presidential and National Assembly elections. This meant that many people were quite busy at the time and might not have had the time to participate in this study. In some cases, some were only able to meet after the presidential election

had passed, limiting the time in which this research could be conducted. There is also the issue that this gives the research a very limited portrait of the party of a specific time in a specific place, rather than the party as whole or over a long period of time. However, even this picture is helpful, as it offers insight into the nature of the party. This approach had some advantages as well. More people were more active in the party than they would normally be in non-election times. More people were thinking about politics in general because of the election, so a study of their party might be more interesting than in other times. There were also more meetings of the party than normal so it was easier for those distributing the questionnaire to do so quickly, as there was less time to set it aside and forget about it when contacts were established. This was more the case in Hauts-de-Seine than in Yvelines due to the fact it was easier to make contacts there.

Organisation of the party

One of the main aims of this questionnaire was to better understand the differences between the various groups within the party by being able to make some comparison between the groups. This endeavour facilitates a greater understanding of the UMP as an organisation. The following group of questions focused on various different approaches towards the view of the organisation, some more concrete and others more abstract, with a view to understanding the realities of the organisation, as well as the perception of the organisation from those who are part of it and to examine if the differences group around a particular ideology. This section seeks to examine where the members of these *fédérations* came from politically, the role of diverse origins on the view of the party organisation, and the degree of continuity of organisation from the parties that came to form the UMP.

Origins and activity within the party

This group of questions was asked to better understand where the members of the party came from politically. That is to say: what were the political origins of the members of a young party created in 2002? The party was formed out of several parties on the Centre and the Right, mainly taking its members from the RPR and, to a lesser extent, the UDF and the RPF. There has also been a push since the creation of the UMP to increase membership numbers, adding to the political diversity of the party. This section of questions sought to determine which groups were dominant in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines, both in numbers and, perhaps more importantly, in regard to their presence in the workings of the party. Moreover, these questions set out to differentiate between the types of members: is it possible to draw distinctions on the basis of the political backgrounds of members?

The core of this group of questions was those that pertained to when the member joined the party and what, if any, previous experience he or she had had of political parties.¹ Almost three quarters of the sample in Hauts-de-Seine joined the UMP at the creation of the party in May 2002 and had been members of another party before joining the UMP. All of those who joined at the creation had been members of the *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) at some point, and some of them had also been members of previous Gaullist parties before the creation of the RPR, with more than 15% of the respondents joining the RPR at its creation in 1976.² One-eighth of the respondents had also been members of the *Rassemblement pour la France* (RPF), most leaving the RPR with the creation of the RPF by Charles Pasqua. These origins are not surprising given the background of Hauts-de-Seine. Hauts-de-Seine is historically strongly supportive

¹Quand avez-vous adhéré à l'UMP ? (mois et année) and Depuis 1981, avez-vous été membre d'un parti autre que l'UMP?

²Si vous avez répondu oui : Pouvez-vous nous dire de quel parti vous étiez membre ? (plusieurs réponses possible) and En quelle année aviez-vous adhéré à la formation à laquelle vous apparteniez avant l'UMP ?

of the Gaullist parties; the *Conseil général* of Hauts-de-Seine has been led by the various Gaullist Parties since its creation in 1967.³ This *fédération* was the stronghold of Charles Pasqua for many years, including his tenure as President of the *Conseil général* from 1973 to 1976 and 1988 to 2004. Hauts-de-Seine has also long been the domain of Nicolas Sarkozy, who was mayor of Neuilly-sur-Seine, the city where the party headquarters of this *département* is located, from 1983 to 2002⁴ and President of the *Conseil général* of Hauts-de-Seine from 2004 to 2007.⁵ Through the interviews it was also revealed that many of those at the top of the UMP in Hauts-de-Seine had also been part of the *Union des jeunes pour le progrès* (UJP), the youth organisation of UNR-UDT which was created in the mid-60s and became quasi-independent with the creation of the RPR. The members of this organisation had been mainly Left Gaullists and Social Gaullists. This organisation had become less important during this time until the end of the 1980s, when it underwent some renewal but has weakened again in more recent years and has been integrated into the UMP. Most of those who had been members of the UJP who have now risen through the ranks of the UMP had belonged to the UJP organisation during the renewal in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such as Nicolas Sarkozy and Patrick Devedjian from Hauts-de-Seine. So the Gaullist influences in the party in this *département* had several origins not just in the RPR, but in the RPF and other historical Gaullist organisations as well.

The respondents in Yvelines were in different political origins than those in Hauts-de-Seine. Like Hauts-de-Seine, many of the members joined the UMP at its creation. Several members from this sample had been members of the UDF,

³Conseil Général des Hauts-de-Seine, *L'organisation administrative*, <http://www.hauts-de-seine.net/portal/site/hds/histoire-historique/conseil-general/1367/7a1ac3b524cf1010VgnVCM100000860aa8c0RCRD.vhtm>, Date accessed: 20 February 2008.

⁴*Découvrir Neuilly: Son histoire*, <http://www.ville-neuillysurseine.fr/1-13291-Son-histoire.php>, Date accessed: 20 February 2008.

⁵Conseil Général des Hauts-de-Seine.

and there were no respondents who were part of the RPF, unlike in Hauts-de-Seine. Those who had been in the UDF joined at a variety of times. The early UDF recruits joined in 2002, and were accompanied by further waves joining in 2003 and 2006. This staged process differed from the former RPR members, all of whom joined at the creation of the UMP. Those who joined the UMP from the RPR had been members of the RPR since at least 1989, giving the party a more experienced background; indeed, one member in this sample had been a member of the Gaullist UNR-UDT in 1966. This respondent explained that he had joined the Gaullists because of his memories and experiences of the Second World War and had been involved in the UJP as well. This shows far greater diversity of political origins of Yvelines in this sample, which one would have anticipated from the variety of origins of the elected officials from this *département*. The more varied origins of Yvelines means that more groups had to integrate into the UMP there than in Hauts-de-Seine, where the RPR provided the backdrop for those who had previously been active in a political party.

Most of those who had been in RPR or RPF in Hauts-de-Seine who are currently members of the UMP had some responsibilities within the party organisation in the RPR or RPF; about 43% had responsibilities at the local level, as well as some with multiple roles and roles on the *départemental* level and the national level.⁶ This means that those who are currently active within the party have been active in political parties for some time, not only as party members, but as office holders in the party organisation, and therefore it is not unusual for them to be active within the UMP. So the UMP party organisation of Hauts-de-Seine is an experienced one and a fairly stable one, despite the newness of the UMP as a party, which helps the party to retain power in this *département* and build upon its base.

⁶Aviez-vous des responsabilités dans cette formation ? (plusieurs réponses possible) Oui, au niveau local (commune, canton, circonscription) Oui, au niveau départemental Oui, au niveau national Non, sans responsabilités dans le parti

According to one of the interviewees, the *département* also has the second largest membership for the party, so there is also in general a strong degree of support for the party at the base, in addition to the strong party organisation. These strong membership numbers help to further strengthen the organisation.

The questionnaire also addressed what elected positions the respondents hold, what responsibilities they have in the party and how much time they spend per month working for the party. These questions attempted to establish whether there are any differences between those in office and those who are regular party members with no responsibilities in the organisation.⁷ More than two thirds of the respondents in Hauts-de-Seine held no electoral mandate at the time of the questionnaire. A few of those who did have an electoral mandate had more than one, a fairly common practice in France. The most common position held was mayor, followed by local councillor, then general councillor/regional councillor and, finally, member of the National Assembly/Senate/European Parliament. More than half of the respondents had responsibilities within the party organisation, with many having responsibilities on more than one level.⁸ Almost 47% of the respondents had responsibilities on the local level, one quarter had responsibilities on the *départemental* level, and one eighth had responsibilities on the national level. Those with the most responsibilities were those also in office, so these powers come often with electoral office.

Of those who responded⁹ to the question in Hauts-de-Seine about how much

⁷Actuellement, exercez-vous un mandat électif ? (plusieurs choix possible) Oui, je suis conseiller municipal Oui, je suis maire Oui, je suis conseiller général et/ou régional Oui, je suis député, sénateur ou député européen Non, je n'exerce pas actuellement de mandat

⁸Aujourd'hui, exercez-vous des responsabilités à l'UMP ? (plusieurs choix possible) Oui, au niveau local (commune, canton, circonscription) Oui, au niveau départemental Oui, au niveau national Non, sans responsabilités dans le parti

⁹About 34% did not answer this question; it is unclear whether or not these people give time to the party. This group was less likely to have a position of responsibility in the party, 6 with no position of responsibility, so this might be an indication that they do not spend much time on the party on a regular basis. This would follow the pattern of those who did respond.

time per month they contribute to the party, 25% contribute 20 hours or more.¹⁰ 12.5% contribute up to 10 hours per month, 21.9% contribute 11 to 20 hours a week, 3% spend 21 to 30 hours a week, 15.6% spend 31 to 40 hours a week and more than 6% contribute more than 40 hours a week. The group that spends the most time on the party per month are those who have responsibilities within the party organisation, rather than regular members with no official responsibilities. There does not seem to be a difference if the respondent has responsibilities on a variety of levels or only one level of the party. In this sample, those who spend the most time working on party activities per month are those who have responsibilities on the local level. Those who have responsibilities on the *départemental* or national level seem to spend about an equal amount of time on party activities at the two levels. Nevertheless, this is less time spent than by those with local responsibilities, but still more than those with no responsibilities. Of those who spent more than 40 hours a month, the time was split between only local responsibilities and responsibilities on all listed levels of the party. It does not seem to make a difference to how much time is spent on party activities whether one is an elected official or not. These members are probably working more than the rest due to the nature of their positions in the party, so it is not just an elected position that results in higher activity.

All of the respondents in Yvelines who had been a member of a previous party reported that they had responsibilities in these previous parties, which is not surprising given that many of the respondents were from the elite level of the party. Half of the respondents do currently have an electoral mandate, and many of these have more than one mandate, typical of the *cumul des mandats* pattern of political office in France. This is common, as the lower level offices are thought to give legitimacy to the higher-level offices and link the politician with these more

¹⁰Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à l'UMP ?

popular local politics. More than half of the respondents have responsibilities in the party, and about half of these have responsibilities on more than one level of the party. There seems to be no relationship between having responsibilities in a previous party and holding responsibilities currently in the UMP in Yvelines. The number of the respondents who were not previously in a political party was split evenly between those who have responsibilities currently and those who do not. This helps to preserve some continuity and gives the party more experienced members, while integrating those who are new to political parties for renewal and future growth. The respondents reported spending about the same amount of time on average as those in Hauts-de-Seine, except one respondent with several positions in the party, both elected and non-elected, who reported working between 130 and 150 hours per month on party activities. This respondent held a higher position than many of the other respondents so this explains the extreme deviation for the amount of time given to the party in comparison to other respondents in Yvelines and Hauts-de-Seine.

The origins of the party membership in the *départements* were unsurprising. Whilst the focus in Yvelines was mainly on the elites, the patterns of the different origins of membership could be seen between them. The membership in Hauts-de-Seine were mainly ex-RPR members of Gaullist origins, and in Yvelines was more mixed, with many having origins in the UDF. As explained above, these *fédérations* were chosen with this difference in mind in order to better understand both the organisation of the party and the differing political origins of the party's members. Additionally, many of those who had positions of responsibility in these *fédérations* had previous experience in their previous party. This shows that the organisation of the UMP is a mature and somewhat stable one, drawing from the experience of the historical parties of the Centre-Right in France. This might explain why the party has had a degree of success which would not necessarily come from a

party of completely new origins or one with a mainly new leadership. As discussed in the literature review, it is important for members to have an understanding of how a party should work, and the degree of continuity from the previous parties helps to establish the unwritten rules of the party. The local implantation of the UMP allows it to be more than just a national party, as the Gaullists were in their beginnings, often with the holders of *départemental* level or higher office seeking to hold on to the local positions. Furthermore, the repetition of the pattern of those with local positions being the most active shows the importance of the local party within the UMP, further strengthening the local implantation. The Gaullists and their inheritors in the UMP over the years have been able to overcome their reputation as only a national party which imposes national candidates and officials on local offices and has adapted to the French political system.

Attitudes towards the organisation

The next group of questions concerned the party organisation itself, rather than just the members and their activities within the organisation. These questions were framed in such a way as to examine how those in the party view the organisation, and to test whether there were different views of the organisation between regular party members and party office holders. These questions were also intended to help us to understand the importance of political origins on views of the party organisation: do those with different political origins than the majority in the party (i.e., those who did not come from the RPR only) have a different view of how the organisation works and should work? This line of questioning is important because if a group feels excluded, either as a group not in a position of power or because of its different political origins, or believes that the party ought to run differently than the other groups within the party, then this could make the party less stable. There are two parts of these questions, one about possible reforms

and the other about how members view the organisation in its current form. Of course, these are closely related because from the question about reform one can infer how the members view the organisation.

View towards potential party reforms

The first section of this group of questions asked: “To improve the functioning of the UMP, are you favourable to the following statements?” followed by a list of statements to which one was able to respond “very favourable,” “somewhat favourable,” “a little favourable,” or “not all favourable to this statement.”¹¹ In part, it is difficult to fully understand the results of this type of questioning, as it is easy just to agree with these propositions because of the positive feeling towards the reforms of the party that have been already put into place. Additionally, the respondent may feel that the researcher might want him or her to agree with the statements or else they would not be suggested. However, they were chosen to better understand how respondents think the party might be run optimally, and the questions provide the ability to compare the results with those of previous studies.

The first proposition in this group was “Give more money to the *fédérations* and therefore decrease the funds for national political action.”¹² Nearly 22% in Hauts-de-Seine said that they would be very favourable to this change, and 81% said that they were either very favourable or somewhat favourable to this proposition, with only 3% saying they were not at all favourable. Those who have responsibilities in the party, especially those with responsibilities on the *fédération* level, tend to be very favourable or somewhat favourable to this statement, far more than those who do not. None of those with responsibilities at the national level stated that

¹¹Pour améliorer le fonctionnement de l’UMP, êtes-vous favorable aux propositions suivantes ? and très favorable, assez favorable, peu favorable, pas du tout favorable

¹²Donner plus d’argent aux fédérations et donc diminuer la part de l’action politique nationale.

they were very favourable to this proposal. This is interesting because the Gaullist parties have historically been very centralised, and the UMP as a party has retained this practice to a certain degree. Some of the interviewees felt the party was highly centralised because of the nature of the French electoral system and any other sort of organisation would not be successful. These respondents felt that the President of the Republic is the most important office in the country electorally so the main focus of the parties is to get that office and, therefore, the party needs a top-down organisation. This is because it is thought that if the national party, especially in the presidential election, was successful, then this success spilled over quite often to the regional and *départemental* elections which follow shortly afterwards. The parliamentary elections which that immediately follow the presidential elections tend to go the same way because the voters prefer to avoid cohabitation and the gridlock that it brings to government. Consequently, parties in France that wish to have long-term electoral success need to be centralised so that the voters know that they are voting for the same thing on all levels within a party and to guarantee continued success in the parliamentary elections after a successful presidential election.

The first question in Yvelines did show some degree of difference between the types of members, even though the responses in favour of the proposal were similar. We will discuss the results of Yvelines in more general terms here because of the comparatively lower response rate than in Hauts-de-Seine. Most of the respondents in Yvelines were either very favourable or mostly favourable to giving more money to the *fédérations*. However, there was no difference according to whether or not the respondent has responsibilities in the party. Like some respondents in Hauts-de-Seine, one of the respondents in Yvelines argued that the party must be centralised because of the nature of the French state and the structure of the elections. There has to be some flexibility on all levels because of some

local/regional differences but, by and large, centralisation of the party structure is necessary for all levels of the party other than the local level. A decentralised party would have trouble with long-term electoral success because the goal of the parties is to get the presidency so that the other elections can follow in its success. The French electoral model promotes centralisation, and, with its historically centralised state, it is the national elections that mean the most to the average person in France. This shows the degree to which the institutions dictate the direction of the French system, even to the extent that those who play an active part in the system are aware of the influence of centralisation and presidentialism caused by the institutions.

The next statement was “Give the local (party) leaders more room to manoeuvre within the *fédérations*.”¹³ Twenty-eight percent in Hauts-de-Seine responded that they were very favourable to this statement and three quarters stated they were either very favourable or somewhat favourable. No respondents said they were not at all favourable to this proposition. Those who have responsibilities were also more likely to be very favourable and somewhat favourable, especially those who have responsibilities on the local level. Despite the centralisation of the party on the higher levels, the interviewees felt that the local level was an exception to the general rule of national success equalling success on other levels of the party, with different patterns of voting on the local level. Some of the interviewees felt that local personalities matter most in the local elections, instead of the party to which they belong. It is often said that the mayor in France is the most trusted of the elected officials, and this view may stem from the view that they do what is ‘best for the community,’ rather than following simple party politics. So, therefore, it seems rather logical that it would be desirable for the local candidates to have a certain degree of flexibility and be able to focus on the issues most relevant to their

¹³Donner plus de marge de manoeuvre aux leaders locaux dans les fédérations.

local situations, rather than being solely focused on the national party's issues.

None of the respondents in Yvelines stated that they were not at all favourable to giving the local leaders more flexibility, and the majority of the respondents were somewhat favourable to this statement. There was no correlation on this question between having or not having responsibilities in the party in Yvelines. Continuing on from the previous question and echoing the view in Hauts-de-Seine, a respondent stated that on the local level there is only a 'notion' of a political party, and it is often more about local issues and local personalities, rather than where the national party stands on a variety of issues. He argued that the voters are more likely to vote for someone who seems to be interested in local affairs and shares their view of how the community should be run, instead of being concerned about which party they are part of. Consequently, it is more common for there to be local co-operation between parties which are rivals on the national level than there is on other levels in the French system. He felt, therefore, that it is necessary for the local elections to be based on local rather than national issues. This is to say that those in power in the party feel that the national party and unity is important for all but the local level, where there must be flexibility for the local issues and differences.

The third statement in this grouping was "Give the party members the last word in the nomination of candidates for legislative elections."¹⁴ One quarter of respondents in Hauts-de-Seine said that they are very favourable to this proposition, and three quarters were very favourable or somewhat favourable. About 6% were not at all favourable to the idea of giving the members this responsibility. There was no difference between those with an electoral mandate and those with responsibilities in the party and those without any of these positions. Most European parties give the party members a say, in one way or another, in the

¹⁴Donner le dernier mot aux adhérents dans les investitures des candidates aux élections législatives.

selection of candidates for the party. According to the party statutes of the UMP at the time, the candidates can be selected by consulting the assemblies of the districts or communes or through the Committee of the *département*, but it is the National Committee of the Party which makes the final selection.¹⁵ This system probably comes from the logic of the need to have a centralised party for national electoral success. The current rules allow for the local and *département* level to have some role in the process, but only a very limited one, as the national party is the one that makes the final decision, and the party members themselves do not have a direct say in many of these institutions.

The majority of those who responded were very favourable or mostly favourable to giving the members the last word on candidates in Yvelines. There seems to be a small effect if someone has responsibilities in the party or not; however, those who have an electoral mandate were more likely to be only a little favourable or not at all favourable. So those who are protected by the current system are those who are most opposed to change. It is difficult for the national party to reject candidates with many local supporters as these supporters play an important role in campaigning. However, with the history of the top-down organisation that came from the Gaullists, there can be the tendency to parachute in candidates for national-level elections.

The final proposition was “Organise referendums for the party members over the large political trends of the UMP.”¹⁶ More than a quarter of those who responded¹⁷ in Hauts-de-Seine were very favourable to these referendums, and more than 78% were very favourable or somewhat favourable. About 6% were not at all favourable to this proposition. Those who were elected officials were

¹⁵UMP, *Le nouveau règlement intérieur*, http://www.u-m-p.org/site/upload/reglement_interieur/reglement_interieur.pdf, Date accessed 24 February, 2008, p. 6.

¹⁶Organiser des référendums auprès des adhérents sur les grandes orientations politiques de l'UMP.

¹⁷One respondent did not answer this question.

less likely to be very favourable to this position. Having responsibilities in the party seems to have no effect on the opinion towards this statement, showing a difference between those who are elected and those who hold a position in the party. Most of the respondents in Yvelines were very favourable or mostly favourable to this statement; there seems to be no relationship between having responsibilities in the party and having an electoral mandate. Generally, the comments for these statements were positive, and members felt that the party had already taken many steps towards democratising itself, and this might be a further extension of this. The UMP has done a considerable amount to involve the members of the party in debates on different policy issues, organising debates on specific policy issues and putting many of these debates on the Internet so that those who cannot come in person are still able to engage in these debates. The major party stances are agreed upon at the party conventions, so whilst the debates have become more open, they have not taken a step as dramatic as this proposition in allowing members to dictate party policy. Other parties in France have adopted other methods, for example, the primaries of the PS, which opened up its presidential candidate section to the general public so those who sympathised with the party could take part, not just members. Such a move from the UMP seems unlikely as the party has come from the very top-down party of the RPR and the candidates of the RPR had come from the top political leadership. It might be difficult to administer referendums on the political trends of the party as well: a ballot would have to be organised for all of the members to vote on, and many might not have the time to consider all of the options available or might not be interested in certain policy areas to vote in such referendums. So it is questionable that those that do not have a say in party policy now would, in fact, participate. A low response rate in such referendums would reflect poorly on the party's self-image as a mass party and its perception in the media.

The section shows a general positive feeling towards party reforms. There are two factors most likely in play here: 1) the members had had positive experience with the reforms that had already taken place and therefore are open to further reforms, 2) the members thought that the researcher is looking for them to agree with these reforms or they would not have been suggested. The strongest response to these suggested reforms came with the suggestion for more local flexibility to which most of the respondents were positive towards. This shows the importance of flexibility in local politics, which is a theme also repeated in other parts of this study that are discussed more in depth in Chapter 6.

Internal party democracy

The next grouping of questions concerned the view of the party members towards the organisation as it is, rather than proposing possible changes. The respondents were presented with a list of statements relating to the organisation and given the opportunity to respond in terms of: agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree and disagree.¹⁸ The first statement was: “I am satisfied with the level of democracy of the UMP organisation.”¹⁹ About 66% percent in Hauts-de-Seine said that they agreed or mostly agreed with this statement, of which nearly 16% said that they agree. Only 3% selected disagree.²⁰ Therefore, most of the respondents are generally happy with the democratic organisation of the party. Those who said they mostly disagree or disagree with this statement in the main did not have responsibilities within the party, and all of those who said they agree with the statement had some responsibilities within the party. One interpretation might be that those without positions of party responsibility feel more left out of the democratic processes of the party. However, this does not seem to be a widely

¹⁸Répondez à chaque phrase suivants si vous : d'accord, plutôt d'accord, plutôt pas d'accord, ou pas d'accord.

