HOW HAS THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR RESPONDED TO STATE SCHOOL PAY REFORMS?

A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

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SUMMARY OF THESIS

This thesis examines the extent to which state policy exerts influence in the independent schools sector. The context of the study is the introduction of threshold pay in the state sector. The reaction to this policy in two independent schools is examined and compared. The political and ideological conditions giving rise to the need for pay reform in the independent sector are identified. The articulation between each case study school’s approach and the centrally planned discourse on threshold assessment is examined. The character and sources of the principles underpinning the proposed changes in pay assessment in the two schools are considered. The key actors in the process at each school are identified. The extent to which the new form of public sector pay calculation gives rise to a new politics of governance and accountability within each case study school is evaluated.

Issues highlighted include the desirability and efficacy of performance related pay in education. The role of staff attitudes to external developments and their actions within the school are evaluated. The extent to which the state policy was co-opted to further the agenda of management in each school is considered. The differences between the schemes adopted in each school are explained by reference to local factors including existing school culture, competition with other schools for staff, the ambition of governors to increase teacher contact time with pupils and the state of existing appraisal schemes in each school.

Two broad themes emerge from the study. The first relates to the character of ‘independent’ schools and raises some questions about their supposed autonomy. The second theme concerns the notion of ‘new public management’ (NPM) and whether it is a concept appropriate for analysing change in practice in purported private sector institutions and whether private sector bodies can ever be subject to NPM measures.
Contents:

Chapter One: Introduction to the Dissertation & the Research Topic

1.1 Background 5
1.1.1 Introduction 5
1.1.2 Implications of Changes in Pay for Both Sectors 8
1.1.3 Significance, Focus and Generalisability 9
1.2 Policy Context 11
1.2.1 1998 White Paper 11
1.2.2 Initial Response 12
1.2.3 Policy Objectives 13
1.2.4 Underlying Research 14
1.3 Research Context 15
1.3.1 Performance Related Pay in Education 15
1.3.2 Public Sector & New Public Management 16
1.3.3 Where this Study Fits in 17
1.3.4 The Two Case Study Schools 17
1.3.5 St Edward’s Context 18
1.3.6 St Bernadette’s Context 19
1.4 Research Questions 21
1.4.1 What political and ideological conditions gave rise to the need for pay reform in the independent sector? 21
1.4.2 How does the approach in each case study institution articulate to the centrally planned discourse on threshold assessment? 22
1.4.3 What is the character and what are the sources of the principles underpinning the proposed changes in pay assessment in the two case study institutions? 23
1.4.4 Who are the key actors in this process? 23
1.4.5 To what extent does the new form of public sector pay calculation give rise to a new politics of governance and accountability within each case study school? 24

Chapter Two: Methods of Enquiry & Research Design

2.1 Methodology – Why did I seek to answer the questions in chapter one qualitatively? 26
2.1.1 My assumptions 26
2.1.2 Research Location – goals and constraints 26
2.1.3 Why case studies? 28
2.1.4 My Privileged Position(s) 29
2.1.5 Ethnography or not? 30
2.1.6 Why the two schools chosen? 31
2.1.7 Why semi-structured interviews? 33
2.1.8 Previous Research Studies 34
2.1.9 Outline Schedule 35
2.2 Research Design 35
2.2.1 Interviews: number, sample composition, characteristics 35
2.2.2 Summary of Interviews 37
2.2.3 Format of the interview schedule 37
2.2.4 Collection of other case study data 39
2.3 Recording & Analysis of Data 42
### Chapter Three: Literature Review I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1</td>
<td>Definition, delineation and direction</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2</td>
<td>The immediate theoretical field</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Literature review: Theory, policy and evidence</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1</td>
<td>Contrasts in Theory (HRM)</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2</td>
<td>Development of HRM and divergent strains</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3</td>
<td>Practical Pay guides of North American origin</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4</td>
<td>The field in the UK – from critical works to handbooks</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.5</td>
<td>A narrower view – Reward Management</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.6</td>
<td>The shift from market place to public sector: UK &amp; US</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.7</td>
<td>The UK state sector</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.8</td>
<td>PRP’s effects on teacher effort and behaviour</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.9</td>
<td>Key research informing the Government scheme</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter Four: Literature Review II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Structure of the chapter</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Policy, New Labour and PRP (macro level)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Responses from the teacher unions and others (meso level)</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Defining the discourse</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Independent Sector Responses (meso level)</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.1</td>
<td>ISBA</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.2</td>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.3</td>
<td>ATL</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.4</td>
<td>GDST</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>How can themes from the literature be applied to the case study schools in the independent sector? (micro level)</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Agency at the micro-level</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>State and independent: congruence or contradiction?</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter Five: St Edward’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Who was interviewed and what were they asked?</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1</td>
<td>Summary of Interviewees at St Edward’s</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.2</td>
<td>Participant Observation</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Staff culture and threshold pay</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>View of PRP</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Context in which Threshold Pay introduced</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Process of applying for Threshold Pay and the Key Actors</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Coincidence of other factors with the Threshold Pay initiative</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>The Part-timer issue</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.9 Evaluation of the Threshold Pay scheme and thoughts on the future 110
5.10 Hierarchical analysis 112
5.11 Conclusion 114

Chapter Six: St Bernadette's

6.1 Introduction 116
6.2 Who was interviewed and what were they asked? 116
6.2.1 Summary of Interviewees at St Bernadette's 117
6.2.2 Participant Observation 119
6.3 Staff Culture and threshold pay 120
6.4 View of PRP 121
6.5 Context in which new scheme introduced, Motives for introduction, Presentations made during introduction of new scheme 124
6.6 Process by which pay changes agreed and Key Actors involved 130
6.7 Coincidence of other factors 132
6.8 Evaluation of the new pay scheme and thoughts on the future 134
6.9 Hierarchical analysis 136
6.10 Conclusion 138

Chapter Seven: Findings & Conclusions

7.1 Introduction 140
7.2 Research Questions – Findings 141
7.2.1 What political and ideological conditions gave rise to the need for pay reform in the independent sector? 141
7.2.2 How does the approach in each case study institution articulate to the centrally planned discourse on threshold assessment? 145
7.2.3 What is the character and what are the sources of the principles underpinning the proposed changes in pay assessment in the two case study institutions? 149
7.2.4 Who are the key actors in this process? 152
7.2.5 To what extent does the new form of public sector pay calculation give rise to a new politics of governance and accountability within each case study school? 157
7.3 Postscript 2001-2004 160
7.4 Conclusions 162
7.5 Future Directions 165

Appendix 1: Interview Questions 167
Appendix 2: Summary Tables of interview responses – St Edward's 169
Appendix 3: Summary Tables of interview responses – St Bernadette's 171
Appendix 4: Timeline of Interviews 173
Appendix 5: Criteria for the DfEE Threshold Assessment 174
Appendix 6: Glossary of Abbreviations 175

Bibliography 176
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION & THE RESEARCH TOPIC

1.1 BACKGROUND

1.1.1 Introduction
In the UK the compulsory schooling is broadly, but unequally divided into two sectors, state and fee-paying. The former is responsible for the education of over 90% of students of compulsory school age. Between 7% and 8% of children in England and 1% to 2% in Wales and Scotland attend private or fee paying schools (Gorard, 1997: p87; DfES, 2004). In terms of elite formation, the private sector has a privileged place but in other respects, what goes on in the state sector has historically driven change and adaptation in the fee-paying counterpart.

In this dissertation, I will examine the interaction between sectors through the private sector’s adoption and adaptation of management strategies, and more specifically through case studies of private sector responses to state school pay reforms for teachers. Historically, private school pay scales have shadowed the state scale, often with an additional allowance added. In individual schools, exceptions have been made to pay over the odds in shortage subjects on a case-by-case basis. However, with increased mobility between sectors, increasing pressure has emerged for transparent pay arrangements in the private sector.

The specific area of pay reform to be considered is the introduction of a performance threshold as part of the Government’s reforms of teachers’ pay structure. From September 2000 the existing seventeen point pay spine was abolished and replaced with a nine point spine based on qualifications and experience, followed by a five point upper pay range with management responsibilities rewarded by flat-rate allowances (ATL, 2000). Teachers who are assessed as having met the specified threshold standards move onto the upper pay range. This first step
represented a salary increase of £2,001. There were no quotas for passing the threshold. All qualified teachers entitled to nine salary points based on qualifications and experience as of September 1999 were deemed eligible. However, each teacher was required to complete an application, supported by guidance notes outlining evidence that they met the eight threshold standards covering five areas: professional knowledge and understanding; teaching and assessment; pupil progress; wider professional effectiveness and professional characteristics. These categories outline the requisite performance standards that are required to cross the threshold and obtain the pay increment available on the upper pay scale. New statutory duties were placed on head teachers to assess whether an applicant teacher met the threshold standards, subject to approval of the assessment arrangements by an assessor.

The rationale behind the introduction of threshold pay as outlined by the then Education Secretary David Blunkett was ‘better rewards and support in return for higher standards’ (DfEE, 1998, foreword). This was presented as part of a prioritising of education resulting in a programme of investment of ‘£19 billion extra over the next three years’ (DfEE, 1998: foreword) designed to realise the Government’s desire for ‘a world-class education service for all our children’ (DfEE, 1999: p5). Specifically, threshold pay was designed to address the significant problem that ‘good classroom performance is not sufficiently rewarded’ (DfEE, 1998: p29) and that, as a consequence, recruitment and retention were proving problematic. In January 1998, according to the Government’s statistical service there were 2,359 teacher vacancies in nursery, primary and secondary schools. Particular problems were encountered in recruiting maths, science, English and languages. In 1997 a good, experienced classroom teacher could expect to earn £21,600 (TTA, 2001), only slightly above the national average wage for all workers in that year of £19,115. In the same year a survey of 800 teachers (Travers & Cooper, 1997) revealed that 55% of teachers had recently considered leaving the profession.
Threshold pay and its consequences are of great interest to teachers and their representative bodies (their reactions to the threshold scheme are outlined below). Clearly, the Government too has a vested interest, as outlined above. However, why should considering the private sector’s response to these state school pay reforms be significant and to whom? ‘The distinction between market-based and non-market organisations is especially salient...’ (Harris, Bennett & Preedy, 1997: p.99).

As market-led institutions it might be expected that independent schools use management techniques from the private sector. I refer specifically to those techniques espoused by proponents of New Public Management (NPM), who argue that these approaches are natural in the private sector and absent in the public sector because the latter can rely on a share of public expenditure. By adopting such methods (including pay by performance and the wider process of performance management), they argue the same efficiencies and economies can be attained in the public sector. However, there are studies of NPM (Exworthy & Halford, 1999) which conclude that the extension of such management techniques to public sector hospitals, social work departments and schools has been far from successful. So it is very relevant to ask whether these approaches are seen as natural in the independent education sector? Equally revealing would be any findings to show that, on the contrary, such NPM approaches were alien to independent schools. Indeed that they have only begun to be considered in response to Government led initiatives in the state sector. A far-reaching and substantial reform package fitting the NPM model was launched by New Labour, this was their recent pay reforms, including the introduction of ‘threshold pay’ (DfEE, 1998).

Is the private education sector adopting or adapting from public sector management ideas sourced from the commercial sector via NPM? ‘Moves to relate pay more closely to individual performance were begun in the civil service in the 1980s and spread quickly to other parts of the public sector’ (White & Drucker, 2000: p.10). What the Conservatives
implemented has been developed under the Labour Government since 1997. If it is the case that the impetus has come from the public sector, rather than the private sector being the natural home of these notions, this raises questions as to the applicability of such approaches to education (public or private). It will also reveal much about the context within which independent school decision makers operate. The ways in which independent schools have had to adapt, perhaps painfully in some cases, to a new situation initiated in the state sector, will indicate much about the relationship between these schools and their external environment (both what is going on in the state sector, the market location of the school for pupils and staff) and the internal structure and culture of the schools.

These issues raise a question of terminology. Should we refer to 'threshold pay' or 'performance related pay'? In order to distinguish between the wider field and the specific developments within education in England and Wales, I intend to use 'threshold' to refer to the state scheme and its derivatives in the independent sector. This is not an arbitrary decision but one informed by the responses of some interviewees at St Edward's, one of my case study schools, who disputed whether the scheme introduced there was a performance related pay scheme as outlined below in Chapter Five. Use of 'performance related pay' (PRP) will indicate the general approach of relating performance and pay as defined in more detail in Chapter Three.

1.1.2 Implications of Changes in Pay for Both Sectors
The pay offered in the independent sector is arguably one key factor in determining the quality of education that sector is able to offer. If the independent sector falls behind the state sector on pay and conditions the ramifications will be felt throughout education. Independent schools' recruitment and teacher retention could be negatively affected, possibly increasing the pool of teachers available to the state sector and also diminishing the attractions of an independent education for parents.
Thus, there is significance in this question for practitioners and policy analysts regardless of sector. Practical lessons may be learned to help inform subsequent refinements of the existing state scheme and vice-versa, analysis of independent school approaches may reveal weaknesses that differentiate schemes on the basis of quality and effectiveness.

As Sheila Cooper from the Girls' Schools Association (GSA) commented in 2001, 'Many schools still seem to be in the process of deciding what to do' (Cooper, 2001: telephone interview). Some eighty GSA member schools had expressed interest in the Government-approved scheme to Cambridge Education Associates Limited (CEA), 'However, all eighty may not decide to proceed once they have considered it further' (Cooper, 2001: telephone interview). In fact, research from the Independent Schools' Bursars Association (ISBA) in cooperation with the Independent Schools Council suggests that 76 schools in GSA and Headmasters and Headmistresses Conference (HMC) together have used the full DfEE approved scheme or partially adopted it with 'informal use of CEA assessors' (ISBA, 2002: p1). This dissertation involves a comparative case study which includes one school which has sought to adapt the state scheme (albeit without the use of external assessors) and another which has chosen a different course.

1.1.3 Significance, Focus and Generalisability
In simple terms, has either sector got it right? Have some independent schools chosen a more effective response than others? This study should reveal telling data on the extent to which independent schools have their notional independence limited by state policies, even where those policies have no legislative compulsion on the independent sector. These findings may help inform future decision-making among independent school managers.
Furthermore, the independent sector in the UK contains some 2,400 schools, with the 1,300 accredited to the Independent Schools Council (ISC) alone responsible for the education of about half a million children. This then is a substantial sector and one which can only exist because parents choose to support it; 'they elect to pay again for something which is provided free at the point of delivery' (Gorard, 1997: preface p. x). However the category of school within this sector with which I am interested, is that group of schools represented by the ISC rather than 'a typical fee-paying school' for Wales, 'with fewer than a hundred pupils, perhaps even fewer than twenty pupils' (Gorard, 1997: preface p. x). Additionally, my focus is on secondary schools which tend to be larger institutions and leaders of independent sector policy.

A key question then is: Are independent schools independent? Is this why they have taken differing approaches in their responses to the state initiative? Can they ignore developments in the state sector? The Independent Schools Bursars' Association has carried out a survey of its members' responses (2002) through the Independent Schools Council. Prior to these results, they were able to confirm that responses had 'been many and varied' although it remained 'very hard to discern a particular trend other than schools are going to do something' (e-mail correspondence with author: p1). If independent schools are constrained by context, to what extent can they mediate these policies in intention or impact? Mike Sant of the ISBA (2001) noted that 'many schools with a contractual link to state pay scales are seeking to break the link above point 9' (e-mail correspondence with author: p1) and this confirms the likely ramifications for staffing and recruitment highlighted at the start. Indeed their 2002 survey revealed that 245 of 541 respondent schools that had been contractually linked to state scales 'managed to sever that link at least beyond the current point 9' (ISBA, 2002: p2).

Furthermore, at a time of teacher shortages in key subjects such as mathematics and physics, newspaper reports suggest, 'independent schools are beating teacher shortages by offering perks such as health
insurance and housing’ (The Times, October 15, 2001). Almost half of the member schools surveyed by GSA and HMC in 2001 reported worsening recruitment conditions over the past twelve months. A quarter of respondents also cited the local cost of living as adding to the difficulties of recruiting. Chris Tongue, chairman of HMC’s professional development sub-committee, in the article cited above, said of independent schools, ‘They are using their independence, and the flexibility that comes with it, to offer attractive packages’ (The Times, October 15, 2001). It is within this context that independent schools’ responses to the state pay initiative need to be considered.

1.2 POLICY CONTEXT

1.2.1 1998 White Paper
In December 1998, a Government White Paper ‘Teachers – Meeting the Challenge of Change’ created a new pay system to apply to England and, with modifications, to Wales. The legislation identified eight threshold standards covering five key areas against which current teachers with nine salary points (excluding responsibility allowances) are to be assessed should they apply. These proposals are widely regarded as introducing a form of performance related pay, although the rhetoric employed in the White Paper never directly refers to the proposals as such. The policy document also tackled a wide range of other issues such as leadership and training under the umbrella of seeking to establish ‘a world-class education system where every school is excellent or improving or both’ (DfEE, 1998: p1). This document in general and the pay assessment changes in particular build on ‘Excellence in Schools’ (1997), the first White Paper published by New Labour just 67 days after their first election victory. However, whether this represents a real shift towards a ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 1998) or whether it is the continuation of an educational discourse established
under the Conservatives with the Education Reform Act, 1988 is debatable.

1.2.2 Initial Response
Applications for threshold assessment are voluntary but it was expected that the majority of those eligible would apply. An Exeter University study of 1000 randomly sampled primary and secondary head teachers in 2001 analysed their data and projected that 21,749 teachers would be eligible to apply in the targeted schools. 19,183 (88% of those eligible) actually applied and 18,684 (97% of those who applied) were successful (Wragg et al, 2001). The standards are those reasonably to be expected of an experienced practitioner. This new mode of assessing pay has created a new process, operating at the school level, whereby head teachers receive application forms in which teachers set out evidence that they have met all the specified standards. Heads are responsible for assessing these applications. External assessors (Cambridge Education Associates Limited are the sole Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) contractors for this service) were to work with head teachers 'to verify, through sampling, that the headteacher has applied the performance threshold standards correctly, fairly and in line with national practice' (DfEE, 2000: p8).

From the moment these arrangements were put in place there was an issue for independent schools, both among staff as employees concerned with their pay and conditions as well as Governors and senior managers concerned with costs, recruitment, retention, competitive advantage and a host of other managerial, practical matters. The only exception would be institutions that already had a similar scheme in place.
1.2.3 Policy Objectives

The new pay assessment meets some of the state's objectives in addressing the quality of teaching provision and extends earlier policies (of both New Labour and Conservatives) that have sought to restructure the education system through devolved budgets, a National Curriculum, A-Level reform and other related initiatives. In this case the programme is intended to identify the best teachers and reward them on a differential basis. The goals are to attract and retain able staff, to allow faster progress, enable progression through classroom performance linked to 'rigorous annual appraisal' and establishing a 'transparent and fair' system (DfEE, 1998: p33). Alongside the new assessment procedures outlined in the White Paper, substantial development of the system and its administrative procedures has taken place resulting in published guidelines for all those involved in the process. There are real questions relating to how this approach sits with independent schools operating in a market context where all budgets are devolved and the National Curriculum (and A-Level reforms), while not compulsory, provides another example of a state policy initiative to which the sector has had to respond.

The objectives of the state policy include changing an existing culture that has 'rewarded experience and responsibility but not performance' (DfEE, 1998). Thus heads are seen as key agents in facilitating this cultural change. They were to assess the teachers in their school prior to external moderation. For this system to work, head teachers must embrace this new culture. Certainly, the DfEE have produced substantial support materials for heads such as their 'Threshold Assessment Process: Prompts for Headteachers' (DfEE, 2000), and updates for subsequent years such as 'Threshold Training for Headteachers - in Round Two' (2001) and further advice referring to rounds three and four available on their web-site. The crucial difference between the new pay arrangements and the traditional system embedded in schools' culture (in the state sector and perhaps the independent sector as well) is the shift from assessment by experience
and responsibility to an emphasis on performance. The broader intentions of the White Paper contain other features that may also prove divisive and be interpreted as working against a collaborative staff culture. The focus of this dissertation will be in assessing the motivation for, process and impact of the introduction of the performance threshold and its attendant procedures through a comparative case study of St Edward’s and St Bernadette’s. This aims to consider how far the assumptions above underpinning the state initiative hold good in the case study schools and perhaps for a wider group of schools within the independent sector.

1.2.4 Underlying Research
These new arrangements and the key standards identified as exemplifying good performance draw heavily upon research by Hay McBer, particularly their report ‘Raising Achievement in Our Schools: Model of Effective Teaching (Hay Group, 2000). The relationship between this research and Government policy is clearly expressed in the Hay Group document:
‘There are clear links between the characteristics for effective teaching and the teaching skills proposed in the DfEE’s draft Threshold Standards published in February 1999. The characteristics bring an extra dimension by describing in detail the behaviours that underpin effective teaching at this level. Thus we have recommended and the Department has agreed that they should be reflected in the draft standards …’ (Hay Group, 2000: pp1-2).
Thus the combination of devolving responsibility to head teachers whilst maintaining an imposed national framework means these arrangements ‘bear a family resemblance to other policies in education and social welfare where public service provision …[is] steered and regulated at a distance from the centre’ (Fitz & Lee, 1996: p1). Will independent schools too, intentionally or not, be subject to some element of this steering from a distance?
There is certainly opposition to such PRP policies, 'There are compelling arguments against performance related pay, especially in schools' (Education Today and Tomorrow, 1999: pp17-19). These include the lack of empirical evidence that the system improves performance, that indeed it leads to demoralisation. Also cited is the lack of a satisfactory way to measure a teacher's performance and the danger that teachers will only concentrate on meeting specified targets leading to a distortion of the educational process (Kessler & Purcell, 1991). Head teachers have also been divided, some opponents of the scheme worrying about 'perverse incentives' and questioning whether financial incentives can 'motivate teachers directly' (Croxson & Atkinson, 2001: abstract). More widely, concern has been expressed that increasing differentiation both between schools and among practitioners within schools will undermine professional collegiality (Bottery, 1998).

Furthermore, press coverage latched onto such concerns, generating headlines suggesting the threshold 'will destroy careers' (TES May 19, 2000:p3) and that surveys find that 'most teachers still hate the threshold' (TES July 7, 2000:p19). These objections will form a useful gauge against which to assess the systems introduced at St Edward's and St Bernadette's.

1.3 RESEARCH CONTEXT

1.3.1 Performance Related Pay in Education
While PRP has long been the focus of extensive study, its applications to education are of more recent origin (Preedy, Glatter & Levacic, 1997; Preedy, Glatter & Wise, 2002). Nevertheless, there had inevitably been very little research conducted on the current assessment threshold package when I began my research as it was only being administered for the first time, let alone in the independent sector where it is not compulsory, individual school reactions have varied and introduction of
schemes has tended to lag behind the state initiative. Many independent schools appear to have been a good year behind the situation in the state sector, having adopted what the Head of St Edward's described as 'a wait and see' policy to the somewhat fraught introductory process that took place in the state sector, including union challenges to the legality of some aspects of the scheme. Of the subsequent plethora of independent school responses, the ISBA listed seven categories of response as of August 2001 (these were confirmed in their 2002 survey) which illustrates the range of perspectives taken on the state policy and its likely implications.

1.3.2 Public Sector & New Public Management
There are accounts of the impact of appraisal and performance management initiatives in the public sector, ranging from the Inland Revenue to the National Health Service (NHS) (ACAS, 1996; Marsden & Richardson, 1992; NHS Directorate for Wales, 1991). Critical accounts of the employment of such strategies within the education system have been based within the fields of New Public Management (Foster & Plowden, 1996), analysis of New Labour's 'Third Way' policies (Power & Whitty, 1999) and work on Human Resource Management including attempts to manage culture (Hall, 1997; Blyton & Turnbull, 1992). There is also substantial literature from firms of management consultants (Arthur Andersen, 1990; Robson Rhodes, 1988) and organisations (OECD, 1997; Income Data Services and Coopers & Lybrand, 1989; Equal Opportunities Commission/ Institute of Manpower Studies (Bevan & Thompson, 1992)). The focus of the majority of research so far has been on other areas of the public sector and theoretical debates over the desirability of initiating similar strategies in education and schemes in other national contexts such as the USA (Jacobson, 1992). School based studies have been confined to analysing the consequences of appraisal systems (Tomlinson, 1992; Armstrong & Murlis, 1991).
1.3.3 Where this Study Fits in

The proposed research is distinctive because it aims to produce an account of the relations between national policy formulation and micro-level changes in school practice. It also seeks to explore and map the micro-political landscape at institutional level, emphasising the implications of and for culture. It is evaluative in that it seeks to establish the extent to which school level responses address these issues in line with national policy intentions and how far mediation by key agents and local conditions takes place and with what effects.

1.3.4 The Two Case Study Schools

Both of these schools can claim, with justification, to be market leaders within their specific niches. Developments at such institutions may establish trends followed elsewhere or emphasise the significance that specific market position has on each institution’s response to the state threshold initiative. As a researcher I held a Middle Management position within the independent secondary sector for six years as Head of History and Politics at St Edward’s. I am now in my third year as Head of Sixth Form at another independent school, St Bernadette’s. At St Edward’s I carried out a research project for the Head on extra-curricular activities provided by staff as possible criteria for the establishment of an ‘in-house’, tailored version of the state threshold assessment system. Subsequently, such a scheme has been introduced at St Edward’s and this raises a wider question as to the extent to which the introduction of a public sector performance threshold [a set of criteria against which teachers will be judged in qualifying for additional pay (DfEE, 1998)] impacts upon the culture and practices of the independent sector. Are such initiatives familiar to the independent sector, operating as it does in a market-led environment? At St Bernadette’s, there has also been a response but it has taken quite a different form with eligible staff across the board being awarded an additional sum of £2,000 with little quid pro quo beyond a clarification of existing responsibilities.
1.3.5 St Edward's Context

In formulating this thumbnail sketch I am drawing upon my observations and interactions as a middle manager at St Edward's over a six-year period.

The school has been operating for about a century. It has about 600 pupils. St Edward's is an independent girls' day school for pupils from age eleven to eighteen. It also has a small class for each of years five and six, as well as a close relationship with its feeder preparatory school. However, entry to the school is by competitive examination. The school is over-subscribed, allowing for selection by ability. It is academically successful and in recent years has been placed high in the national GCSE and A-level league tables. Almost all pupils progress to university, the majority of these securing places on highly competitive courses at Russell Group universities.

The school operates in a competitive local marketplace. There are at least three other adjacent competitors. However, there is also a substantial demand for independent school places in the area. The school's fees are relatively modest but one of its major competitors is able to offer a comparable education for lower fees. There are also several boys' schools in the area attended by brothers, although at least one of these is now taking girls in the Sixth Form. The school bases its appeal (and one that has seen it grow in terms of intake and reputation) on a balance between pastoral care, extra-curricular activities and academic success within a nominally Church of England framework.

The teachers are predominantly female, although there are some men, totalling perhaps a sixth of the total. In total there are 66 members of staff composed of 46 full-time and 20 part-time staff. The total teaching staff is slightly larger than might be expected for an independent day school of its size. Staff turnover is steady with young teachers moving on to other schools into positions of greater responsibility and established staff taking career breaks or reaching retirement. The traditional view
held by established staff is that of a collegial workplace. The school underwent a successful inspection in March 2000. A nascent appraisal system has been implemented but has been slow to take root. There is little tradition of classroom based peer observation or the sharing of best practice across departments. Pay is another area where there has been little discussion between staff, although recent steps to clarify contractual arrangements have caused concerns and even conflict within the staff room.

As independent educational institutions, the Government’s PRP proposals had no legal weight but that did not mean they had no impact. St Edward’s staff wasted little time asking what would be done by their employers to ensure they were not disadvantaged in relation to their state sector colleagues. This issue coincided with management’s attempts to draft a new, standard contract for all teaching staff. Concerns over these issues led to the establishment of a Staff Committee for the first time in the school’s 100-year history. The committee was elected during the last week of the summer term of 2000. School management formulated its response to these developments but it was not expected that any scheme would be in place for the academic year 2000-2001 and this indeed proved the case.

1.3.6 St Bernadette’s Context

In the construction of this brief overview, I am drawing once again on my experience over three years as a senior manager at St Bernadette’s.

St Bernadette’s is about one hundred and thirty years old and has grown from small beginnings to be a full boarding school, occupying a substantial site. It is a girls’ independent school with a policy of giving places to relatives of current and former pupils who would cope with the education provided. However, entry is via testing at eleven, thirteen and in the Sixth Form and there are between 1.5 and 2 applications per place. There are 350 pupils, all but twenty of whom are full boarders and
the school is full. The school recruits its pupils nationally and a small proportion from overseas, mainly Europe. The school achieves high academic standards, always occupying a 'first division' position in the GCSE and A-level league tables. Almost all pupils aspire to and succeed in acquiring places on competitive courses at Russell Group universities. There are approximately 75 teaching staff with another 12 residential staff necessitated by the boarding nature of the school. The managerial and administrative staff total around 30, although 6 of these also have teaching responsibilities.

Unlike St Edward's, St Bernadette's operates within a national, even international marketplace. Its competitors are other major girls' boarding schools, as well as the increasing number of co-educational institutions offering boarding. The school's particular niche is that it operates within a Roman Catholic framework and is a genuinely full boarding school, offering pastoral care and a broad education within this tradition. There are boys' schools within the area which attract brothers and simplify arrangements for parents seeking single sex education for their children. The school's fees are comparable with its major competitors and thus undeniably very substantial.

The teachers are predominantly female, although there are a significant number of men, accounting for approximately a sixth of the total. There are some part-time staff and there is a regular turnover of staff leaving the school, with the majority moving on to positions of greater responsibility. The staff room regards itself as a collegial place, where all members are striving to provide excellence in education and the vast majority are seeking to do this in line with the school's defining characteristics as a small, Catholic, girls', academic, boarding school. The school underwent a successful inspection in May 2001. It has an established appraisal system and a growing culture of peer observation among staff, stimulated in part by a two year focus on a teaching and learning strategy, led by a self-selecting group of teachers, chaired by a deputy head as the teaching and learning group. Pay is not an area
which has been much discussed by staff prior to the developments which led to a re-evaluation of the school's pay structure and the establishment first of a Staff Salaries Committee (a temporary body) and then a redefined staff committee in 2002.

At St Bernadette’s, management had considered the implications of state pay changes for eighteen months and sought to incorporate staff views in the dialogue by establishing a Staff Salaries Committee, chaired by a member of the Senior Management Team (SMT). It was important to unpick the reasons for these approaches and this required a firm appreciation of the cultures of the school, as well as the wider context.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Against this background, the dissertation is guided by the following research questions:

1.4.1 What political and ideological conditions gave rise to the need for pay reform in the independent sector?
This question acknowledges the primacy of context in shaping policy (Ball, 1994). This is also the equivalent of Fullan's initiation stage. It requires a consideration of PRP as applied to education. It also necessitates an analysis of New Labour's 'Third Way' policies (Power & Whitty, 1999). Very little work within the educational policy analysis field has yet been possible based on case studies, let alone considering the indirect consequences of the policy on a related but distinct sector such as that formed by independent schools. The investigation of public sector policy on independent sector practice raises several broad but related conceptual issues of considerable importance to social scientists, educational policy-makers and school level managers in the independent sector. The first is associated with the theorisation of policy trajectories both in terms of 'policy mediation' and 'dominant discourses'. The
second concerns conceptualising leadership and agency both within and across levels from the national level to the institutional and even sub-institutional levels. It is also intended to explore how effectively these perspectives can be combined with notions of culture management (Knight & Saunders, 1999) and leadership styles to produce a mode of enquiry applicable to more than one study, allowing for a comparative case study and the addition of similar studies in the future in which comparability across studies and sectors is facilitated.

