Identity, emotion and memory in Neolithic Dorset

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a PhD in archaeology

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## STATEMENT 1

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
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Summary

Dwelling and practice represent two of the most powerful approaches that have been developed in archaeology over recent years. Together they offer a way of thinking about the past that recognises both the agency of past peoples and the way in which they are always situated within their worlds. Yet both these approaches can be accused of a certain essentialism: they often fail to consider the socially contextual nature of identity, emotion and memory and the vital importance of these to how people go about the business of living their lives. By incorporating understandings of embodiment, gender, personhood, conviviality, emotional geographies, social memory and forgetting, among other themes, this thesis is an attempt to redress that. The first half of the thesis is thus an explicitly theoretical engagement with these broad, complex, but vital topics.

In order to further this argument the second half of the thesis then applies these understandings to a single extended case study over three chapters: the Neolithic of Dorset. This detailed and in-depth examination of one part of the country between 4000 and 2200 cal BC allows both the importance, and the applicability, of this theoretical approach to be set out. Through this case study new understandings of people, landscape, materiality and monuments will emerge. The intention is to offer complex and coherent narratives that interweave the rich evidence of Neolithic occupation from Dorset with a sophisticated theoretical understanding that will allow new understandings of this particular place and time to emerge. Without a serious attempt to consider how identity, emotion and memory may have been both important *and* different in the past, archaeology is doomed to produce a picture of prehistory that not only falls short, but also reflects and reifies the conditions of the present.

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Introduction

Opening gambit

Archaeology is a constantly developing discipline. Although often seen as lagging behind its more sophisticated brethren in sociology, anthropology and geography, it has nonetheless managed to reinvent itself consistently over the last 40 or so years: initially from culture history to processual archaeology in the 1960s and 70s, then from processual to post-processual in the 1980s and now, perhaps, from post-processual to counter-modern, or symmetrical archaeology (Thomas 2004; Witmore 2006). This thesis, however, has no grand designs to revolutionise the discipline. Rather it has two specific aims. The first is to develop the strongest current theoretical approaches within archaeology so that they are better able to provide complex and challenging narratives about the past. The second is to take these approaches and apply them to one particular case-study: Neolithic Dorset. This will not only demonstrate the applicability and importance of the new theoretical approaches but also create new interpretations and understandings of Dorset in this period. In this introduction I want briefly to set out the basis for this study, and to relate it to current debates within archaeology. I shall then summarise the principal methods on which this thesis relies: encounter and analogy. These areas form the broad background for the specific arguments I want to develop in this study. The introduction will then conclude by laying out the structure of the rest of the thesis.

The archaeological background

In recent years two particular approaches have been developed in archaeology that I find particularly powerful. These are the archaeology of practice developed by John Barrett (e.g. 2001) and the dwelling perspective, a broadly phenomenological position brought to archaeology by a combination of Tim Ingold (2000), Chris Tilley (1994) and Julian Thomas (1996). It is on these approaches that this thesis is based. Yet these ideas are not without their difficulties. Principal among them has been the way in which they have failed to pay adequate attention to the socially contextual nature of three key areas of being-in-the-world: identity, emotion and memory. The absence of the former of these has often been noted as a difficulty with archaeological narratives

rooted in dwelling and practice (e.g. Brück 2001; Gero 2000; Whittle 2003). In failing to consider the various ways in which identity is constituted in the past, the ways in which age, gender and personhood may have been radically different, these approaches, and indeed archaeology in general, create a timeless image of what it means to be human. This is fundamentally unsatisfactory. Anthropological studies have shown the multiple variations in identities that exist around the world today, and have demonstrated that these profoundly impact on how people live their lives (e.g. M. Strathern 1988). If we are to offer an archaeology that has any merit it must take these issues into consideration. The failure to address complex identities in the past is not only archaeologically unsatisfying, however, it is politically dangerous, a point I return to below.

The failure to engage with emotion and memory is no less serious. These too, as I shall demonstrate in the thesis, are central to how people live their lives. These do not form a surface of froth somehow that disguises the 'real' motivations of people, the economic and political drives that force people to act in certain ways. On the contrary it is now clearly the case that people spend enormous amounts of time attending to the affective and memorable sides of life. If we are to think about the past in ways that that are not deeply impoverished we need to consider these aspects of people's existence. One argument against this might be that subjects like emotion are unrecoverable from the 'archaeological record'. As I will make clear throughout this thesis, but especially in chapters 1 and 3, such a position is wholly mistaken. The idea that certain aspects of human existence are recoverable from the past and others are not is based on two flawed concepts. The first of these is that the material which archaeologists encounter is somehow a record to be explained. As Barrett has shown, this is absolutely not the case (2000b [1988]). The second is the idea that certain topics are suitable for 'objective' analysis whilst others are 'subjective' and thus should be rejected. This differentiation between objective and subjective rests on the same dualistic thinking that separates mind and body, culture and nature, male and female, and that privileges the former in each case. As I argue in chapter 1, a host of thinkers have now clearly demonstrated that such an approach is an utterly unsatisfactory way to approach the world (e.g. Haraway 1991; Heidegger 1967; Ingold 2000; Thomas 1996; 2004).

Towards a politically aware archaeology

This thesis aims not only to set out a piece of research that helps to write more complex and provocative narratives about the past, but at the same time to help to challenge our assumptions about people, places and things in the present. In doing so I position myself alongside (though not necessarily within) recent calls for a counter-modern archaeology (Thomas 2004). This approach recognises the uniquely modern origin of archaeology, and the problematic heritage which this brings with it (Thomas 2004). Archaeology is a product of modern thought and modern assumptions, but has too often been employed not to challenge ideas of progress, rationality and individuality but rather to reify them (Thomas 2004). Thus the choice to offer complex discussions of identity, emotion and memory and to see each of these as radically different in the past is not, as Thomas has pointed out, a politically neutral decision (2004, 235). Too often in archaeology the people of the past are presented as being, in the end, just like those of the present. This position, at best humanist, and at worst biologically determinist, renders them as shadowy reflections of the present, like us but not quite. This disguises the differences between the present and the past. Worse, it thrusts present conditions into the past and casts them as universal and unchanging, as the product of human evolution rather than the result of a particular set of social and historical circumstances.

It is not simply the case that we can avoid this, however, by refusing to discuss identity, for example. As Joanna Brück has pointed out (2001), refusing to discuss these topics does not leave the identity of past peoples unspecified; rather it implicitly casts them in today's mould. A lack of discussion of age and gender does not leave the past age- and gender-free; rather it implicitly creates the people of the past in the dominant image of Western society: white, male and middle-aged. Equally, refusing to openly discuss emotion does not leave our archaeology emotion*less*. Instead it means that the implicit presence of Western emotions goes unchallenged, again making the past like the present. Through this, modern inequalities between male and female, white and black, old and young, heterosexual and homosexual (not to say the very existence of these categories) are essentialised and legitimised. Again, as Thomas has recently argued, 'it is in its difference that the past reveals truly radical possibilities' (2004, 233).

Thus whilst little of this thesis will be spent discussing the political consequences of the arguments briefly touched on here, it is nonetheless an explicitly political act, as indeed any engagement with archaeology must be (Shanks and Tilley 1992; Thomas 2004). In problematising identity, emotion and memory in the past, I am effectively casting doubt on their essential permanence in the present. In doing so I am deliberately choosing to support a position which recognises that things could have been different: in other words, that the Western, capitalist, androcentric, state-based system in which we live is not automatically superior to any other. Notions of scientific progress slowly revealing an objective and increasingly 'real' version of the world and its past are little more than modernist fallacies. Instead the position I advocate here recognises that the scientific achievements of our society, the results of research and learning, indeed this very thesis, represent one understanding amongst many. The purpose of archaeology, therefore, cannot be to reveal truth about the past, as if such a thing ever existed. Rather archaeology should seek to challenge how we think about our past, to draw on approaches that allow us to conceive of other ways of *being*, and thus write histories for ourselves that challenge rather than conform to our expectations.

How can we do this? There can be no neutral, objective account of the past, one that occupies a view from nowhere (Haraway 1991). Every viewpoint is a view from somewhere, from the social, historical and political ground from which it is produced. This is exactly the point I am making when I argue that emotions, memories and identities are socially contextual. The logical consequence of this is to recognise that all arguments, indeed once more this very thesis, are a product of the times in which they are created, and are inseparable from the conditions in which they are produced. This is certainly the case. To what extent then can archaeologists, as both products and students of modernity, ever begin to access the past? If we are laden, inevitably, with modernist preconceptions, how can we think in ways about the past that do not merely reflect, but also challenge these preconceptions? The answer lies in our ability to encounter the past, to be challenged by it, and to draw upon analogies.

Encounter and analogy

The concept of agency is a central plank upon which this thesis is built. As I will set out in chapter 1, agency is locked in a duality with structure. Thus whilst it is both enabled and constrained by the conditions in which it is produced, it is capable of acting back, of altering those conditions and going beyond them (Giddens 1984). In the context of this thesis one could argue that archaeology *is* agency. Thus although the conditions of modernity are productive of, and reproduced by, intellectual endeavour they can still be altered and transformed by that work. For archaeologists, I suggest, the ability to exercise this agency comes from two things: encounter and analogy. The encounter is the act of engaging with past conditions of *being*, of interacting with the materiality of the past and thus being challenged by it. Archaeology is inevitably an act that takes place in the present, yet it is one that forcibly encounters the evidence of another humanity, one that is made present through its material conditions. By confronting the past we immediately encounter a humanity that existed outside of the modern conditions in which we live. Yet this is insufficient in itself. How do we interpret these other ways of living? How can we construct narratives for these alternative forms of *being* that do not merely reflect folk models of gender, identity and community? The answer to that is through analogy[i].

Analogy, in the sense I mean it here, is the act of drawing ideas from one context and considering them in another. This has a long history in archaeology, and has on numerous occasions been critiqued by both processual and post-processual archaeologists (see Barrett and Fewster 1998 for an example of the latter). The post-processual critique has usually focused on the ways in which it can homogenise all non-Western groups as an 'other' and the ways in which it can present them as timeless and as having no history of their own. This critique is certainly powerful when focused on approaches that base their claims in similarities between two groups, for example in their subsistence strategies. Yet this is not how I intend to use analogy here. Rather, following Alasdair Whittle, I see analogies as a crucial means by which we can challenge our own views of the world, and also 'widen the imagination and open up possibilities of interpretation' (Whittle 2003, xvi). Using analogies, as I do throughout this thesis, is to ask questions such as 'what if it was like this? How would this change our understanding?' Thus I see no difficulties in combining analogies

from different places and using them both, simultaneously, to create new ways of understanding the past as I do in the discussion of Early Neolithic personhood in chapter 5. Analogies, as Thomas has argued (2004, 240-1), involve three-way relations between the archaeologist, the analogy and the past. In this form they can challenge us to think of new possibilities and new directions. It is not only ethnographic analogies on which I will draw, however. Effectively my use of philosophical and feminist thought acts in the same way. Thus whether I am engaging with ideas around childhood in Fiji (Toren 1993), or Judith Butler's performative understandings of gender (1993), both are in effect analogies that I use to challenge our ideas as I engage with the past. It is through these complex, challenging and multi-contextual movements that new understandings can emerge.

Positioning the thesis

With regard to theory

This thesis does not seek to solve a problem. Rather it sets out a series of developments, or moves, that I argue will greatly improve the complexity and sophistication of archaeological narratives about the past. The first half of this thesis thus develops new theoretical understandings. Chapter 1 is a direct engagement with the ideas of dwelling and practice that have proved popular in archaeology over the last ten years or so, and are also the theoretical basis for my argument. It also sets out the most important of the critiques that have been made of these approaches, namely around their essentialist aspects, and their lack of engagement with emotion and memory.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 then seek to outline theoretical positions that, whilst based firmly on and consistent with dwelling and practice, develop these arguments and answer the questions of their critics. I begin with identity. Archaeology has recently begun to develop more complex engagements with past people (e.g. Fowler 2000; 2004). This has included a recognition that people in the past may have had identities, genders and senses of personhood and age that are very different to those we are familiar with in the West today. In chapter 2 I set out my thinking on these issues, which form a central aspect of my analysis of Neolithic Dorset in the second half of the thesis. In

particular the work of Judith Butler (1993) and Marilyn Strathern (1988) are analysed to provide new ways of thinking about how sex, gender and the body are conceived.

Chapter 3 develops another aspect of being-in-the-world that has largely been ignored by archaeology: emotion (but see Gosden 2004; Tarlow 2000). It is a central argument of this thesis that emotions are vital components of how people dwell within their worlds. This does not mean that emotions are universal, nor that we can access them through some kind of trans-historical empathy – far from it. Rather emotions are socially contextual and formed through discourse, agency and being-in-the-world. Nevertheless they are central to the engagements people have with each other, their material culture and the world around them. As chapter 3 shows, it is essential that we consider this if we are to have any hope of understanding the motivations behind people's actions, or indeed the actions themselves. In particular the notion of conviviality, developed in anthropology but now being applied in archaeology (O. Harris forthcoming; Whittle 2005), will prove essential.

Chapter 4 then turns to memory. Memory is a topic that has been discussed within archaeology only comparatively recently, but rarely at a particularly detailed level. In this chapter I set out a view of memory that rejects commonly held memory-as-storage models, and instead develops an approach to memory that recognises it as a central component of being-in-the-world that emerges as part of that process. I also discuss the social, bodily and autobiographical aspects of memory alongside an analysis of its counterpart, forgetting. The conclusion of this chapter considers an ethnography of rural Greece that reveals how identity, emotion and memory are all in fact deeply interrelated, indeed are inevitably caught up with one another (Seremetakis 1991). This point shows the entirely heuristic nature of the divisions between identity, emotion and memory within this thesis. These divisions are for the purpose of structuring my argument only; they are not real or absolute. Indeed the division between the studies of the Neolithic and the theoretical aspects of the thesis are also purely structural. Neither side should be seen as taking precedence over the other, and both were in fact written alongside one another.

With regard to Dorset

In the second half of my thesis I turn to a detailed consideration of Dorset in the Neolithic. The chapters are ordered chronologically, chapter 5 dealing with the Early Neolithic, chapter 6 the Middle Neolithic and chapter 7 the Late Neolithic. Each of the time spans accorded to these periods deliberately overlaps, once more showing that they are an imposition on to the past, rather than something that has emerged from it. Each of the chapters is then structured through the themes of movement, materiality and deposition. These allow me to move between different, and decreasing, scales of analysis from the broad to the intimate. In fact this is true only to a certain extent and in reality there is a constant move between different scales of analysis. Thus aspects of deposition, for example, are discussed in parts that are primarily focused on movement or materiality. Rather than seeing this as a weakness, however, I would argue that the very *messiness* of the past demands that any attempt to impose too tight a structure will always fail. Although all three chapters draw on each theoretical aspect I have outlined above, they inevitably concentrate on some areas more than others. Thus chapter 5 concentrates on discussions of personhood and conviviality, whilst chapter 6 focuses principally on issues of remembering and forgetting. Chapter 7 draws on discussions of identity, personhood and emotion, but deliberately offers a broader narrative than those from chapters 5 and 6. The case-study chapters dovetail with the two appendices. Appendix 1 is an alphabetical list of sites discussed in the text, with information on location, date and principal finds. Appendix 2 is a number of narrative engagements originally conceived as part of the three case-study chapters. Structured along the same chronological lines, these can be read alongside the case-study chapters (and are referred to in the text) or as a series of stand-alone engagements at the end.

It is important to point out at this stage that the chapters on Neolithic Dorset are not intended to act as a catalogue of all Neolithic sites in the region; the point of this thesis is not to develop that kind of exhaustive list, valuable though that would be in other contexts and for other purposes. Rather what the chapters offer is a series of coherent narrative encounters that seek to demonstrate the importance of the theoretical positions developed in chapters 1-4. Whilst I hope this will also provide new and exciting understandings of Dorset in this period, the most important purpose

of the three case-study chapters is to demonstrate the applicability and importance of identity, emotion and memory to our encounters with the past. The final chapter, chapter 8, returns to many of the themes set out across the thesis, in order to discuss the major points raised and to act as some kind of conclusion. This will only prove to be a stepping stone rather than an endpoint, however, and thus this chapter will also make several suggestions for how this work can be developed. In this thesis I aim to develop understandings of identity, emotion and memory within archaeology and use them to create new narratives about Neolithic Dorset. This does not represent an end in itself. Rather this will hopefully prove the beginning of a series of recursive engagements with these ideas, through which archaeology can continue to challenge itself to develop both its understandings of the past, and of the present.

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[i] Here I am discussing analogy as the specific act of engagement between different social and historical contexts. All archaeological interpretation is of course an act of analogy to a certain extent. A stone axe, for example, is understood as an axe through analogy, not through an inherent physical quality.

Chapter 1: People, places, things: dwelling and practice in archaeology today

Introduction

To begin I wish to set out what I perceive to be the most powerful trend, or trends, in archaeological theory. This will set the context for the following theoretical chapters on identity, emotion and memory and also give the basis from which I approach these diverse topics. Dwelling and practice offer the philosophical position from which both the theoretical developments I suggest, and the case-study I carry out, are written. Whilst the 'dwelling perspective', as Ingold (2000, 173) has termed it, offers a description of the person that at last allows us to move beyond notions of subject and object, nature and culture, and individual and society, so notions of practice, developed by Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1990), allow us to begin to reconceptualise sociality, agency and action (e.g. Whittle 2003). This chapter will trace the major thrusts of these ideas, and how they have been incorporated into archaeology by examining three areas: people, places and things. It will not be possible, however, to deal with these ideas in the depth I would like. To fully critique older ideas and to set out detailed analyses of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Giddens and Bourdieu would require a thesis all to itself. In any case such complex and essential work has already taken place in archaeology, and I would merely be treading over old ground (c.f. Barrett 1994; 2001; Thomas 1996; 2004; Tilley 1994; 2004). Instead, therefore, this chapter offers an introduction and summary of these ideas, and readers are directed to the wider literature for a fuller discussion of these concepts and their impact and use in archaeology. The chapter will conclude by critiquing these approaches and showing how, in themselves, they offer inadequate engagements with identity, personhood, memory and emotion. It will be the job of the following chapters to illustrate the centrality of those ideas and how we can begin to access them archaeologically.

People: agents, Dasein, being-in-the-world

I shall begin here with the philosophical view of the person that offers one of the most promising lines of archaeological inquiry. That is the notion of phenomenology, or dwelling, taken principally from the work of Martin Heidegger (1967) and Maurice

Merleau-Ponty (1962)[i]. This approach has found popularity in the anthropological works of Tim Ingold (2000; 2001)[ii] amongst others (e.g. Csordas 1994; Toren 1993), and in archaeology with Julian Thomas (1996; 2004) and Christopher Tilley (1994; 2004)[iii]. This line of thought is a fundamental rejection of the dominant trope of western philosophy: the dualisms of Descartes (Thomas 1996, 11). Rather than seeing the world as based around a split between mind and body, as captured succinctly in philosophy's most famous dictum, *cogito ergo sum*, such splits are explicitly rejected. Not only do they prevent us from properly conceptualising *being*, they also directly privilege one half of the dualism over the other (Thomas 1996, 15). Thus culture is privileged over nature, mind over body and as a consequence, male over female. By rejecting such bifurcations, the great debates of modern philosophy, idealism versus materialism and the relationship between subject and object, are circumvented, based as they are on a peculiarly blinkered view of the world (Thomas 1996, 14).

Heidegger[iv], Dasein and being-in-the-world

The phenomenological conception of the person is perhaps best outlined in Heidegger's great work, *Being and Time* (1967). Rather than using the terms subject, human being, or individual, Heidegger takes a new term for his conception of the person: Dasein (1967, 26). Crucially Dasein is not a subject for analysis in isolation, because Dasein is always being-in-the world (D. Moran 2000, 238). Thus Dasein, like all animals, things, places and landscapes is inseparable from everything else; it is constituted among tangled relations and connections (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1988). Heidegger is concerned with how humans encounter the world, with how they are thrown into it; they are never separated from mood, feeling and being (D. Moran 2000, 228). What is unique for Heidegger about Dasein, is 'that Being is an *issue* for it' (1967, 32 original emphasis). People care about their lives, which are full of meaning and historicised, hermeneutic, interpretation (D. Moran 2000, 223-4). This recognition of the historicised nature of human *being* means that no universalised subject, no eternal human, can be thought of (Altenbernd Johnston 2000, 60; Thomas 1996). People are brought into being in a world from which they are never separate, and a world which in every way colours and conditions their beliefs and their bodies. As we will see in later chapters, identity, emotion and memory too are contingent upon the variable nature of Dasein, on the on-going nature of being-in-the-world (cf. Butler 1993; Foucault 1978).

Such a consideration has profound impact on how we think about people in archaeological contexts. Rather than seeing persons as the outcome of a universal nature which battles with an unforgiving environment we can now see that there is *no such thing as universal human nature*. Equally, as Ingold has cogently argued, there is no such thing as the human genotype outside of the biologist's mind (2000, 382). That is because people are never separated from the world, nature is never apart from culture, and evolution and history are one and the same (Ingold 2000, chapter 21). Thus the historical nature of *being* means that nothing is given and nothing is universal. Instead we need to consider how discourse and being-in-the-world enmesh Dasein in relations which produce particular ways of *being*. Neither body nor mind are universal because body and mind are not separate. There is nothing that is outside the world, nothing that is outside of *being*. Caught up, then, within being-in-the-world are our relations with others. Heidegger points out that *being* is always '*Being-with Others* [sic]' (1967, 155, original emphasis). That is that the world is experienced as being shared with others (D. Moran 2000, 242; Thomas 2004, 147). These relational beings, whose existence is constituted through their engagements with each other and the world, are also fundamentally temporal. Heidegger emphasises how being-in-the-world situates Dasein within a flow of time; past experiences hand us possibilities in the present that stretch into the future (D. Moran 2000, 206; Thomas 2004, 215).

Such a brief introduction to Heidegger's thought already moves us away from seeing human beings as imposing cultural views on to nature, or of acting on the world from a position outside it. Instead we now recognise that human beings are inseparable from the world, and that their lived experience, indeed their existence, is fundamentally historical in nature. This also links directly to discussions of embodiment in chapter 2. What Heidegger talks little of, however, is the nature of the world in which Dasein dwells, and the nature of its interaction with that world and with others who dwell within it. I shall begin to correct that by looking at agency and the archaeology of practice.

People, practice and agency

Agency has undoubtedly been, and indeed remains, one of archaeology's hot topics. This is perhaps understandable; what archaeologists feel they lack most are the people who dug the pit they are excavating, or who knapped and used a flint tool. Thus the frustrations felt, and articulated, with the people-free systems theory and functionalism of processual thought (e.g. Clarke 1968) led to agency becoming a dominant trope of archaeological theory (e.g. Shanks and Tilley 1987; Barrett 1994; 2000a; 2001; Gardner 2004a; Dobres and Robb 2000; 2005). This should not be portrayed solely as a post-processual or interpretive concern. Agency remains an issue for archaeologists from a wide range of backgrounds[v] (cf. papers in Dobres and Robb 2000), but there is insufficient space to deal with them all here. Instead I want to draw on the most powerful of these approaches, the agency theory developed by John Barrett (1994 *inter alia*) that draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens[vi]. This approach to agency is specifically compatible with phenomenological philosophy because it too attempts to transcend the dualisms of subject and object (Bourdieu 1990) and agency and structure (Giddens 1984).

Giddens' (1984) structuration theory forms the basis of Barrett's archaeology of practice. Structuration theory investigates how social practices are reproduced across space and time. In order to do so it circumvents one of the traditional dualisms of sociology, that of structure and agency, and recasts it as a duality (Giddens 1984; fig. 1.1). This move is of crucial importance. Agency and structure can now be seen as mutually constitutive, and thus rather than agency being controlled by structure, structure becomes both *enabling* and *constraining* of agency, whilst simultaneously being maintained and transfigured through that agency. As Giddens puts it, 'the rules and resources drawn upon in the production of social action are at the same time the means of social reproduction' (1984, 19). Agency, here, is not the intentionality of people, but rather the ability to act at all, and specifically the ability to have acted differently (Giddens 1984, 9)[vii]. Giddens thus demonstrates the importance of the unintended consequences of actions to agency and structure (1984; Gardner 2004b, 6). Crucially Giddens differentiates between practical knowledge and discursive knowledge (1984, 4). That is knowledge of how to get along, that is largely unspoken, and knowledge that is regularly discussed and talked about. The lines between these

knowledges are certainly permeable, but it is in the former, Giddens argues (1984), the practical knowledge, that most of how we get along is contained.

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│         │      │  structure and   │      │           │
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
Figure 1.1: The duality of structure and agency (after Giddens 1984).

It is practical knowledge that underpins the second approach that is central to the archaeology of practice, that of Bourdieu's *habitus* (1977; 1990). It is important here to indicate that it is specifically the *habitus*, along with Bourdieu's (1990) rejection of the subject-object dualism that is germane here. Recent critiques of Bourdieu within archaeology have focused upon his concept of doxa (Silliman 2001; Smith 2001). Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* offers a way of combining conceptions of agency and being-in-the-world, within a historicised, bodily, way of moving. Best defined in Bourdieu's own words, *habitus* is

> systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in anyway being the product of

obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends, or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them, and being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor (Bourdieu 1990, 53).

Bourdieu demonstrates how the habitus is written through the body rather than merely being a series of actions. He points out that the body is shaped by the *habitus*, by the way people carry themselves, whether walking along looking at the floor or striding purposefully, with the head held high (Bourdieu 1990, 71). The *habitus* is thus also fundamentally historicised, and it offers a way of addressing practice that recognises the historical conditions that help to shape that practice, and in turn are shaped by it. The tempo of these practices is crucial to Bourdieu; the *habitus* informs one when to act, and the manner of that acting (Barrett 2001, 152). The *habitus* does not control what a person does, rather it guides their practices, much as structure, in Giddens' account (1984), is both constraining and enabling.

By combining the studies of Bourdieu (1977) and Giddens (1984), Barrett is able to focus the archaeological lens on to how 'by moving into the world, agents make both themselves and the social conditions of their time through their practices' (Barrett 2001, 157). The recognition of this also requires a radical realignment of how we view the archaeological material, and I will return to this below. These senses of practice and agency draw together considerations of intentional and unintentional consequences (both vital to the reproduction and transformation of structure and through that agency) and of practical and non-discursive thought.

Phenomenological and practice-based accounts have long been recognised as being compatible (e.g. Gosden 1994; Whittle 2003). Indeed both approaches recognise that no distinction can be made between body and mind or nature and culture (Thomas 1996; Barrett 2001, 156). They do differ, but rather than this offering a problem, I believe that a combination of their accounts can add to each other. Phenomenological thought gives us a dynamic insight into the conditions of being-in-the world, and moves us away from universalised and essentialist assumptions around rationalist, idealist or materialist philosophies. In contrast practice theory allows us to situate these beings within a world constituted largely through the practical actions of agents

who are capable of acting differently. Our research as archaeologists can now explore the constitution of both agents, as Dasein being-in-the-world, and their practices, which help to constitute, and are constituted by, structures, socialities and communities. Both Heidegger and Bourdieu stress the temporal nature of this existence, and that allows us to situate practice and *being* in time, with a past, present and future, and throws open important considerations of mood, memory and identity that I will discuss in later chapters. I shall now move on to see how notions of place, taskscape and landscape, developed through phenomenology, can help us to situate people within a socially contextualised world.

Place, landscape, taskscape, dwelling

One of the most powerful aspects of phenomenological approaches to archaeology is the way in which they have reconfigured notions of space, place and landscape. No longer merely a backdrop for action, once a perspective rooted in being-in-the-world is taken, place and landscape become integral to people's lives, the medium for action (Tilley 1994, 10). Tilley (1994; 2004) has discussed this approach drawing on the work of Merleau-Ponty (1962). In this section I shall examine this reconceptualisation of place and landscape, before turning to Tim Ingold, whose conception of taskscape (1993; 2000) also provides us with another challenging way of engaging with past people and past places.

Place, landscape, perception

Many of the aspects I have discussed above apply to the places people inhabit as much as to their bodies or socialities. The word place, here, is used following Tilley (1994, 11) to describe the specificity of a space. Places are intrinsically caught up in the relationships people have with them. They are not arbitrary locations but rather are constituted through the activities that take place there. They are not *imposed* locales in a landscape, a home, a place of work, or whatever. Rather they are produced through people's on-going acts of engagement with the worlds in which they dwell. A bedroom does not become a bedroom through a particular nomenclature, rather it does so through material culture and the act of sleeping repeatedly night after night in the same place. Places are therefore also temporal; they are constantly changing as new activities are performed there, or as they are altered, whether by the passing of time,

or by human agency (Tilley 2004, 12). The experience of place draws on all the senses, which come together to facilitate perception (Merleau-Ponty 1962). It is in this act of perception, in any case, that senses of place are formed, as Merleau-Ponty himself points out:

> I am the absolute source, my existence does not stem from my antecedents, from my physical and social environment; instead it moves out towards them and sustains them, for I alone bring it into being for myself (1962, ix),

The lived body is central for Merleau-Ponty[viii]; it is the seat of our experience. It is through our bodies that we do not merely occupy space but inhabit it and relate to it (D. Moran 2000, 424). It is thus through the body that people experience place, and it is this realisation that has allowed archaeologists like Tilley to offer powerful reconsiderations of Neolithic monuments, such as the Dorset Cursus (1994, 170-201, and see chapter 6). However, it is important to stress that place impacts back upon the person. The realisation that 'a humanised space forms both the medium and outcome of action' (Tilley 1994, 10) clearly links this phenomenological approach to Giddens' duality of structure. We can thus see that it is through embodied agency, undivorced from the world, that people make, and are made by, different places. When we consider how people make their world, therefore, it is essential we consider how places were formed and maintained and how, through people's bodily perception, these impacted upon how people behaved. As Ingold has pointed out, 'place owes its character to the experiences it affords to those who spend time there – to the sights, sounds and indeed smells that constitute its specific ambience. And these, in turn, depend on the kinds of activities in which its inhabitants engage' (2000, 192). It is also important, however, that we do not see places as somehow bounded off from the rest of the landscape, as somehow nodes in a network. Such understandings, Ingold has demonstrated, come from modern views of maps and movement (Ingold 2005a). Ingold contrasts *transport*, the modern experience of movement as a means to get from bounded place to bounded place, with *wayfaring*. Wayfaring, Ingold suggests, has more in common with traditional views of movement. Here the act of movement itself is of importance, and places are constituted through the intersection of movements bringing with them biographies, memories and emotions (fig. 1.2).

Figure 1.2: This represents the contrast between bounded places, as nodes in a network, and place being constituted through the intersection of multiple movements.

If these acts of perception and performance are constitutive of place then what of landscape? Landscape, Tilley argues (2004, 25), is constituted through places and bodies. Landscapes consist of locales that are linked together by routes through which people move. They are constituted through movement, through the bodily act of moving oneself from place to place down paths (Tilley 2004, 26)[ix]. Such actions are inherently temporal as Giddens (1984, 111) has demonstrated, through his use of Hägerstrand's time-geography (1976 inter alia). Movement in space is also, intrinsically, movement in time. Thus the act of inhabiting a landscape, of moving through a landscape, is a temporal event, just as the small-scale movements within a single locale are. These acts of movement are very important, as Wendy James has shown (2003). She points out how social life is choreographed (2003, 5). That is not to suggest that movement is controlled and preordained, but rather that it is not random. People's interactions on a daily basis flow from place to place in certain orders, and people carry themselves in certain ways whilst they do so. The metaphor of dance may seem initially overly artistic, but in fact this begins to get at how people constantly attend to the aesthetic side of life, and how that life is made up flows of movement, gestures, improvisation and guess work (Wendy James 2003, 91). This understanding of choreography further adds to our understandings of movement as constitutive of place, time and landscape; the three are drawn through the human body to give shape to the world. Movements carry multiple metaphors and messages from one locale to another, reinforcing or transforming how that place is experienced and understood.

Landscape, taskscape, dwelling

Ingold points out that a crucial aspect of landscape is its qualitative character (2000, 190). Whereas land can be measured, cut up and put out for sale, in the sense that it has gained under capitalism, such thinking contrasts directly with Ingold's use of the term landscape (2000). Landscape has also been compromised as a term through the Western tradition of landscape painting. Here landscapes are offered as the captured view of a single artist, whose paintings are then consumed by the spectator at a later date. They represent a curiously disembodied view of landscape that, as Ingold points out, suggests there is an imagined quality to landscape, a captured idealised view (2000, 191). Such a view draws once again on separations of mind and body and is thus unsustainable. Instead landscapes can only be experienced in embodied fashion, and in themselves are also inherently temporal, not only in the sense outlined above, that to move through a landscape takes time, but also that the shape and form of landscape embody temporality. The slowly re-growing clearing that tells of human action or lightning strike, or the paths cut across the fields that indicate the repeated movement of animals or people, are examples of how landscape itself is temporal.

The intersection of landscape and temporality is central to Ingold's crucial notion of taskscape. For Ingold, the taskscape is the situated practice of activities through a landscape, and the sum of all those tasks (2000, 195). Landscape, in turn, is taskscape embodied (Ingold 2000, 198). Through these practices people attend to the affordances of the landscape and to each other and in doing so come to dwell through their worlds. The landscape, Ingold potently argues, is 'the congealed form of the taskscape' (2000, 199). That is to say that landscape takes its form *through* the way in which people dwell. People do not inscribe the taskscape on to the landscape, but rather people, landscape and taskscape are created together, through the act of dwelling, and all three are permanently under construction (Ingold 2000, 199). Landscape is perceived by spectators, while the taskscape is engaged with by participants (Ingold 2000, 196). Taskscape, Ingold potently argues, is not what you can see but what you can hear (2000, 199). Following Merleau-Ponty (1962) this reaffirms the need to consider all the senses when engaging with landscapes; the sounds of animals and birds, the smells of different parts of the landscape and the different textures both underfoot and underhand (Cummings and Whittle 2004, 8).

Dwelling neatly brings together the phenomenological side of the argument I have laid out so far in this chapter. To dwell, as Ingold argues, is the very process of being-in-the-world (2000, 173). This way of phrasing a concept we have already encountered helps to marry together notions of place, person and landscape. The fundamentally temporal existence of people means that process is more important than form (Ingold 2000, 173). That is to say that people do not impose particular forms on to the world, because whether they exist in people's heads those designs are still always within that world. We do not then build a house in order to dwell within it, but, as Heidegger points out, 'to build is already to dwell' (1971, 146 cited in Ingold 2000, 186). People dwell through a landscape which they understand and experience through that act of dwelling, just as people come to understand space and place by dwelling there, shaping it and in turn being shaped by it. Dwelling captures the intimate relationship between people and their world (Cummings and Whittle 2004, 13). The spread of tasks, temporally and spatially, shape and are shaped by the landscape, together constituting its form, which is always a palimpsest of past actions, present possibilities and future expectations. People attend to the affordances of the world around them (Gibson 1979; Ingold 2000). That is to say, through dwelling people become skilful at attending to the rhythms and tempos of their world, and the opportunities this affords them.

The dwelling perspective has been brilliantly applied by Mark Harris in his study of an Amazonian peasant village (1998; 2000). Harris draws on the dwelling perspective to engage with the mutual interlocking of mood, seasonality and sociality in a landscape that radically changes from dry season to wet season, with a change in water level up to ten metres. The change in water levels produces a radically different taskscape. In the dry season people catch fish in large numbers in the reduced waters. This is a time of abundance where parties, or festas, are a regular occurrence, the mood is high and sociable sociality is constantly emphasised through the regular gatherings that take place, and the ease of walking from house to house (M. Harris 2000, 131)[x]. It is a time where communities can be together and courting takes place. The wet season by contrast requires that people move everywhere by boat, and most people feel trapped within their houses into which the water may flow, bringing snakes and other unpleasant companions (M. Harris 2000, 133). Food is much scarcer and fish are caught on single lines in much smaller numbers. Seasonality is thus

crucial to taskscape, landscape and the rhythms of people's socialities. It is important to note, however, that it is not that sociality is constituted purely by seasonality. The resonance between the activities that take place and the variations in water levels show that 'the periodicity of these activities that make up social life can therefore be said to be intrinsic and to constitute seasonality rather than being merely expressive of it' (M. Harris 2000, 126). People attend to their environment; they monitor changes in fish or in birds to inform them of the approaching change in seasons (M. Harris 2000, 133). People here dwell skilfully within a landscape where environmental and social changes are not opposed to one another but rather caught up in the constitution of mood, sociality and seasonality.

But what of things in all of this? How can we access dwelling, being-in-the-world and agency, let alone memory and emotion, from the actual material that archaeologists uncover? This question in itself is misleading, I would argue, and in order to demonstrate why it is necessary to turn to materiality, and to return to the work of John Barrett who posits a radically different way of engaging with archaeological material.

The material conditions of life, or how to understand *things*

The dominant model for many years in archaeology has been that of the archaeological record (Patrick 1985; Barrett 2000b [1988]). Over the last 20 years, however, this has come in for sustained critique, particularly from Barrett (e.g. 2000b [1988]; see also Hamilakis 1999, 69). Barrett argues that the concept of the record immediately prevents us reaching an adequate understanding of the past (2001). By seeing the archaeological material as a record, whether of past practices or past processes, it is immediately separated from the conditions that brought that material into existence (Barrett 2000b [1988]). Instead Barrett argues that we should see the things archaeologists remove from the ground, and the architectures they uncover, as the material conditions of life (Barrett 1994, 169; Bourdieu 1990, 79). Life is lived through these conditions, and is both constituted by them and in turn constitutes them. The material conditions, in other words, exist in a duality with life, or if you will, agency. Here we can see Barrett drawing on the influences of both Giddens and Bourdieu. The task of archaeologists, therefore, is not to search for agency in the

material. The question posed in the previous section of how we *access* agency in the archaeological material, is a misnomer, because agency is always inherent within that material. As Barrett points out:

> those who claim the study of agency through archaeology to be 'impossible' because they are unable to 'see' agency in the material are disarmed simply because the study of agency does not adhere for its validation to such a theory of representation (Barrett 2000a, 63).

This quotation is of central importance. It is my contention that one can replace the word agency here with any of the chosen subjects of this thesis, emotion, memory or identity, and the central meaning of the quotation remains. It is this single recognition that transforms archaeology from a subject struggling to detect change in the archaeological record to one involved in the interpretation and exploration of the meanings, feelings and beliefs of people and their actions in the past. The purpose of archaeology is thus to explore the material conditions of life, and to create engagements with materiality that set out possible ways in which life may have been lived. Materiality here acts as structure, in Giddens' sense of the word (1984). It acts as both the enabler and constrainer of practice, both in the past and present; indeed it is the very act of engagement with those material conditions that allows archaeologists to explore how past lives may have been led.

If this provides a way of engaging with the material which archaeologists encounter that is satisfactory, I still have not considered how objects may have been understood and experienced in the past. In order to do so I will need to return to considerations of dwelling, and the role within that for meaning.

Dwelling and meaning

It is through dwelling, as Thomas points out, that we find ourselves embedded in a world which includes objects (2004, 59). Meaning is always present in these objects. It is not something added to them, a superficial understanding separate from their 'real' material properties (Thomas 2004, 42). Rather we are better off recognising the world as being meaningful 'all the way down' (Thomas 2004, 41). To deny the primacy of meaning is to return to an approach in which subjective gloss is added to

objective fact. It is to return to the very place we are trying to escape from: rigid Cartesian dualisms. This does not mean that meaning is pre-given, however. Rather it is in having meaning that we come to notice objects; it is meaning that makes them stand out (Thomas 2004). A similar consideration of meaning and landscape is possible; it is not the case that places have meanings added to them as people live there, but rather that space becomes place through the emergence of meaning. Such meanings may of course grow, swell, change or evaporate, but they are always there; they are fundamental to place, just as they are to objects. If all meaning were entirely removed, the place would literally cease to exist. Places and objects announce themselves to the world; they are disclosed to us through their meaning (Thomas 2004, 216). As Thomas has recently argued, it is the meaningful nature of experience that defines us as human beings, not an abstracted notion of mind or soul (2004). It is this inevitable encounter with meaning that returns us to the interpretive nature of *being*, and with it to the work of Heidegger (D. Moran 2000, 234).

Heidegger points out that abstract meaning of an object may not always be at the forefront of a person's mind. He makes a distinction between present-at-hand and ready-at-hand (Heidegger 1967, 67, 98; see also chapter 4). Ready-at-hand describes the state in which we find objects when their meaning slips away. Thus, in Heidegger's classic example, when I am using a hammer I no longer think of the hammer itself but rather of the act of hammering (1967, 98). It is not that meaning is absent from this account, but rather that the meaning is caught up in the action and engagement with the world, rather than with the abstract notion of a hammer. Should the hammer break, however, I would begin to consider the object, the hammer, in its own right (Thomas 1996, 68). Here the object might be thought of as present-at-hand (Heidegger 1967, 67). It is this mode of engagement that we might think as being at the root of scientific explanations, where the object is considered as a thing in itself, and not tied into a relationally constituted world (Thomas 2004). Nevertheless it is in the state of ready-at-hand that the world shows itself to us most of the time[xi].

Within this distinction, it is worth remembering the importance of touch in the way that people come to know and understand their materialities (Cummings 2002; Irigaray 1985; Tilley 2004). The reflexivity of touch, that in touching something it touches you, connects people and objects together (Tilley 2004, 17). It creates a direct

relationship between the material and the person, one in which emotions and memories may be deeply entwined (see chapters 3 and 4). This point reminds us that objects, like places[xii], are experienced through all the senses, and not just through sight, as is so often presumed. Equally this returns us to the central fact that meaning is not located within objects, waiting to be discovered, but emerges through the fields and relations in which it is enmeshed (Thomas 1996, 88). Equally for archaeologists, meaning rests not in the disembodied objectified view from the laboratory, but from the aesthetic, poetic and emotional exploration of the material conditions of past existences (Barrett 1994; Pearson and Shanks 2001; Thomas 2004).

This engagement with the meaning of objects, the way they show up to us, and the way in which they are embroiled, physically, in our lives, raises another question. If objects affect people, condition the world for their future experiences and change people through their on-going relationships with them, to what extent can objects be accorded agency?

The agency of objects

In a recent paper Chris Gosden has argued that we need to take into account the agency of objects (2005; cf. Gell 1998). Gosden suggests that artefacts 'work beyond human control' and thus can be considered to have agency (2005, 195). Objects act, he maintains, in a way that does not merely follow human intentions but rather acts to focus them (Gosden 2005, 195). Thus objects can be seen to have agency. We might expand this and think about the ways that animals, even landscapes, also have agency (Sillar 2004). Such a position fundamentally rests upon how one defines agency. Is it the capacity to affect people? Is it the capacity to take a position within a field of social relations? Or is it the capacity to have acted differently? It is this latter position that is suggested by Giddens (1984, 9). In attributing agency to objects, one could argue that Gosden ignores the role of structure. As we saw above, structure is both the constrainer and enabler of action. Thus structures affect what people do and exist outside of any notion of the individual. Gosden argues that the form of objects impacts on the sensory and emotional fields of those who use them, and this is correct (2005, 193). It is not only the form of the objects that does this, however, but the very processes of production, consumption and destruction in which the object is caught up. Equally it is certainly the case that objects are fundamentally relational, that is

their meanings and effects are produced through relationships between things, people and places. Are objects thus part of an active structure, rather than possessing agency?

On the other hand, however, we have seen a recent call in archaeology to put 'things first' (Williams 2005) and for the study of 'a symmetrical archaeology' (Olsen 2005). These arguments suggest that archaeology should not, as a discipline, privilege the social over the material, or impose further dichotomies between human and non-human.

Figure 1.3: A Beaker pot. In chapter 7 I argue that Beakers represent one type of agent in Late Neolithic and Early Bronze Age Dorset (www 1).

I want to argue here that whilst we should accord agency to objects, sites and landscapes, the kinds of agency they have are different to that of human beings. Landscapes affect the way people act within them, objects affect people emotionally and animals can be constitutive of sociality. Human beings meanwhile have a

different kind of agency that flows from language, from care, and from a concern with being-in-the-world (Heidegger 1967, 32). Agency is not a possession held by objects, or by people for that matter (Gardner 2004b, 10). Instead it is a potential for action, for affect, which can be constituted through relationships between all sorts of things, be they people, groups, landscapes, objects, social institutions or animals. The kinds of agency which each of these things can access or draw upon will be different. We can think of multiple agencies being at play, all of which are locked in reflexive relationships with each other, each both constraining and enabling the other. In effect this is no different from dualities of agency and structure. What it recognises, crucially, is that we should not privilege one side of the duality (human beings) with active potential, or agency.

This chapter has briefly outlined the position from which this thesis will be written. The understandings of agency and dwelling set out so far have been offered relatively uncritically. Whilst it is certainly the case that the above position offers the philosophical, sociological, anthropological and archaeological basis from which this thesis will be written, these ideas should not be accepted blindly. There are difficulties both with the thought on which such ideas are based, and in the ways in which they have been applied to archaeology. In this section I want to briefly set out the criticisms I see as particularly relevant, alongside my response to them. The need for a more critical consideration of identity, memory and emotion will emerge from this critique, and that will form the subject of the following chapters.

Agency and dwelling: a brief critique

A number of the principal critiques offered of either dwelling- or practice-based approaches can be dealt with simply by combining the two. For example, it is certainly the case that Heidegger's work focuses mainly on the role of Dasein and less on the world and social relations in which it is enmeshed (Gosden 1994, 114). Yet the compatibility of this thought with that of Bourdieu and Giddens can see this easily overcome. It has also been argued that Bourdieu, despite his attempts to do so, fails to really escape the subject/object dichotomy (R. Jenkins 2002, 91). Yet this again can be surpassed when we situate Bourdieu's concepts of *habitus* and the body within a view of the world that absolutely rejects dichotomies of subject and object and mind

and body. Yet there are more substantial criticisms of these approaches, the most significant of which is that they fail to deal with the performative nature of identity, and the socially contextual nature of personhood.

Universal agents?

Joanna Brück has argued powerfully that the failure of practice- and dwelling-based approaches to deal with the unstable nature of identity, body and personhood, effectively genders people in power in the past as male (2001, 651; c.f. Gero 2000, 35). More than this, she argues, such approaches thrust a particular conception of what it is to be a person into the past and thereby universalise it (Brück 2001, 652). In effect whether conceived as agents, or as people being-in-the-world, the persons of the past too often emerge either as powerful, dominant and bounded individuals, effectively gendered as male, or as dominated, subjugated but still bounded bodies, effectively gendered as female. Archaeologists writing from these perspectives have failed to engage with complex notions of age, gender and identity (but see Thomas 2004). The possibilities for action which they offer tend to be those that would be available to certain people in our own time. These people are able-bodied and middle-aged men. They are not the young, the old or the infirm, and they do not show an awareness of the unstable nature of both gender *and* sex (Butler 1993). As Rosemary Joyce has pointed out, archaeologists:

> either explicitly posit specifically situated subjects or they risk implicitly assuming an undifferentiated subject who tends to approximate to the self-contained, rational, implicitly masculine individual of modern social theory (2004, 82).

Brück locates this failure within archaeologists' unwillingness to let go of the subject/object dualism (2001, 663). This may be true, in which case the fault in that case lies with the particular practitioners. Rather I would locate the fault more in the failure of Bourdieu, Giddens, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to offer a suitably complex view of the nature of identity (Grosz 1994, 86-111; McNay 2000). This is not, I believe, reason to abandon these perspectives. Instead it is necessary to develop these approaches by identifying and developing views of identity compatible with this perspective, which offer us an understanding of the embodied person (Joyce 2004,

85). As Brück argues, we need to consider 'the range of social identities that existed' (2001, 663). Such work is already underway in archaeology (e.g. Fowler 2000; 2004; O. Harris 2003; 2005; Joyce 2004; Perry and Joyce 2001; Whittle 2003; 2005), and it forms the focus of the next chapter. Such developments will allow Brück's (2001) powerful criticisms to be met, whilst the insights of agency and dwelling are maintained.

The dominance of the dramatic

It is also the case that archaeologists who have begun working from positions of dwelling and practice have also largely concentrated on the spectacular and special rather than the quotidian and the mundane (e.g. Barrett 1994; Tilley 1994; Thomas 1996). This, admittedly, is part of a wider approach to archaeology, and the Neolithic in particular, which has privileged the monumental over the day-to-day. The absence of the quotidian is particularly surprising from these archaeologists as the thinkers who are drawn upon by Barrett, Tilley and Thomas all emphasise the importance of daily life (e.g. Bourdieu 1990; Giddens 1984, 35, 69; Heidegger 1967, 38). The dramatic nature of Neolithic monuments no doubt draws the gaze away from day-to-day practice, yet this, as has been repeatedly stressed, forms perhaps *the* crucial part of people's engagements with the world (de Certeau 1984; J. Moran 2003; Highmore 2002). More than this, social life in itself can be dramatic in quality, featuring staged performances, as Thomas Gregor has demonstrated in his elegant study of the Mehinaku (1977). We should not oppose daily life and ritual (cf. Bradley 2005), but rather recognise that aspects of daily life may be ritual-like in quality, and that some rituals in turn may be daily events. Notions of the choreography of social life, which I have already touched upon, can help to develop these understandings, as can a consideration of *conviviality* (Overing and Passes 2000a), a subject I will return to in detail in chapter 3. The absence of the quotidian does not, therefore, require a radical rethink of the basis of our approach, as daily life is in fact already deeply implicated within it. Rather it is the case for ensuring that this emerges in the case-studies, and takes its rightful place at the heart of our understanding about the past (O. Harris forthcoming).

Emotion and memory

It is certainly the case that neither emotion nor memory has been approached in adequate detail in the archaeological literature up to this point. Whilst emotion has rarely been considered (but see Gosden 2005; Tarlow 2000), memory is usually treated rather circumspectly, with only passing reference being made to social memory, often by drawing on the work of Paul Connerton (1989; e.g. Bradley 2002). From the perspectives of dwelling and agency, emotion is treated either from Heidegger's conception of being delivered over to one's mood (e.g. Thomas 2004, 188), or is mentioned in passing and then forgotten (e.g. Tilley 2004, 25). Neither of these is acceptable. Until we begin to offer complex, socially contextual understandings of both memory *and* emotion, our explorations of past material conditions will inevitably fall short. If we are to offer an archaeology that challenges us to think again about what it means to be human, which encourages us to explore the past in ways which are as complete as possible, we must include emotion and memory within our accounts. Indeed, the interaction of memory, identity and emotion is such that a full understanding of one is impossible without considering their interplay (Seremetakis 1991; see chapter 4). People do not experience the world in the broken down form that we, as archaeologists, use to structure our accounts. Memory, emotion, identity, and agency are all caught up in our being-in-the-world, in the seamless and temporal existence of Dasein. These important discussions will be expanded upon in chapters 3 and 4 to present an account both of the importance of memory and emotion, and also how we can begin to situate them within our accounts of dwelling and practice.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have offered a brief outline of the most promising and powerful trends in current archaeological theory. The perspectives of dwelling and practice offer a real opportunity to move away from dualisms of nature and culture, mind and body, and to situate people within, rather than outside, the world. Whilst conceptions of dwelling and phenomenology offer a radical reconsideration of place and what it is to be human, so theories of agency and practice situate the person within complex networks of understanding and knowledge. The improvised feel for the game, implied by the *habitus*, allows us to situate real human action within a point of view that

recognises that human beings are not external to nature, or somehow a victim of it either. The understandings of agency situate people at the heart of archaeology, and focus our attention on the possibilities for action that existed in the past. Both dwelling and practice demand that we attend to the ways in which meaning emerges through the relationships which people had with the world, each other, and the material conditions of life. In the next three chapters I shall develop this perspective through considerations of identity, memory and emotion, so that the powerful insights of dwelling and practice can be maintained, and accusations of essentialism overcome.

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[i] Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty represent of course only two of the many philosophers of phenomenological bent. Perhaps beginning with Franz Brentano and through him to Edmond Husserl, it has like most 'schools' of thought maintained a varied and distinctive output. Philosophers such as Hans-Goerg Gadamer, Jean-Paul Sartre and even Jacques Derrida have been included within the phenomenological canon (e.g. D. Moran 2000). Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, however, certainly represent the two who have had the greatest impact on archaeology (e.g. Thomas 1996; Tilley 2004).

[ii] I include Ingold for discussion here because his ideas have been particularly influential in archaeology, and a consideration of the dwelling perspective would be impossible without his work.

[iii] It should not be presumed that my glossing of these positions under the term dwelling is indicative of any unanimity amongst the various writers, as recent articles have clearly shown (e.g. Ingold 2005b)!

[iv] There is little space here for the discussion around Heidegger's Nazi affiliations and whether that should preclude us from considering his thought. Suffice it to say that his thought, like all others, must be considered stringently and examined for fascist or racist overtones. It is also clear that those aspects of Heidegger's thought that most obviously appeal to fascism (his concepts of heroes, and authentic and inauthentic ways to be) are those least useful to archaeology (for a fuller debate of this issue see Thomas 1996, 1-11).

[v] These include attempts to cast agency as the actions of rational individuals (Cowgill 2000), or as part of evolutionary models (Hayden 1995; Shennan 2004).

[vi] Another version of agency will emerge in my consideration of Judith Butler's work (e.g. 1993) in the next chapter.

[vii] I will return to this conception of agency when I consider the agency of objects later in the chapter.

[viii] Although Merleau-Ponty's approach has proved useful it has also been criticised by feminists for offering a universalised image of the body (e.g. Grosz 1994). I will return to Merleau-Ponty and the body in the next chapter.

[ix] Andrew Fleming has been highly critical of phenomenological approaches to landscape archaeology (1999; 2005). He suggests that such approaches are insufficiently rigorous and cannot be checked, or tested, in clear-cut ways (Fleming 2005). His criticisms entirely miss the point of phenomenology, however, and seem to call for a return to observable and repeatable 'experiments' of processual thought. The enormous problems with such arguments have been set out over the last 20 years and do not require repeating here (e.g. Hodder 1982; Shanks and Tilley 1987; 1992; Thomas 2004).

[x] Bourdieu has made similar points on seasonality and mood in reference to the coming of spring in the Kabyle village (1977; 1990).

[xi] This distinction is perhaps equivalent to that between discursive and practical knowledge drawn by Giddens (1984). The concept of ready-at-hand and practical knowledge are also inherent in Ingold's notion of skill (2000, chapter 19).

[xii] The comparison between objects and places should not be seen as a statement of their equivalence. The manipulability of objects, that they can be handled, examined, turned around and engaged with directly (cf. D. Bailey 2005) differentiates them in many ways from places. Yet in both cases meanings are engaged through on-going relations entwined in the experience of being-in-the-world.

Chapter 2: Identity, embodiment and performative practice

Introduction

The twin perspectives of dwelling and practice offer us an excellent platform from which to approach the past. These perspectives, however, tend to leave the people of the past as faceless, unspecified and undifferentiated (Brück 1998; 2001; Whittle 2003). This is not a side issue. The failure of these approaches to engage with the specificities of gender, identity and personhood tends to cast the people of the past in the role of the classic Western subject: active, white, heterosexual and male[i]. Yet even as it does so the perspectives of dwelling and agency offer us some of the tools required to transcend these difficulties and engage more proactively in the theorising of past identities. The work of Bourdieu (1990) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) insists that we concentrate on the body, or more accurately on the experience of embodiment. Bourdieu's work shows us how bodies can be shaped through engagement with the *habitus* (1990, 71), whilst Merleau-Ponty reveals the inescapable nature of embodiment, and demonstrates its centrality to any perspective taken up in the world (1962). The body, and particularly the process of embodiment, has recently become a subject of debate within archaeology (e.g. Hamilakis *et al.* 2002). As Bryan Turner has pointed out, concentrating on embodiment, rather than the body, moves us away from considering a reified and alienated thing, towards the making of, and doing the work of, bodies (1996, xiii). Thus rather than treating the body as a biological fact, a consequence of our genetic code, recent approaches have focused upon the body (not separated from mind) as the centre of experience (e.g. Tilley 1994; 2004), or the body as a system of signs or as the source of a symbolic code (e.g. Yates 1990). More latterly the body has been interpreted as the locus of a series of performative citations, the material result of the reiteration of gendered, regulatory ideals (e.g. Fowler 2000; O. Harris 2005; Joyce 2004).

In this chapter I want to put forward a perspective that whilst consistent with the arguments of dwelling and practice, develops this position. I will begin by briefly examining the notion of identity, and the role of embodiment within this. Such an understanding will necessarily challenge many of our preconceptions about bodies, sex and gender. Western notions of male and female are culturally specific

(Nordbladh and Yates 1990), rather than biological absolutes, and this argument will be enhanced by a brief examination of some of the multitudinous forms of gender that exist amongst both Western and non-Western groups. I will then turn to the work of Judith Butler to set out an alternative view of gender as the materialisation of bodies through iterative and performative citations of regulatory fictions (1990; 1993; 2004). Butler's ideas form the basis of a new understanding of gender that is already having powerful consequences in archaeology (e.g. Fowler 2000; 2002; O. Harris 2005; Joyce 2004; Perry and Joyce 2001). It will be argued, however, that Butler's work lacks a dynamic sense of agency (Holland *et al.* 1998; McNay 1999; 2000), and thus needs to be situated within the practice-based understandings outlined in chapter 1. This will allow me to put forward the notion of *performative practice* that I have developed elsewhere (O. Harris 2003; 2005; cf. Bourdieu 1990, 92). Having brought the discussion of gender to a close I will then move on to consider two other aspects of identity: age and personhood. The former involves both a discussion of the lifecourse (Sofaer Derevenski 2000a) and of childhood, another area that gets less archaeological attention than it should (but see O. Harris forthcoming; Pawleta 2004). This will allow me to set out phenomenological and historicised views on child cognition that have been developed in anthropology, notably by Christina Toren (1993; 1999; 2001; 2004). Finally the chapter will examine the importance of personhood to archaeological understandings of the past (Fowler 2004).

Identity and embodiment

Identity

The term identity best encapsulates the areas I wish to engage with in this chapter, those of gender, sex, age and personhood[ii], yet it is not a term that one can use unproblematically (Hall 2000, 15). The notion of having an identity can be seen as a finished, unmoving, sense of self. In Western society identity is often seen both as integral and original; it is who you are and there is no getting away from it (Hall 2000, 15). Instead I want to argue in this chapter that identities are contextual, provisional and open-ended (Cavallaro 2001, 82). They are unstable and constructed through difference, rather than actually being about what people have in common (Hall 2000, 17; Redman 2000, 10). Identity can be conceived as being formed by the convergence

of multiple pathways of gender, sexuality, race, age, and personhood. Yet each of these areas has its own contextual history within which any act of self-formation must be situated. Michel Foucault (1977; 1978) has shown how modern Western identities have been formed through various discourses that sprung up from the 18th century onwards. Whether it be through the building of prisons, hospitals, asylums, or schools, or through the construction of a sexuality that delimitated those areas of pleasure that were acceptable, many of the areas of identity we take for granted today are the consequence of the imposition of particular disciplinary regimes upon the body (Foucault 1973; 1977; 1978; B. Turner 1996, 13). Notions of who is sane and who is insane, who is male and who is female, are not fixed facts of nature, but rather contextual practices produced through discourse. Indeed more than this, discourses around sanity, gender or sexuality are in themselves historical. These practices then act to obscure the relations that produced them, casting themselves as their own point of origin (Foucault 1970, xiv). As Holland *et al.* point out, 'what we call identities remain dependent upon social relations and material conditions' (1998, 189). Identity, rather than an absolute attribute of the self, can thus rather be seen as a series of positions that a subject takes up and constitutes through her lifetime (Hall 2000, 19).

This begins to form the basis of an argument that rejects an essentialist view of human identity. Foucault views the subject as constituted entirely within the discursive practices of disciplinary regimes and the repeated performances of 'technologies of the self' (Redman 2000, 10). This point is essential. If subjects, and therefore identities, are created through discourse, then they must be produced through historically constituted acts of performance; through conditions, and at moments, that are unique (Hall 2000, 17). This makes identity an historically constituted creation and different across both time and space. This conception of identity is thus far from an essentialist trans-historical human nature[iii]. Instead identity is now a process, always under construction, a strategic and positional concept (Hall 2000, 17). Foucault's ideas around identity, gender and sexuality are intimately caught up in knowledge and power. He himself points out that sexuality, for example, is a

> historical construct ... a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances,

are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power (Foucault 1978, 105-6).

A crucial lacuna in Foucault's work is the lack of a serious consideration of embodiment (T. Turner 1994, 28), perhaps best defined as the process through which being and bodies are produced together. That is the way in which discourse, identity and power are caught up in the very corporeality of life. The notion of embodiment steers us away from examining the creation of identity purely as a conceptual notion. The phenomenological approaches examined in the last chapter show how the distinctions between mind and body, and between idealist and materialist philosophies, are deeply problematic. So when studying identity it is necessary to examine both how identities are produced through discourse and how identities are produced through embodiment. These are not two separate processes, but rather two aspects of the same process, the process by which people come to dwell within their worlds. Discourse and embodiment can thus become 'dialectical partners' in the words of Thomas Csordas (1994, 12), much as dwelling and agency were in the first chapter.

Embodiment

In the absence of a distinction between nature and culture, many of the archetypal views of the body become impossible to maintain. If there is no mind/body duality, how can minds be cultural and bodies natural? As Elizabeth Grosz has argued, 'bodies cannot be adequately understood as ahistorical, precultural, or natural objects in any simple way' (1994, x). The very processes that have come to define bodies as natural are those that form the very notion of nature itself. They are also the same processes that contrast fatherhood, maleness, culture and rationality with motherhood, femaleness, nature and emotion (Haraway 1991, 135). They are in other words part of the very discourse that produces, and crucially reifies, phallocentric, heterosexist, misogyny (Butler 2004, 43). It is the same schema that makes men subjects and women objects, and that thus renders women's bodies as suitable for study (Grosz 1994, 4). Previous studies of embodiment, including the work of Merleau-Ponty (1962), have effectively privileged male bodies and male sexualities as the seat of experience, and ignored the specificities of particular historical and socially contextualised bodies (Grosz 1994).

The realisation that bodies and embodiment are produced through specific historical and social circumstances emphasises the need both for bodies, and the circumstances of their being, to be a focus of archaeological research (Hamilakis *et al.* 2002). The typical view of the body in the West today is of a bounded, sexed, individual. Yet such a view misses much of the ways in which bodies are porous, with substances flowing in and out (Deleuze and Guattari 1988). Elizabeth Grosz has argued that the body, with its ability to stretch over time through memory and expectations, allows connections to be formed between other bodies, both human and non-human. Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari, she argues that the body can be seen as flows of differing intensities – flows of emotion, substance, sexual contact – that link one body to another (Grosz 1994, 165). Deleuze and Guattari argue that the body is a site of possibilities (1988, 74). These possibilities are produced and curtailed through the structures in which a body is enmeshed. These structures are caught up within broader discourses and are written through the body, inside and out[iv], not by that discourse, as though discourse itself were an agent, but by the ways that bodies shape and surface themselves in order to meet, or to subvert, certain expectations through practice (Taylor 2005)[v]. Within different contexts, or fields to use Bourdieu's term (1990), different aspects of these bodies come to the fore (Holland *et al.* 1998, 41).

Bodies are thus not fixed and permanent. The body cannot be separated from the social and historical figured worlds in which it is enmeshed (Holland *et al.* 1998, 45). Different fields allow different positional identities to be cited, allow different aspects of identity to surface on the body. The process of embodiment, which inevitably is the process of being-in-the-world (see chapter 1), connects bodies together along the perspectives of sight, smell, hearing, taste and, crucially, touch (Irigaray 1985). Although vision is the sense that has often been privileged, Luce Irigaray (1985) has argued that it is actually touch that is central to the body's engagement with the world around it. The traditional view of bounded bodies, always effectively gendered as male[vi], is the particular view generated by the discourses of late capitalism (Deleuze and Guattari 1988). It is within this perspective that the possessive gaze is valued so highly and other senses undermined (Irigaray 1985; cf. Merleau-Ponty 1962).

Grosz (1994) shows how radically different conceptions exist that undermine mainstream views of bodies as the natural outcome of biological and genetic

processes. Where does this leave some of the most basic assumptions we have about the human body? One such assumption held in the West is about the irreducible nature of the sexed body (Nordbladh and Yates 1990; Fowler 2000). Within the social sciences the idea that gender represents the cultural interpretation of sex is a widely held point of view; indeed it has been since Simone de Beauvoir famously argued that 'one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman' (de Beauvoir [1949] 1972, 295). Such work is supported by the widely documented occurrences of multiple genders in different societies around the world. Yet writers such as Donna Haraway (1991) and Judith Butler (1993) have demonstrated that such a distinction rests once again upon the Cartesian duality of nature versus culture. In the next section I will give several examples of the variation in genders that have been recorded, in order to demonstrate that gender is certainly not a simplistic category. I will then return to the split between sex and gender to show that sex too emerges as part of our historically situated being in the world, and is not an absolute consequence of our biology.

Destabilising gender, destabilising sex

'For us there are, not one or two sexes, but many (cf. Guattari/Deleuze), as many sexes as there are individuals' (Wittig 1979, 119).

Multiple genders

Anthropology has challenged the notion that all societies only recognise two genders, male and female (Herdt 1996a)[vii]. Within the West too this notion is now under challenge from transsexual and transgendered peoples (Bolin 1996; Butler 2004; Petra Ramet 1996). Amongst some groups there have been people identified as third gender, or fourth. Indeed Jacobs and Cromwell (1992) identify up to ten genders amongst the Chukchi of Siberia. These acts of gender variance may have been permanent, involving genital alteration or removal (Nanda 1999), or more temporary, a gender taken up during adolescence that might be moved away from later, such as the *xanith* of Oman (Bolin 1996). There is certainly insufficient space here to do more than list many of the multiple genders recognised around the world but they include the *xanith* of Oman (Petra Ramet 1996; Wikan 1977), the *māhū* of Tahiti (Besnier 1996), the sworn virgins of the Balkans (Grémaux 1996), the *hijra* of India (Nanda

1999), the two-spirits of Native America (Holliman 1997; 2000; Lang 1996; Roscoe 1996), and the shamans of Siberia (Mandlestam Balzer 1996; Jacobs and Cromwell 1992). This is by no means an exhaustive list but it begins to demonstrate the geographical spread of multi-gendered groups. There is also much evidence to suggest that third gender groups would often not have been recognised by early anthropologists, or where they were they were often dismissed as homosexuals or perverts (Herdt 1996b, 23). The evidence for the abuse and persecution of Native American two-spirits also suggests that where other third or fourth genders existed, they may have attempted to disguise themselves from Western eyes (Holliman 1997). In order to provide further context, I will now turn to examine three of these gendered groups in more detail: the *hijra*, the two-spirits, and the shamans from Siberia.

