Taiwanese Cinema and National Identity before and after 1989

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Abstract

This dissertation is about Taiwanese cinematic development and Taiwan’s national identity issues before and after 1989. The year of 1989 is crucial to the Taiwanese cinematic industry because the film <A City of Sadness> was made and screened in that year, which publicly challenged political taboo of Taiwanese national identity, and won the Golden Lion Award of Venice International Film Festival. It is an important change within Taiwan’s societies and more people and films dared to express their opinions on the issues of national identity in public.

This dissertation employs a textual as well as contextual analysis based on the discourse of a nation proposed by the Western scholar, Anthony Smith, and the founder of the Republic of China (now Taiwan), Sun Yat-Sen.

In order to get a more complete picture of the discussion of national identity issues, this dissertation is therefore designed and divided into two parts, one from the domestic perspective, meaning that viewpoints from Taiwan’s societies, and the other from the international perspective, meaning that points of view from the discussion of Taiwan’s relationship with other countries, to explore Taiwan’s national identity reflected in cinematic issues. From the domestic, it explores the relationship of language and hegemony, the differences between the Taiwan government’s official history and people’s historical interpretations within cinema. From the international perspective, how the sovereignty discourses of the Republic of China in Taiwan influences the cinematic development and forms people’s national identity are discussed. In addition, how international cinematic societies influence Taiwan’s film market and cultural identity are explored too. Meanwhile, how the Taiwan government’s cinematic institutions contribute to construct national identity is also examined when the Taiwan government faces the issues of globalisation.

This dissertation concludes that the definitions of Taiwan’s national film and language have changed since the late 1980s mainly due to people’s challenge of political taboo and the process of democratization, and hybridised language use within Taiwan’s societies has become clearer than ever and enables the construction of individual, rather than collective, subjectivity. Also, the contradicting territorial sovereignty discourse of Republic of China in Taiwan makes it more and more difficult to define Taiwan’s national identity.
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List of Abbreviations

CCNAA: Counselling Committee for North American Activities (the official representative office for Taiwan in America before 1994)

CDCAC: Cultural Development and Cultural Affairs Council (ROC)

CDN: Central Daily News (Taiwan)

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (USA)

CTS: Chinese Television Service (Taiwan)

CTV: China Television (Taiwan)

DPP: Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)

FIAB: International Federation of Film Archives (U.S.A.)

FTV: Formosa Television (Taiwan)

GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Service

GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GIO: Government Information Office (ROC)

KMT: Kuomintang (the nationalist party in Taiwan)

MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROC)

MOIA: Ministry of the Interior Affairs (ROC)

OCC: Overseas Chinese Committee (ROC)

PRC: People’s Republic of China (Mainland China)

ROC: Republic of China (Taiwan today)

TECRO: Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (the official representative office for Taiwan in America after 1994)

TNC: Taiwanese New Cinema

TTV: Taiwan Television Station

WHO:  World Health Organisation (UN)

WTO:  World Trade Organisation
NB: Chinese Names-written Form

According to written convention, Chinese names appearing in the content of this dissertation are written in the form of last name coming before their first name. Taking the example of Sun Yat-Sen, Sun is the surname, while Yat-Sen is the given name.

NB: The Use of Chinese Sources

Due to the necessity of this project, many original materials used in this dissertation are published in Chinese only, and I have often carried out translations into English. For those Chinese references, I have put “(Chinese)” at the end of each bibliography.
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Introduction

1. Research Background and Purpose

Taiwan has become a democratic society since the late 1980s and its national identity issues have entered into public sphere too. The year of 1989 is important to the Taiwan’s cinematic industry because of the film <A City of Sadness> made and screened in that year, which publicly challenged the Taiwanese political taboo of national identity, and won the Golden Lion Award of Venice International Film Festival in the same year. It is a very important change within Taiwan’s societies and hence more people as well as filmmakers dared to express their points of view on the issues of national identity in public.

In Taiwan, no matter from the government’s or filmmakers’ perspective, cinema industry is not just a business but also a kind of cultural affairs, which may contribute to the construction of the ideology of nationhood and identity. Therefore, this project is to explore the changes of people’s national identity of Taiwan through cinematic analysis before and after 1989. Looking back shortly the development of Taiwanese cinema, people may find that the grand narrative of Chinese ideology reflected in films has been deconstructed gradually since the early 1980s, to be replaced by more indigenous viewpoints of history, which is renowned as Taiwanese New Cinema Movement (1982-1987 or 1988), and mainly focuses on the land of Taiwan and its people, and the year 1989 is crucial because it changed the definition of national film as well as national language in terms of Taiwan’s film studies. I will discuss this in following chapters. In this research, we have better understand what a nation is before we start to discuss
Taiwan’s national identity in terms of cinematic study.

2. Understanding What a Nation Is and the Issues of Nationalism and Separatism

Before defining a nation, Anthony D. Smith starts with its components, of which the conception of territory is arguably the most important. The second is its people. They are inseparable and bounded by history. Thirdly, there is the notion of a community of laws and institutions with a single political will. Beyond these, the nation is also constructed through the cultural practices of its people, including religion, myths, memory and other collective experiences (Smith, 1991, pp.8-11).

Based on the above, Smith argues that the fundamental features of a nation can be defined as “a named human population sharing an historical territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Ibid, p.14). Besides Smith, Craig Calhoun points out “culture” is also one of the most important features of a nation (Calhoun, 1997, p.5), “including some combination of language, shared belief and values, habitual practice” (Ibid). This idea of a nation, it is argued, will be problematic if it relies on an analysis of how people conceptualise their nation and identities. The reasons are that:

1. The bond between territory and people is questionable if it is narrated as a sense of belonging. While only territory may belong to people, people are not necessarily identifiable with territory except through imaginative constructs.

2. Elements such as religion, myth, memory and experiences etc. are all more or less constructed through emotion.

Unlike Smith and Calhoun, the founder of the Republic of China,¹ Sun Yat-Sen,
tried to distinguish a nation and a state from the perspective of the strength of formation. He argued that a nation is formed by nature, one which includes elements of blood, ways of living, language, religion and customs. However, a state is also constructed through force (Sun, 1997, pp. 2-5). He argued that Chinese society is organised mostly by Hanese with a shared blood and lifestyle, speaking a common language and sharing a common religion and folklore. He thought that Chinese society had the possibility to form a nation-state with its own sovereignty only when stabilised by national military power. The nation of Chinese could be different from the Western nation-states or nations-state models by comparison and from the perspective of language use in society (Ibid, pp.14-26).

That said, the two definitions of nation given above possess complementary elements. Whether in the West or East, it is not hard to find the categories of memory and language being used to construct nationalism, which ideology may be used to interpret what a nation should be or what national identity should be held by people. Here, we may term nationalism as some kind of ideological belief relating to the discourse of defining what a nation should be and social movements towards unification or separatism. In other words, nationalism is often associated with territorial separatism. Conversely nationalism also has the potential to bring about the unification of a nation. To this, Michael Billig warns us that ‘there is something misleading about this accepted use of the word “nationalism”. It always seems to locate nationalism on the periphery. Separatists are often to be found in the outer regions of states’ (Billig, 1995, p.5). To this, I would like to propose that there exist many possibilities of nationalism, and they include:

1. That the nationalist is marginalised, and is regarded as separatist of a nation.
2. That the nationalist stays in the centre, and yet could still be regarded as separatist of a nation.

3. That the nationalist is marginalised, and yet could still be regarded as one who insists on unification of a nation.

4. That the nationalist stays in the centre, and can be regarded as one who insists on unification of a nation.

In other words, no matter what the centre or margin of the nationalists stay in, they could be regarded as to insist on separation or unification of a nation. It depends on how and what people look at them. Taking the example of the case of Taiwan, the nationalist party, Kuomintang (KMT), had been in regime from 1945 to 2000, which means stand in the centre power group in Taiwan, and had been regarded as separatist of a nation by the government of People’s Republic of China (PRC) because KMT insists on its country should be Republic of China (ROC), established since 1912, rather than People’s Republic of China (PRC), established since 1949. On the other hand, KMT regime (1945-2000) is regarded as to insist on unification of a nation rather than separation by many Taiwanese people because they think KMT also pursues for the unification of Taiwan and China in future. However, the nationalist party, KMT, has lost its regime since 2000, and stayed in the margin in terms of political power. It could also be regarded as to insist on unification or separation of a nation if we talk about it from China’s or Taiwan’s perspective.

From the above short explanation of Taiwan’s case on the issue of nationalism and national identity, here, I would like to propose that to discuss Taiwan’s national identity through the representations of Taiwan within Taiwanese cinema needs to cover both the
domestic, which means viewpoints within Taiwan’s societies, as well as international perspectives due to its complicated history with China and its neighbouring countries or regions.

Taiwan has a historical background very different from Hong Kong and China. It was colonised by the Netherlands and Spain in the 17th century, and Japan colonised it from 1895 to 1945. Taiwan was surrendered to Japan after the Sino-Japan War in 1895, as China considered it to be an “outsider and difficult to defend” (Chen, Shuei-Lou, 1998, on line). At the end of World War II in 1945, the Kuomintang (KMT) regime in China took over Taiwan, thus displacing Japanese sovereignty. In 1949, more than a million soldiers escaped from China to Taiwan after defeat in the civil war with the Chinese communists.

Geographically, Taiwan is one of the Asian Pacific islands with an area of about 36,000 sq. km and about 22 million inhabitants. It is located off the south-eastern coast of Mainland China. According to ‘The World Factbook’ of the American Central Intelligence Agency, Taiwan’s preference for a formal, long-form name is not recognised and as such is only known in the international community by the much shorter name of ‘Taiwan’ (CIA, 2002, on line). For many years, the Taiwanese government has tried hard to enter (or re-enter) the United Nations since it was excluded in 1971, but has consistently failed to do so (Hsu Chieh Lin, 1997, p.175). Its status and position in the world are also tenuous. Is it the ‘Republic of China’, ‘Taiwan’, the ‘Republic of China on Taiwan’ or ‘Taiwan Province’? Or is it an ‘other’, which, according to Saunders, is a concept proposed by G.H. Mead and is a kind of “symbolic entity located outside of the self and associated with one or more other individuals” (cited in O’Sullivan et al., 1994,
p.213)? Certainly, the historical identity of Taiwan is full of ‘exotic’ elements and uncertainty. Chen Ru Hsiou makes this point well. He thinks there have been three characteristics in Taiwanese cultural experience from its early history. One is “dispersion”, one is “ambivalence”, and the third is “hybridisation”, and these characteristics all arise in Taiwanese New Cinema (Chen Ru Hsiou, 1994, p.3).

According to Chen Kuan-Hsien, Taiwanese New Cinema (TNC) was conceived in 1982 with the film “In Our Time”, and concluded in 1988 when the key players of TNC (including directors Hou Hsiao-Hsien and Chen Kuo-Fu, and script writers Hsiao Yeh and Wu Nieh-Chen) jointly produced “All for Tomorrow”, which was funded by the Ministry of Defence (Chen Kuan-Hsien, 1998, pp.557-8). In this project, I intend to present Taiwanese cinema as my case study in exploring the problematic nature of national identity. In global economic terms, the cinema industry in Taiwan is very small, yet cinema can be also described as a microcosm of society as it includes everything from production to distribution (via agents) and screening (consumption), technology (support) and marketing activities.

The year 1989 is also crucial to Taiwan’s cinema industry. After the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwanese people were able to travel to China to make films. This coincided with the Taiwanese government’s decision to sponsor filmmaking. By discussing the symbiotic relationship between government policy, institutions and industry, the aim of this project is to consider how Taiwanese cinema since 1989 has been crucial to the construction of national identity.
3. Literature Review

There are very few articles relating to Taiwanese cinema in the West. Few people, including the Taiwanese, are aware that Taiwan once had one of the biggest film production industries in the world and made an average of more than 300 films a year during the 1960s, only behind Japan and India in production terms (GIO, 1999, on line). Most of the following books and articles, however, refer to the Taiwanese cinema industry and its films in comparative studies with those of Hong Kong, China, or Third World countries.

In Third World Film Making and the West (1987), the author Roy Armes argues that in order to understand Third World cinema, one has to understand those countries’ colonial and post-colonial experiences, especially the influences of Western powers and capitalism (Armes, 1987, pp.7-13). Armes asserts that Hollywood and the political and economic hegemony of Western powers, together with those values and cultural practices left behind by former colonial masters, still impose themselves on newly independent countries (Ibid, pp.13-16). According to Armes, these influences pervade the economic infrastructure by their former colonial masters’ cultivation of a so-called elite, many of whom were educated in the West. On independence, the places of their former colonial masters were taken over by native elite (Ibid, pp.16-20). On the surface, they may appear independent, but nonetheless they are still dependent on Western political or economic resources. This situation is referred to as post-colonial. In cultural terms, Armes points out that some concepts, like history, language and religion, used to define ethnic identity, are all inevitably destroyed, or pushed to the margins in society (Ibid, p.11). Thus,
accurate and inclusive representations of national identity continue to be suppressed.

After World War Two, cultural and national identity in Taiwan was constructed by the
KMT regime, following the departure of the Japanese. Therefore, it would be more
appropriate to say that the arrival of this new, but external, power elite (that is, the KMT
regime from Mainland China) resulted in a new form of an ‘internal elite’. Even so, in the
long term, Armes’ observations are correct, and are still relevant to Taiwan’s situation
today.

Further Armes talks about the ‘New Industrial Countries’ of the Republic of China,
or Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore (Ibid, p.154). Armes argues that
these countries’ economic achievements are used as examples in disputing the
‘dependence theory’ of the 1960s and 1970s, and offers some common themes which
underpin the shared success of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (Ibid). Firstly, Japan
colonised them all during WWII. Secondly, de-colonisation and the withdrawal of
Japanese influence followed soon after. Thirdly, they rapidly proceeded to modernisation
and saw great economic success. Lastly, they all had relations with China.\(^5\) That said,
Armés believes that, even if those countries have situations in common, their geography
and cultural experiences also imply great differences. In other words, the memory of
being colonised, the problems of cultural identity, and moreover the relationship between
cinema and local culture are all different. In these respects, Taiwanese cinema cannot
expect to be the same as that of Hong Kong or China. Taiwan has produced more films
than Hong Kong, but the former has had more difficulty in distributing its films overseas,
including to the overseas Chinese market.\(^6\) However, Taiwanese films maintain older
Chinese cultural values, which are either disappearing in Hong Kong’s business hothouse,
or buried under the movement of political change in Mainland China. What then exactly are Chinese cultural values? Armes does not give an explanation.

The question may be extended to Taiwan’s own cultural identity within this project. In Taiwan’s case, it could be assumed that Japanese influence, especially in terms of cultural identity, is much more dominant than in other countries, as Taiwan had been colonised by Japan as far back as the end of the 19th century – well before the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, and the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Even the Taiwanese president, Lee Deng Huei, states in an interview with a Japanese reporter that he thought himself to be Japanese, rather than Chinese or Taiwanese, until he was 22 years old (cited in Lon Yin Tai, 1999, on line). It is worth exploring the implications of such an experience within the context of a study of Taiwanese culture.

*Perspectives on Chinese Cinema* (1991), edited by Australian scholar Chris Berry, is a collection of essays from diverse perspectives – such as genre, institution, and director – about the history of cinema in Mainland China. Beyond these, “The Distinct Taiwanese and Hong Kong Cinemas” is the only essay that discusses Taiwanese cinema. Its author, Chiao Hsung-Ping, a Taiwanese film critic, producer and scholar, contrasts cinematic form and content within these two communities by analysing themes, directing styles, actors’ expressions, etc. If Chiao was more aware of Hong Kong’s social situation during the 1980s and early 1990s (which were closer in time and spirit to 1997, when Hong Kong was taken back by Communist China), she might not have implied that Hong Kong films are full of ‘chaos and energy’ (Chiao, 1991, p.159), but could rather be understood from the postmodern point of view. In this respect, discussion of such
postmodern themes as ‘ambiguity’, would lead to an understanding that they would have been more popular than ever before, and thus it is not so difficult to understand Hong Kong’s cinema during this period if we put it into its fuller social context.

Published in the *East-West Film Journal* (1993) and in *Colonialism, Nationalism in Asia Cinema*, Chris Berry’s article ‘A Nation T(w/o) Chinese Cinema(s) and Nationhood(s)’ traces the interplay between Chinese cinema and nationhood and the Tiananmen Square Massacre (or Incident - a term preferred by the Chinese authorities) in 1989. In Berry’s research, there is the existence of another nation, the Republic of China on Taiwan, which cannot be named as such politically. Berry believes that the motivation behind the exclusion of non-Mandarin films at the annual Taiwanese government-sponsored Golden Horse Awards was to force people to forget their own culture, as circulated in the early Taiwan cinema industry. This point corresponds to Armes’ observation about the process of construction of a nation-state.

Berry suggests that viewing nationalism in the Third World as positive, merely because it is anti-colonial, needs to be re-examined (Berry, 1993, p.33). A constructed, cultural entity actively forms as part of the process of resistance, rather than passively awaiting liberation. To borrow from Benedict Anderson’s term, the conception of a nation is also closely linked to the struggle against other types of ‘imagined community’. Unlike theocracies or empires, which are hierarchical, nations are instead commonly defined by boundaries. Anderson may imply the process of constructing nationalism and the essence of nationhood are types of imagined community, but he also raises the possibility that the imagined community is constructed through history and memory. In this way, it is poignant to explore the construction of nationalism and national identity in
Taiwan’s case. According to Berry, Bhabha suggests that much of the world is undergoing what he calls ‘DissemiNation’ where the unitary, eternal collective subject is fragmented into a kaleidoscopic array to match the fragmented postmodern individual subject (cited in Berry, 1993, p.36). He also implies that the postmodern type of cinematic theme or aesthetic is particularly relevant to Taiwan’s cinema, especially in language use. In this regard, I think he is quite right. Berry also suggests that the dissemination and move towards new, post-national imagined communities in places other than the metropolitan centres of European culture need qualification. The quest for dissemination has resulted in a hybrid space that also acts as an imagined community, which has a simultaneous sense of the collective and fragmented selfhood (Ibid.p.41).

In his comparative study, Berry finds that Taipei’s cinema industry more precisely reflects Bhabha’s concept of ‘dissemination’ in an imagined community. In addition to language use, the expressive forms of films like space, time, mise-en-scene, etc., are all worthy of observation. However, Berry refers to a vital political reality identified by Hu Yaobang, second only in political importance to Chairman Mao in the 1980s, who said “unification is the last frontier for China” (Ibid, p.61).

Whether cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan’s cinema industries is consistent with Hu’s statement (or, at least in Berry’s implication) needs exploring, even though it is the most difficult dilemma facing Taiwanese society today. As Tony Rayns makes clear, it is difficult to “read Chinese movies without referring to the national situation at the time it was made” (cited in Armes, 1987, p.136). If so, it can be suggested that history and national identity primarily underpin Taiwanese movies.

In New Chinese Cinema, co-authored by Kwok-Kan Tam and Wim Dissanayake
(1998), the work of two Taiwanese directors – Hou Hsiao-Hsien and Yang De Chang– is discussed. In it, a brief historical background, from 1949 to the early 1980s, is used as the prelude to understand these two directors’ works. According to this study, several film organizations and directors came to Taiwan from the mainland in 1949, appreciably influencing the growth of cinematography there. Before that time, the Taiwanese had few opportunities to participate in film production under the Japanese regime. Until the 1950s, four government-owned studios played a central role in Taiwan’s movie production and, during the late 1960s and 1970s, more than 200 films were produced annually. This number fell in the 1980s as a result of, for instance, increasing production costs and a greater demand for higher quality international imports (especially those from Hollywood and Hong Kong).

Taiwanese cinema, on the other hand, has its origins in the documentaries and newsreels produced by the KMT government-owned studios, like the Taiwan Motion Picture Production Company. In the early 1980s, there appeared “in many Taiwanese films, a glorification of rural culture, in opposition to urban culture, a juxtaposition, which is rarely seen in Hong Kong films” (Tam and Dissanayake, 1998, p.9). Taiwan has its own distinctive problems and issues. Tam and Dissanayake make this point well, and state that Taiwan’s relationship with China always loomed in the background of Taiwanese film discourse. Nevertheless, amidst the challenges and problems facing each tradition, there have also been co-productions under the initiative of artists and financiers from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China, and it can be asked how this situation squares with Taiwanese government policy.

Tam and Dissanayake also argue that this co-operative spirit could have a positive
impact on the growth of Chinese cinema. One might presume that this co-operation is positive for Taiwan’s cinema industry, but one must also be aware of both the political reality and ideological differences. In analysing themes, Tam and Dissanayake clearly believe that:

Political ambiguities, cultural re-evaluation, a revision of history, and personal anguish are all blended in capturing and recapturing the dilemmas of the individual and the nation as they face the forced choice between tradition and modernity, the East and the West (Ibid, p.84).

In *The Oxford History of World Cinema*, the entry on Taiwan is written by Yip June. As Yip states, Taiwan faced many embarrassing diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s, including severance of official ties with the USA, Japan and many other nations, as well as exclusion from the Olympic Games. Under such a depressed political climate, the ‘Hsiang tu’ (‘Soil Literature’) emerged, which sought to liberate Taiwan from the nostalgic literature of refugee writers from the mainland. In responding to the literature movement, Taiwanese cinema started to focus on the Taiwanese experience of social and cultural change during the post-war era.

Some younger directors, born in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and educated at film schools in the USA, were given the opportunity to produce ‘Soil Literature’ films. Adapted from three short stories by Huang Ch’un-ming, a leading Hsiang tu author, the 1983 film *His Son’s Big Doll* was one of the films that heralded the birth of New Cinema. Hou Hsiao-Hisen, one of the three directors of *His Son’s Big Doll*, established a central theme that has subsequently been similarly explored in all his films. The film, *City of Sadness*, won the Golden Lion at Venice, and *Puppet Master* was co-winner of the Golden Bear Award at the 1993 Berlin Film Festival. Motivated by the need to define a
distinctive cultural identity for Taiwan and Taiwanese cinema, Hou directed both of them (Yip, 1996, pp.711-3).

Interestingly, Yip’s article has sought to make connections between diplomatic issues and the Taiwanese cinematic industrial development. These issues influencing the trends of Taiwanese cinema, it is argued, should not be neglected in Taiwan’s special situation, and indeed this is the subject of ‘Taiwanese New Cinema’ by Chen Kuan-Hsien (1998). This focuses on the period in Taiwanese cinema industry described as the New Cinema Era, which lasted from 1982 to 1988 (although some critics and filmmakers think it ended in 1987). Taiwanese New Cinema strictly refers to the alternative cinematic movement, which began with In Our Time (1982) and concluded with All for Tomorrow (1988), a military school recruitment advertising clip co-directed with Chen Kuo-Fu by the foremost director of Taiwanese New Cinema, Hou Hsiao-Hsien. Chen argues that Taiwanese New Cinema was born out of, and participated in facilitating, the nationalist movement. However, it has ultimately been taken over by those state institutions responsible for the new nation-building and state-making projects. Additionally, Chen says, unlike most Third World countries which mobilized a form of ‘soil literature’ in the movement towards independence and global de-colonization after WWII, Taiwan’s ‘self-discovery’ was blocked by the KMT government (Chen Kuan Hsien, 1998, p.557). The drive towards soil literature could not develop fully under this authoritarian, semi-colonial regime. Chen may be right if one looks back at Taiwanese cinematic development, and films made by the KMT’s studios before 1989. However, the impact made by the film A City of Sadness in 1989, which openly discusses political as well as soil literature taboos, should not be ignored (I will discuss this in Chapter Two and
Three). It is also poignant to state that themes of soil literature have not entirely disappeared in films made after 1989.

After reviewing the literature above, and the research they include, it is not difficult to understand that most academics refer to themes relevant to national identity present in Taiwanese New Cinema. Thus, if Taiwanese New Cinema is put into its historical context, this will be helpful in understanding its social meaning. After a long period of having to accept the memory or history of the ‘other’ (what is referred to as the “imagined representations” of communist China), Taiwanese New Cinema envelops the construction of its own memory of experiences from the time of Japanese colonisation.

In short, the academic writings above emphasise the need to approach Taiwan’s national identity from both domestic and international perspectives, while understanding its social context just as much as its foregrounded representation. This is because no country can be totally isolated from the world outside, even if it possesses an ambiguous identity.

4. Research Approach

This research will employ the social historical approach to explore Taiwan’s cinematic phenomena within the context of social relations and to discuss how Taiwan government’s cinematic policy influences the development of Taiwanese cinema and to see how Taiwanese films contribute to construct people’s national identity. For this research approach, Graeme Turner has noted that contextual research analyses the influencing factors within culture, politics, institutions, and industry. This kind of research also includes the study of cultural policy, government involvement, censorship,
technology, commercial practice, public institutions, and the cinema industry at a global level, as well as modes of production, distribution, exhibition and ownership (Turner, 1993, p.132).

In addition, the cinema industry is an institution in itself. Tim O’Sullivan suggests that we have to realize the interrelation between institutions and the problem of integrated compatibility. Any one institution cannot exist independently of others (O’Sullivan, 1994, p.153). This approach might, in turn, reveal a historical context, especially when discussing the problems of social changes or transitions (Ibid, p.24). In 1989, the Taiwan government started to support film production with direct capital sponsorship as well as allowing people to go to China to make films. In 1998, the so-called ‘New Taiwanese’ ideology was trailblazed by the ruling party, KMT, in the national media. Such historical transition points are pivotal to O’Sullivan’s position. This would be relevant in discussing the power relations of organizations like the National Taipei Film Archive, Party-run or state-run film production studios, the Government Information Office, the Education Ministry and so on. If, as O’Sullivan says, autonomy is redefined with some limitations (Ibid, p.24), then it will be imperative to ask what limitations apply to Taiwan’s cinema industry and, furthermore, explore how institutions have responded to the changing reality.

This project’s research approach will be based on the suggestions of the scholars above, and the overall model here will embrace diachronic and synchronic approaches. Firstly, with regard to the diachronic, I will examine how changes to government policy influence cinematic practice over time. Secondly, in synchronic terms, I will consider how different cinematic institutions interact, co-operate, or conflict at levels of
subsystem-to-subsystem or subsystem-to-system in the formation of national identity. Thus, institutional responses to issues of contemporary culture, economics, or politics within Taiwan’s cinema industry are also of concern. Here, I would also like to propose that the diachronic and synchronic research approaches should not be entirely separated, precisely because the interaction between government institutions and their practices persists. Thirdly, examples of films and their representation may also illustrate institutional involvement within the formation of a national identity. All these elements will be interwoven in this diachronic and synchronic research model.

5. Analytical Framework

This project is divided into two parts for the purpose of delineating a more complete picture of Taiwan’s national identity in terms of film studies. The first part is from the domestic, and the second is from the international. There are three chapters in each part, and the followings are the chapter outlines.

Chapter one is seek to identify the possible state apparatuses and institutions within the cinematic industry through a historical retrospective.

Chapter two will focus on the studies of language issues, which may play a crucial role for the formation of people’s national identity. Mainly drawing on Billig’s perspective on hegemony of language (Billig, 1995), I would like to discuss how hegemony and national identity are constructed through language and how these function within Taiwanese cinema.

Chapter three will focus on the discussion of the issues of history and memory. Mainly drawing from Benedict Anderson’s argument on the issue of “our tragedies”
(Anderson, 1999, p.221), this chapter will be to examine how the Taiwan government’s educational and cinematic institutions implicate the formation of family history.

Chapter four will explore the sovereignty issues and their relationship with government’s cinematic policy. The issue of “sovereignty” will be expanded to include the idea of the nation-state, as espoused by Sun Yat-Sen, and the “ethnic” conception of the non-Western model, as suggested by Anthony D. Smith (Smith, 1991, p.12). In this respect, this chapter will also look at the cinematic practice of censorship as well as importing and exporting policies, and we may uncover clues about Taiwan’s identity relatively in national and international terms.

Chapter five will explore the influence of Hollywood and other international Cinema. John Tomlinson (1991) proposes that the cultural imperialist discourse has been often thought of “as protests against the spread of capitalist modernity […which] are often formulated in an inappropriate language of domination, a language of cultural imposition, which draws its imagery from the age of high imperialism and colonialism” (Tomlinson, 1991, p.173). Tomlinson states that what this implicates is a process, “not of cultural imposition, but of cultural loss” (Ibid). Meanwhile, an interesting idea proposed here by Tomlinson is that “cultural will” (Ibid, p.174) shapes our world, and this is always changeable. With Tomlinson in mind, this chapter will put the ideas of the so-called ‘cultural loss’ and ‘cultural will’ together to examine the interaction between cinematic institutions through a market analysis in terms of identity issue of Taiwan’s cinema industry.

Chapter six will open up the debates concerning nationalism, modernity and post-modernity issues in terms of Taiwan’s film study. It can be argued that nationalism is
designed for the purpose of unification or separation, whereas post-modernity might ensure that ambiguities exist within the same nation. This implies systematic assumptions, and one of these is that: post-modernity comes after nationalism, one which might need re-examination in the context of Taiwan’s situation. They could possibly have co-existed in Taiwan since the early 20th century. In this respect, it can be argued that the changing nature of nationalism, modernity and post-modernity should not be neglected. To operationalise some key theorists’ arguments, such as Fredric Jameson’s (1991), who argued that the economic conditions of late capitalism produced post-modern forms of sensibility, is the focus of this chapter.

As well as defining national identity, conclusions will be based on those characteristics of national identity that relate to the study of Taiwanese cinema. Secondly, the aim is to test theories of post-modernity as they relate to nationalism and suggest where future research might be appropriate.
Notes:

1. Republic of China (ROC) was established in 1912 by Sun Yat-Sen, and the government of ROC, governed by nationalist party Kuomintang (KMT), retreated to Taiwan in 1949 when it lost the civil war with the Chinese communists.

2. The population of Han Chinese occupies more than 90% of all ethnic groups in China today. The other ethnic groups include Zhuang, Uygur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Mongol, Buyi, Korean and so on; see CIA 2002 on line www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html

3. The formal name for Taiwan is “Republic of China”; and the Mainland China’s formal name is “People’s Republic of China”.

4. On the country listing of the American CIA World Factbook, the countries of the world are listed from A to Z, and Taiwan is neither listed under “R” (its country name is Republic of China used since 1912) nor under “P” (People’s Republic of China, established in 1949 by China communist). I am unable to find it under “T” (the first character of Taiwan). It follows Zimbabwe and is separated by a crossing line from all countries. According to this World Factbook, Taiwan’s country name is narrated as: “conventional long form: none”, “conventional short form: Taiwan”, “local long form: none”, “local short form: T’ai-pan”, “former: Formosa”. www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tw.html

   Formosa was named by Spain’s explorers about four hundred years ago, and means beautiful island.

5. Armes, here, might mean the People’s Republic of China (PRC) only, but not the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan today from the perspective of historical emigration.

6. However, the quantity of films produced in Taiwan has been fewer than those in Hong Kong since the 1970s.

7. Here, I have to point out that, since winning the Golden Lion Award in Italy’s International Film Festival in 1989, the film “A City of Sadness” (directed by Hou Hsiao-Hsien) has changed the situation, and films made in or dubbed into the Taiwanese language are consequently able to participate in the government-sponsored annual Golden Horse Award.

8. In 1987, film critic, Tsan Hon Chih, and many Taiwanese New Cinema filmmakers, like Yang De Chang, Chen Kuo Fu and many others proclaimed the end of Taiwanese New Cinema.
Part One: Domestic Perspective

Chapter I: Pre-History: Taiwan and Cinema History Before 1989

This chapter seeks to point out the major political, economic and cultural issues regarding national identity through an historical retrospective. Secondly, the aim is to qualify the involvement of state apparatuses or government institutions in this particular formation of national identity in terms of cinematic study.

For Anthony Smith and Sun Yat-Sen, culture comprises one of the most crucial elements of a nation, which relates to people’s livelihoods and collective experiences (Smith, 1991; Sun, 1997). Therefore, it will be helpful to delineate a picture of national identity by discussing cultural issues. Meanwhile, to know a group of people’s historical cultural background may prevent us from misinterpreting how they identify themselves and the land where they live. That could be developed into the discussion of people’s national identity. If culture is not thought to be the whole of all human’s lives, what will it be in a narrow sense? In relation to a nation, we might like to say that culture is about language, religion, myths, history, life experiences and so on. That partly corresponds to what Sun Yat-Sen says about the “natural forces” (Sun, 1997, p.3) of a nation. Thus, the study of cultural identity is one of the aspects of the study in national identity.

By discussing national identity, it might be possible to understand what lies behind its construction. In his lectures about ‘The Three Principles of the People’, Sun Yat-Sen, the founder of the Republic of China, contrasted the fact that China, since the Ch’in and Han dynasties, had been developing a single state out of a single ethnic
group over the last 2000 years,¹ while foreign countries had developed many states from single ethnic group as well as bringing together many nationalities under one state. Sun argued that there is a definite link between a nation and a state and, in order to understand that link, the forces that bind them together should be explored. In simple terms, the nation or nationality has developed through natural forces, while the state has developed through military force. The Chinese say that the Wang-tao (which means royal way) followed nature; put another way, the natural force was the royal way. The group brought together by the royal way is the nation. The armed forces are the Pa-tao, which means the way of might; the group formed by the way of might is the state. Generally speaking, the forces behind the evolution of nationalities are natural. As the blood-line of ancestors is passed down, the greatest of these natural forces, according to Sun, is this common blood.

The second greatest force is livelihood. The development of certain races relates to the various means of making a living. The Mongolians’ abode, for instance, followed water and grass. They lived a nomadic life, tenting by water and grass.

The third greatest force behind nationality is language. If foreign people learn Chinese, they are more easily assimilated into Chinese society. On the other hand, if Chinese people know the language of another country, they are in turn more easily assimilated into that country. If two peoples share blood kinship and language, then assimilation will be easier.

The fourth greatest force is religion. People who worship the same god can often form one type of nationality. The fifth greatest force is traditions. If people have markedly similar customs and habits, they could, in time, cohere and form one nation.
Together, these five forces—blood kinship, a common language, a common livelihood, a common religion, and common traditions—are products, not of military occupation, but of natural evolution (Ibid, pp.1-50).

Apart from this function of the state, Sun also thinks that military power should be used to protect a state’s territory and its people. The elements implicit in this conception of the state are people, territory, government, and sovereignty. There remains one more important factor influencing the existence of a state: the spiritual impulse for unification. Sun once said, “the establishment of a state is no more than the people’s heartfelt contribution towards unification” (cited in Chou, D. J. and Huang, C. M., 1984, p.101). In other words, Sun thought that the surest way towards unification was by encouraging the people’s emotional attachment to their land (even government and sovereignty) (Ibid). Ideological studies of the past show nations have used religion, language, race or patriotism as the spiritual base for national unification. Only through such modes of identification can the people consent to the ideological unification of a strong nation state (Chou and Huang, 1984, pp.100-6).

The importance of spiritual unification underpins many of Sun’s statements about nation or nationality and state; a nation state might be a group of people coming from the same ancestors, sharing common culture and experience, using a common language, sharing the same specific territory, having their own government to exercise sovereignty on their behalf through common beliefs and military power.

Unlike Sun, Anthony Smith focuses his discussion of a nation and national identity on government institutions and the discourse of historical land. He observed that national identity involves some sense of political community, which also implies
some common institutions, laws, and duties for all the members of the community.

Suggesting a definite social space, Smith conceptualised a demarcated and bounded territory, with which its members identify and to which they feel belonging, believing that:

The territories people possessed in question cannot be just anywhere; it is not any stretch of land. It is, and must be, the 'historic' land, the 'home land'. A 'historic' land is one where terrain and people have exerted mutual, and beneficial, influence over several generations. The homeland becomes a repository of historic memories and associations (Smith, 1991, p.8).

The second element of national identity, Smith indicated, is the idea of 'patria'. He termed it as a community of laws and institutions with a single political will. To this end, Smith suggested that some common regulatory institutions would give expression to common political sentiments and purpose. In other words, Smith asserted that:

Nations must have a measure of common culture and a civic ideology, a set of common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas, which bind the population together in their homeland (Ibid, p.11).

In the Western model of national identity, nations could be seen as cultural communities, with common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions uniting members of these communities. So, historic territory, a legal-political community, legal-political equality of its members, and a common civic culture and ideology are the components of this standard Western model of the nation.

Meanwhile, Smith provides a model of the nation that springs up outside the West, notably in Eastern Europe and Asia. He termed this non-Western model as:
... an ethnic conception of the nation. Its distinguishing feature is its emphasis on community of birth and native culture. Whereas the Western concept laid down that an individual had to belong to some nation but could choose to which he or she belonged, the non-Western or ethnic concept allowed no such latitude. Whether you stayed in your community or emigrated to another, you remained ineluctably, organically, a member of the community of your birth and were forever stamped by it. A nation, in other words, was first and foremost a community of common descent (Ibid).

As Smith also argues, the nation draws on elements of other kinds of collective identity. That is not merely to state that national identity can be combined with other types of identity, such as class, religion or ethnicity, but it can also engender chameleon-like permutations of nationalism (as ideology) with other ideologies like liberalism, fascism and communism. A national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional, as the particular factions of nationalism can never be reduced to a single element, or be easily or swiftly induced in a population by artificial means (Ibid, pp.1-18).

Sun and Smith have revealed important categories in defining national identity. For Smith, the elements of national identity in the Western model are historic land, common myths and memories, economic and legal rights and duties, and economy, with territorial mobility for its members. However, both political community and common economy with territorial mobility for its members, as featured in Sun’s work, are organized around government institutions, sometimes with the use of military forces.

After comparing Smith’s and Sun’s arguments on the issue of cultural and national identity and their relationship, we may start to look at Taiwan’s history. The following will be divided into two sections. The first is the general historical
background of Taiwan, and the second will bring us into the discussion of Taiwan’s cinematic development and its relation to national identity.

1. The Political, Social, Economic and Cultural Background of Taiwan Prior to 1989

About 400 years ago, because of the turbulence in China between the Min and Ching dynasties, great numbers of people from Fukien and Guangtung Provinces, both situated on the south-eastern coast of China, emigrated to Taiwan. The Pioneers were farmers or war refugees in the main. At that time in Chinese history, Taiwan was known as Yi Chou, which means uncivilized land. However, Taiwan was also referred to as Formosa by Spanish and Dutch explorers, the latter having colonized the island by then. This was the first instance of Taiwan’s relationship with European society, in which the Dutch built up their forts at the northern tip of Taiwan, where the “Red Castle” still stands in Dan Shuei Town of Taipei. However, those Chinese immigrants predictably brought with them influences from Chinese culture. Indeed, despite Taiwan’s geographical isolation from Mainland China, the thoughts, customs, habits, and lifestyles of the ‘Han ethnic group’ in Taiwan’s population were derived from Chinese culture. Those from Guangtung Province belong to the Hakai ethnic group (meaning ‘guests’ in Chinese), while those from Fukien Province are known as Minna (meaning south of Min), an ancient name for Fukien. Today, the spoken language known as ‘Taiwanese’ comes from Minna. That said, they do have different spoken languages, or dialects to be more precise, although their written characters are
identical. These two groups comprise more than 85% of Taiwan's population today, while the aboriginal population, whose dialects are similar to the aboriginal inhabitants of the South Pacific islands, is less than 2% of the people in Taiwan today. The rest are from other provinces of China (Tsao, 1997, p.4).

(1) The Historical and Cultural Relationship with Japan

In the late nineteenth century, Japan was eager to expand its territories, partially in order to solve its domestic food problem, and started to invade neighbouring countries for their agricultural and industrial raw materials. China was one of its key targets. This resulted in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and ended in the Treaty of Shimonseki between the Chinese Ching Dynasty (1644-1912) and Japan in 1895. Because of the Ching Dynasty's national defence failure, Japan demanded the establishment of factories in the coastal cities of China. In addition, Taiwan and its offshore islands, Peng Hu and Lan Yu Islands, were all ceded to Japan at its government's request (Wang Yu-Wen, 1998, p.104). However, one of the reasons why China ceded Taiwan has to be its location and the ability of the Ching Dynasty to defend it (Chen, S. L., 1998, on line). When the news arrived in Taiwan, Taiwanese generals Chiu Feng Chia, Liu Yung Fu, Tang Ching Sung, the governor of Taiwan (originally assigned there by the Ching Dynasty) and others organized the ‘Taiwan State of Democracy’ in March, 1895. Tang was elected as President, although he escaped back to China when the Japanese military entered Taiwan. Chiu and Liu were arrested and sentenced to death because of their resistance and the ‘Taiwan State of
Democracy’ collapsed three months later, when Japan replaced it with the Japanese-authorized ‘Taiwan Government’ on June 17, 1895 (Yeh, L. I., 1997, p.17).

From then on, Taiwan became Japan’s colony until the end of WWII in 1945.

According to Yeh Long Ian (1998), Lee Tian Duo (1997) and Chiu Kuen Liang (1992), Japan’s colonial policy on Taiwan can be divided into three separate stages of development, and they are ‘the special governance period’ (1895-1918), ‘the assimilation period’ (1918-1937) and ‘the imperial period (1937-1945).

A. The Special Governance Period (1895-1918):

During the period of special governance, Japan used force to suppress any Taiwanese resistance. On the other hand, the people of Taiwan were allowed to keep their own folk culture, religion, traditions and so on. The policy was to develop effective control in a gradual way (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.43).

B. The Assimilation Period (1918-1937):

The assimilation period is also called the ‘Home Extension Period’ (Ibid, p.44). After World War One, Japan was regarded as one of the superpowers of the world. Twenty-three years of Japanese occupation of Taiwan and the mood of nationalism within the international community began to bite. In order to stabilize its regime, the Japanese government therefore tried to impose Japanese culture on Taiwan, mostly through state educational apparatuses.
C. The Imperial Period (1937-1945):

In 1937, the China-Japan War broke out, and Taiwan became the base for Japan’s military policy of ‘Proceeding to the South’ (Ibid, p.47). The Taiwanese were forced to abandon their Chinese culture entirely, by speaking the ‘national language’ of Japanese, change their own names into Japanese etc. The content of folk stories were required to embrace the ‘great Japanese spirit’, which meant conquering the top of the world while remaining loyal to the Emperor, while their characters, in both physical and mental terms, should coincide with the state ideology. The polytheistic beliefs of Taiwan were threatened with the destruction of temples. Moreover, the Taiwanese were forced to change their religion, and instead pray to the Japanese god of Yi Si, Da Ma (Hsu, 1997, p.16). Taiwanese culture generally could be said to have been widely suppressed. Politically, the Taiwanese were forced to be loyal to the Japanese Emperor too, while more than 200,000 young Taiwanese men were forced to serve in the army (Long Ying Tai in The Journalist, 1999, No. 627, on line) and fight on the battlefields of the South Pacific islands and China (Yeh, 1998, Lee, 1997, and Chiu, 1992).

Initially, Taiwan’s contribution to the Japanese economy was to address a dire shortage of food in Japan. Secondly, due to the policy of ‘Industrializing Japan, and Agriculturalizing Taiwan’, importing cheap rice and sugar from Taiwan was intended to maintain price controls and keep labour costs within budget, so that capital remained strong and industrial expansion was kept on course. But, prior to the outbreak of the China-Japan War in 1937, Taiwan was industrialized for the sake of
producing goods like steel for weapons and electricity power’s supply system (Hsu, 1997, pp.1-14).

For Taiwanese young people who had grown up and been educated under Japanese governance, national identity was not easy to define; many of them considered themselves to be Japanese, particularly as China was more the enemy to attack than their ‘mother’ country. As stated earlier, as with many Taiwanese, Taiwan’s late President Lee Deng Huei admitted that he considered himself Japanese rather than Taiwanese before 1945 (Long Ying Tai in The Journalist, 1999, No. 627, on line).

