
Fertility Decline in Greece: Knowledge Gaps in Fertility Policy Debates

by
Alexandra Sarikaki

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (June 2005)



Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning
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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to
the memory of my father Thanasis
who inspired me all his life
and
to my mother Afroditi for her
continued support and understanding.

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ABSTRACT

It is widely believed that state intervention through policy initiatives is a legitimate means to reverse the declining fertility trends experienced in Europe and many other countries. State efforts to address evolving demographic trends, supported by academic research and policy debates, have a history of over two hundred years. Yet, the reality remains that fertility and family policy measures to date have been unsuccessful in effecting a sustained and meaningful reversal of declining fertility.

This research finds that fertility policy debates, which usually involve several political institutions, and sometimes academic and non-governmental faculties, have a crucial role in shaping effective policies. The success of their policy initiatives, however, depends very much on their success in suitably addressing a multitude of informational challenges presented by the complex phenomenon of fertility. The causalities of fertility decline are numerous; the heterogeneity of the societal settings that experience fertility decline is endless. However, there are very few theories to explain such experiences. There are even fewer empirical studies to support the theories. In this context, the policy makers face the difficult task of matching theoretical concepts with the ground realities as experienced by their unique policy target groups. The researcher argues that if the policy makers do not fully comprehend the particular experiences of their target group, including their subjective perspectives, behavioural characterises and policy related needs, then the policy initiatives are unlikely to succeed.

Greece is typical of the European experience vis-à-vis fertility decline. Its total fertility rates (TFR) fell below the population replacement level of 2.1 in 1981 and now remains at 1.3. A review of the fertility policy debates in Europe and in Greece, in particular, reveals that policy debates and discourses are mostly biased with unfounded assumptions and judgements regarding causes and consequences of fertility decline. A review of existing literature and the researcher's own empirical work presents sufficient evidence to support this conclusion. In addition, a comparison of such political and institutional perspectives with the fertility experiences and perspectives of a sample population in Greece finds that the institutional perspectives are not always adequately informed of the ground realities. It is therefore concluded that significant informational gaps are present in Greek fertility policy debates. It is also theorised that such knowledge vacuums are one of the reasons why policy initiatives fail to deliver.

The findings of this research are based on a comparison of data collected through a combination of qualitative research methods (semi-structured interviews with institutional representatives in Greece) and quantitative methods (face to face questionnaire survey with married couples in Crete, Greece).

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ABBREVIATIONS

ASFI = Age Specific Fertility Index

ASPE = Greek Confederation of Families with Many Children

CB95to00 = Number of children born between 1995-2000 for the households interviewed (referring also as Recent Fertility)

CB95PR= Number of Children Born before 1995 for the households interviewed

CBR = Crude Birth Rate

CDR = Crude Death Rate

CEB = Children Ever Born (referring also as Actual Fertility)

Com MFCPDI= Committee of Marriage, Family, Child Protection and Demographic Issues organised by the Greek Orthodox Church

CRI = Crude Rate of Increase of a Population

CRNI = Crude Rate of Natural Increase of a Population

CRNM= Crude Rate of Net Migration

ECHP = European Community Household Panel

EDHM= Greek Society for Demographic Studies

EKKE= Greek National Centre for Social Research

EMU= European Monetary Union

EONFP= European Observatory on National Family Policies

EOP = The Greek National Organisation of Welfare

ESCG= Economic and Social Council of Greece

ESY = The Greek National Health System

EU= European Union

FPAG= The Greek Family Planning Association

GNAP/incl =Greek National Action Plan on Social Inclusion

GRR= Gross Reproduction Rate

IADHP= Organisation to Address Demographic Issues

IKA= Social Security Institute (Greek private sector employees' fund)

IMR= Infant Mortality Rate

IPPF= International Planned Parenthood Federation

KAPI= The Greek Open Care Centres for the Elderly

KKE= Greek Communist Party (Political Party in Greece)

LX = Life Expectancy

Min.IPAD= Hellenic Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation

Min.NEC= Hellenic Ministry of National Economy

MISSOC= Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the Member States of the European Union

ND= New Democracy (Political Party in Greece)

NRR = Net Reproductive Rate

NSSG = National Statistical Service of Greece

OAED= The Greek Manpower Employment Organisation

OECD= Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OEK = The Greek Workers' Housing Organisation

OGA= The Greek Farmers' Insurance Organisation

PASOK= Panehellenic Socialist Movement (Political Party in Greece)

SYN= Coalition of the Left and Progress (Political Party in Greece)

UN= United Nations

TFR = Total Fertility Rate

WFS = World Fertility Survey

In selected Tables and Graphs:

EU-15= European Union of 15 member countries
BE = Belgium
DK = Denmark
D = Germany
EL = Greece
E= Spain
FR = France
IRL = Ireland
IT = Italy
L =Luxembourg
NL = the Netherlands
AU= Austria
P = Portugal
FIN = Finland
SW = Sweden
UK = United Kingdom

INTRODUCTION

> "Reproduction is the sole goal for which human beings are designed; everything else is a means to that end" (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995, p.5)

It may be debatable whether reproduction is the only purpose of human existence. To a student of philosophy human purpose might well be different or even a mystery. Nature, with all its intricacies, has so far been able to ensure that the collective total of the human species on earth is neither decreasing, nor stagnant, but in fact increasing. That does not imply however, that this purpose is smoothly achieved across the entirety of human societies. In the past, human societies have perished and disappeared completely. Wars, famines, diseases and natural disasters were among the known causes for such disappearances. Such threats to human existence although not entirely non-existent, are at least more manageable in the modern day. Nonetheless, there has been the perception of a new kind of 'threat' to the existence of nations. Increasingly, this perception has received intense focus from several sections of the society – political, academic and the public. This perceived threat is the decline in human fertility rates[1], currently experienced in most of the western nations as well as some other countries of the world. The debates on the causes and consequences of fertility decline have rendered its participants multi-polar. On the extremes, there are some who believe that nations, or unique cultural identities will cease to exist, if the current trends in fertility decline are to continue. Then there are others who rationalise their view of fertility decline as a 'problem', with seemingly more pragmatic arguments. They point out that continuous fertility decline would lead to fewer economically active population (labour shortage), lesser economic output, and lesser contribution to the State (in tax, insurance and pensions). This, they argue, would then render the State an ineffective mechanism in carrying out its responsibilities of social provision and protection. Then there are also those who believe that nature has ways of adjusting to all forms of changes to its fabric. They argue that population decline in some parts of the globe is in fact nature's way of adjusting to the population explosion in other parts.

[1] Definitions of the term 'fertility rates' and 'fertility' are given in Chapter 6, section 6.3.1. While the definition of fertility may be diverse depending on the context in which it is used, such as biological fertility, in this thesis, it refers to the number of children the parents have or have had during a specific period of reference, or the number of children they desire or intend to have in future. Thus declining fertility trend refers to the trend in having fewer numbers of children.

The declining fertility trend is just one aspect of the numerous changes that the demographic scenes of nations are undergoing at present. The other features of the recent demographic developments include low mortality rates, high divorce rates and number of births outside of marriage, increase in number of the single parents and an increase in the size of old age population (Coleman 1996). Such developments have led to a coherent thinking process among demographers, social workers, planners and policy makers. In response to such developments the policy institutions have attempted to intervene and assist by undertaking to meet the additional needs brought about by these changes (such as welfare support for single parents, adequate support for the elderly and so on). Nevertheless, the question remains as to what extent have these institutional responses succeeded in adequately addressing these developments in the society. For example, fertility is a factor that has been significantly influenced by the socio-economic changes over the last several decades (J.M. Hoem 1993; Mason 1992, 1997a; Morsa et.al. 1979; Oppenheimer 1994). It may be interesting to investigate policy initiatives that aim to address fertility decline and its consequences. It may prove insightful to understand the process through which policies are developed, whether and how they comprehend the needs of the younger generation. In the context of declining fertility rates, the future fertility intentions of the younger generations could have a crucial impact on the future human resource of a country. Some of the other general questions surrounding fertility trends explored in social science include: 'Why do some people give birth to more children than others?'; 'Why do some people decide not to have children at all?'; 'What lies behind people's decisions to have children?'; 'How many children in total will they have?'; 'How many children do the society need?'; 'Are the present number of children too high or too low?'; and 'How will the future be without many children?'.

1. FOCUS OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH AND LITERATURE

There is a significant amount of theoretical and empirical literature on the variations in fertility trends and the reasons for the declining fertility rates (Andorka 1980; Cliquet 1991; Davis 1987; Greenhalgh 1995; Hall and White 1995; Van de Kaa 1995). Other prominent works that focus on links between family, social policy and reproductive behaviour include Gauthier 1994, 1996a, 1996b; Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Hantrais 1997, 1999a, 1999b; Hantrais and Letablier 1996; Hantrais and Lohkamp-Himmighofen 1999; Hecht and Leridon 1993. There are also some examples of research on the effects of family policies or population policies on the reproductive behaviour (Ekert-Jaffé 1999; Gauthier 1996a; 1996b; Hecht and Leridon 1993; Lindgen 1993; Pritchett 1994; Sadik

1991; Serow and Sly 1993; Whittinhgton 1992).

However, there is no evidence of attempts to establish whether the State or the policy institutions fully understand the reasons of fertility decline unique to its target group. Neither is there any evidence to show that such institutions fully and adequately take into consideration the preferences of individuals or couples of its target group, when fertility and family policies are developed and executed. Finally a comparative level study, in which the policy makers' and planners' perceptions on fertility trends and existing and future family policies are compared against the perceptions of the individuals or couples on these issues and their priorities, cannot be found in the existing literature. If issues of declining fertility need to be comprehensively and effectively dealt with by the State, then such investigations are necessary to identify any gaps that exist between the provisions of the policies and the requirements of the target group. Therefore any investigation at a comparative level on these topics could have great value and contribute considerably to the existing knowledge in this field of research.

2. THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH

The aim of this thesis is to establish whether fertility policy debates[2] in Greece are informed by an understanding of the factors influencing parenting behaviour, and in particular their fertility decisions.

There are several research objectives built in, in order to achieve this main aim. These objectives are developed around the gaps in literature, identified in the previous section.

The objectives are to:

- Examine the nature of the current fertility policy debates.
- Bring out the arguments of those who are in favour of and against State intervention in fertility issues through policy initiatives, and their rationale.
- Understand how the policy makers' arguments and comprehension of the whole issue of fertility, causes and consequences of fertility decline and policy solutions match with what the couples actually perceive and experience in reality. Empirical data collected in the study will help to establish whether the arguments and perceptions of the policy

[2] A detailed rationale for choice of Greece as a case study is forthcoming in the ensuing chapters. Greece, one of the constituent members of the European Union experiences most of the demographic changes mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter. It has one of the highest rates of fertility declines in Europe.

institutions are corroborated.

- Highlight the gaps in some of the relevant existing policies and put forward suggestions to modify and realign those policy initiatives into a more result oriented direction.

The main research question that guides the researcher towards the above objectives and aim is:

What are the Greek policy makers' perspectives on the causes and consequences of fertility decline in Greece and what do they believe to be the fertility policy related needs of Greek couples?

The result of this analysis is not intended to serve as a standard policy analysis, and the thesis discussion is not directed primarily at the policy-making elite. The intent here is to make it theoretical and political in a broader sense. Theoretical in the sense, it argues that when knowledge gaps exist regarding the causalities of fertility decline of a target group, the policy discourses would consequently be ill informed and would possibly result in ineffective policies. It is political in the sense that it brings out the tendencies towards bias and assumptions regarding causalities and solutions of fertility decline, and establish how this too could lead to ill informed policy debates and ineffective policy solutions.

3. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

It has already been explained in the previous sections how the objective of the study is expected to add to the existing literature on demographic studies. The forthcoming literature review and review of fertility policy debates in Europe and Greece in particular, will show that fertility policy debates are rife with clash of biases and assumptions. Thus, it would be a justified attempt to be able to establish that policy debates and discourses are driven more by assumptions rather than facts. The findings of the study would enable the researcher to discuss the policy implications of the bias and assumptions present in the debates. By throwing new light on the 'gaps' in the current policy debates in Greece, this study would indirectly help to raise the quality of future policy formation processes.

4. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

The outcome of the research that incorporated the above objectives are described in ten chapters as follows:

PART I: LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter 1:

A chapter on the demographic developments of the major European Union nations, in particular Greece, with focus on fertility, mortality, migration and the structural changes within families.

Chapter 2:

A review of the international literature in relation to the theories of fertility decline. Four major theories of causalities and the inputs by various authors are reviewed.

Chapter 3:

A review of the origin and development of fertility policy debates in Europe. This chapter describes the apparent rationale behind the State initiatives to intervene in fertility issues through policy initiatives and the academic and scientific support such initiatives have received. It also presents some of the arguments in order to highlight the assumptions and bias in policy debate process.

Chapter 4:

This chapter introduces Greece in detail as a case study for this research. The socio-economic, political and geographical details relevant to this study are explained. A second section of the chapter presents an in-depth review of fertility policy debates in Greece prior to the commencement of this research. As in the case of the previous chapter, this is mainly achieved through review of existing literature that has recorded the debate process. The main sources include official publications on the outcomes of policy debates, and policy measures, which the governments actually implemented or intended to implement.

PART II: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Chapter 5:

This chapter presents the research questions that directed the empirical element of this project. The findings from the review of literature and policy debates are drawn together to develop the researcher's arguments, rationale and research questions. The empirical element of this research has been designed to include both qualitative and quantitative aspects.

Chapter 6:

The research design and methodology of the empirical studies and the analysis of the findings are explained in this chapter. Interviews with the Greek policy making

institutions as well as a selected sample of married individuals in Crete, are the two forms of fieldwork explained in this chapter.

PART III: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND ANALYSES

Chapter 7:

This chapter presents the findings from the first element of the empirical study, that is, interviews with the fertility policy-making institutions in Greece. The presentation includes the institutional perspectives on the causes and consequences of fertility decline in Greece. It also describes what the policy makers believe to be the ideal policy solutions for addressing fertility decline in Greece. As this part is of a qualitative nature, the chapter is essentially descriptive.

Chapter 8:

The findings from the second part of the fieldwork, that is, the interviews with the married individuals in Crete, Greece are presented in this chapter. The interviews were administered in the form of survey questionnaires among 508 individuals, and the findings are analysed and presented using quantitative tools. The analysis presents the factors that appear to influence fertility behaviour of the population studied, their future fertility intentions and fertility policy related preferences.

PART IV: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 9:

This chapter brings together the answers to the main research questions identified through the two empirical studies. The aim is to compare and contrast the findings from the two different perspectives, that is, the institutional perspectives and the experiences of the couples studied. This would provide a platform to discuss the findings in detail and validate and justify the researcher's arguments and research objectives, as well as draw appropriate conclusions from the findings.

Chapter 10:

The policy implications of the research findings, as well as some suggestions for future policy debates and fertility policy research are suggested in this chapter. It also describes in detail the limitations specific to this research project.

CHAPTER 1:

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITIONS IN EUROPE

Introduction

Over the last two centuries, Europe's demographic structure has undergone several transitions, changing its main characteristics from high fertility rates and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates. Four distinct phases of this transition, with their own unique features have been identified in the literature (Bongaarts 2001; Chesnais 1992; Van de Kaa 1995). The central aim of this chapter is to describe these transitional phases and provide background information on how the transitions have manifested in the current demographic map of Europe. The changes are studied through the transformations that have been observed in the three main demographic indicators and causal factors, namely, migration, mortality and fertility.

This chapter has three main sections, the first section briefly describes the four transitional phases. The second section examines the significance of the three demographic indicators, and their role in these transitions. The final section briefly examines the significance of the transformations that the individual family structures of the European societies have undergone during these transitional phases.

1.1 FOUR PHASES IN THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

As originally conceived, the demographic transition theory was based on observations and interpretations of the European experiences from 18th to the 20th century. During this period the population structure shifted from a pattern of high mortality and high birth rates structure that had existed for centuries, to a new equilibrium at low levels of mortality and fertility (McDonald 2001; Van de Kaa 1995)[1]. The first phase of this transition was characterised by high birth and death rates. Some fluctuations were observed in the population growth, but no steady growth was seen (ibid.).

[1] The first suggestions for a structural explanation of that phenomenon came out in 1830 in France, where occurred the first ever recorded sustained decline in fertility (Van de Kaa 1995, p. 9).

The second phase began around 1800. It was characterised by steady birth rates, but declining mortality rates mainly due to improvements in medical science, which helped successfully control contagious diseases. Because high mortality in the previous phase was mainly among children, a reduction in mortality resulted in increased number of children during the second phase (Malmberg and Sommestad 2000, p. 4). This also resulted in larger population groups surviving into adulthood with consequent increase in fertile population and population growth (ibid.).

The third phase of the transition continued to see growth in population. This was mainly catalysed by the disproportionately larger number of women of childbearing age. However, during this period, low mortality rates – infant mortality in particular – meant fewer births were required to achieve desired family size and consequently the birth rates began to decline alongside the mortality rates. This phase, which began approximately in mid nineteenth century has been noted as the young adult phase (Malmberg and Sommestad 2000, p. 14). This phase was characterised by a growing population, fuelled by its young adult population, and saw rapid emergence of industrialisation, liberalisation and economic growth in many of the western countries (ibid.).

The last stage of demographic transition in Europe is the current phase, which began in the 1960s, in which very low birth rates were matched with more or less equally low death rates, and with consequent little or small annual growth in population. Many European nations such as Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece have experienced the lowest fertility rates ever and in most of these countries, population growth is mostly sustained by immigration (Chesnais 1998; Eurostat's demographic statistics- various years).

These four transition phases however, are not universal in several aspects. Many of the developing nations, for example, are still experiencing significantly high rates of population growth. In addition, on the theoretical side, not all the authors distinguish four distinct phases to the demographic transition. Landry (1935, 1945) specifies three phases or systems of demographic development in the western nations. They are: (1) The primitive phase, characterised by high mortality and fertility, and in which the population growth was determined mostly by mortality and fertility; (2) The intermediate phase, when mortality and fertility were declining, and population growth was controlled by the number of marriages; (3) The modern phase, when both mortality and fertility are low and population growth is no longer determined by economic factors (quoted by Andorka 1978). Thus, his second phase theory appeared to combine the second and third phases of the four-phase model of demographic transition described earlier.

1.2 THE TRANSITION AND DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS

While the distinction between the different phases of demographic transitions remains a matter of debate, and different demographers have described different characteristics for each phase, all agree concerning the general direction of the transition. In the following sections, the effects of these transitions as they appeared on the demographic map of Europe during the current phase, or more specifically, from the 1960s onwards, are examined. The transformations are studied in terms of three main demographic indicators, namely, migration, fertility and mortality.


1.2.1 The Evolution of Fertility Trends

The number of births occurring in a population during a given period, as it will be explained in the next chapter, can be influenced by various socio-economic, cultural and behavioural factors. While migration can have an immediate impact on a country's population growth, in the long term fertility is the most influential of the three demographic components. Changes in fertility not only impact the number of children but also that of the grandchildren, and therefore even relatively small changes in fertility may have very significant consequences on future population size and age structure (Lutz and Scherbov 1999, p. 2).

The current reality is that among all the western countries, especially among the European nations, the average number of children per woman in her lifetime has reached levels well below the replacement level of 2.1. After reaching its highest post-war level in the mid 1960s (2.75), it started to take a steep decline by the end of 1970s, and reached its lowest level of 1.42 in 1995. In fact, the fertility rates have remained at the lowest low levels for the longest ever period over the last two decades (Day 1992). Another feature is that the fertility levels among the traditional societies of the Mediterranean countries declined to lower levels than the liberal northern European nations (Spain 1.19; Italy 1.21; Greece 1.3; Portugal 1.48 in 1999 whereas Ireland 1.89; France 1.77; Denmark and Finland 1.74; Luxembourg 1.73) (see Figure 1.1, Eurostat 2000a)[2].

[2] According to information published by Eurostat (1993, 1999a, 1999b) and Council of Europe (1994) the only exceptions of countries where the TFRs never reached a level below the replacement level of 2.1 births per women in Europe were Albania and Turkey (2.60 and 2.38 respectively in 1998), classifying them among the so-called 'young' countries in the world that are experiencing a 'demographic explosion'. In Italy the TFR was 2.70 in 1960 but in 1999 it hit the lowest rates in the world (1.12, and Spain close to it at 1.15). The German-speaking nations have had TFRs below 1.6 since 1980s, while the other north-west European countries (including France) have never seen their TRF fall below 1.6. The countries of the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, unlike the West, experienced no baby boom in the 1950s and 1960s (Coleman 1996). In

Figure 1.1: Total fertility rates in EU-15, 1960, 1980, 1999



Source: Eurostat 2000a, European Social Statistics-Demography

Significant changes in TFR have been observed in many other advanced countries outside the European Union as well. The TFR of USA declined from 3.31 in 1960-64 to 1.82 in 1980-84 and then increased again to 2.07 in 1998. In Japan the TFR declined from 2.02 children per woman during the 1960-64 period to 1.76 in 1980-84 and to 1.39 in 1997 (UN 1998)[3].

In the case of Greece, after the Second World War, from the mid-1950s to the early 1980's the TFR remained at levels between 2.35 and 2.21 with small variations. However, this stability did not continue after the early 1980s. In 1981 the total fertility rate dropped below the replacement level. In 1999, it dropped to the lowest ever level of 1.3, placing it very far below the replacement level, leading to the classification of Greece as a country with one of the lowest TFRs in Europe (Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2; Eurostat 2000a).

Bulgaria the TFR fell from 2.32 in 1988 to 1.53 in 1992 and 1.11 in 1998, and in Romania from 2.32 in 1988 to 1.51 and 1.30 in 1992 and 1998 respectively (Council of Europe 1994; Eurostat 1999b).

[3] Gauthier (1996b) gives a good analysis of the general fertility decline observed. In a study of 22 industrialised countries in the world, the cross-national average fertility rates, which stood at 2.0 children per woman in 1975 had declined to 1.7 in 1990. She, highlights that while in 1970 there were 17 countries with total fertility rates above replacement levels (2.1), in 1990 there were only three countries with fertility rates above that level (namely, Ireland, New Zealand and Sweden) (p.124).

Figure 1.2: The evolution of total fertility rates in Greece, 1950-1999



Source: Eurostat 2000a, European Social Statistics-Demography

1.2.2 Ageing Population and Mortality

There is a close relationship between the number of births, deaths and migration occurring in a population, and the age structure of that population (Hinde 1998; Newell 1994; Pressat 1972; Srinivasan 1998). In the long run low fertility results in a relatively small number of women of childbearing age, and consequently fewer number of births. Low infant mortality and high life expectancy result in a relatively large number of elderly population in the following years (ibid.).

Towards the end of 20th century, all European countries including Greece, experienced substantial decreases in mortality rates. Amelioration of socio-economic conditions and the resultant improvement of living standards and progress achieved in health care and sickness prevention contributed to a decrease in the number of deaths, especially mortality among children and an increase in life expectancy (Mesle 1996; Pinnelli 1993)[4].


Although fewer numbers of children are born per woman, relatively few of those children die in their infancy. The infant mortality rate (IMR)[5], including the neonatal, early neonatal, as well as the early foetal death and late foetal death (or stillbirth), have

[4] Life Expectancy (LX), expressed as the number of years a particular population is expected to live in the future, is the most common indicator of mortality. As the level of mortality varies between different sub-groups often the demographic statistics also measure mortality and LX by age (Newell 1994; Palmore and Gardner 1994; Srinivasan 1998). This is also related to the fact that mortality at different age is closely linked to changes in the mortality by their causes. Different age groups have different causes of death (Mesle 1996).

[5] IMR represents the ratio between deaths of children under one year and the number of live births in the given year (Newell 1994; Palmore and Gardner 1994).

declined in all European countries during the last forty years, and the survival rate of infants are very high. The average levels of IMR dropped from 34.5 per 1000 live births in 1960 to 12.4 in 1980 and reached 5 per 1000 live births in EU-15 in 1999 (Figure 1.3, Eurostat 2000a).

Figure 1.3: Infant Mortality Rates, EU-15 and selected European countries, 1960, 1980, 1999



Source: Eurostat 2000a, European Social Statistics-Demography

The life expectancy of 77.8 years at birth, for both sexes combined for the European member states, in 1998, was one of the highest in the world[6], showing an improvement of approximately 7 to 8 years of life since 1960 (Table 1.1, Eurostat 2000a). Countries that historically recorded relatively low levels of life expectancy with simultaneous high infant mortality rates - such as Portugal - have also seen enormous improvements in Infant Mortality Rates.

Greece had an IMR of 40.1 in 1960, 17.9 in 1980 and 5.9 in 1999 per 1000 live births (Figure 1.3). It also displayed one of the highest male life expectancies in 1998 compared with the other European member states. The female life expectancy also increased during the course of the last four decades (Table 1.1).

[6] Life expectancy (LX) was equal to 80.5 in Japan during the period of 1995-2000, the highest in the world. For the United States of American the LX at birth, for both sexes combined, during the same period was equal to 76.5 (UN 2001). The LX at birth for males increased from 66.7 years in USA during the period 1960-64 to 73.9 years in 1998 and for Japan from 66.5 to 77.3 years. The LX for females showed similar trends, increasing in USA from 73.4 years in 1960-64 to 79.4 years in 1998 and in Japan from 73.4 to 83.8 for the same period. Russian federation is an exemption among the more developed countries where the LX at birth for men had decreased from 64.0 during the period 1960-64 to 61.1 years in 1998, while for women stayed in the same levels at 72.6 years (Eurostat 2000a). The Russian instability and decline of LX may be explained through the political and economic changes that took place in the country during and towards the end of the 1990s (Mesle 1996).

Table 1.1: Life expectancy at birth, males and females, EU-15, 1960,1980,1998


Life Expectancy at Birth						
Males				**Females**		
1960	***1980***	***1998***		***1960***	***1980***	***1998***
67.4	70.5	74.6	**EU-15**	72.9	77.2	80.9
67.7	70	74.3	**BE**	73.5	76.8	80.5
70.4	71.2	73.9	**DK**	74.4	77.3	78.8
-	69.6	74.5	**D**	-	76.1	80.6
67.3	**72.2**	**75.5**	**EL**	**72.4**	**76.8**	**80.6**
67.4	72.5	75.1	**E**	72.2	78.6	82.4
66.9	70.2	74.6	**FR**	73.6	78.4	82.3
68.1	70.1	73.5	**IRL**	71.9	75.6	79.1
67.2	70.6	75.5	**IT**	72.3	77.4	81.8
66.5	69.1	73.7	**L**	72.2	75.9	80.5
71.5	72.7	75.2	**NL**	75.3	79.3	80.6
66.2	69	74.4	**AU**	72.7	76.1	80.9
61.2	67.7	71.7	**P**	66.8	75.2	78.9
65.5	69.2	73.5	**FIN**	72.5	77.6	80.8
71.2	72.8	76.9	**SW**	74.9	78.8	81.9
67.9	70.2	74.8	**UK**	73.7	76.2	79.7

Source: Eurostat 2000a, European Social Statistics-Demography

The combination of changes experienced through the decline of fertility and rise in life expectancy has brought about a gradual change in the age structure of the population. The proportion of the younger population (0 to 19 years old) has declined over time, while that of the older generations (defined as those 60 years of age and over) has steadily increased (see Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5, Eurostat 2000a)[7]. This ageing process of the European population has been described both as 'bottom-up', through fewer births, and as 'top-down' through increasing longevity of the citizens (Hantrais 1999b, p.6).

[7] The trend within the ageing of the population and change of the age structure of the population pyramid was also observed in USA, Japan and the Russian Federation. The USA has seen their population aged 60 and over increasing from 13.3 percent of the total population in 1960 to 16.4 percent in 1999, while the younger population size was seen to decline from 38.2 percent to 23.1 percent during the same period (Eurostat 2000a). Japan has seen its proportion of younger generation being reduced by half (from 42.2 in the 1960 to 21.0 percent of the total population in 1999) and the people aged 60 and over being increased form 8.9 to 22.6 percent during the same period (ibid).

Figure 1.4: Dependency ratios, EU-15, 1960,1980,1999 (%)




[1] Population aged 0-19 as a percentage of population aged 20-59
[2] Population aged 60 and over as a percentage of population aged 20-59
Source: Eurostat 2000a, European Social Statistics-Demography

The current population projections do not forecast any reversal of the population ageing process either within EU, or within other more developed parts of the world such as USA or Japan (O'Neil et.al. 2001). It is expected that in the future, an even more inverted shape of the population pyramid will emerge with the size of the older generation reaching close to one third of the total population (UN 2001; Eurostat 2000a)[8]. By the year 2020, the population of those aged 60 years or more in the present EU-15 countries is estimated to be 5.2 percent more than that of the year 2000, while the group of people aged 19 years of age or less would reduce by one third of what it used to be during the 1960s (see Figure 1.5, Eurostat 2000a).

[8] For more details on European population projections see Eurostat 1995b; Lutz and Scherbov 1999; Lutz et.al. 1999; UN 1992, 1998.

Figure 1.5: Population of EU-15, by age group, 1960-2020 (%)



Source: Eurostat 2000a, European Social Statistics-Demography

In line with general trends in EU, Greece too has seen the proportion of young people (0-19 years old) decrease by approximately 10% since 1960, and the proportion of the older people increase by almost the same amount (Table 1.2, Eurostat 2000a).

Table 1.2: Age groups as a proportion of the total population, Greece, 1960-2020

	Age Groups		
	Proportion of total Population (%)		
Year	**0-19**	**20-59**	**60+**
1960	31.7	54.9	13.4
1970	31.6	52.2	16.2
1980	30.6	51.9	17.5
1990	27	53.3	19.7
1999	22.3	54.9	22.8
2010*	21.8	53.7	24.5
2020*	21.6	51.6	26.7

* based on the Eurostat national population forecast, baseline scenario

Source: Eurostat 2000a, European Social Statistics-Demography

1.2.3 Population Growth: The Role of Migration

As fertility, mortality and migration are the main demographic indicators, their development shape the population growth as well as the age structure of the present and future population of a country (Lutz et.al. 1999; Newell 1994; Palmore and Gardner 1994).

During the last forty years, in the case of the European Union of 15 member countries the rate of population growth has been declining and has come close to zero - the Crude Rate

of Natural Increase (CRNI)[9] in 1999 was equal to 0.7 (Eurostat 2000a). The number of live births has been decreasing and the number of deaths has been increasing, consequently leaving the natural increase in population to a minimum[10]. As the available data reveal, since the 1970s, the single most important factor explaining population growth among the European nations is international migration. Developments over the last 30 years have been such that clearly the contribution of migration to population growth, the Crude Rate of Net Migration (CRNM), is now much greater than the Crude Rate of Natural Increase (CRNI) (Table 1.3, ibid.).

Table 1.3: Influence of migration on population growth in EU-15, 1960-1999

	Population	Live Births (a)	CBR	Deaths (b)	CDR	Natural Increase (a-b)	CRNI (c)	Migration	CRNM (d)	CRI (c+d)
Year	*(millions)*	*(1000)*	*Per 1000 pop.*	*(1000)*	*Per 1000 pop.*	*(1000)*	*Per 1000 pop.*	*(1000)*	*Per 1000 pop.*	*Per 1000 pop.*
1960	314.8	5,784	18.3	3,386	10.7	2,398	7.6	43	0.1	7.7
1970	340.0	5,495	16.2	3,679	10.8	1,816	5.3	-390	-1.1	4.2
1980	354.6	4,630	13.0	3,737	10.5	893	2.5	590	1.7	4.2
1990	363.7	4,379	12.0	3,721	10.2	658	1.8	1,013	2.8	4.6
1999*	375.4	4,005	10.7	3,727	9.9	278	0.7	711	1.9	2.6

CBR= Crude Birth Rate
CDR= Crude Death Rate
CRNI= Crude Rate of Natural Increase
CRNM= Crude Rate of Net Migration
CRI= Crude Rate on Increase
* Preliminary data

Source: Eurostat 2000a, European Social Statistics - Demography

Table 1.3 also indicates how the patterns of net migration in Europe have changed over time. Migration is the most volatile of the three demographic components since the number of people entering or leaving a country can change from one year to another based on political events or the enforcement of new legislation (Lutz, et.al. 1999).


[9] The Crude Rate of Natural Increase (CRNI) is defined as a number that measures the gap between the number of births and number of deaths in the population. It is derived using the formula CRNI= CBR – CDR, where CBR (the simplest and most frequently used measure of fertility) is defined as the number of births in a given year divided by the number of people in the population in the middle of that year. Likewise, CDR is defined as the number of people who die in a given year divided by the number of people in the population in the middle of that year. Conventionally the CRNI is expressed as per 1,000 inhabitants (Newell 1994; Palmore and Gardner 1994). The Crude Rate of Increase (CRI) is defined as the number that measures the total increase of a population. If we add the number of immigrants or emigrants (net migration) of the same given year to the CRNI, then CRI= CRNI + CRNM (ibid.).

[10] While the improved health care and medical facilities have meant that people live longer, this also meant that at any given time there would be a large population of older people, thereby increasing the number of natural deaths during that period.

From the mid-1980s emigration has been falling, and immigration increasing, reaching the peak at the beginning of the 1990s (Table 1.3). As the data from Eurostat (1998a) indicate countries such as Italy, Finland, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland, which were traditionally countries of emigration, now experience immigration. In countries such as UK, France, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands the majority of foreigners are non Europeans (ibid.).

The development in Greek demographic scene has also followed the general European trends of low population growth. The CRNI has fallen by approximately 11.5 percent between 1960 and 1999 (Eurostat 1999a, 2000a). The rate of reduction was higher during the decades of 1980 and 1990, as a direct outcome of general decrease in births (CBR) and the higher incidence of deaths (CDR) (Figure 1.6, ibid.).

Figure 1.6: The evolution of CBR, CDR, CRNI for Greece since 1960



CRNI= Crude Rate of Natural Increase CRNM= Crude Rate of Net Migration,
CRI= Crude Rate on Increase
*Provisional data

Sources: Eurostat 1999a Demographic Statistics, 2000a European Social Statistics – Demography

The graph presented in Figure 1.6 clearly shows how close the line for CRI follows that for CRNM[11] and confirms that international migration has attained a dominant position as the major determinant of the Greek growth as it accounts for almost 99% of its population growth.

As in the rest of Europe, the migratory movements experienced by Greece have had a strong influence on its population growth. Emigration was higher than immigration between the periods of 1960 and 1975. During this period the net migration (CRNM) was

[11] CRI is calculated by adding CRNM and CRNI (see footnote 9). Thus, any changes in CRNM would affect the Crude Rate of Increase.

equal to –3.6 in 1960 and –5.2 in 1970, and it exerted a negative impact on the annual population growth. However since 1975, some of these trends have reversed, and the country has since experienced an increased influx of immigrant population. In 1975 the CRNM was 6.5 per 1,000 population, and in 1990 it reached 7.0, the highest ever, and then gradually decreased to 2.4 by the end of 1990s[12] (Eurostat 1999a, 2000a).
According to the latest national census of 2001, the Greek population was estimated at 10,939,771 inhabitants, over an area of 131,957 square km, incorporating an increase of just 3,306,970 people over the last 50 years (Table 1.4).

Table 1.4: Population growth in Greece, censuses 1951-2001

Year	Total Population (thousand)	Annual Growth Rate (%)	Inhabitants (per square km)
1951	7,632,801	0.39	58.3
1961	8,388,553	0.99	64.1
1971	8,768,872	0.45	66.5
1981	9,739,589	1.11	73.8
1991	10,259,900	0.53	77.7
2001	10,939,771	0.66	82.9

Source: NSSG, Statistics on Population, various years.

1.3 CHANGES IN FAMILY STRUCTURE AND FORMATION

Alongside the wholesale changes in the demographic map of Europe, changes in the family structure and social behaviour have also taken place (Van de Kaa 1987). The areas affected by the changes include marriages, divorce, single parent families, co-habitation, and family size, are discussed and examined below. However, certain limitations exist in the comparison of international data. The data available on families are mostly provided by the national statistical offices of each country, and often there are dissimilarities in the

[12] A more elaborate picture of the evolution of the migratory trends in Greece: It is estimated that during the period 1956-1976 approximately 1,207,000 Greek emigrated, who headed mainly towards Canada, Australia and major European countries (Papadakis and Siampos 1995). The greatest proportions of those emigrants were economically active populations, with direct and grave effects on the population replacement, especially, in remote rural areas. Furthermore, the 1973 era witnessed the prevalence of return migration over emigration. Between the period 1968 to 1985 around 858,000 emigrants returned to their place of origin and to smaller towns contributing to a certain reconstruction of the demographic forces on the periphery (Poulopoulou 1994). Additionally between the period 1989-92 Greece faced a new reality of the foreign immigrant settlement. Since then Greece has been progressively transformed from a country sending labour force abroad into a country that receives immigrant workers, especially from neighbouring countries, as well as from African and Asian nations. The figures were approximately 40,000 in 1993, mounted up to 60,000 in 1992, raising further to 153,000 in 1991 (Council of Europe 1994).

method adopted to record such information in each country. Often the very definition of a family unit has been found to vary[13] (Appleton and Hantrais 2000).

1.3.1 Marriages, Divorces, Age at First Marriage and First Birth


Marriages, divorces, separation, cohabitation, widowhood and remarriage, collectively called nuptiality in demography, is of particular interest to demographers. Their importance stems *'partly from their relationship with the age at which sexual relations begin and end, and partly with the formation and dissolution of families and households'* (Newell 1994, p.90). In addition, they are also found to influence fertility (Bongaarts 1978; Bongaarts and Potter 1983). Nuptiality and the person's age at which it happens (especially for women), are clearly related to the reproductive behaviour and the general low or high fertility trends of the population (ibid.).

Marriages and Divorces

The general trends in marriages and divorces observed among the European member states are summarised in Figure 1.7 below. The figures in the graph are absolute numbers and provide an indication of the general direction of the trends of marriages, first marriages and divorces over the last 40 years. The number of marriages contracted each year has steadily decreased, whereas the number of marriages ending in divorce has increased over the period.

[13] Definitions vary from country to country particularly with respect to age of children and dependency; with respect to defining lone-parent families and reconstituted families where a cohabiting stepfather is included in the household; with respect to consensual unions and the duration that a couple lives together, with respect to same sex cohabitation or married couples or with respect to the method of recording place of residence of individuals when the census data was recorded. In addition to these differences there are also various cultural constraints. For example in the Mediterranean countries with strong catholic or orthodox traditions or in Ireland where there is a strong catholic tradition, it has been argued that it is possible for the people to be more reluctant to giving the real picture of their living arrangements (Appleton and Hantrais 2000).

Figure 1.7: Marriage, first marriages and divorce in EU-15, 1960-1999



Source: Eurostat2000a, European Social Statistics–Demography

These trends are similar in the case of Greece, as shown by the data summarised in Table 1.5. The number of marriages per 1000 population (CMR) has dropped and the stability of marriage has decreased over the period. Crude divorce rates increased from 0.3 per 1000 population in 1960 to 0.9 in 1999 (Table 1.5, Eurostat 2000a statistics).

Table 1.5: Statistics for marriages and divorces, Greece, 1960-1999

Year	Marriages	Crude Marriage Rate (CMR)	Divorces	Crude Divorce Rate (CDR)
	(1000)	*(per 1000 pop)*	*(1000)*	*(per 1000 pop)*
1960	58.2	7.0	2.5	0.3
1970	67.4	7.7	3.5	0.4
1980	62.4	6.5	6.7	0.7
1990	59.1	5.8	6.0	0.6
1999	61.8	5.9	9.5	0.9

Source: Eurostat2000a, European Social Statistics–Demography

Age at First Marriage and First Birth

The overall decline in the number of marriages has been accompanied by an increase in the mean age at first marriage for both sexes (Figure 1.8). The average age of first marriage for Europeans was 26.7 years for men and 24.1 years for women in 1960. By the end of 1990s, after fluctuating throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the EU average age at marriage for both sexes had increased by about three years. Although the age gap has closed slightly, women continued to marry at an earlier age than men.

Figure 1.8: Mean age at first marriage, EU-15, 1960, 1980, 1998 *



* data not available for 1960 and 1980 for some countries

Source: Eurostat2000a, European Social Statistics-Demography

Alongside the increase of the mean age at first marriage, an increase was also observed in the mean age of women at their first birth for all the EU-15 countries (Eurostat 2000a). For example, in Greece, the mean age of women at first birth was 23.6 years in 1975, which has since increased to 26.4 in 1995 (ibid). In the Netherlands, the figures for the corresponding years were 25.0 and 28.6 respectively (ibid).

1.3.2 Consensual Unions and Births outside Marriage

With the decline in the number of marriages (especially first marriages), informal consensual unions have become increasingly popular and more widespread. In the last 25 years, conjugal life in many countries has increasingly taken the form of cohabitation. Comprehensive statistical data about the cohabitation rates for the last four decades is not available for all the European countries. The available data indicate that in 1995 this was a more prevalent living arrangement for the Danish, Finnish, French and Swedish population than it was for the southern European countries (Table 1.6, Eurostat 2000b).


Table 1.6: Couple living in a consensual union, EU-15, 1995 (%)

Percentages of Couples Living in a Consensual Union, Europe-15, 1995															
EU-15	**BE**	**DK**	**D**	**EL**	**E**	**FR**	**IRL**	**IT**	**L**	**NL**	**AU**	**P**	**FIN**	**SW**	**UK**
7	9	23	8	1	2	15	2	2	8	14	10	3	18	15	9

Source: Eurostat 2000b, The Social Situation in the European Union

As a direct consequence of the increasing unmarried cohabitation, the number of births outside marriage have increased in European member states (Figure 1.9).

Figure 1.9: Births outside marriage, EU-15, 1960 1980 1998, (%)




Source: Eurostat 2000b, The Social Situation in the European Union

1.3.3 Household size

As a general outcome of the demographic and family structural transitions, such as the fall in fertility rates and the changes in living arrangement of the families, the household size in the European countries has shrunk over time. Data recorded in 1995 indicate that only three countries among the European member states, namely, Spain, Ireland and Portugal had an average of three or more persons per family. Denmark had the smallest average household size (2 persons), while Greece had 2.7 persons (Figure 1.10, Eurostat 1998a).

Figure 1.10: Average number of persons per household, EU-15, 1995



Source: Eurostat 1998a, Living Conditions in Europe

Conclusion

This chapter has presented some of the prominent features of the current demographic transition in the EU States. The decline and apparent stagnation of the population growth was the main feature of this transition. The significance of this is easy to understand when we compare the changes in the Crude Rate of Increase (which takes in to account the effects of migration as well) between 1960 and 1999: For the whole of EU-15 countries, this figure reduced from 7.7 per 1000 inhabitants in 1960 to 2.6 per 1000 inhabitants in 1999. The respective figures for Greece were 8 and 2.3 (Eurostat 2000a).

The fall in total fertility rates is the main factor that explains the slow down of population growth. In many European nations, the TFR has hit levels lower than the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, and in Greece, like many other EU-15 nations, this level has continued at such low levels for most part of the last decade (1.3 at present).

The other significant areas that experienced changes are mortality and population age structure. The proportion of old-age people has increased over the last 40 years. The proportion of the economically active population has so far remained more or less stable (this includes the contribution of the immigrant population). However, projections show that if the current rates of decline seen in the number of younger population continue (it has reduced to two thirds in the last 40 years), the proportion of the economically active population will also reflect a gradual decline over the next two decades. Major changes were also observed in the family formation process, continuation of the family unit and family dissolution. Alternative family forms and single-parent households have become more widespread and family and household sizes have declined. In Greece, notable changes have occurred in the form of an increased number of late marriages, divorces, and delays in the birth of the first child.

Having identified fertility decline as a major feature of the current phase of demographic transition in Europe, some relevant questions that arise from the information presented in this chapter are summarised below. These are dealt with in the ensuing chapters of this thesis:

- What are the theoretical explanations for the changes observed in the main demographic indicators, especially fertility rates?
- What are the consequences of these changes?
- How do the state, the social scientists and the public perceive these changes?
- What are the various approaches possible to tackle fertility decline?

CHAPTER 2:

THE THEORIES OF LOW FERTILITY: EXPLAINING THE CHANGES IN REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOUR

Introduction

The previous chapter identified fertility decline as the most prominent feature of the demographic transitions that Europe has undergone over the last several decades. The role of this chapter in the context of this research and its objectives is to bring together the various theoretical explanations for fertility decline in Europe. As explained in detail in the conceptual framework of this thesis (Chapter 5), this research is about analysing fertility policy debates, and therefore a knowledge of the prominent theories explaining fertility decline is important. By first understanding the academic or theoretical approach to fertility decline, it would enable comparison with the policy makers' approach to fertility decline in the ensuing chapters. This would then help to develop specific research questions to be dealt with further in this research.

A review of the literature reveals that explanatory theories are as varied and dynamic as the various countries and cultures they refer to. Based on the findings from the literature, this chapter identifies four prominent theories explaining fertility change. These are (1) The Rational Choice Theory; (2) The Theory of Risk and Uncertainty; (3) The Theory of Changing Value Systems; and (4) The Gender Equity Theory. Throughout the discussion, two questions on fertility are addressed: what are the fertility motivators (why do people have children); and what are the fertility de-motivators (why does fertility decline). The researcher's own comments are made in the form of a brief synthesis of the theories in the concluding part of the chapter, in order to help shape the conceptual framework of this thesis. A detailed discussion of all the theories is carried out in the discussion chapter alongside the findings of the empirical work of this project.

2.1 THE RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

Notestein (1945, 1953) developed some of the earlier thoughts by Thompson (1929), and suggested that fertility decline was a direct result of the rational choice made by couples

after weighing the costs/benefits of children. The observed demographic changes in Europe in the pre-war period was more responsive to the process of modernisation and the massive economic transformation that was termed 'industrialisation', than the decline of mortality (ibid.). Rapid urbanisation, the changes in the modes of production, the loosening of the hold of traditional values, the increased levels of schooling, the advance of education and rational thought, and the changes in the economic roles of women were all part of these industrialisation and modernisation processes. 'Industrialisation' and 'urbanisation' were preconditions to the general advancement of the society. This resulted in a substantial increase in the costs of rearing children, and consequently in the decrease of the benefits of children as perceived by parents. Such rapid changes to the socio-economic features of the society also led to changes in individuals' and couples' concept of family and number of children they require (Thompson 1929, quoted from Notestein 1945). They began to opt for a fewer number of children, and consequently fertility began to decline. Eventually falling birth rates converged with lower death rates, leading to little or no population growth (see also Casterline 2001; Mason 1997a).

After the Second World War, micro-economic theories that analysed the link between economic and demographic developments provided a new and systematic framework for explaining fertility changes. G. Becker, H. Leibenstein, R. Easterlin, and T. Schultz were the main proponents, who had strong interest in applying the principles of the calculus of consumer choice to topics such as demand for and quality of children.

In the 1960s, Becker developed a theory of fertility as a branch of the 'consumer choice' or the 'demand-theory'. According to Becker's theory (1960, 1981), when planning on family size, couples behave and calculate in the same way as they do when they plan the purchase of consumer durables. Children are in effect like other consumer durables, and their demand is considered to vary with income. As consumer durables, children are considered to provide 'utility' and psychological benefits, as well as incur cost in terms of time and money. Individuals decide on the optimal number of their offspring given their costs, household income and the household's relative preferences for children and other goods. They take into consideration the cost or price of the goods and the children, make considered calculation as to how the benefits of an additional child outweigh cost, as well as their disposable income (Becker 1960, 1981). The whole objective is the maximisation of utility: if higher utility can be obtained from an alternative to an additional child, then that alternative will be chosen. Thus, the decline in fertility is explained through the relative cost of a child, which has increased, and through the possibility that there has

been a change in the nature of the couple's utility function for children versus other goods (ibid. see also Adorka 1980; Friedman et.al. 1994; Ermisch 1996; Mason 1997a; Namboodiri and Wei 1998). In Becker's revised argument (Becker 1981), he emphasised that children who remained as consumer durables, were time-intensive. Thus, the opportunity costs of having children are related to the value of parent's time, which is associated with their income (See also Schultz 1987). If child care was more intensive on the mother's time than the father's time, where the mother is in employment, the value of the mother's time would increase, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of the child, and hence resulting in a preference for fewer children (Becker 1981; Schultz 1987; see also Friedman et.al. 1994).

The concept of 'utility' of children has been further developed in order to explain the relationship between changes in fertility and economic development. The concept of different benefits and cost of children *over a period of time* was one such development. The utility function or the benefits of children has three aspects to it: 1) *Consumption utility*, as a source of personal and emotional satisfaction; 2) *Work or income utility*, as benefits derived from their entry into labour force; and 3) *Security utility*, as the child would be a source of security and help for the parents in their old age (Leibenstein 1975, 1981). On the other hand the cost function (*disutilities*) of children has two aspects to it: 1) *Direct cost*, such as incurred for feeding, housing, and all the additional costs because of the presence of children; and 2) *Indirect cost* (or opportunity cost) incurred due to income-earning opportunities forgone by the parents (lost market earnings due to having children contingent upon the feasibility of combining work with children) (ibid.). The utilities and disutilities of children are influenced over time by various socio-economic characteristics of the parents. When parents begin to expect fewer monetary returns from their children, because children become more expensive in opportunity cost terms, they also begin to prefer fewer children (ibid.). This approach is however 'one - dimensional in that it measures the disutilities in monetary terms, where as in reality, the benefits of children are less easily quantifiable 'immanent values' (Coleman 1998, p.20)[1].

There is also the new concept of better 'quality children' (Becker 1960). This suggests that couples with higher income would spend some of their disposable income on the improvement of the quality of a given number of children and would not wish to have

[1] The term 'immanent values' was earlier used by Friedman et.al. (1994) when they stated that 'uncertainty reduction' is highly valued by parents in their decision to have children and that children promote risk reduction in several ways (p. 381).

more children (p.30). This new emphasis on the 'quality' rather than 'quantity' leads to increase in costs of children (Caldwell 1976, 1982). It is this increase in cost of children that results in preferences for fewer children and consequently in fertility decline. All societies are rational in their fertility behaviour, within the context of circumstances pertaining to them (ibid.). As soon as the net economic advantages from children are no longer found to be as anticipated, and as the economic utility of children diminishes to the extent that the net flow is reversed, fertility begins to decline[2].

This model of 'quality' based fertility theory, however, drew criticism because it implied the assumption that all children in the family were of the same quality and that quality was fully produced within the family in its own time using market goods and services (Andorka 1978). It was also argued that the pure demand model of fertility behaviour did not give specific consideration to the supply side or to questions of taste, preferences, or aspirations (Blake 1968; Pollak and Watkins 1993). The argument that children could not be considered analogous to consumer durables was further qualified by the following observations: 1) Choosing the number of children was not like deciding whether or not buy consumer durables; 2) Parents were unable to choose the quality of their children; 3) If parents were unsatisfied with the quality of their children, they could not change them as they could do with consumer durables; and 4) The direct costs of children were also differentiated by social classes (Blake 1968).

The demand and supply models have also been combined to achieve a synthesis of the economics and sociology of fertility. This synthesis explains fertility as the result of deliberate choice made by the couples in the same way they make decisions on production, consumption, and engagement in income-earning activities (Easterlin 1969, 1976, 1978, 1980). Preferences or tastes for the number of children in the household are similar to preferences for other goods and there are marginal rates of substitution, which express how many of the individual goods the couples are willing to trade off for an additional child. Thus, fertility decline is seen as an outcome of the process by which a family worked through its preferences for consumption and children (ibid.). Notably, this model also suggests that it is not the income observed at any point in time that influences the couples' fertility decisions (as Becker had suggested). Instead, it is the 'potential income' flow through time, including all income, which might be attained by family by the

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[2] Caldwell (1976, 1982) stated that the limits of economically rational behaviour are set by non-economic factors, such as education and demand for the family planning services.

utilisation of its total earning capacity (ibid.). Such preferences for consumption and children are heterogeneous and dynamic in the space and time continuum, and are influenced by the prevailing socio-economic characteristics[3].

Thus, in conclusion, the proponents of the rational choice theories argue that in all childbearing decisions, there is an element of informed rational decision making process. The implied assumption is that parents are fully aware of the options available to them and the consequences of a particular choice and are therefore in control of their decision making processes. A further suggestion is that in all such decision making process, the goal is maximisation of utility function of a particular choice, be it children or consumer goods. As will be discussed in detail at the end of this thesis, these assumptions and suggestions are open to significant challenges on several fronts. First of all, empirical studies that provide consistent and universal support to many of the underlying assumptions of the economic-rational theories are very few. Secondly, it will also be shown that the economic-utility function has been grossly misunderstood and even misused in the fertility policy debates and discourses, with the hope of 'enticing' people into having children.

2.2 THE THEORY OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY

The risk and uncertainty theories can be said to be a further development of rational choice theories. According to this approach, uncertainty reduction was seen as an universally immanent value that can be achieved through two different means (Friedman et.al. 1994). First, one could acquire all information necessary so that decisions could be made with little risk. Second, persons could adopt several strategies that would enable them to reduce uncertainty regarding their future actions and events (ibid. p.382). Thus, childbearing could be a rational response to the need to reduce uncertainty in life's major areas, such as in marriage and work. Marital solidarity can be achieved by the dependence of the couple on each other in cases where they are extremely compatible. It can also be achieved by their increased involvement with each other in case of '*multistrandedness*' of the relationship (through financial, occupational or other ties of common interest). This, then, reduces the couples' need to rely on children as a means to reduce the uncertainty or risk to marital stability (Friedman et.al. 1994; see also

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[3] Easterlin (1976, 1978) suggests that changes in factors such as religion, ethnical background, place of residence, social status, and education can result in different child bearing preferences.

Coleman 1998; Morgan and King 2001). However, individuals or couples with lesser or no mutual dependence due to lack of compatibility or inability to reduce uncertainty through work (because of inadequate education, skills etc), may perceive their marriage as more divorce-prone. In such cases they would seek to increase marital solidarity and reduce uncertainty by turning to childbearing (ibid.).

Similarly, the concept of risk and uncertainty is also applicable to other social and personal spheres of the individuals (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995; McDonald 2001, 2002). These risks include the risk of disruption to parental relationships caused by children; the risk of children causing parental anxiety by following different and unacceptable pathways; the risk of harm or danger to the children; the risk of relationship failure resulting in the children becoming the responsibility of the mother (or father); the risk of children bringing more trouble into a world that is rife with hardship; the risk of increase in social trends towards non child-friendly societies; and the risk of decrease in public support to families with children. Under such fears, people, women in particular, would be more inclined to decide to have less number of children to minimise their exposure to uncertainty (ibid.).

The increasing risks posed by economic uncertainties are also seen as having an influence on fertility decisions (Beck 1992, 1999; and Coleman 1998). Society has moved from an industrial society to a more 'reflexive modernity', due to the failure of the 'safety State' (welfare State) or the State's inability to protect people from risks any more (Beck 1999). As the economy continues to be increasingly led by market forces, the resultant instability has been reflected in the job market. There no longer exists the concept of a job for life. The new market economy has created a system of labour force that mainly consists of the younger and female population that no longer feel secure under the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1999; Fraser 1994). In this system, it has become the norm that those with maximum utility to the market system stand to be rewarded the most, and face the least uncertainties. This has created a need to maximise the individual's utility to the market through acquisition of marketable skills and work experience; as well as the need to accumulate savings as a safety net (Esping-Andersen 1999; McDonald 2001, 2002). Couples have also recognised the importance of dual employment in providing security against the effects of job loss of either of the partners. As a consequence of such new priorities, childbearing decisions are delayed or avoided resulting in fertility decline.

The market led economic uncertainties have also brought about new perceptions of risks specific to the modern women, in the context of weakening marital relationships. To the modern woman with educational achievements and skills equivalent to or higher than her

male counterpart, it has become imperative that she should be able to support herself and be least dependant on a man, in order not to face uncertainties in the event of relationship breakdown (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995). Therefore, as an insurance against the consequences of union disruption, investments in her own human capital have taken priority over childbearing (Joshi 1998; Morgan and King 2001).

The perception of risk and uncertainties are also said to be evaluated by couples in the context of the temporal influences of their childbearing decisions. When parents make a decision to have a child, they also make a decision to change the course of their future, and therefore their decisions will depend upon their aspirations for the future (McDonald 2001). Thus, if they perceive uncertainties in their economic, social, or personal futures, then they would adopt a risk-averse decision or pursue an opportunity that is within their reach (such as delaying or avoiding marriage or childbearing) (ibid). Lack of information or knowledge would increase the perception of uncertainty and risk. Thus, when the costs and benefits of childbearing are mostly in the future and when there is a poor understanding of that future, risk-averse decisions would be sought (McDonald 2002, p.425). Risk aversion theory, therefore, could be said to imply investment in economic security rather than in the insecurity that accompanies children (ibid.). In other words, people are keener to invest and increase their education, skills, and savings; or to attach more to the labour force by working longer hours than minimising their income for a period, incurring higher consumption expenditure and economic responsibility for their dependants.

While the influences of rational choice theories are evident in the concept of risk and uncertainty, the above discussion also indicates how the various theoretical explanations can sometimes contradict each other. If the concept of rational choice implies decisions that are based on informed judgement, then it clearly contradicts McDonald's (2001) assertion that lack of information about future events could lead to uncertainties and therefore negative childbearing decisions. The notion that couples or individuals will decide to have children to reduce certain perceived uncertainties in life or to obtain certain benefits can have significant policy implications, as it will be shown in the policy debate chapters (Chapters 3 and 4). It will be shown that suggestions such as women will have children purely to avail State benefits for single parents have their justifications based mostly on the assumptions that underlie such theories, and not on empirically proven facts.

2.3 THE THEORY OF CHANGING VALUE SYSTEMS

Human desire for childbearing has been associated with several 'immanent values', or 'social resource values' that motivate reproduction (Coleman 1998; Friedman et.al. 1994; Hoffman and Hoffman 1973; Schoen et.al. 1997). The value theories suggest that fertility begins with needs, motives, beliefs, attitudes, habits and intentions of people. These factors serve as the primary antecedents to the childbearing decision, by assisting the cognitive processes that determine people's preferences to family size (Back 1993; Bagozzi and Loo 1978; Fawcett 1970, 1973; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Hoffman and Hoffman 1973; Miller 1992; Miller and Pasta 1995; Morgan 1981, 1982, 1985; Schoen et.al. 1997; Thomson 1997; Thomson, et.al. 1990; Wu and Wang 1998).

One of the prominent systematic academic research into the motivations of parenthood in Europe was conducted by the Netherlands Inter-university Demographic Institute (NIDI), in the late 1970s[4]. The study concluded that psychological and socio-psychological factors had vital roles in explaining the observed differences in family size among the people surveyed (Moors et.al. 1976; Morsa et.al. 1979). Some of the values associated with parenthood and the psychological benefits that parents were said to derive through childbearing are summarised below (as explained by Hoffman and Hoffman 1973, pp. 47-59):

- *Adult status and social identity:* where parenthood is seen as establishing the identity of a truly mature person.
- *Expansion of the self, tie to a larger entity:* where children may be viewed as continuation of the family lineage or as a tie to the past, and generally make parents feel as an organic part of the community.
- *Morality, religion, altruism, norms regarding sexuality and impulse*: Bearing children may be viewed as an altruistic act, as one that involves giving up one's interest for the sake of another person, or as an act intended to conform to religious traditions or other social norms.
- *Primary group ties and affiliation:* where children are viewed as a source of love and means to maintain ties with close communities.
- *Stimulation, novelty and fun:* To anticipate having children is to anticipate the onset of major changes to one's life. Thus children could add elements of pleasure, fun and excitement.
- *Creativity, accomplishment and competence:* where rearing children may provide an outlet for needs to achieve and to be creative.

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[4] The results and investigations of this research are referenced by H.G. Moors et.al. (1976).

- *Power over others, influence:* childbearing may change parent's power in the community.
- *Social comparison, competition:* children may give their parents prestige and competitive advantage in terms of sexuality, fecundity and marital success.

Coleman (1998) later attached further values to parenthood:

- *Vicarious achievement potential:* where children are seen as a second chance, to overcome own failures and achieve own ambitions through them.
- *Curiosity factor:* that encourage people to try everything at least once.

While the above can be said to be individual childbearing motivators, there are other collective motivators that shape the societal norms and expectations from individuals in relation to childbearing. Children can be viewed as 'public goods' that can be used as potential workers, warriors, mates and citizens (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995, p.11). Also, human reproduction is the ultimate source of an economic system's labour input. Societal institutions such as the work place, religion, and the family network can encourage (or discourage) fertility intentions based on their value systems and by promoting pro-natalist or anti-natalist values (Morgan and King 2001, p.4). For example, Ireland's higher levels of fertility rates have been attributed to strong pro-natalist values promoted by Ireland's Catholic church (Gauthier 1996b; Hantrais and Letablier 1996).

While the value theories have been used to explain the fertility motivators, equally compelling theories based on changes in culture, ideologies and social value systems have been propounded to explain the declining fertility in several parts of Europe. The context in which the issue of cultural and ideological changes came up in developed societies during the latter half of the twentieth century (from the 1960s) has been termed *as 'beyond the demographic transition* (Campbell 1974) or the *'Second Demographic Transition'* (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986)[5]. This period was characterised by the increase of divorce rates, the rise of consensual unions and the decrease of nuptiality, as well as by remarkable advances in technology, that facilitated highly efficient methods of contraception, sterilisation and abortions. Such developments led to the changes in family formation-behaviour, family roles and size, as well as decline in fertility. The theory of changing value systems suggests that the above changes in social and demographic behaviour have been driven by the growth of the ideologies of self-fulfilment, liberalism and freedom from traditional forces of authority, particularly religion, freedom of choice,

personal development and changing lifestyle (Cliquet 1991; Hall and White 1995; Lesthaeghe and Moors 1996; Murphy 1992; Sporton 1993; van de Kaa 1987, 1997b). These changes in the value system of the individuals have resulted in a weakening of the family as an institution. These changes also transformed individual's attitudes towards fertility regulation and the motivation for parenthood (ibid.).

Cliquet's (1991) interpretation of the changing value systems may be studied as an example: Three important shifts in the value orientation of people were perceived - *'pluralisation'* or *'secularisation'*, *'democratisation'* and *'individualisation'* - all of which had an impact on fertility. First, there was a shift in the socio-cultural movement that was associated with the development of a broad pluralisation and secularisation, and new values and opportunities appeared[6] as a consequence. The *norm-enforcing bodies shifted from 'exterior' (such as the churches and other authorities) to 'interior' sources (such as the individual)* (ibid. p.54). The relegation of religion from the public to the private sphere over the last decades gave individuals the freedom to choose from plural value systems (Sporton 1993, p.58).

The trend of *'democratisation'* was a consequence of the ideologies of equality and emancipation (Cliquet 1991). Family relationships between husbands and wives, parents and children, began to be based on an equal footing. Both the spouses began to have equal input in the decision making processes within the household. This democratisation process extended to decisions on childbearing as well and the co-partnership in the family led to an increased rationality in the choice of the number of children and consequently led to lower fertility (ibid.).

The third trend of *'individualisation'* was associated with the social and economic changes of the recent decades that improved and modernised the living conditions (Cliquet 1991). As a result of such socio-economic changes individual livelihood and emancipation no longer depended on the concepts such as *'life time family structures'* or *'family size is a factor of strength'*. Such concepts lost much of their significance as the individual and the family function was largely taken over by *'larger entities exceeding the family, such as market-tied bodies or authorities'* (ibid. p.49). In pre-industrial societies high fertility was

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[5] Lestaeghe and van de Kaa (1986), 'Bevolking: groei en krimp' (Population: Growth and Shrinkage). This publication on the reproductive and relational changes that have occurred in Western Europe since the 1960s, debates whether or not Europe is experiencing a Second Demographic Transition.

[6] Lestaeghe and Wilson (1986) had previously analysed the role of secularisation in leading towards Fertility Decline in Western Europe during 1870-1930 period.

considered equivalent to insurance. The larger the number of family members, the more the needs of the family that would have to be fulfilled (Cain 1983; Caldwell 1980, 1982; Smith 1986). In modern societies larger societal mechanisms provided the material satisfactions that a family derived through its children (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). In a similar way, increasing number of women became independent of their husbands or other family members (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995; Smith 1986)[7]. This change was described by Cliquet (1991) as a *'deinstitutionalisation'* and *'delegalisation'* process. Thus with the raising emphasis on individualism, privatisation and ownership of formerly community interests, and the spread of consumerism as the basis of individual ambition, there began a shift in importance from the children to the couples and the individuals[8].

The effects of transformed value systems do not stay within the individuals or the societies who were exposed to such transformations. There is also a different dimension to the process of changing social values and attitudes towards children, termed as the process of 'innovation and diffusion' (Rogers 1962, 1995). The changes in attitudes and behaviours, and the new and plural value forms that appeared in the society are part of behavioural innovation (ibid.). Amongst its different manifestations, such behavioural transformations also include an acceleration of social acceptance towards the innovative exercise of deliberate fertility control through the practice of contraception and abortion (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Casterline 1999; Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Retherford and Palmore 1983; Rogers 1973, 1995). This is then followed by a process of 'diffusion' whereby such behavioural transformations spread out beyond the limits of social structural changes, with its own pace and characteristics, thereby uniquely affecting the timing and pace of fertility changes (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Casterline 2001)[9].

The observations that societal and individual value systems have evolved over time is indeed a fact. However, what the value theories fail to prove empirically is that such changing values have also affected people's preferences for children. The discussion chapter will show how scientific evidence shows that even in societies with low fertility rates, there is still a preference for a higher number of children than what people actually

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[7] Here the emphasis is on the shift in trends of women's dependency on men and their family.

[8] Van de Kaa (1987) underlined this phenomenon by contrasting the shift in importance from the children (*king child)* of the early 20th century to the couples (*king pair)* of today.

[9] In some other cases it has also been stated that the diffusion and innovation theory can substitute the theories that feature the economic and social structural changes (Cleland and Wilson 1987). However, Retherford (1985) and Montgomery and Casterline (1996) argued that diffusion theory and socio-economic factors were rather a complementary set of explanations of fertility decline.

have. The theory of changing value systems does not adequately explain the gap that exists between the preferred or desired number of children and the actual number of children that couples have. The implications of such assumptions on policy debates will become evident in the discussion of the empirical work in this thesis.

2.4 GENDER EQUITY THEORY

The concept of gender equity in the past has mostly been associated with either 'equality' or 'difference', where equality meant treating women exactly like men, and where difference meant treating women differently insofar as they differed from men (Fraser 1994, p.594). Gender equity is a complex notion that comprises a plurality with distinct normative principles that aim to attain equal respect for women and men; equal access to resources for men and women, equality of capabilities; and the equality of participation in socially valued activities (ibid., pp.595-601)[10].

In attempting to explain the reasons for fertility decline in the developed nations, one of the more recent theoretical approaches has linked the levels of gender equity in the society to its fertility trends. This approach suggests two components to the gender equity theory of fertility trends. The first component applies to those societies where its institutions have a strong orientation towards individualism (McDonald 2000a, 2000b). With the acceptance of individualistic ideologies, women in these societies have achieved higher levels of equality with men in most areas including education and employment. They have also acquired and exerted new decision making powers within the family, including childbearing decisions (ibid). Thus, when women are in control of their own fertility decisions, fertility could decline from previously high to new moderate levels (ibid.). Such moderate fertility levels combined with increasing levels of gender equity would cause further rapid decline of fertility to very low levels (ibid.). The second component applies to those societies that are family-oriented. Such societies are founded on the traditional family model of the 'male bread winner - and female house person' that requires the man to be the provider and protector and the woman to be the reproducer and carer. In these societies, the social institutions are characterised by low levels of

[10] Fraser (1994), analysed the idea of gender equity as a compound of five distinct normative principles: the *Antipoverty principle;* the *Antiexploitation principle* (preventing exploitation of vulnerable people); *Equality principle* (in respect to the distribution of real per capita income, the distribution of leisure-time, and social status); *Antimarginalization principle* (promoting women's full participation on par with men in all areas of social life); and *Antiandrocentrism principle* (challenging the view that only men's traditional activities are fully human). She concluded that when all of those norms are respected then gender equity can be achieved (p. 595).

gender equity and high levels of incoherence between these institutions (McDonald 2000a, 2000b). Such incoherence in the context of low gender equity can lead to low fertility levels (ibid.).

McDonald's observation of links between gender equity and fertility levels appears to be contradictory at several points. For example, it is hypothesised that fertility will only rise from very low levels if gender equity moves to high levels in family-oriented institutions (McDonald 2000b, p.10). However, it is also suggested that if women are provided with opportunities near to equivalent to those of men, and if children act as obstructions to utilising these opportunities, then they would seek to restrict children, leaving fertility at very low levels (ibid. p.11). This second observation brings about several questions. First, how would it be possible to increase gender equity without giving women opportunities that are equal to those enjoyed by men? Second, why would children be perceived as an obstruction? If such obstructions are due to children being dependent on their mothers for care, then perhaps alternative childcare facilities (or lack of it) should receive due attention as gender equity? This then raises the question as to why do individual oriented countries with high gender equity and relatively better childcare facilities (supported by State) still have low fertility?

The gender equity approach has policy implications too. While gender equity levels are relatively high in individual oriented institutions, nonetheless there is much room for improvement. Therefore, if the concepts of the above approach are empirically valid, then there is limited or no scope for fertility policy tools based on gender equity principles. This is because the approach suggests that gender equity could lead to fertility decline. Similarly, the approach does not clarify how increasing gender equity can help increase fertility rates in family oriented institutions. The discussion part of this thesis looks at how such assumptions and approaches can sometimes lead to misinterpretations and deviation from the real issues such as childcare facilities and social provisions, which need to be in the focus at policy level.

2.5 OTHER PROXIMATE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE FERTILITY

Fertility variations have also been explained based on biological factors, or 'intermediate fertility variables' (Davis and Blake 1956). Reproductive behaviour involves three necessary phases, namely 'intercourse', 'conception' and 'completion of gestation' (ibid.).

There is a set of eleven factors known as proximate determinants of fertility[11], which play a role in the chain of events that determine the exposure to intercourse, the risk of conception and the outcome of a pregnancy (ibid.). Fertility outcome is based on the influence of some of the main proximate determinants such as marriage (age at marriage and marital disruption); fecundity; frequency of intercourse; use and effectiveness of contraception and abortion (induced or spontaneous) (Bongaarts 1976, 1978)[12].

The significance of marriage as a factor in deciding fertility outcomes is obvious. Marriage is the socially accepted institution for family formation, and provides the stability that is considered to be necessary for childbearing. However, with the societal changes that have manifested in the family forms, the number of marriages have decreased, alongside increase in divorces as well as less stable family forms such as unmarried cohabitation. Such changes are said to increase the perception of uncertainties associated with the stability of relationships as discussed earlier, and consequently lead to delay or avoidance of childbearing decisions.

Another significant determinant of fertility is the age at marriage. If women marry at an early age, then they start to have children earlier (Beets et.al. 1994; Bongaarts 1978; Pinnelli and Rose 2001). The postponement of marriage contributes to low fertility levels by reducing the length of a woman's marital reproductive life, because a woman's reproductive ability is related to her age. Thus the later a marriage or when a stable relationship occurs, the shorter is her reproductive span (Beet et.al. 1994; Bongaarts 1978; Pinnelli and Rose 2001; Rahman and Menken 1993). In addition, as women's ages increase, it not only reduces their ability to conceive, but also reduces the final number of children they have (Kohler and Ortega 2001; Kohler et.al. 2001).

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[11] The eleven proximate determinants which Davis and Blake (1956) identified were the following: 1. Age of entry into sexual unions; 2. Permanent celibacy: proportion of women never entering sexual unions; 3. Amount of reproductive period spent after or between unions; 4. Voluntary abstinence; 5. Involuntary abstinence; 6. Coital frequency; 7. Fecundity or infecundity as affected by involuntary causes; 8. Use or non use of contraception; 9. Fecundity or infecundity as affected by voluntary causes; 10. Foetal mortality from involuntary causes; 11. Foetal mortality from voluntary causes.

[12] Based on the definitions given in textbooks concerning the terminology of reproductive behaviour *fertility* refers to actual reproduction, whereas *fecundity* denotes the ability to reproduce. A woman is considered fertile if she bears a child, while she is considered fecund if she is able to bear a live child. *Natural fertility* is when human population makes no deliberate efforts to limit birth, while *controlled fertility* is when control practices are widespread and human population makes conscious and intentional efforts to effect or control birth. *Natural fecundability* is the monthly probability of conception in the absence of contraception, and *controlled fecundability* refers to the conception risk in the presence of contraception (Akhter and Khan 1997; Bongaarts and Potter 1983; Knodel 1983; Pressat 1972).

Use of modern contraceptive methods, easy access to family planning and safe abortion are also seen as causal factors of fertility decline. With the legalisation of such facilities, people are able to choose whether or not to become parents at any time during their reproductive life-span. The technological advances made in the areas of safe sterilisation and induced abortion, and the attitudinal changes that gave social approval to the adoption of such practices transformed people's ability to make reproductive choices (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995, p.14). Such facilities have also given people the option to enjoy sex purely as a source of recreation, than a means of procreation (Coleman 1998).

Factors such as contraception and abortion have high policy significance and implication. The clash between individual's liberty and freedom of choice and the assertions of those who oppose such activities on religious, ethical and political grounds have always existed. It is a fact that use of contraception and abortion prevents childbirth, which in turn can have an effect on fertility rates of a country. However, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that birth control measures are the main reason for fertility decline. Nonetheless, the political pressure to regulate such activities, as it will be seen in the following chapter, has always been present.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to understand how the studies in the field of demography have tried to explain causalities of fertility decline. The discussion of the four prominent theories proves that all of the theoretical explanations overlapped each other. For example, the rational choice principles, on which the economic-rational concepts are based are equally applicable to the theories of risk and uncertainty. When couples make decisions to avoid, delay or even engage in parenthood decisions based on their acquisition of knowledge of risks and uncertainties involved, they are indeed making rational choices and decisions. In the same way, if people decide to have children in order to benefit from their immanent values, such decisions must surely be the result of a process of rational thought. In fact, if the available theoretical explanations are considered and applied, it would be impossible to judge any of the fertility decisions as not an outcome of some form of rational thinking process. The links between the proximate factors and the various theories that preceded its discussion are also easily identifiable. Once people have arrived at a decision to have or not to have children, they execute such decisions by managing the various proximate factors associated with them. For example, if a woman decides to pursue education and a career in order to reduce the

uncertainties in her life, she may perhaps delay entry into marriage, or resort to birth control facilities if she is already in a relationship. This brings us easily to the conclusion that fertility decline could be an outcome of all of the various factors discussed in the different theoretical perspectives. However, what would be less easy to conclude is the extent and direction of influence of these multitude of factors, which are said to affect and influence the childbearing decisions. For, many of the factors identified by these theoretical concepts can have influences on each other, without having any direct influence on fertility outcome. For example, for those individuals with high income, the economic utilities of children may not be a deciding factor in their childbearing decisions. However, it may be the case that their level of education or employment status or other factors influenced their income. Thus, it would be difficult to establish exactly the nature of influence all of these individual factors have in determining their fertility outcome.

It is also notable that the theories often present contradicting concepts, and insufficient empirical evidence to validate underlying assumptions. Fertility experiences of different societies are diverse, where as the theories and assumptions are very few. Attempts to generalise such theories and assumptions could have significant implications when applied to fertility policy debates. It could result in policy debates and policy measures being driven by assumptions rather than facts pertinent to the realities and experiences of the policy target group. Thus, the policy makers are faced with certain informational challenges in that they need to be sufficiently informed of the ground realities as experienced by individuals and couples, whom they aim to influence. They could address such challenges through several channels. They could seek to understand the theoretical explanations on causalities of fertility decline and fertility motivators. More importantly, they could also seek empirical evidence specific to the settings in which they operate as policy makers, to corroborate the theories. Where such corroboration is not achieved, the underlying assumptions should be challenged. This should then enable the policy makers to decide whether the theoretical knowledge on fertility decline available to them is adequate and suitable to help develop policies that will delay, stop or reverse fertility decline.

Through an extensive evaluation of fertility policy debates in Europe and Greece, the ensuing two chapters examine the extent to which policy makers have risen up to the above discussed informational challenges. The key questions that would shape the structure and content of these chapters are:

- Does knowledge on universal causes of fertility decline, automatically imply knowledge

of solutions to fertility decline – bearing in mind solutions are seldom applicable universally, and usually need to be specific to the characteristics of the country or community to which they are applied.

- What are the origins of the idea that State intervention through policy measures are required to address fertility decline?
- Are the policy debate processes truly informed of the local realities as experienced by the target groups for policy measures? Are they biased and prejudiced by the universal nature of the fertility theories and their implied assumptions of universal applicability?

CHAPTER 3:

ADDRESSING FERTILITY DECLINE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY APPROACH

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the prominent theories on causalities of fertility decline. It also discussed how these theoretical explanations posed various challenges to the policy makers who are involved in fertility policy debates and policy development. The aim of this chapter is to review the literature on the origin and development of fertility and family policy[1] debates in Europe. It also aims to understand how the various policy makers in Europe have risen to the challenge of matching theories with the fertility experiences of the specific settings in which they operate. The chapter is divided into five sub-sections with specific objectives as follows: Fertility policy being the subject of this chapter, the first section briefly defines fertility policy, its aims and objectives and its significance among the broader family and population policies. In the second section, fertility is examined as the main indicator of the demographic changes, and the debates on consequences of fertility decline are studied. The third section examines the debates on policy approaches to fertility decline, that is, whether the State should intervene through explicit or implicit policy measures, or not intervene at all. These developments are charted in chronological order, to plot the evolution of varying attitudes towards the issue of population 'expansion' and 'decline'. The fourth section presents various debates on the types of policy measures that are seen as necessary to address fertility decline. The final section gives a brief analysis based on the implementation of policies across Europe, and evidence of their effectiveness.

3.1 POPULATION, FAMILY AND WELFARE POLICIES: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP

Population policies may be defined as public policies developed by a government to influence population size, growth and composition. Thus, a public policy intended to influence the demographic variable of fertility could be called fertility policy. Fertility

[1] Fertility, Family and Population Policies are defined in section 3.1.

policies and other public policies such as family policies and social welfare policies are often inter-linked because some of them can involve the same measures, but with different objectives. Population policies may be categorised as explicit and implicit. Through explicit policies, the government intends to influence the country's population growth, composition, or distribution. Implicit population policies are wider social and family welfare policies, which can also influence population growth, composition or distribution. Childcare benefits for example, are intended to help families with the cost of childcare. At the same time, the presence of such benefits is also expected to motivate couples to have children or at least remove some of the financial obstructions that may dissuade them from having children. Similarly, socio-economic development policies for example, on education, housing, or health, are also thought to have an indirect influence on demographic indicators such as fertility rates (Appleton and Hantrais 2000; Bardier 1994, 1995). In policy debates, explicit policies are sometimes perceived as interventionist policies due to the fact that the State aims to intervene in people's fertility decisions through targeted policies. However, although implicit policies are sometimes referred to as non-interventionist policies, it could be argued that this need not be strictly true. For example, if a wider social welfare policy is introduced with the intention of it also influencing people's fertility decision, it could be argued to be an implicit interventionist policy.

Based on the above definitions, family policies are implicit population policies, because their primary objective is not to effect changes in family size. Their objectives are more related to the redistribution of economic resources so as to eliminate differences in the standards of living for households with and without children (Bardier 1995). These are policies, which intentionally target specific actions in order to have an impact on family's resources, its well being and enhancement.

Up to mid 1990s family policy was not identified as a specific policy area in Europe and there was no operational definition for it (Hantrais and Letablier 1996). Legislation on childcare, maternity, parental leave, as well as other work-time arrangements was under an umbrella of equal opportunities policies or health and social protection policies (ibid. p.142)[2]. Thus, often it is difficult to differentiate between family and population policies (Hantrais and Letablier 1996; Moussourou 1994). Several advanced countries have

[2] An explanation of this lack of agreement lies in national ideological and political differences in the approach to family policy between the member states (Hantrais and Letablier 1996).

focused their attention on the adoption of measures aimed at assisting couples and parents with children. Such measures that are part of the family policy can indirectly affect fertility. Therefore, they may be said to also have an implicit demographic objective, and can also be considered as part of population policy, more specifically as part of a pro-natalist policy (Gauthier 1996a, p. 4-5). The overlapping relationship between fertility and family policy can be explained also through the fact that nowadays, most governments are very cautious when expressing explicitly their demographic objectives for fear of being criticised of infringing people's freedom of choice. Thus, while fertility policies may exist by definition, in most cases it is the social welfare and protection policies that shape and direct fertility policies (Hantrais and Letablier 1996; Hantrais and Lohkamp-Himmighofen 1999).

3.2 DEBATES ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF FERTILITY DECLINE

The first chapter identified fertility, mortality and migration as the three main demographic indicators and provided a snapshot of the demographic trends experienced in Europe as seen through these indicators. The theoretical discussions in the second chapter underlined the importance of fertility as the main demographic indicator. This section examines how consequences of fertility changes were perceived and responded to in academia, public and other non-governmental institutions, as well as the State. It also studies the origin of the notion that State intervention through policy initiatives is essential to reverse the declining fertility trends.

3.2.1 The Academic Perspectives of the Population Pessimists

In the context of declining fertility rates in Europe, there emerged a group of 'population pessimists'[3] who agree on the perceived negative consequences of declining fertility (discussed in the following sections). The arguments of these 'population pessimists' are based on the perceived medium and long-term economic impact of low or below replacement level fertility. Low fertility could result in labour shortages and consequently slow the economy, forcing the State to rely on immigrant workers (Bagavos and Martin 2001; Buti et.al. 1998, 2000; Chesnais 1998). Projections for some countries that

[3] Those who view population decline as an undesirable factor.

experience low fertility, low labour participation[4] and low to moderate immigration, such as Greece and Italy, show that an immediate increase in labour force participation and immigration are essential to maintain or moderately increase the labour supply over the next thirty to fifty years (McDonald and Kippen 2000). However, in the long term, increase in fertility levels is essential to achieve sufficient labour supply (ibid.).

Another argument from those who support population growth relates to ageing and changing age structure of the population. It is evident that the number of retirees is growing, and this will continue to be so as the baby boom generation reaches retirement age. This has led to concerns that the ageing population would continue to make greater demands on the State budget for care for the elderly (Bagavos and Martin 2001; Buti et.al. 1998; 2000; Chesnais 1998; Green and Owen 1995; Hugman 1994). The 1996 Eurostat data, which shows that the ratio of social expenditure to GDP in EU has increased from 19% in 1960 to 28.5% in 1990, bolsters such concerns (Eurostat 1996b)[5]. In 1985 the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) for Public Policy Research argues that fewer younger workers and fresher ideas could ultimately lead to disruption of the economic activities, stasis and eventual decline (Wattenberg and Zinsmeister 1985, quoted by McIntosh and Crane 1986, p.236). In countries like Japan and those in the West, where internal migration and birth groups have reached their peak points, there is already a shrinking demand for amenities and goods such as housing, furniture, cars and other services (Chesnais 1998). The increase in direct and indirect cost of labour (pension, health, taxes) due to ageing, could result in the permanent migration of capital and movement of enterprises out of the country into areas that have a balance in the proportion of young and old age population (ibid.).

Loss of political and cultural dominance of Europe in the world are some other consequences foreseen (Chesnais 1998). In 1985, using population projections up to 2150, Ben J. Wattenberg and Karl Zinsmeister of American Enterprise Institute (AEI) predicts that by 2150 the Soviet bloc and the other emerging nations would overtake the political and cultural dominance of the West (McIntosh and Crane 1986, p.235). Their projections show that by 2150, the population of Soviet bloc would have reached over 525

[4] Low labour participation could result from a combination of factors including higher rate of continuing participation in education by the younger population; lower levels of female employment participation; and early retirement policies.

[5] Projections carried out in the 11 EU member states also suggest that under unchanged policy conditions, the ratio of public pension expenditure to GDP will increase by up to 4% over the next 30 years (Franco and Munzi 1996, quoted by Buti et.al. 2000, p.16).

million, where as the combined population of the Western bloc (North America, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Japan) would have declined from 900 million in 2020 to less than 475 million in 2150. McIntosh and Crane (1986) have justifiably disregarded such long-term projections as meaningless due to the inherent uncertainty with such long-term projections. They argue that socio-political changes, advances in international relations, alliances, technology and so forth, could mean that success at international political and cultural dominance, and even a war, may not necessarily depend on the population number of a nation (p. 235). In addition, these projections do not discuss whether the Soviet bloc and the emerging nations themselves are likely to experience a demographic transition whereby their population will begin to decline.

3.2.2 The Academic Perspectives of the Population Optimists

While the population pessimists who called for radical State intervention have dominated policy in Europe, there are also those who believe that low population is desirable. Some of the arguments of these 'population optimists' directly contradict those put by the pessimist lobby.

The earlier references to concerns over growing population can be found in the 18th century Malthusian thesis, which held a pessimistic view on high population growth due to its perceived negative socio-economic effects (Malthus 1798). In the more recent past, the Zero Population Growth lobby of the 1970s became a strong public voice in countries like the UK and US (Gauthier 1996b). They viewed that the decline in fertility helped to reduce the problem of environmental degradation associated with high population growth, and therefore discouraged State intervention to increase fertility rates (ibid. p.127).

Meadows et.al. (1972) predict that population growth rather than decline would lead to sudden collapse of industry and society in the next 100 or so years. This is in exact contradiction to the AEI prediction of ultimate economic and market decline in the next 150 years due to population decline (discussed earlier). The predicted military consequences of fertility decline are criticised as unfounded and presumptuous attempts to establish that military or political changes are effects of fertility decline (McIntosh and Crane 1986). Suggestions that the Western cultural impact and dominance in the world would be lost due to population decline are also criticised. While values such as democracy and supremacy of individual freedom are universal virtues, there needs to be opportunities to encourage and develop other values and cultures as may be preferred by

other societies (ibid.). Moreover, the success of spreading western values will largely depend on their own merits than in their ability to forcefully convert other states' foreign policies and weaponry or even fertility rates for that matter (ibid.).

There is also the argument that State should not intervene via policy measures to increase fertility rates. The role of the State is rather, to help the economy and society to adjust to the consequences of demographic trends (Demeny 1987). The United States and its sustained economic development in the absence of any explicit pro-natalist policies in a low fertility backdrop is quoted as an example (ibid.). In addition, the State's attempt to tamper with fertility trends that are the results of choices between consenting individuals, could be seen as interfering with individual freedom and liberty (ibid.). Thus, state intervention could prove politically, ideologically as well as practically costlier than measures that aim to help the society and economy to adjust to the consequences of low fertility (ibid.). In order to adjust to the predicted labour shortages and possible impact on the economy, some solutions such as increasing labour force participation of women; increasing retirement age; and increasing migration, are suggested or are adopted recently by several European member states (George 1996b; McDonald and Kippen 2000). This would help to maintain the labour supply of most EU nations at adequate levels over the next 50 years (McDonald and Kippen 2000) [6].

The lack of consensus regarding consequences of fertility decline as well as lack of scientific evidence to support projections and predictions are also pointed out, in support of a non alarmist stance. For example some of the prominent past demographic predictions proved to be completely wrong and failed to predict the baby boom or the sudden baby bust era (Demeny 1987). Ignoring the fact that demographic predictions are often subject to varying degrees of margin of error, the economic implications of declining fertility and ageing have often been overplayed as they tend to ignore both the ability of a country to support its economy, and the influential role of other social factors in the economy (George 1996b)[7].

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[6] Exceptions are cases with very low fertility rates such as Greece, Spain and Italy, where immediate action to increase fertility levels in addition to such measures are required to sustain long-term labour supply (McDonald and Kippen 2000).

[7] George (1996b) argues that there is an unreasonable pessimistic interpretation of the recent demographic facts and their assumed cost implications. He explains that in the case of productivity and economy the size of the future working population is not possible to be predicted accurately as there is an extended education (part and full-time), do not know the future unemployment trends or the degree of withdrawal from the labour market.

3.2.3 The Public Perspectives

As early as the late 19th century, ideologies of pro-natalism began to spread out to the wider society, reflecting the attitudes and beliefs of the elites and intellectuals of that period, who championed the nationalistic cause. The French were among the leading proponents of pro-natalism and formed the first pro-natalist organisation in 1896, which called for radical pro-natalist policies to be adopted by the State (Gauthier 1996b, for details see p.20). Several other public organisations linked to family associations soon emerged, most of them demanding immediate State intervention in order to restrict or ban birth control measures (ibid.).

Some of the recent efforts to understand the public perception of the changing demographic and fertility trends[8], suggested that such perceptions were complex and fell into several categories. The majority of the public viewed the demographic and family changes with worry, anxiety and fear. They viewed the declining trend of natural population growth as undesirable, and were also unsatisfied by the predictions for future growth trends. However, the majority of the public also viewed the increasing number of elderly as positive, because they related it to the improvement of life expectancy of those people, benefits that they themselves hoped to enjoy in the course of their life. Concerning migration, the majority of the respondents demanded a stronger government control and 'closed boundary' policies (Bonifazi and Kamarás 1998).

Another study conducted by The National Institute for Population Research in Italy (Misiti 2000) found that on certain issues such as declining fertility and the general dynamics of population, ordinary people had access to good information. On the other hand, on the more emotionally challenging questions like the presence of immigrants and the decline of native population, the public were seen to be influenced by ideological bias[9].

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[8] Survey of the European Attitudes on Population, Family and Welfare (Population Policy Acceptance Survey), carried out between September 1990 and December 1992, co-ordinated by H.Moors and P. Palomba (see Moors and Palomba 1995; Palomba and Moors 1998). Bonifazi and Kamarás (1998), both contributors on the PPA survey, highlight that the result of the study cannot necessarily be considered as a value judgement of European public opinion although it may be said to be representative of the geographic area covered by Europe. The countries represented in the survey were Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland. However as individual countries had the option not to respond to all the questions, information captured by the survey was not complete (Moors and Palomba 1995).

[9] The aim of the research was to examine the relationship between public opinion and demographic information, and to consider how the information is transmitted by the media. There were no fertility specific objectives to this research.

3.2.4 The State's Perspectives

The state's interest in fertility matters in the form of survival of children has always existed in the society and government involvement only formalised that social interest in fertility (McNicoll 1998, p.13)[10]. In Europe, the 19th century and early 20th century projections of a declining fertility and low population numbers caused wide spread concerns among the political establishments. Such concerns related to the impact on political and military dominance of Europe over the rest of the world (Guathier 1996b). Fertility rates had dropped from around five children per woman in the late 19th century to two or below by the 1930s. This initiated several alarming projections that predicted very low future population sizes in Europe (as low as 4.4m in the case of England and Wales by 2035) (Glass 1940, p.84)[11].

However, after World War II, the demographic trends reversed quashing the predictions of a population decline in Europe. From the 1940s to the late 1960s, fertility rates in most European countries increased by an average of 0.3 to 0.5 children per woman leading to the 'baby boom' era (Sporton 1993, p.51). Thus, following the war, the population issue was taken off the political agenda in many countries (ibid.)[12].

By the late 1960s, fertility rates began to decline again in most European countries, triggering yet another phase of State concerns over its potential consequences. This time however, loss of military dominance hardly emerged as an issue as the process of de-colonisation had already begun. The French were concerned about the effect on social dynamism due to an ageing population with a disproportionately low younger age group. In Belgium, fuelled by linguistic rivalries, there were concerns that the Dutch-speaking group had higher population than the French speaking side (Catholic University of Louvain 1975, p.68; quoted by Guathier 1996b). By the early 1990s, fertility levels reached below replacement levels in many European countries including Greece and Italy. This caused

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[10] Glass's earlier studies provide some historic evidence that support such an observation: During the Roman Empire, Augustus sought to encourage child bearing and prevent family disintegration by introducing laws; In the more recent past, during the 17th and 18th centuries, countries such as France, Spain, Prussia and Italy sought State interventions to encourage population growth (Glass 1940).

[11] Gauthier (1996b) mentions some of the other influential works: *The Menace of Underpopulation* by Charles (1936); *The International Birth Strike* (Der internationale Geburtenstreik) by Kahn (1930) and the highly influential *Crisis in the Population Question* (Kris i Befolkningsfragan) by Myrdal and Myrdal (1934).

[12] An exception was Germany, where low levels of fertility persisted even after the end of the war. This led to concerns by the chancellor that an increasingly ageing population and a reducing proportion of younger economically active group would render social care inadequate (Sporton 1993).

further political concerns about the socio-economic impacts such as population ageing and its consequences on possible labour shortages and immigration.

3.3 DEBATES ON POLICY APPROACHES TO DECLINING FERTILITY

This section takes a closer look at how the various perceptions regarding consequences of fertility decline shaped policy approaches to fertility policy in Europe. As indicated in the previous section, the perspectives were divided among those who believed that the State should intervene through explicit policy measures and those who believed that the State had no explicit interventionist role.

3.3.1 Debates up to the 1960s

Academic Approach

A review of the academic debates reveals how the pro-natalists who supported policy intervention gained strength during the first phase of fertility decline in the early 20th century Europe. The 1930s' population projections were catalytic in fuelling fertility policy debates, and resulted in some radical policy approaches to fertility decline (Gauthier 1996b). The work of Alva and Gunnar Myrdal (1934) was essentially pro-natalist, but also a bold departure from most of the pro-natalist thinking up to that period[13] (ibid.). Their policy recommendations differed starkly compared to the then popular policy demand for prohibition of abortion and restriction of access to other forms of birth control measures and advice. Their arguments gave a different dimension to the fertility policy debates that followed, as summarised below (Carlson 1990):

(1) Contrary to popular belief, economic causes instead of moral malaise are the main reasons for fertility decline;

(2) Citing the fact that more than one third of Sweden's children were unwanted, the authors suggested that quality of children was equally important as the quantity of the population. They argued that pro-natalist policies based on voluntary parenthood and free access to birth control were essential to maintain this quality;

(3) While France and other pro-natalist nations discouraged women from joining the labour force in order to enhance opportunities for child birth and care, the authors

[13] 'The English version of the book was printed later (Alva Reimer Myrdal 1945), *Nation and Family: The Swedish Experiment in Democratic Family and Population Policy*, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.

argued that equal opportunities for women to work as well as combine family responsibilities were essential to enable child-bearing decisions.

(4) They favoured benefits in-kind over cash benefits to encourage child bearing, as they believed it would enhance the quality and well-being of children. They also suggested that population policies and family policies should be fully integrated with other social protection and welfare policies. This underlined their belief that pro-natalist population policies should be non-coercive, giving couples the freedom to choose their desired number of children. Thus, by integrating population policies with general welfare policies, which were meant for the well being of the family and society, obstacles to the achievement of that freedom could be removed.

Another radical approach to fertility decline was put forward by Davis (1937). The suggestion was to discard the idea of family as an institution incompatible with the modern industrial society, and to focus on motherhood as a specialised professional activity financed by the State (quoted by Demeny 1987). However, there is no evidence that this idea received recognition at the time.

Following the end of Second World War, however, there were few academic debates with explicit fertility policy intervention as a specific subject. This was mainly because of the conscious efforts to stay away from the painful memories of the fascist regimes of World War II era. In addition, this period was marked with the beginning of a reversal in the previously experienced declining fertility trends, and resulted in the baby boom era up to the 1960s. During this period, policy initiatives continued with much broader social welfare objectives, and mostly without any specific references to fertility and increasing family size (Symonds and Carder 1973).

Political Responses

Political Approach

The literature reveals that the history of political responses to fertility decline closely followed the academic and political thinking of the period when concerns over fertility emerged first. The French State is prominent among the European countries to have had a long and consistent history of pro-natalist and interventionist approaches to the subject of fertility decline. During the pre-World War II period, the scientific evidence of a declining population, compounded by fear of loss of political and military power, prompted the French government to proclaim the need for an urgent pro-natalist intervention

(Gauthier 1996b, p.137). The French State perceived its pro-natalist intervention not as an infringement of individual liberty, but as a means to enhance this liberty by enabling them to fulfil their childbearing desires. They took major initiatives, launched several population commissions and founded a High Council on Births in 1920 with the aim, amongst others, to 'find ways to increase birth rate' (ibid. p.19). Initially, such measures included restricted access to contraception. Later, this developed into other policy areas of social protection and support for the family, especially for women engaged in childcare duties.

Germany, Spain and Italy too belonged to the alarmist interventionist nations in the pre 1960s era. Germany passionately enforced its anti-abortion legislation. They saw the protection of population and the preservation of family as their responsibility[14]. In the Francoist regime of Spain and Mussolini's Italy, restoration and protection of the family unit gained importance, while no explicit fertility intentions were spelt out (Glass 1940). None of these interventionist approaches however, showed any sustained results in fertility rates.

Britain was an exception, and took a non-interventionist approach on the issue of fertility decline. Thus, although early demographic concerns led to the formation of the Royal Commission on Population in 1944, it continued its non-alarmist stance and no political actions or policy measures were adopted to address declining fertility (Simons 1974). The Swedish government too followed a policy of non-intervention through explicit fertility policies.

By the end of World War II the idea of State intervention with explicit fertility intentions was entirely off the agenda for many states, as fertility trends had begun to reverse, and the painful memories of the fascist regimes re-affirmed the value of individual rights and freedom (McIntosh 1998). However, the early initiatives gave the impetus to further develop and expand various social protection, family welfare and child care policies (ibid.).

3.3.2 The Debates from 1960s and onwards

Academic Approach

By the end of the baby boom era in the 1960s, fertility in most European nations began to decline unexpectedly. This was also a period that was characterised by several changes

[14] However, Germany's association with the repressive and racist policies of the Nazi regime would later render it incapable of introducing any sort of explicit fertility policy in the future (McIntosh 1998).

in the social fabric. The popularity of marriage decreased; divorces as well as extra-marital births increased; and the feminist movement gained new momentum. This period also saw an increase in female participation in the labour force. Although the issue of fertility decline was brought back to the debate tables, there were more sensitivities attached to it. Even in the strongly pro-natalist France, there were few demands for direct policy intervention to address the fertility decline because of fear of being criticised as infringing individual rights, or women's rights (Gauthier 1996b). Instead, efforts were made in the debates to find policy solutions to fertility decline that were part of wider social protection and welfare policies. The policy solutions suggested in the debates mainly involved financial and material incentives (ibid. p.118, from Fortier 1988). Child subsidies in the form of money directly transferable to the family was one such measure, that was thought to offer flexibility to the parents to make decisions based on their individual circumstances (Moynihan 1973; quoted by Demeny 1987, p.353).

A second popular policy area debated in the literature relates to gender equity and maternity policies that facilitate reconciliation of family life, childbirth and care with paid employment. The majority of women in employment do not have a choice to combine child bearing and work, and often face persistent inequality in their attempts to reconcile work and family life (Murphy-Lawless 2000, on the Irish case). In their efforts to rise above poverty and provide for childcare, they are forced to take up employment, often – it is feared - at the cost of their children's proper development (ibid.). While Ireland enjoys good fertility rates at present, unless the State intervenes, the society would have to pay for its lack of investment in its children (ibid.). Bernhardt (2000) is more specific in explaining the implications of female employment trends on fertility related attitudes. Female education and employment has under gone phenomenal changes during 1960s - 1990s, significantly raising the level of education and labour participation as well as their career aspirations (ibid.). Such changes have enabled women in Europe to adopt varying strategies to address issues of combining work and family life. Those who have demanding career aspirations would avoid, delay or restrict childbirth; or would quit employment or interrupt employment to facilitate childbirth (ibid.). The latter choice would however gradually decrease, mainly due to economic reasons (ibid.). There would also be a group in between who would attempt to combine work and child bearing by making concessions, but such strategies are more likely to succeed in more family friendly societies (ibid.). Therefore, State intervention aimed at creating employment policy

measures that provide greater flexibility is seen to be crucial to support women's fertility plans and other personal and professional aspirations (Bagavos and Martin 2001).

The third policy area debated draws its original ideas from those put forward by Myrdal and Myrdal in the 1930s: voluntary parenthood. Policy measures that facilitate easy access to a range of fertility control methods are seen as a means to enable women to exercise control over their fertility behaviours, and consequently encourage marriage (Bagavos and Martin 2001). The findings of the Council of Population Problems of the Government of Japan[15], validate this argument (ibid). The study found that women in Japan were reluctant to marry because most contraceptive methods were for males, giving women little control over their own fertility decisions or outcome (ibid.).

Some academic debates also focussed on alternative policy approaches to fertility decline. Consideration for specific socio-cultural and economic characteristics of the country in question as well as the policy needs of the young people, identified through market research, are seen as pre-requisites for State intervention (McDonald 2000b). This would ensure majority support from the population for whom the policies are intended (ibid.). Family policies through which the society can be educated of its collective duty to both have children as well as engage in employment is also seen as a means to help address the declining fertility trends (Golini 2003).

Most of the earlier calls for policy responses in the late 19th and early 20th centuries had a clearly defined pro-natalist or anti-natalist bias based on the perspectives of the lobbyists. Those who supported the Malthusian views demanded policies facilitating liberal access to birth control measures. However, the main arguments of those who did not support Sate intervention through policy measures were based on the underlying principles of some of the interventionist policies, as well as their effectiveness. Given that theories of causalities of fertility decline and variations in fertility trends are very few, they are unable to establish causal links between welfare measures and fertility trends experienced in different societies (Bagavos and Martin 2001). Most policy measures that were already in force failed to stimulate *sustained* fertility growth (McIntosh and Crane 1986). The pro-natalist policies of the 1960s in Romania, East Germany and Hungary serve to support this argument. Although their policies helped to raise fertility temporarily, by the mid 1980s,

[15] Council of Population Problems of the Government of Japan (1997), On the basic viewpoint regarding the trend towards fewer children. A society of decreasing population: Responsibilities and choices for the future, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Japan, 27 Oct. 1997, p.12. (available at: http://www.mhw.go.jp/search/doce/other/council/c0126-2html).

despite a ban on abortion and other contraceptive practices, women succeeded in adopting other traditional methods of contraception and fertility soon declined again (ibid.).

Just as in the case of economic-rational theories that attempted to explain causalities of fertility decline, policy initiatives linked to financial incentives and other material benefits too received criticisms due to some of their implied assumptions. Such policy initiatives appear to assume that all human beings are utility maximisers (Ditch 2000); or that women would get pregnant merely to receive State support (Bagavos and Martin 2001). Some of the new policy measures were no more than reconstituted past policies (that is, mostly economic and benefits oriented) (Demeny 1987). If the State were to invest more into such policies to the extent that parental functions are replaced by the nanny state, then the parents may choose not to have any children as they would effectively have no parental function to perform (ibid.).

The value approaches and social education approaches to policy intervention, similar to those suggested by Golini (2003), may not be practical in democratic societies (Demeny 1987). In societies that reaffirm the virtue of individual rights above all else, individuals are more likely to prioritise the benefits of their individual fertility decisions to themselves over the benefits to the society's total fertility rates (ibid.).

Demeny (1987) suggests the following four changes to existing policy approaches in order to make them less interventionist while rendering childbearing more attractive to parents who desire children:

(1) Re-establish parental authority over children's education by allocating educational subsidies direct to parents rather than to the schools. This would improve parents' choice over children's education, and their ability to spend on children's formal education.

(2) Incorporate the family, in order to enable equal access to both spouses to all state transfers to the family as well as wages and other family income. This could enhance women's economic security and provide them greater freedom to choose between labour participation, household management and child bearing.

(3) Link old-age provisions to prior fertility behaviour. Thus, depending on the number of children parents raise, and the amount of contribution those children make to the social security system, a proportion of guaranteed sum could be earmarked for the old-age provisions of their retired parents.

(4) Initiate a link between the newly born children and the political system by giving parents the right to exercise children's voting rights until they come of age. This could strengthen the family's influence in the political system and society for a longer period.

The rationale for the criticisms of the interventionist policy approaches (mostly through financial incentives) was obvious: most of the policy measures mentioned above were not based on empirical studies that established causal links between welfare measures and fertility trends. They also appeared to be generalised and regarded as applicable equally effectively across the spectrum of fertility experiences.

Some of the alternative policy approaches too stand out in that they have some issues of practicalities. Demeny's first argument, for example, fails to address a very pertinent question: if education subsidies are channelled to individual parents giving them complete authority over their children's educational path and choices. How would the State ensure that all children receive the quality and quantity of education that meets a minimum standard? While it is instinctive to believe that all parents would do what is best for their children, experience has shown that some children do fall victim to their parents' poor choice of decisions and lack of care. Surely, the State has a responsibility to protect a child, and in the least, to try to guide it to the right future, in which education plays a crucial part. The State would fail in its efforts to achieve this equality in quality and quantity of education of its Children, if it does not have authority over the education of its Children. Furthermore, it is not clear how this policy option could be introduced without means-testing. If State subsidies were to be equally distributed to all parents, the rich will benefit more than the poor ones. At the same time, if indeed means testing is introduced, then it would defeat the fertility objective (implicit or explicit) of such a policy. This is because the rich would not benefit from it, and thereby their fertility intentions will not be influenced.

In his second recommendation, Demeny likens the family to a corporation, where all its revenues should be equally vested in the spouses. This is internally contradictory in that in a corporation, the revenue it earns is never vested equally in its members – the stakeholders have access to the revenue in line with their responsibilities, and are rewarded in line with their stake in the corporation! His solution is an ideologically sound one, but difficult to put in practice, as it is difficult to imagine any democratic State going

down the route of dictating how its subjects should allocate their income between the couples.

Demeny's third recommendation is yet another example of a solution riddled with inherent incompatibilities with the aims of a democratic, equalitarian State. If old age economic security were to be linked to prior fertility behaviour, and the economic contributions of the children who resulted from that prior fertility behaviour, then there would be no option but to treat the elderly inequitably. It would also be equivalent to arguing that a successful fertility behaviour (as defined by the State and not the parents) is a pre-requisite for each couple to ensure old age social security. Those who had few children or no children by choice (rightfully) can then surely expect little or no support from the State at old age by virtue of their 'crime'. Even those who had many children, (but all of whom were not economic active due to reasons ranging from intellectual capacity to illness to pure choice and chance) are also in for a difficult time in their old age!

