Communities of Security Practice at Work? The Emerging African Maritime Security Regime

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Communities of Security Practice at Work? The Emerging African Maritime Security Regime

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ABSTRACT. Maritime security has been a long-neglected issue on the African security agenda. This situation is changing incrementally, not the least because of the attention to the problem of piracy in the continent's waters. The "piracy momentum" has led to a significant intensification of maritime security cooperation. This article analyzes current processes, strategies, and institutional responses to maritime security challenges. Drawing on a practice-theoretical constructivist reading of regime convergence, this article investigates how continental actors interact, develop a common repertoire, and engage in joint enterprises to address maritime security challenges. It argues that several nascent transnational collectives are developing that can be interpreted as providing the nucleus of maritime security communities.

KEYWORDS. Maritime security, security communities, communities of practice, securitization, African politics

THE SALIENCE OF MARITIME SECURITY IN AFRICA

Maritime security has been a long-neglected stepchild of African security politics.[1] International donors as well as African states have paid only scant attention to maritime threats and how maritime borders and regional waters can be protected and policed. The construction of the African security architecture mainly focuses on land-based conflict and its resolution. It remains preoccupied with more traditional security issues—interstate and civil war or land-based concerns such as transnational terrorism.

Issues of maritime security are, however, vital for the continent in several regards. Maritime security concerns the economic development of coastal states: the benefits of a country's exclusive economic zone, including fishing and off-shore resource exploitation, can be realized only within effective maritime security regimes. Insecure waters can have a considerable negative impact on trade flows and transport costs. Maritime border disputes, if unresolved, carry a high potential for military escalation up to the level of interstate war. Actors threatening or challenging state governments, including transnational criminal organizations and illegal traffickers of humans, weapons, ammunitions or goods, thrive on maritime instability.[2] Weak maritime security may also further smuggling and significantly undermine the tax monopoly of the state. Maritime security is hence an important issue that relates to various questions of stability and economic development.

There is, however, a new momentum of recognition for maritime security. International and regional actors have started to tackle maritime security and to develop strategies and new institutions. The initial spark for this development has been the threat posed by piracy originating in Somalia as well as West Africa. Piracy has drawn considerable attention to the maritime dimension of security and demonstrated the potential of apparently very local (African) problems to rapidly gain transnational scale and impact world economy. Piracy has proven to be an actual threat of significant proportions. Responding to piracy has revealed how difficult it is to tackle maritime security threats and how weak the continent's infrastructure is to react to (or even prevent) their escalation. While in 2012 and 2013 the rates of successful piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia are down and the problem appears to be contained, piracy continues to thrive in West African waters. The partial success of containing Somali piracy, however, comes at the price of extensive international naval deployments as well as significant investments of the maritime industry in private security. International and regional actors have increasingly sought institutional solutions that can contain piracy in the long run. Developing these solutions intends not only to address piracy but the broader spectrum of maritime security challenges. The piracy problem has created a window of opportunity for considering the maritime in the African security architecture and to improve the maritime security relations on the continent.

This article presents one of the first reviews of the recent attempts to lift maritime security on the African security agenda, to formulate maritime strategies for the continent, and to build institutions. I document how maritime security is addressed by a slowly but gradually emerging regime complex. Describing responses to maritime security by the concept of "regime complex" is useful since the emerging maritime security structures have a significant degree of complexity, form anything but a well-ordered coherent whole, and are characterized by informality, process, multiplicity, overlap, contradictions, and incoherencies.[3] Interaction is, however, very recent; no established patterns of interaction have been formed, and much of it is still in the early stages of construction. Hence, African maritime security structures form an "emergent" regime complex. Because of this emergent character, such a regime complex is less likely to have systemic effects and condition actor's behavior. In contrast to more mature regime complexes, such as global climate governance, emerging ones are less characterized by competition between institutions[4], but are driven by concerns of setting up linkages in the first place. The core analytical task then becomes one of following the actors in their attempts to construct more stable patterns of interaction, develop common resources and projects, and align their behavior. These construction efforts can then in turn be interpreted in terms of which prospects for intensification and convergence they show. Given the emergent character of the new regime complex, the focus has to be on construction efforts rather than evaluations about efficacy. At present it is too early to tell or speculate which structures of cooperation and competition the regime complex will develop and how effective it will become.

In the case of the African maritime security regime complex we are dealing with a security issue area. In consequence, it makes sense to study it by drawing on contemporary security theory. A natural and well-established candidate to develop an ideal understanding for cooperation and convergence is the concept of "security community." To use the concept as a tool requires, however, some reinterpretation of the traditionalist notion and rephrasing it in the light of contemporary security theory. Hence, the core question addressed in this article is whether the current activities of building an African maritime security regime complex can be understood as moves to the formation of a "security community."