While acknowledging the role of external context, this research question also requires consideration of the internal context of the case study schools. That is to say their own circumstances – market position, internal politics/culture, finances, aspirations and existing pay arrangements (see observations above). This leads on to the second and third research questions.

1.4.2 How does the approach in each case study institution articulate to the centrally planned discourse on threshold assessment?
This draws upon Wallace’s framework for analysing the impacts of externally derived policies on educational institutions, including the notion of ‘counter-policy’. This provides a mode of examination and theorisation of the articulation of policy across levels using notions of counter-policy to provide ‘a local perspective on policy implementation’ (Wallace, 1998: p195; Cann et al, 2000). This refines Fullan’s analysis of the implementation stage. It also allows for the incorporation of complexity into the study of a policy’s trajectory (Ball, 1994) and to treat the hierarchy of an institution to a level-based analysis such as is becoming widespread in larger scale studies considering ‘national policy formulation, its meso-level mediation... and micro-level changes in school practice’ (Fitz & Lee, 1996: p2). With colleagues, I have adapted and developed Wallace’s approach to provide a framework specifically designed to pick up the interaction between levels and the creation of layers of context within which policy intentions may be championed,
resisted, deflected or even subverted. This model was intended to apply to a range of differing policy contexts and while providing a useful tool for this research, its application will also provide a test of the framework’s utility.

1.4.3 What is the character and what are the sources of the principles underpinning the proposed changes in pay assessment in the two case study institutions?

This third research question seeks to examine the underlying principles informing the strategies adopted in the two case study institutions. The purpose of this question is to allow for a comparison of state sector motivations with those in the independent sector, while taking account of the relevant context. Thus, all three questions are drawn together in attempting to unpick the character and sources of the aforementioned principles. This analysis will be complimented by consideration of the notions of culture management (Knight & Saunders, 1999) and leadership styles. It also allows for the location of each school’s response within what is known about independent sector responses as a whole. This consideration will be based on the seven categories identified by Mike Sant (2001) of the ISBA which range from payment of £2,000 to staff with no questions asked through to an intention to follow the state scheme, usually through the arrangements negotiated by the Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL), allowing for the Government’s external assessors to verify an independent school’s assessment process.

1.4.4 Who are the key actors in this process? How do Governors, Head, SMT, Staff Committee interpret their obligations and responsibilities? What is the capacity of each to affect the discourse of pay reform within the institution?

My fourth question is complex in nature and flows from the preceding three enquiries. It requires identification of the key actors at school level,
engaging with notions of policy mediation already mentioned in
discussion of the second question (Wallace, 1998; Cann et al 2000). It
also draws on issues of culture and leadership, requiring analysis at the
micro-level and seeks to give voice to opponents of school-based
responses where relevant: seeking to capture these voices through
Ball's critical and post-structural notions of 'power networks' and
discourse (Ball, 1994).

1.4.5 To what extent does the new form of public sector pay calculation
give rise to a new politics of governance and accountability within each
case study school?
This fifth and final question is firmly rooted in the case study schools and
is intended to reveal the impact of the in-house pay reforms. Here we
are involved with the continuation and tentatively with the outcome
phases of Fullan's categorisation. As both schools have adopted
different strategies, while both recognising the necessity of reacting to
the wider context created by Government reforms, it is anticipated that
the immediate consequences may differ for each institution. To what
extent has either of the schools introduced a scheme that requires a
fundamental change of culture in management and/or staff? This
question may necessitate follow up research after a sufficient lapse of
time allows for the new pay structures to bed down. Issues of collegiality:
the extent to which it existed prior to these initiatives and what impact
the changes have brought about should play a part here, drawing on the
work of Campbell and Southworth (1992) which identified a range of
factors contributing to collegiality. These include compatible ideals,
working together, having a sense of community, getting on with one
another, acknowledging individuality and knowing what is going on. Such
a range of factors may usefully be employed as a yardstick against
which to measure the impact on the pay reform initiatives within each
case study school. Again this links with notions of culture management,
as already referred to in questions one and three (Knight & Saunders,
1999). Thus the framing of this question was partially inspired by
Wallace’s ‘Integrating Cultural and Political Theoretical Perspectives’ (2000) which is an attempt to argue for combining perspectives, allowing for an analysis combining culture and power, thus revealing the extent to which the careful use of authority can be used to foster a receptive culture prior to the introduction of a planned change such as restructuring a pay system.
CHAPTER TWO: METHODS OF ENQUIRY & RESEARCH DESIGN

2.1 METHODOLOGY

2.1 Why did I seek to answer the questions in Chapter One qualitatively?

2.1.1 My assumptions
Following Burrell & Morgan (1979) I sought to identify my assumptions prior to subsequent consideration of methods of data gathering or analysis. A sympathy with the subjectivist stance encouraged me to consider qualitative methods seeking to accommodate the relativistic nature of the social world, although I do not go as far as Kirk & Miller's (1986) idiographic questioning of external reality. I was drawn to notions of tension between agency and structure (Layder, 1994) and hence to consider critical theory. I was convinced that political and ideological elements are crucial, however, I was uncomfortable moving away from objectivity, or at least striving after it, as a legacy of my training as an historian. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the practical, seeking understanding and interpretation, fitted with the intentions of this project. However, I remained sceptical of the emancipatory claims of empowering a practitioner's voice (albeit that I was and continue to be one), particularly in the face of mandatory changes in education (Morrison, 1995).

2.1.2 Research Location - goals and constraints
In order to investigate the impact of state policy-making, it was vital to engage with the political dimension at the macro, meso and micro levels. In this study the macro level was represented by national Government and its policy relating to NPM, bodies such as GSA/ ISBA (and their regional sections) occupied the meso level while the micro level was the stratum of each individual school and its internal management structure. Most research is constrained by its origins and funding. I have already
declared that my initial interest stemmed both from my role within the independent sector (and hence a recipient of subsequent pay reforms) and also as a staff member tasked with a specific in-house research project at one of the case study schools. However, that project reached fruition and I was no longer employed by that institution. This gave me a certain latitude, subject to ethical considerations that will be examined later. This research was not funded by any political body (or by any other source) and at least to this extent can claim impartiality. Nevertheless, ownership issues of the data gathered and the dissertation itself needed to be considered (see section on ethical considerations below). There is no doubt that relationships between research in the field of education, politics and policy-making are complex because research designs, including this one, seek to address a complex social reality (Anderson & Biddle, 1991).

I think my goals are well summed up by Mouly's (1978: p12) definition of research as a ‘process of arriving at dependable solutions to problems through the planned and systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of data... For advancing knowledge, for promoting progress and for enabling man to relate more effectively to his environment, to accomplish his purposes, and to resolve his conflicts’. This serves as an expression of my aspirations. Although, as Michael Crotty (1998: p216) warns, we should not ‘feel under any compulsion to wrap our research process in the mantle of an eminent scholar in the first place’. Nevertheless, in drawing upon certain traditions and combining the perspectives offered by several such scholars one may endeavour to establish ‘paradigms to follow... using established paradigms to delineate and illustrate our own’ (1998: p216). This holds true even in what Denzin and Lincoln (1994) have described as this ‘messy’ time for social research and social researchers.

To unpick the views and reactions of a range of staff at two schools with their own distinct cultures, I needed to ask questions to triangulate with my own observations and experiences. The questions I was permitted to
ask senior management and Governors were limited. On the other hand, access to these institutions and permission to study such a sensitive topic, was facilitated by my then working relationship with the respective head teachers. Each Headmistress has had a very different experience of the developments under study from those staff on the receiving end of the two schools’ schemes. They responded differently to questions on pay reform. I could not therefore pursue a quantitative, survey-style approach to my data gathering. I made no pretence that I could, with my goals and resources, ‘exercise… physical or statistical control of variables and their vigorous measurement… to produce a body of knowledge whose validity is conclusive’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995: pp5-6).

2.1.3 Why case studies?
It was important to distinguish between precisely what is meant by a case study and other, perhaps related terms such as ethnography, fieldwork or qualitative research (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000). Equally, I sought to distance my intentions from those described by Stenhouse (1975, 1978) who argued for case studies in education as part of professional practice to develop and test curricular and pedagogic strategies. He emphasised the teacher as researcher and indeed that is what I was (and am) but not within this tradition, as my focus was very different to that of classroom action research. Nevertheless, I intended to use my situation within each institution, as an employee, to generate as much ethnographic material as possible. Certainly criticism of the unscientific nature of case studies has often pointed to their purpose of solving practical problems. However, there are differing applications of the case study approach, it ‘is not a term that is used in a clear and fixed sense’ (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000: p2) and I will attempt here to locate my own approach along this contested continuum.

Case studies are compatible with the collection of certain types of data and tend to be associated with a qualitative methodology of collection
and data analysis. This fitted with my aims and intentions as outlined above. Case studies are also often defined by purpose – ‘to capture cases in their uniqueness, rather than use them as a basis for wider generalization’ (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000: p3) but here I had another purpose as I intended some generalisability aiming to reach conclusions applicable to other cases experiencing similar phenomena and to offer some theoretical inference relevant to the policy process under consideration. At the very least I contend that case studies facilitate the ‘transfer’ of findings from one setting to another on the basis of ‘fit’ (Greenfield, 1975). Furthermore, for me, the role of theory is to ‘locate and explain what goes on within a case in terms of its wider societal context’ (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000: p6).

Robert Stake (in Gomm et al, 2000) has argued that case study method can have general relevance even though possible generalizations may not be of a conventional, scientific kind. He argues the strength of such an approach is in the offer of vicarious experience, helping to build up a body of ‘tacit knowledge on the basis of which people act’ (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000: p7). I agreed up to this point but was less comfortable when he goes on to argue that capturing unique features of a case as a bounded system through effective description is the ultimate goal of the case study researcher. It may well be one valid goal but I intended, as I have already stated, to go further than this, however tentatively. A key criterion for establishing the merit of case studies is, ‘the extent to which the details are sufficient and appropriate for a teacher [or manager] working in a similar situation to relate his decision making to that described in the case study. The relatability of a case study is more important than its generalisability’ (Bassey, 1981: p85).

2.1.4 My Privileged Position(s)

I did recognise the importance of reaching an understanding of how people operating within a context being studied viewed their world but as I have already contended, my relationship to these people, for all the
problems it may produce, facilitated this understanding. I shared their situated language and understood the nuances of their context to a degree unavailable to any but the most determined ethnographer, willing to dedicate years to sharing the experience of his or her subjects. I have gathered, over the years, impressions of staff as colleagues and have been able to gather data, not merely through a limited set of interviews, but through a variety of formal and informal conversations in settings as diverse as the lunch table, heads of department meetings and appraisal interviews. This has allowed me to gather a rich, qualitative data set, partially represented by interview transcripts and follow up interviews but also through my conglomerate experience. All of this was underpinned by the access I was able to achieve to school level documents and minutes that allowed me to investigate the dynamics of these schools in far more detail than any interview schedule alone. However, I concur with Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) that, ‘the problem of access is not resolved once one has gained entry’, which for me was relatively unproblematic, ‘since this by no means guarantees access to all the data...’. This issue is discussed in more detail below in 4, Ethical Issues.

2.1.5 Ethnography or not?
So why do I not describe my approach as an ethnographic one? Hammersley and Atkinson’s (1995: p1) intentionally broad definition of ethnographic research is, ‘participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions – in fact, collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the research’. They go on to admit, and I concur, that there is, ‘a sense in which all social researchers are participant observers; and as a result the boundaries around ethnography are necessarily unclear’ (1995: pp1-2). I acknowledged the need to treat the cultures under study, no matter how familiar to me, as ‘anthropologically strange, in order to ‘make explicit the presuppositions...[I] take... for granted as a culture member’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995: p9). However, my primary goal was not
the description of cultures (although this was important in my work) but
to reveal something of Foucault's policy ensembles as 'regimes of truth'
and the exercise of power, its complexity and diverse sources (Smart,
1986: p164). My research was bounded in terms of access, institutions,
time and money. I was in full-time employment, indeed this was key in
opening doors to me in order to conduct my research, and the
immediacy of my study is part of its justification. I was not therefore in a
position to immerse myself as a true ethnographer might. Nevertheless,
there was much in common between my approach to case study
research and the broader definitions of ethnography as suggested by
Hammersley and Atkinson and my data set is more than just a set of
interviews but an accumulation of ethnographic material.

However, I do acknowledge the ideas of Donmoyer (2000) who argues
for 'naturalistic generalization' which rejects the applicability of
quantitative research's concept of generalization in pursuit of 'law-like
regularities' (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000) as not appropriate to certain
aspects of an applied area like education. I am not arguing against the
utility of quantitative methods in researching many aspects of education
as used in Gorard on school choice (Gorard, 1997; Gorard et al, 2002).
However, I do not see the need for qualitative methods to be on the
defensive. Their applications may be different from a more positivistic
approach but their validity is not dependent upon, 'mere idiosyncratic
impressions of one or two cases that cannot provide a solid foundation
for rigorous scientific analysis' as Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: p6)
characterise criticisms of qualitative research.

2.1.6 Why the two schools chosen?
Donmoyer (2000) contests that a qualitative understanding of
generalisability confined, as by Lincoln and Guba (1989), to similar
cases is too limited. He argues that differences can be equally
illuminating. Thus, however the representative nature of my chosen
schools, as medium and small-scale institutions within the sector,
Catholic and Church of England by foundation, boarding and day (580 of ISC’s accredited schools contain boarding pupils and this makes the selection of St Bernadette's a particularly appropriate one), it must be noted that neither are boys’ schools. But if a primary purpose of this research was to provide case studies upon which other school managers may reflect, offering vicarious experience of sometimes stressful and problematic situations without the attendant difficulties, then the choice was reasonable. Both schools were accessible to me, suggesting a comparative case study approach between the selected sites (with their similarities and differences). Indeed they did also provide some common ground culturally upon which to base the comparative element of the research. In essence, using Piaget's schema theory (Piaget, 1971), Donmoyer views the nature of learning as a process of assimilation and accommodation, leading to integration and/or integration of what is known. Thus case studies can substitute for first-hand experience for the manager or policy-maker and they allow these experiences in a safe but reflective format.

I believe it was worth the additional work to undertake two case studies, rather than concentrating on the context, concerns and responses of a single institution. Although this cannot solve all the problems of generalisability inherent in case studies (Nisbet and Watt, 1984), it did enable me to catch unique features from two settings and compare them, providing insights for other similar cases and providing useful data for other schools. Each institution had taken a different approach to the challenges thrown up by this Government initiative. One had adapted the state approach; the other had followed a different path. Studying the contexts and internal forces at play through a compare and contrast methodology shed illumination on this disparity of response. There is but one state scheme, yet here were two successful schools (in terms of numbers, results and reputations) taking fundamentally different approaches. In asking what motivated each school, it was possible to highlight some of the dynamic processes involved both among managers and recipients of the emergent pay schemes.
The 2002 ISBA survey received 918 responses, a 44.32% response rate. Among respondents, 50 schools were found to have adopted the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) scheme in full, 26 had partially adopted the DfES scheme, 177 schools had adapted the DfES scheme to develop their own performance related pay (PRP) scheme. A further 77 already had extant PRP schemes, 177 institutions developed their own schemes from scratch and 183 simply paid £2,000 or a similar sum without introducing any performance requirements. My choice of case study schools allowed me to examine two of these responses: St Edward’s adapting the DfES scheme to develop its own scheme and St Bernadette’s paying £2,000 without any PRP element, although with considerable effect on the school’s pay scale. Comparing and contrasting the reasons for these responses and examining the process by which these approaches were implemented is relevant to populations of 177 schools and 183 schools respectively. However, it may be possible to draw wider conclusions from a close study of context and implementation. Equally, there may also be lessons for the management of each case study school.

2.1.7 Why semi-structured interviews?

I intended to emphasise the centrality of human interaction, the interchange of views between two people, for knowledge production (Kvale, 1996). Furthermore, interviews reflect life in being neither entirely subjective nor objective but intersubjective, allowing discussions of interpretations of the world (Laing, 1967) – a crucial approach when the focus of research is policy interpretation, cultures and agency contingent upon the perspectives held by the key actors involved at all levels and across both case study schools. Nevertheless, my conception of the interview was as a transaction with bias that needed to be recognised and controlled. This is one of three conceptions of interviews identified by Cohen et al (2000). Given the focus of my study, interviewing was with colleagues and those who were recently colleagues, where in the
case of St Edward's they had known me in a working environment for six years. I believe this helped minimise problems of trust and avoidance and, given that we shared the working environment, that meanings expressed were clear to all participants (without forgetting the need for the researcher to treat the familiar as strange). Nevertheless, I recognised my inability to control every aspect of an encounter and that was why I favoured semi-structured interviews for this task. This allowed for the capture of all relevant comment, giving sufficient flexibility to the process to accommodate differing perceptions and reactions while maintaining focus. Equally, such an approach articulated reflexively with the other formal and informal data gathering that was open to me during this research.

2.1.8 Previous Research Studies
This research was built on the 'trajectory' research (Ball and Shilling, 1994) on the assisted places scheme (Edwards, Fitz and Whitty, 1989) and on the investigation of grant-maintained schools policy, (Fitz, Halpin and Power, 1993) both of which demonstrate the importance of analysing and studying institutions in their context to provide 'systemic accounts of policy analysis' (Fitz and Lee, 1996: p3). However, the proposed research followed Fitz & Lee (1996) in drawing 'on very different theoretical frameworks, moving away from broadly linear 'implementation research' to post-structuralist accounts of production, circulation and interpretation [and mediation] of policy texts' (pp3-4), seeking to reveal the processes at work at the point of impact.

These research experiences confirm the efficacy of the semi-structured interview in policy analysis and thus it was the key research instrument in the investigation, which was largely qualitative in character. The semi-structured interview allowed for exploration of the subject's perceptions and experiences of policy and practice related issues. As an instrument it also enabled the interviewee to identify and expand on themes not
anticipated by the interviewer. These interviews were conducted by the proposer, and all interviews were audio-taped and transcribed.

2.1.9 Outline Schedule
It was my intention to interview a range of key actors in each school and also to interview a range of the recipients of the emergent schemes, the chalk face teachers themselves, the details of which follow below. Access was affected by my position in each school. Following Festinger and Katz (1966), aware that the schools in question are hierarchical structures, I sought permission from the start from each head teacher, using my working relationship with each of them to secure the maximum levels of access possible. In both cases I was able to secure the cooperation of the head teacher. Therefore I have been able to conduct interviews with each Head, a Governor involved in deliberations from each school, senior managers from both schools, middle managers from both schools and, as mentioned above, some teachers without other major responsibilities. I also gave assurances about confidentiality, protecting the names of the schools and of individual respondents.

In addition, the intention to produce a comparative piece of research, to which further studies may be added in similar format further supported the adoption of semi-structured interviews as a readily applied method and one which was likely to be accepted (as proved to be the case) by the gatekeepers of each institution.

2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

2.2.1 Interviews: number, sample composition, characteristics
I conducted a total of nineteen interviews. Ten of these were at St Edward’s and nine at St Bernadette’s. The slight disparity in numbers is insignificant, particularly given the larger number of staff at St Edward’s. In both cases I interviewed the Head, the Deputy Head and another
member of the Senior Management Team. I also interviewed a Governor from both schools. In selecting staff my intentions were twofold. First, I sought to interview a range of key actors within each school, hence my choice of interviewees already mentioned. Second, I sought to interview recipients of the emergent schemes, particularly those who would be eligible under the Government’s threshold scheme – those who had reached the equivalent of point 9 on the old state pay scales. At St Edward’s I interviewed five members of staff who were designated to have other responsibilities. Four of these were heads of department and the fifth was the examinations officer. At St Bernadette’s I interviewed three members of staff with additional responsibilities. These were two heads of department and the timetabler. Furthermore, as a staff salaries committee was set up at St Bernadette’s to have an input into deliberations, I have targeted members of this body as key interviewees. In both schools, I also identified one other teacher without other major responsibilities whose experience was relevant to my research. At St Edward’s this member of staff was eligible to apply for the threshold payment and at St Bernadette’s the teacher in question was a member of the Staff Salaries Committee.

In addition, I interviewed the Bursar at St Bernadette’s. It was not possible to interview the Bursar at St Edward’s as discussed below (see 2. 4 Ethical Issues). As Hitchcock & Hughes (1989: p198) observe, ‘If it appears that the research is going to come into conflict with aspects of school policy, management styles or individual personalities, it is better to confront the issues head on... and make rearrangements in the research design where possible’. I believe, that when cross-referenced with my detailed knowledge, informal data gathering and access to documentary evidence, that these interviews provided an adequate cross-section of activity and opinion within each institution under study (Kvale, 1996: p101).
2.2.2 Summary of Interviews

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<td>Governor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Department</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other responsibility</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.3 Format of the interview schedule

I drafted questions as ‘open ended items’ in order to ‘supply a frame of reference for respondents’ answers, but put a minimum of restraint on the answers and their expression’ (Kerlinger, 1970). This left me with the necessary flexibility to follow up interesting comments and seek clarification where necessary. The design of the schedule was reflexive. Questions that proved fertile were given increased prominence and I became aware of areas where prompts or probes were likely to be necessary. The precise nature of such follow-ups was dictated by my knowledge of and sensitivity towards each respondent (Kvale, 1996: p125). These questions were divided into four sections. Questionnaire schedules are set out in Appendix 1.

I decided to start with broad but general questions to help build a rapport with the respondents and to allow them to reveal their preconceptions without such discussion being rooted in their workplace (possibly resulting in reticence). I then moved on to school specific questions that
related to those already asked more generally. To change the intensity but also to allow the discussion of theory to permeate subsequent answers, I reserved discussion of the process in each school until the second half of the interview. I decided to leave evaluative and speculative questions to the end, arguably their natural location. Interviews averaged forty-five minutes with some a little shorter due to the style of responses and a few running close to an hour. In all cases the same framework was used as detailed below.

The first set of questions sought to establish the interviewee's view of staff culture and then introduce the notion of performance related pay and question the respondent's view of it and how it sat with existing school cultures. These were 'indirect questions' (Tuckman, 1972) in that they were not yet focused on school level developments, thus they might achieve franker and more open responses.

The second set of questions funnelled down from questions of broad principle to the specifics of the school schemes. Was the school scheme PRP (definitions were provided where necessary)? What was the perceived context within which these pay reforms were regarded as necessary? What were the motives for the introduction of the scheme? What were the pros and cons of the proposed scheme? Here it was the respondent's opinions that were sought. Some facts may be revealed but the goal was to obtain an 'unstructured response' that allowed each member of staff the opportunity to answer as fully as they chose rather than constraining the response at the risk of missing crucial data (Cohen et al, 2000). The inherent complexity of such answers had implications for data analysis and these issues are dealt with below.

The third section examined the mechanics of the process of determining the new pay structure, communicating it to staff and implementing it. Here the questions sought descriptive responses or factual answers (in so far as these can be divorced from the respondent's interpretation of events). However, the interviewee was also being asked to use her or
his knowledge to identify definitive passages in the process. Such responses inevitably involve the exercise of individual opinion. As I had been involved in the process at St Edward's, I needed to be on my guard against 'the interviewer ...[seeking] out answers that support his preconceived notions' (Borg, 1981: p87). Questions sought to identify the key actors and obtain a description of and comments on the process through which the changes were brought about. This section also sought to identify any key moments in the elaboration or acceptance of the scheme and to identify whether any concurrent developments had an impact.

The fourth and final section was evaluative and forward-looking. Did the respondents think the scheme a success? How did they see it affecting their performance and the school's future? They were also asked how the pay changes sat alongside developments in the state sector and whether, in their view, it was a good thing for the independent sector to follow public sector initiatives? The need for caution identified with reference to the third set of questions was equally relevant here.

2.2.4 Collection of other case study data (documentary, observational, conversational)

St Edward's:
As a member of staff and head of department at St Edward's, I was well situated to collect relevant documentary evidence as it was generated in-house during the period leading up to the introduction of the school's new pay arrangements. These included (in chronological order of production or release):
2. Teachers' Pay and Conditions Review Timetable.
3. Re-written job descriptions for tutors.
6. PowerPoint presentation: St Edward’s Threshold Application – outlining the assessment criteria, eligibility criteria and application process (including appeals).
7. St Edward’s Application Form to Progress to Upper Pay Scale - to be returned by Friday March 23, 2001.
8. Threshold Assessment – DfEE advice to head teachers, annotated and displayed by Head of St Edward's ‘for information' (DfEE March 2000) – pupil progress section deleted. Also including Prompts for Teachers (with 'evidence about pupil progress’ section deleted).
10. Teachers’ Pay Structure Academic Year Commencing 2001 (Draft) – an eight page document dated June 19, 2001 defining the new pay structure in detail, including arrangements for upper pay scale and all other responsibility allowances. This also included an appendix outlining (or perhaps redefining) the managerial hierarchy and ‘management lines’.
11. Comparison of Full-time and Part-time staff arrangements for Upper Pay Scale 1.
12. Staff Room Committee – outline for staff (first half-termly meeting scheduled for Tuesday November 21, 2001.

Whilst at St Edward’s I was tasked by the Head to undertake a research project into the provision of extra-curricular activities and the documents relating to my research and findings were also available to me. Furthermore, as an EdD student at Cardiff, I was involved in writing assignments that included reflection on my current school. These included a critical review of the approach to managing human resources at St Edward’s and a proposal for managing the introduction of a PRP scheme at St Edward’s. These pieces of work also informed my thinking and refinement of research questions and interview schedules.
Further information was gathered by attendance at key meetings in February and November 2000 at which I took detailed notes (these were meetings that foreshadowed documents listed above or at which said documents were first presented to the wider staff). Colleagues at St Edward’s have also taken notes at meetings since I left covering the year 2001/2002 on threshold, curriculum, pay and the role of the head of department. I was able to interpret and integrate this data into my interview schedule and utilise it to construct a more textured and detailed picture than could have emerged from interviews alone. All of this was done within the context of six years’ familiarity with the school, its culture and with co-operation of key actors.

**St Bernadette’s:**

As a member of the Senior Management Team and head of sixth form at St Bernadette’s, I have been able to gain access to a range of participants as detailed above. My post, when interviewing senior colleagues, aided the level of candour with which my questions were answered. This assisted me in moving beyond the written material, while incorporating it into my overall appreciation of the developments at St Bernadette’s. I was also assisted in refining my interview schedule and interpreting responses by virtue of my experiences and the data gathered at St Edward’s, albeit that I arrived at St Bernadette’s as the newly implemented scheme was introduced. However, I have been involved in subsequent refinements to the pay structure to take account of points above the threshold. I was also able to obtain copies of all major documents generated during the restructuring of the St Bernadette’s pay scheme in light of the establishment of a threshold in the state sector. These included:

1. Teachers’ Pay Structure at St Bernadette’s – September 2001 – a paper prepared for teaching staff following a year-long review of salaries, providing the background to the review, general details of the proposals for September 2001 and a detailed look at how the figures were calculated. It was prepared after consultation with the Staff Salaries Committee and the finance committee of the Governors. The paper is

2. PowerPoint presentation by Head to Staff Salaries Committee in early May 2001 entitled Teachers’ Pay Structure at St Bernadette’s. This document largely introduces and contextualises the material presented in the document of June 10, 2001 (which refers to this meeting between Head and Salaries Committee). It also contained a number of issues for discussion with the Staff Salaries Committee such as the inclusion of a tutor allowance and whether the new allowances should be fixed percentage or fixed sum. The issue of PRP was also on the agenda for discussion.

3. Summary of discussion between Head and Staff Committee representatives May 15, 2003 concerning the upper pay scale beyond the first threshold. I was invited as scribe and as an interested party on the Senior Management Team. This access has allowed me to form a much greater sense of the perception of the school’s pay reforms among existing staff.

4. Complete minutes (together with annotations from chair of committee and Head) of meetings of Staff Salaries Committee from October 4, 2000 to May 10, 2001.

5. The minutes are supplemented by numerous staff and committee responses in the form of letters, memos and addenda, along with information concerning the existing school pay scales and information provided by the DfEE and ATL.

2.3 RECORDING & ANALYSIS OF DATA

How was the resultant data analysed?

2.3.1 Interviews
Coffey and Atkinson (1996: p15) express their view of knowledge, in this case, the theoretical and practical insights that may be gained from
studying pay reform in independent schools, as the outcome of ‘transactions with the social world, shaped by our methods of inquiry, and of transactions with the data we produce, shaped in turn by our ideas and our analytic procedures’.

All interviews were tape-recorded with the prior permission of the interviewees. A transcript was made of each interview. Once all interviews had been recorded and transcribed, they were coded and categorised, subjected to thematic analysis resulting in reduced, diagrammatic (grid) form, in order to display themes, enable comparison and facilitate the formulation of conclusions. This was done in the context of the other written and oral material outlined above. I do not believe there is one all-powerful method of data analysis, just as I do not subscribe to the notion that there is only one mode of data collection. However, what is essential is to find ways of ‘thinking with the data’ (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996: p139). Although there are divisions between writers on data analysis who focus on data handling in a procedural manner and those who see analysis as rooted in the imagination and speculation, it is my view that both elements enter the process. As Huberman and Miles (1994) assert, ‘it is necessary to work towards a set of analytic categories that are conceptually specified’ (quoted in Coffey & Atkinson (1996: p7). The analytic process involved description, analysis and interpretation (Wolcott, 1994) but operating in a cyclical manner as ‘a reflexive activity’ in which ‘data are organized according to a system derived from the data themselves’ (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996: p10), resulting in the formation of categories. Refinements began during the process of data collection, informing subsequent collection and recording and continued as the study identified patterns. I do not wish to be accused of confusing coding with analysis, accepting that the process of interpretation needs to go beyond the simple, if time consuming organization of data.

As stated earlier, the intention of this research was to examine the process of policy implementation and examine the extent to which
externally derived policies drive the decision making process and with what effects. The targets of this study were independent schools and the intention is also to offer examples of responses that may prove instructive to practitioners of school level management. To do this, one must use the data analysed to generate ideas, as Silverman (1993: p46) observes, ‘in observational research, data collection, hypothesis-construction and theory building are not three separate things but are interwoven with one another’.

Coding is a crucial phase of qualitative textual data handling and as the research community is familiar with the NUD.IST program, I considered its use. It is widely available and widely used, and would allow for other studies to be conducted using similar handling techniques without undue difficulty. For this stage of the process, what the computer and this program can offer is not a new order of conceptualisation but savings in time and improved comprehensiveness, coping with multi-layered or overlapping codes. However, the relatively limited data set of around twenty interviews and the benefits of familiarity to be gained from a ‘low tech’ approach outweighed the advantages in this case. In handling the data generated through semi-structured interviews, the opportunity was provided to begin moving towards concepts. However, it was then vital to reflexively check such generated concepts against the data, allowing for modification or even refutation.

2.3.2 Conversation/Observation/Participation
This was perhaps the most contentious aspect of the research design. I did not set out to accumulate a set of field notes. Rather, I have lived through the demand for and development of a new pay structure at St Edward’s and St Bernadette’s as a participant observer. I was actually employed; I was actively interested as an eligible recipient of any changes to the pay scale. I made notes at key meetings and wrote essays on aspects of the process for my EdD, even carrying out a trial questionnaire on the management of human resources. It is this
additional body of information, that manifested itself in instalments, that I intended to draw upon in order to fully contextualise my findings, having already made substantial use of this data, as it emerged, to frame my research, refine my interview questions and interpret the responses.

