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The Athenian Mercantile Community:

**a reappraisal of the social, political and legal status of
inter-regional merchants during the fourth century**



Ph.D. Thesis, Cardiff University, 2008

Mark Woolmer

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Introduction

“Let us see then wherein trade is reputed to be a thing not noble or even respectable, and what has caused it to be disparaged...”

Plato, *Laws*, 918^c

This quotation from Plato’s *Laws* has often been seen as representative of the perception of inter-regional trade and traders held by the majority of classical Greeks. Plato and Aristotle dominate the moral philosophy of the classical world for modern scholars because their works survive in a fairly complete form, whereas, in contrast, the writings of other philosophers of the same era are frequently fragmentary. However, the quality and immediacy of the evidence presented by Plato and Aristotle can be dangerously seductive and, as a result, these works have been given disproportionate importance in previous studies of mercantile operations in the Greek world. In general the picture of merchants and inter-regional exchange that these two men present is very negative. One underlying reason for this negativity is their belief that wealth generated through trade unsettled the balance of society and, in certain circumstances, led to *stasis*. Rather than being based on the principles of equality and fair exchange, inter-regional commerce was seen as centred on the more aggressive concept of profit maximisation.¹ Plato and Aristotle both saw inter-regional merchants as a symbol of failure for the polis, in its attempts to achieve what they viewed as the ideal state of complete self-sufficiency. Aristotle was to take this a step further, suggesting that the world was regulated by a natural order, an order that was centred on balance and equilibrium. Profit-orientated trade, in Aristotle’s opinion, stood opposed to the normal state of equality found in nature, as it sought to upset the natural balance by demanding more for something than it was worth. As a result Aristotle accused inter-regional merchants of perverting the natural order of the world.²

This thesis seeks to explore whether the negative presentation of inter-regional trade and traders, as expressed in the works of Plato and Aristotle, is warranted, or whether these views are those of a narrow sector of society or were formulated as a result of the unique sequence of events that unfolded during the fourth century (for

¹ Hesiod can be identified as the first social moraliser to expound the theory that there were a number of identifiable differences between inter-regional and regional exchange. *WD*, 285-320.

² Arist. *Eth.Eud.* 5.5; *Pol*, 1258^a35. For a fuller discussion, see Chapter Three.

example the Corinthian, Social and Lamian Wars, and the conflicts associated with the rise of Philip of Macedon and the Macedonian hegemony). The discussion offered by modern scholars has, in general, confirmed the philosophers' negative perception of inter-regional merchants.

The first two major studies of Greek inter-regional merchants were those of Knorringa and Hasebroek.³ Knorringa examined the depiction and role of *emporoi* in the Greek literary texts whilst Hasebroek's work investigated the influence of trade on the Greek poleis. These studies have formed the basis for all subsequent investigations into Greek inter-regional merchants and exchange, influencing the work of Finley, Garnsey, Whittaker, Boardman, Mossé, Casson, McKechnie, Vélissaropoulos, Reed and most recently Bresson.⁴ Knorringa's study concluded that critical views of merchants came about because of the prominent role of foreigners in facilitating inter-regional exchange. Since, in his view, inter-regional exchange was solely in the hands of foreigners, Knorringa argued that it was no surprise that Archaic and Classical literature depicts merchants as shadowy and contemptible figures. His primary justification for this conclusion was that inter-regional merchants were an easily identifiable social/occupational group that typified 'barbarian otherness'.⁵ The theory that foreigners dominated the operation of Greek inter-regional exchange was also adopted by Hasebroek and is still accepted by some scholars.⁶ Hasebroek went as far as to suggest "*it has long been recognised that in Athens, at any rate, foreign trade was left entirely to the metics, that is, to resident aliens*".⁷ This is certainly the perception that both Plato and Aristotle would have the casual reader believe and one that early twentieth-century scholars, many of whom accepted the views of the philosophers as the representative truth, have advocated. Furthermore, Hasebroek, Knorringa, and to a certain extent Finley have also accepted the philosophers' negative portrayal of inter-regional exchange as a way of acquiring wealth.

³ Knorringa (1936); Hasebroek (1976) (reprint) [1933].

⁴ Finkelstein (1935); Casson (1971); (1977); (1984); Vélissaropoulos (1977a); Mossé (1983); Finley (1983); (1985); Garnsey & Whittaker (1983a); (1983b); Reed (1984); (2003); McKechnie (1989); Boardman (1999); Bresson (2006); (2008).

⁵ Knorringa (1936) 3.

⁶ Reed, for example, still promotes the theory that, as a general rule, Greek mercantile operations were left in the hands of foreigners. Reed (2003) 3-4.

⁷ Hasebroek (1976) 22.

Aristotle can however be found distinguishing between what he terms the acceptable art of acquisition *ktētikē* and the non-acceptable, i.e. trade that is purely concerned with profit *chrēmatistikē*. Aristotle defines *ktētikē* as the process of acquiring those things necessary to life, including activities such as cattle breeding and hunting.⁸ Traders who undertook exchange in order to gain the necessities of life *metablētikē* were, in Aristotle's opinion, more honest and trustworthy than other merchants.⁹ This conclusion forms part of his theorising on the differing nature of each type of exchange. In the course of his economic analysis Aristotle attempts to determine what it is that makes different types of commodities commensurable. Although he never satisfactorily answers this question, he does identify that there is frequently a sizeable difference between 'use value' and 'exchange value' and as a result two types of exchange can be identified; trade for profit and trade to gain the necessities of life. Having reached this conclusion Aristotle then postulates that traders who sought merely to gain the things necessary for life were dependent on a form of reciprocity, whilst those undertaking commerce purely for profit (in particular those involved in inter-regional exchange) were not. These differing motivations, in the eyes of Plato and Aristotle, impacted directly upon the nature and character of the person undertaking each type of transaction. Couple this with the hypothesis that inter-regional exchange was solely in the hands of foreigners, and it is easy to see why scholars have reasoned that merchants were considered as a disreputable element within Greek society.

However, there is a major flaw in earlier studies and it is this: they placed a disproportionate importance on the philosophical corpus whilst neglecting other types of evidence, literary, epigraphic and archaeological. Since much of the evidence presented by the philosophic corpus is ideological (either explicitly formulated as, or a pragmatic implicit expression of, ideological assumptions), academic studies should always seek to validate these accounts through comparisons with other types of evidence. A number of earlier studies failed to adopt such methodology or, if they did, approached the other non-literary source material having already been convinced by the philosophical view. Therefore, many believed that inter-regional merchants were

⁸ Arist. *Pol.* 1256b.

⁹ Arist. *Pol.* 1257a.

forced to choose between their occupation and their homeland. The mercantile community has therefore traditionally been considered as politically disassociated and marginalized. Again, Hasebroek typifies this viewpoint, arguing that inter-regional merchants were required to be homeless and free from all patriotic ties. In contrast to the nomadic existence of the inter-regional merchant, Hasebroek theorised that citizens who actively participated in the running of the polis had a home and country which demanded their whole attention; if they were to depart the polis, even for a short period, they would be leaving behind all the things which made their lives complete (i.e. political participation, ownership of land and ties of kinship).¹⁰ Hasebroek and Knorringa therefore argued that since in the eyes of the Greeks no commercial or industrial gain could compensate for these losses, the inter-regional mercantile 'class' was comprised solely of foreigners, *metics* and destitute citizens who had no other choice. The common link to all these groups was that they were on the fringes of society. This was also a position advocated by Vélissaropoulos and Mossé, both of whom suggest that traders formed a transient element within the polis and stood low in the scale of respectability, economic standing and integration into the community.¹¹ McKechnie, in the late 1980s, also adopted this viewpoint when discussing inter-regional merchants in his study of outsiders in the Greek cities.¹² As well as using the work of Hasebroek, Knorringa, Mossé and Vélissaropoulos, McKechnie justified his position by drawing upon the research of de Ste. Croix. De Ste. Croix had argued (in his seminal work *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*) that merchants were frequently forced to spend the winter months away from their home poleis owing to Mediterranean sailing seasons. McKechnie agreed with this conclusion and used it to demonstrate how a merchant's connections with his home polis were constantly being weakened.¹³

The most recent study dedicated to Greek maritime traders by Reed, published in 2003, sought to examine the place of traders within the context of their home state and any poleis with which they traded. Although Reed's study differed in its intentions from the work of his predecessors, he shared many of the same flawed

¹⁰ Hasebroek (1933) 43.

¹¹ Mossé (1983); Vélissaropoulos (1977^a).

¹² McKechnie (1989) 179.

¹³ de Ste. Croix (1981) 266; McKechnie (1989) 177 " *This too suggests that the connections of traders with their home cities could become distant. The tendency of this inquiry will be to confirm this impression.*"

assumptions. For example, Reed accepts the previously discussed hypothesis that inter-regional merchants were mainly poor and foreign. Reed also adopted De Ste. Croix's stance that merchants were in general uninterested in, and dissociated politically and socially from, their home polis.¹⁴ In addition to this, Reed has also been criticised for accepting the models and definitions of Finley and Hasebroek with little or no questioning.¹⁵ He is thus content to accept without query the definitions of *emporos* and *nauklēros* offered by Finley (writing under the name Finkelstein) in his 1935 article investigating the terms used to denote different types of Greek 'trader'.¹⁶ With a much larger corpus of material now available to ancient historians, the definitions offered by Finley need to be re-examined and updated. Reed's study failed to do this.

After the work of Hasebroek and Knorringa, Finley was to instigate his revision of the model for economic sophistication and development in the Greek world. The consequence was that much of the literature of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s focused on the primitivist vs. modernist and substantivist vs. formalist debates and it has only been in recent years that Finley's model has begun to be challenged.¹⁷ Polanyi more than anyone seized upon new avenues of investigation and moved the study of the ancient Greek economy far beyond the primitivist-modernist debate. His "substantivist" perspective acknowledges types of economic behaviour, institutions and organisations. Polanyi's view provided a way of understanding the complex nature of the ancient Greek economy and its role in the political decision making of each polis.¹⁸ Polanyi identified three distinct types of trade within the substantive economy: administered trade,¹⁹ market trade,²⁰ and gift exchange.²¹ Polanyi argued

¹⁴ Reed (2003) 2-3.

¹⁵ Osborne (2004) 198-199.

¹⁶ Finkelstein (1935) 320-336.

¹⁷ For the formalists, the ancient economy was a functionally segregated and independently instituted sphere of activity that has its own rationality and which, although less 'developed' than modern economies, was nevertheless recognisable as similar in kind. Substantivists, on the other hand, argue that the ancient economy is both less developed and socially and politically embedded. This results in the economy being conspicuously conventional, irrational, status driven and prone to stagnation. Whereas substantivist vs. formalist debates centre on the politico-social location of the economy within ancient societies, the primitivists and modernists debate centre on the sophistication and level of output of early economies. These two debates are not mutually exclusive and confusion has often arisen when the differing discussions are inadvertently merged.

¹⁸ Polanyi (1957) 87. Tandy & Neale (1994) 9-33.

¹⁹ Administered trade is controlled by the government so that exchange takes place through channels administered by treaties in which equivalence and quantities are fixed by formal agreement.

²⁰ Market trade is exchange that takes place according to the impersonal laws of price-making markets.

all these types of exchange are directed by economic rationality. Even if exchange occurs in the context of a guest friendship the result is still the transfer of material goods or services and thus for this reason Polanyi argued that all exchange is “economic” in the substantive sense. These models are important as they have shaped the way in which merchants have subsequently been viewed. For instance, primitivist scholars marginalized inter-regional merchants as this complimented their view of the Greek economy as being underdeveloped and fully integrated into the social systems of the polis. More recent scholars, such as Andreau, have also pushed for a move away from such debates, instead recognising that the ancient economy, although different from modern preconceptions, was at the same time both comparable, and more complex than had previously been believed.²² Andreau has recently identified five main areas of study where the model presented by Finley has begun to be challenged:²³ the problem of unity within the ancient economy (i.e. do different ancient economies all share fundamental features?); the existence or absence of a market economy; the place of the economy in the ancient state; economic rationality; and the status of traders and bankers in ancient economy and society. Although all of these subjects have some bearing on this thesis, the most relevant are the discussions of market economies, economic rationality and the status of commercial operatives in the ancient economy.²⁴

The discussion of ‘market economies’ highlights one of the primary concerns of economic historians studying Classical Greece, namely how we should classify the Greek economy, and more specifically whether the Greek economy can be considered as a ‘market economy’. Finley was convinced that Greece could not be considered a market economy; he suggested that one could either talk of a market economy, in the sense used in the twentieth century, or not at all. He therefore denied that ancient commerce could be productively studied according to ideas such as competition,

²¹ Gift exchange is undertaken by two parties who enter into a reciprocal relationship, such as those between guest-friends.

²² Andreau (2002). Also see Cartledge (1983); (2002a); (2002b); Millett (1991); Shipton (1997); Salmon (1999); Mattingly (2001); Meikle (2002).

²³ Andreau (2002) 35-36.

²⁴ The development of a market economy is significant as it can be used to gauge the economic sophistication of a particular culture. If Athens can be identified as having a developed market economy, then it is more likely that the state was actively involving itself in the monitoring and regulation of commerce. The development of a market economy was dependent on the political visibility and significance of commercial agents, and thus in an economy of this nature merchants were situated far closer to the centre of political power than they were in other societies.

supply and demand, or pricing theory. Polanyi and Sahlins, who both emphasised how the ancient economy could not be separated from other aspects of the ancient world, also promoted this stance.²⁵ Finley arrived at this conclusion on the basis of his perception that the mercantile community comprised poor, uneducated foreigners. On account of the supposed low status of commercial operatives, Finley proposed that the Greek economy was underdeveloped since he believed that the prosperity and modernity of an economic sector was broadly in proportion to the social rank and wealth of those who dominate it.²⁶ Finley therefore minimised the economic sophistication of the Greeks. However, scholars have recently begun to challenge this model, instead suggesting that Greek society, in its own peculiar way, was more economically minded than previously thought. Whereas Finley, Weber and Hasebroek choose to see economic innovation in Greece as being highly suppressed, other scholars (such as Cartledge, Cohen, Shipton, Descat and Osborne) have begun to question this perception. Recent scholarship has instead proposed that, as in every other aspect of their culture, the Greeks sought to make advances.²⁷

This move away from a model that downplays economic sophistication and innovation has paved the way for scholars to modify Finley's understanding of a market economy. Descat has recently championed this position. He disputes Finley's argument that Greece did not possess market economies, instead proposing that scholars, rather than approaching the Greek economies in terms of market or non-market, should instead see them as containing 'partial' markets. These partial markets can be identified as sharing some of the same traits as a full market economy, but on a more limited, less developed, scale.²⁸ Descat therefore emphasises a number of changes that took place in the fifth and fourth centuries, such as the modification of the relationships between agriculture and market, and between agriculture and non-agricultural activities; the appearance of economic behaviour characterised by the buying and selling of commodities; and the existence of a class of wealthy men who did not owe their affluence to agriculture. The existence of a market economy, even

²⁵ Polanyi (1968); Sahlins (1972).

²⁶ Finley (1973).

²⁷ Hasebroek (1933); Weber (1978); Finley (1983); Cohen (1992); Descat (1995); Osborne (1996); Shipton (1997); Manning & Morris (2005); Morley (2007).

²⁸ Descat (1995) 961-989.

on a partial or limited scale, suggests that Greek commercial agents operated with a higher degree of economic sophistication than Finley had allowed.

This newly emerging school of thought also proposed that it was no longer possible to accept Finley's assessment that economic functions were fully integrated into social infrastructures (something which Finley termed an 'embedded' economy), instead suggesting that some aspects of the economy were distinct from social functions. This recognition that the Greeks did display some form of economic rationality has had a significant bearing on how the relationship between economic and non-economic aspects of society has been understood. In particular this recognition has led scholars to identify economic forms of behaviour, whilst secondly it has undermined the perception that social traditions served to stifle economic innovation. The study of Athenian banking has been used as a test case for this hypothesis, with Cohen and Shipton concluding that banking operations were generally independent from social constraints. Cohen, although not discussing Finley's approach to the ancient economy at any length, does challenge the marginalizing of banks.²⁹ Shipton, in direct opposition to the views of Millett, sees banks as, "*a powerful force for breaking down Finley's wall between the landed world of the citizen and the 'outsiders' world of money and trade*".³⁰ Shipton argues that although it is possible to identify 'outsiders', like the son of Sopaeus using banks such as that owned by Pasion, we also see them being used by wealthy citizens such as Menexenus, Demosthenes, and the influential Athenian general Timotheus. With the increased monetisation of the Athenian economy in fourth century the role of private banks was to become more significant. The son of Sopaeus, despite his disagreements with Pasion, can claim that bankers have many friends and handle much money.³¹ Banks could also serve a social function by operating as meeting places. Isocrates informs us that citizens often gathered at Philios' bank in search of news; a fact that seems to indicate banks were places people could regularly congregate.³² Furthermore, when Theophrastus' man of petty ambition seeks out public places where he could be sure of an audience, he too haunts banks.³³

²⁹ Cohen (1992) 111-89.

³⁰ Millett (1991) ch.5; Shipton (1997) 401-402.

³¹ Isoc. 17.2.

³² Lys. 9. 5.

³³ Theophr. *Chars.* 21.13.

Furthermore, Shipton suggests that the Athenian orators could evidently assume a familiarity with banking procedures amongst the jurors who were likely to encompass a wide spectrum of Athenian society.³⁴

The evidence provided by studies of the Athenian banking sector lends support to the challenge to the primitivists' view that agents in non-agricultural sectors of the economy were, in general, low class citizens or foreigners. Primitivist scholars have suggested that, owing to the inferior social status of non-agricultural commercial agents, the Greek states (in particular Athens) relied on *metics* or freedmen to fulfil most commercial roles. Furthermore they emphasise the problems faced by merchants, even when rich, of climbing the social ladder. Finley, Hasebroek and de Ste. Croix all proposed that the prosperity and modernity of an economic sector was broadly in proportion to the social rank and wealth of its entrepreneurs. That is, if entrepreneurs were of modest status, then their influence on the economy would also be modest thus indicating that the gap between polis and economy was wide. On the other hand, the more affluent and close to the seat of power commercial agents were in the non-agricultural sectors, the more likely they were to be identified, by their social inferiors, with the ruling aristocratic elite, and the greater the opportunity the economy had to develop. This was seen as one of the conditions of 'modernisation'. Nearly all modern scholars, whether Finleyans or not, share this viewpoint but I, like Foxhall, believe Andreau is right to question the validity of this assumption. Foxhall has convincingly argued that economic interactions that both constitute and transform a society need not be limited to modern societies. Furthermore the mercantile community of a polis need not be solely comprised of aristocrats or wealthy men in order to bring about economic development.³⁵

So where, then, does my thesis fit into this field of study and what does it aim to contribute? Firstly, I aim to move away from the primitivist vs. formalist and modernist vs. substantivist approach. Instead I seek to examine what the Athenians themselves thought of their mercantile community. Many modern economic works aim to establish rigid distinctions between social classes and economic activities, whereas I intended to break down this ideology. I will focus in particular on the

³⁴ Shipton (1997) 409.

³⁵ Foxhall (1998) 295-309.

Athenian mercantile community in the fourth century, drawing conclusions that are primarily of significance to this time and place.³⁶ One reason for focusing on fourth-century Athens is that, although this period lacks a historian of the completeness and quality of Thucydides, there is a much greater body of epigraphical evidence.³⁷ The Athenians were keen believers in recording popular decrees, treaties and proclamations, inscribing them on stone and placing them on public display. From surviving inscriptions it is possible to gain a wealth of valuable information pertaining to trade and traders in the fourth century. In addition to the philosophical and epigraphic corpora we can also gain a wealth of knowledge about the mercantile community from the corpus of fourth century Athenian legal speeches. Furthermore any study of the mercantile community, if it is to draw useful conclusions, needs to develop from the perspective of a variety of disciplines, most importantly sociology and social theory, economics, geography, anthropology, archaeology and history. This methodology has not always been adopted.

Secondly, I will re-examine the Greek terminology used to identify the various types of merchants and traders, updating and modifying Finley's 1935 linguistic study.³⁸ I will examine the differences between *emporoi*, *nauklēroi* and *kapēloi*, investigating the nuances and connotations attached to each term, and will conclude that, due to a more comprehensive understanding of the workings of the Greek economies, it is possible to redefine how we translate the term *nauklēros*. I will also examine whether the uses of these terms and phrases are sufficiently uniform to allow authoritative definitions. Linked to my linguistic study will be an investigation of the Athenian 'mercantile class' which will examine the different ethnic, social and economic groups that comprised the trading community. This section will directly

³⁶ It should be noted that the Greeks with their idiosyncratic manner of keeping time, would be mystified with the modern notion of periodizing the past. However, in certain ways they too divided their past, for instance Hesiod's ages of man (e.g. Gold, Silver, Hero). One problem with periodizing the past is that it suggests a unity and order that is more apparent than real. (Tritle (1997) 4). Such periodizing does however, recognise the importance of the fourth century in its own right and as something more than just a footnote to the classical period or a precursor for the rise of Philip and Alexander. By recognising the uniqueness of the fourth century, in particular in relation to the economic history of Athens, I hope to avoid drawing generalised and unrepresentative conclusions about the importance of trade and traders in Greek society as a whole (a drawback with many previous studies).

³⁷ Xenophon could be seen as an exception to this, as many of his works e.g. the *Hellenica*, *Anabasis*, *Agésilas* and *Hipparchius*, do provide some detailed evidence for the first third of the fourth century, however his moral tone as well as his prejudices complicate his usefulness.

³⁸ As has already been suggested, one of the criticisms of Reed's investigation of maritime traders is that he failed to update Finley's linguistic analysis. Osborne (2004) 198-199. See above fn.15.

challenge the theory, first raised by Hasebroek, that the ‘mercantile class’ was in general comprised of foreigners or less affluent citizens, instead suggesting there was a broader mix of men from a variety of ethnic, social and economic groups.³⁹ Following on from this will be an investigation of the close links between maritime financiers and the men to whom they lent, arguing that maritime moneylenders should be seen as a subgroup of the mercantile community.

In light of the model for the composition of the ‘mercantile class’ developed in Chapters One and Two, Chapters Three, Four and Five will seek to reassess the negative perceptions of merchants and the mercantile community. Chapter Three will investigate the differing depictions of merchants in the philosophical and historical writings of the fourth century. This chapter will also contain a discussion of a number of Greek ideals and value systems, for example exploring Greek thinking on risk-taking, death at sea, the acquisition and expenditure of money, and the different types of exchange mechanisms, in order to see how these might have influenced or biased the surviving source material. Chapter Four will discuss the Athenian import-export economy, exploring the commodities being traded and how the need for imported goods and the revenue made from exports might affect the perception of the mercantile community during the fourth century. Chapter Five will move on to examine the reality of negative depictions, and propose, in direct contrast to Hasebroek, that these negative views of merchants were held primarily by certain Greek philosophers, rather than by society in general.⁴⁰ It will also propose that, as the Athenian need for imported commodities increased throughout the fourth century, and as the grain supply lines came under more persistent threat, the Athenians became reliant on inter-regional merchants. As a result the Athenian state recognised the value of these men, a fact that becomes evident through the bestowal of honours and the awarding of the title of *proxenos*. I will also propose that a merchant’s need to find credit resulted in the majority being honest, at least within their commercial dealings, and that they were far from the tricky, devious *comen* the philosophers would have us believe.

³⁹ Hasebroek (1979) 26-27.

⁴⁰ Hasebroek (1979) 40.

Finally in Chapter Six, having constructed a new model for the social perception and status of the mercantile community, I will investigate how a more sympathetic view of merchants affects the way we understand their position and status within the Athenian legal and political structures. My discussion will open with an investigation of the political influence of merchants. I shall dispel the theory that merchants were politically inactive. Instead, I will propose that they could be politically active, either individually or as a group. Moreover, it will be shown that a number of wealthy and influential Athenian politicians demonstrate an intimate knowledge and understanding of the economy (in particular the grain trade). Finally, I will discuss the provision of a separate judicial system in Athens to accommodate the needs of the mercantile community. I will demonstrate that, far from being a hindrance, the occupation of inter-regional merchant could over-ride social status, using the integration of slaves in to the legal system as a case in point. Furthermore it will be demonstrated that the occupation of inter-regional merchant brought with it a degree of specialised legal protection.

In order to offer this interpretation I have undertaken a fresh examination of all the available literary evidence, and combined, or modified it, with the picture presented by recent archaeological and epigraphic discoveries. Although the majority of the material falls within the period 400-323 BC,⁴¹ there are a number of instances when I have felt it sensible to examine a complete process and thus, in these cases, I have incorporated evidence that falls outside this timeframe. One such group of sources is the archaic texts. Although the works of Hesiod, Homer, Theognis and Alcaeus are far removed from the fourth century they nevertheless form part of a development process in Greek rationality and morality. Therefore, if we are to understand fully Classical views on merchants and commerce, it is prudent to examine the opinions expressed in Archaic literature.

Epigraphic evidence can also offer fresh insights or provide information otherwise overlooked by, or not included in, the literary sources. The ever-expanding corpus of epigraphic material, much of which was unavailable to scholars studying

⁴¹ Like Rhodes and Osborne (2003) and Reed (2003), I have used 323 BC as the terminal date, not because of political or economic changes nor because of a dramatic change in the role or status of the mercantile community but because after this period the nature of the source material changes dramatically.

inter-regional trade at the turn of the 20th century, illuminates the mercantile community in a unique way. Honorific decrees, public and private accounts and assembly records all offer a different perspective from which to study inter-regional merchants. Honorific decrees, for example, can be used to demonstrate the high esteem in which a generous and respected merchant could be held by the state. These honorific decrees, erected in public places, record the praise-worthy deeds of the recipient and the rewards and honours that the state bestowed upon them. My intention is to analyse these rewards and privileges, comparing them with the honours bestowed upon victorious generals, ambassadors and athletes. I will demonstrate that the systems of honours and rewards are in fact similar, which begins to undermine the idea that merchants were seen only as a negative element in society.

Another important source for 'Athenian' merchants during the fourth century are the law court speeches. In the forensic orations it is possible to identify a range of opinions being expressed about the morals, character and social position of merchants. Although oratorical literature poses its own particular set of problems (owing to low standards of proof, the falsifying of evidence, the distortion of pertinent facts, the social class of the orator and his client/s and the ability of the prosecution to gain a conviction based on gossip, hearsay and rumour), the legal corpus still offers some of the most insightful information we have concerning the mercantile class. For instance, Demosthenes' speech *Against Zenothemis* contains the only complete surviving example of a contract for a maritime loan, a business arrangement that was commonplace, yet has all but vanished from the literary and epigraphic record. It is also worth remembering that, despite Hasebroek's conclusion, law court speeches do not prove that all merchants were corrupt and dishonest: instead they record the exceptions rather than the rule.

In the closing remarks of his introduction to *Courtesans and Fishcakes* James Davidson points to two dangers for historians approaching the Greeks and their social history.⁴² The first is to think of the Greeks as our cousins and to interpret everything in terms that we can relate to. We must remember we are entering a vastly different world which is very strange and very foreign, a world that has none of the temporal

⁴² Davidson (1997) xxvi.

structures we take for granted, such as a universal calendar or system of timekeeping. And yet despite these differences the Greeks will sometimes seem familiar and it is perhaps at these times the historian should be most careful. Often what may seem the most familiar, most obvious, most easy to understand, can in fact be the most difficult to interpret. But secondly we must resist the urge to push the Greeks further away from us than is necessary: *"They are neither our cousins, but neither are they our opposites. They are just different, just trying to be themselves."*⁴³ This point is especially pertinent to an economic historian attempting to analyse pre-industrial economies and the place of merchants within the economy and society in general. With no easily recognisable form of economic infrastructure it is often tempting to push the Athenian economy (and its agents) to a polar opposite from our modern definitions and constructs. Yet aspects of Athenian economic history can be familiar, and thus a fine balancing act is required if we are to construct an accurate picture of the fourth century 'Athenian' merchant, a picture that gives a true representation of both his economic and social standing. The picture I propose will redefine the status and role of fourth century merchants in Athens, and will challenge the traditionally negative images propagated by the philosophers.

⁴³ Davidson (1997) xxvi.

Chapter One

Kapēloi, Emporoi or Nauklēroi, Defining Greek Inter-regional Merchants

Introduction

One of the fundamental yet highly contentious questions that needs to be addressed in any sustained analysis of Greek inter-regional exchange is who exactly comprised the so-called ‘mercantile class’. The idea that Greek merchants were a clearly identifiable and distinct social class permeated the work of early scholars, with Hasebroek being the first to raise the suggestion.¹ Subsequent scholars followed Hasebroek’s lead: Amit argued that Greek merchants were a social group who can be identified as forming a ‘merchant middle class’;² Calhoun also considered merchant adventurers as forming their own distinct ‘class’;³ whilst Michell theorised that the Greeks divided commerce into three distinct ‘classes’ that were in essence based on wealth.⁴ The theory that merchants formed a distinct social or economic class still finds acceptance. Reed, for example, ends his chapter on the judicial place of maritime merchants by quoting de Ste. Croix’s conclusion that the men who conducted overseas trade were not only citizens or metics of the cities in which they traded, but were also part of an ‘international mercantile class’. The terms ‘merchant’ or mercantile class must be used cautiously as they both presuppose a degree of self-awareness either as a distinct social group or entity. The term ‘mercantile class’ even hints at the consistent treatment and recognition of merchants as a single legal, social, economic or political faction, a supposition that needs careful clarification before being accepted. As will be demonstrated, the occupation of merchant was undertaken by men from a variety

¹ Hasebroek (1933) 5, “*The types of trader with whom we are dealing form a clear and well developed social class*”.

² Amit (1965) 57, “*nauklēroi, emporoi and capitalists investing their money in loans on bottomry were considered as partners in the same business, together they carried out trade... as a whole they formed socially a single middle class*”.

³ Calhoun (1965) 54, “*We do not hear from his [the merchant adventurer] side at all, and we have to take with a very considerable amount of salt what the capitalist has to say about the merchant adventurer, both individually and as a class*”.

⁴ Michell (1940 reprinted 1963) 230-234.

of social classes and ethnic backgrounds, thus making the term 'class' redundant and inappropriate. Instead it is prudent to employ the much less restrictive term 'mercantile community', which can be used to encompass the wide variety of social, ethnic and political backgrounds from which Greek merchants hailed.⁵

The following introductory discussions have a twofold aim: the first is to investigate how the ancient sources denoted and classified the various types of merchants through their use of language. The main purpose is to tease out the underlying connotations of the various terms and phrases, examining whether they were used in a sufficiently consistent manner to warrant assigning precise meanings. Secondly, I will re-examine the composition of the mercantile community, challenging the previous consensus that there was a difference in ethnicity between those financing commercial ventures and those undertaking the actual voyages. These sections will therefore question the perception that full Athenian citizens were solely interested in financing inter-regional exchange whilst being content to leave the daily operation in the hands of metics and foreigners. These sections will also examine whether Greek society recognised merchants as a distinct social class (who shared some determinable characteristic that could be easily recognised by their peers and which could be used to distinguish or identify them in the literary and epigraphic sources), or whether on the other hand they were purely seen as an occupational grouping. If, as will be argued, the mercantile community was comprised of men from the whole spectrum of social, economic, political and ethnic backgrounds, then identifying common distinguishing traits offers a useful way of exploring the relationship between inter-regional merchants and Athenian society.

Although Finley undertook a similar linguistic analysis in the 1930s, the discovery of new epigraphic material, and a more advanced understanding of the economic functions and infrastructures of the Greek poleis, mean that his work needs updating.⁶ A reinvestigation of terminology can also take into consideration modern discussions surrounding the social and economic functions of the various subgroups

⁵ A fuller justification of the use of this term can be found in section 2.1.

⁶ Finley (Finkelstein) (1935) 320-336.

of merchants, offering the potential for reinterpretation and reclassification. Although Reed has recently addressed similar questions he has been criticised for the brevity of his analysis and discussion, and for his almost unquestioning acceptance of Finley's definitions.⁷ Finley, despite recognising that the three terms *kapēloi*, *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* did have specific connotations, felt they were so frequently disregarded that it was a fruitless exercise to try and identify social, economic or political groupings from their usage. He states:

“Few generalizations can be established from the available evidence as to the usage of these commercial terms and... in general we must limit ourselves to the statement that in some cases a given word was used in one way whilst in other cases it was used differently”.⁸

Without an accurate understanding of these terms, it is almost impossible to form a clear picture of the mercantile community. Although Finley's assertion that the ancient sources frequently deviate in their usage of terminology is correct, these deviations can be explained if we explore more closely the context of each anomalous use. This study will demonstrate that in many of the instances where the use of a particular word has been seen as either confusion or carelessness by the ancient author, there is in fact an underlying consistency that has previously been overlooked. Moreover, the ways in which the terms *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* are used make it impossible to assign any precise definitions. Therefore, Reed and Finley conclude that simply because someone is labeled as an *emporos* does not mean he necessarily undertook a career in the wholesale of commodities which were carried on someone else's ship, and which were owned but not produced by him.⁹ Frequently it is possible to establish that men who are designated as *emporoi*, fail to meet one or another of these criteria. Although we cannot gain lexicographical exactitude, it is still important to identify the traits that the majority of *emporoi* had in common. Reed addresses this problem by identifying what he terms as “primary” and “secondary” characteristics.¹⁰

⁷ Reed (2003) 6-14; Osborne (2004) 198-199.

⁸ Finley (Finkelstein) (1935) 334.

⁹ Finley (1935) 320-22; 333-36; Reed (2004) 6-7.

¹⁰ Primary characteristics are those shared almost without exception by men undertaking a particular

Although I will disagree with the way he categories certain traits, this is nevertheless a sensible approach and one that I have adopted. Furthermore, I shall couple my examination into the usage of the terms *kapēloi*, *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* with an investigation of less commonly employed terms such as *autōpolēs*, *andriapodokapēlos* or *andrapodistēs* in order to create a clearer picture of the ‘normal’ role of each type of merchant.

Although in general this chapter will focus on the same period as the rest of the study, that is the fourth century, it is also necessary to examine evidence from outside this period. When attempting to assign precise definitions to Greek terms it is sensible to examine the development in their usage as a way of understanding more fully how the associated connotations and nuances change over time. For this reason the works of Homer, Hesiod, Theognis, Alcaeus and the early lyric poets have been incorporated into the linguistic study alongside the fifth and fourth century sources, in order to chart the usage of each of the three major terms. Additionally, much later sources can also be useful; the scholia and lexica have also been included, as they often present the most coherent attempts at analysing variant terms for trade and traders, and can be invaluable for understanding commercial terminology. Furthermore, the study of more personal documents such as those provided in the *Lead Letters*, the *Periplus Maris Erythraei* and the vast quantities of private correspondence preserved on Egyptian papyri, sources which were unavailable to early twentieth century scholars,

occupation, whilst secondary characteristics only apply in the *majority* of cases. Reed distinguishes primary and secondary characteristics purely on the frequency in which exceptions are tolerated. Therefore, there may only be a few exceptions to a primary characteristic whilst for a secondary more exceptions are permitted. I would add a third category “usual” characteristic, which are traits that are mostly shared but could more frequently be disregarded. An example would be the expectation that *emporoi* were inter-regional maritime traders. Although in the main this was true, there are a number of instances when the term *emporoi* is used to denote men travelling long distances overland or using river boats. See sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2.

offer unrivalled material for highly detailed analysis of commercial language and semantics.

1.1 Distinctions Between *Emporoi* and *Kapēloi*

1.1.1 Range of Operations

It is unfortunate for scholars studying Greek trade that only a handful of surviving sources try to define precisely how the terms *kapēlos*, *emporos* and *nauklēros* should be distinguished from one another. Plato's discussion in the *Sophist* (223c-d) is the most significant and sustained attempt at a detailed analysis of the terms *emporos* and *kapēlos* and, as such, provides an ideal starting point for a linguistic investigation of the mercantile community. Plato, having made the distinction between the sale of one's own products *autopōlikē* and the sale of products produced by others *metablētikē* then moves on to examine the differences between trade carried out within the polis *kapēlikē* and the movement of commodities from one state to another *emporikē*.

Ἰένος· τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης διπλοῦν ἦν εἶδος που, τὸ μὲν θηρευτικὸν μέρος ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ἀλλακτικόν.

Θεαίτητος· ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

Ἰένος· τῆς τοίνυν ἀλλακτικῆς δύο εἶδη λέγωμεν, τὸ μὲν δωρητικόν, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀγοραστικόν;

Θεαίτητος· εἰρήσθω.

Ἰένος· καὶ μὴν αὖ φήσομεν ἀγοραστικὴν διχῆι τέμνεσθαι.

Θεαίτητος· πῆ;

Ἰένος· τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν διαιρουμένην, τὴν δὲ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην μεταβλητικὴν.

Θεαίτητος· πάνυ γε.

Ἰένος· τί δέ; τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἢ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλαγὴ, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ἡμισυ μέρος ὄν, καπηλικὴ προσαγορεύεται;

Θεαίτητος· ναί.

Ἰένος· τὸ δέ γε ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν διαλλάττον ὦνῃ καὶ πράσει ἐμπορικῆ;

Θεαίτητος· τί δ' οὐ;

“Stranger: The acquisitive art was of two sorts, the one the division of hunting, the other that of exchange.

Theaetetus: Yes, it was.

Stranger: Now shall we say that there are two sorts of exchange, the one by gift, the other by sale?

Theaetetus: So be it.

Stranger: And we shall say further that exchange by sale is divided into two parts.

[223d] Theaetetus: How so?

Stranger: We make this distinction--calling the part which sells a man's own productions the selling of one's own, and the other, which exchanges the works of others, exchange.

Theaetetus: Certainly.

Stranger: Well, then, that part of exchange which is carried on in the city, amounting to about half of it, is called retailing, is it not?

Theaetetus: Yes.

Stranger: And that which exchanges goods from city to city by purchase and sale is called merchandising?

*Theaetetus: Certainly”.*¹¹

What immediately becomes obvious from Plato's discussion is that one of the primary distinctions between the different types of exchange was the geographic area they encompassed, with a fundamental difference in the nature and operation of local exchange when compared with inter-regional or cross-border exchange.¹² After this passage Plato moves on to discuss the different economic roles and functions fulfilled by the men undertaking each type of exchange. The definition he offers for *kapēlos* is a trader who buys and sells his products within the confines of the polis, whereas *emporoi* were traders who travelled from region to region importing and exporting a variety of commodities.¹³

¹¹ Pl. *Soph*, 223c-d. Bluck (1975) 38-39, suggests that the whole opening section of the *Sophist* is concerned with clarification on certain concepts rather than a systematic attempt to analyse pre-existing knowledge. The passage is therefore highly significant if viewed from this perspective. See also, Benardete (1984) 100-101.

¹² I have chosen to use the term 'inter-regional' when discussing *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* (and their respective operations), as I think this word most accurately reflects the reality that these men could travel considerable distances either by land or sea. Terms such as cross-border, for instance, are most commonly associated with, or are related to, overland transport. In contrast, the term 'inter-regional' can be used to encompass a wide range of transport methods whilst still inferring the concept of distance exchange.

¹³ Pl. *Soph*, 223 d.

Plato is clearly aware of the contemporary usage for the terms he defines: although he is in the minority of authors who attempt to clarify the distinction, his definitions are supported by the employment of these terms by other authors. His distinctions are also supported by the original usage of the term *emporos* in Homeric literature. In the Homeric epics, the term *emporos* is used as a way of denoting a traveller rather than having any specific economic connotations and it is not until the fifth century that the word becomes synonymous with the concepts of trade and commerce.¹⁴ As trade networks began to expand and flourish and merchants became the men most associated with travel, the word begins to be used to specifically denote travelling merchants rather than merely travellers in general. It is interesting however, that we find a return to the traditional usage in a number of the tragedies (such as Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers*, Euripides' *Alcestis* and Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*), indicating that the word *emporos* could, in specific circumstances, still be used simply to denote traveller.¹⁵ As the plays themselves recall events from the distant past, it is reasonable to suggest that the playwrights used the more traditional meanings of certain words in order to add to the antiquated feel of the performance. Although they demonstrate how the term *emporos* was derived from the word for traveller, the Homeric sources and the corpus of tragic plays offer little insight into the later use of the terms, and as a result they have been largely eliminated from this section of the investigation.¹⁶

An examination of the classical usage of the word *emporos* and its derivatives in the surviving literary texts, reveals that distance and travel were distinguishing factors between *kapēloi* and *emporoi*.¹⁷ Having eliminated the tragedies, there are 271 passages containing the term *emporos* or one of its derivatives; out of these, 243 specifically refer to inter-regional traders who move from region to region rather than having a local sphere of operation. In the remaining 28 passages however, there is no

¹⁴ For the use of the word *emporos* to denote traveller rather than merchant in Homeric literature see *Od.* 2.318; 24.300.

¹⁵ Aesch. *Supp.* 660; Eur. *Alc.* 995; Soph. *OC*, 25; 303.

¹⁶ However, it will be prudent to re-examine these sources briefly in section 1.1.2, which will examine the evidence for overland trade and transport, and its representation in Greek literature.

¹⁷ For a complete list of the sources analysed see Appendix One.

clear indication of the range encompassed by the merchant's trading ventures. Therefore, even a cursory examination of the linguistic evidence reveals that in the vast majority of sources the term *emporos* was used to denote an inter-regional merchant. As there is no positive evidence to suggest any alternatives, it is now sensible to compare how the term *kapēlos* and its derivatives are employed, since their usage can help confirm the idea that distance was a distinguishing factor between different types of merchant.

The term *kapēlos* appears 33 times in the sources identified as important by this study. 17 passages can be clearly identified as retail traders, four can be identified as peddlers whilst in the other 12 the context is unclear.¹⁸ In nine out of the 17 passages containing the term *kapēlos* to denote a type of retail trader, it is possible to identify the author as specifically describing the man's sphere of operation as being local. Of the remaining eight passages only one directly states that the *kapēlos* being described travelled outside the local vicinity (and even then not for trade),¹⁹ whilst the other seven offer no comment. These findings therefore seem to offer further support to the hypothesis that distance is a distinguishing factor.

In earlier studies however, many of the 12 passages that make no specific reference to locality or distance, have been used to suggest that *kapēloi* were not confined to their region of domicile. Knorringa, for example, argued that it is possible to see the term *kapēlos* as encompassing men who undertook a wide variety of commercial transactions, some of which involved travel.²⁰ Despite this theory, it is still far from clear that the authors of any of these passages had long-distance or inter-regional trade in mind when they employed the term *kapēlos*.²¹ For example, in

¹⁸ See Appendix One. Peddler: a person who travels in the local vicinity selling small quantities of products or goods manufactured by a third party, typically a lone operator.

¹⁹ Hdt. 2.141.4. In this passage a number of *kapēloi* are clearly described as moving away from their local sphere of operation but this was not for trading purposes. Instead, these men went to fight for their king, Sethos, when he engaged the Assyrian king Sennacharib, in pitched battle. Sethos, having alienated his warrior class to such a great extent they refuse to fight for him, now relied on the *kapēloi*

²⁰ Knorringa (1926) 16; 30; 116-118 in particular note 6. This is a hypothesis also raised by Finley (1935) 333; 328 n.37, and Michell (1963) 230-231.

²¹ The seven sources which use the term *kapēlos* without any reference to locality, and which have previously been open to interpretation are Pl. *Prt.* 313c; *Plt.* 1.260c; *Soph.* 231d; *Resp.* 317d; Ar. *Vesp.* 447; *Eccl.* 50; Hdt. 1.94.1; 2.141.4; 3.89.3.

Plato's *Protagoras*, Hippocrates compares the occupation of *kapēlos* to that of a sophist without explicitly stating what he understood by the term *kapēlos*. Similarly in the *Statesman* the stranger, when discussing kingship with the young Socrates, draws a direct comparison between a *kapēlos* and a king or statesman. Although in neither passage does Plato define the term, if we use the definition provided in the *Sophist* it is possible to understand these examples as referring to local traders.²²

Like Plato, Aristophanes is not explicit in his use of the term. In *Peace*, lines 447 and 1208, the term is used in reference to a 'dealer in shields', which would seem to indicate a regional business rather than an international operation, though this is never directly stated. Again Aristophanes is not explicit in his usage of this term when in the *Ecclesiazusae* line 50, he describes Geusistraté as the wife of the local tavern keeper (the word used to describe his occupation in this instance is *kapēlos*). Sommerstein has (on the basis of the context) translated the word to mean publican, which if correct, can be seen as another example of the term being linked to local livelihoods rather than inter-regional or cross-border exchange.²³ Finally, Plato in the *Republic*, states that those who trade in the agora on a daily basis are *kapēloi* whilst those who roam from city to city are called *emporoi*.²⁴ This passage clearly offers support to the hypothesis that distance is a distinguishing factor, but has previously been criticised by Finley, Hasebroek and Knorringa, for creating an overly simplistic distinction.²⁵ However, because of the evidence presented above it is reasonable to suggest that this passage of the *Republic* does demonstrate that *kapēloi* were expected to operate within the local vicinity. Additionally, in the two Herodotus passages identified, 3.89.3 and 1.94.1, the term *kapēloi* is again used in a non-specific way. In 3.89.3 the Persian king Darius is given the title "Darius the *kapēlos*" by his subjects on account of his fixing of the tribute system and "other" ordinances: what exactly is meant by this title is far from clear. In 1.94.1 the Lydians are recorded as being the first culture to use gold and silver currency and thus develop an economy founded upon retail rather than barter. Based on this assessment Herodotus suggests the

²² Pl. *Soph.* 231d.

²³ Sommerstein (translator), (1999).

²⁴ Pl. *Resp.* 371d. Adam (1902) 97, cross references this passage with Pl. *Lg.* 918a and concludes that *kapēloi* were expected to operate within the local vicinity.

²⁵ Knorringa (1928) 114-115; Hasebroek (1933) 1-3; Finkelstein (Finley) (1935) 328.

Lydians were the first to create the occupation of *kapēlos* and in the context of his previous discussion of coinage, it is reasonable to suggest that here he is implying a local form of commerce rather than an inter-regional one.²⁶ Finally, evidence from the scholia and lexica also suggests that *kapēloi* and *emporoi* were distinguishable by their differing spheres of operation. The term *kapēlos* is generally defined as “a sedentary trader whose sphere of operation was local and who bought from the producer or a middleman”, whilst the term *emporos*, is defined as being “a distance traveller (who normally utilised sea travel) who, when crossing the ocean, transported their wares in boats belonging to others”.²⁷

Conclusion One:

Having undertaken an analysis of the geographic areas in which *kapēloi* and *emporoi* are recorded as operating, it is safe to conclude that there is a fundamental difference between the two. Although this may seem like an obvious and uncontroversial conclusion due to the stem of *emporos* being directly derived from the words *peraō* and *poreuō*, two Greek words associated with travel and travellers, it has previously been challenged.²⁸ Combine the fact that there are no clear examples of *emporoi* solely operating within a local region, with the fact that the term *kapēloi* is used to designate local retailers who only travelled in exceptional circumstances (even then never for business purposes) and it becomes possible to view distance as a viable way of distinguishing between the two occupations.

1.1.2 *Emporoi* and Overland Transport

The differing distances encompassed by local retailers and inter-regional merchants are clearly important ways of distinguishing between the two. However, although some scholars recognise this, the concept of long distance overland trade has

²⁶ See footnote 19.

²⁷ Schol. Ar. *Plut.* 426; *Anecd. Bach.* 1.379.26. For works linking *emporoi* to overseas travel see:- Suda, Schol. Ar. *Plut.* 521; 904; 1179. For examples of *emporoi* using vessels owned by others to transport their wares see:- Suda, *Zonar.*, *Etym. Magn.* 336.20; *Anecd. Bach.* 1.219.1.

²⁸ See for example Bolkenstein (1923) 164-70 and Knorringa (1926) 47-48 who both argue that what distinguishes *emporoi* and *kapēloi* is the different items they trade (i.e. luxury vs. staple) and the nature of their operations (i.e. wholesaler vs. retailer), rather than the locale in which they operated.

previously been seen as problematic and as presenting an obstacle to such an easy distinction. The confusion arose because earlier scholars, such as Finley, Hasebroek and Michell, believed that the term *emporos* was intrinsically linked to the possession of, or travel aboard, a merchant vessel. As scholars could not identify any specific Greek term for overland traders, they had difficulty in integrating non-maritime merchants into their respective studies. Hasebroek for instance, argued that although both *nauklēroi* and *emporoi* were concerned with trade, they differed because *nauklēroi* owned the vessels on which *emporoi* travelled. He therefore defined an *emporos* as “*the man who, not possessing a ship of his own, travels and carries his wares, on a ship belonging to someone else - that is, to a merchant-ship-owner (nauklēros)*”.²⁹ He therefore disregarded overland exchange, as he believed that the geography and topography of the Greek world meant, “*practically all traffic would be by sea*”. Michell agreed with this conclusion and suggested that, “*Except for absolute necessity carriage over short distances, as, for example, the Oropus-Decelea-Athens road, land transport was hardly used at all, very probably because of the scarcity of transport animals, at least in Attica*”.³⁰ Finley, although arguing that the majority of commerce was undertaken by sea, did recognise that the term *emporoi* could occasionally be used to refer to sedentary trading.³¹ Knorringa, and more recently Reed, have taken a slightly different approach, theorising that travel was one of the primary characteristics of *emporoi* whereas the method of transport was secondary.³² If this is the case, merchants who undertook overland inter-regional exchange should be seen as a subdivision of the term *emporos*.³³ Knorringa’s and Reed’s approach is the most sensible and can in fact be expanded to include those merchants who utilised inland water bodies such as rivers and lakes.³⁴ If it is accepted that a distinction can be

²⁹ Hasebroek (1933) 3.

³⁰ Michell (1940) 252.

³¹ Finley (1935) 328

³² Knorringa (1926) 55, recognises that “*This explanation is correct in so far that the goods of the emporos are nearly always conveyed by sea by the emporos himself. Still it appears that this is not an essential factor, as emporia may also denote overland trade*”. Reed (2003) 8. “*The geography of the Greek world guaranteed that long distance trade would normally be by sea. At the same time Xenophon’s claim that ‘Athens receives her merchandise by way of land’ disqualifies trading by sea as a primary characteristic of emporoi.*”.

³³ This hypothesis is supported by Plato (*Resp.* 289e), who characterises *emporoi* (amongst others) as travelling from city to city both by sea and land, and Diodorus Siculus (2.56.3) who records that Themistokles met two Lynkestians who were engaged in trade and thus familiar with roads.

³⁴ For example, in Diodorus Siculus’ account of Alexander the Great’s invasion of Persia, we find a

drawn between local retailers (*kapēloi*) and maritime inter-regional merchants (*emporoi*), due primarily to the different range of their business operations, then it is not unreasonable to suggest that the Greeks included other types of inter-regional merchants within their definition of *emporos*.³⁵ Like maritime *emporoi*, other types of inter-regional merchants crossed political boundaries, thus making them distinct from *kapēloi*. Furthermore, they also travelled away from their region of domicile with the aim of generating a profit by exploiting another region's deficiency in natural resources or to meet a demand for luxury products. These two factors made other types of inter-regional merchants far more similar to *emporoi* than *kapēloi*, a conclusion that is supported by Xenophon in *Ways and Means*:

ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν τινες πλεον ἀπέχωσιν αὐτῆς, τοσοῦτῳ χαλεπωτέροις ἢ ψύχεσιν ἢ θάλπεσιν ἐντυγχάνουσιν· ὅποσοι τ' ἂν αὖ βουλευθῶσιν ἀπ' ἐσχάτων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπ' ἔσχατα ἀφικέσθαι, πάντες οὔτοι ὥσπερ κύκλου τόρνον τὰς Ἀθήνας ἢ παραπλέουσιν ἢ παρέρχονται. καὶ μὴν οὐ περίρρυτός γε οὔσα ὅμως ὥσπερ νῆσος πᾶσιν ἀνέμοις προσάγεται τε ὧν δεῖται καὶ ἀποπέμπεται ἃ βούλεται· ἀμφιθάλαττος γάρ ἐστι. καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ δέχεται ἐμπορίᾳ· ἡπειρος γάρ ἐστιν.

*For the further we go from her (Athens), the more intense is the heat or cold we meet with; and every traveller who would cross from one to the other end of Greece passes Athens as the centre of a circle, whether he goes by water or by road. Then, too, though she is not wholly sea-girt, all the winds of heaven bring to her the goods she needs and bear away her exports, as if she were an island; for she lies between two seas: and she has a vast land trade as well; for she is of the mainland.*³⁶

The context of this passage is a discussion of the import and export of

brief discussion of an *emporos* who travelled up and down the Tigris River trading with the small villages. Diodorus states that even during the driest seasons the people of the Uxii region could enjoy fresh fruit and all manner of confections for the table. The reason he gives for this is the ease with which merchants could utilise the Tigris and the other various waterways it fed as a quick and easy system of transport. Merchants could therefore sail from Uxii in the north as far south as the mouth of the Tigris and into the Persian Sea. Diod. Sic. 17.67.3

³⁵ For evidence of the term *emporos* being used to designate overland inter-regional merchants, see Pl. *Rsep.* 371A; Plt. 289e; Xen. *Vect.* 1.7; *Eq. Mag.* 4.7, Aen. *Tact.* 10.4, Pl.; Diod. Sic. 11.56.3.

³⁶ Xen. *Vect.* 1.6-7.

commodities by Athens. In the course of this discussion, Xenophon demonstrates that overland trade played a considerable part in the provisioning of the Athenian state. This is an idea also supported by Thucydides who suggests that trade with Euboia could most safely and cheaply be achieved by utilising the overland route from Oropos-Dekeleia rather than sailing round the dangerous Sunium promontory.³⁷ What these passages demonstrate is that inter-regional exchange utilising alternative forms of transport were more prominent than previously acknowledged. Therefore, rather than accepting Reed's suggestion that travel by sea was a secondary characteristic of *emporoi*, as this downplays the importance of other types of transport, I would instead prefer to consider it a 'usual' trait. By allowing a greater frequency of deviation in means of travel, it is possible to maintain the distinction from *kapēloi* whilst simultaneously recognising that other forms of inter-regional trade were also important to Athens.³⁸

Conclusion Two:

The evidence discussed above suggests that the term *emporos* was not solely used in reference to maritime traders. Diodorus' and Xenophon's usages of the term *emporos* confirm that the word could be used to designate a variety of inter-regional merchants, not just those undertaking maritime trading ventures. The fact that these traders, as in the case of the Tigris river merchants, could travel vast distance inland strengthens the hypothesis that one of the fundamental aspects of the term *emporos* is the concept of inter-regional exchange. With the two main types of commercial operatives (i.e. *emporoi* and *kapēloi*) being distinguishable by the distances their operations encompassed, there was little need for the Greeks to develop a separate term for non-maritime merchants as they could be incorporated into one of the pre-existing sub-divisions of the mercantile community.

³⁷ Thuc. 7.28.1.

³⁸ Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.*54.1), demonstrates the Athenian concern with the maintenance of roads when he discusses the *hodopoioi* whose duty it was to construct and repair public highways. Although these roads would be used for a variety of purposes, not merely for facilitating trade, the Athenians paid particular attention to routes that had economic importance to the city. We therefore find roads such as those from the quarries at Pentelicon and the Piraeus being kept in good condition. Furthermore, an interesting discovery on the road from Athens to Pyrgos was a permanent barrier across both tracks. Archaeologists have concluded that this is a toll gate or customs house designed to regulate trade. Forbes (1993) 143-144.

1.1.3 Systems of Purchase and Distribution

Another distinguishing factor (which is in no way incompatible with distinctions based on distance) is the different ways in which each type of merchant purchased and then distributed their commodities. The impression generated by the sources with regard to the purchasing and distribution habits of *kapēloi*, is that they were in essence ‘retailers’.³⁹ In terms of ancient definitions and usage, the term *kapēlos* would seem to indicate someone who could buy their products either directly from the producer or from one of the other groups of commercial operatives (such as *emporoi*, *nauklēroi* or *pōlai*⁴⁰). The corpus of ancient literary references detailing the activities of *kapēloi* suggests that it was common for these men to purchase goods directly from an *emporos*. In Lysias 22 for example, we find the prosecution demanding that the jury punish with the death penalty a group of *kapēloi* who have defrauded a party of *emporoi*.⁴¹ Lysias’ reason for demanding such a harsh penalty was the Athenian reliance on grain imports:⁴² if *emporoi* were seen as being vulnerable to underpayment in Athens, it could have a negative impact on the import industry, possibly resulting in grain shortages or a rise in prices. The underlying implication of this speech is that while it was commonplace for *kapēloi* and *emporoi* to have business relations, there was a fundamental difference between them. The Greek concept of *kapēlos* (retailer) incorporates the idea of someone who dealt with the eventual consumer of the product, whereas an *emporos* need not. Plato in the *Statesman* clearly suggests that *kapēloi*, when acting as commercial operatives, mainly received and sold to the consumer products grown or manufactured by someone else.⁴³ *Kapēloi* can therefore be seen as purchasing their goods either from the producer, a wholesaler or an *emporos* and then selling directly to the consumer, thus preventing them from becoming middlemen in the modern economic definition

³⁹ A retailer is the final link in the chain of distribution from the manufacturer to the consumer. The responsibility of a retailer is to hold stock at a location convenient for the customer. In providing this service the retailer will add value to the goods he purchases from the wholesaler or producer. Bannock *et al* (1998) 358.

⁴⁰ The term *pōlai* can be understood as wholesaler.

⁴¹ Lys. 22.21.

⁴² A topic which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four, section 4.1.

⁴³ Pl. *Plt.* 260d.

of the word.⁴⁴

Plato's discussion in the *Statesman* demonstrates this relationship: the *kapēlos* is described as selling products directly to the consumer, which had previously been sold to him in a separate commercial transaction. The comparison is made with a herald who is told the purpose of others in the form of orders and charged with passing these instructions onto a third party.

Ξένος: τὴν ἐπιτακτικὴν δὴ τέχνην πάλιν ἄν εἴη θεατέον εἴ πῃ διέστηκεν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τῆδε πῆ, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν καπήλων τέχνη τῆς τῶν αὐτοπωλῶν διώρισταί τε τέχνης, καὶ [260δ] τὸ βασιλικὸν γένος ἔοικεν ἀπὸ τοῦ τῶν κηρύκων γένους ἀφωρίσθαι.

Νεώτερος Σωκράτης: πῶς;

Ξένος: πωληθέντα που πρότερον ἔργα ἀλλότρια παραδεχόμενοι δεύτερον πωλοῦσι πάλιν οἱ κάπηλοι.

Νεώτερος Σωκράτης: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ξένος: οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ κηρυκικὸν φύλον ἐπιταχθέντ' ἀλλότρια νοήματα παραδεχόμενον αὐτὸ δεύτερον ἐπιτάττει πάλιν ἐτέροις.

Νεώτερος Σωκράτης: ἀληθέστατα.

“Stranger: Then once more we must see whether the art of command falls into two divisions. It seems to me that it does, and I think there is much the same distinction between the kingly class and the class of heralds [260d] as between the art of men who sell what they themselves produce and that of retail dealers.

Younger Socrates: How so?

Stranger: kapēloi receive and sell over again the productions of others, which have generally been sold before.

Younger Socrates: Certainly.


Stranger: And in like manner heralds receive the purposes of others in the form of orders, and then give the orders a second time to others.

*Younger Socrates: Very true.”*⁴⁵

⁴⁴ In contemporary usage the term ‘middleman’ normally refers to a trader who has no direct contact with the consumer. Therefore, in Classical Greece a *kapēlos*, although in general not producing his own products, cannot be seen as a middleman. The tavern keeper and shield manufacturer discussed above, although not buying their wares from a third party, can be fitted into this definition of *kapēlos* as they dealt directly with the consumers of their products. See Bannock *et al.* (1998) 359 for an explanation of the various components of a basic retail economy.

⁴⁵ Pl. *Plt.*, 260c-d.

In this metaphorical comparison the *kapēloi* receive and distribute goods that have already been sold before, like the herald who transmits second-hand information to a third party. Moreover, in order for this analogy to work *kapēloi* had to deal with the eventual consumer, in exactly the same way that the herald relayed orders to the man who was responsible for acting upon them. In a simplistic form these relationships can be represented by:



The contemporary sources suggest that *emporoi* did share some of the characteristics of *kapēloi* in terms of business operations, but there was a significant difference in the way these two groups purchased and distributed their wares. The majority of the literary evidence depicts *emporoi* as fulfilling a role that kept them separate from the consumer, instead showing them dealing with local retailers. *Emporoi* can therefore generally be considered as middlemen who relied on *kapēloi* to provide a link between themselves and the eventual consumer. Although from outside the main period of investigation, the *Periplus Maris Erythraei* offers strong supporting evidence for these conclusions, since, despite suggesting that *emporoi* might tramp along the coastlines trading with the local people they encounter, the transactions which the *Periplus* records normally involve court or temple officials, or conglomerates of local *kapēloi*.⁴⁶ Nowhere is it suggested that travelling merchants

⁴⁶ Although the majority of merchants travelling the routes describe in the *Periplus* were in business

should interact directly with the consumer or establish a presence in the local agora.

Although the distinction that has thus far been drawn would seem to suggest that *emporoi* operated in a manner similar to wholesalers, the term 'wholesaler' is not totally applicable. Even though in the main *emporoi* did deal in bulk, in a manner reminiscent of our contemporary wholesaler,⁴⁷ there were a number of crucial exceptions to this, the most significant of which was the trade in luxury commodities. The movement of luxury commodities could infrequently involve the merchant dealing in smaller quantities and with the private consumer.⁴⁸ Therefore, when the occasion necessitated, Greek merchants dealing in luxury items were not averse to retail dealings, and could be found displaying their products to small-scale consumers on board their vessels. An example of this can be found in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*.⁴⁹ In this passage, Xenophon has Ischomachus describe to Socrates the methods he used to encourage his wife to keep their house in better order. Ischomachus relates how he used the illustration of the precise system of ordering aboard a Phoenician merchant vessel as a model for his wife to follow when organising their household. In the course of his narrative Ischomachus implies that he had gone aboard the Phoenician vessel to browse their commodities. The way the wares are divided within the hold and the fact that Ischomachus is granted access to the vessel, point towards these commodities being luxury goods rather than wholesale staple products.⁵⁰

Conclusion Three:

either for themselves or for other investors, the locals they dealt with were frequently public officials. This was especially true in regions such as Muza and Kane, which were the only sources of Arabian myrrh and frankincense and as such, trade in these commodities was strictly regulated. *Peripl. M. Eryth.* 32.11.2-6.

⁴⁷ The contemporary definition for wholesaler/wholesale market is: A person or place from which goods and services are brought on a large scale. Bannock *et al.* (1998) 433.

⁴⁸ For a fuller discussion of the luxury items being traded see Chapter Three, section 3.1.2.

⁴⁹ Xen. *Oec.* 8.11. See Pomeroy (1994) pp.150-151; 286-287.

⁵⁰ Although it was common in the Archaic Period for foreign merchants to drag their vessels up onto the beach and sell their commodities from seaside stalls (see for example the account of the kidnapping of Io, Hdt, 1.1-2.), as the Greek poleis constructed larger and more advanced harbours this practice was gradually phased out. Thus, the system of selling directly to the consumer was, aside from luxury goods, replaced by selling to local retailers or wholesalers who gathered around the harbour awaiting the arrival of different commodities.

Emporoi and *kapēloi*, as well as operating in different geographic regions, also purchased from and distributed to, different people within the supply chain. In general, *kapēloi* provided the link between *emporoi* and the consumer, thus fulfilling the role of retailer, whilst *emporoi* operated primarily, but not exclusively, as inter-regional middlemen.

1.2 Distinctions between *Emporoi* and *Nauklēroi*

1.2.1 The Need to Distinguish Between *Emporoi* and *Nauklēroi*

Another misconception this study aims to dispel is that the differences in the commercial functions of *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* were in fact slight. Knorringa argued, “*It appears that a trader with a ship of his own was usually called an emporos, and that, if such a trader was called a nauklēros, he was more looked upon as the owner of the ship than as a trader, and that especially the ship was emphasized*”.⁵¹ Hasebroek, thought that *nauklēroi* were merchant-shipowners who transported their goods from place to place on their own vessel whereas *emporoi* were men who, not possessing a ship of their own, travelled on a ship belonging to a third party. He therefore concluded that, “*In this wider sense, therefore, the nauklēros is himself an emporos*”.⁵² Most recently, Reed has argued that both *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* were heavily involved in inter-regional exchange. He therefore states, “*Rather than quibble over what constitutes even a secondary characteristic, we should attend instead to the vital point (vital at least for historical if not terminological purposes) that in the classical period nauklēroi undoubtedly carried on emporia more regularly than did any other group of people except emporoi*.”⁵³ Although these studies differed in the precise ways in which they distinguished between the roles of *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*,

⁵¹ Knorringa (1926) 96, See similar definitions in the works of, Michell (1940) 230-31; Calhoun (1965); Amit (1965); Starr (1977) 73; Vélissaropoulos (1980) 48-9; Casson (1991) 102-103;

⁵² Hasebroek (1933) 3 This definition was closely followed by Finley (1935) 335, who proposed “*The term nauklēros seems to have been limited to the man who owned a trading vessel, who frequently (if not usually) engaged in commerce himself and who, if ever, transported only his own merchandise.....emporoi were normally maritime traders, but not necessarily so*” (i.e. sometimes they were over-land traders but they were always ‘traders’).

⁵³ Reed (2003) 13

they all agree that both groups were directly involved in commercial transactions, with the primary difference being the ownership of a sea-worthy vessel. The generally accepted rule was that *nauklēroi* were merchants who were affluent enough to own their own vessel, whilst *emporoi* were men who chartered transport space from a third party. However, an investigation of the usage of each term offers little evidence to support this theory, and instead provides compelling evidence for a more substantial difference between the two.⁵⁴

The idea that there must be some definable difference between *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*, is easily justifiable due to ancient authors and inscriptions frequently distinguishing between the two occupations. This distinction was often created through the employment of the phrase '*emporoi kai nauklēroi*', which would seem to indicate that there was a difference between the two occupations. This is an idea further compounded by the law court speeches, in particular those of Demosthenes, in which it is suggested that the Athenian legal system had differing provisions for *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*, on account of their differing roles within the mechanisms for inter-regional exchange.⁵⁵ However, none of the surviving law court orations or laws explicitly record what these differing legal provisions were. The theory that *nauklēroi* were not considered primarily as merchants is supported by a passage from Plato's *Republic*, in which it is clearly stated that it is solely *emporoi* who undertook inter-regional trading ventures.

ἢ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὤνην τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας ἰδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους;

*Or is not kapēlous the name we give to those who, planted in an agora, serve us in buying and selling, while we call those who roam from city to city emporoi?"*⁵⁶

⁵⁴ As with the term *emporos*, the meaning of the word *nauklēros* can also be identified as changing between the Archaic and Classical periods, with later tragedians once again using the original meaning of the term (way-finder) in order to add to the antiquated feel of their plays. The term *nauklēros* therefore, has the potential for meaning a number of different things, for example in Soph. *Ant.* 547 and Aesch. *Supp.* 170-180 the term is used metaphorically to mean guide or 'way-finder'.

⁵⁵ Dem. 33.1-3; 33.26; 58.8-12.

⁵⁶ Plt. *Resp.* 371d.

Plato's definition of *emporoi* as being the men who undertook inter-regional exchange would seem to dismiss *nauklēroi*, suggesting that, in his opinion at least, *nauklēroi* were not directly involved in trade. Furthermore, this is the second occasion when Plato excludes *nauklēroi* from his discussion of merchants and retailers.⁵⁷ This interpretation is given further support from Plato's description of the role of *nauklēroi* in the *Republic*.⁵⁸ In this passage Plato describes the role of *nauklēroi* as being similar to that of a ship's captain or overseer.

The assessment that *nauklēroi* were not traders is further supported by evidence presented in the later works of the scholiasts and lexicographers who similarly exclude *nauklēroi* from their definitions of inter-regional traders. Although the scholia suffer from many of the same problems as modern commentaries, namely that some authors guess, draw speculative conclusions or offer incorrect interpretations, the best scholia can offer invaluable insights and information. One of the most comprehensive of the scholia is that of Aristophanes' *Plutus*. An important benefit of this scholion is that it appears to be based on the explanation of topical or literary references that began in the Alexandrian library during the height of its influence and prestige. This seems to have had a considerable impact on the accuracy of the work, as it is believed to have been edited in the same careful manner as that found in the codex venetus A of the *Iliad*.⁵⁹ The Alexandrian scholion to the *Iliad* offers a detailed insight into the particular scheme of editing, a scheme that clearly operated within a highly critical system of notation. The precision of such an editing system means that scholars can use the definitions provided by the scholion with a considerable degree of confidence in their general accuracy. The scholion to Aristophanes' *Plutus* offers any scholar investigating Greek trade and economics a unique description of the various types of merchants and their respective roles within various commercial infrastructures.

⁵⁷ Pl. *Soph.* 223d. See Brown (1902) 97.

⁵⁸ Pl. *Resp.* 488a. Brown (1902^a) 9, suggests that in this passage the *nauklēros* is supposed to represent the demos of Athens as both were masters of their own destiny. Brown therefore sees the role of the *nauklēros* as being that of captain or overseer. He reaches this conclusion due to his belief that *nauklēroi* owned the vessels on which they travelled. Although his assumption of ownership is incorrect, his assertion that *nauklēroi* function as ship's captains is, in my opinion, more tenable.

⁵⁹ Hornblower and Spawforth (editors) (2003) 1368.

This source divides traders and merchants into five distinct groups that encompass all the various forms of commerce and trade.⁶⁰ The five categories recorded in the scholion are:- 1) *autopōlēs* someone who sells goods which he has produced himself; 2) (*kapēlos*) someone who buys from the *autopōlēs* and then distributes these wares in the immediate locality; 3) (*emporos*) someone who trades abroad or at distance from the location where the goods were purchased or produced; 4) *paligkepēlos* a trader who buys from the *emporos* and resells in the immediate vicinity; 5) *metaboleus* a retailer or pedlar who sells in very small quantities within a limited region of operation. Within this apparently comprehensive definition of various types of ‘traders’ the omission of the term *nauklēros* is glaring.⁶¹ One possibility that could explain the omission is that its contemporary usage was so similar to its original meaning, that it needed no further explanation, a theory favored by Finley.⁶² However, Finley used this alleged oversight to question the validity and completeness of the evidence presented by the scholia, concluding that if such obvious terms were overlooked, then the scholia could not be taken as reliable sources of evidence. This argument seems unlikely as the scholion to *Plutus* does demonstrate a working knowledge of unusual or infrequently used words, for example *paligkepēlos*.⁶³ Similarly, the other basic definitions presented in the scholion also seem to reflect the way in which they were generally used in contemporary and Classical literature.⁶⁴ Clearly, the lexicon and scholion to Aristophanes’s *Plutus* demonstrate at least a basic understanding of Classical usage for each of these terms and reflect their employment in the Classical literary corpus (see previous discussion in section 1.2.1). This demonstrable understanding of the usage of both common and uncommon commercial terms strongly suggests that the omission of *nauklēroi* was deliberate rather than an oversight. This omission, it can be theorised, implies that by the fourth century the role of *nauklēroi* had become so distinct from *emporoi* that it was no longer an occupation considered as playing a direct part in exchange.