To address this question I develop an understanding of an ideal-type of convergence as flourishing and well integrated security community. Thus, I read moves in the direction of such a security community as my core indicator for more convergence. Security community formation can be described on three levels: (1) the intensity with which actors engage and communicate with one another, (2) the degree to which actors securitize together and develop a common repertoire, and (3) the degree to which they engage in a common enterprise. I limit my focus to continent-wide interactions, such as the formulation of an African maritime security strategy at the African

Union (AU), as well as the southern and eastern African responses, including in the framework of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) process. This article does not investigate maritime security cooperation in Western Africa in more detail, nor does it study in-depth the activities of international actors, such as the contributions of the European Union (EU) or the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) or the broader international counterpiracy architecture.[5]

The article is one of the first attempts to review current tendencies in maritime security cooperation from a theoretically informed perspective.[6] As such it contributes to three discourses: (1) the emerging discourses on how problems of maritime security can be governed, (2) the discourse on the shape and future of the African security architecture, and (3) the more general theoretical and methodological debates on how (African) security regimes can be interpreted and especially how the security community framework can be used productively.

The next section introduces the underlying understanding of convergence by briefly discussing the concept of security communities as ideal type. Drawing on securitization theory and the communities of practice framework, I suggest investigating African maritime security practice on the level of shared repertoires, joint enterprises, and mutual engagement. Then I study recent efforts of maritime security cooperation on the African as well as subregional level. I conclude in suggesting that we can observe strengthened maritime security cooperation. Yet some doubt is appropriate whether the objectives the continent has set itself will be achieved and whether maritime security cooperation leads to more stable and sustainable community structures.

SECURITY COMMUNITIES: IDEAL TYPES, SECURITIZATION AND COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE

The concept of security community describes a collective with a high level of transaction and communication in which nonviolent dispute resolution is the norm.[7] The discussion on security communities and on regime complex convergence share a number of similar concerns, such as the emergence of shared interests and identities and the question of overlap of different communities.[8] A security community can be understood as an ideal type of full convergence in the security issue area as members of a community do not consider themselves as threats anymore and have developed a common identity and engage in joint projects.[9]

It is important to be aware what it implies to speak of a security community as an ideal type. Ideal types are "epistemological tools or conceptual constructs enabling understanding."[10] For Max Weber, they present abstractions "from

historical reality meant to enable us to better understand and interpret actual phenomena."[11] Although based on an historical *extraction* of realities, they are formulated as *abstraction*. They are extreme forms of phenomena, and they are unrealistic. Actual phenomena might resemble to a larger or lesser degree an ideal type. It is exactly the difference between the real type and the ideal type that gives this epistemological tool its power. "Thus, they are constructions with no direct empirical reference but stipulate a distinctive (abstract, idealized) set of characteristics that enable comparison and classification."[12] Hence asking whether a form of political cooperation, such as the African maritime security regime complex, *is* a security community or not, misses the point. Understanding the concept in such a way also clarifies that a security community is not an actual irreversible end state of a political process. Community violence might still occur and the threat of the use of force might still be part of the interaction within the community.[13] It is important not to conflate an analytical concept with actual political practice.[14]

Rather than drawing up an understanding of security community as an ideal type by relying on the traditional definition provided by Karl Deutsch,[15] it is useful to rely on contemporary reformulations. In contrast to the Deutschian understanding, these move away from a focus on the nation state as the primary referent of security, go beyond war and conflict and consider the full breadth of contemporary security concerns, and, most important, center on practice. Since a regime complex is primarily "produced and reproduced through practices,"[16] it is important to acquire a thorough understanding of the concept of practice.

As Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver have pointed out, a security community can be understood as a collective in whom the members construct securitizations with one another.[17] By securitization the authors refer to the process by which issues are rendered as problematic because they present threats to the survival of a referent object.[18] A securitization process, moreover, goes along with proposals of measures, or scripts of action that should be adopted to protect the referent object from the threat. Securitization gives us an important understanding of the specificity of security regime complexes without reducing the issue area to problems of war and conflict, as is done in the traditional understanding of security communities. The main criterion for a security community is, then, that the members have a shared understanding of what constitutes a threat and what does not, what requires security action and what does not. In principle this implies that they are not securitizing one another.

Emanuel Adler has argued for an understanding of security community as a "community of practice" drawing on the work of practice theorists Etienne Wenger. Such a reconceptualization gives us a convincing concept of "practice" and how it matters in the formation of communities and regime systems.[19] For Wenger, "communities of practice" are characterized by a "shared repertoire," a "joint enterprise" and "mutual engagement."[20] A *shared repertoire* consists

of all of the tools that the community uses in its practices. This can include various artifacts, such as meeting documents, databases, or communication technology, but it also includes symbolic tools, such as representations, concepts or a common language code. The concept of repertoire provides a direct link to securitization theory since shared threat assessments can be seen as one element of this repertoire. A *shared enterprise* is a distinct project that the community pursues. Such projects provide standards of evaluation as well as normative direction for the community. This can be, for instance, projects of institution building, developing the repertoire further, or bringing about certain states of affair. Joint enterprises suggest a second link to securitization theory given that securitization entails proposals for measures or projects of protection. Finally, the concept of *mutual engagement* points to the importance of continuous interactions, communication, and deliberations among a community's members. This dimension restores some of the original characteristics of the Deutschian understanding of communities, which were above all characterized by intense communication.[21] Practice is what gives coherence to the community, what combines these three elements. The concept of practice is important as it is the intermediary between individuals and structures; that is, in the present case, the collective. An individual becomes a member in the collective in participating in the collective's practices while the collective in turn is glued together and made in those practices.