2.3.3 Documents
I intended to analyse the documentary evidence I have collected, as specified above, using the same methodology as that proposed for the analysis of my semi-structured interviews. In the majority of cases, I have interviewed the authors of these documents and in many cases, been in audiences when their contents were presented. In several instances, I could draw on the responses of the author and others who contributed or influenced a document or scheme, while also having the text of the document and my own recollections or notes on its content and impact. This facilitated the generation of a sustained and nuanced interpretation of the data and its significance.

2.4 ETHICAL ISSUES

How have I handled the Ethical Issues?

2.4.1 Access
As mentioned above access was affected by my position/former position in each school. Thanks to my working relationship with each head teacher, I was able to secure the maximum levels of access possible to these protected spaces. However, in both cases this was bounded by caveats. I had no choice but to agree to the terms specified or my research would have been unable to proceed, except on a clandestine basis, which I was not prepared to consider on obvious ethical grounds. At St Edward's I agreed to leave the Bursar out of my list of interviewees. The context for this request was an incident during the
introduction of the new pay arrangements at St Edward's during which the Bursar had provided the Head with inaccurate information which she presented to the assembled staff, only to have her facts questioned and proven incorrect by members of the audience. Subsequently, this proved a turning point in the reform process. The Head was keen that these events should not be revisited with the Bursar. Although this request placed constraints on my plans, I did not see the omission as insurmountable as I was able to discuss the event in question with the Head, a Governor and all the teaching staff I interviewed.

At St Bernadette's, I was asked to avoid interviewing a particular, long established, vociferous and potentially negative individual within the staff body. The Head felt that there was a danger that asking his opinions might re-ignite debate and perhaps initiate dissatisfaction that had not been voiced at the time of the pay changes. She felt that the process had been a smooth one and did not want to undermine that success retrospectively. As a member of her Senior Management Team, I understood her motivation (as I had concerning the Bursar at St Edward's) and agreed. Once again, I did not feel this to be a fatal exclusion as I had been given access to all the minutes of the Staff Salaries Committee upon which the said individual had sat.

2.4.2 Conduct of Interviews - Advance warning; Anonymity;
Verification
What were the ethical issues involved in a piece of research of this kind? Social research of any kind, and educational research is no exception, involves moral issues in its conduct from initiating the process to publication of findings. In order to carry out a qualitative study of two case study schools I have had to negotiate access and this was the first of several processes that raised ethical considerations. A similar process was involved in approaching each of the subjects whom I wished to interview. To standardise my approach and to ensure that all those participating were clear about my intentions, I drafted an ethical
statement adapted from Reynolds (1979), which I ran through at the start of every interview. Throughout these steps, I was guided by the advice offered by Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) in their chapter entitled ‘The ethics of educational and social research’. I have endeavoured to maintain a balanced ‘costs/benefits ratio’ in all decision making (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992). For example, some issues to be covered with the Head of St Edward’s were likely to reveal shortfalls in management and the effects of such a revelation had to be balanced against her willingness to support my research agenda (as indeed she has supported all work towards my EdD over several years) and the positive benefits to St Edward’s and the independent sector in general that might accrue from this study. This also resulted in the Bursar being removed from my list of interviewees as mentioned above. At St Bernadette’s, the Head was reluctant for me to interview the most unionised member of staff who also sat on the Staff Salaries Committee. As indicated above, she was keen to deny him a platform to undermine the pay settlement. In my capacity as a senior manager of the school, I reluctantly agreed. It is also the case that franker exchanges occurred with senior management interviewees at St Bernadette’s, an inevitable concomitant of my working relationship with them.

Equally, discussion of individuals’ pay was outside the existing culture at St Edward’s, a fact I was aware of having taught there for six years. Thus, every interview with a member of staff, each of whom was chosen because they were eligible to apply to cross the threshold within the St Edward’s scheme, was a source of potential embarrassment for those involved. A similar situation pertained at St Bernadette’s, although the pay scheme adopted made discussion less awkward. Again, I dealt with these concerns by being clear prior to each interview as to my intentions. I outlined my purpose of writing an EdD dissertation on the introduction of new pay arrangements in independent schools and explained my approach as largely based on semi-structured interviews and the analysis of written materials. I also forewarned them of my methodology
of tape-recording and transcribing the interviews and offered them the opportunity to verify (and clarify) these transcripts – an offer taken up by the Head at St Edward's and St Bernadette's. I set out what benefits I hoped might result from the research.

Furthermore, I reassured potential participants that their anonymity would be preserved in that their school would not be named and they would be referred to only in terms of their post and experience. Equally, I assured each of them that, as their Heads might read my final report, I would not incorporate any potentially controversial references without consulting with the interviewee concerned. As Kimmel (1988) observes, there is an expectation among most respondents that confidentiality will be maintained. This was doubly necessary from a personal point of view as the subjects were my colleagues and in many cases my friends of several years' standing.

I have paid attention to the work of Hopkins (1985: p221) on Action Research, as much of my experience researching within my own institutions was likely to be common with those pursuing this type of project. As he puts it, the researcher’s 'actions are deeply embedded in an existing social organization and the failure to work within the general procedures of that organization may not only jeopardize the process of involvement but existing valuable work.' Many valuable issues were raised on this matter by Kemmis and McTaggart (1981) covering a range from protocols, involvement, negotiation, reporting progress, explicit authorizations, negotiating accounts, using quotations, release of reports, confidentiality and ensuring procedural principles are binding and known. It can be seen that a great deal that has been set out above has been influenced by these considerations.
2.5 CONCLUSION

To summarise, I chose to conduct a series of semi-structured interviews to sit alongside accumulated documents and personal experiences. I have endeavoured to be transparent in my methods and have outlined the choices I had to make. I have also outlined how the methods fit my research questions. My intention was to construct a qualitative case study drawing upon my privileged access. Furthermore, I decided to make the research comparative in nature. I was able to do this from the inside as I was employed by two independent girls' schools: St Edward's and St Bernadette's. These two schools, one a day school and the other more than 95% boarding, were similar in academic record and their standing within the sector but different both in terms of religious foundation and size. Thus, a comparative case study was able to reveal a more textured insight into the sector, while providing a template against which further studies might be conducted. The subject of my study was the reaction of independent sector schools to the public sector pay reform that introduced an element of PRP in the shape of threshold payments. I was able to interview a cross-section of senior managers at each school, along with a number of would-be recipients of any scheme that each school might introduce. In total I carried out nineteen interviews, respecting any limits placed on me by each Head. However I was able to maximise access through my long-standing working relationship at St Edward's and my extant senior role at St Bernadette's. I sought to conduct interviews and analyse documents in a consistent manner to maximise the efficacy of the comparison and any conclusions drawn. An outline of which incumbents were interviewed is provided above.

My interview schedule sought to develop a comfortable atmosphere for discussion of a sensitive issue such as pay and then moved on to establish the interviewee's view of existing staff culture, their views of PRP and how the initiatives introduced in their school articulated with developments in the state sector. Finally I asked respondents to
speculate on the likely success and implications of their school’s approach. All interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed and coded by hand, as a reflexive exercise. I followed a consistent code of practice in all interviews, providing advance warning, guaranteeing anonymity and the opportunity to verify transcripts. The nature of the documents available from each school differed but in both cases they included the germane reflections and developments that resulted in each school’s initiative. In both cases my ability to analyse, code and interpret the documents was helped by my familiarity with each school’s culture and the continuing access I had to staff for further clarification and updates. I have also used a range of conversations and observations to which I was party while working in each institution in order to contextualise and clarify other data.
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW I

3.1 INTRODUCTION

3.1.1 Definition, delineation and direction
The purpose of this chapter is to critically review theoretical and policy literature on Performance Related Pay (PRP) with a specific focus on its application to the educational sector in general and secondary schools in particular. Available, albeit limited, empirical research evidence on the impact of pay reforms on relevant aspects of policy and practice in secondary schools will also be evaluated. In order to establish the appropriate boundaries for this review, it is necessary to explore the meaning of the term PRP and related reform initiatives. PRP’s origins are rooted in private sector Human Resource Management (HRM) or its more pejorative twin appellation ‘Managerialism’ and state sector New Public Management (NPM). Managerialism has been defined as an ‘ideology based on the belief that all aspects of organisational life can and should be managed according to rational structures, procedures and modes of accountability’ (Wallace, 1999: EdD handout: p1).

In writing about these phenomena, each author’s definition reveals his or her purpose: it is implicit in the chosen vocabulary. Wallace sides with the suspicious critics who talk disapprovingly of ‘Managerialism’, defined by Cuthbert (1992, p153) as a ‘mistaken approach to managing’. For others New Public Management’s rationale is economic, ‘management is a discrete organisational function which is crucial to planning, implementing and measuring necessary productivity improvements’ (Pollit, 1993, p2-3). Such reform would allow the establishment of ‘public entrepreneurship’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). These alternative perspectives can be traced back to ‘alternative bases for interpreting social reality’. Critics of ‘Managerialist’ tendencies see such intervention as doomed to failure as ‘given diverse human ends, there is always conflict among people’. Whereas those who are more positively inclined towards NPM believe ‘organisations get out of kilter with social values
and individual needs', resolution lies in changing, 'the structure of the organisation to meet' these values and needs (Greenfield, 1975).

I was keen to review the relevant literature emerging from this contested field without pre-conceptions but must engage with the existing vocabulary. It was therefore necessary to attempt as value-free a definition as possible of such a loaded term, whilst retaining focus on the education sector. This necessitated steering a course between the hidden agenda of 'Managerialism' and the cure-all properties of NPM. There is much disagreement as to how far such policies have actually been implemented and the extent of their impact (perhaps calling into doubt my location of state pay reforms within this field). For Ball (1994, p10) 'the market form offers a powerful response… which allows the state to retain considerable 'steerage' over the goals and processes of the education system (while not appearing to do so)'. However, researching into the choices of over 1200 parents and children in a localised area of Wales (including independent schools), Gorard (1998) concluded, ‘… in reality nothing much actually changed…’. One problem is that the concept itself is far from neutral. The following is proposed: the application of private sector management principles to the public sector in order to provide cost effective, high quality education. Inevitably, even this definition represents the author taking a position but it does, at least, seek to avoid the use of charged vocabulary and assumptions of worth.

3.1.2 The immediate theoretical field

Within this broad ambit, it is the area of pay initiatives that provides the immediate theoretical field of interest influencing the formulation of Government policy. In turn, this national policy framework provides the context for the formulation of independent sector and school level policy. It will thus be necessary to identify and assess theoretical literature, plotting the migration of PRP and related notions from private industry to the ambit of public policy. At this point consideration will need to be
given to the influence of ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 1998, 2000) and New Labour thinking.

In assessing the public policy literature, the main purpose is to understand how such notions came to be applied to the education sector. Ball’s (1994) notions of text and discourse are used to guide analysis, along with a model for understanding policy mediation which was designed in collaboration with colleagues during an EdD module at Cardiff University (Cann et al, 2000) drawing upon Wallace’s theory of counter-policy (1998). This facilitates an examination of literature relating to the mediation of public policy, with a particular eye to the influence exerted by state generated policy over the independent sector and its institutions. More specifically this requires a study of the responses of the independent secondary education sector to state pay initiatives. The mode of inquiry for this research is that of the comparative case study and will therefore lead into a close scrutiny of the documentation generated in the two case study schools.

Seeking to review critically the impact of a public sector development on the private sector may appear a fruitless task. However, there are strong reasons why such a study may prove instructive. The adoption of NPM was sector specific and so education is a separate case and worthy of examination in its own right. Furthermore, as a practitioner in the independent sector, it is this researcher’s observation that significant elements of an NPM style approach are in operation, at least in some institutions, not least where related to pay. If institutions in a fully competitive market are borrowing from or emulating trends in the public sector, this may suggest much about the utility of these developments unless an alternative explanation can be provided (such as the provenance of such ideas stretching back to the private industrial sector). Finally, if an emphasis on market forces and rational planning lies at the heart of NPM, then the management of independent secondary schools within their very real, competitive marketplace ought to be considered. Indeed, such schools might be regarded as the natural
home within the education sector for such a strategy. Will this prove to be the case in the chosen two schools?

3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW: Theory, policy and evidence

3.2.1 Contrasts in Theory

**Human Resource Management (HRM)**

HRM is 'a philosophy of people management based on the belief that human resources are uniquely important to sustained business success. An organization gains competitive advantage by using its people effectively... HRM is aimed at recruiting capable, flexible and committed people, managing and **rewarding their performance** and developing key competencies' (my italics) (Price, 1997: p1). This is a business management theory, expressed in a work called 'HRM in a business context', published by a business press. It was written with no expectation that its content might, one day, be applied to the provision of secondary education. The term HRM (Human Resource Management) was first used in the US over fifty years ago but has only been used to identify a new approach to personnel management since the 1980's. It is portrayed as a strategic approach, although much debate continues over its 'distinctiveness and definition' (Price, 1997: p1) despite its adoption (and adaptation) in a wide range of countries including Great Britain. To legitimate HRM, Price traces its roots, referring to it as 'a synthesis of themes and concepts drawn from over a century of management theory and social science research.' (Price, 1997: p2)

3.2.2 Development of HRM and divergent strains

Price acknowledges a variety of strains of HRM but argues it is happening and goes on to combine them 'into ten major principles of HRM to provide a further integrative framework for the subject'. (Price, 1997: p25) His book draws upon an impressive range of critical,
practical, scientific and business references. He traces a wide range of influences and impacts including Taylorism and Fordism, Maslow's hierarchy of needs (1954), Drucker (1955) and then McGregor's (1960) work on management by objectives and leadership, along with the excellence movement inspired by Peters and Waterman (1982). He suggests that all of these developments have helped frame the context in which HRM emerged, broadly under the influence of scientific management, human relations, strategic management and Japanese management developments. These forces produced the twins of HRM: Harvard Business School's soft version and the harder, deterministic vision of Michigan Business School. As Goss (1994) argues, much of the change towards HRM and doubtless future ideas has been generated by the nature of international competition, most particularly the notion of globalisation. It is not clear whether similar forces impact the educational sector, although New Labour's focus on education is set against a backdrop of a need for internationally competitive workers in a global knowledge economy (see below).

It is often managers rather than personnel specialists who have embraced HRM (Storey, 1995). Generally, independent school curriculum and pastoral managers have to double as those responsible for personnel (with the assistance of the Bursar), although St Edward's has recently appointed a part-time personnel manager. Price concludes that the variety of interpretations to which HRM is open may be its strength, allowing it to be applied in a variety of cultural contexts and in an equally wide range of sectors, public as well as private. The tenth and final principle extracted by Price from the uncertain body of HRM is 'cost-effectiveness' the purpose of which is 'competitive, fair reward and promotion systems'. This and all the other principles must operate through an holistic approach.
3.2.3 Practical Pay guides of North American origin

Much of the literature that forms this broad context originated in North America. For example Lawler (1990) 'Strategic Pay – Aligning Organizational Strategies and Pay Systems' is one such key work. This work is intended as a handbook for use by US corporations and offers no challenge to the assumptions of HRM. Its intended use is 'for helping organizations choose the right pay practices for their respective situations'. The approach eschews 'large amounts of jargon..[and] extensive reports of research studies'. Nevertheless, two previous works by Lawler were research-based and his third book was deliberately designed to build on his research to provide 'a framework to help organizations choose the right pay practices'. A similar approach is echoed in Schuster and Zingheim's 'The New Pay – Linking Employee and Organizational Performance (1992). The target audience is fourfold, 'busy executives..., senior human resource... practitioners..., less experienced practitioners' and 'academics who are searching for new factors that contribute to organizational success'. Their view seeks to link individual performance and skills to pay rather than job evaluation as the basis for pay (these notions are at the heart of performance management and specifically the strategy of PRP). The place for research is within the organization through questionnaires and climate surveys to gauge whether the time is right for new pay. The structure is that of a step-by-step outline to be followed by practitioners, supported by brief references to a fairly narrow range of primary and secondary sources. Again, the envisaged target is not educational institutions, state-funded or otherwise.

There are other examples of works seeking to assist firms in redesigning their pay systems and to include a performance element in the new structure: Ledford (1989); Schonberger (1990); Patten (1988); Berger (1999); Chingos (2002); Belcher (1996); Henderson (1976) and Jorgensen (1996) are a representative but tiny sample. The authors and contributors range from academics to management consultants. Titles include phrases like 'handbook', 'how to design' and 'a practical guide'.
Berger’s handbook describes itself as the ‘reference of choice for practitioners’ while Jorgensen’s work ‘includes tear out self-help forms’. Henderson’s ‘Compensation Management – Rewarding Performance’ has been constantly in print since 1976 and it too seeks to provide guidance on the construction and maintenance of a merit pay system. In discussing ‘merit pay and performance appraisal’ differing goals are identified requiring different approaches. For example, ‘If they are only to be used as a bureaucratic façade that permits managers to make whatever decisions they wish, then the generic performance appraisal instrument will do’. The language is clearly that which critics identify as managerialist; there is no suggestion that such an approach is flawed per se.

3.2.4 The field in the UK – from critical works to handbooks

However, the field has also been explored in the UK for decades, with works such as ‘Incentive Payment Systems – A Review of Research and Opinion’ (Marriott, 1961) appearing in the early 1960’s and assessing the field from experimental studies in the mid 1930’s to the then present day. The difference between this and the selection of US works mentioned above is their purpose and audience. The former US studies assert the efficacy of HRM approaches to management while the latter, albeit a much older study, is a critical text. However it would be wrong to assume that UK studies are all in a similar vein. Armstrong and Murlis produced their ‘Reward Management – A Handbook of Remuneration Strategy and Practice’ in 1988 and it has subsequently been reprinted on several occasions in association with the Institute of Personnel and Development (Armstrong & Murlis, 1988; 1991). The key word in the title is ‘handbook’, once again identifying the purpose and audience without ambiguity. The authors assert that an attempt is made to avoid ‘peddling panaceas’ and the theories outlined are ‘based on practical research, experimentation and analysis of experience’.

Certainly, these texts take an holistic view of rewarding work and issues of performance but all have as major elements the consideration of PRP
and associated initiatives, although it should be acknowledged that they do not accept the notion uncritically. Armstrong and Murlis observe, 'it has become generally recognised that PRP cannot be relied upon as a single lever' for increasing motivation and performance. Nevertheless, the goal remains the introduction of a practical pay system that takes account of recent thinking in the field. British works, no more than their North American counterparts, tend to be confined to (and target) companies in a competitive, commercial environment.

This very brief overview already highlights the need to distinguish between US and UK works (at least in their applicability to this study) and more significantly between handbooks and critical studies. Furthermore there are studies by accountancy firms and similar commercial enterprises (Robson Rhodes (1988), Income Data Services and Coopers & Lybrand (1989), Spicer & Oppenheim (1988), industrial foundations and institutes (British Institute of Management (Lloyd, 1976), The Institute of Work Study Practitioners (Gould, 1974), Employment Relations Associates Ltd (Harrington, 1998)). Some of these works assess the impact of particular pieces of legislation such as The Finance (No 2) Act 1997, which introduced tax relief in the U.K for approved PRP schemes (Robson Rhodes, 1988; Spicer & Oppenheim, 1988). Others tend to be reviews, often comparative of extant practice at a particular time and seek to provide information for client companies seeking to manage staff in a wide range of contexts. It is not within the scope of this review to consider the whole field of HRM writing and its critiques. It is intended to confine it to an assessment of the existing literature dealing with PRP and its derivatives. Having outlined the general state of this field in brief (and selectively), it is necessary to look at applications in the educational sector with particular reference to UK practice. At this point it will be necessary to include an analysis of the relevant policy literature.
3.2.5 A narrower view – Reward Management

If we move back up the telescope, reducing the breadth of field, we leave the wide-open vistas of HRM and arrive at the closer focus of reward management. This area was initially explored by writers on HRM providing practical guides rather more than critiques. 'Various texts available... have been largely descriptive and prescriptive in their nature'. (White & Drucker, 2000: jacket notes). These researchers were the first to ‘adopt a critical and theoretical perspective’. In 2000 when they edited 'Reward Management – a Critical Text' they held respectively, the posts of Reader in Reward Management at the University of Greenwich Business School and Professor of Human Resource Management and Director of Research at the same institution. They locate their work as bridging ‘the strong dichotomy between the ‘macro-economic’ literature of the labour economists and the human resource literature’ (White & Drucker, 2000: p1) by emphasising the holistic approach to pay and benefits that in the UK can be traced back to the coining of the term ‘reward management' by Armstrong and Murlis, itself closely related to Lawler’s formulation of ‘New Pay’ in the USA (1986).

In their introduction White and Drucker assert that ‘Pay structures and systems of pay determination are socially determined and are influenced by the context and culture in which they are implemented’. Key features that often still play an important role in UK organisations have often been neglected by ‘the existing reward management textbooks [which are] largely practitioner oriented’ (White & Drucker, 2000: p2). Furthermore, they observe that ‘the most convincing support for the influence of ‘New Pay’ ideas rests in the growing use of flexible pay – particularly the more widespread use of performance-related pay for professional, administrative and managerial workers’. This text provides a concise but thorough review of extant thinking in the field of reward management up to its publication in 2000, with particular focus on the period presaged by the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and the start of ‘a gradual erosion of existing labour market institutions' (2000: p7). I will not
therefore rehearse in inevitably inferior terms, given the limitations of length, their critical review here. Whilst agreeing with their statements above a sharper focus is needed for this study.

3.2.6 The shift from market place to public sector: UK & US
Perhaps the critical contextual point of focus is the transfer of initiatives formulated in the market place to the public sector, initially in the United States, in what Osborne and Gaebler described as an ‘American Perestroika’ (1992). The sub-title of their 1992 book is ‘How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector’. They identify a transformation occurring through the application of ‘a new model of government’. Through the influence of Anthony Giddens among others, many developments in the US have shaped the evolution of New Labour. ‘The advent of new global markets, and the knowledge economy… have affected the capability of national governments to manage economic life and provide an ever-expanding range of social benefits. We need to introduce a different framework, one that avoids both the bureaucratic top-down government favoured by the old left and the aspiration of the right to dismantle government altogether’ (2000: p2). This is the much vaunted ‘Third Way’ which either represented a real shift for Labour in the UK or saw them, in educational terms, continue the discourse established under the Conservatives with the Education Reform Act, 1988.

In the US, theoretical considerations of the use of PRP in education have tended to identify the same pitfalls as critics but argued that careful design of incentive schemes can lead to school improvement (Hannaway, 1996; Hanushek and Jorgenson, 1996). There have been experiments with PRP in education but as Jacobson concludes, ‘examining PRP in practice revealed that it has been more a subject of debate than a reality in the USA’ (1989: pp50-51). As Jacobson rightly points out, ‘the central premise of PRP – that pecuniary rewards can effectively motivate teachers to improve their performance – is based
upon the assumption that teachers are primarily motivated by money'. Jacobson is a critic of such thinking pointing to evidence from ‘the theoretical underpinnings of teacher motivation’ while also contesting the applicability of PRP, as ‘teaching does not satisfy the production conditions under which this type of piece-rate compensation works most effectively’ (Jacobson, 1989: pp50-51). One can question these assertions, particularly in the secondary sector in the UK where almost yearly national tests or examinations provide plenty of scope for a production-oriented analysis of performance. However, Jacobson’s concern that such an approach may distort teacher performance, encouraging ‘opportunistic behaviour’ warrants careful consideration.

A number of US schemes introduced during the 1980s have been criticised for a focus on individual teacher performance that fosters competition between practitioners and endangers an holistic recognition that pupil attainment in any one class is dependent upon their experience in all their learning experiences (Clofelter & Ladd, 1996: p23-64; Moore Johnson, 1984). It is argued that problems with individually based schemes led, in the 1990s, to group schemes based on school-level performance. Critics’ concerns identify the multiple features of education and the problematic nature of measurement of its outputs (Dixit, 2000). They also posit a distorting effect likely to be generated by targeting pupil attainment, leading to over-emphasis on test scores or even cheating (Hannaway, 1996; Kovetz, 1996; Ladd, 1999). Integration with a wider performance management structure and perception that financial incentives are perceived as fair and that the goals are viewed as legitimate by teachers are other caveats (Storey, 2000; Hanushek, 1994)

Jacobson’s survey of practice in the US identified no pure PRP systems and only a few ‘supplemental merit plans’ which accord more closely with the PRP initiative introduced into the UK by Labour. He identifies the difficulty in measuring performance as the key factor in the demise of most schemes. He speculates on the likely future for schemes in the US,
while admitting that advocates of such an approach are probably right that taxpayers 'would be more willing to support higher teacher salaries if salary increases were somehow pegged to improved teacher performance' (1989: p50). He therefore expects such schemes to continue in attracting interest. With an increasing emphasis on school choice, he posits a future where 'schools with high-quality faculties will be magnets' and hence competition will stimulate both teacher and school interest in PRP.

Indeed, there are consultants based in the US, providing advisory services on performance pay to a wide clientele across several continents. John Littleford of Littleford & Associates observes that his firm have, 'assisted over 500 independent schools world wide with analysing their current salary structures'. In his article on how performance pay can work in independent schools, he cites the necessary factors as, 'if the culture is ready for it, if it is developed for the right reasons… and in combination with (and following) effective credible evaluation' (2003: p4). Nevertheless, although his organisation has interviewed over 10,000 teachers in a decade of research, as a proponent of such schemes and without greater insights into the research process, it is necessary to remain sceptical. Equally, his observations on standard pay schemes rewarding qualification or longevity do chime with experience in the UK. He also identifies schools that have sought to reward provision of extra-curricular activities. This approach has a role in the scheme devised at St Edward’s and will be examined in more detail below (Chapter Five).

3.2.7 The UK state sector
In the UK, a study into the links between motivation and performance related pay in the Inland Revenue concluded, 'The positive motivational effects... were at most very modest... worse, there is clear evidence of some demotivation' (Marsden & Richardson, 1994: p253). Such conclusions are supported by wider studies in the public services
Richardson, in a report commissioned by the NUT, examined studies into the introduction of PRP in local government (Heery, 1996) and the NHS (Dowling & Richardson, 1997), discovered that, although many respondents had experienced an impact on their work behaviour, less than 30% believed this had led to increased motivation and only 12% confirmed that they worked harder as a consequence. In a supplementary paper of the Teachers Incentive Pay Project, Chamberlin et al observe, 'it should be remembered that the admission that one works harder for extra money is not easy to make as it involves admitting that one could have worked harder previously but chose not to' (Chamberlin et al, 2001, p3).

The contribution of PRP to recruitment is contested. In the US Jacobson (1995), studying the New York area was able to conclude that differential starting salaries did lead to differentiation in quality of newly qualified applicants. However, this does not grapple with the specific contribution of PRP schemes. Richardson (1999) reaches a similar conclusion in examining recruitment of newly-qualified teachers (NQTs) in the UK. Rather than PRP, 'It is probably starting salaries that have a disproportionate influence on young teachers’ career choices' (p28). Such a view would be supported by evidence from GSA and HMC from 2001 that additional incentives such as health insurance and the provision of housing have assisted recruitment in a difficult labour market for schools.

Moving on, this begs the question whether there is a significant retention effect provided by PRP? In the US, Murnane et al (1991) studying schemes in Michigan and South Carolina designed to both attract people into teaching and reduce staff turnover, found that teachers receiving $2,000 per annum more than the state average were twice as likely to remain in teaching after a year than those receiving a similar sum less than the state average. This is consistent with Jacobson's (1988) findings that teachers in mid-career given attractive salaries were least likely to move on. Richardson, considering the possible implications of
PRP on retention in the UK, felt that decrease in turnover among recipients of PRP would be offset by increased turnover among those teachers not receiving such payments. However, given the extremely high levels of successful applications, this concern appears broadly unfounded.

3.2.8 PRP’s effects on teacher effort and behaviour

US:
Empirical studies in the US have generally focused on school-level group schemes. Qualitative studies have addressed teachers’ attitudes to financial incentives and most concluded teachers find such rewards appropriate but of limited impact on motivation. Across the studies, there is a range of weight given by respondents to financial (i.e. ‘extrinsic’) rewards compared to esteem, satisfaction and other ‘intrinsic’ rewards (Croxson & Atkinson, 2001: p3). In 1999 Kelley found only 20% of teachers regarded a salary bonus as a primary motivating factor for altering teaching practice. The remaining 80% believed they were motivated by intrinsic rewards such as assisting pupil success and public recognition. Nevertheless, this study also found that teachers found bonuses desirable rather than see them go to a school improvement fund. Heneman's contemporaneous study (1999) found a similar regard for the appropriateness of bonus payments but again conviction that their main motivation was helping pupil learning. Both Kelley and Heneman conclude that financial rewards affect behaviour but indirectly, as teachers seek the public recognition associated with an award rather than the financial dimension itself.

Qualitative studies by Ladd (1999) and Clofelter and Ladd (1996) revealed that a school-level bonus scheme had a positive but limited impact on pupil attainment. A similar study by Cooper and Cohn (1997) proved inconclusive. Elmore et al (1996) interviewed teachers after the introduction of a scheme who felt it had resulted in an improvement in pupil writing. Kelley (1998) identified that successful schools changed
their organisation, affecting teacher behaviour, to increase the likelihood of receiving school-level bonuses. A range of undesirable effects resulting from the introduction of incentive schemes have been noted including increased stress, conflict between teachers, cheating on exams, ‘teaching to the test’ and a focus on specific pupils to improve results (Clees and Nabors, 1992; Clofelter and Ladd, 1996; Kelley and Protisk, 1997; Kelley, 1998; Kovetz, 1996). Murnane and Cohen (1986) found that successful schemes were not designed to effect teaching quality but were aimed at other goals such as increasing teacher incomes, supporting teachers, encouraging dialogue on issues relating to quality and encouraging support from the community for increased funding. They also found that some heads used performance related pay schemes to award higher levels than warranted by current performance.

**UK:**
The Teachers Incentive Pay Project (Wragg et al, 2001), while acknowledging ‘some evidence that performance-related pay motivates employees to work harder or more productively, attracts suitable recruits and helps retain high quality staff, there is also evidence of disadvantages and failures’. They list neglect of unrewarded tasks, disagreement about goals, lack of openness, cost, demotivation for the unrewarded and competition instead of cooperation (pp6-10). However, there are also suggestions from the US that in the future, prospective teachers may have different expectations from their predecessors and regard a pay system designed to reward performance more positively (Johnson, 2000). Odden (2000, p362) agrees that, ‘because merit pay is at odds with the team-based, collegial character of well functioning schools’ there have been problems implementing successful schemes. However, despite this, he feels that it is now appropriate to restructure the way teachers are paid to emphasise areas that genuinely motivate teachers, such as acquisition of new skills and being facilitated to be successful in assisting pupils’ learning (Odden, 2000). In order for PRP to work, he has argued (Odden & Kelley, 1997) schemes need to involve all key parties, have adequate funding, sufficient training, an absence of
quotas and persistence. Odden (2000) also cites Danielson’s (1996) criteria developed for use with teachers in mid-career, dealing with four elements of a teacher’s role: planning and preparation, classroom environment, instruction and professional responsibilities. These criteria sit comfortably with the Threshold Assessment criteria in England. As Chamberlin et al (2001, p14) observe, ‘This similarity is not simply coincidental’. Odden has been consulted by the DfEE. Thus, research and experience from the US is influencing the development of policy literature in the UK.

3.2.9 Key research informing the Government scheme
In December 1998, a Government Green Paper ‘Teachers – meeting the challenge of change’ created a new pay system to apply to England and, with modifications, to Wales. The legislation identified eight threshold standards covering five key areas against which current teachers with nine salary points (excluding responsibility allowances) will be assessed. These proposals are widely regarded as introducing a form of PRP, although the rhetoric employed in the White Paper never directly refers to the proposals as such. The policy document also tackled a wide range of other issues such as leadership and training under the umbrella of seeking to establish ‘a world-class education system where every school is excellent or improving or both’ (DfEE, 1998: p6). This document in general and the pay assessment changes in particular build on ‘Excellence in Schools’ (DfEE, 1997), the first White Paper published by New Labour just 67 days after their landslide election victory.

