An Ethnography of Alterity: Margins, Markets, Morality.

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Contents

Abstract

The focus of this thesis is alterity. More accurately, the possibilities of an alternative to the predicament of demoralisation (Fevre, 2000). Demoralisation is a theoretical concept that attempts to account for real world problems. My own reading of the term suggests that these problems are threefold, encompassing: the absence of moral certainty and guides to action, the absence of morale or happiness and a deficiency in social integration. In sum, it can be thought of as a modern day version of anomie that hints at problems with morality, (post)modernity, market hegemony and the everyday. Alterity is studied here as a possible arena in which to subvert and escape this predicament.

Over a year was spent conducting fieldwork using participant observation ethnography. Fieldwork was conducted at multiple sites including an intentional community, a Buddhist retreat centre, a fair trade shop, a real food market that sells local, organic and fair trade produce, a world music festival and a 'new age' dancing group. These sites were selected in the course of the research because they constituted themselves as alternatives to the problems of mainstream, modern, market driven and everyday living. The empirical focus is on the ways in which alterity can occasion cultural and affectual forms of subversion (rather than political and ideological ones) because demoralisation – like anomie – is a cultural and affectual predicament.

In terms of methodological innovation, my PhD represents a contribution to the development of multi site ethnography (Marcus, 1986). It pioneers the strategy of 'tracking analytic themes' to do justice to the range of contexts in which alterity appears and the multiple manifestations it takes. Similarly, it develops ways of thinking about the relationship between theory and empirical research. As an ethnography, this thesis makes connections (Strathern, 1991) such that an evocation (Tyler, 1986) of alterity is offered alongside attempts to engage in myriad theoretical debates. The empirical research is used to displace and develop existing social theories without attempting to falsify them or offer new theories in their place. The theoretical areas of interest are: alterity, marginality, ethos, embodiment, the nature of modernity and processes of social ordering, the nature of transgression, the nature of individuality/identity, the nature of community/sociality and the interface between the market and morality. Additionally, there is a commitment to social philosophy. Here, concepts such as deconstruction (Derrida, 1967) the fold (Deleuze, 1993), heterotopia (Hetherington, 1997), motility (Munro, 2001 [1992]) and the relation (Strathern, 1995) are borrowed from continental philosophy and contemporary social anthropology to make sense of the data and to mount a defence of the social against postmodern tendencies.

The central conclusion of the PhD concerns the fieldwork sites in relation to demoralisation. Noting the impossibility of a wholesale escape from demoralisation, the PhD considers how the fieldwork sites engage with and utilise the things they seek to subvert in order to fashion 'pockets of refuge' and occasion morality. In this spirit, it is concluded that something is better than nothing. With this, it is argued that an appreciation of heterogeneity, complexity, movement and balance can provide forms of subversion and a way forward that does not rely on a return to outmoded, one dimensional certainty.

Declaration

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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Date: 20-11-06

Statement 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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Prologue

This thesis is a study of alterity – of Otherness- and as such, takes lifestyles and practices that might be termed 'alternative' as its focus. In considering the nature of, indeed the very possibility of, alterity; one must consider quite what this 'Otherness' is 'Other' to. This will be dealt with in due course but for now, the generic term 'orthodoxy' can be used to avoid confusion whilst it is first considered why alterity is an area of contemporary interest in its own right. Alternative lifestyles and practices are nothing new; one can look back to myriad historical examples that do not get exhausted by travelling back to the 1960's (Romanticism springs to mind). Nevertheless, there is no doubting the ubiquity of lifestyles and practices that we think of as somehow 'alternative' in contemporary Western cultures. For example, it is estimated that 1% of people living in Australia and Europe are living or making plans to reside in an intentional community. Bypassing the obvious limits of such statistics, this 1% appears small but when one considers the combined population of Australia and Europe *and* the fact that moving to an intentional community potentially marks a radical departure from life, work and family; this *is* significant.

Moving away from this somewhat radical manifestation of alterity; it can be noted that alterity occupies our cultural landscape in less dramatic ways. For example, there is a large amount of interest in alternative forms of spirituality be it in the form of 'Eastern' religions such as Buddhism or 'new age' practices such as yoga and meditation. One need only look at the invariably large 'mind body and spirit' section in the high street bookshops or the Sunday supplements to see the place that such practices occupy within the popular consciousness. Similarly, one cannot help but notice - as Hetherington (1998) reminds us - that in any medium sized town in Britain, one is likely to find 'ethnic bric a brac' shops, health food and whole food shops as well as practitioners of holistic/complementary health and therapy. Then there are festivals and the myriad other ways in which persons engage in something a little different (perhaps only for a day or weekend), transcend the everyday and let go of themselves. Glastonbury is, of course, the most salient example and one need only consider the excitement when tickets go on sale to see the contemporary significance of 'festival' as a vehicle for transgression and alterity. At the opposite

end of the spectrum, the phenomenon of 'retreat' can be considered as a way in which persons go about doing something different, stepping outside of ordinary life and getting away from the quotidian. According to the *Good Retreat Guide*, retreat can take many forms, most notably 'mind, body spirit', 'meditation' and 'yoga'. Incidentally, the very fact that there is a *Good Retreat Guide* and that it is a bestselling book, now in its fifth edition with rave reviews across the board (from the Guardian to Vogue), indicates both the popularity and significance of retreat as a vehicle for alterity.

As will be seen in this thesis, food is an integral component in respect of alterity. On a more general level, one need only look to the contemporary significance of local, organic, fair trade and vegetarian eating to consider the importance of food in relation to alterity. This trend is buttressed from all angles, ranging from ecological pressure groups and the slow food movement to celebrity chefs championing local and organic produce. The presence of such items on supermarket shelves and the fact that sales of organic food are rising at a rate of 10% a year are perhaps the greatest indicators of this trend. This leads to the observation that, quite literally, alterity is a serious business. Going back to the high street we can see body shop outlets (selling animal and environmentally friendly produce) in most British towns and cities except now, after a £652 million bid, it is owned by L'oreal just as the Prêt a Manger cafés (selling organic, fair trade, hand prepared food) that can found on virtually every street in London are in part (33% to be precise) owned by McDonalds. Similarly, Green and Blacks organic chocolate is now owned by Cadbury Schweppes just as Seeds of Change organic food is now owned by a division of Mars. The obvious temptation, already, is to view alterity as not so alternative after all. It is not my intention to argue this; I am merely trying to highlight the contemporary significance of lifestyles and practices that are thought of as alternative through mapping instances of their ubiquity.

Moving this vista away from a discussion of corporate figures and visions of the high street; it can also consider those who have done likewise (again, quite literally) through reference to the trend of 'downsizing' or 'scaling down'. It is not difficult to consider people who have given up the 'rat race' and moved to the countryside, most likely in Wales, Scotland, East Anglia or South West England, to live a

'simple life'. Aside from those who have actually done so, it is without doubt a very popular 'escape attempt' fantasy (Cohen and Taylor, 1992). I have personally lost track of the number of conversations I have had with friends and acquaintances who long to move somewhere scenic, unspoilt and out of mobile phone range. Finally, at the time of writing, popular culture is embracing all that is 'boho' or 'gypsy chic'. So whilst, at present we do not have icons of alterity manifest in the popular consciousness such as Swampy in the early nineties; we *do* have icons such as Sienna Miller reminding us, at some (possibly banal) level, that alterity is cool.

Orthodoxy, Demoralisation, Theory.

Having introduced the contemporary significance of alterity; it is necessary to address what this alterity is 'Other' to. Instead of using a generic term such as 'orthodoxy'; it needs to be seen how alterity here is positioned initially in terms of being 'Other' to the predicament that might be termed demoralisation (Fevre, 2000). In designing the research, alterity was chosen as the object of study in so far as it – at least *a priori*, working out from the theoretical literature – seemed a potential arena in which refuge from/resistance to the predicament of demoralisation might be found.

Demoralisation is a *theoretical* concept that engages a wide range of social theorists such as Bauman, (1991, 1993), Bell (1979), Habermas (1984, 1987) Lasch (1979), Meśtrović (1997) Reisman, (1950), Sennett (1998), Sorokin (1985 [1957]) and Stivers (1994). It is in the work of Fevre (2000) that the themes in these books are crystallised, developed and following Durkheim (1897[1952]) Himmelfarb (1995) and Tester (1997), brought together under the umbrella term *demoralisation*. On a general level, the term demoralisation can be thought of as a contemporary version of Durkheimian anomie. My reading of Fevre and the term 'demoralisation' suggests a threefold predicament. Firstly, there is a concern with moral uncertainty and the absence of a coherent moral code with which to guide conduct. It is this absence that causes human beings to be cruel and neglectful to one another. Secondly, there is a concern with demoral(e)isation – an absence of morale – in so far as persons do not consider themselves truly happy. Finally, there is a concern with morals in the Durkheimian sense - the 'other worldly' phenomena that

facilitate social cohesion. In this respect, demoralisation refers to a deficit in both social regulation and social integration.

Although demoralisation is a theoretical concept; it is an *engaged* concept that endeavours to account for real world predicaments. It considers, at a general level, the ways in which (Western) cultures have lost touch with both morality and a sense of meaning/purpose whilst as yet, they have not found adequate replacements with which to move forth. What is attractive about Fevre's theory is that it does not rest at a description of what is wrong. Instead, like Durkheim and Habermas, it considers ways out of the predicament. Put simply (an in depth discussion will be offered in chapter two) demoralisation, for Fevre, arises when individuals and cultures make sense of all areas of their activity through recourse to something called *common sense* (again, there will be an in depth discussion of this in chapter two). This is problematic because, for Fevre, we should be making sense through recourse to a *balance* of sense making strategies (he identifies science, religion and sentiment as well as common sense) and this balance should vary depending on what area of activity we are making sense of. The theory posits that *remoralisation* rests on recombining elements of these sense making categories to make new sense. In this thesis, alterity is taken as an activity where new sense might be made because alterity is, as will become clear, a different way of organisation social life, a different way of ordering relations.

Alterity is studied here in relation to demoralisation in so far as it represents the potential for remoralisation. To the extent that I am willing to think in terms of 'research questions' the question here is: 'how do alternative lifestyles and practices – how does alterity – operate as a means of subverting or at least escaping the predicament of demoralisation?' It is, of course, natural to think of alterity as a social movement and view it from a 'new social movements' perspective (see for example Jordan, 2002). On this note, I might comment that this is not what is offered here. Following Hetherington (1998), I am adopting a more 'continental' approach to social movements in so far as the affectual and cultural elements of such lifestyles and practices are my focus in place of the socio-political and ideological ones. From the opening vista it should be clear that the contemporary manifestation of alterity that occupies these pages has less to do with the socio-

political and ideological elements that might have been more salient fifteen years ago and far more to do with the cultural and the affectual ones. The main reason for this focus, however, lies in the positioning of alterity in relation to demoralisation. Without doubt, there are socio-political and ideological issues emanating from demoralisation but, at a base level, it is cultural problem and given the focus on anomie, an affectual one. As such, it makes sense to look at the cultural and affectual elements of the proposed solution. So, rather than examining the subversive potential of, for example, pressure groups in relation to political and ideological problems; the thesis examines manifestations of alterity that relate to cultural and affectual forms of resistance and subversion.

1

INTRODUCTION

Alterity, Ethnography, Evocation

Although studying alterity in relation to demoralisation; this thesis is, in the first instance, an *ethnography* of alterity in so far as the tools and methods of ethnography form the basis of my empirical engagement with alterity. What is offered here is an *evocation* (Tyler, 1986) of *multiple* lifestyles and practices in contemporary Britain that are constituted as 'alternative'. A reader may well be expecting a straight forward comparison of 'alterity' and 'demoralisation'. This however is neither possible nor desirable. The impossibility of such comparison derives from the notion that cultures are not pure (Strathern, 1991 1996) and thus it makes little sense to conceive of 'alterity' as unified, stable and yet wholly distinct from 'demoralisation'. The complex relationship between 'alterity' and 'demoralisation' is, of course, a major theme in this thesis so I will not attempt to discuss it here. The impurity and complexity of alterity does however require discussion as it has immediate consequences in terms of how I have conducted and written my ethnography.

The reason for choosing ethnography derives from a belief that alterity necessitates an empirical engagement to complement and enhance the theoretical and philosophical consideration it tends to attract. As a complex and ephemeral phenomenon, there is a temptation to shy away from such empirical engagement; however my contention is that ethnography is more than capable of rising to this challenge. The opening vista intimates that alterity is a *cultural* phenomenon. Seeing that culture is ethnography's subject/object of study; it makes sense to approach alterity ethnographically. In my eyes, ethnography is the only way to go inside (Latimer, 2003) a culture and experience it/engage with it in a meaningful way. As noted, cultures are never pure and alterity is no exception. When one examines alterity in closer detail, it becomes clear that it is 'no unitary phenomenon'

(Strathem, 1991); rather it is a complex set of diverse practices. Indeed, if we historicise the phenomenon it can be seen that 'alterity' changes over time. The contemporary version of alterity is different to the time of Swampy which is different to the 1960s which is different to the Romantics *etcetera*. Even when considering the contemporary cultural landscape, one cannot reify alterity and limit it by place as a conventional ethnography might necessitate (Barnard, 1980). Indeed, an ethnography of alterity that focuses on one site would not provide a satisfactory analysis of alterity; it would only be an analysis of the site in question. Strathem (1996) posits that ethnography need not reduce this complexity and one way in which this reduction can be avoided is the adoption of a *multi-site* approach to ethnography (Marcus, 1986 1995 and Hannerz, 2003). A multi-site approach 'unbinds', so to speak, ethnography in recognition of alterity's impurity and complexity. This allows for a greater appreciation of the multiple contexts and differing manifestations in which alterity appears. Of course, as soon as one *conceptually* unbinds alterity; one is faced with the impossibility of studying alterity across *every* context and manifestation in which it is liable to appear. However, as will be discussed below, ethnographies are only ever *partial* (Strathem, 1991). In any case, having a diverse – if not exhaustive or even representative - selection of material is preferable to binding and limiting alterity to one site. In addition to issues of context and manifestation, multi-site ethnography addresses issues of *definition*. Defining something as ephemeral as alterity is problematic as it relies on the ethnographer's own conceptualisations of Otherness. Doing a bounded study of one site will therefore only yield an account of one site that the ethnographer has constituted *a priori* as a site of alterity. Multi-site ethnography in conjunction with my own strategy of 'tracking analytic themes' allows for an emergent (that is, not pre-specified) research object that is built in terms of sites that constitute themselves as 'Other' as opposed to sites that I constitute as such. The sites that make up my research object are as follows:

- Beechwood Court (BWC): An intentional community premised on ecological and communal living.
- Shakti Manor (SM): A Buddhist retreat centre.
- WOMAD: A world music festival.

- Riverside Real Food Market (RFM): A weekly market selling local, organic and fair trade produce.
- Rainbow Rhythms (RR): A 'new age' dancing group/programme of classes.
- Trade Direct (TD): A shop that sells only fair trade produce.

Ethnography is not a method *per se*; it is the practice of writing. Since the publication of *Writing Culture* (Clifford and Marcus 1986); one cannot ignore the '-graphy' in ethnography. Conventionally, ethnography is thought of as an account that 'inscribes the flow of social discourse' (Geertz, 1973) such that the reader can be brought into contact with the lives of 'the Other' (Peacock, 2001). Tyler (1986), in line with the 'linguistic turn' in social science, considers the impossibility of presenting or even representing reality accurately through the act of writing. Recognising the difficulty of trying to mirror reality and communicate it though language as well the unlikelihood of a reader interpreting the author's intentions *exactly* as they are intended, he offers a more – I feel – modest ambition for ethnography and this is *evocation*. For Tyler, the goal of ethnography is to evoke an object that reader and author alike can grasp through making available that which both can *conceive* of (for Tyler, ethnographies are 'co-operatively evolved texts' which evoke a 'possible world of commonsense reality'). For Marilyn Strathern (1991), the ethnographer is to provide a connection through their ethnography/evocation. Even before the act of writing, ethnography is about making connections: taking, for now, culture (ethnography's object of evocation) to be 'webs of significance' or 'webs of meaning' the ethnographer has to 'tie up the lose ends' and make connections between these 'webs' by way of analysis before s/he can begin evoking. So, evocation rests on the connections the ethnographer makes both in terms of his or her data *and* with the reader. These connections are only ever going to be partial (Strathern, 1991) in so far as they are characterised by fragments and interpretations. Of course, such a position veers close to postmodernism and Tyler (1986) is quite explicit about the potential of *evocation* in terms of writing 'postmodern ethnography'. Here, and throughout the thesis, I am keen to resist any alignment with postmodernism. This recognition of partiality and fragmentation does not necessitate a 'free floating' approach to ethnography. My intention is to evoke alterity through presenting/writing *sedimentations* and these

sedimentations derive from the connections I have made by way of analysis. One might expect each sedimentation to evoke only one site and thus pave the way for comparison between sites in terms of traditional triangulation (Denzin, 1978). However, the connections I make and the sedimentations I present are drawn from multiple sites. Consequently, the evocations are offered as juxtapositions (Crapanzano, 1985 Strathern, 1991) between one another in order to evoke, albeit partially, *alterity* rather than any given site as a fragment. Similarly, each sedimentation - each evocation - is not free from referentiality (Rabinow, 1986) because the data, my experience of alterity, my own connections (which although partial and subject to contest are still sedimented by analysis and writing), other texts and of course, other sedimentations act as referents for each evocation.

As an evocation, this ethnography makes connections between 'webs of meaning', sites of 'alterity' and the evocations/sedimentations offered/written. However, my intention is for this ethnography to be more than an evocation and as such, there are other connections that I seek to make. Whilst I cannot deny my commitment to my data and evocation; my aspiration is to use the ethnography such that it 'says more than it tells' (Peacock, 1998) in as much as I want to use the ethnography to do the work of social theory. This work of social theory involves the making of connections between *ideas* and texts that already exist.

Theory and Ethnography: A Double Braid.

With this, it seems then that on the one hand there is a commitment to ethnography as evocation (of alterity) and on the other, there is an interest in using ethnography as a vehicle for exploring social theory. With this my intention, initially, was quite simple. I intended to conduct a small scale study of alterity both as something that is interesting in its own right and as a way to say something of wider, contemporary significance through engaging with the 'macro theoretical' concept of demoralisation. Such an ambition is nothing novel. Paul Willis' seminal text *Learning to Labour* (1977) took a great effort to establish the importance of ethnography as genre that can discuss both the experience of its subjects *and* make claims about the wider social order in which they are implicated. Indeed, Marcus

(1986) recognises Willis' attempt to use ethnography to engage with 'high theory' through taking into account 'larger issues...and broader vistas of representation' (p. 177). Such was my intention: to use the 'micro' to engage with the 'macro' and as the ethnographer, I was to act as the 'midwife' (Willis, 1977) who makes connections (Strathern, 1991) between the micro-level empirical data and macro-level theoretical issues.

Such an ambition rests on the idea that the ethnographic study of alterity is 'micro' level and empirical whereas the concept of demoralisation is 'macro' level and theoretical. In the course of the research and *writing* the ethnography, it transpired that it is not as simple as that. The difficulty of thinking in terms of 'micro' and 'macro' will be addressed in due course but for now the issue of what is theoretical and what is empirical needs to be addressed as does the relationship between them. For a start, alterity is not just an empirical issue. In my evocation of alterity, the connections I make are made not just to evoke but to develop theoretical appreciations of alterity. Indeed, it is only through the work of social theory in relation to alterity that the work of social theory in relation to demoralisation is done. The dual concern with the empirical and theoretical represents something of a double braid (Cicoux, 1986) running through the thesis. The relationship between the empirical and the theoretical is not one of 'theoretically informed research'; it is one of theoretically *engaged* research. The double braid runs through the study such that the 'strand' concerned with the evocation of alterity is intertwined with the 'strand' concerned with social theory such that social theory is used to make sense of the data just as the data is used to engage with social theory.

The theoretical concerns are not limited to developing theoretical understandings of alterity or how alterity relates to the possibilities of cultural and affectual subversion. Whilst I do not abandon this concern, it became clear to me that it is not satisfactory to think in terms of demoralisation *versus* remoralisation or orthodoxy *versus* alterity because there is more to it than this. As such, many other issues became significant in the acts of analysis and writing providing, even necessitating, an opportunity to engage with and interrogate multiple theoretical debates. Drawing together a range of perspectives, this thesis addresses notions of marginality, ethos,

the body, the nature of modernity, processes of social ordering, the nature of mobility, the nature of transgression, the nature of individuality/identity, the nature of community/sociality and the interface between the market and morality. Of course, some of these themes emanate from the demoralisation/alterity literature and structurally, the thesis interrogates them in the analysis chapters as a route to readdressing the demoralisation/alterity theories in the conclusion. However, some of them do not. For instance, there is a chapter on the body and whilst it was never my intention to write a chapter on the body; the themes emanating from the data made it necessary to do so. So, not only does the theory inform the data and *vice-versa* but, in some cases, the data necessitates theory and this is a matter of letting the data speak rather going at the analysis head on.

Social Philosophy: A Third Strand.

So far I have introduced a double braid running through this thesis. The first strand is the *evocation* of alterity and this is intertwined with the work of social theory wherein a range of theoretical debates are worked with and interrogated. There is however a *third* strand and it is best to think of this in terms of social philosophy in order to distinguish it from social theory. This strand represents both and way of thinking *and* a way of working when doing sociology. In many respects, it is something that came to matter in the process of wrestling with the other two strands. Essentially, this third strand informs *how* I do social theory via epistemological and ontological insights. It also relates to how I conduct empirical work, relate it to social theory and actually write the ethnography; in these terms, it derives from methodological insights. In another respect, this strand is where I arrive at the end of the thesis. In the conclusion, I will be making theoretical and philosophical moves that are not specific to alterity or demoralisation. They are largely matters of ontology and as such pertain to this third strand. Of course, it is somewhat strange to detail where I end up at the beginning of the thesis but I will be using these concepts throughout so it is best to introduce them, at a *very* basic level, upfront. It is not my intention to explain these concepts comprehensively here because, as this is an introduction, I merely want to *introduce* them. A satisfactory presentation of these concepts needs to be *arrived* at and as such, I will be using the other two strands to

illuminate and illustrate these ideas practically. Nevertheless, these concepts are quite complicated and some introduction is required so that the reader does not go into this thesis blind. Much of this way of thinking derives from continental philosophy, particularly the work of Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze (both alone and with Felix Guattari) and it is not my intention to hide this influence. Instead, I take care to highlight the possibility and import of this way of thinking in social science research whilst showing that it is not analogous to an easily arrived at form of postmodernism that is best left to literary criticism. Indeed, to complement the insights of continental philosophy, many of the concepts here are borrowed from thinkers of a more 'social scientific' bent such as Hetherington, Munro and Strathern.

Deconstruction

Deconstruction is a set of strategies most readily associated with the work of Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction rejects Western philosophy's search for origins and 'truth' as well as its assumed position as the sole dispenser of reason with a mastery of meaning. Deconstruction starts with a recognition that there is no language/discourse so reflexive that it can escape the conditions placed on its thought by its own history and ruling metaphysic. Western philosophy is no exception; deconstruction recognises that its claims are maintained by suppressing the disruptive effects of language and subjugating certain themes in order to ensure that its claims enjoy the status of self-evident truth. Breaking with the Platonic dichotomy between philosophical knowledge and 'false' knowledge, deconstruction suggests that the claims of philosophy are made through deploying metaphorical and figurative language and should be subjected to rhetorical questioning in much the same way as literary texts. Deconstruction rests on the contingency and ultimately, the undecidability of meanings. With this, it is essentially an activity of displacement; of displacing Western philosophy's meanings and understandings. The analysis is written through a deconstructionist lens such that meanings uncovered through the empirical encounter are used to displace the meanings and understandings that social theory has positioned.

Motility and the Fold

It was noted earlier that ethnography, as a genre, need not reduce complexity or incongruity and it has also been implied that such a recognition need not result in a free fall postmodernism. One of the concepts used to hold such a position is Deleuze's *fold* (1993). This will be detailed in far more depth in consequent chapters; however a brief introduction is necessary here. Thinking back to deconstruction, one of its main targets is either/or logic and binary oppositions. Deleuze's fold enables the analysis to take this a step further: in addition to recognising the contingency of dichotomies, it never allows understandings to rest and thus create scope for another dichotomy. Consequently, it does not limit itself to one dimension because it allows for the contingency of any number of potential dichotomies. In more familiar terms, it allows for the 'grey' area between multiple 'positions' and dichotomies. Put simply, the fold recognises that phenomena – and as will be seen, all phenomena are essentially *meanings* - are interconnected in myriad, complex and tangential ways. The attraction of the fold when writing ethnography is that it allows for movements between meanings such that any apparent contradiction or incongruity need not be taken as such. It allows for what is actually observed rather than what the ethnographer's theoretical and conceptual framework might expect. This movement is best thought of in terms of *motility* (Munro, 2001 [1992] see also Hetherington, 2004 and Latimer, 2006) and motility starts from a position that recognises the impossibility of disposal. A movement from x to y does not mean that x is effaced; it means that x remains in the fold as an *absent presence* that a potential future movement could make visible and present again. Any data set is bound to exhibit contradiction and incongruity and the temptation is to extract only what one needs to reproduce one's own theoretical and cognitive constructs by only selecting what is necessary or using the incongruity to prove a point. Worse still, the incongruity could get accounted for through postmodern tendencies to view movement in terms of the aesthetics of disappearance (Virrilio, 1991) or notions of surface over substance. Through using the fold in conjunction with motility, I have a device that enables me to better account for what was observed in the field and thus offer a better evocation of alterity. More pressingly, it allows for me *not* to go at my data head on and

reproduce my own cognitive and theoretical constructs. Rather it allows me to use the empirical encounter to displace them and thus do the work of social theory.

There are further epistemological consequences to this way of thinking and they relate to what social theory can and cannot claim. Starting with Derrida's deconstruction it can be noted that, although premised on displacement; deconstruction recognises that its own displacements are open to further displacement and thus it cannot erect new foundational pillars of knowledge or theory. However, looking to the work of Deleuze and Munro; a more refined position can be deployed. Recognising the impossibility of disposal (Munro, 2001 [1992]) it can be thought that the displacement/deconstruction of understandings do not necessitate their destruction because, as noted, they simply remain in the fold as absent presences. Social theory then is about *adding* (more accurately, uncovering) meanings into the fold without subtracting any. In accepting, as a corrective to postmodern epistemology (or lack thereof), the impossibility of disposal and the activity of adding without subtracting; one need not overcompensate and seek to erect further foundational pillars of 'knowledge'. Deleuze and Guattari, in their analysis of Rhizomatics (1987) - a metaphor closely related to that of the fold - stress the value of conjunction ['and...and...and' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: p.27)] in terms of 'uprooting' foundational knowledge whilst recognising the impossibility of rooting something in its place. Hetherington (1998), following Deleuze's interview with Clair Parnet conceives of this as a strategy of 'adding without an equals sign'. Hetherington argues convincingly that one can, at least to some extent, do social theory without making denotative moves – that is, grand statements about what or how society is. For my part, I see social theory as the business of making connections and conjugations (and...and...and). Equally well, I see it as the business of displacement and I recognise both the impossibility of disposal and of the equals sign. It is a matter of engaging with existing theory, displacing it without refusing it, *adding* perspectives and new connections whilst refusing to make a denotative move. For these reasons, I see social theory in terms of 'adding without and equals sign' but also *displacing without effacing.*

The Relation

Moving away from continental philosophy; the discussion can now turn social anthropologist Marilyn Strathern. Marilyn Strathern, if I understand her correctly, occupies an ontological position that views *relations* as paramount. This position marks two key departures from the majority of sociology and anthropology. Firstly, for Strathern, it is *not* meanings or the relationship between them that constitutes culture; it is, first and foremost, the relations between persons. Secondly, Strathern eschews both the tendency to consider an atomist view that considers society as an aggregate of independent individuals wherein relations are the 'property' of individuals *and* the tendency to consider a holistic view wherein relations are considered part of a total structure, system or society by virtue of their function (Strathern, 1991 Munro, 2005). This suggests that neither 'society/culture' nor 'individuals' prefigure relations; rather it is saying that through relations, notions of society and individuality are figured. Essentially, what we think of as 'social' does not exist independently of persons but persons alone are not enough because the social is *relational*. It is through relations, the elicitation of which, that we find the social. I might add (and perhaps I add this because my perspective is sociological) that although neither the individual nor society pre-figures the relation/the social; perhaps the *capacity* to be social does.

As relations are elicited, they are ordered and culture can be thought of as this work of ordering relations/ordering the social. Since relations are elicited from moment to moment rather than being fixed, reified and towering social facts; this ordering of relations must be thought of as a continuous process. It follows that culture is always in the making and as such, the social is perpetually ordered and reordered. Strathern does not depart from the view of culture as ethnography's object of analysis but, from this perspective, it seems that ethnography's object is a process rather than a thing. The connections to be made by way of analysis are those that capture the momentary elicitation of relations. This focus on the connections between persons does not require the ethnographer to abandon a concern with meanings. Strathern merely suggests that the ordering of relations comes first. She does not dispute that culture is a source of illumination; indeed, she is explicit

(1997) that it is culture that illuminates, formulates and conceptualises things as things. So, in addition to figuring notions of individuals and society; culture – the ordering of relations – illuminates much more besides. It is reasonable to assume that *meaning* is the source of illumination and that meaning originates in the relations between persons. Indeed, Strathern (1995) posits that there is a conceptual doubling of relations in so far as the connections between ideas are routed through the connections between persons. It is unproblematic to think about the relationship between ideas in terms of the relationship between meanings and with this a position is developed that is close to the definition of culture that I started with. The twist here is to note that these meanings are social, a product of the relation which is to say that they the *effect* rather than the starting point of culture. Thinking back to my own ethnography; alterity can be seen as an area of activity (thinking with Fevre's model) and the activity is the *ordering of relations* along different lines. My object of analysis is therefore this ordering of relations along different lines and the meanings – culture – that are routed through this. The ethnography tracks and makes connections between relations and meanings in order to evoke this ordering of relations along different lines. Thinking back to the fold, it can be seen as a way of considering and writing both the complexity and motility of this ordering of relations.

Having noted that the connections between ideas are routed through the connections between persons; more can be taken from this insight than just the recognition that culture and meaning are routed through the ordering of relations between persons. If we are talking about the connections between ideas, we can think in terms of social theory and note that the work of social theory must be routed through the ordering/elicitation of relations between persons (i.e. ethnography's object of analysis).   So as a text, the ethnography makes connections not just between persons and meanings; but also ideas and theories (see above discussion of referentiality of other texts). Connections are made between the data and existing theory in so far as the empirical encounter is used to displace (without effacing) existing theory. It is unproblematic to think that social theory *must* be grounded in the data – the connections between persons – which is equivalent to noting that connections between ideas are necessarily routed through the connections between persons. This recognition allows an empirical encounter with alterity to 'double up'

as a theoretical one just as it allows something to be said about the other theoretical interests that come to matter (as detailed above). More contentiously, it allows something to be said about demoralisation which was presented initially as a 'macro' theoretical debate. For Strathern, there is no 'micro' and 'macro'; there is only the question of scale and the business of 'crossing scale' is simply a matter of switching from one perspective to another (Strathern, 1991) and making different connections. So in place of the ethnographer as midwife bridging the micro and the macro; the ethnographer merely makes different connections in order to switch perspective, cross scale and engage with different debates. Multi-site ethnography is particularly useful here as it produces a more fertile data set from which more, or at least *different*, connections can be made. As an ethnography, this thesis makes different connections still, through switching to another perspective that is not exhausted by a focus on alterity or demoralisation. I wish to say something of 'the social' through making ontological (and epistemological) moves that establish the importance of this third strand as both a corrective to postmodern tendencies and a way of taking the 'social' in sociology seriously. My intention is to position concepts such as the relation, the fold and motility as a way of considering 'the social' and the importance of social ordering without making generalisations (or denotative moves) about 'society'.

Heterotopia

Hetherington's analysis of *heterotopia* (1997) resonates well with the above concepts in so far as it allows for the impurity of culture and more importantly, it stresses the significance of social ordering. Put simply, heterotopias are places of Otherness and Hetherington uses the concept in his analysis of society's margins to stress the importance of *ordering*, thus eschewing the view of margins being characterised by freedom and transgression. In turn, this shows the *impurity* of cultures through demonstrating the co-existence of heterogeneous and seemingly incongruous phenomena. In Strathern's terms, it shows the co-existence of different relations/ different versions of the social and through showing how the margins are constitutive and constituted by the 'modernity' they seek to transgress; Hetherington's analysis of heterotopia shows the co-existence of differing versions

of 'modernity'. To see the significance of this insight, we must think back to the above discussion of the relation. Here, it was noted that 'the social' is ordered and re-ordered perpetually by virtue of relations being elicited from moment to moment. It is very tempting to read such a position as a postmodern attitude that accepts the 'death of the social' (Baudrillard, 1983) and celebrates the transgression of social order (Jenks, 1996). However Hetherington, following Law (1994), urges us to think in terms of social *ordering* rather than social *order*; as a process rather than a thing. The attraction of such a position is that it recognises the effort and processes of ordering the social without reifying any given ordering and labelling it 'society'. For my purposes, it suggests that –as already noted - it makes little sense to think in terms of demoralisation *versus* alterity because demoralisation and alterity are just different orderings of relations/the social that can co-exist and be moved between. Since the whole of chapter five (and much of the thesis) is dedicated heterotopia and these related issues; I will resist any further discussion here and allow it to become clear as the thesis progresses.

Chapter Summary: A Triple Braid

By way of introduction to the thesis (and to end the introduction), a chapter summary is offered to detail how these three strands run through the thesis.

Chapter two is offered in lieu of a conventional literature review. Here, an attempt is made to map the cultural and intellectual landscape in which the study is situated whilst detailing where the original ideas came from. Starting with the demoralisation literature, this section seeks to introduce theoretical accounts of what is wrong with Western culture. Drawing on a range of theorists from a range of disciplines with a desultory range of perspectives; concepts such as anomie, adiaphorisation, ambivalence and fragmentation are introduced alongside accounts of modernity and rationality in order to paint a 'meta- theoretical' picture. From here, it introduces 'meta- theoretical' accounts of what might be done about it and arrives at a discussion of why alterity was chosen as an empirical object of study. For reasons of brevity, and to avoid unnecessary complication, this chapter does not introduce the other theoretical themes that come to matter (and an exhaustive review

of each and every body of literature would be as irksome as it is pointless). These theoretical themes – some of which emanate from this literature/theory, some of which do not – form the basis of the substantive chapters and they will be introduced accordingly.

Chapter three is the first of two methods chapters. This chapter is best thought of as the theory of my practice in so far it addresses the philosophical issues that underpin the methodology. It begins with a discussion of *why* ethnography was chosen as the vehicle though which to engage empirically with alterity before discussing my departures from 'conventional ethnography'. Most importantly, it details how I intend to use a small scale ethnographic study to engage with issues that have been presented as 'meta-theoretical'. This chapter will therefore pick up many of the themes introduced in the present chapter such as the business of 'crossing scale', the importance of ethnography as evocation and the methodological implications of the thesis' third strand. In particular, the adoption of a multi-site approach to ethnography will be justified and defended as will my strategy of 'tracking analytical themes' in terms of building the research object. Finally, there is a discussion of the relationship between theory and data which in turn leads to matters of epistemology and my own analytic attitude.

Chapter four is the second of the methods chapters. Where the previous chapter discussed the theory of practice; this one discusses the practice of practice and is a more conventional methods chapter. Building on the material laid out in chapter three, it illustrates practically what I did in the field. Adopting Silverman's (2000) 'Natural History of the Research Project' model as a genre suited to writing the methods chapter of a multi-site ethnography; this chapter shows how the research progressed through discussing the rationale for choosing particular sites, the decisions made/difficulties encountered in designing the research object as well as how and why I did what I did in terms of access and actually executing the fieldwork. Although not strictly a 'data' chapter, this chapter introduces each site on a very general level in order to free up space for theoretically engaged analysis in the substantive chapters. It is here that the 'data' strand begins as it is here that the evocation of alterity starts and joins the threads of theory and philosophy that chapters two and three introduce respectively.

Chapter five is the first analysis chapter. Working out from the literature review and the data, it examines the nature of marginality. Both social theory and the subjects studied tended to constitute a dichotomy that positions their own 'marginality' in opposition to the 'mainstream' which implies further dichotomies of freedom and transgression (associated with the margin) *versus* organisation and order (underlying the 'mainstream'). The analysis is grounded in the empirical encounter and drawing on the third strand, it seeks to displace these dichotomies. Having displaced these dichotomies, this chapter considers ways of thinking though and writing the complexity and movement that is uncovered. Through recourse to the third strand, the concepts of motility and the fold are deployed and here it is hoped that the importance of these concepts will become clear in light of empirical and theoretical examples. The most important concept in this chapter is *heterotopia* and through this, other theoretical debates such the nature of marginality, transgression and modernity are addressed.

Chapter six is a natural complement to the previous chapter. At issue here is the assumed dichotomy between 'the market' and 'morality'; a dichotomy that is common both to the theoretical literature and the ethnographic subjects. The analysis shows that the market – taken to be practices of labour, commodity, gift and monetary exchange - are complicit, even necessary, in occasioning 'moral' alternatives to the problems that the market allegedly creates. It is not stating that the market is inherently moral; it is just 'displacing without effacing' and showing that the market is not universally and inherently immoral. Using the work of Marilyn Strathern, it avoids reifying the market and shows that it is best thought of in terms of *relations* of exchange that can circulate meanings that are constituted as moral just as it can circulate those that are constituted as immoral. Together with the previous chapter, it says something of the nature of transgression through addressing the connection between subversion and what is subverted, the impossibility of wholesale subversion and the significance of what is actually accomplished.

Chapter seven is, at least for me, somewhat unexpected in so far as it is a chapter on embodiment. It was never my intention to consider the body but the empirical

encounter, the data, made it quite clear that it was a salient theme for analysis. Faced with this data, I obviously had to look to the theoretical work that has been done on embodiment and with this, the chapter engages with theoretical debates on the body through considering the myriad ways in which the body figures in my ethnography. In addition to this theoretical trajectory, it discusses the significance of the body in relation to other theoretical and philosophical debates such as the nature of transgression or the occasioning of ethos and marginality within the fold. Looking forward to the next chapter, the analysis of the body introduces the importance of the tension between identity/individuation on the one hand and community/sociality on the other.

Chapter eight is deeply Durkheimian. By this point, the analysis will have made it clear that the thesis is concerned with the attachment and detachment of meanings via the attachment and detachment of practices, objects and values. This chapter tackles the attachment and detachment of persons and in doing so discusses the theoretical issues of identity/individuation and community/sociality. Looking back to the demoralisation literature, this chapter addresses issues of anomie and considers the possibility of subversion in terms of the nature and possibility of sociality.

Chapter nine is offered in lieu of a conclusion. It makes little sense to think of there being a conclusion when I have made explicit my position of 'adding without an equals sign'. What is offered here is more of a summary and discussion. This chapter ceases to evoke alterity and focuses only on the work of social theory and social philosophy (although the moves are always grounded in the data). A summary of the key theoretical insights from each chapter will be offered and further connections will be made in order to engage with a range of theoretical debates in a manner that is not clouded by the artificial division between analytic chapters. The most pressing concerns are to add perspectives and meanings to theoretical understandings of alterity whilst crossing scale to add perspectives and meanings to understandings of demoralisation, particularly *the possibility of cultural and affectual subversion*. Finally, it will consider the inadequacy of thinking in terms of demoralisation *versus* alterity/remoralisation on the grounds that it undermines the epistemological (and ontological) work done throughout the thesis.

From here, a case will be made for thinking of the social, in terms of heterotopia, the fold, the relation and motility whilst still defending the importance of the social and social ordering against postmodernism. In essence, the thesis arrives at the third strand and hopefully, I will defend the possibility of this as a way of thinking and working, that is actually wholly congruous with Durkheimian concerns (such as the demoralisation literature), when doing sociology.

2

DEMORALISATION:

AMBIVALENCE,

ADIAPHORISATION, ANOMIE.

Demoralisation

As noted, demoralisation is a *theoretical* concept that attempts to account for what is wrong with Western culture. This chapter is presented in lieu of a conventional literature review and it is intended to map the intellectual and cultural landscape in which the study is situated though discussing the themes in the demoralisation literature and my rationale for choosing to study alterity.

To recap, the term demoralisation refers to the ways in which Western cultures have lost touch with morality, lost their sense of purpose and as yet, have not found adequate replacements with which to move forth. My reading of the term 'demoralisation' suggests a threefold definition of morality and by proxy, a threefold predicament. There is a concern with moral uncertainty and the absence of a coherent moral code with which to guide conduct. In this sense, demoralisation can be thought of both in terms of ambivalence and adiaphorisation. Secondly, there is a concern with demoral(e)isation. In this reading there is a decline in morale, or quite simple, people do not consider themselves truly happy. It is in this sense that we can think of the 'lack of meaning' that is thought to plague Western cultures. Finally, there is a concern with morals in the Durkheimian sense - the 'other worldly' phenomena that facilitate social cohesion. In this respect, demoralisation refers to the weakening of social bonds and a deficit in social regulation (and integration). Taking the latter two definitions together, demoralisation can be thought of as an updated version of Durkheimian anomie. With this threefold definition, we have a theoretical account of what is going wrong

in Western culture and society, the ramifications of which transcend the abstract realm of social theory. Demoralisation is a predicament that affects us all. Such is the scope of the concern that many of the books discussed in this section fall into that rare category of academic book that is accessible to and well received by 'non academic' audiences. A cursory glance at the covers of the texts in front of me as I write reveals that more than one book has been a 'No.1 American bestseller'.

It is the work of Ralph Fevre (2000) that forms the immediate backdrop to this study. In addition to systematically bringing the themes of other writers together, Fevre's theory traces the cultural mechanisms underlying demoralisation through to their intimate and public cultural consequences. More significantly, he follows his theory through to offer a theory of remoralisation and it is here that I situate my ethnography of alterity. However, to the matter at hand, a more detailed discussion of demoralisation...

A sense of balance, a balance of sense

As will be seen, reason and rationality are commonly cited as the route of demoralisation and to some extent, Fevre's theory is no exception. He identifies a type of reason, which he calls *common sense*, and locates it at the source of the problem. What is significant about Fevre's theory is the mechanism he identifies to link this 'common sense' to demoralisation.

At the heart of Fevre's theory is a typology of sense making. Focusing exclusively on *Western* cultures, he notes a tendency (inherited from the philosophy of Ancient Greece) to make an epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief and an ontological distinction between human and non-human.

	Knowledge	Belief
Human	α	X
Non-Human	β	Y

Plotting these dichotomies against each together within a matrix opens up spaces to be understood, spaces to made sense of. Cultures are required to make sense of α (matters of human knowledge), β (matters of non-human knowledge), x (matters of human belief) and y (matters of non-human belief). Fevre's argument is that cultures have invented appropriate ways of *making sense* in each of these categories:

	Knowledge	Belief
Human	*Common sense*	*Sentiment*
Non-Human	*Science*	*Religion*

Looking at these four sense making devices: common sense, science, religion and sentiment, it becomes clear that, somewhat unconventionally, sentiment and religion are not constituted as the polar opposite of reason. For Fevre, all four sense making devices are forms of reason that are deployed in the act of making sense of their appropriate combination of epistemological and ontological category. For example, religion is a form of reason with which to make sense of the space created by the combination of 'non-human' and 'belief'.

What is *not* made clear from the above matrix is what Fevre means by common sense. He does not apply the term in its day-to-day usage. He is referring to sense making strategies and processes of reasoning that are *common* to us all. It is sense making that human beings can be certain of (which is why it is placed in the 'human-knowledge' category) without recourse to belief or esoteric scientific discourse. Common sense therefore only trusts what can be experienced through the five human senses, distrusting ephemeral phenomena such as emotions and sentiments. One could be tempted to think of science in this way. However, science *can* make sense of phenomena that cannot be grasped by any given human being who is relying only on their five senses. By way of historical illustration, Fevre suggests we look to proverbs to find an example of a stock of knowledge that was common (accessible) to all persons. In a contemporary context we might conceive of this, somewhat crudely, as 'man on the street' knowledge or the common stock of 'lay knowledge' that is available to us all. Additionally, Fevre

posits that this will inevitably involve some general understandings from social science (which of course has purchase on matters of human knowledge) in addition to that which can be grasped by the five senses. The most obvious example is the way in which utilitarianism and 'cost benefit analysis' from the social science of economics has become common to us all in the form of instrumental and economic rationality. Indeed, Fevre reminds us that economic rationality is a 'powerful and sophisticated' version of common sense. To allow for the inclusion of social science, Fevre suggests we think in terms of *cognition* for the human-knowledge category. For the remainder of this discussion, the terms will be used interchangeably.

In thinking about how common sense underlies demoralisation, Fevre does *not* suggest that common sense is indiscriminately bad and wrong. Whereas most critics criticise wholesale anything that resembles instrumental rationality; Fevre identifies the problem as culture (and individuals) applying common sense *in the wrong place*. Common sense, writes Fevre, is unproblematic when it is applied in the act of reasoning about matters of human knowledge; the problems arise when it begins to colonise spaces in which it does not belong. When common sense is applied in the act of reasoning about science it fails, creating misunderstandings which in turn lead to demoralisation in science. More significantly, when common sense is applied in spaces where belief is required (the spaces occupied by religion and sentiment); it begins to efface sentiments, values and emotions because such phenomena are ephemeral and not amenable to reasoning through the five senses. We know from Durkheim (1915 [2001]) that these 'other worldly' phenomena are at the root of morality and social cohesion thus it easy to make the step from their neglect and devaluing to the advent of demoralisation. It is common sense's failure to understand, take seriously and consider them in the act of reasoning that gives rise to demoralisation. This recalls Simmel's critique of 'objective culture' wherein a form of rationality (in Simmel's case the calculating spirit, in Fevre's common sense) effaces subjective phenomena.

The reason for common sense's spread is that it is so alluring. On the one hand, it is so successful in its appropriate space that cultures seek to apply its logic across the board. On the other, it is easy to grasp (without recourse to esoteric discourse) and

carries the sort of advice that no 'reasonable' person can disagree with because it relies on sense that is common to us all. As it spreads into places that it does not belong, it translates ideas about how the world is into ideas of how the world ought to be. In this process of effacing existing morality (which relies on values, sentiments and emotions), it offers only 'sham' or ersatz moralities in their place. However, the problem is not as simple as common sense colonising spaces where it does not belong, it is a problem of balance. For Fevre, any area of human activity should be conceived of as a 'mixed field' and understood by a mixture of sense making devices with a balance towards the appropriate form. The problem, according to Fevre, is that we have lost a sense of balance. Rather than making sense through a mixed field, we have a preference for using just one because it is easier. Common sense is applied far too liberally and again, this is because it is so easy and alluring. Essentially, demoralisation is a result of the wrong balance of sense making. For example, economic rationality (a matter of human knowledge) has historically been subject to moral restriction (morality being the product of sense making by religion and sentiment) such that economic affairs are understood through a mixture of sense making strategies. However, common sense has effaced the potential to create these moral checks and so common sense, aside from being applied in spaces where it does not belong, is no longer subject to restraint, restriction or balance. There is no sense of balance because there is no balance of sense.

Adiaphorisation

Zygmunt Bauman is, of course, the most prolific and influential writer on this topic and as such, a discussion of his output is dispersed through the following sections, beginning with a discussion of adiaphorisation.

A consistent theme in Bauman's writing is a rethinking of the relationship between society and morality. Conventionally, society is conceived of as the 'factory of morality' (Bauman, 1989) wherein its legislators and interpreters (Bauman, 1987) promote and enforce morality and moral behaviour. These legislators and interpreters (of modernity, of society) design a 'garden state' society (Bauman,

1991) wherein a moral world is a regular and orderly one (Bauman, 1994) and moral conduct is guided by reason and rationality rather than irrational, pre-social impulses (Bauman, 1993). It follows that without society and without socialisation that human relations would be characterised by a Hobbesian war of all against all. Modernity's ambition was to rationalise these pre-social impulses and in founding a moral code upon reason, it was hoped that a universal, non-aporetic moral code that is founded on solid foundations could be designed and injected into persons such that (a) no reasonable person would not adhere to it and (b) people would be prevented from using their free will to do wrong (Bauman, 1993). Bauman's great contribution is to problematise the equation of modernity (and by proxy society) with morality and the pre-modern (and pre-social) with immorality. In his brilliant analysis of the holocaust (1989) Bauman shows that society can actually be a morality silencing force. Central to his argument is the illegitimacy of society's legislators and interpreters having a monopoly on morality and moral judgement. The holocaust highlights the potential immorality of such designs and represents an instance where genuine moral actions are manifest in the *subversion* rather than the adherence to society's designated 'morality'. Following Hannah Arendt (1958 [1998]) he suggests that moral responsibility lies in the act of resisting rather that conforming to socialisation. Rather than thinking of society as a factory of morality; Bauman (1989) posits that we can think of society and processes of socialisation as the *manipulation* of moral capacity. This hints that the origins of morality pre-figure society and that morality exists independently of socialisation.

To identify the source of pre-social morality, Bauman frequently turns to the work of Emmanuel Levinas (1996). He does so in *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989) but does so far more rigorously in *Postmodern Ethics* (1993). From Levinas, Bauman takes the idea that being *for* the Other is the first reality of the self such that it precedes any possibility of being *with* the other. Being for the other entails moral responsibility, suggesting that moral responsibility is a primordial impulse. This provides an alternative to the idea that human essence is untamed, immoral self interest. The idea that human beings need to be for the other before they can entertain any notion of being with the Other intimates that moral responsibility prefigures socialisation and that morality is the starting point rather than the consequence of society. It is important to recognise that this idea does not deny that

human beings are selfish; it is suggesting that moral responsibility is so central to human essence that it is an act of self constitution to be moral - morality essentially is selfish (Bauman, 1993). Bauman views the moral self, not the social self as the primary existence of humanity because being for the other precedes 'merely being with' the other. The implication is that morality is something distorted and manipulated rather than created and enforced by society. Within this perspective, immorality is not the breaking of a socially constituted code but the abdication of responsibility for the Other (Bauman, 1989).

Bauman's approach to demoralisation is one that critiques forms of socialisation and social ordering that enable this abdication of moral responsibility to the Other. A consistent theme in Bauman's work (1989, 1991,and 1998) is to show how certain forms of social ordering lead to *adiaphorisation*:

"The process whereby the ethical opprobrium is taken away from morally repugnant acts. To adiaphorise action is to declare is morally neutral, or rather make it subject to assessment by other than moral criteria whilst being exempt from moral evaluation" (Bauman, 1998: p. 78).

Again, it is his analysis of the holocaust (1989) that stands as the shining example. Herein, he demonstrates how the holocaust required the '*neutralisation* of ordinary German attitudes to the Jews *not* their mobilisation' (1989: p. 185 my emphasis). His thesis states that the holocaust was a result of society neutralising primeval moral drives as opposed to the failure of modernity to rationalise uncivilised, pre-social, pre-moral urges. This neutralising and associated processes of marginalising moral impulse is made possible by the apparatus of modernity, most notably *bureaucracy*. Indeed, he warns that the danger of adiaphorisation is acute in our 'modern, rationalised, industrial technically proficient society' (1989: p. 193). This idea, although central to his analysis of the holocaust, is illustrated better when read alongside his pamphlet '*Alone Again: Ethics after Certainty*' (1994).