Such a conceptualization, moreover, leaves scale open and hence allows for grasping complexity. It does not suggest how large or small a community is, who its members are, or how many members are required. This is important to gain a fluid and contingent understanding of security communities and to relate the concept to the concern of regime complex theory. There might be several communities and they might be nested, overlap, or in conflict with one another. An individual might participate in only one community or in several. Hence one security community might be nested or overlap with another.[22] This allows for disaggregating the state as unitary actor and focusing on the transnational dimension. The nation state is but one community of practices in which actors participate. Individuals are the members of a collective, not states. This enables us to investigate communities of military professionals or diplomats, which are the conventional focus of security community research. But with the same toolbox we can investigate, for instance, a Southern African community of conservationists sharing the securitization of poachers and mutually engaging in a joint enterprise such as Rhinoforce fighting the poaching of rhinos or an East African community of humanitarians that shares the securitization of hunger and mutually engages in humanitarian projects or the coordination of them. Phrased otherwise, security communities can be issue-specific, and they may include other actors than those representing the state (or might even explicitly exclude state officials). The focus of analysis is hence on the smaller specific collectives that form security communities. In the light of my

empirical focus these are "maritime security communities." These may or may not be nested within larger geographical or other issue-specific community structures.

In summary, to investigate actual convergence the article draws on the ideal type of a security community as defined previously. A security community is characterized by a shared repertoire tha includes a shared securitization, a joint enterprise to include shared projects of protection, and a high level of mutual engagement. This framework hence induces the study of the practices in which actors engage with one another, build shared repertoires, construct securitizations, and develop joint enterprises. It allows us a sense of how actors build a maritime security regime complex and whether and how it develops toward a security community.

REVIEWING AFRICAN MARITIME SECURITY COMPLEX

Maritime security was for a long time not a major issue of African security, and significant efforts to construct a maritime security regime complex started toward the mid-2000s. Yet a number of institutions already addressed it before the 2000s. Thirty-seven African states are members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The IMO Council, its main government body, has continuously included African representatives. The continent has a maritime transport charter since 1993 and in consequence the AU has a maritime office. Yet, as le Roux observed in 2006,

> the Common African Defence and Security Policy of the African Union . . . fails to address any maritime issue or threat. Indeed, reading these documents leaves the impression of an Africa without a coastline or maritime zone, let alone broader maritime interests such as trade and maritime resources.[23]

Of Africa's regional organizations, SADC introduced in 1995 a Standing Maritime Committee (SMC) as a sub-body of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). An intensification of activities on maritime security starts from the early 2000s. Concerns over maritime terrorism led to a new level of naval engagement in the frame of the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces patrolling the Eastern Indian Ocean. Activities also concerned new forms of international regulation, such as the adoption of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code as part of the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).[24] The ISPS code, which came into force in 2004, induced considerable international pressure to improve risk management at the more than 100 port facilities in Africa. The following sections demonstrate that mutual activities intensified from 2005, new institutions were built, and existing ones started to address maritime security.

My analysis traces actual practices mainly by studying policy documents, meeting protocols, speeches, and newspaper articles. It starts with an investigation of the mutual engagement of actors concerned about maritime security. Since the objective is to understand practice, it aims at identifying where actors meet and how they use existing institutions and create new ones. Mutual engagement not only takes place in existing institutions such as the AU but also in a range of newly created forums. This exploration of mutual engagement is the most extended since this introduces the main activities and forums. Then the analysis considers the repertoires of the emerging maritime security regime complex. Drawing on a broad understanding of repertoire, it scrutinizes the different shared tools at the disposal of the identified collectives. The repertoire consists of documents, strategies, and technology on the one side and shared securitizations on the other. Finally, the joint enterprises of the collectives with an emphasis on future developments are discussed. The intention is to provide an overview of the emergent practices building a maritime security regime complex. Hence, not all of the activities can be studied in clandestine details.

Mutual Engagement: New Forums of Maritime Security Practice

Mutual engagement is first observable in a number of more or less informal meeting formats that were established from 2005 onward. In 2005 the first Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS) was held and attended by senior naval military officials. SPAS has become one of the major forums for interaction, with further meetings held in 2006, 2009, and 2011. Participation has continuously become more extended. The inaugural meeting was attended by senior naval military officials of 24 states, where later meetings included representatives from all African states, major international organizations, civil authorities, port facility, and transport industry representatives or academic experts. Another format, the East Africa and Southwest Indian Ocean Maritime Security Conference (EASWIO), was, on the initiative of the U.S. naval command, inaugurated in 2006. EASWIO participants came from the African Indian Ocean littoral states. The first conference was primarily attended by military staff and focused on the development of national maritime strategies. Yet the two follow-up conferences in 2007 and 2008 broadened the agenda and focused on regional strategies and the work of civil maritime authorities. At the 2007 conference, first ideas for developing a pan-African maritime security strategy in the frame of the AU were discussed. The 2007 conference also led to the establishment of two working groups tasked to explore the possibilities of regional strategies that met throughout 2008.