The fourth recommendation of Demeny, is not clear on its implications on parents' fertility behaviour. It also disregards an important principle that the act voting, and deciding the outcome of a voting process is to be biased by nothing but the individual's ability to judge what is most appropriate to achieve the desired objective of the election. It further borders on the realms of ludicrousness. If parents with children were given additional right to cast a vote on behalf of their children, it would then mean the parents with many children would have the ability to cast many votes. It would also mean that when those children grew up, they would likely be biased by their parents' political bias and thinking.

It would be reasonable to assume that the reasons for not seeing such radical solutions as above, in action in their entirety within any democratic States, are not far from the impracticalities or inherent contradictions, such as discussed in the above critique of Demeny's recommendations. The conclusion that can be drawn from the interventionist and non-interventionist approaches to fertility decline is that both approaches appear to be based on pure theoretical or ideological concepts rather than practical suitability of the policy initiatives. There is no evidence to suggest that the debates or the measures suggested through the debates have been based on research among the target groups. They are merely general policy suggestions, expected to be applicable and effective across the different demographic experiences in Europe.

Political Approach

The experiences of the two world wars and the fascist regimes had changed the tone of even the pro-natalist regimes by the end of the baby boom era. Explicit intervention to increase fertility was not seen any more as a policy priority[16]. By the time fertility began to decline again in the 1960s, policy concerns for many of the States were mostly directed at encouraging women to join the labour market, finding better ways to combine family and work responsibilities, and providing adequate child-care facilities for working parents. In Sweden, although the population question was initially raised in the parliament in 1970, no actions emerged, and later in 1993 along with Denmark, it confirmed its intentions not to pursue any explicit demographic policies (Gauthier 1996b, Hantais 1999a). Austria too discarded any interventionist orientations, and argued that policy responses and measures should be developed to help people readjust to the new circumstances and enhance social welfare and equality (ibid.). The other countries that took a non-interventionist stance were Belgium, Britain, Switzerland, Germany and Italy. In Italy, the rapid succession of governments after the war was a reason for the lack of any political action in the subject of fertility (McIntosh 1998). Switzerland held the view that explicit fertility policies would contravene individual rights (Hantrais 1999a, United Nations and Council of Europe 1994). In Britain, while there was a brief debate on the 'demographic time bomb' that would eventually cripple the labour market, the general view was that, given its relatively large population, no explicit policy response was required (Gauthier 1996b, p. 140, from Evans 1988). Britain's position was also related to its legacy of Malthusian perspective, which debated the negative effects of a large population (ibid.). Britain emphatically maintained that neither the fertility trends nor the population ageing constituted a real problem that could not be managed (United Nations and Council of Europe 1994, p.360). Such perspectives are also associated with Britain's longstanding ideal of individualism that was rooted in the national ethos and its laisser-faire social philosophy (Chesnais 1996, p.737). There are further explanations for the reluctance of certain European countries to intervene in the population and family policy debate: (a) The general suspicion, especially among women, that any active family or demographic policy that tries to increase fertility rates would keep women more involved with traditional roles of mother and housewife

[16] Romania and the German Democratic Republic were exceptions, in that they followed explicit pro-natalist policies including banning of abortion. See section 3.5.2 for details.

and thus increase the male dominance in the family and in society at large. (b) The concept of the family itself differed very much between each country (ibid. p.734).

In the post 1960s era, in addition to France, only Greece[17] and Luxembourg were the other European nations that still considered pro-natalist interventionist approaches. (Gauthier 1996b). Luxembourg had initiated several studies aimed at finding solutions to address the low fertility trends it experienced, and emphasised on creating a social climate favourable for families (ibid).

The Population Inquiry Surveys conducted by the United Nations[18] in 1976, 1989, 1996 and 1999 provide a more up to date summary of the evolution of the political attitudes to policy intervention in the post baby boom era. Between the periods when the UN produced the two reports in 1976 and 1989, four countries had changed their perceptions towards the rate of growth of their country from 'too low' (1976 survey), to 'acceptable' (1989 survey) (Serow and Sly 1993). They were Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg and ex-Soviet Union. None of them expressed any intention to explicitly intervene and increase the rate of population growth. While fertility rates did not increase in these countries during the period, the change in policy attitudes indicates a possible shift in perceptions by the respective States. For example, in 1991 Luxembourg restated its willingness to intervene and influence its declining fertility trends (Gauthier 1996b). Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Singapore and Switzerland moved from 'satisfactory' in 1976 to 'too low' 1989 (Serow and Sly 1993, pp.156-159) (See also Table 3.1). Among them, Cyprus and Hungary were the only countries who expressed an interventional approach to the issue (ibid.). In both the surveys Bulgaria, France, Germany (both East and West) and Greece viewed their rates of growth as 'too low' and all of them expressed the desire to intervene.

[17] Greece's policy discourse will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

[18] In these surveys, governments were asked about their perceptions on the demographic situation of their countries, including questions about the level of fertility, rapidity of fertility decline, the number of years of below-replacement fertility level, the level of fertility compared to that of neighbouring countries, population density, and the composition of the population in terms of native and foreign-born citizens (Bonifazi and Kamaras 1998; Gauthier 1996, p.129-30; Serow and Sly 1993).

Table 3.1: Perceptions of the demographic situation according to fertility level, 1989

TFR	Perception by Country on their Fertility Levels	
	Dissatisfied	**Satisfied**
> 1.80	France	Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States
1.50 – 1.79	Luxembourg, Netherlands[a] Switzerland	Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan
< 1.50	Germany[b], Greece, Italy	Austria, Portugal, Spain

[a]: Considers that population growth is too high
[b]: Is unwilling to intervene to raise fertility

Source: Quoted by Gauthier 1996b, Table 8.2, p.130. Original source from United Nations (1990).

From the review of the different political perspectives on policy approaches, especially after the 1960s, it is clear that even while the fertility trends experienced across the countries surveyed were broadly similar, there were differences in the State's approaches. However, their approaches have not remained static throughout the history. Nations have adopted alternatively interventionist and non-interventionist positions in relation to fertility policy measures. This alternating shift in policy approach, as explained in the above examples, was not a result of alternate increase and decrease in fertility rates. Post 1960's fertility rates have continued to decrease in these nations, save any temporal increase as in the case of Romania. The evolving approaches were not based on scientific factors or evidence, but based on ideological biases. There is no evidence in the political debates so far, which suggests that the efforts to understand the fertility motivators and desires of the couples have been taken as a possible practical approach. The emphasis appears to have been on being seen to do the right thing rather than actually doing the right thing. This suggests that, like the approaches evident in the academic debates, the States too have failed to try and understand what exactly is needed in terms of policy initiatives and measures in their own settings.

3.4 DEBATES ON FERTILITY POLICY MEASURES

From the previous two sections, it is clear how the focus of most European States shifted from intervention through explicit fertility policy measures to debates on broader family policy measures. Thus, when trying to understand the debates concerning policy

measures to enhance fertility trends, it is necessary to examine the debates that helped shape the broader family and social welfare policies as they exist today. Such efforts are however restricted by certain inherent difficulties. Analysing the debates on wider family and social welfare policy measures would be a very broad task and a research topic in itself. Yet it is important to understand the nature, rationale and arguments that underpinned such debates to find out how fertility policy objectives, albeit implicit, were dealt with in these debates. The following two subsections summarise some of the arguments that supported the main implicit fertility policy measures in Europe.

3.4.1 The Academic Debates on Policy Measures

A study of the specific policy suggestions made by social scientists and other researchers shows that financial policies, based on the concepts of economic-rational theories of causalities, are seen as important in addressing the declining fertility trends in Europe. The idea is that such policies help to alleviate the cost of raising children for the parents, and improve their standards of living by compensating them for the extra costs incurred by having and raising children.

Some of the main policy options suggested cover the areas of health, education, housing and other social conditions. Suggestions in the literature in order to improve fertility include free medical and dental care for children and free medical services for mothers during pregnancy. Housing subsidies have been also singled out for consideration at the policy level. Studies suggested that housing costs are a major consideration in family formation decisions and an important factor in deciding the number of children that a couple will have (Moors and Palomba 1995; Palomba and Moors 1998).

A study of assistance with children's education as an instrument of family policy (Neubauer et.al. 1993), among twelve EC member states (as quoted in Hantrais and Letablier 1996, pp.162-163) showed that education and availability of schooling, affects families in two ways: Firstly, when children enter nursery and infant schools, parents become free from childcare responsibilities and have higher possibilities for being in employment. Secondly, where further and higher education is provided free the cost of children becomes lower for their parents. The combined benefit from a fertility perspective is that having children will not be seen as a disincentive to taking up paid employment (ibid.). Equally important is the State support for adequate childcare facilities. In states where public childcare facilities are not adequate to meet the real

needs and the societies are more traditional (especially in the Mediterranean countries), the childcare can be organised through grandparents (MISSOC 2002; McDonald 2002). The availability of such services organised by the state would eliminate extra cost that parents would incur if private care was to be sought.

Improving the working conditions of parents and enabling them to manage employment and family responsibilities simultaneously has long been considered to be an important policy option by social scientists. The primary area of interest has been the relationship between female economic activity and family life. Increasing female labour participation either in full or part-time employment, and reducing unemployment are measures that could increase family income, bring security and therefore play an important role in the decision on family formation (Hantrais 1999b). Availability of part-time jobs and work related provisions are also important for the majority of women who wish to combine employment, family life, and childcare. By providing such facilities, women can be indirectly encouraged to have children (Bradshaw et.al. 1993; Bradshaw and Finch 2002; Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Hantrais and Letablier 1996; Hantrais and Lohkamp-Himmighofen 1999).

Introduction of relationship education and counselling has been viewed as helpful in addressing issues of relationship formation and sustenance. Here the perceived benefit is that child bearing may not be viewed as a disincentive by individuals, because they fear instability in relationships. Demographic studies have demonstrated that the earlier the childbearing the greater is the likelihood of having more children, and that divorce reduces fertility if a new relationship is not formed (Billari and Kohler 2000; Kohler et.al, 2001; Pinnelli and Rose 2001; Morgan and Rindfuss 1999).

Another policy option that has been greatly debated in order to increase population growth and address the shortage of labour force is the introduction of measures to increase the influx of migrant labour (Bagavos and Martin 2001; Hantrais 1999b; Höehn 1987, 1995; Lutz and Schervov 2002; McDonald 2002; Orzechowska 2001)[19]. In addition there are also arguments that because non-European immigrants tend to have more

[19] The paper of E. Orzechowska (2001), *Replacement Migration as Policy Response to Ageing and Declining Populations off the European Union*, gives more insights on the question how well migration can be seen as a solution to the ongoing ageing process, while the work of W. Lutz and S. Schervov (2002) *Can Immigration Compensate for Europe's Low Fertility?,* deals with statistical scenarios and probabilistic projections of the effect of migration.

children than the European citizens, they could contribute to population growth (such evidence has already been seen in UK, Sweden and France) (Hantrais 1999b, p.15).

Despite the widespread sensitivities of contraceptive methods, especially abortion, Europe in general has adopted pro-contraception and birth-control policies. While the ethical questions surrounding it remain, studies have also pointed towards the benefit of giving women full control over their fertility outcomes, in stimulating fertility behaviour. Medically assisted reproduction could help people with fertility problems to achieve their childbearing aspirations (ibid.).

3.4.2 The Main Political Debates on Policy Measures

The key family policy measures with potential fertility implications, debated in Europe over the last ten years are summarised below[20]:

Whether the states should formally endorse alternative family forms such as lone parenthood, reconstituted families and consensual unions

Here the concerns related to the changes in law and to the levels of policy provisions for the alternative family forms. Many countries of the north Europe considered them as socially acceptable to justify their integration into the normative or institutional framework. However, in some States such as Ireland and Spain, where the alternative family forms were not common, they were considered as having little relevance for policy debate as well as for formation of any relevant social and economic policies (Hantrais 1999a, 1999b). Questions regarding the children's rights have also been raised by various countries, particularly by France (ibid.). In Germany the attention was paid to the rights of illegitimate children and of children after divorce. In Spain the policy concerns focused more on the high age of consent of young people, while in the UK the policy debate was oriented towards the couples' needs to develop their parenting skills and on the obligations of parents and step-parents (ibid. see also Gauthier 1996b; MISSOC 2002). Questions concerning such issues have put the states in a dilemma. For example, benefits intended to prevent the children of lone parents from poverty and social exclusion may also be perceived as disincentives for marriages (Hantrais and Letablier 1996). Again, if policies made divorce even easier, then governments would have to deal with a higher number of families and children from families that fall into poverty as a

[20] The summary is mainly sourced from Interactions between Socio-Demographic Trends, Social and Economic Policies, edited by Hantrais (1999).

consequence of divorce. On the other side, if policy makers were opposed to the liberalisation of divorce, they would then have to deal with more family conflicts and their effects on the children (ibid.).

How to prevent poverty and social disadvantages as a consequence of the breakdown of traditional two-parent families

Many of the current policy concerns have focused on the socio-economic status of children who were brought up in either lone parent families, divorced families or reconstituted families (including risk of poverty, social exclusion, and low educational achievement). There are also concerns on the growing number of people who are living alone. In the case of socio-economic status of children the crucial question relates to the legitimacy of government intervention to reduce family break down incidences and relieve resulting hardships (Hantrais 1999b, p.29).

How to redistribute and direct resources efficiently among families, the whole population, or the groups at risk

There are also debates on whether horizontal or vertical distribution of resources, as a means to influence behaviours, including decisions about number and timing of children and family lifestyles, are appropriate (Bardier 1995; Hantrais and Letablier 1996)[21]. In most of the European countries, social, economic and family policy objectives are based on these two means of redistribution of resources, with increasing emphasis being placed on helping families and children at risk. France is an example where the issue of targeting benefits on families most in need has been debated extensively. It suggested reduction on tax rebates for children from higher income families, and creation of revenue from income tax, which could be used to help families in need or lower income families (Hantrais 1999b, p.30).

[21] Horizontal redistribution of the resources means distribution on a universal basis, transferring resources from the individuals or couples without children to those with children in the same income brackets. Vertical redistribution of the resources means targeting groups or families at risk (unstable families, single parents, and young adults living alone) and mainly transferring resources from wealthier to poorer families (Bardier 1995; Hantrais and Letablier 1996; Moussourou 1994). As Hantrais and Letablier (1996) state, the objectives of the horizontal redistribution are: 1) rewarding families for carrying out an important service to the community. 2) as a means to compensate families for the financial burden of raising children and 3) as a means to secure greater equality between couples with children and couples without children (pp. 147-148). Bardier (1995) puts these objectives in a simpler way by saying that horizontal redistribution is a way to eliminate differences in the standards of living for households with and without children (p.20).

Whether to direct resources towards families or individuals

Once the fiscal and social protection systems were developed, during the post-war period, the dilemma was whether the taxation system should be formulated and addressed to family units or to the individuals comprising the family. Although a consensus has not yet been reached, progressively such a system has been adopted in Sweden, and UK. This transformation of social protection systems from couples or family units to individual recipients has mainly been initiated by the increasing number of women who spend a large part of their adult life in paid employment (Flaquer 2000). Countries like Italy, Spain and Ireland give couples the option to choose between joint taxation and individual taxation. The shift towards individual taxation could remove or reduce disparities between married and unmarried couples, but at the same time can make marriage unattractive (see more details in Hantrais 1999b, p.34).

The above concerns and policy debates resulted in various policy initiatives by governments in several countries such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United States (Gauthier 1996b). Such initiatives were aimed at creating a change to the system of the state support to families, while not losing focus on the traditional and stable families. From a fertility policy perspective, such initiatives have a significant role, as they reflect the state's attempt to address fertility decline through family policies.

3.5 A STUDY OF THE MAIN POLICY MEASURES BY IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS

This section aims to understand how the outcomes of the various debates discussed earlier, have transformed into policies and are implemented across Europe, with broad family and social welfare objectives as well as implicit fertility objectives. The first subsection gives an analysis of various policies based on implementation across different countries in Europe. The second subsection looks for evidence of results of the various policy measures by way of achievement of the implicit objective, that is, to increase fertility rates.

3.5.1 Analysis of Policies Based on Implementation

Gauthier's (2002) four-fold typology of nations by approaches to policy implementation provides a quick snapshot of understanding the implementation of various policy

measures in Europe. The policies analysed are mainly broad family policies, with implicit fertility objectives. As shown in Table 3.2, the analysis indicates the existence of major differences across countries. The conservative group provides both the highest level of cash support for families and the highest support for working parents, while the southern European countries and the liberal nations provide the lowest level of support for families.

The study also concludes that: a) The fourfold typology of family policies is a relatively recent development and one that provides a better map of the cross-national differences; b) There have been enormous changes with regards to family policy implementation between the 1970s and the 1990s, characterised by an increase in State support for working parents, and by a modest increase in cash support for families; c) These trends vary across the countries and have consequently increased the divergence across countries. This is especially the case with regard to state support for working parents; and d) Over time, there exist some common trends but not cross-national convergence. In line with other welfare studies, family policies have been adjusted to account for the new demographic and economic realities of families, but these adjustments have not reduced the gap between nations (Gauthier 2002)[22].

An example of a more recent explicit policy approach is that of Italy, where in 2003, a new policy was introduced to offer EUR1,000 as a baby bonus for every family where a second child was born. The reaction to this policy has been mixed – not all believe it would have any impact at all on Italy's dwindling fertility rates (TFR = 1.2). The real impact, if any, would of course only be evident in the long term.

[22] Comparative studies like the above are not unique. Similar comparisons between the European member states or the more developed countries in terms of their levels of support to families have been undertaken by Appleton and Hantrais 2000; Bradshaw et.al.1993; Bradshaw and Finch 2002; Deven and Moss 1999; Golini 2003; Hantrais 1997,1999a; MISSOC 2002; Neyer 2003.

Table 3.2: Types of family policies as of the late 1980s and early 1990s

Policy regime	Overall Characteristics	Cash support	Support for working parents	Countries
Social-Democratic	Characterised by universal state support for families, and high commitment to gender equality.	Medium-level of cash support for families in the form of universal cash benefits, but high level of other forms of support that result in low levels of child poverty.	High-level of support provided to both parents. Combines long parental and childcare leaves with extensive childcare facilities.	Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Conservative	Characterised by a system of state support for families that tends to vary according to the parents' employment status, and that also tends to be driven by a more traditional view of the gender division of labour.	Medium-to high level of cash support.	Medium-level of support. Relatively long parental and childcare leaves (in some countries), but more limited childcare facilities.	Austria Belgium France Germany Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands
Southern European	Characterised by a high degree of fragmentation along occupational lines, and a mix of universal and private services and benefits. It is also a regime characterised by no guaranteed statutory minimum income scheme	Low level of cash support that results in high levels of child poverty	Low level of support.	Greece Italy Portugal Spain
Liberal	Characterised by a low level of support for families that tends to be targeted at families with greater needs, and that leaves room for market forces, especially with regard to the provision of childcare facilities	Low level of support for all families, relatively higher for families with greater need.	Low level of support. Responsibilities for childcare provision given to parents and the private sector.	Australia Canada Japan New Zealand Switzerland UK USA

Source: Gauthier's (2002), Table 1, p.453, (adapted by the work of Esping-Andersen1990; Ferrera 1996;Flaquer 2000; Gauthier 1996; Rhodes 1997).

3.5.2 The Results of Family Policy Initiatives on Fertility Trends

Some studies have suggested evidence of correlation between fertility policies and fertility behaviour, as summarised below:

Ekert's (1986) analysis based on aggregate data and examination of eight member states of the EC, on differences between countries in fertility levels and cash benefits, suggested that "higher cash benefits have a slightly positive effect on fertility, of the order of 0.2 child per woman for cash benefits equivalent to those provided by the French system" (quoted by Gauthier 1996a, p.314).

The results of Ermisch's study (1988) on fertility in Britain suggested that higher child benefits have an effect on the completed family size, by encouraging the birth of a third and fourth child and have also an effect on the timing of births, by encouraging early motherhood.

The study of Robins and Blau (1989) based on life-history data of households in twenty geographical areas in the United States suggested that higher child-care subsidies through tax credit have a small, but not significant, positive effect on the probability of having a child while employed, but does not have an effect on non-employed women. A later analysis conducted by them, using similar framework found that child-care tax credit and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) both have a statistically significant effect on fertility and that higher child-care costs have a negative effect on fertility (Robins and Blau 1991).

The study of Whittington (1992) using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics also suggests that there is evidence that higher tax-related benefits have an effect on both the timing of births and the number of children[23]. Also Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) provide empirical evidence indicating that reducing the cost of having children by providing higher benefits to parents may increase fertility, but that effect is of limited magnitude and varies across countries[24].

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[23] Whittington examined the relationship between the value of federal income tax exemption in the United States and fertility behaviour of married couples over the period 1979-1983. They concluded that as the value of tax exemption increased, some families were more likely to have additional children; or the reduced cost of the child to a household as a result of the exemption was likely to affect the timing of births.

[24] Gauthier and Hatzius's empirical analysis (1997) was based on differences and similarities across 22 industrialised countries in terms of their levels of support for families, for the period 1970 to 1990. They found that there is an effect of the order of 0.07 children per woman in the long-run for benefits 25 percent higher than average (pp: 300-304).

Some of the significant examples of positive effects of policies in Europe are those of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) during the late 70's and Romania during the mid 80's. In the mid 1970s both Germanys (West and East) had similar fertility rates (1.54 for East and 1.45 for West). In the GDR policy measures were introduced to achieve higher fertility. Family allowances were increased, paid leave was granted to women at the birth of the second child, and women with children were given priority in housing. As a result of these measures, a significant increase in the number of births, fertility rates and changes in the timing of births were seen (Monnier 1989a, 1989b). It was shown that, following the adoption of such measures, women were having their children at an earlier age than they would otherwise have had, and the completed fertility was 10% above what it might have been otherwise (ibid.). However, by the end of 1980s, with the unification and the consequent social upheaval, the increase of unemployment rate among women and housing shortages, significant changes were observed in the childbearing behaviour. The fertility rate decreased and high rates of childlessness were observed (Hantrais and Letablier 1996).

In Romania, under the Ceausescu regime that oversaw implementation of a coercive 'public policy' designed to influence reproductive behaviour, by placing severe restrictions in accessing legal abortions and ban on importing contraceptives, the number of births rose from 14.3 per 1,000 population in 1966 to 27.4 births in a year's time by 1967[25] (David 1994, p.346).

Such short-term and sporadic evidence however, cannot be claimed to be of benefit on country's aggregate fertility trends, which are usually seen to have an impact in the long term. When searching for evidence of sustained long-term positive impacts of implicit fertility policies, it becomes obvious that such impacts are not confirmed by the available data (Hantrais 1999b, p.14-15)[26]. Some of the above policy measures even failed to

[25] However, this rate gradually declined to 13.4 by 1983 (David 1994, p. 346).

[26] There are certain methodological issues that emerge when carrying out evaluation of policy impact: a) Policies may accelerate trends that are already present if parents were planning to have children; b) The researcher does not know what would have occurred in the absence of a particular policy measure. c) The results of the policy measures can usually be seen in the long run; d) Policies are not formulated and implemented in an ideal world. The broader environment in which the policies will operate has to be taken into account; e) Same measures could be used to achieve different objectives, and thus could result in different outcomes too; f) Fertility dependence also on other normative, social and psychological factors are important too, apart from the economic cost. These factors have to be taken into account. g) The effects of any benefits/supports on fertility or family structure may vary across different sub-groups of the population for economic, social and other normative reasons; and h) Often different theoretical studies give different outcomes or explanations of human behaviour (see for details Gauthier 1996a, pp. 302-312 and Hantrais 1999b, pp: 14-15).

deliver in other settings. For example, France followed extreme pro-natalist policies during the inter-war and post-war periods. However its fertility rates fell to levels lower than that of Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal, countries that had not pursued any pro-natalist objective (ibid, p.14). France and Luxembourg are also examples of countries that provide generous benefits for large families, but have very different fertility rates - consistently above the EU average for France and below the EU average for Luxembourg (ibid.). In northern Italy, while the support to families is higher than in the southern part, fertility has decreased at higher rates than in the south (ibid. p.16). Sweden, which was among the countries with the lowest fertility rates in Europe, experienced higher fertility rates than all the other EU countries by 1992. This change in the fertility rate, was not due to its generous family benefits policies, but mostly due to the various measures introduced to create equal opportunities for sexes and ensure compatibility between women's paid work and childcare (ibid. p.192). At the same time, similar policies yielded no results in other countries (ibid.).

The effects of social and fiscal policies on the family's finance as well as the effects of social and economic policy on socio-demographic trends have also been questioned. The relationship between family related public policy and socio-demographic or socio-economic outcome is unclear (Hantrais 1999b, p.31). Such policies can or may facilitate changes in family forms but cannot be proved to be determining factors (ibid.). There is no clear evidence to demonstrate strong connections between fiscal policy and family size. Countries that do not grant tax relief for family members, such as Ireland, Netherlands, and the UK, have varying family sizes (ibid. p. 34). Even the most generous family policies may not prevent the declining fertility rates if they are, for example, in competition with female labour market activity (ibid. p.16).

Thus, in reality many of the family and social policy measures have not had long term positive impacts on the fertility rates of any of the countries in Europe. The policies may have achieved to a varying extent their main objectives of alleviation of poverty, social exclusion and improving living standards. Nevertheless, their impact on fertility trends has been minor or negligible. This is evident from the fact that in all the countries where policies showed temporary effects on fertility trends, the actual fertility rates are still declining or continuing to cause concerns.

The study of results based on policy impact also shows that the theories of low fertilities, especially that of economic rational theory and gender equity theory indeed could help

provide valuable contributions to policy development. This however, does not mean that such theories can be generalised and are applicable consistently through space and time. This is proved by the fact that, in some of the examples discussed above, economic benefits through policies have only had temporary effects in some cases, and no effect at all in some other cases.

Conclusion

The objectives of this chapter were to understand the origin of the idea that fertility decline was a key demographic issue demanding political intervention and the arguments that shaped the key fertility policy debates. It also searched for evidence of the impact of fertility policies in reversing the declining fertility trends.

The review of the literature on fertility policy debates confirmed that fertility has indeed been acknowledged as a key topic of interest by the social scientists, demographers, politicians and even the general public to some extent. However, responses to the declining fertility trends from the various interested parties involved were found to be biased by fear, sometimes judgements with out proper rationale and mostly without any scientific backing. The predictions of a rapid population decline in the early 20th century proved to be entirely inaccurate. Neither did the demographers predict or explain successfully the population dynamics evident in the ripple effect of baby boom peaks and baby bust troughs that emerged after the Second World War.

The severity of consequences predicted was such that there were demands from various sources for the state to intervene through policy measures to address fertility decline. The debates on policy approaches and policy measures that followed also appeared to make several biased casual assumptions. One such assumption would have a significant impact in shaping many of the policy measures that were implemented throughout Europe. It was widely believed that the ultimate impact of fertility decline in the future would be of an economic nature. Consequently, it was assumed that providing economic and material incentives to parents would stimulate their interest for more children. Beneath this assumption was the idea that humans were utility maximisers by nature, and therefore any fertility policy with an economic incentive would be accepted by them. The interesting fact was that many involved in the debate process (at least at the academic level) acknowledged that there was a serious lack of adequate information to make reliable predictions, and contributions towards effective policy measures. Nevertheless,

several policy suggestions with 'potential' to impact fertility trends were produced. Also, there was no evidence in the debates, of efforts to understand the role of subjective and behavioural factors that went into the fertility decision making process of parents, and the potential of policies to impact such factors. Such factors, as discussed in the theories of causalities of fertility decline include, amongst others, people's conscious decisions not to have children in order to pursue alternative life styles.

Yet another aspect that emerged through this chapter was that, in the course of the history a focus on the subject of fertility has evolved. While social scientists and researchers maintain more or less consistently that fertility needs more research as well as direct policy intervention, the position of the various states have tended to swing with popular social 'mood' and ideologies. At present political positions range from 'its not a problem that the society cannot adjust to' (UK) to 'any attempts to intervene would infringe individual rights' (Switzerland). Yet, demographers point out that fertility levels and structure of the population pyramid of both these countries give cause for grave concerns.

As discussed in the introductory chapter, the objective of this research focuses on the fertility policy debates in Greece. Thus, the next chapter will seek to understand how the broad developments in the European fertility policy debates have influenced the debates in Greece.

Some questions that will direct the progression of the next chapters include:

- Are the parties involved in fertility policy debates in Greece differing with each other in their stated objectives, as well as the level of comprehension of the real issues involved?
- Is the fertility policy debate in Greece truly well informed of the realities as experienced by the couples? Does the Greek State possess proper and sufficient information with regards to the variety of fertility experiences and policy needs of its people?
- Are there any bias and knowledge vacuums in the fertility debates in Greece?

CHAPTER 4:

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON GREECE: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS, FERTILITY DETERMINANTS AND FERTILITY POLICY DEBATES

Introduction

The first chapter of the literature review examined how demographic developments in Greece followed the trends observed in most of the other European countries. In the current phase of the demographic transition, the Total Fertility Rates continued to decrease and reached below replacement level of 2.1 in the early 1980s. Greece's fertility rate today is one of the lowest in Europe. The number of deaths is higher than the number of births, resulting in a negative natural growth rate and an ageing population. The marginal growth in the total population is only sustained through the continuing levels of immigration[1].

In line with the research objective outlined in the introductory chapter, this chapter focuses on the specific case of Greece. The emphasis is not on re-examining the trends specific to Greece, but on understanding how these trends have been assessed, evaluated and responded to through policy debates. The chapter has three main parts. The first provides a background summary of Greece in the following areas: (1) Geography, Political History and Administration; (2) Socio-economic background; and (3) Socio-cultural background. The second part presents a summary of the findings from other empirical studies that have looked at the determinants of fertility in Greece. This prepares the context in which the responses to fertility decline and policy debates are assessed in the third part. The third part aims to: (i) Evaluate the policy debates in connection with fertility decline in Greece; and (ii) Provide a summary of the policy responses or the main family and fertility policy measures that have been adopted in Greece.

[1] See more details in Chapter 1, section 1.2.3.

4.1 GEOGRAPHIC, HISTORICAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GREECE

The theories of causalities, discussed in Chapter 2, attributed fertility trends of a nation to the socio-economic and cultural characteristics of its people. Thus, before evaluating the policy debates on fertility decline in Greece, it would be helpful to have a brief understanding of the characteristics of the country, which could have influenced the fertility trends.

4.1.1 Geography, Political History and Administration

4.1.1.1 Geography

Greece is located on the Balkan Peninsula and forms part of the southern border of Europe. It has an area of 131940 sq. kms constituting the mainland and around 2000 islands. It has a coastline of 13,676km and its immediate neighbours include Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Republic of Macedonia. The main cities include Thessaloniki and Athens (capital), which have a large urban population. Crete, the largest island in Greece (and where survey sample was drawn from) is located in the Southern most part of the country, in the Mediterranean basin (see Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.9 for maps of Greece).

4.1.1.2 Political History

The origin of the Greek people has been traced back to more than 3000 years BC. Its history has been characterised with transformation through several civilisations and conquests. The earliest of them, the Minoan Civilisation (up to 1500BC), which had its roots in the island of Crete is thought to have had a population of 1.5 million (Clogg 2002; Kalogeropoulos 1972; Platon 1970)[2].

The new Greek nation was born following independence from Ottoman Empire in 1829. King George (1862-1913) introduced a new constitution in 1864, and set up an elected

[2] There are many theories regarding the disappearing of the Minoans civilisation, most of which support the view of a devastating volcanic eruption near island of Thera that destroyed the whole civilisation. The Minoans were followed by the Mycenian culture, which prospered, on the mainland until about 1100BC. (Clogg 2002; Kalogeropoulos 1972; Platon 1970). In about 750BC, the Greeks began to colonise the Mediterranean, creating wealth through trade. The city-state of Athens reached its peak in the 400BC (known as the Golden age of Pericles), however the Macedonians became the dominant power in 338BC. The period of the Alexander the Great (334BC to 323BC) was followed by the Roman Empire (146BC) and later by the Byzantine Empire (324AD to 1453AD) and the Turkish occupation (ibid.).

government, which came to be know as the *"monarchical democracy"* (Lazaridis 1993, p.80).

Greece experienced extensive demographic and political transformations throughout the periods of the first and second world wars. The first large-scale influx of migratory population occurred following the 1922 Asia Minor disaster[3] in which thousands of Greeks lost their lives, and 1.2 million refugees moved into Greece (Mavrogordatos 1983). The Second World War and the German occupation of Greece (1940-1945) created a political dichotomy in the nation between the communist force of EAM-ELAS (National Liberation Front and National Popular Liberation Army) and Colonel Zervas' s EDES (Greek Democratic National Army) who opposed each other, but fought against a common enemy. In December 1944, a civil war broke out, which was suppressed and controlled by the British military forces who dominated Greek affairs during that period, and later by the United States (for more details see Clogg 1973, 2002; Iatrides 1981; Woodhouse 1968).

The Right governed from 1949 to 1963, followed by the liberals. However, the progress to democracy and Europeanisation was again halted during the seven-year dictatorship (1967-1974). In 1974, following the first parliamentary elections, the New Democracy Party (ND) under Konstantinos Karanmalis (Right wing) came to power and a new constitution was established. In 1981 the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) led by Andreas Papandreou formed the first socialist government in Greece, and governed the country until 2004, except between 1989 and 1993 (Lazaridis 1993; Mouzelis 1978). In the latest national elections (May 2004) the ND party was voted back to leadership.

4.1.1.3 Integration into European Union

In the past Greece has been categorised as a *'semi-peripheral'* country alongside some other southern European nations due to its late accession as a member-state of the European Union. It was also a reference to the country's modernisation process, and its social and political development, which lagged behind the more developed countries of the North-West Europe (Great Britain, France and the Scandinavian countries) (Ferrera 1996; Katrougalos 1996; Petmesidou 1991, 2000). Relationships with Europe were enhanced when Greece joined the Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO in 1951, and

[3] The 1922 Asia Minor disaster was the result of Greek expansionist attempts into the Byzantine frontiers, energised by the 'Megali Idea' (big idea) of Eleutherios Venizelos. Venizelos took over King Constantine, who was a pacifist and was opposed to any attempts to re-capture Constantinopole from Turkey (Clogg 2002).

achieved an Association Agreement in 1961 in the negotiations for the country's accession to the European Community (Negreponti-Delivanis 1981; Tsoukalis 1979; Yannopoulos 1986). In 1976 it became a member of the European Union, and achieved full membership in 1981. The 1996 agreement on European Monetary Union (EMU) at the European Council in Dublin marked the step towards greater stability, growth and harmonisation of common practices among the 15 member countries of the European Union, covering a wide range of economic, social and welfare arrangements. In 2001 Greece entered the EMU and replaced its official currency, the Drachma, with the common currency, the Euro[4].

4.1.1.4 Administrative set up of Greece

Until 1999, Greece had been divided into ten main geographic departments[5]. The administration of each geographic department was based on a further three layers of authorities and sub-divisions in each layer. The basic unit was classed as urban, semi-urban and rural based on the size of the population. In 1999, a reformation programme for the Greek public administration and local government was approved by the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation (Min.IPAD 1999)[6]. As a result, the geographic departments were increased to 13 from 10, a layer of administrative authority was taken off, and several local municipalities were merged together. The country's official demographic and other statistical information based on the classification as above was prepared by Min.IAPD and is summarised in Table 4.1.

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[4] See also Mitsos and Mossialos 2000 (eds.), *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, for more information on Greece in the European Union.

[5] Those geographic department were Thraki; Makedonia; Epiros; Thessalia; Central Greece and Evia;, Greater Athens; Peloponnesus; Ionian Islands; Aegean Islands; and Crete. See Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.1 for some more details on the ten geographic departments of Greece.

[6] This program was debated at the Cabinet session on February 1997 under the symbolic title "IOANNIS KAPODISTRIAS" based on the belief that there was a need for a fundamental reform of the country's Public Administration, such as organisation of the regions, introduction of new responsibilities for the primary level Local Government, and Prefectural Self-government (Min. IPAD 1997, 1999).

Table 4.1: Distribution of municipalities *(demoi)* and communities *(koinotites)* of Greece, and their population, according to the Kapodistrias' program.

Geographic Departments	Nomoi	Demoi	Koinotites	Pop. of Demoi *	Pop. of Koinotites *
East Makedonia and Thraki	5	47	8	554,630	15,866
Central Makedonia	7	126	8	1,699,858	9,119
West Makedonia	4	44	17	283,501	9,514
Thessalia	4	93	11	722,346	12,500
Epiros	4	57	19	329,642	10,087
Ionian Islands	4	33	6	191,783	1,952
West Greece	3	72	2	706,572	1,115
Central Greece and Evia	5	89	6	574,513	7,767
Peloponnisos	5	100	7	601,950	5,478
Attiki	4	91	33	3,456,094	67,313
South Aegean Islands	2	45	13	252,208	5,273
North Aegean Islands	3	35	1	198,945	286
Crete	**4**	**68**	**2**	**539,413**	**641**
Total	54	900	133	10,111,455	146,911

* Data is based on the 1991 census
Source: Min.IPAD, Hellenic Agency for Local Development and Local Government, 1999.

Following another unification plan brought at the same time, changes were also introduced to the urban, semi-urban, and rural classifications[7].

4.1.2 The Socio-Economic Background

4.1.2.1 The Greek Economy

The industrialisation of the Greek agrarian economy began in 1922, following the influx of 1.2 million refugees after the Asia Minor disaster (Lazaridis 1993, p. 84). As a result of its transition from a primarily agricultural economy to an industrialised or semi-industrialised economy, as well as due to its integration into the European economy, post war Greece experienced rapid economic growth. These transformations brought about key changes including growth in tourism and labour migration, as well as in the areas of income distribution and social policies.

[7] The new division of *demoi* with respect to the urban, semi-urban and rural dimension are as follows (Min IPAD 1999): a. *Demoi - Group of villages:* Union of rural settlements with population up to 2,500 inhabitants; b. *Demoi - Semi-rural settlement:* A semi -rural settlement with population of 2,500 - 5,000 inhabitants; c. *Dimoi - Semi-urban:* Urban municipality with population of 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants; d. *Demoi – Urban:* Municipalities with population up to 50,000 inhabitants; e. *Demoi - Sections of Metropolitan Areas:* Includes the local authorities of the metropolitan areas of Athens and Thessaloniki.

In the past, Greece often suffered from its poor fiscal policies that it inherited from the 60's and 70's, and have been criticised for it. Its low rates of GDP growth and a very small labour productivity, which in conjunction with 'protectionist' macroeconomic State policies, held back expansion of local industries and increased the trade imbalance of the country (Featherstone and Ifantis 1996; OECD 1992). Greece failed to adjust to the two oil price shocks in the 70s. It had a costly industrial policy biased in favour of traditional manufacturing sectors, and failed to invest in secondary sector industries such as high-tech (Hitiris 1994). The adoption of credit rationing and government-led wage increases and price controls reduced profitability (Featherstone and Ifantis 1996; Gros and Thygesen 1998; OECD 1992). Consequently, public expenditure increased and Greece was characterised by high inflation rates, high fiscal and external deficits, and relatively large increase in public sector debt to GDP ratio (ibid.).

During the 1980s, the government put emphasis on development of service oriented economy. However, poor infrastructure, bureaucracy, lack of adequate domestic capital and investment discouraged the development of a strong service industry (Featherstone and Ifantis 1996; Gros and Thygesen 1998; Negreponti-Delivanis 1981).

Stabilisation programmes were introduced in 1985, 1991 and 1993 in order to reverse these trends and as part of the EU requirements to narrow the economic gap with other EU countries prior to joining the EMU (Gros and Thygesen 1998; OECD 1992). Today, Greece is a signatory to various international trade agreements under the World Trade Organisation and the European Union, and has a market led economy with limited state intervention, facilitating a much needed boost to private investment and profitability. It has registered an average annual economic growth rate of 3.6% (1995–2000), which is higher than the EU average[8] (see Table 4.2 for key economic indicators)[9].

[8] For details on the contemporary economic picture of Greece and influence by its European integration see Mitsos and Mossialos (eds.) 2000.

[9] For further details about the Greek economy, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003), *Greece in Brief / Economy,* Athens, available at http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2002/12/31/1412/print.asp.

Table 4.2: Key economic indicators of Greece

	Unit	1980	1985	1990	1995	1997
Exchange Rate	Drachmas* per $	46.54	147.76	157.63	237.04	282.61
Consumer Prices	Index Number (1990=100)	17.6	44.9	100.0	191.4	218.5
Wages: Hourly Earning	do	15.5	47.5	100.0	187.9	-
Labour Force	In Thousands	-	-	-	4,245	-
Employment	do	-	3,589	3,719	3,824	-
Unemployment	do	-	-	281	425	-
Unemployment Rate	(%)	-	-	7.0	10.0	10.3
Government Finance Deficit	Billions of Drs	53.4	586.6	1,553.1	5,05.3	-
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	do	1,711.0	4,617.8	13,143.1	26,8950.0	33,026.0
Gross National Income (GNI)	do	1,767.6	4,584.0	13,248.2	27,067.1	33,096.0
Inflation	(%)	-	18.7	16.4	9.2	-

Source: International Monetary Fund (1998): pp 442-445.
Drachmas= Drs. - Data not available from the source.

4.1.2.2 Labour Sector and Employment

Despite the expansion of the labour market[10], unemployment has risen across most sectors. Unemployment rates increased during the period 1985-1997, reaching 7% in 1990 and 10.3% in 1997. Unemployment is also higher among females, especially for those aged under 25[11]. (Figure 4.1; NSSG 1992, 1998a; Flaquer 2002).

Figure 4.1: Unemployed status by gender in Greece, 1985-1997



Sources: NSSG, Labour force surveys, 1992, 1998a.

[10] The concentration of labour force in the service sector rose from 27.2% in 1961 to 57.7% in 1997, whereas in the agriculture sector it reduced from 54% in 1961 to 19.9% in 1997. In the manufacturing sector, it was 22.4% in 1997 (NSSG, Labour force surveys 1995, 1998a).

[11] In 1997, the mean unemployment rates in Greece were 22.2 percent for men and 40.6 percent for women, aged under 25 years (Flaquer 2002, p.63).

Among the other characteristics of the labour force are the high self-employment rates and the small rates of female employment. Self-employment – which is one third of the labour force - is above the European average, while more than 10 percent of those in employment are employed in family business (Flaquer 2002, p. 62). According to the Eurostat (2001), in 1995 only 38% of the women aged between 15 and 64 were in employment against the European average of 49.6%. Female participation in part-time jobs is also well below the European average.

4.1.2.3 Infrastructure

Over the last few decades, Greece has undergone major developments in its infrastructure including transport, communication and other public amenities such as schools and hospitals. The road network and the ferry services continue to provide the major transportation services, with new investments in developing the rail network and air transport. The multi-billion investment in improving the transport, communication and residential infrastructure to host the 2004 Olympics, is hoped to accelerate the momentum of such developments, as well as boost employment and economy (ESCG 2001, p. 5).

4.1.2.4 Immigration

The migratory movements of the Greek population and the influx of foreign nationals have had variable levels of influence on the socio-economic and culture characteristics, as well as the demographic map of the country (Drettakis 1996; Papadakis and Siampos 1995; Poulopoulou 1994; Rontos 1995). Up to 1974, Greece experienced mass emigration in search of better opportunities, mostly to countries such as Canada, Australia and other major European states[12]. The greatest proportions of those emigrants were economically active populations, who were also of fertility age, with direct and grave effects on the population replacement, especially, in remote rural areas (ibid.). Since 1973, there has been a trend of reverse migration. It is estimated that between the period 1968 to 1985 around 858,000 emigrants returned to their place of origin and to smaller towns contributing to a certain reconstruction of the demographic forces on the periphery (Poulopoulou 1994). In addition, between the period 1989-1992 Greece faced the new reality of the foreign immigrants settlement. Since then Greece has progressively transformed from a country that sends labour force abroad into a country that receives

[12] During the period 1956-1976 approximately 1,207,000 Greek emigrated, heading mainly towards Canada,

immigrant workers, especially from neighbouring countries, as well as from African and Asian nations[13].

The cultural influence of the returning emigrants, as well as the immigrants, occurred through the diffusion of imported new ideas and cultural norms regarding life, family size, childbearing, and contraceptive use (Academy of Athens 1990, p. 31). However, because the majority of the immigrant population in the early 1990s comprised undocumented economic immigrants or illegal immigrants, their social and economic integration into the Greek society did not take place. Consequently, while the Greek economy benefited from these low cost labour pools, there have been only limited positive social and demographic benefits (Fakiolas 1999, Glytsos 1995b). Following the initiative in 1998 to regularise the undocumented economic immigrants, The National Action Plan on Social Inclusion 2001 – 2003 has mobilised several progressive measures aimed at facilitating economic and cultural integration of immigrant population. These included special intercultural education programmes for immigrant children, Greek language skills programme for adult immigrants as well as measures to combat racism (ESCG 2001).

4.1.2.5 Urbanisation

The lack of diverse employment opportunities, low income of the provincial population, as well as the low quality of life, resulted in large-scale internal migration in search of better opportunities. This was a major contributory factor to Greece's urbanisation (Papadakis and Siampos 1995; Poulopoulou 1994; Rontos 1995). This process accelerated during the 1970s and 1980s resulting in the development of large urban centres especially in the Greater Athens area (Table 4.3). Consequently, the majority of the economic and cultural activities have concentrated in these areas, creating an imbalance of distribution of resources over the rest of Greece. This also led to further depression in the rural areas, which are inhabited predominantly by older people (Stathopoulos 1996). The overpopulation in Athens has had an adverse effect on its environment such as high pollution and traffic congestion, as well as poor quality of life (Poulopoulou 1994; Rontos 1995).

Australia and major European countries (Papadakis and Siampos 1995).

[13] In 1993 immigration to Greece was almost 40,000, after peaking at 153,000 in 1991 (Council of Europe 1994). The immigrants included Pontians from the former Soviet Union, and over 100,000 Albanians (Poulopoulou 1994).

Table 4.3: Distribution of rural, semi-urban and urban population, 1961-1991, Greece

Areas	1961	1971	1981	1991
	thousands and (%)			
Total –Greece	8,389 (100.0)	8,769 (100.0)	9,740 (100.0)	10,260 (100.0)
Rural [a]	3,675 (43.8)	3,082 (35.2)	2,956 (30.3)	2,910 (28.3)
Semi-Urban [b]	1,086 (12.9)	1,019 (11.6)	1,125 (11.6)	1,313 (12.8)
Total Urban [c]	3,628 (43.3)	4,668 (53.2)	5,659 (58.1)	6,037 (58.9)
District of Athens	1,853 (22.1)	2,546 (29.0)	3,038 (31.1)	3,073 (30.0)
District of Thesalonnica	381 (4.5)	557 (6.3)	706 (7.2)	749 (7.3)
Rest of Urban Cities	1,394 (16.7)	1,563 (17.9)	1,915 (19.8)	2,215 (21.6)

[a] Rural area with less than 2,000 inhabitants
[b] Semi-urban areas with 2,000 to 9,999 inhabitants
[c] Urban areas with 10,000 inhabitants of more

Sources: NSSG Statistics on Population: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1998.

4.1.3 Socio-Cultural Background

4.1.3.1 The Greek Family

The Greek family shares several similarities with the other Mediterranean nations in its structure, values and social attributes, as well as in the transitions it has undergone. A prominent change that has occurred over the last several decades is the transition from an extended traditional family system to a nuclear family system (Doumanis 1983; Lambiri-Dimaki 1983). Initially this transition was more evident in the urban regions of the country, and later on spread to the rural areas as well (Papadopoulos 1996). While the nuclear family model with the married couples and children is the most common family type now, the recent socio-cultural changes have also led to the emergence of other types such as single-parent families, and unmarried cohabiting couples[14].

Greek families are very 'child centred' and display a good parent-child relationship (Teperoglou and Tzortzopoulou 1996). Children grow up with parents, with material and emotional support from extended family members as well, until they become adults, obtain employment and are ready to form their own families. Upon marriage, they move out to set up their own families, usually close to their parents' houses. Intergenerational support continues even after this stage either in the form of the parents contributing towards the cost of house and childcare as well as in the form of care of the elderly by the children (Maratou-Alipranti 2000).

[14] See more details in Chapter 1, section 1.3.

While the above model is still the dominant family type found in the Greek societies, several transformations are increasingly evident (Kyriazi 1995; Maratou-Alipranti 1995). The nuclear urban family values have begun to change. For many from the younger generation, starting a new family is less of a tradition to comply with once they reach adulthood, and more of a personal decision, usually made after achieving their financial and occupational aspirations. The transformations have also included large scale migration of the young and economically active population to urban areas seeking better education, employment opportunities and living standards. Further changes are visible in the form of delayed entrance to marriage, delayed child bearing, as well as smaller size families[15].

The role of the Greek family system functions as a significant social institution, facilitating social mobility and progress to higher class. This belief is evident in the social practices of all classes through their attitudes, visions and expectations (Papadopoulos 1996, 1998; Tsoukalas 1977, 1987). As a social institution the family also serves to make up for the inadequacies of the state welfare system through the support from kin and extended families[16]. Childcare is the classic example, with other areas including contributions towards children's education, marriage, and establishment of a family, housing as well as care for the elderly (Flaquer 2002; Matsaganis 1999, 2002; Papadopoulos 1998; Symeonidou 1996). Papadapoulos (1996) describes this role as part of the 'Greek Familism' (p.12). The Greek family solidarity relates to a kind of intergenerational responsibility towards the family that accepts the dependency of women on men and that of children on their parents (Maratou-Alipranti 2000). The failure of the Welfare State to provide adequate support to these groups by way of flexible employment opportunities, child care facilities and adequate unemployment and housing support, legitimises this dependency on the family (Matsaganis 2002; Papadopoulos 1996; Symeonidou 1996).

4.1.3.2 Evolution of Social Attitudes, Values and Behaviours

Looking after the family and providing for its moral and material well being has always been considered to be a very important social value in Greece. In the Eurobarometer survey on social values, 99.4 percent of the Greek respondents stated family as their top

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[15] Data recorded in 1995 indicated that Greece had 2.7 persons per family (Eurostat 1998a). See Chapter 1, section 1.2 for statistical information for Greece and Europe.

[16] In 1996 65 percent of men and 44 percent of women aged between 25 and 29 were living with their parents in Greece (Flaquer 2002, p.55).

priority on the value scale (Malpas and Lambert 1993[17]). In the 1999 survey undertaken by the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE) a similar percentage (96 percent) of the people aged 18 to 49 also stated that 'it is important that more emphasis to be placed on the family life in the future' (Symeonidou 2002a, p.123).

At the same time, several changes are evident to the attitudes on family forms and structure. There is an increasing level of acceptance to unmarried cohabitation[18]. This is linked to the decreasing popularity of marriage as a social institution, increase in ideologies of individualism and self-fulfilment and number of single-parent families (Maratou-Alipranti 2000). The instability of marriages and the social stigma attached to lone-parent families are said to be among the contributory factors of decrease in marriages[19] and increase in preferences to other forms of consensual unions among the younger generation (Papadopoulos 1996). While divorce rates are still comparatively much lower than in most EU states, the national rates have increased over the decades[20]. However, childbirth outside marriage is not well received, despite abolishing the differences in rights of 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' children. The social criticism and rejection of births outside wedlock is said to have had a critical role in the increased number of abortions, which since 1984 has been legalised and hence has obtained widespread social acceptance (Carlos and Maratou-Alipranti 2002).

The previously common social pressure, especially on young women, to get married as soon as they reach adulthood, has gradually given way to family support to continue their education, secure employment and fulfil personal aspirations (Maratou-Alipranti 2000). While the dowry system has been abolished officially, it still continues to receive social sanction by way of the value attached to it as a cultural practice.

Another significant change, observed among the last few decades, is the shift towards a consumer-oriented society (Teperoglou and Tzortzopoulou 1996). This has brought considerable pressure on parents to meet the increasing material needs of the children as best as they can (ibid.). The financial burden this places on the parents, as well as the need to meet the materialistic aspirations of individuals themselves has necessitated

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[17] Quoted by Papadopoulos 1996, p. 4.

[18] According to Symeonidou (2002a) cohabitation is still an open door of marriage as 73 percent of all the cohabitation end in marriage within a duration of three years (p.121).

[19] The marriage rate was 7.7 per 1000 in 1970, which decreased to 5.9 per 1000 in 1999 (Eurostat 2000a).

[20] In 1970 the total divorce rate in Greece was 3.5 per 1000 which increased to 9.5 per 1000 in 1999, the second lowest in EU member states (Eurostat 2000a).

rational decisions and choices regarding the number of children couples wish to have (Pouloupoulou 1994; Polyzos 1996).

4.1.3.3 Women's Status

The male bread winner model, which is still dominant among the Greek families in terms of gender roles, assigns a superior role to the father as the provider and protector of the family. The females on the other hand acquire value, power and increasing responsibilities in the family by bearing children and later by becoming a grandmother (Delithanasi 1999; Doumanis 1983; Kyriazi 1995). This stereotype attributed to the Greek family woman has deep roots in the Greek family tradition, culture and social values. However, like all other aspects of the society, the female gender role too has been subject to significant changes. The first significant move towards enhancing their social position occurred in 1952, when women were granted the right to vote[21]. In 1953 a legislation abolishing discrimination against women was passed. The PASOK government in 1983 took more progressive steps in this direction, by introducing the modernised family law. The law abolished dowry and men's status as head of the family, gave equal rights to both parents in family decisions, naming the child, and simplified divorce procedures (Moussourou 1994).

The key factors that improved the women's social status, however, was the increase in proportion of female participation in formal education[22] together with their contribution to the labour force and family income (Kyriazi 1995; Papadopoulos 1996, 1998; Stamiris 1986). While women have worked in rural or home based occupations for a long time, it was their entry in to the 'out of house' employment that enabled significant change in their status (Teperoglou and Tzortzopoulou 1996). The 'partial socialisation' of the reproduction process to meet the demand for female labour and equal opportunities with men gave the Greek women control over their own lives and the ability to make crucial decisions like the number of children they wanted (Antonopoulou 1988; Kyriazi 1995). Through the reclassification of the social and economic roles between the two sexes, the role of women changed from being just a 'domestic economist' to that of a co-provider of socio-economic security for the family (Delithanasi 1999; Georges 1996; Kyriazi 1995).

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[21] The first feminist movement began in the 1870s, demanding women's right to education, to vote and equal work (Lazaridis 1993).

[22] In 1970, the proportional representation of women in university education was 33.9%, while this figure increased to 58.9 in 1997, overtaking the males (Maratou– Alipranti et.al. 2002, p. 84; also NSSG, statistics on education, various years).

This assigned them with equal roles as men in enhancing the social standing of the household (ibid).

Agriculture and tourism related service sectors continue to be the areas in which most women find employment[23]. However, compared to the EU average, female employment participation in general is still lower in Greece across all age groups and most sectors[24]. This has been attributed to the lack of adequate child care facilities as well as the rigidity of the Greek labour market in not offering sufficient flexible working conditions and part-time employment for mothers with young children[25] (Flaquer 2002; Symeonidou 1996) (See also Table 4.4 for female employment rates by age group).

Table 4.4: Female employment rates by age group, Greece (%)

Year	Female's Age Group							
	20-24	**25-29**	**30-35**	**35-39**	**40-44**	**45-49**	**50-54**	**55-59**
1985	49.1	52.7	50.7	50.9	47.8	44.6	40.1	30.2
1990	54.0	60.2	58.5	57.1	49.9	45.4	37.8	28.5
1995	51.9	63.4	61.9	60.2	55.8	46.0	39.0	28.9

Source: Eurostat 1990, 1995, European Social Statistics - Labour Force Survey Results.

Women, particularly in the younger age group, face difficulties in gaining equal access to the labour market as well as in reconciling family life with paid employment. This is mainly because, in terms of parental roles, the Greek women, as with many other societies, still have a central role in their families and the society. The role of raising a child has not been totally cultivated by both partners yet. Mothers are still assigned and assume a primary role in bringing up the children in the family (Kyriazi 1995; Maratou 1995). As the first child is born, most mothers leave their job outside home to care for the child. At this point the successful management of the household replaces the role of paid employment, as a source of self-esteem and prestige (Georges 1996). Often this leads to conflicting interests and experiences in terms of meeting responsibilities at home and achieving personal aspirations related to further education and employment. In such

[23] In 1995, 23.9% of female employment was agriculture based and 62.2% was service based, against a EU average of 4.4% and 78.9% respectively (Papadopulos 1998, p. 55-56).

[24] Only 45.3% of the women aged between 15 and 64 were in employment against the EU average of 57.3% in 1995 (Eurostat 1996a). For more details about women's employment in Europe see E. Drew et.al. (eds.)(1998), *Women, Work and the Family in Europe*; Eurostat (1995a), *Women and Men in the European Union: a Statistical Portrait*; and J. Rubery and C. Fagan (1993), *Occupational Segregation of Women and Men in the European Community*.

[25] In 1995, only 8.4% of the total females employed in Greece were in part-time jobs, against an EU average of 31.3% (Eurostat 1995a).

circumstances, women who have acquired equal or near equal rights with their spouses in taking major family decisions are able to negotiate and decide on limiting their family size as a balancing exercise (ibid).

4.1.3.4 Education

The value attributed to education in Greek society can be viewed as a continuation of its familial values. Parents believe it is important that the children achieve good levels of education so that they become *better than their parents* and enhance the image and social status of the family (*the symbolic aspect of intergenerational family investment)* (Papadopoulos 1996, p. 12). Consequently, parents invest heavily in securing the best possible education for their children, so that they may secure well paid employment that could provide for additional family income and assets (*the material aspect of intergenerational family investment*) (ibid.)[26].

Education up to the age of 15 is compulsory in Greece[27]. Education is free in all public institutes at all levels. Appointment of teachers and decisions on the teaching syllabus is centralised. There are only limited places for post secondary education and this had created high competition for admission to higher education institutes[28]. Often, overseas education especially in UK, Germany, Italy and other Eastern European nations provides a solution to the lack of opportunities in Greece, but at a higher cost[29].

The 1976-97 curriculum introduced the modern version of Greek (*demotiki*) as the official language for government and of schools. The same curriculum also aimed to establish technical and vocational high schools in order to link education to the labour market, and to serve as an alternative to university education (Stathopoulos 1996). The education reform bill introduced in 1997 sought to alleviate some of the problems associated with higher education by providing assistance in preparing for university entrance exams, as

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[26] However, this belief that access to universities will secure professional and well-paid jobs is no longer true as the number of graduates have increased, and as its takes long time to get to relevant employment after graduation.

[27] The Greek educational system consists of: (1) Seven years of primary education, (one year in the nursery school and six years in the primary school, starting by the age of 5; (2) Secondary education (divided into lower secondary school –*Gymnasium*, which is the end of compulsory schooling in Greece, and the upper secondary School – *Lyceum* which includes general, and technical-vocational education; and (3) Higher education which includes universities (4 to 6 years), Institutes of Vocational Training (up to 2 years) and Technological Education Institutes (2 to 3 years).

[28] There were approximately 120,000 candidates to compete for 40,000 places in the university (Stathopoulos 1996, p.147).

[29] In the academic year 1991-92, 20,000 Greek students registered in EU universities, comprising almost 10 percent of the Greek student population, compared to an EU average of 1.3 percent (The Greek daily *Kathimerini*, 30 October 1994; quoted by Stathopoulos 1996, p. 147).

well as by establishing an open university with life long learning programmes (Maratou-Alipranti et.al. 2002).

In terms of the level of education among the Greek population, significant achievements have been made since the constitutional reform in 1974. Over the time there has been an increase in the levels of education achieved by people from the lower social classes (Lambiri-Dimaki 1995, p. 220). As summarised in Table 4.5, the proportion of enrolment in secondary and higher education for both genders has increased since 1975. In addition, the gap between the level of participation by gender gradually narrowed. Since 1985, there has been more female participation than male in higher education. However, the decline in the absolute number of births experienced in the recent years has resulted in the decrease in enrolment at primary level.

Table 4.5: Enrolments of Greek student by education levels and gender 1975-1995 (% of the total population)

Academic Years	Primary Education [a]		Secondary education		Higher education	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
1975-1976	26.40	24.47	37.60	15.58	4.01	2.35
1980-1981	24.41	22.80	21.08	17.70	3.71	2.63
1985-1986	22.40	21.03	20.87	18.94	4.55	4.37
1990-1991	21.96	20.65	23.20	21.40	5.10	5.12
1995-1996 [b]	36.98		47.14		8.91	

[a] Does not include the pupils in nursery schools.

[b] Data available only for combined gender participation.

Source: NSSG, Statistics on education, various years.

4.1.4 The Greek Welfare State

The Greek welfare state has its roots in a complex web of historical, social, economic and political factors, some of which go back to the time of the creation of the modern Greek state in 1830 (Stathopoulos 1996). A formal welfare state was introduced with the new constitution in 1974, after the end of the dictatorship, and covered health care, childcare provision, social protection, such as maternity and parental leave, family allowances, unemployment, pensions, taxation measures, housing and poverty. Compared to other EU member states, Greece's welfare system lags behind with characteristic inadequacy, inefficiency, disparities in provisions, and a bureaucratic vertical administrative structure

(Katrougalos 1996; Petmesidou 2000; Rhodes 1996)[30]. In 1995 there were 236 different social insurance funds providing different levels of support and had different preconditions in receiving aids (Papadopoulos 1997). There is no universal income safety net to ensure a minimum income at an individual or family level (Flaquer 2002; Petmesidou 2002).

4.1.4.1 Health care

The National Health System (ESY in Greek) was established in 1983, with the stated aim to provide and distribute care to the entire population, irrespective of income level or social class. It also aimed to regulate and control the expansion of the private medical care as doctors were banned from engaging in private practice while employed by the ESY (Stathopoulos 1996)[31].

However imbalances in regional development due to a disproportionate distribution of resources and shortage of qualified medical staff, and an underground system of 'back hand' payment demanded by doctors for services have disadvantaged the less well off sections of the society (ibid). At the beginning of 1990s, in the main cities hospitals become overcrowded and bribery in order to secure treatment increased.

Today the health care system in Greece is still characterised by its complexity. In parallel with the operation of ESY, numerous other Social/Health Insurance Funds operate in each trade/industry or service sector, some of which have their own clinics. Provisions and other arrangements vary between those different Social-health Insurance Funds (Papadopoulos 2002). Also, as part of a modernisation process, by 2006 the ESY plans to implement a system of family doctor and paediatrician (General Practitioner) (ESCG 2001), providing free services to people registered with them[32]. Patients would be expected to pay between 10% to 25% of the expenses, but not for chronic or mental illness cases. In general, all Social Insurance Funds provide free hospital care (where Funds apply a per

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[30] The inefficiencies of the welfare state exist even though in the mid 1990s, the government made efforts to reduce unemployment and raise productivity. Among the other policies introduced included more flexibility at the work place, lower social security benefits for new worker, easier lay off and rehiring policies, as well as training and retraining programmes for workers most of which were funded by European initiatives (Stathopoulos 1996).

[31] Until the 1980s the health care services consisted of public hospitals, rural clinics in remote areas and private clinics. Services were characterised by several inequalities in terms of geographical provision (with fewer and uncoordinated services available to the rural and other remote areas) and major differences in fee scale (those who could pay or who had good medical insurance received best care; while those who did not have any medical insurance had to undergo a means test in order to get eligibility for free treatment (Stathopoulos 1996)). The health care system was also subject to political patronage and nepotism as doctors could practice at the same time at the public hospitals as well as at private medical clinics in which often they were the main shareholders (Petmesidou 2000; Stathopoulos 1996).

[32] Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2001), *National Plan for Social Inclusion*, Athens, p.30.

diem charge) and free medical tests (Papadopoulos 2002). Charges for children's medical care is covered in full by the state or reimbursed (most of the expenses) by the Social-health Insurance funds. The ESY hospitals also provide free emergency dental treatment up to the age of 18 (ibid.).

4.1.4.2 Housing

Home ownership has always been valued highly in Greece. Families do their best to get their own land and build their own house (Flaquer 2002; Stathopoulos 1996)[33].

The large scale migration to urban cities during 1960s and 1970s, especially in Athens, resulted in unauthorised housing construction, low quality houses and a poor planning in terms of provision of parks, schools and other recreational facilities. During the 1980s, the state made very little provision for public housing for the low-income families. In addition, the public houses were of low quality and in segregated areas (Stathopoulos 1996). The public provisions were characterised by subsidised mortgages, or donation of residential units to families with low income, large families and elderly couples on low income. There were no subsidies for renting (ibid. p.139).

Today public provisions for housing still remains inadequate and at very low levels compared to the rest of Europe. Over a period of 40 years, the Workers Housing Organisation (OEK in Greek) which is responsible for the provision of government housing assistance, has built around 50,000 housing units (approximately 1.7 percent of the total stock (Papadopoulos 2002, p. 38)[34]. The allocation of the housing is done on a lottery basis. OEK also provides loans for purchase or construction of new houses, as well as for completion or renovation of privately owned homes. It also provides means-tested rent subsidies for non-insured elderly and for working age persons (employed or unemployed who have contributed to the OEK). The rent subsidy is low and varies by the couple's or parent's marital status, type of employment, health status and income (ibid. pp: 38-39)[35]. In terms of taxation on housing, it varies depending upon the municipality[36](ibid.).

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[33] Compared to other European countries, after Ireland, Greece had highest home ownership rates in the mid 1990s. 77% of the households were estimated to be owner occupied in Greece compared to 81% in Ireland, 67% in UK, and 38% in Germany. The privately rented households were estimated at 23% in Greece, 11% in Ireland, 7% in UK and 43% in Germany (Papadopoulos 2002, Table in B.10 Part B, p. 46; see also Flaquer 2002, p.67).

[34] OEK provides assistance to its members. According to the same source the OEK build approximately 2,000 houses every year.

[35] It was estimated that for a lower middle class working household, the rent for a modest one bedroom flat was approximately 20 percent of the average male earnings (Papadopoulos 2002, pp. 38-39).

[36] Taxation increases with the area of the property in square meters, but not with its value as such or the

4.1.4.3 Childcare Provision

Although the provision of childcare is viewed as one of the main responsibilities of the State[37], this area remains relatively underdeveloped. The number of childcare facilities provided is small compared to the actual needs (Carlos and Maratou-Alipranti 2002; Symeonidou 1996). Public childcare provisions declined during the end of the 1990s[38], making their impact more apparent in certain areas of the country, as the government withdrew the subsidies. Since 1995, the local authorities have had primary responsibility for operating childcare centres, and charge income-related fees. Devolution of service provision, nevertheless, did not improve efficiency. The opening times of schools, nurseries and kindergartens do not always fit the working parents timetable[39], although efforts were made in 1997 (Law 2525/1997) to operate a childcare system with a more 'extended timetable'. On the other hand, during the last decade, private provision has become more widespread, particularly in big cities, playing an increasingly important role in the areas of child protection. According to OECD data (2001) only a 3 percent of young children under three years of age used formal child-care arrangements in 2000. It is the family (mostly grandparents), and community networks, rather than the State, that continue to provide a major source of childcare support.

4.1.4.4 Maternity and Parental Leave

Although different forms of leave and work-time arrangements are available to both men and women, in practice it is women who most often interrupt their employment or reduce their working hours to look after young children (Hantrais and Letablier 1996, p. 167). This is more so the case for Greece, as Greek women have always been seen as the main bearers of parenting responsibilities (see previous section 4.1.3.3: Women's status). There are several regulatory provisions in place to provide a good degree of support to mothers before and after the birth, as well to parents during the early years of child-rearing. However, parental leave related rights and regulations are ineffective. Some measures are unpaid, and unequal depending on the sector of employment (there are

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number of people residing in them (see Papadopoulos 2002, pp. 38-39).

[37] The Ministry of Social Welfare and the Ministry of Interior share administrative responsibility for the care services at the national level.

[38] The number of nurseries fell from 5,700 in the academic year 1997/98 to 5,576 in 1998/99 (NSSG 1999, Statistics on Education).

[39] Schools are normally open between 8:30 and 13:15 with some schools operating an afternoon shift (13:30-18:15). Nurseries and kindergartens are open 7:00 to 16:00.

fewer provisions in the private sector when compared to the public sector) (Symeonidou 1996; Papadopoulos 2002).

The main provisions include protection of working women against dismissal, availability of preferential conditions of employment during pregnancy[40]; universal maternity leave, birth grant to support costs of childbirth and maternity allowance. Statutory maternity leave, which has been redesigned several times since the 1980s, is 17 weeks in the private sector, and 20 weeks in the public sector[41]. After this period, in the private sector, female employees (or their spouses) have the option, either to reduce their working day by two hours per day for one year or by one hour for the next two years. In the public sector the mother or father is entitled to a reduction of up to 2 hours per day for two years, plus 1 hour per day for an extra two years (Law 2683/99). In the public sector, parents can also receive an extra unpaid maternity leave for up to two years, or until six years of age of the child[42]. Furthermore, in public sector, mothers also have the option not to take the reduced working hours, and instead avail nine months paid leave. While on leave, working mothers receive a maternity allowance which covers 100 percent of their pay, for the full duration, for both private and public sector; although in the private sector the allowance is conditional upon the employment record of the mother and more complicated in terms of the distribution[43]. In both public and private sectors, working fathers are entitled to two days fully paid paternity leave during and immediately after pregnancy. There are also other forms of parental leave such as unpaid leave for either parent for 3.5 months for the care of own child or adopted child until it reaches the age of three and a half years. However, there are several restrictive conditions such as both parents should be employed, at least one of the parents should have completed a minimum of one year's service in a company with at least 50 employees, the other parent should be employed

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[40] Pregnant women and mothers with new born babies are prohibited from working a night shift for up to a year.

[41] In the private sector, the maternity leave has increased by one week in 2000, following the National General Collective Agreement (EGSSE). 8 weeks are to be taken before birth and 9 weeks to be taken after birth. In the public sector, 8 weeks are to be taken before birth and 12 weeks to be taken after birth.

[42] To this arrangement, an extra year is added for each additional child that is also below the age of 6.

[43] In the private sector mothers should have worked for at least 200 days in the two years prior to birth in order to qualify for the allowance, which are paid by the Social Security Institute (IKA), and provides up to 70 percent of their wages (Law 2224/1994). Women who do not qualify for the maternity allowance (because they have worked a shorter period) may qualify for a means-tested maternity assistance (cash benefit). The additional payment is paid by the Greek Manpower Employment Organisation (OAED) as extra maternity allowance and covers the remaining amount that IKA do not provide.

outside their house, and finally in private sector, only 8% of the employees can avail this benefit in any one year[44] (Papadopoulos 2002: pp. 19-25).

4.1.4.5 Financial Allowances and Benefits for Families and Child

Public provision for family allowances were announced for the first time in Greece in 1958, and the term family allowances referred to a supplementary family income, which alleviates the cost of bringing up children. Originally, they were restricted to employed parents only, but paid for all the children. Since then a number of modifications have been done (see also Table 4.6 at the end on this chapter). Today, the entitlement for family allowances and child benefit does not have a universal fixed-rate character, but it varies depending on different factors such as family size, the birth-order of the child in the family, children's age, the duration of time spent in education as well as the family or parental income (Mastaganis 2002)[45]. Allowance rates are progressive with the family size, with the larger amount of family allowances and child benefits going to the third and subsequent children[46]. Greece, like most other European countries, has set an age limit for such benefits at 18 years of age for the children, with an extension of up to 25 years of age for children who continue their education, as they are considered as dependants. Moreover, although family allowances have generally been granted on an universal basis, by the early 1990s Greece had introduced some form of targeting and means testing to compensate low-income families. Thus, household resources are taken into account in assessing eligibility for means-tested benefits. Finally, family benefits and child allowances are not funded through taxation, but mainly through contributions, because of the insurance-based social security system. The state also provides some subsidies.

4.1.4.6 Taxation and Pensions Provisions and Unemployment Benefits

Greece operates a mixed system offering the choice between individual or joint taxation for a married couple or a combination of the two. Since the 1980s, the state has shown a clear willingness to support the family through direct or indirect tax reduction. The tax of the families of salaried workers and of pensioners is retained at the source of their

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[44] Thus, the last condition is satisfied by providing the leave on first come first served basis.

[45] Variations in the entitlements for child benefit is also a reality in the other European counties, reflecting, as Hantrais and Letablier, (1996), notes "differences in policy orientations" (p.58). In the United Kingdom for example, in the early 1990s child benefit was paid at a higher rate for the first child than for subsequent children, suggesting that the cost incurred by families may be greater for the first child compared with other children. France, on the other side, was the only country not to pay family allowances for the first child.

[46] Greek government have always considered that the country's population growth depended on couples having more than two children (More to follow in policy debate section).


income. There is tax relief according to the number of children within the family. Special provisions are made for single parent families, widows and widowers. In addition, people with special needs including children have double tax reductions. No tax is payable for the first house purchased. In case a new house is being bought because the house already owned is too small for the family, tax exemptions increase in proportion to the family size. Also, there is no value-added tax imposed for health, education and judiciary services (Symeonidou 1993, 1996). Furthermore, there are also tax exemptions with respect to childcare costs and education[47].

The pension system provides benefits to retired persons, their spouses and dependent children; to disabled workers and their dependant family members; and to surviving spouses and dependant family members of deceased workers. The funds are mainly drawn from the employee – employer contributions with some element financed by the state.

Unemployment benefits are provided up to a maximum of 12 months, and amounts up to 50% of the most recent salary for individuals, or up to 70% in the case of those with dependants. Also, as the policies favour those with long-term full time experience, the young unemployed and those in part-time employment are disadvantaged. While vocational training is available for the unemployed, the prospects for employment continue to be low due to poor performance of the industry and ailing public institutions, as well as the availability of cheap illegal immigrant labour (Petmesidou 1996, 2000).

[47] In 2000 the amount of expenses deducted from the taxable income was 150,000 GRDs (Greek drachmas) per child per year (Papadopoulos 2002, p.35).

Figure 4.2: Social protection expenditures by function, 1990 and 1995 as % of total benefits



Source: Eurostat 1998b, Social Protection in the European Union

The Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of social protection expenditures as a percentage of the total benefits provided in Greece for the years 1990 and 1995. Family and children, together with housing, social exclusion and unemployment, have received the least amount of state investment, even though, as it will be seen in further sections, these areas have been identified as having significant impacts on the country's fertility trends (see Figure 4.2, Eurostat 1998b).

4.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF LOW FERTILITY DETERMINANTS IN GREECE

An extensive review of available literature leads to the conclusion that not much empirical research has been conducted in Greece with the explicit aim to identify causal factors of Greece's fertility decline. As for theoretical work, several scholars have enhanced the understanding in this area by adapting the general theories, as discussed in chapter two, to the Greek experiences[48]. Many of these theoretical works have also suggested more or

[48] Some of the major theoretical works are as follows:

- M. Papadakis (1979), *Developments and Prospects of the Greek Fertility;*
- G. Siampos (Ed.) (1980), *Recent Population Change, Calling for Policy Action;*
- G. Tziafetas (1988), *Greece is Ageing;*
- E. Poulopoulou (1994), *The Demographic Problem;*
- M. Papadakis and G. Siampos (1995), *Demographic Developments and Perspectives of the Greek Population, 1951-2041;*
- N. Kyriazi (1995), *The Decline of Fertility in Greece: Theoretical Explanation;*

less similar policy measures involving increased state intervention in the area of fertility, more support to families, improvements in housing assistance and childcare facilities and tax rebates. These theories are not re-examined in this chapter, because they are similar to the general theories of causalities. The policy measures are examined as part of the policy debates in the third part of this chapter.

The following section discusses four major causal factors that have been identified by the scientific research on fertility decline in Greece.

4.2.1 Female Employment

The first research on the various determinants influencing fertility was undertaken in 1983-1985, by the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE). It employed a socio-economic approach, based on the model of the World Fertility Survey, and the analysis group consisted of married women in the reproductive age between 18 and 49 (see Symeonidou et.al. 1992, 1997)[49]. In a sample of 6484 married women, post-marriage employment and the fraction of marital life spent working, were found to be negatively correlated to the real number of births (Symeonidou 1990; Symeonidou et.al. 1992). The correlation was even stronger among women who had been married for less than 10 years, in comparison to those who had been married for a longer period. The same study concluded that the amount of working hours was negatively correlated to fertility; the longer the work period during the marriage, the fewer the number of children they would have. The effect of these two variables was found to be much more prominent in Athens, in comparison to other urban and rural areas (ibid.). In addition, the majority of women in the study were found to have preference towards either full-time work or for no work at

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- M. Drettakis (1996), Demographic development in Greece: 1961-1990;
- N.T. Papadopoulos (1996), *Family, State and Social Policy for Children in Greece*;
- N. Polyzos (1996), *The Demographic Challenge. Below replacement fertility and ageing in Greece;*
- F. Petralia (1997), The childless country: Demographic Developments – Prospects;
- K. Velentzas and M. Chatziprokopiou (1997), *The Evolution of Fertility in National and Regional Level, 1965-1991*;
- D. Lolis (Ed.) (2001), *Low Fertility. The Major Problem of the Greek Society*;
- Publications of EDHM, various years.

[49] The survey by EKKE was conducted in two phases. The first phase (1983-1984) was in the metropolitan area of Athens, with sample size of 1924 women, the second phase (1984-1985) was in the rest regions of Greece, involving 4,560 married women. The findings were based on both cross-tabulation and multiple regression analysis, with the cross-tabulation demonstrating more associations between the various relevant variables and fertility. Analysis was also undertaken based on the level of urbanisation (urban, semi-urban and rural), controlling at the same time for duration of marriage (see more details for the methodology of the survey in Symeonidou et.al. 1992).



all, after their marriage. For those who stopped working after their marriage, this withdrawal usually took place straight after the birth of the first baby, and since then, they did not return to employment. Moreover, in identifying causal relationships, the study concluded that participation of women in the labour force was related to other characteristics as well.

The study found that factors positively related to female employment were: income utility (benefits derived from their entry into the labour force), their educational level, their young age, their 'progressive' perceptions concerning gender roles, and finally, the attitude and beliefs of their spouses towards female employment. On the other hand, negatively related to women's labour force participation was the household's income (not including the wife's income). Concerning the number of children, it was concluded that the higher the indirect cost emanating from the income-earning opportunities foregone by mothers, the lesser the number of their children. Women with 'radical' beliefs were keener to work and had fewer children than those with 'traditional' beliefs regarding gender roles. Women of younger ages and with higher education had a greater tendency to be employed than older women or women with low level of schooling. Women belonging to the former category had fewer children than women from the latter category. Finally, their childcare methods (by grandparents and other relatives or by paying a baby-sitter) showed no effect on the number of children they had (Symeonidou 1990; Symeonidou et.al. 1992).

4.2.2 Level of Education

Symeonidou et.al. (1997) found that levels of wife's education had a statistically significant negative correlation on the 'actual', as well as the 'desired' or 'ideal' number of children, regardless of the duration of marriage of the women[50]. In the greater area of Athens, the survey found that women with only primary education had, on average, higher fertility (2.29 children) than those with secondary (1.72) or higher education (1.55) (ibid., p. 70). For the rest of Greece, the study found the existence of an 'U' shape correlation between education and fertility. For instance, the desired number of children for women with primary, secondary and higher levels of education was 2.41, 2.21 and 2.24 respectively (ibid. p. 73). Finally, this relationship was found to be also influenced by other factors, such as the woman's age, and employment status and benefits from her

[50] Significance of distinction between actual, desired and ideal number of children is discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.2.

work, the husband's education, as well as their 'progressive' or 'traditional' perceptions of gender roles. The Family and Fertility Survey of 1999 in Greece also revealed that the level of women's and men's education had a delaying effect on timing of birth, and hence fertility rates at any given period (Symeonidou 2000a).

4.2.3 Urbanisation

The urban way of life with the restricted space in the house is an impediment to having many children (Petralia 1997; Poulopoulou 1994; Rontos 1995; Salmanidis 1996; Symeonidou 1990; Symeonidou et.al. 1992). Symeonidou (1990) found that in the Greater area of Athens, one of the important determinants of fertility of women, was the number of rooms of their household. The living conditions affected the number of the children that a family had, since the arrival of children created needs for additional space.

Symeonidou et.al. (1992, 1997) also looked for correlation between various socio-economic factors under three levels of urbanisation of the respondents. Their findings concluded the following:

- Negative and statistically significant contributions to fertility at all three levels of urbanisation existed for the wife's education and employment opportunities.
- At all levels of urbanisation, positive correlation existed between the fertility and family's total income, total number of rooms in the household, the duration of marriage, the husband's rural origin and the progressive gender role attitudes in the households.
- No correlation or inconsistent associations (again in all levels of urbanisation) existed between husbands' education, husbands' occupation, and the help provided by relatives in childcare and fertility rates.

4.2.4 Income

Drettakis (1994) analysed the correlation between couples' level of income and fertility rates for the period 1981-1991 and concluded that couples fertility decisions were related to the purchasing power of their per capita income (quoted by Papadopoulos 1996, p.5). It was found that when couples' per capita income (without children) lost 16.4 percent of its purchasing power, couples increasingly tended to delay having children. The same study also found that when the average income of couples with one child lost 7 percent of its purchasing power, couples stopped having children after the first child or postponed having more children (ibid.).

4.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF FERTILITY POLICY DEBATES IN GREECE

This part of the chapter examines the nature, extent and outcome of the responses to fertility decline, as evident from a review of policy debates in Greece. It also presents a summary of the main policy measures adopted in Greece that had an influence on its socio-demographic structure.

4.3.1 Review of Debates up to 1975

Most of the debates and political measures aimed at the family were initiated by the general socio-economic circumstances of the period, in particular by the poverty that followed the first and second Word Wars. During that period, fertility rates continued to be above the required replacement levels of the population, even though they were declining steadily[51]. Thus, fertility was neither identified as a potential issue that would influence the social and economic fabric of the country, nor were any policy debates carried out explicitly aiming to influence fertility[52].

In 1968, concerned by the low population growth mainly caused by the high levels of emigration, the government set up an Ad Hoc Commission on Population Policy (Louros et.al. 1974). It was the first explicit pro-natalist development, and following two official studies on population in 1968 and 1970, it argued the importance of the third and subsequent child in the family, in order to influence the population growth. It was suggested that Greece should adopt legislation similar to the French Family Code in order to encourage the birth of the third and subsequent child. The objectives of this policy were aimed at increasing fertility and immigration, while decreasing emigration (Louros et.al. 1974).

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[51] The TFRs was estimated to 3.68 children per woman in the period between 1933-1937; 2.27 between the period 1955-1959; 2.18 between 1960-1964; 2.33 between 1965-1969; and 2.33 between 1970-1974. No data is available for the 1950-1954 period (Papadakis 1979, p. 42).

[52] While the Right regime of 1949 idealised the role of motherhood, there is no evidence of them having identified fertility of the nation as an issue of concern. However, many of the policy measures adopted by the first constitution of the Independent Greek State in 1822, such as legislation for the protection of the Greek population, especially the widows and orphans of war, had the potential to indirectly influence the fertility rates of the nation (Moussourou 1994, p. 86). Thus, the first maternity leave legislation (1912), the first law defining a 'large family' and its protection (1944 and 1946) and the family allowance scheme with payment for all children (1958), formed part of the wider policy areas with potential implications on fertility trends.

4.3.2 Developments between 1975 and 1985

In 1975 the focus of the first democratically elected government[53] was on planning and implementing the New Constitution, and the integration of Greece into the EU[54] as well as other international organisations. While the family was recognised as "the foundation stone for the preservation and the advancement of the Nation", policy discourses on fertility and specific demographic issues were yet to come.

In 1976, the Greek Family Planning Association in Athens (FPAG) was established, and aimed to provide family planning services and counselling; and to raise awareness on sexual health issues and abortion (Apostolopoulou 1994; FPAG 1992). However, it did not achieve significant success in its stated objectives, or identify fertility as a subject of any importance.

During this period, at the parliamentary level, some individual initiatives emerged. In 1979, Dr. M. Drettakis, MP[55] tabled questions on the declining fertility trends in the parliament. Concerned by the findings of his own studies, he observed that "the national independence as well as the territorial integrity of any country depended on a renewed and increased population" (Parliament Minutes 12/02/1979). However, this initiative did not result in any policy debates. At best it served as warnings of the impending acceleration of the fertility decline in the years to come.

In 1980, the formation of the Greek Society for Demographic Studies (EDHM) constituting various demographers, initiated interest in the government, who then established a separate governmental committee to address the demographic problems of Greece (Academy of Greece 1990)[56].

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[53] In 1975 the first free national elections took place in Greece, after the fall of dictatorship (1967-1974). In the same year, the Greek politics saw the establishment of two of the biggest political parties that would rule the country throughout the post dictatorship period. These were the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) founded in September 1974, headed by Andrea Papandreou, and the New Democracy (ND) party representing the right wing, which was founded in October 1974 under the leadership of Kostantinos Karamanlis.

[54] The integration of Greece in to the EU was achieved few years later in 1979.

[55] Dr.M. Drettakis studied demography and statistics as part of his research interests, and published a number of reports and books on the main demographic trends in Greece such as migration, fertility and mortality. In 1986, he brought back the same questions quoting the French demographer Alfred Sauvy "*the population problems are so essential that [left unattended] they would avenge those who ignore them*", in order to focus the attention to the demographic issues (Parliament Minutes 14/02/1986).

[56] EDHM aimed to contribute to the research of issues related to demography and the perceived consequences of demographic transition, declining fertility and ageing population. It also aimed to make policy recommendations for achieving a stable population in terms of both quality and quantity (IADHP 1986, Demographic News, magazine).

However, with the change of the country's government during the period, the focus of policy debates shifted. In 1982, the new PASOK government began to prioritise and focus on wider social policy areas[57], especially on the National Health System. It introduced the New Family Law in 1983[58] as part of its first National Plan of Social Policy[59], in order to alleviate the costs of raising children by working parents (Georges 1996; Tseperi and Mestheneos 1994). Even though it was envisaged that these measures would have a positive effect on fertility (ESCG 2000), they were implemented as part of the measures for social protection, rather than as pro-natalist measures to influence fertility trends.

4.3.3 The Pro-natalist Shift: 1986

The data published by the NSSG in 1986 indicating the lowest total fertility rate (1.65), was a major catalyst in the development of policy debates and measures specifically aimed at fertility issues. At the NGO level, in 1987 a group of demographers together with a member of the Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church established an institution in order to address the demographic problems (IADHP in Greek). The aim of the institute was to motivate the State at the policy level to address the issue of declining fertility. IADHP viewed the declining fertility trend as the "most significant problem of Greece" (IADHP - Demographic News) and embarked upon a strong publicity campaign via the media to highlight the need to reverse the declining fertility trends. Their debate on the topic was mainly held at three levels and sometimes included extremist viewpoints:

- At a national level: they argued that the fertility decline weakened the rural areas of the country (especially the Aegean Islands); strengthened the Muslim community within Greece; and impoverished the defence system of the country.
- At an economic level: fertility decline contributed to the weakening of the social security system due to the reduction in the workforce and the increase in number of

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[57] PASOK formed government after wining the elections of Oct. 1981 and was re-elected in June 1985.

[58] Based on the New Family Law (1983) many liberal regulations were applied concerning the definition of family, the individual rights, the relationship between family and labour market demands (parental leaves etc.). The legislation concentrated on rights and obligations between the spouses, protection of the interests of children, clarity of familial relationships, and recognition of equal rights for children born within and outside marriage. This law also required new spouses to decide in common about all family matters, including their residence; contribution and provision for the family and children's surname. Additionally, dowry system was abolished, and the possibility for each spouse to claim a share in the property acquired during the marriage in case of its dissolution was introduced. In case of divorce, it was required to be based on mutual agreement.

[59] In particular family allowances equal to 10,000 Drachmas was introduced on top of the existing allowances for working parents - to those parents who give birth to a third child. The allowances were administered by the ministry of Labour and Social Security.

pensioners. In addition, unemployment could result in certain sectors such as teaching, due to lack of students at school.

- At a social level, it pointed out that fertility decline leads to the ageing of the population, which in turn has it own implications in society, although it did not elaborate on these implications.

IADHM and its support group (FIADHP-friend of IADHM) quickly gained the support of the right wing political party (ND) and the Orthodox Church[60]. However, the involvement of the Church resulted in it not receiving any support from the communist party and other feminist associations due to the church's view on issues such as abortion and single parent family. While the policy discourses resulted in the increased awareness on the issue of declining fertility, it was not successful in achieving its aim of motivating the government to introduce explicit fertility policies mainly because the government of the time had different policy priorities involving social welfare.

With the introduction of the abortion law in 1986, it became possible to carry out abortions legally for any reasons. As issues concerning reproduction were deeply rooted in the cultural and ideological traditions of the country (George 1996; Naziri 1991) the legislation of abortion evoked strong opposition among several social sectors such as medical professionals, scientists, individuals, family lobbies, and in particular the church (ibid). The Church's view on abortion and contraception was prompted by its ethical and moral views as well as the importance it placed on increasing the population to preserve the Greek identity. However, during the last four decades and after an extremely large number of induced abortions, the Church incorporated a more realistic approach, supporting the use of modern contraceptive forms, while still fully opposed to abortion. The significance of these changes in terms of fertility rates was that, with the increase in the number of abortions, fertility has gradually declined implying an interrelation. This however, is a view that has been debated much during the last two decades.

The Academy of Athens (Research Centre for Greek Society)[61] was yet another organisation that put significant efforts to draw the attention of state, political leadership as well as the public to the changing trends and potential consequences of the demographic situation of Greece. It also attempted to highlight the need of urgent

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[60] IADHM was originally formed by demographers and the Church independent of any involvement by the right wing ND party.

[61] Their study was based on information gathered about the Greek demographic experiences, by other NGOs

implementation of demographic policies to address fertility decline and ageing. Its 1988 report contained a significant debate on family policies with a view to addressing the fertility issues. Prior to placing its arguments, the report ascertained two main facts regarding demography in Greece: a) the country' s fertility in both absolute numbers and in rates have been declining and therefore the population growth was low[62]; b) due to the declining birth rates the country's population pyramid was changing and was characterised by an increased number of aged population.

The report debated some of the major demographic trends, especially the declining fertility, and identified the following major consequences (Academy of Athens 1990, pp. 61-84):

- Fertility decline has created an imbalance between the proportion of the working people and the pensioners. This would render the welfare system non-comprehensive, leading to insufficient support and resources for the population in retirement.
- Fertility decline reduced the nation's productivity due to a reducing workforce, and thereby brought changes in economy through reduced consumption of products, especially in the market related to children (food, clothes, school equipment etc).
- Declining fertility has increased the demand on health care support for older people at the expense of investment in education, technology, infrastructure and employment.
- Declining fertility would lead to higher unemployment in specific sectors such as teaching due to the declining number of students, as clearly indicated by the closing down of many schools in remotes areas of the country.
- The declining working population would consequently increase the need to rely on an immigrant work force to increase the economic output. Increased immigration would result in an alteration and shift of Greek identity, language, culture, religion and the way of life (p.13) as well as an increase in racial tensions.

There were also concerns expressed over the reducing Christian population of the country and the simultaneous increase of the Muslims in Greece, especially in the remote areas of the north of the country (Thraki) and in the islands. Several times the report mentioned

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or international bodies.

[62] The TFR in Greece had fallen from 2.3 in 1975, to 2.1 in 1982 and to 1.5 in 1987 (NSSG, Statistics on Population, various years).

the high population growth of the neighbouring countries of Albania and Turkey as a threat to national security. It was highlighted that due to the fertility decline, the Greek armed forces have shrunk in size, again putting the national defence and security at risk.

In terms of the reasons of fertility decline, the reports categorised them under the following groups (ibid. pp. 49-59):

Demographic – Economic changes

- Unequal land-planning and distribution of population, with the concentration of the two out of three of population in the cities.
- The asymmetrical urbanisation which does not favour the constitution of a big family.
- The high internal and external migration of young and working people, especially during the 1952-1974 period.
- The abandonment of agricultural work and the fall of the number of farmers, who traditionally were the higher productive group among the Greeks in terms of family size.

Socio-Cultural changes

- The emancipation of women and their employment in non-domestic work.
- The decline of the Church's influence.
- The wide spread acceptance of the concept that a family with fewer children will have higher and better standards of living.

Behavioural changes

- The diffusion of ideas on contraception and abortion.
- The apparent misunderstanding brought by the media about the demographic explosion of the third world, which has been confused to be a problem affecting the Greek society.

State's responsibilities

- The report criticises the modification of the Urban Code (Law: 1350/1982) that brought up the minimum age limit of marriage from 14 to 18. It argued that this modification had resulted in the reduction of number of marriages, as well as in the increase of induced abortion by young women. It also noted that with the increase in the minimum age of marriage, the number of fertile years of a woman available within

the marriage reduced the number of births.

- The lack of demographic policies and support to families. In particular it highlighted the lack of proper housing support for large families, who face constraints in developing families due to reasons ranging from the insufficient number of rooms to the high cost of housing.

In conclusion, it noted that most of the above factors were interrelated rendering the policy making process a difficult and challenging task. It criticised the fact that demographic information available to the public was limited and that at policy level policy-makers failed to comprehend the reality soon enough. The report then suggested that demographic policies in Greece should have the following main aims (ibid. p. 98): To decelerate the declining fertility rates and increase fertility; to balance the migration within the country as well as between countries; and to improve control of foreigners who reach the country in terms of their legal residential requirements.

To that effect, the report made elaborate policy recommendations, that have been summarised below (ibid. pp. 99-114):

- Develop policies emphasising the importance of the third child as *"the child who will bring a demographic renaissance" (p.19)*[63], and therefore afford special support to mothers giving birth to a third child.
- Higher tax reductions for couples and families with children.
- Implementation of different demographic and tax reduction policies for the frontier areas of the country and islands in order to motivate the population to stay in their native areas. No elaboration of such policies was given.
- Modernising the childcare system in order to facilitate mothers' employment.
- Preservation of motherhood, by enhancing prenatal care, support during pregnancy and labour, post-natal care, and longer maternity leave with adequate pay.
- Recognition of the housework for mother through provision of benefits (monthly salary) equal to the minimum wage for those mothers who decided to stay at home or quit employment and give birth to three or more children and also lived in certain

[63] According the report the third child was the one that affected the economic situation of the family more that the first two children. The first child was usually the result of the deep emotional, social and biological needs of the couple, which is then reduced with the second child. Having already two children a mother will not easily decide to have a third child. Additionally the third child brought more concerns with regard to housing, feeding, education, and child-care (Academy of Athens 1990, p.19).

areas of the county (remote and frontier areas). This benefit could be provided for at least two years time for each child and should be covered by the pension scheme.

- Provision of better housing loans with partial amortisation of the debt for those parents who have children, with the option of total amortisation of the debts for those parents who will have a third child.
- Classification of a family with three children as a family with many children (politekni) entitling it to all the benefits that a family of four children received.
- Encouragement of part-time employment for women.
- Promote demographic awareness among the public as well as the policy makers, governmental departments and other related agencies.

In order for the successful implementation of the above policies, the following administrative measures were also suggested (ibid. pp. 117-126):

- Establishment of a Cabinet responsible for issues relating to Family and Population under the responsibility of the President of the country and in which academics, policy deputies and other experts would participate.
- Establishment of an inter-party committee responsible for the demographic development, which would examine all the necessary policy, measures and laws.
- Creation of an Under-Secretary position in the Ministry of National Economy and Finance in order to co-ordinate the initiatives related to demographic policy issues.
- Establishment of an Institute or a National Centre for Demographic Studies, under the Ministry of National Economy and Finance.
- Creation of research and teaching posts in Demography in all the major universities of the country.

The newly elected right wing New Democracy government[64] shared many of the concerns and opinions presented in the report by the Academy of Athens and displayed an inclination to a more pro-natalist approach to policies. It introduced legislation (1892/90) aimed both at the increasing fertility as a solution to the demographic developments and at increasing the economic status of women who already had children. This included:

- Special third child allowances. The allowances were set at 35,000 Drs. per month and the eligibility remained up to the age of three of the child.

[64] The New Democracy party formed a government, after a short agitation in the political level with the conduction of three national elections with in interval of less than a year (1989-1990).

- Monthly allowance to mothers who had four or more children and at least one of whom was aged under 25. The allowance was equal to one and a half times the wage of an unskilled worker.
- Lifetime pension for all mothers with four or more children and who were not taking any of the above monthly allowances. The pension was equal to four times the wage of an unskilled worker.

The above allowances were provided irrespective of other incomes, allowances or pensions. The ministry of Health and Welfare was responsible for the money while the Organisation of Agricultural Insurance (OGA) was responsible for the administrative process. This was the first explicit effort undertaken by any government so far aiming to increase fertility in Greece.

4.3.4 The Peak of Policy Debates: 1991 –2000

Despite the various policy measures introduced in 1990, the fertility trends of the country, like the other southern European countries, continued to decline and reached below 1.5 children per woman in 1991. This led to increased concerns regarding the implications. Fertility and population related issues were addressed intensively by governments and other policy makers. Nevertheless, this did not result in any immediate modification to existing policies or new measures.

The decade that followed 1990 was perhaps the most significant in the history of the debate on fertility in Greece. A renewed involvement of successive governments along with the other various policy makers was seen during this period. In the parliament, three policy proposals, titled "Incentives for addressing the demographic problems of Greece" were tabled for debate (1991, 1995, and 2000). In 1993, the findings of an Inter-party Committee were published, and in 1998 the Orthodox Church was involved in the area of policy implementation.

4.3.4.1 The 1991 Debate

The 1991 census revealed the ongoing decline in births, and the deceleration of population growth compared to the 1981 census. The Socialist party (PASOK) was the first to respond and proposed debates on the subject (Parliament Minutes of 7th and 28th November 1991).

The parliament minutes on this first debate suggest that there seemed to be a consensus on the reasons and consequences of declining fertility. As the debate was in early stages, it appears as though heavy reliance was made on information provided by external research bodies such as the Academy of Athens (ibid.).

The reasons that were identified as influencing the fertility which received varying levels of agreement from various sections of the parliament were: liberalisation and moving away from traditional values; lack of values and lack of ideological motivation to procreate and establish families; emancipation of females; legalisation of abortion and widespread use of contraceptive methods; increase in divorce rates and fall in number of marriages; urbanisation; delaying child birth; unemployment of young people, especially female and general increase in cost of living and obtaining the basic necessities to establish a family, such as housing; cost of educating and raising children; uncertainty about future; privatisation of several state functions, and the resulting insecurity in the minds of people because of the loss of guaranteed state support; increasing emphasis of quality of children as opposed to quantity, and the cost of attaining this quality; lack of sufficient child care facilities and the poor prospect for children to do well in their future in terms of getting good education and employment.

One of the main highlights of this debate was the objections received to the explicit and interventionist policy approach, from within PASOK and other parties. Several members upheld that an individual's right to exercise freedom should not be attacked and that any measures implemented should be non interventionist - they should not jeopardise individual freedom to make decisions, but must assist individuals to make informed decisions. To that end, the legalisation of abortion was strongly supported, because questioning it would amount to attacking the concept of female emancipation. Some measures such as the guaranteed admission to university education for children from larger families were questioned for its appropriateness and the resulting loss of opportunity for a rightfully deserving candidate by virtue of his or her intellectual capacity.

Regarding implementation of the measures, it was noted that many of the policy recommendations would only display results in the medium to long term, and therefore it was difficult to evaluate their effectiveness immediately after implementation. Most of the policy recommendations were broadly similar to the recommendations by the Academy of Athens. Despite the consensus on the consequences of declining fertility, the policy proposals were defeated in the vote, mainly because there were severe disagreements on the suggested measures as mentioned above. The most concrete outcome of this debate

was the creation of an inter-party committee under the title 'Working Group for the Study of the Demographic problems", with the aim to study the demographic developments and fertility trends. It also had the responsibility to give an informed opinion on the reasons and consequences of fertility decline, together with policy recommendations (parliament decision on the 25/11/1991-N.6355/4101)[65].

4.3.4.2 The 1993 debate

In 1993, the earlier mentioned inter-party committee published its report and debated it in the parliament (Parliamentary Minutes 11/02/1993). Not surprisingly, it contained several parallels to the report produced by the Academy of Athens (1988) as well as to the discussions of the 1991 debate. It highlighted that the "demographic problem – meaning the declining, low fertility- has enormous national dimensions which could influence both the national independence and territorial integrity" (Greek Parliament 1993a, p. 1). The report acknowledged that the problems related to demographic changes were many, complicated and influenced by several factors (economic, social, religious related) and therefore could not be overcome with simple one-dimensional solutions (ibid.). It also stated that "In order to overcome the declining fertility and regenerate the Greek population it is essential to place the emphasis on the third child, and this should be the primary goal" (ibid., p.11).

The report elaborated on the suggested objectives and design of demographic policy. It pointed out that protection of the mother and child, alleviation of family responsibilities and difficulties, and increasing the wife's status and social position, was more related to family policy rather than to demographic or population policy. It suggested that demographic policy should be different. It stated that demographic policy should be able to create a desire in couples to have children or more children. The aim of the demographic policy, it noted, should be the reversal of the declining trends of all the main demographic indicators including trends in marriage and divorces. It further suggested that internal migration should be directed to the small urban cities rather than towards the main capital centres of Athens and Thessaloniki. To this extent, it noted, it was also fundamental to reinforce the status of the agrarian family, society and the rural economy

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[65] The initial suggestion of forming the inter-party committee was made by the Prime Minister K. Mistotakis (05/11/1991) (Parliament Minutes K 07/11/91). The inter-party committee from the time of its establishment up to the time of producing its final report (February 1993) convened twelve times and during the meeting often invited academicians, demographers, doctors and other researchers, members of the Greek Orthodox church and other NGOs for discussion and suggestions (Greek Parliament 1993b).

(ibid.). It called for the society to become child-oriented, caring for children, devoting time to children, and helping them to move from drugs, crime, prostitution, and exploitation (ibid., p.36).

The report produced by the inter-party committee, mainly influenced by the opinion of the Orthodox Church, presented amongst other reasons, the loss of traditional values, legalisation of abortion and materialism as reasons of fertility decline. In the debate, all of these received strong criticisms. They were deemed as an attack on the individual freedom of choice, because by implication they meant that fertility was declining because individuals or couples exercised their freedom. The legalisation of abortion too was upheld, and it was argued that abortion did not necessarily decrease fertility rates – in fact, abortion rates were higher in the 60's and 70's when fertility rates were high too. It was argued that abortion was the right of a woman and legalisation provided the framework to practice safe abortion. The materialistic and cultural changes in life style as reasons of declining fertility also received strong criticisms, as by implication this meant that in order to improve fertility, non materialistic life style, probably in poverty, had to be embraced. It was noted, incidentally, that a big proportion of the population lived in poverty in any case. While studies have shown that high rates of female employment bear a negative influence on fertility rates, some members of the parliament objected to this. They quoted the example of Scandinavian countries such as Sweden, where the state had been successful in maintaining high female employment rates and relatively higher fertility rates. It argued that provision of financial benefits did not always constitute effective measures to address fertility decline, and that it was more important to ensure the provision of new and improved services that assisted the creation of large families. There were also strong criticisms that the measures adopted so far were short sighted, in that the long term consequences of declining fertility were not identified in time, and when measures were implemented, they were only done at the peak of the problem. Some extremist views that declining fertility would render the Greek race a minority within its own country among the increasing population of immigrants as well as among the neighbouring Turks and Albanians were attacked as inappropriate and lacking conviction to encourage the couples to have more children. Absence of discussion of gender roles and gender equity in the report was highlighted in the debate. It was criticised that this indicated a lack of recognition for changing roles of women, as well as the need to attain parity between gender responsibilities as well as opportunities.

Some of the new policy measures suggested in this debate included:

- Creating opportunities for women to continue in higher education and employment and family formation at the same time.
- Extension of the age limit from three to six, for eligibility for child benefits for families with three children.
- Economic and social developments in the frontier and remote areas to motivate couples to set up families there and prevent migration.
- Using channels of communication to educate young people and instil in them the ideology of family creation and procreation.
- Relocation of immigrants from Russia and other eastern European countries to the frontier areas as traditionally they had higher tendencies to have more children.

The suggestions and recommendations were not implemented during that term (due to the fall of the right-wing government ND in the following autumn). They were not legislated in the years that followed either, mainly due to the huge cost involved. The only policy modification related to fertility that year was Law 2163/1993 as an improvement to a previous legislation (Law 1892/1990) of child allowances. The previous law raised controversy as it only referred to mothers' allowances and hence was regarded as discriminatory to the males. Therefore, the law was amended to provide equal rights and benefits to fathers.

Despite the concerns expressed at the national level, in the same year the Ministry of National Economy (Min.NEC) prepared a "Report on the Population of Greece" for presentation at the European Population Conference (Geneva, 23-26 March 1993), that painted a distinctly moderate version of the situation. The report noted that: a) "fertility and therefore the family size would stay at the same levels in the future (i.e., consisting of two parents with one or two children and where possible more children). Such a model of 'nuclear family' followed the European trends and worked without any problems in the particular socio-economic environment of Greece" (Min.NEC 1993, p. 5). Therefore, it noted that there was no reason to be concerned about the future of the Greek family, its size or population trends. b) "Greece is in the same geographic and socio-economic environment of Europe, and has implemented family and demographic policies that other European member states followed" (ibid.). This shift in opinion was partly due to the position maintained by the PASOK government, (which had been in power since 1993). During the mid and late 1990's, the policy priorities of the socialist party agenda shifted to other political issues and solutions[66]. During this period, they also introduced certain

[66] One of the priorities of the socialistic government during the mid and late period of the 1990s included educational reform (1997) through which the government introduced day-long school Act aimed at assisting working parents to alleviate their child care difficulties. It was a policy already implemented by other

cutbacks in terms of incentives and benefits to families with many children in the name of fiscal discipline and continuous public expenditure retrenchments. For example in 1997, under the Legislation 2459/1997, titled "abolition of tax-exemptions and other related issues", child allowances, allowances to mothers and the life pension to mothers introduced in 1990 were tied to the level of family income[67]. This measure was seen not as a policy withdrawal that would accelerate fertility decline, but as a way to adapt to the current needs of social policy by targeting specific groups of the population. The same law also abolished all other allowances that were available to families with many children.