One key influence on the development and refinement of these ideas were the research findings and subsequent reports by Hay Group typified by ‘Raising Achievement in Our Schools: Model of Effective Teaching’ (2000: pp1-6). This research looked at teacher motivation with a particular focus on teacher effectiveness based on in depth interviews, observation, panel discussions and questionnaires involving over 1,000 teachers. Individual interviews were also conducted with representatives
of educational bodies and other stakeholders in order to ‘identify the characteristics that drive performance’ (2000). This research led to recommendations being accepted by the DfEE and the tone of the draft report suggests a close relationship between researchers and those who commissioned the work. This is typified by the assertion that, ‘there are clear links between the characteristics for effective teaching and the teaching skills proposed in the DfEE’s draft Threshold Standards’. The dominant vocabulary in the report is managerial, including ‘drive for improvement’, ‘flexibility’ and ‘accountability’. An extensive outline of the research methodology is presented but much of the emphasis is on the ‘practicality of the outcomes’ as ‘easy to use and versatile’. The claim is that the ‘framework’ offered for measuring and managing performance can accommodate the variety of ways in which exceptional practitioners achieve their excellence whereas a ‘one-size-fits-all’ system could fail by failing to anticipate all possible situations.

The research design certainly seeks to establish a substantial and representative sample using a total of thirteen variables. The coding and reading of interview transcripts is reported in a transparent manner and adds credibility to the report. However, the nature of the organisation undertaking the research needs to be considered. The Hay Group’s website describes their core businesses as including ‘consulting, change management, compensation strategy and practice, employee benefits, incentive design and performance management’ (2002). Thus, in a sense the group’s raison d’être presupposes the desirability of PRP. Under the title ‘What variable pay approaches work best’ their website states, ‘Variable pay is tricky to get right, but the best companies do so... It works well’ (p1). This seems to suggest that if a business wants to be the best it needs this kind of system and as it is ‘tricky’, buying in the group’s expertise is a good investment. In fairness, the group’s research was focused on identifying the most effective performance indicators and considering how far the threshold standards in the Government’s scheme reflected characteristics for effective teaching. The Hay Group
research did not bring about the scheme but was a test of its efficacy, using educational researchers to collect the data.

3.3 CONCLUSION

Having identified the influence of US trends and research on the formulation of a scheme for the state education sector in the UK, it is necessary to look more closely at the environment within which the pay policy was developed, the responses it stimulated from teacher unions and other representative organisations and the impact of the policy at school level. In the case of this study, this requires a consideration of the articulation between state and independent sectors and the consideration of the responses of the two chosen case-study schools. These themes are developed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR: LITERATURE REVIEW II

4.1 STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTER

As indicated above (Chapter Two), identifying and utilising levels at which policy is generated, may be adapted and implemented to assist in identifying the political dimension operating at each level. It is thus an appropriate tool for examining the literature generated by those involved with the policy. At the macro level state policy is formulated and translated into legislation within the context of the dominant ideology. In this instance, the policy is New Labour’s decision to introduce PRP in the guise of Threshold Pay. This is an example of New Public Management ‘promising a fusion of best practice in the private and public sectors... Its essential components include: more active and accountable management; explicit standards, targets and measures for performance’ (Flynn, 2002: p28). The next level is the meso level occupied by teacher unions, university research departments and more specifically for the purposes of this study, the independent sector’s national and regional representative bodies. The responses of all of these groups need to be examined. Finally, the micro level represents the individual schools expected to implement the policy or, in the case of the independent sector, needing to respond to its arrival in the state sector.

In investigating the process which each of the two case study schools underwent, I will again use a level based analysis within the context of each school. It is important to note that this is a distinct analytical process but one which seeks to reveal a more textured outcome through use of the same mechanism. This will be elaborated in the chapters focused on the schools (Chapters Five and Six). In this analysis the macro level is occupied by Governors and senior managers, the meso level contains heads of department and heads of house, while the micro level represents classroom teachers.
4.2 POLICY, NEW LABOUR AND PRP (MACRO LEVEL)

Returning to the political context, the Conservative legacy, stemming from the 1988 Education Reform Act, was an emphasis on the market place in education (Whitty, Power and Halpin, 1998). ‘Labour has retained much of the previous Tory emphasis’ since coming to power in 1997 (Halpin, 1999). Labour’s policy, initially exemplified by the 1997 White Paper ‘Excellence in Schools’ operates within the dominant discourse of market forces established by their predecessors. As Ball observes, ‘Discourses are about what can be said, and thought, but also about who can speak...’ (Ball, 1994). This is in evidence in Giddens’ acceptance of the context of global capitalist competition and whether or not New Labour and Blair see themselves as disciples or fellow thinkers moving in a similar direction, they both frame their ideas in a similar vocabulary of ‘global economy’. However, the addition of an emphasis on what Giddens refers to as ‘coherent society’ (1998) and Blunkett calls a ‘civilised society’ and ‘creating a new culture’ (1997: p3), certainly demonstrates the possibility of impacting and influencing the existing discourse and moving away from extreme Thatcherite views that society does not exist. From this reading it would appear that New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ has not broken free of previous Conservative discourse but it has managed to incorporate something of its own, apart from an Old Left emphasis on centralisation and intervention, an attempt to redistribute resources to ‘benefit the many not the few’ (DfEE, 1997: p11).

Picking up on Ball’s point, focussing on ‘who can speak’, we must consider whose voices are given access to policy formulation. From a surface reading the 1997 White Paper appears to encourage a broadening of input. In his foreword Blunkett, the then Education Secretary, addresses the reader, ‘I ask you to join with us in using your own creativity to answer as well as ask questions’. He appears to be addressing a broad church incorporating ‘Government and the education service... LEAs and schools, parents and school governors’ (1997: p4). Questions are provided in the text, creating the impression of openness
but steering the agenda upon which feedback is to be welcomed. The
document was published in July 1997 and the deadline for consultation
was set as 7 October 1997. This meant that many educational
institutions were on holiday at the time of publication. Once the following
term had started, particularly for the tertiary sector and academics in the
field, a very limited time-span remained, rendering considered and co-
ordinated responses difficult from either practitioners or academics.

In December 1998's Green Paper, the DfEE's ‘Teachers – Meeting the
Challenge of Change’, the language is demonstrably that of NPM:
'reward good performance ... career progression ... flexibility of schools
... successfully assessed at a performance threshold ... systematic
performance management ... clear accountability and monitoring' (p31).
This identifiable vocabulary conveys proposals in which the stated
intention is, 'determined to create the conditions for this culture to
change' (p32). Thus change is manageable, culture is manageable, this
is the language of Human Resource Management but as Ogbonna
observes, 'managing culture is no more than an ideal which is difficult to
attain' (1992: p94). Again there is an indication that consultation is
valued. The Green Paper refers to 'a technical consultation document on
pay and performance management' (Morris, 1999: p2). In her foreword
to this document Estelle Morris, then Minister of State for School
Standards, refers to an extensive consultation process but then indicates
its boundaries, 'In order to minimise workload, we have asked a
representative sample of schools to respond in detail to the proposals,
but we of course welcome the views of all with an interest'. Indeed all
schools in England received copies for consideration.
4.3 RESPONSES FROM THE TEACHER UNIONS AND OTHERS (MESO LEVEL)

Responses to this consultation and the proposals as a whole came from a range of sources including teacher unions, the educational press and research commissioned by the Government. Responding to the Green Paper, Education Today and Tomorrow (Spring 1999, p19) observed, 'the commitment to performance related pay must be seen as the central issue... likely to presage a major confrontation with the government... seen as an attempt to create a more compliant and acquiescent teaching profession'. This interpretation, based on initial readings of the Government proposals saw the scheme as 'a crude attempt to hold down teachers' pay' and 'an attack on the professional autonomy and strength of teachers'. This argument sees the proposal as a twin assault on both pay and the teacher unions. This begs the question, how did the teacher unions react to the proposals? Initial resistance led to a year's delay in the timetable for introduction of the scheme and even the least confrontational of the teacher unions, ATL, 'reserved the option to ballot members on industrial action' (May 1999: p1). However, refinements to the scheme, including clarification that high-performing teachers would not be asked for an additional commitment, ensured this did not take place. The statutory consultation proceeded and unions provided their input, while lamenting, 'the independent contribution of the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB) has been negligible. We regret the fact that teachers can all too easily infer that the reforms are a political fait accompli, rather than the product of authentic consultation' (Feb 2000: p1).

The focus of ATL’s view was that PRP could not be an effective replacement for a satisfactory pay settlement for all teachers, as it only applied to those beyond point 9 on the pay scale. These criticisms identified the Review Body as responsible for the shortcomings in the consultation process. ATL’s final position was pragmatic, while accepting that strong opposition existed in some quarters 'to the suggestion that
their pay can – or should – be related to their performance’, the union stated acceptance that, ‘the Government’s determination to implement a wholly new basis for rewarding teachers will not fade away’, adding that, ‘to recognise this is not to be defeatist but to be realistic’ (2000).

Other unions have ultimately adopted a similar line. Commenting on the STRB’s 11th Report, Nigel de Gruchy, General Secretary of the NASUWT criticised the failure of the Secretary of State to accept the recommendation from the STRB for extra funding ‘to support the Upper Pay Spine Progression’. He added, ‘During the statutory consultation period which now follows, NASUWT will press the Secretary of State on the serious implications of such a refusal’ (January 2002). The NUT’s briefings to its members follow in a similar vein (2002). The following month NASUWT representatives met with Stephen Timms, Education Minister, ‘to press for additional money to fund progression along the upper pay spine for all eligible teachers who meet the criteria’ (2002). Clearly the unions are part of the dialogue but how much influence do they now exercise? Has the Government successfully tackled the unions as presaged by the comments from Education Today and Tomorrow, Volume 1, Spring 1999? Certainly the scheme, despite delays, is now in place. Details have been changed, even at the level of a single word but the essence of a performance related pay element remains. More recent reactions appear to accept the continued existence of the system while seeking refinements, particularly to funding arrangements. However, NAHT and SHA announced a ballot to boycott performance management as an effort to secure additional funding. Not all unions supported this development, concerned much of the system will remain, while payments would be jeopardised. New guidance issued by NAHT/SHA in May 2002 suggested this danger had passed, with a recommendation to their staff that they adopt the revised proposals and the cancellation of the ballot on industrial action but also served to highlight the continuing differences in approach towards the upper pay spine and interpreting the criteria (DfES, 2002). ATL claim that the NAHT and SHA have indirectly condoned the need for a further application
rather than insisting the process utilise the evidence generated by the existing performance management system (June, 2002). Once again the argument is now over the detail not the principle.

Nevertheless, even after the Government succeeded in introducing the scheme and it became apparent that the vast majority of eligible teachers who applied did successfully cross the threshold and secure the £2,000 increment, criticism continued as exemplified by headlines in the Times Educational Supplement such as, 'Damning verdict on performance related pay'. (Dean, July 13, 2001) This assessment was based on a study by Exeter University's research team funded by the Leverhulme Trust (Chamberlin et al, 2001). They discovered that in only 71 of 19,183 applications to cross the threshold did the scrutineers disagree with the heads' judgements. Cambridge Education Associates received in the region of £12 million to check the procedure. The study also raised questions over the almost entirely paper-based methods used. Ninety-seven per cent of those who applied were successful in obtaining the extra £2,000. Only one in five heads were convinced that the threshold has made a significant difference to classroom teaching. It is appropriate to ask how far these responses are rooted in opinion and to what extent they emerge from research generating empirical evidence?

Research by Bristol University, also funded by the Leverhulme Trust (Croxson & Atkinson, 2001) involved interviews with 25 head teachers in English secondary schools. It was designed to 'elicit their perception of the Threshold's impact on schools'. None of the heads had 'observed divisive behaviour as a result of the individual-basis of the performance threshold'. Some believed 'financial incentives cannot be used to motivate teachers directly'. Others believed it could be done but that 'Threshold may not be effective because of flaws in its design'. For example, some but not all felt 'that the Threshold's definition of success creates targets that are too narrow'. However, others 'believed that the targets were constructive'. One may challenge how representative a
cross-section the participants represent, given the knowledge that 970 schools were approached, 36 agreed to take part and the first 25 to agree were interviewed. However, reasons for refusal were investigated, suggesting schools with good data systems and effective pre-existing Performance Management systems prior to the introduction of threshold. The timing of the interviews is significant because they took place, ‘after the introduction of the threshold but, in most cases, before final decisions had been made about whether specific teachers would pass’. Thus the focus of the study is perception and expectation at an early stage rather than evaluation of effectiveness once the scheme was in operation. This limits the evidence to the impact on pre-existing systems and practices such as appraisal (Croxson and Atkinson, 2001:p11-12).

Efforts have also been made to examine the threshold within its global context (Menter, Mahoney and Hextall, 2002). Having noted the ‘torturous and confused’ (2002: p7) policy implementation process and acknowledged ‘it seems possible that there is a very real effect on teachers’ practice… a more sophisticated process of internalised surveillance at work’ (2002: p7) this study highlights the extent to which five private companies have ‘played a significant role in Threshold Assessment’ (2002: p8). This leads the authors to observe critically, ‘these examples of private sector involvement in state education are part of the process of turning the education system into a saleable commodity’ (2002: p12). This shift is portrayed as a battle of ideologies, between the opening up of education to private interests and preserving it as ‘a public good’ (2002: p12). The global dimension involved interviews across three continents. ‘People were astonished at the complexity of the levels of control and regulation… expressed in the form of deep misgivings about the impact on professional autonomy and its implications for the erosion of professional “trust” ’ (2002: p20).

To sum up, although some research has mixed messages, there have been criticisms within each study conducted (by the universities of Exeter, Bristol, Surrey and Paisley) and some funded by the unions...
themselves, for example the NUT’s survey into the claim that the threshold provides a motivation and retention incentive (Richardson, 1999). Furthermore, all the unions were heavily involved in threshold casework at all stages, much of which was used in drawing up their joint submission on the threshold to the STRB (1999). Equally, perceptions are as important as facts where the reception of a policy is at issue. The mediation of policy has a huge impact on its likely success. With the stakeholders involved, it is clear this process has been prolonged and complex. In considering this further, this study will employ the notions of Wallace and refinements by Cann et al to unpick the process of policy mediation for the Government’s threshold scheme, tracing its trajectory from state to school. The bulk of this work will appear in the chapters on the two case study schools themselves.

4.4 DEFINING THE DISCOURSE

Examples of recent policy responses are peppered with the assumptions of NPM. Equally, the responses remain guarded about ‘managerialism’ but are increasingly focused on detail of implementation rather than the principle of PRP itself. The Government has defined the discourse (Ball, 1994). Considering policy in its context, we must reflect on who controls the discourse, who sets the agenda and whether these policies achieve their designers’ intentions in practice? ‘Control can never be totally secured, in part because of agency. It will be open to erosion and undercutting by the action, embodied agency of those people who are its object’ (Clegg, 1989: p193). The extent to which policy makers’ intentions are realised in practice is filtered through the personnel of individual schools, from the interpretation of head teachers to the implementation strategies of those at the chalk-face. Teachers use social defences (James, 1999). As Wallace and Weindling report (1997: p211), ‘the impact of reforms was bounded. Despite evidence of widespread implementation, they had not necessarily achieved stated
central government aims.’ This conclusion was reached on the basis of a study of fifteen management and school reform projects for the Economic and Social Research Council. This led to a 1997 publication for ESRC. The authors freely admit the limitations of their evidence in ‘timing, span and purpose’ (p210).

Perhaps the most significant question of applicability lies in the recent central Government agenda. Nevertheless, there are emergent themes that can provide useful focus for further study. The role of educational managers in reacting and implementing reforms was found to have influenced their impact. The message emerging from Wallace and Weinling’s study reiterates the situation in the late 1980’s, the routes ahead have been way-marked but research continues to lag behind the pace of reform. The research agenda looms larger than the existing body of relevant research and, as was emphasised in the introduction, ‘Divergence among researchers over whether to adopt an explicit positive or negative value stance towards reforms and management practice suggests that different researchers investigating similar phenomena will give prominence to different findings and give them a different conceptual spin’ (p216). This echoes my distinction, imperfect though it is, between those who talk of Managerialism and those who analyse NPM.

4.5 INDEPENDENT SECTOR RESPONSES (MESO LEVEL)

4.5.1 ISBA:
Research so far has been conducted by sector specific organisations such as the Independent Schools’ Bursars Association (2002). They have identified a range of responses from members as detailed briefly in Chapter One above. These variations suggest other factors beyond the Government scheme have played a part in shaping independent school practice. The survey of all members produced 541 respondents, giving a
wide sample of the sector’s 1,300 institutions accredited by the Independent Schools Council. Other research into pay in the independent sector has pre-dated these latest developments (e.g. Thompson, C. MA in Ed Mgt at de Montfort University – unfortunately, despite my efforts to track down this study through the university, I was unsuccessful). Although they can provide a useful starting point for assessing pay practice in the sector, they have little to offer the precise focus of this study.

4.5.2 GSA:
In a letter dated May 23, 2001, Cambridge Education Associates Limited wrote to head teachers in the independent sector concerning ‘extension of threshold assessment to the independent sector’. According to Sheila Cooper of the Girls’ Schools Association, by August of the same year ‘CEA … received expressions of interest from 80 GSA schools. However, all 80 may not decide to proceed…’.

4.5.3 ATL:
Other evidence of independent sector responses has, currently, to be pieced together in this way. ATL, the union most active on behalf of teachers in the independent sector, is currently active in criticising the Government’s financial provision for progression from upper pay scale 1 to upper pay scale 2. This has no direct effect on its independent school members but should these payments not be forthcoming in the state sector, it will raise questions as to whether they will occur in the independent sector. ATL has produced advice to staff in the independent sector, where ‘most independent schools have either already adopted, or are in the process of adopting, performance management schemes’. ATL supports the schemes provided they adhere to their specified list of ten criteria ranging from consultation with staff to the applicability of objectives to each individual teacher (ATL 2002).
4.5.4 GDST:
The Girls' Day Schools Trust (GDST) notes in their recruitment brochure for teachers, 'all our teachers are able to progress to the equivalent of U1 (beyond the threshold) without the need for formal performance assessment and there is an extended discretionary pay scale above that. More than 55% of our teachers are already on the extended scale'. This is significant information as the GDST represents 25 leading independent schools educating almost 20,000 pupils. My study will complement this information as both schools are in the same single-sex part of the sector but operate as single, independent institutions and these are, arguably, most exposed to external factors.

4.6 HOW CAN THE THEMES FROM THE LITERATURE BE APPLIED TO THE CASE STUDY SCHOOLS IN THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR? (MICRO LEVEL)

Ball (1994) asserts the necessity for policy analysis to move beyond a blinkered regard for the state to acknowledge the context within which policies are received, resisted, co-opted and enacted leading to both intended and unintended outcomes. 'Control can never be totally secured, in part because of agency. It will be open to erosion and undercutting by the action, embodied agency of those people who are its object' (Clegg, 1989: p193). Texts are coded and manipulated during formation but are also deflected and interpreted during reception and implementation. However hard the state or other influences try, they cannot entirely control this process. Unintended outcomes or emphases will emerge. Nevertheless, it is in the school and the classroom that the daily reality of reform must be resolved. School managers and teachers, 'develop interpretations and practices which engage seriously with the changes and their consequences for working relationships and for teaching and learning.' These are the local contexts with which Ball is most concerned (Ball, 1994: p12). How much more applicable are these
ideas when considering independent sector responses to a state initiative?

In seeking an appropriate approach, I have considered both external and internal factors. The national context of policy production and implementation has given rise to factors acting upon independent sector schools such as the two represented in this comparative case study. Thus these are the external factors to which each school has had to respond.

Threshold pay policy is part of New Labour's national educational policy reforms. It is binding upon all state schools. Thus, I considered the need to locate the production of this policy within what Ball calls, 'the context of influence' and 'the context of text production' (Bowe & Ball, 1992). This would allow me to map the motivations of those influencing the formulation of this policy and examine the process through which it was developed (Ball, 1994; Fullan, 2001). The purpose of this section is to understand the policy as it emerged into the state sector but given limitations of time, I have decided to forego a more detailed analysis. However, this is only the start of an analytical journey. In targeting the two chosen case study schools, it is the intention to focus on the indirect influence of state policy on institutions not legally bound to implement such policy.

I have chosen to sustain my focus on the case study schools, as reflected in the framing of the five research questions. The substantive policies under study, those at the heart of this comparative case study exercise, are the pay policies adopted by the two schools soon after the introduction of the state-level policy. In order to understand the reasons behind the adoption of these school-level policies and how they articulate with the state-level policy, 'we have an interest in exploring the values and assumptions which underlie policies and the related issues of power, leading to questions such as, 'In whose interests?' and 'Who are the winners and losers?' in any particular policy initiative (Taylor et al,
1997: p37). It is therefore necessary to undertake a policy analysis on the school-level policies.

'There is no recipe for doing policy analysis... approaches to policy analysis will depend at one level on the actual nature and site of production of the policy... other relevant factors... [include] the position and institutional location of the analyst, and the purposes for which the analysis is being carried out' (Taylor et al, 1997: p36). Given the national context of NPM initiatives being implemented by the state, I have considered the use of a theoretical framework that highlighted the management of change, such as Fullan's (2001) conceptualisation of the educational change process as composed of three phases: initiation, implementation and institutionalisation. However, given the limited time frame of this study, the focus will inevitably be on the first two phases, with the possibility of follow up research after five or more years to establish whether institutionalisation has been achieved. Fullan's approach takes account of the characteristics of the change, local characteristics and external factors (Fullan, 2001: p72).

This multiple-perspective echoes the thinking of contingency theorists such as Fiedler (1967) and draws on their analysis of leadership. This approach asserts that there is no single way to manage in a specific situation and that situational variables, located within both the internal and external environments, have an impact on management practice. This perspective is ideally suited to the analysis of the management decisions taken in each case study institution, focusing attention as it does, both on the external context and internal landscape of each school. In considering this latter, internal dimension, I will make reference to a framework for analysing the impact of policies, which was initially elaborated in concert with three colleagues from the Cardiff University EdD programme (2000). This provides the possibility of treating the hierarchy of an institution to a level-based analysis such as is becoming widespread in larger scale studies considering 'national policy formation, its meso-level mediation ... and micro-level changes in
school practice' (Fitz & Lee, 1996). It draws upon Wallace's notion of counter-policy and his analytical framework while seeking to increase its flexibility and applicability to provide 'a local perspective on policy implementation' (Wallace, 1998). 'The concept of a 'counter-policy' is articulated as a heuristic device for grasping the process of mediation whereby implementation of national policies may stimulate resistance and co-optation at other education system levels' (Wallace, 1998, p195).

Power lies at the heart of this comparative study. Who exercises influence nationally, sectorally and locally? To what extent is the style of leadership crucial to understanding the approach to policy formulation and introduction? Whose leadership should we focus on? This touches upon the problematic nature of culture management (Ogbonna, 1992) and requires analysis of key actors' contributions and interplay (Wallace, 1998; Cann et al, 2000).

Research into managing educational change began in the US during the 1930's but as a field it is little more than 40 years old with most of the work still focused on North America. The education systems across the Atlantic tend towards a decentralised model with the work of principals fairly closely controlled at a district or meso level. Nevertheless, the majority of work that has been done on UK institutions has focused on secondary schools, although not on those in the independent sector. Most of this work has been on single innovations 'involving a significant change in practice' (Wallace, 2000). It is necessary to consider the major perspectives offered by this literature and consider how they may be used to establish a viable modus operandi for examining the implementation of PRP in the case study schools.

Three perspectives have dominated thinking on the management of planned educational change over the past two decades. House (1981) identified these as the technological, political and cultural. Each perspective provides 'a screen consisting of concepts, values and assumptions through which social phenomena (are) interpreted' (Wallace, 2000). The technological approach was dominant in the
1960s, focussing on technical and logistical elements of the change process. During the 1970s there was a shift towards consideration of the political dimension, emphasising the processes of conflict, compromise and mediation both within and between levels (House, 1974). Having been introduced in the 1970s, the cultural perspective became dominant in the 1980s. Here the emphasis was the interaction within cultures and between them, particularly contrasting the agents of change and their vision with the potential recipients and their beliefs (Firestone and Corbett, 1988).

More recently researchers have questioned whether such perspectives need necessarily be mutually exclusive. Users of a single perspective have been challenged by work that attempts to combine perspectives, such as Wallace’s ‘Integrating Cultural and Political Theoretical Perspectives’ (2000). It is argued that such an approach allows for an analysis combining culture and power, thus revealing the extent to which the careful use of authority can be used to foster a receptive culture prior to the introduction of planned change. Thus the insights gained from this articulation of culture and power provide practical lessons for educational administrators but also a lens through which to study the vital roles of culture, power and leadership. Nevertheless, Wallace acknowledges the attendant disadvantages of such an approach, not least the complexity of analysis that reduces comprehensibility and loses the finer grain of distinctions possible within a single perspective. Despite these problems, I am convinced, along with Wallace, that ‘this approach is demonstrably capable of wider application in exploring interaction in educational administration’ (Wallace, 2000 – see also Wallace and Huckman, 1999). Such a perspective appears particularly relevant to the introduction of a measure such as PRP into a staff culture previously predicated on notions of collegiality (Campbell and Southworth, 1992; Williams, 1999).

The change process has been conceptualised to provide a ‘general image of a much more detailed and snarled process’ (Fullan, 2001: p50).
He identifies a sequence of interacting phases commencing with initiation (up to and including the decision to proceed), moving towards implementation (attempts to put the change into practice) and continuation (how the change becomes an integral part of everyday practice) then finally reaching outcome. Each stage interacts with the one before it and the one that follows and there are 'numerous factors operating at each phase' (Fullan, 2001: p50). This overview of the change process provides a series of factors to consider during each phase of a change effort.

Fullan's (2001) framework has great utility but requires the addition of other perspectives to render a thorough analysis. Firstly, it is important to appreciate the significance of discourses emphasised by Ball (1994) in the development of policies at all levels: identifying those who can and cannot speak. Furthermore, Fullan’s work is predicated on the very different educational structure of the US and assumes the subject institutions are state schools. The change processes he analyses tend to be curriculum based rather than structural or pay related. His consideration of the initiation phase is detailed but puts too little emphasis on state imposed policies for my purpose, concentrating on notions of policy choice and issues of access. Finally, his multiplicity perspective, while highlighting individual roles and groups, fails to emphasise the interference, overlap and reinforcement between initiatives. Nevertheless, notions of problem solvers and bureaucrats (1991, p59) and adoption factors (1991, p60) provide useful conceptual purchase. Incorporating Wallace (1998) and Cann et al (2000) picks up on the specific setting of each school and allows focus on the use of authority to foster a receptive culture. Also providing a level based analysis within the institution, emphasising the two-way passage of the policy and reactions through the school hierarchy and the resultant changes and consequences.

However, the context within which this planned change is to take place is one of multiple changes rather than an undisturbed status quo. Since
the start of the 1990s work in North America has begun to recognise that in a context of reorganisation, staff have to deal with multiple innovations (Fullan, 2001; Louis and Miles, 1990). Drawing on studies from outside education (Pascale, 1990; Senge, 1990) as well as research on schools, Fullan has constructed a 'new paradigm' for understanding change. This perspective is predominantly cultural but of considerable sophistication, viewing change as 'dynamically complex', involving a greater number of factors than can effectively be taken into account. The interaction of this plethora of factors is also seen as too complex for us to fully predict: suggesting complete control over the change process is impossible (Fullan, 1993, 1999). Small-scale studies in the UK affirm such findings, highlighting the ever-increasing range of innovations that have to be assimilated (Wallace, 1991).

This raises the question whether the planned changes at the case study schools to introduce a form of PRP or adopt a different response should be regarded as single innovations or viewed as part of a more complex shift in managerial and pedagogic relations? Conceptualising complex educational change has also highlighted the importance of leadership (Wallace, 2000). There is a useful distinction between transformational and transactional leadership (Bass, 1985). The former seeks to transform followers’ culture to create an enthusiastic following, whereas the latter uses rewards to motivate followers, using monitoring and sanctions to ensure compliance without necessarily shaping culture. Wallace found that the complexity of change ‘delimited the form of change leadership that was possible’ (Wallace, 2000).

Thus, there is a range of perspectives that have influenced my thinking, but it is contingency theory that provides a sufficiently straightforward, focused and adaptable framework to structure my analysis, emphasising as it does the importance of context both without and within each school. However, I will also bear in mind one criticism of contingency theory in management circles, that it ignores the fact that managers may act politically or pursue agendas that are not rational responses to the
environment (Jones, 1997: p3). This will be an important caveat when considering the key actors in the process at each case study school. This also draws attention to the critical process of internalising policy and concomitant problems involving the management of culture (Ogbonna, 1992).

Performance related pay has long been the subject of extensive study but its application to education is of more recent origin (Tomlinson, 1992; Preedy, Glatter & Levacic, 1997). It must also be read alongside work claiming pay is ‘a lower-order, or hygiene factor … important and necessary, but … consistently rated well down the list of what mattered most to people …’ (Everard and Morris, 1990; Dunham, 1995; Foreman, 1997). If this was so in the current cases, the impact of the change might not be regarded as likely to be fundamental. However, the context of the problem, including staff demands to have equivalent recompense to those in the state sector suggest that this is too simplistic a view of the remuneration issue. The current set of Government proposals are still unfolding, with recent attention fixed on subsequent points on the upper pay scale. Richardson (1999) considered the likely impacts and the Teachers Incentive Pay Project (Chamberlin et al, 2001) has produced a series of papers on the views of head teachers and the experience of teachers. Head teachers were at first told in training that relatively few teachers would successfully cross the threshold. This was then changed to an expectation that the majority would succeed, which has proven the case. This suggests the common independent school tactic of ‘wait and see’ ensured they were able to fully appreciate the implications of the changes before acting. However, it did reduce the timescale over which they could effectively plan for the full cost of any such scheme, a weight to be borne by each independent institution, not funded by the Government. More recent studies building on the research above, continuing to study responses by teachers and heads, suggest that, while performance related pay succeeded in providing a big pay increase to teachers, it had little impact on their daily teaching (Wragg et al, 2004).
Critical accounts of the employment of such strategies within the education system have highlighted the problems of attempting to manage culture (Ogbonna, 1992). The DfEE uses the language of New Public Management, 'rewards for sustained high performance (p18)... career progression (p5)... flexibility of schools (p18)... assessment at the performance threshold (p22)... systematic performance management (p8)... accept accountability (p37)' (DfEE, 1998). This distinct vocabulary outlines proposals in which the stated intention is, 'determined to create the conditions for this culture to change'. There can be no clearer manifesto for change management and the managed change of culture. Thus the Government view is that change is manageable and culture is manageable and that the two processes are interrelated. This is the vocabulary of Human Resource Management but as Ogbonna (1992) observes, 'managing culture is no more than an ideal which is difficult to attain'.