Conferences, symposiums, or seminars are major instruments of mutual engagement. They provide forums for discussion and significant interaction and communication opportunities. Although the number of participants is limited, they strengthen transnational relations and are the backdrop for the

development of joint enterprises. As one participant to the second EASWIO phrased it: "This is a great opportunity for people from different countries to bring different ideas to the table, discuss possible solutions and develop a plan to work toward a common goal when it comes to maritime security."[25]

For a U.S. Navy official, participation in EASWIO "demonstrates a willingness to work together to counter those who wish to exploit for political, ideological or criminal reasons the region's maritime domain. The collaboration lays a strong foundation, and it will need to be strong as this is a commitment of years, not days."[26]

The outcome of the EASWIO process was a training center focused on maritime security, which leads us to a further important type of mutual engagement: joint training. The Maritime Center of Excellence (MCE) became operational in June 2009 and is training junior officials since. Training centers are important instruments for mutual engagement. As one graduate from the first training course said:

> I got to know my comrade who polices Kenyan waters because I am with him in the same training . . . . That's great because here we can get contact. I know him now personally, and he knows me personally. On the other side [of Lake Victoria] which he is opposite me, we can talk in case of anything, any [accident], in case of any emergency or anything that happens in the waters.[27]

The importance of such activities is further highlighted by a professor teaching one of the courses: "I think that is the most important part [of the training], is being able to have these nations and their representatives sit down and communicate with each other and understand what each of them brings to the table amongst these various scenarios that were going through."[28]

From the perspective of Wenger's community of practice theory, training activities are a central mechanism for fostering mutual engagement.[29] They widen the collective of practitioners and introduce new members to the practices of a collective by familiarizing them with the repertoire.

Another initiative was launched by the IMO in 2005. IMO sponsored a series of meetings to discuss the prospects of regional maritime security cooperation in the Western Indian Ocean region, including African states and littorals from the Arabian Peninsula. The first subregional seminar on piracy and armed robbery against ships and maritime security was held in Sana'a, Yemen, in April 2005, and followed up by meetings in Muscat, Oman, in January 2006 and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in April 2008. The 2008 seminar developed a draft regional memorandum of understanding, which became the basis of a regional agreement, the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) signed at the follow-up conference in Djibouti in January 2009. While the initial attempt was to formulate a broader maritime security alignment, the DCoC concentrates on counter-piracy efforts. The corner stone of the agreement are joint

training activities as well as the improvement of communication through three information sharing centers and a system of national focal points.[30]

In 2009 a further conference format on maritime security was introduced, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Launched and initially sponsored by the Indian navy, the annual symposium brings together naval representatives from the Indian Ocean littoral states. It is hence a cross-regional format. Although broader in scope it presents a platform in which representatives from African navies meet one another. The IONS initiative also includes a joint publication titled IONSphere and an essay competition. Hence IONS goes beyond a conference format and is also an instrument for producing shared knowledge about maritime security.

The number of conferences and seminars that reflect mutual engagement is certainly even broader. A significant number of more ad hoc events took place starting from 2006, including several seminars hosted by think tanks such as the Institute for Security Studies or the South African Institute for International Affairs as well as the South African maritime security conference organized by Defenseweb.

A different form of mutual engagement developed through the introduction of the Search and Rescue (SAR) infrastructure and the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). Based on the global attempt to develop an infrastructure of monitoring and information sharing on maritime traffic in the frame of the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, it was decided at a conference in 2000 to establish five Regional Maritime Rescue Centers (MRCCs) in Mombasa, Cape Town, Lagos, Monrovia, and Morocco and 26 Maritime Rescue Subcenters (MRSCs). The centers rely on multilateral treaties and are designed to cooperatively provide search and rescue coverage by monitoring ship movements, information sharing, and coordinating rescue attempts. The first MRCC became operational in 2006 (Mombasa) and the last in 2011 (Marocco). As Wells commented on this process, "for the first time in African history a real maritime security 'neighborhood watch' is becoming operational in each of the regional sea areas."[31] Introducing the regional and subregional centers was accompanied by an extended training program by the IMO. The centers provide a platform of communication on maritime security across the continent. That the role of the centers should not be seen as a minor technical form of cooperation was forcefully emphasized by the IMO secretary general during the opening of the Monrovia MRCC:

> I have no doubt that this network of regional MRCCs and their associated sub centres will vastly improve the capability of the region to effectively coordinate operations for the search and rescue of people in distress at sea, while, at the same time, strengthening the capacity of countries in this part of Africa to ensure effective responses to all threats to maritime security, including threats from criminal elements such as pirates and armed robbers.[32]

As highlighted by Mitropolous, the GMDSS is more than a plain technical infrastructure but is a major tool for cooperation. Indeed it is one tool in the new shared repertoire of African maritime security alignments.

Maritime Security and Engagement in Existing Organizations

The activities described so far are forms of mutual engagement outside of formal security institutions. They are attempts to build and institutionalize new platforms for mutual engagement in the form of regular conferences, training centers, and information-sharing infrastructures. In the next step I investigate mutual engagement in the committees and meetings of existing organizations—IGAD, SADC, and AU. Both SADC and AU have formalized cooperation in the form of a maritime security strategy document.