(2) The Relationship with Chinese Culture Represented by KMT Government

After eight years of the War of Resistance against Japan, China took over Taiwan. According to the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945, Taiwan and its offshore islands were given to the Republic of China, which was established on October 10, 1912, after the downfall of the Chin Dynasty. Once again, Hsieh Hsueh Hung and other Taiwanese formed the ‘Taiwan Democratic Self-Government’ in 1945 to challenge the Potsdam Proclamation. The Kuomintang (KMT) regime, the national party in China, dispatched armies to Taiwan to suppress this organization’s activities, and Hsieh and his followers were regarded as traitors by China, and subsequently arrested and sentenced to death (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.101). As Chen Kuan Hsien points out, ‘unlike most Third World countries which mobilized the indigenous theme in the movement towards independence and global de-colonization after the Second World War,
Taiwan's "self-rediscovery" was blocked by the KMT government. The drive towards the indigenous theme could not develop fully under this authoritarian, semi-colonial regime’ (Chen, K. H., 1998, p.557). Hence, Taiwan’s being under the regime of China’s KMT and its social environment could be said to have evolved in the following stages, and they are ‘the early stage of the post war period’ (1945-1949) and ‘white terrorism period and centralized political movement’ (1949-1980s).

A. The Early Stage of the Post War Period (1945-1949):

By the end of World War Two (WWII), the KMT was in power in China, taking over Taiwan from Japan in 1945 to establish the ‘Taiwan Provincial Government’. The main job of the Taiwan Provincial Government was to reclaim the property that had previously belonged to Japan's Taiwan Government and transport goods to China to support the KMT’s regime, which had been involved in a civil war with the Chinese Communists since the 1930s. Life in Taiwan was tougher than ever before. In 1947, a soldier, trying to stop the smuggling of cigarettes, killed an innocent bystander by accident, which provoked populist rage. Large numbers of people took to the streets and police stations of Taipei City, the capital of Taiwan, to demand punishment for the soldier. This demand was promised solely to buy time for the governor, Chen Yi, to secretly ask for support from China, resulting in a massacre in which thousands of Taiwanese died, known as the ‘February 28 Massacre, 1947’ (Chen, R. S., 1994, p.80). Towards the end of 1949, the KMT government retreated from Mainland China to Taiwan after defeat against the Chinese Communists, who
established the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, and enacted an authoritarian policy known as the ‘White Terrorism and Centralized Political Movement.’

**B. White Terrorism and Centralized Political Movement (1949-1980s):**

After defeat in the civil war, the Republic of China lost its international status, and was confined to Taiwan until the Korean War broke out in 1950. The United States decided to bring the Republic of China back into the international community, and sent its Seventh Fleet to defend Taiwan from an invasion by Chinese Communists. Besides military support, financial aid was effected through the “American Military Committee in Support of the Chinese”, established in 1951. The Republic of China and the USA also signed up to the ‘Common Defence Contract’ in 1954. Consequently, the civil war between Chinese Communists and the KMT became an international affair rather than an internal one for China (Lee, T. D., 1997, pp.101-2). As a result, the national policy of ‘anti-communism and recovery for China’ was effectively also influenced by the American government’s attitude. Domestically, the relocation of the central government to Taiwan accelerated the process of Chinese cultural integration into Taiwanese society. First of all, the removal of all aspects of Japanese culture and Communism became the main functions of national policy, even if most Taiwanese had no real sense of Chinese communism. Anybody found supporting Taiwan's claim for independence or communism was imprisoned or sentenced to death. This state control persisted well into the 1980s. At the
international level, relations with foreign countries worsened following Taiwan's exclusion from the United Nations in 1971, one of a series of diplomatic setbacks that happened to Taiwan's KMT regime during the 1970s. In addition, Japan and the USA broke off official diplomatic ties with the Republic of China, Taiwan, respectively in 1973 and 1979. Before 1976, there were 54 countries that had official diplomatic ties, which dwindled to 20 by 1979 (MOFA, 1999, on line). In such a negative and uncertain political climate, the Taiwanese started to think of their own identity as separate from the other 'homeland', Mainland China, and demanded democracy stronger than ever before. The indigenous 'soil literature' movement of the period sought to replace the 'national literature' that pandered to the history and folklore of Mainland China. In the early 1980s, following the intervention of US President Reagan's administration, the KMT regime started to allow political opposition, which led to the foundation of the 'Democratic Progressive Party' (DDP) in 1986 (Hsu, C. L., 1997). In the same year, the late President Chiang Ching Ko, the son of Chiang Kai Shek, acknowledged that recovery of Mainland China was impossible and decided to cease the "Emergency Decree" (Hsu, C. F., 1995, p.104) in 1987, which had been in place since the February 28, 1947 massacre. He died the next year, to be replaced by the Vice President, Lee Deng Huei, who became known as the first Taiwanese President, which effectively gave birth to Taiwan. By the end of the 1980s, the people of Taiwan had been forbidden from knowing their own history, but then started to build up their own history piece by piece to fill the void.

To the cultural aspect, Chinese culture was allowed to flourish again after years of suppression by Japanese colonization. In 1967, the KMT government established
the “Promotion Committee for Chinese Cultural Renaissance Campaign” (Fang, P. C., 1995, p.375) and similar movements to emphasize the importance of traditional Chinese culture in society, in response to China’s Cultural Revolution, which began in the mid-1960s. As the deputy-director of the Department of Cultural Services at the Straits Exchange Foundation said, traditional Chinese culture on Taiwan could be ‘typified by an emphasis on ethics and the ‘golden mean’, calling for moderation in all matters and avoidance of extremes’ (Fang, P. C., 1995, p.373).

Almost every school pupil was able to memorize the ‘Five Relationships’ (wu lun), which governed relations between the ruler, officials, parents, offspring and spouses, and really helped the government establish a social hierarchy through which to maintain order (Ibid).

Confucian ideas also became the major force that shaped Taiwanese family life. In the school system, students were all supposed to be familiar with Confucianism and its meanings. It proposed that rulers should take popular will into consideration, understand people’s yearnings and govern with responsibility and concern for the people. The leaders of any country were also expected to take responsibility for the people first, as well as cultivate virtue and govern their families well.

However, the very same governors and officials were seldom censored for not meeting such levels of responsibility; in Confucianism, people must be totally loyal to their masters and never question them in order to maintain the social order, while Chuang-Tzu and Lao-Tzu’s philosophy favours passive administration and natural law. Both of these philosophical trends have also exerted significant influences on Taiwanese culture. Temples dedicated to Confucius and academies devoted to the
teaching of Confucianism have been built across Taiwan. This environment has contributed to an emphasis on ethics at the family and societal levels. Conversely, the imperial system, inherent in traditional Chinese culture, disappeared following radical changes throughout history, ultimately to be replaced by a democratic system characterized by free and fair elections in the 1980s (Ibid, pp.372-85).

According to the former director of Higher Education at the Ministry of Education, Yang Kuo-Tzu, the development of education in Taiwan takes the ‘Three Principles of the People’ - nationalism, democracy, and social well-being - as its supreme guide. It presents people with a high degree of national and ethnic pride as well as a strong sense of responsibility, bringing the nation in line with other modernised and developed countries (Yang, K.T., 1995, pp.436-51). Poignantly, this is congruent with Sun Yat-Sen’s position regarding what lies behind the construction of national identity:

Principle is an idea, a belief and a power. When people begin to study a problem, generally, an idea develops first. If the idea becomes clearer, a belief arises, and out of it is a power (Sun, 1997, p.1).

2. Going into the Cinematic Industry

After the exploration of Taiwan’s history, I would like to move onto the cinematic industrial development. It can be divided into several periods, and they are ‘the beginning of film: the special governance period’ (1895-1918), the home extension policy’ (1918-1937), ‘the imperial period’ (1937-1945), ‘the cultural policy of the KMT and the cinema industry post World War Two’ (1945-1949), ‘the era of

(1) The Beginning of Film: The Special Governance Period (1895-1918)

The Kinetoscope first appeared in Taipei in June 1896, which was the earliest record of its appearance in Asia (Yeh, L. I., 1998, p.21). The Vitascope followed in Taiwan the next year. In the age of the Kinetoscope and the Vitascope, cinema was regarded entirely as an entertainment medium until the arrival of cinematography in Taiwan in 1900. The Japanese businessman, Song Pu Chang San, was persuaded by the Japanese-run Taiwan Government to introduce public screenings of films to the Taiwanese, such as Train's Entry, The Gardener and others, at Taipei's Cross House on 16 June, 1900, to great popular success (Ibid, 1997, pp.31-4). As a result, the government recognised the potential to educate the masses with this new medium.

At the start of Taiwan’s occupation by the Japanese, Japan used the police and the military to suppress any rebellion. On the other hand, the Taiwanese were allowed to maintain their culture, language, habit and religion as a means of securing effective governmental control (Yeh, L. I., 1998, p.24, Chiu, K. L., 1992, p.24). To support this, the sanitation consultant, Hau Tan Shin Ping, thought that knowledge of a colony’s culture was the key to its effective control. Thus, in October 1900, he established the "Taiwan Folk Culture Research Committee" (Yeh, L. I., 1997, p.22), which led to the foundation of the "Taiwanese Society" whose purpose was to show dramatic films around the island. By the early 1900s, the moving image was linked to grace and
favour treatment by the government to patronise property owners, businesspeople, and other elite members of Taiwanese society. This kind of policy was intended to attract Taiwanese intellectuals into the governance of Taiwan, and in doing so invited guests to the cinema as a way of honouring them (Chiu, K. L., 1992, p.9). In 1901, the first official cinema screening was held on November 17, hosted by the governor of Shin Chu County and the Captain of Defence. As well as officials, there were about 200 Taiwanese property owners, business people and intellectuals invited. A documentary was shown, called the BeiChing Affair Film, about the feud between the Ching Dynasty of China and the Union of Eight Countries, made in 1900 by a Japanese cinematographer.

The same year, the "Patriotic Women’s Association" was established, which was sponsored by the Japanese-run Taiwan Government to screen a documentary on the Japan-Russia War, emphasising Japan’s heroic achievements and its military power (Lui, S. S., 1991, pp.15-6). Four years later, the Japanese businessman, Gao Song Fon Ts Lan, was allowed by the Japanese Taiwan Government to screen films for the purpose of entertaining Taiwan's aborigines, who were invited to Taipei, which resulted in a donation of 100,000 Yen to the National Defence and Salvation Fund for Taiwan. In 1908, Gao established the "Cinema Group" which travelled around the island to provide free screenings paid for by the Governor for entertaining people who lived outside Taipei (Yeh, L. I., 1998, pp.64-8).

Taiwan's first documentary film, Now in Taiwan, was made by the government in 1907. In this film, the contrast between new and old ways of life was the theme, which was designed to show that the Japanese model for education in Taiwan would
successfully transform Taiwanese. That said, due to Confucianism being at the heart of Taiwanese religion, loyalty to the Japanese Emperor was a given (Ibid, pp.77-8). As the early films were silent, the role of the censor was particularly crucial in interpreting the content of moving images. For national security reasons, only the Japanese were allowed to be censors prior to World War One, with licences issued by the police (Ibid).

(2) The Home Extension Policy (1918-1937)

After World War One, Japan's policy towards Taiwan changed to what is known as "Home Extension", which meant the planned imposition of Japanese culture upon Taiwan (Yeh, L. I., 1998, p.34). In the late 1910s, for example, Taiwan's currency was converted to Japan's Yen system (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.39). Many professional broadcasters arrived from Japan to promote Japanese culture in the colony, with the purpose of assimilation. Although Japan's national strength became stronger than ever after WWI, the tide of nationalism also started to appear in Taiwan too. The latter was manifest in a cultural movement that used folk stories and stage drama as symbolic opposition, particularly with the story of the Taiwanese folk hero, Liao Tian Din, and his rebellion against the Japanese became popular.

The golden age of silent films, however, arrived in 1920s. To cultured people, the job of cinematic interpreter was hotly sought after. At this moment, though, very few Taiwanese worked in cinemas, which pushed many of them to establish their own cinematic businesses (Yeh, L. I., 1998, p.35). There were three ways for young people
to learn the skills required for film production - from the Japanese in Taiwan; from international film companies based in Shanghai, China; or, in Tokyo (Ibid, p.27). This was because the Taiwanese were allowed to gain scientific knowledge abroad during the colonial period, as long as their studies did not relate to politics or law (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.7).

There were several cinematic groups run by governmental organizations, such as the Cultural Bureau of the Japanese Taiwan Government, established in 1921; the Cinematic Department of the Taiwanese Educational Committee; and the Taiwanese Daily News from 1923. All these agencies were officially approved, though all their filmmakers were Japanese. Their responsibility was to educate the Taiwanese in Japanese culture and promote cultural identity (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.49, Lui, S. S., 1991, pp.2-3). However, no matter where the films came from, cinemas had to dub or subtitle them in Japanese (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.25). That said, Shien Tang Lin, Wei Hsei Chiang, Pei Hou Ts, Chao Chi Yang and others from Taiwan established the "Taiwan Culture Association" in 1921, whose intention was to make films about Taiwanese culture. However, the police authorities soon closed it down (Yeh, L. I., 1998, p.137-38).

In April 1922, the Japanese-run Taiwan Government officially converted popular street names into Japanese, such as the "West Gate Ding" and the "East Gate Ding", which have remained thus on the map of Taiwan ever since (Yeh, L. I., 1998, p.114, and 1997, p.24). The West Gate Ding delineated the Japanese cultural district in Taipei City. Japanese temples were also established, among them the "East Base Temple" and the "West Base Temple". Their purpose was to ‘train’ people to be loyal
to Japan's emperor, Yu Zen, (Yeh, L. I., 1997, p.28), whose coming to Taiwan on April 16, 1923 was captured on film and screened back in Japan (Lui, S. S., 1991, p.3).

Cinema was regarded "as a form of social institution with complicated and diverse characteristics. Basically, it is the product of economics and culture, and they cannot be divided from the political issues" (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.40). As regards imports, Chinese films were treated less fairly than those from other countries. Both the customs and police departments would automatically censor films while any import duty was doubled in comparison with films from other countries (Ibid, p.47). Where films contained images of Sun Yat-Sen, the founder of the Republic of China, or Chiang Kai Shek, a leader of China's Nationalist Party, such content was completely removed. In 1926, the Japan-run Taiwanese Government introduced the "Film Censoring Act", which decreed that any "film regarded as an incitement to the public or critical of the government should be banned or confiscated" (Yeh, L. I., 1998, p.123). In 1928, the Chinese film, Chiang Kai Shek's North Revolution was widely anticipated by the Taiwanese. However, the Japanese Government was afraid of inciting thoughts of Taiwanese patriotism, seen as a threat to Japan's governance (Lui, S. S., 1991, p.18). During this golden age of silent films in the 1920s, the background of any censor was fully investigated by the police. As a result, most of those appointed were Japanese, while those that were Taiwanese were told to use Japanese. There was also at least one police officer in each cinema to monitor the content of each film. No matter where the films came from, they all had to use Japanese subtitles (Lee, T. D., 1997, pp.25-6). If the film were made in Taiwan, they would be asked to insert the intertitles into Japanese rather than the Taiwanese local language (Huang, J.,
1994b, p.3). Films imported to Taiwan had to be approved by the police, even if they were made in and had been previously shown in Japan (Lui, S. S., 1991, pp.6-7). In the early stage of silent films, the interpreters were all Japanese, and they all had to follow the written script inspected by police in advance (Ibid, p.20).

In 1931, however, the Japanese film industry entered the sound age (Ibid, p.192). To successfully impose Japanese culture on Taiwan, the government encouraged cinemas to screen films mostly from Japan. Where cinemas screened particular films for more than ten days in a month, or screened educational or propaganda films, they were exempted from tax (Ibid, pp.205-6). In fact, from 1925, Japan remained one of the most prolific film production centres until the 1950s, during which period Taiwan imported more than 1000 Japanese films in an average year since 1927 (Ibid, pp.208-9).

Faced with this policy of enforced cultural assimilation, a number of Taiwanese voluntarily organized the 'Taiwan Folk Culture Improvement Committee', to encourage the learning of Japanese, supporting the 'Movement to Loosen Feet and Cut Hair', all of which was expected to remove the hurdles of assimilation at an early stage. Before the arrival of the Japanese, Taiwanese women, like all other Chinese women, had to tighten the width of their feet from a very early stage of their childhood, while men's hair could not be cut short, however long the hair.

However, rather than make life for the Taiwanese less restrained by regulations, the policy of cultural assimilation was primarily to inhibit all levels of communication with China. In 1935 on the 40th anniversary of Japan's invasion of Taiwan, the "Taiwan International Fair" was held from October 10 to November 20, at which
Taiwan was officially heralded as the "Entrance to the South Pacific and Mainland China" (Ibid, pp.245-52). In the following year, the Sino-Japan War broke out, which lasted for eight years until the end of World War Two. As a result, the military took over the powers of Taiwan’s governor, during which time Taiwanese culture was suppressed more than ever before (Chiu, K. L., 1992, pp.33-5).

(3) The Imperial Period (1937-1945)

From 1937 to 1945, then, political control was held by the military, which enforced loyalty to the Japanese Emperor at the total expense of Taiwanese culture (Ibid, p.9). With this greater imposition of Japanese culture, people were made to speak Japanese in public, and forced to change their Chinese family name into Japanese (Yeh, L. I., 1998, p.34). The film, The Sketch of Highlanders (1938) mirrored these changes to Taiwan’s way of life, particularly its images of Taiwanese natives dressed with traditional Japanese Kimonos and performing traditional Japanese dances (Ibid, p.248). Meanwhile, the 1937 film, The Honourable Soldiers, filmed and directed by Ann Ten Tai Lan, showed young Taiwanese soldiers helping the Japanese to conquer China (Du, Y. J., 1986, p.388). As a result of the warring tensions between the Japanese-run Taiwan Government and China, more films, newsreels, and documentaries were made for propaganda purposes. In 1938, the Cinema Act was implemented (Yeh, L. I., 1998, pp.260-1), which banned all films from China with the exception of those from areas occupied by Japan, such as the Shanghai Japan District and North-eastern China (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.47).
In the early stages of the China-Japan War, films regarded as subversive by the Japanese government were confiscated, while films containing images of Chiang Kai Shek, Sun Yet-Sen, Chinese troops, China's national emblems or the sound of China's national anthem were banned (Du, Y. J., 1986, pp.24-5). Besides the film industry, all other cultural practices that could be related to Chinese nationalism, such as the ancient Chinese stories of heroism that were expressed in Taiwanese folk opera, puppet shows or stage dramas, were also banned, while hundreds of Taiwanese drama groups were forced to disband (Yeh, L. I., 1998, pp.35-6). The film "Spring Wind", directed in 1937 by Ann Ten Tai Lan, was forced to be dubbed into Japanese, instead of using its original Taiwanese soundtrack, when it was shown in 1938 (Lee, Y. C., 1998, p.6; Du, Y. J., 1986, p.387).

Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War between Japan and the USA in 1941, Taiwan's Cinema Distribution Association was established on September 11, 1940. Its first aim was "to accord the film distribution and display recommended by government in order to advance and execute national policy, while promoting loyalty to Japan's Emperor" (Yeh, L. I., 1998, p.275). In the same month, the Taiwan Cinema Association was established by the Japan-run Taiwan Government, who made newsreels and a film series called "War and Training" which sought to establish Mainland China as the enemy in years to come (Du, Y. J., 1986, p.389; Yeh, L. I., 1998, pp.317-8). In 1941, war between Japan and the USA broke out, which led to a ban on all imports of American and British films into Taiwan until the end of World War Two (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.47; Yeh, L. I., 1998, pp.208-9). All cinemas were forced to screen newsreels before showing the main feature (Yeh, L. I., 1998, pp.293-4) and
were given responsibility for building bomb shelters (Ibid, pp.36).

This emphasises how central the cinematic media in Taiwan had become, especially during wartime. In 1941, there were 24 film distributors, but only two of them were Taiwanese run. All the others were Japanese controlled (Ibid, pp.272-3), and more than 2,300 films were imported from Japan, compared with only two from China in 1940 (Lui, S. S., 1986, p.29).

Like other colonial powers, Japan enjoyed great economic benefits during their occupation of Taiwan – firstly, by using Taiwan as a source of raw materials and foodstuffs (Taiwan had great sugar and rice supplies); secondly, by making Taiwan become a market for the industrial products of their colonizers; and finally, making Taiwan an investment market to resolve the problem of their colonizers' surplus capital (Chiu, K. L., 1992, p.33).

(4) The Cultural Policy of the KMT and the Cinema Industry Post-WWII (1945-1949)

World War Two ended in August 1945, and Taiwan was taken over by KMT regime in China. Before that, in March 1945, the KMT (Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party) government in China announced its goal to enable ‘Taiwanese China’s nationalization’ and to ‘De-Japanese’ Taiwan as soon as possible (Liou, S. C., 1997, pp.10-11). Around this time, films could clearly be said to be the best form of propaganda because of its potential power to make people believe what they were supposed to believe in. Consequently, the central propaganda department of the KMT
took over all film studios and cinemas in Taiwan in August 1945, and operated them through both the Propaganda Committees of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Governor’s Office and the Nationalist Party. Hence, cinema became an essential, educative tool for political and social reform (Yeh, L. I., 1995, p.217).

In order to de-Japanese Taiwan, cinemas were banned from screening Japanese films, while the chairman of the Nationalist Party in Taiwan Province declared, on January 16 1946, that, “films would be also banned if they contained Japanese pronunciation or subtitles” (Ibid, p.125). This was supported by the KMT’s enacting of “The Temporary Act of Taiwan Province’s Film Inspection” in 1946. This lasted until 1950 when Sino-Japanese talks sought to improve relations, whereby Japanese firms could import up to 7 films a year (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.63).

However, on Taiwan’s return to its ‘mother country’, there were no effective means for the Taiwanese to produce their own films due to a lack of cinematic technicians and the necessary equipment, following the end of Japan’s colonization. Indeed, Taiwan had produced no dramatic films between 1945 and 1949 (Du, Y. J., 1986, p.391; Lui, S. S., 1991, pp.30-1). Even Japan’s surrender in October 1945 had to be filmed by Japanese filmmakers, as there were no Taiwanese capable of filming it. Mainland China’s films were brought to Taiwan as products from the mother country, while American films also reappeared in this market (Lee, T. D., 1997, pp.50-1) after having been banned during the ‘Imperial Period’ of 1937-1945.

Furthermore, the Journalism Department of the American Institute on Taiwan supplied many newsreels under the guise of the United Nations for screenings across Taiwan. Those newsreels, such as the surrender ceremonies in Tokyo and Nanking,
enhanced the bond between the Taiwanese and their mother country, as well as emphasising America’s victory in World War Two (Yeh, L. I., 1995, p.93). The American film, *Eagle Flying a Thousand Miles*, was dedicated to Chiang Kai Shek, and was shown at the Taipei International Theatre in August 1947. Meanwhile, in order to enforce the national patriotic ideology on people coming from Mainland China, the KMT held a “Government Officials’ Film Appreciation Society” every month around the area of Taipei for those serving in government departments (Ibid, p.161). The Government Information Office of the Yuan Executive of the Central Government of Mainland China despatched film technicians to Taiwan to film *Taiwan Today* in September 1948, dubbing it into English for international consumption because “the KMT’s purpose was to claim legitimacy in owning the territory of Taiwan” (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.61).

Furthermore, the KMT in Taiwan Province brought all the cinema owners in Taipei before the chair of the propaganda department, Lin Tz Guei, who made the statement that his department should maximise film as the best means of bringing the Taiwanese closer to their mother country. At this meeting, he also asked that before each screening the audience should be required to stand for and sing the national anthem, and have it emphasised that any propaganda was in fact educational. Cinemas should also have specific hours for free screenings for soldiers. Even now, many cinemas still play the national anthem before each screening, when many audience members will habitually stand up and sing. Symbols associated with nationalism or the functions of a nation state were ubiquitous, particularly where screenings were free. People in military costume, wearing the Nationalist Party’s badge, bearing the
national flag, or accompanying soldiers were allowed to watch for free (Yeh, L. I., 1995, pp.58-66). As Peng Huai Ang points out:

Having lived under Japanese colonization for a long time, most Taiwanese had developed Japanese tastes, but those soldiers, coming from the so-called "internal home" with a history of fighting the Japanese, naturally express their hatred for the Japanese lifestyle of certain Taiwanese people (cited in Lee, T. D., 1997, p.58).

The insulation of languages also became a barrier to communication (Ibid, p.58). Most conflicts in cinemas were to do with language, with some measures being regarded as unfair to the Taiwanese. The Mandarin Promotion Committee of the Education Ministry used films as tools to promote the Mandarin-Speaking Movement. They made many educational films with mandarin subtitles and the Pin-Ying system of pronunciation. Words used to describe mediated forms were also calculatedly used by these government institutions to construct ‘mother nationalism’. For example, those films imported from Mainland China were always called ‘national films’ and sometimes ‘inner-land films’. These film names were intended to create one of two meanings - to build up the relationship with Mainland China within Taiwanese society, and to construct the relative positions between the centre and the margin. Taiwan, therefore, was still regarded as being an untamed ‘outer land’.

Taiwan was inevitably involved in the civil war between the KMT and Chinese Communists in Mainland China. Goods were largely forcibly exported to China to support the KMT effort. Unfortunately, in the ‘February 28 Massacre, 1947’, a reaction to a smuggling problem, thousands of Taiwanese civilians died because of the government’s military suppression. As a result of the massacre, all films about Taiwan
or their production documents were required for inspection again.

In May 1948, the ‘Temporary Provision Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion’ was executed. A year later, Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist Party lost the civil war and fled from China to Taiwan. The “Emergency Decree dictated the operation of the whole political system and restricted people’s freedom of speech, assembly, association, publication, and exchange of information” in 1949 until 1987 (Hsu, C. F., 1995, p.101). To help win back the people’s sympathy, the KMT government brought its news agencies, *New Life News* and *National Evening News*, in line with the Anti-Communism Literature Movement, which dictated the direction of cinematic as well as literary activities. Predictably, this was because cinema has come to be regarded as one of the major cultural activities, as well as being responsible for constructing historical memory under the KMT regime (Liou, S. C., 1997, p.35).

*(5) The Era of Anti-Communism (1949-1970s)*

The Chinese Communist Party won the civil war and founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Hence, China began two histories. One is represented in the Republic of China (R.O.C.), which is based on Taiwan and its offshore islands, including Penhu Islands, Kingman and Matzu, the last two being less than two kilometres from Mainland China. The other is the ‘People’s Republic of China’, which the United States refused to recognize until 1978. Thus, Taiwan’s status was suddenly changed from a marginalised island to being the base for the restoration
of the legitimate government of China, as it were.

The most important task was to prevent any attempt by Chinese Communists to undermine the KMT government once it exiled itself to Taiwan. The organization ‘Taiwan Democracy Autonomy Affiliations’, run by the Taiwanese communist, Hsieh Shueh Hung, during the period of Japanese colonization, was immediately disbanded, with most other Chinese communists and their sympathisers arrested, jailed and sometimes sentenced to death. Imprisonment was inevitable for the slightest criticism of the KMT government. There was simply no opposition to the government during the 1950s and 1960s – the period known as ‘White Terrorism’ in Taiwanese history.

Japanese films were not allowed to be imported until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, while any films or cinema industry personnel from Hong Kong all needed the consent of the “Hong Kong Jiou Lung Cinema & Drama Career Liberty Council” before they could enter Taiwan. Taiwan’s KMT government dictated the operations of this organization, while the political inclination of people working had to overtly favour the KMT. The first movie made after the KMT arrived in Taiwan was filmed by Hong Kong’s Kaleidoscope Filmmaking Company, which was run by Shiu Shin Fu, one of the most active supporters of the KMT (Du, Y. J., 1986, p.359). This film’s title, Autobiography of Wu Fong, refers to a Han (or Chinese person) who helped Taiwanese natives and ultimately sacrificed his own life in order to persuade them not to kill people for religious reasons. Meanwhile, in order to encourage popular hostility towards communism, the ‘Overseas Chinese Film Corporation’ made the film Fourteen Thousand Witnesses after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which tells the story of thousands of Chinese soldiers going to the Korean War and
finally choosing Taiwan as their home (Ibid).

The United States government started to support Taiwan’s KMT government as a consequence of the Korean War in 1950. In the Pacific War of World War Two, the U.S.A. rescued the Chinese population from the hands of the Japanese; the Korean War, meanwhile, transformed the Chinese Civil War into an international issue. American President Truman’s administration deployed the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Straits (between Taiwan and China). The U.S.A. Military Consultant Council to the Republic of China was established the following year, and the Republic of China-U.S.A. Common Defense Concordat was signed in 1954. As a result, Taiwan started to accept American military as well as financial assistance, as the KMT recognised that without it, reclaiming Mainland China was impossible. For the Americans, Taiwan was protected in support of the Truman policy to prevent the expansion of communism (Lee, 1997, pp.101-2).

In order to maintain friendly relations with the American government, there was no limit to the amount of films that American film distributors could import into Taiwan. For example, in 1950, there were 313 movies imported from America, compared with 185 Mandarin movies from Hong Kong and Mainland China made during the KMT period in China. One year later, the number of American movies increased to 505. Conversely, if Taiwan’s film distributors wanted to import films from America, only two films per distributor were allowed. American movies have dominated more than 70% of Taiwan’s film market ever since (Lu, F. Y., 1997, on line; Liou, S. C., 1997, pp.75-6 and Lee, T. D., 1997, p114).

Taiwan’s cinematic market was re-opened to Japan in 1950, but only 6 films per
year were allowed for import and these had to satisfy one of the following two conditions: films either had to be ideologically against communism, or regarded as scientifically educative (Liou, S. C., 1997, pp.76-9).

Once the KMT government retreated from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, it started to construct its national ideology and encourage anti-communism as popular common sense. In the cinematic industry, this meant state interference in production, distribution, and other related areas. The three largest studios, Taiwan Cinema Studio, China Cinema Studio and Agricultural Education Cinema Studio, were directly controlled by the Nationalist Party, governmental organizations and the military (Chen, R. S., 1994).

The KMT also established a one-party state. In the “Political Outline of the KMT”, it stipulated that the KMT should not only support cultural and literary activities, but also guide them (Liou, S. C., 1997, p.35). Through the KMT’s guidance of the “Chinese Cultural & Literary Association”, it set up a “Cinema Committee” to encourage film production geared towards promoting anti-communist ideology. The late Chair of the Yuan Legislature and the Chinese Cultural & Literary Association, Chang Dao Pan, said that the National Defense and Domestic Departments should be responsible for nurturing anti-communist film scripts, to be produced by the Agricultural Film Studio. Similarly, the Taiwan Cinema Studio would produce newsreels, and the China Cinema Studio would help in making military films (Lui, S. S., 1991, p.60). For example, The Awakening from a Nightmare was made by the Agricultural Cinema Studio, with the support of the China Cinema Studio, to encourage awareness of communist activities. The Three Principles of the People with
Two Supplementary Chapters, as enunciated by Chiang Kai Shek in 1953, was arguably the most influential factor in the national cultural and literary movement. In these essays, Chiang especially emphasized the importance of audio and visual education, of which film was one of the most important media in educational activities (Lee, T. D., 1997, pp.80-4).

In response to Chiang, the Chinese Cultural & Literary Association set up the so-called “Cultural Clearance Movement” a year later, which aimed to ‘cleanse’ cultural activities; in other words, activities that relate to the promotion of communism. In response to this movement’s uprising, Chiang ignited “Combatant Literature”, and sought to inspire people’s patriotic thinking and spirit. This was in order to legitimise and prop up the regime in governing its territory and people. It did so by dominating the development of the cinematic industry through the establishment of a national cultural and literary movement premised on the state’s policy, or more precisely, the policy of particular elite groups. In this regard, Liou Shian Chen clearly points out that this kind of imagined relationship of real existence between Taiwan’s people and national ideology was consciously built up (Liou, S. C., 1997, pp.45-6).

In Taiwan’s cinema history, the Government Information Office (GIO) has played a very important role until today. The Agricultural Education Cinema Studio, which was moved from Mainland China, is subordinate to it. Since the early 1950s, the GIO had participated in both film production and inspection. Besides the film *Awakening from a Nightmare* in 1950, there were many other films, like *Blacklist* in 1951 and *Advice for a Communist Spy to Confess* in 1951, whose theme was
predictably anti-communist. In order to nurture the emotional connection between mainlanders from China and the indigenous Taiwanese, the GIO and its subordinate studio also filmed *Never to Separate* in 1951 and *Beautiful Island* in 1952 (Du, Y. J., 1986, pp.394-6). The Agricultural Cinema Studio at first belonged to the GIO when it was moved from China in 1949. The situation changed in 1954, when the KMT government merged it with the Taiwan Cinema Studio, to establish the ‘Central Motion Picture Corporation’. Directly controlled by the KMT, this merger made Taiwan’s largest studio the property of the Nationalist Party. General Yuan Tsung Mei (1951-1955) and Colonel Lung Fong (1955-1964) were chosen successively as Presidents of this studio (Chou Y. T., in Jing Ing Ruei ed, 1996, p.116). We might say that this property transition and personal arrangement reveals no difference between national property and the party’s. Meanwhile, the use of the word ‘centre’ was to support its policy of marginalising other institutions.

In the 1950s and 60s, even if films reflected an anti-communist ideology, many political taboos still needed to be taken into consideration. Films that displayed the Chinese Communist flag, emblems or uniforms, pictures of Mao Tze Dung, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and so on were forbidden, confiscated, or edited out. For example, the film *Chairman*, made by American-owned Fox Film in Taiwan, included footage of Mao, and in the end was not allowed to be screened due to this political taboo. The Hong Kong film *Good Bye, China* also faced the same fate, merely for a shot that contained a painting of Mao. Chinese Communists were originally dressed in the same style as the KMT, which was called ‘Chung Shan Type’, the nickname of Sun Yat-Sen, but on film they were eventually made to look more
Leninist. Chinese Communists also had to be called ‘Communism Dacoits’ across all media (Huang, J., 1994a. pp.8-9). Historical facts played no role in the process of establishing nation state hegemony. All anti-communist films had to be checked by a number of inspection units from various government organizations, including Police Head-quarters, the Central Investigation Bureau, the National Defense Ministry, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Education Ministry and representatives from the Nationalist Party (Ibid). Through the legislation system, the KMT reinforced its hegemonic control, enacting, for example, the “Temporary Provision Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” (1948-1991), the “Emergency Decree” (1949-1987), the “Provision for Punishing Rebellion”, and the “Provision for Military Secrecy”. The intention behind these acts was to limit the population’s ability to behave and think freely. Talking about her portrayal of a silk-washing woman in the 1965 film Shi Beauty, leading actress, Fu Bi Yuen recalls, “there was a scene where she read out a poem at work, and it was cut out, because the poem she read out was written by a famous pro-Chinese Communist writer, Tsau Yu” (cited in Jing, 1996. p.62).

There had been no Taiwanese films made since 1937, which was the year the Sino-Japan War broke out, and Taiwan was living under the policy of ‘Loyalty to the Emperor’ at the behest of the Japanese government. Eighteen years later, the Taiwanese film Six Intellectuals from West House appeared typifying from the mid-1950s, the many Taiwanese films concerning Taiwan’s hostility to the Japanese government. The film Green Mountain, Blue Blood (also known as Wu Tribe Event), made in 1957, told the story of Taiwan’s rebellious movement against the Japanese.
The film *Temple Si-Lai Event*, or *Yu Ching Fang Event*, also made in 1957, described the tale of the Taiwanese Yu and his colleagues leading a popular revolt against Japanese maltreatment. Also, due to the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), more than 200,000 young Taiwanese men were summoned to the Pacific theatres of war, and their stories were told in films like *Night Flowers* in 1957, *The Soul Flew Over the South Sea* in 1958, and *The Coffin Boat* in 1965. The film *Wu Tribe Rain Cloud* emphasized the maltreatment by the Japanese of the Taiwanese, particularly when they forbade doctors treating many of them, even when seriously ill (Huang, J., 1994b, pp.106-8). In capturing history on film, Taiwanese filmmakers tended to present their works based on collective experience even if they were representations. Surprisingly, there were no anti-Japanese films made by the government-controlled studios during the 1950s and 1960s, in contrast to the government’s imposition of an anti-Communist policy.

Again, through legislation, films produced in the ‘national language’ (Mandarin) could receive financial support or other grants. In this connection, the ‘Cinematic Career Guidance Committee’ was established by the Domestic Ministry in 1952. Its function was to assist filmmakers to produce movies in Mandarin. Whether domestic or overseas Chinese filmmakers, they were all subject to the “Overseas Chinese Mandarin Filmmaking Assistance Measurements” of 1952, the “Provision for Awarding Domestic Films in the National Language” of 1955, and the “Provision of Assistance for Mandarin Films” of 1958. In the “Provision of Assistance for Mandarin Films”, the enforcement of the national language upon social institutions was made explicit. Films made for educational purposes all had to be dubbed into Mandarin.
Subtitles had to employ the Pin-Yin spelling system for the pronunciation of the national language (Liou, S. C., 1997, pp.125-32). To compound this, students who spoke Taiwanese in school were punished, while every public servant had to speak Mandarin in the workplace or face fines.

All governmental support or financial assistance thus only applied to films made in Mandarin. Even the government-held “Golden Horse Award” for filmmaking, which started in 1962, was only for those films made in Mandarin. Taiwanese language films were excluded, and there was no support or guidance for any films made in the Taiwanes language. Language use can relate to a very specific geographical location, which the KMT were politically anxious to avoid; and,

If we were to say that KMT regime suppresses the development of Taiwanese films, its strategy would be to marginalize others and naturalize itself to be in the center (Lee, T. D., 1997, pp.115-28).

The national policy of anti-communism still persisted in the cinematic industry throughout the 1960s. Part of the National Defense Ministry, the China Cinema Studio continuously produced ideological films to reinforce the KMT’s regime. A series of nationalist propaganda films were made and shown throughout the state education system. Films like National Saviour Chiang Kai Shek, Blue Sky, White Sun and Reddish Land, Light of Victory, The Birth of the Republic of China and so on, all made use of nationalist symbols (Du, Y. J., 1986, p.407).

However, the lack of popular appeal of such films meant they were only shown to school audiences. The Central Motion Picture Corporation proposed another type
of filmmaking direction in the late 1960s, called “Healthy Realism”. These films tried to focus on narrating the story of Taiwanese agricultural village life, but containing “healthy content” rather than events that happened in China’s history or during the Chinese Civil War. What “healthy content” meant were improvements to the economic situation of countryside life. Films of this genre included The Oyster Girl, The Family who Raised Ducks, A Mute Girl in Love, My Daughter, Ruo Lan and others. These films, however, were criticised for being far from realistic (Ibid, 1986, p.71), as their content was intent on masking the hard demands of agricultural life with bright sentimentality. Another motivation behind this type of film was to enable participation in international film festivals. The purpose here was to offer a cultural counter-attack in the KMT’s battle against Communist China. It also opened up possibilities in Taiwan’s relationship with Hong Kong, as the major frontier for Chinese unification due to its international political and economic status. Similarly, Hong Kong was a ‘Frontier City’ for the Taiwanese government, not least in obtaining military or other useful information about Mainland China. For these reasons, the KMT government treated films made in Hong Kong as domestic and preferred its filmmakers to Taiwanese ones. They did not have to pay any tax to the Taiwanese government if they worked in Taiwan prior to 1997, when Hong Kong was taken over by the PRC. Apparently, these preferential measures for Hong Kong’s cinema industry were used to gain support in Hong Kong for the KMT government’s stance on the unification issue.

From 1967 to 1975, Mainland China engaged in the “Cultural Revolution Movement”, during which time traditional Chinese Confucianism and its cultural
legacy were attacked, and schools were closed for almost ten years. Responding to this very destructive movement in China, the KMT government established the “Chinese Cultural Renaissance Promotion Committee” in 1967, and held the “Cultural and Literary Colloquy” the following year, at which President Chiang Kai Shek made the following speech: “What culture and literature we need contemporarily, including the cinema, needs to be planted into our national cultural soil” (Liou, S. C., 1997, p.23). Following this speech, a series of films about “Root-Searching” led to a new approach in film production, in which films appealed positively to the kinship amongst all Chinese, no matter where they came from. Films included *Fountainhead* and *Fire of Prey*, products of the 1960s (Huang, J., 1994a, p. 11, and pp.197-236). In the late 1960s, voices of Taiwanese independence started to appear again; they first appeared in literature, with the so-called “Soil Literature” writers, but many of their works were eventually adapted into film scripts from the late 1970s through the 1980s, which are discussed later.

(6) The Abandoned Regime and the Government’s Anti-Japanese Films (1970s)

Taiwan’s KMT government faced a series of diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s, which resulted in political instability at the domestic and international levels and challenged the version of history constructed by the Nationalist Party. Firstly, the Republic of China was forced to withdraw its presence from the United Nations in 1971, to be replaced by the Chinese Communist People’s Republic of China, returning the historical sense of the Chinese people amongst the international
community from Taiwan back to Mainland China. Later, American President Nixon went to China and signed the “Shanghai Communiqué”, that established the concept of there being only one China, of which Taiwan was a part. Soon after, in 1972, Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which had a domino effect internationally. In 1971, 54 countries had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but only 21 remained by 1978. Towards the end of 1978, American President Carter established diplomatic relations with China, and broke off the mutual defence treaty it had with Taiwan. From then on the so-called ‘American Age’ of Taiwan, which had existed since the Korean War in 1950, ended and all American forces were withdrawn from the island. Rather than through diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the “Taiwan Relations Act”, passed by the American Congress in 1979, promised to “provide Taiwan with defensive arms and to resist any use of force or coercion jeopardizing Taiwan’s security” (Gonzales, 1995, p.523). The same year saw the “Beautiful Island Incident”, at which many demonstrators for democracy and Taiwan’s independence were arrested. The current Taiwanese President, Chen Shuei Bian, was one of the lawyers who defended those demonstrators.

The Government’s film policy then became anti-Japanese in revenge for Japan’s unilateral decision to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the 1970s. These films were supported by the National Defense Ministry, and made by the Central Motion Picture Corporation and the China Cinema Studio. Films like Heroes of the Everlasting (1974), Battlefield Heroes (1975), Eight Hundred Braves (1976), Warriors of Jian Bridge (1977), National Flower (1978) and Souls of Huang Pu (1978) were all shown to schools and local communities around the island (Chen, R. S., 1994,
pp.34-5). During the 1970s, schoolteachers and students were asked to bring their families to screenings, while these films were also used to encourage schoolboys to join the army. A piece of forgotten history was resurrected again, generated by the KMT government. Facing domestic challenges to its governance, the Nationalist Party tried to distract popular attention away from domestic issues towards the Nationalist cause. This was because cinema had not only been seen as a cultural activity but also part of the state apparatus for constructing national identity and maintaining the political hegemony of the Nationalist Party. However, these films were hardly welcomed by the international community. For example, the film *Heroes of the Everlasting* was banned by the Hong Kong government due to it containing images of the Republic of China’s national flag and its army. After hard lobbying by its filmmakers, this movie was allowed to be screened for one day only (Huang J., 1994a, pp.366-437). The ideological battlefield in Hong Kong was clearly lost, though. Interestingly, according to the film director Ding Shan Shi, the Japanese film *The Ming Je Emperor and the Japan-Russia War*, when shown in Taiwan, made many Taiwanese audience members weep uncontrollably at the sight of General Nai Mu crying. Indeed, those same audience members also voluntarily stood up and raised their hands to salute His Majestic Emperor, Ming Je, when they saw him on screen (Ibid, pp.439-40). After so many attempts at promulgating a nationalist ideology by the KMT government, small wonder that the “Soil Literature” movement found favour in the 1980s, with its appeal of having stories and history written by the Taiwanese proper.
(7) Soil Literature and Taiwanese New Cinema

By the 1980s, the experience of history seemed to demand a site for constructing Taiwan and its people as a practical entity. Meanwhile, there was also intolerance fermenting between the Taiwanese and other subgroups on the island, such as the Chinese from Mainland China and the Hakai. Many Taiwanese were often made to feel second-class citizens by those Chinese who arrived in Taiwan in 1949, and the Taiwanese used to call them “Persons from the External-Province”. On the other hand, those very Chinese often felt harassed. In addition to this social tension, voices demanding Taiwanese independence became stronger than ever before. As a result, the Government persisted with its policy of making films aimed at ‘harmonising’ the people; the films Home Town People in 1985 and From Tangshan to Taiwan in 1985 told the story of some of Taiwan’s ancestors who came from Mainland China’s Tangshan Town to dwell on Taiwan hundreds of years ago. The Taiwanese were indeed descended from the Tangshan people, and this association was intended to emphasise a Chinese kindred spirit.