The hijra

The *hijra* are an institutional third gender, who reside principally in Northern India (Nanda 1999, ix, xviii). Although their numbers are unclear, Serena Nanda estimates there may be 50,000 or so *hijra* (1999, 38). Estimates vary widely, however, and some have placed the number significantly higher than this. The *hijra* are defined as being *neither* male *nor* female, and true *hijra* are those who were born male, in the Western sense, but have been emasculated during an operation conducted by another *hijra*, the *dai ma*, or midwife (Nanda 1999). *Hijra* dress as women before and after the operation (Nanda 1999). Although not all *hijra* have undergone the emasculation operation, it is an important aspect of their lives, and a crucial moment where they become true *hijra*. The *hijra* often include hermaphrodites, or those men who have become impotent. The crucial definition of a *hijra* is thus not the presence of absence of a penis, but the ability to reproduce. Male homosexuals are thus *not* classified as *hijra* as they maintain the physical capability to reproduce.

The *hijra* take up a number of roles within Indian society. Traditionally their role has been to perform ritual dances on auspicious occasions, such as at weddings, or at the birth of a boy. These performances are crucial as they instil fertility within both the married couple and the male child (Nanda 1999, 3). The *hijra* performances are full of bawdy, exaggerated female sexuality, actions that are seen as comical, not least because they are the very antithesis of how Indians expect women to behave (Nanda 1999, 19). Many, perhaps the majority of *hijra*, also work as prostitutes, servicing

male clients (Nanda 1999, 10). This is true also of many of the *hijra* who have married men. It is interesting to note that some *hijra* invest huge emotional attachments to ideas of romantic love. This is not a strictly female attribute as it might be seen in the West; it would be deemed inappropriate in a Hindu woman. Instead these notions are drawn from other cultural sources such as Bollywood films (Nanda 1999). The point here is that the *hijra* are not withdrawn from sexual or romantic encounters, and they are fiercely jealous of their husbands and boyfriends.

The *hijra* thus play a unique role within Indian society. They are not a uniform group by any means; like any gender they consist of people from many different backgrounds. Crucially they are defined by their inability to reproduce, and thus include some people who were assigned the female sex at birth but later discovered to be intersexed[viii], and thus unable to reproduce. These people can then become *hijra*. The process of becoming hijra is a gradual one (Nanda 1999, 117). It is not something to which people are assigned automatically but rather it involves a growing recognition of one's role, usually around the age of 12, the seeking out of a guru, and eventually the emasculation operation. The *hijra* form a genuine third gender, and force us to question the way in which our sexing of people in the past places them universally within either male or female positions.

Two-spirits

The term two-spirit covers a wide range of gendered roles in various Native American societies. Usually it refers in the broadest sense to men (in the Western sense) who come to dress and act like women. There are also some cases of the reverse being true, although this is significantly less well documented (Blackwood 1984, 39). Amongst the Mohave for example women who dressed as men were known as *alyha* and men who dressed as women as *hwame* (Lang 1996, 191). Amongst other groups the same name applied to both, however. The degree to which they might take up the role of the opposite sex varied. In some cases it might involve a total adoption of their roles, including the mimicking of pregnancy and menstruation, such as amongst the Navajo (Lang 1996, 188). In others it was more partial. Crucially role was central to Native American views on gender. Rather than defining gender purely on the basis of biological attributes, far more attention was paid to the roles in which children showed interest. Thus boys who were interested in basket making may have been

guided towards taking on a different gender role. In the same way girls who were interested in warfare would not take up the traditional female gender. Amongst the Chumash, two-spirits, known as 'aqi, were involved with specific tasks, notably acting as undertakers (Holliman 1997; 2000). Other ways of selecting two-spirits also existed. Many were visited in dreams and felt compelled to take up the role of two-spirit (Roscoe 1996, 332). Like the *hijra*, two-spirits also played important roles at certain ceremonies: burial and mourning rituals, assisting wounded, dancing at the return of warriors (Gilchrist 1999, 62). Unlike the *hijra*, however, they did not take up marginal positions such as prostitutes in society. Instead they were often integrated within their community and enjoyed respect and honour (Roscoe 1996, 335).

It is worth considering sexuality again here. Although two-spirits were usually involved in relationships with people of their own sex (in the Western sense) it would be quite wrong to define two-spirits on this basis. Some two-spirits were involved in relationships with men, others with women, others with other two-spirits (Roscoe 1996, 335). There were also other Native Americans involved in same-sex relations who were not defined as two-spirit. It would thus be quite mistaken to define two-spirit status purely on the basis of sexual relations (Fulton and Andersen 1992, 608), though this may have been important in some situations, as Sandra Holliman argues in the case of the Chumash 'aqi (2000, 181). Unlike the *hijra*, reproductive potential was not crucial in the definition of gender amongst Native American groups. Instead role played the crucial factor, and thus different genders were available to people depending on the roles that they played. It is important to note, however, that in taking up female roles male two-spirits did not become female; rather they took up a third gender position. Also it is important to point out that two-spirits were defined in positive ways, in terms of what they are and what they did, rather than the negative form of identifying *hijra*, as *neither* male *nor* female.

Shamans

The ability to harness male and female sexual potential was central to the power of Siberian shamans (Mandelstam Balzer 1996, 164). One of the most powerful abilities available to shamans, even if they were male, was the potential to give birth to spirit animals (Mandelstam Balzer 1996, 164). Indeed, Mandelstam Balzer has pointed out how 'at times, and in some Siberian cultures, the shamanic use of sexual power and

symbolism meant that male shamans turned themselves into females, for particular shamanic séances, and, in some cases, more permanently' (1996, 165). Amongst the Chukchi of north-eastern Siberia, female shamans occasionally did the reverse, and took on male identities (Mandelstam Balzer 1996, 165). Indeed amongst the Chuckchi male shamans who took on female qualities were known as soft-men. These soft-men then took husbands, dressed, ate and behaved as women, and despite the connotations of the name in English, soft-men were believed to be especially powerful shamans. The same is true of the attested cases of female shamans, who took up male identities and married wives. Jacobs and Cromwell trace up to ten gender categories amongst the Chuckchi (1992, table 2). These range from the taking up of certain female traits by males (or vice versa) through to the total adoption of the other sex's way of life. Amongst other Siberian groups gender transformation was much less totalising, and may have involved much more temporary transformations, around particular ceremonies or events (Mandelstam Balzer 1996). Gender here, then, is not a permanent attribute given by the body, but rather a temporal aspect of a person's being. Gender can be momentary and fluid as well as fixed and permanent (cf. Rautman and Talalay 2000, 2).

It is interesting that in all three cases outlined above the prevailing attitudes to gender in the broader society are quite different from that in the modern West. In India, Nanda has traced how ambiguous genders play crucial roles in Hindu mythology (1999). Amongst Native Americans I have already touched on how role and feeling were far more important in defining gender than genitalia. Finally amongst Siberian groups, gender transformation plays an important role in bear festivals, where men take on women's parts, and gender tensions are a general theme (Mandelstam Balzer 1996, 170-3). Even in the West, however, despite the prevailing attitudes that there are only two genders defined strictly by biology, there are long traditions of cross-dressing, drag and transvestitism that challenge our preconceived notions. More recently the emergence of transsexual and transgendered people have further called into question both our understandings of sex and gender and the violent operations performed on infants to reconfigure those whose gender status refuses to match our expected dichotomies (Bolin 1996; Butler 2004; Petra Ramet 1996).

Contested Sex

The variety of gendered positions identified above challenges us to recognise that a huge range of genders may have existed in the past. Yet it would be deeply misleading to assume that whilst gender is variable, the 'truth' of Western biology reveals to us the reality of sex, upon which gender may be somehow inscribed. As I suggested earlier, such a sex/gender dichotomy is little more than a reconfiguration of the nature/culture dichotomy that has bedevilled Western thought. There is no absolute reality that lies behind conceptions of male or female; rather, as Donna Haraway has argued

> There is nothing about being 'female' that naturally binds women. There is not even a state as 'being' female, itself a highly complex category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other social practices (1991, 155).

Indeed it is only relatively recently that the two-sex model has come to the fore in the West (Laqueur 1990). As Thomas Laqueur has shown, in the medieval period the human body was understood as having one sex, but two genders, the female being the inverse of the male (Laqueur 1990, 4). What is especially interesting to note in Laqueur's work, however, is that scientific 'evidence' of there being two sexes appeared perhaps a century after the idea became a widely held notion (1990, 10). The concept of two sexes emerged for epistemological and political reasons and it was only after this that a detailed examination of the female body produced any evidence for its separate classification (Laqueur 1990, 10). Thus the emergence of a two-sex model for the West is not due to scientific progress but instead, like all understandings, part of a particular set of social, political and historical circumstances.

Even Western science now questions such simplistic dichotomies. Not only are some people born as hermaphrodites, there are in total 11 different chromosomal possibilities between the traditional XX for female and XY for male (Gilchrist 1999, 57). Indeed Butler suggests that as much as 10% of the population may not fit neatly into the XX/XY dichotomy (Butler 1999 [1990], 137). There are other cases where people who are genetically one, present physical features of the other (Butler 1999 [1990], 136). Other local conditions can lead to physical abnormalities that further complicate any simple sex/gender equation (e.g. Herdt 1996c). Thus to view sex as

absolute and gender as variable is merely to move the focus of our analysis, to once more cloud our own local, political, understandings, to disguise and distort their point of origin (Foucault 1970; Nordbladh and Yates 1990). The question thus becomes not how sex is understood as gender, but rather how sex itself is produced (Butler 1993, 10; 1999 [1990]). It is this question that Judith Butler has focused on, and it is through her work that we can begin to understand how identity, including sex, is a *performative* construct, an idea that will prove central to my analysis. I want to begin by offering a relatively uncritical engagement with Butler's work before moving on to suggest where certain difficulties with it may lie, and how these can be overcome.

Performative identities

Performativity, citation, reiteration, abjection

Judith Butler draws on a range of eclectic sources to problematise our basic understandings of sex, gender and identity[ix]. She argues that concepts such as male and female, man or woman are not real or absolute, rather they are regulatory fictions (1999 [1999], 43)[x]. These regulatory fictions represent ideals 'whose materialisation is compelled, and this materialisation takes place (or fails to take place) through certain highly regulated practices' (Butler 1993, 1). These practices are performative, Butler argues, drawing on the work of J.L. Austin (1962). In Austin's view performatives were those parts of language that do what they name. Thus when a vicar says 'I now pronounce you man and wife', the words literally produce a married couple. Butler develops this notion to show how particular forms of both language and action help to produce particular citations of gender. Performativity as defined by Butler is not a singular act, 'for it is always the reiteration of a norm or a set of norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition' (1993, 12)[xi]. This reiteration is crucial in understanding performativity. It is through repeated action that these norms are created and lived up to. Thus when a man puts on a suit, or acts in a macho fashion, he is citing the regulatory ideals of manliness, and at the same time he is producing himself as a man. As Chris Fowler has pointed out, '*the ways that subjects attempt to recite, subvert or reiterate fictions of identity mark them as a specific type of person*' (Fowler 2001, 148 emphasis in original). These performances of gender are

never entirely within a person's control (Butler 2004, 16). This is demonstrated in Butler's classic example of the performative nature of sexing. When midwives lift up a baby, examine its genitalia, and pronounce 'it's a girl', they do not merely report a fact but instead performatively begin the process of binding sex and gender on to the baby (Butler 1993, 232). As Foucault has suggested in parallel discussions of sexuality, such actions hide their own origins; thus in behaving like a girl, one purports to be citing an unchanging universal whereas, in fact, the act itself produces and sustains such understandings (Butler 1999 [1990], 93). Thus the contrast for Butler is not between a real body and an imagined one, but between an alternative body and a hegemonic one (Butler 1993, 91). Thus when we suppose the existence in the past of uniform sexed bodies in the Western sense, it is this hegemonic imagination that we thrust, unwarranted on to the past.

Categories of sex and gender are constructed against an outside, against non-viable choices, that secure the boundaries of sex (Butler 1993, 8). The construction of these categories is through exclusion, through abjection (Kristeva 1982), through making some bodies unthinkable (Butler 1993, 188). In the heterosexual hegemony of modern Western society, these abjected bodies may be homosexual, but in other societies, different bodies may lie outside the regimes of power and discourse constructed through performativity. Bodies are thus materialised through reiterative, performative, citations of regulatory ideals. Such an understanding demonstrates the historicised nature of identity; we cannot assume that the same categories existed in the past. As Butler herself points out, 'these regulatory schemas are not timeless structures, but historically revisable criteria of intelligibility which produce and vanquish bodies that matter' (1993, 14).

Death of the subject and the birth of agency

Butler crucially uses her theories of citation and performativity to point out that there can be no body outside the process of materialisation, no body that is free of the heterosexist matrix that insists upon gender dualisms. It is not the case that an ungendered body is gendered through the process of growing up, but rather that the body itself is produced through the process of gendering. There is instead, she argues, no doer behind the deed. Drawing on Foucault, but to a greater extent Nietzsche, Butler argues that it is impossible to imagine a subject not already caught up in

discourse and power. There is no pre-existing 'I' that is cited through performance. Rather the 'I' is created, reiterated and produced through the performative citation of regulatory fictions (Butler 1999 [1990], 189). The doer, Butler points out, 'is variably constructed in and through the deed' (1999 [1990], 181). The subject is, in other words, the effect rather than the cause (Salih 2002, 48). This viewpoint of course fits well with the dwelling perspective that I discussed in the last chapter, recognising as it does that there can never be a person who is not already enmeshed within the world (Ingold 2000; cf. Joyce 2004, 91).

The pre-existing subject, however, does not mean that people are free to cite any form of gender they want. Because citations of gender are never singularly authored, people are always established within the discourses and power structures in which they are situated. These discourses are both enabling and constraining (Butler 1993; cf. Giddens 1984).

> Performativity is neither free play nor theatrical self-presentation; nor can it be equated simply with performance. Moreover constraint is not necessarily that which sets a limit to performativity; constraint is, rather, that which impels and sustains performativity (Butler 1993, 95).

In Butler's view agency is thus located in the resistance of these hegemonic norms, at the margins of gender performativity, where the alternative performances of drag and sexuality challenge and subvert the wider norms (1999 [1990], 185). This notion of subversion is crucial to Butler's view of agency. She argues that it is through practices within the heterosexual matrix, specifically those positioned at the margins, that such hegemonic norms can be undone. Thus drag works as a classic example. By imitating gender, Butler argues, drag '*implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself –* *as well as its contingency*' (1999 [1990], 175). The regulatory ideals can never be fully embodied, performance always fails, and it is this reality that drag reveals (Butler 1999 [1990], 176).

For Butler, then, sex and gender are regulatory fictions that people produce, maintain or subvert through reiterative and performative citations. It is through such citations that bodies are made to matter; they are produced against other bodies, bodies that are

abjected (Butler 1993; Kristeva 1982). Agency for Butler emerges at the margins of gendered practices, where those practices are shown up to be what they are: forced citations of norms that conceal their own fiction within the very act of their embodiment (Butler 1993, 94).

Critiquing Butler

Judith Butler's ideas have certainly had a powerful impact across the social sciences. In recent times her ideas they have also been employed to examine identity within archaeology, whether more broadly in pre-contact Mesoamerica (Perry and Joyce 2001) or the Neolithic of the Isle of Man (Fowler 2001; 2002), or more specifically at a single site, such as the causewayed enclosure at Etton (O. Harris 2005). Her concept of citation in particular allows archaeologists to engage with material culture as possible outcomes of practices that cited gender performativity (Joyce 2004, 84). More than this, of course, material culture is also both constraining and enabling of the kinds of performativity available to people (Barrett 1994; O. Harris 2005). Yet her ideas are not without their problems. In this section I want to consider the substantive difficulty with Butler's work: her conception of agency. This, I will suggest following Lois McNay (1999; 2000), can be rectified by combining her work with that of Pierre Bourdieu (1977; 1990).

McNay argues that Butler's work, whilst providing a powerful account of gender identity, fails to provide an adequate vision of human agency (1999, 176; see also Salih 2002, 66-7). Drawing on Foucault, Butler constructs agency from within a negative paradigm (McNay 2000, 2). In other words her conception of agency locates itself 'mainly through the residual categories of resistance to or dislocation of dominant norms' (McNay 2000, 4). Thus although the work of Foucault and Butler destabilises gender and identity, and offers a new way of conceptualising sex and sexuality, they fail to offer a comprehensive generative schema for agency and practice. They therefore fail to explain the creation and subversion of categories, norms and fictions in either the past or the present. Fundamentally Butler's conception of agency is insufficient as it fails to recognise how agency can emerge from improvisation and from arenas of social practice that are not enmeshed in the destabilising of gendered norms (McNay 2000, 45). Butler argues that agency emerges from subversion, yet defining which acts are subversive, and which are not,

is extremely difficult (Salih 2002, 95). This has consequences for our understandings within archaeology. Chris Fowler, for example, draws on Butler to define agency as 'a field of activity, consisting of acts that reiterate and subvert previous acts' (2002, 47). He also suggests that 'agency is the process of generating social relations which sediment into persons, selves and bodies' (Fowler 2002, 48), and indeed he is quite correct on both counts. Yet agency is also more than this. It is the possibility of improvised action that can openly challenge, rather than subvert, social norms; it is the ability to have acted differently and it is also the ability to actively connect, to make and to forge new relationships whilst breaking old ones. Agency can also be caught up in the deliberate decision to maintain social norms, rather than just their subversion. It is not that the analysis of agency drawn from Butler is wrong, rather that it is incomplete and unsatisfactory (cf. Moore 2000).

McNay (2000) proposes that this difficulty can be rectified by combining Butler's understandings of gender performativity with Bourdieu's conception of the habitus. The compatibility of these viewpoints has been recognised by a number of authors, including Butler herself (1999 [1990], 192; cf. Gilchrist 1999, 56; Gosden 1999, 140; O. Harris 2005, 42). Both place emphasis on bodily materiality, the way one carries oneself, on corporeality in other words. McNay argues that the combination of the two allows each to deal with the other's principal weakness (2000). For Butler, this is the way agency is underplayed in her account through her reliance on a negative paradigm of subjection, and for Bourdieu his failure to deal adequately with the unstable nature of gender and the ways in which agency can emerge from the margins (McNay 2000, 46-56). Bourdieu's account of agency is generative rather than prescriptive, and considers how improvisation within social and material conditions is central to both practice and identity (Holland et al. 1998, 17). The concept of habitus offers a way of thinking about agency that whilst creative and temporal, is also historically and socially specific (McNay 2000). Due to her reliance on Foucault, Butler remains trapped between competing relations of dominance and resistance, whilst Bourdieu offers a more 'nuanced view of political agency' (McNay 2000, 56). Butler's proposed view of identity, however, resists the naturalised view of the modern West and allows, in contrast to Bourdieu, the ambiguities and dissonance of performative identity to emerge (McNay 2000, 54).

Both Butler and Bourdieu also recognise the crucially temporal nature of agency, Bourdieu through his conception of the tempo of action within the *habitus* (1990) and Butler through her notion of iteration and reiteration of citations (1993)[xii]. Butler, however, focuses her attention on to previous acts, previous citations that are then reiterated. Bourdieu, in contrast, is as equally interested in the forward-looking nature of agency as he is in how agency draws upon previous acts to provide structure. What is needed is thus an understanding of both practice and performativity, of *performative practice* in fact (O. Harris 2005). This notion of performative practice ties together the way bodies are formed both through the performative citation of gendered norms and also how these acts are enmeshed in other areas of social practice. It also follows Mark Harris in arguing that identity should be seen as the 'dialectic product of people's historical experience and their practical and continual engagement in the lived world' (2000, 8). It is not the case that some acts are performative, and others are part of social practice, rather that the performative is always an aspect of social practice, which may be foregrounded or disguised depending upon the social, historical and political context. The concept of performative practice recognises that acts can simultaneously undermine or maintain gender norms, whilst having other consequences that may creatively engage with other parts of the social world.

Concluding Butler

The notion of performative practice brings together the understandings of bodies, agency, dwelling and being-in-the-world that I have set out in the thesis so far. We can now see gender as one aspect of identity that is produced through the process of being-in-the-world, one that recognises that there is never an independent subject that precedes subjectification, there can be no agent without agency. Conceptions of male and female are not biological realities; rather they are particular conceptions of the human body better thought of as regulatory ideals. These ideals are maintained or undermined through reiterative performative citations that simultaneously produce the subject as a gendered person, and disguise that production. Bodies are produced, that is to say materialised, through these practices. It is here that some bodies are made to matter, and others are declared unspeakable. It is against these unspeakable, abjected, bodies that identities are produced. This does not mean that people are free to make bodies in any way they like. Bodies are always materialised through discourse which

opens up certain possibilities and forecloses others. Nor does this deny the irrefutability of pain and death. It recognises, however, that understandings of bodily realities are always created within discourse, within the world, and that there is no position outside this from which to understand the human body. The conception of bodies as fixed, bounded and whole, as sexed and individualised, is a peculiar Western conceit. We might be much better off thinking of bodies as variable, porous and stretchable, both across time and through space. It is these kind of bodies that Deleuze and Guattari (1988) and Elizabeth Grosz (1994; 1995) have suggested. Yet such bodies offer only other alternatives. They no more capture the reality of embodiment in the past, or in other places around the world today, than the traditional Western view. By combining dwelling, agency and performativity we can begin to move towards a cogent view of how identity is produced through performative practice that is inseparable from our being-in-the-world.

Age, identity and inverted understandings

The 'reality' of ageing

Our understandings still lack a clear understanding of temporality, change and process. How is it that identities are formed? What is the role of growing up within this? The concept of identity being open-ended leads us to recognise the crucial role that age must play in identity, beginning with childhood. Bryan Turner (1996) argues that age provides a crucial test for Butler's theory of identity as performative citations (1996, 29). He casts Butler's argument as that of a radical constructivist who reduces everything to discourse and refuses to acknowledge any realities surrounding the body (1996, 28). Turner proposes that whilst the experience of ageing is universal, the understanding and role of different ages are socially constructed (1996, 28-9). In other words he suggests that Butler's account takes little consideration of the phenomenology of ageing, an experience he asserts to be universal, whilst focusing entirely upon the sociology of ageing. Butler acknowledges the temptation of such a critique, but at the same time refuses to bow to it (1993, 10). She points out that as soon as one acknowledges the essentialism of certain aspects of the human body, one is drawn back into a discourse in which sex is a purely biological construct (Butler 1993, 10). Furthermore, whilst one might accept the basic phenomenological facts of

human existence (pain, pleasure, consumption, excretion) as irrefutable, 'their irrefutability in no way implies what it might mean to affirm them and through what discursive means' (Butler 1993, xi). She also questions why these 'biological necessities' are privileged over that which is constructed (Butler 1993, xi). Bodies only appear, Butler argues, within the constructions, discourses and constraints of our understanding of the world (1993, xi). Thus it is not the case that Butler ignores the reality of the body, but rather she recognises that the body cannot be separated at any point from the world in which it is enmeshed: a point that surely would be agreed with by any committed phenomenologist (1993, 66-7; cf. Thomas 2004, 215). Thus when we consider age, although we can acknowledge that there may be broad similarities in bodily transformations, the understanding and, crucially, the *experience* of such transformations will be anything but universal. We need therefore to approach critically how age and identity develop together, both in the West and elsewhere.

Age, identity and the lifecourse

Age in our society can be divided up into a number of categories following birth, and arriving eventually at death. Beginning with infancy we move through childhood, puberty, adolescence, adulthood, middle age and old age. Each of these categories, although associated with certain bodily transformations, is a regulatory ideal laid down for us to live up to as we move through life. People of different ages are supposed to behave in different, appropriate, ways. In the West today these categories are becoming increasingly fluid, the ways in which people act at different ages are much more open to question than they were forty years ago, for example. Often moving from one age category to the next involves a rite of passage. Within Christian belief, there are rites of passage including christening, confirmation and marriage that take place to mark people's movement through life and are intimately connected with age. In other places other rites of passage are recorded, to do with menstruation and circumcision for example (e.g. M. Strathern 1988). In the past, age might have been an important consideration; it may have reflected experience and knowledge just as it does today. These similarities, however, should not prevent us from considering how different ways of thinking about age might be involved (Amoss and Harrell 1981). Different regulatory ideals might exist for different ages, associated with different rites of passage. We also need to consider how knowledge might be tied up in this.

These knowledges may have developed with age, as people became more immersed in the *habitus*, in the knowledge of how to go on.

The concept of the life course has been developed to tie the ways in which age and gender, along with other vectors of identity, interact (Sofaer Derevenski 1997a; 2000a; Gilchrist 2004). Sofaer Derevenski has pointed out that 'gender is not static throughout the life course, but must be constantly renegotiated in the light of increased gendered knowledge and changes in social situations' (1997a, 876). As she points out, a young girl and a grandmother have radically different social positions, understandings and attributes (Sofaer Derevenski 1997a, 876). The same could be said of a man in his early 20s and a grandfather. Thus age and gender intertwine through the life course, and are central together in the citation of regulatory ideals. By tying age to gender we can instantly begin to see how identity is embodied as a process. There may be no doer behind the deed (Butler 1993), but there were other deeds that preceded the deed. Identity is an open-ended process that develops and changes through time, and thus it is a process in which age, and indeed memory, are intimately involved (Gilchrist 2004, 156; see chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of memory).

The notion of age as a process also draws us towards a consideration of different age categories, how these may be created and cited, and how they interact with the bodies and worlds within which they are enmeshed. Children are an obvious example, yet they have been 'notably absent from archaeological narratives' (Pawleta 2004, 181; but see O. Harris forthcoming; Sofaer Derevenski 2000b). Childhood is an historically situated and socially constituted process, not a universal category of being (Sofaer Derevenski 1997b). Day-to-day life often centres on children, on shaping their bodies and on educating them to observe the correct form of behaviour (cf. Belaunde 2000; chapter 3). As Joanna Overing has said, 'a primary moral concern expressed by many Amazonian peoples pertains to the care of children' (2003, 297). We therefore need to address how children engage with community and materiality if we are to get to grips with the complex ways in which people come to dwell within their worlds. I feel that acknowledging the role of children within the past is another important step towards offering a more complex and less essentialist view of both agency and dwelling.

Childhood and inverted understandings

Childhood is an ontologically varied process; it literally involves multiple ways of being-in-the-world. We need to consider this not only as how adults understand children, and childhood, but also as how children understand their world, and reveal their experiences as meaningful (Toren 1993, 461). We need to recognise that children, like adults, are social actors and, as Joanna Sofaer Derevenski has pointed out, have social identities (2000b, 8). These identities are of course relational (cf. M. Strathern 1988), that is they are generated and performed in relation to others, such as parents and other children, but whilst identities are never wholly independent, children do have a social identity of their own (Pawleta 2004, 182). As Sofaer Derevenski correctly argues, children have largely been identified 'in a naturalised and reductionist manner as a universal biological category, rather than as social beings whose categorisation is a relative concept negotiated through context and the materiality of experience' (2000b, 8). It is essential that we now recognise that the view of the child as an a-historical, natural and unaffected being, an 'other' who awaits the imprint of society, is no longer acceptable.

What I wish to examine here is how children come to think about and understand their worlds. That is how, through dwelling, meaning is revealed to children (Thomas 2004), and in turn how they come to be enchanted with those meanings (Toren 1993, 463). It is important to remain aware of the complex differences that might have existed between infants and children, and children and juveniles, and the varied ways that gender might intersect with such categories. Nevertheless I wish to concentrate broadly on how children experience their worlds, and how this can lead to very different understandings from those held by their parents and other adults within the community (Toren 1993).

Christina Toren is one anthropologist who has developed this line of thinking. She points out that cognition – literally how we think about the world – is an historical process, in that 'it constitutes – and in constituting inevitably transforms – the ideas and practices of which it appears to be a product' (Toren 1993, 461-2). Thus childhood, or how we come to think about the world, is also a historical process. One consequence of this, Toren points out, is that children's views of the world may be radically different to those of adults; indeed they may be direct inversions of the way

adults think about their world (1993, 462). One example she gives is from her own research on Fiji.

Inverted understandings on Fiji

Toren examines how in any gathering in a building in Fiji an above/below axis exists that is tied into status through the roles people play in the *kava* ritual (1993, 463). This is a ritual where chiefs are given the root of the kava plant and it is then taken, transformed into a drink, and redistributed to the assembled people. It is worth pointing out that the above/below axis is metaphorical; nobody is physically above anybody else (Toren 1993, 463). At around 9 years old, children show an understanding that above equals high status and below equals low status, but crucially how they comprehend this is the inversion of adults' understandings (Toren 1993, 464). Adults believe above to be high status because the high status people sit there, whilst children believe those people *are* high status *because* they sit in the above part of the building (Toren 1993, 464; fig. 2.1). *Thus their understandings are inverted.* As Toren argues, however, there is no point in dismissing children's comprehension as somehow deficient or not right (1993, 463). Children dwell within their understandings of the world in the same way as adults. Their views are not necessarily more 'right' or 'wrong' than anybody else's.

	Above	Below
Adults' point of view	High status people sit in this part of the building making the physical location high status also.	Low status people sit in this part of the building making the physical location low status also.
Children's point of view	The above part of the building is high status. Therefore people who sit there become high status as a result.	The below part of the building is low status. Therefore people who sit there become low status as a result.

Figure 2.1: The inverted understandings of status and space held by children and adults about buildings in Fiji. The results are the same – both agree above is high status and below low – but they have reached that conclusion through arguments that are the inversion of one another (after Toren 1993).

By employing Toren's ideas of inverted understandings I do not wish to suggest that all children always think like that, since the contingent category of the child is too varied to allow such essentialist claims. Nor do I wish to suggest that the acts of education, initiation and engagement in which children are involved do not help to shape their view of the world. The embodied experience of childhood includes many moments of initiation where children may experience the education of attention. These were crucial moments at which identities were formed, and knowledge learned by new generations. These knowledges themselves may be embodied, that is learned and experienced through the body as an aspect of memory and skill (Ingold 2000; chapter 4). Equally, however, they may be talked about and openly discussed. Meaning is revealed through engagement with others, and although as Toren points out others may influence the conditions through which children perceive meaning, they cannot control what a child makes of those meanings (Toren 2004, 223). Children engage with adults in the historical process of revealing their own meanings through the world (Toren 1999, 267). The crucial point made by Toren is that as children grow up, their ideas are being formed, and transformed, and at different points along that process those ideas may be very different to those of the adults of the same community.

Age and ancestors

Space prevents as detailed a consideration of age as I would like. There is insufficient room to consider in depth the varying approaches to adulthood, marriage, parenthood and other age-related categories that exist around the world. Suffice it to say that these too are socially contextual and are produced through the embodied acts of dwelling through particular socialities. One area I would briefly like to touch on, however, is how old age and ancestors can be understood. Ancestors were one of the dominant themes of Neolithic archaeology in the 1980s and particularly the 1990s (e.g. Barrett 1994; Edmonds 1999; Parker Pearson and Ramilisonina 1998; Shanks and Tilley 1982; Tilley 1994). The largely undifferentiated understanding of ancestors was strongly critiqued by James Whitley (2002), however, and since then the idea has been less prevalent in the literature.

Drawing on the work of Igor Kopytoff (1971) it is possible to return the ancestors to our understandings, not as the unspecified spirits of earlier accounts (Whittle 2003,

125), but rather as specific aspects of the ageing sequence. The concept of ancestors, Kopytoff points out, is an ethnocentric Western one (1971, 129). It requires there be an absolute division between the living and the dead, one that might not be appreciated in other socialities. Kopytoff draws on his study of the Suku of south-western Congo to expand this point (1971). Ancestors for the Suku are active agents capable of rewarding or punishing descendants (Kopytoff 1971). Elders had previously been understood by anthropologists as drawing on the power of these ancestors and intervening with them through ceremonies conducted at crossroads or the graveside. Yet once we move away from seeing ancestors as radically separate from the living a very different view emerges. With the Suku, Kopytoff points out, offerings and requests are always made of people or persons who are older (1971). Thus the elders applied for permission for certain activities, or made offerings to redress certain wrongs, to the people immediately older than them: the recently deceased. Equally mature adults did the same to elders, as did young adults to mature adults and juveniles to young adults (Kopytoff 1971, 132). Thus rather than ancestors being a source of power, they in fact represent a continuity of age-related power structures. As Kopytoff says, 'the manner of addressing a living elder is the same one used in addressing the dead. The Suku regard the activities as being not merely analogous but identical' (1971, 133). Here, therefore, we can think not of ancestorship but of 'eldership' (Kopytoff 1971). These elders, both living and dead, are not objects of mystical worship but rather mundane aspects of normal life caught up in the choreographies of quotidian existence (Kopytoff 1971, 140).

Old age and death thus also require our consideration as these senses of identity, and the power relations they draw on, can play crucial roles in understanding any sociality. We need to consider how notions of the old, the living and the dead interacted with identity and power in the past. We might also consider examples of 'living ancestors' as amongst the Lugbara of the Congo-Ugandan border (Whittle 2003, 125). I am neither suggesting that ancestors were necessarily important in the Neolithic of southern Britain nor that conceptions of eldership were important. Rather this example shows again that, when we move away from Western notions of identity, very different understandings can emerge.

Concerning age

Age is thus a social category created and performed through the citation of various regulatory ideals. Old age may well be associated with various bodily transformations (B. Turner 1996), just as childhood can be associated with the education of attention and the formation of major categories of understanding around language and cosmology. These may be facts, as we in the West understand them, but their facticity tells us almost nothing about the realities of their experience in different times and different places and through different bodies. The opening up of the study of age, and in particular childhood, is essential if we are to understand the most basic facets of past people's lives, and the focus of their socialities (O. Harris forthcoming; Overing 2003). This is particularly the case if we are to challenge the accounts that too often present the people of the past as homogeneous, and effectively as able-bodied adult males (Brück 1998; 2001). We also need to consider how understandings of age, along with the embodied experience of ageing, can produce relations of power and challenge the applicability of Western conceptions of life and death to other social contexts.

I have now considered two of the most important vectors in the formation of identity: age and gender, and how these can intersect along the life course. Yet I have still to address a crucial area: how do different versions of what a person is exist amongst different groups around the world? It is necessary to place our consideration of identity, gender and age within broader conceptions of the body that further challenge essentialist Western preconceptions, particularly those surrounding the notion of the individual.

Personhood

Personhood and individuals

In this final section on identity I wish to examine the concept of personhood, that is how persons are conceived and understood. This is an increasingly debated within archaeology (e.g. Fowler 2000; 2002; 2004; Hofmann 2005; Meskell 1999; Thomas 2002; 2004; Whittle 2003), drawing on the long history of discussions amongst anthropologists (e.g. Battaglia 1990; Hallowell 1960; M. Strathern 1988). By

discussing personhood, archaeologists are beginning to recognise that we cannot take Western conceptions of the individual for granted (Fowler 2004, 7). Instead understandings of what a person is, what a person can be, are contextually specific. They are historically and socially constituted in other words. As Butler has shown with relation to gender, particular notions of personhood have their own historicity, and cannot be assumed to have existed in the past.

Julian Thomas (2004) has been particularly critical of the way archaeologists have assumed that the individual represents a universal category of personhood. In the West people tend to be conceived of as bounded whole individuals, who possess rationality and free will[xiii]. Every individual is unique, yet each one possesses attributes that are central to all people everywhere. The humanist tradition has then sought to extend these attributes to all people at all times (Thomas 2002). As Thomas has argued, however, the individual is in fact a conception that has emerged through the particular historical processes of modernity (2004, chapter 6). Rather than being the foundation of what it means to be human, the individual, like the notions of male and female, emerges as a particular historical construction. Some archaeologists (e.g. Hodder 2000; Meskell 1999; 2001) have called for archaeology to engage with the individual, or to differentiate between the individual and individualism; the former being the inherent nature of being human, the latter the modern West's conception of humanity. Yet as Thomas (2004, 141) correctly argues, such a position forces us to place part of being human outside of history, outside of the world in which it exists (cf. Butler 1993). Such an argument puts the doer back behind the deed and reinstitutes the separation of nature and culture. It places once again our modern notions of the person as truth, and other understandings as cultural gloss (Thomas 2004, 119). Thomas argues that the isolated individual conceived in the West is not merely historically contingent, but that it is 'in some senses aberrant or even pathological when looked at critically' (2004, 126). Indeed this point forms part of Thomas' wider critique of modernity (2004). Whilst Thomas certainly has a point, it is important that we do not separate modern Western peoples entirely from all other conceptions of personhood (LiPuma 1998). For example Marilyn Strathern shows how the notion of the individual can emerge under certain circumstances in Melanesia (1988, 15). Equally when we comment in the West after the death of a close friend or relative that one feels that part of oneself has died or gone missing, we are expressing

a quite different form of personhood (cf. Fowler 2004, 35; LiPuma 1998). In writing about Western personhood as entirely individualised, Edward LiPuma has pointed out that anthropologists are discussing the ideological view of the person in the West, and not, in fact, its reality (1998, 57).

Thus I would argue that to describe the modern Western individual as aberrant is slightly excessive (cf. LiPuma 1998). Instead we need to recognise that all forms of personhood are constructed through particular historical and social circumstances, and are made up of a variety of contrasting understandings that can be simultaneously held. As Fowler argues, 'there are ways to be individuals which do not accentuate the bounded unity of the person' (2004, 17). Nevertheless it is essential that we now consider how different ways of conceiving of human beings exist and how being human need not be limited to our species, or indeed to animate objects (Hallowell 1960). When personhood is accorded not on the basis of biology but on the basis of cosmology or agency, rocks can become people as easily as a human being can (Hallowell 1960, 24; Trudelle Schwarz 1997). In this section of the chapter I want to examine two broad conceptions of the person that Cecilia Busby has identified (1997; cf. Fowler 2004), that of partible conceptions of personhood, drawn largely from Melanesia (e.g. Battaglia 1990; M. Strathern 1988), and permeable conceptions drawn from Indian ethnographies (e.g. Busby 1997). These *dividual* conceptions of personhood, I will argue, offer excellent analogies for understanding personhood in the past, not as direct models, but rather as ways of thinking that disrupt Western conceptions and challenge and undermine our basic assumptions about being human (Gell 1999a, 74). Multiple conceptions of personhood from around the world (e.g. Trudelle Schwarz 1997; Gillespie 2001) fit well within this schema, and personhood can be conceived of as being made up of individual, permeable and partible aspects to differing degrees. As Fowler argues, these do not represent either the totality of possibilities of being human, or polar opposites (2004, 37). Rather they can be seen as 'mechanisms and processes vital to the formation of personhood' (Fowler 2004, 37). As I will show in chapter 5, combining these different areas of personhood can allow radically different understandings of Neolithic personhood and materiality to emerge.

Partible personhood

The first mode of personhood I wish to examine is that of partible personhood. This understanding is taken from Melanesian anthropology, notably that of Marilyn Strathern (1988; 1991; 1992; see also Battaglia 1990; 1991; Wagner 1991; J. Weiner 1988; cf. Josephides 1991). Strathern rejects the Western concept of society altogether for Melanesia, preferring instead the notion of sociality 'to refer to the creating and maintaining of relationships' (1988, 13)[xiv]. The notion of possession is also strongly critiqued by Strathern as emerging from the background of Western capitalism. The idea that people are unitary or seek a bounded state is seen by Strathern as an assumption that plays a key role in anthropology yet would be meaningless in the context of Melanesian relationships (1988, 57). Developing this problematisation of society and possession, Strathern offers a quite different view of the individual arguing that:

> Far from being regarded as unique entities, Melanesian persons are as dividually as they are individually conceived. They contain a generalised sociality within. Indeed, persons are frequently constructed as the plural and composite site *of the relations that produced them* (M. Strathern 1988, 13, my emphasis).

Thus crucially people are produced through the relationships in which they are enmeshed[xv]. Identity in Melanesia is 'an outcome of interaction' (M. Strathern 1988, 128). It results, in other words, from the relationships which people have, rather than being innate or natural (M. Strathern 1988, 185). Thus rather than attempting to define the groups in which a particular is a member, we need to consider 'what modelling of relationships the person him- or herself contains' (M. Strathern 1992, 81). Partible relations are crucial in Strathern's analysis, forming links between persons, indeed acting to constitute those persons in the first place (Gell 1999a, 35). Rather than the bounded, whole, body of the West, instead the body in Melanesia is partible, and thus its parts can be objectified, detached and exchanged. Persons carry relationships with them, indeed are formed literally from them. Through exchange, people can objectify a relationship in the form of a pig, an axe or a child and separate it, *part it*, from themselves. Bodies and people are thus partible[xvi].

Exchange and partibility

Let us consider how these exchanges work in a little more detail. In Alfred Gell's analysis of *Gender of the gift*, he argues that we can best conceptualise the role of relations as constituting and linking particular terms (1999a, 35). These terms he defines as 'ideal entities' (Gell 1999a, 35). Thus a term such as mother or father only comes into being through the relation that the two of them share (Gell 1999a, 35). Gell conceptualises this link through the diagram below (fig. 2.2).

Figure 2.2: Terms, relations and objectification (after Gell 1999a, 38, 40, figs 1.4 and 1.6).

Exchange has long been recognised as a vital part of life in Melanesia (e.g. Mauss 1954 [1925]). Typically this has been seen as being constituted through gifts as opposed to transactions of commodities, and tied into the generation of male prestige. Strathern develops this to challenge our notions of personhood (1988). She argues that there are two forms of exchange in Melanesia, mediated and unmediated (M. Strathern 1988). Mediated exchange, such as that traditionally associated with the gift, is *mediated* by the presence of an object between the two people exchanging. Here the object is *parted* from one person and absorbed by another, the object itself creating mediated relations (M. Strathern 1988, 178). The exchange of a pig between two men is one example of this. The pig is the objectified form of the relationship between two

men (Gell, 1999a, 47). It is objectified and parted from the body of one man and given to another. In this form the relationship that produced the pig (which the pig also embodies), that of the husband and wife, is eclipsed (Gell 1999a, 47; fig. 2.3). The relationship between husband and wife is one of unmediated exchange.

Figure 2.3: The eclipsing of husband-wife relations by exchange relations (after Gell 1999a, 47, fig. 1.14).

Unmediated exchange would not, Strathern acknowledges, normally be considered a type of exchange at all (1988, 179). Here people are able to have a direct effect upon others, say upon their health or growth (M. Strathern 1988, 178). Examples of this include the mother's capability to grow children or the work one spouse does for the other, clearing ground or raising pigs (M. Strathern 1988, 179; fig. 2.4)[xvii]. These are services exchanged between two people (Gell 1999a, 43). This construct allows Strathern to analyse the entirety of Melanesian sociality through the lens of exchange – be it mediated or unmediated – and examine how this interrelates with other concepts such as gender. Gender in fact forms a crucial role in exchange, defining whether it is cross-sex, between different genders, or same-sex between members of the same gender. Here, however, it is the socially emergent gender rather than biological sex that is crucial.

Figure 2.4: Unmediated exchange between husband and wife (after Gell 1999a, 43, fig. 1.10).

Figure 2.5: The eclipsing of previous exchanges within the body of the donor C. The exchange between A and A represents the unmediated exchange between husband and wife that produced the pig. This is then eclipsed in turn by each act of mediated exchange, culminating in that between C and D. The pig here 'reifies the relations encompassed in this term' (Gell 1999a, 49) (after Gell 1999a, 49, fig. 1.16).

Partibility and gender

The relational and partible nature of the body within Melanesian conceptions of personhood means that bodies are not singularly gendered. Strathern's critique of Western possession entails that she sees the idea of possessing a single gender as meaningless in Melanesia. Rather the relations and substances that form a Melanesian body are gendered in themselves and thus different parts of the body are internally divided into male and female parts (Busby 1997, 270). Whether a particular part is seen as male or female, however, depends upon the particular context. Thus gender emerges under certain circumstances in Melanesia. This is true of the roles played not only by people but also by material culture, for example in male initiation ceremonies amongst the Gimi. Strathern gives several examples of what would appear to Western eyes to be conflicting imagery: the role of the flutes in Gimi initiation as the 'mother's penis'[xviii]; the association across the highlands of men's houses with wombs; and penile bleeding being seen as menstrual (M. Strathern 1988, 126). To see these as contrary or odd is to begin with a perspective that presumes that men or women possess particular characteristics from the start (M. Strathern 1988, 127; Gosden 1999, 135). In contrast to this, amongst the Gimi for example, there is a notion of transaction that underlies the relationship between gender and sexual attributes (M. Strathern 1988, 111).

> The corporeal body is presented as exclusively male or female *for specific ritual effect*: persons are not axiomatically conceived by these Highlanders as single sex. Rather, an alternation of sexual conditions, two modes of gender constitution, is displayed (M. Strathern 1988, 122; my emphasis).

Substances and people emerge as certain genders depending on the relationships in which they are engaged. Thus whether exchange is cross-sex depends not on the biological sex of the people involved, but rather on the relationship they are engaged in. In certain forms of exchange between two men, gender may emerge as male for one and female for the other and thus the exchange is cross-sex. Gender here emerges as quite different even from the third gender groups that I examined earlier. Because personhood is relational, gender is produced out of the suppression and expulsion of certain substances (sometimes literally) in exchange relationships. Gell demonstrates neatly the multi-layered nature of these acts. He points out the complex relationships

between semen and milk in Sambia rituals (Gell 1999a, 59). Semen is passed between men and initiates, the initiates taking on the female to the elder's male. The Sambian older male is also responsible for the insemination of the younger man's sister. Female milk, which is transformed semen, may then be given to the offspring of this relationship. The role of semen is analogous to milk; the elder male is effectively breast-feeding the junior (Gell 1999a, 58). All these acts are acts of exchange; in fact they are mediated cross-sex acts of exchange. The crucial thing here in terms of gender is to note how a position is taken up in relation to the nature of the exchange. Both brother and sister are female to the older man's male. These switches of gender are not limited to exchanges between two people, however. Groups too can form cross-sex exchange relationships where the objectification and separation of a certain part of the group and its absorption into another can gender one group as male and the other as female[xix].

Plural and fractal relations

Within this relational concept of personhood, Strathern defines several modes for considering people. The first of these is the one-as-many mode. Here a group of many men or women conceptualise themselves as replicating a single form, repressing internal differentiation. The partibility central to the relational sense of personhood means that whilst the numbers of people may change, there can be one or there can be many, but the relations remain the same. It is this that is implied by Wagner's conception of the person as fractal (1991). The numbers may change but however one multiplies it, the ratio remains the same (Wagner 1991, 172). Thus amongst males, for example, the female aspects of the body might be repressed and their male aspects stressed, replicating a single form. The singular and plural are thus intimately connected; one is a homology of the other, but as Strathern points out, 'neither is to be equated with the pair' (1988, 14).

The pair by contrast constructs another particular form of personhood. Here two dividuals encounter each other and in doing so differences between them emerge and each takes on a particular gender. This applies especially between a husband and wife. Thus in the one-is-many mode gender exists as a suppressed duality in each person, whilst in the pair mode gender is externalised and performed. Each person becomes male or female as part of the pair; a 'dividual androgyne is rendered an individual in

relation to a counterpoint individual' (M. Strathern 1988, 15). Each of these modes of plurality (the multiple and the pair) is matched by two modes of the singular, dividual and individual. People take on these different roles through the relationships they form with other people. Gender and personhood thus emerge under certain situations and through certain relationships and performances (Gosden 1999, 133).

The roles of exchange, gender and personhood in Strathern's argument are all clearly and closely interlinked. In Melanesia, gender emerges through action, through taking particular roles in exchange, and substances too are gendered through the context in which they are encountered. Exchange rests on metaphors of same-sex/cross-sex, just as initiation rites, gender and personhood do. People are partible and dividual; they give parts of themselves away, parts which objectify the relations in which they are enmeshed. People in Melanesia are predominantly involved in *relations which separate* (M. Strathern 1988, chapter 8). This can be contrasted with people in the Western world, Fowler has argued, who are engaged in *relations which alienate* (2001, 140). This contrast fits within the idealist opposition that Strathern creates and maintains between Western worldviews and those of Melanesia (Gell 1999a, 33). Within Melanesia relationships are constituted, Strathern argues, through differing forms of exchange. It is only through exchange that relationships come into being, and it is through these relationships that persons, personhood and gender are created. The metaphor of gender works as the underlying theme that runs through exchange, even as it is constituted, by, and through, the event of exchange, be it mediated or unmediated (M. Strathern 1988, 182). All relationships are relationships of exchange, and all exchanges are gendered (Gell 1999a, 36). Thus in Melanesia, or in Strathern's Melanesia[xx], people are constituted in radically different ways to those of the modern Western world. The partibility of people emerges through exchange, through their ability to give parts of themselves to others (Fowler 2004, 55).

Permeable personhood

Permeable personhood in southern India
Cecelia Busby compares Melanesian bodies, which are internally divided and partible, with Indian ones which she argues are 'internally whole, but with a fluid and permeable body boundary' (1997, 269). Whereas in Melanesia parts of people can be

separated off, objectifying relations between them and others, in southern India, specifically amongst the Mukkavar, substances extend outwards from people and form flows between them (Fowler 2004, 31-2). These substances can include fish, alcohol and money, but are particularly central to the relations between married couples. Married couples are linked through the permanent flow of substances between them, through sexual intercourse, and through eating off the same plate (Busby 1997, 267). This constant flow of substances through the permeable boundaries of the body leads husbands and wives to view themselves as having a singular body (Busby 1997, 268). Women and men provide different substances, through this permeable flow, that help to form children and these substances merge within the child (Busby 1997, 264). The child's gender is determined by the relative balance of male and female substance (Busby 1997, 264).

Children here emerge as entities in their own right, rather than as objectifications of the relations between two adults as they do within Melanesia (Busby 1997; M. Strathern 1988). Also unlike in Melanesia gender does not emerge in southern India under particular circumstances, through various forms of exchange. Instead maleness and femaleness are attributed through the ability to reproduce, to act as a man or to act as a woman. It is within this broadly Indian context, as we saw earlier, that the *hijra* exist as a gender incapable of reproducing and thus neither man nor woman (Nanda 1999). The presence of genitals (ideally absent amongst the *hijra*) reveals the ability to produce male or female substances, and thus to act as a man or a woman. Particular substances are always male or always female in India, unlike in Melanesia where the gender of substances is determined by context (Fowler 2004, 32).

Thus people in southern India are not conceived of as either bounded individuals or as a composite of relationships. Instead they 'engage with others and are connected to them through flows of substance which they exchange with each other' (Busby 1997, 273). This permeable and fluid person offers us another way of conceiving of gender and the body, and another way of contesting dominant Western understandings.

Other possibilities

Andy Jones (2005) has criticised the way in which conceptions of personhood have been used in archaeology. He suggests that archaeology has become too reliant on

specific ethnographic examples of personhood, particularly that from Melanesia (2005, 194). Whilst not disputing the need for archaeologists to problematise past conceptions of the person, Jones argues that the 'European Neolithic has a Melanesian flavour' (2005, 195). In order to counter this Jones draws upon Classic Mayan and contemporary Quechua–speaking communities conceptions of personhood (2005, 196-8). Amongst the Maya he notes that people were made of two substances, blood and bone, which they received from their mother and father (A. Jones 2005). People thus formed containers for these substances (A. Jones 2005, 197). Yet these were not the bounded containers of the modern West, rather they were in Jones' own word *'permeable'* (2005, 197). The substances of the body acted 'as a medium for inter-subjective exchange' (A. Jones 2005, 197). This is strikingly reminiscent of Busby's description of southern Indian personhood. Amongst the Quechua-speaking peoples of southern Peru, Jones argues that people are connected through their relationships and are also connected to objects they have manufactured, even if that object is exchanged (2005, 198). This, in contrast, seems more similar to Melanesian conceptions of personhood.

Thus what strikes me about Jones' analysis is not that the examples he takes from Central and South America undermine the use of Indian or Melanesian models of personhood, but rather they suggest their continued applicability. Certainly all these forms of personhood can be considered as broadly relational (A. Jones 2005, 198), but other connections also exist between them. I do not wish for a moment to suggest that all forms of personhood around the world are either permeable or partible in form, that these somehow represent the totality of possibilities of human being. I do not want to suggest even that personhood was conceived of identically amongst the Maya and amongst the Mukkavar. Rather I argue that these two forms of personhood, permeable and partible, provide us with useful models to understand non-Western conceptions of personhood. We must remember, however, that these two forms do not necessarily exist in isolation, nor are they in total contrast to Western forms of personhood. As LiPuma (1998) has pointed out there are aspects of Melanesian personhood best understood as individual in nature, even if these are underplayed, indeed suppressed by Melanesians themselves. Instead our investigations of past peoples should consider what aspects of personhood, if any, are formed through understandings that can be glossed as partible, permeable or individual (cf. LiPuma

1998, 56). These conceptions in no way need to be contradictory, though it would not matter if they were. Human beings are perfectly capable of holding multiple, in some cases contradictory, understandings at the same time (Gregor 1977, 30).

Personhood amongst the Navajo: partible, permeable, individual

My last example of personhood comes from Maureen Trudelle Schwarz's (1997) study of the North American Navajo. Although personhood takes a very different form amongst the Navajo compared to others I have outlined, it can still be understood in terms of the models of permeability, partibility and individuality.

A crucial aspect of Navajo personhood is the way that part of the person can stand for the whole, or the principle of synecdoche as Trudelle Schwarz puts it (1997, 5). This means that personhood lies in every fraction of a person such as their hair, or their fingernails, as much as it does in the whole. Personhood can thus be transferred to everything that a person comes into close contact with, be it clothes or other everyday objects (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 5). It is as if the boundaries of a person's body might be seen as *permeable*. Navajo personhood is also *relational*, however, and these relations extend to include non-human animals and objects (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 9). Personhood is extended to *Ts'aa'* ceremonial baskets, and children are taught that the earth, sky, mountains and thunder and lightening are 'living kin' (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 9). It is not the case, however, that this is an example of anthropomorphism. That is to say it is not that the Navajo construe mountains, for example, to be like a person. Rather they see both mountains and people to be made in the image of the holy people (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 11). Similarities can be drawn between mountains and people; they both have bases and they are both composed from similar elements, but this is not the abstract application of human qualities on to inanimate objects. Rather it is the belief that both mountains and people share a structure through their common origin.

Differing substances play an important part in Navajo conceptions of personhood and these in turn are deeply entwined with Navajo cosmology. During the marriage ceremony a cornmeal mush is presented by the bride to the groom (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 71). This mush is then divided by the bride's father or maternal uncle into four quarters, each one representing the cardinal directions. The groom and bride then eat

from each of the four quarters and from the centre. In doing so the bride and groom incorporate the different kinds of knowledge that are associated with each of the cardinal points within their marriage (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 72). The watching friends and relatives then consume the mush. In doing so the substance of the mush is absorbed by the community as is knowledge of the marriage, just as the marriage absorbs knowledge through the consumption by the bride and groom. Here then we can see how flows of substance link people, clans, knowledge and cosmology together, through the permeability of the bodies involved[xxi].

The Navajo conceive themselves as being made up of four types of blood, coming from their two parents and paternal and maternal grandfathers (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 73). This again is tied in with the four cardinal points, and represents the different contribution of four clans to the making of a child.

> Through this shared substance – one of the four types of blood – each clan influences the development and functioning of a bodily system – the digestive, the skeletal, the nervous, or the respiratory system (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 74).

The influence of the four bloods, and the people, clans and cardinal directions that they represent are not temporary, but rather ongoing throughout a person's life. Thus people are constantly part of the flows of relationships, understood through people, substance and place that bind families and clans together. These linkages can also make body parts dangerous. As body parts or secretions contain personhood as much as the whole body does (the principle of synecdoche) so any body part can be used to have an effect upon the whole (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 239). Equally this flow of substance links not only fingernails with people, but people with clans, and thus what happens to the smallest fingernail could affect the clan as a whole (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 239).

Although many aspects of Navajo personhood can therefore be understood as permeable, certain aspects could also be considered partible: the ways in which personhood is constituted as relational for example, or the ways in which aspects of personhood are imbued into artefacts that a person makes (Trudelle Schwarz 1997,

111). Each part of a Navajo person is considered equivalent to the whole. Wholes are thus made up of parts, clans of people, and people of 'dual integrated components' such as left and right and male and female (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 233). The concepts of homology at play here have clear parallels with Strathern's analysis of the one-as-many mode in Melanesia (1988).

The Navajo also recognise aspects of their personhood that might be associated with more Western conceptions of the individual, such as their personal autonomy, and sense of self (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 239). Navajo personhood could thus be seen as combining a generally permeable view of personhood with aspects of individual and partible conceptions also. This shows clearly that any attempt to draw too fine a line between permeable, partible and individual personhood would be misleading. Rather we should consider how any form of personhood is more likely to be made up of aspects of all three forms. Permeable, partible and individual aspects of personhood can coexist simultaneously. Our investigations of the past must consider, therefore, how these different kinds of personhood may exist alongside one another and how they may emerge, or be suppressed, in differing contexts.

Concluding personhood

Personhood is a complex category that is central to how people conceive of themselves and their world. Such categories are not merely abstract cosmologies. Rather they are directly implicated in people's daily practice. They are caught up in the production of food (M. Strathern 1988) in the way husbands and wives eat (Busby 1997) and the way people feel about their world, about baskets, carpets and mountains (Trudelle Schwarz 1997). Personhood is directly implicated in broader studies of identity too, whether that be through the examination of gender, or through the ways bodies are seen, identified and shaped through the work of the self and others (cf. Becker 1994; Lagrou 2000). Conceptions of personhood are certainly not limited to human beings as we understand them, but can be extended to baskets, mountains, rocks and animals depending on the particular context (Bird-David 1999; Hallowell 1960; Trudelle Schwarz 1997). It may also often be the case that not all rocks, for example, are persons (Hallowell 1960), or that it is only in certain contexts that certain beings reveal themselves to be human through their actions (Bird-David 1999, 75).

Drawing on the work of anthropologists like Marilyn Strathern and Cecelia Busby and archaeologists like Chris Fowler (2004; but see also Chapman 2000) I have argued that we can conceptualise personhood as being made up of various partible, permeable and individual aspects (LiPuma 1998). These terms should not be seen as universal, nor should similarities between differing forms of personhood mean that I see any of these as ahistorical. Nor should they be considered in any way to cover the total of possible personhoods that may have existed in the past or present. Rather these terms, taken from three disparate contexts, provide us with a terminology for discussing personhood. Such terms always fall short of the contexts in which they were produced, yet they provide models which we can use to analyse various aspects of personhood. In chapter 5, I will draw on this discussion to show how Neolithic forms of personhood may have been both permeable *and* partible, and how differing forms of material culture were caught up in forming and citing those differing aspects of personhood.

Conclusion

Identity is an enormously complex subject, which is at once central to our understandings of the circumstances in which we write, and to the lives of past peoples. In this chapter I have questioned our basic understandings of the body, gender, age and personhood. This is essential if our taken-for-granted views on men, women, children and people are not to be thrust back unwarranted into the past, thereby legitimating today's views and inequalities. Identity, including sex, age and personhood, emerges from our being in the world. It is part of an ongoing, open-ended process of citation. Anthropological evidence shows that multiple genders exist around the world today, and no doubt would have existed in the past. Far from male and female, for example, being part of a biological reality they are in fact contextual regulatory ideals, cited and recited through performative practice. These understandings do not challenge the views of agency and dwelling which I set out in chapter 1. Rather they add to this approach and prevent essentialised, effectively male, bodies being thrust into the past. Equally, however, notions of dwelling and practice have supported understandings developed in this chapter and have allowed me to put forward a more nuanced account of gendered agency, which recognises both its improvisational and reactive qualities. Personhood around the world shows

that the modern, individualised, person cannot be taken as the *sine qua non* of human *being*. Other views of the body exist that challenge the concept of a bounded whole, and reject the notion that only humans are people. Personhood can take on a probable infinity of forms but the notions of permeable or partible dividuals, and individuals, give us a starting place from which to develop more subtle and provocative conceptions of personhood in the past. Bodies do not exist ready to be socialised into the world, rather bodies are produced through socialisation, through the experience of dwelling in the world. This can lead to children having inverted understandings compared to adults, and it is also how the complex and challenging notions of body and self that exist around the world today were produced.

Yet this is still not sufficient in itself. Within the accounts set out above there is little or no consideration of the complex nature of emotion or memory, yet these are surely central to how bodies are conceived and remembered through the citations of regulatory ideals. Memory allows the possibility for bodies to stretch across time, to exist both in the present but also in the past, and to look forward into the future. Emotion too questions the limits of bodies, both temporally and spatially as it creates flows and links between objects, peoples and places. Emotion is central to the production of community. Both memory and emotion are socially contextual, and produced through our being-in-the-world, and both are central, I will argue, to any understanding of the agency and identity of past peoples. These approaches can also help us to think about notions of shared value, community and conviviality that broaden and strengthen our understanding of the past. It is thus to emotion that I turn next.

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[i] As Elizabeth Grosz has argued (1994, ix), the neutralisation of bodily specificities is one of the many tools of phallocentric domination.

[ii] In this chapter there are several areas of identity that I do not consider in detail, notably race. This is not to suggest that race does not form a central aspect of modern identities, and some identities in the past (cf. Franklin 2001; S. Jones 1997). Space and time prevent as full a discussion of identity as I may have liked, and thus I have chosen to concentrate on aspects of identity that I believe may have been particularly crucial in Neolithic Britain: age, sex and personhood.

[iii] This understanding fits within the anti-humanist traditions of thought descending from Nietzsche, through Foucault and Heidegger. It is present within archaeology in the writings of Julian Thomas (e.g. 2002; 2004).

[iv] Grosz (1994) uses the metaphor of the möbius strip to capture the unbroken movement inside and outside the body.

[v] Examples of the way bodies shape themselves includes how people carry themselves whilst walking, the effects on body shape of repetitive activities, the way women today texture their bodies with razors (Penny Bickle, personal communication), and the way women in rural Greece cut themselves and tear out chunks of hair to express grief on the surface of the body (Seremetakis 1991).

[vi] The discussion of bodies as bounded is a classic heterosexual male way of experiencing the world. Female bodies are never thought of as bounded in the same way (Grosz 1994).

[vii] It is extremely difficult to discuss these topics without referring to terms such as male, female, man, woman and sexuality. Throughout this section I use these terms in order to elucidate the argument, not to suggest their universality.

[viii] In the Western sense, of course.

[ix] These include Derrida, Hegel, Foucault, Irigaray, Lacan and Wittig.

[x] There are certain difficulties with Butler's choice of language here. It can be argued that regulatory fiction, or even regulatory ideal, suggests that these hide another, more truthful gender behind them, or that they act almost as an ideology, in a Marxist sense, obscuring the 'truth'. This is not what Butler means, however, or at least, that is not how I understand her argument. Rather these terms reveal that there is no truth, no reality behind the fiction, as there is no subject, no object, no world, that pre-exists gendered performativity.

[xi] Butler here follows Derrida (1999) in his deconstruction of J.L. Austin (1962). The performativity of an utterance does not just depend upon the words but upon the context and the person involved. Thus I cannot stand up in a lecture theatre and pronounce two random students man and wife (Salih 2002).

[xii] Both Bourdieu and Butler do not consider how memory works, however. Thus their conceptions of how acts relate to both future expectations and past events are impeded. I will address memory in detail in chapter 4.

[xiii] Butler has shown eloquently how such a conception of the person is not only essentialist, but also androcentric in nature (1990, 169).

[xiv] This is a notion I too prefer, and the term sociality will be used in this context throughout the thesis.

[xv] Josephides argues that Strathern fails to deal adequately with the concept of knowledge as a cognitive state (1991, 146). She argues that in Strathern's account people's subjectivities are purely objective, 'denoting only their role in a larger theory of social action' (Josephides 1991, 147). In effect she is criticising Strathern's view of agency. Strathern argues that agency and cause are split in Melanesia, 'agents do not cause their own actions' (1988, 273). They act from their own vantage point but with someone else's vantage point in mind. Strathern creates yet another dichotomy to explore these issues, a dichotomy between persons and agents (M. Strathern 1988, 273). The person, Strathern argues, objectifies and thereby unveils the relations of which they are constituted. The agent by contrast acts *because* of those relationships. Thus the relationship between person and agent is identical to the split between cause and agency. A person is the cause of an agent's actions. This shows once again how Strathern's creations of personhood, and of cause and effect, in Melanesia are totally different to the understandings of the modern West. Agency is not a deliberate act by a bounded individual but rather the result of multiple relationships created through exchange. Josephides' view is that this underplays how deliberate knowledge and action maintain these symbolic structures within Melanesia (1991, 147). Yet this criticism is in turn based on a view of knowledge, cognition and agency that is Western in its origin. Josephides effectively tries to restore the individual to the heart of Strathern's argument. This of course runs directly against what Strathern is trying to accomplish. Yet Strathern's argument does lack a historical perspective, however. No understanding of how these structures developed is offered, nor how they might be changing and altering as time moves on (but see LiPuma 1998). Instead a relatively timeless picture emerges, despite the importance Strathern gives to future and past within exchange relationships. It is not necessary to wholly restore a Western conception of knowledge or agency to add a historical dimension. Rather, a more creative understanding of how success or failure in exchange for example might alter the development of future action could add a temporal dynamic to this understanding. Equally an analysis of those kinds of interaction within Melanesia where more 'Western like' forms of agency emerge is also worthy of consideration (Lipuma 1998). Differing and multiple conceptions of agency are essential both in anthropology and in archaeology if we are to escape from essentialist notions around the concept, and Strathern offers us just that.