4.3.4.3 The 1995 and 2000 debate

The 1995 debate was proposed by the ND party, while the 2000 (July) was proposed by MPs of the ruling party (PASOK). The 2000 debate was the first debate that was initiated by a ruling party, whereas all previous debates were initiated by the opposition parties, and most of the policy proposals were voted against by the ruling PASOK due to disagreements and fiscal constraints. This change in initiative was perhaps an indication that the debates were not influenced any more by the opinions held by each parties, but rather by serious concerns amongst the members on the economic and social effects of the nation's declining fertility trends. The 2000 proposition stated: "*when a country does not give births to children, it gestates the path for its ruination. Greece as a country, is threatened by various risks, and owes to itself to counter the dangers that arise through declining fertility*" (Greek Parliament 2000, p. 1). It noted that the declining trends in population which were observed in all parts of Greece, had resulted in a population that did not reproduce itself at sufficient levels, and therefore highlighted the urgent need for concrete and coherent policies. While both legal-proposals initiated a set of policy recommendations, it became apparent that neither of the debates had much to offer in terms of arguments or policy measures that were different to those presented in the initial discussions of 1991 or 1993. However, the 1995 legal-proposal was also accompanied by

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European member states and one that was hoped to have a positive effect on fertility trends.

[67] In details, the Legislation 2459/1997, included the following provisions: a) There was an increase of the third child allowance from 34,000 Drs. per month to 40,000 Drs. and an extension to its payment up to the age of six from the age of three. However, the eligibility for this benefit was restricted only to those families which earned less than 7,000,000 Drs. per year. b) The allowances to mothers with many children were set at 10,000 Drs. for each unmarried child up to the age of twenty three. The eligibility for this benefit was restricted to those mothers whose total family income did not exceed 8,000,000 Drs. per year. c) The lifetime pension for mothers was set at 23,000 Drs. per month, and its provision included only those mothers who family income did not exceed 3,000,000 Drs. per year. Since then, the benefit has been upgraded each year based on inflation. However, the income threshold that determined eligibility has so far remained unchanged (Matsaganis 1999, p. 4).

an economic report that estimated the cost of implementation of the suggested policies to be 300 billion Drachmas (Parliament Minutes 23/02/1995)[68].

While all the recommended legal-proposals were characterised as radical in their proposed actions, some of them were said to have an underlying 'inequity' or 'unfairness' in that they focussed more on the promotion and wellbeing of families with many children instead of all families with children. For example, the proposals recommending guaranteed positions in universities and public sector jobs for children coming from large families received strong opposition due to the consequential disadvantages placed up on other children from smaller families. The argument was that eligibility criteria for such positions should be common to all applicants and should be based on individual capacity. Some of the policies were also criticised as lacking direction as it was not clear if they aimed to increase the number of families with many children, helping families with many children or to increase fertility rates in general. It was suggested that policy recommendations to increase fertility levels should have the basis of a broader national planning, by inclusion in the national budget, so that everyone can analyse research and outcomes of previously implemented policy measures. Several members who took part in the debate supported the idea that economic incentives did not necessarily bear significant influence on fertility, where as the quality of child care facilities, time constraints of parents, couples own evolving ideas on family and children had far greater significance in determining the fertility rates. On a more ideological basis, it was pointed out that benefits that targeted only poor families where women gave birth to more children were not appropriate. Motherhood, it was argued, was important in itself irrespective of the financial circumstances of the family, and hence any such benefits had to be made equally available to both the rich and the poor (Parliamentary Minutes 23/02/1995).

At the 2000 debate, the members of the Communist Party (KKE) and Coalition of the Left and Progress (SYN in Greek) criticised that the recommendations did not contain sufficient inputs from women's organisations or social scientists. It also noted that the Greek Institute on Demographic Studies (IDHM) did not represent all the relevant ministerial departments or sections of the society itself (Parliament Minutes MA' 26/10/2000 and Parliament Minutes 29/11/2000). The left parties strongly opposed the proposal to re-examine the law that had legalised abortion. They argued that abortion itself was not the

[68] The recommended law-proposal suggested that policies for resolving the fertility decline should be prioritised and introduced to remote and fontier areas of the country, and then gradually implemented in rest of the country (Parliament Minutes 23/02/95).

reason for fertility decline, but rather the lack of correct information and proper practices that led to dangerous methods of abortion resulting in infertility, were to blame. They therefore suggested that females should have easy and well-informed access to contraception. However, some members argued that couples need to be held responsible for their actions, and that second abortion should not be allowed except for health reasons, as in the German system. The debate also highlighted the inequality in child benefits and maternity benefits systems. These benefits were dependent on the position and nature of employment, whereas the costs of child care were usually the same for most parents. It was also noted that while the responsibilities of managing the childcare systems had been moved to the local governments, they did not receive extra funding to facilitate this. Suggestions of raising the tax burden received swift opposition. So did proposals for integration of economic immigrants. It was argued that such a move would put Greece's culture and traditions at the risk of dissolution (ibid.).

Most of the policies suggested for implementation were not different to those put forward in the previous debates. Many of the policies focussing only on large families, such as a guaranteed position in university or public sector employment, were opposed as mentioned earlier. At the 1995 debate, the Minister of Health and Welfare had promised to discuss a new legal-proposal, but this never materialised. Despite the findings from the study on the demographic development in Greece by the inter-party committee in 1993, it was argued that not much was known about the reasons of fertility decline, or the effects of policies already implemented.

While the 2000 debate was initiated by the ruling party, the Minister of Health and Welfare strongly opposed several of the proposals due to the huge financial costs involved in implementing those policies. However the proponents of the policy suggestions argued that money should be borrowed for such essential causes. According to them measures such as encouragement of marriage, improvement of family planning advice, promotion of the concept of large family as the ideal family, and use of media for such propaganda put only minimal financial requirements. Obtaining lottery funding was yet another suggestion to overcome the financial constraints (Parliamentary Minutes 26/10/2000 and 19/11/2000).

One of the policy recommendations made in 2000 debate was that families with three children should be given the status of a large family, so that the state benefits available to a large family would be made available to them. However, it was also acknowledged that policies had to cover not just large families, but also focus on the second child in a family,

as increasingly fewer numbers of families had even a second child. It was also proposed that initiatives should be mobilised at the European level, to eradicate the misconceptions such as pregnancy and natality would enslave women to family life and deny individual freedom. Such initiatives, it was noted, should aim to revive the ideology of reproduction and family life. Like in previous debates, it was also proposed and agreed that another organisation called the 'National Centre for Demographic Studies' should be established. It was suggested that this new organisation should aim to seek full involvement of both governmental and non governmental members such as the Orthodox Church, the Academy of Athens and the Association of Families with many children (ibid.).

4.3.5 Inputs into Policy Debates by Other Institutions

4.3.5.1 The Greek Orthodox Church

The Orthodox Church is an important social institution with traditionally significant influence on the socio-political, economic, and cultural aspects of the Greek society[69] (Fokas 2000; Georgiadou 1995). The constitutional status as the 'Established Church' of Greece assigns it high significance in public affairs[70]. This is although its influential role has gradually diminished in recent years.

The Church strongly opposes any kind of contraceptive practices and abortion on ethical and moral grounds. It has also remained strongly opposed to other forms of liberalisation seen in the evolution of the family structure such as divorces, co-habitation, same sex relationships and in more general terms it is opposed to any forms of consensual unions other than marriage legitimised by the Church (Mousourou 1994; Symeonidou 1996). It holds the view that large families are crucial for the development of a coherent and peaceful society that contributes to the growth of the nation (Orthodox Church 1999, p.1). It firmly believes that contributing to the population number by having more children is vital to preserve the 'endangered Hellenism' (Chrysoloras 2003). To this end it has tried to encourage family formation and childbearing by introducing the following measures, mostly at local parish level: In September 1998 the Orthodox Church introduced cash

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[69] 98% of the Greeks are Orthodox Christians (CIA world fact book 2002 - quoted by Chrysoloras 2003, p. 2).

[70] The highly emotive subject of the political influence of the Church, especially its hard-line stance against 'foreign influence' on Greek culture and its longstanding efforts to idealise the 'Greek nationalism' are beyond the scope of this study. For more details of the Orthodox Church's influence in politics, see N. Chrysoloras 2003, *'Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political culture'*; E. Fokas 2000, Greek Orthodoxy and European Identity; V. Georgiadou 1995 *Greek Orthodoxy and the Politics of Nationalism*; and Y. Stavrakakis 2002, *'Religion and Populism: Reflections on the 'politicised' discourse of the Greek Church'.*

benefits of 80,000 Drs. every second month for families that had a third child, available up to the age of twelve of the child. This was introduced in the region of Thrace, with the intention to eventually expand and include the rest of the parishes in the whole of Greece, and clearly aimed at encouraging families with two children to have one more. The program was initiated by a Special Synodic Commission under the title "Committee for the Safeguard of Marriage, Family and Child and Demographic Issues" in response to the observed declining fertility trends. On the other sphere of the public welfare front, the Church plays an important role in complementing the State provisions through its own network of social service centres, counselling services, medical services, orphanages, hostels, and financial aids. The services include providing meals for the children and elderly, assistance with family expenditures, medical expenses, and education expenses. However, the eligibility criteria for such benefits have been criticised, because it favours those who regularly attend the Church rather than those who are in real need (Symeonidou 1996). Thus, the underprivileged among other religious faiths or ethnic backgrounds too would not benefit from its services.

4.3.5.2 The Economic and Social Council of Greece (ESCG)

While the Economic and Social Council of Greece (ESCG) is not in a position to implement independent policies, it can make policy recommendations[71]. In December 2000, the ESCG published a report on the demographic issues in Greece that discussed the causes of declining fertility as well as its implications (ESCG 2000). The report also included a discussion on various demographic policies and make policy recommendations.

In terms of the causes of the declining fertility it initially presented sociological and cultural reasons related to the ongoing process of modernisation of the western societies (ESCG 2000, p. 4). The declining fertility is thus directly related to individualisation, weak

[71] The Economic and Social Council (ESC) was first developed in the 1950s at the national level and thereafter adopted by the European Community through the Treaty of Rome. The Greek Economic and Social Council (ESCG) was established in 1994 (Law: 2232/1994) and was modelled after the ESC of the European Union which is based on the tripartite organisation of the represented interests of three groups, that is a) employers, b) the employees and c) the farmers, representatives of the independent professionals, local government and consumers. The aim of the ESCG is mainly: 'the promotion of the social dialogue through the formation of common positions on issues concerning society as a whole or particular groups. Part of its objectives are also the promotion of a common line through the discussion of various arguments and proposals on issues of common interest of the social partners involved' (ESCG 2000). Often it produces proposals and Opinions (which are submitted to the European Commission, the European Parliament and to the Council) in order to maximise the social benefits or minimise the possible negative side effects resulting from the implementation of government policies (ibid.). The ESC's work also includes issues related to labour relations, social security, taxation measures, as well as socio-economic policy especially in topics of regional development, investment, export, consumer protection and competition.

interpersonal and family relationships, consumption, changes in the free time of the individuals, together with the economic independence of women and the improvement in availability of contraceptive facilities. Although the role of the financial situation of the family or the individual was not disregarded, the standards of living were regarded as more influential on birth rates. In observing the changing social values, it noted that "the predominance of the concept of individual rights and the suppression of commitments (i.e., to family and relationships) constituted a roadblock for the creation of families in this nation" (ibid., p.4).

The ESCG report's policy analysis and recommendations, which were strengthened by a good scientific background of international level research[72], identified three separate policy areas: a. the interventionist policies; b. the associated policies; and c. the policies with scientific context (pp.15-16)[73]. As part of the interventionist policies, it suggested that the direct economic incentives that aimed at specific population groups – such as families with many children – should be counterbalanced with those policies that aimed at balancing family and working life, as well as improving the general social environment for children (child-care centres; primary schools, etc). Simultaneously, it attributed priority for policies that increased employment and sought to achieve gender equality. As part of the associated policies, it stated that the demographic policies ought to be seen as a general effort for social enhancement of the population, in order to address the demographic changes, to create more incentives for couples to have children and in order to give solidarity to specific groups of the population such as the elderly and the young. It suggested that policies for 'active ageing' such as life-long education and vocational skills training (occupational proficiency) should be introduced in order to meet problems in the social security system and national health system.

The ESCG 2000 report also proposed seven areas for extensive scientific research:

1. Assessment of effectiveness of the economic provision in the governance of demographic policy.
2. Evaluation of the effects of those policies addressed to families with many children.
3. Recording of the experiences and policies in the demographic field of other EU member states.

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[72] ESCG has done comparative studies at the European level on the emphasis given by other States on policy priorities and their outcomes.

[73] ESCG has described the interventionist policies as the ones that aim to increase fertility rates of the country, mainly through benefits. The associated policies takes the view on the demographic changes such as ageing process of the population as de facto, and attempts to intervene in order to avoid the possible negative implications that may raise from those phenomena (ESCG 2000).

4. Evaluation of the implications of ageing process in the system of social support and social insurance.
5. Assessment of the effects of the external migration in the Greek demographic model (settlement of the economic migrants and refugees in the Greek territory).
6. Assessment of the effectiveness of peripheral policies and measures of preferential treatment from a demographic aspect.
7. Further research on social and cultural evolution in order to highlight the current disposition of individuals, couples and families.

It concluded that the issues surrounding demographic policy are numerous, and that there was an urgent need to develop a dedicated demographic research movement in Greece. It also suggested that the systematic research of the above issues required the establishment of a 'Greek Institute for Demographic Studies'.

4.3.6 Summary of Major Family and Fertility Oriented Policies in Greece

Given below is a summary of the policy outcomes since the establishment of the first Greek constitution in 1822. The objective is to give an understanding of the policies that have been in force. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the policies in the specific areas they focus on is a separate research topic, beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as far as fertility trends are concerned, the impacts of the policies have not been evident.

Table 4.6: Landmarks of main social, family and demographic policy developments in Greece

Year	Main Policy Development Landmarks
1822	▪ First Constitution of the independent Greek State: special care for widows and orphans of war.
1912	▪ First maternity leave legislation: for workers in factories and industry (unpaid, wage-earners only, duration of leave for 8 weeks).
1926	▪ New Constitution and Family Law: First concern for the welfare of large families. Protection of the family and marriage, special protection for large families.
1934	▪ Second maternity leave benefits: legislation (for wage-earners only, duration of leave for 12 weeks, mandatory benefit covering 33% of earnings).
1944	▪ First Law defining 'large families': (Law.1910/1944) and introduction of favourable measures for their protection (education, health, housing, military service, transportation). ▪ Foundation of Provident Societies (Fund-Federations) for Families with many children.
1946	▪ First legislation governing family relationships.
1949	▪ Greek Civil Code: the institution of dowry is legally protected by the law[74].
1952	▪ Women gain the right to vote.
1953	▪ A legislation abolishing discrimination against women.
1955	▪ Tax relief for large families.
1958	▪ First family allowances schemes (restricted to workers only, paid for all children).
1968	▪ First Ad Hoc Commission on population policy.
1971	▪ Study on Emigration.
1972	▪ Law 1153/1972, introduction of allowances for families with three or more children (valid up to the completion of the 15th year of age for the last child).
1975	▪ New Constitution: Family is considered as "the foundation stone for the preservation and the advancement of the Nation". It also underlines the follows: 1. Large families, invalids and victims of war, widows and orphans of those who have died in the war and the terminally ill were eligible for special care by the State; 2. Health of the citizens was the State responsibility, and special measures were taken for the protection of the young, elderly and the handicapped, and the poor were provided for by the State; 3. State provided housing for the homeless and those inadequately housed; 4. Individuals with special needs were entitled to special support; 5. The equality between the Greek men and women was declared; ▪ Maternity leave extended for 16 weeks in public sector (for wage-earners only, mandatory benefit).
1976	▪ Establishment of the Greek Family Planning Association (FPAG).
1979	▪ Modification of the 1944 Law governing large families (Law 860/1979). Large families are defined at those that have four or more children and up to the age of 18 for the youngest child. The age limit increases to 25 if the child goes to the university. ▪ Introduction of the Open Care Centres for Elderly (KAPI in Greek).
1980	▪ Establishment of the Society for Demographic Studies (EDHM).
1981	▪ Expansion of child allowances given to large families (given to all children irrespective of family income).
1982	▪ Establishment of Family Planning Centres . ▪ Family Law: Secularisation of marriage. ▪ Law (1268/1982) aim to tackle poverty and social exclusion. Extra allowances are introduced to individuals with special needs and to the elderly persons (means tested for the latter group).

Continued on next page

[74] According to the Greek Civil Code (1949), "Property given to the husbands by the woman or by someone else on her behalf in order to alleviate the burdens of the marriage" (quoted by Teperoglou and Tzortzopoulou 1996, p. 491).

table continues from previous page

Year	Main Policy Development Landmarks
1983	▪ New Family Law (Law 1329/1983) - Ministry of Justice: New concepts and provisions are introduced as a step towards incorporating contemporary societal trends and ameliorating issues regarding the equality of the sexes within the family and the family life in general. It includes the following: 1. Civil marriage; 2. Equality between sexes (rights and duties of both men and women who must jointly share decisions on all matters affecting family life); 3. Family relationships; Both parents are liable to pay alimony; 4. Children can use mother's surname too; Wives can keep their surname after marriage; 5. Abolition of dowry; 6. Divorce by mutual agreement; 7. Abolition of distinction between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' children; ▪ First National Plan on Social Policy. ▪ Establishment of the National Health System (ESY in Greek).
1984	▪ New Family Law governing workplace policy (number of restrictions in the implementation). This includes the following: 1. Upgrading of family allowances for working parents (means-tested, related to the number of dependant children); 2. Expansion of maternity leaves (equal to 14 week for private sector); 3. Introduction of 3-month parental leave (for both working parents until the child reaches the age of 2 1/2, unpaid, covering the public sector); 4. Introduction of 6 days paid leave to working individuals to care for their children; 5. Mother's protection against dismissal during pregnancy and for one year after birth.
1986	▪ Legalisation of abortion (Law 1609/1986) (abortion are allowed up to twelve weeks from conception, are covered by social security). ▪ Declaration of the importance of the family as a social institution and the governments responsibility to support family (Law 1609/1986).
1988	▪ Second Plan on Social Policy. ▪ Academy of Athens: Working Group for the Study of Demographic Problem.
1990	▪ The Law1892/1990 introduces a number of measures in favour of families with 3 or more children. This include: 1. Monthly allowance to families with 4 or more children aged under 23. 2. Monthly allowance to all mothers who give birth to a third child and up to the age 3. 3. Lifetime pension for mothers with many children[75].
1991	▪ First recommended law-proposal on the "Incentives for addressing the demographic problems of Greece"- Greek Parliament.
1992	▪ New Family Law: introduction of a number of new institutions in the field of child-care, upgrading parental and maternity leave, reducing marginal tax rates; introduction of the system of nursing at home; artificial insemination is covered by social security (Law 2065/1992 and Law 2085/1992). Under the Law 2085/1992 companies employing more than 300 employees are obliged to operate child-care centres for their employees.
1993	▪ Publication of the findings of the Inter-party Committee of the Greek National Parliament on the demographic problems of the country. ▪ Extension of allowance for having many children to fathers as well and to orphan families (Law 2163/1993). ▪ 38 family Planning Centres opened.

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[75] The lifetime pension for mothers includes all female individuals who have had four or more children in their lifetime, have not abandoned any of their children; and who were either Greek citizens or were refugees with Greek citizenship living permanently in Greece.

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Year	Main Policy Development Landmarks
1995	▪ Second recommended law-proposal on the "Incentives for addressing the demographic problems of Greece"- Greek Parliament.
1997	▪ New Law (1459/1997) on Child and Family allowances. The Law modifies the measures introduced earlier (Law1892/90) for families with many children. Most measures become means tested[76]. Abolishes previous measures on child allowances introduced by the Law 1153/1972, and introduce allowances to the single-parent families. ▪ The Law 2525/1997 introduces the 'Extended Timetable Day' for pre-school care and primary schools aiming to support working parents with young children.
1998	▪ Cash benefits instituted by the Orthodox Church to families who give birth to a third child, in Thrace.
1999	▪ Expansion of maternity (fully paid equal to 20 weeks) and parental leave in the public sector (Law 2683/1999).
2000	▪ Third recommended law-proposal on the "Incentives for addressing the demographic problems of Greece"- Greek Parliament.
2001	▪ Third Plan on Social Policy. ▪ New Law on Migration (Law 2910/2001).
2002	▪ Distribution of child benefits in the public sector to fathers as well.

Conclusions

The prime objective of this final chapter of the literature review was to evaluate the discourses on fertility decline and their outcome in the Greek context. In order to facilitate a better understanding of the debate process, the researcher first brought together the various historic, socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the country.

The historical and political review revealed that behind the overwhelming sense of national identity synonymous with the Greek population lay its history, with political and cultural influences from several surrounding regions in the Mediterranean basin. The original Greeks were not an indigenous population, but were in fact a mix of several cultures that moved in and settled from other parts of the Balkan and Asia Minor.

The transition of the Greek economy in the post-war era has been rapid. The economic development and structural changes have involved a number of distinct processes.

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[76]. Through legislation 1459/97, the monthly allowance to families with four or more children aged under 23 years became means tested. Families with income more than 10,000,000 Drs annualy would not qualify for child-allowances. The limit for getting the allowance also increased by 1,000,000 Drs for the fifth child and above. The lowest child allowance for families with many children (for each child) in 2000, was equal to 11,172 Drs. per month and the higher child allowance per family was 23,000 Drs. per month (Matsaganis 2002, p.164–165). Also, the eligibility for lifetime pension was restricted to those females whose annual income did not exceed 3,500,000 Drs. Finally, there was an extension of allowance for the third child, however, the age limit was reduced from 6 to 3 years of age, and the allowance became tested. In 2000 the annual family income limit for this allowance was set at 8,000,000 Drs. As before the eligibility to all those benefits involved Greek citizenship or those foreigners who had a green card.

Principal among these has been the structural transition from a primarily agricultural economy to industrialised or semi-industrialised economies. This process of industrialisation was increased by the integration into the European economy. Among the other features of these structural transitions were the transformation of the agricultural and service sectors, and the implications of structural adjustments and changes on the distribution of income and for social policy in the field of housing, health and education. Other key aspects that contributed to the economic development include growth of tourism and a large pool of cheap labour source from the unrecorded economic immigrants.

On the cultural front, while holding on to several traditional values embodied in the Greek ideal of 'familism', like most other European and Western countries, Greece too has been subject to cultural and ideological transformations in several spheres. An outcome of these transformations is the simultaneous co-existence of an 'almost near' gender equality with a predominantly 'male bread winner' family model. The intergenerational solidarity and support that exist within the Greek families have ensured that, despite the inadequate provisions from the welfare state, social necessities such as child care, care for the elderly, and high levels of education are made possible through the support from a close and extended family network. The Orthodox Church has significant political and social dimensions, which it has achieved through its endeavours to idealise 'Greek Nationalism' or 'Hellenism' as well as its public welfare activities. However, the more independent and less biased intellectual discourses have often criticised the Church for its xenophobic and anti-Semitic ideologies.

It is in the backdrop of the above characteristics that the demographic picture of Greece has undergone significant transformations from a traditional extended family model with many children, to a modern nuclear family model with an average family size of just 2.7 and total fertility rates of 1.3. An important question for the researcher here is, why is it that in a society that is known to be 'child-centred' with very strong family values, family size has fallen to such low levels without any significant changes in those fundamental values. The literature review showed that the social, political, anthropological and economic research on Greece had developed only during the last five decades, and for a long time continued to be largely descriptive, shallow and non analytical (Lazaridis 1993, p.79). Empirical studies that aimed to understand factors influencing fertility in Greece were very limited. Such void and non-progress have been attributed to the failure of adequate state mechanisms that record, archive and make accessible reliable statistical

data, as well as lack of sufficient research initiatives and funds to drive those research (ibid.).

A review of the fertility policy discourses at the political level revealed that over the last three decades, especially during the period 1990–2000, there have been several theoretical inputs into the area of demographic studies in Greece. While most of the theoretical and empirical contributions came from the studies undertaken by external organisations such as the Academy of Athens, and the ESCG, at the political level, the findings of such organisations were debated on several occasions. In most cases, the participants of the debates concurred on the perceived consequences of fertility decline in Greece. However, it is questionable whether there has been any significant consensus amongst the parties, which was sufficient to mobilise the respective governments into developing and implementing concrete policy measures to address the issue of fertility decline. Throughout the debates, on several occasions it was evident that various party members made use of certain proposals or policy recommendations to involve in arguments and rhetoric with a view to gain political mileage, rather than solutions for real issues. The outcome of most debates was either the formation of, or proposal to form an organisation to study the subject further, whereas actual policy implementations were either delayed or discarded due to disagreements, fiscal constraints, or uncertainty of their effectiveness. Against the backdrop of severe fiscal constraints, a causal factor for non action on policy measures was the dilemma of prioritising and addressing those issues that had immediate consequences, when compared to the demographic issues, the consequences of which were mostly long term.

A more significant feature of the debates reviewed was the lack of challenges to reports on causes and consequences of fertility decline. The only form of challenges that ever came up were from the left political sections who were opposed to the idea of explicit policy intervention, and infringement of individual freedom. None of the participants in the debate however, questioned the applicability of theoretical suggestions on causalities and consequences to the Greek reality. With an exception of the ESCG (2000) report, there was no recognition of the need for empirical studies in the Greek context, to understand what the average Greek couple experienced and needed in relation to their childbearing behaviour and intentions. Furthermore, there was no evidence to suggest that the proposed policy measures, many of which were not implemented in any case, were the results of a comprehensive appreciation of what the Greek couples really wanted

to fulfil their childbearing intentions[77]. As mentioned in the review, most reports debated in the parliament were highly theoretical in their content, and usually drew upon findings at the international level. The suggestions that the structural factors such as the socio-economic characteristics and the changing value systems led to fertility decline in Greece, were no more than presumptuous arguments, because there was not sufficient empirical evidence that proved that the sustained fertility decline in Greece was a result of such factors.

This lead to the conclusion that the fertility and family policy debates in Greece, just as seen in the more general European context, have been biased and based on unfounded assumptions. The next chapter aims to develop these findings and construct the conceptual framework of this research project. To this end, it also provides a critical evaluation of the role of theories of causalities and policy discourses in enriching the policy debates.

[77] This non recognition of need to understand individual experiences was similar to the approaches seen in the development of most social policies, where a generalist view of policy needs and possible impact was held.

CHAPTER 5:

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

The literature review in the preceding chapters provided the historical and contemporary background information on the dynamics of demography and fertility trends as experienced in Europe. It also provided insights into the main theoretical approaches that explained causalities of fertility decline, and the nature of fertility and family policy debates in Greece and the rest of Europe. The review of debates and policy discourses revealed while there was a general consensus on the causes of fertility decline, there was a clear lack of consensus among the various policy interest groups[1] regarding the need for policy intervention, as well as the most effective means of policy intervention. Policy debates reviewed mostly involved 'guesstimating' the effects of fertility decline, and often the policy measures implemented were generalised one-size fits-all policies. Such measures were introduced under the unfounded assumptions that they could motivate couples to have more children. However, in reality, they failed to deliver sustained improvement in fertility rates.

This chapter uses the above findings to develop further arguments and the conceptual framework for this research. The chapter has two main parts. The first part provides a critical analysis of the findings from the literature review. It challenges the apparent consensus regarding the causes of fertility decline. The objective is to develop key concepts and ideas in order to gain better insights into the failure of current policy measures to check declining fertility trends. These concepts are utilised in the second part to develop the main research question.

[1] These groups often consisted of politicians, ministers, social scientists and other NGOs with an interest in the subject of demography, as well as involvement in policy debates, development and implementation.

5.1 A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS FROM THE REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND POLICY DEBATES

5.1.1 The Role of Theories in Explaining Fertility Decline

Chapter 2 focused on four major theories of the causalities of fertility decline. They were: The theory of changing value systems; The rational choice theory; The theory of risk and uncertainty; and The gender equity theory. The review of theories showed that in many cases the concepts outlined by each of the four theories were in some way inter-linked. For example, the theory of risk and uncertainty could be argued to be based on the theory of rational choices. It would require the individuals involved to think rationally in order to make a conscious childbearing decision based on the evaluation of risk and uncertainties. In the same way, individual decisions to delay or prevent a birth using birth control methods, are also rational decisions, which could be based on the evaluation of the individual's financial circumstances, or perception of risk and uncertainties in life. Thus, there is no single theory that could empirically explain the variety of the fertility behaviours of societies, cultures or individuals (Mason 1997a, va de Kaa 1995). Any attempts to generalise causalities would therefore be futile, delivering erroneous results. The unique features that underlie the fertility experiences of each setting, makes it difficult to arrive at a general theory of fertility transition and decline (Greenhalgh 1990)[2].

While the theories of causalities have so far only been able to partially explain the various trends in fertility decline, the theoretical debates have helped to develop several useful conceptual frameworks (as summarised in Table 5.1[3]), that could be used to research fertility determinants in various settings. In addition, such debates are also significant from a fertility and family policy perspective. Compared to the variety of fertility experiences and the heterogeneity of the settings that experience them, there are very few theories to explain causalities. This raises several informational challenges to policy makers interested in finding adequate policy solutions for fertility decline among their unique policy target group. Such challenges involve bridging the knowledge gap between

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[2] Several empirical studies have come across this non-generalisability of theories. For example, Mueller and Short (1983) found that their results contradicted the expected outcome as per socio-economic theories. Their sample did not show a consistent positive and statistically significant correlation between income and fertility. They suggested that such anomalies might be due to the impact of mediating cultural and other intermediate factors.

[3] See Chapter 6 , section 6.3.1 explains how various causal factors of fertility decline have been derived out of this framework, to develop the research methodology.

abstract theories and the highly subjective real life experiences, aspirations, attitudes and values that form part of the lives of the target group.

Table 5.1: Concepts and factors identified in fertility theories

Rational Choice Theories
Cost of children in terms of feeding, housing, opportunity cost, which may be higher than the monetary returns from them.
Utility of children as income earners and security providers at old age of parents.
Cost of childcare: lost time, and income earning opportunities; financial cost
Theory of Risk and Uncertainty
Individuals will invest in economic security (education, skills, saving, long working hours). Therefore, will delay or avoid family formation
Independence of women (social mobility)
Child bearing as a means to gain marital solidarity
Childbearing delayed or avoided due to uncertainties in marriages, and risk of divorce
Childbearing delayed or avoided due to uncertainties at the macro level – poor employment opportunities, social protection, and childcare facilities
Theory of Changing Values
Changes in family formation: cohabitation, late marriage, children born outside marriage, and increasing divorces
Proliferation of ideologies of individualisation, self-fulfilment and need for personal development
Relegation of religion, erosion of traditional ties
Gender Equity Theory
Increasing demand, and promotion of opportunities for gender equality
Increasing levels of female participation in employment and higher education
Female independence, and equity with in family and decision making process

5.1.2 The Role of Policy Debates and Policy Measures in Addressing Fertility Decline

From the review of policy debates[4] in Chapter 3 and 4, it was found that the notion that fertility decline was an issue that had to be addressed via state intervention through fertility policies had long historical precedent. However, the perception of policy makers regarding the causes and consequences of fertility decline has changed over the course of the history of the debates. Similar changes were also found in their approach to policy intervention, which alternated between explicit and implicit policy approach.

[4] For the purposes of this research, fertility policy debate has included the whole process that identified fertility as an issue requiring State intervention, the debates on causes and consequences of fertility decline, as well as the discussions that aimed to develop policy measures to: (1) Stop fertility decline and increase the fertility rates; and (2) Help society to adjust to the impacts of declining fertility. While the State and the ministries are the main participants of the debates, it also includes social scientists working in an academic capacity or employed by the State with specific objectives; other interested NGOs, and religious institutions.

The initial perspectives on the consequences of fertility decline of the pre World War II era related to the sudden and irreversible reduction in the population and the consequent loss of political and military dominance of Europe. Such predictions had less to do with facts than the imagination and fears of the political and other social establishments. These fears and prejudices led to the formation of pro-natalist regimes that actively sought to intervene and improve the fertility rates of their countries. Some of the interventions resulted in strict policy measures like restricted access to birth control, and ban on abortion in countries such as France and Spain. On the other hand, there was also the liberal model of Sweden, which aimed to increase fertility by giving its women more control over their fertility choices and decisions. However, neither of those policy approaches produced sustained improvement in fertility rates.

The review of the debates in the post war Europe showed a major shift in approach – few states wished to explicitly intervene and impose strict fertility policy measures on their people[5]. Most states had abandoned the idea of coercive intervention as they wished to distance themselves from the memories of fascist regimes. They also wished to avoid criticisms that any coercive measures or explicit fertility policy intentions were aimed at obstructing female emancipation by requiring them to stay at home caring for children, and performing other traditional chores. Fears of loss of military strength were also largely accepted as non-relevant in this era[6].

However, research interest in the subject of demography increased several fold during this period, due to the emerging realities of below replacement fertility levels and ageing population. There were new predictions that such developments would soon affect economic growth, old age protection and indeed the very survival of the society. Again, these predictions of consequences on the economic stability and survival of societies were mostly based on assumptions and fears and have attracted criticisms. So far, there has not been any major scientific study that has clearly established a causal link between changing demographic trends such as falling fertility rates and economic instabilities. Neither has any society reached the verge of extinction. Far from it, the economies have developed and continue to develop coping strategies. Utilisation of the abundant skilled

[5] The Ceausescu regime of Romania was an exception. It introduced coercive measures such as restriction on abortion and proclaimed that 'foetus was the socialist property of the whole society'. However, after a temporary rise of birth rate by 1987, the rates have fallen to low levels since then (David 1993).

[6] Exceptions to this were observed in the Greek policy debates where fears over national security and loss of military power continued to be present in fertility policy debates. The historical concerns over security issues between Greece and Turkey has been a major imperative for such perspectives in the debates.

and semi-skilled immigrant population of Europe, enhanced participation of women in the labour market and increased retirement age are some of these strategies. Nevertheless, the intensity of the predictions of consequences of changing demographic trends, and the increasing problems of social unrest caused by the influx of immigrants, have stimulated policy debates over the recent decades.

Several policy measures[7] have been recommended, developed and implemented following these debates. However, most States are faced with the realities of tighter fiscal budgets, increased spending demands and political instabilities. In addition, fertility trends are such that any significant impact on them would become evident only in the long term. Such facts meant that States often lacked the intention or ability to make direct investments in explicit fertility policy measures. The priorities were clearly set at being seen to do what was right and appropriate for the present and imminent future by introducing wider social protection and family policies, most of which had only implicit fertility objectives. This meant that policy measures had to be aligned with the evolving ideologies of individualism, gender equity, equal opportunities and social inclusion, as well as the objectives of achieving economic and material well-being. Consequently, many of the policy measures that were adopted focused on providing economic and material benefits, which the policy makers hoped, would also serve as an incentive for couples to have more children[8]. None of these family and social protection policies however, have yielded any sustained results or indicated the potential for any long-term results as far as reversing declining fertility trends are concerned.

It is not difficult to understand the origin of the assumptions of policy makers that providing economic and material benefits would enhance fertility rates. The various theories of fertilities and some empirical studies had already established a link between fertility behaviour and the socio-economic characteristics of human beings. There was also the suggestion that human beings were utility maximisers by nature. Thus, the conclusion of the policy makers appears to have been that economic and material incentives could change and enhance the socio-economic characteristics of people and also influence their fertility behaviours[9]. Nevertheless, the fact that policies based on such

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[7] See Chapter 3, section 3.1 for definition of fertility policy measures, implicit policy measures and explicit policy measures.

[8] See Chapter 3, section 3.5 for such policy measures with perceived fertility implications. Also see Chapter 4, section 4.3.6 for specific examples in the case of Greece.

[9] See Chapter 3 for policy debates.

unfounded conclusions have not met their implicit fertility objectives suggests that the policy debates are not well informed. It therefore indicates the need for further research to understand what is missing from these policy debates, which is the subject being addressed by this thesis.

5.1.3 Flaws in Policy Assumptions

So, what has gone wrong? Given the failure of current policy debates and policy measures to deliver any sustained results in improving fertility rates in Europe, it is appropriate to challenge the assumptions that seem to underlie the current policy approaches to fertility decline.

It may appear that many policy 'rationales' and policy measures 'make sense' because of their concurrence with what is implied by the fertility theories. However, closer examination would reveal that such policy rationales are the results of misinterpretation and misapplication of theoretical concepts. The assumption that economic and material incentives would help to reduce certain perceived risks and uncertainties in life and thereby encourage couples to make rational choices to *have* children, serves as an example. Not withstanding the theoretical relationship between socio-economic factors and fertility, empirical studies have shown that there is no consistency in such relationship (Mueller and Short 1983). They have also suggested mediating effects of cultural characteristics of couples that could influence and in turn determine the level of net influence of socio-economic factors on fertility (ibid). None of the policy debates reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4 acknowledged the significance of such mediating factors. In addition, in the instances where the economic and material incentives are administered through means tested policies[10], they are only likely to benefit a certain section of the society. How could such policies with a restricted 'target' influence the fertility behaviour of a whole nation?

A second example of a misinterpreted fertility objective is that providing women with equal opportunities, full access to birth control measures and thereby complete control over their own fertility decisions would help to increase fertility. The success model of 1930s and 1940s Sweden in increasing its fertility rates by adopting these policies[11] did

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[10] Chapter 4, section 4.3.6 gives examples of such policies that were increasingly administered on a means tested basis in Greece, especially since 1997.

[11] See chapter 3, section 3.3.1; Myrdal and Myrdal 1934, 1945.

indeed make a strong case for employing such measures as a means to increase fertility rates in other countries. However, the reality is that such measures are *not* yielding any sustained improvement in fertility rates at present in most countries including Sweden[12].

Thus, clearly there seems to be some missing elements or gaps between the theories of causalities, and policy assumptions and measures that appear to be based on these theories. The following sections discuss these gaps in knowledge, in order to develop further arguments and the main research question.

5.1.4 Knowledge Gaps in Policy Debates

The review of fertility and family policy debates and the above mentioned criticisms, lead to the conclusion that debates on policy measures have often only considered the relatively easily identifiable socio-economic factors suggested by the fertility theories. These are objective factors[13] such as income, education, employment and facilities required for childcare, schooling, and parental working conditions. The arguments presented earlier highlighted some flaws in the assumptions that *policies linked to such socio-economic factors could enhance fertility rates*. Exposure of such flawed assumptions that underlie the fertility policy debates should lead to the question whether the policy debates have failed to take into consideration *all* the factors that influence fertility. Such unaccounted factors could include the subjective factors[14] associated with the changing system of social traditions; values; ideologies and perceptions on marriage; family and its plural forms, and children; as well as individual life experiences. They could also include the behavioural factors of the couples such as their proximate characteristics[15], which influence their fertility-related decisions. Such subjective factors could be unique to each culture and sub-culture. Therefore, in order to develop policy solutions to large demographic problems, policy makers need to take a closer look at the local experiences of various cultures and sub-cultures (Carter 1998). In the case of fertility policy debates, this would mean taking a closer look at *current* experiences,

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[12] McDonald (2000a; 2000b); see also chapter 2, section 2.4 for details. This is not to suggest that such policy measures should not be adopted; on the contrary emancipation of women and equal opportunities should be regarded as universal virtues for what they represent and aim to achieve.

[13] These factors are termed objective factors, as they are facts or realities representing the characteristics of the individuals or groups concerned and are not biased by any subjective perspectives.

[14] These are termed subjective factors as they are biased by the individual or collective perceptions or viewpoints, and experiences.

values, perspectives and behavioural characteristics of individuals or couples who are the key elements of such cultures and sub-cultures. It would also mean attempting to obtain deeper appreciation of their motivations, aspirations, needs and requirements as far as child bearing, family formation, and life achievements are concerned.

The need to first *understand the needs and aspirations* of couples with regard to fertility decisions, in order to suitably *address those needs* through policy measures, is well documented in the literature. The public has a significant role in public policy development because their needs drive the policies (Carey 1997). Among the Finnish population, women who *believed* that public aid given to families with small children were sufficient to meet their needs, were more confident that they would go on to have additional children to meet their desired family size than those who did *not believe* that the public aid met their needs (Van Peer 2000). Thus, those involved in policy development have a responsibility to seek social consensus to their policy approaches, failing which, policy interventions are likely to be ineffective or be rejected by the public (McDonald 2002).

Hardly any of the policy debates reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4 were adequately informed of the variety and subjectivity of the behavioural characteristics of the target group they focussed on. Neither did they identify the necessity for an in depth exploration among its target group to understand such variety and subjectivity, or to obtain social consensus to their policy approaches. There was no real recognition of the informational challenges, or for the need to fill the knowledge gap between theoretical assumptions and practical experiences and realities. These were the features found to be lacking in the fertility policy debates reviewed in the Chapters 3 and 4.

5.1.5 Summary of Critical Analysis

This chapter has so far put forward arguments as to why policy makers need to seek a good understanding of the individual's and couples' subjective characteristics, experiences and perspectives in order to enrich the fertility policy debates. The analysis and arguments are summarised below:

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[15] These factors include age of spouses at marriage, age at child birth, use of birth control measures, abortion, and experiences with miscarriages. They are sometimes referred to as intermediate variables. See chapter 2, section 2.5 for details.

- The various theoretical explanations of causalities of fertility decline are not mutually exclusive. In view of the lack of conclusive and consistent evidence to prove the links between the causal factors and fertility decline, there is a consensus that not enough is known about the fertility behaviour of different people and cultures.
- Policy debates and the views of policy makers however, have mainly focussed on easily identifiable socio-economic objective factors that are *assumed* to influence fertility. The main assumption is that providing people with socio-economic incentives via family and social policies would increase their fertility rates, suggesting a link between such incentives and fertility rates. There is however no clear and conclusive evidence for this link.
- Policy debates and policy measures have given insufficient attention to the more abstract and subjective factors of causalities suggested by fertility theories. Policy debates and policy makers have also by the same token mostly failed to understand the decision making process of individuals and couples. These are essential to gain a better appreciation of the factors influencing fertility, which are unique to each culture and sub-culture.

5.2 DESIGN OF THE RESEACH QUESTION

5.2.1 The Case of Greece

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the focus of the empirical studies of this research would be entirely on Greece. Therefore the arguments presented earlier would be tested in the specific context of declining fertility rates in Greece. Some of the key characteristics that render Greece an appropriate case study have been summarised below:

5.2.1.1 The Generic Characteristics

1) Some of the generic trends in fertility experienced across Europe have also been experienced in Greece. It has one of the lowest fertility levels in Europe (TFR: 1.3). Greece also experiences many of the other demographic trends in Europe such as ageing population, negative growth of indigenous population, immigration, plural family forms, and increased family dissolution.

2) Following its accession into the European Monetary Union (EMU), Greece also has experienced rapid economic development. Broad similarities of evolved ideologies of individualism and liberalism are also found in most of the Greek societies.

3) As with the general fertility policy debates throughout Europe, in Greece too, policy debates appear to give more emphasis on the socio-economic factors influencing fertility trends. Consequently, most of the policy measures have been broad-based family and social policies with implicit fertility objectives. So far, there are no indications of success of these policies as far as increasing fertility rates are considered[16].

5.2.1.2 The Specific Characteristics

1) Greece is one of the few European states where its newly embraced ideas of liberalism and individualism co-exist with strong traditional values grounded in religious beliefs and ideal of 'familism'[17]. In the context of strong and traditional family values, it is perhaps ironic that Greece is also one of the few states that experiences the reality of very few children per family.

2) Despite the strong influence of religion, culture and values on the Greek social behaviour, there has been little evidence in the literature to verify that all its socio-cultural and behavioural characteristics have been included in its fertility policy debates. However, *political* debates on the subject of fertility decline, especially those influenced by the political rhetoric on the dilution of Greek cultural identity and 'Hellenism' have been rife.

3) There are only very few empirical studies that specifically focus on the case of Greece to understand the causes and consequences of its fertility decline.

Thus, there are clear justifications for any student of demography interested in the case of Greece to use the earlier identified arguments to challenge the prevailing assumptions and possible prejudices that shape the fertility policy debates in Greece. Such a study would provide the opportunity to better appreciate the specific issues regarding causalities of fertility decline in Greece, which are not known at present. They would also enable an identification of fertility policy issues that need to be dealt with in order to develop policies

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[16] See Chapter 4 for the socio-economic, cultural characteristics of Greece, as well as for the policy debates in Greece.

[17] See Chapter 4, Section 4.5 for Policy Debates.

that *may* encourage child bearing in Greece. Finally, the researcher's own background[18] also made Greece a convenient and appropriate choice for a case study.

5.2.2 The Research Questions

Based on evidence from review of literature and policy debates, it was argued that fertility policy debates in Greece have failed to recognise and use the informational challenges present in the debates. It was also argued that the perspectives of the policy institutions regarding causes, consequences and solutions for fertility decline, are biased and mostly based on unfounded assumptions. It was further suggested that such bias and assumptions were a result of a lack of sufficient knowledge of Greek couples' real life experiences and perspectives regarding family, children and their policy expectations. Such lack of knowledge may be argued to be one of the missing links between policy institutions' understanding of the theories of causalities and their ability to convert that understanding into *effective* policy tools. Thus, if the policy institutions possess the above set of knowledge unique to each setting, they may be able to deliver more effective policy tools, and help to improve fertility rates in Greece.

This research seeks to establish the existence of knowledge gaps in policy debates through independent empirical studies. If such knowledge gaps do exist at present, then it would be of significance to identify them, in order to suggest possible future directions for policy approaches in Greece. The following main research question has been developed in order to achieve a first hand knowledge of the perspectives of the current policy makers in Greece:

> **What are the Greek policy makers' perspectives on the causes and consequences of fertility decline in Greece and what do they believe to be the fertility policy related needs of Greek couples?**

The main feature of this research question is that it is an exploratory question. Irrespective of what has been argued and suggested before regarding the institutional bias and knowledge gap in policy debates in Greece, the question aims to explore the institutional perspectives on causes, consequences and solutions *at* the time of the research. In order to aid this exploration, three sub-research questions have been developed:

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[18] The researcher hails from the village of Chania in Crete in Greece.

1) What are the institutional perspectives on the consequences of fertility decline in Greece?
2) What are the institutional perspectives regarding the various factors that influence the fertility behaviour of the Greek couples?
3) What do policy makers believe to be the right policy measures that would meet the fertility-related needs of the Greek couples, and thereby improve the fertility rates?

A second feature of the research question is its implied objective of establishing justifications for or validation of the arguments made earlier, that the institutional perspectives are biased and there is a knowledge gap. This could be achieved through a reality check or fact finding, that is, by comparing the institutional perspectives with the actual fertility experiences and needs as observed among the Greek couples. To facilitate this second objective, three further sub-research questions have been developed:

1) How do the Greek couples evaluate the current demographic trends? What are their attitudes and values regarding family, marriage, and children?
2) What are the various factors that influence the fertility behaviour of the Greek couples as *experienced* by them in reality?
3) What do the Greek couples believe to be the right policy measures that would meet their fertility-related needs and help them achieve their fertility intentions?

As evident, the two sets of sub-questions are designed to mirror each other and they are discussed in Chapter 7 (the Greek Policy Makers' Perspectives) and Chapter 8 (Evidence from the Survey with the Married Couples) respectively. The answers obtained would provide opportunities to compare them and decide if there are differences in institutional perspectives and experiences of realities by the couples as well as their own view points in Chapter 9 (Discussion of the thesis).

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to draw up on the insights obtained from the preceding chapters and develop the research question. The researcher found it of value to develop an exploratory question that would provide firsthand knowledge of the institutional perceptions in Greece, as well as an opportunity to compare them with the ground realities as experienced by the Greek couples. The research question is oriented towards a qualitative approach, in order to emphasise the need of in-depth knowledge of the experiences, aspirations, motivations, and needs of the Greek couples in relation to their fertility behaviour. As state intervention and policy measures are widely accepted as valid approaches to address fertility decline, it is important to ask why such approaches have failed so far. It is hoped that challenging the current fertility experiences and debates in

Greece both at the policy makers' level as well as at the level of the couples, would reveal the existence of institutional knowledge gaps and bias, which result in ineffective policies.

The research design and methodology has been discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6:

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter explains the research design and various research methods employed in the empirical study of this research. There are four parts to this chapter. The first part explains the design of the research and the focus of the empirical study. The second and third parts describe in detail the chosen research methods, the rationale, the advantages and disadvantages of the choices made, and the procedure of implementing the field work methods. These parts also detail the methodological and administrative issues that emerged during the process of design and administration. In addition, they explain how the data collected via the primary research methods were processed and analysed. The final part briefly discusses the ethical issues associated with data collection, processing and storage.

6.1 THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL ORIENTATION

The proposed fieldwork and analysis of results from the empirical study of this research were designed to incorporate both qualitative and quantitative research techniques as explained below.

6.1.1 The Qualitative Approach

The main feature of the research question of this thesis is its exploratory nature, seeking to find out the realities (or institutional perspectives of realities). The suitability of qualitative research methods in facilitating successful exploratory research has been well endorsed in the literature on research methods. Qualitative research methods are appropriate for capturing the subjective perspectives of the 'targets' studied, especially in socio-political topics (Cicourel 1981, Flick 1998, 2002, McKinlay 1995). The following points identified by Flick (1998, 2002) best explain the advantages of qualitative methods, which bring clear value to *this* research:

- Qualitative research strategy enables methods to be designed that are open enough to do justice to the complexity of the object under study.
- It helps to demonstrate the variety of perspectives on the object and starts from the subjective and social meanings related to it.
- It helps to study the participants' knowledge and practices regarding the topic under study.

In the context of the first objective of the research question, the above three points were crucial. In order to understand the perspectives of the policy makers on a complex subject such as fertility, it was important that the policy makers were given broad, open-ended questions. It was also necessary to have the opportunity and flexibility to explore their answers further, by asking suitable clarifying questions so that a fuller picture could be obtained. Finally, this was the only way in which the researcher could discover any opinions that were not already identified through the analysis of the debates in Chapters 3 and 4. Thus, based on the above explained advantages, a qualitative research strategy in the form of semi-structured interviews was adopted to obtain answers for the three sub research questions directed at the policy makers or policy institutions.

The choice had some limitations too. Qualitative research is most effective when the field is approached with as little bias, assumptions and theorisation as possible (Flick 1998; 2002). New theories should be developed out of the research findings rather than using the findings from qualitative research to prove or disprove existing theories or hypotheses (Morse 1997). Therefore, in the context of this study, the researcher's own arguments regarding the policy makers' bias could potentially influence the way the findings of the study are analysed and interpreted. However, by using objective thematic coding during analysis of the data collected, the effects of such bias were minimised. For example, *'Evaluation of current demographic trends'* and *'Reasons of declining fertility'* were some of the themes used during the coding process[1]. These were more objective themes, when compared to those such as 'pro-natalist perspectives'.

There was also the question of validity of generalisation of findings in a qualitative research (Mason 1996 chapter 2; Peräkylä 1997). Qualitative research focuses on gaining depth of understanding of the field studied, and consequently it would be practical only to study a limited number of subjects. When the subject numbers are reduced, the representativeness of the subjects and the generalisability of the findings potentially

[1] See section 6.2.5 for full details of coding, analysis and interpretation of the qualitative data.

become less reliable. In this study however, this particular problem was not seen to be significant because, the number of institutional entities involved in the Greek policy debates were not many. Thus, the validity of the findings was strengthened by ensuring that the sample selected was representative of all the various policy making bodies or institutions in Greece[2].

6.1.2 The Quantitative Approach

A fact-finding research with the Greek couples in order to establish possible knowledge gaps and bias in institutional perspectives was the second objective of the main research question. Quantitative methods are generally applied to enhance the objectivity of findings, and where objective facts relevant to the field need to be captured and generalised (Black 1999; Blaxter et.al. 1996; Denscombe 1998; De Vaus 1996). In this study, in order to meet the second objective of the main research question, it was necessary to compare and contrast the subjective perspectives of the policy makers with the realities as experienced or viewed by the couples. Thus, in a way, the experiences and needs expressed by the couples can be considered to be realities or facts about which policy makers may or may not have biased perspectives. Therefore as far as comparison of such viewpoints with the aforementioned facts are concerned, a quantitative method would merit justification[3]. Survey research in the form of questionnaire based interviews was the method employed for the research with couples[4].

One of the main limitations to the use of quantitative method in this study is that, due to its nature of collecting objective data, it fails to take into consideration certain circumstances relating to the data collected. For example there are several questions in the survey that seek to obtain agreement or disagreement with certain statements. Such questions however fail to understand the circumstances under which an agreement or disagreement is recorded, or more importantly, whether they are likely to change with change in circumstances. In other words, as Bryman (2001) notes, *"The reliance on instruments and procedures hinders the connection between research and everyday life"* (p.77). It would be impossible, unless an in-depth qualitative approach is employed, to understand what the certain statements and events referred to by the respondent mean

[2] See section 6.2.2 on sample selection.

[3] A qualitative method or combination of qualitative and quantitative methods would have been equally suitable and appropriate to understand the subjective perspectives, experiences and behavioural factors of the couples. However, this approach was not possible due to certain limitations to the project, as discussed in Chapter 10.

to them – as these are highly subjective and therefore likely to be interpreted differently by the respondent than the researcher (ibid.).

6.1.3 Combining the Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches

In most social science research that use both qualitative and quantitative methods, triangulation of methods is performed in order to validate the findings that have been derived from the qualitative research (Bottorff 1997; Bryman 2001 chapter 22; Flick 2002, pp: 264-268; Mason 1995). In this research however, it is only the results of analysis of findings from the two methods that are linked together. This would help to mutually validate the findings of both approaches. Kelle and Erzberger (2002, as explained by Flick 2002, p.268) note three specific outcomes to such an approach of linking the results of the two methods:

1) Quantitative and qualitative results converge, mutually confirm and support the same conclusions.
2) The two results focus on different aspects of a broad issue under study, thus mutually complementing the findings, leading to a fuller understanding.
3) The two results are divergent and contradict each other.

The outcomes 1 and 3 are relevant to the objective of the research, in that they could help to establish the existence of bias and knowledge gap in the institutional approaches. The combination and comparison of findings from the two empirical studies are performed in the discussion chapter, by adopting a synthetic approach. In this method, the research aims to bring in the framework of the theories of causalities discussed in Chapter 2, within which, the perspectives of policy makers and the observations from the couples will be discussed. This will provide the opportunity to understand how the policy makers and policy institutions have used the theoretical assumptions to base their own arguments about consequences and causalities. It would also show whether they have sought and understood the actual experiences of the Greek couples. Finally, such a synthetic approach would also provide the opportunity to discuss the theories themselves in the context of observed ground realities.

Integration of qualitative and quantitative research as proposed in a multi-strategy research such as this project, are open to certain criticisms, explained in Bryman (2001). The main argument, relevant to the objectives of this thesis, is that each kind of research

[4] For details, see Chapter 6, section 6.3.3.1.

methodology has its own epistemological commitments. In addition, the views on methods of interpretation underlying each methodology are irreconcilable (Hughes 1990 and Smith 1983, as interpreted by Bryman 2001). Such an argument would seem to challenge the researcher's proposal to bring together the perceptions on say fertility decline by policy makers and the observed reasons for decline among the sample respondents in Greece. This would then challenge the basis of a synthetic approach that aims to bring together, the results of the survey, theories as well as the debates. The researcher however takes comfort from numerous research based counter-arguments, as given in Bryman (2001, pp. 433-445). These are summarised as below:

- The idea that each research method carries with it its own epistemological commitments is hard to sustain, as each of the methods are applicable in a wide variety of tasks.
- Study into methods applied in other researches has shown sufficient evidence that the choice of methods employed in that research was guided by practical considerations often resulting in independent methodological practices, rather than sticking to general theoretical stances on methodology (Platt 1996, as referred to by Bryman 2001).

Supported by the above, this researcher would argue that the multi-strategy approach and the synthetic approach is justified in so far as it achieves the originally stated objectives and benefits of such approaches.

6.2 UNDERSTANDING THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE GREEK POLICY MAKERS: A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

The specific objectives of this empirical work were to gather and assess the Greek policy makers' perspectives on three aspects: (1) The consequences of fertility decline in Greece; (2) The factors responsible for the declining fertility rates in Greece; and (3) The Greek couple's policy related needs and requirements concerning their fertility decisions. In the Greek context, the term *policy makers* referred to government ministers in Greece, opposition party representatives, representatives of other Non Governmental Organisations (NGO), and the Greek Orthodox Church[5]. They were targeted due to their direct or indirect involvement with the formulation, legitimisation and implementation of family and fertility policy in Greece (Colebatch 1998, pp: 4-5). Their decisions on policies

[5] See Chapter 4, section 4.3, for details on the level of involvement of these parties in the Greek fertility policy debates.

implied expertise, as it required knowledge of the problem or study *area* and of the remedies required to effectively address the problems (ibid.).

6.2.1 Themes for Data Collection

The effectiveness of operational research questions and data collection themes can be attained through a series of evaluation and reformulation of the main research questions (Flick 1998, 2002). At each stage of the research process, right from data collection to interpretation, the questions need to be revisited and reformulated if necessary, in order to ensure appropriateness to the specific objectives of that particular stage of the research (ibid.). One way of 'refining' the research questions is to develop them gradually. Thus, in this research three sub-research questions directed at the perceptions of the policy makers were developed initially alongside the main research question[6]. Following this, at the data collection stage, broader themes surrounding these questions were developed. In developing the themes for data collection, the aim was to ensure that the policy makers understood the field of study and its objectives. Thereby enabled them to express their viewpoints in the context of policy formation responsibilities they held. The following themes were developed in order to be put for discussion with the policy makers in Greece:

- Demographic trends in Greece at the end of the 20th century. Policy makers' evaluation of these trends. Special attention to trends in fertility.
- Views on the determinants of low fertility and its implications.
- Possible future problems/consequences envisaged.
- Previous and current family and demographic policy features and their evaluation. Need for State intervention.
- Considerations and proposals for main policy priorities. Population and family policy objectives, measures and necessary incentives.

The themes were broad enough to give the necessary freedom to the policymakers to respond and clearly articulate their perspectives on the issues considered. Putting extremely specific sub-research questions at this stage would have greatly restricted the policy makers in completely expressing their viewpoints. It was best to formulate such questions to be addressed directly to the data collected in order to derive the needed information.

6.2.2. Sample Selection

Literature review revealed that fertility policy debates and policy making processes in Greece usually consisted of the following participants: The ministers or ministerial representatives responsible for overseeing the functioning of the various legislative and administrative departments such as Population, Labour, Public Welfare, Health and Economy; The members of the main opposition parties; The Greek Orthodox Church; and The demographers who either worked in the capacity of advisors to the governments or worked for independent research organisations such as the EDHM and EKKE[7]. Thus it was important to ensure that the perspectives from all of these participants were obtained during fieldwork[8]. Therefore, the following institutions were approached to collect the data[9]:

1. Directorate of Population and Employment, Ministry of Finance and National Economy.
2. Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social security.
3. Greek Manpower Employment Organisation of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
4. Advisory body of the Greek Prime Minister on Population and Demographic issues.
5. Social Policy section of the Central Committee of PASOK, the ruling party in Greece, as well as of the main opposition parties: The right wing New Democracy party (ND); the Greek Communist party (KKE); and the left-centre party 'The Coalition of the Left and the Progress' (SYN).
6. 'Confederation of Families with Many Children' (ASPE in Greek), an NGO.
7. Greek Society for Demographic Studies (EDHM in Greek), an NGO.
8. National Centre for Social Research (EKKE in Greek).
9. Committee of Marriage, Family, Child Protection and Demographic Issues, of the Greek Orthodox Church.

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[6] See Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.

[7] EKKE: the Greek National Centre for Social Research; EDHM: Greek Society for Demographic Studies.

[8] In qualitative research, selection of samples by purposively ensuring that the sample cover the required spread, or in other words targeting all those in the sample frame deemed important is called purposive sampling (Bryman 2001, p. 324).

[9] See Chapter 4, section 4.3 for details of involvement of these institutions in the policy debates prior to the interview. See also appendix for Chapter 6, section 6.2 for brief description of the various institutions approached. None of the institutions approached refused to be interviewed. The positions and responsibilities of the persons interviewed are as follows, in no particular order: Former Head of Division; Spokesperson for the Political Bureau of the party; President of the organisation; Doctor and President of a non-profit NGO; an internationally acclaimed social researcher; Spokesperson for a Member of Parliament from an opposition party; an advisor to the Greek Prime Minister on Population and Demographic issues; a Member of Parliament who was also Secretary of the Social Policy Section of the Central Committee of the party; a member of an opposition coalition, who was also the secretary of the Demographic Policy and Women's Issues section of the Central Committee; a Member of Parliament who was responsible for initiating a bill consisting certain pro-natalist policies; Spokesman of the Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church, responsible for matters of marriage, family, child protection and demographic issues; and former Assistant Minister of Health, Welfare and Social Security.

The actual individuals approached in the various institutions were based on the availability of the spokespersons within the institution, that is, the institutions approached selected their representatives for the interview. Emphasis was placed on their ability to represent the viewpoint of the institution, which they belonged to. This was made possible by establishing contact in advance with each of the identified departments via telephone and letters. Letters were sent to all the institutions, briefing the objective of the qualitative research, the expectations in terms of data sought, and the themes of the data collection[10].

6.2.3 Data Collection Method: Semi-structured Interviews

In many qualitative studies, semi-structured face to face interviews have been viewed as the best method to collect the required data because they allow subjects to express their opinion and experiences in a relatively open situation (Bryman and Burgess 1994; Denscombe 1998; Fielding 1993; Mason 1996). At the same time it was also necessary for the researcher to maintain a loose agenda to follow during the interview, in order to ensure that the topic of discussion by the politicians focussed on fertility. Hence semi-structured interview was chosen for data collection from the policy makers[11].

Twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted with the representatives of the key policy making institutions in Greece in the period between October 2000 and December 2000. The benefits of a semi-structured interview that were specific to this study are summarised below (Bryman 2001):

- Due to minimal restrictions, and open nature of the interview themes, this format allowed policy makers to answer questions in their own terms. As the questions aimed to understand views and perceptions of policy makers, such a freedom was essential for them to fully explain their rationale for a particular kind of view or perception.
- The researcher has the freedom to guide the interviewee to required information, and introduce probe questions to ensure clarity.

The aim of the semi-structured interview was to capture the official viewpoints of the institutions, which in a democratic institution would most likely represent the viewpoints of

[10] See Appendix for Chapter 6, Section 6.3 for details of written communications with Policy Makers.

[11] Unstructured interviews do provide the same flexibility as semi-structured interviews. However, unlike semi-structured interviews, they do not allow the researcher to guide the direction and specific topics of discussion (Bryman 2001).

the majority of its members. However, one of the limitations of using face to face interviews with individual representatives was the possibility that their answers could have been biased. The approached individuals were likely to have had a personal opinion that may or may not have concurred with the official viewpoint held by the institutions they represented. Thus, ensuring that the approached individual gave a completely unbiased and institutional perspective irrespective of his or her personal opinion was important, but a difficult task to achieve. In most cases, while the aim was clearly communicated, the answers had to be taken at face value.

6.2.4 Documentation

All the interviews were recorded using audiocassette recorder after permission was obtained. The obvious benefit of such a method was that the conversations could be replayed any number of times during the transcription and analysis process to ensure that all the relevant information contained in the conversation was captured (Miles and Huberman 1994). However, there was a disadvantage related to the feature of this method of recording interviews. The recordings created a solid proof of the conversational content, and to some extent the proof of the identity of the interviewee. This feature could have influenced the interviewee and resulted in biased or 'politically correct' responses. However, in reality the experience was that on conditions of anonymity the approached subjects did freely express their viewpoints. As it will be seen in results of the analysis (Chapter 7) some of the opinions expressed included highly sensitive and controversial opinions regarding immigrants in Greece, suggesting that the respondents did not feel any pressure to modify their responses for strategic reasons.

All the interviews were conducted in the Greek language. No more than two interviews were conducted on any single day in order to give the researcher adequate time to process the recorded conversations. Each of the conversations was transcribed in its entirety on the same day, so that it gave an opportunity to reflect on the actual circumstances under which the conversations took place, and make any comments, where appropriate. In the absence of a pilot study[12], it was decided that the interviews recorded would be processed on the same day. This was to enable identification of any potential gaps, compared to the theme of data collection, and to address them in the subsequent

[12] A pilot study was not feasible with the policy makers because of the difficulties in obtaining appointments from them to revisit the same policy makers and do a second interview.

interviews[13]. On completion of all the interviews, each of the transcriptions was revisited and the relevant sections were translated into English based on the criteria explained in the next section.

6.2.5 Coding, Analysis and Interpretation

A variety of coding, analytic and interpretation techniques are available for analysing the data collected through qualitative research, and often researchers find it appropriate to use the relevant features from more than one technique (Miles and Huberman 1994). In this study, the researcher employed many of the key features of the classical qualitative content analysis technique for which Mayring (1983) has developed a detailed procedural model (Flick 1998). While a detailed use of the entire procedure was not relevant to this study, essentially the technique applied to this research involved summarising the data of the interview text under several operational questions derived from the data collection themes. The details of how this method was applied to this study, are explained below:

First the five themes used during data collection[14] were revisited and ten operational questions were developed. These were:

1) How well do the policy makers understand the demographic trends in Greece?

2) How do policy makers evaluate these trends, especially the declining fertility rates? Do they consider this element as positive or negative?

3) What do the policy makers consider to be the consequences of changing demographic trends in Greece?

4) Do the policy makers view the consequences of demographic changes as something with which society can naturally adjust?

5) Do the policy makers view the consequences of declining fertility rates to have significant social, economic and cultural impact?

6) What do the policy makers believe to be the reasons of declining fertility in Greece?

7) Do the policy makers believe there is a case for State intervention through explicit policy measures in order to stop the decline of fertility rates and possibly increase it?

8) Do the policy makers believe that the existing policy measures meet the objective of effectively addressing fertility decline in Greece?

9) What do the policy makers regard to be the policy-related needs of the Greek couples, in order to help them take more childbearing decisions and increase the fertility rates?

[13] No such gaps were however identified in the actual interviews.

[14] See section 6.1.1

10) What do the policy makers think should be the policy priorities in future?

These operational questions were put to the transcribed interview data and texts containing answers to them were highlighted. These texts were then translated into English. In the final part of the coding and analysis process, the translated texts were regrouped under three broader themes that comprised the ten operational questions. These themes are given below:

- Policy makers' evaluation of demographic trends in Greece (Q 1 – 5).
- Policy makers' perception on the reasons of declining fertility in Greece (Q 6).
- Policy makers' evaluation of State intervention, policy effectiveness and perceptions on couples' policy related needs (Q 7 – 10).

One of the problems that emerged during the analysis and interpretation was the repetition of answers to many of the questions above. In the actual interviews themselves, the institutional perspectives were presented in the respondent's own individual style. However, because the answers were analysed based on questions and themes, which were developed externally, in many cases there appeared to be similarities. For example, for the Q 2 and Q 5 above, many of the respondents had similar viewpoints. Such features are among the drawbacks of content analysis techniques where the outcome may possess resemblance to the ideal of quantitative methodology due to the categorisation of text based on external theories (Flick 1998, 2002).

6.2.6 Reliability and Validity

Documentation of collected data is an important factor that leads to the reliability of the whole process of data collection and the data itself (Fielding 1993; Punch 1998; Silverman 1993, 1997). Several procedures were adopted to ensure the reliability of the data collected. As mentioned earlier, only a maximum of two interviews were conducted per day; and in most cases due to issues related to availability of the subject and transportation, only one interview was possible per day. Firstly, this enabled the researcher to transcribe and record the text of the interview in its entirety on the same day, and thereby creating a duplicate record of the data. Secondly, it gave the opportunity to compare the data collected against the theme of data collection in order to ensure that all required information was captured. Gaps identified were addressed appropriately in the subsequent interviews.

In terms of validity of the interpreted data, the important aspect is that the researcher's version should accurately reflect the version of the subjects interviewed (Silverman 1997). In order to ensure that the translation and interpretation maintained its originality of perspectives, the tapes were rerun and compared against the translated version.

6.3 SURVEY OF GREEK COUPLES

In order to address the sub-research questions aimed at the Greek couples, a quantitative research strategy was adopted. The main objectives of this part of empirical study were: 1) Understand the factors that influenced the fertility experiences and intentions of the couples; 2) Understand their preferences for fertility related policies and their likely impact on their future fertility intentions.

6.3.1 The Terminologies in the Survey Research and Analysis

The following section gives a brief explanation of the various main terminologies used in the survey research, statistical modelling and data analysis.

6.3.1.1 'Determinants of Fertility'

Chapter 5 identified and brought together the various concepts developed by the several theories of causalities of fertility decline[15]. These concepts represented the various factors often called 'determinants of fertility'. Based on these concepts, as well as on other empirical studies on fertility determinants, several specific *objective and subjective factors (determinants)* that are considered to influence fertility have been summarised in the table below (Table 6.1). These various categories and the factors represented are sometimes referred to as *couples' characteristics* in this study. The term *background characteristics* or *background variables* refer to the specific objective socio-economic, socio-psychological, socio-cultural or proximate factors presented in the table below. Some studies have identified the proximate factors as *intermediate factors* through which the influence of the objective variables shape the subjective perceptions of the couples, ultimately leading to their particular fertility decisions (Bongarts 1976, 1978; Jones 1990; Morgan and Rindfuss 1999).

[15] See chapter 5, section 5.1

Table 6.1: The determinants or factors influencing fertility

Causal factors or determinants of fertility drawn out from the theoretical concepts	**Some major scientific studies that have applied such categorisation and factors.**
Socio-economic Factors: ▪ Employment related ▪ Income related (at the individual or household level) ▪ Educational levels or achievement ▪ Housing related (ownership; size and satisfaction)	Bagozzi and Loo (1978) Blossfeld and Huinink (1991) Symeonidou et.al. (1992, 1997) Schoen et.al. (1997) Ahn and Mira (1998) Beets and Dourleijn (1999) Bernhardt (2000) Pinnelli and Rose (2001) Kohlmann (2001)
Socio-psychological Factors: ▪ Values on Family and Marriage. Religious beliefs, views on parental role ▪ Attitudes towards abortion and other birth control measures ▪ Perceptions on values of children as providers of family happiness, social status, self-fulfilment, security, income and support at old age ▪ Priorities in life such as materialism, individualism	Hoffmann and Hoffmann (1973) Bagozzi and Loo (1978) Bulatao (1981) Lesthaeghe and Meekers (1986) Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988) Trent and South (1992) Wijsen (1994) Moor and Palomba (1995) Palomba and Moor (1998) Thomson (2001) Kohlmann (2001)
Socio-cultural Factors: ▪ Urbanisation (residence and upbringing) ▪ Number of siblings and other family members in the household ▪ External influences on family size by parents, friends and close relatives ▪ Religious affiliation and beliefs	Bagozzi and Loo (1978) Symeonidou et.al. (1992, 1997) Schoen et.al. (1997) Kohler (1999) Thomson (2001)
Proximate-Factors: ▪ Age ▪ Marital status ▪ Age at first birth for females ▪ Relationship satisfaction/divorce/remarriage ▪ Use of birth control ▪ Abortion/miscarriages	Bongaarts (1976, 1978, 2001) Beaujot and Tong (1985) Reinis (1992) Schoen et.al. (1997) Pinnelli and Rose (2001) Thomson (2001)

6.3.1.2 Fertility Related Terminologies

In order to measure fertility, three different units of measurements were used in this study:

(1) Children Ever Born (CEB)

In this research, this is the total number of live births experienced by a woman up to the time of data collection. Pregnancies at the time were excluded. This is also referred to as actual or achieved fertility.

(2) Recent Fertility (CB95to00)

This is a term specific to this particular research. This is the number of children born to couples approached in this study during the five years that preceded the time of the study, i.e., between 1995 and 2000. This time period was focused because of the probability that the characteristics of the couples during this short period will have changed the least, compared to the last 15 years[16]. Therefore, the fertility decisions made during this period will have been most influenced by the characteristics of the couples at the time of the study. This term was used in association with the studies related to couples' characteristics.

(3) Desired and Ideal Number of Children

The fertility theories suggest that couples make rational choices regarding their childbearing decisions based on their various characteristics. Thus, it is possible that the actual number of children that a couple already have or might have could be different to what they actually wanted or desired. In order to understand such variances, two variables termed 'Ideal number of children' and 'Desired number of children' are used. *Ideal number* is the number of children that couples consider as best to fulfil their family forming aspirations, in line with their perceptions of family, values and traditional influences or beliefs. *Desired number* is what they wish to have based on their circumstances and background characteristics. Actual number is the number of children the couples had when approached for interviews. For some, this figure might change depending on their intention and ability to have children in future. Some empirical studies have stated the importance of examining the ideal and desired number of children, and

[16] As fertility varies remarkably by age within the age range of 15-49 for females, demographers often measure fertility according to the age of the mother, that is the Age Specific Fertility Rate (ASFR). Therefore, ASFRs are defined as the ratio of children born to a specific age group of women to the number of women with the risk of bearing children (Srinivasan 1998). In most demographic analyses, five-year age groups are commonly used to calculate each ASFR.

have demonstrated differences between these three categories[17]. When there are differences between the actual, desired and ideal number of children, it offers the scope to explore the reasons, and possible policy solutions.

6.3.1.3 Policy Measures

The various policy areas referred to in the research questions include the following:

1. Financial benefits for families (child's allowances, birth allowances, and tax relief for dependent children);
2. Leave and working arrangements for parents (maternity and parental leave; child-care leave; flexible working conditions; part-time jobs);
3. Child-care facilities (efficient public services in child-care facilities - infant nursery and school care); and
4. Housing and education related policies and assistance.

6.3.2 Themes of Data Collection

Compared to the broad themes of data collection in qualitative research, the themes for the quantitative study were designed to be more specific. This was because they aimed to capture specific information related to the field of study. This information regarding the realities and experiences of couples would give the opportunity to compare them with what policy makers believed to be the realities, experiences and intentions of the couples. In order to achieve the above objectives, the data collection process aimed to collect information based on the following specific themes:

- The Socio -economic characteristics of the couples and their households;
- The Socio-cultural characteristics of the couples and their households;
- The characteristics of the couples regarding their life events (marriage and childbirth); and use of birth control methods;
- The couples' perceptions on family and marriage, aspirations and priorities in life, and values of children;
- The couples' childbearing intentions (ideal, desired and intended fertility);
- The couples' perceptions on current demographic trends, and preferences to policies that they believe would encourage childbearing decisions.

[17] Simeonidou et.al. 1992; Van Peer 2000.

6.3.3 Data Collection Methods

Survey research using questionnaires was selected to collect the data from the couples. Surveys are particularly effective in collecting data for observing and understanding a large population, and measuring attitudes and orientations that are otherwise too difficult to observe directly (Babbie 1998; Blaxter et.al. 1996; De Vaus 1996; Oppenheim 1992). Other main advantages and disadvantages of the use of survey methods are summarised below in Table 6.2:

Table 6.2: Advantages and disadvantages of survey research[18]

Survey Research (Quantitative Approach)	
Advantages	Disadvantages
• Enables the collection of a large number of cases, which is important for both descriptive and explanatory analysis. • Enables to ask exactly the same questions, as well as to emphasise the same intent to all respondents. • It is advantageous in terms of time, expense, and accuracy.	• Difficult to establish causal connections between variables. • Cannot look at the context in which social actions occur; • Too restricted because they rely on highly structured methods in data collection and analysis. • It is too statistical and 'intrinsically manipulative'

6.3.3.1 The Questionnaire Design

The themes of data collection, mentioned in section 6.3.2 provided the basis for the design of the survey questionnaire. These themes were designed to include the background characteristics; opinions, attitudes and beliefs of married couples regarding childbearing, parenthood and family; as well as their preferences for family policies.

Various indicators and units of measurement can be applied to understand and record the above characteristics, opinions and so on in order to provide the data required for the analysis[19]. Such measurement involves categorisation and assignment of values to the variables[20] that represent such characteristics and other aspects that need to be

[18] Discussed in Babbie 1998; Denscombe 1998; De Vaus 1996; Sarantakos 1998.

[19] As many researchers have pointed out (Babbie 1998; Black 1999; Kirk and Miller 1986; Perakylä 1997; Silverman 1993), the issues of accurate and precise assessment and measurement of theoretical models have special importance because the objectivity of social scientific research is at risk of uncertainty. As Perakylä (1997) argues: "*The aim of social science is to produce descriptions of a social world...that in some controllable way correspond to the social world that is being described. Even though all descriptions are bound to a particular perspective and therefore represent the reality rather than reproduce it..., it is possible to describe social interaction in a way that can be subjected to empirical testing.*" (p. 201).

[20] Variables are logical groupings of concepts that can take two or more values. Their range of variation as well as the extent to which they can be combined in fairly large categories is governed by the expected

measured. Four distinct types of indicators were identified for measurement in this study (Babbie 1998; Black 1999; Kirk and Miller 1986; Peräkylä 1997; Silverman 1993). They were:

(1) Indicators of *attribute* in order to obtain information about the respondents' characteristics, (for example, information about their age, number of children, education and occupational status).

(2) *Behavioural* indicators based on what people do, (for example, information on whether the respondents practised contraception or not).

(3) Indicators of *beliefs*, that is, whether the respondents believed a given statement to be true or false (questions on family, childbearing motivation, or the evaluation of the present demographic trends of the country).

(4) *Attitudinal* indicators, where the researcher tried to ascertain what the respondents thought was desirable (information on the respondents' ideal and desired number of children as well as their future fertility intentions).

Most of the variables in the study had one of the following two qualities: For some variables, the measurement could result in more than one indicator (For example, there could be more than one measurement for the values attributed to children by couples). For some other variables, measurements could be one and only one (for instance, a respondent cannot be employed and unemployed at the same time). Such variables, where the value measurements are mutually exclusive, are called *nominal variables*. Measurements can also be made at the *ordinal level* by arranging the data and ranking the variables in a continuum according to magnitude. That is to say, from the lowest to the highest point ('transitive relationship'), but without mathematical calculations. For example, ordinal number measurement of social status used categories of low/middle/high, and categories of response to the question about *How important is religion to you*? Varies from: 'Not important at all/ Fairly important to Very Important/ Most important thing in my life'. In addition to these levels of measurement, *interval-level measurement* and *ratio-level measurement* for the variables were also used. The interval level of measurement provides information about the distance between the values, containing equal intervals and placing subjects into one of them. The ratio level

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distribution of variables among the subject of study (Babbie 1998).

measurement[21], was used for statements about proportions and ratios, relating one value to another (for example, comparison of household size).

Based on these types of measuring tools, the types of questions selected for the questionnaire were: *Dichotomous* questions that could be answered by recording 'yes' or 'no'; *Rating scale* questions where respondents chose among alternatives; and *Likert scales* where the respondents indicated the level of agreement or disagreement with the statements presented (Black 1999).

Additional principles that guided the construction of the questionnaire included:

1) In the questionnaire, the sequencing of the questions was done in the following order, where the structural characteristics were addressed before attitudinal and value characteristics. First areas such as demographic background (Q1 – Q8); socio-economic (Q9 – Q22); cultural determinants and social network (Q23 – Q28); and proximate characteristics (age, marital duration, contraception, abortion) of fertility (Q29 – Q36) were addressed. These were followed by questions on the priorities in life, perceptions on family, marriage, abortions and values of children (Q37 – Q40). The final part had questions regarding the respondent's future fertility intentions, ideal and desired number of children (Q41 – Q52); as well as questions related to their opinions on current demographic trends and family policies (Q53 – Q67)[22].
2) Objectionable questions were avoided as far as possible. Any question that seemed sensitive and was likely to cause objection by the respondent was made less objectionable by referring to approximate answers, rather than asking for exact details. For example, in order to obtain information on income, a range of income brackets were provided.
3) Wording and phrasing of questions were designed to be simple and easy to understand.
4) Most of the questions were of a structured, closed-end checklist type to which the respondent could simply answer from a series of alternatives or predetermined

[21] The ratio level measurement accommodates all the structural characteristics mentioned previously, plus it has the option of an absolute true zero (0) as the lower value, which in essence indicates the absence of the variable in question (for more details see Black 1999, chapter 9).

[22] Questions on opinions about demographic trends, and family policies were based on a questionnaire used by the Institute for Population Research (IRP) in Rome and the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) in the Hague. The study was titled 'Comparative Survey on the Acceptance of Population-related Policies in the ECE Region' (PPA) and carried out in 1991. The heads of the research team were R. Palomba and Hein G. Moors, and the questionnaire was sourced and used with their permission. Some of the questions used in it were modified, based on research objectives, whereas others were integrated into the study's questionnaire in their original format (See Appendix for chapter 6, section 6.5 for complete questionnaire used in this research).

categories. The aim of constructing closed-end questions was to capture varying but relevant factors that the respondent might not otherwise mention spontaneously. The choice of closed-end questions was also relevant with respect to controlling the form, length, and content of possible responses so that these responses could be easily transferred and processed. It was also an effective way of reducing the time taken to complete the questionnaire.

5) Free-response questions (open-ended questions) were restricted to essential areas only. Thus, the respondents were given the freedom to formulate their answers the way they considered to be the most appropriate in their own words. This ensured that the questionnaire would generate unpredictable answers, as well as cover any opinions not considered by the researcher[23].
6) For some of the questions in the questionnaire a neutral response option - 'I do not know/I do not want to answer/'no opinion'- was also provided. This guaranteed that the response set was comprehensive. It also ensured that the respondents may have the opportunity not to express an opinion or make a statement regarding sensitive issues such as birth control, contraception or marital satisfaction, if they wished so.

6.3.3.2 The Questionnaire Administration: Face to Face Interviews with Couples

There are three methods of administering survey questionnaires to a sample of respondents: the self-administered questionnaires, the interview survey or face to face interview, and the telephone survey. The study has employed the interview survey, where the interviewer asked questions orally and recorded the respondents' answers on the questionnaire.

Advantages

Face-to-face surveys attain high response rates, typically up to 80 to 85% (Babbie 1998). In face-to-face interviews, it is also easier to work out the number of the respondents that were ineligible or/and unreachable. Moreover, the researcher has the control of the time, date, and place of the interview. The researcher also has control of the identity of the respondent who completes the questionnaire and control over the environment, the conditions under which the questions are answered (Babbie 1998; De Vaus 1996; Oppenheim 1992; Sarantakos 1998). In addition, this method of data collection gives the

[23] Such questions included the respondents' opinions on advantages of having many or few children. However, not all such open ended questions were used in the eventual analysis stage due to certain limitations posed by the change in objectives of the study itself. See Chapter 10, section 10.2.2, for limitations of this research.

possibility to correct any misunderstanding of respondents and to deal better with complex questions. Interviewers can help the respondents to work their way through what might be a confusing set of filter questions or can use visual aids to clarify any misconceptions (ibid.). Furthermore, the presence of an interviewer generally decreases the number of 'don't knows' and 'no answers'. Face-to-face interviews are also well suited for open-ended questions (De Vaus 1996). Finally, by questioning respondents face-to-face, interviewers get the opportunity to observe non-verbal behaviour and make important notes in addition to the responses to questions asked in the interview. For example, interviewers may note characteristics of the respondents or the quality of their interaction or whether the respondent had difficulty in communicating (Babbie 1998; Black 1999; Oppenheim 1992; Sarantakos 1998).

Disadvantages

One problem with this method of data collection is that the observable characteristics of the interviewer can affect the way people answer questions (De Vaus 1996, p. 110). Thus, possible bias can be associated with it. Moreover, the presence of another person (such as a spouse or a guest) may also affect responses. Also, face-to-face interviews are more costly and time consuming than other methods of implementation such as mail questionnaires and telephone surveys. The cost disadvantage here depends on how the sample is dispersed geographically[24]. In addition, interviewing offers less anonymity since the interviewer knows the identity, residence, type of housing, family conditions, and other personal details of the respondent. Finally, such interviews depend on the availability of suitably trained staff, who can sensitively handle potentially unpleasant situations such as rejections and animosity from respondents (De Vaus 1996).

In order to administer the questionnaire, the help of three final year undergraduate students at the Department of Sociology, School of Social Science at the University of Crete was employed. These students were familiar with social research methods through University coursework and had some field experience in conducting interviews for survey research. They were given adequate training to familiarise with the specific aims and nature of the study. The training described the study orientation, survey objectives, concepts and definitions. Guidelines and procedures were also provided regarding ethical issues, information about the research area and transportation, along with suggestions to handle difficulties or confusing situations that may occur during the interview. They were

[24] For example, national probability surveys face-to-face interviews, according to Dillman (1978, p. 71, in De Vaus 1996, p. 112), would cost on average about five times as much as telephone surveys and up to 20 times more than a mail survey.

also notified not to skip over or leave any question unanswered, to ensure completeness and quality of the data collected. Interviewers were also advised not to be biased; give clues; or show any sort of personal judgement when answers were given by respondents. In situations where answers given showed inconsistency, they were advised to verify the authenticity of the answers already given by the respondents, by repeating the question referring to inconsistencies. In order to foster confidence among the interviewers, the researcher accompanied them on their first few interviews and provided immediate feedback. This also gave the researcher the opportunity to identify and resolve problems with coding, probing, and completion and thereby to ensure a smooth operation of the subsequent interviews. At later stages of the data collection process, contacts were made via telephone to households on a random basis, to ensure that the research assistants had actually conducted the interviews, as well as to evaluate the respondent's experience of the interview.

Concerning the selection of the actual respondent from each household, the questionnaire was presented to only one of the spouses in the selected household, who could have been either the husband or the wife. The decision to approach only one individual per household has been taken to minimise the logistical and practical issues envisaged, such as repeated visits to 'capture' both the individuals, where both were not present, as well as repetition of answers from the same household. Ideally, it would have been better to collect data from both wives and husbands on a 1:1 ratio to ensure that the collected data represented a balance of perspectives of both the groups[25]. However, this was not practical mainly for logistical reasons mentioned above: wives were more easily available than husbands in many cases. While it could be argued that this could result in imbalance of perspectives and possible bias, studies have shown that spouses are aware of each others intents and desires and normally take both into consideration when stating such intents and desires (Morgan 1985, quoted by Friedman et.al. 1994).

6.3.4 Sample Selection

In deciding the sampling strategy, four specific issues were considered: (1) The geographic area where the sampling and study will be done; (2) The constituents of the sample; (3) The size of the sample; and (4) The distribution of the sample population. Each of these elements are explained in detail below.

[25] Specific statistical tests were conducted to understand the nature and extent of differences in answers of the husbands and wives. See chapter 8, section 8.3 for results.

6.3.4.1 The Geographic Area of Crete

Crete, one of the ten geographic divisions of Greece[26] has been selected for deriving the sample population for this quantitative research. It needs to be mentioned at the outset that despite the several commonalties in demographic trends that Crete shares with the rest of the country, it is not being claimed to be statistically representative of Greece. Given the resources available, selection of a logistically and financially manageable geographic area that would serve as an appropriate field to conduct the study, was the crucial factor. Given below are the specific reasons why Crete was chosen for this study. Also explained are the features that make Crete comparable to the rest of Greece, as well as distinguish it from the rest of Greece.

The fact that the researcher hailed from Crete, and had ongoing academic connections with the School of Social Science at the University of Crete made it a logical choice. This facilitated access to statistical and demographic information and other research aiding resources from the various administrative offices in Crete. It was also expected that familiarity with the social and cultural peculiarities of the region would enable the researcher to more easily gain the respondents' confidence and trust. This was crucial to the success of obtaining accurate facts regarding their circumstances, especially those which related to individual perception and choices on abortion, divorce and marriage happiness.

In terms of the demographic trends of Crete, the major fertility indicators and other demographic trends show good similarity to that of the whole of Greece. As indicated in Table 6.3 below, the TFR in Crete declined over the last three decades following the general trend of the nation's TFR. Although historically Crete has had a higher TFR compared to other geographic departments of Greece, it could be seen that the gap was closing. In fact, the rate of decline of TFR in Crete over the period 1971-1991 has been higher than that of the whole of Greece[27].

[26] As explained in the Background chapter about Greece (See section 4.1.1 on Geography, Political History and Administration), until 1999 (period during which the design of the research was on going) Greece was been subdivided into ten large geographic departments or regions, one of which was Crete.

[27] The exact figures of TFR after 1991 for Crete were not available neither at any of the statistical departments on population in Crete, nor at the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG).

Table 6.3: Difference of TFRs in Crete and Greece, 1971, 1981 and 1991

	TFR			Decline in TFR		
	1971	**1981**	**1991**			
Greater Athens	2.05	1.88	1.28		**Greece**	**Crete**
Central Greece and Evia	2.62	2.09	1.32	**1981-1971**	-.16	-.54
Peloponnisos	2.75	2.08	1.36	**1991-1981**	-.72	-.69
Ionian Islands	2.44	2.01	1.39	**1971-1991**	-1.10	-1.23
Epiros	2.40	2.23	1.35			
Thessalia	2.50	2.24	1.46			
Makedonia	2.31	2.00	1.32			
Thraki	2.68	2.29	1.44			
Aegean Islands	2.47	2.16	1.55			
Crete	2.85	2.31	1.62			
Total Greece	2.51	2.13	1.41			

Source: Velentzas and Chatziprokopiou 1997, p.174.

In addition, similar trends were observed over the period 1971-1991 (Table 6.4) in the age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs), which showed a noticeable decline of fertility for all the age groups of women. However, it has to be noted that over the same period of observation, when comparing the number of live births between the age groups, Crete showed higher fertility rates among the lower age groups (34 and below) where as the whole of Greece showed higher fertility rates for the higher age groups (35 years and above)[28]. The observed difference in data between Crete and the whole of Greece could be for several reasons. While Crete is representative of Greece in its cultural aspects, broad family values, and religious beliefs, most regions of Crete are also characterised by a rural life style. The society in general is much more closely knit, compared to the whole of Greece, with parents, children and grandchildren living together in large extended families in is largely rural economy. This rural life style is also characterised by people traditionally entering into early marriages, consequently starting and completing their fertility cycle early. In addition, the rural and traditional life style means that many such families still have higher than the national average TFRs.

Table 6.4: Evolution of Age-specific Fertility Rates (ASFRs) of Crete and Greece, 1971-1991

	Year	Live Births per 1000 females at Specified Age Groups							Total	TFR
		15-19	**20-24**	**25-29**	**30-34**	**35-39**	**40-44**	**45-49**		
Crete	**1971**	44.1	191.6	169.5	95.2	52.8	15.4	1	569.6	2.848
	1981	64.4	156.3	131.4	65.6	34.2	8.2	1	461.1	2.306
	1991	31.2	105.3	105.2	57	21.3	3.1	0.5	323.6	1.618
Greece	**1971**	36.9	159.8	161.4	79.4	42.7	10.5	1	481.2	2.510
	1981	55	154.1	123.7	60.1	25.6	6.3	0.7	425.5	2.128
	1991	21.2	91	95.9	51.9	17.3	3.5	0.3	281.3	1.407

Source: Velentzas and Chatziprokopiou 1997, p.174.

[28] See Appendix for Chapter 6: section 6.1 for further geographic, economic and other statistical information

With regards to cultural similarities with the rest of Greece, Crete mirrors the strong family ties and relationships as well as religious beliefs that is common throughout the whole of Greece[29].

6.3.4.2 Constituents of the Sample

This study targeted the couples in Crete. The term 'couples' refers to those individuals of the opposite sex, who live together in the same household with the aim to form a family. They also refer to those who have decided not to have any children, but still live together as a basic family unit. In the context of the research questions, couples were defined as those people who had the above characteristics, but were also married. The exclusion of unmarried couples was not considered to significantly impact the representativeness due to their small proportion in the Greek society[30]. Thus, a family would represent a household with individuals at least of above characteristics. The study also looked at only those females who were within their reproductive age, that is below 49 years of age. A final characteristic of the targeted couples was that they were married during the 15 years prior to data collection. This was to ensure that the couples approached had a high probability of considering childbearing decisions at the time of the research. The research questions specifically aimed to understand the couples' more recent fertility related experiences and needs.

6.3.4.3 Sample Size

In quantitative studies estimating the 'correct' sample size is important to ensure the representativeness of the results. Where resources are sufficient, a large sample may be considered, although it does not always guarantee a higher degree of precision or validity. In general, the required sample size depends on different criteria and factors associated with the type of population studied and type of analysis employed. It also depends on the aims of the research, the type of instruments used and the degree of accuracy required (Black 1999; Denscombe 1998; De Vaus 1996; Sarantakos 1998).

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on Crete.

[29] Based on researcher's own experience of living in Greece.

[30] Only married couples were targeted because in Greece, unmarried couples represented only 1% of the population (See chapter 1, section 1.3.2 for details). It was also necessary to target only married couples, as it would have been difficult to identify and establish unmarried couples.

Sarantakos (1998) describes several mathematical formulae[31] that can be used to calculate the sample size (pp. 157–163). However, it is also common practice to resort to guide tables available in the literature such as those prepared by Parten (1950) and Krejcie and Morgan (1970) (in Sarantakos 1998, ibid.). Using the various mathematical formulae, these tables provide a choice of sample sizes that are suitable for varying sizes of population, levels of confidence, standard deviation and population proportion. The benefits of using such tables are that they save time and cost, because, in order to obtain accurate figures for standard deviation, and population distribution, detailed pilot studies have to be conducted. On the other hand, pre-estimated sample sizes have their limitations too. The data for population proportion are estimates. In addition, in surveys such as this, where multiple variables or characteristics are analysed, often in subgroups based on age and sex, the distribution of characteristics among the sample population varies. Thus, it is impossible to determine the most accurate sample size from such tables, which are computed based on population distribution of a single key characteristic. Furthermore, when subgroups are used, the sample size of the subgroups is naturally reduced and increases the sampling error. This second feature is equally applicable even when sample sizes are calculated using formulae for the purposes of a particular research. The only way to avoid such errors is to ensure that each subgroup analysed has a sample size, which is big enough to reduce the sampling errors to within the tolerance levels. De Vaus (1996) states that usually such individual sub-groups should have between 50 and 100 sample units, a rule if applied to this research, would have hugely increased the required sample size.

Thus, when deciding the sample size for this survey, various factors such as the general objectives of the survey research and the degree of accuracy it required, the cost and resource implications were considered. Based on such considerations, it was decided to select the sample size from the table available in De Vaus (1996, p.72; see Table 6.5 below). It was also decided that the overall sample size should reflect the levels of confidence and sampling errors that are generally applied and accepted in similar statistical surveys. Hence a minimum confidence level of 95% and a sampling error (E) of no more than 5% were considered as appropriate for the overall sample size. Also, a

[31] Standard Error (S.E) is a significant consideration when employing statistical methods for sampling size calculations. If standard error can be reduced, then sampling error can be reduced too. Standard error depends on the size of the sample: standard error decreases with increasing sampling size. Thus, an acceptable standard error can be achieved by changing the sample size. Statistical methods try to manipulate the size of the sample, until it corresponds to a standard error that is acceptable (Sarantakos 1998; p. 158). However, this manipulation, as D. Vaus (1996) notes, does not work equally well with large samples. "beyond a certain point the cost of increasing the sample size is not worth it in terms of the extra precision" (p. 71).

50/50 population proportion (p) was assumed, because for the above specified parameters, the tables advise the highest sample size for 50/50 population proportion, rendering it relatively the safest choice. Based on these criteria, the sample size would have been at least 400. However, in order to benefit from any additional improvements in accuracy and validity, it was also decided that the sample size should also represent 1% of the households in Crete, which had couples who were married during the 15 years prior to data collection. Thus, the final sample size was determined to be 508, because there were 50756 marriages registered in Crete[32] during that period.

Table 6.5: Required sample sizes depending on population homogeneity and desired accuracy

Acceptable sampling error (E) [a]	Per cent of population expected to give particular answer (p)					
	5 to 95	10 or 90	20 or 80	30 or 70	40 or 60	50 / 50
1%	1900	3600	6400	8400	9600	10000
2%	479	900	1600	2100	2400	2500
3%	211	400	711	933	1066	1100
4%	119	225	400	525	600	625
5%	**76**	**144**	**226**	**336**	**370**	**400**
6%	-	100	178	233	267	277
7%	-	73	131	171	192	204
8%	-	-	100	131	150	156
9%	-	-	79	104	117	123
10%	-	-	-	84	96	100

[a] At the 95 per cent level of confidence

- Samples smaller than this would normally be too small to allow meaningful analysis

Source: De Vaus 1996, Table 5.5, p. 72.

6.3.4.4 Distribution of the Sample

Having decided the sample size, the next step was to decide how many sample units would be selected from the various geographic and administrative departments within Crete. The distribution of the sample needed a basis for selection, in order to increase representativeness. One way of doing this was by seeking proportionate representation of married couples across the four prefectures (geographic departments) of Crete, namely Chania, Rethymno, Heraclio and Lassithi. However, the available statistics on the married couples only indicated the number of marriages that took place in a prefecture in any given year. They did not record the movements of the couples, who in reality could have registered their marriage in one location and then move to another, possibly even out of Crete. Therefore, it was not possible to ensure distribution of sample based on the proportionate representation of married couples across the prefectures. Another possible

[32] The calculation of the total number of married couples in the geographic department of Crete is based on official data, which are kept in municipal records, in which births, deaths and marriages are registered. These data were collected after numerous visits to the four local statistical offices of Crete.

option was to ensure that the sample selected was proportionate to the population distribution in each prefecture. Based on this criteria, for example because Chania represented 25% of Crete's population, the number of sample units selected from Chania was 127 (25% of total sample size; see Table 6.6 for complete details).

Within each prefecture there are further administrative subdivisions called the *demois* (municipalities), which are categorised into four based on the size of the population in each of them[33]. The distribution of sample among the municipalities was based on the same criteria of proportionate representation of the population. This can be illustrated again with the example of Chania, to which 127 sample units were allocated. A total of 47 (37 percent of 127) sample units were allocated to those municipalities with 10,000 or more inhabitants because, the total population of such municipalities represented 37 percent of Chania's total population (1991 census; See Table 6.6 for full details).

In Crete, each municipality is divided into several villages, towns or cities that consists of several street blocks. Each block consists of one or more houses. The administrative maps available provide detailed topographies of each municipality with its streets, blocks (numbered) and houses[34]. Thus, it was necessary to decide how the questionnaires allocated to each municipality would be distributed among its residents. In order to avoid bias in sample selection, it was also necessary not to exclude any particular type of people among the population. The method of probability sampling was therefore adopted. A probability sample is one in which each person in the population has an equal, or at least a known chance, of being selected. Such a method is more likely to produce a representative sample and enable estimates of the sample's accuracy (Babbie 1998; De Vaus 1996; Mason 1996; Oppenheim 1992). After exploring the different types of probability sampling techniques available, a combination of multistage area sampling and systematic sampling (sampling fraction method) were used, as explained below[35]:

The example of Chania is used to illustrate the process. As mentioned earlier, 127 questionnaires were allocated to be distributed in Chania. At the time of the research, Chania had 25 municipalities based on its population size in the four categories. At least one third of these municipalities from each category were drawn using the random lottery

[33] As of 1999. These four categories included municipalities with up to a population of 2,499; those with population between 2,500 and 4,999; between 5,000 and 9,999; and more than 10,000.

[34] See Appendix for Chapter 6, section 6.9 for a sample of such maps, as well as details of areas from which samples were collected.

[35] See Sarantakos 1998, pp: 141–148.

method. Thus, in total 11 municipalities out of 25 were selected from Chania (see Table 6.6).

The next step was to select the street blocks from the chosen municipality or groups of municipalities in each population category. Using the sampling fraction method, one fifth of the total number of blocks in each group were then identified. For example, if there were 100 street-blocks in a given group of municipalities, then 20 ($1/5^{th}$) had to be selected for questionnaire distribution. Dividing 100 by 20 gave 5 as the sampling fraction. By choosing a random number, between 1 and 5, for example 3, the researcher then marked the 3^{rd} block, 8^{th} block (3 + 5), 13^{th} block (8 + 5) and so forth.

The next stage was to select the households within each of the selected blocks for questionnaire distribution. The number of households selected had to match the number of questionnaires allocated for the group of municipalities, as well as be free from bias in distribution. Because the topographic maps did not provide the total number of households in each block, an approximate number of households was estimated by dividing the total population of the blocks[36] selected by the average family size of 2.9. This gave the final sample frame of households within a group of municipalities. Systematic sampling fraction process was used again to determine the actual number of households and location, where questionnaire would be presented. For example, if the final sample frame had 200 households in a given group of municipalities and 40 questionnaires allocated to that frame, then dividing 200 by 40 gave 5 as the sampling fraction. The interviewer then moved to the beginning of a street at the edge of the first block marked for distribution and selected one house at random to conduct the first survey. Then the fifth house from that house down the street was selected and so on, until all the streets covering that particular block were covered. Then the interviewer moved on the next marked block and continued the process until the required number of interviews were conducted. If an interview was not conducted due to ineligibility of the inhabitants of the household selected, the next house was selected.

In certain areas of Crete, no recorded information regarding the number of street-blocks for the selected municipalities were available (for municipalities with population less than 2500 inhabitants). In such cases, municipalities or villages were first chosen randomly using the lottery method as before. Then in order to determine the households to be approached, maps were obtained and virtual axes were drawn from the centre of the

[36] This information was available from the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) on request.

public square of each village or municipality, through all the streets that ended in the square. Following this, households at varying distances from the centre were selected randomly, in accordance with the number of questionnaires allocated to that municipality.

This distribution process was complicated and required only one interviewer to be present in each group of municipalities or villages. However, it was the most effective, given the multi-layer administrative divisions that were common across Crete.

Table 6.6: Distribution of the sample according to urbanisation character of *demoi* (municipalities) and sex representation in the study area

Districts (4 clusters)	Urbanisation (4 clusters)	Total Population [a]	No. of Interviews	Demoi		Sex Representation	
				Total	Selected	W	H
Chania	Up to 2499 inh.	14484 (11%)	14	10	**4**	10	4
	2500 – 4999	20785 (16 %)	20	6	3	13	7
	5000 – 9999	48428 (36%)	46	8	3	31	15
	10000 plus inh.	50077 (37 %)	47	1	1	31	16
	Total [b]	**133774 (25%)[b]**	**127**	**25**	**11**	**85**	**42**
Rethymno	Up to 2499 inh.	0 (0%)	0	0	0	0	0
	2500 – 4999	24678 (35%)	23	7	3	15	8
	5000 – 9999	18857 (27%)	18	3	2	12	6
	10000 plus inh.	26560 (38 %)	25	1	1	17	8
	Total [b]	**70095 (13%)[b]**	**66**	**11**	**6**	**44**	**22**
Heraklion	Up to 2499 inh.	4498 (02%)	4	2	1	3	1
	2500 – 4999	36653 (14%)	34	10	3	23	11
	5000 – 9999	59252 (22%)	56	9	3	37	19
	10000 plus inh.	164503 (62%)	155	5	3	103	52
	Total [b]	**264906 (49%)[b]**	**249**	**26**	**10**	**166**	**83**
Lassithi	Up to 2499 inh.	2435 (03%)	2	1	1	1	1
	2500 – 4999	10732 (15 %)	10	3	1	7	3
	5000 – 9999	6747 (09%)	6	1	1	4	2
	10000 plus inh.	51365 (72%)	48	3	2	32	16
	Total [b]	**71279 (13%)[b]**	**66**	**8**	**5**	**44**	**22**
	Total	**540054**	**508**	**70**	**32**	**339**	**169**

[a] The percentages given are based on the total population of each District
[b] The percentages given are based on the total population of Crete

6.3.5 Reliability and Validity

The validity of this study is measured as a content validity by trying to cover all possible aspects of the topic. The wording of questions and statements in a questionnaire were key to its validity as a measuring instrument, contributing simultaneously to its reliability as well. The questionnaire was originally constructed in English, in order to obtain comments and advice from the research supervisor. When the first draft was ready, it was then translated to Greek (native language of the researcher). Necessary changes

were made to the questionnaires following observations from the pilot study (discussed below), and the final draft was prepared (in Greek) and used in the interviews[37].

6.3.5.1 Maximising Response Rates

The following techniques were used during the data collection of the study in order to maximise the response rates in face-to-face interviews with the married couples:

- Where possible, the timing of the visits and the characteristics of the respondents were taken into account. For example, daytime visits were avoided or kept to a minimum so that employed individuals could be adequately included in the survey. This was achieved by approaching them during evenings and weekends.
- Before starting the interviews, the interviewers had first to introduce themselves, giving their names and the name of the University. The purpose and nature of the survey, an explanation of how the respondent was selected, why the respondent's participation was important and emphasis on the confidentiality of the survey were explained. The voluntary nature of the survey was made clear. These explanations and assurances that the information given would be used only for academic purposes, were hoped to help derive full co-operation and unbiased answers from the respondents.
- Where questions were on a sensitive topic[38], such as marital satisfaction and possible termination of pregnancies, show-cards were handed to the respondents, on which the responses to these questions had been numbered. The respondents just had to call out the numbers of the applicable responses. This helped to provide honest answers without feeling uncomfortable in the presence of the interviewer.

6.3.5.2 The Pilot Study

In order to check the effectiveness of the research instruments, and discover and correct possible weaknesses, inadequacies, ambiguities and problems in all aspects of the research, the researcher conducted a pilot study with the first draft of the questionnaire. A pilot study is a small-scale test that could help foresee and address administrative and organisational problems that might occur in the main study (Blaxter et.al. 1996;

[37] An English version of the final draft is available in the appendix for Chapter 6, section 6.5

[38] According to Oppenheim (1992) a topic is defined as sensitive if some respondents for some reasons (such as highly personal or private questions, information about socially disapproved behaviour, etc.) find it embarrassing and show reluctance to answer questions about it (p.140).

Oppenheim 1992; Sarantakos 1998). Pilot study - or the 'reassessment without tears' as Blaxter et.al. called it (1996, p. 121) - serves many purposeses and possesses many advantages. Firstly, the researcher can estimate the cost and duration of the main study and test the effectiveness of its organisation. Secondly, it shows whether the research instruments and sampling frame are suitable and adequate. Thirdly, it serves to provide some degree of reliability, by helping to identify and avoid errors in the main study (Babbie 1998; Oppenheim 1992; Sarantakos 1998).