Internationally, Taiwan’s KMT government faced strong pressure from American President Reagan’s administration over the democracy issue, and finally lifted the ‘Emergency Act’ in 1987 (Hsu, C. L., 1997) which had been effective since 1949. As a consequence, people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait came together through business in Hong Kong, although it was still not possible to transport goods there directly. The film Sunset of Re Nei Wua in 1986, which told how a Chinese Communist escaped to a free country, could be said to be the last anti-Chinese
Communist film. *Flying the Flag* in 1987 ended the anti-Japanese film policy, due to political and economic changes.

As stated earlier, many of Taiwan’s elders still live with the memory of Japanese colonization and even use Japanese language for communication today. Thus, improving relations with Japan was one of the most important foreign policy initiatives during Lee’s Presidency (Lee grew up and was educated during the period of Japanese colonization), and saw an almost certain end to anti-Japanese ideology.

In cultural terms, it could be said that “National Literature” was replaced by “Soil Literature”. However, Soil Literature was not necessarily about cutting off relations with the “Mother Country” but about documenting the stories and histories of where the Taiwanese had lived. Soil Literature had been constructed in the form of novels, prose and poems since the late 1960s, but major attention was not forthcoming until the 1980s, with writers like Huang Chuen Ming, Wu Nieh-Chen, Chu Tian Wen and many others. They were born around the time the KMT arrived in Taiwan in 1949, and all of them grew up and were educated in Taiwan. They offered a microcosm of history on Taiwan through their own stories, often located in their childhood. The film *Our Times* (1982) could be said to be the first Soil Literature movie. Its director, Yang De Chang, stated:

This movie may be the first one among Taiwanese films to discover Taiwan’s past consciously. We start to ask ourselves questions which relate to our Taiwanese history, our ancestors, our political situation, and our relations with Mainland China (cited in Chen, R. S., 1994, pp.47-8).

The work of filmmakers who espoused the Soil Literature genre was often
labeled as Taiwanese New Cinema, somewhat to their annoyance. According to Chen Ru Shiou, Taiwanese New Cinema also placed great emphasis on autobiographical elements and the personal life experiences of their filmmakers. For example, *At Grandpa's* (1984) concerned the childhood memory of its scriptwriter, Chu Tian Wen; *Once upon a Time* (1986) was the autobiography of its director, Hou Hsiao Hsien; and *Love in the Dust* (1986) was about the youth of its scriptwriter, Wu Nieh-Chen. Irrespective of the films’ overall styles, celebrating the collective memory was the common theme behind Taiwanese New Cinema (Ibid).

Lee Tian Duo’s study of Taiwanese New Cinema directors gives the following explanations to account for this trend towards the directors: firstly, 7 out of 15 directors got their Master’s degrees or research credits from the U.S.A; secondly, literary writers started to participate in the filmmaking; thirdly, most of their literary works tended to be realist and autobiographical; fourthly, they belonged to the post-World War Two generation and grew up around the time the KMT arrived in Taiwan; they had neither experience of living in Mainland China nor experience during the period of Japanese colonization.

The success of these filmmakers was largely dependent on their desire for social change, while their films rewrote history in line with the way the Taiwanese wished to develop as a society (Lee, T. D., 1997, pp.187-206). Also, because they challenged the KMT’s political anathema and offered a different way of representing “realities”, Taiwanese New Cinema arguably sought to construct a different historical space for the Taiwanese to live in.
3. Summary:

By looking back over the history of Taiwan, specific issues regarding the relationship between cultural and national identities are naturally high-lighted. In studying national identity, as it applies to Taiwan’s cinema industry, I have tried to combine both Chinese viewpoints as well as those of Western scholars, in line with Smith’s caution.

The main issue concerning national identity during the Japanese colonization period (1895-1945) is the process of ‘cultural assimilation’. Through its honours system, in its population census and folk culture survey, it can be seen how Japan started to culturally conquer Taiwanese society. The second step in establishing national hegemony was manifest in their attempt to impose culture from the ‘imagined homeland’ into people’s daily lives and construct a bond between the people and their ‘imagined emperor’. Finally, emphasizing the importance of working collectively for the good of ‘our country’ became crucial to establishing national unity.

Interestingly, this mode of Japanese colonization was similar to that of the KMT regime on Taiwan. The difference was that the KMT tried to establish national identity by appealing to blood kinship and ‘shared’ historical experience. The main issue in terms of national identity during the KMT regime was the ‘politics of speaking’. In other words, the views of those who were in power would be heard the loudest; this situation marginalised other groups and, in this way, hegemony was maintained.
Apart from these comparisons between the periods of Japanese colonization and the KMT regime, government institutes like the Education Ministry, National Defense Ministry, Culture and Development Ministry, Government Information Office, Foreign Affairs Ministry, Domestic Ministry, Financial Ministry, and even the Sanitary Department of the ‘Japanese Taiwan Government’, can be seen to have participated in the construction of national identity. One other important branch of the state apparatus that cannot be neglected, despite being covert, was the Party’s Propaganda Department and its agents, such as ‘The Central Motion Picture Corporation’ and its cinema chains. Their relationships interwove not just at the domestic level but also internationally through censorship, dubbing and propagandist exports.

Issues like the imagined history and memory of the people, national territory and sovereignty, and status in the international community, all need further exploration, and will be addressed in the following chapters.
Notes:

1. A single ethnic group, here, means the Hanese, which is more than 90% among all ethnic groups in China. The governing ethnic group of the Ching dynasty in China, ‘Man’ was regarded as non-Hanese by Sun’s nationalism discourse.

2. The ‘Red Castle’ was first established by Spain named as San Domingo City in 1629. Then, the Dutch occupied it in 1643. The Chinese Hanese General, Cheng Chen Kuong, led his people to land in Taiwan and expelled the Dutch out of Taiwan in 1662, and the Red Castle was in the hand of the Hanese till 1867. After that, the British occupied and rebuilt it till 1972. However, it was taken over by the Austrian and the Americans in 1972. The government of the Republic of China (Taiwan, today) took it over in 1972 till today. We still can see the ‘VR’, referring to the British Queen, inscribed on the Red Castle today (edited from Ding Wei, 1995, pp.15-27 and Yen Shui-Lung, 1997, pp.44-51).

3. According to Lin Yeh-Lien, the language of Taiwanese came from the middle areas along the Yellow River of north China thousands years ago, and went to the Minnan. Then, it entered into Taiwan. It once was the official language in ancient China (Lin Yeh-Lien, 2000, pp.112-3).

4. According to Lu Hsin Chan and Hu Chuen Tian, Lee Chiao thought the figure of the dead of 'February 28 Massacre, 1947' would be about 19,146; and Chen Kuan Cheng estimates it could be from 19,297 to 58,886 (cited in Lu and Hu, 1994, p.186). However, Lu and Hu thought about five thousand people died in this massacre (Lu and Hu, 1994, p.185).

5. The Pin-Ying pronunciation system, which is called as Chu-Yin Tzu-Mu, was invented in 1913 by Chang Bin Lin, who basically adopted side or part of Chinese written characters to be used for pronunciation for Chinese, and the Education Ministry of KMT government decreed it in 1918 for schools’ education. It is still in use in Taiwan (Lai Ming De et al, 1999, pp.40-41). However, this pronunciation system for Chinese has been replaced by Han Yu Pin Yin, which imitates Western writing, in Mainland China since the 1960s.
Chapter II. Language, Hegemony and the Government’s Institution of Language Policy

This chapter will discuss national identity from the perspective of language issues, which may influence people’s identification within their societies. Related to this, the discourse of hegemony will be analyzed through the exploration of governmental cultural institutions. In addition, we will talk about the struggle for hegemony amongst different languages in Taiwan and how this struggle is reflected in the cinematic activities.

1. The Issues of Society in Unity or Diversity

In contrast to the postmodern type of hybridised society, the Western saying, ‘when in Rome, do as the Romans do’, implies that tourists or immigrants should accustom themselves to the cultural environment in which they find themselves for the sake of harmony. In addition, other meanings could be signified by this saying. For instance, it asks people to respect the culture that is different from their own. Secondly, it emphasises the role of cultural identity within a nation state. More complexly, through its construction, the saying seeks to construct some kind of ideology based on cultural hegemony, as well as establish cultural common sense.

Hall identified some important lines of development in the search for meaning in the study of language, including that one had to explain how it was possible for language to have multiple referential ties to the real world. In addition, meaning, once it
is problematised, it is a social struggle—a struggle for mastery in discourse to prevail and to win credibility (Hall, pp.357-8). The viewpoint of Graeme Turner may be helpful in understanding the social struggle for the meanings of signs, as identified by Hall.

In his study of semiotics, Turner (1993) focused on the relationship between language and culture, and mentioned that language is the prime institution for cultural production and replicating social meaning. Language study also includes selecting and combining components of communicating systems. Take the example of what people wear: Turner thought costume could also be regarded as a language, as it expresses in some ways our cultural position. Through language, people become part of a particular cultural society, which internalises their value systems and constructs their lifestyle (Turner, 1993, pp.44-6).

We perhaps also need to know how language constructs meanings if cultural issues are to be researched. Therefore, the following question is also worth asking: who or what constructs the social meaning of language in a particular society? In addition, the function played by language needs to be examined in the study of national identity. In an attempt to answer these questions, Michael Billig and others are turned to, for they address relationship between language, nationalism and ideology.

2. The Relationship between Language, Nationalism and Ideology

Michael Billig argued that language plays a vital role in the operation of ideology and in the framing of ideological consciousness (Billig, 1995, p.17). In addition,
Billig stated that:

The concept of “a language” may itself be an “invented permanency”, developed during the age of the nation state. If this is the case, then language does not create nationalism, so much as nationalism creates language; or rather nationalism creates our common sense, unquestioned view that there are, naturally and unproblematically, things called different languages, which we speak (Ibid, p.30).

Billig also charged that:

If nationalism is to be studied as a widespread ideology, and if nationalist assumptions are to be found in common sense notions about what a language is, nationalism should not be projected on to others, as if we are free from all its effects. In addition, the assumptions, beliefs and shared representations, which depict the world of nations as our natural world, are historical creations: they are not the natural common sense of all humans (Ibid, p.35).

From Billig’s implication, it could be said that the ideology of nationalism creates language much more than language creates nationalism, and thus it constructs the social meaning of language. Billig merely implies the ideology of nationalism, which is not a natural common sense; therefore, the explanation of ideology by Althusser, as interpreted by Martin Carnoy, may be applicable. According to Carnoy, Althusser thought the ideology as representing “the imaginary relationship of individuals to real conditions of their existence (cited in Carnoy, 1984, p.91).

Althusser argued that the individual is free, yet, at the same time, he or she has to obey an internalised ordering of society, which is an acceptance of the hegemony existing in that society. An individual can be regarded as a free subject as long as they
are able to listen to themselves (Ibid, p.92). Althusser’s assertion here is that the individual’s practical activity is dominated by ideology - the individual is regarded as a free subject (Ibid), which means not actually free, but the individual does not sense it. But the creation of ideology by whom or what also needs to be looked at.

Martin Carnoy responded by saying that to study the existence of ideology means to examine some kind of internal manoeuvre (Ibid). What this means is knowing who creates this production and reproduction of derivative relations as well as knowing how they work. However, Carnoy argued that Althusser is not entirely clear about the status of ideology, whether it comes from nature or human action. What he implies is that ideology is a kind of imagined relationship between the individual and his or her existing condition of reality. The question is whether it is naturally imagined or consciously imagined. In contrast to Althusser, Carnoy clearly asked people to examine the internal manoeuvres of institutions if they want to study ideology.

3. The Battle for Hegemony: Dialect versus Language; Centralisation versus Marginalisation

Based on Carnoy and his studies on Althusser, it is useful to return to Billig, who observed that:

...as the ideology of nationalism has spread across the globe, so it has shaped contemporary common sense. Nations, which seem to us so solidly banal, turn out to be ideological constructions of nationalism. They are “invented permanencies”, which have been created historically in the age of modernity, but which feel as if they have existed (Billig, 1995, p.29).
Taking the issue of the creation of language further, Billig said that:

...if the modern political map, unlike its mediaeval equivalent, contains precise boundaries, so too does the modernly imagined map of speech. The assumptions of this imagined mapping are easily projected on to other cultures and other times (Ibid, p.31).

Billig also thought “the modern imagining of different languages is not a fantasy, but it reflects that the world of nations is also a world of formally constituted languages” (Ibid). Billig implied here there could be arguments or battles within the same language or different languages due to the fact of speaking in different ways. Clearly, Billig warned us to be careful with and not to forget the claim of language as well as its imagined map, and they are all such “permanencies” (Ibid, p.29).

With regard to the study of the nation state’s formation and the localised progress of language, Benedict Anderson argued that the model of the nation state had already appeared around the 1820s when printed languages were already being localised (Anderson, 1996, p.67). This model encouraged equal representation of dialects, which had previously been marginalised. The so-called national language then was a well-known mode, and set standards that pushed other dialects out of the centre circle and exhibited rules that they were unable to extend (Ibid, p.101). Due to the separation of a language and its dialects, those people using dialects might inevitably struggle to enter the central society.
4. **Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces**

According to Swingewood (1998), Bakhtin describes "an ongoing struggle between the forces of heteroglossia (centrifugal) and those of centralisation and unification (centripetal)", and thinks the latter try to establish some kind of authoritative ideological norms over the "creation of a universal language" and cultural hegemony (cited in Swingewood, 1998, p.125). Bakhtin argues this unitary language promotes linguistic unification, which will make cultural centralisation possible within societies. Linguistic unification "not only struggles to overcome the heteroglossia of language, but also unites and centralises verbal-ideological thought" (Ibid).

Meanwhile, Bakhtin stresses that "these centripetal forces are rarely so dominant that they can exclude the reality of heteroglossia completely" because:

New and differentiated social groups arise in an intense and vital interaction with other social groups and, confronted by the diversity of other cultures and languages, the national culture can readily lose its hermetic character, with the goal of a single unitary language supplanted by a decentring of the verbal-ideological world (Ibid).

Thus, Bakhtin proposes two forms of culture, and they are:

the official culture of the dominant social groups (hierarchical, closed and monologic); and, the unofficial culture of the people, based in the heteroglossia of language and the realities of the everyday world, authentically human, open and exceeding its own boundaries (Ibid, pp. 125-6).

These two forms of cultures, popular (or unofficial) and official, are often in a
struggle, as the latter's representatives “seek to impose norms on the whole of society, especially within religious, legal and literary texts” (Ibid, p.126). Bakhtin argues that “the official culture increasingly consists of dead, finished elements by elevating norms and canons above life itself (Ibid).

In Swingewood's studies of Bakhtin, a nation state, with these two forms of culture and its characteristics of societies derived from different cultural forms, seems to go to the opposite extremes. In this regard, I will explore later in this chapter whether this is true in Taiwan's case and the relationship between the government's language policy, social contexts and textual analyses of Taiwanese films.

5. Participation of the Cultural State Apparatus in Language Hegemony

In proceeding towards language hegemony, Swingewood thought that:

A cultural apparatus emerges (political, religious, literary, and legal), charged with disseminating the dominant culture from above, thus marginalizing and closing down other, alternative forms of discourse (Swingewood, 1998, p.126).

Bocock also observed that the unity of the people and others is constructed within civil society, and the idea of the people is partly established through the education system (e.g. the teaching of a specific language, literature and history to construct 'our nation, our people'). A state's education system usually imposes its collective ideology upon the members of the state, the people. However, this kind of collective ideology is very often in conflict with the people's identification with their childhood in civil
society (Bocock, 1986, p.36). In addition to the participation of cultural state apparatus, such as the educational institutions, in constructing cultural hegemony, the central issue remains, who and what are behind these state apparatuses? Gramsci pointed out that, essentially, the bases of cultural hegemony include the production of some kind of social leaders’ worldview and philosophy that their subordinates and other subclasses may accept (cited in Bocock, 1986, p.52). Specific examples of likely social leaders given by Bocock include doctors, educators, priests, lawyers, judges, writers, politicians, artists, philosophers, journalists, and broadcasters, all of whom can have a decisive role in the process of constructing national and popular unity (Bocock, 1986, p.36).

Gramsci asserted that the function of a nation is to promote the mono-class reality; and hegemony means that the value and norms of the dominant class are to be ideologically superior to its subordinate. In other words, the dominant class’s lifestyles and ways of thinking occupy the dominant position, compared with the other classes’ positions (cited in Carnoy, 1984, pp.66-8).

Also, according to Carnoy, Giuseppe Fiori stated that the power of a system is not through the use of violence or state apparatuses, but is the acceptance by the subordinate classes of their rulers’ conception of the world (Ibid, p.68). Therefore, for Gramsci, the question is how to realise the complexity of the process operated by the dominant class in customizing their philosophy as common sensual, such that it is naturally accepted by its subordinates. Secondly, how the subordinate class tries to demolish the dominant order, and create a new order based on universal liberty also needs examination. However, the nature of consent between dominant and subordinate
classes is dynamic rather than static. This kind of relationship moves constantly to adapt itself in an environment of historical variety, as well as those behaviors demanded by human beings (Ibid, pp.68-9).

Only through the expansion of class, often expressed in the systematic organisations, ideology, behaviors and cultural values of the dominant class in civil society, can unity be achieved through a hegemonic infrastructure. Hegemony, established by the dominant class, also often reaches out to its related classes, uniting them within a complete system that harmonises other subsystems, such as education, information institutions, structures of living, and patterns of city life (Ibid). From his description of hegemony, Gramsci thought that the role of the state is not just about law and order, and direct control of the economy, but more often it is to persuade its people to accept the beliefs and institutions of the dominant classes, and share the latter’s social and cultural values in civil society (Ibid, p.87).

On the other hand, hegemony can also mean counter-hegemony. In short, this refers to the creation of new social ideas by the subordinate classes, in opposition to that of the dominant class, establishing itself through the establishment of another form of cultural and moral superiority (Ibid).

There are some arguments in Althusser’s essay, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ (Althusser, 1971), on the issue of social structure. First, Althusser thought that in order to produce stability, each type of social structure has to reproduce the right conditions for sustaining productive relationships or it will be unable to maintain itself. Secondly, it tends forcibly to maintain the worker-boss relationship, relying as it does on an education system sympathetic to capitalism and other institutions. To illustrate
this, Althusser took the example of the honours system, which guaranteed the persistence of relations between the dominant and labouring classes. Althusser thought that most of the social relations were generated by a superstructure of legal and political ideology. One prime way to assure the state’s power is through the authoritarian state apparatus, such as government, bureaucracy, the military, the police, the legal and penal systems. The other way is through the use of the ideological state apparatus, such as religion, education, family, clubs and associations, and broadcasting institutions (Ibid). Government institutions and penal systems are all system-bound, while language is the central carrier.

According to Chu, possessed with some kind of racially symbolic meaning, language is also imbibed with important political issues. So the common language is often thought of the prime factor behind the foundations for national unification, while achieving the nation’s objectives are the responsibility of the educational system (Chu, 2000, p.61).

However, even if the suppressive state apparatus and ideological state apparatus are essentially different means for assuring a state’s power, they both (respectively) contain some forms of ideology and suppression. For example, the police employ ideology to enforce internal cooperation, while schools sometimes use corporal punishment. If a nation fails to deliver a hegemonic, national ideology, no single class could maintain its regime in the long term. Althusser emphasised the destruction of the ruling class’s hegemonic ideology, by developing and cultivating the opposite ideology amongst the subclasses (cited in Carnoy, 1984, p.97). Having introduced the relevant language issues above, I will now specifically call on John Edwards’ observation on
language in reference to Taiwan, the target of my research.

6. The Fate of a Language: What Has Happened in Taiwan?

In his study of the changes and maintenance of the Irish language, John Edwards concluded that in the typical society with a dying language, its elders are the most common users of that language, and that language is those elders' mother tongue. Secondly, the use of the bilingual is an only transitional phenomenon, and finally will be replaced by the dominant language. Thirdly, those wanting to stop a language from dying are in an (ethnic) minority. Fourthly, the media plays a vital role in emphasising the use of language by a minority; conversely, the dying-out of a language is accelerated due to the mixing in of external languages (Edwards, 1994, pp.96-106). The main language concern in Taiwan is that the majority ethnic language, Taiwanese, could die out at the expense of Mandarin, which is used by an ethnic minority.

In Taiwan, there are more than eighteen million people in a population of twenty-two million for whom Taiwanese is their mother tongue. Edwards also observed that Taiwan's political culture favours the 'northern official language', that is Mandarin. Although Hokkienese (sometimes referred to as Taiwanese, Minnahuac or Fukienese) is the most common language used in the family home, there is concern that the public sphere will erode the official use of this language (Ibid, p.118).

However, it is not clear from Edwards' study of language use on Taiwan why the official language on Taiwan is not Taiwanese but Mandarin. Edwards assumed the reason was because the KMT government on Taiwan made Mandarin the official
language in order to give it greater legitimacy in claiming to be the government of China. The consequence has been to oppose the use of Taiwanese and Hakainese (which is another ethnic language used on Taiwan) in public. That said, more than 95% of Taiwan’s population are now capable of speaking Mandarin. Also, there is no sufficient power base to challenge the use of Mandarin in favour of Taiwanese. However, there is no evidence that the ‘northern official language’ has replaced the use of Taiwanese in family homes (Ibid, p.263). It is necessary here, then, to examine Edwards’ observations about Taiwan, and bring further contextual knowledge to enable greater understanding of the issue of language use.

7. Language Policy in Taiwan

Edwards did not sufficiently explain the complexity of the relationship between Taiwan’s cultural policy and the use of different languages in Taiwanese communities. Implicit in Edwards’ study is the questionable role of China’s language policy. The interaction between the language policy of China and Taiwan’s KMT government demands a fuller exploration in order to reflect the reality of Taiwan. Secondly, the statistic that 95% of the Taiwanese population are capable of using Mandarin to communicate needs challenging. In order to answer these questions, I will begin by looking at the ethnic groups that constitute Taiwan’s population, followed by the sites of language use.
(1) The Census of Taiwan’s Ethnic Groups and Population

Taiwan’s ethnic groups can be classified as having four roots: the aborigines, Hakainese, Taiwanese, and Wai Shen Ren (those that came to Taiwan from different provinces of China in and after 1949). The aborigines inhabited Taiwan for more than 400 years (Tsao, 1997, p.4). They came from the Southern Pacific Islands and speak the so-called South Islands languages. Hakainese mainly refers to the fact that they came from the southern provinces of China, especially Guangtung and Guangsci, and speak Hakai, which was popular in the late Ming and early Ching dynasties (almost 400 years ago). The so-called Taiwanese derive from Fukien Province in southeast China and speak Fukienese, which has become known as Taiwanese, although this group came to Taiwan at a similar time as the Hakai ethnic group. On this evidence, Taiwan is clearly a multi-linguistic society (Ibid).

According to the Interior Ministry report at the end of December 1999, Taiwan’s population is 22,034,096 (Ministry of the Interior, 2000). The aborigines form about 1.7% of Taiwan’s total population; Hakainese form about 12%; Taiwanese form about 73.3%; and, Wai Shen Ren (who predominantly speak Mandarin) form about 13% (Tsao Fon Fu, 1997. p. 4). It would seem that the ratio of ethnic groups in Taiwan hardly varies, although about 87% of the population were unable to speak Mandarin before 1949. Taiwan’s KMT government had rigidly enforced age limits in the education system until the early 1990s, such that people who were older than the school age were not allowed to go to school. For example, those who were older than seven were not allowed to go to elementary school, while those who were older than 13 missed out on
the opportunity to go to middle school. What this means, effectively, is that anyone around 57 years of age or more today is unlikely to have been taught Mandarin while at school. These elders mostly speak in Japanese and their mother tongue (e.g. Taiwanese, Hakainese or one of the aboriginal languages). The figure of 95% that Edwards quotes to quantify the number of Taiwanese able to speak Mandarin is therefore doubtful. Furthermore, according to Tsao Fon Fu, Huang Fu Shun claimed that more than 7% of Taiwan’s population in 1994 were illiterate (cited in Tsao Fon Fu, 1997, p.4), with 6.25% in 1996 (Ibid). The illiteracy rate in Taiwan decreases year by year due to the government’s education policy. According to Tsao’s and Huang’s research, I suggest that Edwards’s figure (proposed in 1986) is questionable and potentially exaggerated.

The following table seeks to demonstrate how the most common language used in the family home is based upon whether the offer of nine years of state education is accepted. In each group, the left side implies people have not been educated in their mother language; and the right side implies people educated in their mother language. The inner part tells the shared language used within the family.
Table 2-1: Languages Used in Family of Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population Percent</th>
<th>Languages Used in Family</th>
<th>The Uneducated</th>
<th>Shared Language</th>
<th>The Educated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aborigines</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Aboriginal</td>
<td>Mandarin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakai</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Hakainese</td>
<td>Mandarin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>Mandarin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wai Shen Ren</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mandarin</td>
<td>Mandarin</td>
<td>Mandarin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tsao Fon Fu, 1997, p.4

Additionally, when Tsao Fon Fu researched language use in 1995, he found that in the aboriginal families, there was no significant difference between the use of their mother language and Mandarin between the ages of 31 and 50 years. However, those aborigines older than 51 are more capable of using their mother language. In contrast, those between 18 and 30 years apparently show a greater use of Mandarin than their mother language, and it is explained no doubt by the fact that the only language used in middle school is Mandarin.

When conversing with family and friends, the research revealed that the mother language is mostly used; whereas, in school, Mandarin is used due to governmental policy. Interestingly, in the workplace, if the person speaking to an aborigine is of higher status, the aborigine will tend to use Mandarin. Also, when speaking with
strangers, the aborigines are most likely to use Mandarin. Overall, then, those aged
between 31 and 50 years could be said to be the first generation to accept state
education, while those younger than 31 are the second generation; as a result, the ability
to use aboriginal languages is being eroded year on year.

With regard to language use by the Hakai and Taiwanese groups, Tsao and Tsan
found a similar result to those of the aborigines. Irrespective of whom they are speaking
to, the Hakai use Mandarin much more frequently than the Taiwanese do. Secondly, the
Hakai use Mandarin more frequently than their mother language in family conversation,
even amongst those aged more than 51 years. This explains why the disappearance of
the Hakai language is faster than the aboriginal and Taiwanese ones (Ibid, pp.40-46).

According to Tsao and Tsan’s research, if the person speaking is of a higher status,
then the other person tends to use Mandarin. What this demands is further research to
ascertain whether Mandarin has become the dominant, in addition to being the official,
language in Taiwanese society. If this dominance exists, how does it relate to the
purpose of conversation? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to look back
at the history of language policy on Taiwan, followed by textual analysis for specific
evidence.

(2) The Language Policy during the Japanese Colonisation Period (1895-1945)

The language policy during the Japanese governance of Taiwan could be
compartmentalised into three periods: “consoling”, “assimilation” and “loyalty”
periods (Ibid, p.49).
A. The Language Policy during the Consoling Period (1895-1919)

Taiwan and its western islands, Peng Hu islands, were given to Japan by the Ching Dynasty of China after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The Japanese Yi Tse Hsiu Erh was installed as the Academic Minister in Taiwan responsible for all education affairs. On arriving on Taiwan in August 1895, he immediately proposed “Taiwan’s Education Suggestions” to Japanese General Governor of Taiwan, Hua Shan. The first of these suggestions was “that the people of this new territory should learn Japanese as soon as possible” (Ibid). However, the Japanese government was unable to bring law and order to Taiwan at first due to the persistence of various rebellions. In response, the Japanese Government of Taiwan decided to adopt a more laissez-faire attitude to language use. According to Tsao, Yang Bi Yuan and Chen Heng Chia’s research, there were 1,707 private schools on Taiwan in 1898, and there were about 29,941 students studying in these schools (cited in Tsao Fon Fu, 1997, pp.49-50). On the one hand, the Japanese Government on Taiwan allowed these schools to continue teaching Taiwanese by their own methods; on the other, the government also establish new schools and teachers’ institutes for the Japanese to learn Taiwan’s local languages. At the same time, the government also encouraged Taiwanese people to go to Japanese language schools. There were three kinds of primary schools: The first was the “Elementary School”, which was for Japanese children with a select few Taiwanese; the second was the “Public School”, where the majority of Taiwanese studied; the third was the “Mountain School”, which was for the aborigines. In the Public Schools,
traditional Chinese characters had to be used during the first stage of the Japanese governance on Taiwan.

**B. The Language Policy during the Assimilation Period (1919-1937)**

By 1919, the Japanese Government on Taiwan changed how it governed Taiwan, as it was no longer faced with rebellions. The government introduced the “Taiwan Education Act”, which forbade the establishment of private schools, and the subject of traditional Chinese calligraphy became selectively taught in all school systems from 1919. Consequently, the private schools started to decline. Most Taiwanese children of school age went to the Public Schools. In order to achieve the goal of assimilating the Taiwanese, the government’s propaganda machine encouraged parents to send their children to the Public Schools. As a result, the numbers of educated people rose very quickly, from 25.1% in 1920 to 71.3% in 1943 (Ibid, p.50).

**C. The Language Policy during the Loyalty to the Emperor Period (1937-1945)**

As relations with China were increasingly tense, the Japanese Government on Taiwan accelerated the pace of assimilation from 1937. The government converged Elementary Schools and Public Schools into the one National People’s Schools under an education policy known as the “Japanese and Taiwanese learning together”. However, there were three types of curriculum schedule. The Number One curriculum
schedule was designed for Japanese, Number Two was for Taiwanese or Han people, while Number Three was for the aborigines. Traditional Chinese character classes were withdrawn from all curriculum schedules, and the Taiwanese language was no longer allowed to be used in schools and public places. In April 1937, the government ordered the abolition of the Chinese pages of “New Taiwanese People News” and started to prosecute all other papers and magazines which used Chinese. When the China-Japanese War broke out in July 1937, the promotion of loyalty to the emperor by the Taiwanese people was enforced, and the “National Language Use Family” movement was put into place. This movement demanded that all people living in Taiwan should not only be able to speak but also think and express themselves in Japanese (Ibid).

(3) The Language Policy post-World War II and Its Promotion in the School System

The China-Japan War ended in 1945, along with World War II, which result in China’s KMT government taking over Taiwan and its western islands, Peng Hu Islands, from the Japanese. The language policy was changed again, this time favouring Taiwan’s people more. In the state education system, the language policy could be divided into three stages: the first stage was the period of “Institutional Changes for Stable Progress” from 1945 to 1969, the second was the “Thorough Plan Execution” period from 1969 to 1986, and the last was called the “Diverse and Open Policy” period from 1987 to the present (Chen Mei Ju, 1998, p.38).
A. Institutional Changes for Stable Progress Period (1945-1969)

After World War II, Chen Yi was installed as the Governor of Taiwan Province on September 2, 1945. In order to rid Taiwan of Japanese culture as soon as possible, the KMT regime did not allow the Taiwanese to speak and use Japanese in public places from 1946. Between the recovery of Taiwan in 1945 and prior to October 25 1946, Taiwan’s newspapers were bilingual, that is, in Japanese and Mandarin (Ibid; Tsao Fon Fu, 1997, p.51). After October 25 1946, the use of Japanese was withdrawn from all public areas, although this effectively made little difference to the Taiwanese people, as prior to the KMT coming to Taiwan, Mandarin was not spoken in public either. Writers were not allowed to write in Japanese either, even if it was the only language they knew. Furthermore, the Governor, Chen Yi, asked the Education Ministry of the KMT government in China to send people to Taiwan to help in promoting the “National Language and Speech Use” movement, which entirely supported the use of Mandarin. These people organised the “Taiwan Province Mandarin Promotion Committee”, who then established sub-committees in each county and city on Taiwan. This committee also recommended the "Six Outlines of the National Language Movement" (Tsao, 1997, p.51), which also supported the recovery of the Taiwanese language, and the teaching of Mandarin through the study of comparative dialects. However, Taiwan’s Governor declined such suggestions.

This particular committee also advocated the abolition of Japanese sentence patterns, that reading should be done using Mandarin pronunciation, and that the Pin Yin phonetic system of Mandarin should be used for purposes of national
communication and the promotion of Chinese culture. After the February 28 Massacre
in 1947, however, the spoken use of Japanese, Taiwanese and languages other the
Mandarin was banned in public (Chen Mei Ju, 1998, pp.40-1). There was a chronic
failure to recognise that the Taiwanese people were being forced to accept an entirely
different society and a new language in such a short time. Government officials even
blamed the Taiwanese people for not knowing Mandarin as a result of their history of
living in slavery. This resulted in hatred between these two ethnic groups for many
years (Ibid, p.41). The central government of the KMT retreated from China to Taiwan
in 1949, and made use of the media to advocate the importance of a common language
in bringing about national unification. With “The Reinforced Promotion of Mandarin
Plan”, introduced on July 10 of 1965, teachers and students had to use Mandarin at all
times and in all places or they would be punished. On October 9 of the same year, the
Education Ministry ordered each county and city to forbid the use of Romanised bibles
used in churches and by foreign priests, and outlaw the use of dialects to propagandise
religion (Tsao Fon Fu, 1997, p.53).

B. Thorough Plan Execution Period (1969-1987)

Towards the end of the 1960s, the relationship between Taiwan and China reached
breaking point with the coming of the “Cultural Revolution Movement” across
Mainland China. Traditional Chinese culture, values and symbols – e.g. Confucian
philosophy, temples, antiques, the arts, literature, relations among families, teachers
and students – were threatened with destruction. Even traditional Chinese written
characters were changed into simplified forms (Chen Mei Ju, 1998, p.67).

Internationally, Taiwan faced a series of diplomatic setbacks, importantly resulting in Taiwan’s expulsion from the United Nations. Domestically, too, many people questioned the legitimacy of the KMT regime on Taiwan. Faced with these problems, the KMT regime reinforced the use of a common language, in the belief that it would deliver stability and unification. Learning from the universal condemnation of Communist China’s systematic destruction of Chinese cultural values, the KMT government established the “Chinese Culture Renaissance Committee”, which encouraged traditional Chinese culture and activities. One of their measures was to reinforce the promotion of the “National Language Movement” (Ibid, p.69). The Taiwan Province Government asked its bureaucrats and officials to press ahead with the decision of executing the education of Mandarin, and ordered every public organisation, institute, place, and school to use Mandarin for communication (Taiwan Province Government’s Public Paper, Autumn, 1977, No.35).

In school, all the language used in teaching, conversation, textbooks, and even spiritual slogans in spoken or written form were regarded as being part of official learning curriculums (Chen Mei Ju, 1998, p.68). Whatever ideology the state tried to advocate and promote could readily be cultivated in this learning environment. In addition, all school employees and students had to be able to sing the national anthem and speak Mandarin, as an expression of national spirit. The study of ‘national literature’ was reinforced. This referred to works of ancient China, and Chinese history and geography, but excluded works created in Taiwan or describing Taiwan; all this was designed to inspire nationalism in the classroom (Ibid, p.70). Teachers and students
were all asked to be model citizens in society; in other words, their thoughts and actions should be in accordance with the state's ideology.

The marginalisation of dialects was also the motivation behind the “Radio and Television Act” passed in 1975. In particular, Article 21 related to language policy. According to Tsao Fon Fu, the legislator Mu Chao said:

That population of Taiwanese who speak the Min Nan dialect, compared with the population of Mainland China, is very small. Meanwhile, the Min Nan dialect is straggling so it is not necessary to feel pity for its vanishing. In Chinese history, there is always a small number of intellectuals who want to influence the majority and maintain the traditions, while there are so many Taiwanese young people who can speak good Mandarin today. Less than 5% of the Taiwanese do not know Mandarin, so I don’t think there would be any problem if radio and television programmes broadcast entirely in Mandarin. Today, we have to expand the idea of the indigenous to the one of the nation so that every one may speak Mandarin. Through this, people may live in harmony and our nation can be unified more naturally (cited by Tsao Fon Fu, 1997, p.52-3).

The final outcome from the “Radio and Television Act” was that radio and television stations should mainly broadcast in Mandarin, while decreasing the use of dialects. The number of programmes using dialects and the date by which all programmes should be in Mandarin would be decided pragmatically by the Government Information Office. These decisions were not made. However, in the spirit of the Act, the number of programmes using dialects fell from about 20% in 1970 to 11-12% in 1975. This proportion decreased year by year, with only 6.55% in 1989 across all three national broadcasting stations (Ibid, p.53). The “Rules for the Practical Execution of the Radio and Television Act” stated that no more than two songs in
dialects could be broadcast in any one day by a station. Also, if the interviewees were unable to speak Mandarin in news and social education programmes, the reporters had not to use dialect to ask questions unless the interviewees were unable to understand Mandarin. The use of Taiwan’s dialects was limited in such similar situations, and it was made almost impossible for Taiwan’s dialects to regenerate. This act lasted for almost 20 years until a new edition of the “Radio and Television Act” was passed in 1993, with the cancellation of the language policies mentioned above coming shortly after (Ibid, p.54).

C. The Diverse and Open Period (1987–)

With the promotion of Mandarin and Chinese culture across half a century, both Taiwan’s indigenous languages and culture were faced with disappearance. However, when martial law was lifted in 1987, the debate about the use of dialects was opened up again. The lifting of martial law also led to the flourishing of new media and new newspapers, while free speech became a popular subject in society. An education system that had a more indigenous complexion was encouraged more than ever before. In September 1990, Taiwanese was openly taught at the King Hua Primary School in Taipei City, with other “mother tongue languages” subsequently being taught in public and private schools. As a result, the counties and cities that make up Taiwan Province started to advocate the “Mother Tongue Language Learning Movement”. Finally, on the April 3 1994, the Ministry of Education announced that mother tongue languages could be taught at all school levels (Chen Mei Ju, 1998, p.79). The Ministry also
introduced the teaching of Taiwanese culture, history and geography in the middle school education system and decreed to encourage more indigenous artistic activities (Ibid, pp.80-1). These sweeping changes mean that Taiwan faces new challenges that implicates the debates about nationalism, post-modernity, and globalisation (which will be explored in the following chapters).

8. Society Map from Language Observation

The use of written languages in Taiwan is just as problematic as issues relating to spoken versions. The naming of Taiwan’s streets, in particular, is politically loaded. The two biggest roads, Sun Yat-Sen Road and Chiang Kai Shek Road, can be found in almost each town or city around the island, with their reference, respectively, to the founder of the Republic of China and its first President, who held the position for almost 30 years in both China and Taiwan (their images have also featured on Taiwan’s currency). As Benedict Anderson implied, the images of political figures may prolong popular historical memory, and contribute to the construction of national identity amongst the people. In addition to these two roads, the KMT government also ‘imported’ names of provinces or big cities in China to Taiwan. The Peiping Road, which refers to the capital city of the People’s Republic of China, Nanking Road, named after the capital city of the Republic of China, and so on, are the main examples. Beijing is renamed as Peiping in Taiwan by Taiwan’s government for political reasons, too. Peiping is the ancient name of Beijing city in China today. Its name was changed as Beijing by the Communist government in China, whose legitimacy is denied by the
KMT. By recalling this traditional cultural heritage, this is a way in which the KMT government can assert its own legitimacy. Ssu Chuan Road takes its name from a province in the central part of China. More interestingly, Taiwan’s Presidential Hall is located on Chung Ching South Road; Chung Ching was the temporary capital city of the Republic of China during World War II and the civil war between China’s Communists and the KMT. Therefore, it is not difficult to realise that the naming of Taiwan’s roads is a conscious effort by the government to construct an ‘imagined historical memory’ for the Taiwanese. Even the capital city, Taipei, is referred to as being temporary; the permanent one is Nanking in Mainland China.

There are also many university names in Taiwan that are the same as in China. Furthermore, Taiwan does not admit any degree awarded in China, even though the latter’s universities have the longer historical tradition. If presenting an official version of history is their strategy for claiming legitimacy, the KMT’s position is contradictory. The meaning of culture, through language use, is constructed not by who the speakers are but by what status they hold. Meanwhile, to further assert historical legitimacy, Taiwan’s government has insisted on using the traditional format of the written Chinese language, which is much more difficult to learn and write. In contrast, China uses a simplified version of Chinese, both in its cultural and its internationalist activities. Simplified Chinese is much easier to learn, especially for foreigners. China also uses the Romanised Pinyin phonetic system for pronunciation, the system which was adopted by the United Nations in the 1970s; however, Taiwan’s government insists on using the Chu-Yin Tzu-Mu phonetic system, which it considers to be closer to the heritage of Chinese culture. Recently, however, to broaden the international appeal of
Taiwan's Chinese culture, there has been much debate over whether to use the Chu-Yin Tzu-Mu or the Pinyin phonetic systems in Taiwanese society. Taking both indigenous and international aspects into consideration, Taiwan's government has developed the "General Uses of the Pinyin" system, which mixes the Wade-Giles and China's Romanised Pinyin systems (Lai Ming De et al, 1999, p.42). However, this move has been criticised as an ideological strategy through its differentiation from the Pinyin system used in Mainland China.

Meanwhile, on the identification cards used in Taiwan, there is one column that records its holder's place of birth, a heritage that would seem difficult to deny. However, for children born after 1949 in Taiwan, their places of origin are recorded as the same as their father's, many of whom came to Taiwan from Mainland China after 1949. What such government measures represent are clues how ethnic or national identity is established through the ideological construction of language, written and spoken, which supports Althusser's statement that the state's ideology is facilitated through state apparatuses (cited in Chiu Kuei Fen, 1999, p.12). The likely motives behind these cultural strategies are identifiable if one looks behind the scenes.

In the case of Taiwan, a form of Fukienese called Minnanhua was the most common language on the island itself. Prior to 1945, there was a thriving local cinema industry on the island using this language, which in fact continued to exist alongside the Mandarin cinema industry. But, the KMT government privileged the development of Mandarin cinema, for example, by excluding non-Mandarin films from participating in the annual government-sponsored Golden Horse Awards. As a result, local language films declined and almost disappeared in the 1960s and 1970s, while Mandarin cinema
flourished and populated by local characters whose ancestors come from the Fukien province of Mainland China speak paradoxically in perfect Mandarin. The manner in which both states claim to be the Chinese nation through this linguistic sabotage is an example of how the construction of a homogeneous Chinese ‘nation’ employs the process of identifying only a part of its constituents and isolating others (Berry, 1994, pp.48-9).

However, this strict separation between languages has gradually broken down since the early 1980s with the emergence of the Taiwanese New Cinema, which is associated with Hsiang-tu (or, soil) literature and younger directors who grew up on the island. Among other things, these directors are dedicated to describing the experience of living in contemporary Taiwan in a realistic and credible manner. As a result, they employ a mixture of spoken languages as one might typically hear on the streets of Taipei (Ibid, p.57).