[xvi] In similar fashion Roy Wagner has termed this sort of personhood 'fractal' (1991).

[xvii] Here we encounter a difficulty with Strathern's work. Children emerge as the objectified relations between a husband and wife, but they are also clearly more than that. Children, as I argued earlier, have social identities that demand our consideration, lest we only focus on the relationships (partible or otherwise) between adults. It thus essential that whilst we recognise the power of Strathern's arguments we do not accept them at face value but rather situate them within other understandings, such as those developed in this chapter. Alternative conceptions of gender beyond male and female are also absent from Strathern's account. This may well be because they are also absent in Melanesia, but nevertheless,

it means that we must critically combine her ideas with other approaches if we are to access the diversity of identity in the past.

[xviii] The Gimi flutes were mythically stolen from women by Gimi men and are ritually revealed to male initiates. These rituals reveal the multiply sexed nature or androgyny of the Gimi world. Key to this are the flutes. Stolen from women they are phallic, standing for a penis that is both male (it belongs to the initiate) and female (it used to belong to a woman). The play between the two continues as stories are told revealing that the beard a man will grow comes from his sister's pubic hair which originally plugged the flute (M. Strathern 1988, 112). The flute also represents not only a female penis but the 'woman's child and woman's birth canal' (1988, 112). The men could thus be seen as seizing the woman's ability to reproduce. This would be mistaken, however, although it would fit well with a long line of anthropological analysis that has tried to analyse men's domination over women in the highlands of New Guinea. Men still require women in this context to grow the child; what they seize is the ability implant life (M. Strathern 1988, 113). Even here, however, gender differences that emerge are only temporary. In a very real way, and a way which is quite alien to our conceptions of gender, it is not the organs that sex an individual. Having a penis does not make one a man. Quite the reverse in fact, it is acting as a man that makes one's penis male (M. Strathern 1988, 208); 'context is all' in the creation of gender (Gosden 1999, 135)

[xix] Debbora Battaglia traces the role of substance and gender in androgynous motherhood amongst the Sabarl islanders (1990; 1991). Children are the objectified relation between two parents, and they are thus the partible expression of both of their identities. This only accounts for half the story amongst the Sabarl, however (Battaglia 1991, 91). During part of the time of the child's development the mother is seen as totally self-sufficient. This requires her to be androgynous as the child requires both male and female substances to grow. The mother is therefore empowered to 'substitute other substances for semen and to render them masculine' (Battaglia 1991, 91). Through this she too is rendered partially masculine, or more accurately does not suppress her masculinity. Her relationship with the child thus produces a new product, the androgynous mother. This shows again how the Western conception of the 'natural', 'feminine', nature of motherhood is once again a socially contextual understanding. At certain times amongst the Sabarl it instead emerges as androgynous.

[xx] Another important critique of Strathern's analysis of Melanesia has been offered by Gell (1999a). Gell argues that rather than being an ethnography of a particular geographical area, Gender of the gift is instead a distinct intellectual project (1999a, 34). The Melanesia described by Strathern, he argues, is not a real place (Gell 1999a, 34). He stresses this point by arguing that, contra Strathern, commodity transactions do take place in Melanesia, and not everything is ruled by the gendered gift transactions she so assiduously describes (Gell 1999a, 74). That said, Gell does not perceive these as weaknesses within Strathern's argument. In fact he perceives this as a strength, as it means that her techniques, or 'system M' as he terms it, are not only applicable in Melanesia. As he puts it, 'a world consisting of signs and internal relations is imaginable anywhere' (Gell 1999a, 34). This point has clear implications for the applicability of system M to archaeology.

[xxi] The similarity between this and the role of the wedding cake at British weddings is worth noting here.

Chapter 3: Being-in-the-emotional-world

Introduction

Emotion and archaeology are words rarely seen together, and form a subject that has only occasionally been discussed (e.g. Gosden 2004; Tarlow 1999; 2000). It seems as if emotion has remained fastened to the top rung of Hawkes' infamous ladder of inference (1954), even as the postprocessual and interpretive revolution brought the equally intangible ideas of ideology, power, knowledge and memory to the fore (e.g. Barrett 1994; Bradley 2002; Miller and Tilley 1984). Despite the rejection of the positivist dogma that had come to dominate processual archaeology, emotion remained inaccessible, an improper research goal for a scientific subject. This is all the more surprising when one realises that since the 4th century BC, and the writings of Aristotle, the debate around emotion has raged within philosophy (Solomon 2003). Indeed Aristotle's complex treatment of emotion stands up against, and indeed is superior to, many modern day accounts (Solomon 2003, 6). In particular, Aristotle manages to avoid the mind:body duality that has so bedevilled Western thought since Descartes.

For Descartes himself, emotions, or the passions as he called them, were split between the mind and the body, and this caused some of the problems he had with his own theory (Solomon 2003, 21). Nevertheless Descartes, and later thinkers and philosophers such as Charles Darwin and William James, saw emotions as inherent, natural and biologically given (Lupton 1998, 11). Darwin in particular saw emotions as part of our evolutionary inheritance, and central to our survival (Lupton 1998, 11).

Perhaps part of the difficulty with emotions is that they are very difficult to define. The slippery nature of emotion tends to leave a definition that falls somewhere between feeling, mood, body and mind, yet is almost always unsatisfactory. As I go on, I hope to demonstrate that this campaign to define emotion is not only misplaced, it also strikes against one of the fundamental points of this chapter. That is that any definition of emotion would be situated in the terms of the culture of the definer and thus act in a reductionist and essentialist way (Lupton 1998, 5). We cannot assume that our understanding of the term emotion is universal. Of course such debates can

become circular, and if words always fail, as Wendy James has pointed out (2003), then how can we discuss anything? The answer is, of course, that we can benefit from loose understandings. The elusiveness of the term emotion is part of its strength, as all interpretations of mood, feelings, sensations and beliefs can be incorporated within it and thereby any reduction avoided. Thus I will use 'emotion' as an inclusive term, and thereby avoid it acting as an essentialist translation from our culture to others. The aim of this chapter is to explore emotion and emotions in all their diversity, rather than trying to exclude anything from their remit.

Emotion now forms a major topic of discussion not only in philosophy but also in psychology, psychodynamics, sociology and anthropology (e.g. Ekman and Davidson 1994; Lupton 1998; Overing and Passes 2000a; Stein 1985). Whether seen as innately biological, innately cognitive or socially constructed, the role of emotion in practice, agency and sociality can no longer be ignored. Yet it has remained curiously absent from archaeologists' discussions of people in prehistory, despite increasing emphasis on agency, the self and personhood (e.g. Fowler 2001; 2004). In this chapter, I hope to demonstrate how central emotions are to human existence, and thus how central they should be to archaeological interpretation. This can be done by drawing on an understanding gleaned from the in-depth research conducted in those fields listed above. The chapter will begin by giving some brief background to the various conceptions of emotion that are prevalent in the literature today, starting with those which see emotions as innate, whether biologically or cognitively. These positions will then be critiqued from a social constructivist position. This in turn will be examined, critically, drawing on my own thoughts and the ideas of the social historian William Reddy (1997; 2001).

These debates will allow an emerging perspective on emotion to be outlined. Central to the argument of this chapter is the vital importance of emotion in all fields of practice and in order to demonstrate this, I will discuss the work of several anthropologists. This will draw principally on the articles published in the recent volume, *The anthropology of love and anger* (Overing and Passes 2000a), and will detail how central emotions are to small-scale agencies and socialities. The chapter will then turn to archaeology itself. Armed with the theoretical tools garnered from

the earlier discussion, I will begin to examine how we can think constructively about emotion in the past.

Innate emotions? Biological and cognitive perspectives

I will begin the discussion of emotion by briefly examining the school of thought that sees particular emotions as innate to us as human beings[i]. Whether placing the emphasis on biology or cognition these authors believe emotions at their core to be natural (Tarlow 2000, 715). It is important to point out that these works represent a spectrum of points of view that cannot be explained in detail here. Thus for the sake of argument I have grouped them into two categories: those that place the emphasis on biology and evolution and those who, whilst still arguing for an innate drive to emotions, argue that cognition plays a central role. Both sides of the debate have been heavily criticised by those who believe emotions are socially constructed, and I will come to those arguments once the other positions have been set out.

Perhaps the dominant approach has come from those that believe specific emotions are innate biological conditions that have evolved as part of our quest for survival over the millennia. This has been termed, in original fashion, 'the traditional theory of emotions' (Bedford 1986, 15). Emotions from this perspective are not affected by socio-cultural background or by lived experience. They are responses to the structures that have evolved in our brain to deal with the day-to-day encounters of life. In some ways they fit well with what might be called the folk-model of emotions popular in Western discourse. 'I can't help the way I feel' is an often heard line describing emotions. This attitude likens emotions to hunger and thirst. Emotions then, both in the innate biological approach and in the generally accepted thinking of Western discourse are beyond our control, they exist in a nether world of the body, or in the biological structures of the brain. Researchers from this perspective believe that a basic set of emotions are inherent to all humans, and search for the biological basis for such a conclusion, or for the functions they play in our survival and evolution (Lupton 1998, 11). There is very little role for conscious thought, or contextual analysis, in these accounts. Unsurprisingly, both Darwin's approach to emotion and those who have followed after him in evolutionary thought, belong firmly within this camp (e.g. Plutchik 1982). Emotions, as part of our genetic inheritance, inflict upon us moments

of anger, fear and sadness, about which we can do little; only our response to these situations is within our control (Lupton 1998, 11).

These arguments have been strongly criticised for leaving little or no room for cognitive decision making, and a second school of thought has developed that places more of an emphasis on the role of the mind (Solomon 1980). William James (1884) set out one of the classic positions. He argued that emotions were 'perceptions of physiological disturbances' (Solomon 2003, 65). In other words he saw them as natural and inherent responses to stimuli drawn from the environment. If you see a snake, there is a physiological response, a response which we define as fear (Solomon 2003, 65). For James, the way in which emotions have often been conceived is thus reversed. Instead of crying because we are sad or smiling because we are happy, it is the other way around. We are *sad* because we *cry* (Solomon 2003, 65). The physical sensation comes first and the emotional consequence afterwards. Similar ideas were developed around the same time by the Danish psychologist C.G. Lange, and their joint publication, *The Emotions* (1922 [1895]), represented the foundation of this particular school of thought. This approach and others that build upon it, such as that recently proposed by Antonio Damasio (1994; 1999), offer a particularly naturalistic and essentialist view of emotions, but in contrast to the preceding traditionalist view they do recognise that cognition has some role to play. However Damasio, for example, still sees emotions as directly functional, and as 'biologically determined processes, depending on innately set brain devices, laid down by a long evolutionary history' (1999, 51). He argues that emotions are tied into the homeostatic nature of all bodily controls and that this 'is the natural human condition' (Damasio 1999, 58). Damasio explicitly separates emotion and reason though he recognises that they impact upon one another (1999, 58). Overall, this approach sees sensation and emotion as different, in contrast to the totally biologically driven approaches, outlined above (Lupton 1998, 13). The cognitive role in interpreting physiological sensations is emphasised here, but an untenable biological essentialism remains.

The James-Lange hypothesis has formed the starting point of much of the innate cognitive tradition, even though it has often been heavily criticised. Robert Solomon has developed one such cognitive approach to emotion (1980; 2003). He has argued that emotions are not irrational occurrences, which happen to us, but rather 'we

choose an emotion much as we choose a choice of action' (Solomon 1980, 251). Emotions are for Solomon affective judgements about the world (1980, 270). You cannot be angry at someone unless you believe they have done you wrong, and you cannot be sad that someone has left unless you believe that their presence was a boon. Whilst Solomon, like James before him, differentiates between feeling and emotion, he also argues that although emotions often involve feelings, this is not their defining feature (Solomon 1980, 254). This clearly distinguishes Solomon's understanding from the James-Lange hypothesis, which saw emotions as the interpretation of feelings. Solomon's arguments strike against both the 'traditional view' of emotions and the folk-model of emotion. Unlike approaches which see emotions as uncontrolled 'real' responses to situations, he argues they are under our control, based as they are on the choices and opinions we form (Solomon 1980). Emotions, Solomon suggests, are rational and purposive even when decided in haste (Solomon 1980, 262-3).

There has been much debate, within these various schools of thought, as to the degree to which cognition and biology play various roles in the generation of emotion. The cognitive school has also been criticised for placing too much emphasis on rational thought, and ignoring other aspects of knowledge (Calhoun 2003). These debates, however, have failed to deal with the vital critique raised by philosophers and anthropologists who wish to place the emphasis on how emotions are socially constructed. As archaeologists, it is these arguments that have the most impact on how we approach emotion, not only because they move the focus away from the internal minds of individuals but also because they show us that emotion in the past may have been very different from today.

The social construction of emotion

There are several problems that all of the above writers share. First their views of emotion are essentialist. They fit well with the modern concept of the individual that is prevalent in the West today, but are at odds with other societies where different conceptions of the person are paramount (see chapter 2). They are constructed, as Catherine Lutz has pointed out, within a discourse that rests on the old Cartesian dualities of mind and body, nature and culture, and public and private, that are in fact

cultural assumptions rather than scientific fact (2003, 143). Within modern Western discourse emotion takes up a curious place. Different emotions are valued in both a positive or negative light[ii]. It is good to be sensitive to emotions, to feel and express them. Yet it is also seen as a sign of weakness, as irrational, as female (Lutz 2003, 143; Lupton 1998, 112). The notion of the bounded individual, inside of whom lies the torrent of emotions waiting to escape, is a peculiar construct of the Western world. Instead of arguing, as much of the literature on emotions has done, that they represent universal human sensations or the result of a series of decisions, it is time to recognise that these ideas are socially contingent. Like so much of Western thought, our concepts of emotion fail to make sense in a world where differing views of the person, body, identity and society are held.

The American psychologist James Averill was perhaps the first to utter the stark conclusion that 'emotions are social constructions' (1980, 37). This central thesis has proved effective, particularly in anthropology, where it has been used to critique the essentialist approach to emotions popular in much academic discourse. The crucial factor here is that emotions are not held to be biologically innate, but are seen as the result of sociocultural processes and involvements (Armon-Jones 1986, 33).

Post-structuralist philosophy has played an important role in the foundation of many of the arguments around the social construction of emotions, particularly in the work of the influential anthropologist Catherine Lutz (1986; 1990; 2003). Drawing on both the work of Michel Foucault (e.g. 1977), and Jacques Derrida (1981), she argues that we cannot impose Western discourse on people who come from different social contexts. However, she does not use this to reject the term emotion altogether. Using the ideas of Derrida, she argues that 'after deconstruction, emotion retains value as a way of talking about the intensely meaningful as that is culturally defined, socially enacted and personally articulated' (Lutz 2003, 144). Emotion, Lutz argues, is a product of social life; it is structured via the socialities and material conditions through which it is produced. Words like anger, which we in the West presume to be natural and universal, have been reified in our culture, that is made real in and of themselves. In fact these words are human inventions for our own cultural concepts. That does not mean we should necessarily reject them when talking about other

groups, but we must remain aware that they describe *our* conceptions of emotions, rather than a natural, precultural, fact that is somehow ontologically prior to language.

Lutz uses the Ifaluk concept of *fago* to indicate how emotions are socially constructed (2003). *Fago* is an emotion that exists amongst the Ifaluk that includes, to Western minds, seemingly contradictory notions of love and sadness. It thus contains emotions that are seen as positive and negative, in our culture, yet are combined into a new emotion within the discourse of these Pacific islanders (Lutz 2003, 150). *Fago* is used in context to describe the strength of particular relationships and 'to talk about the pain involved in the severance of relations by death or travel' (Lutz 2003, 151)[iii]. Here emotion and identity intertwine as *fago* also represents a claim on social position. To feel *fago* requires someone to have cultivated a certain set of sensibilities and practices (Holland *et al.* 1998, 12). This is just one example of a socially constructed emotion, however, that does not sit easily within Western discourse. Others examples include the Japanese emotion *amae* and the historical notion of *accidae* (Morsbach and Tyler 1986; Harré and Finlay-Jones 1986). The former of these is difficult to render into English and yet it is seen as central by the Japanese to the very nature of being human (Morsbach and Tyler 1986, 290). It typically involves the love between a child and mother, but it can be used in multiple contexts, and has both positive and negative connotations. *Accidae* by contrast was an emotion often spoken about in medieval times, and involved boredom, dejection and disgust with one's religious duty (Harré and Finlay-Jones 1986, 221). In the same article that they discuss *accidae*, Harré and Finlay Jones trace the disappearance of melancholy, once held to be a central part of psychology and an essential mood for any creative genius (1986; cf. Burton 1948 [1621]). Now, although we are aware of what it means, it is hardly an emotion, or mood, that crops up in everyday life[iv].

These examples should hopefully demonstrate that emotions vary across space and time, but it is worth pointing out that the position I have outlined, that of strong social constructivism, is far from universally accepted. Not only does its emphasis on language fail to deal with the embodied or affective side of emotion (Heidegger 1967; Lupton 1998; Lyon and Barbalet 1994), it has also been argued that it fails to deal with the power of emotion words themselves, and the political consequences of emotional regimes (Reddy 2001). I shall return to the former critique in a moment

when I come to set out my own views on emotion, but first I shall deal with this latter criticism and the work of its author, the social historian William Reddy.

Emotives, emotions and emotional regimes

William Reddy has criticised the social constructivist school of thought on a number of levels (1997; 2001). He argues initially that neither the discourse-based understandings of Foucault nor the practice-based understandings of Giddens and Bourdieu adequately characterise the 'the two way character of emotional utterances and acts' (1997, 327). Reddy is deeply critical of both these perspectives and thus also deeply critical of those anthropologists who have drawn upon them (1997, 328). The critique constructed by Reddy attacks these views from multiple directions. He argues that not only do they fail to deal adequately with the nature of emotion and emotional utterances (or emotives as he terms them), they also prevent any political critique being offered of societies in which emotional repression (as he sees it) is omnipresent (Reddy 1997, 329). Social constructivism, he argues, places the individual as infinitely plastic and thus 'there is nothing in virtue of which liberation is good' (Reddy 1997, 328).

Instead Reddy argues for a view which combines psychological understandings of how emotions work, both cognitively and affectively, with a sense of how they can be emphasised or underplayed through language (2001). In particular Reddy emphasises the importance of emotives. These he argues are neither descriptive, nor performative, but fall between the two (Reddy 2001, 99). Emotives attempt not only to interpret internal feelings and report them to another person, but at the same time transform the emotion itself (Reddy 1997, 331; 2001, xii). These emotives exist within emotional regimes that emphasise certain emotions and suppress others. It is these emotional regimes that Reddy wishes to submit to political critique, arguing that the greater the amount of emotional freedom the better (2001, 324). In his view the modern West represents the greatest achievement politically of human kind as it allows, Reddy argues, the greatest amount of emotional freedom (1997, 339).

Overall Reddy falls between the social constructivist position on the one hand and the innate biological/cognitive school on the other. He argues passionately for a politically informed, historically situated view of emotions that nonetheless looks to

ground a 'universal claim in emotional life rather than in identity, gender, culture or discourse' (Reddy 1997, 330). In other words, Reddy believes that a universal basis for humanity can be found within an understanding of emotions, emotives and emotional regimes.

In many ways, Reddy's attempt to find a politically and historically situated understanding of emotion is laudable, as is his willingness to consider data from a multi-disciplinary angle. However there are several, fundamental, difficulties with his work. To begin with, his assumption that emotions remain at least partially innate to human beings is based, once again, upon the concept of a bounded whole individual that is unique to Western discourse. He fails to recognise how much of the psychological approach he uses is rooted within particular notions of the self. These are not notions one can use uncritically. He is right to say that neither notions of discourse nor practice truly capture the nature of emotion. But the answer to this is not to reject the powerful insights of Foucault and Bourdieu, not to mention the anthropologists who have drawn upon them (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1986; Grima 1992; Lutz 1990). Instead as I will argue below, and have argued in a different context elsewhere (O. Harris 2003; see also chapter 2), the answer is to combine these arguments to gain a powerful understanding of both the practical and discursive nature of emotion. It is also unfair, as Catherine Lutz (1997) has pointed out, to argue that a politics of emotion requires a universal claim about the nature of the person when there are excellent works demonstrating that this is not the case (Cvetkovich 1992; Pfister and Schnog 1997; cf. Thomas 2001).

Reddy's concept of emotives fails to deal with how complex emotional expression can be in both body and language, and how it can work at the group level as well as within the form of a bounded individual (1997; 2001). Power for Reddy lies in emotional control, and his concept of emotional regimes is perhaps the finest section of his argument. Yet one can see how this can easily be combined with a recognition that emotions are experienced by a situated self and are still constructed through discourse and practice without being based in a posited universal humanity.

Here, however, I am beginning to stray into the next section of the argument. In what follows I will set out my own view of emotions, drawing not only on the social

constructivist position, but also on the understandings of practice of Bourdieu and others. This in turn I hope will be enhanced by an analysis of the writings of the anthropologist Maurice Bloch. Finally I wish to situate these arguments around the idea of an embodied self, being-in-the-world, developed in chapters 1 and 2. This will allow us to recognise the fundamentally embodied nature of emotions without having to posit a particular conception of the body, self or person.

An emerging perspective

Emotions are not natural, innate, or universal. Yet they are embodied, felt and real. They exist in language and outside of language; they are learnt and absorbed through discursive and non-discursive means. They can be thought about in a narrative linguistic sense, and yet felt and understood in other ways. They are integral to human existence (Lyon and Barbalet 1994, 48). How can we approach this as students of the person? The answer is not to accept only one understanding of emotion but to realise how emotions work at a number of simultaneous levels. Emotions are locked into thought, action and agency and realised through our being-in-the-world. My point of view draws heavily on the constructivist position I have outlined above. Following anthropologists such as Lutz, I would argue that emotions are socially contextualised and are both temporally and spatially contingent (Lutz 1990).

The basis for this understanding lies in the post-structuralist reading of discourse as advocated by Foucault in particular (1978). Yet such points of view place their emphases firmly on language. Within post-structuralist thought, nothing is ontologically prior to language and it is through language that we construct and understand our worlds. Yet recent work on the structure of thought by psychologists, and brought to anthropology by Maurice Bloch, suggests that thought is not language-like (1998). Bloch uses this argument to point out the difficulties in ethnographies that rely upon verbal statements by informants (1998, 24). The people whom ethnographers study are being asked to vocalise ideas that are not, in fact, language-like. They must take ideas, linked by multiple pathways through clumps of thought, and transform them into narratives driven by language. Emotions, however they are defined, surely fall into this category. If they are not language-like in themselves, if their expression through language, as indeed Reddy argues (2001), is always unsatisfactory, then it seems reasonable to conclude they are not entirely constituted

through language. Instead I believe that a second way in which emotions are constituted is through daily practice, through the unconscious world of the *habitus* (Bourdieu 1977; 1990; see chapter 1).

Emotions within this context are learned through experience, through observation. As one grows up, the routines of daily life, which involve emotion of one sort or another *at all times*, are learned and inculcated so that they become, at times, unthinking. Thus it is not surprising in our society that grief is felt at the passing of a loved one, or on a more day-to-day basis, that happiness is felt at the arrival of the weekend, or the meeting of friends. These practical understandings are formed through social experience, just as the more discursive and linguistic structures discussed earlier are.

None of this, however, denies the crucial role that language plays in emotion. Our conversations about emotions, and the words that are invented to describe them, play vital roles in generating the discourse and practice through which emotions are experienced. Differing emotional regimes may create fewer or more words for emotion and differing forms of sociality may place greater or lesser emphasis upon discursive understandings (cf. Belaunde 2000). We can see changes in our own society in this respect, as an increasing emphasis has come to be placed on getting in touch with, and being open about, your emotions (Lupton 1998)[v]. This new emotional discourse places increasing emphasis on open discussion.

Embodied emotions

This is not to suggest that we should accept the social constructivist position without examining it critically. One crucial difficulty with the idea of the social construction of emotion is that it creates an assumed dichotomy between individual and society (Toren 2001, 159). Marilyn Strathern, amongst others, has showed such a dichotomy to be rooted in particular Western ways of thinking about the world (1988). Instead, we need to recognise that whilst the processes of discourse and the habitus play crucial roles in human emotionality, these aspects of emotion emerge through a process of 'development' (Ingold 2001, 120). That is to say, they develop through the lived experience of dwelling, of being-in-the-world (Ingold 2000). This is not the cultural acting upon the natural, but rather that dichotomy is dissolved, and people emerge through being-in-the-world, through performance and through development

(Butler 1993, 10). This does not mean we have to reject the insights of Harré, Lutz and Averill, but it requires us to combine their work with other understandings.

Thus rather than a classic position of social construction, where a person's emotional world is constructed through their interaction with society, this approach recognises that it is through embodied relations and agency that discourse and the habitus emerge. Emotions remain, from this perspective, inherently social, and the insights of Lutz and others continue to be important. They are social in that they are relational, and directed (Ahmed 2004). One is not just angry, but angry about something (Ahmed 2004, 7). Thus emotions direct our attention outwards towards a world in which we are always and inescapably enmeshed. Yet this embodied approach also recognises the felt or affective side of emotions too. Their power and efficacy comes from the fact they are felt as well as understood, and blur in Western terms, the differences between body and mind (Svašek 2005a, 196). Emotions here are central to embodied agency (Lyon and Barbalet 1994, 55), that is, to the position that combines identity, dwelling and practice which I outlined in chapters 1 and 2. Emotions form a central link between internal bodily and psychic processes, and external social relations. It is in this sense that they in fact come to shape the boundaries between people, and between people and the world (Ahmed 2004, 1). I will adopt the terms 'socially contingent' and 'socially contextualised' to summarise my point of view from now on. I believe that this use of language recognises the role of discourse, practice, embodiment and performance, whilst not imposing Cartesian dichotomies on to our way of thinking.

Recent work in archaeology has emphasised the role of embodied experience (e.g. Tilley 1994; Thomas 1996; Hamilakis *et al.* 2002), but one aspect that has often been missing from such accounts is the *emotional* aspect of being-in-the-world (cf. Tarlow 1999; 2000). This is surprising when one considers the important emphasis placed on moods by Heidegger (1967), perhaps the chief inspiration for both Tilley (1994) and Thomas (1996). Moods, for Heidegger, are 'the very basis of human awareness' (Solomon 2003, 180). An instant objection might be raised here that moods and emotions are not the same thing. Moods have something of a different temporality to them. However, as I indicated earlier, these words are part of our particular Western discourse, and I do not wish to be drawn too tightly into definitions of mood, emotion

and feeling. Thus for our purpose moods and emotions are the same thing. These moods are inescapable; we can never be entirely free of them (Guignon 2003, 184). Moods and emotions as embodied experiences allow us to reject a dichotomy between thought and feeling, and to recognise that both emerge together as socially constituted aspects of our being-in-the-world. As Charles Guignon points out in his discussion of Heidegger, 'a mood is a quality of being-in-the-world as a whole, and is therefore prior to any distinction of "inner" and "outer"' (2003, 185).

It is important to emphasise that this recognition of the embodied nature of emotion does not in any way deny that emotions are socially contingent. Heidegger recognised the contextualised nature of the self, and thus the contextualised nature of mood, both socially and historically (Guignon 2003, 183). There are a range of experiences available to human beings, a range of feelings that are possible, but 'it will depend on the acculturation and personal experience of individuals in what ways these sensations, sounds and movements are understood and experienced as emotions and other phenomena' (Lupton 1998, 34). A similar point has been made by Butler (1993, xi) as I pointed out in chapter 2. So while we can accept that a feeling side to emotions exists, and recognise its importance, we have no need to insist upon its specific universality. This understanding of emotions as emerging through being-in-the-world allows us to recognise not only how they are produced through discourse and practice, but the affective side to emotion too.

This argument clashes strongly of course with those of many psychologists, some of which I have discussed above. Objections might be raised highlighting the work of Paul Ekman, who has looked at how emotions and facial expression are linked (e.g. 1973). He argues that there are distinctive and universal expressions for some emotions and that therefore the emotions are universal too (Ekman 1973). This argument has been criticised from several perspectives, however, and evidence has emerged that has found significant differences across cultures in the recognition of different expressions (Russell 1994; Rosenzweig et al. 1999).

Alternatively psychologists often use the study of people suffering from brain damage to support a notion that emotions are biologically determined and universal (e.g. Damasio 1999; Harley 2004). Damasio, for example, has pointed out how

neurological damage can lead people to lose the ability to feel particular emotions (1999, 41). It is also certainly true that stimulating particular areas of the brain can lead to particular emotional responses (Kalat 2001, 340). However, neither of these arguments undermines the theory of socially contingent emotions. No-one is denying that emotions are felt, interpreted and understood in the brain, and that particular sites in the brain may have evolved specifically to deal with this task. Such an assertion, however, does not mean that all emotions are the same everywhere, any more than recognising that people use their brains to think with indicates that everyone has the same thoughts or even range of thoughts. Brain damage, along with other disabilities such as deafness, may well affect how emotional situations are experienced or which emotions are learned, but the basic process remains the same. It is still learned and absorbed through discourse, practice and being-in-the-world, even if that experience is impaired by damage to the brain. The experiential difference of being-in-the-world is huge of course, and may impact on the ability of a person to learn through language or practice, but nevertheless it is still a combination of these factors that will influence how emotions are understood.

Recent work using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has also shed light on the working of undamaged adult human brains and, in my opinion, provides further support for the position I have outlined above (Singer *et al.* 2004). The fMRI works by scanning the brain and detecting which areas are stimulated during various activities. Recent research carried out by Tania Singer and colleagues has looked at how pain, and more importantly, empathy can be detected through the use of fMRI (Singer *et al.* 2004). They examined how pain inflicted on a person caused particular areas of the brain to be stimulated, and how being aware of this caused their partner's brain to be stimulated in very similar, though not identical areas (Singer *et al.* 2004, 1161). The differences they identified showed that empathy led to parts of the brain associated with the affective, rather than sensory side, of emotion being stimulated (Singer *et al.* 2004, 1157). Singer *et al.* conclude from this that 'the understanding of someone else's emotional reaction to pain does not necessitate... a detailed sensory-discriminative representation of the noxious stimulus but rather a representation of the subjective relevance of the stimulus as reflected in the subjective unpleasantness that the other person feels' (2004, 1161). In other words you can imagine a person's pain without feeling it directly. How do these revelations impact on my argument? The

first point to make, again, is that the recognition that certain parts of the brain deal with certain emotions, e.g. pain and empathy, in no way means that these emotions are universally understood in the same ways. Pain is clearly a sensation that all humans feel, but how they understand it may be very different (Butler 1993, xi).

It is the side of the argument that deals with empathy that I feel is important. Empathy is without doubt a socially contingent idea. Who you feel empathy for, under what circumstances and how intensely, depends entirely upon the social relationships through which it is felt. One only needs to examine the genocides of the 20th century to realise that empathy for another's pain is hardly a universal, or automatic, human emotion. Empathy is a Western term for a particular emotion, felt within particular circumstances, and when experienced stimulates a certain part of the brain. Similar emotions to empathy may well be felt elsewhere in the world but they may be experienced in different ways, in differing circumstances, and be associated with other emotions. The point is, *contra* Damasio (1999), that the stimulation of the brain is not dependent just on the sensory input – the sight of a person in pain – but on an *understanding* of their pain (Singer *et al.* 2004). This understanding of empathy, on whose behalf it is felt and when and how intensely, is socially contingent, not universal and natural to humanity. It also demonstrates neatly the point I made earlier in this section, that just because emotions are traceable back to particular areas of the brain, does not mean that they are biologically determined.

Let me sum up the view of emotions I have outlined above. Emotions are constituted through our being-in-the world. They are constantly experienced bodily and are an inescapable part of human existence. They are themselves, however, socially and historically contingent practices (Ahmed 2004, 9). The rhythms of life, of practice, agency and language, help to construct particular notions of what an emotion is and what emotions exist. Emotions are neither wholly linguistic constructions nor entirely unconscious in nature. They are created through both discursive and non-discursive practice. That is to say, they are constructed through both the *habitus* and discourse (Bourdieu 1977; Foucault 1978). They are both felt and understood, and are central to the way people form relations with the world around them (Milton 2005a). However, the distinction between the affective and the understood should not be seen as the creation of a new dichotomy. Their relationship is porous and variable, far more a

duality than a dualism (cf. Giddens 1984). Thus emotions emerge through the practice of quotidian life and the performance of social roles, through unconscious learning and linguistic debate. They are experienced affectively and consciously. Emotions are thus situated within discourse, practice and being-in-the-world.

The anthropology of emotion

This claim that emotions are socially contextualised and central to human experience may not be enough to convince all doubters of the need to include them in archaeological understandings of the past. However, an analysis of ethnographies that have placed emotions at their core will reveal the central role that they play in sociality. It is clear from the work of anthropologists such as Renato Rosaldo and Joanna Overing that an understanding of emotion is essential if any attempt to understand society or sociality is to be undertaken (Rosaldo 1993; Overing 2000; Overing 2003; cf. Overing and Passes 2000a). I will now turn to an examination of the work of these anthropologists, beginning with that of Rosaldo.

Grief and a headhunter's rage

Rosaldo's study of emotion is as much personal, as it is ethnographic, in nature. What it shows clearly, however, is the dominant, driving role which emotion can play in the socialities which people inhabit. Rosaldo's work focuses on the Ilongot people of the Philippines, who until recently were headhunters (1993). Rosaldo was interested in why Ilongot men felt the need to cut people's heads off but was at first unsatisfied by the answer he received (1993, 3). The Ilongot men argued that the rage and grief brought on by bereavement compelled them to seek out other men and chop off their heads (Rosaldo 1993, 3). Rosaldo found this answer initially to be too simple and stereotyped (1993, 3). However, on the occasion of his own bereavement, the sudden and unexpected death of his wife during fieldwork, he experienced rage and grief of such intensity that he began to understand the reality of what the Ilongot had told him (Rosaldo 1993, 9)[vi]. The Ilongots' anger was not identical to Rosaldo's, however, as he had no desire to kill anyone, but it demonstrated to him the force with which emotions could be experienced (1993, 10). It has been suggested by some anthropologists that Rosaldo (1993) offers a universalising account of emotions (e.g. Beatty 2005, 20). Beatty argues that Rosaldo recognises the universal quality of anger

in both his grief and that of the headhunters. I would not agree with this interpretation of Rosaldo's work. It is the intensity, the capacity to motivate action and the impact of emotion that Rosaldo recognises, not its universal quality (*contra* Beatty 2005).

Rosaldo turns his argument to the process of ethnography, which much like archaeology, treats death as a matter for ritual rather than bereavement (1993, 12). He suggests this is in part due to the young age of most ethnographers, and their commensurate lack of direct experience with bereavement (Rosaldo 1993). Overall Rosaldo argues, ethnographies 'that in this manner eliminate intense emotions not only distort their descriptions but also remove potentially key variables from their explanation' (1993, 12). Here we have a powerful argument for including emotions within our understandings of past societies. Without a recognition of emotion in Rosaldo's work, he would have continued to struggle to understand the violence that once dominated Ilongot society, and the changes that have resulted since headhunting was brought to an end. We often encounter the results of death and violence in the Neolithic, at the *Linearbandkeramik* site of Talheim in Germany for example (Whittle 1996), or in the human remains in British Neolithic long barrows such as Ascott-under-Wychwood (Benson and Whittle forthcoming). Our understandings of these tend to be based on explanations of an economic or social nature. Rivalries, raiding, and pressure on resources have all been postulated as causes of violence in the past. Rarely have rage, grief and anger been seriously examined (Rosaldo 1993; Alès 2000).

The anthropology of love and anger

It is not, however, only in such extreme examples that emotion plays a central role in sociality. An examination of the works contained in *The anthropology of love and anger* reveals the central role of emotions in small-scale agency and sociality (Overing and Passes 2000a). Here, in these studies of conviviality in Amazonia, emotions play such a crucial part that no understanding of the groups under scrutiny would be possible without considering their role[vii]. Overing and Passes identify emotions such as love and anger as particularly important (2000b). I will now turn to a consideration of several of the chapters included in this superb and insightful volume, beginning with an analysis of the overall theme.

Conviviality

The key to understanding Amazonian sociality, argue Overing and Passes, is the concept of conviviality (2000b, xiii). By this they mean much more than the traditional English definition of 'having a good time in the company of others' (Overing and Passes 2000b, xiii). Instead, drawing on the work of Ivan Illich (1973), conviviality is seen as on the one hand including:

> the psychological, moral and practical state of collective being implied by such amity and productive social play, and on the other hand, egalitarianism, cooperation, non-coercion and freedom of personal thought and agency (Overing and Passes 2000b, xiii).

Yet this only reflects one half of the notion of conviviality that Overing and Passes wish to describe; the other draws upon a native emphasis on features such as:

> peacefulness, high morale and high affectivity, a metaphysics of human and non-human interconnectedness, a stress on kinship, good gift-sharing, work relations and dialogue, a propensity for the informal and performative as against the formal and institutional, and an intense ethical and aesthetic valuing of sociable sociality (Overing and Passes 2000b, xiii-xiv).

Although it is important, as I will show later, to emphasise the variation between groups within the Amazon, the above definition begins to hint at how conviviality, and within that love and anger, play a vital part in Amazonian sociality. Indeed love and anger play crucial roles in marking the success or failure of social interaction and social process (Overing and Passes 2000c, 3). Central to this is the notion of the virtue of moral behaviour and an emphasis upon agency (Overing and Passes 2000c, 5). This is tied with an aesthetic that sees good/beautiful life as the aim of any sociality. By an aesthetic I mean a way of looking at the world that perceives beauty in proper action and appropriate behaviour. This good/beautiful life, this peaceful tranquillity, must be wrenched from a universe replete with dangers, chaos and temptation (Overing and Passes 2000c, 7). The emphasis within this is on artful living skills, on intimacy and conviviality. Emotion here plays a crucial role, not just in the expression of love and anger but in helplessness, homesickness and jealousy to give just three of many

examples (Gow 2000; Lagrou 2000; Gonçalves 2000). Emotion in Amazonia, as elsewhere, is made up of 'social, cultural experiences learned and expressed in the body in the daily process of personal interactions' (Overing and Passes 2000c, 20). Any consideration of Amazonian sociality[viii] must thus include notions around emotion if the subtleties of life are to be accessed. An emphasis on understanding the areas of life normally underplayed in social anthropology and archaeology, the comic, the personal, the quotidian and the emotional, is the central tenet of this book. Conviviality, the other key theme here, is already proving to be a useful tool to archaeologists (e.g. O. Harris forthcoming; Whittle 2005)[ix]. I will now turn to four specific examples, in order to look in detail at how conviviality and emotion are central to Amazonian life.

Homesickness amongst the Cashinahua

Central to the Cashinahua sense of self, Elsje Maria Lagrou argues, is a feeling of belonging (2000, 152). Through the experience of growing up the Cashinahuan body is moulded by the actions of those around them, transforming it. To reject those who did this, to not long to be with them, to not feel homesick when away, is in fact not to be human (Lagrou 2000). In order to understand why it is that the Cashinahua feel this way, we must examine their embodied notion of emotion and *being*, along with their powerful sense of agency. In Cashinahua ontology, emotions are embodied, as is knowledge. Thus it is the body which is talked about when emotions are discussed (Lagrou 2000, 152). As Lagrou puts it 'feelings are forces which, so to speak, transform the person's body, bodily fluids, smell and appearance' (2000, 152). The importance of this cannot be stressed enough. Just as emotions are embodied, and when felt, change the body, so knowledge is embodied (Lagrou 2000, 157). Rather than stressing the cerebral aspects of knowledge, Cashinahua ontology instead focuses on the performative, embodied, nature of both knowledge and emotion, far closer to Bourdieu's habitus in fact than many Western conceptions of knowledge (Lagrou 2000, 152). A number of differing knowledges are available to the Cashinahua, each drawing on a different body part: there is skin knowledge, hand knowledge and eye, ear, liver and genital knowledge.

This embodied notion of knowledge, emotion and the self is what creates the communal interest of the Cashinahua in any one person's body, 'whose state, shape

and texture are the concern of all' (Lagrou 2000, 159). The body thus reflects aspects of the person. If you are fat, for example, that indicates health and happiness; if you are thin the reverse is true (Lagrou 2000, 161). A key dichotomy in the Cashinahua understandings of self, emotion and knowledge is the bitter/sweet dichotomy (Lagrou 2000, 156). Sweetness is seen as being generous and caring, and is almost always a positive state. Bitterness is more contextually defined in terms of quality. All men are seen as needing some bitterness, but a Shaman is someone who is overpoweringly bitter; so much so in fact that their blood and flesh are said to be bitter (Lagrou 2000, 157). What is central here is that the body is situated in a network of relations, and these relations form that body, through physical contact and through residence in a particular place (Lagrou 2000, 159-63). A child immediately after birth is still physically malleable; the midwife can mould the face of a child to resemble her own (Lagrou 2000, 160). The body throughout life is not perceived as bounded and complete, like the Western individual, but instead its 'shape and state of being are the result of collective modelling and fabrication' (Lagrou 2000, 161). Here we encounter the powerful sense of agency which I mentioned above. Rites of passage use the metaphor of cooking to represent these transformations, much as the mother is seen as cooking the unborn child within the womb (Lagrou 2000, 165-6). These acts help tie individuals into kin-groups, making them human. The emotional ties felt between people are seen as central to this; without the longing for kin, one is simply not human (Lagrou 2000, 167). Anger is thus expressed in this group by ending conversation, in effect denying social relations.

Malignant agency and powerful substances amongst the Muinane

Within the Muinane emotions such as love, sadness and anger are not thought of as coming from within a person, but are believed to come from outside (Londoño-Sulkin 2000, 172). These thoughts/emotions (the distinction is meaningless outside of a Western nature:culture dichotomy) are the result of the agency of outside forces. These can be either benevolent agencies, in the form of consumed ritual substances, such as tobacco, or the malevolent forces of the animal world (Londoño-Sulkin 2000, 173-5). These outside forces bring various speeches to the Muinane, and it is this that gives them the power to act in certain ways. As Londoño-Sulkin points out, 'in Muinane rhetoric there is no essential Ego-like entity which pre-exists the speeches of ritual substances' (2000, 173). Positive emotions, particularly love towards kin, are

the direct results of tobacco speaking through you. Being filled with the speech of tobacco and other positive ritual substances, such as coca amongst many others, will allow cool living to take place and hot anger to be avoided (Londoño-Sulkin 2000, 170).

Cool, peaceful living is explicitly sought by the Muinane as they wish to avoid hot anger at any cost (Londoño-Sulkin 2000, 170; cf. Overing and Passes 2000b). Cool living includes being tranquil, good tempered and loving, whilst hot living is shown in anger, envy and violence. This is tied into an ontology that links thoughts with actions explicitly. Having bad thoughts will make you do bad things, and having bad thoughts is the result of the malign influence of dangerous animals. Animals, in Muinane cosmology, are like humans in many ways but are fatally flawed, their actions immoral and their tobacco false (Londoño-Sulkin 2000, 173). Animals are thus jealous of the Muinane and hope to 'sabotage the social capabilities of Real People by causing them to experience anti-social emotions' (Londoño-Sulkin 2000, 175). Differing immoral actions can be attributed to the speeches of differing animals, just as differing positive emotions/actions can be attributed to differing ritual substances. Thus thought/emotion and agency are explicitly material in character (Londoño-Sulkin 2000, 178).

Here then we have an example where personhood, acts of consumption and cosmology are intimately tied up with attitudes towards emotion, thought and agency. It would be impossible to access Muinane cosmology without recognition of the crucial role played by emotions, particularly those we might call love and anger, in forming sociality.

The fear of anger amongst the Airo-Pai

My third example is drawn from the work of Luisa Elvira Belaunde on the fear of anger amongst the Airo-Pai, of Amazonian Peru, and the crucial role this plays in sociality (2000). Life amongst the Airo-Pai appears to be harmonious but this is not in anyway automatic. The Airo-Pai believe themselves to be inclined to anger, which they see as far more than solely an emotional state (Belaunde 2000, 209). Instead anger is seen as 'a transformational force of key sociological and cosmological significance' (Belaunde 2000, 209). Anger dehumanises people, and it is the main

drive behind sorcery and murder, and thus one of the principal aims of child rearing is to imbue a proper fear of anger into the child (Belaunde 2000, 210). It is the duty of individuals to control their anger, however, and they do this by reminding themselves and others around them that anger leads to death (Belaunde 2000, 211). Thus amongst the Airo-Pai emotion talk, the explicit discussion of emotion, is central to its learning and control. Upbringing is crucial to this as I mentioned above; babies cannot be expected to control their anger, but must be taught how. Adults not only feel pity for babies, but also fear their uncontrolled rage (Belaunde 2000, 212). Anger is particularly dangerous in adults, however, for it is they who have gained a spirit companion (*huati*), and are thus able to kill through sorcery. Anger is thus physically dangerous, even if no physical violence is involved. It is also dangerous to the angry person, as the Airo-Pai cosmology continually stresses that to kill 'is to bring about one's own death' (Belaunde 2000, 217). As we can see, the fear of anger is thus necessary for the well-being of the community and the maintenance of a convivial life.

The three examples so far demonstrate how love, anger, fear and homesickness are caught up in the materiality and agency of daily life amongst these Amazonian groups. However it is not only these emotions that play crucial roles. In both archaeology and anthropology the ludic side of life is often played down. The people of the past, described in archaeology, are invariably serious, concerned with the powerful economic and social matters that weigh on their shoulders on a daily basis. As a final example from *The anthropology of love and anger* (Overing and Passes 2000a) I will offer a counterpoint to this by examining Joanna Overing's account of the comic amongst the Piaroa people of Venezuela (Overing 2000).

Laughter, word-play and bawdy banter

In her study of the ludic in myth and magic in Piaroa society, Overing (2000, 64) argues that anthropology in particular, but the social sciences in general, have suffered from a lack of a sense of humour. This, she argues, has seriously hampered the understanding of myth, ritual and daily practice (Overing 2000, 64). The ludic in Amazonia in general, she suggests, is 'a powerful tool for social living' (Overing 2000, 67). It is tied up with status, leadership, art, performance and the daily round. If people manage to fulfil their desire for collective togetherness, then the leader must

have great skills for 'merriment, jesting, clowning and dancing' (Overing 2000, 67). What is fascinating is that amongst the Piaroa, it is in the telling of myths that the strongest obscenities are used, and every example of myth telling that Overing witnessed included ribaldry, parody and irony (2000, 65). The contrast with typical descriptions of myth and ritual could not be stronger. These were not the serious tales conjured in the writings of social scientists but rude and funny tales about Gods whose behaviour often left something to be desired (Overing 2000, 65). Laughter is tied in with the rejection of many Western dichotomies, by the Piaroa, like that between work and play for example. This is rejected, as the Piaroa value the social side of work, an opportunity for husband and wife to work and socialise together (Overing 2000, 68). It is this that leads Overing to speak of the counter-intuitive (to Western minds at least) *play of work* (2000, 67; cf. Seremetakis 1991; Strathern 1988). Slapstick humour is essential to any physical endeavour that the Piaroa undertake (Overing 2000, 70).

Amongst the Piaroa, however, laughter is also a dangerous thing. Excess laughter is a symptom of a disease, *k'iraeu*, in which the sufferer goes slightly mad. The other symptoms of this disease are diarrhoea and sexual promiscuity. Notably all three are in effect excesses issuing from particular bodily orifices (Overing 2000, 71). The disease once diagnosed must be drawn out by a shaman. It is not only amongst humans that excess humour and indeed excess emotion is thought of as bad. Amongst the myths told by the Piaroa the misfortunes of people today are explained by the 'disturbed socialities' that resulted from excess emotion amongst the creator gods (Overing 2000, 73-6). However, good and proper laughter is also thought to be essential to the health of the community. Amongst the Piaroa, then, *context* is the key for humour (Overing 2000, 69). One banters with one's wife, but not with one's parents-in-law; one laughs in the right places but not in others. It is the balance of humour, a humour that must be thought as well as felt, that produces the tranquil sociality so craved in the Amazon (Overing 2000, 77; cf. all papers in Overing and Passes 2000a). Overing notes how a traditional, scholarly, attempt to describe Piaroa life would not mention the humorous, emotional side, to life (2000, 79). This would give only a shadow of the true picture, and fail to explain how the creator god myths are tied in with lessons around the control of excess of emotions, whilst being bawdy, rude and funny at the same time.

It might be offered as criticism of the papers in *The anthropology of love and anger* (Overing and Passes 2000a) that words like fear, anger and love describe Western emotions rather than Amazonian ones. This would be unfair on two counts. First, several of the papers deal with this problem head-on (e.g. Gow 2000). Secondly we have to use words to discuss these issues; no doubt these words are unsatisfactory, but nonetheless, 'whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent', as Wittgenstein (1961 [1922]) so rightly pointed out. The words that we use must by their nature describe things which we already know; the trick is to be explicit about that fact. Emotions like love and anger are not universal, but those words may suit us best when describing particular emotions in other societies. Thus whilst we can expand our vocabulary to include new words for emotion like *fago, amae* and *accidae*, we also need to recognise that words we already have may serve the purpose required. Overall we must acknowledge that these words are a *translation* of another concept and not a direct signifier of the concept itself.

Emotional archaeology

I have selected these four papers to give a taste of how life in different parts of the Amazon would not be understandable without a consideration of emotion. I could easily have written more about love, hate or jealousy if I had chosen to focus on other papers in the collection. I chose the four examples quite deliberately, however, to give a taste of how homesickness, fear, anger and humour are tied into the socialities of these people and how any attempt to understand their cosmology, mentalité or ontology would be useless without considering them. These emotions are tied in with agency, practice, ritual, myth, community, personhood and materiality. These latter concepts are themes regularly discussed in the post-processual archaeological literature yet none of them would be understandable in these societies without a consideration of emotion. How can we assume that we can understand these concepts in the past, without a similar consideration of how emotion was at play?

The cynical response to arguments like this has always been that, as archaeologists, we cannot begin to access things like emotions from the material record. Unlike anthropologists we do not have access to living people to observe their socialities in

detail. There are two reasons why this argument is wholly false. First, as archaeologists we deal all the time with concepts that are equally as ephemeral as emotion and yet, when we examine them, intrinsically linked to emotion. It is the continuing tyranny of Cartesian thought that has separated emotion from the 'accessible' aspects of society, be that status, cosmology or ritual. Furthermore, it is tied into a view, held implicitly, that emotions are irrational, uncontrollable and female. These have been placed against a view of science as rational, controlled and male. These views have even seeped into post-processual archaeology which has still failed to get to grips adequately with emotions.

The second reason that emotions are accessible in archaeology is that the cynical view, outlined above, relies upon a view of the archaeological material as record. As I set out in chapter 1, this argument has been stringently criticised by John Barrett, who has argued that this view immediately separates the material from the processes of agency that brought that material into existence (2000, 25). Barrett argues that we need to approach the finds which archaeologists recover as the material conditions of social life (2001). Thus our aim is not to recover the evidence for differing social processes, but to explore these material conditions of life, and write about the differing ways they could have been lived through (Barrett 2001). Any attempt to do this, as I have shown above, must include ideas around how emotion and conviviality – the art of living well together – were played out. The material conditions would have been intimately connected to this helping to produce, as well as being produced by, different emotional worlds. We can see this within one of the examples I have just set out, that of the Muinane (Londoño-Sulkin 2000). There the material substances consumed by people (tobacco etc) fed directly into their emotional states (Londoño-Sulkin 2000). This is one example where emotion and materiality are inseparable from one another. We can also see this in Thomas Maschio's (1998) analysis of gift exchange and emotion in Melanesia, a study I return to below.

One archaeologist who has dealt with the subject of emotion is Sarah Tarlow (1999; 2000; see also Gosden 2004 and Meskell 1998 for other considerations of emotion and archaeology). She has rightly pointed out that any account of the past that deals with emotion in an explicit and theorised way will always be superior to one that leaves emotion as implicit and unexamined (Tarlow 2000, 719). She argues that

emotions are central to understandings of volition, agency and performance, and much as I have suggested above, that they are both socially contingent and embodied experiences (Tarlow 2000, 718). More pertinent at this stage of the argument, however, is Tarlow's assertion that it is the very contextual nature of emotions that places them under the remit of archaeology (1999, 35). As she points out, 'emotions are constructed through practices and ways of communicating, which we see in the archaeological record' (Tarlow 1999, 35). Leaving aside the problems which I described earlier with the use of the term record, this is a valuable point. Tarlow enhances this by pointing out that the emotional values of groups may well prove the most amenable to archaeological investigation rather than the direct nature of individual emotion (1999, 34). By this Tarlow means that we should not seek to reveal examples of individuals feeling particular emotions, but rather consider what kinds of experiences may have been emotional and how (1999, 34). What forms of practice may have been caught up in, motivated by and challenged through emotion? It is clear that such an approach would work well within the ideas of conviviality encountered above. Tarlow's important work helps us further our thinking about emotion and archaeology, and she rightly stresses the important role which metaphor can play in this (1999).

The consideration of emotion within archaeology, however, has not been universally welcomed (e.g. Hamilakis 2000, 126). Thomas (2002, 37) has suggested that the archaeology of emotions in prehistoric periods runs the danger of relying on empathy, or worse a transhistorical view of human mental capacities. Thomas is right to an extent, in that the use of empathy, or a notion of a common human heritage, will not allow us to better understand the people of the past. Instead, as I have suggested here, we should explore topics like emotion as we approach other kinds of past practices, by examining the different ways in which it might have motivated, provoked or compelled people to act in certain ways. This recognises explicitly, as Thomas demands (2002, 37), the socially contextual nature of emotion. It does not require us to search for individuals in the past, or discuss their explicit feelings of pain, loss or happiness (contra Meskell 1998). It is not the case that we will somehow access the real emotions of people in the past, but rather, as Gosden has put it, 'we might start to look at the overall texture of people's lives and how this was manifest through objects' (2004, 34).

This is all very well, but what kinds of areas might an archaeology of emotion investigate? The main exploration of that question takes place in my case-study chapters 5, 6 and 7. Before concluding this chapter, however, I wish to briefly examine three thematic areas in which I believe the study of emotion will prove to be central.

Themes to investigate

1) Emotional materialities

The emotional relationships between people and things offers an obvious point for archaeologists, as students of material culture, to begin to engage with the topic of emotion. Gosden has pointed out that objects regularly evoke emotions in people as they embody links to people, places and events (2004, 34). A related point has been made in anthropology by Maschio in his analysis of the affective side to exchange (1998). He argues that acts of exchange are both identity forming and highly emotional events embodying desires for objects, feelings of indebtedness, gratitude and envy (Maschio 1998)[x]. I return to Maschio's analysis of exchange in more detail in appendix 2.3.5.

Sara Ahmed has also developed similar ideas (2004). She has written about how objects, through exchange, become 'sticky' with affect, that is they carry emotions with them, or rather emotions are created in the relations these sticky objects form between themselves and people (Ahmed 2004, 11). This notion of things being sticky is a metaphor, it refers to the ways in which literally sticky objects can attach themselves to other things that come up against them. This of course relates back to the agency of objects I touched on in chapter 1. Part of objects' agency may have come from their ability to evoke emotional reactions in people, to carry, through their stickiness, emotional qualities from one situation to another (Ahmed 2004, 91). Thus 'affective economies' are produced through the circulation and exchange of objects and are held in the relations in which those objects are entwined (Ahmed 2004, 8). By coming up against other sticky objects or people, emotions (and indeed other qualities) can be transferred between things. For example a pottery vessel which comes to contain the cremated ashes of a certain person will produce certain emotions

in people. It is no longer the ashes themselves that produce the emotion, rather it is the stickiness of the urn and its relationship with people that has this effect. Temporality and emotion here are linked as the stickiness of objects allows affective links to be made between the past, present and future (Ahmed 2004, 202). Again these are themes I will return to in the case-study chapters.

2) Emotional geographies

Emotions represent one of the key ways in which senses of place are formed, and how those places are shaped and textured. The term emotional geographies captures something of how space is shaped emotionally, of how 'there are flows, circulations, distributions, intensifications and interferences of emotion between and among people, places and things' (Sheller 2004, 223). Landscape and places elicit, invoke or repress emotions (Sheller 2004, 226). As Sheller has pointed out, the key question is 'how sensations, cognitions and feelings arise together out of particular orientations toward the material and social world' (2004, 226; cf. Ahmed 2004).

An excellent example of these kinds of affective relations between land and people comes from Tracey Heatherington's study of people's relationships with common land in Sardinia (2005). There have been several attempts to remove common land in parts of Sardinia from public ownership. These have been strongly resisted by local Sardinians, who feel enormously emotionally attached to the common lands (Heatherington 2005). Heatherington traces how these affective connections are formed through everyday practice, as well as narratives of struggle, strife and hard work (Heatherington 2005, 147). People were not angry merely because the commons represented an economic resource, but because these landscapes were entwined in conceptions of what it meant to be part of the social group. These were primarily affective relations between the community and the landscape, one in which the commons were incorporated within metaphors of 'kinship, interdependence and affection' (Heatherington 2005, 147). The multiple activities that different people carried out on the common land only served to create various emotional links to the land (Heatherington 2005, 155). These are the emotional geographies which Sheller has defined (2004) and which are encountered through movement. Indeed as she points out:

Motion and emotion, we could say, are kinaesthetically intertwined and produced together through a conjunction of bodies, technologies and cultural practices (that are always historically and geographically located) (Sheller 2004, 227).

3) Performative emotions

It is not only places that were shaped and textured through emotion but people too. I have already noted that Ahmed views emotions as shaping bodies by defining senses of self and other (2004, 191). Feeling the right way at the right time would be an important way of marking somebody, indeed creating somebody, as a particular kind of person. Emotions are a way of responding to objects, people and places and thus form a crucial part of what defines those things and the boundaries between them (Ahmed 2004, 10). Emotions also performatively define groups as well as single persons. Indeed Maruška Svašek has traced how group membership among German expellees from the Sudetenland can be defined by the feeling of particular emotions, and how children of these people are encouraged to feel the same (2005a). This occurs through multiple channels. For example poetry is written intending to evoke emotional attachments to the suffering of their particular people (Svašek 2005a, 204). This poetry is aimed at younger generations, an attempt to ensure that the suffering remains a source of identification.

Perhaps the most striking way in which emotion forms the core of group identity comes from the Sudetendeutscher tag (Svašek 2005a, 206). Here tens of thousands of people gather together and take part in particular rituals (Svašek 2005a). The power both of the numbers of people and the controlled bodily aspects of ritual evoke powerful emotions in people, demand that people pay attention to them and thrust them to the centre of collective identity (Svašek 2005a, 206). Individuals stand and recount aspects of their personal suffering and grief, their memories become social memories, making them the site of identification for the group as a whole. People can chose to make collective emotions the centre of group identity, and this is enhanced through regular social interaction and engagement, the sharing of time and space, to produce 'shifting communities of memory and emotion' (Svašek 2005a, 203). People and groups can thus be created through the performative citation of emotion, through the expression of bodily feeling through language and practice.

Bringing emotion into archaeology will prove a complex and difficult process. It requires that we explore how differing emotional regimes and notions of conviviality might have been in play as life went on in the past. The study requires highly contextualised investigation of both quotidian life and key moments, such as feasts, funerals and monument creation. The temporality of movement and the varying intensities that might come with it also require wide-ranging discussion. Elsewhere, both Bourdieu (1977) and Mark Harris (1998) have described the changing forces of moods and emotions with the seasons, and this too might be investigated as part of a wider study into how people move through the landscape. Materiality, movement and performativity all offer concrete ways, however, in which we can begin to engage with emotion in the past. Yet a major aspect missing from my discussions so far has been the role of memory, a central facet to how emotions are experienced and directly relevant to discussions of materiality and emotional geographies. This latter area is one I will return to at the end of the next chapter, once I have engaged with memory directly.

Conclusion

Emotions are constituted through practical experience and discursive understandings. They are not ontologically prior to language, but nor are they entirely controlled by it. Rather emotions emerge as socially contextualised, embodied experiences, through our being-in-the-world. They are tied in with all aspects of life, notably materiality, cosmology, ontology and conviviality, which is the way people get on together, the art of living-well. With regard to day-to-day life we might ask how movement and interaction were important on a daily and seasonal basis in terms of conviviality and choreography (Overing and Passes 2000a; James 2003; Rivière 2000). I also see emotions as central to life as it was led in the small-scale communities of the Neolithic and thus believe there is much to be gained from Amazonian ethnography (e.g. M. Harris 2000; Overing and Passes 2000a). As Kay Milton has put it, 'understanding why people act as they do requires an understanding of how they feel, how they develop emotional commitments that motivate their actions' (2005b, 223). We need to build in these understandings if we are to write complex three-dimensional narratives about people in the past and if we are to explore the material conditions of life to their fullest extent (Barrett 1994). We need to combine these

understandings with detailed engagements with identity, and also with memory, the subject of the next chapter. Emotions are central to how people form senses of identity, embodiment and being-in-the-world. They are vital parts of how people engage with materiality and experience places, landscapes and monuments. They are crucial, in other words, to any attempt to offer a complex engagement with the archaeology of any period.

> Emotions are materially constituted and material culture is emotionally constituted. The movement from the material to the emotional is not easy, but it is vital if we are to grasp the true complexity of our involvement with the material and social worlds (Gosden 2004, 39).

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[i] In criticising this position I do not wish to suggest that the capacity or tendency to feel emotions has not evolved with human beings. Nevertheless, this tells us almost nothing about the relative importance of emotions, their role within different socialities, or their varied nature. Thus it is with being-in-the-world that such conditions emerge.

[ii] This division of emotions into positive and negative camps dates back to the work of Rousseau who divided human feelings into the natural sensations of the uncivilised (which he viewed positively) and the false sentiments of civilisation (which he viewed negatively) (Svašek 2005b, 3).

[iii] Other examples of Ifaluk emotions unfamiliar to Western discourse include *song* (glossed as justifiable anger) and *metagu* (glossed as fear/anxiety) (Svašek 2005b, 9).

[iv] Although it remains, of course, a crucial part of psychoanalytic discourse (Butler 1999 [1990], 73)

[v] It is worth pointing out the fascinating progression which Lupton traces between the development of ideas around the body in modern times and differing emotional discourses. Our current emphasis on emotional openness contrasts with a still prevalent idea that in certain contexts emotions betray weakness: weakness of a particularly female nature (1998, chapter 4).

[vi] Other examples of love motivating violence can be found amongst the Yanomami of Amazonia (Alès 2000) and also amongst British fascist discourse. In this latter example Sara Ahmed has traced how the fantasy of the ordinary white subject is created through the 'mobilisation of hate as a passionate attachment closely tied to love' (2004, 43).

[vii] By drawing extensively on the concept of conviviality I do not mean to suggest that there are direct similarities between modern day Amazonia and Neolithic Britain. Rather I intend to draw on the concepts developed here to challenge the ways in which we think about the past and to offer us new tools to engage with the small-scale socialities of prehistory. It is in this way that Alasdair Whittle (2005) in archaeology and Paloma Gay y Blasco (2005) in anthropology have drawn on the work of Overing and Passes (2000c).

[viii] The Western, modernist, concept of society is useless to us here, as it curtails much of what is central to Amazonian life (Overing and Passes 2000c; cf. M. Strathern 1988).

[ix] This also led to a highly stimulating session at TAG 2004, organised by Alasdair Whittle and myself. There Joanna Overing and a range of archaeologists discussed the applicability and importance of conviviality as a concept to a range of archaeological periods.

[x] Thomas Gregor has also shown that materiality, in the form of costume, can be caught up in the display of emotion as much as words, or bodily practices (1977). In his study of the Mehinaku he points out how the use of adornments by individuals 'proclaims their feelings to the rest of the community' (Gregor 1977, 166).

Chapter 4: Memory: an effort after meaning

'There is no perception which is not full of memories'

(Bergson 1911, 33)

'Just as expecting is possible only on the basis of awaiting, *remembering* is only possible on that of forgetting, *and not vice versa*' (Heidegger 1967, 389)

Introduction

Memory is central to our lives. It is what allows us to position ourselves within the flow of time, to recognise the past, the present and the future. It works at a number of complex levels, and may have been used differently in the past. Yet in all societies, as Bergson indicates above, remembering, like feeling, is an inescapable part of being human. Even people with amnesia can still remember how to walk, talk and understand. These abilities draw on memory, as much as recalling one's date of birth or name for that matter. What is not innate, or natural, to being human, is what, how and when we remember. In the last chapter I argued that emotion played a crucial role in a range of ethnographic societies. The viewpoint I proposed saw emotions as socially contingent, developed through discourse, practice and being-in-the-world. This latter part was crucial, as it was through development, through dwelling, that emotions came to have meaning. Such an approach also recognised the non-linguistic nature of thought, the affective side of emotions and argued against those who see emotions as purely part of our evolutionary heritage: a simple biological and universal consequence of being human. Some of the debate around memory that follows in this chapter will cover similar ground. There is much more to discuss than this, however. I will also focus on how memory works, how it can play out through narratives, and how it can exist as social, as well as individual, memory. Indeed the sharp distinctions that have been drawn in much of the literature between semantic and autobiographical memory and between individual and collective memory will be questioned.

Rather than the traditional view of memory as storage, I want to argue, following Bartlett, that memory is an 'effort after meaning' that involves the active reconstruction of past events (1932, 20). This understanding, as indeed Bartlett

himself went someway towards realising, needs to be situated within its social context. Memory is socially situated; it works at a variety of levels. It is present in everything we do, and in the form of skill, bodily practice and habit, it is implicit even when we do not realise it (Bourdieu 1990; Connerton 1989; Ingold 2000). Like emotion it requires explicit study by archaeologists both because it is so central to human life, but also because of the variety of ways if which it can play out in any one sociality. We cannot take memory for granted; we must critically examine the ways in which it might have worked in the past, if we are to understand more fully how the material conditions of life were lived through. Memory in the Neolithic, with the period's emphasis on monuments, cyclical movement, and repeated acts of deposition, must have been central to daily life. Before I can discuss how it might have worked in the past, however, I need to set out how it works in the present, and importantly, how it does not.