IGAD issued a first communiqué addressing maritime security concerns in 2005. Addressing the issue of Somali piracy, the IGAD Council of Ministers decided to coordinate its strategies and action plans to face this challenge. Maritime security issues (notably Somali piracy), smuggling, and illegal fishing and waste dumping were recurrent themes in IGAD's various meetings. Maritime security was placed on the agenda of IGAD's Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT). ICPAT commissioned a study "The Impact of Piracy on the IGAD Region," which was published and discussed in various meetings in May 2009. The report called for further regional cooperation to tackle piracy. Following up, during the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa–Indian Ocean Community Regional Workshop on Piracy for the Eastern and Southern Africa in July 2010, IGAD was tasked to draft a "Somalia Inland Action Plan to counter and prevent Piracy 2010–2015." A further study was commissioned to draft such a plan, which was finalized in December 2010. The plan focused on addressing the root causes in Somalia as well as improving regional infrastructure yet did not see direct implementation. When the IGAD Security Sector Program (SSP) replaced the ICPAT in 2011, maritime security became one of four core pillars. The March 2013 action plan projects major investments in maritime security coordination and infrastructure.

SADC addressed maritime security issues within its annual SMC meetings. The SMC initially coordinated naval forces of the SADC member states. Joint activities include regular naval exercises often in cooperation with other littorals such as Kenya as well as an annual naval pentathlon and regatta. Engagement intensified following a July 2011 Extraordinary Meeting of the SADC Defence and Security Council and Senior Staff Council on a Regional Anti-Piracy Strategy. The meeting was interpreted as a "historic occasion, as never before has all the defence chiefs of SADC gathered in the same place."[33] The strategy was formally adopted at a heads of states summit in Angola in August 2011. The strategy proposes the joint procurement of naval vessels and

the creation of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) centers—a mechanism to strengthen information sharing on maritime security incidents and maritime traffic. The strategy also encourages the revision of legal frameworks to persecute pirates and to work toward the ratification of international maritime treaties. A task force was formed, comprising navy commanders from Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa to lead implementation. The strategy led to two MDA centers on the basis of a Memoranda of Understanding signed by the member states as well as the appointment of permanent liaison officers for information sharing. The MDA centers attempt to integrate existing data in a single place and make them available to participants. In addition information is collected from local observers acting as "coastal watchers."[34]

The AU secretariat started to develop ideas for jointly addressing maritime security from 2007. Before dealing with maritime security specifically, the AU worked toward a revision of its 1993 maritime transport charter. When the new charter was adopted at a summit in 2009, it was complemented with a resolution that addressed maritime security. The so-called Durban Resolution announced the agreement to cooperate and embraced the ISPS code as well as DCoC as the major mechanisms for furthering maritime security. Work on a maritime security strategy started formally in April 2010 with a first expert workshop held on the matter followed by a more extended conference in October of the same year. In June 2011 a task force was announced that was mandated to develop a draft for what became the 2050 African Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy. The draft was discussed at further expert workshops throughout 2011 and 2012 as well as at the Conference of African Ministers Responsible for Maritime-Related Affairs and the High Level African Maritime Cross-Sectoral Senior Officials meeting. Work on the AIM strategy was completed by end of 2012. The strategy projects a permanent review mechanism in the frame of a triannual revision of the strategy and an annual review of its implementation. Moreover, part of the strategy is the creation of a 2050 AIM Strategy High Level College of Champions (HLC2), which is tasked to contribute to the implementation by sustained lobbying throughout Africa.

In summary, a significant intensification of mutual engagement between various actors can be identified in which the regime complex is being build. There is a significant territorial overlap. There are Pan-African, sub- , and cross-regional forms of engagement. Interaction not only takes place in the frame of existing institutional settings but also in a range newly created ones. Different types of actors engage with one another. These include navy officials that have been driving many of the processes, senior representatives from civil authorities, such as ministries of transport, fisheries, or port authorities as well as academic and think tank experts. While these actors form the nucleus of the alignments, two further actors are significant: junior staff who are trained in the newly established training centers and state representatives and politicians who have been authorizing the new strategies in official declarations

and memoranda. What are the common resources developed throughout this engagement process? In the next section I investigate what kind of shared repertoire is part of the emerging African maritime security regime complex.

Shared Repertoires and Securitization

As Wenger argues, shared repertoires include "routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, gestures, symbols, genres, actions or concepts."[35] Repertoires develop through mutual engagement and become a core part of the practices of a collective. The discussion of mutual engagement has revealed a number of elements that are part of the shared repertoire of Africa's maritime security complex. Indeed a thicket of several elements can be identified. These include, first, technological infrastructures. The RCMCCs, DCoC, and SADC entail the establishment of information sharing centers. Such centers collect data about the maritime domain and make them available to participants. They produce a joint repertoire of basic information about what is happening in the maritime domain. Second, training centers, including the MCE and the DCoC centers, are not only a tool for interaction but also develop a common stock of knowledge. This knowledge is what participants learn and can be said to share afterward. Third, the newly established meeting formats ranging from SPAS and IONS to the AU minister meetings and the HLC2 are part of the repertoire in so far as they provide routines for engagement through regular meetings. Fourth, the regime complex is developed against the backdrop of the international law of the sea (UNCLOS) as well as conventions (e.g., SOLAS) and codes (e.g., ISPS). Although not all African states have ratified these legal provisions, they form the foundation for building the regime complex. Indeed, the majority of documents produced so far refers to these legal standards as the basic framework for interaction and emphasize to work toward ratification and compliance. Fifth, the documents produced in the activities are a major part of the shared repertoire. Such documents include meeting protocols, conference presentations and papers, declarations and statements, and officially adopted strategies. Such documents are often conceived to be merely rhetoric. Yet they are more than this. As policy researchers and anthropologists have shown, documents are one of the main materials of policymaking. Documents create a policy trajectory. As Riles argues, "Conferences and documents form a kind of chain. The history of documents is created through the unfolding of one conference from the materials produced at another, the incorporation of one document into the next."[36]