The vanishing of a language may be the result of a government’s nation’s language policy and state interference. Historically, there may be clues about why films made in Taiwanese faded. Thus, between 1949 to 1994, 1125 films were in Taiwanese, compared with no films in 2002. Why?

After a long period of Mandarin being taught across all levels of the education system, most Taiwanese will probably use Mandarin to speak, write and communicate. Moreover, the government has always encouraged films to be made in Mandarin by the
use of regulations, subsidy, investment, and competitions. The cinema industry in Taiwan is considered to be its main cultural asset. However, the rules of the ‘game’ are entirely set by government, which has expanded the market for Mandarin films by marginalizing films made in other languages, thus inhibiting communication between filmmakers and their intended audience. Predictably, language policy in the cinema industry plays an important role.

According to Lu Fei Yi (1998), the Education Ministry established the “Cinematic Industry Guidance Committee” in 1956, and hence the government’s cinematic policy changed from passive inspection to actively strategic support. This led to a number of regulations. To sum up the contents of these regulations, the following points can be made: first, the term “national film” was mostly used to determine which films were liable to regulation or support. On the surface, there was no major difference between films made in Mandarin and films made in Taiwanese. However, the definition of “national film” was mainly interpreted by government departments, such as the Education Ministry and Government Information Office, to mean films made in Mandarin. Consequently, films made in other languages were excluded from subsidy, support, or tax-reductions, while those who made films in Mandarin were allowed to distribute foreign films. Also, two plans were introduced which were apparently meant to encourage Mandarin film production. Both ordered in 1962, they were “The Loan Plan for Mandarin Film Production”, and “The Plan to Encourage Quality in Mandarin Films”. The latter plan led to the “Golden Horse Award”, held nationally by the government. All films made in languages other than Mandarin were excluded from taking part in the competition until the appearance of the film The Sadness of a City
made in 1989. This film won the “Golden Lion Award” at the Venice International Film Festival and was subsequently permitted to participate in the Golden Horse Award. Partly due to a sense of the award’s international recognition, the definition of “national film” was changed to mean films that were produced domestically. That said, the government was intent on reinforcing the production of high quality Mandarin films, and revised its original “Guidance for Supporting National Films and the Foreign Film Distribution”, becoming “Practical Guidance for Foreign Film Distribution In Support of Mandarin Film Production”, which still clearly identified films made in Mandarin for support and guidance. Again, films made in other languages were excluded. Besides the legal requirements, the resulting administrative orders were also discriminatory in tone or implication. For example, in 1959, the government demanded that Taiwanese was not used to translate films made in Mandarin. The popularity of cinema encouraged audiences to accept Mandarin, which led to a decrease in the influence of films made in Taiwanese. With regard to inspection, standards were applied to films depending on what language they were made in. Even the title of films was liable to be changed. For example, the Taiwanese film Broken, Broken Heart by Lee Dai Chuan was changed into Heart Broken, as it was not possible to translate the original title into Mandarin. This was particularly unreasonable because there was no such translation of Heart Broken in Taiwanese. From this, it can be concluded that those who speak the hegemonic language can also impose their ideology. As Mandarin speakers have the politically dominant position, they can readily interpret cultural matters on their terms. According to Lu Fei Yi, Huang Jen said the film Brother Ah San, directed by Chiu Lin Bou, met with the same fate, as “Ah San” was regarded as implying the “Wai Shen
Ren” (cited in Lu Fei Yi, 1998, pp.163-5), which means people coming from an outer province.

Besides the legislative and administrative rules and orders, the government also influenced the growth in the market for Mandarin films. In Taiwan’s case, the three biggest film studios were owned by the government - “Central Motion Pictures”, the “Taiwan Cinema Production Corporation” and “China Cinema”. The government also offered favourable subsidies to certain cinematic companies, like “Yuan Hua Cinema”, owned by Lee Tsu Yuan, and “Kuan Lian Cinema”, owned by Lee Han Hsiang, as they would willingly obey government policy in producing films in Mandarin. Therefore, films made in Taiwanese were likely to lose their markets without political and cultural support from the government, and ultimately were destined to vanish completely.

For this cinematic industrial studies, Lu draws a work of the Australian scholar, McKenzie Wark, who proposed the term “Film Memory” in his study of the relationship between the decline in the production of Australian films and the recording of Australian culture in the 1960s. Wark argues that films record cultural phenomena and people’s lifestyles during certain periods, but when some aspect of culture is excluded from the cinema due to political or other factors, this aspect will be denied the opportunity of being ‘remembered’ on film (Ibid, pp.165-6). This is poignant, since once films made in Taiwanese came to an end; there was no longer any witness of Taiwanese culture or lifestyle using the Taiwanese language. In other words, films made in Taiwan simply recorded the Mandarin culture and the government. Even when Taiwan’s cinema industry produced “Healthy Realism Films” to document the life of ordinary Taiwanese folk, they were thought to distort the real experience of the average
Taiwanese family. In addition, as these films were made in Mandarin, not Taiwanese, the cinema industry lacked any sense of subjective authenticity. The Hong Kong scholar, Cheng Shu Sen, stated that:

After being separated from China for over 40 years, the ethnic subjectivity of Hong Kongese became foregrounded gradually. The second and third generations of Hong Kongese have their own indigenous culture, and they also need the positive recognition for their language” (cited in Lu Fei Yi, 1998, p.166).

In contrast, even though the Taiwanese ethnic group is in the majority, they are unable to obtain appropriate recognition for their language due to the national language policy and unable to expect positive representation in the cinema. While language is bound up with the cultural characteristics of expression, the enforced use of another language to narrate the experience of a different culture will presumably construct memory that may have little in common with reality.

The Government Information Office selected the film Kuei Flower Lane to compete for the Oscar for Best Foreign Film in 1988. The director, Chen Kuen Hou, strove to have the film re-edited in Taiwanese to reflect the film’s style, but his request was rejected on the grounds that Taiwanese is not the national language and the GIO would only permit participation in international film festivals and competitions where the films are made in Mandarin (cited in Huang Jen, 1994b, p.25). At the end of the 1980s, some films made in Taiwanese did appear again but made little impact on audiences. Huang Jen observes that some films are issued in bilingual formats; Mandarin editions are made for the northern part of Taiwan, especially for Taipei City,
and Taiwanese copies are made for the remainder. He cites the example of *The Goddess, Ma Tsu* - out of the 26 copies made; only three of them were dubbed in Mandarin for screenings in Taipei, concluding that Taiwanese culture will exist for as long as it has roots in Taiwan. The rebirth of films made in Taiwanese can be explained by the rediscovery of these roots (Huang Jen, 1994b, pp.25-26).

Another viewpoint proposed by Chen Ru Shiou is that language use on Taiwan is a complex matter in Taiwanese society. A Taiwanese film might employ different languages to reflect a specific historical context (Chen Ru Shiou, 1994, p.25).

Responding to Chen Ru Hsiou, I now intend to discuss the film *Taipei Story* (directed by Yang De Chang, 1985) in terms of language hybridisation and related issues about identity. From a vertical analysis, three generations can be identified in this film. Shu Chen’s parents and the teacher Lai represent the older generation. Unlike Shu Chen’s parents, Lai is seen as a modern, cultured individual (Huang Jian Yeh, 1995, pp. 101-26). The middle generation is represented by the male protagonists, who are Ah Lung and friends, Shu Chen and friends, Miss Mei, Little Ke, and Ah Lung’s sister and her husband. As with the older generation, the male protagonists and their friends could represent an older culture, while characters from the youngest generation, like the sister of Shu Chen, her friends, and some young baseball players, are more likely to accept new and external cultures. From the perspective of language use in film, the following table may delineate the language as a cultural phenomenon in Taiwan today.
Table 2-2: The Language Use in the Film *Taipei Story* (1985)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The elder generation</th>
<th>The middle generation</th>
<th>The young generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese, Japanese and sometimes Mandarin</td>
<td>Taiwanese and Mandarin</td>
<td>Mandarin, Taiwanese, and sometimes Japanese and/or English</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above table of the use of language can be said to be reflective of the reality in Taiwan’s society. The older generation use Taiwanese and Japanese, as teacher Lai does. For example, there is a scene showing teacher Lai and Ah Lung’s conversation on the theme of baseball. They both use Taiwanese to communicate. However, teacher Lai, while trying to entertain his grandson, uses Japanese to speak to his grandson when they are at home, even if his grandson does not understand Japanese. Basically, the middle generation use both Mandarin and Taiwanese, reflected by the film’s figures Ah Lung and his friend Ah Youn. There is the example of Ah Youn’s speaking to Ah Lung when the latter is going to sell his house and is preparing to go to America. Ah Youn uses a mixture of Taiwanese and Mandarin when he says “Anyway, this house is easily sold”. The same situation happens to the female character Ah Chin when she has a phone call, and she says “Miss Mei is not here. I am Ah Chin, wait a minute” speaking partly in Taiwanese and partly in Mandarin. In Taiwan, this kind of hybridising of two languages within conversations seems to become the most common use of language, which directly corresponds to what Bhabha calls a society of “hybridity” (Bhabha, 1990,
p.314). The younger generation seem to prefer to speak partly in Taiwanese, Japanese and Mandarin, while even English is sometimes inserted into the conversation.

The youngest generation does not speak Taiwanese, but often inserts perfect American English into the conversation. More interestingly, when Ah Lung speaks Taiwanese to Ah Chin’s son, he responds in perfect Mandarin. Ah Chin asks his own son to say good-bye to Uncle Lung in Mandarin, while Ah Lung is bid ‘Bye-Bye’ in English from Ah Chin’s son. What is potentially signified by this use of contrasting languages across three generations is their sense of where their cultural identity is located. Most of the characters in this film are bilingual. I would argue that their use of certain languages is not about suiting the occasion but is more a self-conscious decision about how they see themselves in the cultural hierarchy. Indeed, the film might be a microcosm that reflects the reality in Taiwanese society in the construction of cultural identity.

Hou Shiao Hsien, a friend of the director Yang, also refers to such cultural phenomena on Taiwan in the film, A Time to Live and a Time to Die (directed by Hou Shiao Hsien, 1987). It follows the story of a family of immigrants from Guangdung province in Mainland China through the voice-over memories of the eldest son, Ah-Ha. Ah-Ha’s younger siblings would have grown up almost entirely on Taiwan, and they speak a somewhat purer Mandarin, as would have been taught them in school. The older generations, including his mother and grandmother, speak a Cantonese dialect, which the children clearly understand, but do not speak themselves. Most of the other people in the village speak a Hokkienesian dialect. It is noteworthy that pure Mandarin is associated most strongly in the film with the voice of the radio announcer, who is the
agent of the nation state bringing news about state events such as the National Day celebrations. In this way, the discourse of the nation is located outside of the space occupied by the main characters in the film, and only interferes by acting as the source of bad or worrisome news or at least of slight concern. More humorously, the film also refers to the impact of neo-colonialism in its deployment of language. There is a brief scene in which the youngest son is shown memorizing the Romanised alphabet as part of his English lessons, in which the phrase “one dollar” is used as a mnemonic (Berry, 1994, p.58).

In his other film, A City of Sadness (directed by Hou in 1989), Hou touches on the political taboo of the February 28 Massacre in 1947, while myriad languages and dialects are used to show how the dominant language of Mandarin is, in effect, that of the minority. According to Liao Hsian Hao (1994), Taiwan’s indigenous culture is also manifest in this film through three particular issues: indigenous rebellion, national reconciliation, and the reconstruction of Taiwan’s identity. Underpinning these three issues is the politics of speaking, reflected in two particular storylines in the film. One narrates the conflicts between the Shanghai rascal, the eldest son, Wen Hsiung, and Wen Liang, the third son of the Lin family. The other storyline concerns the youngest son, Wen Ching, his very good friend, Kuan Jung, and Kuan’s sister, Kuan Mei. The subject touched on in the first storyline is about “what (language) to speak when many different languages are spoken all at the same time”. The latter relates to whether “to (be able to) speak or not” (Liao Hsian Hao, 1994, pp.62-3).

The hatred between Wen Hsiung and the Shanghai rascal is due to the drug-smuggling business of Wen Liang and these rascals. Wen Liang was sent to
Shanghai by the Japanese during wartime but was then jailed by the KMT for working for the Japanese when the war ended. Shortly after being released, he was implicated with the Shanghai rascals, and jailed again on the accusation of being a spy working for the Japanese Emperor. In order to rescue his young brother, Wen Hsiung decides to confront the Shanghai rascals and their business associates. Ah Chia, the brother of Wen Hsiung's wife, aware that Wen Liang was trapped by the Shanghai rascals, tries to secretly take revenge. However, in a fight in Wen Hsiung's bordello, Ah Chia is hurt by one of the Shanghai rascals, and runs away for help. Wen Hsiung appears holding a knife and tries to kill the person trying to murder Ah Chia. Suddenly a gun shot is heard, and Wen Hsiung is shot to death by the head of the Shanghai rascals.

At the beginning of this film, the second wife of Wen Hsiung, a Cantonese, speaks Taiwanese with Wen Hsiung, but uses Cantonese to communicate with her brother, Ah Chia. Here is a stereotypical image of Taiwan possessing cultural purity. The so-called Wai Shen Ren refers to people coming from a different province. The Hakainese and the aboriginal languages hardly get an opportunity to be represented. The film *A City of Sadness* embraces the myriad cultural and political possibilities of Taiwan. Hence, ...we discover that the use of dialects in this film is not only applied as a simple explanation for official oppression versus ordinary rebellion. The Bakhtinian heteroglossia changes the meanings of Taiwan's dialects, and more surmountable and productive meanings are constructed once the multi-dialects are positioned side by side (Ibid, pp.62-63).

Besides Minnanhua, there are seven other dialects heard or mentioned in this film.
They are: Shanghainese, as used by Shanghai rascals; Chechiangnese, used in the radio announcements by the Taiwan Province Governor, Chen Yi: Cantonese, as used by the second wife of Wen Hsiung, her brother, Ah Chia, and one of the Shanghai rascals; Mandarin, as used by a reporter from China and the military, while the northern accent of Mandarin is used by a language teacher in a hospital; Hakainese, as used by the Lin family doctor and mentioned without being heard in the film; and, Wenchounese, as used by Wen Hsiung’s bodyguard.

The oppositions inherent in the use of multi-dialects transfer simplistic concepts, like ‘the self and the other’ or ‘the rebellion of the repressed versus the oppression of the enemy’ into ‘subject positioning’, which instead refers to the model of post-colonial rebellion in a society with cultural diversity. In other words, rebellion is necessary, not in terms of one ethnic group against another, but the dominated against the dominant.

In general speech, each dialect has its own symbolic meanings. In A City of Sadness, Mandarin and its offshoots, like Chechiangnese, all possess some kind of authority and dominance. Shanghainese is used to provide, by contrast, the stereotypical image of deviance. Cantonese and Wenchounese represent the close rapport between Taiwanese and south Chinese cultures, as well as migrant exchanges and their shared dissatisfaction with the official policies that enable the culture of the north Chinese to dominate society.

The emphasis of this close rapport with the culture of the south Chinese restores the equilibrium to the importance of the northern and the neglect of the south, resulting in misunderstanding and exaggerated tension between the indigenous peoples of Taiwan and the Wai Shen Ren. The root of the differences between the north and the
south is not essential; rather it is the official Taiwan ideology, which foregrounds the north. This latter ideology, which emanates from government officials, intentionally or unintentionally, devalues the cultural position of locality, especially of the southern cultures. The south culture is often regarded as the ‘other’ because the hegemony of the centre is exaggerated and cuts off grassroots culture. The tendency of this kind of centralised hegemony therefore leads to the Mandarin culture being rooted in the north, thus suffocating or devaluing the other cultures. This explains why culture has been impoverished in Taiwan. The imbalance of cultural relations is formed by the subject positioning of the dominant rather than the spirit prevalent among the various ethnic groups (Ibid, p.63).

The domination in localised society, represented by the use of dialects, and the dominant role of centralised ideology represented by the use of Mandarin and Chechiangnese, are the two dimensions to this film. That said, there is also the case that interaction between dialects represents the possibility of social equilibrium. For example, Mandarin might be spoken by the reporter from China, but the reporter is the friend of Kuan Jung, who in turn is the friend of Wen Ching, who is mute and the youngest brother of the Lin family. Secondly, one of the Shanghai Ganglanders uses Cantonese as well as Shanghainese. Thirdly, even if a person speaks Minnanhua, he could betray his friend using the same language. Language use is relevant to the status of the speaker, thus the status of the speaker is more important than the language used. It is also possible for those dialects belonging to less ‘potent’ ethnic groups to take on a dominant role. Therefore, two levels of meaning of the heteroglossia appear in this film. The first is that the contrast between the languages of the north and south reflects the
cultural forms deployed by the dominated and the dominant; this tension highlights the essential differences between the indigenous and Wai Shen cultures. The second, concerns the different subject positions within the same dialectic society that deconstruct the relationship of the subject positioning of the dominant and dominated. This certainly raises the characteristics of cultural diversity in Taiwan. A borderline does not naturally exist between ethnic groups, but an unstable virtual line instead cuts across the internal bodies of many ethnic groups, which enables a freedom of speaking positions (Ibid, p.64).

The differences between the southern dialects are used to compete with the official policy of centralisation. In addition, the significant use of Japanese in this film strongly emphasises both the centripetal and centrifugal forces operating within Taiwanese culture from an innovative perspective. The KMT government, when in Mainland China, endured eight years of confrontation with Japan, such that Japanese culture is taken for granted as the ‘ultimate other’. Therefore, the touches of Japanese culture in this film offer the audience a Taiwanese identity linked to resistance through their ability to use the Japanese language, as the following example establishes. In one scene, while on a train Wen Ching is asked the question, “Where do you come from?” by some Taiwanese rascals, who are trying to find out where passengers have come from. They use Japanese to ask this question as they will be able to tell whether they are Taiwanese if they understand the question. Those passengers unable to use Japanese are not classified as Taiwanese and are subsequently beaten. This is not just a symbolic challenge to the official cultural policy of a monocultural identity, but also constructs the notion of identity through a third party’s perspective. The essence of so-called
Chinese nationalism is seemingly challenged more than the impact of Japanese culture in Taiwan (Ibid, pp.64-65).

The mute character represents another kind of speaking politics. He reflects the inability of the Taiwanese to have their own voice for such a long time. It takes an act of violence for him to finally utter a sound. Right after the February 28 massacre of 1947, Wen Chinag is stunned into speaking and proudly announces in the train that he is Taiwanese, not Chinese, when he is asked by the thugs. When he first utters the word ‘Taiwanese’, it is hardly audible—which almost results in a beating. Luckily, he is rescued by Kuan Jung, who tells the rascals that he is in fact a mute. However, in subsequent scenes, where Wen Ching helps Kuan Jung in escaping capture by the KMT military by hiding in the mountains, sending him food parcels in secret, it is clear that he has made his decision to be a Taiwanese. The transition of Wen Ching from ‘ahistorical being’ to ‘participant in history’ is expressed by the abandonment of his favorite photographic job after the assault on the train. Symbolically, again, he wishes to break free from the still life of photography and speak in every way possible; to participate in history. In the final scene, he takes the last shot of his family, knowing that death will surely follow. He is jailed, never to return (Ibid, p.68).

The film _A Borrowed Life_ (directed by Wu Nieh-Chen in 1994) is, essentially, the story of the director’s father, who aspires to be Japanese, and traces the period from the Japanese surrender after World War II to 1991. The Chinese title for this film is _Dou Sun_, which is a Japanese pronunciation meaning ‘father’. The similarity with the films mentioned above is that the older generation mainly use Japanese and Taiwanese. In contrast to these films, when the main character, Dou Sun, speaks in Japanese, he
always feels he is superior to others, especially to his own family. The purpose here is to capture the indulgence of a joyful and private activity through using a language that is not understood by other people. One particular scene describes how use of different languages is caught up with his cheating ways. In this scene, he is shown wanting to go gambling in a red light district, and takes his youngest son with him so that his wife won’t doubt him. On the way to the red light district, Dou Sun meets his friends who ask him, in Japanese, what excuse he has used on his wife this time. He replies that he has told her he is taking his son to see a movie. The conversation continues on the way to the red light district, with them all speaking Japanese very loudly. Suddenly, Dou Sun is aware that his son might be listening into their conversation. His son denies that he is. However, Dou Sun’s friend, Tiao Chuen, asks the son a question that will identify whether he understands Japanese or not. When he answers correctly, Dou Sun playfully taps his son’s head to express his anxiety. In truth, however, he is proud of his son’s ability to understand Japanese.

Another scene tells a different story. The youngest daughter, who is about seven, complains that her father always turns on a Japanese radio programme when she wishes to listen to a Mandarin one. When Dou Sun persists, his daughter finally calls him a traitor in Mandarin, unbeknownst to him, as he does not know any Mandarin. Sensing it was offensive, though, he scolds her in Japanese. Therefore, this scene shows how they resort to communicating in a language the other doesn’t understand when they argue. In this particular film, then, language use is concerned with its role in the private sphere.
10. Summary

Michael Billig implied that nationalists might strive to separate a nation into two countries through the struggle of acclaiming their spoken and/or written languages, which are marginalised or called dialect, in order to legitimate their politics. The ideology of nationalism plays an important role in forming a language, which might explain why people's way of life, as well as the way they think, has become localised. However, in Taiwan's case, the KMT government made every attempt to educate the population in the use of Mandarin as its means to establish a unifying national identity. It would be wrong, therefore to suggest the KMT's promotion of the Mandarin Movement was motivated by a desire to divide the nation state. The very ethos of the KMT as a party is predominantly concerned with national unity. Even if the manner of speech or expression appropriate to Mandarin does not correspond to Taiwanese or Minanhua, both of which are closer to ancient Chinese, Taiwan's KMT government still used bureaucratic instruments of the state to persuade people that its language policy was about recovering the Chinese cultural heritage from the 'destructive' Chinese Communists. Additionally, through contextual information as well as textual analyses of the films mentioned above, a historical contradiction can be seen, as China has separated into two 'Chinas' – The People's Republic of China (Mainland China), and The Republic of China (Taiwan). Each of the two 'Chinas' claims to be the legitimate Chinese government. The implication here for language use is that there are now at least two sets of Chinese as a written language and a phonetic spelling system. Traditional Chinese, whose system is called Chu-Yin Tzu-Mu, is used on Taiwan; while
Simplified Chinese, with its Romanised Pin-Yin system, is used in Mainland China. The changing nature of language use is highly visible in Taiwanese society and, through the experience of cinema, most Taiwan people are now used to bilingual or multi-language environments. The film *Taipei Story* shows how people use their mother tongue language to represent who they are, a theme that was also reflected in the 1987 film *A Time to Live, A Time to Die*. But bilingual language use also has a function at the micro level of family and friends. Indeed, the second generation of Chinese mainlanders who came to Taiwan after 1949 use very fluent Taiwanese to communicate with their Taiwanese friends. More intensely, the film *A City of Sadness* uses more than seven languages (Liao Hsian Hao, 1994), which is rare but not impossible in Taiwanese society—although there are translators to cross the cultural divide within this linguistically diverse society. I would argue the latter film reflects different cultural heritages and experiences, but emphasises that communication should always be possible. Undeniably, the Mandarin speakers represented by the Shanghai rascals, soldiers and (on radio) Taiwan’s governor, Chen Yi, occupy oppressive roles compared to other language users. Liao implied that to place characters into dominant and oppressed categories based on what language they use in this film is too superficial. This may well be true, but if we neglect the struggle of the dominated social groups for greater fairness and appropriate recognition of their identity, and impose this film’s thesis on inner class struggle, the theme would be covered too. In addition to the hybridised characteristics reflected in Taiwanese cinema, there are two other areas worthy of examination. First, I propose that bilingual use in society not only represents communication between the dominant and dominated groups, but also progress to a
more intimate means of communication, as the male protagonist in the film *A Borrowed Life* makes clear. In Taiwan, generally, it is common for one’s parents’ generation to use Japanese to communicate if they don’t want their children to know what they are talking about. But this strategy works both ways, such that their children will use Mandarin or other languages to communicate with their siblings or friends if they want their parents to remain out of the picture.

Secondly, I would like to consider the fact that, every year during the 1960s, more than 300 films were made in Taiwanese on Taiwan, but by the end of the 1990s, there were none. Does this mean that the spoken language most Taiwanese people currently use will disappear very soon? This situation is in stark contrast with television, where there is a tendency to get more programmes made in Taiwanese. However, cinema is regarded as a significant cultural activity by the government, and one which needs to recognise the constant changes in culture.

The film *A City of Sadness* could be said to have successfully challenged the government’s mono-culture policy, by encouraging the ability to speak one’s language freely, and representing and constructing historical meaning and reality that opposes the official version. It went on to gain international recognition by winning the Golden Lion Award of 1989 at the Venice International Film Festival. If film is indeed a representation, knowing how the film relates to memory and constructs reality might bring us to another entity of political subjectivity. The next chapter will focus on this relationship between the issues of history, memory and reality in terms of narrative discourse.
Chapter III: History, Memory and Issues of Interpretation

This chapter seeks to discuss the history force of a nation through the exploration of how the Taiwan government's educational and cinematic institutions implicate the formation of family history and national identity.

Questions such as the operation of passing memory, the challenges of political taboo, the rise of self identity and the interpretation of history and memory are to be examined. In addition, this chapter will also try to find out what the official and people's versions of history might be in Taiwan through film analysis.

1. The Act of Passing Memory

For Benedict Anderson (Anderson, 1996, pp.187-206), the act of passing memory and experiences, especially about unhappy moments, to subsequent generations partly explains why nationalist movements start up. He seems to imply that historical inheritance has a sense of physical accumulation for the inheritors, which enforces their strength of feeling. One of the issues Anderson tackles is how the essence of nationalism is transformed. He does not refer to nationalism as a negative or positive term, but instead prefers to unearth the background reasons behind nationalist policies towards culture, society or the political administration. Two issues are implicit in his observation: that is, the interpretation and representation of history. Again, when applied to Taiwan, the demand for answers to the following questions
becomes inevitable: Is there any issue in Taiwanese society that is historically determined? If yes, what is it (are they)? What is the people’s response?

2. The Absence of Taiwanese History

With regard to Taiwanese society and its relationship to history, the so-called “Chung Yuan” culture-centered discourse is possibly the most controversial. The concept of Chung Yuan refers to the area located in the northern, central part of the Yellow River in China. In official Chinese history, Chinese culture is said to originate from Chung Yuan, while other Chinese communities have subsequently derived from its culture. Predictably, Taiwan is not the only society that is found in the KMT regime’s official history. The KMT regime identifies itself as the true inheritors of Chinese traditions and culture and the master interpreter of Chinese history. Their stand against the Chinese Communists and the Japanese is beyond scrutiny and, thus, becomes the content of history. This regime seeks to represent the views of all Chinese people in terms of the interpretation of modern Chinese history.

Also, in the content of modern Chinese history taught from elementary to university level in Taiwan, the subject of Taiwan is absent. It may be due to “rationalised authority”, a term used by Michael Pickering, which is “a kind of expansive and closed knowledge” (Pickering, 1997, p.242); the rationalised authority in Taiwan’s case is the KMT or Nationalist Party. Pickering agrees experiences contributing to the formation of historical discourse and experiences are also reconstructed over time. What this means is that experiences are not equal to reality
itself or past incidents. Any social history, historical film or autobiography merely references history; in other words, it is “their” history, someone else’s experiences during or at a particular time (Ibid, pp.208-46). With regard to Taiwan, “their” experiences mean those of the KMT regime, which are claimed to represent those of all Taiwanese and Chinese people. What actually represents the Taiwanese experience is an issue that needs exploring. Learning from the government, some of Taiwan’s film makers started to ‘speak for the dead’ while dealing with political taboos, like February 28 or the Terrorism Governance (of imperialism) of the 1950s, a term used in the 1990s in popular memory.

The following film analysis will consider the Taiwanese experience of history.

3. Film Analysis with regard to Memory, History and Interpretation

(1) Challenging the Political Taboo – Making History through Taiwanese New Cinema (1982-1987)

Drawing on Michel Foucault, we can argue that popular memory as contesting official memory is constructed by some groups to legitimise their demands (Foucault, 1989). And asking for other people to remember the ‘family history’ (Anderson, 1996, p.201) of tragedy is a way to achieve their demand. The biggest tragic family stories in Taiwan are about the February 28 Massacre in 1947 and the Terrorism Governance during the 1950s. Those identified here as asking people to remember are the directors of New Taiwanese Cinema.

Announced by Taiwanese filmmakers, including Tsan Hong Chih, Yang De
Chang, Hou Hsiao Hsien, and Wu Nieh-Chen, in 1987, the Declaration of Taiwan
New Cinema begins with the statement:

We think that filmmaking is a creative activity that combines an awareness of
ideology with art. It can also be a cultural activity along ethnic or national lines

To generate enough interest in order to compete with other films at the Venice
Film Festival in 1989, the film *A City of Sadness* (1989, directed by Hou) was referred
to as being about Taiwan’s version of the Tiannanman Square massacre. At that
festival, it won the Golden Lion Award that year, the first Taiwanese film to win an
award at an international level. It also collected nominations and awards at the Oscars,
and at the Cannes and Berlin Film Festivals. When the news hit Taiwan, people were
keen to see how the government would respond. *A City of Sadness*, according to Lin
Wen Chi, “returns the broadcast of the February 28 Massacre in 1947 to Taiwanese
society even though it remains the government’s political taboo and does not officially
exist in its history” (Lin, W. C., 1995, p.95). Supported by Lin’s statement, the film
might compare with the political inheritance of former Taiwan President, Lee Deng
Huei. Installed after President Chiang Ching Ko in 1988, former Vice President Lee
Deng Huei was the first Taiwanese to be made the President of Taiwan. *A City of
Sadness* was the first Taiwanese film to show how the February 28 Massacre was
inscribed upon people’s memory. As it challenged the official version of history, many
people were anxious to see how government censorship would deal with its domestic
release. As it happened, the censor from the Government Information Office passed
the film without the need to edit any section out. This heralded a new era: a new
history was being constructed and represented, and might have anticipated what Jason
Hu called the “quiet revolution” (the title of a book edited by Hu, 1995). Meanwhile,
this film not only broke records for Taiwanese films in the international market but
also entirely changed the meaning in Taiwan of the term ‘national film’, which
originally meant films made domestically and in Mandarin. As A City of Sadness was
classified as such by the GIO, despite being made in Taiwanese, it was eligible to
participate in the Golden Horse Award, given by Taiwan’s government.

As indicated earlier, only films made in Mandarin were hitherto regarded as
national, otherwise they were excluded from the Award. Secondly, this film was just
as well received in the domestic as well as international markets, and a series of
historical films based on people’s memory followed in the film’s footsteps. These
films include Banana Paradise (1989), The Puppet Master (1993) and A Borrowed
Life (1994). However, I would like to begin with a film analysis of A City of Sadness.

(2) A City of Sadness (1989) and People’s Memory

The story of A City of Sadness covers the period from 1945 to 1949, starting with
the Japanese surrender of Taiwan in August 1945, when Taiwan became the territory
of China. The families of Lin Ah Lu are faced with an uncertain future. Lin Ah Lu has
four sons. The oldest son, Wen Hsiung, who runs a bordello, is known as “Little
Shanghai”. The second son, Wen Sen, was a military doctor but died in the South
Pacific Islands during World War II. The third, Wen Liang, was once imprisoned by
China for being Japanese but has a mental breakdown on his return to Taiwan. As for
the fourth son, mute and deaf Wen Chin, he opens a photography shop. In the course of the story, Wen Hsiung discovers that Wen Liang is involved in drug smuggling with some Shanghai gangsters, and tries to persuade him away from a life of crime. However, Wen Liang is set up by the gangsters and accused of being a Japanese spy, resulting in a prison sentence. With the help of Wen Hsiung, Wen Liang escapes but cripples himself in the process; he eventually goes mad. Meanwhile, Wen Hsiung is shot dead in a fight with the Shanghai thugs. Wen Chin, however, gets married to a nurse, Kuan Mei, the sister of Kuan Jung, a teacher. Wen Chin is eventually arrested by the KMT government due to his membership of an illegal organisation, for which he is jailed and never returns to civil society.

_A City of Sadness_ could be regarded as featuring documentary techniques (Huang, Y. F., 1996, pp.99-124). Large numbers of flashcards, diary-like narration, voice-overs, off-screen sounds, radio announcements, pictures and chronological structures are all used in it. As Hayden White proposes, the evidence of the visual, especially through photographs and film, is more persuasive and reliable than by language use alone (White, 1993, p.11). White basically approves of the narration of history through pictures, which he calls historiophoty. In addition, pictures are sometimes more persuasive than the narration of writing (Ibid).

About the film _A City of Sadness_, Chang Ning (1993) argues that the audience is unable to find enough reasons to support the view that this film speaks for Taiwanese intellectuals, citing the following two reasons. One is that the film's narrative is constructed from diverse angles, and the multi-language complexity inhibits any clear message. It weakens the single cause and effect linear-like narration and makes
historical representation more complicated. The other reason is that this film installs the mute photographer as the central narrating character. As he is unable to speak, his role raises the issue of how to write and reconstruct history in silence (Chang, N., 1993, pp.84-7). These questions will inevitably surface when analyzing historical representations, such as films. Filming technique is one way that might reveal what a filmmaker is trying to say with reference to historical representation.

This film also locates the confusion and helplessness felt by both intellectuals and ordinary people in the face of the building of a new nation in various spaces. For instance, they face the problem of identifying with the most obvious of all symbols, the national flag. There is a poignant scene in which the national flag of the Republic of China was mentioned at a meeting of Kuan Jung and some other intellectuals, who are against the KMT’s regime, describing this identity issue. One of them says:

'Since Taiwan was reclaimed, the government has demanded that the people hang up the national flag. As does our area chief. As you know, the Japanese flag is white with a big red dot in the middle, and no matter which way you hang it, it is always the right way up. However, the “blue sky, white sun” flag is different. How to fly it has been the cause of much argument. Our area chief with knowledge of these things says that the sky is bright red when the sun has fully risen, and so the sun should be at the bottom. Some people have their doubts, but all of them do what our chief says. However, some people have returned from other towns and cities and told the area chief that he has made a fatal mistake. He has been raising the national flag upside down, for which he will possibly be arrested and shot' (from the film, A City of Sadness, 1989).
From the dialogue here, if it is to be believed, it might seem that most Taiwanese people are unsure about the new nation’s flag, and consequently in danger if they mistakenly happen to hang the national flag in the wrong way and thus become labeled as subversives. In the same scene, the speaker continues: “because people feel regret if they throw away Japan’s national flag, many of them use it to make pants”. These two commentaries about the different signifiers of national identity imply the conflict that must exist in people’s minds when they are passively told to accept the new nation.

A new language often comes with a new nation. Ironically, the French film 400 Blows (directed by Francois Truffaut in 1959), with a scene showing an English teacher instructing French boys the English pronunciation of “father”, is imitated in A City of Sadness, with a scene in which people are told how to feel about the new nation. The scene is in a hospital, and a Mandarin teacher from China is teaching nurses and doctors how to use Mandarin to ask and pronounce the words, “where do you hurt?”, “fever”, “headache” and “collywobbles”.

(3) The Rise of Self Identity

Self-identity is also described in this film. Wen Hsiung and his family could be said to have no sense of the new nation and its identity until his third brother, Wen Liang, is accused of spying by the KMT regime. Wen Liang was conscripted by the Japanese during the Second World War, and sent to Shanghai in China. After the war, he was regarded as a Japanese spy by the Chinese. Therefore, his family is blacklisted,
realising the full extent of their association with Wen Liang when they have to live under the KMT regime. Through letters read by Wen Hsiung’s daughter to her mute uncle, Wen Ching (the fourth brother), we learn that:

‘The third uncle (Wen Liang) was caught by a couple of soldiers for unknown reasons yesterday. Those soldiers went to search for his father too. Luckily enough, father ran away fast and only got a foot injury. On hearing that someone has grassed on the third uncle for being a spy against the Chinese when he served as a Japanese soldier in Shanghai, well, he was obliged to, wasn’t he’
(from the film, A City of Sadness, 1989)?

This attempt to turn historical inevitability into black comedy reinforces the notion that the fate of the Taiwanese is always manipulated by others. The account here is given by a little girl rather than an adult, which might be a strategy on behalf of the filmmakers. And the characters would elicit sympathy from the audience because their fate is as a result of being Taiwanese. However, unlike the way Anderson describes how the “family story” is passed onto the second generation by their elders, this kind of “family story” is presented by the filmmakers and passed onto the audience via the little girl’s statement. It might be inevitably determined by historical facts too, but seeing people’s memories, especially from childhood, may also be embedded in our minds and allow us to claim these stories as our own family story. This is what takes place between the little girl and the mute photographer, Wen Ching.
In later scenes, when Wen Hsiung asks friends for help in breaking Wen Liang out of jail, he knows that the Taiwanese Spy Enactment is to be revised, and the KMT government is about to release those Taiwanese soldiers who were conscripted to fight for Japan. He expresses his anger by saying:

*The law is made by them, and they do whatever they want. But, we, the people, are the most downtrodden. They say we are Japanese, so we are Japanese; they say we are Chinese, so we are Chinese. They all want to ride on our back, and no one cares about us* (from the film, *A City of Sadness*, 1989).

This expression of Taiwanese self-identity is also seen in the film *Straw Man* (directed by Wang Tung in 1987). In *Straw Man*, Taiwanese students are even asked to change their names into Japanese. But the difference is that Wen Hsiung in *A City of Sadness* starts to question both the KMT and the Japanese colonial regimes on Taiwan, while the farming father in *Straw Man* demands that his son “Go and ask your teacher whether I can change my name too.”

The intellectuals also express their opinions about national identity in the meeting scenes. For example, Kuan Jung along with Wen Ching, Lao He (a journalist from China), and some other friends meet in secret to talk about what they heard on the way home. The journalist is reading a book about Marxism, and is thought to be “very progressive” by the intellectuals. The following dialogue may reveal their views towards the Republic of China, here represented by the KMT regime, and in particular the factors that brought about the February 28 Massacre in 1947:
A: I heard a policeman has killed a cigarette seller.

B: It's very drastic. Cigarettes are smuggled in by those officials and generals, but they export Taiwan's rice and sugar to China. They don't care whether we have rice or not.

A: When Governor Chen Yi came, rice went up 52 times the price it used to be.

While we are jobless. The Interior [China] takes over Taiwan, but the intellectuals are out of work.

B: Not only intellectuals, those soldiers coming back from the South Pacific are all ending up jobless. The courts have all been taken over by those Ah Sans [Chinese mainlanders]. Their friends and relatives have all come, and the courts seem to be run by them. The Taiwanese have been pushed out.

A: People like you, who were educated by the Japanese government, are still enslaved. Not only that, you don't even speak Tang San [Mandarin].

B: Being slaves is not what we want. It was the capitulation by the Ching Dynasty's Ma Kuan that's betrayed and enslaved us. Fuck slavery. They sold the Taiwanese, but nobody every asked our opinion.

A: The nationalist government will make big trouble for themselves if they carry on the way they're going. You, Lao He, have your pen ready because you will be the witness (from the film A City of Sadness, 1989).

While the dialogue in this scene takes place, the role of the mute photographer, Wen Chin, should not be neglected. The two characters who speak are intentionally
positioned at the same occasion: one of them will write down what he hears, and the other will witness this historical event with his camera (the witness who is unable to speak out). It is not necessarily the case that this scene implies that the Taiwanese and the Ah Sans (who came from China around 1945) are binary opposites in this film. Here, the journalist Lao He stands alongside the Taiwanese intellectuals and they intend to construct their own history together. However, the plight of the Taiwanese is nonetheless narrated through the character of the mute photographer. Wen Chin is not only the silent witnesses but also the one mediating the historical inheritance.

In the scene where the young Huang sends a message via the mute photographer to Huang’s brother, who is hiding in the mountains, Wen Chin brings with him the young Huang’s last will and testament, which is contained on an inserted card and says:

'Born away from the mother country;

to die at the hand of the mother country;

this is destiny, so

there's no need to feel loss' (Ibid).

From the scenes above, we can see that the nation those intellectuals identify with is not the Republic of China represented by the KMT regime, but the one in mainland China run by the Marxists. From their conversation, we know that even if they feel angry at being betrayed by the Ching Dynasty, they still refer to mainland China as the “interior” land”; thus, Taiwan should here be presumed to be the
off-shore island of mainland China. But if the nation referred to in this film were
presumed to be the People’s Republic of China, this would be a misunderstanding of
this text. The film’s story runs from 1945 to 1947, but the People’s Republic of China
was not established until 1949. So, the nation identified by the intellectuals in this
film is some kind of utopian version.

(4) Juxtaposing Different Realities

This film employs a special documentary-style binary narrative to express the
representation of the Republic of China by the KMT regime. For instance, it includes
a number of radio announcements by the Governor, Chen Yi. On the other hand, there
are also statements from the nurse Kuan Mei (the sister of Kuan Jung) of diary
narration by Wen Hsiung’s daughter, while Wen Chin’s writings are expressed by
inserted flash cards. The governor, Chen Yi, on the radio represents the official history
and other narrators are to represent the people’s history.

Chen Yi never appears on screen, but the radio is always used to announce what
measures he is going to take to deal with the Massacre. For example, in one scene, the
sounds of a radio broadcast waft across a village, with the voice of Chen Yi seeming
to come from the sky and onto the rooftops of a quiet village. We hear:

“To all Taiwan's compatriots, last night's accident in which a cigarette
smuggler was hurt during an inspection by Taipei City Hall has been dealt with,
and I have already ordered the court to take over this investigation. The
appropriate penalty will be executed. The woman who was hurt is not critical and she is receiving medical care. She has also been helped with appropriate compensation” (Ibid).

After Chen Yi’s radio announcement, the film moves from the rooftops of a quiet village to a hospital scene. Many injured people are visible, the hospital is in chaos, and Kuan Mei’s voice is heard reading from her diary:

“The incident that happened in Taipei was broadcast on the radio today. The Taiwanese and the Wai Shen Ren are killing each other. Taipei has imposed martial law. The people in hospital are all talking about it. All are afraid of going to war again. My brother (Kuan Jung) and Wen Chin came to hospital to see me, and said they want to go to Taipei. It is in chaos there. Brother, you must take good care of Wen Chin because he is not in good health” (Ibid).

Then, Chen Yi’s radio broadcast continues:

“A special committee has been set up to look into this accident. Besides government officials and senators, many other representatives from different fields will be included so that this committee can consider the opinions of the majority” (Ibid).

In later scenes, Chen Yi’s voice is again heard over the image of Wen Chin’s
writing as though in debate. From the radio, we hear:

“To all Taiwan compatriots, I have declared martial law again in Taiwan. I sincerely tell you that martial law is to protect the majority of Taiwan’s people. Don’t listen to the rumours from the thugs and feel afraid. Those who obey the law will not be hurt at all. Be sure of that. I have only declared martial law to flush out the petty traitors and the rebels. We will not let up until they’re eradicated” (Ibid).

In response, we see Wen Chin’s handwriting on screen, giving an answer to a question by Kuan Mei about her brother’s situation:

“Teacher Lin (Kuan Jung) goes to the Public Meeting Hall every day. Many people have died in Taipei” (Ibid).

In the later scene, when Wen Chin bandages Kuan Jung’s injury, we see Kuan Jung writing to Wen Chin, saying:

“The committees dealing with the investigation have all been arrested. Chen Yi has summoned soldiers onto the scene, and they’re going to kill” (Ibid).