At the very least it is crucial that consideration is given to the articulation between the introduction of PRP and the existing culture of the institution. Even if it is not possible to manipulate staff culture, an awareness of its nature may increase the success of proposed change strategies. Another chastening perspective is offered by the *Handbook on Performance Related Pay* (LACSAB, 1990: p5), 'While many organisations believe that PRP helps to clarify the intentions of management and motivate staff, some have found it inappropriate or hard to get right'. In light of these conclusions, Cracknell (1992: p158) observes, 'A majority of performance-related pay schemes are perceived to have failed, to have lost their focus on performance so that the wage bill is inflated without securing any benefits'. Such pessimistic conclusions indicate that the Governors and SMT at St Edward's needed to consider carefully whether they support the introduction of a scheme mirroring the Government's current model. Or whether a radically different approach to achieving equivalency might have provided a better route to satisfying staff expectations without running foul of embedded staff culture, an option pursued by St Bernadette's?
4.7 AGENCY AT THE MICRO LEVEL

We must consider the impact of this mediated policy on the majority of the school’s staff, the full and part-time teachers who deliver the bulk of the curriculum and whose horizons, as intimated above, are pedagogic and pragmatic (McBean, 1994). I agree that a case study approach reveals the ‘big, booming, buzzing confusion’ of experience without omitting its complexity (James, 1890). This necessitates ‘understanding the subjects from their own point of view’ (Bogdan and Biklen, 1992). Although my roles as a head of department and head of Sixth Form inevitably led to some distortion, it also ‘can potentially mine rich seams of data’ (Elliott and Crossley, 1997). Furthermore, it is necessary to build in to my proposed analytical framework the capacity to accommodate both the messiness of this picture and the short circuits that occur. What I mean is that time may be passing as we move deeper in but a purely linear view of time is in itself a distortion. It would be a gross distortion to suggest an absence of interplay between the levels of each institution. This has already been illustrated above. Staff talk to each other and are overheard, representations are made to senior management and meetings are held for the exchange of information. Ultimately we must reflect inter-penetration between the levels if we are to construct an accurate picture of the process of policy impact and implementation. In short any diagram really needs to be three-dimensional!

One important mediating factor at this level is that of the existing staff culture or staff cultures. Based on my own observations at St Edward’s, I believe a distinct sub-culture based around those who have entered the profession in the last five years had emerged prior to the introduction of this policy. This group does not espouse the traditional culture of the school. Certainly this picture contradicts the view of the Head at St Edward’s that ‘staff professional culture is in harmony’ (Interview, 1999). At St Bernadette’s, there may be divisions within the staff but the strong emphasis on Catholic values tends to create more homogeneity even
where fifty per cent of staff are not themselves Catholic. Such a mediating factor as staff culture needed to be entered into the analysis. One possible way forward would be to utilise the work of Campbell and Southworth (1992) which identified a range of factors contributing to collegiality. These include compatible ideals, working together, having a sense of community, getting on with one another, acknowledging individuality and knowing what is going on.

4.8 STATE AND INDEPENDENT: CONGRUENCE OR CONTRADICTION?

Finally, it is necessary to focus on the nexus between the values underpinning the introduction of the threshold pay reforms into the state sector and the values of powerful actors within the independent secondary sector. This should reveal how and why the policy moved from the state to the independent sector, migrating from the macro level of policy generation by national Government through the meso level of unions and representative bodies to the micro level chalk face of individual schools. There are a number of bodies that lay claim as representatives of the independent sector, among them the Headmasters and Headmistresses Conference (HMC) and The Girls' Schools Association (GSA). The headmistress of St Edward's and the headmistress of St Bernadette's are members of both of these bodies. There is also the Independent Schools Council (ISC) which 'provides a single, unified organisation to speak and act on behalf of the eight independent schools' associations which constitute it. ISC promotes the schools' common interests at the political level...' (ISIS, 2002: p1). This is the point where initial mediation or deflection of Government policy may have taken place. It is not easy to establish whether this is a top-down or bottom-up process. Should we read the varied sector level responses to the state pay reforms as starting from grass-roots initiatives or as a distant decision by more powerful actors than those present in St
Edward’s and St Bernadette’s? If the latter is true, we must establish whether the policy actually contradicted the values of the schools’ Governors and senior management. The differing schemes introduced at the two case study schools must be examined, along with the motivations that lay behind their adoption.

In an interview conducted with the headmistress dated September 15 1999 (Williams, 1999), I asked to what extent management decisions at St Edward’s were taken with developments in the public sector in mind? She replied ‘towards and in spite of reflecting a pragmatic and business-minded attitude towards the state sector’. From the context in which she made this observation, it would appear that she acknowledged the need to be both aware of and respond to pertinent developments in the state sector. However, she also suggests wariness towards state initiatives and indicated a predisposed attitude to achieve goals despite impositions by and impacts from state initiatives.

Thus, the rationale for mirroring the Government approach at St Edward’s goes beyond necessity. It allowed management to present this inevitably traumatic process as imposed from a distance, placing themselves as mediators seeking to minimise the negative impacts of the policy by introducing an amended scheme whilst achieving the emphasis on performance that satisfies the business-like approach referred to above. In this sense, there was more leeway available than that historically observed in the FE sector (over the issue of inspection) where, ‘Many of the initiatives were required to be in place in order for colleges to continue to receive FEFC funding for their core work, which gave senior college managers little opportunity – even if they wanted to – to resist them’ (Elliott & Crossley, 1997). The self-funding nature of the independent sector makes take up voluntary, although the need to compete effectively for staff cannot be ignored in explaining the transfer of the policy, albeit in adapted form, from the state to the independent sector. At St Bernadette’s, a similar need to remain competitive for staff was perceived as will be seen in the relevant case study chapter but the
need for a quid pro quo was rejected and so, their pay settlement took a very different form.

The next two chapters set out the evidence collected at each case study school and begin the task of analysis.
CHAPTER FIVE: ST EDWARD’S

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I present a summary of the evidence gathered at St Edward’s. Reference is made to interview transcripts, follow-up conversations, personal observation and documents generated at the time during the implementation of the threshold pay system. I also contrast the views of interviewees and comment on them in light of developments at a national level.

5.2 WHO WAS INTERVIEWED AND WHAT WERE THEY ASKED?

A total of ten interviews and one follow up interview were conducted. The interviewees comprised the Head (7 years at St Edward’s at time of interview), Deputy Head (3 years), another senior manager (14 years), four heads of department (6, 7, 10 and 26 years), two teachers with or without other responsibilities (10 years and 23 years) and a Governor. They were chosen to represent a reasonable cross section of those staff most directly affected by the proposed pay reforms, either as recipients or implementers. The majority were selected because they were prepared to confirm their eligibility for the St Edward’s threshold payment; that is they had reached the equivalent of point 9 on the old scales. In a school where discussion of pay was rare, this was an important factor. The most significant omission from the list of interviewees was the Bursar. As I mentioned earlier, he was removed from the interviewing schedule at the request of the Head. This decision will be discussed later. Further details of the interviews are summarised in the table below and in Appendix 4 for a timeline of interviews.
5.2.1 Summary of Interviewees at St Edward's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee designation</th>
<th>Position/ subject</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Years teaching</th>
<th>Years at St E's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Head/ English</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Head (GR)</td>
<td>Deputy Head/ ICT</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Manager (TC)</td>
<td>Head of Middle School/ Geography</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Head of Department/ English</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BD</td>
<td>Head of Department/ Classics</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Head of Department/ Mathematics</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJ</td>
<td>Head of Department/ Physical Education</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Exams Officer/ Mathematics</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WJ</td>
<td>Teacher/ Religious studies</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Governor/ Staff liaison</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The open ended questions that provided the semi-structured interview template were broadly similar for interviews at both institutions, although they were refined as interviews progressed at each school and experience at St Edward's informed the drafting of questions for St Bernadette's. Equally influential was my knowledge of each school resulting from much informal discussion with staff and reading of school level documentation. This allowed me to devise questions aimed at revealing key incidents, themes and coincidences in each school.

The questions fell into four broad sections: exploration of the staff culture of each school alongside the notion of PRP; a consideration of the context and motives behind each scheme; communication with staff and the actual process of implementation, including an identification of the key actors; finally, an evaluation of each scheme, its impacts to date and
some speculation on the future. A broader question was also introduced towards the end of each interview focusing on the extent to which the independent sector ought to be following state initiatives. The questions were deliberately open, seeking to facilitate each respondent making the points that were important to them, within the guidelines of my study. Issues that had not been anticipated were followed up and key themes were pursued by follow up questions when initial questions did not evoke responses on those issues.

I will start by outlining the main themes that emerged from my interviewing at St Edward's and I will also examine the answers of participants holding differing posts within the hierarchy of the institution (see also Tabular Summary: St Edward's—hierarchical, Appendix 2 below). The table gives an overview of interviewee responses. Staff are categorised as senior (SMT/Governors), middle management (heads of department/house) or teaching staff. For St Edward's this makes a total of four senior staff, four middle managers and two other teachers. The broad categories of questions are listed across the horizontal axis, with emergent themes from interview responses occupying the vertical axis. This approach facilitates an analysis of responses according to position within the school hierarchy. For each question area, the number of staff in each category who mentioned a particular theme can be identified and compared. These findings are outlined below.

5.2.2 Participant Observation

It was necessary to take account of my position within the institution. I was a well established member of staff and head of department. I had integrated into the staff culture and many of my colleagues were also my friends. Nevertheless, I had to be sensitive to my environment and consider the impact that my position and relationships had on interviewees. On the plus side I gained wide access to colleagues and I believe my familiarity helped them feel comfortable discussing the issues frankly. However, I had no choice, given my position within the school

94
hierarchy and my dependence on the Head as gatekeeper of her institution as a place of research to respect her request to omit the Bursar from my list of potential interviewees. This matter is dealt with below.

In a school where there was little tradition of openness when discussing pay, I have to allow that members of staff may have been reticent to discuss these issues frankly. That is why I was very careful to stress my ethical guidelines, with particular reference to anonymity. The frank and full responses I obtained and the tone of the interviews suggests that this potential stumbling block did not fundamentally undermine the data gathered. Furthermore, I was able to offset these concerns to some extent by cross-referencing all interview data with school documents and my knowledge of the institution.

It is worth observing that the events I studied were taking place at St Bernadette’s. I was therefore to some extent both observer and participant, albeit one who was soon to leave and would not personally be impacted by the new pay scheme. This helps locate my position on a spectrum between ‘complete participant’ and ‘complete observer’ as “somewhere between these two poles” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995: p107). This contrasts to some extent with the situation described at St Bernadette’s, where my research was taking place after the implementation of changes to the pay scheme and I was not involved in the meetings and events that were discussed in the interviews.

5.3 STAFF CULTURE AND THRESHOLD PAY

Eight out of ten interviewees used the word ‘collegial’ in describing the existing staff culture at St Edward’s; at least before the impact of the changes associated with a new pay system. The other two respondents both used the word ‘positive’ and conveyed similar notions of co-operation and mutual support. However, all ten, when asked to describe
the situation as it pertained in June 2001, after the threshold pay policy, suggested that there were factors that had challenged or impacted this collegiality or at least affected morale negatively. The factors they identified included the development of a sub-culture involving the younger teaching staff (mentioned by 4 respondents), the effects of pay and contract changes (raised by 5 interviewees), problems over the working arrangements for part-time staff (referred to by 6 out of 10) and a resistance to performance management and form filling (commented on directly or by inference by 3). Five out of ten mentioned the development of departmental offices as reducing the times when the staff gathered together as a whole body and intimated that they perceived this as a threat to the pre-existing relationships within the staff body. One established head of department spoke of the ‘fragmentation of the physical accommodation... that’s a danger...’ (BD). All but one of these factors is dealt with below. However, the issue of a clique of younger staff falls outside the remit of this study, as by definition, those staff have not progressed up the pay scale sufficiently to be eligible for threshold pay as envisaged either in the state or St Edward’s schemes.

Clearly, the existence of influential developments beyond the pay changes make evaluation infinitely more problematic but supports the observation by Fullan (2001) that schools are faced with and working through ‘multiple innovations’ some externally imposed and others voluntarily initiated from within. For all these impacts and concerns, every interviewee spoke of the strong sense of support and commitment they experienced among their colleagues. Typical phrases were, ‘pulling together, very much in tune with each other’ (WJ) and ‘everybody working for everybody’ (DJ).

5.4 VIEW OF PRP

I asked interviewees what they thought of the notion of PRP. Where necessary, I offered a definition to help (the one outlined in the
introduction to Chapter Two above – elaborated where required). Some
respondents could not separate the state threshold pay initiative or the
St Edward’s system from a wider consideration of the issue. However,
responses were more favourable to such an approach than I anticipated.
Seven staff had something positive to say about PRP. Even two of those
who positioned themselves in opposition were prepared to acknowledge
that, used appropriately, it might be of use elsewhere. For example, BD
observed, ’I defy anyone to write a definition that is applicable to every
good teacher... in industry I suppose it’s touched some productivity, in
the retail trade...profits from sales...’. Another opponent had a radical
alternative, arguing that only if all teachers were self-employed could a
form of PRP work fairly, as the able would obtain the best paid jobs and
progress rapidly, assessed on ability not years served (DK). However,
independent contracting would seem to mitigate against collaborative
working and this very respondent observed that PRP was ‘destructive’
as ‘people became more selective about responsibilities they took on’.

Senior management and the Governor had a generally positive view of
PRP, but with caveats such as not using pupil results as a measure
(Head) and provided the scheme’s goal was to benefit the pupils
(Deputy). They were all prepared to consider its application to an
educational institution. The Governor and Deputy both had backgrounds
in industry, where such schemes were and are commonplace. The other
senior manager had recently completed the National Professional
Qualification for Headship (NPQH) and felt that the time was right at St
Edward’s ‘for more accountability’. My follow up question was intended
to elicit their views on the potential impact of PRP on the collegiality they
so frequently mentioned as indicated above. Leaving aside senior
management, only one respondent saw little difficulty, provided the PRP
scheme was handled ‘sensitively’ (SP). He also observed that he was
the first person to apply under the St Edward’s scheme, ‘I believe I do do
a good job...and so I want to take advantage...’. The majority of heads
of department and other staff (a total of 5 out of 6) used vocabulary
including ‘divisive’, ‘destructive’, ‘alien’ and ‘not workable in a collegial
system’. One head of department suggested staff would likely become more selective in what contributions they made, focusing on those measured by the scheme to the detriment of less quantifiable but equally or more valuable activities (DK).

In contrast, senior management interviewees, while acknowledging the significant change in culture required by the new pay scheme, were able to suggest why there would be no long-term problems. The Head observed, ‘I think that an upper pay scale availability that is open to all should not strike at the roots of collegiality’. Although her presentation to staff on the pros and cons of adopting a PRP approach did ask whether such a development could be divisive or ‘be more a source of discontent than contentment?’ (Nov 2000). However, this should be considered in light of her intention, at that time, to avoid the necessity of following the state threshold pay scheme, as it was initially understood. The Deputy questioned whether the issue was the specific St Edward’s culture or rather, a wider issue concerning teacher attitudes, ‘I think it’s teachers in general who feel insecure and therefore feel anything like this is somehow questioning their ability…[we need] to get the staff to see this not as a threat but an opportunity…the key issue is… changing attitudes’. The Governor felt that care was needed but that in time the system would bed down and the turmoil of the introductory phase would be forgotten, helped by staff turnover and the receipt of enhanced pay.

Within a generally negative assessment of the introduction of PRP into a school like St Edward’s, there were also comments suggesting that, although the scheme was perceived as measuring performance in specified areas, that there were some possible benefits. These included claims that it would keep teachers in classrooms rather than moving into increased administration (WJ) – this was from a long-standing teacher without additional responsibilities. However, the other non-head of department could see no benefits current or future, just divisiveness (GS – 25 years at St Edward’s). A long-standing head of department felt that
the need for self-analysis had been stimulated (DJ) and another head of department felt that rewarding contributions would have a positive effect (SP). Among managers, the perceived advantages were in motivation, reflection on performance, providing evidence to Governors of commitment (Head), the valuing of performance beyond the classroom (Deputy) as the St Edward's scheme used an adaptation of the state form, replacing the pupil results section with one evaluating extra-curricular contribution by staff. The other member of SMT (TC) also felt it would reward contribution and facilitate the effective handling of shortcomings, albeit that to her mind, the school scheme is 'only minimally a performance related scheme'. The Head too described the St Edward's scheme as PRP 'only as a minimum level', a bar of competence, beyond which all teachers at the school ought to be progressing. Furthermore, in her November 2000 report to staff, she concluded, 'St Edward's teachers should have available to them the pay potential of the state sector'. This brings us to the context within which the scheme was introduced.

5.5 CONTEXT IN WHICH THRESHOLD PAY INTRODUCED, MOTIVES FOR INTRODUCTION, PRESENTATIONS MADE DURING INTRODUCTION OF THRESHOLD PAY

When asked to identify the context within which the school's pay reforms were mooted, all ten respondents suggested the state policy as the determining factor. Six respondents articulated this with alterations in staff attitudes towards the notion of a PRP scheme. Six respondents also overtly suggested that the need to be competitive for staff (i.e. recruitment issues) and to maintain a differential over the state pay scale formed a crucial background. These included the Governor, two senior managers, two heads of department and one other member of staff. The issue of staff responses to the state scheme was covered in detail by the six who raised it. In every case they distinguished between the initial state policy proposal, where the expectation was that only perhaps one
in five applicants would successfully cross the threshold. 'I think the original idea of performance related pay was that very few people would get it' (DJ) and the redrafted policy in practice saw the vast majority of applicants awarded the additional sum.

When asked by the Head what was their view of a PRP scheme such as that mooted by the state, 'the staff rejected out of hand' (BD) the idea as divisive. However, as one head of department (BD) put it, 'the goalposts changed in the state sector, and along with those, so we moved with it.' As WJ observed, 'I actually think it was the staff as a whole... I don't think it would have come from senior management or the Governors'. GS agreed, adding that, 'wanting to... have that same opportunity as the State sector' underpinned the staff request. This respondent clearly identified the Governors as the driving force behind the requirement for a scheme ‘trying to mirror in most ways the state’, while seeing the Head as 'putting it positively rather than negatively' by emphasising the utility of such an information gathering exercise, in affirming how hard staff do work and ensuring that management are fully appraised of all such activities and commitments.

When questioned about the motivation behind the introduction of the St Edward’s scheme, the Head cited the need to ensure existing staff were adequately rewarded, that the school remain competitive in staff recruitment and to facilitate maximising staff performance, a dimension driven by, ‘the Governors, once they got used to the idea, were very keen on the performance management element’. Indeed, in discussion with staff in 2000, the Head commented that ‘the Governors have been putting me under pressure about low contact time’ a point that the staff liaison Governor confirmed. Contact time had been mentioned in the February inspection report as generous but allowing for excellent preparation. The figure for contact averaged 61% in contrast, according to the Head, with '70% to 80% in the state sector'. Here we see similar motives to those lying behind the spread of New Public Management (NPM) strategies in the public sector to increase accountability and performance of professionals in a range of spheres, including education.
It is also clear from her presentations in February and November 2000 that the Head relied on the issue of transferability to and from the state sector as an additional justification for the proposed scheme mirroring much of the state application form. Indeed after ‘valuing teachers’ it was her second reason at the 20th November meeting, ahead of ‘keeping up with modern practice’ and recommendations in the Independent Schools Inspectorate’s report in favour of ‘performance assessment and targets’. The deputy head also cited reward and recruitment while TC, the other member of SMT focused on the Governors’ perspective, ‘I’m sure it’s viewed by many of the Governors in business terms... Sometimes the subtleties of the school, as opposed to another business is probably missed, but yes, I think it was seen as an opportunity, if we are going to have to pay anybody more, what can we get out of it?’ Similar views were expressed by a total of 5 out of the 10 interviewees. Seven staff, from all segments of my sample, also referred to retention or reward of existing staff as a motive underpinning the scheme.

From my personal experience of the implementation process, I was aware that issues of communication were likely to have had an effect on staff perception of the school’s proposed pay scheme. One case of this was a key staff meeting (20th November 2000) at which the Head responded to the staff request that they be given some equivalency with the increase in state teachers’ pay. This took place within the context of the state scheme where it was evident that the vast majority of teachers were crossing the threshold and securing an additional £2,000. The PowerPoint presentation set out details of the costs to the school. Some members of staff disputed the figures and this led to a good deal of confusion and a subsequent meeting to clarify matters. Rather than put words into my respondents’ mouths, I will relate their impressions of this critical moment in the process. In fairness, I will start with the Head, ‘I really used staff meetings to show… the thinking behind it… I responded to concerns that were expressed… I would like to see it as consultative’. She then went on, without prompting from the interviewer, to focus on the meeting mentioned above, ‘One fairly famous meeting [where] what I
intended to do changed fairly radically as a result of staff observations...I led a staff meeting in which I had a wrong figure in my presentation...it affected the whole pitch of what I was proposing (the need for staff to deliver more periods and possibly some consolidation of part-time staff along with a rise in fees if the school were to afford the scheme), that meant I had to go into a second draft...I hope that a readiness to correct mistakes made in public has some virtue in it'.

How was this interpreted by the staff that were on the receiving end of the presentation? One teacher, WJ was absent on Inset and therefore was unable to give any first hand observations. However, all my other interviewees referred to 'wrong figures', 'misunderstanding', 'mistake' and 'trauma' in reference to the presentation under scrutiny. The Governor had heard of the misunderstanding but she had not seen the figures in question. One long-standing member of staff (DJ) described the meeting thus, 'the staff meeting on the day after being [named] Sunday Times School of the Year...the Head introduced some facts and figures that were really not valid...they were overestimating the costs...it was shown [by the staff] that the costs could be, it was viable...whereas the argument had been we would have to raise school fees and lose our pupils'. This member of staff also intimated how much her trust in the Governors was undermined by her perception (reasonable but incorrect) that they had already seen and approved these erroneous figures. She went on to highlight her impression, 'the implication was there that we would all have to...work much harder and presumably there would be redundancies in order to save on staff salaries...'. One head of department, BD, described the meeting: 'it was a very unfortunate occurrence, because it was based on incorrect mathematics'. In DK's words: 'the Head got her sums wrong... that was a major sort of blow really' and finally from DJ, 'I'm sorry, but that just made a joke of the whole thing'.

The Head's follow up presentation went through the 'history' (Deputy's description of the presentation) of threshold in the state and responses
at St Edward’s from staff and management. Mathematical errors were corrected and the offer was made of a threshold across which £2,000 would be awarded in exchange for completing a form similar to that in use in state schools but omitting the pupils’ results section and substituting an extra-curricular contribution section. Responses to this presentation were more positive. The Deputy described the presentation as being done ‘extremely well’. This took place at the end of the Easter term 2001 and allowed clarification of the position for all staff, including part-timers, something I will deal with in more detail in a following section. From the Deputy’s perspective the Head, ‘said exactly what I believed to be the situation for performance related pay and for achieving the upper pay scale, and it did certainly, as far as I can see, allay the fears of the staff’. Do staff responses support this assertion? One head of department commented, ‘She put forward a scheme now, which I think the staff are quite keen on’ (BD). As will be seen in the section on looking ahead, all six potential staff recipients (non-senior management) of the threshold payments believe there are positives associated with the scheme actually implemented following this second key meeting.

It is interesting to note from the commencement of the initiation phase, within seven months the scheme was in place and the majority of eligible staff had submitted their forms. There was general expectation that they would receive the payment from that September (less than a year later). I will examine attitudes to the scheme as it went into operation and thoughts about its future in the following section. However, the incident did elicit negative comments concerning the wider issue of general communication and consistency of message from a senior manager, along with both regular teachers, ‘inconsistency’ from GS and ‘absolutely no idea what was going on’ from WJ. Perhaps as a consequence of such feelings, a Staff Committee has been established at St Edward’s as a conduit for views of the staff to the Head and vice versa. Since then, a further body, the Staff Salaries Committee (Pay and Remuneration Committee) has been formed to deal on salary related matters with the Head and Governors.
A final area for further consideration in this section is the notion of transferability. One stated intention at St Edward's was to ensure that staff who crossed the threshold would have this status recognised should they move to other schools, even in the state sector. Seven of ten interviewees raised this issue. Here again, the impact of NPM is felt in the fee-paying sector. St Edward's cannot ignore developments in the public sector and needed to ensure its practices made it possible to continue recruiting staff from state schools. These staff will also wish to preserve the possibility of returning from whence they came. For four staff, this had been achieved, at least broadly and three of them cited an outgoing member of staff, whose threshold status was recognised by Jersey, although there were as yet no examples of staff moving into the England and Wales state sector. WJ saw the St Edward's scheme as, 'trying... to produce something that would have produced credibility if you wanted to move to another school'. For the Deputy, 'it's in the same format... so that in all probability, most of that would qualify...'. The other three members of staff were less convinced. As SP observed, 'I don't know if the school might consider the ATL agreed model, and ask people to resubmit certain bits, but it's that pupil progress one that I think would be the sticking point'.

5.6 PROCESS OF APPLYING FOR THRESHOLD PAY AND THE KEY ACTORS INVOLVED

Most matters relating to the process of introduction have been dealt with above and, particularly, in the section dealing with institution level documents. However, it is necessary to examine the implementation phase and the experience of those staff involved in this new administrative process. From the Head’s perspective, she responded to staff concerns. The Deputy saw the scheme as ‘to value the extra’ commitments and contributions of staff, through the bespoke section of the form which is referred to in the documents section above. The other
senior manager, TC raised a different point from her colleagues, suggesting, ‘I think there was a lot of anxiety about all that (the form filling), which needn’t have been there had we used the heads of department…to actually translate what the senior management wanted into fairly easy practice throughout the staff’. All six staff recipients did mention anxiety on their own part or an awareness of it among colleagues at this stage. However, the senior managers’ comments sit interestingly alongside the most unionised of the heads of department, DK’s observation that heads of department meetings had changed from being involved in the formulation of policy to a larger body which received policy and was tasked with some aspects of implementation. However, at least one head of department (SP) talked at length, when considering the impact of the scheme personally, about the time he had taken to advise and reassure his colleagues that their forms would pass scrutiny. Was the level of staff anxiety affected by the approach of their head of department to supporting them? One teacher, an interviewee and member of SP’s department observed, ‘my head of department doesn’t think he will need to read through what I have written…so I would be very cross if I didn’t get it…’. This comment suggests her head of department’s handling of the situation has instilled confidence rather than exacerbated anxiety.

What support was offered by senior management? Staff were referred to advice from unions, particularly ATL on the completion of the state scheme. A copy of ATL’s advice on summarising evidence, with examples that meet each standard was pinned to the staff board. This was accompanied by DfEE Threshold Application: Guidance Notes headed by a handwritten note from the Head stressing it was ‘for information only’. The section on pupil progress was crossed out with another handwritten comment, ‘not part of the St Edward’s assessment’. From this, it would seem the Head’s expectation was that the forms would be filled in to the same standard and in a similar manner to those being submitted in the state scheme. The form itself runs to nine pages, the first requiring basic details and the last to be completed by the Head,
including a box for the outline of what evidence has been used in reaching the decision. It is a substantial document. Pages two to seven require evidence from the applicant on a range of experience and skills.

The first section deals with 'knowledge and understanding' of their subject. In the second section 'teaching and assessment' (including confirmation from head of department) is covered. In the third section it is 'contribution to pupils’ education beyond the examined syllabus' (here there are four specific boxes and one for 'other' – the specified areas are tutoring, general studies, PSHE, activity or club). The fourth section covers 'wider personal effectiveness' (specifying professional development and contributing to policies and aspirations of the school) and the final section is summative, entitled 'professional characteristics' and provides a series of attributes applicants should be able to exemplify (including inspiring trust and confidence, building team commitment to pupils, engaging and motivating pupils, analytical thinking about your own practice). Each of these sections also has a box for the Head’s assessment and a tick box for 'met/not yet met'. Page eight is a signed declaration from the applicant. Having looked at this document in some detail, the anxiety among staff expressed above is understandable, particularly as part of the first cohort. With all those applying having passed or been subsequently passed after responding to advice, future applicants may feel more secure. That is the impression I was given in follow up discussions with DS and DJ in early 2003.

The other much commented on aspect of the process, was the timetable for completion of forms, their assessment by the Head and an official response as to whether the applicant has passed, needs to pay more attention to certain sections and so on. Four respondents suggested form filling was contrary to St Edward’s culture, two were senior managers (TC, Deputy) one was a head of department (DJ) and the other a teacher (GS). Furthermore, 'if the first ones are quite considerably delayed, then the later ones are going to be even further back and then it starts throwing doubts in people’s minds' (SP), 'I haven’t
heard’ (WJ), ‘a sort of e-mail from the Head apologising for not having sent it yet’ (BD), ‘I was quite flippant which is why my form came back, so I had to fill the damn thing in again!’ (DK), ‘I do know that there are people who have been waiting for a considerable amount of time’ (DJ).

In fact, all six interviewees mentioned the delays in processing and the additional concerns these have caused for some staff. The Head does not dispute the time taken for her to process the forms, ‘I'm still working through the applications’, it should be noted, that although staff culture was averse to discussing pay, it has become apparent that a large proportion of staff were eligible to apply. This administrative burden placed on head teachers has been highlighted in the state sector (Chamberlin et al, 2001: pp5-6).

In terms of the burden of the application for staff, two felt that it had required a lot of work, while three felt it was manageable – two of them mentioning a timeframe of two hours, the other commenting it was, ‘not too much work to do the form’ (DJ).

When asked to identify the key actors involved in these developments, all but one named the Head and five suggested her as the prime mover. Nine of ten indicated the role of the Governors, one head of department suggesting they were the key driving force (DK) and four others suggesting the importance of interplay between Head and Governors, BD describing the Head’s position, ‘because of having to satisfy the Governors’ as ‘between a rock and a hard place’. GS observed, ‘trying to mirror the state system in [many] ways comes from the Governors and the Head is trying to influence that’. The third key group identified by the respondents were the staff themselves. One teacher, WJ felt the staff were the prime movers, ‘I think it was a staff movement in general, I don’t think it would have come from senior management or from the Governors.’ In total, seven respondents did identify the staff as influential actors and the remaining three referred to the staff role in initially rejecting PRP and subsequently requesting consideration of some equivalent remuneration to that on offer in the state sector. With the
identification of the Head's role and the discussion of key presentations she led, the role of her leadership and the function of heads in general in the change process is highlighted. This also suggests Wallace's (2000) emphasis on the role of Heads in preparing a receptive culture is an important observation and that preparations fell short of the mark on this occasion, particularly when we take into account the coincident factors considered in the next section. In the Head's own words, 'I think that the implications of change, another time I would want to work through more fully before deciding to suggest the change...'.

5.7 COINCIDENCE OF OTHER FACTORS WITH THE THRESHOLD PAY INITIATIVE – PAPERWORK, CONTRACTS, BUILDING WORK AND APPRAISAL

A number of related and perhaps unrelated issues were developing during the discussions on and implementation of St Edward's new upper pay arrangements. One involves part-time staff and this will be covered in the next section. Six interviewees mentioned the requirement for members of all departments to complete staffing grids, indicating all their commitments and 'free' periods. Four respondents raised the issue of contracts and if one includes those referring to the situation of part-timers the number is raised to seven out of the ten. As a background issue, the inspection completed in February 2000 was mentioned by four of the six heads of department and teachers. Other factors raised individually included the spread of departmental offices, recent building work disrupting the staff room physically and emotionally and the increasing involvement of Governors in the day-by-day running of the school. However, the other major consideration was the appraisal system that was embryonic in 2000. I had recently undergone appraisal and found it a stimulating and challenging process. However, few staff below heads of department had been appraised and three respondents voiced concerns that an appraisal system and the threshold criteria could become confused. Theoretically, the upper pay scale applications
are voluntary, suggesting the two systems must remain discrete. However DJ’s view was, ‘I think areas where people haven’t been appraised might have found those forms… more difficult to fill in’. Asked directly about linking appraisal to the threshold process, ‘I don’t think you can do one without the other, looking at it now, I really don’t… might be a different part of performance in appraisal, you know you are taking a very small part of it, but even so’.