Applying insights from Stanley Milgram's infamous obedience experiments (1974 [2005]), Bauman (1989) shows that the neutralisation of moral sentiments relies on replacing proximity with social distance. It is through bureaucracy that modernity achieves this symbolic distance. Looking back to Weber (1968), it can be seen that

bureaucracy is a decidedly modern institution, deployed in order to realise modernity's ambition of a regular, orderly world. Those who operate within a bureaucracy are guided by commands and codified rules rather than personal beliefs (Bauman, 1994). Action is intended to be wholly impersonal - a process of 'effacing the face' (Bauman, 1990). In Weber's terms this is *procedural rationality* and all that comes to matter is following procedure 'to the letter' (Bauman, 1994). This relies on loyalty to the organisation and a sense of duty such that any attack of conscience is overridden by the knowledge that the action is procedurally correct. With this, following rules absolves any given person of moral responsibility because one cannot be responsible if one is undertaking a course of action dictated by an appropriate superior. Of course, this generates a situation of *floating responsibility* (Bauman, 1994) in so far as responsibility is dispersed across many persons and it cannot be pinned on any given individual. Good and bad, right and wrong cease to matter, all that matters is what is correct and what is incorrect. Moral sentiments are both marginalised and neutralised in one fell swoop. A consequence of this is that there is no sense of the bigger picture. Any given individual does not see the end result or the consequence of their action and are largely ignorant to the outcome. Returning to Milgram, Bauman notes that those operating within a bureaucracy enter the 'agnetic state' in so far as potentially moral and decent persons may be, in their adherence to procedural rationality, in some way responsible for the most atrocious outcomes without even being aware of it and potentially disgusted if they were. But bureaucracy adiaphorises their actions and absolves them, absolves *anyone* of responsibility. Clearly, adiaphorisation rests on fragmentation and this hints at another salient theme in the demoralisation literature.

Fragmentation.

Of cultures

The diffusion of responsibility and the marginalising of morality leads nicely into a discussion of Meštrović's *Postemotional Society* (1997). Meštrović's problematic is as follows: how can a society that can readily emote at any given opportunity show so little regard and feel so little obligation in response to genuine atrocity and

disaster? On the one hand, we know how we should feel in response to such occurrences but on the other we feel powerless to help others or assume moral responsibility precisely because the world is so fragmented (indirectly supporting Bauman's contention that mechanisms exist to symbolically distance ourselves from moral responsibility). In resolving this tension, Meštrović identifies a deeper rooted problem at the heart of demoralisation. By definition, emotions are irrational but in our postemotional society they have become rationalised, hollowed out and ultimately devalued. Reason has done away with genuine emotions and converted them, so to speak, into its own currency. They have been torn apart, recycled and reformed in a hollowed out form such that emotions - *quasi-emotions* - can be drawn on at will without carrying any substance or meaning. Emotions have been rationally ordered and pre-packaged such that 'other directed types' (who we will meet in the next section) can rationally choose the appropriate emotions to display as and when it is necessary. Society is characterised by representations of second hand emotions which are just that - (re)presentations carrying no substance or guidance for action. Postemotionalism recognises the presence of emotions but stresses that they are no longer a reasonable basis for thought. From Meštrović, Fevre takes the idea of applying rationality in the wrong place (applying rationality to irrational phenomena such as emotions) with the consequence of hollowing out morality (morality, like emotions, depends on belief which is essentially irrational) such that it is an impotent, neutral force that fails - despite its sham of a promise- to provide a guide to action.

The above discussion of Bauman recalls the work of Richard Stivers (1994 1999), in particular his explicit discussion of morality *The Culture of Cynicism: American Morality in Decline* (1994). In his analysis of demoralisation, Stivers' (1994) notes that the concern is common to the political left and the political right but identifies a deeper crisis in morality that transcends any such divisions. Stivers posits that beyond moral decline, we are in a situation where anti-morality - the antithesis of anything we might term moral - comes to pass for morality. We live in a 'technocratic utopia' wherein technical and bureaucratic rules replace morality (resonating well with Bauman's ideas) and the pursuit of success and prestige erodes morality. This (anti)morality breeds cynicism because power, rather than being for the other or being morally responsible, is the primary aim of action. It

also breeds nihilism since culture and character are fragmented leading to a loss of symbolic value and meaning. The consequence of this is a decline in morale, the paradoxical situation where the unbridled quest for happiness leads to both demoralisation and demoral(e)isation. In order to make clear how the anti-morality of a technocratic utopia leads to the fragmentation of culture, a discussion of Bell's thesis is necessary.

In *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, Bell (1979) posits that capitalism is a socio-economic system in which there is an interrelationship between *economy*, *culture* (which Bell defines as the effort of humanity to provide a coherent set of answers to existential predicaments; traditionally, we think of religion as representing unity in culture) and *character* (an individual's 'set' or moral constitution). Historically, the economy has always been balanced and tempered by culture which provided some sort of moral check or regulation. Even capitalism used to exhibit this property. According to Weber (2002), the spirit of acquisition that characterised the economy was subject to Protestant asceticism by way of a moral restraint emanating from cultural endeavour. With the advent of cultural modernism, the spirit of the endless frontier which underlies the spirit of acquisition in the economy is applied to culture. It is at this point that things go wrong and here it is worth pausing to draw some parallels. Stivers (1994) makes a similar point when he identifies the application of bureaucratic (anti)morality to culture. Stivers also notes it is the freedom from material want that makes this possible which, aside from resonating with Bell, recalls Fevre's idea about common sense being applied in spaces where is does not belong precisely because it works so well in the spaces where it does belong.

So, what happens when the spirit of the endless frontier is applied to culture? Aside from there no longer being any moral check placed on the economy, culture loses its unity. Culture is delimited such that there are no longer ethical or aesthetic limits. This recalls Stivers' concern with nihilism and the loss of meaning in so far as culture, the source of morality, becomes fragmented when subject to the spirit of the endless frontier. The result is nihilism and a loss of meaning. Bell's consequent analysis is fascinating but not necessary here. It is sufficient to say that cultural modernism fails to subvert capitalism whilst the cultural heterodoxy and pluralism

become orthodox, offering no real benefit to offset the loss of a coherent moral code. What is noteworthy is the effect this shift in culture has on character. With the spirit of the endless frontier applied to culture, there is the development of the unrestrained self. Behaviour is legitimated only through recourse to this fragmented, meaningless, moral void of a cultural system. The result is a shift from character (an individual's moral 'set') to *personality* (a manifestation of this unrestrained self). Essentially then, this fragmentation of culture is matched by a fragmentation of self.

Of Selves

Richard Sennett (1998) traces the consequences of a fragmented society through to the effects on character (which recall, carries connotation of a moral self). Sennett focuses on the personal, human consequences of working within an economy characterised by flexible capitalism. Flexible capitalism requires frequent changes in location which obviously makes it hard for persons and their families to develop lasting community or friendship ties to the extent that there are no 'long term witnesses to another person's life' (Sennett, 1998: p.21). The fragmentary nature of flexible capitalism rests on a principle of 'no long term' which although (arguably) appropriate to work is not appropriate to personal life. Sennett reminds us- in stark opposition to the idea that procedural rationality neutralises our moral capacity - that the 'the qualities of good work are not the qualities of good character' (1998: p.21). The flexible behaviour that brings success in the work place is responsible for the weakening of character because these attributes do not serve us well in roles outside of work. Sennett shows how persons who felt stifled by old moral codes are beginning to crave ethical discipline, durable guidance and lasting values. This, argues Sennett, relies on long term involvement, connection and commitment. The problem is that long term purposes cannot be served by the short term society in which we live because a coherent, sustained narrative of identity cannot be fashioned in a society composed of 'episodes and fragments' (Sennett, 1998). This corrosion of character attacks the very qualities that enable sociality and a sense of sustainable, moral self. In Sennett, we see how a fragmented culture in turn

fragments character which has by now familiar consequences in terms of demoralisation.

Sennett's work recalls earlier work, in particular the influential work of David Reisman. In *The Lonely Crowd* (1950), Reisman focuses on character (again, taken to mean an individual's moral 'set'). Starting with the observation that societies produce the characters/characteristics that they need, he identifies modern societies as characterised by *other direction*. In modern societies resources are plentiful, there is material wealth and the potential for freedom from material want (the previous generation of *inner directed* characters saw to that) such that we live in an abundance society. Our society is a 'throwaway society' (remember, remarkably that he was writing nearly sixty years ago) where the material world is no longer our primary concern, the cultural world of other people is. Although inner directed types were individualistic, they were guided/directed by inner moral standards. *Other* directed types, by contrast, do not even internalise values such as work and enterprise; instead, inner standards are relaxed in favour of winning acceptance and popularity with others. Other directed types have no inner core, their guiding principle is to be liked and some fifty years later Meśtrović (1991) would note that a central problem in society is that one's beliefs and character do not matter as long as one is 'nice'. The other directed character is 'shallow', 'free with money' and 'friendly' but experiences uncertainty and demands the approval of others. And this is the crux, rather than looking to tradition and ancestors for direction (as tradition directed types did) or inside themselves (as inner directed types did) they look to their contemporaries. However, since culture is so fragmented, this entails seeking direction from a wider social milieu than in the past. In their freedom, persons relate to the outside world through leisure, education, consumption, mass media and pseudo-involvement. This of course entails taking direction from a variety of contradictory sources. Now, the other directed person is socialised for personal adaption so rather than having a coherent moral character; their guiding principle is acceptance. In the face of this, they are susceptible to the confusion that ensues and experience the emotional sanction of *anxiety*, not knowing if they are conducting themselves in the right way.

Christopher Lasch picks up, thirty years later, on the theme of other direction. Lasch is far more explicit in the idea that problems with character are an indication of wider social pathology. For Lasch, fragmented selves are indicative of fragmented culture. It is easy to think of *inner* directed types as individualistic and contrast them with *other* directed types who, in their quest for approval could seem anti-individualistic. However, the involvement with others is a *pseudo* involvement (Reisman, 1950) geared only towards selfish ends (self affirmation, direction, approval). It is easy to view economic individualism (inner direction in Reisman's terms) as the root of demoralisation but it is the type of individualism underlying other direction that Lasch identifies as the cause of the problem. For Lasch, social pathology is not manifest in bourgeois individualism or 'economic man'; it is located in 'psychological man' or the modern *narcissist*. The modern narcissist does not accumulate for the provision of the future (as the inner directed economic man might); he consumes relentlessly in the pursuit of immediate sexual, aesthetic and existential gratification whilst constantly chasing the meanings and satisfaction that are, of course, ever elusive. This echoes Bell's diagnosis of the unrestricted self. The modern narcissist (Lasch, 1979), in his freedom (the spirit of the endless frontier is applied to culture, generating a culture of narcissism and in turn the narcissistic character) lacks certainty, guidance and meaning. He has no relation to the past or the future, doubts everything, appears plural and tolerant yet has no group loyalty. Despite expressing a belief in co-operation and teamwork, he sees everybody as a rival and is fiercely competitive, anti-social and ruthless in the quest for approval. The modern narcissist can be viewed as an other directed sort (Reisman, 1950) whose character has experienced corrosion (Sennett, 1998) to the extent that it has been replaced with the cult of personality (Bell, 1979 Durkheim, 1893[1964]). In terms of morality, the narcissist states the importance of rules but believes they do not apply to him. This absence of morality again leads to uncertainty and anxiety. At this juncture, two further issues are raised that are central to demoralisation: ambivalence and anomie.

Anomie

In many ways one might think of demoralisation as a contemporary version of Durkheim's anomie (1893[1954]). Strictly speaking anomie pertains to insufficient

regulation of the individual by the collective (Durkheim, 1897) however, it carries connotations of insufficient social *integration*. In Durkheim's study of suicide (1897[1952]), the latter deficiency results in *egoistic* suicide, the former in *anomic*. Nevertheless, anomie can be taken to mean a combination of insufficient integration and insufficient regulation because it relates to a sense of normlessness (insufficient regulation) *and* a sense of isolation (insufficient integration) and the root of the problem is symbolic distance from the collective. Recall, Durkheim was concerned with the *balance* between society and the individual and anomie represents too much individualism with a deficit in the social. The problem with the concept of anomie is that is refers to a general normlessness and in doing so, leaves out morality. The absence of norms is not *vis a vis* tantamount to the absence of morality since not all norms are moral ones. However, Durkheim also uses the term demoralisation (1893[1964]) to refer to the feeble presence of morality in our conduct and the dominance of our 'well understood self interest' as the primary rule for guiding our conduct and affairs. The implication is that distance from the collective and too much of the wrong kind of individualism is tied inexorably into the predicament of demoralisation.

Putnam (2000), in his popular book *Bowling Alone*, focuses on the processes and effects of this distancing from the collective. Putnam takes *social capital* as his focus. Social capital, in Putnam's use, refers to the connections between individuals and the idea that social networks have value. Social capital is taken to be more than just contacts and networks; for Putnam, social capital is closely linked to notions of civic virtue and community. The problem is that despite the value of social networks, people no longer invest in social capital. Investment in social capital and the participation in social and civic affairs is conceived of as a medium through which norms arise and are sustained, most notably the norms of mutual obligation and reciprocity. This norm is not necessarily a moral one but drawing on Durkheim (1893[1964]), one could make the case that mutual obligation and reciprocity are at the heart of moral individualism. Furthermore, Putnam shows that investment in social capital *can* have positive consequences in so far as it fosters connections for those who invest but *also* brings about external benefits for those who do not. For example:

"[s]ervice clubs, like Rotary or Lions, mobilise local energies to raise scholarships or fight diseases at the same time that they provide members with friendships and business connections that pay off personally." (Putnam, 2000: p.20).

That social capital is simultaneously a public and private good intimates that it has moralising potential. Putnam rightly reminds us that investments in networks *can* result in social exclusion but even in his distinction between *bridging* forms of social capital (which are inclusive) and *bonding* forms (which are exclusive) he still celebrates their potential (the latter still breeding opportunities for solidarity and for members of the community to 'get by'). At a simple level and general level, he notes that in modern American society, persons no longer invest in social capital and that rugged individualism is effacing community with the underlying message that Americans need to re-connect.

In respect of *de*moralisation, we can take an interesting detour here. In his diagnosis of American society, Putnam (2000) is *not* saying that community bonds have been weakening over time and painting a romanticised view of the past. He is saying that community bonds collapse and renew over time and at present, they are collapsed and in need of renewal. This leads to a problem I have with the term *de*moralisation in as much as one runs the risk, syntactically, of donning a set of rose tinted glasses. The idea that before the birth of modernity, humanity was characterised by *gemienschaft* relationships and associated moral virtue is deeply problematic. Whilst there is clearly something wrong with the present day, it is fallacious to adopt a nostalgic view of the past. Indeed, Alan Wolfe's survey of American values (1998) - more specifically, American middle class values - hints that the picture is as good now, if not better, than it has ever been. What is appealing about Fevre's theory is that, like Durkheim's work, it does not romanticise the past but looks forward and this is something that I will return to in due course.

On the relationship between anomie and morality, we can turn once again to the work of Bauman. In *Society under Siege*, Bauman (2002) identifies threats to the very notion of society. Society, for Bauman, implies a sense of cohesion and presumed certainty. A threat to society involves a threat to solidarity (via the decline of 'mass conscription to popular emotions') and to institutions and structures of political,

democratic and above all, ethical action and regulation. Essentially, Bauman (2002) is concerned with a threat to integration and regulation which is tantamount to a concern with anomie. So, what is the threat to society? Bauman notes two related assaults: on the one hand, there is globalisation which eradicates structure and certainty and on the other, there is life politics. In respect of the latter, he is using the term differently to Giddens (1991) in so far as he uses the term pejoratively to intimate some sort of narcissistic individualism. Bauman views globalisation at the root of a society characterised by the transgression of boundaries and echoing Bell, thinks of this as problematic. As the state becomes divorced from the nation, notions of community lose potency and a succession of temporary, self enclosed coalitions come to replace any long term investment in social bonds. Indeed, durable societal institutions are seen as a source of uncertainty rather than stability such that he suggests, following Paul Virilio, that our world is characterised by the 'aesthetics of disappearance'. Again, we can think of the fragmentation of culture. With the advent of globalisation, the moral designs of modernity's legislators and interpreters assume less and less significance such that, more than ever, we have to assume our key responsibility of being *for* the other. Globalisation, Bauman reminds us, is essentially an ethical challenge but is one that we retreat from. Recalling Meštrović (1997), he posits that we feel helpless and therefore do not assume this moral responsibility. Our ability to act does not reflect the need to do so. As noted, a moral code has not been engineered to regulate a global system and the only truly global institution is the world market which, Bauman intimates, has no vested interest in rising to the challenge. The responsibility lies with us yet we do not seek a global solution to a global problem, nor do we even seek a local solution. We seek individual, biographical solutions (Bauman, 2001, 2002) that are anathema to any notion of society, (moral) regulation and integration.

In this book, Bauman addresses happiness (already established as central to demoralisation but please note that anomie already connotes unhappiness). More specifically, he draws a distinction between happiness and pleasure; the former is found in duration whereas the latter is found in immediate gratification. Bauman posits that whilst all happiness brings pleasure, it is not true that all pleasure brings happiness and in this sense, identifies demoral(e)isation. Bauman equates delayed gratification with happiness (Resiman's *inner* directed characters will tell you that)

and notes, like Lasch, that modern persons are geared towards immediate gratification through consumption. It is easy, when using concepts like 'demoralisation' and 'consumer society' together to see the problem as a shift from 'being' a coherent moral character to 'having' goods and services. However, Bauman resists this by showing that being and having both imply commitment. In respect of the latter – having – commitment is implied (Lasch's narcissist will tell you that) but modern existence is devoid of commitment, we are only concerned with ourselves in the moment. We won't (and here we are starting to differ even from Reisman's *other directed* types) even take the advice or direction of others as this distracts us from our goal of pursuing momentary gratification. Moral development is stifled by this narcissistic pre-occupation with consumption.

A consequence of commitment and long term association being seen as bad (and effaced by narcissistic consumption) is that we become, in Bauman's eyes, a throwaway society governed as much by waste as by consumption. It is unproblematic to see this in terms of goods because we are clearly a society that wastes materials and resources in consumption. However, Bauman goes a step further, particularly in his later work on *Liquid Love* (2003) and *Liquid Modernity* (2000) and shows that just as we do not have a long term investment in material accumulation, we do not have a long term investment in society or human bonds. With investment in people construed as bad, bonds and human beings become disposable and subject to waste. Bauman (2002) notes that this is because of society being, as it were, under siege – people are no longer willing to invest in society. For people to invest in society, it needs to be seen as something greater than the sum of its parts, more durable than any individual. With society fragmented, providing few reference points for conduct or points through which to impute long lasting significance to our lives and actions, we can no longer believe or trust in it. With society discredited, we tend not to tend to it. Just as we do not repair faulty consumable objects, we tend not repair human bonds and relationships that are faulty. According to Bauman (2002), we have a tendency to 'surf' on the surface of reality since nothing could be worse than tying ourselves to a sinking ship. With this, Bauman is clearly drawing our attention to the moral consequences and problems associated with, even caused by, distance from the collective.

Ambivalence: Modernity and Post modernity

We have already encountered the idea that some form of rationality is at the heart of demoralisation. A logical corollary is to attribute these forms of rationality and their consequences in terms of demoralisation to 'modernity' (quotation marks intended to highlight the contingency of the term). 'Modernity' carries (not unproblematically) connotations of rationalisation processes (the so-called 'cradle of the enlightenment') coupled with the loss of traditional sense making, moral coherence and the idea that the loss of community entails the birth of the individual. One need only turn to the Frankfurt school to see a dedicated critique of enlightenment, rationality and modernity [see, for example, Adorno and Horkheimier (1972), Horkheimer (1976) and Marcuse (1964)]. Since the advent of modernity coincides approximately with the birth of sociology, we can find a critique of societal rationalisation in its 'founding fathers'. In Weber's (2002) noting of instrumental rationality and action driving out affectual, value laden action we find an antecedent to themes running through the demoralisation literature. The work of Simmel (1971, 1997 and 2004) represents a recurrent critique of modernity and its consequences in terms of culture and character, making him an even stronger forerunner to the demoralisation debate. In *The Philosophy of Money* (2004), Simmel traces the ramifications of monetary rationalisation. Noting the dominance of 'intellectual energy' (referring to the rational, calculating spirit) over emotions and sentiments, he identifies money as the medium through which these processes take place. For Simmel, money is the 'talisman of modern life' through which *everything* is converted into a common monetary form. The effect is the creation of an objective culture in which subjectivity and heterogeneity is denied (for Simmel, since everything is reducible to a monetary value, everything is *essentially* the same in spite of superficial difference) which in turn objectifies persons. It also creates an objective intelligence (objective sense making if you will) which devalues or obscures that which cannot be rationalised through monetary valuation: for example emotions, sentiments and values. It is a short step from this to a variety of themes identified in more contemporary theorists (common sense in Fevre, the hollowing out of emotions in Meštrović *etcetera*).

Equally well, postmodernism (no quotation marks required as contingency is embedded in the concept) in all its anti-rational glory is at the heart of demoralisation. Postmodernism, often introduced as the collapse of meta-narratives (Lyotard, 1984), is the source of the cultural and character fragmentation addressed in a previous discussion. The oft-cited upshot of postmodernism is the recognition and celebration of heterodoxy and plurality. This however holds little merit for those theorising the demoralisation of Western culture. Bell, you will recall, posits that heterodoxy and plurality have become orthodox and thus, in the process of carrying us nowhere, we also lose a coherent moral code. This logically requires us to turn to relativism, postmodernism's epistemological forerunner. In terms of demoralisation, a discussion of Bloom's (1987) work is appropriate here. In addition to representing the conservative Right's input to the demoralisation debate, Bloom is particularly vocal in his critique of relativism. Bloom's identification of social pathology looks to the malignant effects of relativism across the whole of the cultural spectrum – aesthetic, ethical and epistemological. Bloom views the attractions of 'low' culture (made possible by aesthetic relativism) as distractions from the development of a liberally educated character with which to critique moral decay in society. However, between this *Closing of the American Mind* and moral/epistemological relativism, Bloom suggests that this is simply not feasible at present. Another consequence of relativism is the devaluation of values and sentiments (just as the rationalising spirit of modernism does) because if everything is relative, then nothing can have value. This hints at another issue raised by postmodernism, that of nihilism. Again, the theme of nihilism has been touched on by theorists already mentioned such as the loss of meaning identified by Stivers (1994) and the consequences of narcissism identified by Lasch (1979). Similarly, in the work of Meśtrović (1997) and Fevre (2000), we find a strong critique of postmodernism. Both theorists deride the way in which postmodernism 'hollows out' meaningful phenomena (Meśtrović considers emotions, Fevre considers morality) offering only manufactured and 'sham' substitutes in their place (it is in this respect that Fevre considers ersatz moralities). Conversely Bauman, in his quest for non-universal values, embraces (at least to some extent) postmodernism and replaces a concern for morality with a concern for ethics (please see below).

Common to modernity and postmodernity is uncertainty regarding morality. This is *the* defining feature of demoralisation and the one that separates it from anomie. This is obvious in the case of postmodernism ('everything is relative') but less so in the case of modernity. Again, it is the work of Bauman that can shed light on this discussion. We have encountered already the idea that modernity, more specifically its legislators and interpreters, seek to compose and impose a universal, foundational moral code upon persons (Bauman, 1987 1989 1993). We have also encountered the idea that this is emblematic of a wider ordering project. It is with this that Bauman conceives of modernity as a systematic effort to exterminate ambivalence (1991). Central to this effort, Bauman reminds us, are processes of taxonomy, classification, inventory, catalogue and statistics (1991: p.15). Resisting Weberian temptations to flag up bureaucracy as the archetype, Bauman turns to the metaphor of geometry as a shining example of modern practice. Using this metaphor, Bauman shows that geometry shows us how the world would be if it were, in reality, geometric. However, the world is not geometric and real world phenomena cannot fit neatly into the geometric grids set up by modernity's ordering project. Much remains ambivalent such that ambivalence is for Bauman, the *waste* of modernity. Morality is one such phenomenon, as it is inherently ambivalent, inherently undecidable, and inherently irrational (Bauman, 1993). A clear cut sense of morality in terms of a straight forward right *versus* wrong is very much a product of modernity's ordering project. *A priori* it is easy to realise that very few actions are unambiguously right, good and moral [Bauman (1993) gives the example of the desire to care for the Other manifesting itself as a denial of the Other's autonomy]. Moreover, the criteria by which we make moral judgements are multiple and conflicting: one could judge an action as good by virtue of economic sense, usefulness, aesthetic merits, truthfulness *etcetera* yet very few actions could be said to satisfy every one of these criteria.

With this, we can return to Bauman's approach to ethics and what it means to be moral (being for the Other ahead of being with the Other) to recall that it is essentially something that is pre-rational (we also know from the likes of Durkheim and Meštrović that morality it inherently irrational). Any attempt to rationally design and enforce an ethical code is (a) going to face the impossibility of reflecting the inherent undecidabiltity of morality and (b) leave out what is truly moral about morality. In respect of the latter contention, no rational code can exhaust the non-rational nature of

morality and any attempt to do so merely shifts responsibility from the realm of personal autonomy (and it is this responsibility for one's responsibility that makes us moral) to the heteronomy of society's legislators and interpreters (Bauman, 1993). This creates a paradox where any attempt to rationalise primordial commitments to the Other and thus eradicate ambivalence actually results in more ambivalence. The problem with morality for Bauman is that modernity fails to address moral ambivalence. It is on this note that he introduces his postmodern approach ethics (1993). In abandoning modern approaches to morality, Bauman is *not* abandoning modern moral concerns; he is merely abandoning modern ways of thinking about them. For Bauman, taking a postmodern approach to ethics is not a matter of replacing ethics with aesthetics, it is the recognition that modernist ethical theories are something of a blind alley (so, in the most literal sense his approach is *post* modern). His postmodern approach to *morality* ('Life in Fragments', 1995) derives from this ethical theory (once again, being for the Other before being with the Other) and notes that the crisis of morality in the postmodern age is a matter of cultural fragmentation and the 'episodicity of life pursuits' which carries us round again to the fragmentation of culture that lies at the heart of demoralisation. In a sense, it is this book that marks the transition from the themes in his classic works (1987, 1989, 1991, 1993) to those in his more contemporary writing (2000, 2002, 2003).

Having introduced the major themes in the demoralisation debate with particular reference to the work of Zygmunt Bauman, it remains to introduce the theorists whose work is ostensibly significant in relation to Fevre's.

Habermas: Rationalities and Colonies

Fevre's theory owes a lot of the work of Jürgen Habermas', particularly his theory of communicative action (1984, 1987). This chapter necessitates a dedicated focus on a theorist of Habermas' standing. Through discussing the work of Habermas, we can draw obvious parallels with Fevre's theory and begin the journey back to a discussion of Fevre's theory in respect of remoralisation. It is also through Habermas that we can see the importance of social movements – in my case alterity – as a way of subverting (on a cultural and affectual level) the predicament of demoralisation.

Habermas takes issue with the prevalence of individualistic, goal orientated rationality. He also takes issue with the intellectual descendents of Weber who, despite a diffuse typology, focus too narrowly on purposive, goal orientated rationality. For Habermas, there is far more to societal rationalisation than teleological, goal orientated rationality and he calls for a wider conceptualisation of rationality that allows for action that is geared towards argumentative speech. Habermas identifies three 'world relations' to which rationality can make validity claims: the objective world of physical things, the subjective world of inner experience and the social world of roles and norms. These validity claims rest on four types of action: teleological, strategic, normatively regulated and communicative. Social theory tends to focus only on teleological action but Habermas draws our attention to the importance of communicative action in which persons 'seek to reach an understanding about their action situation...in order to co-ordinate their actions by way of agreement' (Habermas, 1984: p.86). Like all types of action, it is reliant on increasingly complex aspects of rationality (not just teleological, purposive, instrumental rationality) in particular, communicative rationality. Communicative rationality refers to the reliance of communication on rationality to make and interpret claims in respect of the three 'world relations'. For Habermas, demoralisation – or more accurately, the problem with capitalist modernity – arises when communicative action and communicative rationality are undermined by more instrumental forms of rationality.

Modernity, according to Habermas, differentiates the social and subjective worlds from the objective world such that the objective world can be understood through objective means. This disembedding is crudely understood to represent the distancing of the lifeworld from the system. However, Habermas (1984) makes it quite clear that this happens against the backdrop of the lifeworld. True enough, Habermas views societies as composed of the system and the lifeworld but he arrives at this by noting the difference between the *systematic* integration of societies that reaches through and beyond action and the *social* integration that takes effect in action (Outhwaite, 1994). This distinction suggests that there is more to society than the lifeworld. To make clear the definition of 'system' and 'lifeworld': 'the system' actually refers to the collection of strategic, organisational and bureaucratic systems such as the 'garden state' (Bauman, 1991) and the free market. The lifeworld is the culturally transmitted

stock of knowledge and linguistically organised stock of interpretative patterns (including the interpretative work of previous generations) through which cultural reproduction, socialisation and the balancing of individuality and sociality takes place. In respect of the distancing of the lifeworld from the system, Habermas notes that a clean break cannot be made as systems such as the 'norm free market' are part of our culturally transmitted stock of knowledge whilst the lifeworld and its structures are crucial for systems maintenance (Outhwaite, 1994). However, Habermas notes the trend for new systems (such as the state and the market economy) to emerge and then become increasingly detached from the lifeworld - the social structures in which their integration first took place - such that they are 'anchored in the lifeworld' (Habermas, 1984) whilst their 'detailed workings are not' (Outhwaite, 1994).

As modernity progresses, Habermas notes that the advent of rationality ensures that nothing is taken for granted such that the common stock of meanings in the lifeworld become fragmented. With this, the lifeworld relies less on the interpretative work of previous generations and more on the interpretative accomplishments of present inhabitants. Rather than viewing this as relativistic or nihilistic, it is here that Habermas situates the necessity and potential of communicative and rational action (1987). However, the problem is that this does not happen. Instead, the lifeworld becomes open to manipulation by 'formal steering media' such as the market, bureaucracy and power (Habermas, 1984 1987). The system is associated with the co-ordination of action with a view to success whilst the lifeworld is associated with the co-ordination of action with a view to understanding. When the lifeworld becomes open to the co-ordination of action by these formal steering media (oriented to success) it is suggested that the system has colonised the lifeworld. These formal steering media literally steer the lifeworld's inhabitants away from action geared towards mutual understanding in the direction of money and power. For Habermas, modernity could offer the potential for higher forms of moral reasoning but they get marginalised by the formalisation of market and administrative structures within the lifeworld. For Habermas, it isn't rationality *per se* that causes demoralisation nor is it simply the replacing of one type of rationality with another. It is also the uncoupling of the system and the lifeworld as this allows the development of an 'objective' relationship with the 'objective world' giving money and bureaucracy success through efficiently securing the material reproduction of society. More significantly, it is the

colonising of the lifeworld by media that steer action in the system that prevents the development of a more appropriate form of rationality. The fragmentation and differentiation of the lifeworld, as seen, estranges persons from broader cultural traditions and ensures and that the conditions are met for the colonisation of the lifeworld.

The parallels with Fevre's theory are striking: neither theorist mounts a wholesale critique of rationality/reason as they both recognise multiple types of reason. They both identify different arenas of social life in which different types of rationality/reason are appropriate but recognise the problem of applying the wrong type of reason in the wrong place and applying the logic that is appropriate in one area to an area where it is not. Both theorists use the language of colonisation and draw attention to the problems associated with the spread of common sense and instrumental rationality whilst identifying its inherent appeal and potency as the reason for its spread. Both theorists draw attention to the simultaneous (or consequent) failure of culture to create a moral check on reason in the wrong place. Finally, both theorists – through systematically identifying the problem – offer the possibility for remoralisation. In a sense, both theorists see the problem as too little rationality rather that too much and see the solution in terms of developing the appropriate forms of rationality.

Sorokin: Sensate Culture and Social Change

On a general and possibly superficial level, it is necessary to draw parallels between the work of Pitrim Sorokin and Fevre's theory. Noting the congruity and more importantly, the incongruity between Fevre and Sorokin will, when read in light of Habermas, give a better illustration of Fevre's theory and put us in a position to have a meaningful discussion of remoralisation.

Sorokin (1985 [1957]), like Fevre, notes a relationship between how societies tend to make sense of reality and wider 'systems of culture' that include aesthetics, ethics, social relationships, law and the constitution of character (the last four points can be taken together as morality). Sorokin identifies three ways in which societies have

historically comprehended reality: 'truth of the senses', 'reason and intellect' and 'faith and intuition'. The temptation is to view these as somehow analogous to Fevre's four sense making categories. However, closer inspection reveals that they are not. The distinction between 'truth of the senses' and 'faith and intuition' recalls the epistemological distinction (knowledge *versus* belief) identified by Fevre whilst 'reason and intellect' is common to all four of Fevre's sense making devices because they are all forms of reasoning. Sorokin's typology is better thought of as the raw ingredients of Fevre's matrix and typology. Sorokin identifies systems of culture that derive from this typology: a culture that comprehends reality through 'truth of the senses' is a *sensate* culture whilst a culture that comprehends reality through 'reason and intellect' is known as an *ideational* culture. Sorokin identifies the 'crisis of our age' in relation to the prevailing sensate culture.

Again, it is tempting to draw parallels with Fevre as both are noting a problem in society that has its origins in cultural tendencies to comprehend reality through 'truth of the senses' or *common sense*. However, this would be a crude comparison. Firstly, Sorokin would include science in the category of 'truth of senses' whereas Fevre is keen to distinguish science from common sense. More significantly, where Sorokin draws a direct link between making sense through 'truth of senses' and prevalence of sensate culture; Fevre recognises it is not that simple. Fevre does not suggest that we live in a common sense culture as he recognises that all systems of culture are *mixed fields* (Fevre, 2000). Even when one form of sense making dominates, this does not mean that others are wholly absent. For example, although religion has lost its potency, it is still a real force within Western culture. Fevre's diagnosis is one of imbalance: it is not common sense *per se* but the absence of a balance in sense making. I may be being a little hard on Sorokin here for he does *recognise* the possibility of balance in his identification of *idealistic* culture (which is a mixture of sensate and ideational elements) even though he does not seem to think its existence is particularly probable. For the most part however, he *does* suggest that the presence of more than one sense making device is at the root of the problem. True enough, both Fevre and Sorokin posit that culture has run out ideas in respect of morality, *however* where Fevre focuses on the decay of sense making devices with which to balance common sense; Sorokin focuses on the decay of sensate culture through viewing it as a culture on its way out. For Sorokin, a balance of sense making devices is

tantamount to calamity and the presence of other methods of comprehending reality (elements of an ideational culture) serve to undermine the potency of sensate culture. In essence, both focus on malintegration but Fevre views the problem as too much common sense and too little integration whereas Sorokin views it as too little 'truth of the senses' and too much integration. Sorokin suspends value judgements of sensate and ideational culture and finding fault only with the co-existence of sense making devices (with the exception of idealistic culture). Adopting a broadly Hegelian perspective, he views this co-existence as a dialectic whose resolution will move society into an epoch of new sense making leading in turn to a new system of culture and a resolution of the 'crisis of the age'. Fevre is opposed to this deterministic model of change. For Fevre, social change is not a passive or inevitable process. In order to resolve the crisis of demoralisation, culture needs to play an active role in creating new sense.

Remoralisation

In terms of remoralisation, Fevre's theory is once again very close to the work of Habermas. In William Outhwaite's evaluation of Habermas' theory (1994), he suggests that Habermas' theory is not a short term solution to the problems it identifies. Rather it is focused on the long term and should be seen as a 'reconstructive theory' which is aimed at the practical development of human capacities. A corollary of this is that Habermas' theory cannot be viewed as a ready made set of answers; instead it should be aimed at developing the 'grammar of our ways of life' (Outhwaite, 1994). Habermas' theory is deemed relevant to those who conceive of modern politics in terms of communication and culture (remember that Bell defines culture as the attempt to address existential and ethical issues) as opposed to economy and bureaucracy. A crude but commonplace reading of Habermas is that he views the system as bad and the lifeworld as good. However, aside from recognising the flaws of the lifeworld, Habermas also notes the function and achievements of the system. It therefore makes more sense, at least in my reading, to view Habermas' theory (1984 1987) as a call for the rejuvenation of communicative rationality and action in the lifeworld in order to balance the purposive action and

rationality of the system. These comments could equally well be applied to Fevre's theory.

Fevre's approach to remoralisation offers a long term solution in the form of a reconstructive theory aimed at developing human capacities and the 'grammar of our ways of life'. Fevre is calling for a rejuvenation of morality such that we can 'think the unthinkable' and address dilemmas that have remained untapped through an excess of cognition. Remoralisation is reliant on making *new* sense. Common sense has effaced belief (so too religion and sentiment) which in turn has effaced morality, offering hollowed out sham moralities in its place. Remoralisation relies on social invention (an active cultural process) to fill the space that sentiment and religion used to occupy:

	Knowledge	Belief
Human	A	x
Non-Human	B	y

Returning to the original diagram, remoralisation requires new sense making devices to fill categories x and y. Fevre reminds us that this is within the realm of possibility because cultures have already invented sense making devices to do so (common sense, science, religion and sentiment) and are therefore wholly capable of doing so again. The first step to be made is to generate something to believe in because a morality that we can respect and adhere to relies on us seeking meaning 'beyond and beneath the old discredited truths'. Fevre refers to this as a *first cause*. Any sense making endeavour requires a subject to make sense of: religion had god, science had nature, common sense had human nature and sentiment had human spirit and all of these are first causes. The necessity of first causes becomes clear when Fevre explains that there are things 'out there', in all four categories of the matrix, which we need to make sense of but cannot study directly. We therefore invent a subject or *first cause* through combining an epistemological and ontological category from which we can begin to make sense and start reasoning. Demoralisation has arisen as our

reasoning has reached a dead end in categories x and y so we need a *new* first cause from which to make new sense.

In order to make new make sense, Fevre argues, we need to recombine existing elements of sense making. Between science, religion, sentiment and common sense we have a significant body of language, ideas and concepts such that it is unnecessary to start from scratch. Culture's task is to bring together disparate elements and recombine them in novel and innovative configurations such that new sense can be made of the new first causes. This recombination of sense making will generate new ideas about how the world is and more importantly, the way the world ought to be. Where the problem underlying demoralisation was *imbalance*, recombination should generate a better sense of balance such that belief is taken seriously, providing the antidote to an excess of cognition. Taking belief seriously in this way allows for the rejuvenation of morality which is turn allows for greater moral regulation of common sense and science. Again, this provides a greater sense of balance in all processes of sense making. Any temptation that remains to claim that a focus on remoralisation is equivalent to some variant of right wing moralising would do well to consider the progressive potential of Fevre's (and Habermas') theory. It is not suggested that we look back to the old moral structures but look forward to a way out of our present predicament.

At this juncture, it is important to pause for moment to consider the importance of belief in respect of the distinction that Fevre draws between ethics and morals. For Fevre, ethics are guidelines to action that are still very much grounded in common sense and as such, do *not* take belief seriously. Ethics are a matter of doing x because of y rather than doing x because of a de-ontological belief and commitment. To give a contemporary example: the BBC's Newsnight programme has feature called 'ethical man' wherein one of its journalists (Justin Rowlatt) aims to live an ethical lifestyle. Predictably, most of the focus is on reducing his carbon footprint or buying local produce. Strangely though, 'ethical man' does not appear to address issues of not being unfaithful to his wife or being kind to waiting staff in restaurants. For Fevre, this would intimate quite nicely the predicament of demoralisation in so far as there is a deficit in thought that means belief is not taken seriously. For instance, it is easy to grasp that one should give up their car for the sake of the environment whereas

matters of felicity and fidelity require us to believe in something. Given our inability to take belief seriously, it follows that any attempt to address these issues in the 'ethical man' feature would not be taken seriously. For Fevre, the actions of ethical man would only represent *morality* if they were to be grounded in a belief such as preservation for future generations or even some conception of Mother Earth. Of course, we could take ethics – as Bauman does – as a matter of being for the Other and this would cover the above issues of not cheating on one's partner and being kind to waiting staff. However, for Fevre, we need morality and in turn belief to make us be for the Other, to make us be 'ethical'.

This thesis considers alterity as a potential arena in which new sense can be made and the possibilities of remoralisation explored. The remainder of this chapter is given to an exploration of the literature and theory that hints that this may be fruitful.

Alterity: a space of remoralisation

Thinking back to Habermas' theories of communicative action and rationality, one finds the potential for resistance and/or withdrawal from society (which is characterised as processes of the system's rationality colonising the lifeworld) embedded in the concept. Outhwaite (1994) suggests that the 'protest potential' in Habermas' theory lies in the capacity for silent revolution. This idea is borrowed from Inglehart (1977) who suggests that 'protest potential' or the potential for refuge and resistance, lies not in any form of revolutionary rhetoric but in terms of how one's life is lived. Accepting that protest potential lies in lifestyles, it is a short step to see how the alternative *lifestyles* that form the focus of this project can be viewed as one space in which persons or groups can operate on the existing platform of a rationalised lifeworld to try out new forms of communication and co-operation. On this note, we can identify a significant departure that Fevre makes from Habermas. Where Habermas seems to have an abject fear of all things affectual and ephemeral; Fevre gives significance credence to feelings, emotions and beliefs (see above) and recognises that they are necessarily intertwined with morality (see below). The idea of communicative rationality and actions is all well and good but if one does not

recognise the importance, emotions, beliefs and above all morals; it is hard to imagine quite what it is that persons are going to talk about.

This thesis draws heavily on the work of Kevin Hetherington as it he who has – systematically and engagingly – discussed the significance of alternative lifestyles in relation to challenging and transgressing society (most notably Hetherington, 1997). Indeed, it is Hetherington (1998) who identifies the tendency of those participating in alternative lifestyles to constitute themselves in terms of some sense of moral election. I shall resist, as far as is possible a detailed discussion of Hetherington's work and its focus on complexity and heterogeneity as it will be used frequently in the analysis chapters. What is important for now are the parallels that one can draw between Hetherington's and Fevre's departures from Habermas. Hetherington (1998) rejects Habermas' fear of the affectual and instead turns to the work of Melucci (1989) who, he states:

'[g]ives more credence to affectual issues associated with cultural forms of self-expression and identity formation within new social movements that do not necessarily take an obviously communicatively rational form' (Hetherington, 1998: p.34)

In addition to this, he follows Pakulski (1991) in identifying the moral dimension to new social movements but departs from him to argue that new social movements are *emotional* communities (see discussion of Maffesoli below) as well as moral communities. Indeed, for Hetherington feeling and morality cannot be separated; a statement that is not a million miles away from Fevre. In light of this, one can see why Hetherington suggests a focus on the cultural and affectual elements of new social movements in place of the socio-political and ideological ones; a suggestion that I have already stated that I am following. With this, it must be noted that *part* of the reason for this focus is Hetherington's departure from the British analysis of subcultures associated with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS). For Hetherington, it is problematic to think in terms of oppositional or counter-hegemonic cultures that are wholly distinct from what they seek to subvert. Indeed, I have already noted – in chapter one- that cultures are not pure. Again, I will not discuss this in detail here as it is something that I want to come through in the analysis and conclusion.

In light of the above, it is also important to note the role Hetherington accords to identities, more specifically the occasioning of expressive identities in relation to lifestyles. This rests on the idea that identities can and should be thought of as a project (Bauman, 2004). To make sense of this, we need to go back to the stepping stones offered by Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991). Recalling that both modernity and postmodernism are at the heart of demoralisation, Beck's notion of reflexive modernisation provides a conceptual antidote to this aporia. Reflexive modernisation offers a way out of modernity without the nihilism and relativism embedded in postmodernism, herein the realm of identity politics is valorised as an arena of cultural and political resistance in which sub-political groupings (taken to mean new social movements) make attempts to manage the challenges posed to lifeworlds by the system (Beck, 1996). In a sense, reflexive modernisation allows for the shaping of structures imposed by the system and modernity rather than being constrained by them or purporting to destroy them wholesale. Within this debate, Giddens (1991) introduces the distinction between *emancipatory* and *life* politics - the former being associated with traditional conceptions of political resistance, the latter being associated with lifestyle and identity politics. We encountered the term life politics when Bauman (2002) referred to it in a pejorative sense. However Giddens' intention, as I perceive it, is to view life politics in a more positive light. True enough, it carries the same connotation of biographical, individual solutions to demoralisation but Giddens suggests that there is potential for refuge and resistance whereas Bauman (2002) views this as yet another symptom of demoralisation. How then is this accomplished?

True enough, identity can be seen as a project, a project of individualism but identity politics and life politics also provide opportunities for belonging and sociality:

"Identity is about more than the development of a life project...it is fundamentally about issues of belonging, expression, performance, identification and communication with others" (Hetherington, 1998: p.62).

Again, it is Hetherington, (1994) that highlights the link between identity and identification through reference to a renewal of Schmalenbach's concept (1961) of the *Bund*. These Bunds are forms of organisation that facilitate affectual identification

with other persons whilst enabling the creation of expressive identities. They are forms through which the need for affective and emotional solidarity with others is sought yet, since participation is a matter of *choice* (is not ascribed membership to a community) they are *elective* forms of affinity. The *Bund* is thought to provide the elements of *Gemeinschaft* that are lost through modernity without returning to the ascriptive elements of traditional community. A logical corollary is that identity, the *expressive* identities realised through the *Bund* owe more to lifestyle choices and sub cultural identifications than traditional sociological variables such as class, race and gender. As a concept, the *Bund* allows us to think of the politics of identity in terms of the politics of identification (and solidarity). According to Hetherington, persons electing affinity with a bund:

"[a]re more likely to seek collectivities of like minded others. This is especially so in the case of those who seek to create a lifestyle that is ethically committed towards others" (Hetherington, 1998: p. 94)

So, in addition to providing solidarity and doing the work of identity (through identifying with others for reasons other than shared ascribed, characteristics), *Bunds* actually embody an ethical dimension. Hetherington goes on to say:

"[l]ifestyles... associated with 'new social movements' seek to make life meaningful on affectual and value-rational grounds...others – indeed the whole category of Other – become significant on emotional *and* moral grounds" (Hetherington, 1998: p.94 my emphasis)

The solidarity and identity work afforded by the *Bund* is governed by principles, values, ethics and morals. The importance of the bund is that it is an obvious medium through which to pursue the creation of identity and projects of life politics but it also embodies a sense of collective identification and empathy with like minded others.

The concept of the Bund recalls many other attempts to theorise what has eventually been construed as forms of postmodern sociality [for example Bauman's *peg communities* (2001a) or Turner's *communitas* (1969)]. However, it is Maffesoli's concept of the *neo-tribe* (1996) that complements naturally Hetherington's analysis. Maffesoli (1996) highlights the desire to belong, the yearning to experience the *divin social* or 'transcendental warmth of the collective' at the source of persons seeking affiliation with *neo-tribes* (or *Bunds*). Again, it is through neo-tribes that persons

seek to show their identification with like minded others. Like Hetherington, Maffesoli is concerned with *expressive* identities and he draws our attention to the fact that expressivism allows for a combination of the ethical and aesthetic. Identity work is done at an aesthetic level (you could even think of this as the work of self constitution and presentation), but simultaneously the work of morality is done. In relation to the work of morality, the particulars of the group's moral code are not important. Following Lefebvre (1991), it might be thought of in terms of an *emergent ethos*. What *is* important is Hetherington's idea (1998) that those in a *Bund* view themselves as a moral elect who are symbolically distanced from the mainstream of society by virtue of their commitment to each other and their 'oppositional goals to society at large'. They are seeking an 'expressive alternative to the conditions of modern life'. For our purposes, this is easily translated as 'seeking an alternative to demoralisation'. With this connection, it is not hard to see the rationale for studying alternative lifestyles, alterity, as a potential space of remoralisation.

It is becoming clear that identity is an arena where the ambivalence (Bauman, 1991) [in Beck's (1992) terms, risk] that underlies demoralisation is managed. Belonging, based on expressivism (combining the aesthetic with the ethical) and collective ascription to an emergent ethos, is facilitated. In turn, this combats anomie (providing regulation and integration) and on this note it is worth pointing out that both Hetherington and Maffesoli note the importance of these processes in relation to the role assigned to religion - as the source of social solidarity through recourse to the other worldly- in Durkheim's theories (1915[2001]). A consistent theme is the importance of affect and the affectual which carries connotations of the Romantic. Indeed, Hetherington (1998) outlines the importance of the Romantic structure of feeling. Thinking back to the aporia posed by modernity and postmodernity, it worth considering the Romantic through the eyes of Meštrović (1991). Meštrović argues that a genuine alternative to modernity is not to be found in postmodernism. Instead, he suggests a return to the *fin de siecle* spirit wherein thinkers such as Durkheim, Simmel, Neitzsche, Schopenhauer and Baudelaire were critiquing modernity first hand. Central to Meštrović's theory is the establishing of an *irrational* basis for social order rather than the 'irrational' (postmodern) abandoning of the possibility of sociality as imagined by Baudrillard (1983) [Fish (2003) has written an interesting article drawing the parallels between Meštrović and Maffesoli in their common

Durkheimian heritage in as much as both theorists note the affinity between 'religion and sociality' against the extremes of what I would term an easily arrived at postmodernism]. To have an idea of what this irrational basis for social order might look like we need only recall Bauman's concern with the demoralising effects of modernity's ordering attempt and identification of morality in the practice of being for the Other before being with the Other. This sits easily with Hetherington's concept of the Romantic structure of feeling and carries us right back to the importance of affect and the affectual. Please also recall Hetherington's idea (1998, cited above) that the category of Other assumes importance, morally and emotionally, in processes of expressive identity formation. Looking at this idea through Bauman's eyes, we have further justification for thinking of alterity as a space of remoralisation.

Thinking back to Fevre's theory, one can make *a priori*, a case for viewing alterity as a space in which the mechanism and processes of remoralisation can be satisfied. As noted, remoralisation requires belief to be taken seriously to counter an excess of cognition which in turn will lead to a better balance of sense making. The literature above, with its focus on the emotional, affectual and irrational, certainly suggests that belief *can* be taken seriously. Indeed, there is a body of literature that highlights the capabilities of social movements in respect of inventing belief (see for example Jordan, 2002). More importantly, these beliefs lead to the creation of - via the emergence of an ethos - a moral code. There is cause to believe that these beliefs and values may be genuine as the literature suggests, against postmodern notions of recycled representations, that ethics as well as aesthetics feature. In terms of recombination, the focus on the affectual and emotional hints logically at the presence of *sentiment* but also at *religion* as forms of sense making (recall how Durkheim viewed religion as the worship of the collective). It would seem that alterity is a space of recombination where elements of sentiment and religion (and quite possibly science) are combined with the prevailing *common sense*. Alterity then, through recombination, is being taken as a way of ordering the relations between persons along different lines such that a new form of communication and co-operation in being tried out; one that perhaps takes belief seriously. Of course, this is now just conjecture and the thesis is now given to an empirical exploration of this.

3

ETHNOGRAPHY: THE THEORY OF PRACTICE AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY.