Indeed the documents are nested in one another in at least two ways. One document refers to the earlier document. For instance, meeting protocols of the SMC refer to and discuss the protocol of the earlier year. But there is also cross-referencing of documents. The AIM strategy refers to SPAS, or IONS declarations are referenced in SMC documents. It is, hence, through the use of

documents that regimes become linked and nested in one another. One further feature of documents is that they can be circulated to even far distance. Through their materiality they can travel and allow for the coordination of action. As Freeman and Maybin state:

> The physical properties of policy documents extend the scope and reach of governments in space and time. Their material inscription means that a standard message can be communicated to numerous public servants in numerous and often distant locations, coordinating their actions. And the same message can serve as a reference point for successive actors and actions over time."[37]

It is in this sense that documents are part of the repertoire. They link different actors and institutions, allow for the coordination of action, and provide resources for further activities.

In-depth ethnographies will be required to reveal and understand further elements of a shared repertoire.[38] In how far can we also observe shared representations? A core feature of security communities is that they share threat assessments and that these are part of the repertoire. Meeting documents and transcripts of speeches provide major clues for shared threat assessments. Analyzing these documents, it becomes first observable that the majority of them point to a common set of maritime security threats: illegal resource exploitation, transnational organized crime, piracy, environmental pollution, and terrorist activities. Second, the threat of piracy is identified as a major motivation to address maritime security. For instance, DCoC primarily addresses piracy, and IGAD initially tackled piracy and only later broadened its agenda to include other maritime security concerns. SADC's response was triggered by a piracy incident that occurred in the waters of Mozambique and led to concerns that Somali piracy is coming closer to the subregion's maritime zones.[39] Also, the AU's development of the AIM strategy was, as documented in the Durban resolution, motivated by concerns over piracy. The piracy problem was important in the sense that it revealed that significant maritime threats exist and that only multilateral responses can address them.

Let me briefly discuss two paradigmatic statements that document how actors have framed maritime security. Other statements and documents reveal similar patterns. Maritime security is framed as a regional challenge, and the "region" or the "continent" is identified as the main reference object of securitization. There is a strong dimension of "othering" in the sense that the threats are conceived to be external and come from the outside. Moreover, maritime security is considered important because of its economic dimension rather than framed in terms of national security. The following statement was given by a SPAS participant:

> The challenge to us is to develop our maritime power, our naval power, to a level where this continent will no longer be an easy target. That does not mean building massive navies. It does mean developing the maritime and

> naval strength to control our waters, to protect our maritime assets and inter-
> ests, and to discourage adventures by foreign actors, be they states or non-state
> groups such as international terrorists, narcotics smugglers, illegal immigration
> or mercenaries.[40]

In this statement the reference object that requires protection is the continent which is so far an "easy target." The statement is also very explicit that the main perpetrators that maritime security shall be concerned about are foreign actors, which can be states or non-states. There is, moreover, a strong economic understanding of the challenges of maritime security. Such a pattern is visible in the following statement:

> Maritime security is a regional concern to all SADC Member States. Both
> SADC coastal states and SADC land-locked states are equally dependant on mar-
> itime trade. In many instances, SADC Maritime security is not only linked to
> trade, but also to other important aspects of their economy such as commercial
> fishing and tourism. SADC countries, even land-locked countries, are dependent
> on maritime trade for economic prosperity.[41]

The quote first documents another case in which the region is the main geo-graphical referent object of maritime security and, second, the speaker makes a strong case for the link to economic prosperity and stresses trade, fishing, and tourism as important elements. While these are only two paradigmatic examples they reveal common constructions of securitizations.

In summary, a substantial amount of elements make up an emergent shared repertoire. This includes technology, training centers, international law, documents, and shared securitizations. What are the main underlying joint enterprises?

Joint Enterprises

Throughout the mutual engagement a rich set of projects have been identified by actors and pursued. This included not only the drafting of shared strategy documents and the ratification of treaties and memoranda of understanding. The joint projects that the maritime security regimes develop have been well described by Leijenaar. Following her, the projects consist of developing

> effective maritime legislation, the establishment of a combined exclusive
> maritime zone, good governance, education and training, ports and harbour
> management, maritime scientific research, inclusion of the private sector in
> developments, risk management, maritime defence and security, tourism, estab-
> lishment of regional maritime early warning centres, common fisheries policies
> and a naval component.[42]

This is arguably a very wide set of tasks. Seen from a contemporary per-spective, some of these enterprises are advanced already. One shared project

is, hence, the maintenance of the structures that have been developed in the past decade. This includes keeping information-sharing centers staffed and operational as well as ensuring that training activities are ongoing. It is also to further intensify the communication among maritime security officials, experts, and ministers dealing with maritime matters as well as to ensure that the information sharing systems and training activities run smoothly.