5.8 THE PART-TIMER ISSUE

‘The area where there is disagreement at the moment is over its [the new pay scheme] applicability to the part-time staff and that is related to the whole of the new pay structure and the section that refers to them’ (Head). Clearly, the consideration of upper pay scale and moves to standardise contracts linked with issues of parity and comparability and transparency. As WJ points out, setting developments chronologically, ‘I know we are talking specifically about the threshold and the way that was managed, but I think also the issue about part-time staff and pay has actually brought everything back to boiling point, perhaps it was calming down but now it’s resurfaced and the fact that our contracts have never been sorted out, although this was started before inspection… I think that while you have got things going on that aren’t resolved then you won’t get back to that collegiate feeling’. A damning view? Not entirely as she later comments, ‘but I actually think, in the long term, that all of this is actually beneficial… I actually feel it’s fair that we should be asked to produce something in writing… to justify the reason why we think we should have it’.

In essence, part-timers had been paid for all extra contributions. In order to qualify for their relevant proportion of £2,000, they were asked to produce those contributions without specific pay, as did all full-time staff. If they weren’t prepared to do this, they would remain on their old pay scale without access to upper scale pay. Effectively, there were two
different contracts available to part-time staff. DJ commenting on this said, ‘this idea of part-time and full-time, that’s come in a bit through the threshold as well, I think has also been very disruptive for everybody, and having to have two different kinds of system I think is, well, I suppose it’s inevitable, but I think it’s difficult’. With approximately twenty part-time staff, this was a major issue and polarised views across the whole staff room. Some existing part-timers chose each of the available options, one even left and the issue took over two years before, in a follow up interview, a full-time member of staff (GS) still commented, ‘Some contracts are still not signed’. This raises the issue of multiple innovations and the complexity of innovations that have several dimensions (Fullan, 2001).

5.9 EVALUATION OF THE THRESHOLD PAY SCHEME AND THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE

When asked if the scheme was a success the Head felt it had been for full-time staff although personally she had found the process ‘bruising’. She also felt that more time was needed for a complete evaluation. The Deputy also thought it would depend on the time it took for staff attitudes to change and the need for holistic targets for any future stages of the upper pay scale. TC felt there was now a clearer pay and job structure. SP felt useful information had been gathered for the Head and that self-analysis was valuable and likely in submitting an application. The delays were a concern. BD felt that those who had applied and particularly those who had already passed were satisfied and as this applied to more staff, so more would be accepting. However, BD was unsure about any further stages – the second stage has actually been introduced at St Edward’s as I learnt in a follow up interview in July 2003 based on two lesson observations and a report on the year, all by the head of department, followed by an interview with the Head. GS found this process positive, approved of the requirement for the Head to meet with each member of staff every year. As a member of the Staff Committee
she is well placed to pick up on the mood of the staff and she evaluated it as ‘quite good’ as the reviews had gone well, ‘people feel valued and another £1,000 is welcome’.

DK had found the process encouraged him to reflect on his excessive workload, he also wondered about the next stage – given his critical stance it is perhaps not surprising that he has moved on and back into the state sector. DJ was concerned that the delays in processing forms might mean even greater backlogs and thus delays in receiving additional pay and hence discontent in the future. However, although an ‘inelegant’ process, people were happier she believed now the forms were in. GS was pleased the review had emphasised enrichment activities and hoped it would lead to a wider cross-section of staff giving fully of their time and energies, thus diminishing the sense of a sub-culture within the staff room. The Governor felt it was just a matter of time before all the upheaval was forgotten and the new scheme was taken for granted – my follow up interview largely corroborates this view with the passage of two further years. WJ approved of the self-reflection and the need to make an application but felt the handling of the scheme had left ‘a bitter taste’ and had been ‘divisive’, leaving unresolved issues threatening collegiality.

Finally, in light of this pay initiative at St Edward’s, I encouraged each interviewee to consider a wider question. Should independent schools follow state policy initiatives when they are not legally binding? For the Head, the need to compete in the market for good professionals made it necessary but that independent schools do have a choice, to wait and see how state initiatives work before leaping. ‘The responsibility of judgement is greater’ because ‘running a state school you don’t have any alternatives’, but ‘our choice will be limited by the market’. The Deputy sees state developments as ‘catalysts’ for developments in independent schools. For SP, the independent sector’s advantage is that it can ‘wait and see’. For BD there will always be a close link because of the close relationship between state and independent pay scales. DK
noted the need to keep close to the state if transferability were to work. For the Governor, 'in areas like pay we have to', although in curriculum matters, St Edward's is for example considering the IB.

5.10 HIERARCHICAL ANALYSIS

If the above data is examined hierarchically, making use of the table above, certain patterns emerge. All staff, regardless of role, saw staff relations as collegial or positive. Some staff from each category identified factors challenging the existing staff culture. More instructive is the fact that all senior staff favoured the introduction of PRP and none of them foresaw any long-term problems with introducing a PRP scheme. However, two heads of department and one teacher were opposed to the principle of PRP. All but one middle manager and both teachers felt PRP was likely to have a divisive effect on staff culture, a notion not anticipated by any of the senior managers, all of whom felt that a change to PRP would be of benefit.

When asked to consider the context within which the school's proposals emerged, all staff, regardless of role, identified the state policy as the determining factor. Asked to consider the motives behind the school's scheme, at least half of those in all three categories suggested competition in terms of recruitment and retention with state schools. Exactly the same profile of interviewees also felt there was an element of managerialism at work. Thus both the senior managers leading the school and the heads of department mediating the introduction of the scheme shared this perception, that the threshold was to be used as a tool for steering performance. At least half of all three categories also credited staff requests for a school response to the state policy as a factor. Those who did not mention a staff role, acknowledged that the Head had first mooted a PRP scheme, only to have this declined by the staff.
The introductory phase was prefaced by an unfortunate meeting at which incorrect figures led to confusion. All eight of the interviewees present at the meeting highlighted this event and an almost identical profile of interviewees referred to poor communications in general undermining the process. Once the necessary forms were distributed, all but one senior manager felt the process was unproblematic, whereas all four heads of department referred to the anxiety among eligible members of their departments as the forms were completed. This reinforces the earlier identification of poor communications between staff and senior management as a significant issue.

All but one teacher identified the Head and Governors as key actors in the introduction of the new pay scheme, while both teachers, half the heads of department and three of the four senior staff also credited the staff body with that status. There was thus little disagreement about the driving and shaping forces at work. Half the senior managers, just one middle manager and one teacher raised the coincidence of other school developments as complicating factors at a time of change. However, three out of four senior and three out of four middle managers did mention the assessment of teaching commitments through staffing grids as increasing the sense of a managerialist process.

Asked to evaluate the scheme and look to the future, exactly half the respondents felt that delay in processing forms had heightened tensions. Both teachers thought the process had been problematic and would wait and see before making a final judgement on the changes. Two heads of department concurred as did three senior managers, an interesting admission given their unanimous support for a PRP scheme and their dismissal of any danger to staff culture. The remainder, although a minority, were optimistic about the future of the threshold pay scheme, expecting it to bed down quickly. It is fair to observe that they appear to have been proven correct as my follow up interview (GS) indicated.
In summary, we can see some patterns from this analysis. Senior managers were more enthusiastic about the notion of PRP than other staff. Heads of department were most aware of the tensions created by the need to complete substantial forms. The key role of the state policy was acknowledged by all interviewees. This was the sole question upon which all ten were unequivocally in agreement. The majority of staff from all categories specified areas where mistakes exacerbated the problems of introducing the new scheme. These areas provide useful warnings for those contemplating the introduction of similar reforms.

5.11 CONCLUSION

The responses above demonstrate how influential the introduction of the state pay threshold was in shaping events at St Edward’s. When first broached by the Head, at a time when the expectation was that perhaps only 20% of eligible teachers would be awarded the increment, the staff rejected such a scheme out of hand. When it emerged that the vast majority of teachers were successfully crossing the threshold, it was the staff who asked the Head to look again at the issue. Once proposals were presented to staff, many of their comments drew comparisons with state schools. The St Edward's scheme borrowed heavily from the state application form, simply omitting the results section and substituting it with an assessment of wider contribution to school life. Much of the hostility picked up in my interviews can be traced to one unfortunate meeting where the tone of the presentation suggested paying for such a pay award would require the school to put up its fees beyond the tolerance of its ‘niche’ or to ask staff to teach more and accept that there would need to be a commensurate reduction in the number of part-timers employed. Immediately some staff felt a sense of responsibility for their part-time colleagues’ jobs. Furthermore, the figures upon which these quite drastic measures were based proved to be inadvertently false.
Once this initial phase was passed, the Head was able to submit revised proposals that were put into effect. By March 2001 all eligible staff had received copies of the application form and eventually, all those eligible made their applications. Delays in processing these applications led to some additional anxiety, which proved unnecessary as, after some advice in one or two cases, every application was successful. However, even though a follow up interview suggests, ‘the mood is quite good now’ (GS), a number of other issues that emerged from the process are worth noting. Concerns over the status of part-time staff led to prolonged negotiations over their contracts. Indeed the coincidence of redrawing staff contracts was an unfortunate one. Had this been timed differently, staff morale might have been better preserved. Alongside the existing Staff Committee, a new Pay and Remuneration Committee has been set up which reports to the Head and then on to the Governors. Upper pay scale two has also been tackled and this is dealt with in the postscript below. A further development, related to the number of contact periods expected of teaching staff, led to the introduction of staffing grids, to be completed via heads of department. These formed a part of a much wider pay review that drew its impetus from the threshold issue and that of staff contracts. This led to the publication, in February 2001 of ‘New Pay Structure’ distributed to heads of department following the presentation of its contents to them. Its full title is, Allocation of classroom teaching, remission time and money under the new St Helen’s pay structure. This in turn formed the basis of the draft Teachers’ Pay Structure dated 19 June 2001 and, indeed, the structure that was implemented that September.

In short, addressing the introduction of the pay threshold in the state sector and the coincidence of an ongoing drive to standardise contracts had varied and far reaching effects on the school’s pay structure – going well beyond the adoption of a threshold scheme. It is equally clear that a managerialist (PRP) element runs through these developments.
CHAPTER SIX: ST BERNADETTE'S

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I present a summary of the corresponding evidence gathered at St Bernadette's. Reference is made to interview transcripts, follow up conversations, personal observation and documents generated at the time during the implementation of the revised pay scheme. I also contrast the views of the interviewees and comment on them in light of developments at a national level.

6.2 WHO WAS INTERVIEWED AND WHAT WERE THEY ASKED?

A total of nine interviews, a follow up interview with the Bursar and several follow up conversations were conducted. The interviewees comprised the Head (6 years at St Bernadette's at time of interview), Bursar, Deputy Head (3 years), another senior manager (3 years; Chair of Salaries Committee – see below), two heads of department (6 and 14 years), two teachers (5 and 14 years) with or without responsibilities and a Governor. They were chosen to represent a reasonable cross section of those staff most directly involved in and affected by the proposed pay reforms. The majority were selected after reading the minutes of the Salaries Committee set up by the Head to draft proposals in response to the developments in pay in the state sector. Four of the seven members of the committee were interviewed. However, it was also important to interview recipients of the new scheme who did not have the insights provided by such membership. The most significant omission from the list of interviewees was one of the committee members who was removed from the interviewing schedule at the request of the Head. She was concerned that a successful restructuring of salaries be allowed to bed down without reopening debate among the minority of less cooperative staff (see Chapter Two). Further details of the interviewees
are summarised in the table below and in Appendix 4 for a timeline of interviews.

### 6.2.1 Summary of Interviewees at St Bernadette’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee designation</th>
<th>Position/subject</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Years teaching</th>
<th>Years at St B’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Head/Physics</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Head (KF)</td>
<td>Deputy Head/Religious Studies</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Manager (TJ)</td>
<td>Head of Sixth/Chemistry</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursar</td>
<td>Bursar</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JR</td>
<td>Director of Music/Music</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Head of Department/Economics</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Teacher/Geography</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Teacher/Chemistry</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor (BS)</td>
<td>Governor/Finance</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the questions that provided the semi-structured interview template were broadly similar for interviews at both schools, although they were refined as interviews progressed and drafting those to be asked at St Bernadette’s was influenced by my experience at St Edward’s. Equally influential was my growing knowledge of the school resulting from much informal discussion with staff and reading of school level documents. This allowed me to focus questions on key incidents, themes and coincidences in each school. Reference will also be made to certain key documents including the minutes of the Salaries Committee, the text of the Head’s PowerPoint presentation on her proposals and the subsequent summary of the refined proposals issued to all staff jointly by Head and Bursar.
The questions fell into four broad sections as they did at St Edward's: considering staff culture alongside the notion of PRP; an examination of the context and motives behind the scene; how this was communicated to staff and the process of implementation itself, including an identification of the key actors in that process; finally an evaluation of the scheme, its impacts to date and some speculation on the future (some of which will be addressed in the postscript to follow). A broader question was also asked towards the end of each interview focussing on the extent to which the independent sector does follow and should be following state initiatives. The questions were deliberately open, seeking to facilitate each respondent making the points that were important to them. This was particularly important at St Bernadette's, where I had less personal experience at the date of the interviews, in order to allow the construction of a textured appreciation of the context within which these changes were made. Issues that had not been anticipated were followed up and key themes were pursued where initial questions did not evoke clear responses.

I will start, as in the previous chapter, by outlining the main themes that emerged from my interviewing at St Bernadette's. I will also examine the answers of participants holding differing posts within the hierarchy of the institution (see also Tabular Summary: St Bernadette's – Hierarchical, Appendix 3 below). The table gives an overview of interviewee responses. Staff are categorised as senior (SMT/Governors), middle management (heads of department/house) or teaching staff. For St Bernadette's this makes a total of five senior staff, two middle managers and two other teachers. The broad categories of questions are listed across the horizontal axis, with emergent themes from interview responses occupying the vertical axis. This approach facilitates an analysis of responses according to position within the school hierarchy. For each question area, the number of staff in each category who mentioned a particular theme can be identified and compared. These findings are outlined below.
6.2.2 Participant Observation

It was necessary to take account of my position within the institution. I was recently arrived at St Bernadette’s as a senior manager. I had to be sensitive to my new environment and consider the impact that my position within the hierarchy had on interviewees. On the plus side I gained wide access to colleagues on the senior management team and I believe they felt comfortable discussing the issues frankly in my company. However, I felt obligated to respect the Head’s request to omit one member of staff from my list of potential interviewees. This matter is dealt with below.

Equally, I have to allow that other members of staff may have been more reticent with me as I had not had sufficient time in the school to build developed relationships based on mutual trust. However, the frank and full responses I obtained and the tone of interviews, even with younger and perhaps somewhat dissatisfied members of staff such as MG suggest that this did not fundamentally undermine the data gathered. Furthermore, I was able to offset these concerns to some extent by cross-referencing all interview data with school documents and the minutes of the staff salaries committee.

It is worth observing that the events I studied had already taken place at St Bernadette’s. I was therefore more in the position as observer than participant, albeit one who held a post in the institution. This helps locate my position on a spectrum between ‘complete participant’ and ‘complete observer’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995: p107). This contrasts to some extent with the situation described at St Edward’s, where my research was taking place during the implementation of changes to the pay scheme and I was involved in the meetings that were discussed in the interviews.
6.3 STAFF CULTURE AND THRESHOLD PAY

Only three of nine interviewees used the word collegial in describing the existing staff culture at St Bernadette’s but three others used words such as ‘friendly’, ‘tight knit’ and ‘supportive’. The remaining two respondents (the Governor felt unable to comment) described the staff as ‘hard working’ and ‘committed’. However, the Head referred to ‘a residual distrust of management’ and another member of staff identified ‘a small core very aware of conditions’ (CE), while a head of department observed that the staff body was ‘easily upset but very well consulted’ (JR). All eight used positive descriptors when considering motivation: four used the term ‘hard working’ and the others talked of ‘commitment’ and ‘having the school’s interests at heart’. No one identified the introduction of a new pay scheme as having a negative impact on the prevailing staff culture. The chair of the Salaries Committee made this point explicitly. One senior manager (KF) did feel that the new pay arrangements had led to a redefinition of the differentials between middle managers (heads of house and heads of department) and other staff. She felt there might remain some tension between these two groups of middle managers as to the details of that aspect of the pay settlement (see the following section analysing the pay structure through oral and documentary evidence for further detail). The absence of other major developments of the sort observed at St Edward’s makes evaluation relatively more straightforward although there were some events and issues that are dealt with below including a recent inspection, impending restructuring of the physical staff room, turnover of staff and the issue of the tutor role.
6.4 VIEW OF PRP

I asked each member of staff what they thought of the notion of performance related pay (PRP). Where necessary, I offered the same definition as to the staff interviewed at St Edward’s (as outlined in Chapter Two above). The respondents were more comfortable discussing whether such an approach was suitable for St Bernadette’s, although three did not rule it out as an approach in some educational contexts. These included a teacher, a senior manager and the Bursar. All nine of those questioned felt a PRP approach was inappropriate for St Bernadette’s. The Head preferred payment by task rather than based on performance within a task but with ‘a bar’ or minimum standard beyond which all would be expected to progress. Four respondents were overtly critical of the state scheme, while three referred to the high quality of staff and results as reasons why such an approach was ill suited, even if, as one senior manager observed ‘linking targets and salary was good but not feasible’ (TJ). Another member of staff who agreed that PRP ‘is a good idea’ went on to describe the state application form as ‘a nightmare’ and concluded such an approach was ‘not right here’ (CE).

The Governor observed that she ‘didn’t really understand the state approach’ and a forthright member of the Salaries Committee objected, ‘you can’t assess teachers fairly... in industry it is much easier to reward performance because good performance will result in profit. How do you assess profit of a child?’ (MG). This echoed the comments of BD from St Edward’s cited above (Chapter Five). She went on to reject payment by results, arguing that the inputs were many and varied and impossible to quantify, leaving the contribution of each teacher as an uncertain variable. She was also concerned with the potentially divisive impact of a PRP scheme, which could lead to a situation where, ‘You are there on a divide and rule... I do not like the idea of any member of staff being restricted in what they say to their colleagues... so I think that it could be divisive’. Here she was expressing concern that an unconvincing set of
criteria for awarding PRP could make staff uncomfortable sharing
information about their pay awards or lead to discontent where staff who
did not receive an award felt unjustly treated.

In total, four interviewees felt that the introduction of a PRP scheme
would have proven divisive, the Governor felt it was unnecessary when
an appraisal scheme was in place. The Head did observe that her post
was paid on performance but agreed that payment by performance was
'probably quite divisive'. She also related an experience from a recent
meeting of the Boarding Schools Association where a Head had been
extolling the virtues of his threshold scheme involving an application
form which took six hours to complete and two hours to analyse for each
member of staff who applied. The Head inquired whether any staff had
failed the standard and was told all had passed. In many ways this
reflects the situation described at St Edward's above. 'Why go through
all that just to prove your staff are doing what they should be doing?' In
her view appraisal and 'continual lesson observation' could achieve
similar results with far less wasted effort.

From the nature of the responses and the language used, it was
apparent that none of those being interviewed felt that the pay scheme
adopted at St Bernadette's contained any PRP dimension. Phrases such
as 'would have caused dissent' and 'no performance element' (TJ)
confirm this conclusion. Indeed when asked to describe the St
Bernadette's scheme, six respondents stated explicitly that it was not a
PRP scheme. Senior managers tended to refer to specific details of the
scheme to describe it, pointing out its intention to establish an 8%
differential between the state pay scales and those used at St
Bernadette's for all staff, with in addition, all of those reaching the old
point 9 (new point 6) being automatically put across the threshold, thus
maintaining the differential. They also acknowledged that the pay review
had provided an opportunity to restructure allowances for middle
managers, which was something the Salaries Committee had felt
needed addressing. Indeed this issue was raised by senior management
at the preliminary meeting called with staff to discuss the establishment of such a committee. This suggests that the Governors and management, just as much as the committee members who were subsequently appointed, felt this was an area that needed addressing and saw the pay review was an opportunity.

The only direct reference to PRP in the minutes of the Salaries Committee is in the form of a note from the Head in response to the statement, 'The committee felt we should not detach ourselves from the state pay spine'. She asked, 'Should we therefore have PRP?' The first reference to PRP thereafter is two months later and turned out to be a misuse of the term! In the following week’s meeting the phrase was replaced with 'threshold assessment', an assessment that in their proposals would contain no performance element nor require any application. It would be automatically awarded as staff reached the old point 9, to maintain an 8% differential in pay between St Bernadette's staff and those in the state sector at an equivalent level. Only the caveat that all full-time staff should be tutors was added in the final proposals, in response to the extended discussion in the Salaries Committee as to whether a tutor’s allowance could be used to provide a part-threshold payment to less senior staff to facilitate recruitment and retention. This was not identified by any interviewees as a major issue nor as a cause of discontent. Thus, although it does provide evidence of some quid pro quo being required in exchange for the new pay structure, it was largely the formalisation of existing practice and its extension to the few ambiguous cases of staff who had not previously undertaken this role.

The Head observed that in the state scheme almost everyone had passed and thus PRP could not have realised any significant change in performance. In fact, her interpretation of Government motivation was that ‘they wanted to pay teachers more…but didn’t want it to be an inflationary measure’. She was not prepared to introduce 'a pretend paper exercise' at St Bernadette's 'just because they (the Government) didn't want to pay nurses more that year'. Five members of staff
identified ‘transparency’ or ‘fairness’ as a perceived benefit of the new pay structure. All nine interviewees also mentioned maintaining a
differential between the state sector and St Bernadette’s as an important outcome and one that made all ‘staff feel valued’ (KF) (see below for further detail). Four of the nine interviewees also noted the clarification of responsibility allowances for middle managers as important.

6.5 CONTEXT IN WHICH NEW SCHEME INTRODUCED, MOTIVES FOR INTRODUCTION OF NEW SCHEME, PRESENTATIONS MADE DURING INTRODUCTION OF NEW SCHEME

When asked to identify the context within which the school’s pay reforms were mooted, all nine respondents suggested that state policy was the determining factor. Four mentioned incoming staff from the state sector as a factor contributing to general staff awareness of the measures being taken in the state sector. All nine saw pay developments at St Bernadette’s in the context of a ‘marketplace’ for teaching staff, the need to remain competitive in recruitment and to ensure retention. The Head’s recollection is that she and the Governors were discussing the need to restructure pay in Summer 1999, a clear year before one member of staff e-mailed her asking what the school intended to do in response to the introduction of threshold in the state sector. By summer 2001, St Bernadette’s had implemented its own response (the same time as implementation of the threshold scheme took place at St Edward’s and after a similar gestation period). Although only two interviewees overtly mentioned staff awareness as an impetus for the changes, it is implicit in all their responses as all nine refer to retention as an important factor. A good summary of the responses is provided by one member of staff (CE) who commented succinctly, ‘I think it was to maintain a differential with the state sector so that St Bernadette’s could retain staff and attract new staff here’. This issue of transferability between sectors is an important
emergent theme and is considered in more detail below in Chapter Seven.

Timing was singled out by the Head as a significant factor in influencing the form of the new pay scheme. She pointed out that St Bernadette’s implemented its scheme a year after the introduction of PRP in the state sector. Commenting on those independent schools that implemented a scheme at the same time as the state sector, she observed ‘I think that independent schools who did it too early, that is at the same time as the state sector, probably went down the threshold payment path’.

Nevertheless, she admits, it was not possible to do nothing; ‘I had (new) members of staff who were coming who already had the threshold before we made the change’. By the time St Bernadette’s was openly discussing a new pay scheme, it was apparent that the majority of state teachers were going to successfully pass the threshold. The Salaries Committee minutes of 11th January 2001 note that, ‘93% of teachers who applied for the threshold have been given it out of 197,000 applications’.

Five members of staff mention ‘fairness’ or ‘transparency’ as motives for the new pay scheme, including those who identified the need to address rewards for responsibility as a dimension of the scheme. Most insistent on this point was TJ, chair of the Salaries Committee and a senior manager. In her own words from Summary of conclusions from the Staff Salaries Committee – March 2001, ‘Although we discussed many issues, most of our work has involved looking at the possibility of a more transparent and differentiated (her emphasis) pay scale. We felt that some differentials, e.g. between staff at the top of the main scale at point 9 and staff with considerable responsibilities such as HoDs (Heads of department), were too small’. This summary document was distributed to staff and invited comments. Three letters were received, two of which touched upon the proposals for heads of department and heads of house. One staff member (MG), who was neither form of middle manager but was currently a year head stated, ‘I also believe that heads
of house, heads of department, director of studies and heads of sections (year heads) should be on a par. Apart from recognising their work and responsibility it would attack the prevailing view of cliques, in-groups and them/us, and instead bind together those in key positions'. It is worth noting that she was a year head at this time. The second relevant letter, after making a case for a specific post of responsibility held by the writer, observed, ‘I am surprised that heads of house would have a lower allowance than some heads of department (all, in fact). I feel that the role of head of house and the attendant responsibility are the *sine qua non* of academic success, and to that extent need to be rated at least with heads of department’. The correspondent was not a head of house and her comments failed to take account of the provision of free accommodation for heads of house. The earlier letter does not seem to have had any impact on subsequent proposals.

To gain a fuller picture of the St Bernadette’s proposals, it is instructive to examine the PowerPoint presentation ultimately given by the Head to the full staff in early May 2001. This was described as ‘clear and effective’ by the Governor and by a head of department as ‘good, clear communication by PowerPoint, giving all the information to staff’ (JR). When asked to assess the effectiveness of communication during the deliberations over pay, all nine felt that this had been well done and well received. One senior manager said she had, ‘picked up very little complaint’. The Head produced her document in response to the findings of the Salaries Committee and presented it first to the Salaries Committee. Once they had approved it, she presented to the Governors and once they had ‘edited’ (BS) it and agreed it was then put to the whole staff.

The presentation begins by reiterating the background events of the previous year, ‘Teachers on point 9 in state sector offered PRP and an associated ‘threshold payment’ of £2,000’. It then outlines the response from independent schools, ‘many independent schools pay higher salaries than the state sector. In some sense, the state sector is catching
up with pay in the independent sector but independent sector wants to maintain some differential. Many schools are using this opportunity to have a salary review'. The presentation moves on to identify the underpinning principles of the pay review, 'To take into account recommendations of Salaries Committee and response from staff, to ensure that if any change to the pay structure is made no existing staff lose out, to continue to share the success of the school with the staff and to reward staff for their professionalism, their work and their commitment; and to ensure appropriate retention and recruitment'. No mention is made of a need to extract greater contribution from staff in exchange for seeking to maintain such a differential. After a breakdown of the impact of threshold payments on differentials between state and St Bernadette's, the Head addressed the fact that staff would compare themselves with the state sector and this would show teachers over point 9 that they only earned 3% over the state scale if St Bernadette's did not respond. Given the commitment expected of staff this could lead to a loss of many teachers above point 9 and make recruitment at point 9 difficult. She then set out the school's proposal to achieve a differential of 8% through a 'St Bernadette's allowance' but made it clear they could not achieve the existing (pre state threshold) 11%. This allowance, as explained in the minutes of the Salaries Committee, October 4th 2000 was in acknowledgement of the extra time put in by all teaching staff on weekend duties at this full boarding school.

The next section of the presentation dealt with the proposals for middle managers. Referring to the wishes of the Salaries Committee, the Bursar observed 'they wanted... to increase the heads of department and heads of house. That was their main thrust in all this and it was certain the school felt it was necessary also'. The proposals in the presentation were: 'point 9 + threshold + St Bernadette's allowance + heads of department/heads of house allowance' providing heads of department (including their allowance of £4,200) with an extra 7.8% and heads of house (including their allowance of £3,600) with an additional 6.9%. It should be noted that the latter also receive free accommodation. The
presentation ended with two brief sections. The first pointed out, ‘These proposals will cost the school an additional £100,000 which will be found in increased fees, in increased letting over summer... things which will not hurt us in terms of conditions, budget, staffing levels and so on’. Finally some details were left for future discussion. Should the allowance be broken down into a St Bernadette’s allowance of £1,400 and a tutor allowance of £600 – which would obligate all staff who wished to reach the pay scale beyond point 9 to be tutors? Should the £2,000 allowance be a fixed percentage rather than a fixed sum? What about the issue of PRP? These questions were put to the Salaries Committee. They opted for an 8% allowance rather than a fixed sum. Some members of the Committee, notably MG wanted the £600 tutor’s allowance paid to all staff from September with £1,400 being paid once staff reached point 9. There was not agreement on this issue, although the chair commented in her summary, ‘We did not reach complete agreement about this. We do not wish to jeopardise the rest of the package by making suggestions to change this’. The urge to maintain a differential is another major emergent theme that requires further consideration in the conclusion, Chapter Seven.

In June 2001 the Bursar distributed an outline of the proposed pay structure, clarifying a few of the remaining issues: ‘All full time staff will be expected to be tutors: there will be no separate allowance for tutors’ and ‘St Bernadette’s allowance (will be) 8%’. A final comment addressed the issue of PRP, ‘Many independent schools have introduced PRP before awarding a salary increase to those teachers on the equivalent of point 9. St Bernadette’s governors wish to reward... St Bernadette’s teaching staff without introducing PRP at this stage. Discussions will continue in the future on the issue of PRP’ (developments since this date will be dealt with in the postscript below). From the Bursar’s point of view, the process ‘brought staff in ... a good communication exercise, (the Head) explained it very well’. All the interviewees echoed this view including the Head who felt the presentation went well and that staff were ‘happy’ with the proposals.
Since the Salaries Committee was wound up upon completion of its duties, a staff member has been invited to represent staff concerns to the Governors on a regular basis and the old staff Social Committee has been reformulated as a staff forum, giving the opportunity for staff to air concerns and provide an additional conduit for the exchange of ideas with senior management. This development echoes the establishment of a Staff Committee at St Edward’s, similarly acting as an additional channel of communication. The termly meetings are preceded by an agenda of suggested discussion topics and minutes are produced. These developments were not, as far as I have been able to establish, as a direct result of the pay reforms but do suggest an appetite for continued input into discussions from the staff, whose representatives expressed a desire for the establishment of a new body.

It is worth reflecting on how all of the above relates to NPM. In the public sector, NPM strikes at the heart of the relationship between professionals and managers. New Labour’s educational reforms have included a strong element of such an approach, seeking to increase the accountability of professional practitioners to managers, classroom teachers to head teachers. For the state sector, this has much to do with resource allocation decisions (Flynn, 2002: p19). Is it any different in the fee-paying sector? Clearly, a majority of respondents at St Bernadette’s were opposed to an NPM approach either as applied in the state sector or as a mechanism in their particular school. Fear of divisiveness was mentioned by four respondents and contrasted with the St Bernadette’s scheme that avoided payment by performance *per se*. However, the existence of a marketplace for educational services was widely recognised at St Bernadette’s. The creation of quasi-markets is a common approach in NPM (Flynn, 2002: p19) and seeks to establish a context within which private sector management strategies may be applied in the public sector in an attempt to improve the way services are provided. The Head’s presentation, outlined above, stresses the need to maintain a differential to staff and a desire to seize the opportunity to increase the transparency of the school’s pay structure, along with the
need to allow for transferability between sectors for recruitment purposes. Thus, the response of St Bernadette's recognised the existence of competition in formulating a new pay structure but laid only minimal emphasis on increased accountability.