This chapter, the first of two that are concerned with methods, represents a *methodology*, a philosophy of social science. Firstly, this chapter outlines my theoretical rationale for adopting an ethnographic approach to the study of alterity. More significantly, it provides the rationale for adopting and developing multi-site ethnography (Marcus, 1986). Secondly, my approach to the complex relationship between social theory and empirical research is detailed. Most pressingly, this chapter illustrates why (and how) a small scale study is offered by way of empirical engagement with the seemingly meta-theoretical issues detailed in chapter two.

Alterity

Empirically engaging with alterity is a problematic business. Taking such an ephemeral phenomena as one's object of study leads quickly to difficulties: how does one define and identify alterity? How does one account for the range of spatial and temporal contexts in which it appears? How does one discover the myriad, as yet unknown, manifestations in which it will appear? Between these problems of definition, identification, context and manifestation, it is difficult to think that any form of empirical engagement might be possible. Indeed, it is an arena in which one could bring any number of theoretical tools to the table and bypass the obligation to engage empirically with the issue. However, without wishing to neglect the purchase of theory, alterity *needs* empirical analysis. One cannot, in my view, detach their focus from empirical engagement if they seek to do some serious sociological analysis.

Why Ethnography?

To see *why* ethnography is a suitable vehicle for the study of alterity, classic definitions need to be revisited. As chapter one will have made clear, I eventually depart from these classic definitions. Nevertheless, they are the necessary stepping stones that justify the use of ethnography to empirically engage with alterity. An ethnography is the desired outcome of the fieldwork process. The ethnographer's ambition is to produce a thick description (Geertz, 1973) of what might be termed a *culture*. To elaborate: of Raymond Williams' various definitions of culture, we find an approximation of what this means in the following:

"The independent noun, whether used generally or specifically, which indicates a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group or humanity in general." (Williams, 1983:p.90).

Ethnography then is an account of culture, an account of a particular way of life. In a sociological context, it can be seen as the collective framework within which the actions and meanings of a group are situated or the taken for granted and tacit understandings that are learnt and shared by a given group. Since the goal of ethnography is an account of culture, it follows that culture is ethnography's object of analysis. Clearly, one could view culture as an abstraction that eludes analysis. However, doubting the ontological status of culture is fruitless (Geertz, 1973) because the behaviours and beliefs that emerge from it *are* real, as are the *meanings* given to them and these are indicative of the broader context and holistic framework in which they are situated.

To pick up on the importance of meanings: Geertz (1973) claims that the investigation of meaning is at the heart of cultural analysis by virtue of mankind's unique ability is to bestow *meaning* upon experience using culture, a symbolic system, as the source of illumination. Bypassing any philosophical critique of his logic, a *semiotic* conception of culture can be taken on board. A semiotic conception of culture naturally draws on Saussarian linguistics (Saussure, 1936). Put crudely, within every sign/symbol there is a signifier (in this case, the action/phenomenon) and there is a signified (in this case, meaning and culture); the task of the ethnographer is to examine the symbols with a view to discovering

meaning. However, such a pursuit can only ever be *interpretative* and as such it is going to be both incomplete and contestable:

"[m]an is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an *interpretative* one in search of meaning" (Geertz, 1973: p.5 my emphasis).

One need only recall Derrida's deconstruction of Saussurian linguistics (Derrida, 1972) to recognise that meaning is inherently contestable and a property of *différance* (see below for a discussion). *Différance* forces one to accept that the signifiers they investigate (the specific forms) are not in an isomorphic relationship with the signifieds (culture/meaning) and as such, their interpretations are just that: *interpretations*, caught up in the play of endless displacement. With this in mind I am drawn to another of Geertz' suggestions:

"Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses, not discovering the continent of meaning and mapping out its bodiless landscape". (Geertz, 1973:p.20).

Ethnography gives an interpretative account of culture *via* an interpretation of meanings. The importance of 'thick description' is that is reveals the abstract through a focus on the concrete and uses the ethnographic imagination (Willis, 2000) to trace actions, via meanings, back to their cultural framework.

To do this one must get one's hands dirty, so to speak, through spending time with those who produce and consume the culture in which one is interested. So through participant observation (this will be discussed in chapter four), this is what ethnography allows: a real world, human encounter that precedes the search for meaning and culture. Participant observation allows one to go inside a culture and discover the intricate web of threads that constitute it. The ethnographer is required to maintain a cool analytic distance in the process of experiencing culture. There are systematic procedures (call them methods) that manage the tension between involvement and detachment such that the human encounter/real world experience can be transformed into an inscription of the flow of social discourse and subsequently an ethnographic account. It follows that ethnographic analysis

involves the 'tying up of loose ends' through connections between 'webs of significance' such that an account of the cultural framework can be offered.

Although departures will be made from this approach to ethnography, it has been introduced to show the applicability of ethnography to the study of alterity. It is unproblematic to view alterity as a cultural phenomenon (see prologue) and having established ethnography as an appropriate tool for the study of culture; it can be noted that alterity is amenable to ethnographic analysis. Noting the congruity between alterity as a cultural phenomenon and ethnography as a way of going inside the culture is only half of the story. There are many issues (and these issues are the reasons for my departure from conventional ethnography) to be resolved before ethnography can be seen as up to the challenge of analysing alterity.

Binding Ethnography, Binding Alterity.

My original intention was to go inside the culture of a space that I deemed to be 'Other'. My focus was to be Beechwood Court (BWC); an intentional community practising an alternative lifestyle premised on ecological and communal living, set up as an educational charity to provide courses and retreats for those who wish to do likewise. My way inside the culture of BWC was to go on one of these retreats as a paying visitor. In the interests of triangulation (Denzin, 1978), I intended to repeat this immersion in various other capacities: attending different retreats, attending a community experience week and having gained some level of trust, going inside as a volunteer resident and member of the community. Further triangulation was intended to come in the form of doing the same thing in a different retreat centre. With the benefit of hindsight, I can see that this would have been wholly unsatisfactory. It would have just been an ethnography or BWC, at best an ethnography of intentional communities that run retreats. The cultural phenomenon of alterity does not begin and end at the spatial limits of BWC nor is it reasonable to equate alterity only with intentional communities that run retreats. Aside from undermining the above claims about ethnography's capability to explore the ephemeral, this binding of alterity does a great disservice to the nature of alterity as it neglects the range of spatial and temporal contexts in which alterity might appear.

A corollary of this is the reification of alterity - turning it into a physical as opposed to ephemeral object that can be identified in advance which is tantamount to presupposing what it is that one hopes to discover. This is problematic as defining alterity by one's own pre-existing conceptions does violence to the different *manifestations* that alterity may take.

Before discussing how I overcame these issues, I must note that there were practical, ethical and access issues that prevented me from carrying out my original intentions and as such I could only go inside the culture of BWC to do one period of fieldwork, as a resident volunteer. This forced a change in the direction of my ethnography and now, aside from being a great believer in serendipity, I feel that I have a much richer, sophisticated and satisfactory ethnography of alterity.

Unbinding Alterity, Unbinding Ethnography

To 'unbind' alterity, it need only be recalled that it is manifest across a range of spatial and temporal contexts and cannot be limited to one physical or social space. It follows that ethnography should, in order to do justice to alterity, be able to investigate it across a range of contexts. This becomes problematic when we note that ethnography traditionally focuses on the culture of a bounded space or bounded community (Barnard, 1980). Of course, one can argue that triangulation (Denzin, 1978) - investigating your subject across a range of spatial and temporal contexts- overcomes this problem. This idea was built into my original design but, as suggested, this is unsatisfactory for the study of alterity because it does not avoid the problem of pre-supposing what one seeks to uncover. To triangulate in any traditional sense requires the ethnographer have a clear idea of their object (relatively unproblematic in the majority of ethnographic studies), identifying it in advance of selecting fieldwork sites and then investigating it across a range of contexts. However, alterity is a highly ephemeral object and the manifestations in which it appears are *a priori*, unknown. Assuming that you *know* these and going at the study head on will, despite making an effort to do justice to the range of contexts in which it appears, neglect the range of manifestations in which it appears (which has a knock on effect of making the contexts less satisfactory).

Of course, one could *never* do justice to the range of contexts and manifestations in which alterity appears, but a better effort could be made than my original intention. To do justice to the unbinding of alterity, ethnography requires a more satisfactory unbinding than is offered by traditional triangulation. Having discussed *why* ethnography can and should be adopted for the investigation of alterity, it remains to be seen *how*.

Multi-site Ethnography

Multi-sited ethnography holds the key to a successful unbinding of alterity. George Marcus (1986 1995) can be thought of as the pioneer in this field although others suggest that we can go back to Bourdieu or even Durkheim and Mauss to find advocates of multi-site ethnography (see Wacquant, 2004). The starting point is the futility of trying to bind ethnography to a single site when we live in a complex, global system (Burawoy, 2001) and the advent of multi-site ethnography marks a shift from the ethnographic goal of 'being there' (Geertz, 1988) to 'being there...and there...and there' (Hannerz, 2003). Multi-site ethnography takes on objects that cannot be accounted for by an intensive study of a single site (Marcus, 1986). It takes on *complex* objects (Abu-Lughod, 2004) such as alterity. Multi-site ethnography is embedded in a complex global system and moves away from single sites to examine 'the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time space' (Marcus, 1995: p.96). Its object is a cultural formation produced in several locales rather than the culture produced by a given set of subjects so, whilst it does not abandon the focus on culture, it is given to mapping a cultural formation *in* a complex global system rather than offering a holistic account of a single site.

Multi-site ethnography becomes appealing for the study of alterity when Marcus takes care to distinguish it from any traditional concept of triangulation. Marcus (1995) contrasts conventional 'controlled comparisons', which deal in 'homogeneously conceived conceptual units', with comparisons in multi-site ethnography where the investigation of 'complexly connected real-world sites of

investigation' gives rise to an *emergent* object of study that is not known before hand. This addresses the twin problems of context and manifestation *but* Marcus (1995) notes that the challenge for the ethnographer is to construct a useful object of study. Clearly, one must take care to construct a useful object to avoid falling into the pitfalls that multi-site ethnography is presented as an antidote to. This is a matter of selecting fieldwork sites very carefully when there are clearly many that could be chosen (Hannerz, 2003). Marcus reminds us (1995) that strategies of 'following connections, associations and putative relationships' are central to multi-site ethnography and suggests several, including: following the people, following the thing, following the metaphor and following the conflict. For my multi-site ethnography of alterity, I settled on a strategy of 'indirection' and 'tracking analytical themes'.

Tracking Analytical Themes and Indirection

The strategies of tracking analytical themes and indirection are intertwined, but for the purposes of illustration, they will be detailed separately. Firstly, the strategy of tracking analytical themes. To introduce this concept and the challenge involved in building a useful object, it is best to turn to a practical illustration through looking at the strategy for selecting fieldwork sites after the study at BWC.

Although the study endeavoured to avoid defining alterity in advance of the fieldwork (in Marcus' terms, using homogeneously conceived conceptual units), the strategy of tracking analytical themes needs an entry point to the emergent object of study. One is on relatively safe ground in taking BWC as a manifestation of alterity because the resident community ostensibly constitutes itself as such in the brochure, on the website and through their correspondence with me during access discussions (having told them about my project, my gatekeeper noted that they would be ideal for my purposes). From here, the strategy of tracking analytic themes did not attempt to do justice to the different contexts in which alterity appears through traditional triangulation. Consequent fieldwork choices were based upon a desire to track (Latimer, n.d.) alterity.

Initially, I sought to follow persons away from BWC into other spheres/arenas of their lives, their 'mainstream' lives for example. Such an approach, one of *tracking persons* (Latimer, n.d.), although an excellent strategy for some objects/subjects, particularly when one considers the applicability of multi-site ethnography to mobile persons (Hannerz, 2003) has its limitations when alterity is the focus. Aside from the practical and ethical issues, this would not have actually allowed me to follow alterity. Alterity is not limited to the persons that produce and consume the culture of BWC and limiting the study/further fieldwork sites to them is tantamount to binding alterity by space as per my original intention and neglecting the different contexts in which alterity appears. There is also the problem of manifestation and definition: persons alone do not constitute alterity. To the contrary, alterity could be one part of any given individual's lifeworld in so far as when they are away from BWC, they may be symbolically removed from alterity. Of course, this *is* interesting but it would not lead me to different manifestations of alterity.

So, what is meant by tracking analytic themes? Having analysed the data from BWC, certain themes transpired as important in the constitution of the site as a space of alterity. These themes then served as guide for selecting further fieldwork sites such that I tracked alterity across a range of contexts *and* a range of manifestations. In respect of manifestations, this meant I was guided to manifestations that are made to matter rather than identifying manifestations that I thought might matter. Of course, the analytic themes are not things; they are based on the abstractions and connections I was making by way of analysis. However, as will be seen below, I took great care not to go at my ethnography head on. To give a flavour of how this 'tracking analytic themes' worked:

- The data from BWC revealed food to be important within cultures of alterity, particularly fair trade, organic, local and vegetarian/vegan food. Tracking this theme lead to me identifying RFM, a 'real food' market based on these precepts as another site of alterity in which to conduct further fieldwork.
- The data revealed an identification with spatial and temporal 'Others'. In particular, a fascination with cultures from the past (Pagans and Celts) and from afar (India and South America) as evident in cookery, decoration, clothing,

books and narratives. Tracking this theme led to me identify WOMAD - a music festival based on world music and roots music mirroring the theme in the BWC data and their CD racks - as another site of alterity. My way into WOMAD was as a representative on the stand of a pressure group which was in itself an analytic theme tracked from the BWC data, namely affiliations with left of centre pressure groups.

- The data from BWC revealed the importance of dancing rituals and occasions. This theme was tracked to RR (rainbow rhythms) a dance group running a similar programme of classes.

- Ethical consumption is important within the culture of BWC and tracking this theme led me to a fair trade shop as another manifestation of alterity. This theme also buttressed the significance of RFM as a site of alterity.

- In the interests of more traditional triangulation, I wanted to go on another retreat (retreat is a theme present at BWC and is therefore a valid theme to track). Tracking another theme from BWC, an interest in Buddhism and meditation, I decided to go on a retreat at Shakti Manor, a Buddhist retreat centre. Going to SM allowed the investigation of retreat centres from another perspective as here, I was actually going on a retreat.

Through tracking analytic themes and analysing each site as I went through, it began to transpire that themes were coming up that could be tracked back and forth between the existing sites such that there were multiple interconnections between themes across all the fieldwork sites. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms (1987), this can be seen as a *mapping* of alterity that represents a 'rhizomatic object'. Of course, I could have carried on tracking themes *ad infinitum*: for example, I wanted to investigate meditation groups after SM and the delivery of organic vegetables after RFM. The temptation to do so is great but I was acutely aware that I already had too much data for my purposes and had to put it to some use. With the mapping of alterity in place, another of Deleuze and Guattari's concepts became relevant, that of the *milieu*: the idea that there is no start and no finish, only *milieus* (which is the French word for 'middle'). Given the impossibility of mapping alterity in every possible manifestation, the mapping of a milieu seems like a logical idea and a satisfactory guide as to when one has a sufficient amount of data with which to stop

'tracking'. By this point, it seemed as if (a) I had enough data to do justice to the multiple contexts in which alterity is present and (b) I had discovered the manifestations of alterity without imposing my own sense of what alterity is.

This approach is one of *indirection* (Marilyn Strathern's terms not mine). Rather than going at ethnography head on and reproducing one's own cognitive categories (and existing theories), this is a softer, more tactile approach that allowed me to be guided. Having gone inside cultures of alterity via a context/manifestation that ostensibly constitutes itself as such (BWC), analytic themes were tracked, leading the ethnography to phenomena and sites that emerged as significant. This emergent object was built up ('mapped') in a way that does justice to both the contexts and manifestations of alterity whilst definition (if one can speak of such a thing) was revealed through the research process rather than ahead of it. It is worth noting that Deleuze and Guattari advise that such mapping does not 'reproduce an unconscious closed in on itself; it constructs the unconscious' (1987: p.13). In essence, indirection refers to this mapping and the emergent nature of the ethnographic object as compared to the problems created by going at ethnography head on. The theoretical significance of an approach that guards against reproducing one's own theoretical constructions will be discussed in a later section, for now it is enough to note that an indirect approach produces a much richer account of alterity as it allows for the creation of a much more satisfactory object, the emergent milieu of alterity. Please note that this is *not* just a variant of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) because it is *not* about building a theory; it is about building a research object. There are theoretical consequences to the way in which the research object is built but I am not in business of building theory; rather this thesis is intended to engage with *existing* theory.

Issues and Problems

Having ascertained the benefits of this approach, there are clear pitfalls. The goal of ethnography, as noted, is a *thick description* of culture and tradition dictates that the minimum necessary fieldwork period to achieve this is between twelve months and two years (Wolcott, 1995). Clearly, a multi-site ethnography conducted within the

confines of a doctoral thesis (offering a twelve to eighteen month fieldwork period as a maximum) will not offer sufficient opportunity to create a thick description of any given site. This section aims to pre-empt this criticism through defending the quality of data from any given site and making a departure from the goal of thick description.

Differing Objects and Objectives

Traditional ethnography aims to offer an account of the 'entire culture and social life' of its object and the minimum fieldwork period is governed, in part, by the need to observe the object at every season in the year. However, multi-site ethnography has a different object(ive). It is not governed by seasons as it is set against a backdrop of a complex global system and it is not concerned *ipso facto* with the 'entire social and cultural life' of any given site. As noted, it is concerned with mapping a cultural formation *in* this complex global system. So, where traditional ethnography endeavours to offer a thick description of culture; my thesis has both a different object *and* a different objective. Thinking back to chapter one, it was made clear – following Strathern (1995) – that the object of ethnography (for me at least) is the momentary elicitation/ordering of relations between persons. This does not dispute that culture and meaning are ethnography's objects of study; however it *does* suggest a slight difference in emphasis. Firstly, it suggests that the connections between meanings (which a conventional approach would think of as culture) are not 'out there' independently of the relations between of persons; rather, it suggests that the relations between meanings are routed through the connections between persons. Secondly, it follows that culture is not a solid and stable 'thing'; rather culture is the effect (not the starting point) of the ordering/elicitation of relations between persons.

In terms of objectives; the goal of this ethnography is not to offer a thick description. Again, thinking back to chapter one, my ambition in this ethnography is to capture the ordering of relations such that I can offer an *evocation* (Tyler, 1986) of alterity. In addition to capturing the connections between persons (and by proxy, the connections between meanings), there is another objective to this ethnography.

It is hoped that connections between ideas can be made such that theoretical debates can be engaged with. It is in this respect that this small scale study is presented as an appropriate way to engage with issues that were presented initially as 'macro' or 'meta' theoretical debates. You will recall from chapter one, that I am reluctant to think in terms of 'micro' *versus* 'macro'. Following Strathern, I only consider the question of scale and the business of 'crossing scale' is simply a matter of switching from one perspective to another (Strathern, 1991) to make different connections. So in place of thick description; the objective of my ethnography is to capture connections and write evocations.

Ethnographic research time

Jeffery and Troman, in their interesting article 'Time for Ethnography' (2004) address the (im)possibility of thick description in light of external pressures. Drawing on their own experience, they discuss the possibilities and benefits of different ethnographic time modes, two of which are relevant to my ethnography.

Firstly, they identify the *compressed time mode*. Taking care to distinguish this time mode from any notion of blitzkrieg ethnography, they note that the researcher can spend anything from a few days to a month permanently immersed in the setting with a view to producing a snapshot of the research site (in my terms, this is capturing the elicitation of relations). Since the aim is to gain a whole picture of the setting, the ethnographer must seek access to all the relevant places and as many people as possible. Similarly, every tiny detail must be absorbed and recorded lest it becomes important, with field notes being organised *in situ*. Whilst this will not offer a thick description in any traditional sense, it allows for a rich account of a snapshot by way of *evocation* (Tyler, 1986). This is the time mode I employed at sites such as BWC, SM and WOMAD. For instance, I only spent 8 days at BWC but in that time I operated with the compressed time mode. As a resident volunteer, I lived and worked with the community and I had access to all aspects of community life 24/7: work, meal times, social events, rituals, leisure activities and outings. Furthermore, I rotated the job I did each day so that I could get access to different people and different experiences. I would be up at 6 each day, given me

access to breakfast, morning rituals and a full working day whilst in the evening I would attend events, courses and 'hang out' in communal areas not going to bed until 12. So in any given day, I was doing at least 18 hours of participant observation and I endeavoured to record everything (luckily I have an excellent memory and an eye for detail), taking 5 minute breaks to record notes and ensure that field notes were written up every night before going to sleep.

Secondly, they identify a *recurrent* time mode. With this, temporal phases formalise the methodology and govern when fieldwork can be conducted. In my own research, this proved necessary when conducting fieldwork at RFM or RR. Indeed, one cannot permanently be immersed in these research sites, only as and when they arise. The trade off is between total immersion and long term involvement. In essence, this is the mirror image of the compressed time mode in so far as there is long term involvement but not a total immersion (for example, I attended RFM for at least two hours per week over a 12 month period). Each has benefits and whilst I did not have long term total immersion in any given site, it can be suggested that having total immersion in some sites and long term involvement with others enabled me to balance the trade off rather well.

Ethnography as an experience

I have gone to great lengths to suggest that Ethnography is about going inside a culture and experiencing it as it manifest. Many of my research sites have been temporary so to try and explore any given site over a year long period would be a redundant endeavour. For example, one cannot experience a week long retreat for more than a week. In the case of WOMAD - a three day festival - I conducted fieldwork for the three days of the festival and as a representative of a pressure group, I was able to spend a day either side of this, setting up and clearing up (giving me five days of fieldwork). I could have tried to spend longer in the field here though involvement with the organisation of WOMAD, the pressure group or the network that the pressure group belongs to. However, this would (a) be an ethnography of something other than alterity; it would become an ethnography of WOMAD or festival organisation (and recall, the objective of multi-site

ethnography is not a holistic picture of any given site) which in turn would (b) rebind alterity and detract from the practice of tracking analytic themes because it would be ignoring the manifestation that I have been guided to and start to assume the authority to label something as alterity and (c) obscure the focus on the elicitation of relations between persons. Through focusing on the elicitation of relations in the culture as it is manifest, I am doing justice to my indirect approach and approaching alterity in a way that is true to my own 'theory of practice'.

Taken together, it can be seen that a year long immersion in any given site with a view to a traditional thick description is, aside from being pragmatically difficult and impossible, wholly unnecessary and undesirable. Each field work site was experienced as it is naturally manifest (in line with the idea of ethnography as an experience and the objectives of multi-site ethnography), with a focus on the momentary elicitation of relations (which in turn tends to culture) within the appropriate and pragmatic time mode. This means that meaningful, appropriate results were derived from each site. Although this does not lead to a thick description; the research object is alterity, taken as a milieu, and *not* the culture of any given research site. Suspending the spatial dimension, each site can be viewed – by virtue of the focus on the momentary elicitation of relations - as a different elicitation or perspective within the research 'site'. In addition to mapping the setting; the indirect approach to multi-site ethnography maps the contrasts, contours and relationships between the sites (Marcus, 1986). Thinking back to chapter one, it can be seen that multi-site ethnography is used to evoke alterity through presenting and writing *sedimentations*. These sedimentations are made by mapping the contrasts, contours and relationships between the different elicitations. Consequently, the evocations are offered as juxtapositions (Crapanzano, 1985 Strathern, 1991) between one another in order to evoke, albeit partially, alterity rather than any given site as a fragment.

The Practice of Theory

Hitherto, the focus of this chapter has been the theory behind the practice of ethnography. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the theoretical use to which

ethnography can be put, or, the way in which it aides the practice of social theory. As noted, this ethnography is intended to serve some wider, theoretical purpose. This is nothing novel; even traditional approaches to ethnography recognise that ethnography must 'say more than it tells' (Peacock, 2001). Multi site ethnography however, by its very nature, *has* to serve some theoretical purpose. If its goal is to understand cultural formations in and of a complex global system; then it must take account of 'broader vistas of representation' alongside an evocation of its subjects. I have already presented the relationship between theory and data as a *double braid* (Cicoux, 1986) running through the thesis, the strands of which intertwine, interact and inform each other to the extent that they cannot really be conceived of as separate. The remainder of this chapter is given to a discussion of this relationship.

Reflexive Critique

I am drawn to Patrick Baert's (2005) approach to the relationship between social theory and empirical research. Baert takes issue both with the deductive-nomological model of this relationship, where research is designed to test (potentially falsify) theory *and* the representational model where research 'maps' (Baert's use of the term is different to my own, in Deleuze and Guattari's terms he is referring to *tracing* which is the opposite of *mapping*) various dimensions of social life. He criticises the deductive-nomological model on the grounds that research relies on observations which in turn relies on existing theoretical pre-suppositions. He criticises the representational model on the grounds that it commits the fallacy of assuming a 'God's eye view' and tends only to use data that exemplifies existing theory. The criticism common to both is that they confirm and reproduce existing theory rather than offering a way for translating the engagement with empirical phenomena into the development and adaptation of theoretical perspectives.

Baert's solution is 'hermeneutics inspired pragmatism' (2005) as a way of linking empirical research and conceptual innovation. From pragmatists such as Rorty (1980), he adopts the idea that research should not try to mirror (*trace*) reality but try to make sense of it. Essentially, a shift from copying reality to coping with

reality (Baert, 2005). From the hermeneutics of Gadamer (1965) he takes the idea that research involves many potential objectives *including* a reassessment of theoretical understandings. For Baert, the encounter with empirical phenomena should be used to reassess theoretical perspectives and cognitive constructions. Notice that the goal is a *reassessment* of theory, not an empirical refutation. Empirical refutation is impossible for Baert because knowledge is not 'out there', it is made and remade in attempts to make sense and 'cope' with reality. With this, he suggests that we conceive of the relationship between social theory and empirical encounters as a reflexive critique:

"[e]xperiences are always mediated by a set of presuppositions, but we see the former as an opportunity to reassess the latter" (Baert, 2005:p.22)

In essence, Baert is suggesting that the empirical encounter should be used to challenge but not refute conceptual and theoretical frameworks rather than unreflexively reproducing existing ones. For my part, the significance of ethnography is as an empirical encounter with which to *displace* (without *effacing*) existing theory. It is worth noting that the desire to avoid the reproduction of conceptual frameworks is in line with an approach to ethnography that 'maps' an emergent object through a strategy of indirection and recalls the above quote about not reproducing an 'unconscious closed in on itself' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). From Baert, the next step is towards Derridean deconstruction which Baert and Rorty alike are hostile towards despite the congruity of their projects.

Deconstruction: My Analytic Attitude

Deconstruction is somewhat problematic: on the one hand it is a widely misused buzzword adopted by postmodernism's epigoni yet it cannot be reduced to a universal, concise definition. It is not a ready-made 'concept' or a sophisticated method that impinges on the 'text' from the outside whilst using the 'text' to support prefigured 'knowledge' (Norris, 2002). The best way to introduce deconstruction is through a discussion of its purpose and its strategies.

Philosophy, textuality, deconstruction

Western philosophy, in the wake of Kantian transcendentalism decrees itself the sole dispenser of reason: if philosophy is granted sovereignty to uncover the a priori truths and regularities that constitute human understanding (Kant, 1781) then it follows that philosophy accrues a certain status with respect to legitimating truth claims. Deconstruction takes issue with this idea whilst questioning the Socratic conception of reason wherein truth, logic, history and consciousness combine to produce an alleged mastery of meaning (Norris, 2002). In other words, deconstruction rejects Western philosophy's search for origins and 'truth'. From here, deconstruction recognises that there is no language/discourse so reflexive that it can escape the conditions placed on its thought by its own history and ruling metaphysic such that it can claim the status of 'sole dispenser of reason'. Deconstruction:

"[i]s a question of explicitly and systematically posing the problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself (Derrida, 1967c)."

It follows that the claims of philosophy are maintained by suppressing the disruptive effects of language and subjugating certain themes in order to ensure that its claims enjoy the status of self-evident truth. Its claims are made through deploying metaphorical and figurative language, which renders these claims as rhetorical not *reason*able. Breaking with the Platonic dichotomy between philosophical knowledge and 'false' knowledge (produced by poets, Sophists and rhetoricians), deconstruction suggests that the claims of philosophy should be subjected to rhetorical questioning in much the same way as literary texts. In rejecting notions of origin and truth, the deconstructionist turn is to conceptualise Western philosophy as a text/texts whose rhetorical, figurative and metaphorical workings must be exposed alongside their self contained parodies. Having illustrated the background to deconstruction, further illumination can come from a discussion of Derrida's central strategies that together are given the umbrella term deconstruction (Kamuf, 1991).

Trace

The foundations of Western metaphysics rely upon constructed binary oppositions such as masculine/feminine; West/East; reason/emotion; speech/writing and presence/absence. Within each separation, one of the terms is privileged over the other and in the above examples, the former is privileged over the latter. This is one of the rhetorical devices utilised by any discourse in the production of its text(s) and it serves to subjugate certain themes whilst facilitating claims pertaining to the privileged term.

If the task of deconstruction is to shake up the conceptual and non-conceptual foundations of western metaphysics from the ground up (McQuillan, 2000), then it cannot just reverse the order of privilege. Taking a repressed or subjugated theme and pursuing its textual ramifications to show how they subvert the very order that serves to hold them in check is only half the story. A violation of the very conceptual order that makes the system of privilege possible is required and here Derrida's notion of *trace* is appropriate because it serves to show that the separation cannot be sustained indefinitely. The definition of each term within the dichotomic pairing relies on mutual contamination by the other within the signified of the self-same:

"[t]his pure difference, which constitutes the self-presence of the living present, introduces into self-presence from the beginning all the impurity putatively excluded from it (Derrida, 1967b)".

This means that the definition and meaning of the privileged term is dependent on some intrinsic 'conception' of the subjugated term but, in the act of violent separation, Western metaphysics denies the *trace* in order to strengthen its claims (those which relate to the privileged term). The task of deconstruction is to show the trace of the subjugated term within the definition of the privileged one (and *vice-versa*) in order to de-construct the dichotomy (and here I use a hyphen to show that this is not the essence of Derridean *deconstruction*) and weaken the stability of Western philosophy's claims.

Supplement

Derrida's notion of *supplement* extends and complements that of *trace*. The French word *supplément* translates as both replacement and addition thus the Derridean *supplement* is seen to extend by repetition and oppose by replacement. To return to the aforementioned dichotomies:

"[t]he subordinate position is the position also of the supplement, that which is both added to and substituted for the father (dominant) term (Derrida, 1972)."

In his deconstruction of Rousseau (Derrida, 1967a) Derrida introduces the *supplement* when reflecting upon the speech/writing dichotomy. If Western thought associates speech with presence and conceptualises it as language's mode of accurately presenting thought/meaning, then writing is rendered an unnecessary addition which could distort the passage of thought to meaning. Derrida's move is to accept that writing is destructive of presence whilst recognising that it is invoked at source to capture the elusive presence that has escaped speech (Howells, 1999). In other words, writing both destroys and restores presence through being simultaneously surplus to language and constitutive of it.

The signifiers within the dichotomic pairings mask the absence of presence thus the introduction of the supplement shows the essential insufficiencies of whatever is presented as complete:

"[t]heir addition *comes* to *make up for* a deficiency, it comes to compensate for an originary nonself-presence (Derrida, 1967b)."

Clearly, supplements have an immense power for disruption hence Western metaphysics tries hard to mask them (Howells, 1999). However, it is the task of deconstruction to ensure their visibility.

Différance and undecidability

Derrida's neologism *'différance'* comes from his deconstruction of Saussure (Derrida, 1967a) where again the speech/writing dichotomy is taken to task. On the one hand différance constitutes disturbance at the level of the signifier because the anomalous spelling resists graphical reduction and on the other, one cannot speak the difference between 'différence' and 'différance'. Here, writing is mobilised to invade speech:

"[I] would say in effect that this graphic difference (*a* instead of *e*)...remains purely graphic: it is read, or it is written, but it cannot be heard (Derrida, 1972)."

This supports previous discussion, but *différance* also serves a new purpose. The French verb *différer* has two meanings: 'to differ' and 'to defer'. Consequently, the word *différence* cannot refer exclusively to one or the other and as such, the neologism *différance* is introduced to compensate for the loss of meaning. Différance openly offers us *spacing* (differing) and *temporalisation* (deferring) and thus suspends itself between the two verbs, 'both of which contribute to its textual force but neither of which can fully capture its meaning' (Norris, 2002).

French structuralism, which was born out of Saussurian linguistics (Saussure, 1983), held that meaning is a function of difference at the level of the signifier. However, différance challenges this because,

1. It reminds us that meaning is a function of deferral as well as difference thus it is constantly deferred and, as such, never stable.
2. Since différance is not a signifier or a signified: in recognising that meaning is a function of différance, it is recognised that meaning isn't a function of either yet paradoxically is a function of both.

Since meaning is constantly deferred and irreducible to a transcendental signified, it follows that meaning is *undecidable*.

The Fold and Motility

My own variant of deconstruction takes onboard some insights from the concepts of the fold and motility (as detailed in chapter one). Where deconstruction is an activity of displacement that recognises the contingency of its own meanings and understandings; the concept of motility (Munro, 2001 [1992]) enables one to recognise that displacement does not necessitate destruction because the meanings and understandings that get displaced remain in the fold as absent presences. My approach is one of *adding* (uncovering) meanings and understandings into the fold without subtracting any. It follows that one is to add perspectives to existing theory without striving to (a) make denotative statements about how society is or (b) efface irreversibly the perspectives that have gone before. Please note that my variant of deconstruction (in fact any variant) is not about building or generating theory anew (indeed, it resists any attempt to create foundational pillars of knowledge); it is about engaging with *existing* theory.

Ethnography and Deconstruction

This thesis seeks to practice deconstruction through the vehicle of ethnography. Ethnography - in Baert's terms the empirical encounter - seeks to uncover traces, supplements and aporias within existing social theory. Taking Derrida alongside Baert and Rorty, one is left with the idea that there is no objective knowledge for theory to copy, there are only conceptual abstractions and the task of deconstruction, through an empirical encounter, is to shake up foundations, displace meanings and add perspectives. This requires, in line with the indirect approach to ethnography, the researcher to have their own cognitive constructions challenged. Without going to the narcissistic extremes of 'reflexivity', it is important to note that I discovered the importance of 'letting the data speak' in the act of analysis in order challenge my own theoretical and conceptual pre-suppositions and in turn displace existing theory.

Each analysis chapter can be thought of as a deconstruction or a conceptual displacement resulting from the ethnographic encounter. In no case can it be thought

that the analysis seeks to erect new foundational truth claims. Indeed, Baert warns against attempts of falsification and Derrida reminds that any deconstructive reading merely displaces meaning and is itself open to further deconstruction in an endless chain of displacement. It follows that one cannot erect new foundational pillars in place of what has been displaced (please recall that my approach is *not* one of grounded theory). The analysis is merely intended to think openly about the data which in turn is merely intended to think differently about the theoretical debates in which it engages. The deconstruction – at least my version of it (which adopts the concept of the fold and motility) - does not seek to efface other theoretical contributions. My intention is to use the empirical encounter as a way to 'add without an equals sign' and 'displace without effacing'.

4

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE

RESEARCH STUDY.

Where the last chapter discussed the theory of practice; this chapter discusses the *practice of practice*. This second, less obtuse, methods chapter represents something close to Silverman's (2000) suggestion that one might present a qualitative methodology chapter as a *natural history of the research study*. Ignoring the autobiographical connotations of such an approach, this chapter adopts Silverman's approach to the extent that the reader will be informed of how and why I made certain choices and how the research developed in the directions that it did. This format allows the chapter to offer a practical account of how the research was conducted and more significantly, shows how an *emergent* methodology was developed to reflect the emergent object of study.

Adopting the natural history of the research study format necessitates a discussion of *why* I chose particular sites in relation to the process of 'tracking analytic themes'. This affords a descriptive discussion of the fieldwork sites that 'sets the scene' for the analysis chapters. It is in this chapter that the traditional foci of a methodology chapter, such as access and the practicalities/actualities of conducting research in the field are discussed. As the last chapter noted, BWC was my entry point to the study of alterity and the empirical encounter that marked a change in direction for the research design. BWC therefore occupies the first part of this chapter, leading to a discussion of the research object's emergence and an introduction to the subsequent fieldwork sites.

Beechwood Court: A Retreat.

As noted, I initially set out to do an in-depth ethnography of a closed community and my initial idea was to study some form of 'new-age' or 'mind body and spirit'

retreat as a site of refuge from the predicament of demoralisation. To go about finding such a site I relied initially on word of mouth and the internet. For a long time, the search was fruitless. However, I was lucky enough to find the Metta website (www.metta.org), which describes itself as:

'A web service for people seeking complementary health and just about anything considered holistic and alternative in the UK.'

In effect, Metta is a search engine, database and directory that is concerned with a whole manner of alternative lifestyles and practices. One can search for anything that falls under this umbrella term ranging from rune stones, yoga and meditation to herbalism, breathing techniques and, most importantly, retreats.

Through this website, I could search for retreats in my geographical area of interest (South West England and Wales) and although the website provided little discussion of the retreats, it seemed to be selective in choosing what to include and provided a number of links to the retreats' websites. More significantly, through a book search on Metta, I came across *The Good Retreat Guide* (by Stafford Whiteaker, 2001). This is an excellent resource: providing discussion of over four hundred retreats in the UK with information on activities, facilities, prices, accommodation, availability, nature of retreat and – most importantly- a 'write up', evaluation and verdict.

I cross referenced Whiteaker's book with Metta and any other information I could find (discussions with friends and colleagues, other internet sites) in order to find an appropriate site. I found about fifteen that I wanted to pursue further. Upon phoning these places to discuss what they do, I began to feel the futility of the search that I felt at the beginning and in the end, only three still seemed appropriate. My next step was to request their brochures/information packs. When phoning for brochures, I decided with my supervisors, not to declare that I was a researcher as it may cause unnecessary complications. I do not consider this unethical as I was merely requesting a brochure to seek further information. I was *not*, at this stage, negotiating access. When it came to negotiating access, I was entirely open and honest about my research.

Based on the three brochures, one place in particular struck me as appropriate - Beechwood Court, an intentional community practising an alternative way of life premised on ecological and communal living. BWC is managed by a resident community who live and work there and is a registered educational charity set up for the provision of 'holistic education'. To this end they run retreats for families and individuals, community experience weeks, volunteer programmes (short, medium and long term), day and weekend courses (such as stained glass window painting and willow basket making) and weekly events (such as trance dancing and yoga). With this, it seemed perfect so I set about writing an access letter (see appendix A). Before discussing access, I would like to give a flavour of the setting by introducing the people of BWC.

The resident community is composed of fourteen people, not one of whom was born into a culture of alterity. They were predominantly white, 'middle class' and aged between 25 and 50 (apart from one elderly gentleman and two children) whose narratives intimated that they had become dissatisfied with day to day life. I had a long and particularly memorable discussion with one permanent resident about the people who come here and he said that it was *always* the same and commented that although there were European and American nationals, there was *never* anyone from an ethnic minority or a poor background. He suggested that this was because 'such people have other priorities' and joked that it was 'middle class would-be radicals' who came here before suggesting that BWC is a 'haven for disaffected people looking for that something extra in life'. Of the fourteen residents, there was an even balance of men and women and according to the residents, this is perfectly normal. Up to thirty five people can stay at any one time and they claim to have over two thousand visitors each year. Again, the visitors tend to be from the same socio-demographic background as the residents.

Beechwood Court and Access

The first thing to mention is that I had no desire to do covert research. It would have been possible to go to BWC without declaring my intentions/purpose, making

notes surreptitiously as and when I could. However, I decided against this on several grounds. Primarily, I view this approach as personally and professionally unethical. Aside from this, I felt that covert research would be detrimental to the quality of my work since my insights would be severely limited by not having the input of participants in the form of informal interviews.

Given that BWC possesses a degree of institutional organisation (it is an established educational charity that produces information brochures), it was decided that a formal letter on headed notepaper was preferable to a casual telephone call. The letter set out what my research was about without recourse to esoteric language. It was completely open and honest about what I wanted to do at BWC but gave them the option to discuss it with me further in person and the opportunity for them to stipulate what they would deem to be acceptable during my time at BWC. The letter also gave reassurance about my ethical commitments and re-iterated this on matters of consent and anonymity. In the interests of reciprocity, I offered myself as a volunteer worker and gave them the chance to accommodate me at *their* convenience.

Shortly after posting this letter, I received a phone call from a woman named Saskia who said she was happy for me to come to BWC and seemed very interested in my research. In effect, Saskia was my gatekeeper and it became clear that access was something to be negotiated over time (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). Over the following two months we corresponded on the telephone and through letters to negotiate the following issues:

- The dates of my visit. Ultimately, I sought to please them and as it happens, they were in need of help on a specific week at short notice. Therefore, I deemed it proper to help them out in the interests of reciprocity.
- Some members of the community had certain reservations. In response to this I posted a more detailed synopsis of my work and interests as well as the British Sociological Association's ethical guidelines and a personal statement of ethical practice. Saskia found this satisfactory but I still offered to visit in person before my fieldwork to put people's minds at rest. She said that this was

unnecessary if I was willing to hold myself answerable to participants when doing research.

- Seeing as I had offered myself as a volunteer, I had to negotiate a role as a volunteer. This was something I had to discuss with James and Moon, the volunteer co-ordinators and it required me to fill in a volunteer application form and to give my reasons for wanting to be a volunteer. This is because Saskia wanted me to *genuinely* be on a retreat and treated like any other volunteer. This leads to the next issue...

- The *biggest* issue that I had to discuss with Saskia was my identity at BWC. On this note, I feel that I must discuss participant observation before giving an account of my time at BWC.

Participant observation and BWC.

To begin, I shall take this opportunity to offer a brief discussion of participant observation, the method most readily associated with ethnography (Peacock, 2001) and the method I utilised throughout this study. To travel inside a culture and investigate the intricate web of threads that constitute it, one must live with and experience it which in turn requires one to be a *participant.* However, one can never just 'hang out' and go native (Delamont, 2002) as this would render the ethnographer incapable of maintaining the cool distance that the fieldwork demands. In effect, the participant must not forget that they are also there to *observe.* The ethnographer is obliged to use systematic procedures such as note making, observations and question asking just as s/he is required to maintain a certain detachment in order to make sense of the setting. In short, the experience can never be conceived of as mere experience or social tourism as one must record, analyse, describe and understand. Indeed, one must keep in mind one's commitment to producing an evocation (Tyler, 1986).

This tension between participation and observation characterises ethnography. Junker (1960) famously suggests that you think of there being a continuum between 'complete participant' and 'complete observer' within which you should consider the balance required for your proposed study. Between the human encounter and

the ethnographic account, one must actually be a member of the group and this requires one to have an identity. As such, one must present oneself (Goffman, 1959) and assume a *role* (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983) within the group and this role is linked inexorably to the tension between participation and observation. Rather than trying to carve out a role, my feeling is that one should let members place one in a role according to their own agendas. At BWC I allowed myself to be moved by the resident community such that my role was dependent on what they wanted it to be. For example, if they wanted me to work in the kitchen, I worked in the kitchen. At a deeper level, I actually let *them* manage the extent to which I was a participant and the extent to which I was an observer. For example, there were times that residents just got on with their lives in my presence and thus positioned me as more of a participant. Equally well, there were times when they took great care to engage with me and my research which positioned me, I feel, as more of an observer.

In the context of access however, it was important to negotiate my *general* role within the group. Initially, I had wanted to attend BWC as a retreatant as well as a volunteer but Saskia and I could find no way for me to attend as a retreatant. This is because she thought it would be too difficult to obtain informed consent from all the other retreatants and I did not want to cause problems and distress in respect of people booked onto/booking into the retreat nor did I want to jeopardise this source of funding for the resident community. So, having decided that I was going to be a volunteer (Saskia said that many people came as volunteers as a form of retreat), we discussed my role. It was important to her that I participate fully as a volunteer and have the minimum impact on life at BWC. I of course agreed to this but when she suggested that I just 'come as a volunteer' I explained the need to maintain a distance and be an observer as well as a participant just as I needed to have informal chats and interviews. She accepted this. In effect it was decided that on Junker's continuum, I needed to be more participant than observer, or, *participant as observer*.

In the field at BWC.

I lived at BWC as a member of the community for just over a week in the capacity of a volunteer using the method of participant observation. In terms of presenting myself, I was conscious of not creating an obtrusive presence. Without labouring the issue of reflexivity I wore appropriate clothing and made sure that I was knowledgeable on topics that might be of interest to members (ecology, fair trade, self-sufficiency, Buddhism, alternative health *etcetera*). I deemed this necessary as I only had a short space of time in which to gain trust. Other factors such as being young and a little scruffy (which I am sure is preferable to being a well turned out middle aged professional) and being a competent vegetarian cook contributed to my acceptance. In particular, I noticed that when members realised that I shared some of their values they commented upon this with delight ('oh, so you think that is wrong too? or 'Oh, I imagine that you might have come here even if it weren't for your research!' *exempli gratia*) and opened up to me. I am sure that my presence was not too disruptive as people acted normal/natural to the extent that they were acting in ways that they would not necessarily want recorded by a relative stranger, such as gossiping or talking about intimate personal and emotional problems.

That said, I was conscious not to reveal too much of myself in order to maintain a cool distance and retain my status as ethnographer-*observer*. For example, there are certain rituals wherein members reveal emotional thoughts and personal information. When partaking in this ritual, I did not reveal too much. It was a complex balancing act: to not speak would be conspicuous and a little churlish but offering too much could potentially put me in a position of 'over-identification' (Delamont, 2002). To resolve this tension, I tended to offer something without saying too much.

In my time at BWC as a volunteer, I requested to do a variety of jobs throughout the week so as to gain as broad an experience as possible with access to as many persons as possible. I worked in the office and the kitchen as well as doing cleaning/odd jobs, roofing, wall building and child care (there was a family week on and I possess a valid police check). This was changed daily, enabling me to see all

sides of working life at BWC. In addition to this, I made myself present for all meals (including breakfast which is a two hour self-service slot starting at 6 am), social events/workshops as well as trying to socialise with other members of the community. In effect, I was immersed in the full range of activity present within the site. I was entirely accommodating in terms of the roles I was placed in and found it useful that people tended to give accounts of why they were positioning me there. For example, when being asked to cook a vegan meal, I was told that this was to show people - residents as well as visitors - that a good meal can be made that is entirely free from animal produce.

I was entirely honest about what I was doing when in conversation. There were meant to be two people named David volunteering during my time at BWC. When introducing myself to everyone, I made it clear that I was the David doing the research. This proved fruitful as it gave everybody an opportunity to ask me questions and find out a bit about me and my research. In terms of data collection, I simply used observations and informal interviews (natural conversations or 'chats'). I was conscious to observe *everything* - spatial arrangements, documents left lying around, accounts, events, objects, conversations I had, conversations other people had *etcetera* as well as asking questions and being given explanations/accounts.

Due to the intensity of my days, I relied on memory for much of my note taking. Fortunately, I have a very good memory for detail but I also took along small notebooks for me to make short hand notes in. I would take every spare moment I had to transfer notes from my memory to my notebook and I would give priority to specific events and conversations as I reasoned that general observations could wait whereas the specifics of an event or conversation might get distorted with time. These spare moments were the five and ten minute breaks I had in my working day and the occasional slot I had between working, eating and socialising. At the end of the night, I would write down the more general observations from the day that had been neglected as well as adding to the more intense material in the small notebooks.

I mentioned in chapter three that I abandoned my original intentions in favour of pursuing a multi-site research project. The above discussion highlights why. On the one hand, I could *not* go back to BWC in any other capacity or role as that would not have been satisfactory for the residents of BWC (as per the access discussions with Saskia). On the other, there were practical considerations. By the end of the period, doing 18+ hours of participant observation including a full working day as well as several hours making field notes before sleeping was beginning to take its toll on me. I was mentally, physically and emotionally exhausted and although I managed to secure some fascinating data, I had learnt a valuable lesson. I had learnt that such an intense approach to ethnography was less than ideal.

It was on the train journey back home after my fieldwork experience that I began the thought process (of course, the pragmatic and access problems had acted as a catalyst) that led to the adoption and development of multi-site ethnography as detailed in the previous chapter. The remainder of this chapter is given to a discussion of subsequent research sites. None of these sites will be discussed in the same detail as BWC; to do so would generate a chapter approaching the word length of the thesis! BWC was discussed in detail because (a) it was originally intended to be my main research site and even in practice, it remained my way inside cultures of alterity from which all other fieldwork sites followed and (b) a detailed discussion of access and participation is only required once, by way of illustration. Indeed, it would be a repetitive and redundant exercise to offer the same level of detail for each fieldwork site. The remaining discussions will only include material that is deemed additional, necessary and relevant.

Recurrent Time Mode

Whilst it was to become clear that I would repeatedly have to go away for short periods and adopt the compressed time mode (Jeffery and Troman, 2004); I wanted to have some research sites that I could explore *intermittently* over a longer period

of time, using the recurrent time mode (Jeffery and Troman, 2004). The reasons for this are twofold: Firstly, I wanted to have a longitudinal component to my research object and secondly, on practical grounds, I wanted to some fieldwork where I would not feel the same intensity and pressure that I felt at BWC. I wanted some fieldwork sites where I could enter the field, go away, write up field notes and return to the field with fresh eyes. With this in mind, I set about tracking some analytic themes from the BWC data with a view to setting up some longer term fieldwork experiences.

Rainbow Rhythms

One of the most striking occasions at BWC was one of the evening classes, ran on site, where they enact a ritual known as *dances of universal peace*. These sessions are held every week, on a Tuesday from 8pm until 10pm and they are attended by some - although not all - residents, visitors to BWC and anyone else in the locality who wants to attend (in fact, one couple drove 45 miles to be there). These dances are organised around the principles of togetherness. Basic songs and dances are borrowed from myriad world cultures; Islamic, African, Zoroastrianism, Native American and Russian traditions, among others, are drawn upon. Each song and dance is introduced by its origins and meanings and then taught, bit by bit, by the instructor such that it is understood and memorised by everyone. The songs advocate sentiments of peace, tolerance, togetherness and love while the dances are built around everyone standing in a circle and engaging in immense amounts of physical, tactile contact. The potency of this ritual lies in what it accomplishes. From the participants' narratives, one gets the sense that it accomplishes a *collective effervescence* (Durkheim, 1915 [2001]) and in turn a sense of togetherness, happiness and ethos (guidance on how to relate to yourself, others and the world around you). Additionally, despite my cynicism, this is something that I actually experienced.

To find out more and to track this theme, I returned to the Metta website and discovered that there was a global network of practitioners and set about finding another as a potential fieldwork site. I soon found a group, Rainbow Rhythms (RR)

that was running a four month programme of weekly classes followed by a two month programme of bio-danza which is a very similar practice/ritual. Between these two courses, I reasoned that I could have two hours a week of participant observation over a six month period and with this access was negotiated with the course organisers. In the field, I again operated as a participant as observer, taking the opportunity - during breaks and after classes - to talk to participants about my research (in the interests of informed consent) which led to discussions and informal interviews.