The pilot study of this project (first phase of the administration) was conducted in March 2000. The draft preliminary questionnaire containing 96 questions was randomly distributed to 40 households in four different *demoi* (municipalities) of the prefecture of Chania. These *demoi* had different population sizes. Moreover, the respondents (wives or husbands) chosen were permanent residents of the respective households, and had not exceeded 15 years of marriage. The pilot study revealed that the research orientation was well understood by the respondents. However, some revisions were made to the questions to clarify their meaning. Some other questions were integrated in order to reduce the size of the questionnaire. A few alterations were also made to some of the opinion-eliciting questions. The finalised version of the questionnaire contained 67 questions.

6.3.6 The Data Collection

In mid-July 2000, the final phase of the research commenced and was completed by the end of September 2000. 508 respondents meeting the study's criteria were approached (339 females and 169 males). The average time taken by a successfully completed interview was between 40 and 50 minutes.

During the fieldwork, as expected, some of the selected respondents were reluctant to be interviewed. Some felt either annoyed at being approached by the so-called 'social researchers' (mistaking them for sales agents who promote products or other services), while some others were pre-occupied with other activities. In such situations, where possible the interviewers attempted to explain the purpose of the interview or rearrange visits as appropriate. Where respondents were still unwilling or unable to participate, the next eligible respondent replaced them.

Of the 508 households selected from the final sample frame, 446 households (87.8 percent) achieved positive responses (that is, a successful interview was conducted at the first visit or during the second and third revisits to the same households). In the

remaining households, the respondents were unwilling to participate or unavailable. Thus, 62 interviews (508 minus 446) were conducted at households selected a second time from the sample frame. Table 6.7 summarises the response rates of the sample distribution, by different districts and different urbanisation size of those districts.

Table 6.7: Response rates of the interviews by urbanisation size and district

Response Rate by Urbanisation and District				
Urbanization	**Districts**	**Successful interviews at first three contacts**	**Replaced**	**Total Number of Interviews**
Less than 2499 Inhabitants	Chania	14	0	14
	Rethymno	0	0	0
	Heraklion	4	0	4
	Lassithi	2	0	2
	Total	**20**	**0**	**20**
2500 - 4999 Inhabitants	Chania	18	2	20
	Rethymno	22	1	23
	Heraklion	30	4	34
	Lassithi	10	0	10
	Total	**80**	**7**	**87**
5000 - 9999 Inhabitants	Chania	42	4	46
	Rethymno	16	2	18
	Heraklion	50	6	56
	Lassithi	6	0	6
	Total	**114**	**12**	**126**
More than 10.000 Inhabitants	Chania	36	11	47
	Rethymno	23	2	25
	Heraklion	134	21	155
	Lassithi	39	9	48
	Total	**232**	**43**	**275**
	Total	**446 (87.8%)**	**62 (12.2%)**	**508**

6.3.7 Documentation, Coding, Analysis and Interpretation

6.3.7.1 Documentation and Coding

The questionnaire used for data collection had the scope for several types of responses. These responses ranged from check marks against one of a series of numerical responses, to brief verbal descriptions, such as the household's socio-economic and demographic characteristics, or the respondents' statements about reasons for wanting (or not wanting) a (or another) child. The initial coding was done on each questionnaire against each set of questions. Detailed coding was done only for the open ended questions. Before engaging in the coding process, the questionnaire was studied to ensure that all questions were answered and that all unclear responses were clarified. For open-ended questions where the responses were non-numerical, a coding scheme was developed based on the list of responses, ensuring that each of the listed responses fitted into one of the code categories. Then, the researcher began coding the responses by assigning a

pre-established numerical code to each separate response reported. Thus, in the process of coding, for the closed-end questions, where the data were already in the form of numerical responses, the data were entered in the respective box exactly as respondents reported them. As for the open-ended questions, the researcher followed the general principle of coding the data in somewhat more detail so that coding categories could always be combined during the analysis[39]. Using the statistical analysis programme SPSS 10, a database was created by inputting all the numerical codes. The data was also copied and stored on floppy disks. The data entry process lasted from September 2000 to January 2001.

6.3.7.2 Statistical Modelling and Analysis

Statistical analysis programmes SPSS for Windows (version 11)[40] and 'R' (version 1.7.1) were selected for analysing the data collected from the questionnaire surveys. Both programmes had the capacity for statistical analysis, ranging from simple descriptive to complex inferential statistics and different kind of multiple regressions[41]. The SPSS package was used first for checking data for accuracy, as well as carrying out univariate and bivariate analyses. The R programme was mainly used for running a specific kind of multivariate analysis known as Poisson Regression (described in detail later in this section).

Through univariate analysis the researcher was able to check frequency distributions for the examined variables and also deal with interval estimation statistics such as the mean and standard deviation (SD). Two tests of significance were used that is the one-sample Chi-square Test and the one-sample t-Test, in order to establish generalisability of distribution (to Crete) of characteristics represented by each variable. Chi-square test was used when the variable was nominal or ordinal with more than two values, as well as when the variable had just two categories (values). Such tests are widely accepted as most appropriate in these cases (Morgan et.al. 2001; Pallant 2001). The one-sample t-

[39] See for more details Appendix for Chapter 6:6.6: Clarifications of the main variables used in the analysis: coding and measurement, and 6.7:Coding for the open ended questions of the questionnaire.

[40] Version 10 of SPSS was used at the initial data entry stage.

[41] The R software is less known in the social sciences. The core of it is an interpreted computer language that allows branching and looping as well as modular programming using functions. Its distribution contains functionality for a large number of statistical procedures, such as linear and generalised regression models, non-linear regression models, time series analysis, classical parametric and nonparametric tests, clustering and smoothing. More about the R software and its documentation can found its home page at http://www.r-project.org/ , as well at Dalgaard 2002; and Venables et.al. 2002.

Test was used for interval variables, as it compared the mean in a sample with the assumed or known population mean[42].

The bivariate analysis helped to identify relationships (correlation or statistical association) between two variables. For this analysis cross-tabulation tables were produced along with summary statistics called correlation coefficients or measures of association. In particular, for testing the strength, direction, and linearity where applicable, between two variables the Cramer's V, Gamma, Spearman's rho and Pearson's r inferential statistics were employed depending on the level of measurement of each of the variables (nominal, ordinal, interval) as well as of the number of categories of the variables[43]. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to examine the difference between means of groups, for example, the mean of Children Ever Born between different age groups of wives[44]. As the data came from probability sampling, tests of statistical significance similar to those used in the case of univariate analysis were also used. These tests showed whether the distribution of the variables' values was due to sampling error and whether the results could be generalised to the whole population, from which the sample was collected. While the Pearson Chi-square test of significance was used in most cases, other tests such as the F test and the t-test were also utilised depending on measures of associations already used (some measures of association had their own specific test of significance). In those cases where the assumptions of Pearson Chi-square were violated, the significance of the Monte Carlo exact test was reported instead (SPSS Inc 1999). In both univariate and bivariate analyses, the specific degrees of freedom (df), associated with each test of significance was also recorded.

The study also applied multivariate statistical modelling in order to examine simultaneously the relationships between more than two variables. In particular multivariate analysis aimed to identify how the various structural (objective), attitudinal

[42] For more details on the appropriate inferential statistics about a single variable see also De Vaus 2002, Chapter 31.

[43] There are several works on choice of right correlation coefficients when detecting and summarising relationships between a given pair of variables (de Vaus 1996, 2002; Morgan et.al 2001; Pallant 2001; Sarantakos 1998). In this study, the Cramer's V correlation coefficients was employed when the two variables were nominal and in the cases where the x variable was nominal and the y variable ordinal with many categories or interval. The Gamma was employed when the two variables (x and y) where ordinal and with few categories. Spearman's rho was used when both variables were ordinal but with many (3+) categories as well when one variable was ordinal and the other one was interval. The Pearson's was used when both variables were interval.

[44] In the bivariate analysis, ANOVA is applicable for those cases where analysing relationships between interval-level y variables and categorical x variables. This method compares the groups in terms of the mean of each group in the y variable. The analysis produces an F ratio which indicates whether the difference between the group means are attributed or not to sampling error (for more details see De Vaus 2002 chapter 38 and 39; Pallant 2001; Sarantakos 1998, pp: 430-439).

(subjective) and proximate factors influenced fertility, when all of them were analysed under the same model. Such modelling helped to answer questions like 'do some or all the examined components of fertility differential play an influential role in the fertility decision?' or 'which of the examined factors have the highest influence?'

Selecting the appropriate multivariate statistical modelling was not an easy task. Initially the simple linear regression model was selected, when the Children Ever Born (CEB) variable was selected to represent fertility. This decision was mainly influenced by various other studies of similar nature that used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models to estimate the effects of X variables on the occurrence of fertility. In those examples, fertility (measured as CEB) was treated as a continuous and unbounded variable (Barmby and Cigno 1990). When other options available to measure fertility were considered such as using recent fertility data, that is the number of children born between 1995 and 2000 variable (CB95to00) and not the CEB variable[45], the multivariate statistical modelling used for this analysis had to be revised. The fertility variable had to be handled as a count data, and therefore models other than the OLS models had to be applied[46]. What distinguishes the analysis of count variable is that the dependent variables are nonnegative integers. Cameron and Trivedi (1998) define an event count as the "realisation of a nonnegative integer-valued random variable" (p.1). More specifically, variables are counts of an event and count the number of times that something has happened[47].

One approach to the analysis of count variables is using Poisson regression. Wang and Famoye (1997) discuss the appropriateness of using generalised Poisson regression for modelling household fertility decisions. The Poisson is a discrete distribution useful for describing the outcomes of a random variable, and is based on the number of times a rare event occurs. The mean in the Poisson distribution should be small relative to the maximum possible number of events per sampling unit in order for the *event* to be *rare*.

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[45] The reasons for this have been explained in section 6.3.1.2. See also Appendix for Chapter 6, section 6.6 for more details of the main variables included in the analysis.

[46] Long and Freese (2001) mention that "while the linear regression model has often been applied to count outcomes, this can result in inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates. It is [thus] much safer to use models specifically designed for count outcomes" (p. 223).

[47] Examples of count variables in the social sciences could be the number of times in a year that persons visits the doctor, the number of occupational injuries and illness occurred in a company each month or year, the number of loan defaults and mortgage prepayments by geographical districts per year, and so on. In demography, other count variables in addition to the number of children born to a woman or the number of pregnancies a woman has in a specific time period, include the number of sexual intercourse a person has in a given time, the number of residential migrations a person makes in a lifetime, or before she is married, or after she retires, and so forth.

The model also assumes that the observations are independent Poisson random variables with different means. Another critical assumption of the Poisson distribution is that when an event occurs, it does not affect the probability of the event occurring in the future. If the *count* is children born to mothers, the assumption of independence implies that when a woman has a baby born to her, it does not affect the probability of another baby being born to her. In other words, past fertility success does not affect future fertility success. However, in demography this is not true since having babies is not unrelated to having more babies. Therefore, this assumption of a Poisson distribution is often not met[48].

When applying the Poisson regressions, certain assumptions had to be checked for 'goodness of fit' for each model used. Part of the limitations of the statistical package R used in this analysis to perform the Poisson regressions, is that it does not directly give any summary for the Goodness-of-fit statistics (such as both the Likelihood Ratio and its levels of significance; or the Pearson' s Chi-Square and its levels of Significance). Instead, the assumptions are checked through the Deviance Residuals, the difference between the Null and the final Residual deviance, the critical values of the Chi-square and the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion)[49] measure, all of which are reported under each summary regression table[50]. Assessing the goodness of fit statistics the Chi-square value on the specific degrees of freedom (df) given by the residual deviance was reported. Where the value of the Residual Deviance was lower than the critical value of the Chi-square, it provided the required evidence that the regression had a good fit. Additionally, before

[48] For details about the Poisson distribution and Poisson regression see Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Long 1997; Long and Freese 2001; Sokal and Rohlf 1998, pp. 83-97; Wang and Famoye 1997. See also appendix for Chapter 6, section 6.8 for details of models used to estimate the Poisson Regression.

[49] With regards to the use of residuals and AIC measure, the following were of interest to this study: a) Residuals measure the difference between the model's prediction for a given case and the observed value for that case. The bigger the difference between the minimum and the maximum value of the Deviance Residuals given in the model, the higher the possibilities that regression predictors misfit the observed values. b) By using the Null and the Residual Deviance the total proportion of variation in the dependent variable explained by the regression model (the so called R squared) could be assessed. The bigger the difference between the two deviances the higher the variance explained and therefore the higher the indications that the model does fit the data well. In addition, by using the analysis of deviance table, the attribute of each factor in the model could be identified. c) the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) is a different approach to assessing the fit of a regression model. Its estimate is based on the likelihood of the model, and the number of the parameters in the model. Similar to the R program, by default it entirely relies on the existence of a method computing the log-likelihood for the given class/factor. When comparing fitted objects, the smaller the AIC, the better the fit (for more details of measures see Cameron and Trivedi 1998, pp.140-158; Long 1997, pp. 98-113).

[50] In particular, in a regression with a good fit it is expected that both the minimum and maximum value of the deviance residuals do not exceed the value of 2.0. Also the bigger the difference between the null deviance and the residual deviance the more the variance explained in the model.

each Poisson regression was performed, bivariate correlations between the independent variables were examined in order to detect multicollinearity problems[51].

Moreover, to facilitate the data interpretation, factor analysis was used prior to undertaking the Poisson regression, by using the SPSS programme. The factor analysis is an appropriate method for scale development when there is a large set of interval-level or non-dichotomous variables (de Vaus 1996, p.257-67; de Vaus 2002 p.134-145). This method helped to discover simple patterns in the relationships among the variables and to reduce people's answers to questions from a large number of variables to a much smaller number of variables (called *factors),* that could be easily interpreted. For all factor analyses undertaken, when interpreting factors in the varimax rotation, 0.5 was used as the cut-off point in Factor loadings.

Certain control variables were introduced in the multivariate analysis (that examined the impact of fertility determinants) in order to minimise the limitations posed by using the CB95to00 variable of fertility. One such limitation is that it does not capture the results of childbearing decisions made prior to 1995. Thus the control variable, the number of children the couple had prior to 1995 (CB95PR) was introduced. Two other control variables used were wife's age (WAGY) and couple's marital duration (MRDY), both of which have positive correlation to the number of children the couples are likely to have[52].

The CEB variable was used to analyse the data from those research questions that examined the possible relationships of the couple's future fertility intentions, the reasons for their future fertility intentions, and general policy preferences.

6.3.7.3 Interpretation

The interpretation of univariate and bivariate analysis was based on the frequency distribution of a variable or variables as well as on the correlation coefficients. The values of the correlation coefficients range from -1 to +1. Values closer to 0 indicate no or trivial relationship between the two variables and values closer to ±1 to indicate very strong, near perfect, or perfect relationship. The 'negative' sign of the coefficient indicates a negative relationship, while the sign of 'positive' sign indicates a positive relationship. Similarly, the interpretation in the Poisson regressions undertaken in this analysis, was

[51] Where variables were found to have very high correlation (that is ≥ 0.95) it was decided one of the two variables should be excluded from the analysis.

[52] The studies of Beet et.al. 1994; Bongaarts 1978; Bongaarts and Potter 1983; Kohler et al. 2001; and Morgan and Rindfuss 1999 demonstrate very well the links between age, marital duration and fertility outcomes.

based on the regression coefficients, which demonstrated the direction of the relationship as well as the strength of the influence of each independent variable on recent fertility. The exponential value[53] [exp(b)] of the regression coefficients was also used. This is a standard way of expressing the level of influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Using the exponential value of the regression coefficients also made it possible to compare the effects of the independent variables with each other, as the intercept (or the constant) in the regression is dropped as it is always zero[54]. Where the variables were nominal or ordinal, the values given in the regression tables were based on the first level of measurement of each variable, which was automatically considered to be the reference category by the R program[55].

6.4 ETHICAL ISSUES

The main ethical issues associated with any social research involve informed consent, honesty and trust, confidentiality and anonymity and bias (Miles and Huberman 1994 pp: 288-297; Sarantakos 1998 pp: 20-25; De Vaus 2002). The issue of bias has already been dealt with in the appropriate sections that detailed the qualitative and quantitative methodology. Both groups of participants of this survey were informed of the aims and objective of the study, as well as the voluntary nature of their participation before consent was sought to conduct the research on their views and experiences. In the case of the few objections during the quantitative field survey, a single attempt was made to understand the reasons for objection and clarify the aims and objectives. Where objections persisted, the respondents were replaced with the next available household. Complete anonymity and confidentiality of any personal information that reveals the identity of the respondents were offered and have been maintained throughout. With regards to the policy makers, as some of the participants required anonymity, a decision was taken not to reveal any of the personal identities or institutional affiliations of the persons involved.

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[53] Often known as standardised coefficient.

[54] For more details on the differences between standardised and non-standardised β coefficients see de Vaus 1996, pp: 217-220.

[55] For example, when the effects of urbanisation (URB) was measured in three levels, that is 1 for Rural (URB1), 2 for Semi-urban (URB2), and 3 for Urban (URB3), the Poisson regression tables showed only the influences of semi-urban (URB2) and urban (URB3) environment in recent fertility, as the rural area was taken as the reference category with which the comparisons were made.

Conclusions

The enormity of the various methodologies involved in social research that seek to combine both qualitative and quantitative research methods were self evident in this chapter. Having administered the time intensive and complex methodologies associated with the semi-structured interviews and field survey interviews, as well as the analysis of the findings, the results indeed helped to justify the means approached. These results are presented in the following three chapters that begin with the qualitative analysis. Nevertheless, in retrospect, several areas of improvement, or alternative strategies that may have yielded similar or better results with improved efficiency of the process, were also identified. These aspects, together with the limitations of this study are addressed in the final chapter of this thesis (section 10.2).

CHAPTER 7:

GREEK POLICY MAKERS' PERSPECTIVES: FINDINGS FROM THE FACE TO FACE INTERVIEWS

Introduction

One of the main arguments that formed the basis of the research question was that there were significant knowledge gaps in fertility policy debates in Greece. Based on the evaluation of policy debates to date, the researcher argued that policy makers were not fully aware of many of the ground realities as experienced by Greek couples, in relation to their fertility behaviour. This chapter presents the first set of findings from empirical studies to validate this argument. It presents the perspectives of policy institutions, which were actively involved in policy debates at the time of this research. The face-to-face interviews were carried out with 13 representatives in 12 separate interviews[1], between October 2000 and December 2000. These interviewees represented the perspectives of 12 policy institutions[2]. As discussed in Chapter 6 (Research Design and Methodology), qualitative analysis techniques were applied to the data collected from these interviews. The aim of this chapter is to present the relevant findings from these interviews so that they may be compared later in the next chapter with the actual experiences of couples, surrounding their fertility decisions. The findings are presented under three parts based on the sub-research questions designed in Chapter 5[3]. These are: 1) Policy makers' evaluation of the current demographic trends, and their consequences; 2) Policy makers' perspectives on reasons for fertility decline in Greece; and 3) Policy makers' evaluation of current policies; their perceptions of couples' policy related needs; and their recommendations on policy aims and measures.

In the interest of protecting the identity of the institutions and the respondents, the institutions have been numbered from 1 to 11[4] and are referred to as Institution 1,

[1] In one of the interviews, two persons were present.

[2] See Appendix for Chapter 6, section 6.2.2, for a list of institutions approached.

[3] See Chapter 5, Conceptual Framework, section 5.2.2.

[4] These numbers *do not* relate to the order in which the names of institutions are listed in Chapter 6, section 6.2.2. They *do not* link comments with the identities of the institutions or policy respondents who made the comments.

Institution 2 and so on. Where there are more than one respondent representing the same institution, they are referred to as Respondent 1, Respondent 2 and so on.

7.1 INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON GREECE'S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

In this first part of the analysis of the data collected from the face-to-face interviews, the aim is to present the data that represents the institutional viewpoints on the demographic changes in Greece. It aims to understand how the policy makers see the demographic trends, especially fertility decline, and its potential consequences.

The analysis found that the majority of the respondents viewed the current trends of fertility decline and population ageing as undesirable. However, perspectives on the consequences were widely varied. On one end of the spectrum of opinions, were the majority of the institutions who held concurring and extreme viewpoints such as declining fertility trend was the most significant problem that could lead to eventual obliteration of the Greek nation. On the other end, there were some liberal institutional perspectives, which maintained that declining fertility was not an issue at all. In between there were institutions, which viewed the changes as real and poignant, but not the most significant problem of Greece. Extracts from the interviews, which represent this variety of perspectives, are presented below:

7.1.1 Evaluation of Socio-cultural Consequences

7.1.1.1 Some Liberal Viewpoints

> "The declining fertility trends is mostly an issue of the more advanced ... countries. ... The question here is 'why do only these countries [experience fertility decline?] ... What is happening in Africa and Asia? There we have over population, [which is] another problem... The [real] problem is the system we live in. ... [our system] tends to see these issues as separate problems... But, *we* see things in the whole... Thus, it does not matter if there is a problem of declining fertility in Greece. Bulgaria, China, Turkey and Africa give birth [and have high fertility rates].... If [all these countries] are equally developed, ... then it is only a matter of [re]distribution of the [population]... [Therefore, the declining fertility trends in Greece] does not matter for us. There is no [such] problem" (Institution 2).

Such liberal perspectives were not common among the policy makers interviewed. However, some institutional representatives expressed their disagreement with the ideological and nationalistic bias evident in some of the institutional viewpoints:

> " We do have a problem of declining fertility, and that ... is a serious one. ... [However claims that] declining fertility is the most serious problem of Greece does not concur with the opinions of women or our institutional perspective... This issue of fertility has so far been approached by ... [other political parties and policy makers] from ideological viewpoints of fatherland, religion and family.... [But], we reject the comparative arguments such as 'Greece has a declining fertility while countries such as Albania or Turkey have higher fertility'.... We oppose the suggestion that Greeks need to give birth to many children, or else the [Greek] nation will disappear... Arguments that our neighbouring countries with high birth rates are a threat to Greece's survival are hysterical and deeply nationalistic..." (Institution 8).

Issues such as individual rights, gender equality, voluntary parenthood and free choice of family size, were seen as important aspects to be considered when debating child bearing as moral responsibilities and social imperatives:

> "...No one can state that a family with no children or one child or a family with two or three children is the ideal type of family... There are [more important] human rights issues related to reproduction, which means each couple, especially the woman, should have the right to chose to give birth to as many or as few children as desired...They should have the information and freedom to exercise that right" (Institution 8).

It was also noted that *women* were the main subjects of the demographic issues, especially the issues related to fertility trends, and therefore their individual rights superseded these other issues related to fertility:

> "... I wish to emphasise that, irrespective of the trends in declining fertility, women are not reproductive machines, [and] they do not come to earth only to reproduce. Women, above all, have their own rights to life" (Institution 2).

7.1.1.2 Perceptions on Negative Impacts on Greek National Identity

Opinions of the two interviewees stated above show that they clearly do not share the common perception that changing demographic structure and declining fertility could have catastrophic consequences to the nation. Nevertheless, these were viewpoints of the minority. In stark contradiction to such perspectives were the opinions expressed by many other institutional representatives, who were interviewed. They all stated that fertility decline was a serious issue for Greece. Their opinions of the consequence of fertility decline ranged from paranoia of loss of national security and military power to extreme xenophobia, although some of them emphasised that their views were not racist:

"The declining fertility creates problems to the defence system of our country as there are not enough people to join [the armed forces]. A country is strong only when it has many men to fight. ... None can threaten a country with high population... This situation is going to be even more threatening in the future" (Institution 3).

"I believe that the 21st century is a century of conflict of civilisations. Hence, the issue if declining fertility should be our main priority. [This issue] ... is also related to the existence of our nation, its security and the risk of assimilation of our nation by the surrounding population. This is not a racist view..." (Institution 9).

Many cultural consequences such as loss of Greece's cultural identity and the 'Greek conscience' were envisaged. When evaluating the consequences of fertility decline, several of these interviewees also viewed it in the context of increasing fertility in neighbouring countries such as Turkey, and the increase in immigrant population in Greece:

"The development of low fertility is nightmarish. While in 1980 we were among the few countries in Europe with highest fertility rates, in 2000 Greece, together with Italy and Austria, are among the European countries with the lowest number of children, that is, 1.2 per women of reproductive age. During the last few years, we have seen the number of births reduce by about 30 percent, from 135,000 to 100,000[5]. In addition, in the last few years, the number of deaths have been more than the number of births[6].... If this situation does not change in the coming years, the 21st century is going to bring unpleasant surprises and Greece, as a country will cease to exist.... We should also not forget that a high percentage of them [the children born in Greece] are from immigrants and foreign women.... The number of the Greek students [in our schools] is decreasing while the number of foreign students is increasing[7]. We are going to become a minority within our [own] country" (Institution 3).

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[5] The number of births have reduced from 148,134 in 1980 to 100,643 in 1999, representing a cumulative decrease of 32 % over a 20 year period. The annual rate of decrease from 1997 have been less than 2% (NSSG 2000).

[6] Data provided by the National Statistical Service of Greece confirm that since 1998, there have been more deaths than births in Greece (NSSG 2000).

[7] The decrease in the number of students aged between 5 and 6, registering for primary education in Greece has been 2.1%, 9.7% and 13.9% during the periods 1970-80, 1980-90, and 1990-95, respectively (Maratou-Alipranti et. al. 2002, pp:226-227, Table 3.10). This data however, includes both native Greek and immigrant children. Data supporting the specific argument of the interviewee was not available from NSSG or other independent research.

7.1.1.3 Immigration: Is there a 'Hidden Agenda'?

Responses from other interviewees also suggest that many of them view immigration as a major issue that Greece has failed to tackle. The population growth in Greece's neighbouring countries, and the simultaneous increase in immigrant population are viewed with suspicion as if to suggest the existence of a hidden agenda:

> "[It is] the number one problem of the country.... It is a well-known secret that the Greek nation is gradually dying out and in a few generations' time, there will not be many Greeks left in the Balkans.... It has been projected by the OECD that in 2050 Greece will have 7.5 million inhabitants while Turkey will have 95 millions inhabitants, a population which will be higher than any other European country[8]" (Institution 4).

> "... We are in the frontiers of Europe and have unfriendly neighbours who experience a baby-boom such as in countries like Albania and Turkey.... Already we have a lot of immigrants coming from Albania.... [Shortly] Turkey will join the EU and its citizens will be able to move freely [in Europe] and therefore enter ... Greece. We think we may have time to implement [appropriate policies], but this is not true because what ever policies we implement to tackle the problem [of declining fertility] ... will only have results in the long run. We have to take actions now, otherwise in ten to twenty years time the current problems will be multiplied several fold" (Institution 6).

Parallels were drawn with the ethnic conflicts in neighbouring countries, in order to support anti-immigrant viewpoints:

> "If somebody ... thinks of the problems that were created very recently in our neighbouring country of Serbia, where, in Kosovo nowadays the majority of the population is Albanian, it is easy to understand why the Serbs fight with such passion for Kosovo. The real reason is that Kosovo is to Serbs what Athens is to Greeks. This is the position [Kosovo] occupies in their history and in the national [identity]. The other question here is: How did it happen that in Kosovo, which forms Serbia's heart, the majority of the population are not Serbs? This could be indicative of what Athens could look like in a few years. We all know very well that in many schools in the area of Athens the majority of students are not Greek. We can be nothing but suspicious" (Institution 11).

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[8] The UN (2001) projection (median variant) in 2050 is 8.9m for Greece; 98.8m for Turkey; 58.9m for the United Kingdom.

7.1.1.5 Impact on Traditional Family forms

Some policy respondents also voiced concerns about the wider structural changes that have taken place in the traditional family form in Greece.

> "The traditional family form has broken down. The couples live alone in the cities and the Filipinos and the Albanians have replaced the traditional role of the grandparents [as providers of childcare]. This, in my opinion, is a crime because it affects the child's psychological maturity and education when it grows up with more images of Albania and Philippines than about Greece" (Institution 10).

In direct contrast to this perspective was the opinion stated by another institutional representative, who held that the society is readjusting to the changes that it has undergone:

> " ... I believe that the picture we have [regarding the demographic trends in Greece] is also misleading to a certain extent. Initial observations show that we are moving towards a society in which families are fewer, smaller and disjointed. [But] there are studies[9] that reveal that ... the traditional [family] bonds in our country are still very strong. It is just that these ties have taken different manifestations, as they try to readjust to the new environment.... Still there are a large proportion of families that live close to each other, providing childcare and other support... " (Institution 7).

7.1.2 Socio-economic Consequences

Concerns about the perceived socio-economic consequences were also evident in the institutional responses. Such concerns were similar to those discussed in the policy debate review chapters and ranged from the 'demographic time bomb' to impact on labour market.

> "Due to the declining fertility trends, Greece faces the consequences of the ageing of its population, a feature which is more obvious in the rural areas of Greece [as younger population] abandon those areas. ... The reproductive population also has a heavy burden of caring and paying for the increasing number of older population" (Institution 4).

For another interviewee the consequences were already visible:

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[9] The respondent referred to the study by Maratou-Alipranti: Maratou-Alipranti, L. (1998), Single Parents Families: Contemporary Trends and Policy Dilemmas. A Comparative Review Among the European Union Countries; (2000) Ageing and Family: Demographic and Social Aspects.

> "...The number one problem is the demographic problem that will constitute a bomb in the nation's foundation.... You can see the consequences of declining fertility in all aspects [of life]: social security, pensions and labour force. The increase of pension age for example indicates that there is a problem: lack of labour force, lack of people. Those [receiving social security payments] outnumber those contributing to social security. In other words there is a chain of problems..." (Institution 11).

As evident in the responses mentioned above, all but one respondent in the interview appeared to express their opinions based on their individual or institutional ideologies. Nationalistic and religious bias, as well as assumptions based on the more prevalent theoretical knowledge on consequences of fertility decline seemed to underpin these ideologies. Only one interviewee (from Institution 7) referred to any form of empirical work to support the viewpoint presented. In several cases, when asked for research material based on which such opinions were expressed, none were made available. In addition, in most of the cases, there was a clear bias towards over-representing the perceived cultural consequences, such as those related to immigration. Any initiative to present a balanced perspective of both socio-economic and cultural consequences was mostly missing from the responses.

7.2 INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON REASONS FOR FERTILITY DECLINE IN GREECE

Analysis of perspectives on reasons of fertility decline showed that there was a broad agreement on the various factors that were believed to cause fertility decline. Most of the respondents highlighted socio-economic factors, while some of them also mentioned cultural and attitudinal changes in the society. Among the socio-economic reasons, inadequate housing support for young couples, high unemployment and lack of proper childcare facilities were highlighted as significant factors by many of the respondents.

7.2.1 Socio-economic Determinants

All the major socio-economic factors identified in the literature were seen as influential in determining fertility trends in Greece. As it has been criticised several times in the preceding chapters, at no point were there any references to empirical works that connected institutional opinions with realities as found in the Greek context. The State was severely criticised by all those not part of the Government, for not doing enough to alleviate the difficulties faced by the Greek couples in their efforts to form a family:

7.2.1.1 Employment and Housing

> "The declining fertility is a [result of] combination of different factors: ... the quality of life and living standards of the younger generations have changed.... [One] very important issue is that the new couples cannot easily find employment.... Women especially face this [problem] to a larger extent than men do, even though officially there is a policy of equality between men and women.... Women stay unemployed for longer periods.... When there is no job, there will not be any consideration for marriage and children..." (Institution 6).

> "... As a consequence of inflexible labour market, with little opportunities for part-time and temporary employment, a large proportion of the younger generation is denied access to employment. Consequently, they are unable to avail housing facilities either. Together with these issues, the fact that there are very inadequate child care facilities result in the postponement of childbearing by young couples" (Institution 7).

The nature of arguments and viewpoints on causalities appeared to suggest that at least in some cases, the aim was to oppose the perspectives of political parties from the opposition. For example, in the above extracts, the interviewee from Institution 7 notes lack of part-time employment opportunities as a causal factor. In direct contradiction to this view is the opinion expressed by a policy respondent in the below extract:

> "Declining fertility [in Greece] is the consequence of the process of development it went through.... This is the price that ... [Greece] has to pay. The society has become pro-industrial. We do not need too many hands to help with farming as it used to be the case before.... Also there are proclivities for more privatisation of education, health and social security. This does not create a friendly environment to raise family or a family with many children.... We are facing a big crisis in the labour market.... Our present government is trying to create opportunities for more flexible and part-time jobs both in the private and public sector.... However, such policies will only serve to exacerbate poverty and the already existing problems of illegal practices at work.... It would also increase the [financial] instability experienced at homes [by young couples] and act as a disincentive to have children.... We have created a society that breeds insecurity among our young couples. There are no adequate housing policies for them to obtain assistance with rent or setting up a new home" (Institution 8).

Many other interviewees too highlighted the significance of housing as a highly influential factor in parents' childbearing decision. However, the perception of the problems related to housing varied among the respondents. Some viewed actual ownership of a house was

the issue, whereas others believed that the issues were the inability of people to afford houses with adequate facilities to raise children, and the lack of State support.

> "The main problem faced by the couples is the fact that they do not have their own house. A couple without [own] house do not have any prospect to develop a family" (Institution 3).

> "... [One] very important problem [that couples face], and it is a real deterrent in having children, is the housing issue.... Nowadays the rent takes up a significant portion of a family's income. Sometimes a whole salary is required just to cover the rent and other household expenses. This is a very important factor. Moreover, at the same time I cannot see a scheme that would help [families] in getting easy housing with support and help from the State... [Also] life has many [other] needs and sometimes [these] needs increase [even more]. The prospect therefore is that, for couples to give the best that they can to their children, they believe that the fewer children they have the better they will [be able to] look after them..." (Institution 11).

7.2.1.2 Childcare Facilities and Cost of Children's Education

> "[Another] issue is related to State support in terms of childcare infrastructure. There is no proper State support to provide nurseries and childcare facilities in general. On the other side, if the birth of a child obliges one of the parents to stay at home, the couple will have to face the consequences of reduced income. In addition, childcare facilities do not operate long hours to assist working parents and they are not always adequately equipped" (Institution 6).

Another interviewee, while agreeing on housing as a causal factor, however suggested that lack of childcare facilities was not an issue:

> "I was hugely surprised when a report ... indicated that the most important problem faced by the Greek mothers is the difficulty they face in securing adequate childcare facilities for their children. Other studies have shown that the main determinants of fertility are female employment, inadequate housing facilities, and several other reasons ... that I do not recall now. You should know them or you will find them out from your field survey" (Institution 12).

> "One of the most important modern issues is the specific expense of children's education that did not exist before - not University education - but primary and secondary education. When a family needs to find the astronomical amounts we hear about in order to educate their child, then it really constitutes a prohibitive factor in having children. We can see that this issue is related to the quality of education that is provided by our country. Because, in the end, when education is so expensive – and it becomes expensive as state-

provided education lacks quality – then it is only [natural] that young couples are troubled over how, under these conditions, they would raise children, and give them these simple changes [in life]. This issue of education and its cost is one of the most substantial for a couple that is starting out and thinking of how to organise their life" (Institution 11).

7.2.1.3 High Income as a Negative Factor

All of the above perspectives suggest indirect references to the financial positions of the couples. Those who have good income or financial circumstances would be able to afford or achieve most of the facilities mentioned above such as housing, good education for children, and healthcare. However, one of the policy respondents disagreed with such viewpoints and suggested that higher income could have a negative influence on fertility decisions:

"... [One] reason is socio-economic. As the socio-economic status increase, fertility decreases. It is the income. 80% of families with many children are from lower social class" (Institution 9).

This opinion clearly contradicts the previous statements by other respondents that poor socio-economic circumstances as well as cultural factors are the reasons for Greece's low fertility. This highlights the lack of consensus among policy makers regarding determinants of fertility decline. Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that indeed 80% of families with many children in Greece are from lower socio-economic backgrounds.

7.2.2 Socio-cultural Determinants; Transformations in Societal Attitudes and Values; Behavioural Factors

Many of the institutional representatives, who were interviewed, highlighted socio-cultural and attitudinal transformations in Greek society and among Greek couples, as the causes for fertility decline. They particularly pointed to the increased focus on individualism, careerism and increasing female participation in employment. Some of these respondents did not view the earlier mentioned socio-economic factors as the main determinants of fertility decline.

7.2.2.1 Individualism, Materialism and Relegation of Religion

"... Economic reasons are not so important.... They are more deontological and less normative. They [may] appear as the necessary criteria, but they are not the major criteria for someone to have children and create a family.... There are surveys - I do not

remember which ones - which show that income is not a determinant of declining fertility [in Greece]. We have rich and poor families with many children as well as rich and poor families with no children. There is a more deeper criteria, which is the eudaemonistic attitude of the modern man. When individuals put priorities in life such as first to buy a car, then to buy a house ... then raising children never happens, as those priorities are never satisfied...." (Institution 1).

"[We] do not accept the view that if the family is able to solve all the problems regarding employment, education, health, housing etc, they will have more children. There are additional factors in between. It is also the attitude of the modern individual who does not wish to have many commitments..." (Institution 8).

The above opinions clearly disagree with the more dominant explanations suggested by the economic rational theories. However, it is difficult to ignore the fact that no evidence is given to support such claims about people's changing values and their apparent impact, when making such strong assertions. The suggestion is that the value transformations have rendered people more individualistic and materialistic; and that this has resulted in people desiring fewer children. Such bias in opinions was obvious in the following comments too:

"The selfish attitude, the anti-social and insular habits, and the anti-national and unfriendly feelings towards family and children by the young generation of Greeks also have a catalytic influence on fertility decline.... Behind these attitudes also lies the loosening of Christian principles" (Institution 4).

"There are changes in attitudes and perceptions towards contemporary life and contemporary society.... Today's materialistic society has altered people's attitudes that were once willing to raise three or four children despite difficulties" (Institution 6).

7.2.2.2 Breakdown of Relationships and Marriage

The behavioural changes that result from the impact of general socio-economic, and attitudinal changes were also pointed out as causal factors of fertility decline:

"... Nowadays, we do not have sufficient free time or money.... We go home and because we are unhappy about our financial situation and the work we do, we do not have the right attitude towards family and marriage.... Marriage and relationships have ended up to be based on economic criteria" (Institution 2).

"...There is no sense of purpose [among those in a relationship], but a lax attitude towards making and breaking a relationship.... The couples, as basic example of a team is undergoing a crisis, a crisis of collaboration" (Institution 8).

7.2.2.3 Changing Gender Roles

The changing role of women, especially increased female labour participation was another causal factor highlighted:

> "One of the main determinants, which is also common to all the developed nations, is female employment, which leads to their autonomy and careerism.... Women [nowadays] have different aims in life, having moved away from their traditional roles of mother and housewife. At the same time, children are not viewed anymore as a capital [with economic or social benefits]" (Institution 1).

While the above opinion was prominent among the various policy representatives interviewed, some other interviewees disagreed that female employment was a causal factor. Instead, the inability of the society to readjust to the changing female roles, which created an imbalance in distribution of male and female responsibilities, as well as decision making opportunities, were seen as having influenced fertility decisions:

> "Greece, alongside some other countries such as in Italy and Spain, has one of the lowest levels of female employment in Europe. Other European counties like France and the Scandinavian countries have proved that high participation of women at work can coincide with high fertility. Therefore, there are other reasons behind these trends, which in my opinion, are related to two broader situations [such as] the economic environment that exist at home and the lack of state support to families. Both have direct and indirect negative effects on fertility. When women do not work or when they stop working in order to have children, their household has to suffer the consequences of the lost income. The cost of children nowadays is too high to be supported by only one parent's income. Therefore, the family would have to reduce the number of children it desires. On the other hand, even when women are employed, there are not sufficient childcare facilities, such as the lack of harmonised working hours with the opening and closing hours of nurseries and primary schools.... The informal sources of childcare through family members such as grandparents have begun to diminish. These again would lead to a decision not to have children...." (Institution 5).

> " [Declining fertility] is also a consequence of the new role of women, their liberation from household chores and their participation in the labour force.... However, ... they are not entirely free from their family responsibilities.... These transformations, together with trends towards a shrinking Welfare State and the deficiencies in care for the elderly and the children, make it difficult for the couples to plan a family. In addition, for the new role of women, there has been no equivalent new role for men, where men would undertake responsibilities within the household. Thus women, in addition to their employment, continue to do what they used to do, creating an imbalance.... Therefore they do not

have the time to participate in debates concerning political and other social issues or to equally participate in the decision making process [within the family]" (Institution 8).

7.2.2.4 Concerns about Future

Some of the interviewees also pointed out that increasing levels of crime and social inequality could create insecurity among the couples about their own and their children's future:

"The issue of declining fertility is not only related to money. Several women have mentioned to me their concerns about the peace and security of our world that leave them uncertain about their childbearing intentions. They are concerned about raising their children in a world of violence, hate and conflict" (Institution 8).

"Many of our parents are worried about social injustice, increasing crime, ... fear of war and other problems. Parents consider such issues while making decisions regarding having children.... Fear of war is one of the basic determinants.... There is an anxiety about the future and what it holds for our children" (Institution 2).

7.2.2.5 Birth Control Measures

The increase in use of family planning methods such as contraception, and the widespread use of abortion, was seen as outcomes of cultural and attitudinal changes by some of the institutional representatives. Legalisation of abortion was highly criticised by one of the policy respondent, who called for its abolition:

"A lot of money is spent on family planning in our country, which I condemn.... Family planning constitutes a negative influence on fertility ... as after 35 years of age, the possibility of conceiving is less. So when the modern young women [delay childbirth because they] desire to enjoy their life first ... it will be too late to have children.... Use of abortions and contraception can cause infertility.... Abortions should be completely banned and should not be presented as a family planning tool.... The embryo is a separate biological entity, it is a self-existent life, the death of which could only be regarded as a homicide" (Institution 4).

7.2.2.6 Impact of Urbanisation

Another causal factor pointed out, as part of changing culture was the increasing trends in urbanisation. It was suggested that urbanisation had a cultural impact and consequent financial implications for the couples:

"Urbanisation is not good because it obstructs the economic support from the wider family members, that is common in the rural villages" (Institution 10).

7.2.3 Some Different Perspectives on Causalities

Most of the policy makers interviewed mentioned several socio-economic, cultural and attitudinal factors as reasons for fertility decline. However, some of them also pointed out certain additional factors, which they believed were specific to the Greek context. In the context of lack of scientific or statistical data to support some of these arguments, they appear to be presumptuous and judgmental than factual, as evident in the below comment:

> "They [the young people] go out often and get drunk... their bodies are affected by alcohol ... not to mentions the drug-users. This has consequences on their everyday life and later during conception and planning of a family. Their children too face the risk of having some kind of disorders ... [In addition], car accidents kill our reproductive population, since the majority of accidents involve the young generation..." (Institution 4).

The following comment is another example of a different perspective. The policy respondent in this case not only disagrees with the majority opinion about the Greek tradition of large families, but also presents some factually incorrect statements:

> "The primary reason is related to the roots of our civilisation. Greece has never had a tradition of large families. Throughout its existence, Greece has had medium sized families with two or three children, because of its system of monogamy and strength of the family institution... We should also consider the fact that during the last decade, fertility declined also because 60%[10] of women entered the labour force..." (Institution 9).

Finally, one of the interviewees presented a very different outlook on the issue of policy debates as well as the observed trends to generalise causalities of fertility decline. This respondent did highlight some of the socio-economic causal factors; however, called for deeper understanding of subjective characteristics of couples:

> "I disagree with the quantitative methodologies [such as survey questionnaires] that are employed to understand fertility determinants. Even though they give some interesting insight into the subject, ... it may be difficult [for a quantitative researcher] to extract reasons from the sub-conscious mind [of the subject] and clearly define the rationale for a particular [subjective] decision. These reasons are not isolated, but part of the broader social environment that is not static.... Therefore, what appears to be a rational decision [for the researcher], may have been taken by the subject without a full understanding [of the reasons]. It is not appropriate to just ask someone why he or she does not have

[10] The actual figure of female labour participation for the year 2000 is 41.3% according to Eurostat 2001.

children – as no one puts such questions to oneself! Therefore, the answer would not be adequate to help design a right policy" (Institution 7).

Having already found that policy debates in Europe and Greece were mostly biased and generalised, such an opinion constituted a radical departure from the common thinking. However, throughout the analysis of the interviews, this was the only example, where an institutional perspective was found to challenge the current one-sided approach to fertility policy debates. This opinion does pose a challenge to part of the research method employed in this research. As pointed out in the methodology chapter, it is indeed a limitation of a quantitative research approach that it is unable to go behind the objective answers and probe deeper the circumstances behind certain opinions and decisions. This limitation is discussed in the limitation section of Chapter 10 of this thesis.

7.3 POLICY MAKERS' EVALUATION OF CURRENT POLICY OBJECTIVES AND POLICY MEASURES; SUGGESTED POLICY OBJECTIVES; AND PERSPECTIVES ON COUPLES' POLICY RELATED NEEDS

The results of the analysis showed that there were marked differences among the policy makers interviewed, regarding the issue of explicit State intervention in couples' fertility decisions; evaluation of current family and fertility policies; as well as their perspectives on couples' policy related needs. The majority of the policy makers had a pro-natalist bias and therefore agreed that State intervention through policies was essential. Most of them also agreed that the policy mechanism in place at the time of the interviews were mostly insufficient.

7.3.1 Evaluation of Current Policies

The dearth of policy implementations, despite several debates and discussions; as well as ineffectiveness of the current policies to motivate couples to have children were highlighted:

"So far there have been several [discussions] and perspectives on the issue of below replacement fertility, but no policy measures [to address this situation] have been adopted.... The policy measures [that are currently implemented] have very broad character.... They target families with many children ... There are hardly any [policy] measures that has the 'shock-value' to motivate someone to have a child" (Institution 1; Respondent 1).

It was also criticised that although attitudinal factors were major causal factors of fertility decline, not enough importance was given to them in the policy debates. The interviewee

also questioned the assumptions behind the policies that sought to improve fertility rates through financial incentives:

> "Officially, attitudinal determinants are not highlighted very often, ... the reason is that if we assume those factors as reasons of declining fertility, then there are no reasons to implement economic policy measures as a means to improve fertility.... I am opposed to the suggestion that children will be had, not because they are wanted, but because some sort of financial benefit can be derived out of it" (Institution 1, Respondent 2).

Opinions in the previous sections showed how the majority of the policy makers associated fertility decline with immigration when evaluating the consequences. Most of those respondents were firmly opposed to adopting positive immigration policies (that included allowing foreigners with generally high fertility rates) as a solution to improve the rate of population growth in Greece. Some of the comments below demonstrate their rationale behind such opposition:

> "When there is a problem – and this is the declining fertility - which is directly related with the disappearance of our nation, we cannot say that it can be solved by integrating the foreigners into our society.... Those people do not have the same religion that we have, do not have the same culture, language and traditions. They are foreigners in this country, and assimilation will never be successful.... In addition, there is the question as to how many foreigners will we integrate? ... Politicians have not told us how many foreigners we need and in what posts. A positive immigration policy could be accepted only if each foreigner first admits that he or she is and feels Greek" (Institution 3).

> "Allowing more foreigners [into the country] to resolve the declining fertility is a wrong policy. There are already too many Muslim families in our country - more than what it should be. The immigrant families due to their higher fertility rates, will very soon become the regulator of social, political and electoral life of our country, and this would [turn to] be the worst policy decision that has ever been taken" (Institution 4).

> "...The demographic problem in our country and the introduction of immigrants are two different things for me.... I believe that the motive [behind] this incorporation is clearly financial. There is no doubt that full integration will bring a recovery of our economy. The point is [though that it] would lead to an alteration of the population of this country. Greece may obtain more inhabitants, but the difference would be that those people would not be Greek. I do not mean they would not be Greek citizens but that they would not possess a Greek conscience..." (Institution 11).

At the same time, there were also those who welcomed immigration policies and criticised the anti-immigrant ideologies:

> "We complain that immigrants have higher fertility. I do not consider it as a threat. I do not support the view of racial purity. However, I support [preservation of] the Greek conscience. Thus we have the issue of creating the Greek conscience among those who come into Greece" (Institution 10).

Policies (or lack of it) related to changing gender roles were another area discussed. The ineffectiveness of current policies in helping women to combine work and family responsibilities was highlighted; and the policy respondent disagreed with those with stated policy objectives to encourage women to stay at home to raise children:

> "I do not share the view that women ... [have to stop employment] and return to making children. International experience has shown that where female labour participation is high, fertility is also high. This is [made possible] through a network of institutions of the Welfare State that allow women to successfully combine family and employment. In the Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece where female labour participation rates are low, fertility rates are also low.... It is meaningless to suggest that fertility will increase itself [just by encouraging women to leave employment and focus on child bearing]. What is needed is to increase opportunities for young women to do what they want to do. As evident, women nowadays want to do both, have a family as well as a career" (Institution 7).

The difficulties that women face in combining these two aspirations were highlighted, stating that often, they have to delay childbearing to develop a career. In addition, it was noted, when they are ready to form a family, often for biological reasons, they find it impossible to have children. Asked whether rectifying the problems with unemployment, housing and childcare would change the attitude of couples towards child bearing, it was mentioned that no sudden changes could be expected. However, it was noted that international experiences[11] suggested that where these three key issues had been addressed through appropriate policies, declining fertility trends had reversed in a relatively shorter time span.

The existing tax relief systems were criticised as being in favour of those couples with fewer children, because the increase in tax relief allowed to those families with many children were not adequate. Introduction of the means tested distribution of allowances in 1997 was also criticised as a backward measure that would not motivate couples to

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[11] No specific example was cited. The references to Northern European States such as Sweden, however, does not entirely support the argument, as Sweden's achievements in fertility trends were not sustained in the long term.

have more children. The means tested policy of a lifetime pension for women with many children was pointed out as an example.

> "Couples will not consider such policies with only potential long term benefits, to favour their current circumstances.... Which female is going to think of having many children when there are such limitations for receiving the benefits? ... Is it ever possible for a woman to decide to have three or more children when the allowances are means tested...? Such policy responses can only destroy couples' and parents' confidence and trust and this is what has happened in our country" (Institution 3).

As observed in the policy debate review chapter four, fiscal constraints and policy priorities of the State were also cited as reasons why it has been unable to implement many of the policies recommended in the debates:

> "...A lot of effort was put to design the [policy] proposals ... [but] we could not complete it due to economic circumstances.... The country had a priority to improve its economy in order to be able to enter the EMU. You cannot support social policies with borrowed money..." (Institution 12).

7.3.2 Suggested Policy Objectives

In most cases, the suggested objectives for family and fertility policies were similar to those of broad social policies. None of the suggested policy objectives gave any indication that such suggestions were based on a real understanding of the needs of couples. Instead, in many cases, they focussed on expected results at the macro level:

> "[The policy makers] need to set ... targets regarding the structure, distribution and number of the population that is being aimed at.... [Given the current demographic situation in Greece] it is appropriate that demographers have stated that we need a fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman. It is also ideal for the population aged above 60 years not to be above 10 to 15 percent of the total population.... Recent Greek demographic literature shows that ... [the trends will reverse] only after the year 2050, which is too far. We have to find a way to bring this down to 2020 or 2030" (Institution 1, Respondent 1).

Creating more employment opportunities (although no mention was made regarding how to achieve this), and integration of illegal immigrants were seen as essential to increase contribution to the social protection funds:

> "...The challenge for the present government is ... to create new jobs. [In order to increase contribution to the social protection system], put all the unemployed people to

work; ... integrate the illegal immigrants who do not currently pay any contributions into the pension system" (Institution 2).

"It is claimed that declining fertility has caused an imbalance between employed people and pensioners. Our response to this is to reduce the unemployment of our young people and the number of uninsured people in the labour market such as the illegal immigrants" (Institution 8).

It was also envisaged that through policies, the State could aim to create attitudinal changes in the younger generation through propaganda and education, and enable them to understand the need for large families:

"The State has to try and change the attitudes of all those parents and women who wish to have only one or two children ... as long as their attitudes remain the same, no amount of incentive will motivate them to have more children. Our young generations do not learn ... [anymore] about the family, the Fatherland and the Church.... If we do not propagandise the family with many children as the ideal family through our education systems, then we will not be able to convince ... new couples to have [more] children" (Institution 3).

"The demographic problem is not an eye-catching head line in the newspapers or on the television. It does not count as a real problem in everyday life of Greek citizens, since there is no such thing as a well-organised publicity campaign initiated by the government or the mass media. [Therefore, an] issue is how to educate the Greek citizen about the depth of the current [demographic] problem.... Their lack of knowledge [about the issue] is one reason why the political parties and media have ignored it...." (Institution 6).

"Usually people have children when they do not need them. We have to educate them to have children when they desire them.... This is one of the problems of our educational system.... We have reached a stage where we attempt to connect the demographic issues with our failing social provision systems" (Institution 8).

Some of the policy makers interviewed believed that policies had to be targeted on higher birth order of children, in order to encourage more childbearing decisions:

"In order to achieve replacement of the population, the third child is most important. Most couples forming families will have the first child as a matter of course ... and possibly a second one. [Hence] we could say that we need to give more financial benefits for the second [and third] child..." (Institution 1; Respondent 1).

"I understand the importance of first or second child ... but it is inappropriate to implement such a [targeted] policy.... The family with four children offers an invaluable

service to the State, and this fact cannot be disputed.... When there are families with six and seven children those families deserve more support from the State" (Institution 6).

However, another institutional viewpoint suggested that policies had to target the lower birth order of children, in order to achieve results:

"... It is not through the family with many children that we will be able to address our demographic problem [of declining fertility]... the fertility policy incentives should focus on motivating couples to have a second child.... The Greek couples need to be convinced that existence of the nation depends on whether they have children or not.... For reasons of the nation's survival, they have to have at least two children.... Who is going to protect our borders?" (Institution 12).

The interviews provided further evidence of multiple perspectives regarding policy objectives. For example, as evident from the two quotes below, there were also suggestions that policy objectives should *not* be targeted at any birth order at all, but should aim to attain broad social equality irrespective of family size and forms:

"The aim of demographic policies [at present] is to increase the number of children in the family, which is ... [not what we need], as they do not understand why families have one child or two children or no children.... What is required is a broader social policy that protects the child, even if it is the first child in the family.... Policies that aim to move from privatisation of responsibilities and family care to socialisation of those responsibilities.... It does not appear to have been understood in Greece that policies which support only families with many children are reactive policies" (Institution 3).

"Policies should give emphasis on the broader socio-economic conditions of the employees.... All kinds of family forms such as large families, single parent families, unmarried couples ... should be supported through appropriate social policies, in particular an improved public health care system, education and social protection systems. These would reduce the inequalities between people from different classes" (Institution 8).

The need for a pragmatic approach to fertility policies that include changing social values and attitudes, and the limitations these impose on State intervention was also pointed out:

"[Women] have suffered a lot under our patriarchal society.... However we have to see the issue of fertility in a more realistic away, which has certain limitations such as the rights related to sexuality and reproductive rights of both men and women ... freedom of abortion, and right of women to do what they chose with their bodies.... [In fact] such changes are indeed a victory for women.... If the abortion law was not introduced in

1986, now under the current circumstances [of declining fertility] and religious fanaticism... it would never have been considered" (Institution 8).

7.3.3 Perspectives on Policy Related Needs of Couples; Policy Recommendations

There were very few specific policy recommendations made by the policy makers interviewed. Despite the various policy objectives discussed, most of the policy recommendations had some element of financial incentives in them. In addition, in all of the policy suggestions, there were no indications of their suitability and applicability to the specific characteristics or needs of the Greek couples, but appeared to be rather generalised policy solutions.

7.3.3.1 Employment; Parental Leave and Work Arrangements

Many of the interviewees saw a clear need to reform the parental leave facilities available, and for the creation of flexible work opportunities:

"Good maternity and parental leave policies are more important than the current ridiculous policy that gives women aged over 50, the eligibility for early retirement if she has a child aged below 18 years. It is more important to have longer periods of parental leave or maternity leave" (Institution 7).

It was not clear whether such policies should be fully paid or not:

"The first year could be fully paid, the second with lesser payment and the third – I don't know – I think it would be ok to be paid. The most important thing is to ensure that a woman will have a job to go back to after her leave. These changes can happen in the private sector, if the employers do not have to pay for the costs associated with such facilities. We have to transfer the costs back to the society in its totality – that is the key point in this issue" (Institution 7).

Creation of more part-time and flexible employment opportunities were seen as undesirable by some, due to their apparent disadvantages:

"We do not agree with that... these policies are tricks of ... [our present] system to hide unemployment rates.... The people get confused as to whether they are [in fact] employed or unemployed ... because they do not have permanent contracts, they are also unable to plan long term, and therefore become insecure about their future.... [Increasing maternity leave and part-time job opportunities for women] will increase their burden of family responsibilities, which the State is trying to do because there are not enough child care facilities.... [It would also] result in women earning less, contributing

> less [to the pension system] and receiving insufficient pension ... All parental leaves should be fully paid, with out cutting out rights and contributions to the pension funds, because at present contributions to pension funds are discontinued during the parental leave period.... Which parent would be prepared to take a two-year leave if it would affect the contributions to [his or her] pension fund? ... Also, for a woman returning to employment after a long leave, certainly in the private sector and increasingly in the public sector, she will not find her old post [to continue her employment].... When all the socio-economic problems related to employment, pension, health insurance ... are resolved, it will create the right psychological disposition to have children..." (Institution 2).

Substitution of paid employment with paid motherhood was another policy suggestion. However the assumption here seems to be that women would be happy to relegate their personal aspirations related to career and education and stay at home to produce and look after children:

> "It is an obligation of the State to give allowances to non-working mothers who decide to stay at home and raise children, for her invaluable contribution to the society. Such an allowance would also provide a degree of economic independence to mothers...." (Institution 4).

7.3.3.2 Financial Incentives

Many of the interviewed policy makers suggested various financial policies that included incentives such as tax relief, increase in child allowance; as well as punitive claw back of tax cuts for those who did not have the 'right' number of children.

> "Financial benefits [for children] should indeed be linked to income of the family. However, the [annual] income thresholds should be raised from the present Drs 7m to Drs 10m[12].... Allowances should also be readjusted based on the inflation levels[13].... Tax relief for families is very small at present and need to be increased. The income limits in order to be eligible for this relief are also very low" (Institution 1; Respondent 1).

> "The income threshold of Drs 6m for a mother to be eligible for life time allowance for having a third child should be raised. Child allowances should be given to both the parents[14]. Policy measures such as these could be incentives for couples to have children.

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[12] The correct threshold was in fact Drs 8m in 2000, as corrected by a second interviewee present at this interview. It was also pointed out by this person that the annual income threshold limits for families with many children (3 or more) is Drs 10m, which also increases by Drs 1m for every additional child.

[13] For example, the financial allowance for having a third child was Drs 30,000 in 1990.

[14] This policy has been implemented from January 2003.

However, the aim is not number of children ... [but] quality of life the children have" (Institution 1, Respondent 2).

"... We condemn the woman who [goes to] work for more than eight hours per day, waving to her children who may be in the hands of baby-sitters, grandparents or neighbours.... Those families without children should be taxed in order to support those families with children. Child allowances should be increased with the number of children, however no allowance should be made for the first and second child" (Institution 4).

"In my opinion all child allowances should be abolished and replaced with one flat rate allowance paid for each child until it reaches the age of 18. The burden of bearing the cost of the allowance should not be on the employer, as it is in the case of private employers, but on the State. Such allowances should also be independent of family income. Such allowances should not increase by the number of children, instead they should decline by the number of children. The second child for example could play with the toys of the first child or wear the same clothes of the first child. Such policies have been employed in the Scandinavian countries" (Institution 7).

7.3.3.3 Housing and Children's Education Related Policies

There were some specific recommendations on the kind of housing policies to be implemented, both as incentives and disincentives.

"As a way to increase fertility, the State should agree that if a family has a third child, it will not have to pay any interest on its mortgage, and if it has the fourth child, it will not have to pay back the mortgage at all. The couples will therefore know that by having four children not only will they have the happiness that children brings, but also that they will have a house to enjoy their life..." (Institute 3).

"We could also create negative incentives. For example, rent allowances could be given to new couples. But if they do not have a child during the first or second year, the allowance should be stopped..." (Institution 9).

The specific problems faced by young couples in securing adequate housing before they start families were highlighted in support of such generous housing benefits policies.

"For an institution such as a bank, to authorise a housing loan, this person has got to have worked for a few years and [be able] to show that he or she can pay it back. This can be achieved by someone who is around the age of 30-35, but at this age it is really late to start a family.... The cost of renting makes it harder [for a couple] to satisfy their [housing related] needs. However, if the rent was paid for them [by the State] from the very beginning, things would be a lot different. Such an approach would certainly lead to different tendencies in fertility [levels] (Institution 11).

With regards to assistance with children's education, it was suggested that parents needed assistance with the cost of educating their children. However, no specific policy measures were put forward and some of the suggestions in this case seemed to contradict each other:

> "The Greeks consider it extremely important to invest in the education of their children.... Therefore, policies that assist families with the education of their children will be more effective than giving them financial incentives.... Incentives should be given from third child and above as Greek families have an average of two children...". This was later contradicted again: "Incentives are costly and are inadequate at present. It would take a long time for a couple to have 3 or 4 children. Am I going to have 3 or 4 children in order to have these benefits? Therefore incentives should be given from the first day [of the couples coming together as a family]" (Institution 9).

7.3.3.4 Childcare Facilities

With regards to childcare facilities, policy suggestions were mostly broad, with no specific recommendations[15]. One such broad suggestion, presented by all interviewees, was improvement of existing childcare facilities. It was also suggested that the Welfare State had to be modernised in order to socialise the care responsibilities of the mother and alleviate her burdens as the main provider of care for children and the elderly.

7.3.3.5 Other Policy Suggestions

There were a few other broad policy suggestions related to employment and welfare. However, all of these suggestions were too generalised and also appeared to be less than practical either due to their financial implications on the State's budget, or because they appeared too arbitrary and not well thought out:

> "... Factories and production should stay under the control of the state and not privatised. The state should be the main financier, which will provide and care for the people. By working for the State ... the employees do not have to fear dismissal, ... while at the same time they are eligible for insurance, pensions, free health treatment and free education. All those that an ordinary person tries to achieve so hard ... [under the current] system ... [should] be given free..." (Institution 2).

> "Families with many children could be given free access to all the theatres.... Ideally incentives should be independent of income. However they should not be accessible to ...

[15] No quotes are mentioned here, as no specific policy suggestions or differing perspectives were contributed here by the interviewees.

[the very rich people] and therefore a limit should be set at the high-income level..." (Institution 9).

As noted above, the arbitrary nature of most of the policy suggestions is obvious in many cases. There are so many disagreements among the policy institutions regarding the basic aspects such as whether to focus benefits on the birth order of the child, and whether they should be means tested. This brings the question, as to how, without political consensus on what the couple needs and how to meet their needs, could the Greek policy mechanism deliver effective fertility enhancing policies.

Conclusion

A critical review of the institutional perspectives presented in the previous three parts, in its true sense, would only be complete once this research has established the experiences of couples regarding their fertility decisions and behaviour, and a comparison has been made between the two. However, throughout the presentation of the findings in this chapter, it was clear that many of the perspectives were very subjective, extreme and at times perhaps not based on facts. Such biased opinions were also identified in the two chapters that reviewed the historic policy debates in Europe and Greece (Chapters 3 and 4)[16].

A review of the perceived consequences of fertility decline showed that a few (but significant number) of the institutional representatives associated the perceived consequences of fertility decline with that of immigration. However, the deeply nationalistic sentiment and at times extremely xenophobic attitudes that underlie some of these perspectives were nothing new. Throughout the history of the Greek fertility policy debates, the pro-natalists have always used such extreme viewpoints to bolster their arguments[17]. Nonetheless, comments such as 'There are already more Muslim families than there should be' demonstrated the extent to which bias and prejudice are present in the debates. A 98 percent majority of the Greek population are still Orthodox Christians. Thus, given the non-availability of any statistical projections that predict the obliteration of the Greek nation, either due to its low fertility levels or due to presence of immigrant population, such perspectives contribute little towards making effective policies.

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[16] See Chapter 3, sections 3.2.4; 3.3.4; 3.3.5 and 3.4.2; as well as Chapter 4, section 4.3 for references to different perspectives identified in the review of historic policy debates in Europe and Greece.

[17] See Chapter 4, sections 4.3.3; 4.3.4.2 and 4.3.5.1 for references to examples of similar viewpoints identified in the review of historic policy debates in Greece.

This chapter also showed that some of the institutional representatives, who held a more liberal outlook, disagreed with such extreme perspectives as discussed in the above paragraph. They also argued for the need to uphold individual freedom and rights, especially women's rights to make their own life-decisions. However, the judgement in making comments such as 'there is no such issue as fertility decline', and the visionary but seemingly impractical suggestion that 'the current demographic problems could be resolved by redistributing population from Asia and Africa', appeared questionable. Such arguments also seemed to be biased by ideological perspectives rather than pragmatism.

The analysis also brought out some institutional viewpoints that held that declining fertility rates could have certain socio-economic impacts, in the context of an ageing population. Again, no credible evidence were available to support such opinions. For example, the increase in retirement age and labour shortage was quoted in support of such opinions on perceived socio-economic impact of fertility decline. These, however, contradicted the opinions of some other institutional representatives who argued that in fact there were high levels of unemployment, which had led to fertility decline.

As for the reasons of fertility decline, lack of State support for housing, inadequate childcare facilities, and high rates of unemployment among the reproductive population were the most quoted reasons. Several respondents also mentioned the attitudinal factors, where by the younger generation were said to put individual priorities and aspirations before that of family formation. For example, increased use of birth control methods were also attributed to cultural and attitudinal changes in the society. While there are theories and some empirical evidence of the influence of such factors on a country's fertility rates in other parts of the world[18], at the time of this research, no such studies were known to have been conducted in Greece, in order to conclusively confirm their impact on Greece's fertility rates. Some policy makers also stated that attitudinal factors were more significant than other factors, and that such factors could not be altered through policy measures, because they related to an individual's freedom of choice.

The responses on reasons for fertility decline in Greece also revealed that in some cases, the institutions or its representatives were misinformed. For example, one of the institutional representatives interviewed stated that high levels of female labour participation caused fertility decline – that is, around 60% apparently entered the labour

[18] See Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.1, Table 6.1.

force in the last decade. In reality, this figure was close to 38 percent in 1998[19], one of the lowest in the whole of Europe.

Of particular relevance to the main arguments of this research was the opinion stated by one of the interviewees. This respondent emphasised the need for qualitative research with couples to identify actual reasons behind their fertility decision making behaviour and fertility decline. It was seen to be vital for policy debates to understand the subjective characteristics of couples in Greece that lead to their fertility decisions.

With regards to the policy related needs of couples, almost all of the policy makers suggested better State support for housing, improved child care facilities and more opportunities for employment. Two of the respondents however mentioned that financial constraints were the reasons why such policies have not been implemented so far. In this context, suggestions such as free housing for all couples with four children seemed impractical. The childbearing incentive in providing free access to theatres to members of large families was not apparent either. Policy suggestions such as negative incentives and tax penalties for those without children clearly infringe human rights and are therefore also impractical. Some of the policies such as finding employment for all, free education, health care and insurance, also suggest that such recommendations were made from an ideological position, rather than based on a real understanding of the couples' needs or practicalities. Furthermore, suggestions regarding waiver of mortgage repayments depending on number of children, nationalisation of already privatised industries etc are again impractical policies, either due to the enormous cost implications or due to inherent non-progressive implications.

In conclusion, it was clear that while all of the policy makers had a good understanding of most of the key demographic trends in Greece, there was also evidence to suggest that several key facts and figures eluded their arguments. Because of this gap in knowledge, often the perspectives on consequences, reasons and policy needs appeared to be biased, presumptuous, and charged with extreme sentiments. Some of the key determinants and policy suggestions had theoretical backing. However, in most cases the actual relevance of such factors to the Greek reality was not established. It was also a significant finding that there was an element of recognition for the need to do in-depth research with couples to understand their subjective behavioural characteristics and childbearing motivators.

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[19] NSSG 1998a: Data on Labour force participation in Greece.

Having established the policy makers' perspectives, the next chapter aims to present the experiences of reality according to the data collected from the couples in Crete. It presents an opportunity to compare perspectives of the policy makers and evidence from the survey with couples, regarding the determinants of their fertility behaviour, and their policy-related needs.

CHAPTER 8:

EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY RESEARCH IN CRETE: MARRIED COUPLES' FERTILITY EXPERIENCES AND POLICY PREFERENCES

Introduction

The previous chapter presented the findings from the semi-structured interviews with policy makers involved with development and implementation of fertility and family policies in Greece. The analysis focussed on three main areas, namely: (1) The policy makers' evaluation of the current demographic trends and their consequences, as well as the ideological and value transformations in Greece; (2) Their perceptions on reasons of fertility decline in Greece; and (3) Their ideas about suitable policy solutions that would meet the policy preferences and demands of Greek couples and thereby motivate them to desire and have more children. This chapter uses the same structure to present the findings from the survey research among the couples in Crete. This enables a comparison between the two findings, and helps to understand how well the institutional perspectives match the realities as experienced by Greek couples.

Before presenting the findings from the analysis, there is a section that provides statistical details related to the background characteristics of the sample surveyed. Then the first section of the findings presents the survey respondents' evaluation of current demographic trends in Greece. It also presents findings about their attitudinal and value perceptions regarding family, marriage and children, as well as their concerns about the future. Thus, this section provides comparative opportunities with the institutional perspectives presented in section 7.1 in Chapter 7. The second section presents results of regression analysis to examine the fertility determinants that showed a causal influence on fertility decisions made by the sample population during the years from 1995 to 2000[1]. Comparable institutional perspectives on fertility determinants are presented in section 7.2 of Chapter 7. The third section presents the findings on the surveyed respondents' preferences vis-à-vis fertility and family policy measures. This section also provides insight into how the preferred policy measures are likely to influence the future fertility behaviour of the sample surveyed.


8.1 BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SURVEYED POPULATION IN CRETE

As mentioned in research methodology (Chapter 6), the survey element of this research comprised 508 interviews conducted over four months in Crete in the year 2000. The respondents targeted were individuals married during the fifteen years before data collection. The following sections summarise the various relevant background characteristics of the surveyed population.

8.1.1 Fertility Related Characteristics: Cumulative Fertility (CEB) and Recent Fertility (CB95to00)

Cumulative fertility is the number of children ever born (CEB) for each couple at the time of data collection. As indicated by Figure 8.1, a high proportion (44 percent; n=226) of the surveyed couples already had two children while 16 percent (n=83) had no children at the time of survey (The average number of children per household interviewed was 1.57).

Figure 8.1: Children ever born (CEB) for the surveyed households



The main analysis section uses recent fertility of couples to understand influences of various fertility determinants. Figure 8.2 indicates that almost half of the households had

[1] Coded as recent fertility (CB95to00). See Chapter 6: Research Methodology, section 6.3.7 for details.

no children born during 1995 and 2000[2]; 190 households (38 percent) had one child born during that period; 66 households (13 percent) had two children, while only three households (<1%) had three births. The average number of children born between 1995 and 2000 per household interviewed (or per couple) was 0.65.

Figure 8.2: Recent fertility (CB95to00) for the surveyed households




Table 8.1 presents the distribution of the mean of CEB based on different age groups of the wives in the households interviewed. As indicated in the table, the older the wife's age the higher the mean[3]. Also notable is the inverted 'U' shape of the mean number of children born between 1995 and 2000. This is because those in the lower order of age group will have only begun childbearing during this period, whereas those in the higher

[2] The number of households which had no children born during the 1995–2000 period consists of two categories: a) Those that had all the children born before 1995; and b) those who never had a child. Out of the 508 households interviewed 165 households (33%) had all the children born before 1995; 83 households (16%) never had a child; while there was found 259 households (51%) that had at least one fertility incident occur in or after 1995 period. The statistics for the above distribution was x^2(2df)= 90.476, p=.000. There was one missing case regarding the timing of the childbirth (for more details see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariete analysis- household size and fertility).

[3] The positive relationship between women's age and number of children she bears is well established in theory (Bongaarts 1978; Bongaarts and Potter 1983; Kohler et.al. 2001).

order age group would have neared or completed their childbearing before or during this period.

Table 8.1: Mean number of CEB and CB95to00 for the surveyed household

		CEB		CB95to00	
Birth Cohort	**Age Group**	**Mean[a]**	**No. of Wives**	**Mean[b]**	**No. of Wives**
(< 1981)	**19 or less**	.57	7	.57	7
(1980-1976)	**20-24**	.93	43	.81	43
(1975-1971)	**25-29**	1.28	148	.82	148
(1970-1966)	**30-34**	1.74	183	.66	182
(1965-1961)	**35-39**	1.86	86	.41	86
(1960-1956)	**40-44**	1.94	36	.42	36
(1955-1951)	**45-49**	3.00	5	.00	5
	total	**1.57**	**508**	**.65**	**507**

[a] F (6, 507df) = 13.365; p = .000
[b] F (6, 506df) = 4.840; p = .000
See Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.3 Bivariate analysis for the more details

As fertility also varies by marital duration, Table 8.2 gives the distribution of mean of CEB and CB95to00 based on three different groups of marital duration of the couples interviewed. As it has already been established in other fertility studies[4], the longer the period that couples are married the higher the number of children they have. This relationship is evident when the distribution of CEB is considered. However, for CB95to00, the distribution again follows an inverted 'U' pattern for the same reasons discussed as above.

Table 8.2: Mean number of CEB and CB95to00 by marital duration of the surveyed household

		CEB		CB95to00	
Married Cohort	**Marital duration**	**Mean[a]**	**No. of couples/ household**	**Mean[b]**	**No. of couples/ household**
(< 1995)	**5 years or less**	.81	201	.81	201
(1994-1990)	**6 to 10 years**	1.96	135	.86	135
(1989-1985)	**11 to 15 years**	2.15	172	.32	171
	total	**1.57**	**508**	**.66**	**507**

[a] F (2, 507df) = 179.056; p = .000
[b] F (2, 504df) = 31.689; p = .000
See Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.3 Bivariate analysis for more details

8.1.2 Socio- Economic and Cultural Characteristics

This section summarises the distribution of the sample population based on their socio-economic and cultural characteristics. The background characteristics presented (Table 8.3) are the same as those employed as fertility determinants later in the study.

[4] Bongaarts 1978; Bongaarts and Potter 1983; Kohler et.al. 2001.

Table 8.3: Summary of the main socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the sampled population

Socio-economic and cultural characteristics		%	Total valid cases
Wife's education (WED)	1. Low	25.4	
	2. Medium	51.4	
	3. High	23.2	508
Husband's education (HED)	1. Low	32.7	
	2. Medium	44.1	
	3. High	23.2	508
Wife's employment status (WEMP)	1. Stays at home	33.3	
	2. Works part-time	5.4	
	3. Works full-time	62.3	496
Husband's job skill level (HJSKIL)	1. Low-skill level	40.7	
	2. Medium-skill level	39.7	
	3. High-skill level	19.6	501
Husband's nature of job (HJNAT)	1. Casual worker	5.2	
	2. Self-empl./ family bus.	57.1	
	3. Salaried employee	37.7	504
Husband's contractual status in his full-time job (HJCONT)	1. Temporary job	27.3	
	2. Permanent job	72.7	501
Household's Annual Income (INC)	1. Low	42.0	
	2. Medium	37.2	
	3. High	20.8	452
Financial Satisfaction (FSAT)	1. Dissatisfied	6.9	
	2. Neither	42.5	
	3. Satisfied	50.6	506
Residential Status (OWNH)	1. Not an owner	34.8	
	2. Owner	65.2	508
Home size in square metres (m^2) (SIZH)	Min	30 m^2	
	Max	230 m^2	
	Mean	102.95m^2	499
Living conditions satisfaction (LCSAT)	1. Dissatisfied	6.7	
	2. Neither	15.5	
	3. Satisfied	77.8	508
Wife's Upbringing (WUPB)	1. Rural	37.4	
	2. Semi-Urban	18.7	
	3. Urban	43.9	508
Husband's Upbringing (UPB)	1. Rural	38.8	
	2. Semi-Urban	15.5	
	3. Urban	45.7	508
Wife's religiosity (WREL)	1. Unimportant	3.5	
	2. Fairly important	21.7	
	3. Very important	74.8	507
Husband's religiosity(HREL)	1. Unimportant	6.1	
	2. Fairly important	27.4	
	3. Very important	66.5	507
Close network pressure on family size (EXPR)	1 Discouraging	4.0	
	2 No pressure at all	68.1	
	3 Encouraging	27.9	495

a. The p value of the x^2 test for the distribution of each variable was statistically significant ($p < .05$), see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis.

b. For more elaborate picture of the above characteristics see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis.

c. For clarifications of the main variables used in the analysis see Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.6 Coding and Measurement.

The characteristics presented in Table 8.3 are descriptive, however certain of them are worth highlighting. A comparatively higher proportion of married women in Crete

possesses medium and high level education than men. This compares with the observations at national level, where there is more female participation in higher education than men[5]. Nevertheless, only approximately two thirds of the women surveyed were in full-time employment, and one third of the women surveyed were not in any form of employment, while almost all the men surveyed were in full-time employment. Also, self-employment rates among the surveyed men were higher (57 percent) than the national rates (roughly one third)[6]. A similar trend in national average was also observed in proportion to homeownership, in that two thirds of the people surveyed owned their homes. While almost half of the sample surveyed belonged to the low income category, an equal proportion of them were satisfied with their financial conditions, and more than three quarters were satisfied with their living conditions at home.

8.1.3 Marital and Other Proximate Characteristics

Table 8.4 summarises distribution of some of the behavioural characteristics of the sample surveyed, such as age at first marriage, marital duration, and age at first childbirth. The survey showed that more than three-quarter of the sample population surveyed discussed their fertility intentions and family size with the spouse and used some form of birth control measures. Consequently, roughly two thirds of them had a planned family. Concerning marital characteristics, on an average, men tend to marry almost five years later than women, at an age of 28. Also, on an average, the birth of the first child followed with in a year of women's marriage at the average age of 24 years.

[5] See Chapter 4, section 4.1.3.4.

[6] See Chapter 4, section 4.1.2.2.

Table 8.4: Summary of the main marital and other proximate characteristics of the sampled population

Use of contraception and abortion		
	% [1 b]	**No of cases**
Couple had planned their family	61.6	505
Couple uses a birth control method	77.3	502
Wife had terminated pregnancy	23.8	501
Wife had had a miscarriage	18.2	501
Wife had had an abortion	8.4	501
Discusses about family size with spouse	75.4	501
Birth control methods used [2]		
	% [1 b]	**No of cases**
1. Coitus interrupts	58.0	225
2. Condoms	41.0	159
3. Contraceptive Pills	12.1	47
4. Diaphragm	1.5	6
5. Intrauterine Device (IUD)	6.4	25
6. Vaginal Douches	1.0	4
7. Other	0.5	2
8. I do not know/ I do not wish to answer	1.8	7
	Total valid cases 388	
Mean of age, age at marriage and childbirth [c]		
	Mean	**Std. Dev.**	**No of cases**
Wife's age in years	31.14	5.387	508
Husband's age in years	36.00	6.064	508
Couples' Marital duration (in years)	8.29	4.757	508
Wife's age at first marriage	23.39	4.463	501
Husband's age at first marriage	28.18	4.805	497
Wife's age at first birth	24.30	4.692	418

a. 'I do not know/ do not want to answer' responses were excluded from the analysis.
b. The p value of the x^2 test for the distribution of each variable was statistically significant ($p < .05$), see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate Analysis.
c. The p value of the T- test for the distribution of each variable was statistically significant ($p < .05$), see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate Analysis.
d. For more elaborate picture of the above characteristics see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis. See also Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.6 Coding and Measurement for clarifications of the main variables used in the analysis.
[1] Percentage is for those who indicated Yes.
[2] This was a multiple response answer. See questionnaire Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.5.

8.2 COUPLES' PERSPECTIVES REGARDING DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND CHILDREN

The findings from the survey with the couples are presented here to provide opportunities to compare perceptions and experiences of couples with the perceptions of the policy makers.

8.2.1 Couples' Evaluation of Recent Demographic Trends in Greece

Interviews with policy makers showed that they viewed the breakdown of the traditional family form of married cohabitation as an undesirable trend, with implications on Greece's fertility rates. So how do such opinions match with those of the sample surveyed from

Crete?

Table 8.5: Respondents' evaluation of some of the emerging changes within the socio-demographic and family structure of the Greek population[7].

	Respondents' Evaluation (%)			
Trends considered	Positive	Neither	Negative	**No of Cases**
The declining number of young people	1	6.2	92.8	501
The increasing number of aged people	9.5	15.9	74.6	496
The increasing number of unmarried couples who are living together	38.3	36.5	25.2	493
The increasing number of unmarried couples who are childless	1.4	8.5	90.1	503
The declining number of marriages	2.8	24.6	72.6	504
The declining number of births	1.6	4.5	93.9	507
The increasing number of children who are living in one parent family	0.6	7.7	91.7	504
The increasing number of persons who are living alone	4.2	13.6	82.2	501
The increasing number of births among unmarried couples	11.4	36.7	51.9	493
The increasing number of divorces	1.8	10.4	87.8	508
The respondents prefer the Greek population to	Increase	Remain the same	Decrease	
	80.6	19.2	0.2	493

1. The 'I don't know/ I do not want to answer' responses were excluded.
2. The p significant value of the one-sample Chi-square test (x^2) for ordinal variables was less than <. 05 in all statements (see Appendix Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis).

Table 8.5 summarises the responses to 11 statements that represented opinions regarding the main demographic trends seen in Greece. The results indicate that most couples agree with the opinion that the current trends in areas such as declining birth rates, negative population growth and increasing divorces are undesirable. At the same time, reflecting the actual experiences among the present generation of couples, the results also indicate tolerance, if not acceptability, of unmarried cohabitation. This change from the traditional family form of married cohabitation, however, was seen as an influential feature of the current demographic trends by the policy makers. They viewed preservation of the traditional family form as vital. Thus, there is a mismatch between the perspectives of the average Greek couple regarding evolving family forms and that of the policy makers. This provides the first clue that institutional perspectives, to some degree,

[7] The respondents were asked to state whether they believed the trends presented to them in the questionnaire to be positive (desirable), negative (undesirable) or neither. Similar surveys on public attitudes on population trends were conducted by Moors and Palomba (1991, 1998). See Chapter 3, footnote 8 for details.

fail to understand the experiences and perspectives of the people[8].

8.2.2 Perspectives on Family and Marriage, and Value of Children

Both the theories of causalities of fertility decline and the Greek institutional perspectives attribute declining fertility, amongst other factors, to the evolution of people's attitudes and values vis-à-vis marriage, family, children, individual achievement and personal fulfilment. Many of the policy makers explicitly condemned the trends in individualism. Some also suggested that the increasing female employment and careerism lead to their distancing from traditional role of the mother and housekeeper. The following section presents the findings on distribution of various attitudes, values and beliefs among the sample surveyed. The aim is to see how the people see the evolving ideologies; do they feel part of it; do most of them agree that women and men still have separate family functions to adhere to and so on.

8.2.2.1 Attitudes on Family and Marriage: Results of Factor Analysis

Nine statements that represent attitudes towards family and marriage were presented to the respondents in order to obtain their level of agreement to each statement. The results (Table 8.6) show that, although people increasingly accept alternative family forms, a vast majority of them (85 percent) still value marriage as an important social institution. In addition, only less than 30 percent of them believe in traditional gender roles as implied by the male breadwinner – female housekeeper model. In fact, a vast majority (including both men and women) also believes that men have equal roles in performing household duties as women. Thus, the responses indicate that while certain traditional values are still highly regarded, the principles of gender equity are also viewed as important by most of them. Responses also indicate that most people consider it necessary to achieve personal satisfaction with their own life before starting a family. This is in line with policy makers' observation that the younger generation give great importance to individualism and personal achievements. However, this does not necessarily confirm that individualism and personal achievements are a priority over family[9]. Such a viewpoint by the younger generation could simply be because they consider it as ideal to achieve personal satisfaction through achievements in life, in order to be able to raise successfully a family.

[8] The survey questionnaire did not include questions to elicit public opinions on possible consequences of fertility decline and changing age structure in Greece. The reasons are related to some change in direction of the research, and are discussed in Chapter 10, section 10.2.2.

Table 8.6: Distribution of opinions regarding general views on family life, and marriage

Components (a)	Statements	Degree of agreement (b)			No of Cases
		Strongly disagree or disagree	Undecided	Agree or strongly agree	
Religious view of family life (**RELFAM**)	Having children is God' s will	37.6%	15.0%	47.4%	498
	A large family is a blessing from God	21.8	21.6	56.6	486
	Marriage is not an outdated institution	6.9	8.1	85.0	507
Traditional parental roles in family (**TRADPAR**)	The father should be the breadwinner while the mother should be the homemaker	55.2	16.2	28.6	507
	Mothers with young children should stay at home and not go out to work	10.7	15.4	73.9	506
	The husband does not have to help with the housework whether the wife is working or not	79.0	10.3	10.7	504
	Woman does not have the right to choose to be a single parent	59.3	14.1	26.6	504
Modern view of marriage (**MODMAR**)	Divorce is acceptable when marriage becomes an unhappy experience	1.2	2.2	96.6	504
	A person should be satisfied with his/her own life before starting a family	4.0	7.7	88.3	505

a. The components where created through undertaking a factorial analysis –see details in Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.2 Factor Analysis.

b. The degree of agreement is recoded based on the original answers given in the questionnaire varied from strongly disagree to strongly agree (see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis).

1. The p Value of the x2 test for the distribution of each agreement and the degree of generalisation to the population was found to be statistically significant for all the nine statements (see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis).

2. The 'I do not know/ do not want to answer' responses were excluded from the analysis.

8.2.2.2 Perceived Value of Children: Results of Factor Analysis

This analysis aims to understand the couples' perceptions regarding the value of children. There were suggestions in economic rational theories that couples value children based on their perceived psychological and other utilities and disutilities, which in turn could affect their fertility behaviour. Some institutional respondents also believed that today's couples attribute different values to children and view them within a framework of consumerism. The analysis results (Table 8.7) however indicate that the traditional values or the *immanent values*[10] seen in children are regarded very highly among the respondents. Almost all the statements that represent these values have received strong agreement from over 70 percent of the respondents[11]. There is no indication that children are valued

[9] See Chapter 7, section 7.2.2.1.

[10] See Chapter 2; section 2.3.

[11] The statements that represent various attitudes and values have been developed by the researcher. While no similar use was found in the literature, Hoffman and Hofman (1973) have presented certain values attached to parenthood and children. See Chapter 2, section 2.3. While the statements in the above table all

for their perceived material benefits or in other words, they are not viewed as equivalent to consumer goods. 83 percent of the respondents agree children should look after their elderly parents. This, however is part of the Greek tradition, where large and close knit family systems, with grown-up children living with or close to parents are a common feature. Just over 50 percent of the respondents expect financial support from their children; but a much higher proportion also believe that the parents should invest in the welfare, education and proper upbringing of their children. Thus, the results clearly indicate that the expected immanent values and psychological benefits of children far outweigh the perceived financial and other material returns expected from them by the respondents. In other words, even if people have become more individualistic and attach more importance to personal achievement, their perceptions regarding children remain firmly grounded in the traditional values.

Table 8.7: Distribution of opinions regarding values of children (%)

Components (a)	Statements	Degree of agreement (b) Strongly disagree or disagree	Undecided	Agree or strongly agree	No of Cases
Family happiness view (**FAMBEN**)	Children bring excitement to the home	1.2%	3.6 %	95.3 %	506
	Children are a source of happiness	1.0	4.8	94.2	503
	A child makes one feel important/needed	3.0	5.7	91.3	507
	Children are a kind of companionship	2.8	4.1	93.1	507
	Children strengthens the marital bond	2.2	7.8	90.1	503
Complete self-fulfilment view (**FULFBEN**)	No Happiness possible without children	6.3	9.5	84.1	504
	Fulfillment after becoming a parent	14.5	12.1	73.4	503
	Parent's duty to do the best for their children	12.6	14.8	72.6	507
	Children are an extension of the self of the parents	30.6	9.7	59.7	504
Selfish reasoning view (**SELFBEN**)	Children should financially support their parents when they grow up	29.6	16.3	54.1	503
	Children should look after their elderly parents	7.3	9.9	82.8	505
Societal Aspect (**SOCIOBEN**)	Children enhance a couple' s prestige	24.4	14.6	60.9	499
	Childbearing is a duty towards society	56.7	12.3	31.0	503
	Children's contribution to the family lineage	11.7	10.5	77.8	505
Welfare of the child view (**CHIBEN**)	Children's proper education is necessary even if it is costly	4.1	11.3	84.6	507
	Children should have the best that money can buy	12.0	19.9	68.1	507
	Extra curricular activities are beneficial for children	1.8	1.8	96.4	489

a. The components where created through undertaking a factorial analysis –see details in Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.2 Factor Analysis.

b. The degree of agreement is recoded based on the original answers given in the questionnaire varied from strongly disagree to strongly agree (see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis).

1. The p Value of the x2 test for the distribution of each agreement and the degree of generalisation to the population was found to be statistically significant for all the nine statements (see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis).

2. The 'I do not know/ do not want to answer' responses were excluded from the analysis.

appear to be worded positively, the actual questionnaire contained a mix of positively and negatively worded questions. The above change was carried out after data collection for the purpose of factor analysis.

8.2.2.3 Differences between Actual, Desired and Ideal Number of Children[12]

The theories of changing value systems as well as some of the policy respondents suggested that changing values and attitudes of individuals could result in people wanting fewer children than they used to before. In other words, they value children less and consequently want fewer children. Evidence from the survey however, suggests that this cannot be entirely substantiated. The previous section already showed that children are still valued highly by the respondents. There is also evidence to suggest that more children are wanted by the respondents. Approximately 80 percent of those surveyed indicated that they considered two to three children as ideal; and a similar proportion desired to have two to three children (Table 8.8). Given that the TFR in Greece is 1.3 at present, and the required population replacement level is 2.1 children, this finding suggests that most people's preferences for number of children, if achieved, would result in large families and population growth in Greece.

Table 8.8: Respondents' ideal and desired number of children [a]

	Desired		Ideal	
No of Children		**Cases (%)**		**Cases (%)**
0	1	0.2	0	0
1	24	4.7	4	0.8
2	246	48.4	178	35.5
3	160	31.5	227	45.3
4	67	13.2	89	17.8
5	10	2.0	3	0.6
Total valid cases	508	100.0	501	100.0
			I do not know/ want to answer 7	
	Mean number = 2.59 Std. Dev.= .856		Mean number = 2.82 Std. Dev.= .746	
	x^2= 570.134 (5df); p = .000		x^2= 408.770 (4df); p = .000	

[a] For more details on the Desired and Ideal number of children of the respondents by gender see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis.

Similar differences between ideal, desired and actual number of children were also observed among those respondents who said they had completed their family formation at the time of the survey (Table 8.9).

[12] See Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.2 for explanations and relevance of distinction between ideal, desired and actual number of children.

Table 8.9: Actual, desired and ideal number of children of those respondents who stated that they had completed their family size

		Mean	N	Std. Dev.	p Value[b]
i	Actual No. of children	2.07	233	.685	.000
ii	Desired number[a]	2.47	232	.837	.000
iii	Ideal number	2.78	228	.773	.000
	(i) – (ii)	-.40	232	.820	.000[c]
	(i) – (iii)	-.71	228	.907	.000[c]

[a]. This is of the Respondent who answered the questionnaire
[b]. Significant value of the One Sample T- Test for means
[c]. Significant value of the Paired Samples Test for means

The results (Table 8.9) show that there is a difference of 0.7 children between the actual number of children and what they consider as ideal; and a difference of 0.4 children between the actual number and what they desired to have. The values of these differences are even higher for those who were uncertain about their future fertility intentions. There is a difference of more than one child between the actual and ideal numbers of such respondents[13] (Table 8.10).

Table 8.10: Actual, desired and ideal number of children of those respondents who stated uncertainty with their future fertility intentions

		Mean	N	Std. Dev.	p Value[b]
i	Actual No. of children	1.81	59	.840	.000
ii	Desired number[a]	2.64	59	.804	.000
iii	Ideal number	2.90	59	.759	.000
i – ii		-.83	59	.723	.000[c]
i – iii		-1.09	59	.772	.000[c]

[a]. This is of the Respondent who answered the questionnaire
[b]. Significant value of the One Sample T- Test for means
[c]. Significant value of the Paired Samples Test for means

The observed difference in actual and desired number of children may be explained further. For those who have not completed their family size, one of the obvious reason would be that they are yet to have more children. However, more important is the observed difference among those who believe they have completed their family size. It is possible such a difference is linked to one or more of the determinants of fertility[14].

[13] Paired Sample Test for Mean Differences (exclude cases list wise) was also undertaken in order to understand whether there were any variations in responses based on the gender of respondents. It was found that the wives desired fewer children (mean = 2.51) than their husbands (mean = 2.66). Statistically significance (t=-3977; df=504; p= .000).

[14] Such an analysis, comparing the change in difference between desired and actual number of children for people with different socio-economic characteristics was not carried out in this research.

However, it is also possible that, the data collected in this respect may not be an entirely accurate reflection of couple's true desire, as responses could be biased by strategic reasoning of the respondents – i.e., some could well think that desiring fewer children in a traditional society may not be viewed upon favourably.

8.3 DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY OF COUPLES

8.3.1 The Influence of Control Variables

In this analysis, various fertility determinants[15] are tested for their influence on the fertility behaviour of the couples during the five years before data collection (CB95to00). Three control variables are used in the analysis. They are number of live births before 1995 (coded as CB95PR), wife's age in years (coded as WAGEY) and marital duration in years (coded as MRDY). The influence of these variables was tested for all the households put together, as well as separately for households with younger wives (aged 30 or below) and households with older wives (aged above 30) [16]. As expected, the results show that (Table 8.11), the higher the number of live births before 1995, the fewer the fertility incidents during 1995 and 2000. The wife's age has shown a negative influence on recent fertility, although not statistically significant whereas marital duration shows weak positive influence on recent fertility.

Table 8.11: Poisson regression coefficients of the control variables

THE CONTROL VARIABLES			
	Regression Coefficients [a]		
Variables/characteristics	**All households**	**Households with younger wives**	**Households with older wives**
Intercept	0.190	0.586	0.607
CB95PR live births born prior to 1995	-0.887***	-0.768***	-0.893***
WAGEY Wife's age in years	-0.022	-0.048	-0.019
MRDY Marital duration in years	0.093***	0.145***	0.036
No of Cases	507	245	262
Residual deviance	391.82	194.58	179.23
df	503	241	258
x^2	556.2827	278.2127	296.4659

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); *** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$).

[a] For more details see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.5 Multivariate Analysis: Poisson Regression.

[15] The variables tested for influence were identified from literature review. Most of the factors are also highlighted by policy makers interviewed. See Chapter 6, for details on the variables.

[16] See Chapter 6, section 6.3.7.2 for more details regarding use of control variables including reasons for using two age groups for wives.

8.3.2 Influence of Socio-Economic Variables on Fertility

Most of the policy respondents interviewed believed that the socio-economic characteristics of couples had a significant influence on their fertility behaviour. Factors such as employment and unemployment, financial security, female employment, and housing were some of the determinants they pointed out. The results from the analysis of the survey data collected from the couples give the opportunity to understand how these institutional perspectives match with the real life experiences of the sample population (Table 8.12).

Table 8.12: Poisson Regression coefficients of socio-economic determinants of recent fertility

SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES				
		Regression Coefficients [a]		
Variables/characteristics		**All households**	**Households with younger wives**	**Households with older wives**
Intercept		-0.992	-4.215**	1.515
CB95PR Previous Fertility (live births born prior 1995)		-1.019***	-0.989***	-1.060***
WAGEY Wife's age in years		0.011	0.031	-0.005
MRDY Marital duration in years		0.073**	0.124**	0.038
WED Wife's level of education	1. Low	-	-	-
	2. Medium	-0.220	-0.111	-0.181
	3. High	-0.401	-0.800*	-0.229
HED Husband's level of education	1. Low	-	-	-
	2. Medium	0.126	-0.040	0.163
	3. High	-0.277	0.121	-0.647
WEMP Wife's employment status	1. Stays at home	-	-	-
	2. Works part-time	-0.008	0.150	-0.812
	3. Works full-time	-0.421***	-0.310	-0.688**
HJSKIL Husband's job skill level	1. Low-skill level	-	-	
	2. Medium-skill level	0.063	0.210	-0.042
	3. High-skill level	0.366	0.191	0.667
HJNAT Husband's nature of job	1. Casual worker	-	-	-
	2. Self-empl./ family bus.	-0.187	-0.343	-0.276
	3. Salaried employee	-0.387	-0.553	-0.483
HJCONT Husband's contractual status in his job	1. Temporary job	-	-	-
	2. Permanent job	0.179	0.629*	-0.052
INC Household's Annual Income	1. Low	-	-	-
	2. Medium	0.108	0.010	0.266
	3. High	0.076	-0.404	0.721*
FSAT Financial Satisfaction	1. Dissatisfied	-	-	-
	2. Neither	0.336	0.697*	-0.021
	3. Satisfied	0.040	0.522	-0.437
OWNH Residential status	1. Not an owner	-	-	-
	2. Owner	0.031	-0.118	0.077
SIZH House size in square metres		0.002	0.007*	-0.003
LCSAT Living conditions satisfaction	1. Dissatisfied	-	-	-
	2. Neither	0.378	2.098*	-0.312
	3. Satisfied	0.444	1.885	-0.020
	No of Cases	427	202	225
	Residual deviance	273.68	106.71	123.63
	df	404	179	202
	x^2	451.8646	211.217	236.159

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); *** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$).

- Used as the reference category.

[a] For more details see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.5 Multivariate Analysis: Poisson Regressions.

The analysis results in Table 8.12 show that not all of the socio-economic variables tested had a statistically significant influence on respondents' fertility behaviour between 1995 and 2000. Some of the policy makers interviewed pointed towards increasing levels of female education and careerism as a contributing factor to fertility decline. The survey results showed that the younger age group of wives with high levels of education had fewer children born during the five years compared to those with low levels of education. This influence was statistically significant too. In all the other categories tested, the influence was still shown to be negative, but not statistically significant. Female employment, as many of the policy makers believed, showed a strong negative influence on their fertility behaviour. Women in full time employment had fewer children born to them during 1995-2000 compared to those who stayed at home. For those in part-time employment, the influence was negative, but not statistically significant. The analysis also showed that for the younger age group of wives, where their husbands were in permanent jobs, they had more children during the five year period compared to those women whose husbands had only a temporary job. This positive influence was evident for the whole group put together, but the relationship was not statistically significant. Thus, as many policy makers pointed out, it appears that the security offered by a permanent employment position could influence positive fertility decisions. The household's total annual income also showed a positive influence on fertility decisions among high-income earners and medium-income earners, when compared to low-income earners. However, this influence was not statistically significant, except for the high-income older age group. Furthermore, for the high-income younger age group, the influence was negative, but not statistically significant. Interestingly though, satisfaction with financial conditions or living conditions at home did not show any statistical significance in its influence on fertility decisions during the five year period. However, the influence was positive for both age groups put together. Thus, there is an element of perception of reality when some of the policy makers interviewed stated that people ought to be first satisfied with their personal circumstances to be able to feel comfortable making childbearing decisions. However, it is also worth recalling here that 50 percent of the sample were satisfied with their financial conditions and over 75 percent were satisfied with their living conditions[17]. Homeownership, another factor underlined as crucial by many policy makers interviewed, showed only a very weak positive influence and was not statistically significant. Thus, it is possible that, unlike the policy makers

[17] See Chapter 8, section 8.1.2, Table 8.3.

believe, ownership of a house may not necessarily influence couples to make positive childbearing decisions. House area in square meters, also showed a positive weak significance in determining fertility rates among the younger age group of wives.

8.3.3 Effects of Socio-cultural Determinants on Fertility

Six variables that represented socio-cultural characteristics of the sample surveyed were tested for their influence on their recent fertility decisions. One policy maker interviewed had observed that urbanisation was an undesirable factor that would lead to obstruction of intergenerational wealth transfer, and could lead to fewer fertility decisions as an indirect consequence of financial difficulties. The survey results (Table 8.13) however, could neither verify this nor provide any conclusive results. In the case of those couples living in a semi-urban area, there was a negative influence, but it was not statistically significant. At the same time, for those living in an urban area, the influence was positive, but again not statistically significant. However, when tests were carried out based on the area of upbringing of the parents, the results showed that families where the father was brought up in urban settings had fewer children compared to the families where husbands were brought up in rural settings. This negative influence was also evident among the semi-urban category as well as for the women brought up in urban settings, but not statistically significant. Such negative influence do not verify the suggestion that urbanisation hinders intergenerational wealth flow between rural-urban settings, because here the parents themselves were brought up in urban or semi-urban settings.

Loosening of religious principles and faith was pointed out by some institutional representatives as another reason for people wanting fewer children. This was yet another claim that could not be substantiated by the results of the survey. The results in Table 8.13 show that the findings were mixed, and not statistically significant. Also, in cases where husbands considered religion as very important, the influence on fertility was negative. This is inconsistent with the trend suggested by the institutional representatives' comments. One significant observation from the test carried out is the impact of close network pressure. It would appear that for the sample tested, in those cases where the couples perceive there is an encouraging pressure from close network to make positive childbearing decisions, in fact the number of children they have is likely to be fewer than for those who do not perceive such a pressure. This could be explained in several ways. It could indicate the existence of resistance towards any kind of external pressure on making childbearing decisions. In other words, such couples may prefer to make their own decisions regarding childbearing without the influence of friends and family (or even

the State). It could also be that those without children of with few children experience a higher network pressure to have more children.

Table 8.13: Poisson Regression coefficients of socio-cultural determinants of recent fertility

SOCIO-CULTURAL VARIABLES				
		Regression Coefficients [a]		
Variables/characteristics		**All households**	**Households with younger wives**	**Households with older wives**
Intercept		0.808	1.362	1.057
CB95PR Previous Fertility (live births born prior 1995)		-0.903***	-0.898***	-0.925***
WAGEY Wife's age in years		-0.018	-0.029	-0.022
MRDY Marital duration in years		0.076***	0.133***	0.036
URB Urbanisation	1. Rural	-	-	-
	2. Semi-Urban	-0.266	0.077	-0.709
	3. Urban	0.390	0.754	0.153
WUPB Wife's Upbringing	1. Rural	-	-	-
	2. Semi-Urban	0.215	0.078	0.376
	3. Urban	-0.258	-0.671	0.180
HUPB Husband's Upbringing	1. Rural	-	-	-
	2. Semi-Urban	-0.274	-0.201	-0.290
	3. Urban	-0.482*	-0.443	-0.667*
WREL Wife's religiosity	1. Unimportant	-	-	-
	2. Fairly important	0.130	-0.266	0.662
	3. Very important	0.208	-0.180	0.711
HREL Husband's religiosity	1. Unimportant	-	-	-
	2. Fairly important	-0.127	-0.054	-0.432
	3. Very important	-0.070	-0.070	-0.291
EXPR Close network pressure on family size	1. Discouraging	-	-	-
	2. No pressure at all	-0.380	-0.673	-0.341
	3. Encouraging	-0.905***	-1.065**	-1.032**
	No of Cases	494	240	254
	Residual deviance	350.06	174.85	154.23
	df	478	224	238
	x^2	529.969	259.914	274.987

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); *** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$).
- Used as the reference category.
[a] For more details see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.5 Multivariate Analysis: Poisson Regressions.

8.3.4 Effects of Couples' Attitudes towards Family, Marriage and Value of Children on their Recent Fertility Behaviour

Results discussed earlier in section 8.2.2.2 showed that although the majority of the respondents regarded individualism and self-fulfilment as important, and had modern views about marriage and divorce, they still highly regarded the traditional values attributed to children. Results in Table 8.14 show how these value and attitudinal characteristics of the couples have influenced their fertility decisions during 1995 - 2000. The influence between their religious view of family life (i.e., children are a Gift of God etc) and fertility decision was positive but weak. In case of those who agreed with traditional parental roles, the influence was positive, except for the older age group of wives, but weak in all cases. For those who agreed with modern views of marriage, the influence was negative, but again weak. These three factors represent societal value

characteristics that can be said to change with time. The direction of influence evident in the analysis results suggests that, as some policy makers think, changing values could influence childbearing decisions. However, the results also suggest that such values may not have an overriding influence on fertility decisions, and in any way, cannot be generalised to the whole population.

Some of the policy respondents had pointed out that concerns and uncertainty about the future could influence people's fertility decisions. The survey results showed that such negative influence did exist, however, again this was not statistically significant, and therefore it was not possible to make conclusions. Four variables that represented the perceived psychological benefits of having children were also tested. The results proved to be inconclusive and also inconsistent with some of the perspectives identified during interviews with institutional representatives. For example, for all respondents who believed that children contributed to family happiness (over 90 percent of the sample), the influence on actual fertility decision was weak and negative. Also, for those respondents who believed that children should support and care for their elderly parents, the influence was positive, but weak and not statistically significant.

Table 8.14: Poisson Regression coefficients of attitudinal-value determinants of recent fertility

VALUES			
	Regression Coefficients [a]		
Variables/characteristics	**All households**	**Households with younger wives**	**Households with older wives**
Intercept	0.298	-0.353	2.018
CB95PR Previous Fertility (live births born prior 1995)	-0.842***	-0.724***	-0.803***
WAGEY Wife's age in years	-0.014	-0.024	-0.024
MRDY Marital duration in years	0.080***	0.124***	0.032
RELFAM Religious view of family life	0.077	0.033	0.123
TRADPAR Traditional parental roles in family	0.128	0.210	-0.066
MODMAR Modern view of marriage	-0.231	-0.053	-0.329
FUTCON Concerns and uncertainty about future	-0.206	-0.292	-0.101
FAMBEN Family happiness view	-0.089	-0.059	-0.096
FULFBEN Complete self- fulfilment view	0.060	-0.049	0.165
SELFBEN Selfish reasoning view	0.120	0.098	0.085
SOCIOBEN Societal Aspect	-0.001	0.034	-0.070
CHIBEN Welfare of the child view	0.157	0.259	-0.005
No of Cases	432	202	230
Residual deviance	320.95	152.84	151.92
df	419	189	217
x^2	467.725	222.076	252.366

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); *** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$).