From the examples above, the official version of history and its reality, along with the people’s arguments and statements, are juxtaposed in this film. We see the
binary oppositions at work in the February 28 Massacre episode in Taiwan’s history collide and explode. The effect is stunning, even if it is only a representation. Challenging the official historical discourse, which means the absence of history from the Taiwanese perspective, this film dares to challenge this political taboo and enable an open discussion of historical affairs.

There are also clues to the relationship between the Taiwanese and the Japanese in the following scenes, even though this is not the main theme of this film. There are three Japanese characters in *A City of Sadness*, all belonging to the Hsiao Chuan family. After World War II, all Japanese in Taiwan were repatriated by the government. The scene described next, concerning the friendship between Kuan Mei and Hsiao Chuan Jin Tze (a Japanese girl) takes place when Jin Tze comes to the hospital to say good-bye. Appearing sad, Jin Tze gives her favourite kimono to ‘Hinomi’ (Kuan Mei’s Japanese name is used here), and also delivers gifts from her brother, who is still on the battlefield, to Hinomi’s brother, the teacher Lin Kuan Jung. They are a bamboo sword and a poem. That poem is written in Japanese, and says:

*I will remember you forever,*

*go ahead and fly;*

*I will meet with you again soon,*

*we all are the same* (Ibid).

More dramatic is that Jin Tze’s father, who is a principal and Kuan Jung’s colleague, refuses to be sent back to Japan, escaping to the southern part of Taiwan in
order to stay with his Taiwanese friends. In this film, there are no disputes or quarrels between the Taiwanese and Japanese, only the friendship that exists between the Taiwanese and Japanese families. The role of the Chinese and Japanese military is absent, as is the subject of Taiwan in Chinese history. This reflection of the KMT’s official narrative strategy towards history is used to emphasise the cause of their opponents.

(5) Does the Use of the Japanese Language Distinguish the Taiwanese or Not?

One scene in *A City of Sadness*, it could be argued, might use the Japanese language to distinguish the Taiwanese people. Following the February 28 Massacre, in which the KMT government massacred thousands of innocent Taiwanese, many Taiwanese thugs took revenge on the ‘Wai Shen Ren’, or the ‘Ah Sans’, meaning those who arrived from China around 1945 to 1949. In this scene, the mute Wen Chin and the teacher Lin Kuan Jung are on a train, when two Taiwanese youths with hammers are searching for Ah Sans. It is difficult to distinguish Wai Shen Ren from Taiwanese by appearance alone, and so these two youths use both the Taiwanese and Japanese languages to ask train passengers, “Where are you from?” If they are unable to answer correctly and in the ‘right accent’, they will be beaten heavily. When asked repeatedly, the mute Wen Chin is almost beaten due to his incapacity to respond. Feeling intensely threatened, he tries desperately to utter the words, “I ... I ... Tai ... wan ... people.” However, the thugs are not satisfied by his muted uttering, and ask him again. His fear does not abate. As the thugs are about to beat him, Kuan
Jung returns to his seat just in time and yells out to the thugs, “He has been mute and deaf since he was five years old, so how can he hear you?”, wrestling with them. In the final scenes of this film, Wen Chin is not so lucky and is arrested by the KMT government and never returns, just for taking pictures of his own family. He has witnessed all his friends being arrested and dying for their beliefs, imagined community, and ideal nation, and has taken pictures not just for himself and his family but for everyone watching this film. Hence, it is clearly the story as told by the filmmakers. This is a history very different from the official version.

(6) The Film *A Borrowed Life* and the Bond between Taiwan and Japan

The film *A Borrowed Life*, directed and scripted by Wu Nieh-Chen in 1995, is an (auto) biographical film. It follows the life of the director’s father from the mid-1930s to 1990, when his father dies. Wu often collaborates with Hou, the director of the previous film, and probably they have been the key players in Taiwan’s indigenous cinema industry since the early 1980s.

As stated earlier, the Chinese title for *A Borrowed Life* is pronounced *Dou San*, which is a Japanese pronunciation meaning ‘father’. The father, Sega, is called Do San by his three children in the film. Like *A City of Sadness*, this film also employs the third party perspective to tell the story, with voice-overs and off-screen dialogue from his eldest son, Wen Jian, describing his father’s behavior. At the beginning of the film, Wen Jian is heard off-screen, saying:
If any one asks my father his age, he always answers.

He was born in the fourth year of Chao He [the reign of the Japanese Emperor],
and not in Ming Kuo [the start of the Republic of China] or the Christian year
(from the film A Borrowed Life).

As this dialogue implies, Sega’s life is referred to in connection with his memory of the period of Japanese colonisation, which he retains until his death in 1990. Any other form of chronology, particularly which of the Republic of China, as well as the Western Christian calendar, is excluded from Sega’s life.

This film also touches on the February 28 Massacre, but not as much as in A City of Sadness. There is a scene that, through his stepmother’s description, explains why Sega went to the northern part of Taiwan to live and work as a miner. From the explanation, we learn that Sega was born in the middle part of Taiwan and lived there until 1947, when he was 18 years old. During the February 28 Massacre, a doctor named Tsai, who lived near Sega’s town, was shot to death. Sega saw his discarded body on street and said a Taiwanese funeral prayer for him. As he did so, he was warned that he would be arrested too. Worried about his safety, Sega’s parents ordered him to leave his hometown, and he escaped to the mining areas in northern Taiwan.

Even when he left his hometown, he still retained his Japanese traits – language, dress and tastes. It is easy, then, to recognise his identity with Japan and its culture. As Huang Jian Yeh states, this film “revises the prototype of the deeply inscribed bond between Taiwanese and Japanese culture” (Huang, J. Y., 1995, p.125). So where are
the examples in this film? Throughout the film, Sega is seen listening to Japanese radio programmes. When he arrives home, he casually changes to a radio station that has Japanese programmes, not caring about what his family is listening to. His children like listening to programmes in Mandarin, while his wife prefers Taiwanese. However, Sega always plays the master and tunes the radio to a Japanese frequency each time he comes home. In one particular scene, it is explicitly shown how he does not believe what the radio news says if it is in Mandarin. While listening to a Japanese radio news programme, he castigates the Taiwanese media in front of his wife and children, saying assertively, “If the Taiwanese news reports are to be believed, then the dog will be dressing itself before long”.

Predictably, this situation could be the basis for generation gaps forming. That said, Sega not only uses Japanese to speak to his friends and mixes it in with family chat, but also prefers Japanese products. Two scenes in *A Borrowed Life* may explain this. For instance, while tuning the radio, he finds it is broken, angrily stating, “If this was made in Japan, it would work for another ten years and more”. Similar dialogue is heard again when he is retired and staying at the home of his eldest son, Wen Jian. He sees his grandson playing with a toy robot and, knowing it is made in Japan, says proudly, “If this was made in Taiwan, it would have broken a long time ago”.

With regard to issues of national identity, whether it is the Republic of China, Taiwan, or Japan, these are also approached in this film. In a scene where Sega chats with his miner friends, one miner complains that the KMT government is to call up more young men to fight in the war against the Chinese Communists. This is because, even after the 1950s and 1960s, the KMT’s Nationalist Party and China’s Communist
Party were still officially at war and the former brought more and more young
Taiwanese soldiers to serve on King Men, Taiwan’s frontier island near southeastern
China. Under Japanese governance, young men who were not strong enough were
never called up to serve in the military. However, as Sega says in this scene, “Those
who were exempt from serving in the army under Japan’s governance are now all
called up and sent to King Men to be cannon fodder.” From this, it is not difficult to
recognise which nation Sega identifies with.

The following two scenes indicate how Sega’s identity responds when the
symbols of the two nations in his life come together. In Sega’s heart, there is only one
national flag, and it is the Japanese one. On one occasion, Sega’s daughter is doing
her homework, painting the national flag of the Republic of China, which is
composed of a white sun with twelve white rays in a blue box in the top left with the
rest of the flag being red. In official descriptions given in the school system, the flag
is described as “blue sky, white sun and red earth”. So, when Sega sees his daughter
painting the national flag of the Republic of China, he decides to help his daughter to
finish it. At first his daughter will not allow her father to help, but her father insists
and so she lets him have a go at the painting. Sega looks so happy helping his
daughter with this special piece of homework. But, just as it is nearly finished, his
daughter screams out, “You’ve spoilt my flag”. Instead of the “blue sky, white sun and
red earth” flag, he has painted the “big red sun” of the Japanese national flag. She is
furious, shouting in Mandarin, “For you, everything must be Japanese; you, Wan
Jieng Wei (a historical figure, meaning “traitor” in the official KMT official history).”
Responding to his daughter’s anger, Sega angrily replies, in Taiwanese, “What are you
talking about” and then, in Japanese, “Little Bastard”. What this reveals is how language communication problems and national identity issues function within a culturally diverse family unit. A similar conflict also occurs between Sega and his second son. They are watching a basketball game on television between Taiwan (the Republic of China) and Japan. When Sega’s second son cheers for the Chinese team, Sega retorts, “The Chinese team can go to hell. Come on, the Japanese team”. This kind of rival cheering for each other’s nation almost brings father and son to fisticuffs. Sega storms out, singing the lines, “Alas my youthful days, alas my tragic destiny.”

The differences in generation and identity extend to the third generation, as the problem of communication and the value of cultural identity erupt between Sega and his grandson, Wen Jian’s son. One scene, when he is in the living room of his eldest son’s home, reveals how lonely he must be. In it, he is seen speaking to his grandson in Taiwanese, but gets no response from him because his grandson does not know any Taiwanese. Sega asks his eldest son, “How come two Taiwanese people managed to bring up a Wai Shen Ren (Mandarin speaker).” In order to comfort his father, Wen Jian replies, “When he grows up and goes to college, I will ask him to major in Japanese.”

Due to a chest disease contracted during his long career in the mines, Sega has to take pills whenever he feels in pain. Throughout the film, his health deteriorates day by day, and he realizes that his days are acutely numbered. Just before he is shown being rushed into hospital, he tells Wen Jian what his biggest wish is: “I have promised late Uncle Tiao Chun to go to Japan and visit the Imperial Palace and Mount Fuji.” However, he is unable to fulfill this wish because of his serious illness. Before
he dies, he asks his family to leave the room, and commits suicide by jumping out of
the window. In the closing moments of Wen Jian’s narration about his father’s life,
Sega’s second son is seen with his father’s portrait in Japan, standing before Mount
Fuji.

The main characters of A Borrowed Life, like Sega and his generation, are
thought to be out of touch with the tide of history. Their identities of lifestyle, culture
and experience all conflict with the new nation’s arrival. This film reflects the facets
and complexity of national identity for those elders in Taiwan now, many of whom are
70 years old or more. It is not an exaggeration to say that they are the fading
generation, with an identity that is constantly challenged. The filmmakers have the
resources to reconstruct history through such people’s memory, and circulate it in our
society, transforming those memories into “our own” family stories, to quote
Anderson (Anderson, 1996, p.206). If film is based on people’s experience,
imagination, or other forms of historical research, and is circulated widely in our
society, it does not necessarily mean it is sentimental. If they are made with integrity,
compassion and humanity, they can often play a positive role in relieving the burden
of memory from people, and become a useful outlet for feelings about identity.

(7) The Puppet Master - What is a Nation?

“The fate of the Taiwanese is the most tragic. It is like a drama, like a dream, like
a baby, and is also like him, Lee Tian Lu (the main character in this film).
They were the people of the great Chin dynasty, then subjects of the Japanese
emperor, and now they are to become Taiwanese compatriots”
(Lin, W. C., 1994, p.154).
The above words are cited from the poster blurb for the film *The Puppet Master,*
(directed by Hou Hsiao Hsien in 1993) by Lin Wen Chi. Lin thinks this film is intended to:

... introduce the popular cultural facets of puppet drama, other folk legends and the representation of Taiwanese history according to Lee Tian Lu, not China’s official version ... and to point out the individual variations relating to the notion of national identity as a hybrid. Any attempt to appeal to the identity of China or Taiwan through the discourse of nationalism will only lead to dissemi/nation. (Ibid, p.144).

This refers to what Bhabha (1990) called the hybridity of a nation, a nation becoming a dissemination (Ibid.). *The Puppet Master* is also an (auto) biographical film, narrated mainly by Lee Tian Lu. Lee is a well-known figure in Taiwan, and was awarded Taiwan’s “Folk Artistic Master of the Puppet” by the government. He narrates his own life story in this film, which spans the time from his birth in the late Ching Dynasty to Taiwan’s take-over by the KMT regime in 1945. His narration focuses on how he started to learn puppetry and his work around the island. He also tells us much about his interaction with the Japanese during colonisation. The style of narration used in the film journeys beyond just his life story and, rather, presents the image of an historical figure, whose life spans three regimes. Unlike Sega in *Borrowed Life* and Wen Hsiung’s family in *A City of Sadness,* Lee Tian Lu chronicles how his life has evolved against such historical changes on Taiwan, but is seemingly unaffected by inner conflicts of politics and culture. From this film, we know that Lee Tian Lu started to learn puppetry from his father at the age of seven. At the age of 22,
he established his own puppetry club, named “Yi Wan Jan” by an elite official in the former Ching dynasty. However, his traditional Chinese puppet show is banned when the Sino-Japanese War breaks out in 1937, when he was twenty-eight. When the Japanese government in Taiwan enforces the loyalty to the Emperor phase, the puppet show is replaced by Japanese drama. He then changes his job to become director of a Taiwanese folk opera company, which he tours around the island. Then Japan raids Pearl Harbour in 1941, which starts the Pacific War. Due to being known by a Japanese official, Lee Tian Lu is recruited and gives puppet shows for the army. According to Lee, all the Chinese puppets’ costumes are replaced by Japanese and military ones. The contents of the puppet shows are all revised to boost the morale of the Japanese soldiers, and are called the “New National Wind” puppet shows. There is a reconstruction of this type of puppet show operated by Lee Tian Lu himself.

The story in the puppet show concerns the death of a Japanese soldier, who is responsible for the communication of military information. The story’s title is “The American and British Murder Squad.” The puppet soldier has a badge of the Japanese flag on his hand. On duty, the puppet soldier tries to repair a communication line. Unfortunately, he is killed in an American bombing raid. In the film Lee Tian Lu concentrates all his resources into performing this, almost capturing the essence of his youth. Also, from what he says, it is impossible not to feel pride at what he has achieved.

Towards the end of World War II, America asserts its might by bombing Taiwan heavily. All propaganda entertainment is stopped. On May 15 1945, the same day that Japan surrendered, Lee Tian Lu got approval to move to the Taiwanese countryside. In
the course of the war, Lee Tian Lu lost his little son as well as his father-in-law, due to ague.

At the beginning of this film, Lee Tian Lu explains the origin of his family name, which is not the same as his father's – a mirror of *A Borrowed Life*, in which the family name of the main character, Sega, is not the same as his father's either. The surname of Lee Tian Lu's father is Hsu, due to an arrangement with his wife when they married. Interestingly, the surname of Lee is thought to be the same as his grandfather's by a Japanese official. According to Taiwanese tradition, Lee Tian Lu should be given the family name Hsu by his father, not that of his grandfather Lee. A third party, if they have enough political or other power, may influence what you are named.

It can also be applied to Taiwan's situation within the international context. The name, the Republic of China, is not recognised by the international community, although it had existed in the past. The people of Taiwan face the naming problem constantly. Some would argue that a name is simply a means of distinguishing one from the other. On the subject of the other, if a person knows what their name is, but it is not accepted by others, does that mean it loses its subjectivity? The Taiwanese people must wonder what their name is or doubt they have the power to name themselves. Thus, could the identity of self and nation be imagined? It is questionable. Or, can it be imagined but not spoken, as implied by the mute photographer, Wen Chin, in *A City of Sadness*? These issues are confusing for the Taiwanese.

Referring back to previous chapters, here we find examples relating to the second stage of Japan's governance and its cultural policy towards Taiwan. Narrated
by Lee Tian Lu, we see a scene concerning the execution of Japan’s “Homeland Extension Policy”, conveyed by the haircutting in this film. Under Ching’s governance, the Taiwanese all keep their hair long and tied in ponytails. Lee Tian Lu says:

“The magistrate comes and says everyone can have a ticket to go to the drama show but they must have their ponytails cut ... So while the shows going on, people are watching the performance and having their hair cut at the same time ... Some of the people there are responsible for burning the hair”

(from the film The Puppet Master, 1993)

As for his relationship with the Japanese, Lee Tian Lu was treated well by his superiors and enjoyed good food and given a higher rate of pay than that of Japanese soldiers. In a scene where a Japanese soldier complains about his wages being less than Lee Tian Lu’s, it reminds us that the President of Taiwan welcomes filmmakers into the Presidential Hall, to recognise their contribution on the issue of national identity. Again, there is a similar moment of farewell to that in A City of Sadness. Lee Tian Lu’s superior official once said to him that, “Taiwan is my second home”. This kind of heartfelt friendship rather than aggressive occupation happens too in A City of Sadness. The representation of friendships between the Taiwanese and Japanese conflicts with the evil Japanese image used in official versions of history.
(8) *Banana Paradise and the Issue of Naming*

The film *Banana Paradise*, directed by Wang Tong in 1989, is about those who came to Taiwan from China after 1949 after the defeat of the KMT regime in the civil war. The film’s timeline runs from 1948 to the late 1980s, and its theme could be regarded as the issue of naming, where people’s names are forced to be or are voluntarily changed. The two main characters, Chang De Sheng and Men Shuan, are accused of being spies working for Communist China, although they are innocent. This film describes how these two people escape by continually having their names and identities changed throughout their life in Taiwan.

This film reflects some aspects of history never openly admitted or taught in the school system of the KMT government until the late 1980s. The period of the KMT regime in Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s was known as the “White Terrorism Governance” by ordinary people, although the term is also used officially today. Whether a Taiwanese or a Chinese mainland, if you were accused of spying for Communist China in Taiwan, you would follow thousands of innocent victims and be executed by firing squad or jailed on Green Island, an isolated island located in the south-east of Taiwan in the Pacific Ocean. Even the current Vice President, Lady Lee Shiou Lian, was imprisoned there for more than ten years. So, in the film, in order to keep out of the authority’s reach, the main characters Chang De Sheng and Men Shuan are forced to change their names several times and lose all sense of their real identity. Chang De Sheng goes insane, while Men Shuan is seen crying out for the fact that his destiny is lost in history. Chang De Sheng changes his name three times...
in the film to Liou Jing Yuan, Chen De Sheng, and Lee Chuan Hsiao. Unable to take being condemned as a spy, he often imagines himself accused of this crime and finally goes mad. Men Shuan, his good friend, serves in the army, which makes no difference to him being classed as a spy. He also changes his name three times to He Jiu Mei, Zuo Fu Kuei, and Lee Chi Lin. This leads to the focus on the naming problems in *Banana Paradise* and a discussion about how they relate to national identity issues in this film.

First, what is the background to Men Shuan initially being forced to change his name? The scene opens with a military roll call in his barracks around the time of the retreat to Taiwan from northern China; a soldier named He Jiu Mei is absent from the roll call. Men Shuan, who is not soldier but only a friend of Chang De Sheng, appears. There is still no response to He Jiu Mei being called by the official, who starts getting angrier and louder, which makes Men Shuan look awkward, to the point where he is thought to be He Jiu Mei. In the following scene, Chang De Sheng says to Men Shuan, “If that’s what they’ve called you, then you are that man.” However, Men Shuan is understandably angry that his name has been changed in this manner and says to his now fellow soldier Chang De Sheng. “Next time they do a roll call, make sure they give me a good name”. When it comes to the battlefield, the number of soldiers going AWOL is vast. It is not sufficiently clear from this scene whether Men Shuan is willing to join the army or not; nonetheless, there are two issues raised on the theme of naming by what Chang De Sheng implies in his dialogue. The first is that a name is given by some kind of authority; the other issue is that it may also be that a person will possibly lose their subjectivity if they are unable to name themselves. The
ensuing scenes reinforce this.

When the KMT army arrives on Taiwan, Chang De Sheng and Zuo Fu Kuei are assigned to serve in the military entertainment troop. The film shows a map of the whole of China hung on the walls, along with propaganda slogans calling for the recovery of China, everywhere in the military camps. During an entertainment show aimed at promoting political ideology, we see that Men Shuan’s name has changed again to Zuo Fu Kuei. While the show takes place, an official asks Zuo Fu Kuei “Which army troop do you belong to?” He replies “I don’t belong to any army troop, just the entertainment one.” Men Shuan is not being smart or clever, but honest. He has never actually belonged to any army troop, either for the nationalist KMT or the Chinese Communists. About two million nationalist soldiers came to Taiwan around 1948, and many are like Men Shuan, who does not have a sense of serving in anyone’s army but merely following their destiny. Also, many young men are actually caught and conscripted into serving for the nationalist army by the KMT regime. The reasons why they have ended up in Taiwan are various. Some of them imagine Taiwan is an island of fruit plantations with plentiful supplies of bananas, and are willing to follow the nationalist army. Others come to find safe harbour, while some are compelled to come to Taiwan. This variety of reasons is reflected in the film, but they have not been included in the official history by the KMT regime. As a result of his replies to the official’s question of which army troop he belongs to, the name of Zuo Fu Kuei could end up on the list of accused Communist spies, and bring about his downfall. This is discussed later.

As for Chang De Sheng, the following scene also sees him accused as a
Communist spy. While on holiday, he joins in with a Taiwanese entertainment group. The group is singing Taiwanese folk songs, which he does not know and he says in Mandarin, “Stop it, stop it. I don’t know what you guys are singing. Let me sing instead”. At which Chang De Sheng has a drink and sings two songs. One is about his army service, the other about how he misses his home back in China. The latter was regarded as taboo in the 1950s and 1960s by the KMT regime. To sing songs about missing home would weaken the national resolve to fight the Chinese Communists, with the likely accusation of being a Communist spy. Chang De Sheng, by confronting this taboo, is arrested. In the judgment scene, besides Chang De Sheng, we see the playwright, Chang Chuen Hua, from the military entertainment troop, but he has been seriously hurt and is unable to speak in his defense. When it is Chang De Sheng’s turn to be judged, one judge says: “Are you Liou Jin Yuan”. Remembering what he has said to Men Shuan after the roll call, Chang De Sheng glances at Chang Chuen Hua for a while and answers, “Yes”, to the judge. Then the military judge asks, “Did you know him when you were in Tian Jin City [a northern industrial city near Beijing] before you served in the army?” Chang De Sheng now realises that he is presumed to be Liou Jin Yuan, and tries to argue that he did not know the playwright before serving in the army. However, the military judge takes no notice, and says angrily, “You are a Communist spy.” Chang De Sheng answers, “How come?” However, his approach does not help his situation and the judge appears inpatient, asking about his identity again. Shivering, Chang De Sheng hesitantly answers, “I … am … Liou Jin Yuan.” He is then dragged away, after which painful screams are heard. Due to their superior’s demand for ridding the army of Communist spies, the
military officials or judges condemn high numbers of people deliberately. Those who argue they are not guilty are often regarded as ‘stubborn traitors’ and receive much heavier punishments than if they were to confess. From Liao Chao Yang’s study of this film, the character Chang De Sheng therefore starts “to lose the ability of using signs, becomes a slave to military songs and propaganda slogans about spying activities dragnet, and is condemned to be, as Lacan says, a person who is “unable to speak but is narrated” by words (cited in Liao, C. Y., 1994b, p.153). The filmmakers here might refer to the reality that the nationalist army would probably rather have killed one hundred innocent people than allowed one guilty person to escape punishment.

The dialogue in the following scene may imply that Chang De Sheng, like thousands of others, is the victim of the so-called “White Terrorism Governance” during the 1950s and 1960s. Men Shuan returns to find Chang De Sheng on the verge of a mental breakdown following his brutal physical and mental torture, and seeming very afraid of anyone trying to comfort him. He curls up his body and covers his head with a pillow. Men Shuan says, “So, De Sheng, how did you manage to become a Communist spy?” He persists, “What is this Soviet? Who is in this Soviet?” referring to the “New China Soviet Youth Society”, which Chang De Sheng is associated with, resulting in his conviction as a Communist spy. Through a female soldier in the military entertainment troop, Men Shuan is alerted to the fact that he is to be the next victim of the spying crackdown, due to the fact that his new given name is “Zuo”. The meaning of Zuo in Chinese is “left”, thought to be a reference to a leftist political party, as opposed to the right wing politics of the KMT nationalists. Warning Men
Shuan, the female soldier asks, “Who gave you the name of Zuo Fu Kuei? You are in big trouble.” Men Shuan is very shocked. The female soldier asks again:

“Fu Kuei is Fu Kuei. How come you add on Zuo? East Fu Kuei, West Fu Kuei, North Fu Kuei, South Fu Kuei, they’re all fine except for Zuo Fu Kuei. It is apparent that your brain is the problem”.

If we understand the meaning of Fu Kuei in Chinese too, it will help us realise further why Men Shuan is in big trouble at that time, as it describes a wealthy property owner. Add the surname, Zuo, and the first name Fu Kuei together, and it is not hard to imagine why it could be interpreted as the left wing inheriting the property of the wealthy. In Taiwanese history, thousands of people were imprisoned and killed just by thinking of, writing or publishing words that are thought to be problematic by the KMT’s nationalist ideology in the 1950s and 1960s (Lee, T. D., 1997, p.86).

In order to escape the military camp, Men Shuan takes the name of a dead person, Lee Chi Lin. This is the fourth new name he had used in his life. As the deceased whose name he has taken graduated from a university, majoring in English, Men Shuan gets a very good job in an American military base. This particular episode highlights the difficulty inherent in assuming another person’s identity. Men Shuan does not know any English at all and feels very frustrated at work at he needs the ability to read English. Men Shuan takes his assignments home with him to show to his wife Yueh Hsian. “It’s all in English, but you’re only supposed to check the list.” she says to Men Shuan. He replies, “How am I supposed to check it properly? The list
might end up in America”. “But, all you need is to follow the old copy”, she answers.

“After you check it, go and ask someone to have a look for you. If we need a cannon,
don’t check off a screw and it will be fine”. Men Shuan says, “I’ll quit tomorrow”.
His wife replies, “But, where are you going to go?” They both know there is nothing
left for them to do except for Men Shuan to carry on playing the role of Lee Chi Lin.

Until the policy of forbidding people to go to China to visit their relatives was
lifted in late 1987, only Taiwanese people who are not civil servants were permitted to
go to China. As Men Shuan serves in a government department, he is of course
excluded from the policy. The son of Lee Chi Lin does not know that his real father is
already long dead, and treats Men Shuan as if he were his real father. The truth comes
to light when Lee Chi Lin’s son arranges for his assumed father to speak to his
grandfather in Hong Kong by phone from Taiwan. On screen, we see the Lee Chi
Lin’s wife starting to worry about the situation and confess that she is not the real wife
of Lee Chi Lin, just a woman rescued by him while she was escaping from China to
go to Taiwan in 1949. They cry and hold each other. However, the problem has still to
be resolved. Men Shuan picks up the phone, pretending to be the real Lee Chi Lin,
and starts to speak to Lee Chi Lin’s father in Hong Kong. At first we see Men Shuan
feels awkward when referring to Lee Chi Lin’s father as “father” on the phone.
However, exchanging messages to say how much they miss each other, Men Shuan
begins to cry out loud. The lie is over. He could continue to assume the identity of Lee
Chi Lin forever, and lose out on the opportunity to get his own identity back by lying
to Lee Chi Lin’s son and father. More than that, we already know an uncertain future
still awaits him and his family, just as it does the Taiwanese people in their struggle
for a national as well as an international identity. The following dialogue between
Men Shuan and his best friend, the insane Chang De Sheng, perhaps symbolises their
uncertain future: “I have had enough bananas, so you can take me home now.”

4. Summary:

If memory corresponds to Benedict Anderson’s ideas, the conscious knowledge
of childhood is impossible to be identified after the experience of puberty and changes
in environment. It must be represented by narration, and serves the purpose of
narration. If we try to apply this idea to cinematic analysis, the ideological issues
concerning the relationship between history, memory and identity, as discussed in this
chapter, might become clearer. Those ideological issues may be hidden in the contents
and modes of expression within the films.

After discussing the films above, it is not difficult to establish common ground.
Thus, all of these films question the content of history that is broadcast,
communicated or taught across all levels of society. The only difference is that the
films stand on different positions to uncover other facts of historical narration through
documentary-style film techniques. Filmmakers like Hou Hsiao Hsien, Wu Nieh-Chen,
and Wang Tung do not directly question the details of the official version of history
(with the possible exception of Wu Nieh-Chen, during minor moments in the film A
Borrowed Life), but rather reveal a much wider picture than this official version. This
strategy, and the chronological narrative used, makes people think about what history
and their identity might be in a more focused way (Hsieh, C. F., and Chiu, C. M.,
2001, pp.120-1). They propose a historical discourse that attends to people that belong to Taiwanese society, the majority of whose voices have been silenced by the minority elite.

The historical stories above are represented in documentary-style feature films and draw on ordinary people’s day-to-day existences. The images of family life are so easily imagined; and the idea of ‘internalisation’ of the history given in the films is constructed through mouth-to-mouth (oral) dialogue, rather than through the official history. Higher levels of congruence are revealed with what audiences ‘know’, and the fact that the language used is also their own adding to the reality of the reconstruction. *A City of Sadness* even dares to challenge the KMT regime’s political taboo, using a ‘close to reality’ historical environment with a long-take shooting technique and insertion of flashcards that construct a sense of historical accuracy. Therefore, the last generation’s story has also become that of two or more generations’ after. *The Banana Paradise* follows the immigration story of the Wai Shen Ren (Chinese mainlanders), exploring their naming problems and their sense of belonging. It not only exposes their suffering to the government, but also to the Taiwanese and other ethnic groups on Taiwan. If their plight remained uncovered, they would live in the absence of subjectivity, which would result in their treatment as nomadic outcasts on Taiwan. Nobody can empathise with his or her experiences. Meanwhile, the other two films discussed in this chapter are opposites of each other. *A Borrowed Life* tells the story of a fading Taiwanese generation, aged around sixty-five or more today. They live with the memory of Japan’s governance of Taiwan and think there is no place for them in society. They have a strong national bond with the previous historical era. In contrast,
Lee Tian Lu in *The Puppet Master*, hardly has a sense of nation, with his heart and soul rooted in the present. The question of tomorrow does not bother him at all.

According to Chiu Kui Fen, Taiwan’s indigenous postcolonial discourse places emphasis upon the subjectivity of Taiwanese literature and the writing of history. It gradually develops its own indigenousness after the intervention of soil literature and expresses its strong will to resist the centralism of so-called China (Chiu, K. F., 1999).

These stories on screen have become parts of the “family story” of the Taiwanese people. These might originally have been the stones of a certain generation and their internalised world of historical memory. The accumulation of memory might be their life’s burden. But now they are liberated and in good company. So, from bearing history and memory alone to having large numbers of imagined companions sharing or empathizing with their experiences, inter-generational harmony might be possible in society. Predictably, people of the last generation are more likely to live with memory, but their experiences are not imagined but real ones that their families can touch. Knowing the story of the last generation does not necessarily burden the next.

In the education system, more and more teachers and students learn history through the use of “historiophoty”. One of the main themes of historiophoty, according to Chou Liang Kai, is “to analyze modern historical thinking through visual images and filmic discourse” (Chou, L. K., 1996, p.470), such that it might become “a part of public history” (Ibid, p.445). The historical films analyzed above are certainly trying to transform Taiwanese memory into public history.

Lastly, I would like to argue that historical representation could be used as outlets for people’s memory. Meanwhile, history might have a pernicious tendency to
cover up rather than discover the truth. Even though Benedict Anderson warns about the potential danger implicit in historical inheritance, especially where massacres are concerned, I believe that denying history is not always the common sense solution to establishing national identity and harmony in society. When the Monument to the February 28 Massacre was unveiled in 1996, Taipei New Park was renamed February 28 Peace Memorial Park, while the Peaceful Monument of Green Island was erected in 2000. The national identity issue in Taiwan remains as complex as ever. However, the hatred that existed between the various ethnic groups in Taiwan is diminishing.

After exploring the domestic slant on national identity, I will broaden the debate to consider the international society in the next chapter, beginning with the issues of territory and sovereignty.
Part Two: The International Perspective

Chapter IV—Territory, Sovereignty and Cinematic Policies

After the discussion of cultural hegemony, language use and historical interpretation, this chapter will seek to analyze the Taiwan government’s cinematic policies in terms of the studies of the issues of Taiwan’s sovereignty discourse relating to its neighboring countries or regions. In exploring these issues, this chapter will be divided into seven sections. The focus of the discussion in the first section will refer to Anthony Smith’s (1991) arguments about the historical land discourse of oriental nations. Following this, I will apply Taiwan’s sovereignty discourse to the case of the People’s Republic of Mongolia in section two, while section three will focus on Taiwan’s sovereignty discourse in relation to Hong Kong and Macao. A discussion of the cinematic policy towards Mainland China will compose section four. Taiwan’s cinematic policy towards Japanese films will be the next. The cinematic policy towards other foreign films in Taiwan will be in section six. Finally, after exploring the sovereignty discourse and cinematic policies of Taiwan to all foreign films, comparisons between the societies named above will be identified.

1. The Issues of Historical Land

According to the Constitution of the ROC, which was passed on Christmas Day 1947, the territory of the ROC has never been amended or revised since 1946. Article
Four, Chapter One, states that, "as the origins of the territory and boundary of the ROC are inherited, they cannot be changed without the will of the National Assembly" (GIO, 2001a, on line). However, the Constitution of the ROC does not clearly define the meaning of territory, even though the people of the ROC know what it means. According to Lin Teng Yao, territory is one of the most important components of a nation. It refers to the land dominated by some political entity in its sovereignty. Therefore, a nation within its territories has territorial sovereignty. In one way, the government of a nation may have the power to govern people within those territories to the exclusion of other nations, either in domestic affairs or, where necessary, to prevent invasion (Lin, T. Y., 1995). Anthony Smith explains territory in his comparative studies of the Orient and Western societies. He terms territory as a historical land in the discourse of an Oriental nation’s inheritance, which is unlike the Western model. This historical land may be traced back thousands of years (Smith, 1991). Geography books that are used in junior high and senior high schools in Taiwan do not refer to the ‘historical land’ of the ROC to mean only those territories in a certain time of an ancient Chinese empire but the historical accumulation of all Chinese empires for almost five thousands years. In volume one of the actual geography text book used in junior high school on Taiwan, the first chapter states that the boundary of the ROC is as follows: the most easterly point is the meeting point of the Hei Long River and the Wu Su Li River <135’4 E>; the most westerly point is the Pen Chih River <71’E>; the most southerly point is the Tseng Mu An Sai Islands <4’N> and the most northerly point is the Hill of Sai Yen <53’57 N>… It occupies
11,420,000 square kilometres, which is about 1,000,000 square kilometres larger than Europe (National Institute of Compliancy and Translation, 1994, pp.1-3).

What the above description of the boundary of the ROC means is that there is no single Chinese dynasty that really governs those territories. It covers all the lands of Mainland China, Outer Mongolia and Taiwan. As stated, the government of the ROC defines the boundary and territories in school textbooks. The KMT government of the ROC often claims legitimacy in representing the Chinese people around the world, and the discourse of inheriting territories from the Ching dynasty in 1912 could represent the inheritance of all ancient Chinese cultures and territories from all dynasties if the boundary of the ROC is ever redefined. This geographical boundary discourse partly results from the exclusion of other regimes, but essentially defines the sovereignty claim of the ROC, as it implies the right to govern certain other territories.

However, according to Chang Ya Chung, as the concept of sovereignty may provoke political disputes with neighbouring nations, modern Western countries try to avoid using this term when analysing the territorial disputes between or among nations. Instead, international law determines whether a political entity can enjoy effective governance of a particular territory for a certain period of time. This period usually lasts fifty years (Chang, Y. C., 1998). Using the observations of Anthony Smith and Chang Ya Chung about Oriental societies, together with perspectives of international law in relation to sovereignty and territories, the issue of the Outer Mongolian in the territorial discourse of the ROC is discussed.
2. The Independence of Outer Mongolia and the Territorial Sovereignty

Discourse of the ROC

In Chinese history, Outer Mongolia established its dynasty and empire in Mainland China hundreds of years before the Ching dynasty. According to Chang Chi Shung’s study (1991), the original Mongolian empire was brought to an end by the Man ethnic group (which established the Ching Dynasty in China) in 1688, and thus lost its status as a nation (state). Even though Outer Mongolia is geographically closer to Russia, the language, religion, costumes, folk cultures and so on are quite distinct from the latter’s peoples. The Ching dynasty, in fact, shares the blood of the Man ethnic group, which is thought to be closer to the Mongolian. However, due to unrest between the Han and Man ethnic groups, the former ended the Ching dynasty and empire under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen in 1911, establishing the ROC a year later. Outer Mongolia, though, declared itself to be an independent nation-state at the same time, calling itself the People’s Republic of Mongolia. The idea of declaring Outer Mongolia to be an independent country was suggested by the Russian Envoy in China, Korostovetz, who said:

Throughout history, the Mongolians have never been willingly governed by China, and only surrendered to the Man ethnic group (Ching Empire) a little over 200 years ago because of blood ties. Even if the Mongolians were subordinate to the Ching Empire, they still respect and love each other. Now that the Ching are destroyed, Mongolia’s relations with China are at an end (cited in Chang, C. H., 1991, p.264, my translation).

Korostovetz here proposes a theory designed to establish an independent nation
(state), by equal juxtaposition of Mongolia and China, as opposed to superior and subordinate positions. The Mongolians never surrendered to China but to the Ching Empire. When the Ching Empire was overthrown, both the Han and Mongolian ethnic groups were empowered to become independent nation-states, and establish independent sovereignty.

The China Association, which was the Han people’s group led by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, overturned the Ching dynasty in 1911, and believed that the ruling Man (Ching) ethnic group was a foreign regime in the eyes of the Han people in China. Appealing to nationalist instincts, the China Association sought to repel the Da-Lu (an offensive referring to foreign people as uncivilised), to recover Chinese, to establish the republic, and to have the right to the land. Seemingly, this kind of slogan shows that the revolution was not only about replacing a regime but also about inspiring nationalism along racist lines (Chang, C. H., 1991, pp.259-92). Whether they might be the Man (Ching) Empire or the Mongolian ethnic group, they were all excluded by Han society at that time. However, from the perspective of international law, Chang Chi Shung also thinks that “although government policy has changed as a result of international law, it does not make any difference as they were the same international people within the same international society” (Ibid, p.289). In other words, the ROC merely replaced the Ching regime, and maintains the principle of a state’s continuity in international law. The right to claim legitimate power over Outer Mongolia still exists even if it is unable to have effective governance of it.

Liou Hsueh Yao reaches the same conclusion, but by a different approach. He argues the KMT government of the ROC was betrayed by the Ya Er Da Agreement in
1945, where it was compelled to sign the “China-Soviet Friendly Protocol” and promise to let Outer Mongolia vote for independence. When this vote was held, Outer Mongolia elected to be independent, which was realised when the ROC withdrew in January 1946. After the ROC appealed to the United Nations over a two-year period, the Soviet Union was judged to have acted illegally in forcing an independence vote in Outer Mongolia, and the China-Soviet Friendly Protocol was scrapped. Hence, the independence of Outer Mongolia was no longer securely premised, and as such the ROC still has the right to claim sovereignty over it (Liou, H. Y., 2001, on line). That is why Outer Mongolia is still included on the map of ROC today.

Here I am not going to argue that both Chang Chi Hsung and Liou Hsueh Yao’s historical discourse about sovereignty of Outer Mongolia is questionable. But, if it were asked today whether the ROC has the right to claim sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, this kind of sovereignty discourse would be challenged. With Chang Chi Hsung’s statement about the principle of a state’s continuity in mind, it should be noted that the ROC replaced the Ching regime of China in 1912, while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) replaced the status of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1971 on the international stage, due to the United Nations’ recognition of the former. In this sense, does international recognition determine the legitimacy of inheriting a nation-state’s status? If it does, then the ROC no longer exists in the international community. If it doesn’t, does it mean that the PRC should not have been given the international status that once belonged to the ROC? Or, is there a case for two Chinas - the ROC (now on Taiwan) and the PRC - after 1949 when the Chinese Civil war ended?

Moreover, I propose that the reason why the United Nations invalidated the vote for
independence in Outer Mongolia, brought about by the China-Soviet Friendly Protocol, was as a result of the cold war between America and the Soviet Union. It was for political, not legal reasons. The reason why the KMT government signed the Protocol in the first place was to get help from the Soviet Union to defeat Japan during the Second World War. Both sides certainly had their own interests in mind when they signed it.

More ironic is the fact that the PRC does not claim sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, and as such Outer Mongolia is excluded from the map of the PRC. However as we have seen, Outer Mongolia is still included in the sovereignty discourse and map of the ROC. Another reason why the KMT regime of the ROC insists that Outer Mongolia is still part of its territorial sovereignty is to construct and impose its claim to be the legitimate inheritors of 5,000 years of Chinese culture.

As for Tibet, unlike the Outer Mongolian situation which enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union, it lacks open support from a superpower country, and is unable to gain autonomy or independence. Tibet actually has more of a claim to be an independent country if we see how different it is from China. Its language, history, culture, religion and style of government are all in contrast to those of China. Here, I am not asking whether Tibet should be on the map of either the PRC or the ROC, but arguing that the territorial sovereignty discourse is changeable according to the power relations the particularly country enjoys. As Chang Chi Hsung implies, if a political entity only has independent sovereignty in theory and cannot back it up with force, then it is difficult to achieve the goal of independence (Chang, C. H., 1991).

Returning to the ROC government’s response to Outer Mongolian independence,
within the central government of the ROC, there is an organisation called the
"Mongolia and Tibet Affairs Council", responsible for dealing with the cultural
activities and representing the ethnic identity of Mongolian and Tibetan people on
Taiwan or overseas under the name of the ROC. Both the Mongolian and Tibetan
people are regarded as citizens of the ROC. Those who live overseas are also able to
obtain an Overseas Chinese Identity Certificate, if they apply for it, and can stay in
Taiwan for however long they wish to be regarded as citizens of the ROC if they have
qualified. Those who insist on Taiwan’s sovereign independence, such as the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), frequently question the organisation of the
central government. In addition, they do not consider Taiwan’s sovereignty to include
Mongolia, Tibet, and the PRC. However, as far as the KMT is concerned, both
Mongolia and Tibet are territories belonging to the ROC, claims they refuse to
relinquish. Within the Constitution of the ROC with regards to its territories,
Mongolia is interpreted as one of the territories belonging to the ROC. However, as I
have discussed earlier, the ROC on Taiwan now needs to revise its policy and
recognise the independence of Outer Mongolia, whether for domestic, international or
United Nations reasons.

Meanwhile, the ideological stance towards Outer Mongolian independence may
make political and cultural activities, like cinema, contradictory. The film *Mongolian
Spirit* (1994) is a case in point where the government’s film censorship conflicts with
its own interpretation of territorial sovereignty towards Outer Mongolia. When the
film was first sent to the Government Information Office of the Yuan Administration
in 1994, it was treated as being a PRC film. The film came from the People’s
Republic of Mongolia, whose independence is not recognised by the KMT
government of the ROC, as discussed. Thus, this film was not eligible for screening
on Taiwan due to the regulations that apply to PRC films. It was judged to be a film
from the PRC by the Government Information Office and therefore subject to the
regulations for films from China. This is because, in 1994, films from the PRC could
be imported to Taiwan for the purposes of academic research only. The policy to allow
films from PRC to be screened commercially on Taiwan did not happen until the
appearance of the film *Farewell My Concubine*, directed in the same year by Chen
Kai-Ge (this film is discussed later).