This chapter will begin by outlining the traditional view of memory as a store of information. This point of view will then be critiqued from a perspective that was developed in the early part of the 20th century by Frederic Bartlett (1932). This point of view, which sees memory as an act of (re)construction, rather than one of recall, will then be situated within the broader, but in my view complementary, dwelling perspective. This will provide the basis for my view of memory. In order to flesh out these ideas there will then be detailed consideration of the concepts of memory as skill, social memory and the role of memory as, and in, narrative. There will also be a consideration of how memory can work through material objects. I will also discuss the process of forgetting, and how material objects can be caught up in this (Forty and Küchler 1999). The discussion of social memory will be particularly important, and although informed by the dwelling perspective, the discussion will draw on a range of sources (e.g. Connerton 1989; Fentress and Wickham 1992; Halbwachs 1992 [1925]; Middleton and Edwards 1990). These concepts will then be critiqued drawing on the arguments of the anthropologist Maurice Bloch once again (1998). As with the discussion of emotion in the last chapter, however, it will be argued that his ideas can in fact be successfully combined with the others, if one recognises that thought acts in *both* language-like and non-language-like ways. The chapter will then set out fully my view of memory, drawing on these discussions.

Two further areas will be covered in this chapter. The first will be an examination of how some archaeologists have approached the topic of memory. The second will be a discussion of how memory and emotion, our earlier topic, work together. Memory and emotion are central to understanding each other, and one area in which they interact in particular is in the act of mourning the dead. This section will thus examine the work of the anthropologist Constantina Nadia Seremetakis (1991). She has studied the role of mourning and lamenting amongst the women of Inner Mani in Greece. An analysis of her work will be central to seeing how emotion and memory interact and how they can allow dominant narratives and discourses to be challenged.

Memory as storage

The traditional view of memory is summed up neatly by the psychologist Alan Baddeley when he says 'human memory is a system for storing and retrieving information, information that is, of course, acquired through our senses' (1990, 13). The idea that memory is a store from which we retrieve information has proved to be popular both within psychological and folk accounts of memory. From this point of view the mind works much like a computer's hard disk, saving information, and although some may be corrupted, or forgotten, most will survive to be passed on to the next generation through a process of transmission (Ingold 2001, 113). Such a view concentrates on knowledge, and on memory, as information that is stored in the human brain. Crucial to such a point of view as Ingold has pointed out, is that 'objects of memory pre-exist, and are imported into, the contexts of remembering' (Ingold 2000, 138). Such an argument has emerged out of a school of thought that sees memory as part of our biological inheritance, a consequence of environmental pressures at some point during the Pleistocene (Ingold 2001, 118). One key proponent of such an approach has been Dan Sperber, who has argued that 'human, genetically determined cognitive abilities are the outcomes of a process of natural selection' (1996, 66). Within these approaches memory is divided between long-term and short-term, which covers the temporality of the memories, and semantic and autobiographical, which covers the difference between external knowledge and personal experience. All of these rely on a view of memory as evolutionarily determined and universal to all of human kind.

I have already critiqued a position very similar to this on emotion at length in the previous chapter. Here again we are encountering a world of biological determinism based upon the Cartesian dualities of mind and body, and nature and culture. Such an approach, it has been clearly demonstrated, fails to begin to get to grips with what memory is, and how memory actually works. It also totally fails to understand the effect that different forms of sociality can have on what, and how, we remember. This is doubly surprising considering that the first, excellent, account of memory was written as long ago as 1932, by the psychologist Frederic Bartlett. It is to an analysis of his work that we turn to now.

Memory as effort after meaning

Bartlett attacked two of the key assumptions behind the memory as storage school of thought. First he emphasised the role of social influences in what, and how, we remember. He examined how memory worked in a number of ethnographic examples, looking at what was remembered and how much effort it took. This he discovered was heavily influenced by social factors. Bartlett demonstrated for example how someone, from a society that placed a great emphasis on cattle ownership, would easily remember the details of a long list of cattle (1932, 251)[i]. Indeed he concluded, 'the manner of individual recall may be very strongly influenced by persistent social tendencies' (Bartlett 1932, 263). Bartlett also showed how ideas needed to be converted into the 'schema' of a particular group in order for it to be remembered (1932, 312). He did this by getting a group of Cambridge students to read and remember a particular Native American folk-tale. Their recall of the details of the myth showed clearly how it had been converted to fit within their understandings of the world (1932)[ii]. Here we see how social contexts affect what it is that is remembered. Such an understanding shows how social influences can be central to how our memories work, yet if anything, this was the lesser of Bartlett's contributions to the understanding of memory.

Bartlett also carried out a series of tests on people's short-term or working memory, where he tested people's ability to recall written texts. His discovery that there were multiple variations in what people remembered led him to the exciting conclusion that 'remembering appears to be far more decisively an affair of construction rather than

one of mere reproduction' (Bartlett 1932, 205). Indeed he added to this 'as has been shown again and again, condensation, elaboration and invention are common features of ordinary remembering' (Bartlett 1932, 205). These reconstructions are locked into the *schemas* as Bartlett describes them of particular societies. Thus memory as an effort of reconstruction, or as Bartlett called it 'an effort after meaning' (1932, 20), is very different from the recall from storage view that has dominated much of academic and folk understanding of memory. Instead of simple recall we have an imaginative process of reconstruction built out of attitudes and points of view that are, in turn, socially contingent. This does not mean that the mind does not access real information, connected throughout different parts of the brain, when constructing a memory, but that the memory itself does not pre-exist the moment of remembering. Different forms of memory may thus more or less closely resemble the access of information stored in the brain, but even the most simple of tasks, say remembering the location of a light switch, still in fact requires the creative reconstruction of a mental map (cf. Zerubavel 2003). This latter example also relies on muscular memory that again is quite different from the simple recall of information from a store (see my discussion of bodily memory below).

Memory through dwelling

I believe that Bartlett's work forms an excellent foundation for the approach to memory that I wish to put forward here. This does not mean that this is the full story, however. It is important to situate these understandings gleaned from Bartlett's work within the dwelling perspective once more. It is through approaching the world from this perspective, inspired by the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, that mind:body dualisms can be overcome (see chapter 1). Furthermore, taking this perspective will allow us to complete the critique of the memory as storage model begun by Bartlett (1932).

Crucial to this approach once again is the work of Ingold (2000). In his discussion of memory, Ingold differentiates between two forms of model for society (2000, 133). These are the genealogical model and the relational model. The genealogical model sees culture as a body of acquired information that can be transmitted from individual to individual regardless of context (Ingold 2000, 138). From this perspective memory acts as a store, just as I discussed earlier. It acts, as Ingold puts it, 'like an inner

cabinet of the mind in which this information is stored and preserved from the vagaries of everyday life' (2000, 138). Such a point of view is exactly the one Bartlett was arguing against almost 70 years earlier. The core model of this approach is a tree, with straight simple lines connecting people together (fig. 4.1). Within this perspective knowledge is something that is possessed and remembering is 'a matter of retrieving from storage – or "calling up" – items of information relevant to the situation at hand' (Ingold 2000, 138).

Figure 4.1: This tree represents the classic view of the flow of information down interconnected branches to the main limbs and through them to the trunk. Note the pathways do not overlap, interconnect or contradict one another. The arrow represents the directional flow of information (after www 2).

It is this quite traditional view of memory that the relational model, situated explicitly within the dwelling perspective, attempts to overcome. Ingold argues that the rhizome, rather than the tree, forms a better model for human interconnectedness. Drawing on the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1988), Ingold argues that the rhizome, with its 'dense and tangled cluster of interlaced threads or filaments any point in which can be connected to any other' gives us a more accurate understanding of how memory works (fig. 4.2). The genealogical model presents humans as complete entities, finished and bounded, collecting and passing on information, knowledge and memory to the next section of branch or twig. In contrast the relational model situates

persons 'as a locus of self-organising activity: not a generated entity but a site where generation is going on' (Ingold 2000, 142).

Figure 4.2: My representation of a rhizome. Unlike the tree, the model suggests here that information intertwines, intersects and interacts (after Deleuze and Guittari 1988).

Thus memories from this perspective are not the recall of stored information but are generated through a process of development. Memory here, like emotion in the previous chapter, emerges through a process of being-in-the-world. Much of memory from Ingold's point of view therefore emerges through practice, through skill, in other words (Ingold 2001, 114). The memories we express everyday, in walking, driving and crossing the road have emerged through the developmental processes we have undergone, as we have become *skilful* at dwelling within this world. Memory, *contra* Sperber (1996; 2001), is not an internal genetic capability that is then filled with information either witnessed or told about[iii]. Instead the capability to reconstruct memories, the memories themselves, and the person emerge together through development, through dwelling and through being-in-the-world. It is essential that we approach memory from a dwelling perspective because, as Edward Casey puts it, 'what is memory-laden exceeds the scope of the human: memory takes us into the environing world' (2000, xix). Such an approach emphasises context above all else, and thus, as with emotions, memories are the products of engagements with particular social contexts, and emerge through inescapable relations with the self, others and the world at large (Toren 2001, 157). We cannot assume, therefore, that what we remember, or think is important to remember, would have been important to people in the past.

Social Memory

Memory does not only work at the level of the singular person, however. We also need to consider the notion of social memory. By social memory I am referring to those ideas, notions and concepts that are held in common by groups. This not only

refers to memories of events, occasions and happenings which multiple people experience, but also those common principles that bind a group together, and agreed versions of the past. Perhaps the first account of this was that by Maurice Halbwachs (1992 [1925]). Halbwachs was an academic influenced by two key figures, initially Henri Bergson and later, and more significantly, Emile Durkheim (Coser 1992, 7). It was this emphasis on Durkheim that led to his emphasis upon the collective, and in combination with Bergson, collective memory. Halbwachs argued that memories are structured through group identities (Fentress and Wickham 1992, ix). He believed that as people form memories in society, 'it is also in society that they recall, reorganise and localise their memories' (Halbwachs 1992, 38). Halbwachs argued that memories were structured through 'collective frameworks' that ensured they fitted within the dominant discourses of society (Halbwachs 1992 [1925], 40). Halbwachs developed this idea further, and indeed concluded that memory can only function in social contexts (Connerton 1989, 36). This probably pushes the notion too far. As a follower of Durkheim it is little surprise to see this emphasis on the collective coming to dominate, and indeed it leaves the individual rather as a slave to the enforced collective memories. Nevertheless, as James Fentress and Chris Wickham have argued:

> Halbwachs was certainly right to say that social groups construct their own images of the world by constructing an agreed version of the past, and to emphasise that these versions are established by communication, not by private remembrance (1992, x).

It is this emphasis on communication that is central, in Fentress' and Wickham's eyes to how memories become social (1992). They reject the term collective memory, which Halbwachs had espoused, and use the term social memory instead. This allows them to move away from the all-dominating society inherent in the thought of both Durkheim and Halbwachs.

Memory, in Western thought, tends to be divided into two types: autobiographical memory, which is memory of the events that happen to us, and semantic memory, that is memory of information that exists independent of context. An example of the former might be the events of a birthday party one attended, and the latter, that two

plus two equals four. Such a viewpoint was first put forward by the psychologist Endel Tulving (1983). However, this way of viewing memory comes from our own view of information as neutral and separate from the contexts of learning. It is doubtful that such a distinction would hold in other societies lacking the information storage systems of writing, and more latterly computers (Fentress and Wickham 1992, 21). Indeed it is probably a meaningless distinction in many literate societies too. The dichotomy has been criticised by Fentress and Wickham who argue that such a distinction far from being universal, or based on a biological distinction, is in fact a social fact (1992, 7). That is to say it emerges from our own agreed understandings, from our own social memory in other words.

We cannot divide memory into autobiographical and semantic functions, and neither can we neatly divide memory into individual and social functions. As Fentress and Wickham point out, 'memory is structured by language, by teaching and observing, by collectively held ideas, and by experience shared with others' (1992, 7). The crucial factor here is that all memories, even those that reconstruct events that were experienced alone, are constructed through our understandings of language and discourse, and are thus social as well as individual. Some memories may be more private and others more public, but these differences exist on a sliding scale; they are not absolute (Middleton and Edwards 1990, 10). Both emerge through our understandings of discourse and our experience of being-in-the-world. Thus we might distinguish between memories that are held socially and those that are not, but this distinction is heuristic and not absolute. The social nature of memory also allows contested accounts of the past to emerge; it is through debate, discussion and agreement that approved versions of the past emerge that themselves become in time to be accepted social memory (Middleton and Edwards 1990, 7). If memories are produced through particular social contexts, it is worth remembering that that very context is the stuff of social memory itself (Middleton and Edwards 1990, 11). Not mere background, nor all-controlling device, social contexts and social memories emerge through a process of dwelling within the world. Remembering is a particular form of social action within this. How is social memory sustained? Partly through discussion and debate, but also, as Paul Connerton (1989) has argued, through ritual and through bodily practice. I will now turn to an analysis of his work.

Bodily practices and incorporated memories

The emphasis upon language in the accounts of social memory by the likes of Halbwachs (1992 [1925]), and Fentress and Wickham (1992), contrasts strongly with the work of Paul Connerton, who places his emphasis firmly upon bodily practice, and commemorative ceremonies (1989, 7; see also Casey 2000). Connerton argues that it is through the relatively fixed and stable commemorative ceremonies and rituals of a particular society that social memory is created and sustained (1989, 57). Unlike myth, for example, ritual, Connerton argues, requires active belief for participation, and is relatively unchanging. These commemorative ceremonies, like all rituals he argues, are formal and performative and draw on a restricted vocabulary and are thus easily repeatable (Connerton 1989, 61). More than this, however, Connerton suggests that these commemorative ceremonies involve the ritual re-enactment of important moments in the past, and thus convey and sustain particular social memories (1989, 65). These ceremonies explicitly claim continuity with the past (Connerton 1989, 45). The way ritual acts in a performative fashion, he argues, also shows why the bodily practice of those that take part is central. It is through their bodily *incorporated practices* that commemorative ceremonies can help form habitual bodily memory: the right way of standing, acting speaking and listening (Connerton 1989, 72). It is these incorporated practices that situate the body within the commemorative ceremony, and thus within social memory. Once again memories emerge through a process of recreation, in this case, a physically embodied memory, rather than through the access of neutral stored information.

There are several difficulties with Connerton's account. First his assumption that in order to take part in a ritual you have to believe in it seems far too generalised. People can take part in rituals they do not believe in, and ritual can also be the site of contesting and conflicting beliefs (e.g. Seremetakis 1991; Snyder 1997). Indeed as Alasdair Whittle has pointed out 'ritual may itself depend on varying kinds of remembering, and can hardly be used to justify the distinction of a particular kind of memory' (2003, 109)[iv]. Rather than reject Connerton's account because of these weaknesses, however, we must rather consider how it can be broadened to overcome these problems. Undoubtedly, commemorative ceremonies play an important role in sustaining social memory, but these are not the only venues through which bodily practice can sustain particular memories. Both Bourdieu's notion of the *habitus* and

Ingold's notion of skill draw on similar understandings of habitual, unthinking, bodily practice (Bourdieu 1990; Ingold 2000). I have already described the idea of the *habitus* in chapter 1 and those 'systems of durable transposable dispositions' (Bourdieu 1977, 72) can now be situated within an understanding of social memory. Thus Connerton's ideas about rituals can be broadened into quotidian life. How people carry themselves, the clothes they wear, the paths they walk and their body language at every moment, are all caught up in the *habitus*, in bodily practice and thus in social memory (Bourdieu 1990; de Certeau 1984; W. James 2003). These performative actions not only convey the past into the present, but also the present into the future, and thus help sustain social memory.

Ingold's notion of skill also takes a similar view of memory, habit and bodily practice (2000; 2001). Ingold argues that human understanding of the world is not 'founded in some combination of innate capacities and acquired competence, but in *skill*' (2001, 135 original emphasis). Human beings develop skills as they dwell within their environments, and these skills are bodily knowledge: memory encoded within the body. Often these skills, or memories, are learned through a process of 'guided rediscovery' (Ingold 2001, 138). That is to say therefore that they are social skills, as much as private practical ones, and thus form part of social memory. Skilled practice, such as how to walk or how to make a pot, emerges through dwelling within a particular landscape, through particular contexts, and is locked into bodily, social memory. This division helps collapse once again the individual and the social, the past and present, and history and evolution[v] (see chapter 1). Bodily memory, or skill, as Casey has pointed out, only tends to be perceived consciously when something is out of place (2000, 146). Here we can return to Heidegger's division between ready-at-hand and present-at-hand (1967; see chapter 1). Bodily memory means we remember how a hammer works, how it should feel, without being consciously aware of it. The hammer is ready-at-hand (Heidegger 1967, 98). It is only when it fails to meet our expectations that we become aware of it, when it becomes, in Heidegger's term, present-at-hand (1967, 67).

The crucial aspect of place memory can be tied to the consideration of body and skill here (Casey 2000). As I discussed in chapter 1, places are produced through people's ongoing engagements and movements through certain locales. These movements are

replete with memories (Campbell 2006; Casey 2000; Harrison 2004). More than this these memories, as with emotion, come to shape these places, to entexture them and give them a sense of mnemonic geography (cf. Sheller 2004; see also chapter 3). People have memories of places, but engaging with places also stimulates memories both of earlier visits and of other people and events (Casey 2000, 33). Such memories emerge through dwelling, through the knowledgeable and skilled inhabitation of landscapes, through the engagement of *living bodies* with spaces that become places, and in so doing become bearers of memory (Casey 2000, 189)[vi].

Where does this leave my argument? I began by discussing social memory but soon came to the conclusion that the division between individual and social memory was meaningless. Nevertheless this does not mean that only individual memory remains. Instead, I take the view that all memory is social, in that it is constituted through a process of dwelling in a world wrapped up in bodily practices, discourses, places rituals and skills that are in themselves inherently social. Thus whether a memory is public, or private, it is constituted socially. Are there other ways that memories are conveyed and sustained? Partly inspired by Connerton's work, but also by those who have focused on the notion of object biographies (e.g. Appadurai 1986a), there has been much discussion lately of *material* memories (e.g. Kwint *et al.* 1999). This has clear resonance for our work as archaeologists and so it is to a brief discussion of this that I will now turn.

Material memories

The material we encounter on a daily basis is largely mnemonic in quality. Even in the modern West, where we are surrounded by mass-produced, alienated commodities, the ability of the material world to evoke memories should not be underestimated. This should come as no surprise. I have already drawn on Ingold's work to show how memories emerge through the process of dwelling (2000), and the process of dwelling is embedded within the material conditions of life (Barrett 1994). If memories, at least in part, allow us to share common views about the world and each other, it is unsurprising that the objects that surround us are caught up in this. How does this actually work, however? Marius Kwint has argued that in the modern West objects serve memory in three distinct ways (1999, 2). First they act as aids to memory, helping to 'constitute our picture of the past' (Kwint 1999, 2). Secondly they

act to stimulate memory, both accidentally and deliberately. Finally they can act as a form of record, storing information above and beyond human memory (Kwint 1999, 2). These 'stores' of information, however, are not neutral memory banks. Instead material things open up a dialogue between 'object, the maker and the consumer in constructing meaning' (Kwint 1999, 3). Once again here memories are constructed through a dialectical process, rather than merely being read off from an object or remembered in the mind. Objects can invoke memories of production and consumption, but also of exchange, gift giving and absent people or places (Maschio 1998). Their shapes, materials and textures can be redolent of spaces, places and people far away and can be pregnant with memories that are both comforting and upsetting.

Material memories also open up the possibility of considering how the senses interact with memory (Stewart 1999). We often consider the visual aspect of objects but rarely their textural nature (but see Cummings 2002). Although discourse and practice can form understandings around objects, just as they do around memories and emotions, objects too have the power to act back. Their shape, texture, smell and taste may influence the memories they invoke. Touch in particular 'traverses the boundary between interiority and externality and reciprocally returns to the agent of touching' (Stewart 1999, 35; cf. Irigaray 1985). A consideration of texture has also begun to influence archaeological approaches in recent times (e.g. Cummings *et al.* 2002). Taste as a stimulant to memory has been the staple of many debates, and of course, finds its apotheosis in that most quoted of biscuits: Proust's madeleine. We should remember that everything that can be found in a corporeal form can be touched and tasted and so it may not only be through objects that the senses stimulate memories. Memories might also be aroused through landscapes, animals, plants and people (cf. Pointon 1999 for a discussion of hair in this context).

Within this discussion about how material objects can be used as part of remembering, we should not forget the wider topic of how people *forget*, and crucially, how objects can be caught up in this. I will now turn briefly to examine this.

'Blessed are the forgetful: for they get the better even of their blunders'

(Nietzsche 1989 [1886], 217)

As David Lowenthal has pointed out, we cannot recall most of what we experience (1999, xi). But rather than merely dismiss that which we forget as failure to remember, we also need to consider that which is deliberately forgotten. This has led some authors to consider *'the art of forgetting'* (Lowenthal 1999, xi; Forty and Küchler 1999; Küchler 2002). These issues return us once again to ideas around social memory, because crucial to the art of forgetting is how societies as a whole remember certain events, people and places and choose, consciously or otherwise, to forget others (Forty 1999, 1). This is no bad thing. Without the ability to forget, it is unlikely that the human mind could function, already replete as it is with countless memories (Lowenthal 1999, xiii). Within the traditional view set out above, material objects are constructed to aid memory, and their decay and destruction, tantamount to forgetting (Forty 1999, 2). Yet as Adrian Forty has argued it is possible that 'artefacts constitute part of the process of social forgetting' (1999, 8). This seems counter-intuitive at first: how do you construct an object in order to forget something? However, as a number of authors have shown, this is exactly what happens both in ethnographic situations, and in our own society.

Susan Küchler has investigated how such ideas play out in the Bismarck Archipelago, which lies to the northwest of Papua New Guinea (1999; 2002). Particularly she examined the practice of *Malanggan*, and how this was tied up in forgetting (Küchler 1999, 55). *Malanggan* in fact is both the name of the practice and its outcome, which is a wooden sculpture carved from wood or woven from vines (Küchler 1999, 56). These sculptures 'mark the finishing of the work for the dead' (Küchler 1999, 56). To Western eyes, the *malanggan* appear not to be monuments, as they are temporary and transient, but this is exactly what they are. Instead of aiming to perpetuate memory, *malanggan* are tied in with the forgetting of the dead and the end of mourning. This involves a ritual where the skins of the *malanggan* are removed and it is left to 'die'. This represents the return of the dead to the earth and 'the triumph over death by turning the finality of death into a process of eternal return' (Küchler 1999, 57). *Malanggan* represent just one form of ephemeral monument, whose death and decay stand in turn for a process of forgetting (Küchler 1999; cf. Argenti 1999). The decay of the *malanggan* represents the 'literal burying of memories' (Küchler 1999, 58).

Some monuments are created to last, however, and are still associated with the concept of forgetting. Michael Rowlands has written about western war memorials from this perspective (1999). On the surface, such monuments seem like classic examples of material objects that are tied into remembering. Whilst this is true at one level, Rowlands demonstrates they are also crucially involved with an 'active process of remembering to forget' (1999, 131). He argues that war memorials recast the dead of war as sacrificial victims (Rowlands 1999, 136). The dead as actual people, the memory of the pain and brutality that they suffered and indeed gave out are forgotten, and replaced with an image of the purpose of their sacrifice (Rowlands 1999, 137). They died so the nation could live; they, in effect, were willing to be sacrificed. The dead thus become not a slain body on a battlefield but 'an idealised icon, cleansed of transitory weakness and moral stains' (Rowlands 1999, 136). War memorials are thereby tied into a process of 'collective forgetting' (Casey 2000, xii) of the horrors of war and remember instead triumphant, youthful sacrifice.

Rowlands' argument, whilst interesting, only deals with one aspect of war memorials, and different monuments to different wars may well serve different purposes. Notably the Vietnam war memorials play a complex role in America's relationship with that period of the past (Forty 1999). Memory and memorials are often caught up in these ambiguous processes (Young 1993). Crucially, therefore, Rowlands demonstrates one of the many ways in which these monuments can work, and shows how even explicit *memorials* can be caught up as much in forgetting as remembering.

These of course represent just a handful of the ways in which monuments can be involved in forgetting. What they allow us to do, however, is to begin to think about material objects, monuments and rituals as being, *contra* Connerton (1989) as much about forgetting as they are about remembering. Once again attention focuses on social memory. Although I do not wish to return to an individual versus social dichotomy, it is also important to consider how personal events and memories can effect individual people. In order to do this I will now turn to a consideration of autobiographical memory.

Autobiographical memory

Autobiographical memory is usually used to oppose semantic memory, the memory of context-free information. Autobiographical memory, by contrast, is seen as memory of what happens to us. As I hope has been made clear such a contrast cannot be sustained when one takes up a dwelling perspective (Ingold 2000). Nevertheless, by denying absolute contrasts between different forms of memory I am not suggesting that all memories are in fact the same. We should be willing to accept a range of ways of remembering, through habit, through skill, through material objects and through the narratives we create about ourselves. It is through this latter strand that I think we can tease out what we might mean by autobiographical memory, that is memories that are caught up in narratives around the self. Indeed it has been suggested that autobiographical memory plays a crucial role in the production of notions of self, personhood and gender (Fivush and Buckner 2003; Fivush and Haden 2003).

The roles of narrative and autobiographical memory are seen as critical to the production of self by authors such as Robyn Fivush and Catherine Haden (2003). They argue that narrative forms the crucial link between memory and the self (Fivush and Haden 2003, viii). Memory and autobiographical narrative structure each other, and in their argument are 'constructed through specific forms of social interaction and or cultural frameworks' (Fivush and Haden 2003, vii). Leaving aside for one moment the problems that any constructivist account has with imposed dichotomies and a lack of agency (see chapter 3), this is an interesting argument. How do autobiographical narratives help structure memory and a sense of the self?

The ability to construct narratives around and through memory emerges during early childhood (Nelson 2003, 3). This is not, however, an innate ability coming to the fore. Rather it emerges through the interaction of children and adults, and through their conversations about the past, present and future (Nelson 2003, 13). As Katherine Nelson points out (2003, 14), 'engaging in these experiences serves the child as a framework for reconstructing his or her own specific memories'. The role of language is crucial here as it provides the narrative framework for turning a single memory into part of a story. Known as social-interaction theory, this recognises how cultural variation can affect the importance of autobiographical narratives. Not only does this recognise how different languages and different discourses can form differing

narratives about the past, it also recognises how differing socialities place varying emphasis on the construction of autobiographical narratives (Nelson 2003, 21). In the modern West, for example, a sense of self and of being an individual is highly valued and thus autobiographical narratives are extremely important. This is less so in other parts of the world, such as India (Leichtman *et al.* 2003). Leichtman *et al.* examined variation in the date of earliest memories and the qualitative characteristics of autobiographical narratives in India and the United States in order to test for cultural variation (2003). Their research indicated that American's first memories dated back to a younger age than those of Indians, and their memories in general appeared to be more self-focused (Leichtman *et al.* 2003, 77). These differences, they argue, coincide with differing cultural values and the emphasis upon individualism within American society.

Such evidence has been reflected in New Zealand where comparative studies have taken place between the Maori (autochthonous) and Pakeha (people of European decent) populations (Hayne and MacDonald 2003). This revealed that amongst the Maori population, which places great emphasis on oral traditions and rich descriptions of the past, first memories were significantly earlier than those of the Pakeha population (Hayne and MacDonald 2003, 102). So the importance of autobiographical narrative and the date of first memories emerge from the different processes of *being* in various social worlds. This has important ramifications for the narratives we in turn construct as archaeologists, as we will need to be aware how differing emphasis on the self can produce different kinds of narratives and memories.

What goes without saying

In contrast to this the anthropologist Maurice Bloch has been extremely critical of the emphasis on narrative in memory studies (1998). He has argued passionately that memory and narrative are not intrinsically linked (Bloch 1998). As we saw in the last chapter, Bloch has argued that thoughts are not language-like in character (1998, 23). By this he means that thought 'does not involve linking propositions in a single sequence' (Bloch 1998, 23). Instead drawing on the theory of connectionism, Bloch argues that thought:

relies on clumped networks of signification which *require* that they be organised in ways which are not lineal but multi-stranded if they are to be used at the amazing speed necessary to draw on complex stored information in everyday activity (Bloch 1998, 23).

These clumps of signification can be accessed, Bloch argues, through many different parts of the brain through 'multiple parallel processing' (1998, 25). Thus in Bloch's example, when anthropologists ask for an explanation of a decision what they get is *'post hoc* rationalisation' (1998, 23). In other words the linguistic construction around the action comes after the thought and is not integral to it. Building on this, Bloch argues that we need to consider experience, practice and feeling as much as language in how socialities are constituted (1998, 25). We should consider, he argues, 'what goes without saying' as more important than the things that are actually said (Bloch 1998, 22). Bloch (1998, 102) explicitly rejects the connections between narrative and memory that authors such as Fivush and Haden have argued for (2003). Narratives, he argues, do not represent the ways in which we think about the world (Bloch 2003, 110). In his examination of the Zafimaniry, Bloch traces the multiple ways that narrative can work, through official histories, exaggerated myths, through houses and through material culture (Bloch 1998, 108-110). He concludes from this:

> humans construct a multiplicity of narratives of different types appropriate to different contexts and this very multiplicity ensures that their knowledge is not bounded by the narrative characteristics of any one of them. Narratives talk in different ways about what is known. They are not knowledge itself (Bloch 1998, 110).

This, however, slightly misses the point. Whilst agreeing entirely with his arguments that humans form a multiplicity of varied narratives, I do not think that these narratives form a neutral background to different forms of knowledge. That thought can work in non-linguistic ways is clear, both from the rapid and unconscious decisions made while driving a car or knapping an axe, and from the studies of cognitive psychologists. This, however, does not mean that thought *has* to be non-linguistic in fashion. We can think things through, or speak in one's head, and these thoughts are demonstrably language-like. Bloch might argue that they represent silent

speaking rather than true thought, but the point remains the same. These language-like thoughts are locked into narratives, and are influenced by discourse. Thus while thought can work in ways outside of narrative, it can also be understood through narrative, and crucially it is through narrative that memories are shared. The analysis of Hayne and MacDonald (2003) and Leichtman *et al.* (2003) demonstrates clearly that different narratives in different societies directly affect the nature of memory. They may not be knowledge themselves, but they do help to frame and shape knowledge.

This strikes directly against Bloch's argument (1998). I am not suggesting that a consideration of 'what goes without saying' is unimportant. As I argued both in chapter 1 and in the last chapter on emotion, the affective side of life and the unthinking actions that come with skill and habit are central to any understanding of sociality. What I believe is crucial is that, *contra* Bloch, we do not ignore the linguistic aspects of life and memory, and that we recognise how narratives and discourses are caught up in this. Bloch's argument is that thought is not language-like and, therefore, that linguistic narratives do not accurately represent thought and thus do not shape or effect knowledge or memory. My argument, in contrast, is that our understandings of thought, memory and knowledge are directly influenced by language and narrative, even when they are not language-like themselves. The agreed accounts of the past, what is remembered and what is forgotten can emerge through narrative and through debate and can thus become explicitly linguistic. Language in itself is a form of memory, as the contexts and discourses in which it subsists recall and refer to past debates, even if this, in turn, is unthinking.

Bloch is right to point out, however, that much of memory is unthinking, and it is certainly not stored in a linguistic form even if we sometimes, in my opinion, recall it as such. His understandings also allow the false dichotomy between semantic and autobiographical memory to be broken down (Bloch 1998). In his study of the Zafimaniry Bloch argues that both semantic and autobiographical memory are recalled as experience and thus the difference between them vanishes (1998). The Zafimaniry, who live in Madagascar, were the victims of a particularly cruel repression by the French colonial authorities in 1947 (Bloch 1998, 119). They had to hide at a particular location away from their village for some time. On returning to

their hideaway with Bloch, many years later, the scene was retold not only by adults who had been alive at the time but also by those too young to have experienced it (1998, 121). For both generations the memories were part of the lived experience, even though only one had experienced the actual events (Bloch 1998, 121). This agrees well with views of memory argued for by both Bartlett (1932) and Ingold (2000). The reconstruction of memory through experience rather than the recall of transmitted information is precisely what both these authors have argued for. The children remembered the events in the same way as the adults 'not by reciting once again what they had been told, but by reimagining the events which they both did and did not experience' (Bloch 1998, 121). Crucially, for both adults and children, the memory of the hiding was one of reconstructed lived experience, rather than recalled fact.

Looking back

Memory is an effort after meaning that emerges as an inevitable part of dwelling (Bartlett 1932; Ingold 2000). It is what allows us to make sense of time, to position ourselves in its flow, to have a sense of past, present and future. Remembering, the performance of this effort, is an open-ended and selective process, which can work in a variety of ways. It can work through bodily practice, through the positions one takes, the clothes one wears and the words one says (Connerton 1989). It can take place through movement down a particular path or through a certain ritual. Although memory can be directed towards the self, it is fundamentally social in nature (Middleton and Edwards 1990). It emerges through the narratives and discourses of particular socialities and although it may not be language-like in itself it is, at least partially, constituted through language. Memory is negotiable and changeable because it is not limited to the recall of stored information. Because it is an effort after meaning it is temporal, fluid and dynamic (Whittle 2003). The divisions often drawn between inscribed and incorporated, autobiographical and semantic, and social and individual memory, are, like most dichotomies, probably unhelpful. Indeed, although this is not the place for such a discussion, whether any division between thought, memory and emotion can be maintained must now be questioned.

Despite the difficulties with dividing memory into different sections it is certainly true that memory does not always work in the same way; it can be thinking or unthinking, linguistic or not, bodily or verbal, public or private. These divisions exist on a sliding scale, however, and are not diametrically opposed. Crucially, more often than not memories will be reconstructed through the use of some, or all, these tools, along with material objects that help to stress certain aspects of the past and to deny others. For as Bartlett himself pointed out, memory is fundamentally selective, and certain things will always be forgotten (1932). The attitudes, emotions and desires prevalent in different groups lead in the present, and must have led in the past, to different *fields of memory* being emphasised. There would have been varying levels of emphasis on what was appropriate to remember and why. As with war memorials, material objects can play a part in such processes denying certain memories whilst accentuating others (Rowlands 1999). Both objects and places are shaped by, and carry, memories (see chapters 5 and 6). They are mnemonic, in that they can stimulate memories, but can also be crucial to what is forgotten.

Places and objects become textured through biography through the ways they interact with people, and defy any notion that memory is a bounded process of the human brain (Casey 2000). All of this remains situated within being-in-the-world. It is through practice and dwelling that memories are formed and reformed, since they do not exist as essential information to be transmitted but as experiences to be had and then later recalled (Ingold 2000). Language and thus discourse give shape to these rememberings (Shotter 1990; Foucault 1978). Remembering in turn is an act of construction that is rhetorical in nature, that is to say it is argumentative, it gives form to things and this form can be debated, discussed and a common agreement reached (Shotter 1990, 131). This agreement can be challenged, contradicted or ignored, however, and one should not underestimate the possibilities for both group and individual agency here once again. Memory is caught up in identity, personhood, embodiment, discourse, emotion and agency, all of which emerge through an on-going process of being-in-the-world. Indeed it is the constructed and rhetorical side to memory that allows the diverse understandings within, and between, socialities to exist.

If this sets out how I believe we can best approach memory, it is worth considering, for a moment, how archaeology has already engaged with this topic. The discussion of memory is quite widespread in archaeology (e.g. Williams 2003), so a complete analysis cannot take place here. Instead I will examine how it has been used in the recent work of two authors, Richard Bradley (2002) and Vicki Cummings (2003).

Memory and archaeology

In comparison with the previous subject, emotion, memory has been relatively well treated in archaeology. It is an accepted object for study and has received a number of excellent, extended, treatments in recent times (e.g. Bradley 2002; Campbell 2006; Harrison 2004; Jones 2002; Whittle 2003). This does not mean, however, that we cannot move the discussion forwards. The purpose of the extended theoretical discussion that has preceded this has been exactly that. I will now examine the work of two authors to see how well memory has been used and how that use can be improved. There is insufficient space here to do justice to all the work on memory of even the two authors I have selected for analysis (Bradley 2002; Cummings 2003). Therefore I will instead examine how both have used an understanding of memory to analyse monuments in the Neolithic. Both Bradley and Cummings use memory in different ways to gain greater insights into the role of monuments in Neolithic society.

Memory, long houses and long mounds

The first example of how the study of memory has been used to enhance archaeological understandings comes from the work of Richard Bradley (2002). In his book, *The past in prehistoric societies*, Bradley postulates that the memory of long houses was central to the building of long barrows in Neolithic Europe (2002, 33). Such a suggestion is hardly new, having been put forward by Childe (1949), Hodder (1984) and others previously (e.g. Sherratt 1990). However, what is different about Bradley's approach is his explicit use and discussion of memory to account for the relationship between the long houses of the *Linearbandkeramik* (LBK) and the long barrows of the European Atlantic façade (2002). This is the reason why I wish to focus here on his work rather than give a general account of the relationship between these two architectural constructions.

Bradley draws his conception of memory principally from the work of Paul Connerton (1989). Connerton, as I set out earlier, emphasises the ways in which bodily practice and ritual are caught up in the transmission of social memory (1989). Bradley argues that the construction of monuments is an example of the incorporated practices of which Connerton speaks (Bradley 2002, 12; Connerton 1989). It is Bradley's suggestion that the incorporated practices that enshrined social memory through the construction of long mounds were inspired by the memories of the long houses of the earlier LBK. The physical similarities between long mounds and long houses have been noted for some time. Bradley also extends this argument to include their orientation (2002, 30). Despite the fact that they were built later, and largely in different parts of Europe, Bradley argues that the long mounds 'replaced the dwellings of the living and carried the structural principles of the Linearbandkeramik and its immediate successors into new regions' (2002, 31). These structural principles were carried in the form of memory. Bradley supports his argument by drawing on the two areas of Europe where the distribution of mounds and houses overlap, a small section of Poland, and parts of Northern France, notably the Paris basin (2002, 31). At Balloy in Northern France the argument works especially well as long mounds overlie older long houses, on the same orientation, and both contain burials (Bradley 2002) (fig 4.3). The long houses were the inspiration for these monuments, which acted as inscribed memory of a time long ago when different lives were lived. The construction of these mounds, and the later causewayed enclosures which also had precedents in the LBK, allowed the formation of 'landscapes of memory, whose characteristic form recalled an ideal existence that had been followed in the remote past' (Bradley 2002, 33; cf. Campbell 2006).

BALLOY

HOUSE

GRAVE

BARROW /
ENCLOSURE

0   10m

Figure 4.3: Shared orientation of barrow and longhouse at Balloy. Note the graves that occur inside both (after Bradley 2002, 31, fig. 2.6).

There are several difficulties with Bradley's account (2002). First it lacks any sense of diverse and creative remembering. As Bartlett demonstrated (1932), remembering is inherently a selective and creative process, yet there is no hint of this in Bradley's account. The memories emerge as unchanging and timeless, the long mounds their means of transmission to the next generation. Instead, as Ingold has argued, we should be thinking about how those memories might emerge through dwelling. The reasons why people might have drawn on the memory of long houses is not discussed by Bradley. How was it, through the process of being-in-the-world, that these houses, usually both temporally and spatially distant, came to be so important? What practices were at play that made them remain part of social memory, and how were such memories contested? How did such memories play out away from the monuments in quotidian life?

By drawing on Connerton, Bradley also falls into the weaknesses of such an approach that I detailed earlier. Not least in this are the excessive emphasis on ritual, and the presumption that taking part means accepting within a ritual context. Bradley's work does not look at how the monuments might be tied into a process of forgetting. As Rowlands has pointed out in reference to war memorials, monuments that hark back to the past inevitably require a version of that past to be agreed (1999). This agreed version in turn requires that other views were forgotten. If the long mounds of Europe

harked back to the long houses of the LBK, what was forgotten in this? One suggestion might be the way of life present in these parts of Europe before the arrival of the Neolithic; another might be the shorter, less monumental, houses also present during the LBK.

My final criticism of Bradley is that his account works at a very general level. There is little consideration of the specifics of memory at individual sites. How did memory play out differently at different tombs? Were the variations in architecture that we see across Europe important in how the long houses were remembered? How were memories caught up in specific bodily practices (cf. Connerton 1989)? What other memories were at play at different monuments? Bradley fails to consider either of these points, as he does not deal in detail with the development of different long mounds. One author who has considered these points along with specific case-studies, however, is Vicki Cummings (2003). It is to an analysis of one of her articles that I now turn.

Megalithic tombs and fragments of memory

Memory, Cummings argues like Bradley, should be central to our understanding of megalithic tombs (2003). Examining tombs in both Wales and Scotland, Cummings argues that we may have over-emphasised the importance of architecture not only in our own typologies, but also in the analysis of experiencing these monuments (e.g. Tilley 1994). As she points out 'since memory is a social process, embedded in a specific cultural context, it seems possible that people in the Neolithic were not as concerned with precise morphological differences as we are today' (Cummings 2003, 34). Instead Cummings suggests the fact that many monuments are situated in similar landscapes, have similar views, and tend to be significantly 'sided' in nature stresses their similarities (2003). By sided, she means that each side of the monument is significantly different from the other, either in texture, shape or colour (Cummings 2003; cf. Cummings *et al.* 2001). It is these similarities we should concentrate on, not the apparent architectural diversity, as these similarities would have led to a similar experience of the monument. The architectural variations, Cummings argues, are the result of local processes of remembering and forgetting, thus structures were unlikely ever to be exactly the same as one another (2003, 35). Interestingly, she suggests, the monuments drew on archetypal memories of other monumental structures in Europe,

and ultimately the long houses of the LBK (Cummings 2003, 36). The landscape settings and sidedness of the monuments referred to similar sidedness and settings of long houses. Thus the experience 'of engaging with the monuments in western Britain may ultimately relate to the experience of encountering a long house in Europe' (Cummings 2003, 37). The local context is not ignored in Cumming's account (2003). She recognises that the tombs would have tied into local understandings as much as broader memories (Cummings 2003, 36). She also emphasises that the memories were open to reinterpretation, and could be 'transformed and altered as time progressed' (Cummings 2003, 26).

Cumming's account fills in some of the detail that Bradley's more general account glosses over. She offers us a clear way of thinking about the connections between monuments that appear diverse in morphology, and rightly stresses the way local and broader concerns might have interacted. There continue to be difficulties with this account, however. Although Cummings makes a series of convincing arguments linking the diverse monuments together, the variations are dismissed as not perceived, or as the results of local processes of forgetting and remembering. What were these processes, however? How were differences important as well as similarities, and what other memories were being stressed? I feel this requires more explanation. What was being forgotten, and why? Forgetting is often, perhaps usually, a deliberate process. The changes in form may well have been emphasising certain memories and denying others. In other places, in eastern Britain for example, tombs were being created of architectural similarity to both each other and to the more distant long houses. Why not in west Wales or south-west Scotland? Again, as with Bradley's account, the memories are not taken out into the landscape away from the tombs. It was surely here in daily life, through practice and dwelling that these memories meant something, as much as at the tombs themselves. Crucially the bones of the dead, the very stuff of memory, are found both at these tombs and in the landscape (see chapter 5). What was their role in connecting these tombs to memory and to the past? The notion of an archetypal memory also stretches the point too I feel. These tombs surely played off one another and off local processes. The similarity in sidedness may not have related to an archetypal longhouse, but instead to a concept that was generally important in all areas of Neolithic life (cf. Whittle *et al.* 1999).

The last word

It is now time to tie together this chapter on memory with the previous one on emotion. These two subjects are surely heavily intertwined, divided only perhaps by our own continuing Cartesian dualities. As the extended discussion of both has indicated, I believe they can both be approached in similar ways: as socially contingent notions that emerge through discourse, practice and being-in-the-world. They both work in conscious and non-conscious ways and tie into ritual, performance, forgetting and materiality.

Maruška Svašek has discussed the relationship between memory and emotion in her study of German Sudetenland expellees (2005; see chapter 3). She differentiates between evoked, remembered and re-experienced emotions (2005, 200). Each of these interacts with memory in different ways. Evoked emotions are immediate reactions to current events. This still involves remembering, as such moments will be mnemonic in that they stimulate memories of other occasions on which such emotions have been experienced (Svašek 2005, 200). Remembered emotions occur when memory, rather than the experience of emotion, dominates. In these circumstances people look back on their own emotions ('remember how worried I was...' etc.) without actually experiencing the emotion again (Svašek 2005). They involve the memory of emotion without its affective consequences. Finally re-experienced emotions occur when a previously felt emotion is not only remembered but also affectively encountered. These kinds of emotion are classically experienced in victims of trauma, yet to a certain extent involve choice, selective rememberings and deliberate recall, as Svašek has pointed out (2005, 203). It is here that joint emotional experiences through memory can become central to identity.

Memory, emotion and identity also intertwine in my final case-study. This examines the ethnography of rural Greek women in Inner Mani by Constantina Nadia Seremetakis (1991). This ethnography is enlightening and can expand our thinking in several ways. Not only does it emphasise the fact that no understanding of socialities are possible without a consideration of memory and emotion, it also demonstrates how these concepts can be caught up in battles around power, domination and gender.

Memory, emotion, mourning and gender

There are many aspects of Seremetakis' study of the women of Inner Mani that I could draw on to help understand the past (1991). I could employ her analysis of historical fragmentation, or her study of how capitalism and the medicalisation of death are attempting to challenge and disempower women in Inner Mani (Seremetakis 1991). Or indeed I could examine the complex symbolism that surrounds dreaming, and the foretelling of death. Unfortunately there is insufficient space to do so here. Instead I will examine the role of memory, emotion and personhood in her study, and crucially the ways in which they allow women to challenge male dominance through the mortuary rituals of this part of Greece (Seremetakis 1991). I will move on in a moment to examine the role of exhumation and divination in this, and how the memories and emotions of the women are written through the landscape. First, however, I wish to examine the *kláma*, the mourning ritual that goes on around the corpse, both before and after it is taken to the church for the funeral. It is here that the *moiróloi*, the laments, are composed and performed by the mourning women. It is these *moiróloi* that allow women to claim shared substance with the dead, to assert their pain, and to re-write cultural truths as they do so (Seremetakis 1991, 3).

Pain, memory and the moiróloi

The *moiróloi* of the women of the Inner Mani take place beside the corpse both before and after the Christian funeral service. During the *kláma* it is women who are at the centre and men at the periphery, a reversal of the usual strictures (Seremetakis 1991, 98). Women are normally alienated from power in Inner Mani, but the lament allows them to assert themselves. It is for this reason that Seremetakis describes the laments as the 'empowering poetics of the periphery' (1991, 1). These laments are performed by those close to the kin, especially the widow, sisters and mother. Although performed by an individual the *moiróloi* works in concert with the chorus of voices of other women, and the silent chorus formed by men at the funeral. The voices of the other women witness the pain of the lamenter, and in doing so recognise her right to speak and her relationship to the dead. This extends beyond the immediate *kláma* and into the improvised women's café or *róugha*. Here, just as by the corpse, the chorus act 'as a formal institution for the production of narratives and their juridical authentication' (Seremetakis 1991, 123). The laments are made up of short verses, and are often autobiographical in nature. They assert the relationship between the

mourner and the deceased, and also the pain that she feels. This pain (*pónos*) is both emotional and physical and is written by the women on to her body through self-inflicted wounds (Seremetakis 1991, 3). The mourner's body thus physically represents the violence of death. The force of this pain, the witnessing of it by the chorus, allows the mourner to make claims about cultural truth, in effect also about memory.

These laments act as memory in a number of ways. First they are generally improvisations on a theme, they follow set patterns, and thus they draw on memories of previous laments. They are thus an act of creative remembering. Secondly after they have been performed they are remembered and referred to again; they become a kind of oral history, recording the pain and suffering of women down the years. It is through the pain they feel, through the power of the emotions, that the usual social order can be inverted and women's voices heard, and listened to, where normally they must remain silent. Thus here we have emotion and memory interacting and producing a truth that challenges the dominant discourse. The *moirolói* can challenge the reasons for a death, particularly a violent one and can force revenge killings when the political (i.e. male) forces would rather not (Seremetakis 1991, 127). This of course was more common in days gone by when feuding was a regular feature of Maniat life. The *moiroloi* has real power, therefore, both in the immediate and long-term future, as remembered oral history. It is the emotion, the pain of the lament, that gives it this force. For the Maniats '*discoursed pain and discourse in pain constitutes truth*' (Seremetakis 1991, 120 original emphasis). Thus pain here works as an act of cultural resistance (*contra* Foucault 1977).

Divination, creative remembering and the second body

It is not only during the *kláma* that women can exert power through emotion and memory. Secondary burial acts as another opportunity for women to act as tellers of truth. After burial, the bones of the dead are exhumed, cleaned and reinterred; they are known as the second body. This act allows an examination of the colour of the bones and in doing so a reinterpretation of the deceased's life. The bones can, as Seremetakis puts it, 'convey to the present the signs of a sometimes hidden past' (1991, 189). This can prove problematic if the bones emerge still fleshed, or black in colour, as this can reveal unpleasant truths about the deceased. Indeed 'bones that

display the signs of impurity compel the mourner to confront and mediate the past in the present' (Seremetakis 1991, 189). This is an extension of the Maniat view of personhood, which sees the consequences of actions as being written on, and through, the body (Seremetakis 1991, 158). Thus at the *kláma* the pain of the mourners is visible in the cuts on their body and in the hair they tear out. Similarly the actions of a person are written upon the exhumed bones, which can be read by the mourner in an act of divination (Seremetakis 1991, 190). The colour and the smell of the bones are examined by the mourner to reveal the moral past of the dead. This of course again allows the production of cultural truths by women, and facilitate further acts of creative remembering which must now include these new facts about a person, read from their bones.

These acts of divination explain partly the cynical attitude towards life of Maniat women. They experience the death of others intimately, they handle the bones, they wash and they clean them. It is the women who control the facts after death, it is women who have '*the last word*' (Seremetakis 1991, 224 original emphasis). The act of secondary burial is as much an emotional experience as one of divination. Not only are the memories people have of the deceased checked against the material evidence of the bones, but the emotional pain of separation is experienced once again. The sight of the bones for the women is 'a material expression of the deceased in the state of estrangement' (Seremetakis 1991, 188). This again reveals the complex sense of personhood held in Inner Mani, which sees the acts of the person written on the body, and a sense of connection which continues after death. Exhumation connects the bones and the memories directly. As Seremetakis suggests, 'exhumation as the reordering and restoring of bones, creates tangible presence: every bone a word, every bone a memory' (Seremetakis 1991, 217).

Memory and emotion interact here again. No understanding of the way Maniat women assert cultural power, challenge dominant discourses, or assert their gender would be possible without a consideration both of how memory is creatively controlled through laments and divination and how truth is written through the public acclamation, and acknowledgment, of pain. However, it is interesting to note how emotion and memory are written through the landscape by Maniat women.

An archaeology of feeling

In order to understand the connection between the landscape, memory and emotion that are formed by Maniat women one has to understand two factors. First the way in which the pain of labour (in the sense of physical work) and the pain of mourning are connected through the female body. Thus just as the cemetery is the physical expression of female mourning, and the state of the graves within a commentary on who is keeping up their obligations, so the landscape speaks of the pain of labour. These are aspects of place memory (Casey 2000, chapter 9). The olive groves and houses, tended or untended, contain within them memories and emotions to be experienced and noted by other women.

> Examining their surround, women constantly search for 'tracks' of the past and the future in the present. It is a constant search for signs of the self in otherness. This is an archaeology of feeling (Seremetakis 1991, 217).

Running through this quotation is the second key factor, the sense of personhood amongst women in Inner Mani. I have already touched on this above, but it becomes central once again here. The search for the self in others draws upon the same metaphor that links the dead to the mourner, that of 'shared substance'. They are linked, through consumption, to each other. This idea of shared substance is also what links women together, through the shared substance of food production, through the *kláma, moirolói* and *róugha*. Crucially, it is the memory of shared substance that is central, so personhood here is understood through memory. The emotions are remembered in the landscape, they are remembered through the bones of the dead and they are remembered through the oral histories that the laments become. This shared substance links in to a notion of reciprocity. Shared substance 'is not merely the sharing of objects but rather the exchange of artefacts of emotion' (Seremetakis 1991, 216). The shared substance is stored in olive trees, in grave stones and in the tower houses of the villages. It ties emotions into the landscape, stores them there and connects them with memory through that. This is then laced together by consumption of the shared substance through the land, and the laments which trace the history of shared substance and shared pain (Seremetakis 1991, 217). Living/dying, work/play and memory/emotion are dichotomies that dissolve in Inner Mani as different temporal cycles play out; cycles that see into the future through dreaming and the past

through divination. The archaeology of feeling that a Maniat woman performs moving through the landscape draws on these different temporalities and on the shared substance between her and other women and between her and the dead.

Emotion, memory and personhood are central to the world of Maniat women, and it is through them that the dominant discourses of men can be challenged. Equally importantly though, to archaeologists, is that without an understanding of memory, emotion and personhood, no understanding of Maniat sociality would be possible.

Conclusion

Memory, as we have seen, is an effort after meaning (Bartlett 1932). It is a complex device that works in a number of ways. It is creative, selective and intimately tied in with emotion, materiality and personhood. It is located in skill and in habit, and in language and discourse. Memory can act as both liberator and repressor just as it both remembers and forgets. That is not to say, however, that remembering is tied to liberty in any way. Remembering can be as much a tool of repression and dominance as forgetting. Memory can work in ways that are linguistic and in ways that are unconscious. In both forms, however, it emerges through a process of dwelling. Almost all of what we learn might be described as guided rememberings; things that other people remember and help us to remember too (Ingold 2000, 138). Memory is after all, fundamentally social, and even our most private thoughts are constituted within a social world. Thus the division between individual and social memory is a false dichotomy. Memory can emerge through ritual and through performance (Connerton 1989) but also through discussion and narrative (Nelson 2003). It is central to our lives and like emotion, central to the experience of being-in-the-world.

If the analysis of the last two chapters tells us anything, it is that no understanding of socialities is possible without an understanding of memory and emotion. Earlier I argued that understandings of agency, identity and personhood were also central to how people see themselves, their lives and their world. We can now add memory and emotion to this list of factors requiring investigation[vii]. I will now take these complex and difficult understandings of people that I have developed in the thesis so far, and

use them to help flesh out our narratives of, and develop new engagements with, Neolithic Dorset.

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[i] The emphasis placed on the importance of memory also varies from group to group, with direct results on how much information is remembered and by whom (Casey 2000, chapter 1).

[ii] The irony inherent in Bartlett's work is that as he became more and more inculcated within the values of the psychology department at Cambridge so his writing came to emphasise the social context of remembering less and less. This is hardly surprising within a department that looked upon such a view with suspicion. As his theory had predicted, in this new social environment Bartlett forgot the social side of memory, which did not fit within this new schema and instead emphasised universal forms of remembering. His own academic development helped to support his original theory through his own forgetting (Douglas 1986; Shotter 1990)

[iii] This does not mean that memory does not employ physical structures within the brain that are coded for in DNA. What it does mean, however, is that these structures are not prior to memory, but rather are formed, along with memories and the person themselves in the process of being-in-the-world.

[iv] Another difficulty with Connerton's work is his notion of inscribed memories, which he contrasts with the incorporated ones I describe here (1989). He sees the recollection of the alphabet as an example of an inscribed memory that is akin to writing, recording and storing (Connerton 1989, 74). This clearly draws on the conception of memory I have critiqued earlier in the chapter. In my opinion the act of remembering the alphabet is in no way like the act of tape recording. It is not an act of information storing in that sense (Bartlett 1932). Thus from my position in which all memories are bodily acts of recall the distinction between Connerton's inscribed and incorporated memories falls away.

[v] This is why, in Ingold's excellent example, Cro-Magnon Man could not ride a bicycle (2000, chapter 21).

[vi] The relationship between place and memory will be investigated in detail as part of the case-studies, particularly in chapter 6.

[vii] Personhood is a good example of this in fact. I had no intention of discussing it again in the last section on the women of Inner Mani, yet it was impossible to explicate their world view without touching on their concepts of the person.

Chapter 5: Early Neolithic Dorset 4000 – c. 3350 cal BC

Figure 5.1: Dorset, highlighted in red on this map.

Introduction

The Neolithic in Dorset offers one of the richest concentrations of archaeological locales anywhere in Britain. From Cranborne Chase in the north to Hengistbury Head in the south the county has many sites that can be dated to this period, from simple pits to substantial bank barrows and henge monuments. It also includes the largest Neolithic monument in Britain, the Dorset Cursus, which runs over Cranborne Chase for some 9.8 kilometres (Barrett *et al.* 1991). These sites date from the Earlier Neolithic through to the very end of this period, from 4000 to about 2200 cal BC[i]. Indeed some that were constructed in the Late Neolithic were reworked and expanded in the Early Bronze Age, the most obvious example being the henge at Mount Pleasant (Wainwright 1979; see chapter 7 and appendix 2.3.2). How can I, within the room that this thesis provides, begin to make sense of these large tracts of space and time, and the people who dwelt within them? How can I begin to explore these

material conditions in terms of the emotions, memories, identities and agencies that were central to their construction and understanding?

The first answer is to break the period down into three periods: the Early, Middle and Late Neolithic. For the purposes of this thesis I will date these as 4000-3350 cal BC, 3500-2900 cal BC and 3000-2200 cal BC respectively. The overlap between these periods is deliberate, and reveals the purely heuristic nature of the division. Each period stands as a useful shorthand, and as a way to structure my account, rather than as a distinct historical reality. I have not attempted to create more sophisticated chronologies for Dorset in this chapter (cf. Barclay forthcoming), because the range of dates at many sites are insufficient for the purposes. Although Hambledon Hill and Maiden Castle are now well dated, other sites have at best one or two dates. Although this allows approximate relationships to be understood, and a basic three-part chronology to be defined, it would be unwise at this stage to tie ourselves to a more complex system (but see Whittle *et al.* in prep.). As more dates emerge from other sites, more complex chronologies will become a central part of our understandings.

The second answer is to approach each of these periods thematically. Thus each of these sections will be examined from the positions of movement, materiality and deposition. These three themes run, broadly, at different scales. They act as lenses of different magnification that we can turn on to the past. The first, movement, runs at the largest scale. This considers the way people might have dwelt in the landscape, the environments through which they moved, and the ways in which this movement might have structured, and been structured by, monuments. It also places movement at the heart of our understandings (Tilley 2004). Materiality, at the middle scale, examines how a range of media were employed in the Neolithic. This included both locally produced artefacts and those of more distant origin, and will thus naturally touch on issues around exchange. At the most intimate scale, the sections on deposition examine how particular moments and performances were caught up with the broader patterns of life. Archaeology's great strength is not only that it has access to large tracts of time; it also has access to the momentary, the temporal and the contingent. It is the relationship between them that proves more problematic.

There is no final division between these three levels of analysis, however, and in places it will be impossible to stop the argument spilling into the remit of the next section, or drawing on that of the previous one. The three scales play off one another, and play out within one another. Throughout this chapter, the theoretical subjects of this thesis, dwelling, agency, conviviality, emotion, memory, identity, gender and personhood will be explored. I will examine how concerns around these issues shift and move, as differing kinds of movement, materiality and deposition come to the fore. The three case-study chapters are not an attempt to produce a totalising narrative for Dorset in the Neolithic or a gazetteer of all Neolithic sites in the region. Rather they represent an interpretive engagement with those sites and landscapes I feel are most important. These three chapters thus represent one story amongst many, or perhaps several stories amongst many more. They do not claim to be finished, complete or definitive.

All sites mentioned in the text are listed with descriptions in appendix 1, and appendix 2 contains further interpretive narratives that had to be sacrificed from the main text for reasons of space. These can be read either alongside the chapters, and are referred to in the text, or can be read as a separate series of engagements. The theoretical aspects of this analysis are no more complete than their archaeological counterparts. For example, I will not directly address the nature or make-up of communities during the Neolithic in detail[ii]. A general description might suggest that these communities were small-scale, coming together at different times of the year, but also bound up in movements that worked at different rhythms depending on the age and identity of its members, and the animals their lives interwove with. Different kinds of identity may have crosscut communities, and these may have played out at larger gatherings, but been less important for most of the year. People may have gone off on journeys both smaller and longer in distance to heard animals to pasture, or to collect particular kinds of resources. This outline forms the background for the kinds of investigation I want to carry out. I recognise fully that this could be expanded further, and much could be gained from a detailed interrogation of these themes. Indeed, I see that as central to my future research (see chapter 8).

Dorset in the Early Neolithic

Number	Name	Type
1	Bincombe	Pits
2	Fir Tree Field shaft	Doline
3	Flagstones pits	Pits
4	Greyhound yard pit	Pit
5	Grey mare and her colts	Megalithic tomb
6	Gussage Cow Down 1	Long barrows
7	Handley Down	Pits and mortuary enclosure
8	Hambledon Hill	Causewayed enclosure
9	Hell stone	Megalithic tomb
10	Maiden Castle causewayed enclosure	Causewayed enclosure
11	Middle Farm	Pits
12	Pamphill	Pit
13	Pentridge 2	Long barrow
14	Pentridge 19	Long barrow
15	Rowden	Pit
16	Sutton Poyntz	Pit
17	Thickthorn Down	Long barrow
18	Wor Barrow	Long barrow

Figure 5.2: Map of sites in Dorset discussed in the chapter[iii].

Dorset contains many of the elements associated with the British Early Neolithic. The evidence for occupation is largely drawn from pits and flint scatters, with little evidence for permanent houses, or long-term residency at any one spot (Barrett *et al.* 1991; Woodward 1991a; see Thomas 1999a). People appear to have herded domesticated animals including pigs, sheep and cows from 4000 cal BC, to have hunted animals, grown some cereals, but to still have drawn on wild flora. The relative balance of these resources is not entirely clear, and remains the subject of intensive debate (e.g. G. Jones 2000; Robinson 2000), but there is no reason to posit a one-size-fits-all model even for the whole of Dorset. More likely the relative dependency on various plant resources fluctuated over time and space, and only the evidence for the importance of domesticate animals appears to be relatively unambiguous. The monument evidence within this period includes a large number of long barrows, both on the Dorset Ridgeway to the south of the study area and on Cranborne Chase. It also includes three causewayed enclosures: Maiden Castle to the south, and the Hambledon Hill complex off Cranborne Chase, which includes both the Hambledon and Stepleton enclosures. The relative chronology of these sites is understood to greater and lesser degrees. The enclosures have now been the subject of Bayesian analysis on the one hand (Bayliss *et al.* forthcoming a; Healy 2004; Healy *et al.* in prep.; Mercer and Healy forthcoming; see also appendix 2.1.2), whilst many of

the long barrows can only be attributed roughly to this period on typological grounds. Nevertheless, a more detailed picture of Dorset in this period can now begin to emerge.

Movement in the Early Neolithic

Before I begin to describe the movement of people and things around the Neolithic landscapes of Dorset, let us take a moment to examine the environment in the first half of the 4th millennium cal BC. This is not to suggest that the landscape acted as a mere backdrop to the events and actions that took place. Human beings dwell through the landscape (Ingold 1993; chapter 1). Their actions are central to its formation, to its maintenance and change. The landscape at 4000 cal BC was already changed by human hand. It was not somehow natural; it stood as a palimpsest of histories, as testament to human and other agencies. Instead my description of the environment acts to set the scene for the further changes that took place during the Neolithic as people's activities changed, and they began to dwell in new ways.

Environment

The study area contains a wide variety of landscapes even today: lowland and upland, coastal and inland. The north of the county features Cranborne Chase, a sweeping chalk plateau set above the lowlands to the south. After crossing these lowlands one reaches the South Dorset Ridgeway. This chalk upland divides the inland areas from the coastal zone which has much heavier clay soils and a different resource base (Woodward 1991a, 6). Yet whilst these aspects of the landscape remain, much else has changed. What do we know of this landscape during the Early Neolithic?

The overall impression of the Dorset landscape in the Early Neolithic is one of diversity, as indeed has recently been argued for much of Britain in this period (Cummings and Whittle 2003, 259). On Cranborne Chase one can point to evidence for woodland, at the Handley Down mortuary enclosure for example (Allen 2000, 43; French et al. 2005, 122), and evidence for open grassland, such as at Thickthorn Down long barrow (Bradley and Entwistle 1985). The clearance of the landscape began, in places, in the Mesolithic, and this can be seen in the sequence of molluscan evidence from the Fir Tree Field Shaft (M. Green and Allen 1997; Allen 1998; Allen

and M. Green 1998). Elsewhere, however, woodland persisted for some time. The enclosures at Hambledon Hill, just off the Chase, were constructed in woodland around 3690 cal BC (Bell *et al.* forthcoming). Further south we again have evidence for both open and wooded conditions. The Early Neolithic pit at Greyhound Yard appears to indicate a woodland setting (Woodward *et al.* 1993, 17), whilst the pits at Flagstones, only a kilometre or so away, were dug in a fairly open environment (Allen 1997, 167). The evidence now beginning to emerge for both Cranborne Chase and the region as a whole is of a 'mosaic of habitats' (French *et al.* 2003, 229). Perhaps only 70 per cent of the Allen valley on Cranborne Chase, for example, was ever wooded (French *et al.* 2005, 131). Although many monuments were built in new clearings, others were built in locations open since the Mesolithic. As French *et al.* point out, 'if there were major changes in vegetation and soil complexes, these had occurred *by the Neolithic*' (2003, 201, my emphasis). This is only enhanced by the time we reach the Later Neolithic which the evidence appears to indicate contained more substantial and widespread open areas of land, particularly on Cranborne Chase (French *et al.* 2003, 229). This was continuous from the Mesolithic, but it was not a sudden revolution. Recent research has supported this understanding (Allen and Scaife 2006; French 2006). Open areas were probably commonplace by the Early Neolithic of Dorset, and the image of a primordial forest being cleared by the first farmers should now be abandoned (Allen and Scaife 2006; French 2006). Of course new areas were opened up around 4000 cal BC, but these complimented other areas that had been open and kept open throughout the Mesolithic (French *et al.* 2005, 131). Thus it is a shifting mosaic of woodland and considerable open spaces that we must consider as we examine how people moved through their landscape during the Early Neolithic.