¹⁹Je suis satisfait(e) du niveau démocratique d'organisation de l'UMP.

²⁰The option of “pas d'accord” only.

held view. Even amongst those who do not have responsibility in the party, a considerable number stated that they agree or mostly agree that they are satisfied with the level of democracy. Like the previous group of questions, this sort of question is hard for the members not to agree with; either they believe that the researcher wants agreement, or they want to present the party in a favourable light, or both. It would also be possible for the media to come across the results and use them to portray the party as internally undemocratic, which the members would not wish to see, especially in the run-up to an election.

The vast majority of the respondents in Yvelines agreed or mostly agreed with the statement that they are satisfied with the level of democracy, with none of the respondents choosing the option of disagree.²¹ There seems to be no relationship between holding responsibilities in the party and opinion on this statement in Yvelines. Those who have an electoral mandate were more likely to mostly disagree than those that do not, perhaps thinking those outside the official positions need to be brought into the party more. In sum, responses in both of the *départements* were positive, suggesting that even in the more politically diverse Yvelines, most groups and members feel included in the party's processes. Members in both federations approved the democratic reforms that had taken place in the UMP, and they were satisfied with the structures of the party.

A related statement from the questionnaire was "The leaders of the UMP take into account the concerns of the members."²² About 10% of those who responded²³ in Hauts-de-Seine said that they agree with this statement and 58% either said they agree or somewhat agree with this statement. Another 10% responded that they disagree²⁴ with this statement; these respondents do not have elected positions nor have any responsibilities in the party. Nevertheless, this agreement was also

²¹The option of "pas d'accord" only.

²²Les dirigeants de l'UMP prennent bien en compte les préoccupations des adhérents.

²³Only one respondent did not answer.

²⁴The option of "pas d'accord" only.

the situation for many of those who agreed or mostly agreed with this statement. Therefore, the lack of position in the party probably has little or no connection to this view of the leadership of the party, similar to the internal party democracy question. Those who agreed or mostly agreed with this statement generally agreed with the statement on the level of democracy within the party. Those who mostly disagreed with this statement were also more likely than the others to have disagreed or mostly disagreed with the statement regarding the level of internal democracy. We can surmise that those who have concerns about the leadership of the party are motivated by their view of the lack of internal democracy in the party, instead of what positions that they do or do not have.

The members in Yvelines also were generally supportive of the idea that the party leadership takes into account the members' concerns. Like the democracy question, the response in Yvelines was more positive than in Hauts-de-Seine. This is probably in part due to additional factors of the elite status of many of the respondents in Yvelines. First, as argued above in this chapter, there has been a great deal of reform in recent years to improve internal democracy in the UMP and the RPR before it. Second, those who had a position of responsibility in the party felt more satisfied with the level of democracy in Hauts-de-Seine, and both samples had a high level of respondents from this category. Nonetheless, even amongst those who did not have such responsibilities, most agreed that they were satisfied with the level of democracy, so it is unlikely that this group feels excluded from the democratic processes of the party because of a lack of official positions within the party. One of the respondents expanded his answer by saying that he believed that Nicolas Sarkozy was sincerely interested in the concerns of the party members. This respondent argued that the party structure that has been adopted with Sarkozy as leader has led to better responsiveness to the membership of the party. This positive result is logical, following on from the positive view of the level

of democracy in the party showing that the respondents are generally satisfied by how the party operates.

The next statement was “It is important to give more of a place for the different political currents within the party.”²⁵ About 13% of those who responded²⁶ in Hauts-de-Seine chose agree, and around 73% either agreed or somewhat agreed with this statement. About 7% responded that they disagree²⁷ with this idea. Those who labelled themselves as not Gaullist were more likely to state that they agree or mostly agree with this statement than those who labelled themselves as Gaullist, and all those who disagreed or somewhat disagreed labelled themselves as Gaullist or no political current. Therefore, those from the dominant group of the party attach less importance to the different political currents. This might be because they do not recognise the extent of political currents within the UMP, rather than because they are opposed to giving them more of a place within the party. However, our findings do not suggest that the other currents feel excluded: there is no pattern of the minority political groups within the party reporting that the level of democracy was lacking, and, maybe more importantly, they seem no less likely to be in positions of responsibility in the party. All currents have a chance to flourish within the party.

All but one of the respondents in Yvelines agreed or mostly agreed with the importance of giving more of a place to the different political currents, and this respondent stated that he or she only mostly disagreed. Those who have responsibilities in the party and have electoral mandates have about an equal view of this statement. One of the respondents felt that the different political currents are only present as much or as little as the party members want them to be. So if these currents do not wish to express themselves, they will not be present within

²⁵Il est important de donner plus de place aux différents courants au sein du parti.

²⁶Two respondents did not answer.

²⁷The option of “pas d’accord” only.

the party, and the party should not artificially promote the existence of political currents. This feeling could come from the fear of creating further divisions in the party than already exist. Those who labelled themselves as something other than Gaullist were more likely to agree with this statement, so those who might feel pressure from not being the largest group in the party are probably more interested in such ideas to ensure their voices continue to be heard. In Yvelines, there are a variety of groups in the party, many of which are part of an organisation for their political current, national and/or local, so this probably leads the membership of this *fédération* to be more positive towards the recognition of the various political currents of the party than one would expect in a more politically homogeneous *fédération* like in Hauts-de-Seine.

The final statement in this grouping of questions regarding the party was “The law of *parité* is a positive change for the UMP and permits the promotion of the equality of the sexes in politics.”²⁸ This is clearly a change which has been imposed from the outside, but it is interesting to see how it was received in the party. More than one quarter of the responses²⁹ in Hauts-de-Seine agreed with this statement, and almost 65% stated that they either agree or somewhat agree with this statement. Thirteen percent of the respondents stated that they disagree³⁰ with this statement. Interestingly, it was the male respondents who tended to agree or mostly agree, and the female respondents who were more likely to disagree or mostly disagree with this statement. It is possible that the women in the survey are concerned that if they run as a candidate for a seat, the others might think that they got the position because they are the best woman for the job, but not necessarily the best person for the job, and wish to have such positions on merit alone. Also, those who disagreed or mostly disagreed with the statement were more

²⁸Le loi de la parité est un changement positif pour l’UMP et permette de promouvoir l’égalité entre les sexes en politiques.

²⁹One respondent did not answer.

³⁰The option of “pas d’accord” only.

likely to place greater importance on the traditional role of women in the home. Those respondents might have a concern that this law is something acting against this role of women by pushing them into political careers and away from their traditional roles. Interestingly, those who placed themselves more on the Right were more likely to agree with this statement than those who placed themselves on the Centre-Right or further to the Left. This may seem odd: usually the Right has had a more traditional view of the role of women, so one would expect them to oppose this statement. The counter-argument is that women ought to be able to achieve high positions with the help of the parity rules. Additionally, in France historically females have been associated more with the Right in politics, both in terms of voting and in membership of the political parties, with the Gaullists of the past attracting more of the female vote than other major parties, so those on the Right could feel it is natural for their party to include more female candidates.

About half of the respondents in Yvelines stated that they mostly agree, and almost all of the respondents agreed or mostly agreed with the positive effects of *parité* in Yvelines. For the response of disagree and mostly agree, there was only one respondent for each. So this sample generally approved of this change, which was imposed on all of the political parties from the outside. Of course, this sort of statement is difficult to disagree with, as doing so may sound sexist. However, the response for this reform was generally positive from both of the *fédérations*. Like in Hauts-de-Seine, the male respondents were more positive towards this law than the female respondents were. Moreover, those with a more traditional view of the roles of women were more opposed to this. None of those who placed themselves in the Centre in Yvelines disagreed with this statement, and there was no difference between those who placed themselves on the Centre-Right and the Right in the response to this question.

This section shows a general approval of the party at the time but also shows

a willingness for further reforms. Differences can be seen in the more diverse Yvelines, reflecting the plurality of the party. We will now examine what we also can find in the members in interactions outside the party. The UMP structures have addressed the internal diversity of the party, which is important in practice, as well as to the members who come from more diverse areas. The local party has had some freedom to adjust to the local differences and the members of the party and the members are also able to express their political diversity in the sub-groups of the party. *Mouvements* and *personnes morales associées* were addressed in Chapter 3 and will be addressed in Chapter 3 and will be addressed in the next section in terms of those to which the questionnaire and interview participants indicated they belong in addition to the party.

Activity outside the party

The questionnaire also examined the other organisations to which respondents belong.³¹ This was done to see how active the members are outside of the party and to examine which political currents they are part of through observing their membership of other political groups. Examining what groups the members are part of outside the party allows for a better understanding of who the members are, in the sense of their values (in regards to the types of organisations in which they participate) and their role in the communities in which they live. This also gives a sense of how they are engaged in civil society outside politics and to what extent they penetrate society, rather than being outsiders who are only engaged in the political process and not the rest of civil society.

The first group of organisations concerned humanitarian organisations, of which about 16% of respondents in Hauts-de-Seine were members.³² Of those who

³¹Etes-vous membre de certaines des associations suivantes ?

³²Une association humanitaire, caritative (par exemple : Comité catholique contre la faim, Médecins du monde) Si oui, lesquelles ? Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses associations ?

disclosed which humanitarian organisation they are part of, half were members of the Red Cross. The others were part of *Secours catholique* and *Secours Populaire*. All of these humanitarian organisations operate in France and abroad. The French Red Cross is a member of the International Red Cross; in France it provides disaster relief and abroad it provides care in conflict zones and in disasters.³³ *Secours catholique* is an organisation linked to the Catholic Church in France and fights poverty and promotes social justice.³⁴ *Secours Populaire* has similar goals to *Secours catholique* and it works through local partner organisations abroad.³⁵ Those who were active in these types of organisations were more likely to be retired and the members placed themselves as Centre-Right or Centre on the political spectrum. In relation to humanitarian organisations, two members in Yvelines reported being members of these type of organisations, which were the Red Cross and the *Association des collectivités locales pour le Liban*.

The next group was professional organisations, of which about 9% of respondents in Hauts-de-Seine are members.³⁶ Those members were more likely to be male and in a higher-level job. These were generally organisations of the Centre and/or the Right or a professional organisation specific to their profession. More than a quarter of the respondents in Yvelines reported that they were part of professional organisations. All of these organisations were directly related to their professions but not with political ties like those in Hauts-de-Seine. Unions tend to be associated with the Left of the political spectrum, so for those who are not in a specific profession, such as a doctor, it seems unlikely that they would be in a professional

³³Croix Rouge, *Nos actions : La Croix-Rouge sur tous les fronts*, <http://www.croix-rouge.fr/goto/actions/index.asp>, Date accessed: 24 February 2008.

³⁴Secours catholique, <http://www.secours-catholique.asso.fr/>, Date accessed 24 February 2008.

³⁵Secours Populaire, *Qui sommes-nous ?*, <http://www.secourspopulaire.fr/qui.0.html>, Date accessed 24 February 2008.

³⁶Une association professionnelle (par exemple : syndicats, ordres, chambre de commerce) Si oui, lesquelles ? Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses associations ?

organisation.

The third group of organisations is cultural, religious, and free-time organisations.³⁷ About 16% of respondents in Hauts-de-Seine are members of such organisations, with members belonging to Lions Club, Rotary Club, swimming clubs and “*Association à vocation européenne*”. Both Lions and Rotary Clubs are international voluntary service organisations that undertake a number of actions to improve their local communities, as well as fighting problems like disease abroad.³⁸ About one third in Yvelines reported being members of cultural, leisure, or free-time organisations. Amongst the groups were the Lions Club, the Rotary Club, the Francophonie, hunting associations, *Société Historique et Archéologique de Rambouillet et de l’Yveline* (SHARY), *Patrimoine et Avenir de Rambouillet et de sa Région* (PARR), and non-specified cultural associations. The Francophonie is an international organisation of French-speaking countries and communities which is similar in organisation to the Commonwealth focusing on a variety of issues ranging from human rights and peace to language and culture.³⁹ These responses show that the party members are active in community organisations, not just in political organisations.

Nine percent of the respondents in Hauts-de-Seine were also members of a political club or another UMP associated political movement.⁴⁰ Of these respondents there were members of *Debout la République*, *Club 89*, and *Femme avenir*. *Debout la République* was a political club headed by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, a former

³⁷Une association culturelle, religieuse ou de loisirs (du type Rotary, Lyons Club, association du patrimoine, association diocésaine, association de chasse) Si oui, lesquelles ? Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses associations ?

³⁸Rotary International, *Programmes*, <http://www.rotary-francophone.org/new/cadre.asp?categorie=Programmes>, Date accessed: 24 February 2008. and Lions Clubs International, *Qui sont les Lions*, http://www.lionsclubs.org/FR/content/about_index.shtml, Date accessed: 24 February 2008.

³⁹L’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, *Actions*, <http://www.francophonie.org/actions/index.cfm>, Date accessed: 29 February 2008.

⁴⁰Un club, un mouvement associés à l’UMP Si oui, lesquelles ? Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses groupes ?

member of the UMP who has a Gaullist and *souverainiste* outlook.⁴¹ *Club 89* was founded in the 1980s to help return the Gaullists to power⁴² and is currently headed by Jacques Toubon. The group is generally pro-European.⁴³ Both *Club 89* and *Debout la République* are addressed in the chapter on the political families and the formation of the UMP. *Femme avenir* is a political club that was created by General de Gaulle to get women more engaged in politics, economics, and social life; it is still a Gaullist women's organisation and is currently part of the UMP.⁴⁴

The following group of organisations on which the questionnaire focused were political associations, of which about 16% of respondents in Hauts-de-Seine are members.⁴⁵ The political associations of which they are members are *Appel d'R*, *Rassemblement pour Levallois*, *Union Paneuropéenne* and *Mouvement Européen*. *Appel d'R* is political association for young Gaullist republicans; the honorary president was Philippe Séguin.⁴⁶ *Rassemblement pour Levallois* is a group of the diverse Right which presents a common electoral list for the elections in the Parisian suburb of Levallois.⁴⁷ *Union Paneuropéenne* is a European-wide organisation which supports a strong Europe.⁴⁸ *Mouvement Européen* is a European-wide organisation which supports further European integration and federalism.⁴⁹

⁴¹Debout la République, *En trois questions*, <http://www.debout-la-republique.fr/-En-trois-questions-.html>, Date accessed: 24 February 2008.

⁴²Searls, E. 1986, "The French Right in Opposition 1981-1986", *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 39, no. 4, p. 469.

⁴³Club 89, <http://www.club89.org>, Date accessed: 24 February 2008.

⁴⁴Femme Avenir C.F.E.I., <http://femmeavenir.hautetfort.com>, Date accessed: 24 February 2008.

⁴⁵Une association politique (par exemple : LICRA, Mouvement Européen, etc.) Si oui, lesquelles ? Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses associations ?

⁴⁶Appel d'R, <http://appeldr.free.fr/indexframes.html>, Date accessed: 24 February 2008.

⁴⁷Nanterre, C. , "Patrick Balkany présente sa liste et son DVD", <http://elections.leparisien.fr/elections-municipales-2008/actualite-resultats-direct-municipales/1838-patrick-balkany-presente-sa-liste-et-son-dvd.php>, *Le Parisien* (Online), 5 February 2008.

⁴⁸PanEurope France, <http://www.pan-europe.org/rubrique.php>, Date accessed: 24 February 2008.

⁴⁹Mouvement Européen, *Présentation*, <http://www.mouvement-europeen.eu/>

For UMP associated political clubs and associations, more than a quarter in Yvelines reported belonging to this sort of group; the groups were listed *Debout la République*, *Club 89*, *UNI*, *Yveline Dialogue et Démocratie* and *Société en Mouvement*. *Yveline Dialogue et Démocratie* group based in Yvelines which was created to promote and preserve Gaullist values with a strong emphasis on the social aspects of Gaullism.⁵⁰ *UNI* is a students' union on the Right which is associated with the European Democrat Students, which is the European conservative students' organisation.⁵¹ *Société en Mouvement* is a centrist group with many ex-UDF members led by Gilles de Robien.⁵² One member reported being a member of another political association, which was *Mouvement Européen*.

The final group was "other" associations; the examples given of associations included: parents of pupils' associations, environmental associations, pensioners' associations, veterans' associations, and reserve officers' associations.⁵³ More than one-third of respondents in Hauts-de-Seine are members of associations in this group. More than 9% are members of parents of pupils'/pupils' associations, of veterans' organisations and in reservist organisations. One other respondent was a member of the *Avenir de Clamart*. For the final group of 'other associations', about one third of the respondents in Yvelines reported being a member of an association in this grouping. Two of the respondents were members of *Associations d'aide à domicile*, one a member of a veterans' organisation, one of a reserve officer's organisation, and one of an association helping the unemployed and young people.

Many of the respondents who reported they are members of one type of group or

-Presentation-, Date accessed: 24 February 2008.

⁵⁰Yveline Dialogue et Démocratie, 2002-2004, "Yveline Dialogue et Démocratie," Numbers 1 and 4, Rambouillet.

⁵¹UNI, <http://www.uni.asso.fr/>, Date accessed: 29 February 2008.

⁵²Société et Mouvement, *Qui sommes-nous ?*, http://societeenmouvement.typepad.com/societeenmouvement/qui_sommesnous/index.html, Date accessed: 29 February 2008.

⁵³Autres associations (ex : association de parents d'élèves, pour l'environnement, de retraités, d'anciens combattants, d'officiers de réserve, etc.) Si oui, lesquelles ? Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses associations ?

association were also members of another group or organisation. About 16% of the total respondents in Hauts-de-Seine were members of two or more associations in different groupings, with an additional 6% who were members in two organisations in the same grouping. About 9% of the respondents were members of three organisations in the listed groupings. Nearly 47% of the respondents were in a group, club, or association other than the UMP itself, so this sample of the party members is fairly active in community and political organisations beyond the party. The respondents in Yvelines were fairly active outside the party as well, many in multiple organisations, with only two respondents not reporting being part of some organisation other than the party itself. These groups are a wide range of groups as well, not solely political organisations, which shows a deeper sort of engagement in the lives of their communities.

These groups tell us a few different things about the members. Some are organisations which are cross-political in nature, such as parents' and pupils' associations, the Lions Club, the Rotary Club, and the Red Cross. Nevertheless, many of the organisations of which the members are part are political and/or associated with those on the Right of the political scale. Whilst the *Secours catholique* is an organisation which promotes some social ideas but not specifically political, these are social Catholic ideas, so one would expect its members to be more to the Right. Often groups like hunting associations and veterans' organisations are also associated with the Right as well. One of the interesting things that one can see in the political groups is that one finds supporters of both pro-European and Euro-sceptic groups in the UMP, and both can be found in each of the *fédérations*. This should not be surprising given that Europe is an issue which divides most French parties internally, often being a source of internal party conflict, and there were both pro-European and Euro-sceptic groups in the RPR and UDF. This necessity of working together is probably due to the fact that

when Euro-sceptics have broken from the main parties they have only been able to have a minor impact upon the parties from which they split. Most of the clubs and associations to which the UMP members belong are those that are what one would expect from a Centre-Right party to take part in and help to better integrate the members into civil society.

Conclusion

The activists of the UMP still in some ways reflect the parties from which they come; for example, the top-down focus of the party and the continuation of many pre-existing political clubs and associations. Therefore, the party is similar in many ways to the parties that made it up, often with the continued domination of the strongest local groups. Many members of the RPR made no difference in the time of when they joined the UMP and when they joined the RPR; therefore, one can see that they see the UMP more or less as a continuation of the RPR.

What is interesting from the results is that whilst there is a very centralised organisation, there is some willingness to decentralise the organisation to a degree, even in such an influential *département* as Hauts-de-Seine. However, by and large, these questions and responses suggest the members were satisfied with the UMP organisation at the time of the questionnaire. The strength of the party in Hauts-de-Seine is probably due to the experience that comes from those who worked in the RPR and the RPF before joining the party and the large membership within the *fédération*. This is key because without this organisational maturity, it might be harder for the party to preserve its unity given the diversity of the party on the national scale. The UMP's organisation has been successful in bringing together the Right in a new way for France, minimising internal conflict in order to maximise the possibility of electoral successes. We saw from questions regarding internal democracy and the role of diversity that the various factions are allowed to flourish

and feel represented. However, this unity might now be under threat in 2012 since the UMP has suffered a large national-level defeat. The continuation of this unity depends on how important the members believe it is to have a united front against the Left. The different political currents have been able to contribute to the party, rather than being marginalised and/or dominated, and this should only contribute to the success of the party in the future. The party has been able to successfully move from an organisation built for Jacques Chirac to the leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy, and much of the membership has seen this as a positive development to bring new members to the party. Hauts-de-Seine's local ties to Sarkozy enhance this positive feeling towards the leadership of the party within the *fédération*, and this is especially the case with the typical positive feelings towards local politicians over national level politicians.

The results for the questionnaire in the *fédération* Yvelines showed a mix of the traditions from the UDF and the RPR, especially coming from the social Gaullist strand, but with many similar results in the organisation itself to Hauts-de-Seine. In regards to the organisation of the Yvelines, there is also a strong element of experience, both in those who came from the UDF and those who were from the RPR. The leadership of the *département* is diverse in its origins, reflecting the change into the UMP. As in Hauts-de-Seine, the members see the party as having at least some characteristics of a presidential party and think that those who came from both the RPR and the UDF have benefited by the formation of the UMP. Moreover, the different groups have not been suppressed. Party members feel, moreover, that the party is democratic and that it is open to the membership playing an active role in the party, rather than leaving this only to the elites. The organisation of Yvelines, like that of Hauts-de-Seine, is also a very mature one, in the sense that its leadership has a great deal of experience in the running of a political party and is willing to work within a diverse political framework. This

was seen with the *fédération* as a whole. This is probably more important in Yvelines than in less diverse *fédérations* because it gives the party a sense of rules to follow, as was the case in the past, and of preserving a sort of continuity in the party's functioning.