⁶⁰ Schol. Ar. *Plut.* 1155.

⁶¹ Another striking omission of the term *nauklēros* from a discussion of inter-regional merchants can be identified in the writings of Pollux, 3.124-125; See also 1.82-125.

⁶² Finkelstein (Finley) (1935) 331.

⁶³ Although the scholion is correct in its definition, the phrase was rare on account of the similar function undertaken by *kapēloi* hence frequently the term *kapēlos* was used instead.

⁶⁴ See section 1.1.1. Although these definitions fit nicely with the evidence presented in other literary sources, the lexicographers and scholiasts demonstrate confusion regarding the generalised terms used to describe ‘trade’ as a concept, an issue that will be discussed in detail below.

Conclusion Four:

The evidence recorded in the lexica and scholia, when examined in conjunction with the theories and ideas presented by Plato, brings into question the validity of classifying *nauklēroi* as men who were directly involved in the face-to-face exchange of commodities which they themselves owned. Although they were an integral part of inter-regional exchange within the fourth century, it is possible to conclude that the commercial role of the *nauklēroi* was considerably different from that of *emporoi*. As will be demonstrated below, it is possible to theorise that *nauklēroi* were commercial agents rather than traders *per se*.

1.2.2 The Ownership of Vessels and Goods Being Transported

Early scholars including Finley, Michell and Hasebroek all accepted that *nauklēroi* were inter-regional traders who differed from *emporoi* because of their ownership of a vessel.⁶⁵ To accept the hypothesis that a distinction between these two groups of inter-regional merchants can be made simply on this account requires the disregarding of a small, yet significant, number of literary references that attest to *emporoi* also owning a vessel. To draw a distinction on this basis would also mean accepting the idea that *nauklēroi* were always, or at least more often than not, ship-owners, a hypothesis not supported by the literary evidence.

Although, in general, the word *emporos* was used to denote a trader who travelled on a vessel owned by a third party, the frequency with which this term is also used to indicate a merchant who owns a vessel presents a considerable complication to this conventional modern distinction between *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*. This section will therefore argue that although ownership of a vessel cannot be used as a way to distinguish between *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*, ownership of the goods being transported can. In section 1.2.3 it will be argued that one of the primary roles of

⁶⁵ Hasebroek (1933) 2-3; Finley (1935) 334-335; Michell (1940 reprinted 1963) 230-231.

nauklēroi was as shipping agents or hauliers, and that therefore in the few instances when it is possible to interpret the term as meaning ‘ship-owner’ (which will be discussed below), it is always in the context of transporting the goods of a third party/parties. In the case of *emporoi* however, it will be demonstrated that in all the examples where the word is used to indicate a ‘ship-owning’ merchant, the assumption is that the *emporos* will be using his vessel to transport solely his own wares and therefore he would never act as a shipping agent for a third party.

A) Ownership of a Vessel

Although the term *nauklēros* has previously been most frequently translated to mean ship-owner,⁶⁶ out of 103 uses (see Appendix One) only four can be indisputably linked with the ownership of a vessel; even then this is because the background of the men to whom the term is being applied is well known.⁶⁷ All other usages of the term are ambiguous and therefore open to interpretation when being translated. For example, Demosthenes seems to change his understanding of the term according to the context in which he uses it. Therefore, in speech 49.14-15 he can be found using the term to indicate that the man (Philip) was a ship-owner, whilst in 35.52 the implication is that the subject was acting as a haulier (a role that will be discussed in detail below). What the surviving evidence indicates is that, although on occasion, *nauklēros* could refer to a ship-owner this is not necessarily the word’s primary meaning.

The hypothesis that the word *nauklēros* is intrinsically linked with ownership of a vessel is further weakened by the discovery that slaves could be designated as *nauklēroi*. An important example of this is Lampis, the slave of Dion, who is given the title *nauklēros* and found being charged with the task of overseeing a trade venture on behalf of his master.⁶⁸ In this instance, Dion is stated as being the owner of the vessel and its crew (including Lampis), whilst Lampis is considered to be the

⁶⁶ See above n.51.

⁶⁷ Dem. 49.14 ; 49.15 (Philip the *nauklēros*); Dem. 18.194 (Lampis); Dem. 24.138 (the son of Philip the ship-owner).

⁶⁸ Dem. 34.7.

nauklēros. If the traditional definition for the term *nauklēros* was applied to this situation, then we would have to accept Lampis was the ship-owner, but the background details of the case prove this to be untrue.⁶⁹ A more likely interpretation is that Lampis was overseeing the voyage on behalf of Dion and was thus the captain or master of the vessel. In addition to being charged with the overseeing of the logistics for the venture he was also responsible for the exchange of the commodities when he reached his destination. This idea is further supported by the fact that Lampis is able to offer a substantial loan, one thousand drachmae, to Phormio. Cohen has suggested that, as in banking operations, slave agents engaged in commercial operations on behalf of their masters were able to draw up legally binding contracts.⁷⁰ A further example of a merchant vessel being crewed by slaves can be found in the case of Apatourios, recorded in Demosthenes 33.⁷¹ Finally, an investigation of the 271 passages identified as containing the term *emporos* also undermines the theory that ownership of a vessel was a distinguishing factor between the two occupations. Out of the 271 usages of the word *emporos* (see Appendix One) nine passages clearly link the subject of the term with ownership of a vessel.⁷² Again, these findings call into question the validity of the hypothesis that *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* can be distinguished solely on account of their ownership of a vessel.

B) Ownership of Goods Being Transported

Although a clear distinction cannot be drawn according to the ownership of a vessel, as suggested above, it is possible to identify a difference according to the ownership of the commodities being transported. An examination of the nine *emporoi*

⁶⁹ Casson (1971) 314-15; Velissaropoulos (1980) 48-9. Reed (2003) 105, states “*The case of Lampis is extremely puzzling. Given a commercial world in which there is no surviving evidence for an explicit law of agency, how can a slave be held accountable by his owner for captaining a ship, for lending, and for shipping goods he himself bought... One scarcely knows how to characterise him; perhaps he falls into the “agent” category Bravo posits as the normal role for archaic traders. I therefore resolve to group Lampis and Dion together under one entry as collectively constituting a probable nauklēros*”.

⁷⁰ Cohen (1992) 91-101.

⁷¹ Dem. 33.8-10. In this speech Demosthenes suggests that the ship and a complete crew was sold to a third party in order to pay off some of Apatourios’ debts. The fact that the entire crew was included as part of the deal strongly suggests that the ship was crewed solely by slaves, as slaves were the only social group who were considered as property and could thus be bought and sold.

⁷² Dem. 8.25; Xen. *Hell.* 6.37; *Cyr.* 6.2.8; Strab. 14.5.2. Diod. Sic. 14.461; Pl. *Resp.* 371a; Plut. *Lyc.* 1.55-1.56; Hdt. 4.154.3; Paus. 4.20.8.

who are recorded as owning ships provides some interesting findings. The first is that five out of the nine are found within the context of a military venture or military action.⁷³ Out of these five passages, three specifically relate to merchants who followed armies in order to gain plunder.⁷⁴ The merchants in these passages are all depicted as purchasing plunder from a successful military venture and then transporting it back to a home port, where it could be more easily converted into liquid assets. What is interesting about these passages is the underlying connotation that it was solely the goods of the vessel's owners, who in these examples are designated as *emporoi*, that were being transported. The use of the word *emporos* as ship-owner in Diodorus 14.46.1 is ambiguous and unclear in its overall meaning, but, the passage from Strabo suggests that the *emporos* being described was a lone trader who owned a vessel. The passage records the size of the slave markets on Delos and suggests that an *emporos* (who had followed an army on campaign) could unload his cargo of slaves and sell them all in one afternoon. As with merchants who followed military ventures slave traders were frequently lone operators who could fill an entire vessel with their merchandise.⁷⁵

This is significant because, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five section 5.1, a large number of inter-regional merchants relied on obtaining maritime loans in order to fund their ventures. To obtain this type of loan the merchant was required to declare, amongst other things, the exact details about the cargo he intended to purchase with any credit that might be extended.⁷⁶ This gave the lender the opportunity to assess the potential hazards of the venture and thus offer an appropriate rate of interest. Any trader who intended shadowing a military campaign as a way of turning a profit faced a number of additional risks: firstly there was no guarantee that the campaign would be successful; secondly, even if it was, the spoils it yielded might prove to be of poor quality or little intrinsic value. Without a definite cargo the value of the commodities to be traded could not be assessed and thus lenders would be

⁷³ Dem. 8.25; Xen. *Hell.* 6.37; Cyr. 6.2.8; Strab. 14.5.2. Diod. Sic. 14.46.1.

⁷⁴ Dem. 8.25; Xen. *Hell.* 6.37; Cyr. 6.2.8.

⁷⁵ The reason most slave traders operated in this manner was due to the size of merchant vessels. A slave trader would not only need to have space to transport the slaves themselves but would also need to carry the food and water required to sustain them. For more information on the slave trade Chapter Four section 4.3.

⁷⁶ Lys. 35.10-13.

unable to determine an appropriate level of interest. Furthermore, in Greek warfare merchants from, or operating on behalf of, a rival polis became legitimate targets for privateers and military vessels.⁷⁷ Thus even if a military campaign was successful, the creditor could still face losing any credit that had been extended to him. On the other hand, if the military campaign was unsuccessful the risk of financial loss increased substantially and this increased level of risk would make it almost impossible to find a financial backer willing to extend credit. Therefore in order to undertake such a venture, a merchant would need to own a vessel and be able to finance the purchase of any spoils from his own personal funds.

The other four passages, which are not linked to military ventures, also imply that only the goods of the ship-owning *emporos* were being transported. This would again indicate that the *emporoi* being described were not acting as hauliers in a manner reminiscent of *nauklēroi*.⁷⁸ One example of this is found in Pausanias 4.20, which, although a later source, seems to reflect the usage in the fifth and fourth centuries:

“Αριστομένης δὲ οὐ πολλὰ ἰς πρότερον ἡμέραις Κεφαλλῆνα ἔμπορον, ἑαυτῷ ξένον καὶ ἐσάγοντα ἐς τὴν Εἴραν ὁπόσων ἐδέοντο, ἐαλωκότα ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τοξοτῶν Ἀπτεραίων ὧν ἦρχεν Εὐρύαλος Σπαρτιάτης, τοῦτον τὸν Κεφαλλῆνα ἀφαιρούμενος ἐκεῖνον μὲν καὶ τὰ χρήματα ὁπόσα ἦγεν ἀπέσωσεν....”

“A few days earlier a merchant from Cephallenia, who was a friend of Aristomenes and was bringing to Eira all that they needed, had been captured by the Spartans and archers from Aptaera, commanded by Euryalus the Spartan; Aristomenes rescued him and recovered all the goods that he had been bringing...”

The passage depicts a lone merchant who seems to be transporting goods to a guest-friend, Aristomenes, in Eira when the Spartan commander Euryalus imprisoned

⁷⁷ Thuc. 2.67.4.

⁷⁸ Pl. Resp. 371a; Plut. Lyc. 1.55-1.56; Hdt. 4.154.3; Paus. 4.20.8.

him. One interpretation of this passage is that the merchant was using his own vessel to transport specific goods as a favour to his friend and thus as a result he seems to have travelled without the company or wares of other traders. Although this interpretation fits the facts as recorded by Pausanias, few conclusions can be drawn from this passage since it refers to the Messenian hero, Aristomenes, who resisted the Spartan aggressions during the second Messenian war c.650BC.⁷⁹ As a result, Pausanias is not seeking to comment on the situation or activities of the merchant, instead he is merely using him as an instrument to explain why Aristomenes had been unable to complete his rounds on the night of the Spartan attack.⁸⁰

The hypothesis that those *emporoi* who owned a vessel only transported commodities belonging to themselves is supported to a varying degree in the remaining three passages: Lycurgus, for example, depicts Leocrates (1.55-1.56) as using his vessel in a similar manner to a lone trader in order to disguise the fact that he was defecting to Megara. Similarly, Herodotus (4.154.3) implies that the Theran trader Themison was wealthy and influential and because of this affluence owned a vessel in which *he* undertook a variety of trading ventures. The use of the term *emporos* in these passages would therefore seem to be consistent, as each of the merchants being described possessed a vessel and appears to employ it to *exclusively* transport his own wares. Less affluent *emporoi* who were unable to afford their own vessel would be reliant on the transportation services of *nauklēroi* (who it will be shown always transported the wares of others).⁸¹

Conclusion Five:

Although the ownership of a vessel can no longer be seen as a factor distinguishing *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*, the ownership of the commodities being transported does offer a partial alternative. By examining the nine examples of *emporoi* who own a vessel, it becomes clear that these men are transporting only their

⁷⁹ Although some scholars have suggested Aristomenes can be associated with a possible Messenian revolt of the 490's BC. Hornblower & Spawforth (2003) 163.

⁸⁰ Pausanias records that whilst rescuing his merchant friend, Aristomenes had been injured thus preventing him from undertaking his normal nightly checks on his watchmen.

⁸¹ See above section 1.2.3.B.

own goods and wares. Furthermore, contrary to previous opinion, *nauklēroi* should not be primarily thought of as ship-owners; instead as will be suggested below, they should be considered as hauliers, ship's captains or agents working for, or in partnership with, a third party. Therefore, unlike the surviving examples of commodities transported by ship-owning *emporoi*, the goods transported by *nauklēroi* belonged to a third party. As a result, when the ancient authors drew a distinction between *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*, instead of being based on the ownership of a vessel, they had other, clearer, differences in mind. Part of this distinction may have been centered on the way in which each type of merchant utilised the vessel they owned but it must be stressed that this is only a partial explanation.

1.2.3 *Nauklēros*: Independent Trader, Haulier, Ship's Captain or Something Else?

Having firstly demonstrated that it is unsafe to conclude that ownership of a vessel was the main distinction between *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*, and secondly that ownership of the goods being transported is only a partial explanation, we must look for other ways of distinguishing between the two occupations. The following sections will examine the other roles which have previously been assigned to *nauklēroi*, including independent trader, haulier, ship's captain and commercial agent, whilst suggesting that perhaps a new term, 'ship's master' might be more appropriate.

A) *Nauklēroi* Not Independent Traders

One basis that could account for the need to distinguish between the two occupations is the differing roles each fulfilled within inter-regional commerce. Although previous studies, most recently Reed's, have tended to consider *nauklēroi* as independent traders, this theory is not supported by an examination of the source material.⁸² Out of the 104 examples of *nauklēroi* found in the ancient sources,⁸³ only

⁸² Reed (2003) 12-14, although Reed does recognise that it is uncertain whether *emporoi* is a primary or secondary characteristic of *nauklēroi* he still concludes "and of no *nauklēros* in the catalogue can we say with certainty that he did not trade", See also Reed (2003)12, n.27 & 28.

⁸³ See Appendix One.

one directly depicts the *nauklēros* being involved in the independent exchange of goods.⁸⁴ The rest, although found in the context of inter-regional trading ventures, do not directly record the subject exchanging or selling commodities. Even in the single example where the *nauklēros* (Parmeniscus) does appear to be trading in an independent manner, it is debatable whether he was directly involved in the independent brokering of a deal, or if in reality he was following the instructions of his partner (the defendant Dionysodorus). In a previous section of the same speech, Demosthenes suggests that there were three parts to Dionysodorus's corn importation business: firstly there were men who would assemble a grain shipment in Egypt, secondly there was the man responsible for overseeing the transportation of the goods from Egypt to Athens, and finally there were the men who would dispose of the goods when they arrived.⁸⁵ In this business operation Pameniscus was the man responsible for overseeing the safe transportation of grain from Egypt to Athens, and Demosthenes makes it clear that he was the *nauklēros*

πέρας δ' οὖν, λαβὼν γὰρ ὁ Παρμενίσκος ὁ τουτουὶ κοινωνὸς τὰ γράμματα τὰ παρὰ τούτου ἀποσταλέντα, καὶ πυθόμενος τὰς τιμὰς τὰς ἐνθάδε [τοῦ σίτου] καθεστηκυίας, ἐξαιρεῖται τὸν σῖτον ἐν τῇ Ῥόδῳ κάκεϊ ἀποδίδοται, καταφρονήσαντες μὲν τῆς συγγραφῆς, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ τῶν ἐπιτιμίων, ἃ συνεγράψαντο αὐτοὶ οὗτοι καθ' αὐτῶν, ἐάν τι παραβαίνωσιν, καταφρονήσαντες δὲ τῶν νόμων τῶν ὑμετέρων, οἱ κελεύουσι τοὺς ναυκλήρους καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας πλεῖν εἰς ὃ τι ἂν συνθῶνται ἐμπόριον, εἰ δὲ μή, ταῖς μεγίσταις ζημίαις εἶναι ἐνόχους.

“The outcome was that Parmeniscus, the defendant's partner,⁸⁶ when he had received the letter sent by him and had learned the price of grain prevailing here, discharged

⁸⁴ Dem. 56.10.

⁸⁵ Dem. 56.7.

⁸⁶ The word “partner” (*koinvnhw*) is frequently used in Greek to symbolise a relationship that was not necessarily on equal terms. See for instance Dem. 18.21 and Pl. *Phdr.* 333b. Therefore in this case the two men are not required to be equals as it is just as likely that the term was understood to mean business associate: more specifically the relationship should be understood as that of a business owner and his shipping agent.

*his cargo of grain at Rhodes and sold it there in defiance of the agreement, men of the jury, and of the penalties to which they had of their own will bound themselves, in case they should commit any breach of the agreement, and in contempt also of your laws which ordain that ναυκλήρους and supercargoes shall sail to the port to which they have agreed to sail or else be liable to the severest penalties”.*⁸⁷

Therefore, although in this instance Parmeniscus is accused of involving himself in the actual sale of goods, the probability (implied by Demosthenes in a later passage), is that Dionysodorus was in control of an extensive inter-regional trading operation and already had good contacts in Rhodes who would be willing to dispose of any grain they received.⁸⁸ It is therefore probable that when Dionysodorus instructed Parmeniscus to dispose of the grain in Rhodes, he would have specified a dealer rather than leaving Parmeniscus to broker a deal himself.⁸⁹ Although these two passages are unclear on the exact role of *nauklēroi*, when read in conjunction they appear to indicate that under normal circumstances Parmeniscus would be acting purely as a shipping agent or haulier.

B) Nauklēroi Operating as Hauliers or Ship’s Masters

Having shown that it is no longer appropriate to consider *nauklēroi* as independent traders, it will instead be suggested that an alternative, more viable understanding of their role, is as hauliers.⁹⁰ This new interpretation is supported by an analysis of the root and compounds of the term itself. The term *nauklēros* is comprised of two Greek words, *naus* - meaning ship and *klēros* which, when combined with *naus*, has been translated to mean ‘owner’, thus the term *nauklēros* has

⁸⁷ Dem. 56.10.

⁸⁸ Dem. 56.17. This section of the speech indicates that Dionysodorus has a maritime money-lending business in Rhodes, a fact that offers strong support to the hypothesis that he already had commercial contacts within the city.

⁸⁹ This hypothesis is supported by Demosthenes’ switch from the use of singular participles to describe the actions of Parmeniscus in the previous construction, to the use of plural participles when describing the sale of the grain in Rhodes. Carey & Reid (1985) 213-14, suggest this is because the speaker, in his own mind, considers the act of Parmeniscus to be under the authority of Dionysodorus.

⁹⁰ The definition of haulier used by this thesis is: “A man who rents out space aboard a merchant vessel and who was responsible for ensuring the safe transportation of goods and passengers to an agreed destination.” In general, hauliers are likely to have gathered in the Piraeus and bid against their rivals in order to secure business; a situation envisaged by Casson (1991) 99-108.

generally been understood as shipowner. This situation has arisen despite ownership rarely being denoted by use of the word *klēros*. Although there is no question that the term *naus* is always used to indicate some kind of seagoing vessel,⁹¹ the word *klēros* has a number of alternative, more frequently applied meanings: these include the casting of lots,⁹² the assigning of something by lot (for example land grants in the colonies and public offices⁹³) and plots of land.⁹⁴

What is immediately striking about two of these alternate meanings is their intrinsic link to the concept of luck or the winning of something by chance. Of particular interest to this study are the assigning of public offices and land in the *cleruchies*. The *cleruchies* of the fourth century were overseas settlements that, in their local institutions, copied Athens faithfully and which were considered an extension of the Athenian state.⁹⁵ Land in these settlements was distributed by lot; however, the settlers of the *cleruchies* kept their original citizenship in Athens and thus did not form a completely independent community. As a consequence the land they were granted was not heritable. If a *cleruch* was to die or return to Athens, the land that they had held in trust was redistributed to another Athenian citizen or metic. *Cleruchs* were therefore considered temporary stewards, rather than owners of the land they were granted. The concept of temporary stewardship is also understood in the appointing of public officials. Men who were elected to office received their position for a temporary period, most commonly a year. Whilst in office the elected official was considered to be in temporary stewardship of the position they held.⁹⁶ It is therefore possible to posit that two of the primary connotations of the word *kleros* are: “allotted by chance” and “temporary stewardship”. Both of these connotations are

⁹¹ νηες μακραί = ships of war, which were built long for speed, while merchant-vessels (ναῦς στρογγυλαί, γαῦλοι, ὀκιάδες) were round-built in order to offer greater stability and carrying capacity.

⁹² Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.2; Plut. *Aem.* 10.

⁹³ The assigning of land: Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.2; Plut. *Aem.* 10. The assigning of public office: Hom. *Il.* 7.175; *Od.* 10.206; Hdt. 3.83; Plt. *Rep.* 619d.

⁹⁴ Hom. *Od.* 14.64; Hes. *OP.* 37; 343; Hdt. 1.76.

⁹⁵ Graham (1999) 167.

⁹⁶ Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 8.1; 48.3 ff. From these passages it is clear that Aristotle considers public officials to be temporary stewards of the positions they hold, and as a result he details at length the auditing process magistrates were subject to upon leaving office.

also intrinsically linked to the occupation of haulier.⁹⁷ In the haulage industry, the element of chance was the securing of cargos through the system of bidding for business on the dockside. Moreover, whilst in transit, a haulier was considered to be in temporary stewardship of the goods entrusted to his care. Consequently, when combined with a *nau-* stem, it is more appropriate to understand *kleros* as referring to ‘chance’ and ‘temporary stewardship’ rather than ‘ownership’.⁹⁸

Additionally, if we examine other words with *nau-* stems (and alternative usages of the word *nauklēros*) it is possible to identify meanings more connected to the role of haulier than to ship owner or independent traders. A study of these terms reveals a strong association with the concept of renting a particular space (frequently aboard some kind of naval vessel). For instance, the terms *nauloō* (to let one’s ship for hire),⁹⁹ and *naulōtikos* (for chartering or hiring of a ship),¹⁰⁰ both refer to the temporary hiring of a vessel (or space aboard a vessel), whilst the words *nauklōsimos* (to be sublet to lodgers), and *naulōsimos* (for hire), and an alternative meaning of the term *nauklēros* (one who rents or sublets tenement houses)¹⁰¹, all incorporate the concept of the temporary renting or hiring of a space. This again supports the perception that *nauklēroi* were most commonly hauliers. In its simplest form the primary role of a haulier (or haulage company) is to rent out space aboard a particular mode of transport and then oversee the shipping of commodities from A to B. Once the transaction has been completed the space is then rented to another party and the process begins again.

In addition to the etymological evidence, Demosthenes can also be found suggesting that the main role of *nauklēroi* was as hauliers or shipping agents in his speech *Against Zenothemis*. The case revolves around the attempted fraud by two men Hegestratus and Zenothemis. Hegestratus (the *nauklēros*), having accepted money to transport the commodities of a number of other merchants, went with his partner

⁹⁷ A meaning first suggested by Bravo in his study of Archaic Greek trade. Bravo (1977) 11-24.

⁹⁸ This hypothesis goes against the accepted theories of Finley (1935) 335; Casson (1971) 314-315; Vélissaropoulos (1980) 4-9; 77-86 and Reed (2003) 12-13, all of whom explore the etymology of the term and conclude that ownership rather than stewardship is the primary characteristic of *nauklēroi*.

⁹⁹ Plu. 2.707c.

¹⁰⁰ *PO Oxy.* 643.

¹⁰¹ Hyp. Fr. 37; Diph. 37, Hsch; Poll. 1.75.

Zenothemis and acquired a variety of loans from money-lenders and bankers.¹⁰² Hegestratus bore witness to say that Zenothemis had stowed on board his vessel a large amount of grain. In order to profit from these loans, Hegestratus intended to scuttle his own vessel whilst at sea and therefore, by the terms of their contract, be exempt from repaying them.¹⁰³ In fact Hegestratus loaded no merchandise of his own, an act that is recorded as arousing no suspicion from his passengers. This lack of suspicion suggests that it was neither uncommon nor extraordinary for *nauklēroi* to solely transport the goods of others.¹⁰⁴ Demosthenes' speech *Against Lacritus* offers further support to the idea that *nauklēroi* could operate as hauliers. In this speech it is stated that Androcles of Sphettus and Nausicrates of Carystus lent to Artemo and Apollodorus, both of Phaselis, three thousand drachmae in silver for a voyage from Athens to Mendê or Scionê. Having stipulated that the interest rate on the loan would increase if the merchants were to sail outside the normal sailing season, the two money-lenders then stipulated the voyage had to be undertaken aboard the 20-oared vessel of which Hyblesius was the *nauklēros*. Although, again, the exact connotations of the term are unclear, the fact that Hyblesius was expected to be willing to transport the grain, suggests that one of the functions performed by *nauklēroi* was transport or shipping agent.

This hypothesis gains further support from an examination of two other orations by Demosthenes. The first, *Against Timotheus*, records that an Athenian citizen, Timotheus, before setting sail to serve as a general in the army of Artaxerxes, appointed a Megarian, Philondas, to act as a haulier on his behalf. Timotheus specifically engages Philondas to travel to Macedon and collect a cargo of timber he has received as a gift from King Amyntas.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, Timotheus is said to have given private oral instructions to his banker Pasion to lend to Philondas (as his representative) the money for the freight, considering himself to be guarantor for the loan.¹⁰⁶ When Philondas returned to Athens he accordingly approached Pasion and

¹⁰² Dem. 32.4-7. See Pearson (1972) 256-58.

¹⁰³ The terms and conditions of maritime loans will be explored in full in Chapter Five sections 5.1 and 5.2.

¹⁰⁴ Pearson (1972) 256.

¹⁰⁵ Dem. 49.26 (c.362).

¹⁰⁶ Dem. 49.26; 30. The loan was not secured on the cargo, as would have been the case if the contract

gained a loan for 1,750 dr. to settle the freight charges. Having done this Philondas then delivered the timber to the house of Timotheus in the Piraeus. However, Philondas died before Timotheus returned to Athens and thus on his return Timotheus denied that Philondas was his agent and thus refused to repay the loan. Timotheus instead tried to argue that Philondas had taken out a private loan with Pasion in order to finance an overseas trading venture. Although it is impossible to ascertain the truth, this is actually unimportant. What is significant is that the Athenian legal system recognised 'transport agent' as a form of business arrangement. The second forensic speech recording the existence of a professional haulier is Demosthenes, *Against Meidias*. Although this case is less clear, Moreno has suggested that Meidias' association with the Egyptian Pamphilus was also that of transport agent and patron.¹⁰⁷ Moreno reaches this conclusion because when Meidias is called to serve as *trierarch* his first instinct is to send Pamphilus in his place; furthermore, the lucrative job (*chrēmatismos*) Meidias is accused of undertaking alongside his liturgy could equally as well have been performed by Pamphilus.¹⁰⁸ These cases demonstrate the complexity and variety of the involvement of wealthy and powerful Athenians in trade (see also Chapter Two section 2.3.2 and Chapter Six section 6.2). These men could effectively act as traders themselves, or alternatively, they could use transport agents to go overseas on their behalf and freight goods back to Athens.¹⁰⁹ Timotheus could plausibly argue to an Athenian jury that Philondas shipped timber for the purpose of trade because the dividing line between the gift or privilege-freights of Athenian politicians, conveyed by their hauliers, and the merchandise of *emporoi* (or hauliers transporting goods for trade) was difficult to distinguish.

If, in certain situations, *nauklēroi* can be identified as operating as hauliers another reasonable interpretation for their role would be ship's captain.¹¹⁰ However, the modern term 'ship's captain' has a number of connotations that are not necessarily

had been between the banker and a regular *emporos*.

¹⁰⁷ Moreno (2008) 281; 283.

¹⁰⁸ Dem. 21; 166-7; 200.

¹⁰⁹ Although Bravo was the first to raise this hypothesis in relation to Archaic Greece, it did not become accepted and was generally ignored, even though he presented a considerable amount of evidence to support his theory. Bravo (1974) 111-183; Bravo (1977) 17-29. See also, Wilson (1997-98) 29-53.

¹¹⁰ As suggested by Casson (1971) 314-15; (1991) 102-3.

applicable to their ancient equivalent. In terms of the modern merchant navy, ship's captains are often considered the most experienced sailors who make decisions on, and have ultimate responsibility for, navigation, sailing and logistical matters. Although the *nauklēros* can be seen as responsible for the logistics of a trading venture, as will be discussed below, it is clear that they were rarely, if ever, in charge of sailing matters. Plato's use of the *kybernētes* (pilot or navigator) as the illustrative example of the most important role aboard any sailing vessel, rather than the *nauklēros* who is never recorded in this manner, confirms this.¹¹¹ A few passages from Thucydides also demonstrate the high regard in which *kybernētai* were held when it came to sailing matters. During the Sicilian expedition Thucydides depicts Nicias as taking advice from his *kybernētes*, whilst the Syracusan navy is recorded as employing a foreign *kybernētes*, Antiochus, who was reputed to be the best in the fleet because he gave good advice to his superiors which was often heeded.¹¹² Xenophon also records the importance of pilots when in 407 BC Alcibiades left his *kybernētes* in charge of an entire fleet; although this man was a citizen, he was doubtless of lower status than many other present at the time, including the *trierarchoi*.¹¹³ The evidence presented in the works of Plato, Thucydides and Xenophon, suggesting that the ship's pilot was the position of greatest responsibility aboard a vessel, can easily be explained on account of the pilot's extensive knowledge of the sea.¹¹⁴ Clearly, the sailor with the most experience in sea travel became, by default, the most important man on the vessel, as his intimate knowledge of sailing and weather conditions could prevent disaster. As the pilot was responsible for negotiating the dangerous passages and straits that formed the coastline of any destination the vessel sailed towards, his experience meant that even the ship-owner or ship's master must bend to his will on sailing matters. Xenophon recognises this fact when he states:

"βασιλέας δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων αἰρεθέντας οὐδὲ τοὺς κλήρω λαχόντας οὐδὲ τοὺς

¹¹¹ Pl. *Legs.* 961e; *Resp.* 1.332e; 6.488a-489a.

¹¹² Thuc. 7.39; 7.62. A story reported in Plut. *Alc.* 10 shows Antiochus attending the Athenian assembly thus confirming his citizen status.

¹¹³ Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.11.

¹¹⁴ Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.10-12.

βιασαμένους οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξαπατήσαντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν. ὁπότε γάρ τις ὁμολογήσειε τοῦ μὲν ἄρχοντος εἶναι τὸ προστάττειν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀρχομένου τὸ πείθεσθαι, ἐπεδείκνυεν ἔν τε νηὶ τὸν μὲν ἐπιστάμενον ἄρχοντα, τὸν δὲ ναύκληρον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηὶ πάντας πειθομένους τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ"

*“Kings and rulers, he [Socrates] said, are not those who hold sceptres, nor those chosen by the multitude, nor those on who the lot falls, nor those who owe their power to force or deception: but those who know how to rule. For once it was granted that it is the business of the ruler to give orders and of the ruled to obey, he went on to show that on a ship, the one who knows, rules, and the nauklēros and all the others on board obey the ones who know.”*¹¹⁵

The choice of pilot as an illustrative example for the position of greatest responsibility aboard a merchant vessel also indicates that the duties of a *nauklēros* lay outside sailing matters. An alternative interpretation is to consider the role of the *nauklēros* as centring on the organisation and overseeing of the logistics of the voyage, rather than on sailing matters, a situation that is a reflection of the Athenian naval practice of appointing a *trierarch*. Rather than being the most qualified seaman or naval commander, Athenian trierarchs were almost always appointed on the basis of their level of affluence. As Gabrielson suggests:

*“To have a well-defined corps of warship commanders, modern practice might lead us to assume, is indeed an indispensable feature of an orderly, organised navy: but once more the evidence points to the inapplicability of this assumption to Classical Athens”*¹¹⁶

Although in Athens the *trierarch* was in essence a military commander, his primary duties revolved around the provisioning and supply of the vessel and crew. In sailing or navigational matters his decisions were based on the information and assessments of his pilot, whilst in military matters his actions were frequently under

¹¹⁵ Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.10.

¹¹⁶ Gabrielsen (1994) 69.

the control of the expeditionary general. Therefore, rather than being seen primarily as naval tacticians or the most experienced sailors, *trierarchs* were considered by the state to be its representatives whose job it was to safeguard the vessel, crew and equipment. This role as logistical overseer is one that commercial *nauklēroi* also seem to have fulfilled on behalf of their master, employer or partner. Therefore, the word *nauklēros* should be translated as ship's master, with the understanding that this man's role could change according to the specific context.

Conclusion Six:

Nauklēroi should not be considered ship's captains in the modern sense of the word, i.e. the most experienced sailors as suggested by Casson (as these were the *kybernētai*), neither should they be thought of as independent traders, as argued by Michell and Finley, since there is no clear supporting evidence to suggest they fulfilled this role. A logical alternative is to consider the role of *nauklēroi* as being most similar to that of a ship's master or haulier, i.e. someone who oversaw the logistics of the transportation of various commodities.

1.3 General Definitions for the Terms *Emporos*, *nauklēros* and *kapēlos*

1.3.1 Definition of *Emporos*

Throughout the rest of this thesis, *emporoi* are considered, unless specifically stated otherwise, to share a number of primary and secondary traits. The first primary trait of *emporoi* is that they undertook cross-border exchange. It is therefore possible to incorporate distance into the meaning of the term *emporos*. A second primary trait of *emporoi* is that they were men who travelled with the commodities they wished to trade and who utilised a variety of transport methods including sea-going vessels, overland caravans and river barges. A secondary trait of *emporoi* is that, in general, they operated as middlemen who usually had little or no contact with the eventual consumer (in direct contrast to *kapēloi*). A further secondary trait, is that the majority of *emporoi* were reliant on hauliers (although there are enough exceptions to this rule

that it cannot be stated with certainty, and thus each case must be examined individually).

1.3.2 Definition of *Nauklēros*

The definition I offer for the term *nauklēros* is by necessity imprecise. However, after a detailed examination of the source material, a flexible approach to this term is fully justified. I would therefore suggest that the primary trait of *nauklēroi* is their role as haulier or ship's master: i.e. they were someone who oversaw the transportation of goods from one marketplace to another. However, when using the term ship's master it should be understood in the sense of someone more concerned with the logistics of transport than in sailing matters. Therefore, hauliers or ship's masters were not the most experienced sailors since this position was filled by the *kybernētes*. Furthermore, the term *nauklēros* does not envisage those men undertaking trading ventures for themselves, as has been suggested previously, instead, if the sources do indicate a *nauklēros* involved in any form of exchange, in these instances he is acting as a type of commercial agent on behalf of a master, partner or owner (if he is a slave). Moreover, in contradiction to the suggestion by Finley, Knorringa, Hasebroek and Reed (see above Section 1.2.2), ownership of a vessel should not be considered a primary trait of *nauklēroi*, as instances of this are rare and the interpretation of the source material is contentious: instead it seems more sensible to suggest that ownership was a possibility rather than an expectation. However, the roles of haulier and owner were not mutually exclusive and thus on occasion the two could be combined. The misunderstanding of instances of dual occupation account for why there has been considerable confusion when trying to attach a precise definition to the term.

1.3.3. Definition of *Kapēlos*

Although *kapēloi* will only play a minor role in the remainder of this thesis, clarifying what exactly is meant when the term is used is still worthwhile. Firstly the word *kapēlos* can be understood in terms of a local businessman who operated in a limited geographical region, a region that normally centred on his local agora.

Although *kapēloi* were local businessmen, the exact enterprise that they operated could vary considerably and thus they can be found operating as bartenders, shopkeepers, and retailers or as dealers in specific products, for example the shield-maker discussed previously. The term *kapēlos* also usually conveys the concept of someone who bought products that either had been sold once before or had been purchased directly from a small-scale producer. Furthermore, the term *kapēlos* indicates a type of commercial operative who would frequently have had direct contact with the eventual consumer.

Chapter Two

Foreigner, Citizen, Metic, Rich or Poor? Who Comprised the Mercantile Community?

Introduction

Having clarified the definition and usage of the Greek terms *emporos*, *nauklēros* and *kapēlos*, it is now possible to define exactly what is meant in this study when the terms ‘trader’, ‘merchant’ and ‘mercantile community’ are employed. The primary focus of this thesis, as already stated, is to investigate the social, political, legal and economic role and influence of inter-regional merchants in fourth century Athens, whilst also challenging modern perceptions and misconceptions of the ‘mercantile community’. As a result, subsequently, when either of the terms ‘trader’ or ‘merchant’ are used, they will specifically refer to those men who were seen by their contemporaries as being *emporoi*, according to the definition offered in the previous chapter. The terms will be used to designate maritime merchants, but in addition will encompass those *emporoi* who undertook distance exchange by utilising alternative forms of transport such as overland caravans or riverboats. Where necessary, the type of inter-regional trader being referred to will be clarified: for example, certain legal provisions were only of benefit to maritime merchants, whilst others were more generic in applicability. Although, as argued previously, *nauklēroi* cannot be considered merchants in the truest sense of the word, they have been included as part of the ‘mercantile community’ on account of the crucial role they played in facilitating inter-regional exchange when operating as hauliers, ship’s masters or commercial agents. As the definition of the ‘mercantile community’ offered in this study only encompasses those merchants and operatives who undertook inter-regional exchange, i.e. those men in the main designated as *emporoi* or *nauklēroi*, there will be no sustained discussions of the evidence relating to *kapēloi* because, as demonstrated, they formed a distinct social group of their own. In future the terms ‘retailer’, ‘shopkeeper’ or ‘wholesaler’ will be used with their modern meanings and connotations in mind, as each of these words embodied one, or in some cases several, aspects of the less precisely defined Greek term *kapēlos*.

Although it has been suggested that the ‘mercantile community’ should be seen as comprising *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*, whilst excluding *kapēloi*, such a division needs further clarification if the term is to be used purposefully. For example, issues concerning the placement of merchants in different economic, social and political ‘classes’ have blurred such an easy division, and need resolving. Similarly, questions regarding the ethnicity of the mercantile community and how this may have affected individuals’ roles within inter-regional commercial operations need to be addressed if the term ‘mercantile community’ is to be employed effectively throughout the rest of this study. Therefore the following sections will seek to answer these questions and determine who comprised the ‘mercantile community’.

2.1 Justifications for the Usage of the Term ‘Mercantile Community’

Although it is debatable how relevant the term ‘mercantile community’ is when trying to identify merchants as a distinct demographic, economic, political or social group (on account of the fact that it presupposes a degree of self-recognition), it does become useful when employed as a way of denoting a distinct interlinked group of occupations such as *emporoi*, *nauklēroi* and maritime financiers. As already shown, the occupations of *emporos* and *nauklēros* were seen by contemporary society as linked, and as distinct from other forms of livelihood. This section will briefly outline the main social, legal and economic conditions that linked inter-regional merchants as an occupational group, and which, it can be argued, make the term ‘*mercantile community*’ both valid and vital. Many of the issues raised in this section will be investigated in greater detail in subsequent chapters; here the aim is merely to examine the diversity of the social and demographic groups represented in the Athenian ‘*mercantile community*’.

Perhaps the most easily identifiable link uniting all inter-regional merchants as an occupational group in Athens was their treatment in the legal system. The hypothesis that the occupation of inter-regional merchant was seen as distinct from other commercial livelihoods is confirmed, to a reasonable degree, by the surviving contemporary legal speeches. In the forensic speeches of Lysias and Demosthenes we

find a significant number of references to special legal provisions that have been made to assist those men engaged in inter-regional exchange, either as an *emporos* or *nauklēros*. For example, in Demosthenes 33.23 we find that *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*, under the *dikai emporikai*, were granted the right to an immediate trial in order that their journey would not be held up. Any delay in departure might have prevented merchants from taking advantage of the limited sailing seasons of the Mediterranean, or resulted in overland routes becoming impassable when adverse weather conditions caused mountain passes to become blocked, eventualities that would leave visiting merchants stranded in Athens. This right to an immediate trial distinguishes inter-regional merchants from other occupations, including those encompassed by the term *kapēlos*, as no other livelihood was ever granted similar legal provisions. In the *Poroi*, Xenophon can be found suggesting that the speedy settlement of commercial legal disputes would benefit Athens as a whole, because inter-regional merchants would find the Piraeus a more agreeable place to conduct business. He goes as far as to suggest that by rewarding harbour officials who settle cases justly and quickly, Athens could ensure inter-regional merchants received favourable treatment and thus endear the polis to the mercantile community.¹¹⁷ In Lysias 17 there is supporting evidence for the existence of this policy when the speaker claims:

“πέρυσι μὲν οὖν διεγράψαντό μου τὰς δίκας, ἔμποροι φάσκοντες εἶναι· νυνὶ δὲ λαχόντος ἐν τῷ Γαμηλιῶνι μηνὶ οἱ ναυτοδίκαι οὐκ ἐξεδίκασαν.”

“*Last year they had my suit quashed by claiming that they were maritime merchants, but at present, although I was permitted to bring proceedings in the month of Gamelion, the nautical court has not decided the case.*”¹¹⁸

The provision of extraordinary laws to govern inter-regional trade and traders adds further support to the argument that the term ‘mercantile community’ is a useful concept. These unique laws are vital to our accurate understanding of the mercantile community and will be therefore be discussed further in Chapter Six.

¹¹⁷ Xen. *Por.* 3.3. For a detailed investigation of the significance of this passage see section 6.1

¹¹⁸ Lys. 17.5.

Furthermore, the importance of foreign trade to Athens and the unique roles undertaken by inter-regional merchants meant that in addition to legislation being passed to facilitate the smooth operation of their businesses, traders also had at their disposal a number of magistrates, officials and semi-official points of contact whose duty it was to protect their interests, assist in their commercial transactions or regulate their behaviour.¹¹⁹ These included the *nautodikai*,¹²⁰ *epimelētai tou emporiou*,¹²¹ *sitophulakes*,¹²² *dokimastai* and *syllogeis*,¹²³ *proxenoi*, and the specialist judges in commercial cases¹²⁴. The most significant of these groups were the *proxenoi* who operated as semi-official points of contact for visiting merchants and offered assistance in a variety of ways. *Proxenoi*, who were literally ‘guest-friends’ of a city-state, looked out for the interests of a foreign state within their own country,

¹¹⁹ During the fourth century, the Athenians were well aware that their commercial interests were intrinsically linked with the concerns of their mercantile community, and thus these officials had a twofold purpose: firstly they were to serve the commercial interests of the polis, whilst secondly, and equally as important, they offered protection to the *emporoi*, *nauklēroi*, and money-lenders on whom the polis’ import and export industries relied.

¹²⁰ The *nautodikai*: Lys.17.5 suggests these officials performed some role within cases tried under the *dikai emporikai*, but the exact nature of these duties is unclear. Photius and Suidas record the *nautodikai* as being concerned with overseeing the *emporoi* within the ports of Athens, whilst Hesychius suggest they were also charged with bringing legal proceedings against aliens claiming unlawful citizenship (*Anecd. Graec.* I, 283). The inscription IG I² 41 also records these officials but again their exact duties are unclear.

¹²¹ The *epimēletai tou emporiou* were an executive committee, that, unlike most of the other magistracies, was unique to the Piraeus (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 51.4). The duty of the *epimeletai* was to ensure that two-thirds of all corn was unloaded in the Piraeus and not shipped to other destinations. The *epimelētai* were based in the emporium beside the stele of Poseidon; near to their offices were public copies of the laws regulating trade and commerce in Athenian markets.

¹²² The *sitophulakes* are first attested c.386 and were responsible for overseeing the fair trade of wheat, barley, barley-meal and bread (Lys, 22.5; 8.). As well as ensuring the price of grain and bread, the *sitophulakes* also kept a record of the total volume of corn imported to Athens on a daily basis (Dem. 20.32). This was done to ensure that corn retailers neither hoarded grain nor made a profit of more than 1 obol per unit. After 370 the *sitophulakes* were solely responsible for overseeing retail transactions (Arist. *Ath. Pol.*, 51.4).

¹²³ The *dokimastai* were public coin testers who were stationed in the agora and *emporion* and who were charged with ensuring the purity of Athenian silver coinage (*SEG* 26.72). The mandatory acceptance of any coinage passed as acceptable by the *dokimastai* was enforced by the *syllogeis* who could confiscate the property of anyone refusing to accept coinage officially certified as legitimate. The *syllogeis* were also charged with ensuring that the *dokimastai* were operating according to the dictates of the boule. See also Pl. *Hp. Mi* 368^b, Ap. 17 c.

¹²⁴ The debate over the existence of specialist commercial judges to oversee maritime court cases is still a contentious one. Two excerpts from Demosthenes (35.43-46 and 56.16) indicate there were a group of specially selected judges who were conversant with commercial laws and business practices, and who were thus in an advantageous position to preside over the commercial courts. The concept of a specialised group of experts presiding over mercantile disputes fits well with the argument that the commercial sophistication of the Greeks was far greater than has previously been believed. In light of the deduction that written contracts played a unique yet significant part in commercial practices (see Chapter Six section 6.4) it is hardly surprising that a panel of experts would be required to preside over these types of cases. For contrasting views on the existence of specialist judges for commercial cases see Cohen (1972) 93-95, who argues strenuously for their existence and Gernet (1950) 141 n.31, who questions the practicality of such a system.

for example the Corinthian *proxenos* in Athens was Athenian (vice versa, an Athenian *proxenos* in Corinth would be Corinthian). As merchants formed the largest group of travellers in the ancient world, the main functions of many *proxenoi* were connected to the commercial life of the city in which they dwelt. *Proxenoi* could assist merchants by offering them lodgings, exchanging their foreign currency, providing information or speaking on their behalf in front of the council or legislative body.¹²⁵ *Proxenoi* were also expected to know which of the local lenders were reputable or what to do if a legal case was brought against a countryman or guest-friend.¹²⁶ The number of magistrates and unofficial points of contact that involved themselves with the affairs of inter-regional merchants suggest that these men were considered as forming an identifiable group. This awareness of merchants as an occupational group transcending wealth and social status, as also demonstrated by the development of the *dikai emporikai*, again points to the applicability of the term 'mercantile community'.

The idea that, at some level, inter-regional merchants formed a distinct social or occupational group was originally raised by de Ste. Croix in his examination of class struggle in the ancient world. He explored this theory from the perspective that merchants would often be forced to spend their winter months wherever they happened to be, on account of the primitive nature of ancient sailing methods. This temporary winter residency is an idea that is given support by the *Periplus Maris Erythraei*, which suggests that it was common practice for merchants to spend winter months away from home. de Ste Croix believed that this enforced stay away from their home polis meant that by necessity, merchants from the same region, or indeed from a variety of regions, could be found associating with other transient elements within the polis.¹²⁷ This temporary formation of social groups with a similar sense of otherness, occupation and interests, suggests that it is possible to identify the

¹²⁵ *Schol. Aesch. Ctes.* 3.138.

¹²⁶ For a more detailed discussion of *proxenoi* and their roles in Greek society, see Chapter Five section 5.4.2.

¹²⁷ de Ste. Croix (1981) 266.

concept of the 'mercantile community' being present, informally at least, during the fourth century.

Further evidence to support the idea of a network of informal social groups created by men embedded in the 'mercantile community' can be found in the Latin play *Mercator*, by Plautus. Although outside the period covered by this thesis, the play (thought to have been written in the 180s BC) is believed to follow the format and plot of a previously lost Greek play, *The Emporos*, by Philemon (c.362-262 BC). The opening sequence has the main character, Charinus, having arrived in Rhodes and sold his grain at considerable profit, wandering the city streets enjoying the fact that he now has money to spend. Whilst wandering he randomly encounters an old family friend (*hospes*) who offers him an evening meal and a place to stay.¹²⁸ Although the play never directly states that Philemon, Charinus' friend, is a merchant or business associate, it seems understood. This understanding arises from a number of references to previous business relationships and transactions, and the fact that Charinus refers to Philemon as also being a friend of his father (who incidentally does not appear in the play). This suggests a previous tie of friendship existed, one originally created by Charinus' father.

Accepting that the original tie of friendship was created because of some kind of commercial interaction is a reasonable assumption, especially in light of the work undertaken by Herman in his study of ritualised friendship in the Greek world.¹²⁹ In this comprehensive examination of friendship ties, Herman not only explores the connections themselves but also the circumstances under which such relationships developed, concluding that although these friendships could last a number of generations, the original meeting was often brought about by some type of commercial dealing. In such a climate it was common for merchants to form close bonds of friendship with traders from other cities, and this often led to the development of social networks. Therefore, the institution of guest-friendship, as well as being an important aspect of social life, was an important aspect of the mercantile

¹²⁸ Plaut. *Merc.* 97-8. See McKechnie (1989) 179.

¹²⁹ Herman (1987) 41-72.

community, as it was amongst their close friends and associates that merchants often formed their long-term business relations. The archaeological discovery of *symbola* also offers strong evidence to indicate the existence of an inter-regional social network, a network of friendships that were maintained even after a merchant had retired.¹³⁰

Finally, gaining credit was fundamental to many trade ventures during the fourth century and, as with many other aspects of an inter-regional merchant's life, his source of credit was unique to his livelihood. Whereas other businessmen had a variety of credit agreements available to them, inter-regional merchants did not. The only credit regularly available to inter-regional merchants, who traded overseas, apart from borrowing from friends or family, was the maritime loan. It is also important that all known maritime lenders are acknowledged to have been heavily involved in inter-regional commerce (maritime credit agreements will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Five section 5.1 and Chapter Six section 6.4.). There is sparse evidence to suggest that banks could also offer these types of loan, but the only concrete example we have is Pasion, who like other maritime money-lenders, seems to have been actively involved in inter-regional exchange and thus in a strong position to form risk assessments of those men to whom he lent. The intimate knowledge that was needed by both money-lenders and bankers when making this type of credit agreement indicates that there was a close bond between financier and borrower (see Chapter Five section 5.2). This intimacy was not necessarily present in other systems of credit, and therefore justifies the inclusion of maritime financiers as a sub-group of the mercantile community. Furthermore, this intimacy also resulted in recognition that loans for the purpose of inter-regional exchange required a specialised knowledge if a lender was to avoid ruin. Thus, as will be demonstrated, they became separated from other types of credit transactions.

¹³⁰ *Symbola* often took the form of a common everyday object such as a bone or a coin: this item would then be divided into two with each party taking one of the halves (see for instance *IG* i² 916; *Pl. Symp.* 191d; *Eur. Hel.*, *Schol. Eur. Med.* 613). The object represented a physical symbol of the transaction and hence if either of the parties (or one of their friends, family or associates acting as agent) met again, they could prove the previous encounter by connecting the two halves, thus guaranteeing favourable treatment and trade terms. Bravo (1977) 1-59, suggests that it was common for *symbolon* to be given to a commercial operative if a wealthy merchant no longer wished to undertake trade ventures himself, but still wanted to renew old business relations, or to utilise favourable terms of trade with old friends.

Conclusion One:

This investigation has begun to reveal that there were a significant number of differences in many aspects of a merchant's life when compared with men with other livelihoods, and that, as a consequence, merchants naturally gravitated towards others with a similar occupation. These differences also served to make the position of *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* in Greek society unique, which in turn created bonds that in other occupations were either irrelevant or undesirable. These various links between inter-regional mercantile occupations make the use of the term 'mercantile community' relevant within this thesis.

2.2 The Mercantile Community

Having established that using the term 'mercantile community' is a justifiable way of designating an inter-linked group of commercial occupations, it is now sensible to define the exact nuances of the term. With the mercantile community mainly comprising *emporoi*, *nauklēroi* and, to a lesser extent maritime financiers, it is sensible that we scrutinise these sub-groups in closer detail. The problem of defining membership of the mercantile community has traditionally been approached in two ways. The first was to examine merchants in terms of their ethnic origins. Such studies aimed to determine whether in general it was foreigners, metics or citizens that undertook inter-regional exchange.¹³¹ Finley's investigation of ethnicity concluded that "*Plato is correct in defining emporos as a foreign trader*". This was a sentiment shared by Hasebroek who believed that foreigners, and more significantly *metics*, were the only people represented in the mercantile community.¹³² Other scholarly works took a more balanced view by suggesting that *metics*, although constituting the most visible and best-represented group within the mercantile

¹³¹ Clerc (1893) 396; 323 Gernet (1909) 328; Glotz, (1926) 214; Finley (1935)

¹³² Hasebroek (1933) 22, "*It has long been recognised that in Athens, at any rate, foreign trade was left entirely to metics - that is to resident aliens. None of the merchants and shipowners whom we encounter in the speeches of the Athenian orators, and whose disputes were dealt with in the Athenian courts, were themselves Athenian citizens*".

community, did not *exclusively* operate inter-regional exchange.¹³³ Knorringa, for instance, determined that the men operating as *emporoi*, although predominantly foreigners or metics, could on occasion be citizens. Whilst Casson argued that, “*Of the three roles [in commerce] –ship owning, trading, money-lending - they [foreigners] almost totally monopolized the first: practically all the vessels that carried products in and out the Piraeus belonged to men from Marseilles, Byzantium, the Greek cities in Southern Russia, Asia Minor and so on... In trading ventures foreigners were clearly in the majority, although there were plenty of Athenians taking part along side them... In the third, the financing of maritime ventures, Athenians outnumbered non-Athenians by a good margin*”.¹³⁴

The second approach to membership of the mercantile community was to scrutinise the accumulated wealth of each element in order to determine whether merchants formed an occupational sub-division of an already existent economic or social grouping. For example, such scholars sought to investigate if the majority of merchants were part of the liturgical class or of more humble origins.¹³⁵ One of the main proponents of this school of thought was Knorringa.¹³⁶ He suggested that the primary occupational aim of *emporoi* was to gain sufficient wealth to retire from commerce and make a respectable living through some other means, for instance cash crop farming. This was a conclusion also reached by Finley who argued that the citizen elite in Athens were unwilling to involve themselves in trade. Similarly, Starr suggests, “*Initially overseas traders had been of upper-class origin...for only well to do elements could have provided the surplus needed for ship, crew and cargo. By the sixth century probably men of lesser background carried on most Greek commerce, but there is no evidence to suggest they lost their independence.*”¹³⁷ Meijer on the other hand, proposed that only individuals of lower status were *emporoi*, whilst men of aristocratic stock were *nauklēroi* (Meijer, like many of his contemporaries

¹³³ Knorringa (1926) 79-80.

¹³⁴ Casson (1991) 108-109.

¹³⁵ Finley (1973) 60.

¹³⁶ Knorringa (1926) 91, “*We may assume that the aim of all emporoi was to get capital sufficiently large to enable them to leave navigation to other people; so that in Athens they themselves could use their routine and capital for loans to less well to do emporoi*”.

¹³⁷ Starr (1977) 75

translated the term *nauklēros* to mean ship owner).¹³⁸ Michell took a slightly different stance suggesting that it was rare for merchants to become wealthy and, instead, proposed a model that depicted the vast majority of inter-regional merchants being relatively poor, even in comparison with small-scale landholders.¹³⁹ This is a conclusion also recently adopted by Reed who suggested “*Probably no later than the mid-fifth century, then, bottomry loans made maritime trade a possibility for even the poor men. The proportions were very likely the same as in the fourth century – the majority poorer, with wealthy exceptions*”.¹⁴⁰ Although more recent discussions, such as that of Reed, have attempted to re-evaluate and update these positions, the general conclusions still tend to argue either for or against a high level of affluence or citizen element amongst the mercantile community. It is therefore prudent to question whether we must necessarily see the mercantile community as formed by either rich or poor, or by foreigners and metics, or citizens, instead suggesting a composition that includes a more complex (perhaps more even) mixture of all these groups.

Before beginning this evaluation, it is worth briefly discussing the available source material in order to demonstrate how bias may distort our perception of the mercantile community. The surviving corpus of Attic oratory is the main source of textual evidence for the composition of the mercantile community. Most of our information regarding the wealth, ethnicity, social status and moral character of the mercantile community, comes from speeches composed and delivered before large public audiences. These speeches date from the end of the fifth century to the end of the fourth. They were often edited after performance and recorded as examples of unusual or typical cases, good examples of fine oratory or because they were useful propaganda. Recognising this is important, as we need to be aware of the difference between ‘fact’ and ‘argument’. Therefore, we should be less concerned with trying to identify the ‘truth’ and ‘fact’ and more focused on identifying individual arguments, recurring types of argument and counter-arguments. Lies or fiction (particularly if identifiable) are just as useful for this purpose as the ‘truth’. Furthermore, the

¹³⁸ Meijer (1986) 80.

¹³⁹ Michell (1962) 232, “[*emporoi*] Being in so small a way a business they had little or rather no command of capital... Under such circumstances it is quite mistaken to think of rich merchants who were able to influence the legislature to make commercial treaties or impose tariffs in their favour.”

¹⁴⁰ Reed (2003) 34-42.

speeches are also likely to give a distorted view of the affluence of merchants as it was only the wealthier men who could afford the services of lawyers such as Demosthenes and Lysias. Types of argument can reveal the strategy and the unexpressed intentions of the speaker, the mentality as well as the assumptions he shares with the jury. Therefore, forensic speeches can illuminate contemporary society even though they often try to distort reality in order to win a case. For instance, with regard to issues of ethnicity of the mercantile community, the glimpse of the international character of the corn trade offered in Demosthenes 35, is probably a better guide to the origins of merchants than the status-conscious arguments rehearsed in court.¹⁴¹

2.1 The Size of the Mercantile Community

Before profiling members of the mercantile community according to their affluence or ethnicity, it is first prudent to determine the number of men who comprised it. Isager and Hansen in their analysis of Athenian inter-regional exchange state, '*At any rate, the conclusion is that at least half the population of Attica were engaged in trade, which presupposes the existence of a "market economy"*'.¹⁴² However, this figure is unsubstantiated and they offer no evidence to support their conclusion. This section will therefore examine the sparse literary and archaeological evidence that can be used to tentatively reconstruct the number of men that comprised the mercantile community. This figure will then be compared to those of other multi-ethnic occupation groups such as potters, shipbuilders and manufacturers.¹⁴³ The figures provided in this section are at best speculative and are provided merely as way of indicating the relative size of the mercantile community compared to other

¹⁴¹ Androcles (an Athenian) has a partner from Carystus (35.8,10,14). The witness to the partners' contract with the two Phaselites was a Boeotian (35.13), the chief witness called to recount the events aboard the ship is a man from Halicarnassus (35.20,34), as were the part owner of the ship Apollonides (35.33) and the money-lender from whom the Phaselites acquired funds (35.23); finally there is another money-lender from Citium who had previously lent money to Apollonides (35.32).

¹⁴² Isager and Hansen (1975) 51.

¹⁴³ The term 'multi-ethnic occupation' can be understood as indicating an industry or group of interlinked occupations that was undertaken by citizens, metics and foreigners (including slaves).

occupation groups.¹⁴⁴ A sound starting point for any investigation of this type is Harris' discussion of technical specialisation in Classical Athens. Harris' article explores three main concepts these are; the organisation of production and its influence on the nature of exchange, the nature of technical specialisation and its relationship to the rise of the market economy, and the division of labour within the Athenian economy. Through the course of his discussion Harris argues that those adult male citizens who did not work as farmers (or have a primary income derived from agrarian pursuits) may have accounted for as much as fifty-percent of the citizen body.¹⁴⁵ However, unlike Isager and Hansen, Harris suggests that the majority of these men were engaged in the manufacturing industry not inter-regional commerce.¹⁴⁶ Harris' investigation of the division of the *demos* into occupation groups is important and will form the basis of the following discussion.

If the population figures presented in Chapter Four are accepted it is possible to conclude that on average the number of adult male citizens in Athens during the fourth century was 25,000. Moreover, if we accept Harris' proposal that fifty-percent of these men were not reliant on agriculture as their primary form of income it is possible to identify that there were 12,500 citizens distributed amongst the other commercial sectors (including trade, manufacturing and mining). However, what percentage of these men formed part of the mercantile community? The only three authors that shed any light on this question are Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle. Xenophon records that the Athenian assembly consisted of a cross-section of society and lists the main groups and subdivisions, included within his catalogue are inter-regional merchants (the other occupations are: fullers, cobblers, builders, smiths, farmers and *kapēloi*).¹⁴⁷ Xenophon's inclusion of merchants within this list is significant since it indicates that he considers them one of the main occupation groups in Athens. Plato also indicates that the citizen body comprised a significant number of merchants when he states that *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* took their place in the *ekklesia*

¹⁴⁴ These figures are rendered more imprecise by the fact that membership of the mercantile community is likely to have fluctuated at various points throughout the fourth century.

¹⁴⁵ Harris (2002) 87. Amemiya (2007) 67, agrees with this figure although he disputes the way Harris then subdivides this figure in order to propose that 10,000 citizens were involved in manufacture.

¹⁴⁶ Harris does recognise that a 'significant' number of men were involved in inter-regional exchange but he, like Isager and Hansen, does not provide any evidence to support this assertion.

¹⁴⁷ Xen. *Mem.* 3.7.6.

amongst other important occupational groups including farmers, blacksmiths and shoemakers. Finally, Aristotle in the *Politics* states that the original polis was divided into five main occupation groups or classes which were farmers, the mechanical class (which consists of those engaged in the various arts and crafts), the marketing class (i.e. those men occupied as *emporoi*, *nauklēroi* or *kapēloi*) and the defence force.¹⁴⁸ Aristotle's list modifies that of Socrates (as recorded by Plato in the *Republic*) who theorised that the first cities were comprised of men undertaking four main livelihoods these were weavers, farmers, shoemakers and builders, however because these men could not achieve self-sufficiency they quickly diversified into other occupations, the most important of which were smiths, herdsmen, *emporoi* and *kapēloi*.¹⁴⁹ Aristotle's main opposition to this model was that Socrates did not recognise the value of a defence force to the emerging state, however both are in agreement as to the importance of inter-regional merchants. Having examined the primary occupation groups found in a emerging polis Aristotle moves on to explore the underlying causes for the development of different types of constitutions in poleis administered by similar forms of government (i.e. questioning why different forms of democracies or oligarchy evolved). He concluded that the reason behind the development of variant constitutions in the various poleis is that different percentages of their population were engaged in the 'primary' occupations.¹⁵⁰ Again, merchants are recorded as one of the largest and most important groups. If we use these passages to tentatively identify the composition of the citizen body according to occupation, it is possible to conclude that a significant percentage of the demos undertook mercantile occupations.

If 12,500 is accepted as plausible estimate for the number of citizens who did not have a predominantly agrarian profession (and who could thus potentially have had a commercial occupation), it is possible to derive the following estimates for the size of the mercantile community:

¹⁴⁸ Arist. *Pol.* 1299^b37; 1291^b14.

¹⁴⁹ Plt. *Resp.*. 369d-372d.

¹⁵⁰ Arist. *Pol.* 1291^b14. In this section Aristotle argues that the population can be broken down into those who farm, those who are engaged in crafts and manufacture, those engaged in buying and selling (i.e. local retailers/peddlers/tavern owners/brother keepers), those involved in maritime matters (including fishermen, rowers, merchants and ferrymen) and unskilled labourers.

%	A	B	C
5%	625	1775	1925
10%	1250	3650	3800
15%	1875	5525	5675
20%	2500	7400	7550
25%	3125	9275	9425

Table showing estimates for the total number of men comprising the mercantile community

% = estimate for the percentage of the 12,500 citizens with non-agricultural occupations that were part of the mercantile community.

A = approximate number of men comprising the mercantile community who are citizens.

B = approximate number of men comprising the mercantile community including foreigners and metics.¹⁵¹

C = approximate number of men comprising the mercantile community including bankers and moneylenders.¹⁵²

Using the figures from the table above I would suggest that on average the mercantile community numbered between 5675-7550, a total that can be supported from evidence contained in Theopompus and Philochorus. In these accounts of Philip's capture of Hieron it is stated that between 180-230 grain ships were seized.¹⁵³ As has been shown the majority of *emporoi* can be identified as chartering space onboard a vessel belonging to a third party.¹⁵⁴ Casson has suggested that in general it was standard for between two-five *emporoi* to group together to hire a vessel owned by a third party (although he does recognise that on occasion more affluent merchant could hire a vessel by themselves).¹⁵⁵ Thus if we accept that Philip captured 200 vessels at Hieron each of which had one *nauklēros* and between one-five *emporoi* it is possible to calculate that between 400-1000 members of the mercantile community

¹⁵¹ This study will argue that the mercantile community generally comprised more even numbers of citizens, metics and foreigners thus in order to estimate the number of metic and foreign merchants we must multiply the number of citizen merchants by three (see sections 2.3.1-2.3.6).

¹⁵² Harris (2002) 6 and Amemiya (2007) 104-105 argue against Finley (1985) 73, who suggested that there were very few banks in Athens. Instead Harris and Amemiya conclude that a conservative estimate for the total number of bankers would be 100. This figure is lower than that suggested by Cohen (1992) 30-36, however Cohen does convincingly prove that there were probably four times as many moneylenders; a hypothesis that is borne out by Millett's analysis of lending and borrowing in classical Greece. In recognition of the fact that not all banks and moneylenders will have offered maritime loans, this study will propose that that on average approximately 150 bankers and moneylenders were part of the mercantile community (this figure includes men who were full-time bankers or moneylenders but not those men whose primary occupation was trade but who offered small value loans as I considered these men to be *emporoi*).

¹⁵³ For further discussion of these passages see Chapter Four section 4.1.4.

¹⁵⁴ See Chapter One sections 1.1.1-1.1.3; 1.2.1; 1.2.3A; 1.3.1.

¹⁵⁵ Casson (1971) 314-318; (1992) 101-104.

were detained.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, if we believe Demosthenes' claim that the Athenians acquired half their grain imports from the Black Sea then we can double this figure to give an approximate total for the number of men bringing grain to Athens.¹⁵⁷ It is therefore possible to suggest that approximately 1200-2000 men were involved with the transportation of grain to Athens. Furthermore, if we accept Amemiya's and Bresson's conclusion that, in monetary terms, grain imports constituted half of all Athenian imports it becomes possible to calculate that the approximate number of men importing commodities to Athens was between 2,400-4000.¹⁵⁸ Additionally, if Bresson's hypothesis that Athenians' import and export accounts were balanced then it is possible to double this figure giving an estimate of 4,800-8000 for the total number of men involved in importing and exporting from Athens (excluding bankers and moneylenders).¹⁵⁹ However in recognition of the fact that some of these merchants are likely to have imported one commodity and exported another (or vice versa) I would propose that the total number of men involved in inter-regional exchange (including bankers and moneylenders) is in the range of 5775-7650, with a higher figure being the most probable.

Although this may not appear a particularly high figure, its significance becomes more apparent when we compare it to the number of men engaged in other non-agricultural occupations.

¹⁵⁶ Moreno (2007) 253-254 suggests that this must have constituted most if not all of Athens' annual grain import from the Black Sea.

¹⁵⁷ Demosthenes 20.31, claims that half of all the grain imported by Athens comes from the Black Sea region: "*For you are aware that we consume more imported corn than any other nation. Now the corn that comes to our ports from the Black Sea is equal to the whole amount from all other places of export.*"

¹⁵⁸ Amemiya (2007) 106-111.

¹⁵⁹ Plato, *Resp.* 370e-371b; Bresson (2000) 109-30. For further discussion of the import-export account of Athens see Chapter Four section 4.5. Although men trading in luxuries were more likely to group together to hire a vessel (owing to the fact that their commodities tended to be less cumbersome), traders dealing in slaves or marble generally operated alone thus making it reasonable to conclude that a comparative number of men were involved in the import-export of commodities other than grain, as were part of the grain trade.

Occupation	No. of workers
Bankers ¹⁶⁰	100
<i>Naupegoi</i> ¹⁶¹	300
Moneylenders ¹⁶²	300-400
Vase painters ¹⁶³	500
Manufacturing ¹⁶⁴	5,000
Mining ¹⁶⁵	10,000

Table detailing the approximate number of men involved in other multi-ethnic non-agrarian occupations.

Aside from mining inter-regional commerce was the largest sector of the Athenian economy in terms of manpower. As a result of this, and the importance of inter-regional trade to the Athenian economy, the mercantile community was politically visible and had the potential to acquire a considerable amount of economic and political influence (as will be discussed in Chapter Six).

2.2.2 Foreigner, Metic and Citizen

Scholars seeking to explore the ethnic mix of the mercantile community in Athens during the fourth century are in an advantageous position since most of the surviving literary evidence relating to the ethnicity of traders was written during this period. Furthermore, the vast majority of this literature is Athenocentric in outlook. If, as will be demonstrated, it is possible to identify the Athenian mercantile community as comprised of men from various ethnic backgrounds (including full citizens), then it is no longer tenable to accept that Athenian citizens were content to all leave inter-regional trading ventures solely in the hands of foreigners and metics.¹⁶⁶ Instead, the surviving evidence can be used to demonstrate that citizens from most Greek poleis engaged in inter-regional exchange and that Athenian citizen merchants were as integral to this system as any other, although not, as some have suggested,

¹⁶⁰ See above fn. 152.

¹⁶¹ Harris (2002) 67-73.

¹⁶² See above fn. 152

¹⁶³ Cook (1959) 114-132, argues that even in its heyday painted pottery manufacture only employed approximately 500 men. This is a conclusion supported by Beazley (1963); Isager and Hansen (1975); 41; Amemiya (2008) 85.

¹⁶⁴ Hopper (1979) 98; 102; Osborne (1991) 133; Harris (2002) 75-77 Amemiya (2007) 86-87.

¹⁶⁵ Lauffer (1956) 904-912.

¹⁶⁶ Knorringa (1926) 79; Cohen (1973) 15; Reed (2003) 27.

dominant.¹⁶⁷ Consequently, one of the first theories that needs to be questioned is the idea that the metic population undertook the vast majority of inter-regional exchange.¹⁶⁸

Although it is indisputable that metics were a vitally important component of the Athenian economy, it is debatable whether they were vastly more significant in number than either citizens or non-metic foreigners.¹⁶⁹ The first piece of evidence that undermines the theory that metics formed the core component of the Athenian mercantile community is Lysias' speech *Against the Corn Dealers* (386 BC). In this speech it is possible for Lysias to suggest to a jury that inter-regional merchants were of great importance to the city and, as a consequence of this, it was worth the Athenians' while to ingratiate themselves to these men by putting to death the corrupt dealers.¹⁷⁰ The implication of this speech is that corn and grain imports could be seriously affected by low, artificially engineered prices. If corn were commanding a low price in Athens, merchants would transport their shipments to more profitable markets. As grain supplies dwindled, the fraudulent grain dealers would slowly sell off their reserves at greatly inflated prices, thus increasing their profit margins. The impact of this scam would not have been as harmful if Athens was relying almost solely on her metic community to operate inter-regional exchange.