Settlement

Although discussion of the Neolithic in Dorset has been dominated by the county's monuments, there has now emerged a significant body of data that refers to what might be termed settlement (cf. Pollard 1999). The evidence that has emerged from flint scatters and pits across the county should not be seen, however, as somehow opposed to the monuments. Rather the evidence that has emerged shows how monuments and settlements existed within a range of Neolithic practices that focused on differing parts of the landscape in different ways, rather than at either end of a ritual versus quotidian dichotomy. Being-in-the-world requires skilled practice,

whether that be at sites we term settlements, monuments or elsewhere in the landscape. Thus I will attempt to avoid using the word 'settlement', which appears to counterpose our understanding of these sites with those we call monuments, wherever possible. Instead a different range of words will be employed to refer to these sites, including place, residence, occupation, dwelling and locale. Study of these types of sites begins to open up for our analysis some of the quotidian concerns we find echoed and magnified at monuments. Crucially, they hint at how the daily and seasonal round were caught up with concerns around memory, conviviality and identity.

It is this role within the daily and seasonal round that we can begin to examine from the evidence in Dorset. As I have indicated above, there appears to be little evidence of large-scale permanent occupation at this time. Instead the ephemeral evidence from pits at Sutton Poyntz, Bincombe, Middle Farm and Handley Down amongst others, hints at a mobile people (Butterworth and Gibson 2004; Farrar 1958; Piggott 1936; Pitt Rivers 1898; Woodward 1991a). That does not mean that everybody was moving all the time. Rather the evidence hints at different scales of movement (cf. Whittle 1997a), of people coming together, in greater or lesser numbers, not just at monuments, but beside and around these pits also. It is not always easy to detect the exact scale of such gatherings. Where we have more than one pit, such as at Flagstones, dated to 3850-3660 cal BC, we might easily be looking at the closing acts of repeated visits, rather than at both pits being open at the same time.

Feasts and conviviality at Rowden

Figure 5.3: Section of the pit at Rowden (after Woodward 1991a, 44, fig. 24).

However, there are indications at one site in particular that larger gatherings took place; the pit at Rowden (c. 3750 cal BC), which can be compared to the Coneybury anomaly, both for its size and early date (Thomas 1999a, 70)[iv]. The fill of the Rowden pit contained large quantities of lithic waste, 644 sherds of Neolithic pottery, and 225 mostly well preserved animal bones, some of which had been burnt (Woodward 1991a; fig. 5.3). To put this in perspective, that is more than twice the number of pottery sherds in both the Flagstones pits. Along with this the pit contained large amounts of charcoal, including bits from oak, hazel, ash and hawthorn and both emmer wheat and barley (Carruthers 1991, 106-7). The most commonly represented animal here is pig (Maltby 1991, 105). This contrasts with most Early Neolithic assemblages in which cattle dominate. In contrasting Rowden with other contemporary pits, we can begin to see how people moved round the landscape in more complex ways than have sometimes been imagined. Rather than a homogenous group, moving in a simple, cyclical, fashion, leaving flint scatters and the occasional pit in their wake, we have a much more fluid scenario. People came together, moved apart, and moved on through the landscape. The scales of sociality varied, from intimate gatherings around small pits, to much larger groups feasting and depositing. Rowden hints at the intermediate scale between the huge feasts of Hambledon Hill, with perhaps a hundred people or more, and the small-scale deposits at the Flagstone pits, or at Sutton Poyntz (Healy 1997a; Farrar 1958).

Of course people in the Neolithic did not move alone. As people of different groups, ages, genders and identities came together and moved apart, so did various groups of animals. Domesticated cattle, pigs, goats, sheep and dogs were also part of these different scales of movement. They too were part of people's socialities, and may have been conceived of as persons in themselves (see appendix 2.1.3). These animals vary in how easy they are to herd round the landscape, the speed at which they move, and their relative abundance. These variations would further add to the differing scales and speeds of movement. Recognising these different scales allows us to consider sites like Rowden again. Pigs were deliberately chosen to be deposited here in a higher proportion to other animal bone than was normal. This may well represent a feasting episode, where one or more pigs were consumed.

In chapter 3 I set out how Amazonian people place great emphasis on conviviality, that is the art of living well together (Overing and Passes 2000a). It is something similar we see being stressed at gatherings like those that took place at Rowden. Meeting and feasting would renew the bonds between different parts of the same community[v]. At this slightly larger scale than that experienced every day, people would have the opportunity for socialising, exchanging news and for meeting new people. It is difficult to be exact about the numbers involved in such a feast or feasts. The number of pigs deposited at Rowden is not known, but the bones come from animals of different age and size suggesting that several pigs were consumed at the site (Maltby 1991, 105). As a fully-grown single pig can provide up to 130 kilograms of meat (Vigne 1992), several pigs if slaughtered and consumed at the same time could have provided food for several hundred. That of course assumes that all the meat was consumed, and all at the same time. It is also possible that some of the flesh was deliberately discarded or used as offerings, or kept and preserved for later consumption. Equally not all the pigs were fully-grown when killed and so would not have provided quite this much meat. Whatever the numbers the eating of even a single pig at any one time would have brought people together and with them an opportunity for communal relations to be cited and reiterated through shared consumption. Alongside these concerns the pottery present at Rowden may have enabled substances to flow between people, to physically link different aspects of the community and allowed many to sip from the same pot. The pots in themselves were directly mnemonic, embodying links to other people and places, perhaps in these early days to

the origins of pottery. They also embodied the skill of the potter, however, another kind of memory as Ingold (2000) and Connerton (1989) have pointed out (chapter 4 and see below for a more detailed engagement with pottery).

Differing emotions might well be in play in such circumstances. If, as I have suggested, differing scales of movement and different people were involved with different animals, then the number of pigs killed and eaten here might speak of one group providing more than their usual contribution. This might cause resentment on the one hand, but maybe pride on the other; perhaps both were at play simultaneously. These emotions would have had ramifications for the interaction of the people at the feast. If different people cared for and herded different animals then the time of their slaughter may well have been an emotional one. Again we do not have to impose any particular Western sense of emotion here on to the past, but people's relationship with animals they were with every day would undoubtedly differ from people who interacted with other animals.

Mark Maltby argues that the pig mandibles and skulls at Rowden may well have been removed from the butchery deposit and placed elsewhere, unlike the other animals deposited in the pit (1991, 105). It seems there is a connection between the unusual proportion of pig bones, and the absence of pig skulls. Perhaps these were taken away as mementos, either by those who supplied the pigs or by others. Equally the pigs might have been butchered elsewhere, but this would have still created connections between those two places, one the site of butchery, the other of consumption. In either case the skulls acted as a metonym of the feast, and tie us to memory. People may have filled the pit with the bones, ash and plant remains and taken with them the skulls of the pigs, which as an unusually dominant aspect of the feast would act as physical reminders of the past event. Equally the pig skulls might be encountered elsewhere, acting as a powerful reminder of the events that had taken place at Rowden. Identity too would have been caught up here. Pigs might have been herded by particular people in the group, defined also perhaps by their age or gender. In turn, herding pigs could help to define age and gender, by becoming a particular regulatory ideal that certain people cited in order to claim certain identities (chapter 2).

Thus movement in this period not only encompasses a certain, mobile, form of dwelling, it also lends itself to different scales. These scales, associated with different animals and different people, were played out and affirmed at gatherings like those at Rowden when people came together in somewhat larger numbers to feast and maintain conviviality. At moments like this it was through the ways in which people dwelt in the world, the rhythms with which they moved through the landscape, the animals they lived with, that helped define who they were. This was made real in the acts of deposition that followed the feast, and made real in the mnemonic pig skulls elsewhere. Through movement around the landscape people came to understand their identity; this was tied up with a desire to live in the proper way, to feel the right emotions and to remember the right things.

The acts of feasting at Rowden would also have shaped the site itself, and would have textured the site with emotion and memory. These emotions and memories could then be re-encountered through movement creating certain experiences, or emotional geographies, which were inherently mnemonic (Sheller 2004; chapter 3). By returning to the site people encountered these textures once again. I suggest that Neolithic community may have been performative, and thus seen to only exist through acts of consumption, through the emotional links that people forged together, through the remembered act of getting along. The pigs and the pottery along with the emmer and barley were not just forgotten leftovers of these engagements. Rather these were the physical evidence of convivial community. They were sticky, to use Ahmed's term (2004), with emotion, they carried with them the evidence of encounters and engagements and thus would have been redolent of the affective memories inherent in this. By taking the remains of performed community and placing them into a pit people physically placed memories and emotions into the ground, shaping forever how they would encounter this part of the landscape, how they could move through the landscape, how they could feel about the landscape.

One interesting suggestion is that the material at Rowden may have been middened before it was deposited, wholesale, into the pit (Pollard 2001, 323)[vi]. Thus rather than a single occurrence of mass consumption, smaller scale feasts may have taken place over time, each one adding material to the midden forming on the site. Repeated visits, leaving some pottery and bones behind, would slowly come to add layer upon

layer of memories and emotions. The repeated use of pig is interesting here. Rather than a single feast dominated by pig, we instead have the importance of this animal at this location being maintained over time, texturing the site as one where pig consumption was appropriate. The midden may have become the very materiality of memory, its size and existence demonstrating the community's ongoing commitment to place, to convivial relations and to a sense of continuity. Returning to the site, seeing and handling the contents of the midden may have facilitated the return of memories of former visits, of people now dead, or of events that may have been special, amusing or frightening. Equally the midden may have acted as a mnemonic that reminded people of certain stories or myths that in turn caused other emotions to come to the fore (Harrison 2004; Svašek 2005a). Depositing the midden into the pit thus closed and fixed the narratives that surrounded Rowden. It limited the possibilities for the memories physically present on the site to be added to.

Whether the material at Rowden was middened or not the physical connection between the earth and the Neolithic material would have created an association with that place, that ran beyond the lifetime of the people who were present. This argument is supported by the fact that a later pit, 3640-3209 cal BC (Woodward 1991a, 43), cut the earlier one. Such repeated acts of digging and deposition in the same place could just be happenstance, but this seems unlikely. Throughout the Neolithic we encounter moments where monuments are built on earlier examples of residence, sometimes dating back to the Mesolithic (cf. Benson and Whittle forthcoming).

Flint scatters

The evidence from flint scatters offers a different window on to Neolithic locales. Rather than providing us with the detailed understandings that a pit such as that at Rowden offers us, they instead paint a more general picture of Neolithic movement. Although we need to consider flint scatters as the outcome of particular practices (Barrett 1994) rather than merely settlement debitage, they still begin to hint at those areas in which people (at the least) knapped flint. Cranborne Chase, for example, was much less heavily exploited during the Neolithic than it had been in the preceding Mesolithic (Arnold *et al.* 1988; Barrett *et al.* 1991, 34). At the same time, however, monuments were being built on the Chase. Thus people were moving between the river valleys and lowlands on to Cranborne Chase rather than staying in the uplands

for extended periods[vii]. Elsewhere the South Winterborne valley, which runs to the south of Maiden Castle, was a focus of occupation (Woodward and Bellamy 1991, 29; Woodward 1991b), as was the area around Maiden Castle more generally (Woodward 1991a, 31). Again in these areas, and around the Dorset Ridgeway, the evidence is for a largely mobile lifestyle, of people moving between different environmental zones taking advantage of the affordances of the landscape.

Movement and monuments

If evidence for day-to-day life, scales of movement, memory and conviviality can be gleaned from the pits and flint scatters of Neolithic life, what of the monuments?[viii] Firstly it is worth stressing that monument construction was probably not a feature of the very earliest Neolithic. No evidence for any form of monumentality exists before 3780 cal BC at the very earliest (see endnote i) although the vast majority of long barrows have not been dated. This fits well the evidence for southern Britain as a whole now beginning to emerge (e.g. Benson and Whittle forthcoming; Whittle et al. in prep.). Nevertheless, many of the long barrows on Cranborne Chase, and elsewhere in the study area for that matter, clearly date to the Early Neolithic. Other monuments too date from the Early Neolithic, notably the well-dated causewayed enclosures of Hambledon Hill and Maiden Castle. I wish to discuss movement through and around sites, particularly at the Hambledon Hill complex. I also discuss movement and monuments at a smaller scale with regard to the construction of the Thickthorn Down long barrow in appendix 2.1.1. Such concerns were wrapped up in conviviality, memory, emotion and identity. This of course leaves the largest scale, that of the relationship between monuments and the landscape, itself un-discussed. I will return to this in chapter 6.

Movement, identity and conviviality

Figure 5.4: Hambledon Hill (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 1.3).

Here I wish to examine how larger numbers of people coming together might have created tension and anxiety (Rivière 2000). Particularly I want to examine this after the majority of Hambledon Hill's Neolithic earthworks had been dug, around 3500 cal BC (fig. 5.7), because it is here that we can trace people's movements across the hill. I do not mean to suggest by this that tensions were somehow absent during construction of the main enclosure at Hambledon, say, when some 100 people may have come together over two months a year for perhaps two years (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; Healy 2004, 18)[ix]. This is almost certainly not the case; construction is a crucial period where emotions, identities and memories are in flux (see appendix 2.1.1). Nor do I wish to suggest that Hambledon ever reached some final form, or was ever finished. Indeed the evidence suggests that acts of construction were on going as long as the site was being visited (see appendix 2.1.2 for a comparison of the temporalities of building at Hambledon and Maiden Castle). What I wish to examine, however, is how the architecture of the site, as it was constructed, helped to deal with these tensions by creating a series of nested spaces that were tied into bodily

movement and rites of passage (Van Gennep 1960; Turner 1969). The physical experiences of movement through the site were central to the ways in which notions of incorporation, exclusion or liminality were stressed, and in turn these ideas helped to create differing senses of identity. On occasions these attempts to diffuse tensions demonstrably failed, leading to the deaths of at least two people, and the burning of parts of the enclosure. In order to develop this I must first describe the enclosures, long barrows and outworks at Hambledon Hill, as they are understood today (Mercer 1980; Mercer 1988; Mercer 2004; Mercer and Healy forthcoming).

Figure 5.5: Plan of Hambledon Hill (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 1.4).

On Hambledon Hill between 3690 and 3300 cal BC, a complex of Neolithic monuments were created, including two enclosures, two long barrows, and a series of outworks and cross dykes across the hill (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; fig 5.5). Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show the developmental sequence of these earthworks over time. These earthworks were constructed away from the main areas of Neolithic habitation and set within woodland. The ditches saw several periods of deposition and recutting, especially in the main enclosure, and these have been divided into a number of phases (see figure 5.6)[x]. Unfortunately these phases are not chronologically directly comparable with one another (Bayliss *et al.* forthcoming a). In other words phase III in segment 1 is not necessarily contemporary with phase III in any other ditch segment. This makes placing particular deposits into the history of Hambledon more difficult where the deposit itself has not been directly dated.

Phase	Description
I & II	Formation of primary fine chalky silts on the ditch bottom.
III	Vacuous chalk rubble, runs of finer silts and heavily weathered chalk deposits, usually formed after the partial removal of the primary silts.
IV	Scattered pits cut into chalk rubble, usually containing charcoal and occasionally burnt flint.
V	Episode of slow silting.
VI	Series of slots cut over the deepest parts of the ditch. Individual segments recut up to four or five times.
VII	Setting of flint nodules and fragments capping the slots.

Figure 5.6: Early Neolithic phases of the main enclosure ditch.

Period	Constructed	Dates cal BC	Deposits and events discussed in the chapter
1a	Main enclosure	3680-3360	
	Inner east cross dyke	3690-3620	
	South long barrow	3680-3640	
	North long barrow?	?	Deposition of child in phase 1 of segment 18 of the main enclosure.
1b	Shroton spur outwork	3650-3570	
	Stepleton enclosure	3650-3570	Foot bones deposited in segment 3 of the Shroton spur outwork. The bones themselves may predate the digging of the ditch.
	Middle Stepleton outwork	3650-3580	
2	Inner Stepleton outwork	3630-3500	Burning of the inner Stepleton outwork, death of two men? Deposition of axe fragments in phase VI of segment 10. Pit BF14 dug? Soil tipped into butt of segment 9, part of phase II
2 or 3	Hanford outwork (partial)		Phase III segment 4 deposits?
3	Outer Stepleton outwork	3530-3360	Second violent episode. Two men shot with leaf shaped arrowheads, buried in inner and outer Stepleton outworks.
	Inner south cross-dyke	3570-3390	Burial of partly articulated torso in segment 6.1 of the main enclosure. Deposition of flint axes in inner south cross-dyke
4	Outer east cross dyke	3360-3310	
	Western outwork	3510-3360	
	Outer south cross dyke	?	
	Hanford outwork (segment 3)	3360-3320	Burial of child in segment 17 of the main enclosure.

Figure 5.7: Dates of construction at Hambledon Hill. The fourth column represents various events that I discuss during the chapter, where these can be placed into the broader history of the site (after Healy *et al.* in prep.; Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 4.2).

Figure 5.8: Possible sequence of development at Hambledon Hill (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig 1.9).

Figure 5.9: Plan of the central enclosure at Hambledon Hill (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 3.15).

The central enclosure as a nested space

The central enclosure at Hambledon could be approached from a number of directions, from across the hillfort spur to the north, which would have led people past the northern long barrow and across the putative northern outwork and cross-dykes to the enclosure (see figs 5.5 and 5.8). Alternatively the enclosure might be approached from the east along the Shroton spur; this would have taken people across both the inner and outer Shroton outworks and across the east cross dykes. Finally the enclosure might be approached from the south-east across the Stepleton spur. This would have led people through not only the Stepleton enclosure and its three

outworks but also past the south long barrow and the south cross-dykes. The hill acts through its topography to structure movement in this way and, as it was wooded, it is easy to imagine how vistas might be focused down the spurs towards the central area.

The idea that people moved in this way is supported by the evidence from the hill, particularly in that from the Stepleton spur and the main enclosure (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). There are two areas of evidence that indicate that movement between the two enclosures was an important aspect of the events that took place on the hill. The first of these is rather ephemeral; it can be argued that two lines of postholes run away from the Stepleton enclosure towards the main enclosure (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). These could be later in date, however. The artefactual evidence, as Healy has suggested, more clearly points to movement between these two enclosures, down the Stepleton spur (2004, 29). Pottery from fabric group 6, which was most common in the Stepleton enclosure, was also widespread in the ditches of the southern long barrow, particularly the east ditch, which people would have passed as they moved from one enclosure to the other (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Equally in both ditches on either side of the probable entrance to the Stepleton enclosure (to the northwest of the enclosure, facing up the spur, between segments 8 and 9; see fig. 5.10) was the highest frequency on the spur of pottery from Jurassic sources, which was much more common in the main enclosure (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). It appears that as people moved down the spur they deposited the pottery found most frequently in one enclosure at the entrance to the other. As Mercer and Healy (forthcoming) point out, 'this provides a hint of the extent to which movement about the enclosure may have been channelled and directed'.

I would argue that movement was also channelled down the hillfort and Shroton spurs towards the enclosure. Although little definite indication of this has been recovered from the excavated evidence, it is hinted at in my opinion not only by the cross dykes and outworks, but also by the concentration of beach pebbles found in segments 8 and 9 of the main enclosure (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; fig. 5.9). The causeway in between, identified by Mercer and Healy as a possible entrance (forthcoming), faces out on to the Shroton spur. It appears as if these pebbles, like the pottery on the Stepleton spur, was deposited as people moved into the enclosure. The possibility of

these being pebbles from Chesil Beach recalls Tilley's (1999) suggestion of the mythological importance of that place in the Neolithic (see chapter 6).

These controlled approaches to the central area, with specific axes of movement, acts of deposition, entrances and exits are tied in with the essentially liminal nature of the central enclosure. I have described this enclosure as a nested space. By this I mean that by being situated, in effect, at the heart of the series of outworks, cross-dykes and long barrows, people would have had to traverse a number of liminal boundaries to gain access to it. In similar vein, and also in reference to its topographical position, Mercer and Healy describe the central enclosure as a 'secret place' (forthcoming). This liminality would have been enhanced by its distance away from the main areas of Neolithic occupation and perhaps by the presence of items of material culture from far flung places, notably the gabbroic pottery from Cornwall and axes from Cornwall, South Wales and mainland Europe (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). The formation of such a liminal place created certain possibilities for dwelling within the material conditions. Principally, it allowed what might best be termed *controlled conviviality*. Drawing on my analysis of the concept of conviviality in chapter 3 one can imagine how these day-to-day concerns around sociable sociality might come into focus within the larger-than-normal gatherings that took place at Hambledon Hill. These gatherings included feasting and drinking, possibly of wine (G. Jones and Legge 1987; G. Jones and Legge forthcoming). But these gatherings may also have been replete with dangers as well as possibilities (Rivière 2000). Alongside the feasting, imbibing, exchange and revelry that almost certainly took place there may well have been disagreements, arguments and conflict.

Situating these gatherings within the nested space of Hambledon Hill ensured that people met in the correct fashion. They approached down particular paths, down particular spurs, depositing particular items in pits, ditches and long barrows. The architecture of the site helped regulate people's encounters and maintain peaceful conviviality. The acts of movement may have led people to experience the site in certain ways, it may have encouraged certain feelings and memories to be emphasised and others to be downplayed. Within this safe space practices that might have been considered as dangerous, or risky, such as the defleshing of the human body or

exchange of artefacts, might become acceptable. I will return to these issues again when I consider materiality in the next section.

Burning passions

Figure 5.10: Plan of the Stepleton enclosure and outworks, the numbers 3 and 7 refer to segment 3 of the outer Stepleton outwork and segment 7 of the inner outwork. These were the locations of the two individuals apparently killed by leaf shaped arrowheads in the second violent episode (see figs 5.11 and 5.12). Segment 7 was also the location of the body of the man whose death may be associated with the burning of this outwork. The numbers 8 and 9 refer to those segments of the Stepleton enclosure where large quantities of pottery from Jurassic sources were found (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 3.81)

There is evidence that these attempts to maintain sociable sociality, peacefulness and conviviality were not always successful. There appear to have been at least two violent episodes at the Stepleton enclosure. The first of these involved the burning of the palisade and the possible death of two people. One of these was an adult male located in the phase I deposits of segment 7 of the Stepleton enclosure and dating to between 3600 and 3490 cal BC (fig. 5.10). Although there is no direct evidence that this man suffered a violent death Mercer and Healy convincingly argue for his association with the burning of the palisade soon after its erection (forthcoming). Thus this event occurred relatively early in the history of the monument, perhaps only a century or so after the main enclosure was founded. The second person associated with this event was buried in a pit outside the enclosure (pit 4B F712). The pit here was filled with burnt material consistent with it being filled with material from the burnt palisade, and the dates from the burial do not preclude such an interpretation (Mercer and Healy forthcoming).

The second period of violence is marked by the death of two males, both of whom were shot with leaf shaped arrows. One of these was discovered face down in the phase III fill of segment 7 of the inner Stepleton outwork, an arrowhead amongst his ribs (fig. 5.11). This body, that of a sub-adult or young male, dated to either 3500-3420 cal BC (31 per cent) or 3390-3320 cal BC (64 per cent) (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). This death may have been contemporary with that of another young male also found with an arrowhead in the west butt of segment 3 of the outer Stepleton outwork (see fig. 5.12 for a photograph). His body dated to 3530-3360 cal BC and so could be contemporary with the death of the other individual, both in terms of the date and stratigraphically (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). This evidence for violence has been interpreted by the excavator as indicative of assaults on the hill, and he thus interprets much of the earthworks as being defensive in nature (Mercer forthcoming). Despite this, he is quick to recognise that 'attacks' occur perhaps only four times in the three hundred years or so of the enclosures' existence.

Figure 5.11: Plan of the skeleton from phase III segment 7 of the Inner Stepleton outwork, killed in the putative second violent event (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 3.102).

Once we place notions of the aesthetics of conviviality and emotion at the centre of our understanding of Neolithic worldviews, these moments take on a different complexion, however. Rather than being the remnants of assaults these become moments at which peaceful conviviality broke down, moments at which people were killed as the site's architecture and deposits failed to prevent the tensions and anxieties spilling over into violence. Alternatively it may not have been stress that motivated such actions. We might imagine that anger and hatred are the prime forces behind violence, but other emotions might also be at play. Catherine Alès has described how for the Yanamamo, anger and violence spring from love (2000). Perhaps we can imagine something similar here. Certainly this fits the evidence of the deaths better than arguments for an assault. We need no longer think of violence like this as only springing from contests over resources; indeed as Nick Thorpe has argued violence and warfare 'may well have arisen from matters of personal honour – such as

slights, insults, marriages gone wrong, or theft' (2003, 160). Where we do have evidence for the attacks on enclosures during the Neolithic, at Crickley Hill and at Carn Brea these are accompanied by hundreds of leaf shaped arrowheads. Nothing like that appears at Hambledon Hill. Yet what of the burning? Perhaps this too fits better with the notion of a moment where the aesthetics of the good beautiful life break down, and the inner palisade is burnt, but then in an act of renewal swiftly rebuilt (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Such an act would be visible from some distance, and coupled with the violent deaths would make a potent statement as to the renewal of the enclosure. The renewal of conviviality may have been a potent feature of acts of construction throughout Hambledon's history.

Figure 5.12: Skeleton from the outer Stepleton outwork on Hambledon Hill, possibly killed in the same violent episode as the man found in phase III, segment 7 of the inner Stepleton outwork (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 3.106).

Other movements: other meanings

Within this understanding of Hambledon Hill as a centre for practices that might be considered dangerous, and were on occasions violent, we can add other layers of interpretation. The topography of the hill combined with the architecture of the site indicates the possibilities that existed for differentiating between people, for stressing particular identities, and for citing certain regulatory ideals (Butler 1993). We could imagine this in several ways. One way is to view each approach to the hill as serving a

particular group defined by some kind of shared identity. An alternative, which is the interpretation I prefer, is to see each approach to the hill as being available to particular people depending on other aspects of their identity, such as gender for example[xi]. The aspect of identity, be it age, gender, role or status might vary over time, but these variations in identity would explain why certain items are deposited in certain places on the Stepleton and Shroton spurs, namely the pottery on the former and the Chesil Beach pebbles on the latter. Rather than merely marking entry to the enclosure these deposits are now markers of identity. More than this, it is through such acts, such practices, such moments of performativity, that regulatory ideals around identity might be cited (Butler 1993). Thus whether you belonged to a certain gender, or a certain group, might be defined less by a Western, biologically driven understanding, and more by the consequences of positions taken up by a person through performative practice (Butler 1993; O. Harris 2005; chapter 2). That does not mean that these spurs were occupied only by people of a single gender at all times. What it might mean, however, is that at certain moments people came to take on particular gendered positions by moving across one particular spur instead of another.

These moments might well have been tied up with rites of passage (Van Gennep 1960; Turner 1969). The notions of separation, liminality and reincorporation can easily be played out on the Stepleton spur, for example. As people left the Stepleton enclosure, they became separated from those left behind and became physically parted, perhaps, from particular forms of pottery. They then move across the spur, down between the posts that lined the way. This liminal phase incorporated the south long barrow where other acts of deposition took place, this time with forms of pottery that referenced the Stepleton enclosure. Finally, people would traverse the cross-dykes and the ditch itself to enter the central enclosure and so be incorporated into a particular group, an aspect of their identity having been transformed in some way. None of these actions were vastly different to those of everyday life. But within the architecture and topography of the hill they took on new meaning, through what might be called ritualisation (Bell 1992). Perhaps the violence I noted earlier emerged from people attempting to subvert these regulatory ideals and take on identities that caused people to question the boundaries against which their own identities were formed. Following Butler, one can see how identities are created against an abjected other (1993, 188; chapter 2). When people take on the identity of that abjected other it can

cause other people's understandings of their boundaries of sex, gender and sexuality to become weaker, and this can lead to violent consequences. Thus perhaps those who tried to subvert or challenge particular regulatory ideals by approaching the central area in different ways may have sometimes met with violent ends. Again here the motivation for violence emerges from emotion: from shock, horror or disgust perhaps, or maybe from others that would be unfamiliar to us in the present.

Concluding movement

Thus when we examine movement in the Early Neolithic we can see how this takes in a wide range of events and touches on many of the themes I investigated in the first half of this thesis. Movement was central to the way people dwelt in the world, to how they encountered each other, to the ways memory worked, and to how conviviality was maintained. This played out at a variety of scales, within the way people moved about and through monuments and the ways in which people moved around the landscape, coming together and moving apart in a variety of fashions. Central to all of this was the materiality of Neolithic life and the ways in which those materials were manipulated. These also had ramifications for understandings of emotion, memory identity and personhood, and it is to this I now turn.

Materiality in the Early Neolithic

Neolithic people manipulated a huge range of materials in a vast number of ways. This included both human and animal bone, flint and stone of various kinds, clay, wood, antler, plant materials, meat, hide and soil. Some of these I have already touched on, and will again as I come to examine deposition. Using, manipulating and fashioning these materials played a central part in Neolithic people's lives and a central part in their understanding of the world. The multitude of forms that materiality took would if explored to its fullest extent take up the remainder of this thesis. Instead therefore I will look at two specific examples of materiality in the Early Neolithic. First, I will examine how materiality, personhood and exchange were interwoven, particularly in relation to those items whose exchange we can trace over long distances. Thus I will examine, especially within the contexts of Hambledon Hill

and Maiden Castle how pottery and stone axes from distant places were exchanged and deposited in these locations. Drawing on my earlier discussions I will analyse how these acts might encapsulate certain understandings of personhood (chapter 2).

The second area I will consider is how human bone acted as part of Neolithic material culture. Alongside examining the roles of exposure, decay and defleshing I will look at how bones were exchanged, curated and deposited. Central to this understanding will be the work of Seremetakis that I discussed in chapter 4 (1991). By using her account of rural Greece as inspiration I will examine how human bone and its manipulation and exchange not only creates access to another view of personhood, but will also allow me to consider the emotional ramifications of engaging with this evocative materiality. In both the examples memory, conviviality and power will have roles to play. What I will indicate is that very different power relations emerge from each, the first based on exchange, the second upon emotion.

Materiality, exchange and personhood

In order to examine how materiality, exchange and personhood are intertwined in the Early Neolithic I need to examine particular aspects of that materiality, notably those items whose movement, and thus potential exchange, we can trace around the landscape. Two obvious types suggest themselves that can be found deposited at both Hambledon Hill and at Maiden Castle. These are gabbroic pottery, which comes from Cornwall, and stone axes which came to these sites from, amongst other places, Cornwall, South Wales and mainland Europe (Smith forthcoming a). Thus in order to reach these sites these items certainly travelled over long distances and may well have been exchanged. Furthermore, following the excavators of both these sites, I would interpret the two causewayed enclosures as sites of exchange for these items (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; Sharples 1991), although some, clearly, were left behind as deposits. I wish to examine both these two types of artefact separately. The argument I wish to make is that their very materiality was central to the ways in which they were exchanged and the ways in which they incorporated social relations within themselves. Although at times they might have drawn on the other as metaphor, their role in day-to-day life and their material properties meant that the ways in which they

were exchanged and what those exchanges represented were very different. I will begin by examining stone axes.

Stone axes and exchange

Figure 5.13: A Neolithic greenstone stone axe (www 3).

Stone axes have often been viewed as the prestige item *par excellence* of the British Neolithic, although recent interpretations have moved away from seeing them purely as loci of power and more as being tied in with ideas of biography, memory and pilgrimage (Bradley and Edmonds 1993; Price forthcoming). These associations with memory and biography are not side issues to those of exchange and personhood; rather they are central to the ways in which these axes could come to stand for social relations, and encapsulate them as they were exchanged.

Axes would have carried numerous associations. On the one hand they would act as referents to particular places of origin (Thomas 1996, 154). At Hambledon Hill axes from 14 different rock types were recovered (Smith forthcoming a), whilst at Maiden Castle more than 17 axes have been found in both the Wheeler and Sharples excavations (Roe and Edmonds 1991, 230). At Hambledon Hill five of the axes, and possibly two others, were of Cornish origin, whilst others came from group VI from the Lake District, group VIII from South Wales and included two of continental origin (Smith forthcoming a). At Maiden Castle, by comparison, at least ten of the axes seem to be of Cornish origin (Roe and Edmonds 1991, 230)[xii]. Again these axes betray a

variety of scales of interaction. People would have been aware of how axes looked and felt different, and they would also have been aware that axes had passed through different hands, not in all cases perhaps, but in many. The axes of Cornish origin may have come from a particular place that some members of the community had visited, but they may never have seen the source of the jadeite or nephrite axes from continental Europe that were found at Hambledon Hill[xiii].

Equally we can think of variation amongst the Cornish axes. The axes at Maiden Castle and Hambledon Hill included stone from five south-western groups: I, IV, IVa, XVI and XVII. Each of these comes from rock sources at varying distances from Dorset (Clough and Cummins 1988). Thus whilst people might be familiar with the source of group IV axes, which may have come from Callington in east Cornwall, they may never have visited the source of group I axes which may have been near Penzance in the far west (Clough and Cummins 1988)[xiv]. The axes from groups I and XVI from west Cornwall, along with both those from elsewhere in Britain and those of continental origin, may not have spoken of a specific point of origin, but rather the exchange networks which they represented, and the ties and links between people in far distant places. The axe in this context was inalienable from the social relations it encapsulated, and the memories and biographies within which it was entwined (A. Weiner 1992; Thomas 1996). It was also inalienable from its point of origin; it became a way of moving a powerful part of the world around with you, even if you had never visited that particular place. The shape and textures of the axe and the colour and density of the stone would have given clues that people could understand and trace back through particular people to certain points of origin either known, remembered or imagined.

Axes/bodies/persons

Although the connections with landscape are revealing, these have been discussed at length elsewhere (Bradley and Edmonds 1993; Edmonds 1999). Instead I wish to concentrate here on how the axes were tied into exchange and social relations, and more importantly what these relations can tell us about personhood during the Neolithic. The large numbers of axes deposited at the causewayed enclosures of Hambledon Hill and Maiden Castle suggest that these were locations through which axes moved as part of their exchange. These were not the only places where axes have

been deposited, of course, but nevertheless I wish to argue that they were central to their exchange. Why was this? We have already seen how Hambledon Hill acts as a liminal hidden place, amongst forest, cross dykes, outworks and ditches. The same can be argued for Maiden Castle. Again it sits on the edge of Neolithic occupation, next to woodland (Evans 1991, 251). The two ditches, along with possible outworks, help give the site the similar hidden and nested qualities as Hambledon Hill. Of course the two sites had very different temporalities as enclosures (see appendix 2.1.2 for a full discussion of this), but both were scenes of axe working and exchange over long periods. In Maiden Castle's case this extended well beyond its brief period of existence as an enclosure (Healy *et al.* in prep.)[xv]. Why were these sites chosen as the loci for exchange of stone axes? The answer I believe lies in the conceptions of personhood of people in the Neolithic.

If people in the Neolithic saw stone axes, and maybe other aspects of material culture, as part of the human body, then their exchange would represent the literal separation of part of the human body and its combination with another. What better place to do this than within causewayed enclosures where the acts of exposure and fragmentation of the human body, and its exchange, were all around? Even at Maiden Castle the acts of burial, such as the three year-old interred in the inner ditch, or the disarticulated remains of at least three people in the outer ditch (Sharples 1991, 151), would have permanently altered the way the site was textured, making it an appropriate place to work and exchange axes. The transformation of bodies would have acted as a potent metaphor for the exchange of axes, another part of the human body[xvi]. These acts of transformation might be added to by the physical separation of the axe from its haft and binding, mimicking, as Fowler points out, the transformation of bodies within the enclosure (2003, 49). The suggestion that people saw axes as part of the human body is not one taken at random. Once we move away from a Western-centred view of the bounded individual we can begin to think about how the body is not limited to the biological definition we give it in the West. Marilyn Strathern's work in Melanesia suggests how objects can be considered as people, or as parts of people, just as people are parts of groups (1988; Fowler 2004; chapter 2). As Fowler has pointed out in this context, 'to give a gift is to give a part of oneself' (2004, 55). This in turn can be supported by other anthropological examples which recognise the ways in which objects, including axes can be seen as analogous to human beings, and thought of as

part of a person (e.g. Battaglia 1990, 86; Thomas 2004, 124), or how objects and people can both perceived as achieving personhood as both are constituted in a similar fashion, both modelled on the same entity (Trudelle Schwarz 1997, 111).

Thus personhood here may have been partible (Fowler 2004, 33). People could separate off part of themselves and this could be incorporated within others. However, the biographical and metonymic association with the axe adds another layer to this interpretation; the act of exchange becomes more than the transfer of one part of a person's body to another. The axe also encapsulates the social relations of everyone who has carried the axe, and adds the new person's biography to it. The axe, in other words, represents a kind of combinable personhood within itself. As the axe is passed from hand to hand and from body to body it remains inalienable from each of those connections even as it is combined with a new person. At the moment of exchange those relations may be temporarily eclipsed by that between the two persons exchanging, as in Melanesia (M. Strathern 1988, 155), but the axe's fundamental tie to each of the people it has encountered remains unbroken.

Thus a form of dividuality is at work. On the one level the axe may have acted as a person, as an inalienable node of social relations, on the other it may have acted as part of people, moving and joining with different people over time. This kind of dividuality may have been mimicked by the ways people moved between groups. At the one level people too may have stood as a person, as a node of social relations, whilst at others they were part of a larger whole. Both axes and people had biographies, that told the stories of formation, origin, shaping, movement, exchange and, in the end, deposition. Indeed both axes and people may have been understood as being *grown* rather than made (Battaglia 1990, 134; Ingold 2000; Thomas 2004). Thus both axe and human emerge as people or parts of people in different contexts: a fundamentally partible, fractal, personhood (M. Strathern 1988; Wagner 1991). This kind of personhood is very different from that of the Western individual. Instead we have a view of the person in which different things can combine and separate from the body, and in separating take part of that sense of personhood with it, and combine it with others inside material objects.

Central to the way in which axes connected people through partible personhood was the materiality of the axes themselves. I have already touched on how different looks

and textures might speak of different places of origin. The colour and feel of the stone might act as mnemonic devices, helping people remember the rock faces from which they had been taken and the acts of forming and shaping the rock which may have taken place around those sites. Alternatively they might hint at unknown places, at distant locales in mainland Europe, or in far west Cornwall, and of the people and exchanges that had brought them to Dorset. The very hardness of the axe suits these long-term connections. The axe is unlikely to break by accident, and even if through use and wear it might become damaged, it can be reshaped, reworked and preserved. The combination of persons within the axe, and the flow of the axe from person to person can thus be maintained because of the axe's materiality. This creates long-term relationships between people, perhaps over a span greater than any one person's lifetime. The axe preserves, curates if you will, the social relations in which it is enmeshed. Tied in with this would be both the emotional aspects of these acts (Battaglia 1990, 56; Maschio 1998) and indeed with what Annette Weiner has described as the 'drama of exchange' (1992, 145). Materiality relates to people through the affective connections it embodies and through the memories it inspires and evokes of other people, places and events (cf. Gosden 2004). Within partible personhood perhaps memories and emotions moved with the axes, becoming parts of different people's bodies in a way we might find inconceivable in the West.

Axes did not move around between people forever, however, because at certain points in their history they were deposited either as whole, broken, or flakes in various contexts both at monuments but also elsewhere in the landscape. Again this mimics the treatment of human bone, further emphasising the ways in which axes might have been seen as part of the human body. The deposition of axes may also have had further consequences. When deposited whole axes acted to fix the relations between people that the axe embodied, the elements of different people bonded together in the axe, for all time. They made those relations fixed and permanent; they prevented other people from joining that particular form of sociality. When deposited as fragments, however, the reverse may have been true, such as in phase VI of segment 10 of the main enclosure at Hambledon Hill (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; fig. 5.9). Phase VI represents the phase of recut slots into the ditch (fig. 5.6). Into one of these slots, cut almost to the ditch bottom, two joining fragments of a greenstone axe were placed along with fragments of a ground axe and a flint axe (Mercer and Healy forthcoming).

This deposit dates to between 3670 and 3510 cal BC. Here we may see on occasion the deliberate sundering of relationships, the denial of a shared history, the physical wrenching apart of a shared personhood, in effect the *killing* of the axe. The breaking up of the axe may have been driven by political, economic or emotional motivations, but more likely it was a combination of many reasons that led people to assert their agency in the physical destruction of the social relationships and partible personhoods that the axe embodied. Away from monuments certain areas of the landscape may have been particularly suitable for the deposition of axes. The area between Maiden Castle and the ridge on which the Flagstones pits were dug, for example, has a higher proportion of polished stone axes than the South Dorset Ridgeway (Woodward 1991b, 29). Again here places too may have been textured by the way materiality was treated. The deposition of axes may have meant people came to associate certain places with particular sets of social relations, memories and emotions.

Gabbroic pottery and exchange

Figure 5.14: General examples of Early Neolithic pottery (after Thomas 1999, 100, fig. 5.2).

Early Neolithic pottery in general was part of a 'fluid exchange network' (Cleal 1992, 303), but one particular kind of ceramic can be traced travelling up from Cornwall: gabbroic pottery. Gabbroic Ware formed 9.1 per cent of the assemblage at Maiden Castle and a smaller 1.2 per cent at Hambledon Hill (Sharples 1991, 254; Smith forthcoming b). Gabbroic clay comes from the head of the Lizard peninsula in

Cornwall, and pots made from it emerged around 3650 cal BC (Cleal 2004, 180), or perhaps slightly before (Whittle *et al.* in prep.). How does this new form of pottery compare with the axes that travelled from a similar part of the world to these enclosures?

The first facet worth emphasising is the very different materiality of pottery compared to axes. Initially they go through different processes of formation, pottery being shaped by hand and then fired whilst axes are chipped and ground to a smooth surface. Secondly pottery is much more fragile than axes. Pots would have broken, both by accident and deliberately, with much greater ease. This increased fragility suggests that the exchange of pottery might lend itself to social relations of a different temporality to that of the exchange of axes. Rather then the act of exchange encompassing and eclipsing multiple previous exchange relationships, pottery of this sort might only be exchanged once or twice. Thus any one single pot will connect two particular people, or two groups of people, in a more intimate way than the exchange of an axe might have done. Pottery may also have represented, or been seen to stand for, the ability of human bodies to act as containers of substance (Fowler and Cummings 2003, 13).

More than this, the pottery, with its ability to contain substances, represents a flow of exchange between people rather than the movement of part of one person to another as the exchange of axes represents. It places people within a flow of substances through the world. The movement of pottery is tied in with, therefore, what might be described as a kind of permeable personhood (Fowler 2004, 33). One objection to this might be that flows of substance are construed in Melanesia as partible (M. Strathern 1988, 235), so why should they be seen as permeable here? As I touched on in chapter 2, in Melanesia substances such semen or milk, for example, are viewed as partible objects of exchange between people (M. Strathern 1988). There are important differences, however, between my account and these relations in Melanesia, however. First, the objectified substances there are moving directly from person to person, or perhaps via an intermediary, who is again a person (see chapter 2). Here, however, it is pottery that captures these flows and connects them, not just to other people, but to animals (notably cattle), water sources and plants. Pottery thus forms a permeable link between people and the world around them. Fowler has pointed out how within

permeable personhood flows of substance 'are not objectified as a specific part of a person' (2004, 33); here this is because it links exchanges between people, and thus people themselves, to the broader flow of substances through the world.

Indeed there is certainly evidence that some of the pottery at Hambledon Hill was used to contain dairy fats. Of the sherds examined from both enclosures 26 per cent contained dairy fats, and a further 67 per cent had contained a mixture of dairy and adipose fats (Copley *et al.* forthcoming). The knowledge that these pots contained animal fats extends the permeable links through people to animals, and through them to people's wider daily lives and the movement around the landscape to which cattle were central. Thus although the pots were short-lived in themselves they tied people together and linked their lives and landscapes through the flow of substances from land, to animal, to pot, to person. Animals moved round the landscape with people, and helped to link people to their world. Pottery helped catch the flow of substances between people and animals and hold it for a moment, thus allowing people to exchange these substances before consumption, extending the temporal links between one set of people, animals and landscapes and another.

Pots, therefore, whether transported as clay or pottery, came to stand for the flow of relations and substances between people, and the world, over a short period of time. Further understandings might be gleaned from the style, decoration or quality of a particular pot, alongside the clay from which it was made. The mixtures of styles of pot, which Rosamund Cleal (1992) has so cogently argued for elsewhere in southern Britain, offered opportunities for people to make clearly identifiable statements around identity, social networks, links and alliances. It is interesting to note here that the gabbroic pottery at Hambledon Hill is of a high quality, featuring both red and black burnish (Smith forthcoming b).

The fragmentation of the pot (cf. Chapman 2000), whether by deliberate agency or by accident, would see the end of this flow of substances. This would be neither as dramatic nor as shocking as the deliberate dismemberment of an axe. Pottery was used for such connections precisely because its materiality lent itself to such short-term engagement. The broken sherds could then be deposited or taken away as metonyms of the shared flow that had existed between people. The sherds created relationships of enchainment between people (Chapman 2000). If people met and

exchanged gabbroic pottery within causewayed enclosures, particularly Maiden Castle over a generation or so, it is no surprise that we find large amounts of it deposited in the ditches. These pots might have stood for relationships that lasted only for a few days, and once over, both sides could see the shattering of the pot, its deposition and perhaps the removal of a few sherds, as I have suggested, as reminders of the occasion. If the pot was made in Cornwall then this temporality may have been extended of course, but it would still be of a quite different nature to the rhythms of exchange that axes generated.

We cannot be certain about exactly how prevalent pottery was in people's daily lives, whether it was ubiquitous or a more specialised form of materiality. Pottery, as Hamilton and Whittle have argued, may 'have been appropriate to certain times and places in seasonal, annual or other cycles' (1999, 45). Thus these permeable relations might have emerged particularly within causewayed enclosures where large amounts of pottery was present to be exchanged, fragmented, deposited or taken away. Thus interestingly the relationships generated through pottery may have been highly contextual, in contrast to the relationships created through axes which were usually inalienable and fixed.

Permeability versus partibility

Do these different forms of materiality, temporalities of exchange and types of personhood contradict each other? Most certainly the answer to this is no (see chapter 2). Partibility and permeability do not exist in opposition to one another. Instead, as Fowler points out, 'we can consider these as mechanisms and processes vital to the formulation of personhood' (2004, 27; see also Battaglia 1990[xvii]). Thus permeability and partibility emerged under different circumstances during the Neolithic, perhaps as I have suggested, under the regime of different exchange relations. The materiality of both pots and axes was central to this. Both were inalienable to their source of origin, but their different materialities led to radically different temporalities of exchange and modes of connection between people. Axes could be exchanged over huge swathes of time, only slowly becoming smaller as they were used and reworked. In contrast pottery would have created shorter-term relationships between people, but its more fragile materiality meant that it could be more easily smashed and taken away[xviii]. The taking away of the sherds, or of fragments or flakes of an axe, allowed as Fowler has

argued 'people to share a part of the *same* thing at the *same* time' (2004, 67 original emphasis; see also Chapman 2000). The differing materialities of the two objects meant that this was much more likely to happen with pottery than with axes, but the distinctions are by no means absolute. Axes *could* be fractured as pots were, and might be seen as the *containers* of social relations, and of other flows of substance. Hence they might, within certain contexts, be seen as being caught up in permeable exchange. Similarly the break up of a pot might allow it to be exchanged in a partible fashion. Thus whilst most of the time, and in many contexts, the dominant understandings of a pot might be as permeable and of an axe as partible, these could be reversed within particular moments of discussion, debate and exchange.

Within these exchange networks certain opportunities to express power relations may also have existed. This may not have been power in the sense of dominion over others, but power in a proactive sense: having the power to act, to give and to create certain exchange relationships and not others. Gender too here may be involved. A traditional explanation might associate pots with women and axes with men, and this is a relationship I have explored elsewhere (O. Harris 2003). Here I would argue that gender might emerge from within the exchange relationship, rather than being imposed on it by the people involved (cf. M. Strathern 1988; chapter 2 and see also chapter 7). Thus, say, in the exchange of axes we might have same-sex relations, as part of one body becomes part of another; with pottery exchange we have cross-sex relations as the substance of one body flows to the other[xix]. Thus the substances within the pot stand as a *substitute* for the relations between people (M. Strathern 1988, 182)[xx]. They have been removed from the generalised flows, through the medium of the pot, to represent the flows of substance between two people or groups of people. The particular bowl of cow's milk can only represent those specific links. In contrast the axe acts as a *replication* of the relationship between two people or groups of people (M. Strathern 1988, 181). It can be used again and again to stand for these and other acts of relationship in future acts of exchange. The exchanges of axes or pottery were not automatically same-sex or cross-sex but they tended to fall into these categories because of the way they tended to be conceptualised. Of course, as I pointed out in the previous paragraph, there may have been moments where these differences were reversed; they were always contextual.

On occasions the relationships between these different acts of exchange, the different materialities and differing forms of personhood might be expounded through acts of deposition. In pit BF14 in the central enclosure at Hambledon Hill a group XVI axe head from Cornwall was deposited with half a flint-tempered cup resting on top (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; located in area B in fig. 5.9). The pit dated to between 3780 and 3490 cal BC. Above this two bowls of gabbroic pottery were deposited, again possibly incomplete, although plough damage means we cannot be certain of this (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). The deposition of gabbroic pots with a Cornish axe suggests that people may have been aware that they both came from a similar place (Smith forthcoming b); indeed one possible source of the group XVI stone is near Camborne (Clough and Cummins 1988, 9), only some 15 miles from the Lizard. The long-term connections embodied in the axe and the shorter-term links of the pottery are combined here. The axe was deposited whole, remaining inalienable from the connections it had formed through exchange between people and place. The pottery meanwhile stood for the more regular flows of substances between people. Indeed the flint-tempered cup at least was deposited in broken form, the other half being taken away perhaps as kind of material memory both of the exchanges and the act of deposition itself (see Chapman 2000; Kwint *et al.* 1999).

Emotion may have been understood quite differently within these conceptions of personhood. Rather than the possession of a single *individual*, it may instead have been conceived as partible or permeable in itself. Emotions may thus have flowed between people as they consumed the same substances. Shared consumption may have been as much about the transfer of feeling as of nutrients. Equally by entering into exchange relationships and absorbing parts of people within themselves, emotions may have been seen as leaving one person and entering another, as being carried in the materiality itself.

The exchange of gabbroic pottery and stone axes reveals moments at which different forms of power, personhood and gender were at play in the Neolithic. I have argued that differing forms of personhood emerge under these differing exchange relationships. Both these forms of personhood were possible, however, because both fitted in with the way the human body was conceptualised, because both made sense in a world where the body was both permeable and partible. This can be seen in the

ways in which human bone acted as another component of Neolithic materiality. Here, however, it may also have been caught up with powerful memories and emotions, that allowed other points of view to come to the fore (Seremetakis 1991). It is to human bone as an aspect of this materiality that I now turn.

Human bone, human bodies: partible, permeable, emotional

Figure 5.15: Skull from the Main enclosure at Hambledon Hill (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 3.12).

Human bone was undoubtedly a key aspect of early Neolithic materiality (Fowler 2001, 144). It is found in numerous contexts: long barrows, megalithic tombs and causewayed enclosures. Human bone occurs in almost every aspect of Neolithic life (Thomas 1999a). Obviously the attitudes people held towards this material was significantly different to the ones prevalent in the West today. Central to these attitudes were the ways in which bodies were treated after death. The methods through which bodies were transformed, particularly at causewayed enclosures, were,

as Fowler has argued, 'a key vehicle for the structuring principles of life and death' (2003, 50). More than this, the transformation of the dead, the materiality of bone, and the memories and emotions this engendered were fundamental to the ways in which personhood and thus other aspects of materiality were understood. Human bone may have also offered opportunities through memory and emotion for power to be exercised, possibly by persons or groups to whom it was more normally denied (Seremetakis 1991). Bodies would have been broken up and moved round the landscape and there is evidence for this at Wor Barrow (Barrett *et al.* 1991; Thomas 2002, 41). Thomas has pointed out that the three disarticulated bodies buried at Wor Barrow may well have been brought there from elsewhere, and could have been in circulation for a considerable period of time prior to deposition (2002, 41).

At causewayed enclosures, particularly at Hambledon Hill, there is widespread evidence for the exposure of the dead (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Indeed this image was powerfully evoked by Roger Mercer's oft quoted description of the central enclosure at Hambledon as 'a vast reeking open cemetery, its silence broken only by the din of crows and ravens' (1980, 63). Yet such an image inevitably draws upon our own preconceptions of what such a 'cemetery' would be like. The emotional imagery here seems to be drawn more from 20th century horror films than anything else. Nevertheless the evidence from the weathered, gnawed and cut marked bones shows that exposure and deliberate defleshing did take place in the Hambledon Hill enclosure. This latter point is important, as it was not only the dry bones that were taken and removed. 'Manipulation of the fleshed human corpse,..., may have been far more prevalent than has so far appeared' (Healy 2004, 23). What it is crucial to point out here is that variety was very much the spice of death. At Hambledon Hill alone corpses were interred in articulated, partially articulated and disarticulated form, although the latter was the most common by far.

Figure 5.16: The partially articulated pelvis and femurs of the young man from segment 6.1 of the main enclosure at Hambledon Hill (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 3.16).

The best example of a partially articulated skeleton comes from the articulated torso and femurs of a young man that were found in the interface between phases II and III in segment 6.1 (fig. 5.9), dating to between 3460 and 3370 cal BC (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; fig. 5.16). His body had been both gnawed by dogs and had cut marks on the femurs, indicating the acceleration of the defleshing process. There is other evidence for certain bones, such as skull fragments, having been burnt and other bones appear to have been curated before deposition (Healy 2004, 23). These include apparently articulating toe and foot bones from segment 3 of the Shroton spur outwork (fig. 5.17), which although stratigraphically later than other bones, are earlier in radiocarbon date (Healy 2004, 24). The foot and toe bones, dating to between 3760 and 3630 cal BC were located in the phase III rubble fill of the ditch, which was older than antler picks and an articulated dog skeleton (3640-3490 cal BC) on the base of the same segment (Healy 2004, 24). Many of the bones were certainly exposed, and have fissures consistent with soaking and then rapid drying (McKinley forthcoming). Skulls in particular seem to have been exposed for notable periods of time (McKinley forthcoming). Much of this skeletal material was deposited in the ditches of the enclosure, but some would have been taken, curated and placed elsewhere in the landscape, forming a central part of Neolithic materiality. As Frances Healy argues, 'the treatment of human remains was at least as diverse as the roles individuals may have filled in life' (2004, 24).

Figure 5.17: The Shroton spur outworks (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 3.73).

What do these transformations of the dead tell us about Neolithic life? Fowler has argued that they were tied in with the dialectical process of remembering and forgetting (2003). He suggests that the transformation of the corpse from a fleshed, known, person to a dry skeleton was part of a process of forgetting (Fowler 2003, 59), a way of acknowledging the place of the dead but forgetting the names and faces of any one single person. These transformations from one role to another, demonstrated by the transformation of the corpse, echoed other transformations in life both of people, from child to adult for example, and of things (Fowler 2003, 59). Others have often argued that the apparently collective structure of Neolithic remains points to the importance of generalised ancestors: ancestors that act as legitimation for either the

occupation of land or the dominance of one group over another (e.g. Shanks and Tilley 1982, Tilley 1984).

I believe that more complex reasons lie behind these practices, simply because the variety of ways of treating the dead was so great that they speak against any one catch-all explanation. Certainly Fowler is right that remembering and forgetting were central to these transformations (2003), but there is more to be said on this point, particularly on the way this helps to create the kinds of social and bodily memories I described in chapter 4. He is also right to see the way the human body was treated as a metaphor for how living people, animals and material things were treated (Fowler 2003, 59). However, the sheer variety of ways of treating the dead speaks of negotiation over the corpse, of competing interests, and that the materiality of the corpse offered up opportunities for power and shared social memory to be challenged and changed particularly through emotion (Seremetakis 1991). As Ingold has argued (2000), knowledge and memories are not handed down from generation to generation, but are re-learnt and renegotiated. It was this that took place within the powerful architecture of causewayed enclosures like Hambledon Hill, and central to it was the manipulation of a particularly powerful form of materiality: human bone. I shall now develop this argument in three phases. The first will look at how shared social memories were created, cited and recalled, or more accurately re-created, through the manipulation of human bone. This will also examine how forgetting and bodily memory were wrapped up in this. The second phase will examine the possibilities for subversion of these practices, for agency, for challenging dominant understandings of the past, particularly through emotion. Lastly, I will return to the theme of personhood and examine how human bodies and human bone helped create understandings of people as permeable or partible in different circumstances, and as more dividual than individual overall.

Memory bones

When I discussed memory in chapter 4 I argued that those memories held in common by people, alongside discussed and agreed versions of past events, are central to the way people live their lives. These kinds of social memory play important roles in all the other aspects of emotion, identity and personhood that I have touched upon. It is only through being able to re-imagine the world and the past in similar ways that

people can make sense of it, and of each other. This is precisely why Neolithic practices seem strange to us; we cannot remember what they remembered. It was at sites like Hambledon Hill that bodily and social memories came into being. People could draw on and re-imagine powerful memories surrounding their experience within the architecture of Hambledon Hill. The smell of rotting bodies, the acts of cutting flesh away to reveal the bone underneath, the very feel of the bone, would create powerful experiences that could be re-imagined at later dates by all who had seen them. Even in a community with a partible view of personhood, the break up of a body's 'material coherence' may have been a notably memorable moment (Battaglia 1990, 194). Such moments would also have been made use of to understand other aspects of life, the exchange of axes being one example[xxi].

The bones taken from the site and passed between people would act as material memories; touching, seeing and smelling the cleaned bone would hark back to the sites and sounds of events at Hambledon Hill. These memories were not somehow stored, either in the brain of the person, or in the bones, but instead the bones acted as stimulants that aided, through 'an effort after meaning', the re-creation of memories (Bartlett 1932). Following Ahmed (2004) again, we can think of them as becoming almost *sticky* with memory (see chapter 3). Thus human bone became a physical extension of memory, and helped move the power of the site, the architecture and the events that took place there, into the landscape. The human bone, as material culture, mediates between remembering and forgetting (A. Jones 2003, 67). The bodily memory of touching and handling bone at the site could be caught up in every moment that human bone was being handled, even at a subconscious level (Kwint 1999; Harrison 2004). When bone was deposited elsewhere it made sense to people because they knew to what it referred: the acts of exposure at causewayed enclosures. For those who had not witnessed such moments, their exclusion would have been equally as powerful as ours is in the present. This metaphor, available to most if not all, as a source of memory was central to the maintenance of the aesthetics of conviviality, which enabled people to live alongside each other without resorting to anger and violence.

Emotional negotiations

What of the dead themselves? The loss of personal identity through the break up of the corpse has been a common theme, as I touched on above. Forgetting may well have a role to play here, but what of those people who were buried intact? I wish to make a suggestion here that, counter-intuitively, the burial of bodies intact was, on occasions, an act of forgetting. If bones were mnemonic items, they may have been caught up in how people remembered the dead themselves. Thus part of the way in which people would remember, and engage, with the dead would be through the handling of their bones. This may have brought back memories of the dead involuntarily (Harrison 2004). Thus by burying the body whole the crucial mnemonic devices, the bones themselves, were denied to the living; they were hidden away. Thus rather than the usual position that views forgetting as being caught up in the dismemberment and exposure of the corpse, this may in fact have been central to the acts of remembering. In contrast the corpses that people were encouraged to forget may have been buried whole[xxii].

I do not want to impose any kind of absolute distinction here, however. The vast number of ways of treating the body, as I said above, prevents any kind of catch-all interpretation. Instead this variety can in fact lead us to a recognition that the body was always a site for negotiation both before and after death. The evidence from Hambledon Hill not only for exposure but also for the washing and drying of bones indicates that people went on interacting with the body in an intimate way. This may have involved the remembering of the person from whom the bones came. Emotions may have played important roles here, which challenged and prevented corpses being disposed of in any one particular way. The power of emotions surrounding death should not be underestimated; as we have seen in rural Greece they can give normally underprivileged groups a chance to exert authority. That does not mean that Neolithic people felt emotions exactly like the women of rural Greece, but they may have used emotions in similar ways (O. Harris 2003). Thus whether people were remembered or forgotten cannot be 'read off' from how bodies are treated in any kind of simplistic fashion. Instead we need to consider the contextual evidence for particular bodies rather than assuming that broad genres of practice related automatically to particular kinds of memory work[xxiii].

With exposed bodies, the differing states of rotting may also have allowed interpretation of the life of the deceased, or of the living to take place. Whether a corpse had rotten away entirely over the course of a year, whether animals had gnawed at the bones, whether the bones had turned particular colours, may have influenced the way it was disposed of. Whether the corpse should be allowed to rot for longer, whether the flesh should be cut away, whether the skull should be left out for further exposure, whether the bones should be washed and dried; all this was open for discussion and negotiation and more besides. The crucial point is that behind these discussions were not cold, emotionless conversations around what was best, but powerful, emotionally driven, arguments. These may have been very different emotions to those we might consider, but they were driven by such affective concerns nonetheless. People may have cared very deeply about how bodies were treated. The reinterpretation of the bones based on their condition could lead to new understandings and new memories, as people challenged and subverted dominant understandings through emotion and agency, according to what *felt* right. Again, conviviality may have been central here.

Through these engagements the narratives that surrounded people's lives could be challenged and rewritten, memories reworked, and understandings transformed, as the bones were defleshed, washed, dried and deposited. These re-written narratives, and re-called but transformed memories, would allow new identities of both the living and the dead to be forged and cited through the materiality of the bones. Through these processes human bone itself would start to take on some of the emotional qualities of these negotiations and reinterpretations. It would thus act not only as a mnemonic of certain places, rituals and people, but of powerful emotions also (see also Maschio 1998, 96). The presence of intense emotions may have directly affected the ease with which people remembered the places and events (Milton 2005a, 34). Whether the particular person was remembered or not, or for how long, was thus not the only matter of import. There were also the powerful associations with the bones and the place, transformations and emotions for which it stood.

Partible bones, permeable people

The materiality of human bone is tied up with another aspect that I have already touched on within this case-study: personhood (Fowler 2001; 2002). It is inevitable

that the treatment of human bone will have an impact on people's understanding of personhood, just as today the unity of the human body both before birth and after death is central to our views on the subject. Earlier when I examined the way people exchanged pottery and axes I argued for a view of personhood in the Early Neolithic that was both partible and permeable. This view both emerged from, and was conditioned, by the treatment of the human corpse, which emphasised both partibility and permeability to differing extents. The mixing of human bone together also suggests a view of people that is dividual in nature (Fowler 2001, 145). These points are not absolute, however, and the permeable or partible nature of people emerged only in certain contexts, just as they do in Melanesia, or for that matter in the West, today (Fowler 2004; M. Strathern 1988).

The partibility of people emerges from a consideration of persons as a site of social relations, much as I argued for earlier with axes (Thomas 2002, 42) As Thomas has argued, 'both artefacts and bodies were governed by the principles of partibility' (2002, 42). The deposition of a corpse as whole would sanctify and make permanent those social relations whilst the exposure, defleshing and disarticulation of a corpse might represent the break up of those social relations. The parting of the body was equivalent to the parting of still living people, and just as those who had had a relation with an axe might take a flake or a handle away with them, so might a parent or a child take a bone of a person away with them. Equally just as people could give up part of themselves (an axe say) and give it to another, at death they could give up all of themselves. Indeed this argument might be enhanced. If people in life were tied into complex exchange relationships that involved the occasional giving up of parts of their bodies, axes for example, then these relationships may not have ended with death. During life people, or groups, may have tried to hold on to various possessions, to parts of themselves as part of 'the paradox of keeping-while-giving' (A. Weiner 1992, 152). At death the exchanges may have continued as the end of a person's life offered new materialities with which exchange relationships could be maintained and debts settled.

Thus the bones of the dead could have been understood in a multitude of ways. To be more specific, they might act simultaneously as material mnemonic of the dead, part of a living person for exchange (cf. Thomas 1996, 181), an element of an on-going

exchange relationship that existed both before and after death, and as the locus of the dead person's social relations[xxiv]. Both the first and last understandings might be eclipsed by the act of exchange, but would remain present nonetheless. If bones were taken and exchanged they may have acquired biographies of their own, adding to the mnemonic links, emotional engagements and relations in which they were enmeshed. Thus partibility is inherent within the fractured nature of much of the remains we find in the Early Neolithic (Fowler 2001). It is also indicated by the combinable nature of bone in the Neolithic. For example, in segment 3 of the ditch of the Shroton spur outwork (fig. 5.17) a fibula and a radius were placed alongside each other like a radius and ulna would be in a forearm (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; see also Fowler 2001, 142-3). Interestingly the radius was complete, which is unusual for the long bones at Hambledon, suggesting, perhaps, that it was younger than the cut-marked fibula it was placed in conjunction with. Neither bone has been directly dated, however. Battaglia has pointed out that the Sabarl islanders 'exchange and redistribute material substitutes for the dead in the form of things that were used in life to extend their influence throughout space and time' (1990, 156). During the Early Neolithic it was not just material substitutes that were exchanged but the bones of the dead themselves. This suggestion is supported by the work of Michael Richards (2000). Through the analysis of stable isotopes he has argued for a greater variation in diet for the people interred (in various forms) at Hambledon Hill in comparison to those people buried both in the long barrow at this site and at a number of Cotswold Severn chambered tombs (M. Richards 2000, 133). This he argues may mean that the bones deposited at the enclosure had come from further afield than those buried in the long barrow. Given the disarticulated nature of the assemblage from the enclosure Richards suggests this supports a view of bones as moving around the landscape over some distances before being deposited (2000, 133).

If partibility can be tied in with the bones of the dead, and indeed it is this I have been concentrating on, there is another aspect that stresses people's more permeable nature, which is the flesh and blood of the corpse. This rotted away from the body, either in the air, or in the ground, or was cut off and perhaps burnt, buried or even, on occasions, consumed. This flesh had a permeable relationship with the world around it. It was not an objectified part of someone, to be separated and exchanged (Fowler 2004). Rather it was part of the flow of substances, or the 'economy of substances' as

Thomas has described it (1999b), which created a permeable relationship between people, and between people and the world in which they dwelt. During life people's permeable or partible nature emerged under different circumstances, in death, the permeable outside was stripped away to leave a partible core. Within this understanding it is no surprise that mouldable clay and its counterpart, the pottery which contained substances, should often be exchanged in ways that hinted at the permeability of the body and hard axes exchanged in ways that spoke of the movement of bones.