The respondents in both Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines were fairly active outside the party, with many being members of multiple organisations and different types of organisations. The members in Yvelines reported being members of more organisations than the members in Hauts-de-Seine did. This might be due to the fact that the members who reported in Yvelines were more often elected officials and party officials and generally these groups tend to be members of more societies and groups in the first place in order to help preserve and widen their local connections. The more interesting result of this part of the questionnaire was the fact the members in Yvelines reported being members of associated movements and other associated political clubs more often than those in Hauts-de-Seine. The origins of this lie in the political diversity of Yvelines and the presence of different political groups not found in *départements* like Hauts-de-Seine. As stated above, the members in Yvelines put more importance on ensuring that the different political currents have a place in a party, but they did not seem to have any concerns about the responsiveness or democracy of the UMP organisation, so perhaps they feel that they get to voice their political differences through these organisations. This shows more of a 'new' party forming than in Hauts-de-Seine, which is more homogenous.

In this, one is able to see observable differences between the two *fédérations*, in relation to the organisation of the party. In Hauts-de-Seine, the organisation mainly comes from those who had been active within the RPR, with the addition of members of the RPF. As those who come from the RPF had origins in the RPR before joining the RPF, this makes for a more homogeneous organisation and a

more Gaullist group than that in Yvelines. Yvelines is more mixed, with many members coming from the UDF, making more space for the use of the UMP's organisational accommodations for political diversity, such as associated groups. However, these different political origins should not be seen as a weakness, as the respondents in both *fédérations* were generally satisfied with the party leadership and the level of internal party democracy. This is reinforced by the reforms of the party which have improved internal debate, as well as the role of associated groups in preserving diversity. The members of the party generally believe that the national party organisation is the most important. Nevertheless, as local politics needs local personalities and politicians, this level should deal mainly with local issues, and local politicians should have leeway in interpreting what the UMP represents in a given locality. Though the UMP is a centralised organisation, there is an important role for the party *fédérations* to play. Members supported the existence of flexible local structures, following the traditions of the predominant party in the area, giving the necessary local flexibility. The UMP could allow such flexibility because it is a more mature party than most newly created parties.

Chapter 5

Case Study: Political positioning and attitudes in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines

This chapter focuses on the section of the questionnaire on the political positioning and beliefs of the members of the UMP. These questions were asked to see what sorts of beliefs are held in the party. This was considered important for several reasons: to examine if political differences still exist between the different groups that came together to form the UMP to see if there has been convergence of the ideologies of the factions, to map out differences between new members and those having belonged to a party before 2002, and to make some general observations about new arrivals and those who have been politically active in the past. The chapter will also examine how the members identify themselves politically, and from this, how they identify the party politically. This is examined through self-placement, attitudes towards other French parties, and attitudes towards current political issues. The political attitudes and positioning of the members should be reflected in the differences both within and between the *fédérations*, revealing the differences in political origins and factions between the RPR and the other parties. We put forward the basic hypothesis that those coming from outside the largest group, the RPR, would see themselves as different politically from the other groups

which have come to make up the party.

This means that we will see if the members will more resemble the typology of the traditional French Right or if there is an UMP ideology developing. Remond argued the origins of the Right in France are deep historical ones that continue on today. This separates the Gaullists, who fall under then Bonapartist tradition, and the liberals, who fall under the Orléanist tradition (though Chirac was labelled often as an Orléanist).¹ The UMP is home of various currents of the Right and Centre that are working together in a party, rather than an electoral alliance. There will be some convergences in the ideology from Remond's original typology. However, this is not a new development; Knapp argues² there has been for some time over the years a convergence on some issues and a lessening of the importance of others between the Gaullists and non-Gaullist Centre-Right. However, this is not a result of the UMP, but something that helped the UMP to exist, as its origins come from the time before the UMP. This convergence would follow from the idea of Knapp and the general dealignment of Wolinetz.³ This could also indicate not only the development of a UMP institutional culture, but also a sort of UMP ideology. However, we expected to still see a difference between these factions, especially as there has been an institutionalisation of these factions, as the UMP can be seen as highly factionalised party. Nevertheless, as Sartori argues,⁴ this is not necessarily negative, as it indicates a degree of internal democracy in the party.

Examining the views of the predecessor parties, one would expect more typical

¹Réné Rémond, *Les droites en France*, (Editions Aubier Montaigne, Paris, 1982).

²Andrew Knapp, "From the Gaullist movement to the president's party," in Jocelyn A. J. Evans, (ed.) *The French party system*, (Manchester University Press: Manchester; 2003), pp. 121-125.

³Steven Wolinetz, "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems," in Peter Mair (ed.), *The West European Party System*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p 218-231.

⁴Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and party systems: A Framework for analysis*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

Gaullist attitudes from those coming from the RPR and RPF, such as more Euro-scepticism, economic *dirigisme* and caution towards globalisation as it undermines the Gaullist notion of a strong nation-state. One would expect a more liberal economic view from those who come from the UDF, and more openness to globalisation and the EU. Given the Christian Democratic origins of the UDF, especially amongst those in Yvelines, one would expect more of a moral conservatism amongst those who came from the UDF in that *fédération*. Additionally, one would expect the former RPF members to be more morally conservative than those who had only belonged to the RPR, due to the traditionalist nature of the RPF. This focus allows us to map what differences persist and in which areas there have been political convergences. The analysis in this chapter is based on the results of the questionnaire alone. These differences will show the UMP to be a continuation of the Centre-Right traditions of the Fifth Republic.

Whilst activists are more extreme in their opinions than the average voter for a party, as they usually are ‘believers’ in the party policies and ideology⁵, the activists are vital in understanding what a party is. They help to direct policy by preventing the party abandoning core beliefs, and they are in many ways the ones who direct the party on the ground. Therefore, we can better understand the UMP as an organisation, as well as what it represents in politics and policy, through what the activists believe and the direction in which they wish to bring the party.

Political positioning

In the first part of the questionnaire which focused on the politics of the UMP, members were asked to place themselves politically, both where they think they fit

⁵Angelo Panebianco, Marc Silver (trans.), *Political parties: organization and power*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

on the Left-Right political spectrum and which political current they see themselves as a part. This was done in order to examine how the members view themselves politically and examine if there are any differences between those coming from different political origins. This line of questioning was also used to help later with the comparison between Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines, in comparing the political origins of members, especially between the different parties that came to form the UMP, to see if perceptions of ideological and policy differences were reflected in the issues. We expected Gaullism to be strong in both *fédérations* because of the origins of the parties there. However, there will be differences; Hauts-de-Seine, with the influence of the RPF, taking more right-wing and more anti-EU strands, and the more social version that is popular in Yvelines focusing on ideas of *dirigisme* and not as opposed to the EU.

In order for us to better understand their political positioning, the respondents were asked to place themselves in relation to a Left-Right scale of 1 to 7, where '1' represents Far Left, '4' Centre and '7' Far Right.⁶ This method is consistent with those carried out in comparable French surveys on French parties. More than three quarters of the respondents in Hauts-de-Seine placed themselves at '5' or '6' on this scale, with fully more than half placing themselves as lying on the Centre-Right ('5').⁷ One-eighth of those who responded placed themselves in the centre or '4', and one respondent responded '3' on the scale of 1 to 7. But no respondents placed themselves as a '1', '2' or '7'. Therefore, the members of this *fédération* see themselves and the party mainly as part of the democratic Right, generally Centre-Right as opposed to the further end of the scale of the Right and also as distinct from a centrist party.

All of the respondents in Yvelines placed themselves from '4' to '6' on this Left-Right scale or the Centre to the Right, but not Far Right. More than 40%

⁶Où vous placez-vous politiquement ? Extrême gauche 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extrême droite

⁷Two respondents did not answer.

placed themselves at '6', more than one third placed themselves at '5' and the remaining respondents placed themselves at '4.' The most common response for those who were in the UDF before joining the UMP was '4', with only one of the ex-UDF respondents placing himself or herself at '5', probably due to the centrist nature of the party. None of those who had been in the RPR in Yvelines placed themselves at '4.' The new members put themselves in the whole range of '4' to '6.' This means that the new members are politically diverse, occupying the part of the political spectrum from all of the parties that came to make up the UMP.

These differences in the Left-Right self-placement are probably due to the strength of the Gaullist history in Hauts-de-Seine and the movement not seeing itself as strongly Right but as taking from a variety of political ideals; therefore, more centrist or Centre-Right than the traditional Right. On the other hand, the respondents in Yvelines also placed themselves more often in the Centre than those in Hauts-de-Seine. The respondents who placed themselves in the Centre in Yvelines tended to be those who came from the UDF. In contrast, none of those who had been the RPR in Yvelines identified themselves as from the Centre, so this strengthens the idea that those in the UMP in Yvelines originally from the UDF are different from those who came from the RPR, one difference which is still apparent between the groups that made up the UMP.

Nearly 60% of those who placed themselves in a political current in the party in Hauts-de-Seine⁸ classed themselves as Gaullists.⁹ Most of these classed themselves solely as Gaullist, whilst some used more specific terms such as: social Gaullist, Gaullist *souverainiste*, traditional Gaullist, Right Gaullist and Left Gaullist. Following the Gaullists were those who identified themselves as followers of Nicolas Sarkozy and ex-RPR members. One respondent each replied that he or she was

⁸Five did not respond, this is most likely an indication that they do not self-identify with one of these political currents.

⁹Au sein de l'UMP, de quelle sensibilité ou tradition vous sentez-vous le plus proche ?

liberal, *Majorité Présidentielle*, *Parti Radical* and a follower of the beliefs of Raymond Barre. The respondent who called himself a Left Gaullist was also the one who placed himself on the Left-Right scale at '3', meaning Centre-Left, which one would expect from a Left Gaullist. Other than that case of the Left Gaullist, Gaullists in this questionnaire placed themselves on the Centre-Right, exactly what would be expected by most academic specialists. More of the ex-members of the RPF placed themselves as '6' than those who had been just RPR members, and these were also the ones that called themselves Gaullist *souverainiste* and *Majorité Présidentielle*. As the RPF is usually viewed as more traditional Gaullist and/or conservative, the positioning further to the Right in comparison with the rest of the membership of this *département* would be expected. None of the members who identified themselves '4' or Centre on the scale that was used also identified themselves as Gaullist. These respondents said they are liberal or not part of a specific political current within the UMP. All of those who identified themselves with Nicolas Sarkozy placed themselves at '5' or Centre-Right on this political scale.

Half of the respondents in Yvelines labelled themselves as Gaullists; most just used the term Gaullist, but Left Gaullist and social Gaullist were also used.¹⁰ One of the respondents who labelled himself as a social Gaullist stated that Gaullism was something that came out of the reaction against both the Far Right and the Far Left, and it is hard to place if the movement is something of Right or Left. As a social Gaullist, he is in favour of the market economy but with regulations to protect workers and consumers. The market alone is just as negative and dangerous as a totally government controlled economy, and Gaullism tries to find the positive aspects of all models and adapt them to work in a mixed model. Other respondents labelled themselves Christian Democratic, liberal, Sarkozite, and Chiraquian. Not

¹⁰Three respondents did not answer.

all of the Gaullists were RPR members; two of them came from the UDF, and some had not been a member of a political party before 1981. The fact that only half of the respondents labelled themselves as Gaullist shows that Yvelines is more diverse than most *fédérations* of the UMP, which are generally dominated by those from the RPR. The new members often showed more of tendency to not wish to label themselves or identified more with Sarkozy.

In relation to political currents, it should be unsurprising for both *fédérations* that the most common self identification was with Gaullism. Hauts-de-Seine was slightly more Gaullist than Yvelines, probably due to the historical strength of the Gaullist movement within Hauts-de-Seine and the relative strength of the UDF in Yvelines. In Yvelines, the term Gaullist was mainly used without a further adjective, but those who were used were Left and social Gaullist. This is in contrast to the members from Hauts-de-Seine, who labelled themselves as social Gaullist and Left Gaullist like in Yvelines, but also Gaullist *souverainiste*, traditional Gaullist and Right Gaullist. This is due to a couple of factors. First, the social Gaullist movement does have some strength in Yvelines, because of the leadership of the social Gaullist Gérard Larcher. Second, Hauts-de-Seine has been a stronghold for the RPF, which is a more traditionalist and *souverainiste* Gaullist party than the RPR was, and many from this party labelled themselves along those lines. Those who labelled themselves as social and Left Gaullist or something other than Gaullist placed themselves more towards the Centre and the Left than the other groups in the party, particularly the liberals, in both *fédérations* following the pattern of political positioning.

This shows that the UMP at this time still represents very much the groups that came together to form it, at least in their self-identification. The UDF saw itself as a more centrist party and the replies of these members still indicate this and they often identified with the groups that where in the UDF. There was still

a strong identification with Gaullism in the UMP at the time of the questionnaire, especially amongst those from the RPR and RPF, showing that those from these parties felt an identification with this ideal of the other parties, rather than a new one from the UMP.

Views of other parties

The next section of the questionnaire asked the respondents for their views of some of the other French political parties. This was done to better understand where the respondents placed themselves politically and to help reflect on the later questions which cover specific political issues and to better understand the groups and factions within the party. Parties were chosen to reflect on what ideas the parties represent, instead of a specific political figure, which might have been more of an indication that the respondent liked the politician as a figure or a person. The parties examined in the questionnaire were *Les Verts*, *Parti socialiste*, *Front national*, *Mouvement pour la France*, *Union pour la Démocratie Française* and *Rassemblement pour la France*. These were chosen on the basis of avoiding the parties on the Far Left, as they would receive only very negative responses, and avoiding smaller parties which do not have any sort of history (positive or negative) with the UMP or its predecessor parties and which would likely not get any sort of real response. The parties were selected on the basis that they are usually believed to represent a certain type of politics or ideology (even though many of these parties are internally diverse as well), and this question seeks a reaction to that.

One would expect that the members of the UMP would be more favourable to parties of the Centre-Right and Right because of shared cultural and political values. Alternatively, one would assume that the members of the UMP would reject the parties of the Left and the Far-Right, especially the Greens who are

seen as the inheritors of the May '68 legacy that so opposed Gaullism and the other conservative groups in France at the time. The scale that was used to rate the parties was 1 to 10, with 1 meaning not at all close to its beliefs and 10 very close to its beliefs.¹¹ Many of the respondents responded '0,' even with the stated 1-10 scale; this probably means they felt that they have nothing in common with that party. For this question, many of the respondents in Hauts-de-Seine did not answer.¹² One of the respondents in this *fédération* explained that he did not feel much in common with any other parties; therefore, he was a member of the UMP so this probably plays a role in the lower response of other respondents.

The party with the most negative response in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines was *Les Verts*. In Hauts-de-Seine nearly 70% of those who responded to this question gave *Les Verts* a 0 and the rest gave it a 1. Most of the ratings for *Les Verts* were 0 and 1 on the scale of 1-10 in Yvelines, with one respondent replying 2. This negative response is because *Les Verts* are seen very much as a party of the Left. One of the respondents explained his negative view of this party; though he felt that the issue of the environment is very important, *Les Verts* approach the issue in the wrong way, misunderstanding many of the issues behind the protection of the environment. Moreover, he felt that *Les Verts* are above all a Leftist party, not just a green party. Some of the leaders of *Les Verts* and other Left-wing Green parties in Europe were part of the riots in 1968, and the party is seen as coming from those values so this might influence those who see themselves as Gaullists as that *Les Verts* are opposed to the traditional conservative values. In addition, *Les Verts* have shown hostility to the UMP, particularly Sarkozy, which also probably has a negative effect on the view of the party amongst members of the UMP.

¹¹À part l'UMP, lesquels partis suivants vous sentez-vous la plus proche ? (1 pas de tout proche - 10 plus proche) UDF /10 MPF /10 FN /10 PS /10 RPF /10 Les Verts /10

¹²6-9 for each party not responding. Only 1 or 2 did not reply in Yvelines for each of the parties.

The next two parties are the PS and FN in Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines. The PS had more than 39% each for 0 and 1 each in Hauts-de-Seine. However, whilst the rest of the responses for the PS fell into 2 or 3 in Hauts-de-Seine, the responses for the FN went up to 4, with 13% of the respondents giving the FN a 4. About half of the respondents in Yvelines gave the PS a 0 or a 1, with the rest of the respondents giving the PS between 2 and 4. The FN had about 43% responding 0 and more than 30% responding 1 in Hauts-de-Seine. Like in Hauts-de-Seine, the FN received a larger negative response in Yvelines, but a smaller group of the respondents gave the FN a high rating, with more than one tenth of respondents giving the FN a 6 or 7, but also almost half of the respondents placing the FN at 0.

The FN, whilst a Right-wing party, probably received such a strong reaction because of the extreme nature of its views. This is reflected in some of the explanations in which some respondents stated that PCF would have received a 0 as well because Gaullism is the politics of moderation, not extremism. The FN routinely attacks the ‘establishment’ of the mainstream parties, including the UMP in the same view as the PS and the Communists, which leads to further hostility to the FN. Those who are Gaullists might also be opposed to the FN for its portrayal of the Vichy puppet government in a better light than it deserved. The FN probably had some mild support because of some attitudes which are echoed in the UMP. For example, those who rated the FN as 4 or higher also think there are too many immigrants in France and think that the EU is too powerful. So those who are concerned with foreign influences in France might have a better view of the FN, which also wishes to remove as many ‘foreigners’ and ‘foreign influences’ as possible.

We might expect a more extreme reaction to the FN from those who had come from the UDF, as the regional councils in 1998 caused a split in the party between

those who did not wish to work with the FN and those who saw it as their only chance to gain power. In Yvelines this was not obvious, but this could be down to the regional nature of the conflict, which was mainly in *Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur*. However, those who view the FN more favourably could push more for cooperation, renewing this conflict. For example, in the 2012 National Assembly election, Nadine Morano, a former cabinet minister, called for FN voters to vote for the UMP in the second round because of their “shared values,” particularly on immigration.¹³ Others in the UMP, like *La Droite populaire* contend that the UMP must be true to its values as the only real way to combat the FN and the Far Right more generally.¹⁴ This conflict could grow as the UMP looks for new strategies to get back into government after national level losses of 2012; however, this would be more difficult in these *fédérations* as the membership seems strongly opposed to the FN, and the FN is not as successful in these *départements* so there is less for them to gain.

The PS (and the parties that preceded it) has long been the rival of the UMP and the parties of the Centre-Right. Moreover, the PS is the largest force on the Left of politics in France, an obvious source of opposition to those who identify themselves as part of the Right. Those who gave the PS a 2 or 3 in Hauts-de-Seine placed themselves in the Centre/Centre-Right; none of those who labelled themselves in the Right were so indulgent towards the Socialists. This idea of Left-Right opposition still holds a large amount of relevance in French politics, even though this has become less the case in many other countries. This partisan structuring has an impact upon UMP members' negative opinion of a party which

¹³“Morano lance un appel aux lecteurs du FN : Le Pen ironise,” *LeParisien.fr* Available from: <http://www.leparisien.fr/elections-legislatives-2012/morano-lance-un-appel-aux-electeurs-du-fn-le-pen-ironise-l-ump-s-interroge-11-06-2012-2043412.php>.

¹⁴La Droite Populaire, *Vue de Droite... en trompe- l'oeil* Available from: <http://www.ladroitepopulaire.com/2012/06/21/vue-de-droite%E2%80%A6-en-trompe-1%E2%80%99oeil/>.

is seen as the main player of the Left.

The next lowest response went to MPF in Hauts-de-Seine. The MPF is a conservative *souverainiste* party which split from the UDF in 1994 as a result of the UDF's pro-European stance, and it is led by Philippe de Villiers. It actively campaigned against the European Constitution and is opposed to Turkish membership in the EU and 'Islamisation' of France. About 23% of respondents rated the MPF as a 0 and nearly 41% rated the party 1. The respondents had a higher range of responses than the previous parties going up to 7, though the majority of the responses for the MPF were on the lower end of the scale. Most of those who ranked the MPF higher were also those who oppose the EU Constitutional Treaty and labelled themselves as Gaullist of some nature, and some were members of Euro-sceptic groups. Even though the RPF worked with the MPF in the 1999 European election, those who were in the RPF were no more likely to rank the MPF highly than those who had only been in the RPR or those who had no previous political party affiliation. So Euro-scepticism is not the only factor in a more favourable view of the MPF in Hauts-de-Seine. This probably also relates to the fact that the MPF and the RPF partly occupy the same political beliefs and, therefore, the MPF can 'steal' potential voters and activists from the RPF, and it is also likely that there is a strong leadership loyalty to Pasqua of the RPF members especially in Hauts-de-Seine, as this is his political home.

The next two parties were RPF and MPF in Yvelines. These two parties received almost the same rating, with the RPF receiving a slightly more positive ranking, probably due in part to the closer ties with the UMP. Both parties received a range of responses between 0 and 8, and less than half the respondents gave the parties 0 or 1. The RPF received better ratings in the middle rankings than the MPF did. There was a direct correlation between the ratings of these two parties in Yvelines: those who ranked one of these parties highly also rated the other

party highly. About a quarter of the respondents rated the RPF slightly higher than the MPF, and one respondent rated the MPF slightly higher than the RPF. There seems to be no relation of where they placed themselves on the Left-Right scales and the ratings of these two parties. One of the respondents explained his higher ranking of the RPF because he felt that the party was interested in protecting the French state; the MPF has a somewhat similar goal; however, the RPF approaches this in a better way. Therefore, the RPF's ties to Gaullism also helped the perception of it by the respondents in Yvelines.

The two parties which received the highest responses in Hauts-de-Seine were UDF and RPF. The UDF had a lower range of responses, 0 to 7, but it received a less negative response than the RPF, which had the full range of 0 to 10. One sixth of respondents gave the UDF a 0, and one eighth gave the UDF a 1. About 19% of the respondents gave the RPF a 0 and 23% gave the party a 1. More than half gave the RPF a 3 or less, while a similar percentage gave the UDF a 4 or less. A quarter gave the UDF either a 6 or 7. The highest ratings of the RPF, 8, 9, and 10, received 19% of the response, with about 8% giving the RPF a 10. There was some confusion about what was meant by the UDF, as the UDF broke up during the time of the questionnaire into *Nouveau Centre* and *MoDem*. It was instructed that the respondents should answer as the UDF before the creation of *MoDem*.

Those who placed themselves as '5' or lower on the political spectrum ranked the UDF more highly than those who placed themselves at a 6 in Hauts-de-Seine. Therefore, the UDF's appeal as a centrist party may have had to do with the higher rankings of the UDF relative to the other parties that this questionnaire asked about which were either Left or extreme in some way. Those who ranked the UDF highly had more education (bac+5, bac+8 or grande école) than those who gave the UDF a low mark, typical of the support of the UDF.