We know that by the 350s at the latest, the Athenians had implemented a number of legislative measures that forced metics and citizens to transport their grain to Athens in preference to any other markets. Demosthenes' speech, *Against Leocritus* records a previously passed law that prevented maritime financiers offering credit on any venture transporting grain to a destination other than Athens.¹⁷¹ Although there

¹⁶⁷ See for example, Ehrenberg (1974) 140, who argues, "it was only to Athenian *emporoi* that the Bosphoran kings gave permission to export corn to their country"; Isager-Hansen (1975) 204 and Whitehead, (1977) 117, 123 n.38, recognise that Athenian merchants could play a role within Athenian inter-regional exchange without going as far as Ehrenberg. For a fuller discussion of the problems with Ehrenberg's translation see below.

¹⁶⁸ Although it would be useful to know the exact proportions of citizens, metics and non-resident foreigners within the mercantile community such precise figures are impossible to determine.

¹⁶⁹ Hasebroek (1933) 22; 101. See note 15.

¹⁷⁰ Lys. 22.21. Seager (1966) 172-84; Whitby (1998) 119; Moreno (2007) 221-223.

¹⁷¹ Dem. 35.50. There is still scholarly debate over the exact date for Demosthenes 35. Gernet & Bizos (1924) II 84 and n.1 recognised the possibility that Lys. 22 and Dem. 35 could overlap. Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1974) 116, pointed out the need for such a law early in the fourth century. Reed (2003)

were other sources of credit, such as loans offered by family or friends, the vast majority of inter-regional trading ventures were funded by finance from either banks or money-lenders.¹⁷² An Athenian metic therefore, unless affluent enough to be able fund his own trading ventures, would be forced to import grain to Athens despite severe reductions in his profit margins. If metics did constitute almost all of the mercantile community, then logically, Athenian imports would be largely unaffected. However, Lysias, even taking into consideration oratorical exaggeration, felt he has a case for suggesting that Athenian imports would be seriously affected. Thus as a by-product of this argument he is also implicitly suggesting that there were a considerable number of foreign merchants, men not constrained by Athenian legislation, who were importing corn to Athens. This idea is also attested by Xenophon in the *Poroi*. Xenophon advances the argument that the Athenian state could gain great benefit from inter-regional trade, going as far as to suggest that it was only possible for Athens to flourish during times of peace since it is during cessation of hostilities that trade can operate unhindered.¹⁷³ In order to maximise the advantage they gain from their mercantile community, Xenophon suggests that the Athenians should increase the number of lodging houses in and around their harbours in order to accommodate more non-resident foreign merchants.¹⁷⁴ By encouraging increased numbers of foreign merchants to Athens, Xenophon believes the Athenians would be able to increase their revenue dramatically. This evidence again suggests that there were a large number of non-resident foreigners trading with Athens, a conclusion which is given further support with the discovery of a considerable number of *proxeny* decrees that record praise and rewards bestowed upon non-resident foreign merchants.¹⁷⁵ These decrees demonstrate that such merchants played a significant role in the Athenian import and export industry.¹⁷⁶

Having established that there were a significant number of foreign merchants

28 n.6, therefore concludes that “*the law in question might have existed by the date Lys. 22 was delivered*”.

¹⁷² See Chapter Five section 5.1.1 for a discussion of the prevalence of maritime loans.

¹⁷³ Xen. *Vect.* 5.2-3.

¹⁷⁴ Xen. *Vect.* 3.12.

¹⁷⁵ These decrees will be the primary focus of Chapter Five sections 5.3-5.4.11.

¹⁷⁶ Due to the importance of *proxeny* decrees in shedding light on the role and position of inter-regional merchants within Greek society they will be discussed fully in Chapter Five section 5.4.2.

within the mercantile community, I shall move on to demonstrate that Athenian citizens were not content to ignore the spoils of inter-regional exchange, and, as a result, formed a noteworthy part of the commercial community. An important literary source, which implies that a considerable number of citizens were engaged in trade, is Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (3.7.6.). In this passage, Xenophon is commenting on the functions and composition of the Athenian assembly. He remarks that the assembly was comprised of a cross-section of society; having made this observation, he lists the main subdivisions, and strikingly *emporoi* are included within this group. The fact that *emporoi* were worthy of mention as one of the main groups represented in the assembly, suggests there were a considerable number of such men or that merchants had considerable political influence, thus undermining the modern hypothesis that citizens rarely involved themselves in inter-regional exchange.¹⁷⁷ This idea is also alluded to in a number of the Attic New Comedies.¹⁷⁸ The ease with which playwrights such as Menander could use citizen *emporoi* or *nauklēroi* within their plays, indicates that this was a situation reflective of Athenian society. This conclusion is further reinforced since none of the plays depends for its comic effect on the fact that the trader is a citizen; instead the occupation is merely a device for introducing a specific situation or scenario.¹⁷⁹

Finally, the proposal that the Athenian mercantile community contained a more even mixture of foreigners, metics and citizens during the fourth century can be further supported in a survey of the ethnic origins of litigants in cases tried under the *dikai emporikai*.¹⁸⁰ The litigants in such cases were from a wider cross-section of

¹⁷⁷ For further evidence that suggests large numbers of citizen merchants attended the assembly see Chapter Six section 6.1.

¹⁷⁸ *Men. Sam.* 96-104; *Men. Fr.* 349. *Philemon Merc.* 3 a.

¹⁷⁹ Another piece of evidence that supports the theory that the mercantile community comprised a higher number of citizen merchants than previously believed, comes from the inscription *IG II² 343*. This inscription is a *proxeny* decree (c.323/2) which records the bestowal of the status *proxenos* upon an unnamed Sidonian. As well as the functions and privileges of the position, it also records that it was an unnamed *emporos* and an unnamed *nauklēros* who made the recommendation. In order for either of these men to be eligible to make such a suggestion to the *boule*, they were required to be full Athenian citizens. However, it is possible that these men brought the suggestion by proxy, i.e. they used a citizen friend or business associate to raise the suggestion on their behalf. This seems unlikely, as, in these circumstances, it would be the friend or associate whose name would be recorded as making the suggestion. For a more detailed discussion of the rarity of this type of inscription see Chapter Six section 6.3.1.

¹⁸⁰ During the fourth century, we can identify Athens beginning to develop, and then formalise, the

society than in any other branch of the Athenian legal system. Such commercial cases were unique in the sense that the litigant could be citizen, metic, foreigner or even slave (see Chapter Six section 6.4). Although it is frequently difficult to pin down precisely the status of particular individuals, there is enough evidence to suggest that having a commercial occupation was sufficient to enable one to bring about legal proceedings under the *dikai emporikai*, even over-riding one's ethnic origins and social status.¹⁸¹ Because of this disregard for nationality, it is possible to identify a number of commercial cases that involved foreigners or metics. For instance, in Demosthenes 21.176 we find a commercial dispute arising between two non-Athenian businessmen, Evander of Thespias and Menippus of Caria. We can also identify non-Athenian litigants in Demosthenes 32 (Messalians), 33 (Byzantines) and 35 (Phaselites). There are also a few examples of legal disputes being heard within the commercial courts that were between metics and non-metic foreigners.¹⁸² Through an examination of the complete corpus of forensic speeches, it is also possible to demonstrate that citizens were far from a minority within Athenian inter-regional

dikai emporikai which in essence were specialist commercial courts. The *dikai emporikai* were distinct from all other aspects of Athenian civil law, since they not only had their own set of functions and procedures, but were created to serve the needs of foreigners, metics and citizens. There were a number of requirements for cases heard under the *dikai emporikai*: firstly, that the dispute had to be commercial in nature, in general directly relating to inter-regional exchange; secondly that the contractual dispute had to involve the transportation of commodities to or from Athens; finally that the contract had to be in written form according to a specific formula. The clearest contemporary account of the requirements for a case to be deemed as *dikē emporikē* is in Dem.32.1. "Men of the jury, having entered a plea that the action is not admissible, I wish first to speak concerning the laws in accordance with which the plea was entered. The laws, men of the jury, ordain that actions for nauklēroi and emporoi shall be upon loans for shipments to or from Athens, concerning which there shall be written agreements; and if anyone brings a suit in violation of this provision, the action shall not be maintainable". For more detailed discussions of the *dikai emporikai* see Gernet (1955); Cohen (1973); Burke (1992); Wilson (1998).

¹⁸¹ The inclusion of non-citizens in the commercial courts is significant as it demonstrates that the Athenians deemed it necessary to separate commercial law from other civil proceedings. Furthermore, it also indicates a departure from the otherwise inflexible idea that entry to the legal system required some kind of formal membership of the polis. By granting foreigners and metics access to the commercial courts, the fourth century Athenians appear to be promoting the idea that nationality could be over-ridden by occupation, so long as that occupation was in some way related to inter-regional commerce.

¹⁸² Cohen (1973) 59-61. See for instance Dem. 21.176.

commerce. Within the forensic corpus, there are a total of 29 *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*;

of these only 14 are either metic or non-resident Athenians,¹⁸³ in comparison with 15 who are citizens.¹⁸⁴ However, despite this almost even citizen-non-citizen divide other scholars have drawn different conclusions.¹⁸⁵ For instance, Ehrenberg concluded that the majority of merchants trading in Athens were Athenian.¹⁸⁶ His basis for this conclusion is the evidence presented in Isocrates 17.57. Ehrenberg interprets this passage as suggesting that “*it was only to Athenian emporoi that the Bosphoran kings gave permission to export corn from their country*”. However, as Reed correctly identifies this translation is incorrect. What the speaker of Isocrates 17 actually states is that in time of grain shortage his father and King Satyros sent away the ships of other *emporoi* while granting to you [*humin*] export rights.¹⁸⁷ Reed identifies that Demosthenes has already shown that the word *humin* in this passage is not confined to Athenian citizens as he had already reminded the jury that Satyros’ successor Leukon had granted exemption from duty “*to those carrying [grain] to Athens*” and priority docking for those “*sailing to you [humin]*”. Isager and Hansen, and Hopper, also suggest that the majority of merchants trading with Athens were citizens.¹⁸⁸ However, scholars such as Knorringa, Cohen and Reed have reached a different conclusion. They propose that the evidence points towards the majority of merchants

¹⁸³ **Apaturius of Byzantium**, Dem. 33.26, Dem. 33.6; **Apollodorus of Phaselis**, Dem. 35.10; **Artemon of Phaselis**, Dem. 35.10, 49; **Chrysippus and his brother**, Dem. 34.38-39; **Phormio**, Dem. 34.6, 13, 50, Dem. 34, 6-9; **Hegestratus of Massalia**, Dem.32.4, 8; **Lycō of Heraclea**, Dem.52.3-9; **Parmeniscus**, Dem. 56.5, 7; **Protus**, Dem. 32.8, 14, 18, 25, 29; **Pyro of Pherae**, Isoc. 17.20, **The son of Sopaïos**, Isoc. 17.4; **Theodorus of Phoenicia**, Dem. 34.6-8, 22, 26, 40; **Zenothemis of Massalia**, Dem. 32.4-5, 15.

¹⁸⁴ **Andocides**, Lys. 6.19, 49; **Androcles**, PA 872, Dem. 35.10, 49; **Archeneus**, PA 2362; Lys. 12.16; **Diodotus**, PA 3885, Lys. 32.24, Lys. 32.4; **Philip**, Dem. 24.138; **Hyblesius**, PA 13893, Dem. 34.33. **Leocrates**, PA 9083, Lyc. i.55; **Megaclides**, PA 9686, Dem. 52.20. **Mico** PA 10204, Dem. 58.6-10. **Nicippus**, PA 10830, Dem. 1.17; **Nicobulus**, PA 10839, Dem. 37.6, 46, 54; **Timosthenes** PA 13810, Dem. 49.31; **Thrasyllus**, PA 7342, Dem. 52.20; **Anonymous Citizen 1**, Dem. 34.50; **Anonymous Citizen 2**, *Poxy.* 2538; **Speaker against Apaturius**, Dem. 33.4; **Lampis** (non slave) Dem. 34.5, 10.

¹⁸⁵ For instance, Reed (2003) 27, disputes the above lists. He disregards Hyblesius as he considers him to be a Samian, Diodotus as he does not consider him to be an *emporos*, and Andocides and Leocrates as he believes that they only traded whilst they were in exile (however, as will be shown in Chapter Five section 5.4.1 and Chapter Six section 6.2 Andocides seems to have continued trading upon his return). Reed’s calculation is problematic as although he identifies Lampis and Nicippus as citizen merchants in his catalogue, he fails to include them in his list of known Athenian traders.

¹⁸⁶ Ehrenberg (1974) 140.

¹⁸⁷ Reed (2003) 28.

¹⁸⁸ Isager and Hansen (1975) 205, designate those men carrying grain to Athens as “*Athenian merchants*”, whilst Hopper (1979) 84, refers to the ships carrying grain to Athens as “*Athenian vessels*”.

being foreigners or metics rather than citizens. Knorringa and Cohen reference Lysias 22.17 to support this hypothesis. They argue that the reference to *emporoi* as “*those who sail into Athens*” supports the theory that the majority of merchants were foreign. However, the context of the passage undermines this conclusion. In this section the speaker is referring to grain traders, thus even Athenian merchants had to go elsewhere to acquire grain and then “*sail [back] into Athens*”. Reed points to Aeschines’ casual reference to “*the emporoi or other foreigners or citizens*” that were trading with Athens as evidence to suggest that *emporoi* were, in the main, foreigners.¹⁸⁹ However, the interpretation of this passage is disputed and thus the use of the word *allos* could mean ‘additionally’ rather than ‘other’.¹⁹⁰ Reed then uses his catalogue of fifth and fourth century merchants to consolidate his position. He suggests that out of the sixty-one merchants he identifies from the fourth century, only twelve are Athenian whilst the remaining forty-nine are foreigners or metics.¹⁹¹ However, Reed combines both literary and epigraphic material in his catalogue, and this serves to skew his results. The majority of epigraphic evidence cited by Reed is from honorific decrees, which, in terms of ethnographic studies, poses a unique set of problems. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, in a commercial context the Athenians used the bestowal of honours as a way of encouraging foreign merchants to trade with them on favourable terms. As a consequence, we do not find inscriptions rewarding citizen merchants; therefore by including honorific inscriptions in an ethnic study, Reed unnecessarily distorts the results. It is therefore preferable to base any ethnic analysis on the limited (and sometime problematic) evidence contained in the forensic speeches, as by doing so a less distorted picture can be formed.

Conclusion Two:

An investigation of ethnicity reveals that the mercantile community should be considered as varied in composition, including sizable numbers of citizens, metics and

¹⁸⁹ Reed (2003) 27.

¹⁹⁰ See Finley (1935) 330 fn.48 who notes that in Pl. *Grg.* 473c-d, the word *allos* is used to mean additionally.

¹⁹¹ Reed (2003) 27; 93-132. Reed’s calculation for the total number of merchants found in the forensic speeches is contentious. Reed identifies Lampis and Nicippus as citizen merchants in his catalogue yet fails to include them in his list of Athenian traders. Furthermore, he disregards Andocides and Leocrates as he believes them only to have traded whilst in exile.

foreigners. Owing to the nature of the evidence it is impossible to offer any specific percentages for each group, especially since the composition is likely to have fluctuated at various times. It is therefore sufficient to conclude that the Athenian mercantile community, during the fourth century, was not dominated by any one particular ethnic group.

2.3 Rich, Poor or Moderately Affluent?

Having established that the mercantile community comprised a more even mix of foreigners, metics and citizens, the discussion will now move on to explore whether it is possible to identify a connection between the three groups on the basis of affluence. I will question, for instance, whether all inter-regional merchants were, irrespective of their ethnic origins, of the same economic affluence, and ask whether these groups also represent a divide in relative levels of wealth? Since the rejection of Marxist and Keynesian approaches to the study of economics and economic history, terms such as ‘capitalist’ and ‘communist’ have gradually become redundant and been replaced with more politically neutral terminology, such as ‘profit maximising’ and ‘subsistence operations’. So how do these shifts and changes in perceptions of modern economic and commercial terminology affect modern views of ancient Greek traders? Hasebroek argued in the 1930s that the overriding aim of Greek inter-regional commerce was to fund a subsistence existence, rather than to gain profit. He posited, “*capitalists indeed existed but they were entirely distinct from traders and took no part in commercial activities*”.¹⁹² Such conclusions came from independent studies investigating the financing of maritime trade in the Classical period. Early studies highlighted the heavy dependency of the mercantile community on money-lenders to finance their overseas ventures. It was noted that the majority of merchants mentioned in the private legal speeches of the Athenian orators were far from wealthy, with many requiring the continued services of money-lenders in order for their businesses to continue to operate.¹⁹³ Böckh concluded that whilst the “money-lending class” was of considerable affluence, the merchants themselves were at best of modest means,

¹⁹² Hasebroek (1933) 7.

¹⁹³ Böckh [1842] (translated by Lewis 1976) 33; Glotz (1926) 241; Knorringa (1926) 92-93; Hasebroek (1933) 7-8; Michell (1940) 232; Meijer (1986) 80.

and in general poor, which explained their dependency on maritime loans. This picture is distorted because of the overly neat, clear divide early scholars drew between the mercantile community and the so-called 'maritime money-lending class'. As will be demonstrated, there is considerable scope to suggest that the wealth divide between the two classes was nowhere near as easily distinguishable as early scholars suggest. Most recently Reed has tentatively concluded that "*Most fourth-century emporoi were poor, and even then most nauklēroi fell somewhere below the upper echelon of wealth*".¹⁹⁴ Although I would agree with the assessment that most *nauklēroi* were from outside of the highest wealth bracket, I disagree with Reed's hypothesis that most *emporoi* were poor. As will be demonstrated below, during the fourth century, the majority of mercantile community fell into the 'moderately' wealthy category.

2.3.1 Moderately Wealthy Merchants

The largest attested economic group within the mercantile community is that of the moderately affluent merchant who spent his life undertaking inter-regional commerce in order to obtain small amounts of profit. The range of respective wealth encompassed by the term 'moderately wealthy' is considerable. For example, at one end of the scale are *emporoi* who acted as lone operators utilising the transport services of *nauklēroi*, whilst at the other are men who could afford to own a vessel and crew it with slaves. The term 'wealthy' merchants is used to designate those men who were of such affluence they owned more than one vessel or who undertook the most expensive forms of liturgies, such as the *trierarchy*.¹⁹⁵ Meanwhile the term 'poor' merchant denotes those men who were either undertaking inter-regional exchange to fund a subsistence lifestyle or slaves (who it will be shown had a special function within the mercantile community). The term 'moderately wealthy' has to be used to encompass such a broad range of men due to the impossibility of determining precisely most merchants' level of affluence. The two traditional methods of gauging

¹⁹⁴ Reed (2003) 36.

¹⁹⁵ The two clearest examples of 'wealthy' merchants are Lampis and Phormion, who are both recorded as owning more than one vessel, and who will be discussed in greater detail below in section 2.3.5.

the affluence of merchants, i.e. examining the defendants in commercial lawsuits or an investigation of bottomry loans, if not used carefully, can produce skewed results. For instance, an examination of the merchants found in the Demosthenic corpus can produce a model that artificially inflates the affluence of the mercantile community, since it was only wealthier men who were able to afford the services of Demosthenes (and other orators). Meanwhile, the results of any demographic investigation utilising maritime loans are influenced by the investigators' understanding of the use and purpose of such loans.

Hasebroek for example, argues that an analysis of maritime lending can be used to demonstrate that "*merchants and ship-owners, if we can judge from those who appear in the private speeches of the Athenian orators, were invariably without any capital worth mentioning of their own*".¹⁹⁶ Hasebroek refers to Demosthenes 34.41 as evidence to support his conclusion. In this passage, the bottomry lender claims that the money for facilitating trade did not come from those who borrow, but from those who lend. The speaker claims that no ship, *nauklēros* or passenger could put to sea without borrowing money. However, a number of scholars have argued that the high level of borrowing is not necessarily because of poverty amongst the mercantile community, but because bottomry loans provided a good form of insurance. These include: Finley who suggests that "[Bottomry] *loans are an exception to be explained by the function of the loan as an insurance policy rather than a form of credit*";¹⁹⁷ de Ste. Croix;¹⁹⁸ Casson,¹⁹⁹ Cohen,²⁰⁰ Todd²⁰¹ and Reed.²⁰² Millett however, downplays this insurance element arguing that it "*was an effect rather than a cause*" of maritime

¹⁹⁶ Hasebroek (1933) 7-8 for example, argues that an analysis of maritime lending can be used to demonstrate that "*merchants and ship-owners, if we can judge from those who appear in the private speeches of the Athenian orators, were invariably without any capital worth mentioning of their own.*"

¹⁹⁷ Finley (1999) 141

¹⁹⁸ de Ste. Croix (1974) 42-3.

¹⁹⁹ Casson (1991) 102-3 "*There was no insurance in those days; the men who made the loans assumed total responsibility – if the vessel failed to come back, they not the shipper, lost everything -...*";

²⁰⁰ Cohen (1992) 140-6 "*Fourth-century maritime loans have long been recognised as carrying quantifiable risk; indeed, ship-financing has repeatedly been cited as constituting the earliest form of insurance*".

²⁰¹ Todd (1993) 337-40.

²⁰² Reed (2003) 34-6 "*Bottomry loans provided such good insurance that even some of those who were able to 'put to sea without the help of the lenders' might choose not to do so*".

lending.²⁰³ Millett questions whether the right of non-repayment in the event of a disaster was a clause attractive enough to encourage wealthy merchants to borrow money to finance their ventures. Although the clause does provide a form of insurance against loss, Millett points out that the privilege could be costly: not only did the borrower lose between 12-33% of their profit, the lender could also dictate the products to be bought and sold, and the eventual market where the commodities had to be traded. Whereas a merchant within an independent operation had the freedom to change destination according to fluctuations in market prices and conditions, during the fourth century men funding their ventures using maritime loans were tied to Athens. The importance of maritime loans in financing inter-regional exchange will be discussed at length in Chapter Five.

The majority of merchants who utilised maritime loans did so because it made economic sense. Men of modest means can be identified as utilising maritime loans because a) they provided them with half of the capital needed to purchase a cargo and b) if they lost their goods, they would only be liable for half the value (i.e. the money they had invested themselves but not that which they had borrowed). Because this system offered only partial insurance, we do not find wealthier merchants utilising maritime loans purely because of the advantage offered by indemnity. Instead, as a merchant became more affluent, it made sense to risk the loss of one shipment rather than to borrow money and be subject to interest whilst still only having partial insurance. If, as I have suggested, a number of moderately affluent *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* gained enough profit to fund their own ventures, why do we not hear more about them in the sources? The simple answer is that trade funded from a merchant's own money will not give rise to the same kind of legal proceedings as that financed through maritime loans and thus they are less likely to be mentioned in the forensic speeches. The fact that a number of moderately affluent merchants did not rely on maritime loans can be inferred from an investigation of the men offering maritime credit. As will be discussed in section 2.3.6, outside of professional lenders, the largest group offering maritime loans consisted of moderately affluent merchants who extended credit whilst continuing to trade. One reason for branching out into money-

²⁰³ Millett (1983) 44 & 188-89 n.22.

lending was that it was considerably easier to generate a profit by offering modest sized loans (between 500-3,000 drachmae) than it was to fund a significant increase in inter-regional trading operations.²⁰⁴ Secondly, by diversifying their business ventures, moderately affluent merchants could spread the risk thus reducing the chances of catastrophic financial loss. The recognition of moderately affluent merchants extending loans is important as we know from Demosthenes 56, *Against Dionysodoros*, that it was illegal for someone to gain a maritime loan only to offer it as credit to a third party.²⁰⁵ Consequently, it is *unlikely* that a moderately affluent merchant would borrow money in order to ‘insure’ his own cargo whilst extending credit to a third party, as this could cause legal complications. The implication would therefore seem to be that a once a merchant became sufficiently wealthy he would no longer rely on maritime loans, instead, he himself frequently became a source of credit for others.²⁰⁶

2.3.2 Evidence for Wealthy Merchants as Part of the Mercantile Community

As already discussed above, the hypothesis that wealthy men could themselves engage in the actual operation of trading ventures, rather than merely financing them, stands against previous approaches. Although most *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* can be identified as moderately affluent, a few of the 72 traders whose name and background are known seem to have commanded a considerable amount of wealth.²⁰⁷ Two such wealthy men are Phormion and Lampis. Phormion was the slave and subsequent freedman of the Athenian banker Pasion, and worked as a broker in Pasion’s bank. Just prior to Pasion’s death, Phormion leased the bank from him and was so successful that he was able to accrue a considerable fortune. Phormion therefore became one of the richest men in Athens and is recorded by Demosthenes as owning several ships.²⁰⁸ Although the standard view is that Phormion was in possession of an

²⁰⁴ For analysis of the profitability of these modest loans see Chapter Five section 5.2.

²⁰⁵ Dem. 56.50.

²⁰⁶ For a discussion of the frequency of maritime borrowing see Chapter Five section 5.1.

²⁰⁷ The 72 known merchants have been collected by Reed in both his Ph.D. thesis and his recent book, see Reed (1980); Reed (2003).

²⁰⁸ Dem. 35.64.

indeterminable number of vessels, Erxleben argues that instead of owning these vessels, Phormion merely gave bottomry loans on the security of them.²⁰⁹ However, the implication of Demosthenes' statement is clear. Although other passages, such as Dem. 49.31, record that Phormion was a money lender, in this instance Demosthenes is undoubtedly referring to ownership. Furthermore, the possibility of a single individual owning (or controlling) a large number of merchant vessels and their cargo was not inconceivable to the Athenians.²¹⁰ Phormion's wealth is also highlighted by his involvement in maritime finance as he is able to offer a number of substantial loans to a variety of clients.²¹¹ The other wealthy merchant is Lampis (not the slave of Dion) who is a shadowy figure and hard to identify. Both Demosthenes and Plutarch record that Lampis owned the largest number of ships in Greece but little more is known about him.²¹²

Another wealthy merchant is Diodotus who is recorded in two of Lysias' speeches.²¹³ Within these orations it is stated that Diodotus' affluence was great enough that he was able to spend 5,000 drachmae on the erection of a lavish funeral monument. Lysias also relates the story of a merchant who sailed the Adriatic with a cargo of mixed merchandise having an estimated value of two talents. When the merchant came to sell these goods, he sold them for such a high price that he was able to gain a 100% profit margin. These passages illustrate how a successful merchant could have a considerable amount of wealth at his disposal.²¹⁴ Included within this wealth bracket of the mercantile community are also those merchants who, although

²⁰⁹ Erxleben (1974) 491-2

²¹⁰ The later writer Athenaeus, for instance, records an imaginary example in his work on fine dining. Ath. 12.554e.

²¹¹ Dem. 45.54; 72; see also Dem. 36.55-57. Davies (1971) 435-6; Cohen (1992) 44. n.16; 145; Reed (2003) 113-114.

²¹² Dem. 23.211; Plut. *Mor.* 787A. Lampis' wealth was so well known in antiquity that his affluence is recorded by the later writers Cicero and Stobaeus (Cic. *Tusc.* 5.40; Stob. 29.87).

²¹³ Lys. 21; 32.8.

²¹⁴ Herodotus 4.152-53, records two examples of merchants who made exceptional amounts of wealth, the first is a group of Samian merchants who made a sizeable profit when they were accidentally blown off course and forced to beach at Tartessus. Although the original value of their cargo is unknown the profit is recorded as being 60 talents, a figure Herodotus claims is attested by their exceptional dedication in the temple of Hera. Although these merchants are recorded as being extremely wealthy, their affluence was allegedly dwarfed by that of Sostratus of Aegina, son of Laodamas, who according to Herodotus was the most successful merchant known at that time. The discovery in Gravisca of an anchor dedicated to 'Aiginetan Apollo' and inscribed with the name Sostratus provides compelling evidence for the existence of this wealthy merchant; as does the identification of pots stamped with the graffiti mark SO, although the link here is less certain. Cornell (1995) 111; Boardman (1999) 206.

not as exceptionally affluent as Diodotus, were of sufficient means that they could extend high value loans to other traders (e.g. loans of over 3,000 drachmae).²¹⁵ There is also evidence for a number of wealthy merchants who decided to quit their involvement in commercial ventures in order to concentrate their efforts more seriously on money lending. These merchants, having made their fortunes through inter-regional exchange, then retired to live a more leisured lifestyle. Therefore, men such as Nicobulus and Parmenon, could state “*for a long time I occupied myself with sea trade and went through many dangers. It is not quite seven years since I ceased navigating and as I have made a modest capital I try to make it productive by lending the money out for sea commerce*”.²¹⁶

The importation of wheat is one area of exchange that seems to have attracted the attentions of highly affluent men. In the orations of Demosthenes and Dinarchus we find that wheat is implicitly marked off from barley as a sign of the conspicuous wealth of the seller (and presumably also of the buyer).²¹⁷ Demosthenes presents Philocrates as using wheat, not only for his own consumption, but also for enrichment by becoming a wheat-dealer.²¹⁸ The wheat trade is depicted as a lucrative business alongside timber-importing and large-scale absentee land-owning and farming in countries conquered by Philip.²¹⁹ The portrayal of men such as Demosthenes, Aeschines and Philocrates as intimately familiar with the working of the inter-regional wheat trade begins to undermine the idea that there was a wide gulf between the elite Athenian politicians and overseas commerce. Andocides, an immensely powerful and influential citizen, describes in detail his activities whilst operating as both an *emporos* and *nauklēros*. For instance, he reports how he used his privileges with King Archelaus of Macedon to sell oars at cost price to the Athenian navy, and then details the quantities of grain and bronze he brought to Athens, asserting the significant role this bronze played in the subsequent victory over the Peloponnesians

²¹⁵ See section 2.3.6 for a more detailed examination of non-professional moneylenders. For discussions concerning the value of loans extended during the fourth century see Davies (1981) 63 and Amemiya (2007) 102.

²¹⁶ Dem. 33.4; 37.54.

²¹⁷ Moreno (2007) 220.

²¹⁸ Dem. 19.114.

²¹⁹ Dem. 19.114; 145, see also 18.41. For further details on the commodities being traded and their importance to the Athenian economy see Chapter Four.

at Cyzicus.²²⁰ Moreno points to the similarity of negative rhetoric deployed against politicians and grain dealers as further evidence for the involvement of wealthy men in inter-regional exchange.²²¹ So why do Athenian politicians and wealthy citizens downplay their involvement in this type of trade? We can reasonably deduce from the case of Andocides the considerable dangers an Athenian politician could incur by having a direct involvement in the grain trade. Any claim to influence over such a vital aspect of the Athenian economy would be seen as an open assertion of power, wealth and overseas connections, which the average assembly member would likely resent as undemocratic.²²²

Further compelling evidence that suggests wealthy and powerful Athenians involved themselves in trade during the fourth century can be found in two speeches of Demosthenes, *Against Meidas* and *Against Timotheus*. In both these orations it is suggested that wealthy Athenians could involve themselves in trade whilst serving as *trierarchs*, generals or ambassadors (see also Chapter Six section 6.2). In the case against Meidias, the defendant's friendship with Plutarchus, the tyrant of Eretria, seems to have helped him establish a flourishing import operation. Although Demosthenes suggests that the vine-props, cattle, framed doors and timber were for Meidias' personal consumption, it was not, as will be demonstrated below, unheard of for men performing liturgies to import items for profit. The case against Timotheus illustrates how wealthy Athenians through the use of agents and commercial operatives, could still engage in trade even whilst undertaking public services. What is interesting about this case is that Timotheus, it is alleged, authorises his agent to borrow 1750 dr. on his behalf, a situation that Apollodorus treats as a commonplace. This tacit acceptance of agency suggests that wealthy men could involve themselves in trade far more frequently than has previously been credited, often without leaving

²²⁰ And. 1.134; 145; 2.12.

²²¹ Moreno (2007) 222.

²²² Interestingly, the impostor who claims to have wealth in Theophrastus' *Characters* 23.3-4, is recognised as such because he acts in manner that distinguishes him from the true elite. By boasting of the enormous amounts he has spent on relieving famine, and on fulfilling trierarchies and other liturgies he convinces only foreigners and ignorant people of his wealth. Although the deeds he speaks of are reflective of those undertaken by the elite, no self-respecting man of affluence would boast of his trading exploits or the money he lends out in bottomry loans.

any record of their transactions.²²³

As suggested previously, Timotheus was able to argue plausibly before an Athenian jury that Philondas shipped timber for the purpose of trade precisely because the dividing line between the gift/privilege-freights of Athenian politicians, conveyed by their agents, and the merchandise-freights of ‘real’ traders, working for individual profit, was difficult for jurors to see.²²⁴ The inability of a jury to distinguish easily between goods being transported as ‘gifts’ and those for the sake of commerce demonstrates an expectation that the wealthy could involve themselves in both. It was therefore not sufficient for a defendant to prove he was wealthy and then expect the jury to accept he was moving gifts. Instead, the wealthy defendant is forced to prove the eventual purpose to which the commodities would be put (as in the case of Meidias), thus demonstrating recognition that wealthy men would involve themselves with inter-regional exchange.

2.3.3 Slaves as Part of the Mercantile Community

The cross-section of social and economic groups encompassed by the mercantile community can even be seen to extend as far as slaves. As previously shown (see section 1.2.3a), we have two clear examples of merchant vessels being crewed solely by slaves. The first example is recorded in Demosthenes 33.8 who reports that Apaturius sold his merchant vessel and all the gear that went with it, in order to pay off his debts. This equipment is listed as including a full crew of slaves. The second example is in Demosthenes 34 and reveals that a ship owned by Dion was crewed exclusively by slaves, in charge of which, was a trusted overseer, Lampis, himself a slave. Despite the crew in these two examples not being free men, whilst they were undertaking commercial ventures they were designated according to the task they had been allotted: Lampis is therefore designated as a *nauklēros* even

²²³ Timotheus borrows 4,488 dr., 2 obols, without leaving any written record of the transaction beyond some dated annotations in Pasion’s ledger. Dem. 49.6-8. See Moreno (2007) 282 n. 349 for a detailed breakdown of Timotheus’ borrowing from Pasion.

²²⁴ Moreno (2007) 283.

though he is a slave.²²⁶ Having already demonstrated that the term *nauklēros* can be understood as commercial agent or haulier, it is now worth showing how agency facilitated the inclusion of slaves within the mercantile community.

From as early as the 420s conservative sources complain of the presence in Athens of numerous slaves who appear to be acting independently and who were indistinguishable from other social classes. This blurring of the social status of slaves is a complaint raised by both Plato and Pseudo-Xenophon, who claim it is no longer possible to distinguish easily slaves from free men.²²⁷ Pseudo-Xenophon for instance, bemoans the fact that slaves in Athens were so well dressed that they were indistinguishable in appearance and clothing from full-citizens. Consequently the slaves wandering the streets of Athens were no longer clearly identifiable and could not be treated in a manner appropriate for their status. Plato echoes this sentiment suggesting that in a democracy such as Athens slaves had similar liberty to their owners, even slaves who were not necessarily *choris oichountes*, and he felt that this undermined traditional social distinctions and boundaries. Although the sentiments expressed by Plato and Pseudo-Xenophon cannot solely be considered a reaction to the existence of slaves who were financially autonomous, especially as the majority of slaves found in the streets of Athens would have been those undertaking short errands on behalf of their master, the existence of slave businessmen certainly emphasised their point. It is possible to demonstrate that in fourth century Athens some slaves were able to operate as trusted agents or managers for bankers and for moderately wealthy and wealthy *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*. If one accepts Fisher's argument then words such as *andrapoda misthophorounta* and their variants seem to indicate categories of relatively independent slaves. He has argued that these designations could be applied to both slaves who were hired out to another for a daily *misthos* paid to a master, and to those who lived and worked independently, operating businesses and paying a fixed amount as a return to their owner.²²⁸ Confusion about the social status of slave businessmen is compounded by the independence they could have whilst undertaking commercial transactions. However, despite the inference that slave businessmen had considerable freedom of operation, many of the probable slaves mentioned in the law court speeches (who appear to be exercising independent agency in banking or inter-regional exchange) are designated in a manner which leaves their exact status, slave or free, unclear. Therefore the subsequent sections will investigate the extent to which slaves could function independently in commercial operations, in particular maritime financing and inter-regional commerce, exploring the Athenians' use of agency as a way of overcoming any unforeseen legal disputes.

²²⁶ Dem. 34.6; 34.9.

²²⁷ Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.10-12, *Plt. Rep.* 563^b.

²²⁸ Fisher (2005). Perotti (1976) 47-56.

The participation of slaves in commerce as independent bankers, lessees, managers, *nauklēroi* or *emporoi*, is wholly dependent on the legal recognition that these men could enter into contractual agreements with some equality. Cohen correctly identifies that a bank or business' interests would be endangered if a slave operator could be easily intimidated due to his status by 'free' or 'citizen' consumers.²²⁸ For example, there were occasions when slave bankers had reason to question the demands of highly connected metics or citizens, as in the case of Heracleotes, challenged by Phormion, in Demosthenes 52.5-6. It is clear that a slave working in a bank owned by another as a chief cashier could exercise considerable financial power and arrange substantial loans and other deals. An example of this dating to the early fourth century is Kittos, Pasion's chief cashier, who appears in the 390s arranging substantial loans. Kittos is recorded as being in the position to advance 36,000 dr. to his customers.²²⁹ What is interesting is that he is evidently still treated as a slave since the proposition that he should give evidence under torture was actively canvassed.²³⁰ However, it is uncertain whether slaves could manage businesses completely in their own right, taking all current financial decisions on loans and investments. Two examples from Pasion's bank offer conflicting views. The date of Phormion's manumission by Pasion is never recorded and thus it is unclear whether he had already been manumitted when he acted as 'friend and business partner' whilst arranging a loan for the citizen Timosthenes.²³¹ Davies argues that in order to be acting in such a manner Phormion must have been freed, whilst Cohen believes he was still a slave.²³² The second case is that of the leasing in 362 by Pasion's sons, Apollodorus and Pasikles, of the bank to four men: Xenon, Euphraios, Euphron and

²²⁸ Cohen (1992) 93. This appears to be a sentiment expressed by the author of the Pseudo-Xenophontic *Constitution of the Athenians* 1.10-11, who noted the elevated social position of slaves was the result of their entry into commercial operations. "If anyone is also startled by the fact that they let the slaves live luxuriously there and some of them sumptuously, it would be clear that even this they do for a reason. For where there is a naval power, it is necessary from financial considerations to be slaves to the slaves in order to take a portion of their earnings, and it is then necessary to let them go free. And where there are rich slaves, it is no longer profitable in such a place for my slave to fear you. In Sparta my slave would fear you; but if your slave fears me, there will be the chance that he will give over his money so as not to have to worry anymore."

²²⁹ Isoc. 17.4.

²³⁰ Isoc. 17.51.

²³¹ Ps. Dem. 49.31.

²³² Davies (1971) 431-32; Cohen (2000) 134-5.

Kallistratos.²³³ The lease was to last ten years; at the end of this time, the contract stated the men were to be ‘set free’. One way of interpreting this, and perhaps the easiest, is ‘set free’ in the sense of being manumitted (Cohen, 2000, 134), but the alternative meaning ‘released them’, i.e. set them free from all claims (Davies 1971, 432-3) cannot totally be dismissed. As Fisher states “*These two instances from Pasion’s bank have produced an irresolvable debate*”.²³⁴

Similar issues are raised with regard to the world of inter-regional exchange. The most problematic case is that of Lampis. Reed considers Lampis as ‘puzzling’ and asks “*Given a commercial world in which there is no surviving evidence for an explicit law of agency, how can a slave be held accountable by his owner for captaining a ship, for lending and for shipping goods that he himself has bought?*”²³⁵ Having already demonstrated that the use of agency was actually common in both the worlds of banking and inter-regional commerce it is possible to interpret Lampis as a slave operating as an agent for his master. Two passages seem to suggest that Demosthenes’ client Chrysippus wished to make clear to the jury that Lampis was a slave. In section 34.5. Lampis is described as the ‘domestic’ (*oiketēs*) of Dion, whilst in the shipwreck (which he is alleged to have helped engineer) ‘he was saved with the other ‘boys’ (*paidēs* =slaves) belonging to Dion. Fisher points out that the term *oiketēs* most commonly (but not invariably) refers to a slave; whilst *paidēs*, in the context of the shipwreck, must mean slaves rather than sons. Although the two passages intend to make the point that Lampis is a slave, Chrysippus nowhere labors the point. It seems that suggesting that Lampis was Dion’s slave was helpful but not crucial to the case. Part of the reason for this must be that the case was held in the commercial courts (*dikai emporikai*).²³⁶ These courts disregarded the status-

²³³ Dem. 36.10-14.

²³⁴ Fisher (2005).

²³⁵ Reed (2003) 105. See also, Partsch (1909) 136; Lipsius (1905-15) 797 n. 28; Jones (1956) 141 n.3.; Paoli (1930) 107.

²³⁶ Another reason why the jury may not have found it strange, or particularly unusual, that Lampis has been given a position of great responsibility is because there was a parallel use of slaves as agents or overseers in the mining industry, in particular by Nicias in his silver mines. Xenophon records that Nicias son of Niceratus needed an honest slave whom he could entrust with the daily running of his silver mines. Once he had found a slave who embodied the virtues he required, he was willing to pay one talent for his purchase, an exceptional amount of money for a slave. This slave, because of his honest nature, went on to become a trusted friend of Nicias and it was the value of this friendship that Socrates promotes to Antisthenes (*Xen Mem.* 2.5.2).

distinctions observed in other branches of the Athenian legal system, as slaves, freedmen, foreigners and citizens gave evidence in the same way.²³⁷

2.3.4 Moneylanders as Part of the Mercantile Community

Before drawing some overall conclusions with regard to the composition of the mercantile community, it is worth undertaking a brief digression to explore the origins of maritime credit and to demonstrate that a considerable number of moderately affluent and wealthy merchants used their surplus money to offer maritime loans. Whereas a number of previous studies have tended to see moneylenders and merchants as two distinct social or occupational groups, others have recognised that the division is not necessarily clear.²³⁸ Millett, for example, posited that “*The only indisputable example of a citizen without trading interests lending in maritime loans is Demosthenes’ father; all other citizen lenders were either actively involved in trade, or were professional lenders. Given the high risk of maritime loans, this is understandable. The indication is that the complexity of maritime credit made it an unsuitable field for casual lenders without experience in trading*”.²³⁹ As already suggested, maritime moneylenders can be seen as an integral part of the mercantile community, so immersed in the world of commerce that they shared many of the same interests as their clients.²⁴⁰ As will be demonstrated in Chapter Five section 5.2, the maritime credit arrangement was a complex process that demanded the collection of detailed information if the lender was to extend credit profitably. Maritime lending therefore became a specialised form of finance that was distinct from all other types of financial operations, and consequently these loans were extended by a small group of specialist ‘maritime lenders’.

What prior studies have tended to overlook in their analysis of maritime

²³⁷ For evidence showing that the torture of slave witnesses did not occur in the commercial courts see Dem. 34.28 and 31. See also Harrison (1968) 175-76; Chapter Six section 6.4.

²³⁸ Those who saw money lenders and inter-regional traders as two distinct groups include Hasebroek (1933) 43; Finley (1973) 56; Erxleben (1974) 482; Humphreys (1977) 150; Van Effenterre (1979) 19 n.1. Other scholars have argued, to differing degrees, that there was less of a distinction between merchants and moneylenders these include: Knorringa (1926) 91; Hansen (1975) 70-75;

²³⁹ Millett (1983) 44.

²⁴⁰ The close relationship between bankers and money-lenders, and merchants is recognised by Demosthenes when he appears to consciously group the occupations together. (Dem 36.44)

lenders is the previous occupation of the men offering the loans.²⁴¹ As will be shown, many of the men whom we can identify as offering maritime loans had been, or in a number of cases still were, involved in inter-regional exchange themselves. The following sections will demonstrate that the group of men who operated as maritime financiers can be sub-divided into two categories: moneylenders who undertook lending at a professional level; and men who were part-time or non-professional lenders. When the term 'professional' is used, it presupposes that the lender has made a number of loans, lends out a considerable amount of capital, uses the interest from these loans as his primary form of income and is immersed within the community to which he is lending. Non-professional lenders are, in contrast, men who have only extended a small number of loans, only have a small amount of capital to invest, have another occupation that is their primary form of income, but are nevertheless, like the professional lender, socially and occupationally linked to the group to whom they are lending. In order to tease out the differences between these types of lender, the two will be discussed separately, beginning with an examination of the large-scale professional lender.

2.3.5 Large-Scale Professional Maritime Lenders

The sources refer to a number of examples of what have been termed large-scale lenders, and they can be identified as coming from a diverse range of backgrounds and as having a variety of ethnic origins. Yet, what is common to all (bar one) of these lenders is their current or previous involvement in inter-regional commerce.²⁴² Perhaps the most famous large-scale maritime lenders were Pasion and his successor Phormion who, despite making vast amounts of money through their various financial ventures, still participated in inter-regional commerce as a way of

²⁴¹ The exception is Millett (1983) 52, who recognised that non-professional lenders were frequently either currently or previously engaged in trade. However, he did not extend this conclusion to professional maritime lenders, since he believed these men to be skilled in fashioning loans and therefore able to successfully offer maritime credit without having direct experience of inter-regional exchange.

²⁴² The exception is Demosthenes' father whose estate at the time of his death had 7,000 dr. lent out in maritime loans with Xuthus. However, Bogaert (1965) 141-146, has persuasively argued that Xuthus was a middleman who looked after Demosthenes' father's maritime interests. Thus, I would suggest that it is likely that Xuthus was employed because of his experience of maritime exchange.

supplementing their income.²⁴³ It is widely thought that Pasion was the wealthiest banker and manufacturer of his time. He was originally a slave of a banking corporation in the Piraeus, but gained manumission and acquired the lease to the bank. He was later made a citizen as reward for the vast sums of money he donated to the polis.²⁴⁴ When he died (c.370/369), he left 20 talents worth of real estate and almost 40 talents worth of money on loan to friends and clients of his bank (Dem. 27.11). His successor at the bank, Phormion, was a freedman who had previously been employed by Pasion. Phormion is referred to by Demosthenes as continuing to organise commercial ventures even while operating as a banker (Dem. 45.64).

An illustrative example of a retired inter-regional merchant switching occupation in order to become a professional maritime moneylender is the unnamed defendant in Demosthenes' speech, *Against Apaturius*. In this oration, the unnamed defendant explicitly states that before becoming a moneylender he had spent many years engaged in inter-regional commerce (Dem. 34.4). Having grown tired of constantly risking his life in pursuit of profit he decided to invest his modest capital in offering maritime loans. He justifies this decision by stating that:

"διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀφίχθαι πολλαχόσε καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι μοι τὰς διατριβὰς περὶ τὸ ἐμπόριον γνωρίμωσ ἔχω τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν πλεόντων τὴν θάλατταν· τούτοις δὲ τοῖς ἐκ Βυζαντίου καὶ πάνυ οἰκείωσ χρῶμαι διὰ τὸ ἐνδιατρίψαι αὐτόθι."

*"As I have visited many places and spent my time in exchange, I know most of those who are seafarers, and with these men from Byzantium I am on intimate terms through having myself spent much time there."*²⁴⁵

The defendant suggests that his experiences as an inter-regional merchant gave him a specialist knowledge of both the regions being traversed and the men who applied for credit. Furthermore, on a simplistic level, by residing and working in the

²⁴³ Phormion, Dem. 45.64; 49.31; Pasion, Dem. 27.8-11.

²⁴⁴ Dem. 46.13. See also Dem. 36.6; 47.

²⁴⁵ Dem. 34.5.

Piraeus, the defendant was living amongst, sharing amenities with and socialising alongside the merchants to whom he extended credit. This again helped moneylenders, such as the defendant, gain a large quantity of specialised information about their clients' business ventures. This knowledge would be vital to maritime moneylenders hoping to extend credit successfully.

Other illustrative examples of retired merchants becoming moneylenders include Chrysippus, who gives us a brief description of his life in Demosthenes' speech, *Against Phormio*. In this speech we are told that Chrysippus and his partner had both been merchants and money-lenders in the *emporion* for many years and had made a number of loans without any recourse to the law (Dem. 33.4). Similarly, the maritime lender Dareius opens his speech *Against Dionysodorus* by stating that he and his friends, who were also engaged in trade, lent considerable amounts of money to other merchants in order to make a profit. It is possible to include within this group Diodotus, who appears in Lysias' speech, *Against Diogeiton* (Lys. 32.6). Diodotus is recorded as investing a huge proportion of his fortune in commercial ventures. When Diodotus died his estate was found to be at least 15 talents, of which nearly half (7 talents and 40 minae) was lent out in maritime loans. This was a considerable amount, clearly marking him out as a professional lender. Another large-scale lender who is suggested to have extended maritime loans is Nicobulus in Demosthenes' speech, *Against Pantaenetus*. The unusual aspect of this case is that Nicobulus tries to persuade the jury that he is not actually a professional lender; instead, he portrays himself as a concerned friend who only lends money to close acquaintances if they are in financial trouble. Despite his vigorous pleas, Millett has persuasively argued that the finer points of the case dispel this idea.²⁴⁶ Although it is impossible to state with complete certainty that Nicobulus was a maritime financier, there are a number of facts that make this a plausible suggestion. For example, Nicobulus, having completed his loan agreement, set sail to Pontus on a trading voyage of his own, a fact that demonstrates he was already engaged in inter-regional commerce. Additionally, Nicobulus admits to having utilised maritime credit to fund some of his previous ventures; this would have provided him with an intimate knowledge of potential

²⁴⁶ Millett (1983) 50-51.

clients, again putting him in an ideal position to offer loans to other merchants (Dem. 37.53-54). These examples underline the fact that most professional, influential maritime lenders were from commercial backgrounds themselves, either having undertaken or still undertaking inter-regional trade. Furthermore these sources support the argument that maritime financiers were totally immersed within the world of commerce and can thus legitimately be considered as an important sub-group of the mercantile community.

2.3.6 Small-Scale Non-Professional Lenders

The other group of maritime lenders were those men who continued to undertake commercial ventures as their primary occupation, whilst offering loans of smaller amounts to their compatriots; these include men such as Apollodoros, Parmenon, Theodoros, Lampis, Androcles, Nausicrates and the borrowers in Demosthenes 56, *Against Dionysodoros*, who are accused by their creditors of gaining a maritime loan in order to offer it as credit to a third party.²⁴⁷ These examples of small-scale lenders highlight the impossibility of drawing a clear divide between those offering finance and those operating inter-regional exchange. All the men listed above, with the exception of Lampis, were men of moderate means who were not affluent enough to operate as professional moneylenders, but neither were they so poor that they had no surplus funds. This resulted in a group of men who simultaneously undertook both occupations. These men were primarily traders, but were simultaneously operating as maritime money-lenders, an inverse situation of the large-scale lenders. An investigation of non-professional lenders again highlights the close links between the occupations of maritime money-lender and inter-regional merchant.

Conclusion Three

The only indisputable example we have of a professional lender involving

²⁴⁷ **Apollodoros**, Dem. 36.20; **Parmenon**, Dem. 45.66; **Theodoros**, Dem. 34.6; **Androcles**, Dem. 35.6-9; **Nausicrates**, Dem. 35.1-2; 6.

himself in maritime finance without having any known previous link to the world of commerce is Demosthenes' father. Even then, it seems that Demosthenes' father utilised an agent experienced in inter-regional exchange to oversee his business. During the fourth century it is possible to identify the emergence of a specialist group of moneylenders, men who had experience, either previous or current, in inter-regional commerce. Given the high-risk nature of maritime lending and the complexities of financial contracts of this type, this situation is both understandable and logical. The blurring of two occupations, merchant and financier, is in general confined to the Athenian financial sphere; furthermore, because membership of the mercantile community was primarily defined by direct involvement in inter-regional exchange, maritime moneylenders and financiers should be seen as an important subgroup.

Overall Conclusions

An investigation of inter-regional merchants has revealed that there were a significant number of differences in many aspects of a merchant's life when compared with men in other occupations. As a consequence of this, merchants naturally gravitated towards others with a similar livelihood. These differences also served to make the position of *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* in Greek society unique, which in turn created bonds that in other occupations were either irrelevant or undesirable. These various links between inter-regional merchants make the use of the term 'mercantile community' relevant within this thesis. Moreover the use of the less restrictive term 'mercantile community' is preferable to 'mercantile class', as it does not carry with it any unwanted connotations. In contrast to previous investigations this study has revealed that in terms of ethnicity the mercantile community should be considered as varied in composition, including sizable numbers of citizens, metics and foreigners. However, owing to the nature of the evidence it is impossible to offer any specific percentages for each group, especially since the composition is likely to have fluctuated at various times. It is therefore sufficient to conclude that the Athenian mercantile community during the fourth century was not overly dominated by any one particular ethnic group. The range of wealth encompassed by members of the mercantile community is considerable. The largest attested economic group within the

mercantile community is that of the moderately affluent merchant who spent his life undertaking inter-regional exchange in order to obtain modest amounts of profit. However, it has been possible to demonstrate that highly affluent men, such as Diodotos, also involved themselves in inter-regional exchange. These wealthy men could either involve themselves in trade directly, as seems to be the case with the ex-merchants Nicobulos and Parmenon, or indirectly through the use of agents, an option favoured by Meidias and Timotheus. Furthermore, the cross-section of social and economic groups encompassed by the mercantile community can even be identified to extend to slaves. Evidence from Demosthenes 33 and 34, indicates that merchant vessels could be solely crewed by slaves operating on behalf of their master. Finally, it has been possible to argue that maritime financiers should be included as a sub-group of the mercantile community. With the frequency at which maritime loans were extended by current or ex-merchants it is possible to identify the emergence of a specialist group of money-lenders. Given the high-risk nature of maritime lending and the complexities of financial contracts of this type, this situation is both understandable and logical. With membership of the mercantile community being primarily defined by direct involvement in inter-regional exchange, maritime moneylenders and financiers should be seen as an important sub-group.

Chapter Three

Perceptions: An Examination of the Social Standing and Integration of the Mercantile Community

Introduction

This chapter seeks to explore the idea that there was a negative perception of the mercantile community held by the majority of Athenian society. It will therefore examine the representation of the mercantile community found in a variety of sources in order to determine if the opinions being expressed are those of the individual or a more widely held conviction. When attempting to identify the social status of the mercantile community, nearly all previous studies have turned primarily to the philosophical and legal corpora to formulate their answer.²⁴⁸ The higher survival rate for the forensic and philosophical works means they are attractive sources for classicists and thus they have been given disproportionate weight in studies of the ancient Greek economies, despite a number of drawbacks. Plato, for example, based his economic analysis primarily on philosophical ideas, rather than representing contemporary society. Similarly, the legal orations are problematic owing to the original intent of the composer. If, in a case brought against a merchant, the oration was a speech for the prosecution then the depiction was likely to be extremely negative, whereas if the speech was composed for the defence it would be overtly positive. Despite such limitations these sources have frequently been used to suggest there was a coherent view of inter-regional merchants in the classical period, a view that was generally negative and distrustful. Ross for instance suggests that the Athenians viewed trade as a degrading occupation for free men to undertake. He reached this conclusion, on the basis of his belief that Aristotle's views reflect the prejudice of ordinary Athenians against the occupation.²⁴⁹ Mulgan suggests that the

²⁴⁸ Hasebroek (1933) 22-43; Finley (1935) 320-336; Michell (1963) 231-2; Hopper (1979) 18-21; Vidal-Naquet (1980) 11-18; Balme (1984) 18-21; 140-52; McKechnie (1989) 178; Millett (1991) 191; Murray (1993) 235.

²⁴⁹ Ross (1949) 243.

philosophers' views on merchants were influenced by the aristocratic mistrust of wealth acquired through inter-regional exchange.²⁵⁰ Even Meikle, who has, in general, taken a more positive approach to the economic sophistication and mentality of the Greeks, accepts that the works of Plato and Aristotle are a reflection of a culture (or elite value system) that shunned inter-regional commerce and sought to marginalize it.²⁵¹ In view of the evidence presented in Chapter Two that wealthy citizens were more actively involved in inter-regional commerce than previously recognised, it is now no longer tenable to suggest that trade was universally despised by all sectors of Athenian society. The philosophers' work can in part be seen as a response to the economic instability that followed Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War.²⁵² Both Plato and Aristotle saw themselves as responding to a world in actual or incipient economic anarchy. Furthermore, each man's perception of the mercantile community was coloured by his personal views on other subjects, such as wealth and its acquisition, or the ethnic and occupational composition of the ideal society. The works of these men should therefore be understood in this light. Other sources, such as Xenophon, and the forensic speeches offer a more nuanced view of the mercantile community. Despite the obvious biases of the forensic speeches, they can be used to identify which actions of the mercantile community were considered by Athenian society as worthy of praise or scorn. Xenophon meanwhile, recognises the importance of inter-regional merchants to the Athenian economy and thus expresses great appreciation for their commercial services. Many of the praiseworthy deeds mentioned in these works are ones that, as will be shown in Chapter Five, are also recorded in the corpus of honorific inscriptions.

In order to gain a more accurate picture of the social integration and standing of the mercantile community these more positive or nuanced sources need to be balanced against the writings of the philosophers. This chapter therefore seeks to explore the idea that there was a negative perception of the mercantile community held by the majority of fourth century Athenian, not just among the elite groups such

²⁵⁰ Mulgan (1977) 49.

²⁵¹ Meikle (1995) 100-101.

²⁵² Spengler (1969) 450.

as the philosophers. It will discuss the representations of merchants found in the literary sources, including the philosophical works, forensic speeches, and histories. Moreover, in order to understand fully the opinions expressed by the cultural critics and moral philosophers it is prudent to investigate the wider ideology surrounding money, both its acquisition and expenditure. An investigation of this nature can also help explain why different occupations could be viewed in vastly different ways. Although there is a substantial amount of evidence to support many of the negative views or stereotypes presented by the philosophers, it is also possible to identify a number of sources that depict inter-regional merchants acting honourably or which detail their extraordinary services on behalf of the polis. This dual opinion of the mercantile community is demonstrated most clearly in the legal orations. In a number of these speeches, it is possible to demonstrate that the attitudes towards *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* vary considerably according to the personal opinion of the speaker, or because of the specific situation or merchant being described. Moreover, it will be suggested that some of the criticisms of inter-regional exchange can be attributed to other factors, such as the personal risks taken by merchants, rather than because of the occupation itself. The chapter will close by concluding that owing to my reinterpretation of the composition of the mercantile community and the inconsistency of the views being expressed by the ancient authors, it is no longer possible to justify the hypothesis that inter-regional merchants were always, or even mostly, seen in a negative light.

3.1. The Development of Economic Thought

Baeck²⁵³ suggests that the history of ideas demonstrates that changes in world-views and scientific paradigms are generally the work of a spiritual and intellectual elite who launch a new tradition of thought or who inspire the re-interpretation of an old one.²⁵⁴ This theory is important to my argument. If this process of tradition can be

²⁵³ Baeck is professor of Economics at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and has worked extensively on the development of economic thought and tradition in ancient societies. Baeck's research is highly regarded, especially his work constructing a model for the development of economic thought (Price (1997) 9-10).

²⁵⁴ Baeck defines a 'tradition' as a historical embodiment of the institutionalised communication of the elite, which over time becomes a reference point for later generations. This process goes through the

identified as going through its embryonic stage during the late-fifth and early-fourth centuries (as I will suggest below), then we can expect to identify the intellectual elite (such as the philosophers) forming theories or opinions concerning the place of both inter-regional trade and traders within Greek society. Crucially however, according to Baeck's theory these opinions should not necessarily be considered as representative of those held by other members of Greek society. Therefore, unlike most previous scholarship, I will suggest that the views expressed in the corpus of philosophical writings are not reflective of a general disparaging of inter-regional merchants but merely the start of a process that would ultimately lead to the development of economic rationality.

With Baeck's theory in mind it is both interesting and relevant that the fourth century Greek philosophers, social moralisers and legal speech writers can be identified as the first to write extensively on the problems of practical philosophy like ethics, politics, and economics. In the post-Socratic demarcation of disciplines, ethics was the study of an individual's behaviour and interaction with other individuals, politics was the discourse generated by the organising of the public sphere, whilst *oikonomia* referred to the material organisation of the household and of the estate, and

following stages: thematisation, textualisation, institutionalisation, and canonisation (or canonicity). **Thematisation** is the condensation of elite communication brought about by changes in the historical perspective as the result of a change in collective experience, technical improvement, scientific discoveries, social disruption, or external factors such as a geological disaster. **Textualisation** involves the recording of new ideas or theories in written form that future generations can cross-reference. **Institutionalisation**: in order for texts to become reference points for subsequent generations it is vital that they become adopted by specific institutions which then function as transmitters for the new theories. Particular theories will therefore become associated with particular schools thus leading to the next stage in the process, canonisation. **Canonisation** is the selective process of text-stabilisation and theme focusing. During this phase of the process, the original texts are understood in a number of different ways and from a number of new perspectives.

to supplementary discourses on the financial affairs of the polis.²⁵⁵ At this stage of Greek history, the discourse on the organisation of the *oikos* and the economic ordering of the polis was not conceived to be an independent analytical sphere of thought. However, fourth century scholars were the first to demonstrate a basic understanding of economic rationality through the creation of the concept of “*peri oikonomias*”.

Moreover, three major strands of economic thought were to develop in Athens during the fourth century. The first was centred on the aristocratic art of estate management, more specifically on the development of the natural economy²⁵⁶ with an emphasis on increasing efficiency and production in agriculture (a prime example of this type of literature is Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*). Secondly, there were treatises on politics, ethics, social justice, economic value, exchange relations, the intermediary function of money and discussions on the practice of usury (the main philosophical schools that debated some or all of these themes are the Socratics and the Cynics, and from outside of the fourth century the Epicureans and the Stoics). The third strand of economic thought consisted of the public debates and essays focusing on the public economy, financial administration and the distribution of human and physical resources (Isocrates, Demosthenes, Xenophon and Aristotle are the leading figures in this field of economic thought).

Economic theory and rationality first appear in the fourth century since it is at this time that Athens first provided the required social and political climate in which a basic form of commercial rationality could develop. In Athens, philosophy more directly affected social and political discourses, thus philosophical discussions functioned as directors of elite consciousness in a culture that embraced public and polemic debate. With the philosophers’ embracing of economic theory it was possible to develop the conceptual tools needed to engage in public discourse on economic matters. However, this process was in its embryonic stage and thus during the fourth

²⁵⁵ Baeck (1997) 146.

²⁵⁶ The natural economy should be understood in terms of the exchange of ‘natural’ resources such as foodstuffs and timber. The primary aim of this type of economic transaction was to obtain sufficient quantities of these items to meet survival needs.

century economic thought did not gain sufficient academic and moral standing to achieve an autonomous status. Therefore, the fundamentals of economic rationality were integrated into discussions of ethics and political theory. Although the Sophists were the first intellectuals to confer moral judgement on the efficient organisation of the *oikos* and polis, and on the economic agents engaged in business (mainly as a response to the development of a monetary economy), it is during the fourth century that textualisation, institutionalisation and canonisation was to occur.

3.1.1 Economic and Social Change Prior to the Fourth Century

In order to understand fully the economic theories presented by fourth century philosophers it is prudent to explore briefly the few archaic sources which contain discussions of economic matters. Although none of these works has inter-regional trade as its primary focus, the discussions of wealth and affluence undertaken by early social moralisers can be identified as influencing some later philosophers. For instance, although Aristotle was the first Greek writer to undertake a sustained examination of the role of wealth and its impact upon society, the foundations for many of his complaints about the eroding of social boundaries had been laid in previous centuries. Prior to the eighth century wealth had been the result of status, but during the eighth century the situation began to change and gradually status began to follow wealth, so much so that Hesiod could confidently state, “*Excellence (arête) and renown (kudos) attend upon wealth*”.²⁵⁷ The move from wealth following status, to status following wealth, was to have a significant impact on Greek society for two reasons, firstly, the possibility of making large quantities of money through inter-regional exchange threatened the traditional social hierarchies which were founded upon agrarian prosperity whilst, secondly, the availability of prestige goods through inter-regional trade enabled poorer men to purchase status symbols cheaply and thus blur social boundaries. Whereas prior to the eighth century Greece was a stratified society with wealth being determined in agricultural terms (for example heads of

²⁵⁷ Hes. *WD* 313. Burford (1993) 10; Tandy (2000) 106-110.

cattle or acres of land),²⁵⁸ subsequent to c.800 BC a significant increase in population

began to affect social processes.²⁵⁹ With the expansion of trade networks, wealth could now be obtained quickly; consequently, status began to follow affluence. The result was that for the first time the aristocratic social group was being punctured by men who, having made their wealth through exchange, then diversified into land holding.

3.1.2 Prestige Goods and the Blurring of Social Status

With affluence beginning to break down social barriers, the archaic period saw social statuses becoming further blurred by large-scale importation of luxury items.²⁶⁰ Foxhall argues that a change in consumption patterns in archaic Greece also resulted in the less affluent being able to situate themselves far closer to their social and

²⁵⁸ A stratified society is one in which members of the different social classes who are of the same sex and equivalent age, do not have the same access to the basic resources that sustain life. The three main distinguishing features of a stratified society are: the exclusion of at least one segment of society, the tendency of high-ranking individuals to socialise only with one another, and the elite ensuring that some form of economic advantage accompanied their status.

²⁵⁹ Snodgrass (1980) 35-41. Snodgrass's proposal of a significant population boom has been at the centre of a vibrant academic debate since its initial proposal in 1971. In particular Morris has challenged the model suggesting that although there was a restructuring of Greek society during the Archaic period (around 800 BC) this was the result of the collapse of a two-rank society (i.e. one divided between the upper class '*agathoi*' and the lower orders '*kakoi*'). Morris suggests that as the old 'class' system was replaced there was a resultant change in the burial practices of the common citizen. This change resulted in the internments of *kakoi* becoming more common and it is this alteration in funerary practices, and not an increase in population that he suggests explains the increase in burials during the eighth century (Morris (1992) 26-30; (2000) 90-100). Other scholars, most notably Tandy and Donlan have begun to bring about a synthesis between the two views, arguing that there was a true 'dark age' between 1100 and 800 BC which led to the heroic age in the eighth century similar to the one proposed by Morris and Finley. However, both men recognise the merits of Snodgrass's model for a sizable population increase. Finley (1971); Tandy (1997); Donlan (1997).

²⁶⁰ The most recent socio-economic approaches to archaic exchange by Humphreys (1977), Morris (1986^a) and Von Reden (1994) have all taken the term 'exchange' as their key focus. The models put forward in these studies present inter-regional trade as just one form of exchange, whilst other modes of redistribution, such as gift giving, piracy and border raiding, are seen as more prominent or socially important. Wilson (1997-98) 29-30, although accepting that trade was just one aspect of the inter-regional redistribution network, suggests that the fundamental problem with these socio-economic studies is their central focus on the term 'exchange'. Although he agrees that, in economic terms, the activities are barely distinguishable as they all facilitate the movement of goods from one region to another, ideologically the distinction is much clearer. It is on these ideological differences that Wilson bases his argument that professional exchange was far more important than has previously been given credit. He even goes as far as to suggest that commerce and politics were linked, with each directly influencing the development of the other. Wilson's theory is persuasive and fits with the archaeological evidence.

economic superiors than had been previously possible.²⁶¹ Whereas prior to this luxury foreign items had only been available to the elite on account of their friendship ties with wealthy men from other regions, trade now made these status commodities available to the whole spectrum of Greek society. Foxhall further suggests that this expansion of trade networks and increased availability of expensive foreign commodities, which had previously been considered as luxurious, irreversibly changed the nature and patterns of Greek consumption.²⁶² She proposes that, although they were not able to make themselves identical to the elite, the socially inferior could now mimic the aristocracy through the consumption of the same commodities. However, she also argues that the elite were able to maintain their social position through the manner and scale of their consumption.

Traders were in a doubly beneficial position to exploit the emerging ideology that the consumption of luxury commodities could be used to gauge affluence and social standing. Firstly, they could achieve considerable wealth by importing luxury items, whilst secondly they had access to them at a greatly reduced cost and could therefore consume them in greater quantities than other social groups. The result of an increasing number of men making their wealth through inter-regional exchange was that, by the classical period, elite status could now be achieved solely due to acquired wealth. Wealthy merchants who made their fortune through trade were therefore assailing the social status of the elite. Existing aristocrats saw these social climbers as undermining pre-existing value systems. Therefore, when Hesiod claims in line 313 that “*Excellence (arete) and renown (kudos) attend wealth*” he is documenting a change in traditional social hierarchies, a change which caused social tension. Moreover, in the mid-sixth century Theognis of Megara records that the move from the traditional social hierarchy under which wealth followed status, was now so far advanced that he could confidently state that status followed wealth. In the corpus of poetry attributed to Theognis it is possible to identify him creating a conceptual link between virtue and birth, with wealth considered as an undesirable disturbance to the social order. For example, Murray has interpreted the poet’s use of words such as

²⁶¹ Foxhall (1998) 305-6.

²⁶² Foxhall (1998) 306-7.

‘good’ and ‘bad’ as having the same connotations as the English terms ‘noble’ and ‘base’, i.e. they encompass both social and moral concepts.²⁶³ “*Wealth (ploutos), men do not honour you without reason, for you put up with their evils so easily; it would be right if only the good had wealth, and poverty were the companion of bad men*”.²⁶⁴ The result was the corruption of the aristocracy as the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ men intermarried:

*“We seek well-born goats or asses or horses, Kyrnos, and want them to come from good stock; but a good man does not hesitate to marry a bad women from a bad father, provide he gives much money, nor is a women ashamed to be the wife of a bad man if he is rich preferring wealth to birth. They honour money, and good marries bad, and bad good: wealth has mixed the race.”*²⁶⁵

Wealth was seen to blur social boundaries and as the elite tried to distinguish themselves through their patterns of consumption, some were unable to keep up with the lavish spending and became impoverished.²⁶⁶ Theognis was therefore able to claim that many bad (or undeserving) men were becoming rich whilst conversely many good (or deserving) men were becoming poor.²⁶⁷

Conclusion One

The expansion of trade networks during the sixth century, and the associated influx of wealth, meant that it became harder to link affluence with virtue. Consequently, archaic writers began to criticise inter-regional commerce since it undermined social hierarchies. With the elite now being penetrated by men

²⁶³ Murray (1993) 220.

²⁶⁴ Thgn. 523-6. This is a sentiment also expressed by Sappho who, although claiming gold (i.e. wealth) was a child of Zeus, warns that it is a danger to society if consumed without *arete*. Sappho frag. 148.

²⁶⁵ Thgn. 183-90.

²⁶⁶ Foxhall; (1998) 295-309.