Concluding materiality

Human bone and human bodies formed a central part of Neolithic materialities, and their transformation at death offered potent metaphors, tempos and rhythms against which life could be played out (Fowler 2003). The rotting body revealed the permeability and partibility of these Neolithic dividuals, aspects of their personhood which were played out in other exchanges, of axes or pottery for example. Personhood was also played out at the larger scale. The aggregation of the communities, the social person if you will, at these enclosures and the exchanges of marriage partners, pots, axes and animals between them, mimicked the exchanges particular people made in life (chapter 7). Equally the break up of the community, the social person, as groups moved away from the causewayed enclosure drew on the metaphor of the way the human body was broken up after death. Tied up with human bone were the memories, emotions and associations that were played out within the transformations of bodies at causewayed enclosures. Part of the impact of death may have been its ability to provoke powerful emotions in people (Blasco 2005; Seremetakis 1991). These may have allowed people to challenge the ways in which the dead were treated, to demand alternative burial for relatives, friends or enemies. All of these aspects were caught up within these and other parts of Neolithic materiality. They unfolded within the day-to-day concerns that surround the notion of conviviality. How can we begin to access the detail of such moments? What examples can we find where dominant hegemonies were challenged, senses of identity formed and cited, and materiality used to refer to memories and provoke emotions? The answer lies in the acts of deposition that took place in this period, most notably at causewayed enclosures like Hambledon Hill and Maiden Castle, but also at other

sites, such as at Rowden, that were located around the landscape, and throughout people's lives.

Deposition in the Early Neolithic

Throughout the previous two sections deposition has lurked just off stage, its presence always acknowledged, yet not often addressed. In this section I wish to correct that imbalance. Here I will focus on the acts of deposition which have informed my discussions of both movement and materiality. Deposition was central to Neolithic life, both at small-scale sites and at large monument complexes. These acts of deposition were not chance occurrences, nor were they designed merely to dispose of rubbish, or unwanted belongings. Instead these were acts of 'structured deposition' (C. Richards and Thomas 1984). Many items was deliberately selected and deposited in the right context, in part referencing and reinforcing symbolic and conceptual relationships between people, objects and their world (Pollard 2001, 316). Although on occasion we may discover artefacts that were redeposited or residual, much of what archaeologists encounter in this period is the result of deliberate deposition. Joshua Pollard has argued that the efficacy of acts of deposition lay 'both in the act of performance and in the aesthetic effect of the resulting composition' (2001, 328). Within the section on deposition here, and in the next two chapters, I want to show that we can extend this to demonstrate that the emotional and memorable impacts that it had were also absolutely vital.

Deposition played such a crucial role in the Early Neolithic because of the different temporality at which it ran. When items were placed in a pit at a place like Bincombe (Woodward 1991a), or in the ditches of Maiden Castle (Sharples 1991), they acquired a different rhythm of engagement. They could no longer be altered or transformed in either form or context. Instead, framed by the earth, they fixed transient and momentary understandings to a certain spot. These meanings were seldom permanent, as the objects might be encountered again in recutting in an altered form, but they were comparatively long-term. This altered, prolonged, temporality, looking to the future as much as the past, makes clear why deposition was tied in with many aspects of Neolithic life. The acts of deposition were central to emotion and memory, to the formation of identity and to how people understood themselves and their place in the world. They also offered up moments of multiple and contradictory understandings,

moments where perceived wisdoms might be questioned and challenged and people's agency could come to the fore. Analysing deposition gives us access to the *moments* of people's lives, no longer just broad themes and sweeping changes. In what follows I will look at several aspects of deposition in the Early Neolithic. Once more the majority of my focus will be on Hambledon Hill. I will begin, however, by thinking about small-scale acts of deposition at habitation sites.

Deposition as closure

Many of the acts of deposition encountered at Neolithic sites in Dorset, particularly at small, non-monumental, sites have the feelings of acts of closure (Pollard 1999). They represent the moment at which people prepare to leave the site and move on with their seasonal round (Thomas 1999a; Whittle 2003). As Pollard has argued, 'the *act* of settlement abandonment and movement, like any social transition, was probably perceived as threatening to the social order and in need of mediation through ritual practice' (1999, 89, original emphasis). The Early Neolithic pits at Flagstones are typical in this sense. Pit 00221 at Flagstones was a steep-sided pit about 2 metres across that contained 28 Early Neolithic sherds, 36 pieces of flint and a few animal bones (Healy 1997a, 30). These were placed in the pit within a deposit of charcoal and ash dated to 3850-3660 cal BC, which also contained burnt chalk and burnt bone (Healy 1997a, 30). This had either been created through burning in situ, or deposited on the base of the pit (Healy 1997a, 30). The sherds of pottery, the animal bone and the flints were deliberately selected and placed within the pit. As archaeologists we tend to approach these acts of deposition either as evidence for economy or as ritual acts. Instead when we realise that people's concerns, on a day-to-day basis, were more around the aesthetics of conviviality then different concerns emerge from such moments. This deposit, in many ways typical of Neolithic pits, centres around conviviality, and day-to-day concerns. The physical artefacts and bones, along with the heat from the burning, the smell of the smoke, the taste of meat all made up part of the memories that were sealed in such a pit at the end of a stay (Pollard 1999, 89). The relationships formed and renewed, and the familial bonds reaffirmed, were all placed in the pit, physically linking people through the act of deposition. Their bonds renewed and renegotiated; people could leave the site knowing that their links with the rest of the community remained unbroken. The acts of deposition brought to a

close the gathering at a particular spot, and sealed the relationships between different people, and between the landscape and the community (Pollard 1999, 89)[xxv].

Elsewhere, such as perhaps at Rowden and Pamphill, objects were not immediately deposited in the ground (Field *et al.* 1964; Pollard 2001; Woodward 1991a). Instead they were curated above ground in a midden, slowly being added too before being deposited into pits. The use of middens in this fashion drew out the temporality of deposition and projected the connections it made into the future as well as the past. Now not only mnemonic devices, the items promised a future re-engagement, a second chance to interact, examine and alter them before deposition. It also created a context in which pottery, bone and organic matter could interweave, becoming a single item with a diverse make-up. Just as pottery might be flint tempered, so middens were tempered with the materiality of life, awaiting deposition at a future point. Middens thus created a form of engagement that collapsed past, present and future, pot, bone, stone and earth into a single moment. They were a form of visual deposition that hinted at future acts of transformation to come.

Thus bringing together wood, pottery, bone and stone helped to move different aspects of both the landscape and the taskscape (Ingold 1993) into a single context, allowing many people's contributions to be acknowledged. These relationships, physically embodied in the pits and the middens, were thus projected into the past, in recognition of the work done in gathering plants, clay, stone and animals, and into the future, assuring all that this work would continue. We should not think of this work necessarily as we would consider it, as somehow counterpoised to fun, playfulness or enjoyment. Elsewhere in the world the notion of the *play of work*, shows us that this might be considered very differently (M. Strathern 1988; Overing and Passes 2000b). Such moments of deposition created emotional and memorable relationships between people and place and thus created particular geographies and textures of experience as I suggested for Rowden earlier.

Deposition at monuments

If deposition played an important role in maintaining the relationships between people at sites like Flagstones, its role at sites with monumental architecture, particularly causewayed enclosures, was even more vital. The concerns encountered at the smaller

sites were still at play, but on a larger scale, with greater numbers of people witnessing and being involved in feasts, exchanges and acts of deposition. Alongside this I have already touched on other considerations, identity for one, which would have been more open to question at such sites. That does not mean that who placed what item into a pit at say Rowden or Sutton Poyntz was not also caught up in the citing of regulatory ideals, or the subversion of identities, but that these things were called into question more, were observed and noted more, within the ritualising architecture of monuments (Bell 1992). This was only exacerbated by the nature of the deposits in the ditches, the bodies, the axes and the pots acting as the 'technology of enchantment' just as the architecture acted as the 'enchantment of technology' (Gell 1999b, 163). Materiality could enchant and entexture a site through emotion and memory.

This means that monuments, such as enclosures, acted in two, almost contradictory, ways. Their architecture demanded that people move and act in certain ways, yet this very same architecture meant that it was here that people sought to define their identities and relationships, to deal with the dead and the living and to exchange. Thus within the controlling and unifying architecture people sought out ways to differentiate themselves and determine particular roles. Through acts of deposition accepted ideas could be challenged and overcome, or subverted and switched. Thus what on the one hand appears to provoke orthodoxy and homogeneity on the other provides the very material with which such orthodoxies might be thrown down. Crucial to both sides of this relationship were the specifics of particular deposits, both in terms of what was deposited and where it was deposited. At Hambledon Hill, which I return to now, deposition took place in a number of phases within the ditches, some containing at least seven phases of deposition (fig. 5.6). Alongside this were the many pits, both within the Stepleton and main enclosures, and the acts of deposition in and around the two long barrows.

Almost every aspect of Neolithic materiality found its way into the deposits at Hambledon Hill, many of which I have already examined. It seems as if the entirety of Neolithic people's engagement with the material world was brought to the enclosure for deposition (cf. Whittle and Pollard 1999). Crucially we can now see that this did not just apply to the obvious categories like pottery, flint and bone. The

analysis of the charcoal from burnt deposits at the Stepleton enclosure shows that wide ranges of different woods were burnt at the enclosure (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). These included many locally available species such as oak and hazel, amongst others, but also more exotic plants like vinewood and Cornish heath which may have travelled some distance to reach the site (P. Austin *et al.* forthcoming). Although one could suggest that these different woods were selected by chance, it seems clear to me that this is not the case. As Austin *et al.* point out, 'anthropogenic factors are likely to profoundly influence the nature and composition of charcoal remains' (forthcoming). This might indicate different parts of the landscape, different kinds of landscape also, being brought to a single fire. Alternatively they may represent different tools, crafted from different woods, that were burnt (P. Austin *et al.* forthcoming). The crucial point here is that even within types of deposit we might think of as straightforward, there are multiple references to the wider world.

Equally important were the locations in which items were deposited. At the broader scale I have touched on this already, when I examined how people deposited certain artefacts in certain places as they moved through the complex. In more detail we can also consider how the butt ends of particular ditches were marked in certain ways[xxvi], presumably associated with crossing causeways, or at the very least their visibility from such points. At Hambledon Hill many of the ditch segments contain notable butt-end deposits, including those by one of the possible entrances to the main enclosure. Here both segments 8 and 9 contained significant deposits (see fig. 5.9 for location of these ditches). In the north butt of segment 8, part of the deposits in a phase VI recut (a 45cm deep and 70cm wide slot) included two human femurs, crossed over each other, along with a considerable amount of animal bone and lithics (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Interestingly the two femurs, right and left, may have come from a male and a female body (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Earlier in the history of the site, on the opposite side of the possible entrance in the butt of segment 9, three successive lenses of soil appear to have been tipped into the ditch from the causeway (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). These occurred in phase II, and were thus an addition to the natural silting process, taking place between 3640 and 3490 cal BC. These lenses lay just east of a spread of pottery and might be associated with the repeated acts of deposition as the enclosure was entered. It is not, however, only the butts of ditches directly next to possible entrance causeways that contain

unusual acts of deposition. During the excavation of the south cross-dyke by Desmond Bonney in the late 1950s a striking deposit was found in the west butt of the inner ditch of the western outwork (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; marked as trench E1 on fig. 5.9). It included three chipped and polished flint axes, flint flakes, bones and pottery sherds and occurred in phase I, thus soon after the southern cross-dyke was constructed, probably between 3570 and 3390 cal BC (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Such an extraordinary deposit has obvious ramifications when we think back to my earlier discussion of the relationships between bone, pottery, axes and personhood. The pottery connected people both through the permeable flows of substance they facilitated and the mnemonic and metonymic connections they created once fractured (Hamilton and Whittle 1999, 45). The bones hinted back to past lives, past experiences and past people. The axes meanwhile emphasised the inalienable links people generated across both spatially and temporally by separating out part of their body and incorporating it with another's. The axes' biographies stood as testament to the linkages people made across time and space to, and through, each other.

These examples show the importance of a detailed consideration of what was deposited, where. Bearing this in mind there are two areas of deposition at Hambledon Hill which I wish to examine. The first consists of the acts of deposition over many years in the ditches to the northwest of the main enclosure, particularly in segments 16 to 19. I will examine how the details of deposition played off tensions between remembering and forgetting and how identity and emotion were caught up in this. Secondly I wish to examine how a particular deposit might have been caught up in the performance of a person's identity. Deposition was also caught up in the way people understood, and constituted their understandings of animals, and I consider this in appendix 2.1.3.

Themes and memories

The acts of deposition in segments 16, 17, 18 and 19 (fig. 5.9) display particular characteristics that differentiate them from other excavated ditches in the enclosure. Although superficially they follow a similar pattern of re-cutting and deposition over some six or seven phases, the details demonstrate interesting differences. Importantly these differences are maintained throughout the history of deposition at the enclosure

over some 300 years. Clearly then, long-term memories, oral histories or other mechanisms existed so that new generations could experience the history of the site and maintain its traditions. Central to these memories and traditions, I will suggest, was the power of emotion to texture monuments. We can trace these traditions of deposition in the absence of axes and axe fragments from these segments, in the absence of antler and virtual absence of deer bone. We can also trace it in the repeated deposition of Jurassic pottery and articulated animal bone (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Most interestingly we can trace it in the two articulated burials of children (figs 5.18 and 5.19).

Figure 5.18: Photo of the child burials from segments 17 and 18 of the main enclosure at Hambledon Hill (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, figs 3.34 and 3.35).

Figure 5.19: Plan of child burials from segments 17 and 18 in the main enclosure at Hambledon Hill (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 3.32).

The two children are the only fully articulated burials in the central enclosure (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; figs 5.18 and 5.19). There are other inhumations on the hill, under the long barrow and in and around the Stepleton enclosure, and these occurred before and after these child burials. None, however, took place in the central area apart from the interment of these two children. The similarities between these burials are striking; both are of children, both are articulated and both were deposited with

what might be termed grave goods. In segment 18 the child was buried with three tubular bone beads, two made from mammal limb bones, and one from a large bird, possibly a swan (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). In segment 17 two chalk lumps carved with criss-crossed lines were placed behind the child's head (Mercer and Healy forthcoming)[xxvii]. Most striking of all however is that both children's appearance would have been affected by the premature fusing of their skulls (Mercer forthcoming). What is remarkable about these similar acts of interment, in adjacent segments, of children of a similar age with an identical physical abnormality, is that they were buried between 160 and 250 years apart (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Were specific acts of deposition being remembered ten or so generations later? It is important to point out that there were differences between the two burials, not only in terms of the different grave goods, but also in terms of the side on which they were laid. Furthermore the older burial, that in phase I or II of segment 18 (3660-3540 cal BC) might well have been deposited in an organic container as the excavator suggests (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). The more recent burial in phase VII of segment 17 (3380-3320 cal BC) was not. How can we develop this discussion?

Emotional and mnemonic geographies

Now it might appear that these burials represent a simple act of memory, that people recalled the former burial as they engaged in the latter. In other words, that either in story, or in myth, tales of the first burial could be vividly recalled many years later. Certainly it makes no sense to claim that as no one was alive who witnessed the earlier burial it was impossible that it could have been remembered, as Bloch has shown with the Zafimaniry (1998; see chapter 4). Nevertheless, I want to suggest here that it was not necessarily *direct* memory of the first burial that was at play. Rather tensions existed between remembering and forgetting, and these were central to both acts of deposition. Earlier I suggested that on occasions the burial of the intact corpse might have been caught up in processes of forgetting as material memories (bones) were prevented from entering circulation. This, counter-intuitively again, may have been at play here. The burial of the first child intact would have prevented their bones entering circulation, thus preventing memories of the child themselves from being sustained within the group. Thus this, to an extent, emphasised forgetting. Nevertheless at the same time, the particular circumstances of the burial created a

particular texturing, in terms of both memory and emotion, in that part of the enclosure. Thus the first act of interment created an emotional and mnemonic geography that transformed how people would feel about, and thus remember, the northwest segments of the central enclosure (Sheller 2004; chapter 3). The burial of the child may have been a highly emotional event. People may have contested the interment, demanding the child be broken up like others. Other people may have argued that whole burial was essential for children suffering from the skull condition.

The birth, life, death and burial of the first child could have altered the ways in which people lived their lives, and could have created new possibilities for identities to be cited and reconfigured at various stages. This is probably true of any person's life to some extent, but this child may have offered different possibilities, because they were, physically at least, visibly different. This difference may have been central both to the ways in which they lived their lives and, at the time of their death, how they were buried. It may have affected not only the way in which their identities were created but also facilitated their construction as an 'other' against which different people could create their own identities. It may have been this that led to demands that the child not be dealt with in the usual fashion. The body was not selected for exposure, the bones were not defleshed, washed and dried, nor were they taken, exchanged and later deposited. Instead the child was buried intact, in an organic container, wearing a necklace of beads and was then covered with nodules of flint. As I discussed earlier, these acts were almost certainly not cold and unemotional; rather they would have been replete with emotions, many of them conflicting and contrasting. This form of burial might have been seen as an honour or as a disgrace, and people may have responded to either of these with passionate feelings motivated by something like love or anger or something else. People may have reacted in a very strong way to the suggestion that the child be forgotten. Again, however, this might be in ways we find contradictory, it might be seen as an honour, or as a good thing, rather than in a negative light.

Tensions were at play then between the forgetting of the first child, the absence of their bones, and the explicitly memorable conditions of their interment. If memory usually worked through the bones of the dead, here the absence of them denied people the technology of memory. I do not mean by this that people would immediately

forget the child, rather that, like the war memorials discussed in chapter 4 (Rowlands 1999), the encouragement to forget focused people's attention in other directions and denied them the aid to memory that the bones represented. Remembering and forgetting thus play off one another here. The power of emotions and memories surrounding the *burial*, if not the child, meant that this part of the site would always be experienced differently, and this is reflected in the second child burial. Thus whether the particular interment could be remembered over at least 160 years is less important. What matters is the way in which it textured this part of the site with emotion, and through that with memory. In re-encountering this part of the site memories may have returned involuntarily (Harrison 2004; chapter 6) and with them particular emotions (Svašek 2005a). These may not have been memories of the child, but rather of how this part of the enclosure was understood *affectively*. These geographies and textures were maintained through the different forms of deposition and practice that took place in this part of the enclosure throughout its history.

The burial of the first child in that particular part of the enclosure may thus in fact not only explain the burial of the second, but also the other differences in deposition that exist there through time. When people came to re-encounter the site, through movement, the way they felt about these particular segments was different to how they felt about other parts of the enclosure, and this is shown in the long term differences in deposition that took place there. It was thus *felt* to be appropriate to bury the second child in a remarkably similar way in the same part of the enclosure because of the emotional geographies with which that part of the site was entextured. The emotional and mnemonic geographies do not resemble the exact recall of knowledge, rather the reimagining and re-encounter of the site through movement and practice. Identity, memory and emotion here intersect. This was the right part of the site to bury, and forget, these kinds of people. The unintended consequences of these acts of forgetting, however, were ironically to make this part of the site particularly memorable over long periods of time.

Narratives of deposition

Each of these acts of deposition has been examined in order to refer back to broader schemas, be they of memory, personhood, emotion, or generalised modes of identity. In this section I wish to develop these studies by looking at how singular deposits

might be tied in with these broader concerns. In order to do this I will closely examine a deposit from phase III, the rubble fill, of ditch segment 4 of the main enclosure at Hambledon Hill (fig. 5.9).

Figure 5.20: Plan of ditch segment 4 phase III (after Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 3.13).

The particular deposit I wish to think about is an undated alignment of bone from the southwest end of segment 4, which ran towards the northeast (fig. 5.20). The sequence began with a subadult human mandible, followed by a juvenile mandible that was also human. After this a bovine axis vertebra was placed next to an infant or juvenile human skull without mandible, which in turn was next to a second bovine vertebra, this time a lumbar one. Next to this were further fragments of the same skull, overlying nine sherds of pottery. Finally crossed human left tibia and left fibula shafts were placed with unidentified bone fragments (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Thus we have an alignment of both animal and human bone, with pottery also present, running southwest to northeast away from the butt of segment 4. Why were these particular bones placed in this particular sequence in this particular point in the ditch? There is nothing all that unusual in the deposit, made up as it is largely of disarticulated human and animal bone. Yet this should not allow us to suggest that this collection of bone and pottery is random. The interchanging of human and animal bone, the principal association between cattle vertebra and human skulls, and the crossing of the fibula and tibia, all suggest deliberate selection and placement, rather than chance association. So how might we begin to interpret this deposit?

The answer is to examine not only the relationship between the different objects and to consider what each, and the whole, might stand for, but also, drawing on my earlier considerations of personhood and memory in particular, to examine what the objects might *do* (Pollard 2001). Let us examine each object in turn. The first is a sub-adult mandible. This mandible, interestingly, fits a skull that was deposited in phase II of ditch segment 3 as part of a row of skulls along the ditch bottom (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). When one considers that McKinley (forthcoming) argues that skulls in particular were curated for longer periods of time than other bones, this may mean that the mandible dates to the earliest period of construction on the site. Indeed the young person, probably female, from whom this bone originated, may have even been involved in the initial acts of construction. Although this last part is speculative, the connection that the mandible gives to the past is not in doubt. It now connects the deposits in phase III of segment 4 directly with the probably earlier ones of phase II in segment 3. The temporality of the act of deposition would thus have been changed; it now reached into the past and drew on memories and mythologies of earlier deposits. The row of skulls, although not carrying the morbid fascination which it does today

would still have been a memorable deposit[xxviii], and it seems unlikely that the mandible from one of the skulls was deposited in the adjacent ditch by chance. It is difficult to ascertain the exact gap between the burial of the skull and that of the mandible, as not all the sequences of deposition have been dated and those that have show considerable variation (Bayliss *et al.* forthcoming a). The gap however could easily be only 30 or 40 years, within the lifetime of one person.

Thus this mandible worked in three ways. It recalled a previous act of deposition, memorable in its own right, and drew on memories and emotions that might have been associated with that act. Secondly, if bodies acted as sites of social relations, as I have argued, then the social relationships recalled and embodied by the original skull may have been encoded in the mandible also, and thus linked to this new deposit. Finally, in depositing what could have been an item of recognised antiquity, and perhaps power, it made a powerful statement that the acts of deposition that followed had to respond to. The position of this mandible at one end of the alignment, close to the butt, is also crucial.

The second mandible does not have a demonstrable connection to other deposits nearby, but it would still have embodied its own set of social relations and memories, ones that may have been equally powerful. The skull from which it came may have been deposited elsewhere at Hambledon Hill, or might still have been in circulation, or might be deposited at some other place. In any case a powerful set of associations would have been carried by this bone, in a similar fashion to the initial mandible.

Then we have the alternate cattle vertebrae and human skull fragments. The vertebrae might have come from the same animal, just as the skull fragments came from the same human. The animal bone may have stood metonymically for the whole animal (A. Jones and C. Richards 2003, 46), and I have argued that both animal and human bone can be representative of social relations and central to a partible view of personhood (see appendix 2.1.3). The fact that the four were separated suggests to me that they were items that had previously been in circulation. They may have been taken away from a site where meat was consumed and the human bones excarnated, and each person might have taken part of the skull or a section of vertebrae both as mnemonic device and, through notions of partible personhood, as part of their own body. These parts could then be separated and deposited in the ground. Multiple

aspects of people's lives would thus have been caught up with these bones. These aspects included not only the social relations embodied in them but also the cattle's breeding and exchange histories and the memories of the child from whom the bones originated. Alongside this the memories of the feast which might have accompanied the slaughter of the cattle would be brought to mind, of people sharing and consuming meat, and of the emotional sociable sociality that surrounded this. Thus the memories of the consumption and exposure that saw the bodies, both human and animal, become dispersed would have been recalled and combined with the personhood and relations of the carriers of the bone. All these understandings were channelled through these items and the act of deposition itself.

The second set of fragments of infant skull was placed on top of nine sherds of plain bowl pottery. This adds a second temporal dimension to the act of deposition; it projects the ramifications of the act into the future. It does this because not all of that pot was deposited under the bone; at least some was kept back and deposited later. We know this because more of the pot was discovered in the phase V silts of the same ditch segment (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Thus not only were the other connections associated with pottery caught up in this, such as who made the pot, what it held and the possible permeable connections between people it embodied, it also displaced part of the power of the act of deposition forward in time, allowing it to be recalled and re-employed at a point in the future.

Next to these interspersed cattle and human bones lay the crossed fibula and tibia, possibly from the same person. I believe that multiple meanings and understandings are again at play. Like the skull fragments, these two bones would act as material memories not only of the human being from which they came, but the social relations that person was tied into. The ways in which the bones might have moved between people after death would have tied in further social relations, and in addition to this the memories of the specific acts of exposure and dismemberment and the emotions caught up in that might also have been remembered.

Having analysed the bone and pottery within this deposit, either alone or in context, what narratives can be created that would allow us to think about this deposit as a whole, as a product of a specific series of actions by people? One difficulty, of course, is that multiple narratives might be constructed to fit such a deposit, but this presents

less of a problem once we realise that there never was a single truth or meaning around this deposit in the past. People can have multiple understandings of the material and its meanings, so multiple narratives will always have been at play (cf. A. Strathern and Stewart 1999). Nevertheless I believe that narratives can still be generated that help us to situate the practices that produced this deposit within wider meanings of personhood, identity and conviviality. Indeed it is this latter aspect that I feel was central to the creation of this deposit. Each deposit running away from the butt drew in sequence on associations that linked them to one another, to the enclosure, to the past and to the future. These bones, originally excarnated at Hambledon Hill perhaps, were taken by different people or groups and moved around the landscape. Some may have been exchanged between people, leaving the body of one person and becoming part of another, layering new social relations onto the bone.

These bones then returned to Hambledon Hill and were deposited again. In almost every case, these bones were being combined with other bones from the original bodies they came from. The primary mandible was deposited in the ditch segment next to the skull from which it came. The two parts of the child's skull and the two cattle vertebrae might have travelled around with different groups, only now being recombined in the deposit. This is true also of the fibula and tibia, together again after at least some time apart. Thus alongside the memories and social relations located in each of these bones, narratives around return and renewal were at play. This deposit acted, therefore, to reconstitute sociality; it is fundamentally convivial at heart. People visiting Hambledon Hill after time moving around the landscape, travelling to other places and monuments perhaps some distance away, returned and renewed their relationships with the monument and each other through the deposition of these items. Seeing them in context would reaffirm the historical links between people, and would help re-constitute their sociable relations and, simultaneously, the importance of Hambledon Hill. If conviviality is the stress people place upon good relations, high affectivity and getting along (Overing and Passes 2000c), then these acts of deposition may have been directly intended to cite a commitment to convivial community. As each person, perhaps the representative of a particular group, perhaps of an appropriate age, stepped forward and placed the appropriate item in the ground, links, roles and identities would have been renewed and reconstituted through this form of ritual practice. Through this the acts of deposition might also have acted as rites of

passage for the people taking part (O. Harris 2005). These need not have been solemn acts but ones surrounded by laughing, drinking, feasting and joking. The acts of deposition may have been subtle, even satirical in nature. When one puts the emphasis of Neolithic life not on the competition for resources, or the battle to appease ancestral groups, and instead upon the struggle to maintain conviviality these very different kinds of narratives can emerge.

Such acts of deposition may also have been crucial in helping children to learn about the importance of a place like Hambledon Hill. Indeed their understandings of these acts may have been quite different to those of the adults who also witnessed this act of deposition. In chapter 2 I examined the work of Christina Toren, and how her work reveals that children often have inverted understandings of their world compared to adults (1993). We can imagine something very similar taking place around these deposits at Hambledon Hill. Children might be familiar with bones as a part of their material worlds but less clear as to their symbolic importance. By seeing them placed in Hambledon Hill, a spectacular, heard about, but rarely visited site, their importance might emerge. This could be seen, again in the words of Gell, as the 'enchantment of technology' (1999b, 163). In contrast adults who remembered both the original acts of exposure and the myriad social relations encapsulated in the bones and, perhaps, even the person or animal from which they came, might see Hambledon Hill as important because these kinds of bones were deposited there. This, in Gell's terms again, could be seen as the 'technology of enchantment' (1999b, 163). Through these acts of deposition children could thus come to understand the importance of these kinds of materiality and their relationships with particular understandings of personhood.

History at Hambledon

It would be ideal to fit this deposit more specifically within the history of the monument at Hambledon. Even within a site with such a sophisticated chronology, however, certain deposits remain undated. We know where these deposits took place (segment 4 – see fig. 5.9), and we know when in the sequence this occurred (phase III – see fig. 5.6). We cannot date the deposit directly, however, and instead must settle for a view of it situated broadly within the complex engagements people had with the ditches of the central enclosure over three centuries. As the narratives I have engaged with here show people were constantly engaged with Hambledon, whether through

acts of building or the more commonplace periods of cutting and recutting ditches across the site. Although it is not always possible to place a specific event precisely within the chronology of the enclosure we can begin to detect the ways in which people may have cited and produced a notion of community by interacting with each other and the monument. Concerns around personhood and emotion were not limited spatially or temporally at Hambledon Hill; rather they were a constant presence, being reworked through the recutting of older ditches, the digging of new pits, the depositing of old items of material culture and engagement with new ones. Whether with the deposits in segment 4, the ways in which children were buried in segments 17 and 18, both in the main enclosure, or the tensions so evident at the Stepleton enclosure, people throughout the Early Neolithic were caught up in concerns with community, conviviality and memory at Hambledon Hill.

Concluding deposition

Thus deposition played a crucial role in Neolithic life, not only at sites like Hambledon Hill, but also at long barrows and occupation locales. In a world where movement was an important part of how people lived their lives, and different kinds of materiality moved in a state of flux between and through people, acts of deposition gave opportunities for meanings to be negotiated and agreed upon. It gave people the chance to renew their socialities, their links with others, and to formalise them through deposition. Thus deposition did not just reflect people's feelings about particular places, artefacts, people or animals, it helped to constitute them. Deposition is a fundamentally performative act, which cited and transformed identities and understandings (J. Austin 1962; Butler 1993). It created emotional and mnemonic geographies of experience by placing potent materials into ditches and pits, geographies that would then be re-encountered through movement. At sites like Hambledon this had long-term consequences for the kinds of practice and deposition which took place. The agency of material culture, its ability to evoke emotions and memories and to transform identity, meant that once it had been deposited that space, place or monument would never be the same again. Through the pits at Flagstones and the deposits at Hambledon Hill we can see how central the acts of deposition were in the ways that memory worked, in the ways people understood themselves, others and animals, and in the ways they maintained peaceful conviviality

Dorset in the Early Neolithic: the three strands together

In this chapter I have examined the Early Neolithic of Dorset from three perspectives; movement, materiality and deposition. I have argued that people moved around the landscapes at different scales, coming together in greater or lesser numbers at different locales; and that identity might have been cited through this, and via movement around and through places like Hambledon Hill. I have suggested that different forms of materiality lent themselves to different kinds of social relations and thus acted as metaphors for different kinds of personhood. Indeed I have proposed that human bone and human bodies, acting as other kinds of materiality, ratified these understandings, and demonstrated them through the tempos of rot and decay at causewayed enclosures (Fowler 2003). By looking at deposition I discussed how memory worked over long tracts of time, and how people drew on earlier forms of deposition to renew and rework their understandings at a later date. Deposition was thus crucial to how people came to understand and remember a place, through the way it created emotional and mnemonic geographies.

At the heart of this analysis of the Early Neolithic in Dorset, however, has been the concept of conviviality. It was this that led people to construct monuments like Hambledon Hill with its nested spaces, and controlled movement. It was this that was central as people renewed their connections to each other and the landscape through deposition. Yet this was not always successful, as we have seen with the violent deaths of people not only at Hambledon Hill but also at Wor Barrow (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; Pitt Rivers 1898). This desire to get along, to ensure people met in the right ways, and did the right things when they did would only have been amplified by a view of personhood that could be permeable at times. If substances could flow into the body they may have been seen as being able to affect the body, as I discussed with regard to the Muinane in chapter 3 (Londoño-Sulkin 2000). Thus the desire to have a good time at feasts like those that appear to have taken place at Hambledon Hill and Rowden might have been about ensuring that the correct foodstuffs entered the body to help combat more malignant agencies (Londoño-Sulkin 2000). The power of emotions may have been explained within such accounts as being the result of particular powerful substances of spirits that enraged people, or impassioned them and led them to act in certain ways, disputing the way a certain

body was to be treated for example. This might not prevent the emotions from being powerful or taken seriously; rather they may have lent them additional force.

Of course other aspects were at play too. The people who lived in the Early Neolithic in Dorset lived extremely complex lives, and without far more space it would be impossible to touch on it all. Nevertheless, I have developed a picture of how people thought about the world, their bodies and their lives. How did this change in the Middle Neolithic? Why were new monuments like the Dorset Cursus built and how did they affect the way people thought about the world? It is to this exciting period that I now turn.

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[i] A note on dating: Throughout this chapter dates are given in calibrated years BC. In addition it is worth making a few notes on chronology here. The most reliable radiocarbon dates for the very earliest Neolithic around 4000 cal BC comes from the Fir Tree Field shaft (Allen and Green 1998). Here evidence for Neolithic activity in the form of a hearth, plain bowl pottery and a cattle bone can be dated to 4060-3830 cal BC (Healy *et al.* in prep.). There is also other evidence for Neolithic occupation dating back to the earliest fourth millennium. One possible example is the pit at Rowden which possibly dates back to before 4000 cal BC, although a date around 3750 cal BC seems more likely (Woodward 1991a). As Healy *et al.* (in prep.) point out, however, the dating here is by no means secure. The pits at Flagstones may also be early, as they date to 3850-3660 (Healy 1997a), and the pottery is similar in form to that from the certainly early Coneybury anomaly (Cleal 2004, 173). It is unlikely that monuments formed part of this earliest Neolithic, although the evidence could certainly be better. The only well dated monument is Hambledon Hill, which dates to the start of the 37th century cal BC. Of the long barrows in the region very few have been excavated. Of those that have only Wor Barrow has a secure Early Neolithic date and this has a very high standard deviation. In any case it was probably built between 3650 and 3430 cal BC (68% probability) or perhaps 3780-3260 cal BC (95% probability) (Healy *et al.* in prep.). That no monuments were built prior to 3800 cal BC at the very earliest is not surprising in the light of recent attempts to provide more in-depth chronologies of monument construction (e.g. Benson and Whittle forthcoming; Whittle *et al.* in prep.).

[ii] The principal reason this has not been directly discussed is that it would require extensive theoretical discussion, as well as investigation within the case-studies. For reasons of space it has thus been left deliberately in the background, as part of a target that this research can build towards.

[iii] The long barrows Pentridge 2, Pentridge 19 and Gussage Cow Down 1 are included on this map although they are discussed predominantly in the next chapter. This is because these three long barrows pre-date the Dorset Cursus and are thus definitely Early Neolithic in date.

[iv] Other more local comparisons can also be found. This includes the large pit excavated at Pamphill which contained Neolithic flint, pottery and charcoal (Field *et al.* 1964). This too appears to have been deliberately infilled, rather than being allowed to silt up naturally (Field *et al.* 1964, 355).

[v] At one level at least. We could also consider how feasts could allow the *same* part of *different* communities to come together. Thus if the pigs were provided by a particularly prominent person it might have attracted other prominent persons to the feast who would normally consider themselves to belong to alternative communities. Regardless the opportunities for socialising and gossiping remain the same.

[vi] The similar pit at Pamphill may also have been filled by the contents of a single midden (Pollard 2001, 323).

[vii] These different rhythms of occupation would no doubt have lent differing parts of the landscape different textures of emotional experience. Visiting places that were important, or sites where spirits, ancestors and strangers resided, may have been very different from moving through more familiar terrain. These emotional and memorable geographies were part of the experience of the taskscape and of how people felt and understood the landscape through which they dwelt.

[viii] Again we can think about the variety of scales at which we could answer such questions. At the larger scale Chris Tilley (1994) has written about the long barrows of Cranborne Chase and how they and the Middle Neolithic cursus there help create axes of movement around the landscape. The Dorset

Cursus dates to the Middle Neolithic (c. 3300 cal BC) and so will be discussed in the next chapter, as will its effect on some of the long barrows that surround it, such as Pentridge 2a on Martin Down, and those long barrows that were either contemporary or later than the cursus. Alongside this I will reserve discussion of the 'temple' at Monkton Up Wimborne (Budd *et al.* 2003). That site dates between 3500 and 3100 cal BC and could form part of the discussion either here or in the next chapter. Its siting close to the Dorset Cursus, however, suggests that it either postdates that monument's construction circa 3300 cal BC, or was contemporary with it and therefore it forms part of the next chapter.

[ix] Again I stress my debt of gratitude to Frances Healy here for providing access to the Hambledon report in advance of publication and permission to reproduce figures here.

[x] I have thus divided the construction of the site into a series of periods, rather than phases so that when I refer to period 2, it is clearly to a point in the history of construction of the site, and when I refer to ditch segment 4, phase III, for example, it is to a period of an individual ditch segments use.

[xi] I prefer this interpretation because it allows for materiality to be caught up in identity in more fluid ways. Thus rather than beach pebbles representing people from a certain place, they instead represent people expressing, and so producing, a particular form of their identity at a particular temporal and spatial location.

[xii] A number of axes of continental origin have been found in Britain, most famously the jadeite axe that lay next to the Sweet Track in Somerset (B. Coles and J. Coles 1986).

[xiv] We need to be careful with the sourcing of these axe groups, however. The designated sources for south-western groups in particular may not be as accurate as first thought. The particular sources may be only one amongst many, and the use of beach pebbles has also to be considered. Nevertheless, the general area (the southwest) remains the likely origin of these axes. I am grateful to Frances Healy for discussing this issue with me.

[xv] The comparative 'wealth' of Maiden Castle is doubly interesting given its much shorter period of existence as a causewayed enclosure compared to Hambledon Hill (see appendix 2.1.2).

[xvi] Of course this understanding may not have been one-way. Just as axes were understood as parts of bodies, so bodies may have been understood as being made up of axes. Perhaps more accurately both may have been seen to be different versions of the same thing, to draw upon similar substances and relations in their constitution (cf. Trudelle Schwarz 1997).

[xvii] Battaglia explicitly identifies both partible and permeable aspects of personhood amongst the Sabarl who dwell on one of the islands of the Calvados Chain off Papua New Guinea (Battaglia 1990, 50 and 195). Here whilst substances move between permeable, channelled, people, through foods jointly worked, or through the consumption of sea water, people can also develop a partible sense of personhood, particularly through the experience of what Battaglia describes as 'masculine matrilineage' (1990, 50; 1991; chapter 2).

[xviii] Again this might not always be the case. Pots may have been repaired and curated, axes destroyed soon after being made. In the majority of cases, however, it is likely to have been the other way around, and in any case we do not see in Early Neolithic pottery the evidence for curation that we have for Beakers, for example (chapter 7).

[xix] One could expand that further and see such an exchange as a moment in which the giver takes on a 'male' identity and the receiver a 'female' one, as the act of exchange takes on a sexual metaphor. As I argued in chapter 2, this might have little to do with the 'biological sex' of either (Butler 1993; M. Strathern 1988).

[xx] Again here the differences between permeability and partibility are not clear cut. At the moment of substitution we might consider this form of exchange partibility *within* permeability, within the more generalised flows of substance. I still maintain that permeability might have played a central role within Neolithic conceptions of personhood because of the way people related to bodies, animals and substances. The Neolithic was not the same as Melanesia (A. Jones 2005) and we need to be explicit about how it was different. For me, the role of permeability as a counter-point to partible conceptions of personhood is central to this.

[xxi] Another example might be the hidden changes that went on in megalithic tombs. Megalithic tombs, however, are much more common away from Dorset. There are two possible megalithic tombs, Grey Mare and Her Colts and the Hell Stone in the study area (Gale 2003). Neither of these have been excavated to a modern standard however and so interpretation of the role they played in Neolithic practices, funerary or otherwise, must be put to one side.

[xxii] It is notable here that there are whole corpses in the Stepleton enclosure and outwork of people who met their end through violent means. It is certainly possible that these kinds of death would be deliberately forgotten by the community.

[xxiii] I discuss whole bodies and their contextual relationship with remembering and forgetting later in this chapter and again in chapters 6 and 7.

[xxiv] Again, however, there is no need to be absolute. Although I argue bone that would largely have been conceived in a partible fashion, at other times it may have taken on more permeable qualities. This may be especially true if it was on occasions treated more like a substance than an object and used in the fabric of pottery or in cooking. The differences between the two modes of personhood are once more contextual, not absolute.

[xxv] It was not simply the case that the contents of the pit *represented* the renewal of community, rather in its deposition it *was* the renewal of community.

[xxvi] This is an aspect noted at a number of enclosures, including many outside the study area, notably Windmill Hill and Etton (Whittle *et al.* 1999; Pryor 1998).

[xxvii] The carving of lines in chalk present in the second burial is something that continues to be practised into the Middle Neolithic, notably at the enclosure at Flagstones (Healy 1997a; Woodward 1988).

[xxviii] The suggestion that the deposit would not have carried the morbid fascination of today is not to suggest that the reaction to human skulls was unemotional. Rather in a world where human bone was commonplace and the skulls may have belonged to known (or imagined) human beings, differing emotional responses would be forthcoming. Indeed the reasons why the mandible was deposited may have related directly to the emotional texturing of this part of the enclosure by the deposition of the skulls 40 years earlier. Again deposition created emotional and mnemonic geographies that formed the context for later acts of deposition.

Chapter 6: Middle Neolithic Dorset 3500 – c. 2900 cal BC

Number	Name	Type
1	Alington Avenue	Long barrow
2	Broadmayne bank barrow	Bank barrow
3	Chalk Pit Field	Flint scatter
4	Dorset Cursus Thickthorn Down terminal	Cursus
5	Dorset Cursus Martin Down terminal	Cursus
6	Fir Tree Field shaft	Doline
7	Flagstones enclosure	Enclosure
8	Gussage Cow Down 1 and 2	Long barrows
9	Handley 26	Round barrow
10	Handley 27	Round barrow
11	Long Bredy	Bank barrow
12	Maiden Castle bank barrow	Bank barrow
13	Monkton Up Wimborne	Temple
14	Pentridge 2	Long barrow
15	Pentridge 19	Long barrow
16	Poundbury	Pits
17	Thickthorn Down	Long barrow
18	Wor Barrow	Long barrow

Figure 6.1: Map of sites discussed in the text.

Introduction

In the definition I set out at the beginning of the last chapter the Middle Neolithic was dated from between 3500 and 2900 cal BC. It is here that I can deal with some extraordinary monuments, including the vast Dorset Cursus and the bank barrows at Maiden Castle, Long Bredy and Broadmayne (Barrett *et al.* 1991; Bradley 1983). Within this chapter a different array of concerns will come to the fore compared to the last. Not least, I wish to suggest that a concern with controlled encounters and engagements with the past dominated much of the building of monuments, the use of some material culture, and a number of the acts of deposition that took place. I will argue that this is the case not only in the way that the Dorset Cursus links many long barrows together, as has been suggested before (Barrett *et al.* 1991; Tilley 1994) but also elsewhere in Dorset (appendix 2.2.1). I will approach this chapter again through the three themes I used to examine the Early Neolithic: movement, materiality and deposition. The theoretical tropes of this thesis, conviviality, emotion, memory, identity, gender, personhood and agency will again be central. It is important to point out that not everything changed between the Early and Middle Neolithic and this is indicated by the overlap in time I have allowed. There was continuity as well as change and I will try to tease that out as I go along. Much of my discussion will focus on the changes, however: the new forms of monumentality and material culture that

emerged in this period, and the new ways in which landscape, memory and the past were treated and considered.

Movement in the Middle Neolithic

There seems little doubt that people maintained a mobile lifestyle into the Middle Neolithic, moving at a range of scales through a range of locales. Again settlement was transitory, but the lack of a clear-cut Middle Neolithic style of flint working if anything makes it even harder to detect in this period. Within this examination of movement two things particularly interest me. The first is the movement of particular people over long distances both into and out of the study area. This has been demonstrated by the analysis of the burials at Monkton Up Wimborne (Budd *et al.* 2003; M. Green 2000; Montgomery *et al.* 2000). The second deals with how the monuments built in this period began to control movement in certain ways over long distances, and in so doing, control people's encounter with the past. I shall begin, however, with an examination of Monkton Up Wimborne and the burials there, and what this tells us about how people moved around during the Middle Neolithic.

Tracing people's movement: Monkton Up Wimborne

Figure 6.2: Plan of Monkton Up Wimborne (after M. Green, 79, fig. 52).

Monkton Up Wimborne is not easily classified. Dating to between 3500 and 3100 cal BC (Budd *et al.* 2003) it lies to the south of the Dorset Cursus within view of three points along it, Martin Down and Thickthorn Down at either end and Gussage Cow Down in the middle (Allen 2000). It is made up of a circle of 14 oval pits with wide entrances to both the east and the west (M. Green 2000, 77; fig. 6.2). In the centre of the monument a huge pit was dug into the chalk, 10 metres wide and 1.5 metres deep (M. Green 2000, 78). In the side of the pit a grave was dug and into this was placed a multiple burial made up of an adult woman of about 30, a young boy aged about 9, and two girls of 5 and 10 years respectively (M. Green 2000, 78; fig. 6.3). The grave was then covered by a large block of chalk and this was packed in with smaller lumps of chalk, as if they had tried to hide the burial (M. Green 2000, 79). I will return to this act of deposition in itself later, in the third section of this chapter. It is the people themselves, and their movements, however, that I will concentrate on first.

Figure 6.3: The multiple burial at Monkton Up Wimborne (after M. Green 2000, 80, fig. 53).

DNA tests indicate that the woman and younger girl were mother and daughter, the boy and other girl were probably brother and sister, but certainly not the children of the woman (M. Green 2000, 79). What has emerged, fascinatingly, from the study of lead and strontium isotopes in their teeth is a history of movement between Cranborne Chase, on the one hand, and the Mendips on the other (Budd *et al.* 2003; Montgomery

et al. 2000)[i]. The isotope ratio reflects the geology of the area in which a person lived as different isotopes are absorbed through diet and then laid down in both bones and teeth. Analysis of the woman's dental enamel, which forms between the ages of two and six, revealed isotope ratios which would not have been produced if she had spent that period of her life on the chalk of the Chase (Budd *et al.* 2003, 75). The nearest place she could have lived that would have produced that particular isotope signature is the Mendips, some 80 kilometres away. The analysis of the children's teeth has been even more revealing, because they retain both deciduous and permanent teeth. The elder two children, probably brother and sister, appear to have been born on the chalk as the strontium and lead isotopic ratios, in their deciduous teeth, are consistent with the geology of this area (Budd *et al.* 2003, 75). Their permanent teeth have a different isotopic ratio, however, revealing that they then moved away from the chalk, though not necessarily to the Mendips (Budd *et al.* 2003, 75). They then at some point after the age of six returned, of course, as they were buried on the chalk. The final child, the youngest girl and daughter of the adult woman, shows the reverse. She was born away from the chalk, as revealed by her deciduous teeth and later moved there, as shown by her permanent teeth (Budd *et al.* 2003, 75). So we have a woman who spent her young childhood in the Mendips, had a child in her mid 20s and then later journeyed to Cranborne Chase. We also have two children who were born on the chalk, moved away soon afterwards and then returned again, all within the first 10 years of their lives. All four were then buried within sight of the Dorset Cursus in the 'temple' at Monkton Up Wimborne (M. Green 2000).

What do these singular examples of long distance movement tell us about the Middle Neolithic? First, these examples of movement, whilst interesting in themselves, and in their specifics, are not surprising, and fit well within a view of Neolithic existence as mobile, fluid, varied and largely non-sedentary. It also reminds us of the distances people may have moved; that as well as the daily, seasonal and yearly round, people on occasion may have taken longer journeys. Indeed the older children moved at least twice in the first ten years of their lives. These rhythms of movement, which we can now trace over some distance, would have played an important part in the dynamics of encounter. If people, as seems to be the case here, were moving between Cranborne Chase and the Mendips they may have been more comfortable with places and people at *either end* of the journey than they were in between the two. Of course the

movements may have had more of a serial character than a singular journey. The evidence from the adult woman, however, does indicate that she spent a significant time at some remove from the chalk, suggesting that along with a series of small-scale movements, longer journeys were occasionally undertaken. These journeys may have had something of a rite of passage quality about them, with the crucial liminal phase lying between the journey's start and journey's end.

These acts of movement may well have been emotional. Greeting or bidding farewell to friends and family before long, dangerous, journeys would have certainly been an emotional experience, in contrast to the regular rhythmic movements, the comings together and partings that took place at different points of the year. Where normally such events would have been taken for granted, these larger-scale movements may have been much more notable events. People may have travelled in small groups, perhaps only the size of the group buried at Monkton Up Wimborne. The separation of these smaller groups from the broader community may have drawn on partible understandings of personhood. If the broader community could be conceptualised as a person, then removing a family group would be akin to a single person exchanging an axe or other inalienable possession (M. Strathern 1988; chapter 5). As such the emotions may have surrounded notions of loss, absence and pain akin to these exchanges, and were tied up not so much in the missing of absent friends as in the failure to keep hold of people (cf. A. Weiner 1992).

Inevitably when people engaged in long distance movement they would have passed through places that were less familiar to them than those they encountered on a seasonal basis. They may have met people too who were less familiar. This may have added other emotional qualities and experiences to the journey. They may also have collapsed the gap between places that are geographically separate like the Mendips and Cranborne Chase. If people, like the woman at Monkton Up Wimborne, moved between these places and spent large periods of their life in both, they may have felt equally comfortable in both yet less so in between. Thus the two places, though geographically separate, may have had similar textures in terms of the memories and emotions they provoked and the people encountered. They may in effect have been much closer to each other than we in the West, with our Cartesian view of the world, may understand.

Moving and visiting certain people in certain places may also have been central to how people formed, and performed, their senses of identity. Notions of gender for example may have been formed by moving between groups at certain points in one's life. In other words, to be a particular gender may have entailed certain movements at certain times, like those we can trace in the people buried at Monkton Up Wimborne. Arrivals of people might have been greeted with acts of feasting or particular rituals, though this may have depended on the exact relationships between particular people and the communities at large (cf. Alès 2000). Emotion and conviviality may have been central motivations behind people's desire to move, the wanting to see old friends and places, loneliness, home-sickness or boredom playing central roles (Lagrou 2000; chapter 3). The desire to mix with the right people, at the right time and at the right place, may explain these journeys as much as narratives around resource shortages, marriage exchange or trade relationships.

One argument against this, however, is the evidence for social stress that can be gleaned from the children's bodies (M. Green 2000, 79). All three children were suffering from iron deficiency which suggests that their movements may have been perhaps motivated by other considerations. Yet I do not find this argument entirely convincing. The mother did not show this deficiency; indeed she had consumed a great deal of dairy products suggesting access to cattle if not their meat. Thus whilst these signs no doubt indicate a poor diet, they are not enough to explain movement in themselves, especially in a society where such movement may have been commonplace.

Whether the people at Monkton Up Wimborne travelled alone or as part of a larger group is not clear[ii]. We can be fairly certain, however, that they were not the only ones moving over such distances, and perhaps such movements were relatively common. People may have moved to other places, become parts of other socialities for periods of their lives, yet returned to visit relations or exchange partners close to where they were born. Equally they may have returned to become permanent members of the community once more, both whilst alive, or as we saw with the children who were born and buried on the chalk, when dead.

Movement and monuments

These long-distance movements may have been nothing new even in the Early Neolithic, though ties, alliances and friendships may have switched or merged over the years of course. What *was* new in the Middle Neolithic, however, was the concern that began to emerge around medium-scale movements, and the use of monuments to influence them. In the last chapter I suggested that movement was structured at Hambledon Hill to allow people to approach the hill from certain directions and pass certain monuments, like the long barrows, as they did so. We might term this small-scale movement. In the Middle Neolithic, monuments were constructed that exerted much wider control over people's movements; they began to structure how people moved over entire landscapes. Central to this, I want to argue, was the way people remembered and interacted with the past. Movement provided a key form of bodily memory (Connerton 1989; see chapter four) and by controlling how people interacted with certain places and certain, older, monuments, the new forms of construction created new ways of engaging with the past.

Movement can provide a way of stimulating memories, indeed it can provide a way in which people, through effort after meaning, can recall things involuntarily (Bartlett 1932; Harrison 2004). Through this remembering emotion would have been recalled and on occasions re-experienced (Svašek 2005a). Rodney Harrison (2004) has written about how Australian Aboriginal people explore places that were previously occupied and through that remember aspects of the past. The site in question, the former Dennewan reserve, is regularly visited by Aboriginal people who explore with their bodies this former site of occupation (Harrison 2004; see also Casey 2000, 205). They focus upon remaking the past around these ruins. Indeed as Harrison points out

> with time the physical traces of the site become more important as a source for the creation of collective memory, as people's lived memories of the place become less clear (2004, 203).

The bodily action of moving around the site is central to this, again as Harrison argues:

Landscape memories, produced through the interdependence of performativity and space, work on the body to create a communicative bridge between past and present, allowing people to recall and experience the past-in-the-present (2004, 214)

In chapter four I examined how social memory was central to how people agree on collective narratives about the past. Here we have an example of how bodily experience of place, and the past, can be central to that. It is my argument that such concerns became central to monumentality in the Middle Neolithic, that more than this, prevailing versions of the past were maintained by building monuments that hoped to ensure that the possibilities of movement and experience were limited. Thus what could be remembered and what could be felt were also kept within particular boundaries as this became increasingly central to group identity and the maintenance of peaceful conviviality.

There is one example of this in particular that I wish to examine in Dorset. This involves the Dorset Cursus and the way it ties the landscape of Cranborne Chase and the monuments, both old and new, into a single experience (Tilley 1994). I wish to develop this argument to look at how bodily memory, shared experience and a controlled engagement with the past lay behind the construction and use of this enormous monument. A second example can be drawn from the area around, and to the north, of Maiden Castle. It has recently been suggested that controlled movement may have been extremely important here, both past the bank barrow at Maiden Castle and also along the Flagstones ridge, past the Alington Avenue long barrow to the Flagstones enclosure itself (Davies *et al.* 2002). I consider this example in detail in appendix 2.2.1.

Tying the past, present and future together: movement and the Dorset Cursus

Figure 6.4: The Dorset Cursus (after Barrett *et al*. 1991, 32, fig. 2.4).

The Dorset Cursus is the largest Neolithic monument in Britain. Stretching for some 9.8 kilometres, it runs north-east from Thickthorn Down to Martin Down (fig. 6.4). The Cursus[iii], probably built between 3360 and 3030 cal BC (Barclay and Bayliss 1999, 23), or perhaps slightly earlier (Healy *et al*. in prep.), was originally constructed in two parts (Harding and Barclay 1999, 2). The first was constructed between Thickthorn Down and Bottlebush Down, and is known as the Gussage Cursus (Harding and Barclay 1999, 2). The second part was then added connecting Bottlebush with Martin Down and is known as the Pentridge Cursus (Harding and Barclay 1999, 2). Together the two combined form the enormous Dorset Cursus. The

Cursus is explicitly tied in with the long barrows of Cranborne Chase, both those that were constructed before and after it (Tilley 1994).

Long barrows are connected with the Cursus in three distinct ways: those that have a direct physical connection, those with an indirect physical connection, and those that are visually linked to the monument through lines of sight. There are two examples of long barrows with a direct physical association with the Dorset Cursus: one of the two long barrows on Gussage Cow Down, which the cursus changes direction to include, and the Pentridge 19 mound on Martin Down, which was built into the western bank of the Cursus (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 49). The Cursus also has an indirect physical relationship with both the long barrows on Thickthorn Down; here the Cursus ends at a slanted angle in order to follow their alignment (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 50). In addition the terminal is built up in order to resemble a long barrow, a long barrow in alignment with two others of course (fig. 6.5). At the opposite end of the Cursus the terminal was aligned with the Pentridge 2 long barrow. This long barrow was later lengthened at the 'wrong' end as Barrett *et al.* (1991, 53) term it. In other words the extension took place after the construction of the Cursus. The Cursus also links 31 long barrows through visual connections (Tilley 1994, 150). Not all of these pre-date the monument and at least three appear to post-date it as they point directly towards its ends (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 51). Thus the Dorset Cursus 'links together a whole series of mounds associated with the dead and sometimes gives them a strong visual impact' (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 54).

Figure 6.5: The Thickthorn Down terminal of the Cursus, looking north (photo: author).

Tilley (1994), in an influential account, has argued that the bodily experience of walking down the Cursus was central to understanding the monument in the past. He argues that the relationship between the Cursus, the long barrows and topographical features was experienced and understood by people as they made their way down from the Martin Down end to Thickthorn Down (Tilley 1994, 197). By walking the Cursus, Tilley suggests, people had a number of 'dramatic encounters' (1994, 188), which created a spatial story which could unfold through physical experience (1994, 199). These include descending into boggy valleys, the way Penbury Knoll disappears and reappears in view, and encounters with long barrows both within and outside the Cursus (Tilley 1994, 173-96). I do not wish to entirely disagree with Tilley here. The experience of walking down, or alongside, the Cursus would, I think, have been a central part of understanding the monument. The encounters with topographic features and long barrows would in turn have helped to form narratives about the way that the landscape was formed and understood. What Tilley fails to do, however, is begin to think about how the Cursus actually works beyond creating these physical encounters. How does the Cursus collapse time and temporalities through encounters

with the past? How did the Cursus change how people understood that past? I wish to argue that emotion, memory and identity were central to all these questions. These themes lay behind the construction of the Cursus, and behind the experience of moving down it.

Narratives of experience

The construction of the Dorset Cursus created a narrative of experience; it gave the monuments on Cranborne Chase a beginning, a middle and an end. This structure was not temporal in itself, however; it was not an experience that claimed to give the monuments it encountered a place in absolute chronological time as we would understand it (cf. Lucas 2005). Instead it ordered the experience and ensured that several places of topographic or historical note were encountered in a specific order. Let me quote Harrison again here:

> At Dennewan the practice of walking a route around the settlement, experiencing the settlement from set places and pathways and interacting with material remains in particular ways allows... *a mnemonic recollection in which previously forgotten memories are recalled involuntarily* (2004, 214, my emphasis).

This is precisely the experience I believe the Dorset Cursus may have induced. The chronology admittedly is much more drawn out, but the signals of human dwelling, both through monuments and other places, would have been repeatedly encountered by moving down the cursus, and memories may have been recalled *involuntarily* (Harrison 2004, 214).

There are various examples of moments at which this might happen as people moved down the Cursus. Accepting for the sake of argument Tilley's suggestion that movement took place from Martin Down via Bottlebush Down to Thickthorn Down (fig. 6.3), there are a number of features that might carry the mnemonic impact I suggest[iv]. One of the first of these may be Penbury Knoll. This high place, occupied in the Mesolithic and Early Neolithic, moves into and out of vision three times as one moves down the Cursus (Tilley 1994). Its return into vision each time would have stimulated memories, initially of the myths and stories associated with that place on

the one hand. Older persons might then retell these to younger people. The second time it reappeared other stories might be told, but this time it would already be mnemonic of the stories told just a little while before. Thus even for those unfamiliar with the landscape around the Cursus its interaction with the topography insists that people draw upon memory. The two long barrows incorporated within the Cursus would also act as mnemonic devices. Tilley describes the encounter with the first of these, Pentridge 19, as a 'surprise' (1994, 181), because of the way that it only appears in view once one is within 100 metres of it. But this would hardly be the case for anyone who had been involved in building either the barrow or the Cursus or indeed had walked the Cursus before. Only for those travelling the Cursus for the first time would such encounters be surprising.

Instead, therefore, it is memory that once again is important here. Some people would remember the acts of building as they encountered the Pentridge mound, or stories about them in any case. When memories once forgotten return, they may be powerful, shocking and moving but they would not be surprising. The way Pentridge 19 leaps into view as Tilley describes it, may have lent the return of these memories force, but it would not have been a surprise, except perhaps, for those on their first visit. This barrow is intervisible from its top with Wor Barrow and this sight may have reminded people of the dead who were buried there, and perhaps of the violence that had killed at least one person interred within the mound (Barrett *et al.* 1991; appendix 2.1.1). The second long barrow included inside the Cursus, on Gussage Cow Down, is visible from Bottlebush Down and it is here that the setting sun might be witnessed disappearing behind the barrow on midwinter's day (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 56)[v]. As people approached the barrow on Gussage Cow Down itself this moment would thus be recalled as people had to go round or clamber over the barrow as it blocks much of the width of Cursus. Encountering this long barrow would stimulate memories in everyone. For those who knew of the building of the Cursus, of making sure this barrow was within its path, it would have provoked powerful memories of digging and building (cf. appendix 2.1.1). For those who had not witnessed or heard about such moments it would still have been mnemonic of the powerful image of the setting sun they had witnessed earlier. Moving past it in the dark may have been frightening; people were entering the realm of night, perhaps of death, where the sun disappeared.

Matthew Campbell has recently written about the ritual procession way that exists on Rarotonga in the south Pacific (2005). There the *Ara Metua* is a road that preserves the mythical route of the first founders of the island (Campbell 2005, 103). Surrounding the road are many *marae*, places that serve as ritual foci or houses of the gods (Campbell 2005, 106). Ritual circuits of the island along the *Ara Metua* are made by both chiefs and gods, and in doing so they follow the route of the founding father; thus it 'is also an act of remembrance, akin to the performance of oral tradition' (Campbell 2005, 107). The act of moving down the *Ara Metua* engages people with their landscape, the ritual places of the *marae* and forces them to remember, bodily, the acts and people that had gone before. By moving down the Dorset Cursus people not only encountered long barrows, which as monuments are inherently the bearers of memory (Bradley 1998; Campbell 2005), they also passed through boggy valleys and up and down undulations in terrain (Tilley 1994). These too would have been mnemonic of other acts of movement not only personal but historical and mythical too. Through this they would remind people of other places where different activities took place. Moving down the Cursus, like the *Ara Metua*, was inevitably an act of remembrance.

Each place encountered would have memory, myth and story embedded through it, that would be recalled with each passing mile down the Cursus route (cf. Battaglia 1990, 25). Alongside this emotions would have been evoked, tied to the memories of places and people long gone. These emotional reactions would have reinforced the power of the memories and stories, and in time would have become memories in themselves, helping to call forth appropriate behaviour at future encounters and engagements. The Cursus collapsed the divide between past and present (Tilley 1994); it placed the past in the present, and forced people to encounter it in specific ways. It forced people to touch the past, to use their bodies to return, through movement, to the places which their parents, grand parents and ancestors had inhabited. Within this architecture of encounter and experience a series of emotional and memorable engagements took place. These may have appeared to contrast with each other to our eyes, slipping from the formal to informal, from the serious to the ludic, from moments of despair to joy as different events took place. These experiences would have had added impact on midwinter's day when the sun set directly behind the incorporated barrow on Gussage Cow Down (Barrett *et al.* 1991,

56). Here the mythological, remembered, imagined and affective aspects of the experience came together and were legitimated by the setting of the sun, confirming the changing of the seasons and the continuation of the yearly round.

Controlled engagements

Why was the Cursus constructed, however? Why was this controlled engagement with the past so desirable? First, here we must be careful not to reify the final form of the monument. The process of construction was also important, and as Robert Johnson has argued, the construction of the Dorset Cursus may mark the end of the passing of people down this route (1999, 46). I am not convinced by this, however, not least because the construction of the Cursus does not mark an end to the alterations of experience of moving down it. In the context of this discussion recent evidence that parts of the Cursus were back-filled is worth noting. Excavations in 2000 revealed that a stretch of the Cursus close to the Bottlebush terminal was back-filled shortly after the monument was constructed (French *et al.* 2005, 125). Thus once the route was established, in places it may have been maintained by the movement of bodies rather than permanently established ditches. In addition to this evidence the lengthening of the Pentridge 2 long barrow took place after the Cursus was built, as did the construction of other monuments within sight of the Cursus, such as Monkton Up Wimborne which I have already described[vi]. It is also possible, it seems to me, that people were walking both inside *and* outside the Cursus either at the same time, or on different occasions. Thus the experience of movement down the route of the Cursus remained important, even as parts of the ditch were being deliberately filled, and the digging of the ditch did not mark the end of people moving through this landscape in a particular, controlled, fashion. Why was this?

I would argue that the reason was two-fold. First, the controlled encounter with the past allowed people to develop and claim shared historical narratives. The experience of walking down the Cursus could not have been universal; differences in identity would have ensured that. Nevertheless the similarities allowed people to share and express feelings and understandings that could then become shared and more widely agreed upon on the next visit. The Cursus ordered the emotional and mnemonic geographies that ran through Cranborne Chase; it created an order through which a variety of landscape textures could be affectively engaged with. The exact

experiences would not have become identical, but they might have been felt to be identical, however, if people could now express them within a discourse centred on the agreed order of experience that the architecture of encounter of the Cursus created. This was an interactive experience in which people brought their own memories and feelings to a guided set of encounters. The alterations I touched on above, the extension of the Pentridge 2 long barrow and the creation of the Monkton Up Wimborne temple changed, but did not transform the nature of this discourse. These were not moments where one group convinced another of its legitimacy through the experience of walking the Cursus, but rather one where the memories and emotions of everyone came together to form agreed narratives about the past (cf. Brück 2001, 653).