Riverside Real Food Market

A salient theme from my preliminary analysis of BWC was the importance of food. Food appeared to play a significant role in accomplishing the culture, identities and ethos present at BWC. Even before arriving, the importance of food is established in their brochure. Here, they announce proudly their commitment to vegetarianism, organic food and self sufficiency/local produce. Upon arriving at BWC, this promise is confirmed and the importance of food is demonstrated further. I was meant to be shown around by my link worker (every volunteer is assigned a permanent resident as a guide/mentor) and aside from my room, he only showed me where the kitchen was, symbolically indicating the importance of food. In the kitchen, one is confronted by herbal teas in re-used jars (no tea bags), fair trade produce, organic produce (honeys, jams *etcetera*), Soya milk and health food (such as Swiss bouillon). In addition to this, residents *always* gave verbal accounts to support what is in the kitchen: 'we only use locally produced bread' or 'we tend not to drink caffeine' or 'we grow most of our own vegetables'. I recall trying to get my breakfast on the first day: all I could find was dandelion coffee, Soya milk, stale bread and organic honey.

With this, I had another analytic theme to track with which to ascertain my next fieldwork site. After a few false starts such as a local organic wholefood café who refused my request to do fieldwork; I settled on RFM, a weekly real food market located on Cardiff's riverside embankment. Riverside real food market is given to the provision of fresh, local, organic produce (ranging from vegetables, through

game, to jams and pickles) as well as assorted wholefoods and fair trade produce. Access was not problematic because RFM is a public space that I would frequent anyway. In terms of participant observation, I was again a participant as observer. I spent at least two hours there every Sunday (it only runs for four hours) over a twelve month period, taking the opportunity to talk to producers and consumers about my research interests which (a) handled the issue of informed consent and (b) gave me the opportunity to conduct informal interviews as part of my participant observation. Seeing as the research site tended to be convivial, it was surprisingly easy to approach people and conduct these informal interviews. As an aside, it is worth noting that this event used be held monthly but is now held weekly. This is a historical testimony to the spread of alterity as a cultural phenomenon that can be read alongside the vista with which this thesis opened.

Trade Direct

A corollary of ethical food consumption is ethical consumption in general. With this, I found Trade Direct (TD); a shop dedicated to fairly traded produce (from coffee and chocolate through jewellery and CDs to furniture and ornaments) as a site of alterity. In terms of access, I negotiated with the owner a role as a volunteer worker. My original intention was to work for one day a week over an extended period. However, this proved impractical as the shop was in a city other than my own. More significantly, it proved limited as a research site. After three visits, I began to experience 'diminishing analytic returns' (Fine, 1983) in so far as nothing new was being discovered. I had gathered useful data but it seemed fruitless to continue. My gatekeeper (the shop's owner) and I had negotiated this contingency at her suggestion so it was unproblematic to leave the field.

Shakti Manor: A Retreat

With the longitudinal fieldwork sites in place, it remained to generate more fieldwork sites that could be experienced through permanent immersion. After BWC, I wanted to experience alterity through a retreat centre by actually going on a retreat. This was for predominantly practical reasons: I wanted to be immersed in a

site that would afford me the opportunity to have time to myself with which to make field notes and avoid the exhaustion experienced at BWC. It was also in the interests of tracking analytic themes: tracking and experiencing retreat from a different angle seemed a sensible direction in which to take the construction of the research object as it would allow me to examine how one is processed by the retreat apparatus as consumer rather than producer.

So, returning to the Metta website and Whiteaker's Good Retreat Guide, I set about finding a retreat. In setting about choosing a retreat, I decided to kill several birds with one stone, so to speak, through tracking several analytic themes at once:

- An emergent theme from the BWC data was an identification with the Other, particularly what might be termed 'The East'. This was manifest in residents' accounts of their travels, an interest in Buddhist spirituality and the practice of meditation. Since, as a retreat, BWC was a heterogeneous 'mind body and spirit' centre (i.e. non-denominational), I thought it would be useful to conduct fieldwork at a Buddhist retreat centre in order to elicit a different perspective and experience a different manifestation of retreat.

- The spatial location of BWC seemed central to its constitution as a manifestation of alterity. In terms of its location, BWC certainly represents a site that is spatially remote and distanced from 'mainstream' society. Travelling there to conduct the fieldwork on a bank holiday proved problematic. Set on the Devon/Dorset border, I experienced a whole manner of disruption trying to get to the nearest train station. However, getting to the train station was only half the battle as, once there, BWC is still 5 miles away. There were no taxis or buses running on the bank holiday weekend so my only option was to carry my heavy backpack and walk to BWC. On leaving the *small* town in which the train stopped, it was an uphill walk in the blistering heat through what can only be described as a quintessential rural idyll. In all honesty, BWC is only *easily* accessible by car and the brochure, in keeping with the ethos that is espoused, strongly encourages car sharing. Turning off the A road to walk the final stretch up to BWC, one cannot help be struck by the beauty of the setting. One walks through a canopy of trees on a narrow road, in the absence of cars where the

only sounds are those of a light summer breeze and children playing. On the hill, the building stands out as an old and rather grand stone building set amongst vast grounds (eleven acres) and other small, rustic buildings. *Everybody* that I spoke to enthused about the location and cites it at as the main reason for being there. Without exception, every resident gave me an account of what a great location BWC is, both in terms of the site itself *and* in terms where it is situated (the nearness to the coast and the quietness of a rural idyll being the main candidates for praise). With this, I decided to find a fieldwork site that was spatially remote in order to track the theme of locating alterity on the spatial margins.

With these criteria, I settled on Shakti Manor as my next fieldwork site. SM is a Buddhist retreat centre providing meditation retreats and instruction in Buddhist traditions. It presents itself as a 'sanctuary of contemplative calm' in the 'quiet, gentle and roomy' countryside - a tranquil space for meditation and solitude away, quite literally, from the modern world. It is situated at the far end of Devon; one has to get the train to a remote town and then a Taxi into the sparse, deeply rural area where the house is located. There is not a shop or pub for miles and the taxi ride takes at least twenty minutes in which time one feels a literal, physical and progressive distancing from the modern world. The taxi driver tells me that the place is full of 'wierdos' and it is a place where you can not speak and you 'just sit around do nothing'. 'No steak, chips, peas and a pint for you tonight son' he tells me. One could not imagine a clearer case for taking this as a manifestation of alterity.

In terms of access and participant observation, I followed the same processes as detailed in relation to BWC. During my time at SM, there were three different retreats running and the retreat I went on was attended by thirty people. There was a 6:4 ratio of women to men and at the age of twenty three, I was at least ten years below the average age. In terms of informed consent, I negotiated access with SM but they suggested I address my fellow retreatants personally. SM was a silent retreat but there was an induction ceremony where we all sat in a circle to talk about what lead us to SM and a debriefing session at the end where we could collectively reflect upon this retreat. It was in these occasions that I introduced my research

(which explained the presence of such a young person, no explanation may have raised more suspicion than not introducing myself) and 'debriefed' participants (I provided a written outline of my research and contact details in case anybody had any objections). In actuality, my fellow retreatants were keen to support my research and gave consent to use the data in my thesis and any future publications. Again, an overt approach led to me having the opportunity to hold informal interviews with retreatants.

It must be noted that I did *not* learn my lesson after the exhaustion suffered from conducting fieldwork at BWC. As noted, I *had* intended this fieldwork site to afford me time on my own in order to mitigate this problem. However, the first meditation was at 7am and the last one at 10pm and even though I did not have a working day to contend with, I could still volunteer to do jobs and get access to more aspects of the setting. Similarly, there was always *something* going on and I simply could not resist the opportunity to collect as much data as possible. Once again I was completely exhausted but I had collected 18+ hours of fieldwork data each day and this contributed to a meaningful data set. Sitting in meditation instructions proved the biggest challenge as it is here that one runs the risk of going native. Although I sat in the hour long meditation instructions I did not participate. I closed my eyes and assumed the relevant body positions so that nobody would be any the wiser but I took this opportunity to analyse and memorise what was going on in the room and begin to analyse conceptually the themes that were emerging.

WOMAD: A Festival

Thinking back to chapter two, alterity was introduced as an arena where lifestyles can be conceived of as an agent of 'silent protest' (Inglehart, 1977). For these reasons, it makes sense to explore a festival space – in which one might imagine an element of the carnivalesque (Bahktin, 1984) and its associated powers of subversion – as a manifestation of alterity. It also makes sense in terms of tracking themes. On one level, elements of the carnivalesque are present in several of the fieldwork sites. More significantly, the potency of carnival is said to derive from its sort term status and this recalls a theme emerging from the analysis of BWC. It

is short term retreats that they offer and this is what the visitors' narratives celebrate. For instance, Ashleigh, a visitor to the community, tells me that 'I would love to live like this but between my job, mortgage and family I just couldn't do it, not now...I'm just grateful that this place exists so that I can have *something*'.

Thinking about *which* festival I should conduct fieldwork at, I again decided to kill many birds with one stone through taking the opportunity to track several analytic themes. As noted, a key theme at BWC was the identification with the 'Other' both spatially and temporally. This was manifest clearly in their CD racks, where the music (dis)played was, without exception, what we might term 'World' music. As a genre, this encompasses music that is not situated within the Anglo-American tradition and by virtue of some convention (the genealogy of which is unknown) includes 'roots' music (older, forgotten music in the Anglo-American tradition). Incidentally, these are the very genres of music that one could purchase at TD, the fair trade shop. With this, the WOMAD festival seemed like the best choice of festival space. WOMAD is a three day festival held in Reading (South East England) and is given to the promotion of World and Roots music. It is attended by large numbers of people and a cross section of society. Another important dimension to WOMAD is the presence of a large 'market' area where countless shops and stalls sell 'alternative' clothing, food, ornaments, trinkets and musical instruments. Again, this is significant because the data from BWC (and all the other sites) was by now revealing consumption and the market to be a salient analytic theme.

As with the real food market, access was not problematic as this is a public event. It would have been perfectly straight forward to attend the festival in my standard capacity, as a participant-as-observer. However, I felt that I could carve out a more significant role in the research setting. WOMAD provides an opportunity for left-of-centre pressure groups to promote their causes (again, this is a theme from the BWC data). I decided to enter the field as a representative of one such pressure group (they have requested anonymity which I of course respect, their identity is not significant for analytic purposes). In addition to giving me access to the setting up and closing down of the festival, this also gave me access to more participants and festival goers. As people came to pressure group's stall on which I was working; I

had a ready made set of participants and respondents with whom I could conduct informal interviews. At WOMAD I had access to the festival by day and by night, in the capacity of a worker, a festival goer, somebody staying on the campsite and somebody who helps set up and clean up. Again, as with BWC and SM, I was collecting 18+ hours of fieldwork each day which I was recording and analysed *in situ*. So once again, I did not - despite my best intentions - learn my lesson!

5

THEORISING HETEROTOPIA: SOCIAL ORDERING AT THE MARGINS.

The focus of this thesis is alterity and embedded in this is some concept of *marginality*. Looking to the literature and theory that concerns itself with marginality, one finds a tendency to valorise the marginal. Hetherington (1997) notes social theory's willingness to equate the margins with counter hegemonic, ludic and transgressive practices/values that resist and subvert the mainstream or 'centre' of society. I have already addressed this tendency in chapter two through my *a priori* justification for investigating alterity as a space of remoralisation. So, what is this 'mainstream' of society? Acknowledging my own 'black boxing' (Latour, 1987) of the term, it is 'modernity' that social theory views the margins as an alternative to. Again, it is chapter two that introduced the idea that 'modernity', in all its rational and ordered glory, is the source of demoralisation from which alterity represents a *potential* space of transgression. With this, we are faced with two related dichotomies: margin *versus* mainstream and freedom *versus* order. This gives way to the idea that there is a mainstream 'centre' of society (to which we can attach notions of modernity, rationality and order) in diametric opposition to the marginal 'periphery' of society (to which we can attach notions of alterity, subversion and transgression). These dichotomies are so deeply rooted within social theory that even the work of Shields (1991), which takes great care *not* to valorise the margins, still reproduces them.

This chapter aims to displace this tendency through reference to my ethnographic encounter with alterity. The analysis will be using ethnographic data alongside Derridean strategies of 'deconstruction' to highlight the contingency of these dichotomies before problematising the ways in social theory engages with marginality. Essentially, this chapter aims to aims to add perspectives to our

understandings of alterity and marginality through developing Hetherington's trope of heterotopia (1997). Crossing scale (Strathern, 1991), it is also hoped that connections can be made with which to remove the term 'modernity' from the black box in which social theory places it. It should be clear that this chapter is given to a displacement of the very foundations on which this study is founded and I make no apologies for this. I have already established the need to use an empirical encounter to displace existing theory and that is exactly what is being done here. These displacements, along with those from consequent analytic chapters, will allow me to engage meaningfully with alterity and consequently demoralisation/remoralisation in the conclusion.

The Margin/Mainstream Dichotomy: An Empirical Encounter.

To begin, I should highlight the ways in which the empirical encounter seems, initially, to support and reproduce the theory. For example, Beechwood Court and Shakti Manor offer the promise of marginality. This promise is manifest in their brochures and Stafford Whiteaker's 'Good Retreat Guide' (2001). BWC is presented as an intentional community premised on spiritual growth and ecological, communal living. The brochure also conveys a commitment to organic, vegetarian food and the opportunity to engage in a whole range of alternative practices ranging from sacred drumming and trance dancing to willow design and yoga. Against this, the residents' narratives express disdain for the 'day to day bullshit' they find in the modern world ranging from 'big business', money and the government through office jobs, cities and temporal pressures to fashion and consumption, the lack of felicity in human relationships and the 'blatant disregard people show for our planet'. Indeed, these narratives of their mainstream experience were juxtaposed with their experience at BWC where they claim to feel 'love', 'inner peace' and 'in touch with myself and others'. Similarly, please recall that SM was presented as a 'sanctuary of contemplative calm' in the 'quiet, gentle and roomy' countryside; a tranquil space for meditation and solitude away from the modern world. Upon participating in the first meditation, the teacher's instruction supports this. We are urged to forget the modern world, to forget about 'multi-tasking' and muddle, pressure and deadlines, money worries and 'hi tech' ways of living in favour of

focussing on 'older and forgotten' simplicities. In respect of the last statement, it becomes clear that there is some sort of temporal distancing from the modern world involved in SM's act of constituting itself as marginal. A similar process occurs at BWC where they do the work of temporal distancing through anti-modern practice such as using an AGA oven and not owning a television.

Chapter four has already shown that these sites are in hard to reach locations at the spatial margins; however the work of distancing is also done symbolically. For instance, residents at BWC were keen to talk about how the city is remote from them. One resident told me that her home town was 'alright, as far as cities go' but she disliked the 'loneliness, pressure and pretentious people' whilst another held contempt for Madrid (his hometown) by virtue of its pollution, lack of greenery and 'urbanites'. One need only look to Simmel (1997) to see that literal distance from the city [which, almost as a matter of tautology, involves Romantic allusions to the rural (Urry, 1995)] is equivalent to spatial distancing from modernity. At SM the work of symbolic distancing is more intense. One is cut off from the outside world through the prohibition of communication: telephone calls are not allowed (there is however a telephone box onsite, disguised as a mud hut!), one is discouraged from writing letters and any mail received during one's stay is withheld until the end of the retreat. The content of the meditation also encourages retreatants to ignore thoughts about the outside world. A frequent instruction is: 'if you start to think about anything from the outside world...focus on your breathing and ignore your thoughts'. Here, the work of distance is accomplished through an almost psychological distancing alongside the literal and symbolic distancing.

Other sites such as RFM, WOMAD and TD rely only on symbolic distancing. These sites constitute themselves as distant and marginal through the provision of difference and a different way of doing things. For example, RFM is situated a few minutes from the centre of Cardiff, quite literally in the shadow of the Millennium Stadium. Yet in this decidedly modern and urban setting; a different way of 'doing' food is offered. The food is overtly local, fair trade, organic and anathema to the supermarkets and chain restaurants that characterise most of the town centre. Furthermore, the way one buys food requires personal interaction. In place of a priced up object that is taken to a cashier; one speaks to the trader, negotiates a price

and engages in conversation (which proved very convenient in terms of data collection). Similarly, TD offers alternative ways of 'doing' shopping yet spatially, it is located in a street of shops that do not appear to practice similar values. Admittedly, this shop is not in the town centre but the owner informs me that this is due solely to rents being cheaper and not a 'statement about the shop' on her part. WOMAD is held in the grounds of a leisure centre situated near the centre of a typical medium-large sized town in the South East of England. It is within this quintessentially urban and modern setting that WOMAD promises an aesthetic, cultural and musical experience of the Other. In the case of these sites, their location is mainstream yet a lot of work is done symbolically to constitute themselves as marginal. Again, the emphasis on doing something differently is relational and the implication is that they are doing things differently to the mainstream.

The Mainstream

It seems that my empirical encounter with alterity is supporting and reproducing the prevailing social theory. However, scratching beneath the surface, the data reveals different meanings which suggest that this existing theory needs to be unsettled. The first move in this analysis is to deploy the Derridean strategy of trace (1967b) to tease out the presence of what participants constitute as mainstream within their own practice that *they* constitute as marginal.

It's like fucking Detroit out there

Thinking back to BWC, whose constitution of marginality relies partially on its location, one need only scratch the surface to see this valorisation of location waning and replaced by attitudes that resonate well their constitution of 'the mainstream'. After the initial praise that residents offer for the location, they are all quick to discuss the problems of living in a spatially remote location. For example Susanne, a Medium Term Volunteer (MTV). As an MTV, she is a part time resident who spends half of her time at BWC and half of it in London whilst she decides if she wants to become a full time resident. She tells me how she misses

'being able to pop out for my fags and my paper' and states what a nuisance it is to have to *plan* a trip to Tesco on a day off and organise a lift with residents who *do* own cars. With this she notes that learning to drive is something that she must do before she becomes a permanent resident. Susanne informs me that '90% of residents own cars' and a cursory glance at the car park supports this. So BWC, which draws on ecology and anti-modern living to 'do' marginality, is composed of residents and visitors who rely on cars. The car, of course, is a clear and potent symbol of the mainstream and modern life. I later learn that BWC, and SM for that matter, encourage lift sharing among visitors, but for now Susanne is moved by this discussion to do some 'repair work' (Garkinkel, 1967). She gestures towards the car park, exclaims that 'it is like fucking Detroit out there' and suggests that a communal mini bus may be the answer.

In respect of the car, residents of BWC are keen to detail how getting places is problematic because somebody has to drive. For example Nick, a member of the resident community, tells me that they never go to the pub; not because alcohol consumption is at odds with their outlook, but because a trip to the pub requires somebody to drive. However, quite why somebody *has* to drive is unclear. BWC is two miles away from the pub and five miles away from the town which, although small, has all the necessary amenities and is where the residents drive to when they need to go shopping. BWC's marginality is premised (again, partially) on an alternative to the temporal rhythms of the city and those of modernity. One might therefore expect a temporal slowing down and respite from the speed and pressure of the modern world. However, the fact that a two mile journey requires a car suggests that, in actuality, there is not and as such one cannot help but wander what the rush is. Given their commitment to ecology and celebration of nature, it would seem more logical to avoid car use in favour of a slow walk, bike ride or horse ride through the gorgeous countryside that they were initially keen to celebrate. You will recall that because of BWC's spatially remote location, I needed to walk five miles from the station to get there. Upon hearing this, residents expressed disbelief and very kindly assured me that I 'should have just phoned for a lift'. This dependency on the car and the absence of a temporal slowing down sits uneasily with the work of marginality; it is rather more synonymous modern cultural systems (Latimer and Munro, 2005) as is the response given to my taking a five a mile walk. The

meaning of these practices and attitudes therefore sits alongside those that they themselves have constituted as mainstream. With this, the trace of the mainstream can be seen within the margin and the contingency of the margin/mainstream dichotomy begins to be exposed.

Mainstream foundations

In addition to identifying attitudes that are constituted as mainstream; the data reveals the reliance of the 'margin' on spaces, practices and institutions that are characterised as 'mainstream'.

The owning of a car is a clear indication that BWC requires things outside of its limits. The car allows residents to travel, quite literally, away from this marginal space and back into the 'mainstream'. For example, residents did both communal shopping and personal shopping at Tesco, using their own cars to drive there or getting lifts with those who do drive. So BWC is not a *pure* space of marginality. Far from being self sufficient, they are consuming goods from the same supermarket at which nearly 25% of Britain's GDP is spent, positioning them firmly in line with the mainstream. Another reason why cars are relied on is that residents do not want to leave their lives in the mainstream behind. In the course of my fieldwork, three residents had overnight visitors come to stay and there were frequent visitors to the house from the 'mainstream', outside world. Similarly, Saskia (a resident, my gatekeeper) used her holiday to visit old friends and tells me that it is common practice for residents to use their time off as an opportunity to travel back to their mainstream lives. Katherine, for example, told me that she *was* going to stay at BWC for her week off and that this was the first time in her eighteen months there that she or anyone else had done this.

These connections are not the only ways in which mainstream foundations come to matter at BWC. Residents also need mainstream foundations in the form of money, savings, property and assets. Many residents tell me that the 'pocket money' (weekly allowance) received is not enough to live on, particularly when the running of a car is brought into consideration. Maria, another MTV, tells me that by time

she has paid for her insurance, tax and petrol, she has spent more than her weekly allowance. Whilst working in the office, I come across a feedback form in which a short term volunteer (someone who stays with the community for a week) states that she would love to become a resident but does not have the financial or familial security to give up her mortgage. To come to BWC, one needs to be in a position to give up work (and mortgage payments) for 2-4 years without 'burning their bridges'. Residents that I spoke to tended to have taken early retirement or have wealthy parents/partners, substantial savings/assets or careers that supported the notion of a career break. Similarly, participation in the marginal practices of sites such as WOMAD, SM and RFM require a firm footing in the mainstream world as, at a base level, participation costs a lot of money. Tickets to WOMAD cost £100, retreats at SM start at £90 and a loaf of bread at RFM can cost as much as £1.80. For persons to afford this, it is fair to assume that they must have access to monetary resources, the source of which is the preserve of mainstream practice and organisation. Most significantly, the woman who runs TD tells me that she could not make a living through running the shop as 'the profits wouldn't even cover my family's food bill'. However, she *can* afford to run the shop because her husband, in his mainstream labour market activity, generates enough money for their family to live on. She is able to do the work of marginality because she has solid foundations in the form of an institutionalised emotional attachment (marriage) and finances generated in the mainstream.

Holding the mainstream present and absent: Objects and Meanings

These sites of marginality hold the mainstream present in processes of attempting to refuse it. Thinking again with the data from BWC, it has been seen that food plays a key role in the constitution of marginality. Whilst working in the kitchen, I spoke with Maria about vegetarianism. Like many participants in my research, she does the work of marginality through discussing the ease of which persons can have a balanced and exciting diet as a vegetarian. Yet simultaneously she holds present an attitude to food that may be considered mainstream. In the course of this conversation she informed me that she and her partner (who was visiting) went out the night before and 'enjoyed a nice steak' and with this she explains that she 'likes

vegetarian food' but is 'unwilling to give up meat'. Since Maria is part time resident – betwixt and between (Turner, 1967) if you will – it is perhaps unsurprising that she has attachments to the margin *and* the mainstream. However, this dual attachment *is* surprising when practiced by permanent members of the resident community. Later that same day John, a full time resident, tells me that he eats meat. Interestingly, he presents this as a way of doing the work of marginality *within* BWC because it is an act of resistance against BWC's 'mainstream'. I eventually learn that nearly all of the residents *do* actually eat meat. Since it is a marginal, clandestine practice within the culture of BWC, it is largely confined to residents' back regions (Goffman, 1959). I witnessed and was treated to tales of residents sneaking into their bedrooms with a pork pie or a takeaway as well as incidents of people eating meat off the premises.

This idea is buttressed by data from other fieldwork sites. At SM, against the backdrop of Buddhist ideals and asceticism, a trolley with a range of cakes and cobblers was seen being wheeled towards the manager's office whilst visitors ate pea soup. The picture at RFM is slightly more complex. Within this space of marginality, meat and meat eating carries connotations of the mainstream and is characterised as matter out of place (Douglas, 1966 [2000]). For many traders, stall holders and visitors at the real food market the presence of meat is deeply problematic. Of the pressure groups represented at the real food market, animal rights groups were frequent sights because they feel 'the people who come here will be sympathetic to our cause'. These groups, unsurprisingly, felt that the presence of meat was wholly inappropriate. Even traders and visitors who are *not* vegetarian found this problematic. As one visitor told me: 'I mean I'm not a vegetarian, I eat meat, but it is a bit odd to see it for sale here'. However, this presence of meat (and so too the mainstream) is negotiated and accounted for through recourse to the discourses of alterity and marginality. Traders are keen to present their meat as local, free range and humanely treated whilst those who buy the meat make similar arguments and position it as 'an alternative to that unethical shit the supermarkets feed us'.

This pattern is manifest in more than just food. Despite BWC's overt rejection of modern living, every single resident owns a mobile phone and there is a list of their

numbers stuck to a filing cabinet in the office where there are also two internet equipped computers. Similarly, DVD players, hair straighteners, hi-fi systems, televisions and even games consoles were ubiquitous. Admittedly, these items were never present in shared, communal, public or visible areas where they would pollute the categorical enactment of marginality. Instead, they were tucked away in residents' private spaces or 'back regions'. There is a peculiar complexity in as much as residents are distancing themselves from the mainstream yet in their 'back regions', they are holding their conception of the mainstream present such that they can travel back (quite literally, although no car is required here) when desired.

In order to understand this movement between the margin and the mainstream; we need first to appreciate that this dual attachment is done at the collective as well as individual level *and* that it is unsatisfactory to think of it spatially in terms of front and back regions. Returning to food, one need not go into the back regions to uncover the presence of mainstream foodstuffs. In the kitchen, a highly visible space which is the symbolic and social centre of BWC, one can easily come across foodstuffs that are constituted as mainstream. The organic, fair trade and health foods are still clearly visible and upon opening the fridge one is still confronted with vegetables and Soya milk. However, one need only look behind these products to find things that do not fit. In the cupboards, where food can be kept away from view, the dried pulses ('we soak them ourselves' a resident tells me) are replaced with Tesco cans of chickpeas and the herbal teas are replaced with Nescafé (made by Nestlé, who have an appalling human rights record). In the fridge, behind all the appropriate foodstuffs, I found milk from Tesco (*not* from their organic range) nestling next to a big block of (Tesco) cheese and English country butter. Rather than thinking in terms of front and back regions, it is fruitful to think in terms of what is made visible. On this note, a certain irony can be uncovered. For instance, butter could stand to be kept out of the fridge whereas Soya margarine needs to be kept in there; however, the butter was well hidden whilst the Soya would almost always be left on the work surface for all to see. Foodstuffs that fit are made visible, whereas individuals and the collective do a lot of work to make the 'matter out of place' invisible.

Thinking about medicine at BWC, the analysis can move away from objects to meanings in order to make a more subtle point. In 'doing' marginality, BWC rejects conventional medicine in favour of homeopathic alternatives. These remedies are kept in a white cupboard with a large red cross on the front. Aside from borrowing this symbol from 'mainstream' medicine; this also connotes something about the potency of this medicine. Through using these symbols, they are suggesting that homeopathic medicine is every bit as potent as conventional medicine. This connotation is stronger when one notices that this cupboard is locked. However, the key to the lock is actually hung on the cupboard itself, acting as a signifier that disrupts at source the meanings carried by the white cupboard, red cross and key. The key is, in Derridean terms, a *supplement* (Derrida, 1972); something that is once an addition and a replacement. As soon as the keys are added, they replace the meanings connoted by the white cupboard, red cross and keys. The supplementary of the keys connotes that residents do not believe that homeopathic remedies are as potent as conventional medicine. Children reside at and visit BWC so if the cupboard were to contain conventional medicine, it is unlikely that residents would allow them to be so easily accessible. Mainstream meanings are held present in respect of the relative potency of conventional, mainstream medicine against the homeopathic, herbal remedies that are used to do the work of marginality. Similarly, during my time at BWC, one of the resident's children fell ill and the first reaction was to take the child to the local hospital.

The Margin and the Mainstream: Movement and Motility.

The above analysis has shown that the constitution of marginality relies on the absence of what is constituted as mainstream. There is nothing controversial here: it is just the idea that difference, particularly a difference deriving from 'transgressive' practice, is relational (Jenks, 2003). More contentiously, it is has shown that the 'mainstream' - in the form of values, practices and behaviours - is drawn upon, even relied on, in processes of 'doing' marginality such that the mainstream is at once present and absent. This analysis can be taken as the uncovering of a *trace* (Derrida, 1967b) which in turn can displace the margin/mainstream dichotomy.

However, it serves a more interesting purpose in so far as it necessitates an understanding of the *movement* between the margin and the mainstream.

Following Munro (2001 [1992]), this movement can be thought of in terms of *motility* (see also Hetherington, 2004 and Latimer, 2006). Thinking back to BWC, it was shown how thinking in terms of front and back regions, objects and physical spaces proved unsatisfactory. Instead *meanings* are transpiring as the phenomena that come to matter because it is meanings that are attached to materials and practices in order to constitute them as either 'margin' or 'mainstream'. Munro starts from the premise that meanings cannot be irrefutably refused or disposed of and it follows that any absence of meaning is essentially an absent presence. For Hetherington (2004), disposal (or rather attempts at disposal) is about placing. Following Douglas (1966) he posits that processes of making 'dirt' invisible are implicated in processes of creating categories and a sense of recognisable social stability. Empirically, we have seen that the attempts to 'do' marginality rest on attempts to dispose of the mainstream but the mainstream meanings *cannot* be refused because their absence is, in actuality, an absent presence. Again, thinking back to BWC, we saw the presence of these absences - in the fridge, in the bedroom, in visitors to the site, flows of capital and goods, practices *off* the site *etcetera* (essentially, the trace is the stream of present absences). We also saw that a lot of work is done by the community to make them invisible and in Taussig's terms (1999) this 'labour of the negative' can be thought of as attempts of deface them. At an individual level this involves persons taking their pork pies into their bedroom away from the collective and at a *collective* level it is the *public secrecy* (Taussig, 1999) involved in 'forgetting' that everyone else is eating meat, hiding the 'matter out of place' in public spaces, or relying on mainstream foundations and a car worth in excess of ten thousand pounds.

Motility comes into play when we consider persons, such as the residents of BWC, moving between different agendas. Persons can be doing the work of marginality one moment and then, in an instant, move into the agenda of the 'mainstream' (for whatever reason: not wanting to give up their mainstream lives, loved ones or financial stability...). In moving between agendas, persons need only position themselves (or be positioned) within a different set of meanings through making

absent presences present without refusing what is in turn made absent. This is the crux of motility: it is the moving between and drawing upon different meanings to accomplish different agendas. In terms of Derridean supplementarity it gives, in my view, more importance to the role of replacements as additions than it does to additions as replacements. Rather than viewing a movement towards the meanings of the mainstream as a replacement or disposal of the meanings of the margin; motility enables the recognition of complexity and incongruity. As an ethnographer, this allows me to see what is being accomplished in the research site rather than reproducing my own conceptual models of what is 'margin' and what is 'mainstream'.

Complexity and Heterogeneity.

Margins

Hitherto, the analysis has dealt with complexity and heterogeneity through recognising the co-existence of 'marginality' and 'the mainstream'. Thinking *away* from the mainstream for a while; the margins themselves are complex and heterogeneous. I have been writing about the categorical enactment (accomplishment) of marginality but it must now be stressed that the 'category' of 'margin' is not fixed, nor is it homogeneous. The methodology chapters highlighted that alterity is as an ephemeral phenomenon that is present across a range of contexts. In Foucaultian terms, it makes sense to think of alterity as a *discursive practice* that is characterised by:

"[t]he delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designates its exclusions and choices" (Foucault 1977: p. 199)

So too the margins. If I were to write the margins as a homogeneous social space; I would be undoing all that I sought to achieve through utilising multi-site ethnography because marginality, like alterity, is manifest across a range of contexts in a variety of manifestations. Within my own research, it is hard to see any

structural congruity between, for example, a Buddhist retreat, a world music festival and an intentional community; the only connection is mutual attachment to disparate elements of alterity's milieu.

Aside from heterogeneity and complexity manifesting themselves *between* sites; it also manifests itself within sites such that no single site can be conceived of as homogeneous. For example, the range of persons and more importantly, the range of meanings at WOMAD is remarkable. Predominantly the event is attended by Caucasian, middle aged and ostensibly middle class couples yet they can be seen dancing alongside families, children, young people and the elderly just as this 'safe' presence co-exists with communities of travellers who tell me that they spend the summer touring festivals that 'the people here would have a heart attack if they went to'. Similarly, there is a heterogeneous collection of meanings attached to attending the festival: for some it is 'about the music', for others it is the experience of the 'exotic', several people (mainly middle aged women) came for the shopping, stating that they can buy 'all sorts of wonderful things that cannot be found at home' and there were those who view it as an opportunity for a safe but exciting outing that the whole family can enjoy. A similar picture is painted by RFM: some are there as part of an ongoing commitment to the practice of alterity and view it as a weekly opportunity to buy food that they are comfortable with, others are there as part of a Sunday ritual ('it's just something we do...the whole family comes down here for a poke around') whereas for others it is an opportunity to 'dip into a different way of doing things'. Of course, being located in Wales, there is an element of participation by those who maintain that: '(you) gotta support Welsh food made by Welsh people'.

In terms of spirituality, BWC displays heterogeneity. The emphasis is on an eclectic mix of faith and spiritual practice including (but not limited to) Buddhist, New Age, Pagan and Celtic traditions. A recent televised documentary about Findhorn (a large, well established intentional community: see appendix B) tells a similar story. A large portion of the documentary is given to conveying the importance of spiritual beliefs and values *and* the impossibility of pinning them down. Members of the Findhorn community are said to 'neither adhere to or reject any specific creed or doctrine; nor invest spiritual authority in any external figures'.

This is illustrated by an incident wherein an individual visits Findhorn with the aim of bringing about a unified spirituality with him as the spiritual leader. Suffice to say, his proposal was rejected. SM does not exhibit this eclecticism as it is premised solely on Buddhist precepts. One participant with whom I sat on the train after the retreat relayed his experiences of different retreats to me and situated SM in opposition to 'come one, come all' retreats such as BWC. Of course, Buddhism is not a homogeneous practice but for the purposes of SM's retreats, *they* use it as a blanket term. In actuality, SM run an eclectic range of retreats premised on an eclectic range of Buddhist teachings. During my time at SM, three categories of retreat were being run: long term hermitage retreats, Mahasi retreats and a generic retreat entitled 'meditation for daily living'. The differences between the retreats were marked clearly and rather beautifully through the adoption of different temporal rhythms. Those on the generic retreat moved at a normal place (though they were encouraged to 'slow down') whereas Mahasi meditation is premised strictly on slowing *everything* down (walking, working, moving and eating) and the long term hermitage retreats are premised (so I am told by the managers, I did not see this first hand) on long periods of motionlessness. Within one physical space, one can literally visualise heterogeneity by observing the different speeds at which a large number of persons are moving.

The mainstream and 'modernity'

Highlighting the complexity and heterogeneity of the margin necessitates the same of the mainstream. The start of this chapter saw the equation of the mainstream with modernity and the margins as an attempt to transgress modernity. The remainder of this chapter is therefore given to an illustration of how marginality is accomplished through its interplay with modernity. The implication is that 'modernity' is part of the margin and consequently, the margin is part of – rather than a transgression of – modernity such that modernity can be viewed as a complex and heterogeneous space that should not be placed within a black box (or quotation marks for that matter). In its black box, modernity is associated with attempts to impose order upon existence and order upon the social. As detailed in chapter one, I am taking the stance that it makes little sense to think of social order as stabilised,

fixed and concrete. Rather I take social ordering to be a *process*, a process of assembling and reassembling (Latour, 2005), a verb rather than a noun (Law, 1994), something that we *do* as well as something that we are in such that persons are constantly doing and redoing the work of social ordering. For example, meat eating is constituted as 'mainstream' yet in John's account of eating meat – where he constitutes it as an act of marginality in relation to the 'mainstream' of BWC – he is applying a different set of meanings to the same phenomenon in order to *re-order* the social. He is *flipping* things around such that the 'mainstream' becomes the margin and *vice versa*. It follows that the idea of modernity imposing order and homogeneity on existence in place of pre-modern cacophony holds little weight. Strathern (1991) reminds us that there is no modern and pre-modern; there is just a move from complexity and heterogeneity to complexity and heterogeneity. Furthermore, the analysis here has shown that attempts to transgress modernity are characterised by yet more complexity and heterogeneity. It therefore makes little sense to think of the margins as ontologically different or remote from modernity. Indeed, these movements are better thought as different orderings/elicitations of relations (see chapter one), all of which are characterised by complexity and heterogeneity (Strathern, 1991).

Heterotopia

In order to make sense, both of complexity and heterogeneity *and* the 'tangle' between the margin and mainstream/modernity, Hetherington's analysis of heterotopia (1997) can be deployed. The immediate use of this concept is that it enables a way of thinking about marginality (and making sense of my data) without reproducing the tendencies we started with. An auxiliary benefit is that it allows for an understanding of the role played by organisation and ordering in doing the work of marginality.

Although the term originates in medicine, Foucault (1966 1983 1986) is responsible for its import to philosophy/social science. In this respect, the term refers to places of Otherness where incommensurate phenomena are juxtaposed in order to challenge the way thought is ordered. Writers such as Genocchio (1995) attempted

to limit its import to the study of literary texts but Hetherington has rightly claimed the concept's importance for social science. Without denying the transgressive potential of the margins (challenging both thought and notions of social order); Hetherington notes that heterotopia are far more complex than this. He draws attention to the importance of ordering at the margin because even though the margins are thought to challenge social order(ing); they are still, when seen through Foucault's eyes, forms of social ordering.

Heterotopias do not come out of nowhere. They are not spasmodic manifestations of alterity; they derive from ideas about the good society and attempts to organise them into practice. Thinking back to More's (1985) seminal work on ideas of the good society, *Utopia*, we find an undecidablilty embedded in the term. Utopia is comprised of the word *eu*topia (meaning good place) and *ou*topia (meaning no place). With this tension, Hetherington draws on the work of Marin (1984) to argue that the term utopia should be collapsed into its constitutive parts to afford a focus on the space between them. Marin calls this space *'the neutral'* and coins the term *utopics* to describe the spatial play involved (within the neutral) in translating ideas of the good society into practice. Of course in practice, the process of translation is never fully realised because ideas of 'the good place' exist only in the 'no place'. Consequently, Hetherington views the passage from eutopia to outopia as one of endless deferral and in this space that Marin calls 'the neutral', Hetherington situates his concept of heterotopia. Drawing on Marin's utopics of translation, heterotopia are conceived of as places where alternate ideals of how the social should be ordered are translated and put into practice. However, in attempting to order the social/order relations along alternate lines, the impossibility of doing so is encountered (the only actuality is the no place) and the ordering of the social along these alternate lines is, as seen, a process of endless deferral. It is for these reasons that Hetherington views order in terms of ordering: the utopian alternative is never fixed, never stable and never complete because attempts to translate ideas of the good place into actuality can never be reached.

Heterotopias do not derive solely from difference *per se*. They are relational (as juxtaposed to what is constituted as mainstream) and are thus different modes of ordering the social through a heterogeneous collection of materiality, practice and

event (Hetherington, 1997). I have shown already this 'heterogeneous collection of materiality, practice and event' as well as a heterogeneous collection of *meanings* in relation to what is constituted as marginal. More importantly, I have shown a heterogeneous collection of practices and meanings that are constituted as mainstream. What needs to be addressed is the fact that heterotopia are reliant on processes of ordering, particularly processes of ordering that are synonymous with the mainstream. This will be dealt with empirically below but for now we will stay with Hetherington. Going back to Foucault, Hetherington notes that heterotopia signify through similitude not resemblance. This involves the juxtaposition of signs not usually found together (materiality, practice, event, meaning) in new and unexpected relationships. Through doing so, cultural and cognitive ideas are unsettled and from this, difference emerges. This juxtaposition is taken as a form of ordering and with this, the importance of ordering is seen. Indeed, a transgression of order that blindly celebrates freedom without saying anything of order would be too simplistic (Derrida would view this as a simple reversal of privilege). Viewing difference (or alterity) and marginality as an alternative ordering rather than a transgression of order is a far more satisfactory analytic tool.

In addition to making sense of the tangle between margin and mainstream, the concept of heterotopia allows for the co-existence of ideas of freedom and ideas of order. Hetherington goes on to note that modernity is a utopian ideal characterised by the same tensions as the margins (now thought of as heterotopia). He recognises that 'modernity', like 'the margin' is complex and heterogeneous; a process of order*ing* and endless deferral. In more concrete terms: he notes that the utopian ideal of modernity is an ordering that never comes to rest as it vacillates between ideas of freedom and ideas of order. When thinking about the margins in terms of heterotopia, it can be seem that different versions of modernity (utopics of freedom and utopics of order) or, in Strathern's terms, different orderings of relations *co-exist*. More radically, he departs from postmodernism's monopoly on marginality and alterity in noting that modernity is not simply synonymous with order. He is of course hinting that modernity, like the margins, can be conceived of as heterotopia. Essentially modernity (like the margins) is characterised by the co-existence of different orderings of relations and as such, is a complex and heterogeneous space of endless deferral.

Social Ordering at the Margins

The sites studied exhibited the tendency to promise freedom. In its brochure, BWC encourages potential visitors to 'let go and explore new corners of yourself', a slogan that promises the transgression of constraint and an encounter with the sublime. Similarly, during one of the dances at RR, the instructor yells out cries of 'let yourself go', 'lose yourself' and 'fly away from your Earthly body'. At WOMAD, a middle aged woman, very respectable by all accounts, tells me how the wearing of a colourful hat (purchased at the festival) made her feel like she was somebody else, away from her day to day life who could do things that she would not normally dream of doing. These allusions to the carnivalesque will be addressed in chapters six and seven. What is important now is that underlying these attempts to organise the social in an (alternative) way that privileges freedom, is the necessity of organisation and ordering.

Organisation

At a very basic level, none of the sites can be thought of as spontaneous, ludic or improvised. Far from deriving from any sort of transgressive, sublime *puissance*; all of the sites displayed the necessity of organisation. BWC and SM are registered as educational charities that produce brochures, maintain a website, create a yearly schedule of activity and a detailed pricing structure. One does not experience any of these by turning up and hanging out. Equally well, RFM has a website, organises its traders and stalls (who in turn organise the supply of their own produce) and is held in the same spot at the same time each week. It is not a matter of turning up and selling what you like, when you like. WOMAD requires a huge amount of organisation: booking performers, promoting the festival, organising the stalls (food, charity and retail), organising the venue and traffic coming into it, selling tickets, maintaining the website, cleaning up after the festival *etcetera*. It is far removed from any notion of a spontaneous and free party/festival/rave. Similarly, RR requires a room to be booked, the event to promoted, leaflets to be distributed and an instructor to be booked.

Management and Organisation

Of course, it is not significant in itself that organisation is required. What *is* significant is the type of organisation that is occasioned. Common to all the manifestations of alterity studied is a very formal, institutional form of organisation (that can be viewed as a further trace of the mainstream) that makes more sense to think of in terms of bureaucracy. This idea is best illustrated through reference to Shakti Manor. SM is a trust, run by a team of managers who play no role in meditations, instruction or the substance of the retreat. They are 'behind the scenes', doing the work of organising that underlies this experience of alterity and marginality. There is a clear separation between these managers and the teachers at SM. Teachers *are* responsible for meditations, instruction and the substance of the retreat. It is they who deal with matters of alterity and marginality such as the emotional content of the retreat, spiritual issues and guidance on meditation. Conversely, managers are responsible for practical and pragmatic issues such as allocating rooms, finances, upkeep of the building, organising the retreat and processing arrivals (there will be more on this in chapter seven).

On the retreat, this division is made immediately clear with two introductory talks. There is a manager's talk in which matters of fire safety and practical issues (when food is served, when lights should be turned off) are addressed. Then there is a separate teacher's talk in which emotional and spiritual aspects of the retreat are addressed. This division is manifest in SM's spatial arrangements: managers are located in an office with paperwork, internet equipped computers and filing cabinets whereas the teachers are located in a library with incense, bean bags and a range of sacred and instructional books. This division is magnified by the fact that these rooms are at opposite ends of the building. SM is a silent retreat centre and much of the communication between teachers or managers and retreatants is done through the exchange of written notes placed on notice boards (retreatants are discouraged from communicating with one another in this way). There are two separate notice boards: one for teachers to address their concerns (such as reminders to our time alone to practice what we are learning in instructional meditations) and one for managers to address theirs (such as shutting doors and turning of lights when not in

a room). Should we wish to contact a manager or teacher for any reason, we (as retreatants) were advised to 'contact a manager for practical issues' and 'a teacher for meditation ones' by placing a note on their respective notice boards

This separation of management from teachers is in essentially a separation of the bureaucratic and the affectual (which as a matter of tautology testifies to their co-existence at SM). This echoes Weber's account - wherein it was the separation of business enterprise from the family and household that marks the birth of modernity (Weber, 2002) - in so far as the managing of SM is structurally distanced from the subjective, emotional work that the teachers do. This separation can be seen as an attempt to accomplish some sort of bureaucratic purity with which to do the work of organisation and managing, leaving free a space of transgressive purity for the teachers to do the work of retreat, marginality and alterity. There is a further bureaucratisation within the management such that each manager is assigned a specific task. There is a garden manager, a finance manager, a household manager and so on who, as far as I could tell, tended not to stray from their assigned role. For example, I asked one manager a question about a job I was doing in the garden and was told that I would have to ask the garden manager. The manager's notice board is ordered into discrete segments (one for the garden manager, one for the household manager *etcetera*) to enable efficient communication with and from appropriate managers. So, underlying the realm of retreat, marginality and alterity is a highly bureaucratised system of organisation that is geared towards efficiency.

In line with a bureaucratised, managerial organisation, many of the fieldwork sites operate by the 'tyranny of the clock' (Marx, 1972). That is not to say that they did not ostensibly reject it: when working at BWC, whoever was in charge of me would be very relaxed about time keeping. For example, John would say: 'we start at 11 but any time before 12 is cool.' Likewise, at SM we are encouraged to 'leave behind' a world that places demands our time and requires us to be in a certain place at a certain time. However, both sites use time as a key organising and people managing tool. The day at BWC is punctuated by exact timings (meal times, morning rituals, and the working day) marked by the ringing of a bell at the same time each day. At SM temporal rigidity, in the absence of speech, becomes something of a necessity. The day is planned through reference to a rigid temporal

structure and the same thing is done at the same time each day. Again, the timetable is marked by bell ringing; in this case however, a very soft bell is carried around the house rather than an obtrusive noise that undermines the commitment to silence and peace. It is retreatants who ring the bell and they volunteer to do so. The bell ringing schedule is so rigid that volunteers ring the same bell each day (for example, to mark the start of a morning meditation) 'to avoid mistakes' and just in case, a written copy of the schedule (detailing who should ring which bell and when) is posted on both of the notice boards and is colour co-ordinated to indicate that some bells are to be rung seven minutes ahead of schedule in order to give retreatants time to get to where they need to be.

The Labour of Division: Ordering the Social

Rather more significantly, these sites of marginality do the work of social ordering. I have laboured already the point that culture is always in the making and we constantly order and re-order the social. Central to practices of marginality and alterity is the ordering of the social through the labour of division (Munro, 1997 Latimer, 1997b) and the constitution of categories (Latimer, 1997a).

This tendency is best illustrated through reference to BWC which claims to be egalitarian, with no 'hierarchy, labels or boxes'. Indeed many residents cite the freedom from such ordering and hierarchy as a major benefit of BWC and juxtapose it with the 'tyranny' of living and working in mainstream society. This picture of freedom and fluidity in residents' narratives obscures the extent to which they do the work of constituting categories and hierarchies (Douglas, 1966 [2000]); Latimer, 1997a, 1999). For a start, residents do the labour of division to create the categories 'residents' and 'visitors'. As will be seen in chapter six, they express contempt for visitors and symbolically exclude them through creating separate living areas, kitchens, mealtimes and rituals (which sits at odds with the brochure's promise of experiencing community life). Within the category of 'resident' there is a labour of division and again the categories relate to hierarchies and processes of social inclusion/exclusion (Latimer, 1999). There are full time residents at the top, volunteers who come for a week at the bottom and there are various degrees of

medium term volunteers in between graded quite clearly by the length of time they have been a resident. All residents take meals together and attend attunement (a morning ritual where the day is organised) together *but* only full time residents and occasionally higher ranking volunteers are present for all of the attunement ritual. Similarly, nobody but the full time residents has the authority to make final decisions about the organisation of the day or the allocation of finances. It is interesting to note that even within the category of full time resident, those who had been there the longest tended to have the most authority when it came to making final decisions.

The data from SM tells a similar story. The teacher's instruction during meditations stresses the interconnectedness of human beings. However, the analysis has already highlighted the labour of division at SM. We have seen the creation of the categories 'manager' and 'teacher' who are mutually distinct from those who go on the retreats. Again, these categories are translated into practices of inclusion and exclusion. From the moment of arrival, one is struck by the division: in the car park, visitors' cars are crowded into a small, grassy and muddy area whereas managers have a separate, concrete and spacious, area on which visitors cannot park. Similarly, the managers' and teachers' accommodation is separate from visitors' and visitors are not allowed past the door into these areas. I have already shown how managers have access to different foodstuffs and upon noting this, visitors were quick to do their own labour of division and turn this into a 'them *versus* us' issue: 'it's alright for them…tucking into a fruit cobbler whilst we are eating this…at least I'll lose weight here!' They omit to mention that they have chosen – paid - for this ascetic experience. We have already seen the creation of three categories *within* the category of retreatant, (hermitage, Mahasi and generic) during my fieldwork visit and yet again, this labour of division relates to inclusion and exclusion. Different categories of retreatant ate on different tables and those on solitude and Mahasi retreats (those positioned higher within the hierarchy) had access to more food and choice in respect of which table they ate at. Furthermore, they had access to more 'communal' rooms in the house such as the library and walking meditation rooms.

The first part of the analysis saw how residents at BWC were complicit in constituting the categories of margin and mainstream, giving clear privilege to what they constitute as marginal. Even within the category of margin, there is a labour of division and attempts are made by residents to position themselves within the hierarchy that ensues. For instance, those who are vegans assume more right to decide what is cooked (even when there is an offer to cook for both vegetarians and vegans) and thus constitute the categories of vegetarian and vegan, using the division to position themselves higher within the hierarchy. Beyond marginalising what is constituted as mainstream, residents at BWC create their own margins. They have a 'wayfarers' policy wherein travellers and gypsies are allowed to stay for one night if they promise not to consume alcohol/drugs, steal or start fights and leave after one night. Despite the ample space available inside the halls and dorms, wayfarers have to sleep at the spatial margins, in the barn. When I asked if wayfarers were allowed to dine with the community or partake in attunement rituals, I was met with ridicule. Ironically, they are marginalising and excluding persons who carry the meanings from which they borrow in order to do marginality. A similar process occurs at WOMAD where the travellers (who tour the country attending the summer's free festivals) and their trading activities are located at the periphery of the festival space, in the car park and camping grounds. Here, they can be found selling special brew, drugs and camping equipment for vastly inflated prices

Ordering the organisation: organising the ordering

In their organisational endeavours, the fieldwork sites rely on processes of categorisation and ordering. SM relies on monetary donations as a key source of funding (more on this in chapter six). They create categories for visitors to make donations to – teacher's fund, manager's fund, benevolence fund and maintenance fund – each with a dedicated box in which to place donations. Similarly, they have different sinks for different categories of washing up and colour coded recycling bins for different types of waste. These examples show the ordering underlying the organisation that in turn underlies marginality. When cleaning at BWC, a resident advises me to use particular mops for particular cleaning jobs and that these mops

are colour coded. This incident buttresses the previous argument, but it is interesting for another reason. She tells me that this rule exists for health and safety reasons and proceeds to tell me that they *have* to take health and safety very seriously. So here we see a site characterised as one of transgressive freedom having to organise and align itself with the health and safety regulations that are created and enforced by the mainstream that it seeks to subvert.