The other areas will require ongoing work. Information is not enough, since naval capabilities are also required to police waters or make arrests. Building and maintaining naval capabilities is a core challenge. Procurement can, however, be a costly and politically difficult exercise. Electorates might reject the significant investments required, and corruption can drive up costs. Since navies require advanced training to become operational, this is also a long-term project. Training officers can easily take decades. Strengthening maritime security will require significant technical competence as well as a considerable level of interagency and civil-military coordination, which is already difficult to achieve on the national level. Moreover, the different treaties, codes, and memoranda of understanding that will have to be ratified induce a lengthy legislative process.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN MARITIME SECURITY

Maritime security has become a major challenge for the African continent. From 2005 onward, and significantly intensifying with the growing concerns over Somali piracy, a diverse set of institutions is under construction to address maritime security. In consequence, a maritime security regime complex is emerging. This article has described the work of constructing this regime complex along three domains. An investigation of mutual engagement revealed a rich set of new types of activities and forums. New meeting formats imply increased communication—information-sharing platforms develop a common stock of knowledge and information and training centers educate a new generation of maritime security officials. A shared repertoire is being developed in these activities. Elements in this repertoire include technical infrastructures, training centers, legal codes, documents, and shared securitizations and threat assessments. Moreover, various joint enterprises can be identified, stretching from the maintenance of the built infrastructure to the developing of navies, education, ratification processes and coordination challenges.

These observations allow for the conclusion that various overlapping and nested collectives are being formed that constitute proto-forms of maritime security communities. These are issue-specific collectives. Their nucleuses are actors other than politicians, statespeople, and diplomats. They are driven by actors such as naval staff and maritime experts. We can observe an intensifying level of interaction and communication, the construction of shared repertoires,

and evolving joint enterprises of these maritime actors. Yet these actors are specialized transnational professional communities. It would be, hence, a mistake to suggest that these communities allow for conclusions in regard to general African interstate security community formation. The value of the revised understanding of security communities introduced in this contribution is to make visible these smaller formations of transnational collectives that work toward the formation of issue-specific security communities via shared securitizations and forming communities of practice.

In observing the efforts of constructing a maritime security regime complex, we can see patterns of interaction emerging that indicate a growing convergence. The maritime security regime complex is, however, an emergent one. While a trend toward convergence is apparent, at present claims about the future shape of the regime complex and the efficacy it will have to respond to maritime security challenges are speculative. Further insights will be required on which practices are shared by actors in the frame of which collectives and how temporarily precarious they are. This will require more detailed, centrally ethnographic, studies. Further investigations will have to study how the vast challenges of furthering maritime security cooperation are tackled; how agreements, strategies, and memoranda are translated into action; and whether the maritime security regimes and communities grow in members and resources. This will also entail asking whether the African maritime security regime complex, once it matures, corresponds with the expectations of regime complex theorists and conditions the behavior of African actors through the logic of competition and forum shopping mechanisms.

NOTES

1. Francois Vreÿ, "African Maritime Security: A Time for Good Order at Sea," *Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs* 2, no. 4 (2010): 121–132.

2. J. Ashley Roach, "Initiatives to Enhance Maritime Security at Sea," *Marine Policy* 28, no. 1 (2004): 41–66.

3. For the discussion on the concept of regime complexes, see Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, "The Politics of International Regime Complexity," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 1 (2009): 13–24; Thomas Gehring and Benjamin Faude, "The Dynamics of Regime Complexes: Microfoundations and Systemic Effects," *Global Governance* 19 (2013): 119–130; and Malte Brosig, "The African Security Regime Complex: Exploring Converging Actors and Policies," *African Security*, in this issue.

4. On the notion of competition as a core characteristic of regime complexes, see Alter and Meunier, "The Politics of International Regime Complexity," and Gerhing and Faude, "The Dynamics of Regime Complexes."

5. A detailed analysis of maritime security regime building in West Africa is provided in Adjoa Anyimadu, "Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean," *Chatham House Paper 2* (London: Chatham House, 2013). An overview of the counter-piracy architecture can be found in Christian Bueger, "Responses to Contemporary Piracy: Disentangling the Organizational Field," in *Modern Piracy: Legal*

Challenges and Responses ed. Douglas Guilfoyle (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013): 91–114.

6. For excellent, more policy-oriented discussions, see Deane-Peter Baker, "The South African Navy and African Maritime Security," *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 2 (2012): 145–165; Frank C. van Rooyen, "Africa's Maritime Dimension: Unlocking and Securing the Potential of Its Seas—Interventions and Opportunities," *African Security Review* 16, no. 2 (2007): 109–119; Paul Musili Wambua, "Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation in Africa: The Planned End State," *African Security Review* 18, no. 3 (2009): 45–59; Vreÿ, "African Maritime Security."