²⁶⁷ Thgn. 53-69; 1197-1202. The sea and sailing provided a rich source of imagery for Theognis who encompassed both the personal circumstances of an intoxicated individual and the reeling of a city where good order is threatened by private interest, in his metaphor of men who have goods onboard a vessel but who have thrown overboard the pilot and who are giving orders themselves (lines 675-80). It is therefore reasonable to suggest that Theognis saw the wealth generated through trade as being a considerable influencing factor in the shift of social and economic boundaries. Schefold (1997) 132.

considered by some as 'unworthy', traditional archaic Greek society was under threat and men such as Hesiod and Theognis represent the reaction to these developments. These poets, although being disparaging of inter-regional trade, were arguing against the new reality that status could follow wealth, rather than against merchants as a group

3.2 Athenian Economic Thought: The Fifth and Fourth Centuries

At the end of the fifth century men such as Socrates and Xenophon, brought economic considerations to the forefront of philosophical discussion. Unfortunately for modern scholars none of Socrates' own writings remain and thus we know Socratic philosophy almost exclusively from later authors such as Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle. Although Socrates' work is transmitted second-hand it is possible to identify that he considered it important that politicians had a working knowledge of economic considerations. He was such a keen proponent of this philosophy that he can be found warning away from political life a young man who, despite being keen to engage in politics, had no knowledge of state finances.²⁶⁸ Socrates was also the first to express, albeit in an obscure way, utility theory. Thus, in Plato's *Protagoras* 357B Socrates can be found pursuing hypothetically the consequences of the assumption that demand determines the volume of trade. In response to development and expansion of a monetary-economy, the Sophists broke away from traditional consensus and began to confer moral and social respectability on the efficient economic organisation of the *oikos* and polis, and on the agents engaged in commerce. During the fourth century well-known orators like Isocrates and Demosthenes and the historian Xenophon adopted this line of thought.²⁶⁹ Furthermore, the Socratic philosophers were to revive these moral and value judgements and incorporate them into their work. Schefold suggests, "*The historical significance of*

²⁶⁸ Xen. *Ap.* 3.11.9.

²⁶⁹ Isocrates was a proponent of interstate solidarity and an advocate of a pan-Hellenic confederation. His pragmatic views on politics and economics were based on his belief that synergy between states could be achieved if common sense was mixed with the plurality of public opinion, whilst being guided by professional expertise. His legal speech *Trapeziticus* explores in detail the structure and institutions of the Athenian economy, discussing how their ineffective management contributed to Athens' financial and monetary problems. Baeck (1997) 153.

organising Greek economic thought within philosophy by the Socratics cannot be contested” and it was after this thematisation by the Sophists that Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle began the next stage in the process of economic rationality, textualisation.

3.2.1 Xenophon’s Discussions of Economics, Inter-Regional Trade and Traders

Xenophon, a former disciple of Socrates, established a synthesis between honourable and virtuous behaviour (*kalokagathia*), and professional efficiency in public administration, military command and household management.²⁷⁰ His work the *Oikonomikos* explores the basic concepts and strategies of professional management. Xenophon proposed that if a desired target was to be achieved, it required the development of an optimum strategy so that all elements within a system worked together as a coherent and harmonious whole. These ideas were expanded in his pamphlet exploring the financial resources and management of the state. In the *Poroi* Xenophon expresses a great appreciation for both inter-regional trade and traders, even giving the impression that it was only possible for Athens to flourish during times of peace. His reasoning for this assessment was that it was only during times of prolonged cessation of hostilities that inter-regional exchange could operate unhindered.²⁷¹ Therefore, rather than suggesting the segregation of the mercantile community, a course of action later proposed by Plato, Xenophon would rather see the state embrace them. He therefore recommends that the Athenians should build more lodging houses in and around the harbour district to accommodate foreign visitors; additionally he suggests that land should be granted to especially honoured merchants in order that they settle in Athens and continue to offer their valuable services to the state.²⁷² The fundamental services that inter-regional merchants offered

²⁷⁰ Amemiya (2007) 117-119.

²⁷¹ Xen *Por.* 5.2-3.

²⁷² Xen. *Por.* 3.12. Interestingly, at least two of Xenophon’s suggestions, the institution of faster trials and the construction of lodging houses were enacted under the leadership of Euboulos. Gernet (1955)

to the state are further highlighted by his advice that *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* who continued to trade with Athens on favourable terms should be granted seats at the theatre and be dined at public expense in recognition of their contribution. What is especially interesting is that Xenophon does not argue for the creation of a completely new system of honours and rewards, but merely the expansion of one already in operation (as will be discussed in detail in chapter Five). Xenophon's admiration for the mercantile community and the services they provide is not confined to the *Poroi* and there are a number of other passages throughout his works that extol the favourable virtues of merchants. An example of this can be found in *Hiero* 4.7, where Xenophon records that Hiero of Syracuse considers harbours as being amongst the most desirable possession a ruler can control because they made it easier to provision the state, whilst simultaneously bringing an influx of wealth. In addition to this, Simonides suggests to Hiero that he should assemble a large number of *emporoi* if he desires to increase his overall revenue, but if he wants to be totally successful he would need to offer rewards to those men who undertook the greatest number of successful trade ventures. Simonides also theorises that a town adequately provided with harbours and markets will reflect honour and praise upon the ruler.²⁷³ Whereas Xenophon's handbook for household management was to become a popular resource for land owners and was even staple reading for Roman *latifundia*, his treatise on public finances was not so well received. As a result, Xenophon's work was to come under sustained criticism from the Socratic philosophers, in particular Plato.²⁷⁴

Conclusion Two

The fifth century saw economic thought and theorising come to the forefront of philosophical discussions. In response to the development and expansion of a monetary economy, the Sophists began to confer moral and social accountability on the efficient organisation of the polis and on economic agents. Moreover, Socrates'

173-200; Michell (1963) 350; Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977) 367 n.3; Whitehead (1977) 128, Garland (1987) 43.

²⁷³ Xen. *Hier.* 9.9; 11.2.

²⁷⁴ Baeck (1997) 153-154.

recognition that supply and demand were in some way linked paved the way for later moralists such as Plato and Aristotle to theorise that those men who demanded more for something than it was 'worth' were morally irresponsible.

3.2.2 Plato's Discussions of Economics, Inter-regional Trade and Traders

Plato was the antagonist of the Sophist school of economics and argued vehemently against the relativistic morals and technocratic and professional management theory advocated by the Sophists. This counter-movement particularly attacked the ideas and theories of Xenophon. Plato's first and most sustained attack on Xenophon came in the *Republic*, his model for the ideal or virtuous state. Plato's views concerning the utopian polis were particularly influenced by his theorising on metaphysics and his idea that the supreme good was knowledge, and that ethical norms, in particular justice, stemmed from pure reasoning (i.e. theoretical speculation).²⁷⁵ Although Plato is the most negative of the philosophical writers with regard to both the economy and trade, he nevertheless dedicated an entire chapter of the *Republic* to the genesis of the state with the main emphasis being on the economic and material needs of society.²⁷⁶ In this discussion Plato recognises that man, due to his material needs, is not self-sufficient and thus society is the response to the premise of mutual need (*hēmetera chreia*). Plato therefore theorised that during the early stages of development for a fledgling state, the citizens all co-operate out of necessity. This co-operation is based on the simple division of labour and reciprocity: as the state becomes more developed the citizens begin to exchange each other's surplus in the spirit of solidarity and neighbourly unity.²⁷⁷ It is at this point of development that Plato argues that vice enters the city. Glaucon's contribution to the discussion clearly highlights this point. Glaucon argues against the idea that the frugal state was the most desirable, instead suggesting that without large-scale production, local commerce, and the development of markets or entrepreneurs in long-distance and maritime trade, there would be no comfort, manufactured goods, or specialised

²⁷⁵ Schofield (1992) 186-193; Baeck (1997) 154-155.

²⁷⁶ Pl. *Resp.* 369b-371e.

²⁷⁷ Schofield (1992) 189.

services such as musicians, or doctors.²⁷⁸

Plato has Socrates argue against Glaucon's model, suggesting that this type of progression might lead a better quality of life but would also encourage a state in which the desire to acquire wealth becomes dominant. In such states the acquisition of wealth and cupidity become the driving force of society. This obsession with acquisition would result in the degeneration of moral values and ultimately leads to social disharmony. This is a theme Plato also discusses in the *Laws*. In this work he offers a damning criticism of the moral characteristics of inter-regional merchants and berates them for having a disruptive effect on the community. Trade, he states, "*fills the markets of the city with foreign merchandise and retail trading, and breeding in men's souls knavish and tricky ways, it renders the city faithless and loveless, not to itself only, but to the rest of the world as well.*"²⁷⁹ Furthermore, 'wants' generated by political means outstrip the community's economic capacity to satisfy such 'wants' and thus frequently result in the frustration of the citizenry's expectations. For instance, as an economy acquires surplus wealth the government is able to spend money increasing or renovating public amenities such as water supplies, temples, markets etc., however at a certain point these programmes begin to cost more than the excess revenue being generated. At such times a desire for increased revenue arises and those men with an entrepreneurial spirit are given free reign to amass wealth. Plato concludes that when the entrepreneurial spirit, stimulated by a desire for wealth, takes hold of citizens, traditional values and moral codes are destroyed.²⁸⁰ He therefore compares men motivated by profit, i.e. men who would charge more for something than it was worth, with men who steal or gain another's property through dishonest means.²⁸¹ The uneven growth of wealth, something that had already been noted by social moralisers in the archaic period, produced an ever-widening gap between the citizens and created particular tensions between poor and rich. In order to prevent stasis caused by wealth, Plato proposes that the state should monitor and

²⁷⁸ Pl. *Resp.* 372d. Glaucon goes as far as to suggest that a frugal state was, "*a state of pigs*".

²⁷⁹ Pl. *Leg.* 705a.

²⁸⁰ Spengler (1969) 451; Amemiya (2007) 125; 146-47. Plato also posits that if only good men undertook inter-regional trade and commerce then commercial occupations would soon become loved. Pl. *Leg.* 918e.

²⁸¹ Pl. *Resp.* 331c; 331e; 332a.

control profit-making ventures as much as possible (this was most easily achieved by appointing a philosopher as supreme ruler). Furthermore, in the ideal polis, people engaged in profitable businesses – the men he terms *chrematistai* – the traders, craftsmen, bankers and money changers, should be located in the lower echelon of society. These men, driven by desire and a profit-seeking mentality created a link with the feverish and luxurious state and thus needed close regulation. In order to avoid the spread of a profit-making mentality Plato recommends that there should be laws enacted which prevent the top 5040 families from participating in commercial ventures.²⁸² Additionally the land and houses, having been distributed among the 5,040 citizens, were to be monitored by the state in order to ensure that no-one purchased property in excess of four times the initial holding; if they did, then the excess would be claimed by the state. One again Plato's reasoning for this regulation was a concern with the distraction of wealth and profit making.²⁸³

For Plato agriculture was the only honourable or gainful occupation appropriate for all citizens. In the ideal state every citizen was to own and cultivate a plot of land just adequate in size to support himself and his family.²⁸⁴ Trade and handicrafts were to be carried out by the resident-alien population or slaves, whilst the importation of luxuries and exportation of necessities were prohibited, as were money-lending and all exchange involving credit.²⁸⁵ Possession of gold and silver by private individuals was also forbidden. Plato also proposes that all commercial transactions should be closely regulated.²⁸⁶ This stems from his belief that 'virtually all dealings between man must be regulated'. Furthermore, in Plato's ideal state goods were to be bought and sold at specified places and at only moderately profitable prices which should be fixed by the state.²⁸⁷ Strict penalties were in place to punish adulteration, the misrepresentation of goods or failure to pay a craftsman, whilst money-lending at interest was forbidden. In Plato's view trading, profit and

²⁸² Pl. *Leg.* 741d-742c.

²⁸³ Pl. *Leg.* 744-45; 754; 850.

²⁸⁴ Pl. *Leg.* 743b.

²⁸⁵ Pl. *Leg.* 736; 741; 743; 842; 846; 847; 849; 919-921.

²⁸⁶ Amemiya (2007) 145-7.

²⁸⁷ Pl. *Leg.* 922; 915-920.



abundance were fatal to a state which wished to attain “just and noble sentiments”.²⁸⁸ Interestingly, rewards and honours for public services have a very diminished role in Plato’s ideal state, with public expenditure being a very small honour, constituting the reward of the citizen soldier (although Plato did recognise that some foreign and domestic services for the state could be costly).²⁸⁹ Plato therefore counted upon the advantages of citizenship to animate most men to do their best, especially given the punishments for infraction of the law.²⁹⁰ This stands in stark contrast to the situation in Athens at the time Plato was writing. As will be shown in Chapter Five the system of honours and rewards for public services was being expanded to include men, both citizen and foreign, who undertook commercial services. It is perhaps as a reaction to this diluting of citizen privilege that Plato is responding when he diminishes the importance of the public honours system within the ideal state.

Inter-regional merchants were further criticised by Plato, as he believed their loyalty to the polis was tainted or diminished through their interaction with foreigners (or alternatively they were foreigners themselves).²⁹¹ Although in Chapter Two the notion that the Athenians were content to leave inter-regional exchange in the hands of foreigners has been dispelled, in Greek philosophical thought there was a conceptual link between trade and ‘foreignness’. Plato used this association to theorise that merchants were corrupted by foreign social values and ideals. In turn these men distorted the value system of the polis by disseminating alien ideals and traditions. He also proposed that if foreign merchants were required to visit the polis

²⁸⁸ Spengler (1969) 454-453; Schofield (1992) 193-195. Baeck (1997) 154-155. Plato may have reached this conclusion due to the experiences of his friend the Pythagorean philosopher Archytas. When Archytas rose to power in Tarentum, a conflict broke out between the “commercial” classes of traders, craftsmen and fishermen, whose activities formed the main source of Tarentum’s wealth, and who were strongly democratic in outlook, and the landed aristocracy, whose wealth was derived from agriculture. Archytas, having been trained in Pythagorean thought and reasoning, undertook a series of reforms, such as granting the use of land to the poor. Through skilful political manoeuvring he managed to defend a democratic society against the aristocracy, by proving that in his democracy, offices and social status would go to those who deserved them on the strength of their services to the community.

²⁸⁹ *Pl. Leg.* 921-922; 742; 804; 813; 950-951.

²⁹⁰ Since the state derived no revenue from public land, mines, and tribute or from taxes on trade or metics, it had to depend heavily on fines to meet its financial needs. *Pl. Leg.* 735-736; 741-744; 777; 860-874; 914-915.

²⁹¹ Plato compares inter-regional merchants with migratory birds who fly long distances and have no ties to any particular region. *Pl. Leg.* 952b.

their stay should be as brief as possible in order to limit their corrupting influence.²⁹² Although Plato recognised that many states saw harbours (and their mercantile community) as being advantageous to their economy, he believed these poleis paid for their commercial advantage with the degradation of the moral health of their citizens.²⁹³ Furthermore, Plato directly states that this moral decline was exacerbated by the freedom of movement and association granted to the mercantile community. In order to reduce the social corruption, Plato suggests the polis should be situated at least 80 *stadia* from the coast, with, if at all possible, the territory controlled by the polis being able to meet all of its material needs.

“νῦν δὲ παραμύθιον ἔχει τὸ τῶν ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίων. ἐγγύτερον μέντοι τοῦ δέοντος κεῖται τῆς θαλάττης σχεδὸν ὅσον εὐλιμενωτέραν αὐτὴν φῆς εἶναι...”²⁹⁴

“As things are, however, there is consolation in the fact of that eighty stades. Still, it lies unduly near the sea, and the more so because, as you say, its harbours are good...”

By situating the polis so far inland, Plato believed that the corrupting influence of the maritime community could be diminished. However, if a polis was located on or near the coast, it would be an almost impossible task to prevent the spread of corrupted morality. Furthermore, if a polis could be situated 80 *stades* inland it was possible for the city to avoid becoming reliant upon the sea (only being dependent on it for transport or military purposes).²⁹⁵

"πρόσοικος γὰρ θάλαττα χώρα τὸ μὲν παρ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἡδύ, μάλα γε μὴν ὄντως ἀλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν γειτόνημα· ἐμπορίας γὰρ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ διὰ καπηλείας ἐμπιμπλάσα αὐτήν, ἦθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἄπιστα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντίκτουςα, αὐτήν τε πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν ἄπιστον καὶ ἄφιλον ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὡσαύτως."

²⁹² Pl. *Leg.* 949b.

²⁹³ Pl. *Leg.* 705b.

²⁹⁴ Pl. *Leg.* 704e

²⁹⁵ Pl. *Leg.* 740b; 705a; 704c.

*“For the sea is, in very truth, “a right briny and bitter neighbour,” although there is sweetness in its proximity for the uses of daily life; for by filling the markets of the city with foreign merchandise and retail trading, and breeding in men's souls knavish and tricky ways, it renders the city faithless and loveless, not to itself only, but to the rest of the world as well.”*²⁹⁶

If we examine the Piraeus it is possible to identify the cause of Plato's fears concerning the cultural threat posed by commercial harbours. The Piraeus, as a concept rather than a place or as a representation of a specific social group, can be perceived as standing opposed to the ideals and values traditionally promoted by the polis. Firstly, the Piraeus was a constant reminder that the state was far from achieving the aim of self-sufficiency, whilst secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it embraced foreigners and metics with less discrimination than other regions of the polis. The relaxing of cultural barriers led to a unique blend of religion, culture, and ideology, which was distinct from the *astu*. Because of the pervasiveness of foreigners and foreign culture within the Piraeus it is likely that the deme had a cosmopolitan atmosphere. Anthropologists such as Polanyi have often argued that within the ancient world there was a prevalent tendency towards parochial attitudes, whereby foreign influences were seen as subversive and a threat to the natural order and stability of the polis.²⁹⁷ The establishment of foreign cults and religious sites further emphasised the alien atmosphere that permeated the harbour district and could be viewed by an Athenian citizen as a potential threat to the unity and stability of the polis and to traditional ideals and values.²⁹⁸ Religious cults were often used in antiquity as a vehicle to help express a sense of one's own identity and culture within foreign cities, and thus frequently they promoted individuality rather than conformity. By the end of the fourth century there existed in the Piraeus a number of cults to meet the religious needs of Greeks, non-Greeks, men, women, free and slaves.²⁹⁹ This endorsement of 'otherness' and individuality stood in opposition to the morality of the

²⁹⁶ Pl. *Leg.* 705a.

²⁹⁷ See for instance Polanyi (1963) 30-45; (1975) 133-154; Fried (1967) 1-20.

²⁹⁸ For the foundation of religious cults within the Piraeus see :- Amit (1965) 80-82; Garland (1987) 101-138; Nilsson (1951) 45-8; Von Reden (1995) 29-34.

²⁹⁹ See Chapter Six section 6.3.1.

polis that, in general, promoted a group identity and conformity to a shared set of standards, beliefs, and values. Plato clearly alludes to this phenomenon in both the *Republic* and *Laws*.

However, Plato's view of harbours is not reflected in all Greek literature, and thus it is possible to identify some philosophers and historians openly praising the virtues of ports. For example, as discussed previously, Xenophon considered harbours as an important resource for any state. Aristotle can also be found taking a slightly different stance to Plato. Although he acknowledges that inter-regional exchange, if unregulated, could bring about a degradation in moral standards, he does not think this situation is inevitable (Arist. *Pol.* 1326^b27). Furthermore he recognises that the simplest way for a state, even the ideal state, to achieve self-sufficiency was through the exploitation of inter-regional commerce (Arist. *Pol.* 1319^b12). Again, in contrast to Plato, Aristotle theorised that it was possible for a state to legislate against practices which might corrupt the citizen body. This could be achieved if the polis was to appoint a sufficient number of magistrates and overseers. These administrative officials would be charged with maintaining the smooth functioning of the markets and harbours, whilst also ensuring that the behaviour and social interactions of the mercantile community remained within acceptable boundaries (Arist. *Pol.* 1321^b12).

Conclusion Three

The main criticism that Plato levels against inter-regional trade is that this type of commerce distorted and corrupted traditional value systems. Plato directly states that the moral decline of a polis was exacerbated by the freedom of movement and association granted to the mercantile community. He further criticises inter-regional merchants, as he believes their loyalty to the polis was diminished due to their long absences from home and their interaction with foreigners. Finally, Plato is critical of the entrepreneurial spirit as he concludes that this stimulates a desire for wealth which, when it takes hold of the citizens, makes 'just' exchange impossible. Although Aristotle was to be less critical of inter-regional merchants, he too was concerned with the idea of justice in exchange.

3.2.3 Aristotle's Discussions of Economics, Inter-regional Trade and Traders

Aristotle's comments on economics, although amounting to fewer than a dozen pages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*, has had a considerable impact on the writing of Greek economic history. Langholm is so enamoured with the importance of Aristotle's economic theorising that he proposes that Aristotle's work has had fundamental influence on the development of all subsequent western economic thinking.³⁰⁰ Baeck claims that, "*in the field of economic analysis Aristotle may be called a pioneer*".³⁰¹ In his economic methodology, Aristotle produced a balanced synthesis between an analytical approach based on theoretical concepts and observation of human experiences. He analysed the various forms of just behaviour to discover the pattern of justice underlying human interaction. From his observations he constructed models that, although abstracted from his empirical data, frequently referred back to reality in order to prove the validity of his arguments or to modify the model in accordance with his ever-changing experience.³⁰² The objective of Aristotle's economic theorising was to prove that every exchange of goods has to be the 'exchange of equivalents', if the economy was to work in harmony.³⁰³

To Aristotle, the exchange of economic goods in the market was primarily an ethical problem: exchange of goods as the material content of social relations can only exist as long as it represents an exchange of equivalents. "*For if this is not so, there will be no exchange and no intercourse*".³⁰⁴ The objective of much of Aristotle's economic theory is to find a principle that makes it possible to equate what is apparently unequal. One of his primary concerns in both the *Ethics* and *Politics* is to determine whether or not the acquisition of wealth and material goods was a 'natural' desire for mankind, or an artificial concept created by human greed.³⁰⁵ As part of this investigation Aristotle explores the various ways of accumulating wealth in order to

³⁰⁰ Langholm (1983) 20.

³⁰¹ Baeck (1997) 147.

³⁰² Soudek (1952) 48.

³⁰³ Broadie & Rowe (2002) 165-167; 335.

³⁰⁴ Arist. *N.E.* 5.5, 1133a, 24.

³⁰⁵ Hughes (2001); Smith (2001), Broadie & Rowe (2002) 335-337.

ascertain which, if any, were natural and therefore acceptable. Therefore, before exploring Aristotle's views on inter-regional trade and traders, it is worth briefly exploring his attitude to wealth and its acquisition.

3.2.4 Aristotle's Views on Wealth and its Acquisition

As suggested previously a concern with the 'justice' (or equality) of inter-regional exchange was a primary concern of Aristotle who, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, situates his chapter on exchange not in a general discussion of economics but in a section exploring justice and injustice. Unease with the 'justness' of profit maximisation (or the striving for ever increasing exchange value) was therefore one of the central concerns of Aristotle. In the course of his discussion Aristotle identifies two types of wealth, true wealth (*alēthinos ploutos*), and 'general wealth' which is wealth in terms of exchange value rather than in a physical sense such as property or livestock.³⁰⁶ General wealth was generated through unnatural *chrematistike* (i.e. through profit seeking or money-lending) whereas true wealth came from the purer economic art of *oikonomikē*.³⁰⁷ According to Aristotle's definition 'true wealth' was the stockpiling of those commodities that were useful in the community, household or *polis*.³⁰⁸ The significance of this is that he understands 'true wealth' as the available stock of useful things, or in terms of use values. The availability for use is what is significant *not* the form the property takes or how it becomes available for use.³⁰⁹ Meanwhile, he defines 'general wealth' as consisting of using things rather than owning them: he therefore claims that it is really the activity – that is the use - of property that constitutes wealth.³¹⁰ Trade by its nature cannot belong to the art of acquiring 'true wealth' because its aim is to acquire wealth as a quantity of exchange value (normally in the form of money), or to stockpile items in order to improve one's social standing.³¹¹ This distinction between the two types of wealth is derived from Aristotle's discussion of the differences between 'use' and 'exchange' value in the

³⁰⁶ Meikle (1996) 140.

³⁰⁷ Ari. *Pol.* 1256^b 27ff.

³⁰⁸ Arist. *Pol.* 1.1256b30f.

³⁰⁹ Soudek (1964) 64; Gordon (1964) 117; Meikle (1996) 138-39;

³¹⁰ Arist. *Rhet.* 1361a23f.

³¹¹ Arist. *Rhet.* 1257b29f.

Politics (1.1257a6-13), where he proposes that use value (or useful things) should fall into the category of quality, whereas exchange value should be placed in the category of quantity.³¹² This, as Meikle suggests, meant that there was a metaphysical gulf between the two types of wealth that could not be bridged.³¹³ This distinction is the foundation of modern economic thought and Aristotle is the first economic theoriser recognised as making this crucial observation.³¹⁴

Aristotle therefore concludes that exchange undertaken to gain something's use value was considered 'natural', whereas trade aiming to gain something for its exchange value was seen as 'unnatural'.³¹⁵ In natural exchange a commodity that is needed less (say for instance olives) is exchanged for money in order to purchase something different that is needed more (wood for example). The point of this type of exchange is bound up with use value, need and consumption, and it meets a natural terminus when the thing needed (wood) is acquired. This type of transaction can be represented thus: C-M/M-C (where C= commodity and M = money) or in a shortened form C-M-C.³¹⁶ In unnatural exchange, which develops from natural exchange, the order and the acts of sale and purchase are reversed. The exchanger comes to market with money rather than goods in order to buy goods and sell them in order to acquire more money. This type of transaction can be represented as M-C/C-M (or M-C-M). The end objective of this type of commerce is not 'true wealth' but wealth as exchange value in the form of money. Aristotle complains that, "*in this branch of wealth-getting there is no limit of the end*".³¹⁷ Moreover, he continues by suggesting that it is from the existence of wealth as exchange value that the idea that affluence could be unlimited, originated.³¹⁸ When exchange value, or its representative, money, is developed, it becomes the aim of exchange, not self-sufficiency or achievement of

³¹² Amemiya (2007) 153-156.

³¹³ Meikle (1996) 139-40.

³¹⁴ Arist. *N.E.* 1132b31f. Polanyi (1958) 78-115.

³¹⁵ Arist. *Rhet.* 1361a19; *Pol.* 1256b34.

³¹⁶ Johnson (1939) 449 "*In the Politics Aristotle had traced the historical development of money from its existence as a 'commodity' to its use as token coinage, and there was expressed a conviction that money was closely associated with all reprehensible forms of trade; he felt that money had deserted its natural function as a medium of exchange to become the beginning and end of exchange.*"; See also, Soudek (1952) 52-53; Meikle (1996) 140; Judson (1997) 164-166.

³¹⁷ Arist. *Pol.* 1257b28f. Meikle (1996) 141 and Judson (1997) 171-173 both propose that Aristotle's concern with 'limit' is the fundamental reason why he is so hard on inter-regional merchants.

³¹⁸ Arist. *Pol.* 1.1256b40f.

the good life. He therefore confidently states that, “*all these faculties become means for the business of providing wealth, in the belief that wealth is the end and that everything must be directed to the end.*”³¹⁹ Within Aristotle’s theory of action, actions are defined by their aims or ends, and if two activities aim at different things they must therefore be seen as different despite any similarities.³²⁰ C-M-C exchange shares the same aim as barter or non-money-exchange (C-C), and thus Aristotle sees it as fulfilling man’s natural want.³²¹ On the other hand M-C-M exchange is not designed to purely meet man’s want but instead to gain profit. Consequently it has no natural terminus.³²² However, as Meikle correctly identifies, the point that needs to be emphasised is that Aristotle sees the pursuit of exchange value of money, as a distinct end of its own, distinct from trade or any other particular way of pursuing it. In both the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, Aristotle hypothesises that every commodity and service has a fixed value, which, unless external pressures are influencing the market, should remain stable.³²³ In theory, as long as the market remained stable and there were a socially accepted set of conceptual values for products, exchange could occur in a fair and equitable (and even profitable) manner.

3.2.5 Aristotle’s View of Trade and Traders

Previously scholars have used *Politics* 1.8-10, to demonstrate that Aristotle was a staunch opponent of inter-regional merchants.³²⁴ Although it is true that Aristotle has very few positive comments to pass with regard to inter-regional merchants, it is also true to say that he has very few negative comments to make

³¹⁹ Arist. *Pol.* 1.1258a8-14.

³²⁰ Arist. *N.E.* 3.1115b22 “*each thing is defined by its end*”; *Met.* 9.1050a22-24.

³²¹ Arist. *Pol.* 1256a30.

³²² Aristotle therefore considers this type of exchange as only being concerned with gaining wealth, with the exchange of commodities merely a step in the process of gaining more money. Therefore, money is the starting point and the goal, whereas C-M-C has limit built into its form, M-C-M does not and can potentially continue indefinitely. Arist. *Pol.* 1257b22f “*money is the starting point and the goal*”; 1257b28f “*There is no limit to the end it seeks; and the end it seeks is wealth of the sort we have mentioned...the mere acquisition of currency*”; 1257b33f “*they increase their fund of money without any limit or pause*”.

³²³ Arist. *N.E.* 5.5; *Pol.* 1258a35. The unexpected pressures to which he refers are the results of natural disasters such as fires, floods droughts and earthquakes, or man-made events such as warfare, all of which could seriously affect the export or import industry.

³²⁴ Hasebroek (1923) 28; Knorringa (1926) 120-123; Ross (1949) 243; Soudek (1952) 57-58; Gordon (1964) 123; Mulgan (1977) 49; Baeck (1997) 155-56;

either. Unlike Plato, who passed judgement on the moral qualities of inter-regional traders, Aristotle is more concerned with the nature and operation of trade, rather than commercial agents. As will be demonstrated, Aristotle's target is too general and its social applications too wide, for it to be plausible to suggest that the purpose of his economic theorising is to attack merchants in particular.³²⁵ Furthermore, Aristotle's criticisms are directed at wealth-getting in the sense of money making, and he is explicit that merchants are not the only ones who do this: doctors, philosophers, soldiers and other professionals can also be identified undertaking similar practices.³²⁶ It cannot even be said that he identifies traders as offenders more regularly than he does others, as the Sophists come under the most frequent and harshest of attacks. Therefore I would suggest, contrary to the majority of previous scholarship, that Aristotle was not particularly dismissive of, or negative towards, inter-regional merchants, so long as they sought to acquire wealth in a just manner.

Chapters 8-11 of the *Politics* offer a penetrating discourse on the transformation from the natural and familial practice of the household economy, to a market economy in which individuals seek profit through exchange. The driving force of the new market economy is the evolving dominance of the profit motive. In a state corrupted by profit motive, natural wealth-getting degenerates into commercial and speculative money-making.³²⁷ This section is strikingly similar to Plato's contrast between the frugal community and the luxurious state, with the expansion of commercial exchange bringing the development of the profit mentality, and thus the corruption of the polis and its citizens. As has been suggested, Aristotle's theory of exchange attempts to establish a rule by which the trade of commodities could be

³²⁵ This is a theory that was first raised by Meikle (1996) 138; 150. Meikle states, "Certainly, Aristotle does not refrain from observing that trade 'is justly discredited (for it is not in accordance with nature, but involves men taking things from one another)', 1258b1-2, but, on the whole, criticisms of this kind are strikingly absent from the four chapters that make up his economic thought in *NE*. 5.5. and *Pol*. 1.8-10, and this is not what we might expect if his views on trade were little more than expressions of prejudice against traders."

³²⁶ Arist. *Pol*. 1258^a 11ff; Meikle (1996) 72.

³²⁷ In book 10 Aristotle introduces the form of trade and money-making most viciously contrary to nature: i.e. the trade in money itself on the basis of interest charging. According to Aristotle, interest is money born from money (*Pol*. 1258b7-8). The philosophical stance against money-lending at interest is in stark contrast to the more lenient reaction of influential orators such as Isocrates in *Trapeziticus* and Demosthenes *Against Aphobus*. These two men defend interest taking as a prerequisite of commercial development, so long as laws were in place to regulate the actions of bankers and money-lenders.

established as an exchange of equal values.³²⁸ However, Aristotle rejects the Pythagorean view that justice is in essence based on reciprocity; instead suggesting that reciprocity in exchange is based on proportion of things not on equality.³²⁹ Therefore, Aristotle is not thinking in terms of one producer's product being higher quality than another's. Instead, what he is suggesting is that reciprocity demands one item for another item but in exchange this is not appropriate because you cannot trade one house for one pair of shoes. Consequently for equitable trade to occur there needs to be a formal scale of exchange. The final two thirds of chapter 5.5 in the *Ethics* are therefore spent discussing how to convert the relative values of different products.³³⁰ As Aristotle is not disparaging of trade *per se*, we can follow his argument to its logical conclusion and determine that traders, as long as they operated within the boundaries of 'just' exchange and did not demonstrate *pleonexia*, could obtain profit whilst still being equally as respected and integrated as other occupational groups.³³¹

Conclusion Four

To conclude this section, it is unfair to accuse Aristotle of simplistically disparaging trade. In general Aristotle produced a balanced synthesis between an analytical approach based on philosophical concepts and careful observation of human experiences. His criticisms concerning the various methods of generating wealth apply not only to traders but also other 'professionals' including doctors (a profession undertaken by his father). To him, the exchange of economic goods in the market place was primarily an ethical problem and this is how he approached both inter-regional trade and traders. Consequently, the objective of much of Aristotle's economic theorising was to find a principle that made it possible to equate what is apparently unequal. Aristotle therefore is not negative against inter-regional trade or traders *per se*. Instead he criticises those who demonstrate graspingness (*pleonexia*), i.e. those who attempted to grab, and hold onto, material gain at someone else's

³²⁸ Finley (1970) 33.

³²⁹ Arist. *N.E.* 1132b31-33. Broadie & Rowe (2002) 37.

³³⁰ Arist. *N.E.* 1132^b-1138^b10. Meikle (2002) 129-146; Broadie & Rowe (2002) 229-357.

³³¹ *Pleonektēs* = literally 'one who goes in for having more' is most frequently translated to mean grasping or graspingness. 'Grasping' is always pejorative in Aristotle and Plato and cannot be used of any laudable figure (Broadie & Rowe (2002) 337). In the context of exchange *pleonexia* was the act of charging more for something than it was worth.

expense. If exchange was undertaken in an equitable manner, Aristotle considered it to be a necessary, and vital, component in the provisioning of the state. However, Aristotle warns that, just as an individual should not be driven by *pleonexia*, neither should a city.³³²

3.2.6 The Legal Corpus

The forensic speeches are the sources which most clearly highlight the distinct set of problems scholars are faced with when analysing contemporary literary evidence relating to the mercantile community. Although legal oratory provides some of the most detailed information concerning the mercantile community, it also presents some of the most biased. Firstly, it is worth remembering that these speeches represent a failure in the system of exchange, either on account of the actions of a merchant or those of his business associates. Secondly, as should be expected, these speeches are often intended to show commercial operatives in either an extremely negative light, if it is a prosecution speech, or from an overtly positive perspective if the oration is written on behalf of the defendant. It is also worth remembering that we are not dealing with ‘facts’ in these cases but rhetorical arguments. Therefore in some speeches, such as Lysias’ oration *Against the Corn Dealers* (circa 386), we can identify vastly different opinions of merchants being raised in the same speech.³³³ In this speech Lysias compares favourably a group of *emporoi* with a group of *kapēloi* who were operating as corn dealers. The *kapēloi* are presented as being devious and underhanded due to their plan to purchase and store large quantities of grain and thus initiate panic in the market place. In contrast the *emporoi* are presented as maintaining a fair and just relationship with their customers, demanding a constant and reasonable price despite the swindle being operated by the grain dealers. What makes this case especially interesting is that it is brought by a group of *emporoi* against a group of *kapēloi*. Knorringa concludes that the criticisms levelled against the *kapēloi*, “do not represent the disposition of the Athenian people but the personal opinions of the

³³² Arist. *Pol.* 7.1327^a 25-31.

³³³ Lys. 22.6; 9; 21.

emporoi instead".³³⁴ However, although the views expressed might be the personal opinion of the *emporoi*, they still had to persuade the jury of the validity of their claims. With this end in mind it is probable that the arguments they employ are ones towards which the jury were already predisposed. Consequently, the criticisms levelled at the *kapheloi* were, in all probability, ones which were designed to play upon shared value systems and thus evoke either fear or anger amongst the jury, while it was hoped that the ploy of listing the *emporoi*'s benefactions would elicit sympathy for their plight. As will be demonstrated, many of the criticisms of *emporoi* contained in the legal speeches are not intrinsically linked to their occupation. For instance, the crimes of fraud and embezzlement were prevalent in other areas of Athenian society and as a consequence of this evoked a particular response. Therefore, what we often find in the corpus of legal oratory is a series of personalised views or insults that were aimed specifically against a group or individual, and which were designed to provoke specific responses, rather than generalised criticisms of a particular occupation or social class.

Although the legal speeches reveal that the views relating to *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* could vary considerably according to the personal opinion of the speaker, or because of the specific situation or merchant being described, they are still useful since they record the activities of the mercantile community that were viewed either positively or negatively by Athenian society. Although there is a substantial amount of evidence in the legal speeches that supports the pejorative views or stereotypes expressed by the philosophers, there are also a number of occasions when *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* are recorded as acting honourably or which detail their extraordinary services on behalf of the polis. Consequently, in many of the prosecution speeches the defendant takes on the persona of a powerful public enemy, whilst the plaintiff adopts the role of important public benefactor. This ambiguity in relation to the social standing and integration of merchants further undermines the hypothesis that there was a consistently negative view of the mercantile community shared by Athenian society. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, many of the positive deeds lauded by the orators as a way of proving a litigant's honest nature and

³³⁴ Knorringa (1926) 83

behaviour, are ones that were also formally praised and rewarded by the state.

A) Negative Actions of the Mercantile Community

One of the charges most commonly levelled at *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* is that they attempt to gain other people's money through dishonest methods. These dishonest means could take a number of forms including, failure to repay loans, charging a higher price for their commodities than they were worth, or swindling money from others using lies and deceptions. Demosthenes' speech, *Against Phormio* (c.327/6), is a prime example of a case revolving around the failure to repay a loan. In this speech Chrysippus and his partner, who are both wealthy metic wheat dealers, merchants and bottomry lenders, sue Phormio, an Athenian metic merchant, for recovery of a loan of 20 minae on a round-trip to the Bosphorus.³³⁵ Phormio was to travel aboard the vessel owned by Lampis, and, upon reaching the Bosphorus was to purchase a return cargo and continue back to Athens. The interest payment was 600 drachmae, and the loan was to be repaid in Athens (or to Lampis in the Bosphorus if Phormio wished to continue trading). The conflict arises as Phormio maintains he repaid the loan in the Bosphorus, claiming to have given the money to the *nauklēros* Lampis; however the vessel is wrecked on the return journey and Chrysippus disputes the fact that Phormio ever repaid the loan.³³⁶ Chrysippus claims that Phormio was not in a position to repay the loan in the Bosphorus and that he only claimed to have loaded merchandise on Lampis' vessel upon discovering that the ship had been wrecked, thus safe in the knowledge that he would now be absolved from repayment.³³⁷ Chrysippus goes on to allege that because Phormio's claims about repaying the loan and loading a return cargo could be disproved he was forced to bribe Lampis, which in turn explains Lampis' inconsistent testimony.³³⁸ Although it is impossible to determine who is telling the truth in this case, the fact that merchants might attempt to avoid repaying loans, often resorting to deception to achieve this aim, is attested in a number of other

³³⁵ Dem. 34.38; 39; 40; 50-3.

³³⁶ Dem 34.

³³⁷ Dem. 34. 12; 46.

³³⁸ Prior to the arbitration Lampis had allegedly testified that he had received money from Phormio Dem. 34.18; 35; 46. However, Chrysippus claims that he can provide witnesses who will confirm that immediately after his return to Athens, Lampis declared in public that he had received no money (Dem. 34.11; 14-16; 20; 41; 46-49.

speeches. A prime example is found in Demosthenes' oration, *Against Zenothemis* (c.354-340). Zenothemis, a Massaliot merchant and possibly a maritime lender, sues Demon, an Athenian moneylender, for wrongful sale of a cargo of Sicilian grain.³³⁹ Demon enters a counter-claim (which is the basis of this speech), claiming that the cargo was his own, acquired as security for a bottomry loan to the merchant Protus (a third party who has fled Athens).³⁴⁰ Demon therefore claims that he has no outstanding contractual relationships with Zenothemis. As circumstantial evidence of the untrustworthiness of Zenothemis, Demon then goes on to allege that Zenothemis and his partner Hegestratus had borrowed money from a variety of sources in Syracuse for a phantom shipment of grain.³⁴¹ In order to obtain these loans each bore witness for the other to say that had already loaded the cargo. Having ensured that their contract relieved them of repayment in the event of disaster, Hegestratus and Zenothemis planned to scuttle their own vessel whilst at sea and thus embezzle the lender's money.³⁴²

Another case of alleged embezzlement can be found in Demosthenes' speech *Against Apaturius* (c.341). Apaturius, a Byzantine ship owner, sues an unnamed Athenian moneylender for 20 minae, a sum which had been decided by a previous arbitration.³⁴³ Apaturius claims the money is owed to him by Parmenon, an exiled Byzantine merchant for whom the Athenian moneylender is guarantor.³⁴⁴ This speech is the Athenian moneylender's reply to those charges. He claims that he is not a guarantor and that Apaturius had previously attempted to flee Athens with a mortgaged ship and slave crew in order to avoid repaying a non-bottomry loan of 40 minae owed to the moneylender and to Parmenon.³⁴⁵ Once again, it is impossible to determine the exact facts of these cases,³⁴⁶ and we are also unable to determine with

³³⁹ Dem. 32.2; 12; 14; 31-32.

³⁴⁰ Dem. 32.14-15; 18; 25.

³⁴¹ Dem. 32. 8; 12. This scam can also be identified in Demosthenes' speech *Against Lacritus*, in which Artemon and Apollodorus are described as taking an additional loan in Athens against security that had already been pledged to another lender (Dem.35. 21-23).

³⁴² Dem. 32.5-6

³⁴³ Dem. 35.4-5

³⁴⁴ Dem. 33.6; 11-13; 20.

³⁴⁵ Dem. 33. 33.6-12.

³⁴⁶ Isager and Hansen for instance, use the fact that the vessel was hit by a storm to suggest that Demon's account is falsified, "*When he [Demon] suppresses this fact in his earlier description of the shipwreck, one begins to suspect that his complaint against Hegestratus is an empty charge without*

recovery of a loan of 30 minae they had lent for a round trip to Pontus.³⁵⁴ Lacritus claims that the secured cargo had been lost at sea, and that in fact it was his dead brother Artemo, and not himself, who had a contractual relationship with the plaintiffs.³⁵⁵ Androcles and Nausicrates dispute the argument that the shipment was lost at sea and instead demonstrate how Artemo had broken the terms of the contract on at least four occasions: firstly he had taken an additional loan using the same security,³⁵⁶ secondly he did not provide the agreed security,³⁵⁷ thirdly on arriving at Mende he failed to purchase a return cargo,³⁵⁸ and finally when the ship returned to Athens the vessel dropped anchor in ‘pirates’ harbour’ instead of docking at the commercial harbour.³⁵⁹

Other more subtle ways in which merchants are recorded as swindling others out of their money include embezzling the inheritance of their dead business partner’s children and stealing the money that had been left in their care for safekeeping. In Lysias’ speech *Against Diogeiton*, the defendant is an inter-regional merchant who regularly transports goods to and from the Adriatic.³⁶⁰ However, the money he used to secure the loans needed to fund his ventures belonged to the children of his dead brother (and business partner) Diodotus, who had been left in his care.³⁶¹ By spending the inheritance money of the infants under his guardianship Diogeiton was breaking Attic law.³⁶² When his trading ventures were fantastically successful he denied that the money belonged to the children, instead claiming all of the sizeable profit as his

³⁵⁴ Dem. 35.15; 40-43; Plut., *Dem.* 28.3; Isoc. 15.30; 224.

³⁵⁵ Dem. 35.3-5. The plaintiffs propose that Lacritus is liable for the debt as he is sole heir to his brothers’ estate (Dem.35.5).

³⁵⁶ Dem. 35.21-23.

³⁵⁷ When Hyblesius’ ship sailed from Athens to Mende, Artemon had loaded only 450 jars of wine when the loan contract stated he would transport 3,000 (Dem.35.18-20).

³⁵⁸ Dem.35.24-15; 34.

³⁵⁹ Dem. 35.28; 53.

³⁶⁰ Lys. 32.25.

³⁶¹ Diodotus and Diogeiton were brothers who had held their father’s estate in partnership. When Diodotus had made a large fortune from his shipping business, Diogeiton induced him to marry his daughter (a marriage that was to produce two sons and a daughter). Some time later, when Diodotus was enrolled for infantry service, he summoned Diogeiton and entrusted him with his will and five talents of silver in deposit; he also produced an account of his loans on bottomry (amounting to seven talents and forty minae), and two thousand drachmae invested in the Chersonese (all this money was to be divided between his sons when they reached manhood). As a precaution he also left his wife and his daughter with a talent each for their dowries (Lys. 32.4-5).

³⁶² Lys. 32.25.

own.³⁶³ In Isocrates' speech, *Trapeziticus* (c.393), Pasion is shown as using similar underhand tactics in order to obtain money which rightfully belonged to the son of Sopaïos.³⁶⁴ Sopaïos was a prominent and powerful figure in the Bosporan kingdom who had sent his son to Athens with money and grain to engage in commerce.³⁶⁵ The son alleges that his relationship with Pasion was so close that he trusted his judgement on all matters, not just finance. Thus when his father temporarily fell into disfavour with the Bosporan king and was ordered to hand over all his money and assets, the son, on the advice of Pasion, left some unknown funds in the banker's care.³⁶⁶ When Sopaïos was later restored to favour, thus permitting the son to reclaim his deposit, Pasion denied holding any such funds. Pasion therefore acquired a considerable sum of money (around 68,000 drachmae) through his underhand tactics.

Finally, if we briefly return to Lysias' speech *Against the Corn Dealers*, we can identify the orator accusing a group of unscrupulous *kapēloi* of keeping a watchful eye out for natural disasters that might have an impact on grain prices and then using these calamities to their own advantage.³⁶⁷ The grain dealers are therefore accused of having interests that are contrary to those of the polis. The orator explains the meaning of this accusation when he suggests that the grain dealers, rather than mourning the arrival of bad news (such as a ruined harvest or the capture of grain vessels), actually uses this information to generate an increased profit. Moreover, the speaker claims, some types of unwelcome news were so profitable to these men that they actually delighted in hearing it.³⁶⁸ The orator then goes so far as to suggest that these unscrupulous dealers invented calamities and spread lies amongst the markets in

³⁶³ Lys. 32.23; 25. The impression Lysias seems to be attempting to make is that it is unacceptable for guardians to use the money in their charge to extend maritime loans (or as security for a maritime loan), a theory that is supported by Lys. frag. 91. However, Gernet (1924) 26; 183 n.3, suggests that the cases of Diogeiton and Aphobos show that maritime loans *were* allowed and Finley (1985) 235 and Cohen (1992) 51; 132 n. 92 agree with this conclusion.

³⁶⁴ Isoc. 17.7.

³⁶⁵ Isoc. 17, 3-4; 40.

³⁶⁶ Isoc. 17.5-7. Pasion seems to have advised Sopaïos's son, at the time of his father's fall from favour, to disown the money in the bank and instead claim that it was money indebted to Pasion and other creditors. When it came time to repay this money Pasion cleverly used the son's insistence that the money belonged to creditors as proof the money was legitimately his. Isoc. 17.8-11.

³⁶⁷ Lys. 22.14.

³⁶⁸ The types of disasters that could be profitable to unscrupulous grain dealers include the loss of grain ships in the Black Sea, the capture of merchant vessels by the Lacedaemonians, the blockade of trading ports, or the impending rupture of various truces.

order to profit from their falsehoods. Then, when the price of corn was rising sharply in the market place, these men sold their corn thus gaining highly inflated amounts of profit.

B) Positive Actions of the Mercantile Community

Although the legal orations do depict merchants acting in a dishonest manner, they also record that merchants could act honourably and be rewarded for their services to the state. Frequently, mercantile participants in legal cases point to their services on behalf of the state as proof of their trustworthiness and honest behaviour. The selfless services to which they point include; the continued importation of grain, the donation of money to purchase grain, selling grain at below market value, liasing with foreign dignitaries to ensure a priority supply of grain for Athens, and undertaking liturgies beyond those required by the state. What is interesting about the services recorded in these speeches is that they are ones which, as will be shown in Chapter Five, are also found in the epigraphic record. In the corpus of Athenian honorific inscriptions dating to the fourth century, the Athenians can be found bestowing a variety of honours upon merchants who undertook these types of services. Therefore, whereas previously these statements have been seen as oratorical “spin doctoring”, the respect and gratitude of the state that some of these recipients claim appears to be genuine. Demosthenes’ speech *Against Phormio* (c.327/26),³⁶⁹ provides an illustrative example of a participant in a legal dispute listing his economic services to the state as a way of influencing the jury. In this speech the speaker, Chrysippus, tries to reinforce the negative image of Phormio he has been creating by stating, “*He [Phormio] thinks it proper to rob us of our money – us, who have continually brought grain to your markets*”.³⁷⁰ By making this statement the speaker subtly creates in the jury’s mind, the idea that Phormio was not defrauding just anyone, but was in fact defrauding someone who had proven themselves to be a benefactor of the state. The speaker then compares the dishonest actions of Phormio with his own selflessness and virtuous behaviour. In order to highlight his generosity

³⁶⁹ For the dating of this speech see Hansen and Isager (1975) 169.

³⁷⁰ Dem. 34.38.

he recounts that during a period of famine when the price of grain had reached sixteen drachmae per *medimnus*, he and his brother imported a thousand *medimni* of wheat and sold it to the Athenians at the pre-famine price of five drachmae.³⁷¹ Furthermore, when Alexander invaded Thebes (thus threatening Athenian grain supplies) the speaker states that he and his brother donated one talent in cash to the Athenians.³⁷²

In his case against Apollodorus, Phormio of Athens (not to be confused with the Phormio discussed above), also lists his good deeds to demonstrate his honest and trustworthy nature to the jury. In Demosthenes' speech *For Phormio* (c.351/50), the speaker claims that as Phormio has, "*never wronged anybody in anything, but, on the contrary, has voluntarily done good to many, how could he reasonably be thought to have wronged Apollodorus*", additionally he claims "*Far greater advantage accrues to you from this wealth while it remains in the possession of the defendant. For you see for yourselves, and you hear from the witnesses, what a friend he shows himself to be to those in need. [59] And not one of these acts has he done with a view to pecuniary advantage, but from generosity and kindness of disposition*".³⁷³ The implication of these passages is that Phormio regularly used his wealth to be of benefit to the state. This is a claim also made by Apollodorus, the son of Phormio's previous owner, Pasion. In the oration *Apollodorus Against Stephanus* (1), Apollodorus states that, "*My father gave you a thousand shields and made himself serviceable to you in many ways, and five times served as trierarch, voluntarily equipping the ships and manning them at his own expense. I remind you of this, not because I consider that you are under obligation to me--for it is I that am under obligation to you,--but in order that I may not suffer unworthy treatment without your knowing it*".³⁷⁴ Apollodorus clearly believes that the honest actions and substantial services undertaken by his father, entitle him to favourable treatment by the jury, a

³⁷¹ Dem. 34.38-39.

³⁷² Furthermore, in order to prove that his case against Phormio is not baseless (as argued by the defendant) Chrysippus states, "*Surely, if any inference may be based upon these facts, it is not likely that we should freely give such large sums in order to win a good name among you, and then should bring a false accusation against Phormion and thus throw away the reputation for honourable dealing we had won*" (Dem. 34.39). During the fourth century Athens offered *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* protection from frivolous charges. If someone brought a case against a merchant which was found to be baseless the accuser was punished with large fines and "other" punishments (Dem.59.10-11). See also Chapter Six section 6.5.

³⁷³ Dem. 36. 56; 58.

³⁷⁴ Dem. 45.85.

sentiment shared by the son of Sopaïos in Isocrates' speech *Trapeziticus*. In this oration Sopaïos' son states, "*It is only right that you keep in mind both Satyrus and my father, who have always esteemed you above all the other Greeks and frequently in past times, when there was a scarcity of grain and they were sending away empty the ships of other merchants, granted to you the right of export; furthermore, in the private contracts in which they are arbiters, you come off not only on even terms but even at an advantage*".³⁷⁵ In order to carry favour with the jury, the son of Sopaïos claims that his father had played a major role in supplying Athens with grain, "*I ask of you, then, both on their behalf and on my own, that you vote in accordance with justice and not count the false assertions of Pasion to be more worthy of belief than my own words*".³⁷⁶

Finally, in order to counter charges of un-citizen-like behaviour, Andocides can also be found emphasising the civic duties he undertook on behalf of Athens. His speech, *On His Return*, describes his provisioning of the Athenian fleet with oars, made possible through ties he had with the Macedonian monarchy.³⁷⁷ Although Andocides did not provide these oars free of charge, he does reveal that he sold them at cost price, thus sacrificing a sizable profit. He also boasts that he imported significant quantities of grain and bronze despite the dangers posed by war, winter sailing conditions and pirates. He ends his account by stressing the crucial role his provision of new oars was to have in the subsequent victory of the Athenian fleet at Cyzicus. Andocides can therefore be identified as attempting to use his services to the state as a way of proving his democratic credentials. He thus claims that his provisioning of the democratic fleet at Samos caused him great enmity with the Four Hundred, in particular the famous oligarch Peisander.³⁷⁸ Andocides' demand for acquittal rests primarily on his importation of grain and other commodities that had been vital to sustaining the political power of the Athenian democracy. His defence therefore relied on the notion that commercial services could prove both his democratic credentials and his benefit to the state.

³⁷⁵ Isoc. 17.57.

³⁷⁶ Isoc. 17.57.

³⁷⁷ Andoc. 2.11; 2.21.

³⁷⁸ Andoc. 2.13-14.

Conclusion Five

What the legal corpus demonstrates is that views of *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* could vary considerably according to the personal opinion of the speaker, or because of the specific situation or merchant being described. Even though the forensic speeches do record examples of merchants acting dishonourably, there are also a significant number of merchants who could list their extraordinary services on behalf of the state. Furthermore, many of the actions or behaviors criticised in relation to merchants are not ones that are unique to the mercantile community. For instance, the criminal acts of fraud and embezzlement were despised in any context and thus perpetrators of this type of crime were not limited to exchange transactions. Consequently, when using the forensic speeches as evidence for the social standing and integration of traders it is unwise to assume that the views expressed are indicative of a general disparaging of inter-regional trade and traders.

3.3 The Cultural Stigma of Inter-Regional Trade: Death at Sea

The ultimate risk for a sailor was being shipwrecked or suffering a disaster at sea, with the price often being his life. This willingness to put one's own life in danger for profit, especially if it meant dying at sea, went against the cultural thinking of the Greeks.³⁷⁹ Phalaeus therefore states:

“Avoid busying yourself with the sea, and put your mind towards the plough that the oxen draw, if it is any joy for you to see the end of a long life. For on land there is length in days, but on the sea it is not easy to find a man with grey hair”.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁹ Although recorded subsequent to the fourth century, the epitaphs contained in the *Palatine Anthology* can help illuminate the cultural stigma, or fear, of a maritime demise. Although the epigrams recorded in such anthologies are difficult to date (impossible to date precisely), some are believed to be copies of fourth century and Hellenistic inscriptions. Furthermore, although Athenian society, culture, economy and government had undergone a series of changes, the fear of dying at sea remained consistent.

³⁸⁰ *Anth. Pal.* 7.650.

Whilst Julian, Prefect of Egypt records,

“It was not the sea which caused your end, or the gales, but insatiable love of that commerce which turns you mad. Give me a little living from land; let others pursue profit from the sea gained by fighting the storms”.³⁸¹

The dangers of maritime trade were widely recognised: Antiphanes, for example, states that a merchant and his goods were at the mercy of the wind and waves.³⁸² Death at sea was considered a horrific demise as it was a lonely death suffered away from one’s family and community;³⁸³ it also resulted in the relatives of the deceased being unable to carry out proper burial rites or rituals of commendation, both of which were thought vital if an individual was to enter the afterlife.³⁸⁴ Furthermore, a maritime demise was intrinsically linked to the concept of dying abroad, although if a merchant died whilst away from home, it was hoped a guest-friend or *proxenos* would take care of the burial rites. The inability to recover the bodies of sailors who died at sea gave rise to the over-riding fear of a maritime demise.³⁸⁵ In religious terms, the Athenians perceived a direct link between a formal burial and entry into Hades, and therefore if the body was not recovered, as was frequently the case after a shipwreck (even those that occurred close to the shoreline), then the victim was prevented from entering the afterlife.³⁸⁶ The result of this

³⁸¹ *Anth. Pal.* 7.586.

³⁸² Antiphanes, Fr. 151. See also Isoc. 7.32-33; Dem. 33.4; *Anth. Pal.* 7.293; 7.294; 7.350; 7.494; 7.534; 7.699.

³⁸³ *Anth. Pal.* 7.494. “*Arcturus’ rising (mid-September) is an ill season for sailors to sail at, and I, Aspasius, whose tomb you pass, traveller, met my bitter fate by the blast of Boreas. My body, washed by the waters of the Aegean main, is lost at sea. Lamentable is the death of young men, but most mournful of all is the fate of travellers who perish at sea*”. See also, 7.277; 7.285; 7.286; 7.291; 7.383; 7.395;

³⁸⁴ Morris (1994) 8-30. A funerary inscription by Dioscorides alludes to the fear of remaining unburied. The epigram records the darkly ironic situation of Philocritus. “*Philocritus, his trading over and yet a novice at the plough, lay buried at Memphis in a foreign land. And there the Nile running in high flood stripped him of the scanty earth that covered him. So in life he escaped from the salt sea, but now covered by the waves hath, poor wretch, a ship wrecked mariner’s tomb*.” *Anth. Pal.* 7.76. See also, *Anth. Pal.* 7.267; 7.269.

³⁸⁵ Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 288. *Anth. Pal.* 7.271 “*Would that swift ships had never been, for then we should not be lamenting Sopolis the son of Diocliides. Now somewhere on the sea his corpse is tossing and what we pass here is not himself, but a name and an empty grave*”. See also *Anth. Pal.* 7.272; 7.275; 7.285; 7.286; 7.291; 7.404; 7.496.

³⁸⁶ The link between burial and the right to enter Hades can be identified in the *Iliad* when Achilles fails to bury Patroclus as he is unable to emotionally detach himself from the body of his dead friend. As a result, he is visited by Patroclus’s ghost who requests his body be interred so he can finally enter

incapability to enter Hades meant that the individual would find themselves stranded in limbo, a fate perceived to be worse than death itself. Sophocles demonstrates this belief when he depicts the ghost of Polyneices wandering restlessly. Polyneices is prevented from entering Hades, as his body remains in Thebes unburied.³⁸⁷ This example is far from unique, and the corpus of tragic plays, even if studied in isolation, demonstrates the importance of burial rites and a concern with interment.³⁸⁸ This belief system was to find formal expression during the Classical period with the throwing of criminals and enemies of the state into the sea.³⁸⁹ In Attica, men convicted of being a traitor to the state, or who were found guilty of sacrilege, could expect to be executed and then thrown unburied over the border into a neighbouring territory. This was the fate of Antiphon, the *strategos*, who failed to recover the dead and wounded after battle of Arginusae in 406; it was also the fate of Phocion and his friends.³⁹⁰ It is highly significant that Antiphon was punished in this manner as the Athenian state was effectively ensuring that he shared the same fate as the sailors whose bodies he had failed to recover. This practice of refusing burial was not limited to Athens and we find other examples including the fate of the mythical Boeotian king Pylaechmis at the hands of Heracles,³⁹¹ the Arcadian Aristocrates,³⁹² the Macedonian Alcetas,³⁹³ Hyperides, Pausanias son of the Agiad regent Cleombrotus (according to some traditions) and sacrilegious people throughout Greece (according to Locrian tradition).³⁹⁴ This form of punishment was intended as a deterrent against what were considered to be the worst crimes and thus to highlight the tangible fear the prospect of a death at sea might evoke. Greek rituals associated with death and burial were in a large part a reflection upon, and symbolic representation of, death as being a moment in the history of the community. Although the community would continue beyond the death of an individual, it was the brief lives of its citizens, past, present and future,

Hades. Hom. *Il.* 23.71.

³⁸⁷ Soph. *Ant.* 26-30.

³⁸⁸ Eur. *Phoen.* ll.1630; *Supp.* ll.15-36 Soph. *Aj.* ll.1047ff. We also find in the opening scene of Euripides's *Hecuba*, the ghost of Polydorus wandering the shores of Thrace as his body lies unburied at the bottom of a cliff after his execution at the hands of Polymestor.

³⁸⁹ Bremmer (1983) 90.

³⁹⁰ Thuc. 8.101.2ff; Plut. *Mor.* 833A.

³⁹¹ Plut. *Mor.* 307c.

³⁹² Paus. 4.22.7.

³⁹³ Diod. 18.47.3.

³⁹⁴ Diod. 16.25.2.

which gave a city or state, a sense of shared meaning, identity and ideology.³⁹⁵

The perception that those who died at sea became the restless dead meant that the Greeks sought ways of appeasing these spirits through the development of special burial rites and grave monuments. Sourvinou-Inwood, in her analysis of archaic inscribed grave monuments, points to the fact that a large proportion of these monuments, especially until 510BC, were associated with people whose deaths involved an exceptionally traumatic aspect, or a death that prevented their continuation within the communal memory (i.e. continuation in the memories or lives of the living).³⁹⁶ She therefore argues that the erection of a grave monument could be an offering designed to compensate for the lack of funeral rites, thus overcoming the problem of survival in the memory of the community. Furthermore she identifies two groups that she believed had strong links with this type of burial tradition; the first are children and youths who were considered to have died before their time, whilst the other group were those who died at sea. These groups are significant because youths were not afforded the opportunity to make a name within the community, whilst seafarers were deprived of the memorial rites intrinsically associated with Greek burial customs. It is therefore possible to argue that the increase in this type of monument coincides with the dramatic expansion of maritime travel and trade networks, a situation that should not be unexpected.³⁹⁷ As more men died away from their community the need for this type of burial would also increase. Merchants were therefore considered unusual in a society that placed considerable value on burial rites, as not only were they willing to risk their physical well-being in this life to turn a profit, but they were also willing to jeopardise their place in the afterlife. Unlike the philosophical viewpoint that centred on the injustice of profit-maximisation, a negative perception of trade on account of the physical and spiritual risks it involved permeated all layers of society. Trade could therefore be stigmatised in Athenian culture as the death of a family member whilst at sea, and the associated 'spiritual

³⁹⁵ Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 20-22.

³⁹⁶ Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 290.

³⁹⁷ There are 77 (out of 748) references to deaths at sea in book of sepulchral epitaphs in the Greek anthology, these are; *Anth. Pal.* 7.76; 7.77; .6214; 7.215; 7.264-280; 7.282; 7.283; 7.285-291; 7.293-295; 7.305; 7.350; 7.374; 7.381-383; 7. 395; 7.397; 7.404; 7.494-504; 7.506; 7.532; 7.534; 7.539; 7.543; 7.582; 7.584-586; 7.624-625; 7.630; 7.631; 7.637; 7.639; 7.640; 7.642; 7.650-654; 7.665; 7.675; 7.699.

pollution' this could cause a family or community, were something a broad range of Athenians could understand, irrespective of their social status.

Overall Conclusions

The evidence presented in this chapter has shown that merchants, like any other social or occupational group, were seen from a variety of different perspectives by their peers and even within particular groupings, such as the various schools of philosophical thought. As a consequence there is little uniformity of opinion. As the exploitation of trade networks stimulated growth and development within the Athenian economy, social commentators and moralists began to associate trade with the acquisition of wealth. As a consequence inter-regional commerce began to be criticised as it was believed to represent the greatest threat to traditional hierarchies. Although being disparaging of inter-regional trade, these moralisers were arguing against the revolutionary concept that status followed wealth, rather than against inter-regional trade or traders per se. The fifth century saw the development of 'economic' theorising with the Sophists beginning to confer moral and social accountability on economic agents. Although recognising the need for inter-regional commerce, the Sophists argued that trade should, as far as possible, be reciprocal, and undertaken in a friendly (almost neighbourly) manner. Plato and Aristotle were to adopt the principles of morality and justice in exchange and explore them further. Plato can be identified criticising merchants from a moral perspective, arguing that the mercantile community's interaction and association with foreigners corrupted it. Over time this corruption diminished a trader's loyalty to the polis and undermined traditional civic ideals. Although Aristotle was to be less critical of inter-regional merchants, he too was concerned with the idea of justice in exchange. Therefore much of Aristotle's economic analysis is concerned with defining what makes products commensurable rather than passing judgement on the mercantile community. The works of Plato and Aristotle should therefore be seen as a reflection of the economic instability that followed the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War. Both philosophers saw themselves as responding to a world in actual or incipient economic anarchy. The forensic speeches, perhaps, provide the more accurate barometer of Athenian feelings towards the mercantile community. In general the average Athenian

would have had little interest in the moral conduct of merchants, but in times of crisis the activities of the mercantile community came to the forefront of public consciousness. If a merchant acted selflessly during such times he could gain high favour and honour, but if he sought to exploit the situation for his own advantage, he was considered on a par with those deemed public enemies. Although scholars have been quick to recognise the mercantile community's role as public enemy, few studies have explored their role as public benefactors. Therefore, Chapter Five will discuss the corpus of honorific inscriptions arguing that the frequency with which honours and rewards were bestowed upon members of the mercantile community for their commercial services indicates that a significant number of merchants were highly regarded by the Athenians.

Chapter Four

The Importance of Inter-Regional Exchange

The Goods Being Traded

Introduction

In order to appreciate fully the importance and social standing of inter-regional merchants during the fourth century, it is first necessary to analyse the type and volume of goods being exchanged. For instance, a reliance on large-scale importation of certain items, or a financial dependency on specific exports, might have a direct bearing on the social and political status or visibility of the mercantile community. The following chapter will therefore investigate the level of demand for the principal commodities imported and exported by Athens, seeking to determine their economic and ideological importance. One way of determining the importance of specific commodities (and thus the significance of the merchants importing or exporting them) is to examine the treaties and alliances arranged to protect their supply. Previous studies have interpreted these treaties as simply demonstrating a concern with regulating the importation of commodities vital to Athenian economic and military prosperity, but this over-simplifies what is in actuality a complex set of arrangements between the state and inter-regional merchants. Scholars such as Hasebroek, de Ste. Croix, Jameson and Austin have argued that in general the Greek states were officially only concerned with imports, more specifically the importation of grain, timber and various types of metal: consequently state policy was only determined with this in mind.³⁹⁸ However, it can be shown that exports provided the Athenians with a considerable amount of revenue and thus this view is no longer tenable.

In its basic approach, this chapter will adopt the methodology of Reed:

³⁹⁸ Although the main treaties will be identified in this chapter, they will be discussed at length in Chapter Six Section 6.3.2A. Hasebroek (1928) 102; 116; 151, de Ste. Croix (1972) 393-6; Jameson (1988) 11; Austin (1994) 561.

therefore, it will examine only those commodities that were important enough to influence the socio-political status of merchants.³⁹⁹ It therefore will not seek to chart the different trade networks, explore specific artefacts, or look in detail at the origins or destinations of each commodity. However, this study will differ from Reed's because in addition to exploring Athenian imports it will also highlight the economic importance of Athenian exports.⁴⁰⁰ These, it will be argued, were important to the state on account of the substantial amount of revenue they generated. The opening sections will examine Athenian imports, focusing in particular on the importation of grain, timber and slaves. The discussion will then move on to highlight the importance of Athenian exports. Although not suggesting that exports were as important as imports, it will be demonstrated that they were nevertheless vital to the Athenian economy and consequently helped raise the social standing and acceptance of the mercantile community. These sections will focus particularly on silver, olives and olive oil, and manufactured goods (such as pottery). Finally, this chapter will demonstrate that import and export taxes, and also harbour duties comprised a considerable proportion of the overall income of Athens, and as such, made the mercantile community a vital (and valued) component of the Athenian economy.

4.1 The Grain Trade

In order to assess the importance of the grain trade to Athens during the fourth century, it is first necessary to examine a number of other relevant factors. Firstly, it is important to demonstrate the centrality of grain to the Athenian diet and having established this, it is essential to calculate the population of Attica during this period and the volume of grain these people would consume. Finally, it is crucial to determine the quantity of grain Athens itself could produce, questioning how much of Attica was suitable for cultivation and whether the Athenians used a system of fallow. Although these questions are of interest to modern scholars, unfortunately none of the surviving texts attempts to answer them in any detail. This is particularly surprising

³⁹⁹ Reed (2003) 15-26. Reed, despite recognising that Athens intervened to benefit traders and not simply as a way of securing vital resources, is still content to argue that; "*On the other hand the foregoing (Austin-Naquet no.5) confirms Hasebroek's more general and basic contention that Athens' official interest in trade was limited to an 'import' interest.*"

⁴⁰⁰ Reed (2003) 52-53.

since food was of central importance to any ancient society. It is even more startling in relation to the fourth century when the subject of grain was part of the required agenda of each principal assembly and was discussed at least ten times each year.⁴⁰¹ With no regular population census, no attempt to calculate the productivity of arable land nor a record of the nutritional requirement of Attica's inhabitants, scholars have been forced to attempt reasonable reconstructions based on their best estimates. A number of scholars have attempted to answer some or all of these questions.⁴⁰²

4.1.1 Consumption

The most complete study of the centrality of cereals in the Greek diet is still the work of Foxhall and Forbes.⁴⁰³ These scholars based their study on extensive comparative nutritional analysis, concluding that the *choinix*, the most widely attested daily ration in classical times, is too high a consumption figure, except for adult males doing a substantial amount of physical activity. Furthermore, they concluded that the *choinix* should be understood as a standard of distributed quantity, part of which was consumed whilst the remainder was stored.⁴⁰⁴ The study indicated that cereals played a far more significant role in the Classical diet than was previously thought. Furthermore, it demonstrated that grain was more central in ancient diets than in our own, contributing as much as 70% to 75% of daily calories.⁴⁰⁵ Although it is impossible to differentiate between different age/sex/social groups in Athens, Foxhall and Forbes estimated that the consumption of a 'hypothetically typical' Greek

⁴⁰¹ Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43.4.

⁴⁰² For instance, Jardé (1925); Foxhall & Forbes (1982); Hansen (1985); Garnsey (1985) (1988); Osborne (1987); Sallares (1991); Isager and Skysgaard (1992); Whitby (1998); Bresson (2000); Oliver (2007); Moreno (2007).

⁴⁰³ Foxhall & Forbes (1982) 41-90.

⁴⁰⁴ Foxhall & Forbes (1982) 73, "*This is a very important distinction, for what a man is given as an allowance may not be what he actually eats; i.e., rations cannot be considered identical with consumption.*"

⁴⁰⁵ A low protein intake was supplemented by large rations of carbohydrates. Therefore, other important foodstuffs included fish, olives, cheese and wine. Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 75 "*Indeed, for some, gathered or grown food supplements may have helped eke out a limited supply of grain; foods such as: wild greens (e.g., mustard, dandelion, amaranthus, black nightshade, etc.) mushrooms, bulbs, pickled olives, dried figs and assorted vegetables*"; Sallares (1991) 301 "*The abundance of beans, lentils, chickpeas and other legumes in Mediterranean agriculture is a direct evolutionary consequence of an ecosystem in which plant nutrients are scarce, because of summer drought*"; Gallant (1991) 120-12, "*once it became clear that crop yields were going to be diminished, ancient peasants turned to their natural habitat as a valuable source of food. They had a wide range of resources from which to choose and an extensive body of folk knowledge about how to use them.*"

household was 15,496 calories per day, or about 237 kg of wheat per year (assuming grain provided 75% of these calories).⁴⁰⁶ Importantly, Moreno has shown that the grain tax law of 374/3⁴⁰⁷ suggests that the ancient strains of wheat and barely were 30% lighter than previously thought.⁴⁰⁸ Therefore, one *choinix* of wheat of 687 grams per day results in approximately 251 kg of wheat per capita, per year (or 7.6 *medimnoi* of wheat). This new understanding of Athenian weights results in a *choinix* whose nutritional value closely coincides with the average per capita nutritional requirements calculated by Foxhall and Forbes. The calculations of Foxhall and Forbes have therefore been widely adopted, most significantly by Bresson, Moreno, and Oliver.⁴⁰⁹

Conclusion One

The nutritional values determined by Foxhall and Forbes highlights the importance of grain to the Athenian economy and society. With grain comprising the staple part of every Athenian's diet, a constant supply was vital. As will be demonstrated, Attic agricultural land was, from an early period, unable to meet completely the population's demand for cereal crops. Consequently, the Athenians turned to inter-regional exchange, and inter-region merchants, to overcome the shortfall.