Unsurprisingly, those who had been members of the RPF in Hauts-de-Seine

ranked the RPF the highest. The RPF did not become officially part of the UMP like some of the smaller parties and remains one of the *personnes morales associées*; therefore, some of the members who were in the RPF might have double membership. None of those who had been in the RPF specified if this was the case or not. Those who ranked the RPF highly were also concerned by globalisation and the EU's power. Most of those that ranked the RPF highly placed themselves at '6' on the political spectrum. Those who ranked the RPF as a 0 or 1 on were supportive of the EU constitution and placed themselves as '4' or '5' on the political spectrum. Of course, the RPF is a Euro-sceptic party and widely viewed as one, and it is also viewed as a more traditional Gaullist/conservative party and a party further to the Right. These factors combined produced a more unfavourable view of the RPF amongst the more centrist members of the UMP.

The highest rated party in Yvelines was the UDF, with three quarters of the respondents rating the UDF 4 or higher. Unsurprisingly, the members who had been part of the UDF ranked the party the highest. However, even those who were not previously members of the UDF had a better opinion of the UDF than those in Hauts-de-Seine. It was explained by one of the respondents that the UDF has been very close to the UMP in politics, and it is not problematic for the two groups to work together, and historically, this has been the case in Yvelines. This has been more important in Yvelines than in Hauts-de-Seine because many people left the UDF from the UMP in this *départements*. Those from the UDF often placed an importance on the unity of the Centre/Centre-Right, so those who left the UDF were possibly attracted to the party as a needed united front against the Left and Far-Right, so this could indicate the rejection of Bayrou and the idea of a need for a separate party, rather than of rejection of the ideas behind the UDF.

This variation in the results between the three highest-rated parties should be seen as a result of the different membership make-ups. Those who had been

members of the RPF in Hauts-de-Seine are more favourable to that party than the other members. The ex-RPR only members in Hauts-de-Seine would have had to work longer with the RPF in the past, bringing the parties closer. This is why in Yvelines, where the sample did not show any members from the RPF, respondents gave the RPF a rather similar result to the MPF, another Euro-sceptic party. The higher favourable ranking for the UDF in Yvelines can be seen as similar to the high rating of the RPF in Hauts-de-Seine, as not only the ex-UDF members rated the UDF more highly. The interaction between the parties is therefore key in fostering more positive feelings between them. However, it should not be forgotten that both *fédérations* rejected the Left and the Far-Right, so whilst there are some differences in ideology still apparent in their view of the rest of the political world, the opposition to the Left and the Far-Right unite them. For this, we can better examine how the different factions manifest themselves on concrete political issues.

Political attitudes

The next grouping of questions concerned attitudes on a variety of political issues. This is important as activists influence the direction of the party and reflect a more hard-line of the ideology of the party. It is also another way to see if there has been a convergence between the factions of the party. Like the party organisation questions, there was a statement, and the respondent was asked to state if he/she agrees, mostly agrees, mostly disagrees, or disagrees with the statement. These questions were asked in order to better understand the political beliefs of the membership. We were interested in whether these beliefs coincide with those traditionally attributed to these different groups, especially in relation to party origins and the self-identified scales of political positioning we investigated above. It is important to understand what differences exist between the members and whether differences correspond to identifiable groups within the UMP. If there are

no real differences, then we might surmise that the party is not factionalised on ideological grounds. If differences do exist, however, their management informs us about the sort of adjustments the party must make for the groups to be able to work together in the face of ideological differences that kept the different groups apart in the past.

Views towards Europe

The first relevant question group focused on the issue of Europe. The issue of Europe is one that has divided French parties, both Left and Right, for a long time. It is mainly an issue that divides parties internally, rather than creating divisions between the parties. Traditionally, the Gaullists were more Euro-sceptic in the sense that they wished for the EU to be limited to a ‘Europe of the Nations;’ however, in more recent years, the Gaullist movement has become more accepting of Europe, some becoming more or less pro-European in many areas and seeing the EU as a way to protect French interests. Generally, the UDF was pro-European throughout its history, though this was not the case with all of its members, as can be seen in the MPF split over Maastricht. Furthermore, the RPF split from the RPR was over the issue of Europe, so this group of statements aims to explore what differences persist – and whether they can be explained by party origins. The three questions address different ways to view Europe. The first of these focuses on the specific issue of the EU Constitution, which was officially supported by the UMP, in spite of some internal opposition to it. The next addresses the EU – how it is and how it exercises power over France, to see the strength of Euro-scepticism. The final question of this group shows interest in co-operation in Europe with those with a similar ideology. These should show the differences that exist on an issue that traditionally divided the RPR, RPF, and UDF by showing more general opposition to the idea of Europe.

The first question in this group was “The EU constitution is a good thing for France.”¹⁵ This question was chosen to see how the respondents felt about the UMP’s support of the Constitution in the referendum. About 38% of respondents in Hauts-de-Seine stated that they agree, and almost 69% of the respondents chose the option of either agree or mostly agree. Around 9% stated that they disagree. Those who labelled themselves as Gaullist were more likely to mostly disagree or disagree, unsurprisingly, given the traditional stance of the Gaullists on Europe. Those who hold an elected position and those who have responsibilities in the party organisation were more likely to agree or mostly agree with this assertion. Generally, in most parties those in elected office tend to be more moderate than the regular party rank and file on Europe. It should be no surprise, given the official party line for the referendum on the EU constitution, that those who are in charge of the party are also in favour. Those who ranked the MPF and RPF more highly, as well as those who gave the FN a rank of 2 or more, were more likely to mostly disagree or disagree. This is probably a result of the Euro-sceptic nature of these parties. Almost all of the respondents in Yvelines stated that they agree with the Constitution being a good deal for France; only one respondent stated that he or she only mostly agree. The respondent had been a member of the RPR before joining the UMP, rather than from the more pro-European UDF.

Another of these statements on the subject of the view of the European Union was “The EU is too powerful. We must fight to protect French sovereignty.”¹⁶ This question is more about the EU in general, rather than the specific issue of the Constitution so it is able to gauge the general opinion of the EU. Around 35% in Hauts-de-Seine stated they agreed with this, and about 68% stated they either agree or mostly agree.¹⁷ About 6% of the respondents stated that they disagree.

¹⁵La constitution pour l’Europe est une bonne chose pour la France.

¹⁶L’Union européenne est trop puissante. Il faut se battre pour protéger la souveraineté de la France.

¹⁷One respondent did not answer.

Unsurprisingly, those who are members of pro-European organisations were against this assertion. Those who placed themselves as 6 on the political spectrum were the most likely to approve of this statement, and those placed themselves as 4 or 3 were the least likely to approve of this assertion. So the more moderate members of the party do not believe the EU is much of a threat to France's sovereignty. Those who have no responsibilities in the party were more likely to support this idea. The respondents who had been members of the RPF and those who ranked the RPF higher than 7 were a great deal more likely to agree, and those who had been not been part of a party before joining the UMP were less likely to agree with this statement. Therefore, those who see themselves as part of traditional Gaullism in this sample continue to have more negative views towards the EU. Perhaps the new members of the UMP are more moderate in such views because they have not been previously engaged in politics, and Europe can be a rather contentious issue in French politics. Those who gave the FN a 2 or higher were much more likely to approve of this assertion, which is expected given the negative view of the EU in the FN. The respondents who disagreed with this idea were more likely to agree or mostly agree that the EU constitution is a good thing for France. The older members and the retired were more likely to agree with this statement.

This idea of the EU being too powerful showed a slightly more negative view of Europe in Yvelines than the Constitution question did, though it was still less negative than in Hauts-de-Seine. About a third of the respondents either agreed or mostly agreed with this statement. Those who placed themselves at 6 on the political spectrum were more likely to agree or mostly agree, like in Hauts-de-Seine. Those who had been in the UDF were more likely to be against this statement, which probably comes from the party's pro-European origins.

The next statement regarding the European Union was "We must co-operate

more with the other major European parties of the Right.”¹⁸ This question was to see the view of co-operation in the EU with those who might more inclined to share the political views of the UMP, rather than the EU in general, with which it may be more difficult to reach agreement. Twenty-nine percent of the responses in Hauts-de-Seine were in agreement with this assertion, and 87% stated that they either agree or mostly agree.¹⁹ Only 3% stated that they disagree with working more closely with the other major European parties. Those who supported this assertion were more likely to have agreed that the EU constitution is a good thing for France. None of those who stated that they oppose²⁰ more co-operation stated that they agree the EU constitution is a good thing. So those who generally have a more positive view about Europe are more interested in working with other European parties, European parties, and those who are more Euro-sceptic are unlikely to be convinced of the European project, even when it deals with more similar political groups.

Most of the respondents in Yvelines mostly agreed with more co-operation with the European parties of the Right; the rest of the respondents stated that they agree with this statement. One of the respondents added that it is not only necessary to work with the other European parties on the Right, but that the UMP should do this with the European centrist parties as well. He believes that the UMP is not a party exclusively of the Right, and many commonalities could be found between these European centrist parties and the UMP. Therefore, if the UMP worked with them as well as the parties of the Right, this could mean more of the types of policy that the UMP would approve could get accepted in the EU.

In general, the responses in Yvelines were more pro-European than those from the sample of Hauts-de-Seine. One of the respondents explained that he was more

¹⁸Nous devrions coopérer plus avec les autres grands partis européens de la droite.

¹⁹One respondent did not answer.

²⁰Mostly disagree or disagree.

anti-EU integration in the past because he was concerned that the adoption of the Euro was too early, so he campaigned against the Maastricht treaty. However, he is generally supportive of the European Union now and thinks that Europe is important for preserving France's place in the world to be able to stand as a world power. This generally stronger pro-European attitude in Yvelines is probably due in part to the greater presence of those from the UDF, which was a more pro-European party than the RPR. We should note that the RPF was absent from this sample in Yvelines, but the more negative responses in Hauts-de-Seine were reflective of the continuing influence there of the more Euro-sceptical RPF tradition. This also could be in part because more respondents of Yvelines were elected officials, so those who have responsibilities in the party in Yvelines were more positive about these on these questions about Europe. The next section will go to explore the wider view of France in the world to consider how this relates to the issue of the EU. From this, we can move to another traditional Gaullist principle of France's place in the world and the importance of national independence.

Views of globalisation and France's place in the world

The next statements examined the view of globalisation and France's place in the world. This cluster of questions sought to capture the extent to which dirigisme and a belief in absolute national interest was still present in the mindsets of those who identified themselves as Gaullists, especially through undertaking a comparison between those from the RPF and the other groups in the party. This allows us to see what differences exist between the Gaullists and non-Gaullists, given the traditional Gaullist view of the nation-state. This group of statements also sought to test whether party members perceive an external danger for French society and economy, and, if so, whether fear of outside influences spills over into a more

negative view of the EU. We surmise that those who worry about the growing influence of the EU are also more likely to be concerned about the possibility of declining French influence in the world.

The first question in this cluster was “The government must protect French industry against globalisation and foreign buyouts.”²¹ Historically, the Gaullists have acted to protect French business and industry when they believe it was under threat from foreign influences. About 28% in Hauts-de-Seine stated that they agree with this statement, and the vast majority of the respondents, nearly 88%, stated that they agree or mostly agree. No respondents choose the option of disagree²² for this assertion. Those that ranked the UDF highly were more likely to mostly disagree with this statement, probably due to the more liberal political beliefs of the UDF. Unsurprisingly, those who ranked the RPF highly and those who had been members of the RPF were more likely to support this assertion. Those who gave the FN a 4 were also more likely to approve of this statement. Logically, those who think that the EU is too powerful are more likely to agree with this statement. In sum, those who agree with this assertion are concerned the effects of regionalisation through the EU, as well as the effects of globalisation on French industry. This general agreement is not surprising given that the party has strongly supported intervention with the idea of the “national champions” that was put forward by the government under both Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy, and the reason for this question was to gauge if the party members generally agree with this policy.

About two thirds of the respondents in Yvelines stated that they agreed or mostly agreed with protecting French industry from foreign buyouts, though one of the respondents felt that this is the role of Europe, not for France alone to

²¹Il faut que le gouvernement protège les entreprises françaises contre la mondialisation et contre l'achat des entreprises étrangères.

²²The option of “pas d'accord” only.

face. Those who placed themselves at 6 on the Left-Right scale were more likely to support this statement, as were those who rated the RPF and MPF highly. Generally, those who had more favourable views of the EU and those coming from the UDF were more likely to oppose this assertion. One of the respondents felt that it was not so much a question of protection against globalisation, but that the government should help French industry fit better into globalisation. He argued that the State should help the French economy and industry adapt to this new reality, rather than ignoring it. Because of the Gaullist influences, one would expect the responses in Hauts-de-Seine.

The next statement was “France must look after her interest first even if her actions compromise her alliance with the United States.”²³ This question was asked because of the usual view on the French Right of suspicion towards American foreign policy, and the invasion of Iraq provoked a very negative reaction amongst the leadership of the UMP and the government of Jacques Chirac. However, Nicolas Sarkozy is often portrayed as pro-Atlanticist so this question was looking to see if there has been a difference amongst those who have joined the UMP who were not in a previous party; we might surmise that, as they were more likely to have joined because of Nicolas Sarkozy, they would be less anti-American. A large proportion of the respondents in Hauts-de-Seine supported this statement (“France must look after her interest first even if her actions compromise her alliance with the United States”) with nearly 86% stating they agreed or mostly agreed with this assertion.²⁴ Nearly 3% disagreed with this statement.²⁵ Those placing themselves on the Centre-Right, ‘5’, were more likely to approve of this assertion. None of those who had been members of RPF stated that they oppose this statement, which is probably in part due to the strongly Gaullist nature of

²³La France doit d’abord veiller à son intérêt même si son action compromet son alliance avec les Etats-Unis.

²⁴Four respondents did not answer.

²⁵The option of “pas d’accord” only.

that political party. There seems to be no difference between those who had been part of a previous party and those who had not. Those who mostly agreed with the need to protect the French economy from globalisation were more likely to mostly disagree or disagree with France compromising the alliance with the U.S. So those who fear outside pressures, such as globalisation, do not view the influence of the U.S. less negatively than those who are not as concerned about globalisation. Anti-Americanism remains an important component of the French Centre-Right.

Nearly three quarters of the respondents in Yvelines agreed or mostly agreed with this idea of France's interest coming before the alliance with the U.S. Generally, those who supported the previous assertion on protecting French industry from foreign buyouts also agreed with this statement, maybe showing a general concern for France's place in the world and the effects of globalisation. One of the respondents tied this in with the questions about Europe and stated that Europe as a whole needs to do this, not just France, and that a strong Europe is better able to stand up for her own interests so the connection to Europe is needed for independence from American power. Those who were members of the UDF were more likely to oppose this statement than those who came from the RPR or no previous party. The generally positive response to this statement was not from anti-Americanism, according to one of the respondents. He argued as a Gaullist that the importance of the French nation comes first; this did not necessarily mean a dislike of America. Both of the *fédérations* generally agreed with this statement, though the response was more negative towards this assertion in Yvelines. One can see this difference as part of the membership origins because all of the members from the RPF approved of this statement more often, and the members from the UDF were more likely to oppose this assertion. Interestingly, new members were in fact less likely to disagree with this statement, so there is no evidence that Sarkozy has brought in a new Atlanticist element to the UMP with the expanding membership that was

most likely attracted to the party in part by his leadership.

The final statement in relation to globalisation and the effect of outside forces in France was “There are too many immigrants in France.”²⁶ This was asked because of concerns of the effects of immigration, especially after the riots in the *banlieues* in recent years, and the reaction for action in these immigrant-dominated communities. Around 32% in Hauts-de-Seine agreed with this assertion, and 64% stated they mostly agreed or agreed.²⁷ Thirteen percent stated that they disagree with this statement. Those who ranked themselves on the Centre or Centre-Right of the political spectrum were more likely to oppose this assertion. Those who were members of the RPF and those who ranked the RPF highly and the FN as 3 or 4 were much more likely to support this statement, and those who had been in no previous party were more likely to mostly disagree or disagree. All of those who supported this statement also either agreed or mostly agreed with the need to protect the French economy from the effects of globalisation. Almost all of those who agreed with this assertion also agreed that the EU is too powerful. So, to summarise, those who are more concerned about threats to traditional French life and outside pressures on France and her sovereignty and economy are more likely to have fears of those coming to France from outside and changing it. The older respondents and those who are retired were more likely to agree with the idea that there are too many immigrants in France. Indeed, all of the respondents born since 1975 disagreed with this assertion. This is typical in most of Europe: the younger generations are more accepting of immigration, perhaps because they have lived with larger scale immigration their whole lives, and the older generations have not. Those who live in cities of less than 40,000 people were more likely to disagree or mostly disagree with this statement. Since those who live in larger cities are more likely to feel the impacts of immigration, it is logical that those in areas of less

²⁶Il y a trop immigrés en France.

²⁷One respondent did not answer.

immigration are less likely to perceive there are too many immigrants.

More than one third of the respondents in Yvelines disagree or mostly disagreed with the idea that there are too many immigrants in France.²⁸ Those who placed themselves on the Right ('6') of the Left-Right scale were more likely to support this statement, as were those that ranked the RPF, MPF, and FN more highly. One of the respondents stated that it is not a problem of too many immigrants in France; it is more of a problem of the lack of integration in some immigrant communities. Communitarianism is undesirable and potentially dangerous, and communitarianism and religious extremism must be fought, rather than immigration in itself. He argued that those who come to France to live must make efforts to integrate, and a cohesive society can and should develop from this. Another respondent argued that one must make the difference between legal immigration and illegal immigration. He felt that something needs to be done to deal with the problem of illegal immigration, but there is no inherent problem with legal immigration. So perhaps if this question was more specific on the sort of immigration, legal or illegal, or about the integration of immigrants, it would have resulted in a different sort of response. Nonetheless, this assertion was chosen because it is a rather standard survey question to gauge attitudes in France towards immigration.

This section showed differences between those who identify themselves more to the political Centre and those who identify themselves to the Right, reflecting the assumption that those in the Centre are more liberal than those to the Right. It also showed that those who came from the UDF were more liberal than those who came from the other parties, and those from the RPF were less liberal; this is unsurprising given the origins of both parties. These views of globalisation and foreign influences were also, predictably, closely related to the views of the EU.

²⁸One respondent did not answer.

Those less negative toward the EU were also less negative toward globalisation and those more Euro-sceptic were more protective about France's place in the world.

Views towards moral issues

The next group of questions concerned moral issues and politics. The Gaullist movement is generally viewed as a mix of different elements on the Centre-Right, so this group of statements addresses the level of moral conservatism within the party. These questions were asked in order to examine what effects the presence of the UDF, with the various Christian Democratic groups coming from this party, has on the membership. This is especially important in Yvelines, with the presence of groups like the FRS. One would expect, if there has not been a convergence of views, to find a stronger view that relates to Christian Democracy, such as the opposition to homosexuals being able to adopt and a more positive view of religion in politics, particularly with the leader of the FRS coming from Yvelines. Furthermore, one might expect that those from the RPF would support the traditionalist views as well, though not the idea of mixing religion with politics, as this would be an opposition to traditional French republican values. We, therefore, anticipated visible differences in this field, which we found.

The first of this group was "Homosexual couples ought to be allowed to adopt."²⁹ About 61% in Hauts-de-Seine stated that they disagree with homosexuals being able to adopt, and about 81% stated that they disagree or mostly disagree with this statement.³⁰ Around 10% of the respondents said that they agree. There were some comments made in response to this question, that it was not a question if the potential adoptive parents were homosexual or not, but homosexual adoption is a problem as a child should be brought up with a role model of both sexes, and they cannot have this with parents of the same sex. Therefore, this would be a

²⁹Les couples homosexuels doivent pouvoir adopter les enfants.

³⁰One respondent did not answer.

problem if a single person adopted a child as well. It is not possible to know how many disagreed on these grounds other than those who stated their reasoning, but it is a possible factor in the strength of the negative reaction towards this statement. Those who ranked the UDF highly were more likely to support allowing homosexuals to adopt, which might be because the UDF is seen as a more socially liberal party due to elements like the Radical Party. Those who ranked the RPF highly and those who had been members of RPF were more likely to be against homosexual adoption. The respondents who had been in no previous party were more likely to agree with homosexuals having the right to adopt. The practicing Catholic and Muslim respondents were more likely to oppose this statement, which is not surprising given the traditional view of the family model and the negative view of homosexuality in those religions. The older respondents were more likely to state that they disagree with homosexual adoption, as were the male respondents. This is a typical pattern in most countries of the older generations and males being opposed to such rights for homosexual couples.

This first question also received a very large negative response in Yvelines. Only one respondent agreed with the idea of homosexual couples being able to adopt. More than a quarter of the respondents stated that they mostly disagree, and the remaining respondents stated that they disagree. Like in Hauts-de-Seine, there was the concern for the lack of role models of both sexes. Generally, this idea is one that is opposed by both Christian Democratic groups and conservative groups, so it is unsurprising that there was such a negative response in Yvelines. In Yvelines a favourable view of the UDF or having been member in the UDF did not seem to make a difference in the response to this question, reflecting the nature of the elements of the UDF that came to the UMP from there, in keeping with the very negative response of the *fédération*. This general opposition could be because of the strong Christian Democratic presence of those who had been in

the UDF with the absorption of those who had been in the *Mouvement républicain populaire* (MRP) and more currently, figures like Christine Boutin from the FRS, also a member of the National Assembly from Yvelines.

The next statement in this group was “The role of women above all is to take care of their children and their home.”³¹ This was asked to measure the amount of support for the traditional role of women amongst the respondents since some of the groups in the UMP, such as the FRS, argue for a more traditionalist society. This statement was very strongly weighted toward the disagree side in Hauts-de-Seine.³² More than half chose the option of disagree, and 87% said they either disagree or mostly disagree. About 10% agreed with the idea. Those who ranked the FN lowly were more likely to disagree. As the FN often promotes maternalism, one would expect those who oppose the FN the most would also oppose such ideas. Those who ranked the RPF 5 or lower were more likely to be against this statement as well, which probably comes from the view of the RPF as a more traditionalist party. However, there seems to be no correlation between this question and the view on *parité*. There seems to be no connection between sex, age, religious belief, nor education level and the response to this question, which means that this idea is more related to having traditionalist views, rather than other factors.