The GIO still did not change their interpretation of this film’s nationality, even
when the film’s importer had appealed against the judgment three times. Ironically,
the PRC accepts that this film is from the People’s Republic of Mongolia, and is
unable to refer to it as being ‘made in China’. Therefore, the treatment shows that the
national ideological sovereignty of the ROC contradicts their own interpretation of the
claim to own the territories of Outer Mongolia as well as the PRC, where it is
politically expedient to do so. However, this situation is worthy of further exploration
beyond the conflicts about sovereignty mentioned above.

If, the ROC claims sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, then this film, *Mongolia
Spirit*, should be regarded as a domestic film. Instead, it is considered to be a film
made by the PRC by Taiwan’s KMT government. Secondly, in the discourse of
territorial sovereignty of the ROC, Mainland China is considered to be part of its
“interior” land, but even under such a definition, *Mongolia Spirit* still cannot be
censored as a domestic film. The PRC recognises the independent sovereignty of the
People’s Republic of Mongolia, but the KMT regime of the ROC wishes that the former would accept that Outer Mongolia is part of China, not an independent country. If China officially confirmed this film to have been made in China, it would have meant that the PRC recognises the ROC’s discourse of territorial sovereignty, which represents the inheritance of 5,000 years of Chinese culture. In other words, the KMT regime of the ROC demands that the Communist regime of the PRC stands side-by-side over the Outer Mongolia territorial sovereignty. This kind of sovereignty discourse is hegemonic as it seeks agreement with the PRC on the interpretation of Chinese national identity. It also may imply that Mainland China and Outer Mongolia are all parts of the ROC, as opposed to the international community’s view about Chinese territorial sovereignty that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. Therefore, on the surface, it could be said that the KMT’s regime is simply refusing to admit Outer Mongolia’s independence. But the implicit meaning behind the censorship problems of *Mongolia Spirit* is to deny the international status of the PRC, which is to represent Chinese society in the world and its discourse of territorial sovereignty and history in relation to national identity. In this respect, the strategy of the ROC could be said to fulfill the ancient Chinese proverb, which states, “If you’ve got the right name, then your life will run more smoothly”.

3. The Return of Hong Kong and Macao to the PRC and the Territorial

*Sovereignty Discourse of the ROC*

It is necessary to offer some historical background in order to better understand
Taiwan's sovereignty discourse towards Hong Kong and Macao. The British were given Hong Kong in 1842 as a result of the Nanking Capitulation, followed by the Kowloon peninsula in 1860 under the Peking Capitulation, during China's Ching dynasty. In order to gain complete control of Hong Kong's affairs, Britain went to war again to compel the Ching regime to sign up to the Special Protocol for the Expansion of the Hong Kong Area, which stated that Britain could lease the New Territories for 99 years, expiring on July 1 1997 (Li, Y. H., 1997, p.32). The New Territories referred to the uncultivated area of Hong Kong and small islands near Hong Kong. Hong Kong and Kowloon were the spoils of war for the British, just like Taiwan's situation with Japan; the New Territories however was leased not surrendered. For convenience's sake, "Hong Kong" is used as an inclusive term to describe all the islands and territories under lease.

Hong Kong, like Outer Mongolia, is included in the territorial sovereignty discourse of the ROC. Before the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the ROC represented the authority to negotiate with the British government over Hong Kong's sovereignty. However, the government of the ROC failed to return Hong Kong to China due to its "poverty of power" (Ibid, p.46) compared to the British. Conversely Taiwan was given to the KMT's ROC regime after WWII due to American support and Japanese defeat. However, without this support, the KMT government of the ROC found it impossible to take over Hong Kong from the British, due to the latter being regarded as one of the superpower countries after WWII. As the lease had not expired, the ROC government did not have a legal right to take back Hong Kong either, and as such could only claim sovereignty through its historical land discourse. After
retreating to Taiwan in 1949, the ROC government maintained diplomatic relations with the British government until the late 1960s, after which time the ROC systematically started to lose countries in Europe willing to befriend it, such that only one European country has diplomatic relations with the ROC today. As a result, the PRC took over sovereignty negotiations with the British. The PRC expressed their strong desire to take back Hong Kong from the 1980s on, and it was finally agreed by both sides that Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories would all be taken over by the PRC on July 1 1997.

The ROC government on Taiwan, on the other hand, can only work towards friendlier relations with the people of Hong Kong through economic and cultural exchanges in the hope that it will foster a sense of national identity with the ROC (a textual analysis of related cinema is discussed later).

The issue of the sovereignty of Macao originated in 1887, when China’s Ching regime and Portugal signed the “Friendly Business Protocol”, stating that Portugal should have “perpetual occupation” (Tan, Z. Q., 1994, p.147). More specifically, this protocol stated that, “China confirms perpetual occupation and government of Macao, and its dependencies, by Portugal, just as with any Portuguese possession” (Ibid, p.148). However, according to Tan, the phrase “perpetual occupation” only exists in the English edition, whereas the Chinese one refers to “perpetual management” (Ibid, p.147). As a result of such linguistic differences, misunderstanding the true intent of the Portuguese government potentially cheated China. Furthermore, this protocol also stated that, “Portugal cannot transfer Macao to another party unless it gets consent from China”; thus, ultimate sovereignty of Macao should rest with China, even if
Macao can be inhabited or managed permanently by the Portuguese (Ibid, pp. 147-52). The status of Macao in international law was not clarified until June 1979 when the PRC and Portugal built up diplomatic relations, and agreed that “Macao is China’s territory under Portugal’s management” (Ibid, p.147). It was mutually agreed that Macao would be taken over by the PRC after 1999.

With this historical background in mind, I would now like to discuss the ROC government’s response through its cinematic policy towards national identity, using textual analysis. For convenience’s sake, I will use “Hong Kong” to refer to Hong Kong, Kowloon, the New Territories, and Macao.

(1) Hong Kong Cinema in Taiwan before July 1, 1997

Prior to July 1 1997, when Hong Kong was taken over by the PRC, Hong Kong films were categorised as “nationally produced” by the Government Information Office (GIO) of the ROC. According to Item 8 of the Second Article of the Cinema Act of the ROC, the term “nationally produced” refers to “those films domestically produced, directed, written, acted, and made in the national language by the people of the ROC” (GIO, 2001b, p.239). Are the people of Hong Kong also the people of the ROC then? According to the ROC, it thinks its sovereignty includes the lands of Hong Kong. As Anthony Smith implies, the nationality of many eastern countries is based on ancestral blood ties (Smith, 1991, p.12). The ROC is not excluded from this discussion. Lin Teng Yao states that the Constitution of the ROC qualifies nationality as “any person given birth to by the people of the ROC”, and it is mainly “based on
the principle of blood-inheritance” (Lin, T. Y., 1995, pp.55-6). In international law, the
government of the ROC does not effectively manage Hong Kong, while Hong Kong
is regarded as one part of ‘free’ China (meaning Taiwan and Hong Kong) by the KMT
government of the ROC. Thus, it is not a problem if any citizen of Hong Kong with
‘Chinese blood-inheritance’ wants to own to nationality of the ROC. The citizenry of
the ROC actually includes two types of Chinese. One type are the people of the ROC
who are domestically located (here it may mean Hong Kong and Taiwan), and the
other type are the citizens of the ROC who live in other countries, also known as
‘overseas Chinese’. Whether they live in Hong Kong or Taiwan, the people of Hong
Kong are thought to be the people of the ROC. Even films produced in Hong Kong
are categorised as national films. The main benefit to Hong Kong films being
interpreted as national films of the ROC is reflected in the free tariff on imports, as
well as in the same levels of business tax and entertainment tax as Taiwanese films.
When the filmmakers of Hong Kong, including actors or actresses, come to Taiwan,
whether to make films or for publicity purposes, they earn money without having to
pay personal income tax. Taiwan’s filmmakers, however, are treated unfairly by the
government because each dollar they earn is liable to personal income tax.
Furthermore, if filmmakers from Taiwan work in Hong Kong, they are also taxed
there. Compared to actors or actresses coming from Hong Kong, Taiwan’s actors and
actresses are second-class citizens in the ROC. The sense of feeling inferior to
filmmakers from Hong Kong has apparently made some Taiwan’s filmmakers hostile
to the KMT government of the ROC. However, they are unable to influence the
national policy on the issue of sovereignty and identity of Hong Kong due to
intimidation from the PRC.

As for the filmmakers from countries other than the PRC (discussed later in this chapter), they are taxed at about 20% of their personal income if they work in Taiwan under the “Act of Occupation and Service”, implemented on May 10 1992 by the Yuan Legislature and Presidential House (Min Shen Daily News, 1992, 5.19, p.10). According to the Labour Affairs Council of the Yuan Administration, the filmmakers of Hong Kong should be regarded like any foreigners, and taxed accordingly if they work in Taiwan. However, if they hold a passport, working permit or citizen’s identity card of the ROC, they should be thought of as people of the ROC (United Daily News, 1992, 6. 3, p.22). However, the Government Information Office (which takes charge of cinema affairs), the Overseas Chinese Affairs Council (which deals with Chinese living overseas), and the Mainland China Affairs Council (which deals with Mainland China matters) all disagreed with the opinion of the Labour Affairs Council and insisted that the people of Hong Kong are not foreigners. In other words, as they are people of the ROC, they should have special grace to support the nation’s policy in terms of national identity and cultural propaganda. As Hong Kong people were implicated in the national identity policy of the ROC, the Labour Affairs Council, the Government Information Office and the Overseas Chinese Affair Council all had to ask the opinion of the Mainland China Affairs Council. The final decision was that Hong Kong people could also be regarded as people of the ROC prior to July 1 1997 (Ibid.), the date when China took over Hong Kong. In other words, the situation where Hong Kong’s filmmakers could hold a tourist visa and work on Taiwan without any income being taxed would not be changed. As Shu Cheng Chien points out, actors
have been coming to Taiwan from Hong Kong for a long time as a result of not having to pay tax and get working permits (cited in *United Daily News*, 1993, 5. 30, p.22).

To encourage Hong Kong filmmakers to side with the ROC government on the issue of national identity, the Golden Horse Film Festival, the largest annual national film festival held by the ROC since 1960, always invites Hong Kong films to be entered and filmmakers to participate, despite the fact that the annual Hong Kong Oscar Film Festival always excludes Taiwanese films. Due to this situation, Taiwanese filmmaker Chiu Fu Sheng openly demanded that the government of the ROC should negotiate with Hong Kong to agree to allow Taiwanese films to participate in the Hong Kong Oscar Film Festival (cited in *The Great Daily News*, 1993, 6.21, p.10). Unfortunately, Taiwan’s filmmakers do not foresee any improvement to this unfair situation. Again, and understandably, they feel they are treated as inferior to Hong Kong because of the government’s cinematic policy.

Here, the film *Sisters of Song*, directed by Hong Kong filmmaker Chang Wan Ting in 1994, is used to explore how the changing identity of historical figures functions within film censorship. The film is set between 1912 and the 1940s, the period that included the establishment of the ROC, the China-Japan War and China’s Civil War between the Chinese Communists and the KMT nationalist party. In this film, the eldest sister, Song Chin Ling is married to Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the founder of the ROC, while the youngest sister, Song Mei Ling, is married to Chiang Kai Shek. After the death of Sun Yat-Sen in 1935, the KMT and the Communists embarked on a power struggle for China. However, in 1937, Japan decided to invade China, and the Chinese Communists agreed to cooperate with the KMT regime in order to stop this
invasion. However, the leader of the KMT regime, Chiang Kai Shek, insisted on a strategy where “the expulsion of the foreign invader should be based on achieving internal peace first”, believing that every effort should be made to destroy the Chinese Communists. Song Chin Ling played a mediation role between these two parties but failed to persuade Chiang Kai Shek to stop the civil war. Chiang Kai Shek, in this film, is portrayed as stubborn and easily provoked into a temper. The youngest sister, Song Mei Ling, is in contrast a figure of hope and strives to get close to Chiang Kai Shek, whom she finally marries. She has since become the most important female figure in modern Chinese history for the ROC.

In the film, Song Chin Ling says that Dr. Sun Yat-Sen would like to see the KMT and the Chinese Communists deal with the problem of the Japanese invasion together. However, Chiang Kai Shek does not accept the suggestion. The Song sisters separate due to their different political viewpoints; Song Chin Ling stays in Mainland China, while Song Mei Ling comes to Taiwan with Chiang Kai Shek in 1949 after the KMT’s defeat in the Civil War.

This film, then, represents the late President, Chiang Kai Shek and his wife, Song Mei Ling, negatively, such that their film images are constructed in the opposite way to the KMT’s official history. Instead of being the “saviour of the Chinese”, Chiang Kei Shek is seen as a corrupt politician, while the First Lady, who addressed the American Congress to persuade them to help China during World War Two, is portrayed as a woman full of private ambition and bad will. The KMT regime’s response to this film became the leading topic of filmmakers in the 1990s. To the surprise of most people, the censors at the Government Information Office without
any cuts passed Sisters of Song. However, had the film been imported to Taiwan before the death of President Chiang Ching Ko, the son of Chiang Kai Shek, in 1988, it would probably have been confiscated or destroyed before its was shown in public.

According to Article 26 of the Film Act of the ROC, “films cannot disgrace established wisdom or distort history” (GIO, 2001b, pp.247-8), which this film would apparently seem to violate. As I have discussed in previous chapters, Taiwan’s indigenous film movement started in the early 1980s with the beginnings of Taiwanese New Cinema (1982-1987). Under the first Taiwanese President, Lee Deng Huei, everyone confronted the notion of what it meant to be Taiwanese, whether from the ROC or the PRC. In his presidency of Lee Deng Huei (1988-2000), people started to openly question official history and the so-called ‘Great Heroes’ of the KMT regime through different kinds of literature, poetry and films. In Taiwan, the grand narrative of Chinese ideology is being deconstructed, to be replaced by more indigenous viewpoints of history, which mainly focus on the land of Taiwan and its people. Their stories might have started to become the mainstream of social thought. Mainland China therefore might become the land of ‘others’. After being taken over by the Chinese Communist regime on July 1 of 1997, Hong Kong films are no longer regarded as being domestic by the ROC. The government of the ROC and its people has started to accept the reality of Hong Kong’s sovereignty that it does not belong to the ROC.
(2) Hong Kong Cinema in Taiwan after July 1 1997

When Hong Kong was taken over by the Chinese Communist regime, the Mainland China Affairs Council of the ROC introduced the ‘Enactment Regarding the Relationship with the People of Hong Kong and Macao’, which was passed by the Yuan Legislature in 1997 (GIO, 2001b). In this Enactment, the people of Hong Kong and Macao were no longer regarded as people of the ROC, and were referred to as Hong Kong and Macao residents rather than residents of the PRC by the ROC government. Based on the above Enactment, the GIO of the ROC also introduced the “The Granting of Permission for Published Works, Films, Videos and Radio Programmes Imported into Taiwanese Areas or Distributed, Sold, Produced, Broadcast, Commercially and non-Commercially Screened in Taiwan from Hong Kong and Macao”. This came into effect on the same day as the above Enactment. In order to exclude films that display overt Chinese Communism sympathies, the fourth article of this document clearly states that films cannot be shown in Taiwan if “films actively promote the Chinese Communist regime, unification under Communist ideology, or are sympathetic to Chinese Communism”. If films possess such content, they can be used in Taiwan for academic purposes only (GIO, 2001b, p.133).

Meanwhile, in a public hearing on the cinema held by the Legislature department of the government in 1992, Legislator Tsai Bi Huang proposed “to demand the use of traditional Chinese characters in subtitles in films in order to prevent the simplified Chinese characters of Mainland China being used in Taiwan’s cinemas” (cited in The Great Daily News, 1992, 3. 17, p.10). The Government adopted this suggestion,
which appears in the Twelfth Article of the above Enactment.

It could be said, therefore, that this policy is to control films whose purpose is to spread propaganda on behalf of the Chinese Communist regime. By comparing what has been discussed about Hong Kong films in Taiwan before 1997, we can distinguish the changing attitudes that have been adopted by the ROC government. Knowing that the people of Hong Kong are unlikely ever to recognise its national identity claims, the ROC government seems to have adopted a more realistic attitude towards Hong Kong films and filmmakers.

Under the nationality regulations of the PRC, Hong Kong people are unable to hold two different passports. In other words, they can hold either a PRC or another country’s passport; and, the passport of the ROC is not recognised by the PRC government. As for the ROC government, Hong Kong films are no longer categorised as “domestic films”; therefore, their filmmakers are no more regarded as residents of the ROC. However, they can still hold an Overseas Chinese Certificate of the ROC when applying to work on Taiwan, such that they will be taxed the same as the domestic filmmakers of Taiwan. If they do not have the Certificate, they will be classified as foreigners and taxed at the appropriate level of tax, which means about 20% of personal income. Hence, any Hong Kong filmmaker will be taxed if they are permitted to work on Taiwan, which is unlike the situation before July 1 of 1997.

4. The Cinematic Policy towards Mainland China

The Chinese Communists were called “Communist Burglars” by Taiwanese
people for more than forty years until 1987, when the policy of letting Chinese people from Taiwan go back to China to see their relatives was introduced. China had been termed by the KMT regime as the “stolen land” of the ROC, and the thieves were hence referred to as “burglars”. The inner meaning behind such a discourse is apparently designed to legitimise the KMT regime by devaluing the ‘other’.

Before his death, President Chiang Ching Ko decided to let those Chinese people who came to Taiwan around 1949 to return to China, once it was clear that Mainland China would not be taken back and out of humanitarian considerations. Those retired Chinese soldiers and China mainlanders who came to Taiwan around the 1940s had not been allowed to go back to China hitherto, but this situation had now changed. Thus, this “human’s hell”, a term used in official propaganda to describe Mainland China under Communist rule, became a “tangible but lost dream home” for millions of Chinese people on Taiwan.

However, filmmakers were not permitted to go to China to make films or programmes for another two years. If we look back over history, it is possible to find hostile ideology towards the Chinese Communist enemy regarding sovereignty tied up in the cinematic rules of the ROC. “The Inspection of the Communist Burglars’ Cinema Industry and Filmmakers” (1957-1989) and “The Rules Governing Published Works, Films, and Broadcast Programmes Entering the Free Areas of the ROC from the Burgled Areas”, which ceased in 1992, are examples. The former “Inspecting Instrument” ceased after the policy of letting filmmakers to go to China to make films and the lifting of the “Temporary Enactment of the Turmoil Period” (1947-1989) in 1989 (Lin, Y., 1999, p.19). Before the “Inspecting Instrument” was cancelled in 1989,
Taiwan’s filmmakers were unable to go to China to make films. Soon after, the Government Information Office of Taiwan introduced the “Operational regulations for mass communication industry representatives going to China to make programmes”, which permitted Taiwan’s filmmakers to go to China to make films and even use Chinese equipment, props and costumes (Yang, Z., and Wang, Y., 1999, pp.2-4). At this stage, professional Chinese actors and actresses were not allowed to appear in Taiwan’s films, nor any officials serving in the PRC’s government (China Times, 1992, Sep. 2, p.22). This latter ruling was lifted after the “Enactment Relating to the People on Both Sides of Taiwan Strait” was decreed in 1992. From then on, the term “Communist Burglars” was no longer used by Taiwan’s KMT regime in official literature and public media, and was replaced by the term, Chinese Communists.

Things seem to be changing, then. However, there are still many limitations imposed on Taiwan’s filmmakers making films in China even though the term “Communist Burglars” is not to be used any more in official discourse. The following table should make it clearer about how the cinematic policy of the ROC towards Mainland China has evolved:
Table 4-1: Cinematic Policy of the ROC relating to the PRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Contents of Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Allowing filmmakers to go to China to make films, where they may hire understudies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Up to half of film personnel can be made up of Chinese scriptwriters and directors, while up to half of actors and actresses hired can be Chinese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Allowing China’s filmmakers to visit Taiwan. Films made in China can be screened non-commercially in Taiwan. Films that win the leading international film festivals awards* are no longer banned if they exceed the ‘up to half’ regulations governing filmmaking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Films made in China can be imported into Taiwan for commercial reasons, as long as this does not exceed 10 films per year.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* These are the Oscars (USA), the New York Film Festival (USA), the Cannes Film Festival, the Venice Film Festival and the Berlin Film Festival (GIO, 2001b).

From the above table, we may see the changing cinematic policies of the ROC government towards the PRC. Prior to 1989, films made by Chinese Communists were not to be allowed into Taiwan, and Taiwanese films and filmmakers were unable to go to Mainland China. Between 1989 and 1992, professional actors and actresses from Mainland China were not to be allowed to appear in Taiwanese films, even if they were shot in Mainland China. Taiwanese films, such as Five Women and A Rope (directed by Yeh Hong Wei in 1991) and Shou Lan Hong (directed by Lee Chia in 1992) were all banned by Taiwan’s government because these films violated the
regulations that prohibited the hiring of any professional actor and actress from mainland China (*Independent Evening News*, 1991, Nov. 23, p.15 & *China Times*, 1992, July 4, p.42). Meanwhile, the director of *Shou Lan Hong*, Lee Chia, and its producer, He Shin, were forbidden to travel to China for one year as punishment (*Min Shen Daily News*, 1992, July 15, p.10). The limit on the number of filmmakers - including scriptwriters, directors, actors and actresses - from mainland China who could participate in Taiwanese films between 1992 and 1995 was said to protect Taiwanese filmmakers’ rights; but in reality it did no such thing (*China Times*, 1992, Sep. 2, p.22). Prior to July 1 1997, Hong Kong filmmakers were considered to be Taiwanese, and as such did not have to pay any personal income tax on Taiwan. Most Taiwanese film-producing companies have branches in Hong Kong, and they do not pay tax either if they make films on Taiwan. Meanwhile, according to the interpretation of the nationality of filmmakers from Hong Kong by the government, Hong Kong people are regarded as people from the ROC. Therefore, if half a film’s personnel are made up of Hong Kong filmmakers and half is made up of filmmakers from Mainland China, it would be classed as a film of the ROC rather than Hong Kong or Mainland China. Thus, this regulation actually protected Hong Kong’s rather than Taiwan’s filmmakers.

Between 1989 and 1993, Taiwanese filmmakers could go to Mainland China, but Chinese filmmakers could not go to Taiwan. The policy in 1993 of allowing films that exceeded the ‘up to half’ limit on mainland Chinese film personnel, as long as they won one of the leading international film festival awards, is also debatable. Originally, any Taiwanese or foreign film that violated this regulation could not be publicly
screened in Taiwan. However, the film *Farewell My Concubine* (produced by Taiwan’s Hsu Fong but directed by Chen Kai-Ge in 1993) broke the rule. More than half the roles were played by actors from Mainland China, and therefore the film should have been banned according to government regulation. But because this film won the Golden Palm Award at the Cannes International Film Festival in 1993, Taiwan would have incurred international condemnation if the government had tried to ban it. Therefore, the government revised its regulations, such that films that exceed the ‘up to half’ limit were allowed in Taiwan provided they won one of the leading international film festival awards. One year later, the film *To Live*, directed by a Chinese director but funded by a Taiwanese film producer, won the Grand Jury Award at Cannes and was therefore allowed to be screened commercially in Taiwanese cinemas. As the director of *Five Women and A Rope*, Yeh Hong Wei, said:

Film is the most instant and direct form of diplomacy and the best propaganda for a nation’s image in international society. Foreigners may tell how progressive or regressive a nation is from films” (cited in *China Times*, 1993, Aug. 9, p.23).

Prior to the *Farewell My Concubine*, the application to screen the film *Raising the Red Lantern* (directed by Chang Yi Mou in 1992) was rejected by Taiwan’s government due to its exceeding the limitation on the number of Mainland Chinese actors and actresses used. If this film had also won one of the most named international film festival awards, permission to screen it in Taiwan would have been granted. We can see, therefore, how keenly the Taiwan government’s voice wishes to be heard by the international community since its expulsion from the United Nations.
in 1971.

Unlike the attitude of the KMT regime prior to 1989, which always denied the PRC’s international status, the censorship example of the film *The Spring River Runs East* reflects the change in policy towards the PRC’s governance in China. *The Spring River Runs East* was made in 1947 in China and mainly narrates the story of how Chinese families and young people joined the Anti-Japan war during WWII. Before 1949, China was still under the governance of the KMT regime, under which this film was issued permission for public screening. Taiwan’s film distributor, Liang Liang, imported it in 1991. But it was not allowed a commercial release because it was thought to be a film from the PRC, not the ROC. From this case, it appears that the KMT’s government seems to have given up its sovereignty claim and recognised the effective governance of the PRC. Even if the film distributor argued that this film was a product of the ROC, it flew in the face of the changing attitude of the KMT government towards China. The changing discourse about sovereignty could be said to support the view that the ROC is the only true claimant in terms of the rule of China, while the government is making the ‘right’ sounds to the international community that the relationship between China and Taiwan is of a special country to a special country, a term used by former President Lee Deng Huei.

In the process of recognizing the sovereignty of the PRC, Taiwan’s government still carefully watches its steps. Even though it has opened Taiwan’s film market to Mainland China, it still limits the number of films that may be imported. Since 1995, only ten films per year made by Mainland China may be imported to Taiwan for commercial screenings. Compared to films from other countries, this regulation is the
most restrictive. The Taiwanese government insists on preserving the culture and traditions of Chinese society and, consequently, sees cinema as a cultural activity that seeks to protect their society from a “simplified” Chinese view on society, meaning that of Mainland China.

5. The Cinematic Policy towards Japanese Films

After the KMT came from China to Taiwan in 1945, the policy of ‘De-Japan-isation’ became one of the most pressing of the KMT regime. However, in order to cultivate friendly relations with other countries, the Taiwan government did not break off diplomatic relations with Japan until 1973. That said, Japan initially announced an end to diplomatic relations after Taiwan had lost its position in the United Nations. As a result, the Taiwan government banned the import of Japanese films from 1973 until 1984 (*Central Daily News*, 1992, April 13, p.20). During these years, there were no Japanese films openly screened in Taiwan’s cinemas. The following table may illustrate the process by which Taiwan opened up to the Japanese gradually, and why they can now import films to Taiwan under conditions created after 1984.
Table 4-2: History of the Quota to Import Japanese Films after 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>donating 3 million dollars NT per film</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>openly bid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>donating 1.5 million dollars NT per film</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>donating 0.5 million dollars NT per film</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>donating 0.1 million dollars NT per film</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Oct.1, 1994</td>
<td>no limit</td>
<td>no conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: collected from *China Times*, 1992, April 18, p.30 and Lin Yang, 1999, p.176

The changes in policy identified above are based on research into the film market by organisations such as the Government Information Office, the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Cultural Development Council. The table also shows that the film quota was limited to below ten films per year before 1990, due to the “Historical Knot” (*Great Daily News*, 1992, April 8, p.10). This may mean that Taiwan’s KMT regime still worried about the recovery of Japanese culture in Taiwan in the initial stages of opening up, and therefore demanded high levels of monetary donations from film distributors. The money donated from film buyers was used to support the production of national films. However, we also see that as the yearly film quota increases, the donation amounts decreased year on year. Eventually, the KMT government withdrew the quota system and ended the limit to the numbers of films allowed as well as the obligatory donations from Japanese film buyers from October 1, 1994. This could result from a decrease in interest in Japanese films by Taiwanese cinemagoers, whereby the market for national films is being threatened. Is it actually
so? I would also like to explore this in more depth in the next chapter, when I will focus on the market aspect.

6. The Cinematic Policy towards Other Foreign Films in Taiwan

With regard to other foreign films, such as those from the USA, Europe and other countries of the world, the ROC government has adopted a policy of nonresistance. In other words, any other international society may export their films to Taiwan, the only limit being the number of copies of any film being allowed in. The following table will show how Taiwan's cinematic policy has changed towards films from countries other than those already discussed.
Table 4-3: The Changes, in Chronological Order, to Taiwan’s Cinematic Policy towards Copies of Foreign Films and Screening Venues (1988-1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Copies Per Film</th>
<th>Venues for Screening the Same Film</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capital Cities (Taipei &amp; Kaoshung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1988</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1990</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1992</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1994</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1994</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1995</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1996</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1997</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/1997</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1997</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/1999</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lin Yang, 1999, p.104

The quota system for other foreign films in Taiwan was implemented in 1954 (Wei, D., 1999, p.40) and withdrawn in 1986 (Lin, Y., 1999, p.82). If we are aware of the distribution system for foreign films in Taiwan, we could say that the table above mainly refers to American films. According to Lu Fei Yi, American films enjoyed
95% of the box office among all foreign films in Taiwan in 1994 (cited in Wei D., 1999, p.25) This being the case, American films, then, practically represent the totality of the foreign films market in Taiwan, and the statistics are essentially in reference to American films distributors, mainly the so-called “Big 8” in Taiwan, which are Paramount, Twentieth Century Fox, Warner, Universal, Columbia, Disney, Loew’s (MGM), and UA, and which currently have their own film distributors and agents on Taiwan (discussed in more detail in the next chapter). This is dramatically different to Taiwan in 1928, when American films only had 20% of the box office compared to 80% for Japanese films (Wei, D., 1999, p.33). But if we consider the interaction between Taiwan’s government and the USA over time, this situation might not be so surprising.

In order to prevent the expansion of Communism around the world, the American government supported Taiwan’s KMT nationalist regime to the tune of 100 million US dollars a year between 1951 and 1965. This support not only influenced the development of Taiwan’s economy, but also led to Taiwan’s dependence on America in many aspects of life (Ibid, p.40-1), not least the consumption of American films in Taiwan.

The only limitation for protecting the market for national films is the issue of copies of a single film. As the table above states, the number of copies permitted per film in 1999 was 58, which is more than 7 times the number of copies permitted in 1988. We see that the number of copies increases year by year, thus the “cultural exception” does not seem to work at all. Taiwan’s government actually does not seek to argue for the “cultural exception” when they talk with American film distributors
and their agents. Why? When it comes to entering the international community, such as joining the WTO, Taiwan’s films are easy sacrifices. But the most important factor here is the effect on the identity of Taiwanese cinemagoers, it can be argued.

7. **Comparisons between the Cinematic Policies of Different Countries**

The Taiwan government’s cinematic policies towards films from different countries are based, then, on its territorial sovereignty discourse. The following table is intended to compare and contrast the treatment of these films by the ROC government in terms of sovereignty and cinematic issues.
Table 4-4: Taiwan Government’s Cinematic Policy towards Films from Overseas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Outer Mongolia</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>foreign</td>
<td>domestic</td>
<td>domestic (before July 1, 1997)</td>
<td>neither domestic nor foreign</td>
<td>foreign</td>
<td>foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identification of film</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hong Kong (After July 1, 1997)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quota limit</td>
<td>yes (10 films a year after 1995)</td>
<td>no limit</td>
<td>no limit</td>
<td>no limit after 1994</td>
<td>no limit</td>
<td>no limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>copies limit</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxed</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no (before July 1, 1997)</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>No (before May 10, 1992)</td>
<td>yes (after May 10, 1992)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above table, we see how similarly or differently the Taiwan government treats films from different countries.

First, with regard to the film’s nationality identification, we see Hong Kong films are categorised as domestic films prior to July 1, 1997. Even after that date, when its
sovereignty was taken over by the PRC, Hong Kong films are categorised as Hong Kong is rather than Chinese films. As such, Taiwan’s government still does not admit the sovereignty discourse of the PRC. Also, films from China are thought to be foreign films although they are not treated the same as other foreign films when it comes to the quota system due to the unresolved sovereignty issue between the ROC and the PRC. Meanwhile, as far as the film “Mongolian Spirit” is concerned, Outer Mongolia is not regarded as separate by the ROC government, even if it is identified as such by the United Nations. Taking the Constitution of the ROC into account, the ROC government still claims territorial sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and thus does not admit to its independence. Strangely, films made in and from Outer Mongolia can still not be imported to Taiwan, unless the PRC accepts the sovereignty discourse of the ROC. Two reasons may explain this: One is that the ROC government wishes the PRC government to support the ROC’s historical interpretation, which denies the legitimacy of Outer Mongolian independence. The other is that, if the PRC issued the nationality identification for the film Mongolian Spirit, it would imply that the PRC agrees with the ROC’s sovereignty discourse. That might also indirectly undermine the PRC’s sovereignty discourse, that there is only one China in the world (which is the PRC). In other words, getting the PRC to acknowledge the existence of two Chinas – the PRC and the ROC – is part of a strategy about who can claim legitimacy of the “only one China in the world” discourse.

With regard to the nationality issue of Hong Kong Films, these are no longer considered to be domestic films since July 1 of 1997, but are thought to be “Hong
Kong films” as opposed to domestic Taiwanese or Chinese. That said, Hong Kong films can still compete in the Golden Horse Film Awards held by ROC government annually, but China’s films remain excluded.

Secondly, regarding film quota policies, we see the ROC government sets the strictest limitations on films from the PRC in order to prevent large numbers of films being imported to Taiwan. The ROC government’s position here differs towards Japanese films, as the Taiwanese film market has been fully opened to Japan, except for the number of copies of any imported film. However, only ten films made in the PRC per year can be imported to Taiwan for commercial screenings since 1995. Other than commercial products, in the light of the Cinema Act of the ROC, films are also thought to be cultural products. The clues to the preferred cultural products of the ROC government are thus reflected in the importing conditions and rules for different countries.

Thirdly, for tax purposes, films and filmmakers from Hong Kong were thought to be domestic by Taiwan’s government prior to July 1 of 1997 and, as such, they were not taxed if they worked in Taiwan before that date. This was better than the treatment enjoyed by films and filmmakers from Taiwan itself. To enforce the notion that the national identity of Hong Kong people’s was that of the ROC, the government neglected Taiwanese filmmakers’ complaints about this unfairness for years, rather than try to improve it. When it comes to insisting on its territorial sovereignty, the ROC government may be excused for this kind of cinematic policy. However, this was open to change. As such, when it began to recognise that it was unlikely ever to take back Hong Kong, it started to listen to Taiwanese filmmakers and how they felt
they had been unfairly treated on the tax issue. Hong Kong films are now liable to import duties if imported to Taiwan, and since 1997 their filmmakers have to pay personal income tax if they work on Taiwan. But there is still no limit to the number of copies of a single film that can be imported from Hong Kong, unlike other foreign films, especially from the PRC.

8. Summary:

Since the ROC was excluded from its seat at the United Nations in 1971, it has made every effort to maintain its representation within the international community. Inevitably, this leads to the concept of there being two Chinas (PRC and ROC).

The ROC government also acknowledges the legal fact that Hong Kong is now one of the territories of effective governance under the political principle known as “one country, two systems”, as proposed by Mainland China. This means that the PRC has promised Hong Kong reasonable autonomy for the 50 years after July 1, 1997. Since that date also, Hong Kong filmmakers have been regarded as “Hong Kong citizens” rather than “domestic citizens of the ROC”. The most perplexing issue, however, in the ROC government’s sovereignty discourse is that of Outer Mongolia. In effect, Outer Mongolia’s status here is much like that of the ROC amongst the international community, as it cannot enjoy a “permanent name”.

Even so, the ROC government in Taiwan still gets to make its name heard during international events, such as international film festivals (discussed in detail in the next chapter). The KMT regime of the ROC government and the PRC both declare that
there is only one China in the world, but there is a fundamental difference between the interpretations of “one China” by each government. For the PRC government, China is the PRC, but in the sovereignty discourse of the KMT regime of the ROC on Taiwan, it is the concept of one China being the “future China” where these two governments come together in unification.

According to international law, for the past 50 years, neither the PRC nor the KMT regime of the ROC has had effective governance over the other party’s territory. In effect, this means that the concept of territorial discourse as it relates to international law does not apply to Taiwan and the PRC. This corresponds to what Anthony Smith says about the Western model of national identity not applying to Oriental society (Smith, 1991). The sovereignty discourse of the KMT regime of the ROC government has insisted on its legitimacy to represent the Chinese government from 1949 to 1988. However, this policy seemed to change under the Presidency of the first Taiwanese President, Lee Deng Huei, in 1988. The KMT regime of the ROC government started to acknowledge the PRC is also a political entity, but that does not mean the former has changed its sovereignty discourse on territorial issues, as they see themselves as the inheritors of traditional Chinese history. That is why there are two Chinas in the world at the present time.

For the DPP, the party opposed to the nationalist KMT, their discourse of territorial sovereignty for the ROC does not cover China, Outer Mongolia and Hong Kong. As Outer Mongolia is recognised as an independent country by the United Nations, the DPP has tried to inhibit the Outer Mongolia and Tibet Affairs Council, since winning the Presidential Election for the first time in 2000. Will they succeed in
revising the central government’s organisations and sovereignty discourse such that they only refer to the lands of Taiwan and its neighboring islands? It remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, the sovereignty issue of the two Chinas remains a dispute between the Taiwan and Mainland China societies. But this problem is in fact the result of international politics (Chang, Y. C., 1998). The next chapter will discuss the international influences upon Taiwan’s cinema market, focusing on economic factors.
Chapter V. Cultural Identity Issues in Film Marketing and Government Responses

The previous chapter discussed the Taiwanese government’s cinematic policies toward Hong Kong, China, Mongolia, Japan, other foreign films, etc. What follows is an exploration of the cinematic influences on Taiwan from these aforementioned areas. Through contextual analysis, this chapter will focus on discourses of cultural imperialism. In addition, to explore how definitions of national films have changed in relation to the above analysis is also the aim.

In doing so, this chapter will be divided into four sections. The first section will explore the debates on the issue of cultural imperialism. The second will look at the reality of the Taiwanese film market. After that, I will consider the issue of entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which concerns Taiwan’s national status within the international community. The fourth section will focus on how Taiwan’s government has responded to competition from other international markets and especially the measures it has introduced.

1. Is it Cultural Imperialism or Democracy? And Issues of Diverse Cultural Wills among People, Cinematic Institutions and Government

In response to issues of cultural production, according to Liou Li Hsin (1996), scholars like Adorno and Habermas, are preoccupied with cultural industries in advanced capitalist societies, and their dominant role amongst lower social classes. What these cultural industries rely on are superior capital and technology to eradicate
any sense of anti-ideology (cited in Liou, L. H., 1996, pp.309-312), which Tim O'Sullivan refers to as the meaning of cultural imperialism. O’Sullivan argues that cultural imperialism is:

Both an integral part and product of a more general process of imperialism, whereby certain economically dominant nations systematically develop and extend their economic, political and cultural control over other countries (O’Sullivan et al., 1994, p.73).

However, in opposition to the criticisms of cultural imperialism, Walter Benjamin argues that film is an expressive art form, which creates its own sense of reality and therefore has political potentiality. For example, American movies can be regarded as a productive form of diplomatic activity. Benjamin also thinks that quality mass cultural products should be accessible and not merely enjoy minor cultic value. Thus, as they can de-mythologise the acceptance of myths, these products should be much more accepted in a democratic society (cited in Liou, L. S., 1996, pp.309-12). In this way, Benjamin is presumably trying to explain the meaning of democracy, which is to fulfil the will of the masses.

But a society that seeks to protect its disappearing cultural products must also support democracy by representing the opinions of the majority, which in turn may make the protection of these cultural products impossible. In other words, does it violate the spirit of democracy if an impotent section of society or government wants to impose unfair measures to ensure that its cultural activities continue to exist?

Adorno and Habermas analyse the phenomenon of cultural dominance within the discourse of cultural imperialism; conversely, Benjamin seems to think it is a
phenomenon of democratisation within film production and distribution. Based on these binary viewpoints of cultural dominance and democratisation, John Tomlinson proposes four levels on which to explore cultural imperialism. He thinks that when we talk about cultural imperialism, further concepts such as “media imperialism”, “nationality”, “global capitalism” and “criticism of modernity” should also be taken into consideration and engaged with (Tomlinson, 1991, p.173). The synthesis of the first three concepts primarily underpins the criticism of modernity. He argues that the discourse of cultural imperialism is often thought to antagonise the expansion of modernity in capitalism. What is involved in the discussion about the expansion of modernity is that process of expansion that focuses on cultural loss rather than culturally obliged acceptance. According to John Tomlinson, the economic and technical will of superpowers is strong, whereas their cultural will, which can shape our world, is weak (Ibid, p.178). Tomlinson also proposes that this kind of cultural will is changeable (Ibid). In other words, the dominant culture might also become the culture of the dominated in an uncertain future and might possibly face the fate of cultural disappearance, too. With this in mind, I now wish to explore the reality of Taiwan’s film market.

2. Background to Cinematic Regulations and the Reality of Taiwan’s Film Market

According to Sun Yat-Sen, cultural identity is one of the most important components of a nation or a nation-state. In Taiwan, film is regarded as a cultural product by the government, and the cinema is clearly defined as a cultural activity by
the Cinema Act of the Republic of China, which was passed by Congress in 1983 and revised in 2001. The General Chapter of the Cinema Act of the Republic of China states that the two most important aims in realising this Act are “to advocate national policy” and “to advance Chinese culture” (GIO, 2001b, p.239). Meanwhile, the Thirty-ninth Article of this Act states that “cinematic activities are cultural activities”, authorising the Government Information Office of Taiwan to guide and support Taiwan’s cinematic development (Ibid, p.250). If Taiwan’s cinematic policies, as passed by the Legislature, imply the government’s “cultural will” (Tomlinson, 1991, p.174 and 178), then an analysis of Taiwan’s film market will likely reveal the identity of the Taiwanese cinemagoing public through consumption. The consequences of consumption trends might be that the government introduces or revises its cinematic policies in order to prevent Taiwanese films and filmmaking from being pushed out of the marketplace. This kind of legislative support could be regarded as pragmatic amongst government institutions and film-related industries. Therefore, it is necessary to explore what kind of operational model is used by the film industry, and how this functions within processes of identity construction, in any discussion of Taiwan’s cinematic activities.

Since the early stage of Taiwan’s cinematic development, the Taiwan government sets no import limit on American movies while it has to all other countries. But why are the cultural values and practices of American films accepted by the lower classes in a developed country like Taiwan? This is discussed later in the section on the World Trade Organization, since one of its principles is that any member of the WTO should open its market to any other member totally or in a gradual way, without the use of
protectionist measures. As discussed in the previous chapter, protectionism does exist in the cinematic policy of the Taiwan government, especially towards films from Mongolia and China. Before entry into the WTO in 2002, the Taiwan government also imposed variable limits on copies of single foreign films to be screened in Taiwan, with the exception of Hong Kong films due to historical factors and the national sovereignty discourse.

In the following table, what is examined is how the Taiwanese people’s cultural will is reflected in the film market. Firstly, Table 5-1 can help us understand the situation faced by Taiwanese filmmakers when it comes to the distribution of licenses granted to domestic and foreign films, in chronological terms.
Table 5-1: The Distribution Licenses Granted to National and Foreign Films (1990-1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
<th>Mainland China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government Information Office (GIO), 2000, on line

www.gio.gov.tw/info/movie/movie6.html

Table 5-1 shows that the Taiwan government’s definition of a national film, as determined by the Categorisation Criteria for a Film’s Nationality, actually includes both Taiwanese (referred to as domestic) and Hong Kong films (GIO, 2001b). In 1990, there were 81 films produced in Taiwan that were permitted distribution, but that number declined to 18 films in 1996. Although it rose again the next year, the decline continued in the two years after that, with only 16 films produced and granted permission for distribution in market in 1999.

As for films from Hong Kong, an average of more than 130 films a year were imported to Taiwan and permitted distribution between 1990 and 1995. Between 1990
and 1992, this figure appeared to be rising and reached 200 films in 1992, which is five times more than Taiwanese films. However, fewer than 100 films were imported and were permitted distribution in 1996, 1997 and 1998. The figure rose again in 1999 to 121 films. The number of foreign films imported and permitted distribution has always exceeded 200 films a year, and reached more than 300 in 1998 and 1999.