[a] For more details see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.5 Multivariate Analysis: Poisson Regressions.

Similarly, influences not generalisable to the whole population were also found to be exerted by marital satisfaction/propensity to divorce on fertility decisions. While the

results suggested that the more satisfied and the less divorce prone are likely to have more children, such influence was not statistically significant (Table 8.15).

Table 8.15: Poisson Regression coefficients of marriage related determinants of recent fertility

MARRIAGE RELATED VARIABLES				
Variables/characteristics		**Regression Coefficients** [a]		
		All households	***Households with younger wives***	***Households with older wives***
Intercept		0.187	0.574	0.426
CB95PR Previous Fertility (live births born prior 1995)		-0.909***	-0.775***	-0.925***
WAGEY Wife's age in years		-0.022	-0.053'	-0.013
MRDY Marital duration in years		0.099***	0.148***	0.045
MSAT Satisfied with marriage	1. Less satisfied	-	-	-
	2. Satisfied	0.028	0.163	-0.043
	3. Very satisfied	0.003	0.153	0.008
DIVR Thinking of divorcing	1. No	-	-	-
	2. Yes	-0.287	-0.184	-0.407
	No of Cases	493	238	255
	Residual deviance	374.48	183.42	173.30
	df	486	231	248
	x^2	538.393	267.455	285.734

' at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); '' at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); ''' at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$).
- Used as the reference category
[a] For more details see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.5 Multivariate Analysis: Poisson Regressions.

The analysis results of value characteristics and attitudes and behaviours have shown that while such factors may influence fertility decisions, such influences cannot be generalised across the whole population. Such factors are very subjective, and differing values may be held irrespective of actual fertility behaviour. In this context, institutional viewpoints such as fertility policies would not be effective because they cannot change people's values, hold little significance.

8.3.5 Effects of some Proximate Factors

Family planning and abortion were sensitive issues for some of the policy respondents, who pointed them out to be important reasons for fertility decline in Greece. The results (Table 8.16) show that those couples who had resorted to family planning methods had fewer children than those who did not, during the period 1995 – 2000. The negative influence on recent fertility decision is weak, but statistically significant. In those cases where the women had undergone previous abortions, the influence on fertility decision during the five years is negative for all age groups put together, as well as for the older age group. However, it is not statistically significant. Another indicator with statistically significant influence on fertility decision is wife's age at marriage. The result shows that those who married late had fewer children during the five-year period compared to those who married early.

Table 8.16: Poisson Regression coefficients of proximate determinants of recent fertility

PROXIMATE VARIABLES				
Variables/characteristics		**Regression Coefficients** [a]		
		All households	***Households with younger wives***	***Households with older wives***
Intercept		0.153	0.247	0.914
CB95PR Previous Fertility (live births born prior 1995)		-0.931***	-0.891***	-0.937***
WAGEY Wife's age in years		0.076***	0.116**	0.018
MRDY Marital duration in years		NA	NA	NA
WMAGEY Wife's age at marriage		-0.118***	-0.118***	-0.060
HMAGEY Husband's age at marriage		0.022	0.022	0.016
PLANF The couple	1. No	-	-	-
has planned their family	2. Yes	-0.239*	-0.318*	-0.195
MISC	1. No	-	-	-
Wife has had a miscarriage(s)	2. Yes	0.130	0.311	-0.117
ABOR Wife has had an abortion(s)	1. No	-	-	-
	2. Yes	-0.104	0.271	-0.254
	No of Cases	481	237	244
	Residual deviance	375.19	184.07	170.42
	df	473	229	236
	x^2	524.702	265.3012	272.836

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); *** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$).
NA The variables was excluded as it has been highly correlated with WMAGEY.
- Used as the reference category.
[a] For more details see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.5 Multivariate Analysis: Poisson Regressions.

8.3.6 Some Factors that Influence Future Fertility Intentions of the Couples

The respondents who had completed their fertility intentions were asked to state their agreements to sixteen statements, which represented various reasons for not wanting more children (Table 8.17). 62 percent of the respondents expressed concerns about their children's future as a reason for not wanting another child. This factor had also shown in an earlier analysis to have a negative influence on their fertility decisions during 1995-2000 period, although not statistically significant[18]. At least two of the policy makers interviewed also had mentioned that parents concerns about future and security could influence their fertility decisions.

Most of the reasons chosen by the majority of the respondents indicate that they consider their socio-economic characteristics as the reasons why they do not wish to have another child in the future (Table 8.17). Nevertheless, when asked to select the most important reason for not wanting another child, the results showed (Table 8.18) none of the statements received a majority choice. Age of parents, concerns about future, and biological reasons were chosen as reasons by between 14 and 19 percent of respondents. For the other reasons, the responses ranged from between less than 1 percent up to 8

[18] See Table 8.14.

percent. This clearly indicates that different people have and perceive different reasons to influence their fertility behaviour.

Table 8. 17: Reasons for not wanting another child[19]

Reasons	Count	% of Cases[a]
13. Concerns about the child's future	133	62.4
10. Would not be able to take proper care of family and household	101	47.4
12. Child care facilities are too expensive/inadequate	88	41.3
11. Wish to maintain better standard of living	85	39.9
5. Job/professional commitments are too much	80	37.6
7. Cannot cope with the pressures of bringing up another child/children	79	37.1
9. Fear of pregnancy and childbirth	72	33.8
4. Worries about couple's relationship and marriage	63	29.6
15. Would not be able to give enough care/attention to the other children	58	27.2
6. Do not wish to give up leisure-time activities	54	25.4
2. Health problems/Biological reasons	47	22.1
8. The house is not suitable (small)	44	20.7
1. Too old to become parents	36	16.9
14. Affect my/ spouse's education or career plans	32	15.0
16. Other reasons (explain)	18	8.5
3. Already have completed our fertility intentions	excluded	-
Total valid cases 213;	**Total responses 990**	

[a] Percentage indicates the % of valid cases that responded 'Yes' to each policy measure.
[1] The total % is greater than 100 as this is a multiple response question.
[2] The p value of the One-Sample Chi-square test for nominal and ordinal variables was found statistically significant ($p < .05$) for the distribution of each one of these statement (see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate Analysis).

Table 8.18: The most important reason of not wanting another child

Reasons	%
• Health problems/Biological reasons	18.9
• Concerns about the child's future	18.2
• Too old to become parents	14.2
• Wish to maintain better standard of living	8.1
• Worries about couple's relationship	6.8
• Job/professional commitments do not allow	6.8
• Would not be able to give enough care/attention to the other children	6.0
• Would not be able to take proper care of family/household	5.4
• Fear of pregnancy and childbirth	4.7
• Child care facilities are too expensive/inadequate	4.1
• Cannot cope with the pressures of bringing up more children	3.4
• The house is not suitable (small)	2.7
• Do not wish to give up leisure-time activities	0.7

The p value of the One-Sample Chi-square test for nominal and ordinal variables was found statistically significant ($p < .05$) for the distribution of each one of these statement (see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate Analysis).

[19] The results have been ranked in descending order by the number of responses received for each statement. The statements are presented exactly as they were presented to the respondents in the questionnaire. The statements used in tables 8.17 and 8.18 have been used in surveys by Moors and Palomba (1991). See Chapter 6, footnote 22 for details.

8.4 POLICY PREFERENCES EXPRESSED BY THE COUPLES

One of the important questions discussed in the policy debate review chapters was whether state intervention through policy initiatives was acceptable and if so should it be through explicit or implicit policy approaches. The analysis of policy makers' responses, in the previous chapter, showed that institutional opinions were divided. However, most pro-natalist opinions supported explicit policy intervention. Several analyses were conducted to understand the opinions of the couples regarding policy approach; and their policy preferences in relation to their future fertility intentions.

8.4.1 Public Opinions on State's Policy Responsibilities

Table 8.19 shows the result of analysis of respondents' opinions on what should be the state's responsibilities vis-à-vis implementation of, and intervention through, social welfare and family policies. It provides an important understanding about the kind of policy approach that the couples expect from the state.

Table 8.19: Distribution of respondents' opinions on the level of the state's responsibilities

	Level of State Responsibility			
Public welfare/policy areas	Fully responsible	Partly responsible	No responsible	**No of Cases**
• Look after the elderly	33.6%	65.2%	1.2%	504
• Ensuring adequate housing for everyone	22.2	73.3	4.5	504
• Enable couples to have the number of children they want	32.1	65.7	2.2	508
• Facilitate participation of women in labour force	29.6	68.7	1.8	504
• Provide more opportunities for women to combine a job outside home with raising children	33.5	64.5	2.0	502
• Help young people to find employment	60.6	39.4	0.0	507
• Provide adequate health care for everyone	73.2	26.8	0.0	508
• Promote equal opportunities for all the citizens	65.8	34.0	0.2	506

1. The I don't know/ I do not want to answer' cases were excluded.
2. The p significant value of the One-Sample Chi-square test (x^2) for ordinal variables was less than <.05 in all statements (see Appendix Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis).

The results show that the majority of the respondents (66 percent) believe that the state is only partly responsible to enable couples to have the number of children they wish to have. In other words, they do not wish to see the state intervening in their fertility decisions through explicit policy measures, as most policy makers interviewed would

want[20]. Even in an area such as housing, which policy makers believe to be a high priority policy area in order to help increase fertility rates, the respondents believe the state only has a partial responsibility. At the same time, areas such as equal opportunities, employment and public health care are those they believe the state should assume full responsibility to provide the necessary support through policy initiatives. These, incidentally, are the broader policy areas to which theories have attributed implicit fertility objectives.

8.4.2 Public Preferences for Policy Measures

Twelve policy measures under four categories were presented to the respondents to understand their policy preferences[21]. These policy measures broadly match those suggested by policy makers at the interviews. They are also similar to the broad family and social policies considered having implicit fertility objectives.

The distribution of responses (Table 8.20) showed that there was no clear majority preference for any particular policy measure or policy category. This suggests that policy priorities are widely varied among the population. However, reduction of income tax and cost of children's education received higher response rates (44 and 37 percent respectively), compared to the other policy measures presented to the couples. Also, increased opportunities for part-time work as a policy measure received the least response (10.3%), meaning that couples prefer security at work. It is worth recalling here that the analysis results showed that the part-time employment status of women had shown no statistically significant influence on fertility decisions during the five years. In addition, the influence itself was negative for all the age group put together as well as for the older age group of wives[22].

[20] It is acknowledged here that the wording of the question relating to this statement gives potential for ambiguity in interpretation of the result. An alternative explanation could be that 66% of the couples believe that State *can only* be partially responsible, as opposed to be *should only* be partially responsible.

[21] Prior to the categorisation of policies into four, the Cronbach's Alpha reliability test was carried out in order to ensure that such categorisations were statistically valid. The Cronbach's Alpha coefficient is always between 0 to 1, with values closer to 1 indicating higher reliability. The reliability tests undertaken in this occasion, indicated the standardised Cronbach's Alpha measure to be 0.72 for policy measures related to Leave and work arrangements, 0.75 for Financial incentives; 0.62 for the policy measures related to Housing and Education assistance, and 0.80 for the policy measures related to child-care facilities (For more details of these tests Appendix for Chapter 8: section 8.4).

[22] See Chapter 8, Section 8.3.2, Table 8.12.

Table 8.20: The most preferred policy measures of the respondents[23]

Policies Measures [c]	Total count	% of cases [a]	% of responses [b]
Leave and Work Arrangements			
Improved maternity/parental leave arrangements	136	26.9	
Flexible work hours for working parents	101	20.0	19.2
More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	52	10.3	
Financial Policies			
Lower income tax for parents with children	223	44.2	
Higher child allowance for families with children	150	29.7	38.0
Increase of the allowance at the birth of each child	100	19.8	
An allowance for non-working parents for bringing up their children	100	19.8	
Housing and Education assistance			
A substantial decrease in the cost of education	187	37.0	
Improved housing support for new couples and families with children	126	25.0	20.8
Child-care facilities			
Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old	123	24.4	
Improved day care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive	89	17.6	22.0
Improved child care facilities for school-going children	120	23.8	
Total valid cases: 505	**Total responses 1507**		100.0

[a]. Percentage calculated as the proportion of responses 'Yes' out of the total number of cases (505), which indicated 'Yes' to each policy measure. The total % is greater than 100 as this is a multiple response question.
[b]. Percentage computed as the proportion of responses which indicated each main policy area taken from the total number of responses (1507) for all twelve policies.
[c]. The p Significant Value of the One-Sample Chi-square test (x^2) for ordinal variables was statistically significant (<.05) in each of the above policy measures (see Appendix Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis).

Further tests were also undertaken in order to understand whether policy preferences vary depending on the background characteristics of parents. The analysis took into account the levels of urbanisation where the couples lived, the wife's employment status, the household income and the number of children in the family (Tables 8.21-8.24). As discussed below, all the tests showed marked differences in policy preferences based on such characteristics.

For example, it was found that a higher proportion of those living in urban settings had preferences to policies related to the cost of children's education and maternity and parental leave arrangements, than those living in rural settings (Table 8.21). At the same time, more people in rural settings had preference for better child care facilities for children up to 3 years of age and for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive.

[23] All policy measures used in the survey (tables 8.20 to 8.30) were used in previous surveys by Moors and Palomba (1991). See Chapter 6, footnote 22 for details. Many of the policies were also mentioned in the interviews by the Greek policy makers.

Table 8.21: Distribution of respondents' policy preferences based on levels of urbanisation.

Policy measures [a]	Urbanisation			Inferential Statistics
	1. Rural	2. Semi-urban	3. Urban	
	No. of responses & of total cases [b]			
Improved maternity/parental leave arrangements	20 (18.7 %)	30 (23.8%)	86 (31.6%)	X^2 (2df)= 7.351* Gamma: .241**
Flexible work hours for working parents	19 (17.8)	37 (29.4)	45 (16.5)	X^2 (2df)= 9.274** Gamma: .-124
More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	6 (5.6)	11 (8.7)	35 (12.9)	X^2 (2df)= 4.828 Gamma: .295*
Lower income tax for parents with dependant children	47 (43.9)	56 (44.4)	120 (44.1)	X^2 (2df)= .007 Gamma: .000
Higher child allowance for families with dependant children	40 (37.4)	32 (25.4)	78 (28.7)	X^2 (2df)= 4.279 Gamma: -.093
Increase of the allowance at the birth of each child	20 (18.7)	9 (7.1)	71 (26.1)	X^2 (2df)= 19.598*** Gamma: .303**
An allowance for non-working parents for bringing up their children	23 (21.5)	18 (22.2)	49 (18.0)	X^2 (2df)= 1.205 Gamma: -.095
A substantial decrease in the cost of education	25 (23.4)	41 (32.5)	121 (44.5)	X^2 (2df)= 16.142*** Gamma: .322***
Improved housing support	24 (22.4)	38 (30.2)	64 (23.5)	X^2 (2df)= 2.482 Gamma: -.031
Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old	40 (37.4)	36 (28.6)	47 (17.3)	X^2 (2df)= 18.464*** Gamma: -.358***
Improved day care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive	29 (27.1)	27 (21.4)	33 (12.1)	X^2 (2df)= 13.529** Gamma: -.343**
Improved child care facilities for school-going children	26 (24.3)	31 (24.6)	63 (23.2)	X^2 (2df)= .120 Gamma: -.028
Total valid cases Missing cases: 3	**107**	**126**	**272**	**505**

[a] Each policy measure was coded as 1= No (not selected) 2= Yes (selected).

[b] Percentage within each column indicates the proportion of valid cases that responded 'Yes' to each policy measure. The total is greater than 100 as this is a multiple response question.

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$) ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$)

*** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)

Concerning the wife's employment status, the data (Table 8.22) showed that for those households where the wife was in part-time or full-time employment, there were higher preferences for improvements in leave arrangements. On the other hand, those households where the wife stayed at home, there was higher preference for improved day care facilities for children up to five years of age. This could suggest that if they had an alternative childcare opportunity, they would be in some form of employment. Also, for those households where the wife stayed at home, there was a preference for higher income tax reductions for parents with children when compared with those households where both parents were in employment and therefore may have higher household incomes.

Table 8.22: Distribution of respondents' policy preferences based on the wife's employment status.

	Wife's employment status			
Policy measures [a]	**1. Stays at home**	**2. Works part-time**	**3. Works full-time**	**Inferential Statistics**
	No. of responses & % [b]			
Improved maternity/parental leave arrangements	25 (15.6%)	8 (29.6%)	100 (32.7%)	X^2 (2df)= 15.615*** Gamma: .388***
Flexible work hours for working parents	25 (15.6)	5 (18.5)	70 (22.9)	X^2 (2df)= 3.471 Gamma: .209
More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	19 (11.9)	0 (.0)	25 (8.2)	X^2 (2df)= 4.574 Gamma: -.164
Lower income tax for parents with dependant children	93 (58.1)	7 (25.9)	118 (38.6)	X^2 (2df)= 20.177*** Gamma: -.316***
Higher child allowance for families with dependant children	54 (33.8)	9 (33.3)	81 (26.5)	X^2 (2df)= 2.927 Gamma: -.159
Increased of the allowance at the birth of each child	26 (16.3)	5 (18.8)	67 (21.9)	X^2 (2df)= 2.136 Gamma: .164
An allowance for non-working parents for bringing up their children	27 (16.9)	8 (29.6)	60 (19.6)	X^2 (2df)= 2.475 Gamma: .055
A substantial decrease in the cost of education	52 (32.5)	11 (40.7)	122 (39.9)	X^2 (2df)= 2.560 Gamma: .135
Improved housing support	43 (26.9)	4 (14.8)	78 (25.5)	X^2 (2df)= 1.783 Gamma: -.014
Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old	51 (31.9)	5 (18.5)	67 (21.9)	X^2 (2df)= 6.219* Gamma: -.218*
Improved day care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive	41 (25.6)	5 (18.5)	43 (14.1)	X^2 (2df)= 9.516* Gamma: -.323*
Improved child care facilities for school-going children	21 (13.1)	12 (44.4)	84 (27.5)	X^2 (2df)= 18.683*** Gamma: .313**
Total valid cases Missing cases: 5	**160**	**27**	**306**	**493**

[a] Each policy measure was coded as 1= No (not selected) 2= Yes (selected).

[b] Percentage within each column indicates the proportion of valid cases that responded 'Yes' to each policy measure. The total is greater than 100 as this is a multiple response question.

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$) ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$)
*** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)

The analysis of the data based on respondents' policy preferences in the context of their varying annual income brackets also indicated the following (Table 8.23): a) Respondents in low income brackets preferred housing support; b) Those with high income preferred support with education. This was possibly because private education was expensive; c) Those with high income also preferred better leave arrangements and child care facilities for school children. This observation may suggest that high income is probably achieved by both parents being employed, consequently leading to lesser time available to spend with children; or that high income jobs by nature demand higher time commitments from the parents; d) Those with high income also preferred better child care facilities for school children.

Table 8.23: Distribution of respondents' policy preferences based on the household's annual income

	Household's annual income			
Policy measures [a]	**1. Low**	**2. Medium**	**3. High**	**Inferential Statistics**
	No. of responses & % [b]			
Improved maternity/ parental leave arrangements	34 (18.0%)	52 (31.1%)	30 (32.3%)	X^2 (2df)= 10.525* Gamma: .268*
Flexible work hours for working parents	40 (21.2)	42 (25.1)	15 (16.1)	X^2 (2df)= 2.907 Gamma: -.047
More opportunities for part-time work for parents	23 (12.2)	12 (7.2)	9 (9.7)	X^2 (2df)= 2.493 Gamma: -.143
Lower income tax for parents with dependant children	81 (42.9)	67 (40.1)	35 (37.6)	X^2 (2df)= .749 Gamma: -.069
Higher child allowance for families with dependant children	62 (32.8)	50 (29.9)	24 (25.8)	X^2 (2df)= 1.461 Gamma: -.102
Increased of the allowance at the birth of each child	35 (18.5)	29 (17.4)	22 (23.7)	X^2 (2df)= 1.612 Gamma: .075
An allowance for non-working parents for bringing up their children	40 (21.2)	28 (16.8)	20 (21.5)	X^2 (2df)= 1.359 Gamma: -.029
A substantial decrease in the cost of education	49 (25.9)	64 (38.3)	38 (40.9)	X^2 (2df)= 8.852* Gamma: .235**
Improved housing support	63 (33.3)	35 (21.0)	24 (25.8)	X^2 (2df)= 6.972* Gamma: -.174*
Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old	56 (29.6)	42 (25.1)	19 (20.4)	X^2 (2df)= 2.852 Gamma: -.152
Improved day care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive	38 (20.1)	32 (19.2)	15 (16.1)	X^2 (2df)= .652 Gamma: -.074
Improved child care facilities for school-going children	39 (20.6)	47 (28.1)	28 (30.1)	X^2 (2df)= 4.017 Gamma: .174*
Total valid cases Missing cases: 59	**189**	**167**	**93**	**449**

[a] Each policy measure was coded as 1= No (not selected) 2= Yes (selected).

[b] Percentage within each column indicates the proportion of valid cases that responded 'Yes' to each policy measure. The total is greater than 100 as this is a multiple response question.

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$) ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$)
*** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)

When policy preferences were analysed by the number of children of the respondents, the following were evident (Table 8.23): a) Those respondents with no children or one child were more in favour of improved maternity and parental leave conditions when compared with respondents who had two or more children; b) Preference for housing support increased with the increase of the number of children in the family; c) Respondents with two or more children preferred improved day care facilities more that those with none or one child.

Table 8.24: Distribution of respondents' policy preferences based on the number of children

	Number of children				
Policy measures [a]	**None**	**1**	**2**	**3 or more**	**Inferential Statistics**
	No. of responses & % [b]				
Improved maternity/ parental leave arrangements	28 (34.1%)	43 (33.1%)	49 (21.7%)	16 (23.9%)	X^2 (3df)= 8.147* Gamma: -.192*
Flexible work hours for working parents	12 (14.6)	24 (18.5)	53 (23.5)	12 (17.9)	X^2 (3df)= 3.533 Gamma: .102
More opportunities for part-time work for parents	11 (13.4)	16 (12.3)	16 (7.1)	9 (13.4)	X^2 (3df)= 4.678 Gamma: -.104
Lower income tax for parents with dependant children	37 (45.1)	53 (40.8)	95 (42.0)	38 (56.7)	X^2 (3df)= 5.334 Gamma: .082
Higher child allowance for families with dependant children	32 (39.0)	33 (25.4)	67 (29.6)	18 (26.9)	X^2 (3df)= 4.832 Gamma: -.079
Increased of the allowance at the birth of each child	15 (18.3)	22 (16.9)	49 (21.7)	14 (20.9)	X^2 (3df)= 1.349 Gamma: .081
An allowance for non-working parents for bringing up their children	10 (12.2)	42 (32.3)	41 (18.1)	7 (10.4)	X^2 (3df)= 19.874*** Gamma: -.145
A substantial decrease in the cost of education	39 (47.6)	45 (34.6)	86 (38.1)	17 (25.4)	X^2 (3df)= 8.231* Gamma: -.148*
Improved housing support	17 (20.7)	28 (21.5)	55 (24.3)	26 (38.8)	X^2 (3df)= 8.502* Gamma: .188*
Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old	17 (20.7)	28 (21.5)	61 (27.0)	17 (25.4)	X^2 (3df)= 2.034 Gamma: .099
Improved day care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive	9 (11.0)	16 (12.3)	51 (22.6)	13 (19.4)	X^2 (3df)= 8.976* Gamma: .237**
Improved child care facilities for school-going children	17 (20.7)	36 (27.7)	55 (24.3)	12 (17.9)	X^2 (3df)= 2.832 Gamma: -.049
Total valid cases Missing cases: 3	**82**	**130**	**226**	**67**	**505**

[a] Each policy measure was coded as 1= No (not selected) 2= Yes (selected).

[b] Percentage within each column indicates the proportion of valid cases that responded 'Yes' to each policy measure. The total is greater than 100 as this is a multiple response question.

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$) ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$)

*** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)

These results clearly show that policy preferences and consequently their potential impacts are likely to be widely varied depending on people's individual circumstances. This further suggests that policy development approaches should aim to understand and include such varying preferences, rather than targeting at one-size-fits all policies.

8.4.3 Perceived Impact of Preferred Policy Measures on Respondents' Future Fertility Intentions

Can policy measures have an impact on fertility behaviour of the couples? This question was asked several times throughout the review of fertility policy debates. It was argued that policy debates were not adequately informed of realities specific to each setting. Failure of current policy measures to deliver sustained improvement in fertility rates was pointed out in support of such arguments. Tests were conducted to understand whether there was a relationship between different policy measures and their various possible impacts on future fertility intentions as perceived by couples. These policy measures are similar to those suggested by the Greek policy makers in the interviews. Separate tests were conducted for groups who planned to have more children in future, who were uncertain about their future fertility intentions, and who planned not to have any more children in future.

The groups that were presented the various policy options, discussed earlier, and were asked to state agreement (with a yes) or disagreement (with a no) to five statements that represented the possible impact of policies on their future intentions. The first group, that is, those who had positive fertility intentions, consisted of 213 couples (Table 8.25). Of this group, notably 78 percent of them believed that implementation of their preferred policies would make it easier for them to achieve their fertility intentions. Furthermore, 40 percent believed that if their preferred policy measures were implemented, they would consider having a further child in addition to their original intentions, and 38 percent were confident that they would certainly have another child.

Table 8.25: Perceived impact of the preferred policy measures for those respondents who stated *Positive* future fertility intentions

	Perceived impact of the selected policies measures				
	Easier to have the number of children I intend to have	Enable to have the next child sooner	Give some more thought to the possibility of having another child	I would definitely have a/another child	I would still not want a/another child
	Count and (%)				
No	47 (22%)	122 (57%)	128 (60%)	131 (62%)	213 (100%)
Yes	166 (78)	91 (43)	85 (40)	82 (38)	0
total	213	213	213	213	213
	x^2= 66.484 (1df) p= .000	x^2= 4.512 (1df) p= .034	x^2= 8.681 (1df) p= .003	x^2= 11.272 (1df) p= .001	-

Table 8.26 gives the analysis of perceived impact by each policy measure for the group with positive fertility intention.

Table 8.26: Perceived impact on the fertility decisions, by each policy measure, of those respondents who had *Positive* future fertility intentions

	Perceived Impact				
Most Favoured Measures	Easier for me to have the number of children I intend to have	Enable me to have my next child sooner	Give some more thought to the possibility of having another child	I would definitely have another child	Total
	Count (% of cases [a])				
Leave and Work Arrangements					
Improved maternity/ parental leave arrangements	46 (78%)	18 (30.5%)*	18 (30.5%)	17 (29%)	59
Flexible work hours for working parents	29 (71)	22 (54)	20 (49)	21 (51)	41
More opportunities for part-time work for parents	12 (63)	2 (10.5)*	5 (26)	2 (10.5)*	19
Financial incentives					
Lower income tax for parents with children	79 (80%)	42 (42%)	33 (33%)	37 (37.5%)	99
Higher child allowance for families with children	52 (82.5)	34 (54)*	27 (43)	31 (49)*	63
Increase of the allowance at the birth of each child	23 (66)	3 (9)*	9 (26)	3 (9)*	35
An allowance for non-working parents	30 (71)	18 (43)	15 (36)	15 (36)	42
Housing and Education assistance					
A substantial decrease in the cost of education	63 (78%)	32 (40%)	24 (30%)*	27 (33)	81
Improved housing support	37 (74)	29 (58)*	19 (38)	25 (50)	50
Child-care facilities					
Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old	53 (90%)*	33 (56%)*	35 (59%)*	32 (54) *	59
Improved day care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive	32 (84)	23 (60.5)*	28 (74) *	22 (58) *	38
Improved child care facilities for school-going children	39 (83)	15 (32)	20 (43)	14 (30)	47
	166	91	85	82	
Total Valid Cases 213					

[a] Percentage within each row computed as the proportion of responses 'Yes' out of the total number of cases that indicated that particular policy.

* Where the p significant value of the Phi and Cramer's V test for two nominal variables was statistically significant ($p < .05$).

[1] For more details see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.3 Bivariate Analysis: Perceived Impact on Fertility Decisions by Each Specific Policy Measure.

Statistically significant correlation between the perceived impact of future fertility intentions and preferred policy measures were observed in the case of 8 out of 12 policy measures tested. For example, 90 percent of those who chose improved child care facilities for children up to 3 years of age believed that such a policy would make it easier for them to have the number of children they intend to have. 59 percent believed they would consider having an additional child, and 54 percent believed they would certainly have another child. Similarly, 58 percent of the couples who chose improved housing support as a preferred policy measure believed that it would enable them to have their next child sooner. 30 percent of the respondents who chose a reduction in the cost of children's education as a preferred policy measure, believed they would consider having an additional child if the measures were to be implemented.

The second group of couples tested were those who were uncertain about their future fertility intentions (Table 8.27 and Table 8.28). Of the 59 couples who were uncertain about their future fertility intentions, 97 percent believed that implementation of their preferred policy measures could have some impact on their future fertility behaviour. 26% believed they would certainly go on to have another child, and 37 percent believed their preferred policies would enable them to have their next child sooner (Table 8.27).

Table 8.27: Perceived impact of the preferred policy measures for those respondents who were *Uncertain* about their fertility intentions

	Perceived impact of the selected policies measures				
	Easier to have the number of children I intend to have	Enable to have the next child sooner	Give some more thought to the possibility of having another child	I would definitely have a/another child	I am still uncertain
	Count and (%)				
No	28 (49%)	36 (63%)	22 (39%)	42 (74%)	57 (97%)
Yes	29 (51)	21 (37)	35 (61)	15 (26)	2 (03)
total	57	57	57	57	59
	x^2= .018 (1df) p= .895	x^2= 3.947 (1df) p= .047	x^2= 2.965 (1df) p= .085	x^2= 12.789 (1df) p= .000	x^2= 51.271 (1df) p= .000

Table 8.28: Perceived impact on the fertility decisions, by each specific policy measure, of those respondents who stated *Uncertain* with their fertility intentions

	Perceived Impact				
	Easier to have the number of children I intend to have	Enable to have my next child sooner	Give some more thought to the possibility of having another child	I would definitely have another child	Total
Most Favoured Measures	**Count (% of cases [a])**				
Leave and Work Arrangements					
Improved maternity/ parental leave arrangements	11 (55%)	6 (30%)	13 (65%)	4 (20%)	20
Flexible work hours for working parents	5 (56)	5 (56)	5 (56)	5 (56)*	9
More opportunities for part-time work for parents	4 (57)	2 (29)	2 (29)	0 (.0)	7
Financial incentives					
Lower income tax for parents with children	11 (44%)	7 (28%)	15 (60%)	5 (20%)	25
Higher child allowance for families with children	13 (65)	8 (40)	12 (60)	8 (40)	20
Increase of the allowance at the birth of each child	8 (44)	5 (28)	15 (83)*	5 (28)	18
An allowance for non-working parents	5 (31)	7 (44)	9 (56)	2 (12.5)	16
Housing and Education assistance					
A substantial decrease in the cost of education	15 (56%)	9 (33%)	16 (59%)	7 (26%)	27
Improved housing support	6 (60)	7 (70)*	6 (60)	6 (60)*	10
Child-care facilities					
Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old	5 (62.5%)	4 (50%)	6 (75%)	2 (25%)	8
Improved day care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive	1 (17)	2 (33)	4 (67)	0 (.0)	6
Improved child care facilities for school-going children	3 (60)	1 (20)	2 (40)	1 (20)	5
Total	29	21	35	15	
Total Valid Cases 57					

[a] Percentage within each row computed as the proportion of responses 'Yes' out of the total number of cases that indicated that particular policy.

* Where the p significant value of the Phi and Cramer's V test for two nominal variables was statistically significant (p< .05).

[1] For more details see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.3 Bivariate Analysis: Perceived Impact on Fertility Decisions by Each Specific Policy Measure.

The results of the tests conducted to understand the perceived impact of each policy measure on the fertility behaviour of this group of couples are summarised above in Table 8.27. In this case only three out of the 12 policy measures showed to have a statistically significant correlation to the perceived impact. 83 percent of those who noted a preference for increased child allowance believed that they would give more thought to having another child in future. 60 percent of those who chose improved housing support and 56% of those who chose flexible working hours believed they would certainly go on to have another child, if their preferred policy measures were implemented.

The final group of respondents were those who had decided not to have any more children in future, and comprised 232 couples. Among them, 62 percent believed that implementing their preferred policy measures could have some kind of impact on their decision not to have another child (Table 8.29).

Table 8.29: Perceived impact of the preferred policies measures for those respondents who stated *Negative future fertility* intentions.

	Perceived impact of the selected policies measures				
	Easier to have the number of children I intend to have	Enable to have the next child sooner	Give some more thought to the possibility of having another child	I would definitely have a/another child	I would still not want a/another child
	Count and (%)				
No	85 (59%)	110 (77%)	49 (34%)	115 (80%)	143 (62%)
Yes	58 (41)	33 (23)	94 (66)	28 (20)	89
total	143	143	143	143	232
	x^2= 5.098 (1df) p= .024	x^2= 41.462 (1df) p= .000	x^2= 14.161 (1df) p= .000	x^2= 52.930 (1df) p= .000	x^2= 12.569 (1df) p= .000

Statistically significant correlations were shown to exist between 5 out of 12 policy measures and the perceived impact of them on the decision not to have another child (Table 8.30). 49 percent of those who chose improved child care facilities for children aged up to 3 years, believed that if such a policy measure were to be implemented, then they would reconsider their decisions not to have children in future. 79 percent of those who chose improved housing support believed they would do the same. 37 percent of those who chose flexible working hours believed they would certainly go on to have another child if such a policy were to be implemented.

Table 8.30: Perceived impact on the fertility decisions, by each specific policy measure, of those respondents who stated *Negative* fertility intentions

Most Favoured Measures	Perceived Impact				
	Easier for me to have the number of children I intend to have	Enable me to have my next child sooner	Give some more thought to possibility of having a/another child	I would definitely have a/another child	Total
	Count (% of cases [a])				
Leave and Work Arrangements					
Improved maternity/ parental leave arrangements	18 (42%)	14 (33%)	24 (56%)	13 (30%)*	43
Flexible work hours for working parents	19 (63)*	11 (37)*	22 (73)	11 (37)*	30
More opportunities for part-time work for parents	6 (32)	3 (16)	14 (74)	2 (10.5)	19
Financial incentives					
Lower income tax for parents with children	23 (42%)	16 (29)	35 (64%)	14 (25.5%)	55
Higher child allowance for families with children	16 (39%)	10 (24)	30 (73)	8 (19.5)	41
Increase of the allowance at the birth of each child	11 (41)	5 (18.5)	17 (63)	3 (11)	27
An allowance for non-working parents	11 (44)	3 (12)	18 (72	3 (12)	25
Housing and Education assistance					
A substantial decrease in the cost of education	15 (34%)	3 (7%)*	29 (66%)	1 (2%)*	44
Improved housing support	11 (29)	6 (16%)	30 (79)*	5 (13)	38
Child-care facilities					
Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old	12 (36%)	8 (24%)	16 (48.5)*	6 (18%)	33
Improved day care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive	11 (46)	6 (25)	14 (58)	6 (25)	24
Improved child care facilities for school-going children	22 (43)	15 (29)	34 (67)	13 (25.5)	51
Total	58	33	94	28	
Total Valid Cases 143					

[a] Percentage within each row computed as the proportion of responses 'Yes' out of the total number of cases that indicated that particular policy.

* Where the p significant value of the Phi and Cramer's V test for two nominal variables was statistically significant ($p < .05$).

[1] For more details see Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.3 Bivariate Analysis: Perceived Impact on Fertility Decisions by Each Specific Policy Measure.

The respondents' perceptions of the likely impact of their preferred policy measures on their future fertility intentions suggest that implementation of various broad family and social policies could have a positive impact on the fertility behaviour of people. As mentioned before, most of the policy measure options tested were also in line with those suggested by the institutional representatives interviewed. Thus, it would appear that policy makers too are generally aware of what policy measures are likely to have an impact on couples' fertility behaviour. However, the results of the analysis need to be considered in the context of the earlier findings, which suggested that policy preferences are widely varied. In other words, one-size fits-all policies are unlikely to have the desired impact on fertility intentions. The results suggest that a package of policies, rather than

singular policies, that are also linked to broader social welfare policies, are likely to be viewed by couples as favourable to making a positive fertility decision. However, it also needs to be noted that these perceived impacts on fertility intentions are generalised views by the respondents, and do not necessarily mean that couples would certainly behave as they think they would, if those policies were to be implemented.

Chapter 7 had shown that there were marked disagreements among the policy makers interviewed regarding how specific policy measures should be implemented. The survey results show that the couples' preferences are too varied in some cases and mostly differed from what were considered ideal by the policy makers. For example, policy makers' viewpoints were varied on whether child allowances should be means tested, and related to the birth-order of the children. The survey revealed that just above half of the sample believed that it should be means tested, while most of them believed that it should not be targeted at the birth order of children. Similarly, while there was no policy maker consensus on whether additional parental leave should be fully paid or not, almost all the couples wanted it to be fully paid (Table 8.31).

Table 8.31: Respondents' preferences on implementation of certain policies

Whether child allowance should be means tested [a]	**%**
1. In inverse proportion to income level	56.3
2. For low-income families only	12.8
3. Same allowance for families with the same number of children	30.9
Total valid cases 508	100.0
Whether child allowance should vary with the number of children [a]	**%**
1. The older the child the higher the allowance	42.2
2. The younger the child the higher the allowance	3.9
3. The same for every child	22.5
4. Increasing with an increasing number of children	31.4
Total valid cases 508	100.0
Whether child allowance should be limited to certain birth orders [a]	**%**
1. For the first two children only	1.0
2. Only for the third child onwards	12.6
3. For all the children	86.4
Total valid cases 508	100.0
Preferred type of parental leave [a]	**%**
1. Unpaid leave	0.4
2. Partly paid leave	6.7
3. Full paid leave	92.9
Total valid cases 481	100.0

[a] The p Significant Value of the One-Sample Chi-square test (x^2) for ordinal variables was less than <.05 in all statements (see Appendix Chapter 8: 8.1 Univariate analysis).
-The 'I don't know/ I do not want to answer' cases were excluded from the analysis.

Summary of Findings

The findings of the survey research with couples in Crete were presented in a format that reflected the structure adopted in Chapter 7, which dealt with perspectives of the policy makers interviewed. The presentations in these two chapters were intended to form answers to the six sub-research questions described at the research design stage[24]. The objective was to provide opportunities to compare the respective findings and develop evidence to support arguments presented in the conceptual framework of this thesis.

Throughout the presentation of findings in this chapter, several references were made to the perspectives of policy makers while presenting the relevant finding from the surveyed couples. A summary of all the findings, with some conclusions are presented below:

Evaluation of Demographic Trends and Attitudes towards Marriage, Family and Children:

The responses from the surveyed population suggested that they were aware of the major transformations that the Greek population has undergone. They viewed many of the demographic trends as undesirable or negative, and such views concur with those held by social scientists and the majority of policy makers interviewed. As some policy makers observed in the interviews, the respondents were also seen to regard as highly important individualism, self-fulfilment and achievement of personal aspirations. Theories of fertility have attributed these notions as part of the changing value systems. However, unlike the policy makers (and even theories[25]) suggested such new value systems did not appear to erode or influence the traditionally attributed values of children or the respondents' perspectives on traditional family form. While being tolerant and open to the evolving alternative family forms, most of the respondents still considered traditional family form of married cohabitation to be an important social institution. The results also showed that couples surveyed not only valued children highly, but also desired to have more children than they actually had.

Determinants of Respondents' Fertility Behaviour During 1995 and 2000:

Multivariate analysis (Poisson Regressions) for fertility determinants showed that only a few variables tested had a statistically significant influence on the respondents' fertility behaviour between 1995 and 2000. Among the socio-economic and cultural variables tested in the regression analysis, five variables showed statistically significant influence on couples' fertility decisions during 1995-2000. They were: Wife's level of education; Wife's

[24] See Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.
[25] Chapter 2, section 2.3, Theory of Changing Value Systems.

employment status; Husband's job status; Household's annual income and House size in square metres. The causal influences of these variables ranged from strong negative influence (wife's education and employment) to positive influence (income and house size). Other variables that showed significant but weak influences were husband's area of upbringing (rural/urban) and use of family planning. None of the value related variables showed to have any statistically significant influence on fertility decisions. Other analyses mentioned earlier had already shown that parents highly regarded the traditionally attributed values of children and desired to have more children than they actually had.

Couples' Policy Preferences and their Perceived Impact on Future Fertility Intentions:

The review of policy debates in Chapter 3 showed how, after the Second World War, many European States preferred not to intervene in people's fertility decisions through explicit policy measures. Greece was one of the few exceptions to this, and many of the opinions expressed by policy makers interviewed confirmed the State's intention to intervene through explicit policy measures. However, results of surveys with couples showed that they did not wish to see the state directly intervene in their fertility decisions. They rather prefer the state to implement broad social and family policies, which can remove obstructions to achieving their desired family size. Most of the respondents believed that implementation of their preferred policy measures would positively influence the timing of future childbirth and would help those uncertain about their future intentions to make positive childbearing decisions. This could potentially influence the observed gap between the desired number of children and actual number achieved by many couples. Significantly, the results also showed that in many cases, the respondents believed that implementation of their preferred policies measures could also motivate them to consider having another child, which they had not originally planned for. Policy preferences ranged from improved childcare facilities to reduction of cost of children's education, and from several financial policies such as income tax reduction to those related to work and leave arrangements.

An interesting observation was that no single policy measure was selected by an overwhelming majority of the respondents. While more people indicated income tax reduction and decrease in cost of education as their preferred policies, other policy measures received more or less equally distributed preferences. Policy preferences also varied with varying socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. Such findings are significant to the overall aim of this research in order to understand whether the policy makers and policy debates recognise such differences, so that targeted policy measures

can be developed[26]. What this really indicates is the heterogeneity of the various background characteristics, as well as the subjectivity of the behavioural characteristics of the respondents. The way people perceive and value children have not changed much and are still firmly grounded in traditions. However, their circumstances have changed, and they are different for different individuals or groups. Equally varied are the reasons for and outcomes of the various behavioural decisions they take. In this context, it is important that policy makers and policy debates try to understand and include such variety and subjectivity in their discourses. This leaves no room for generalisation of causes of fertility decline or policy solutions for fertility decline, at least not without the backing of empirical evidence collected from the target groups. Both the causes and solutions may be different dependent on the peculiarities of the settings, the people, their behaviour and aspirations.

The findings discussed above provide another important topic of discussion in the policy debates. They should debate whether the policies should aim to help couples bridge the gap between their desired and actual fertility rates, or whether they should target the achievement of a national minimum fertility rate[27], that is statistically generated. The former choice would not be perceived as interventionist, and could help people make the decisions they wish to make, with regards to the number of children. The results, if achieved, could also mean an increase in fertility rates and population growth. The latter choice, however, may not be welcome among all. People do not wish the State to direct them how many children they should have in order to 'preserve the Greek race' or to prevent the explosion of the demographic 'time bomb'. Even some of the policy makers interviewed strongly objected to such approaches.

The next chapter provides a synthetic discussion of the various findings and theoretical assertions regarding causalities of fertility decline. This would provide the opportunity to develop further arguments based on the findings in order to validate the researcher's opinion that institutional perspectives are biased and founded on assumptions. They would also help to establish that policy debates in Greece have failed to address the informational challenges posed by the various theories of causalities and subjectivity of behavioural factors of the target group, that is, the Greek couples.

[26] Some possible directions for future policy debates in Greece are discussed in Chapter 10, section 10.3

[27] Often referred to as replacement level of population.

CHAPTER 9:

DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS AND ITS FINDINGS

Introduction

The main objective of this chapter is to synthesise and discuss the findings of the two empirical studies performed in this research, namely the face to face interview with policy makers in Greece, and the questionnaire survey with the couples in Crete. The discussions here draw upon the theories of causalities explained in Chapter 2, as well as the fertility policy debates discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Where appropriate, relevant studies added to the literature after the fieldwork of *this* research had been completed are also discussed. Prior to the discussion of the main findings, the chapter begins with a brief discussion of the objective of this thesis, the literature and policy debate review prior to the fieldwork of this research. It also discusses the researcher's method of approach to the study. An evaluative discussion of the merits and de-merits of the approach, can be found in the conclusion chapter that follows.

9.1 THE OBJECTIVE

This study was prompted by the researcher's curiosity as to why fertility rates in Europe continued to decline below replacement levels, despite all the international level attention, research, policy debates and measures undertaken so far. Greece was chosen as a case study for two reasons: Firstly, it had one of the lowest fertility rates in Europe (TFR: 1.3); and secondly, the researcher hailed from Greece. The obvious initial course of action, in order to establish some leads towards an answer to this question, was to study the existing literature. The vast amount of the information available on the subject made it clear from the outset that adequately capturing the diversity of the existing literature would be a limiting factor. Given the scope of a single-individual project such as a Ph.D., which was constrained by both time as well as resources, it would not have been possible to research and synthesise all the available material before finalising the researcher's own course of action.

With the above constraints in sight, a broad framework for this project was developed. This framework involved an initial study of the historic and contemporary demographic trends in Europe, followed by a review of four major theoretical approaches that explain

fertility decline. The literature review showed that there were several studies, which had already theorised and analysed the causes and consequences of fertility decline. Thus, the researcher considered it to be of value to be able to understand why a *policy approach or state intervention* was considered to be necessary and appropriate to address fertility decline. This question took the study to the history and development of fertility policy debates in Europe, and especially in Greece. It also raised the question why fertility policy measures were ineffective in Greece. Having not found any similar challenges or sufficient explanations in this regard in the literature, the researcher decided it to be of merit to identify the possible reasons for fertility policy failure in the context of Greece's declining fertility.

9.2 THE LITERATURE REVIEW

A review of the existing knowledge on the topic of population studies and European demographic situation revealed several facts. First, it provided an insight into the state of Europe's population structure and its present direction. The European demographic structure has passed through several transitional phases and reached the current state of low mortality - low fertility, from a phase of high mortality - high fertility. By the end of the 20th century, the total fertility rates (TFR), a commonly used predictor of growth or decline of net population of a country, had reached below replacement level of 2.1 children in many countries including Greece (1.3). Immigration became the single factor that sustained a growth of gross population in most of these countries. A further prominent feature was the ageing of the population that was a result of both the reduction in birth rates and increased longevity at old age. Alongside these changes at the national and international level, several structural changes took place also at the micro-level. Plural forms of the family emerged across Europe. The significance of marriage as a societal institution was increasingly challenged, as other family forms such as unmarried cohabitation, single parent family and even same-sex cohabitation became socially and legally accepted. Among all these changes, fertility decline received the greatest attention in most of the demographic studies.

Second, the literature review identified the major theoretical explanations on the causalities of fertility decline in Europe. There is a strong bias towards explaining fertility decline as the outcome of conscious rational decisions made by humans to have fewer children or no children at all. The economic rational theories argue that such decisions involved the evaluation of the economic and psychological costs and benefits of children,

the risks and uncertainties involved in parenthood as well as the perceived values of children. There is also the thesis that fertility decline is an outcome of so called increased levels of gender equity. It is argued that as the social status of women gains greater parity with that of men, the appeal of parenthood for women declines and that of alternative societal roles such as in education and employment increases. Where social infrastructures supported women to combine both family responsibilities as well as these alternative societal roles, it helped women to have children, albeit fewer in numbers. In those societies that are slow to embrace gender equity or had high levels of gender inequity, women nonetheless desire to engage in alternative societal roles of which they increasingly become aware. Where the social infrastructure does not facilitate a combination of family responsibilities and the alternative societal roles, fertility falls to far lower levels. As all these decisions regarding parenthood are conscious decisions, the economic rational model appears to have an overarching influence on all the explanations in one form or other. Proximate factors such as birth control methods, timing of marriage and family formation, are the *means* through which individuals and couples achieve their desired fertility goals, whether to have or not have children. A detailed discussion of the theoretical approaches is conducted alongside the political perspectives and the findings from the survey, later in section 9.5.2.

9.3 A REVIEW OF POLICY DEBATED PRIOR TO THE FIELD WORK

Chapters 3 and 4 examined and discussed the development of fertility policy debates in Europe and Greece respectively. The main conclusion drawn out of these two chapters was that policy makers were mostly biased and highly subjective in their assumptions about the causes and consequences of fertility decline. The emotive tone, and the politicised rhetoric of the debates in Greece, would lead one even to suspect whether such debates help to achieve an objective understanding of the complex subject of fertility, and to develop measures to reverse its decline. Often, the projected consequences such as disappearance of 'Hellenism', and immigrants taking over Greece, amongst others, seemed to be the reasons why fertility decline was debated at all. There was no evidence of efforts to understand the reasons of fertility decline and the consequences from the perspective of the common man and woman, in this case the Greek couple. The debated reasons and consequences were often based on the policy makers' own assumptions and judgement. The theoretical inputs and suggestions from such external research bodies as

the Academy of Athens were also drawn upon during the policy debates, although such research had only minimal backing of fieldwork carried out in Greece.

The review of policy debates also showed how the theoretical assumptions and political bias and judgement have often extended into fertility policy measures. A prominent feature of most of the policies was that fertility objectives were only implicit in them. In most cases, the policies were wider family and social welfare policies, with the secondary objective of raising fertility[1]. The major policy objectives were to alleviate poverty, reduce social exclusion, and create equal opportunities. Although the extent to which these objectives had been achieved was questionable, the integrity and sincerity of intentions behind setting up such objectives were indisputable. With regards to the implied fertility objectives of those policies, the outcome was again clear – no results were delivered, because fertility rates had continued to decline in Greece.

The failures of the policy measures to deliver results, in so far as increasing fertility rates were concerned, led the researcher to question the rationale behind the assumptions that policy measures could help increase fertility rates. The root causes of such an assumption were to be found not only in the subjective policy debates, but also in some of the theories of causalities. The economic theories of fertility decline rationalise that human beings make childbearing decisions based on the rational evaluation of the costs and benefits involved[2]. The general theoretical assumption is that if the perceived socio-economic benefits outweighed the costs of bearing and rearing children, then a decision would be made to have a child or more children. This economic rationale has all the logical imperatives and powers of conviction, and policy makers did not see the need to challenge it. Then there is also the thesis that human beings are utility maximisers by nature. Thus, the conclusion appears to be that if through policy measures, the child-shy individual or couple can be assisted to overcome the costs of having children and derive socio-economic benefits out of it, then they can be persuaded to have more children. At least two assumptions seemed to be implied in such a conclusion. One, that all or most human beings ultimately decide to have fewer children because of socio-economic reasons. Secondly, irrespective of the diversity of the factors for which people decide not to have more children, all or most human beings could be motivated to have more

[1] The only exception being in 1991, when the government introduced specific policies aimed at fertility increase. See Chapter 4, section 4.3.3 for details.

[2] See Chapter 2, section 2.1 for details.

children through policies, that would compensate or appear to compensate the perceived socio-economic costs of those factors.

As excessive it may seem to criticise the fertility policies as state attempts to 'bribe' couples into having children by giving them economic and material benefits, similar criticisms of the *functional effectiveness* of policy measures are not new. One such poignant question raised was 'how much was enough to induce a couple to have a child, which they had originally decided not to have?' Without crippling the State budget, how generous could it afford to be, in order to entice the *child-shy* couple? In this regard, Charles' (1936) observation is as relevant today as it was seven decades ago:

> "There is not the slightest reason to believe that income-tax reduction or family allowances, except possibly on a scale that would wreck the present distributive machinery, are likely to have any appreciable effect in raising the fertility ... For many reasons, the estimates of adequate family allowances usually given are grotesquely and fantastically low" (p.207).

On several occasions during the review of policy debates in Greece it was clear that, despite the grand intentions to implement far-reaching measures, many of those remained just intentions and were never executed because of fiscal constraints. Some policy makers have admitted to this[3].

A further challenge, which goes beyond the operability of most policy measures, can be brought upon the assumptions behind such policies. Is there any evidence that Greek couples indeed wish for the state to intervene through policy measures to help them have more children? It would be a relatively straightforward assumption to make that, if for example, unemployment or crime was rife in a country, then its subjects would expect the state to intervene. However, fertility decisions made by couples are clearly much more complex than that. It is probable that, as theories and some evidence suggest, external socio-economic circumstances can influence such decisions. Nevertheless, there is still a largely unknown, mostly subjective and highly complex area of behavioural characteristics and pattern of preferences of individuals. There are studies that prove that individual preferences for children, their behaviour and attitudes, are as diverse as the ones that make people to choose different cars, different clothes, different careers, or delay their marriage, cohabit or live alone. Therefore, it would be presumptuous if the state was to embark upon introducing 'fertility enhancement policies' without really understanding whether *its* subjects really had a desire for them.

[3] See Chapter 7, section 7.3.1.

Other theories of causalities such as gender equity, ideational changes and evolving proximate characteristics were also seen to receive varying levels of representation in the fertility policy debates. However, when it came to suggesting or implementing policy measures, they were not far from the principle of *'positive economic inducement'*[4]. This finding again led to the point made earlier, namely attempting to motivate people to have children by 'exploiting' their perceived nature as utility maximisers.

Such conclusions are of course open to the question 'what sort of policy measure could then possibly be safe from such criticisms?'. 'Probably none' may be the answer; but that does not exempt the policy makers from their responsibility to first ascertain that the policies they implement are actually what *the* couples want, in order to have more children. Fertility trends may be the same across several nations or continents, but that does not necessarily imply that the reasons and solutions for those trends or problems are also common.

9.4 THE RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

The findings based on the review of policy debates in Chapters 3 and 4 led the researcher to argue that *if* policy makers do not fully understand the experiences and needs of their specific target population, then the policy measures they implement are unlikely to be effective. This gave the impetus to understand the Greek policy makers' perception of couples' fertility related experiences and needs. Qualitative research, in the form of a face to face semi-structured interview was considered to be the most suitable method to understand the subjective perceptions of the Greek policy makers.

The approach adopted in the research design stage was not to develop a hypothesis to be proved or disproved later by empirical studies. It was felt that, despite some suggestive evidence in the policy debate review chapters, it would not be appropriate to start the empirical studies from a hypothetical statement such as 'Greek policy debates and policy makers are not fully aware of those commonplace realities of child-rearing'. Most of the prominent experts on qualitative research methodologies suggest that such research should not start from any hypothetical viewpoint[5]. By nature, they are explorative research, and therefore an open-mind to the possibility of finding new ideas, concepts and realities is essential. Therefore, an explorative research question, as given below, was developed:

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[4] Charles (1936).
[5] See Chapter 5, for details of research design.

> What are the Greek policy maker's perceptions on the causes and consequences of fertility decline in Greece and what do they believe to be the fertility policy related needs of the Greek couples?

Notwithstanding the explorative nature of this question and the empirical work it involved, it was important to subject the findings of the empirical study to a reality check, which in this case was to compare the findings with the actual viewpoints, experiences and needs of the Greek couples. Thus, in order to understand the couples' experiences and perceptions, the field survey research was also designed, the nature of which was quantitative. In retrospect, the choice of a quantitative research method to collect couples' experiences and perceptions was found to be open to further discussion[6]. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, originally when the research methodologies were decided, it was thought that a quantitative method would ensure objectivity and generalisability of the data collected.

The researcher hoped that finding answers to the main research question and comparing them against the *'commonplace realities of child-rearing'* would provide the empirical evidence to support the researcher's own arguments and conclusions. It would also help to gauge the nature and extent of disparities that existed, if any, between the institutional perspectives in Greece and the commonplace realities concerning the couples' fertility experiences. A further expected benefit was that it could provide clues into what the Greek couples really wanted the state to do, in so far as their fertility experiences and expectations were concerned.

Thus, the research design involved two different empirical studies and the synthesis of their findings. The actual execution of these studies and methodologies are discussed at length elsewhere in this thesis (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6), and need no further discussion here. The following section synthesises and discusses the findings from the two empirical studies.

9.5 A DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS FROM THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES

As mentioned in the introduction, this part forms the main section of this chapter and aims to bring together the findings from the semi-structured interviews with Greek policy makers and the questionnaire survey with Greek couples. The findings have three parts,

[6] The limitations of such a choice are discussed in detail, along with other limitations of this research in the conclusion chapter.

namely, (1) The perceived consequences of fertility decline; (2) The causes of fertility decline; and (3) The policy related needs. The institutional perceptions regarding consequences are discussed first independently of any framework, drawing on both the literature as well as the policy debates in Chapters 3 and 4. Then the perceptions regarding the causes, as well as evidence from the surveys are discussed in the framework of the four theories of causalities discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, the policy suggestions made by the policy respondents are compared against the needs and preferences as expressed by the couples.

9.5.1 The Perceived Consequences of Fertility Decline in Greece

9.5.1.1 'Threat to Hellenism'

As seen in Chapter 7[8], perceptions among the policy makers regarding consequences of fertility decline in Greece are clearly divided, with the majority of them believing it to be the gravest problem of Greece, and hence with the direst of consequences. The opinions of this majority mostly relate to disappearance of Greece as a nation, its national security and the increasing number of immigrants in Greece. The notable characteristic of those respondents, who have such opinions, is that they appear to consider these potential consequences to be the main reason why the state should intervene through policy measures.

What do these institutional perceptions regarding the consequences of fertility decline tell us? As one of the respondent puts, in the modern day secular society, clearly it is not sufficiently convincing or a politically correct argument to suggest that Greeks should have more children because Turkey does[9]. If Greece is a signatory to international treaties that aim to protect refugees and asylum seekers, and has a national policy that allows immigrants in, then there should not be doubts as to why there are immigrant children in the schools. The suggestion that there is a hidden agenda among the immigrants to take over and rule the country is cynical, xenophobic and irrational. As for the weakening of the defence system due to lack of numbers, could it be because fewer native citizens wish to join the armed forces? What about the naturalised immigrants to whom the

[7] Charles (1936). She referred to real experiences of parents in terms of child-rearing costs and associated burden, which according to her, did not match the perceptions within academic debates as well as among the policy makers.

[8] Results of semi-structured interviews with policy makers in Greece.

[9] Such radical opinions were rare. See Chapter 7 for full details.

constitution grants equal rights, and are therefore eligible to join the armed forces? Is there a reluctance to trust the loyalties of those naturalised citizens? Countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have immigrant citizens serving their armed forces, without jeopardising the integrity and efficiency of those services. Therefore, it would seem that in order to defuse such *consequences*, a more appropriate solution would be to adopt an open minded and inclusive culture in the country's institutions, to adequately reflect its population's diversity. Given the history of the development of fertility policy debates in Europe as well as in Greece, however, the high subjectivity, bias and irrationality of some of the institutional perspectives are not surprising[10], and supports the researcher's own earlier claims of assumptions. Attempts by some of the prominent demographers, to link Europe's fertility decline and its consequent *loss of political dominance* over the world while the more populous third world countries progress in the world arena, only serve to aggravate such biased judgements within the institutional perspectives[11].

9.5.1.2 The Perceived Socio-economic Impacts of Fertility Decline

In late 19th century Sweden, Wicksell used the Neo-Malthusian theory to argue that controlling and limiting population growth was essential in order to achieve a stable and happy society (Charles 1936). Yet ironically, only half a century later, in the 1930s, Sweden witnessed the impending threat of depopulation, which prompted the famous work of Myrdal, in order to understand the reasons of fertility decline and possible solutions for it. In Chapter 3, section 3.2, we saw how different schools of thoughts presented their arguments for and against population growth, citing their own predicted consequences. Such consequences of low fertility included ageing population, shortage of labour supply, slowdown of economic growth, and inability of the social protection system to take care of its elderly, as the contributions made by the economically active population would supposedly be outstripped by the demand of the elderly population.

The popular concerns such as the increasing burden on the reproductive population to pay for the care of the elderly, the dwindling social welfare and pension funds, and shortage of labour force are also seen to be reflected among the Greek policy makers interviewed. None of the respondents however, can be said to be as passionate or vocal as in the previous section, when discussing such consequences. There seemed to be

[10] See Chapter 4, section. 4.3.
[11] For example, Chesnais (1998).

more concerns about the earlier mentioned 'cultural' consequences than the socio-economic consequences. Notwithstanding the level of significance it received in interviews, a discussion of the perceived socio-economic impacts of fertility decline is appropriate, because if such impacts are real, the nation ought to be concerned more about them than the 'threats to Hellenism'.

The literature provides several theses that argue that population ageing and simultaneous low fertility rates can place a huge burden on the economy due to high levels of old-age dependency and low economic output. In the context of population ageing, the OECD and Word Bank have raised concerns over the sustainability of the public pension systems, that has mostly relied on the 'Pay as you Earn' scheme of funding the pensions budget (OECD 1998; World Bank 1994). The International Monetary Fund has warned that failure to address the inadequacies of the contributions by the 'pay as you earn' scheme could lead to serious macro-economic damage at national and international levels (Chand and Jaeger 1996, p.1). As an example, Bongaarts (2004) projects that without a significant increase in labour force participation, retirement patterns or in the pensions benefit ratio[12], the spending on public pensions in Italy could be expected to rise from 35 percent to 75 percent during the period between 2000 and 2050 (Bongaarts 2004, p. 20). It is argued that there is an urgent need for governments to interfere through policy measures to influence the demographic trends that lead to such a situation, policy options such as increasing taxes are not a viable way forward (Lutz et.al. 2003).

Notwithstanding the significance of these warnings and projections, there are counter arguments that challenge the integrity of these projections on the basis of historic inadequacies seen in similar past projections as well as the continuing efficiencies gained in care for the elderly. One of the poignant discussions, which looks at the various perceptions of the impact of an ageing population on the economy, growth and social protection systems, can be found in the work of Mullan (2002). He argues that the branding of the aged population as a burden on social resources is unjustified, cynical and motivated by a hidden state agenda. Post recession (of the 1970s) governments have systematically attempted to distance themselves from their role in the economy and social provisions; and fearing the inevitable financial deficit, they have used the excuse of an ageing population to cut back on financial benefits and increase the age of pension entitlement (ibid). However, in reality the cost of provisions for the elderly has been

[12] Benefits Ratio is the average public pension benefits per pensioner to average earnings per worker (Defined in Bongaarts 2003, p. 7)

significantly lower, compared to the cost of provisions for the other casualties of recession such as the high levels of unemployed (ibid. p. 146). Furthermore, the increasing cost of social care cannot be attributed entirely to the increase in the number of the elderly population. This could also be due to the fact that the unit cost of providing the financial benefits and care has also increased over the years, due to long term inflation, increased living standards and increased expectation of better services.

Mullan's (2002) criticisms also suggest that the arguments presented in the literature on the perceived effects of ageing on economy, at best lack conviction among the proponents themselves, and at worst contradict factual evidence. Various opposing schools of authors have tried to establish that ageing could lead to an increase in savings as well as a decrease in savings at the same time! Some have argued that due to the reduced demand for and spending on consumables in an aged population, as well as a collective awareness that the society is ageing, savings would increase[13]. Some others have argued that an economically inactive aged population, larger in size compared to the active younger population, can increase demand for goods and services, thereby not only reducing the level of savings, but also stretching the resource allocation, and consequently stagnating investment and economic growth[14]. Against the backdrop of these contradicting theses that attempt to establish a relationship between ageing and economic growth, historical data proves that short-term and long-term economic growth have been *unconnected* to the pace of ageing[15]. It also shows how economic wealth has expanded at twice the rate of ageing over the long term.

Another predicted socio-economic consequence of declining fertility is labour shortage. It is easily conceivable that in the context of a growing economy, a low fertility generation could cause a shortage of labour supply, which could in turn impact economic growth. However it is not clear how any increase in fertility can *not* have an immediate net impact both on the social provision systems as well as on the economic growth. Suppose fertility rates were to reverse and increase from now, this should in theory mean that there will be a proportionate increase in young age dependency rates, as well as demands on the state for childcare provisions and related costs. In addition, it should also mean that employers would have to hand out much more to meet the consequent increase in demands on maternity and paternity benefits – provisions that are mandatory under the increasingly

[13] McRae (1995); Moore (1987), as explained by Muller (2002, p. 203).

[14] Jackson (1991), as explained by Muller (2002, p. 201).

[15] Mullan 2002, pp: 197-199.

stricter EU directives. They would also have to employ additional manpower to compensate for the lost manpower hours during absences related to maternity. Also, if employers realise that their potential employees are likely to have babies soon, they may not be willing to take on employees on permanent or full-time contracts that make them eligible for parental leave benefits (McDonald 2002). Thus, if low fertility can lead to a shortage in labour supply, it is equally possible that a reversal in fertility rates could lead to a net increase in the cost of welfare provisions as well as employee costs, and possible employment disruptions, impacting businesses and ultimately economic growth. This argument is not to undermine the significance of cases presented by those concerned with the consequences of low fertility. Rather, it is to bring to the discussion the need to consider alternative options other than just wanting to increase fertility rates as a means to prevent those consequences. It is to suggest that as obvious it may seem, increasing fertility rates, if at all possible, may not be the best solution to the problems caused by low fertility rates.

From the above discussion, it therefore seems that, to every thesis on the consequence of fertility decline, there is an equally valid antithesis. The predicted consequences at best have remedies, and at worst are ill perceived, subjective, biased and unsupported by empirical evidence. Therefore, any attempt at achieving political or policy solutions for the conceived problems, calls for a careful and objective evaluation of the realities.

9.5.2 The Perceptions of the Causalities of Fertility Decline

The political perspectives of causalities are discussed here using the framework of the theories of causalities explained in Chapter 2. This therefore, serves as a platform to discuss and challenge some of the theoretical perspectives as well, by comparing them against the realities as experienced and expressed by the Greek couples. Use of this framework however, does not mean that the political perspectives are clearly divided along the lines of the theories. Far from it, as it becomes evident below, the policy respondents seldom refer to any theoretical concepts when they analyse the causes of fertility decline. Furthermore, the majority of the respondents attribute the fertility decline to a mixture of causes, some discussed in the theories, and some not discussed in the theories. It will be observed in the discussion that, as with the case of the likely ineffectiveness of a one-size-fits-all policy, the theories too, when considered individually, are of minimal value. No single theory is sufficient to explain the observed variances in the impact of fertility determinant, or is equally applicable across space and time. It

would be seen that the collective value of theories serves to provide a better understanding of fertility determinants.

9.5.2.1 The Rational Choice Perspective

Rational choice theory has received a significant level of attention and application in demographic studies over the last several decades, as evident from the several volumes available in the literature. In simple terms, the theory suggests that decisions to have or not have children are results of conscious rational choices taken by human beings[16]. The process of making reproductive decisions is equated to almost any other process involving rational decision making. The specific advantages and disadvantages of making various choices are evaluated, taking into consideration the socio-economic constraints of the setting, and a decision is made to accept the choice that favours a net advantage over disadvantage. Thus, children too are viewed as capital goods, with their own characteristic *utilities* (advantages) and *disutilities* (disadvantages). Utilities include the perceived 'pleasure' of bringing up children, the expected economic input of the children into the family once they enter the labour market and the expected care and support they would give the parents during their old-age (Leibenstein 1957, 1975 and 1981; See also Becker 1960). The disutilities, usually referred to as the costs of children, include direct costs of child rearing, investment in the human capital of children, as well as the opportunity cost of parental time invested in bringing up the children. The constraints of the settings include the household income, employment status of the spouses, the mother in particular, which in turn are usually related to their level of educational achievement, urbanisation and so forth[17]. The argument is that if the perceived net costs are higher than the net values or benefits of the children, then people will decide either not to have children or to restrict the number of children. In other words, household attempts to maximise the utility function of its product, that is, the children, using the resources it has, such as parent's income, education and time.

The ability to use an economic model that identifies certain standard utilities and disutilities of children that are supposedly homogenous in a society, and therefore easy to analyse and understand, makes it an attractive proposition for the social scientist in

[16] Leibenstein (1957) and Becker (1960) developed the original notable propositions of this kind. See Chapter 2, for details of the various proponents whose contributions have enriched and redefined this theory over the years.

[17] See Chapter 5 for a more detailed list of various socio-economic factors, which are thought to influence the rational choices of couples.

search of a *theoretically elegant*[18] answer. A quick review of the responses of the policy makers reveals that they too place significant importance on the economic constraints and costs of children as identified in these theories. One of the most frequently mentioned constraints is the difficulty faced by couples due to inadequate housing facilities and support. According to most of the respondents, couples consider it a priority to set up a house (preferably owned) before they begin to have children. They also note that because most young people often cannot afford a house and the state does not support them in getting a house, child bearing is delayed or avoided as a result. Urbanisation is yet another constraint pointed out in this context, because it obstructs intergenerational wealth flow from parents to children, consequently resulting in a negative net impact on the financial status of the young couples and negative fertility decisions. Poor employment opportunities and lack of financial stability and security are two other causal factors identified by many policy respondents. If the suggestion here is that good and stable employment could lead to better income and socio-economic status, and result in higher fertility, then there is also strong disagreement to it. Although not a view that the majority of the policy makers share, it was stated that it was in fact the improved socio-economic status and higher income that had caused the fertility decline. A further causal factor noted was female employment.

All the above-described opinions fit very well with most of the postulates of the economic model and the rational choice theory. Nevertheless, the subjectivity and bias in the remarks of the respondents do not go unnoticed. Just as evident in the literature among the social scientists and their multiple theories, one evident feature is the lack of consensus among the policy makers interviewed as to what factors really influence the childbearing decisions of the Greek couples. None of the policy makers interviewed refer to any particular fieldwork done to back up their claims[19]. This does not necessarily suggest that their judgements are not based on empirical studies. However, the analysis of the survey results shows that, only in a few cases are the policy makers' perceptions on causal influences of socio-economic constraints and costs of children matched by the real experiences of the couples approached in Crete. In the majority of the cases, the

[18] This term was used by Friedman et.al. (1994), in 'Theories of the Value of Children: A New Approach'.

[19] Many of the opinions presented by the policy makers suggest the report by Academy of Athens, to be one of their sources of information. This report itself drew mostly from major theories of causalities, and with a few references to actual empirical evidence from Greece. The exception is a reference to Symeonidou et.al. (1992, 1997), with regards to correlation between fertility in Greater Athens area and number of rooms in the houses. For the correlation between female employment and fertility, they quoted evidence from France as well as the aggregate results from OECD nations. For more details, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.3, *Debate period 1986: the Pro-natalist Shift.*

empirical observations show that their ideas about the socio-economic causalities are not all that significant in reality.

For example, contrary to the view of most of the policy makers, the results show that ownership of a house did not have any statistically significant influence on the couples' recent fertility, children ever born or their desired number of children[20]. Two other related variables tested, namely, *size of the house* and *satisfaction with living conditions* on the other hand, show a weak positive influence on recent fertility rates[21]. However, *urbanisation*, another connected factor, when tested as a separate variable, shows weak correlation of mixed directions with little statistical significance in *this research*. At the same time, the recent fertility levels in households where the husbands were brought up in urban conditions were found to be lower than those brought up in rural areas, and the influence is statistically significant, albeit weak. Such mixed results render it very difficult to make blanket assumptions about the impact of housing and urbanisation on couples' fertility rates. In traditional societies like that of Greece, where there still exists a significant level of intergenerational wealth transfer, including that of parental property, finding a house to live in may not yet be a cause for concern for the younger generations (Cordon and Sgritta 2000). Difficulties in accessing childcare services offered by the grandparents may be a more apparent impact than obstructions to direct and indirect financial transfers. Also, *urbanisation* in itself constitutes several sub-factors, such as its impact on the size of the house, cost of living, disposable income and availability of recreational facilities for children, making it difficult to generalise the impact. Furthermore, people living in urban area may have a totally different perception on various aspects of life. For example some may perceive the urban environment to be less secure to bring up children compared to the rural. Some others may be concerned about the levels of competition their children are likely to face in urban areas in education and career. Based on their subjective perceptions about the risks and uncertainties, fertility decisions are likely to vary[22].

In the case of *employment status*, the data collected and the method of analysis, were inadequate to verify the policy makers' observations. This was because, for all but one couple approached, the husbands were in some form of employment. So the impact on

[20] The main analysis chapter presents the findings of regressions only for fertility decisions during 1995-2000. The regressions for children ever born and desired fertility are presented in Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.5.

[21] This finding is also in concurrence with Symeonidou et.al. (1992, 1997), whose work observed amongst other factors, the impact number of rooms in a house in highly urbanised locations such as the Greater Athens area. See Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 for details.

fertility decisions of those men who were not employed could not be assessed. However, female employment did show a strong negative influence on fertility decisions that was statistically significant.

Tests on the causal influences of *household income* and *financial satisfaction* show some influence on the fertility decision, but with inconsistent direction of impact[23]. However, another study in Greece, by Drettakis (1994), shows that the couples' fertility decisions are positively related to the purchasing power of their per capita income[24]. Thus the policy makers' perspectives that income and financial status can have both a positive and negative impact on fertility decisions seem to be valid. However, the theoretical assumption underlying the opinion that income is positively correlated to fertility decisions has been heavily challenged in the literature, because in many cases, empirical evidence shows that as income increases, fertility in fact decreases[25]. In some cases, fertility has shown an inverted 'U' correlation with income[26].

The empirical observations above clearly challenge some of the policy maker's perceptions about factors of causalities. The fact that some of the socio-economic constraints identified in the economic rationalisation theories do not show any significance among the sample surveyed also poses a challenge to the theoretical assumption that the predicted causal influences are easily generalisable to the whole population. Even within any given society, its socio-economic factors and characteristics can have significantly variable influences on the fertility decisions and outcomes (World Fertility Survey, Entwisle and Mason 1985). This directly disagrees with the argument of Cleland (1985) that such group differences in fertility impact are only temporary and theoretically insignificant.

There are several other challenges that can be brought upon the concept that childbearing decisions are the results of conscious rational choices. It is indeed possible

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[22] Discussed in detail in the next section, Theory of Risk and Uncertainty is based on rational choice theory.

[23] See Chapter 8 for details.

[24] See also Chapter 4, Sec. 4.2.4 for details.

[25] The explanation for such observation is that as income increase, parent's demand for quality over quantity of children increase. Becker's revised explanation is that over the time, as income increased parent's demand for higher quality children has increased (Robinson 1997). Quality can be achieved through increased investment of capital and parent's time in a child. Also, since the parent's demand is not for children *per se*, but for the net utilities expected to be derived out of the children, the same desired net utility outcome can be achieved by increasing the quality and reducing the quantity, because net utility is quantity multiplied by quality per child (ibid. p. 64). Moreover, as the cost of purchase of this quality (such as education, health, and entertainment) increases, there will also be a downward pressure on the quantity. Finally, higher income and financial satisfaction are likely to be related to better educational achievements and higher positions in job, which means that the opportunity cost for the parents is also likely to increase with income, again resulting in a downward pressure on fertility.

that, like with many decision-making scenarios, human beings *may* make conscious decisions about child bearing, taking into considerations the cost and benefits of the outcome. However, this cannot always be the case. What the empirical observations of this study suggest, is that not all decisions are outcomes of conscious rational choices. When faced with economic hardships or uncertainties, people might make a conscious decision to delay or avoid the arrival of a child. This is a possibility, and if it happens, we can assume that the decision-makers must have made a conscious and rational decision, having reasoned that the child cannot be afforded or cared for. However, such an outcome is not a certainty because many people with poor financial circumstances do go on to have several children. In such cases, the decisions can be hardly termed as rational[27], because for someone to assess their financial conditions as not favourable for childbearing and then to decide to have a child is simply *not* economically rational. Thus, in such cases, or in many such cases, clearly the impetus to childbearing must be something other than a simple economic calculus. The reasons for childbearing could range from the innate human desire to reproduce, to the results of human interactions with their surroundings, and could also change from one instance of decision making to the next instance (Day 1992).

A further feature of the rational choice theory, which is open to challenge, is the principle of utility maximisation, or more precisely, that of economic utility maximisation. If economic utility or wealth maximisation is one of the fundamentals of the rational choice theory, then the challenge to this assumption comes from the economic theories themselves. The net cost of having children under modern conditions is more than the net economic benefits according to Becker (1960). The question then is, if wealth maximisation is the aim of human beings, then why would people continue to have children at all? What makes children so valuable that despite the net economic costs over economic utilities of children, people still have them? This question has been addressed more recently by expanding on the idea of *immanent values* or non-instrumental utilities such as psychological benefits (Coleman 1998)[28].

What conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of rational choice theory, its application by policy makers and its validity in the empirical results? One aspect common

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[26] See Chapter 5, section 5.1.3 for the example of Mueller and Short (1983), who explained the variances due to the impact of cultural and intermediate proximate factors.

[27] Except in cases where decisions are made with the hope that children could facilitate economic utility to the family through child labour.

[28] See Chapter 2, section 2.3 for details.

to the theories and policy perspectives is that they both identify almost similar socio-economic constraints and costs of children. While there is a tendency to generalise causalities to all settings, the reality is different, as shown by the survey results. In short human fertility behaviour is a field where the *messiness of subjectivity in social life*[29] is amply displayed. Theories that focus solely on the economic rationality of fertility behaviour risks fail to comprehend the subjective rationality of such behaviour. Another aspect that differentiates the theoretical perspective from the policy perspective is that the latter appears to portray the individual actor more as a *victim* of its (socio-economic) circumstances, as a result of which it is *forced* to make a particular decision. The theorists however, depict the individual as one who is fully in agreement with the reasons and outcome of his or her decision. When an individual makes a conscious rational decision based on the understanding of the circumstances and impact, rarely can the individual or the decision be termed as a victim of the circumstances[30].

9.5.2.2 The Risk Aversion and Uncertainty Reduction Perspectives

The explanation that fertility decline is a result of couples delaying or avoiding childbirth as a result of their evaluation of the perceived risks and uncertainties associated with childbearing, also has its roots in the rational choice theories. The argument is that just as individuals or couples make a rational evaluation of costs and benefits of children, they also evaluate the probabilities of occurrence of various events or contingencies associated with the arrival of children. Such risks include amongst others, children disrupting a happy relationship between the couple, children obstructing educational or career aspirations, a spouse being left alone with the children in the event of a relationship break up, and children being the victim of a hostile, crime ridden society[31]. If the perception is that of high probability of such risks, then the individuals or couples may attempt to avoid the risk by delaying or preventing childbirth, resulting in fertility decline.

The analysis of the responses of the policy makers interviewed show that some of them do understand and perceive some of these supposed risks faced by parents. One of the arguments of some policy makers who were interviewed, is that the continuous process of privatisation of most of the welfare system, education and employment sector has served to breed a sense of insecurity among the younger generation, as there is little assurance

[29] Friedman et.al. 1994.

[30] Although this is possible, because victims of circumstances can also make rational decisions.

[31] See Chapter 2, sec. 2.2 for details.

of protection from the Greek State[32]. This was claimed to have resulted in the couples shying away from making positive fertility decisions. Another argument is that the disorganised public education system has raised concerns among the parents that their children will not get a good quality education. Social injustice, increasing crime and most importantly fear of war[33] are some other factors, claimed to cause the risk aversion trends in young parents who are about to decide on childbearing. It was claimed by an institutional representative that several women have mentioned the uncertainty caused by the lack of peace and security in the world, because of which they are hesitant of having children[34]. Again, as in the case when the policy makers identified the socio-economic constraints to positive childbearing decisions, here too, they appear to evaluate individuals and their decisions to be victims of the perceived threat and uncertainties in the society. A comparison with the findings from the field survey with the couples shows that the policy makers are indeed right in their perceptions about the couples' experiences as far as risks and uncertainties in life are concerned. As already mentioned before the majority of the people surveyed have chosen concerns about the child's future as a reason for not wanting another child or children and this is the reason selected by most couples than any other[35]. The results also show that, the couples surveyed also share the theoretical assumptions of most of the other kinds of risks and uncertainties. These include the risk of children affecting the living standards, professional commitments, career aspirations and leisure time activities as well as uncertainties caused by marital dissatisfaction and fear of pregnancy. However, due to the nature of the questionnaire and research method used (i.e., selection of pre-determined responses), it is not possible to elaborate and understand the exact nature of these concerns. From a policy perspective, another interesting finding from responses on not wanting another child/children, is that there is no single reason that everybody or the majority think to be the most important reason for not wanting another child/children. For example, even though majority of respondents mention future concerns as one of the reasons, only a small proportion of them state that it is the most important reason. The distribution of responses for all the other options presented is less than 10 percent, indicating towards the highly subjective nature of people's perceptions. This leads to the conclusion that any one set or two sets of policy tools would not serve to change the perception about risks and uncertainties held by a vast majority of the population and thereby influence their fertility decisions.

[32] See Chapter 7, section 7.2.1.1.
[33] See Chapter 7, section 7.2.2.4.
[34] See Chapter 7, section 7.2.2.4.

The previous section has discussed the concept of the rational choice in childbearing and no further elaboration is needed here. However, some of the postulates of theories based on values of children, that appear to challenge the principles laid out above by those who support the risk aversion theory, need further mention here. In the theories of value of children by Friedman et.al. (1994), the authors argue that people decide *to have* children to reduce uncertainties in life, in particular the uncertainties associated with marital breakdown. By having children, parents are able to strengthen the marital bond, and thereby avoid the uncertainties in life that a divorce would bring about. In other words, the suggestion is that when there is a high risk of divorce, there is a high probability that couples will decide to have children to avoid the risk. This suggestion appears to be in disagreement with the rational actor models of risk aversion theory[36] [37]. Friedman et.al. (1994) bring in the argument of decision theorists and cognitive psychologists[38] that human beings are biased towards accepting and downplaying the risks that they face voluntarily than involuntarily (p. 383). Thus, they contend that because parenthood is voluntary in most cases, and because parents have great control over their children's fate, the uncertainties associated with children will be downplayed or preferred to the uncertainties associated with divorce.

This claim can be challenged in different ways. First of all, it is the action of parenthood or childbearing that is voluntary and controllable, and not necessarily the risks and uncertainties associated with childbearing (more on this further down). Secondly, the assumption that parents have great control over their children's fate is incorrect, at least not in all societies. Especially in the liberalised western societies, parents increasingly have lesser control over the life paths chosen by their children, external influences on their children, and therefore the fate of their children. That the survey results of *this research* show 'concerns about children's future' to be the reason chosen by the majority of the parents for not wanting another child, suggests that they perceive the fate of their children to be beyond their control. The third challenge follows from the second. If the children's fate is mostly uncontrollable by the parents, it means that the risks and

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[35] See Chapter 8, section 8.3.6 for details of distribution of all the responses.

[36] The survey results of this research show that contemplation of divorce had a weak negative influence on recent fertility. See chapter 8, section 8.3.4.

[37] Based on empirical observations, Beaujot and Tong (1985) conclude that more children are likely to be born into satisfactory relationships, while children are not generally seen as instrumental in improving unsatisfactory relationships. Lehrer et.al (1996), also comment on the internal inconsistencies of the several assumptions of the uncertainty reduction theory and quote various empirical studies to counter the theory by Friedman et.al. (1994).

[38] They refer to Goszczynska et.al 1991; MacGregor and Slovic 1989; Teigen et.al. 1988; and Slovic 1987.

uncertainties likely to emanate due to parenthood must also be mostly involuntary and uncontrollable. Thus, to qualify the point made earlier, even if the act of childbearing may be voluntary, the risks and uncertainties associated with it did not always be voluntary and controllable. Finally, if as suggested, parents are able to rationally assess the risks and uncertainties involved with a childbearing decision, they must also be able to rationalise that such risks are different to the risks associated with divorce only in their nature, but not so much in their impact. So, it is not clear on what basis would a rational actor choose one type of risk or uncertainty over the other, when the element of unknown and impact are similar in both.

This discussion, in conjunction with that in the previous section of rational choice theory, has sought to question the fundamental assumption in the rational actor models that people generally decide to have or not have children in order to gain some sort of tangible or intangible benefit from them. This is however, not to suggest that instrumental or immanent values and disutilities of children do not influence childbearing decisions – indeed scattered empirical evidence show that it may be the case in certain settings, and more importantly in certain time periods[39]. However such findings do not lend themselves to generalise to the whole population and conclude that these are the main reasons for peoples' childbearing decisions. As will be discussed later, it is imperative to policy decision making that such general conclusions, that span into space and time, are not drawn.

9.5.2.3 The Changing Value Systems

As in the case of the economic rational theories of causalities, the value theory of fertility too has received both support as well as significant challenges from opposing schools of thought. The various changes that the values, attitudes and behaviour of human beings have undergone over the periods before and after industrialisation have been discussed and analysed through the eye-piece of modernism, post-modernism, materialism and post-materialism to name a few. As described in Chapter 2, the value theorists envisaged the existence of a relationship between the evolving system of values, attitudes and behaviour and the evolving human fertility behaviour. More precisely, they have argued that with the onset of post-modernist and post-materialist values, human beings have began to prioritise individualism, self-expression and achievement of own aspirations such as those related to education and career as values more important than the traditionally

attributed socio-psychological values of children (Lesthaeghe and Moors 1996; van de Kaa 1997a). With more societies moving towards economic prosperity, the individual focus has moved from material concerns such as food and shelter to the enhancement of the 'self' (Inglehart 1977 as explained by McDonald 2000b). Therefore the argument is that the relative value of children to parents has decreased over the period, leading to a decline in fertility rates across the more developed nations, such as in the case of Europe. A further explanation is that the modern trends of consumerism and human desire to invest in individual pleasure seeking activities, have often resulted in a trade-off between the 'fun' and 'burden' of having children leading to decision not to have children or delay childbearing (Lutz 1996). Finally, there is the argument that modern values such as the legitimacy and benefits of birth control practices, easily diffuse into the broader society through channels such as the mass media resulting in fertility reductions (Misiti 2000; Westoff 1999).

Before discussing the challenges to this theory, let us compare it with some of the perspectives of the policy makers interviewed in this study. The results showed that, many policy institutions in Greece believe that the younger generations of Greece are self-seeking, insular, anti-social and anti-national in their attitude. The young generation are alleged to have moved away from Christian principles and to have set priorities on such 'pleasures' of life as travelling, building a luxurious house and buying a car, before thinking about having children. There is also the suggestion that the increasing employment of women leads to their autonomy, emergence of the value of careerism in them along with their departure from traditional family roles. In some cases there is outright condemnation 'of the woman who works more than eight hours a day'! Finally there is the suggestion that mass media has served to confuse the Greeks with the idea that the problem of population explosion of the third world is in fact also a problem of Greece, as a result of which, many Greeks consider it important not to have many children. Thus, the theory of changing value systems seems to fit very well with the opinion of many of the policy makers. Such perspectives, even though they resonate with the theoretical suggestion of evolving value systems, cannot be said to be analytical and an objective evaluation of the causalities of fertility decline. They seem to be more indicative of an institutional system that reduces the debate to a blaming game, where the finger is pointed at the modern women or men who are associated with low fertility.

[39] See Chapter 5, section 5.1.3.

Van de Kaa (2001) clearly voices the gap in institutional perception and reality experiences of the new generation in the post-modern era:

> "The populations have become alienated from the political elites: yesterday's men are incapable of understanding the problems and desires of today's young women and men. Conflicts about ethical issues ... appear impossible to resolve now that the self-evident truth and value of certain moral positions have been questioned" (p. 294).

Not all of the institutional responses at the interviews, however, are as biased or judgmental as described above. For example, some of them discuss the need to preserve individual freedom and right of choice in all aspects of life including children[40]. Some others refer to value and ideational changes connected to more realistic issues such as parents' increasing concerns about crime, war and general insecurity in society, and modern marital values as reasons for fertility decline. These opinions in fact compare well with the findings from the survey with the couples, which showed that concerns and uncertainty about the future had a weak negative influence, but statistically significant, to their recent fertility. Apart from agreeing with the responses of some of the policy makers interviewed, if anything, this shows that the majority of the couples indeed value children and their wellbeing very highly, contradicting the opinion that most of the new generation are self-seeking individuals. In the case of modern perceptions about marriage[41] too, the results match the opinion of some of the policy makers. The results show that those individuals with a modern view of marriage may have fewer children, although the influence is weak and not statistically significant.

There are other further empirical observations that challenge many of the theoretical assumptions behind the value theory as well as the biased political perspectives that emerge from the interviews. First of all, the results of the field survey of this research itself indicate a healthy mix of both traditional and modern values among the couples surveyed. Most people still think that marriage is important to family formation and that children are a blessing from God[42]. The traditional gender role of male breadwinner model is challenged and most respondents think husbands should equally share the household responsibilities with the wife. In the case of values of children, all the traditionally attributed values of children are very highly regarded by a vast majority of the respondents. These observations are also consistent with the findings of the

[40] See Chapter 7, section 7.1.1.1.

[41] The concept of 'Modern view of marriage' included two statements: 1) Divorce is acceptable when marriage becomes an unhappy experience; and 2) A person should be satisfied with his/her own life before starting a family (see Chapter 8, section 8.2.2.1.

[42] See Chapter 8, section 8.2.2.1.

Eurobarometer report on Europeans and the Family (Malpas and Lambert 1993). Thus, all of these findings clearly cast doubt on the suggestions of most of the institutional representatives interviewed that children have become a relatively low priority in the value order of the modern generation.

The observations on the preferences for the number of children provide another strong case to suggest that despite the ideational changes of the post-modern era, peoples' perceptions on the values of children are unlikely to have changed significantly. In the case of Greece, although the mean number of children ever born to the couples surveyed is 2.07 (those who have completed their fertility intentions), the mean number of children desired by them is 2.47 and the mean number of children they consider to be ideal for a Greek family is 2.78[43]. This suggests that based on their values and attitudes, the Greek people still prefer to have more children. Note that these figures are also higher than the population replacement level of 2.1[44]. Based on the observations of above-replacement level preferences for number of children by women in Europe, Bachrach (2001) raises the poignant question *Why do post-modern fertility preferences in Europe still remain high, above the replacement levels, even while the actual fertility rates are below replacement levels?* Two parts can be identified to this question. Firstly, if the evolving or the already evolved post-modern values have a depressing effect on fertility, then why is it that surveys show that people of the post-modern era still have high fertility preferences? Secondly, why is it that there is a difference between the preferred fertility rates and actually achieved fertility rates? (ibid. p. 335). The first part challenges the suggestion of the changing value theory. The second part suggests there could be other factors that sway people's actual fertility behaviour from their preferences.

One of the reasons for such variations between fertility preferences and actual fertility experiences may be that, at the point of decision making, couples may have to make compromises based on their individual circumstances, such as the socio-economic background. Based on the findings of a survey in Morocco, Obermeyer (1999) suggests the possibility of existence of a dual value system, one at the societal level, that is more traditional, and a different one at the individual level that is more responsive to the prevailing socio-economic conditions and ideational norms. Although not the ideal comparison due to different settings, Greece like Morocco, has a traditional society where individuals, at least the modern individuals, try to co-exist with more contemporary

[43] See Chapter 8, section 8.2.2.2, Table 8.9.

ideologies. Following on from the question raised by Bachrach (2001), another possibility is that, influenced by the ideational evolution, people may not have altogether abandoned or demoted their preference for children, or their perceived value of children. Instead, they may have redefined their own ideas as to how children, not just in quantity, but also in their quality and timing, can help them attain their individual aspirations[45]. This could also mean just postponement of childbirth rather than totally avoiding it. In fact, Van de Kaa's evidence to support the theory of links between post-modern values and fertility highlights the influence of such values on the timing of births rather than their ability to prevent or reduce the number of births (Bulatao 2001).

A further challenge to the value theory arises when the fertility pattern is analysed across several groups of countries. Traditional societies such as the southern European countries of Greece, Italy and Spain, who have relatively more traditional values, experience *lower* fertility rates than the liberal northern Western countries such as Norway and Sweden, where the so called post-modern values are more evident. This and similar evidence by Bachrach earlier, points towards the incongruity between theoretical suggestion and empirical observation, diminishing the usefulness of the theory of changing value systems (McDonald 2000b).

The observations of Santow and Bracher (1999), based on evidence from southern European and other nations, serves as a suitable concluding remark for this discussion of the value theory of fertility:

> "We present here a case study ... it shows that family size can fall without corresponding change in the values attached to the family or family life ... we do not dispute the commonly expressed notion that changes in ideas about the importance of the family may be sufficient to catalyse a reduction in family size, but we do dispute that such changes are necessary" (p. 52).

Both the above statements as well as the discussion that preceded it suggest that from the perspective of fertility policy debate and development, it is important to have, at the least, an openness of interpretation of the likely influences of ideational changes on fertility behaviour. However, as evident from the policy makers' statements above, all too often, they are eager to blame ideational changes as the reason for fertility decline in Greece.

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[44] Symeonidou (2000a, 2002b) found similar disparities between ideal, desired and actual number of children born, in the Family and Fertility Survey conducted in 1999.

[45] In anthropology, there is now a wide consensus that individuals continuously reinterpret and renegotiate cultural and social norms regarding acceptable individual behaviour (Mason 1997a, p.447).

9.5.2.4 The Gender Equity Perspective

One of the common features found in all three theoretical approaches discussed so far is that empirical evidence and observations often seem to contradict theoretical predictions. The gender equity theory of fertility decline is not impervious to this paradox. The same tenets of the theory have been applied by different authors to explain the fertility trends observed during the pre-transition period (high fertility) as well as that of the post transition period (both relatively high and low fertility). One argument is that in pre-transition societies, which are characterised by high levels of gender role and status classification, female child mortality[46] and therefore aggregate child mortality are high. When child mortality rates are high, fertility levels are also high[47]. Another argument is that highly stratified gender systems put greater restrictions on women's access to better education and employment opportunities. Following the economic models, this then lowers the opportunity cost of having children, helping to maintain a high demand for them and hence high fertility rates. Gender equity theories are further applied in societies where women achieve increasing levels of autonomy, as well as in the post-transition societies where fertility levels are already lower. High levels of gender equity gives women greater knowledge and access to fertility control methods as well as facilitate the diffusion of such knowledge, both resulting in the lowering of fertility.

Before moving to a discussion of challenges to this theoretical approach, the Greek policy makers' evaluation of the fertility decline from a gender equity perspective can be discussed. None of the policy respondents commented directly on gender equity. However, if greater gender equity is assumed to be a causal factor of the observed increase in female education and labour participation, then both these results have been emphasised by several respondents as causal to fertility decline. One such observation is that female education and employment has resulted in their autonomy and careerism as well as a shift away from traditional family roles. The career oriented woman who depends on the baby sitter for childcare, while she focuses on her career is condemned. However, the opinion that female employment leads to fertility decline is rejected by some, who point to the relatively low female employment rates in Greece, compared to the Scandinavian countries, which still have higher fertility rates. The modern young

[46] Female mortality rates are high in societies that have a preference for male children over female children. See also Mason 2001.

[47] Mortality decline has been stated as a necessary pre-condition for fertility decline by several well known authors including Chesnais (1992) and Mason (1997a, 2001).

women who use various birth control methods to 'first enjoy their life' too are criticised by some. Taking a slightly different and more practical approach, another observation is that even though the gender roles of women have changed, they are still forced to carry out most of the family responsibilities, while men have not assumed any similar roles yet creating an inequity in roles as well as decision making process[48].

There are different variables tested in the survey results with the couples, through which varying gender roles of women and their impact on recent fertility rates can be understood. Female education and female employment show a negative influence on recent fertility[49]. Similarly, the age of females at the first marriage and the use of family planning also show a negative influence. Thus, in the aggregate, both theoretical predictions and political perspectives seem to be matched by observed experiences as far as changing gender roles and their influence on fertility is concerned.

Notwithstanding the empirical observations above and their apparent match with theoretical predictions and political perspectives, do gender equity theories really explain the post-transitional fertility decline seen in Greece as well as in Europe? That the roles of women are changing, more women are utilising opportunities traditionally accessible only to men, and more women are taking up employment is indisputable. However, does this necessarily mean that women have achieved or are even moving towards gender equity? If gender equity is interpreted in its strictest sense, that is, women and men are considered equal in all aspects except their gender, or more correctly despite their gender difference, the answer would have to be an emphatic *no*. This then suggests that throughout the literature, the proponents of gender equity theory appear to have misinterpreted the concept of gender equity. The truth is that gender equity, in its true sense, does not exist in any society in this world. At the same time, the concept of partial equality in human interactions is questionable because one is either equal to another or simply not equal to another[50].

Why is it important to avoid using the concept of gender equity in explaining fertility trends? This is because, just as it is misinterpreted and misapplied in theoretical explanations, a review of the earlier mentioned institutional responses shows that it has been wrongly understood to be the reason for fertility decline. It also creates that myth

[48] See Chapter 7, section 7.2.2.3.
[49] Similar negative influence of female education and female employment are also observed in the desired number of children. See Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.5.

that somehow, achieving 'greater' or 'full' gender equity in the context of changing gender roles, will help create and sustain increasing fertility trends. Different societies, based on their cultural norms, class division norms, and susceptibility to evolving technology and ideologies, have practised different levels of gender role stratification. This role stratification is dynamic in that, based on changes to various norms, ideologies and technology, the role stratification will evolve. However, that does not necessarily imply a move towards gender equity. To achieve gender equity, fundamentally, is to achieve a complete abandonment of this role stratification and a simultaneous change of mindset amongst both men *and women* that they are equal in all aspects except their actual gender. The reality is that this may never be possible. While the ethically challenged and morally open minded society will always desire and strive to achieve this equity, it is nonetheless likely to remain just as elusive, as other forms of equality such as between races, social class and so on. No matter how abhorrent it may be, just as there might be individuals and societies who may never accept that they and their coloured neighbour are the same, there might be individuals and societies who will never accept that men and women are the same. This is however, not to suggest that any move towards reducing the gap between gender roles is undesirable. While it is a virtue in itself, a discussion of some of the empirical observations and their explanations by gender equity theorists will demonstrate how this concept has sometimes been misinterpreted and misapplied.

One of the gender equity paradoxes is that the observed fertility trends in southern European countries such as Greece and Italy contradict the prediction that 'low gender equity' results in higher fertility trends, relative to societies with 'higher levels of gender equity'. For example, Greece, which is a traditional society in this respect, has very low levels of fertility compared to Sweden, which is a modern and liberalised society, with supposedly 'higher gender equity'. The explanation given for this paradox is that, it is the combination of 'high gender equity' and a welfare infrastructure that is favourable to combining work and family life, that helps to sustain higher fertility rates in the latter societies[51]. However, the reality is that gender roles remain highly stratified even in the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden[52]. So the difference is that, irrespective of the similarities in gender role stratification throughout the liberal and traditional societies, Scandinavian nations provide better State support to their working mothers with

[50] This strict interpretation of gender equity however, disagrees with that of Fraser (1994), who broadly defines it as affording women the same respect, rights and access to all social activities as men. See Chapter 2; section 2.4.
[51] See Chapter 2 and also Chesnais 1996 and McDonald 2000a.
[52] Presser 2001 (p. 181), see also Mason 2001 (p.173).

parenthood intentions. Flexible and part-time work opportunities, is one such means that would normally help women better cope with work and family life. The example of the Netherlands provides a different perspective. In the Netherlands, the majority of the employed women work only part time[53], and there is a high degree of male participation in family work[54]. Yet, its fertility levels are below the replacement level. This suggests that even if the prevailing social settings enabled women to combine work and family life, fertility increase need not necessarily follow it.

What then is the significance of the concept of gender equity for interpretation of fertility trends? That it would help to focus efforts to identify more practical and realistic issues, would be the obvious answer. Efforts to attain gender equality should be a policy objective for the virtue it represents, and not be considered as instrumental for other societal objectives. The above arguments show that gender role ideologies, and in certain cases even social settings may not have a significant influence on fertility trends. The literature has provided convincing arguments that the contraceptive revolution that began in the 1960's, whereby women took control over their fertility behaviour, may be the single most significant gender role change, which has influenced the post-transitional fertility trends (Mason 2001; Hakim 2003). Based on her recent research and remarkable findings, Hakim (2003) argues that women's lifestyle preferences have a great predictive power on their fertility behaviour[55]. The freedom availed through contraceptive revolution has a significant role in defining and achieving those preferences, in so far as fertility stands between the preferences and their achievement (ibid). Thus, from a policy perspective, identifying those lifestyle preferences and enabling women to achieve them, may be crucial to understanding fertility trends.

9.5.3 The Policy Suggestions by Policy Makers and Couples

This section discusses the policy suggestions made by the Greek policy makers in order to increase fertility rates in Greece. It also compares these suggestions to the preferences for various fertility policy measures[56] shown by the Greek couples as well as their

[53] Presser (2001).
[54] Schulze et.al. (2000).
[55] Hakim (2003) defines the lifestyle preferences based on women's bias towards career (work centred), family (home-centred) and a combination of both (adaptive). Accordingly, the work-centred are less likely to have high fertility intentions and consequently least likely to be influenced by fertility policies such as parental leaves. A combination of flexible policy tools, however, will enable the adaptive and home-centred groups to achieve their relatively higher fertility intentions.
[56] These policy preferences were obtained through a set of multiple response close-end questions. See Chapter 8, section 8.4.2 for full results.

perspectives on the likely impact of such policy measures on their future fertility intentions. Knowledge about couples' policy preferences and their own perspectives on the likely impact does not guarantee that such policies will indeed help to increase fertility in future. However it does represent the policy-related expectations of the Greek couples to a certain extent, as well as what they believe to be the possible solutions for the issues they experience at present. In this context, comparison of these two perspectives could help to understand how well policy makers understand the policy-related needs and expectations of the Greek couples.

The analysis results of the most preferred policy options by the Greek couples show that, among the options presented to them, there is no overwhelming preference for any single policy option compared to the others[57]. Less than half of the surveyed population (44%) prefer to see a reduction in income taxes for parents with children. Just over one third of them wish to see a substantial decrease in the cost of their children's education. For all the other policy options presented, the distribution of positive preferences is under 30% and some even as low as 10% (increased opportunities for part-time work for parents with children). This suggests that, just as the causes of fertility decline are likely to be highly subjective and heterogeneous even within a given society, the preferences for various policy measures are also likely to be subjective.

Analysis was also carried out to understand how the couples themselves evaluate the probable impact of some of their preferred policy measures on their fertility intentions. For those couples who intend to have children in the future, an overwhelming 78% believe that if their preferred policy measures are implemented in full, it would make it easier for them to achieve their preferred family sizes. Almost 38% of them say they would even consider the possibility of having an additional child. For a significant majority of those who are not certain of their future fertility intentions, implementing their preferred policies are likely to help them make a positive fertility decision. Furthermore, in the case of those who have decided not to have another child, but believe that their preferred policies are likely to have some impact on their decision, two thirds of them believe they would reconsider their decision[58].

So what are some of these policy options that are likely to make a difference to the couples' future fertility intentions? What do the policy makers think to be the policies that

[57] See Chapter 8, section 8.4.3. The policy options presented to the couples create certain limitations to the findings in that the list of options given were by no means exhaustive and inclusive of all various options in force or that could be implemented in future. See Chapter 10, section 10.2.2 for details of limitations.
[58] See Chapter 8, section 8.4.2.

are likely to make an impact? The analysis of couples' responses shows that they believe that policy measures such as reduction in income tax and education costs, improvement in child allowances and maternity and parental leave arrangements, and better child care facilities are most likely to impact on the future fertility decision of those who intend to have more children as well as those who are uncertain about their intentions.

9.5.3.1 Financial Incentives, Child Care Facilities and Allowances

An analysis of policy maker's responses indicates that they too place heavy emphasis on policy options related to financial incentives[59]. However, a closer look at the financial incentives reveals that there are severe disagreements between different policy respondents. While some suggest that any financial incentives should be linked to income, most disagree with the means tested eligibility criteria. The field survey show that more than half of the couples believe allowances should be means tested, even though almost all of them think the current level of allowances are too low. Several policy respondents suggest that the second and third child are the most important in reversing fertility trends, and therefore child allowances should increase with the birth order of the child. However, there are also respondents who believe allowances should decrease with the birth order, placing emphasis on motivating couples to have one or two children. Some suggest no allowances should be given for the first or second child, where as a vast majority of the couples surveyed wanted allowance for all the children. Improvement in childcare facilities is a policy area where a vast majority of those couples who have shown a preference to it, believes that its implementation will positively influence their future fertility intentions. However, none of the policy makers interviewed make any specific policy suggestions apart from making it completely free and increasing the hours of service. For example, they do not discuss up to what age such facilities should be available. The couples' responses show that preferences for types of childcare facilities vary.

On the far extreme, there are also policy suggestions that recommend a complete ban on child allowances and benefits. The policy respondent with this opinion believes in a more socialist approach, where the State should assume complete responsibility for insurance, health care, education and pensions. It is also suggested that employers should be freed from the burden of all forms of parental and maternity allowances, and the responsibility

[59] See Chapter 7, sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 for details of all policy suggestions, by number of policy makers who supported and opposed the measures.

should be transferred to the State. The additional cost to the State should be borne by increasing VAT, income tax and sales tax, it is suggested. Another suggested means of meeting the additional expenses was taxing those who do not have children, in order to pay for the provisions to those who had children! Neither of these policy suggestions make practical sense or applicability. However, such a policy option contradicts the preference of almost half of the sample population, who would like to see a decrease in income taxes for parents with children.

9.5.3.2 Housing and Education Support

Further policy suggestions have been made to remove the perceived socio-economic constraints that prevent couples from achieving their desired family size. One such measure is related to housing. Housing support for young families is one popular policy option that has received much attention even in the literature[60]. Improved support in housing such as rent allowances would be preferred by a significant proportion of the couples surveyed, and a vast majority of those who have selected this policy think it will positively influence their future fertility decisions. However, as seen in the discussion of causalities, this does not necessarily imply a preference for an owned house or that couples wait until they own a house to have a child[61]. In this context, one of more radical policy suggestion needs mention here. The policy opinion is that the state should provide housing loans to young couples, with interest waived at the birth of the third child, and the whole mortgage written off if the couples go on to have a fourth child[62]. As attractive it may seem, it is highly unlikely that such policies will convince the average Greek couple to have three or four children, because as indicated in the survey results, most couples desire less than three children on average[63]. Another suggestion that rent allowances should be cancelled for those who do not have children within the first two years of forming a family[64] is highly likely to be contested on grounds of infringing individual freedom of choice.