Secondly, identity became central to the experience of walking down the Cursus. The controlled and negotiated access to the past that the Cursus created may, as I indicated above, have caused people to involuntarily experience memories and emotions. Remembering things and feeling things are fundamentally performative, that is they not only mark someone as a particular kind of person, but create them as such too (Butler 1993; Kosofsky Sedgwick 2003). Thus these moments would have been caught up centrally in people's identities. Failure to feel, or failure to remember, may have marked people as outside particular categories of sociality, gender, age, or even of being a person at all. Tilley (1994) refers repeatedly to the surprise inherent in the encounters created by the Cursus but I find it far more likely that other emotions, driven by memory, would be at the heart of the experience for most of the people, most of the time. These may have fallen within a range we might characterise as grief, nostalgia, awe, joy and relief but undoubtedly such words are likely to fail to grasp the depth and range of emotions involved. Moments that brought surprise, however, would be more likely to come from others behaviour than from the landscape itself.

Dwelling within the *habitus* may have led people to experience these feelings and memories at appropriate moments, reacting with horror or humour as different sights and experiences were revealed to them. Within this, different scales of reaction may have been expected from adults and children, from people of different genders, or from people of certain roles. People may also have physically altered their bodies to express, or to demonstrate feelings, though no direct evidence of this survives. This

may have included dressing in certain ways, or altering the body with tattoos, or cutting the skin and removing hair (cf. Gregor 1977; Seremetakis 1991). The affective side of identity, of feeling and remembering the right things at the right time allowed people to perform in certain ways, to carry their bodies in the right way. The performance of identity is not a series of conscious decisions one after the other; it is the performance of regulatory ideals, understood through the *habitus*, *without* having to think about it, at least a lot of the time (Bourdieu 1990; Butler 1993).

I believe that the experience of walking the Cursus was central to its role (Tilley 1994; *contra* Johnson 1999). It was not for the sake of this experience, however, that it was constructed, but in order to create a new, or legitimate an existing, series of encounters with the past. Whether these encounters were with long barrows or topographic features of importance may have made no difference. The architecture of the Dorset Cursus acted as a technology of engagement; it forced people to interact with the past in certain ways and this in turn, through the common understandings people have of their world, called forth particular emotions and memories. Feeling and memory acted here as performative signals that helped build and confirm notions of identity. The Cursus guided the experience of emotional and mnemonic geographies and through this allowed agreed versions of the past to be constructed through narratives of encounter. This would have further enhanced the identity of those in the know, of those who knew the stories of the mounds, rivers and other features that the cursus embraced as it crossed Cranborne Chase. What one knew, what one felt, what one could remember, all of these allowed subtly different performances of identity at the Dorset Cursus. Bodily movement was absolutely central here to the nature of experience and the nature of encounter between the present and the past. The social memories evoked by the Cursus were central to people's senses of community, of sociality, and thus of conviviality.

Concluding movement

Movement played a crucial role in the Middle Neolithic, just as it had in earlier times. People moved over a range of scales, from small-scale daily movements, to long journeys between different parts of the country, as indicated by the burials at Monkton Up Wimborne (Budd *et al.* 2003). Alongside these movements which were probably similar in scale and rhythm to the Early Neolithic, new concerns began to emerge

around movement between particular places. Although the monuments of the Early Neolithic had controlled movement within and around their architecture, the monuments of the Middle Neolithic began to structure movement across much wider ranges. In the case of Cranborne Chase this extended to a direct control of movement over almost 10 kilometres as the Dorset Cursus created a series of encounters with the past, both in topographical and monumental form. I have argued here that the involuntary reactions to such encounters, both mnemonic and emotional, helped people to cite differing versions of identity and to agree a shared view of the past. Other, less controlled encounters with the past took place around the Flagstones ridge and Maiden Castle bank barrow, and I explore this in appendix 2.2.1. Movement was thus central to how people engaged with their past in this period, and to how they developed social memory, myths and narratives about their place in the world.

Materiality in the Middle Neolithic

Introduction

If people in the Middle Neolithic were concerned to engage with their past, and came to do so by interacting with its physical remains in certain ways, how was this affected by, and how did it affect, their materiality? In this section I want to develop my understanding of the Middle Neolithic by examining how materiality was caught up with such concerns, but also worked in quite different ways. At the same time I do not wish to revisit the ground covered in the Early Neolithic chapter by looking at stone axes or human bone again. Instead I want to examine Neolithic materiality in this period at two distinct levels.

The first of these levels might best be described as an examination of the materiality of landscape. People are not separated from their worlds (chapter 1). Landscape does not form a backdrop upon which the various acts of our Neolithic drama were played out. It was central to people's lives, people interacted with it, and through it, every day. Here I want to think about how it may have worked as a form of materiality; how it might be moved, transformed and used. Of course I did this to a certain extent in the last chapter. Axes and pots came from the stone and clay of the landscape, and I discussed how axes in particular might have been inalienable from their places of

origin. In this section I want to consider the landscape more generally as a form of materiality, and how it may have been transformed and employed, perhaps without ever becoming what we might term an object.

Central to this will be two particular examples: building and chalk. The materiality of building will consider how people worked the land to form monuments, and in doing so brought various materials from around the landscape together and transformed them. Through these acts of construction, the metaphors and meanings of these places became a mobile part of people's materiality, even if the monument itself did not. I will consider this with particular reference to the three Dorset bank barrows. The second example examines how chalk may have been thought about and used. This material was available over much of Dorset and was revealed through digging and construction, and also contained the flint that formed other aspects of people's materiality. Chalk was not only a constituent of building, nor was it only encountered in the search for flint. At enclosures like Flagstones chalk ditch walls form part of the architecture of the monument. Chalk was also shaped and moulded during the Middle Neolithic and thus could act as an object as well as a form of material.

Finally, I want to look at Peterborough Ware as a specific example of Middle Neolithic material culture. I want to examine how it worked as a specific materiality of remembrance and was selected for deposition at a wide range of older sites including those that dated back to the Early Neolithic such as Hambledon Hill (Healy 2004; Mercer 2004; Mercer and Healy forthcoming). I shall begin, however, with the consideration of how landscape acted as a form of materiality.

The materiality of landscape

> '...people were not only in an intimate and reciprocal relationship with their surroundings and taskscape, but specifically also with the very elements, which went to constitute the places by and through which they ordered their existence' (Whittle 2004, 22)

In order to appreciate what I mean by the materiality of landscape it is worth reminding ourselves of Ingold's definition of landscape as 'the world as it is known to those who dwell therein, who inhabit its places and journey along the paths connecting them' (2000, 193; chapter 1). Although this is true both in the past and the present, today we have suffered a radical disjuncture with the *materiality* of landscape. In the Western world the dominant ideology places a nature:culture dichotomy at the heart of our understanding (Thomas 2004). Not only this but the severing of most people's interaction with the means of production prevents people in the modern West fully appreciating the material nature of the world in which they dwell. This would not have been the case in the Neolithic. People were surrounded by aspects of the landscape which could be employed, shaped and transformed. People were directly aware of its affordances (Gibson 1979; Ingold 2000, 166), not only in terms of resources or building potential but also the metaphorical possibilities of moving, working and transforming the materials around them. In a landscape, which was surely, in Ingold's potent term, 'pregnant with the past' (2000, 189), people could rework their understandings of place, identity and personhood through the manipulation of the materiality of that landscape.

Bank barrows and metaphors: building with and through the landscape

Figure 6.6: Broadmayne bank barrow (photo: author).

Acts of building were not simply transformations of place, they also sometimes acted as continuations of previous acts of occupation, and as sites for the renegotiation and citing of people's identities (McFadyen forthcoming; appendix 2.1.1). This is only part of the picture, however. Building acted to bring many different materials together, including stone, bone, antler, chalk, earth, and bodies (McFadyen forthcoming). I want to consider here how both building, and the monuments themselves, drew on, worked and transformed both the physical and metaphorical aspects of the materiality of landscape. Caught up within this were other concerns around knowledge, emotion, memory and identity of the kind that I have engaged with throughout this thesis. The metaphorical relevance of one set of Dorset monuments, the bank barrows, has already been considered by Chris Tilley (1999). I want to turn here to an examination of his argument, and a critique that will suggest that his powerful suggestions could be enhanced by a consideration of the building of these monuments and the materiality of the landscape itself.

There are three certain bank barrows in Dorset, stretched out over the Dorset Ridgeway. Working from west to east we have Long Bredy, Maiden Castle and Broadmayne (Bradley 1983; Kinnes 1992). Of these three Maiden Castle is by far the longest and is the only one to have seen modern investigation. It was 564 metres long, 17.5 metres wide and built on three different alignments, probably around 3500 cal BC (Healy et al. in prep.; Sharples 1991; appendices 2.1.2 and 2.2.1). Bank barrows differ from long barrows in several ways. First, they are far longer than long barrows. Maiden Castle is an extreme example of this but Long Bredy is 197 metres in length and Broadmayne 183 metres (Kinnes 1992, 8). The bank barrows also sit on the crest of their various hills, with excellent visibility in all directions; long barrows usually have limited views in one direction (Tilley 1999, 202). Finally, the bank barrows do not taper in either direction; they maintain a constant width, unlike many long barrows. Crucial to understanding these unusual monuments, indeed all monuments, Tilley argues (1999), is the concept of metaphor. Metaphor, suggests Tilley, is 'a primary way in which persons and cultures make sense of their world' (2004, 22). When we take on a dwelling perspective, that situates an undifferentiated mind/body being-in-the-world, we can begin to see the crucial role of metaphor. In our own culture, Tilley points out that we routinely rely on metaphors like the leg of a table or

the face of the clock (2004, 23). Crucial to our understanding of metaphor, however, is that we do not see it as simile. Simile suggests that one thing is like another whilst metaphor, significantly, suggests that *one thing is another* (Tilley 2004, 22). Tilley develops this understanding of metaphor to examine how bank barrows and their landscapes interacted.

Figure 6.7: Chesil Beach, looking towards the Isle of Portland (Photo: Nick Harris).

Tilley argues that a metaphorical relationship existed between the bank barrows and one of Dorset's most notable natural features, Chesil Beach (fig. 6.7). This long thin beach which runs for some 13 kilometres is separated from the land by a tidal lagoon that varies in width from 100 to 900 metres (Tilley 1999, 191). The beach is made up of 98 per cent chert, which varies in size depending on the location along the beach (Tilley 1999). The importance of this beach appears to date back to at least the Early Neolithic, as seen at Hambledon Hill where chert beach pebbles, probably from Chesil Beach, were deposited in a number of contexts (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; Chapter 5). Indeed Tilley argues that the importance of the beach may stretch back further, as 'beach pebbles seem to have had particular significance... across southern England during the Mesolithic' (1999, 193).

What was the metaphorical relationship between the bank barrows and the beach? Tilley begins his argument by examining the Maiden Castle bank barrow. This, he points out, when seen from the south, curves round to the right and so 'is an almost exact representation of the beach' (Tilley 1999, 204). It is also due north of the place where Chesil Beach meets the Isle of Portland (Tilley 1999, 207). Alongside this the ditches on both sides mirror the water on both sides of the beach (Tilley 1999, 204). Thus Tilley argues that a metaphorical connection exists between the monument and the beach, indeed that the bank barrow, in effect, was 'a beach in the sky' (Tilley 1999, 206). People came to understand their world and their landscape through interacting with monuments like the Maiden Castle bank barrow, which was the world in miniature, a place that *was* a beach, because of its metaphorical connection with the stretch of Chesil Beach 13.5 kilometres to the south (Tilley 1999, 205). The other two bank barrows are also 'beaches in the sky' according to Tilley (1999, 206). Although their visual similarities are not as marked, they connect in other ways with Chesil Beach. Long Bredy[vii] lies seven kilometres north of the point at which Chesil Beach leaves the mainland, and also marks the beginning of the Dorset Ridgeway, Broadmayne (fig. 6.6) on the other hand marks the eastern edge of the Ridgeway and also the eastern edge of the Isle of Portland (Tilley 1999, 206-7). Together the three barrows form a metaphorical whole with the Ridgeway and Chesil Beach, or as Tilley puts it 'a connected and bounded symbolic system' (1999, 207).

Building with metaphor

Tilley's (1999) argument is persuasive as it deals with crucial questions such as why the bank barrows were built where they were, what they represented, and how they formed part of people's cosmology and mentalité. I would argue, however, that these suggestions do not go far enough. I feel that the idea of metaphor can be used more powerfully when we consider not only the finished monument, but also the acts of building and construction that preceded them. When we examine construction *as well* as final form we turn a static monument into a process. This process, whilst continuing to relate the beach in the sea to the beach in the sky, allows us to extend the temporality of these metaphors beyond the monument itself and into the past and the future. As people constructed the bank barrows the metaphors would become infused with the material encountered and the tools they were using, with the earth, chalk, stone and antler. When encountering these materials again, the metaphor would

connect the person to a different place and a different time. Just as beach pebbles from Chesil Beach could move around the landscape bringing with them the myths and metaphors of that special place, so encounters with earth and chalk would now draw upon the metaphors encountered when building the bank barrow. Metaphor was a crucial building block of such a monument, but in being used it would have taken residence in the other materials, and in people's relationships with those materials. Thus the act of construction pushed the metaphors into the future through expected acts of construction and encounter to come, and into the past through its relationship with Chesil Beach. When we consider the acts of construction, and crucially the materiality of construction, the metaphorical connections become greatly extended.

It was surely the process, as much as the final form of the monument, that helped form the metaphors that Tilley writes about. There are further connections to be made here. The alteration of the landscape through building connected the landscape of the Ridgeway with the beach and with the monument. Metaphor thus became mobile, and was present not just at the monuments but along the Ridgeway. Thus I would disagree with Tilley when he asserts that the bank barrow stood as a cultural representation of the beach (1999, 204). Such a statement assumes that the beach is natural and the bank barrow cultural. We hardly need to revisit again the problems that lie behind such assumptions (cf. Pollard 2004; Thomas 2004). Instead people would not necessarily have differentiated one part of the landscape as natural and the other cultural[viii]. Indeed the entire landscape may have been perceived as being constructed or built, although by a variety of agents: contemporary humans, animals, spirits, ancestors or gods. The acts of constructing the bank barrows may thus conceptually have equalled the construction of Chesil Beach, which may have been seen to have been in turn conceptually equalled by the Ridgeway or vice versa. By revisiting the act of construction at three points in the landscape, those metaphors became vital links in how people made sense of their world. The multiple materialities that combined together to build the monument thus included metaphor – it too was a building block as much as stone, chalk, earth and antler.

Chesil Beach must also have been changed through these acts of building. If constructing the bank barrows created metaphorical relationships between the monuments and the beach then inevitably the beach will have been altered by these

connections. Re-encountering the beach would now remind people of the acts of building the bank barrows and of moving past them, just as moving past the bank barrows reminded people of the beach. Equally the myths surrounding the beach may have changed. Where perhaps in the Mesolithic one set of myths had been associated with it these may now have altered. If the beach had always had ancestral overtones people may have come to understand that it was a barrow too as they built the bank barrows. Such moments of building may thus also have been acts of discovery. Much as the bank barrows were beaches in the sky, perhaps Chesil Beach was the barrow in the sea. Perhaps this can speculatively be developed. It appears that at the end of the Mesolithic that people turned away from the sea (Schulting 1998; M. Richards and Schulting 2006). This is indicated by isotopic evidence that suggests people stopped eating seafood and salt-water fish at the beginning of the Neolithic[ix]. Thomas has suggested that this move away from the sea as a dietary resource may be the result of a taboo (2003). This taboo, in turn he suggests, may have been driven by people disposing of their dead in rivers, giving the sea ancestral overtones (Julian Thomas personal communication). This may directly have influenced the view of Chesil Beach as a barrow in the sea, and thus perhaps in turn the building of the bank barrows. The metaphors and memories entwined in both the beach and the barrows would thus have tacked back and forth between both, drawing on each and on other understandings to blur any differences between the two.

Here we have people concerned with a past again, therefore, although at a quite different scale to the controlled interactions which I discussed with regards to the Dorset Cursus (and see also appendix 2.2.1). Here the materiality of the landscape itself was crucial. By constructing the bank barrow in the image of Chesil Beach that place in a sense was moved to a different point in the landscape. Again our Western sense of Cartesian geography is lacking here. Surely a place can only be at one location at one time? In a world not limited by such understandings, however, places may have been able to move or exist simultaneously in two locations at the same time. The act of construction may therefore have helped 'move' the very landscape itself. The metaphors contained by the land and the histories written through it could both be manipulated, referenced, or altered through the process of construction, where people themselves worked and altered the land bringing new meanings to new places.

Building with emotion

A second critique of Tilley is that he fails to deal with how memory, emotion, identity and metaphor may have interwoven. By approaching metaphor as a literary tool, Tilley loses much of the affective side of such engagements. The relationships he describes seem a literal reading of the monuments. Although he refers briefly to bodily movement, song and dance, he spends little time exploring these issues. I would suggest that the links between Chesil Beach and the bank barrows may have been as much about how people *felt* about these places as what they thought about them; although they, of course, may not have recognised any difference between the two. The power of the metaphors lay not only in their ability to say 'this is the same as that' but also in their ability to make people *feel* that 'this is the same as that'. Such a process would have involved the interweaving of identity and memory as much as emotion, and construction is central to both of these. In a world where, as Tilley (1999) suggests, places like Chesil Beach may have been seen as a site of ancestral origin, people would certainly have memories and emotions that they associated with those places. These would have come not only from visits but from stories, myths and legends, perhaps associated with the barrow in the sea. Thus to evoke the power of the beach in the new monumental forms, people had to feel a similar way about it. Building manipulated the emotional and mnemonic geographies inherent in the metaphors that were integral to people's understandings of Chesil Beach. Metaphor here works as a motivational agent as well as a way of understanding the world. Identity too played a crucial role both before, during and after construction. Age in particular may have been important, as older people could draw on memories of earlier visits to the beach, the acts of construction themselves perhaps, and the reasons for building the monument originally.

The bank barrows worked on multiple levels. They linked themselves through form and location to important parts of the landscape, and claimed a metaphorical relationship with them. The experience of building the monuments, alongside the rituals that may have taken place there later, created an understanding of this metaphor in people, an understanding which felt right, because it drew on people's emotional attachment and memories of Chesil Beach, and of the Dorset Ridgeway. They also helped to form particular axes of movement around the landscape,

connecting them to another kind of past, that represented by other monuments and other landscapes (appendix 2.2.1).

Multiple materialities here were also crucial. When people constructed a bank barrow it would have brought together a plurality of materials. One can imagine that wood, bone, stone, antler, flint, chert, earth, chalk and human and animal bodies would have been employed to dig the long ditches and cast up the material to form the barrow itself. Some of these materials were brought to the site, others revealed through the process of building. In either case they would be associated as being part of the memorable and emotional building process that had referenced a particular set of metaphors. These materials would then be encountered in other places and in other forms, but they too would now carry new meanings and references. People were not alienated from their world, but neither were the materials, objects and monuments with which they interacted. All of these together formed the materiality of the landscape; indeed, this was the materiality of the landscape writ large. I want to move on now to consider a particular kind of material found over much of Dorset: chalk. It would have been encountered through the digging of ditches, the building of barrows, the search for flint and the digging of pits and shafts. This material was then used in many interesting ways: it was used for building, it was shaped into several different forms and it was used as the basis for the pictograms at the Flagstones enclosure (Woodward 1988).

The materiality of chalk

The land on the move

Figure 6.8: Carved chalk block found in the central shaft at Monkton Up Wimborne (after M. Green 2000, 83, fig. 57).

Although not ubiquitous, chalk does cover much of Dorset, notably Cranborne Chase and the Dorset Ridgeway. As a substance it would have been encountered in all sorts of circumstances: digging, building, searching for flint, planting and many others. Chalk gives a classic example of a substance that may have stood for the very land itself; this was the materiality of landscape. White in colour when exposed, it may have seemed as if the very bones of the land itself were being dug up. These bones were then taken and worked, perhaps moved from place to place, much as the bones of humans and animals were (chapter 5). The interesting aspect of chalk of course is that one cannot tell where it came from in any detail. Unlike the greenstone axes we encountered in the last chapter, that the experienced eye may have known came from Cornwall, there would be no way of identifying the exact source of chalk from the material itself. Although its properties might vary depending on where it came from, or the depth from which it was dug, these would not be enough for people to associate

particular lumps of chalk with exact locations in the landscape. Thus when chalk was worked and shaped, like the figurine from an undated pit at Maiden Castle (Sharples 1991, 185), or the chalk ball found at the base of segment 29 at Flagstones (Healy 1997a, 38), it was only by being told where it came from that people might know its significance. The chalk exposed and used in the digging and building of monuments may have had special significance. As one part of the building matrix it may have absorbed some of the power of other aspects of that matrix, like the metaphors by which that monument was understood. Thus the chalk may have stood metonymically for the monument from whose construction it came, as well what that monument represented. Thus a block of chalk from a bank barrow might stand for the bank barrow and Chesil Beach simultaneously; indeed any distinction between them may have been lost within the piece of chalk. Of course, the chalk would also stand, mnemonically, for the act of construction itself.

Such understandings of chalk objects may thus have been intensely local and personalised; unlike axes in the last chapter, or pottery for that matter, people may not have been concerned with exchanging chalk. Instead they may have been kept as objects, those things whose power and veracity were known only by certain people. The knowledge of where chalk came from, what it stood for, and thus the chalk itself, may have been a marker of identity. People may have carried particular shapes like chalk balls, which were fairly common, as citations of particular identities. Indeed I would like to suggest that gender may have played an important role within this. A number of chalk objects have been found that could be interpreted as taking part in fertility rites. This includes one find from Monkton Up Wimborne (M. Green 2000, 80). In the central pit that contained the multiple burial encountered earlier in this chapter, a seven metre deep shaft was dug (M. Green 2000, 80). Near the bottom a piece of chalk was found with a ten centimetre deep hole on one side and picked lines and arcs on the other (M. Green 2000, 80; fig. 6.8). The chalk was placed near the bones of a piglet that had been butchered with a flint knife (M. Green 2000, 82).

The chalk here may have served multiple purposes. It may have come from the building of the monument itself, and thus carried meaning in the ways I indicated above. In addition the worked hole may have stood as a metaphor for female genitalia. The arcs and lines on the other side may have represented the empowering of this

object with a form of sexuality it might not otherwise have had. This may have mimicked the ways bodies were formed during rites of passage, particularly those tied in with burgeoning sexuality. Being a particular gender, whether it be what we might understand as male or female, or any other form of gender (chapter 2) would have involved performativity; the citing of that gender in particular ways in particular circumstances (Butler 1999 [1990]; 1993). This is true even when being a particular gender only emerges under certain conditions (M. Strathern 1988; see chapter 3). Carrying, working and depositing items like this may have been part of the ways in which people cited gender in the Neolithic. It is not only this item that we might associate with gender performativity. There is the chalk ball from Flagstones, the figurine from an undated pit at Maiden Castle, and four pieces of chalk with scored lines on the back also found there (Laws 1991, 211). Although lacking a direct sexual symbolism, this harks back to the chalk piece from Monkton Up Wimborne. Chalk may have also physically marked people when they used and shaped it, leaving a white residue on their hands and bodies. Chalk may thus have been understood as being especially potent, a materiality that literally left its mark, and blurred the boundaries between it and the people who worked it.

If we broaden our horizons for a moment, we can see that the importance of chalk in this regard is not limited to the Middle Neolithic. At Hambledon Hill in the Early Neolithic a chalk phallus was discovered in phase III of segment 9 of the main enclosure (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Also at Hambledon Hill I have already described the carved two chalk blocks that were deposited behind the child burial in phase VII of segment 17 of the main enclosure (chapter 5). It is also interesting to note that other forms of materiality may have played a similar role at Hambledon Hill. A flint rod was found next to a perforated flint nodule in pit 4B712 inside the Stepleton enclosure (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). As flint is found in chalk it is particularly interesting that this material should have been used in such a similar way. A flint phallus was also found in the ditches of Thickthorn Down long barrow (Drew and Piggott 1936). Finally in the Late Neolithic another chalk phallus along with a chalk ball was found at Mount Pleasant (Wainwright 1979, 40). Other examples could be taken from the Wyke Down henge on Cranborne Chase (Barrett et al. 1991) or the shafts at Maumbury Rings (Bradley 1975).

The materiality of chalk was the materiality of the land on the move. People would have encountered it through building, through working the land itself, and it could then be taken, moved and deposited elsewhere, carrying with it its metonymic, mnemonic and emotional resonances. The power of a monument, its metaphors and meanings could be taken on in part by the chalk and then carried with people around the landscape. Thus chalk offers a uniquely specific and general materiality at the same time. It is available, obviously, all over the chalk of Dorset, yet might also, to those in the know, have held special resonance for a particular place. Along with this, particular bits of chalk were chosen, perhaps because of the context of their encounter, to be worked into forms that allowed people to cite particular forms of gender. What forms these genders took is difficult to say, but if working this materiality into sexually potent shapes was seen as dangerous or liminal, it may have cited a form of gender that was different to that held by others, perhaps a kind of third gender (cf. Holliman 1997; Petra Ramet 1996; chapter 2). In any case the working and deposition of chalk would allow people to make public statements about their gender, even if that gender was fluid, and emerged only under particular circumstances. The substance of the land was uncovered and used to build with, but it was also used by people to carry that place around with them, and to simultaneously make statements about who they were, and what role they fulfilled within certain socialities. The chalk, a crucial aspect of the materiality of landscape, provided a potent source of metaphors for how people dwelt in the world, how they built, how they moved, the way their socialities reproduced themselves and the role that complex and performed genders may have had within this.

The land in place

Figure 6.9: Flagstones enclosure (after Healy 1997a, 34, fig. 22).

An interesting counterpoint to this world of mobile chalk comes from the enclosure at Flagstones where the chalk walls of the ditch were used as a backdrop for a series of carvings (Woodward 1988; Woodward 1991a; Healy 1997a; fig. 6.10). Built directly next to the site of the Early Neolithic inhabitation I described in chapter 5, the site consisted of a series of unevenly spread segments enclosing a space some 100 metres in diameter (Healy 1997a, 33). The causeways between these segments ranged in size with two particularly wide spaces, one to the north and one to the west. Three primary burials were placed in the ditch of the enclosure, two under large stone slabs, and the third near a large sarsen fragment (Healy 1997a, 37)[x]. These large stone slabs, along with the possibility of shallow sockets for stones around the edge of the enclosure have led Frances Healy to suggest that a stone setting may have preceded the enclosure (1997b, 283). The enclosure is dated to between 3300 and 3000 cal BC and so this could place the stone setting before this date, although it is unclear how long the stones would have been standing for (Healy 1997b, 284).

Figure 6.10: The pictograms at Flagstones (after Healy 1997a, 35; fig. 23).

The four pictograms are located on the external walls of segments 4, 18 and 34, and the terminal of section 28 (Healy 1997a, 33). None of the engravings are associated with any of the burials at Flagstones; indeed as Peter Woodward has pointed out 'depiction and burial... appear to be carefully orchestrated and separate' (1988, 270).

The designs are worth thinking about as a process here, as has recently been argued for Irish passage tomb art (Cochrane 2005), rather than as merely a finished project. The engravings were carved in two stages, initial, lighter and simpler designs being engraved first, and then heavier ones second (Healy 1997a, 37). Thus this was not idle doodling, but a thought out process of carving and decoration of the monument. This understanding is enhanced by the knowledge that the pictograms were carved on the most suitable chalk surfaces available, and not at random across the enclosure (Woodward 1988, 270). The notion of these carvings as a process is important because it reminds us of other important considerations. Who saw the carvings as they were done? Who did the carvings? Alongside this other questions are worth raising. What is the significance of their being done on chalk? How do they relate to the mobile chalk objects encountered a moment ago? Most fundamentally of course we might want to think about what they mean, or indeed if they meant anything at all (Bloch 1998; Gell 1999b).

The performance of drawing the carvings would, I argue, have been important. They were all located within 50 centimetres of the bottom of the ditch, and were thus probably carved soon after the ditch was dug (Healy 1997a, 33). The location here may also mean that the acts of carving were seen by relatively few people. Nevertheless they were certainly a public act, one that was meant to be seen, by however many people. The witnessing of the acts of carving and their aftermath (the carvings themselves) was central to the processes as they acted, I would argue, as a technology of enchantment (Gell 1999b, 163). They helped to engage people with the monument, and they helped to provoke aesthetic, affective, responses to the monument. Such responses may have been amongst the many factors used to assert identity as I have already suggested. The aesthetics of conviviality, living in a good, beautiful way, may well have been tied in with the act of carving; it was the right thing to do, at the right time in the right place.

From this perspective the carvings themselves may have had no meaning in themselves. Like the carvings on the Tisa wood poles of the houses of the Zafimaniry, their purpose may have been to decorate the enclosure, to enhance and enchant the enclosure, rather than meaning any one thing in themselves (Bloch 1995, 213). Rather than seeing the carvings and interpreting them, people may have seen the carvings and

reacted to them. This is a different kind of engagement, a more emotional and affective one, and one quite in keeping with a site that also drew on people's memories and feelings about a place that had seen two previous phases of engagement (Healy 1997a). People may have enjoyed acknowledging their past by working the land that they had occupied for many years. Indeed these acts of carving may have been a crucial part of how people maintained their connections with the land (Ingold 2000), and this may have brought sensations close to satisfaction or joy. Nevertheless, one aspect of the creation of these pictograms did convey a more important meaning, and that was their engraving on chalk. As has been suggested, chalk may have been seen as the very substance of the land, and it was this potent materiality that the carvings were drawn upon, and drew upon in turn. In other places chalk may have been loosened, become mobile and been moved to other locations, but here the chalk was stationary, tied in with this specific locale. Thus this was the land in place, the substance of this part of the world being worked on *in situ*. Elsewhere aspects of place tied in with the chalk (metaphors, emotions or memories) could be moved around and deposited in other contexts and at other sites – the land on the move.

This leaves one question unanswered. Who was it who actually did these carvings? Was it a role given to certain people within a sociality? I would like to tie this back in again to gender. As I touched on above, other blocks of chalk were selected to have carvings upon them, for example, at Monkton Up Wimborne (M. Green 2000), Maiden Castle (Sharples 1991) and Hambledon Hill (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). It was not only the pieces of chalk with direct sexual symbolism that may have been caught up in the performance of gender, but also the act of carving the chalk, of drawing lines on the back of the piece from Monkton Up Wimborne for example (M. Green 2000). Thus taking a piece of flint and carving the pictograms on the walls of the Flagstones enclosure may have acted to both enchant the enclosure and cite the gender of the person or persons involved. If gender was fluid in the Neolithic the act of working with chalk, like the acts of exchange in the last chapter, may have been one area in which gender emerged. Indeed developing this further, we might consider if exchanges resulted in people assuming particular genders. Be they seen as masculine or feminine, *other* genders might emerge from the deliberate act of decorating and shaping chalk. Working chalk, being marked by the substance, the flesh even, of the land, may have been a liminal and dangerous experience. Forming

shapes that were imbued with the power of place, with mnemonic, metonymic, metaphorical or sexual references may have been appropriate for people of a certain gender that was neither male *nor* female (cf. Nanda 1999). Such a gender may have been permanent or contextual, but in either case it may have been cited and performed through working with chalk.

Sarsen, stone, chalk and extravagant juxtapositions

Figure 6.11: Sarsen boulder in segment 16 of the Flagstones enclosure (after Healy 1997a, 36, fig. 26).

It is interesting for a moment to compare chalk to other kinds of rock that were important at Flagstones, including limestone, sandstone and sarsen. They provide an excellent counterpoint to chalk for a number of reasons, and provide an example of how the materiality of landscape can work in a number of ways. The possibility of a stone setting at Flagstones has already been discussed, but whether that was present or not, sarsen, sandstone and limestone were certainly deposited in the ditches and had been brought to the locale from elsewhere (Healy 1997a, 46). The sarsen, for example, may well have come from what is today known as the Valley of Stones, where much of the sarsen used in the Dorset in the Neolithic is believed to have

originated (Gale 2003, 44). Whether or not this was the source, the sarsen stones, as Gillings and Pollard (1999) have suggested for the Avebury area, may long have been recognised and used as landmarks. The stones themselves, or the outcrops from which they came, may even have been named and seen as people, spirits or ancestors (Gillings and Pollard 1999). As the old man of the Ojibwa tribe of North America said when asked if all of the stones around him were alive - 'no! But *some* are' (Hallowell 1960, 24, original emphasis). Personhood can be accorded, or achieved, by inanimate objects as much as by people or animals (Fowler 2004). The limestone and sandstone too may have come from known, specific locations, even if they were not named, or understood to be alive or to have lived. If they had stood as part of a stone setting at Flagstones, as Healy suggests (1997a, 46), then these understandings would only have been enhanced.

These stones thus provide a stunning contrast with the undifferentiated chalk I have discussed up to this point. When placed within the ditches of the enclosure they offered an extravagant juxtaposition, as Bahktin might have described it (1984 [1964]). These stones, known from specific locations, would have been emphasised as they were deposited against the chalk. The specific against the general, the known against the unknown: these would have offered further powerful metaphors for people to play with both during and after the acts of deposition. The metaphors would have been enhanced by the fact that at least two large blocks were placed above burials (Healy 1997a, 37). Thus the acts of deposition, the act of burial, played off the metaphors of the undifferentiated chalk beneath the body, and the specific known (named?) stones that were placed above them. I will return to these burials in more detail in the next section where I will deal with deposition directly. For now the vital point is the way in which the materiality of landscape could be worked, moved and employed to construct meaning, memory and metaphor.

Materiality of landscape – the working and reworking of the world

That landscape is not mere backdrop but central to people's understandings of the world is now a shibboleth of interpretive archaeology (e.g. Ingold 1993; Tilley 1994; 2004; Thomas 1996; Cummings and Whittle 2004). What I have done in this section is to try to take this a step further, to imagine how the materiality of the landscapes in which people dwelt could have been employed. These were people who worked and

reworked the conditions through which they lived. This was done not only by the manipulation of various physical materialities, but also through the use of metaphor, metonym and the mnemonic and emotional geographies of place. The materiality of landscape was also reworked through decoration and juxtaposition, through the enchantment of technology and the technology of enchantment (Gell 1999b, 163). Within this identity, gender, emotion and memory were in flux. They too were cited and reworked through the materiality of landscape just as monuments, landscape and place were transformed through its manipulation. Whether it was through the building of bank barrows that mimicked Chesil Beach (Tilley 1999), or through the working and transformation of chalk, the landscape offered powerful tools for the creation of meaning and metaphor, and the performance of identity.

Most of the emphasis so far within this chapter has been on the earlier part of the Middle Neolithic, examining the construction and use of various monuments, most of which were in place by 3100 cal BC. Before I go on to examine deposition, I wish to change tack slightly and examine another aspect of Middle Neolithic materiality, one that was repeatedly placed in later contexts in many of the sites I have examined so far: Peterborough Ware.

Peterborough Ware

Figure 6.12: General examples of Peterborough Ware (after Thomas 1999a, 107, fig. 5.8).

Peterborough Ware is an excellent example of a new materiality that emerged in the Middle Neolithic, shortly before 3300 cal BC (Gibson 2002, 78). The development of our understanding of this material has been well documented in recent years (e.g. Gibson 2002; Gibson and Kinnes 1997; Thomas 1999a), and thus there is little point repeating that here. Suffice to say that what had originally been seen as three chronologically separate, developing styles, of Ebbsfleet to Mortlake to Fengate have now been suggested to be roughly concurrent, and in use by 3000 cal BC (Gibson 2002, 17). I do not wish to become bogged down in distinguishing between these three styles; the evidence from Dorset is too partial to be definitive on differences in either chronology or function. Instead whilst recognising that differences in form and decoration may have been important, I shall concentrate on Peterborough Ware as a unified subject, and leave more detailed discussion of typology for another time.

Peterborough Ware of all three styles was usually decorated on the rim or upper body using twisted or whipped cord, or bird bone, impressions in diagonal or herringbone motifs (Thomas 1999a, 111). In terms of form it appears that there were far fewer distinct vessel shapes in the Middle Neolithic compared to earlier periods (Thomas 1999a, 107). Indeed Thomas has argued that 'it seems that one element of the original assemblage was chosen at the expense of others and elaborated through the addition of profuse decoration' (1999a, 107). This leads him to conclude that Peterborough Ware represents a fundamental change in the practices that ceramics were used for (Thomas 1999a, 107). I am not convinced of this. Whilst it is clear that changes took place, this may have been as much about how pottery was understood, as what its actual function was. What is clear, however, is that, as Thomas has also pointed out (1999a, 120), Peterborough Ware was being deposited in particular contexts in the Middle Neolithic, often on sites that had previously seen monument construction or occupation. Indeed it seems as if this new form of pottery 'demonstrated a strong orientation towards the past' (Thomas 1999a, 120). I want to argue that this certainly means that Peterborough Ware was being deposited in new ways and being understood in new ways, even if it was being used, whilst intact, in similar ways to Early Neolithic pottery.

Peterborough Ware, as I just noted, is commonly found in Dorset on sites that had previously seen acts of building. Examples of this include Hambledon Hill where

fragments from five bowls were found (Smith forthcoming). Two of these came from superficial contexts in the interior of the main enclosure and two from the Stepleton Spur. One, however, was found in the phase III fills of the segment 6 of the middle Stepleton outwork. This phase has been radiocarbon dated to 3500-3340 cal BC (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Other examples come from Maiden Castle where 34 sherds were recovered, largely from the upper layers of the enclosure ditch (Cleal 1991, 181). Elsewhere Peterborough Ware was found in the upper fills of the Wor Barrow ditch silts, and in later contexts in the ditches of Thickthorn Down long barrow (Healy 1997b, 287; Mercer forthcoming). Over 50 sherds of Peterborough Ware were also found in the upper fills of the Down Farm Shaft (Allen and M. Green 1998, 35). This may have been a 'natural' feature to our eyes but such distinctions, as has often been noted, may have been meaningless in the Neolithic. It would most likely have been perceived as being of great antiquity.

So these Early Neolithic monuments, and other older features, were being visited again in this later period and a new kind of materiality was being used to mark those visits. In this context it is important to contrast these with monuments that were built in the Middle Neolithic. At Monkton Up Wimborne scraps of Peterborough Ware were found in the upper fills (M. Green 2000, 78) and at the Dorset Cursus there was a clear break between the primary fills and the later Chalk Pit Field pits and flint scatter which included Peterborough Ware (Barrett et al. 1991, 85). At Alington Avenue there is only one possible body sherd in the secondary fill of the south ditch and no Peterborough Ware was found at all at the Flagstones enclosure (Davies et al. 2002, 41; Healy 1997a, 38). The only examples of Peterborough Ware in the initial fills of recently constructed monuments come from the round barrows on Handley Down near Wor Barrow (Barrett et al. 1991, 85). Here Peterborough Ware was found in the lower fills of the ditch of Handley 27 and on the bottom of the ditch of Handley 26 (Barrett et al. 1991, 85).

How can we interpret these acts of deposition of a particular kind of materiality? It seems clear that Peterborough Ware was specifically selected for deposition both at older monuments and in later contexts at some more recently constructed sites, with the exception of the two round barrows. What I want to argue is that these acts represent a modification of how pottery was understood, rather than a revolutionary

change. Pottery in this period may well have been caught up in the enchainments, flows of substance and exchanges that I suggested for the Earlier Neolithic. People were still exchanging pottery which contained a range of substances that created flows between people, linked them, and created a sense of permeable personhood. People, however, were making new forms of pottery, decorating it in different ways and depositing it in particular circumstances, circumstances that now related those pots to older monuments. Thus the connections I traced in the last chapter were now being reforged with reference to the past. Rather than the large-scale acts of exchange and deposition at sites like Hambledon Hill, people were making smaller-scale deposits, revisiting sites that now had a place in myth as much as in memory, tying together the relations that the fragments of pottery encoded with older places and stories. Even on sites that were more recent creations, like the Dorset Cursus or Monkton Up Wimborne, it was only once they had become old in themselves that they were suitable for the deposition of Peterborough Ware. Thus a three-way engagement now took place between the two different people, or groups, who exchanged the pot, and the past, which was referenced when the pot sherds were deposited at Maiden Castle, Hambledon Hill or Wor Barrow, for example.

Why were people suddenly concerned to tie these acts of exchange and enchainment into a past, where previously they had been referenced through acts of deposition at monuments that were currently in use? Throughout this chapter I have argued that the past was becoming an increasingly important force in monument construction (see also appendix 2.1.1). Indeed I have suggested that the Dorset Cursus linked older monuments together and created a route of movement that controlled engagement with their history. If people were becoming increasingly concerned with how their past was experienced, perceived and understood, it is no wonder that this was also an issue for the materiality of this period. Depositing Peterborough Ware at these sites not only placed the links between people that the pottery embodied into another time, it was also an act of engagement with the monument itself. It may also have formed part of the way in which the dominant narratives of engagement that the Cursus created, for example, were supported, challenged or overcome. The way people manipulated Peterborough Ware meant that they could make it, use it, or break it in a variety of ways. This would have been far harder to regulate than the encounters people had with monuments through the Cursus. It thus offered people a way to do

different things with a materiality that carried the past in its very form, and through that to maintain or subvert people's expectations. Peterborough Ware thus connected the people, the past, the present and the monument together, and simultaneously reworked those links.

One objection might be that not all Peterborough Ware has been found at monuments, but if this form of pottery linked people and the past together like this then it was not only at monuments that such connections existed. Memory and myth would have been a concern as part of daily life, as part of artful living. The production of Peterborough Ware, shaping the clay, decorating the rim and firing the pot, these activities too which referenced times gone by. Peterborough Ware was a technology in itself that referenced the past; its shape drew on Earlier Neolithic forms (Thomas 1999a, 107)[xi]. The past was now part of people's daily concerns, and people worked with it in forming, shaping and decorating these pots. Artistic production was lodged in the world of the everyday (Overing 2003, 294), and it was here that the connections with the past were remade, renewed and reformed through the making of Peterborough Ware. Whether a pot was Mortlake or Ebbsfleet, for example, in form may have had more to do with the particular connections with the past that were being stressed than with a desire to differentiate form, use or identity. The process of making a pot, of decorating it, of making it beautiful may have expressed the skill of the particular potter, a skill which in itself referenced earlier acts (cf. Connerton 1989). This was a tactile, temporal, technology; people's hands worked the clay and as they did so they literally re-shaped and decorated the past. Different metaphors may have surrounded the clay that might have been seen, as part of the landscape, to be the workable physicality of history itself. Even when deposited at non-monumental locales of inhabitation such as Poundbury the pottery was used to reference older engagements. Here it was placed in the upper fill of a pit. We can imagine that people returning to the site some months after it was last visited would have recognised the infilling pits dug when the site was previously occupied. They selected one of these pits, pit E22, to place a sherd of Peterborough Ware in (Sparey Green 1987, 22), thus connecting themselves once again with the past.

It is not surprising that pottery was used in this fashion. In the Early Neolithic it must at some point have been a new technology, a fresh way of working with and

transforming the world. By the Middle Neolithic, at least 500 years later, this would no longer be true. Although the techniques of production might be relatively specialised (Hamilton and Whittle 1999), people would have been more familiar with it than in years gone by. It thus made sense that it was used not only to reference previous moments of practice but older places as well. Joanna Overing has written forcefully on the power of the everyday, on how people's ability to get along, to move through the world, can be centred within the artful living of daily life (2003). In the Middle Neolithic the repeated actions of making and decorating Peterborough Ware were part of daily life yet also drew on and referenced the past through the remembrance of previous acts of deposition and expectations of future ones. This 'projective remembrance' would have created a sense of continuity with the past (cf. Bradley 2002), which people encountered on a daily basis, and with the future through what Battaglia describes as 'the perception that time and space have collapsed' (1990, 156). Thus looking forward (in the future this pot may be placed in the ditches of an older monument) was also a way of looking back.

Another objection that might be raised to this concerns the two round barrows on Handley Down, both of which were newly constructed when Peterborough Ware was placed in their ditches (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 85). Yet these monuments, as Barrett *et al.* point out, themselves cited the past as both were focused on the Wor Barrow (Barrett *et al*, 1991, 84). Thus as they referenced the past, so did the Peterborough Ware that was deposited in the ditches. It is also possible that the pottery gave the two round barrows a 'false' sense of antiquity, much like that suggested for Alington Avenue long barrow in appendix 2.2.1. Again, however, this conception of real or false antiquity is very much one rooted in our own Western conceptions of linear time, and may have made no sense to people in the Middle Neolithic of Dorset (cf. Lucas 2005).

Concluding materiality

People in the Middle Neolithic of Dorset were not separated from the world in which they dwelt. Their materiality, unlike ours in the modern West, was inalienable from the landscape from which it came. The affordances of which Ingold (2000) and Gibson (1979) have written were not just economic resources, but materials and metaphors also. People reworked their worlds by reworking their materiality. Whether it was by building large Bank Barrows that transformed multiple materialities

including metaphor, or shaping blocks of chalk as part of gendered performativity, the materiality of the landscape was central to people's lives. People could use it to create contrasts and juxtapositions, to reference important places or to help form memories, emotions and senses of identity. These concerns were not fixed only at these monuments, they were part of people's daily lives. The manipulation of these materialities would have been central to the artful living of daily life (Overing 2003), to the maintenance of the aesthetics of conviviality (Overing and Passes 2000b). The practice of working the materiality in an artful way (Overing 2003, 301), be it to shape a pot, or a chalk block, or build a bank barrow, may have been central to how people understood their identity, their community and their world.

Deposition in the Middle Neolithic

Deposition has already formed a large part of my discussion. Nevertheless what this section offers is a chance to engage with the acts of deposition directly, with the circumstances of particular moments of agency. I also want to move from broad considerations of movement and materiality to exact instances where certain items were taken and placed into the ground. This helps to move my discussion forward from the general notion of a concern with the past to specific examples of where memory was worked through, both via remembering and forgetting (Forty and Küchler 1999). More than this, one can also examine how deposition demonstrates specific instances where identities are cited and transformed (O. Harris 2005), or where certain materialities were taken and deposited as a way of making broader statements about the world.

In this section of the chapter I want to address these issues by returning to examine in detail two of the sites I have already touched on this chapter: Flagstones and Monkton Up Wimborne. At Flagstones I will examine the circumstances around the burials that took place there, both of people and stone, encountered in the last section (Healy 1997b). In particular I want to examine the tensions that may have existed here *between* remembering and forgetting (Forty 1999; Thomas 2004, 124). I want to develop that argument in this context by examining how emotions surrounding the dead may have been at play, and how the tension around remembering and forgetting may have been as much emotional as anything else. These arguments will be extended

at Monkton Up Wimborne, where a range of deposits requires attention. First, I will return to the burial of the four people with whom I began this chapter, the three children and the woman. The circumstances of their lives and of their burial will be used to argue that forgetting was important here too. The importance of considering children as social actors in their own right will also be stressed within this.

If forgetting was crucial to these deposits, remembering played its part also at Monkton Up Wimborne. The monument here had an architecture, I will argue, that drew attention to certain acts of deposition, and these were accompanied by feasting. The ways in which memories were created and formed around these acts will be examined, as will the way in which these drew on the enclosure's relationship to the Cursus, and to the natural shaft at Fir Tree Field (Allen and M. Green 1998). Identity was central to these acts of deposition, and was formed partially through their performative aspect. I also consider the relationship between wild animals, flows of substance and deposition in this period in appendix 2.2.2.

Memorable funerals? Tensions of memory and forgetting in deposition

More weight![xii] *People under stone at the Flagstones enclosure*

Figure 6.13: Burials at Flagstones in segment 19. The child burial in the lower photograph was found 30cm below the sandstone block pictured above (after Healy 1997 a, 36-7, figs 27 and 28).

I have already examined the importance of the different materialities that people employed at Flagstones in the last section: the chalk on which the pictograms were drawn and the sarsen and other stones that first stood upright and were later deposited into the ditches. Two of these stones were placed on top of two burials, one the cremation of an adult in segment 16, the other the skeleton of a two- to three-year old child in segment 19 (Healy 1997a, 37; fig. 6.13). Neither of the two stone slabs, a

sarsen one in the former and a calcareous sandstone in the latter, were placed directly on top of the burials; rather they were separated by 20 centimetres in the former and 30 centimetres in the latter (Healy 1997a, 37; fig. 6.13). This suggests that they formed a second act of deposition, although as the ditches would have been open only for some four to eight years (Healy 1997a, 46), the two cannot have been separated by a great span of time. A third burial, of a 6-12 month old child, was placed in segment 30 with a single femur of a three to five year old (Healy 1997a, 37). Although not placed under a slab of stone, a sarsen fragment some 65cm by 25cm was placed close by. A second cremation was also discovered nearby, probably from the unexcavated half of the enclosure, during the building of Maxgate House, and this too was under a sarsen slab (Healy 1997a, 46). Thus although the exact sequence is unclear it seems that at least five people, in a variety of forms, were placed on the bottom of the ditch. These were then covered at a later date by stone slabs that had previously stood above ground.

I want to argue here that there is a clear tension being played out between the memories of the burials on the one hand and the forgetting of them on the other. In chapter 5 I suggested that when bodies were buried whole people may, on occasions, have been trying to forget the dead, to deny themselves (or others) access to the bones that might act as a technology of remembrance. Whilst the stones, perhaps as I suggested earlier named and recognised in themselves, marked the locations of these burials, they simultaneously covered them, acting as a technology of forgetting, as the enclosure became associated with the burial of the stones rather than with the burial of the people (cf. Rowlands 1999). Thus tensions may have been at play between remembering the stones and forgetting the dead. The forgetting of the dead may have been particularly important here as two were children. In a society where infant and child mortality may have run at a high level, people may have been especially encouraged to forget the young dead, and this process may have been enhanced by the burial of the stones. Equally the burial of the stones may have counter-acted the memorable process of cremation that had taken place around the adult bodies. The stones, understood as important before they were moved to Flagstones, would have transferred attention and memory away from the burials themselves. They would have encouraged people to remember the stones, and the enclosure as the site of the stones interment, rather than the burial of the children. Their deposition would have been a

crucial part of the social process of forgetting (Forty 1999, 8). Or perhaps more accurately, in Rowlands' term, they were part of the process of 'remembering to forget' (1999, 131; chapter 4)[xiii]. Would these acts of forgetting have been successful?

The emotions caught up around the burial of these children would not have easily been forgotten. That does not mean that they would be the same as those we would expect to exist around these moments in the modern West. The emotions may have been felt and understood very differently, but they would have been powerful, real and affective nonetheless. The claim that they were powerful may also be central here, not least in that they would allow, or perhaps force, the process of forgetting to be challenged (Seremetakis 1991). Some people, on the other hand, perhaps those not closely related to the dead, may have felt threatened by the raw power of such emotions and by encouraging people to forget may have helped close off the legitimacy of their expression. Conflicting emotions may also have been at play. Different people may have clashed as their contrasting affective states created disputes and tensions. These may have had to be settled through mediation, through shared consumption, through gifts or apologies. These tensions may have been at play and may have run through the conflicts of remembering and forgetting, indeed they may lie at the heart of these disputes. Honouring *and* forgetting may have been caught up with the powerful emotions people felt as they visited the monument over the years that followed the initial interments. Powerful emotions may also have surrounded the adults who were cremated and buried on the site; grief or equivalent emotions would not have been limited to the death of children. Again, the way in which these powerful emotions shaped the experience of the enclosure may have had powerful long-term consequences. This was the case even as people were being encouraged to forget the burials through the absence of bones to circulate and through deposition of particular stones.

Within this the child femur deposited with the infant in segment 30 forms an interesting addition. If this femur had been curated and kept for some time, its burial may not have to do with the death of that person. Rather here a sense of acknowledgement of emotion may have been at work. Placing the bone of another dead child with the body of the baby may have stressed the shared personhood that both the dead, and perhaps their still living parents felt, and a sense that their pain and

emotions were one and the same, as their children were now one and the same. A sense of partible personhood might mean that a bone of a child might become, after death, part of another person, perhaps a parent or relative, and then part of another child through this particular burial. Emotion here may have connected people through this sense of personhood, and the emotions themselves may have been partible, and so the placing of the femur in the grave may have marked the transference of emotion from one person to another. This would emphasise the equivalence of both, and both were supposed to be forgotten, when the closing sarsen fragment was placed in the ditch perhaps a year or two later.

Pressure to remember	Pressure to forget
Material culture associated with the dead?	Absence of bones from circulation
Emotions surrounding the dead (pain/loss/grief/sorrow/anger or other non-western emotions?)	Placing of memorable stones above the burials – a technology of forgetting
Memorable place in the landscape where the bodies were interred	Social pressures and sanctions, expectations of the community about the proper way to behave
Memorable moment of cremation	No recutting of the ditches at Flagstones – a social refusal/taboo to re-engage?

Figure 6.14: The social tensions between remembering and forgetting the Flagstones burials.

Yannis Hamilakis (personal communication) has spoken of the need for people to fix specific memories against the broad fields of general memory that exist. This was done here through the deposition of certain well remembered, perhaps ancestral, stones (Gillings and Pollard 1999), which pressed through the act of their deposition for the memory of certain acts and the forgetting of others. The absence of bones may have begun the act of forgetting but perhaps this was more difficult in some circumstances than others. In this case other technologies of forgetting, like covering the body with an object memorable and mnemonic in its own right, may have helped to aid the process[xiv]. That the stones would have been powerful mnemonic devices seems likely. Their shape and texture would have helped to create bodily memories

that people would have re-encountered as they lowered them into the ditches. The power of these memories would have been central to the forgetting of others, however, and as the stones became covered, they too would slowly have been forgotten. The fact that the ditches at Flagstones were never recut hints that people avoided re-encountering either the stones which they chose to remember, or the burials which they worked to forget.

Interestingly it appears that the attempts to forget these acts of burial were not completely successful, and that the powerful emotions created memories which survived the attempts to make people forget. Evidence again exists of on-going emotional and mnemonic geographies as another child was later buried at the site (Healy 1997a, 38). Sometime between 2910 and 2610 cal BC a pit was dug into the fill of segment 14 and the body of a 10-12 year old child placed within it (Healy 1997a, 38). Thus although the interment of the stones may have been intended to act as a technology of forgetting, and indeed may have led people to forget about the burials themselves, this may not have been enough to change the way people *felt* about the site. The stones may have dominated when people discussed and reminisced about activities that took place there and in the oral history that surrounded Flagstones. Other feelings emerged, however, that challenged this and drew on other memories, acknowledged or not, to maintain people's affective associations. As with the burial of the two children in the main enclosure at Hambledon Hill, encountered in the last chapter, the burials may have textured the site in a way that transcended particular moments of forgetting.

Forgetting and remembering at Monkton Up Wimborne

Figure 6.15: Monkton Up Wimborne (after M. Green 2000, plate 9).

Forgetting was also important at the site of Monkton Up Wimborne. Here, whilst some deposits were placed in a way that was explicitly memorable and used the architecture to make them so, the burial of the four people with whom I began this chapter was placed in such a way that forgetting them seems to have been a primary concern. I will examine this act of deliberate forgetting before I look at how other acts of deposition were, in contrast, explicitly memorable.

The four people encountered earlier, the mother and daughter and the two children, were buried in a grave cut into the north face of the central pit at Monkton Up Wimborne (M. Green 2000, 78). Whilst initially one might think that burial in such a monument marks a moment where remembering was stressed, in fact, when one examines how the grave was covered over, it becomes clear that forgetting was more important. The grave was infilled by placing a large block of chalk over the bodies around which were hammered a series of smaller blocks, ensuring that the grave was, as Martin Green describes it, 'carefully concealed' (2000, 79). This forgetting would have been enhanced by the absence of their bones from circulation as all four were

articulated when interred. Of course this demand to forget may have been challenged by people whose emotions ran high at such a time, by the various relatives of the deceased who may have witnessed the deposit. On the other hand, the emphasis on forgetting may have been a means of disempowering people who might otherwise use the raw force of the emotion to challenge dominant understandings and alter the way in which life was led (Seremetakis 1991). Forgetting here seems to have followed immediately on from the burial, unlike at Flagstones, where some interval separated the acts of burial of people from the interment of the stones.

It is interesting to consider here whether the movement of these people on to and off the chalk, or their dietary deficiencies, had anything to do with their burial circumstances. The youngest child had a tumour on the skull and an abscess on a tooth, and all three of the children had an iron deficiency (M. Green 2000, 79). One could create an argument in which these people, these outsiders perhaps, who were ill to various degrees, were hidden away from the community, deliberately forgotten as they were feared, rejected or unwanted.

I am not entirely happy with such an explanation, however, for several reasons. First, as I suggested earlier, is that these kinds of movement may well have been commonplace. Until we have wider ranges of isotope studies it will not be possible to see whether these movements were unusual or, as I have suggested, quite normal. Similar considerations apply to the sickness of the children. Illnesses and dietary shortcomings may well have been commonplace, and these have not been widely enough studied for us to be dogmatic on the subject. Furthermore to presume that these aspects were central to the reasons behind the hidden burial draws on modern Western understandings of illness as something we need to be separated from and which needs to be hidden away (Foucault 1973). More than this, such explanations deny the possibility of agency for the children themselves (Sofaer Derevenski 2000b; O. Harris forthcoming). It may have been how they led their life, their roles within the wider sociality, which led to the need to place them in a hidden place, to use the blank chalk as a tool to forget them. If the actions, roles or perhaps circumstances of death challenged how people felt that life ought to be lived, and broke down what has been termed the aesthetics of conviviality, people may have felt that forgetting the dead,

rather than remembering them, may have helped to maintain the community, to sustain the artful living of daily life.

It is interesting here to speculate for a moment on what the relationships between these four people were. Some sort of relationship obviously existed between brother and sister on the one hand and the mother and daughter on the other. This is indicated both by their shared history of movement and by their shared location of burial. We might speculate that they came from the same small group, that perhaps the woman had adopted the other two children, or that they represented an extended family. Multiple kinds of marriage relationships may have been at play, including polygamy. Maybe the woman's identity was constituted by her role as a carer for children. Other possibilities exist. Does their hidden grave indicate these people were thought lowly of, perhaps they were slaves of some kind? Perhaps a combination of all of the circumstances I have touched on above combined to produce the hidden nature of the grave. The deaths, illnesses, movements, actions, identities and relations of the four people buried at Monkton Up Wimborne combined to ensure that whilst they were buried in a powerful place that looked towards the past, in the form of the Dorset Cursus, they were also hidden, and through the act of hiding, forgotten.

An interesting aspect of this particular example of forgetting is that it contrasts with many of the other events and acts of deposition that took place at Monkton Up Wimborne that were clearly intended to be memorable, located as they were within a ritualising architecture and in view of three points along the Dorset Cursus. Central to these acts was the seven metre deep shaft dug into the south side of the central pit (M. Green 2000, 80). Around this a chalk platform was constructed, and a variety of items were deposited into the shaft (M. Green 2000, 80). The deposition of these items was witnessed by those surrounding the central pit, and included the carved chalk block encountered earlier. The first act of deposition consisted of the placement at the bottom of the shaft of the bones of a butchered piglet along with a sandstone ball and three vertebrae that were placed against the angle of the shaft wall and base (M. Green 2000, 80). Such a deposit may have been highly memorable. Within the outer ring of pits at Monkton Up Wimborne people could have stood and observed the performance of ritual on the chalk platform where the piglet may have been butchered and its remains dropped into the shaft. The importance of this shaft is enhanced by its

obvious similarity to the Fir Tree field doline, on the other side of the cursus. This natural shaft, which saw deposits from the Later Mesolithic to the Early Bronze Age, may have played an important part in how people understood the landscape, and here we have a deep shaft that mimics this, reaching deep down into the earth itself. Again the difference between natural and man-made may not have been important, or even understood, by the people at the time. In addition the marks at the bottom of the shaft indicate that it was cut in part by polished flint and stone axes (M. Green 2000, 82). In the last chapter I discussed the multiple meanings and importance of these items of material culture. Their use in the construction of the shaft would have imbued the shaft with something of that, of the personhood contained within the axe, and tied it into the biographies of these important aspects of materiality.

Figure 6.16: The central pit and shaft at Monkton Up Wimborne (after M. Green 2000, 82, fig. 56).

The acts of deposition at Monkton Up Wimborne took place within an architecture that whilst enclosed and intimate, in comparison with the larger enclosures of the Early Neolithic, was still highly memorable (figs 6.15 and 6.16). This would have been enhanced by the location of the monument in relation to the Dorset Cursus. The enclosure was intervisible with three points along the cursus, including the mythologically powerful Gussage Cow Down, behind which the mid-winter sun set. One can thus imagine the kind of events that would have taken place at this enclosure. If people approached Monkton Up Wimborne from the east a series of postholes indicate that they would have passed behind a screen before entering the monument, perhaps as the sun was setting. Standing within the ring of pits, the evidence of burning and animal bone suggests that fires would have been lit and cattle butchered

and consumed as part of a feast (M. Green 2000, 83). The cooking and feasting focused on the central pit within which acts of butchery were made and then items placed into the deep shaft that reached into the very heart of the earth itself. If this took place after sunset, people moving down the cursus might be seen only by the flickering of their torches. Even in daylight the sight of others progressing down the cursus, with the sound perhaps drifting down towards the enclosure, would have made for a powerful backdrop.

Within this atmosphere, the smell of cooking and the taste of the meat would have helped create bodily memories that, like Proust's madeleine, would be recalled the next time beef was consumed or cooked over a fire. The white chalk would have been contrasted with the blood of butchered animals, the smell of burning and cooking, the tastes, sounds and textures of the feasts and performances. These acts were not merely memorable, they were *intensely* memorable. The deposition in the deep shaft formed the central focus to this, and the evidence suggests that as the shaft filled up people returned on several occasions to repeat the rites and place other important items there. These items included the carved piece of chalk discussed above, a cattle skull, a fragment of human skull, several natural but unusual flints, two exceptional arrowheads and a red deer antler beam (M. Green 2000, 80). Depositing the right items, with people acting in the proper ways, would have been central to how these events became unforgettable (Battaglia 1990, 155). Thus we have memorable deposits taking place as part of a memorable series of events that linked into the landscape through both the shaft and the relationship between the enclosure and the Cursus. This relationship with the Cursus also tied the enclosure into the past, into the series of encounters that the Cursus itself created, and gave the monument a link to the older long barrows across Cranborne Chase.

What effect did these memorable encounters have? When I examined the Cursus I suggested it created a series of encounters with the past in a controlled fashion, and drew on memory and emotion to do so. Here people were not encountering the past directly, although they did draw on it through the shaft and through the relationship between the monument and the Cursus. More important here were the acts of deposition themselves and their performative nature. Identity, in other words, was crucial. The architecture of the monument created a clear space where performances

could take place, a space where identities could be cited in a way that was both meaningful and memorable. The chalk platform around the shaft in the huge, ten metre wide pit created a stage where performances could be made, performances that would have centred on the cooking, redistribution and consumption of meat and the act of deposition. Relationships would have been created between those who watched around the edge of the pit, some standing, some sitting and those who stood within the pit, or on the platform, leading the ceremonies. Their identities in terms of role, status and gender would have been cited and confirmed in these moments, legitimated by the understanding of what should be deposited when and whom to give the meat to and so on. These may also have been contested, of course. Who was given the meat first? Who was given the best cuts? These issues are often central to the relationships people have, to how they got on with another, and offer opportunities for alliances to be honoured and even insults to be made (Maschio 1998; Sillitoe 1998). People may have had very different understandings of why certain actions were performed or why certain substances were burned or deposited, not just different adults but people of different ages too (Toren 1993; A. Strathern and Stewart 1999; O. Harris forthcoming).

The central pit may have formed a liminal area that was central to rites of passage (Van Gennep 1960; Turner 1969; O. Harris 2005). If people met there, perhaps on a yearly basis, children of a certain age, for example, might descend into the pit, thus leaving behind a previous identity. In full view of others they could then go through a series of events featuring consumption, or other practices, and then leave the pit re-entering society in a new role. Such performances would not only transform the children's identity but cite and reiterate the identity of the people leading the rite. The act of depositing something in the deep shaft may have brought such a process to a close. The children going through such a rite of passage, however, should not be treated as mere participants, as they may have challenged what was going on, or sought to deny a change in identity. In any case the understandings they may have held may have been very different, perhaps inversions, of how adults saw the events (Toren 1993; O. Harris forthcoming; chapter 2). For the children the events may have been forced upon them by adults who demanded that they alter their identity and behave in new ways. For the adults the children may have changed, by growing or ageing, in such a way that demanded a process of carefully controlled transition. The

closing items placed in the pit, the fragment of human skull, the antler beam or the carved chalk block may even have been selected by a participant in the ritual and interpreted and understood as being a central part in their transition. If such a rite involved children it is essential we deny neither their understandings nor their agency. Indeed we should not forget that children themselves, or the process of childhood, may have been understood very differently in the Neolithic (O. Harris forthcoming; chapter 2).

Now of course this is only one possible interpretation, and other rites could have gone on as well, or rites of passage around children may have played no part in the events and acts of deposition. Nevertheless the citing and performance of identity of certain people would, I believe, certainly have been central to the rituals that took place at Monkton Up Wimborne during the Middle Neolithic. The architecture of the monument, its position, the cooking and consumption of meat and, crucially, the acts of deposition that took place, all stress the role that performance would have had. Through such moments, which I have termed performative practice (O. Harris 2005; chapter 2), identities would inevitably have been cited, maintained, and on occasions undermined. These performative practices would have been made deliberately memorable through the smells, tastes, sights and sounds of the rituals and through the way in which people moved into and out of the monument's ritualising architecture (Bell 1992). These memorable practices would only have served to enhance the demand to forget the burial of those four human beings hidden behind the chalk at the north edge of the pit.

Concluding deposition

Deposition, as I have suggested in this section and throughout this chapter, remained a crucial part of Neolithic existence. There were clear tensions in this period between remembering and forgetting, and I have examined how they were played out in particular with the burials at Monkton Up Wimborne and Flagstones. The demands to forget would, I have argued, have been challenged by people's emotions, which, although different to ours, called on people to remember. At one site, Flagstones, it appears that some form of emotional geography, the affective texturing of the site, persisted through time, but at Monkton Up Wimborne perhaps it did not. The circumstances of deposition demanded remembering or forgetting, depending on what

was buried and how people felt, as much as thought, about it. By examining the detail of deposition we can begin to pick out how different emphases were placed on remembering and forgetting and by drawing on anthropology (e.g. Battaglia 1990) how emotion may have challenged this. Equally the demand to forget may have weakened mourning as a source of power and prevented certain groups from drawing upon it to challenge how life was led.