6.6 PROCESS BY WHICH PAY CHANGES AGREED AND THE KEY ACTORS INVOLVED

Most matters relating to the process of introduction have been dealt with above and in particular in the section dealing with institution level documents. As there was no application required from staff, there was no commensurate increase in paperwork or any issues of anxiety as to whether an application would be successful. From the Head's perspective, the changes were the result of sixteen months' discussions, the work of the Salaries Committee and a Governors' sub-committee. The Bursar credits the initial idea that change was needed to the Head with him providing the necessary information to the Salaries Committee for their deliberations. The Deputy Head (KF) felt the proposals were largely shaped by TJ as chair and the Salaries Committee, while she herself was 'hardly aware' of their deliberations prior to the presentation. Her relative lack of awareness may, in part, be explained by the existence of a separate pay scale for Deputy Heads, although, as a whole school management issue, her lack of recollection was surprising to the interviewer.

The chair of the Committee described its members as 'active' and felt it played a substantial role. She describes the setting up of the Committee as follows, 'we had a meeting with all staff who wanted to be informed about it... and we asked people to nominate themselves or nominate each other for the Committee and we said we wanted a spread of staff... and that we wanted six people'. TJ herself was nominated as chair by the Head. As a result of the invitation, just six nominations were received
and so these six became the Committee 'by default'. They comprised two heads of department, three members of staff, two of which had additional responsibilities and one younger member of staff not eligible for the threshold (MG). This last member was very active in arguing a tutor's allowance should be granted to all staff and this position is, perhaps, explicable by her own place on the pay scale (and as a representative of those others in a similar position). 'I felt we got it right at the top but that we didn't really get it right at the bottom'. She felt cost of living issues for younger staff were insufficiently taken into account and that this could lead to recruitment and retention problems in this area. Indeed there has been a significant turnover of young staff over the past three years although the reasons for moves are difficult to quantify. All nine respondents do identify the Salaries Committee as an important element; they all also specify the Head. Five refer to a key role for the Governors and seven also recognise the input of the Bursar.

TJ describes the actual process of formulating the new pay scheme, 'we presented our report to (the Head) who formulated her own ideas... and then she came back to the Committee and we all came to a mind, I think, as to what should be presented to the Governors, then it was presented to the staff'. This chimes with the Head's recollection and that of the Governor interviewed, although the Governor does refer to 'editing' of the Head's PowerPoint presentation, 'we did quite a lot of tinkering with the actual wording... we wanted the wording to be plain to be honest' before it was presented to the whole staff. However, she does not suggest the contents were substantively changed. She also states that it was the Governors who asked the Head to set up a Staff Salaries Committee. The Head agrees it was initially the Governors who were pushing her to respond to the developments in the state sector but, as described above, she wanted to resist a hasty action. This led to long-term discussions between her and the Governors, particularly in sub-committee. It was here that the idea for staff involvement emerged and the Governors were instrumental in ensuring the Head did not chair the Committee, to avoid the risk that she 'might be bounced into something'
as she put it in interview. However, they were also clear that they wanted it to be chaired by a senior manager. In conversations with staff, I have picked up a sense of initial resentment at the appointment of TJ but both Committee members and other staff are much more positive about her role when considering it in light of the final scheme. Indeed, MG, the youngest Committee member commented that TJ, ‘Handled it very well... she would allow discussion to go and wouldn’t intervene too much... I actually think the Salaries Committee was very well balanced’.

6.7 COINCIDENCE OF OTHER FACTORS – INSPECTION, STAFF ROOM RESTRUCTURING, TURNOVER OF STAFF, TUTORS ISSUE

A number of other issues, mostly unrelated, were developing during the discussions on and implementation of St Bernadette's new pay arrangements. Two interviewees referred to the recent inspection completed in late May 2001 but did not elaborate beyond commenting that it went very well and that the final report was very positive. Upon reflection, I suspect they saw this as an important part of the context, providing an external affirmation of the staff's worth prior to the discussion of new pay arrangements. The Bursar was very concerned that plans to shrink the staff room to make space for a Development Office could have affected staff morale and made them less receptive to the pay proposals. However, he was the only respondent to even mention this development which, in fact, only came to fruition a good eighteen months after the implementation of the new pay scheme. Three of those interviewed suggested turnover of staff as an issue but without making the connection to the pay review explicitly. Indeed one of the teachers (CE) said, ‘I don’t think we’ve had a bad record on retention... it’s slightly early to say whether it’s worked as far as attracting staff is concerned’. In fact a number of appointments have subsequently been made (2002-2004) drawing about equally from state schools and independent schools. It may also be noted that NQTs have applied for
posts and in at least two cases been appointed, suggesting some of MG’s concerns may have been overstated.

The issue of tutors is connected with the pay scheme. St Bernadette's requires 45 tutors to operate its existing system from a full-time staff of on average 55 (out of 75 total teaching staff). Hence, it was convenient to work in a requirement to act as a tutor into the pay reform, although there was an existing, if informal, expectation that staff would take on the role as part of their ‘normal duties’. Three interviewees raised the issue, although one member of the senior management team felt the pay settlement was simply an opportunity to, ‘confirm the tutor situation as per existing contracts’ (KF). As this is the one area in which one might identify an element of managerialism, it is worthy of attention. As has already been mentioned, MG had a great deal to say on the matter but her objections appended to the final minutes of the Salaries Committee ‘weren’t looked at very closely’ according to the Head. There was acceptance from the Committee that the tutor issue should be addressed but some disagreement over how this should be done. In the end, the Committee did not fully support the arguments for a £600 tutor’s allowance below point 9 and were clear that, if it were agreed, it should be subsumed within the threshold payment above point 9. As we have seen above, in the end, the expectation to be a tutor was asserted but the idea of a separate allowance was rejected. As a whole, the staff body accepted this without comment and the system continues with relatively little problem to the present. A recent (2004) review of the tutor system has affirmed its central role within the structure of the school, although it has proved difficult in the past two years to appoint year heads, suggesting that MG may have had a valid point about remuneration at this level. However, discussion with those in post suggests it is the need to perform evening duties rather than the level of allowance that is a disincentive.
6.8 EVALUATION OF THE NEW PAY SCHEME AND THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE

When asked if the scheme was a success the Head felt it had been ‘very successful’. In the paper distributed by her and the Bursar to all teaching staff after her PowerPoint presentation, dated 10 June 2001, was the following invitation, ‘We welcome comments from teaching staff before the governors take a final decision on our proposals’. This request was highlighted in bold and surrounded by a border for further emphasis. All that was received by way of a response was two letters of thanks. The Head’s interpretation is that no complaints, no comment and a little thanks constitute a major success in so sensitive an area. It is instructive to compare her perception with the other eight interviewees. In every case, whether senior manager or member of the Committee or recipient of the new pay structure, the assessment was positive. One senior manager (KF) commented, ‘The staff felt valued’. A head of department (JR) recalled ‘we were pleased at the time and it’s just not an issue now’. The Governor was ‘pleasantly surprised’ that the proposals were ‘unanimously accepted by the staff’. From the Committee MG remembered ‘a buzz’ with the proposals that were ‘better than we could have hoped’. DS concurred that ‘the Committee felt valued by the outcome’.

Five of the nine, including the Head suggested the second threshold as an issue for the future. The Bursar was aware that criteria would have to be decided for implementation of a further stage. This has subsequently been dealt with and will be touched upon in the postscript below. However, at the time of the interviews CE felt it was important because ‘it has already been awarded in the state sector’. Three members of staff thought recruitment and retention would be a good indicator of future success and two expressed particular concern for young teachers at the bottom of the scale. Two also suggested the provision of more staff housing on site as a key area that might address concerns over affordability of the area, particularly for young staff. This issue has
subsequently (2004) been dealt with through the purchase of a large property for conversion into staff accommodation.

Finally, in light of the divergent way in which the two case study schools had responded to developments in the state sector, I encouraged each interviewee to consider a wider question. Should independent schools follow state initiatives when they are not legally binding? For the Head, 'We've been able to look at, examine and then adapt educational developments where they have been good'. She elaborated, 'I think one of the brilliant things about being independent is that you can wait to see if it's working and then you can bring it in if it suits your school'. She observed that many London day schools had staff clamouring for an accredited threshold scheme because they wanted to be able to move easily between sectors. 'If I had a staff room who were saying that we would probably have to do threshold or do PRP and do our threshold based on that.' In terms of levels of pay, 'Should we copy the state sector in pay? We're going to have to... Is it easy to recruit from the state sector at the moment? Well, I'm trying to do it at the moment with this maths teacher, and she's probably getting paid more than we would have originally been able to offer her'.

In contrast, the Governor (BS) took a long time in discussion to accept that there were any areas where the independent sector was constrained by initiatives in the state sector. Although she did eventually comment, having considered curriculum and pay, 'So we're not independent, that's an interesting one'. Seven respondents felt that the independent sector could never really move too far away from the state on pay and almost all mentioned the curriculum with reference to standardised examinations, university entry and inspections, albeit under the auspices of the Independent Schools Inspectorate – provided their regime continues to be approved by Ofsted.
6.9 HIERARCHICAL ANALYSIS

Examining the above data hierarchically, making use of the table above, reveals all levels of respondent viewing the staff culture as positive although there was less reference to a collegial atmosphere, perhaps because it has been placed under less pressure. This is shown from the absence of other impacts coinciding with pay reforms. Two senior managers and one teacher were prepared to concede that PRP might be positive in other schools but every respondent, regardless of level was opposed to its introduction at St Bernadette's.

All interviewees at all levels identified the defining context of pay reform at St Bernadette's as the new state pay policy introducing a threshold beyond which an additional increment of some £2,000 was to be available. Again, all staff saw the need for St Bernadette's to remain competitive for staff in a region where recruitment was not always easy given the high cost of living, as the key motivation for a change in the school's pay structure. All also agreed that retention of existing staff in this competitive region was an equally important motivation. Two senior managers also suggested staff reactions to state developments played a role, in contrast with St Edward's where this was seen as a key contributor by six of ten interviewees in all three categories.

The St Bernadette's scheme, requiring no changes to existing contractual obligations, was not seen as a managerialist strategy by any interviewee. However, half the respondents, including three senior managers and two middle managers identified an attempt to increase the fairness or transparency of the school's pay system as an additional motivation. Interestingly, neither of the teachers mentioned this, suggesting little was made of the point during the introduction of the new structure by management of the school. Nor was any anxiety engendered by the changes as no forms of evidence were required of staff in order to qualify for the additional increment. The introductory phase of the policy was not dogged by problems of incorrect figures or
poor communication between senior managers and staff. Indeed, no interviewees at any level had any criticisms in this area.

Asked to identify the key actors in the introduction of the new pay scheme, all interviewees identified the Head and all interviewees apart from the Bursar, somewhat surprisingly, cited the Governors. Every interviewee also acknowledged the key role played by the Staff Salaries Committee. Other factors mentioned as significant by respondents included the emphasis on the expectation that full-time staff would fulfil their contractually agreed tutor role, the recent and successful inspection and significant staff turnover in recent years. However, none of these factors were brought up by a majority of senior managers or teachers, although staff turnover was highlighted by both middle managers. This last fact may reflect that both of these individuals had been involved in replacing staff within their areas of responsibility in recent times.

There was no delay in implementation of the pay scheme once it had been devised, so no criticism was voiced over the introduction of the new structure. Looking ahead, two senior managers, both middle managers and one teacher expressed their interest as to the likely response required by the second phase of threshold payments in the state sector, effectively establishing a further point on the pay scale. A similar number of interviewees, including two senior managers, one middle manager and both teachers felt the impact of the new pay structure on recruitment and retention could only be judged when a significant period of time had passed and one teacher voiced concern that little had been done for teachers lower down the salary scale. Finally, when asked to evaluate the whole process, everyone, regardless of role, described it in positive terms.
6.10 CONCLUSION

The responses above demonstrate how limited a part, at least overtly, the issue of PRP has played at St Bernadette’s. The context for a pay review was, it is clear from the evidence, the introduction of a threshold payment in the state sector. But discussions at St Bernadette’s remained centred around maintaining a pay differential between the state scale and the school above the old point 9 and below. Furthermore, even when the issue of PRP was raised by the Head, it was ignored by the Salaries Committee. Indeed, there is evidence that they never really looked in detail at the rationale behind the state scheme, remaining confused as to the meaning of PRP right up to the end of their deliberations. Their objections to the state scheme centred around the form filling, the requirement to prove what was already being done and the implication of distrust seen as inherent in such a process. The Salaries Committee looked at the strengths and weaknesses of the existing St Bernadette’s pay structure and discussed the desirability of the school scale remaining attached or shadowing the common professional scale. They spent a lot of time looking at differentiation according to responsibilities, particularly for middle managers. They were also concerned that the outcome be both transparent and sufficiently flexible to allow for the effective running of the school. On the other hand, pay differentials have to be seen in light of the impact of PRP on state sector salaries.

When interviewees were asked directly about PRP, they were not unanimously negative. However, not a single respondent felt that such an approach was appropriate at St Bernadette’s and neither did any of them express any sense that such a scheme was ever mooted during the pay deliberations. There was broad agreement that the Head, Governors and Salaries Committee, assisted by the Bursar were instrumental in producing the final pay scheme. However, fewer respondents were aware of the dynamic between these key actors. The Salaries Committee was influential and many staff have expressed this
idea to me. They suggested policy and made suggestions as to the possible restructuring of pay for particular posts of responsibility. However, their ideas were processed by the Head into her proposals along with the substantial addition of threshold pay and presented back to the Committee. There was never any suggestion that the Committee would be the final arbiters of the new scheme. Indeed, the approval of the Governors was an absolute requirement – which they gave after editing the wording. It is instructive to reflect on the words of MG describing the Committee’s reaction to the Head’s presentation to them. The proposals were, ‘better than we could have hoped’. At this point, they became staff members awaiting management’s decision.

It is also worthy of note that the school was in a position financially to please staff with their proposals. The school has a very specific niche. Fees are high. It has received a positive inspection report and its roll is full. As the Head observed at the time, ‘These proposals will cost the school an additional £100,000’. However, through fees and increased summer lettings, the working conditions of staff could remain largely unchanged. Only a formalisation of the requirement of all staff to perform a tutorial role beyond their teaching commitment was required in exchange for the additional payment as outlined above. Not all schools in the independent sector were in a similarly strong position to respond to the rise in state sector pay above point 9.

Further analysis of this chapter and the preceding one on St Edward’s will take place below (see Chapter Seven). This chapter will also consider whether a hierarchical analysis of responses sheds any further light on attitudes to pay, perspectives on the motivation for change, influence over the process, views of the scheme settled on and thoughts of the future. This will include a consideration of any redistribution of power and control. Of particular interest is the effect the new salary structure has on each Head’s power: is it increased, decreased or does it remain largely unaffected? Do they have greater or less discretion to determine salary?
CHAPTER SEVEN: FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In this final chapter, I will attempt to answer the research questions set out above in Chapter One. In each case I will have regard for the national context, the meso level of unions and independent sector representative bodies such as the Girls' Schools association (GSA) and Headmasters and Headmistresses Conference (HMC), along with further analysis of the school-level data generated by my research. At this micro level I will continue to consider interview responses from each school through a hierarchical model (Cann et al, 2000) that categorises respondents into three broad categories: senior managers and Governors; middle managers; teaching staff. This is necessarily crude but with small institutions any further division would render any emergent picture an impossible mosaic. Clearly these are overlapping categories as heads of department and heads of house, not to mention some senior managers have substantial teaching responsibilities. Nevertheless, in attempting to identify and utilise the managerial hierarchy and plot their responses against their positions, I believe it is possible to shed light on a development regarded by many as an example of 'managerialism' or NPM in action. Within this approach I hope to reveal something of the cultures of the institutions, motivations for change and how change managers and other key actors operated within or towards these cultures. Tabular summaries of the hierarchical analysis and comments on what is revealed by this approach are provided in Chapter Five for St Edward's and Chapter Six for St Bernadette's.
7.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS - FINDINGS

7.2.1 *What political and ideological conditions gave rise to the need for pay reform in the independent sector?*

As indicated in my introduction to the research questions in Chapter One, this question deals with the indirect consequences of the state policy on the independent sector. This sector is related to the state education sector (here the focus is secondary schools) but distinct in its governance both at the meso level of representative bodies who oversee inspections through the Independent Schools Inspectorate (ISI) and at the micro level of each individual school albeit far from the wholly independent sector common usage implies, as illustrated by the degree of influence exacted by the state over the standards applied by ISI, common examination specifications and the publication of results-based league tables.

The development of the state scheme has been dealt with in both political and ideological terms above. However, it is worth reiterating the meso level developments that have influenced the formulation of responses at the level of each case study school. Relatively early on in the development of the state policy, ATL, ‘the largest professional association representing teachers in the independent sector’ (ATL, 2004) was advising cautious acceptance of threshold pay and offering advice on the range of schemes emerging in the independent sector. In 2001 GSA reported 80 member schools investigating the possibility of adopting the state scheme and making use of the assessors provided. However, other schools were seeking to break any link between state pay scales above the old point 9, simply adding £2,000 to their upper pay scale, or playing a waiting game to see if any form of consensus emerged within the sector. It was within this climate of uncertainty about the best way forward that each case study school had to formulate a response (or not) to the state’s introduction of threshold pay.
At St Edward’s all ten interviewees identified the development of a new state pay regime, specifically the introduction of threshold pay as the determining context within which the school's pay reforms took place. Two senior managers including the Head stressed the ‘minimal’ nature of the PRP dimension in the St Edward’s scheme as the link between pupil results and passing the threshold was not a part of the school scheme. However, this section was substituted with one that required evidence of commitment to the extra-curricular activities of the school. This was an area of concern to senior management which had already led them to tasking me with writing a report on the scale, take-up and contributions of staff to extra-curricular activities.

Crucial to understanding the attitude of St Edward’s staff towards both the state threshold scheme and that introduced in situ was a change in perception regarding the state scheme. Initially staff were hostile to any hint of PRP, although Governors were interested in maximising returns through its use as the Head admits. In conventional terms this represents a productivity side to PRP, not in terms of results, but in consolidating staff duties. This was when ‘the original idea...was that very few people would get it’ (BD). However, once ‘the goalposts changed in the state sector’ (BD), staff requested equivalence in pay ‘wanting to...have the same opportunity as the state sector’ (GS). All ten of those interviewed acknowledge the importance of the revelation that no quotas were to be imposed on passing the threshold in state schools. Six respondents drawn from all three categories of staff cited staff requests for change as a key element in the introduction of the school scheme and these included the Head. All of the above confirms the primacy of context in shaping policies (Ball, 1994) and that ‘policies are also processes and outcomes’ (ibid: p15). It also demonstrates the uniform perception of that context held by those at all levels within St Edward’s, suggesting the existence of a ‘dominant discourse’ within which school-level policy was shaped. However, the role played by staff at St Edward’s, dealt with in more detail below, indicates that this policy was mediated between its inception at national level and its
implementation in its final form at St Edward’s. This issue is covered in a later research question.

In the ideology of senior management and Governors at St Edward’s we see a broad acceptance of PRP. Whether their backgrounds are industrial or not, they all (4 out of 4) speak of the utility of linking elements of performance with an additional increment. The Governor I interviewed, who had a specific role as liaison with the teaching staff, regarded PRP as ‘an appropriate mechanism...used all over’ which contrasts starkly with GS’s description of PRP as ‘alien...divisive’. The Head was careful to emphasise that her view of a PRP scheme for St Edward’s excluded the use of pupil results as a performance indicator. However she also acknowledged that, when she first raised the issue of pay in light of the state threshold scheme, the Governors were very interested in a ‘quid pro quo’ which she elaborated to indicate their interest in linking payment to performance and indeed a willingness on their part to consider academic results as an indicator. They were also very keen to increase teacher-pupil contact time in light of comments in the inspection report (ISI, 1999) that allocation of classroom periods was very generous. Thus, restructuring pay provided an opportunity to manage change over a broad area with implications for working conditions and contracts. On balance, these changes achieved greater consistency of conditions and contractual arrangements, while requiring greater accountability from teachers for performance, an extension of extra-curricular commitment for some staff and with a negative impact on the appraisal system which became subsumed within the mechanisms for assessing eligibility for threshold payments. Thus, we see a substantial NPM agenda realised at St Edward’s, whereas this has only minimally been the case at St Bernadette’s.

In summary, at St Edward’s there was uniformity in responses describing the political conditions giving rise to pay reform. These coincide with my own experiences at the time and the content of many staff room conversations. The state scheme and the need for independent schools
to remain competitive in recruitment and retention were cited by the majority of those interviewed (6 out of 10). There is no doubt that the competitive nature of the independent sector in the area where St Edward’s is located made staff very aware of pay issues, as did their friendships with many teachers in the state sector. However, there was a clear distinction between senior managers and Governors on the one hand, and the majority of teaching staff on the other, over their ideological appreciation of PRP. Although one head of department (now a senior manager in another school) and one part-time member of staff were prepared to support the notion of PRP and entertain its introduction to their school, the remainder were hostile.

In comparison, at St Bernadette’s all senior and middle managers and teaching staff felt PRP was inappropriate (9 out of 9) for the school. However, given the scheme proposed to staff at St Bernadette’s (see Chapter Six above), the issue of PRP never really entered the equation. When asked their views about PRP in more general terms, two senior managers and one teacher felt it had a role in other educational contexts while the remainder were sceptical. As discussed above in Chapter Six, the only mention of such an approach during deliberations on pay came from the Head in response to minutes of the Salaries Committee. The Head’s view was that there could be no serious PRP element in a scheme where almost all applicants passed, as they had in the state sector. She interpreted the national approach as a mechanism for awarding a pay rise without inflationary implications on other public sector workers. She was not prepared to pursue ‘a paper exercise’ for the sake of form and her standpoint was not challenged by Governors who remained quite unclear on the details of developments in the state sector, although they had been quick to pick up on the need to ensure St Bernadette’s pay remained competitive. Equally, all nine interviewees believed that state policy was the key political context within which changes were introduced in the school and that it provided the key impetus for those changes. There was equal agreement (9 out of 9) from all levels of staff that the need for the school to be competitive for
recruitment and retention of staff in the marketplace was the key element of this context.

In terms of discourses and mediation there is a stark difference between the two schools. The state threshold pay scheme largely shaped the debate at St Edward’s at each stage. When it was expected to be highly ‘selective’ there was resistance. When the state scheme became ‘inclusive’ there were staff demands for a reciprocal move from the school. At this stage in the trajectory of the policy we do see something as simple as the ‘dominance/resistance binary’ (Schurich, 1992). It was almost inevitable, given this history, that the scheme proposed by Governors and the Head should mirror the state scheme in its inclusion of performance indicators. However, the influence of the Head and her appreciation of the nature of the school, one where almost all pupils secure results greatly in excess of national averages, led to the exclusion of a link between pupil results and pay. Issues of culture management and leadership are dealt with in more detail in the research questions below.

7.2.2 How does the approach in each case study institution articulate to the centrally planned discourse on threshold assessment?
Neither school escaped the need to respond to the introduction of threshold pay in the state sector. However, there was a sharp contrast in the approach taken in each case study school. At St Bernadette’s, reform to the existing pay scheme was introduced to remain competitive on pay for staff. However, it was not influenced significantly by the ideology of PRP nor were deliberations driven by close reference to the emergent state threshold pay scheme. In this sense one may ask whether the St Bernadette’s scheme, which contained no performance element beyond the expectation that full time staff continue to take on the tutor role and perform weekend duties, represents what Wallace (1998) calls a ‘counter-policy’? Is the St Bernadette’s pay reform a school or micro level generated form of resistance to the dominant
discourse and its national policy of threshold pay? Indeed, given the existence of a Salaries Committee composed of a volunteer cross-section of staff, albeit with a Head appointed senior manager at the helm, it must be asked to what extent this ‘counter policy’ was the result of resistance or adaptation at levels within the hierarchy of the institution rather than simply generated by the school level decision makers of senior management and Governors?

A close examination of the dynamic between Governors, Head and Salaries Committee reveals where decision-making power was located. The Committee’s ideas were presented to the Head, she devised a scheme in light of their input, presented it to the Committee and the Governors edited it before presentation to the full staff body. This structure reveals the realities of power. The Salaries Committee had an important role to play but should their input have been unacceptable to the Head and Governors, there is little doubt who would have prevailed: their remit was to present ‘views and ideas’ not hold the casting vote. Nevertheless, regardless of the presence of a senior manager as chair of the Committee, a reading of the minutes of their meetings reveals a constructive dialogue operating within the confines of factual information provided by the Bursar, guidance from the chair and a clear understanding of the existing pay structure at St Bernadette’s. The most striking element is the absence of discussion of PRP by both sides, indeed the absence of discussion of any threshold criteria.

My observations of St Bernadette’s spanning three years have revealed a strong wish, albeit not always successful, among senior management to take staff with them on the implementation of changes. Thus, the establishment of a Salaries Committee, the consultative tone of exchanges between Head and the Committee and the resultant scheme reflecting the vast majority of the Committee’s proposals. However, this dynamic operated in both directions. Staff did not make sweeping demands, they accepted their remit to ‘review the teachers’ salary structure and report back with views and ideas’ within the constraints of
figures supplied by the Bursar. The specific aims which emerged from their deliberations were increased transparency, redefining responsibility allowances and the aim of achieving an 8% differential between the St Bernadette's and state pay scales for all staff in place of the old 11% allowance which they accepted could not be maintained in the context of change in the state sector (Staff Salaries Committee minutes, March 2001). The Head added the need to provide an equivalent to the threshold payment in addition for those on point 9 in order to avoid losing many staff on point 9 who would only be paid at 3% above the state scale whereas all other staff at St Bernadette's would be 11% above. The Salaries Committee had suggested threshold payments be 'implemented in the future'.

The situation at St Edward's was very different. Discourse within the school was always couched within the context of the state scheme and its performance element both at the rejection phase when first broached by the Head and later when staff requested a response in light of the shift of emphasis towards inclusivity in the state scheme. Staff were more active in demanding some form of matching pay reform than at St Bernadette's, although they were never involved in the development of the proposals to the extent of staff being asked to form a Salaries Committee as at St Bernadette's. Therefore, what might initially appear to be a greater role played by staff at St Edward's, certainly at the inception stage, turns out to be less significant in shaping the detail ideologically or practically. Certainly staff sought to mediate the policy from the national level, to the point of rejecting it out of hand when presented with all the attributes of the state scheme, including the possibility that only a proportion of staff might cross the threshold. Again, their demand for some reciprocal pay reform once their perception of the state scheme changed may appear decisive but the Head and Governors were already in discussion about the implications of higher pay beyond point 9 being available in the state sector. The issues that concerned them were competitiveness for staff in terms of recruitment
and seeing an opportunity to maximise performance of staff in terms of unit cost.

The issue of part-time staff cannot be ignored here. At St Edward's, a substantial number of staff, many long serving, fell into this category. The proposal from the Head and Governors was that they could apply to cross the threshold if eligible in order to secure an additional sum on a pro rata basis. However, issues of contact time and payment for non-contact time led to a dispute with this section of the staff that remained unresolved long after the St Edward's threshold payment scheme was up and running. At least one member of staff departed the school over this issue. There is no doubt that this problem overshadowed progress on the threshold scheme once the teething problems encountered during the initiation stage, including the stop-start phase and the presentation with incorrect figures, were overcome.

It should also be noted that there is evidence of substantial communication both in meetings and papers between the Head and heads of department over the implementation of a new pay structure including a detailed memorandum dated February 13th 2001 entitled ‘Allocation of classroom teaching, remission time and money under the new St Edward’s pay structure’. It is clear from this document that many issues were still being refined in the year prior to the new pay structure’s introduction. The paper ends with six questions for middle management’s consideration although none of these leave the use of a performance element open to question. In the areas of part-time staff and changes to contact period allocation, the approach at St Edward’s diverges from the state scheme in focussing on purely local, institution-level issues, albeit drawing on comparisons with the state sector’s existing working practices in these areas. Here we see both complexity in the trajectory of a policy explained by its local context and the perceived needs of the institution by the key actors. This issue is discussed in more detail below.
7.2.3 What is the character and what are the sources of the principles underpinning the proposed changes in pay assessment in the two case study institutions?

Using the seven types of response identified by the Independent Schools’ Bursars Association (ISBA, 2002), each school occupies a different category. Neither school ‘adopted the DfES scheme in full’ nor did they ‘partially adopt the DfES scheme’ as both of these approaches required use of the state forms and some use of CEA assessors. St Edward’s falls into the next category, having ‘adapted the DfES scheme to develop its own Performance Related Pay scheme’. Neither school developed their own PRP scheme from scratch nor did they already have a PRP scheme prior to the introduction of threshold pay in the state sector. Equally, neither school sought to pay a lesser sum. St Bernadette’s falls into the category of schools that, ‘with the introduction of PRP…simply [paid] £2000 to all staff without introducing any performance requirements’. It should be noted that these categories only apply to staff eligible to cross the threshold.

This question also requires a study of the underlying principles informing the strategies adopted in each school. It requires an examination of the motivations in each case study school and a comparison between these and those in the state sector. Blunkett outlined the rationale behind threshold pay as ‘better rewards and support in return for higher standards’ (DfEE, 1998, foreword). This is, unequivocally, a statement in favour of PRP, embodying the ideas of NPM.

At St Bernadette’s, the principles referred to by the Salaries Committee were transparency, differentiation according to responsibilities, maintaining a link to the state pay scale, retaining a differential between state pay levels and those at St Bernadette’s and retaining sufficient flexibility for the successful functioning of a small school. My interviews with staff support this list. Five members of staff cited transparency and fairness, including three senior staff and two middle managers. One teacher, not herself eligible, observed that the changes would ‘avoid staff
having to worry what to tell colleagues’ (MG). As mentioned above, all
nine interviewees highlighted the need to be effective in recruitment and
retention of staff and referred to staff awareness of pay issues and the
need to maintain a pay differential between St Bernadette’s and the state
pay scale. The Head made it plain that she rejected an approach based
on PRP, favouring one which created a differential, avoided an excess of
scrutiny, particularly so soon after the completion of a full inspection, and
facilitated the retention of able staff, including those on point 9 by moving
them onto a new point that provided an additional increment
approximating to the £2,000 threshold payment. The Head, in her
presentation to staff, also highlighted a determination to ensure that
existing staff did not lose out and that there should be a clear reward for
the professionalism and commitment of staff. In short, the reasons are
pragmatic rather than ideological with the aim to secure the future of the
school in a competitive marketplace.

At St Edward’s the principles underpinning the approach were much
more closely allied with thinking in the state sector. The management of
performance and the linking of particular criteria to crossing the
threshold, indeed the very notion of the threshold itself was a key
principle that was embraced by the St Edward’s scheme. This was the
mechanism that allowed the imposition of criteria. However, the
opportunity was also taken to address other issues such as the contact
time of staff and provision of extra-curricular activities. The principle at
work here was what the Governors viewed as ‘value for money’. Rather
than seeking to celebrate the successes of the school in terms of results
and the wider education offered, as acknowledged in the school’s latest
inspection report, the decision was taken to address issues of unit cost
and seek increased productivity across the board in return for making
the upper pay scale available for those who reached point 9.

The expectation of the Governors was that they could achieve greater
control over teaching allocations and require a rigorous application
process of self-reflection and the production of evidence to prove that
the chosen performance indicators were met. This may appear a negative approach, compared to the politically palatable 'celebration' of the St Bernadette’s scheme. However we must see beyond the rhetoric. As senior managers at St Edward’s pointed out, opportunities would be generated for reflection on practice, encourage the development of staff contributions beyond the classroom – a key indicator in the St Edward’s scheme that replaced the analysis of academic results, and provide a mechanism to ‘handle shortcomings’ (TC) should this prove necessary in the future. Indeed, more than one initial application for crossing threshold was rejected. However, the staff concerned were invited to meet with the Head to discuss how they could improve their applications. In each case their new submissions were successful. It should also be noted that one of these members of staff, a middle manager, acknowledged that his first application was ‘flippant’.