There is also another special category of film nationality; namely, films from Mainland China. According to the Taiwan government, films from China are neither domestic nor foreign, in keeping with Taiwan’s international status from the American perspective (as mentioned previously). Due to political reasons, Taiwan’s cinematic policy and commercial market did not open up to China until 1997. In the first year that films from China were allowed to be imported, only five were allowed commercial distribution. Perhaps surprisingly, only one film was allowed to be imported and allowed commercial distribution in the following year, while this rose to eight films in 1999. Indeed, since the cinematic policy to allow films from China to be imported was put into action in 1997, there have always been less than ten films per year allowed into Taiwan. This situation might speak less of the government’s anxieties about political ideology and more to do with the cultural will of Taiwanese people still favouring foreign films.

However, it could also be argued that the table above, in using government statistics, is undermined by the fact that the ideology of nationality is applied to films when categorizing them. That said, just because a film is allowed distribution does not necessarily mean it gets screened in the marketplace. Table 5-2 may reveal the fuller picture about films screened in Taiwan’s market.
Table 5-2: Films Screened in Taiwan’s Film Market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taiwan Films</th>
<th>Hong Kong Films</th>
<th>Foreign Films</th>
<th>Percentage of Taiwan Films</th>
<th>Percentage of Hong Kong Films</th>
<th>Percentage of Foreign Films</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>12.14%</td>
<td>31.69%</td>
<td>56.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>9.81%</td>
<td>39.62%</td>
<td>50.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>4.45%</td>
<td>40.25%</td>
<td>55.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>2.62%</td>
<td>45.27%</td>
<td>52.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>3.78%</td>
<td>45.39%</td>
<td>50.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>3.22%</td>
<td>38.87%</td>
<td>57.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>3.54%</td>
<td>34.85%</td>
<td>61.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>5.87%</td>
<td>24.86%</td>
<td>69.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
<td>27.95%</td>
<td>67.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>4.53%</td>
<td>17.82%</td>
<td>77.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>4.14%</td>
<td>25.15%</td>
<td>70.71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: edited from Taiwan Cinema Information Center, on line cinema.nccu.edu.tw/box/4/4a1.htm

From Table 5-2, we can see that more than 50 Taiwanese films were screened in Taiwan’s films market before 1990. After that, the figure drops to less than 20 films a year except for 1991 and 1996, in which only 21 films were screened in each. The percentage of Taiwan-produced films in the marketplace peaked at 12.14%; at the last count, this has slipped drastically to only 4.14%. If we compare the number of Taiwanese films screened in Taiwan’s cinemas in 1999 with 1980, when 174 Taiwanese films were screened (Lu, F. Y., 2002, on line), it would be easy to conclude that Taiwan’s cinema industry is in rapid decline and about to disappear from the marketplace.
Looking back at Table 5-1, there is clearly a difference between the figures of distribution licenses issued and actual films screened in the marketplace. In 1997, for example, 29 Taiwanese films were granted distribution licenses but only 17 films ended up being screened in the marketplace. There are at least two reasons that may explain this situation. The first is that even though filmmakers get licenses, they may still lack proper distribution channels. In particular, Taiwanese films have difficulty in getting screened in cinemas because most cinema owners are contractually bound to foreign films distributors. The seven national cinema chains that screened films from Taiwan and Hong Kong during the 1980s do not exist anymore, as they have resorted to screening foreign films since the 1990s. In addition, the Western film distributors own many deluxe cinemas that are all equipped with high-tech ‘surround sound’, such as the Warner Village in Taipei, a company which has the largest number of cinema complexes in Asia. The other reason may be that Taiwanese film distributors sometimes have difficulty in finding cinemas to screen their films before the screening license granted to them expires, which has a knock-on effect for the films seeking licenses the following year. That is why the figure for distribution licenses is larger than the figure for films actually being screened in the marketplace.

As for Hong Kong films, more than 200 films were shown in the marketplace in both 1990 and 1992. Before 1995, there were always more than 130 films screened per year, but that figure dropped to less than 100 films screened from 1996. Hong Kong has always seen a greater amount of film production than Taiwan since the 1970s. Hong Kong films are imported to Taiwan without any restriction and with no limit on the number of copies. But, having to face hot competition from the West,
especially Hollywood, Hong Kong films, which occupied more than 40% of the film market in Taiwan in 1992, 1993 and 1994, enjoyed only about 25% in 1999.

With regard to the number of foreign films screened in Taiwan, this tends to exceed 200 films a year. If we look at the percentages involved, the figure rose from about 50% to 70% of the entire film market during the years from 1990 to 1999. Both Taiwanese and Hong Kong films are sharing a market decline, while foreign films are enjoying an increase. Compared to Table 5-1, differences also exist between films getting distribution licenses and films actually screened when it comes to Hong Kong and foreign films. However, unlike the situation with Taiwanese films, the figures for both Hong Kong and foreign films being screened is larger than the figures for those obtaining licenses in some years. This is because some films get their licenses in the previous year but are not screened until the next year(s) before their licenses expire. What that means is that the difficulty in getting Hong Kong and foreign films screened is not as bad as for Taiwanese films.

Table 5-3 deals with the audience share in Taipei cinemas for all films.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taiwan Film Audience Figures</th>
<th>Hong Kong Film Audience Figures</th>
<th>Foreign Film Audience Figures</th>
<th>Percentage of Taiwan Film Audience</th>
<th>Percentage of Hong Kong Film Audience</th>
<th>Percentage of Foreign Film Audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1821559</td>
<td>5555220</td>
<td>8744372</td>
<td>11.30%</td>
<td>34.46%</td>
<td>54.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1194465</td>
<td>5525328</td>
<td>10402319</td>
<td>6.98%</td>
<td>32.27%</td>
<td>60.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>560634</td>
<td>5096823</td>
<td>9063332</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
<td>34.62%</td>
<td>61.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>248850</td>
<td>7591349</td>
<td>8044651</td>
<td>1.57%</td>
<td>47.79%</td>
<td>50.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>603346</td>
<td>4315339</td>
<td>10232555</td>
<td>3.98%</td>
<td>28.48%</td>
<td>67.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>524810</td>
<td>2376438</td>
<td>9653361</td>
<td>4.18%</td>
<td>18.93%</td>
<td>76.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>188673</td>
<td>1931166</td>
<td>10251405</td>
<td>1.53%</td>
<td>15.61%</td>
<td>82.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>252164</td>
<td>1071749</td>
<td>11872092</td>
<td>1.91%</td>
<td>8.12%</td>
<td>89.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>156458</td>
<td>815446</td>
<td>11909740</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
<td>6.33%</td>
<td>92.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>68087</td>
<td>441454</td>
<td>11836473</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
<td>3.58%</td>
<td>95.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>58413</td>
<td>379693</td>
<td>10265580</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
<td>3.55%</td>
<td>95.91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: edited from cinema.nccu.edu.tw/box/4/4b1.htm

*There are more than two million people living in Taipei, the largest city in Taiwan.

The table above shows how competition from foreign films has led to a decline in audiences for Taiwanese and Hong Kong films. For example, 1,821,559 people watched Taiwanese films in Taipei in 1989, while only 58,413 were watching Taiwanese films by 1999. In this ten-year period, the percentage of audiences for Taiwanese films fell rapidly from 11.30% to 0.55%; put another way, that is only about one person watching a Taiwanese film for every two hundred film admission tickets sold.

As with audiences for Taiwanese film, audiences for Hong Kong films have also
fallen very quickly, from 5,555,220 people in 1989 to only 379,693 in 1999. The percentage going to watch films from Hong Kong in the Taipei cinema circuit was 34.46% in 1989, falling to only 3.55% in 1999.

However, if we look at the figures for audiences of foreign films in Taipei, the reason for such dwindling audience numbers becomes clear. In 1989, 8,744,372 people went to see foreign films, with the number rising to 10,265,580 in 1999. During 1996, 1997 and 1998, more than 11,800,000 watched foreign films in Taipei. The audience share for foreign films grew steadily during this ten-year period, with the exception of 1992, from 54.24% in 1998 to 95.91% in 1999.

A discussion about box office takings leads from the above examination.
Table 5-4: Film Box office in Taipei Cinemas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taiwan Film Box Office Takings</th>
<th>Hong Kong Film Box Office Takings</th>
<th>Foreign Percentage of Box Office Takings for Taiwan Films</th>
<th>Percentage of Box Office Takings for Hong Kong Films</th>
<th>Percentage of Box Office Takings for Foreign Films</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>145939128</td>
<td>436961747</td>
<td>883699975</td>
<td>9.95%</td>
<td>29.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>104916398</td>
<td>517264727</td>
<td>1192898615</td>
<td>5.78%</td>
<td>28.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>63777162</td>
<td>544256718</td>
<td>1182943791</td>
<td>3.56%</td>
<td>30.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>36570610</td>
<td>1021612714</td>
<td>1119588712</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
<td>46.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>103144502</td>
<td>720195626</td>
<td>1662816250</td>
<td>4.15%</td>
<td>28.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>84534960</td>
<td>402835540</td>
<td>1758113514</td>
<td>3.77%</td>
<td>17.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>31033280</td>
<td>354748913</td>
<td>1998256130</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
<td>14.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>39583272</td>
<td>188115562</td>
<td>2489516301</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
<td>6.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>25401536</td>
<td>151035720</td>
<td>2680958444</td>
<td>0.89%</td>
<td>5.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>12367760</td>
<td>87735171</td>
<td>2725643021</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11676805</td>
<td>72415775</td>
<td>2438320845</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
<td>2.87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: edited from cinema.nccu.edu.tw/box/4/4c1.htm

Box office takings are in NT dollars; 52 NT dollars were about equal to £1 sterling in 2002.

The statistics in Table 5-4 are calculated by and based on the report of the box office by the Taipei Film Distributors Association. We find there is little difference between the percentages of total cinema box office takings in Table 5-4 and film audience in Table 5-3. For example, the box office percentages in Table 5-4 for films from Taiwan and Hong Kong are all lower than those percentages of film audience for Table 5-3 in 1999. However, the box office percentage for foreign films here is higher.
than that of Table 5-3 in 1999. In fact, cinemas, especially those screening films from Western, developed countries, such as the U.S.A. or the U.K., are almost all equipped with high-tech Dolby and 'surround sound' systems. This is to enable the screening of those films made with complicated sound designs, which create the atmosphere of viewing in authentic surroundings. In order to screen those films with high-tech sound systems, those cinemas have to invest heavily. Thus, the admission price for those films is a little higher than that to watch films from Taiwan or Hong Kong, which usually lack such effects. Except for 1992, the box office percentage for foreign films increased year on year, reaching 96.67% in 1999. In the same year, the box office percentage for Taiwanese films was only 0.46%, and only 2.87% for Hong Kong films. In this sense, it could be argued that the cinema industry of Taiwan is on the verge of dying out.

After comparing cinema screenings, film audience figures, and the state of the box office for the "national films", which includes Taiwanese and Hong Kong films, I will now take a look at the films of other nationalities based on the categorisation of the Government Information Office of the Republic of China. In Table 5-1, the sum of foreign films receiving distribution licenses is always higher than that for national films, with consistently more than 200 films per year during the past 11 years. In both 1998 and 1999, it even exceeded 320 films per year.
From the table above, we can see that American films constitute the greatest proportion of foreign films screened in Taiwan, with the exception of 1989. There were 180 American films screened in 1990, which was 68% of the foreign films market in Taipei. 194 American films were shown in 1991, or about 74% of all foreign films screened in Taipei. It rises to 206 films, or about 79% of all foreign films, in Taipei in 1992. Between 1996 and 1999, about 160 American films were screened in Taipei each year, which is more than 65% of the foreign film market. The following table may give us a clearer picture about the popularity of American films.

Table 5-5: Foreign Films Screened in Taipei

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign Films Screened in Taipei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>145 (Jan.-June only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in Taiwan in terms of box office statistics (please see Table 5-6).

### Table 5-6: Films Released by American Film Distributors and the Market Share in Taipei from 1997 to 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Films Released</th>
<th>Box Office Takings</th>
<th>% Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>$1,951,815,175*</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>$2,103,985,000</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>$2,414,993,460</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Box office takings are calculated in Taiwanese dollars; about 52 Taiwanese dollars were equal to £1 Sterling in June 2002.

Table 5-6 reveals the statistics for films issued by American film distributors, such as the ‘big eight’ in Taiwan mentioned above. From Tables 5-5 and 5-6, we can see that films made in the U.S.A. are not distributed exclusively by American film distributors. In fact, most U.S.A. films are imported into Taiwan by Taiwanese film distributors, rather than by American ones. However, this minority of American film distributors in Taiwan shares more than 70% of the total film marketing in Taipei. Although there is little difference when compared with the report by Lu Fei Yi in Table 5-4, the box office report made by Wang Ching Hua shows how popular American films are in Taiwan. In other words, films made in the U.S.A. are the
preferred choice of Taiwan’s people.

According to Tomlinson’s point of view, if we talk about cultural imperialism, the issue of cultural loss should be at the forefront. With regard to the statistics given above, Taiwan’s situation really needs to address the issue of cultural loss. Meanwhile, Tomlinson also proposes the notion of “cultural will” when interpreting the meaning of cultural imperialism. From the analysis above, if we say that going to the cinema is one example of the people’s free will, we can equally define the cultural will of Taiwan’s people as being based on free will, which manifests itself in watching more and more foreign films year on year and rejecting domestically produced films.

After exploring the film market in Taiwan, it is not difficult to see that Taiwan’s people favour foreign films, especially those films made in America. As for the Hong Kong film industry, which has had a long-term historical relationship with Taiwan, it seems to be facing the same fate as Taiwanese films with the challenge from the American, mostly Hollywood, film industry.

Where Taiwanese people are exercising their free choice in going to cinemas screening Chinese movies, it would appear that the government’s worry about the cultural threat from China is in vain. Does this mean, then, that Taiwan’s people do not favour films made by China, and the cultural contents and meanings they embody, any more? It is too early to judge the effect of entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as Taiwan and China only became members in 2002, and the interaction between these two groups in official business talks and negotiations has yet to be measured.

As for films from Japan, even if Japanese television programmes are very
popular with older generations of Taiwanese, who were educated during Japan’s colonisation of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, and with young fans of Japanese culture, Japanese films are still unable to compete with those from America.

For Adorno, cultural imperialism, with its huge amount of capital investment, seeks to industrialise production and publicity to dominate the lower classes, distributing its cultural products to create some kind of economic and cultural dominance through its own cultural evaluation systems (Adorno, 1991). However, criticising this cultural imperialism discourse, Tomlinson demands a focus on the reasons behind cultural loss rather than the discussion of external threats (Tomlinson, 1991). Unlike the period of political control in the early 1950s for political reasons, Taiwanese people now go to the cinema and engage in related activities as a result of free choice, based on their freely exercised cultural will. Responding to Tomlinson, it is clear that the erosion of the Taiwanese film industry is related to the issue of cultural loss today. In addition, the imposition of political and economic structures such as the free market, which are ordered by organisations such as the WTO, demands that people’s free will is exercised. Furthermore, protectionist measures are not allowed to be practised by members, even if some cultural products, such as Taiwanese films, disappear as a result. It is therefore necessary to explore the issue of Taiwan’s entry into the WTO in more detail.

3. Issues of Entry into the WTO

The Taiwan government actively planned to sign up to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the former body of the World Trade Organisation, from the early 1990s, after being unable to participate in many international organisations, such as the United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organisation (UNESCO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO). As such, Taiwan has been unable to state its own official position since its status as an independent or sovereign country was called into doubt in the early 1970s. In order to compensate for this lack of political clout amongst international organisations, the Taiwan government cultivated goodwill for the purpose of joining the WTO for many years. Championing the demand for Taiwan to be treated fairly in the international community should be one of the main duties of Taiwan’s government and people. As entry into the WTO in 2002 approached, many nationwide broadcasters, such as the Taiwan Television Station (TTV), the Chinese Television Service (CTS), China Television (CTV) Formosa Television (FTV) and the Central Daily News (CDN), etc., advocated the benefits of joining the WTO on the grounds that Taiwan would no longer be absent from the ‘international game’. The first two (and largest) media organisations named here are government-owned. The Administration Cabinet, like the government cabinet in the UK or the USA, owns one and the National Defense Ministry owns the other. Additionally, the bosses of the latter three are all political appointees. The voice from smaller groups in society, such as Taiwanese film producers and farming units, is pretty weak when compared to what is heard from the government and political parties.

Under the rules of the WTO, the cinema industry belongs to mass media business activities, in the chapter covering the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS).
The basic rules of the WTO are to support the principles that members of the WTO should treat each other the same as “domestic citizens or the most favoured nation”, “in free marketing”, “in publicity” and “in gradual liberalisation” (Lu, S. L., 2002, on line). For example, the First Item of Article Two of GATS emphasizes the spirit that any member should be treated fairly, as well as provides any member with unconditional support as though they were the most favoured nation (Ibid.). The principle that WTO members should be treated as domestic citizens or the most favoured nation influences Taiwan’s cinema industry the most.

Before Taiwan officially became a member of the WTO in 2002, Article 11 of the Cinema Act of the Republic of China stated that cinemas should screen a certain percentage of nationally-produced films according to the stipulations of the central government (which means the Government Information Office) (GIO, 2001b). This Act regards film production as a cultural activity, which helped persuade the Congress to pass this Article, thereby ensuring that films made domestically enjoyed guaranteed screenings. However, this Article was not enforced in the 1990s, as it violated the spirit of the WTO. In the WTO, all films should have the same status as domestic ones; thus, to protect films made in Taiwan violates the rules of the WTO. As mentioned, entry into the WTO was of the highest priority for the government in the 1990s; any policy that conflicted with this was postponed, ignored or cancelled. This is one of the reasons why Article 11 of the Cinema Act was not implemented at all.

Secondly, letting international communities know about the progress of Taiwan’s democratisation has been one of the most important thrusts of Taiwan’s diplomatic activities since the late 1980s. If the Taiwan government’s efforts to protect cultural
activities conflict with the image of democracy that other parts of the government (like the Foreign Affairs Ministry or the Economic Ministry) seek to convey, then the fate of cultural activities in Taiwan is evident. Where culture, political diplomacy and the total economic development of Taiwan are organised in terms of priorities, even though they are interwoven, cultural activity is apparently the least important to be taken into consideration.

In order to have credibility within the WTO, the film quota limits were cancelled by the Taiwan government from 2002, with the exception of films from the People’s Republic of China. To satisfy the demands of the international cinema industry, such as Hollywood, the Taiwan government not only cancelled these quotas but also terminated Article 11 of the Cinema Act as a goodwill gesture on joining the WTO. However, we can not discuss the cancellation of Article 11 without considering the historical changes in Taiwan’s cinematic policy towards Hong Kong.

Looking back at the issue of Taiwan’s cinematic policy towards Hong Kong, as discussed in previous chapters, we know that films from Hong Kong have always been regarded as “national films” by Taiwan’s government. However, for Taiwan to join the WTO, it had to get approval from the Hong Kong government during the negotiation process because Hong Kong became a member of the WTO prior to Taiwan’s entry. Hong Kong is an independent tariff territory, like Taiwan’s international status with WTO members today, and has the right to intervene in Taiwan’s application to join the WTO. If Taiwan insisted on keeping its domestic regulations over film quota limits and maintain its ‘most favoured’ treatment of films from Hong Kong as a member of the WTO, then other members would accuse
Taiwan's government of violating the rules against protectionism. They would not support Taiwan joining the WTO, and its application would be rejected. The dilemma is that if Taiwan agrees that Hong Kong films should be treated in the manner of foreign films in Taiwan, then its application to join the WTO might be obstructed by Hong Kong.

However, from the point of view of UNESCO, the cinema industry could be regarded as a cultural activity that many countries try to maintain or advocate in the face of cultural loss as a result of Hollywood's challenge. This postulation can be asserted where countries insist on the cultural exception principle (Lin, Y., 1999). In the case of Taiwan, insisting on the cultural exception principle when negotiating with members as the U.S.A. and Hong Kong is also loaded with difficulty. For Hong Kong, the cultural exception issue would mean reducing its film market in Taiwan. For the U.S.A., though, the insistence of a non-protectionist business policy would simply be to practice in the spirit of the WTO. However, for Taiwan, because it is neither a member of UNESCO nor the UN, its insistence on cultural exception during the negotiation process for joining the WTO would not be heard in every quarter of UNESCO. Meanwhile, if it exercised cultural exception, Taiwan could be denied entry to the WTO by Hong Kong. So, faced with the dilemmas posed by Hong Kong's WTO status and the U.S.A.'s free market policy, the Taiwan government has had to make the decision whether to join the international game or not. Small wonder, then, that culture, and particularly cinematic activity, is that chosen to be sacrificed first, well before political considerations such as the sovereignty discourse or economic development. As Taiwan wants to participate in the WTO, it is a foregone conclusion
that its film market will be totally opened up, even though its own cinematic culture is
close to extinction. Meanwhile, it is also clear that it is impossible to discuss the
culture issue without exploring the political and economic dimensions of Taiwan’s
case study. What I am arguing here is that cultural exception is not asserted here
because of historical reasons in preserving its sovereignty discourse. It is a
self-conflicting nightmare for Taiwan to balance the redefinition of “national films”
with the reinterpretation of its sovereignty discourse so that it no longer covers the
territory of Hong Kong.

On the surface, it appears that the Taiwan government’s cultural policy is
dominated by the economic might of more developed societies, as implied by Adorno
in his criticism of cultural imperialism. It is readily argued that what a politically
expedient measure is taken by the Taiwan government in order to join forces with
these international economic elite. Yet those societies whose dominance impacts
negatively on the cultural products of less developed societies need to understand and
identify the historical make-up of these societies; as such, a social justice element to
the ethos of the WTO is still far away. Whether the Taiwan government is
intentionally or unintentionally neglecting the reality of the Taiwan cinema industry
today, it is clearly concerned with becoming a member of the international entity
above all things. If Article 11 of the Cinema Act of the Republic of China is regarded
as a mere obstacle to entry into them WTO, then, predictably, it should go.

That said, what exactly have been the characteristics of Taiwanese culture in the
late 1990s? The following cinematic policy measures may give us some clues to how
Taiwanese culture looks today.
After cancelling Article 11 of the Cinema Act of the Republic of China, the Taiwan government encouraged cinema owners to apply for business tax exemptions and reductions if the films they screened could be regarded as cultural products. The government's "Cultural Development Committee" has been given responsibility for administering this arrangement. However, no matter whether cinema owners screen domestic or international films, they are all eligible to apply. In this regard, the Taiwan government evidently wants to encourage cinematic activity that includes both national and foreign films on the grounds that they all have cultural meanings. Therefore, films made in the U.S.A. would also apply as they could be regarded as representative of the most potent popular culture phenomena in Taiwan.

4. The Government's Response and Support Measures

According to Anthony Smith, the law and governmental institutions are also concepts through which to explore the issue of national identities (Smith, 1991. p.14). In discussing the law, we may also uncover clues that might reveal the cultural will that exists among Taiwan's people, cultural representatives and government. Faced with the dilemmas of having to democratise and being heavily criticized for its inability to save the cinematic culture that is disappearing day by day, the Taiwan government has allowed the cinematic market to pretty much run by itself. On the other hand, it handles many of the support measures for the Taiwanese cinema industry at the same time. Firstly, we can see how the government emphasizes the importance of the potential cultural influences inherent in cinematic activities,
officially stating in the Cultural Development Policy White Paper, proposed by Cultural Development and Cultural Affairs Council, that, “Cinema is always to reflect and interpret diversity in society; it is a microcosm of national culture” (Cultural Development and Cultural Affairs Council, 2002, on line).

In the Thirty-ninth Article of the Cinema Act of the Republic of China, it states that “cinematic enterprise belongs to cultural activity, and the government’s central management organisation should provide support measures”. Among them is the measure “to guide participation in international film festivals” (GIO, 2001b, p.250). From this, we infer that to allow films made in Taiwan to appear at international level supports the government’s diplomatic missions in business and cultural terms. After a long period of isolation from the United Nations, the Taiwan government has found that participating in international film festivals has given the Republic of China some international presence since the early 1980s. However, what has been the international response, such as at film festivals, to Taiwan’s cultural will?

(1) Issues Pertaining to Participation in International Film Festivals and the Definition of the Domestically-produced Film

In order to give practical support to Taiwanese films with regard to international film festivals, the Government Information Office has introduced “Awarding Measures for National Films and Filmmakers to Participate in International Film Festivals” and “Awarding Measures for Corporate Films made by Trans-Nationals to Participate in International Film Festivals” (GIO, 2001b). The third Article of the
former set of Measures arranges international film festivals into four categories, and makes different levels of awards if films are nominated and/or awarded by them. Nominations and awards at primary international film festivals (e.g. Cannes, Venice, Berlin and the Oscars) will result in their films and filmmakers being awarded the highest levels of bonus and grants. Meanwhile, the Taiwan government also covers the expenses of filmmakers who are invited to international film festivals, or participate in them on their own terms. This encouragement only applies to nationally produced films, that is, Taiwanese films (GIO, 2001b, pp.291-95). However, where films are made with trans-national cooperation, the measures below are applied.

The Third Article of the “Awarding Measures for Corporate Films made by Trans-Nationals to Participate in International Film Festivals” states that films qualifying for a government award should:

1. Participate in an international film festival under the name of the Republic of China (or Taiwan).
2. Have more than one-third of capital investment from domestic companies; but if films are made under cooperation in the ‘free areas’ of the nation (meaning Taiwan, Pen Hu Islands, Kinman and Matsu Islands), the capital investments from domestic companies can be half that.
3. Ensure that one-third of those participating in the filmmaking (including producer, director, scriptwriter, main characters and supporting characters) should be domestic filmmakers (Ibid, p.297).
produced, national and foreign films, we find that there are inconsistencies in defining domestically produced (or Taiwanese) films.

Item 8 of Article 2 of the Cinema Act states that “a domestic film is a film that is produced by a film-making company which has been established and is run domestically, and is written, directed, and cast by people from the Republic of China and performed using the national language”. Item 9 of the same Article of the Act states that “a national film means a film produced, spoken or dubbed in the national language of the Republic of China”. Item 10 states that “a foreign film means a film that excludes domestically produced and national films mentioned in the above” (Ibid).

Here it is interesting and ironic that films from Hong Kong are also categorized as “national films”; even though Hong Kong is technically a foreign land. This validates the observation by Smith, which is that Oriental culture (here we are specifically referring to the case of Taiwan) is about blood-inheritance, not about place of birth. Since Hong Kong is regarded as a foreign land rather than a territory of the Republic of China abroad, the territorial sovereignty discourse of the Republic of China should not include Hong Kong. Therefore, on the territorial map of the Republic of China, Hong Kong should not appear.

Additionally, Article 5 of “The Permission Measures for Film Imports and
majority investor where trans-national or multi-national corporations make it.

However, if the film’s leading cast members (leading actors, actresses and support characters) have the same nationality and more than half of the remaining cast have the same nationality, then the film can be categorized based on the nationality of the majority of cast members”. “The film’s required capital investment from the Republic of China can be halved if the film is made in cooperation between filmmakers from the Republic of China and foreigners where it is made in the ‘free areas’ of the nation” (Ibid, pp.274-5).

Based on the government regulations above, a film’s nationality can be judged thus. Firstly, it is based on the nationality of the film’s production company if that has investment from only one country. However, if a film is made with multi-national cooperation, the nationality of the film is based on the majority investor’s nationality as well as the nationality of the leading cast members and the majority of the overall cast. The latter condition takes precedence when judging a film’s nationality.

According to the above, if a film is made cooperatively with investment from the Republic of China and foreign capital and filmed in Taiwan, and if the capital investment from the Republic of China is more than one-quarter of the total investment, that film can be defined as domestically produced. However, this differs from the definition of the domestically produced film in the Cinema Act of the Republic of China, which should have legal precedence. In other words, the suppo
cultural will of the administrative government.

Also, if we try to compare the “Permission Measures for Film Imports and Production” and the “Awarding Measures for Corporate Films made by Trans-Nationals to Participate in International Film Festivals”, we find more differences with regard to the interpretation of a film’s nationality. In order to encourage more films and filmmakers to participate in international film festivals, the criteria for identifying a film’s nationality has been changed or interpreted differently. In other words, if a film has at least one-sixth of its capital investment from the Republic of China, it will be regarded as a domestically produced film. Again, this definition differs from that in the Cinema Act, which stipulates that domestic investment should be at least one-half of the total, while the Measures for Film Imports and Production only require a quarter of domestic investment. The required amount of leading and supporting actors and actresses is also reduced from one-half to one-third.

From the analysis above, we can see that the government’s cultural will has resulted in a loosening-up of how a film’s nationality is defined to enable greater participation of domestically produced films in international film festivals, thereby seeking to increase the representation of Taiwan internationally.

From the discussions above, we now see how different the cultural wills expressed among the people, government and the representatives of the people can
By discussing the marketing problems for Taiwanese films, it appears that foreign films, especially films from Hollywood, have almost defeated the confidence of Taiwan’s filmmakers in the marketplace.

To encourage Taiwanese filmmakers to continue making cultural movies, the Taiwan government has supported domestically produced films openly through the public purse since 1989, under an arrangement known as the “Support Funds for Domestic Film Production”. According to a report on the film market carried out by Lu Fei Yi in 2002, the budget of the Funds has increased from $50,000,000 NT in 1989 to 120,000,000 NT dollars in 1997 to support the production of domestic films. However, the share of the film market for Taiwanese films has not revived and has even worsened year on year. In 1998 and 1999 respectively, Taiwanese films only occupied 0.44% and 0.46% of the market share (Lu, F. Y., 2002, on line).

On this matter, the chairperson of the Taipei City Film Enterprise Association, Wang Yin Hsian, stated that:

The management crisis in the Taiwanese cinema business has been overlooked for many years by the Support Funds for Domestic Film Production. The adjudication of the Funds serves those films that were made for international film festivals, and the cultural elite determine which films get funded. There are just one or two people representing the cinema business on the Funds committee, and it has no influence on the decision-making (Wang, Y. H., 1998, in Min Daily News, 9.4, p.15).
The films that are encouraged and supported by the Funds are those that promote anti-morality and exaggerate historical pain” (Wang, Y. H., in Sheng Daily News, 9.4, p.15). Wang here is implying the films directed by Hou Hsien, Wang Tung and Tsai Ming Liang. Having already looked at the films of Hou and Wang in previous chapters, I will discuss Tsai’s films from a post-modern perspective in the next chapter.

What Wang Yin Hsian and Liou Li Hsin are criticizing are those cultural elites or intellectuals who hold sway over the allocation of support funds and therefore the evolution of Taiwanese filmmaking; and, that is what is making the marketing such a difficult task today. It is one thing to say that those films that are supported by the government are great achievements and frequently win prizes abroad, but they are not well received at all well by the domestic audience.

The Eighth Article of the “Rules for Support Funds for Domestic Film Production” states that the film producer, executive producer, scriptwriter and director should come from the Republic of China, as well as at least half of the people participating in the film’s production. If this is true, it is appropriate to look at the films of the director, Tsai Min Liang, and his films Neon God (1993), The River (1997), The Hole (1998). Tsai is well known at European international film festivals, but he does not hold the Identification Card of the Republic of China. His nationality is Malay, but he makes films in Taiwan. The chairperson of the Taipei Film Enterprises
stating that the film *Neon God* had earned a commendable reputation at an
ternational level and the government should cherish talented filmmakers, like Tsai.
As a result, he referred Wang’s complaint to the Overseas Chinese Committee (OCC) of the Administration cabinet to explain Tsai’s case. According to the OCC’s explanation, if someone’s parent(s) hold the nationality of the Republic of China or she may be regarded as also coming from the Republic of China, even if he or she was born abroad. From the explanation of the OCC, then, Tsai could be regarded as having the correct nationality criteria to be awarded money from the Support Fund to make films in Taiwan.

Also, the same rules state that all films supported by the Funds should be made in the 35mm film format. Another film producer, Mei Chang Kuen, objected that the film *The Hole*, again directed by Tsai Ming Liang, was made in the Super 16mm format, and only transferred onto 35mm film when handed to the Government Information Office for inspection. Mei demanded that the government should take back the $10,000,000 NT subsidy from Tsai and his film company for their violation of the regulations (*The China Times*, 1998, 9.6, p.26; *Min Shen Daily News*, 1998, p.10). Although faced with this accusation from other filmmakers, Tsai and his film company managed again to have the government’s interpretation of the regulations contorted. The process of copying film from 16mm to 35mm formats was interpreted by the Government Information Office as being a legitimate way of making 35mm
interpretation of its own regulations. Ambiguities in the law, or other rules and regulations, are often exploited depending on a nation’s political climate. This particular case also reveals the fact that one of the Taiwan government’s most important strategies is to make every effort to be represented in the international community at events such as film festivals.

Showing Taiwanese films at such international occasions is one way in which Taiwan is represented in the international community, sometimes under the name the Republic of China. Therefore, to encourage films that represent Taiwan, or the Republic of China, to participate in international film festivals, no matter who names them, is one of the government’s important acts of cultural diplomacy; and, its importance takes precedence over the taste of the domestic cinema audience. Put another way, the support funds for filmmaking serve to enhance Taiwan’s international status in political or cultural terms, rather than the formation of domestic cultural identity.

If we look at the findings of the Foreign Activities Ministry of the Taiwan government, the importance of cultural diplomacy to Taiwan might become clearer. The following table reflects the real situation of Taiwan’s diplomacy.
In Table 5-7, based on the findings by the Foreign Activities Ministry of the Taiwan government, we can see there are only 27 countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan among more than 200 countries in the world. In 98 of the countries that have no diplomatic relation with Taiwan, there are offices of the Taiwan government that deal with economic or cultural activities abroad. However, only 84 of them are permitted to use the name Republic of China, while 84 are permitted to use the name Taipei, and the remaining one is permitted to be known as the “Chinese Travel Agency” in Hong Kong. Although these offices are there to represent the Taiwan government abroad, we can see most other countries’ governments do not accept its nation’s preferred name of the Republic of China. Even its geographical name, Taiwan, seems to be hidden from view from the international political map due to Communist China’s objection.

To refer to the nationality of Taiwan is not even accepted in the American cinematic academies and institutions. For example, when Taiwan applied to be a member of the International Federation of Film Archives (FIAF) in Los Angeles in 1992, the name “National Taiwan Film Archive” that Taiwan tried to use was forbidden to be changed to the “Chinese Taipei Film Archive”, and even then, the FIAF on
of the archive translates as the “National Taiwan Film Archive”, but it is still officially known as the “Chinese Taipei Film Archive” in English. Again, even the apparent neutrality of its geographical name, that is, Taiwan, seems to be politically problematic for the many countries that try to avoid or neglect the issue.

(3). The Issues of Film Distribution and Culture Exchanges

As already stated above, the dominance exerted by American films in terms of their market share in Taiwan has established a kind of cultural hegemony through highly developed technology and capital investment. However, Taiwan’s film distributors as well as other foreign cinema owners are also involved in this situation. For example, to help Taiwan filmmakers to resolve the problem that many of them are unable to get cinemas to screen domestically produced films, the Taiwan government has made a budget allocation of 15,000,000 NT dollars each year since 1997 to subsidise cinema owners that screen Taiwanese films. Before the 1980s, there were seven cinema-chains that screened nationally produced films in Taipei, but they disappeared in the 1990s. From this, we can see how difficult it is to find places to show domestic films today.

One year into the programme, and no cinema applied for any subsidy. This means that the cinema owners would rather screen foreign films than Taiwanese ones. T
judged by the government. Therefore, the GIO decided to authorise related cinem
organisations, like the Taipei Cinemas Association, to process applications on Au
4 1998 (Min Shen Daily News, 1998, 8.5, p.15). The original government idea of
supporting seven to eight cinemas to form a cinema-chain to screen nationally
produced films was revised, such that only two cinemas were selected but the tot
budget allocation was divided in half all the same. Only through the lure of great
economic benefits to induce more cinema owners to apply, presumably, would the
policy become a success (The Liberty Times, 1998, 9.10, p.30). This meant that each
 cinema owner selected would get 7,500,000 NT dollars as a consequence of this
programme.

However, from the author’s inquiries to the Senior Adviser of the GIO, Che
Juen Che, who is now the Deputy Director of the Cinema Department of the GIO,
January 8 of 1999, we learn that the situation has hardly improved. In other wor
again, no cinema owner is applying for this subsidy, as they still prefer to be part
of a cinema chain that shows foreign, particularly American, films rather than nation
produced ones. Logically, if the main goal of business is to pursue the greatest
economic prize, then Taiwan’s cinema owners are not any different. In other wor
stay part of a cinema chain showing foreign films may result in greater economic
benefits than government subsidies might yield. As Ji Wen Chang’s study of
Hollywood movies makes clear, many major Hollywood studios produce 15 to 2
long-term audience stability in the cinema marketplace. This is a typical vertical integrated market, from production to distribution and public screening (Ji, W. C. H., 1999, pp.91-95).

As we can see, continuously making movies, even if they are unable to make huge profits, needs an enormous amount of financial investment. Compared with Hollywood, Taiwan’s cinema industry is in a considerably inferior state in terms of technological and capital investment. However, to state that the cultural imperialism inherent in Hollywood films is just about technology and capital would present an incomplete picture. For example, as discussed, cinema owners, government, filmmakers, and audiences all contribute to this manifestation of cultural imperialism in addition to foreign film distributors. Meanwhile, when studying cultural imperialism, what is being communicated in, and by, films needs exploring. Lii Ding-Tzann argues that Hollywood movies often convey a message that American heroes rescue our world, making other countries’ people appear inferior. This aspect of cultural imperialism certainly demands critiquing (Lii, D. T., 1996).

5. Summary:

From the above historical explorations, we clearly see that more than 75% of Taiwan film market is dominated by the American cinema industry, with other f
reflected in the number of Taiwanese films being shown at international film festivals and receiving awards, certainly as far as the government’s statistics are concerned. This latter phenomenon is predictably related to the government’s support measures. Therefore, those films and filmmakers that are supported from the planning and production stages to their participation in international film festivals emphasise the extent of government involvement in this area. It is a pity, though, that Taiwanese films promote cultural diplomacy at high profile international cinematic occasions in the same way as Hollywood films play a diplomacy role for America (Chi, L. J., 1995, pp.18-23; Fon, J. S., 1999, pp.14-17), but they are not well received by audiences back in Taiwan.

Meanwhile, we also discover the diversity of Taiwan’s cinematic organisation. If we consider the concept of cultural will as proposed by John Tomlinson. Firstly, with a collapsing film market, Taiwan’s film production enterprises insist that the government should take action to save it from total extinction. Secondly, with regard to film distribution and screening enterprises, we also find that almost all the domestic film distributors trade in foreign films; whereas, the seven cinema chains that showed national films in the 1980s stopped doing so by the 1990s, while their major business today is screening foreign films. Even where the Taiwan government is prepared to generously subsidise cinema owners, the latter still prefer to maintain their contracts with Hollywood film distributors. In this way, Taiwan cinema owners are clearly
guarantee profit for every film but it can result in enormous financial rewards for a single box office smash (even if it is uncertain). Consequently, Taiwan’s cinema owners reject government subsidy and continue to sign contracts with foreign film distributors to have their market share of these uncertain, but potentially great profits (Ji, W. C., 1999, pp.91-95). Apparently, the cultural will of cinema owners is totally inconsistent with the expectations of government.

From a legislative perspective, the cultural will of legislators, who are expected to represent the people’s opinion, is seemingly in line with Taiwan’s film production enterprises, which seek to protect the national cinematic culture. But they do not scrutinise the government’s administrative functions effectively in this area, so there exist great differences between the legislative and administrative departments of the government.

Fourthly, we also discover that the Executive Details of the Cinema Act of the Republic of China, along with many other support measures enacted by the government’s administrative departments, apparently violate the ‘mother’ law, the Cinema Act of the Republic of China, which was enacted by legislators. Moreover, the administrative department of the government achieves its cultural diplomacy missions and enforces the people’s national identity through administrative orders rather than through the revision of cinema laws. As we have discussed in previous sections, many cinematic support initiatives have changed or distorted the definition
cinemas (GIO, 2001b, pp.257-73). However, that order is not written or implied by the ‘mother’ law. If we take a closer look at the lyrical content of the national anthem of the Republic of China, we can see how the nationalist party, the KMT, whose regime held sway on Taiwan between 1949 and 2000, enforced the people’s national identity through the national anthem. The first line of the national anthem says, “The Three Principles of the People are Our Party’s Aim”, the party being the KMT. In this way, the party’s song thus becomes the national anthem of the Republic of China. Loyalty to the party has merely transferred to mean loyalty to the nation here. What this actually foregrounds is the relationship between the legislators and the administrative departments. It thus comes as no surprise to learn that more than 60 percent of the legislators belong to the nationalist party. In fact, they cooperate more than scrutinise. The conflicts pointed out between the legislative and administrative departments of the government are in effect not conflicting at all.

Today, playing the national anthem in audio and visual formats is no longer obligatory in venues where films are screened. The version of the national anthem is now played before films is only instrumental, introduced after the Democratic Progressive Party came to power in 2000.

Lastly, we find that the cultural will of the audience tends to accept foreign, especially films from Hollywood, and reject domestic films. Whether in terms of
The mental self-abasement resulting from scientific and economic factors, intellectual differentials and encourages identification with the value-system of the colonialist. This exacerbates the difficulties that are known to cause economic deprivation (cited in Ji W. C., 1999, p.93).

From the viewpoint of Adorno, cultural imperialism may mean that films are produced by standardised means of industrialisation. Film genres could be an example (cited in Liou, C. H., 1993, pp.173-203). Those standardised films, full of hero worship, should be critiqued according to Lii Ding-Tzann. He argues that the standardisation of the film’s cultural content and the content analysis of the film keys to unlocking the discourse of cultural imperialism (Lii, D. T., 1996, pp.14).

In the next chapter, another textual analysis of Taiwanese films made in the 1990s is carried out in terms of how post-modernity has responded to issues of nationalism.
relationship to issues of national identity as reflected in Taiwanese films. Firstly, I consider the features and definitions of post-modernism, as well as nationalism. I will use the notion of the self-reflexivity of modernity, as proposed by Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck to discuss Taiwan’s national identity as reflected in films *Good Men, Good Women, The River* and *The Hole*. Meanwhile, by discussing the relationship between post-modernism and national identity in this chapter, I am concerned with the possibilities of other cultural discourses or narratives that might coexist at the same time in Taiwan. Therefore, the content of this chapter will be as follows:

1. Rethinking nationalism, and the features and definitions of post-modernism
2. The cultural movement of post-modernity
3. The new modernity, or the self-reflexivity of modernity
4. Moral reflexivity in the post-modern era

1. Rethinking Nationalism, and the Features and Definitions of Post-modernism

Nationalism, it could be said, is a form of discourse designed to operationalise people’s ideology to stabilise a nationalist regime through strengthening national identity in return for economic and other social benefits, and those related discursive activities might be manipulated by a dominant group within society. As Lu Jian...
When Martial Law, which lasted from 1947 to 1987 and the “Temporary Laws for the Period of Lawlessness and Disorder”, which was in operation from 1945 to 1950, were ended, the KMT nationalist regime in Taiwan introduced a new type of nationalism. In the discussion about language use and the interpretation of historical events in Chapters II and III, we found that there were at least two kinds of nationalist motives during the 1990s. One emanates from the dominant political group, the KMT regime, and the other emanates mainly from the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), as well as literary and cinematic culture groups. So, coming from the position of political, economic or cultural impotence, a nationalist movement and its activities may actually refer to an anti-domination ideology. Here, we might even call it a post-modernist movement.