4.1.2 Population and Consumption

A) Population

Having demonstrated the centrality of grain in the Athenian diet it is crucial to determine the population that needed to be fed during the fourth century. The first obstacle to overcome when trying to calculate the total population of Attica is the lack

⁴⁰⁶ Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 49, 70-2. The figure 237 kg of wheat per person per year is higher than all other estimates: Jardé (1925) = 230kg; Garnsey (1985) (1988) = 175kg; Osborne (1987) = 200kg; Sallares (1991) = 175.

⁴⁰⁷ *GH* II 26, ll. 21-5, Rhodes & Osborne (2003) 118-123.

⁴⁰⁸ Moreno (2007) 31-32;

⁴⁰⁹ Bresson (2000) 183-210; Oliver (2007) 15-30; Moreno (2007) 31-32.

of a centralised register for much of the period. It is therefore difficult to determine accurately the number of citizens, metics and slaves in Attica for most of the fourth century. The two most comprehensive works on this subject are those by Hansen and Whitby.⁴¹⁰ Adult male citizens will be discussed first. The census undertaken by Demetrius of Phaleron c.317-307 is the only one we have from the fourth century and records that there were 21,000 Athenians, but both Hansen and Whitby are quick to point out that it is unclear whether this represents *all* citizens or only those liable for military service, or only those that met the new property qualifications of 1,000 drachmae.⁴¹¹ At the end of the Lamian war (322/321) Plutarch also puts the citizen population at 21,000, but this figure is disputed by Diodorus who claims a total of 31,000.⁴¹² Both record 9,000 full citizens with property over 2,000 drachmas, but disagree over the number of men disenfranchised by the Macedonian settlement – either 12,000 or 22,000. Although Demetrius may appear to corroborate Plutarch’s figure (or vice versa), Whitby has argued that after the Lamian war there was a substantial shift of population around the Aegean, with many impoverished Athenians being relocated to colonies in Thrace, and so he believes that Diodorus’ figure of 31,000 adult male citizens in 322/1 is the most plausible. This conclusion roughly agrees with that of Hansen, and even Garnsey has had to concede the strength of the argument.⁴¹³ Moreno has adopted Hansen’s calculation of 30,000, but Whitby’s slightly higher figure does find support in the number of men needed to run the *boule* and the surviving ephebic lists.⁴¹⁴ Hansen concluded that for the *boule* to operate legally, namely that no one could serve as president (*epistates*) more than once in his lifetime, Attica would need to have a population of 375-400 males citizens over the age of 30 each year.⁴¹⁵ However, Whitby suggests that the members of the *boule* tended to be relatively wealthy, of hoplite status or higher, and might be closer to 40

⁴¹⁰ Hansen (1985); Whitby (1998). Both come to roughly the same conclusions based on the available evidence. Other works on this subject include Garnsey (1985) (1988); Osborne (1987); Sallares (1991); Isager and Skysgaard (1992); Moreno (2007).

⁴¹¹ Athen. 6.272c = Ctesicles *FgrHist* 245 F1 for 317-307BC. Hansen (1985) 28-36; Whitby (1992) 109.

⁴¹² Plut. *Phoc.* 28.7; Diod. 18.18.5.

⁴¹³ Hansen (1985) 34-36; Garnsey (1988) 136. Whitby argues for a slightly higher figure of about 35,000 adult male citizens, whereas Hansen (1999) 93, opts for 30,000.

⁴¹⁴ Moreno (2007) 110-111. Strangely Moreno fails to consider Whitby’s work.

⁴¹⁵ Hansen (1985) 51-64; (1994) 306-308.

than 30 in age.⁴¹⁶ In order to establish the number of ephebes scholars combine the corpus of ephebic inscriptions with an estimate made by Demosthenes, reaching a total of 500 for the average size of the group who were in training to become hoplites.⁴¹⁷ The evidence for the *diaitetai* or public arbitrators, men of hoplite status in their sixtieth year, is also pertinent: an inscription from 325/4 records 103 names from all tribes, while the fragmentary list from 330/29 suggests a total of 100-150 men.⁴¹⁸ These figures would suggest that the resident hoplite element in the population of Athens during the fourth-century was around 15,000. Extrapolating from adult males in order to establish the total number of citizens involves estimating the number of wives and children of each man: the standard way of doing this is to multiply the number of males by four.⁴¹⁹ Using this method Hansen concluded that the average total citizen population in the fourth century, including women and children, was 100,000 (a figure accepted by Moreno), whilst Whitby reaches a figure between 120,000-140,000. Whereas, in the fifth century, Athenian interest in colonisation has been used to demonstrate a quick recovery from the Persian wars and as evidence for a rapid increase in population, during the fourth century the Athenian involvement in *cleruchies* and other forms of overseas property owning has been disregarded. If these activities are taken into consideration then it seems more sensible to adopt Whitby's figure in preference of Hansen's. Thus having examined both calculations, I consider Whitby's figure to be the more plausible.

B) Metics and Slaves

Similar calculations have to be made in order to determine metic and slave numbers.⁴²⁰ However, as Whitehead states "*The evidence here is meagre and*

⁴¹⁶ Whitby (1998) 110.

⁴¹⁷ Dem. 4.21; Sallares (1991) 120-21; Hansen (1985) 47-50. Hansen is reluctant to accept that *ephebes* represented future hoplites: (1994) 302-304.

⁴¹⁸ *JG II*² 1926, 2409, with Lewis (1955) 27-36. Whitby (1998) 111 & n.15, points out that "*By coincidence these respective age cohorts for men of hoplite status, of 500 aged 18, 400 aged about 35-40, and fewer over 100 aged 59 produce a very respectable age profile for the population, one that accords with demographic tables derived from better-attested more modern populations*".

⁴¹⁹ This demographic model was developed by Coale and Demeny (1966) and was created in order help determine the most likely patterns of age distribution in pre-census societies: both Hansen and Whitby use this model. Hansen (1985) 9-13, 64-69; Hansen (1999) 90-4; Whitby (1998) 111.

⁴²⁰ All the figures discussed in this section are highly speculative and are approximations due to the fact that the number of slaves and metics is likely to have fluctuated considerably. Xenophon

controversial, and frequently discussion of it has produced little common ground."⁴²¹

In the census of Demetrius it is recorded that 10,000 metics were residing in Athens around 317-307: however, it is likely that this figure is based on the records for those paying the *metoikion* tax.⁴²² Hansen accepts the figure 10,000 as being the likely number of able bodied, long term residents of Athens. He then multiplies this number according to the Coale and Demeny model (see above note 417) to give a total of 40,000 metics including women and children.⁴²³ Moreno accepts this conclusion and adopts the figure of 40,000 into his calculations.⁴²⁴ However, Whitby argues that Hansen's figure is too high and instead proposes 30,000 as an alternative. His reasons for this are: firstly that the census was taken at a time when the attraction of living in Athens was diminished (both by the political instability that followed Athenian defeat in the Lamian War and by the economic opportunities offered by the successor kings); secondly, that Athens was no longer the economic hub of the Aegean world and thus business opportunities were restricted; and finally because it is reasonable to conclude that metic numbers must have been considerably lower than they were in the fifth century (see Thuc. 2.13 6-7; 31.1-3).⁴²⁵ Both Hansen and Whitby have strong reasons for their estimates and thus the debate seems irresolvable. In recognition of this, I have accepted the figure 35,000 (i.e. the mid-point between the two figures) as being a good approximate average for the total number of metics in Athens during the fourth century.

The number of slaves is an even more contentious subject.⁴²⁶ The figure preserved in Demetrius' census (400,000) is considered "too fantastic to be

documents this phenomenon when he suggests that the Athenians should make the Piraeus a more attractive place to trade so as to encourage the return of metics who had avoided Athens during the Social War. Xen. *Por.* 2.1-5.

⁴²¹ Whitehead (1977) 97. For other discussions see Gomme (1933) 4-26; 72-73; Isager & Hansen (1975) 11-5; Hansen (1985) 31-4; Hansen (1999) 93-94; Whitby (1998) 111-113; Moreno (2007) 28-30.

⁴²² Whitehead (1977) 97, suggests that if this figure is based on the number of people paying the metic tax then it would include a small number of women

⁴²³ Hansen (1985) 31-34.

⁴²⁴ Moreno (2007) 29.

⁴²⁵ However, Whitby (1998) 110, does state "*I suspect that this total is on the low side for actual numbers of metics, but it may represent numbers present in Athens and requiring to be fed regularly.*"

⁴²⁶ For instance, there is disagreement over whether they were used in agriculture, how many were required to run Athenian mining operations, how many households owned slaves and how many slaves there were in commercial operations.

countenanced”, especially as it is still in doubt whether slaves were even counted for the census.⁴²⁷ The figure given by Hyperides, that there were more than 150,000 adult male slaves in Attica in the immediate aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea, is also problematic.⁴²⁸ Hansen is attracted by this figure, but he suggests that when Hyperides offers it he has in mind *all* slaves in Attica (i.e. men, women and children in all sectors of society).⁴²⁹ Whitby totally dismisses Hyperides’ figure as ‘exaggerated’, whilst Moreno believes it is too simplistic a calculation to be of use.⁴³⁰ Garnsey and Sallares opt for a much lower figure, both arguing for a number between 15-30,000, though in the case of Garnsey this relates to 323/2 when the overall population was at a relatively low level.⁴³¹ Moreno, although arguing for a figure lower than that of Hyperides, suggests there were 100,000 slaves in Attica during the mid-late fourth century, a much higher total than Garnsey and Sallares.⁴³² Moreno bases his figures on the calculations made by Sargent in his seminal work examining the slave population of Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries.⁴³³ Sargent concluded that the number of slaves varied at different periods, but stood in direct relation to the size of the free population and the general economic conditions. He therefore proposed that during the first half of the fourth century there were 32,000 slaves whilst by the end, there were approximately 65,000. Whitby on the other hand uses figures recorded in Xenophon’s *Poroi* to suggest a peak figure of approximately 100,000.⁴³⁴ Although it is difficult to determine with any precision the number of slaves in Attica during the fourth century, I am inclined to suggest a figure between 65,000 – 100,000 (with 100,000 representing the peak population).

⁴²⁷ Hansen (1985) 30-31; Cartledge (2002^b) 161; Whitby (2007) 113; Moreno (2007) 29-30.

⁴²⁸ Hyp. Fr. 29.

⁴²⁹ Hansen (1985) 30-31.

⁴³⁰ Whitby (1998) 113; Moreno (2007) 29.

⁴³¹ Garnsey (1988) 90; Sallares (1991) 60. These figures are not explicitly given but can be established from other figures provided.

⁴³² Moreno (2007) 29-30.

⁴³³ Sargent (1925) 126.

⁴³⁴ Xenophon proposes a body of state owned slaves to be hired out in the silver mines (*Por.* 4.13-39), in order for this scheme to work he envisages large numbers. He therefore suggests that the state should begin by purchasing 1,200 slaves annually to acquire a force of 6,000 within five to six years. Having achieved this, he suggests the state should increase numbers to 10,000 (*Por.* 4.23), with the final stage being to purchase three slaves for every Athenian citizen. Whitby recognises that these figures were exceptionally high, and therefore moderates them to eventually come up with his estimation of 100,000.

Conclusion Two

Combining these estimates would provide a resident population of mid-fourth century Athens in the range of 220,000-275,000, with times of prosperity and stability seeing the upper end of the scale. Generally, half the population was composed of citizens, the remainder being metics and slaves. This is significantly larger than studies such as Finley's and Garnsey's have suggested and, as will be demonstrated below, has a significant bearing on how we interpret the importance of the grain trade to fourth century Athenians.

4.1.3 Cultivable Land

The suggested figure of 2,400 km² as the total area of ancient Attica that could be cultivated is one adopted by all studies of ancient agriculture and the grain trade. This number is derived from Beloch, who suggested a figure of 2,527 km², minus the area of Oropus and Eleutheræ.⁴³⁵ Even as recently as 2007 Moreno and Oliver have accepted this figure as the most probable and thus this study will do the same.⁴³⁶ However, despite there being 2,400 km² of arable land, the poverty of Attic soil has long been recognised by both ancient and modern scholars:⁴³⁷ consequently, there has been much debate over the exact productivity of Attic farmland.

Jardé's monograph published in 1925 was the first to try to determine how much of Attic land was cultivable. He theorised that Attic land could sustain 33 people per km², he then went on to calculate that the total area of Attica was 2,400 km² and thus that Athenian agriculture could support a maximum population of 80,000.⁴³⁸ However, he concluded that in reality only about 20% of that land was cultivable and thus by the end of the archaic period Athens was no longer agriculturally self-sufficient. Furthermore, during the Classical period Athens was dependent on grain imports. Garnsey was the first to challenge Jardé's work. He was

⁴³⁵ Beloch (1886) 56-7

⁴³⁶ Moreno (2007) 11; Oliver (2007) 17-20.

⁴³⁷ Ar. *Mete.* 360b; Pl. *Crit.* 111b5; Plut. *Sol.* 22; Strabo 9.18; Thuc. 1.2; Hopper (1979) 147-163; Osborne (1987); Sallares (1991); Isager and Skydsgaard (1992); Burford (1993).

⁴³⁸ Jardé (1925) 143.

influenced heavily by Finley and sought to downplay the importance of inter-regional trade. Consequently he needed to prove that Athens was far more agriculturally independent than Jardé suggested.⁴³⁹ Garnsey adopted Jardé's 2,400km² for the approximate total area of cultivable land, but whereas Jardé argued that 20% of that land was cultivated, Garnsey suggested between 35-40%.⁴⁴⁰ Garnsey went on to suggest that, due to a system of crop rotation where high nitrogen pulses were planted to maintain soil fertility, Athens was able to use nearly all of her cultivatable land every year. Garnsey therefore argued that Attic land was capable of sustaining 55 people per km², roughly 132,000 people. This calculation not only far exceeded Jardé's but meant that during the 480s Athens was able to feed 100% of her population, 75% during the fourth century and more than 50% at the population peak during the fifth century.

Osborne presents similar arguments to those of Garnsey. Osborne, using the accepted figure of 2,400km² for the total area of land in Attica, also estimated that 40% of this land was being used for agriculture of some sort.⁴⁴¹ However, Osborne uses evidence from Theophrastus and land lease documents, to suggest there was widespread use of biennial fallow.⁴⁴² He therefore argued that the amount of arable land that could be devoted to cereals must be halved every year. He also suggested a much higher seed:yield ratio than Garnsey (1:10 vs. 1:3-1:4) and a lower population figure (Osborne suggests an average population size of 150,000 during the fifth and fourth centuries, whilst Garnsey estimates an average of 182,000). Osborne ultimately concluded that even in bad years, Attica could support a population of 150,000 people

⁴³⁹ Garnsey (1988). Finley argued that in the Greek world trade was socially marginal with most economies revolving around self-sufficiency and autarky. Finley (1973) 28-29; 33-34. Morris (1994) 361, took a slightly different approach by accepting Finley's substantivist view in relation to the social function of trade, industry and banking, but argued that this did not limit the scale of these activities or marginalise them.

⁴⁴⁰ Garnsey (1988) 90-93; Jardé (1925) 52-3. Garnsey justified this figure firstly by looking at the number of landowning hoplites and the amount of land they owned, secondly by suggesting that Jardé had failed to take into consideration terrace cultivation and thirdly the figures provided by the First-Fruits inscription from Eleusis (*IG II² 1627*).

⁴⁴¹ Osborne (1987) 41-46.

⁴⁴² Scholars who argue for Athens importing large quantities of grain = Austin (1994) 558-64; de Ste. Croix (1972) 46-9; Davies (1978) 59; Casson (1994) 521; Those scholars who argue for Athens being more self sufficient include Jardé (1925) 143; Garnsey (1988) 91; Osborne (1987) 46.

and therefore Athens normally never imported grain.⁴⁴³ By lowering the population figure and substantially increasing the seed:yield ratio, Osborne's results had the same minimising effect on grain imports as Garnsey's.

Sallares was the next to examine the agricultural productivity of Attica, like Garnsey he believed that Jardé had gravely underestimated the cultivatable land in Attica.⁴⁴⁴ Using agricultural data from a 1961 census of Greece, Sallares argued that about 30% of ancient Attica was cultivated (he also allowed for a maximum figure of 40% if Athens was to utilise extremely poor quality land).⁴⁴⁵ Sallares also accepted the idea of biennial fallow (dismissing Garnsey's alternative of using pulses and animal dung as fertiliser and thus avoiding having to leave land fallow) as impractical during the classical period.⁴⁴⁶ He therefore concluded that 15% of Attica was cultivable at any time. He then determined a seed:yield ratio of 1:3 –1:5, and a total production of 9,600-17,000 tons of grain per year. Then, like Garnsey, he calculated that the average person consumed 200 kg of grain per year and thus he concluded Attic agriculture could support a population of approximately 55,000-97,000. With his estimates of an average population of 183,000 this left a considerable shortfall that would need to be made up by imports. Whitby also concluded that Athens needed to import a considerable amount of grain.⁴⁴⁷ Although he shies away from providing definite figures he does, after discussing population figures and nutritional requirements, state: "*It seems that the traditional view holds: in a normal year the production of Attica and its dependent territories would probably not have fed more than half the resident population, so that the Athenians did have a substantial and continuing need for imported grain, even after a good year*".⁴⁴⁸ Moreno has been the latest scholar to analyse the Athenian grain supply during the fifth and fourth

⁴⁴³ Osborne has since distanced himself from these views by showing how dependent Pithecussae was on imported grain during the Eighth-Century. Osborne (2004) 39-54.

⁴⁴⁴ Sallares (1991) 73, 80, "*This need not invalidate the hypothesis proposed here because there is no doubt that Jardé seriously underestimated the proportion of Attica that could be cultivated*".

⁴⁴⁵ Like Jardé and Garnsey, Sallares accepted the figure 2,400 km² as the total cultivable area of Attica. Sallares (1991) 79, 310, 386.

⁴⁴⁶ Sallares (1991) 386.

⁴⁴⁷ Whitby (1998) 102-128. "*My wish is to redress the balance and to return the emphasis to the importance of the trade in grain.*" Despite disputing Garnsey's minimising of the Athenian need for imported grain, Whitby is content to accept Garnsey's lowest estimate that between 10-15% of Attica was cultivable in any given year. Whitby (1998) 106.

⁴⁴⁸ Whitby (1998) 118.

centuries. He concludes that despite being unable to calculate any of the variables with exactitude, the best estimate would suggest that Attica could sustain between 52,000 and 106,000 people, with a figure in the upper end of the scale being preferable.⁴⁴⁹ The results, he suggests, would seem to provide independent confirmation of Demosthenes' figure of 800,000 *medimnoi* (26,368 tons of wheat) as the yearly import of Athens during the mid-fourth-century.⁴⁵⁰

Conclusion Three

Although there is still debate as to the exact quantity of cereal crops Athens could cultivate in the fourth century, most scholars agree that the Athenians were forced to import some (on average between 500,000–800,000 *medimnoi* of grain). This thesis agrees with Sallares, Whitby and Moreno that during the fourth century Athens relied on large volumes of imported grain (most likely 700,000-800,000 *medimnoi*), a fact that is attested to by the legislation regulating the grain trade and the honours bestowed upon inter-regional merchants who imported large quantities of grain at cheap prices.

4.1.4 The Importance of the Grain Trade and Traders

As has been shown in the preceding section, the evidence for domestic agricultural output suggests that Athens was heavily dependent on grain imports, a point made by Demosthenes in his speech, *Against Leptines*⁴⁵¹. The contention of this study, therefore, is that Athens regularly imported substantial quantities of grain, even though precise figures are indeterminable. Furthermore, during the fourth century, the Athenian ideal was not merely to meet their immediate supply needs but to be able to command the import of enough grain to obtain a surplus. This surplus would then

⁴⁴⁹ Moreno (2007) 3-33. Moreno's estimates include: the total area of Attica 2,400 km; percentage of land cultivatable 35%; percentage actually cultivated 15% (taking into consideration biennial fallow); seed:yield 1:5; average population size 270,000; grain (wheat and barley) imported 44,000 tons. Moreno (2007) 10; 32.

⁴⁵⁰ Dem. 20.31. Garnsey (1988) 97, dismisses this source as unreliable, whereas Moreno's and Whitby's calculations provide a total far closer to that of Demosthenes.

⁴⁵¹ Dem. 20.31 "For you are aware that we consume more imported corn than any other nation. Now the corn that comes to our ports from the Black Sea is equal to the whole amount from all other places of export."

ensure that prices remained low and it could be stockpiled or sold on at a profit.⁴⁵² Having shown that Athenian agriculture was unable to meet the basic sustenance needs of the Attic population (suggesting a shortfall of roughly 800,000 *medimnoi* per year), the discussion will now show that the evidence pertaining to grain imports also supports this figure. Although the size of the annual requirement is impossible to calculate precisely, especially since it would vary from year to year, some rough estimates can be gained from evidence about supplies from the Black Sea. Demosthenes, for instance, states that Athens imported about 400,000 *medimnoi* from the Bosphorus; a figure he claims can be verified by the records of the grain wardens.⁴⁵³ Additionally, he claims that half of all the grain imported by Athens comes from the Kingdoms in the Bosphorus. Gomme suggests that, as Demosthenes was a politician, he was '*probably not speaking the truth*'. Gomme therefore concluded that Demosthenes, in order to over emphasise the importance of Leucon's services, was belittling the significance of non-Pontic imports, and thus he proposes an annual total of 1,200,000 *medimnoi*.⁴⁵⁴ Garnsey exploited the orators' uncertain credibility in the opposite direction, proposing that no conclusions about non-Pontic imports can be drawn from this figure since 400,000 *medimnoi* might represent an exceptional quantity imported in a bad year.⁴⁵⁵ Whitby on the other hand, although recognising a need to be cautious, argues that Leucon's status as a perpetual benefactor of Athens supports Demosthenes' claim about the importance of Black Sea imports. More recently, Moreno has combined Demosthenes' figure with one recorded by Strabo, to suggest that Athens did rely heavily on grain from this region.⁴⁵⁶ Strabo states that Leucon dispatched 2,100,000 *medimnoi* from Theodosia to Athens, a figure that equates to roughly 260,00 *medimnoi* per year in the eight years between the opening of the port shortly before 355, and Leucon's death in 349/8.⁴⁵⁷ These figures, it is argued by Moreno (and to a certain extent Whitby), are corroborated by two independent sources: Theopompus *FGH* 115 F292 and Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 162.

⁴⁵² Dem. 20.33 records that one of Leucon's grain gifts in year of shortage was substantial enough that Callisthenes sold some grain abroad. This re-sale by Callisthenes (the food controller) generated 15 talents of profit.

⁴⁵³ Dem. 20.30-33.

⁴⁵⁴ Gomme (1933) 32-33.

⁴⁵⁵ Garnsey (1998) 87.

⁴⁵⁶ Moreno (2007) 206-208.

⁴⁵⁷ Strabo 7.4.6;

In these accounts of Philip's capture of Hieron it is stated that between 180-230 merchant vessels loaded with grain for Athens were seized. By studying the size and carrying capacity of Greek merchant vessels it is possible to estimate that Philip captured between 600,000-800,000 *medimnoi* of grain heading for Athens. If we accept that Philip detained approximately 200 ships each with an average cargo of 120 tons, the fleet would be transporting about 600,000 *medimnoi*; however, if the ships averaged 160 tons, then the cargo could have been as large as 800,000 *medimnoi*.⁴⁵⁸ This provides some sort of perspective on Demosthenes' assertion of the importance of Leukon's exports of grain. The Hellespont was long recognised as a crucial part of the Athenian grain trade routes, as was shown in 405/4, and again in 387. Furthermore, the Athenian perception that they were heavily dependent on this region can be identified in Demosthenes' claim that if Philip gained mastery of the region, he would effectively control the Athenian food supplies.⁴⁵⁹

Grain was clearly a matter of public concern and unsurprisingly the topic was brought before the assembly once a month. Demosthenes demonstrates the extent of this concern when he records that if the grain trade routes were disrupted in any way, Athens was quick to dispatch her navy.⁴⁶⁰ Although grain imports were vital, it is still unlikely that the average Athenian would understand the grain supply in any great depth. Their best gauge of grain supplies seems to have been the price level in the markets, which would fluctuate in response to shortages or rumours of upcoming supply problems.⁴⁶¹ Whitby and Rathbone argue that what mattered most were 'impressions', since a belief that grain was in short supply would rapidly escalate into

⁴⁵⁸ The Hellenistic harbour regulations from Thasos (*SEG XVII 417*) provide a rough definition of small, medium and large ships: vessels of large carrying capacity of 2,000 *medimnoi* or less was considered as small (these vessels were used to traverse the shorter, coastal hugging trade routes), vessels which could carry 100-150 tons (or 2,500-3,750 *medimnoi*), were considered average size, whilst larger vessels were those which could transport 300-500 tons (7,500-8,750 *medimnoi*): Casson (1971) 170-175. Casson (1971) 183-184, concludes that the average size of vessels transporting grain to Athens in the fourth century was 120 tons (3,000 *medimnoi*). Whitby (1998) 124-125, suggests that Casson has under-estimated the average carrying capacity of grain ships and opts for an average carrying capacity of 160 tons (4,000 *medimnoi*).

⁴⁵⁹ Dem. 18.241.

⁴⁶⁰ Dem. 50.4-6.

⁴⁶¹ Lysias records such a situation in his speech *Against the Corn Dealers*, wherein consumers are shown as panicking in response to high prices, whilst the corn-dealers stockpile their grain in order to gain higher prices: Lys.22.8. However, as will be shown in Chapter Six, some individual Athenian orators were highly knowledgeable about the grain trade.

reality, as those who could afford to, increased their personal stores, while those with substantial reserves held back from the market in hope of higher prices.⁴⁶² The inefficiencies, or inequalities, of the distribution of grain within Attica should not be forgotten, since too neat an equation of supply and demand downplays the fact that numerous Athenians were living on subsistence rations whilst their better off neighbours enjoyed sufficiency or even surplus. During the fifth century Athenian naval domination of the Aegean ensured a relatively easy supply of grain, even though the annual requirement was somewhat greater than in the fourth. Having had their command economy destroyed the Athenians instead had to rely on a combination of protection, legislation and encouragement to ensure importation of sufficient amounts of cereals.⁴⁶³

Legislation was used to reinforce the considerable economic pull of Athens and thus encourage private traders to import grain vital to the Athenians. No resident of Athens, therefore, was to convey grain to anywhere other than the Athenian market, and no Athenian citizen, metic or individual under their control was to lend money on any ship that was not going to bring grain (or other specified commodities) to Athens.⁴⁶⁴ The importance of this decree is reflected in the penalty inflicted for infringement: death. Sadly, it is impossible to gauge the effectiveness of this law and owing to the nature of our legal evidence we hear only about infringements. Obviously Athenian laws could only be enforced upon residents, but it is clear (as has been shown in Chapter Two section 2.2.2) that the mercantile community was multinational in composition and thus other measures had to be used for those outside Athenian jurisdiction. Xenophon recommends that, in order to stimulate foreign merchants to trade with Athens, the Athenians should implement a number of measures including the rapid settlement of legal disputes, honorific treatment and better accommodation and amenities in the Piraeus.⁴⁶⁵ These measures will be discussed in detail in Chapters Five and Six.

⁴⁶² Whitby (1998) 119; Rathbone (1983) 49. Rathbone suggests that some crises at Athens may have been manufactured to further the ends of benefactors and orators.

⁴⁶³ de Ste. Croix (1972) 49; Sallares (1991) 299.

⁴⁶⁴ Dem. 34.37; 35.50-51; 58.8-9, 12; Lyc. *Leoc.* 27.

⁴⁶⁵ Xen. *Por.* 3.3-5; 12-13.

Interestingly the Athenians were to adopt some of these suggestions: thus in the mid-fourth century Athens changed her legal system to ensure that quicker judicial proceedings were available to merchants.⁴⁶⁶ The public building programme in the Lycurgan 'regime' in the 330s and 320s also seems to have been intended to help Athens preserve its attractiveness to traders at a time when Athenian pre-eminence was being challenged by developments in the East.⁴⁶⁷ Athens also implemented a system for honouring those merchants who provided gifts of grain to the state, or who sold their grain below market value.⁴⁶⁸ Special honours were accorded to the rulers of the Bosphorus kingdom who were often granted Athenian citizenship. In return, traders whose destination was Athens received preferential treatment from the Macedonian Kings when loading their cargoes and were at times exempt from the normal duty of one-thirtieth on the export of grain.⁴⁶⁹ Another measure Athens implemented to encourage traders to the Piraeus was the creation of grain convoys accompanied by military escorts. The purpose of these was to prevent the seizure of mercantile vessels by hostile or hungry states, or by pirates. Hopper suggests that piracy was so prevalent in the fourth century that it can be described as the 'great menace'.⁴⁷⁰ In addition to establishing a system of military escorts the Athenians also attempted to reduce piracy by fining those states that gave shelter to pirates (see Chapter Six section 6.3.2B).⁴⁷¹ A more permanent solution to the problem of piracy was the establishment of naval bases or colonies. That is why in 325/2 the Athenians dispatched a colony to the Adriatic with the stated purpose of reducing acts

⁴⁶⁶ *Ar. Ath. Pol.* 52.2. Cohen (1978) 114-129; Gernet (1938) 1-44; Calhoun (1965) 165. See also Chapter Six section 6.4 .

⁴⁶⁷ Garland (1987) 44; 62; 186;192. Lycurgus, who served as the Athenian minister of finance in 338/7, in addition to building a large number of triremes, brought to completion the construction of the naval arsenal and the ship-sheds, and carried out repairs on the Piraeus' defences. In order to ensure that Athens had enough grain at a time when Greece was facing a famine, Lycurgus encouraged the settlement of Egyptian and Cypriot merchants in the Piraeus (333BC) by proposing that they should be allowed to establish shrines to their native deities. *IG II²* 337.

⁴⁶⁸ See for example *IG II²* 360 (a). This system of honouring and rewarding respected merchants will be central theme of chapter Five.

⁴⁶⁹ *Dem.* 20.29-31; *IG II²* 212.

⁴⁷⁰ Hopper (1979) 81.

⁴⁷¹ See for example *Dem.* 12.2; 58.53-56. In *Dem.* 58 it is recorded that the Melians, contrary to a common decree against piracy, had allowed privateers to have unrestricted access to their harbour. As a result of their flagrant disregard for the treaty the Melians were now being forced to pay a fine of ten talents. The inference of this speech is that allies of Athens had agreed, or been forced, to accept a mutual pact against piracy, with each state being held accountable for the suppression of piracy within its own sphere of influence.

of piracy against merchants transporting grain to the Piraeus.⁴⁷²

Conclusion Four

The evidence pertaining to the Athenian grain trade supports the hypothesis that, on average, Athens annually imported approximately 800,000 *medimnoi* of grain. This heavy dependency on imported grain resulted in the Athenians taking an active interest in the trade and traders that kept them supplied. Consequently, grain supplies became a matter of public concern and were thus the subject of a monthly discussion in the assembly. Moreover, in order to encourage grain merchants to the Piraeus, the Athenians sought to protect and reward those men who continued to trade with them on favourable terms. Although these measures were implemented in order to secure vital supplies of food, they also demonstrate recognition of the important role played by merchants in ensuring the economic well-being of the state. In Chapter Five it will be shown that these services were of such importance that they gained merchants the genuine respect and gratitude of the state.

4.2 The Trade in Timber and Pitch

Greece was in the fourth century, as it is today, a sparsely forested country. However, in the age of Demosthenes, men could remember that, in the not too distant past, the mountain slopes of Attica had been covered with trees, wood which was subsequently harvested in order to meet the growing demands for charcoal by the Laurion silver mines, and timber for the shipwrights (Pl. *Critias* 111 A-D). Although Athens did import wood for her building projects (as clearly demonstrated by the accounts of the Eleusinian Commissioners for 329/8 BC)⁴⁷³, the vast majority of the timber imported by Athens was used in the production of warships and merchant

⁴⁷² *JG II*² 1629. The decree emphasises that the purpose of the settlement is to provide Athens with their own commerce and grain transport, and, through the provisioning of their own naval station, defend themselves and other Greeks against the Tyrrhenians. Rhodes & Osborne (2007) 525; Harding (1985) 148-150.

⁴⁷³ *JG II*² 1672.

vessels.⁴⁷⁴ In order to construct a typical trireme the Athenians needed fir, silver or white pine, cedar (probably Syrian) and pine (probably Aleppo). Keels of triremes were usually made of oak or beech, a tough wood being needed for the constant beaching of the vessel.⁴⁷⁵ For bentwood, Aleppo pine was used on account of its lightness, but mulberry, manna-ash, sycamore and acacia, elm or white pine were often preferred for their superior toughness. Plane wood was used sparingly because it was prone to decay and warping. The cutwater and cathead were made of manna-ash, mulberry or elm, whilst the masts, yardarms and oars were constructed from silver pine.⁴⁷⁶

During the first half of the fifth century Attica had produced enough timber to meet most of her demand. However, by the time of the occupation of Attica between 413-404 BC, timber had become so scarce in Southern Greece that the Boeotians robbed the Athenian houses of their timbers.⁴⁷⁷ Just two years previously, Alcibiades upon his defection to Sparta informed the Spartans that one of the primary objectives of the Sicilian expedition was to obtain the forests in Southern Italy.⁴⁷⁸ The vast scale of deforestation had been brought about by the increase in demand for naval vessels to support the Athenian thalassocracy. Haas has convincingly argued that even before the time of Themistocles Athenian timber resources were becoming stretched and thus the construction of a large trireme fleet was difficult.⁴⁷⁹ Owing to this scarcity of wood, Borza calculates that during the fifth century the Athenian navy had a vast need for imported timber.⁴⁸⁰ This need was to increase during the fourth century, for whereas during the period 480-410 BC Athens had approximately 200 naval vessels,

⁴⁷⁴ Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* ii.11.

⁴⁷⁵ Michell (1962) 279; Davison (1947) 18-24; Casson (1971) 85-92; Morrison (1941) 14-44; (1979) 53-63. The chief problem was the supply of fir and Syrian cedar, of which the reserves were slender (Theoph. *HP.* 4.5.5; 5.8.1-2.); thus Athens looked to Thessaly and Macedonia where supplies were more plentiful.

⁴⁷⁶ Theoph. *HP.* 4.1.2; 4.2.8; 4.5.5; 5.7.1; 5.8, 1-2.

⁴⁷⁷ *Hell. Oxy.* 37.4.

⁴⁷⁸ Thuc. 6.90. Thucydides 2.81, records that by 430/29 Phormio had taken control of Naupactus in order to prevent any ships from entering or leaving the Corinthian Gulf. Michell (1960) 281, argues that this was a deliberate strategy designed to prevent Corinth from importing ship building materials. Furthermore, Thucydides 4.108 states that Brasidas' campaign in Chalcidice and his capture of Amphipolis in 424 were deliberate attempts to cut Athens off from her timber supplies in Macedonia.

⁴⁷⁹ Haas (1985) 37-46.

⁴⁸⁰ Borza (1987) 34. Borza estimates that, at any given time during the fifth century, Athens needed 300,000 oars.

Gabrielsen suggests that from the period 350 to 323/2 the number of Athenian vessels was considerably higher than 250, perhaps even as high as 380.⁴⁸¹

By the fourth century therefore Athens can be identified as importing large quantities of timber, most of which came from Macedon.⁴⁸² Consequently, when relations with Macedon were strained or broken, as they were during the reigns of Philip and Alexander, different suppliers had to be found. A speaker in the Athenian assembly during the early stages of Alexander's eastern campaign states that it was difficult for the Athenians to get timber for the fleet as it now had to travel a long distance (possibly from south Italy).⁴⁸³ Due to this reliance on timber imports the Athenians made every effort to monopolise the trade in wood as part of their general commercial policy. Pseudo-Xenophon informs us that if any country possessed significant quantities of timber, iron, copper, wax, pitch or hemp (i.e. those commodities needed for the construction of naval vessels) then they were compelled to sell them to Athens.⁴⁸⁴ Additionally, those traders who brought large quantities of cheap timber to Athens were rewarded with gifts and honours. Although dating to just outside the period covered by this thesis, two inscriptions *IG I³ 182* (c.410/407) and *IG I³ 117* (c.407/406), record that two men, Phanosthenes, a metic, and Archelaos of Macedon, were honoured for gifting Athens with imported timber and oar spars. The dates of these two inscriptions are important, since Athens had lost a large part of its fleet due to the destruction of the Sicilian expedition. Moreover, since Athens could no longer expect to import ship's timbers from Sicily, its sole supply was now from Macedon. Archelaos not only provided Athens with timber but also provided the additional services of allowing Athenian shipbuilders to go to Macedon to construct their ships, rather than shipping the timber to Athens over seas that the weakened

⁴⁸¹ Gabrielsen (1994) 126-9. The approximate figure of 380 triremes matches almost perfectly with the 372 warship slipways discovered by Blackman (1982) 204-5. This approximate figure is also suggested by Amit (1965) 24-7, and Cawkwell (1984) 334-345.

⁴⁸² Andoc. 2.11; Dem. 17.28; Dem. 19.114;145 ;265; Dem. 49.26-30; 33-42, 59-61; Xen. *Hell.* 6.1; 11. Theophr. *Char.* 23.4; Theophr. *HP* 4.5.5; 5.8. Some wood was also imported from Thrace and Southern Italy (Diod. Sic. 22.58.4; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.16).

⁴⁸³ Dem. 17.28. Once the disruption of Alexander's invasion of the east had begun to fade it was again possible for the Athenians to look eastwards for her timber supplies. Therefore, in 307/06, Demetrius and Antigonus of Syria sent the Athenians so much timber it was possible for them to construct a fleet of around 100 triremes (Plut. *Demetr.* 10. See also *IG II/III² 1492*, 120 sqq.).

⁴⁸⁴ Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* ii.11-13.

Athenian navy may not be able to secure.⁴⁸⁵ These inscriptions demonstrate that by the beginning of the fourth century, when Athens faced shortages of timber, those men who facilitated its import could be rewarded and honoured in the same manner as those men who imported grain. Therefore despite the exact volume of the timber trade being unknown, it is sufficient to state that during the fourth century Athens relied heavily on timber from abroad and that, as a consequence, the men importing wood became valuable to the state.

Another important material in the construction of ships is pitch. In the *Moralia* Plutarch records a dinner table discussion debating the reason why the *pitys*-pine, which was used for the victor's wreath at the Isthmian festival, was sacred to both Poseidon and Dionysus.⁴⁸⁶ After a lengthy deliberation, it was finally agreed that the association with Poseidon was due to the value of *pitys* in the construction of ships. In order to make any vessel seaworthy, a shipwright was required to coat the hull in pitch and resin. *Pitys* (coastal pine) and kindred trees, *peuke* (mountain pine) and *strobilos*), produce the most suitable wood, pitch and resin for shipbuilding. Meiggs has used Plutarch's conversation to point to the importance of pitch in the Greek and Roman world.⁴⁸⁷ The need for pitch for naval and merchant shipping is demonstrated in the sources. For instance, when the Macedonian king, Amyntas III, during the early years of the fourth century, granted permission for the cities of Chalcidice to export timber from Macedon, he included pitch in the agreement.⁴⁸⁸ Interestingly, in this treaty pitch actually precedes the timber. With most of the best-quality pitch coming from overseas, the Athenians would again be forced to use trading agreements to ensure they could import sufficient quantities to meet demand.⁴⁸⁹ Unfortunately, no such agreements or treaties survive but in all probability they are likely to be similar

⁴⁸⁵ *IG I³* 117, ll. 26-28. Meiggs and Lewis (1969) 279 no. 91. Since the construction of any vessel required the collection of materials spread over a wide geographical area, it was not possible to construct the ships where the timber was felled. As a result, timber was carried by ship or floated to Athens. The accounts of the dockyard superintendents show that all Athenian warships were assembled in the Piraeus (*IG II²* 1604.32). Meiggs (1982) 334-335; see also Isager & Hansen (1975) 29-31.

⁴⁸⁶ *Plut. Mor.* 676a.

⁴⁸⁷ Meiggs (1982) 467-468.

⁴⁸⁸ *SIG* 135; *Tod GHI* 2. 111.10; Rhodes & Osborne 12.

⁴⁸⁹ Theophrastus (*HP* 9.2.5) draws attention to the quality of pitch from pines on Mount Ida, Strabo (6.2) records the superiority of pitch from Cisalpine Gaul and Spain, whilst Hiero of Syracuse (*Athen.* 206) favoured pitch from the Rhone valley when constructing his super-sized merchantman.

in function and form to those securing the ruddle supplies discussed in Chapter Six Section 6.3.2A.

Conclusion Five

Timber was a vital natural resource that the Athenians needed to import in considerable quantities in order to meet domestic demand. The Athenians therefore made every effort to monopolise wood as part of their general commercial policy. Moreover, as with grain, in order to encourage merchants to transport timber to the Piraeus, the Athenians sought to protect and reward those men who continued to trade with them on favourable terms. Outside the importation of grain, the import of timber was the service most frequently honoured by the Athenians and it is possible to demonstrate that a number of merchants trading in timber could gain the genuine respect and gratitude of the state.⁴⁹⁰

4.3 The Import of Slaves

Slaves were an integral part of the Athenian economy. Although the extent of slave workers in the agricultural sector is hard to determine, in other areas of the economy, such as mining and manufacturing, the extensive use of slaves is clear.⁴⁹¹ The archaeological evidence from the Laurion mines, when combined with figures provided by the literary sources, suggests that at times of high extraction upwards of 10,000 slaves were employed in mining operations.⁴⁹² In the manufacturing sector it is possible to identify a range of businesses: from small workshops run by between 10 and

⁴⁹⁰ See Chapter Five section 5.3.1A & C.

⁴⁹¹ There are two broad positions currently taken regarding the use of slavery in agriculture: each of these may be held in a more or less extreme form. The first view, the minimalist, argues that slavery was not used extensively on Attic farms; rather poor freemen made up the majority of the workforce (see Jones (1957) 3-20; Osborne (1985) 142ff.). The more extreme subscribers to the minimalist approach suggest that even the wealthy made little use of slave labourers on their estates, instead preferring to employ seasonal workers (see Sallares (1991) 54-55). The second view, the maximalist, suggests that slave labour was frequently used by farmers (see Sinclair (1991) 196ff); the hard-line proponents argue that even poor farmers made use of slaves on their small land-holdings (see Jameson (1977-8) 122-46; de Ste. Croix (1981) 505-506; Garlan (1988) 60-4). Fisher (1993) 37-47, concludes tentatively that a less extreme version of the maximalist view is the most plausible (with the important qualification that the extent of slave ownership fluctuated over time). The evidence present by Fisher is compelling and it is his model which has been adopted by this study.

⁴⁹² Xen. *Por.* 4,14; *Ap.* 2.5. Jones (1982) 169-83; Fisher (1993) 49-52; Kakavoyannis (2001) 365-80.

12 slaves to large factories operated by over 150 slaves.⁴⁹³ It is also possible to identify significant numbers of slaves working in the banking and trading sectors (see Chapter Two), as public slaves,⁴⁹⁴ and in the marble quarries.⁴⁹⁵ In addition to slaves working in the economic sectors there were those engaged in the domestic setting,⁴⁹⁶ or who worked in the entertainment industry such as prostitutes.⁴⁹⁷ What such a brief and sweeping overview of slavery reveals is its centrality to the Athenian economy and society. Consequently, Athens needed to regularly import large numbers of slaves in order to meet demand.

In order to estimate the number of slaves that Athens had to import every year, we have to make many assumptions such as the total number, their age distribution, and the proportion of slaves who were bred at home. As many of these assumptions cannot be easily ascertained, the resulting estimate of slave imports is necessarily imprecise. However, the purpose of the exercise is not to obtain a precise figure for the number of slaves imported, but to determine whether Athens was heavily dependent on trade to meet its need for slaves. If we accept that in the fourth century Athens had a slave population of between 65,000-100,000 (see above section 4.1.2A), and that a slave's working life was an approximate maximum of 25, then Athens, using the calculation proposed by Isager and Hansen, must have been importing at least 3,000 slaves per year.⁴⁹⁸ Even though this figure is approximately half that suggested by Isager and Hansen, it is nevertheless a substantial figure, and one that cannot have been met solely by military ventures. Amemiya approached the problem

⁴⁹³ An illustrative example of a small workshop is the shoemaker's owned by Timarchos, which employed 9-10 slaves and a slave overseer (Aeschin. 1.97). Larger workshops include Lysias' shield manufacturing plant which employed 150 slaves (Lys. 12), Demosthenes' father's knife-making factory (which employed 32 knife-makers) and couch manufacturers (which employed 20 or so slaves) (Dem. 27.9) and Pasion's shield workshop that was worth over one talent a year (Dem. 36.11).

⁴⁹⁴ Most public slaves were engaged in menial work such as temple repairs, road building, street cleaning or working in the public mint. However there were other, more skilled jobs, that could be done by public slaves. For instance, the Scythian archers, the manager of the coins, weights and measures, keepers of the archives, clerks and assistants to the council. Glotz (1926) 211-214; Westermann (1984) 9-11; Amemiya (2007) 28-36.

⁴⁹⁵ Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977) no.73.

⁴⁹⁶ See for instance Xen. *Oec.* 9; Fisher (1993) 53-55.

⁴⁹⁷ Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 50; Athen. 569d-f.

⁴⁹⁸ Isager and Hansen (1971) 31, Isager and Hansen argue that Attica in the fourth century had 150,000 slaves, each with a maximum working life of 25 years. They therefore calculate that due to death and manumission, Athens needed to import at least 6,000 slaves per year. If we accept an *average* slave population of roughly 75,000 (approximately half of that suggested by Isager and Hansen), we arrive at the figure of approximately 3,000 for the number of slaves being imported annually.

by using a statistical model.⁴⁹⁹ He therefore seeks to determine the hazard function,⁵⁰⁰ survival function,⁵⁰¹ and age distribution of slaves, and then analyse the relationship between the three. Having inputted a variety of totals for the average number of slaves, their age distribution, the proportion which were bred at home and different hazard and survival figures, Amemiya concludes that on average during the fourth century, Athens needed to replace between 5,000-7,000 slaves annually, of which approximately 5/6th had to be imported. Amemiya's findings further highlights the importance of regular imports of slaves.

One further question that must be answered before delving into an investigation of the slave trader is, were most slaves in Greece obtained "externally" (largely by purchase from outside the Greek world or its fringes), or "internally" (largely by Greek military activity or piracy)? This question has been discussed by a number of scholars including Finley, Garland, Pritchett, Ducrey, Isager and Hansen, Wiedemann and Reed.⁵⁰² On one side of the debate stand Finley, Garland, Isager and Hansen and Reed, who all, to differing degrees, downplay the importance of military activity as a way of obtaining slaves.⁵⁰³ Reed, although not offering precise figures for the number of slaves, suggests that even the lowest estimate for Athens in the fourth century places them in the tens of thousands. Combine this figure with the need for slaves by other states and Reed's suggestion that the "*Greek states relied principally on long-distance "external" exchange to meet these needs (on account that it provided a more regular supply and larger supply than did more haphazard means such as wars and piracy)*", becomes more persuasive.⁵⁰⁴ Finley argues that after c.600 BC most slaves in Greece were non-Greeks from the Danubian basin, the Black Sea region, and barbarian Asia Minor, identifying Ephesos and Byzantion as the primary

⁴⁹⁹ Amemiya (2008) 87-91.

⁵⁰⁰ The hazard function is defined as the proportion of people who die between different times (i.e. between birth and 10 or between the ages of 10 –20).

⁵⁰¹ The survival function is the proportion of people still alive at a given age.

⁵⁰² Ducrey (1968) 74-91; 131-9; 238-45; Isager & Hansen (1975) 31-34; Finley (1981) 173-4; Wiedemann (1981) 106-121; Garland (1987) 13-20; Reed (2007) 20-25.

⁵⁰³ Finley (1981) 174; Isager and Hansen (1975) 33 "*Most slaves in Athens were, however, barbarians. Of the forty-five slaves in the auction accounts, thirty-one are of barbarian origins*"; Garland (1987) 13-15; Reed (2003) 22.

⁵⁰⁴ Reed (2003) 22.

outlet marts.⁵⁰⁵ Isager and Hansen identify that the auction accounts of 414 BC, when combined with the fourth century inscriptions found in the mining districts of southern Attica, can be used to demonstrate that the majority of slaves were of barbarian origin.⁵⁰⁶

*This chart lists the number and ethnicities of slaves identified by Meiggs in the auction accounts of 414 BC alongside those identified by Lauffer in the corpus of fourth century mining inscriptions.*⁵⁰⁷

	Meiggs	Lauffer
Greek	14	3
Thrace	12	2
Caria	7	1
Scythia	3	-
Syria	2	1
Illyria	2	-
Macedon	1	1
Lydia	1	-
Phrygia	1	8
Cappadocia	1	1
Colchis	1	-
Paphlagonia	-	5
Ethiopia	-	1
Bithynia	-	1
Persia	-	2
Total	45	26

This conclusion fits with the evidence from the comedies of Aristophanes and Menander in which we are introduced to slaves mostly from Thrace,⁵⁰⁸ Phrygia,⁵⁰⁹ Caria,⁵¹⁰ Paphlagonia⁵¹¹ and Syria.⁵¹² Garlan's analysis of non-Greek names among slaves in Greece also supports this position. Garlan argues that a preference for

⁵⁰⁵ Finley (1981) 167-175, 271-273. For Ephesos he cites Hdt. 8.105 whilst for Byzantium he references Strabo 4.38.1-4.

⁵⁰⁶ Meiggs and Lewis (1988) no.79.

⁵⁰⁷ Meiggs and Lewis (1988) 79; Lauffer (1956) 68; 124-28.

⁵⁰⁸ Ar. *Ach.* 273; *Vesp.* 828; *Thesm.* 279, 293. Men. *Aspis* 242-5; *Her.* 13; 68, *Dys.* 410; *fr.* 805

⁵⁰⁹ Ar. *Vesp.* 433; *Ran.* 1146; *Av.* 523; 762, 1244, *Fr.* 56; Men. *Aspis* 206; *Fr.* 928.

⁵¹⁰ Ar. *Av.* 764.

⁵¹¹ Ar. *Eq.* 2.

⁵¹² Ar. *Ran.* 1146; Men *Epit.* 94;

barbarians, coupled with an increasing reluctance to enslave fellow Greeks, meant that the majority of slaves, during the fourth century at least, had originated from outside the Greek world. Furthermore, Garland suggests that the prevalence of slavery meant that the only way of acquiring non-Greek slaves in sufficient quantities to meet demand was through barter and purchasing transactions on the fringes of the Greek world.⁵¹³ He supports this conclusion by pointing to the fact that slavery flourished in precisely the same poleis that had strong inter-regional trading networks (these include Athens, Chios, Corinth and Aegina). Furthermore, Andocides records that the Attic police force consisted of 300 Scythian slaves.⁵¹⁴ All these sources can be interpreted as suggesting that Athens preferred to import her slaves from the North and East, Thrace, the Black Sea regions, and from the interior of Asia Minor and Syria. Of slaves imported from the west, we only have mention of those from Illyria and Sicily.⁵¹⁵

Next we need to assess whether the slave trade was in any way specialised and thus operated by professionals. Reed, taking a stance opposite to that of Harris, suggests that in the classical period a case can be made for specialisation.⁵¹⁶ Reed recognises that Athens imported two vital items from the Black Sea region, grain and slaves, but proposes that the two types of commerce were operated by different groups. His reasoning for this conclusion is that the grain trade was financed by bottomry loans, whereas the slave trade was not, and thus, in his opinion, the two types of commerce would not overlap. Furthermore, Reed opts for slave traders who had personal connections in various regions outside the Greek world proper.⁵¹⁷ The logistics of, and time consumed by, such long-distance inter-regional trade, would in all probability, require men who made slave-trading their principal occupation, which again supports Reed's suggestion of specialist slave traders. Furthermore, the large and persistent demand for slaves in the poleis of Classical Greece provided steady work for such merchants. The only concrete example we have of a specialised slave

⁵¹³ Garland (1987) 13-15.

⁵¹⁴ And. 3.5.

⁵¹⁵ Ar. *Eccl.* 867; Men. *Dys.* 393.

⁵¹⁶ Reed (2003) 22-23; Harris (1980) 129.

⁵¹⁷ A suggestion first raised by Finley (1977) 163.

trader is Panionios of Chios who is mentioned by Herodotus.⁵¹⁸ Panionios was reputed to be a super-specialist merchant who traded exclusively in eunuchs.

The exception to professional slave traders are those merchants who followed military ventures in order to purchase any slaves or plunder generated by the venture. Since armies or fleet on campaign required provisioning, merchants who accompanied a military venture often traded in a variety of commodities. The men who provisioned military ventures fell into two groups; firstly those men described in Chapter Two Section 2.2-2.3.6 who were part of the mercantile community, secondly merchants from the area in which the army or fleet was assembled.⁵¹⁹ The official attitude of the Athenians towards those who supplied their army or fleets is likely to have been the same as those discussed throughout the rest of this thesis (i.e. that the Athenians recognised the important services offered by these merchants and thus responded accordingly).⁵²⁰ This situation is summed up neatly in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, when Cyrus, expressing some very Greek sentiments, welcomes the *emporoi* who wish to follow his army, offering loans to the respectable needy, as well as gifts and honours to those who do their job well.⁵²¹ This system of honours and rewards mirrors the one operated by the Athenians, a fact which once again undermines the perception that inter-regional merchants were universally seen in negative terms.

Conclusion Six

Athens can be shown to have imported annually approximately 3,000-5,000 slaves in order to ensure that both the economic and domestic sectors were fully supplied. Although a small number of slaves would have been acquired internally (i.e. by military ventures or piracy), the vast majority were obtained externally (i.e.

⁵¹⁸ Hdt. 8.105.

⁵¹⁹ See for example Xen. *Anab.* 5.6.19-21, who records that his troops relied upon the services of Sinopean and Herakleot merchants during their march along the southern coast of the Black Sea.

⁵²⁰ Furthermore, in a manner reminiscent of the grain trade, the Athenians took an active interest in those who provisioned their armed forces. We therefore find public officials (*tamiai*) being regularly appointed by the state to accompany military expeditions and ensure that adequate provisions were being provided. Pritchett (1971) 37-8. Arist. *Oec.* 2.2.8.1347.

⁵²¹ Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.38-39.

through purchase from outside the Greek world). This need for slaves obtained externally served to make slave traders an important component within the Athenian economy. Although not as valued as either grain or timber merchants, slave traders nevertheless performed a vital service and generated a considerable amount of revenue (see below section 4.5). Cyrus' positive opinion of slave traders who follow his military ventures, as expressed in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, appears to be recognition of the important services these men provided the state. This sentiment again serves to undermine the belief that merchants were marginalized socially and politically.

4.4 Athenian Exports

Having shown that Athens relied on a large volume of vital imports, I shall now highlight the potential importance of exports in helping to pay for these commodities. Although there are very few written sources detailing the exports of Athens, archaeological evidence can be used to build up a partial picture. For example, when written sources provide insufficient details it is possible to identify Athenian exports through the archaeological discovery of finds such as coins and vases. Although we know very little about Athenian exports, it will be demonstrated below that, contrary to previous opinion, some commodities, during the fourth century, produced revenue that was vital to the Athenian economy. The following sections will therefore discuss those commodities which were a) important to the Athenian economy as a whole and b) illuminated by archaeological evidence. These sections will therefore focus primarily on olives and olive oil, honey, manufactured goods and silver.

4.4.1 Olives and Olive Oil

Olives were, aside from grain, the most important crop in classical Greece. Olive oil was an indispensable foodstuff since animal fats were rarely used. Furthermore, perfumed oil was utilised in cleaning and anointing the body and was

the primary fuel used by the Greeks for artificial lighting. Lohmann argues, “*The intensive terracing of nearly all available slopes for the cultivation of olives is of the greatest importance in the fields of economic and social history*”.⁵²² Although the poor soil of Attica could be used to grow olive trees, Sallares demonstrates that in order to gain a surplus to export, Athenian farmers would need to use at least some of their fertile land.⁵²³ Apart from a dubious law of Solon recorded by Plutarch in his *Life of Solon*, the only uncontroversial written source we have for the export of olive oil from Athens is from the fourth century comic writer, Athenaeus.⁵²⁴ Athenaeus records that a perfumed olive oil was the characteristic export of Athens.⁵²⁵ Demosthenes’ speech *Against Macartatus*, can also be interpreted as demonstrating the importance of olives/olive oil as an export crop. In this speech, it is recorded that no Athenian was permitted to fell more than two trees per year.⁵²⁶ One reason for this is that by the time of the speech (c.361/0) Athens was using her olive/oil exports to the Black Sea region as a way of offsetting the cost of her increased grain imports. Although the destination of Athenian exports is difficult to prove conclusively (due to a scarcity of archaeological evidence),⁵²⁷ the Black Sea seems a reasonable option because of its unsuitability to the cultivation of olives.⁵²⁸ As a result, the Greek population of these coastal cities had to import any olive oil they required. Lohmann argues that because Athenian olive oil was of the highest quality Athens was able to export significant quantities to the Black Sea.⁵²⁹ Whitley agrees with Lohmann’s conclusion, using the

⁵²² Lohmann (1992) 51. Foxhall (2007) 17-18, argues against this stance suggesting that the importance of olives and olive oil to the Athenian economy has been overstated.

⁵²³ Isager and Hansen (1975) 36-37; Hopper (1979) 93-94; Sallares (1991) 304-309; Isager and Skydsgaard (1992) 38-39; Hanson (1998) 55-67; 222-223.

⁵²⁴ Plut. *Sol.* 24. Plutarch records that Solon passed a law which prohibited the export of any crop but olives/olive oil. Ath. 27 E and 688 f.

⁵²⁵ It is also probable that Phormio exported perfumed oil to the Bosphorus. Phormio is recorded by Demosthenes as transporting merchandise designated as ‘*ropos*’ (Dem. 34.9). This word is in part a generic term that means ‘goods’ with the connotation of ‘cheap’. However, it can also mean more specifically ‘perfumes’ and ‘dyes’ (Strabo 4.5.3; Arist. *Mir.* 844a19). Since Chrysippus must seek out Phormio in the perfume-dealers’ quarter of Athens in order to present the summons (Dem., 34.13), it is reasonable to argue that Phormio is involved in the trade of perfumed oil.

⁵²⁶ Dem. 43.71.

⁵²⁷ Olives were presumably exported in unpainted and un-stamped amphorae meaning that it is extremely difficult to distinguish such imported pottery from its local counterpart. Consequently, archaeologists are unable to identify any substantial evidence that can help illuminate the export of olive oil.

⁵²⁸ Xenophon comments twice about the unsuitability of soil and climate for the cultivation of olives in the Black Sea region. Xen. *Anab.* 6.4.6; 6.6.1; Polybius also passes a similar comment “*But they also absorb the surplus of our own countries, namely olive oil and every type of wine*” (4.38).

⁵²⁹ Lohmann (1992) 51-54.

archaeological material from southern Attica, in particular the deme of Atene, to illustrate the point that during the fourth century agricultural practices were being diversified. The strongest evidence for diversification is the existence of large numbers of terraces: terracing was both labour-intensive and costly and would only be justified by the production of cash crops, most typically olives or olive oil.⁵³⁰ These conclusions agree with those of Moreno who examined olive oil production in the Attic deme, Euonymon. Using aerial photography, Moreno was able to demonstrate that in Euonymon during the fourth century there was a dramatic intensification of olive cultivation. Osborne, in his wealth index of the Attic demes, places Euonymon well above the average;⁵³¹ Moreno concludes that the only explanation for this deme's material wealth is olive cultivation and oil production.⁵³² Moreover, using the work of Osborne, Amouretti and Lohmann, Moreno calculates that an average harvest of olives would produce at least 560 tons of oil.⁵³³ The profitability of this industry is clear with the average price of oil being 12 dr, per *metretes*, 60 tons would be worth 30 talents.⁵³⁴ However, if this oil were sold in the Black Sea it would command a price three times that in Attica.⁵³⁵ The high value of oil supports Amamiya's conclusion that exports were a vital source of revenue for the Athenian economy.

4.4.2 Honey

Another profitable agricultural product that could easily be combined with the production of the olive was honey.⁵³⁶ Honey was the prime sweetener of the ancient world and was a famous product of Mt. Hymettos.⁵³⁷ Much of the archaeological evidence for the production of honey is found in areas of olive cultivation. Euonymon

⁵³⁰ Whitley (2001) 377-78.

⁵³¹ Osborne (1985) 45-46; 196-200.

⁵³² The importance of olive cultivation to a deme's economy can be identified in a public land lease from Aixone c.346/5 (*IG II²* 2492). In this lease it is stated that the recipients of the land are to ensure that no soil is to be removed from the plot and the terraces are to be maintained. Furthermore the purchasers are required to ensure that when pruning the olive trees enough of the trunks survive to ensure their rejuvenation and profitability in subsequent years.

⁵³³ Amouretti (1986) 196 n. 64; Osborne (1987) 45; Lohmann (1993) 216 n. 1484. Moreneo bases his hypothetical amount on a lower-end production figure of 20 kg of olives per tree with a 14% oil yield, resulting in 2.8 kg of oil per tree.

⁵³⁴ For the price of olive oil in Attica see *IG II²* 1356 ll. 7-8.

⁵³⁵ Pritchett (1956) 184; Lohmann (1993) 217-18.

⁵³⁶ Jones et al (1973) 443-451. A passage in Aristotle seems to reflect the belief that there is a correlation between the sizes of oil harvests and bee populations. Arist. *Hist. An.* 553a22-3; 553b23.

⁵³⁷ Dalby (1996) 47; 65.

and the Vari house, located approximately 7 km to the southeast of Mt. Hymettos have provided the most studied evidence for terracotta beehives.⁵³⁸ Geroulanos has suggested that the Attic deme Trachones yielded up to three tons of honey per year.⁵³⁹ The honey harvest would be collected twice a year, once in July and once in September and Moreno has calculated that the deme of Euonymon would probably have reached similar yearly volumes relative to its area of territory, concluding that it would produce approximately 15 tons of honey.⁵⁴⁰ At a price of 5 dr. per *kotyle*, 15 tons of honey would sell for approximately 38 talents (thus if the honey was exported at this price it would generate $\frac{3}{4}$ of talent in revenue for the state).⁵⁴¹ As with olive oil, the price of honey was likely to increase dramatically outside the domestic market place. This demonstrates the substantial amount of revenue the state could generate through the export of honey.

4.4.3 Manufactured Goods

As with the production of olive oil, there is only sparse literary evidence for the export of manufactured goods. Although we can identify that affluent citizens owned workshops that had large industrial outputs, and which had considerable degrees of specialisation, these operations shed little light on Athenian exports as it is impossible to determine what percentage of these workshop's output was shipped overseas.⁵⁴² The only explicit evidence for Athenian exports during the fourth century is contained in the speech *Against Phormio* (discussed above), and a law from c.350 that states capital punishment is to be inflicted upon anyone who exports weapons or building material to Philip of Macedon.⁵⁴³ Although this law is only referred to in passing, it does give an indication that Athens was exporting a number of commodities that have not been recorded in the literary sources. Isager and Hansen have therefore posited that Athens exported a considerable amount of manufactured

⁵³⁸ Moreno (2007) 66-69.

⁵³⁹ Geroulanos (1973) 446; 448.

⁵⁴⁰ Moreno (2007) 68.

⁵⁴¹ Plut. *De tranq. Anim.* 470e10-470f6.

⁵⁴² For example, we know that Lysias had a shield workshop that employed up to 120 slaves (Lys. 12.8; 19), Demosthenes' father owned a knife workshop with 32 slaves and a bed shop with 20 slaves (Dem. 27.9), whilst the politician Timarchus has a leather workshop with about 10 slaves (Aeschin. 1.97).

⁵⁴³ Dem. 19.286.

goods, “*How did Athens pay for her imports in the years around 400 when many of the olive trees had been cut down and the silver mines were not being worked? All reserves were exhausted and Athens had no natural resources or crops to sell. The only possible answer is that Athens paid for her imports with the export of manufactured goods*”.⁵⁴⁴ Although scholars such as Hansen and Mattingly have argued against such a bleak economic picture following the end of the Peloponnesian War, Isager and Hansen’s point is nevertheless valid.⁵⁴⁵ Therefore, although it is impossible to determine precisely the quantity of manufactured goods being exported by the Athenians, it is likely that during the early part of the fourth century these types of commodities formed a substantial part of Athens’ export sector. Osborne has also suggested that manufacture played, “*a significant part in the creation of wealth at Athens*”.⁵⁴⁶ Although Osborne recognises that Finley’s arguments against the economic importance of manufacture remain strong, he believes the archaeological evidence is beginning to create a different picture.⁵⁴⁷ This view had previously been championed by Hopper who suggested that the graves of South Russia belonging to the ruling classes indicate that a variety of manufactured articles in bronze and ivory, furniture and weapons, engraved gems and personal ornaments in various metal had been imported from Greece. Although archaeologists had been unable to provide a precise location for the origins of these items, Hopper concluded that Athens must have had a large share of this market.⁵⁴⁸ The export commodity that has received the most scholarly attention is Athenian painted pottery, with debate focused in particular on its value as an item of trade. On one side of the debate stands Boardman who argues that Athenian painted pottery was not cheap and was therefore valuable as a commodity to exchange.⁵⁴⁹ In contrast, Vickers and Gill argue that Greek decorated

⁵⁴⁴ Isager and Hansen (1975) 42.

⁵⁴⁵ Mattingly (1996) 5-30; Hansen (1998) 171-173.

⁵⁴⁶ Osborne (2002) 128. Fischer-Hansen (2000) 92, notes that the considerable evidence for workshops undermines Finley’s view that Athens was a consumer city. They therefore propose that workshops were too numerous to have served just local consumers, but were clearly aimed at generating exports.

⁵⁴⁷ Osborne (2002) 118; 128.

⁵⁴⁸ Hopper (197) 98; 102. Hopper supported his conclusion by pointing to the large bed and sword factories owned by Demosthenes’ father, the shield workshops owned by Lysias and Pasion, Cleophon’s lyre factory and the flute manufacturers owned by Isocrates (see above fn.542)

⁵⁴⁹ Boardman (1988) 27-33; 371-373. These two articles update Boardman’s previous assessment that “*From the prices which merchants scratched on some of the vases, the profit could not have been great and certainly could never have formed an important part of the state’s revenue, even through taxes*”. Boardman (1964 reprinted 1999) 31-34, see also Johnston (1979) 33.

pottery was little more than saleable ballast.⁵⁵⁰ Even though a significant number of red figure vases have been discovered over a wide geographical area (including Southern Spain and France, Italy, Asia Minor, Thrace, Macedonia, Southern Russia, Syria, Phoenicia etc.) Amemiya has argued that even these finds shed little light on the significance of pottery exports.⁵⁵¹ He therefore adopts two of Isager and Hansen's more general conclusions: firstly, that Athenian vase production and export had diminished considerably by the middle of the fourth century and secondly, that even in its heyday, only about 500 people worked in painted pottery manufacture at any one time.⁵⁵² These conclusions are hard to dispute: therefore, rather than trying to examine the importance of pottery exports in isolation, it is more prudent to see them as part of a trade in 'manufactured' commodities. So, what conclusions can be made concerning the export of manufactured products? Firstly, during the early part of the fourth century manufactured goods are likely to have formed the backbone of the Athenian export industry. As olive production and silver mining struggled to regain their pre-war output, manufactured goods such as pottery and furniture were exported in larger quantities. However, as other industries recovered the economic importance of manufactured goods was reduced. Nevertheless, Amemiya, when estimating Athens' gross domestic product, calculates that the export value of all manufactured goods (including pottery, furniture, weapons, cloth, jewellery etc.), totalled 1, 466 talents per year (providing the state with about 30 talents of revenue).⁵⁵³ This total is put into perspective when we consider that during the years following the Peloponnesian War, Andocides was able to bid a mere 38 talents for the collection of the entire 2% import-export tax.

4.4.4 The Export of Silver

⁵⁵⁰ Gill (1987) 123; (1988) 369-370; Vickers (1984) 90; (1985/6) 165.

⁵⁵¹ Amemiya (2008) 85.

⁵⁵² Isager and Hansen (1975) 38, reach this conclusion based primarily on Beazley's excavations at Spina. Beazley (1963) 214-221 catalogued 1,022 red-figure vases; 286 could be dated securely to the fourth century whilst the other 736 date to the fifth century. For a discussion of the men involved in pottery manufacture and painting see Cook (1960) 227.

⁵⁵³ Amemiya (2008) 106-112. Amemiya reaches this figure by determining the number of labour force in the manufacturing sector, the wage rate, the number of days worked per year, the percentage of the labour cost and the profit rate. From these figures he arrives at his estimates for Athenian import-export of manufactured goods. See also, Adams (1994) 91.

Another profitable commodity that the Athenians had for export was silver.⁵⁵⁴ The Laurion mines had proved so rich that the state revenue from silver production enabled the Athenians to build an entire fleet to face the threat of Xerxes.⁵⁵⁵ Thucydides and Xenophon inform us that by the end of the fifth century the mines at Laurion were employing more than 30,000 slaves.⁵⁵⁶ In his discussion of state revenue Xenophon declares that prior to the occupation of Decelea, the mines were run by a many times greater' number of slaves than the 10,000 that he himself proposes. Although we have few literary sources for Athenian mining operations or the export of silver due the fourth century, there are a number of inscriptions recording the leasing of different mine shafts. Although these inscriptions are difficult to date with any precision and are only fragmentary, in some cases it is possible to determine the number of leases by the size of the inscription.⁵⁵⁷ The earliest inscriptions date to c.367/6 and record the leasing of 17 mines, whereas the most extensive inscription dates to 342/1 and records the leasing of 140 mines.⁵⁵⁸ We know from Hyperides' speech *Against Euxenippos* that in 330, the large mine leases could earn one hundred talents and that new shafts and tunnels were still being developed.⁵⁵⁹ Using the limited evidence contained in the mine leasing inscriptions, Isager and Hansen, and Goldsmith estimate that the total silver extraction in c.340 amounted to about 1,000 talents.⁵⁶⁰ This is a conclusion supported by the work of Jones, who has shown that by the middle of the fourth century mining operations in the Laurion region had

⁵⁵⁴ Finley (1973) 134, "Silver was the most important Athenian resource exported in substantial quantities". Osborne (1985) 11, "It is arguable that silver was the only significant Athenian export". Isager & Hansen (1975) 42-49, "The most important export of Athens was silver from Laurion in southern Attica". Boardman (1988^a) 31, is the only scholar who has seriously attempted to downplay the importance of silver exports to the Athenian economy. He considers the debate on trade as being centered on demonstrating the prime importance of metals at the expense of all other commodities. He proposes that historians examining trade often lack a desire to grapple with the issues raised by ancient authors in their works on the economy. It is from this viewpoint that he attempts to reduce the importance of silver as an Athenian export.