More than three quarters in Yvelines disagreed or mostly disagreed with the statement that a woman’s role is firstly to take care of her children and home, with more than half stating that they disagree.³³ Those who ranked the UDF highly were more likely to state they disagree, as were those who ranked the PS and Les Verts more highly. However, there seems to be no correlation between where they place themselves on the political spectrum. So the respondents who might be more

³¹Le rôle de la femme est avant tout de s’occuper de son foyer et de ses enfants.

³²One respondent did not answer.

³³The option of “pas d’accord” only.

tolerant of the parties to the Left of the UMP, rather than actually being on the Left, seem to be more opposed to assigning women a more traditional role.

The final question from this group was “Religion and the State must work together. It is impossible to disassociate politics and morals.”³⁴ Most of those who responded in Hauts-de-Seine were in disagreement with the statement. About 43% stated that they disagreed, and 64% said that they either disagree or somewhat disagreed.³⁵ Fewer than 4% chose the option of agree³⁶ with this assertion. This question had some of the strongest reactions because of the secular nature of the French state. However, this question was asked because of the Christian Democratic beliefs of some of the groups within the UMP, especially the FRS. For this question in Hauts-de-Seine, one would expect the results to be similar to those that were found because this is a *fédération* which identifies that itself as strongly Gaullist, rather than Christian Democratic. Those who had been members of the RPF were more likely to support this statement, and those who had not been in a party before were more likely to oppose it. Those placed themselves as Right (‘6’) on the political spectrum were more likely to approve of this assertion. So those who are further to the Right are more likely to believe in the influence of the traditional values of religion impacting politics. Those who ranked the UDF highly were more likely to state that they were against this idea, so perhaps these respondents feel more sympathy with the Radical element which was part of the UDF. The practicing Catholics were more likely to be in agreement with this assertion, and the non-Catholics were the most likely to disagree with this view of religion, the State, and politics. So those who are more involved with the traditional religion of France are more open to the idea of a role for religion, and the groups outside are more likely to disassociate the two.

³⁴Il faut que l'état et la religion travaillent ensemble. C'est impossible dissocier la morale et la politique.

³⁵Four respondents did not answer, probably due to the controversial nature of this statement.

³⁶The option of “d'accord” only.

Whilst this question received a very negative response in Hauts-de-Seine, more than half of the respondents in Yvelines stated they agreed or mostly agreed with the idea that religion and the State ought to work together because one cannot separate morals and politics; this might be expected in a *département* that has had more influence from the Christian Democratic movements. So unsurprisingly, those who had been in the UDF were more likely to support this statement. Those who placed themselves at 6 on the political spectrum were also more likely to agree or mostly agree, showing more conservative support for this idea beyond the Christian Democratic influences of the UDF in Yvelines. Those who opposed this assertion also opposed the statement regarding the traditional role of women. This probably stems from the groups with a less traditionalist outlook. One of the respondents added, as Nicolas Sarkozy argued, that one cannot separate morals and politics, but that does not necessarily mean that the two must work directly together. Another respondent echoed some of this, stating that religion is complementary to politics, but he thought that it does not guide politics itself. This respondent argued that there are elements of Christian Democracy within Gaullist thought, but that this is also informed by logic, in addition to religious beliefs. He believes that it is necessary to preserve the *laïque* nature of the Republic. A further respondent added that religion and the State must work together, but he did not completely agree with the second half– “It is impossible to disassociate politics and morals.”

These questions reveal the difference between the conservative strands of the party, especially the RPF in this sample. This is more apparent in questions about homosexual adoption and the role of women in society. It also reveals the strength of the more Christian Democratic strands of the former UDF members within the UMP in Yvelines, especially with the question on the role of religion in politics. These key differences show another area where that the parties have not merged

into one single ideology, but the UMP is more of a co-operation of these groups

Views of the economy and the State

The next group of statements pertains to the view of the economy and the State. The questionnaire addressed the role of the President and the role that he should have in the running of the country as well as the role of the State in the economy. These issues were explored to see if those who call themselves Gaullists still hold traditional Gaullist ideas and to see if there is a difference between those who were in the RPF and the rest of the party, in the light of RPF claims to uphold the traditional Gaullist ideals in the face of the changing Gaullist movement. This allows us to understand if there are differing opinions between the Gaullists and the non-Gaullists, as well as test for differences between those who came from the RPR and RPF, with both claiming to come from the Gaullist tradition. Therefore, one would expect if there has not been an convergence to have a more liberal attitude in the UDF and an attitude leaning toward interference from the Gaullists.

The first statement in this group was “The 35 -hour workweek must be withdrawn.”³⁷ The UMP government under Chirac had already made some modifications to this unpopular policy. About 56% of the respondents in Hauts-de-Seine agreed with this assertion, and about 88% of those who responded stated that they agreed or mostly agreed. Only 6% stated that they disagreed with getting rid of the 35-hour workweek. Those who placed themselves a 5 or lower on the political spectrum were more likely to agree than those who placed themselves at 6 on the political spectrum. So those who placed themselves at 5 might see themselves as more economically liberal and, therefore, be more favourable towards a more ‘flexible’ economy. Those who are retired and are students are more likely to agree with the ending of a 35-hour workweek than those who are currently active in the work

³⁷Il faut supprimer la semaine de 35 heures.

force, so those who are not directly influenced by the policy see it more negatively than those who are.

The majority of the respondents in Yvelines agreed with ending the 35-hour workweek; only about a quarter disagreed or mostly disagreed. Those who placed themselves at 5 or 6 on the political spectrum were more likely to agree with the ending of the 35-hour workweek. Those who labelled themselves as Gaullists were more likely to agree or mostly agree. This difference between the *fédérations* may be due to the fact that in Yvelines the Right is less protectionist than the Right in Hauts-de-Seine because of the lack of groups like the RPF, meaning they are not as concerned about the effects from outside on the economy.

The next statement in this group was “The workers must play an important role in the life in the companies at which they work.”³⁸ This question was asked to determine the outlook on the Gaullist idea of *participation*; since this is a vague term, the aim was to ask a more specific question, in order to make sure that it was understood what was being asked. More than a quarter agreed with this assertion in Hauts-de-Seine, and 97% stated that they mostly agree or agree. No respondents chose the option of disagree with this statement. Those who had not been a member of a political party in the past were more likely to say that they agree than those who had been in a political party before joining the UMP. Those who did not label themselves as Gaullist were more likely to approve of this assertion. There seems to be no connection between where they place themselves on the political spectrum.

None of the respondents in Yvelines disagreed or mostly disagreed with the workers playing an important role in the companies in which they work. More than half responded that they mostly agree and the remaining respondents stated that they agree. One of the respondents explained that *participation* is an important

³⁸Les salariés doivent jouer un rôle important dans la vie des entreprises où ils travaillent.

part of the social Gaullist beliefs, and it is a key part of balancing the mixed economy in such a way that it works best for all of those involved and makes sure that businesses are not able to take advantage of their employees. He feels that it also ensures that the workers have a stake in the business, rather than it being just a job but something they are really part of; hence the business benefit for having more happy and engaged workers. In Hauts-de-Seine, in fact, those who were more likely to agree with this statement were those who did not label themselves as Gaullists. This effect was not present in Yvelines, possibly because of the strong presence of the Social and Left Gaullists in Yvelines, versus the more Right-wing ones in Hauts-de-Seine. However, it should be noted that there was no correlation between the positioning on the political spectrum and the responses to this question. The general positive view of this assertion may be down to the fact it is hard to disagree with it.

The last statement of this group was “It is the president that must direct the country; parliament should not be allowed to become too powerful.”³⁹ This statement received more responses for the ‘mostly’ options in Hauts-de-Seine. About 39% stated they mostly agreed, and about 34% said they mostly disagree.⁴⁰ Nineteen percent stated they agree with this assertion. Former members of the RPF were more likely to support this statement. This question was asked because of the traditional view in Gaullism that it is the president who has the most important position and the Constitution of the Fifth Republic written for de Gaulle created a more powerful presidency. Therefore, it is logical that those who were part of a party that identifies itself as traditional Gaullist were more likely to agree with this assertion. The respondents who ranked the RPF highly and those who gave the FN a 2 or higher were more likely to approve of this statement. Those who

³⁹C’est le président qui doit diriger le pays ; il ne faut pas que le parlement devienne trop puissant.

⁴⁰One respondent did not answer.

placed themselves at 4 on the political spectrum were more likely to oppose this statement. So self-placed centrists prefer a moderate view of how the government ought to be run.

More than one third in Yvelines mostly agreed with this idea of presidential power over parliamentary power, and the rest of the respondents mostly disagreed or disagreed with this statement. Those who placed themselves at 6 on the political spectrum were more likely to have mostly agreed. Those who had been members of the UDF and those who had not been part of a party previously all opposed this assertion. Those who rated the UDF more highly as well as those who gave the PS a higher rank than the others were more likely to disagree or mostly disagree. This is probably due to the UDF's hostility to the presidentialist system; it has called in the past for a new constitution to rebalance the institutions. The PS has also made similar suggestions, but has not been as negative towards it in more recent years. One of the respondents argued that it is the president who directs the country, but parliament has an important role and has to have a certain amount of power in this system. This should be in the framework of the current constitution, and there is no need for a new French constitution for which some groups have argued. This question was asked because of the historical Gaullist ideal of strong presidential power over the weak deliberative powers of a parliamentarian system. Those who view themselves as traditional Gaullist or on the Right tend to place more value on a strong, stable government.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the questionnaire results in Hauts-de-Seine broadly matched what might be expected from a mainly Gaullist *fédération*. The majority of views would fit into those that are usually attributed to the Gaullists such as a mixed view of the EU, *dirigisme* and conservatism. There were some notable differences between

those who had only been in the RPR and those who had been in the RPF as well, with those coming from the RPF holding more traditionalist Gaullist views. The mixed and fairly negative view of Europe in this *fédération* was not surprising as Gaullists have had a more negative view of European integration than most other movements of the Right in the rest of Europe. This is in part due to the emphasis on independence in Gaullist discourse. This can offer an explanation for the mixed view on globalisation as well, feeling that it threatens French independence. These areas showed a continuation of the factions that pre-date the UMP.

Another key difference between the RPF and RPR seemed to come from the questions regarding moral issues, showing the RPF to be more conservative in its moral views, which can be attributed to the traditionalist nature of the RPF. It is interesting to see this reflected in the party: whilst Gaullism is certainly conservative in its origins, it is not strictly a Christian Democratic current like elements of the UDF were. So even in the more secular tradition of the French Right and Centre-Right, one can see the importance of moral influences, in spite of the strong reactions against the idea of religion and politics working together. The new members often fall between the older groups on these issues. These new members identified themselves more with the Centre and were slightly more liberal than those who had been in a party before the UMP's creation.

The results of the questionnaire reflected the different political origins of the *fédération* of Yvelines, a mix of the traditions from the UDF and the RPR, especially coming from the social Gaullist strand of the RPR. This *fédération* is not dominated by Gaullism in the same way that Hauts-de-Seine is. The members who participated in this questionnaire were more pro-European than those in Hauts-de-Seine, owing to the more pro-European ex-UDF members and the opening of the Gaullists towards the EU as an extension of French influence in the world. The respondents in Yvelines were more open to the forces of globalisation than

the respondents in Hauts-de-Seine as well; this could also be in part due to the liberal influences of the UDF.

Support for the mix of Church and State was higher in Yvelines than in Hauts-de-Seine. This probably was in part because of the influences of the UDF; however, not all of the support came from the ex-members of the UDF but also from the new members and ex-RPR members. This perhaps shows the influences for the UDF spilling into those from the RPR here, given the necessary co-operation between the parties of the Centre-Right in the past and working together in the UMP. On economic issues and the running of the State, the members were very much more supportive of the question on *participation*. This was to be expected because of the strength of social Gaullism in this *fédération*, and it was interesting that many of the UDF also agreed with this statement, maybe showing a more social side of the UDF in Yvelines. The respondents in Yvelines were also less supportive of the idea that it is the president who should lead the country first. This is in part because of the strength of the UDF, against the strong presidentialism of traditional Gaullists. The absence of the RPF in this *fédération* also probably contributed to this result.

However, there are some overarching beliefs between the *fédérations*. Both parties were in favour of France putting her interests first, though in Yvelines it was not as strong, with more of the ‘mostly agree,’ rather than agree. The opposition to homosexual adoption was also strong in both, a typical conservative view, though probably more so in Yvelines owing to the UDF Christian Democratic influences there. Both *fédérations* opposed the idea that a woman’s place is first the home; this is probably because this is viewed as a rather out-dated idea by many, and the only party that would actively argue this is the FN. There was general support for the abolition of the 35-hour workweek, reflecting a key part of party policy that could be easily supported by both liberals and conservatives,

therefore the bulk of the UMP.

Many of these similar views were ones that we could witness already between the factions before they came to join as one party; therefore, this does not indicate a developing UMP ideology, but rather a continuation of the political attitudes held before the creation. This means, whilst they work together as a party, there are still major differences in terms of how they see themselves and in terms of political attitudes. The fact that the new members seem to be more varied could help in the long run to bridge the different sub-groups, but it is also possible that they could simply go to the side that they agree with most instead. At this point of the questionnaire, one can see the differences between the factions of the UMP in these *fédérations*, which eludes to an ideological difference between the factions.

Chapter 6

Case Study: Change and continuity in the UMP

This final chapter of the fieldwork examines the open question of the questionnaire as a way of addressing the implications of the fieldwork as a whole, through the lens of change and continuity in the UMP from its creation to the time of the fieldwork. This open question addressed the way that the members perceived the move to the UMP from their previous parties and the development of the party up to the point of this questionnaire. It is interesting to examine this, as it gives us a chance to look at how the members view the development of the party and how this accords with the responses they gave to the other questions. The questionnaire as a whole addresses what the party is as an organisation, how it has changed from its predecessor parties, and in what ways the UMP resembles its predecessors, both in political make-up and structure. Thus, it is essential to try and understand this to see if the UMP is a real, cohesive party, rather than a confederation of parties and factions, and if it is a different sort of political organisation than the main party from which it came, the RPR, or if it has adapted to be a party that has elements from the many groups which have come together for the UMP.

How the UMP has changed

The final substantive question which was asked is how the UMP has changed since 2002 and whether these changes were positive or not.¹ This question was an open and intentionally very broad one to allow the respondents to write whatever they liked on the development of the party since its creation in order to examine what they think is the most important part of this party's founding and what effects they feel from its development. Because it was an open question, one should not expect to have the same level of response to this question as the closed questions of the rest of the questionnaire, as it required more time and thought to complete. This question was mainly looking for responses in relation to the organisation of the UMP, specifically looking into the reforms which the UMP has undergone since its creation. However, this question is open to other sorts of answers as well, such as about electoral successes of the party, which are also important given that the party was created to promote further electoral success of the Centre-Right. This has implications for how the party works because of the focus of the organisation and what sort of party the UMP is; that is, is it a presidential party, a party with strong localism, an electoral confederation, or a catch-all party?

Presidentialism in the UMP

The most common response to this question in Hauts-de-Seine was that the change was positive because of Nicolas Sarkozy, in his role as the leader of the party and/or in his successful bid for the presidency. Some of the respondents said that he brought dynamism to the party and to France that had been lacking. They argued that the party under his leadership is pushing the country to move towards new ideas, rather than the ideas of previous generations of political elites, and this

¹Comment est-ce que l'UMP changé depuis 2002 ? Est-ce que ses changes (sic) sont positifs ou négatifs ? Pourquoi ?

has allowed a new generation of politicians to develop and come to the forefront, particularly those who have not been career politicians. Also cited was the electoral success of the party as a whole and the new unity for the presidential elections in face of the divided past of the Centre-Right in the Fifth Republic. Others said that he was responsible for positive party reforms like the primaries in 2007, which allowed the members to have more of a voice in the party; these were cited both in the interviews and the questionnaires.

The respondents viewed the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as bringing more positive changes to the party in Hauts-de-Seine: more people joined the party to take part in his presidential campaign, and rallied to the UMP after his success. There has been more internal democracy in the party through internal debates and conventions which were brought in with his leadership of the party. However, some thought that there is a gap between the elected officials and the party militants which ought to be addressed, but even they thought that most of the changes of the party were generally positive. Some disagreed that there have been any changes at all in the party; it was mainly just a change of leadership and name, rather than a fundamental change in the party for good or bad. The number of responses arguing the party has changed for the good outweighed those arguing that the change is neutral, that there has been no change, or that there have been negative changes as well as positive ones. Many of the responses in Hauts-de-Seine hinted that at least some of the members of the party see the UMP as a presidential party, which would fit with the original name of the party, *Union pour la majorité présidentielle*. They related positive actions of the party to Sarkozy's leadership and successes: for instance, attracting more members and bringing in more politicians who were not exclusively career politicians. So these views of Sarkozy were tied to his role not only as a leader of a party but also as the main figure in a presidential party. This follows from the hypothesis that the French

parties are dominated by the presidential candidates.²

Some of the respondents in Yvelines felt that changes in the party have been positive thanks to the leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy, as in Hauts-de-Seine. The respondents who cited Sarkozy as a positive change for the party said that it was his willingness to take on more risks, instead of taking the ‘typical answers’ to the problems that have been used for so long, that has helped the party move forward, as well as helped the country. Again, this recalls the role of a president/presidential candidate in a presidentialised party like the UMP. This also comes from a greater sense of presidentialism in the UMP which is not unique to this party, but it is a greater trend within French parties. The presidentialism has its origins in variety of pressures, both internal, such as the general belief in the party of the importance of the presidency for general success, and external pressures, such as the media’s tendency to focus on personality and key figures of the parties (the personalisation of politics), rather than the party as whole or an ideology. The French system has always been focused on the office of the presidency because of its relatively important role in comparison to other European countries. However, in the absence of charismatic figures like de Gaulle, the parties and their ideals played a bigger role. This increased focus on the president has to do with the attitudes of the parties as well as the role of the media, which find it easier to focus on a person, rather than on the broader party.³

Localism of the party

It must be remembered that Sarkozy is not only a figure of the national level, but also an important local figure who dominated Hauts-de-Seine for an number of

²Ben Clift, “Dyarchic Presidentialization in a Presidentialized Polity: The French Fifth Republic” in Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (eds.), *The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford,; 2005).

³David Hanley, “Party, Personality and Institutional Constraint: The French Presidential Election of 2007,” *Modern & Contemporary France*, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 423-439.

years. This would help to explain why in Hauts-de-Seine there was more reporting of the importance of Sarkozy, as he is much more than just a national figure there. It was argued by a number of respondents, as well as seen with the desire of national-level politicians to remain with a strong local base in *cumul des mandats*, that local politics are different from and important to the politics of the nation. Local politics tend to focus on local issues and personalities, and co-operation on this level is dependent more on personalities and the local issues, rather than on the party politics which often dominates national politics. In Yvelines there was also praise of the relative freedoms of local politics and this was focused on the uniqueness of local politics in comparison to the rest of centralised French political culture.

The bulk of the answers in both *fédérations* related to the organisational changes and changes in the party which have been made by the leadership. In Hauts-de-Seine, the most common responses referred to Nicolas Sarkozy, either about what they view as positive changes to the organisation or his election as the president. This is probably in part due to Hauts-de-Seine being very much Nicolas Sarkozy's political territory, and his political origins being in this *fédération*. Some also argued that he brought new ideas to the party and into French politics, and argued forcefully that there has been an ideological change since the creation of the party.

An examination of the tenth *circonscription* in Yvelines

One of the key things that came out of the fieldwork was the importance of the role of local level politicians in local politics. This was echoed in both of the *fédérations* throughout the organisational section of the questionnaire – in particular, the role of those who came from the various predecessor parties play in the UMP. This is important because of the need for a degree of continuity in the political party to

make it more stable than a typical new political party, both in terms of knowing what unwritten rules to follow and in terms of having a leadership that is able to use the past experience to direct the party.

This next section of this chapter focuses on the documents which were provided by the tenth *circonscription* pertaining to the history of the organisation of the party in this *circonscription* for the last twenty years and its long-term leader, Gérard Larcher, following from the transition from the RPR to the UMP. This shows some of the dealings with the local leadership and continuity in the party on a more concrete level to better understand the implications of the more abstract questionnaire results. With this we also examine another angle of the party from its base, slightly different from the party through the eyes of the members, in particular what the role is that local leaders/personalities play in local politics. This allows us to reflect on the continuity of the party, as well as the changes in the party since its foundation in 2002 which have been discussed so far. This is especially important with the consideration that the members of the party believe that the local party is exceptional in breaking the rule of the top-down French political system, in that local personalities and politics play more of a role than the national politics.

The tenth *circonscription* of Yvelines, formerly the eighth *circonscription* before the reforms of the electoral districts of 1987, has been led by Gérard Larcher since 1986, from the RPR to the UMP.⁴ He has held this office since and through the transition from the RPR to the UMP. The structure of the committee of the *circonscription* was the secretary of the *circonscription* and the cantonal delegates, from which the debates and proposals would be taken to the *département*. The information from the meetings of the committee of the *circonscription* was passed to party members through local meetings. These meetings varied in frequency,

⁴“Fonctionnement des structures de la *circonscription* du RPR et ses orientations de 1983 à 2002,” in a letter 5/9/2007 addressed to P. Schmidt.

which meant that the number and the importance of the meetings would change if the elections and the referendums were taking place, as one would typically expect in the affairs of a political party. Many local events were often organised by the committee of the *circonscription*. An example of such events is rural festivals⁵ which were based on themes like the end of Communism in Eastern Europe and its relation to France, agriculture, and Europe. These sorts of events were organised by the committee of the *circonscription* until the change in the finance of political life in 1995.

After the organisational reforms of 1995, there were some changes in party organisation and finance and the *circonscription* was organised differently.⁶ The debate became more active in the committee of the *circonscription*, where it was once a group mainly based on reflection and to spread information. There was also the creation of working groups, and the more regular life of the local headquarters of the party. A newsletter was also created to help inform the party members of the activities of the party. The themes of these newsletters starting in 1997 covered a variety of issues and continued through the creation of the UMP.⁷ The presentation of this newsletter usually took the form of a short news article written by Gérard Larcher, as well as miscellaneous information about the *circonscription*. The articles of Larcher often concerned elections, both the internal party elections and elections of political positions, as well as a variety of political issues relevant at the time. For example, in the newsletter of April 1999,⁸ Larcher addressed the importance of a strong Europe, but a Europe of the Nation-States, rather than a “United States of Europe,” reflecting a strongly Gaullist theme. In November 2001, Larcher raised the issues of the approach by the Socialists towards Corsica

⁵Fête champêtre.