7. For discussions on the original concept see Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," in *Security Communities*, eds. Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 3–28; Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 2 (2006): 275–299.

8. See notably Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities," and Benedikt Franke, "Africa's Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multilayered Security Communities," *Cooperation and Conflict* 43, no. 3 (2008): 313–340.

9. See Brosig, "The African Security Regime Complex," for the formulation of a related ideal type of full security convergence.

10. Mark R. Rutgers, "Splitting the Universe: On the Relevance of Dichotomies for the Study of Public Administration," *Administration & Society* 33, no. 1 (2001): 15.

11. Ibid., 14.

12. Ibid.

13. For the case of the transatlantic community see Gunther Hellmann and Benjamin Herborth, "Fishing in the Mild West: Democratic Peace and Militarised Interstate Disputes in the Transatlantic Community," *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 3 (2008): 481–506.

14. In this sense the discussion on security communities on the African continent has mainly misread the epistemology of the concept since the debate is centered on the question of whether African security cooperation can be understood as a security community. See Nathan, "Domestic Instability Security Regime Complex," Franke, "Africa's Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multilayered Security Communities," and the symposium in *African Security Review* 19(2).

15. See Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective."

16. Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring, "Institutional Interaction Ten Years of Scholarly Development," in *Managing Institutional Complexity*, eds. Sebastian Oberthür and Olav Schram Stokke (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 47.

17. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, "Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory," *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (2009): 254.

18. For formulations of securitization theory see Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46–86; and in the context of the discussion on security communities see Ole Wæver, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community," in *Security Communities*, eds. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 79–81. The securitization of piracy is discussed in Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, "Security Communities, Alliances and Macro-securitization: The Practices of Counter-Piracy Governance," in

Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance, eds. Michael J. Struett et al. (London: Routledge, 2012).

19. Emanuel Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post–Cold War Transformation," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 2 (2008): 195–230; Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve, "When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance," *Review of International Studies* 35, no. S1 (2009): 59–84.

20. Etienne Wenger, *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 72ff.

21. Mathias Albert, Oliver Kessler, and Stephan Stetter, "On Order and Conflict: International Relations and the 'Communicative Turn,'" *Review of International Studies* 34, no. S1 (2008): 43–67.

22. For the idea of the nestedness of security communities, see Franke, "Africa's Evolving Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multilayered Security Communities." This conceptualization, however, remains tied to the state as a unitary actor.

23. Len le Roux, "Experts Warn of Piracy Threat to South African Water," *Pretoria News*, November 27, 2006, http://www.issafrica.org/pgcontent.php?UID=15664.

24. See Nathalie Klein, *Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 157–163.

25. Quoted in Wanjuguna, "CJTF-HOA co-hosts Maritime Security Conference in Kenya," Wanjuguna Internet Blog, 2007, http://wanjuguna.blogspot.co.uk/2007/10/cjtf-hoa-co-hosts-maritime-security.html.

26. Quoted in Ibid.

27. Jesse B. Awalt, "Joint Training Enhances Maritime Security among African Partners," *US Navy News Story*, December 8, 2009, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=47529.

28. Ibid.

29. See Wenger, *Communities of Practice*, 214ff.

30. Christian Bueger and Mohanvir Singh Saran, "Finding a Regional Solution to Piracy: Is the Djibouti Process the Answer?" Piracy Studies Blog, August 2012, http://piracy-studies.org/2012/finding-a-regional-solution-to-piracy-is-the-djibouti-process-the-answer.

31. Robert S. Wells, "Africa Needs a New Map," *Journal of International Peace Operations* 6, no. 4 (2011), http://web.peaceops.com/archives/1170.

32. Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, *Commissioning of Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, Monrovia, Liberia. Speech given in Monrovia, April 24, 2009* (London: International Maritime Organization, 2009).

33. Chris Szabo, "SADC Defence Conference "Historic,"" *SA Reporter*, July 26, 2011, http://sareporter.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2201&Itemid=1.

34. Graeme Hoskens, "Big Drive on to Boost SA Naval Security," *IOL News*, March 19, 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/big-drive-on-to-boost-sa-naval-security-1.1259754#.UUTjSBfIY_p.

35. Wenger, *Communities of Practice*, 83.

36. Annelise Riles, "[Deadlines]: Removing the Brackets on Politics in Bureaucratic and Anthropological Analysis," in *Documents. Artifacts of Modern Knowledge*, ed. Annelise Riles (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006): 80.

37. Richard Freeman and Jo Maybin, "Documents, Practices and Policy," *Evidence & Policy* 7, no. 2 (2011): 160.

38. For instance, symbols, such as the AIM logo, or routines that can be observed in the meetings.

39. Hoskens, "Big Drive on to Boost SA Naval Security."

40. Ronnie Kasrils, "Opening Address at the "Sea Power for Africa" Symposium," August 29, 2005, http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05083113151001.htm.

41. Christopher Szabo, "Southern African States Tackle Joint Anti-piracy Strategy," *Digital Journal*, July 26, 2011, http://digitaljournal.com/article/309559.

42. Annette Leijenaar, "Africa Should Wake up to the Importance of an Integrated Maritime Strategy," Institute for Security Studies News Blog, 2012, http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1552.