⁵⁵⁵ Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.7.

⁵⁵⁶ Thuc. 7.27.5; Xen. *Por.* 4.25; Ar. *Eccl.* 815; *Ran.* 720. Although the Spartan occupation at Decelea (414-413) crippled mining operations and forced the Athenians to mint copper coins, by 390 silver coinage was again in circulation although there was still a shortage (Lys. 19.11).

⁵⁵⁷ Crosby (1950) 189-312; Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1980) 310-15; Osborne (1985) 117-118.

⁵⁵⁸ Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1980) no.95; Crosby (1950) no.5; no. 20a.

⁵⁵⁹ Hyp. 3.34-36. Shortly after this speech, c.328, we hear that mine leases suffered severe losses, whereas agriculture was yielding profits. This seems to be the result of the grain crisis of the 330s-320s, which made mining unprofitable due to the need to purchase large supplies of grain to feed the slave work force. This incident highlights how grain prices and grain imports could directly affect other areas of the Athenian economy (Dem. 42.3; 21).

⁵⁶⁰ Isager and Hansen (1973) 45; Goldsmith (1987) 260.

exceeded fifth century output. This, he proposes, was due to the increased sophistication and efficient design of mining facilities.⁵⁶¹

Of the 1,000 talents these mines generated annually, Amemiya calculates that roughly 825 talents were exported or exchanged for imports.⁵⁶² This would generate 16.5 talents in export duties alone. That silver was a valuable and regular item of Mediterranean trade is most clearly attested by the Naucratis Stela of Nektanebos II (360-343), which required that ‘a tithe from the gold and silver coming from the Greek sea’ should be paid to the ruler.⁵⁶³ This clearly suggests that profit could be made from the export of silver during the fourth century. The only mention of Athenian silver exports during this period is in Xenophon’s *Poroi*. In this work Xenophon states that one of the benefits of Athens as a trade partner is that: “*In most states, merchants are forced to take aboard a return cargo because the state’s coinage is not current beyond the borders of the country, but from Athens one can export almost anything the heart might desire, and if the merchants refuse to take aboard return cargo, they can also conduct good business by exporting silver coins, for everywhere they can get more for them than they themselves have paid*”.⁵⁶⁴ Isager and Hansen persuasively conclude that the importance of silver extraction during the fourth century can best be grasped by the fact that, at its height, the production of silver corresponded to the total value of grain imported by Athens.⁵⁶⁵

4.5 The Revenue Generated by Inter-Regional Exchange

Having examined the importance of various imports and exports, both in terms of the commodities themselves and the revenue they generate, it is now prudent to examine briefly inter-regional exchange in the wider context of Athenian public finance. According to Andreades, the Athenians did not have the kind of comprehensive annual budget found in modern countries, which tries to match

⁵⁶¹ Jones (1982) 174-182; Kakavoyannis (2001) 80-83.

⁵⁶² Amemiya (2008) 110-111.

⁵⁶³ Gunn (1947) number 87.

⁵⁶⁴ Xen. *Por.* 3.2.

⁵⁶⁵ Isager and Hansen (1975) 45, 220.

revenues and expenditure. Instead the assembly voted on each item of expenditure and allocated a specific revenue for it.⁵⁶⁶ To some extent it is reasonable to suppose that the Athenians must have tried to foresee their expenditure and revenues and strike a balance between the two but this was not done in any systematic way.⁵⁶⁷ Despite this lack of a balance sheet, the Athenians had enough understanding of their own economy to recognise the significance of different sources of revenue.⁵⁶⁸ Consequently the importance of public revenues generated by the taxation of inter-regional trade would have been obvious to the council. A passage in Andocides' *De Mysteriis* records just how much money could be generated through the 2% import-export tax.⁵⁶⁹ The speaker states that in 400/399 Agyrrhius and an association of his business partners purchased the contract for the 2% import-export tax for 30 talents (ultimately making a profit of 3 talents).⁵⁷⁰ The following year Andocides outbid the same group of men and purchased the contract for 36 talents (probably collecting about 40 talents of revenue). This figure is especially surprising as this year was soon after the Athenian defeat and thus trade was at a low point.⁵⁷¹ The importance of import-export and harbour taxes is further emphasised by decision in 413 to increase it from 2% to 5% as a way of compensating for the decline in tribute payments.⁵⁷² During the latter half of the fourth century the import-export tax for the grain trade was leased independently from other commodities and it is possible to establish that this tax alone generated between 8-16 talents per year.⁵⁷³ We also know that after Thrasybulus took Byzantium in 390 he imposed a 10% toll on all commodities

⁵⁶⁶ Andreades (1933) 366.

⁵⁶⁷ For the need to balance imports and exports see Bresson (2000) 109-30.

⁵⁶⁸ For a detailed breakdown of Athenian public revenue and the recognition of their importance by Athenian orators and statesmen see Amemiya (2008) 91-99.

⁵⁶⁹ Michell (1963) 257, suggests that all ships were subject to harbour duties possibly levied as a percentage of the value of a cargo (Pollux. 9.30; Ari. *Wasps*, 658; Ps. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.17). Import duties were payable at the time of unloading (Dem. 35.29-30) so it is logical to assume that export duties were paid as the vessel was loaded (Dem. 34.7).

⁵⁷⁰ Andoc. *De. Myst.* 133. For a reference to this tax in the fifth century see Thuc. 7.28. Hopper (1979) 101, suggests that, if we take into account the cost of collecting the tax, it is likely that the overall revenue generated by import/export duties was approximately 36 talents.

⁵⁷¹ Boeckh (1842) 325; Hopper (1979) 100; Isager and Hansen (1975) 51-52; Amemiya (2008) 97.

⁵⁷² *JG II*² 28; Thuc. 7.28.4; Boeckh (1842) 325; Finley (1983) 57. This link between commerce and economic prosperity is further illuminated by Xenophon when he advises the Athenians to make Athens a more attractive place for merchants to operate and thereby increase the volume of trade flowing through the Piraeus. This increase in trade would bring about an upsurge in the state's revenue, since more money would be generated through harbour taxes and duties, and through the metic tax (Xen. *Por.* 3.12-13).

⁵⁷³ Dem. 59.27. Amemiya (2008) 97.

transported through the Bosphorus strait, but unfortunately Xenophon does not record how much revenue this tax generated.⁵⁷⁴ During the fifth and fourth centuries Athens also levied an import and export tax on slaves (*andrapodikon*) (even those who accompanied visitors) and Andreades suggests that this raised 38 talents.⁵⁷⁵ There were also harbour dues (*ellimonia*) charged for the use of docking privileges at the Piraeus, but again the amount of revenue generated by these charges is not recorded.⁵⁷⁶

So how important were these taxes to the overall Athenian economy? Amemiya collates estimates of Athenian revenues and expenditures from a range of sources and suggests the following figures as approximate averages during the fourth century:

Government Account

Revenue		Expenditure	
War Contributions/Spoils	369	State Pay	238
Taxes from the Rich	584	Theoric Fund	60
Taxes from Manufacturers	70	Trierarchy	230
	(total taxes = 654)	Military Expenditure	160
		Other Military	335
Total	1023⁵⁷⁷	Total	1023
Exports		Imports	
War Contributions/Spoils	369	Wheat	244
Silver	825	Barley	368
Mfg	1,466	Other Food	637
Farm Products (such as honey)	100	Mfg Goods	345
		Raw Materials	700
		Slaves	131
Total	2,760	Total	2,760

⁵⁷⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.31.

⁵⁷⁵ *Anecd. Bach.* I.297; Andreades (1933) 282.

⁵⁷⁶ Pollux 7.132; 9.29; Michell (1963) 256-57.

⁵⁷⁷ Isager and Hansen (1975) 54, state that in the time of Lycurgus (338-326) the state revenues were 1,200 talents.

Amemiya then calculates that the total taxable trade (including grain but excluding military expenditure, slaves, war contributions, spoils and silver) is 3,860 talents, and two percent of this total provides the Athenians with an overall revenue of 77 talents from import/export taxes.⁵⁷⁸ If we compare this figure with those provided for other forms of revenue it is possible to identify the importance of import/export duties to the public finance of Athens.

Tax/Revenue	Talents generated
<i>Eisphora</i> ⁵⁷⁹	50
<i>Metoikion</i> ⁵⁸⁰	8
Festival liturgies ⁵⁸¹	18
<i>Trierarchy</i> ⁵⁸²	96
Mining fees ⁵⁸³	175
Fines/Confiscations	100
<i>Epidosis</i>	40
Slave tax	20
Taxation on trade	77

Table detailing the amount of money generated by different forms of revenue during the fourth century.

Finally, Murray and Tandy propose that maritime trade also created a new class of wealthy men who could generate money far more quickly than those engaged in agriculture. This new breed of businessman provided the state with a larger pool of men who could be drawn upon to undertake liturgies and perform public duties, and who could be taxed by a variety of methods. This increasing reliance upon wealthy traders again directly connects merchants to the financial and economic well-being of the state.⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁷⁸ This total is more than the 38 talents given by Andocides but, as noted above, the time of Andocides' tax collection was soon after the end of the Peloponnesian war when the volume of trade was at its lowest.

⁵⁷⁹ Davies (1981) 23.

⁵⁸⁰ 12 drachmas a year for men and 6 drachmas for unmarried women.

⁵⁸¹ Osborne (1991) 130.

⁵⁸² Amemiya (2008) 94-95.

⁵⁸³ Amemiya (2008) 84-85, calculates that Athens generated approximately 16.5 talents from the export taxes charged on silver.

⁵⁸⁴ Murray (1993) 220-245 and Tandy (2000) 137-138.

Overall Conclusions

An examination of the commodities being imported and exported by Athens reveals immediately the social and political importance of inter-regional trade and traders. With an average population of around 250,000 during the fourth century, the Athenians needed to import roughly 800,000 *medimnoi* of grain to overcome the shortfall in their agricultural production and thus meet the nutritional requirements of the demos. Additionally, the importation of other vital commodities, such as timber and slaves, and the importance of revenue generated by commercial taxes meant that even during times of relative peace and prosperity inter-regional exchange was a matter of public concern. The grain supply for instance was a topic that was brought before the assembly on a monthly basis, whilst Xenophon has Socrates suggest that in order to be a successful politician one needed to be able to give good council on all the revenues and expenditures of the polis (presumably including import-export and harbour taxes). Moreover, having demonstrated the extent to which the Athenian economy relied on the revenue generated by import-export and harbour taxes, it is no longer tenable to suggest that the Athenians were only interested in their import economy. An examination of honey for instance, revealed that one deme, Euonymon, could generate $\frac{3}{4}$ of a talent in revenue for the state through the exportation of honey. Other profitable export commodities included olive/oil (30 talents), silver (16.5 talents) and manufactured goods (30 talents) which when combined added 76.5 talents to the state treasury. A consequence of Athenian dependency on inter-regional commerce and the revenue it generated, was that merchants became a valuable resource which in turn helped raise their social standing and visibility. Even slave traders, men traditionally thought to have been marginalized, could, because of the need for the commodities they traded and the revenue they generated, be thought of positively. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Five the importance of commercial services was to manifest itself through the development of a system of honours and privileges that were bestowed in order to encourage merchants to bring vital commodities to the Piraeus and which rewarded those men who continued to trade with Athens on favourable terms. Chapter Five will therefore demonstrate that the services undertaken by the mercantile community were of such importance that merchants could gain the genuine respect and gratitude of the state. Although it is

reasonable to conclude that the primary aim of this system was the procurement of vital imports, the Athenians clearly recognised that the most effective way of achieving this was to endear themselves to the men that plied the trade routes. Therefore, rather than simply being interested in the commodities at the expense of the men who supplied them, the Athenians recognised that the two were intrinsically linked. This chapter has thus shown that it is not prudent to attempt to separate an interest in vital imports from an interest in inter-regional merchants.

Chapter Five

Credit, Reputation and Honour; An Alternative Model for the Perception of the Mercantile Community

Introduction

Having established that contemporary literature does not present a consistently negative portrayal of the mercantile community, and that inter-regional trade was a vital component of the Athenian economy, it is now possible to begin offering an alternative model for the social standing and reputation of merchants. This reappraisal will be achieved through the exploration of two main areas, firstly the business reputation of merchants (especially within the context of credit agreements), and then secondly the bestowal on honours and rewards to merchants. The chapter will begin by defining what exactly is understood when the term 'credit' is employed. Next it will discuss the credit-worthiness of the mercantile community, exploring the number of men who were reliant on this type of credit and the sources of capital available to them. It will be argued that banks, as well as money-lenders, were an integral part of maritime finance, and that as such bankers forged close business and personal relationships with *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*. The subsequent sections will explore the business reputation of merchants, analysing how a merchant's reputation could affect the interests rates he was offered by lenders. It will also suggest that owing to their dependence on credit, many merchants were under pressure to act honourably in order to maintain their credit-worthiness. The last half of this chapter will discuss the honours and rewards bestowed on the mercantile community. In these sections, it will be argued that inter-regional merchants undertook acts that demonstrated *philotimia* and, as a result, were honoured by the state. Furthermore, it will demonstrate that the frequency and nature of the honours bestowed upon merchants indicate that they, and the services they provided, were valued and respected by Athens. This in turn further undermines the hypothesis that merchants were socially unimportant and politically invisible figures who were in general marginalized.

Credit, Reputation and Honour

In modern society, the term credit is used to encompass a variety of concepts, and is interpreted according to the precise context in which it is found. For instance, the term ‘consumer credit’ can be understood entirely differently from ‘production credit’ and thus a distinction must be maintained.⁵⁸⁵ Despite this modern need to distinguish between credit processes, there is no evidence to suggest that the ancient Greeks understood, or indeed needed, such distinctions, and in general one system of credit (*pistis*) was standard throughout all sectors of the Athenian economy. The basic Greek understanding of credit was the use or possession of goods or services without immediate payment, i.e. one has faith in another’s future payment or ‘credits’ him to be trustworthy.⁵⁸⁶ A prevalent example of this was the institution of maritime loans, a system of credit that large numbers of inter-regional merchants relied on during the fourth century. In Athens the infrastructure that enabled goods to be transported from one region to another depended upon four main groups of businessmen in order to function. These were, inter-regional merchants (*emporoi*); shipping agents (*nauklēroi*); money-lenders and bankers (*trapezai*); and wholesalers and local traders (*kapēloi*). In order that inter-regional exchange could operate with the least amount of problems and complications, these men needed to interact with and trust one another. The importance of bankers and money-lenders within this system was their provision of credit to fund the movement of goods from one region to another.

So what exactly is meant by the term ‘maritime loan’? Put simply the maritime loan was money lent to an *emporos* or *nauklēros* to pay for the cargo being transported. The money was borrowed for the duration of the trading venture, which was either one way (*heteroplous*) or a return trip (*amphoteroplous*). The loan and interest was repaid out of the proceeds from the sale of the cargo (on condition that

⁵⁸⁵ Bannock, Baxter, Davies (eds) (1998) 86.

⁵⁸⁶ Often the study of economic history has become overly concerned with attempts to identify modern trends and concepts in ancient economies, a practice that is frequently unproductive and irrelevant. The development of economics into a distinct scientific discipline has been a slow and laborious process, due, in a large part to the fact that past economies could be highly integrated into the social and political spheres of their respective cultures. It is therefore prudent to avoid forcing modern concepts and models onto ancient economies, and preferable to understand ancient economies according to their own terms and rationality.

the vessel arrived safely at its destination). Millett shows that this is the unique feature of maritime loans.⁵⁸⁷ If a cargo was lost owing to a shipwreck or piracy the borrower was freed from any obligation to repay the loan, and the loss was borne by the lender. Because of the high risks involved in maritime commerce, the rates of interest charged were extremely high in comparison with other types of loan. In general the interest rate charged on a maritime loan was between 12-30% although, as will demonstrated below, it could be higher. As a partial guarantee against fraud by the borrower, the cargo or other property, could be offered as security.⁵⁸⁸ Furthermore, as will be discussed in Chapter Six, there was usually a written contract detailing at length the terms and conditions of the loan.

5.1 The Importance of Maritime Loans as a Source of Finance

Next it is important to determine how reliant merchants were on the services of maritime lenders and bankers.⁵⁸⁹ Although it is impossible to offer any quantitative analysis of the frequency of maritime loans and the percentage of trade ventures that relied on their procurement, there are a significant number of indications that this type of financing was widespread. If, as will be shown, a considerable number of men were dependent on obtaining credit, then it is possible to suggest that this served as a regulating factor for the behaviour of the mercantile community. This hypothesis is further supported by the intimacy between maritime lenders and borrowers.⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁷ Millett (1983) 36. See also Millett (1998).

⁵⁸⁸ If the borrower was a ship owner then it was possible for the lender to demand that the vessel be used as security.

⁵⁸⁹ Although the debate over how to distinguish between a moneylender and a bank are important, there is insufficient space to expand such a complex series of arguments in this study, and thus for a fuller exploration the reader should refer to the works of Bogaert (1965); Millett (1986); (1991); Cohen (1992). For the purposes of this investigation it is sufficient to state that the most reasonable distinction between the two is that banks accepted deposits of money and were thus on occasion able to offer non-productive loans. Moneylenders, on the other hand, were purely concerned with profit and interest payments and thus neither accepted deposits nor extended credit as a non-productive loan.

⁵⁹⁰ Bogaert (1968) 335 n.293; Cohen (1992) 66; Shipton (1991) 409-411 all suggest that it is possible to identify bankers embracing the traditional ideology about lending and borrowing (which emphasised a friendly, reciprocal relationship between lender and borrower) while continuing to charge interest on the money they lent. Shipton argues that bankers, whether citizen or metic, would make loans like any other private individual, utilising the traditional system of social contracts and reciprocal relationships. Cohen suggests that a banker's personal network of friends and his prestige as a professional lender were so significant that clients were said to 'use' (*chresthai*) bankers. Cohen and Bogaert both argue that the financial 'use' of someone also implied a close involvement with him in other areas of life (see for example Isoc. 17.6). Cohen also argues that the banker's intimacy with his clients, and his use of

Demosthenes provides the main corpus of evidence for maritime loans: in four of his speeches he represents the interests of lenders against fraudulent borrowers.⁵⁹¹ Each of these cases occurred as the result of a failure to repay a maritime loan; consequently, they offer some insight into the frequency, nature and operation of maritime finance. Demosthenes' speech *Against Phormion* is the most frequently cited source that is used to demonstrate the widespread use of maritime loans to fund inter-regional commerce.

"ἡγεῖσθε γὰρ τοὺς τοιοῦτους οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κοινῇ βλάπτειν τὸ ἐμπόριον ὑμῶν, εἰκότως. αἱ γὰρ εὐπορίαι τοῖς ἐργαζομένοις οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν δανειζομένων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν δανειζόντων εἰσίν, καὶ οὔτε ναῦν οὔτε ναύκληρον οὔτ' ἐπιβάτην ἔστ' ἀναχθῆναι, τὸ τῶν δανειζόντων μέρος ἂν ἀφαιρεθῆ." ⁵⁹²

*For you hold that such people not only wrong those who have dealings with them, but also more generally harm your exchange (emporion) and that is quite correct. For the resources of those involved in trade come not from those who borrow but from those who lend; and neither ship, nor nauklēros, nor passenger can put to sea if you take away the part contributed by those who lend".*⁵⁹³

Although this statement is likely to be oratorical exaggeration, one of the most interesting aspects of all these speeches is the frequency with which the speaker refers to other loans that are not relevant to the case. In these four speeches alone there are references to over twenty different maritime loans, not all of which were procured in Athens. This demonstrates two things: firstly that maritime loans were not a uniquely

household members to undertake transactions, demonstrates closeness in terms of both business and private dealings (see for example Dem. 49.2; Dem. 49.50; Dem. 52.9). It is therefore possible to suggest that banking was so personalised in the fourth century that business and social relations tended to coalesce. As will be discussed below, this closeness between banker and customer could be vitally important when it came to extending credit.

⁵⁹¹ Dem. 32; 34; 35; 56.

⁵⁹² Dem. 34.52.

⁵⁹³ Dem 34.51.

Athenian institution, and secondly that they were frequently utilised by a large number of merchants. Apart from the four speeches of Demosthenes there are a number of references to maritime loans in other legal speeches, even orations that are not specifically commercial in nature. Millett has identified six instances where he believes it is possible to suggest that the loan being referred to was a maritime credit arrangement, rather than some other type of financial transaction.⁵⁹⁴ Apart from the forensic speeches there is also a number of references to maritime credit in other sources: these include Theophrastus' *Characters*, Eupolis, Diphilus, Diogenes Laertius and most significantly Xenophon's *Poroi*.⁵⁹⁵ The 'Boastful Man' in Theophrastus' *Characters*, for example, brags about the amount of money he has tied up in trading ventures, while according to Diogenes Laertius, it was rumoured that the philosopher Zeno of Citium had more than 1,000 talents lent out as maritime loans. A significant feature of the references to maritime loans in the *Poroi* is the brevity of Xenophon's treatment. This lack of detail or explanation suggests that the mechanisms for maritime finance would be familiar to the majority of his audience and thus required no special attention. Millett suggests that this mentality can be applied to all passing references to maritime loans in the non-legal sources:

*"Writers apparently made the assumption that the general principles of maritime loans are familiar to all Athenians"*⁵⁹⁶.

Even in the four speeches of Demosthenes it is noticeable that there is no summary or account of the workings of maritime loans for the benefit of the jury. Millett contrasts this with the lengthy description of a credit letter given in a speech of Isocrates, and suggests that the concept of a credit letter was unfamiliar to a jury and thus needed explanation, whereas maritime loans were well-known and thus did not.⁵⁹⁷ From the surviving evidence that discusses maritime credit, it is reasonable to conclude that a high number of trading ventures were financed through this type of borrowing.

⁵⁹⁴ Millett (1986) 41: Isoc. 17.42; Dem. 27.11; 33.4; 52.20; Lys. 32.6; Hyp. Dem. Frag. 4. col. 17.

⁵⁹⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 23; Diog. Laert. 7.13; Schol. Eupolis' *Marikas*; Diphilus, *frag.* 43; Xen. *Por.* 3.9.

⁵⁹⁶ Millett (1986) 42.

⁵⁹⁷ Isoc. 17.35-7. Millett (1983) 42.

5.1.1 The Reasons for the Prevalence of Maritime Loans

So why were inter-regional merchants so reliant upon maritime loans? The traditional way of answering this question has been to examine the level of affluence of the mercantile community. As has been shown, previous studies have frequently considered merchants not to be particularly affluent. Hasebroek and Erxleben therefore concluded that *all* inter-regional merchants relied on obtaining credit as a consequence of their poverty.⁵⁹⁸ This stance has also been adopted by a number of later scholars including Finley, Knorringa, Millett and Reed. However, as I have demonstrated in Chapter Two, it is no longer reasonable to consider merchants as impoverished: on the contrary there is plenty of evidence to suggest that some merchants were prosperous and wealthy. So how is it possible to reconcile this new perception of the affluence of the mercantile community with the fact that maritime loans were utilised on such a large scale?

Although Finley saw the mercantile community as being poor, he offered an alternative reason as to why maritime loans were so prevalent. He argued that these loans, in addition to being a form of credit, were also a type of insurance. Finley proposed that maritime loans offered the borrower insurance as they shifted the financial risk from borrower to lender.⁵⁹⁹ He reached this conclusion since there are a number of cases where the creditor is recorded as negotiating an arrangement whereby, in the event of a disaster, the borrower was relieved from any financial obligation. This was a hypothesis also advocated by de Ste. Croix who posited that maritime loans were the closest equivalent the Greeks had to 'modern insurance'.⁶⁰⁰ Cohen also adopted this interpretation of maritime loans. He suggests that, owing to the Piraeus's position at the centre of the main Mediterranean trade routes, creditors had the opportunity to absorb (over a number of transactions) the losses incurred from the sinking of a single vessel. He therefore concludes that lenders would be willing to

⁵⁹⁸ Hasebroek (1923) 424; Erxleben (1978) 479; 482.

⁵⁹⁹ Finley (1951) 87; (1973) 141.

⁶⁰⁰ de Ste. Croix (1974) 42-43.

offer maritime loans as a type of insurance in order to encourage borrowing.⁶⁰¹ Furthermore, he interprets the creditor's willingness to negotiate agreements that relieve the borrower from the responsibility of repayment, as evidence that the financial risk from offering insurance was manageable.

Not all scholars accept this understanding of maritime loans and thus Millett disputes Finley's conclusion. Millett offers two counter arguments against the idea of insurance; firstly, he argues that in the majority of cases only part of the cargo was covered by the loan. He cites Demosthenes 34.6-7 and 35.18 as evidence that the value of the security in a maritime loan had to be twice the sum of the original amount borrowed. This meant that the merchant would have to bear the cost of half the cargo. Due to his acceptance of Hasebroek's hypothesis that most merchants were dependent on maritime loans owing to their poverty, Millett argued that it is unlikely traders would be able to provide the necessary security. Secondly, Millett argued that since all merchants sailed with their cargo, if a ship was wrecked then it was probable that the merchant would be killed, thus making the question of insurance irrelevant. Having dismissed insurance as a factor, Millett offers an alternative interpretation of maritime loans; he suggests that they should be considered as sharing many of the features of consumption credit.⁶⁰² As Millett considers merchants to be of low affluence he proposed that traders' primarily utilise maritime loans out of necessity rather than choice, consequently he recommends that this type of finance should be understood as a form of non-productive 'consumption credit'. This conclusion is strongly influenced by his belief that the merchants utilising maritime loans only made enough profit to cover the interest owed and to stay in business (thus only making them productive in the narrowest of senses).⁶⁰³ Furthermore, he considers maritime borrowers to be primarily motivated by a desire to continue operating rather than to gain large quantities of profit. Thus ultimately he concludes that maritime loans are not evidence of a productive mentality but instead "*serve to emphasise the poverty of traders, who are forced to borrow to pay for their cargoes*".

⁶⁰¹ Cohen (1992) 140-141.

⁶⁰² Bannock, Baxter, Davies (eds) (1998) 86-87. Consumption credit is a short-term loan that is extended for the purchase of specific goods; it normally takes the form of credit offered by shopkeepers and other suppliers and is generally taken out of necessity rather than choice.

⁶⁰³ Millett (1986) 46.

However, as has been demonstrated in Chapter Two, it is no longer tenable to accept Hasebroek's views on the affluence of merchants and thus Millett's conclusions must be questioned. In contrast to Millett's opinion, the evidence pertaining to the affluence of the mercantile community suggests that a considerable number were able to provide security totalling half the amount of their intended cargo. Consequently, loans that provided a borrower with insurance against the loss of some or all of this security would be an attractive option, especially in light of the high-risk nature of inter-regional exchange. Following the demonstration in Chapter Two that the use of agency was a common feature of inter-regional commerce, it is no longer necessary to assume that a merchant would always travel with his goods, and this counters Millett's second argument against the use of maritime loans as insurance.⁶⁰⁴ Furthermore, the majority of moderately affluent merchants seem to have continued utilising maritime loans even when turning a small profit. One way of interpreting this situation is that it made better business sense to stockpile money until a loss was not going to cripple a business, than it was to risk everything in order to gain a quick profit (see section 2.3.1). Therefore, contrary to Millett's findings, it is possible to identify a significant number of merchants borrowing out of choice rather than necessity. Moreover, this suggests that maritime loans were a form of 'productive' rather than 'consumer' credit.⁶⁰⁵ This is an important conclusion. If maritime loans were productive then the aim of merchants was not merely to make enough money to survive but to make a profit. This desire to make profit could then be used by bankers and money-lenders to help regulate the behaviour of their clients. The way they did this was to vary the rates of interest they charged on the credit they extended. The interest rate on maritime loans, rather than being calculated solely according to the amount of time the money was to be borrowed for (as with landed yields), was instead determined as a percentage of the original amount borrowed. The amount of interest was therefore determined by considering the length of the voyage, the potential dangers of the venture, the commodities being traded and the reputation

⁶⁰⁴ However, the recognition of the widespread use of agency and hauliers undermines this argument as a significant number of merchants could utilise the services of these men in order to eliminate the need to travel with their own commodities.

⁶⁰⁵ Production credit is a loan extended to finance a project or business venture with the expected outcome being that the borrower will gain a considerably greater return than the interest being charged.

of the borrower (for a more comprehensive discussion of maritime loans see section 5.1). So for example, in Demosthenes 35 a group of merchants sailing from Athens are to purchase in Mendē or Skiōnē 3,000 containers of Mendaian wine, intended as collateral security for a loan of 3,000 drachmae. From there the wine was to be shipped to the Bosporan kingdom, or to Borysthenēs in the Black Sea, for resale. Upon their return, the merchants were to pay the lenders 675 dr., in addition to the principal (3,000 dr.), within 20 days of their arrival. The interest rate on this loan was therefore 22.5% (i.e. $675 \text{ dr.} \div 3,000 \text{ dr.} \times 100 (\%) = 22.5 \%$).⁶⁰⁶ However, as will be demonstrated in section 5.2, if a merchant was considered a financial liability, bankers and money-lenders could charge high rates of interest (up to 36%). This system can only work if the loans being extended were for productive purposes. This contradicts Millett's hypothesis that merchants were merely eking out a subsistence living from trade, since if this were the case there would be little scope for lenders to shift interest rates dramatically since profit margins would be too small.

Conclusion One

An examination of maritime finance reveals that the majority of inter-regional trading ventures relied on the procurement of some level of credit. By considering maritime loans in terms of productive rather than consumer credit it becomes possible to conclude that the demand for finance was, in a large number of cases, stimulated by the provision of insurance offered by this type of loan. Although these loans provided only partial insurance this clause was nevertheless attractive for small businesses because, in the event of a disaster, it could represent the difference between survival and ruin.

5.2 The Business Reputation of Merchants

As has now been shown, it is possible to prove that the majority of inter-

⁶⁰⁶ For more detailed discussions of Greek interest rates see Paoli (1930) 136-137; de Ste. Croix (1974) 46 n.20; Thompson (1978) 417; Finley (1985) 23; Boegaert (1986) 21; Millet (1991) 94-96; 184-5; 189; 191; Cohen (1992) 44-45; 52-58.

regional commercial transactions, whether import or export, relied heavily on the obtaining of credit. With a lender standing to lose at least half of their investment in the event of disaster, misadventure, or criminal activity, the initial loan decision was crucial. In any inter-regional commercial transaction there were a number of inherent risks, which range from the obvious (such as shipwrecks) to the more subtle types of hazards suggested by pricing theory⁶⁰⁷, and it was the money-lender who stood to lose if things went badly wrong.⁶⁰⁸ Criminal activity was also a problem, and if a bank or money-lender made a bad decision and lent to a dishonest party, the chances of recovering any investments were slim at best. As a partial defence against fraud, lenders required merchants to offer security on the loan, for example, any valuable items of property, including houses or vessels owned by the borrower.⁶⁰⁹

Losses on account of misadventure and through criminal activities had two significant impacts on the operation of maritime finance. Firstly, as already noted, because of the high-risk nature of inter-regional commerce, the interest rates for maritime loans were exceptionally high.⁶¹⁰ Secondly, as banks and money-lenders extended credit to men whom it was difficult to monitor, this system of lending was heavily reliant on the honour and reputation of those involved. In order for this system to operate, banks and money-lenders had to be convinced that there was a high chance

⁶⁰⁷ Pricing theory is the area of economics which deals with the determination of pricing within individual markets. The two main components of pricing theory are the demand side and the supply side; it is the interaction of the two that determines the equilibrium between output and price in any market.

⁶⁰⁸ In order to avoid loss financiers had to be confident in the business acumen and honesty of their clients. Demosthenes 32.6; 30, records the case of Protus who, owing to his inadequate business knowledge, made a dramatic loss and was unable to repay his loan to Demon.

⁶⁰⁹ However, even if a fraudster was detained and brought to trial, the legal process was expensive. Although the loser of the case supposedly sustained the cost of litigation, it was the responsibility of the victor to recover his costs. When the formal complaint was made, the magistrate collected a temporary procedural fee from both parties, which went to the state, with the winner being responsible for reclaiming his half from the loser (evidence for the fee going to the state = Pollux. 7.38; evidence for the procedural fee = Isoc. 20.2; Dem. 43.7). This fee was used to cover the expenses of assembling a jury and to create a transcript of the plaint to be posted on the magistrate's notice board in the Agora, so that all interested parties could examine it (Isoc. 15.237). Although according to Athenian law all parties must plead their own cases before the court, they were permitted to hire a professional logographer to write their speech. As well as composing legal speeches, logographers could be sought for legal advice and their services were expensive (Thuc. 8.68; Ar. *Nub.* 471). Unlike modern legal systems where the winner of a case could claim the costs of their legal advice and representation from their opponent, in Athens the victor would be liable for any costs he incurred aside from the court fees. Therefore even if a successful case was brought, it could still be expensive for the victor.

⁶¹⁰ Dem. 50.17; 34.23.

they would see a return on their investment. This consideration was of primary importance to a bank, which would frequently be investing money belonging to other people.⁶¹¹ This resulted in maritime lenders being faced with a daunting set of challenges: the initial credit decision, the monitoring of their investment, the monitoring of funds generated through the sale of collateral, and the organising of protection for their own interests if disaster should strike, or if the goods did not receive a favourable price at market.⁶¹² In an emporium handling numerous arrivals and departures on a daily basis, a correct credit decision relied upon the collection and collation of accurate information about the potential borrower, and the precise nature of the transaction that any credit would be used to fund.

The only way for a lender to assess the reliability of a merchant who wished to be extended credit was through an examination of his personal, family, or business reputation. The Greeks clearly recognised the importance of a good reputation to men undertaking commerce, as is shown in Demosthenes 36.44, where it is stated “ *If you do not know that for money-making the best capital of all is trustworthiness, you do not know anything at all*”. There were a number of options a lender could use in order to ascertain the reputation of his client, and which also served to encourage merchants to deal honestly if they wished to gain credit in the future. As demonstrated in sections 2.3.4-2.3.6, many maritime financiers were heavily integrated into the life of the Piraeus, and were therefore interacting with their clients and potential clients on a daily basis, whether in a business or social context. One man, Aeschines, was a credit risk of such notoriety that Lysias states:-

“*In the Piraeus people are of the opinion that it seems to be much less risky to sail to the Adriatic than to deal with this fellow; the money he borrows he considers to be his own much more than what his father left him*”.⁶¹³

⁶¹¹ Hansen (1985) 79; Cohen (1992) 141; Shipton (1997) 418-420.

⁶¹² See for instance Dem 56.1. As well as establishing the honesty and business acumen of a potential borrower, lenders had to determine that the men to whom they were lending were competent mariners, or at least that they intended to travel with experienced sailors. These men should be sailors who would not undertake unnecessary risks by traversing quicker but more dangerous routes, or by sailing outside the safer sailing seasons, in order to shorten the overall length of the voyage (Dem. 35.10).

⁶¹³ Lys. Frag. 38. The reference to the Adriatic seems to be a proverbial nautical allusion to the dangers of traversing this region. See also Lys. 32.25.

Although the reliability of Lysias' statement can be questioned it is reasonable to suggest that it was indeed possible for a merchant's credit history to become infamous. Maritime financiers were in a strong position when it came to formulating a risk assessment of their clients, since they could utilise a variety of sources and methods to obtain the information they required. The fact that Aeschines' 'credit rating' was so well known among the local bankers and money-lenders suggests that there were lines of communication through which a potential lender could discover the reputation of clients. Firstly, it is likely that through frequenting social amenities such as taverns, bathhouses, brothels, barbers etc. maritime financiers would utilise gossip as a way of judging their client's reliability. Hunter suggests that hearsay and rumour were two fundamentally important ways in which information could be exchanged.⁶¹⁴ Lysias in his oration *Against Pancleon*, illustrates how wide-reaching gossip circles could be tapped for information. Hunter concludes that gossip played such a fundamental role in Athenian society that it was even permissible as evidence in lawsuits.⁶¹⁵ Hunter's conclusion complements those presented by Ober and Lewis. Both Ober and Lewis regard rumour and gossip as fundamental conduits for the dissemination of information in a culture that lacked organised news or a comprehensive system of public record-keeping.⁶¹⁶ Furthermore, in addition to disseminating information about the reliability of potential borrowers, gossip also functioned in another vitally important way: it served to regulate personal behaviour and thus ensured that most merchants conducted their private and business lives in a manner acceptable to the community. Since Dodds' seminal work on irrational behaviour, it has become widely accepted that the Greek poleis in general abided by the rules of a 'shame culture', a society where deep anxieties existed about "what other people will say or think".⁶¹⁷ In such societies, anyone who does not meet the expected standards is open to public criticism and ridicule; more specifically, in the commercial sector gossip became the standard way for one's business credentials to be judged. Any rumours of bad commercial practices, or dubious transactions, could

⁶¹⁴ Hunter (1994) 299-325.

⁶¹⁵ Lys. 23.2-10. Hunter (1994) 102-106.

⁶¹⁶ Ober (1989) 148; Lewis (1996) 9-13.

⁶¹⁷ Dodds (1951).

be severely damaging to the merchant's business opportunities, and could even affect their chances of acquiring a loan or dictating the terms on which one was offered. For example, the banker Sosinomus was the target of ridicule from his fellow bankers since he was willing to lend to anyone, irrespective of their credit history, although for this service he charged 36% interest. Combine this with the evidence presented in relation to the notoriously dangerous credit risk Aeschines, who as has been seen was also subjected to exceptionally high interest rates, and it is possible to identify how a negative reputation could affect loan agreements and be damaging to a merchant's commercial prospects. Aeschines had gained a negative reputation amongst the money-lenders and bankers since he treated the money he borrowed "*as if it were his own*". His carefree attitude towards credit resulted in him taking financial risks that often ended in disaster and thus his reputation served to warn other lenders of the dangers they faced in extending him credit. Therefore, in order to deter reckless behaviour amongst their clients, lenders could make an example of 'bad' borrowers by charging high levels of interest and demanding payment even if a venture was unsuccessful. This, it was hoped, would help encourage responsibility amongst other borrowers.⁶¹⁸

Another way for lenders to avoid risky credit decisions was to form long-term

⁶¹⁸ An example of this system in operation is found in Demosthenes 56. In this oration a vessel travelling from Egypt to Athens, transporting the cargo of a variety of merchants (most of whom had purchased goods using maritime loans), was disabled in transit and forced to terminate its voyage on Rhodes (Dem. 56.12; 20;40). The *nauklēros* (Parmeniscus) and his business partner, Dionysodorus, had borrowed 3,000 drachmae in Athens, a loan that had been secured on Parmeniscus's vessel (Dem. 56.3). When Parmeniscus and Dionysodorus failed to return to Athens and repay their debt, their lender sought out both men and demanded repayment. Parmeniscus and Dionysodorus, however, claimed that they were no longer bound to repay the debt, as the contract had not been fulfilled. They argued that when the contract had originally been drawn up, it explicitly stated that in order for reimbursement to be made, the ship and its cargo had to return safely to Athens (Dem. 56.36). As the vessel had never reached its intended destination, they contended that the contract was void, and hence they were free from any further obligations relating to the loan. Although litigation was brought against the two partners, the loans arranged by their passengers did not give rise to similar legal actions. Demosthenes informs the jury that the other merchants, rather than attempting to avoid their financial obligations, made every effort to ensure that their cargo reached Athens, and that they repaid their loans with the interest rates that had been arranged. These merchants made such efforts despite the fact that, at the time, the grain prices in Rhodes were far higher than they were in Athens (Dem. 56.24). They also did this irrespective of the fact that they would be forced to pay an extra, unexpected, second transport fee, and thus stood to lose a considerable sum of money. Although Demosthenes is making a rhetorical comparison between the dishonest behaviour of Parmeniscus and Dionysodorus and that of the other merchants, the passage does highlight the fact that at least some merchants were concerned with dealing honestly in order to avoid a bad reputation and possible legal proceedings.

business links with specific borrowers: this enabled a lender to gain an intimate knowledge of a man's long-term financial history. Demosthenes' speech *Against Apaturius*, demonstrates that it was not uncommon for merchants to form long-lasting business relations with a specific bank or money-lender and thus repeatedly borrow from the same source.⁶¹⁹ In Athens, as in many cultures throughout history, a large number of businesses were comprised of father-son partnerships, whose family had been involved in inter-regional exchange for a number of generations. A consequence of this system was that it enabled some merchants to point to a long family tradition of trustworthy behaviour and honest dealings when making an application for credit. Absence of such knowledge could be disastrous, as can be identified in the case of Androcles, who claimed to have no prior knowledge of the borrowers who defrauded him.⁶²⁰

Conclusion Two

It is possible to show that the obtaining of credit was vital to a sizeable number of inter-regional trade ventures. A consequence of this need for finance was that it served to regulate the behaviour of merchants by encouraging honesty and integrity. Contemporary accounts of maritime lending suggest that, owing to the intimacy of lenders and borrowers, an individual's reputation could have a direct impact on the terms on which a loan was offered. Therefore, if a merchant wanted to maintain his credit-worthiness and thus gain (or maintain) lower rates of interest he was encouraged to operate in a manner that enabled him to preserve a positive reputation amongst the bankers and money-lenders. The case of Aeschines demonstrates how bankers could use high interest rates as a way of deterring reckless behaviour amongst their clients. Although there were some unscrupulous men who attempted to defraud banks or moneylenders, in order for this system of credit to function, it relied on those offering loans to have faith that, in the majority of cases, the borrower would honour the terms of any contract.

⁶¹⁹ Dem. 36. 43-44.

⁶²⁰ Dem. 35.6.

Social Reputation and Honour

Böckh, by the middle of the 19th century, was well aware of the honours and privileges (and their monetary costs) that were being granted to men who had acted as benefactors to the state.⁶²¹ Yet his analysis of regular liturgies and of *eisphora* and *epidosis* includes scant reference to foreign benefactors and nowhere does he mention the honorary decrees for foreigners who had performed trade-related services for Athens. Böckh's only discussion of the practice of granting honours and privileges for trade-related services is in his brief discussion of Xenophon's *Poroi*.⁶²² Many later works share Böckh's cursory treatment of honours. In general, the privileges bestowed to reward trade-related services have been overlooked in debates concerning the nature of the Athenian economy. However, a few scholars have made passing comment. Busolt was the first scholar to acknowledge that, in the fourth century, Athens had to rely on foreign kings and wealthy citizens to provide grain in times of famine. Furthermore, Busolt suggested that during the fourth century the Athenian economy shifted to emphasise industry and trade at the expense of agriculture.⁶²³ Gernet also offers comment on the importance of trade-related services. He proposed that the state had a keen interest in trade because of its importance as a source of revenue.⁶²⁴ Hasebroek's consideration of honours is limited to a discussion of the rewards bestowed upon the Bosphoran king, Leucon.⁶²⁵ Hasebroek is content to show that the Athenians considered Leucon's trade-related services as a gift and they thus reciprocate in the manner expected of any *xenoi*. Hasebroek therefore concludes that, since all honorific decrees rewarding trade involve either grain or timber, the state was not concerned with the men facilitating trade but merely the goods they transported.⁶²⁶ Similarly, Finley also concluded that Athens was not interested in the agents of commerce and was merely preoccupied with ensuring regular supplies of grain. Finley suggested that the arrangement with Leucon, although important, could

⁶²¹ Böckh (1857) 342; 584; 689; 758-59.

⁶²² Böckh (1857) 773-80. Böckh's neglect of this subject is perhaps understandable since many of the honours and privileges rewarding trade-related services required little or no monetary expenditure.

⁶²³ Busolt (1920) 602 ff.; 1213. However, Busolt failed to recognise that Athens rewarded other foreign citizens in addition to kings and princes.

⁶²⁴ Gernet (1909) 347-381.

⁶²⁵ Hasebroek (1976) 84; 89; 114; 129; 148; 191.

⁶²⁶ Hasebroek (1976) 146.

not be proved a formalised commercial treaty and should thus be seen as a private arrangement.⁶²⁷ Hopper also uses Leucon as his basis for a brief discussion of rewards bestowed for commercial services. He argued that, whereas Athens benefited from the material gains brought from a close relationship with the Bosphoran king, Leucon received honours and privileges that brought only honorary distinctions and not material gain.⁶²⁸ Hopper's analysis is therefore confined to exploring the degree of material advantage gained by each party.⁶²⁹

More recently the honours rewarding commercial services have received some attention from several scholars who have begun to suggest that these decrees were part of an overall 'Athenian trade policy'.⁶³⁰ The focus of these studies has been the grain trade and Athenian efforts to ensure a steady flow of corn into the Piraeus. Since the role of honorary decrees is not the primary focus of any of these works, each tackles the subject relatively briefly. The discussions of Isager and Hansen, and Garnsey, centre on the sources of Athenian grain and the impact of shortages upon Athens. Garnsey's exploration goes further than Isager and Hansen, since he recognises the importance of Athenian efforts to ensure adequate supplies of grain. He identifies four methods Athens utilised to guarantee a steady supply of corn: diplomacy; incentive, regulation and force. Garnsey recognised the role played by honorific decrees in the first two categories, but he fails to apply this conclusion to his discussion of the Bosphoran kings.⁶³¹ Burke, on the other hand, noted a shift in the public institutions of honours and privileges in the fourth century. He showed that several honours such as *proxenia* and citizenship were awarded to maritime traders with greater frequency in the late fourth century than they had been previously. Although Burke's approach was overly simplistic, his conclusion that the Athenian

⁶²⁷ Finley (1985) 162, 164.

⁶²⁸ Hopper (1979) 88.

⁶²⁹ Bresson (2000) 125, disputes Hopper's conclusion and instead suggests that the terms arranged by the Spartokid kings and Athens in fact served the interests of both parties. Merchants sailing to Athens were given priority loading and exemption from the one-thirtieth tax, whilst the various grants awarded to the Bosphoran kings brought a considerable movement of traders and commerce to their territories. Furthermore, they were granted *ateleia* by the Athenians, which made Athens an attractive trade partner (see section 5.4.8).

⁶³⁰ Isager and Hansen (1975) 20-27, Camp (1982) 14ff; Garnsey (1985) 137-44; Burke (1992) 199-226; Whitby (1998) 102-128; Moreno (2007) 169-206.

⁶³¹ Garnsey (1985) 139.

demos was beginning to recognise that the mercantile community were fulfilling a role vital to the polis, is indisputable.

The most comprehensive and recent discussion of rewards and honours bestowed upon merchants is Lambert's series of articles in *ZPE*.⁶³² Lambert concludes that honorific decrees were intended to influence not only the behaviour of the recipient, but also others who were encouraged to emulate the honorand's services in order to attract similar praise for themselves. This is an argument first raised by Henry who, having studied the corpus of honorific inscriptions, concluded that the hortatory intention of the Athenians could be subdivided into three categories: A) those inscriptions in which potential benefactors are encouraged by their knowledge that the Athenians know how to express their gratitude for services performed B) those inscriptions that stressed the fact that the Athenians were willing to publically record their gratitude towards both individuals and states C) those inscriptions which had the deliberate intention of providing a reminder either of the service which led to the honour or privilege being bestowed or a reminder of the people's gratitude.⁶³³ Lambert goes on to suggest that "*In other words, honorific decrees were monumentalised diplomacy; and the study of them as a group over time has the potential to cast a powerful light on the changing priorities of Athenian foreign policy*".⁶³⁴ Lambert proposes that the main objective of these honours was to secure the grain supply from Macedonia and that after the battle of Chaironeia it is possible to identify the systematic honouring of grain traders as a new development in Athenian policy.

Low takes a slightly different approach to Lambert and Henry, examining the underlying imperial policy and language of honorific inscriptions. She argues that *proxeny* decrees record a reciprocal exchange in which the *proxenos* provides a service to Athens and in return receives certain benefits. Moreover, she believes that the assertion of power in these decrees '*forms a central part of the benefits which the Athenians are able to offer: i.e. that the proxenos will receive certain tax breaks, or, more usually, protection from harm and will be entitled to these not just in Athens but*

⁶³² Lambert (2006) 115-158; (2007) 101-154.

⁶³³ Henry (1996) 105-106.

⁶³⁴ Lambert (2006) 117.

in a whole range of cities'.⁶³⁵ Consequently Low concludes that by specifying the limits of their power in this way the Athenians were emphasising the extent of their influence. Furthermore, through the assertion that their power extends beyond the boundaries of their own territory the Athenians were able to promise benefits that very few other Greek poleis could match. The outcome of this epigraphic tradition is partly practical – the *proxenos* gets the promise of better perks – but more importantly it is also symbolic. Thus these honorific inscriptions bring as much credit to the honourer as they do to the honorand. In the surviving honorific inscriptions from Attica the Athenians can be identified as offering benefits which go beyond those offered by most other Greek states. In turn these benefits gave the Athenians an unrivalled advantage when it comes to attracting merchants to the Piraeus. Low therefore sees these inscriptions as a demonstration of the Athenians' ability to outbid their rivals in a '*battle of competitive generosity*'.

This is an important conclusion and thus this thesis will propose that Athens did not merely grant honours and privileges as a way to recognise those who, with no prompting, had brought supplies to Athens. In addition it will show that the Athenians granted honours and privileges to their benefactors in order to encourage them and others to continue to perform vital services. Athens was not passively relying on the generosity of benefactors to supply the city with those vital commodities in which it was deficient. Instead, the state had an active policy of rewarding generosity and honourable behaviour. This system suggests that, contrary to the views of the philosophers, the mercantile community could act honourably and thus gain social acceptance and prestige. Although it is frequently difficult to distinguish between the concern to secure imports and a genuine respect for the men involved, I would argue that some of the honours bestowed by Athens would seem to strongly indicate the latter. For instance, the bestowal of citizenship, the right to pay equal taxes as citizens and the right to serve in the same phalanxes as citizens, suggest true admiration for the individual rather than merely a preoccupation with securing imports. If the Athenians were simply concerned with securing grain shipments then they could have achieved their objective through tax breaks, grants of land or favourable commercial

⁶³⁵ Low (2005) 99.

terms, but the system of honours goes beyond this and in a number of instances serves to blur the boundaries between citizen and non-citizen. This thesis will argue, in contrast to Lambert, that although the frequency with which Athens bestows honours on merchants increases after Chaironeia, this is merely an extension of a policy that already existed. Furthermore this thesis will propose that the Athenians sought to secure the supply of other resources (such as timber) through the bestowal of honours, not just grain.

5.3 Mercantile Displays of Honour and the Services Being Rewarded

Before beginning to explore the services being rewarded and the associated honours, it is worth briefly discussing the term 'honour' itself, questioning how a merchant could display it, and how mercantile concepts of honour fitted in with, or deviated from, philosophical or social ideals. In general the aristocratic and philosophical understanding of 'honour' centred on the idea of undertaking a service for the city at the expense of one's own profit, interests, health or in extreme cases, life. The Greek term used to denote this concept was *philotimia*, meaning love of honour.⁶³⁶ Previously *philotimia* has rarely been associated with the mercantile community, primarily owing to the theory that gaining honour through the abandonment of self-interest and profit were not conducive to trade.⁶³⁷ The 'advantage' sought by *philotimia* was the reputation that went with such praiseworthy acts. The common identification of patriotic action with virtuous action is expressed in Demosthenes 52.29, where *philotimos* is contrasted with 'kakos' or 'aiskhros' behaviour. Dover suggests that when someone is honoured in Greek society the honour is necessarily withheld from others who wanted it just as badly; no one can win unless someone else loses.⁶³⁸ As a result the *philotimia* of individuals within the community as a whole took the form of a contest of good men.⁶³⁹ The word *philotimia* first appears in honorific inscriptions during the middle of the fourth century,

⁶³⁶ Dover (1994) 230-231.

⁶³⁷ One recent work that has examined the link between *philotimia* and trade is Henry (1996), 105-19.

⁶³⁸ Dover (1994) 231.

⁶³⁹ See for example, Dem. 20.107.

although at this point it is only used in relation to military and political services.⁶⁴⁰ Behaviour which was commonly recognised as displaying *philotimia* included disregard of one's personal safety in battle, a military or naval commander's subordination of his own advantage to the city's needs, the ransoming of prisoners, the zealous prosecution of miscreants and the display of modesty in public by the highly affluent. Whitehead points out that most of the men who are described as displaying *philotimia* during the fourth century had spent considerable sums of money in assisting the polis. He therefore concludes "*Explicitly or implicitly, then, the close association of philotimia with the expenditure of money was clear - and entirely unsurprising.*"⁶⁴¹ Evidence contained in the work of Aeschines and Demosthenes supports this hypothesis.⁶⁴² This is an important conclusion. During the final decades of the fourth century the Athenians were to face a series of economic pressures instigated by war and grain shortages, and consequently they became more reliant on the generosity of public benefactors. This resulted in commercial services becoming more vital to the economic and political well-being of the state and thus by the end of the fourth century the term *philotimia* (and its cognates) began to be used to describe significant commercial services. It is therefore possible to identify six honorific inscriptions that reward commercial services, and which state that the recipient demonstrated *philotimia*.⁶⁴³

5.3.1 The Commercial Services that are Rewarded

This section will examine the commercial services for which Athens bestowed honours and privileges; it will also offer comment on the goods being exchanged through these services. Furthermore, the following sections will explore the changes and developments made to the honours system during the fourth century, suggesting that the process was not linear, as suggested by Gernet, but rather occurred as a reaction to different situations.⁶⁴⁴ The variety of trade-related services honoured by the

⁶⁴⁰ Whitehead (1983) 55-60; 62-64.

⁶⁴¹ Whitehead (1983) 65.

⁶⁴² Aeschin. 2.111; Dem. 28.22; 42.25.

⁶⁴³ See Appendix Two *IG II² 423; IG II² 360 (a); IG II² 360(b); IG II² 398 (a) = 438, Schweigert no.39; Schweigert no.42.*

⁶⁴⁴ Gernet (1909) 350.

Athenians can be broken down into five categories. These are: the importation of commodities, the sale of imported commodities below market value, the securing of shipments of various commodities, the gift of imported commodities and miscellaneous commercial services which do not fit in one of the other categories.

A) The import of Commodities

Out of the 31 occasions⁶⁴⁵ I have identified the Athenians bestowing honours and privileges on those who had performed commercial services, seven are listed as being rewarded for the importation of goods to Athens.⁶⁴⁶ The men in these inscriptions appear to be full-time professional traders who accompanied the wares they transported. For instance, the honorand in Schweigert no. 39 was a Herakleote who had personally transported his grain to Athens. Additionally, Sopatros of Akragas, recorded in Camp no.3, is honoured for his importation of grain. As there is no mention of these goods being sold at cost price, it is likely that the reward is simply for bringing grain to Athens. The granting of *xenia* (public meal) in the Prytaneion and *thea* (permanent seat) at the Dionysia suggest that Sopatros travelled with the commodities he was exporting.⁶⁴⁷ In these seven inscriptions the lack of clear indication that the men had sold their goods at a reduced price suggests that they are being honoured solely for bringing grain to Athens.⁶⁴⁸ All seven of the cases where Athens granted honours and privileges to merchants who had performed simple importation of goods are likely to be in the context of typical profit-seeking trading ventures. Moreover, it is interesting, and indeed significant, that all of these grants occur after 350, with four being securely dated post-338. The surviving inscriptional evidence from pre-350 suggests that Athens rewarded only those merchants who imported grain at a reduced price (i.e. below the current market value in Athens at that time). After 350, however, several serious grain shortages occurred in Athens:

⁶⁴⁵ There are 26 extant inscriptions which honour 31 individuals. For a full list of these inscriptions, their date and the service being rewarded, see Appendix Two.

⁶⁴⁶ *IG II²* 342; *IG II²* 543; *IG II²* 312, Camp no. 4; Schweigert 39; *IG II²* 409; *IG II²* 407.

⁶⁴⁷ Camp (1974) 324.

⁶⁴⁸ *IG II²* 312. Lawton (1995) no. 118, 135. The relief of a prow of a ship, with projecting stalks of grain, suggest that the decree honoured men for the importation of grain. Unfortunately it is impossible to determine whether this grain was sold at a reduced price and so I have included the inscription in the more general category of rewards gained for importing commodities.

following its defeat at Chaironeia in 338, when Alexander invaded Greece and destroyed Thebes in 335/4, and during the period 331-324.⁶⁴⁹ These grain shortages clearly heightened Athenian interest in obtaining imported grain and thus they extended their system of rewards and honours to include those men who brought grain to Athens for profit.

B) The Sale of Imported Commodities at Below Market Value

Of the 31 instances where Athens honours commercial services, four rewarded men for selling their goods at below current market value.⁶⁵⁰ In *IG II² 360 (a)* it is recorded that Herakleides sold his grain (3,000 medimnoi) at a price of 5 drachmae per medimnos.⁶⁵¹ Rhodes and Osborne suggest that the fact Herakleides was the first merchant to arrive in Athens during a famine and the fact that the price he sold his grain at is recorded in his inscription suggests that he could have commanded a far higher price.⁶⁵² Similarly, in *IG II² 408* the price the recipients sold their grain at is recorded (nine *drachmai* per *medimnos* of wheat and five *drachmai* per *medimnos* of barley), and thus it is highly probable that these were below the current market values.⁶⁵³

During times of famine, when the price of grain could increase dramatically, there is evidence to suggest that Athens attempted to regulate market prices. This would account for why some merchants are specifically praised for selling grain below the established price (*kathestekuia timē*). Both Bresson and Oliver suggest that

⁶⁴⁹ Isager and Hansen (1975) 55; Garnsey (1988) 14; 154-164; Moreno (2007) 169-206.

⁶⁵⁰ *IG II² 283*; *IG II² 408*; *IG II² 360 (a)*; *IG II² 400 (b)*. The normal market value of wheat and barley at Athens seems to have been six and three drachmai respectively per medimnus in the last half of the fourth century. This can be established on account of a series of inscriptions which record that during the early 320s the Athenian assembly voted to sell public wheat at six and barley at three drachmai per medimnus (*IG II² 1672.282*; *IG II² 287*). On another occasion, when the price of wheat shot up to 16 drachmai, Athens sold its wheat to its citizens at five drachmai per medimnus (Dem. 34.39). It is likely that the Athenians reduced the price of wheat and barley to a level that was approximately normal, non-crisis prices. Isager and Hansen (1975) 200; Böckh (1857) 130, draw similar conclusions.

⁶⁵¹ *IG II² 360 (a)* ll. 10.

⁶⁵² Rhodes & Osborne (2007) 485.

⁶⁵³ Isager and Hansen (1975) 202 n.16.

a price-setting authority lies behind the term *kathestekuaia timē*.⁶⁵⁴ Oliver points out that the First-Fruits inscription from Eleusis provides the mechanism for barley and wheat, along with other commodities, to be sold at a price determined by the assembly. Additionally, the grain tax law of 374/3 attempted to regulate the price of grain. The price fixing of grain from the islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros was to be voted upon in the month of Anthesterion (February/March) with the demos deciding the price at which the elected men were to sell the wheat and barley.⁶⁵⁵ Bresson takes a slightly different stance to that of Oliver and argues that, although prices could be recommended by official mechanisms (the 'prix officiel'), there was no way of enforcing them.⁶⁵⁶ In both of these models however, it is possible to identify a difference between being honoured for selling at 'below market value' and 'below the prevailing price': merchants honoured for the former were selling their grain at a price below the *unregulated* market average, whilst men rewarded for the latter were demanding less for their grain than the maximum established (or recommended) by the assembly.

Although the men rewarded for selling their grain at less than market values (or less than the prevailing price) had a reduced profit margin, that is not to say that they did not make any profit, or at least cover their costs. For example, although grain prices may have been high in Athens this was not necessarily a reflection of prices across the Mediterranean. For instance, during the grain crisis of the 320s Cleomenes, Alexander's governor in Egypt, bought up as much of the Egyptian surplus grain as he could and then sold it to Greece wherever the price was highest. In order to profit from this scheme grain in Egypt had to be cheaper than it was in Greece.⁶⁵⁷ Therefore, even those men who sold their grain at a lower than market price were still businessmen who sought to at least break even (or to make a small profit). As these men were not performing any extraordinary service or sacrifice it is unsurprising that it is not until periods of crisis that the Athenians honour men simply for bringing

⁶⁵⁴ Bresson (2000) 182-206; Oliver (2007) 28-29.

⁶⁵⁵ Stroud (1998) 73 ll.42-6; Oliver (2007) 27; Rhodes and Osborne (2007) no. 26; 118-128.

⁶⁵⁶ Bresson (2000) 200-206.

⁶⁵⁷ Dem.58.8; Arist. *Oik.* 2.1352^a 16. However, it is worth noting that at this time Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros were under Athenian control and thus the Athenians had considerably greater control over grain prices in these regions than they did in the markets of other allied states.

grain to Athens. During times of crisis however, the personal sacrifice made by merchants could increase dramatically. For instance the speaker of Demosthenes' oration *Against Phormio* states that he sold his shipment of grain at the pre-famine price of five drachmae a *medimnos* (even though prices were as high as sixteen drachmae per *medimnos*).⁶⁵⁸ The foregoing of profit on such a large scale was a sacrifice worthy of praise and thus during times of crisis the Athenians rewarded merchants for importing grain at prices considerably lower than the going market value.

C) Securing Shipments

In addition to men being rewarded for transporting grain to Athens, we also have four inscriptions honouring the recipient for securing shipments of different commodities.⁶⁵⁹ In two of these four inscriptions the honorands acted as escorts (*pompai*), the exact duties of which are uncertain. For example, it seems likely that the primary purpose of these escorts was to guide the shipments safely to their destination but whether or not 'safe guidance' entailed protection of merchant ships against pirates or hostile states, navigation to avoid geographical features, or a combination of these, is unclear. In the other two inscriptions the men are rewarded for providing protection to secure shipments but again the exact meaning of this is unclear. In *IG II² 416 (b)* records that the honorands took care of the *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* so that there was an uninterrupted supply of grain to Athens.⁶⁶⁰ Additionally they made sure that no Athenian merchants were unjustly hindered or forced ashore.⁶⁶¹ Similarly, in Woodward IV, the recipient ensured that those *emporoi* sailing to the Hellespont in foreign vessels arrived safely at the Emporion. These inscriptions are interesting because, although the men being honoured are facilitating trade, they are not actually undertaking commerce themselves. Yet although these men are not engaged in trade, two (Schweigert 39 & *IG II² 407*) are believed to be merchants. Schweigert argues that the implied fact that Pandios travelled with his goods suggests

⁶⁵⁸ Dem. 34. 38-39.

⁶⁵⁹ Woodward 4; Schweigert 39; *IG II² 416 (b)*; *IG II² 400*.

⁶⁶⁰ See also the honours recorded in the legal speeches discussed in Chapter Three 3.2.6.B.

⁶⁶¹ *IG II² 416 (b)* ll. 6-12.

he is a professional merchant, whilst in *IG II*² 407 the various trade related services mentioned in relation to the recipient suggest that he is also an accomplished inter-regional merchant. Again, all known instances of men receiving honours for securing shipments are found in the latter half of the fourth century. One reason for this, I suggest, is that, prior to the Social War Athens had a navy that was sufficiently strong to protect her own mercantile interests. However, after the Social War the Athenian navy was too weakened to fully protect mercantile shipping (see sections 6.3.2 A & B), a situation made worse by Philip of Macedon who encouraged and even joined with pirates to prevent grain from reaching the Piraeus.⁶⁶²

D) Gifts of Imported Goods or Money for Grain

During the fourth century it is also possible to identify the Athenians bestowing rewards upon men who had given gifts of grain (or money to purchase grain) to Athens.⁶⁶³ In each case the recipient had incurred a monetary loss as a result of the gift. In these cases the trader, or agent, gave Athens imported grain (or money to purchase grain), while in exchange they were granted privileges. This type of transaction harks back to the gift exchange networks of the archaic period.⁶⁶⁴ Although these inscriptions, like those praising the import of goods at less than market value, show the Athenian state as involving itself in trade, these are the least relevant to this thesis.

E) Miscellaneous Commercial Services

This section focuses on those commercial services that either do not fit into the above categories or are not described in sufficient detail for them to be categorised.⁶⁶⁵ The services that cannot easily be categorised include those of Satyros,

⁶⁶² Dem. 4.34; Dem. 7; Dem 12.13. Ormerod (1987) 115; De Souza (1995) 179-198.

⁶⁶³ **Gifts of grain:** *IG II*² 212 (a); *IG II*² 363; Schweigert 42. **Gifts of money to purchase grain:** *IG II*² 423; *IG II*² 360 (b).

⁶⁶⁴ See sections 3.1.1 & 3.1.2. See also, Herman (1987) 130-142.

⁶⁶⁵ Those inscriptions in which the services cannot be confidently ascertained are: *IG II*² 81; *IG II*² 286; *IG II*² 337; *IG II*² 343; *IG II*² 400 (a), *IG II*² 398 (a), *IG II*² 438; *IG II*² 401; *IG II*² 414 (c).

Leukon, Pairisades and Eumelos.⁶⁶⁶ A prime example demonstrating the complexities of these alternative commercial services is *IG II² 207*, which records honours bestowed upon the Persian Satrap, Orontes. In fragment (a) of the inscription there is a record of a trade agreement between Orontes and Athens. In fragments (b), (c) and (d), which it has been argued are part of a separate decree passed subsequently to fragment (a), are the details of an agreement between Athens and the Satrap, in which it is stated that Orontes will sell grain to the Athenians in order that they can provision a military venture. *IG II² 212* records the honours and privileges granted to the kings of the Bosphoros for various commercial services.⁶⁶⁷ Spartokos II (347/6-342/1) and Pairisades I (347/6-309/8) are honoured for ensuring that regular supplies of grain are dispatched to Athens (ll.14-16) and for giving gifts of grain like their grandfather (Satyros) and their father (Leukon) (ll.20-22).⁶⁶⁸ *IG II² 423* records that Philomelos loaned money to Athens during a period of sustained grain shortages in order that the city could purchase grain from overseas.⁶⁶⁹ Whether the loan was at interest, or interest free, it is clear that the money was not a gift and thus ineligible to be included in category D. Although these commercial services are of interest, they are not undertaken by individual (or groups of) professional merchants and thus they are of less interest to this study than categories A) and B).

Conclusion Three

What is immediately obvious from an examination of the fourth century honorific inscriptions rewarding commercial services was that there were a wide variety of activities that could be honoured. Circumstances outside of the Polis' control, such as more frequent shortages of grain, a weakened navy, and the rise to prominence of Macedon, inspired the Athenians to use non-traditional methods for stimulating trade. The type of commercial services being honoured by Athens provides some indication as to the state's interest in trade and traders. All the

⁶⁶⁶ *IG II² 207; IG II² 212; IG II² 423.*

⁶⁶⁷ These honours are also recorded in *Dem. 20.30-41; Din. 1.43* and *IG II² 653.*

⁶⁶⁸ *Dem. 20.31; 33,* records Leukon receiving honours and privileges from the Athenians in recognition of his commercial services which included granting exemption from export taxes and priority loading for ships carrying grain to Athens.

⁶⁶⁹ The assumption that the money was loaned during the time of a grain shortage is based on Kirchner's (1901-03) highly speculative restoration of the inscription.

commercial services that are rewarded by Athens, on one level or another, facilitate the provisioning of the polis with various imported commodities. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the Athenians' main interest in honouring members of the mercantile community was to ensure the polis was adequately provisioned with the commodities in which she was deficient.

5.4 The Honours and Rewards Granted to the Mercantile Community

Owing to the limited amount of epigraphic evidence the following sections have, by necessity, examined all 32 inscriptions rewarding commercial services, not just those praising professional traders. From these inscriptions it is possible to identify that there was a range of honours and privileges that could be bestowed to reward commercial services. These include *proxenia*, official commendations, *enktesis* (right to acquire land), serving in the army and *eisphora meta* (equal tax with citizens), gold crowns, an inscribed stele, invitations for dinner at the Prytaneion, a seat in the theatre of Dionysos, *asylia* (protection from seizure) and *ateleia* (exemption from obligations including taxes). What is most significant about all these honours is that previously they have only been associated with political or military service. With prior scholarship perceiving the mercantile community to be considered as of low status and insignificant by the Athenians, studies exploring the social status of the Athenian mercantile community have tended to overlook the epigraphic evidence.⁶⁷⁰ In general these studies concluded that the state had little or no official interest in the mercantile community. However the fact that during the fourth century, Athens provides the same honours and awards to traders as to other groups suggests that this view is no longer tenable. As will be shown, an investigation of the rewards and honours granted to merchants can be used to demonstrate that the Athenians recognised the importance of the mercantile community and actively sought to offer them incentives and protection in order to ensure their continued service.

5.4.1 Public Commendations

⁶⁷⁰ For instance Knorringa (1926); Hasebroek (1976); Finely (1979); (1983). Reed (2003) takes a slightly more nuanced approach recognising that in some situations Athens considered merchants valuable but still failing to examine the epigraphic material.

The most frequent means of rewarding those who had performed trade-related services was for Athens to publicly commend them. Commendation was simply official recognition of a service done on behalf of the polis. Therefore commendations required no real monetary expenditure and thus the Athenians officially commended many honorands for a variety of services. As commendations were bestowed regardless of the status of the recipient, commendations had little practical use or monetary value. Thus, as with the awarding of inscribed stelai (discussed below), it must be concluded that the true value of the commendation was the honour it bestowed.

Out of the 26 extant honorary decrees rewarding commercial services, 15 award commendations.⁶⁷¹ Nine of the remaining 11 are too badly damaged for us to be certain that a commendation was not awarded,⁶⁷² leaving only two that certainly do not grant a commendation to the recipient.⁶⁷³ Although, during the fifth century, Athens was willing to grant commendations to men who had undertaken political and military services, we find no examples of inter-regional traders being honoured in the same manner.⁶⁷⁴ Andocides' speech, *On His Return*, delivered c.409/408 demonstrates that even at this date Athens was reluctant to reward commercial services with a commendation.⁶⁷⁵ According to Andocides' statements in 2.12, his commercial services were vital to the construction of the fleet that was victorious in the battle of Cyzicus in 410. However, despite the importance of his services, Andocides records that he was disappointed in his expectation of a commendation. Moreover, Andocides, when addressing the Athenian assembly in 409/8, states that Athens granted crowns and proclaimed publicly as good men those who added to the state's revenues in the performance of public offices or who achieved crucial military victories. He wonders then, why he himself, who performed services at the risk of his own life and goods, was not considered worthy of a commendation. From Andocides'

⁶⁷¹ *IG* II² 207; *IG* II² 212; *IG* II² 283; *IG* II² 342; *IG* II² 408; *IG* II² 409 (restored); *IG* II² 407; *IG* II² 360 (a); *IG* II² 360 (b); *IG* II² 343; *IG* II² 400 (b); *IG* II² 401; Camp no.3; Schweigert no. 39 & No. 42.

⁶⁷² Woodward no. IV, *IG* II² 286; *IG* II² 423; *IG* II² 363; *IG* II² 416; *IG* II² 398 (a) +438. *IG* II² 312; *IG* II² 543; *IG* II² 653

⁶⁷³ *IG* II² 81; *IG* II² 337.