⁶“Fonctionnement des structures de la *circonscription*.”

⁷Gérard Larcher 1997-2003, “10ème infos”, Permanence de dixième *circonscription* (ed.), Numbers 1, 5, 10, 13, 17, 18, 22, 24, 27, 29 and 34, Rambouillet.

⁸“10ème infos”.

and his concerns of their policies leaving the traditional republican model. Another example of issues that were addressed is the social heritage of the Gaullists and the difference between this and the more authoritarian social policies of other groups, such as the policies of the Socialists, discussed in the October/November 2002 edition. Some of the other items in the newsletters included information about candidates, the party membership numbers, elections, meetings, and interviews and editorials on certain policy areas in the *circonscription*. Some of the issues contained interviews and editorials which covered social security, rural identity, and the invasion of Afghanistan.

The political current of the *circonscription* in 1997 was mostly *Séguiniste*, and in the first election of the president of the RPR, the vote for the president of the party was split between Michèle Alliot-Marie and François Fillon.⁹ The *circonscription* was massively supportive of Jacques Chirac in the election of 2002, both in the party itself and the population in general. After the first round of the 2002 presidential elections, the committee of the *circonscription* organised itself into a committee of support for the presidential candidate. Without “excessive soul-searching”¹⁰, the creation of the UMP followed in order to help rally the Right and the Centre to President Chirac. This resulted in the further revitalisation of the party, and the creation of clubs was able to protect the identities of the various currents such as *Yveline Dialogue et Démocratie* of the social Gaullist current, which is also led by Gérard Larcher.¹¹

After the 2007 National Assembly elections, the UMP and the associated groups controlled all 12 seats in the National Assembly which are allocated to Yvelines.¹²

⁹“Fonctionnement des structures de la *circonscription*” and “10ème infos”.

¹⁰États d’âme excessifs.

¹¹“Fonctionnement des structures de la *circonscription*,” p. 2.

¹²Tiphany Payre and Jean Frissard, “Petites notes complémentaires: Grâce au témoignage de Monsieur Jean Frissard”.

This is in comparison to 1982 when only half of the 8 seats of allocated to Yvelines¹³ went to the RPR, so the strength of the UMP has grown over the years in this *département*. The tenth *circonscription* in particular gives strong support for the Right, perhaps due to its more rural nature, with the candidate for the UMP in this district, Christine Boutin nearly, winning her seat on the first round in 2007, despite the large support for the MoDem candidate in this *département* which had a strong historical support for the UDF before its collapse.

The main difference between the RPR and the UMP is there now is a lot more liberty' at the local level than during the RPR to run the party in the way that the members see fit, which the members indicated that they desire. In some areas it has continued to be run with a very similar organisation to that of the old RPR, whilst other *circonscriptions* have adopted other organisational methods, often following the pattern of membership in of membership in the area. This means that the UMP has a more flexible local structure than did the RPR, which can be an advantage in that local politics is usually viewed as being focused on local personalities rather than national issues. And as the UMP is more politically diverse than the RPR was, this allows the party to adapt to the dominant political currents and traditions of the area.

One of the key roles in the UMP, not only in the tenth *circonscription*, is filled by Gérard Larcher. He is the president of the *fédération* and has many other positions in and outside the party. For example, he was the president of the Association of Mayors of Yvelines. As the mayor of Rambouillet, he held this position from 1995 to 2004, when he became a minister of the government.¹⁴ Moreover, he has been very successful in his *circonscription*, with more than 71% of the vote in the mayoral election of 2001.¹⁵ Larcher had built the organisation

¹³Yvelines had 8 seats before the reform of seats in the National Assembly in 1987 when it was re-allocated 12 seats.

¹⁴Jacques Trentesaux, "Le système Larcher", in L'Express, 1 February 2007, p. II-VIII.

¹⁵"Le système Larcher", p II.

of the tenth *circonscription* up to 1,100 members of the party 48 members when he first arrived. He continued to have a role in many of the towns and cities of the *circonscription*, offering advice from his experience and information from previous leaders. He had encouraged the development of social housing and promoted the arts in his town. In Rambouillet, all but 4 of the 31 councillors belong to the UMP or its associated parties and groups in the local council. Therefore, his success has not been limited only to his own personal electoral success and strengthening party membership numbers, but this also has been extended to the whole party in his main political domain.

His local success is an example of the importance of strong local personalities energising the party. Without this sort of presence, it is easier for the membership numbers and activity to remain low. It also shows the importance of these local personalities for the party's electoral success, which was also reflected in the questionnaire responses. In some ways, one would expect that the tenth *circonscription* would be strongly Centre-Right as it is more rural and in most countries, the rural areas tend to be more conservative. However, this is not an unbreakable rule in French politics as it is many countries, especially bearing in mind the 'Red' farmers in the South of the country. Therefore, it is not possible to rely on this alone, and other factors, such as the traditions of the area and the local politics, must also come into play.

The tenth *circonscription* has been able to develop through the RPR to the UMP through the consistent leadership of Gérard Larcher, as well as his willingness to promote unity. This unity seems to extend to the *département*, as a whole, which he also heads, with a variety of political currents represented both in the elite level and in the sample for the questionnaire. For example, of the 12 members of the National Assembly in Yvelines at the time of the questionnaire, all are from the UMP or those associated with its parliamentary group; three were previously part

of the UDF or its associated groups, and one had been a member of the DL.¹⁶ This is a more diverse party than one can find in the UMP in many other *départements*, rather than one that is almost solely made of ex-RPR (some from the RPF, after leaving the RPR) like in Hauts-de-Seine. In addition, these leaders have strong local roots as well, helping the party to flourish in its diversity with its flexible local structures.

Electoral confederation or a catch-all party?

Some of the respondents indicated that they believe the UMP was different from the old parties ideologically. The ideological change which some of the members argued came from Sarkozy would indicate a sort of developing Sarkozyism within the UMP which would gain importance over the old ideologies and factions of the party. This new ideology would have to take many ideals and opinions from the previous groups, but these members also argued that there were new ideas behind this (without listing what those might or might not be). However, the rest of the results of the questionnaires and many of the other responses to this open question indicated otherwise.

The organisational issues which were raised more often in Hauts-de-Seine concerned attracting new types of members to the party, bringing a new energy to the movement, and increasing internal democracy. In contrast, the respondents in Yvelines focused more on the change of the Centre-Right ending electoral conflict amongst the Centre and Right, meaning that they are improving their electoral chances and are able to work together more closely, allowing them to reduce internal conflict and obtain better electoral results. This more instrumental view is probably due the diversity of the party in this *fédération*. We must remember that this internal diversity of the party is not necessarily bad and factions are often

¹⁶Assemblée nationale, <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr>, Date accessed: 5 March 2008.

good for internal democracy.¹⁷ The members in Yvelines also cited the increased party membership that has come with the creation of the UMP.

In Yvelines, the increased democracy and openness was cited as an improvement, but it was not mentioned as being a direct consequence of the leadership of Sarkozy, as it was in Hauts-de-Seine. Even though some respondents in Yvelines did focus on the positive effect of his leadership and the new ideas which he has brought to the party, it was not as big a theme in Yvelines, but this reflects Sarkozy's local power base in Hauts-de-Seine. Internal diversity was a more important issue in Yvelines and members were more focused on ending the conflict between these many factions on the Centre-Right in France. This stance reflected the fact that the UMP in Yvelines is more diverse in its political origins than the party in Hauts-de-Seine. So these different types of membership between the *fédérations* are even apparent in the different responses to this open question. This shows that whilst there is some unity, the differences between the various factions still exist despite the feelings of some of the members to the contrary. This can be explained, as in the more homogeneous Hauts-de-Seine, which was strongly influenced by Sarkozy as both a local and a national figure, does not experience these differences as much and therefore does not recognise them. This shows itself most in the more diverse *fédération*.

Some of the responses in Yvelines followed a similar pattern to those in Hauts-de-Seine, but there were some key differences in the types of responses in Yvelines. One respondent felt that the changes with the creation of the UMP have been positive, because of how the many different political currents of the democratic Right and parties were able 'to come together to form a coherent and harmonious party.' Several respondents echoed this by stating that the new unity of the different parties helped the Right in general by giving it a more of an electoral

¹⁷Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and party systems: A Framework for analysis*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976)

chance, eluding to the external pressures on the party, rather than the parties competing against each other as they had in the past. This is key to understanding how the UMP has accepted the more diverse political background in Yvelines; it provides the attraction of working together as a party, rather than rival parties fighting against each other.

Another respondent felt that the positive change that the UMP has brought was a massive growth in membership in the party since its creation from 50,000 to 350,000 members, making it a real mass movement of the Centre-Right, rather than just an elite-run party. This gives the party an additional political legitimisation, as all but the most undemocratic parties and political movements want to be seen as a mass party. This additional membership gives the UMP an element of the mass party of Duverger¹⁸ or, perhaps more accurately in the case of the UMP, a catch-all party of the Centre-Right as described by Kirchheimer.¹⁹ The membership in the RPR had been much more limited, and the UMP was able to bring more people into the party in a more active and innovative way. One of the respondents felt that the most positive change was that the UMP has become a more open party with greater clarity, a more modern party better suited for the current system. Another respondent agreed with this sentiment and thought that the party has become more democratic, allowing the selection of the party's candidate for the presidency, rather than leaving this sort of decision to the elites of the party alone, which makes the party appeal to more new members. UMP members feel more engaged with party activities, as they feel more part of the organisation. This was also echoed in Hauts-de-Seine, reflecting a generally positive response to the democratisation of internal party politics.

Sarkozy has also been able to energise the base of the party unlike some of

¹⁸Maurice Duverger, Barbara and Robert North (trans.), *Political Parties*, (London: Lowe & Brydone Ltd, 1964).

¹⁹Otto Kirchheimer, "The Catch-All Parties," in Peter Mair (ed.), *The West European Party System*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 50-60.

the party leaders in the past. One of the respondents agreed with the positive changes in growth of membership, the growth of openness in the party, and the importance of the electoral success of the party; however, this person thought the UMP still needs to do more to win back the big cities. The Gaullists in the past were able to have successes in many of the big cities, and the UMP must try to make more in-roads in the big cities for more long-term electoral success and not just allow them to be the domain of the Left. This member also argued that the UMP has more of an appeal to the Centre than the RPR did, in part because of the incorporation of those from the UDF, so this should help to bring in those voters who may be unhappy with the Socialists and do not wish to turn to the Far Left.

This reveals that the UMP had changed in these *fédérations* in important ways from its origins in the RPR, RPF and UDF to adapt to its increased plurality. In the beginning of the UMP, it was foreseen that there could be problems in this area if nothing was done. Therefore, new bodies within the party, such as the *personnes morales associées* and *mouvements*, were adopted in order to ensure the groups within the party would not feel that they were voiceless, nor would they be made so powerful that they could undermine the party's stability, perhaps a lesson learnt from the UDF's internal problems with its powerful factions. This development was intended to strike a balance between a loose confederation of the UDF variety and the typical top-down, highly centralised parties of the historical Gaullist movement. Whilst this did a lot to ensure the party's stability, further democratic reforms were undertaken after the UMP's formation to give more legitimacy to the party in light of this plurality, such as having the party members select the presidential candidates, meaning the members have a greater say in the party's affairs. These reforms both ensure the party's electoral unity with an official candidate and give more legitimacy to the candidate within the party, very

important in such a presidentialised system as the French one. This was reflected in the questionnaire in relation to the views towards internal party democracy and the recognition for factions within the party.

There has not been much change in the political beliefs of the members in joining in the UMP, at least not more than these ideas were already changing in the Centre-Right in France. The weakening of the Gaullist movement and the collapse of the UDF, as it was, had lessened the divisions in the Centre-Right for many years. as discussed by Knapp;²⁰ we also observed a convergence in key issues and belief areas preceding the creation of the UMP. However, one can still see some differences between the *fédérations* and the different political groups within the *fédérations*, especially when dealing with those who came from the RPF and the UDF, in comparison to the largest group, which came from the RPR alone, in relation to some issues, such as the views towards the moral issues and the European Union examined in the political attitude statements. Additionally, over the years the parties had moved closer together in terms of ideology and, in some areas, organisational structure, with the loosening of the structures in the RPR to make greater accommodation for political diversity. The fact is that those coming from the RPR in Yvelines were closer to the UDF in their *département* than their counterparts in Hauts-de-Seine. This was probably more to do with their shared local history and the political climate of the Yvelines *département* in comparison to Hauts-de-Seine, rather than due to them coming toward each other, ideologically speaking, as a single party, as a result of the creation of the UMP. Nevertheless, it does show an interesting dynamic of the Centre-Right in Yvelines that is different than in Hauts-de-Seine, as the need to compromise with groups became more necessary for electoral success.

²⁰Andrew Knapp, "From the Gaullist movement to the president's party," in Jocelyn A. J. Evans, (ed.) *The French party system*, (Manchester University Press: Manchester; 2003), pp. 121-125.

The organisation of the parties has maintained some degree of continuity in certain areas. This can be observed both in terms of the attitudes of the groups that made up the organisation and the beliefs about how the organisation ought to operate. We observed some differences between the *fédérations*, those who have been politically active in the predecessor parties are continuing to play a role in the UMP party structure, which helps the party to run more smoothly than one would find in an entirely new political party. One can see the difference in attitudes towards the party structures and organisation in the more politically homogeneous Hauts-de-Seine and the more politically diverse Yvelines, such as Yvelines wanting more accommodation for difference than Hauts-de-Seine. The UMP has continued to view the local party as important, as least as much as the UDF and the late RPR did. Certainly, this was not the case in the beginning of the Gaullist movement, which was very top-down in its structure, and it struggled on the local levels early on because of this, unlike the UDF and its predecessor parties. However, the Gaullists had moved towards facing this reality of the French political system, and the RPR had already adapted to this organisational pressure of the French political system.

Conclusion

The UMP as a party has changed in many ways to adapt to the new groups within the party, but this does not mean that the UMP has changed in such a way that it is dramatically different from the parties from which it came. It is natural to expect that the traditions of these parties would not be completely pushed to the side, especially after such a short period of unity, which is the case. This is both because it ensures greater stability and because the parties which came together to form the UMP were successful parties in the past and following what made these parties successful can help the UMP carry on and build on their successes.

Continuity within the party comes from the official written rules, which are highly centralised on the national level but allow local flexibility. Continuity also comes from a stability of personnel, with those who had been active in a political party before continuing to play an important role within the UMP, thereby also helping to establish the unwritten rules of the party. In a politically diverse party like the UMP, it is important to have an element of stability, as long as the groups are fairly represented in the party. This is helped by the maturity of the party organisation, as was examined in the example of the tenth *circonscription* in Yvelines. There is also continuity in that the difference in political attitudes is still visible between the different political groups within the party. These differences certainly are not as strong as they were in the past, but it is unlikely that they will disappear in the near future.

The most obvious changes from the RPR were the change in leadership and the development of the official recognised bodies within the party to recognise factions and more clearly define their position in the party, even to the extent of political parties within the greater structure of the UMP. The UMP has also been more active with recruitment than were the parties before it in recent years, in addition to trying to engage the membership more through things like the Internet and the implementation of primaries in 2007 in the attempt to make the UMP more of a catch-all party, in the face of the decline of party membership numbers in France as well as in much of Europe. The UMP has also increased the presidential imperative of the party; it was founded to support Chirac as president with *Union pour la majorité présidentielle*, and this has gone further with the attempt of the primaries to make sure that there is only one legitimate candidate from the party to prevent a repeat of a divided Centre-Right in the presidential elections like that of the 1995 elections which so damaged the relationship between the groups on the Centre and Right in France.

This examination of the change in the party since its creation gives us some insights into what the UMP is as a party, in terms of its organisation, the sub-groups within it, and how it interacts with the institutions of the French system, and in what sense the UMP can be seen as a ‘real party,’ rather than just an electoral coalition. We examined in the fieldwork two contrasting *fédérations*, one more politically diverse, Yvelines, and one that is more politically homogenous, Hauts-de-Seine, to examine the party ‘on the ground,’ rather than through the more abstract structures alone. Through this, we see that the factions, which are apparent in the political and organisational attitudes of the members, have not disappeared but have been integrated into the structure. The conclusion examines what the party is, by revisiting the themes examined in the literature review.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis has examined the UMP through the view of the theory of political parties and the institutional context that encompasses them. It has also examined the historical context of the French Centre-Right, the formation of the UMP and the various factions and tendencies within the party. Finally, it has examined two cases of the party on the ground to come to an understanding how the institutional context, factionalism of the party, and party development have affected the UMP. With this we sought to answer the following questions:

1. What was the role of the party system and of the broader institutional context in explaining the formation and nature of the UMP? What effects did they have on the nature of the new party?
2. What is the role of factions and intra-party politics in UMP?
3. What was the nature of the ‘fusion’ process that created the UMP and how does this shape the organisation of the party?

Approaches to the UMP

The French political system is different to that of many West European countries, both because of its history and because of its semi-presidential constitution and

culture. The parties in this system must manage to attract enough voters in the first round to proceed to the second without placing themselves in a position that alienates most of the voters for the second round. The double ballot electoral mechanism centralises and nationalises the political system around the institution of the presidency, in which only one party may triumph, making it important to ensure that someone who is ideologically similar reaches the second round of the presidential elections. The UMP came together in part to address this centralisation effect, especially in regards to the electoral pressures that the Centre-Right had been facing in recent years. This is not to say that these pressures have disappeared with the creation of the UMP. We can also see from the elections of 2012 that the creation of the UMP has not guaranteed the Centre-Right winning the presidential elections or majorities in parliament. There are still strong pressures both internally with the wide variety of groups within the party and those from outside the party that play a role in its interactions.

Additionally, there is the importance of local politics for those in the UMP. Whilst the other levels of politics, such as the regional and departmental politics, are seen to follow the lead of national trends, local politics is more dependent on local personalities and issues, which means a balance must be struck within the organisation between national and local politics. We must also address the organisation of the party because the UMP has to cope with the transition from the various parties and factions that preceded it to put forward a single, nationally coherent politics. There has been some convergence on the Centre-Right, which has been developing for some time as argued by Knapp, but many unique institutional cultures and ideologies remain. From this, we have three approaches to the UMP:

1. the role of institutions and the UMP,
2. the role of national and local politics and influences,

3. and the development of the organisation of the party

These factors are considered in turn in the next three sections, following which we look at the role of the national French political institutions, specifically the role of the presidency; the strength of the local politics in spite of the centralising tendencies of the French system; and what mechanisms the party has developed to deal with the party's internal diversity.

Institutions and the UMP

We have examined the UMP as a party on the ground to see to what extent the party is, or is not, different from the parties that came to form it. Is the UMP a loose confederation of parties and factions, or has it created an internally cohesive, unified party? Has the party merged its predecessors, politically, or are there still noticeable differences between the factions so that the party is really a concealed coalition which exists only to cope with the institutional pressures of the French political system? Within the French system, there have been increasing pressures on the political parties to focus on obtaining the presidency, and as Pütz discusses, this has been key to the development of the parties in the Fifth Republic, with the increasing centralisation of the political parties. The role of the media in politics has had some effects on this, as it is easier for the media to grasp onto the image of a specific leader than to grasp the more vague idea of what a party or an ideology is, especially in the context of the internally politically diverse larger political parties in France like the UMP and PS.

The parties have also followed this imperative, seeking this office as their main goal, as they believe the other elected offices should follow from presidential success. Having a charismatic leader such as Nicolas Sarkozy who could capture the media's attention helped with this in the case of the UMP. However, we also saw that this can boomerang, when the leader become viewed negatively. In some

ways, because of this increasing presidentialisation within the French system, the UMP can be seen in part as a presidential party, and, therefore, a party for Sarkozy. Not all of the party is totally, unconditionally supportive of him, in contrast to the early Gaullist parties of General de Gaulle, and the 2012 defeat will mean some challenges to his role as the presumed presidential candidate for the party. Indeed, there were many groups in the party that were not in agreement with Sarkozy before the 2012 election and seek now to replace him, but the presidency is very much a primary focus of the party.

The presidential system discourages political co-operation between the institutions of the presidency and parliament; however, Kaiser adds that this is so only in the case of highly factionalised party systems where it is less in the interest of parties to compromise, or in two-party systems when one party controls the presidency and the other the parliament.¹ Even with the obedient prime ministers of de Gaulle, there were some differences between the president and prime minister in which direction to go. Nonetheless, the Gaullists' attitudes toward loyalty in regards to de Gaulle made it very difficult to express them, both as an ideological issue for themselves but also in preventing conflict with the rest of the Gaullist party, especially from the National Assembly which they depended on as well for their power. Some of this factionisation of the UMP internally can help to explain as well the tension between the institutions, particularly when those institutions are occupied by different factions. We can see this internal conflict in the UMP as the party leader Jean-François Copé is trying to position himself to be the next presidential candidate rather than Sarkozy or the former PM, François Fillon. This helps us to understand the role of semi-presidentialism in France and its effects on the UMP. Semi-presidentialism encourages aggregation of parties at the party system level as only one party can win the presidency; however, this does not

¹André Kaiser, "Types of Democracy: From Classical to New Institutionalism," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 419-444.

require that the French parties are unified internally. In the case of the UMP, it appears from the level of the party that fragmentation is encouraged by the system as it requires those parties with real ambitions for the presidency to become catch-all parties to encompass as many different political ideologies as possible, without this presidential catalysis, it is unlikely that such a factionalised party could remain together. This centralisation and nationalisation of politics dominates all levels other than the local level, which has its own unique role in French politics.

The role of national and local politics

This thesis has argued that in order to understand the degree of integration the UMP has achieved an important factor which needs to be considered alongside factions (normally analysed in terms of national politics) is the importance of the local level of the party. Sarkozy is not just a national figure of a presidential party – he is a local figure as well. Many of the survey results in his *département*, especially to the changes in the party since the creation of the UMP, focused upon him. This sort of influence of leadership is important on the local level, even when these leaders move on to higher offices. A similar effect can be seen with Gérard Larcher in Yvelines, who was once a government minister and had moved on to being the President of the Senate. Certainly, Larcher had preserved his local, constituency and *départemental* ties in a way that Sarkozy had not been able to because of his political offices, but both men had left a strong mark on their *fédérations*. Even in more democratically structured parties, these sort of notable figures are important for attracting new members and energising and running the local party organisation, as Sarkozy did up until recently, and Larcher continued to do even at the time of the study.