The co-existence of marginality and this necessity of ordering existence according to the *rules* of the mainstream is captured beautifully in the juxtaposition of signs and notices littered around the buildings at BWC and SM. On the one hand there are artistic and eloquent notices made out to evoke the new age or signed 'with metta' in psychedelic and/or peaceful colours. On the other, within metres of these, are the imposing and familiar green signs pointing towards fire exits. Next to exotic house plants, black and white photography and 'ethnic' looking art, one might see an ugly red fire extinguisher. Here we see, quite literally, incommensurate phenomena (icons of alterity and icons of conformity) juxtaposed with one another to create new and unexpected meanings. This co-existence is the essence of heterotopia and testifies to the necessity of alternative ideals having to engage with reality to the extent that alterity relies, to a certain extent, on *mimesis* of the mainstream if it is to function at all (Taussig, 1993).

Liminality

Using Hetherington's concept of heterotopia alongside my data, it has been shown that the dichotomies we started with (margin/mainstream and freedom/order) do not hold. The 'margin', better thought of in terms of heterotopia can be seen as characterised by ordering and the trace of the mainstream as well as freedom and alterity. The natural tendency within social theory/sociology is to theorise this complexity in terms of *liminality* such that heterotopia are conceived of as 'liminally constituted spaces'. However, I do not find this concept satisfactory for my analysis. Looking back to Van Gennep (1902 [1960]) and Turner (1967), liminality is seen to have a very specific anthropological meaning – as an interstructural situation in which persons can be positioned – that is not appropriate for my

purposes. For a start, an interstructural situation implies that there is structure either side of the liminal such that conceptions of 'margin', 'mainstream', 'freedom' and 'order' are fixed. However, the analysis has already shown that conceptions of these phenomena are not fixed; they are multiple and motile. Similarly, this notion of being inbetween is problematic. Heterotopias are not 'inbetween' the margin and the mainstream so much as they are characterised by their co-existence and movement between them. The same goes for 'freedom' and 'order'. Hetherington reminds us that heterotopias vacillate between notions of freedom and those of order and this vacillation is a movement of motility. Another problem with liminality is that it is rather one dimensional. At best it can account for complexity through destabilising just *one* dichotomy (either margin/mainstream *or* freedom/order). However, I am already presenting *two* and there are more to come in this analysis (and that is before we even consider the potentially limitless number of dichotomies that *could* be addressed.) What is needed is a way of thinking about the complexity that the analysis uncovers.

The Fold

In *The Fold* (1993), Gilles Deleuze celebrates Leibniz and the baroque and aligns himself with a complex, fragmented and prismatic philosophy that predates Hegelian dialectics. The allure of such a position is that it provides an antidote to the one-dimensional dichotic thinking that the concept of liminality fails to transcend. Before arriving at a discussion of *The Fold*, a detour by way of a stepping stone needs to be made through reference to Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) where we find recognition of the 'multiple, lateral and circular' in their concept of the rhizome. The rhizome serves to show that 'thought lags behind nature' in as much as reality is far more complex than thought would have it.

Within a rhizome, there are no points or positions; just lines of flight. The rhizome is not a system, nor can it be conceived of as a structural or generative model that can be divided into (discrete) units. The rhizome is characterised only by the directions in motion taken by these lines. Any 'point' that thought (theory, philosophy, the work of social ordering) positions within a rhizome is, in actuality,

connected to any other 'point' such that a rupture along a line of flight does not equal an eradication as it will just start up again on old or new lines. This generates an important insight: one cannot posit a dualism of x versus y with the presence of one intimating the absence of the other. This is exactly what we saw in the data: attempts to refuse the meanings of the mainstream resulted only in absent presences that resumed on new lines to be drawn on in another instance.

To understand the relationship between lines of flight and the rhizome, it must first be appreciated that these lines of flight have no beginning and no end, just a middle (or *milieu*). The intersection of *milieus* forms a plateau and like lines of flight, these have no beginning or end. In addition to being multiplicities in their own right, these are connected to each other through a potentially limitless and varied array of connections, tangents and intersections. It is these connections, tangents and intersections that allow the formation and extension of rhizomes. Like the lines and the plateaus, the rhizome has no beginning and no end. It is always *intermezzo* and connected to others in increasingly complex and multiple ways such that it cannot be reduced to the singular or the multiple. With this, it offers the possibility of thinking complexity. In relation to the data, the lines of flight can be thought of as the flow of meanings 'out there' that are drawn upon as persons do the work of social ordering. This work of ordering entails the intersection of meanings (a heterogeneous selection of meanings) to form sedimentations or plateaus such as conceptualisations of 'marginality', 'freedom', 'mainstream' and 'order'. These plateaus are connected together in multiple, diverse formations such that there are myriad tangents between 'margin' and 'mainstream', 'margin' and 'order', 'margin and freedom' and so on, *ad infinitum*. The connections between plateaus can be thought of as the rhizome as can heterotopia, with the movements between plateaus representing motility. The rhizome exhibits multiple connections, tangents and intersections with other rhizomes. It follows that heterotopias such as 'the margins' exhibit this same interconnectedness with other heterotopias such as 'modernity'. It is not however the Rhizomatics of Deleuze and Guattari that I wish to appropriate for my analysis; it is Deleuze's own concept of the fold.

With *The Fold*, Deleuze extends this way of thinking but with subtle differences and departures. The departures derive from thinking differently about the lines of flight.

In *The Fold*, Deleuze draws attention to the 'curved shapes' and the curvilinearture that results from 'accidental' changes in direction. If we are to take on board the significance of motility, then changes of direction *must* be allowed for. For instance, the analysis has shown how meanings (lines of flight) can be 'flipped' in order to engage with different agendas through a discussion of John (a resident at BWC) constituting the eating of meat as *marginal* against the tendency of BWC to constitute it as mainstream. It is only curvaceous lines that allow for this 'flipping'. It follows that the fold is more sensuous than the rhizome and from Leibniz, Deleuze posits a philosophy of 'pleats, curves and twisting surfaces' wherein curvaceous lines of flight are twisted, turned and folded over each other to produce the fold. Of course, there is infinite movement and the baroque trait, to which Deleuze is alluding, is to twist and turn these folds upon themselves through further folding, unfolding and refolding such that the multiplicity (the fold) produces submultiplicty after submultiplicity without dissolving into units or positions.

Where the rhizome is 'built up' from lines of flight and plateaus to rhizomes; the fold continually folds in (and out). It twists and turns, in a series of infinite regress, progress and perpetual motion. In addition to taking seriously the movement between meanings, it allows – as does the rhizome – for the multiple interconnections between the meanings. However, it also highlights the importance of perspective: what was discovered in the course of the fieldwork depended entirely on where and when I looked. It follows that the fold works better than the rhizome in conjunction with the notion of motility. Meanings *cannot* be disposed of because they are all folded in; any absence of meaning is purely a matter of perspective because these absences could, at any moment, be discovered somewhere else within the fold. The beauty of the fold is that it provides immunity from any postmodern tendencies to think in terms of the surface being a masquerade under which there is a void. It would be *very* easy to view marginality as a spectacle or simulacra (Baudrillard, 1981 [1994]) that falls apart as soon as one scrapes beneath the surface. However, *The Fold* encourages us to think in terms of twisting surfaces from which further lines and curves emanate, leading to a refolding and another submultiplicity. Consequently, viewing marginality in terms of a folding never allows 'contradiction' (more accurately, complexity) to be to written off as postmodern or dramaturgical enactment. It allows/forces (depending on your

attitude) the analysis to view this so-called 'nowhere' beneath the surface as the *now here...* as something to be explored, understood and explained. It is hoped that the analysis in this chapter has done so which is why I am suggesting that the concept of heterotopia can be enriched by an appreciation of the fold and motility.

Modernity

Finally, thinking of heterotopias in terms of the fold raises issues about modernity. It has already been seen that 'modernity' is a complex and heterogeneous ordering of (multiple) relations that, like the margins, can be thought of in terms of heterotopia. Hetherington (1997) shows that the margins are inexorably related to modernity in as much as they are part of it. For Hetherington, modernity is not static and oppressive; it is inherently open to challenge and resistance from its own margins. In terms of the fold: *any* ordering of relations - such as alterity - can be thought of as a fold and any fold can be seen to be related to any other fold –such as 'modernity'- in multiple and complex ways. It also follows that alterity is folded into 'modernity' just as 'modernity' is folded into alterity with the multiple movements between the folds accounted for by motility. The nature of the interplay between 'modernity' and its transgression will now be explored in detail with reference to its most (un)comfortable bedfellow, the market.

6

BRINGING THE MARKET BACK TO MORALITY.

The focus of this chapter is the interface between the market and morality, or more accurately, practices of exchange and consumption on the one hand and those of ethos and morality on the other. Sociology and social theory exhibits a tendency to construct this relationship as a dichotomy in the form of the market *versus* morality. Thinking back to the demoralisation literature, Bauman (1998) is quite explicit in his view that the market is a form of organisation that *adiaphorises*, or neutralises, moral capacity. Admittedly, many of the other demoralisation theorists resist such a simplistic account of demoralisation; some view market hegemony as a symptom as well as a cause of demoralisation whereas others view the absence of morality with which to balance the market as the problem. Nevertheless, they still reproduce the idea that the market is anathema to morality. Taking the fieldwork sites as attempts to create moral alternatives to the predicament of demoralisation, the analysis in this chapter brings together a range of perspectives to reveal a multi-layered reliance on monetary, commodity, labour and gift exchange in order to 'do' – in the ethnomethodological sense – moralities. Viewed as such, the market can be viewed, somewhat paradoxically, as complicit (even necessary) in facilitating moral alternatives to itself. This unexpected relation at the market/morality interface can be used to problematise and displace the ways in which both sociologists and economists conceive of it. Where the last chapter highlighted the *trace* of the mainstream within what is constituted as marginal; this chapter uncovers the *trace* of the market within what is constituted as moral in order to show how the occasioning of morality relies on engagement with a range of market practices. In addition to adding perspectives to social theory's understandings of the market; this chapter, when read alongside chapter five, offers a detailed discussion of transgression and contributes to my discussion of the fold and motility.

Moral Alternatives: An Empirical Encounter.

In chapter five, I detailed how the fieldwork sites (re)present themselves in terms of a different way of doing things. What is significant for this chapter is that this 'different way of doing things' is constituted as a *moral* way of doing things. For instance, BWC constitutes itself as moral by virtue of its commitment to communal living (which, as chapter eight will discuss in detail, is premised on 'being *for* the other') and ecology. TD constitutes itself as moral through its commitment to and provision of fairly traded produce just as RFM constitutes itself as moral in its commitment to local and organic production. SM constitutes itself as moral through the practice of and training in Buddhist precepts; indeed, the centre was set up for 'the teaching and practice of ethics'. The central tenets of these ethics were translated, printed and placed on the various notice boards around the site. These precepts include: 'retreatants are to take only what is freely given', 'retreatants are to exhibit sensitivity to all living beings and a non-harming relationship to all life' and 'retreatants are to abstain from all sexual contact during their retreat'.

Recalling that demoralisation is a threefold predicament, the fieldwork sites also constitute themselves as moral through the provision of morale and sociality in addition to moral guidance and direction. In terms of morale, recall how residents and visitors to BWC characterise the experience of being there as one of 'love' 'inner peace' and being 'in touch with myself and others' – this can surely be taken as an intimation of happiness. At SM, retreatants are encouraged by the teachers to think of their visit as a re-treat and an opportunity to indulge themselves. Similarly, I learn from visitors who have been there before that they are never better than when they take what they have learnt there and meditate every day. In terms of sociality, the majority of the sites constitute themselves in terms of the provision of some sort of community; however I will defer a detailed discussion of this until chapter eight. It is important to re-iterate that it is not me that constitutes the sites as 'moral alternatives'; it is the research respondents that do so. As an ethnographer, I do not view it as my place to evaluate the moral value of a fieldwork site's practice, if it is constituted as moral then I take it as moral. However, my analysis *does* uncover the trace of the market within this constitution of morality.

The necessity of money, the necessity of markets

The first way in which the trace of the market is present is in the fact that the fieldwork sites rely on money and commodities to do the work of morality. In turn, this requires monetary and commodity exchange which is of course a central feature of the market and the mainstream. For example, despite claims of self sufficiency, BWC is actually far from it (we saw this briefly in chapter five). The resident community cannot produce or provide for all of their food, utility and commodity needs. This necessitates the purchase of goods and services from the outside world which demonstrates their inability to wholly distance themselves from the 'mainstream' and the market economy. Seeing as residents do not live or work outside of BWC, they need money from outside to finance and sustain their lifestyle. To this end, they are a registered educational charity and run myriad courses on various new age practices ranging from basket weaving and stained glass painting to perma-culture and sacred drumming. It is under this guise that they run the retreats, experience weeks and family weeks as 'an education in sustainable and communal living'. The same is true of Findhorn but on a much larger scale. They offer a greater range of courses, retreats and programmes as well as having a dedicated team of consultants who provide insights – in exchange for money – to business, managers and organisations. Back to BWC, I learn from a permanent resident that 99% of their funding comes from these retreats and courses, the rest coming from rare donations.

Although they are registered as an educational charity, the retreats courses are not run out of benevolence. In actuality, residents expressed nothing but contempt for visitors. Virtually every resident told me that they disliked the intrusion that visitors bring and that they were looking forward to the weeks when they had no visitors so that they could have 'peace and quiet and be themselves'. More severely, many residents openly criticised visitors and retreatants by virtue of their difference: when preparing a packed lunch for visitors John contrasted the food he was preparing with the 'shit that those idiots like to eat'. He proceeded to affect a cockney accent and joke with Katherine that 'a proper lunch should include a ham sandwich, crisps and chocolate and, if you are lucky, an apple!' Following this was a comment that they

would be a lot 'healthier and slimmer if they ate brown rice salad and seaweed'. The flipside of this irritation is that visitors bring the residents the money that they need with the costs for the courses and retreats ranging from £134 to £313. In John's own words: 'visitors are a necessary evil'. This is hard line utilitarianism; the cost incurred by the visitors' presence is overridden by the benefit of monies received. However, one must not take this as immoral profiteering. Residents are not commodifying their culture in order to make profit and live lavishly; they are simply making the money they need to cover the bills, food and property maintenance in order to sustain their (moral) lifestyle. Admittedly, residents receive a personal allowance, but in the words of one resident it is 'meagre' (about £25 a month) and can hardly be constituted as a large personal gain. The money is made, quite simply, to facilitate and sustain their work of morality.

At this point, an interjection must be made to note that it is the market that brings in the money and facilitates this moral work. This is the paradox: the market is necessary for facilitating and sustaining the residents' 'moral' alternative to itself. BWC supplies a demand and in doing so, a price mediates the exchange of money for goods and services. To take this a step further: the market enables a two way exchange that facilitates moral work on both sides of the counter. Those who pay to visit are given access to the alternative ethos practiced at BWC (indeed, it is by virtue of this that they are a registered educational charity), inclusion in the community (and the community of visitors) and - according to visitor's narratives, residents' expectations and feedback forms from previous visitors - a sense of happiness or morale. The market and their use of money (in turn, earned through the market mechanism) gives them access to an experience that they would not otherwise have. If we abstract our usual affect in response to the (im)morality of the mechanism and focus on the effect and consequences, we can see that the picture is somewhat different to a Marcusian commodification of culture or Simmelian version of disenchantment. People who come on these retreats are looking for something and the market/money provides access to it where they otherwise would not have it. For visitors, the market facilitates inclusion and access to/an experience of the practice of alterity and alternative moralities. Indeed, as Strathern (1999) has identified, money has an elicitory capacity in as much as it can detach and attach things to persons that would otherwise take a long time to accomplish and acquire.

Just because it is *easy* to gain access to this experience; it does not make it insincere or bad. Zelizer (1994) draws our attention to the *social* differentiation of money and the idea that money cannot be reduced to its utilitarian exchange value. In this case, it is wholly possible that the money visitors spend is earmarked (Zelizer's term, not mine) for purposes that they conceive of as 'moral'. Indeed, visitors appreciate that there is supply for their demand and without this provision; they would not have this opportunity. For instance, Ashleigh, a visitor to the community, tells me that 'I would love to live like this but between my job, mortgage and family I just couldn't do it, not now...I'm just grateful that this place exists so that I can have *something*'. This introduces an important idea: that doing something is better than nothing. Working with the way society is organised, this temporary inclusion shows people making the best of what there is to work with and it recalls Giddens' notion of life politics (1991) where individuals' shape modernity's structures (in this case, 'the market') in their own way rather than professing to destroy them or else remain confined by them. Thinking back to chapter five, it can be thought of as an attempt to translate a utopian ideal into practice. That money and the market facilitate this, serves only to buttress the idea that the market can be put in the service of the moral.

At SM, the above argument - that the market can be seen as being put in the service of the moral – is upheld. However, this relationship is manifest in different ways. SM is much more upfront about its need for money but this need is justified and accounted for by recourse to an explicit moral dimension that is simply not present at BWC. SM does not have a resident community that relies on the market to finance their lifestyle, as such the moral consequences of the mechanism are apparently more one sided than at BWC. It is the visitors who utilise the market to gain access to SM and facilitate their work of alterity and morality (as with visitors to BWC). SM is a trust, managed by non-resident volunteers, set up to provide what they describe as a 'much needed service'. In line with Buddhist precepts, they state that they are committed to providing the service free of charge however visitors *do* still have to pay for retreats. In order to manage this tension, they go to great lengths to account for the use of the money, telling us that the teachers offer tuition without pay, the managers (volunteers) only receive a small monthly stipend of £90 and the majority of the fee goes toward food, bills and general maintenance. There is also an access fund built in so that, in line with Buddhist precepts, 'everyone has

access, irrespective of income'. With this account, we are told that this is provided 'below cost' so you pay a little more to help out. Although visitors still pay, the money is exchanged for provision and longevity of service rather to finance a resident community's lifestyle. Consequently, retreats are significantly cheaper than BWC (£130 is the maximum for a week long retreat). Seeing as the market benefits retreatants and not the trust, SM (through its accounts of this) can be open about their need for money. Indeed, money is central to the experience of being at SM. On arrival the symbolic importance of money is established: one is greeted by a volunteer with a checklist and the first item is the receipt of payment rather than (for example) inquiring about one's meditation experience. Similarly, they are very keen for retreatants to stay extra days (at a cost of £28 per day) as that brings in more money (of course, one must remember the above point about money's elicitory capacity in terms of access and facilitating inclusion).

The centrality of money finds its most striking manifestation in the concept of Dana. Dana stems from an ancient Palí word meaning generosity and with this, residents are encouraged to make donations in order to continue the provision of service. Residents are told that any benefit they have derived has come from the generosity of others (teachers, managers, those who have gone before and made donations) and this generosity is a Buddhist tradition and precept in which one is 'invited' (encouraged) to participate. The persuasion to do so is ubiquitous: in the brochure, in various talks given on the retreat, a slip that comes with a registration form as well as direct debit forms, pamphlets and notice boards around the centre. Visitors can chose which fund they donate to and again, SM offers an account of what the donation is for: teachers (because the offer their services freely but still need to live), managers (for their small monthly stipend), assistance fund (for 'less fortunate' others) and the general fund (upkeep of the house and grounds). The discourse of Buddhist morality is deployed to acquire money and at first glance, this is hard to swallow. However, residents are encouraged to see the process of giving as facilitating a moral outcome. The managers give a talk at the start of the retreat telling how it spreads peace and beauty as well as freedom and compassion. Similarly, the teacher gives a talk at the end of the retreat (perhaps after visitors have had the opportunity to experience a sense of sociality) telling how this giving acknowledges interconnectedness, interdependence and a collective heart whilst

diminishing self-centredness. With this, we can return to Zelizer (1994) and see that the meaning of money here is something other than utilitarian acquisition. The need for money doesn't pollute or efface the moral. In actuality, money and monetary exchange come to stand for morality and sociality. In Bataille's terms (1985), Dana is constituted as the *excess* above cost that contributes to a *general* economy (beyond utilitarianism).

The activities of the woman who runs TD can be thought of in terms of excess. As was shown in chapter five, she can do what she does – the work and provision of morality – because her husband's labour market activity meets her family's needs for material survival. In Bataille's term the conditions of their *particular* economy are met and with the *excess* generated, she can contribute to the *general* economy where she does not make enough money to make a living but accomplishes the work of morality. On this note, she also told me (during a conversation about supermarkets providing fair trade produce) that she buys fair trade produce from the supermarket in order to ensure that they keep providing it. Again, this is *excess* in so far as there is no discernable utilitarian motive to it. It more likely that she is using the *general* economy to circulate moral sentiments in terms of what she spends her money on. Again this money - this excess - comes to stand for more than just utilitarian consumption and exchange, it stands for morality.

To return to my discussion of Dana: establishing that the system of Dana can be put in the service of the moral - facilitating morality, sociality as well as longevity and provision - does not make immediately clear how this relates to the market. However, recalling Mauss' observation (1954) that the market pre-dates the monetary economy by virtue of gift exchange; it can be noted that a system of gift exchange can constitute a market every bit as much as the exchange of goods and services for money. Although part of the Dana exchange is monetary it is, by SM's own admission, 'outside of the traditional fee paying structure' and as such is a system of gift exchange. Again, Zelizer has argued that money can be seen as a gift *depending on the context* and the context here certainly makes it so. With this in mind, we can see (gift) exchange and thus the market facilitating the moral work detailed above.

Dana, Donner, *Dō –

On the topic of gifts and the market, some other interesting points can be made. One cannot help but be struck by the etymological similarity between the word Dana and the French verb *Donner*. This verb has two meanings – to give and to poison- the undecidability of which was famously exploited in the work of Mauss (1954). From Mauss, it is a short step to the work of Benveniste (1973) who goes back to a fundamental and foundational undecidability in Indo-European languages. In the root, *dō -, Benvensite notes an ambiguity which, depending on the words' construction, can either mean 'give' or 'take'. It is fruitful to explore this tension in respect of Dana at SM.

In the gift exchange, it is worth thinking about who it is that is doing the 'taking' through considering who it is that gives the first gift that necessitates a counter gift. On the surface, it would make sense to think of the system of Dana as one that moves retreatants to view the retreat and teaching as a gift to which they must reciprocate with their monetary donations. In this view, the gift from SM is also a poison as they are bound to financial remuneration and in this sense, they have something taken from them. However, following Derrida (1992), the temporal elements of the gift and counter gift can be questioned. Whilst the above picture is not refuted, there is also a sense in which the Dana payments are the gifts and the counter gift is received *before* the gift in expectation of it. In this view, it is retreatants who give to SM and thus poison them and take from them.

In expectation of the Dana payments, SM water down and make palatable what they do. It is in this sense that SM is poisoned and has something taken from them. If retreatants, largely neophyte Western consumers, experienced an intensely strict and rigorous Buddhist retreat it is unlikely that they would feel moved to part with money after the ordeal. This is present in the teacher's narratives. She makes it clear in the first meditation that this is NOT a proper, spiritual retreat that demands a certain amount of discipline and discomfort because 'you would all leave after the first day'. Instead, she encourages us to think of it as a re-treat and use it as an opportunity to relax. This sentiment is symbolically buttressed when she instructs

us on meditation positions: 'it needn't be spiritual, just make sure you are comfortable'. Throughout the retreat, the discipline relaxes. By the third day, she informs us that we do not have to attend every meditation if we do not feel like it. Similarly, there is a Buddhist principle that states that one should not take what is not freely given. To temper the asceticism, SM makes a lot freely available at all times including luxuries such as tea and biscuits. It certainly seems as if the experience is somehow 'watered down' and made palatable in order to suit the Western consumer. However, it makes more sense to think of this as an absence of purity that the ethnographer (or reader) may have expected. When viewed like this, one can distance themselves from an aggressive or critical perspective and see it for what it is. For a start, the analysis can return to the above point that this 'something' is better than nothing and in respect of the market, this serves to ensure that the market functions correctly to secure Dana payments. As such, gift exchange helps accomplish the sustained provision of what SM has to offer.

The Division of Labour: Macro and Micro.

Macro: mutual reliance on the outside

Chapter five detailed the importance of the labour of division; in this chapter I am going to return to more familiar territory to discuss the division of labour. The idea that markets rely on the division of labour (an exchange of labour) is an uncontentious one, familiar to both sociologists and economists. Although BWC is constituted as an alternative to the market economy; it forms part of this system through participating in the division of labour and relies on it to produce moral outcomes. Within this system, BWC's specialism is the provision of alterity and this is traded, via the market and money, for those goods and services that it cannot produce. As already noted, BWC is not – as it claims to be- self-sufficient in as much as it cannot provide for all its food, commodity and utility needs. What they do produce does not go very far. As Amy tells me: 'between our needs and those of visitors, we can only produce 10% of what we need...some vegetables, some dairy and a little heat from burning excess wood'. This being so, the majority of their needs and wants are met from *outside*. This point can be read alongside the earlier

analysis of BWC's need to make money from market exchanges in order to participate in the market (which itself has been established as necessary). Having established the moral implications of BWC acquiring money through the provision of courses and retreats, there are further moral consequences in as much as they can exhibit moral commitments in the goods and services they consume with this money.

Taking food as an example, they are committed to buying ethical produce or at least produce that is constituted as such. Here, they are referring to local, organic and fair trade foods. I am told that they are 99% successful in this commitment (the 1% allowing for supply and availability problems) and get their food from local bakeries, local farmers, Riverford organic farms (a large company based in the South West of England) and even produce from Tesco's fair trade and organic ranges. So, this consumption of ethical produce is another moral consequence of exchanging money for the provision of retreats and courses. With this, the analysis can be taken a step further. These ethical foodstuffs arrive through and are provided by the market. In response to the demand BWC has for these products, the market can produce and supply them. The very possibility of obtaining these products, these moral and ethical foodstuffs, is a consequence of market forces. Indeed, it is for these reasons that the woman who runs TD purchases her personal fair trade produce from Tesco: she is symbolically expressing her demand in the hope that the market will operate to ensure provision. It is interesting to note that Tesco, a salient signifier and ubiquitous target for all that is 'wrong' with capitalism, is the source from which much of BWC's ethical consumption flows. Upon discussing this with residents they note the irony (as Tesco is 'the opposite of what we stand for') but are grateful that they can at least purchase fair trade and organic foods easily and readily. Again, this hints at a theme to be developed later: the idea that the (im)morality of the (market) mechanism can be abstracted in order to focus on the moral consequences of it.

Micro: mutual reliance on the inside

The division of labour is, of course, not purely economic. Indeed the title Durkheim's famous study (1893 [1964]) translates *better* as 'the Social Division of Labour'. This social division of labour arises at both BWC and SM and in neither case is it mediated by money. Nonetheless, it is still a central feature of the market and again, it can be seen to have moral consequences.

At SM, a requirement of the retreat is that participants contribute *at least* two hours work per day. Upon registration, one is allocated a job such as washing up after lunch/supper, gardening or household cleaning. For the sake of efficiency (again, a central feature of the market) and to limit the need for verbal communication (silence is a feature of retreats at SM), retreatants conduct the same job at the same time each day. Both in registration and talks from the managers/teachers, we are told that this is to create a sense of interdependence and togetherness. One cannot help but be struck by this explicit manifestation of Durkheim's organic solidarity analogy (1893 [1964]): mutual interdependence provides moral content for the *conscience collective* and in doing so creates a sense of sociality, albeit a temporary one lasting only the duration of the retreat. Alongside this, we are also told that it keeps cost down. Whilst it is tempting to think that this moves us back to the domain of profiteering and the immorality of the market; it must be remembered that the costs are kept down with moral consequences. When viewed like this, the division of labour *inside* SM can also be seen to facilitate moral consequences *outside* in so far as it helps ensure longevity for their provision of a 'much needed service'.

This process and its consequences are less explicit at BWC but it is present nonetheless. All members of the resident community work at BWC. There is a lot of work to be done, ranging from cooking and the provision of food, through gardening, burning wood for heating and household/grounds maintenance, to running retreats and teaching courses. The working day is organised each morning (in a ritual called attunement) in order to ensure that this gets done. That said, generally speaking, residents tend to specialise: Pepé in gardening, John in cooking,

Katherine in dealing with family weeks/ retreats. Similarly, the running of courses divides labour by virtue of the residents' various specialisms such as John for stained glass window and Saskia for singing. Either way, this is an instance of organic solidarity where the successful operation of the community relies on mutual interdependence and each participant playing their part. In addition to this formal division of labour (which pertains largely to work), there is a large level of informal division of labour. For example, residents who do not have cars are almost always offered lifts by those who do not; in return (as has been seen, gifts necessitate counter gifts) they may offer one of their specialisms such as an Indian head massage. Again, it can be seen that the market's mechanism of specialisation and the division of labour can facilitate morality via the provision of content for the *conscience collective* with organic solidarity representing a form of morality in the guise of sociality.

It must however be noted that the picture is not as utopian as I have painted it. We know from Durkheim that the division of labour can go wrong and that is certainly the case here. For example, at SM retreatants are encouraged by moral obligation to do extra work beyond what is specified. On arrival, visitors are asked to undertake extra tasks such as bell ringing. The statements are framed in terms such as: 'the running of the centre relies on it and refusal to help out will have adverse consequences for everybody'. In effect, this indicates the moral being put in the service of the market or the affectual being put in the service of the bureaucratic. There is a similar story at BWC. Visitors are asked to partake in a system of karmic yoga (which means nothing, it is just two 'new age' words put together) which in actuality is undertaking work as part of the retreat. It was admitted to me that the real reason for this system being in place is that it provides 'free labour'. This point is not intended to undermine the accomplishments of the fieldwork sites; it just serves to highlight the issues of complexity and heterogeneity.

Consumption, Extension, Morality

It was noted (without comment) that in addition to food and utility needs pertaining to survival, longevity and an ethical commitment in food consumption, BWC also

has *commodity* needs. This suggests that the residents at BWC are consumers in much the same way as those in the 'mainstream' society that they seek to subvert. Such thought stands in direct opposition to the widely circulated idea that 'alternative' (new age) lifestyles are both post-materialist and post-consumerist (Inglehart, 1977). Incidentally, this idea is not purely academic. Stafford Whiteaker's invaluable *Good Retreat Guide* (2001) suggests that sites such as BWC are 'alternatives to modern materialism'. Following the so-called 'material turn' in the social sciences (Pels, *et al*, 2002) -that draws attention to the role of materials in human organisation and interaction- the purpose of this section is to focus on the role of consumption in enacting alterity and morality.

The importance of materiality has long been established within anthropology (e.g. Appaduri, 1986). So too the importance and centrality of the social in matters of exchange and even consumption. In the work of Douglas and Isherwood (1984), one finds the idea that processes of consumption share culture, mirror *fixed* relations (Munro, 1996) and reify society. However, for the purposes of this analysis, the concept of *extension* (Strathern, 1991; Munro, 1996) is more appropriate (because, thinking back to chapter one: I do not wish to reify society nor do I wish to fix relations). In extension, persons and relations are made visible, made to matter. At BWC, extension enables residents and visitors to 'cut' appropriate moral identities and at once do the work of belonging, which, as established, is a moral process in itself. Seeing as consumption is reliant on the market mechanism (and this is often characterised in very negative ways), it is suggested that the market, via consumption, makes possible these moral consequences.

Through consumption, residents and visitors enter extension. In the first instance, extension can be taken quite literally as the prosthetic addition of objects to subjects such that persons can proclaim individuality and identity through decoration (Strathern, 1999). This decoration takes the form of objects and these objects are borrowed from a range of other cultures, ranging from oppressed marginalised Others (Hetherington, 1998) through Celts and pagans to 'hippies' and they include a virtually limitless milieu. For example: food, clothing (new age and 'ethnic', the absence of branded clothing and either barefoot or sandals), hairstyles (such as unkempt or dreadlocks) jewellery (Celtic and tribal), world music CDs, earthenware

pottery, incense and oils, vegetarian cookbooks, shamanistic crystals and self help tapes are all objects utilised in the process of extension. It is very easy to think that ethics are replaced by aesthetics, that this is simply some form of postmodern hollowness, a cynical performance of selves (Goffman, 1959) or the dramaturgical enactment of culture. In actuality, it is these aesthetic qualities that enable the ethical. These aesthetics are symbols and the ease of which symbols circulate meanings says nothing of the substance underlying them. Thinking back to chapter two, we can recall the work of Hetherington (1998) and Maffesoli (1996) on *expressivism* that considers the joining of the ethical and aesthetic. In this case, the aesthetic features are powerful, immediately recognisable symbols that circulate meanings and act as signifiers for one's ascription to the ethos of BWC and allow persons to 'cut' the figures of morality and alterity. On this note, many of the objects in question are readily available - the market sees to that - and are even available for purchase from the on site shop at BWC. Again, this need not be thought of as immoral consumerism and profiteering. One need only recall Strathern's point about money having an elicitory capacity in as much as it enables the acquisition of objects that would otherwise take a lifetime to accumulate (1999). The shop ensures the availability of these objects and it is this ease and availability that contributes to the moral outcomes. These moral outcomes are not limited to the cutting of appropriate moral identities; they relate also to issues of belonging, sociality and morality.

Extension involves attachment and Strathern plays up to the double meaning of the term. There is the attachment of an object to the self but this also necessitates the attachment of the self to others such that the addition of a part extends the possibilities for performance as a *part*icipant (Munro, 1996). It is in this respect that extension makes relations visible as well as persons. Indeed, the constitution of identity detailed above cannot be done alone as others are required to act as recipients for these symbols (Strathern, 1999) such that figures need to be 'cut' in a form that can be consumed by others. Extension at BWC facilitates belonging in as much as the aesthetics signify ethics and these shared moral sentiments are one of the ways in which social cohesion is achieved at BWC. Alternative modes of social organisation such as BWC elicit relations in as much as people who are usually disparate (with the exception of families who come together, residents and visitors

alike tend to have no previous social integration with one another) are brought together (Strathern, 1999). The flip side of this is that, in the absence of deep rooted social bonds, the relation needs to be symbolically mediated. In this sense, identity is an exchange and affiliations circulate with prosthetic extension (Munro, 2005). What is circulated is the common assent to shared moral sentiments and this facilitates sociality by providing moral content for the *conscience collective*. In this instance, we see something similar to Durkheim's notion of mechanical solidarity. Such a contention may seem to displace the above claims regarding organic solidarity. However, once again it must be noted that this is not so because BWC is a complex and heterogeneous space.

The Market: As Bazaar and the Carnivalesque.

Building on the above analysis, consumption and extension can be seen to take on even greater significance in relation to WOMAD. Where BWC is a permanent settlement, WOMAD is a three day festival and as such the role that consumption, extension and the market need to play in doing the work of identity and identification becomes even more pivotal. To this end, WOMAD is as much a festival of consumption as it is a celebration of world and roots music. I have already mentioned the multitude of meanings attached to WOMAD, one of which is 'coming for the shopping'. My experience of WOMAD suggests that this 'coming for the shopping' is the defining meaning for festival goers and that consumption is the defining feature of WOMAD.

Very few people come to WOMAD knowing anything about the music or performers. Most people would say things along the lines of: 'it's nice to hear different stuff but no, I didn't know any of the bands before I came...we just come every year 'cause it's a good day out'. Contrasting this with more familiar music festivals such as Reading festival (incidentally, this is held on the same site) and Glastonbury where the music and performers are as much a part of the experience as anything else; the music here seems to be a vehicle for the festival as a celebration of alterity. The fact that the music is so unfamiliar makes it a very suitable vehicle indeed; aside from evoking a sense of Otherness, it also means that the music does

not distract from more salient aspects of the festival. For instance, many festival goers would say: 'I don't really watch a whole show... there is no point when you don't know the band. I mean, it is nice to dip in and out of but there is so much going on that you don't want to miss it by watching a band'. WOMAD is better thought of as a bazaar than a music festival. Walking around the site, one is struck by the ubiquity of merchants selling an eclectic array of food, drink and commodities that are not encountered in the everyday. WOMAD is characterised by this, its 'global village' (as the festival's organisers call it) where international (and traditional) food, drinks, arts, crafts and merchandise are on sale. It is worth noting that international and traditional produce are a corollary of the aesthetic that defines the festival – international (world) and traditional (roots) music which in turn reflects alterity's identification with spatial and temporal Others. Littered throughout this global village are the stages on which the musicians perform. Rather than being contained venues where festival goers stay and watch the whole performance, the stages are open such that persons can 'dip in and out' of performances as the music being performed is pumped out as the background music, the soundtrack, to the bazaar.

The produce on sale serves to evoke the Other and contribute to the festival's air of alterity. One is treated to unfamiliar sites and smells alongside the unfamiliar sounds emanating from the performance areas when walking around the global village. There were Goan Fish stalls, South American food outlets, Middle Eastern snack bars and traditional mulled cider carts. There were 'ethnic' jewellers, candle/lantern/incense sellers, the seedpot hat company and exotic musical instrument sellers (selling unfamiliar musical instruments associated with world and roots music). There were the usual array of 'new age' merchants selling crystals, the types of clothing that would be appropriate at BWC, fairy wings, glow sticks and juggling equipment. It is interesting to note that the majority of clothing on sale was clothing that could be easily added to what persons were already wearing – hats, headbands, scarves and sarongs rather than trousers and jumpers – because people tended to buy these things at the festival rather than ahead of it to 'get in the spirit'. Equally well, the tattooist onsite offered only *temporary* tattoos as opposed to permanent ones. As one respondent told me: 'I thought "what the heck", I might as well get a Henna tattoo...by the time I go back to work it will have nearly faded'.

So WOMAD is clearly about consumption, consumption and immediate disposal. Many of the hats, products and wasteful byproducts of consumption (polystyrene trays from the food) were transformed into litter and discarded after the festival, recalling Bauman's argument (2002) about a society characterised as much by waste as it is by consumption. I say this as somebody who stayed behind to help clear up, however this phenomenon was present at the start of the festival. By the end of the first day, the litter bins were overflowing where, ironically, the recycling bins that were positioned next to each litter bin were all but empty and remained so at the end of the festival. However, I am not willing to succumb to the temptation to view this as immoral consumption and profiteering. The suppliers of the food and produce cannot be thought of as the opportunist profiteers that one might expect to find because they actually sold their produce for fair prices. At festivals, one is used to paying vastly inflated prices for non-descript and substandard food/produce but here this was not the case. I should imagine that the festival organisers regulate prices and quality to some extent because only the unlicensed merchants who were set up outside of the global village (in the car park and campsite) were selling produce for vastly inflated prices (£1.50 for a cup of tea, £3.50 for a bacon sandwich and I personally recall paying £7 for a poor quality rug). It seems therefore that the bazaar is seen as important and that the suppliers are enabling something such that the market is about more than utilitarian exchange alone, but what?

Turning again to the work of Hetherington (1997), it can be seen that historically, the market has been associated with festival and the carnivalesque as well as trade and commerce:

"The market place has in the past been...associated with strangeness and Otherness: it creates a world of the unfamiliar, chance encounters, the exotic, the pleasurable, and with throwing off social constraints..." (Hetherington, 1997: pp.28-29)

This is exactly what the market place, the bazaar, of WOMAD offers and it is, as a matter of tautology, a product of the market (monetary and commodity exchange). The bazaar promises all of this, it brings together an array of produce that cannot normally be found and in consuming it, the work of identity and identification is

done. Looking back to Campbell's (1987) work on the connection between Romanticism and consumerism, it can be seen here that consumption can be used to signify affectual identities and affiliations. Here, it is all the more striking because the temporary nature of the identities and affiliations require immediate symbolic mediation and it is consumption that affords this. On an aggregate level, the co-existence of all this Otherness creates a world of the unfamiliar and festival goers are grateful for this: 'it's just so different... you can't get any of this stuff where I am from; it is nice just to walk around even if you don't buy anything'. More importantly, the consumption of these products constitute a throwing off of everyday constraints like the woman who wears her hat to feel like somebody else or the person who gets a temporary tattoo that she hopes will fade before she returns to work. This world of the unfamiliar and strange that the market facilitates can be thought of in terms of the transgression associated with Bakhtin's notion of the carnivalesque (1984).

In an earlier paper, Hetherington (1992) posits that consumption serves a dual purpose within the festival space. In addition to doing the work of identity and identification; it facilitates distance from the everyday. It is consumption and by proxy, the market within these ambivalent spaces (which he later terms heterotopia) that makes transgression possible. Indeed, Stallybrass and White (1986) have illustrated the role of the market in making possible (and acceptable) practices that would otherwise be considered unusual. At WOMAD the market, the bazaar, is both an enactment of *and* a vehicle for the carnivalesque. Just as it represents an inversion of the everyday and offers an experience of the Other and unfamiliar; it facilitates an inversion of 'mainstream' morality. Recalling that the 'mainstream' is (for now) characterised by demoralisation, its transgression brings about a celebration of the 'moral'. Within the ambivalent space that the festival creates, the work of morality can be done. At WOMAD there is a huge presence in terms of 'left of centre' pressure groups and charities ranging from the Vegan society, through amnesty international to campaigners for pure water in Africa. Working on the stand of one such pressure group and speaking with those working on others, I learnt that festivals such as WOMAD are fruitful sites to represent such causes: 'People are very receptive at festivals like this...I doubt very much that they would give us a second look if we had a stall on the high street but here, they are'. Festival

goers reflect this idea: 'I suppose it makes you more aware, when you are amongst it, in this atmosphere, you just think 'when in Rome' and listen to what they have to say, maybe even make a donation'. Equally well, a lot of the trading is done against the backdrop of an explicit moral agenda. For instance, the Madras Café offers traditional Indian food with all profits going to the Indian earthquake appeal.

Of course, the carnivalesque being the carnivalesque derives its potency from being temporary and this view is certainly held by persons that I spoke with at WOMAD. Many of the pressure groups took the view that it is unlikely that their message will resonate with many once the festival is over but state that it is still useful to come here in terms of (a) raising money and (b) raising awareness even if only a few people take the message on board. It is very easy to criticise the accomplishments of the carnivalesque on these grounds. Indeed Bauman (1998) has suggested that carnivalesque outpourings of morality serve only to distract and deflect from the need for ongoing responsibility. In a cultural landscape dominated by Bob Geldof and Live-8 fever I am tempted to agree, however the data intimates a different attitude. A gentlemen working on one stand stated: 'so what if they don't take anything away with them...surely it is better that they do something be it giving money once a year or going veggie for one weekend...surely this is better than nothing'. The above analysis applies equally well to the RFM where, like WOMAD, a feeling of the unusual is created. Here, the market can be seen to organise nearness and remoteness into unity in order to do so. There is a commitment to the immediate and local ('you gotta eat Welsh food') sitting alongside a sense of the exotic in terms of (among other things) olive stalls evoking a sense of the Mediterranean and a van selling 'authentic Indian food'. Both the commitment to the local and the sense of the exotic are Other to the 'mainstream' and together they create a sense of the unfamiliar which in itself is an enactment of alterity. Moreover, as with WOMAD, this acts as a *vehicle* for alterity and morality as evidenced by the pressure groups and charities present at RFM.

The Nature of Transgression

The fieldwork sites have been seen to provide a *complex* moral alternative in their attempts to transgress the market. They *do* provide scope for alternative moralities but this claim is supplemented (in the Derridean sense) by the idea that the work of morality relies on the very thing that it seeks to subvert, the market. Here we have a parallel to the linguistic philosophers' idea that the only way to escape or get outside of language is through the medium of language itself or else reinforce the boundaries of language. In this case, it is a very practical manifestation: refuge from the market is only possible through use of the market itself. On a deeper level, one is reminded of Foucault's idea (1977) that an act of transgression (in this case, providing a moral alternative to the market) relies on the limit (in this case, the market). Moreover, Foucault's contribution is that the relation between transgression and limit 'takes the form of a spiral which no simple infraction can exhaust' (1977: p.35). This is seen here in the multiple movements between transgression and limit, the way that the occasioning of moralities relies on various types of market practice.

This being so, none of the fieldwork sites can be characterised as a coherent or sustained alternative to market hegemony. If they *could* subvert the market, they would in all probability, implode. Thinking with Foucault's spiral analogy, it seems as though these sites are characterised by intermittent moments of 'doing' the moral alternative in which the market's presence is never far away. Indeed, alterity derives its potency from the fact that it is temporary rather than a coherent or sustained alternative. Faced with a system of market hegemony, the fieldwork sites appear to work *with* and *enrol* (Latour, 1987) this system (instead of trying to subvert it) in order to facilitate their moral alternatives. As hinted at earlier, this is loosely analogous to Giddens' ideas regarding *reflexive modernisation* and *life politics* (1991) in so far as modernity's structures are not destroyed; they are taken control of and re-shaped by groups that are in some way empowered. In this case, the structure of modernity in question is the market. That said, the above insights regarding transgression can link back to the previous chapter wherein attempts to

transgress modernity were seen to rely on modernity such that heterotopias can be viewed as attempts to organise modernity along different lines.

Interestingly, the data supports this theoretical conjecture as none of the sites actually constructs itself as a coherent, sustained alternative. In conversation with Maria (at BWC) she tells how hard it is to do what BWC wants to in the world we live and she states that 'it is hard to be perfect, it is hard to know what is best, but we have to work with what we have and *try*...ultimately we are doing something and that is better than not trying and not doing anything'. This exactly what I discussed above in respect of temporary outpourings of morality at WOMAD and is the crux of what alterity accomplishes: doing something is better than doing nothing, even if what they set out to do is unattainable (recall: heterotopias are spaces of endless deferral). So a novel connection has been noted at the market/morality interface in arguing that the market can be put in the service of the moral. In turn, this has implications for understandings of 'the market'.

The Market

Bearing Foucault's spiral analogy in mind, a further step can be made: in addition to noting the role of the limit for facilitating the transgression (the market facilitating morality), it can be seen that the movement is two way. This has implications for the definition of the limit (in this case, the market). Again, a similar argument can be made in respect of the previous chapter in as much as my analysis of modernity's transgression has implications for how we understand 'modernity' in addition to how we understand 'the margin'. In this case, the black box that economists and sociologists put around 'the market' is being problematised. Of course, there is a potentially unlimited number of ways in which one could do this. As such, the following discussion is just a 'move' that makes no pretence of being exhaustive.

The market tends to be understood as a system of commercial activity that allows people to exchange money for goods and services. Underlying this is the idea (see for example, Guisenere, 1996) that the market is a co-ordination device wherein the divergent interests and resources of rational actors are mediated symbolically

through a monetary price via the economists' sacred cow, the laws of supply and demand. Economists tend to abstract the market from its moral context and constitute it as amoral, conceiving of it as a mechanism that offers a means to an end whilst holding no connection or responsibility for these ends. The (im)moral consequences are seen as beyond the remit of the market; indeed, a Paretian economists' line would view this as someone else's (the 'decision makers') problem. By contrast, sociologists are keen to return the market to its moral context. In doing so, it is *de rigueur*, to maintain that this context is wholly immoral.

With reference to my data, it would be easy to work with the sociologists' black boxing and view the market creeping into social, cultural and moral affairs as immoral, even deplorable. True enough, the analysis does bring the market back to its moral context; however it does so with rather more optimism than such black boxing would permit. Through focussing on market practices: monetary, commodity, labour and gift exchange, I have shown how they are turned to moral ends at the field work sites in question. To summarise:

- At BWC and Findhorn, money is exchanged for the provision of retreats and courses which has moral consequences for the visitors. In turn, the money earned in this exchange allows the resident communities to participate in the market to meet food, utility and commodity needs. This is a moral consequence as it ensures longevity and allows residents to sustain a way of life that has been constituted as a 'moral alternative'.

- At SM money is exchanged for the provision of retreat which has moral consequences for visitors. This money enables the trust to meet the basic requirements for longevity and continue provision. Beyond the standard fee, money assumes the status of gift exchange with its own set of moral consequences for the givers, receivers and those who gain access to SM's provision as a result.

- The market circulates and supplies produce that is constituted as ethical in response to a demand. In turn, through consumption of this produce, the work of morality is done.

- Systems of labour exchange can facilitate, even necessitate, moral and affectual outcomes.
- The market provides objects for use in processes of extension which enables moral identity work and sociality (via moral content for the *conscience collective*).
- The market can work as both an enactment of and a vehicle for the carnivalesque which offers the provision of morality in its inversion of 'mainstream' demoralisation.

The implication of this is that the market, far from being immoral or amoral, actually has a moral context and a moral capacity. To make this move one needs to abstract affects about the (im)morality of the mechanism and focus on the *effects*. In a sense, one needs to objectify the market- divorce it from any moral or subjective considerations- in order to focus on its moral consequences. Indeed, this is what the residents of BWC do (the SM trust do not even make a distinction because the exchange of money is constituted as a moral act in itself). A theme common in many residents' narratives is that they are uneasy about having to participate in a monetary system (market) but justify in terms of what this achieves (morality). This appears to be getting rather close to the economists' definition of the market. However in this move, the market is objectified in a way that does not allow the moral context to be fully disposed (Munro, 2001 [1992]) of. The moral context is suspended - not fully absent, not fully present- always held in mind in the process of objectification. The move is, like the residents of BWC, to objectify the market to the extent that the potential for a moral outcome is always held in mind.

With this, I should posit that the market is not being taken as a synonym for capitalism. Processes of monetary, gift, commodity and labour need not (re)produce any relations of exploitation. In essence, the market can be seen as colourless. Of course, when it is premised on and manipulated by the values of economic rationality without any moral constraint or balance then it can and does go wrong. The argument here is to suggest that moral sentiments can always be held in mind to facilitate consequences that are constituted as moral. This idea, that the market is

not an antagonist of non-pecuniary values, is nothing new. Cooley notes, in 1913, that:

"[p]ecuniary values are part of the same general function as the moral and aesthetic values and it is their function to put the latter upon the market" (Cooley, 1913:p. 202)

Similarly, as has already been seen, anthropologists have long noted the role that practices of exchange play in non-pecuniary processes. For example, Douglas has shown the importance of exchange in matters of culture whilst Strathern shows its importance in respect of persons and relations. The relationship between the pecuniary and the non-pecuniary is not alien to sociology. In 'The Common Culture', Willis (1990) defends the role of the market creeping in matters of culture and creativity through abstracting production in a commercial nexus from the positive consequences of consumption. He argues that the market creates and circulates appetites (creative and cultural) in the process of circulating commodities; my argument is that the market can create and circulate *moralities* just as it circulates money, labour, gifts and commodities.

The Market: Relations and the Fold.