Post-modernism has been expressed in different narratives in areas like politics, the economy, culture and aesthetics. In political terms, post-modernism rejects the dominance by any authoritarian hierarchy, which includes populist patriotism and loyalty to the nation as discoursed by oppressive groups, and questions the legitimacy of any government appealing to the “grand narrative”, as defined by Jean-François Lyotard, of national and universal unity. Instead of this grand narrative, “little narratives” can be used to oppose authoritarianism (cited in Sim, ed. 1998, pp.210-211). However, Homi Bhabha questions the notion of a unitary identity, not by binary

后现代将建立在现代的基础之上，将不可描述的内容在表现形式上展现出来；不承认它作为安慰的形式，共识的品味，这使人们能够分享对无法获得的怀旧感；寻求新的呈现，不是为了享受它们，而是为了强调对不可描述的呈现（Lyotard, 1984, p.81）。

根据弗雷德里克·詹姆逊，后现代特征出现在资本主义发展的不同阶段。根据恩斯特·曼德尔的研究，詹姆逊认为资本主义有三个基本阶段：从1848年的“市场竞争阶段”；垄断阶段”或“帝国主义阶段”从1890年代；“我们的，错误描述为后工业，但可能更好被称为跨国资本”从1940年代（cited in Jameson, 1991, p.340）。
post-modern features as having a new depthlessness, which means that depth relations are replaced by a conception of practices, discourses, textual play, surface and text.

History is not as the real, but as representation, as pastiche. Jameson also argues that a radical break occurred between modernism and post-modernism (cited in Saruyama, pp.95-6). However, Anthony Giddens disagrees with the view of the replacement of modernity by the post-modern. Giddens argues that:

The disjunctions that have taken place should rather be seen as resulting from the self-clarification of modern thought, as the remnants of tradition and providential outlooks are cleared away. We have not moved beyond modernity, but are living precisely through a phase of its radicalisation (Giddens, 1991, p.51).

Essentially, both Jameson’s and Giddens’s arguments are chronologically precise as to characterise modernity or post-modernism. Giddens’ observations are of technological advancement and knowledge accumulation, while Jameson focuses on economic and artistic development. However, the social phenomenon of modernity and post-modernity might have coexisted within the same society much earlier than the Enlightenment. For example, the invention of the printing press could embrace concepts from both modernity and post-modernity in terms of its technological and cultural considerations. If this is the case, Lyotard’s observation on the issue of modernity and post-modernity might be accurate. He thinks that the relationship
2. The Cultural Movement and an Analysis of the Film, *Good Men, Good Women*

When looking at Taiwan’s cultural movement, we have to go back to the with the recognisable start of the literary movement known as “Hsiang tu”, or indigenous literature. With stories from the land where the Taiwanese live instead stories from China, this type of literature tries to document the Taiwanese experience that had been overlooked or suppressed by the Taiwan government for a long time. Wang Chian Long’s study of the curriculum in Taiwanese primary schools shows that the name of Taiwan does not have legitimacy in school textbooks, and it rarely appears in teaching materials from the first grade to the fifth grade. Likewise, the word “Taiwanese” never appears (Wang, C. L., 1998, p.43). Therefore, in response to this situation, Taiwanese literature has started to embrace the thoughts of Taiwan people and their relationship with the land, but not just to oppose Chinese culture (I will discuss *Good Men, Good Women* later in this chapter for this argument).

In searching for a contradictory ideology within official historical discourses, it could be said that the strategy of Taiwanese filmmakers is to take advice from transformed “Archaeology” method, proposed by Michel Foucault in his study on knowledge. Foucault suggests that people should not be afraid in searching for shards and chasms on the historical map. The linear-like chronology of official histo
What Foucault argues is not anti-history, but he proposes another way to overcome the historical objectivity that is different from the traditional. Moreover, the status and existence of the ‘other’ are always overlooked and what they say is either denied or intentionally suppressed by traditional history. In fact, for Foucault, to other people, each of us can only be the ‘other’. Based on this kind of belief, to respect the voice of culture of the ‘other’ is one way to overcome the disadvantages in the alienation phenomenon of modernity (cited in Wu, I. C., 2001, p.6). Thus, it can be said Foucault does not really seek to reconstruct the past but to write down his own or history from the position of the ‘other’ (Yang, Y., 1999, p.215).

The film Good Men, Good Women (directed by Hou Hsiao Hsien, 1995) is said to have been made under this kind of consideration. In the official history Taiwan from the 1950s to the 1970s, Taiwan was a bastion of anti-communism world, whose people worked hard with a collective will under the leadership of country’s President, Chiang Kai Shek. The people were all on war alert, ready to back Mainland China. From school, to barracks to the family home, the slogan: Back Against China and Get Back the Lost Land” was daubed everywhere. The film Banana Paradise (directed by Wang Tung, 1989) also features the same slogan.

However, the 1950s was also an era known as the government’s “Terroristic Governance”. “Nearly 5,000 people were sentenced to death and more than 1,6
the director Hou Hsiao Hsien in the documentary film, A Portrait of Hou Hsien (directed by French director Oliver Assayas, 1997). Good Men, Good Women
(by Hou Hsiao Hsien, 1995) blends historical background in a paradoxical way;
memory. There are three storylines in Good Men, Good Women. A girl named
narrates the story. In the film, Liang Jin is currently an actress consumed by her
memories. She also plays the role of Chiang Bi Yu, who was a real political per
Taiwan. Meanwhile, Liang Jin is also shown as a showgirl three years earlier.
The woman plays all three characters, Liang Jin, the actress, the showgirl, and the
figure Chiang Bi Yu. The storyline essentially narrates the life of Chiang Bi Yu
husband, Lu Hou Dong, who was also a real figure in Taiwan. Their suffering
place during the ‘Terrorism Governance’ period of Taiwan during the 1950s.
 begins in the late Japanese colonisation period in Taiwan, when a group of Ta
young people are shown denouncing Japan’s occupation of China since 1937
decide to join the Chinese nationalist army. When they land in China’s south
province, Guangdung, they are investigated about their intentions and loyalty
regards their joining the army. Due to the language difference, a translator makes
communication possible between the investigator and the young Taiwanese. A
being investigated one by one, Chiang Bi Yu, her husband and all other com
suddenly and very unexpectedly put in leg irons for being regarded as Japanese.
Sometime after, though, an official from another military camp rescues them
KMT, loses the civil war and retreats to Taiwan in 1949, Lu and his fellow townsmen publish a newspaper called 《Kuan Min Bao》 (The Light) to advocate democracy.

However, when the KMT comes to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT government enforces an oppressive governance of the people, and Lu’s newspaper is banned and all those connected with the newspaper are caught, with most of them sentenced to death. Lu himself, therefore, is arrested and executed. After months of imprisonment, his wife, Chiang Bi Yu, is freed due to her lack of involvement.

The second storyline is about the past life of Liang Jin and her boyfriend, Chiang Bi Yu. Liang Jin used to be a showgirl, but three years after her boyfriend is shot dead in a dance hall, she becomes an actress. The third storyline is about her current life, that of an actress, one who often lives life in chaos caressed by her sweet, but also painful, memory of when she was with her boyfriend. In short, the three storylines in 《Good Women》 concern the happier times in the life of Liang Jin and her boyfriend, painful memories of her life as an actress and the life of Chiang Bi Yu and her husband Lu Hou Dong.

However, those storylines are randomly pieced together, to reflect the fractured state of the present-day Liang Jin’s memory, hardly making any sense. The actress sometimes has to memorize the earlier happiness she had with her boyfriend when she in fact a thug, and occasionally drifts into becoming Chiang Bi Yu. All these fragments are layered like three maps, interweaving and overlapping, each one
official version of history and the discourse that is based on this mode of historical interpretation. To the search for knowledge, those pieces of historical detail span exist side by side. In other words, we should also consider non-linear information fragments that exist in space, when we pursue knowledge, which could be regarded as a kind of democratic pluralism (Hsieh, C. F. and Chiu, C. M., 2001, 111-121). Although it is impossible to get a complete picture of history from Foucault's argument, it does not necessarily mean that post-modernism is without an ideal of our world. But we can still argue that any ideal picture should also consist of voices of the other where it has been suppressed by the dominant ideology.

From the point of view of hybridisation in post-modern society, the film character Liang Jin, embodies the mixing of fragments of memory and her current life. The story-within-a-story nature of Good Men, Good Women is a hybrid concept made of falsehood (Ah Wei and Liang Jin’s life), and the real (Chiang Bi Yu and her husband life) becoming more fake (after Chiang Bi Yu’s death) than ever before. In addition, the duality of the showgirl and historical figure is realised in part by the fact that the actress in film portrays both roles. Similarly, Liang Jin’s boyfriend, Ah Wei, a thug, Chiang Bi Yu’s husband, Lu Hou Dong, an intellectual, have the same importance to Liang Jin, for they both feature in the fragmented memory of the same girl, Liang Jin. What is being said here is that the voice of both the thug and the intellectual in should be heard no matter how real or fake they are. From this point of view, if
hybridity that allows one to speak for the other, no matter how real or fake they are. Thus, it champions a more ideal view of our world where the central group in power empathises with the marginalized, less powerful group and speaks for them to compensate for the latter's inability to represent themselves.

In terms of language use, Good Men, Good Women delineates a picture of Taiwan's post-modern phenomenon, which corresponds to Donna Haraway's "cyborgianisation" concept (cited in Liao, H. H., 1999). According to Haraway, a cyborg is "a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction" (Haraway, 1991, p.149). Haraway notes that we all became cyborgs by the late twentieth century. "The cyborg is a condensation of two images of imagination and material reality, the two joined centres structuring any possibility of historical transformation" (Ibid, p.150). The cyborg "is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy and perversion" (Ibid, p.151) Drawing on Haraway, Liao Hsian Hou thinks that nationalism and post-modernity developed simultaneously in Taiwan to deal with the historical fact that Taiwan's international struggle to become an independent country was worse than ever. The integrated development of nationalism and post-modernity made Taiwan a place of hybridity (Liao, H. H., 1999, pp.110-111). The cultural complications of hybridity became clearer in the 1990s, though, when the opportunity arises to develop what Haraway...
Taiwanese, thus employing the hybridity of the post-modern types of Taiwanese to question extreme nationalism (Jiang Y. H., 1998, p.209).

Take the example of the language used by Liang Jin in *Good Men, Good Women* where she speaks in Japanese, Taiwanese, Mandarin and English in a very fluent convincing way, depending on the situation and to whom she is speaking. This might be what Bhabha refers to as a kind of cultural hybridity in pluralism. However, hybridity alone might be insufficient in explaining Taiwan’s real situation on the use of language. Haraway’s “cyborgisation”, then, could be more appropriate to describe the new language use in Taiwan today. As Liao Hsian Hou puts it:

Taiwan is a non-place (neither a nation nor a province; neither China nor China; neither an island nor a mainland), and at the same time it is also a place where many kinds of culture converge. In addition to Chinese culture, Taiwan also contains the cultures of the South Islands of the Pacific, Japan, Holland, Spain, America etc. (Liao, H. H., 1999, p.110-1).

Liao suggests that Taiwan really needs a better framework of discourse to fully grasp the potentiality of its hybridised society and the meaning of post-modernism such as post-structuralism. Its concrete action therefore becomes apparent and potentially helps Taiwan to move on its own course (Ibid.).

Liao tries to employ the cyborgian practice as a strategy for Taiwan’s social...
In Good Men, Good Women, we also see Liang Jin has cyborgian character terms of the use of language. She uses different languages depending on whom she speaks to. Basically, she uses Japanese to communicate with her father and mixes Mandarin and Taiwanese to communicate with her peer group. For example, when she warns her boyfriend Ah Wei not to fight with other people anymore, she says, “with this kind of temper [in Mandarin], will be killed [in Taiwanese]”. This kind of language use, where two languages are used within the same sentence, also appears in the dialogue of her sister’s husband, when he threateningly demands protection from some business people, saying that, “If you don’t give me the money [in Mandarin], I will shut down your store [in Taiwanese]”. We also see the same situation in the Super Highway Closed (directed by Ho Ping, 1998). Undeniably, Taiwan’s society not only already has multi-language use, but also is seeking to create a new form of language use within society. In other words, this new form of language use in cyborgian terms is expanding as we speak. However, one caution here is that without understanding the cultural position of the other, the meaning of the content within mixed language use might be misunderstood or misinterpreted.

For example, elderly people may only use one single language, whether Mandarin or Taiwanese, and therefore become ostracized due to language differences, on top to be understood by their own peer group. I would not like to say this situation from the post-modernity of pluralism but rather results from two extremes of
important cultural policies. But things have started to change in Taiwan. When the Democratic Progress Party came to power in 2000. That does not necessarily mean that the Mandarin language will be marginalized in Taiwanese society. Instead, many of the ethnic languages, such as Taiwanese, Hakainese, and the aboriginal languages, are now offered as selective courses in schools, which was never the case with the KMT government, who always suppressed other languages in line with its Mandarin hegemonic ideology. However, although the DPP has political control, it has not suppressed the use of Mandarin in revenge. This insistence on cultural pluralism has not result in a more tolerant world because, ultimately each language is only the other's the position of the other, and therefore there is no reason to marginalize Mandarin in Taiwanese society today.

With regard to encouraging foreigners to take up one of Taiwan’s languages, Taiwan employs the same strategy of hybridisation in trying to find a way of preserving learning that lies between the two extremes of nationalism. The Taiwan government now advocates a system called the “General Use Phonetic Spelling System”, created by the Academia Sinica of Taiwan. It is based on Roman characters and can be used to pronounce more than 90% of all languages used in Taiwan (Lai, M. D., et al., 1991, p.42). Again, Taiwan has found its own solution to the dilemma of balancing it to become part of the international community as quickly as possible with securing cultural subjectivity. If it adopted the “Hanese Pinyin System”, the phonetic sp
Committee voted on the issue, there were 14 votes for the use of the “General Chinese Phonetic System” among 27 counselors, while 6 voted for the “Hanese Pinyin System”. The rest were either absent or did not vote (The Liberty Times, 2000, 10, 7, p.8). This result shows again that the Taiwan government’s cultural policy cuts through the issue of cultural hegemony. To insist on cultural autonomy is one thing, but to be part of an international community is more important. Haraway’s cyborgian theory can be applied to Taiwan’s case here. We could also define it as “Post-modern Nationalism”, as subjectivity is not pure but instead refers to a kind of hybridised subjectivity in Taiwan.

The former chair of the Democratic Progress Party, Hsu Hsin Liang, advocates the idea of the Taiwanese being a new ethnic group in the world, and says that “because modern Taiwanese do not believe in purity and legitimacy and easily accept different cultures, they deserve to be defined as a new ethnic cultural group” (cited in Chiu Kuei Fen, 1995, p.126). Similarly, Liao Chou Yang proposes the “empty subject” strategy to construct the discourse of post-modernity in Taiwan. He thinks that the key to keeping the subjectivity with the realms of possibility in life is to let subject become nothing, first (cited in Chiu Kuei Fen, 1999, conference paper). He also points out the difference between traditional Chinese culture and contemporary Taiwanese culture. Liao Yang argues that, if Taiwanese culture is the opposite of traditional Chinese culture at this moment in time, it is because Taiwanese culture is looking outward, while Chinese culture demands that it looks inward (Ibid). However, as Chiu Kuei Fen warns,
This ought to be discussed from the perspective of the self-reflexivity of post-modernity and modernity.

3. The Death of Truth in Post-Modernity and the Self-Reflexivity of Modernity

One of the characteristics of post-modernity might be to doubt, even deny, the existence of the truth. The post-modernist gives up looking for essentiality and end, opposes the discourse of essentialism (Hong, Y. C., and Chen, H. M., 200... The truth cannot be recognised nor believed, and all that we know is constructed of fragments of our imagination, thoughts or memory. The post-modernists do not in the existence of only one truth in the world because truth cannot be seen clearly, the concept of there being “only one truth” smacks of an essentialist discourse. may mean that the enlightenment’s concept of knowledge, which declares the exist of truth and its universality, is in fact organised and maintained through narrati also means that the value of the object is in ‘the eye of the beholder’, as it were therefore there is no absolute truth (Ibid, pp.3-7). Everything appears in fragments and incomplete. In this sense, the representation of history becomes unfeasible, esp when the authorized narrative is in relation to memory. Even memory is fragm

As for the issue of memory in post-modernity, Michel Foucault stated in a interview that:
... dll. The meaning, the progress of knowledge, the popular was, to a certain extent, even more alive, more clearly formulated in the 19th century, where, for instance, there was a whole tradition of struggles that were transmitted orally, or in writing or songs, etc. (Foucault, 1989, p.91).

If those films about historical interpretation made by filmmakers like Hou Hsien, Wu Nieh-Chen, Wang Tong etc., reflect what Foucault refers to as “popular memory”, this would be problematic for Taiwan today. That’s because, during the 1990s, when the government, for democratic purposes, did not inhibit the means of cultural production such as filmmaking, the “popular memory” issue may be not appropriate for discussion in Taiwan (Wu, C. C., 2000, p.315). Wu Chia Chi thinks it would be more appropriate to say that filmmaking in Taiwan during the 1990s was part of the construction of “cultural memory”, a term coined by Marita Sturken (cited in Chia Chi, 2000, p.315) in preference to popular memory. Marita Sturken defines cultural memory specifically through its distinction from both personal memory and history and says that:

it is a field of contested meanings in which Americans interact with cultural elements to produce concepts of the nation, particularly in events of trauma, where both the structures and fractures of a cultural are exposed (Sturken, 1997, pp.

In addition, Sturken argues that “cultural memory and history are entangled than oppositional” (Ibid, p.5). Sturken also distinguishes her concept of cultural
It is produced through “representation – in contemporary culture often through photographic images, cinema, and television; and these are technology of memory”. Cinematic representations of the past have the capacity to tangle with personal and cultural memory (Ibid, p.8-11). “Cultural memory is not in and of itself a healing process. It is unstable and unreliable” (Ibid, p.259).

Wu Chia Chi suggests that the idea of “cultural memory” may explain why history is reproduced through fragments of memory in both Taiwan’s filmmaking and its history. Cultural memory partly means that the production of memory in popular culture sometimes appears to counter-attack and sometimes to cope with the dominant ideology. In other words, cultural memory may be close to the functional meaning of people’s memory, which champions the official discourse, but the relationship with institutional or the official is ambiguous and uncertain (Wu, C. C., 2000, p.315).

This could be shown by the confession of A City of Sadness director, Hou Hsiao Hsien, in the documentary film A Portrait of Hou Hsiao Hsien. In this documentary film, Hou states that there were several shots that were still too sensitive with regard to official historical interpretation and were edited out by negotiation between the filmmaker, production company and the censoring department at the Government Information Office.

Even so, is Hou not in the business of constructing another type of nationalism that differs from the government’s historical discourse with the tools of film production?
demonstrate how the representation of official history is distorted through the
government’s prism-like discourse. Any kind of national identity constructed by the
prism-like historical narrative is therefore only a construction of the official version
(Lin, W. C., Shen, H. Y. and Lee, C. Y., 2000, pp.16-7). If so, does this personal
historical perspective also represent a kind of nationalist product that attempts to
construct a national identity in opposition to the official one?

On the subject of Good Men, Good Women, Wu Chia Chi takes a different stance,
arguing that the film is made up of private individual memory and national history,
composition of incomplete pieces, fragments, and non-linear narratives which question
the narrow definition of history. Through its fragmented representation of the life of
historical figure, Chiang Bi Yu, and the modern girl, Liang Jin, it moves away from
traditional linear narrative structure. Instead, Good Men, Good Women allows the
audience to construct their own view of history. This film, at the same time, cons.
blurs the line between truth and fiction, and, in so doing, breaks down the border
between individual and collective memory. As it is impossible to get the complete
picture, any representation of history ought to be distrusted. In this way, the film
be regarded as a post-modern text, a reflection of the essence of film and history
fills the void within official historical discourse (Wu, C. C., 2000, pp.303-20).
self-reflexivity (Chen, Y. W., 2000, pp.27-30). It is similar to Giddens’ argument of the modern thought of self-clarification, or what is known as high modernity (Giddens, 1990, p.51). In reference to Giddens, Liou Wei Kong suggests that the period of radicalisation of modernity might be called “second modernity”, to explain the new types of human activity in response to developments such as globalisation, and to cope on the uncertainty and contingency that contribute to continual social change (Liou K., 2000, p.13).

Regarding the factors of uncertainty and contingency implied by Giddens, Beck gives us two perspectives on reflexive modernization. He says that:

In the first view, reflexive modernization is bound in essence to knowledge (reflection) on foundations, consequences and problems of modernization processes, while in the second one … it is essentially tied to the unintended consequence of modernization. In the former case, one could speak of reflexivity (the narrower sense) on modernization, and in the latter of the reflexivity (the broader sense) of modernization (Beck, 1999, p.109).

Beck argues that, ‘The linear modernity of “bigger, faster, more” is at risk of infraction everywhere. The implacable “more” and “faster” of primary modernity collides everywhere with problems, erosion and obstructions it generates’ (Ibid).

Therefore, Beck does think that the accumulation of knowledge by faster and faster means is the route to high modernization, as he says, “manufactured uncer
desired + the familiar = new modernity”. (Beck in Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994, p.5).

From Beck’s statements, there is a focus on the discussion of the desired and the unintended consequence. “Reflexivity does imply reflection but also self-confrontation” (Ibid, p.5).

For Fredric Jameson, the art of film in the post-modern world is “a kind of reflection that might keep history at bay, while those classic storylines have now become allegorical” (Jameson, 1993, p.98). Admittedly Hou Hsiao Hsien’s films, such as Men, Good Women, still deal with history but they are also full of ambiguity on the issue of the truth and reality. However, the films, The River and The Hole, by Taiwanese film director Tsai Ming Liang, have nothing to do with history. These are now discarding from a post-modern perspective.

The film The River (directed by Tsai Ming Liang, 1997) begins when an unemployed young man, Ah Kang, meets one of his female schoolmates, Hsiao Chi, out on the street. Hsiao Chi is working as an assistant to a film production company and invites Ah Kang to where their latest film is being made. On the set, a fake dead body floating up down a river is being filmed, which the director is complaining about because the fake dead body looks too unreal. When the director tries to find a solution to make this fake dead body look more real, Ah Kong is invited to play the role of the dead body.

Hsiao Chi takes Ah Kong to a hotel so he can clean up his body, which, by now, is wet and dirty after playing the role of the dead body in the river. They make love...
A Mandarin-speaking father from Mainland China is gay. Although Ah Kong uses Taiwanese to speak to his mother and Mandarin to speak to his father, his parents never say a single word to each other all through the film.

Ah Kong’s father worries about his son’s illness, trying several avenues around Taiwan to find a cure including doctors, a necromancer, a witch, a soothsayer, a bonesetter, an acupuncturist and masseur, but all to no avail. On one occasion, Ah Kong is in a public bathhouse, for no apparent reason it must be said, and goes into a small restroom where people may go after bathing. The restroom is in pitch black although there is another man in there already. Ah Kong and the other man start to caress each other’s body. All of a suddenly, the other man jumps up to turn on a light. The man turns out, is Ah Kong’s father, who, in a state of shock, slaps his son. They then go to the hotel, where father and son await for a reply from a soothsayer, whom people has amazing magic powers. The father calls the soothsayer, who says they may return home with God’s blessing. We then see Ah Kong walk onto a veranda, the sun blazing, starting to feel remission from his sickness, which is where the story ends.

Ah Kong, then, is possibly a typical cyborgian figure in contemporary Taiwan. Certainly according to Liao Hsian Hao, who says that Taiwan is both “non-Taiwan” and “non-China” (it could also be argued that it is part-Taiwan and part-China and part-place of others). Ah Kong could be also regarded as second-generation Mainland Chinese in Taiwan, the product of two totally opposing nationalisms in terms of
card indicated the holder’s “Ji Kuan”, which means their place of origin and had to be completed on every identification card. Second generation Mainland Chinese were categorised as having the same place of origin as their father. They might have been born and grown up in Taiwan and never left, but to categorise the “Ji Kuan” column this way made their identity more complex in terms of their own recognition and they were made to feel within the ethnic make-up of Taiwanese society. At election times, when debates are aired about excessive nationalism and national identity in Taiwan, their vulnerability forces them to take one side or the other – either they are Chinese but not Taiwanese, or they have to say they are Taiwanese but not Chinese. Thus, their social status and identity in ethnic terms in Taiwan are very close to the description of the cyborgian from Haraway and Liao Hsian Hao. As a consequence of the ethnic diversity in the blood inheritance of Taiwan people, nobody can be said to be a real Chinese or Taiwanese. To argue about the ethnic difference in society, though, is futile and does not advance modernity.

In The River, the identity issue is disguised and expressed, on the surface, through sexual behaviour. This film does not clearly imply that Ah Kong’s undiagnosed disease is the result of portraying the dead body afloat in the river or not. What the audience does see, though, is that he feels very uncomfortable and in pain when he rides a motorcycle home straight after the love-making scene with Hsiao Chi in the hotel. Nobody can cure him of his strange illness until the film’s final section, when he goes
with no facial expression, although the film employs the controversial strategy of having his father caressing his body in a pitch-black restroom to make a very strong impact on the heterosexual issue. We cannot confidently say that Ah Kong and his father are only attracted to men because Ah Kong is shown making love to Hsiao while his father is presumed to have had sexual relations with Ah Kong’s mother at some point. They may be bisexual, though. Moreover, it is at the point where he discovers his father’s sexuality as well as his own (in front of his father, too) that Ah Kong starts to recover from his inexplicable illness. This film, on the surface, then appears to be about heterosexual dominance and the marginalisation of homosexual issues in Taiwan’s society from the self-reflexive perspective of the post-modern. In reality, both homosexuals and bisexuals are marginalized in Taiwan, with only a few people willing to speak out for them. Society would be a better place if all marginalized social groups, such as homosexuals and bisexuals, able to stand up with pride and demand the dignity that The River implies.

Furthermore, it is also a film that deals with cultural identity in terms of language and the subject of cyborgisation, as concealed by the sexuality issue. Two scenes in the film, for instance, reveal Ah Kong’s loneliness and sense of alienation from his parents. While riding his scooter home with his injured neck, he sees his father in a lane near home, tumbling from his scooter. His father runs up to him, asking genuinely about his injury, and says “What’s happened to you, are you alright, are you hurt?” There’s
This film employs the controversial strategy that Liao Hsian Hao suggests for a post-modern cyborgian society of Taiwan. While this strategy initially concerns the interplay of film structures and speeds that are either 'slower than slow' or 'faster than fast', it is reflected back into Taiwanese society so that it can aspire to an international status. This film has less than 150 cuts in about 90 minutes of film time, much slower than in Hollywood films, which usually have more than 1,000 cuts in a film of the same duration. The River, then, adopts the 'slower than slow' narrative strategy to allow the audience to consider what is going on in our society as the alienation phenomenon of modernity, as well as second generation Mainland Chinese people and their political and cultural identity in Taiwan.

Meanwhile, the film The Hole (directed by Tsai Ming Liang in 1998) possesses the allegorical form of self-reflexive post-modernity that Fredric Jameson has observed in post-modern filmmaking. The Hole starts with an announcement on the radio that northern Taiwan will suffer from rain, more torrential than ever before, and it will last for a long time. The radio also predicts this torrent will spread an unknown disease to epidemic proportions by the year 2000. The film moves on to a woman with no job who lives alone in an apartment with a leaky ceiling. She asks a plumber to check the upstairs floor and stop the leak. The plumber needs to get permission, albeit reluc
repaired the hole that he's dug. The downstairs ceiling, however, still has a leak, which becomes heavier day by day due to the heavy rain. The radio announces that many cases of an epidemic have been diagnosed, and its victims are behaving like lunatics, crawling everywhere in search of a place to hide. The radio calls it "Taiwan Fever." The upstairs tenant starts to peer through the hole in his floor onto the woman living downstairs, which eventually becomes a habit. The woman telephones for another plumber to come and fix the upstairs hole. The new plumber arrives, but the woman is not in. Then he goes upstairs and pushes the doorbell. The upstairs tenant is aware that the new plumber has come to repair the hole dug by the previous plumber, but he doesn't want it repaired and pretends not to be home. The plumber leaves. The upstairs tenant wants the hole in his floor to remain because he likes to peer down at the woman downstairs everyday. When this woman is not home, he feels lonely and cries. He makes the hole bigger and bigger until he can put his leg through. He gets a kick out of this game, invented as it were as a consequence of the unexpected heavy rain. However, the woman downstairs contracts the epidemic and feels very sick. She moves along the ground everywhere, trying to hide her body, sobbing. The man upstairs listens to her tears, and passes a cup of water to her through the hole, then gives her his hand and pulls her up through the hole.

There are two minor storylines in The Hole. The first concerns an elderly man who is always looking for an old brand of bean sauce that has not been made for a
her changing mental state, from emptiness, desire, sickness, loneliness and, finally, a feeling of love.

In *The Hole*, these vaudevillian recollections not only refer to Fredric Jameson’s insistence that the post-modern film has an allegorical function, but also remind us of Beck’s formulaic definition of new modernity. According to Beck’s formulaic definition, desired + the familiar = new modernity; and, this kind of new modernity is inscribed with the meaning of the moral self-reflexivity of modernity. In addition, it may also take Liao Hsian Hao’s advice that Baudrilliard’s “accepting the seduction” is one of the ways to enter the moral self-reflexive post-modern world in order to counter-attack the extreme nationalist hegemony (cited in Liao, H. H., 1999). This might be what *The Hole* tries to imply that one of the ways to avoid the extreme nationalism movement is to accept the seduction for entering the moral self-reflexive postmodern world to let our society be more diverse.

**5. Summary:**

If post-modern culture is consciously trying to counterattack the nationalist discourse that imposes the dominant group’s ideology on people’s national identity, then it might apply to Taiwan. Since the 1980s, there have been two types of nationalism in Taiwan. One is to strengthen people’s national identity through the
latter form of nationalism, speaking for the 'other' that has been suppressed by official history. In so doing, historical details that belong to the 'other' can stand alongside the official history. Good Men, Good Women is a good example here. Therefore, I propose that even the post-modern comes with a shattered history, like positive internalised spirits that seek to piece together fragments of memory that have been suppressed intentionally neglected so that they should be part of history too. I agree, then, with director Hou Hsiao Hsien, and call this kind of goal “post-modern nationalism”, a does not intend to suppress others but to speak for those others who are less powerful positioned.

We also find that Tsai Ming Liang’s films, The River and The Hole, reflect many post-modern characteristics of filmmaking. In line with Fredric Jameson’s observation, The Hole is allegorical in structure in order to predict the future. Furthermore, both River and The Hole connect with Baudrilliard’s suggestions of “accepting seduction” and using a “controversial strategy” to create a strong impact. The practice, meanwhile, for cyborgs is “to be slower than slow” (Liao, H. H., 1999, pp.113-4), almost to function in reverse in order to help us see the empty essence of things.

However, if post-modernism insists upon anti-essentialism, there is a conflict because the “empty essence of things” is also a kind of essentialist discourse. Therefore if this kind of anti-essentialist post-modernism is strategic, then it corresponds with
The post-modern society is a society of pluralism, the potential to change, even though the future is unclear, and uncertainty may be destiny. To reduce the uncertainty in facing the future, the “self-reflexivity of post-modern nationalism” could be the solution for Taiwanese society as it deals with its own national and cultural identity in the world.
Colonisation, the ideological hegemony of Taiwan’s language use and historical interpretation from domestic perspective. In addition, how the territorial sovereign discourse influencing government’s cultural policy is discussed as well as how cultural identity is manifest in film market demographics, the Taiwan government having to balance cultural protectionism with progressive democratic politics, particularly as Taiwan enters the international economic and political centre (e.g. WTO) from international perspective. In the final, the debates between post-modernism and the self-reflexivity of modernity in respect of Taiwan’s cinematic activities are examined, mostly after 1989.

From the exploration of Taiwanese cinematic development before 1989 in chapter one, we got a picture of how cinema-going played an important role in the cultivation of the people’s loyalty to the nation as run by a politically oppressive dominant group, such as the Japanese government on Taiwan or the regime of the Chinese nationalist party, the KMT. This picture helps us understand the background as to why Taiwan’s cinematic industry is essentially regarded more as a cultural activity than a commercial enterprise from the government’s perspective, especially after the late 1980s.

In chapter two, we explored how the national language has been defined and underpinned by the government’s dominance. Furthermore, government’s language policy actively plays an important role to construct national identity through the
The government has successfully provided in Taiwanese society. These apparatuses like the Government Information Office, the Education Ministry, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Overseas Chinese Committee, etc., all participate in constructing represented memory; that is, memory as planted by the grand narratives of history according to the political elite, the nationalist KMT regime, not memory that relates to the experience of most Taiwanese. In addition, these two crucial elements, language use and the historical discourse of a nation, work together in the overall construction of national identity.

With regard to the relationship between identity and language use, we have also seen how defining the national language has changed since the late 1980s. The changes are reflected in several ways. For example, the Golden Horse Award, the main film award in Taiwan that has been held by the government since the early 1960s, had previously excluded films not made in the Mandarin language from participating in this film festival. However, this policy changed from the late 1980s, when any film whose nationality belonged to the Republic of China or Taiwan, even if it received international co-operation, could participate in this film festival, no matter what language it used or was dubbed into. What this means, then, is that the definition of what constitutes a national film has changed in terms of language use. The motivating factor behind the government changing its interpretation of the issue of the national language was to gain influence with the international community.
Secondly, we have also seen the changing function of the National Language Development Committee in the Education Ministry. Before the late 1980s, this Committee’s responsibility was to advocate the exclusive use of Mandarin in Taiwanese society, such as in schools, civic life, public organisations, etc. However, since the 1990s, as a consequence of the growing importance of multicultural coexistence in Taiwanese society, this Committee has broadened its remit to include the development of different languages, such as Taiwanese (used by the majority of Hakainese and aboriginal ones. Some policies of redress have been implemented as the establishment of Taiwanese Literature Departments in the university sector since the 1990s, and courses set up to teach Taiwanese, Hakainese and aboriginal languages in elementary schools from 2002. More poignantly, corporal punishment no longer meted out if schoolchildren speak different languages. Therefore, the National Language Committee, which exclusively promoted Mandarin, has been transformed into a multicultural committee. Those communities in Taiwan, whose languages have been marginalised by the hegemonic ideological discourse of Mandarin, have been brought back into the centre, although the use of Mandarin has not been marginalised in the process. Thus, the differences that once existed between the centre and the margins within Taiwanese society have since become unclear, just reflected in Taiwanese films, the hybridity of multi-language use seems to
language use, has become clearer than ever. In other words, a new form of language that mixes different spoken languages within the same sentence has become a standard in Taiwan. What will transpire, potentially, is increasingly imperfect communication, and for anyone who can only use a single language in Taiwan. Thus, the discourse of nationalism for the purpose of unification will be inhibited by the cyborgian paradigm.

If the cyborgian paradigm takes over the practice of daily life, I propose that there are three points with which I would like to argue. First, I also want to argue that the cyborgian paradigm is not a version of post-modernism that rejects any kind of subjective discourse. The cyborgian practice is to deny the way one is being named by others by first admitting to being an illegitimate offspring, and then searching for one’s own individual subjectivity, all of which is dissimilar to post-modernism’s rejection of any discourse of subjectivity.

With regard to the issue of historical memory and identity talked about in three, the Taiwanese people consciously recognise that the official interpretation of history is concerned with the government’s strategy of imposing ideological governance on the people. Taiwanese filmmakers are already challenging the representations of history by depicting political taboos, such as the February 28 Massacre in 1947 and the Terrorist Governance during the 1950s, through the filmmaking and showing to construct people’s popular memory. Those popular
which the people’s collective cultural memory is embraced. A City of Sadness is a clear statement against unjust treatment by the KMT’s governance in Taiwan. In 1993, the Puppet Master, Lee Tian Lu, narrates his family’s experience of Japanese colonisation until the end of World War Two. In particular, this film did not clearly see how he thinks about, interprets or resists the issue of national identity. Lee Tian Lu is just like any other ordinary person in Taiwan standing on their own individual position to narrate their own stories from memory. Good Men, Good Women (1995) shows that individual histories, just like the collective interpretation of grand history, are based on memory too, but are also fragmentary and incomplete. As such, to obtain the full picture of reality or truth is impossible. It is impossible to clarify the line between truth and falsehood would be futile. On the contrary, whether official or the people’s popular memory is expressed in written or oral form, it is all made up from truth, fact, reality or even falsehood. In this respect, the development of Taiwanese society, from the discourses of nationalism to post-modernism since the late 1980s, is reflected in cinematic cultural production. The issues of national identity that were implicated by historical interpretation are being gradually transformed, but from clarity of argument to ambiguity and uncertainty.

In chapter four, we found that the territorial sovereignty discourse is in some conflict with the issue of national identity from both the domestic and international perspectives.
Films made in Hong Kong, Macau and, of course, Taiwan. Consequently, films made by Mainland China are categorised as neither domestic nor foreign but uniquely labeled as from the Mainland. Films made by Hong Kong are categorised as nationally produced films, no longer referred to as domestic since Hong Kong was returned to the People’s Republic of China on July 1 1997. The national categorisation of films made in the Republic of Mongolia remains unresolved, as there is no place for it in the Taiwanese government’s national film categories. These categorisation issues above show different kinds of interpretation at work within the territorial sovereignty discourse of the Republic of China, and they are more or less self-contradictory with regard to the concept of “historical land” as implied by Anthony Smith. That is to say that the Taiwan government’s ideology about territorial sovereignty goes some way to affirming Smith’s implied belief about the historical land, although it is hardly identical. The element of self-contradictory belief in Taiwan’s case is made explicit by the national film categories above. It especially seems absurd and ironic that there is no national category for films made in the Republic of Mongolia within the Republic of China’s discourse of territorial sovereignty. It is also paradoxical that Hong Kong’s films can be regarded as “national films” after 1997, while Mainland China’s are excluded, if we accept the historical land discourse of the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan. This kind of territorial sovereignty discourse makes it more and more difficult to define Taiwan’s national identity. In this sense, Taiwan...
In chapter five, we explored the issue of cultural identity through an analysis of film markets and the government’s cultural policy. We found that the cultural vision of filmmakers and cinema owners are diverse, perhaps even opposing. Filmmakers would prefer the government to adopt a policy of cultural protectionism; however, cinema owners simply defer to the benefits of the free market, whatever the cultural elite may argue. As for cinemagoers in Taiwan, most of them undeniably favour American films, in common with most countries in the world. In response to this, we would argue that it is unreasonable to say that American films belong to the idea of cultural imperialism solely in terms of film market share. The government prefers to subsidise filmmaking, rather than adopt protectionism. In addition, we have seen how Taiwan’s filmmaking functions within the government’s strategy. Participation in international film festivals is one of the primary policies of culture diplomacy for the government even though Taiwan’s audience does not welcome most of the films being subsidised. Meanwhile, I would like to argue that Taiwan’s cultural policy, generally, is interwoven with economic and political policies. The entry into the WTO has impacted upon many other policies (not just cultural) and there has been inevitability about the changes to many domestic regulations that previously violated the WTO spirit.

In chapter six, we compared and applied post-modernism and the self-reflection of modernism (also known as new modernity or high modernity) to the study
have not in fact lived beyond modernity because self-clarification always underlies modern thought. In the case of Taiwan, post-modernism did not arrive until the 1980s, as a result of political openness rather than capitalist development. I will also argue that if the continuity of history is absolute, then modernity or non-modernity should not be defined by a single industrial or scientific innovation. If the invention of the steam engine was the dawn of modernity, then why not the invention of the printing presses as well? Lyotard may be more levelheaded when he argues in favour of a cyclical phenomenon of social change, which may help us understand the meaning of tolerance. In addition, with regard to our research on Taiwan’s cinema and the issue of national identity, Beck’s warning about the unintended consequence resulting from the new modernity of desire should be seriously taken into consideration. Responding to Beck, I would like to suggest a much slower pace of action could be more appropriate in order to identify what problems might evolve when Taiwan decides to confront the issues of national and cultural identity today.

In general, after discussing the components of a nation, like language, history, territories, people, culture, government institutions, and its legal aspects, as put forward by Sun Yat-Sen and Anthony Smith, as well as the Taiwanese people’s national identity in relation to cinematic research, we find that Taiwan is at a crossroads...
own subjectivity, not through extreme nationalism that marginalizes others and discursive death of the subject in post-modernism but through the “self-reflexivity of modernism”, which mainly appeals to the reality of multicultural coexistence in contemporary Taiwan.

Besides insisting on multicultural coexistence, I propose that, if Taiwan wishes to bring about unification based on the discourse of nationalism or to search for subjectivity and prevent the alienation phenomenon of modernity within Taiwanese society, then Liao Hsian Hao’s notion of cyborgian practice could be considered at a slower pace. The cyborgian practice can be regarded as a way to integrate nationalism, post-modernism and the self-reflexivity of modernism, all capable of coexisting within the same society.

From an international perspective on Taiwan’s national identity, admitted by most countries in the world today question and even deny Taiwan’s claim to be an independent country, whether it calls itself Taiwan, the Republic of China or the Republic of China on Taiwan, a term which was used in the 1990s. Talking about people’s national identity without considering the international view is counter-productive because the issue of identity is also resolved in relation to recognition by the other.

Taiwan’s inability to name itself as it wishes at international occasions is mainly due to the People’s Republic of China’s involvement. Taiwan has officially ne
correct way for others to call you" is nothing more than wishful thinking for put in the context of the international community. However, looking back over prior to 1971, we see that the People’s Republic of China had been denied entry to the United Nations since it was established in 1949 mainly due to objections from the Republic of China. Today, the People’s Republic of China is taking revenge on the Republic of China on Taiwan by rejecting Taiwan’s appeal to be taken back into the United Nations. This cycle of revenge is not the route to unification. However, this state of play is never taught in schools in Taiwan. But, if Taiwan really wants to be seen as a place where modernity or high modernity (as defined by Beck and Giddens) exists, it would be worth teaching this lesson in the education system.

**Recommendations for Further Research**

This dissertation is not exhaustive in covering all components of a nation, as the religions, folklore or myths within Taiwanese society. Admittedly, these omissions are a weakness of this thesis. I hope that someone interested in these sub-topics within this nation can deal with them in the near future. In addition, I also admit that this dissertation only reflects those aspects of national identity that relate to the development and research of Taiwanese cinema. It is not, therefore, a complete picture of Taiwan’s national identity.
part of the People’s Republic of China. The second also insists that there is only one China in the world, but this time it is the Republic of China, which claims sovereignty over Mainland China. The third national identity discourse argues that there is only one China, but that it resides in the future. Until unification between the two states—the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan takes place, each side of the Taiwan Strait perpetuates its own sovereignty discourse. The fourth discourse on the issue of national identity is to argue that Taiwan is a country independent from the People’s Republic of China in political terms, and its name is the Republic of China, which has been used since 1945. This would mean that there are two Chinas in the world today, even if most countries do not recognise that fact. The fifth national identity discourse is that Taiwan is a completely independent country, and should be called Taiwan or the Republic of China. Taiwan. This latter discourse of national identity wishes to sever all ties with the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan. This desire to create a new country in the world is borne out of the process of breaking free from history. This particular discourse on the issue of national identity readily irritates the Communist regime of the People’s Republic of China and creates hostility on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. A more detailed comparative study and quantitative research could explore the political discourses discussed above further in the future. Better still, my major recommendation would be that the impact of globalisation on Taiwan’s national identity would soon demand further exploration.


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