Finally, one cannot escape the fact that all nine interviewees at St Bernadette’s regarded the pay reform process as positive. Whereas, at St Edward’s the phrases used to describe their experiences included, 'bruising' (Head), 'discontent' (BD), 'mistakes shouldn’t happen' (DJ), 'against the grain' (GS), 'bitter taste' (WJ) and 'divisive' (DK). At St Bernadette’s the Head retained control of the process, steering staff responses through the establishment of a staff body chaired by one of her senior managers to report on the pay structure. She did not meet a strong agenda from her Governors seeking a significant shift in performance in exchange for enhanced pay. The discussions over pay centred on issues of competitiveness with the state sector, seeking an identifiable differential and to facilitate transferability. The opportunity was also seized to emphasise a differential between posts at St Bernadette’s. However, the situation for the Head at St Edward’s was different. Staff had initiated the debate in a way that had not happened at St Bernadette’s. When the Head discussed the issue with Governors, they were attracted to a performance element in any future pay settlement. Thus the Head at St Edward’s was steered by her Governors and her staff. The recent history of staff/management interchanges at St
Edward's was tense, involving major issues such as contracts. The Head's assumption that staff would not want PRP when it was perceived as divisive and only on offer to a few made her slower to respond when the scheme was opened up in the state sector. Having considered the issue promptly, she appeared to be wrong-footed by staff demands for a response to developments in the state sector.

At St Bernadette's, the Head had also been considering options well in advance but never sought to impose any element of PRP. Instead she introduced an intermediate stage, utilising the mechanism of a Staff Salaries Committee to ensure staff felt consulted. Indeed, she was able to accept or incorporate the majority of staff proposals into the new pay scheme. Although the appointment of a senior manager to the chair of the Committee was initially unpopular, the testimony of the participants above in Chapter Six suggests that this soon ceased to be an issue and almost all participants in the meetings were positive and complimentary in their assessment of TJ's performance. In summary, staff cultures, the histories of the discourse in each school and the expectations of staff all help explain the very different reaction to the schemes proposed in each school.

7.2.4 Who are the key actors in this process? How do Governors, Head, SMT, Staff Committee interpret their obligations and responsibilities? What is the capacity of each to affect the discourse of pay reform within the institution?

Much of the information required to answer these questions has been presented in the chapters on each individual school and the summary answers to the research questions above. In each school the Head and Governors were central to the process, as was inevitable in a policy affecting pay and hence the largest running cost of each institution. As the Bursar of St Bernadette's pointed out, staff salaries represent 70% of school expenditure.
At St Bernadette’s, the Head invited input from a Staff Salaries Committee but appointed the chair from among her senior managers with the Bursar attending in an advisory capacity. The Governors were involved in the detail of the presentation the Head made to staff once the scheme was formulated in light of the input of staff by the Head. At St Edward’s, the Head and Governors devised a scheme that suited their perception of the school’s purposes in light of requests from staff for a response to the increase in pay available to staff in the state sector who crossed the threshold. The Governors, responding to the Head informing them that action was needed, identified the criteria upon which basis they were prepared to proceed. In both cases the Head was seen as driving the scheme but in reality the Head at St Bernadette’s retained control over the discourse in a way that wasn’t possible to the Head at St Edward’s, given both the recent history and expectations. This may also suggest a fundamental difference in the staff culture of each school. It may be argued that at St Bernadette’s the staff committed themselves to the additional duties inherent in working for a boarding school. The Head and her senior management team traditionally made great efforts to ensure staff felt valued for their contributions both in the classroom and beyond. This may have supported a culture where staff were prepared to be more patient with management, to wait and see rather than start with demands, it might also have made them more accepting of an extension of their duties, as represented by the extension of tutorial duties to all staff. At St Edward’s there was no equivalent history of staff feeling valued for their contributions, although they did see themselves as, with some exceptions, working together for a common goal. Equally, the pay issue must be considered within the context of other unpopular initiatives such as the standardisation of contracts.

However, it does appear that one fundamental difference exists between the two schools. St Edward’s never considered increasing staff pay without a substantial quid pro quo such as increased teaching time or extra-curricular commitments. This position was based on an economic assessment of the situation. With fees rising rapidly to take account of
changes in National Insurance and the need to have facilities that stood comparison in a competitive market, the Bursar, Head and Governors judged that it was not possible to fund a new pay scheme without changes. As we have seen, the initial calculations from the Bursar proved faulty in suggesting that redundancies, at least of part-time staff, would be necessary, along with increased contact time. Nevertheless, the financial implications remained a major driving force. To put it simply, the Governors saw an opportunity to respond to an inspection report that made them feel they might not be extracting full value from staff by suggesting contact time in the classroom was low. This failed to recognise the corollary argument in the inspection report that indicated the contribution such an arrangement had on the quality of planning and teaching.

My insights into the perceptions of the Governors at each school are through the lens of interviews with one Governor and comments from the Head of each school about their working relationships. The Governor at St Edward’s sat on the Finance and General Purposes Committee. She was aware that a core of the established staff were wary of change and that concerns existed over the drafting of new contracts. She felt care was needed in handling the process but that once established, it would ‘bed down in time’. Asked whether she regarded the school’s scheme as PRP, she replied, ‘not in any deep sense...a minimum standard’. This chimes with the Head’s view of PRP which she had ‘warmed to...but not payment by results’ and only where open to all and as ‘a minimum level’. The Head and Governors’ motivations have been covered above but the Head also mentioned the ‘developmental’ nature of the St Edward’s scheme, where help would be provided if any applicants failed to pass.

She also viewed the application forms as an opportunity for her to be more aware of all the contributions that staff were making. Finally, she observed that by shadowing the state scheme she was preserving choice for senior staff. They would be able to participate in the ‘wider market for good professionals’ having the choice to enter or re-enter the
state sector. Although one member of staff did have her threshold payment confirmed when she moved to Jersey, other staff have a different view on this matter. One senior manager (TC) commented it was, ‘not going to be accepted by the state’ and a head of department (SP) described the school scheme as ‘following the form but not recognised’ by the state because of the absence of external assessors. In the case of St Edward’s the Staff Committee was set up in light of concerns expressed by staff that communications within the school could be improved to the benefit of all. After careful discussion, in which I was involved, the Head agreed to the establishment of a committee to refer concerns and act as a conduit of information to staff. This has now become an established part of the scene at St Edward’s as follow up interviews with DJ and GS indicate, both of whom have served on that body. However, their detailed perception of their role falls outside the remit of this investigation.

At St Bernadette’s, the Governor interviewed was also on the Finance and General Purposes Committee. Her view was that PRP was not appropriate or needed because of the existence of an established appraisal system. The goal of the St Bernadette’s pay reform was to achieve ‘fairness’ and maintain a differential with state pay, while allowing for some restructuring of differentials within the school’s pay structure. Responsibility for ensuring the school’s pay system was competitive for recruitment and fair for those in post by paying for the task performed rather than evaluating performance per se was how the Head viewed it. She stressed that in a state scheme where almost all applicants pass the threshold, there is little scope for raising performance. However this view may be challenged by suggesting self-reflection in the run up to an application may, in itself, stimulate heightened performance as suggested by SP and WJ from St Edward’s. Other members of the senior management team also talk of the need to achieve transparency and fairness through ‘responsibility differentials’ (KF) without a performance element that was ‘possibly badly done’ elsewhere as the Bursar commented. Ultimately, as TJ, chair of the
Salaries Committee pointed out, with 'a hardworking staff...PRP is not needed'.

What of those opposed to or at least critical of developments in each school? I was asked not to interview one member of St Bernadette's staff who sat on the Salaries Committee, as the Head was keen that issues that may have been raised during the deliberations of the Salaries Committee and resolved to general satisfaction not lead to the reopening of debate. From reading the Salaries Committee's minutes, these issues likely involved the payment of maternity and paternity pay, sickness pay and remuneration for staff below point 9 particularly in an area with such a high cost of living. This issue became bound up with discussion of a tutor's allowance. However, it should be noted that since the completion of this Committee's work, a new mechanism has been put into place through which staff can air concerns over pay. A member of the Staff Committee, which has taken on a more political flavour in recent years, very much on the same lines as the St Edward's model, now has a regular slot to present to the Governors. The only other discontent that emerged from my interviewing at St Bernadette's was MG, the teacher below point 9 on the Salaries Committee who remained concerned that too little had been done for NQTs and those below point 9, despite the enlargement of the St Bernadette's allowance to ensure no existing staff lose out.

At St Edward's there was the initial view that PRP should be resisted but this was eroded by the realisation that the state scheme was free from quotas. Then there was a broad-based call for equivalence that led to the establishment of a scheme shadowing the state but without payment by results. Thereafter, opposition was mainly generated by the Head's presentation in which she suggested the school could not afford such a threshold scheme without all staff working more contact periods and some part-time job losses. The figures on which this claim was based were shown to be inaccurate but increased the wariness of staff identified by the Governor and led to 'low morale' according to a head of
department (BD). However, there was broad acceptance by staff that the scheme introduced was about ‘competence’ (GS) and to ‘help staff development’ (WJ). It was also viewed as ‘in line with the state’ (DJ) to ‘keep up with other schools’ (BD) and ensure ‘value for money’ and effective ‘use of time’ (GS). Negative comments from later interviews tended to focus on the burden of completing the form and delay in processing applications leading to uncertainty. Perhaps the best summary, from a head of department of long standing (DJ), is that the process was ‘inelegant’ but that ‘people are happier now that the forms are in’ and that the outlook is ‘positive’. If we consider the ‘opposition’ voices and their role in the ‘power networks’ (Ball, 1994), they may have influenced discussion in the staff room and even coloured how staff viewed developments and decisions made by senior management and Governors. There may even have been doubts among senior managers at St Edward’s but the scheme went ahead, despite its shaky start, the process it set out has been followed, staff have crossed the threshold and received their increment. The scheme is now approaching its third year and follow up discussions indicate it is now ‘part of the furniture’ (GS).

7.2.5 To what extent does the new form of public sector pay calculation give rise to a new politics of governance and accountability within each case study school?

Here we are concerned with the immediate consequences of the adoption of new pay schemes for each case study school. At St Bernadette’s there was no attempt to alter the existing culture or perceptions of staff. The Head and Governors were aware that there was a ‘residual distrust of management’ (Head) and that there was a small core of staff ‘very aware of conditions’ (CE). With a successful inspection completed in May 2001, there was an opportunity to reinforce staff morale and reward staff for their commitment. TJ, head of the Staff Committee described the staff at St Bernadette’s as, ‘friendly, intelligent, high standards, high performance’. In such a context, the goal was to
sustain rather than modify the existing staff culture where 'committed' staff were 'generous with their time' (CE). The approach taken to the deliberations over a new pay scheme acknowledged the staff as in 'favour [of] consultation' and given to 'little grumbling' (MG) through the establishment of a Salaries Committee that made a major contribution to the shaping of the new pay scheme.

As a member of St Bernadette's staff for the past three years, arriving just as the new scale was implemented and benefiting from it, I have been in a good position to assess any impact on collegiality in light of Campbell and Southworth's (1992) categorisation. The vast majority of staff at St Bernadette's do share ideals compatible with the school, although a large number of non-Catholic staff working in a Catholic school can lead to minor tensions. Staff work together in a cooperative manner. KF and the Head described the staff as 'collegial' and 'supportive' (DS) of each other and 'tight knit' (MG) were other descriptions. I have picked up no sense of a major change in any of these elements as a result of the pay changes. However, it is fair to observe that there is a regular turnover of younger staff (not exclusively) and this may relate to the issues highlighted by MG on the Salaries Committee, namely a desire to see pay for younger staff augmented.

The situation at St Edward's has proved more complex throughout the initiation and implementation phases. The pre-existing culture of staff was already stretched by the development of a younger clique of staff that did not share all of the ideals of long serving staff, the diaspora of staff to departmental offices (mentioned by five interviewees) with 'departments fighting their own corners' (WJ) and disputes over contracts and part-time working arrangements. With so many changes encompassing structural (building), staff turnover, working conditions and contracts occurring immediately before or during the introduction of a major pay reform, it is perhaps expected that morale and even the culture of the school were affected.
Indeed, if we take the same indicators as mentioned in consideration of the situation at St Bernadette's, we reveal a rather different picture. As has already been suggested, there was a divergence on ideals, particularly with reference to the expectation to work beyond the specified number of contact periods, among a growing number of younger staff. Such developments may have reduced the degree to which staff got on together. The establishment of departmental offices scattered around the school site may have encouraged a growth of departmental introspection that undermined the willingness of staff to work together or share in a sense of community.

Communication failures have already been highlighted and these may have reduced the sense in which staff knew what was going on, particularly as the staff room and staff workroom were becoming less frequent foci of staff activity and interaction. However, it is important to identify how many of these indicators were affected specifically by the pay reforms. Few, if any, can be attributed solely to the impact of the introduction of a threshold scheme. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suggest that the majority of the problems identified above were exacerbated by the implementation of a new pay scale at St Edward's.

Equally, it is the case that the Head now has extended her knowledge of staff activities and achievements as she processes all the evaluations on staff made by their heads of department. Arguably, this has placed her in an enhanced position with relation to her staff and equips her with a mechanism for evaluating and motivating staff both in terms of reflective practice and the provision of commitments beyond the classroom. She has the opportunity to provide 'support' to staff approaching the threshold who might otherwise struggle with their applications. To put it another way, the existence of threshold may encourage or assist in the encouragement of staff to be self-critical and seek out ways in which to prove their competence in all the criteria. Not least among these criteria is extra-curricular contribution. Something perceived to be offered unevenly across the staff and perhaps with a particular emphasis on
some of the younger staff and others who had always resisted being
drawn into this aspect of an independent school's existence. Indeed, GS,
a critic of some younger staff has suggested in a follow up interview that
the application process has provided a 'stimulus for extra-curricular'
involvelement by staff. This can be seen as ensuring a more even
participation in such activities by staff, suggesting a more transparent
scheme but it has also, for those who previously did little, led to more
pressure to contribute in additional areas.

This foreshadows the next stage of pay reforms at St Bernadette's that
address the next point on the upper pay scale by requiring staff to
complete an annual form highlighting their contributions to the school.
This suggests that the Head at St Bernadette's has also recognised the
potential inherent in identifying criteria required for passage up the pay
scale. She too is now using the restructured pay scheme to encourage
extra-curricular commitment from staff. However, once again this was
introduced with little problem, presented as a way of ensuring all
contributions are known and valued – all staff are expected to complete
the form but it is specifically scrutinised to confirm passage onto the
second point of the upper pay scale once staff are eligible.

7.3 POSTSCRIPT 2001-2004

Follow up conversations with staff at St Edward's in 2003 and 2004
suggest that the appraisal system in operation prior to the introduction of
a threshold application has fallen into abeyance. Indeed, the completion
of application forms, at least for staff on the old point 9 and beyond (with
annual reviews) has supplanted it. Although an analysis of the appraisal
system is beyond the scope of this study, it should be noted that it was
regarded as cumbersome in its requirement that all heads of department
be externally appraised and that this led to a backlog in completed
appraisals. In essence, it was grinding to a halt for middle management,
even though they were responsible for maintaining its momentum with those in their departments. It is interesting to note, that at St Bernadette’s, where the appraisal system is well established and up to date, the Governor commented ‘PRP was not appropriate because we have appraisal’.

Equally interesting is consideration of St Bernadette’s response to upper pay scale point 2. This was introduced in 2003. When asked about the future CE, a teacher, JR, a head of department, and KF, a senior manager all suggested that the school’s response to this would be significant in assessing the long-term success of its pay reforms. Every member of staff was required to complete a summary booklet of their contributions to the school, retrospectively in the first year. For those eligible for the second upper scale point, this was used to ‘confirm’ their contribution and eligibility for the additional increment. For the remainder of staff it established a portfolio of their contributions that would be used as they progressed to this point on the pay scale. Further, it was presented to staff as ensuring the Head was aware of all their commitments, thus echoing the Head of St Edwards’s justification of the utility of the threshold application form. In essence, this mechanism requires staff to indicate how they contribute both to the academic and extra-curricular dimensions of the school in order to qualify for the additional payment.

As at St Edward’s, the intention is that anyone whose form does not support their receipt of the payment will be informed in advance and given the opportunity to take on additional roles in order to qualify. These forms are now filled in for the year ahead; identifying those contributions that will be made and as such provide a more powerful tool to management. For the equivalent payment at St Edward’s, staff underwent two lesson observations and a report on the year by their head of department, followed by a meeting with the Head. With the exception of the meeting with the Head, except for senior staff, this is very like the format of the St Bernadette’s appraisal procedure!
So, it is fair to say that as we approach the third year of the new pay schemes in operation, both have been extended to respond to further developments concerning the upper pay scale in the state sector. The examination of staff contributions and consequent mechanisms for management of their professional development at each school has grown more similar over time, albeit addressed through different vehicles. This has resulted in a similar extension of each Head’s ability to evaluate and steer the overall contribution of staff. However, any latitude in the award of management points or other pay awards as incentives in recruitment or retention have been swept away by the transparency of the new pay schemes.

7.4 CONCLUSIONS

What has been learned from this comparative case study? There are two broad themes that emerge from the study. The first relates to the character of ‘independent’ schools and raises some questions about their supposed autonomy. What is clear from this study is that this sector, although governed by a strong cash-nexus between the schools and their clientele (Gorard, 1997; Gorard, Fitz & Taylor, 2003) is also influenced in its operations by changes in the organization of the state sector. Thus far educational policy has been dominated by the perception that there is a one-way flow of management practices from the private to the state sector.

We have shown, for example, that state policy on pay does impact the independent sector in a very direct way. It cannot be ignored or the pool of teachers willing to work in that sector would evaporate. It is not only legally binding developments that force the so-called independent sector’s hands. However, their degree of independence does leave these schools free to choose the form of their response, within the financial limitations of a competitive marketplace for staff services.
Currently, teachers in independent schools can belong to the Teachers' Pensions Scheme (TPS) and are recognised by the General Teaching Council (GTC). Were these conditions to be withdrawn by a radical government, it is possible that recruitment between sectors might dry up.

In the case of threshold pay, the sector opted for some seven different categories of response. The two case study schools took contrasting routes. One heavily influenced by the form of the state scheme, the other addressing its effects without adopting its philosophy. However, with hindsight, we see that elements of each school's approach have been adopted by the other school between 2001 and 2004. St Bernadette's now has its paper assessment of contributions, albeit for stage 2 payments and St Edward's has adopted a system of scrutiny similar to St Bernadette's appraisal system. This suggests there are certain realities about operating successfully in the independent sector that must be addressed by management not only in terms of pay but also in the management of performance.

It has also emerged from this study that both schools took the opportunity of a pay review to address a range of related issues. In neither case was this a single innovation but both clear examples of 'multiple innovations' (Fullan, 2001) being implemented through the medium of a single, apparently externally imposed need for change. The degree of success with which these wider agendas were satisfied remains contested. Certainly, St Edward's continued to struggle with the issues of redrawn contracts and the role of part-timers within the school. In a follow up interview in August 2003 GS informed me that some contracts remained unsigned even after the Staff Committee supported these contracts. She also revealed that a Pay and Remuneration Committee was set up in the aftermath of the introduction of threshold pay. This body reports to the Head who then takes their concerns and observations to the Governors.
Local conditions have determined the nature of the response to state policy. Particularly in the realm of pay reform, independent schools are constrained by their bottom line. They cannot pay more than they can afford, maintain competitive fees, invest in their fabric and expect to survive in the long term, unless underwritten by the kind of endowments almost never available to girls' schools. With staff pay representing the single largest cost in both day and boarding schools, there is no more crucial area to be understood by school-level managers. As seen from the evidence at St Edward’s, the dangers of striking the wrong note in presenting pay related information to staff are substantial. The whole pay reform process at St Edward’s has been protracted, particularly if we include the issues of part-time staff and new contracts, and in the Head's own word 'bruising'. All of this on the back of national accolades singing the praises of the school's achievements, balance and potential, both from journalists and inspectors alike. At St Bernadette’s, staff were relatively content prior to the emergence of a need for pay reform. They remain in a similar state. By the Head's own reckoning, this is evidence of success. The goal was to maintain a successful team working together towards largely shared goals.

Pay arrangements appear to be a fruitful area to study. A number of key themes have emerged. Transferability between state and private sectors has been highlighted. Differentiation between pay in each sector, and between posts within schools, has played a substantial role in deliberations. Pre-existing attitudes of staff and managers as expressed in the cultures of specific schools have to be considered. The impact on the power and control exercised by Heads should also be noted, constraining and empowering simultaneously. Pay arrangements reveal much about the hierarchies of independent schools. Although there is only limited evidence from this study that pay has a direct influence on teacher performance, there have been indications from a range of interviewees at St Edward's that the reflection required to complete the threshold application reform has been beneficial. These would appear to be areas that could be investigated in a larger number of schools. One
way forward would be to identify a sample set of schools matching each category of the ISBA's typology used in their 2002 'Questionnaire on Performance Related Pay'.

7.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The second theme concerns the notion of 'new public management' (NPM) a term which denotes a range of measures including strong accountability systems, the imposition of strong forms of leadership and the creation of customer-client relations between public service providers and the people who use them (Exworthy & Halford, 1999). Additionally, NPM can be used to explain the introduction of 'performance related pay' (PRP) in public sector institutions across a number of sectors. This dissertation raises the interesting question whether it is a concept appropriate for analysing change in practice in purported private sector institutions and whether private sector bodies can ever be subject to NPM measures.

It may well be that PRP is one of a number of initiatives that since 1998 have blurred the boundary between the state and the independent sectors. Although independent schools are not required to teach the National Curriculum or participate in national key assessments in fact many do, or else align their practices to changes that were directed at state schools. In this study, teachers embraced the idea to maintain pay parity, while schools wished to retain the idea of transferability across sectors. This study shows that NPM has some explanatory purchase outside the public sector.

Another potentially fruitful area would be to evaluate staff satisfaction with appraisal and professional development arrangements in the schools studied. This could help establish how effectively the new pay structure and its anticipated benefits have proven for the staff
themselves. Was the Head of St Edward’s proved right that the process would prove ‘developmental’? To what extent have staff at St Bernadette’s found themselves doubly scrutinised now that they complete an annual form on their contributions and undergo regular appraisal procedures? With the possibility of more inspections in the offing, how are they responding to what might be regarded as a proliferation of scrutiny? From my current position at St Bernadette’s, I think they have a story to tell.

If I were to repeat this study, the greatest improvement would be to conduct all interviews at both institutions within a very short time. The more contemporaneous the interview data from each school, the more secure one can be in comparing and contrasting responses with confidence. This was not possible given my position in full time employment. If I had been in a position to interview the Bursar at St Edward’s or the awkward member of staff at St Bernadette’s, my data would have been fuller. However, all interviewers are placed under constraints in order to achieve access. I would never have had such far-reaching access to interviewees and documents had I not been employed in these institutions during the course of my research. To this extent, using teachers to research pay has benefits, albeit at jeopardy to the objectivity of the study.
Appendix 1: Interview Questions

- Describe your role at X?
- How long have you been at X?
- How would you describe the staff culture at X?
- What do you think of PRP?
- How might the introduction of PRP affect staff culture?

- Was X's scheme PRP?
- What was the context for the introduction of the new pay scheme?
- What were the motives of the pay scheme that was proposed?
- What benefits might PRP bring?
- What negatives might PRP bring?

- Who were the key actors in devising and introducing the new pay scheme at X?
- Describe your role in the process?
- What effect has the scheme had on differentiation between functions in the school?
- How was the motivation for the scheme and the scheme itself explained to staff?
- How effective was communication during the process?
- What was required of staff in exchange for the new pay scheme?

- How do you feel about the new pay scheme at X?
- How has it affected you personally/professionally?
- How do you think things might stand looking a year ahead?

- Do you think the independent sector should follow state initiatives?

- Is there anything obvious I haven't asked that you think would help me with my study?
N.B. This represents the template to which I worked when conducting interviews. Follow up questions varied depending on the responses and some questions were tailored to the specific experiences/roles of those being interviewed.
Appendix 2: Summary Tables of interview responses – St Edward’s

These tables divide respondents into three categories, identifying each respondent’s position within the school hierarchy. The categories are as follows. Senior includes members of SMT and governors; Middle includes heads of department and heads of house, Teaching includes all other teachers with or without other responsibilities. The key responses which emerged from the interview data on a particular theme are indicated in the left hand column of the table, while the number of respondents in each category identifying this theme are identified in the next three columns. I have endeavoured to reflect responses on similar themes across both schools and this explains the occasional nil response at one school – where the issue simply proved to be irrelevant. Each table covers one emergent theme. The maximum number of responses for St Edward’s was ten, comprised of four senior staff, four in the middle range and two teachers. Reading the tables together allows an overview of responses at St Edward’s based on a hierarchical reading of the data.

**Staff Culture**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collegial culture predominates</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff attitudes are very positive</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Impacts on Staff Culture**

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-culture among younger staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputes over pay and contracts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms and conditions for part-timers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation – building of dept offices</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**View of PRP and its impact on the existing Staff Culture**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A positive mechanism for other schools</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Oppose its implementation at St E’s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pay changes a good thing for St E</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Context for and motives behind introduction of school’s pay reforms**

<table>
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<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Response to introduction of state policy</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>To remain competitive for staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Response to request from staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motive = recruitment and retention</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motive = managerial intentions</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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### Issues arising from presentation of scheme and implementation process

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wrong figures used as basis for scheme</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poor communication in general</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety at having to complete form</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Identifying the key actors in introduction/implementation of the scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Salaries Committee</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Identifying other factors coinciding with the pay change process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requiring full-time staff to be tutors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent inspection</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recent staff turnover</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues over part-timers terms</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuing problems over contracts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement to complete staffing grids</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Evaluation of changes and thoughts on the future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delay over processing forms</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty over second threshold</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait and see how effects recruitment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall assessment positive</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See pay issue remaining problematic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Summary Tables of interview responses – St Bernadette’s

These tables divide respondents into three categories, identifying each respondent’s position within the school hierarchy. The categories are as follows. Senior includes members of SMT and governors; Middle includes heads of department and heads of house, Teaching includes all other teachers with or without other responsibilities. The key responses which emerged from the interview data on a particular theme are indicated in the left hand column of the table, while the number of respondents in each category identifying this theme are identified in the next three columns. I have endeavoured to reflect responses on similar themes across both schools and this explains the occasional nil response at one school – where the issue simply proved to be irrelevant. Each table covers one emergent theme. The maximum number of responses for St Bernadette’s was nine, comprised of five senior staff, two in the middle range and two teachers. Reading the tables together allows an overview of responses at St Bernadette’s based on a hierarchical reading of the data.

### Staff Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collegial culture predomnates</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff attitudes are very positive</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Impacts on Staff Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-culture among younger staff</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputes over pay and contracts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms and conditions for part-timers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation – building of dept offices</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### View of PRP and its impact on the existing Staff Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A positive mechanism for other schools</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose its implementation at St B’s</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See impact as divisive on staff culture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Context for and motives behind introduction of school’s pay reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response to introduction of state policy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To remain competitive for staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response to request from staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motive = recruitment and retention</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motive = managerialist intentions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve fairness/ transparency in pay</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Issues arising from presentation of scheme and implementation process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wrong figures used as basis for scheme</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor communication in general</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety at having to complete form</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Identifying the key actors in introduction/implementation of the scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Salaries Committee</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Identifying other factors coinciding with the pay change process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requiring full-time staff to be tutors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent inspection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recent staff turnover</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

### Evaluation of changes and thoughts on the future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delay over processing forms</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty over second threshold</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait and see how effects recruitment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall assessment positive</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4: Timeline of Interviews

St Edward's
Interviews were conducted in the third term of the academic year 2000 - 2001 and were spread over a period of six weeks between mid June and late July 2001. The follow up interview with GS took place in May 2003. Further details of the dates are summarised in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Position</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>21 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Head (GR)</td>
<td>Deputy Head</td>
<td>26 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Manager (TC)</td>
<td>Head of Middle School</td>
<td>13 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Head of Mathematics</td>
<td>18 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJ</td>
<td>Head of PE</td>
<td>6 July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BD</td>
<td>Head of Classics</td>
<td>20 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Head of English</td>
<td>19 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Examinations Officer</td>
<td>19 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WJ</td>
<td>Teacher – RS</td>
<td>12 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>27 July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS – follow up interview</td>
<td>Examinations Officer</td>
<td>3 May 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

St Bernadette's
Interviews were conducted throughout the academic year 2002 – 2003 and were spread between September 2002 and July 2003. The follow up interview with the Bursar also took place within this period. Further details are summarised in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>21 September 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Head (KF)</td>
<td>Deputy Head</td>
<td>2 July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Manager (TJ)</td>
<td>Head of Sixth</td>
<td>21 November 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursar</td>
<td>Bursar</td>
<td>25 February 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JR</td>
<td>Director of Music</td>
<td>14 April 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Head of Economics</td>
<td>5 May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Teacher – Geography</td>
<td>5 May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Teacher – Chemistry</td>
<td>4 July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor (BS)</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>5 June 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursar – follow up interview</td>
<td>Bursar</td>
<td>14 April 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 5: Criteria for the DfEE Threshold Assessment

Knowledge and Understanding
Teachers should demonstrate that they have a thorough and up-to-date knowledge of the teaching of their subject(s) and take account of wider curriculum developments which are relevant to their work.

Teaching and Assessment (3 standards)
Teachers should demonstrate that they consistently and effectively:

- Plan lessons and sequences of lessons to meet pupils’ individual learning needs
- Use a range of appropriate strategies for teaching and classroom management
- Use information about prior attainment to set well-grounded expectations for pupils and monitor progress to give clear and constructive feedback

Pupil Progress
Teachers should demonstrate that, as a result of their teaching, their pupils achieve well relative to the pupils’ prior attainment, making progress as good or better than similar pupils nationally. This should be shown in marks or grades in any relevant national tests or examinations, or school based assessment for pupils where national tests and examinations are not taken.

Wider Professional Effectiveness (2 standards)
Teachers should demonstrate that they:

- Take responsibility for their professional development and use the outcomes to improve their teaching and pupils’ learning
- Make an active contribution to the policies and aspirations of the school

Professional Characteristics
Teachers should demonstrate that they are effective professionals who challenge and support all pupils to do their best through:

inspiring trust and confidence
building team commitment
engaging and motivating pupils
analytical thinking
positive action to improve the quality of pupils’ learning

(DfEE, 2000)
Appendix 6: Glossary of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACAS</td>
<td>Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATL</td>
<td>Association of Teachers and Lecturers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>Cambridge Education Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfE</td>
<td>Department for Education and Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfES</td>
<td>Department for Education and Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EdD</td>
<td>Doctor(ate) of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESRC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>Further Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEFC</td>
<td>Further Education Funding Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDST</td>
<td>Girls’ Day Schools Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>Girls’ Schools Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTC</td>
<td>General Teaching Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMC</td>
<td>Headmasters’ and Headmistresses’ Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resource Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISBA</td>
<td>Independent Schools’ Bursars Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>Independent Schools’ Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Independent Schools’ Inspectorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Independent Schools’ Information Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LACSAB</td>
<td>Local Authorities Conditions of Service Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEA</td>
<td>Local Education Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAHT</td>
<td>National Association of Head Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASUWT</td>
<td>National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPQH</td>
<td>National Professional Qualification for Headship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUD.IST</td>
<td>Non-Numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUT</td>
<td>National Union of Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OISTED</td>
<td>Office for Standards in Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Performance Related Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Secondary Heads’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMT</td>
<td>Senior Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRB</td>
<td>School Teachers’ Review Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TES</td>
<td>Times Educational Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPS</td>
<td>Teachers’ Pensions Scheme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY:


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184


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