The market has been presented as *processes* of labour, gift, monetary and commodity exchange. This implies that the market, like the social, is not something that can be reified and I would go a step further to suggest that we think of these processes in terms of *relations of exchange* (Strathern, 1991 1995 1996) that are ordered and elicited from moment to moment. Since I cannot conceive of the market as a 'thing' that is in anyway fixed or stable; it follows that it is problematic to label it 'moral', 'immoral' or 'amoral'. My argument is that the market elicits different orderings of relations and each of these can circulate meanings that are constituted as moral, immoral or even amoral. I am not trying to argue that the market is inherently moral, nor am I disputing that the market can have wholly immoral and undesirable outcomes; I am merely flagging up the possibility that the market *can* (as my data suggests) have moral consequences. This argument intimates that I cannot follow Bauman (1998) and think of the market as something that *makes* persons immoral, nor for that matter can I think of it as something that

makes persons moral. Indeed, it is well established within economic sociology that the market is embedded (Polanyi, 1944) in social (Granovetter, 1985) and moral (Etzioni, 1988) processes such that it *cannot* be thought of as a realm of objective purity that imposes on and dictates our social and moral considerations (Bourdieu, 2000 [2003] Lebaron, 2000). On this note, I also take issue with Bauman's idea (1989 1994) that society and bureaucracy, like the market, adiaphorises some innate moral capacity. Chapter five detailed how the 'margins' rely on processes of social ordering and bureaucracy and in light of this chapter, it can be seen that the occasioning of *morality* relies on these processes. More accurately, this suggests that social ordering and bureaucracy *can* facilitate rather than stultify morality but this is something that will be dealt with in chapters seven, eight and nine.

In chapter five, the margins were seen to be constituted by and constitutive of the mainstream 'modernity' that they seek to subvert. Here, it is argued that attempts to occasion moral alternatives to the market are constituted by and constitutive of it. Again, it is the fold that accounts for this: practices/relations of exchange are folded (embedded) into moral considerations and outcomes such that the market and morality can be seen to co-exist. Of course, the market co-exists with multiple moralities and the movement between these co-existing moralities and the market can be thought of in terms of motility (Munro, 2001 [1992]). It should be clear that it is not satisfactory to think in terms of liminality because this would not allow for the interconnections between the market and potentially limitless 'moral outcomes' (some of which are constituted as moral, some of which are constituted as immoral). On a more general level, liminality would not allow for the co-existence of the market and morality with other co-existences (such as the 'margin' and the 'mainstream'). It is hoped that this analysis brings 'the market' and 'morality' to the fold and buttresses chapter five's contention that the fold is a useful way to consider the complexity and interconnectedness that characterises alterity.

7

EMBODYING ALTERITY:

INCORPORATION INTO THE FOLD.

As noted in chapter one, it was never my intention to write a chapter on embodiment however the data made it necessary to do so. Even allowing for this, it is perhaps not surprising that the body should come to matter (no pun intended) in this study. For instance, it is well established within the sociology of the body (see for example Shilling, 1993) that different forms of social organisation and civilisation are reflected in different forms of conduct. In turn, these differing forms of conduct are manifest in different ways of 'doing' and relating to our bodies. Having established that alterity is a matter of ordering relations along different lines; it follows that alterity produces different forms of social ordering and different 'rules' of conduct (thinking back to chapters five and six, we have seen the importance of 'marginal' and 'moral' conduct). In turn, this suggests that alterity is characterised by different forms of embodiment. This chapter is given to exploring these different ways in which the body features in my ethnography of alterity. Having shown that alterity is a complex and heterogeneous space; it is perhaps not surprising that the body comes to matter in many *different* ways. In line with the demoralisation literature *and* the sociology of the body, there are two key ways in which the body features. Firstly, the body is presented as a site of reflexive development in which persons work on their bodies to develop their identities and a sense of a moral self. Secondly, the body is presented as a site of social and affectual re-vitalisation in contrast to the forms of organisation and embodiment that characterise the predicament of demoralisation. This of course hints at the co-existence of individuality/identity and sociality/community and in that respect this chapter is a precursor to the subject matter of chapter eight.

There is a third way in which the body occupies my analysis and it is here that I depart from the prevailing theory in the sociology of the body literature. The analysis in chapters five and six has suggested that alterity is characterised by

multiple, interconnected and incongruous phenomena *folded* together with the movement between them being one of motility. My argument here is that these movements rely on the possibility of embodiment. This chapter illustrates that the phenomena that constitute the fold are essentially *meanings* and that if these meanings are to made visible (present) then they need to be *incorporated*.

The Body as a Project.

It is well established within the sociology of the body that the body, under conditions that we might term reflexive modernisation, is an entity to be worked upon (Shilling, 1993 Turner, 1996 Synott, 1993). The process of working on one's body is conceived of as one of becoming and accomplishment. Through conceiving of the body as an object for display, it is seen as a medium through which we can present ourselves and self-identity. Of course, Goffman's writings (for example, 1959) are central to this idea yet, ironically, he is never explicit about the body. Somewhat predictably, a discussion of bodies in this sense invariably leads to a discussion of consumer culture (Featherstone, 1982) however few studies address the relationship between ethical bodies, consumption and identity (Smart, 1996). My analysis in chapter six began to address the relationship between consumption, identity and morality however it did not address the issue of ethical *bodies*; this chapter is intended to bring the body back in (Frank, 1980).

One of the interesting contributions made by the sociology of the body is the recognition that this identity work requires the body's interior as well as its exterior to be tended to and invested in (Shilling, 1993). My data reveals the importance of this non-aesthetic management of the body in the form of regulating what is eaten. On the one level, food has already been analysed as a key resource for doing alterity at the aesthetic (and ethical) level but the significance of food goes a little deeper than this. Residents at BWC and patrons of RFM took great care to account for the food they consumed in relation to the discourses of health. For example, at RFM one patron told me: 'it is nice to know what you are getting, or at least have some idea what you are getting...when you buy stuff from the supermarket you just don't know what crap they are putting in it.' Another patron told me, during a discussion

about the afore-mentioned meat problematic that: 'At least when you buy meat here it isn't pumped full of water and chemicals...you know, like it is at TESCO, when you cook it you are not faced with a watery goo...so in addition to easing my conscience, I just know that it is better for me'. At BWC, their commitment to vegetarian and wholefood is often framed in relation to health and well being: 'Eating this stuff just makes me feel better...I have more energy, my emotions are more stable and i'm even losing weight!' In the kitchen, there are countless wall charts detailing what vitamins and minerals are needed and for what purpose, offering illustrations of the fruits, vegetables and other sources from which these may be found. Working in the kitchen, I learn that whoever is cooking takes these charts very seriously and takes great care to include the necessary nutrition in every meal, including the balancing of deficits from previous meals ('we had chips last night so we better have lots of veg today') and catering for any particular ailments within the group ('Saskia is tired all the time so we better cook some spinach so that she gets enough iron'). Of particular note is that residents with children took great care to ensure their children get all the nutrition they need 'in order to look after their little bodies'. Again, the chart on the wall gave a very visual illustration of this phenomenon and at one point a resident pointed proudly to it at stated: 'anyone who thinks vegetarians are malnourished should take a look at this.'

It is also important to consider what is *not* consumed. Thinking back to the analysis of consumption and extension at BWC (in chapter six), what is not consumed or attached to the body is illuminating: designer brands are done away with, as are shoes, as are cosmetic and beauty products, in some cases so is soap. In essence, the ostensible absence of doing any sort of body work (like combing hair or washing oneself) is as important a body project as any. At SM, one is to refuse what is not freely given so the body project occasioned at SM could, in theory, require one to remain hungry which is clearly an embodied practice. At SM, one is not allowed to wear scent or even use scented toiletries on the grounds that it may distract from meditations, no jewellery or conspicuous clothing is allowed, nor is footwear. Just as food is important to interior work of a body project; the non-consumption of certain foodstuffs is important. At BWC, any food that is not vegetarian/local/organic/fair trade is refused just as RFM is characterised by the absence of supermarkets or fast food. However, in the case of BWC, this refusal

has been shown not to hold. Chapter five illustrated that the residents of BWC *do* consume food that is *not* vegetarian/local/organic/fair trade. This difficulty or refusal recalls the impossibility of disposal on which motility is premised. Of course, motility rests on the impossibility of refusing *meanings* whereas I appear here to talking about the refusal of objects. However my argument is that when the residents of BWC refuse meat (for example), they are not refusing the object; they are refusing the *meaning* that the object carries. To see this, one need only recall that the residents will consume the same object when it carries a different meaning (remember the residents sneaking into their rooms to eat a pork pie or Maria and her boyfriend going out for a steak).

So for me, it is not the consumption or disposal of the object that matters; it is the consumption or disposal of the meaning. My argument here is that meanings come to *matter*, quite literally, through practices of embodiment. It is not the objects that are consumed or refused by persons in process of internal and external 'body' work; it is the meaning attached to these objects and the meanings that they circulate. To see how meanings are created and negotiated via objects and through embodiment; a re-reading of Hebdige's [following Levi-Straus's (1966)] notion of bricolage (1979) is required. This concept shows that meanings shift depending on how (or through whom) they are embodied. The consumption of objects relies, in keeping with BWC's identification with the Other, on a degree of *borrowing*. For the *bricoloeur,* objects are of importance because, together with meaning, they constitute a sign (Clarke, 1976). The bricoloeur, in *borrowing* an object from one culture and placing it alongside other objects in a new setting, bestows new meanings. So, when a woman at BWC attaches an African headscarf to her body, it is most likely carrying a different meaning to the one carried in its original context. A different embodiment brings about a different meaning so it can be seen that meaning relies on embodiment. Objects and attachment alone are not enough because the circulation of meaning depends on how it is embodied. Having established the importance of *meanings* rather than objects alone; it is necessary to discuss how the body is site for the reification of meanings that are not mediated through objects. More specifically, it is necessary to see how projects of the body can draw on meanings that are mediated through practice.

Asceticism

Asceticism is one such bodily practice that assumes importance when ordering the social along the lines of alterity. My analysis has shown asceticism is an important practice/set of practices relating to alterity and Turner (1996), following Weber (2002) has highlighted that asceticism is a *bodily* practice. In line with Buddhist precepts, asceticism is absolutely central to the work of alterity at SM: denial of material goods, denial of that which is not freely given, denial of excess, denial of carnal indulgence. The same can be said, on a less severe level, to BWC in respect of their denial of conspicuous consumption and modern technology *etcetera*. This is why I argued earlier that what is *not* consumed is every bit as important as what is consumed and this focus on objects is merely part of/indicative of wider *practices* of self denial and asceticism. For example, self denial at SM involves the denial of sleep in so far as attending all the meditations that one is supposed to would leave one with a maximum of five hours sleep. It involves the denial of comfort in as much as rooms are minimal and sparse with poor heating, shared showers and an absence of hot water. It involves hunger and the denial of gluttonous indulgence in as much as the food is basic and only available when offered, not when one feels like it. It involves, quite explicitly, the denial of sexual gratification. These forms of self denial are clearly bodily and this denial of bodily pleasures alongside the content in the meditations supports the importance of asceticism. In meditations, we are encouraged to practice our daily lives in a way that resists carnal and corporeal gratification. For instance, in one meditation we are told: 'if you feel hungry, or cold, or uncomfortable the best thing you can do is meditate so that you transcend your body and work on your mind'.

Bodily self denial is practiced at BWC although, again, it is not done so on such a large scale. I am told by one resident that visitors and residents alike *should* practice minimalism and indulge only needs, not wants in terms of food, shelter and comfort. Again, the focus on objects forms part of asceticism as a wider practice of self denial. She goes on to tell me that: 'as a centre that practices and teaches ecology, this is absolutely essential'. Unlike SM, the self denial at BWC is linked to ecological purposes and not 'spiritual ones'. For example unlike SM, BWC is not

concerned with the regulation of sexual conduct (as will be seen, far from it!). So at BWC, an environmental ethos is routed through the regulation of bodily practice whereas at SM there is also a spiritual dimension.

Carnivalesque

At the opposite end of the spectrum to asceticism, we find the carnivalesque. Chapter six demonstrated the importance of a sense of the carnivalesque; this chapter argues that it is routed, via its meanings and practices, through the body. It was seen that the carnivalesque can be made visible through the attachment of objects to bodies (you will recall the woman who felt like somebody else when she wore a hat at WOMAD). However, as with asceticism, the focus on objects is just part of a wider set of practices that rely on embodiment and incorporation.

The carnivalesque is characterised by the inversion of the everyday and this conduct is manifest in bodily practice. At BWC the everyday sense that we should be clean and prudent is inverted. In Mary Douglas' terms (1966[2000]) *dirtiness*, particularly in relation to the body, becomes sacred. At BWC, flushing the toilet is frowned upon and should only be done when it is absolutely necessary. This is for ecological reasons and the fact that they have a reed-bed sewage filtration system that would clog up and break if too much waste were to pass through it. Nevertheless, this bodily dirtiness comes to stand for moral virtue; making cleanliness comes to stand for immorality. I heard one resident criticising another for being too clean: 'She's just too clean, she *always* flushes, I have been in there after her...someone should really speak to her about it'. This is a peculiar inversion of the day-to-day where a failure to flush the toilet would most likely meet with objection. Needless to say, the smell could occasionally become rather bad. On speaking about this with residents, I was told that 'when it smells, we know we're doing it right'. A similar association between dirt and virtue is manifest at SM. Upon being shown around the site we are told that we can, if we desire, use a compost toilet (defecate outside) which was met with smiles and nods of approval by my fellow retreatants. Here, going to the toilet outside and tossing a load of sawdust over the product is associated with virtue whereas, in a 'mainstream'

setting, disgust would most likely be the reaction. On a general level, being dirty is seen as virtuous either on ecological (not wasting resources) or spiritual (transcending the body) grounds such that thick body odour, unkempt (often hairy) appearance and greasy hair represent goodness against the 'mainstream' mantra where cleanliness is next to godliness. This is true to WOMAD and RFM where this dirtiness in bodily appearance marked authenticity in so far as it connotes their presence as part of a wider commitment to alterity rather than just 'dipping into it'.

The fieldwork sites exhibited a familiarity with bodily functions that would generally be the root of a *faux pas* in British culture. It was entirely common place to pass wind without laughter or comment just as talking about defecation was seen as normal - even when eating - on the grounds that 'it is a natural process'. Similarly, Katherine (at BWC) burst into the kitchen to tell Maria about a 'particularly heavy period' whilst I was there. Noting the transgression embedded in this kind of discussion in front of a male stranger she turned to me and said: 'I hope you don't mind, we are just open about this kind of thing'. Indeed, this openness is a salient way in which the carnivalesque relates to the body. At RR there were instances of the carnivalesque in relation to the body of which I will have more to say later but a brief mention is required now. There is a general sense of letting go and the instructor urges us to not be conscious of our bodies. Paradoxically, the body is the medium through which this in done. I remember most vividly the intimate contact with strangers and the cacophonous kinaesthetic that ensued as we were encouraged to let go and 'fly like an eagle'. In terms of inverting the everyday, this tactile contact extended to children and dancing with them was allowed, even encouraged. In a world where the child's body is a site to be regulated and protected, the dancing and hugging of children that are unknown to you is certainly transgressive.

However, the thing that sticks out in my mind from BWC is the importance of the sexual body (Frank, 1990). There was a general level of familiarity and openness about sexuality at BWC. For instance, many of the residents were couples and it was commonplace for them to discuss sexual matters both in informal conversations and formal rituals. However, it is the dances of universal peace session where this was most strongly manifest and the carnivalesque was most clearly routed through

the body. This dancing ritual was one that made me slightly uncomfortable. I am not a tactile person, less still when it comes to strangers. During one of the dances, we were required to embrace our partners, look them in the eye and touch the centre of their chest whilst singing about the giving of love to one another. For this particular dance, we were required to move around the circle such that we go through this with everybody taking part in the dance. By virtue of my own perspectives on the body, I found this dance a little problematic, particularly when dancing with women. From my perspective, it is inappropriate to place my hand on a stranger's breasts (which is what inevitably happens when placing hands upon a woman's chest). Also, I was fully aware that a woman may find it inappropriate for a stranger to do so. To manage this tension, when it came to dancing with women I placed my hand on their shoulder so that there could be no suggestion that I was trying to violate their bodies. In the majority of cases, this seemed like a reasonable compromise. Towards the end of the dance however, I found myself coupled with a rather beautiful Argentinean woman. Having placed my hand on her shoulder when it should have been on her chest, she grabbed my arm and repeatedly placed it on her chest whilst smiling at me. I of course found this a little uncomfortable, not least because her partner kept looking at us. Speaking with everyone after the class, her husband approached me. I thought he might be looking to confront me but instead he informed me that Estrella (his partner) had taken a liking to me and offered me the opportunity to go home with them to be with her. I of course declined but it revealed to me an attitude to the body in respect of sexuality that represents a sense of the carnivalesque.

Processing Bodies

The retreats that SM runs can be viewed as a processing apparatus through which persons are enrolled into an ethical agenda. SM is quite explicit about its purpose in terms of providing *training* (as opposed to practice) in these ethics. This is evident in the printed ethical guidelines that are posted on the notice boards because they are phrased in terms of 'undertaking *training* to...' The ethical agenda (as detailed in chapter six) is the aforementioned set of precepts that were printed and placed on the notice board and my experience of being there reveals a particular commitment

to 'being mindful towards others' (which is perhaps not a million miles away from 'being for the Other'). This training relies on the processing of persons. What is interesting are the many levels on which this happens and the extent to which it relies on the processing of the body. The processing of *bodies* becomes salient when the retreat begins *properly*. This 'proper beginning' of the retreat is marked by the necessity of adhering to the principle of silence. Before the enforcement of silence however, there is a period where retreatants are betwixt and between (Turner, 1967).

Betwixt and Between

There is a period during the retreat at SM where you are not yet on the retreat 'properly' but you are not properly away from the retreat. This period, which might legitimately be termed liminal (Van Gennep, 1902 [1960]), is inherently ambivalent and uncertain, not least because the issue of silence has not yet been established. The retreat proper has not yet begun so silence has not been enforced but seeing as anyone coming on a retreat knows that the centre is silent, there is a lot of confusion as to whether or not one can speak. This leads to a lot approaching people and looking blankly, waiting to be told you can talk or exchanging whispered asides to fellow retreatants. Within this period, retreatants – neophytes - are processed and a lot of work is done to pave the way for the processing of bodies. Keeping this period ambivalent allows for residents to start practicing silence and get used to the idea that speech is not acceptable, whilst allowing the managers and teachers to do their work of organisation (see chapter five). The ambivalence in this liminal period, in fitting with Turner's analysis (1967), not only allows for the communication of behavioural expectations (for when one is properly on the retreat); it also creates a vulnerability that establishes a power relation. Here, it is established that the teachers and managers are in control and retreatants are to do what they are asked.

Upon arrival, with the knowledge that SM is a silent retreat, I was conscious not to speak but did not know where to go (thankfully, my taxi driver pointed me in the right direction). Going through the door I followed the signs that had been put up for new arrivals and obeyed a large notice that told me to 'dump my bag' in the

cloakroom. The signs took me into the kitchen (which is not usually open) where there were a lot of people – residents and managers – trying to negotiate their way through this uncertain situation. Being mindful not to speak, I just waited for a manager to address me. There were three managers processing people. Each manager had a checklist, with bullet points, of what is needed to be done with each resident. When a manager sat me down she followed her list and took my details (name, age *etcetera*), my 'interview sheet' (filled in advance, in preparation for a 'one-to-one' with the teacher), checked the retreat that I am on (there are several happening at once), allocated me a job, allocated me a teacher and allocated me a room. Interestingly, the *first* item on her list was to check that my payment was received and I was congratulated for paying in full, establishing symbolically the importance of money that I addressed in chapter six. As she moved down her bullet pointed list, she transferred each point onto a piece of paper, point by point, for *me* to keep and told me that it is for my reference so that I do not have to ask again. In Strathern's terms (2000), this is bullet proofing. At this point I asked about the silence and her response was one of deferral - the essence of ambivalence - in as much as she told me only that it will all become clear.

Having been shown to my room (where my roommate also had a bullet proofed checklist) it was only, according to my list, ten minutes to the show around wherein the grounds manager showed us around and introduced us to how the centre runs – how the bells act as a timetable, how communication is done through notes, that mail is kept to the end of the retreat *etcetera*. Between retreatants on the show around there was an air of uncertainty and the silence was addressed with little looks of confusion and whispers such as: 'so...are we allowed to speak?' One retreatant asked this manager about the silence issue and like the manager that I had asked, he did the work of deferral and said it will all become clear in the manager's and teacher's talks. These manager's and teacher's talks were marked on my timetable/ checklist and it did indeed become clear. In these talks we were given other bits of information that enable silence and the processing of bodies to take place. For example, the manager told us about meal times and how we take meals: 'You line up, help yourself, clear up your own plate and skip the queue if you are allocated the job of washing up... if you see anybody skipping the queue or pushing in, they are doing so for this reason so do not lose your patience'. Getting this out of the way

allows for it to happen silently, without contest. The teachers' talk told us that speaking is only allowed by her and that she will speak less and less as the retreat goes on. She did a good deal of introduction to the meditation so that it is out of the way, meaning that she does not need to repeat it throughout the retreat. Interestingly, when the manager gave a talk, she had a list (with bullet points) as an aide memoir whereas the teacher did not (supporting chapter five's contention that managers deal with bureaucracy and organisation whereas teachers do not).

Throughout the show around, the manager's talk and the teacher's talk there was a lot of talk about 'finishing off business'. For instance, on the show around we were told that we can use the telephone box (disguised as a hut) to take care of any last minute business. So, in this period we were able to detach ourselves from outside just as we looked forward to attaching ourselves to the retreat. By the time we reached the end of the teacher's talk, we were told that the retreat had begun and silence must now be respected. It is interesting to note that the site changed physically in conjunction with the end of this period. For example, the kitchen was closed and the signs that guided new arrivals were taken down. On the show around, one of my fellow retreatants knocked a sign over and was told 'its ok, they are coming down when the retreat starts anyway'.

Docile Bodies: running the retreat

There are two ways in which the body is processed at SM. The first way relates to the ways in which the body is kept docile to ensure the smooth running of the centre and retreat in the absence of speech. After the teacher has committed the retreat to silence, persons are denied the subjectivity and interaction that speech provides and with this, the body assumes importance. The running of the centre depends largely on the docility of bodies and as such our checklists, notice boards, timetables and ringing bells cause a mass of silent bodies to move where they are meant to, when they are meant to. It is really something to behold, the movement between spaces at SM is *en-masse*, in silence and triggered by the sound of a bell in conjunction with the knowledge (put in place during the betwixt and between stage) provided by the timetables, checklists and notices. For example, we were told how to take our meals

in the opening talks and so, on the retreat, when the bell rings, bodies line up at the table to get their food. It is like a conveyor belt and it is reminiscent of a prison scene in a film. It is all the more marvellous to behold when we remember that persons on different retreats are moving at different speeds so within the mass of bodies, difference is marked by a different speed of moving.

Likewise, we were allocated a job on arrival told how to do it during the betwixt and between stage. Consequently, on the retreat, when it comes to doing the job, persons are like objects: performing repetitive tasks efficiently without any need for communication. In case one forgets what they are meant to be doing, there are checklists –in bullet points, detailing how to do each task be it housekeeping, vegetable chopping or gardening. Indeed, in the absence of speech, it is through checklists and repetition that things get done. Communication at SM tends to be written and mediated through use of the notice board. Here, there is a power effect in so much as retreatants are not allowed to communicate with each other, only managers and teachers. Managers and teachers can leave notices for whoever they like. Should retreatants try to communicate with each other, in the absence of speech, it is through recourse to bodily practice. For example, recognising someone that you spoke with during the betwixt and between period is marked by the obligatory smile and nod. Similarly, asking somebody where they got their blanket from involves a point and a shrug by way of question, directional pointing by way of response and a smile and 'thumbs up' by way of thanks.

In terms of ensuring docility and keeping the day to day running of the centre in order, bodies were moved through recourse to the centre's ethical agenda. Notices told you to 'shut doors behind you and 'turn of lights when you leave a room' all 'in the interests of running the centre efficiently' (they are not explicit as to whether this is financial or ecological efficiency) just as a notice tells us by way of reminder (as we were told this during the manager's talk) not to take long showers as there are 90+ retreatants and few showers. Again, this is in the interests of efficiency and 'being mindful towards others'. In case the notices are not enough to ensure complicity, *bodies* are targeted as a means of enrolling persons to these agendas of being mindful and efficient. Looking to Latour (1991), it can be argued that the non-human – materials – and their inter relationships with the attempts of the human

need to be accounted for. Having been told *not* to bring towels because they are provided; it turns out that they do not actually provide them. More accurately, they do provide towels but they are communal and shared and not large enough to dry oneself with. Faced with this and the fact that the room is so cold that one would want to dry oneself quickly, it becomes preferable to just have a quick wash rather than a lengthy shower and this is before one considers the fact that there is little hot water and low water pressure. The point is that through materials and their impacts upon the body, persons can be enrolled to the agendas of being mindful and efficiency. An alignment of interests is accomplished through the impact of materials upon the body.

This point is better illustrated through reference to BWC where ecology *is* an ethical agenda and to this end notices were put up that asked people to limit their water usage. However, such measures are not enough and so, thinking with some of Latour's ideas (1991), I noticed how materials and technology were used to enrol and align people such that they did not use too much water. For example, trying to use the basin in my room to wash my hair, I noticed that it was designed in such as way that (a) it could not hold too much water and (b) if one tried to run water for any length of time, or with any pressure, one would get soaked. As such, one is soon aligned with the agenda of not using too much water. What is interesting is that BWC tries to move and align persons through reference to the discourses of alterity but to *actually* move persons, they must exercise materials on *bodies*. The same can be said of work at SM. As if the notices reminding one how to do one's job are not enough; the organisation of materials is geared towards processing bodies efficiently and ensuring docility. For example, when allocated the job of washing up: there are four different sinks that relate to each part of the task (rinsing, soapy water, second rinsing, and tea tree polish) and a drying area. They are organised sequentially so that an object such as a dirty plate will enter this production line and move through each sink with each person acting as an objectified body doing the task that the lay out of the materials dictates. This process is aided by the materials attached to each sink (rinsing agent, sponge, tea tree, tea towel) and the fact that there is room for only one person at each sink so it is not going to be easy for two people to try and do the same job at the same sink.

Docile bodies: the process(ing) of retreat(ants)

The second way that bodies are processed is in terms of the training provided in order to enrol retreatants to the ethical guidelines that are to help them in their day to day lives. To do so, bodies need to be worked on during the retreat. The sociology of the body has long recognised that the body is a site of restrain in so far as it is an entity that can be *disciplined* (Foucault, 1982 Frank, 1990 Turner, 1996). The ability to discipline the body successfully relies on the Cartesian mind/body split. If the mind – with all its connotations of subjectivity and caprice – can be distanced from the body then the body can be rendered a site of objective purity. An object – in the most literal sense – that can be engaged with and understood rationally. One need only look to Foucault's analysis of biomedicine to see this (Foucault, 1976). If something can be understood rationally then it becomes possible to accomplish rational authority in as much as the object can be worked on, controlled and disciplined. This distancing of mind from the body is exactly what goes on at SM. Although treating persons as bodies - as objects - has certain pragmatic benefits in terms of running the retreat (for instance, the conveyor belt of docile bodies lining up to serve themselves food); this is *not* about any sort of sinister control. The process of retreat requires the processing of retreatants through reducing them to bodies. The first step towards training/enrolling retreatants into the centre's ethical agenda - which is intended to change how one relates to oneself and Others - involves training in how to relate to one's body.

In the first meditation this is apparent through the teacher's account of why we should be silent. She tells us that silence is important as it strips us of 'our badges' in as much 'you don't know the backgrounds of those who are on a retreat with you...all you know is that you are all human and you are on this journey together'. With that, we are immediately objectified in the act of being homogenised. Without speech, without 'our badges' we are just a mass of bodies. The teacher is quick to make sure that our bodies cannot be used as badges when she tells us that 'your meditation position should not be about posing, showing that you can make your body bend more than anyone else...just make sure you are comfortable'. On this note, she dispels any preconceptions we might have about meditation in relation to

our bodies: 'you are not going to levitate, you are not going to get fit...this is not yoga...what you *are* going to learn is how to relate differently to yourselves and other human beings'. Nonetheless, meditations are an embodied practice that rest on the use of the body, and what is interesting is the way that the process of retreat relies on the processing of our bodies in order to offer us this different way of relating to ourselves and others.

For the first two days of the retreat, it is the body that the meditations work on. From the first meditation, we are trained to sit (for comfort not performance) with our legs crossed and our shoulders open, keeping a straight back and taking care to not fidget. We are told that the importance of sitting still – aside from being respectful to others and not disrupting their meditations – is that it allows clarity and a focus on the present. I have already discussed the importance of a temporal slowing down but with stillness, there is the possibility of atemporality and 'being in the moment'. This 'being in the moment' is central to the process of retreat and essentially it is an embodied accomplishment. To do it, the meditations encourage us to distance and depersonalise the pain and discomfort of sitting still for an extended period: 'do not think in terms of *my* pain or a pain in *my* back...think of it is as a pain that is external to your body'. Notice how, once again, the body is being objectified as it is not even allowed the subjectivity of pain. From here, the meditations encourage us to focus on *breathing* – a central bodily practice. To begin, we have lengthy meditations where we focus on the mechanics of breathing: 'think about the air going in...focus on it, hold it...now think about the air going out...and again...' Having repeated this until breathing is almost conceptualised as an object that can be focused on, the teacher starts introducing ways of coping with thoughts, feelings, memories and other people. She tells us not to let these thoughts in: 'if you start to think about worries you have at home, with your work or your families or even if you start to think about happy memories...don't allow yourself to think about them, just focus on your breathing...the air coming in, the air going out'. Through breathing, we are trained in a way of refusing physical and mental stimulation in favour of focusing on our bodies: 'even if it is the sound of a bird outside or someone else coughing...don't engage with it, just focus on your breathing'.

The processing of retreatants also relies on another bodily practice, walking. There are sitting meditations in which we sit and focus on our breathing but there are also moving meditations where we focus on walking. Here, we are encouraged to move slowly and contemplate every movement that we make. So, just as we are encouraged to focus on our breathing in the sitting meditation, here we are encouraged to focus on the embodied process of walking. We are told that we should look at the ground, feel the sensation of the ground beneath our feet and only consider the ways in which we are grounded: 'if any other thoughts enter your head, focus on the movement and your connection to the Earth'. As already noted, the teacher has a preference for sitting meditations rather than walking meditations as evidenced by the fact that, when she tells us we do not have to attend *every* meditation; she tells us that we can skip the walking ones because 'the sitting ones are the most important'. It is likely that this is because it is easier to discipline bodies when they are all in one place. Walking meditations allow persons to meditate in various different rooms or at various points within the grounds (though we are asked to alternate the patches of grass that we walk to avoid trampling on and ruining the gardens!). Sitting meditations are held in one room and here the teacher can assume a panoptical position and work on all the bodies simultaneously rather than trying to survey and work on a dispersed set of bodies.

Eventually, we are encouraged to think of *everything* as a meditation. This instruction corresponds to both *everything* at SM and *everything* in our day to day lives. At SM, for example, we are advised to 'view your assigned job as a meditation...if you are on washing up duty, just focus on the washing up: the water against your hands, the motion of scrubbing the plates, the sensation of the foam...don't think about anything else, if you are washing a tea cup, don't think about a tea cup – if you do you are focusing on something outside of the moment and not doing it properly'. This of course is beneficial to the smooth running of the centre (retreatants are complicit in work if they view it as a meditation) however, away from the gaze of the teacher, this enables one to internalise the surveillance of the 'meditation' gaze and discipline one's own body.

As the retreat goes on, the meditations move away from this focus on the body and breathing. The meditations start encouraging us to think about ourselves and

engage with ourselves differently. For instance, we are encouraged to reflect on ourselves during meditations and consider things that we consider good about ourselves and things that we consider bad. The things we consider good we are encouraged to hold on to: 'so as you breathe, keep in the good thoughts you have about yourself.' As for the bad things, we are encouraged to address these in a way that does not allow us to 'get bogged down' nor 'ignore them completely'. We are told to consider them but: 'try to get rid of the bad thoughts by thinking of ways that you can change them...as you breathe, hold on to ways that you can change... to avoid negativity and the weight of problems, let them go as you breathe out'. Notice how this way of thinking about oneself relies on being able to relate to one's body in a certain way; a technique of the body that has been made familiar by earlier meditations. Similarly, as the retreat goes on, the discourse of the social (Latimer, 1997) is played up to. Having instructed us to think of everyone else as the same as us – in so far as we are all bodies – introducing our thoughts then makes it possible to think about other people as the same as us in the sense that we are all human. With this, we are encouraged to be 'creatively aware' and treat others with compassion and respect. This again rests on the way the body is worked on. Just as we are objectified along with everyone else; re-introducing subjectivity allows us to attribute this same subjectivity to others. The culmination of this process is that we are allowed to speak again at the end of the retreat and engage socially with others. Again, we are betwixt and between in as much as we can speak but the logic is that we will take what we have learned with us to the outside world. In both cases - how we relate to ourselves and how we relate to others - what is accomplished depends on disciplining the objectified body such that the subjective and social 'mind' (if we must work with the mind/body dichotomy) can be disciplined. This is of course not surprising given that Foucault (1982) has shown how discipline of the body can discipline the mind. What is interesting is that this is not about control; it is about the provision of training in ethics (for which retreatants volunteer and pay) which rests on the processing of bodies.

Embodied Affect and Collective Effervescence

Thinking back to the demoralisation literature – Bauman in particular - one of the prevailing tendencies is to locate morality within persons and view the social as the demoralising or adiaphorising entity. My analysis has taken issue with this through showing that social ordering (and relations of exchange) do not neutralise some innate moral capacity (see chapter six). This chapter seeks to build on this analysis through following Durkheim to show that 'morality' can in fact be located within the social.

Within the sociology of the body, there is some attempt to rescue Durkheim's legacy along these lines. Moving away from misreadings that position Durkheim as a positivist, conservative and functionalist; the importance of the social in relation to morality is being recognised as are the ways in which this relationship is routed through the body (Shilling, 1993, Mellor and Shilling, 1997 1998). Looking back to Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1915 [2001]), Mellor and Shilling (1997) conceive of society as a *moral* force which can stimulate persons, 'in an effervescent propulsion', towards cohesion (or equally well, dissolution) indicating that (im)morality is located in the social through its relations to persons. To strengthen this case, they return to Durkheim's concept of *homo-duplex* to position morality as a social engagement with human nature (Mellor and Shilling, 1997). Durkheim argues:

"Man is double. There are two beings in him: an individual being...and a social being which represents the highest reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation – I mean society (Durkheim, 1915[2001])"

Durkheim identified the capacity of human beings to be governed by egoistic impulses but also to reach beyond themselves and be moral. This reaching beyond and being moral, for Durkheim, is attachment to the social *and* collective sentiments. Holding the homo-duplex in mind, it can be remembered that this attachment is both emotionally grounded in the individual and something that can impinge upon egoistic desire such that individuals are moralised as they are socialised. Mellor and Shilling (1997) conceive of the homo-duplex in terms of an

embodied individual that is divided between egoistic impulses and the ability to 'reach beyond' to the realm of moral activity that is common to the collective. This amounts to a concern with both the asocial capacity of an embodied individual *and* the potential of embodied persons at a collective level.

The sociology of the body has also established that forms of embodiment are a product of the society in which they are manifest (Turner, 1996 Mellor and Shilling, 1998) and it follows that a study of society cannot be separated from a concern with the embodied individual. A re-reading of Durkheim can strengthen this claim in as much as the mind/body and individual/social dichotomies cease to hold in so far as forms of embodiment are shared and acted on both physically and mentally. It is held that different societies produce, in Mauss' terms (1934 [1973]), different techniques of the body - different ways of relating to and deploying the body in social life. Closely related is the idea that different societies produce different ways of knowing and these are routed through the body (Shilling, 1993). Thinking about modernity – you will recall that modernity is theorised frequently as the source of demoralisation – Mellor and Shilling (1997 1998) present it as an attempt to eliminate carnal, sensual forms of knowing as well as affectual and convivial practices in favour of rational and reasonable ways of knowing. The effect of this is the championing of the mind over the body and individuality over society in so far as the individual is denied bodily contact with the sacred. We know from Durkheim that the sacred need not refer to religion, it can equally well occur through instances of society worshipping itself. Similarly, we know from Weber's (2002) analysis of Protestantism that religion can enable the *removal* of persons from bodily contact with the sacred. Mellor and Shilling argue that it is through the body that persons become moral. It is through sensual knowing, corporeal attachment and a sense of collective effervescence that persons are bound to others with shared ideas and values. Modernity, in all its civilising efforts (Elias, 1939 [1978]) brings about a *de-vitalisation* (Mellor and Shilling, 1997 1998) in so far as this effervescent basis of sociality and morality is neglected in favour of a rational, individualistic one.

This resonates well with much of the demoralisation literature outlined in chapter two where rationality and individualism were seen to do away with the ephemeral, social and moral (of course, Fevre would argue that it is one type of rationality

doing away with another). Incidentally, Bauman (1993) recognises the embodied nature of morality in his 'being for the Other' which is presented as a sensually grounded impulse. However, he fails to address the collective and effervescent sources of morality as he still locates morality *within* persons. However, those theorists - such as Maffesoli (1996) and Meštrović (1991) - who resist the death of the social and champion the 'warmth' of the collective against a general 'cultural cooling' (Hochschild, 2003) do not recognise the ambivalence of the social. They fail to acknowledge that, depending on the agenda, it can be either 'moral' or 'immoral'. Durkheim (1915 [2001]) by contrast did recognise this ambivalence in noting that this effervescence can lead to cohesion or equally well, 'bloody barbarism'. Since the thesis is concerned remoralisation, it will recognise this ambivalence but consider only the ways in which the social can be moralising. Devitalisation, the removal of effervescent contact with the social removes the very notion of society, the social, from the minds of individuals and thinking back to chapter two, it can be seen that when 'society is under siege' (Bauman, 2002) the effects are demoralising. Although, in the mind, 'society' may be dissolving, Mellor and Shilling (1998) argue that the notion of society and morality can come back, can be revitalised, through the *body*. They argue that through the body and bodily practice, persons can experience (via sensual and carnal knowing) a sense of collective effervescence and by proxy society and morality. With this we can turn to the data before returning to theorise these themes in more depth:

Dances

The data reveals ways in which bodily practice can create this sense of collective effervescence. In particular, RR and the dances of universal peace at BWC show this. The conduct of these occasions (Garfinkel, 1967) or focused gatherings (Goffman, 1961) can be thought of as *ritualistic* (Durkheim 1915 [2001]) but a detailed discussion of ritual will be deferred until chapter eight.

For now, we need to recall that these dances are organised around the very principle of togetherness. Basic songs and dances are borrowed from myriad world cultures: Islamic, African, Zoroastrianism, Native American and Russian (among others)

traditions are drawn upon. Each song and dance is introduced by its origins and meanings and then move by move, line by line, the instructor teaches us the songs and dances such that they are understood and memorised by everyone. The songs advocate sentiments of peace, tolerance, togetherness and love whilst the movements are based on participants standing in a circle and engaging in tactile, physical contact with *everybody* in the room (the dances require one to move around the circle, repeating the dance until one has danced with everybody). The circle and movement around it are making possible sensual contact and a sense of togetherness but there is more going on than this. The instructor or leader of any session stands in the centre governing the start and end of each dance, the pace of each dance, the movements within each dance and the overall timing of the occasion. The occasion as a whole - not just the dancing - is significant in terms of embodiment, effervescence and as I will discuss below, affect. To begin, one starts relaxing by being barefoot on a wooden floor with incense and pine wood burning before walking around to the rhythm of the instructor's guitar or drum whilst being encouraged to concentrate on one's breathing as one lets go, closes one's eyes and concentrates on the ground beneath whilst considering every step that is taken. This begins to get persons into a trance-like state which is then built upon such that the rituals become, in the words of many participants, *moving meditations*. That the dances and lyrics are simple and repetitive whilst the meaning of the words is unknown (as they are sung largely in foreign tongues) contributes to this sense of moving meditation. The state of mind that this moving meditation creates helps create a sense of *collective effervescence* and it is largely down to bodily practice and impact upon the body.

In these focused gatherings, persons move into this grouping from various and differing positions (their families and their day-to-day communities) and engage in emotionally charged physical proximity. Of course there is a role for the carnivalesque since one form of embodiment - carnal, sensual, tactile, affectual – is adopted in place of the 'civilised' form associated with the day to day. The emphasis is on inclusion and one must interact with everybody (by virtue of the moving circle) whether one is a regular practitioner or a novice, an adult or a child, a good singer and dancer or, in the words of one instructor, 'tone deaf with two left feet'. In fact, one gets an even wider sense of inclusion and connection when one is

reminded that these dances are part of a worldwide phenomena and network. One man told me how he had attended events across the country as well as in New Zealand and South America. As with the meditations at SM, the emphasis is *not* on the aesthetics of the body (hence it does not matter if you cannot sing or dance), it is on the ways in which embodied practice can facilitate something else, a sense of collective effervescence.

As with the meditations at SM, the consequences of this work on the body reach far beyond the body. This sense of conviviality enables participants to relax enough to talk openly even though nobody is actually required by the dances to get to know or depend on anybody else. There is no possibility of forging a meaningful social bond (in the everyday sense) in *one* session yet part of the occasion sees strangers sitting in a circle (after over an hour of dancing) and talking about their deepest emotions, fears and problems. This possibility is most likely a result of the effervescence and conviviality generated by the bodily practice of dancing. The interesting thing is that the rigidity of the event's structure facilitates a form of *mechanical solidarity* (Durkheim, 1893 [1964]) through shared forms of embodiment wherein sociality is a consequence of similitude. Similitude is achieved by the highly organised nature of the proceedings, the control of the event's leader and the trance like state induced by the repetitive, moving meditation (again, please see chapter eight for a discussion of ritual). It is unlikely that the experience would vary much if any of the present personnel were to be replaced by another willing participant. As such, this is a powerful way to experience collective effervescence and a sense of sociality (in relation to the immediate surroundings and a global network) without any need for 'meaningful' social bonds. Of course, it is easy to criticise the absence of long standing social bonds *but*, many participants at RR tell me that over the course of the programme they have made 'good friends who I can relate to'. Even if the analysis were look at one session in isolation; it could still be stated that, as I have already established, 'something is better than nothing'.

Bodily practice creates a sense of collective effervescence and sociality at WOMAD and again, it is through dancing. Recalling my discussion of WOMAD in chapter six, it can be seen that there is a role for the carnivalesque. As noted, there is a general sense of letting go at WOMAD and dancing forms a large part of this. At

WOMAD dancing is a very inclusive practice, the aesthetics of which seem not to matter. As persons move in and out of the marquees where the music is performed, it is almost obligatory to dance. Virtually everybody dances regardless of social identity and there is just a mass of bodies dancing and creating a really nice atmosphere. For example, one gentleman in his fifties tells me that he does not normally dance but feels like he can here because 'it just doesn't matter, everybody is doing it, and everybody is having a good time'. A young woman tells me: 'it's wicked, you've got old people, kids, couples, families...all dancing together, its really like you are a part of something.' It is my contention that the dancing here, like the dancing detailed above, is so successful because participants do not know the music because knowing the music would just distract from the dancing. The importance of dance lies in its relation to *rhythm* and the music forms present at WOMAD facilitate this: Afro-Cuban, Senegalese, Salsa, Tango, Dub, New Orleans funk - these are all music forms that have heavy and simple rhythms that are easily picked up. Within any given performance the substance of the music – the melody, the harmony, the lyrics (sung in foreign languages making it even harder to attach yourself to the substance of the music) is secondary to the rhythm. Given the acoustics of a performance in a tent it is hard to hear the lyrics and the melody but it is *easy* to respond to the rhythm. The dancing at WOMAD is not limited to performances. In the campsite and parking area there are occasions where groups of people create and dance to music and term the practice *battacuda*. Battacuda is a Brazilian practice of making and dancing to music with purely percussive instruments which are of course rhythmic instruments (often purchased at the festival). This highlights the importance and ubiquity of rhythm. Thinking with the mind/body split in relation to music: the mind responds to melody, lyrics, harmony and form where the body responds to rhythm. This is what is going on at WOMAD: collective effervescence is created by an embodied *affect* in response to rhythm. This, along with other points in the preceding analysis, needs theoretical illumination.

Affect

The importance of the body lies in it being a form that can be affect-ed. Affect is taken here in respect of Deleuze and Guattari's combined and independent conceptualisations (Deleuze, 1994 Guattari, 1995 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Affect is something that is liberated from organising systems of representation. It cannot be reduced to language, cannot be reduced to content or meaning, cannot be reduced to any everyday *form* because – as one might expect from Deleuze and Guattari – it is not formed and it is not fixed. Affect is the realm of pure experience and to see how it relates to embodiment, we need only recognise that the body has a 'grammar' that cannot be captured by language. The body is a site of affect and affection, a medium whose changes are manifestations of affect. The body experiences changes in state that cannot be described fully through reference to representation systems such as language and the body experiences these changes in terms of intensities (Massumi, 1992). Intensities are the ways in which the body infolds and registers all the stimuli placed on it such that when the body is affected, it experiences it as an intensity (Massumi, 1992), a change from one bodily state to another. It is not a thought, it is not a feeling, it is not an emotion – all these things imply cognition – it is a 'pre-personal' bodily reaction. Affect is a purely embodied experience and this is exactly what happens in the dancing occasions detailed above. The bodies that are dancing experience something that is not a thought, feeling or emotion (to the extent that you might imagine it to be a feeling, Deleuze reminds us that it is affect that enables feelings to feel); the experience is bodily, an intensity, a change in the state of the body that produces the feeling of collective effervescence (Durkheim, 1915 [2001]), a trance like state, a rush of energy' (Mellor and Shilling, 1997), the 'warmth of the collectivity' (Maffesoli, 1996). The source of this is affect.

This all becomes rather difficult when we try to locate affect. It is certainly not within persons because it exists ahead of identity and the formation of subjectivities (Seigworth, 2003). Affects are absent presences - located somewhere 'out there', somewhere within the social, somewhere within the fold. The importance of the body then is merely as a means through which to transmit these affects and as such

the *affection* experienced during the occasions and gatherings detailed above is, in actuality, the process of transmitting affect from one body to another. This raises the insight that affect is greater than the bodies they occupy:

"[a]ffects...go beyond the strength of those who undergo them...affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: p.164).

This is very similar to Durkheim who viewed society as something greater than the sum of its parts. Thinking back to Bauman's *Society Under Siege* (2002), we see the idea that one of our contemporary problems is that persons no longer think or believe in a society that will remain when they have gone. You will recall that the remedy to this was located by Shilling and Mellor in the possibilities of embodiment and the concept of affect allows us to see practically how this might work. Rather than thinking that the body actively chooses to affect itself or others, the affects 'out there' in the fold (the social) are absent presences that require embodiment in order to make themselves present through manifestation and transmission. The body only assumes importance in relation to the transmission of affect and as such, the distinction between bodies (and individuals) can be viewed as less significant or marked than we commonly hold. Indeed, this is the crux of Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) infamous 'bodies without organs' – the idea that a body is not defined in its materiality or its organs, rather affects and movements.

It is important to highlight how little affect relies on subjective complexities like thought, objects, language and representations. Affect impinges directly on the body ahead of any notions of subjectivity. Colebrook (2002) gives the example of a poem that relies on rhythm and meter to convey its message rather than form, content, object or language. This is exactly what my data shows – it is less the content of the songs, their melody, lyrics or harmony; more the rhythm and affect. Lyrics and harmony cannot necessarily produce the *pure* intensity that impacts upon the body ahead of thought but rhythm can. Singing songs whose lyrics one does not understand (less still pay attention to) or dancing to unfamiliar music whose melody and lyrics cannot be heard allows music to be stripped down to rhythm which causes a bodily intensity and transmits affect. In Lefebvre's brilliant but overlooked analysis of rhythm (2004), a similar point is made. Lefebvre argues that rhythm has

the power to supplant harmony and in turn sublimate the aesthetics of art and music (a triumph of affect over form). Lefebvre also goes a step further to highlight an ethical function of rhythm in so much as it purifies the everyday, purifies the social, to bring compensation for the failings of the everyday. Again, this is exactly what my data shows. The rhythm is creating an affect which in turn creates an effervescence that acts as a pure experience of the social (the affectual and convivial) that is by its very nature transgressive (carnivalesque) in relation to the everyday.

Extension, Embodiment and the Fold.

Having discussed the importance of the body in respect of reflexive development and revitalising the social; all that remains is to discuss the third way in which the body comes to matter. Here, I start from the position that:

"[t]he body is not an *object* to be studied in relation to culture, but is to be considered as the *subject* of culture, or in other words the existential ground of culture" (Csordas, 1990: p.5)

I have already demonstrated that alterity is characterised by a fold in which multiple, interconnected and incongruous phenomena co-exist. These phenomena are comprised of objects, practices and values. However, it must now be noted explicitly that it is actually the *meanings* attached to these objects, practices and values that constitute the fold. Indeed, I have hinted throughout this chapter that objects, practices and values only assume importance when we consider the *meanings* they carry. With this, I am arguing that we think of the curvaceous lines of flight that make up the fold (see chapter five) in terms of meanings. My argument here is that the movement between these meanings/lines of flight – motility – relies on embodiment.

Marilyn Strathern's concept of extension (1991) is particular useful here. Extension is concerned with the attachment (and detachment) of parts to persons (bodies) and it is these processes (of attachment and detachment) that elicit relations. It follows that extension elicits different *meanings* (because, as chapter one detailed, meanings are routed through the elicitation of relations). It is extension that solidifies

meanings – if only partially and temporarily – through magnifying the presence of persons and things in the here and now. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms, extension creates *plateaus* within the fold. Clearly then, extension is an embodied process and my argument is that the different meanings in the fold become visible and solidified through attachment to the body. In chapter five, I argued that the movement between these meanings was one of motility: making certain meanings present whilst rendering others as absent presences. These movements *must* be characterised by differing attachments and detachments to the body (Latimer and Munro, 2006). I am therefore stating that motility is *mobilised* and made possible through grounding these meanings in attachments to the body. The implication of this is that alterity - the fold in which I am interested – needs the capacity to incorporate (through embodiment) its meanings if they are to be solidified, magnified and above all, given presence.

8

PRACTICES AND PROCESSES OF ATTACHMENT AND DETACHMENT.

Hitherto, the whole of the analysis can be read as a study of attachment and detachment in so far as it has examined the ways in which persons attach themselves (or they are attached) to certain objects, practices and values. Furthermore, at the end of the previous chapter, it was argued that these attachments and detachments should be thought of in terms of the attachment and detachment of *meanings*. The analysis in this chapter moves away from the focus on objects, practices and values in order to address the attachment and detachment of *persons* to and from one another. It is also argued that processes of attaching and detaching persons are essentially processes of attaching and detaching meanings. It follows that the attachment (and detachment) of persons to persons is no different to the attachment of objects, practices and values to persons. The extent to which we conceive of persons as different to objects, practices and values rests on the meanings we attach to personhood. In light of this congruity, this analysis adds more phenomena to the fold. More specifically, this chapter addresses the ways in which alterity – the fold in which I am interested - is characterised by the co-existence of (and movement between) notions of individuality/identity *and* those of community/sociality. This chapter is deeply Durkheimian in so far as it is focussing on this co-existence of individuality and sociality. Similarly, in line with Durkheim, I am using this chapter to address explicitly the possibilities of sociality, conviviality and community because it is here that 'alternatives' to anomie and demoralisation can be considered. It is argued that sociality is not, as Bauman (2002) would have it, disappearing. Nor is it, as Mellor and Shilling (1998) suggest (see chapter seven), only likely to be found and experienced through the body. To the contrary, this chapter highlights instances where notions of community and attachment to the Other are alive and well.