In the UMP there is an understanding of the importance of strong leadership on all levels of a political party, not just in regard to the national level of the party,

but having an established local organisation as well. Therefore, it is unlikely that the balance of local and national politics will be upset as the Gaullists and the others that made up the RPR have come to understand the importance of local politics in local elections and offices. This was something that the UDF and its predecessors had understood for some time, though the degree of factionalisation that it also encouraged had become a disadvantage for the UDF, as it had stopped being a viable single party. The Gaullists also understood the importance of national politics for higher level offices, and this will probably remain a key part of the UMP structure, even with the more local based ex-UDF elements. The UMP stands a good chance of long-term survival as an important political player in the French party system if they preserve the following three factors: 1) the balance between national politics and local politics, 2) the cooperation between the factions and tendencies, and 3) a similar level of the internal democracy that was found in the party in 2007.

Organisation of the Party

What is interesting about the UMP compared to some other new parties is that one can observe a mature political organisation with some degree of continuity from the organisations of the RPR and the UDF. Certainly, a new national organisation had to be created which could accommodate the various political traditions, though in some ways it resembles the old RPR organisation with further democratic reforms. Nevertheless, there is a strong degree of continuity with the pre-existing organisations on the local level, which means a more stable and mature party because the players, for the most part, already know the rules of the game. From the questionnaire and interview results, one can see that a lot of the members of the party came from other parties before the UMP, and those in positions of responsibility in the UMP often had responsibilities in their previous parties.

Furthermore, one can see the role of continuity in the successful tenth *circonscription*, which was also examined in the case-study work of this thesis; this case in Yvelines showed that an existing structure and rules helped a new organisation like the UMP to thrive in spite of its newness. The pre-existing structures help to establish the routines and the culture which institutions such as a party need to function, as March and Olson argue.

The UMP has developed a structure that allows the accommodation of a wide range of political currents within the party. Whilst that does not necessarily guarantee that the party will last long into the future (which will depend upon how the party deals with challenges, such as the recent national electoral defeat), it does make the party more able to cope with this plurality of tendencies and factions, as well as being suited to handle both local and national politics, a necessity in French politics. There must be some caution to ensure that the party does not move too far to being a party of factions, developing into a party with many factions above party as identified in our typology in Chapter 2. If these sub-groups dominate, they risk splitting the party, following the fate of the old UDF. On the other hand, if the UMP stifles factions or disallows their existence, the party may encourage splits. In this situation, the smaller groups might feel dominated by the large groups within the party or feel that they do not have a voice in the party, similarly to the split of the RPF from the RPR. The democratic reforms of the party with the formation of the UMP will help to ensure internal democracy for as long as diversity is used for genuine internal debate, rather than being a way for the majority to control minority groups. The evidence from the surveys suggests that it has not been used in this negative way, and most of the groups of the party have not felt that it has, and are supportive of these democratic processes as a way to resolve internal party policy conflict. The UMP must balance a variety of factions based on many issues, particularly personal and ideological

factions.

However, these structures of the factions are not artificial constructions, as one can see in most political parties at least an informal grouping of factions, as discussed in the examination of factions in the literature review, be it based on groups within the party or ideological or leadership groupings, even when the groups do not exist in the rules of the political parties. Many of these groups within the UMP have some basis in a previous political body, as can be seen in the groups examined in the political families chapter and those examined in the fieldwork chapters, either the political clubs of the RPR or the various parties which made up the UDF. With the flexibility of the UMP's structure and the acceptance of *personnes morales associées*, and *mouvements*, these groups have been able to develop into their own part of the organisation and preserve their identity. These features of the party came from the pressure to deal with the political plurality of the UMP and to ensure that the party organisation and structure are sound. With regard to the two department cases studies, one can see a more homogeneous party in Hauts-de-Seine than in Yvelines. The relative homogeneity of the party in Hauts-de-Seine can be seen as stemming from one or two factors: 1) the UMP here is made up primarily of the RPR and RPF, which had been originally part of the RPR, so they might have similar organisational culture already, 2) a convergence of attitudes on how a party should work. This is more likely a combination of both because it was also the RPR's more pro-EU stance that drove the RPF to leave the RPR, which the RPF perceived as the RPR abandoning Gaullist principles and, therefore, disrespecting their factions' beliefs.

The UMP in its historical context and development of the party

Like all parties in France, the UMP must cope with the semi-presidential system; for this the party has developed a strong national structure. This is one important reason why the UMP formed when it did. It is a party which was born in the presidential election of 2002 to rally behind Chirac. Traditionally, Gaullists have had the most top-down party structures on the French Right. This was first cultivated according to the principle of loyalty to de Gaulle and later around the imperative to reach the most important office in the view of many, the presidency. The UMP does follow from this tradition of a party with its main goal to get the presidency, as the original name of the party indicates *Union pour la majorité présidentielle* (Union for the Presidential Majority). However, the UMP is different in some ways to a traditional presidential party because of some unique features, such as strong factions, owing to the French political system, its creation at an important electoral moment and its internal political life.

Factionalism is useful in understanding the UMP because of the many ideologies which make up the party. When the UMP came together, it was formed from the RPR, RPF, and UDF; both the RPR and UDF were rather internally diverse in their own right before the formation of the UMP. This diversity can only exist with a degree of democracy and internal recognition of the various factions; however, this needs to be balanced with the imperatives which unite the party, which in the UMP's case are for a more united Centre-Right opposed to the Left on the levels above local politics and some basic ideals which one finds in all of the ideological groups, such as some parts of economic policy. It should also be remembered that the UMP is not unique in this internal diversity; one can find another, larger internally diverse party in the French system in the PS and one can see examples of internally diverse parties on the Centre-Right in other European countries, like

the British Conservatives and the German CDU-CSU.

The UMP can be seen from this study as a party which was created due to external pressures on the Centre-Right parties, as Panebianco describes as necessary for party system change. This can be understood by the fact that there were several attempts to create a united Centre-Right before the creation of the UMP which failed and several electoral alliances which collapsed. This external pressure was necessary in creating this formation; before then, most constituent elements of what would become the UMP did not see the advantage of such a political union. The Centre-Right had been in internal conflict for a number of years about what to do about the threat of the FN, both between the parties and within them. However, it was the FN's achievement in advancing through to the second round in 2002 that put the necessary pressure on the Centre-Right parties to unite. Only unity would protect against the threat of the growth of the anti-system parties like the FN.

This is not to say that the UMP was only created as a reaction to Le Pen's success in 2002; indeed, the idea was already on the table before the election, and this was not the first time the FN had had electoral success at the expense of the mainstream parties. Nevertheless, the pressure from the FN provided an additional incentive for the Centre-Right to succeed in their latest effort at unification. This can be seen in the responses from the fieldwork as well. Several of the members reported positive changes which were brought by the UMP involving the electoral growth of the party, as well as the unity of the party, which helped to create the electoral success of the UMP in 2002 and 2007, even in the face of a single presidential candidate for most of the democratic Left in 2007. It will be interesting to see if these institutional pressures keep the UMP together now in 2012 that the party has suffered a large defeat in the national-level elections. It is possible that as blame is laid, the various groups of the party will see the others as responsible

for the defeat, making it more difficult for the party to remain together. There could also be a struggle between the factions if someone should replace Sarkozy in the leadership role and over who that person should be.

The UMP in its present formation is a party which is still adapting to its circumstances. This is in light of a few different factors. It had been a party of government on the national level until the recent elections, but the UMP had struggled on the regional level for some time. This stemmed from the popularity of the government usually having sunk by the time of these elections, and this is often viewed as a way of ‘punishing’ the government for what voters see as wrong behaviour. The UMP had continued to hold on to the national government until the last elections in 2012, in part due to its own electoral unity and the Left’s disunity, as well as the failure of the Left to grasp the imagination of the voters and to present a sufficiently united front to counter the united Right. The last elections saw the UMP struggling to promote a leader who had largely become unpopular outside its base.

The UMP is an internally created party. The leadership of the groups which now make up the UMP came together to make this new organisation. As Panebianco argues, this is typical of the conservative and liberal parties, and these are the political origins of several of the groups which formed the UMP. This means that the UMP, whilst having some strong structures outside the party which are related to it in the *personnes morales associées*, is made of many factions but not dominated by them. Many of the parties which joined to create the UMP dissolved themselves into this organisation, grouping themselves into *mouvements*, helping to create a more powerful and united party, rather than one steered by such groups, as the UDF had been, with its more independent sub-groups in the various constituent parties. This is different to the running of some Socialist/Labour parties and the role of labour unions within them. Nor does one necessarily join an outside

organisation and get routed into the UMP, like the role of labour unions within some Socialist/Labour parties or of church groups in some confessional parties; therefore, the UMP has direct membership. This all adds to the internally created nature of the UMP.

However, the UMP is a party between strong and weak institutionalisation, as defined by Panebianco, making it different to the typical conservative or liberal party. This is due in part to the way that the UMP was created, that is to say that it was created in a very similar fashion to the German CDU, bringing together some related political groups to make a stronger, more competitive, and larger party. Yet, it does not fit totally with the description of a weakly institutionalised party because there is still some degree of the strong national-level Gaullist organisational style which it inherited from the RPR; to a degree, this is necessary in the French centralised political system. The UMP on the *fédérational* and regional levels does not share the same level of flexibility as the CDU on the equivalent levels. Nonetheless, there is a greater deal of flexibility for the local level of the party to do as it sees fit than exists on the national-level elections in France, making the party not truly a strongly institutionalised party on every level either. In addition, the groups and associated bodies of the UMP have a greater deal of flexibility than those in the CDU, though the bodies are quite different in the two parties, especially as they do not have the same direct influence on the policy of the UMP. The official sub-groups of the CDU are mainly restricted to specific policy interests or representing specific groups within the party, such as women, young people, and people with a migrant background. However, these groups of the UMP do not have the same direct influence on the policy of the UMP, meaning that they have a very different role in the party. These mixed levels of institutionalisation and being internally created places the UMP somewhere between the typical conservative party and the type of federated party

like the CDU-CSU and the SFIO.

We must also understand the UMP as a party which is driven, especially on the local level, by its activists. This is not only because it is the activists who have the day-to-day contact with those outside the party, often as the face of campaigning. The activists have an direct influence on the direction of the party, both directly and indirectly through having influence on policy issues and being able to ‘vote with their feet,’ if they feel abandoned by the party. They can help to push specific political issues to preserve the ideology of the party, because without their participation the party would cease to function as a catch-all party. Their views tend to be stronger than those of the general public, and they often reflect more what one would expect from a particular strand of thought rather than picking and choosing on issues. With this in mind a party must accommodate the beliefs of its own members and at the same time prevent the party from only appealing to its own narrow base.

What holds the UMP together

The UMP was formed out of two key imperatives, one being the importance of a greater guarantee of electoral success, the other being loyal to the organisation. The first of these is a logical conclusion given the way that the UMP formed in 2002. At this point, the mainstream political parties were shocked about the real possibility of an anti-system party like the FN being able to take hold within the electoral system. So those within the RPR saw it as necessary to take this moment in time to create a rally around the only viable presidential candidate, their candidate Jacques Chirac. Many of the other parties which joined the UMP had run their own candidates in the first round of the 2002 presidential election, so there was more at stake for them in joining the UMP because it would mean losing part of their independence and, possibly, their future ability to put forward

their own candidate.

However, as those supporting rational choice theory would argue, joining the UMP also means that they were more likely to win seats in the National Assembly, both because of the electorate's tendency to oppose cohabitation and because such alliance reduced the number of competitors within the constituencies. Increasing the number of MPs is a more realistic goal for these smaller parties in a French electoral system which limits the number of potentially successful parties (in that they are represented in one form or another). Certainly, it is in the best interest of these smaller parties to have a partner in the presidency who shares similar beliefs, rather than someone on the other side of the political spectrum.

The factor of loyalty came more from those parties which dissolved themselves into the UMP, like the RPR and DL. It was an easy decision for the members of these groups, as their party, as it had been, no longer existed; they had to join the UMP or leave the group from which they came. This was less the case with the *personnes morales associées*, as their members could remain outside the UMP if they saw fit or be members of both, but the electoral imperative of legislative seats helped to bring them to the UMP. In addition, as discussed earlier in this thesis, often the local structure of the party resembled that of the stronger party of that area, meaning less organisational change on that level, helping to preserve the rules which already existed in these areas.

What are the implications for the UMP

In the typology of parties from chapter 2, the UMP probably fits better into the view of a catch-all party than any type derived from the typology that Duverger used, given the party's attempts to appeal to the widest audience possible, whilst aiming to remain electorally credible. Perhaps in a presidentialised system, it is necessary to be a catch-all party to maximise electoral power; to win the presidency

requires attracting the widest range of voters possible. Organisationally, the party is something that is in between the mass party and the cadre party of Duverger, making it different from most conservative parties, as a party with a larger membership for its system and a more democratic party structure with a strong national and local leadership groups. The UMP is not a mass party as Duverger described, and this party type is becoming rarer in most political systems with the falling numbers of party members in most countries. For example, in Germany traditional mass parties such as the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) have seen their numbers fall below those of the CDU, which has not been traditionally seen as a mass party, as it is a conservative/Christian-Democratic party.

France has always had a lower level of party participation than most countries so it makes it more difficult to have the sort of membership numbers which many socialist parties throughout Europe enjoyed in the past and more so in this difficult time for political parties in general. Therefore, it has been seen for some time that the French parties do not really fit into this pattern of the typical mass parties described by Duverger.² The UMP also has some characteristics of Koole's modern cadre party, in particular predominance of the professional leadership groups, a low member/voter ratio, and the maintenance of the structure of a mass party. The UMP had to adopt this, as low member numbers are a feature of the French political parties, and the UMP does attempt to be more of a catch-all party, often not referring to itself as party of the Right, but of the centre or all politics, as the Gaullists throughout the Fifth Republic have done. There is also, as in the RPR, a great deal of focus on the leadership of the party, with the members themselves focusing on the importance of the presidency, again reflecting more the

²Steven B. Wolinetz, "Beyond the Catch-all Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies," in Juan Linz, Jose Ramon Montero, and Richard Gunther, eds., *The Future of Political Parties*. (Oxford University Press, 2002) pp. 136-65.

electoral-professional party type of Panebianco. The UMP does focus on recruiting members like the typical catch-all party, but we see a great deal of institutional and leadership continuity from the parties which preceded it. There has been a development of a group of those in power in the UMP, rather than a constant change in leadership. The leadership of the party is also very personalised as in an electoral-professional party. However, we can also see that those in leadership positions do tend to be of the dominant group in their specific area, meaning that internal party politics does play a role in leadership section.

The UMP shows an interesting development in French politics which reveals the local entrenchment of the party, in contrast to the top-down nature of the Gaullists of the past. It implies a highly centralised party for the national, regional, and *fédérational* levels with a flexible local party which allow local differences to prevail. As the members believe this local entrenchment is important, this is generally a positive development that the Gaullists have abandoned a purely top-down system. However, as the UMP is now approaching a potentially difficult time for its national unity, this could develop into a disadvantage with the possibility of conflict developing between the factions which have been locally strengthened with these flexible structures. If the UMP does split in future, the Centre-Right will most likely return to their old divisions as many of the old structures have been preserved at the local level. The future of the UMP will depend on its ability to create a synthesis amongst the factions at a time when the party must regroup, either behind Sarkozy or behind someone who will change the image of the party, to make it more appealing to those outside its base again, especially given the challenges of voter dealignment.

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Figure 1: Map of France, location of Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines




Figure 2: Zoom to Île-de-France: Paris 75, Seine-et-Marne 77, Yvelines 78, Essonne 91, Hauts-de-Seine 92, Seine-Saint-Denis 93, Val-de-Marne 94, Val-d'Oise 95

Table 1: Parties of the French Centre and Right discussed in this thesis (alphabetical order by acronym or name used in thesis)

Party Name	Years of Existence	Ideological Currents	Notable Figures
Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (CDS)	1976–1995	Formed from various Christian Democrats, social Catholic, centrist parties	François Bayrou, Pierre Méhaignerie, Philippe Douste-Blazy
Centre Démocratie et Progrès (CDP)	1969–1974	Splinter of centrists and Christian Democrats, supporters of Pompidou	Jacques Duhamel, Joseph Fontanet
Centre national des indépendants et paysans (CNI)	1949–present (part of UMP)	Right, conservative, anti-Left	René Coty, Antoine Pinay, Christian Vanneste
Clubs Perspectives et Réalités (CPR)	1965–1995	Giscardian	Jean-Pierre Fourcade
Démocratie Libérale (DL)	1997–2002	Neo-liberal, successor to PR	Alain Madelin
Debout la République (DLR)	1999–present, as a party and split from UMP in 2007	Gaullist, <i>souverainiste</i>	Nicolas Dupont-Aignan
Force Démocrate (FD)	1995–2007	Successor to CDS, Christian Democrat	François Bayrou
Front national (FN)	1972–present	Far right, <i>souverainiste</i> , anti-immigration, nationalist, populist	Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine Le Pen, Bruno Gollnisch
Forum des républicains sociaux (FRS)	2001–present	Social Catholic, social conservative	Christine Boutin
La Droite Libre	2002–present	Liberal, conservative	Rachid Kaci

Table 1 Parties of the French Centre and Right – Continued from previous page

Party Name	Years of Existence	Ideological Currents	Notable Figures
Mouvement démocrate (MoDem)	2007–present	Remains of the UDF, social democrats, Christian Democrats	François Bayrou
Mouvement pour la France (MPF)	1994–present	Conservative, <i>souverainiste</i> , anti-immigration	Philippe de Villiers
Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP)	1944–1967	Christian Democrats, centrists	Robert Schuman, Georges Bidault, Maurice Schumann
Nouveau centre	2007–present	Social Liberal, Christian Democrats, centrist, split from UDF	André Santini, Hervé Morin, Christian Blanc
Parti Populaire pour la Démocratie Française (PPDF)	1995–2002	Giscardian, successor to Club Perspectives et Réalités	Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Dominique Bussereau, Jean-Pierre Fourcade
Parti Radical “valoisien”, Radicals (PRV)	1901–present	centrist, Republican, radical	Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, André Rossinot, Jean-Louis Borloo
Parti Républicain (PR)	1977–1997	Liberal, Giscardian, successor to RI	Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Alain Madelin, François Léotard
Républicains Indépendants (RI)	1966–1977	Liberal, Giscardian	Valéry Giscard d’Estaing
Rassemblement pour la République (RPR)	1976–2002	Gaullist, conservative, liberal	Jacques Chirac, Édouard Balladur, Philippe Séguin, Nicolas Sarkozy

Table 1 Parties of the French Centre and Right – Continued from previous page

Party Name	Years of Existence	Ideological Currents	Notable Figures
Rassemblement pour la France (RPF)	1999–present	<i>souverainiste</i> splitter of RPR	Charles Pasqua
Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF)	1978–2007	Liberal, social liberal, Christian Democratic	François Bayrou, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Alain Madelin,
Union pour la Défence de la République (UDR)	1968–1971	Gaullist, rename of UNR-UDT	Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, Michel Debré, René Capitant, Louis Vallon, Gilbert Grandval
Union des démocrates pour la République (UDR)	1971–1976	Gaullist, rename of Union pour la Défence de la République	Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, Michel Debré, René Capitant, Louis Vallon, Gilbert Grandval
Union démocratique du travail (UDT)	1958–1962	Left Gaullist	René Capitant, Louis Vallon, Gilbert Grandval, Philippe Dechartre
Union pour la nouvelle République (UNR)	1958–1962	Gaullists	Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, Michel Debré
Union pour la nouvelle République-Union démocratique du travail (UNR-UDT)	1962–1967	Gaullists, merger of UNR and UDT	Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, Michel Debré, René Capitant, Louis Vallon, Gilbert Grandval

Table 2: Quand avez-vous adhéré à l'UMP ? (mois et année)

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
May 2002	72.4%	21	57.1%	8
Oct 2002	0%	0	7.1%	1
Jan 2003	3.4%	1	0	0
Mar 2003	3.4%	1	7.1%	1
Dec 2003	0%	0	7.1%	1
Jan 2004	3.4%	1	0%	0
Jan 2005	3.4%	1	7.1%	1
Sep 2005	3.4%	1	0%	0
Sep 2006	0%	0	7.1%	1
Oct 2006	0%	0	7.1%	1
Nov 2006	6.9%	2	0%	0
Apr 2007	3.4%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	29	100%	14

Table 3: Depuis 1981, avez-vous été membre d'un parti autre que l'UMP?

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	71.9%	23	78.6%	11
No	25%	8	21.4%	3
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 4: Pouvez-vous nous dire de quel parti vous étiez membre ? (plusieurs réponses possible)

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
CD, CDS, UDF	0%	0	9.1%	1
RPR & RPF	17.4 %	4	0%	0
RPR	73.9%	17	54.5%	6
RPR & UJP	4.35%	1	9.1%	1
UDF	0%	0	18.2%	2
no response	4.35%	1	9.1%	1
Total	100%	23	100%	11

Table 5: En quelle année aviez-vous adhéré à la formation à laquelle vous apparteniez avant l'UMP ?

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
before 1970	0%	0	12.5%	1
1970-1979	30.4%	7	37.5%	3
1980-1989	30.4%	7	25%	2
1990-1999	30.4%	7	12.5%	1
2000-2001	4.35%	1	12.5%	1
No response	4.35%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	23	100%	8

Table 6: Aviez-vous des responsabilités dans cette formation ? : Oui, au niveau local (commune, canton, circonscription)

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	43.5%	10	75%	6
No	52.2%	12	25%	2
No response	4.3%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	23	100%	8

Table 7: Aviez-vous des responsabilités dans cette formation ? : Oui, au niveau départemental

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	21.7%	5	50%	4
No	73.9%	17	50%	4
No response	4.3%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	23	100%	8

Table 8: Aviez-vous des responsabilités dans cette formation ? : Oui, au niveau national

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	21.7%	5	50%	4
No	73.9%	17	50%	4
No response	4.3%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	23	100%	8

Table 9: Aviez-vous des responsabilités dans cette formation ? : Non, sans responsabilités dans le parti

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	39.1%	9	0%	0
No	56.5%	13	100%	8
No response	4.3%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	23	100%	8

Table 10: Où vous placez-vous politiquement ? Extrême gauche 1 - 7 Extrême droite

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
3	3.1%	1	0%	0
4	12.5%	4	21.4%	3
5	50%	16	35.7%	5
6	25%	8	42.9%	6
No response	9.4%	3	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 11: Au sein de l'UMP, de quelle sensibilité ou tradition vous sentez-vous le plus proche ?