⁶⁷⁴ Possibly the earliest example of a professional merchant being rewarded with a commendation is *IG* II² 283 dated by *IG* dated c.336/5BC.

⁶⁷⁵ Andok. 2.11-12.

speech it is clear that at this stage trade-related services were not considered worthy of a commendation. However, during the fourth century this situation was to change. Without the economic influence provided by their empire the Athenians found that obtaining supplies of resources vital to their survival was considerably more problematic. As a consequence mercantile services began to be considered equally as vital to the state as political or military service. This shift in state policy was not an overnight phenomenon and it is possible to chart its development. The first men to receive commendations from Athens for their commercial services were Phanosthenes and Archelaus, both of whom were high status individuals.⁶⁷⁶ What can be identified then, is that initially Athens began to bestow commendations for commercial services to foreigners of high status. This explains the Athenians' failure to commend Andocides who, at the time of his speech, was an exile of Athens and who appears to have been operating as a professional merchant. As the services of the mercantile community became more vital to Athens, we can identify the Athenians bestowing commendations on lower-status individuals who were professional traders. The first example we have of Athens honouring a professional trader is Sopatros of Akragas who is honoured for importing grain to Athens during the shortages between 331 and 324.⁶⁷⁷

5.4.2 *Proxenia* and *Euergesia*

Although the dating of the first known official grant of *proxeny*, a funeral monument erected by the people of Corcyra in memory of Menecrates of Locris, is uncertain, the generally proposed date of 600BC seems reasonable.⁶⁷⁸ Thus the corpus of *proxeny* decrees from across the Greek world covers a period from approximately the early sixth century to the end of the second century BC.⁶⁷⁹ The word *proxenia* is derived from the prefix 'pro' which means 'on behalf of' or 'instead of' and 'xenos'

⁶⁷⁶ Archelaus was king of Macedon (*IG I³* 117) while Phanosthenes was a prominent citizen of Andros who had been exiled for his pro-democratic and pro-Athenian sympathies (*IG I³* 182 (a))

⁶⁷⁷ Camp (1974) no.3.

⁶⁷⁸ This date was proposed by Meiggs and Lewis on account of pottery objects discovered inside the tomb. Meiggs and Lewis (1969) no. 4; p.4-5. See also Walbank (1978) 4; Herman (1987) 135-6.

⁶⁷⁹ Although this study does not offer me the space to provide a full examination of the development of *xenia* relations and their metamorphosis into the institution of *proxenia*, I refer the reader to Herman (1987) 130-142 and Gauthier (1985) 131-147.

meaning 'guestfriend' or sometimes more generally 'foreigner'. Poleis granted the title *proxenos* to those men who had provided important services to the state or had proven their goodwill. In general, Athens granted the title *proxenos* alongside that of *euergetēs* (which was a purely honorific term designating the recipient as a benefactor of Athens), and thus scholars disagree over whether it is honorific or functional in nature.⁶⁸⁰

However, what is clear is that when the Athenians bestowed the title *proxenia*, they expected the *proxenos* to continue to provide commercial services to the state. So what exactly were the roles of those men who became *proxenoi* because of their commercial services? Few scholars attempt to specify how *proxenoi* actually served the 'trading interests' of the states who rewarded them. Wallace loosely defines the role of *proxenoi* as 'one city's friend in another city', whereas Hasebroek states that a *proxenos* served the city that had appointed him by acting as a middleman between citizens of the bestowing city and local officials in his own.⁶⁸¹ Both men suggest that poleis appointed *proxenoi* to aid their own citizens who were involved in overseas trade. Other scholars such as Ziebarth, Walbank and Burke, tried to create a link between the geographical distribution of a city's *proxenoi* and that city's trading interests.⁶⁸² For example, Ziebarth argues that the distribution of awards of *proxenia* by Delos to men from the Black Sea in the third century BC makes it highly likely that the polis was trying to create trade links in this region. Although this is an attractive argument, the link between trade and the awarding of *proxenia* is still far from proven.⁶⁸³

⁶⁸⁰ On one side of the debate stands Hopper (1979) who argues that the title *proxenos* was purely honorific, on the other are Henry (1983) and Herman (1987) who see the award as offering both tangible and intangible benefits. Marek (1984) and Gauthier (1985) take a slightly different approach and see the awarding of *proxenia* in terms of 'privilege' and 'use' rather than 'honour' and 'function'.

⁶⁸¹ Hasebroek (1933) 129; Wallace (1978) 189-200.

⁶⁸² Ziebarth (1932-1933) 245; Rostovtzeff (1941) 245; 1375 n.73; Walbank (1978) 74; 78; 81; 474; Burke (1992) 206-208.

⁶⁸³ Braund (forthcoming) 57-59, has recently downplayed the importance of the Black Sea trade, thus further undermining Ziebarth's conclusion. Although it is not possible to determine a link between the importance of specific trade routes and the bestowal of *proxenia*, it is safe to conclude that throughout its existence, and irrespective of any change in the social makeup of the Greek states, the title *proxenos* was representative of an agreement between a community and an outsider, or a group of outsiders. Wallace (1970) 189, n. 2; n. 190; Walbank (1978) 2-20; Marek (1984) 4.

Out of the 31 occasions when Athens rewarded merchants for their commercial services during the fourth century, seven recipients were granted the titles *proxenos* and *euergētēs*.⁶⁸⁴ Out of the remaining 24 occasions, 13 are from stelai that are too fragmentary for us to be certain whether *proxenia* or *euergētēs* was bestowed.⁶⁸⁵ Out of the remaining 11, one is bestowed on a city not an individual,⁶⁸⁶ eight are bestowed on men who had been granted citizenship or already had grants of *proxenia*,⁶⁸⁷ which leaves two occasions when the recipient was clearly not awarded either *proxenia* or *euergesya*. The Athenians granted *proxenia* and *euergesya* for at least three of the five categories of trade related services identified above, the exceptions being the import of grain at a reduced price and the securing of shipments of goods.⁶⁸⁸ Absence of evidence however, is not evidence of absence, since it is highly unlikely that the Athenians would reward the simple importation of goods while considering these other two services as unworthy of the honour. As with commendations, most of the Athenian grants of *proxenia* and *euergesya*, in the fifth and early fourth centuries, were for political and military services. In fact, prior to 415 it is impossible to identify any grants of *proxenia* for non-military or political services. The first non-military or non-political service that is rewarded with *proxenia* is recorded in *IG I³ 174* and is granted for commercial services. This inscription dates to the first cluster of grants of *proxenia* and *euergesya* for commercial services, c.414-407/6 with the second cluster being between 330-319/8 BC. These two groups of dates are significant. The first group of decrees are just subsequent to the Sicilian expedition, and it is no surprise that we find Athens rewarding merchants who transported oar-spars to Athens.⁶⁸⁹ The second cluster dates to the years following the battle of Chaironeia when Athens was no longer the commercial superpower she had been in the fifth century. This fact, combined with a famine during the early 320s, resulted in Athens seeking alternative methods for ensuring her grain supplies (see chapter 4.3.1 & above section 5.3.1 A). From the seven fourth century inscriptions that bestow *proxenia* and *euergesya* in

⁶⁸⁴ *IG II² 81; IG II² 286; IG II² 342+; IG II² 360 (b); IG II² 343; IG II² 400 (a); Camp (1974) No. 3.*

⁶⁸⁵ *IG II² 283; IG II² 423; IG II² 408; IG II² 363; IG II² 416 (b); IG II² 407; IG II² 401; IG II² 409; IG II² 414 (c); IG II² 312; Woodward (1956) no.IV; Schweigert (1940) no.39; Schweigert (1940) no.42.*

⁶⁸⁶ *IG II² 543.*

⁶⁸⁷ *IG II² 212; IG II² 212 (a); IG II² 212 (b); IG II² 207; IG II² 400 (b); IG II² 398 (a) +438; IG II² 653 (1); IG II² 653 (2).*

⁶⁸⁸ **Importation of goods** = *IG II² 342+*; Camp. No. 3. **Gifts of imported goods** = *IG II² 360 (b)*. **Miscellaneous commercial services** = *IG II² 286; IG II² 343; IG II² 400 (a)*.

⁶⁸⁹ *IG I³ 182 (a) and IG I³ 117.*

recognition of commercial services, six date between 336-319.⁶⁹⁰ During this same timeframe there are only five clear cases in which Athens granted *proxenia* for political or military services.⁶⁹¹ It would therefore appear that, as the Athenians became pressed to obtain grain from new sources after 338, they used the bestowal of *proxenia* and *euergesy* to help achieve their objective.

Conclusion Four

The bestowal of the titles such as *proxenos* and *euergetēs* demonstrate that even the highest honours could be awarded to merchants when their services to the state were considered important enough to be on a par with vital political or military services.

5.4.3 Invitations to *Xenia*

Another important symbolic award, which can be seen developing from a practice found in *xenia* relations, was the inviting of the honorand to a feast at public expense. This would appear to be a more formalised version of the feasting that commonly occurred as a way of finalising guest-friendship arrangements.⁶⁹² *Xenia* at public expense consisted of a formal reception and meal in a public setting (most probably the Prytaneion).⁶⁹³ As with commendations and commemorative inscriptions, an invitation to a publicly funded meal was an honour granted to a variety of honorands for a range of services.⁶⁹⁴ Out of the 31 instances rewarding commercial services three grant *xenia* to the recipient.⁶⁹⁵ The recipient of *IG* II² 81 had performed trade related services that were not specified in his inscription, whilst in Camp no.3, Sopotros of Akragas was granted *xenia* because of his importation of grain. In *IG* II²

⁶⁹⁰ *IG* II² 286; *IG* II² 342+; *IG* II² 360 (b); *IG* II² 343; *IG* II² 400 (a); Camp No. 3.

⁶⁹¹ *IG* II² 330; *IG* II² 133; *IG* II² 240; *IG* II² 284; *IG* II² 466. See Henry (1983) 262-274

⁶⁹² Herman (1987) 59, 'The ritual was made up of a complex combination of symbolic elements which were enacted in sequence. The whole range of possible elements included a declaration, an exchange of objects, feasting, and again, the taking of an oath'.

⁶⁹³ Miller (1978) 4-11; Osborne (1981a) 153-170.

⁶⁹⁴ The decision on whether to invite foreign benefactors for *xenia* in the Prytaneion was at the discretion of the honorary decree's proposer and members of the assembly. Osborne (1981^a) 156-158. Dem. 19.234.

⁶⁹⁵ *IG* II² 81; *IG* II² 212; Camp (1974) no.3.

212 it is not actually the recipients of the inscription who are invited to meal, but their representatives, Sosis and Theodosios, who had taken care of visiting Athenian ambassadors. Out of the remaining cases nine are unlikely to have been granted *xenia* since they post-date 330, by which time Osborne suggests the practice had been phased out by Athens.⁶⁹⁶ The fact that all foreign ambassadors and benefactors, irrespective of the duties they performed, are invited to the same *xenia*, again suggests that commercial services were not viewed as considerably less significant or honourable than other public duties.⁶⁹⁷ As with the erection of an inscription recording the recipients' good deeds, the financial benefit of a meal at public expense was negligible, but the honorary value was important. The foreign merchant would, for an afternoon at least, be considered on a par with benefactors who had undertaken political, military or religious services for the Athenians.⁶⁹⁸ The invitation of merchants to *xenia* at the Prytaneion also points to the fact that Xenophon's *Poroi* is more reflective of Athenian trade policy than previously believed. *IG II² 81* clearly suggests that the recipient was rewarded for his trade-related services with a meal at public expense. The inscription dates to c.390-380, considerably earlier than the *Poroi*, indicating that Xenophon's suggestion to award merchants with meals at public expense was not a new idea, but in fact the expansion of a pre-existing policy.⁶⁹⁹

5.4.4 The Award of Priority Theatre Seats

Xenophon, in the *Poroi*, suggests that one way of attracting merchants and ship's masters to the Piraeus would be to offer them priority seats during the Dionysia.⁷⁰⁰ Xenophon believed that by offering these priority seats Athens could encourage *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* to bring a variety of vital commodities to Athens.

⁶⁹⁶ See Appendix Two; Osborne (1981^a)160

⁶⁹⁷ However, this view is in opposition to that of Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977) 367, n.14, who argue that inviting traders to the Prytaneion was deeply subversive to traditional Greek social and moral values, given that such an invitation was 'an exceptional honour'.

⁶⁹⁸ Miller (1978) 4, states that '*to invite someone into the Prytaneion for entertainment at public expense was one of the highest honours paid by a Greek city to an individual*'.

⁶⁹⁹ The argument that Xenophon was merely suggesting the expansion of a pre-existing system of honours goes against the work of Böckh (1857) 778; Hasebroek (1933) 25; Gauthier (1976) 1-6; Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977) 362-368.

⁷⁰⁰ Xen. *Por.* 3.4.

The Athenians were to adopt this suggestion and take it a step further. Xenophon's proposal called for the granting of a seat at one particular festival whereas the Athenian granting of Thea provided the recipient with a permanent seat at the Theatre of Dionysus.⁷⁰¹ Out of the 31 occasions when Athens granted honours for commercial services, only Camp (1974) no. 3 honouring the foreign merchant Sopatrus of Akragas, which was inscribed a considerable time after Xenophon's suggestion, records that the recipient was granted a seat in the theatre. However, the inclusion of a theatre seat was most commonly recorded at the bottom of an inscription, one of the sections most frequently missing or damaged, and thus it is impossible to tell how many other inscriptions might have recorded this honour. Böckh argues that the financial cost of this reward to the state was minimal but the prestige it provided was of considerable importance to the recipient.⁷⁰² Whereas traditional views have seen the mercantile community as being socially segregated from the rest of Athenian society, the awarding of theatre seats shows a willingness on the part of the Athenians to integrate even foreign merchants into what was fundamentally an Athenian festival.

5.4.5 The Award of Gold Crowns

Gold crowns are perhaps the single most expensive honour that was granted to men who undertook trade-related services on behalf of the city,⁷⁰³ and the Athenians bestow gold crowns in 14 out of the 31 occasions when they reward commercial services.⁷⁰⁴ Gold crowns are granted to men who had performed any of the five main categories of commercial service, without distinguishing between Greeks and non-Greeks, metics and non-metics, or non-wealthy professional merchants, wealthy professional merchants and foreign rulers.⁷⁰⁵ As with a number of other honours

⁷⁰¹ Henry (1983) 291.

⁷⁰² Böckh notes from Dem. 18.28, that a typical seat in the theatre cost 2 obols. However, Böckh suggests the prestige of having a guaranteed seat was far more important to the recipient than the cost was to the state. Böckh (1857) 300-310.

⁷⁰³ Henry (1983) 22-38; Dem. 20.30-33; Isoc. 17.57.

⁷⁰⁴ *IG II² 212 (Satyros); IG II² 212 (Leukon); IG II² (Spartokos II and Pairisades); IG II² 543; IG II² 653; IG II² 207; IG II² 342; IG II² 408; IG II² 407; IG II² 360 (a); IG II² 360 (b); IG II² 343; IG II² 401; Schweigert no. 42.*

⁷⁰⁵ The Athenians also bestowed foliage crowns which were normally made from olive leaves (although sometimes ivy or myrtle) and which were a less prestigious honour than gold crowns. Henry (1983) 38, suggests that from the middle of the fourth century Athens made increased use of this award.

identified above, the earliest grants of gold crowns for trade-related purposes went to foreign rulers rather than professional merchants. Whereas Athens granted gold crowns to Satyros, Leukon, Spartokos II, Pairisades and Orontes for their trade related services, they did not do the same for the professional Megarian merchant honoured in *IG II*² 81 which dates to roughly the same time. Satyros, Leukon, Spartokos II and Pairisades were all kings of the Bosphoros whilst Orontes was an important Persian Satrap, and thus these men were in a position to offer Athens more than just commercial services. It is not until after the mid-fourth century, possibly as a result of the Social War in 355 and the ever more frequent shortages of grain, that we can identify Athens granting a gold crown to a professional trader, Apses of Tyre, for his commercial services.⁷⁰⁶ From 350 the price of the gold crown is usually (but not always) specified in the decree. For both citizens and non-citizens the value of gold crowns was either 500 or 1,000 drachmas.⁷⁰⁷ Lambert suggests that it is likely that the council was entitled to award only 500 dr. crowns to Athenians and that 1,000 dr. crowns required an Assembly decree. Even though, as Lambert himself points out, there is insufficient evidence to establish this as a definite rule, it is a sensible conclusion. The cost on all but two of the occasions when Athens granted gold crowns to reward commercial services is 1,000 drachmae. The exceptions are recorded in the inscription *IG II*² 360, in which the Athenians bestow two gold crowns on Heraclides of Salamis for his continued commercial goodwill: the cost of the first crown is 500 dr. while the value of the second is left unrecorded. The granting of gold crowns to reward trade was a significant expenditure for the Athenians. Isager and Hansen point out that in Demosthenes' *Fourth Philippic*, dating to 341/0, the speaker claims that previously Athenian revenue had not exceeded 130 talents, but that now revenues had increased to 400 talents.⁷⁰⁸ During the time of Lykourgos (338-326 B.C.) the Athenian revenues are said to have increased from 60 to an average of 1,200 talents per year.⁷⁰⁹ From these figures it is possible to calculate that a single gold crown of 1,000 drachmae could cost the Athenians anywhere from 0.01% of their total revenue (with revenues of 1,200 talents) to 0.30% (assuming a total revenue of

⁷⁰⁶ *IG II*² 342+.

⁷⁰⁷ Henry (1983) 24-25; Lambert (2004) 88.

⁷⁰⁸ Isager and Hansen (1975) 54; Dem. 10.37-40.

⁷⁰⁹ Plut. *Vit X Orat.* 842f.

60 talents). If we accept Gabrielson's assessment that the average trireme cost the Athenians approximately 5,000 – 6,000 drachmai to construct, then every gold crown bestowed was around a fifth or sixth of the cost of a warship. This demonstrates precisely how important the Athenians considered trade-related services and the men who undertook them. This importance is further highlighted when we examine the underlying reason behind the Athenians' bestowal of gold crowns. Due to the significant expense incurred by granting a gold crown it must be questioned whether or not the bestowal was primarily aimed at acquiring the increased revenue from the trade it encouraged (as has been supposed previously).⁷¹⁰ Xenophon in the *Poroi* (discussed above) was primarily concerned with raising Athenian revenues by increasing the number of metics and the volume of trade (both of which could be taxed). To achieve this he suggests the offering honours and privileges to foreign merchants.⁷¹¹ However, Xenophon does not include the bestowal of gold crowns in his list of recommendations. It seems probable that Xenophon recognised that the bestowal of a gold crown in these circumstances would significantly reduce the increased revenue brought about by the upsurge in commerce. Instead, gold crowns seem to have been bestowed upon those men who continued to import vital commodities to Athens, and so the Athenians can be identified as being primarily interested in the commodities themselves, not the revenue they generated. Evidence to support this view can be identified in Demosthenes speech *Against Leptines*. Demosthenes states that Leukon was worthy of the honours and privileges he had received from the Athenians, primarily because of his actions in helping the Athenians secure grain supplies.⁷¹² Although Athens was able to sell the surplus grain for 15 talents, Demosthenes is explicit that it is the import of the grain itself, and not the increased revenue, which was the main reason for honouring Leukon. Furthermore, Moreno points out that Athens acquired the revenue from the sale of grain only *after* the state had fed the people.⁷¹³ Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that when granting gold crowns for trade-related services, the primary interest of the Athenians was to gain supplies of grain, not to increase revenues.

⁷¹⁰ Burke (1992) 199-226.

⁷¹¹ Xen. *Por.* 3.4; See also Gauthier (1976) 1; 4-6.

⁷¹² Dem. 20.30-32.

⁷¹³ Moreno (2008) 258.

5.4.6 The Award of Inscribed Stelai

One of the most common and archaeologically visible symbolic honours was the conferment of an inscribed stele. These stelai listed the honourand's good deeds and were erected in a public place visible to all.⁷¹⁴ The Athenians explicitly bestow 10 inscribed stelai in the corpus of 31 occasions when they reward trade-related services.⁷¹⁵ Even though 15 of the extant inscriptions praising trade-related services do not mention or have lost the lines that record provisions for inscribing the decree, their very existence attests to the fact they were to be recorded and displayed in a public place.⁷¹⁶ Whereas previously, the recipient met the cost of inscribing an honorific decree, by the mid-fourth century the assembly covered it with money drawn from its expense account.⁷¹⁷ The granting of an inscription at public expense transcended ethnic and occupational groupings and was bestowed upon citizens, foreigners and metics to recognise a wide variety of services including religious, athletic, political, military and commercial.⁷¹⁸ The decrees were inscribed by a public clerk onto a marble stele, with each inscription varying in length and detail (and thus value), according to the budget decreed by the assembly.⁷¹⁹ The indiscriminate nature of the award demonstrates that all the men being honoured had one thing in common, the respect, and gratitude of the polis. Although this may not seem like a particularly high honour, especially in light of the Athenian fondness for recording large amounts of information in a similar manner, public recognition could be highly important to the recipient, as proof that he was honest and trustworthy.⁷²⁰ In a culture centred on honour and shame, such proof of reputation could be highly important; so much so

⁷¹⁴ Xen. *Por.* 3.11.

⁷¹⁵ *IG II²* 212 (Satyros); *IG II²* 212 (Leukon); *IG II²* 212 (Spartokos II and Pairisades); *IG II²* 81; *IG II²* 342+; *IG II²* 407; *IG II²* 360 (b); *IG II²* 343; Woodward no. 4. Camp no.3.

⁷¹⁶ *IG II²* 207; *IG II²* 286; *IG II²* 283; *IG II²* 423; *IG II²* 408; *IG II²* 337; *IG II²* 363; *IG II²* 416 (b); *IG II²* 409; *IG II²* 407; *IG II²* 400 (b); *IG II²* 398 (a) +438; *IG II²* 401; Schweigeret no. 39; Schweigert no. 42.

⁷¹⁷ Henry (1983) 12, n.1.

⁷¹⁸ For the most comprehensive discussion of commendations see Henry (1983) 1-11.

⁷¹⁹ An illustrative example of this process is *IG II²* 206, which closes with a statement detailing how much could be spent on the inscription (20 drachmae) and the time frame in which it would be erected.

⁷²⁰ The significance of the honour bestowed by such an inscription is highlighted by the fact that men who continued to undertake valuable services on behalf of the polis, could have appendices added to their original stele. See for example, *IG II²* 12.

that the respect gained from these inscriptions could transcend political and geographical boundaries, and even prove good character in states other than Athens.⁷²¹ For example, in 403/02 Athens granted an award of *proxenia* to Poses of Samos for his outstanding loyalty and friendship. His service to the state and the subsequent rewards were to be recorded in Athens, but, in addition to this, he was to be provided with a written copy of the decree so that he could take it back to Samos and have a second stele inscribed.⁷²² The expected result was that both the Samians and the Athenians would recognise his public worth. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Poses was a merchant, the recognition of honourable behaviour and a trustworthy nature would be equally, if not more, important to those of a commercial persuasion. As discussed previously, the personal reputation of a merchant had a considerable impact on his livelihood: by affecting the interest charged on any money he borrowed; by influencing the type of businessmen who would deal with him; and by affecting the access rights he was granted to foreign states (which will be explored in detail below).⁷²³

Although these inscriptions are produced in large quantities it is significant that commercial services are rewarded in this manner. Although the Athenians are known for recording a vast amount of information on marble stelai, not every decree passed by the assembly was published. Moreover, in order for an honorific inscription to be erected it first had to be voted for by the assembly, suggesting there was a concern with maintaining the exclusivity of the honour. Therefore, in contrast to the traditional view that the state wanted to marginalize trade and traders, during the fourth century, the Athenians thought it important to publish at least a selection of the decrees praising those who had undertaken commercial services. Furthermore, many of these inscriptions were placed on the Acropolis alongside those honouring men who had undertaken political and military services.⁷²⁴ The fact that Athens inscribed honorary decrees for commercial services again emphasises the importance of inter-regional exchange during the fourth century and demonstrates that trade could be

⁷²¹ Veyne (1990) 127. Veyne explores the importance of this type of inscription in the Roman world.

⁷²² *IG II²* 1.

⁷²³ See also sections 3.2.6 A & B.

⁷²⁴ For example, *IG II²* 360; *IG II²* 343; Camp no.3; Woodward no.4, were all found on the Acropolis.

recognised as being as important to the polis as either political or military services.

5.4.7 The Award of *Asyilia*

An honour that was granted solely to men of the mercantile community is *asyilia*, which is translated as “inviolability”. This honour was in essence a guarantee of protection for the honorand and his property from seizure anywhere that Athens could prevent it.⁷²⁵ The Athenians grant *asyilia* in two out of the 31 occasions they reward commercial services, but the inscriptions detailing 28 of the remaining 29 occasions when Athens rewarded commercial services are so badly preserved that it is impossible to determine if *asyilia* was bestowed.⁷²⁶ The exception is, *IG II² 360 (a)*, which although not explicitly granting *asyilia* to Herakleides of Cyprian Salamis, records that the Athenians elect to dispatch an envoy to Dionysius, tyrant of Herakleia, to request he return to Herakleides his sails (which had been confiscated) and obtain a promise that the Herakleotes would in future desist in detaining those merchants sailing for Athens. This inscription therefore, despite not granting *asyilia*, provides an example as to what *asyilia* could mean to the recipient.

All those who were granted *asyilia* were professional traders. This is not surprising since a grant of *asyilia* brought practical benefits to professional traders which foreign rulers might not need or want. *Asyilia* was an important clause for the state bestowing the honour as they frequently found that trade often dwindled as the expectation of a military conflict heightened. This phenomenon occurred because traders who were overly reliant on one particular market place knew they could face financial ruin if this source of commerce was suddenly cut off, and thus, in order to prevent this eventuality, many merchants would begin to frequent other, safer, emporia. As a way to counter this reduction in commercial operations, states would

⁷²⁵ There have been various arguments concerning the precise nature of *asyilia*. Hasebroek(1933) 128 suggests that it only applied within the granting state’s territory; Michell (1963) 227, argues that it applied to nationals of the granting city when they went abroad; MacDowell (1978) 78, suggests it protected the honorands from Athenian plunder went abroad; whilst Hopper (1979) 59, proposes that it offered honorands protection from judicial or military seizure. Engels (1996) 320-321, concluded that the honour offered protection to non-Athenian merchants and their property from whoever, Athenian or foreigner, and wherever, in Athenian territory or beyond, that Athens could provide it

⁷²⁶ *IG II² 81*; *IG II² 286*. In three other inscriptions: *IG II² 360 (a)*,

begin to offer incentives, such as unrestricted freedom of entry and *asylia*, to respected merchants thus giving them reassurance that they would not lose out if the state went to war.⁷²⁷ Unlike many of the other honours, which saw an increase after the battle of Chaironeia, the awarding of *asylia* was gradually phased out as it was recognised that Athens could no longer protect ships traversing the Aegean.⁷²⁸ This privilege again emphasises the high regard in which some merchants (and the services they provided) could be held by the state. It also demonstrates an interest in trade as a distinct activity which although different from other political or military services was nevertheless crucial to the state's well-being.

5.4.8 The Award of *Ateleia*

The awarding of *ateleia* for commercial services had one of two benefits for the recipient: firstly the honorand could be made exempt from all obligations including liturgies (excluding the trierarchy) and the payment of various taxes (apart from the *eisphora* (*ateleia pantōn*),⁷²⁹ or secondly, the recipient could be freed from the burden of specific taxes such as the *metoikion* (*ateleia metoikiou*)⁷³⁰ or the payment of the one-hundredth tax⁷³¹ (which Garland and MacDonald suggest was a harbour tax).⁷³² During the fourth century there were five occasions when Athens

⁷²⁷ An interesting example of this is the Theban honouring of Nuba of Carthage *IG* vii 2407 (364/3). This inscription is interesting as it coincides with the creation of the Boeotian navy and could therefore be representative of Thebes' renewed interest in naval matters. Although the Thebans were not officially at war with the Spartans, Xenophon suggests that by this stage the Thebans recognised that eventually they were going to involve themselves in the affairs of the Peloponnese. Theban confidence in their newly built and refurbished navy meant that they could now offer trusted merchants, such as Nuba, the protection they needed to continue trading with Thebes throughout the forthcoming conflict. A similar clause granted by the Athenians is recorded in *IG* I³ 174 (c.414-412) in which the recipient received the right to sail freely and to carry his goods wherever the Athenians ruled.

⁷²⁸ The latest decree granting *asylia* is *IG* II² 286, which dates to c.336/5. *IG* II² 360 (a), as already discussed, does not explicitly grant *asylia*, but does record that an envoy was dispatched (see Rhodes and Osborne (2007) 478-486). Furthermore, two (Camp no.3 and *IG* II² 343) out of the three decrees rewarding commercial services that certainly do not grant *asylia*, date to after Chaironeia. The inscriptions detailing the remaining 26 occasions when Athens rewarded commercial services are so badly preserved it is impossible to determine if *asylia* was bestowed.

⁷²⁹ For example, *IG* II² 286 ll.4-5.

⁷³⁰ For example, *IG* II² 211 and *IG* II² 141. See Henry (1983) 244-5 for discussion on exemption from the metic tax and 245 for relief from the *eisphora*.

⁷³¹ For example, *IG* I³ 182 (a).

⁷³² Macdonald (1981) 142-144; Garland (1985) 79. Demosthenes suggests that the honour of freedom from harbour taxes should be awarded as infrequently as possible because Athens relied heavily on the revenue such taxation produced. *Dem.* 20.31-35.

granted awards of *ateleia*.⁷³³ Out of these four are foreign rulers whilst one (IG II² 286) is a professional merchant who was rewarded for his unknown commercial services.⁷³⁴ As with other honours the Athenians granted *ateleia* for a variety of services during the fifth and fourth centuries.⁷³⁵ Prior to 410 these services were always political or military in nature, but after 410 foreign rulers were rewarded for their commercial services with awards of *ateleia*. At an unknown point between 410 and 336 the Athenians extended grants of *ateleia* to include professional merchants.⁷³⁶ Henry suggests that the most probable timeframe for this development is post-Chaironeia. He suggests the Athenians may have waited until this point to bestow this honour upon merchants since, like golden crowns, the award of this honour reduced public revenues. Whereas prior to Chaironeia the Athenians were in need of revenues to build their military strength, post-Chaironeia they were more in need of grain than money, and thus in order to encourage merchants to bring grain to Athens, they extended a pre-existing honour to include professional merchants. Again this hypothesis is supported by Xenophon who, as he did with gold crowns, avoids suggesting offering freedom of taxes to merchants since his primary concern was with increasing revenues, not securing supplies of grain. The granting of *ateleia* to professional merchants is again an indication of how highly they (and their activities) were thought of by the Athenians. By granting *ateleia* to merchants the Athenians were essentially placing them in the same company as the descendants of Harmodios and Aristogiton, as well as men who had undertaken crucial political and military services. Although there is clearly an honorary value to the recipient, Oliver suggests that scholars should not be afraid to also underline the commercial benefits of *ateleia*.⁷³⁷ *Ateleia* certainly performed a practical benefit in terms of tax avoidance, especially commercial duties.⁷³⁸ However, recipients were also relieved from having

⁷³³ IG II² 212 (Satyros); IG II² 212 (Leukon); IG II² 212; IG II² 653 (Eumelos); IG II² 286.

⁷³⁴ For an extended discussion of the grant of *ateleia* to Leukon see Oliver (2007) 30-37.

⁷³⁵ For instance, there are over twenty examples of Athens granting *ateleia* in response to political or military services during the fourth century. Most commonly the Athenians granted freedom from the *metoikion* to political exiles who had been of use to Athens. Henry (1983) 241-246.

⁷³⁶ Bresson (2002) 148, has discussed the mechanisms of the tax exemption enjoyed by those exporting grain from the Bosphoros and has persuasively argued that merchants carried documentation that could identify the cargo, its origins and destinations.

⁷³⁷ Oliver (2007) 31.

⁷³⁸ This argument is first raised by Gauthier (1985) 156, who suggests that grants of *ateleia* were much more than honorific grants and were of real financial value to the recipients (in this case the Bosphoran kings).

to perform other civic duties, such as the trierarchy, thus granting them the freedom to travel unhindered by such concerns.

5.4.9 The Award of *Enktesis*

Enktesis, literally meaning ‘possession in’, was commonly used with the addition of either land or house to define the right to own real property within a state. Since this right was normally limited to citizens, it became the practice to make special grants of *enktesis* to privileged foreigners.⁷³⁹ As a consequence we often find that bestowals of *enktesis* accompany grants of *proxenia* and the title *euergesys*. Burford (in her study of land and labour in the Greek world) suggests that the granting of the right to own land in Athens was an exceptional honour and one that was normally reserved for services of great magnitude.⁷⁴⁰ It is therefore significant that *enktesis* is bestowed upon merchants. The Athenians granted *enktesis* in five of the 31 instances when they rewarded commercial services.⁷⁴¹ Four of these grants bestow *enktesis* alongside *proxenia* while the exception is *IG II² 337*, which bestows the right to own land as a specific response to the request of a group of Citian merchants. Athens granted the right to own land and/or property to men undertaking four of the five categories of commercial services. These are: the importation of goods,⁷⁴² securing shipments of vital commodities,⁷⁴³ gift of goods or money⁷⁴⁴ and miscellaneous commercial services.⁷⁴⁵ This honour was bestowed on both Greek and non-Greek recipients, however, significantly in all five instances where *enktesis* is granted, the honorand is a professional trader.⁷⁴⁶ The reason for this is that it is unlikely that a foreign ruler would want to spend much time in Athens (and away from their kingdom) even if the right to own land was bestowed. Additionally foreign

⁷³⁹ Henry (1983) 116 n.4; Gauthier (1985) 152-158.

⁷⁴⁰ Burford (1993) 54.

⁷⁴¹ *IG II² 342+*; *IG II² 337*; *IG II² 360 (b)*; *IG II² 343*; Camp no.3. Less certain are the grants of *enktesis* identified by Burke (1992) 209, as rewarding commercial services in *IG II² 206*, *IG II² 279*; *IG II² 285+414d*. Firstly, it is less than clear that these grants were rewarding commercial services whilst secondly Burke’s restorations are very speculative.

⁷⁴² *IG II² 342+*; Camp no.3.

⁷⁴³ *IG II² 343*.

⁷⁴⁴ *IG II² 360 (b)*.

⁷⁴⁵ *IG II² 337*.

⁷⁴⁶ In four instances the recipient appears to be moderately wealthy (*IG II² 342+*; *IG II² 337*; *IG II² 343*; Camp no.3) whereas one (*IG II² 360 (b)*) is highly affluent.

rulers had no specific 'trading operations' which could be more profitably run from warehouses in the Piraeus.⁷⁴⁷ Although Xenophon suggests that the bestowal of the right to own land should be used to increase the revenue generated by trade, it seems that the Athenians adopted his suggestions rather to help increase the volume of grain imports. All of the five grants of *enktesis* rewarding commercial services date to the third quarter of the fourth century. As already shown, it was during this period that the Athenians were most concerned with securing the importation of vital commodities and thus they sought ways to facilitate inter-regional commerce. Consequently it is possible to date three of the decrees granting *enktesis* as reward for the simple importation of grain to the early 320s, a time when the Athenians were facing severe shortages.⁷⁴⁸ It therefore appears that once again the Athenians adapted their practice of granting *enktesis* for political and military service to meet the need for encouraging traders to transport grain to Athens. From the point of view of a merchant, the right to own property was important since any land purchased could be used as security when acquiring loans. This meant that foreign merchants with grants of *enktesis* could theoretically overcome one of the main hindrances for non-citizens operating a large business in Athens, the gaining of credit using property as security. Owing to the paucity of evidence it is impossible to trace more specifically any developments in the bestowal of *enktesis* for trade related services.

As Burford correctly points out, the granting of *enktesis* is an extremely high honour and demonstrates the esteem in which merchants could be held. By granting *enktesis* to professional merchants Athens was willing to undermine traditional social boundaries. Whereas previously the right to own land and property in Attica was one of the exclusive rights of citizens, by the last quarter of the fourth century this was no

⁷⁴⁷ By granting the right to own land to foreign merchants the Athenians hoped that important traders could be encouraged to settle in Athens (or, if not settle, at least relocate part of their commercial operations to Athens, as land which was purchased could have warehouses built upon it). This option could be attractive to merchants since, rather than having to continually rent accommodation or storage space, they could construct lodgings or warehouse thus reducing the costs they incurred when trading with Athens. It is worth noting that the majority of the land the assembly set aside for the construction of houses for foreign dignitaries and merchants was located in and around the Piraeus. As a general rule it seems that foreigners, irrespective of their occupation and social standing, were expected to spend most of their time within this region.

⁷⁴⁸ *IG II² 360 (b); IG II² 343; Camp no.3.*

longer the case. From 410 onwards *enktesis* was granted to foreign generals, diplomats and then, by the third quarter of the fourth century the Athenians offered this privilege to professional merchants.⁷⁴⁹ By granting *enktesis* to professional merchants the Athenians demonstrated a willingness to share the benefits of citizenship with men whom previous scholars have seen as marginal and despised. Although the granting of *enktesis* to professional merchants can be considered the result of a shift in Athenian foreign policy and the increased need to obtain grain from overseas, it is also an indication that the mercantile community was far from the despised, low class foreigners previously suggested. Rather than keeping foreign merchants at arms length by simply bestowing rewards such as tax breaks or priority loading/unloading, the Athenians instead chose to embrace those merchants whom they respected. This formal embracing of esteemed traders is most clearly displayed in the awarding of *enktesis* and citizenship (which will be discussed below). Furthermore, both these honours vividly highlight the need to combine the epigraphic material with the philosophical texts in order to achieve a more balanced viewpoint.

5.4.10 The Award of Paying the *Eisphora* and Serving in the Army

An honour which is bestowed only on one merchant in the surviving epigraphic corpus, and which again undermined the traditional citizen/non-citizen boundaries, was the granting of the right to serve in the army and to pay the same *eisphora* tax as citizens.⁷⁵⁰ *IG II² 360* (b) records that Herakleides of Salamis, a professional merchant residing in Athens, was granted these rights c.325/4. Apart from the fact that these two honours were granted together, very little else is known about them.⁷⁵¹ Although there is no consensus regarding the relative burden of different taxes on citizens when compared with metics, contrary to expectation it seems that metics paid less tax than citizens. Whitehead argues that since the majority of metics were prevented from owning land in Attica, most of their property was

⁷⁴⁹ The exclusive nature of this award can be demonstrated by the fact that during the period 430-350, Athens awarded grants of *enktesis* only 21 times. Pecirka (1966) 152-154.

⁷⁵⁰ In the fourth century the *eisphora* was a proportional tax, imposed by the assembly at a rate determined to meet the immediate needs of the polis. The *eisphora* was levied on those men who owned property over a certain value. See, de Ste. Croix (1953) 30-70; Brun (1983) 3-73.

⁷⁵¹ Henry (1983) 249.

almost entirely moveable and easy to hide, thus making it difficult for the Athenians to accurately assess a metic's affluence for taxation purposes.⁷⁵² Additionally, Whitehead argues that Demosthenes 22.61, rather than indicating that metics paid 1/6th of their total property, as has previously been suggested, actually contributed 1/6th of the total tax.⁷⁵³ Since metics comprised more than 1/6th of the population of Attica Whitehead concludes they must have been paying less in proportion to their numbers than citizens. If this were the case, then a metic such as Herakleides, who was awarded the honour of equality with citizens for the *eisphora*, would in actuality pay more than they had previously. Consequently, the value of this privilege was the honour it must have brought the recipient. Similarly, the same must be true of the right to serve in the army. The simplest explanation for this privilege is that it enabled honoured metics to serve in the citizen units rather than in their normal metic contingents. By bestowing this honour the state was publicly demonstrating the value they placed upon certain metics. The honorary value of these two privileges was the rise in social standing and prestige such grant brought. By paying the same taxes and serving in the same units as citizens, a metic's social status became blurred. This again enabled metics to situate themselves, both economically and socially, more closely to the citizen body. Moreover the right to pay the *eisphora* could be used in legal cases to demonstrate the recipient's continued service to the polis.⁷⁵⁴

5.4.11 The Award of Citizenship

The highest award that could be offered to any foreigner was a grant of citizenship. From the fifth century, and increasingly during the fourth, Athens granted the ultimate honour of citizenship to a number of benefactors.⁷⁵⁵ Osborne, in his work exploring naturalisation in Athens, states that citizenship was the rarest and most prestigious award of all. Although grants of citizenship were reserved to reward acts or services that were of extreme importance to the state, especially diplomatic success, even this highest of honours was not withheld from the mercantile

⁷⁵² Whitehead (1977) 78-80.

⁷⁵³ Whitehead (1977) 79. See Böckh (1857) 691, for the counter-argument to that of Whitehead.

⁷⁵⁴ Lys. 12.20; Isoc. 17.41.

⁷⁵⁵ Osborne (1983) 141-145; 147-154.

community. Of the 31 instances when Athens bestowed honours to reward commercial services during the fourth century, seven grant the recipient (or recipients) citizenship.⁷⁵⁶ In two out of these seven instances it is possible to identify that the recipient had gifted Athens, either with imported commodities, or money to buy grain.⁷⁵⁷ In the other five instances the commercial service being rewarded is unknown but all are related to the grain trade. In general this honour was bestowed upon foreign rulers such as Satyros I, Leukon and Spartokos II, but we have two possible, highly affluent, merchants being awarded citizenship.⁷⁵⁸ In *IG II² 398 (a) +438* it is clear that the recipient's commercial services are not the only reason he receives citizenship. In this instance the recipient provided supplies to the Athenian fleet prior to an important engagement in the Hellespont, and in addition he dispatched grain to Athens. These services, although economic in nature, were also important political services. Similarly, the recipient in Schweigert no.42 gave 3,000 *medimnoi* of grain to Athens during the shortages of 331-324. Consequently it is not only the services that are being rewarded but their timing. It is therefore possible to suggest that Athens granted citizenship to professional merchants for important commercial services when those services had fulfilled more than just the trading interests of the polis. For example, the supplying of a naval fleet or the gifting of grain to Athens during a time of shortage. With regard to foreign rulers, Athens bestowed citizenship in the hope of honouring the recipient so greatly that they continued to facilitate the export of vital commodities to Athens. In general, recipients of citizenship had performed services that required a considerable expenditure of money or had been a risk to the honorand's life, and that almost always helped to

⁷⁵⁶ *IG II² 212* (Satyros I and sons); *IG II² 212* (Leukon and sons); *IG II² 207* Orontes; *IG II² 212* (Spartokos II, Pairisades I and Apollonios); Schweigert no.42; *IG II² 398(a) +438*; *IG II² 653*;

⁷⁵⁷ *IG II² 212 (a)*; Schweigert no.42.

⁷⁵⁸ Schweigert no.42; *IG II² 398(a) +438*. Schweigert no.42, is a possible example of a wealthy merchant being granted citizenship. Although the inscription is unclear on the exact status of the recipient, the fact that he is able to give Athens 3,000 *medimnoi* of grain proves his affluence (see, Osborne (1982) 95). *IG II² 398 (a) +438*, provides very little detail about the recipient. It is certain that he is a metic but his precise socio-economic status and trade related services are uncertain. Although the recipient is recorded as dispatching grain to Athens it is not a gift and thus it is probable that the man is a highly affluent merchant and not a foreign ruler. Further evidence for the awarding of citizenship to a professional merchant can be found in Athen. 3.119 f-120 a; Din.1.43; Hyp. Frags 63 and 64. In these sources it is recorded that the wealthy professional merchant, Chairephilos, was rewarded for importing salted fish to Athens.

fulfil vital political, military and in a few cases commercial objectives of the polis.⁷⁵⁹

Overall Conclusions

The evidence presented in this chapter has shown that the majority of inter-regional trading ventures relied on the procurement of some level of credit. A consequence of this need for finance was that it served to regulate the behaviour of merchants by encouraging honesty and integrity. Owing to the intimacy of lenders and borrowers, an individual's reputation could have a direct impact on the terms with which a loan was offered. Therefore if a merchant wanted to maintain his credit-worthiness he was encouraged to operate in a manner that enabled him to preserve a positive reputation amongst the bankers and money-lenders. Consequently, in their business dealings at least, merchants were in general trustworthy and respectable. This conclusion supports those presented in Chapter Three which suggested that the mercantile community was not disparaged by the whole of Athenian society. Instead, as with any occupational group, it is possible to identify a range of views being expressed. This plurality of opinion indicates that the general level of respect for merchants was higher than previously thought. Rather than being disparaged merchants could be equally as esteemed as anyone else. However, during times of economic instability or crisis the level of respect for merchants increased. An examination of the corpus of fourth century honorific inscriptions rewarding commercial services has revealed that there was a wide variety of activities that could be honoured. Moreover, the honours bestowed indicate that rather than merely trying to secure imports Athens actually has a genuine respect for the men involved in inter-regional commerce. If the Athenians were simply worried about securing grain shipments then they could achieve their objective through tax breaks, grants of land or favourable trade terms, however the system of honours goes beyond this and a number of rewards, such as citizenship, the entitlement of equal taxation with citizens and the right to serve in the citizen phalanxes, blur the normally rigid boundaries between non-citizen and citizen. Although this chapter has shown that opinions of the mercantile community could fluctuate there are two important conclusions that can be drawn. Firstly, the general

⁷⁵⁹ Osborne (1983) 211-216.

opinion of the mercantile community was higher than previously thought and thus its members were equally as esteemed as men of other occupations. Secondly the respect for the mercantile community, and the services it provided, increased during times of famine or conflict. This situation is not unexpected and a parallel can be drawn with military generals: just as the number of honours bestowed upon merchants increase during times of famine (or economic instability) the same is true for generals in times of prolonged conflict. That is not to say that generals were only respected at these times but that the services they provided were more important and visible during times of hostilities. Neither then is it reasonable to suggest that merchants were only respected during times of economic instability or grain shortage; instead it is at these times that they become most visible owing to the state recognising and rewarding their vital services.

Chapter Six

The Legal and Political Status of the Mercantile Community

Introduction

It has been suggested that all modern governments, whatever their complexion, now accept some responsibility for the general economic well-being of the population, even if their actions amount to little more than a claim that prosperity will trickle down from top to bottom.⁷⁶⁰ This, Salmon proposed, was also a feature common in most Classical Greek poleis, with the governments of many states recognising that they had an active part to play in the economic prosperity of the polis. This recognition of economic responsibilities can be identified in the contemporary sources: for example, in c.322BC, a businessman named Dareius brought a private legal action against the *emporos* Dionysodorus who had failed to repay a loan. In the closing sections of his speech, Dareius highlights to the jury the close connection between the role of the courts in enforcing contracts and the volume of trade in the market places of Athens.⁷⁶¹ In his final remarks Dareius reveals an awareness of the interplay between politics (represented in this instance by the law) and the economy. In Dareius' opinion, a healthy economy depended on the willingness of the government to safeguard the mercantile community by ensuring their fair treatment and legal protection. Dareius' identification of a symbiotic relationship between politics, law and economy is significant and will form the focus for this chapter.

The discussions in this chapter have been divided into two main sections. The first will explore the extent of mercantile participation in the Athenian political system and will conclude that the mercantile community was well represented in the government of Athens. This conclusion contradicts those of Hasebroek, de Ste. Croix,

⁷⁶⁰ Salmon (1999) 47.

⁷⁶¹ Dem. 56. 48-50.

Mossé and Reed who downplay the importance of merchants.⁷⁶² These scholars propose that, since it was foreigners and metics who promoted and undertook inter-regional commerce, the merchants residing in the Piraeus did not constitute any identifiable group and had no shared interests (either in the sense of their occupation or because of shared social or political concerns). These scholars, as will be discussed below, concluded that there was nothing that would motivate *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* to unite in order to influence the political life of the polis. The second section of this chapter will explore the active and passive political influence of merchants, investigating their role in shaping domestic and foreign policy. In particular, it will examine the examples of Andocides and Androtion who were involved in both trading and politics. This section will also examine a number of policies that are believed to have been implemented as a direct result of either active or passive pressure from the mercantile community. The second half of this chapter will explore the legal status of the mercantile community in light of the new model for its composition proposed in Chapter Two. It will discuss the development of the *dikai emporikai* (commercial courts),⁷⁶³ exploring the distinct procedural characteristics, and examining how these unique legal features have a direct bearing on our understanding of both the social standing of the mercantile community and the complexities of their business operations. Furthermore, it will be argued that commercial occupations overrode social standing and ethnicity: thus slaves, foreigners and metics could, owing to the use of agency, all participate in commercial disputes, either as defendants, or more importantly, as plaintiffs. This will be followed by an investigation of laws and regulations specific to the mercantile community.

The Political Influence of the Mercantile Community

Reed has argued that any sort of political cohesion amongst the mercantile

⁷⁶² Hasebroek (1928) 30, 65, 84, 101, 168; de Ste. Croix (1972) 267; Mossé (1983) 53-63; Reed (2003) 85-88.

⁷⁶³ Cohen (1978) 114-129. In his comprehensive work on the *dikai emporikai*, Cohen points out that the Athenian commercial legal system included citizens, metics and foreigners, rich, poor, free, slaves *emporoi*, *nauklēroi*, moneylenders and bankers. However he does not accept that such a diverse mix of people could have any shared interests or status in either the political or judicial system. Although Cohen is right to be sceptical of the existence of a commercial 'class', his dismissal of the existence of a group or community with shared interests and a shared legal status needs re-examination.

community is very unlikely. He bases this conclusion on his belief that those trading in and on behalf of Athens were largely non-citizens and therefore without access to political and judicial processes.⁷⁶⁴ This view is in line with that of de Ste. Croix, who wrote that “*Not a single man known to have been politically prominent in fifth and fourth century Athens ever appears as a merchant (except Andokides when in exile)... and not a single known merchant is found playing any part in politics*”.⁷⁶⁵ However, this viewpoint is not universally accepted and thus McKechnie, Starr and Hopper all suggest that merchants could, or in some cases did, form groups that could influence the political decisions of the state. McKechnie, for instance, states that “*Note should be taken of the influence of traders and ship captains on getting decrees passed in Athens. The marginality of the world of commerce from the point of public policy ought not be over stressed*”.⁷⁶⁶ Reed however, believes that McKechnie has missed the point, which is not that the *emporoi* confronted Athens as a unified group with a common political or economic policy, but that the Athenian interest in merchants can be explained by the single, all embracing reason that without the corn brought to the Piraeus, Athens would have starved. However, this reliance on inter-regional merchants is exactly why the mercantile community could exert political pressure: the Athenians recognised that there was a common set of interests, desires or needs that united, or at least *could* unite, the mercantile community and that these needs had to be addressed in order to maintain a steady flow of corn (and other vital commodities) into the Piraeus. This would therefore suggest that both Reed and McKechnie’s assessments are to some extent correct. Reed is right to suggest that in general the mercantile community had no need to become a pressure group since the state already sought to protect their interests, but McKechnie and Starr are also correct to recognise that occasionally merchants did unite in order to effect change. The following sections will therefore argue that, under normal circumstances, the mercantile community had a *passive* influence on politics (with Athens recognising the necessity of protecting the needs of the mercantile community in order to secure vital supplies such as grain and timber). Furthermore, it will also posit that infrequently (primarily during times of crisis or economic disruption) the mercantile community could temporarily unite

⁷⁶⁴ Reed (2003) 85-88.

⁷⁶⁵ de Ste. Croix (1972) 267.

⁷⁶⁶ Starr (1977) 220 n.69; Hopper (1979) 87; McKechnie (1989) 197 fn. 62.

and become an *active* political force.

6.1. Mercantile representation in the Athenian *Ecclesia* and *Boule*

Unlike previous studies that have accepted that the mercantile community was primarily comprised of foreign men of modest means,⁷⁶⁷ this study has stressed the considerable proportion of moderately and highly affluent citizen merchants, men who had direct access to the political processes of the polis. Thus if we accept Rhodes' insightful suggestion that, although it is never stated directly by the contemporary sources, it is likely that membership of the *boule* was open to the top three property classes, and combine it with the theory that the mercantile community was comprised of a sizeable number of moderately affluent and wealthy citizen merchants, then the scope for inclusion of merchants in the Athenian political system increases greatly.⁷⁶⁸ Furthermore, Hansen points out that irrespective of occupation citizenship brought with it political rights and granted all citizens a role in the political decision-making of the polis.⁷⁶⁹ Democracy in Athens rested on the power and sovereignty of the *Demos*. This sovereignty was exercised through the making of policy and administrative decisions in the *ecclesia*, a meeting which all citizens were entitled to attend, and which, from the fourth century onwards, discussed matters that were ongoing or of universal interest.

As has been seen in Chapter Two, Xenophon provides compelling evidence to suggest that merchants comprised a sizeable percentage of the assembly. In the *Memorabilia* he records that the Athenian assembly consists of a cross-section of society, and he lists the main groups or subdivisions; included within this catalogue are inter-regional merchants (the other occupations are: fullers, cobblers, builders, smiths, farmers and *kapēloi*).⁷⁷⁰ Xenophon's inclusion of merchants within this list is significant since it indicates that inter-regional merchants were not politically inactive

⁷⁶⁷ Mossé (1983) 53-63. Mossé, for example, concluded that the world of the emporium, in Athens at least, was a marginal one that was distinguished sharply from the world of citizens and politics. See also Chapter Two section 2.2.2.

⁷⁶⁸ Rhodes (1985) 2.

⁷⁶⁹ Hansen (1984) 77.

⁷⁷⁰ Xen. *Mem.* 3.7.6.

or voiceless. Plato has Socrates suggest that members of the mercantile community were politically active when he claims that the speeches in the *ekklesia* were made by blacksmiths, shoemakers, merchants, shippers, rich poor, the grand and the humble.⁷⁷¹ Moreover, the hypothesis that the assembly comprised a complete cross-section of society, including considerable numbers of merchants, is given further support by a comment made by the scholiast to Aeschines *Against Ctesiphon*, who describes the assembly as being a *mikrá polis*.⁷⁷² Moreover, Sinclair argues, ‘*If distance alone were a consideration, inhabitants of the Piraeus would, moreover, have found it easier to partake in the political activities in the city of Athens than, say, the farmers or the charcoal burners from the most populous of demes*’.⁷⁷³ He therefore points to the men from Akharnai, which was over 10km north of the agora, and the inhabitants of Eleusis who lived some 20km west-north-west and who had to cross the Mt Aigaleos, as examples of groups who would have found it difficult to participate in political process.⁷⁷⁴ Hammond calculates that the demesmen from Marathon, living on the far side of Mt Pentelikon, would have taken six hours or more at a fast walking pace to reach the city.⁷⁷⁵ Thus, while Attica was in one sense small and compact (with the most remote part within a 50km radius from Athens), in practical terms much of the population was dispersed on account of Attic topography and thus their capacity to participate in the political life of the polis was diminished. This conclusion is supported by the work of Osborne who demonstrated that 85% of all decrees are proposed by men from demes no further than 15 miles away from the Pnyx. Furthermore Hansen argued that although Athenian democracy was based on a belief in equality, and thus in theory all male citizens could take a direct part in the political life of the city, to a large extent the geographical constraints and social inequalities intervened: consequently, although a large number of citizens did probably attend the assembly, political decision-making rested in the hands of a restricted portion of the

⁷⁷¹ Pl. *Prt.* 319C-D.

⁷⁷² Schol. A. III. Ctes.4.

⁷⁷³ Sinclair (1993) 12.

⁷⁷⁴ Although it is impossible to determine precisely the deme of residence for the citizen members of the mercantile community Garland (1987) 58-61; 68, has suggested that in order to be near their businesses many would have dwelt in or around the Piraeus. This is a reasonable conclusion and one that will be utilised in this chapter.

⁷⁷⁵ Hammond (1967) 216 n. 2.

citizen body.⁷⁷⁶ Owing to the ease at which one could travel from the Piraeus to the asty (and with long periods of free time between sailing seasons) it should come as no surprise that merchants formed a significant proportion of the *ekklesia*.⁷⁷⁷

In addition to living within easy travel distance of the asty, merchants were also in an advantageous position as, occasionally, both the *boule* and the *ekklesia* could hold sessions in the Piraeus.⁷⁷⁸ The earliest attested meeting of the *ekklesia* in the Piraeus took place in 411 when the hoplites held a meeting in the deme theatre at which it was resolved to march upon the asty.⁷⁷⁹ In 343 Demosthenes 19.209, records that the *ekklesia* once again met in the Piraeus but to what extent this was a regular occurrence is unknown. Demosthenes 19.60 and 125 also records that during the year 347/6 the assembly was held in the Piraeus so as to more effectively discuss 'dockyard business' (*peri tôn en tois neôriois*) The epigraphic corpus also records that, if necessary or prudent, the *boule* could be convened in the Piraeus in order to debate or oversee maritime matters: for instance in 325/4 the *boule* was ordered to assemble at the docks in order to oversee the dispatch of a colony to the Adriatic (see below section 6.3.2).⁷⁸⁰ A decree of the assembly, preserved as part of the navy lists, suggests that it was common for the *boule* to be present in the docks every day for the 2 weeks prior to the dispatch of a major fleet.⁷⁸¹ Garland has reasonably suggested that it is probable that the plenary sessions held by the assembly to discuss the grain supply (see below) would on occasion be held in the Piraeus since this would enable the state to better gauge the feelings and mood of the mercantile community. Moreover, Garland argues that the existence of an old *bouleuterion*, which is attested in the epigraphic corpus,⁷⁸² makes it highly likely that the *boule* would meet regularly in the Piraeus. As the Athenians began to recognise that their economic well-being

⁷⁷⁶ Hansen (1976) 115-34; (1981) 345-70; (1999) 125-132.

⁷⁷⁷ The ease of travel between the Piraeus and asty is emphasised by the fact that the elderly Socrates walked from the asty to the Piraeus in order to witness the first performance of the Bendideia – and would have returned the same day if Polemarchos had not inveigled him to stay other night (Pl. *Resp.* 1.327a). Furthermore, Antisthenes, a resident of the Piraeus, is recorded as having commuted to the asty on foot everyday for the privilege of listening to Socrates (Diog. Laert. 6.1).

⁷⁷⁸ Ps.-Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43.34; Hansen (1987) 14; 142 n.109; Garland (1987) 81-82.

⁷⁷⁹ Thuc. 8.93.

⁷⁸⁰ *IG II²* 1629. Meiggs and Lewis no.65, the second decree on Methone, also records that the *boule* could be convened in the Piraeus.

⁷⁸¹ MacDonald (1943) 143.

⁷⁸² MacDonald (1943) 142 n.63.

was increasingly dependent on their mercantile community, a situation that was intensified after the Social War and the Battle of Chaironea, discussions exploring ways of provisioning the state became more important.⁷⁸³ With evidence demonstrating that it was not uncommon for the *boule* to meet in the Piraeus, and with other imports such as timber being vital to the state's economic well-being, it is not unreasonable to suggest that other commercial matters would be discussed in the same plenary sessions as the grain trade.

6.2 Political Awareness of Commercial Affairs

The following sections will explore whether or not the worlds of politics and commerce were mutually exclusive in fourth century Athens. Previous scholars seeking to answer this question have tended to conclude that the Athenians attempted to keep trade and politics separate. Hasebroek for instance, argued that commerce in Athens was never an affair of state since the majority of merchants were poor and foreign, a view that was to be adopted by Finley.⁷⁸⁴ Moreover, Mossé argued that “*although there certainly were Athenians involved in commercial affairs, and although some of them were not merely money-lenders but personally took part in maritime commerce, either themselves going to sea or managing offices in the port, these Athenians in no sense belonged to the circles of leadership in the city*”. Although recognising that the state could not afford to ignore merchants, she concludes “*If the world of the emporium remained marginal in relation to the city during the second half of the fourth century to which the corpus of work by Demosthenes belongs, it is surely because ‘trade and politics’ belonged to two mutually impenetrable domains*”.⁷⁸⁵ This is a position shared by Lewis who suggests

⁷⁸³ For example, after the Social War Isocrates (8.21), records that there was an exodus from Athens of *emporoi*, *xenoi* and metics that further amplified the Athenian economic problems. As a result, Xenophon in *Poroi* 3.4 urges the Athenians to take special steps to encourage the return of these groups, highlighting their importance to the economy in general and more specifically to maritime commerce.

⁷⁸⁴ Hasebroek (1933) 43; Finley (1962) 3-24. More recently Reed has also concurred with Hasebroek's findings stating ‘*Hasebroek claimed that there was no evidence for any sort of political or economic cohesion among maritime traders in the classical period. He believed traders to be united only by religious ties, some of which were “national” in character. That is precisely what this review of the evidence has confirmed*’, Reed (2003) 88.

⁷⁸⁵ Mossé (1983) 63.

that “*There was to a large extent separation between the world of the respectable citizen and the world of the emporion*”.⁷⁸⁶ However, the recognition that the well-being of the state was increasingly dependent on the activities of merchants, resulted in commerce becoming a matter of public interest. Thus contrary to the views of Hasebroek, Mossé and Lewis, the following sections will demonstrate that a number of important political figures can be identified as displaying an intimate knowledge of commercial matters: a situation that indicates that the creation of a clear divide between the worlds of commerce and politics is no longer appropriate.

The first indication that the worlds of politics and commerce were not mutually exclusive can be identified from the fact that during all meetings of the assembly aspiring political figures were expected to be sufficiently informed about current events that they could offer advice. This, according to Kallet-Marx, was especially true in relation to the economic and financial functions of the polis.⁷⁸⁷ She proposes that the realms of finance and rhetoric were central to the public life of Periclean and post-Periclean Athens. Kallet-Marx concludes her article by suggesting that the average citizen was predisposed to be interested in, and receptive to, financial information, especially as it was directly linked to their general welfare.⁷⁸⁸ If this can be concluded for the ‘average’ citizen (and Kallet-Marx’s assessment is persuasive), then discussions concerning Athenian financial and commercial policy would be even more important to the men of the mercantile community. Another passage from Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* highlights how important financial information and knowledge of the grain trade were to aspiring political figures. In this dialogue set not long after the end of the Peloponnesian War, Socrates has learned that Glaucon, the brother of Plato, wants to undertake a political career.⁷⁸⁹ Socrates suggests to Glaucon that in order to be a successful politician he would need to be able to give good counsel on the city’s revenues and expenditures, war and defence, or at the very least on the amount of grain needed yearly to supplement home grown produce. According

⁷⁸⁶ Lewis (1996) 119.

⁷⁸⁷ Kallet-Marx (1994) 227.

⁷⁸⁸ This interest, Kallet-Marx argues, arose from experience of money exchange in public and private spheres, the receipt of payment for participation in democratic institutions of the courts, magistrates, council (and later the assembly), and through private commercial activities.

⁷⁸⁹ Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.18.

to Socrates, having an intimate knowledge of the grain trade would enable Glaucon to 'aid and save' the city from the speaker's platform. However, Socrates finally concludes that Glaucon is too young and inexperienced to have a successful career and would in all likelihood be dragged off the speaker's platform and made a laughing-stock. This passage demonstrates the highly specialised information politicians were expected to have in relation to the domestic economy and inter-regional exchange.

Andocides is a prime example of a wealthy and influential politician who has both detailed knowledge of, and experience in, ship-owning and inter-regional trade.⁷⁹⁰ In Lysias' speech against him, Andocides is described as an immensely wealthy and powerful man who was the guest-friend of kings, but who was always unwilling to contribute to the *eisphora* or to help the city by importing cheap grain during times of famine.⁷⁹¹ Andocides' actions are compared with those of the metics and foreigners who did transport grain at cheap prices. These men, Lysias argues, demonstrated more loyalty to their adopted place of residence or business than Andocides did to his homeland.⁷⁹² Lysias also claims that Andocides disappointed the polis firstly by failing to perform any service in order to cancel out his previous misdeeds,⁷⁹³ and secondly by not providing grain to the very place that had nourished him. Moreno suggests that this type of argument was meant to elicit anger by demonstrating to the jury how Andocides failed to live up to the expectations of both the polis and the people.⁷⁹⁴ Moreno proposes that the popular morality assumed in this speech is one that demanded that a wealthy and powerful Athenian, a ship-owner intimate with foreign kings, should above all other people come to the aid of his city by importing grain.⁷⁹⁵

⁷⁹⁰ Lys. 6.48.

⁷⁹¹ Lys. 22.13; Lys. 6.48-49.

⁷⁹² Lys. 6.49.

⁷⁹³ Andokides had been an active participant in the mutilation of the Hermae and profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries in 415 and was subsequently tried for his crimes. In order to gain immunity and to save his father, Andokides confessed to his part in the mutilations and gave an account for the whole affair. This secured his release but after the decree of Isotimides (which prevented those who had confessed to acts of impiety from entering temples or the agora) Andokides decided to live in self imposed exile.

⁷⁹⁴ Moreno (2007) 246. See also Chapter Three section 3.2.6B and Chapter Five section 5.4.1.

⁷⁹⁵ This is an important conclusion; firstly, this speech again underlines the fact that the world of the merchant and the world of politics were not mutually exclusive. Secondly, it demonstrates an

However, Andocides' claims that while operating as an *emporos* he had become an expert on the Athenian grain supply and that he had used his expertises to benefit the polis. He therefore claims that his knowledge of the grain trade was so intimate and so extensive, that he was able to frustrate those men on Cyprus who were scheming against the interests of Athens.⁷⁹⁶ Furthermore, he suggests that without an insider of his capabilities and knowledge, the assembly would find it difficult to collect accurate intelligence concerning the grain trade. He therefore proposes that if the assembly wishes to be certain that the grain-ships had been dispatched from Cyprus and were due to reach the Piraeus, they need to utilise trustworthy men (such as himself) who are experienced in inter-regional commerce.⁷⁹⁷ Andocides' argument clearly highlights how the dividing line between the world of politics and that of commerce were blurred (or even non-existent) in the minds of an Athenian assembly during the fourth century.

Demosthenes also demonstrates an intimate knowledge of the grain trade. In his speech *Against Leptines*, Demosthenes describes himself as being at the start of his public career, a democrat, and a man who is well-informed on all aspects of state policy,⁷⁹⁸ and he explores the harmful consequences the law of Leptines would have on the grain trade.⁷⁹⁹ He lists at great length the amounts of grain imported from the Bosphorus each year and how this compares to other sources of grain, and he also lists Leucon's measures in favour of men exporting to Athens (including the right to export grain free from all taxation and what this equates to in monetary terms).⁸⁰⁰ Demosthenes claims that he draws his detailed information partly from the public records held by the grain guardians and, more importantly, partly from merchants.⁸⁰¹

expectation on behalf of the Athenians that the majority of merchants would be willing to act honourably and import grain at reasonable prices, thus again undermining the theory that merchants were always considered a negative element of the polis.

⁷⁹⁶ Andoc. 2.20-21.

⁷⁹⁷ Andoc. 2.21.

⁷⁹⁸ The unique style and content of this speech have led scholars to propose that it dates to the same period as Isocrates' work *On the Peace*, and Xenophon's pamphlet *Poroi*, a time when public finance and policy were crucial subjects for Athens in the aftermath of the Social War.

⁷⁹⁹ Dem. 20.41.

⁸⁰⁰ Braund (forthcoming) 58-62; Velissaropoulos (1980) 179-183; Rosivach (2000) 41-42.

⁸⁰¹ Dem. 20.33.

He therefore demonstrates an in-depth understanding of the mechanisms of the grain trade, thus further emphasising the fact that the world of politics and trade were not mutually exclusive.

Another wealthy and influential Athenian politician who shows that he is closely acquainted with the grain trade is Androtion, the man responsible for suggesting the honours and rewards bestowed upon Leucon and his sons.⁸⁰² On behalf of the *demos*, Androtion praises Spartocus and Pairisades for their (and their father's) role in ensuring a steady supply of grain to Athens. Androtion suggests that his role in the grain trade was overseeing and organising a complex relationship that could have significant ramifications for the Athenian Demos.⁸⁰³ Finally, Agyrrhius, another influential politician and author of the Athenian Grain-tax law of 374/3, also proves to be an expert on the grain trade.⁸⁰⁴ Agyrrhius served as collector of the tax in the Piraeus, was originator of attendance pay for the assembly and perhaps created the theoric fund.⁸⁰⁵ These duties show that Agyrrhius had considerable experience with Athenian finance, furthermore his interactions with Pasion and the son of Sopaaios point to his active involvement in the commercial life of the polis.

Although it is impossible to determine if these men undertook the role of *emporos* or *nauklēros* whilst operating as a politician, they do serve to demonstrate that there was not a wide gulf between the mercantile community and politics. As has been demonstrated in Chapter One wealthy Athenians could make use of agents to operate their commercial ventures while they themselves continued with their political careers. Moreno concludes that, "*The fact that these individuals stayed at home, coordinating their overseas commercial involvements with their political ambition, reveals much about the structure of the grain trade. In order for the system to work, personal ties with overseas rulers had to be combined with continuous contact with, and control over, the decision-making process of the Athenian demos*".⁸⁰⁶ Moreno's conclusion again highlights the close connection between the

⁸⁰² *IG II²* 212; Rhodes and Osborne 64.

⁸⁰³ Rhodes and Osborne (2007) 323-324.

⁸⁰⁴ Stroud (1998) 63; Rhodes and Osborne (2007) no.25, 119-128.

⁸⁰⁵ Andoc. 1.133-134; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 41.3; Ar. *Eccl.* 183-8; Stroud (1998) 21-22; Moreno (2007) 256.

⁸⁰⁶ Moreno (2007) 258.

mercantile community and political decision-making. The intimate knowledge of the grain supply displayed by Athenian politicians, the ten principal assemblies held each year which addressed the grain supply and the claims of Aristotle and Xenophon that knowledge of the commercial and financial infrastructures of the polis are vital to any aspiring politician, all serve to demonstrate the close links between the mercantile community and politics.⁸⁰⁷

So why might politicians and influential men downplay their knowledge and involvement in trade, in particular the grain supply? In the case of Andocides, especially in contrast to that of Demosthenes, the considerable dangers faced by a politician who claimed direct involvement in the grain trade are revealed. Such a claim of prominence in the grain trade would almost amount to an open and direct assertion of power, wealth and overseas connections; something that Moreno argues would be resented as undemocratic by the average Athenian audience.⁸⁰⁸ The fact that inter-regional exchange could evoke this response suggests that mercantile activities could be associated with power and wealth in the mind of the demos. This situation makes it understandable why it was extremely rare for politically important men such as Andocides to reveal their influence and participation within the grain trade. A comparison of Demosthenes' and Andocides' rhetorical strategies reveals a fundamental tension between the democratic ideology and the politics of the Athenian grain supply. On the one hand Athenian politicians must appear to be one of the demos having no more influence or power than any other citizens, while on the other hand there was political gain to be had from being intimately acquainted with the polis' grain supply. Demosthenes therefore goes to great lengths to share the information he has acquired on the grain supply in order to demonstrate that he is not obtaining such knowledge in order to make a profit but to be of benefit to the polis. He therefore claims that the information and contacts he had obtained were public not private resources.

⁸⁰⁷ Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43.4; *Rhet.* 1359^b19-23; 1360^a12-17; Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.13.

⁸⁰⁸ Moreno (2007) 258.

Conclusion One

What the preceding sections have demonstrated is that the spheres of commerce and politics should no longer be as considered as mutually exclusive. With the recognition that a considerable number of citizens (men who could participate politically) were inter-regional merchants, it is possible to situate the worlds of commerce and politics far closer together. Furthermore, politicians were expected to know a considerable amount of detail about the trade in vital resources and the revenue that can be generated through exchange. Even aspiring orators were expected to have an understanding of the basics if they were to address the assembly. Finally the location of the Piraeus, and the fact that the *ecclesia* and the *boule* occasionally met in the harbour district, also demonstrates that merchants had plenty of opportunity to participate in the political life of the polis.