Detachment

Many of the fieldwork sites were, in the first instance, characterised by detachment from persons, detachment from 'society' and detachment from the everyday. For example, the remote location of BWC and its distance (literal and symbolic) from 'the mainstream' was cited as an alluring feature by those - residents and visitors - attempting to 'escape' society just as the withholding of mail and banning of telephones at SM serves to detach retreatants from persons on the outside. This however, is only part of the story. It is interesting to note that many residents at BWC were there to get away from people and groups of people that they were 'attached' to (in some capacity) prior to their coming to BWC. I am withholding any further detail on *these* reasons for detachment as it is highly sensitive and personal and as such, I have been asked not to divulge it. To give a less problematic example, I can quote one resident who stated: 'it's not that I dislike my friends and family back home...I just always felt different, out of place somehow and that I needed to get away to be me... that's why, after five years of travelling, I came here'. Indeed, BWC places a huge emphasis on this self-actualisation, this 'being me', as evidenced by its invitation to 'let go and explore new corners of yourself'. The ways in which BWC offers this possibility have been discussed already through reference to its provision of objects (such as clothing), practices (such as not eating meat) and values (such as their commitment to ecology). This wealth of cultural materials makes BWC a site, *par excellance*, of individuation. That is to say, the detachment from persons (the 'friends and family back home') that leads people to BWC affords the opportunity for persons to work on their reflexive projects of self and identity (Giddens, 1991) whilst meeting the modern demands of creativity and individuality (Simmel, 1904).

At SM, detachment leads to opportunities to work on these reflexive projects. As noted, we are encouraged from the start of the retreat to think of it as a re-treat. From here, the teacher goes on to say: 'it is all about *you*...forget about everyone, forget about everyone that you have left behind to be here...you are here for you, you are here to work on *you*'. Of course, as chapter seven demonstrated, part of this 'working on you' is working on how one relates to others but I shall suspend a

discussion of this until a more appropriate space in the chapter opens up. At WOMAD, even though people come as families, they are still detached from their wider networks associated with, for example, work or locality. One gentleman even told me that: 'my family aren't really into this but they still come with me, it is nice for me to realise parts of myself that I don't get to in my life as a father, husband or actuary (his occupation) so it's nice to get away from all that and do this with my family in tow'. As for RR, nobody that attended regularly went as part of a group (although some *became* a group). For instance, one participant told me: 'If my friends knew I was here they would take the piss out of me and I doubt very much that my family get it...but it is important to me and I feel okay with myself when I do stuff like this'. Even RFM - which was largely characterised by families and friendship dipping in and out of alterity - provided the resources for projects of self actualisation through the possibilities afforded in terms of what one buys, *how* one buys it and the support (financial or otherwise) that can be given to various charities.

Arguing that detachment leads to the possibility of working reflexively on one's project of self and identity brings the analysis dangerously close that old sociological chestnut: 'the death of community marks the birth of identity'. I should like to state that I am in no way trying to make *that* argument. For a start, this neat theoretical model is most likely to fall by the wayside when confronted with anthropological or historical evidence. For instance, whilst it is entirely plausible that we have more freedoms to work on our identities as we move away from the ascriptive elements of community; it is deeply problematic to assume that pre-modern (or pre-postmodern) persons lived in 'communities' characterised some sort of mechanical solidarity (Durkheim, 1983[1964]) and *gemienschaft* relations with little scope for notions of self or identity. As Strathern (1991) reminds us, we move from complexity and heterogeneity to complexity and heterogeneity. More importantly, the very idea that 'community' – or at least the social – is dead is precisely what I am trying to move away from. I am trying to illustrate that part of alterity's allure is the provision of some form of sociality as well as highlighting the ways in which the identity work afforded by alterity rests on a degree of *identification* (Hetherington, 1998) with others. More accurately, I am trying to

show how alterity is characterised by the movement between conceptions of individuality/identity (detachment) and those of community/sociality (attachment).

Attachment

BWC: The Possibilities of Community

Despite the above focus on detachment; many of the fieldwork sites were characterised by a sense of sociality or at least the *promise* of sociality. As an exercise in communal living, it is reasonable to think of BWC's residents organising themselves into some kind of community. On the one level, the immediate aesthetics of the place suggest this: every room (bathroom, office, kitchen *etcetera*) has a friendly, artistic notice (flowers, trees, small animals) labelling the room and it is *always* labelled '*our* bathroom', '*our* office', '*our* kitchen'. Here, both the language and the message (connotation) are inclusive. Looking to their brochure, an experience of communal living is promised - as a fully fledged member of '*our* community'. On another, deeper, level the residents of BWC do operate – at least to some extent – as a community. They live and work together within the spatial boundaries of the site. *Every* member of the resident community lives there full time due to the necessity of work. There is a lot of work to be done in terms of maintaining the community and ensuring it functions properly as an educational/retreat centre (which, as we have seen, is necessary for the longevity of the community) and it would not be practical for one to work there if one did not live there.

Similarly, every member who lives there full time must work there full time because it would be impossible to live there and 'free ride' if one did not work there. As one resident put it: 'you have to work if you want to be part of the community…we only let people here in return for money on a short term basis (paying for retreats or courses)…there has never been, at least to the best of my knowledge, a resident who just paid and didn't work'. Unsurprisingly, the importance of working as a community lies in the ability of the group to divide the labour: 'when people apply to become members of the community, we ask what their skills are, what they can

bring to the community, 'cause there is no point in having five people who are great at gardening but nobody who is any good at cooking...if the only thing that somebody could bring was money then they are not much use to us, that isn't what we are about.' It seems that to be a member of the community, to be a participant, one must play a part. Of course, Durkheim has highlighted the importance of this in his *Division of Labour* (1983[1963]) where he showed the possibilities of belonging and solidarity brought about through mutual interdependence. Thinking back to chapter six (where this was discussed in detail), we can recall the multiplicity of formal and informal practices/relations of exchange brought about by the division of labour and these suggest that the residents of BWC are behaving as a community - as a group of people who are 'for' one another.

Beyond the division of labour, there are many ways that BWC can be thought of as a group of people who are for each other and organising themselves along the lines of a community. The most shining example of this happened during my stay when a member of the resident community received some bad news (again, there is no need for me to divulge the particulars given that it was something upsetting and deeply personal). As soon as the other residents heard of this, they dropped what they were doing, one resident even drove back from town on her day off (she was called on her mobile telephone), and did what they could to help. There were offers of Chai tea, groups hugs, a shoulder to cry on, a lift to the coast for some meditation and a general sense of letting the individual concerned know that she had emotional support should she need it. I will go on to argue that BWC, like all of the fieldwork sites, does not always operate as a community but here, there is a clear example of BWC behaving like a community *when it matters*. Interestingly, Bauman (2004) posits that modern sociality takes the form of 'peg communities' wherein persons are loosely attached to one another, exhibiting a social bond that dissolves precisely when it needs to be mobilised. Here we have the exact opposite, the social bond *materialises* precisely when it matters. One could actually see this physically: bodies were literally flocking from various points around the site (and beyond) to centre on this person such that there was a very visual representation of the bond materialising. I witnessed many other, albeit less dramatic, examples of residents being for their co-residents such as Henry offering to trade 'shifts' on the cooking rota so that Nick could go to a yoga class or Saskia calming Katherine down with a

cup of tea in response to a minor crisis. Again, this shows BWC to be characterised by a sense of community that is based on more than the mutual reliance that the division of labour necessitates.

Although those at BWC were there are as a result of distance and detachment from conventional attachments, such as family and workmates; it is interesting to note that they frame their attachments to BWC in these terms. For example, I have just demonstrated that working together enables solidarity just as we might expect in the 'mainstream' workplace. More significantly, they conceive of their attachments in terms of the discourse of family which is at once emblematic of 'the mainstream' *and* a strong social bond. Whilst talking with Katherine about her young son, she described Henry (the eldest member of the resident community) as 'a Grandfather' to her son and proceeded to describe how much her son loved him and how good he was with him. Henry, who is usually somewhat aloof, stepped in to confirm how much he loved Katherine's son and claimed that the reason that Katherine's son responded so well to him was 'because he set clear limits'. This lead to Henry and Katherine discussing how cacophonous it is at BWC with the multitude of adults giving her son mixed messages and how important it is to have 'key people' for a child to identify with. Notice how they frame this bond (between Henry and the child) through reference to the concept of Grandfather and the way that Henry does 'Grandfather', just as the way Katherine does 'Mother', relies on the expectations we associate with the mainstream (rather than the 'anything goes' parenting that one might expect from a site such as BWC). Again, this recalls the work of Michael Taussig (1993) and here the attachments manifest within this space of *alterity* rely on *mimesis* of the attachments associated with the 'mainstream' (such as family and expectations of the roles it entails) if they are to be understood, meaningful and above all realised (quite literally). Interestingly, aside from being 'like a Grandfather' to her son; Henry is 'like a father' to Katherine. Katherine enthusiastically told me about the things that Henry did for her: giving her lifts to avoid long and inefficient bus journeys, helping her organise her finances or giving her advice on her relationship with Lee (her boyfriend). Again, aside from showing an attachment, it shows how the attachment takes a form that mimics the attachment we might expect between a father and his adult daughter in a 'mainstream' family.

The above analysis hints at the idea that those who have 'detached' in order to pursue their identity projects are actually finding new attachments and a sense of 'community' at BWC. Forgetting for a moment the possibilities of community, it can be noted that reflexive projects of identity and self rely on the possibility of attachment in terms of *identification* with others (Hetherington, 1998). I had countless conversations with residents where they said things like: 'here, I am around people that dress like me, think like, act like me and I can actually be myself' or 'yea, I'm finding myself here...I guess I was a bit lost, bit out of place before I came here...I was always a bit different, not really myself but being here is helping me to figure out what I am about'. Additionally, I have already detailed how residents accepted me when they felt that I could identify with their values and way of life (see chapter four). It seems that this identification with others who have similar values and expectations is central to BWC such that there is a tacit level of attachment, even when they are not operating as a community. Thinking back to Hetherington's work (1998), this is hardly surprising because this grouping is one of elective affinity (rather than ascription) and the choice to align, even in the unlikely event that one's sole motive is the opportunity to work on one's identity, is most likely based on the possibilities of being, in the words of the resident above: 'around like minded others'.

This identification and attachment within BWC is particularly clear when they are juxtaposed or juxtaposing themselves with the outside world. Thinking back to chapter five, I have already demonstrated how they constituted themselves as marginal in relation to the 'mainstream' outside. Cohen (1985 [2004]) has illustrated how identity is a property of one's belonging to a culture, particularly if the identity/culture is marginal. He also posits that one becomes aware of their culture and identity when one is confronted with boundaries and difference. When confronted with difference, particularly in relation to the 'mainstream' outside, the residents of BWC are defensive of their culture and *collective* identity. For example, visitors are offered the opportunity to leave feedback and one visitor complained about the food, expressing concern over the nutritional value of it. In response to this, residents collectively discussed and defended this central aspect of their lifestyle. They are proud of their ability to offer a varied and nutritionally sound diet (recall from chapter seven the nutritional charts) and accounted for this

complaint in terms of the commentator's ignorance of vegetarianism before juxtaposing their diet with the 'boring' and 'imbalanced' diet associated with 'the majority of mainstream meat eaters'.

Similarly, there was an incident during my stay where somebody was meant to be coming as a volunteer but did not turn up or bother to inform them that he would not be able to make it. John was quite upset by this and told me that he would not have minded if he had had the courtesy to call, but he felt that the visitor assumed it would not matter as people view them as a bunch of 'disorganised hippies'. With this, the others joined in and commented how ignorant 'outsiders' can be. On another occasion, Saskia was upset and told of a friend disapproving of her lifestyle. Again, this prompted a vitriolic discussion of how 'ignorant' people can be and how at BWC, people are free to be themselves without being judged and how pitiful it is that outsiders do not share this attitude. This sense of them and us shows that, even if they do not always behave as a community, they behave as a tribe. Here, I am thinking about Renato Rosaldo's analysis of Ilongot headhunters (1980) wherein members of a tribe resolve or at least abstract their internal detachments and differences to form a united attack, 'beating with a single heart', in preparation for a raid on a rival tribe. The most striking manifestation of this tribal – 'them *versus* us' - attachment came when I overheard John talking to Maria (a medium term volunteer) about becoming a full time resident. John told Maria that: 'the best thing about being here is that you don't need anything else or anybody else...everything you need is here and there is no need for anything or anyone from outside'.

Other Sites: Other Attachments

Of the fieldwork sites studies as part of my ethnography of alterity, only BWC ostensibly constitutes itself as a community and is consequently characterised by various forms of attachment such sociality, identification, tribalism and of course, community. However, the other fieldwork sites are still characterised by some sense or some possibility of sociality and attachment. The last chapter detailed how WOMAD and RR enabled a form of sociality through affect, collective effervescence and conviviality. It is fruitful to think about these occasions in terms

of *neo-tribal* sociality (Maffesoli, 1996). Herein, an otherwise disparate group of persons form a temporary attachment through coming together as a collective and experiencing the 'transcendental warmth' (Maffesoli, 1996) of it. The essence of such attachments, for Maffesoli, is that they are temporary. WOMAD is a weekend festival, the participants of which disperse when the festival ends. The participants of RR move in and out of it on a weekly basis whilst the dance group at BWC sees a mixture of BWC residents, visitors and outsiders coming together once a week.

Given the temporary nature of such attachments, it is perhaps too strong to describe them as a community. It is however fair to recognise that they are still attachments that afford some sense of sociality and an experience of the collective. The attachments are not limited to, as the last chapter intimated, embodied affect nor are they limited to the persons located in the immediate vicinity. For example, it is ostensibly important to many of the participants at RR to remember that participation in the activity places them within a global network. As one woman put it: 'these dances are about togetherness, peace, tolerance and it is nice to know that across the world other people are doing exactly what we are doing'. One could read this as an instance of imagined community (Anderson, 1983 [1991]) but if it is figured as meaningful then is not the place of the ethnographer, less still the sociologists, to deride its importance on the grounds that it does not fulfil one's own expectations of how a community should look. In any case, those who attended the groups regularly tended to forge deeper, lasting attachments that move beyond the temporary affiliation afforded *within* the occasion. Similarly, WOMAD is characterised by an attachment beyond the vicinity through its connection to a global network. This was evidenced by the 'one world' or 'global village' outlook and the possibilities of donating to charities that tackle global issues. In a sense, it makes it possible for festival goers to feel an attachment to the 'Other' (in every sense) and consequently be *for* the Other even if it is at the somewhat detached level of charity donations. Aside from this, the whole experience of being at WOMAD, the whole atmosphere, is one of conviviality (see chapters six and seven) and that is something of which people are aware – you will recall how one participant celebrated the feeling of 'being part of something'.

If RFM itself cannot be thought of as a community; attendance and participation certainly serves to attach persons to the locality and feel that they are part of a community. On one level, many people I spoke to expressed the importance of supporting local business, production and agriculture indicating an attachment to (and 'being for') others who live and work in and around Cardiff (and South Wales in general). As with WOMAD there is an air of conviviality and here persons move in and out of it on a weekly basis, experiencing temporary attachments to other participants for the duration of the occasion. Again, this can be thought of in terms of neo-tribal sociality. There is also a ritualistic element to participation and attendance of which I will have more to say later. For now, it is sufficient to note how people conceive of their attendance as a way of feeling attached to Cardiff, more specifically the district in which the market is held. Many of the persons who live in the area and attend RFM are not local to Cardiff (ex-students are well represented) and see this as a way to feel part of the locality: 'it's nice to be here, I feel like I am part of Cardiff when I come here, seeing the same faces each time I come, talking to and buying from the same sellers each week...I guess it is part of my Sunday and I like that'.

In many ways, SM is characterised by the possibility of attachment. Although we are urged to view it as a re-treat and a journey of self-discovery; the instructor is quick to note that it is a journey that we, the retreatants, are taking together. The process of retreat and the processing of retreatants (see chapter seven) consistently plays up to this. As the retreat progresses from working on bodies to working on – for want of a better term – minds, the focus shifts from how we relate to our bodies, through how we relate to ourselves and ultimately, to *how we relate to others*. The instructor's immediate reference point when working on how we relate to others is our fellow retreatants: 'now be aware; be creatively aware, of the people – the human beings who surround you, who are connected to you, who you are making this journey with'. Please note, these people were originally figured as just bodies by the instructions but the process of retreat leads them to be figured as other humans and humans that we have an attachment to. The attachment to fellow retreatants is manifest also in the running of the centre. As with BWC, there is a division of labour facilitating belonging and mutual interdependence. Similarly, the smooth running of the centre rests on being 'creatively aware' of others. For

example, there are many notices around the site reminding you to shut doors quietly or not wear scent in order to respect everyone else's right 'to be' and 'to meditate'. Similarly, we are encouraged to take short showers through reference to 'being mindful towards others' such that everybody has the chance to shower before the meditations begin.

During the 'betwixt and between' period (where we are uncertain about the rule of silence) a lot of work is done to facilitate this attachment to our fellow retreatants. Given the ambivalence of the situation (see chapter seven), a tribal sense of 'them and us' develops. For example, there was the jealous reaction of my fellow retreatants when a fruit cobbler was seen *en route* to the manager's office whilst we ate pea soup (see chapter five). Similarly, the ambivalence forced retreatants to bind together to try and figure out collectively the expectations regarding silence. So, when the retreat proper begins, retreatants *are* 'stripped of their badges' but having bonded in the liminal period, it is somehow more plausible to consider the attachment to each other that the instructor demands. At the end of the retreat there is another liminal phase where retreatants are allowed to talk and here, having been through the retreat together, it is easy to bond, to attach, by virtue of shared experience. Once again, it is another manifestation of neo-tribal sociality in so far as it is a temporary attachment and liable to dissolve once the collective disperses to their individual points of origin. However, there is another level of attachment here in so much as the attachments forged on such retreats do *not* necessarily dissolve once the retreat is over. There are many groups across the UK that have been set up in response to the experience of SM wherein people come together to meditate and socialise. These groups are made up of people who met on retreats. On leaving SM, retreatants are given details of retreats in their area so that they too can join them. I spoke with two people who belonged to such groups and they both commented on how they have made lasting friendships through these groups. Furthermore, the retreat is fundamentally a training exercise in how to relate to and manage our attachments to others. Going on the retreat marks a detachment that is geared towards re-attachment and the training offered in preparation for re-attachment is training in ethics and how be 'for' the other.

Ritual

In his *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim (1915(2001)) sets out the sociological significance of religious ritual. For Durkheim, ritual – religion in general come to that – is not about other worldly conceptions of divinity but *this* worldly conceptions of society and solidarity. The worship that is so central to ritual, Durkheim argues, is a worship of unity - of society worshipping itself *as a collective*. It follows that rituals and their efficacy bear no inherent relation to any 'divine' body. Instead, they 'mechanically produce the effects that are their jurisdiction' (Durkheim, 1915[2001]: p. 35). That is to say that they operate automatically to produce the effects that are inherent in the process without recourse to anything beyond the ritual. Rituals are therefore characterised by a group of people with a common interest and ability to participate. The effects of the ritual – the unity of a group of people expressing shared interests, values and by proxy their solidarity and unity - reflects this willingness and ability. There are of course, negative rituals which are designed by religions to separate the sacred from the profane. Durkheim gives the example of the dietary restrictions that are inherent in many religions and my data certainly reflects this idea (not eating meat for example). Conversely, the rituals that pertain to solidarity and unity are the *positive* rituals that serve to *create* a sense of the sacred. This sense of the sacred is a property of shared values which in turn amounts to social solidarity and it is experienced as the *divin social* or, as we have seen, collective effervescence. There is a level of ambiguity as to whether Durkheim is arguing that ritual *creates* or merely confirms this sense of the sacred (*vis* social). Victor Turner's (1967) distinction between ritual and ceremony would most likely hold that ritual *creates* it and *ceremony* confirms it (because, for Turner, ritual is transformative and ceremony is confirmative). My reading of Durkheim is that ritual both creates and re-creates it. That is to say that it creates and then confirms a sense of unity because it is necessary to periodically do so. Thinking back to chapter one, this can be thought of in terms of *eliciting relations* from moment to moment. Indeed, within the same text Durkheim posits that 'the categories of human thought' (which I presume must include notions of the sacred and the profane) 'are made, unmade and remade incessantly' (1915[2001]:p.16)

The analysis has already shown the importance of rituals in terms of making and remaking a sense of solidarity and unity. For example, it is a short step to think about the dancing at WOMAD and RR (detailed in chapter seven) in terms of ritual. They are activities in which all participants share a common interest and, more importantly a general *ability* and as such, they result in a sense of collectivity and unity. In respect of *ability*, please consider the emphasis on it *not* being a performance or an exercise in posturing alongside the simplicity and repetition of the songs and dances. Of course, in themselves these rituals are not transformative because the unity disperses as soon as the ritual/occasion finishes. Similarly, they cannot be thought of as confirmatory because, prior to the ritual, there is little or no attachment to confirm. Such ritual can be thought of as the making of unity that is liable to be unmade and possibly remade at a later date. Over time however, as we have seen, repeated participation in the dancing ritual at the groups and classes leads to an ongoing sense of unity outside of the occasion. In this sense, the ritual can be thought of as both transformative and confirmative in so far as it is an attachment that is created and maintained. The same can be said of the ritualised elements of going to RFM every Sunday. Here, a sense of attachment is developed over the course of time and then maintained through continued participation. However, to see the most striking manifestation of ritual and its importance, we must return to BWC.

The importance of ritual at BWC is perhaps unsurprising because, as noted, BWC is the only site that ostensibly constitutes itself as a community. The above examples relate either to short term and intense or a long term, non intensive, manifestations of sociality. As a community, BWC is characterised by an attachment that is both long term *and* intensive. That is to say, the residents of BWC live and work together throughout the year within the spatial and social limits of site rather than coming together for a short hit of effervescence or gently moving in and out of attachments on a weekly basis. This is, quite obviously, a difficult attachment to maintain and manage. Fittingly, in the next section I will detail the ways in which the community is characterised by many levels of detachment and *not* operating as a

community. However, for now it is important to highlight the role of rituals as practices that create and maintain a sense of unity, attachment and community.

Giving it stick: the Enactment of Community

The most important ritual at BWC is the formal, institutionalised ritual of attunement. Attunement takes place *every* day and all of the residents who are working that day are obliged to attend as are any volunteers and MTVs. Residents, MTVs and volunteers who are 'around but not working' are welcome but not obliged to come (same applies to the children living there). It takes place at 9am in the old library room. A scented candle burns in the middle of the room and some of the by-now-familiar 'new-agey' looking cushions form a circle around it. The first part of attunement involves holding hands with your eyes closed in complete silence. At this point, everybody in the circle is to breathe deeply (to inhale positive energy from the group and exhale the bad) and simultaneously 'think, feel and meditate'. This process stops when you feel your hand squeezed and you then squeeze the hand of the person on the other side of you. When the last person in the circle squeezes the hand of the first person, the first person opens their eyes and says 'thank you', marking the end of this part of the ritual. Sitting in a circle and holding hands clearly connotes a sense of togetherness and attachment. A candle burns in the centre of the circle and this acts as a focus for the 'energy of the group'. It is a very fungible expression of the group's solidarity and although it tends to burn in the centre; any member who feels that they need it near them 'to concentrate the love of the group on them' can request it. For example, on one occasion Pepé requested it, citing his daughter's illness as the reason for this need.

The next phase of attunement allows members to ritually (re)enact a sense of community through dealing with 'issues feelings and grievances'. It is here that participants are expected to be *for* one another and resolve any internal rifts. A stick that looks as if it may have been brought back from someone's travels acts as the means through which speech rights are allocated. The stick *always* travels counter clockwise and everybody in the circle must take their turn holding it. When holding the stick, participants can take the opportunity to talk about what they have been up

to, what they are feeling, anything they want to raise with the group, anything they want to share or to request help and invite others to join them for some activity or another. I have been asked not to reproduce the content of these utterances and I will honour that. Suffice to say that people take this opportunity to do the things that we might expect a community to do. As such, this is a ritual that allows (even forces) people to behave as a 'community' even though they do not necessarily have to (or even want to) *all* of the time. So in addition to affirming and reinforcing the attachment it also *occasions* and (re)*en*forces an attachment in the moment.

It is during attunement that residents elicit their attachments in the moment and renew them beyond it. It is interesting to note the role accorded to the non-human in this ritual and the ordering/elicitation of attachments. On the one level, the use of space and time are significant. The fact that it is ritualistic and repetitive - being at the same time each and every day - helps to formalise both the ritual *and* the attachment. Being a daily practice means that the attachment is perpetually renewed and there are regular occasions where the 'doing' of community is accomplished. Of course, the use of a circle acts as a catalyst for this sense of togetherness as does the ritualistic element of meeting in the same room – a quiet, grand room – every day. The use of space is related to the use of materials and together a sense of alterity is created and recreated daily which of course marks the source of the group's identification. For example, the circle is prepared with bean bags and incense whilst the room itself is an old library with dusty old books, ethnic throws and tribal prints on the wall, creating a real sense of distance from the everyday. The stick is a significant material in respect of ordering the ritual and the attachment as it *looks* the part. When I enquired about the meaning of the stick, nobody could tell me. It was not an object that had been at BWC for years, nor was it an item from somebody's travels. It was, in fact, an object with an arbitrary meaning that someone had purchased from a local 'new age' shop about six months previously. However, rather than dismissing this stick as 'ethnic tat', it can be seen as significant for the meaning that it *assumes* in the ritual – like the candle, it comes to stand, quite tangibly for the groups attachment and identification (a totem if you will).

The final part of the ritual begins when the stick is put away. The moment the stick is put away, this *emotional* aspect of doing community vanishes. Having served its purposes and allowed everybody to speak; attunement turns instantaneously to matters of organising the working day. The circle disperses and the 'touchy feely' talk is replaced with 'business speak' geared towards identifying and allocating tasks to be done as well as dealing with business related problems such as the late delivery of some candles. By this point, participants are ordering relations and ordering their attachment in very different ways and the role of the non-human reflects this. Aside from the circle dispersing, the stick being put away, the candle and incense being blown out and the bean bags being returned to the edge of the room; some giant timetables and rotas appear to aid the organisation of the working day. There is an almost instantaneous 'flip' between these orderings. However, rather than viewing this as a flip from attachment and alterity to 'cold' business organisation; it is better thought of a flip to another kind of attachment. Essentially, they are dividing the labour and organising the work that ensures their longevity as a community. In Durkheim's terms (1893 [1984]), the attachment here is one of organic solidarity.

Mealtimes and the failed promise of community

Of course, as has been seen, this formalised ritual is not the only way in which the residents of BWC act like a community (for example the rallying around in response to bad news). Another ritual that seeks to formalise attachment is the eating of meals together. I am told on my arrival that 'it is important that we all eat our meals together' and as was the case with attunement, these meals are taken at the same time every day. Lunch is taken at 1pm and supper is taken at 6pm and the occasions are marked by the ringing of a loud bell. Only breakfast is a deliberately desultory affair with those who actually eat breakfast coming in at any point between 6am and 8am. All of the meals are taken in the same room – a large kitchen/dining room that is the symbolic centre of BWC - every day. I say it is the symbolic centre of BWC because when I am shown around, it is the only room (apart from my bedroom) that I am shown to and I am told that it is here, if anywhere, that residents might 'hang out'. Similarly, given the importance of food in terms of doing alterity at BWC and

the accepted wisdom that meal times are important occasions for reinforcing bonds and behaving like a community; one might expect mealtimes to be as potent a ritual as attunement.

One begins with the impression that meal times will be an *event* wherein *everyone* sits around a large, circular table, with the food in the middle, being shared around, whilst people talk way beyond the moment that the eating actually ends. On my first day, I worked in the kitchen and learnt that everyday, those who are working in the kitchen prepare food for *all* the residents and so by time the mealtimes came around I was expecting something quite spectacular. However, the reality did not match this expectation – neither on this day nor any other. In actuality, the food is placed at the side of the room and residents go up and help themselves (in a manner akin to a school canteen) before sitting down to eat. People do not sit down together (in fact, it is rare for everyone to be in the room together at or around the designated meal time). Some sit at the table while others sit on sofas at the other side of the large room. Those that *do* sit at the table tend to sit as far away from each other as is possible and this distance is made possible by the table's design (it is long, thin and rectangular...hardly conducive to achieving a sense of togetherness). Virtually every meal was characterised by an uncomfortable silence and minimal interaction save for a little awkward small talk. In effect, individuals ate in isolation and the spatial arrangements reflected this. On one day, it was a beautiful evening and a couple of people went outside to eat. However, they all sat in different parts of the vast grounds and at no point did anybody suggest that it would be nice for everybody to sit outside together. There was literally *nothing* social about mealtimes. It was purely instrumental: people ate as quickly as possible, in silence and left as quickly as they could. Everybody did their own washing up and on more than one occasion I saw residents queued up, plate and cutlery in hand, by the sink waiting their turn to get to the sink. In these queues, nobody spoke to anyone; it was as if they were on a mechanical conveyer belt (much like the docile bodies during mealtimes at SM).

From Attachment to Detachment

With the exception of the formalised occasions detailed above, much of life at BWC is characterised by isolation and solitude. Throughout the working day, there was very little to suggest that residents worked *together*. Whilst they all worked onsite, the size of the grounds and the diversity of tasks meant that residents spent the majority of the working day in isolation be it in the kitchen, in the office, in the gardens or on the roof. People only tended to work in pairs when an experienced member of the community was supervising a volunteer or new resident. Furthermore, most residents told me that they liked it this way. This sense of detachment is heightened when, as soon as the day finishes and the evening meal has been sat through, people go off in separate directions to - in the words of John- 'do their own thing'. On my first day, I asked John if people socialised together in the communal rooms (and there are many: kitchen, lounges, large halls) in the evenings and he informed me that this was not really the case. He said that if you stayed in a communal room all evening, then you *might* 'hang out' with different people for an hour or so throughout the night but it was never really the case that everybody got together for the evening and stayed together for the duration. On two occasions, I put this to the test by staying in the kitchen (where I was told that socialising is most likely to occur) all evening and whilst people would pop in and out and chat for a bit; there was never an occasion when lots of people would stay together for prolonged periods of time. On these occasions, conversation between residents revolved around 'business' or small talk (although towards me, people took the opportunity to talk about themselves or BWC) in a manner completely anathema to any sense of conviviality.

In spite of the tribal attachment evidenced by John telling Maria that there is no need to leave BWC because everything and everyone she needs is here; it is rare for persons to limit their attachments to the community at BWC. As detailed in the chapter five, residents were reluctant to leave their mainstream attachments behind and as such, there were frequent visitors to the site whilst every opportunity to detach from BWC and travel back to the 'mainstream' was taken. This is of course one of the reasons why the ownership of a car, a potent signifier of detachment on

many levels, is so important – it allows persons to detach themselves from persons at BWC and attach themselves to others outside. Furthermore, the attachment to BWC is *not* likely to be permanent. Throughout my time at BWC, I learn that the 'permanent' community of residents are not bound by a permanency that amounts to a long term attachment. Any member of the resident community is likely to stay for just two years. As John puts it: 'People don't come here and stay here...most people are only here for a few years...two years is about the average duration of a stay'. With this, he goes on to remark how that makes the place very dynamic, with no two years being the same. In reference to himself he notes: 'I have been here for *four* years which is *rare*, I don't think anyone else – or at least very few people – has ever lived here for that long so, although I am one of the youngest here, I guess I am like a community elder!' Interestingly, it was John who seemed to be in charge of the centre so, although there is no official hierarchy – the relative permanency of attachment seems to mark *some* sense of hierarchy. It is interesting to note that a four year attachment is considered lengthy which intimates that an attachment to persons at BWC is an attachment that will, sooner or later, turn to a detachment.

Outside of working practice, there is a characteristic amount of detachment in day to day life *within* BWC. When talking with Suzanne, a medium term volunteer, she told me about the process of becoming a full time resident: 'you come for a week and then you come for progressively longer stays in order to figure out if you want to –and they want you to - come and stay for good'. She tells me: 'with each visit, you soon learn to bring what you need to be by yourself...it is the same for any volunteer...for me it is my music, I cannot be on my own without music'. She goes on to say: 'when I first came, I thought I wouldn't be allowed my CD player and thought I would be around people all the time...as it happens, it is easy to be lonely here, particularly if you don't have a car to get away... you have a lot of time on your own to fill and you need to find ways to fill it'. Indeed, the site is organised in a way that almost necessitates this isolation. Residents do not live on top of each other; everybody has their *own* room in which they have their own computers, CD players, mobile telephones and televisions. These rooms are littered around the edges of the site such that they are far away from each other. If individuals were in dormitories or in closer proximity there might be more of a feeling of togetherness, not least because it might disrupt this notion of having your own possessions in your

own room. Also, residents mark their detachments from the commun(e)ity through notions of private property and ownership. For instance, at a latent level, everybody owns their *own* car and their *own* telephone. More ostensibly, when I was first shown to the kitchen I was told in one breath to help myself 'because the food is communal' and in the next to 'avoid that shelf because the food here belongs to individual residents'. Similarly, when chatting with John in the library (where attunement is held) I was told not to touch any of the books in one of the cabinets because 'they are Nick's own books and he gets *very* angry if people touch *his* books'.

The visitors who came to BWC to experience community were denied the possibility of attachment to the community. In addition to excluding them from central practices such as attunement and meal times, the community spent little time interacting with visitors which is perhaps unsurprising given the contempt in which visitors were held (see chapter six). Indeed, just one person is allocated the role of liaising with visitors whether they are running courses, retreats or family weeks attended by over thirty people. The detachment was so deeply rooted that visitors lived in completely separate areas to the community, had their own rooms (dining room, living room, kitchen, laundry, showers and toilets) and notice boards. I mentioned earlier that visitors had the opportunity to leave feedback at the end of their stay (and I had access to these forms whilst working in the office). One of the main complaints left by visitors on these feedback forms was that they came in search of a community experience and were greeted with hostility. Indeed, without prompting, Nick (a resident) informed me that visitors always want to 'hang out' and 'do stuff' but soon learn that 'we're not those sorts of people'. That said, the community do make possible (whether they intend to or not) a sense of community, or at least sociality, among visitors through organising mealtimes and attunement rituals of their own as well as accommodating visitors in close proximity to each other. One of common points of praise on the feedback form, and when talking to visitors, was the opportunities they had to 'make friends and get to know people'. So, in refusing visitors the possibility of attachment to the community; they in fact facilitated the attachment of visitors to other visitors.

It should be becoming clear that BWC cannot be understood in terms of either detachment and individuation nor attachment and sociality. It needs to be understood in terms of *both* because participants (residents and visitors) exhibit and experience multiple movements between practices and processes of attachment and practices and processes of detachment. This movement is not unique to BWC: the meditations at SM, for example, move between figuring retreatants as individuals (detached) and figuring them as social beings (attached) *even* when the process of retreat has moved onto instruction in how to relate to others. Similarly, participation in RR and RFM brings about an attachment that is severed when the occasion finishes only to give way to another attachment the following week. This movement – between attachment and detachment – can be thought of in terms of motility. Thinking back to my earlier analysis of motility, we can recall that the impossibility of refusal is central to the concept and that is exactly what I am arguing here. For instance, the detachment that precedes the movement to BWC does not necessitate the disposal of the attachment from which it sprang (I have shown that residents do not leave their 'mainstream' social bonds behind – they are always an absent presence) just as the attachments occasioned during attunement do not dispose of the possibility of being a detached individual (the private property lurking in individuals' living quarters testifies to the absent presence here). Similarly, when residents at BWC are – through work or otherwise – acting as detached individuals; the attachment to others is never disposed of because attunement is never far away, and - as we saw when everything was dropped to attend to a resident who had received some bad news - the attachment to others can be mobilised at a moment's notice. Indeed, if the attachment that is (re)created through attunement *were* to be rendered absent when attunement finishes then, in Durkheim's (1915[2001]) terms, we could take attunement to be an instance of *magic* rather than *religion*. That is to say: something that does not unite individuals into a moral community because they are just individuals partaking in the same cult rather than participating in a *shared* one. To think this would underestimate the importance of attunement and leads to the idea that attunement does not actually serve any purpose for the collective. In actuality, many residents recognise the role it plays in (re)creating solidarity: 'without it we couldn't be a community…it is here that we sort things out and get ourselves together'. Similarly, the attachments occasioned at RR and SM have been shown not to disappear after the event (leaving

participants as detached individuals) in so far as lasting attachments, groups, networks and friendships have been forged.

The above idea – that attachments cannot be disposed of – stands in stark contrast to Bauman's later work on 'liquidity' (2000, 2003) where he notes that relationships and bonds are somehow 'fluid' and ultimately disposable. Once again, I am trying to think of mobility less in terms of fluidity and more in terms of *motility* (Munro, 2001 [1992]). Of course, strictly speaking, motility is about the movement between and impossibility of disposing of *meanings* rather than the movement between and impossibility of disposing of social bonds and persons. Thinking back to chapter six, where I argued that all phenomena – objects, values and practices – should be thought of in terms of the *meanings* that they carry, I would like to make a similar argument here. I see no reason for making a distinction between the attachment and detachment of concepts such as 'margin' or 'morality' and the attachment and detachment of persons. Notions of detachment – that is to say individuation and identity and those of attachment – community and society – are, like the 'margin' or the 'mainstream', characterised by certain objects, values and practices that rest on the *meaning* bestowed on them. For example, the idea of being an individual rests on certain practices (such as working and spending time alone), objects (a private living space) and values (such as entertaining the possibility of private property) which in turn rests on the meanings they assume. Hitherto, my analysis has been using the metaphor of the fold to account for the complexity and incongruity that characterises alterity. The analysis in this chapter can be seen to add more meanings to the fold because notions of individuation/identity and community/society are just lines of flight (meanings) that are intertwined with others to form part of the fold. My argument here is that alterity is characterised by the co-existence of 'individuality' and 'sociality' in as much as it provides scope for reflexive development and individuation (detachment) but it also provides opportunities for identification, sociality and community (attachment). When we recall that Durkheim's opus exhibits a concern with finding the *balance* between individualism and social integration/regulation; this insight can be seen as highly Durkheimian. Moreover, it hints that alterity is a form of social ordering that represents an antidote to *anomie* or *demoralisation* however I will save this discussion for the conclusion.

I am labouring the point about the movement between attachment and detachment being characterised by *motility* to distance my analysis from any theories that identify or celebrate 'liquidity' and 'fluidity'. Even Maffesoli's analysis of neo-tribes rests on the idea that persons move seamlessly in and out of collectives. Motility – as I have already stated but it bears repeating - is a different kind of mobility to fluidity. Motility debunks the notion of perfect mobility on which fluidity rests through highlighting the impossibility of refusal, disposal and *complete* detachment. To this, I want to add the recognition that persons cannot glide into attachments because there is a difficulty of *arrival*. For example, the attachments detailed here in respect of alterity studied are *not* available to everybody nor can they be moved into easily. At a rather banal level, I have already noted 'blocks' in the form of the geographical locations (and surely fluidity should take account of spatial mobility!) and the fact that participation in these settings costs a lot of money. The most striking point on this note was a conversation that I had at BWC with John, about *who* it is that goes there. He tells me that not one of the residents was born into this way of life – indicating some form of mobility – but goes on to tell me that *everyone* who comes (residents and visitors) are 'white, middle class and somewhere between 25 and 65' (though there are exceptions in terms of the children and one elderly gentleman). He goes on to tell me that, in his four years here, it has always been so and although they have European and American residents and visitors; they never have anyone from an 'ethnic minority or a poor background'. To account for this, he posits: 'I guess they have other priorities...coming here is a luxury and as such, we only ever get white, would be radicals'. Furthermore, although two years is the average length of a stay (again, indicating a level of fluidity) this means that people are ultimately going to leave and need something to go back to (indeed, this was the dilemma facing medium term volunteers). This means that they need to be in a position to come to BWC without 'burning their bridges' (the impossibility of disposal). Essentially, those without the capital (economic, social, cultural) to so do are unlikely to be in a position to *arrive* indicating a further block on the perfect mobility that fluidity necessitates.

On a deeper level, the attachments observed at the fieldwork sites do not 'come out of nowhere', so to speak (excuse the double negative). Maffesoli's analysis of neo-tribalism (1996) suggests that attachments are spontaneous, improvised and deriving from some sort of *puissance* just as theories of liquidity posit that one can just 'buy their way in' (assuming that they have the capital). However we have already seen that paying visitors at BWC were not successful in their attempts to 'buy their way in' and attach themselves to the community. Equally well, a lot of work goes into (re)creating the attachment that exists *within* the community (rituals, living together, working together *etcetera*). Elsewhere, the sense of attachment that is manifest in some form of sociality requires a lot of work. For example, the collective effervescence at WOMAD relies on rhythm, ritual, dancing and the general atmosphere of the carnivalesque that characterises the festival. Similarly, the effervescence occasioned at RR rests on organisation, repetition and rhythm whilst the attachment made possible at SM rests on the process of retreat and bureaucratic organisation (as detailed in chapter seven). My point is, the sociality and attachments that alterity affords do not magically appear and exist only on the surface (as Bauman would have it). Underlying the sociality and morality that alterity occasions are complex processes of social ordering (as detailed in chapter five) and once again I am offering a Durkheimian corrective to ideas that (a) celebrate the 'death of the social' and (b) view social ordering as something that neutralises moral impulse.

9

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION.

At this juncture, I would like to afford myself the luxury of reflection as I consider briefly what it is that I have done in these pages. Ethnography, as detailed in chapter one, is a practice of writing and one that involves the making of connections (Strathern, 1991). In producing this ethnography, I have had rather more connections to make and contend with than I could possibly have imagined. The first difficulty stems from attempting to write a multi-site ethnography (Marcus, 1986). Not only have I had to make connections between the 'webs of significance' that constitute any given site; I have had to make connections *between* the sites. In doing so, I have resisted the temptation to offer a straight forward comparison between the sites (the easy way out in my eyes) in favour of making connections that make possible the evocation (Tyler, 1986) of my research object, alterity. Coupled with this, I have had to consider my commitment to theory and this involves the making of connections between ideas (and connections between the data and ideas). In the course of writing it became clear (through connections I was making in the analysis of the data) that I had to engage in many theoretical debates. Moreover, my engagement with these theoretical debates involved me bringing together a desultory and eclectic range of perspectives (for example, chapter seven brings Durkheim together with Deleuze and Guattari in its analysis of embodiment). Clearly then, my commitment to social theory necessitates the making of many connections that need to be *written* alongside the evocation of alterity. Additionally, thinking back to chapter one, I argued that there is a 'third strand' (concerned with social philosophy) running through the thesis alongside the evocation of alterity and the work of theory. Again *this* requires more connections to be made.

In spite of this difficulty there is not, as far as I know, a model of 'best practice' for making these connections and writing ethnography. As such, I have tried to write a series of sedimentations that bring together the multitude of connections between my theory, data and philosophy. Of course, this involves so many connections *not* being made and as such there is so much data and so many ideas/lines of analysis

that I have *had* to leave out. I made my decisions about what to include on the basis of what I think matters and perhaps more importantly, in terms of what *fits*. With this, I have attempted to present the sedimentations in a way that enables the most important connection of all; the connection between the ethnography and the reader. My intention in this chapter is to bring together the threads of analysis that flow from these sedimentations and tease out the arguments that I am trying to make. On this note, I add two points of clarification: (i) this chapter is not intended to present or discuss new empirical material; the arguments here are matters of social theory and social philosophy and (ii) this chapter is *not* a conclusion; as chapter one has made clear, it is not my intention to make conclusions. Instead, a 'summary and discussion' is offered such that I can 'add without and equals sign' (Hetherington, 1998) and 'displace without effacing'.

Summary of Analysis Chapters

My intention here is to refresh the reader and recap the arguments that were made in each analysis chapter. In doing so, it is hoped that I will (i) summarise my engagement with theoretical debates and (ii) pave the way for discussions of 'demoralisation' and 'alterity' that are not clouded by the artificial distinction between analytic chapters.

Before summarising the arguments that I have made in the analysis chapters, a brief detour is required. I noted in chapter three that my analytic attitude is a personalised variant of deconstruction. It is worth reiterating here what it is that I have been 'deconstructing'. In the analysis chapters, I have been deconstructing – or *displacing* – ideas that emanate from the literature presented in chapter two such as the idea that there is a 'margin/mainstream' dichotomy or that the market effaces morality. Of course, these are ideas that are common to both social theory and my ethnographic subjects (because demoralisation is an *engaged* concept) and as such, my analysis chapters are intended to pave the way for a discussion about the nature of 'demoralisation' and the possibility of 'alterity'.

Chapter five.

Chapter five engaged with the concept of 'marginality' and the reasons for this are two-fold. One the one hand, the fieldwork sites were seen to constitute themselves as 'Other' by virtue of their 'marginality' which in turn was juxtaposed with the 'mainstream' of society. On the other, prevailing social theory reflects this dichotomy and celebrates the margins as spaces of transgression. Adopting the Derridean strategy of *trace*, the analysis demonstrated that the occasioning of marginality at the fieldwork sites in question was contaminated or *supplemented* by 'the mainstream'. The presence of the mainstream was manifest in, among other things: reliance on foundations in the mainstream, 'travelling' (usually by car) back to the mainstream and most importantly by attachment to objects, values and practices that *they* constitute as 'mainstream'. From here, it was argued that the margins are complex and heterogeneous spaces by virtue of (i) the desultory range of phenomena that are constituted as 'marginal' and (ii) the interplay and reliance of the margin on the mainstream that they seek to subvert. To make sense of this tangle, Hetherington's concept of *heterotopia* (1997) was deployed and a corollary of doing so was that the importance of social ordering was highlighted. Empirical evidence was presented to support Hetherington's contention that sites of alterity (Other spaces) rest on processes of social ordering and as such, it was demonstrated that 'the margins' are characterised by the co-existence of order and transgression.

In highlighting the importance of social ordering at the margins; another one of social theory's dichotomies was displaced. Social theory tends to view 'modernity' as synonymous with social order and the margins of society as spaces of transgression. Indeed, my own work began (see chapter two) with the idea that alterity might represent a transgression of demoralisation (which one can easily view as a problem *caused* by modernity). However my analysis, following Hetherington (1997) and Strathern (1991), suggests that 'modernity' is not a stable concept that can be placed within a 'black box' (Latour, 1987). Taking modernity as the work of social ordering, it was argued that *all* persons in *all* spaces are 'modern' in the respect of the fact that *everybody* is involved in this work of social ordering. Thinking back to chapter one, it was argued that the social is perpetually ordered and reordered as *relations* are elicited from moment to moment and with

this, it follows that 'modernity' is just an ordering of relations that is made and remade incessantly. With this, it was argued that there is no transgression of modernity; only the movement between different forms of it (from complexity and heterogeneity to complexity and heterogeneity).

Having broken down the dichotomies of 'freedom *versus* order' and 'margin *versus* mainstream'; this chapter considered how we might account for and *write* this complexity and heterogeneity. Building on Hetherington's analysis of heterotopia, I suggested that we think of 'Other spaces' – alterity - in terms of the fold (Deleuze, 1993). The fold was presented as a way of considering the interconnections between multiple and incongruous phenomena. It was also argued that the movement between the phenomena that constitute the fold should be thought of in terms of motility (Munro, 2001 [1992]). The reason for this, as stated, is that it allows for the analysis to consider the trace of the mainstream *without* suggesting that this presence undermines what is accomplished at 'the margin'. In thinking of alterity as a fold, it was noted that any given fold exhibits multiple interconnections and is folded in, so to speak, with other folds (again, this builds on Hetherington's analysis of heterotopia). As such, it was argued that alterity is just one ordering of relations and is connected – in multiple and complex ways – to other orderings of relations whilst the movement between these orderings of relations was presented in terms of motility. In essence, the main contribution of this chapter is to add to Hetherington's analysis of heterotopia (as a way of considering alterity) through bringing the concepts of the fold and motility to the table.

Chapter six.

Chapter six engaged with the interface between the market and morality. As was the case with chapter five, the reasons for doing so are two-fold. On the one hand, the fieldwork sites constituted themselves as some sort of 'moral alternative' to the market economy. Similarly, social theory (and accepted wisdom for that matter) tends to view the market as anathema to any moral considerations or more severely, as something that actually effaces morality. Of particular note here is the work of Bauman (1998) that views the market as a social form that neutralises or *adiaphorises* morality and moral capacity. The analysis in this chapter displaces

this idea through demonstrating how the morality occasioned at the fieldwork sites in question relies on engagement with practices of consumption and exchange. It was argued that practices of monetary, commodity, labour and gift exchange can actually enable rather than efface morality. It was shown that some of the fieldwork sites exchanged the provision of retreat for money and/or gifts which had 'moral' consequences in terms of (i) generating money with which to meet food, utility and commodity needs thus ensuring the longevity of practices that are figured as 'moral alternatives' and (ii) providing visitors with access to 'moral alternatives' that they would not have in the absence of money and the market. Similarly, it was shown that the market circulates and supplies produce that is constituted as 'ethical' in response to a demand whilst consumption of such produce allows persons to fashion moral identities and attachments on ethical and aesthetic levels. It was also argued that the market can enact and catalyse a sense of the carnivalesque which in turn subverts and inverts the predicament of demoralisation. Finally, it was shown that practices of labour exchange can facilitate or even necessitate moral and affectual outcomes.

The crux of the argument was that the market *can* circulate moralities just as it circulates money, labour, gifts and commodities. To make this argument, it was demonstrated that the market can be thought of in terms of *relations* of exchange that are elicited from moment to moment. In conceiving of the market in terms of relations (and processes) rather than a 'thing', it was shown that the meanings and moralities that are routed through them are not fixed nor are they certain. In light of the previous chapter's analysis (and chapter one), it follows that different orderings of relations circulate different meanings; some of which are constituted as moral, some of which are constituted as immoral. The analysis in chapter six argued that the fieldwork sites in question were orderings of relations that, at least some of the time, circulate meanings that are constituted as moral. In terms of the fold, it was argued that practices of exchange and conceptions of morality/immorality can be added to the phenomena that chapter five positioned within the fold. In terms of motility, it was demonstrated that movements from away 'morality' to 'immorality' do *not* mean that the market is immoral; they merely represent a shift to a different ordering of relations that could, at any moment, flip back again.

In noting the presence of the market (practices and relations of exchange) within the fold that constitutes alterity; the analysis picked up on the implications of this in terms of transgression. It was argued that the transgression of the market (attempts to create a moral alternative) rely, paradoxically, on multiple engagements with the market itself such that the market is folded into morality and morality is folded in with the market. The most important argument in this respect is the idea that alterity does not and cannot represent a sustained and coherent alternative to market hegemony. The analysis demonstrated that alterity is characterised by intermittent movements and moments of 'doing' morality and suggested that the potency of what alterity accomplishes derives from the fact that it is temporary. Interestingly, it was shown that the fieldwork sites do not constitute themselves as coherent and sustained alternatives; rather they try to do what they can through working with the resources available (such as the market) with the view that doing something is better than doing nothing.