Many policy makers also recognise that the Greek society gives great importance to the education of its children, but however face difficulties due to the poor quality of public education systems and the cost of private education[65]. However, when it comes to policy

[60] McDonald 2000b; Gauthier 1999.
[61] See Chapter 8, section 8.3.2.
[62] See Chapter 7, sections 7.3.2 and 7.2.3 for policy suggestions.
[63] See Chapter 8, section 8.2.2.3.
[64] See Chapter 7, section 7.3.3.3.
[65] See Chapter 7, section 7.2.1.2.

suggestion, the only suggestion made is the provision of completely free education as part of the socialisation of all benefits. The practical implication of such measures was not addressed. Subsidising education by the state, however, is not a policy option that has received widespread approval in the literature, because of its inherent restrictive nature on parental choice over children's education (Demeny 1987)[66]. Therefore, providing financial assistance to cover education costs would be a more appropriate policy (ibid.).

9.5.3.3 Employment, Leave and Work Arrangements

Employment is another area which many of the policy makers think need significant policy improvements, in order to help the couples with their fertility decisions. On the more practical side there are suggestions that parents, especially working mothers, should be given more flexibility and opportunities to combine work and family responsibilities by increasing part-time work opportunities. Other policy suggestions include providing parental leave for the father, increasing the duration of parental leave, fully paid parental leave[67] and job guarantees for mothers returning to work. However, the responses did not suggest that there was a majority of the policy respondents considered these policy options to be important[68]. However, there is no political consensus in this area of policy suggestion. For example, certain institutional representatives disagree with the policy of flexible and part-time opportunities and suggest that such policies are in the first place attempts by a failed state to hide the true levels of unemployment in the country. According to them, such policies (as a means to increase fertility) would only serve to take more people out of full-time employment, reducing their earnings and benefits, leading to illegal work practices, financial instability and poverty, and thereby act as a disincentive to having children. Following this argument, the nationalisation of all industries, creation of more employment opportunities and a system of equality where all employees will receive the same salary, is suggested.

9.6 THE INFERENCE AND CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this final part of this chapter is to draw conclusions based on the discussion above. It is appropriate to start by restating the main research question:

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[66] Demeny (1987) argues that when State subsidies are introduced, as opposed to direct cash transfer to parents, it limits the parents ability to choose the location and quality of education available to their children.
[67] Since 2001, either parent can take the parental leave, if both are working. However it is fully unpaid and the duration is for a maximum of 3.5 months.
[68] Only 3 of the policy respondents interviewed discussed in detail parental/maternity leave arrangements.

> What are the Greek policy maker's perceptions on the causes and consequences of fertility decline in Greece and what do they believe to be the fertility policy related needs of Greek couples?

In order to find and evaluate the answer to this question, it was necessary to discuss and evaluate theories on causalities of fertility decline. Most scientific studies consider it desirable to neatly and logically compartmentalise causes and effects. Once causes and effects are established, the next step is to generalise and draw a universal principle explaining the phenomenon. Most theoretical studies on fertility decline follow this model. Even while many theorists admit that theories of causalities of fertility decline cannot be an absolute science, the conclusions of most theoretical explanations often reflect this tendency to generalise. Most of the theorisation on causalities suggested, argued and presented empirical evidence to prove that fertility decisions are a result of rational decisions, based on individuals' cultural, attitudinal, value and socio-economic characteristics. Between these characteristics and the actual achievement of fertility goals lie the proximate characteristics that act as intermediate factors. In the backdrop of such theorisation, and the results from the empirical studies of *this research*, the first question to ponder is why is it that several of the theoretically identified determinants of fertility have been shown to have no significant causal influence on couples' fertility decisions?

A second question to ask is whether the theories have adequately addressed the subjectivity of fertility decision-making behaviour of people. Most fertility theories have used macro-analytic models and explained the causal relationships at aggregate levels such as the society, community and institution, using exogenous structural factors like socio-economic characteristics and certain cultural characteristics (Smith 1989). Such explanations however, fail to apportion adequate attention to the individual level fertility experiences that are often the result of the endogenous socio-psychological and behavioural factors. Consequently, the subjectivity of human behaviour that is more easily identifiable at the micro-level, does not receive sufficient recognition.

The subjectivity of human behaviour could also mean that the reasons for fertility decline of the last century or few decades need not necessarily be the same as those that cause a decline now or in the future. As people go through cultural, ideological and attitudinal changes, they are also likely to experience behavioural changes both at the macro and micro level. Thus, while history has shown that fertility trends are dynamic, clearly it should also mean that the causes of such trends are also dynamic.

The fact that many theories fail the test of empirical studies on several occasions suggests that they fail to suitably incorporate this subjectivity and dynamism of the causalities of human fertility behaviour. Therefore, if policy intervention is a stated objective of the government, the most important thing is to understand the subjectivity of human behaviour and incorporate a micro-level approach. A micro-approach is not only essential to clarify causalities of fertility decline, but also vital to develop effective policy options. Policy efforts to understand the fertility experiences and needs at the micro level, could help improve understanding of subjectivity and the diversity that might be found even within the fertility experiences of a single society.

However, the responses of the policy makers such as "we need to set a target with regards to the age structure, and number of population we require" shows that the macro-analytic approach to causation prevails in their ideas about solutions. Such a blanket concept of solutions is a result of traditional societies' and institution's perspectives that disregard the 'individual decision maker', but affirms the notion of the 'individual social-servant' who has the responsibility of ensuring societal continuity through reproduction (Ryder 1983). Such institutional perspectives that expect the individuals to discharge their perceived social obligations are akin to the existence of an 'overall pattern of autocratic control' over the people, of which social vices such as gender inequalities and female subordination are inextricable components (Smith 1989). This is however, not to suggest that macro-approaches are undesirable or completely avoidable when setting policy targets. On the other hand, in the context of earlier discussions, it highlights the need to ensure that policy targets and policy measures are also driven by new research, which looks more carefully at the subjectivity of the target population.

The review of institutional perspectives in Greece also revealed several other shortcomings that underpin the current fertility policy debates. The perspectives on consequences and causalities clearly indicated that in many cases, policy-makers' opinions are emotive, biased and based on unproven assumptions. That the empirical findings on causalities did not match with the political perspectives in many cases confirms this. Thus, the answer to the first part of the research question, concerning institutional perspectives on causes and consequences is that current knowledge is limited in its relevance to the true experiences of Greek couples. Policy makers just have a good general understanding of the likely factors that influence fertility trends. Such limited understanding is based on assumptions, and theories. It is clearly not based on knowledge of the actual behaviour of Greek couples.

Nevertheless, a review of policy suggestions showed that policy makers have a better grasp of the policy related needs of couples. It would seem paradoxical that although policy makers' perspectives on causes and consequences of fertility decline in Greece do not match these of the Greek couples, they are still able to understand the general policy related needs of the Greek couples, in relation to their fertility decisions. The results of the survey however showed that, their apparent understanding of the couples' policy related needs do not go beyond knowledge of general policy areas such as housing, childcare, financial incentives and employment. Furthermore, such an understanding is only a result of general theoretical debates on policies, and not a result of any specific policy oriented empirical studies conducted in Greece. Where specific suggestions were made, in most cases they are ideologically biased and often highly impractical. In addition, there are strong disagreements among policy makers as to the relevance and need for policies in certain areas. Another feature is that policy makers believe that any policy could help to improve fertility rates. In addition, indeed couples too believe that implementation of their preferred policies would positively influence their future fertility intentions. However, that is no guarantee for their likely future behaviour.

Thus, from an evaluation of Greek institutional perspectives on the causalities and consequences of fertility decline, various policy suggestions, and a comparison with the ground realities as observed through the survey with the Greek couples, the following can be concluded:

> The Greek institutional perspectives and fertility policy debates at the political level are not completely informed of the true causes of the observed continuous fertility decline in Greece. There is bias in these debates towards mobilising political initiatives to reverse fertility trends for nationalistic reasons such as preservation of the Greek people and 'Hellenism'. There is very little understanding of what Greek couples really face and experience in their day to day life, influencing their fertility behaviour. Such lack of understanding of real experiences have led to the development and implementation of mostly one-size fits-all policies, that have yielded little effect in so far as reversing fertility trends are concerned.

This conclusion suitably addresses the stated aim of the thesis in the introduction chapter, which was: "To establish whether fertility policy debates in Greece are informed by an understanding of the influences on parenting behaviour, and in particular on their fertility decisions".

It also addresses the various objectives mentioned in the same chapter, and restated here:

- Examine the extent to which the Greek fertility policy debates (or policy discourses) are informed by an understanding of the influences on parenting behaviour, and in particular on their fertility decisions.
- Examine the nature of the current fertility policy debates.
- Bring out the arguments of those who are in favour of and against State intervention in fertility issues through policy initiatives, and their rationale.
- Understand how their arguments and comprehension of the whole issue of fertility, causes and consequences of fertility decline and policy solutions match with what the couples actually perceive and experience in reality. Empirical data collected in the study will help to establish whether the arguments and perceptions of the policy institutions are corroborated.
- Highlight the gaps in some of the relevant existing policies and put forward suggestions to modify and realign those policy initiatives in to a more result oriented direction. This objective of providing suggestions based on identified gaps, is dealt within the following chapter.

The policy implications of this conclusion and the findings behind it, possible future research and policy directions, as well as the limitations of this research itself, are discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 10:

POLICY IMPLICATIONS; CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS; AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Introduction

The objective of this research was to understand the Greek institutional perspective on the causes and consequences of fertility decline as well as the policy-related needs of couples. The researcher considered it of merit to understand whether the institutional perspective matched with the realities of the common man and woman, that is, the Greek couple, concerning their fertility behaviour and decisions. It was expected that the research would provide insight into understanding why the country's fertility policies (implicit and explicit) have not yielded any significant results, in so far as reversing fertility trend were concerned. The findings have been discussed in the form of a synthesis of different perspectives in the previous chapter. This final chapter of the thesis has three objectives: (1) To discuss the policy implications of the findings; (2) To perform an evaluative summary of this research's contributions and its limitations; and (3) To outline some directions for future research on the topic of policies related to fertility decline in Greece.

10.1 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

10.1.1 Is Direct State Intervention Desirable?

The survey of Greek couples shows that the vast majorities of them believe that the state only has a partial responsibility to intervene in fertility intentions in order to increase the nation's fertility rates[1]. On the other hand, they expect the state to take full responsibility to ensure equal opportunities for all citizens, provide adequate health care and improve employment opportunities. What do these findings imply? Against this backdrop, it is relevant to ask whether the state should directly intervene to influence couples' private decisions regarding their fertility intentions. The historic precedent of state intervention

[1] See Chapter 8, section 8.4.1.

as well as the emphasis placed by the vast majority of the demographic research to date, appear to cement the notion that the state is responsible to try and increase its fertility rates. But do Greek couples really want the state to dictate to them how many children they should be having, or coerce them into having a family size that the State thinks is ideal? Evidence from this study suggests that they do not want the State to influence their decisions. If so, how does this fit with the empirical observations that also suggest that if their desired policies are implemented, the couples believe that it would positively help in their fertility decisions? Careful observation and interpretation of the results would confirm that there is no contradiction in what the Greek couples expect from the state. As already stated, most of them only see a limited role for direct state intervention. At the same time they would approve of a greater state role in other social policy areas, such as employment and social equality that can have an indirect impact on their fertility decisions by creating favourable circumstances. In other words, they would like the state to remove the obstacles that stand in their way of achieving their individual fertility intentions. They are as protective of their rights to freedom of choice, as they are aware of their traditionally mandated social roles. For example, that they see only a partial role for the state to facilitate female labour participation or provide opportunities to combine work and child-rearing, suggests there is a bias towards upholding traditional female roles in Greece. That they see only a partial role for the state to take care of the elderly suggests that, in line with Greek tradition, they believe it is their own responsibility to provide care for the elderly parents.

What are the implications of such an observation on attempts for direct state intervention to influence the couples' childbearing decisions? The first implication is that, irrespective of what the science of demography says should be the fertility rate to achieve replacement population, the state may not be able to control family size in Greece. This is a choice that forms part of the individual freedom, as has been reaffirmed on various occasions by the United Nations, as well as by most democratic constitutions (Freedman and Isaacs 1993). Because the desired number of children is likely to vary from individual to individual, it would be an infringement upon freedom of choice if the state were to stipulate how many children families should ideally have[2]. The state might stipulate an

[2] As observed the mean desired number of children in Crete is 2.59 (Chapter 8, section 8.2.2.3), which is well above the replacement level of 2.1. This means that, even without idealising any particular family size, the State has sufficient opportunities to take alternative political measures that will not be perceived as infringement of freedom of choice. Potential political actions are discussed later.

ideal family size, but contrary to what some policy respondents suggest, it might not be possible for it to determine what the country's total population should be.

A second implication of such findings is that they challenge policy makers' suggestions for policy disincentives for those not having children, as well as the state's current policy orientation for positive economic inducements. In an era where individual freedom has been accorded utmost importance, there is no justification in suggesting that those exercising their individual freedom not to have children should be taxed or excluded from social provisions. Such measures could be seen as coercive and may be met with public and political objection. Equally questionable are the state's attempts to induce couples into having children or having many children by providing financial benefits, especially when they are incremental, relative to the birth order of the child[3]. There are suggestions that positive incentives could enhance the choice available to parents, in that they create a new option to have a child and benefit economically out of it or decline the option and lose nothing (Berelson and Lieberson 1979). However, this does not hide the fact that there are indirect state-efforts to buy more children off the parents, to add to the number.

Based on the findings from the survey and the above arguments, it can be concluded that state-attempts to direct and regulate fertility behaviour are unlikely to be welcomed by the people.

10.1.2 The Scope for Future Political Action towards Fertility Decline

Four options for State response could be conceived: (1) Coerce the couples to have a certain number of children; (2) Retreat completely from state responsibilities to assist couples with their fertility intentions; (3) Increase the desire in people to have more children; and (4) Remove the obstacles that prevent couples from achieving their desired number of children. If the findings of this research and the earlier arguments are taken into consideration, then the first two options become unacceptable. Direct intervention is unacceptable, but at the same time, the couples expect the state to assist. The third option, is not strictly relevant to the Greek reality, because already the couples on average desire for more than two children, which if achieved is sufficient to replace population levels. In a context where they cannot even achieve their desired number of children, it would not make sense for the state to attempt to increase their desired number even

[3] As explained previously, the majority of the couples surveyed require the same allowance for all the children, and believe it should be related to the family income and age of the child. This means, they do not expect it

further through media propaganda and education, as some policy makers suggest. Thus, the most viable policy option available to address decline of fertility is to remove the barriers that prevent Greek couples from having their desired number of children.

10.1.2.1 Remove the Obstacles

If removing the obstacles is accepted as a suitable option for policy, then policy objectives need to be set accordingly. It will not be sufficient just to set numerical or statistical targets such as raising the average number of children per woman to 2.1. The objectives would fully take into consideration the identified needs of individuals and couples. Policy assistance should be provided where it is needed. Where couples desire to have children of their free will, but are restricted due to circumstances, policies should try to mitigate the effects of those circumstances.

Removal of obstacles would involve implementing policy measures based on a real understanding of couples perceived difficulties in having children as well as preferred policy measures as discussed in Chapter 8. Examples would be understanding the needs based on their socio-economic circumstances, and introducing policies such as improved child care where there is a preference shown for such policies and so on.

10.1.2.2 Decentralise the Political Debates, Policy Development and Administration

It has been discussed at length in the previous chapter how several theoretical and political approaches have failed to give adequate significance to the subjective nature of human decision making behaviour. If policy response is a stated objective of the government, it is vital to understand the subjectivity of human behaviour. Efforts to understand such behaviour should be dynamic, continuous, and constantly open to review in relation to the changing contexts. As societies increasingly become multicultural, and social norms, family forms, individual life styles become increasingly pluralistic, it will be of little value to develop and introduce general one-size fits all policy measures at the national level, on the basis of theoretically established causalities. At a national level, what is required is the political will to mobilise efforts and resources into research and policy initiatives. However, equally significant responsibilities lie at the local administrative level. The local authorities need the flexibility to implement the policy measures that are found to be needed in their settings. For example, a rural prefecture might show its

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as an incentive, rather as a means to meet the economic demands incurred as the child grows, given their ability to afford them (See Chapter 8, section 8.4.3).

fertility trends to be linked to high levels of unemployment and therefore to low income and high economic insecurity. Another highly urbanised prefecture might show its fertility trends to be related to lack of childcare facilities in combination with high levels of female employment. Economic development policies would be the ideal ones in the first case, whereas adequate child-care infrastructure could help in the second case. National level policy debates will not be suitable to identify and establish such regional differences in causalities, because as already established in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7, they are invariably likely to be influenced by generalised theories on causalities[4].

10.1.2.3 Mobilising Unbiased, Fact-based Policy Debates

Another feature of the policy debates discussed in the previous chapter was that they tended to be biased, based on political, cultural and religious ideologies, and assumptions. Previous attempts to establish national level political debate forums in Greece have proved unsuccessful because of the domination by strongly pro-natalistic and nationalistic ideologies[5]. The dearth of political consensus on policy directions due to ideological differences was also evident in the findings of this research[6]. One consequence of ideology-based policy debates was that their findings had only a surface level relevance to the reality as experienced by most Greek couples. It is therefore essential to create a platform where demographic trends and policy options can be debated independent of such ideological biases. This would facilitate policy debates based on facts and development of policy tools that are based on established needs of the people. Realising the long-standing demand to establish a National Demographic Institution could be an appropriate move in this direction.

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[4] In making this suggestion, it is indeed recognised that there could be an argument that how would a one-size-fits-all policy that is ineffective at a national level, become effective at a regional level. The aim of de-centralising policy formation and implementation is that the authority to research, formulate and implement policies at regional level has several advantages. First it is far more flexible, quick and efficient to mobilise a project at a local level than at the national level. Secondly, the regional or local administration would likely have a better understanding of the socio-economic circumstances of the area. Thirdly, it is far more likely that a package of policy selection would fetter target the needs of a region than the needs of a nation. Fourthly, if policies are found to be ineffective, it is far easier to reverse them and adopt different policies at a regional or local level, than at a national level.

[5] See Chapter 4, sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4.

[6] Other researchers have clearly stated the fact that Greece never had an explicit family or demographic policy (Moussourou 1994, Papadopoulos 1996, Symeonidou 1996, Hantrais and Letablier 1996).

10.2 MERITS AND DEMERITS OF THIS RESEARCH

This section gives an evaluative summary of the contributions of this research as well as its limitations. Such an appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses would help to develop future directions for continuing the research in the field.

10.2.1 Contributions to Knowledge

The Objective

Numerous research have tried to understand the causes of fertility decline, mostly through quantitative research methods, based on the findings of which, general policy tools have been recommended and implemented. In most cases, findings on causalities have proved to be too general. Also, the policy measures implemented in Greece failed to provide consistent results. By setting the objective to find out the political and institutional perspectives on causalities, this research has identified one of the missing links between theoretical assumptions on causalities as well as solutions, and the actual fertility experiences. This link is in fact the political and institutional perspectives that shape the fertility policy debates and the policy measures with the aim of influencing these fertility experiences.

The Literature Review

The literature review provided a chronological narrative of the evolution of fertility and family policy debates in Greece. It also brought out the conceptual and ideological motivators that underpinned and initiated most of these debates. If the aim is to understand why and where Greek fertility policy fails, it is also important to understand what are the historical and contemporary imperatives that have motivated the Greek fertility policy debates and policy formation. The conclusions from the literature review proved adequate to challenge the political and institutional perspectives that appeared to be ideologically biased, judgmental and in many instances, disengaged from actual experiences of the Greek couples.

The Research Design and Methodology

For the first time in Greek demographic studies, *this research* aimed to understand the political and institutional perspectives on causes and consequences of fertility decline. It is unique in its aim to perform fact-finding research with the Greek couples so that the findings on institutional perspectives could be compared and contrasted with the facts. The theoretical implication of this aim is that if the institutional perspectives do not match

with the ground realities as experienced by the couples, then the institutions are unlikely to be able to develop successful policy measures – one of the potential reasons why fertility and family policies could fail to address the situation of declining fertility.

The Empirical Findings

The empirical findings pose significant challenges to contemporary theoretical as well as institutional versions on consequences and causalities of fertility decline. The research with couples clearly confirm that the causal factors are highly subjective and in most cases cannot be standardised or generalised into a few categories as expected in most theoretical assumptions. The synthetic discussions of the findings also prove that the challenges against institutional perspectives are indeed valid and that indeed there exists a knowledge gap between institutional perspectives and actual experiences. The findings strengthen the argument that institutional misinformation feeds into the political debates and policy formation process which could then lead into development of ineffective policies. Therefore, it follows that it is equally important to understand and *realign* political and institutional perspectives where necessary, as it is to find the real causal factors in relation to the particular settings, in order to develop effective fertility and family policy tools.

10.2.2 The Limitations of this Study

The Objective

The main limitations of the research work arise from changes in the circumstances of the researcher, during the project period. The initial objective was to understand the determinants of fertility decline from an institutional perspective as well as from the Greek couples' perspective. However, during the period when the data was collected and first analysed, the department in which the research was originally based[7] closed, and the researcher's project affiliation was transferred to the City and Regional Planning Department of Cardiff University. At a panel meeting with my new supervisors, it was jointly discussed and agreed that the direction of the research lacked originality in that an aim to find the fertility determinants in Greece would not constitute a sufficiently unique topic for research, and that the policy focus needed more emphasis. It was agreed that given the sample size and data collection methods, the method of analysis that had initially been adopted was inappropriate[8]. Following further discussions, the objective was reset. This change in direction however, posed some problems. First, it rendered a

[7] Sir David Owen Centre for Population Studies, Cardiff University, now based at Keele University since 2001.

significant amount of literature review done before the fieldwork irrelevant. Second, due to resource and time constraints, new fieldwork, appropriate to the new research objective could not be conducted, and the study had to rely on the original data collected. Thirdly, by the time the research direction was restated, over three years' of research time had already passed, as a result of which a further literature review, specific to the new objective, had to be done in a limited timeframe.

The Literature Review

In addition to the above constraints, the literature on the relationship between policy and fertility decline is very limited, while the general demographic literature is vast. Nevertheless, the quality and quantity of the theoretical review presented here can be considered adequate given the fact that the objective of the thesis is *not to understand the causalities* of fertility decline *as such, but the institutional perspectives of causalities.*

The policy debate review in Chapter 3 gives a broader cross-continental picture, although the individual national level developments could in retrospect have been deeper. An in-depth review of such developments across Europe was impossible due to resource and time constraints, although such an understanding may have helped to refine the research question concerning Greek fertility policy debates.

The Research Design and Methodology

The change in objective discussed above, had an impact on the content of the research, in that, the main research question had to be defined not before data collection, but afterwards. The methodology and data collection techniques were thus originally designed to serve the objective of a somewhat different research question.

As the objective changed, the research orientation shifted from mainly quantitative to a mix of quantitative and qualitative. The method and technique adopted to understand and collect the institutional perspectives were entirely qualitative in nature. This was necessary to capture the subjectivity in, and the rationale behind, the perspectives and fitted nicely with the revised research question. However, a comparable and equally effective method to capture the subjectivity and rationale behind the various fertility intentions and decisions of Greek couples would have been a qualitative research of similar nature with couples. Ideally, this would have been in the form of semi-structured interviews with couples. However, as the data had already been collected using quantitative methods, and there was no scope for further fieldwork, that data had to be

[8] Details in further sections on Research Design and Methodology.

utilised as best as possible. The survey and analysis method therefore gave limited scope to understand the rationale behind most decisions, attitudes and perspectives of the couples. For example, when the couples stated 'concerns about future' as a reason for not wanting more children, it was not possible to understand the exact nature of such concerns. In addition, the questionnaire survey gave the couples only the opportunity to state their agreement or disagreement with pre-designed statements or concepts. It did not give them the scope to add any other factors that the researcher had not already pre-conceived[9].

Had qualitative research been conducted among couples, it is unlikely that the results would have differed significantly, in so far as establishing incompatibilities between policy makers' perspectives and couples' perspectives. What it would have likely supported was the ability to further bolster the conclusions of observed differences through access to background realities that underpinned the stated preferences and decisions of couples.

Data Collection, Processing and Analysis

During data collection and analysis, there was the risk that the opinions represented by the individual institutional representatives would have been personal opinions rather than institutional. Thus, it would have been ideal to select several individuals from each institution to obtain a better and balanced institutional perspective. However, the normal difficulties in gaining access to political establishments meant it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to approach the same institution more than once.

The data collected from couples was limited to the geographic area of Crete, which cannot be said to be strictly representative of Greece. In addition, such attempts to generalise would have been against the underlying principle of subjectivity of human decision making behaviour, which the researcher has emphasised. Furthermore, the data was collected only from married couples, where as fertility is an event relevant to all women in childbearing age. Therefore, to get a more accurate picture of determinants and policy related needs across a range of family forms such as single parents and cohabiting couples, the sample spread should have been wide enough to represent such diversities. Similarly, while the policy makers placed great emphasis on unemployment as a causal factor, it was not possible to assess this among the couples, as at least one spouse among all the respondents were in some form of employment. Therefore, including the above diversities in the sample would also have helped to understand why people delayed

[9] For exceptions see Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.5.

marriage and family formation, and indeed if financial security and stability were factors that couples considered as pre-requisites to childbearing.

Using the time series statistical analysis method with longitudinal data collected from the couples would have been ideal to understand the actual cumulative effect of the various determinants of fertility. This would have made it possible to take into consideration the effect of variations that would have occurred in the structural characteristics and background of the couples over the period of 15 years during which they were married[10]. Such data collection methods were however beyond the scope of a Ph.D. research project, and the analysis had to be carried out on the fertility experiences for a shorter duration of five years prior to data collection using the variable CB95to00. This meant the findings were not as conclusive as they might have been concerning the actual reasons for the fertility behaviour of the couples since they got married. For example, during data collection and analysis, it was not considered whether wives who were homemakers had been previously employed. In those cases where they were employed in the past, this could have had an influence on fertility, but the method of research used was not equipped to assess this. Separate analysis with children ever born (CEB) and desired fertility, presented in the appendix, did not make the results any more conclusive, due to the statistical method not considering the variations in structural factors over the fifteen year period.

There are some further limitations posed by the content of the questionnaire to the couples. Because the original research objective had greater emphasis on finding fertility determinants among the couples rather than policy-related needs, the questionnaire did not have sufficiently detailed and specific questions that would cover all the areas of family and fertility policies. In addition, not all policy options discussed with the policy makers were tested for preference with the couples. Again, using a qualitative approach via semi-structured interviews would have provided the opportunity to dig deeper into the subjective nature of different couples' and individual's various needs and expectations rin relation to policies. It also became clear that the questionnaire was not designed to understand and estimate the couples' level and sources of knowledge about the family and fertility policies. Consequently, questions that sought to understand how they evaluated family policies in Greece (e.g., sufficient, insufficient) were of little value, and eventually were not used in the analysis. A further limitation relates to the questions

[10] The data was collected only from couples who were married in the 15 years prior to the time of data collection. See Chapter 6, section 6.3.4.2 for details.

designed to elicit the couples' values in order to understand their influence on fertility behaviour. The data obtained for such questions are limited in their reliability in that respondents may chose to conceal their actual values for strategic reasons; their values may have changed since they made a fertility decision in the past; or they simply may not know what exactly their values are (Friedman et.al. 1994)[11]. Therefore, it would not be possible to accurately predict their behaviours based on such methods of value assessment.

Notwithstanding these and other limitations mentioned elsewhere in this study, it is important to note the exploratory nature of this study. It tries to emphasise the need for a better understanding at the policy level, of what is happening at a micro-level in the households. Therefore if further support is required to strengthen the study's conclusions, case studies similar to that done in Crete, can be conducted in other geographic areas and including the diversity of the social fabric through further research efforts. In this regard, some directions for future research projects associated with the objective of this research are outlined below.

10.3 SOME DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Given the importance attributed to the subjectivity of human decision making behaviour, through the findings and discussions of this thesis, the most obvious starting point for future studies would be to design research among couples with a qualitative orientation. The opinion of one of the institutional representatives interviewed is particularly relevant in this regard:

> "I disagree with the quantitative methodologies [such as survey questionnaires] that are employed to understand fertility determinants. Although they give some interesting insight in to the subject, ... it may be difficult to extract reasons from the sub-conscious mind [of the subject] and clearly define the rationale for a particular [subjective] decision ... what appears to be a rational decision [for the researcher], may have been taken by the subject without a full understanding [of the reasons]. It is not appropriate just to ask someone why he or she does not have children – as no one puts such questions to oneself! Therefore, the answer would not be adequate to help design a right policy".

It would certainly be of great value to research the causalities of fertility decline of specific social or geographic settings, with emphasis on individual preferences, whether the interest is purely academic or for policy development purposes. Admittedly, from a policy

[11] For the stated reasons, Friedman et.al. (1994) argue that value imputation can often prove unreliable. In their study on value of children, they do not directly assess the value of children to the parents. Instead they theorise that children's value lie in their ability to reduce uncertainties and enhance marital solidarity.

perspective, the logistical practicalities of such efforts may be challenged. However, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, such difficulties may be overcome by devolving research, debate and policy formation responsibilities to the grassroots level. While the case study presented in this thesis is specific to Crete and intended for the demographic research in Greece, similar directions can be applied in other European settings where fertility trends are similar to that of Greece, and policies have been ineffective so far.

Apart from a qualitative orientation to future studies, the actual research question and contents and therefore the quality of the findings can be improved by adopting the following approaches to demographic research in Greece:

- The data collection methods should also aim to gather information such as age when cohabitation began, its duration, difficulties in finding employment and housing and their impact on fertility decision making.
- Explore if there are significant differences in fertility and policy preferences between men and women. There are differing opinions on whether parenthood decisions are taken jointly or individually. However, there are also suggestions that spouses are aware of each other's desires and intentions and therefore, when stating such intentions they do take into consideration their partner's intentions (Morgan 1985 in Friedman et.al. 1994)[12].
- Assess the impact of urbanisation on intergenerational wealth flow and access to childcare services provided by the couples' parents. This would be helpful to identify priority areas for introducing or improving childcare facilities.
- As suggested by Entwisle and Mason (1985), if objective surveys are done, questionnaire should include details of children's schooling and associated costs, as well as questions that can elicit detailed life-cycle characteristics before, and during the early stages of child bearing. This could help better understand the aggregate impact of structural and ideational factors.
- As Hakim (2003) points out, it would be useful from a policy perspective to understand the lifestyle preferences of women in relation to their employment. Targeted policy tools can be developed if it is known whether some women prefer to combine work and family, whilst others are purely career oriented with little or no desire for children, or family oriented with a desire for several children.

- Perform an analysis based on the impact of policies introduced in 1991 in Greece. This, admittedly, was a task that could have been carried out in this research, and thereby possibly help to strengthen the findings.

Conclusion

This final chapter has endeavoured to summarise the contributions of this thesis to existing knowledge, possible political actions as well as suggest some possible directions for future research based on an evaluation of the limitations of this study. This research has clearly succeeded in its objective of gaining a broad understanding of the institutional perspectives that has underpinned most of the policy debates in Greece up to the year 2000, when the field work was carried out. However, almost four years have passed since the data collection inevitably means policy directions may have been altered and influenced by the more recent developments in the political and social settings of Greece. Most significant of such changes is the recent election of the New Democracy (ND) Party[13] (right wing) to the government after almost a decade. This party has been historically characterised by their strong pro-natalist viewpoints, also supported by the Greek Orthodox Church. Early indications are that they are keen to mobilise political support and execute their original policy ideas that mostly favoured families with many children[14]. However, there are no parallel efforts to boost up research in the field, in order to understand whether those couples who are keen to have only one or two children for various reasons, will be motivated to have many children as a result of these new policy initiatives. Given that on an average Greek couples prefer less than 3 children, clearly there is a case to understand and adequately represent the experiences and needs of a large section of the couples, who do not desire to have many children. Success of any future policy efforts will almost certainly depend on the success of gaining adequate levels of knowledge of the diverse behavioural imperatives and needs of the Greek couples as emphasised in the findings of this study.

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[12] See Chapter 6, section 6.3.3.2.

[13] The national elections took place on May 2004.

[14] A recent news article on the *Apogemautini* daily press (dated 15.06.2004) reported that the government planned to implement policies of free health care, education and priority in finding employment for families with many children.

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Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.1

Crete, The Geographic Area of the Survey with Married Couples: Some Main Characteristics

Crete is one of the ten geographic divisions of Greece. This section describes the geographic, demographic and socio-economic characteristics of Crete.

1. Geography and Population

Crete is Greece's largest island, the fifth largest in the Mediterranean basin, and it covers an area of 8,336 sq. km, which is 6.3% of the total area of Greece. Like the other georgraphic divisions of the country, Crete is further divided into smaller geographic departments (*nomoi*), namely Chania, Rethymno Heraklion and Lassithi (For maps see Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.9). Each of these departments is divided into municipalities (*demoi* with a minimum of 2,000 inhabitants and *koinotites* communities with less than 2,000). The later division is based on the reform programme for public administration and local government that was approved by Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Centralisation in 1999.

The 2001 census estimated Crete's population at 601,159 inhabitants (540,054 in 1991). Table 1 shows the 1991 and 2001 census figures on population and other household statistics for the four administrative districts of Crete, and gives a comparison with the corresponding census figures of Greece as a whole. The higher rate growth of the population of Crete compared to that of Greece is related to the higher life expectancy of the people of Crete (highest for the whole of Greece).

Table 1: Population and Household Statistics for the Geographic Department of Crete, Greece, Census 1991 and 2001.

Population and Household Statistics											
Geographic divisions of Crete	**Area Sq. km**	**Total Population**	**Pop. Density (per sq. km)**	**Pop. Growth Rate 1981-1991 (%)**	**District's Distribution (%)**	**Urban Population (%)**	**Semi-Urban Population (%)**	**Rural Population (%)**	**Total Households**	**Average Household Size**	**Single Person Households (%)**
Chania	2,375	133,774	56.3	6.3	24.8	53.9	2.2	43.9	41,121 (23.9%)	2.83	18.1
Rethymno	1,496	70,095	46.9	11.9	13.0	35.8	3.3	60.6	22,674 (13.2%)	2.87	22.6
Heraklion	2,641	264,906	100.3	8.7	49.0	47.9	11.2	40.9	82,952 (48.3%)	2.98	17.1
Lassithi	1,823	71,279	39.1	1.8	13.2	0	44.0	56.0	25,043 (14.6%)	2.68	17.8
Crete	8,336	540,054	64.8	7.6	100	41.5	12.3	46.2	17,1790	2.90	18.4
Greece	131,957	10,259,900	77.8	5.33	100	58.8	12.8	28.4	3,203,834	2.97	16.2
Statistics for 2001 based on preliminary report of the 2001 census											
Crete	8,336	601,159	72.12	11.31*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greece	131,957	10,939,771	82.9	6.63*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

* Population Growth Rate 1991-2001

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1995: NSSG, 1997, 2001.

Heraklion and Chania are the largest geographic divisions in Crete and the two main gateways for people and trade into the island. The city of Heraklion is the 4th biggest in Greece, and has *above 100,000 inhabitants (100.3 inhabitants per sq. km) and Chania is the seventh biggest.* Heraklion is also the capital of the prefecture and the administrative capital of the entire island. Urbanisation of the island varies from prefecture to prefecture, (41% of the population live in urban areas and 46% live in rural areas). The semi-urban population accounts for 12%, similar to that of the whole of Greece (12.8%). The average household size is almost equal among the districts and slightly smaller than the national average household size (Table 1).

2. Natural Increase and Migration

Changes of Natural Increase (NI) and Net Migration (NM) of the Population in Crete compared with the other geographic department of Greece for the period 1961-1990 are given in Table 2.

Table 2: Changes of Natural Increase (NI) and Net Migration (NM) of the Population in Greece by Geographic Department, 1961-1990 (%)

	1961-70		1971-80		1981-90	
	NI	NM	NI	NM	NI	NM
Greater Athens	24.6	26.0	39.9	9.1	44.2	-2.5
Central Greece & Evia	12.5	-8.6	10.6	4.0	9.2	12.3
Peloponnisos	10.2	-17.8	6.2	-1.4	2.5	6.7
Ionian Islands	1.2	-18.0	0.1	-1.4	-1.4	8.2
Epiros	4.4	-22.5	3.1	-1.7	2.4	2.7
Thessalia	9.0	-15.3	7.8	-2.1	7.3	2.7
Makedonia	24.8	-11.3	21.5	5.0	23.6	2.3
Thraki	4.8	-18.8	3.7	-2.3	4.4	-5.6
Aegean Islands	3.0	-17.7	1.8	-0.2	0.8	6.1
Crete	5.4	-15.0	5.5	2.3	7.0	3.7
Total Greece	100.0	-5.5	100.0	3.8	100.0	2.5

* Natural Increase = Number of Births – Number of Deaths

Source: Drettakis 1996, Table 3.3.and Table 3.4, p.23 –24.

3. Age Structure of the Population

Table 3 presents the Cretan population in the four prefectures by age group. The dependent age group (0-14 years old and 65 year and over) is 3.5 percent higher than that of the whole of Greece. In addition, the districts of Chania and Heraklion have higher percentages of people in the middle age group (15-64 years) than those of Rethymno and Lassithi.

Table 3: Population of Crete by Age Goups, in 1991

	Absolute numbers and Percentage (%)			
	Total	0-14 years	15 - 64 years	65 + over
Greece	10,259,900	1,974,867 (19.2%)	6,880,681 (67.1%)	1,404,352 (13.7%)
Crete	540,054	115,130 (21.3)	343,513 (63.6)	81,411 (15.1)
Chania	133,774	27,081 (22.2)	85,722 (64.1)	20,971 (15.7)
Rethymno	70,095	14,836 (21.2)	43,303 (61.8)	11,956 (17.0)
Heraklio	264,906	59,446 (22.4)	170,858 (64.5)	34,602 (13.1)
Lassithi	71,279	13,767 (*19.3*)	43,630 (61.2)	13,882 (19.5)

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1997: NSSG 1998.

Table 4 presents the population of Crete by gender as well as the percentages of females per 100 males. The figures show that in 1996 there were more males than females in Crete, unlike that of the whole of Greece. The female ratio per 100 males in Crete stood at 93.3 in 1991 and increased by 4.5 percent by 1996. When compared with other geographic districts in Crete, at the 1991 census Chania was the only district that had fewer females than males. However, on the other hand Rethymno was the only district that had more females than males (1996). The varying and different mortality rates between the genders could explain these differences.

Table 4: Population of Crete by Gender, According to Census 1991 and Mid-year Estimation 30/06/96

	Males		Females		Females per 100 Males	
	1991	1996	1991	1996	1991	1996
Greece	5,055,408	5,168,692	5,204,492	5,307,186	100.3	100.3
Crete	270,958	282,633	269,096	276,640	93.3	97.9
Chania	68,509	70,925	65,265	66,893	95.3	94.3
Rethymno	34,779	36,689	35,316	36,934	101.5	101.0
Heraklion	132,208	137,987	132,698	136,594	100	99.0
Lassithi	35,462	37,032	35,817	36,219	101	97.8

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1997: NSSG, 1998.

4. The Economy of Crete

Table 5 presents the evolution of employment pattern during the period 1971-1998. The percentage of the labour force in Crete has reduced progressively over the past decades mainly due to modernisation of the methods of production in the regional economy. It reduced from 98.1% to 97.6% during the period 1971-1981 and has dropped 92.8% in 1998.

Table 5: Evolution of Employment in Crete and Greece, 1971-1998

	Crete			Greece		
Year – Sex	Employed '000	Employment (%)[1]	Un-Employment (%)	Employed '000	Employment (%)[1]	Un-employment (%)
Total						
1971	182.6	98.1	1.9	3,143.0	96.9	3.1
1981	188.5	97.6	2.4	3,388.5	95.6	4.4
1991	199.4	94.5	5.5	3,571.9	91.9	8.1
1998	243. 8	92.8	7.2	3,967.2	89.2	11.7
Men						
1971	123.7	98.2	1.8	2,280.3	97.1	2.9
1981	135.4	98.1	1.9	2,485.3	96.2	3.8
1991	140.0	96.0	4.0	2,484.7	93.7	6.3
Women						
1971	58.9	98.0	2.0	862.6	96.1	3.9
1981	53.1	96.3	3.7	903.1	94.2	5.8
1991	59.4	91.0	9.0	1,087.2	88.0	12.0

[1] As a % of the economically active population

Source: Special Publication for Unemployment, Employment and Wages: NSSG, 1998; 1999.

Unemployment in Crete is approximately 4% less than that of the whole of Greece. Women are more affected by unemployment than men and the gap between male and female unemployment is increasing.

The economy of Crete, which was mainly based on farming, started to change during the 70's. While there is still an emphasis on farming and stock breeding, there has been a drop in manufacturing sector output, while the service industry (mainly tourism) has developed. The distribution of employment by sector (agriculture, industry and services) is presented in Table 6.

Table 6: Distribution of Employment by Sector, Crete and Greece, 1997

	Distribution of Employment(%)		
	Agriculture	**Industry**	**Services**
Crete	37.9	12.3	49.8
Greece	19.9	22.5	57.7

Source: European Commission 1999

The average per capita income of Crete is close to the national average. The GDP of Crete is higher than the corresponding GDP of the country (Table 7, European Commission 1999).

Table 7: GDP per Capita of Crete and Greece, 1988-1996

	GDP per Capita (in PPS), Based on EU15=100								
	1988	**1989**	**1990**	**1991**	**1992**	**1993**	**1994**	**1995**	**1996**
Crete	57	64	61	62	64	68	71	72	72
Greece	58	59	57	58	60	64	65	66	68

Source: European Commission 1999

5. Education

When comparing the educational level of the working population of Crete with that of Greece, it was found that there was a lower percentage of people with both higher and medium level education in Crete. Nevertheless, the progress in farming and tourism has created higher demand for specialist skills in these sectors. According to data from the Greek National Statistical Service (ESYE) on working potential of the people (1997), 50.3% of the active population had an education only up to the primary school (38.1% for the whole of Greece). 32.3% had certificate of studies from high school or lyceum (A level equivalent), while 16.5% had higher education (the corresponding percentages at the national level were 39% and 22.9% respectively). However, with increasing number of people attaining higher levels of education over the last decades, the quality of life of the Cretan population has improved, as well as their level of productivity and the available skills on the island.

Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.2

Brief Details of the Greek Policy Institutions Approached in the Semi-Structured Interviews

Directorate of Population and Employment, Ministry of Finance and National Economy.

The Ministry of National Economy and Finance has various superintendent divisions under the broader Department of Social Policy. Among them is the Directorate of Population and Employment and the Economic and Social Council.

Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social security.

The Division of Family and Demographic Policy, an operational arm of the Department of Family Protection under this Ministry, holds the main responsibility to formulate family and population policies in Greece, as well as oversee the distribution of benefits under these policies. It also aims to collaborate with other corresponding departments within the European Union and within other Ministries, offices and organisations at a national level.

Greek Manpower Employment Organisation of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

This administrative department aims to promote equal opportunities in employment for men and women, for those who work in public and private sector, as well as to create employment opportunities and reduce unemployment, and to support low income groups.

Advisory body of the Greek Prime Minister on Population and Demographic issues.

This department consists of individuals who are mainly social scientists with more academic orientation, but advise the Prime Minister on demographic matters. Thus, their opinions and recommendations play significant role in the policy guidance that the Prime Minister's Office may issue to the various legislative departments.

Social Policy section of the Central Committee of PASOK, the ruling party in Greece at the time of data collection, as well as of the main opposition parties (The right wing New Democracy party; the Greek communist party KKE; the left-centre party 'The coalition of the Left and the Progress' (SYN)).

Each political party has a social policy section that is responsible for the preparation and promotion of their policy manifesto. Their contribution to the policy debate process in the parliament very much depends on what policies and principles they believe in.

'Confederation of Families with Many Children' (ASPE in Greek), an NGO.

This organisation represents the large families in Greece with the aim to eliminate poverty among large families by ensuring that their legitimate financial and other social support benefits from the State are channelled and delivered. They are continually involved in policy debate in the Greek media. The government actively considers and includes their perspectives on family policy issues into the policy debates in the parliament.

Greek Society for Demographic Studies (EDHM in Greek)

The EDHM promotes demographic and population policy debates, the findings of which the government integrates into its own policy making process. Normally the transformation of information is through individuals of authorities within the government who are also members of EDHM. However, no independent research is undertaken by EDHM.

National Centre for Social Research (EKKE in Greek)

The EKKE conducts empirical studies and produces reports on the demographic and other issues of public importance. The government extensively relies on their studies and findings to formulate wide-ranging social policies.

The Greek Orthodox Church Committee for Marriage, Family, Child Protection and Demographic Issues.

Historically the Greek Orthodox Church has always had an influence on the nation's thinking. In its own right, the Orthodox Church conducts debates on the various family and demographic issues at local levels, formulates policies regarding distribution of financial and other material benefits at the local level to encourage and promote the family values it believes in. Thus, although not formally part of the State policy-making mechanism, the role of Church is of significance to the researcher's study.

Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.3

Letter to Institutional Representatives

Alexandra Sarikaki
Sir David Owen Population Centre,
University of Cardiff, PO Box 915, Cardiff, Wales, UK.
Tel: (+44) 2920-874794
Fax: (+44) 2920-874372
E-mail: Sarikakia@Cardiff.ac.uk
Sarialex@hotmail.com

02/10/00

Subject: Request for Interview

Dear Sir/ Madam,

I am a research student in the Sir David Owen Population Centre, at the University of Cardiff. The topic of my research is related to the determinants of fertility, the public perceptions and the effectiveness of the State's intervention to influence the demographic trends.

The well known demographic trends of our country, as with rest of the more developed countries, such as very low fertility rates, the increase of life expectancy, the increase of divorce rates and single parent families, are considered to have significant consequences. The increasing number of older people in proportion to the younger ones and the reduced number of entrants into the labour market, makes difficult the financing of social security.

As part of the data collection process for my research, I would like to meet you during the period of 25th of October to 10th of November in order to undertake a face to face interview focusing on the aforementioned issues. The purpose of this meeting is to extract useful information from your experience on the demographic problems in our country, as well as record your official actions, assignments, or positions of your political party/organization/institution on the demographic trends experienced by Greece.

I will try to get in touch with you soon (by phone or via e-mail) in order to arrange further details of our meeting, provided that you do not have any objections. In the meanwhile, If you have any question, suggestion or comment about the attached framework for interview, please contact me on telephone number 0831-50038, or on the email address given above.

I attach my curriculum vitae, as well as a suggested outline for the interview.

Thank you in advance, for your cooperation and I look forward to meeting you.

Yours sincerely,

Alexandra Sarikaki

Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.4

Guide for the Interviews with the Policy Makers

The following guidelines indicate the areas/issues to be discussed at the interview:

- Demographic trends in Greece at the end of 20th century. Evaluation of these trends. Special attention to trends in fertility.
- Views on the determinants of low fertility and its implications.
- Possible future problems encountered.
- Previous and current family and demographic policy features. Need for State intervention.
- Considerations and proposals for main priorities. Population and family policy objectives, measures and necessary incentives.
- General overview (current situation and future prospects).

Model Questionnaire Used at the Face to Face Survey with Couples in Crete

UNDERSTANDING FERTILITY

Questionnaire for a Survey on the Determinants of Fertility, Public Perceptions and the Effectiveness of the State Interventions to Influence the Trends in Fertility, in the Geographic Department of Crete, Greece.

April, 2000

Prepared by: Alexandra Sarikaki
Research Student
Sir David Owen Population Centre
University of Cardiff, Wales,
United Kingdom

SCREENING RECORD

	1st Visit	2nd Visit	3rd Visit	Comments
Screening date				
Result[1]				
Appointment time and date				
Interviewer				

[1]SCREENING RESULT CODES (Report to field supervisor)

1. Address not a dwelling unit
2. Vacant
3. No-one at home. Another visit to be made
4. Respondent refusal - no screening carried out
5. Screening completed; eligible respondents
6. Screening completed, no eligible respondents
7. Screening not completed, appointment made for completion
8. No responsible person to answer screening
9. Other outcomes _____

INTERVIEW RECORD

	1st Visit	2nd Visit	3rd Visit	Comments
Interview date				
Time interview started				
Time interview ended				
Result[2]				
Interviewer				

[2]INTERVIEW RESULT CODES (Report to field supervisor)

1. Completed Interview
2. Interview partially completed, appointment made for completion
3. Respondent refusal - no interview carried out
4. Eligible respondent not at home. Appointment made for another visit
5. New interviewer required
6. Respondent incompetent _____
7. Other reasons _____

Introduction - Request for permission

Dear Sir/Madam

My name is _____ and this is a sample survey for a doctoral research project undertaken at the Sir David Owen Population Centre - Cardiff, UK. The survey examines the determinants of low fertility in Greece, as well as tries to explain the intentions, attitudes, beliefs, and motivations of couples who have married in the past fifteen years in Crete towards fertility.

Your house is one of the many houses that have been selected for this survey, and we hope you will give us your full co-operation in providing the necessary information. Your kind assistance in ensuring the success of this survey will be greatly appreciated.

In this regard, I would like to ask you some questions. If you choose to answer these questions, the questionnaire on which you answer them will be protected from disclosure to third parties. The findings from the survey will be analysed and published in the research report in the form of conclusions referring to the married couple's in Crete. However, no specific reference will be made to the individual or the location in Crete from which the answers are obtained. Some of the questions are or of a more personal nature, as they are related to your family's socio-economic situation, your values towards parenthood, marriage, religion, and family policies, but they are necessary in order to obtain information considered important for this research. This is not a test and there are no right or wrong answers. The questionnaire will take approximately one hour to complete and it is very important that you are as honest as possible.

Would you like to take part in this survey? (If Yes, go to the questions).

Thank you.

IDENTIFICATION PARTICULARS

	Questionnaire ID NUMBER: _____	[__] V01
Household No.	_____	[__] V02
Prefecture	_____	[__] V03
Municipality	_____	[__] V04
Urbanisation	_____	[__] V05
House Address	_____	
Telephone No. (if any)	_____	
Interviewer's Name	_____	[__] V06
Date	_____	[__] V07
Interview's Result	_____	[__] V08

Q.1 Please indicate the gender of respondent

1. Female
2. Male [__] V1

Q.2 How many children do you have? (Step or adopted children to be included).

Number = ---------- [__] V2

Q.3 What is the gender and the age of your children? (Please write the total number of children of each sex).

	Girl	Boy		Year of birth	
First child	G	B	[__] V3.1	_____	[__] V3.6
Second	G	B	[__] V3.2	_____	[__] V3.7
Third	G	B	[__] V3.3	_____	[__] V3.8
Fourth	G	B	[__] V3.4	_____	[__] V3.9
Fifth	G	B	[__] V3.5	_____	[__] V3.10

Q.4 Are you currently pregnant? (Is your wife currently pregnant?).

1. No
2. Yes [__] V4
8. I do not know

Q.5 How many siblings do (did) you and your spouse have? (In addition to you)

Wife = ---------- [__] V5.1

Husband = ---------- [__] V5.2

Q.6 In what kind of environment have you and your spouse spent most time? (Choose the appropriate number from the list below).

1. Rural (up to 4.999 inhabitants) Wife ---------- [__] V6.1
2. Semi-urban (5.000 - 9.999 inh.) Husband ---------- [__] V6.2
3. Urban (10.000 inh. or more)

Q.7 How many persons live in this house apart from the couple and the children? (Do not include household members who have died and /or moved out and now live elsewhere).

Number = ---------- [__] V7

Q.8 What is their relationship with the couple? 1=Yes 2=No

1. Parents ---------- [__] V8.1
2. Siblings ---------- [__] V8.2
3. Other Relatives ---------- [__] V8.3
4. Friends ---------- [__] V8.4
5. Other (please specify): ---------- [__] V8.5

Education

Q.9 Could you please specify your and your spouse's highest educational achievement? (Choose the appropriate number from the list below).

1. No formal schooling
2. Few years in Demotiko
3. Graduate from Demotiko
4. Few years in Gymnasium
5. Graduate from Gymnasium Wife ---------- [__] V9.1
6. Graduate from middle level technical school Husband ---------- [__] V9.2
7. Few years in Lyceum
8. Graduate from Lyceum
9. Some form of post-secondary education (IEKs/KEK)
10. Some form of higher education (University/TEIs)
11. Graduate from TEIs
12. Graduate from University
13. Postgraduates studies

Employment Status

Q.10 Could you please specify your and your spouse's status?

1. Full or part time employed
2. Unemployed Wife ---------- [__] V10.1
3. Home maker Husband ---------- [__] V10.2
4. Student
5. Pensioner
6. Other (please specify)

Q.11 Could you please specify your and your spouse's present job? (Please give full details)

Wife: Full time job ---------- [__] V11.1

Part time job ---------- [__] V11.2

Husband: Full time job ---------- [__] V11.3

Part time job ---------- [__] V11.4

Q.12 Could you please specify the nature of your and your spouse's current post in your and /his/her job?

1. Employer
2. Self-employed Wife Full-time job ---------- [__] V12.1
3. Salaried employee Part-time job ---------- [__] V12.2
4. Casual worker
5. Working in a family business Husband Full-time job ---------- [__] V12.3
8. I do not know/ I do not answer Part-time job ---------- [__] V12.4

Q 13 Could you please specify the contractual status of your and your spouse's job?

1. Permanent job
2. Long term job contract Wife Full-time job ---------- [__] V13.1
3. Short term job contract Part-time job ---------- [__] V13.2
4. Contracted work
5. Per unit of work Husband Full-time job ---------- [__] V13.3
6. Per day Part-time job ---------- [__] V13.4
7. Per hour
8. I do not know/ wish to answer

Q 14 How satisfied are you and your spouse with your current job?

1. Highly satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
4. Dissatisfied
5. Highly dissatisfied
8. I do not know/ wish to answer

Wife	Full-time job ----------	[__] V14.1
	Part-time job ----------	[__] V14.2
Husband	Full-time job ----------	[__] V14.3
	Part-time job ----------	[__] V14.4

Q.15 Which of the following categories applies to your and your spouse's average monthly Income from your current job(s)? (Choose the appropriate number from the list below).

1. None
2. Less than 200.000 Drs.
3. 200.000 - 349.999 Drs.
4. 350.000 - 499.999 Drs
5. 500.000 - 749.999 Drs.
6. More than 750.000 Drs.
7. I do not know
8. I do not want to answer

Wife ---------- [__] V15.1
Husband ---------- [__] V15.2

House

Q.16 What is the residential status of the house you and your family currently live in?

1. Tenant
2. Owner
3. Mortgaged
4. Living with parents/ family house
5. Other (please specify): ---------- [__] V16

Q.17 Do you own any other properties apart from the one that you and your family live in?

1. No
2. Yes
7. I do not want to answer

[__] V17

Q.18 What is the size of the house your family currently live in, in square metres (m²) ?

Metres (m²) = ---------- [__] V18

Q.19 How many rooms are there in your house apart from the kitchen and bathroom?

Number = ---------- [__] V19

Q.19a Could you specify the numbers of bedrooms in your house?

Number = ---------- [__] V19a

Q.20 How satisfied are you with the living conditions in your current house?

1. Highly satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
4. Dissatisfied
5. Highly dissatisfied

[__] V20

Wealth- Income

Q.21 Which of the following annual income bands does your family fit into?

1. Less than 2,000.000 Drs
2. 2,000.000 - 3,999.999 Drs
3. 4,000.000 - 6, 999999 Drs
4. 7,000.000 - 9, 999999 Drs
5. More than 10,00.000 Drs
7. I do not know
8. I do not want to answer

[__] V21

Q.22 Do you find your family's current financial situation satisfactory?

1. Highly satisfactory
2. Satisfactory
3. Neither satisfactory nor dissatisfactory
4. Dissatisfactory
5. Highly dissatisfactory

[__] V22

Cultural Determinants of fertility and Social Network

Q.23 Thinking about the following people, how do they feel about the number of children you have? Do they feel that there are too many, too few, just right or do they not have an opinion?

1. Too few
2. Just right
3. Too many
4. No opinion
8. I do not know/ wish to answer

a. Your parents ---------- [__] V23a
b. Your spouse's parents---------- [__] V23b
c. Other person with significant personal influence (best friend, close relative)--- [__] V23c

Q.24 Do you feel that the above persons put any pressure on you in order to influence the number of children you have? Towards what direction was/is this pressure?

1. Discouraging
2. No pressure at all
3. Encouraging
8. I do not know I do not answer

a. Your parents ---------- [__] V24a
b. Your spouse's parents---------- [__] V24b
c. Other person with significant personal influence (best friend, close relative)--- [__] V24c

Q.25 Are there any other people who have an opinion about the number of children that you have?

1. No (→ Q.26)
2. Yes (→ Q.25a –Q.25b) [__] V25

Q.25a If Yes, What is their relationship with the family? ---------- [__] V25a

Q.25b How do they feel? ---------- [__] V25b

Religion

Q.26 What is your and your spouse's religious affiliation? (Choose the appropriate number from the list below).

1. Christian Orthodox
2. Christian Catholic
3. Protestant
4. None/Atheist
5. Other (please specify)
8. I do not know/ I do not want to answer

Wife ---------- [__] V26.1
Husband ---------- [__] V26.2

Q.27 How important is religion to you and to your spouse? (Choose the appropriate number from the list below).

1. Unimportant
2. Fairly important
3. Important
4. Even more important
8. I do not know/ I do not want to answer

Wife ---------- [__] V27.1
Husband ---------- [__] V27.2

Q.28 How frequently do you and your spouse go to church/place of worship? (Choose the right number from the list below).

1. Never
2. Only on particular occasions
3. Once every three months — Wife ---------- [__] V28.1
4. Once per month — Husband ---------- [__] V28.2
5. Two or three times per month
6. Every week

Proximate Determinants of Fertility

Age and Marriage

Q.29 What is your and your spouse's year of birth?

Wife = ---------- [__] V29.1
Husband = ---------- [__] V29.2

Q.30 Could you specify the year of your current marriage?

Year =---------- [__] V30

Q.31 Have you or your spouse ever been married before? **(Show Cards)**

1. No — Wife = ---------- [__] V31.1
2. Yes — Husband = ---------- [__] V31.2
7. I do not wish to answer

Q.32 How satisfied are you with your marriage? **(Show Cards)**

1. Highly dissatisfied
2. Dissatisfied
3. Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied
4. Satisfied
5. Highly satisfied
7. I do not wish to answer

[__] V32

Q.33 Have you ever considered getting divorced? **(Show Cards)**

1. Yes
2. No
7. I do not wish to answer

[__] V33

Contraception & Abortion (Show Cards)

Q.34 Since you have been married, have you and your spouse planed the timing of having children?

1. No
2. Yes [__] V34
3. Other (specify): ----------

Q.35 Does you or your spouse use any method of birth control, such as condoms, withdrawal, IUD, pill, etc.?

1. No (→ Q.36)
2. Yes (→ Q.35a) [__] V35
7. I do not wish to answer (→ Q.36)

Q.35a Could you specify what method of birth control you or your spouse are you using currently? (Choose more than one answer if necessary).

	1. No 2. Yes
1. Coitus interruptus	[__] V35a.1
2. Condoms	[__] V35a.2
3. Contraceptive Pills	[__] V35a.3
4. Diaphragm	[__] V35a.4
5. Intrauterine Device (IUD)	[__] V35a.5
6. Vaginal Douches	[__] V35a.6
7. Other (please specify): ----------	[__] V35a.7
8. I do not know/ I do not wish to answer	[__] V35a.8

----→ *SHOW CARDS for the following three questions*

Q.36 During your marriage did you (or your wife) ever have (has) any pregnancy(ies) which did not go to full term?

1. No (→ Q.37)
2. Yes (→ Q.36a) [__] V36
7. I do not know/ I do not wish to answer (→ Q.37)

Q.36a Did the pregnancy(ies) not go to full term because of a miscarriage or because of an induced abortion? (Choose both types if necessary).

1. Miscarriage (specify number ----------) (→ Q.37) [__] V36a.1
2. Induced abortion (specify number ----------) (→ Q.36b) [__] V36a.2

Q.36b What was the main reason for carrying out an induced abortion(s)?

--- [__] V36b

Individuals Beliefs and Perceptions on Family, Marriage and Abortion, Value of Children and Childbearing Motivations

----→ *Show Cards for the following Q.37*

Q.37 There are a number of things important in a person's life. Please define to what extent the following broad categories are important to you by ranking them according to priority. Start from number 1 being the 'Most important' to 4 being 'Unimportant'.

1 = Unimportant
2 = Fairly Important
3 = Important
4= Most Important

a. Materialistic Priority ---------- [__] V37a
Having financial security and sufficient material goods.
Living in a nice, spacious house with all the modern amenities.

b. Self-interest Priority ---------- [__] V37b
Having a successful occupation/career. Striving for self-fulfilment.
Having enough time for yourself and for your own interests.

c. Family-Household Interest Priority ---------- [__] V37c
Having a complete and happy family life. Having enough time for the household and family. A equal division of household tasks between men and women.

d. Children's Development and Future Priority ---------- [__] V37d
Enabling a child to develop properly. Being able to Giving enough care and attention to your children. Being able to give your children a proper education. Providing for your children's future.

Q.38 How much do you agree with the following statements? (Circle the appropriate answer according to the degree of agreement).

1 = Strongly Disagree 4 = Agree
2 = Disagree 5 = Strongly Agree
3 = Undecided 8.= I do not know/ wish to answer

1. The father should provide financial support for the household while the mother should be a housewife and rear the children	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.1
2. Having children is God's will		[__] V38.2
3. A woman has the right to have a child as a single parent, if she doesn't want to continue relationship with a man	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.3
4. Marriage is an outdated institution	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.4
5. The man should help with the housework whether the woman is working or not	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.5
6. Divorce is acceptable when the marriage becomes an unhappy experience	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.6
7. A person should be satisfied and happy with his/her own life before starting a family	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.7
8. A large family is a blessing from God	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.8
9. Mothers with young children should stay at home to look after them and not go out to work	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.9
10. A child needs a home with both its parents	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.10
11. It is difficult to trust people nowadays	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.11
12. In the world things are getting worse	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.12
13. There is uncertainty about the future	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.13
14. Family is more important than profession	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V38.14

Q.39 How much do you agree with the following statements? (Circle the appropriate answer according to the degree of agreement).

1 = Strongly Disagree 4 = Agree
2 = Disagree 5 = Strongly Agree
3 = Undecided 8.= I do not know/ wish to answer

1. Abortion is acceptable when there is a strong chance of serious disabilities in a baby	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V39.1
2. __ if the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V39.2
3. __ if a woman became pregnant as a result of rape	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V39.3
4. __ if a woman is not married and does not want to marry the father	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V39.4
5. __ if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V39.5
6. __ if a woman is married and does not want any more children	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V39.6
7. __ if a woman wants it for any reason	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V39.7

Q.40 How much do you agree with the following statements? (Circle the appropriate answer according to the degree of agreement).

1 = Strongly Disagree 4 = Agree
2 = Disagree 5 = Strongly agree
3 = Undecided 8.= I do not know/ wish to answer

1. A person cannot be really happy without children	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.1
2. A person cannot fulfil themselves completely unless they become a parent	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.2
3. Children contribute to the strengthening of marital bond	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.3
4. It is the parents' duty to do their best for their children, even at the expense of their own well-being	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.4
5. Children are an expansion of the self of the parents	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.5
6. Children should provide material and financial support to their parents when they grow up	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.6
7. It is a duty towards society to have children	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.7
8. Children should look after their elderly parents	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.8
9. Children are a source of happiness	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.9
10. Children enhance a couple's prestige	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.10
11. Extra curricular activities for children are necessary for the development of their personality	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.11
12. Children contribute to continuation of the family lineage	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.12
13. Children should have the best quality life that money can buy	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.13
14. As a parent it is important to be able to give your children a proper education even if it is costly	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.14
15. Children add an element of excitement to the home	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.15
16. Children are a source of companionship for the parents	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.16
17. A child makes you feel important and needed	1 2 3 4 5 8	[__] V40.17

The Ideal, Desired, and the Real Number of Children. Future Fertility Intentions of Couples

Q.41 Do you and your husband/wife have discussions about family size?

1. No (→ Q.42)
2. Yes (→ Q. 41a) [__] V41
7. I do not know/ I do not wish to answer (→ Q.42)

Q.41a If yes, Please state how often:

1. Only on particular occasions
2. Once every three months
3. Two or three times per month [__] V41a
4. Once per month
5. Every week

Q.42 Who makes decisions about the family size?

1. Husband
2. Wife [__] V42
3. Both spouses together
8. I do not know/ I do not wish to answer

Q.43 In your opinion, what is the **ideal number** of children for the Greek family? *(Total number of children).*

Number = ---------- [__] V43

Q.44 What is your and your spouse's **desired number** of children? *(Total number of children).*

Wife ---------- [__] V44.1
Husband ---------- [__] V44.2

Q.45 Do you intend to have a/another child (children) in the future? *(If the wife is currently pregnant include this pregnancy as a positive-yes strongly certain intention).*

1. Yes, Strongly certain (→ Q.46)
2. Yes, Fairly certain (→ Q.46) [__] V45
3. Do not know/ Uncertain (→ Q.50)
4. No, Fairly certain (→ Q.48)
5. No, Strongly certain (→ Q.48)

---→ *The following **Q.46–Q.47** to be answered ONLY BY THOSE WHO ARE **INTENDING TO HAVE** A/NOTHER CHILD/CHILDREN in the future otherwise go to **Q.48**.*

Q.46 How many (more) children do you intend to have? (If the wife is pregnant count this pregnancy as 1. and then add any additional children wanted)

Number = ---------- [__] V46

Q.47 How soon do you intend to have your first/next child?

1. Within 12 months or sooner
2. 12 to 23 months (1 to 2 years)
3. 24 to 35 months (2 to 3 years) [__] V47
4. After 36 months, or more (3 years or more)

Q.47a Could you explain the main reasons of why you want a/another child (children)?

---------- [__] V47a

---→ *The following **Q.48-Q.51** to be answerd ONLY BY THOSE WHO ARE **NOT INTENDING TO HAVE** A/NOTHER CHILD/CHILDREN in the future otherwise go to **Q.52**.*

Q.48 There are many different reasons for a couple for not wanting a (or another) child. Are the following reasons important to you and to your spouse for not wanting a (or another) child?

	1. No 2. Yes
1. I am/my spouse is too old to become a parent ----------	[__] V48.1
2. Our state of health does not allow it ----------	[__] V48.2
3. We already have the desired number of children ----------	[__] V48.3
4. There are concerns about the relationship/ and the future of our marriage ----------	[__] V48.4
5. Our job and professional commitments do not allow it----------	[__] V48.5
6. We do not wish to give up the leisure activities we currently enjoy ----------	[__] V48.6
7. We would not be able to cope with the financial pressure of bringing up a/another child	[__] V48.7
8. Our house is not suitable (small) to accommodate a/another child ----------	[__] V48.8
9. The wife is afraid of another pregnancy and childbirth ----------	[__] V48.9
10. We would not be able to take proper care of family and household ----------	[__] V48.10
11. We want to maintain better standard of living ----------	[__] V48.11
12. Child care facilities are inadequate and private care is too expensive ----------	[__] V48.12
13. We are too concerned about the future our children will have ----------	[__] V48.13
14. A/another child may affect my/my spouse's educational or career plans ----------	[__] V48.14
15. Our other child(children) would not get enough care and attention ----------	[__] V48.15
16. Other (please specify): ----------	
----------	[__] V48.16

Q.49 Of all the above reasons for not wanting a/another child (children), which is the most important? (Choose only one reason).

---------- [__] V49

Q.50 What kind of changes in society or in your family life could make you change your attitude towards having a/another child? (Choose as many aspects as you wish).

	1. No 2. Yes
1. Better financial situation ----------	[__] 50.1
2. Having a bigger home ----------	[__] 50.2
3. Guaranteed home care allowance ----------	[__] 50.3
4. More financial aid for families with small children ----------	[__] 50.4
5. Guaranteed reliable day care for children ----------	[__] 50.5
6. More flexible hours of work ----------	[__] 50.6
7 A more favourable attitude to children from other people ----------	[__] 50.7
8. A better world ----------	[__] 50.8
9. None of the above ----------	[__] 50.9
10. Other (please specify): ----------	
----------	[__] 50.10

---→ *The following QUESTTIONS to be answerd BY ALL THE RESPONDENS*

Q.51 In your view, what are the **advantages** of having a big family (three or more children)? (Underline the one which is the most important).

---------- [__] V51

Q.52 In your view, what are the **disadvantages** of having a big family (three or more children)? (Underline the one which is the most important).

---------- [__] V52

Related to Population Policy Issues

Q.53 The proportion of young people (below the age 20) of our country is sharply declining. How do you evaluate this development?

1. Excellent
2. Good.
3. Neither good nor bad
4. Bad
5. Very bad [__] V53
8. Do not know/ I do not wish to answer

Q.54 The proportion of people aged 65 years and over of our country is sharply increasing. How do you evaluate this development?

1. Excellent
2. Good.
3. Neither good nor bad
4. Bad
5. Very bad [__] V54
8. Do not know/ I do not wish to answer

Q.55 Would you prefer the population of Greece to increase, to decline, or to remain more or less the same in the future?

1. To increase
2. To remain the same [__] V55
3. To decline
8. Do not know/ I do not wish to answer

Q.56 *In our days many changes have occurred affecting family formation.* How do you evaluate the following trends? (Circle the appropriate answer according to the degree of agreement).

1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Neither good or bad
4. Bad
5. Very bad
8. Do not know/ wish to answer

1. The increasing number of couples who are not married but live together	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V56.1
2. The increasing number of couples who decide to remain childless	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V56.2
3. The declining number of marriages	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V56.3
4. The declining number of births	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V56.4
5. The increasing number of children who spend part of their childhood in single- parent family	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V56.5
6. The increasing number of persons who live alone	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V56.6
7. The increasing number of births among unmarried couples	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V56.7
8. The increasing number of divorces	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V56.8

Q.57 Changes in society can be a concern. The state could play a major or a minor role to address such changes. Please indicate what you think about the state's responsibility regarding the following issues. (Circle the appropriate answer according to the degree of agreement).

1. Fully responsible
2. Partly responsible
3. Not responsible at all
8. Do not know/ wish to answer

1. Looking after the elderly	1	2	3	8	[__] V57.1
2. Availability of adequate housing for everyone	1	2	3	8	[__] V57.2
3. Enable couples to have the number of children they want	1	2	3	8	[__] V57.3
4. Facilitating participation of women in the labour force	1	2	3	8	[__] V57.4
5. Provide more opportunities for women to combine a job outside home with raising children	1	2	3	8	[__] V57.5
6. Helping young people looking for a job	1	2	3	8	[__] V57.6
7. Providing adequate health care for everyone	1	2	3	8	[__] V57.7
8. Promote equal opportunities for all	1	2	3	8	[__] V57.8

Q.58 People have different opinions on government policy regarding families. How do you rate the current Greek State policy on families?

1. Excellent
2. Good.
3. Neither good nor bad
4. Bad
5. Very bad
8. Do not know/ I do not wish to answer

[__] V58

Q.59 Thinking about measures and incentives to facilitate having, looking after, and raising children, which of the following would you been in favour of? (Circle the appropriate answer according to the degree of agreement).

Note: the measures described below are not just suggestions. Most of them have actually been implemented in some European countries, including Greece.

1. Strongly against
2. Against
3. No opinion
4. In favour
5. Strongly in favour
8. Do not know/ wish to answer

1. Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements for working women who are having a baby	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V59.1
2. Lower income tax for parents with dependent children (than people without children). to take into account the costs of raising children.	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V59.2
3. Improved day-care facilities for children younger than 3 years old	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V59.3
4. Improved day-care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V59.4
5. Higher child allowance for families with dependent children	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V59.5
6. Increase of the allowance at the birth of each child	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V66.6
7. An allowance for mothers or fathers who do not take a job because they want to take care of the children while they are young	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V59.7
8. Improved child-care facilities for school-going children before and after school and during school holidays	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V59.8
9. Flexible working hours for working parents with young children	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V59.9
10. More opportunities for parents with children to work part-time	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V59.10
11. A substantial decrease in the cost of education	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V59.11
12. Better housing support for new couples and families with young children, (low interest mortgages, rent-free house for low-income families with children).	1	2	3	4	5	8	[__] V59.12

----→ *SHOW CARD for the following question*

Q.60 If you had to choose, which of these measures would you most like to see implemented or developed by the Greek government? (Name no more than three).

	1. No	2. Yes
1. I would not like any of these measures to be implemented *(go to Q.62)*	[__]	V60
2. I would prefer: a.---------	[__]	V60a
b.---------	[__]	V60b
c.---------	[__]	V60c

Q.61 If those measures, which you consider desirable in the previous question, were developed and implemented, would this have any consequences for your own personal or family life? (Select as many answers as you wish).

	1. No	2. Yes
1. It would make it easier to have the number of children I intend to have	[__]	V61.1
2. It would enable me to have my next child sooner	[__]	V61.2
3. I would give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child	[__]	V61.3
4. I would still not want a/another child	[__]	V61.4
5. I would definitely have a/another child		
6. Other (please specify): ----------		
----------	[__]	V61.5

Q.62 Could you imagine a policy measure or condition, which would encourage you to *have an additional child*?

1. No (----→ Q.63)
2. Yes (----→ Q.62a) [__] V62
8. Do not know/ I do not wish to answer

Q.62a If yes, What kind of measure or condition would that be?

--- [__] V62a

Q.63 Which of the following types of child allowance system would you prefer more?

1. Child allowance in inverse proportion to income-level (less income more allowance)
2. Child allowance for low-income families only [__] V63
3. The same child allowance for families with the same number of children

Q.64 Which of the following options of child allowances would you prefer more?

1. The older the child, the higher the allowance
2. The younger the child, the higher the allowance [__] V64
3. The same child allowances for every child
4. Increasing child allowance with increasing number of children

Q.65 Which of the following options of child allowances would you prefer more?

1. Child allowance for the first two children only
2. Child allowance only from the third child onwards [__] V65
3. Child allowance for all children

Q.66 Do you, or does your spouse, receive child allowance for one or more of your children at the present time?

1. No (→ Q.67)
2. Yes (→ Q.66a - Q.66b) [__] V66
8. Do not know/ I do not wish to answer (→ Q.67)

Q.66a What is the total amount in Drachmas you or/and your spouse receive on a monthly basis as child allowance?

Drs = ---------- [__] V66a

Q.66b What do you think of the amount of child allowance to which you are entitled. Do you think it is too high, too low, or about right?

1. Too low
2. About right [__] V66b
3. Too high
8. Do not know/ I do not wish to answer

Q.67 Have you/ has your spouse/ had maternity leave or parental leave in the last 5 years?

1. No
2. Yes [__] V67
8. Do not know/ I do not wish to answer

Q.67a What do you think of the present leave schemes related to childbirth in private and public sector? Do you think they are too long, too short, or are they enough?

1. Too long
2. Enough
3. Too short
8. Do not know/ I do not wish to answer

Private sector---------- [__] V67a.1
Public sector ---------- [__] V67a.2

This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for your co-operation.

Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.6

Clarifications of the Main Variables Used in the Analysis: Coding and Measurement

HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND FERTILITY RELATED VARIABLES			
Label	**Code variable**	**Measurement** Nominal/ordinal/continue	**Further Explanations (Original Coding)**
Household size	**SIZHOLD**	ordinal	That includes the parents, number of children and any additional person (relatives or friend) who live permanently in the same household
Children ever born per household	**CEB**	0,1,2,3,4 (ordinal)	This is the number of children born to each couple until the time of the survey
Number of children born per household between 1995 to 2000	**CB95to00**	0,1,2,3 (ordinal)	This is a re-coded variable, based on the year of birth of each child in the household. The 0 value includes those households that did not have any children at all, as well as those who had children but all born before 1995. The 1,2,3 indicate the number of births that took place in each household between 1995 inclusive to 2000
Number of children born per household before 1995	**CB95PR**	0,1,2,3,4 (ordinal)	This is a re-coded variable, based on the year of birth of each child in the household. The 0 value includes those households that did not have any children at all, as well as those who had children but all born in 1995 and onwards. The 1,2,3 indicate the number of births that took place in each household before 1995.
Desired number of children	***DCH*** ***WDCH*** =for the wife ***HDCH***= of the husband	0,1,2,3,4 ... (ordinal)	The variable indicates the number of children that the wife/husband/or respondent desire to have
Ideal number of children	IDCH	0,1,2,3,4 .. (ordinal)	The number of children that the respondent considers ideal
Intention of having a/another child/children in the future	**FYINT**	1. Yes 2. Uncertain 3. No (nominal variable)	This is a re-coded variable from the original V45 of the questionnaire. 1. *Yes,* includes those who stated that they were Strongly Certain or Fairly Certain of their intention of having a child/children in the future. 3. *No,* includes those respondents who were *negative* regarding their fertility intention by stating that were Strongly Certain or Fairly Certain of *NOT* having a child in the future

SOCIO-ECONOMIC, GEOGRAPHIC AND CULTURAL VARIABLES			
Urbanisation	***URB***	1= Rural 2= Semi-urban (ordinal) 3= Urban	The Rural settlement includes areas with less than 4,999 inhabitants The Semi-Rural settlement includes areas with 5,000 to 9,999 inhabitants The Urban settlement includes areas with more than 10, 000 inhabitants
Wife's upbringing **Husband's upbringing**	***WUPB*** ***HUPB***	1= Rural 2= Semi-urban (ordinal) 3= Urban	As above.
Wife's education **Husband's education**	***WED*** ***HED***	1= Low level 2= Medium level 3= High level	The Low level education category included the first five education levels of education categories up to and including Graduate from Gymnasium, which is equivalent to British O-level graduate or to 15 years of schooling. Medium level categories range from middle-level technical school Graduate, to some higher education. This category includes all those continued education after the Gymnasium, but do not hold any university diploma or degree. High: The remaining three categories are considered as High levels of education, as it includes all those respondents who hold a university diploma or degree, or those with some form of postgraduate education.
Wife's Employment status	***WEMP***	1= Stays at home 2= Works part-time 3= Works full-time	Part time: Those who work at least few hours per day/weak outside home. Full-time: Those who work more than 16 hours per week
Husband's skill level in his full-time occupation	***HJSKIL***	1= Low-skill level 2= Medium-skill level 3= High-skill level	This is a re-coded variable High-skill level: Occupations such as top managerial, ministerial, scientific and other skilled professions; Medium-skill level: Occupations such as clerical positions, skilled technicians, providers of general services. Low-skill level: Occupations that include small traders and shopkeepers, small farmers, farm-workers and related occupations and semiskilled or unskilled manual workers Those who stated Armed-Forces personnel were excluded as it was unclear as to exactly was their skill level was.
Husband's contractual status in his full-time	***HJCONT***	1= Temporary job contract 2= Permanent job	

occupation			
Husband's post in his full-time occupation	***HJNAT***	1= Salaried employee 2= Self-employed/family business	Re-coded to 2 groups • Salaried employee includes those who earn daily/weekly or monthly wages • Self-employed/family business includes those who run their own/family business
Home ownership	***OWNH***	Re-coded to 2 groups 1= Not outright owner 2= Outright owner	
Home size in square metres	***SIZH***	Continuous variable	
Living conditions satisfaction	***LCSAT***	Re-coded to 2 groups 1= Dissatisfied 2= Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied 3= Satisfied	
Annual Income	***INC***	Re-coded to 3 groups 1= Low 2= Medium 3= High	• Low-income bracket (annual earnings up to 11,740 Euros or 3,999,999 GRD); • Medium- income bracket (annual earnings from 11,741 Euros to 29,350 Euros) • High- income bracket (annual earnings from 29,351 Euros and above)[1].
Family's finance satisfaction	***FSAT***	Re-coded to 3 groups 1= Dissatisfied 2= Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied 3= Satisfied	
Close network pressure on family size	***EXPR***	Re-coded to 3 groups 1= Discouraging 2= No pressure at all 3= Encouraging	This is a new variable created by computing the three different kind of networks pressures (own parents, spouse's parents and best friend) experienced by the couple simultaneously (V24a, V24b, V24c). The basic criterion was that out of the three networks, each household was experiencing at least two of the same kind of pressure (encouraging, not pressure at all, or a discouraging). The cases with the 'I do not know/I do not want to answer' as well as those who showed three different pressures from their close network, they were excluded from the analysis.
Wife's religiosity **Husband' s religiosity**	***WREL*** ***HREL***	1= Not important at all 2= Fairly important 3= Very important 4= Even more important	

[1] 1 Euro was equalised to 340.75 GRD.

Wife' s frequency of going to the church **Husband's frequency of going to the church**	***WCH*** ***HCH***	1= Occasionally 2= Often 3= Regularly	This is a re-coded variable. 'Occasionally': Includes both those who go to church Only on particular occasions (such as weddings) and those who state that never go to the church 'Often': Includes those who go to church once per month or at least, once every three months 'Regularly': Includes those who go to church every week or two or three times per month

VARIABLES RELATED TO MARRIAGE AND OTHER BIOLOGICAL/PROXIMATE CHARACTERISTICS			
Wife's age in years **Husband's age in years**	***WAGEY*** ***HAGEY***	continuous variables	
Wife's age in groups	***WAGEG***	1= 30 years of age or younger 2= 31 or older	
Wife's age at marriage **Husband's age at marriage**	***WMAGE*** ***HMAGE***	continuous variable (14-36) continuous variable (14-46)	Those who were married before were excluded/ thus, this is the age of the wife/husband at the first marriage. The variable was created by deducting year of birth of each wife/husband from the year of their marriage
Marital duration in years **Marital duration in groups**	***MRDY*** ***MRDG***	continues variable (0-15) 1= 5 years or less 2= 6 to 10 years 3= 11 to 15 years	
Marriage satisfaction	***MSAT***	1= dissatisfied 2= neither dissatisfied nor satisfied 3= satisfied	
Planned family	***PLANF***	1= No 2= Yes	
Wife had miscarriage(s) in the past	***MISC***	1= No 2= Yes	
Wife had abortion(s) in the past	***ABOR***	1= No 2= Yes	

Attitudinal and Value Variables			
Perceptions on Family and Marriage	**RELFAM** - Religious view of family life **TRADPAR** - Traditional parental roles in family **MODMAR** - Modern view of marriage	Scale variables produced from Factor analysis The mean score is used- ranking for 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree	
Concerns and uncertainties about the future	**FUTCON** - Concerns and uncertainties about the future	Scale variables produced from Factor analysis	

		The mean score is used-ranking for 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree	
Value of Children	**FAMBEN** - Family happiness view **FULBEN** - Complete self-fulfilment view **SELFBEN** - Selfish reasoning view **SOCIOBEN** - Societal aspect view **CHIBEN** - Welfare of the child view	Scale variables produced from Factor analysis The mean score is used-ranking for 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree	

Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.7

Coding Used for the Open Ended Questions –The Option 'Other' Provided in the Questionnaire

The letter **V** refers to the corresponding values and therefore questions of the questionnaire. The numbering 1,2, 3 etc refer to the different set of answers given by the respondents

V36b **The main reason(s) of undergoing an induced abortion(s)**	
1	Undesired pregnancy
2	For spacing (between pregnancies)- Timing
3	Health reasons for mother (potential danger)
4	Health reasons for child (potential danger)
5	Pressure from the spouse
6	Financial
8	I do not know/ I do not want to answer
9	Other (unhappy environment inside the house/ bad relationship)

V47a **The main reason for wanting a/another child**	
1	Companion to parents
2	Companion to the rest of children
3	Revitalisation of family bond
4	Happiness
5	Security in case of unforeseen events
6	Duty to society/ relatives
7	Balance between the two sexes (a wish for boy or girl)
8	I do not know/ wish to answer
9	Ideal, Desired number of children
10	Help in family business/ household
11	Self fulfilment, maturity as a person or as a family
12	Other (better character formation of the children, Parents grew up in a big family, it was the reason for getting married, giving love)

V48 and V49 **Reasons for not wanting a/ another child (children)**	
V48.16/v49.16	**Other**: Lack of patience, stress for the future, big responsibility to be a parent, strong opposition from one of the spouse

V50 **Changes in the society or in the family life which could facilitate having a/another child**	
V50.10	**Other**: certainty about the child's sex-boy/girl, psychological reasons, certainty about mother's health, more help from the husband towards housework, improvements in the educational system

V51: **Advantages of having many children (three or more)**	
0	none
1	More happiness in family, beauty, satisfaction
2	Best companion for other children and parents
3	Better support when parents grow older
4	Social status, power for the family
5	Financial and tax advantages
6	Better character formation of children, socialisation
7	Help in family business/ household duties
8	I don't know/ wish to answer
9	Mutual support/ and solidarity within the family/ fulfilment/ good for the family
10	Other (variety in life, creation, more people to remember in later life, friendship, communication, companionship, to avoid broedom)

V52: **Disadvantages of having many children (three or more)**	
0	none
1	Significant financial cost
2	Difficulties in raising too many children (education, house, care)
3	Less attention to the rest of children/ less focus in their future
4	No free time for parents
5	Tiredness, exhaustion for mother
6	More stress and fears about the children' future (more responsibilities)
7	**Other** : lack of privacy
8	I don't know/ wish to answer

V61 **Impact of the most preferred policy measures if they were to be implemented**	
6	**Other**: Almost all the respondents who selected this option highlighted that they would have or not have children not because of the policy measures themselves.

V62a: **Kind of policy measure or condition recommended for implementation**	
1	**Income** related
2	Parents' s **working hours related**
3	D**ay-care for children** related (kindergartens, childcare)
4	**Education** related
5	**Child allowance** related
6	**Social-conditions related**
7	**Other** (change in the general infrastructure of the country, improvement of the country's financial)

Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.8

The Mathematical Model Used to Estimate the Poisson Regression:

The following structural model is for estimating the Poisson regression:

$$y_i = \exp(a + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \ldots + \beta_k x_{ik}) + \varepsilon_i^p$$

Where y_i is the observed number of counts and ε_i^p are the Poisson distributed error terms[1].

This can be written in terms of expected counts $\hat{y}_i$ as

$$\log_e \hat{y}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \ldots + \beta_k x_{ik}$$

where the log faction prevents the expected counts being negative.

In R program the following formula was applied for executing such kind of Poisson regression:

glm (y ~x1+x2 +x3 +x4.....xk, family = poisson(log), na.action=na.omit)

Where:

Glm: general linear model;

y :is the dependent variable (number of children born to women between 1995-2000)

x1, x2,x3,...xk : are the various explanatory, independent variables (such as level of urbanisation, wife's and husbands education, values on children variables etc).

family = poisson(log): of the log-linear Poisson regression family

na.action=na.omit to exclude missing cases leastwise


[1] In this study, the y_i is the observed number of children born to women $_i$ in last five years. The α (also known as β_0) is the intercept or constant, the point at which the regression line passes through the y axis and $x_1, x_2 \ldots x_k$ are the various explanatory variables.

For each regression, the z Test, which is the regression coefficient of a variable divided by its standard error (z = b/se) is given. When the z statistic is greater than 2.0, it means that the regression coefficient is at least twice the size of its standard error. This implies a significance level probability of .05 or less, indicating that the associated explanatory variable is statistically significant.

Appendix for Chapter 6: 6.9

Maps of Greece and Crete

Map 1: Greece in Europe



Map 1: Greece in Europe




Map 2: Crete in Greece




Map 3: Crete and its Prefectures




Map 4a: Prefecture of CHANIA




Map 4b: Prefecture of RETHYMNO






Map 4c: Prefecture of HERAKLIO




Prefectures with less than 2,499 inhabitant
Prefectures between 2,500 and 4,999 inh.
Prefectures between 5,000 and 9,999 inh.
Prefectures with 10,000 inh. and above




Sampled prefectures

Map 4d: Prefecture of LASSITHI



Prefectures with less than 2,499 inhabitant
Prefectures between 2,500 and 4,999 inh.
Prefectures between 5,000 and 9,999 inh.
Prefectures with 10,000 inh. and above




Sampled prefectures

ΕΘΝΙΚΗ ΣΤΑΤΙΣΤΙΚΗ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ ★ Χαρτογραφήσεις

ΤΟΠΟΓΡΑΦΙΚΟ ΔΙΑΓΡΑΜΜΑ
ΚΛΙΜΑΚΑ 1:5.000

ΚΙΣΣΑΜΟΣ Χανίων



ΥΠΟΜΝΗΜΑ

Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.1

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1. Geographic Characteristics and Other Related Information during The Data Collection

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2-/t test and-P value
V03. Geographic Prefecture	1. Chania	127	(25.0)	
	2. Rethymno	66	(13.0)	x^2: 175.795 (3df);
	3. Heraclion	249	(49.0)	p:.000
	4. Lasithi	66	(13.0)	
	Total valid cases 508		(100.0)	
V04. Municipality/ Community	1. Chania	47	(9.3)	
	2. Akrotiri	16	(3.1)	x^2: 960.106(30df);
	3. El.Venizelos	16	(3.1)	p:.000
	4. Kissamos	14	(2.8)	
	5. Armenoi	7	(1.4)	
	6. Voukolies	7	(1.4)	
	7. Pelekanos	6	(1.2)	
	8. Georgioupolis	6	(1.2)	
	9. Kandanos	5	(1.0)	
	10. Fres	3	(.6)	
	11. Rethymno	25	(4.9)	
	12. Geropotamos	10	(2.0)	
	13. Lambi	8	(1.6)	
	14. Nikiforos Fokas	8	(1.6)	
	15. Anogeia	7	(1.4)	
	16. Arkadi	8	(1.6)	
	17. Heraclion	130	(25.6)	
	18. N. Alikarnassos	13	(2.6)	
	19. Tymbaki	12	(2.4)	
	20. Viannos	21	(4.1)	
	21. Kastelli	18	(3.5)	
	22. N. Kazantzaki	17	(3.3)	
	23. Zaros	10	(2.0)	
	24. Krousonas	12	(2.4)	
	25. Tylissos	12	(2.4)	
	26. Thrapsano	4	(.8)	
	27. Ierapetra	26	(5.1)	
	28. Siteia	22	(4.3)	
	29. Neapoli	6	(1.2)	
	30. Makris Yalos	10	(2.0)	
	31. Lefki	2	(.4)	
	Total valid cases 508		(100.0)	
V05. Urbanisation	1. Less than 2,499 inh	20	(3.9)	
	2. 2,500 – 4,999 inh	87	(17.1)	x^2: 275.228 (3df);
	3. 5,000 – 9,999 inh	126	(24.8)	p:.000
	4. 10,000 inh or more	275	(54.1)	
	Total valid cases 508		(100.0)	
Re-coded to **URB**	1. Rural (Less than 4,999 inh)	107	(21.1)	
	2. Semi-Urban (5,000 – 9,999 inh)	126	(24.8)	x^2: 99.972(2df);
	3. Urban (10,000 inh or more)	275	(54.1)	p:.000
	Total valid cases 508		(100.0)	
V06. Interviewer's Name	1. Katerin	113	(22.2)	
	2. Dion	111	(21.9)	
	4. Emmanuela	97	(19.1)	
	3. Alex	187	(36.8)	
	Total valid cases 508		(100.0)	
V07. Date of data collection	First Interview: 25.06.2000 Last Interview: 14.10.2000			
V1. GENDER	1. Female	339	(66.7)	
	2. Male	169	(33.3)	
	Total valid cases 508		(100.0)	

2. HOUSEHOLD SIZE; AND FERTILITY

HOUSEHOLD SIZE

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V7 Household Size **(SIZHOLD)** Re-coded variable based on the additional number of people leaning in the household	2	81	(16.0)	x^2: 347.378(5df); p:.000
	3	122	(24.0)	
	4	216	(42.5)	
	5	62	(12.2)	
	6	21	(4.1)	
	7	6	(1.2)	
	Total valid cases 508		(100.0)	
	Median 4			
	Mode 4			
	Mean 3.68 Std. Deviation: 1.083			
V8 Other people living in the household other than parents and children-	1. Parent	37	(7.3)	
	2. Siblings	5	(1.0)	
	3. Other Relatives	0	(0.0)	
	4. Friends	0	(0.0)	
	5. Other	0	(0.0)	

NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY and THEIR AGE,

V4. Wife is Currently pregnant	1 No	448	(88.2)	x^2: 265.524(2df); p:.000
	2 Yes	54	(10.6)	
	8. I do not know	6	(1.2)	
	Total valid cases 508		(100.0)	
V2. Couple's Actual number of children (CEB)	0	83	(16.3)	x^2: 265.524(4df); p:.000
	1	131	(25.8)	
	2	226	(44.5)	
	3	58	(11.4)	
	4	10	(2.0)	
	Total valid cases 508		(100.0)	
	Median 2.00			
	Mode 2			
	Mean 1.57 Std. Deviation: .959			
	Skewness: -0.029			
	Kurtosis: -0.386			
Re-coded to **NOCHG** (3 groups)	1. Having no or one child	214	(42.1)	x^2: 12.925(2df); p:.000
	2. Having two children	226	(44.5)	
	3. Having three or more children	68	(13.4)	
	Total valid cases 508		(100.0)	

First child's year of birth (3.6)	before 1985	4	(0.9)	
	1985	15	(3.5)	x^2: 39.892(16df); p:.001
	1986	21	(5.0)	
	1987	27	(6.4)	
	1988	32	(7.5)	
	1989	25	(5.9)	
	1990	35	(8.3)	
	1991	30	(7.1)	
	1992	32	(7.5)	
	1993	27	(6.4)	
	1994	21	(5.0)	
	1995	25	(5.9)	
	1996	23	(5.4)	
	1997	36	(8.5)	
	1998	30	(7.1)	
	1999	20	(4.7)	
	2000	21	(5.0)	
	Total valid cases 424		(100.0)	
	Not applicable cases/Missing cases 84			
	Median 1992			
	Mode 1997			
	Mean: 1992.48 Std. Deviation: 4.414			

Second child's year of birth (3.7)	before 1985	2	(0.7)	
	1985	2	(0.7)	x^2: 80.014(16df); p:.000
	1986	3	(1.0)	
	1987	6	(2.0)	
	1988	15	(5.1)	
	1989	15	(5.1)	
	1990	22	(7.5)	
	1991	21	(7.2)	
	1992	23	(7.8)	
	1993	28	(9.6)	
	1994	30	(10.2)	
	1995	27	(9.2)	
	1996	20	(6.8)	
	1997	17	(5.8)	
	1998	28	(9.6)	
	1999	19	(6.5)	
	2000	15	(5.1)	
	Total valid cases 299		(100.0)	
	Not applicable cases/Missing cases 215			
	Median 1994			
	Mode 1994			
	Mean: 1993.73 Std. Deviation: 4.692			
Third child's year of birth (3.8)	before 1985	1	(1.5)	x^2: 28.597(14df); p:.012
	1985	1	(1.5)	
	1987	2	(3.0)	
	1989	2	(3.0)	
	1990	4	(6.0)	
	1991	2	(3.0)	
	1992	5	(7.5)	
	1993	1	(1.5)	
	1994	9	(13.4)	
	1995	6	(9.0)	
	1996	8	(11.9)	
	1997	9	(13.4)	
	1998	6	(9.0)	
	1999	8	(11.9)	
	2000	3	(4.5)	
	Total valid cases 67		(100.0)	
	Not applicable cases/Missing cases 441			
	Median 1996			
	Mode 1994 same as 1996			
	Mean: 1994.82 Std. Deviation: 3.713			
Fourth child's year of birth (3.9)	before 1985	1	(10.0)	x^2: 4.000(4df); p: .406
	1996	1	(10.0)	
	1997	1	(10.0)	
	1999	4	(40.0)	
	2000	3	(30.0)	
	Total valid cases 10		(100.0)	
	Not applicable cases/Missing cases 498			
	Median 1999			
	Mode 1999			
	Mean: 1996.30 Std. Deviation: 4.855			

RECENT FERTILITY (CB95to00) AND PREVIOUS FERTILITY (CB95PR)

No. of children born between 1995 to 2000 per household (CH95TO00)	0	248	(48.9)	x^2: 297.489(3df); p:.000
	1	190	(37.5)	
	2	66	(13.0)	
	3	3	(0.6)	
	Total valid cases 507		(100.0)	
	Missing cases 1			
	Median 1			
	Mode 0			
	Mean: .65 Std. Deviation: .724			
	Skewness: -0.729			
	Kurtosis: -0.419			

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
No. of children born prior to 1995 per household (CB95PR)	0	238	(46.9)	x^2: 353.464(4df); p:.000
	1	103	(20.3)	
	2	139	(27.4)	
	3	26	(5.1)	
	4	1	(0.2)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	Missing cases	1		
	Median 1			
	Mode 0			
	Mean: .91 Std. Deviation: .980			
	Skewness: .554			
	Kurtosis: -.975			

3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATED CHARACTERISTICS

COUPLES' NUMBER OF SIBLINGS AND UPBRINGING

V5.1 Wife's number of siblings **(WSIB)**	1. Having none or one sibling	203	(40.1)	x^2: 10.628(2df); p:.005
	2. Having two siblings	155	(30.6)	
	3. Having three or more	148	(29.2)	
	Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
	Missing cases	2		
V5.2 Husband's number of siblings **(HSIB)**	1. Having none or one sibling	190	(37.5)	x^2: 4.154(2df); p:.125
	2. Having two siblings	155	(30.6)	
	3. Having three or more	161	(31.8)	
	Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
	Missing cases	2		
V6.1 Wife's upbringing **(WUPB)**	1. Rural	190	(37.4)	x^2: 52.161(2df); p:.000
	2. Semi-Urban	95	(18.7)	
	3. Urban	223	(43.9)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V5.1 Husband's upbringing **(WUPB)**	1. Rural	197	(38.8)	x^2: 75.901(2df); p:.000
	2. Semi-Urban	79	(15.5)	
	3. Urban	232	(45.7)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	

COUPLES' EDUCATION

V9.1 Wife's education	1. No formal schooling	0	(0.0)	x^2: 623.87(11df); p:.000
	2. Few years in Demotiko (primary)	5	(1.0)	
	3. Graduate from Demotiko (primary)	54	(10.6)	
	4. Few years in Gymnasium (some O-level equivalent educ.)	17	(3.3)	
	5. Graduate from Gymnasium (O-level graduate)	53	(10.4)	
	6. Graduate from middle-level Technical school	19	(3.7)	
	7. Few years in Lyceum (some A-level equiv.)	16	(3.1)	
	8. Graduate from Lyceum (A-level equivalent graduate)	18	(35.8)	
		2		
	9. Some post-secondary education (third level college)	35	(6.9)	
	10. Some higher education (attended university)	9	(1.8)	
	11. Graduate from TEI (university diploma equivalent)	42	(8.3)	
	12. Graduate from University	71	(14.0)	
	13. Postgraduate studies	5	(1.0)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
Re-coded to **WED**	1. Low	129	(25.4)	x^2: 74.791(2df); p:.000
	2. Medium	261	(51.4)	
	3. Higher	118	(23.2)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V9.2 Husband's education	1. No formal schooling	0	(0.0)	x^2: 350.709(11df); p:.000
	2. Few years in Demotiko (primary)	2	(0.4)	
	3. Graduate from Demotiko (primary)	85	(16.70	
	4. Few years in Gymnasium (some O-level equivalent educ.)	25	(4.9)	
	5. Graduate from Gymnasium (O-level graduate)	54	(10.6)	
	6. Graduate from middle-level Technical school	58	(11.4)	
	7. Few years in Lyceum (some A-level equiv.)	7	(1.4)	
	8. Graduate from Lyceum (A-level equivalent graduate)	121	(23.8)	
	9. Some post-secondary education (third level college)	30	(5.9)	
	10. Some higher education (attended university)	8	(1.6)	
	11. Graduate from TEI (university diploma equivalent)	40	(7.9)	
	12. Graduate from University	70	(13.8)	
	13. Postgraduate studies	8	(1.6)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
Re-coded to **HED**	1. Low	166	(32.7)	x^2: 33.276(2df); p:.000
	2. Medium	224	(44.1)	
	3. Higher	118	(23.2)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	

COUPLES' EMPLOYMENT RELATED

V10.1 Wife's Employment Status	1. Full or part time employed	336	(66.1)	x^2: 583.34(3df); p:.000
	2. Unemployed	10	(2.0)	
	3. Home maker	160	(31.5)	
	4. Student	2	(0.4)	
	5. Pensioner	0	(0.0)	
	6. Other	0	(0.0)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
Re-coded to **WEMP**	1. Stays at home	160	(33.3)	x^2: 240.754(2df); p:.000
	2. Works part-time	27	(5.4)	
	3. Works full-time	309	(62.3)	
	Total valid cases	496	(100.0)	
	Missing/not applicable cases	12		
V11.1 Wife's' full-time occupation	1. Top managerial occupations/ Senior government. officials & MPs	3	(1.0)	x^2: 125.068(8df); p:.000
	2. Scientific and artistic occupations	74	(23.9)	
	3. Associate professional and technical occupations	22	(7.1)	
	4. Clerical and related occupations	43	(13.9)	
	5. Providers of general services	21	(6.8)	
	6. Small traders and shopkeepers	51	(16.5)	
	7. Small farmers, farm-workers and related occupations	25	(8.1)	
	8. Skilled technicians	13	(4.2)	
	9. Unskilled or semi-skilled manual workers	57	(18.4)	
	10. Armed-Forces personnel	0	(0.0)	
	Total valid cases	309	(100.0)	
	Missing/not applicable cases	199		
Re-coded to **WJSKIL**	1. Low-skill level	133	(43.0)	x^2: 15.456(2df); p:.000
	2. Medium-skill level	77	(24.9)	
	3. High-skill level	99	(32.1)	
	Total valid cases	309	(100.0)	

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V12.1 **Wife's nature of her full-time occupation**	1. Employer	34	(11.0)	x^2: 278.33(4df); p:.000
	2. Self-employed	81	(26.2)	
	3. Salaried employee	168	(54.4)	
	4. Casual worker	10	(3.2)	
	5. Working in a family business	16	(5.2)	
	Total valid cases	309	(100.0)	
	Missing/not applicable cases	199		
Re-coded to **WJNAT**	1. Casual worker	10	(3.2)	x^2: 132.602(2df); p:.000
	2. Self-employed/family business	131	(42.4)	
	3. Salaried employee	168	(54.4)	
	Total valid cases	309	(100.0)	
V13.1 **Wife's contractual status in her full-time occupation**	1. Permanent job	195	(63.5)	x^2: 691.67(6df); p:.000
	2. Long term job contract	72	(23.5)	
	3. Short term job contract	22	(7.2)	
	4. Contract work	8	(2.6)	
	5. Per unit of work	1	(0.3)	
	6. Per day	4	(1.3)	
	7. Per hour	5	(1.6)	
	Total valid cases	307	(100.0)	
	Missing/not applicable cases	201		
Re-coded to **WJCONT**	1. Temporary job contract	112	(36.5)	x^2: 22.440(1df); p:.001
	2. Permanent job	195	(63.5)	
	Total valid cases	307	(100.0)	
V15.1 **Wife's average monthly income from employment** (full and/or part-time)	1. None	26	(7.7)	x^2: 281 43(6df); p:.001
	2. Less than 200 000 Drs	91	(27.1)	
	3. 200 000 - 349 999 Drs	121	(36.0)	
	4. 350 000 - 499 999 Drs	28	(8.3)	
	5. 500 000 - 749 999 Drs	8	(2.4)	
	6. More than 750 000 Drs	9	(2.7)	
	7. I Do not know/ not want to answer	53	(15.7)	
	Total valid cases	336	(100.0)	
	Not applicable/ Missing cases	172		
V10.2 **Husband's employment status**	1. Full or part time employed	505	(99.4)	x^2: 998.08(2df); p:.000
	2. Unemployed	2	(0.4)	
	3. Home maker	0	(0.0)	
	4. Student	0	(0.0)	
	5. Pensioner	1	(0.02)	
	6. Other	0	(0.0)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
	Among the employed, those who were in:			
	Full-time employment	504		
	Part-time employment	4		
V11.3 **Husband 's full-time occupation**	1. Top managerial occupations/ Senior government. officials & ministers	17	(3.4)	x^2: 261.16(9df); p:.000
	2. Scientific and artistic occupations	63	(12.5)	
	3. Associate professional and technical occupations	18	(3.6)	
	4. Clerical and related occupations	33	(6.5)	
	5. Providers of general services	33	(6.5)	
	6. Small traders and shopkeepers	71	(14.1)	
	7. Small farmers, farm-workers and related occupations	77	(15.3)	
	8. Skilled technicians	133	(26.4)	
	9. Unskilled or semi-skilled manual workers	56	(11.1)	
	10. Armed-Forces personnel	3	(0.6)	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
	Not applicable/ Missing cases	4		
Re-coded to **HJSKIL**	1. Low-skill level	204	(40.7)	x^2: 42.84(2df); p:.000
	2. Medium-skill level	199	(39.7)	
	3. High-skill level	98	(19.6)	
	Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
	Not applicable/ Missing cases 7 (armed forces personnel was excluded)			