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Gaullist	34.4%	11	35.7%	5
Social Gaullist	6.3%	2	7.1%	1
Barrist	3.1%	1	0%	0
Sarkozite	6.3%	2	7.1%	1
Ex-RPR	6.3%	2	0%	0
Traditional Gaullist	3.1%	1	0%	0
Right Gaullist	3.1%	1	0%	0
Majorité présidentielle	3.1%	1	0%	0
Christian democrat	0%	0	7.1%	1
Liberal	3.1%	1	7.1%	1
Left Gaullist	3.1%	1	7.1%	1
Sovereignist Gaullist	6.3%	2	0%	0
Parti Radical	3.1%	1	0%	0
Chiraqian Right	0%	0	7.1%	1
None	3.1%	1	0%	0
No response	15.6%	5	21.4%	3
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 12: Etes-vous membre de certaines des associations suivantes ? Une association humanitaire, caritative

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	15.6%	5	14.3%	2
No	84.4%	27	85.7%	12
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 13: Si oui, lesquelles ?

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Croix rouge	40%	2	50%	1
Secours catholique	20%	1	0%	0
Secours populaire	20%	1	0%	0
No response	20%	1	50%	1
Total	100%	5	100%	2

Table 14: Etes-vous membre de certaines des associations suivantes ? Une association professionnelle

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	9.4%	3	35.7%	5
No	90.6%	29	64.3%	9
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 15: Si oui, lesquelles ?

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Syndicat professionnel	33.3%	1	40%	2
Bureau municipal	0%	0	20%	1
CGPME	0%	0	20%	1
UNI	0%	0	20%	1
Coll-Cab	33.3%	1	0%	0
No response	33.3%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	3	100%	5

Table 16: Etes-vous membre de certaines des associations suivantes ? Une association culturelle, religieuse ou de loisirs

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	15.6%	5	35.7%	5
No	84.4%	27	64.3%	9
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 17: Si oui, lesquelles ?

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines ^{3%}	Number of responses
Lyons Club	20%	1	40%	2
Rotary Club	20%	1	20%	1
Association à vocation europeene	0%	0	20%	1
Association du patrimoine	0%	0	40%	2
Association de chasse	0%	0	20%	0
Francophonie	0%	0	20%	1
SHARY	0%	0	20%	1
PARR	0%	0	20%	1
Club Plogée	20%	1	0%	0
No response	40%	2	0%	0

Table 18: Etes-vous membre de certaines des associations suivantes ? Un club, un mouvement associés à l'UMP

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	9.4%	3	28.4%	4
No	90.6%	29	71.4%	10
Total	100%	32	100%	14

³Some respondents are members of more than one organisation

⁴Some respondents are members of more than one organisation

Table 19: Si oui, lesquelles ?

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Debout la République	33.3%	1	25%	1
Club 89	33.3%	1	25%	1
Société en mouvement	0%	0	25%	1
UNI	0%	0	25%	1
Femmes avenir	33.3%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	3	100%	4

Table 20: Etes-vous membre de certaines des associations suivantes ? Une association politique

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	15.6%	5	7.1%	1
No	84.4%	27	92.9%	13
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 21: Si oui, lesquelles ?

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Appel d'R	20%	1	0%	0
Rassemblement pour Levallois	20%	1	0%	0
Union Pan-Europeene	20%	1	0%	0
Mouvement Europeene	20%	1	100%	1
No response	20%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	5	100%	1

Table 22: Etes-vous membre de certaines des associations suivantes ? Autres associations

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	34.4%	11	42.9%	6
No	65.6%	21	57.1%	8
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 23: Si oui, lesquelles ?⁴

Response	Hauts-de-Seine%	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
ACORAN	9.1%	1	0%	0
UNOR	9.1%	1	0%	0
Avenir de Clamart	9.1%	1	0%	0
Association de parents d'élèves	18.2%	2	0%	0
Caisse des écoles	9.1%	1	0%	0
Ancient Combattants	18.2%	2	16.7%	1
ADSOR 75	9.1%	1	0%	0
Souvenir Français and Médaillés Militaires	9.1%	1	0%	0
Officiers de réserve	0%	0	16.7%	1
Bureau des élèves	9.1%	1	0%	0
Aide aux chômeurs et jeunes	0%	0	16.7%	1
Association d'aids à domicile	0%	0	33.3%	2
Association de Reserviste de la Marine Nationale	9.1%	1	0%	0
No response	0%	0	16.7%	1
Total	100%	11	100%	6

Table 24: Actuellement, exercez-vous un mandat électif ? (plusieurs choix possible): Oui, je suis conseiller municipal

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	12.5%	4	21.4%	3
No	87.5%	28	78.6%	11
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 25: Actuellement, exercez-vous un mandat électif ? (plusieurs choix possible): Oui, je suis maire

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	15.6%	5	28.6%	4
No	84.4%	27	71.4%	10
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 26: Actuellement, exercez-vous un mandat électif ? (plusieurs choix possible): Oui, je suis conseiller général et/ou régional

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	6.3%	2	14.3%	2
No	93.8%	30	85.7%	12
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 27: Actuellement, exercez-vous un mandat électif ? (plusieurs choix possible): Oui, je suis député, sénateur ou député européen

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	6.3%	2	14.3%	2
No	93.8%	30	85.7%	12
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 28: Actuellement, exercez-vous un mandat électif ? (plusieurs choix possible): Non, je n'exerce pas actuellement de mandat

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	68.8%	22	50%	7
No	31.3%	10	50%	7
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 29: Aujourd'hui, exercez-vous des responsabilités à l'UMP ? : Oui, au niveau local (commune, canton, circonscription)

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	46.9%	15	57.1%	8
No	50%	16	42.9%	6
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 30: Aujourd'hui, exercez-vous des responsabilités à l'UMP ? : Oui, au niveau départemental

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	25%	8	42.9%	6
No	71.9%	23	57.1%	8
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 31: Aujourd'hui, exercez-vous des responsabilités à l'UMP ? : Oui, au niveau national

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	12.5%	4	21.4%	3
No	84.4%	27	78.6%	11
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 32: Aujourd'hui, exercez-vous des responsabilités à l'UMP ? : Non, sans responsabilités dans le parti

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
Yes	40.6%	13	28.6%	4
No	56.3%	18	71.4%	10
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 33: Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à l'UMP ?

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
0 hours	6.3%	2	0%	0
1-10	12.5%	4	50%	7
11-20	21.9%	7	7.1%	1
21-30	3.1%	1	7.1%	1
31-40	15.6%	5	7.1%	1
41-50	3.1%	1	0%	0
51-70	3.1%	1	7.1%	1
71-more	0%	0	7.1%	1
No response	34.4%	11	14.3%	2
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 34: À part l'UMP, lesquels partis suivants vous sentez-vous la plus proche ? (1 pas de tout proche - 10 plus proche): UDF

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
0	12.5%	4	14.3%	2
1	9.4%	3	0%	0
2	9.4%	3	7.1%	1
3	6.3%	2	0%	0
4	6.3%	2	14.3%	2
5	12.5%	4	21.4%	3
6	12.5%	4	7.1%	1
7	6.3%	2	7.1%	1
8	0%	0	14.3%	2
No response	25%	8	14.3%	2
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 35: À part l'UMP, lesquels partis suivants vous sentez-vous la plus proche ? (1 pas de tout proche - 10 plus proche): MPF

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
0	15.6%	5	28.6%	4
1	28.1%	9	14.3%	2
2	9.4%	3	21.4%	3
3	0%	0	14.3%	2
4	9.4%	3	0%	0
5	3.1%	1	0%	0
7	3.1%	1	7.1%	1
8	0%	0	7.1%	1
No response	31.3%	10	7.1%	1
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 36: À part l'UMP, lesquels partis suivants vous sentez-vous la plus proche ? (1 pas de tout proche - 10 plus proche): FN

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
0	31.3%	10	42.9%	6
1	21.9%	7	21.4%	3
2	6.3%	2	7.1%	1
3	3.1%	1	7.1%	1
4	9.4%	3	0%	0
6	0%	0	7.1%	1
7	0%	0	7.1%	1
No response	28.1%	9	7.1%	1
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 37: À part l'UMP, lesquels partis suivants vous sentez-vous la plus proche ? (1 pas de tout proche - 10 plus proche): PS

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
0	28.1%	9	28.6%	4
1	28.1%	9	21.4%	3
2	12.5%	4	14.3%	2
3	3.1%	1	7.1%	1
4	0%	0	21.4%	3
No response	28.1%	9	7.1%	1
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 38: À part l'UMP, lesquels partis suivants vous sentez-vous la plus proche ? (1 pas de tout proche - 10 plus proche): RPF

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
0	15.6%	5	28.6%	4
1	18.8%	6	14.3%	2
2	9.4%	3	14.3%	2
3	6.3%	2	14.3%	2
4	6.3%	2	7.1%	1
5	6.3%	2	0%	0
6	3.1%	1	0%	0
7	0%	0	7.1%	1
8	3.1%	1	7.1%	1
9	6.3%	2	0%	0
10	6.3%	2	0%	0
No response	18.8%	6	7.1%	1
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 39: À part l'UMP, lesquels partis suivants vous sentez-vous la plus proche ? (1 pas de tout proche - 10 plus proche): Les Verts

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
-1	3.1%	1	0%	0
0	46.9%	15	50%	7
1	21.9%	7	35.7%	5
2	0%	0	7.1%	1
No response	28.1%	9	7.1%	1
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 40: Pour améliorer le fonctionnement de l'UMP, êtes-vous favorable aux propositions suivantes ? : Donner plus d'argent aux fédérations et donc diminuer la part de l'action politique nationale.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
très favorable	21.9%	7	28.6%	4
assez favorable	59.4%	19	42.9%	6
peu favorable	15.6%	5	21.4%	3
pas du tout favorable	3.1%	1	7.1%	1

Table 41: Donner plus de marge de manoeuvre aux leaders locaux dans les fédérations.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
très favorable	28.1%	9	21.4%	3
assez favorable	46.9%	15	57.1%	8
peu favorable	25%	8	21.4%	3
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 42: Donner le dernier mot aux adhérents dans les investitures des candidates aux élections législatives.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
très favorable	25%	8	42.9%	6
assez favorable	50%	16	28.6%	4
peu favorable	18.8%	6	21.4%	3
pas du tout favorable	6.3%	2	7.1%	1
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 43: Organiser des référendums auprès des adhérents sur les grandes orientations politiques de l'UMP.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
très favorable	25%	8	35.7%	5
assez favorable	53.1%	17	42.9%	6
peu favorable	12.5%	4	14.3%	2
pas du tout favorable	6.3%	2	7.1%	1
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 44: Répondez à chaque phrase suivants si vous : d'accord, plutôt d'accord, plutôt pas d'accord, ou pas d'accord.: Je suis satisfait(e) du niveau démocratique d'organisation de l'UMP.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	15.6%	5	35.7%	5
plutôt d'accord	65.6%	21	42.9%	6
plutôt pas d'accord	15.6%	5	21.4%	3
pas d'accord	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 45: Il est important de donner plus de place aux différents courants au sein du parti.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	12.5%	4	35.7%	5
plutôt d'accord	56.3%	18	57.1%	8
plutôt pas d'accord	18.8%	6	7.1%	1
pas d'accord	6.3%	2	0%	0
No response	6.3%	2	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 46: Les dirigeants de l'UMP prennent bien en compte les préoccupations des adhérents.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	9.4%	3	7.1%	1
plutôt d'accord	46.9%	15	85.7%	12
plutôt pas d'accord	31.3%	10	7.1%	1
pas d'accord	9.4%	3	0%	0
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 47: Le loi de la parité est un changement positif pour l'UMP et permette de promouvoir l'égalité entre les sexes en politiques.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	25%	8	28.6%	4
plutôt d'accord	37.5%	12	57.1%	8
plutôt pas d'accord	21.9%	7	7.1%	1
pas d'accord	12.5%	4	7.1%	1
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 48: La constitution pour l'Europe est une bonne chose pour la France.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	37.5%	12	92.9%	13
plutôt d'accord	31.3%	10	7.1%	1
plutôt pas d'accord	21.9%	7	0%	0
pas d'accord	9.4%	3	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 49: Il faut que le gouvernement protège les entreprises françaises contre la mondialisation et contre l'achat des entreprises étrangères.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	28.1%	9	28.6%	4
plutôt d'accord	59.4%	19	35.7%	5
plutôt pas d'accord	12.5%	4	28.6%	4
pas d'accord	0%	0	7.1%	1
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 50: Les couples homosexuels doivent pouvoir adopter les enfants.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	9.4%	3	7.1%	1
plutôt d'accord	9.4%	3	0%	0
plutôt pas d'accord	18.8%	6	28.6%	4
pas d'accord	59.4%	19	64.3%	9
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 51: Il faut supprimer la semaine de 35 heures.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	56.3%	18	57.1%	8
plutôt d'accord	31.3%	10	14.3%	2
plutôt pas d'accord	6.3%	2	21.4%	3
pas d'accord	6.3%	2	7.1%	1
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 52: C'est le président qui doit diriger le pays ; il ne faut pas que le parlement devienne trop puissant.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	18.8%	6	0%	0
plutôt d'accord	37.5%	12	35.7%	5
plutôt pas d'accord	34.4%	11	50%	7
pas d'accord	6.3%	2	14.3%	2
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 53: Le rôle de la femme est avant tout de s'occuper de son foyer et de ses enfants.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	9.4%	3	7.1%	1
plutôt d'accord	3.1%	1	14.3%	2
plutôt pas d'accord	34.4%	11	21.4%	3
pas d'accord	50%	16	57.1%	8
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 54: La France doit d'abord veiller à son intérêt même si son action compromet son alliance avec les Etats-Unis.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	28.1%	9	7.1%	1
plutôt d'accord	46.9%	15	64.3%	9
plutôt pas d'accord	9.4%	3	28.6%	4
pas d'accord	3.1%	1	0%	0
No response	12.5%	4	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 55: Il y a trop immigrés en France.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	31.3%	10	14.3%	2
plutôt d'accord	31.3%	10	42.9%	6
plutôt pas d'accord	21.9%	7	14.3%	2
pas d'accord	12.5%	4	21.4%	3
No response	3.1%	1	7.1%	1
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 56: L'Union européenne est trop puissante. Il faut se battre pour protéger la souveraineté de la France.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	34.4%	11	7.1%	1
plutôt d'accord	31.3%	10	28.6%	4
plutôt pas d'accord	25%	8	50%	7
pas d'accord	6.3%	2	14.3%	2
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 57: Nous devrions coopérer plus avec les autres grands partis européens de la droite.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	28.1%	9	14.3%	2
plutôt d'accord	56.3%	18	85.7%	12
plutôt pas d'accord	9.4%	3	0%	0
pas d'accord	3.1%	1	0%	0
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 58: Les salariés doivent jouer un rôle important dans la vie des entreprises où ils travaillent.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	25%	8	42.9%	6
plutôt d'accord	68.8%	22	57.1%	8
plutôt pas d'accord	3.1%	1	0%	0
No response	3.1%	1	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Table 59: Il faut que l'état et la religion travaillent ensemble. C'est impossible dissocier la morale et la politique.

Response	Hauts-de-Seine %	Number of responses	Yvelines %	Number of responses
d'accord	3.1%	1	21.4%	3
plutôt d'accord	28.1%	9	35.7%	5
plutôt pas d'accord	18.8%	6	21.4%	3
pas d'accord	37.5%	12	21.4%	3
No response	12.5%	4	0%	0
Total	100%	32	100%	14

Je suis une doctorante à l'Université de Cardiff (Royaume Uni). En ce moment, je suis attachée au CEVIPOF (Sciences Po). Mon doctorat s'intitule L'UMP – ses fondations, sa évolution, et son organisation : Etudes de cas des Hauts-de-Seine et des Yvelines. Ceci est un titre provisoire. Je mène une enquête sur l'organisation, l'adhésion, et la direction de l'UMP aux fédérations Hauts-de-Seine et Yvelines. Dans ma thèse, je compare ces deux fédérations pour comprendre l'UMP.

Cette enquête est une partie intégrante de ma thèse, et je vous saurai gré de bien vouloir y répondre. L'enquête est strictement anonyme et confidentielle. Les résultats seront utilisés uniquement pour les buts scientifiques. Merci pour votre participation.

1) Quand avez-vous adhéré à l'UMP ? (mois et année)

2) Depuis 1981, avez-vous été membre d'un parti autre que l'UMP?

Oui Non

Si vous avez répondu oui :

a) Pouvez-vous nous dire de quel parti vous étiez membre ? (plusieurs réponses possible)

b) En quelle année aviez-vous adhéré à la formation à laquelle vous apparteniez avant l'UMP ?

c) Aviez-vous des responsabilités dans cette formation ? (plusieurs réponses possible)

- Oui, au niveau local (commune, canton, circonscription...)
- Oui, au niveau départemental
- Oui, au niveau national
- Non, sans responsabilités dans le parti

3) Où vous placez-vous politiquement ?

Extrême gauche

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
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 Extrême droite

4) Au sein de l'UMP, de quelle sensibilité ou tradition vous sentez-vous le plus proche ?

5) Etes-vous membre de certaines des associations suivantes ?

a) Une association humanitaire, caritative (par exemple : Comité catholique contre la faim, Médecins du monde) Si oui, lesquelles ? Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses associations ?

b) Une association professionnelle (par exemple : syndicats, ordres, chambre de commerce) Si oui, lesquelles ? Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses associations ?

c) Une association culturelle, religieuse ou de loisirs (du type Rotary, Lyons Club, association du patrimoine, association diocésaine, association de chasse) Si oui, lesquelles ? Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses associations ?

d) Un club, un mouvement associés à l'UMP Si oui, lesquelles ? Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses groupes ?

e) Une association politique (par exemple : LICRA, Mouvement Européen, etc.) Si oui, lesquelles ? Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses associations ?

f) Autres associations (ex : association de parents d'élèves, pour l'environnement, de retraités, d'anciens combattants, d'officiers de réserve, etc.) Si oui, lesquelles ?
Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à ses associations ?

6) Actuellement, exercez-vous un mandat électif ? (plusieurs choix possible)

- Oui, je suis conseiller municipal
- Oui, je suis maire
- Oui, je suis conseiller général et/ou régional
- Oui, je suis député, sénateur ou député européen
- Non, je n'exerce pas actuellement de mandat

7) Aujourd'hui, exercez-vous des responsabilités à l'UMP ? (plusieurs choix possible)

- Oui, au niveau local (commune, canton, circonscription...)
- Oui, au niveau départemental
- Oui, au niveau national
- Non, sans responsabilités dans le parti

8) Combien des heures vous consacrez-vous par mois à l'UMP ?

9) À part l'UMP, lesquels partis suivants vous sentez-vous la plus proche ? (1 pas de tout proche – 10 plus proche)

UDF	/10	PS	/10
MPF	/10	RPF	/10
FN	/10	Les Verts	/10

10) Pour améliorer le fonctionnement de l'UMP, êtes-vous favorable aux propositions suivantes ? :

a) Donner plus d'argent aux fédérations et donc diminuer la part de l'action politique nationale.

- très favorable
- assez favorable
- peu favorable
- pas du tout favorable

b) Donner plus de marge de manœuvre aux leaders locaux dans les fédérations.

très favorable assez favorable peu favorable pas du tout favorable

c) Donner le dernier mot aux adhérents dans les investitures des candidates aux élections législatives.

très favorable assez favorable peu favorable pas du tout favorable

d) Organiser des référendums auprès des adhérents sur les grandes orientations politiques de l'UMP.

très favorable assez favorable peu favorable pas du tout favorable

Répondez à chaque phrase suivants si vous : d'accord, plutôt d'accord, plutôt pas d'accord, ou pas d'accord.

11) Je suis satisfait(e) du niveau démocratique d'organisation de l'UMP.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

12) Il est important de donner plus de place aux différents courants au sein du parti.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

13) Les dirigeants de l'UMP prennent bien en compte les préoccupations des adhérents.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

14) Le loi de la parité est un changement positif pour l'UMP et permette de promouvoir l'égalité entre les sexes en politiques.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

15) La constitution pour l'Europe est une bonne chose pour la France.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

16) Il faut que le gouvernement protège les entreprises françaises contre la mondialisation et contre l'achat des entreprises étrangères.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

17) Les couples homosexuels doivent pouvoir adopter les enfants.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

18) Il faut supprimer la semaine de 35 heures.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

19) C'est le président qui doit diriger le pays ; il ne faut pas que le parlement devienne trop puissant.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

20) Le rôle de la femme est avant tout de s'occuper de son foyer et de ses enfants.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

21) La France doit d'abord veiller à son intérêt même si son action compromet son alliance avec les Etats-Unis.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

22) Il y a trop immigrés en France.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

23) L'Union européenne est trop puissante. Il faut se battre pour protéger la souveraineté de la France.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

24) Nous devrions coopérer plus avec les autres grands partis européens de la droite.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

25) Les salariés doivent jouer un rôle important dans la vie des entreprises où ils travaillent.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

26) Il faut que l'état et la religion travaillent ensemble. C'est impossible dissocier la morale et la politique.

d'accord plutôt d'accord plutôt pas d'accord pas d'accord

27) Comment est-ce que l'UMP a changé depuis 2002 ? Est-ce que ses changements sont positifs ou négatifs ? Pourquoi ?

Questions démographiques

En quelle année êtes-vous né(e) ? :

Sexe :

Profession : Agriculteur, Artisan, Commerçant/chef d'entreprise, Cadre/profession intellectuelle supérieure, Profession intermédiaire, Employé, Ouvrier, Retraité, Chômeur, Etudiant, Autre inactif

Education : moins de baccalauréat, baccalauréat général, baccalauréat professionnel, baccalauréat technologique, Bac+3, Bac+5, Bac+8, grande école

Religion : catholique (pratiquant), catholique (non pratiquant), protestant (pratiquant), protestant (non pratiquant), musulman (pratiquant), musulman (non pratiquant), juif (pratiquant), juif (non pratiquant), autre, aucun religion

Nombre des habitants dans votre ville : moins de 2.000, 2.000 à 9.999, 10.000 à 39.999, 40.000 à 79.999, 80.000 ou plus