Chapter seven.

Chapter seven addressed the importance of embodiment in my thesis at empirical, theoretical and philosophical levels (i.e. pertaining to all three strands). As mentioned, I did not intend to write a chapter on embodiment but the data made it necessary to do so. Nevertheless, in my view at least, it is a pivotal chapter that brings together many of the themes in the thesis. The analysis in chapter seven considered the role of the body in process of identity formation and individuation. Picking up on a major theme in the sociology of embodiment literature, it addressed the ways in which the body is a *project* that persons work upon. Firstly, it was shown that the body's interior *and exterior* are worked upon in processes of fashioning identities that are constituted as 'marginal', 'moral' and 'Other'. It was argued that (i) these processes involve more that just the attachment of objects to bodies; they also involve the attachment of (or attachment of the body to) practices and values (ii) the objects, values and practices that are *not* attached to the body (are detached) are every bit as important as those that are. In addition to highlighting the importance of this 'Cartesian body' where the body is subservient to the mind's will; the analysis showed the presence of the 'Foucaultian body' where the body is disciplined in order to discipline the mind. However, it was argued that the

Foucaultian body in *my* analysis was implicated in projects of self because it had little to do with control and surveillance. Instead, it was argued that the instances where bodies were disciplined in order to discipline minds (in particular, the processing of bodies at SM) were processes that persons had participated in voluntarily with a view to developing their moral and social capabilities.

In addition to highlighting the body as a site of individuation and identity formation; the analysis demonstrated the ways in which the body is a site of social and affectual *revitalisation*. Again, the analysis here picked up on a major theme in the sociology of embodiment; the idea that 'de-vitalisation' (which is conceptually very similar to demoralisation) – or the cool, calculating, individualised and rational nature of Western culture- is manifest in cool, calculating, individualised and rational forms of embodiment. It was shown that alterity's subversion of this 'de-vitalisation' rests on bodily practice, most notably dancing. Here, it was argued that through dancing, persons can 'do' bodies in ways that are *not* cool, calculating and individualised and in doing so they can experience some sense of collective effervescence. From here, it was argued that persons are consequently able to reconnect – at a bodily level – to some sense of the *divin social* and the warmth of a collectivity. At a theoretical and philosophical level, this section brought together Lefebvre's analysis of rhythm (2004) and Deleuze and Guattari's notion of *affect* (1994 1995 1997) together with insights from Durkheim (1915 [2001]) and the sociology of the body (Mellor and Shilling, 1997 1998) in order to develop understandings of where this sense of collective effervescence might come from and how it works.

Finally, in terms of the thesis' 'third strand' (which was termed 'social philosophy' in chapter one), it was argued that the possibility of embodiment is central (for want of a better word) to my conceiving of alterity in terms of a fold. It was argued that the phenomena that constitute the fold – objects, values and practices – should be thought of in terms of *meanings*. It follows that the interconnectedness and multiplicity that characterises the fold is essentially the interconnectedness and multiplicity of meanings. From here, it was argued that the movement *between* meanings (movements that the analysis in chapters five and six discussed in detail) rests on the attachment and detachment of different meanings – via the attachment

and detachment of objects, values and practices – to the body. Using Marilyn Strathern's concept of extension, it was argued that differing attachments and detachments to the body made visible the different meanings within the fold. As such, it was concluded that the meanings that constitute the fold *need* to be incorporated if their presence is to be magnified (Latimer and Munro, 2006).

Chapter eight.

Much of the analysis in chapter eight picked up on the analysis in chapter seven. Primarily, it picked up on the idea that notions of individuality/identity co-exist with those of community/sociality and in that respect, this chapter was very Durkheimian. More significantly, it focused on the *possibilities* of sociality that alterity affords and the reason for this is found in chapter two where demoralisation (the predicament that alterity is studied in relation to) was presented as a predicament that is characterised, at least in part, by anomie and a deficiency in social integration. The analysis in chapter eight began by illustrating the ways in which alterity affords persons enough detachment and individuation with which to tend to their projects of self and fashion their identities as 'marginal', 'moral' and 'Other'. However, it was argued that alongside these processes, alterity offers the possibility of attachment to others in the form of community, living and working together, tribalism, neo-tribalism and identification with like minded others. Furthermore, it was argued that even temporary attachments to others could provide meaningful social bonds (or at least bonds that are constituted as meaningful by those who experience them). Linking back to the analysis in chapter seven, the importance of *ritual* was demonstrated in terms of creating and renewing the attachments that alterity affords.

It was then argued that, despite the possibilities of attachment, alterity is still very much characterised by many levels of detachment and individuation. With this, it was demonstrated that alterity is characterised by the *movement* between the attachment and the detachment of persons in the same way that it is characterised – as chapter seven demonstrated – by the movement between meanings. In fact, it was argued that notions of individuality/identity and community/sociality should be though of in terms of meanings because - like notions of 'marginality' or 'morality'- they rest on certain objects, practices and values which in turn rest on the meanings

that they assume. Essentially, the analysis in this chapter positioned the meanings of identity/individuality and community/sociality within the fold alongside the other meanings that the previous chapters had uncovered. In doing so, it was argued that alterity is characterised by both the co-existence of these meanings *and* the movement between them. Similarly, it was argued that this movement – like any other – should be thought of in terms of motility. It was argued that motility, with its focus on the impossibility of disposal, is particularly poignant here as it allows the analysis to distance itself from any notions of 'disposable' bonds (for example Bauman, 2003) and defend itself against the 'death of the social' (Baudrillard, 1983). Finally, in addition to noting the impossibility of disposing of social bonds; the difficulty of creating and arriving at social bonds was noted by way of (i) highlighting the importance – and the work that goes into- processes of social ordering and (ii) distancing the analysis from any notions of 'fluidity' or 'liquidity'.

Alterity

Given the title and focus of this thesis (an ethnography of alterity), it follows that I should address and summarise what it is that I am trying to say about *alterity*. Having looked back over the analysis and summarised my engagement with various theoretical debates; I am now in a position to do so. To begin, I must add the caveat that I am not trying to make any denotative moves (Hetherington, 1998) or grand statements about how alterity *is*. Instead, I am trying to add perspectives and understandings to social theory's understandings of alterity whilst recognising that these perspectives and understandings are specific to my data and my analysis. With this, a discussion of my arguments *in relation to alterity* is offered to pave the way for the next section where I discuss alterity in relation to demoralisation and the possibilities of cultural and affectual subversion.

My analysis of alterity is grounded in my empirical data but above all, my intention is to make connections between the data and *ideas* with a view towards developing theoretical understandings of alterity. The starting point in my analysis of alterity is Hetherington's (1998) concept of heterotopia. Hetherington posits that heterotopias – spaces of Otherness – are complex spaces that are constituted by a heterogeneous collection of materiality, practice and event. Such a concept is attractive as it allows for an analysis of alterity that does not reduce complexity and incongruity (which,

as chapter three made clear, is exactly why I chose to adopt a multi-site approach to ethnography). The salient point in Hetherington's analysis is that these spaces of otherness are characterised by the co-existence of freedom and transgression with processes of social ordering as well as a 'tangle' between the margin and the mainstream. My own data supports this analysis (see chapter five) in as much as the spaces of alterity that I studied constituted themselves as marginal whilst being characterised by the presence of values, objects and practices that *they* constitute as mainstream just as they offer the promise of transgression (the essence of Otherness) whilst relying on processes of social ordering. My own analysis builds on this idea (see chapters seven and eight) through showing that this incongruity, complexity and heterogeneity extends to the presence of the market and morality as well as notions of identity/individuation and community/sociality. Moreover, it was demonstrated that these phenomena are manifest in objects, values and practices. My argument here is that these phenomena are not only present within spaces of otherness but are connected in multiple and complex ways.

In light of this complexity, interconnectedness and apparent incongruity; my argument is that alterity can be thought of as a fold. In no way am I trying to suggest that the concept of heterotopia is limited; I am just adding perspectives to it that are grounded in my data and analysis. For now, I am using the fold as a heuristic device with which to theorise and write this complexity; however, I will be positioning the fold as more than this in the final section of this chapter/thesis. In light of this, I should summarise the key points I have made about the fold. Firstly however, a detour is required to reiterate that the natural tendency within social theory/sociology is to theorise and write this complexity in terms of *liminality* such that heterotopias are conceived of as 'liminally constituted spaces'. However, as noted, liminality is seen to have a very specific anthropological meaning – as an interstructural situation – that is not appropriate or satisfactory for my purposes. For a start, an interstructural situation implies that there is structure either side of the liminal such that conceptions of 'margin', 'mainstream', 'freedom', 'order' 'market', morality', 'individuality' and 'sociality' are fixed. However, my analysis has already shown that conceptions of these phenomena are *not* fixed. For example, chapter five detailed that what is constituted as 'marginal' depends very much on context (remember how in one moment meat eating was constituted as 'mainstream'

and in another it was constituted as 'marginal') and manifestation (marginality is not a unitary phenomena: BWC's constitution of marginality is different to SM's which is different to RR's *etcetera*) just as chapter six demonstrated the 'the market' is a set of relations that are elicited from moment to moment and chapter eight detailed the many forms that 'sociality' can take (ranging from identification to community). Similarly, this notion of 'being inbetween' is problematic. Heterotopias are not 'inbetween' the margin and the mainstream (for example), rather they are characterised by their co-existence and the co-existence of multiple phenomena. Another problem – the main problem - with liminality is that it is rather one dimensional. At best it can account for complexity through recognising the 'grey area' between just two concepts – such as 'margin' and 'mainstream' – which is clearly unsatisfactory because the analysis highlights the co-existence of *multiple* concepts.

In *The Fold* (1993) Gilles Deleuze offers a complex, fragmented and prismatic philosophy that recognises that reality is far more complex than thought would have it and provides an antidote to the one-dimensional thinking that the concept of liminality fails to transcend. Within the fold, there are no points or positions; just curvaceous lines of flight. It is not a system, nor can it be conceived of as a structural or generative model that can be divided into (discrete) units. Any 'point' that theory or philosophy positions within the fold is, in actuality, connected to any other 'point' and as such, one cannot posit a dualism of x versus y with the presence of one intimating the absence of the other. The curvaceous lines of flight are folded together in ways that generate surfaces (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987 refer to these surfaces as plateaus) or, as I have called them, sedimentations. In relation to the data, the phenomena – objects, values practices - that the analysis uncovered can be thought of as the lines of flight that constitute the fold. As the analysis in chapter seven (and eight) demonstrated, these phenomena/lines of flight should be thought of in terms of *meanings*. In thinking of the fold as the interconnection between meanings; it is easy to see why the fold is useful for theorising and writing culture which, in this case, is alterity. It is therefore the intersection of meanings that gives rise to surfaces or sedimentations such as 'margin', 'mainstream', 'freedom', 'order', 'market', 'morality', 'individuality/identity' and 'community/sociality'.

These surfaces/sedimentations are connected to others through a potentially limitless and varied array of connections, tangents and intersections such that any elicitation of relations within the fold that constitutes alterity can connect these surfaces in a limitless and possibly incongruous array of formations. Essentially, the fold allows for the 'grey area' (more accurately, the interconnectedness) between *multiple* concepts.

Not only does the fold allow for the co-existence and interconnectedness of these surfaces and sedimentations; it allows for the movement between them. Because the lines of flight (meanings) are curvaceous; their twisting, turning and movements can be seen to constitute the fold. It follows that the fold is a very 'sensuous' analogy premised on a philosophy of 'pleats, curves and twisting surfaces'. Of course this hints at infinite movement and the baroque trait to which Deleuze is alluding wherein these twists and turns produce folds which fold upon themselves through further folding, unfolding and refolding such that the multiplicity (the fold) produces submultiplicty after submultiplicty without dissolving into units or positions. It is with this that I am adding the concept of motility to the fold (which in turn, I am adding to that of heterotopia). Motility is a form of movement that rests on the impossibility of *disposing* of meanings (Munro, 2001 [1992]). The implication of this is that any movement within the fold, any movement between surfaces, is a movement between meanings (because it rests on the movement between certain objects, values and practices which in turn rests on the *meanings* that they carry). Taking the concept of motility in conjunction with that of the fold it can be noted that meanings cannot be disposed of irrefutably because they remain in the fold. For instance a movement from x to y – for example, from objects, values and practices that are constituted as 'marginal' to objects values and practices that are constituted as 'mainstream' – does not mean that the meanings of x (the margin) disappear; it means that they are *absent presences* that could re-appear again at any given moment, with any given movement. What is made present is purely a matter of perspective and I will address this presently. For now, I should highlight that the importance of this in terms of writing ethnography lies in the idea that the surfaces within the fold are twisting. It would be *very* easy to view alterity as a spectacle or simulacra (Baudrillard, 1981 [1994]) that promises marginality, morality and sociality yet falls apart and offers nothing as soon as one scrapes beneath the

surface. Indeed, my first attempt at analysing the data considered alterity as a masquerade beneath which there was a meaningless void on the grounds that the data contradicted my own expectations of how alterity should be (hopefully, I have moved beyond this satisfactorily). However, recognising that surfaces are twisting highlights that it is unsatisfactory to think in terms of a surface *versus* substance dichotomy and reproduce postmodern tendencies to write off 'contradiction' (more accurately, complexity) as dramaturgical enactment of culture. It actually allows the analysis to view this so-called 'nowhere' beneath the surface as the *now here*; as another surface, another ordering of relations, that needs to be explored, understood and explained if one is to evoke what it is that one has encountered.

Finally, in taking the different surfaces within the fold as different orderings of relations; the importance of perspective can be highlighted through addressing *how* certain surfaces and meanings come to be visible within the fold. Where chapters five, six and eight detailed the meanings that constitute the fold; it was chapter seven, with its focus on embodiment, which addressed this issue. My argument here is that the movement between these surfaces – motility – relies on embodiment. This argument derives from Strathern's (1991) concept of extension. Extension is concerned with the attachment (and detachment) of parts to persons (bodies) and posits that it is these processes (of attachment and detachment) that elicit relations. In my analysis, this intimates that the attachment and detachment of parts – which can be taken as the meanings/lines of flight that constitute the fold – elicits different surfaces. It follows that extension solidifies meanings – if only partially and temporarily – through magnifying the presence of certain phenomena in the here and now. My argument, following Latimer and Munro (2006) is that the different meanings in the fold become visible and solidified through attachment to the body. It follows that motility, the movement between meanings and surfaces, *must* be characterised by differing attachments and detachments to the body. I am therefore stating that motility is *mobilised* and made possible through grounding these meanings in attachments to the body. The implication of this is that the fold, alterity, needs the capacity to incorporate (through embodiment) its meanings if they are to be solidified, magnified and above all, given presence.

This section has summarised the line of analysis that suggests that alterity can be thought of in terms of a fold. At an empirical level, I noted in chapter one that ethnography does not need to reduce complexity and impurity (Strathern, 1991) and it is hoped that the fold is a useful heuristic device for *writing* alterity in way that does not reduce the complexity that it exhibits. At a theoretical level, it is hoped that I have built on Hetherington's analysis of alterity in terms of heterotopia through adding (without an equals sign) the concepts of the fold (Deleuze, 1993), motility (Munro, 2001 [1992]) and extension (Strathern, 1996). The next section addresses the *impurity* of the fold that represents alterity through discussing the possibility of subverting the predicament we began with, demoralisation.

Demoralisation and Subversion

At an empirical level, this section addresses the possibilities of cultural and affectual subversion. At a theoretical level, it crosses scale and makes different connections (Strathern, 1991) between my analysis of alterity and theoretical accounts of demoralisation which in turn shows that ethnography can be used to engage with 'meta-theoretical' debates. Again, I will add the caveat that I am *not* trying to make statements about how demoralisation *is*; I am just attempting to add perspectives and understandings. To begin, let us recap and recall that demoralisation is a *theoretical* concept that engages with real world predicaments. My reading of the term suggests that it is an umbrella concept that accounts for (i) an absence of moral guidance with which to guide conduct (ii) an absence in morale in as much as persons do not consider themselves happy or satisfied and (iii) a deficiency in sociality. Let us also recall that chapter two provided a theoretical rationale for studying alterity as a potential space of remoralisation which, through the provision of social integration, regulation and morale, might provide cultural and affectual forms of subversion or at least respite from a cultural and affectual predicament. To the extent that I am willing to think in terms of 'research questions'; this one is pivotal so I should start with a discussion of the extent to which the empirical encounter supports this conjecture.

Before doing so however, we must think back to chapter two where we saw that it is the work of Fevre (2000) that provides the link between demoralisation,

remoralisation and alterity. Here, it is important to recap the mechanism that Fevre identifies for remoralisation. Fevre posits that remoralisation requires us to make new sense through recombining existing elements of the sense making strategies that we already have (elements of science, common sense, religion and sentiment) in new and innovative ways. However, before new sense can be made, we need a subject, a *first cause*, to make sense of. In terms of first causes: religion had god, science had nature, common sense had human nature and sentiment had human spirit. It follows that new sense making requires a new first cause. Fevre stresses that we do not need to start from scratch because between science, religion, sentiment and common sense we already have a significant body of language, ideas and concepts. For Fevre, the task of culture is to bring together existing yet disparate elements and begin making sense of the new first cause. From this, he argues that new ideas about how the world is and how it ought to be will follow. Alterity was taken as a 'small scale' instance of where we might find this remoralisation. Recall from chapter two that recombination (remoralisation) is intended to make new sense and rejuvenate morality in different areas of human activity. Alterity is here taken as an area of human activity in so much as it is an activity of ordering the social (or, the ordering of relations) along different lines and represents a tangible 'case study' in how this recombination/remoralisation might work. Indeed, I started with the idea that those participating in alternative lifestyles constitute themselves as some sort of moral elect and here, it is worth repeating a quote from Hetherington that I used in chapter two:

"[l]ifestyles... associated with 'new social movements' seek to make life meaningful on affectual and value-rational grounds...others – indeed the whole category of Other – become significant on emotional *and* moral grounds" (Hetherington, 1998: p.94 my emphasis)

The significance of the above quote is that it provides a concise statement of the congruity of alterity with Fevre's model of remoralisation

Thinking back to my discussion of alterity, the thrust of my argument was that alterity can be thought of as a fold, the essence of which is the co-existence of multiple and complex phenomena. It is a short step from here to consider that alterity (taken as a fold) represents the 'recombination' of existing phenomena in

novel and innovative configurations. Indeed, I have suggested that alterity is characterised by the co-existence of disparate phenomena in the form of objects, values and practices and the meanings given to them. Similarly, the meanings that constitute the fold are not created from scratch (even if they are elicited and renewed from moment to moment). On this note, I am borrowing ideas from the work of Taussig (1993) who suggests that alterity rests on the mimesis of that which already exits because this is necessary if the meanings are to be meaningful. Now, having seen that alterity fulfils the criterion of 'recombination' it can be seen that alterity has its own first cause. The first cause in this case is 'Otherness' or 'difference' and from this, attempts to translate the idea of difference into actuality are made. For example, constituting a space as 'moral' and 'marginal' whilst juxtaposing it with the mainstream and the market is an attempt to make concrete an ephemeral belief in difference. Please recall that the concept of heterotopia addresses attempts to translate ideas into practice whilst showing that such attempts are met only with endless deferral. I will deal with this in due course but for now, we just need to note that alterity – or at least the spaces that I experienced and interrogated – can be thought of as the ordering of the social along different lines in response to the 'first cause' of Otherness. The analysis has demonstrated that this commitment to doing something differently creates guides to action as well as moral and ethical precepts/intentions to adhere to. For example, among other things, BWC is premised on ecology, SM is premised on 'being mindful towards Others', TD is premised on the consumption of fair trade produce, RFM is premised on a commitment to local producers and WOMAD is characterised by letting go on the one hand and charitable donations on the other. Similarly, many of the participants in this study cited their participation in alternative lifestyles and practices as a source of happiness and well being. Finally, as chapter eight examined in detail, these spaces of alterity are characterised by the possibility of sociality and social integration. It certainly seems that alterity can provide some sort of subversion, or at least transgression, of demoralisation. However, unsurprisingly, it is not as simple as that.

I noted in chapter one that cultures are not pure and alterity is no exception. In conceiving of alterity as fold it follows that alterity is related to, is folded together with, other folds or 'cultures'. Indeed, Deleuze makes explicit the idea that any fold

is folded into lots of other folds. To see this, please recall that any fold can be unfolded and refolded such that the multiplicity (the fold) produces submultiplicty after submultiplicty without dissolving into units or positions. It follows that the fold that constitutes alterity is a submultiplicty that is part of a 'larger' multiplicity. Similarly, Hetherington's analysis of heterotopia (on which my analysis of alterity is built) highlights that the margins of society are constituted by modernity (even though they are often thought of as attempts to transgress modernity) just as modernity is constituted by its margins. With this, we have a very fungible illustration of different folds, different cultures, folding together. This recognition of impurity raises two general issues about the nature and possibility of transgression and subversion. The analysis chapters, particularly chapters five and six, dealt with these issues in depth and here I am attempting to distil and crystallise these insights. To take them each in turn:

Firstly, the subversion of demoralisation detailed above does not represent a coherent and sustained alternative to the predicaments I have presented under the term demoralisation. Instead, the spaces of alterity studied are characterised by intermittent moments in which morality, morale and sociality are occasioned. Indeed, the analysis demonstrated that these spaces are equally well characterised by the moral ambivalence and anomie that characterises the predicament of demoralisation. For example, moral ambivalence at BWC was evidenced by discussions I had with residents concerning the *uncertainty* they felt: 'even though we have our intentions; it is hard to know what is right...the most obvious example is that recycling requires us to use a car and there are no answers as to what the right thing to do is'. Equally well, I have shown that the residents at BWC spend a large portion of their time away from the collective, working alone and spending time alone in their own living quarters. Admittedly they seem to like this; however, it shows that BWC is not a space characterised by the sustained possibility of social integration. It is fruitful to consider these moments of subversion and refuge as surfaces within the fold that are liable to twist and unfold at any moment. They are particular orderings of relations *within* spaces of alterity that do not render alterity 'as a whole' a space of subversion.

In fact, it should be clear that alterity *cannot* be thought of as a whole nor can it be thought of as a space of wholesale subversion. I have argued throughout this thesis that culture is never fixed; it is always in the making and elicited from moment to moment. It follows that alterity is not a thing, it is a process and as such, cannot be pinned down and conceived of as a wholesale subversion of demoralisation. Indeed, spaces that we think of as 'mainstream' and plagued by the predicament of demoralisation could equally well exhibit 'surfaces' or 'sedimentations' where the ordering of relations represents the same subversion that spaces of alterity offer. Recall, the movement between cultures is a movement from complexity and heterogeneity to complexity and heterogeneity and as such there is no ontological difference between spaces. On this note, it is worth recalling that participants in the study do not constitute their practice as a coherent and sustained alternative to what they seek to subvert. Indeed, in chapter five I detailed the difficulty experienced by the residents of BWC when trying to realise their intentions. As noted above, the essence of heterotopia is endless deferral. The participants managed this tension through recognising that they could not accomplish everything but expressed that attempting to do something is better than doing nothing. Equally well, the efficacy of alterity rests on elements of the carnivalesque. Firstly, the potency of what is accomplished within these spaces of alterity rests on their temporary status. Similarly, the potency of subversion relies on it being relational to what it seeks to subvert and if this alterity were to become permanent it would not carry the significance or strength of transgression. No doubt Bauman would undermine these accomplishments [see his attack on 'carnivalesque' outpourings of morality (1998) or his attack on the absence of longevity (2002)] but again, in the words of this study's participants, something *is* better than nothing. On this note, I can turn to my second discussion.

Transgression and subversion rely on engagement with what they seek to subvert. Chapters five and six demonstrated that alterity relies on processes of social ordering as well as practices of consumption and exchange; the very things that they are constituted and conceived of as alternatives to. It has been argued that alterity is characterised by multiple movements between the notions that are intended to translate it into practice (marginality, morality, sociality) and those that it seeks to subvert (market, modernity, anomie). To tighten this up in light of the above

discussion: the movements are *not* between concepts such 'the market' and 'moral alternatives'; they are between different orderings of relations, some of which are constituted as 'moral' and 'Other', some of which are not. Indeed, it is clear that the market and processes of social ordering are implicated in *all* of the orderings of relations - the 'surfaces' within the fold - and that some of them circulate meanings that are constituted as moral whereas others do not. One need only recall Hetherington's analysis of heterotopia to see that there is no space outside of social ordering. In this respect, alterity is characterised by working with what there is in order to translate its intentions, its first cause, into practice. This recalls Giddens' (1991) notion of life politics. For Giddens, life politics is about working with and shaping modernity's structures rather than trying to destroy or subvert them. For me, one finds 'modernity' where one finds processes of social ordering (and one finds this everywhere). It follows that alterity, rather than transgressing modernity, is characterised by persons trying to be modern in their own and different ways.

Thinking now about demoralisation and remoralisation; Fevre might not be so quick to accept the potential and significance that I am attributing to alterity. Recall from chapter two that Fevre defines morality – as distinct from ethics- in relation to belief and de-ontological commitment. Much of what is accomplished at my fieldwork sites could well get written off as ethics or pseudo morality in relation to Fevre's criteria. It seems that Fevre, like Bauman, associates morality with consistency (or at least commitment) whereas my ethnographic data is characterised by movement and compromise. Indeed, in relation to the first cause of 'difference'; participants did not exhibit the overarching *belief* that Fevre demands. Most notably I recall John, at BWC, telling me that he could not 'get on board with *all* the hippy shit that goes on here' and this refusal to take difference seriously suggests that he understands it through common sense rather than belief. Here, I must depart from Fevre in as much as I do *not* have a definition of morality. For me, as an ethnographer, if something is constituted as moral by those who I am studying then I take it as such. Consequently, I do not find it problematic to recognise the moral significance of what is accomplished and take on board the idea that something is better than nothing.

A consequence of the above discussion (the majority of the thesis for that matter) is that it makes little sense to think in terms of 'demoralisation' *versus* 'alterity'. That is, it makes little sense to think of spaces that constitute themselves as 'Other' being characterised by morality, morale and sociality whilst looking out at the rest of society and noticing that it is plagued by the problems that we account for through the term 'demoralisation'. 'Demoralisation' and 'alterity' are just orderings of relations that circulate different meanings, some of which are constituted as 'moral', some of which are not. These orderings of relations can be found in any given fold, space or culture as can the movement between them. The important thing to take from this is that clearly, processes of social ordering *can* have moral consequences. Throughout the analysis, I have been keen to distance myself from Bauman's idea (1989 1994 1998) that social ordering neutralises or adiaphorises the innate moral capacity of persons. My argument is much more in line with Durkheim in noting that 'the social', processes of social ordering, are actually the source of the morality occasioned at the spaces of alterity that I studied. Two points of clarification are required: (i) I am not arguing that 'socialisation' indoctrinates persons into a pre-figured moral code; I am saying that processes of social ordering elicit and renew meanings that are constituted as moral and (ii) like Durkheim, I fully accept the ambivalence of the social in respect of morality (see chapter seven) and consequently I recognise that processes of social ordering can elicit and renew meanings that are constituted as immoral as well as those that are constituted as moral. As such, it can be seen that I am not trying to say that the social is inherently moralising, nor am I trying to efface Bauman's insights; I am merely trying to displace them and add to them through flagging up another perspective.

Before picking up on this and ending with a discussion of 'the social'; I want to end this section with a little reflection. The most obvious limit to this study is that it is a 'small scale' study of society's 'margins'. However, I have taken great care to illustrate that questions of scale and the issue of 'alterity *versus* orthodoxy' do not amount to much through arguing that (i) the margins are not ontologically different to the mainstream (both are characterised by complexity and heterogeneity) and (ii) there is no such thing as scale; just the elicitation of relations and different connections. It is hoped that I have used my analysis of alterity to 'cross scale', make different connections and address 'broader vistas of representation' such that I

have said something of demoralisation. A more pressing limitation, or at least the limitation that I have wrestled with over the past two and half years, is that this thesis examines issues of morality and sociality only in relation to those who are ostensibly and intentionally addressing these issues. Perhaps a more pressing issue and one that would have more useful policy ramifications is the nature of morality and sociality in different contexts where these considerations are not salient. In turn, this leads to the *biggest* limitation of my thesis and some vital connections that I have had to leave out. In my ethnography of alterity, I have left absent the role of history. For example, I have not addressed *why* (and to a lesser extent *how*) it is that alterity can be readily associated with morality nor have I addressed why it is that my ethnographic subjects could constitute themselves as 'alternative' (and remember that I went to great pains to find sites that constitute themselves as such).

Equally well, I have not discussed where the ideas that I engage with and displace have come from. For example, I have not examined the historical contingency that gives rise to the idea that there is 'margin/mainstream' dichotomy or the idea that the market is incongruous with moral considerations. Given that these ideas are common to social theory and 'lay' perspectives; it would perhaps be fruitful to consider where they have come from. Seeing as my analysis displaces these ideas, it follows that they *are* contingent – the result of history rather than nature - and it would perhaps be fruitful to deploy the Foucaultian strategy of genealogy (1971, 1975) to uncover how and why they have come to be taken for granted. My reason for not doing so is that, given the time and resource limitations of a doctoral thesis; I have not been able to do *everything* that I have wanted to. Equally well, introducing a historical dimension to complement my ethnographic 'snapshot' would generate a level of complexity that I could not do justice to within the confines of my thesis (and the word limit). Of course, Rosaldo (1980) has made a convincing case for considering history alongside ethnography in one's analysis and this is the direction in which I would like to develop my own project.

Finally, given my focus on the *meanings* that constitute the fold being the effect rather than the starting point of culture, I feel that I have generated a certain ambiguity or 'chicken and egg' situation. Whilst I genuinely believe that meanings are elicited from moment to moment as opposed to sitting 'out there' as towering

and static social facts; I do not feel that their elicitation requires us to start from scratch every time. My feeling is – as I hinted at in chapter eight – that meanings are made, unmade and remade incessantly. The implication of this is that history has positioned meanings in the fold where they remain as absent presences until they are elicited through the ordering of relations. On this note, I do not think that the meanings that constitute the fold have all *always* been there (even as absent presences) because thinking this would neglect the role of history and social change. My feeling is that human beings develop new meanings over time and add them to the fold. Again, I have left this out of my thesis due to practical limitations and considerations but it is certainly a direction in which I would like to take my work.

Resisting Postmodernism: The Importance of the Social.

In this final section, I wish to end where I began. In chapter one, I introduced the idea that there is a 'third strand' running through this thesis that draws on concepts such as the fold, motility, heterotopia, the relation and deconstruction. It was also noted that the importance of this third strand would become clear in the course of the analysis and it is here, in light of everything that has gone before, that I am in a position to draw out and comment on this third strand. In this, I get closer to establishing a 'position' than anywhere else in the conclusion because I cross scale yet again to say something of 'the social' that is not exhausted by a focus on demoralisation or alterity. Nevertheless, I am keen to stress that this is just one perspective, *my* perspective. The purpose of this section is to show that the third strand – in spite of its grounding in continental philosophy and contemporary social anthropology – does *not* equate to postmodernism. To the contrary, it is hoped that the epistemological and ontological arguments that emanate from the third strand provide a way of thinking and working when doing social science research that takes the 'social' in sociology seriously (in many ways, I view the rest of my thesis as a case study in this way of working). Indeed, it is the third strand that has made this thesis deeply Durkheimian and provided me with a way of resisting postmodernism in light of contemporary and hermeneutic challenges *without* recourse to the kind of structural functionalism that has misappropriated Durkheim's legacy.

So, the overarching aim of this section is a corrective to postmodern tendencies to celebrate, or at least think in terms of 'the death of the social' (Baudrillard, 1983). The fold, although being taken as a heuristic device with which to theorise and write alterity, is actually a very useful way of defending and considering the importance of the social. I have stated (*ad nauseam*) that the lines of flight that constitute the fold are best thought of in terms of *meanings*. My argument here is that meanings are social in so much as it is the ordering of the social that creates *all* of the meanings that are folded, unfolded and refolded as attachments and detachments move through the fold (and not just, as a reading chapter eight in isolation might suggest, notions of sociality and community). To see this, we must recap and recall what we mean by 'the social' and how it relates to meanings. The first thing to do here is to recognise that it is unproblematic to conceive of meanings as social because virtually any definition of culture draws our attention to the significance of meanings and contains the words 'collective' or 'shared', intimating that meanings are social rather than private. For example, thinking back to chapter three, Geertz (1973) defines culture as the webs of significance that mankind has (collectively) spun, implying that (i) culture is the source of meaning and (ii) culture is shared. More pressingly, for my purposes at least, Marilyn Strathern posits that the relation between meanings and ideas is routed through the relations between persons. However, she recognises that culture is a source of illumination when she argues (1997) that it is culture that formulates and conceptualises things as things (values, practices, objects). It is fair to assume that *meaning* is the source of illumination and meaning originates in the ordering and elicitation of relations between persons. It follows that the meanings that constitute the fold are a product of the ordering of relations and that, although they are social they are the *effect*, rather than the starting point, of culture. Culture then –the social - is above all the work of ordering and eliciting relations. It follows that the work of ordering the social entails *extension* (Strathern, 1996) - the eliciting of the *meanings* that constitute the fold through attaching and detaching objects, practices, values and persons (for it is these that carry meanings).

A consequence of the above argument is that all of the meanings and surfaces that I have positioned within the fold of alterity ('margin', 'mainstream', 'freedom', 'order' *etcetera*) are a product of the social. This can be seen most clearly through

reference to notions of individuation and identity. Although the oft-celebrated flipside of the 'death of the social'; these notions can be seen, in actuality, to be a property of the social and an effect of the ordering of relations. The very notion of individuality, as we have seen, rests on meanings and in turn, these are a product of ordering relations. Similarly, identity - the doing of identity - relies on the attachment and detachment of the other meanings that constitute the fold (via objects, practices and values). As noted, attachment to objects, practices and values alone is not enough to *do* an identity as they need to *mean* something, they need illumination. This illumination through meaning is an effect of the social because the meanings are routed through the ordering of relations. So these projects of self actualisation do not take place in a vacuum; they need an attachment to the social in order to mean something. Recalling that these projects rely on the *cultural* materials of extension affirms the necessity of meaningful illumination from a collective, or at least relational, source. Indeed, Lyotard (1984) – who is wrongly if consistently labelled a postmodern theorist – reminds us that 'no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever'.

The idea that relations are complex and mobile leads to my next argument. In light of the above analysis, it is reasonable to state that the social is ordered and reordered incessantly and culture is always in the making. Again, this seems to veer dangerously close to postmodernism. However, once again, it is not. Just as we saw in chapter eight that movement within the fold is a movement from one surface to another, leaving no space for any conception of 'the nowhere'; I am noting here that relations are ordered and reordered in a way that means we have movement from one ordering to another. Just as there is no point within the fold where there is no meaning it follows (by virtue of meanings emanating from relations) that there is no point where there is no social. Indeed, that is one of the important insights that Hetherington's analysis of heterotopia enables. Movement between orderings is just that, movement and nothing more. In no way does it necessitate the eradication of ordering nor does it eradicate the social. Of course, in giving back some sense of importance to the social, one runs the risk of reifying society (Munro, 2006) and returning to a stabilised, structural view of society as a prefigured entity. Equally well, in rejecting that view (as I am doing); there is a risk of reifying the individual and returning to the idea that individuals constitute society. I am trying to move

away from any simplistic notions of 'bottom up' or 'top down' approaches to culture. Following Strathern (1991 1995 1996), I view the elicitation of relations as the source of culture as it is through relations with others that the social is ordered and ideas/meanings are elicited. This does not say that the ordering of the social prefigures relations (as the top down view holds) nor does it hold that individuals prefigure the relation (as the bottom up view would hold). It is saying that it is through the social – the ordering of relations – that things get figured, constituted and illuminated *including* notions of society and individuality. The social does not exist independently of persons but persons alone are not enough; the social is *relational*. Please note then that 'the social' is not analogous to society; it is not a prefigured, universal thing. Since relations are elicited from moment to moment, so too is the social. The social is ordered and re-ordered such that, as noted in chapter five, it makes more sense to think in terms of social ordering than in reifications such as social order or society.

Throughout the thesis, I have stated the significance of the fold in terms of theorising and writing complexity. A corollary of this is the need to recognise movement between the potentially incongruous phenomena (more accurately *meanings*) that constitute the fold. As noted, recognition of movement leaves the analysis open to charges of postmodern sins such as celebrating fluidity and the aesthetics of disappearance. To counter this, I have argued that any movement within the fold *needs* to be thought of in terms of *motility* (Munro, 2001 [1992]); as a movement that is *not* premised on the disposal of existing meanings. Taking the fold and motility together, movement can be accounted for in terms of shifting perspectives. The unfolding of a given surface that makes certain meanings *appear* absent does not actually create absences. These meanings are *absent presences* that remain in the fold and are liable to become presences with the re-folding of meanings into a new, or at least different, surface (or a different ordering of the social). Chapter eight demonstrated the flip side to this through showing that *surfaces* are actually quite difficult to arrive at in as much as the attachment of meanings relies on processes of social ordering. Indeed, the surfaces that can be found in the fold do not – so to speak- come out of nowhere. A corollary of this is that one cannot think (as postmodern theory would have it) in terms of a surface/substance dichotomy in which movement away from the 'surface' is taken

to intimate a meaningless void beneath. In place of this idea, one can see that a movement away from a given surface is just a movement towards another. Indeed, Deleuze (1993) reminds us that the fold allows us to think in terms of the 'now here' instead of the 'nowhere'. Indeed, one cannot conceive of anything being meaningless because the 'now here' that the fold forces recognition of can only be thought as a surface (or plateau) that is full of meaning - quite literally, meaning*ful*.

In addition to the ontological significance of this third strand (taking the social in sociology seriously without recourse to structural functionalism); there are epistemological consequences of taking on contemporary and hermeneutic insights without recourse to the traps of postmodernism. The third strand, with its emphasis on perspective, allows one to critically engage with data and ideas without (i) attempting to erect foundational pillars of knowledge or (ii) being rendered impotent by epistemological relativism. The ambition here may be modest, perhaps weak, but it enables one to say something without refusing the knowledge and perspectives of others. It also allows one to recognise the contingency of the connections one makes by way of analysis and writing. To recap: I have stated extensively (in chapters one and three) that the third strand, particular the concepts of the fold and motility, allows one view social theory and social research as an activity of both 'adding without an equals sign' (Hetherington, 1998) and displacing without effacing. What I would just like to add now is the epistemological implication of 'the difficulty of arrival' discussed above. Just as the surfaces and sedimentations within the fold are difficult to arrive at because they rely on the conjunction of meanings and the work of social ordering; the arguments made here are the result of making multiple and difficult connections between data and ideas. So, whilst I recognise the contingency of my arguments; the sedimentations offered by way of writing my ethnography of alterity have not 'come out of nowhere'. It is hoped that the connections I *have* made have added perspectives and understandings on empirical, theoretical and philosophical levels without effacing what has gone before or attempting to position an 'equals sign'. Equally well, it is hoped that the epistemological and ontological implications of my third strand represent a way of thinking and working when doing social science research of which my own ethnography is a reasonable example.

In respect of this third strand, I feel I must end with a note of clarification. Whilst I have put forward this 'third strand' as a way of thinking and working when doing social science; my attachment to it is only partial. If I were to attach myself to it more coherently, it would not be a 'third strand' at all; it would be my theory, my methodology and my philosophy all in one, with no distinction between them. Whilst there are many fantastic examples of this way of working where this is the case (the work of Latimer and Munro springs to mind); this is not *my* way of working. For me, this third strand is something that came to matter in the processes of analysis and writing as a way of making sense of and connecting my theory and data. Similarly, I have adopted it as a way of thinking and writing complexity that takes on board contemporary perspectives without abandoning a commitment to more traditional sociology. I suppose this is the crux, whilst I have an attachment to this emerging and 'marginal' way of working; I cannot abandon my commitment to more 'mainstream' sociology and social theory. If I am honest, I have perhaps wanted – or at least *felt* that I wanted - to be on the margins of sociology but my own analysis of the 'margins' and the 'mainstream' in chapter five has taught me that that is not where I want to be nor is it what I want to be.

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Appendix A.

<u>Beechwood court and Access.</u>

In terms of access, I have attached some of my correspondence with BWC by way of illustration (to attach all of the correspondence that I had with all of the fieldwork sites would be as cumbersome as it is pointless). Please note that I have made no changes to the correspondence. It would be tempting to 'tidy up' these letters with the benefit of hindsight but I see no merit in doing so. The only adjustments that I have made are the ones that are necessary to protect anonymity (replacing names with pseudonyms).

(i) Initial access letter (14/02/04).

Dear Sir/Madam

I am a sociology post-graduate research student, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, and studying in the School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University.

Cardiff University has a cross-disciplinary interest in changing patterns of belief. My research is a part of this wider programme, and is concerned with what might be called the demoralisation of western culture. This is a twofold social problem where, on the one hand, people are dissatisfied with their lives and the modern world; and on the other, they lack any certainty as to how to proceed through life.

I am therefore writing to ask you if there is any possibility of my conducting some of the field work for my study at Beechwood Court. My interest in Beechwood Court stems from a belief that there *are* alternatives to the predicament of demoralisation. Specifically, I would like to explore how retreat and alternative practices such as those offered by Beechwood Court, can be considered as sites of refuge from, and perhaps as offering solutions to, the predicaments of demoralisation.

My request is for permission to come to Beechwood Court and spend some time, both as a volunteer, and as a participant on one or two of your courses. Primarily, I wish to participate fully in life at Beechwood Court as well as observe what is going on. In addition, I would like to conduct very informal interviews with people in which we would explore the meaning that retreat has for them, subject to their informed consent.

I understand that volunteers usually come for one week and, ideally, I would like to do this twice. Obviously, the dates I come would be at your discretion, but visits during April and May this year would suit me, as these are periods when I am not helping with teaching or attending courses. In addition, I would like to attend the community experience week (from the first until the sixth of March) and the retreat with the community week (from the tenth until the fifteenth of May), for which I will, of course, pay.

Should you be kind enough to agree to my request, I would like to reassure you that the interests and privacy of all residents and visitors will be respected by me at all times. The stringent professional ethical principles laid down by the British Sociological Association would guide my conduct of the research, particularly in respect of issues of anonymity,

consent and confidentiality. In addition, I would welcome discussion with you over the details of my research and what you would feel to be appropriate and acceptable behaviour for me while a member of your community.

I would be extremely grateful for your help. If possible, I would like very much appreciate the opportunity to visit you to discuss the research in person. In particular, I would value any suggestions or questions that you may have.

Should you wish to contact me I have enclosed a SAE for your convenience, or you can telephone me on any of the following:

- Work: (02920) 876662 (day).
- Home: (02920) 312 706 (evenings).
- Mobile: (07855) 779 240.

Very many thanks in anticipation of your help. I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours faithfully

David Evans

Dear Saskia,

Further to our telephone conversation yesterday (Thursday the 26th of February), I am writing to you to book some dates as a volunteer.

You mentioned that you needed somebody for the week beginning on the 12th of April and I would be happy to come down that week, if the offer still stands. As for the other dates we were discussing, the end of May and beginning of June would be perfect for me. I read in the volunteer information pack that, subject to approval, volunteers could return for a two-week period. I was hoping that could apply to me and, if so, a two week period starting from the 24th of May or the 31st would be ideal but obviously, it will be at your discretion.

I feel that if I were to volunteer for that week in April; it could be a good opportunity for you to all 'suss me out' (so to speak) and for me to orient myself at Beechwood Court. On this topic, just let me know if you would like me to write to you in more detail about my purpose *and* my ethical commitments. As I have mentioned, I would be more than willing to come and meet you all in person before I arrive. It is very important to me that I don't make anyone feel uncomfortable, the last thing I want to do is disrupt or impose myself upon your community.

Finally, I have been thinking. Seeing as you have reservations about me coming on the retreat with the community week (May 10th until May 15th), I feel I should maybe back away from that idea. Again, because I don't want to cause any disruption or worry.

Again, I have enclosed an SAE so please don't hesitate to contact me with any questions. Thank you again.

Yours sincerely

David Evans

08.03.04

Dear Saskia,

Sorry for the delay in getting this to you. I have enclosed:

1. A more detailed outline of what my research will entail and where I coming from.
2. A statement of ethics – as requested- with a written commitment stating that you have the right to read and veto my work before I use it for publication and/or presentation.
3. The British Sociological Association's code of conduct.

I hope this will provide you with the information you need as well as setting people's minds at ease. As always, if there is anything else you need; please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely

David Evans

Attachment A: Statement of Ethics.

I have enclosed a copy of the British Sociological Association's *code of conduct* for your convenience. This is a *voluntary* code of conduct to which I agree and will follow in the course of carrying out my research. I have highlighted those parts of the dossier that I feel are relevant to my proposed work at Beechwood Court. Those parts that I have not highlighted are those that are not relevant to my research.

Perhaps you could look over this and see if this is to your requirements. If there is anything that you want to clarify with me or add than I will be happy to do so. In the mean time, here are some further commitments that I will make in light of my discussions with Saskia.

1. I understand that there are certain times at which you do not want me to record information (Saskia mentioned the sharing circle). In these cases, I will not make any sort of note about this information; even under the guise of anonymity. I respect that this sort of information is too personal and sensitive to use at any level.

2. It goes without saying that Beechwood Court and the individual's involved in my study will have their anonymity and privacy respected. In addition to this, I wish to make it clear that my work will *not* be disclosed to the media. Where many sociologists feel it is important to share information with the media, I do not. I could not trust the media to handle information with the same respect that I am willing to commit myself.

3. Following on from 2. In terms of my disclosure, my research *will* be used in the production of academic literature. At this stage, I predict that I will be using the data

in the production of my PhD thesis and academic journal articles as well as in the giving of conference papers. In addition to this, a book could well be written on the basis of the thesis and papers. As always, your privacy and anonymity will be closely guarded. Depending on how the research goes, there could be an opportunity to use it in a process of policy formation. This is, of course, entirely at your discretion and something we can discuss in the future.

4. Following on from 3. The material will not be used without your permission. You will be able to read anything that I intend to publish/present beforehand and have the right to veto anything with which you are not happy. I hope that I will not be writing anything that you object to, however if I do then I will explain to you why I have written it and respect your decision to have it changed or removed.

As I have said; if there is anything else; just let me know.

Attachment B: Summary of proposed work.

As I may have mentioned briefly, my research is concerned with what academics have termed the demoralisation of *Western* culture. Indeed, the professor supervising my work- Ralph Fevre- is a key scholar in this field and his book *The Demoralisation of Western Culture* is the starting point for my research. In a nutshell, the term demoralisation is used to describe the sense of dissatisfaction and alienation felt by individuals as well as a feeling of uncertainty about how to proceed through life. The argument holds that people are unhappy in the face of a (Western) culture where economic/scientific rationality, self-interested calculation and individualism/isolation (among other things) characterise existence yet there is an absence of solid beliefs or ethics to guide conduct.

My interest in Beechwood Court stems from an interest in alternatives and refuge from this predicament. Clearly, Beechwood Court provides *literal* opportunities for retreat but I am interested on what goes on at a deeper level. For example, Beechwood Court could:

- Provide and *alternative* way of life that doesn't exhibit the same processes that characterise mainstream live in Western cultures.
- Provide a sense of belonging, togetherness and community.
- Provide guidance via the ethical norms that tend to emerge from collectivities.

With this in mind, I am less concerned with Beechwood Court and the community of residents *per se* and more concerned with how Beechwood Court operates to provide retreat and refuge for those who continue to live in the 'mainstream'. Put crudely, my interest is how people move into communities temporarily to pursue an 'alternative' way of life that provides refuge from processes of demoralisation on one or more levels.

At this point, it is worth noting that I am in no way seeking to discredit or 'expose' Beechwood Court. In fact, I chose to approach Beechwood Court because I feel I could approach my study with optimism rather than cynicism. I am genuinely interested in learning about this both in terms of academic study (which I hope to put to good use) and also on a personal level. On this note, may I draw your attention to the documents I have enclosed detailing my ethical commitments.

During my time at Beechwood Court, I wish to –with the minimum of disruption- conduct ethnographic fieldwork. This means I will be *participating* in life at Beechwood Court as a volunteer but I will also be an *observer*. An observer who views the setting with a view to developing a thick description and in-depth understanding of the cultural framework

alongside the social processes, identities and meanings surrounding it. This will entail me making observations and taking fieldnotes as well as having informal conversations (at appropriate moments) and discussions. In addition to this –subject to consent and appropriate opportunities- I would like to conduct some interviews that are more structured.

As I have already discussed with Saskia, I will be a participant above all else and as such, I will be participating in life at Beechwood Court as any other volunteer would. With this in mind, I do not intend to disrupt day-to-day life, nor do I expect to be afforded any special circumstances by virtue of doing my research. My note-taking and interviews etc. will all take place in the more private spaces at times when we are free to be alone such that disruption is kept to a minimum

Finally, given my interest in those who retreat at Beechwood Court but continue to live in the 'mainstream', I am looking to follow other volunteers back to their day-to-day lives. I hope to do this with a view to examining how the meanings, processes and identities that are present at Beechwood Court are manifest in their 'mainstream' life worlds. Obviously, this phase of the research will be subject to your approval and the approval of the individuals concerned. Similarly, the ethical standards that apply during my time at Beechwood Court will still hold here. I hope that this will generate some meaningful knowledge that is of use to the resident community at Beechwood Court.

Appendix B

<u>The Findhorn Experience.</u>

I had intended to conduct my own empirical fieldwork at Findhorn. Because BWC is central to the whole of this thesis, I had decided to track a 'blanket' of analytic themes with a view to finding a site that is similar to BWC. My rationale was that this would allow me to cross reference all (or at least many) of the emergent analytical themes. With this in mind, I returned to the Good Retreat Guide to find another intentional community that runs 'mind, body and spirit' retreats. I settled on Findhorn, the largest and oldest community of its type in Britain and the one on which BWC is modelled, and arranged a visit. My intention here was to actually go on a retreat to experience such a community from a different perspective (and again, in an attempt to avoid the exhaustion felt experienced at BWC, SM and WOMAD). Arranging this visit required me, in addition to the standard access issues surrounding informed consent, to write a statement of my own spirituality. In the interests of gaining a credible role in the field I did so, taking care to not to reveal too much personal information. Having gone to this much trouble to secure access, I encountered a problem. Having paid a deposit to secure my place on the retreat; they did not receive the balance of payment (with which to confirm my place) on time. I might add that I certainly *did* send the balance on time and it was not until a week before my proposed visit (when I phoned to check that everything was still going ahead) that they decided to tell me that they had not received it. With this, they informed me that they had given away my place but I could organise a visit for another time. I declined this offer on three grounds:

1. I had carefully selected my desired week to fit in with other research and teaching commitments. The alternatives they offered were not practical.
2. I was angry about their handling of the incident. It seemed to me that this was an attempt to make money. With this clouded perspective, I would have not been able to approach the field with any semblance of objectivity.
3. If this had happened in response to objections about my proposed fieldwork then I suspected it might happen again.

Around the time of this incident I was starting to feel like I had too much data for my purposes. I also found out that there was a three part documentary about Findhorn being screened on channel four. Of course, there are obvious limits to using a televised documentary but given my excess of data and the fact that I only really needed something with which to cross check the data from BWC, I decided to use this documentary to complement my analysis.