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V12.3 **Husband's nature in his full-time occupation**	1. Employer	118	(23.4)	x^2: 279.02(4df); p:.000
	2. Self-employed	168	(33.3)	
	3. Salaried employee	190	(37.7)	
	4. Casual worker	26	(5.2)	
	5. Working in a family business	2	(0.4)	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
	Missing cases	4		
Re-coded to **HJNAT**	1. Casual worker	26	(5.2)	x^2: 208.619(2df); p:.000
	2. Self-employed/family business	288	(57.1)	
	3. Salaried employee	190	(37.7)	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
V13.3 **Husband's contractual status in his full-time occupation**	1. Permanent job	364	(72.7)	x^2: 1435.96(6df); p:.000
	2. Long term job contract	70	(14.0)	
	3. Short term job contract	26	(5.2)	
	4. Contract work	13	(2.6)	
	5. Per unit of work	10	(2.0)	
	6. Per day	17	(3.4)	
	7. Per hour	1	(0.2)	
	Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
	Missing cases	7		
Re-coded to **HJCONT**	1. Temporary job contract	137	(27.3)	x^2: 102.85(1df); p:.001
	2. Permanent job	364	(72.7)	
	Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
V15.2 **Husband's average monthly income from occupation** (full and/or part-time)	1. None	0	(0.0)	x^2: 314.79(6df); p:.000
	2. Less than 200 000 Drs	46	(9.1)	
	3. 200 000 - 349 999 Drs	197	(39.0)	
	4. 350 000 - 499 999 Drs	100	(19.8)	
	5. 500 000 - 749 999 Drs	39	(7.7)	
	6. More than 750 000 Drs	19	(3.8)	
	7. I Do not know/ not want to answer	104	(20.6)	
	Total valid cases	505	(100.0)	
	Missing/not applicable cases	3		

HOUSING RELATED VARIABLES

V16 **Tenancy status of home**	1. Tenant	140	(27.6)	x^2: 771.11(4df); p:.000
	2. Owner	331	(65.2)	
	3. Paying mortgage	8	(1.6)	
	4. Family house	27	(5.3)	
	5. Other	2	(0.4)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
Re-coded to **OWNH**	1. Not an owner	177	(34.8)	x^2: 46.685(1df); p:.000
	2. Owner	331	(65.2)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V17 **Ownership of other properties (OWNH2)**	1. No	336	(66.7)	x^2: 56.00(1df); p:.000
	2. Yes	168	(33.3)	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/. I do not wish to answer	4		
V18 **Home size in square metres (SIZH)**	Minimum 30 square metres (m^2)			t: 74.822(499df); p:.000
	Maximum 230 m^2			
	Mean 102.95 m^2 Std. Deviation: 30.735			
	Total valid cases	499		
	Missing cases	9		
V19 **Number of rooms in the household (ROOMS)** (kitchen and toilet not included)	1	11	(2.2)	x^2: 363.858(5df); p:.000
	2	45	(8.9)	
	3	191	(37.7)	
	4	175	(34.6)	
	5	59	(11.7)	
	6	25	(4.9)	
	Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
	Missing cases	2		

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V19a Number of bedrooms in the household	1	57	(11.3)	x^2: 253.431(3df); p:.000
	2	259	(51.2)	
	3	157	(31.0)	
	4	33	(6.5)	
	Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
	Missing cases	2		
Re-coded to **BEDRMS**	1. Two bedrooms or less	316	(62.5)	x^2: 31.375(1df); p:.000
	2. Three bedrooms or more	190	(37.5)	
	Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
V20 Satisfaction with living conditions	1. Highly dissatisfied	7	(1.4)	x^2: 385.27(4df); p:.000
	2. Dissatisfied	27	(5.3)	
	3. Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied	79	(15.6)	
	4. Satisfied	251	(49.4)	
	5. Highly satisfied	144	(28.3)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
Re-coded to **LCSAT**	1. Dissatisfied	34	(6.7)	x^2: 457.091(2df); p:.000
	2. Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied	79	(15.5)	
	3. Satisfied	395	(77.8)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	

ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME

V21 Household's Annual Income	1. Less than 2 000 000 Drs	49	(10.8)	x^2: 164.416(4df); p:.000
	2. 2 000 000 – 3 999 999 Drs	141	(31.2)	
	3. 4 000 000 – 6 999 999 Drs	168	(37.2)	
	4. 7 000 000 – 10 000 000 Drs	67	(14.8)	
	5. More than 10 000 000 Drs	27	(6.0)	
	Total valid cases	452	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/. I do not know- wish to answer	56		
Re-coded to **INC**	1. Low	190	(42.0)	x^2: 33.575(2df); p:.000
	2. Medium	168	(37.2)	
	3. High	94	(20.8)	
	Total valid cases	452	(100.0)	
V22 Financial Satisfaction	1. Highly dissatisfied	5	(1.0)	x^2: 450.976(4df); p:.000
	2. Dissatisfied	30	(5.9)	
	3. Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied	215	(42.5)	
	4. Satisfied	220	(43.5)	
	5. Highly satisfied	36	(7.1)	
	Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
	Missing cases	2		
Re-coded to **FSAT**	1. Dissatisfied	35	(6.9)	x^2: 163.877(2df); p:.000
	2. Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied	215	(42.5)	
	3. Satisfied	256	(50.6)	
	Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	

CLOSE NETWORK (PARENTS AND FRIENDS)

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V23a Parents' feelings about number of children	1. Too few	179	(38.1)	x^2: 157.574 (3df); p:.000
	2. Just right	177	(37.7)	
	3. Too many	13	(2.8)	
	4. No opinion	101	(21.5)	
	Total valid cases	470	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	38		

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V23b Spouse parents' feelings about number of children	1. Too few	184	(39.6)	x^2: 152.092(3df); p:.000
	2. Just right	164	(35.3)	
	3. Too many	13	(2.8)	
	4. No opinion	104	(22.4)	
	Total valid cases	465	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	43		
V23c Other person with significant personal influence	1. Too few	142	(30.1)	x^2: 132.796(3df); p:.000
	2. Just right	175	(37.2)	
	3. Too many	12	(2.5)	
	4. No opinion	142	(30.1)	
	Total valid cases	471	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	37		
V24a Parents' pressure on the number of children	1. Discouraging	26	(5.2)	x^2: 272.974 (2df); p:.000
	2. No pressure at all	327	(65.0)	
	3. Encouraging	150	(29.8)	
	Total valid cases	503	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	5		
V24b Spouse parents' pressure on the number of children	1. Discouraging	21	(4.2)	x^2: 268.060(2df); p:.000
	2. No pressure at all	319	(64.1)	
	3. Encouraging	158	(31.7)	
	Total valid cases	498	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	10		
V24c Other person with significant personal influence	1. Discouraging	15	(3.0)	x^2: 388.707(2df); p:.000
	2. No pressure at all	366	(73.0)	
	3. Encouraging	120	(24.0)	
	Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	7		
Re-coded to **EXPR** The predominant pressure on family size as expressed by all groups simultaneously	1 Discouraging	20	(4.0)	x^2: 311.139(2df); p:.000
	2 No pressure at all	337	(68.1)	
	3 Encouraging	138	(27.9)	
	Total valid cases	495	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/ Not applicable	13		

RELIGION –RELIGIOSITY

V26.1 Wife' s religious affiliation	1. Christian Orthodox	504	(99.2)	x^2: 992.154(2df); p:.000
	2. Christian Catholic	3	(0.6)	
	3. Protestant	0	(0.0)	
	4. None/Atheist	1	(0.2)	
	5. Other	0	(0.0)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V26.2 Husbands' s Religious affiliation	1. Christian Orthodox	502	(98.8)	x^2: 1476.425(3df); p:.000
	2. Christian Catholic	1	(0.2)	
	3. Protestant	0	(0.0)	
	4. None/Atheist	4	(0.8)	
	5. Other	1	(0.2)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V27.1 Wife's religiosity	1. Unimportant	18	(6.1)	x^2: 491.698(3df); p:.000
	2. Fairly important	110	(27.4)	
	3. Very important	335	(58.2)	
	4. Even more important	44	(8.3)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	1		
Re-coded to **WREL**	1. Unimportant	18	(3.5)	x^2: 416.462(2df); p:.000
	2. Fairly important	110	(21.7)	
	3. Very important	379	(74.8)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V27.2 Husband' s religiosity	1. Not important at all	31	(6.1)	x^2: 353.521(2df);
	2. Fairly important	139	(27.4)	p:.000
	3. Very important	295	(58.2)	
	4. Even more important	42	(8.3)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	1		
Re-coded to **HREL**	1. Unimportant	31	(6.1)	x^2: 285.018(2df);
	2. Fairly important	139	(27.4)	p:.000
	3. Very important	337	(66.5)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
V28.1 Wife' s frequency of going to church/place of worship	1. Never	1	(0.2)	x^2: 399.134(5df);
	2. Only on specific occasions	241	(47.4)	p:.000
	3. Once every three months	70	(13.8)	
	4. Once per month	67	(13.2)	
	5. Two or three times per month	87	(17.1)	
	6. Every week	42	(8.3)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
Re-coded to **WCH**	1. Occasionally	242	(47.6)	x^2: 46.965(2df);
	2. Often	137	(27.0)	p:.000
	3. Regularly	129	(25.4)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V28.2 Husband' s frequency of going to church/place of worship	1. Never	3	(0.6)	x^2: 856.386(5df);
	2. Only on specific occasions	327	(64.4)	p:.000
	3. Once every three months	57	(11.2)	
	4. Once per month	49	(9.6)	
	5. Two or three times per month	49	(9.6)	
	6. Every week	23	(4.5)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
Re-coded to **HCH**	1. Occasionally	330	(65.0)	x^2: 232.079(2df);
	2. Often	106	(20.9)	p:.000
	3. Regularly	72	(14.2)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	

4. BIOLOGICAL AND OTHER PROXIMATE CHARACTERISTICS

AGE AND MARRIAGE

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V29.1 Wife's age in years (WAGEY)	Minimum 18 (born in 1982)			
	Maximum 49 (born 1951)			t: 130.278(507df);
	Mean 31.14 Std. Deviation: 5.387			p:.000
	Total valid cases	508		
Re-coded to **WIFEAGE** (7 groups)	1. 19 years of age or less	7	(1.4)	x^2: 401.55(6df);
	2. 20 to 24 years	43	(8.5)	p:.000
	3. 25 to 29 years	148	(29.1)	
	4. 30 to 34 years	183	(36.0)	
	5. 35 to 39 years	86	(16.9)	
	6. 40 to 44 years	36	(7.1)	
	7. 45 years of age or more	5	(1.0)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
Re-coded to **WAGEG** (2 groups)	1 30 years of age or younger	245	(48.2)	x^2: .638(1df);
	2 31 years of age or more	263	(51.8)	p: .425
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V29.2 Husband's age in years (HAGEY)	Minimum 21 (born in 1979)			
	Maximum 55 (born 1945)			t: 133.819(507df);
	Mean 36.00 Std. Deviation: 6.064			p:.000
	Total valid cases	508		
Re-coded to **HUSAGE** (in 7 groups)	1. 24 years of age or less	9	(1.8)	x^2: 330.67(6df);
	2. 25 to 29 years	57	(11.2)	p:.000
	3. 30 to 34 years	136	(26.8)	
	4. 35 to 39 years	173	(34.1)	
	5. 40 to 44 years	90	(17.7)	
	6. 45 to 49 years	28	(5.5)	
	7. 50 years of age or more	15	(3.0)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V30 Couple's year of marriage (MRDY)	0. 2000	22	(4.3)	x^2: 25.858(15df);
	1. 1999	39	(7.7)	p:.040
	2. 1998	30	(5.9)	
	3. 1997	40	(7.9)	
	4. 1996	30	(5.9)	
	5. 1995	40	(7.9)	
	6. 1994	20	(3.9)	
	7. 1993	27	(5.3)	
	8. 1992	24	(4.7)	
	9. 1991	31	(6.1)	
	10. 1990	33	(6.5)	
	11. 1989	36	(7.1)	
	12. 1988	23	(4.5)	
	13. 1987	32	(6.3)	
	14. 1986	35	(6.9)	
	15. 1985	46	(9.1)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
	Median 1992			
	Mode 1985			
	Mean 1992.29 Std. Deviation: 4.757			
Re-coded to **Marital duration in 3 groups (MRDG)**	1. 5 years or less	201	(39.5)	x^2: 12.925(2df);
	2. 6 to 10 years	135	(26.6)	p:.000
	3. 11 to 15 years	172	(33.9)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics			No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V31.1 **Wife has been married previously**	1. No			501	(98.6)	x^2: 480.386(1df);
	2. Yes			7	(1.4)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V31.2 **Husbands been married previously**	1. No			497	(97.8)	x^2: 464.953(1df);
	2. Yes			11	(2.2)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
Wife's age at first marriage (WMAGEY)	Minimum	14				t: 117.312(500df);
	Maximum	38				p:.000
	Median	23				
	Mode	25				
	Mean	23.39	Std. Deviation: 4.46303			
			Total valid cases	501		
Re-coded to **WMAGEG** (in 6 groups)	1. less than 20 years old			107	(21.4)	x^2: 243.594(4df);
	2. 20 - 24 years old			197	(39.3)	p:.000
	3. 25 - 29 years old			152	(30.3)	
	4. 30 - 34 years old			35	(7.0)	
	5. 35 - 39 years old			10	(2.0)	
	6. 40 and over			0	(0.0)	
			Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
Re-coded to **WMAGE** (in 3 groups)	1. 24 years old or younger			304	(60.7)	x^2: 202.862(2df);
	2. 25 - 29 years old			152	(30.9)	p:.000
	3. 30 years old or more			45	(9.0)	
			Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
Husband's age at first marriage (HMAGEY)	Minimum	14				t: 130.756(496df);
	Maximum	46				p:.000
	Median	28				
	Mode	26				
	Mean	28.18	Std. Deviation: 4.80514			
			Total valid cases	497		
Re-coded to **HMAGEG** (in 6 groups)	1. less than 20 years old			4	(0.8)	x^2: 375.465 (5df);
	2. 20 - 24 years old			106	(21.3)	p:.000
	3. 25 - 29 years old			205	(41.3)	
	4. 30 - 34 years old			134	(27.0)	
	5. 35 - 39 years old			36	(7.2)	
	6. 40 and over			12	(2.4)	
			Total valid cases	497	(100.0)	
Re-coded to **HMAGE** (in 3 groups)	1. 24 years old or younger			110	(22.1)	x^2: 29.654(2df);
	2. 25 - 29 years old			205	(41.2)	p:.000
	3. 30 years old or more			182	(36.6)	
			Total valid cases	497	(100.0)	

MARITAL SATISFACTION AND DIVORCE

V32 **Satisfied with marriage**	1. Highly dissatisfied			2	(0.4)	x^2: 547.183(4df);
	2. Dissatisfied			6	(1.2)	p:.000
	3. Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied			41	(8.2)	
	4. Satisfied			204	(40.6)	
	5. Highly satisfied			249	(49.6)	
			Total valid cases	502	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer 6					
Re-coded to **MSAT** (3 groups)	1. Less satisfied			49	(9.8)	x^2: 131.574(2df);
	2. Satisfied			204	(40.6)	p:.000
	3. Very satisfied			249	(49.6)	
			Total valid cases	502	(100.0)	
V33 **Thinking of divorcing (DIVR)**	1. No			438	(88.3)	x^2: 291.129(1df);
	2. Yes			58	(11.7)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	496	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer 12					

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics			No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
Wife's age at first birth (WAG1BRT)	Minimum	15				t: 105.877(417df);
	Maximum	38				p:.000
	Median	24				
	Mode	26				
	Mean	24.30	Std. Deviation: 4.692			
			Total valid cases	418		
	Missing cases/Not applicable cases 90					
Re-coded to **WAG1BRTG** (3 groups)	1. 24 years of age or less			231	(55.3)	x^2: 109.584(2df);
	2. 25 to 29 years of age			130	(31.1)	p:.000
	3. 30 years of age or more			57	(13.6)	
			Total valid cases	418		

CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION

V34 **The couple has planned their family (PLANF)**	1. No			194	(38.4)	x^2: 27.107(1df);
	2. Yes			311	(61.6)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	505	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer 3					
V35 **Use of any birth control method (BIRTCON)**	1. No			114	(22.7)	x^2: 149.554(1df);
	2. Yes			388	(77.3)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	502	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer 6					
V35a1-V35a8 **Use a specific birth control method**						
1. Coitus interruptus	1. No			163	(42.0)	x^2: 27.107(1df);
	2. Yes			225	(58.0)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	388	(100.0)	
2. Condoms	1. No			229	(59.0)	x^2: 27.107(1df);
	2. Yes			159	(41.0)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	388	(100.0)	
3. Contraceptive Pills	1. No			341	(87.9)	x^2: 27.107(1df);
	2. Yes			47	(12.1)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	388	(100.0)	
4. Diaphragm	1. No			382	(98.5)	x^2: 27.107(1df);
	2. Yes			6	(1.5)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	388	(100.0)	
5. Intrauterine Device (IUD)	1. No			363	(93.6)	x^2: 27.107(1df);
	2. Yes			25	(6.4)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	388	(100.0)	
6. Vaginal Douches	1. No			384	(99.0)	x^2: 27.107(1df);
	2. Yes			4	(1.0)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	388	(100.0)	
7. Other	1. No			386	(99.5)	x^2: 27.107(1df);
	2. Yes			2	(0.5)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	388	(100.0)	
8. I do not know/ I do not wish to answer	1. No			381	(98.2)	x^2: 27.107(1df);
	2. Yes			7	(1.8)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	388	(100.0)	
V36 **Wife had had termination of pregnancy(ies) (PREGTERM)**	1. No			382	(76.2)	x^2: 138.062(1df);
	2. Yes			119	(23.8)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer 7					
V36a1 **Wife has had a miscarriage(s)(MISC)**	1. No			410	(81.8)	x^2: 203.116(1df);
	2. Yes			91	(18.2)	p:.000
			Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer 7					

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V36a2 **Wife has had an abortion(s) (ABOR)**	1. No	459	(91.6)	x^2: 347.084(1df); p:.000
	2. Yes	42	(8.4)	
	Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	7		
V36b **The main reason of undergoing induced abortion(s)**	1 Undesired pregnancy (did not want more children)	6	(14.3)	x^2: 18.000(6df); p:.006
	2. For spacing (between pregnancies)	13	(31.0)	
	3. Health reasons for mother	6	(14.3)	
	4. Health reasons for child	10	(23.8)	
	5. Encouragement from the spouse	0	(0.0)	
	6. Financial reasons	3	(7.1)	
	7. Other reasons (unhappy environment inside the house/ bad relationship)	3	(7.1)	
	8. Do not know/wish to answer	1	(2.4)	
	Total valid cases	42		
	Not applicable cases	466		

5. VALUES RELATED VARIABLES

PERCEPTIONS ON FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE FUTURE

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V38.1 The father should be the breadwinner while the mother should be the homemaker	1. Strongly disagree	39	(7.7)	x^2: 262.615(4df); p:.000
	2. Disagree	241	(47.5)	
	3. Undecided	82	(16.2)	
	4. Agree	97	(19.1)	
	5. Strongly agree	48	(9.5)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V38.2 Having children is God' s will	1. Strongly disagree	37	(7.4)	x^2: 97.020(4df); p:.000
	2. Disagree	150	(30.1)	
	3. Undecided	75	(15.1)	
	4. Agree	149	(29.9)	
	5. Strongly agree	87	(17.5)	
	Total valid cases	498	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	10		
V38.3 Woman does not have the right to choose to be a single parent	1. Strongly disagree	75	(14.9)	x^2: 232.488(4df); p:.000
	2. Disagree	224	(44.4)	
	3. Undecided	71	(14.1)	
	4. Agree	114	(22.6)	
	5. Strongly agree	20	(4.0)	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	4		
V38.4 Marriage is not an outdated institution	1. Strongly disagree	1	(0.2)	x^2: 487.270(4df); p:.000
	2. Disagree	34	(6.7)	
	3. Undecided	41	(8.1)	
	4. Agree	266	(52.5)	
	5. Strongly agree	165	(32.5)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V38.5 The man does not have to help with the housework whether the wife is working or not	1. Strongly disagree	121	(24.0)	x^2: 451.675(4df); p:.000
	2. Disagree	277	(55.0)	
	3. Undecided	52	(10.3)	
	4. Agree	47	(9.3)	
	5. Strongly agree	7	(1.4)	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	4		
V38.6 Divorce is acceptable when the marriage becomes an unhappy experience	1. Strongly disagree	0	(0.0)	x^2: 450.397(3df); p:.000
	2. Disagree	6	(1.2	
	3. Undecided	11	(2.2	
	4. Agree	271	(53.8	
	5. Strongly agree	216	(42.9	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	4		
V38.7 A person should be satisfied with his/her own life before starting a family	1. Strongly disagree	4	(0.8)	x^2: 537.584(4df); p:.000
	2. Disagree	16	(3.2)	
	3. Undecided	39	(7.7)	
	4. Agree	268	53.1)	
	5. Strongly agree	178	35.2)	
	Total valid cases	505	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	3		

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V38.8	1. Strongly disagree	16	(3.3)	x^2: 154.885(4df);
A large family is a blessing from God	2. Disagree	90	(18.5)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	105	(21.6)	
	4. Agree	188	(38.7)	
	5. Strongly agree	87	(17.9)	
	Total valid cases	486	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	22		
V38.9	1. Strongly disagree	6	(1.2)	x^2: 311.984(4df);
Mothers with young children should staying at home and not go out to work	2. Disagree	48	(9.5)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	78	(15.4)	
	4. Agree	234	(46.2)	
	5. Strongly agree	140	(27.7)	
	Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	2		
V38.10	1. Strongly disagree	1	(0.2)	x^2: 884.686(4df);
A child needs a home with both of its parents	2. Disagree	3	(0.6)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	7	(1.4)	
	4. Agree	153	(30.2)	
	5. Strongly agree	343	(67.7)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V38.11	1. Strongly disagree	1	(0.2)	x^2: 540.689(4df);
It is difficult to trust people nowadays	2. Disagree	22	(4.4)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	31	(6.2)	
	4. Agree	262	(52.2)	
	5. Strongly agree	186	(37.1)	
	Total valid cases	502	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	6		
V38.12	1. Strongly disagree	0	(0.0)	x^2: 360.882(3df);
In the world things are getting worse	2. Disagree	25	(5.1)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	48	(9.7)	
	4. Agree	294	(59.6)	
	5. Strongly agree	126	(25.6)	
	Total valid cases	493	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	15		
V38.13	1. Strongly disagree	1	(0.2)	x^2: 653.279(4df);
There is uncertainty about the future	2. Disagree	16	(3.2)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	22	(4.4)	
	4. Agree	295	(58.8)	
	5. Strongly agree	168	(33.5)	
	Total valid cases	502	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	6		
V38.14	1. Strongly disagree	5	(1.0)	x^2: 838.024(4df);
Family is more important than profession	2. Disagree	24	(4.8)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	61	(12.1)	
	4. Agree	357	(71.0)	
	5. Strongly agree	56	(11.1)	
	Total valid cases	503	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	3		

VIEWS ON ABORTIONS

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V39.1	1. Strongly disagree	12	(2.4)	x^2: 761.748(4df);
Abortion is acceptable when there is a strong chance of serious defect in a baby	2. Disagree	5	(1.0)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	4	(0.8)	
	4. Agree	171	(33.7)	
	5. Strongly agree	315	(62.1)	
	Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V39.2	1. Strongly disagree	10	(2.0)	x^2: 649.313(4df);
Abortion is acceptable if the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy	2. Disagree	9	(1.8)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	17	(3.4)	
	4. Agree	178	(35.3)	
	5. Strongly agree	290	(57.5)	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	4		
V39.3	1. Strongly disagree	11	(2.3)	x^2: 368.187(3df);
Abortion is acceptable if a woman became pregnant as a result of rape	2. Disagree	29	(6.0)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	56	(11.6)	
	4. Agree	152	(31.5)	
	5. Strongly agree	234	(48.5)	
	Total valid cases	482	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	26		
V39.4	1. Strongly disagree	22	(4.6)	x^2: 115.996(4df);
Abortion is acceptable if a woman is not married and does not want to marry the man	2. Disagree	133	(27.7)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	103	(21.4)	
	4. Agree	155	(32.2)	
	5. Strongly agree	68	(14.1)	
	Total valid cases	481	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	27		
V39.5	1. Strongly disagree	32	(6.4)	x^2: 322.769(4df);
Abortion is acceptable if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children	2. Disagree	250	(50.3)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	98	(19.7)	
	4. Agree	86	(17.3)	
	5. Strongly agree	31	(6.2)	
	Total valid cases	497	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	11		
V39.6	1. Strongly disagree	34	(6.9)	x^2: 363.102(4df);
if a woman is married and does not want any more children	2. Disagree	260	(52.9)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	64	(13.0)	
	4. Agree	101	(20.5)	
	5. Strongly agree	33	(6.7)	
	Total valid cases	492	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	16		
V39.7	1. Strongly disagree	33	(7.0)	x^2: 258.743(4df);
Abortion is acceptable if a woman wants it for any reason	2. Disagree	223	(47.1)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	66	(13.9)	
	4. Agree	113	(23.8)	
	5. Strongly agree	39	(8.2)	
	Total valid cases	474	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	34		

VALUES ON CHILDREN

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V40.1	1. Strongly disagree	2	(0.4)	x^2: 431.000(4df);
A person cannot be really happy without children	2. Disagree	30	(6.0)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	48	(9.5)	
	4. Agree	188	(37.3)	
	5. Strongly agree	236	(46.8)	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	4		
V40.2	1. Strongly disagree	9	(1.8)	x^2: 286.493(4df);
A person cannot fulfil themselves completely unless they become a parent	2. Disagree	64	(12.7)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	61	(12.1)	
	4. Agree	226	(44.9)	
	5. Strongly agree	143	(28.4)	
	Total valid cases	503	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	5		
V40.3	1. Strongly disagree	0	(0.0)	x^2: 328.483(3df),
Children contribute to the strengthening of the marital bond	2. Disagree	11	(2.2)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	39	(7.8)	
	4. Agree	239	(47.5)	
	5. Strongly agree	214	(42.5)	
	Total valid cases	503	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	5		
V40.4	1. Strongly disagree	1	(0.2)	x^2: 300.840(4df);
It is the parents' duty to do their best for their children, even at the expense of their own well-being	2. Disagree	63	(12.4)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	75	(14.8)	
	4. Agree	232	(45.8)	
	5. Strongly agree	136	(26.8)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V40.5	1. Strongly disagree	15	(3.0)	x^2: 264.571(4df);
Children are an expansion of the self of the parents	2. Disagree	139	(27.6)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	49	(9.7)	
	4. Agree	222	(44.0)	
	5. Strongly agree	79	(15.7)	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	4		
V40.6	1. Strongly disagree	14	(2.8)	x^2: 209.316(4df);
Children should give to material and financial support their parents when they grow up	2. Disagree	135	(26.8)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	82	(16.3)	
	4. Agree	205	(40.8)	
	5. Strongly agree	67	(13.3)	
	Total valid cases	503	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	5		
V40.7	1. Strongly disagree	38	(7.6)	x^2: 337.109(4df);
It is a duty towards society to have children	2. Disagree	247	(49.1)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	62	(12.3)	
	4. Agree	133	(26.4)	
	5. Strongly agree	23	(4.6)	
	Total valid cases	503	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	5		

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V40.8	1. Strongly disagree	1	(0.2)	x^2: 587.743(4df);
Children should look after their elderly parents	2. Disagree	36	(7.1)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	50	(9.9)	
	4. Agree	307	(60.8)	
	5. Strongly agree	111	(22.0)	
	Total valid cases	505	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	3		
V40.9	1. Strongly disagree	0	(0.0)	x^2: 396.412(3df);
Children are a source of happiness	2. Disagree	5	(1.0)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	24	(4.8)	
	4. Agree	228	(45.3)	
	5. Strongly agree	246	(48.9)	
	Total valid cases	503	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	5		
V40.10	1. Strongly disagree	15	(3.0)	x^2: 253.194(4df);
Children enhance a couple's prestige	2. Disagree	107	(21.4)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	73	(14.6)	
	4. Agree	229	(45.9)	
	5. Strongly agree	75	(15.0)	
	Total valid cases	499	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	9		
V40.11	1. Strongly disagree	3	(0.6)	x^2: 725.653(4df);
Extra curricular activities for children are necessary for the development of their personality	2. Disagree	6	(1.2)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	9	(1.8)	
	4. Agree	296	(58.4)	
	5. Strongly agree	193	(38.1)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V40.12	1. Strongly disagree	8	(1.6)	x^2: 559.980(4df);
Children contribute to the continuation of the family lineage	2. Disagree	51	(10.1)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	53	(10.5)	
	4. Agree	308	(61.0)	
	5. Strongly agree	85	(16.8)	
	Total valid cases	505	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	3		
V40.13	1. Strongly disagree	1	(0.2)	x^2: 334.489(3df);
Children should have the best quality that money can buy	2. Disagree	60	(11.8)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	101	(19.9)	
	4. Agree	250	(49.3)	
	5. Strongly agree	95	(18.7)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V40.14	1. Strongly disagree	0	(0.0)	x^2: 313.757(3df);
It is important to be able as a parent to give your children a proper education even if it is costly	2. Disagree	21	(4.1)	p:.000
	3. Undecided	57	(11.2)	
	4. Agree	279	(55.0)	
	5. Strongly agree	150	(29.6)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	1		

Variables		Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V40.15		1. Strongly disagree	0	(0.0)	x^2: 450.047(3df);
Children add an element of excitement to the home		2. Disagree	6	(1.2)	p:.000
		3. Undecided	18	(3.6)	
		4. Agree	288	(56.9)	
		5. Strongly agree	194	(38.3)	
		Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	2		
V40.16		1. Strongly disagree	0	(0.0)	x^2: 378.767(3df);
Children are a source of companionship for the parents		2. Disagree	14	(2.8)	p:.000
		3. Undecided	21	(4.1)	
		4. Agree	247	(48.7)	
		5. Strongly agree	225	(44.4)	
		Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
		Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	2		
V40.17		1. Strongly disagree	0	(0.0)	x^2: 350.365(3df);
A child makes you feel important and needed		2. Disagree	15	(3.0)	p:.000
		3. Undecided	29	(5.7)	
		4. Agree	217	(42.8)	
		5. Strongly agree	246	(48.5)	
		Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
		Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	4		

PRIORITIES IN LIFE

Variables		Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V37.a	Materialistic priority (PRMAT)	1. Unimportant	205	(40.4)	x^2: 191.685(3df);
		2. Fairly important	205	(40.4)	p:.000
		3. Important	51	(10.0)	
		4. Most important	47	(9.3)	
		Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V37.b	Self-interest priority (PRSEL)	1. Unimportant	239	(47.0)	x^2: 194.157(3df);
		2. Fairly important	162	(31.9)	p:.000
		3. Important	47	(9.3)	
		4. Most important	60	(11.8)	
		Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V37.c	Family interests priority (PRFAM)	1. Unimportant	29	(5.7)	x^2: 201.024(3df);
		2. Fairly important	73	(14.4)	p:.000
		3. Important	176	(34.6)	
		4. Most important	230	(45.3)	
		Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V37.d	Children's development and future priority (PRCH)	1. Unimportant	35	(6.9)	x^2: 206.409(3df);
		2. Fairly important	65	(12.8)	p:.000
		3. Important	236	(46.5)	
		4. Most important	172	(33.9)	
		Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	

6. DECISIONS ON FAMILY SIZE; DESIRED AND IDEAL FERTILITY; FERTILITY INTENTIONS

COUPLE'S COMMUNICATION ON FAMILY SIZE

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V41	1. No	125	(24.6)	x^2: 131.031(1df);
Couples' discussions about family size (FAMDISC)	2. Yes	383	(75.4)	p:.000
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V41a	1. Only on particular occasions	220	(57.6)	x^2: 360.696(4df);
Frequency of discussions on family size	2. Once every three months	18	(4.7)	p:.000
	3. Two or three times per month	24	(6.3)	
	4. Once per month	49	(12.8)	
	5. Every week	71	(18.6)	
	Total valid cases	382	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/Not applicable cases	126		
V42	1. Husband	24	(4.8)	x^2: 800.558(3df);
Family size decisions made by (FAMDEC)	2. Wife	13	(2.5)	p:.000
	3. Both spouses together	468	(92.7)	
	Total valid cases	505	(100.0)	
	Missing cases	3		

IDEAL AND DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

V43.	1	4	(0.8)	x^2: 408.770(4df);
Ideal number of children for the Greek Family as stated by the respondent **(IDCH)**	2	178	(35.5)	p:.000
	3	227	(45.3)	
	4	89	(17.8)	
	5	3	(0.6)	
	Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	7		
	Median 3.00			
	Mode 3			
	Mean 2.82 Std. Deviation: .746			
Re-coded to **IDCHG** (in 3 groups)	1. Two children or less	182	(36.3)	x^2: 56.587(2df);
	2. Three children	227	(45.3)	p:.000
	3. Four children or more	92	(18.4)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
Ideal number of children as stated by the wives **(WIDCH)**	1	3	(0.9)	x^2: 273.522(4df);
	2	124	(37.0)	p:.000
	3	148	(44.2)	
	4	59	(17.6)	
	5	1	(0.3)	
	Total valid cases	335	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I Do not know/wish to answer	4		
	Minimum 1			
	Maximum 5			
	Median 3			
	Mode 3			
	Mean 2.79 Std. Deviation: .744			
Ideal number of children as stated by the husbands **(HIDCH)**	1	1	(0.6)	x^2: 137.072(4df);
	2	54	(32.5)	p:.000
	3	79	(47.6)	
	4	30	(18.1)	
	5	2	(1.2)	
	Total valid cases	166	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	3		
	Median 3			
	Mode 3			
	Mean 2.87 Std. Deviation: .751			

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V44.1 Wife's desired number of children **(WDCH)**	0	1	(0.2)	x^2: 649.079(5df); p:.000
	1	25	(4.9)	
	2	259	(51.0)	
	3	165	(32.5)	
	4	55	(10.8)	
	5	3	(0.6)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
	Median 2			
	Mode 2			
	Mean 2.51 Std. Deviation: .783			
Re-coded to **WDCHG** (in 3 groups)	1. Two children or less	285	(56.1)	x^2: 152.319(2df); p:.000
	2. Three children	165	(32.5)	
	3. Four children or more	58	(11.4)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V44.2 Husband's desired number of children **(HDCH)**	1	26	(5.1)	x^2: 509.190(5df); p:.000
	2	240	(47.5)	
	3	149	(29.5)	
	4	68	(13.5)	
	5	14	(2.8)	
	6	8	(1.6)	
	Total valid cases	505	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer 3			
	Minimum 1			
	Maximum 5			
	Median 3			
	Mode 3			
	Mean 2.87 Std. Deviation: .751			
Re-coded to **HDCHG** (in 3 groups)	1. Two children or less	266	(52.7)	x^2: 95.339(2df); p:.000
	2. Three children	149	(29.5)	
	3. Four children or more	90	(17.8)	
	Total valid cases	505	(100.0)	
Desired number of children as stated by the respondent **(DCH)**	0	1	(0.2)	x^2: 570.134(5df); p:.000
	1	24	(4.7)	
	2	246	(48.4)	
	3	160	(31.5)	
	4	67	(13.2)	
	5	10	(2.0)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
	Minimum 0			
	Maximum 5			
	Median 3			
	Mode 2			
	Mean 2.59 Std. Deviation: .856			
Re-coded to **DCHG** (in 3 groups)	1. Two children or less	271	(53.3)	x^2: 111.902(2df); p:.000
	2. Three children	160	(31.5)	
	3. Four children or more	77	(15.2)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	

FERTILITY INTENTIONS

V45 **Intention of having a/another child in the future**	1. Yes, Strongly certain	131	(25.8)	x^2: 33.897(4df); p:.000
	2. Yes, Fairly certain	84	(16.6)	
	3. Not sure/ Uncertain	59	(11.6)	
	4. No, Fairly certain	115	(22.7)	
	5. No, Strongly certain	118	(23.3)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	Missing cases 1			
Re-coded to **FYINT** (in 3 groups)	1. Certain of having a child	215	(42.4)	x^2: 108.355(2df); p:.000
	2. Uncertain	59	(11.6)	
	3. Certain of not having a child	233	(46.0)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	

7. REASONS FOR WANTING AND NOT WANTING A/ANOTHER CHILD

WHY HAVING A/ANOTHER CHILD IN THE FAMILY/ WHEN AND HOW MANY by those who stated a certainty of having a child/children in the future (positive fertility intention)

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V46 **Number of children that the couple intend to have in future (MORECHIL)**	1	129	(60.3)	x^2: 160.467(3df); p:.000
	2	52	(24.3)	
	3	25	(11.7)	
	4	8	(3.7)	
	Total valid	214	(100.0)	
	Not applicable/ Missing cases	294		
V47 **Timing of the first/ next child**	1. Within 12 months	91	(43.5)	x^2: 53.220(3df); p:.000
	2. Within 1 to 2 years	62	(29.7)	
	3. Within 2 to 3 years	30	(14.4)	
	4. Within 3 years or more	26	(12.4)	
	Total valid cases	209	(100.0)	
	Not applicable/ Missing cases	299		
V47a **The main reason for wanting a/another child**	1. Companionship to parents	20	(9.7)	x^2: 134.777(9df); p:.000
	2. Companionship to other children	52	(25.2)	
	3. Revitalisation of family	4	(1.9)	
	4. Family happiness	42	(20.4)	
	5. Security in case of unforeseen events	8	(3.9)	
	6. Duty towards society / relatives	3	(1.5)	
	7. Balance between sexes	18	(8.7)	
	9. Ideal - desired number of children	13	(6.3)	
	10. Help in family business/ household	0	(0.0)	
	11. Personal fulfillment – Maturation	39	(18.9)	
	12. Other (better character formation of the children, the parent grew up in a big family, the reason for getting married, giving love, etc)	7	(3.4)	
	Total valid cases	206	(100.0)	
	Not applicable/ Missing/ I do not want to answer	cases 302		

WHY NOT HAVING A/ANOTHER CHILD IN THE FAMILY by those who stated a certainty of NOT having a child/children in the future (negative fertility intention)

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %) 1. No	2. Yes	X^2/t test & P value
V48.1-V48.16	**Reasons for not wanting a/or another child** (a) (b)			
V48.1	Too old to become parents	197 (84.5)	36 (15.5)	x^2: 111.249(1df); p:.000
V48.2	Health problems/Biological reasons	186 (79.8)	47 (20.2)	x^2: 82.923(1df); p:.000
V48.3	Already have completed our fertility intentions	75 (32.2)	158 (67.8)	x^2: 29.567(1df); p:.000
V48.4	Concerns about couple's relationship/marriage	170 (73.0)	63 (27.0)	x^2: 49.137(1df); p:.000
V48.5	Job/professional commitments do not allow	153 65.7	80 (34.3)	x^2: 22.871(1df); p:.000
V48.6	Do not wish to give up leisure-time activities	179 (76.8)	54 (23.2)	x^2: 67.060(1df); p:.000
V48.7	Unable to cope with the financial pressures of bringing up a/another child	154 (66.1)	79 (33.9)	x^2: 24.142(1df); p:.000
V48.8	The house is not suitable (small)	189 (81.1)	44 (18.9)	x^2: 90.236(1df); p:.000
V48.9	Wife's fear of pregnancy and childbirth	161 (69.1)	72 (30.9)	x^2: 33.996(1df); p:.000
V48.10	Would be unable to take proper care of family/household	132 (56.7)	101 (43.3)	x^2: 4.124 (1df); p:.042
V48.11	Wish to maintain better standard of living	148 (63.5)	85 (36.5)	x^2: 17.034(1df); p:.000
V48.12	Child care facilities are too expensive/inadequate	145 (62.2)	88 (37.8)	x^2: 13.944(1df); p:.000
V48.13	Concernes about the children's future	100 (42.9)	133 (57.1)	x^2: 4.674 (1df); p:.031
V48.14	Effects on couple's education or career plans	201 (86.3)	32 (13.7)	x^2: 122.579(1df); p:.000
V48.15	Other children would not get enough care and attention	175 (75.1)	58 (24.9)	x^2: 58.751(1df); p:.000
V48.16	Other reasons (too much stress)	215 (92.3)	18 (7.7)	x^2: 166.562(1df); p:.000
	Total valid cases 233		(100.0)	
	There were not missing cases			

(a) The question was answered by those respondents who stated a certainty of NOT having a child/children in the future (negative fertility intention)
(b) This was a multiple response question

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V49	**The most important reason of not wanting a/another child** (a)			
	1. Too old to become parents	21	(9.0)	x^2: 292.77 (14df); p:.000
	2. Health problems/Biological reasons	28	(12.0)	
	3. Already have completed our fertility intentions	74	(31.8)	
	4. Concerns about couple's relationship/marriage	10	(4.3)	
	5. Job/professional commitments do not allow	10	(4.3)	
	6. Do not wish to give up leisure-time activities	1	(0.4)	
	7. Unable to cope with the financial pressures of bringing up a/another child	5	(2.1)	
	8. The house is not suitable (small)	4	(1.7)	
	9. Wife's fear of pregnancy and childbirth	7	(3.0)	
	10. Would be unable to take proper care of family/household	8	(3.4)	
	11. Wish to maintain better standard of living	12	(5.2)	
	12. Child care facilities are too expensive/inadequate	6	(2.6)	
	13. Concerns about the children's future	27	(11.6)	
	14. Effects on couple's education or career plans	0	(0.0)	
	15. Other children would not get enough care and attention	9	(3.9)	
	16. Other reasons	11	(4.7)	
	Total valid cases 233		(100.0)	

(a) The question was answered by those respondents who stated a certainty of NOT having a child/children in the future (negative fertility intention)

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V49	**The most important reason of not wanting a/another child** (a)			
	When the options 3 and 16 are excluded			
	1. Too old to become parents	21	(14.2)	x^2: 77.74 (12df); p:.000
	2. Health problems/Biological reasons	28	(18.9)	
	3. Already have completed our fertility intentions	excl	-	
	4. Concerns about couple's relationship/marriage	10	(6.8)	
	5. Job/professional commitments do not allow	10	(6.8)	
	6. Do not wish to give up leisure-time activities	1	(0.7)	
	7. Unable to cope with the financial pressures of bringing up a/another child	5	(3.4)	
	8. The house is not suitable (small)	4	(2.7)	
	9. Wife's fear of pregnancy and childbirth	7	(4.7)	
	10. Would be unable to take proper care of family/household	8	(5.4)	
	11. Wish to maintain better standard of living	12	(8.1)	
	12. Child care facilities are too expensive/inadequate	6	(4.1)	
	13. Concerns about the children's future	27	(18.2)	
	14. Effects on couple's education or career plans	0	(0.0)	
	15. Other children would not get enough care and attention	9	(6.0)	
	16. Other reasons	excl	-	
	Total valid cases 148		(100.0)	

(a) The question was answered by those respondents who stated a certainty of NOT having a child/children in the future (negative fertility intention)

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %) 1. No	2. Yes	X^2/t test & P value
V50.1-V50.10	**Changes in society or in the family life which could facilitate having a/another child** (a) (b)			
V50.1	Better financial situation	172 (59.1)	119 (40.9)	x^2: 9.653(1df); p:.002
V50.2	Having a bigger home	226 (77.7)	65 (22.3)	x^2: 89.076(1df); p:.000
V50.3	Guaranteed home care allowance	199 (68.4)	92 (31.6)	x^2: 39.344(1df); p:.000
V50.4	More financial aid for families with small children	199 (68.4)	92 (31.6)	x^2: 27.220(1df); p:.000
V50.5	Guaranteed reliable day care for children	180 (61.9)	111 (38.1)	x^2: 16.361(1df); p:.000
V50.6	More flexible hours of work	196 (67.4)	95 (32.6)	x^2: 35.055(1df); p:.000
V50.7	A more favourable attitude to children from other people	208 (71.5)	83 (28.5)	x^2: 53.694(1df); p:.000
V50.8	A better world	163 (56.0)	128 (44.0)	x^2: 4.210(1df); p:.040
V50.9	None of the above	196 (67.4)	95 (32.6)	x^2: 35.055(1df); p:.000
V50.10	Other (specify)	264 (90.7)	27 (9.3)	x^2: 193.021 (1df); p:.000
	Total valid cases 291		(100.0)	
	Not applicable/Missing cases 217			

(a)) The question was answered by those respondents who indicated *Uncertain* or *Negative* future fertility intentions
(b) This was a multiple response question

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF HAVING A FAMILY WITH 3 OR MORE CHILDREN

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V51	0. None	62	(14.6)	x^2: 361.277(9df);
Advantages of having many children	1. More happiness in family	134	(31.5)	p:.000
	2. Best companion to other children and parents	51	(12.0)	
	3. Better support when parents grow older	17	(4.0)	
	4. Social status	7	(1.6)	
	5. Financial and tax advantages	9	(2.1)	
	6. Better character formation of children	68	(16.0)	
	7. Help in family business/household	5	(1.2)	
	9. Mutual support and solidarity	63	(14.8)	
	10. Other	10	(2.3)	
	Total valid cases	426	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	82		
V52	0. None	60	(13.2)	x^2: 393.401(7df);
Disadvantages of having many children	1. Significant financial cost	184	(40.5)	p:.000
	2. Difficulties in raising too many children	78	(17.2)	
	3. Less attention to the rest of children	15	(3.3)	
	4. No free time for parents	42	(9.3)	
	5. Tiredness of mother	32	(7.0)	
	6. Stress - Insecurity about children's future	39	(8.60	
	7. Other	4	(0.9)	
	Total valid cases	454	(100.0)	
	Missing cases/I do not know/wish to answer	54		

8. POLICY RELATED VARIABLES

EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC DEMOGRAPHIC AND FAMILY CHANGES IN THE GREEK SOCIETY

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V53	1. Excellent	1	(0.2)	x^2: 638.631(4df);
Evaluation of the declining number of young people	2. Good	4	(0.8)	p:.000
	3. Neither good nor bad	31	(6.2)	
	4. Bad	283	(56.5)	
	5. Very bad	182	(36.3)	
	Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
	I do not know/ I do not want to answer	7		
V54	1. Excellent	10	(2.0)	x^2: 346.762(4df);
Evaluation of increasing number of old people	2. Good	37	(7.5)	p:.000
	3. Neither good nor bad	79	(15.9)	
	4. Bad	246	(49.6)	
	5. Very bad	124	(25.0)	
	Total valid cases	496	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	12		
V56.1	1. Excellent	42	(8.5)	x^2: 201.331(4df);
The increasing number of unmarried couples who are living together	2. Good	147	(29.8)	p:.000
	3. Neither good nor bad	180	(36.5)	
	4. Bad	112	(22.7)	
	5. Very bad	12	(2.4)	
	Total valid cases	493	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	15		
V56.2	1. Excellent	5	(1.0)	x^2: 720.728(4df);
The increasing number of unmarried couples who are childless	2. Good	2	(0.4)	p:.000
	3. Neither good nor bad	43	(8.5)	
	4. Bad	323	(64.2)	
	5. Very bad	130	(25.8)	
	Total valid cases	503	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	5		
V56.3	1. Excellent	1	(0.2)	x^2: 590.960(4df);
The declining number of marriages	2. Good	13	(2.6)	p:.000
	3. Neither good nor bad	124	(24.6)	
	4. Bad	301	(59.7)	
	5. Very bad	65	(12.9)	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	4		
V56.4	1. Excellent	1	(0.2)	x^2: 786.540(4df);
The declining number of births	2. Good	7	(1.4)	p:.000
	3. Neither good nor bad	23	(4.5)	
	4. Bad	331	(65.3)	
	5. Very bad	145	(28.6)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V56.5	1. Excellent	1	(0.2)	x^2: 727.052(4df);
The increasing number of children who are living in one parent family	2. Good	2	(.4)	p:.000
	3. Neither good nor bad	39	(7.7)	
	4. Bad	320	(63.5)	
	5. Very bad	142	(28.2)	
	Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	4		

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)	X^2/t test & P value

V56.6 **The increasing number of persons who are living alone**	1. Excellent	2	(0.4)	x^2: 583.621(4df); p:.000
	2. Good	19	(3.8)	
	3. Neither good nor bad	68	(13.6)	
	4. Bad	303	(60.5)	
	5. Very bad	109	(21.8)	
	Total valid cases	501	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	7		
V56.7 **The increasing number of births among unmarried couples**	1. Excellent	4	(0.8)	x^2: 328.998(4df); p:.000
	2. Good	52	(10.5)	
	3. Neither good nor bad	181	(36.7)	
	4. Bad	208	(42.2)	
	5. Very bad	48	(9.7)	
	Total valid cases	493	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	15		
V56.8 **The increasing number of divorces**	1. Excellent	2	(0.4)	x^2: 603.988(4df); p:.000
	2. Good	7	(1.4)	
	3. Neither good nor bad	53	(10.4)	
	4. Bad	296	(58.3)	
	5. Very bad	150	(29.5)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	

STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY REGARDING THE FOLLOWING ISSUES

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics		No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V57.1	Look after the elderly	1. Fully responsible	170	(33.6)	x^2: 311.209(2df); p:.000
		2. Partly responsible	330	(65.2)	
		3. Not responsible at all	6	(1.2)	
		Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	2		
V57.2	Ensure an adequate housing for everyone	1. Fully responsible	112	(22.2)	x^2: 387.561(2df); p:.000
		2. Partly responsible	371	(73.3)	
		3. Not responsible at all	23	(4.5)	
		Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	2		
V57.3	Enable couples to have the number of children they want	1. Fully responsible	163	(32.1)	x^2: 308.413(2df); p:.000
		2. Partly responsible	334	(65.7)	
		3. Not responsible at all	11	**(2.2)**	
		Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V57.4	Facilitate the participation of women in the labour force	1. Fully responsible	149	(29.6)	x^2: 341.226(2df); p:.000
		2. Partly responsible	346	(68.6)	
		3. Not responsible at all	9	(1.8)	
		Total valid cases	504	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	4		
V57.5	Provide more opportunities for women to combine a job outside the home with raising children	1. Fully responsible	168	(33.5)	x^2: 294.614(2df); p:.000
		2. Partly responsible	324	(64.5)	
		3. Not responsible at all	10	(2.0)	
		Total valid cases	502	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	6		

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics		No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V57.6	Help young people looking for a job	1. Fully responsible	307	(60.6)	x^2: 22.582(1df); p:.000
		2. Partly responsible	200	(39.4)	
		3. Not responsible at all	0	(0.0)	
		Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V57.7	Provide adequate health care for everyone	1. Fully responsible	372	(73.2)	x^2: 109.638(1df); p:.000
		2. Partly responsible	136	(26.8)	
		3. Not responsible at all	0	(0.0)	
		Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V57.8	Promote equal opportunities for all citizens	1. Fully responsible	333	(65.8)	x^2: 326.850(2df); p:.000
		2. Partly responsible	172	(34.0)	
		3. Not responsible at all	1	(0.2)	
		Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	2		

PREFERRED POPULATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT FAMILY POLICY

V55 **Preferred direction of the Greek population**	1. To increase	394	(80.6)	x^2: 517.583(2df); p:.000
	2. To remain the same	94	(19.2)	
	3. To decline	1	(0.2)	
	Total valid cases	489	(100.0)	
	I do not know/ I do not want to answer	19		
V58 **Assessment of current family policy**	1. Excellent	1	(0.2)	x^2: 235.317 (4df); p:.000
	2. Good	60	(12.6)	
	3. Neither good nor bad	201	(42.1)	
	4. Bad	128	26.8)	
	5. Very bad	87	18.3)	
	Total valid cases	477	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	15		

POLICY MEASURES AND INCENTIVES, DEGREE OF APPROVAL

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics		No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V59.1-V59.8					
V59.1	Improved maternity/parental leave arrangements	1. Strongly in against	2	0.4	x^2: 617.36 (4df); p:.000
		2. Against	14	2.8	
		3. No Opinion	11	2.2	
		4. In favour	243	49.0	
		5. Strongly in favour	226	45.6	
		Total valid cases	496	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	12		
V59.2	Lower income tax for parents with dependant children	1. Strongly in against	0	(0.0)	x^2: 473.90 (3df); p:.000
		2. Against	2	0.4	
		3. No Opinion	8	1.6	
		4. In favour	269	53.2	
		5. Strongly in favour	227	44.8	
		Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	2		
V59.3	Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old	1. Strongly in against	0	(0.0)	x^2: 238.36 (2df); p:.000
		2. Against	0	(0.0)	
		3. No Opinion	5	1.0	
		4. In favour	254	50.2	
		5. Strongly in favour	247	48.8	
		Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	2		

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics		No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V59.4	Improved day care facilities for children aged	1. Strongly in against	0	(0.0)	x^2: 244.22 (2df); p:.000
		2. Against	0	(0.0)	
		3. No Opinion	5	1.0	

	3 to 5 years inclusive	4. In favour	273	54.0	
		5. Strongly in favour	228	45.1	
		Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	2		
V59.5	Higher child allowance for families with dependant children	1. Strongly in against	0	(0.0)	x^2: 483.35 (3df); p:.000
		2. Against	1	(0.2)	
		3. No Opinion	5	(1.0)	
		4. In favour	250	(49.3)	
		5. Strongly in favour	251	(49.5)	
		Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V59.6	Increase of the allowance at the birth of each child	1. Strongly in against	0	(0.0)	x^2: 299.22 (3df); p:.000
		2. Against	26	(5.1)	
		3. No Opinion	33	(6.5)	
		4. In favour	230	(45.4)	
		5. Strongly in favour	218	(43.0)	
		Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V59.7	An allowance for non-working parents for bringing up their children	1. Strongly in against	8	(1.6)	x^2: 335.90 (4df); p:.000
		2. Against	45	(9.0)	
		3. No Opinion	56	(11.2)	
		4. In favour	227	(45.5)	
		5. Strongly in favour	163	(32.7)	
		Total valid cases	499	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	9		
V59.8	Improved child care facilities for school-going children	1. Strongly in against	0	(0.0)	x^2: 463.75 (3df); p:.000
		2. Against	10	(2.0)	
		3. No Opinion	17	(3.4)	
		4. In favour	301	(59.5)	
		5. Strongly in favour	178	(35.2)	
		Total valid cases	506	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	2		
V59.9	Flexible work hours for working couples with children	1. Strongly in against	2	0.4	x^2: 699.30 (4df); p:.000
		2. Against	9	1.8	
		3. No Opinion	18	3.6	
		4. In favour	301	59.6	
		5. Strongly in favour	175	34.7	
		Total valid cases	505	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	3		
V59.10	More opportunities for part-time work for couples with children	1. Strongly in against	2	(0.4)	x^2: 614.44 (4df); p:.000
		2. Against	20	(4.0)	
		3. No Opinion	31	(6.2)	
		4. In favour	295	(58.6)	
		5. Strongly in favour	155	(30.8)	
		Total valid cases	503	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	5		
V59.11	A substantial decrease in the cost of education	1. Strongly in against	2	(0.4)	x^2: 704.83 (4df); p:.000
		2. Against	4	(0.8)	
		3. No Opinion	12	(2.4)	
		4. In favour	285	(56.4)	
		5. Strongly in favour	202	(40.0)	
		Total valid cases	503	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	5		
V59.12	Improved housing support for new couples and families with young children	1. Strongly in against	1	(0.2)	x^2: 589.26 (4df); p:.000
		2. Against	14	(2.8)	
		3. No Opinion	38	(7.5)	
		4. In favour	284	(56.2)	
		5. Strongly in favour	168	(33.3)	
		Total valid cases	503	(100.0)	
		I do not know/want to answer cases	5		

POLICY MEASURES AND INCENTIVES, THE MOST PREFERRED TO BE IMPLEMENTED

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
		1. No	**2. Yes**	
V60		505	3	x^2: 496.07(1df);
I would not like any measure to be implemented		(99.4)	(0.6)	p:.000
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
V60.1-V60.12 (a)		**1. No**	**2. Yes**	
V60.1	Improved maternity/parental leave arrangements	369	136	x^2: 107.50(1df);
		(73.1)	(26.9)	P:.000
V60.2	Lower income tax for parents with dependant children	282	223	x^2: 6.89(1df);
		(55.8)	(44.2)	p:.009
V60.3	Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old	382	123	x^2: 132.83(1df);
		(75.6)	(24.4)	p:.000
V60.4	Improved day care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive	416	89	x^2: 211.74(1df);
		(82.4)	(17.6)	p:.000
V60.5	Higher child allowance for families with dependant children	355	150	x^2: 83.21(1df);
		(70.3)	(29.7)	p:.000
V60.6	Increased of the allowance at the birth of each child	405	100	x^2: 184.20(1df);
		(80.2)	(19.8)	p:.000
V60.7	An allowance for non-working parents for bringing up their children	405	100	x^2: 184.20(1df);
		(80.2)	(19.8)	p:.000
V60.8	Improved child care facilities for school-going children	385	120	x^2: 139.05(1df);
		(76.2)	(23.8)	p:.000
V60.9	Flexible work hours for working couples with children	404	101	x^2: 181.80(1df);
		(80.0)	(20.0)	p:.000
V60.10	More opportunities for part-time work for couples with children	453	52	x^2: 318.41(1df);
		(89.7)	(10.3)	p:.042
V60.11	A substantial decrease in the cost of education	318	187	x^2: 33.98(1df);
		(63.0)	(37.0)	p:.000
V60.12	Improved housing support for new couples and families with children	379	126	x^2: 126.75(1df);
		(75.0)	(25.0)	p:.000
	Total valid cases	505	(100.0)	
	There were not any missing cases			

(a) This was a multiple response question

IMPACT OF THE MOST PREFERRED POLICY MEASURES IF THEY WERE TO BE IMPLEMENTED

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V60.1-V60.6 (a)		**1. No**	**2. Yes**	
V60.1	It would make it easier for us to have our desired number of children	249	256	x^2: .097(1df);
		(49.3)	(50.7)	P:.755
V60.2	It would enable us to have our next child sooner	358	147	x^2: 88.160(1df);
		(70.9)	(29.1)	p:.000
V61.3	I/we would give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child	290	215	x^2: 11.139(1df);
		(57.4)	(42.6)	p:.001
V60.4	I/we would still not want a/another child	414	91	x^2: 206.592(1df);
		(82.0)	(18.0)	p:.000
V60.5	I/we would definitely have a/another child	379	126	x^2: 126.750(1df);
		(75.0)	(25.0)	p:.000
V60.6	Other	466	39	x^2: 361.04(1df);
		(92.3)	(7.7)	p:.000
	Total valid cases	505	(100.0)	
	There were not any missing cases			

(a) This was a multiple response question

OTHER RELATED POLICY ISSUES (recommend policies; child allowances, maternity-parental leave)

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V62 Other policy measure or condition recommenced	1. No	390	(86.3)	x^2: 238.01(1df); p:.000
	2. Yes	62	(13.7)	
	Total valid	452	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	56		
V62.a Kind of policy recommended	1. Income related	6	9.7	x^2: 20.871(6df); p:.002
	2. Parents' s working hours related	2	3.2	
	3. Day-care for children related	14	22.6	
	4. Education related	5	8.1	
	5. Child allowance related	10	16.1	
	6. Social-conditions related	18	29.0	
	7. Other (specify)	7	11.3	
	Total valid cases	62	(100.0)	
V63 Preferred type of child allowance by income	1. In inverse proportion to income level	286	(56.3)	x^2: 145.56 (2df); p:.000
	2. For low-income families only	65	(12.8)	
	3. Same allowance for families with the same number of children	157	(30.9)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
	No missing cases			
V64 Preferred type of child allowance by age of the child	1. The older the child the higher the allowance	214	(42.2)	x^2: 159.45 (3df); p:.000
	2. The younger the child the higher the allowance	20	(3.9)	
	3. The same for every child	114	(22.5)	
	4. Increasing with an increasing number of children	159	(31.4)	
	Total valid cases	507	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	1		
V65 Preferred child allowance option	1. For the first two children only	5	(1.0)	x^2: 654.45(2df); p:.000
	2. Only for the third child onwards	64	(12.6)	
	3. For all the children	439	(86.4)	
	Total valid cases	508	(100.0)	
	No missing cases			
V66 Received child allowance	1. No	298	(59.8)	x^2: 19.28(1df); p:.000
	2. Yes	200	(40.2)	
	Total valid	498	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	10		
V66b Evaluation of the amount of child allowance received	1. Too low	173	(92.0)	x^2: 291.45(2df); p:.000
	2. About right	9	(4.8)	
	3. Too high	6	(3.2)	
	Total valid	188	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	12		
V67 Received a maternity and/ or parental leave	1. No	385	(76.2)	x^2: 139.059(1df); p:.000
	2. Yes	120	(23.8)	
	Total valid	505	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	3		

Variables	Numeric Value & Discrete Characteristics	No of Cases and (Valid %)		X^2/t test & P value
V67a Evaluation of the duration of the maternity/parental leave on the PRIVATE SECTOR				
By all the Respondents	1. Too long	4	(1.0)	x^2: 551.767(2df); p:.000
	2. Enough	37	(9.6)	
	3. Too short	346	(89.4)	
	Total valid cases	387	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	121		
By those who had received such a leave of absence	1. Too long	0	(0.0)	x^2: 60.828 (1df); p:.000
	2. Enough	16	(13.8)	
	3. Too short	100	(86.2)	
	Total valid cases	116	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	4		
V67a Evaluation of the duration of the maternity/parental leave on the PUBLIC SECTOR				
By all the Respondents	1. Too long	24	(6.7)	x^2: 355.200(2df); p:.000
	2. Enough	288	(80.0)	
	3. Too short	48	(13.3)	
	Total valid cases	360	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	148		
By those who had had received such a leave of absence	1. Too long	9	(8.3)	x^2: 59.963(2df); p:.000
	2. Enough	73	(67.0)	
	3. Too short	27	(24.8)	
	Total valid cases	109	(100.0)	
	I do not know/want to answer cases	11		
V68 Preferred type of parental leave	1. Unpaid leave	2	(0.4)	x^2: 771.622(2df); p:.000
	2. Partly paid leave	32	(6.7)	
	3. Fully paid leave	447	(92.9)	
	Total valid cases	481	(100.0)	
	Missing/I do not know/want to answer cases	27		

Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.2

Details of the Factor Analyses

FACTOR ANALYSIS 1: THE PERCEPTIONS ON FAMILY AND MARRIAGE 410

FACTOR ANALYSIS 2: THE FUTURE CONCERNS AND UNCERTAINTIES..... 415

FACTOR ANALYSIS 3: THE VALUE OF CHILDREN 418

FACTOR ANALYSIS 1: THE PERCEPTIONS ON FAMILY AND MARRIAGE

Table 1: Summary of Factor Analysis on the Perceptions on Family and Marriage

Components	Statements	Partial Correlation [a]	Variance Explained [b] (%)
Religious view of family life (RELFAM)	Having children is God' s will	.785	24.6
	A large family is a blessing from God	.768	
	Marriage is not an outdated institution	.523	
Traditional parental roles in family (TRADPAR)	The father should be the breadwinner while the mother should be the homemaker	.755	18.4
	Mothers with young children should stay at home and not go out to work	.634	
	The husband does not have to help with the housework whether the wife is working or not	.515	
	Woman does not have the right to choose to be a single parent	.511	
Modern view of marriage (MODMAR)	Acceptability of divorce when marriage becomes an unhappy experience	.784	11.3
	A person should be satisfied with his/her own life before starting a family	.627	
Total Variance Explained =			54.3%
KMO[1]= .671			
Bartlett's test of sphericity: x^2= 495.521 (36df), p: .000			

[a] The partial correlation is between the statement and the unrotated factor (component).This is for the Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings

[b] This is for the Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings

[1] The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure (KMO) of Sampling Adequacy is a statistic which indicates the proportion of variance among the variables which is common variance, i.e. which might be caused by underlying factors. High values (close to 1.0) generally indicate that a factor analysis may be useful for the data. If the value is less than .50, the results of the factor analysis probably will not be very useful. The Bartlett's test of sphericity indicates whether the correlation matrix is an identity matrix (i.e., the variables are unrelated). The significance level gives the result of the test. Very small values (less than .05) indicate that there are probably significant relationships among the variables. A value higher than .10 or so may indicate that the data are not suitable for factor analysis. For more about the technique of factor analysis and its tests which indicate the suitability of the data for factor analysis, see SPSS Inc. 1999; and De Vaus 2002 chapter 19.

Detail on the factor analysis, based on the Output produced in the SPSS program

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Analysis N
V38.1 The father should be the breadwinner while the mother should be the homemaker	2.76	1.143	467
V38.2 Having children is God' s will	3.19	1.254	467
V38.3 Woman does not have the right to choose to be a single parent	2.54	1.102	467
V38.4 Marriage is not an outdated institution	4.14	.802	467
V38.5 The man does not have to help with the housework whether the wife is working or not	2.06	.903	467
V38.6 Acceptability of divorce when marriage becomes an unhappy experience	4.39	.592	467
V38.7 A person should be satisfied with his/her own life before starting a family	4.18	.774	467
V38.8 A large family is a blessing from God	3.47	1.091	467
V38.9 Mothers with young children should stay at home and not go out to work	3.90	.943	467

Correlation Matrix(a)

		V38.1	V38.2	V38.3	V38.4	V38.5	V38.6	V38.7	V38.8	V38.9
Correlation	V38.1	1.000	.226	.214	.097	.129	-.080	-.023	.215	.386
	V38.2	.226	1.000	.003	.290	-.196	.006	.219	.428	.227
	V38.3	.214	.003	1.000	-.001	.189	-.166	-.144	.037	.061
	V38.4	.097	.290	-.001	1.000	-.196	.102	.225	.229	.242
	V38.5	.129	-.196	.189	-.196	1.000	-.252	-.097	-.140	-.008
	V38.6	-.080	.006	-.166	.102	-.252	1.000	.223	-.062	.075
	V38.7	-.023	.219	-.144	.225	-.097	.223	1.000	.154	.174
	V38.8	.215	.428	.037	.229	-.140	-.062	.154	1.000	.268
	V38.9	.386	.227	.061	.242	-.008	.075	.174	.268	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	V38.1		.000	.000	.018	.003	.043	.308	.000	.000
	V38.2	.000		.478	.000	.000	.453	.000	.000	.000
	V38.3	.000	.478		.493	.000	.000	.001	.212	.095
	V38.4	.018	.000	.493		.000	.014	.000	.000	.000
	V38.5	.003	.000	.000	.000		.000	.019	.001	.433
	V38.6	.043	.453	.000	.014	.000		.000	.091	.052
	V38.7	.308	.000	.001	.000	.019	.000		.000	.000
	V38.8	.000	.000	.212	.000	.001	.091	.000		.000
	V38.9	.000	.000	.095	.000	.433	.052	.000	.000	

a Determinant = .342


KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.671
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	495.521
	df	36
	Sig.	.000

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigen values			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.216	24.625	24.625	2.216	24.625	24.625	1.880	20.885	20.885
2	1.655	18.391	43.015	1.655	18.391	43.015	1.545	17.167	38.052
3	1.020	11.336	54.351	1.020	11.336	54.351	1.467	16.299	54.351
4	.875	9.726	64.078						
5	.824	9.159	73.237						
6	.732	8.129	81.366						
7	.605	6.719	88.086						
8	.568	6.309	94.395						
9	.504	5.605	100.000						

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.



Rotated Component Matrix(a)

	Component		
	1	2	3
V38.2 Having children is God' s will	.785		
V38.8 A large family is a blessing from God	.768		
V38.4 Marriage is not an outdated institution	.523		
V38.1 The father should be the breadwinner while the mother should be the homemaker		.755	
V38.9 Mothers with young children should stay at home and not go out to work		.634	
V38.5 The man does not have to help with the housework whether the wife is working or not		.515	
V38.3 Woman does not have the right to choose to be a single parent		.511	
V38.6 Acceptability of divorce when marriage becomes an unhappy experience			.784
V38.7 A person should be satisfied with his/her own life before starting a family			.627

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.
a: Rotation converged in 4 iterations.

Component Transformation Matrix

Component	1	2	3
1	.848	.332	.414
2	-.007	.787	-.617
3	-.530	.520	.669

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.

Component Score Covariance Matrix

Component	1	2	3
1	1.000	.000	.000
2	.000	1.000	.000
3	.000	.000	1.000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.
Component Scores.

Component Score Coefficient Matrix

	Component		
	1	2	3
V38.1 The father should be the breadwinner while the mother should be the homemaker	.022	.488	.041
V38.2 Having children is God' s will	.452	-.057	-.110
V38.3 Woman does not have the right to choose to be a single parent	-.023	.317	-.205
V38.4 Marriage is not an outdated institution	.243	.012	.149
V38.5 The man does not have to help with the housework whether the wife is working or not	-.294	.391	-.058
V38.6 Acceptability of divorce when marriage becomes an unhappy experience	-.200	.016	.594
V38.7 A person should be satisfied with his/her own life before starting a family	.017	.049	.427
V38.8 A large family is a blessing from God	.456	-.029	-.191
V38.9 Mothers with young children should stay at home and not go out to work	.007	.437	.306

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Component Scores.

FACTOR ANALYSIS 2: THE FUTURE CONCERNS AND UNCERTAINTIES

Summary Table of Factor Analysis on the Future Concerns and Uncertainties

Component	Statements	Partial Correlation [b]	Variance Explained [a] (%)
Concerns and uncertainty about the future (FUTCON)	In the world things are getting worse	.790	51.35
	There is uncertainty about the future	.705	
	It is difficult to trust people nowadays	.648	
KMO= .584			
Bartlett's test of sphericity: x^2= 104.343 (3df), p: .000			

[a] This is for the Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings

[b] The partial correlation is between the statement and the unrotated factor (component). Because there was only one component/factor produced to represent the three statements, the rotated component matrix was not produced

Details on the factor analysis, based on the Output produced in the SPSS program

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Analysis N
V38.11 It is difficult to trust people nowadays	4.20	.767	484
V.38.12 In the world things are getting worse	4.06	.749	484
V38.13 There is uncertainty about the future	4.22	.696	484

Correlation Matrix(a)

		V38.11 It is difficult to trust people nowadays	V.38.12 In the world things are getting worse	V38.13 There is uncertainty about the future
Correlation	V38.11 It is difficult to trust people nowadays	1.000	.289	.173
	V.38.12 In the world things are getting worse	.289	1.000	.340
	V38.13 There is uncertainty about the future	.173	.340	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	V38.11 It is difficult to trust people nowadays		.000	.000
	V.38.12 In the world things are getting worse	.000		.000
	V38.13 There is uncertainty about the future	.000	.000	

a Determinant = .805


a: KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.584
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	104.343
	df	3
	Sig.	.000

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigen values			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.540	51.345	51.345	1.540	51.345	51.345
2	.830	27.661	79.007			
3	.630	20.993	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.



Component Matrix (a)

	Component 1
V.38.12 In the world things are getting worse	.790
V38.13 There is uncertainty about the future	.705
V38.11 It is difficult to trust people nowadays	.648

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a 1 components extracted.

a: Rotated Component Matrix. Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

Component Score Coefficient Matrix

	Component 1
V38.11 It is difficult to trust people nowadays	.421
V.38.12 In the world things are getting worse	.513
V38.13 There is uncertainty about the future	.458

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Component Scores.

Component Score Covariance Matrix

Component	1
1	1.000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Component Scores.

FACTOR ANALYSIS 3: THE VALUE OF CHILDREN

Summary Table of Factor Analysis on the Values of Children

Component	Statements	Partial Correlation [a]	Variance Explained [b] (%)
Family happiness view (FAMBEN)	Children bring excitement to the home	.734	15.6
	Children are a source of happiness	.715	
	A child makes one feel important/needed	.713	
	Children are a kind of companionship	.701	
	Children strengthens the marital bond	-	
Complete self-fulfilment view (FULFBEN)	No Happiness possible without children	.765	11.9
	Fulfillment after becoming a parent	.749	
	Parent's duty to do the best for their children	.605	
	Children are an extension of the self of the parents	-	
Selfish reasoning view (SELFBEN)	Children need to support their parents	.773	10.8
	Children should look after their elderly parents	.766	
	Children enhance a couple' s prestige	.754	
Societal Aspect (SOCIOBEN)	Childbearing is a duty towards society	.686	10.1
	Children's contribution to the family lineage	.579	
Welfare of the child view (CHIBEN)	Children's proper education even if it is costly	.787	9.7
	Children having the best that money can buy	.657	
	Extra curricular activities are beneficial for children	.515	
Total Variance Explained =			58.3%
KMO= .795			
Bartlett's test of sphericity: x^2= 1970.802 (136df), p: .000			

[a] The partial correlation is between the statement and the rotated factor (component). Where – means that this correlation was less than the predetermined level of .50

[b] This is for the Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings


Details on the factor analysis, based on the Output produced in the SPSS program

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Analysis N
V40.1 No Happiness without children	4.26	.885	477
V40.2 Fulfilment after becoming a parent	3.88	1.016	477
V40.3 Child strengthens the marital bond	4.32	.693	477
V40.4 Parent's duty to do the best for their children	3.87	.953	477
V40.5 Children as extension of self of the parents	3.42	1.143	477
V40.6 Child' s material and financial support to their parents	3.36	1.102	477
V40.7 Childbearing as a duty towards society	2.73	1.084	477
V40.8 Children looking after their elderly parents	3.99	.779	477
V40.9 Children as a source of happiness	4.44	.624	477
V40.10 Children enhance a couple' s prestige	3.50	1.080	477
V40.11 Extra curricular activities beneficial for child	4.33	.638	477
V40.12 Child's contribution to the family lineage	3.83	.880	477
V40.13 Children having the best that money can buy	3.75	.908	477
V40.14 Child's proper education even if it is costly	4.09	.753	477
V40.15 Children brings excitement to the home	4.34	.602	477
V40.16 Children as a kind of companionship	4.35	.693	477
V40.17 A child makes one feel important/needed	4.38	.726	477

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.795
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	1970.862
	df	136
	Sig.	.000



Rotated Component Matrix (a)

	Component				
	1	2	3	4	5
V40.15 Children excitement to the home	.734				
V40.9 Children as a source of happiness	.715				
V40.17 A child makes one feel important/needed	.713				
V40.16 Children as a kind of companionship	.701				
V40.3 Child's strengthens to the marital bond					
V40.1 No Happiness without children		.765			
V40.2 Fulfilment after becoming a parent		.749			
V40.4 Parent's duty to do the best for their children		.605			
V40.5 Children as extension of self of the parents					
V40.6 Child' s material and financial support to their parents			.773		
V40.8 Children looking after their elderly parents			.766		
V40.10 Children enhance a couple' s prestige				.754	
V40.7 Childbearing as a duty towards society				.686	
V40.12 Child's contribution to the family lineage				.579	
V40.14 Child's proper education even if it is costly					.787
V40.13 Children having the best that money can buy					.657
V40.11 Extra curricular activities beneficial for child					.515

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.
a Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

Component Transfomation Matrix

Component	1	2	3	4	5
1	.660	.505	.210	.413	.308
2	-.461	.212	.720	.349	-.320
3	.018	-.503	.535	-.174	.655
4	-.578	.494	-.249	-.001	.599
5	-.133	-.450	-.298	.823	.120

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.

Component Score Coefficient Matrix

	Component				
	1	2	3	4	5
V40.1 No Happiness without children	-.019	.437	-.081	-.066	-.080
V40.2 Fulfilment after becoming a parent	-.053	.428	-.137	-.020	-.013
V40.3 Child strengthens the marital bond	.108	-.116	.015	.154	.130
V40.4 Parent's duty to do the best for their children	-.099	.378	.092	-.216	.229
V40.5 Children as extension of self of the parents	-.066	.233	.206	.042	-.099
V40.6 Child' s material and financial support to their parents	.022	-.080	.435	-.006	.004
V40.7 Childbearing as a duty towards society	-.103	-.110	.112	.468	-.066
V40.8 Children looking after their elderly parents	.098	-.086	.464	-.141	-.013
V40.9 Children as a source of happiness	.327	.022	.098	-.148	-.108
V40.10 Children enhance a couple' s prestige	-.041	-.080	-.075	.512	.002
V40.11 Extra curricular activities beneficial for child	.120	-.184	-.102	-.016	.294
V40.12 Child's contribution to the family lineage	.023	-.043	-.199	.391	.088
V40.13 Children having the best that money can buy	-.173	.044	.159	-.024	.460
V40.14 Child's proper education even if it is costly	-.095	.027	-.083	.024	.515
V40.15 Children bring excitement to the home	.353	-.094	.006	-.115	-.045
V40.16 Children as a kind of companionship	.325	-.054	.058	-.039	-.117
V40.17 A child makes one feel important/needed	.295	-.034	-.014	.059	-.102

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Component Scores.

Component Score Covariance Matrix

Component	1	2	3	4	5
1	1.000	.000	.000	-1.607E-16	-1.108E-16
2	.000	1.000	.000	2.363E-16	.000
3	.000	.000	1.000	-1.263E-16	.000
4	-1.607E-16	2.363E-16	-1.263E-16	1.000	.000
5	-1.108E-16	.000	.000	.000	1.000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Component Scores.

Correlation Matrix(a)

		V40.1	V40.2	V40.3	V40.4	V40.5	V40.6	V40.7	V40.8	V40.9	V40.10	V40.11	V40.12	V40.13	V40.14	V40.15	V40.16	V40.17
Correlation	V40.1	1.000	.586	.217	.312	.321	.052	.155	.070	.364	.270	.012	.294	-.015	.127	.148	.257	.297
	V40.2	.586	1.000	.141	.312	.250	.038	.168	.000	.250	.274	.005	.306	.075	.168	.261	.244	.386
	V40.3	.217	.141	1.000	.201	.157	.088	.106	.130	.362	.226	.223	.282	.144	.233	.192	.211	.305
	V40.4	.312	.312	.201	1.000	.277	.193	.064	.119	.283	.221	.078	.206	.210	.263	.110	.282	.248
	V40.5	.321	.250	.157	.277	1.000	.308	.335	.217	.201	.266	-.218	.195	.172	-.035	.049	.134	.190
	V40.6	.052	.038	.088	.193	.308	1.000	.329	.429	.134	.183	-.002	.040	.204	-.020	-.031	.072	.069
	V40.7	.155	.168	.106	.064	.335	.329	1.000	.209	.052	.364	-.149	.150	.097	.004	-.049	.094	.117
	V40.8	.070	.000	.130	.119	.217	.429	.209	1.000	.095	.116	-.075	-.016	.176	.074	.055	.111	.058
	V40.9	.364	.250	.362	.283	.201	.134	.052	.095	1.000	.215	.199	.277	.080	.209	.399	.446	.440
	V40.10	.270	.274	.226	.221	.266	.183	.364	.116	.215	1.000	-.020	.380	.086	.155	.113	.272	.313
	V40.11	.012	.005	.223	.078	-.218	-.002	-.149	-.075	.199	-.020	1.000	.148	.044	.334	.211	.165	.129
	V40.12	.294	.306	.282	.206	.195	.040	.150	-.016	.277	.380	.148	1.000	.127	.234	.274	.297	.404
	V40.13	-.015	.075	.144	.210	.172	.204	.097	.176	.080	.086	.044	.127	1.000	.334	.141	.084	.163
	V40.14	.127	.168	.233	.263	-.035	-.020	.004	.074	.209	.155	.334	.234	.334	1.000	.288	.220	.204
	V40.15	.148	.261	.192	.110	.049	-.031	-.049	.055	.399	.113	.211	.274	.141	.288	1.000	.376	.520
	V40.16	.257	.244	.211	.282	.134	.072	.094	.111	.446	.272	.165	.297	.084	.220	.376	1.000	.497
	V40.17	.297	.386	.305	.248	.190	.069	.117	.058	.440	.313	.129	.404	.163	.204	.520	.497	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	V40.1		.000	.000	.000	.000	.130	.000	.064	.000	.000	.396	.000	.370	.003	.001	.000	.000
	V40.2	.000		.001	.000	.000	.202	.000	.496	.000	.000	.456	.000	.050	.000	.000	.000	.000
	V40.3	.000	.001		.000	.000	.028	.010	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
	V40.4	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.081	.005	.000	.000	.045	.000	.000	.000	.008	.000	.000
	V40.5	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.224	.141	.002	.000
	V40.6	.130	.202	.028	.000	.000		.000	.000	.002	.000	.484	.194	.000	.329	.251	.059	.066
	V40.7	.000	.000	.010	.081	.000	.000		.000	.130	.000	.001	.001	.017	.462	.144	.020	.005
	V40.8	.064	.496	.002	.005	.000	.000	.000		.019	.006	.051	.364	.000	.053	.114	.008	.102
	V40.9	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.130	.019		.000	.000	.000	.040	.000	.000	.000	.000
	V40.10	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.006	.000		.333	.000	.030	.000	.007	.000	.000
	V40.11	.396	.456	.000	.045	.000	.484	.001	.051	.000	.333		.001	.170	.000	.000	.000	.002
	V40.12	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.194	.001	.364	.000	.000	.001		.003	.000	.000	.000	.000
	V40.13	.370	.050	.001	.000	.000	.000	.017	.000	.040	.030	.170	.003		.000	.001	.033	.000
	V40.14	.003	.000	.000	.000	.224	.329	.462	.053	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000
	V40.15	.001	.000	.000	.008	.141	.251	.144	.114	.000	.007	.000	.000	.001	.000		.000	.000
	V40.16	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.059	.020	.008	.000	.000	.000	.000	.033	.000	.000		.000
	V40.17	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.066	.005	.102	.000	.000	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	

a Determinant = .015

Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.3

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1. CHILDREN EVER BORN (CEB)

CEB BY WIFE'S AGE

Table 1: Mean number of CEB per household By wife' age (in 7 groups)

Wife's age (in 7 groups)	Mean *Number of children*	N	Std. Dev.
1. 19 years of age or less	.57	7	.787
2. 20 to 24 years	.93	43	.768
3. 25 to 29 years	1.28	148	.990
4. 30 to 34 years	1.74	183	.965
5. 35 to 39 years	1.86	86	.722
6. 40 to 44 years	1.94	36	.630
7. 45 years of age or more	3.00	5	.707
Total	1.57	508	.959

F (6, 507df) = 13.36; p = .000

Table 2: Mean of CB95to00 per household BY wife's age (in 2 groups)

Wife's Age	Mean of CEB	N	Std. Dev.
1. 30 years of age or less	1.20	245	.962
2. 31 years of age or more	1.91	263	.824
Total	1.57	508	.959

F (1, 507df) = 78.961, p.=001

Table 3: Number of CEB per household BY wife's age (in 7 groups) (Cross-tabulation)

Wife's age (in groups)	Children Ever Born 0	1	2	3	4	Total
	Count (%)					
1. 19 years of age or less	4	2	1	-	-	7
	(57.1)	(28.6)	(14.3)			100.0
2. 20 to 24 years	14	18	11	-	-	43
	(32.6)	(41.9)	(25.6)			100.0
3. 25 to 29 years	39	44	51	12	2	148
	(26.4)	(29.7)	(34.5)	(8.1)	(1.4)	100.0
4. 30 to 34 years	21	46	82	28	6	183
	(11.5)	(25.1)	(44.8)	(15.3)	(3.3)	100.0
5. 35 to 39 years	5	13	58	9	1	86
	(5.8)	(15.1)	(67.4)	(10.5)	(1.2)	100.0
6. 40 to 44 years	-	8	22	6		36
		(22.2)	(61.1)	(16.7)	-	100.0
7. 45 years of age or more	-	-	1	3	1	5
			(20.0)	(60.0)	(20.0)	100.0
Total	**83**	**131**	**226**	**58**	**10**	**508**
	16.3	25.8	44.5	11.4	2.0	100.0

Pearson x^2 (24df)=103.10, p= .000; Gamma= .408, p= .000

CEB BY MARITAL DURATION

Table 4: Average number of CEB BY couples' marital duration (in 3 groups)

Marital Duration	Mean *Number of children*	N	Std. Dev.
1. 5 years or less	.81	201	.777
2. 6 to 10 years	1.96	135	.674
3. 11 to 15 years	2.15	172	.731
Total	1.57	508	.959

F (2 505)=179.056; p=.000

RECENT FERTILITY (CB95TO00) BY WIFE'S AGE

Table 5: Mean Number of CB95to00 per household BY wife' age (in 7 groups)

Wife's age (in 7 groups)	Mean *Number of CB95to00*	N	Std. Dev.
1. 19 years of age or less	.57	7	.787
2. 20 to 24 years	.81	43	.732
3. 25 to 29 years	.82	148	.756
4. 30 to 34 years	.66	182	.723
5. 35 to 39 years	.41	86	.621
6. 40 to 44 years	.42	36	.604
7. 45 years of age or more	.00	5	.000
Total	**.65**	**507**	**.724**

F (6, 506df) = 4.840; p = .000

Table 6: Mean of CB95to00 per household BY wife's age (in 2 groups)

Wife's Age	Mean of CB95to00	N	Std. Dev.
1. 30 years of age or less	.77	245	.746
2. 31 years of age or more	.55	262	.686
Total	.652	507	.724

F (1, 506df) = 12.131, p.=001

RECENT FERTILITY (CB95to00) BY MARITAL DURATION

Table 7: Average number of CB95to00 BY couples' marital duration (in 3 groups)

Marital Duration	Mean *Number of children*	N	Std. Dev.
1. 5 years or less	.806	201	.773
2. 6 to 10 years	.859	135	.682
3. 11 to 15 years	.316	171	.558
Total	**.655**	**507**	**.723**

F (2 504)= 31.689; p=.000

Table8: Recent fertility By marital duration (Crosstabulation)

Marital Duration in groups	CB95to00 0	1	2	3	Total
	Count (%)				
1. 5 years or less	82	79	38	2	**201**
	(40.8)	(39.3)	(18.9)	(1.0)	100.0
2. 6 to 10 years	41	73	20	1	**135**
	(30.4)	(54.1)	(14.8)	(.7)	100.0
3. 11 to 15 years	125	38	8	0	**171**
	(73.1)	(22.2)	(4.7)	(0.0)	100.0
Total	**248**	**190**	**66**	**3**	**507**
	48.9	37.5	13.0	.6	100.0

Pearson x^2 (6f)=69.805, p= .000; Gamma= -.387, p= .000

RECENT FERTILITY BY PREVIOUS FERTILITY (CB95PR)

The recent fertility of the couples, also depends upon or correlation with their previous fertility. For those couples with higher fertility incidents before 1995 (and therefore the older the wives), the mean number of children born between 1995 and 2000 is lower, compared to that of those who had fewer fertility incidents prior to 1995 (Table 5).

Table 9: Average number of CB95to00 BY previous fertility (CB95PR)

Previous Fertility (CB95PR)	Mean of recent fertility (CB95to00)	N	Std. Dev.
0	.90	238	.778
1	.78	103	.625
2	.23	139	.471
3	.19	26	.402
4	.00	1	-
Total	**.65**	**507**	**.724**

F (4, 502) = 26.921, p.=000

3. FERTILITY INTENTIONS BY NUMBER OF CHILDREN

As the table below indicates there is a substantial to very strong relationship or correlation between fertility intentions and CEB (Gamma correlation equals to .696 and is also statistically significant). The more children the couple has the stronger their wish of not having more/any more children in the future (giving a negative fertility intention).

Table 10: Future fertility intentions By actual number of children (CEB)

Actual Number of children (CEB)	Future fertility intentions: 1. Yes Strongly or fairly certain of having a/another child	2. Uncertain	3. No Strongly or fairly certain of NOT having a/another child	Total
	Count (%)			
None	79 (36.7%)	2 (3.4%)	2 (.9%)	83
1	78 (36.3)	19 (32.2)	33 (14.1)	130
2	45 (20.9)	28 (47.5)	153 (65.7)	226
3 or more	13 (6.0)	10 (16.9)	45 (19.3)	68
Total	**215** (100)	**59** (100)	**233** (100)	**507**

Missing cases 1
Pearson x^2 =182.908 (6df), p= .000; Gamma= .696, p= .000

4. TABLES OF THE DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN THE MAIN VARIABLES AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE USED IN THE REGRESSIONS

Table 11: Number of Households Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00), and By Economic Characteristics and Mean Number of CB95to00

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
WED Wife's level of education	1. Low	58	46	24	1	129	.75	.781	
	2. Medium	123	106	29	2	260	.65	.705	X^2 (6df)= 8.843
	3. High	67	38	13	0	118	.54	.687	Gamma: -.143*
	Total	248	190	66	3	507	.65	.724	
HED Husband's level of education	1. Low	81	62	22	1	166	.66	.728	
	2. Medium	98	91	32	2	223	.72	.738	X^2 (6df)= 7.267
	3. High	69	37	12	0	118	.52	.676	Gamma: -.084
	Total	248	190	66	3	507	.65	.724	
WEMP Wife's employment status	1. Stays at home	51	78	28	3	160	.89	.749	
	2. Works part-time	12	9	6	0	27	.78	.801	X^2 (6df)= 33.517 ***
	3. Works full-time	176	100	32	0	308	.53	.677	Gamma: -.376***
	Total	239	187	66	3	495	.66	.726	
HJSKIL Husband's job in terms of skill levels	1. Low-skill level	96	79	26	3	204	.69	.749	
	2. Medium-skill level	96	75	28	0	199	.66	.713	X^2 (6df)= 6.399
	3. High-skill level	54	32	11	0	97	.56	.692	Gamma: -.080
	Total	246	186	65	3	500	.65	.724	
HJNAT Husband's nature of his job	1. Casual worker	10	10	6	0	26	.85	.784	
	2. Self-employed /family. Bus.	136	105	43	3	287	.70	.759	X^2 (6df)= 9.684
	3. Salaried employee	100	74	16	0	190	.56	.646	Gamma: -.159*
	Total	246	189	65	3	503	.65	.723	
HJCONT Husband's contractual status in his full-time job	1. Temporary job contract	73	53	11	0	137	.55	.641	X^2 (3df)= 5.007
	2. Permanent job	172	136	52	3	363	.69	.744	Cramer's V= .100
	Total	245	189	63	3	500	.65	.719	
INC Household's Annual Income	1. Low	79	83	27	1	190	.74	.716	
	2. Medium	83	61	23	1	168	.65	.734	X^2 (6df)= 7.958
	3. High	54	27	11	1	93	.56	.744	Gamma: -.154*
	Total	216	171	61	3	451	.67	.730	
FSAT Family's financial satisfaction	1. Dissatisfied	18	11	5	1	35	.69	.832	
	2. Neither	89	96	29	1	215	.73	.705	X^2 (6df)= 12.474*
	3. Satisfied	139	83	32	1	255	.59	.720	Gamma: -.148*
	Total	246	190	66	3	505	.66	.724	
OWNH Home ownership	1. Not owner	91	64	21	1	177	.62	.715	X^2 (6df)= 754
	2. Owner	157	126	45	2	330	.67	.729	Cramer's V= .039
	Total	248	190	66	3	507	.65	.724	
SIZH Mean Home size in sq. metres		103.36	101.75	103.00	133.3	498	-	-	F (3, 497df)= 1.085
		244	185	66	3				Pearson Correlation: .007
LCSAT Satisfaction with living conditions	1. Dissatisfied	26	6	1	1	34	.32	.684	
	2. Neither	46	20	13	0	79	.58	.761	X^2 (6df)= 23.689**
	3. Satisfied	176	164	52	2	394	.70	.712	Gamma: .281**
	Total	248	190	66	3	507	.65	.724	

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

1. The cases that responded with 'I do not know/I do not want to answer' option available in the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis.

2. Where the x2 test was violated the Monte Carlo was used

Table 12: Number of Households with Younger Wives Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00), and By Economic Characteristics, and Mean Number of CB95to00

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
WED Wife's level of education	1. Low	19	26	20	1	66	1.05	.812	
	2. Medium	54	65	16	1	136	.74	.691	X^2 (6df)= 24.173***
	3. High	28	11	4	0	43	.44	.666	Gamma: -.392***
	Total	101	102	40	2	245	.77	.746	
HED Husband's level of education	1. Low	31	40	18	1	90	.88	.762	
	2. Medium	42	46	19	1	108	.81	.755	X^2 (6df)= 10.022
	3. High	28	16	3	0	47	.47	.620	Gamma: -.249*
	Total	101	102	40	2	245	.77	.746	
WEMP Wife's employment status	1. Stays at home	23	49	20	2	94	1.01	.740	
	2. Works part-time	3	6	6	0	15	1.20	.775	X^2 (6df)= 27.951***
	3. Works full-time	69	47	14	0	130	.58	.680	Gamma: .342***
	Total	95	102	40	2	239	.79	.745	
HJSKIL Husband's job in terms of skill levels	1. Low-skill level	42	46	15	2	105	.78	.759	
	2. Medium-skill level	31	41	21	0	93	.89	.744	X^2 (6df)= 13.366*
	3. High-skill level	27	14	4	0	45	.49	.661	Gamma: -.116
	Total	100	101	40	2	243	.77	.747	
HJNAT Husband's nature of his job	1. Casual worker	4	4	3	0	11	.91	.831	
	2. Self-employed /family. Bus.	48	59	29	2	138	.89	.780	X^2 (6df)= 11.395
	3. Salaried employee	48	39	8	0	95	.58	.645	Gamma: -.309**
	Total	100	102	40	2	244	.77	.746	
HJCONT Husband's contractual status in his full-time job	1. Temporary job contract	36	22	7	0	65	.55	.685	X^2 (3df)= 8.544*
	2. Permanent job	63	80	33	2	178	.85	.752	Cramer's V= .188*
	Total	99	102	40	2	243	.77	.746	
INC Household's Annual Income	1. Low	35	49	20	1	105	.88	.743	
	2. Medium	30	33	14	0	77	.79	.732	X^2 (6df)= 7.761
	3. High	18	11	3	1	33	.61	.788	Gamma: -.182
	Total	83	93	37	2	215	.80	.748	
FSAT Family's financial satisfaction	1. Dissatisfied	12	6	4	0	22	.64	.790	
	2. Neither	32	61	14	1	108	.85	.667	X^2 (6df)= 18.231
	3. Satisfied	57	35	22	1	115	.71	.803	Gamma: -.092
	Total	101	102	40	2	245	.77	.746	
OWNH Home ownership	1. Not owner	43	38	13	1	95	.71	.742	X^2 (3df)= 1.483
	2. Owner	58	64	27	1	150	.81	.748	Cramer's V= .078
	Total	101	102	40	2	245	.77	.746	
SIZH Mean Home size in sq. metres		97.82	103.33	105.48	150.00	239	-	-	F (3, 238df)= 2.933*
		100	97	40	2				Pearson Correlation: .144*
LCSAT Satisfaction with living conditions	1. Dissatisfied	11	2	1	0	14	.29	.611	
	2. Neither	19	10	7	0	36	.67	.793	X^2 (6df)= 13.582*
	3. Satisfied	71	90	32	2	195	.82	.735	Gamma: .326*
	Total	101	102	40	2	245	.77	.746	

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

1. The cases that responded with 'I do not know/I do not want to answer' option available in the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis.

2. Where the x2 test was violated the Monte Carlo was used

Table 13: Number of Households with Older Wives Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00), and By Economic Characteristics, and Mean Number of CB95to00

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
WED Wife's level of education	1. Low	39	20	4	0	63	.44	.616	
	2. Medium	69	41	13	1	124	.56	.713	X^2 (6df)= 3.100
	3. High	39	27	9	0	75	.60	.697	Gamma: .120
	Total	147	88	26	1	262	.55	.686	
HED Husband's level of education	1. Low	50	22	4	0	76	.39	.591	
	2. Medium	56	45	13	1	115	.64	.716	X^2 (6df)= 8.013
	3. High	41	21	9	0	71	.55	.713	Gamma: .122
	Total	147	88	26	1	262	.55	.686	
WEMP Wife's employment status	1. Stays at home	28	29	8	1	66	.73	.735	
	2. Works part-time	9	3	0	0	12	.25	.452	X^2 (6df)= 10.978
	3. Works full-time	107	53	18	0	178	.50	.674	Gamma: -.230
	Total	144	85	26	1	256	.55	.690	
HJSKIL Husband's job in terms of skill levels	1. Low-skill level	54	33	11	1	99	.59	.729	
	2. Medium-skill level	65	34	7	0	106	.45	.619	X^2 (6df)= 4.358
	3. High-skill level	27	18	7	0	52	.62	.718	Gamma: -.010
	Total	146	85	25	1	257	.54	.684	
HJNAT Husband's nature of his job	1. Casual worker	6	6	3	0	15	.80	.775	
	2. Self-employed /family. Bus.	88	46	14	1	149	.52	.694	X^2 (6df)= 4.321
	3. Salaried employee	52	35	8	0	95	.54	.649	Gamma: -.029
	Total	146	87	25	1	259	.54	.683	
HJCONT Husband's contractual status in his full-time job	1. Temporary job contract	37	31	4	0	72	.54	.604	X^2 (3df)= 4.696
	2. Permanent job	109	56	19	1	185	.52	.700	Cramer's V= .135
	Total	146	87	23	1	257	.53	.673	
INC Household's Annual Income	1. Low	44	34	7	0	85	.56	.645	
	2. Medium	53	28	9	1	91	.54	.720	X^2 (6df)= 5.146
	3. High	36	16	8	0	60	.53	.724	Gamma: -.063
	Total	133	78	24	1	236	.55	.692	
FSAT Family's financial satisfaction	1. Dissatisfied	6	5	1	1	13	.77	.927	
	2. Neither	57	35	15	0	107	.61	.724	X^2 (6df)= 22.603*
	3. Satisfied	82	48	10	0	140	.49	.629	Gamma: -.149
	Total	145	88	26	1	260	.55	.687	
OWNH Home ownership	1. Not owner	48	26	8	0	82	.51	.671	X^2 (3df)= .710
	2. Owner	99	62	18	1	180	.56	.694	Cramer's V= .052
	Total	147	88	26	1	262	.55	.686	
SIZH Mean Home size in sq. metres		107.20	100.01	99.19	100.00	259	-	-	F (3, 258df)= 1.092
		144	88	26	1				Pearson Correlation: -.104
LCSAT Satisfaction with living conditions	1. Dissatisfied	15	4	0	1	20	.35	.745	
	2. Neither	27	10	6	0	43	.51	.736	X^2 (6df)= 20.036**
	3. Satisfied	105	74	20	0	199	.57	.669	Gamma: .216
	Total	147	88	26	1	262	.55	.686	

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

1. The cases that responded with 'I do not know/I do not want to answer' option available in the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis.

2. Where the x2 test was violated the Monte Carlo was used

Table 14: Number of Households Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00), and By Cultural Characteristics and Mean Number of CB95to00

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
URB Urbanisation	1. Rural	49	43	14	1	107	.69	.732	
	2. Semi-Urban	57	46	20	2	125	.74	.784	X^2 (2df)= 6.421
	3. Urban	142	101	32	0	275	.60	.689	Gamma: -.096
	Total	248	190	66	3	507	.65	.724	
WUPB Wife's Upbringing	1. Rural	88	75	25	2	190	.69	.737	
	2. Semi-Urban	44	40	10	0	94	.64	.670	X^2 (6df)= 4.376
	3. Urban	116	75	31	1	223	.63	.736	Gamma: -.063
	Total	248	190	66	3	507	.65	.724	
HUPB Husband's Upbringing	1. Rural	88	78	29	2	197	.72	.748	
	2. Semi-Urban	37	32	8	1	78	.65	.718	X^2 (6df)= 6.153
	3. Urban	123	80	29	0	232	.59	.702	Gamma: -.117
	Total	248	190	66	3	507	.65	.724	
WREL Wife's religiosity	1. Unimportant	9	8	1	0	18	.56	.616	
	2. Fairly important	52	43	14	1	110	.67	.731	X^2 (9df)= 1.588
	3. Very important	186	139	51	2	378	.65	.728	Gamma: -.005
	Total	247	190	66	3	506	.65	.724	
HREL Husband' s religiosity	1. Unimportant	16	13	2	0	31	.55	.624	
	2. Fairly important	66	55	17	1	139	.66	.718	X^2 (9df)= 2.108
	3. Very important	165	122	47	2	336	.66	.736	Gamma: .019
	Total	247	190	66	3	506	.65	.724	
EXPR Close network pressure on family size	1. Discouraging	2	12	6	0	20	1.20	.616	
	2. No pressure at all	167	113	54	2	336	.68	.760	X^2 (6df)= 29.173***
	3. Encouraging	72	61	5	0	138	.51	.570	Gamma: -.241***
	Total	241	186	65	2	494	.65	.718	

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

1. The cases that responded with 'I do not know/I do not want to answer' option available in the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis.

2. Where the x2 test was violated the Monte Carlo was used

Table 15: Number of Households with Younger Wives Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00), and By Cultural Characteristics, and Mean Number of CB95to00

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
URB Urbanisation	1. Rural	21	25	12	1	59	.88	.790	X^2 (2df)= 9.470 Gamma: -.228*
	2. Semi-Urban	21	33	13	1	68	.91	.748	
	3. Urban	59	44	15	0	118	.63	.702	
	Total	101	102	40	2	245	.77	.746	
WUPB Wife's Upbringing	1. Rural	36	51	16	1	104	.83	.717	X^2 (6df)= 10.512 Gamma: -.173
	2. Semi-Urban	14	21	9	0	44	.89	.722	
	3. Urban	51	30	15	1	97	.65	.778	
	Total	101	102	40	2	245	.77	.746	
HUPB Husband's Upbringing	1. Rural	35	41	19	1	96	.85	.767	X^2 (6df)= 5.012 Gamma: -.161
	2. Semi-Urban	17	20	7	1	45	.82	.777	
	3. Urban	49	41	14	0	104	.66	.705	
	Total	101	102	40	2	245	.77	.746	
WREL Wife's religiosity	1. Unimportant	4	4	1	0	9	.67	.707	X^2 (9df)= 2.885 Gamma: .084
	2. Fairly important	20	21	5	1	47	.72	.743	
	3. Very important	76	77	34	1	188	.79	.751	
	Total	100	102	40	2	244	.77	.746	
HREL Husband' s religiosity	1. Unimportant	6	7	1	0	14	.64	.633	X^2 (9df)= 3.785 Gamma: .143
	2. Fairly important	28	25	7	1	61	.69	.743	
	3. Very important	66	70	32	1	169	.81	.756	
	Total	100	102	40	2	244	.77	.746	
EXPR Close network pressure on family size	1. Discouraging	0	6	1	0	7	1.14	.378	X^2 (6df)= 18.452* Gamma: .285**
	2. No pressure at all	58	55	33	2	148	.86	.808	
	3. Encouraging	39	41	5	0	85	.60	.602	
	Total	97	102	39	2	240	.77	.743	

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

1. The cases that responded with 'I do not know/I do not want to answer' option available in the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis.

2. Where the x2 test was violated the Monte Carlo was used

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
URB Urbanisation	1. Rural	28	18	2	0	48	.46	.582	
	2. Semi-Urban	36	13	7	1	57	.53	.782	X^2 (2df)= 9.026
	3. Urban	83	57	17	0	157	.58	.681	Gamma: .117
	Total	147	88	26	1	262	.55	.686	
WUPB Wife's Upbringing	1. Rural	52	24	9	1	86	.52	.731	
	2. Semi-Urban	30	19	1	0	50	.42	.538	X^2 (6df)= 8.384
	3. Urban	65	45	16	0	126	.61	.704	Gamma: .127
	Total	147	88	26	1	262	.55	.686	
HUPB Husband's Upbringing	1. Rural	53	37	10	1	101	.59	.710	
	2. Semi-Urban	20	12	1	0	33	.42	.561	X^2 (6df)= 4.738
	3. Urban	74	39	15	0	128	.54	.698	Gamma: -.060
	Total	147	88	26	1	262	.55	.686	
WREL Wife's religiosity	1. Unimportant	5	4	0	0	9	.44	.527	
	2. Fairly important	32	22	9	0	63	.63	.725	X^2 (9df)= 3.489
	3. Very important	110	62	17	1	190	.52	.680	Gamma: -.111
	Total	147	88	26	1	262	.55	.686	
HREL Husband' s religiosity	1. Unimportant	10	6	1	0	17	.47	.624	
	2. Fairly important	38	30	10	0	78	.64	.702	X^2 (6df)= 3.604
	3. Very important	99	52	15	1	167	.51	.684	Gamma: -.123
	Total	147	88	26	1	262	.55	.686	
EXPR Close network pressure on family size	1. Discouraging	2	6	5	0	13	1.23	.725	
	2. No pressure at all	109	58	21	0	188	.53	.689	X^2 (6df)= 21.263***
	3. Encouraging	33	20	0	0	53	.38	.489	Gamma: -.331**
	Total	144	84	26	0	254	.54	.675	

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

1. The cases that responded with 'I do not know/I do not want to answer' option available in the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis.

2. Where the x2 test was violated the Monte Carlo was used

Table 17: Number of Households Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00) and By the Perceptions and Values Characteristics (mean scores [a])

Variables/characteristics	Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
RELFAM Religious view of family life	3.639	3.533	3.746	2.889	478	3.608	.784	F (3, 477df)= 2.183
	230	182	63	3				Spearman's rho: -.010
TRADPAR Traditional parental roles in family	2.808	2.785	2.981	3.000	499	2.823	.628	F (3, 498df)= 1.762
	242	188	66	3				Spearman's rho: .051
MODMAR Modern view of marriage	4.377	4.180	4.231	4.500	501	4.285	.541	F (3, 500df)= 5.195*
	247	186	65	3				Spearman's rho: -.143*
FUTCON Concerns and uncertainty about future	4.240	4.051	4.169	4.111	483	4.159	.528	F (3, 482df)= 4.470*
	235	182	63	3				Spearman's rho: -.122**
FAMBEN Family happiness view	4.395	4.322	4.398	4.083	502	4.366	.501	F (3, 501df)= 1.160
	245	190	64	3				Spearman's rho: -.048
FULFBEN Complete self- fulfilment view	3.967	4.007	4.021	4.111	499	3.990	.745	F (3, 498df)= .171
	243	188	65	3				Spearman's rho: .011
SELFBEN Selfish reasoning view	3.592	3.680	3.831	4.250	500	3.659	.805	F (3, 499df)= 1.961
	244	189	65	2				Spearman's rho: .109*
SOCIOBEN Societal Aspect	3.396	3.328	3.205	3.667	492	3.347	.7454	F (3, 491df)= 1.353
	241	183	65	3				Spearman's rho: -.068
CHIBEN Welfare of the child view	4.082	4.014	4.081	3.889	506	4.055	.537	F (3, 505df)= .726
	247	190	66	3				Spearman's rho: -.037

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

[a] The mean score is ranging from 1 = strongly disagree with what each value represents to 5= strongly agree.