6.3. The Active and Passive Political Influence of Merchants

Having shown that a number of important political figures were knowledgeable about the grain trade (and could be merchants themselves, or at least have commercial interests) it is possible to suggest that the mercantile community did have some political influence. Although the mercantile community cannot be viewed as having a common political outlook (in the sense of oligarchic or democratic),⁸⁰⁹ this does not mean that as group they could not have an impact on political decision-making, either actively or passively. The discussion will now move on to explore the potential political influence that the mercantile community could have within Athens. As has been demonstrated in Chapter Four, one of the primary economic concerns of the Athenians was the securing and maintenance of inter-regional trade networks. The recognition of the importance of inter-regional trade for the economic prosperity of the polis resulted in Athens demonstrating a concern for the safety and well-being of those men who plied the trade routes. It is therefore possible to identify the Athenians

⁸⁰⁹ For discussions exploring the political persuasion of the mercantile community see Amit (1965) 81-88; Davies (1985) 617; Osborne (1995) 36; Garland (1987) 35-37; Von Reden (1995) 25-37; Roy (1998) 191-202; Reed (2004) 85-88.

implementing a variety of policies aimed at protecting and safeguarding commercial shipping. Although these policies were frequently implemented as a way of safeguarding commercial ventures that procured vital resources such as timber and grain, they were not exclusive to these imports, and thus a range of merchants could benefit.⁸¹⁰ These policies could be instigated either as the direct result of political lobbying by the mercantile community (which I have termed as the ‘active’ influence of merchants), or because the state recognised that merchants had a common set of interests and fears that needed to be addressed if it wished to have continued access to the revenues and vital resources supplied by inter-regional exchange (this will be termed as the ‘passive’ influence of merchants).

6.3.1 The Active Influence of Merchants

The mercantile community, despite containing a diverse mix of social and ethnic groups, could on occasion unite as an active political group in order to change state policy or force the implementation of particular legislation.⁸¹¹ Although the evidence recording the active political campaigning of the mercantile community is scarce and often indirect, there is enough to suggest that, in certain circumstances, common interests could unite it, or at least parts of it. It is therefore possible to tentatively identify merchants as temporarily becoming an active political force.⁸¹² An example of the formation of a temporary political pressure group can be identified in the inscription *IG II² 337 (c.333BC)*. This inscription records that the Athenian *ekklesia* granted a group of merchants from Kition on Cyprus the right to found a

⁸¹⁰ Seager (1966) 184, argues that the Athenian interest in inter-regional merchants was solely due to the single over-arching reason that they needed to secure the grain supply. Although securing supplies of grain was the primary aim of much of the legislation relating to inter-regional trade, Athens was also dependent on other resources from abroad, and on the revenue generated by all inter-regional commerce, and thus the influence of these considerations on Athenian policy making should not be overlooked.

⁸¹¹ This was a suggestion first raised briefly by McKechnie (1989) 197 n.62, who suggested that *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* could be influential when it came to getting decrees passed or legislation changed.

⁸¹² Having demonstrated that a considerable number of inter-regional merchants were citizens, and that some of these citizen merchants could be influential politicians it is now possible to counter Reed’s bleak conclusions regarding the political significance of the mercantile community: Reed (2004) 85.

temple to their goddess Astarte (a local equivalent of Aphrodite).⁸¹³ The inscription records that the assembly had set a precedent for this kind of petition when it granted a group of Egyptian merchants the right to establish a temple dedicated to the goddess Isis.⁸¹⁴ What is significant about this inscription is that it seems to recognise that merchants could group together and lobby the assembly in order to gain certain privileges. Hopper has interpreted the grouping together of the Egyptian and Kition traders as an indication that small groups of merchants could effectively work together to bring their interests into the political domain.⁸¹⁵ From this evidence, he proposes that merchants could unite and form ‘unions’ or ‘guilds’ with common sets of interests.⁸¹⁶ Starr similarly points to the existence of mercantile guilds of limited size and scope.⁸¹⁷ He argues that two inscriptions from the fifth century, *IG I 127* and *IG I 128*, suggest that guilds of *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* were in existence. Although the evidence presented by Starr is ambiguous and unclear in its meaning, there are a couple of inscriptions from the fourth century which record that the decree was made on the recommendation of groups of *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*. The honorific inscription, *IG II² 416 (b)*, praises an unknown man from Kos for securing shipments of grain on behalf of Athens.⁸¹⁸ By acting to ensure a steady flow of grain from the cleruchs on Samos the honorand is recorded as receiving praise from the *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* and the Athenian citizens of Samos.⁸¹⁹ The second inscription, *IG II² 343 (323/2 BC)*, is an honorific inscription praising Apollonides of Sidon for unknown commercial services.⁸²⁰ The state, having received favourable reports from a group of

⁸¹³ Harding (1985) no.111; Tod (1946) no.189.

⁸¹⁴ *IG II² 337 ll. 44-45*. There is also a substantial amount of archaeological evidence for the existence of a number of Phoenician cults, and although the inscriptions recording their right to function have not survived, the probability is that some, if not most, of these cults were petitioned for by groups of merchants. Amit (1965) 82ff, Garland (1987) 101-138. and von Reden (1995) 29-34, suggest that the Athenians utilised ‘religious politics’ as a way of rewarding those men who undertook important commercial services on behalf of the state. See also Simms (1985).

⁸¹⁵ Hopper (1979) 87.

⁸¹⁶ Reed interprets this inscription as demonstrating the political importance of Kition rather than the political influence of traders. He draws this conclusion on the grounds that the merchants make the request in the name of the *demos* of Kition. This was a conclusion also reached by Austin and Vidal Naquet (1977) 273-274.

⁸¹⁷ Starr (1977) 220 n.69.

⁸¹⁸ On the basis of its letter form and its relevance to Athens’ grain shortages between 331 and 324 Tracey has dated the inscription c.330: Tracey (1995) 128.

⁸¹⁹ *IG II² 416 (b) ll. 7-12*.

⁸²⁰ Although the exact services of the recipient are unknown, it is safe to conclude that they were commercial since it is on the recommendation of *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* that the Athenians bestow their praise.

emporoi and *nauklēroi*, honour Apollonides with a commendation, a gold crown to the value of 1,000 *drachmai*, the right to acquire land, the title of *proxenos* and an inscription which is to be placed on the Acropolis. This extensive list of honours suggests that the services he performed were of considerable importance to Athens. These examples, although not proving the existence of the type of ‘trade guilds’ suggested by Starr and Hopper, do demonstrate that merchants could temporarily unite to become politically visible or active.⁸²¹ Furthermore the existence of honorific decrees praising recipients who had been recommended to the *boule* by *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* undermines Hasebroek’s hypothesis that there is no evidence for any sort of political or economic cohesion among maritime traders during the classical period.⁸²²

Finally, if all other attempts at political manoeuvring failed, the mercantile community could act together in a less open manner through the use of bribes.⁸²³ The primary example we have of this is the case of Diotimus, who was *strategos* in 388/7, and who is accused by a number of groups within the assembly of receiving a total of forty talents from various *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* in return for offering them ‘protection’.⁸²⁴ These allegations were made while Diotimus was serving abroad, but upon his return the *sykophantai* were not ready to put the matter to proof in the courts. Although it is unclear what exactly is meant by the term ‘protection’, it is probable that one aspect entailed Diotimus petitioning the assembly to grant a merchant’s request or to raise mercantile concerns before the *ekklesia*. Although we have no conclusive proof that this was an aspect of Diotimus’ arrangement, we do know that a number of Athenian officials were charged with accepting payment in order to protect the interests of an individual or group.⁸²⁵ For example, a foreign litigant (related by politics and marriage to the ruler of the Bosphoros, and who is suing an Athenian banker) complains of a network of ‘friends’ and the high credibility attained by

⁸²¹ The closest we find to Starr and Hopper’s ‘guilds’ are the tax and grain cabals recorded in Andocides (1.133-6). and Lysias (22.1-8) respectively.

⁸²² Hasebroek (1976) 30; 65; 84; 101; 168.

⁸²³ This grouping together to bribe politicians is significant as it clearly demonstrates that there were issues or agendas which could unite members of the mercantile community.

⁸²⁴ Lys. 19.48-52.

⁸²⁵ For discussions of bribery and their effect on the smooth running of the state, see Arist. *Pol.* 1270^b-13; 1270^b35-1271^a6; 1308^b10-16; 1308^b31-1309^a25; Hyp. 5.2.24-25; Dem. 19.293-295; 21.113; Lys. 21.22.

money-lenders, making it almost impossible to achieve justice.⁸²⁶ The implication is that money-lenders and bankers could endear themselves to rich or politically important clients in order to gain influence or immunity from prosecution. Having already demonstrated that some sections of the mercantile community were well connected politically, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the ‘protection’ offered by Diotimus was similar in nature to that complained about by the speaker of Isocrates 17.⁸²⁷

6.3.2 The Passive Influence of Merchants

As suggested in the introduction to this section, the term ‘passive’ influence in the context of this study conveys the idea that the interests of the mercantile community were so entwined with those of the state that their concerns were, in general, taken into consideration by the *ekklesia* or the *boule* when determining policy. Having demonstrated that the worlds of commerce and politics overlapped far more frequently than previously believed it is possible to conclude that the mercantile community could have a significant influence on the political life of the polis. The following discussion will examine the evidence that suggests that the mercantile community (because of its crucial role in ensuring the economic prosperity of the state) could have a passive influence on the determining of Athenian domestic and foreign policy.

One of the most important ways in which Athens safeguarded the interests and well-being of her mercantile community was through the signing of trade agreements. A prime example of this can be found in a series of treaties between Athens and three Cean cities. The inscriptions are agreements in which the Athenians dictate the terms of a monopoly on the trade in *miltos* (red ochre).⁸²⁸ This was used to impart red colour to a variety of objects, such as pottery, the stones used in buildings, the rope used to gather men from the Agora to the Pnyx for the assembly and the hulls of triremes.⁸²⁹

⁸²⁶ Isok. 17.6

⁸²⁷ See above note 824.

⁸²⁸ *IG II*² 1128; Rhodes and Osborne no.40.

⁸²⁹ *SIG*³ 972.155; Ar. *Arch.* 21-22; *Eccl.* 378-9; *Hdt.* 3.58. Ruddle was also used for medical purposes

We know from the writings of Theophrastus that Cean ruddle was considered best in colour (in particular the red) and consistency.⁸³⁰ Therefore at some unknown point in the mid-fourth century, Athens passed a decree to send five envoys to Ceos in order to persuade the main cities to implement greater control over the ruddle trade.⁸³¹ Rhodes and Osborne have argued that the context of *IG II² 1128* is likely to be the same as *IG II² 111* (an inscription listing a peace-settlement between Athens and the city state of Iulis after it had revolted), which is believed to have been inscribed during the Theban naval programme. Although the underlying reason for the Athenian desire to regulate the trade in ruddle is unclear, the decree demonstrates one of the methods Athens could employ to protect or stimulate trade. The three main concerns of the decree are firstly, to ensure that only certain predetermined vessels are allowed to export ruddle; secondly, that prosecution for violating this first agreement should be encouraged through the offering of rewards; and finally, that agreement should be secured to ensure that future decrees relating to the ruddle trade will be honoured without question.⁸³² The decree is revealing since it illustrates the extent to which the Athenians were prepared to interfere in the economies of their allies, and the degree of flexibility allowed in the allies' response. Frustratingly, we do not know how the Athenian envoys persuaded their Cean allies to conform to their demands, and thus Rhodes and Osborne are correct to point out that, "*It is hard to see how the agreement to export ruddle only to Athens and in specified vessels could be presented as in Cean interests, except as a way of avoiding even more direct interference*".⁸³³ Furthermore, Rhodes and Osborne suggest that the highly subversive way in which the Athenians seek to enforce their ruddle monopoly, and the fact that in reality ruddle was not an essential commodity, indicates that Athens' intervention in the affairs of the three Cean cities was extremely high-handed. What is more crucial is that the Athenians were willing to intervene in the trade of non-essential commodities. If Athens was prepared to go to such lengths to protect her supplies of non-essential goods then these inscriptions can be used to underline the readiness of the Athenians to protect

(Dioscorides, *De Mat. Med.* 5.96.).

⁸³⁰ Theophr. *On Stones*, 7.51-54.

⁸³¹ *IG II² 1128*. The inscription is still of uncertain date since there is no internal dating, furthermore the letter forms do little more than place it in the mid-fourth century. Rhodes & Osborne (2007) 207-208.

⁸³² *IG II² 1128* 9-17; 20-25.

⁸³³ Rhodes and Osborne (2007) 208.

their interests in more vital commodities such as grain and timber.

As well as using treaties to secure their supply of *miltos*, the Athenians signed a series of economic agreements with a succession of rulers in the Bosporos that were designed to ensure preferential treatment of Athenian merchants. Satyros I, for instance, granted priority to merchants loading corn that was to be exported Athens. This arrangement continued even during periods when there was a scarcity of grain and vessels destined for other poleis were dispatched empty, irrespective of the price they offered.⁸³⁴ Leucon, the son of Satyros, continued with his father's tradition of granting favourable commercial rights to Athens and he thus made Athenian merchants exempt from the 1/30th harbour tax, while also providing priority loading to those exporting grain to Athens.⁸³⁵ Leucon's sons ratified these personal treaties after the death of their father, demonstrating their intention to continue offering favourable treatment to Athenian merchants.⁸³⁶ Reed has identified that Athens secured these types of privileges from rulers of grain- or timber-producing states by 'assiduously bestowing honours and negotiating treaties'.⁸³⁷ The honours that Athens bestowed upon these men to reward their services to the Athenian economy have been discussed at length in Chapter Five.⁸³⁸ In addition to negotiating preferential treatment for their own merchants the Athenians granted special legal status or privileges to merchants from states who regularly supplied them with corn. Thus in the 360s Athens was to bestow a range of privileges on Sidonian *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* who plied the eastern trade routes bringing grain to Athens.⁸³⁹ These men, if they overstayed the time when a *xenos* was legally required to register as a metic, were excused from the obligations of other resident foreigners.⁸⁴⁰ For instance, they were exempt from the metic tax, the

⁸³⁴ Isoc. 17.57.

⁸³⁵ Dem. 20.36. Interestingly, the tax exemption and priority loading received by merchants who took grain to Athens was granted not by Bosporan law but through Spartocid proclamations (Dem. 20.31).

⁸³⁶ See *IG II²* 212 ll. 11-24.

⁸³⁷ Reed (2003) 47 fn. 29.

⁸³⁸ Athens also signed similar agreements with Perdiccas king of Macedon, who swore that, for as long as he was in power, he would not trade timber or oars to any state that was considered hostile to Athens. Additionally, he pledged an oath that he would only supply these items to the Athenian allies in quantities that had been approved by Athens: *IG I³* 61 (c.424/3); *IG I³* 89 (c.417-13); *IG I³* 117 (c.407/6). Although these inscriptions date to outside the period covered by this thesis, they are nevertheless significant, since they illuminate the methods Athens used to protect vital supplies.

⁸³⁹ *IG II²* 141 = Tod no. 139 = Harding 40. See also Austin and Vidal Naquet (1977) 273-74.

⁸⁴⁰ Whitehead (1977) 8-9; 14-15.

choregia and any form of property tax (*IG II²* 141 ll. 30-35). A similar decree dating to c.330-326 bestows honour upon all Rhodian *emporoi* as they regularly transported grain to Athens.⁸⁴¹

In addition to using political pressure as a way of negotiating treaties with other states, there is evidence that suggests that in certain circumstances, Athens could use political negotiations to benefit an individual merchant directly. As has been demonstrated in Chapter Five, one of the honours that could be bestowed upon merchants held in high esteem was the right to diplomatic assistance. The most explicit example we have of this is Heraclides of Cypriot Salamis who was rewarded with various honours (including the title *proxenos*) on account of the commercial services he had provided to Athens.⁸⁴² The inscription reveals that while undertaking a trading venture to transport corn from the Black Sea to Athens (c.325/4), Heraclides was detained by the Heracleans who confiscated his sails and prevented him from completing his journey. In response, Heraclides sent a message to Athens requesting that the Athenians dispatch diplomatic assistance. The inscription then goes on to detail the Athenians' response to his request. Having debated Heraclides' plea at length the *boule* decided the best course of action was to send a special envoy to Dionysius, the tyrant of Heraclea Pontica, and enquire after the return of Heraclides' sails and cargo. The inscription demonstrates a concern by the *boule* for an individual commercial operative and shows that the assembly was willing to incur the cost to dispatch an envoy to the Black Sea. Although Heraclides is never explicitly granted *asylia* (inviolability), it has already been argued that it is likely that such protection took this form.⁸⁴³ Therefore it is logical to assume that concern demonstrated by the *boule* was far from altruistic. By impounding Heraclides, the Heracleans had not only inconvenienced the merchant himself, but had also inadvertently challenged Athenian naval supremacy. By detaining a man who had received honour and praise for his commercial services the Heracleans were challenging the Athenian will and ability to defend their economic interests. As has been suggested by Lambert (and has been

⁸⁴¹ Wallbank (1980) 251-55. Tracey (1995) 35, disputes this date for the decree instead proposing that the letter forms suggests that it should be dated to the first half of the second century.

⁸⁴² *IG II²*-360; Rhodes and Osborne no. 95.

⁸⁴³ See Chapter Five section 5.4.7.

demonstrated in Chapter Five), one of the primary purposes of honorific inscriptions was to encourage others to behave in a similar honour-seeking manner.⁸⁴⁴ By encouraging merchants to transport grain to Athens (at a reasonable price) through the offering of rewards and honours, the Athenians had established a reciprocal system. Within such an arrangement merchants expected to be rewarded for their commercial ‘good deeds’.⁸⁴⁵

Therefore, as honoured merchants could be granted *asylia* it was imperative that the Athenians demonstrated a willingness to enforce this inviolability if they wished to encourage other merchants to traverse dangerous trade routes and continue to bring corn to Athens. Although Heraclides had not been granted *asylia*, he had already been honoured twice for his commercial services and thus it would set an unwanted precedent if the Athenians ignored his detention. Furthermore, if the Athenians overlooked Dionysius’ seizure of grain headed to the Piraeus, it might encourage other attacks on Athenian shipping (especially since much of Greece was suffering from grain shortages). The Heracleans had therefore forced the Athenians to make a choice: they could leave Heraclides to his fate and potentially lose face amongst the mercantile community (and possibly their allies) whilst also undermining their own system of honours and rewards, or they could spend public money going to his aid. Ultimately the Athenians decided to send diplomatic assistance, thus demonstrating a concern with protecting the mercantile community and, by doing so, their own commercial interests. Moreover, by aiding Heraclides, Athens was making a public declaration that it valued mercantile activities and would seek to protect the interests of those merchants who demonstrated continued goodwill towards the Athenian demos.

⁸⁴⁴ Lambert (2006) 116-117.

⁸⁴⁵ Furthermore de Souza (1999) 38-39, has convincingly shown that by the time of the Social War Athenian politicians were already worried about their naval standing in the Aegean. Thus if Athens failed to protect an honoured *xenos* they could further undermine mercantile confidence in their ability to protect commercial shipping.

The Athenians recognised that another important aspect of protecting mercantile shipping was to reduce the threat of piracy.⁸⁴⁶ The suppression or eradication of piracy was believed by Herodotus and Thucydides to be a common goal of all thalassocratic states.⁸⁴⁷ One way Athens sought to reduce incidences of piracy was through the creation of alliances. In two treaties dating to the period 427-424BC (between Athens and Mytilene, and Athens and Halieis) we find the Athenians demanding that their allied states should make their harbours available to all Athenian shipping whilst closing them to any known pirates.⁸⁴⁸ In addition, both treaties contain a clause that forbade the signatory states from sanctioning any type of piratical activity. These treaties represent an attempt to reduce piracy through less expensive political endeavours than military campaigning or colonisation. By attempting to reduce the number of ports that granted access to pirates the Athenians hoped to limit their access to safe anchorages, thus making it more difficult for them to operate. Further evidence of this strategy can be found in Demosthenes' oration *Against Theocrines*, which refers to the decree of Moirokles which contained a clause preventing pirates having access to the harbours and ports of the Melians.⁸⁴⁹ Although the decree itself does not survive Demosthenes records that the Melians chose to ignore it and allowed privateers to have unrestricted access to their harbour. As a result of their flagrant disregard for this decree, the Melians were forced to pay a fine of ten talents. The inference from this speech is that the allies of Athens had agreed,

⁸⁴⁶ For the purpose of this thesis, so-called acts of piracy undertaken by states or their legitimate representatives have been disregarded: therefore alleged 'piratical' attacks on Athenian merchants such as the capture of Athenian grain vessels by Philip at Hieron, are considered as dubious acts of war. Unless otherwise stated, piracy is taken as being a smaller-scale phenomenon mainly centred around regional groups and factions, rather than acts sanctioned or endorsed by a state or ruling body.

⁸⁴⁷ Both historians claim that King Minos of Crete desired to become the master of the seas (Thuc. 1.8.19; Hdt. 3.122). His underlying reason for this was his realisation that he could significantly increase his revenue by exploiting maritime trade. By becoming master of the seas, King Minos aimed to eliminate the threat of piracy, thus offering protection to merchants and increasing the volume of inter-regional commerce. Although this tradition is in all probability an example of fifth century authors projecting contemporary theorising and situations onto the mythical (or semi-mythical) past, it does highlight the fact that during the fifth century at least, there was a commonly held belief that the suppression of piracy was an effective way of assisting merchants. See also Ormerod (1987) 59-74; Souza (1998) 26-29.

⁸⁴⁸ *IG I³ 67; IG I³ 75.*

⁸⁴⁹ Dem. 58.56. In two earlier treaties dating to the period 427-424 (between Athens and Mytilene, Athens and Halieis), we find Athens demanding that the allied states should make their harbours available to all Athenian vessels while closing them to known pirates. Additionally both treaties contain a clause that forbids the signatory state from sanctioning any piratical activity (*IG I³ 67; IG I³ 75*). Also see de Souza (1999) 38-39.

or been forced, to accept a mutual pact against piracy, with each state being held accountable for suppressing piracy within its own sphere of influence. If a state was unable to suppress incidents of piracy they could appeal to Athens for assistance or face heavy fines.

In addition to the suppression of piracy, it is also possible to identify Athens using her triremes to escort *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* safely to the Piraeus.⁸⁵⁰ Two routes that were particularly notorious for piratical acts were the routes from Phaselis and Phoenicia to Athens. Although this practice began in the Peloponnesian War, it was not limited to this conflict, and thus we can identify its reintroduction at various times during the fourth century.⁸⁵¹ We therefore find that triremes were occasionally dispatched to accompany merchant vessels safely to Athens. Although these convoys primarily operated along major grain supply routes, they were not exclusive to traders in victuals and thus merchants transporting a variety of commodities could tag along. It was even possible for non-Athenian vessels to join these convoys in return for a contribution to help fund the military escort.⁸⁵² Detailed evidence for the operation of these convoys can be found in Demosthenes' oration *Against Polycles*, in which Apollodorus (son of Pasion) records that while serving as a *trierarch*, his main duty was to protect Athenian commercial shipping by escorting trading vessels from the Propontis in the northern Aegean, back to Athens.⁸⁵³ This account is supported by the inscription *IG II² 1623*, dating to approximately 335/6 BC, which is a series of accounts recorded by the dockyard superintendent. The inscription records that the *strategos*, Diotimus, was sent out to the Pontus region to provide protection against piratical attacks on merchant shipping.⁸⁵⁴ Similarly, in *IG II² 1638*, dating to 326/5, we

⁸⁵⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.36; 5.4.60-61; Dem. 17.20; 18.87-8; 18.301; 50.4-6; Philoch. Frag. 328; Theopomp. Frag. 115; 229; *IG II² 408*; *IG II² 1628*.

⁸⁵¹ Dio. 15.34.3; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.36; 5.4.60-61; Dem. 17.20; 18.87-88; 18.301; 50.4-6; 17-20; *IG II² 408*; *IG II² 1628*.

⁸⁵² For example, in 410 merchants were charged a 10% tax on their cargo if they sailed through the zone being patrolled and protected by the Guardians of the Hellespont. Polyb. 4.44.4; *IG I³ 61* dated to around 420 BC.

⁸⁵³ Dem. 50.17-21.

⁸⁵⁴ Establishing a permanent presence in a region made it easier to disrupt regional piracy and force it to the fringes of society. A colony situated on a major trade route made it possible to undertake continuous random spot checks on all shipping within a certain radius. This type of random spot check was far cheaper than a full scale expedition and could be more precisely targeted. Ormerod (1987) 108-109. See also de Souza (1995) 179-198; (1999) 41.

find another *strategos*, Thrasybulus, also being charged with the task of escorting a grain convoy from this region.

If these convoys failed to provide adequate protection, a more permanent solution was to establish a colony along a particularly important trade route. The most dramatic example we have of the Athenians implementing such a policy during the fourth century was their establishment of a colony in the Adriatic in c.325.⁸⁵⁵ The inscription recording the foundation of this colony clearly states that its primary purpose was to secure one of the most important Athenian grain routes and, by means of the newly constructed naval base, to protect all commercial shipping from the threat of Etruscan pirates.⁸⁵⁶ The Athenian policy of using naval outposts and colonies as a deterrent against continued acts of piracy (either state-sponsored or carried out by unaffiliated brigands) can be traced back to the fifth century.⁸⁵⁷ The inscription *IG I³ 61* (dating to around to the 430s or 420s) refers to a fleet of ships known as the “Guardians of the Hellespont”. Unfortunately, this is the sole surviving direct reference to these ships. The inscription records that one of the main duties of these guardians was to regulate and tax trade in the Hellespont, but their other responsibilities were not of relevance to this inscription and were thus left unrecorded. The position advocated by Reed and Hopper, that these guardians are the same as the armada of nine ships which Xenophon records as being permanently stationed in the Hellespont, is the most plausible.⁸⁵⁸ It is thus possible to identify Athenian concern for maintaining stability throughout the region and for providing

⁸⁵⁵ *IG II² 1629*; Rhodes and Osborne 100.

⁸⁵⁶ Rhodes and Osborne (2006) 525 and De Souza (1999) 38-41; 50-53, also consider a reduction in the number of piratical attacks as the primary aim of establishing this colony. Rhodes and Osborne suggest that further evidence for a concern with Etruscan piracy was probably contained in Dinarchus’ *Tyrrhenian Speech* and Hyperides’ speech *On defence against the Tyrrhenians* which are now lost, but which they believe date to the same period as the foundation of the Adriatic colony. Furthermore, *IG II² 1623 ll. 276-308* can also be identified as displaying a concern with guarding against piracy.

⁸⁵⁷ For example, Ormerod (1987) 108-109, argues that one of the primary purposes of the cleruchies throughout the Athenian empire was to help suppress piracy and banditry. The use of colonies as a way to reduce piratical activity across a large geographic area was a strategy also adopted by Corinth. Salmon (1984) 216-17, theorises that Corinth used this method during the reign of the tyrants, a period in which archaeology has shown many of Corinth’s colonies were founded. However, Salmon is quick to point out that the suppression of piracy was a subsidiary, not primary, aim of this colonisation drive.

⁸⁵⁸ *Xen. Hell.* 1.1.36.

security for commercial shipping heading to Athens.⁸⁵⁹

Conclusion Two

What the preceding sections have shown is that it was possible for the mercantile community to have both a passive and, occasionally, an active influence on the political life of Athens. For instance, the state sought to protect those merchants who regularly transported vital resources, such as timber and grain, to the Piraeus. Therefore it is possible to identify the Athenians actively negotiating preferential treatment for their merchants operating in foreign states, but this policy went both ways and infrequently Athens granted universal privileges to all merchants hailing from states that were important trade partners. Finally, although measures such as the suppression of piracy, military escorts for merchant vessels and political negotiations were primarily implemented to protect the trade in natural resources, other merchants could still benefit. In addition to securing resources, these policies must also be interpreted as being implemented to protect the significant revenues Athens gained from inter-regional commerce.

The Legal Status of the Mercantile Community

The exact legal status and privileges of the mercantile community are still hotly debated. In 1938 Louis Gernet argued that the introduction of the *dikai emporikai* in Athens during the mid-fourth century signified the beginning of commercial law within the Greek poleis.⁸⁶⁰ He hypothesised that the guarantee of legal protection, which was afforded to merchants through the swift conclusion of legal proceedings, would have been of benefit to the whole community, and that by

⁸⁵⁹ Hopper (1979) 75-6; Reed (2004) 48; see also Krentz (1989) 100. There is also evidence to suggest that Athens had undertaken a similar policy during the Peloponnesian War. Plutarch, in his *Life of Cimon*, records that there were two expeditions against areas renowned for piratical activities, Scyros and the Thracian Chersonese, which were specifically aimed at reducing piracy (Plut. *Cim.*8). Moreover, Plutarch suggests that the Athenian foundation of colonies in these regions was intended to be a permanent solution to the persistent problem of piracy. Although Thucydides mentions the expeditions to, and colonisation of, these regions, he remains silent on the stimulus and merely notes their occurrence.

⁸⁶⁰ Gernet (1938) 186.

extending such protection the Athenians hoped to encourage a greater flow of trade through the Piraeus. In contrast, an examination of the literature generated on this subject during the 1960s and 1970s reveals the impact of communism: Eastern European scholars (convinced by the merits of Marxist economic theory) wrote, or significantly influenced, many works exploring the Classical Greek economy produced during these decades. These Marxist approaches to the ancient economy were to have a significant impact on the interpretation of the social and political standing of the mercantile community. For example, economic historians such as Gluskina, Pecirka and Erxleben concluded that merchants were legally indistinct from other occupations, instead choosing to highlight their low legal status and exploitation by the rich, citizen financiers who extended maritime loans.⁸⁶¹ Although Mossé later attempted to update scholarly opinion regarding the legal status of the Athenian mercantile community, her arguments for a legal distinction between commercial occupations and other livelihoods ultimately did not go far enough. She concluded that, even in the commercial courts, citizen status brought with it a degree of legal protection not offered to foreigners and metics.⁸⁶² Cohen, in his examination of the *dikai emporikai*, challenged Mossé's conclusion.⁸⁶³ He argued that the Athenian commercial courts integrated a diverse mix of citizens, metics, foreigners, rich, poor, free, slaves *emporoi*, *nauklēroi*, money-lenders and bankers. However, Cohen did not accept that such a diverse mix of people could have any shared interests or status in either the political or judicial systems.

6.4 The *Dikai Emporikai*

During the fourth century, Athens began to develop, and then formalise, the *dikai emporikai* (commercial cases). The *dikai emporikai* were distinct from all other aspects of Athenian law, since the commercial courts had their own set of functions and procedures. Moreover they were not exclusively for citizens but also served the needs of foreigners and metics.⁸⁶⁴ There were a number of requirements for a case to

⁸⁶¹ Gluskina (1974) 111-138; Erxleben (1974) 460-520; Pecirka (1976) 5-3.

⁸⁶² Mossé (1983) 53-63.

⁸⁶³ Cohen (1978) 114-129.

⁸⁶⁴ See Cohen (1973) 99-114, Isager and Hansen (1975) 87; Burke (1992); Wilson (1997^b) 199-207.

be as a *dikē emporikē*: firstly, the dispute had to be commercial in nature; secondly, the contractual dispute had to involve the transportation of goods to or from Athens; whilst finally, and perhaps most crucially, there had to be a written contract structured according to a specific formula. The most sustained account that attempts to define the exact requirements for a case to be deemed as a *dikē emporikē*, as opposed to any other branch of Athenian law, is given by the speaker in Demosthenes 32. The imprecise wording of this passage means that it is open to interpretation and thus two schools of thought have developed. The first proposes that cases heard within the commercial courts must *either* have involved a dispute arising from the importation or exportation of goods to or from Athens, *or*, if the dispute had arisen in relation to a voyage between two other regions, there must be a written contract. This interpretation was favoured by Gernet,⁸⁶⁵ whereas Cohen preferred an alternative understanding which suggested that *both* a written contract *and* the movement of goods to or from Athens were required to make a case eligible to be heard in the commercial courts.⁸⁶⁶ However, Reed's conclusion, that there is insufficient evidence to resolve the disagreement conclusively, is sensible.⁸⁶⁷

Another defining aspect of cases tried as a *dikē emporikē* was the speed and frequency with which they were adjudicated.⁸⁶⁸ Prior to the mid-fourth century special legal proceedings for maritime trade already existed, but by c.352 B.C. Xenophon

⁸⁶⁵ Paoli (1930) 101-5; Gernet (1938) 1-44; Gernet (1955) 186-7; Todd (1993) 336.

⁸⁶⁶ Cohen (1973) 99-114; Cohen (1992) 104. The strongest evidence to support Cohen's conclusion can be found in Demosthenes 32.1 which states; "*The laws, men of the jury, ordain that actions for shipowners and merchants shall be upon loans for shipments to or from Athens, concerning which there shall be written agreements; and if anyone brings suit in violation of this provision, the action shall not be maintainable*". Furthermore, the speech indicates the importance of the destination of the goods when the speaker argues that the case should be dismissed, as it would be both unfair and unjust, if men who had tried to prevent commodities from reaching Athens could still expect to be permitted to instigate legal proceedings in the Athenian commercial courts (Dem. 32.1; 32.22.8-10; Dem. 33.1 34.42). Other scholars who accept Cohen's approach include Isager and Hansen (1975) 87; Burke (1992) 210; Rhodes (1993) 664-5; Wilson (1997^b) 199-207.

⁸⁶⁷ Reed (2003) 90.

⁸⁶⁸ The swift resolution of commercial cases under the *dikē emporikē* was in stark contrast to other branches of the Athenian legal system which were frequently subject to long delays. For example, evidence from the litigation over the 'crown' recorded in two speeches, one by Demosthenes (36.26-27) and the other by Aeschines, suggests that the case came to trial seven years after the initiation of proceedings, despite the normal statutory time limit being stated as five years. There are a number of other examples where there was a lengthy delay in the case coming to trial after the initiation of legal proceedings, for example we have Demosthenes 21.13 and 30.15-16 which saw a two and three year delay respectively, in Demosthenes 38.10-14 there was a 14 year delay, whilst finally in Demosthenes 36.26-27 it is claimed that there was a delay of more than 20 years.

states that these procedures are not sufficiently rapid to accommodate the needs of inter-regional traders.⁸⁶⁹ He therefore suggests that Athens should guarantee merchants the fastest possible resolution to any legal disputes so as not to detain anyone who wished to sail out of Athens.⁸⁷⁰ The Athenians responded and thus by the c.347 we find the first reference to the *dikē emporikē*.⁸⁷¹ Reed suggests that these “monthly” arrangements for the settling of commercial legal disputes were specifically designed to attract more trade to Athens at a time when the prosperity once guaranteed by Athenian power had waned.⁸⁷² However there is scholarly disagreement as to the exact meaning of the term ‘monthly’.⁸⁷³ On one side of the debate stand those who consider that the term “monthly” (either *kata mēna* or *emmēnoi*), when applied to maritime suits, should be understood as meaning that cases had to be settled within a month.⁸⁷⁴ Cohen and his successors on the other hand argued that “monthly” referred to the interval at which proceedings could be brought.⁸⁷⁵ However, in terms of this study these arguments are irrelevant, what is clear is that the commercial courts were specifically designed to be more convenient to inter-regional merchants. Xenophon express this sentiment most explicitly when he suggests that by ensuring quick settlement of commercial cases the Athenians could stimulate trade. By offering prizes to the courts and judges that offered the swiftest and most just settlements of commercial disputes Xenophon believes the Athenians

⁸⁶⁹ See above fn. 868. Additionally, there are also a significant number of cases where there were severe delays after the initiation of legal proceedings due to the high volume of cases being heard. See for example Dem. 39.17; 40.43; 45.4; 46.22; Lys. 7.5.

⁸⁷⁰ Xen. *Por.* 2.3.

⁸⁷¹ Dem. 21.176.

⁸⁷² Reed (2003) 89.

⁸⁷³ A further controversy arises when trying to determine the exact time of year at which these trials were adjudicated. The confusion arises because of an unclear passage contained in Demosthenes’ speech, *Against Apaturius*. The unedited manuscript reads “*The lexis [controversial in meaning] involving emporoi are monthly [emmēnoi] from Boedromion [i.e. most of September] to Munychion [most of April] in order that they may immediately obtain justice and set sail.*” Reed (2003) 90, suggests that the final clause could read “*in order that they may obtain justice and sail immediately*”. Reed bases his conclusion that the term “monthly” should be understood as “resolved within a month”, on the argument of Paoli (1933) 175-86, that the order of the months has been reversed in this text. Paoli therefore altered the timetable for *dikai emporikai* from totally outside of the sailing season (i.e. the winter months), to totally within it (i.e. the summer months). This conclusion was accepted by Gernet (1954) 60 and Harrison (1971) but was criticised by Cohen (1973) 42-58. Cohen points towards evidence in Lysias 17.5 which suggest that commercial hearings were held during the winter months, but, as Cohen himself recognises, this evidence is far from clear.

⁸⁷⁴ Harrison (1971) 16; 21; 154; Gauthier (1974) 424-5; Isager and Hansen (1975) 85.

⁸⁷⁵ Cohen (1973) 23-36; Macdowell (1976) 85; (1978) 321-2; Rhodes (1981) 583; (1995) 315; Hansen (1983) 167-70. See also Calhoun (1965) 165.

would allay the fears of the mercantile community that a contractual dispute in Athens would lead to long delays.⁸⁷⁶

Finally, the litigants in these commercial cases were from a wider-cross section of society than is found in other branches of the Athenian legal system. Such commercial cases were unique in that the litigant could be a citizen, metic, foreigner, and, as proposed previously (see section 2.3.3), even a slave.⁸⁷⁷ Although it is frequently difficult to identify precisely the status of particular individuals, there is enough evidence to suggest that having a commercial occupation was sufficient to enable one to bring about legal proceedings under the *dikai emporikai*, even overriding one's ethnic origins and social status. For instance, it is possible to identify a number of commercial cases that involve only foreigners or metics. In Demosthenes 21.176 a commercial dispute arises between two non-Athenian businessmen, Evander of Thespias and Menippos of Karia.⁸⁷⁸ It is worth noting that the development of the *dikai emporikai* provided new legal rights only to those merchants who were not covered by privileged status or inter-state treaties (i.e. slaves and merchants who spent only brief periods in Athens).⁸⁷⁹ For example, from the middle of the fifth century privileged foreigners (such as *proxenoi*) had full access to the Athenian courts under the jurisdiction of the Polemarch, whilst merchants who came from states that had trading and judicial agreements with Athens could find justice in Athens, albeit far more slowly, by attending courts presided over by the *Thesmothetae*. Although these privileged merchants (or men from states with *symbola* agreements with Athens⁸⁸⁰) already had some legal protection, the security offered by the *dikai emporikai* for commercial transactions was nevertheless attractive (as suggested in

⁸⁷⁶ Xen. *Por.* 3.3.

⁸⁷⁷ Harrison (1968) 175, "It may be here as elsewhere that rules governing overseas commerce were more advanced than the rest and that in this sphere the agency of a slave was more clearly recognised". See also Gernet (1955) 162-3; Paoli (1930) 105-9; Todd (1993) 192-4.

⁸⁷⁸ See also Dem. 32 (Massiliots); 33 (Byzantines); 35 (Phaselites). For cases between metics and foreigners see Dem. 34 and 35.

⁸⁷⁹ . Cohen (1973) 8-62; 126-7; Gernet (1955) 173-200; Paoli (1930) 97-117; Todd (1993) 334-7. Wade-Gery (1958) 186-89; de Ste. Croix (1961) 100 n.5; 100-05; Harrison (1968-71) vol 2, 16.

⁸⁸⁰ For instance the Phaselites were granted the privilege of the right to appear before the Polemarch in order to settle any legal disputes which might arise (IG I³ 10; Meigs and Lewis (1988) no. 31; Fornara (1998) no. 68. Reed suggests this privilege was primarily aimed at further expediting the settlement of disputes arising from bottomry loans (Reed (2003) 45. Seager (1961) 172-84 disagrees with this interpretation and instead see the decree as being intended to honour all Phaselites equally. See also de Ste. Croix (1961) 95-108.

Xen. *Por.*2.3).⁸⁸¹ As has been demonstrated, these commercial courts provided swift resolutions to disputes, while simultaneously providing a more transparent system because of the requirement of a written contract.

From as early as the 420s it is possible to identify a large number of independent slaves in Athens. These slaves were earning their own money, thus making them indistinguishable in appearance and clothing from citizens.⁸⁸² Having already shown that slaves could operate as agents in inter-regional commerce (Chapter Two section 2.3.3) it is now possible to reappraise their role in commercial litigations. Evidence from Pseudo-Xenophon, Menander, Theophrastus and Demosthenes indicate that it was possible for slaves to initiate legal proceedings under the *dikai emporikai*. In Pseudo-Xenophon's *Constitution of the Athenians*, it is suggested that it was commonplace for slaves to initiate lawsuits within the context of their commercial activities. Although it is impossible to calculate precisely the date that this provision was implemented, Pseudo-Xenophon indicates it had been established at least as early as the mid-fifth century. In the works of both Menander and Theophrastus we can identify slave businessmen instigating legal proceedings owing to property disputes that affect their businesses. Todd has convincingly argued that the objection to a slave's participation in the judicial system was not that they could not necessarily be trusted to tell the truth, but that they lacked the financial means to be sued for perjury. The slave businessman was the exception to this rule and thus in commercial cases, Todd argues, slaves were free to give their testimony.⁸⁸³ This is an important conclusion, since it suggests that under commercial law slaves had a different legal status than in other branches of Athenian law. It is therefore possible to conclude that to a certain extent social status, like nationality, could be over-ridden by a commercial occupation.⁸⁸⁴

6.5 Laws Protecting Inter-Regional Merchants and Commerce

⁸⁸¹ For fuller discussions of symbola agreements see Hopper (1946) 35-51; de Ste. Croix. (1961) 111; Gauthier (1972); Cohen (1973) 60-61; Velissaropoulos (1977) 77-83; Ager (1996).

⁸⁸² Xen. *Ath Pol.* 1.10-12; Pl. *Rep.* 563^b.

⁸⁸³ Todd (1990) 28. See also Jones (1956) 141 n.3;

⁸⁸⁴ This conclusion compliments those of Paoli, Harrison and Fisher who argue that the evidence from the forensic speeches indisputably shows that, in commercial cases at least, slaves could appear as an almost equal party. Paoli (1930) 105-115; Harrison (1968) 175-176; Fisher (unpublished) (2005) 20.

As has been shown in the previous discussion of the political influence of inter-regional merchants, the Athenians had a policy of safeguarding the interests and well-being of the mercantile community. In addition to providing commercial courts in which legal disputes could be settled quickly and fairly, the Athenians also passed legislation aimed at protecting the mercantile community. As part of this policy, the Athenians passed a number of laws that sought to protect the mercantile community from unscrupulous business practices or frivolous lawsuits. The following discussion will explore the main laws that offered some form of protection to the mercantile community. Although it has been correctly argued that the primary aim of much of this legislation was to protect the trade in vital resources,⁸⁸⁵ the revenue generated by other imports and exports, and the need for less important commodities should not be downplayed. Consequently it is possible to identify that some of this legislation offered protection to all merchants not just those trading in grain or timber. Therefore the enactment of these laws demonstrates that the Athenians recognised one of the most effective ways of stimulating (or protecting) inter-regional commerce was to “gratify and render more zealous” the *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* who plied the trade routes.⁸⁸⁶

In 1974 Stroud published the text and translation of a remarkable piece of epigraphic evidence uncovered during the course of the Agora excavations. An almost complete marble stele (dating to 375/4) recorded previously unknown details about the circulation of silver coinage in Athens, in particular the Piraeus, during the first half of the fourth century.⁸⁸⁷ The law listed the duties of the *dokimastai* (see Chapter Two section 2.1) and the fines that could be issued for unlawfully debasing Athenian coinage. Although we have no literary or archaeological evidence that suggests Athens had a particular concern with the purity of her silver coinage during this period, there are a number of inferences that can be made from the law itself. It is possible to ascertain that merchants had lost, or were losing, faith in the purity of

⁸⁸⁵ See Reed (2003) 52.

⁸⁸⁶ Lys. 22.21

⁸⁸⁷ Stroud (1974) *Hesp.* 63; Austin and Vidal Naquet (1980) no. 102; Harding (1985) no. 45; Rhodes & Osborne (2007) no.25.

Attic coinage, which in turn was having a negative influence on the volume of trade. This inference can be understood from the opening line stating that ‘genuine’ Attic standard silver coinage must be accepted in any transaction, which implies that at the time this was not occurring. Moreover, the establishment of *dokimastai* in the Piraeus indicates that inter-regional merchants constituted a sizeable proportion of this type of fraud. In line 37 the inscription states that there should be a *dokimastai* immediately established in the Piraeus in order to be of direct benefit to the *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*. The urgency to enact this law suggests that the situation was having an impact on the Athenian economy, as does, Stroud theorises, the appointment of *nomothetai* and the extraordinary legal procedures that encouraged the prosecution of reticent *kapēloi* or corrupt officials.⁸⁸⁸ In contrast with the fifth century when the Athenians had met with resistance when they attempted to force the allies into using Athenian silver coinage,⁸⁸⁹ during the fourth century the Athenians had to counter not reluctance to use their coinage but a temptation to imitate it using less pure silver.⁸⁹⁰ Stroud theorises that the detailed instructions issued to the *dokimastai* about what to do on discovering a set of counterfeit coins indicates that debased or fake coins were a common problem. What has generated the most controversy is the question of how the Athenians responded to foreign silver having the same stamp as the Attic (ll. 8-9). Stroud believes that if the imitation coins were as good as Athenian they were approved,⁸⁹¹ but a majority have since argued that such coins were neither approved, like good Athenian coins, nor defaced and confiscated like base or counterfeit coins, but simply returned to those who tendered them.⁸⁹² However, the latter situation is unlikely as there was no way to distinguish between coins that were approved and coins that were returned but were considered unacceptable. Consequently I, like Rhodes and Osborne, prefer Stroud’s interpretation.⁸⁹³ By accepting Stroud’s conclusion it is possible to interpret this law as offering a guarantee to foreign merchants that their coinage, once passed by the *dokimastai*, was legal tender. This interpretation also fits with the statement that the *dokimastai* in the Piraeus were

⁸⁸⁸ Stroud (1974) 185.

⁸⁸⁹ Meiggs and Lewis (1998) no. 45; Fornara (1998) 97; Ar. *Birds*, 1040-1. See also Figueira (1998).

⁸⁹⁰ Rhodes and Osborne (2007) 116.

⁸⁹¹ A view shared by Giovannini (1978) 39 (who changes his argument from his 1975 article) and Engelmann (1985) 170-173.

⁸⁹² Giovannini (1975) 191-5; Martin (1991) 26-7; Stumpf (1986) 23-40;

⁸⁹³ Rhodes and Osborne (2007) 118.

established to be of benefit to the *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*.

Furthermore the Athenians passed laws that sought to regulate the activities of regional wholesalers, such as the *sitopōlai* found in Lysias speech *Against the Grain Dealers*, in order to offer protection to the mercantile community. Although Reed is correct to emphasise that the laws regulating the grain dealers and the prosecution of offenders were designed primarily to serve the interests of the citizen consumer, the speaker of Lysias 22 makes it clear that such laws were also meant to ‘gratify’ and render more ‘zealous’ the *emporoi* against whom the *sitopōlai* had combined.⁸⁹⁴ What provokes the legal proceedings is that the *sitopōlai* decided to co-operate in order to force the *emporoi* into selling their grain at lower prices. By defrauding the *emporoi* in this manner, Lysias suggests that the grain dealers were threatening future supplies. He therefore suggests, contrary to modern expectation, that if the Athenians wanted to maintain cheap grain prices they needed to prevent the grain dealers from co-operating against *emporoi*.⁸⁹⁵ The laws regulating the *sitopōlai* forbade anyone in Athens from accumulating more than fifty *phormoi* of grain at any one time,⁸⁹⁶ from adding more than one obol to the retail cost,⁸⁹⁷ or from selling stored grain at high prices.⁸⁹⁸ The punishment inflicted for these crimes (either a hefty fine or in extreme cases the death penalty) suggests that if *emporoi* are not protected from this type of scam they might take their services elsewhere.⁸⁹⁹ The ambiguity of these laws provided the Athenians with flexibility during times of crisis. For instance, the Guardians of the Grain were given a broad mandate which was to ensure that stored grain was sold ‘justly’, a mandate which enabled the demos to fix prices when required.⁹⁰⁰

⁸⁹⁴ Lys. 22.17; 21. The aim of endearing inter-regional merchants to Athens, as has already been shown in Chapter Five, is one that also underpinned the Athenian honours system.

⁸⁹⁵ Lys. 22.8-9; 17; 21.

⁸⁹⁶ Lys. 22. 5-7. However, what Lysias means when he states that the grain dealers are prevented from ‘buying together’ more than fifty measures of grain is unclear. For further discussions see, Stanton (1985) 122-3; Rhodes (1993) 578; Pritchett (1993) 194-5; Figueira (1986) 162-4; Tuplin (1986) 495-98; Moreno (2008) 213-214.

⁸⁹⁷ Lys. 22.8; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 51.3.

⁸⁹⁸ See above footnote 896.

⁸⁹⁹ Moreno (2007) 214-215.

⁹⁰⁰ One instance of this can be found in the grain-tax law of 374/3. See Stroud (1998) 73-4; Moreno (2007) 216-217.

The Athenians also sought to protect the mercantile community from baseless accusations and spurious judicial proceedings. Although, as with so many of the laws referred to by the Athenian orators, the exact details of this regulation are lost, it is possible to piece together some information from Demosthenes 58. In this speech a man named Theocrines is accused of being in breach of a law that was designed to prevent unfounded legal cases against *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*. Theocrines had brought charges against another man, Micon, which had subsequently proven to be false. Thus the plaintiff demands that the defendant should have the full force of the law brought against him and should be arrested in order to face ‘other’ unspecified punishments.⁹⁰¹ Although the ‘other’ punishments are again left unrecorded, the speaker does state that the law was introduced in order that men who had braved the hazards of open sea travel could trade with Athens knowing that they were protected from the annoyance or disruption caused by baseless charges.⁹⁰² The plaintiff is clear trying to remind the jury of the dependence Athens has on her mercantile community and thus the need to ensure their grievances are dealt with.

In addition to seeking to protect the interest of merchants the Athenians also sought to protect the interests of the bankers and moneylenders who financed inter-regional exchange. With financiers playing a vital role in the facilitating of inter-regional commerce the Athenians sought to endear themselves to this section of the mercantile community. Consequently Demosthenes records that the Athenians passed a law that made it illegal for *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* to sail to any destination other than the one stipulated in their loan agreement. If this clause was ignored transgressors could face severe penalties.⁹⁰³ Demosthenes also records that the death penalty was decreed for any merchant *emporos* or *nauklēros* that borrowed on already mortgaged security.⁹⁰⁴

⁹⁰¹ Dem. 58.10-13.

⁹⁰² Dem. 58.53-54.

⁹⁰³ Dem. 56.6-10. This law is different from the one which dictated that a maritime loan may not be extended unless the ship mentioned in the contract carries grain back to the Piraeus (Isager and Hansen (1975) 213; Gauthier (1972) 156 fm 163; Moreno (2007) 291 fn. 400). Erxleben (1974) 496, argues that these laws operated together to place the same obligations on bankers and moneylenders irrespective of their social class or ethnicity.

⁹⁰⁴ Dem. 34.50.

Overall Conclusions

Having shown in previous chapters that the mercantile community included a number of citizens, some of whom were highly affluent, this chapter has offered alternative models for the legal and political integration of merchants. Firstly, it has been shown that the location of the Piraeus, and ease of travel between the port and the Astu, meant that citizen merchants, in comparison to men from other demes such as Akharnai, had more opportunity to participate in the political life of the polis. Moreover, the epigraphic corpus has shown that if necessary, or prudent, the *boule* could be convened in the Piraeus in order to debate or oversee maritime matters. Thus owing to the recognition that a higher number of citizens were part of the mercantile community it has become possible to demonstrate that merchants could have both an active and passive influence on political decision making in Athens. Furthermore, this chapter has dispelled the misnomer that a commercial occupation precluded one from political participation. It therefore challenged Mossé's widely accepted theory that the worlds of commerce and politics were mutually exclusive. Whereas Mossé argued for a clear and stark divide between politics and trade, the expectation that prominent political figures would have a working knowledge of inter-regional exchange undermines this theory. Furthermore, passages from the works of Xenophon and Plato clearly record that merchants played a part in the political life of the polis by comprising a significant portion of the assembly. Additionally citizen merchants could become a conduit through which non-citizens could gain access to political process. This hypothesis is borne out by the epigraphic evidence which records that on occasion honours and rewards were bestowed to foreign merchants owing to the recommendation made by *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*. Moreover, an investigation of the legal status of the mercantile community revealed that the litigants in commercial cases were from a wider-cross section of society than in other branches of Athenian law. It has therefore been possible to conclude that ethnicity and social status were to a large extent overridden by a commercial occupation. As a consequence of the legal recognition of agency metics, foreigners and slaves were able to participate in commercial disputes, either as defendants, or more importantly, as plaintiffs. Finally, as part of the policy of endearing themselves to members of mercantile community the Athenians enacted a number of laws that sought to protect their interests, these

included laws that guaranteed the purity of Athenian silver, that ensured the acceptance of coins minted abroad, that regulated the wholesale of grain and which sought to protect the mercantile community from baseless accusations.

Conclusions

This thesis has provided the opportunity to challenge a number of modern preconceptions that have frequently been applied to the mercantile community. The first key assumption that was questioned was our own understanding and translation of the main terms used to designate inter-regional commerce and commercial occupations. With the recognition that there were a number of connotations encompassed by the terms *kapēlos*, *emporos* and *nauklēros*, and that there is insufficient clarity or consistency of use to enable us to attach a precise definition, I have instead suggested that, when encountering these terms, they should be examined in their original context, with their individual meaning be established accordingly. This is most crucial in the case of the term *nauklēros* which demonstrates a wide flexibility of use and which, if to be understood correctly, needs to be examined on a case-by-case basis. For instance, I have demonstrated that the primary role of the majority of *nauklēroi* was that of haulier, however when the subject is not acting in this manner a more appropriate way of understanding the term is as ship's master (a role which emphasises their logistical duties). Furthermore, men operating as *nauklēroi* should not be considered as undertaking trade ventures for themselves, instead any instances where they can be identified as engaging in the face-to-face exchange of commodities should be understood in terms of a commercial agent operating on behalf of a master, partner or owner (if a slave).

Another of the preconceptions that this thesis has dispelled, and perhaps the most widespread and damaging, was the notion that the mercantile community was in general comprised of one socio-ethnic group. Once again, I would argue that a more flexible approach to the evidence is the most prudent. Studies into the ethnic origins of inter-regional merchants reveal that the mercantile community was not overly dominated by any one particular racial group (i.e. citizen, metic or foreigner). However, the exact proportions of each group are likely to have varied throughout the fourth century. Furthermore this study has shown that the range of wealth encompassed by members of the mercantile community is considerable. The largest attested economic group is that of the moderately affluent merchant who spent his life undertaking inter-regional exchange in order to obtain modest levels of profit.

However, it has been possible to demonstrate that highly affluent men, such as Pasion and Diodotos, also involved themselves in inter-regional trading ventures. These wealthy men could either undertake trade directly, as seems to be the case with the ex-merchants Nicobulos and Parmenon, or indirectly through the use of agents, an option favoured by Meidias and Timotheus. It has also been shown that the cross-section of social and economic groups encompassed by the mercantile community even extend to slaves. Furthermore, this study has also proposed that maritime moneylenders and financiers should be seen as an important sub-group of mercantile community, owing to the importance of their role in funding inter-regional exchange.

Chapter three presented evidence that showed inter-regional merchants, like any other social or occupational group, were seen from a variety of different perspectives by their peers (even within particular groups). For instance I have suggested that, although being disparaging of inter-regional trade, the social moralisers of the archaic period were warning against the revolutionary concept that status could now follow wealth, rather than criticising *emporoi* and *nauklēroi per se*. With the advent of 'economic' theorising in the fifth century the Sophists beginning to confer moral and social accountability on economic agents. Although recognising the need for inter-regional commerce, the Sophists argued that trade should, as far as possible, be equitable and based on the principles of reciprocity. Plato and Aristotle also embraced the theory that morality and justice should be regulating factors within trade and this idea becomes a central part of their economic analysis. Plato therefore criticised merchants from a moral perspective, arguing that the mercantile community's interaction and association with foreigners corrupted it. He believed that over time this corruption diminished a trader's loyalty to the polis and undermined traditional civic ideals. Although Aristotle was less critical of inter-regional merchants, he too was concerned with the idea of justice in exchange. Therefore, much of his analysis concentrates on defining what makes different products commensurable rather than passing judgment on the mercantile community. I have therefore suggested that the works of Plato and Aristotle should be seen as reflections of the economic instability that was prevalent during the fourth century, whilst arguing that a more accurate barometer for identifying Athenian attitudes towards the mercantile community are the forensic speeches. In general the average Athenian

would have had little interest in the moral conduct of merchants, however during times of crisis their activities came to the forefront of public consciousness. If a merchant acted selflessly during such times he could gain high favour and honour, however, if he sought to exploit the situation for his own advantage he could potentially be considered a public enemy. Consequently, even by the end of fourth century, there is little uniformity of opinion contained in the literary evidence. Therefore in chapters Four, Five and Six, I focused on the epigraphic evidence and utilised alternative methods of analysis in order to demonstrate that the Athenians had a more positive view of inter-regional merchants and that the mercantile community was more integrated into the social and political life of the polis than had previously been thought.

Chapter Four highlighted the fact that the social standing and political visibility of merchants was directly influenced by the goods they imported/exported and the public revenue they generated. With Athens needing to import vital commodities such as grain, timber and slaves, and owing to the importance of import/export and harbour taxes, inter-regional commerce became a matter of public concern. The grain supply for instance was a topic that was brought before the assembly on a monthly basis, whilst it is possible to identify that successful politicians were expected to be able to give good advice on all the revenues and expenditures of the state. A consequence of Athenian dependency on inter-regional commerce (and the revenue it generated) was that merchants became a valuable resource. This in turn served to raise the social standing and visibility of the mercantile community. Even slave traders, men traditionally thought to have been marginalized, could, because of the need for the commodities they imported and the revenue they generated, be thought of positively. Although previous studies have concluded that Athens' interest in merchants was solely in terms of procuring vital resources, the Athenians clearly recognised that the most effective way of achieving their commercial and economic aims was to endear themselves to the men that plied the trade routes. Therefore, rather than simply being interested in the commodities being traded whilst overlooking the men who supplied them, the Athenians recognised that the two were intrinsically linked. Chapter Four therefore highlighted the imprudence of attempting to separate Athenian interest in vital exports and

imports from a concern for merchants.

Chapter Five presented evidence that showed the majority of inter-regional trading ventures relied on the procurement of some level of credit. Owing to the intimacy of maritime lenders and borrowers, an individual's reputation could have a direct impact on the terms with which a loan was offered. A consequence of this was that it served to regulate the behaviour of merchants encouraging honesty and integrity. Therefore if a merchant wanted to maintain his credit-worthiness he was encouraged to operate in a manner that enabled him to preserve a positive reputation amongst the bankers and moneylenders. The result was that in their business relationships at least, merchants were generally trustworthy and respectable. The second half of Chapter Five analysed the corpus of fourth century honorific inscriptions rewarding commercial services. This discussion revealed that a variety of commercial activities could be honoured. Moreover, the honours being granted confirm that rather than trying to simply secure imports, the Athenians actually had a genuine respect for the men engaged in inter-regional commerce. Honours such as citizenship, the right to pay equal taxes as citizens and the right to serve in the same phalanxes as citizens, served to blur social and ethnic boundaries and point towards a genuine admiration for the mercantile community. Although the popular opinion of merchants fluctuated during the fourth century, the general level of respect for the mercantile community was far higher than previously accepted.

As a consequence of this Chapter Six was able to offer an alternative model for the legal and political integration and influence of the mercantile community. Firstly, it demonstrated that the location of the Piraeus, and ease of travel between the port district and the Astu, meant that citizen merchants had the opportunity to participate in the political life of the polis. This conclusion is supported by the works of Xenophon and Plato who both record that a significant number of merchants attended the assembly. With the average assembly comprising a significant number of merchants, it has become possible to demonstrate that the mercantile community could have both an active and passive influence on political decision-making. Additionally citizen merchants could become a conduit through which non-citizens could gain access to political process: this is a hypothesis proven by the epigraphic evidence which demonstrates that on occasion honours and rewards were bestowed to


foreign merchants solely on the recommendations made by other *emporoi* and *nauklēroi*. This chapter therefore dispelled the misnomer that a commercial occupation precluded one from political participation. It also challenged Mossé's hypothesis that there was a clear and stark divide between politics and trade, instead showing that prominent political figures were expected to have a working knowledge of inter-regional exchange (in particular the grain trade). An examination of the legal status of the mercantile community revealed that the litigants in commercial cases were from a wider-cross section of society than in other branches of Athenian law. It has therefore been possible to demonstrate that ethnicity and social status were to a large extent overridden by a commercial occupation. As a consequence of the legal recognition of agency metics, foreigners and slaves were all allowed to participate in commercial disputes, either as defendants, or more importantly, as plaintiffs. Moreover, as part of the policy of endearing themselves to members of the mercantile community the Athenians enacted a number of laws that sought to protect their interests, including legislation that guaranteed the purity of Athenian silver, that ensured the acceptance of coins minted abroad, that regulated the wholesale of grain and which sought to protect the mercantile community from baseless accusations.

In closing, my reassessment of the social, political and legal perceptions and standing of the mercantile community means it becomes possible to re-interpret radically the roles and duties performed by inter-regional merchants within Athenian society. Although a complete revision of the social importance of inter-regional trade and traders was beyond the remit of this project, this topic offers the opportunity for future research. For instance, I have already published an article highlighting the centrality of merchants within the system of intelligence gathering (a role which has traditionally been over-looked in relation to merchants due to their perceived low status).⁹⁰⁵ With the mercantile community now being recognised as having a fundamental role within many aspects of polis life it is only right that we should recognise the importance of the men who plied the trade routes and who had a direct hand in making fourth century Athens the sophisticated and unique society that it was.

⁹⁰⁵ Woolmer (2007).

Appendix One:

Greek Word Frequencies



Word: ἔμπορος ἔμπορία ἐπιδήμιος ἔμπολεύς ἐπιβάτης πρακτῆρ

Primary Source

Agatharchides	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aeschines	1	0	0	0	0	0
Aeschylus	1	0	0	0	0	0
Andocides	0	1	0	0	0	0
Antiphon	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aristophanes	5	2	1	0	0	0
Aristotle	10	4	0	0	1	0
Bacchylides	1	0	0	0	0	0
Demades	0	0	0	0	1	0
Demosthenes	16	8	0	0	14	0
Dinarchus	0	0	0	0	0	0
Diodorus	8	1	0	0	9	0
Euripides	2	0	0	1	0	0
Herodotus	2	1	1	0	9	0
Hesiod	0	1	0	0	0	0
Homer	2	0	4	0	0	2
Homeric Hymns	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hyperides	0	0	0	0	0	0
Isaeus	0	0	0	0	0	0
Isocrates	3	5	0	0	0	0
Lycurgus	4	4	0	0	0	0
Lysias	4	2	0	0	1	0
Menander	0	0	0	0	0	0
Old Oligarch	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pausanias	5	3	0	0	0	0
Pindar	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plato	18	5	0	0	2	0
Plutarch*	3	4	0	0	4	0
Pseudo-Appollodorus	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scholia#	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sophocles	3	0	0	0	0	0
Strabo	6	2	0	0	0	1
Theophrastus	0	0	0	0	0	0
Theognis	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thucydides	4	4	0	0	9	0
Xenophon	18	4	0	1	10	0
Total	116	51	6	2	60	3

* Greek lives; Alcibiades, Aristides, Cimon, Lysander, Nicias, Pericles, Solon, Themistocles, Theseus

Scolia to Aeschines, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Euripides, Hesiod, Homer
Plato, Sophocles, Thucydides, Xenophon.

~ excluded from investigation

Word: ναύκληρος ναυκληρέω ναυκληρία κάπηλος καπηλεύω

Primary Source

Agatharchides	1	0	0	~	~
Aeschines	0	0	0	0	0
Aeschylus	1	1	0	0	1
Andocides	0	0	1	0	0
Antiphon	0	0	0	0	0
Aristophanes	2	1	0	0	0
Aristotle	1	0	2	2	0
Bacchylides	0	0	0	0	0
Demades	0	0	0	0	0
Demosthenes	31	4	2	1	0
Dinarchus	0	0	0	0	0
Diodorus	2	0	0	0	0
Euripides	1	0	5	0	1
Herodotus	2	0	0	5	3
Hesiod	0	0	0	0	0
Homer	0	0	0	0	0
Homeric Hymns	0	0	0	0	0
Hyperides	0	0	0	0	0
Isaeus	0	1	0	0	0
Isocrates	1	0	0	0	1
Lycurgus	1	0	0	0	0
Lysias	2	1	1	1	0
Menander	3	0	0	~	~
Old Oligarch	0	0	0	0	0
Pausanias	0	0	0	0	1
Pindar	0	0	0	0	0
Plato	9	0	1	16	4
Plutarch	9	1	2	0	0
Pseudo-Appollodorus	0	0	0	0	0
Scholia	16	9	4	0	0
Sophocles	3	1	1	0	0
Strabo	6	0	6	0	0
Theophrastus	0	0	0	~	~
Theognis	0	0	0	~	~
Thucydides	2	0	0	0	0
Xenophon	10	1	2	1	0
	*	*	*		
Total	103	20	27	26	11


φορτηγός καπηλικός

Primary Source

Agatharchides	~	~
Aeschines	0	0
Aeschylus	0	0
Andocides	0	0
Antiphon	0	0
Aristophanes	0	1
Aristotle	0	6
Bacchylides	0	0
Demades	0	0
Demosthenes	0	0
Dinarchus	0	0
Diodorus	18	0
Euripides	0	0
Herodotus	0	0
Hesiod	0	0
Homer	0	0
Homeric Hymns	0	0
Hyperides	0	0
Isaeus	0	0
Isocrates	0	0
Lycurgus	0	0
Lysias	0	0
Menander	~	~
Old Oligarch	0	0
Pausanias	0	0
Pindar	0	0
Plato	0	2
Plutarch	1	0
Pseudo-Appollodorus	0	0
Scholia	0	0
Sophocles	0	0
Strabo	0	1
Theophrastus	~	~
Theognis	~	~
Thucydides	0	0
Xenophon	0	0
Total	19	10

Appendix Two:

Inscriptions List



No.	Inscription	Date	Recipient	Service	Goods	Honours Bestowed	
1	IG II ² 212	c. 390-380	Satyros I	Miscellaneous	Grain		
2	IG II ² 81	c.390-378	Unknown Megarian	Miscellaneous (unknown)	Primarily Grain	1,2,3 & 4	
3	IG II ² 212 (a)	389/8	Leukon of the Bosporos	Gifts of imported goods	Grain	3, 5, 6, 7 & 8	
4	IG II ² 207	364/3	Orontes, Satrap of Mysia	Miscellaneous	Grain	5, 6, & 8	
5	IG II ² 342	c. 350-320	Apse of Tyre	Importation of goods	Grain	1, 3, 5, 9, & 10	
6	IG II ² 212 (b)	347/6	Spartokos II of the Bosporos Pairisades I of the Bosporos Apollonios of the Bosporos	Miscellaneous	Primarily Grain	3, 4 5, 6, 7, & 8	
7	IG II ² 543	340	An unknown allied city	Importation of goods	Possibly Grain	5	
8	Woodward <i>BSA</i> no. IV	340/339	Unknown recipient	Securing shipments	Unknown	3	
9	IG II ² 423	c. 340-300	Philomelos	Gift of money	Grain	Unknown	
10	IG II ² 312	337-320	Unknown recipient	Importation of goods	Possibly Grain	5	
11	IG II ² 286	336/5	Unknown recipient	Unknown	Unknown	1, 2, 7 & 9	
12	IG II ² 283	336/5	Ph- of Cyprian Salamis	Sale at reduced price	Grain & Fish	6 & 5*	
13	IG II ² 414 (c)	c. 334/3 or 314/3	- unknown/ Astym-/Polysthenes	Miscellaneous	Primarily Grain	5*	
14	IG II ² 408	333/2	Mnemon and -ias of Herakleia	Sale at reduced price	Grain	5 & 6	
15	IG II ² 337	333/2	Group of Kitian <i>emporoi</i>	Unknown	Unknown	10	
16	IG II ² 363	331/0	Dionysios of Kerakleia	Gifts of imported goods	Grain	Unknown	
17	Camp <i>Hesp.</i> No.3	c. 331-324	Sopatros of Akragas	Importation of goods	Grain	1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10 & 11	
18	Schweigert <i>Hesp.</i> No.39	330	Pandios of Herakleia	Importation of goods Securing shipments	Grain	6 (the rest are lost)	
19	IG II ² 416 (b)	330	Unknown man from Cos	Securing shipments	Grain	Unknown	1 = <i>Proxenia</i>
20	IG II ² 409	330 or c. (337-320)	Two men from Miletos (?)	Importation of goods	Grain	6 (the rest are lost)	2 = <i>Asyilia</i> 3 = <i>Stele</i>
21	IG II ² 407	c. 330-326 or 321-318	Unknown recipient	Importation of goods Securing shipments	Grain	5 & 6	4 = <i>Xenia</i> 5 = Gold Crown
22	IG II ² 360 (a)	330/29 or 321/18	Herakleides of Cyprian Salamis	Sale at reduced price	Grain	5 & 6	6 = Commendation
23	IG II ² 653 (a)	327	Pairisades II of the Bosporos	Miscellaneous	Primarily Grain	12	7 = <i>Ateleia</i>
24	IG II ² 360 (b)	325/4	Herakleides of Cyprian Salamis	Gift of money	Grain	1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 & 13	8 = Citizenship
25	IG II ² 343	323/2	Apollonides of Sidon	Miscellaneous (unknown)	Unknown	1, 3, 5, 6, 9 & 10	9 = <i>Euergesia</i>
26	Schweigert <i>Hesp.</i> 42	323	Unknown recipient	Gift of imported goods	Grain	5, 6, & 8	10 = <i>Enktesis</i>
27	IG II ² 400 (a)	320/19	Eucharistos	Unknown	Unknown	1 & 9	11 = <i>Thea</i>
28	IG II ² 400 (b)	before 320/19	Eucharistos	Sale at reduced price	Grain	6	12 = Bronze statue
29	IG II ² 398 (a) +438	322/1 or 320/19	-phanes	Miscellaneous (unknown)	Grain	8	13 = Eisphora and Army
30	IG II ² 401	c. 321-319	Metrodoros of Kyzikos	Miscellaneous (unknown)	Grain	5 & 6	
31	IG II ² 653 (b)	310/9	Eumelos of the Bosporos	Miscellaneous	Primarily Grain	7 & 8	* = possibly foliage

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