Table 18: Number of Households with Younger Wives Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00) and By the Perceptions, Values Characteristics (mean scores [a])

Variables/characteristics	Children born recently (CB95to00)				N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
	0	1	2	3				
RELFAM Religious view of family life	3.709 95	3.578 98	3.921 38	3.000 2	233	3.682	.767	F (3, 232df)= 2.438 Spearman's rho: .031
TRADPAR Traditional parental roles in family	2.715 99	2.843 100	3.088 40	3.375 2	241	2.835	.684	F (3, 240df)= 3.355* Spearman's rho: .191**
MODMAR Modern view of marriage	4.411 101	4.185 100	4.359 39	4.250 2	242	4.308	.548	F (3, 241df)= 3.065* Spearman's rho: -.130*
FUTCON Concerns and uncertainty about future	4.302 96	4.080 96	4.193 38	3.833 2	232	4.188	.520	F (3, 231df)= 3.340* Spearman's rho: -.139*
FAMBEN Family happiness view	4.435 100	4.400 102	4.526 38	4.125 2	242	4.432	.478	F (3, 241df)= .927 Spearman's rho: -.010
FULFBEN Complete self- fulfilment view	4.085 98	4.003 100	4.222 39	4.500 2	239	4.077	.725	F (3, 238df)= 1.100 Spearman's rho: .008
SELFBEN Selfish reasoning view	3.561 98	3.683 101	3.962 39	4.250 2	240	3.683\	.838	F (3, 239df)= 2.475 Spearman's rho: .177**
SOCIOBEN Societal Aspect	3.299 97	3.313 98	3.350 39	4.000 2	236	3.319	.763	F (3, 235df)= .575 Spearman's rho: .049
CHIBEN Welfare of the child view	4.033 101	4.0359 102	4.158 40	4.333 2	245	4.057	.531	F (3, 244df)= .049 Spearman's rho: .046

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

[a] The mean score is ranging from 1 = strongly disagree with what each value represents to 5= strongly agree.

Table 19: Number of Households with Older Wives Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00) and By the Perceptions and Values Characteristics (mean scores [a])

Variables/characteristics	Children born recently (CB95to00)				N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
	0	1	2	3				
RELFAM Religious view of family life	3.590 135	3.480 84	3.480 25	2.667 1	245	3.537	.796	F (3, 244df)= .783 Spearman's rho: -.082
TRADPAR Traditional parental roles in family	2.872 143	2.719 88	2.817 26	2.250 1	258	2.812	.572	F (3, 257df)= 1.645 Spearman's rho: -.095
MODMAR Modern view of marriage	4.353 146	4.174 86	4.038 26	5.000 1	259	4.264	.534	F (3, 258df)= 4.502* Spearman's rho: -.169**
FUTCON Concerns and uncertainty about future	4.197 139	4.019 86	4.133 25	4.667 1	251	4.131	.535	F (3, 250df)= 2.316 Spearman's rho: -.125*
FAMBEN Family happiness view	4.367 145	4.233 88	4.212 26	4.000 1	260	4.305	.515	F (3, 259df)= 1.694 Spearman's rho: -.124*
FULFBEN Complete self- fulfilment view	3.887 145	4.011 88	3.718 26	3.333 1	260	3.910	.757	F (3, 259df)= 1.326 Spearman's rho: -.017
SELFBEN Selfish reasoning view	3.613 146	3.676 88	3.635 26	-	260	3.637	.773	F (3, 259df)= .121 Spearman's rho: .034
SOCIOBEN Societal Aspect	3.461 144	3.345 85	2.987 26	3.000 1	256	3.372	.730	F (3, 255df)= 3.332* Spearman's rho: -.164**
CHIBEN Welfare of the child view	4.116 146	3.989 88	3.962 26	3.000 1	261	4.054	.544	F (3, 260df)= 2.611 Spearman's rho: -.112

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

[a] The mean score is ranging from 1 = strongly disagree with what each value represents to 5= strongly agree.

Table 20: Number of Households Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00) and By Marital Satisfaction, and Mean Number of CB95to00

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
MSAT Satisfied with marriage	1. Less satisfied	31	10	7	1	49	.55	.818	X^2 (2df)= 13.022* Gamma: .130
	2. Satisfied	101	79	22	1	203	.62	.696	
	3. Very satisfied	112	100	37	0	249	.70	.714	
	Total	244	189	66	2	501	.65	.718	
DIVR Thinking of divorcing	1. No	206	169	59	3	437	.68	.729	X^2 (6df)= 3.063 Gamma: -.186
	2. Yes	34	17	7	0	58	.53	.706	
	Total	240	186	66	3	495	.66	.727	

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

1. The cases that responded with 'I do not know/I do not want to answer' option available in the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis.

2. Where the x2 test was violated the Monte Carlo was used

Table 21: Number of Households with Younger Wives Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00) and By Marital Satisfaction, and Mean Number of CB95to00

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
MSAT Satisfied with marriage	1. Less satisfied	11	4	4	0	19	.63	.831	X^2 (2df)= 6.103 Gamma: .061
	2. Satisfied	33	38	12	1	84	.77	.734	
	3. Very satisfied	55	60	24	0	139	.78	.723	
	Total	99	102	40	1	242	.76	.733	
DIVR Thinking of divorcing	1. No	88	94	36	2	220	.78	.745	X^2 (6df)= .565 Gamma: .005
	2. Yes	8	7	4	0	19	.79	.787	
	Total	96	101	40	2	239	.78	.747	

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

1. The cases that responded with 'I do not know/I do not want to answer' option available in the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis.

2. Where the x2 test was violated the Monte Carlo was used

Table 22: Number of Households with Older Wives Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00) and By Marital Satisfaction, and Mean Number of CB95to00

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
MSAT Satisfied with marriage	1. Less satisfied	20	6	3	1	30	.50	.820	X^2 (2df)= 11.206 Gamma: .129
	2. Satisfied	68	41	10	0	119	.51	.649	
	3. Very satisfied	57	40	13	0	110	.60	.693	
	Total	145	87	26	1	259	.55	.688	
DIVR Thinking of divorcing	1. No	118	75	23	1	217	.57	.698	X^2 (6df)= 2.135 Gamma: -.231
	2. Yes	26	10	3	0	39	.41	.637	
	Total	144	85	26	1	256	.55	.690	

Sign. *** when p. <-000, ** when p. <-001; * when p. <-005

1. The cases that responded with 'I do not know/I do not want to answer' option available in the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis.

2. Where the x2 test was violated the Monte Carlo was used

Table 23: Number of Households Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00) and By Proximate Determinants of Fertility, and Mean Number of CB95to00

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
WMAGEY		23.45	23.41	23.21	23.33	500	-	-	F (3, 499df)= .049
Wife's age at first marriage (mean)		245	186	66	3				Pearson Correlation: -.015
HMAGEY		28.30	27.84	28.64	31.00	496	-	-	F (3, 495df)= .906
Husband's age at first marriage (mean)		246	183	64	3				Pearson Correlation: .010
PLANF	1 No	87	80	25	2	194	.70	.729	X^2 (3df)= 3.688
Planned family	2 Yes	161	107	41	1	310	.62	.722	Cramer's V= .086
	Total	248	187	66	3	504	.65	.725	
MISC	1 No	198	154	55	2	409	.66	.724	X^2 (3df)= .584
Wife has had a miscarriage(s)	2 Yes	45	34	11	1	91	.65	.736	Cramer's V= .034
	Total	243	188	66	3	500	.66	.725	
ABOR	1 No	219	173	63	3	458	.67	.732	X^2 (3df)= 2.281
Wife has had an abortion(s)	2 Yes	24	15	3	0	42	.50	.634	Cramer's V= .068
	Total	243	188	66	3	500	.66	.725	

Table 24: Number of Households with Younger Wives, Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00) and By Proximate Determinants of Fertility, and Mean Number of CB95to00

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
WMAGEY		22.68	21.49	21.20	20.50	243	-	-	F (3, 242df)= 2.551
Wife's age at first marriage (mean)		100	101	40	2				Pearson Correlation: -.166**-.015
HMAGEY		27.87	27.06	27.69	23.50	241	-	-	F (3, 240df)= 1.244
Husband's age at first marriage (mean)		101	99	39	2				Pearson Correlation: -.063
PLANF	1 No	30	34	16	2	82	.88	.807	X^2 (3df)= 5.374
Planned family	2 Yes	71	67	24	0	162	.71	.711	Cramer's V= .148
	Total	101	101	40	2	244	.77	.747	
MISC	1 No	93	87	34	1	215	.73	.736	X^2 (3df)= 4.878
Wife has had a miscarriage(s)	2 Yes	8	13	6	1	28	1.00	.816	Cramer's V= .142
	Total	101	100	40	2	243	.77	.749	
ABOR	1 No	100	92	40	2	234	.76	.760	X^2 (3df)= 8.876*
Wife has had an abortion(s)	2 Yes	1	8	0	0	9	.89	.333	Cramer's V= .191
	Total	101	100	40	2	243	.77	.749	

Table 25: Number of Households with Older Wives, Cross-classified By their Children Born Recently (CB95to00) and By Proximate Determinants of Fertility, and Mean Number of CB95to00

Variables/characteristics		Children born recently (CB95to00) 0	1	2	3	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Tests of significance
WMAGEY		23.98	25.71	26.31	29.00	257	-	-	F (3, 256df)= 3.841*
Wife's age at first marriage (mean)		145	85	26	1				Pearson Correlation: .202
HMAGEY		28.61	28.75	30.12	46.00	255	-	-	F (3, 254df)= 4.377**
Husband's age at first marriage (mean)		145	84	25	1				Pearson Correlation: .114
PLANF	1 No	57	46	9	0	112	.57	.640	X^2 (6df)= 6.427
Planned family	2 Yes	90	40	17	1	148	.52	.723	Cramer's V= .157
	Total	147	86	26	1	260	.54	.688	
MISC	1 No	105	67	21	1	194	.58	.703	X^2 (3df)= .920
Wife has had a miscarriage(s)	2 Yes	37	21	5	0	63	.49	.644	Cramer's V= .060
	Total	142	88	26	1	257	.56	.689	
ABOR	1 No	119	81	23	1	224	.58	.691	X^2 (3df)= 3.493
Wife has had an abortion(s)	2 Yes	23	7	3	0	33	.39	.659	Cramer's V= .117
	Total	142	88	26	1	257	.56	.689	

Note: The cases that responded with 'I do not know/I do not want to answer' option available in the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis.

5. PERCEIVED IMPACT ON FERTILITY DECISIONS BY EACH SPECIFIC POLICY MEASURE FOR THOSE RESPONDENTS WHO STATED POSITIVE FERTILITY INTENTIONS

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	34	120	154
		%	22.1%	77.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	13	46	59
		%	22.0%	78.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .000, p= .994

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	81	73	154
		%	52.6%	47.4%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	41	18	59
		%	69.5%	30.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.153, p= .026

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	87	67	154
		%	56.5%	43.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	41	18	59
		%	69.5%	30.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.119, p= .083

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	89	65	154
		%	57.8%	42.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	42	17	59
		%	71.2%	28.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.123, p= .072

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	35	137	172
		%	20.3%	79.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	12	29	41
		%	29.3%	70.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.085, p= .216

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	103	69	172
		%	59.9%	40.1%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	19	22	41
		%	46.3%	53.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .108, p= .115

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	107	65	172
		%	62.2%	37.8%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	21	20	41
		%	51.2%	48.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .088, p= .197

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	111	61	172
		&	64.5%	35.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	20	21	41
		&	48.8%	51.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .128, p= .062

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	40	154	194
		%	20.6%	79.4%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	7	12	19
		%	36.8%	63.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.112, p= .104

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	105	89	194
		%	54.1%	45.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	17	2	19
		%	89.5%	10.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.204, p= .003

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	114	80	194
		%	58.8%	41.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	14	5	19
		%	73.7%	26.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.087, p= .205

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	114	80	194
		%	58.8%	41.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	17	2	19
		%	89.5%	10.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.180, p= .009

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	27	87	114
		%	23.7%	76.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	20	79	99
		%	20.2%	79.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .042, p= .541

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	65	49	114
		%	57.0%	43.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	57	42	99
		%	57.6%	42.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.006, p= .935

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	62	52	114
		%	54.4%	45.6%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	66	33	99
		%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.125, p= .068

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	69	45	114
		%	60.5%	39.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	62	37	99
		%	62.6%	37.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.022, p= .753

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	36	114	150
		%	24.0%	76.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	11	52	63
		%	17.5%	82.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .072, p= .294

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	93	57	150
		%	62.0%	38.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	29	34	63
		%	46.0%	54.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .147, p= .032

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	92	58	150
		%	61.3%	38.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	36	27	63
		%	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .039, p= .569

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	99	51	150
		%	66.0%	34.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	32	31	63
		%	50.8%	49.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .143, p= .037

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	35	143	178
		%	19.7%	80.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	12	23	35
		%	34.3%	65.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.131, p= .057

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	90	88	178
		%	50.6%	49.4%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	32	3	35
		%	91.4%	8.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.306, p= .000

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	102	76	178
		%	57.3%	42.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	26	9	35
		%	74.3%	25.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.129, p= .061

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	99	79	178
		%	55.6%	44.4%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	32	3	35
		%	91.4%	8.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.273, p= .000

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	35	136	171
		%	20.5%	79.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	12	30	42
		%	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.078, p= .256

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	98	73	171
		%	57.3%	42.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	24	18	42
		%	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .001, p= .984

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	101	70	171
		%	59.1%	40.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	27	15	42
		%	64.3%	35.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.042, p= .536

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	104	67	171
		%	60.8%	39.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	27	15	42
		%	64.3%	35.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.028, p= .679

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	29	103	132
		%	22.0%	78.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	18	63	81
		%	22.2%	77.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= - 003, p= .966

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	73	59	132
		%	55.3%	44.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	49	32	81
		%	60.5%	39.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.051, p= .457

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	71	61	132
		%	53.8%	46.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	57	24	81
		%	70.4%	29.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.164, p= .016

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	77	55	132
		%	58.3%	41.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	54	27	81
		%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.083, p= .225

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	34	129	163
		%	20.9%	79.1%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	13	37	50
		%	26.0%	74.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.053, p= .443

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	101	62	163
		%	62.0%	38.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	21	29	50
		%	42.0%	58.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .171, p= .013

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	97	66	163
		%	59.5%	40.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	31	19	50
		%	62.0%	38.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.022, p= .753

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	106	57	163
		%	65.0%	35.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	25	25	50
		%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .131, p= .056

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Adequate day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	41	113	154
		%	26.6%	73.4%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	6	53	59
		%	10.2%	89.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .178, p= .010

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Adequate day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	96	58	154
		%	62.3%	37.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	26	33	59
		%	44.1%	55.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .165, p= .016

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Adequate day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	104	50	154
		%	67.5%	32.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	24	35	59
		%	40.7%	59.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .245, p= .000

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Adequate day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	104	50	154
		%	67.5%	32.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	27	32	59
		%	45.8%	54.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .200, p= .003

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	41	134	175
		%	23.4%	76.6%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	6	32	38
		%	15.8%	84.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .071, p= .303

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	107	68	175
		%	61.1%	38.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	15	23	38
		%	39.5%	60.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .168, p= .014

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	118	57	175
		%	67.4%	32.6%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	10	28	38
		%	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .321, p= .000

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	115	60	175
		%	65.7%	34.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	16	22	38
		%	42.1%	57.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .186, p= .007

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	39	127	166
		%	23.5%	76.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	8	39	47
		%	17.0%	83.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	166	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .065, p= .345

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	90	76	166
		%	54.2%	45.8%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	32	15	47
		%	68.1%	31.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	122	91	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.116, p= .090

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	101	65	166
		%	60.8%	39.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	27	20	47
		%	57.4%	42.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	128	85	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .029, p= .675

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	98	68	166
		%	59.0%	41.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	33	14	47
		%	70.2%	29.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	131	82	213

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.095, p= .164

PERCEIVED IMPACT ON FERTILITY DECISIONS BY EACH SPECIFIC POLICY MEASURE FOR THOSE RESPONDENTS WHO STATED UNCERTAIN FERTILITY INTENTIONS

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	19	18	37
		%	51.4%	48.6%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	9	11	20
		%	45.0%	55.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .061, p= .647

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	22	15	37
		%	59.5%	40.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	14	6	20
		%	70.0%	30.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.104, p= .431

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	15	22	37
		%	40.5%	59.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	7	13	20
		%	35.0%	65.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .054, p= .682

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	26	11	37
		%	70.3%	29.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	16	4	20
		%	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.105, p= .426

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	24	24	48
		%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	4	5	9
		%	44.4%	55.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .041, p= .760

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	32	16	48
		%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	4	5	9
		%	44.4%	55.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .168, p= .205

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	18	30	48
		%	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	4	5	9
		%	44.4%	55.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value =- .058, p= .695

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	38	10	48
		%	79.2%	20.8%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	4	5	9
		%	44.4%	55.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .288, p= .030

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	25	25	50
		%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	3	4	7
		%	42.9%	57.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .047, p= .723

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	31	19	50
		%	62.0%	38.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	5	2	7
		%	71.4%	28.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.064, p= .628

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	17	33	50
		%	34.0%	66.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	5	2	7
		%	71.4%	28.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.252, p= .057

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	35	15	50
		%	70.0%	30.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	7	0	7
		%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.224, p= .091

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	14	18	32
		%	43.8%	56.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	14	11	25
		%	56.0%	44.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.122, p= .359

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	18	14	32
		%	56.3%	43.8%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	18	7	25
		%	72.0%	28.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.162, p= .221

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	12	20	32
		%	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	10	15	25
		%	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.025, p= .847

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	22	10	32
		%	68.8%	31.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	20	5	25
		%	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.127, p= .339

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	21	16	37
		%	56.8%	43.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	7	13	20
		%	35.0%	65.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .208, p= .117

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	24	13	37
		%	64.9%	35.1%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	12	8	20
		%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .048, p= .716

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	14	23	37
		%	37.8%	62.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	8	12	20
		%	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.021, p= .873

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	30	7	37
		%	81.1%	18.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	12	8	20
		%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .228, p= .085

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	18	21	39
		%	46.2%	53.8%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	10	8	18
		%	55.6%	44.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.087, p= .509

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	23	16	39
		%	59.0%	41.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	13	5	18
		%	72.2%	27.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.128, p= .335

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	19	20	39
		%	48.7%	51.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	3	15	18
		%	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .306, p= .021

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	29	10	39
		%	74.4%	25.6%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	13	5	18
		%	72.2%	27.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .023, p= .865

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	17	24	41
		%	41.5%	58.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	11	5	16
		%	68.8%	31.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.245, p= .064

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	27	14	41
		%	65.9%	34.1%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	9	7	16
		%	56.3%	43.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .089, p= .499

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	15	26	41
		%	36.6%	63.4%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	7	9	16
		%	43.8%	56.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.066, p= .618

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	28	13	41
		%	68.3%	31.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	14	2	16
		%	87.5%	12.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.196, p= .139

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	16	14	30
		%	53.3%	46.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	12	15	27
		%	44.4%	55.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .089, p= .503

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	18	12	30
		%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	18	9	27
		%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.069, p= .602

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	11	19	30
		%	36.7%	63.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	11	16	27
		%	40.7%	59.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.042, p= .752

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	22	8	30
		%	73.3%	26.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	20	7	27
		%	74.1%	25.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.008, p= .949

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	24	23	47
		%	51.1%	48.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	4	6	10
		%	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .084, p= .525

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	33	14	47
		%	70.2%	29.8%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	3	7	10
		%	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .317, p= .017

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	18	29	47
		%	38.3%	61.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	4	6	10
		%	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.013, p= .920

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	38	9	47
		%	80.9%	19.1%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	4	6	10
		%	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .353, p= .008

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Adequate day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	25	24	49
		%	51.0%	49.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	3	5	8
		%	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .094, p= .478

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Adequate day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	32	17	49
		%	65.3%	34.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	4	4	8
		%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .110, p= .405

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Adequate day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	20	29	49
		%	40.8%	59.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	2	6	8
		%	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .113, p= .394

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Adequate day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	36	13	49
		%	73.5%	26.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	6	2	8
		%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.012, p= .927

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	23	28	51
		%	45.1%	54.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	5	1	6
		%	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.235, p= .076

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	32	19	51
		%	62.7%	37.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	4	2	6
		%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.025, p= .851

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	20	31	51
		%	39.2%	60.8%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	2	4	6
		%	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .037, p= .780

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	36	15	51
		%	70.6%	29.4%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	6	0	6
		%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.205, p= .122

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	26	26	52
		%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	2	3	5
		%	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	28	29	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = .057, p= .669

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	32	20	52
		%	61.5%	38.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	4	1	5
		%	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	36	21	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.108, p= .414

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	19	33	52
		%	36.5%	63.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	3	2	5
		%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	22	35	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.136, p= .303

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	38	14	52
		%	73.1%	26.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	4	1	5
		%	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	42	15	57

a. Phi and Cramer's V value = -.044, p= .735

PERCEIVED IMPACT ON FERTILITY DECISIONS BY EACH SPECIFIC POLICY MEASURE FOR THOSE RESPONDENTS WHO STATED NEGATIVE FERTILITY INTENTIONS

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	60	40	100
		%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	25	18	43
		%	58.1%	41.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .017, p= .835

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	81	19	100
		%	81.0%	19.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	29	14	43
		%	67.4%	32.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Footnote Phi and Cramer's V value= .148, p= .078

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	30	70	100
		%	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	19	24	43
		%	44.2%	55.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.137, p= .101

Crosstab V60.1 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.1 Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements	1 no	Count	85	15	100
		%	85.0%	15.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	30	13	43
		%	69.8%	30.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .176, p= .035

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	74	39	113
		%	65.5%	34.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	11	19	30
		%	36.7%	63.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= 239, p= 004

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	91	22	113
		%	80.5%	19.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	19	11	30
		%	63.3%	36.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .166, p= .047

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	41	72	113
		%	36.3%	63.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	8	22	30
		%	26.7%	73.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .083, p= .324

Crosstab V60.9 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.9 Flexible working hours for working parents	1 no	Count	96	17	113
		%	85.0%	15.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	19	11	30
		%	63.3%	36.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .222, p= .008

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.1 [a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	72	52	124
		%	58.1%	41.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	13	6	19
		%	68.4%	31.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.072, p= .392

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.2 [a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	94	30	124
		%	75.8%	24.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	16	3	19
		%	84.2%	15.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.068, p= .418

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.3 [a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	44	80	124
		%	35.5%	64.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	5	14	19
		%	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .066, p= .433

Crosstab V60.10 * V61.4 [a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.10 More opportunities for part-time work for parents with children	1 no	Count	98	26	124
		%	79.0%	21.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	17	2	19
		%	89.5%	10.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.089, p= .286

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.1 [a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	53	35	88
		%	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	32	23	55
		%	58.2%	41.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .020, p= .809

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.2 [a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	71	17	88
		%	80.7%	19.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	39	16	55
		%	70.9%	29.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .113, p= .177

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.3 [a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	29	59	88
		%	33.0%	67.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	20	35	55
		%	36.4%	63.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.035, p= .676

Crosstab V60.2 * V61.4 [a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children	1 no	Count	74	14	88
		%	84.1%	15.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	41	14	55
		%	74.5%	25.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .117, p= .162

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	60	42	102
		%	58.8%	41.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	25	16	41
		%	61.0%	39.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.020, p= .813

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	79	23	102
		%	77.5%	22.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	31	10	41
		%	75.6%	24.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .020, p= .813

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	38	64	102
		%	37.3%	62.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	11	30	41
		%	26.8%	73.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .099, p= .235

Crosstab V60.5 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.5 Increased allowance for families with dependent children	1 no	Count	82	20	102
		%	80.4%	19.6%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	33	8	41
		%	80.5%	19.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.001, p= .990

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	69	47	116
		%	59.5%	40.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	16	11	27
		%	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .002, p= .983

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	88	28	116
		%	75.9%	24.1%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	22	5	27
		%	81.5%	18.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.052, p= .533

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	39	77	116
		%	33.6%	66.4%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	10	17	27
		%	37.0%	63.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.028, p= .736

Crosstab V60.6 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.6 Increased in child's birth allowance	1 no	Count	91	25	116
		%	78.4%	21.6%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	24	3	27
		%	88.9%	11.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.103, p= .218

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	71	47	118
		%	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	14	11	25
		%	56.0%	44.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .032, p= .700

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	88	30	118
		%	74.6%	25.4%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	22	3	25
		%	88.0%	12.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.121, p= .148

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	42	76	118
		%	35.6%	64.4%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	7	18	25
		%	28.0%	72.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .061, p= .467

Crosstab V60.7 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.7 An allowance for not working parents for rearing their children	1 no	Count	93	25	118
		%	78.8%	21.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	22	3	25
		%	88.0%	12.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.088, p= .293

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	56	43	99
		%	56.6%	43.4%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	29	15	44
		%	65.9%	34.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .088, p= .294

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	69	30	99
		%	69.7%	30.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	41	3	44
		%	93.2%	6.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.257, p= .002

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	34	65	99
		%	34.3%	65.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	15	29	44
		%	34.1%	65.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .002, p= .977

Crosstab V60.11 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.11 Improvements in children's education	1 no	Count	72	27	99
		%	72.7%	27.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	43	1	44
		%	97.7%	2.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.291, p= .001

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	58	47	105
		%	55.2%	44.8%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	27	11	38
		%	71.1%	28.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.142, p= .089

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	78	27	105
		%	74.3%	25.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	32	6	38
		%	84.2%	15.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.104, p= .213

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	41	64	105
		%	39.0%	61.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	8	30	38
		%	21.1%	78.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .167, p= .045

Crosstab V60.12 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.12 Better housing support	1 no	Count	82	23	105
		%	78.1%	21.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	33	5	38
		%	86.8%	13.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.097, p= .244

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Adequate day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	64	46	110
		%	58.2%	41.8%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	21	12	33
		%	63.6%	36.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.047, p= .576

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Adequate day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	85	25	110
		%	77.3%	22.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	25	8	33
		%	75.8%	24.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .015, p= .856

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Adequate day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	32	78	110
		%	29.1%	70.9%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	17	16	33
		%	51.5%	48.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.199, p= .017

Crosstab V60.3 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.3 Improved day care facilities for children up to three years old	1 no	Count	88	22	110
		%	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	27	6	33
		%	81.8%	18.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.019, p= .817

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	72	47	119
		%	60.5%	39.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	13	11	24
		%	54.2%	45.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .048, p= .564

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	92	27	119
		%	77.3%	22.7%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	18	6	24
		%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .020, p= .806

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	39	80	119
		%	32.8%	67.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	10	14	24
		%	41.7%	58.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= -.070, p= .402

Crosstab V60.4 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.4 Adequate day care facilities for children three to five years inclusive	1 no	Count	97	22	119
		%	81.5%	18.5%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	18	6	24
		%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .061, p= .463

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.1[a]

			V61.1 Easier to have the number of children I intend to have		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	56	36	92
		%	60.9%	39.1%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	29	22	51
		%	56.9%	43.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	85	58	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .039, p= .640

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.2[a]

			V61.2 Enable to have the next child sooner		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	74	18	92
		%	80.4%	19.6%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	36	15	51
		%	70.6%	29.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	33	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .112, p= .181

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.3[a]

			V61.3 Give some more thought to the possibility of having a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	32	60	92
		%	34.8%	65.2%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	17	34	51
		%	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	49	94	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .015, p= .861

Crosstab V60.8 * V61.4[a]

			V61.4 Would definitely have a/another child		
			1 no	2 yes	Total
V60.8 Improved child-care facilities for school-going children	1 no	Count	77	15	92
		%	83.7%	16.3%	100.0%
	2 yes	Count	38	13	51
		%	74.5%	25.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	115	28	143

a. Phi and Cramer's V value= .111, p= .185

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Reliability Analysis - Scale (Alpha)
For the Four Main Policy Areas

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4. Child-Care Facilities.....477

1. Leave and Work Arrangements

1. **V60.1** Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements
2. **V60.9** Flexible working hours for working parents
3. **V60.10** More opportunities for part-time work for people with children

	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1. V60.1	1.6341	.7052	492.0
2. V60.9	1.7358	.6534	492.0
3. V60.10	1.8435	.7429	492.0

Correlation Matrix

	V60.1	V60.9	V60.10
V60.1	1.0000		
V60.9	0.3953	1.0000	
V60.10	0.3298	0.6657	1.0000

N of Cases = 492.0

	Mean	Variance	Std Dev	N of Variables
Statistics for Scale	5.2134	2.8322	1.6829	3

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
Item Means	1.7378	1.6341	1.8435	.2093	1.1281	.0110

Item-total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
V60.1	3.5793	1.6251	.3948	.1643	.7954
V60.9	3.4776	1.3946	.6548	.4778	.4955
V60.10	3.3699	1.2885	.5881	.4484	.5655

Reliability Coefficients 3 items

Alpha = .7182 **Standardised item alpha = .7217**

2. Financial Policies

1. **V60.2** Lower income tax for people with dependent children
2. **V60.6** Increase of the allowance at the birth of each child
3. **V60.7** An allowance for non working parents for rearing their children when they are young
4. **V60.5** Higher child allowance for families with children

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	V60.2	1.5703	.5494	498.0
2.	V60.6	1.7369	.7930	498.0
3.	V60.7	2.0100	.9693	498.0
4.	V60.5	1.5161	.5314	498.0

Correlation Matrix

	V60.2	V60.6	V60.7	V60.5
V60.2	1.0000			
V60.6	.3773	1.0000		
V60.7	.2990	.5217	1.0000	
V60.5	.4785	.5042	.3922	1.0000

N of Cases = 498.0

Statistics for Scale	Mean	Variance	Std Dev	N of Variables
	6.8333	4.7106	2.1704	4

Item Means	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
	1.7083	1.5161	2.0100	.4940	1.3258	.0493

Item-total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
V60.2	5.2631	3.4820	4519	.2576	.7027
V60.6	5.0964	2.5259	.6172	.3898	.5951
V60.7	4.8233	2.2464	.5247	.2982	.6899
V60.5	5.3173	3.3197	.5724	.3636	.6549

Reliability Coefficients 4 items

Alpha = .7240 **Standardised item alpha = .7502**

3. Housing and Education Assistance

1. **V60.11** A substantial decrease in the cost of education
2. **V60.12** Improved housing support for new couples and families with children

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	V60.11	1.6501	.6061	503.0
2.	V60.12	1.8032	.7078	503.0

Correlation Matrix

	V60.11	V60.12
V60.11	1.0000	
V60.12	.4521	1.0000

N of Cases = 503.0

Statistics for Scale	Mean	Variance	Std DeV	N of Variables
	3.4533	1.2563	1.1208	2

Item Means	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
	1.7266	1.6501	1.8032	.1531	1.0928	.0117

Item-total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
V60.11	1.8032	.5010	.4521	.2044	
V60.12	1.6501	.3674	.4521	.2044	

Reliability Coefficients 2 items

Alpha = .6175 **Standardised item alpha = .6226**

4. Child-care Facilities

1. **V60.3** Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old
2. **V60.4** Improved day care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive
3. **V60.8** Improved child care facilities for school-going children

		Mean	Std DeV	Cases
1.	**V60.3**	1.5208	.5195	505.0
2.	**V60.4**	1.5584	.5166	505.0
3.	**V60.8**	1.7228	.6223	505.0

Correlation Matrix

	V60.3	V60.4	V60.8
V60.3	1.0000		
V60.4	.8511	1.0000	
V60.8	.4352	.4516	1.0000

N of Cases = 505.0

	Mean	Variance	Std DeV	N of Variables
Statistics for Scale	4.8020	1.9528	1.3974	3

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
Item Means	1.6007	1.5208	1.7228	.2020	1.1328	.0115

Item-total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
V60.3	3.2812	.9446	.7311	.7276	.6149
V60.4	3.2436	.9386	.7465	.7325	.5996
V60.8	3.0792	.9937	.4608	.2133	.9196

Reliability Coefficients 3 items

Alpha = .7902 Standardised item alpha = .8051

Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.4

Reliability Analysis - Scale (Alpha)
For the Four Main Policy Areas

1. Leave And Work Arrangements.....474

2. Financial Policies 475

3. Housing And Education Assistance.....476

4. Child-Care Facilities.....477

1. Leave and Work Arrangements

1. **V60.1** Improved maternity and parental leave arrangements
2. **V60.9** Flexible working hours for working parents
3. **V60.10** More opportunities for part-time work for people with children

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	**V60.1**	1.6341	.7052	492.0
2.	**V60.9**	1.7358	.6534	492.0
3.	**V60.10**	1.8435	.7429	492.0

Correlation Matrix

	V60.1	V60.9	V60.10
V60.1	1.0000		
V60.9	0.3953	1.0000	
V60.10	0.3298	0.6657	1.0000

N of Cases = 492.0

	Mean	Variance	Std Dev	N of Variables
Statistics for Scale	5.2134	2.8322	1.6829	3

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
Item Means	1.7378	1.6341	1.8435	.2093	1.1281	.0110

Item-total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
V60.1	3.5793	1.6251	.3948	.1643	.7954
V60.9	3.4776	1.3946	.6548	.4778	.4955
V60.10	3.3699	1.2885	.5881	.4484	.5655

Reliability Coefficients 3 items

Alpha = .7182 **Standardised item alpha = .7217**

2. Financial Policies

1. **V60.2** Lower income tax for people with dependent children
2. **V60.6** Increase of the allowance at the birth of each child
3. **V60.7** An allowance for non working parents for rearing their children when they are young
4. **V60.5** Higher child allowance for families with children

	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1. **V60.2**	1.5703	.5494	498.0
2. **V60.6**	1.7369	.7930	498.0
3. **V60.7**	2.0100	.9693	498.0
4. **V60.5**	1.5161	.5314	498.0

Correlation Matrix

	V60.2	V60.6	V60.7	V60.5
V60.2	1.0000			
V60.6	.3773	1.0000		
V60.7	.2990	.5217	1.0000	
V60.5	.4785	.5042	.3922	1.0000

N of Cases = 498.0

Statistics for Scale	Mean	Variance	Std Dev	N of Variables
	6.8333	4.7106	2.1704	4

Item Means	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
	1.7083	1.5161	2.0100	.4940	1.3258	.0493

Item-total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
V60.2	5.2631	3.4820	4519	.2576	.7027
V60.6	5.0964	2.5259	.6172	.3898	.5951
V60.7	4.8233	2.2464	.5247	.2982	.6899
V60.5	5.3173	3.3197	.5724	.3636	.6549

Reliability Coefficients 4 items

Alpha = .7240 **Standardised item alpha = .7502**

3. Housing and Education Assistance

1. **V60.11** A substantial decrease in the cost of education
2. **V60.12** Improved housing support for new couples and families with children

	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1. **V60.11**	1.6501	.6061	503.0
2. **V60.12**	1.8032	.7078	503.0

Correlation Matrix

	V60.11	V60.12
V60.11	1.0000	
V60.12	.4521	1.0000

N of Cases = 503.0

Statistics for Scale	Mean	Variance	Std DeV	N of Variables
	3.4533	1.2563	1.1208	2

Item Means	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
	1.7266	1.6501	1.8032	.1531	1.0928	.0117

Item-total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
V60.11	1.8032	.5010	.4521	.2044	
V60.12	1.6501	.3674	.4521	.2044	

Reliability Coefficients 2 items

Alpha = .6175 **Standardised item alpha = .6226**

4. Child-care Facilities

1. **V60.3** Improved day care facilities for children up to 3 years old
2. **V60.4** Improved day care facilities for children aged 3 to 5 years inclusive
3. **V60.8** Improved child care facilities for school-going children

	Mean	Std DeV	Cases
1. **V60.3**	1.5208	.5195	505.0
2. **V60.4**	1.5584	.5166	505.0
3. **V60.8**	1.7228	.6223	505.0

Correlation Matrix

	V60.3	V60.4	V60.8
V60.3	1.0000		
V60.4	.8511	1.0000	
V60.8	.4352	.4516	1.0000

N of Cases = 505.0

Statistics for Scale	Mean	Variance	Std DeV	N of Variables
	4.8020	1.9528	1.3974	3

Item Means	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max/Min	Variance
	1.6007	1.5208	1.7228	.2020	1.1328	.0115

Item-total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
V60.3	3.2812	.9446	.7311	.7276	.6149
V60.4	3.2436	.9386	.7465	.7325	.5996
V60.8	3.0792	.9937	.4608	.2133	.9196

Reliability Coefficients 3 items

Alpha = .7902 Standardised item alpha = .8051

Appendix for Chapter 8: 8.5

Multivariate Analysis: Poisson Regressions

SUMMARY TABLES OF THE POISSON REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF THE CONTROL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC; SOCIO-CULTURAL, ATTITUDINAL-VALUE, MARITAL AND PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS OF CEB 482

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ALL HOUSEHOLDS 502

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES 502

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Summary Tables of the Poisson Regression Coefficients of the CONTROL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC; SOCIO-CULTURAL, ATTITUDINAL-VALUE, MARITAL AND PROXIMATE Determinants of CEB

Table 1: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the 'Control' Determinants of CEB

THE CONTROL DETERMINANTS			
	Regression Coefficients		
Variables/characteristics	**All households**	**Households with younger wives**	**Households with older wives**
Intercept	-0.157	0.532	-0.001
WAGEY Wife's age in years	-0.006	-0.044	0.000
MRDY Marital duration in years	0.093***	0.142***	0.061***
No of Cases	508	245	263
Residual deviance	266.54	160.81	90.428
df	505	242	260
x^2	558.3864	279.2876	298.6106

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); *** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)

Table 2: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the Socio-economic Determinants of CEB

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS				
		Regression Coefficients		
Variables/characteristics		**All households**	**Households with younger wives**	**Households with older wives**
Intercept		-0.307	-2.189*	0.517
WAGEY Wife's age in years		0.005	0.015	0.003
MRDY Marital duration in years		0.077***	0.096***	0.052***
WED Wife's level of education	1. Low	-	-	-
	2. Medium	-0.035	-0.047	0.034
	3. High	-0.183	-0.651'	-0.071
HED Husband's level of education	1. Low	-	-	-
	2. Medium	-0.021	-0.093	-0.058
	3. High	-0.064	0.003	-0.111
WEMP Wife's employment status	1. Stays at home	-	-	-
	2. Works part-time	0.015	0.022	-0.124
	3. Works full-time	-0.203*	-0.200	-0.247*
HJSKIL Husband's job in terms of skill levels	1. Low-skill level	-	-	-
	2. Medium-skill level	0.047	0.097	0.080
	3. High-skill level	0.105	0.148	0.113
HJNAT Husband's nature of his job	1. Casual worker	-	-	-
	2. Self-empl./ family bus.	-0.144	-0.123	-0.132
	3. Salaried employee	-0.285	-0.324	-0.253
HJCONT Husband's contractual status in his job	1. Temporary job	-	-	-
	2. Permanent job	0.081	0.333	0.009
INC Household's Annual Income	1. Low	-	-	-
	2. Medium	0.076	0.084	0.103
	3. High	0.063	-0.355	0.265
FSAT Financial Satisfaction	1. Dissatisfied	-	-	-
	2. Neither	0.127	0.521*	-0.100
	3. Satisfied	-0.008	0.412	-0.222
OWNH Tenancy status of home	1. Not an owner	-	-	
	2. Owner	0.033	-0.010	0.052
SIZH Home size in square metres		0.001	0.004'	0.000
LCSAT Living conditions satisfaction	1. Dissatisfied	-	-	
	2. Neither	-0.028	0.863*	-0.330
	3. Satisfied	0.006	0.758*	-0.216
No of Cases		428	202	226
Residual deviance		177.90	88.805	56.337
df		406	180	204
x^2		453.9803	212.3039	238.322

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); *** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)
- Used as the reference category

Table 3: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the Socio-Cultural Determinants of CEB

SOCIO-CULTURAL DETERMINANTS				
Variables/characteristics		**Regression Coefficients**		
		All households	**Households with younger wives**	**Households with older wives**
Intercept		0.141	1.044	0.004
WAGEY Wife's age in years		0.002	-0.025	-0.001
MRDY Marital duration in years		0.081***	0.116***	0.056***
URB Urbanisation	1. Rural	-	-	-
	2. Semi-Urban	-0.118	-0.001	-0.129
	3. Urban	0.258	0.525	0.176
WUPB Wife's Upbringing	1. Rural	-	-	-
	2. Semi-Urban	0.062	0.114	0.000
	3. Urban	-0.242	-0.540	-0.131
HUPB Husband's Upbringing	1. Rural	-	-	-
	2. Semi-Urban	-0.158	-0.084	-0.150
	3. Urban	-0.269*	-0.274	-0.256'
WREL Wife's religiosity	1. Unimportant	-	-	-
	2. Fairly important	0.008	-0.232	0.357
	3. Very important	0.057	-0.242	0.437
HREL Husband's religiosity	1. Unimportant	-	-	-
	2. Fairly important	-0.039	-0.085	-0.138
	3. Very important	-0.006	-0.046	-0.095
EXPR Close network pressure on family size	1. Discouraging	-	-	-
	2. No pressure at all	-0.153	-0.425	-0.342
	3. Encouraging	-0.471***	-0.729*	-0.047
	No of Cases	495	240	255
	Residual deviance	234.05	144.30	74.107
	df	480	225	240
	x^2	532.0754	260.9921	277.1376

* at .05 level of significance (p < .05); ** at .01 level of significance (p < .01); *** at .001 level of significance (p < .001)
- Used as the reference category

Table 4: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the Value Determinants of CEB

VALUES DETERMINANTS			
Variables/characteristics	**Regression Coefficients**		
	All households	**Households with younger wives**	**Households with older wives**
Intercept	-0.273	0.018	0.235
WAGEY Wife's age in years	-0.004	-0.027	-0.006
MRDY Marital duration in years	0.090***	0.132***	0.063***
RELFAM Religious view of family life	0.055	-0.004	0.086
TRADPAR Traditional parental roles in family	0.090	0.129	0.032
MODMAR Modern view of marriage	-0.080	0.027	-0.108
FUTCON Concerns and uncertainty about future	-0.122	-0.269'	-0.046
FAMBEN Family happiness view	-0.028	-0.048	0.007
FULFBEN Complete self- fulfilment view	0.006	-0.015	0.014
SELFBEN Selfish reasoning view	0.038	0.064	-0.001
SOCIOBEN Societal Aspect	0.037	0.045	0.012
CHIBEN Welfare of the child view	0.077	0.158	0.020
No of Cases	434	202	231
Residual deviance	215.04	127.02	73.841
df	421	190	219
x^2	469.8388	223.1602	254.5232

* at .05 level of significance (p < .05); ** at .01 level of significance (p < .01); *** at .001 level of significance (p < .001)

Table 5: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the Marital Determinants of CEB

MARITAL DETERMINANTS				
Variables/characteristics		**Regression Coefficients**		
		All households	**Households with younger wives**	**Households with older wives**
Intercept		-0.206	0.611	-0.130
WAGEY Wife's age in years		-0.006	-0.048	0.002
MRDY Marital duration in years		0.094***	0.144	0.062
MSAT Satisfied with marriage	1. Less satisfied	-	-	-
	2. Satisfied	0.051	0.025	0.040
	3. Very satisfied	0.029	0.031	0.050
DIVR Thinking of divorciing	1. No	-	-	-
	2. Yes	-0.128	-0.159	-0.154
	No of Cases	494	238	256
	Residual deviance	256.69	154.26	87.642
	df	488	232	250
	x^2	540.4985	268.5313	287.8815

* at .05 level of significance (p < .05); ** at .01 level of significance (p < .01); *** at .001 level of significance (p < .001)
- Used as the reference category

Table 6: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the Proximate Determinants of CEB

PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS				
Variables/characteristics		**Regression Coefficients**		
		All households	**Households with younger wives**	**Households with older wives**
Intercept		-0.178	0.432	0.059
WAGEY Wife's age in years		0.085***	0.097***	0.058***
MRDY Marital duration in years		na	na	na
WMAGEY Wife's age at first marriage		-0.106***	-0.151***	-0.070***
HMAGEY Husband's age at first marriage		0.014	0.016	0.009
PLANF The couple has planned their family	1. No	-	-	-
	2. Yes	-0.087	-0.231'	-0.020
MISC Wife has had a miscarriage(s)	1. No	-	-	-
	2. Yes	0.061	0.141	-0.003
ABOR Wife has had an abortion(s)	1. No	-	-	-
	2. Yes	-0.011	0.193	-0.027
	No of Cases	482	237	245
	Residual deviance	253.21	153.41	83.353
	df	476	230	238
	x^2	526.8091	266.3781	274.987

* at .05 level of significance (p < .05); ** at .01 level of significance (p < .01); *** at .001 level of significance (p < .001)
na The variables was excluded as it has been highly correlated with WMAGEY
- Used as the reference category

Summary Tables of the Poisson Regression Coefficients of the CONTROL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC; SOCIO-CULTURAL, ATTITUDINAL-VALUE, MARITAL AND PROXIMATE Determinants of Desired Number of Children (DCH)(for the wives and husbands)

Table 7: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the 'Control' Determinants of Desired Fertility (DCH)

THE CONTROL DETERMINANTS		
	Regression Coefficients	
Variables/characteristics	***DCH-WIVES***	***DCH-HUSB***
Intercept	0.584**	0.796*
CEB Children Ever Born	0.136**	0.068
WAGEY Wife's age in years	0.007	0.003
MRDY Marital duration in years	-0.015	0.005
No of Cases	339	169
Residual deviance	79.910	45.748
df	335	165
x^2	378.6823	195.9734

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); *** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)

Table 8: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the Socio-economic Determinants of Desired Fertility (DCH)

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS			
		Regression Coefficients	
Variables/characteristics		***DCH-WIVES***	***DCH-HUSB***
Intercept		0.795*	0.746
CEB Children Ever Born		0.156**	0.038
WAGEY Wife's age in years		0.002	0.005
MRDY Marital duration in years		-0.015	0.003
WED Wife's level of education	1. Low	-	
	2. Medium	-0.151	na
	3. High	-0.151	
HED Husband's level of education	1. Low		
	2. Medium	na	-0.172
	3. High		-0.328
WEMP Wife's employment status	1. Stays at home		
	2. Works part-time	0.085	na
	3. Works full-time	0.089	
HJSKIL Husband's job in terms of skill levels	1. Low-skill level		-
	2. Medium-skill level	na	-0.098
	3. High-skill level		-0.231
HJNAT Husband's nature of his job	1. Casual worker		-
	2. Self-empl./ family bus.	na	0.141
	3. Salaried employee		-0.026
HJCONT Husband's contractual status in his job	1. Temporary job	na	-
	2. Permanent job		0.001
INC Household's Annual Income	1. Low	-	-
	2. Medium	0.082	-0.062
	3. High	0.124	-0.093
FSAT Financial Satisfaction	1. Dissatisfied	-	-
	2. Neither	0.099	0.034
	3. Satisfied	0.158	0.122
OWNH Tenancy status of home	1. Not an owner	-	-
	2. Owner	-0.045	-0.147
SIZH Home size in square metres		0.000	0.001
LCSAT Living conditions satisfaction	1. Dissatisfied	-	-
	2. Neither	-0.246	0.190
	3. Satisfied	-0.186	0.004
No of Cases		283	152
Residual deviance		62.187	33.195
df		267	133
x^2		306.1126	160.9148

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); *** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)
- Used as the reference category

Table 9: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the Socio-Cultural Determinants of Desired Fertility (DCH)

SOCIO-CULTURAL DETERMINANTS			
		Regression Coefficients	
Variables/characteristics		***DCH-WIVES***	***DCH-HUSB***
Intercept		0.670	0.859
CEB Children Ever Born		0.108*	0.008
WAGEY Wife's age in years		0.010	0.008
MRDY Marital duration in years		-0.014	0.006
URB Urbanisation	1. Rural	-	
	2. Semi-Urban	-0.165	-0.078
	3. Urban	-0.172	-0.159
WUPB Wife's Upbringing	1. Rural	-	
	2. Semi-Urban	-0.008	na
	3. Urban	0.063	
HUPB Husband's Upbringing	1. Rural		
	2. Semi-Urban	na	-0.059
	3. Urban		-0.168
WREL Wife's religiosity	1. Unimportant		
	2. Fairly important	-0.051	na
	3. Very important	0.042	
HREL Husband's religiosity	1. Unimportant		-
	2. Fairly important	na	-0.035
	3. Very important		0.031
EXPR Close network pressure on family size	1. Discouraging	-	-
	2. No pressure at all	-0.036	0.041
	3. Encouraging	-0.035	0.026
No of Cases		331	164
Residual deviance		70.973	37.959
df		319	152
x^2		361.6524	181.7702

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); *** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)
- Used as the reference category

Table 10: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the Attitudinal-Value Determinants of Desired Fertility (DCH)

ATTITUDINAL- VALUES DETERMINANTS		
	Regression Coefficients	
Variables/characteristics	***DCH-WIVES***	***DCH-HUSB***
CEB Children Ever Born	0.106*	0.028
WAGEY Wife's age in years	0.007	0.005
MRDY Marital duration in years	-0.013	0.006
RELFAM Religious view of family life	0.048	0.037
TRADPAR Traditional parental roles in family	0.053	0.164'
MODMAR Modern view of marriage	0.032	-0.049
FUTCON Concerns and uncertainty about future	0.018	-0.075
FAMBEN Family happiness view	-0.045	0.163
FULFBEN Complete self- fulfilment view	0.093	-0.084
SELFBEN Selfish reasoning view	-0.032	-0.004
SOCIOBEN Societal Aspect	0.024	-0.047
CHIBEN Welfare of the child view	-0.086	-0.005
No of Cases	286	147
Residual deviance	57.963	33.084
df	273	134
x^2	312.5377	162.0156

* at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); ** at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); *** at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)
- Used as the reference category

Table 11: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the Marital Determinants of Desired Fertility (DCH)

MARITAL DETERMINANTS			
		Regression Coefficients	
Variables/characteristics		***DCH-WIVES***	***DCH-HUSB***
Intercept		0.620*	0.759*
CEB Children Ever Born		0.128**	0.074
WAGEY Wife's age in years		0.008	0.003
MRDY Marital duration in years		-0.011	0.004
MSAT Satisfied with marriage	1. Less satisfied	-	-
	2. Satisfied	0.100	0.014
	3. Very satisfied	0.029	0.043
DIVR Thinking of divorce	1. No	-	-
	2. Yes	-0.124	-0.029
	No of Cases	327	167
	Residual deviance	74.803	45.260
	df	320	160
	x^2	362.7175	190.5165

' at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); '' at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); ''' at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)
- Used as the reference category

Table 12: Poisson Regression Coefficients of the Proximate Determinants of Desired Fertility (DCH)

PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS			
		Regression Coefficients	
Variables/characteristics		***DCH-WIVES***	***DCH-HUSB***
Intercept		0.296	1.183**
CEB Children Ever Born		0.152**	0.083
WAGEY Wife's age in years		0.003	0.015
MRDY Marital duration in years		-0.010	-0.018
WMAGEY Wife's age at first marriage		0.010	Na
HMAGEY Husband's age at first marriage		na	-0.023
PLANF The couple has planned their family	1. No	-	-
	2. Yes	0.113	-0.014
MISC Wife has had a miscarriage(s)	1. No	-	-
	2. Yes	-0.030	0.082
ABOR Wife has had an abortion(s)	1. No	-	-
	2. Yes	-0.067	0.154
	No of Cases	328	159
	Residual deviance	73.508	39.939
	df	320	151
	x^2	362.7175	180.6756

' at .05 level of significance ($p < .05$); '' at .01 level of significance ($p < .01$); ''' at .001 level of significance ($p < .001$)
na The variables was excluded as it has been highly correlated with WMAGEY
- Used as the reference category

DETAILS OF THE POISSON REGRESSIONS UNDERTAKEN FOR RECENT FERTILITY (CB95TO00)

MODEL 1: Effects of the CONTROL Determinants (CB95PR, WAGEY, MRDY) on CB95to00

ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.0369	-0.8810	-0.3625	0.5180	2.2929

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.19034	1.2096665	0.36027	0.528	0.597
CB95PR	-0.88671	0.4120086	0.10616	-8.353	2e-16***
WAGEY	-0.02200	0.9782392	0.01352	-1.627	0.104
MRDY	0.09261	1.0970369	0.01991	4.651	3.31e-06***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 485.04 on 506 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 391.82 on 503 degrees of freedom

AIC: 961.3; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -476.6478 (df=4); p= 0.9999221; x^2 = 556.2827

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.4201	-1.0658	0.1336	0.5231	2.1041

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.58558	1.7960244	0.69149	0.847	0.3971
CB95PR	-0.76818	0.4638584	0.15576	-4.932	8.15e-07***
WAGEY	-0.04831	0.9528378	0.02721	-1.775	0.0759.
MRDY	0.14541	1.1565188	0.02813	5.169	2.35e-07***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 223.66 on 244 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 194.58 on 241 degrees of freedom

AIC: 517.11; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

log Lik.' -254.5549 (df=4); p= 0.9873567; x^2 = 278.2127

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.5251	-0.7267	-0.4798	0.4965	2.2189

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.60674	1.8344461	0.88343	0.687	0.492
CB95PR	-0.89267	0.4095623	0.14265	-6.258	3.91e-10***
WAGEY	-0.01880	0.9813732	0.02658	-0.707	0.479
MRDY	0.03649	1.0371659	0.02795	1.306	0.192

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 251.85 on 261 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 179.23 on 258 degrees of freedom

AIC: 434.18; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -213.0911 (df=4); p= 0.9999457; x^2 = 296.4659

MODEL 2: Effects of the SOCIO-ECONOMIC Determinants on CB95to00

ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.5641 -0.8051 -0.4213 0.4552 1.6935

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-0.992191	0.3707636	0.641597	-1.546	0.12200
CB95PR	-1.018837	0.3610145	0.123519	-8.248	2e-16***
WAGEY	0.011214	1.0112775	0.016289	0.688	0.49116
MRDY	0.072522	1.0752165	0.023953	3.028	0.00246**
WED2	-0.219663	0.8027896	0.159239	-1.379	0.16776
WED3	-0.400556	0.6699474	0.233582	-1.715	0.08637.
HED2	0.125773	1.1340245	0.157642	0.798	0.42497
HED3	-0.277464	0.7577027	0.304280	-0.912	0.36184
WEMP2	-0.008347	0.9916872	0.253713	-0.033	0.97375
WEMP3	-0.421115	0.6563144	0.149106	-2.824	0.00474**
HJSKIL2	0.062721	1.0647294	0.141117	0.444	0.65671
HJSKIL3	0.365630	1.4414225	0.298536	1.225	0.22067
HJNAT2	-0.187389	0.8291215	0.313508	-0.598	0.55003
HJNAT3	-0.386818	0.6792149	0.305752	-1.265	0.20582
HJCONT2	0.179145	1.1961937	0.179399	0.999	0.31800
INC2	0.107932	1.1139721	0.156958	0.688	0.49167
INC3	0.076142	1.0791156	0.222772	0.342	0.73251
FSAT2	0.336046	1.3994030	0.257423	1.305	0.19175
FSAT3	0.040477	1.0413072	0.273367	0.148	0.88229
OWNH2	0.031081	1.0315694	0.134122	0.232	0.81674
SIZH	0.002194	1.0021968	0.002224	0.987	0.32385
LCSAT2	0.378032	1.4594090	0.400259	0.944	0.34493
LCSAT3	0.444390	1.5595387	0.378770	1.173	0.24070

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 411.76 on 426 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 273.68 on 404 degrees of freedom

AIC: 805.48; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -379.7391 (df=23); p= 0.9999999; x^2 = 451.8646

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.6688 -0.7955 -0.1342 0.4217 1.7826

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-4.214683	0.01477701	1.409451	-2.990	0.00279**
CB95PR	-0.989340	0.37182202	0.195676	-5.056	4.28e-07***
WAGEY	0.031108	1.03159664	0.035211	0.883	0.37699
MRDY	0.124039	1.13206026	0.038404	3.230	0.00124**
WED2	-0.110642	0.89525929	0.200258	-0.552	0.58061
WED3	-0.800388	0.44915447	0.395900	-2.022	0.04321*
HED2	-0.040231	0.96056708	0.194785	-0.207	0.83637
HED3	0.120726	1.12831559	0.443168	0.272	0.78530
WEMP2	0.149878	1.16169260	0.285692	0.525	0.59985
WEMP3	-0.310134	0.73334873	0.202531	-1.531	0.12570
HJSKIL2	0.209717	1.23332951	0.191056	1.098	0.27235
HJSKIL3	0.191403	1.21094727	0.416095	0.460	0.64552
HJNAT2	-0.343472	0.70930366	0.478417	-0.718	0.47280
HJNAT3	-0.552899	0.57527960	0.449290	-1.231	0.21847
HJCONT2	0.629244	1.87619104	0.281149	2.238	0.02521*
INC2	0.010462	1.01051734	0.204638	0.051	0.95922
INC3	-0.403555	0.66794144	0.308267	-1.309	0.19050
FSAT2	0.696574	2.00686548	0.346693	2.009	0.04452*
FSAT3	0.522461	1.68617247	0.363495	1.437	0.15063
OWNH2	-0.118000	0.88869581	0.177573	-0.665	0.50636
SIZH	0.006935	1.00695956	0.003001	2.311	0.02083*
LCSAT2	2.098051	8.15026956	1.020496	2.056	0.03979*
LCSAT3	1.885168	6.58746007	1.007753	1.871	0.06139.

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 177.70 on 201 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 106.71 on 179 degrees of freedom

AIC: 431.4; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -192.7017 (df=23); p= 0.999996; x^2 = 211.217

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.5960 -0.6777 -0.4256 0.3200 1.5114

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	1.514687	4.5479987	1.256558	1.205	0.22804
CB95PR	-1.060003	0.3464546	0.182036	-5.823	5.78e-09***
WAGEY	-0.004680	0.9953310	0.033544	-0.140	0.88904
MRDY	0.038295	1.0390374	0.036228	1.057	0.29050
WED2	-0.180608	0.8347625	0.340799	-0.530	0.59614
WED3	-0.228990	0.7953364	0.373982	-0.612	0.54034
HED2	0.162825	1.1768313	0.307608	0.529	0.59658
HED3	-0.647281	0.5234672	0.498928	-1.297	0.19451
WEMP2	-0.812472	0.4437597	0.770596	-1.054	0.29173
WEMP3	-0.687514	0.5028246	0.238829	-2.879	0.00399**
HJSKIL2	-0.041718	0.9591403	0.263675	-0.158	0.87429
HJSKIL3	0.666636	1.9476734	0.448666	1.486	0.13733
HJNAT2	-0.276145	0.7587028	0.456171	-0.605	0.54494
HJNAT3	-0.483165	0.6168282	0.484013	-0.998	0.31816
HJCONT2	-0.052135	0.9492008	0.279520	-0.187	0.85204
INC2	0.265586	1.3041952	0.275230	0.965	0.33456
INC3	0.720903	2.0562897	0.362019	1.991	0.04644*
FSAT2	-0.021498	0.9787317	0.421886	-0.051	0.95936
FSAT3	-0.437317	0.6457669	0.444081	-0.985	0.32474
OWNH2	0.077071	1.0801187	0.240449	0.321	0.74857
SIZH	-0.003259	0.9967466	0.003622	-0.900	0.36835
LCSAT2	-0.311630	0.7322525	0.550928	-0.566	0.57163
LCSAT3	-0.019641	0.9805508	0.479128	-0.041	0.96730

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 220.48 on 224 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 123.63 on 202 degrees of freedom

AIC: 376.74; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -165.3682 (df=23); p= 0.999997; x^2 = 236.1585

MODEL 3: Effects of the SOCIO-CULTURAL Determinants on CB95to00

ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.8306 -0.8706 -0.4705 0.5366 1.9259

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.80821	2.2438767	0.56945	1.419	0.155822
CB95PR	-0.90284	0.4054150	0.11035	-8.182	2.8e-16***
WAGEY	-0.01837	0.9817941	0.01431	-1.284	0.199249
MRDY	0.07583	1.0787778	0.02191	3.461	0.000539***
UPB2	-0.26601	0.7664288	0.38428	-0.692	0.488784
UPB3	0.38950	1.4762450	0.36440	1.069	0.285127
WUPB2	0.21452	1.2392627	0.35726	0.600	0.548210
WUPB3	-0.25824	0.7724115	0.32975	-0.783	0.433546
HUPB2	-0.27377	0.7605059	0.19482	-1.405	0.159938
HUPB3	-0.48169	0.6177392	0.19021	-2.532	0.011330*
WREL2	0.12974	1.1385344	0.39092	0.332	0.739974
WREL3	0.20771	1.2308544	0.40342	0.515	0.606642
HREL2	-0.12660	0.8810844	0.30250	-0.419	0.675570
HREL3	-0.07019	0.9322186	0.32443	-0.216	0.828722
EXPR2	-0.38010	0.6837914	0.23147	-1.642	0.100569
EXPR3	-0.90497	0.4045540	0.25342	-3.571	0.000356***

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 469.02 on 493 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 350.06 on 478 degrees of freedom

AIC: 929.93; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -448.9669 (df=16); p= 0.9999974; x^2 = 529.969

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.14677 -0.98165 0.02928 0.51797 1.89590

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	1.36159	3.9023816	0.90915	1.498	0.13422
CB95PR	-0.89791	0.4074190	0.17115	-5.246	1.55e-07***
WAGEY	-0.02895	0.9714630	0.03039	-0.953	0.34068
MRDY	0.13273	1.1419370	0.03228	4.111	3.93e-05***
UPB2	0.07685	1.0798817	0.50943	0.151	0.88009
UPB3	0.75364	2.1247295	0.47059	1.601	0.10927
WUPB2	0.07848	1.0816428	0.48165	0.163	0.87056
WUPB3	-0.67089	0.5112553	0.42369	-1.583	0.11332
HUPB2	-0.20113	0.8178027	0.23239	-0.866	0.38675
HUPB3	-0.44326	0.6419381	0.24654	-1.798	0.07219.
WREL2	-0.26613	0.7663365	0.51732	-0.514	0.60694
WREL3	-0.18009	0.8351946	0.51885	-0.347	0.72852
HREL2	-0.05363	0.9477862	0.43166	-0.124	0.90113
HREL3	-0.07012	0.9322794	0.45642	-0.154	0.87790
EXPR2	-0.67329	0.5100296	0.39198	-1.718	0.08586.
EXPR3	-1.06516	0.3446719	0.40858	-2.607	0.00913**

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 216.13 on 239 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 174.85 on 224 degrees of freedom

AIC: 518.77; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -243.3855 (df=16); p= 0.9935297; x^2 = 259.9144

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.6689 -0.7192 -0.4851 0.4982 1.9173

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	1.05711	2.8780535	1.21851	0.868	0.38564
CB95PR	-0.92468	0.3966571	0.15914	-5.811	6.23e-09***
WAGEY	-0.02175	0.9784832	0.02938	-0.740	0.45904
MRDY	0.03628	1.0369475	0.03160	1.148	0.25086
UPB2	-0.70885	0.4922121	0.63216	-1.121	0.26216
UPB3	0.15301	1.1653374	0.52309	0.293	0.76989
WUPB2	0.37557	1.4558166	0.56302	0.667	0.50474
WUPB3	0.18043	1.1977296	0.46366	0.389	0.69717
HUPB2	-0.28959	0.7485702	0.38153	-0.759	0.44784
HUPB3	-0.66682	0.5133386	0.31868	-2.092	0.03640*
WREL2	0.66154	1.9377712	0.63018	1.050	0.29383
WREL3	0.71123	2.0364975	0.65657	1.083	0.27870
HREL2	-0.43152	0.6495194	0.44266	-0.975	0.32964
HREL3	-0.29142	0.7472041	0.47367	-0.615	0.53840
EXPR2	-0.34091	0.7111259	0.32551	-1.047	0.29496
EXPR3	-1.03205	0.3562768	0.36913	-2.796	0.00518**

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 242.00 on 253 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 154.23 on 238 degrees of freedom

AIC: 422.19; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -195.0954 (df=16); p= 0.9999941; x^2 = 274.987

MODEL 4: Effects of the ATTITUDINAL-VALUE Determinants on CB95to00

ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.083 -0.896 -0.451 0.509 2.052

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.297797	1.3468878	0.929794	0.320	0.748754
CB95PR	-0.842057	0.4308232	0.118682	-7.095	1.29e-12***
WAGEY	-0.014424	0.9856795	0.015413	-0.936	0.349352
MRDY	0.079895	1.0831731	0.023018	3.471	0.000519***
RELFAM	0.077016	1.0800588	0.099390	0.775	0.438409
TRADPAR	0.127740	1.1362578	0.101374	1.260	0.207637
MODMAR	-0.231143	0.7936262	0.119963	-1.927	0.054006.
FUTCON	-0.205950	0.8138738	0.130166	-1.582	0.113601
FAMBEN	-0.089169	0.9146906	0.147888	-0.603	0.546542
FULFBEN	0.060255	1.0621071	0.100329	0.601	0.548125
SELFBEN	0.119500	1.1269327	0.082250	1.453	0.146256
SOCIOBEN	-0.001102	0.9988989	0.098645	-0.011	0.991089
CHIBEN	0.156819	1.1697844	0.122790	1.277	0.201555

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 411.78 on 431 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 320.95 on 419 degrees of freedom

AIC: 825.91; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -399.9573 (df=13); p= 0.9998792; x^2 = 467.7252

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.26322 -1.02000 0.04085 0.51365 1.57856

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-0.35334	0.7023360	1.47535	-0.239	0.810720
CB95PR	-0.72360	0.4850008	0.17507	-4.133	3.58e-05***
WAGEY	-0.02371	0.9765667	0.03325	-0.713	0.475769
MRDY	0.12426	1.1323080	0.03457	3.594	0.000325***
RELFAM	0.03277	1.0333080	0.13405	0.244	0.806900
TRADPAR	0.21029	1.2340321	0.13641	1.542	0.123175
MODMAR	-0.05255	0.9488087	0.17816	-0.295	0.768030
FUTCON	-0.29246	0.7464285	0.17480	-1.673	0.094313.
FAMBEN	-0.05897	0.9427330	0.23628	-0.250	0.802905
FULFBEN	-0.04863	0.9525312	0.14519	-0.335	0.737664
SELFBEN	0.09797	1.1029260	0.11453	0.855	0.392342
SOCIOBEN	0.03427	1.0348685	0.13614	0.252	0.801228
CHIBEN	0.25923	1.2959344	0.17264	1.502	0.133203

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 185.30 on 201 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 152.84 on 189 degrees of freedom

AIC: 439.08; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -206.5376 (df=13); p= 0.9749404; x^2 = 222.0756

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.6087 -0.7723 -0.5239 0.3591 2.1648

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	2.017552	7.5198916	1.452041	1.389	0.1647
CB95PR	-0.802929	0.4480147	0.162882	-4.930	8.24e-07***
WAGEY	-0.024133	0.9761559	0.029057	-0.831	0.4062
MRDY	0.032259	1.0327850	0.032667	0.988	0.3234
RELFAM	0.122558	1.1303846	0.155114	0.790	0.4295
TRADPAR	-0.065798	0.9363201	0.167586	-0.393	0.6946
MODMAR	-0.329327	0.7194079	0.171135	-1.924	0.0543.
FUTCON	-0.100831	0.9040862	0.205953	-0.490	0.6244
FAMBEN	-0.096067	0.9084033	0.195778	-0.491	0.6236
FULFBEN	0.164987	1.1793775	0.148103	1.114	0.2653
SELFBEN	0.084779	1.0884765	0.121542	0.698	0.4855
SOCIOBEN	-0.070193	0.9322140	0.150963	-0.465	0.6420
CHIBEN	-0.005324	0.9946903	0.187328	-0.028	0.9773

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 218.20 on 229 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 151.92 on 217 degrees of freedom

AIC: 396.65; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -185.3265 (df=13); p= 0.9997422; x^2 = 252.3655

MODEL 5: Effects of the MARITAL Determinants on CB95to00

ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.1072 -0.8968 -0.2956 0.4957 2.1220

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.186533	1.2050638	0.447161	0.417	0.677
CB95PR	-0.908659	0.4030644	0.109470	-8.301	2e-16***
WAGEY	-0.022162	0.9780816	0.013722	-1.615	0.106
MRDY	0.098729	1.1037673	0.020888	4.727	2.28e-06***
MSAT2	0.028139	1.0285390	0.259980	0.108	0.914
MSAT3	0.002507	1.0025100	0.262674	0.010	0.992
DIVR2	-0.287039	0.7504822	0.238825	-1.202	0.229

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 468.18 on 492 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 374.48 on 486 degrees of freedom

AIC: 938.97; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -462.4851 (df=7); p= 0.9999461; x^2 = 538.3931

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.4815 -1.0735 0.1180 0.5133 1.4299

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.57378	1.7749628	0.80412	0.714	0.476
CB95PR	-0.77502	0.4606950	0.16301	-4.754	1.99e-06***
WAGEY	-0.05311	0.9482723	0.02745	-1.935	0.053.
MRDY	0.14825	1.1598007	0.03042	4.873	1.10e-06***
MSAT2	0.16338	1.1774815	0.40836	0.400	0.689
MSAT3	0.15275	1.1650306	0.40086	0.381	0.703
DIVR2	-0.18357	0.8322897	0.37444	-0.490	0.624

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 212.19 on 237 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 183.42 on 231 degrees of freedom

AIC: 506.96; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -246.4801 (df=7); p= 0.990748; x^2 = 267.4548

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.5425 -0.7499 -0.4783 0.4583 2.1720

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.426073	1.5312331	0.979006	0.435	0.663
CB95PR	-0.925386	0.3963782	0.146304	-6.325	2.53e-10***
WAGEY	-0.012740	0.9873405	0.027338	-0.466	0.641
MRDY	0.044725	1.0457401	0.028930	1.546	0.122
MSAT2	-0.043464	0.9574671	0.354658	-0.123	0.902
MSAT3	0.008313	1.0083478	0.367125	0.023	0.982
DIVR2	-0.406716	0.6658333	0.324111	-1.255	0.210

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 246.57 on 254 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 173.30 on 248 degrees of freedom

AIC: 428.25; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 5

'log Lik.' -207.1244 (df=7); p= 0.9999063; x^2 = 285.7339

MODEL 6: Effects of the PROXIMATE Determinants on CB95to00

ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.8907	-0.9136	-0.4816	0.4949	2.0913

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.15328	1.1656468	0.44166	0.347	0.728558
CB95PR	-0.93144	0.3939868	0.11468	-8.122	4.58e-16***
WAGEY	0.07564	1.0785785	0.02003	3.777	0.000159***
MRDY	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
WMAGEY	-0.11766	0.8889982	0.02411	-4.880	1.06e-06***
HMAGEY	0.02169	1.0219292	0.01397	1.552	0.120569
PLANF2	-0.23908	0.7873543	0.11616	-2.058	0.039577*
MISC2	0.12967	1.1384474	0.15009	0.864	0.387627
ABOR2	-0.10376	0.9014376	0.23449	-0.443	0.658122

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 466.19 on 480 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 375.19 on 473 degrees of freedom

AIC: 919.44; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -451.7208 (df=8); p= 0.999673; x^2 = 524.7022

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.19323	-1.03055	0.02137	0.50395	1.69298

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.24748	1.2807921	0.80185	0.309	0.75760
CB95PR	-0.89123	0.4101502	0.17074	-5.220	1.79e-07***
WAGEY	0.11565	1.1225998	0.03547	3.260	0.00111**
MRDY	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
WMAGEY	-0.17592	0.8386858	0.03578	-4.917	8.78e-07***
HMAGEY	0.02526	1.0255828	0.01980	1.276	0.20192
PLANF2	-0.31801	0.7275938	0.15642	-2.033	0.04205*
MISC2	0.31050	1.3641128	0.22267	1.394	0.16319
ABOR2	0.27112	1.3114294	0.37107	0.731	0.46500

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 220.35 on 236 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 184.07 on 229 degrees of freedom

AIC: 499.99; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -241.9926 (df=8); p= 0.9869072; x^2 = 265.3012

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.6180	-0.7216	-0.5393	0.4649	2.1234

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.91422	2.4948207	0.98098	0.932	0.3514
CB95PR	-0.93720	0.3917249	0.15927	-5.884	4e-09***
WAGEY	0.01788	1.0180412	0.03769	0.474	0.6352
MRDY	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
WMAGEY	-0.05956	0.9421796	0.03385	-1.759	0.0785.
HMAGEY	0.01573	1.0158537	0.02023	0.778	0.4368
PLANF2	-0.19457	0.8231917	0.17591	-1.106	0.2687
MISC2	-0.11659	0.8899491	0.20645	-0.565	0.5723
ABOR2	-0.25443	0.7753583	0.30676	-0.829	0.4069

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)
Null deviance: 237.32 on 243 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 170.42 on 236 degrees of freedom
AIC: 414.75; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4
'log Lik.' -199.3767 (df=8); p= 0.999555; x^2 = 272.8358

DETAILS OF THE POISSON REGRESSIONS UNDERTAKEN FOR THE CHILDREN EVER BORN (CEB)

MODEL 1: Effects of the CONTROL Determinants (WAGEY, MRDY) on CEB

ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.10541	-0.48582	0.03455	0.36635	1.69067

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-0.157269	0.8544746	0.230215	-0.683	0.495
WAGEY	-0.006432	0.9935889	0.008369	-0.769	0.442
MRDY	0.093364	1.0978613	0.009808	9.519	<2e-16***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 401.93 on 507 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 266.54 on 505 degrees of freedom

AIC: 1331.4; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -662.7122 (df=3); p= 1; x^2 = 558.3864

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.4512	-1.0494	0.0744	0.5063	1.6963

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.53238	1.7029877	0.63407	0.840	0.401
WAGEY	-0.04384	0.9571076	0.02513	-1.745	0.081.
MRDY	0.14229	1.1529080	0.01640	8.678	<2e-16***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 244.38 on 244 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 160.81 on 242 degrees of freedom

AIC: 586.59; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -290.2931 (df=3); p=0.9999853; x^2 = 279.2876

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.6363	-0.3067	-0.1120	0.3278	1.3064

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-0.0011007	0.9988999	0.4117049	-0.003	0.998
WAGEY	-0.0003461	0.9996539	0.0119270	-0.029	0.977
MRDY	0.0610579	1.0629605	0.0127083	4.805	1.55e-06***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 116.841 on 262 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 90.428 on 260 degrees of freedom

AIC: 735.54; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -364.7693 (df=3); p= 1; x^2 = 298.6106

MODEL 2: Effects of the SOCIO-ECONOMIC Determinants on CEB

ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.64749	-0.38954	-0.01665	0.39976	1.30537

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-0.306933	0.7356995	0.372029	-0.825	0.4094
WAGEY	0.005188	1.0052013	0.010446	0.497	0.6194
MRDY	0.076521	1.0795249	0.012224	6.260	3.85e-10***
WED2	-0.034729	0.9658675	0.101892	-0.341	0.7332
WED3	-0.182638	0.8330694	0.152752	-1.196	0.2318
HED2	-0.021418	0.9788094	0.099660	-0.215	0.8298
HED3	-0.063799	0.9381939	0.176002	-0.362	0.7170
WEMP2	0.015398	1.0155169	0.164001	0.094	0.9252
WEMP3	-0.202870	0.8163844	0.093687	-2.165	0.0304*
HJSKIL2	0.047049	1.0481738	0.086893	0.541	0.5882
HJSKIL3	0.105132	1.1108567	0.171446	0.613	0.5397
HJNAT2	-0.143877	0.8659939	0.189179	-0.761	0.4469
HJNAT3	-0.284657	0.7522724	0.191480	-1.487	0.1371
HJCONT2	0.081411	1.0848163	0.108546	0.750	0.4532
INC2	0.075917	1.0788730	0.101220	0.750	0.4532
INC3	0.062958	1.0649821	0.143538	0.439	0.6609
FSAT2	0.127052	1.1354766	0.158944	0.799	0.4241
FSAT3	-0.007532	0.9924964	0.171942	-0.044	0.9651
OWNH2	0.032695	1.0332358	0.090485	0.361	0.7178
SIZH	0.001190	1.0011902	0.001332	0.893	0.3720
LCSAT2	-0.028166	0.9722269	0.181861	-0.155	0.8769
LCSAT3	0.006292	1.0063122	0.166012	0.038	0.9698

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 297.05 on 427 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 177.90 on 406 degrees of freedom

AIC: 1150.1; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -553.0714 (df=22); p= 1; x^2 = 453.9803

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.50267	-0.69258	0.01864	0.39346	1.64232

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-2.188588	0.1120749	0.933486	-2.345	0.0191*
WAGEY	0.014545	1.0146510	0.031983	0.455	0.6493
MRDY	0.096216	1.1009965	0.022926	4.197	2.71e-05***
WED2	-0.046984	0.9541026	0.157605	-0.298	0.7656
WED3	-0.651348	0.5213425	0.357543	-1.822	0.0685.
HED2	-0.093013	0.9111819	0.150937	-0.616	0.5377
HED3	0.003272	1.0032772	0.394772	0.008	0.9934
WEMP2	0.021753	1.0219912	0.219770	0.099	0.9212
WEMP3	-0.199848	0.8188555	0.156327	-1.278	0.2011
HJSKIL2	0.097096	1.1019660	0.154558	0.628	0.5299
HJSKIL3	0.147661	1.1591200	0.345291	0.428	0.6689
HJNAT2	-0.123236	0.8840553	0.361075	-0.341	0.7329
HJNAT3	-0.324410	0.7229536	0.328100	-0.989	0.3228
HJCONT2	0.333072	1.3952471	0.222373	1.498	0.1342
INC2	0.083602	1.0871966	0.158827	0.526	0.5986
INC3	-0.355143	0.7010729	0.255267	-1.391	0.1641
FSAT2	0.520606	1.6830468	0.260036	2.002	0.0453*
FSAT3	0.411628	1.5092730	0.280129	1.469	0.1417
OWNH2	-0.010024	0.9900260	0.145423	-0.069	0.9450
SIZH	0.004126	1.0041348	0.002235	1.846	0.0648.
LCSAT2	0.862871	2.3699558	0.376502	2.292	0.0219*
LCSAT3	0.758354	2.1347595	0.369349	2.053	0.0401*

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 181.752 on 201 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 88.805 on 180 degrees of freedom

AIC: 505.15; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -230.5729 (df=22); p= 1; x^2 = 212.3039

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.658050	-0.237663	-0.009705	0.295905	0.866052

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.5172730	1.6774470	0.5893817	0.878	0.380132
WAGEY	0.0030443	1.0030490	0.0150831	0.202	0.840043
MRDY	0.0523773	1.0537733	0.0158177	3.311	0.000929***
WED2	0.0340839	1.0346714	0.1515164	0.225	0.822017
WED3	-0.0709859	0.9314750	0.1919416	-0.370	0.711508
HED2	-0.0578414	0.9437996	0.1379557	-0.419	0.675015
HED3	-0.1114832	0.8945065	0.2097859	-0.531	0.595132
WEMP2	-0.1239909	0.8833879	0.2761750	-0.449	0.653462
WEMP3	-0.2471541	0.7810203	0.1252744	-1.973	0.048507*
HJSKIL2	0.0797801	1.0830489	0.1188488	0.671	0.502046
HJSKIL3	0.1133299	1.1200013	0.2006823	0.565	0.572262
HJNAT2	-0.1319316	0.8764009	0.2390548	-0.552	0.581025
HJNAT3	-0.2533085	0.7762284	0.2534716	-0.999	0.317622
HJCONT2	0.0091130	1.0091546	0.1338000	0.068	0.945699
INC2	0.1031509	1.1086587	0.1472617	0.700	0.483640
INC3	0.2649823	1.3034080	0.1950394	1.359	0.174270
FSAT2	-0.0998093	0.9050100	0.2158593	-0.462	0.643808
FSAT3	-0.2223608	0.8006264	0.2307440	-0.964	0.335212
OWNH2	0.0519537	1.0533269	0.1294036	0.401	0.688063
SIZH	0.0002845	1.0002845	0.0016819	0.169	0.865671
LCSAT2	-0.3297035	0.7191369	0.2341204	-1.408	0.159053
LCSAT3	-0.2156982	0.8059785	0.1946036	-1.108	0.267690

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 89.378 on 225 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 56.337 on 204 degrees of freedom

AIC: 656.24; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -306.121 (df=22); p= 1; x^2 = 238.322

MODEL 3: Effects of the SOCIO-CULTURAL Determinants on CEB

ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.99116 -0.47786 0.02845 0.38598 1.43279

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.140849	1.1512511	0.343738	0.410	0.68198
WAGEY	-0.002023	0.9979793	0.008991	-0.225	0.82201
MRDY	0.080656	1.0839975	0.010645	7.577	3.55e-14***
UPB2	-0.118038	0.8886626	0.245701	-0.480	0.63093
UPB3	0.258422	1.2948852	0.215235	1.201	0.22989
WUPB2	0.062486	1.0644801	0.224043	0.279	0.78032
WUPB3	-0.242392	0.7847484	0.192827	-1.257	0.20874
HUPB2	-0.157992	0.8538568	0.135154	-1.169	0.24241
HUPB3	-0.269333	0.7638891	0.117256	-2.297	0.02162*
WREL2	0.008113	1.0081456	0.263166	0.031	0.97541
WREL3	0.056950	1.0586028	0.272208	0.209	0.83428
HREL2	-0.039064	0.9616890	0.190678	-0.205	0.83767
HREL3	-0.006032	0.9939863	0.202230	-0.030	0.97621
EXPR2	-0.153421	0.8577682	0.153162	-1.002	0.31649
EXPR3	-0.471423	0.6241136	0.169423	-2.783	0.00539**

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 393.02 on 494 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 234.05 on 480 degrees of freedom

AIC: 1296.3; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -633.1291 (df=15); p= 1; x^2 = 532.0754

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.11894 -0.94278 0.08028 0.45083 1.47659

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	1.043646	2.8395509	0.743614	1.403	0.1605
WAGEY	-0.024624	0.9756772	0.027893	-0.883	0.3773
MRDY	0.115973	1.1229654	0.020253	5.726	1.03e-08***
UPB2	-0.000908	0.9990924	0.419802	-0.002	0.9983
UPB3	0.524817	1.6901491	0.378972	1.385	0.1661
WUPB2	0.113667	1.1203790	0.392403	0.290	0.7721
WUPB3	-0.539851	0.5828353	0.343271	-1.573	0.1158
HUPB2	-0.083698	0.9197088	0.187839	-0.446	0.6559
HUPB3	-0.273914	0.7603973	0.203860	-1.344	0.1791
WREL2	-0.232137	0.7928372	0.410115	-0.566	0.5714
WREL3	-0.241545	0.7854138	0.427545	-0.565	0.5721
HREL2	-0.085402	0.9181429	0.363676	-0.235	0.8143
HREL3	-0.046213	0.9548386	0.387732	-0.119	0.9051
EXPR2	-0.424757	0.6539288	0.265942	-1.597	0.1102
EXPR3	-0.729075	0.4823549	0.284007	-2.567	0.0103*

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 238.65 on 239 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 144.30 on 225 degrees of freedom

AIC: 586.84; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -278.4204 (df=15); p= 0.9999933; x^2 ≈ 260.9921

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.618454 -0.287817 -0.006278 0.284355 1.296203

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.0038058	1.0038131	0.5765006	0.007	0.9947
WAGEY	-0.0007840	0.9992163	0.0129762	-0.060	0.9518
MRDY	0.0555496	1.0571215	0.0136171	4.079	4.52e-05***
UPB2	-0.1291165	0.8788716	0.3235401	-0.399	0.6898
UPB3	0.1757190	1.1921030	0.2642121	0.665	0.5060
WUPB2	0.0001131	1.0001131	0.2862776	0.000395	0.9997
WUPB3	-0.1307408	0.8774451	0.2355717	-0.555	0.5789
HUPB2	-0.1501292	0.8605968	0.2037688	-0.737	0.4613
HUPB3	-0.2564614	0.7737848	0.1463973	-1.752	0.0798.
WREL2	0.3565114	1.4283379	0.3772503	0.945	0.3446
WREL3	0.4368108	1.5477633	0.3873696	1.128	0.2595
HREL2	-0.1383589	0.8707861	0.2317702	-0.597	0.5505
HREL3	-0.0952571	0.9091391	0.2412671	-0.395	0.6930
EXPR2	-0.3424818	0.7100061	0.2151518	-1.592	0.1114
EXPR3	-0.0465558	0.9545113	0.1922393	-0.242	0.8086

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 114.716 on 254 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 74.107 on 240 degrees of freedom

AIC: 723.77; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -346.8856 (df=15); p= 1; x^2 = 277.1376

MODEL 4: Effects of the ATTITUDINAL-VALUE Determinants on CEB

ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.17146 -0.50850 0.01249 0.39331 1.37381

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-0.273175	0.7609595	0.571769	-0.478	0.633
WAGEY	-0.004373	0.9956364	0.009417	-0.464	0.642
MRDY	0.089787	1.0939409	0.010733	8.366	<2e-16***
RELFAM	0.054795	1.0563241	0.061844	0.886	0.376
TRADPAR	0.089681	1.0938256	0.064828	1.383	0.167
MODMAR	-0.080484	0.9226700	0.082993	-0.970	0.332
FUTCON	-0.121647	0.8854608	0.088994	-1.367	0.172
FAMBEN	-0.028082	0.9723085	0.093338	-0.301	0.764
FULFBEN	0.006450	1.0064713	0.064536	0.100	0.920
SELFBEN	0.037526	1.0382385	0.051961	0.722	0.470
SOCIOBEN	0.037498	1.0382094	0.062822	0.597	0.551
CHIBEN	0.077481	1.0805617	0.084134	0.921	0.357

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 340.22 on 432 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 215.04 on 421 degrees of freedom

AIC: 1149.7; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -562.8402 (df=12); p= 1; x^2 = 469.8388

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.41753	-0.99644	0.03335	0.48842	1.23032

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.018304	1.0184726	1.226594	0.015	0.9881
WAGEY	-0.027121	0.9732433	0.029565	-0.917	0.3590
MRDY	0.132069	1.1411866	0.020473	6.451	1.11e-10***
RELFAM	-0.004431	0.9955791	0.104283	-0.042	0.9661
TRADPAR	0.128911	1.1375886	0.101852	1.266	0.2056
MODMAR	0.027496	1.0278775	0.136642	0.201	0.8405
FUTCON	-0.269237	0.7639623	0.145185	-1.854	0.0637.
FAMBEN	-0.047554	0.9535594	0.191757	-0.248	0.8041
FULFBEN	-0.014726	0.9853819	0.124002	-0.119	0.9055
SELFBEN	0.063544	1.0656063	0.095371	0.666	0.5052
SOCIOBEN	0.045415	1.0464616	0.105670	0.430	0.6674
CHIBEN	0.157841	1.1709796	0.143328	1.101	0.2708

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 203.57 on 201 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 127.02 on 190 degrees of freedom

AIC: 497.83; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -236.9173 (df=12); p= 0.9998653; x^2 = 223.1602

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.65045	-0.34086	0.01221	0.32411	1.27002

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.2348028	1.2646593	0.7306908	0.321	0.748
WAGEY	-0.0061039	0.9939147	0.0131879	-0.463	0.643
MRDY	0.0630361	1.0650653	0.0135804	4.642	3.46e-06***
RELFAM	0.0862183	1.0900442	0.0793845	1.086	0.277
TRADPAR	0.0316933	1.0322009	0.0889030	0.356	0.721
MODMAR	-0.1077219	0.8978773	0.1079766	-0.998	0.318
FUTCON	-0.0456645	0.9553625	0.1162996	-0.393	0.695
FAMBEN	0.0069597	1.0069839	0.1086876	0.064	0.949
FULFBEN	0.0142222	1.0143238	0.0788057	0.180	0.857
SELFBEN	-0.0009278	0.9990727	0.0631846	-0.015	0.988
SOCIOBEN	0.0122026	1.0122774	0.0804128	0.152	0.879
CHIBEN	0.0198787	1.0200776	0.1095591	0.181	0.856

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 101.566 on 230 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 73.841 on 219 degrees of freedom

AIC: 661.66; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -318.8320 (df=12); p= 1; x^2 = 254.5232

MODEL 5: Effects of the MARITAL Determinants on CEB
ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.11197	-0.52459	0.01663	0.39466	1.52417

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-0.205705	0.8140734	0.277415	-0.742	0.458
WAGEY	-0.005768	0.9942482	0.008566	-0.673	0.501
MRDY	0.094034	1.0985968	0.009940	9.460	<2e-16***
MSAT2	0.051135	1.0524653	0.144451	0.354	0.723
MSAT3	0.029371	1.0298070	0.148038	0.198	0.843
DIVR2	-0.128090	0.8797740	0.126000	-1.017	0.309

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 391.19 on 493 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 256.69 on 488 degrees of freedom

AIC: 1298.6; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -643.3104 (df=6); p= 1; x^2 = 540.4985

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.48724	-1.04219	0.06653	0.50770	1.40036

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.61097	1.8422187	0.71311	0.857	0.3916
WAGEY	-0.04757	0.9535459	0.02558	-1.860	0.0629.
MRDY	0.14369	1.1545306	0.01721	8.350	<2e-16***
MSAT2	0.02460	1.0249081	0.28148	0.087	0.9303
MSAT3	0.03066	1.0311397	0.28184	0.109	0.9134
DIVR2	-0.15859	0.8533431	0.26074	-0.608	0.5430

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 235.00 on 237 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 154.26 on 232 degrees of freedom

AIC: 574.15; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -281.0765 (df=6); p= 0.9999778; x^2 = 268.5313

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.59111	-0.34021	-0.07075	0.28837	1.27166

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-0.130195	0.8779241	0.470937	-0.276	0.782
WAGEY	0.002363	1.0023657	0.012504	0.189	0.850
MRDY	0.062466	1.0644584	0.012905	4.840	1.30e-06***
MSAT2	0.040437	1.0412655	0.172136	0.235	0.814
MSAT3	0.050326	1.0516134	0.178752	0.282	0.778
DIVR2	-0.153585	0.8576274	0.146999	-1.045	0.296

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 115.766 on 255 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 87.642 on 250 degrees of freedom

AIC: 721.68; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

`log Lik.' -354.8422 (df=6); p= 1; x^2 = 287.8815

MODEL 6: Effects of the PROXIMATE Determinants on CEB

ALL HOUSEHOLDS

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.99727	-0.52909	0.01012	0.38659	1.60190

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	-0.178448	0.8365674	0.283199	-0.630	0.529
WAGEY	0.085400	1.0891530	0.008859	9.640	<2e-16***
WMAGEY	-0.105974	0.8994480	0.011776	-9.000	<2e-16***
HMAGEY	0.013685	1.0137790	0.009030	1.515	0.130
PLANF2	-0.086867	0.9167987	0.075318	-1.153	0.249
MISC2	0.061425	1.0633512	0.090662	0.678	0.498
ABOR2	-0.011382	0.9886821	0.121219	-0.094	0.925

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 389.03 on 481 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 253.21 on 475 degrees of freedom

AIC: 1259.1; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -622.5646 (df=7); p= 1; x^2 = 526.8091

HOUSEHOLDS WITH YOUNGER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.17816	-1.02681	0.04296	0.46274	1.39224

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.43227	1.5407461	0.70279	0.615	0.5385
WAGEY	0.09688	1.1017280	0.02213	4.378	1.20e-05***
WMAGEY	-0.15064	0.8601587	0.01986	-7.584	3.35e-14***
HMAGEY	0.01582	1.0159424	0.01596	0.991	0.3217
PLANF2	-0.23146	0.7933719	0.12525	-1.848	0.0646.
MISC2	0.14116	1.1516112	0.16445	0.858	0.3907
ABOR2	0.19255	1.2123319	0.25819	0.746	0.4558

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 242.46 on 236 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 153.41 on 230 degrees of freedom

AIC: 568.73; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -277.3635 (df=7); p= 0.9999729; x^2 = 266.3781

HOUSEHOLDS WITH OLDER WIVES

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.59631	-0.28713	-0.07287	0.33169	1.30339

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.058717	1.0604751	0.465917	0.126	0.89971
WAGEY	0.058031	1.0597484	0.016266	3.568	0.00036***
WMAGEY	-0.070197	0.9322098	0.015252	-4.603	4.17e-06***
HMAGEY	0.008822	1.0088610	0.011057	0.798	0.42497
PLANF2	-0.020114	0.9800870	0.095074	-0.212	0.83245
MISC2	-0.003461	0.9965445	0.110235	-0.031	0.97495
ABOR2	-0.026582	0.9737685	0.138350	-0.192	0.84764

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 109.661 on 244 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 83.353 on 238 degrees of freedom

AIC: 687.96; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

'log Lik.' -336.9795 (df=7); p= 1; x^2 = 274.987

DETAILS OF THE POISSON REGRESSIONS UNDERTAKEN FOR THE DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN (DCH)

Why are two groups studied?

The reason for studying wives and husbands as two different groups when analysing the desired fertility (number of children that one wishes to have) was that statistically significant differences (T = -3.977; p: .000) were found in the mean number of children that each of the two groups desire. Comparing to wives, husbands desired to have more children (Table 1 below).

Table 1: Mean Number of Children Desired (DCH) by Gender

	Mean of DCH	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	N
WDCH Wife's desired number of children	2.50	.782	.035	505
HDCH Husband's desired number of children	2.66	.977	.043	505
WDCH - HDCH (mean differences)	-.15	.873	.039	505
T(1, 504)=-3.977; p: .000	(Paired Samples Statistics- exclude cases list-wise)			

MODEL 1: Effects of the CONTROL Determinants (CEB, WAGEY, MRDY) on the Desired Number of Children (DCH)

WIFE' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.1862 -0.3299 -0.1125 0.3173 1.3435

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.583993	1.793184	0.215842	2.706	0.00682**
CEB	0.136128	1.145829	0.045830	2.970	0.00297**
WAGEY	0.007233	1.007259	0.007977	0.907	0.36451
MRDY	-0.014875	0.985235	0.011409	-1.304	0.19228

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 90.176 on 338 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 79.910 on 335 degrees of freedom
AIC: 1026.3; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
'log Lik.' -509.1574 (df=4); p= 1; x^2 = 378.6823

HUSBAND' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.1860 -0.4980 -0.0976 0.3768 1.3277

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.796287	2.217293	0.314165	2.535	0.0113*
CEB	0.067567	1.069902	0.070011	0.965	0.3345
WAGEY	0.002555	1.002559	0.011139	0.229	0.8186
MRDY	0.005068	1.005081	0.015815	0.320	0.7486

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 49.798 on 168 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 45.748 on 165 degrees of freedom
AIC: 538.62; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
'log Lik.' -265.3105 (df=4); p= 1; x^2 = 195.9734

MODEL 2: Effects of the SOCIO-ECONOMIC Determinants on the Desired Number of Children (DCH)

WIFE' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.08440 -0.30235 -0.08192 0.30585 1.27012

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.7945917	2.2135371	0.3421124	2.323	0.0202*
CEB	0.1556928	1.1684672	0.0579273	2.688	0.0072**
WAGEY	0.0019700	1.0019720	0.0107385	0.183	0.8544
MRDY	-0.0149488	0.9851623	0.0133773	-1.117	0.2638
WED2	-0.1506397	0.8601575	0.1016434	-1.482	0.1383
WED3	-0.1509262	0.8599112	0.1488403	-1.014	0.3106
WEMP2	0.0849517	1.0886645	0.1585415	0.536	0.5921
WEMP3	0.0888451	1.0929114	0.1025185	0.867	0.3861
INC2	0.0816787	1.0851071	0.1015256	0.805	0.4211
INC3	0.1241423	1.1321770	0.1417743	0.876	0.3812
FSAT2	0.0986938	1.1037283	0.1709886	0.577	0.5638
FSAT3	0.1579096	1.1710604	0.1774368	0.890	0.3735
OWNH2	-0.0449439	0.9560511	0.0853360	-0.527	0.5984
SIZH	-0.0001327	0.9998673	0.0013660	-0.097	0.9226
LCSAT2	-0.2460405	0.7818906	0.1914612	-1.285	0.1988
LCSAT3	-0.1864893	0.8298674	0.1738437	-1.073	0.2834

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 76.968 on 282 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 62.187 on 267 degrees of freedom
AIC: 872.24; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
'log Lik.' -420.1224 (df=16); p= 1; x^2 = 306.1126

HUSBAND' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.97940 -0.36027 -0.04849 0.26531 1.04530

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.746038	2.1086292	0.492210	1.516	0.1296
CEB	0.037626	1.0383428	0.077640	0.485	0.6279
WAGEY	0.005268	1.0052815	0.012339	0.427	0.6695
MRDY	0.002977	1.0029812	0.017087	0.174	0.8617
HED2	-0.172320	0.8417097	0.138616	-1.243	0.2138
HED3	-0.327880	0.7204496	0.195053	-1.681	0.0928
HJSKIL2	-0.098452	0.9062391	0.117866	-0.835	0.4036
HJSKIL3	-0.230670	1.2594433	0.181380	-1.272	0.2035
HJNAT2	0.140580	1.1509407	0.265085	0.530	0.5959
HJNAT3	-0.026481	0.9738663	0.272873	-0.097	0.9227
HJCONT2	0.001498	1.0014992	0.146043	0.010	0.9918
INC2	-0.061574	0.9402838	0.144999	-0.425	0.6711
INC3	-0.092648	0.9115146	0.178215	-0.520	0.6032
FSAT2	0.034117	1.0347058	0.195218	0.175	0.8613
FSAT3	0.121990	1.1297425	0.222015	0.549	0.5827
OWNH2	-0.146766	0.8634960	0.117653	-1.247	0.2122
SIZH	0.001475	1.0014760	0.001866	0.790	0.4292
LCSAT2	0.190255	1.2095574	0.228679	0.832	0.4054
LCSAT3	0.003510	1.0035166	0.196125	0.018	0.9857

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 46.710 on 151 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 33.195 on 133 degrees of freedom
AIC: 509.74; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
'log Lik.' -235.8724 (df=19); p= 1; x^2 = 160.9148

MODEL 3: Effects of the SOCIO- CULTURAL Determinants on the Desired Number of Children (DCH)

WIFE' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.10472 -0.30819 -0.07491 0.30915 1.52354

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.670191	1.9546098	0.355264	1.886	0.0592
CEB	0.108054	1.1141076	0.049697	2.174	0.0297*
WAGEY	0.009643	1.0096893	0.008876	1.086	0.2773
MRDY	-0.014151	0.9859488	0.011996	-1.180	0.2381
URB2	-0.165138	0.8477769	0.106131	-1.556	0.1197
URB3	-0.172493	0.8415640	0.105755	-1.631	0.1029
UPB2	-0.007644	0.9923855	0.099660	-0.077	0.9389
UPB3	0.062835	1.0648508	0.094564	0.664	0.5064
REL2	-0.050949	0.9503270	0.244994	-0.208	0.8353
REL3	0.042476	1.0433908	0.235088	0.181	0.8566
EXPR2	-0.035782	0.9648508	0.161488	-0.222	0.8246
EXPR3	-0.035184	0.9654277	0.176011	-0.200	0.8416

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 85.239 on 330 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 70.973 on 319 degrees of freedom
AIC: 1011.7; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
'log Lik.' -493.8699 (df=12); p= 1; x^2 = 361.6524

HUSBAND' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.5316 -0.3483 -0.1120 0.3259 1.4189

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.858921	2.3606125	0.473702	1.813	0.0698
CEB	0.008057	1.0080895	0.081259	0.099	0.9210
WAGEY	0.008034	1.0080663	0.011720	0.685	0.4930
MRDY	0.005793	1.0058098	0.016359	0.354	0.7233
URB2	-0.077622	0.9253138	0.140291	-0.553	0.5801
URB3	-0.159354	0.8526947	0.152360	-1.046	0.2956
UPB2	-0.059414	0.9423167	0.160805	-0.369	0.7118
UPB3	-0.167755	0.8455613	0.131771	-1.273	0.2030
REL2	-0.034502	0.9660866	0.244657	-0.141	0.8879
REL3	0.030697	1.0311735	0.235887	0.130	0.8965
EXPR2	0.040708	1.0415481	0.283583	0.144	0.8859
EXPR3	0.025778	1.0261130	0.295503	0.087	0.9305

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 48.588 on 163 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 37.959 on 152 degrees of freedom
AIC: 532.73; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
`log Lik.' -254.367 (df=12); p= 1; x^2 = 181.7702

MODEL 4: Effects of the ATTIDUTINAL-VALUE Determinants on the Desired Number of Children (DCH)

WIFE' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.0394 -0.3328 -0.0531 0.2445 1.2176

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.326672	1.3863463	0.605421	0.540	0.5895
CEB	0.105589	1.1113650	0.051725	2.041	0.0412*
WAGEY	0.006609	1.0066308	0.009472	0.698	0.4853
MRDY	-0.012881	0.9872020	0.013133	-0.981	0.3267
RELFAM	0.048299	1.0494849	0.061746	0.782	0.4341
TRADPAR	0.052549	1.0539539	0.068174	0.771	0.4408
MODMAR	0.031773	1.0322829	0.082397	0.386	0.6998
FUTCON	0.017857	1.0180172	0.092311	0.193	0.8466
FAMBEN	-0.044958	0.9560380	0.093598	-0.480	0.6310
FULFBEN	0.093335	1.0978292	0.068488	1.363	0.1730
SELFBEN	-0.032464	0.9680570	0.049463	-0.656	0.5116
SOCIOBEN	0.024276	1.0245727	0.059729	0.406	0.6844
CHIBEN	-0.086221	0.9173916	0.085082	-1.013	0.3109

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 71.322 on 285 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 57.963 on 273 degrees of freedom
AIC: 882.13; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
`log Lik.' -428.0653 (df=13); p= 1; x^2 = 312.5377

HUSBAND' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.4215 -0.4044 -0.1244 0.3494 1.3949

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.472461	1.6039367	0.729144	0.648	0.517
CEB	0.028026	1.0284222	0.083148	0.337	0.736
WAGEY	0.004615	1.0046261	0.012685	0.364	0.716
MRDY	0.005646	1.0056624	0.017977	0.314	0.753
RELFAM	0.037091	1.0377876	0.080173	0.463	0.644
TRADPAR	0.164083	1.1783126	0.087602	1.873	0.061
MODMAR	-0.048937	0.9522410	0.105332	-0.465	0.642
FUTCON	-0.074794	0.9279343	0.109700	-0.682	0.495
FAMBEN	0.162518	1.1764692	0.127812	1.272	0.204
FULFBEN	-0.084350	0.9191096	0.072770	-1.159	0.246
SELFBEN	-0.003601	0.9964055	0.069282	-0.052	0.959
SOCIOBEN	-0.047062	0.9540283	0.087888	-0.535	0.592
CHIBEN	-0.004570	0.9954403	0.098414	-0.046	0.963

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 42.247 on 146 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 33.084 on 134 degrees of freedom
AIC: 478.12; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
`log Lik.' -226.0588 (df=13); p= 1; x^2 = 162.0156

MODEL 5: Effects of the MARITAL Determinants on the Desired Number of Children (DCH)

WIFE' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.1340 -0.3271 -0.1163 0.3097 1.2995

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.620107	1.8591273	0.263644	2.352	0.01867*
CEB	0.128197	1.1367775	0.046678	2.746	0.00602**
WAGEY	0.007881	1.0079125	0.008162	0.966	0.33427
MRDY	-0.011160	0.9889020	0.011696	-0.954	0.33999
MSAT2	0.100160	0.9046924	0.140008	0.715	0.47437
MSAT3	0.028831	0.9715804	0.141269	0.204	0.83828
DIVR2	-0.124476	0.8829591	0.130661	-0.953	0.34076

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 86.795 on 326 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 74.803 on 320 degrees of freedom
AIC: 995.94; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
`log Lik.' -490.9682 (df=7); p= 1; x^2 = 362.7175

HUSBAND' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.18093 -0.42756 -0.09901 0.37864 1.29206

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.759460	2.1371226	0.382111	1.988	0.0469*
CEB	0.073928	1.0767288	0.074199	0.996	0.3191
WAGEY	0.002828	1.0028317	0.011207	0.252	0.8008
MRDY	0.004373	1.0043826	0.016156	0.271	0.7866
MSAT2	0.014330	1.0144332	0.232883	0.062	0.9509
MSAT3	0.043214	1.0441612	0.233424	0.185	0.8531
DIVR2	-0.029201	0.9712216	0.193948	-0.151	0.8803

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 49.542 on 166 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 45.260 on 160 degrees of freedom
AIC: 538.53 ; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
`log Lik.' -262.2639 (df=7); p= 1; x^2 = 190.5165

MODEL 6: Effects of the PROXIMATE Determinants on the Desired Number of Children (DCH)

WIFE' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.0821	-0.3247	-0.1276	0.2954	1.3382

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	0.295524	1.3438298	0.272251	1.085	0.27771
CEB	0.151985	1.1641427	0.048781	3.116	0.00184**
WAGEY	0.003474	1.0034804	0.010109	0.344	0.73108
MRDY	-0.010062	0.9899888	0.013429	-0.749	0.45371
WMAGEY	0.009982	1.0100322	0.008463	1.180	0.23817
PLANF2	0.113011	1.1196438	0.075142	1.504	0.13259
MISC2	-0.030132	0.9703175	0.096590	-0.312	0.75507
ABOR2	-0.066748	0.9354306	0.132737	-0.503	0.61506

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 87.714 on 327 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 73.508 on 320 degrees of freedom
AIC: 997.1; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
`log Lik.' -490.5509 (df=8); p= 1; x^2 = 362.7175

HUSBAND' S DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.2148	-0.4311	-0.1561	0.3718	1.2802

	Coef. Est.	eb	Stand. Err	Z Value	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	1.18322	3.2648760	0.37684	3.140	0.00169**
CEB	0.08293	1.0864655	0.07339	1.130	0.25847
WAGEY	0.01460	1.0147094	0.01400	1.043	0.29711
MRDY	-0.01778	0.9823722	0.02017	-0.882	0.37802
HMAGEY	-0.02290	0.9773566	0.01323	-1.732	0.08332
PLANF2	-0.01362	0.9864716	0.10234	-0.133	0.89412
MISC2	0.08153	1.0849408	0.11868	0.687	0.49212
ABOR2	0.15433	1.1668743	0.16886	0.914	0.36074

Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1 ` ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Poisson family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 47.373 on 158 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 39.939 on 151 degrees of freedom
AIC: 512.62; Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 3
`log Lik.' -248.3076 (df=8); p= 1; x^2 = 180.6756