Alongside this people continued to place deposition at the centre point of rituals which reworked identity, and which created memorable moments of performative practice. These were moments that could be re-awoken through effort after meaning, or through the stimulating of unconscious somatic memories by smell, taste or sound. At Monkton Up Wimborne a sequence of deposits were placed into a deep shaft, which I argue formed the centre point of a number of deliberately memorable rituals. These drew upon the acts of deposition set within an architecture that focused people's attention on to a stage where theatrical performative practices took place that cited and transformed people's identities. The monument as a whole was situated within sight of the Dorset Cursus and thus was linked into another of people's principal concerns in this period, the relationship they had with the past. This too was stressed in the increased number of wild animal bones deposited in this period (appendix 2.2.2).

Dorset in the Middle Neolithic: the three strands together

The Middle Neolithic saw different sets of practices to those of the Early Neolithic in some areas, yet many aspects of life remained the same. Although the large enclosures at Hambledon Hill and Maiden Castle went out of use, much of people's lives was still concerned with the yearly round: with moving with their animals through the landscape from place to place, with mixing and engaging with each other in the right way, with maintaining the aesthetics of conviviality. Evidence from the group buried at Monkton Up Wimborne shows just how widespread this travel may have been (Budd *et al.* 2003). New concerns and new materialities did emerge in this period, however, and many of these focused on how people interacted and engaged with their past. Thus the Dorset Cursus was built, for example, and this linked up many of the older monuments and important places on Cranborne Chase. More than

this, the Cursus created a series of engagements with the past that invoked particular emotional and mnemonic responses from people. These allowed people to create and agree shared narratives around a past that was not merely history but a resource to be worked with and encountered on a daily basis. Peterborough Ware, and the bones of wild animals (appendix 2.2.2), were specific materialities that through their production, use and deposition offered other ways of interacting with the past. Landscape too offered a potent materiality that could be worked with. It offered both material and metaphor (the distinction is ours not theirs) that people could re-work through shaping chalk, depositing sarsen or building a bank barrow.

At the end of the Early Neolithic monuments like Maiden Castle and Hambledon Hill were going out of use. Even the latter of these two sites had seen its last period of building by 3300 cal BC. With their departure the concerns people had around day-to-day life, around peaceful and affective living, around skilful being-in-the-world changed. Central to the causewayed enclosures, I argued, was a concern with peaceful conviviality (Overing and Passes 2000a). In their absence people needed new ways of ensuring that they came together in the right way. The gatherings that took place in the Middle Neolithic may have been on a smaller scale than those in the earlier period. Sites like Flagstones do not have the masses of animal bones deposited that Hambledon Hill does, for example, in addition to being far smaller. The normally peaceful conviviality engendered by the architecture, feasts and rituals at the older enclosures could not be so easily replicated in the smaller gatherings of the Middle Neolithic. Instead, therefore, people came together to build monuments which would, through movement, give them common access to the world, and allow similar emotions to be evoked or similar encounters with the past to be had.

Through these (still) communal efforts the landscape came to be structured in new ways. People may no longer have gathered in enclosures to exchange and maintain conviviality, but new technologies, new monuments, had emerged for this. Central to this were the increasingly common encounters with monuments and other evidence of past human behaviour. It was a desire to fit this within particular schemas of knowledge, ones that made sense to people, that led to the construction of the Alington Avenue long barrow (appendix 2.2.1) and the Dorset Cursus for example. These helped to structure people's understandings of the past and the present, and thus

of their worlds. The rhythms and choreographies, both physical and emotional, that were caught up with artful living were shaped in part by these movements and the shared view of the past they helped to create. Through these understandings identities could be performed, gatherings held and peaceful conviviality be maintained.

The themes of this thesis such as memory (and its counterpoint, forgetting), emotion, daily life, agency and identity were all continuing concerns in this period. It was not that new motivations came to the fore, that suddenly people became concerned with economics or politics or power. Rather, new ways of drawing on the things that mattered to people came about, and instead of constructing large enclosures to regulate this the past became an increasingly important resource, both at monuments and in daily life. It was this that was reworked through the building of monuments that influenced movement, and the acts of deposition of various materialities. This was by no means the sole concern, however; other things were important too, and many of the issues that were present in the last chapter around exchange and personhood continued to be important. Once again the limits of space prevent a complete discussion of the enormous complexity of people's lives. Many of these concerns continue to be important in the Late Neolithic, the period I shall turn to now, the time of the great henge monuments like Mount Pleasant and Maumbury, and the new materiality of Grooved Ware.

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[i] I do not wish, nor am I qualified, to offer in-depth scientific analysis of the process that obtained these results. Readers are recommended to examine the excellent range of papers on the subject (e.g. Montgomery *et al.* 2000; Budd *et al.* 2003).

[ii] I shall return to the possible relationships between the four people later in the chapter when I consider deposition. At that stage I will also consider whether the dietary conditions they were suffering from affected the conditions of interment.

[iii] Throughout this chapter I will refer to the Dorset Cursus either in those terms or as the Cursus (capitalised). Thus a cursus might refer to any monument of this type whilst the Cursus is a shortened form of Dorset Cursus and thus refers exclusively to that monument.

[iv] Of course, as Adrian Chadwick has pointed out (2004, 197), other very different experiences and narratives may have emerged from moving down the Cursus in the opposite direction, and the possibility of this reversal or inversion may have been central to its experience.

[v] A Mesolithic flint scatter close to the Bottlebush Down terminal may also have been noticed or encountered by people as they moved down the Cursus, hinting at even older stories, myths and relationships with the landscape (Chadwick 2004, 196).

[vi] This was only one of several enclosures constructed south of the Cursus (French *et al.* 2005, 122).

[vii] Tilley (1999) refers to the Long Bredy bank barrow as Martin's Down, but with the Martin Down associated with the end of the Dorset Cursus, that can be a little confusing. Thus I use the name Long Bredy, commonly employed in other literature (e.g. Bradley 1983; Woodward 1991a).

[viii] This in no way contradicts my suggestion that the bank barrows may have been caught up in people's guided movements and encounters with the past (appendix 2.2.1). It was the specific monuments and locations that people used to guide their movements around the landscape, not the fact that they understood them as 'built', 'constructed' or 'cultural'. Indeed a host of 'natural' features such

as rivers, trees and rocks may also have been caught up in the guided encounters with space and time that people had around this landscape. 'Natural' features certainly played a crucial part of the experience of the Dorset Cursus, for example (Tilley 1994).

[ix] It is important to point out here that the debate around the reality of this dietary change is ongoing (e.g. Milner *et al*. 2004; 2006).

[x] The burials and other deposits at Flagstones, along with the extraordinary carvings, are certainly worthy of discussion (Healy 1997; Woodward 1988). I will put these details to one side for a moment and return to them when I discuss deposition and materiality later in the chapter.

[xi] Although it is fair to say Fengate wares have a shape that is somewhat different to other Peterborough Ware styles. With its flat base it may have moved between older styles of pottery and new emergent forms (chapter 7).

[xii] The words 'more weight' are taken from Arthur Miller's The Crucible. They are reported by Elizabeth as the last words of the old man Giles as heavy stones are placed on his chest to get him to enter a plea to the court. I am not suggesting, however, that the stones at Flagstones were used in the same way!

[xiii] This is quite different from the process discussed by Bradley (2002, 42-4; cf. Küchler 1999) of remembering *by* forgetting.

[xiv] It is interesting in this context to note that the children buried in the main enclosure at Hambledon were covered in flint nodules (Healy 1997b, 284; Mercer and Healy forthcoming).

Chapter 7: Late Neolithic Dorset, 2900 – c. 2200 cal BC

Number	Name	Type
1	Conygar Hill pit ring 52118	Pit henge
2	Conygar Hill pit ring 52100	Pit henge
3	Fir Tree Field pits	Pits
4	Fir Tree Field shaft	Doline
5	Fordington Farm round barrow	Round barrow
6	Greyhound Yard henge	Henge
7	Handley 26	Round barrow
8	Handley 27	Round barrow
9	Hengistbury Head	Flint scatter
10	Kingstone Lacy round barrow	round barrow
11	Knowlton Rings	Henge
12	Maumbury Rings	Henge
13	Middle Farm	Pits
14	Mount Pleasant	Henge
15	Poundbury	Pits
16	Thomas Hardye school	Pits and round barrows
17	Tolpuddle Ball	Pit
18	Wyke Down 1	Pit henge
19	Wyke Down 2	Pit henge

Figure 7.1: Map of Late Neolithic sites in Dorset discussed in this chapter.

Introduction

The period between 2900 and 2200 cal BC, the Late Neolithic, has often been portrayed as a very different world from earlier times. If the Early Neolithic represented one revolution from hunting and gathering to farming, the Late Neolithic has been seen as representing another. On the one hand there was the emergence of a much more diverse material culture, with complex arrowheads, knives, mace heads, Beakers, jet belt sliders and others often being taken to represent a 'prestige goods economy' (Harding 2003, 109; Thorpe and C. Richards 1984). This is often associated with the emergence of round barrows, the so-called single burial tradition, as these new, exclusive, forms of material culture are often found as 'grave goods'. On the other hand the Late Neolithic is famous for Grooved Ware and the great henge monuments. In Dorset these included, but are not limited to, the enclosures at Mount Pleasant, Maumbury Rings and the Dorchester timber monument (henceforth called Greyhound Yard). These new forms of monument, material and practice have been interpreted in various ways. They have been seen collectively as evidence for the emergence of powerful chiefdoms (e.g. Renfrew 1973), or as two sides of a competing battle for the hearts and minds of Late Neolithic Britain (Harding 2003). Hierarchy, power and dominance in its various forms have been central to almost all

accounts of the Late Neolithic (e.g. Barrett 1994; Thomas 1996; Renfrew 1973; but see Whittle 1997b for a contrasting view). In contrast within this chapter I want to argue that henges were in fact intimately linked with the *defeat* of hierarchy (A. Weiner 1992, chapter 4).

Let me be clear here. I am not suggesting that during the Late Neolithic, or indeed at any point that people existed in an egalitarian utopia with no variation in access to resources, power or prestige. Differences in age, experience and skill would have constantly resulted in differential power relationships between people. The ability to gather and organise people together certainly existed, but as Whittle has shown, this does not require the existence of a politically dominant figure, situated in a permanent hierarchy (1997b, 147-9). There is no evidence for inequalities in life or death which might suggest the existence of chiefs or big men. Of course it is impossible to be absolute about this, but forms of leadership based on charisma, oratory and consent seem to me far more likely to have been in place during the Late Neolithic (Gregor 1977; Overing 2000; Whittle 1997b). It is these forms of leadership that exist amongst the small-scale socialities of the Mehinaku (Gregor 1977) and the Piaroa (Overing 2000), and these analogies seem to fit better with the evidence from Neolithic Dorset. Neither being egalitarian nor ranked is *natural* (Bender 1978; Chadwick 2004, 183); both are the outcome of particular social processes. Henges, rather than offering opportunities for people to come forward and claim authority, placed persons under the watchful eye of the community, and prevented them, through physical, emotional and moral pressure, from achieving or maintaining power.

The defeat of hierarchy represents only one of several themes that will be pursued in this chapter. Familiar considerations of emotion, identity, memory and personhood will once again be to the fore, analysed through the three lenses of movement, materiality and deposition. Other themes central to this analysis will be the authentication of inalienable possessions, the ways in which the world was shaped through memory and emotion, and the centrality of community to the Late Neolithic of Dorset. Within this chapter I also want to offer a slightly different kind of engagement with the evidence. I will still move through the themes of movement, materiality and deposition, but here I wish to offer slightly broader, more encompassing, narratives than in the previous two chapters. As a result the style of

this chapter is slightly different to the previous two, and a different level of understanding will therefore emerge.

Movement in the Late Neolithic

There are three aspects of movement in the Late Neolithic that I wish to address. The first will begin by focusing on daily lives and movements. People began to spend more time on Cranborne Chase in this period, and it is worth taking a moment to consider the consequences of such an act. In particular I want to consider how people began to dwell across a landscape they had previously encountered in very specific ways. In the second section I will begin to explore the architecture of henges and their interrelation with movement and human bodies. Concentrating on Mount Pleasant I will argue that on occasion the henge monument offered the opportunity for the community to engage critically with its constituent parts. These would have included the times when the community gathered together to alter the site, as it did when the palisade was constructed (appendix 2.3.2). Thus at certain times organised activities would have taken place, at other times, perhaps most of the time, however, Mount Pleasant was the scene of ad hoc celebrations and rituals involving feasting and deposition that renewed and restored people's ties with convivial community. Finally, having discussed Mount Pleasant I will then set it in the context of the other nearby large henge monuments, to consider the role of movement between each of these.

Pastures of the past: Movement, dwelling and daily life in the Late Neolithic

By the Late Neolithic the landscape of Dorset was becoming increasingly open (French *et al.* 2003; Gale 2003). Although some tracts of woodland may have remained, sites such as Wyke Down, Conygar Hill, Mount Pleasant, and the henges at Knowlton were all constructed in clear grassland (French *et al.* 2003, 229; Gale 2003; Healy 1997c, 52). Despite this the rhythms of people's day-to-day life may have remained much the same. Animals still played a vital part in the community with cattle, sheep, goat and pig continuing to do much to influence the way people moved around the landscape. The importance of pigs at henge monuments has often been discussed, and there is some evidence that they were more important in this period than previously. Nevertheless, as Legge (1991, 65) has argued, their occurrence at

henge monuments, and in structured deposition, may have over-played their importance as a food stuff, if not as a symbolic resource[i]. It is certainly the case that cattle remained important and they dominate at certain sites, notably Wyke Down 1 (Legge 1991, 56). There is also little evidence in the Late Neolithic for any kind of 'settling down' or permanent occupation of any one place. Although there is evidence for two structures on Cranborne Chase, these do not appear to be 'houses' in any conventional sense of the word (M. Green 2000)[ii]. At Poundbury the pits appear to be too dispersed to represent a single settlement, and instead more likely represent the repeated visits of a group of people (Sparey Green 1987, 143). Thus it appears that life remained relatively mobile in this period. Again, however, there is no need to posit a one-size-fits-all model (Whittle 1997a; 2003). Perhaps the increased number of pigs meant that more people spent longer periods of time making similar movements. Grigson (1999, 230) has argued that pigs are more or less impossible to herd around the landscape, and whether or not this is true, they certainly would not have moved at the same speed as cattle. Wild animals too, particularly deer, continued to be hunted and consumed in this period.

At one level, then, the choreography of community would have been remarkably similar with people herding animals, moving around the landscape and making and exchanging stone tools, pots and people. At another level, however, there were striking differences, not necessarily in how people lived, but *where* people lived. Within communities whose involvement with the landscape was central to their lives, such changes were extremely important. There is evidence in particular that people began to dwell in significant numbers on Cranborne Chase for the first time (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 59), and also evidence that Hengistbury Head began to be occupied in this period (Cunliffe 1987; Gardiner 1987)[iii]. The former of these areas is of particular interest. I argued in the last chapter that people were concerned, in the Middle Neolithic, with moving around Cranborne Chase in particular and controlled fashions. Now in the Late Neolithic people began to live all over the Chase, and must have encountered the Dorset Cursus from all sorts of angles. This should not be taken to suggest that the Cursus was no longer important, however. It continued to exert influence over people's engagement with the landscape. Its effects on the way people moved and engaged with the landscape were of a different form now. In this period Cranborne Chase formed part of the rhythms and tempos of *everyday* life on a regular

basis, not just as a place where the stories and myths about the past could be encountered and recalled.

Reclaiming the past: the move to Cranborne Chase

In the Middle Neolithic Cranborne Chase was dominated by the Dorset Cursus and perhaps the ways in which the architecture of that monument led people to controlled encounters with their past where memories and emotions could returned involuntarily (cf. Harrison 2004; chapter 6). In the Late Neolithic people engaged with the landscape in a quite different manner. Nearly three times as many Late Neolithic transverse arrowheads have been found on the Chase compared to Early Neolithic leaf shaped ones (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 60). Indeed the evidence from flint scatters shows that, particularly on the clay-with-flints soil to the north of the Cursus, there was a marked increase in people living on the Chase in this period. Cranborne Chase now formed part of quotidian movement. People were moving over and through the past on a day-to-day basis. Rather than only a single narrative of encounter, multiple ways of engaging with the past opened up to people. They could approach long barrows, topographic features, or indeed the Cursus itself, from multiple directions. The pieces of the past could be fitted together into any order, any structure, whereas before they had formed part of a closed and fixed series of encounters.

People were not only engaging with the past by moving around this landscape in new ways, however. All the Late Neolithic flint scatters from the clay-with-flints include a Mesolithic component (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 62). This, it is suggested, represents 'the reuse of particularly favourable areas which had experienced a phase of clearance and partial regeneration' (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 62). Whilst this may be correct it fails to explain why these areas were not exploited in the intervening Early and Middle Neolithic periods. It also seems increasingly unlikely in view of the more open appearance of the Chase since Mesolithic times (French *et al.* 2003; 2005). If my argument is accepted, however, that the construction of long barrows, and particularly the Cursus created a landscape in which encounters with the past were controlled, then it is not surprising that people avoided other areas they had previously occupied. I am not suggesting that people returned to the clay-with-flints in the Late Neolithic because they remembered that they had previously occupied that area in the Mesolithic, though myth and legend may have persisted over time. Rather the people

of the Late Neolithic would be highly skilled at understanding their landscapes, recognising how human activity may have affected it over many years and at seeing and engaging with flint scatters of much older periods. By returning to the clay-with-flints, people chose deliberately to engage with the evidence of former occupation. By dwelling on Cranborne Chase they engaged with the past in a much more diverse fashion; the control of the Middle Neolithic had begun to fade.

Part of the social drama of daily life was therefore performed against a powerful backdrop of resonance with the past. As Ingold has argued, landscape offers those who dwell through it a series of affordances (2000; cf. Gibson 1979). These affordances can be natural resources, sources of food, water or clay. Equally, however, they can be the traces of past acts of dwelling, the signs left by previous acts of occupation, and the shapes and textures left by performative practices of past generations. By engaging with Cranborne Chase on a daily basis new kinds of choreography emerged in the Late Neolithic. These continued to draw on the Cursus, however, on the affordances of the past, as it affected how people moved and dwelt upon the Chase. Rather than acting as conduit for movement, it now acted as a permeable barrier separating the uplands and the lowlands (Barrett 1994, 138). People, perhaps seasonally, would have moved between these areas, no longer just for short periods for ceremonies and monument construction, but to dwell on the Chase in significant numbers. The Cursus also had a more local effect on the way people lived and the items they deposited on the Chase. The flint scatters closer to the Cursus are smaller than those found on the clay-with-flints with two exceptions, the Chalk Pit Field scatter I briefly touched on in the last chapter, and one at Fir Tree Field that I shall return to later (Barrett et al. 1991, 64). The range of tool types was also smaller in the scatters near the Cursus, with an increase in the proportion of polished flint tools, imported stone axes, fragments of macehead and plano-convex knives (Barrett et al. 1991, 64). So it appears that people were behaving in different ways when near the Cursus, moving perhaps in smaller groups, leaving fewer signs of their visit, but ensuring that important objects were deposited there.

Thus in the Late Neolithic people came to dwell *through* the past as part of the rhythmic choreography of community (W. James 2003). Rather than engaging with it on special occasions, it became part of people's lives on a daily basis. New rhythms

of memory were caught up in this. People were reclaiming the past from dominant narratives and into mainstream experience. They still recognised the importance of both the Dorset Cursus but they now engaged with it in different ways. As Harrison has shown, movement and engagement with the past can cause memories to be recalled involuntarily (2004). New kinds of movement, especially over a potent landscape like Cranborne Chase, would lead to different acts of remembering, other memories being recalled. People may still have moved in similar ways on a daily basis, but they moved in different places. They now dwelt on Cranborne Chase in a quite different fashion. What stimulated these changes? I argued in the last chapter that Peterborough Ware was a technology that referenced the past through its shape and through its deposition. It acted as a technology that brought the past into people's lives on a daily basis. As people began to work the past directly through its materiality, this could have been a direct challenge to the narratives which the Dorset Cursus evoked. It is not surprising therefore that it is after the introduction of Peterborough Ware that people come to live on the Chase in these new ways. In the Late Neolithic people began to emphasise a form of conviviality that included the past as part of something they could work with, engage with and play with on a daily basis. New notions of the relationship the broader community had with their history may have come to the fore and these altered the kinds of movements people made and the kinds of practices they performed. The affordances offered by the landscape were engaged with in new ways through new forms of materiality and new acts of deposition. I will return to these latter practices below.

Movement through Mount Pleasant

By using their bodies to engage with landscape in new ways people began to challenge claims to knowledge, and alter their access to the past. Alongside this a series of extensive communal projects were undertaken across the Dorset landscape. These included the construction of an enormous henge at Mount Pleasant (Wainwright 1979) and other large enclosures at Maumbury Rings (Bradley 1975) and Knowlton (Gale 2003; appendix 2.3.3). In addition to this a huge ring of massive oak posts was erected at Greyhound Yard (Woodward et al. 1993). These massive undertakings created a series of arenas for performance where the community as a whole could witness, authorise and acknowledge what was taking place. Each of these sites worked in different ways, however, and we should not view them as identical.

The act of constructing these monuments would have been of vital importance (appendix 2.3.1). The coming together and intimate movement of bodies would have played a crucial role in creating emotional and memorable attachments to the monuments. As has been argued for the Early Neolithic, these acts of construction would have helped form a sense of identity as well as shape the associations that the monument would have had for people in the future. Additionally after they were constructed the monuments affected how people could move through a site and experience different parts of it through their bodies. Such an argument is not new in itself (e.g. Barrett 1994; Thomas 1996). What I want to argue, however, is that the architecture of the sites also gave particular prominence to those who remained still. It was the presence of a watching, only half-included audience, which set the social stage. Their performance, their agency, needs to be considered as much as that of the people who played a more active role at these monuments.

Figure 7.2 Plan of Mount Pleasant (after Wainwright 1979, 36, fig. 20).

If movement of bodies and materials in the construction of henges helped to create and reinforce notions of identity and link people, emotionally and physically, to a

monument, then it was in the movements of people through henges that power could be exerted, not necessarily by them, but by the watching others. Such power drew explicitly on the memories of building these monuments. Even for those not alive at the time, the social aspect of memory would have lent the locations force which they would not otherwise have had (cf. chapter 4 and Bloch 1998). The dynamic between those people watching and those people moving at sites like Mount Pleasant, Knowlton or Maumbury was crucial to the way the dynamics of community played out, both in terms of the power to act and the power to influence how others acted. It was the three-way relationship between the monument, the people acting and those watching that created these dynamics. I want to suggest that previous explanations have concentrated power in the hands of particular people within henge enclosures. In contrast to this I want to suggest that the nature of the architecture and the events that took place were such that power was in fact placed in the hands of the many, and this prevented a permanent hierarchy from being created. Community here may have been recognised as performative, that is, it had to be cited and recited for it to exist. In order to examine this I will now discuss Mount Pleasant in more detail, and examine how the dynamics of community may have been at play.

The sequence

The sequence of construction at Mount Pleasant is far from clear, and I will not attempt to resolve all the questions that surround it here[iv]. The henge itself is made up of an enormous bank and ditch, 320 metres by 370 metres, with at least *five* entrances (Barber 2004; *contra* Wainwright 1979). In addition to this a post setting and enclosure ditch, known as Site IV, were constructed in the middle part of the henge, situated so that the entrance through the ditch was at the highest point of the hill (Thomas 1996, 197; fig. 7.2). It has recently been suggested that Site IV may predate the construction of the main enclosure (Davies *et al.* 2002, 191), and Barrett (1994, 101) has argued that the digging of the ditch around Site IV may have occurred after the construction of the timber setting. Such a sequence is, of course, largely speculative and the absence of reliable radiocarbon dates and stratigraphic relationships makes any firm statement foolhardy. The Conquer Barrow may well have been built before the henge itself, though Wainwright felt it post-dated the monument (1979, 65). Yet such a sequence does fit the facts as we know them, and provides the basis for an analysis of the development of Mount Pleasant.

Phase 1a	Date cal BC 1 sigma	Date cal BC 2 sigma	Problems
Conquer Barrow	2863-2507	2876-2480	Possibly residual
Enclosure bank and ditch	2862-2494	2881-2460	none
Site IV wood settings	No direct dates		
Phase 1b			
Site IV stone settings	Shortly after wooden posts?		No direct dates
Site IV ditch	2606-2458	2869-2290	Curated material?
Phase 2a			
Destruction of the cove	2131-1921	2192-1828	Related to construction?
Construction of the palisade	2130-1961	2173-1902	None
Phase 2b			
Destruction of the palisade	Shortly after construction?		No direct dates

Figure 7.3: Possible sequence of development at Mount Pleasant (after Wainwright 1979; Woodward 1991a).

Site IV is a post setting made up of some five rings with an outer diameter of 38 metres, and an inner diameter of 12.5 metres (Wainwright 1979, 9; fig. 7.4). The rings are divided by four corridors into quadrants, thus leaving access to the centre from the cardinal points (Wainwright 1979, 11). The southern of these corridors was blocked, however, by a single post at the northern end. A possible later phase at Site IV was made up of a stone cove and a series of pits. The excavator, Geoffrey Wainwright believed these represented a separate second phase of the monument (1979). Josh Pollard has argued, however, that the stone settings are in fact more likely to be contemporary with their wooden counterparts (1992, 218-9). The stone settings are made up of a central stone cove consisting of four sarsens, with definite outliers to the north and west, and a possible one to the east (Wainwright 1979, 28). Wainwright argued that the construction of the stone cove could be dated to around 2000 cal BC, contemporary with the construction of the palisade[v] (appendix 2.3.2). The evidence for this came from the Site IV ditch where some 300 lbs of sarsen and a number stone mauls were located, associated with an episode of burning (Wainwright 1979, 28).

This deposit, Wainwright argued, was produced in the construction of the cove (1979, 28).

Figure 7.4: Site IV at Mount Pleasant (after Wainwright 1979, facing page 10, fig. 5).

Pollard interprets this differently, pointing out that the post holes and stone holes never intercut (1992, 220). The gap between the construction of the wooden elements of Site IV and the stone cove is estimated to be around 500 years according to Wainwright (1979), on the basis of both artefactual evidence and radiocarbon dates. Pollard argues that it is unlikely that any traces of the posts would have survived by this point (1992). He thus concludes that the episode of burning, associated with sarsen flakes and stone mauls that Wainwright uses to date the construction of the stone cove in fact relates to its *destruction* (1992, 220). The use of heat is commonly part of the process used to break up monoliths, and some of the sarsen fragments were exposed to extreme temperatures (Wainwright 1979, 163). This suggestion can be further supported, as Thomas has noted (1996, 214), by the fact the 'construction'

phase produced some 300lbs of sarsen flakes, whilst Wainwright's postulated 'destruction' phase, sometime in the Iron Age produced only 45lbs of sarsen (Wainwright 1979, 31). As Thomas (1996) has pointed out it is difficult to be absolute in choosing between these two competing models. He instead selects a path midway through the two models, arguing that although the stone cove post dates the wooden structure, this may not be by as much as Wainwright suggests (Thomas 1996, 214). It is impossible to be too rigid about this; the evidence does not support a certain conclusion either way, but I find Pollard's arguments convincing, and they suggest to me the possible model for Mount Pleasant summarised in figure 1[vi]. The destruction of the cove in this model, around 2000 cal BC coincides with the construction of the palisade[vii]. This then seems to be a moment of significant renewal at Mount Pleasant, and one I return to in appendix 2.3.2.

Movement, bodies, hierarchy

Julian Thomas has argued persuasively that the movement of human bodies was central to the experience of Site IV (1996). In particular he argues that there were correct ways of moving through the enclosure which involved entering the post setting from the north, then circling around to the left between the outer rings to the four corridors (Thomas 1996, 199). This controlled movement was enhanced by the addition (if that is what it was) of the bank, which would have helped to hide the movements of bodies and ceremonies going on among the post settings. Thomas also argues that the later addition of the stone cove at Site IV, and the digging of the pits associated with this, reinforced this sequence of movement (1996, 214). The posts and stone settings, Thomas argues, would have been enhanced by the topographic setting of Mount Pleasant which meant that from the north entrance of the henge only the entrance to Site IV could be seen (1996, 197). Indeed he argues that 'the convex surface of Mount Pleasant and the bank and ditch of Site IV suggest areas to which access was restricted, and whose contents were intended to be obscured' (Thomas 1996, 197). Thomas develops this argument to conclude that 'monuments like Mount Pleasant may have been instrumental in the creation of specific interest groups within later Neolithic society' (1996, 203).

This conclusion clearly differs from my stated opinion that henges were central to the *defeat* of hierarchy rather than its construction, and although Thomas offers a series of

caveats, it is difficult to separate his conclusions from those of Barrett who argues that ceremonial enclosures 'contributed towards the construction of a ritual elite, who at certain moments may have spoken and acted on behalf of the wider community' (1994, 105). This conclusion has been reached, I would argue, because too much emphasis has been placed within accounts like Thomas' (1996) on vision[viii] and visibility (cf. Lefebvre 1996; J. Moran 2005). He argues that people could not have *seen* what took place in Site IV and those people outside the main bank could not have *seen* into the monument at all, and this would have acted to restrict knowledge and create difference. It also suggests a rather static picture of 'ritual' at Mount Pleasant, with a passive and excluded audience, straining to see into a secretive centre.

I want to suggest that this misses the full impact of how people and architecture interacted at a site like Mount Pleasant. Although the details of certain acts of deposition across the monument (Thomas 1996 200-5), or the moments of performance in Site IV, would indeed have been invisible to the majority of people within the enclosure, this would not have acted to create differentials in power or knowledge. The emphasis on the visual, in this account, denies the importance of other senses, of hearing what was going on, of smelling the different meats that may have been consumed, as beef, rather than the pork, dominated at Site IV in contrast to the rest of Mount Pleasant. Equally the architecture constructed, perhaps first around Site IV and then the henge itself, was not an architecture of exclusion. The creation of the huge banks created a vast area where people could stand, sit or lie to view, listen and absorb what was going on in the henge (Gray 1934, 161). They may have been separated from the performances going on inside the henge by the great ditch, but this separation was not one of inside and outside, of us and them. Instead we should think much more of the people collectively as acting as a singular social person. So it was that this dividually centred social person took its place around the banks of the henge monuments and observed, commented and critiqued the performances that were made by parts of that same person inside the henge. The architecture of Mount Pleasant created an arena for performance, even if parts of that performance were sometimes hidden.

Accounts of power and exclusion also miss much of the possible spontaneous nature of the events going on around Mount Pleasant. People may not have been able to see into the centre of Site IV or the depths of the ditches, partly because not everyone was looking. Instead we can think more profitably, I suggest, of multiple activities taking place at the same time. There may have been acts of deposition, in the main ditches, of antler, chalk balls and pottery occurring at the same time as rites of passage through henge entrances, or movement through Site IV. Senses of convivial community may have been produced through a somewhat chaotic choreography, an interweaving of encounter and co-presence where people perceived that their expectations were being met in general and not in detail (Giddens 1984; Goffman 1963). Thus the variations in the broader patterns of deposition that Brück (2001, 660) has identified can be explained. Brück identifies how that range of artefacts deposited in the ditch by the north entrance reveals how 'it is likely that, even over the course of one year, this part of the enclosure may have seen a whole range of different activities (2001, 660). As she argues, 'the transformation of space at Mount Pleasant resolves itself into multiple small-scale depositional activities, often in a continuous stream over long periods of time' (Brück 2001, 660). That these on-going, small-scale, series of actions took place is also suggested by the re-growth of trees at Mount Pleasant after its initial construction (J. Evans and H. Jones 1979, 209). This suggests that perhaps even large-scale gatherings were more interested in particular events such as feasting than in re-clearing any emergent trees.

Organised or ad hoc? Practice at Mount Pleasant

There may have been two different forms of practice in play at Mount Pleasant, therefore. At times the henge may have been characterised by multiple small-scale acts of performance, which whilst structured by similar concerns, were by no means identical. At different times people may have moved into and out of Site IV, depositing items in the ditches on their way round. At the lowest levels these deposits included both Grooved Ware and Early Neolithic forms of pottery, suggesting that much older material was still preserved in some form (Bradley 2000, 128)[ix]. People were perhaps referencing the past here, drawing on a sense of community that was seen to reach back beyond their own life times. Elsewhere people deposited red deer bone in the primary fills of the main enclosure ditch (Wainwright 1979, 31), referencing other places where deer might be found, and other concerns over the roles

of animals in people's lives and perhaps the ways in which substances flowed through the world (appendix 2.2.2). Other events were also taking place. A series of stakeholes were dug in the main enclosure ditch suggesting that temporary shelters may have been erected whilst particular events took place there (Wainwright 1979, 44)[x]. People were slaughtering cattle within the enclosure whilst pigs were killed outside and their joints of meat then brought within the enclosure to be consumed (Thomas 1996, 205)[xi]. I want to suggest that the feasting, deposition, courting and drinking were ongoing, performative, acts, perhaps over days at a time, in the production of community. As community was produced and cited so the acts of deposition around the site helped to texture people's engagements with the monument. The placing of pottery and stone tools in the ditch not only acted as part of the process of renewing the community and the site, it also allowed people to associate certain parts of the site with particular memories and emotions, ones that may have been locked into the items they deposited. These are not the kinds of activities over which particular people have control, rather they are the sort that the community as a whole keeps an eye on, that form part of a set of broad, monitored, activities, which are acceptable within certain locales, certain fields of action (Bourdieu 1990). This is not to say that there were not certain moments when another form of practice dominated, where people stood, watched and remained silent rather than taking an active part. These would be more occasional, however, I believe, and even here it may still have been the role of the community to judge the actions of the participants rather than vice versa.

In these temporary moments of clarity henges may have stood, cosmologically, for the world itself (Bradley 1998; C. Richards 1996; Watson 2004) and people would be included within that world. Their presence, spoken or unspoken, would have created huge moral, physical and emotional pressure upon people within places like Site IV to act in the proper way. There was moral pressure, in that people were expected to behave in a certain way. There was physical pressure, in that being surrounded by people would inevitably create somatic tension, and emotional pressure in the sense that powerful emotions like shame and guilt may have been at play for those who failed to meet the aesthetics of conviviality (Battaglia 1990; Overing and Passes 2000a). It was not a case that these people could be deceived by what they could not see, in other words that the hidden nature of Site IV disguised what took place there.

The power of the rites and rituals may have *depended* on the acclamation of those watching. This is not to say that people within the monument were at the mercy of those who watched; they could still have exerted much agency in terms of what was exchanged, displayed or deposited but they operated within the bounds set down by those who watched. Thus the power, far from being in the hands of a specialised few, in fact lay at the feet of the community.

This should not prevent us from stressing the importance of variations in who witnessed what. Just as at Hambledon Hill in the Early Neolithic, or Monkton Up Wimborne in the Middle Neolithic certain people would have led and spoken whilst others followed and remained silent. Such differences may have been based in, and productive of, different aspects of identity. The ways of moving around the monument, and around Site IV in particular, would have undoubtedly been important. It was important because the ways bodies had moved together had always been important in the Neolithic; it was not because of new esoteric and powerful knowledge. Any experience of Mount Pleasant would involve for any one person a multiplicity of encounters, experiences and engagements. Different rhythms would be at play across the site and people would experience them differently. Certain social bonds might be emphasised through acts of deposition, through the placing of a polished stone axe in the east terminal of the ditch by the north entrance for example (Wainwright 1979, 44). As A. Strathern and Stewart (1999) have shown, people can have very different opinions and understandings of what is taking place in front of them. Acts of feasting involve complex decisions over who gets which cut of the meat and who provides the meat in the first place. People may have taken the opportunity of the gathering to settle long standing disputes over resources, insults, and previous confrontations. Crucially, however, whilst certain people may have been turned to help adjudicate such disputes their power was not *legitimated* by their skills in oratory, or their possession of certain items or esoteric knowledges, though it may have been *facilitated* by both. Instead their power was legitimated by the consent of those watching, by those who had built the great monument, and those who came after. Thus long-term hierarchy could be defeated through the way bodies, objects and architecture came together at Mount Pleasant.

Henges in the landscape: movements through meaning

The close proximity of monuments at the henge complex at Knowlton (appendix 2.3.3), just of Cranborne Chase, means that the temptation to treat that site as a complex is overwhelming, particularly in the absence of detail from any large-scale investigations. Mount Pleasant too was set in relation to other monuments, both contemporary and older, and it is important at this stage that I lay out the association between it and the two other large Late Neolithic monuments in the area, Greyhound Yard and Maumbury Rings.

Relationships certainly existed between the three monuments. Only a kilometre and a half separates both Greyhound Yard and Maumbury Rings from Mount Pleasant, and the former are only 600 or so metres from each other. Indeed the probable entrance to Greyhound Yard faces south towards Maumbury Rings, a monument whose exit in turn faces north towards the timber monument (Bradley 1975; Woodward *et al.* 1993). Mount Pleasant as I have noted has five entrances, and one of those faces along the Alington Ridge towards Maumbury Rings whilst the one to the north connects it to the Frome River which runs close to Greyhound Yard[xii]. It is difficult to believe that these three monuments, all roughly contemporary and built between 2900 and 2500 cal BC, were constructed by three separate groups (Davies *et al.* 2002, 186[xiii]; figs 7.5 and 7.6). Instead it may be better to approach them as three separate, but interlinked, monuments. It was not only these monuments that were drawn into this complex interlinkage, however. Moving from Maumbury Rings to Mount Pleasant would have involved travelling past both the Alington Avenue long barrow and the Flagstones enclosure. In appendix 2.2.1 I argue that these two monuments formed part of a physical guide that led people around the landscape of this part of Dorset, and encouraged them to engage with their pasts in particular ways. In the Late Neolithic it appears that this route was still important, but that its importance was now transformed. The past was taken up and used as a medium to connect these new enclosures.

Figure 7.5: Sites around Mount Pleasant (after Davies *et al.* 2002, 191, fig. 89).

Site	Date of construction
Mount Pleasant	2900-2450
Greyhound Yard	2890-2340
Maumbury Rings	2858-2300
Fordington Farm round barrow	2460-1970
Alington Avenue round barrow	2580-1920

Figure 7.6: Table of dates for construction of monuments on the Alington Ridge (after Bellamy 1991; Bradley 1975; Davies *et al.* 2002; Wainwright 1979; Woodward *et al.* 1993).

People would have moved between the two great henges and in doing so would have traversed an ancient past, their movements guided by the monuments. It was no longer the encounters with these monuments themselves that was the purpose of such movements, however, instead it was the arrival at the henge monuments. In this context it is no surprise that Site IV is set on direct alignment with the Alington Avenue long barrow and the Flagstones enclosure (Davies *et al.* 2002). The older monuments would still have stimulated memories and emotions in people; moving past them would indeed have been the physical embodiment of memory (Campbell 2006; appendix 2.2.1), but the memories and emotions themselves no longer held the power they once did. The ridge itself though may have continued to hold meaning, imbued in part from these monuments, but perhaps more from its place as part a long history of seasonal movements. We should not privilege the cultural over the natural; that is our distinction not theirs. Alongside these affordances new monuments were constructed along the ridge towards the end of the Neolithic. A double round barrow was built on the end of the Alington Avenue long barrow, containing at least three burials, and another was built at Fordington Farm (Bellamy 1991; Davies *et al.* 2002; appendix 2.3.6). The former of these dates to 2580-1920 cal BC and the latter to 2460-1970 cal BC (Davies *et al.* 2002, 32). These were thus constructed at the very end of the Neolithic, probably before the palisade was built at Mount Pleasant. Part of the act of moving between these sites thus involved engaging not only with much older monuments, but also with more recent acts of building and deposition. These too would carry particular emotional and mnemonic connotations helping to shape and texture the acts of movement from one place to the next.

Where does Greyhound Yard fit in with this? Again we find a slightly different state of affairs here. The different performances that took place at this enclosure meant that other concerns were at play. Crucially there is no architecture at Greyhound Yard that separated people into different groups (see appendix 2.3.1 for details), into those who performed and those who watched, or those that led and those that followed. Thus Greyhound Yard may have been the place where the ceremonies at Maumbury or Mount Pleasant began and ended. It was here that people, undivided, undistinguished from one another could gather, feast, socialise, gossip, joke and play. In this place where the powerful forests from where different groups may have placed their origins came together, people could begin and end ceremonies that took place at Maumbury and Mount Pleasant. The river connected Greyhound Yard to the latter, and its entrance connected it to the former. Thus Greyhound Yard offered a different yet still connected and important place, where the architecture acted to bring people together and emphasise the need for living the good/beautiful life (cf. Overing and Passes 2000c).

Each of the three monuments was interlinked with one another and movement between them was undoubtedly an important part of how they were experienced. Each monument also emphasised different aspects of community. Greyhound Yard stressed the undivided nature of sociality, whilst the architectures of both Mount Pleasant and Maumbury Rings allowed, at times, particular people to be separated off from the broader community whether to exchange objects, take part in ceremonies or engage in rites of passage. At certain times all three sites must have emphasised community as a single agent, acting in concert to dig ditches or erect palisades. At Mount Pleasant, perhaps most of the time, people acted in improvised ways, breaking off from feasts and ceremonies to walk the banks, or deposit items in ditches. Community was produced through actions in concert and actions alone. The former connected people together directly while the latter allowed people to stress their own connections to the broader community. I will examine later how different forms of material culture were caught up in these different kinds of engagement. The power of community was certainly central at all three monuments, and, I suggest, central to how permanent hierarchies may have been defeated.

Conclusion: Bringing movement together

Movement in the Late Neolithic led people to engage with their past in different ways. People began to dwell on Cranborne Chase in much more significant numbers, and much of that took place on the clay-with-flints, which may have revealed traces of occupation from thousands of years earlier. This landscape, which previously people had been concerned to engage with in very specific ways, was now approached from all angles. New rhythms of memory and community were being created, cited and lived through. Although the Cursus clearly continued to play a part in the way that landscape was organised (Barrett *et al.* 1991), it no longer acted to create specific encounters between people and their past. Instead people interacted with their past in new ways, both creating new narratives and remembering older stories and myths in new ways. The movement of bodies was also central to the ways in which people engaged with each other in building henge monuments (see appendix 2.3.1). The numbers of people working together here must have been extraordinary, and multiple identities would have been at play.

Movement was also crucial once the henges had been built, however. It was here that the interplay of people over the banks and through entrances took part in the renewal of community. At certain moments too the architecture of henge monuments would allow the greater portion of the community to watch and pass judgment on the acts of others. Although the architecture of sites like Mount Pleasant created hidden spots, notably at Site IV, the architecture interwove with the human bodies on its banks to place enormous moral, physical and emotional pressure on those inside. At other times, however, Mount Pleasant in particular encouraged impromptu engagements, acts of feasting and deposition, both inside and outside the henge, that celebrated the convivial nature of sociality, the eclectic mix of people who have gathered to create and modify the henge, and the enduring ties that bound them together. These sites did not offer an opportunity for hierarchy to emerge (*contra* Barrett 1994) nor were they the outcome of hierarchies (*contra* Renfrew 1973). Instead they were the outcome of a social process which emphasised the role of community. The architecture of the henges was a technology that defeated hierarchy rather than created it, and the movement of bodies was central to that.

Materiality in the Late Neolithic

Introduction

In this section of the chapter I want to examine two forms of Late Neolithic materiality, Grooved Ware and Beakers. I will begin by looking at Grooved Ware which, I argue, was tightly bound in with the creation and citation of community, and this is one of the reasons why henge monuments and Grooved Ware are so often associated. Grooved Ware, I will suggest, played into a permeable view of personhood, and connected the wider community through the flows of substances it could contain and embody. Once the arguments around Grooved Ware have been developed I will contrast this with the role of Beakers after 2500 cal BC. Beakers, I will suggest, acted as one example of inalienable possessions in this period. Inalienable possessions were important throughout the Neolithic but took on particular roles during the third millennium. I will suggest that the authentication of inalienable possessions may have taken place at henge monuments in this period and were caught up with citations of personhood, community and identity that had real affective consequences. I will also suggest that the power to authenticate inalienable possession was also located within the community, and this was one way in which hierarchy was defeated. Building on these discussions, and those in appendices 2.3.5 and 2.3.6, I will suggest that the power which Beakers had to provoke emotional reactions, to change people's identities and to affect the way people experienced particular places allows us to view them as agents in their own right (Gosden 2005).

Grooved Ware: potent pottery

Figure 7.7: Grooved Ware pottery (after Thomas 1999a, 113, fig. 5.12).

Pottery chronology

Figure 7.8: Graph showing the overlapping chronologies of pottery styles in the third millennium.

Grooved Ware was a new form of pottery that first appears in Dorset around 2900 cal BC (Cleal 1999; Thomas 1999a; fig. 7.8). Traditionally the material from Southern Britain has been divided into three style categories, Clacton, Woodlands and Durrington Walls. Cleal (1999, 2) argues, however, that in fact there are two categories, a broad one consisting of both Clacton and Woodlands and another featuring pots of the Durrington Walls type. This is by no means universally accepted, and Thomas has argued that the Woodlands style is quite distinctive, pointing out that it has not been found at any major English henge (1999a, 120). The association with henges is crucial, of course, to how archaeologists have come to understand Grooved Ware, as the two appeared at approximately the same time, and Grooved Ware was often deposited at henges, including those in the study area such as Mount Pleasant (Wainwright 1979). Grooved Ware was significantly different in form and decoration to older kinds of pottery. It featured different fabrics, including extensive use of grog and shell as temper, it was different in shape, being flat bottomed, tall and thin, and it was often much larger in volume than earlier forms of pottery (Thomas 1999a, 113-4). This last facet has often been associated with Grooved Ware's use at henge

monuments to argue that they played a crucial role in feasting. The decoration was also remarkably different, featuring grooves, lozenges, cordons, finger nail impressions and many others (Cleal 1999; Thomas 1999a). This decoration has been described by Thomas as a '"grammar" which allowed the articulation of difference between places and practices without necessarily labelling any one with a specific material signifier' (1999a, 117). Certainly the evidence from Mount Pleasant supports this, where Thomas has traced in detail the variations in decoration on Grooved Ware across the site (1996, 200-2). In the east terminal of the ditch by the northern entrance, the Grooved Ware was dominated by many undecorated or simply decorated vessels (Thomas 1996, 202). In comparison Site IV has a much higher percentage of pots with herringbone and diagonal incisions and more complex motifs (Thomas 1996, 202). These patterns, crucially, are maintained over time, showing that deliberate decisions were being made about what kind of Grooved Ware decoration was suitable for deposition in any one place (Thomas 1996, 202).

What do these kinds of style variation mean? Thomas is right to stress that the meaning of these symbols were probably not fixed (1999a, 117). Instead they allowed the articulation of difference through the possibility for variation that their decorations offered. This is also suggested by a vessel recovered from the small pit henge Wyke Down 2 on Cranborne Chase (M. Green 2000). This vessel featured design features from all three styles of Grooved Ware (Cleal 1999, 5), so the differences in style may have been overplayed. Instead what differences there were emerged as much through context as form, and were probably fluid, much like the identities of the people who used them.

Grooved Ware as a unifying materiality

Instead of seeing Grooved Ware as being purely about defining difference, another approach has been suggested by Hamilton and Whittle (1999). They argue instead that Grooved Ware 'may have served to promote integration into shared ritual and other practice' (Hamilton and Whittle 1999, 45). I want to suggest that Grooved Ware was crucial in the formation of convivial community at these monuments, and that it played a central role in transforming the disparate groups that gathered together into the dividually centred social person. Grooved Ware certainly played a prominent role at the henges of this period, both small and large. Some 657 sherds were found at

Mount Pleasant (Longworth 1979, 84). Only a single sherd survives from Maumbury Rings, but that may be taken to be as much the consequence of the site's history and excavation as anything else (Bradley 1975, 24). Fifteen sherds were found during the excavation of Greyhound Yard, although only part of that monument has seen excavation (Woodward *et al.* 1993, 202). The smaller pit henges were also the site of Grooved Ware deposits. Both Wyke Down 1 and 2 saw Grooved Ware deposited in their pits, as did one of the pit rings at Conygar Hill (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 96; M. Green 2000, 86-7; Healy 1997c, 50). Particularly at the large henges, however, I believe Grooved Ware would have played a central role in the making of community (cf. A. Jones 2002; C. Richards 2005)[xiv]. The acts of feasting that took place at these sites were central to the ways in which broader senses of community could be acted out. Community was a performative concept; it was not inherent in the relations between people, and it was created in the ways they acted and interacted. The materiality of Grooved Ware was central to this. The large vessels would allow multiple people to sup from them, and in doing so acknowledge their shared links with others.

This returns us to the notion of permeable personhood. In chapter 5 I argued that two forms of personhood co-existed in the Early Neolithic. On the one side there was partible personhood, where people could detach part of themselves and give it to somebody else. On the other was permeable personhood, where substances flow between people. The ability of pots to contain substances would therefore have been central to how flows of substance were linked between plants, animals and different people. At henge monuments, Grooved Ware offered a materiality that linked human bodies through flows of substance. Different communities may have made Grooved Ware, decorated perhaps in ways that stressed parts of their identity. The substances contained within that pot - milk, meat, blood, water or whatever - could then be partaken of by multiple people. This would set up a link between those people, who were literally absorbing the substance of community. As Jones puts it in relation to Grooved Ware on Orkney, 'the practices of food consumption are both medium and outcome for the expression of different kinds of communal identity' (2002, 166-7). Consumption from Grooved Ware was not merely symbolic or expressive of community, however; it was the performance of community, its maintenance and its creation all in one (*contra* A. Jones 2002). Feasting here was central to personhood and to the aesthetics of conviviality. The citation and creation of community may

have helped to bond people together and avoid conflict. Undoubtedly this was not always possible; people who were angry at decisions the broader group had made might refuse to drink from Grooved Ware, physically separating themselves off from the flows that bound the community together. In the main, however, we can imagine Grooved Ware successfully binding people together. At Mount Pleasant I have argued that the majority of the time there was an ad hoc nature to the ceremonies, acts of deposition and feasting that took place. Grooved Ware would have acted to link these different performances together, to provide a sense of unity to the site and to each other. The movement of Grooved Ware vessels around the site, carried and passed from hand to hand, may also have provided opportunities for those performances to be monitored by the wider group. At moments when more formal activities did take place, Grooved Ware may have played a powerful role in linking and empowering the broader community, watching from the banks perhaps, as events took place within the henge. Its deposition in the ditch terminals, presumably by people entering the monument, may have been an explicit acknowledgement of those persons' relationship with, and responsibility to, that broader community.

Yet although Grooved Ware largely acted to unite, there were certainly other ways in which it allowed differences in place and person to emerge. As I noted earlier, Thomas has pointed out how the east ditch terminal by Mount Pleasant's north entrance is dominated by pots with either no decoration or simple vertical or horizontal cordons (1996, 202). In contrast to this the pots deposited in the ditch of Site IV had a higher ratio of pots with herringbone and incised diagonal motifs, and plain cordons were totally absent (Thomas 1996, 202). These patterns of deposition suggest that particular kinds of pot, perhaps used in certain ways or made by certain people, could be used to shape the site, to create associations between particular *aspects* of the community and particular places. Grooved Ware thus linked people together, but also allowed differences in person and place to be drawn apart.

Grooved Ware away from henges

The power of Grooved Ware to bind communities together was not located solely at henges. Grooved Ware is also found in many other contexts. In the study area it has been found at sites of occupation like Poundbury, where a relatively complete bowl was found in one pit, along with other sherds (Sparey Green 1987, 22). It was also

found at Fir Tree Field on Cranborne Chase (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 78-80). Thus Grooved Ware did not only form part of the events that took place at henges, but played a role in people's day-to-day existence. The act of encountering, holding and using Grooved Ware would have helped people remember the feelings of community engendered at henge monuments. The emotional and physical associations that such memories carried with them would have acted in themselves as powerful reminders of the importance of community, of togetherness, away from those monuments. Grooved Ware in this sense may have become 'sticky' with the emotional and memorable textures of community (Ahmed 2004). Handling it may have reminded people not only of visits to henges but of what it meant and how it felt to be part of that wider sociality. The portability of this kind of materiality, whether as a whole pot or merely as a fragment, allowed the message of the monuments, the power of community, to be taken out into the landscape. Pots may have been used at monuments, and then broken. It is a possibility that part of the pot could then be deposited at the monument whilst other sherds might be taken away, perhaps by different groups, out into the wider world (Chapman 2000).

Those sherds stood as a metonym for the whole pot, just as the single person stood as metonym for the community: the dividually conceived social person. The sherds of pottery chosen for deposition in pit 29 at Fir Tree Field, for example, would remind the people touching the sherd of their links to the wider world, of the flows of substance that tied them together. Children too might learn from the sherds of the role they would be expected to play, of the connections they created between the henge monuments and the power of community. Of course how the children actually understood such links may have been very different (e.g. O. Harris forthcoming; Toren 1993; chapter 2). Decoration here was probably used again to mark out certain differences in space, or between different pits, but this was not its primary purpose. Instead the decorations on the pot, or sherd, would allow people to remember the particular occasion on which that pot had been used and the particular links that it represented. A sherd connected at once the place it was deposited, the locales in which the rest of the pot had been distributed, the people it united, and the ties that linked the various and fluid groups around Dorset to one another.

The materiality of Grooved Ware, its shape, its decoration and its use connected people both at henges and away from henges to one another. It helped form community by providing a unifying materiality that allowed substances to flow between people and in so doing to bind them together. The fabric of Grooved Ware often contains shell (Thomas 1999a, 113), and this too may have been important, connecting the people not only to each other but to the sea also. Different fabrics, like the different forms of decoration, may have allowed people to cite particular identities within the generalised materiality (A. Jones 2002). Whether as pot or sherd Grooved Ware acted to bind the community together affectively as both container and mnemonic. Whilst the decoration allowed for difference to be articulated, this was less important than the overall connections that Grooved Ware created. Crucially the materiality of Grooved Ware allowed those forms and messages to travel out into the wider landscape and helped connect people together away from these sites through the memories and emotions that the pots carried as effortlessly as they carried anything else.

Form and history: the making of inalienable possessions

If the use of Grooved Ware created and cited community through the flows of substance it embodied, then other objects helped to cite different expressions of personhood. Inalienable possessions are items of material culture, or knowledge, which cannot be separated from the conditions in which they were produced, the people who produced them and the biographical nature of their existence from that point. A watch received by my grandfather from his father-in-law and given to me on his death is, to me at least, an inalienable possession. It cannot be separated from the path it has taken to get to me. In the Late Neolithic the burgeoning material repertoire included many items that may have been seen as inalienable (Thomas 1996, 150-1; fig. 7.9). These included stone axes, boar's tusks, jet belt sliders and mace heads amongst others (Pollard 2001, 327; Thomas 1996; fig. 7.9). These artefacts would have embodied the histories of the hands through which they had passed, the places they had been made and used, and the stories that were associated with them. As Thomas puts it:

> Each of the 'complex artefacts' of the later Neolithic, then, was a concrete manifestation of a series of networks of significance, involving places, the

personal histories of people, substances, skills and symbolic references (1996, 159).

When I discussed the Early Neolithic in chapter 5, I examined how stone axes, as inalienable possessions, came to embody the people who had had possession of the axe, and in turn could be considered part of their body. What I did not consider was how possessions come to be authenticated as inalienable. That is, how can people be certain that an object is what it, and its current owner, purports it to be?

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Possible inalienable objects

- Boar's tusks

- Stone axes

- Flint axes

- Discoidal knives

- Complex arrowheads

- Human bone

- Jet belt sliders

- Beakers

- Bear bone

- Mace heads

- People?

</div>

Figure 7.9: Table of possible examples of inalienable possessions in the Late Neolithic (after Thomas 1996).

Annette Weiner (1992, 40), in her reconsideration of exchange in Oceania, has recognised that the central concern of exchange there is not, as has commonly been assumed, reciprocity, but in fact the paradox of keeping-while-giving. That is to say, people invest time and effort in trying to keep the most important inalienable possessions whilst meeting their debts by giving away others. The most prestigious inalienable possessions are of key importance in setting up exchange networks, as people give gifts and incur debts in the hope of one day being able to secure the exchange of a particularly desired object. The presence of inalienable possessions,

particularly of more desired ones, thus becomes a central part of all exchanges, as their presence, displayed or not, and their possession, acknowledged or not, demonstrate the differences between people (A. Weiner 1992, 41). Thus the motivation for exchange in these groups comes not from the desire to give, but the desire to keep (A. Weiner 1992, 43). The possession of these inalienable items can also have consequences in terms of power, authority and hierarchy. The development of hierarchy in Oceania, Weiner points out, is directly connected with the possession of inalienable goods, and how they authenticate the rights and privileges of their owners (1992, 131). The possession of a powerful inalienable item can legitimate claims to resources, to meaning, to knowledge that cannot otherwise be made. But in turn 'what is most essential about the trajectories of inalienable possessions... is not their individual ownerships but the source of their identification' (A. Weiner 1992, 100). In the Neolithic, therefore, particular objects may have been understood as intensely powerful because of the social relationships they embodied and represented, the complex histories of movement and exchange in which they were involved and the multiple bodies of which they had been a part. Thus the power to authenticate such items, to judge their stories as true and accurate, may have been a central component of authority in the Late Neolithic. How these items were ranked, however, would have depended far more on these *relational* aspects, than upon any considerations of form or quality, though these may have been secondary concerns.

The aesthetics upon which the community judged the power of an item, above and beyond its authentication, rested upon its history, claimed or real, rather than its form or function. In the Late Neolithic the authentication of inalienable possessions may have taken place in a public surround – within henge monuments. Perhaps it was here, through the relationships between the henge, the people and the objects, that the veracity of claims of inalienability and of the specificity of biography, could be assessed. These are moments in which people, objects and the community may have been caught up in 'tournaments of value' (Appadurai 1986b, 21; Edmonds 1993, 124). These tournaments judged the veracity of claims made about objects. Or as Appadurai has put it, 'what is at issue in such tournaments is not just the status, rank, fame or the reputation of actors, but the disposition of the central tokens of value in the society in question' (1986b, 21)[xv]. Such moments of judgement, I want to argue, would have empowered the community, rather than any particular individual, to

assess the authenticity of inalienable possessions. What makes a possession inalienable in this context, what the authentication may have judged, was 'its exclusive and cumulative identity with a particular set of owners through time' (A. Weiner 1992, 33). Among Aboriginal societies and Melanesian Big Men the defeat of long term hierarchy 'is traceable to the various cultural constructions that are created to overcome the exchange and gender paradoxes of keeping-while-giving' (A. Weiner 1992, 99). A crucial part of those cultural constructions in the Late Neolithic of Dorset were the giant series of monuments constructed in the third millennium cal BC.

Beakers

The above discussion of inalienable possessions and exchange has taken place at a general level. I would like to deepen that now by examining a particular kind of material culture, Beaker pottery. Beakers have traditionally been seen as a prestige form of pottery, associated with incomers from Europe, who brought with them metal working and single burial (e.g. Ashbee 1960). Much debate has taken place as to the different forms of categorisation of shape and design, and much effort has been put into attempting to analyse the chronology of different forms (e.g. Clarke 1970; Case 1993; Needham 2005). Recent reanalysis of radiocarbon determinations however, has now thrown out much of the possible sequence of designs (Kinnes *et al.* 1991; but see Bradley 2000, 130). Instead we can now recognise the contemporaneous nature of many of the different kinds of Beaker, although some chronological differentiation can still be detected (Needham 2005). The connection between Beakers and single burial rites has also fallen apart as it has been shown that single burials certainly precede the arrival of Beakers, and been suggested that Beakers were possibly in use for some time before they began to be incorporated into burial rites (Parker Pearson 2006). The old narrative of Beakers as the elite drinking vessel of an incoming male population has been undone as new evidence has emerged and new theoretical questions have begun to be posed[xvi].

Thickthorn, Dorset. (scale ×⅔).   Thickthorn, Dorset. (scale ×⅔).

Blackbush, Dorset. (scale ×⅔).

Figure 7.10: Dorset Beakers (after Clarke 1970, 288, figs. 65, 66 and 69).

It is easier in this context to set out the current thinking on Beakers, rather than conduct a lengthy historiography into the enormous literature on them. It is now thought that Beakers appear around 2500 cal BC and remain in use for the next 800 or so years (Kinnes *et al.* 1991; Needham 1996; 2005). Indeed the latest model puts the appearance of Beakers in England between 2475 and 2315 cal BC at 95 per cent probability (Bayliss *et al.* forthcoming b). Although traditionally associated with drinking vessels, Beakers come in many shapes and sizes, though it is probably true to say, as Thomas has argued, that they tend to be smaller than other kinds of Neolithic pottery, especially Grooved Ware (1999a, 124). They also *tend* to be finer and thinner than the pottery styles they are contemporary with, and their production involved new techniques, including the scraping of the interior to thin the walls (Boast 1995, 71).

The first Beakers were in all probability imported from the continent, although they began to be produced soon afterwards in Britain itself. 2500-2250 represents the beginning of Beaker use, and it is after 2250 that Beakers begin to appear in large numbers (Needham 2005). Although it is not clear for reasons that will become apparent, Beakers probably appeared at Mount Pleasant at around 2400 cal BC. Beakers were certainly used for drinking on occasions, but also for other things as well. They occur in burials but this is probably after their appearance at domestic sites and henges, as I noted above. In Dorset at least there is no evidence for Beakers being included in burial assemblages until after the first occurrences of single burial and of Beakers at Mount Pleasant.

I want to suggest that Beakers were an important kind of materiality at the end of the Neolithic, however, and their importance was not solely a consequence of the contexts in which they were employed (*contra* Boast 1995, 78). Instead evidence has emerged suggesting that Beakers were often preserved and curated, and this combined with their new technology, smaller size and often finer forms suggests a quite different role for Beakers than for Grooved Ware, for example. Where Grooved Ware stood, I have argued, as a materiality that allowed the creation and citation of community, Beakers seem to have been treated, preserved, exchanged and deposited as inalienable possessions, with specific histories, biographies and relations. They were specific as opposed to general, dividing as opposed to unifying. This may in part have come from an understanding of their foreign origin (Thomas 1999a, 122), but their importance was clearly centred on the local processes in which they were enmeshed, the local structures of meaning and power (Barrett 1994, 94). In this analysis of Beakers I will examine the evidence for the curation and preservation of Beakers, especially at Mount Pleasant, and consider what may have caused them to be treated in this way, and what consequences this may have had. This analysis of Beakers as inalienable possessions is developed in three ways in the appendix. Their role in the citation of gender is analysed in appendix 2.3.4, their role in exchange, including their emotional impact and their importance in citing identity, is examined in 2.3.5 and their role in burials in 2.3.6.

Curation of Beakers

It has recently been suggested by a number of authors that Beakers were curated before being deposited and may have acted as heirlooms (Bradley 2000; Chadwick 2004, 218; Needham 2005; A. Woodward 2002, 1040). Anne Woodward has argued that Beaker sherds may have been preserved in middens, or kept in circulation for a considerable period of time after they were made (2002, 1041-2). Examining Beaker sherds from an Early Bronze Age round barrow at Lockington in Leicestershire, she argues that the abraded nature and missing elements indicate 'the pots may have functioned as carefully curated family or ancestral property' (A. Woodward 2002, 1041). Richard Bradley has recently put forward a similar argument for Mount Pleasant (2000). Bradley argues that the Beaker material from the ditch of Site IV was 'already of considerable age when it was deposited' (2000, 128). It is this that makes the dating of the first arrival of Beakers at Mount Pleasant so difficult. Bradley supports his assertion by pointing out that earlier Neolithic pottery was found alongside Grooved Ware in the lowest levels, and by the way in which multiple styles of Beaker pottery were found in the same context (2000, 130), notably in segment XIII, layer 5 (Wainwright 1979, 21). This is the segment immediately to the west of the entrance indicated on figure 7.4. Bradley questions the recent dismissal of the sequence of Beaker designs, and instead points out that the radiocarbon determinations date the point of deposition not creation, and that the preservation and curation of Beaker sherds thus disguises any chronological sequence (2000, 130).

Whether or not Bradley is correct on the chronology, the evidence of Beaker sherd curation at Mount Pleasant has been further supported by detailed analysis by A. Woodward (2002). She concentrates on the Beakers found in segment XIII, layer 5 of the Site IV ditch, which contained not only the major assemblage of Beaker sherds from Site IV but also a mixture of many different styles including All Over Cord (AOC), European, Wessex/Middle Rhine, Northern/North Rhine and Southern (A. Woodward 2002, 1042). Whilst the general sequence of Beaker pottery design has been rightly questioned following the dates published by Kinnes *et al.* (1991; cf. Case 1993; 1995), it can still be argued that AOC and European Beaker styles are earlier than other types in Britain (Needham 2005; A. Woodward 2002). On this basis A. Woodward compares the size of sherds from segment XIII and argues that later

Beaker styles tend to occur as large portions, whilst the older styles tend to be found as sherds (2002, 1043). From this she concludes that:

> The overall impression is that large chunks of Beaker vessels were circulating or were temporarily deposited for many years, if not generations. Thus they may have functioned as heirlooms or relics before they eventually came to be deposited within the ditch around the focal timber and stone monument (A. Woodward 2002, 1043).

It thus seems very possible that Beaker sherds, both at Mount Pleasant and elsewhere, were being curated, at times directly by people, at times in middens, and thus may have acted, as both Bradley (2000, 128) and A. Woodward (2002, 1043) conclude, as 'heirlooms'[xvii]. Can I take this explanation further? I want to suggest I can, by examining how Beakers may have worked as inalienable possessions and may have been authenticated at Mount Pleasant.

Beakers as inalienable possessions

Initially Beakers may have been preserved because of their foreign point of origin[xviii] (Thomas 1999a). In time this would have faded, but they may already have been established as inalienable. The importance of the Beakers would have been enhanced by the histories in which they were caught up, the different people who had drunk from them, or the various hands through which they had passed, much as I argued for stone axes in chapter 5. Beakers acted as inalienable possessions as they would have been inseparable from the conditions though which they were produced and the particular history of use and exchange in which they were enmeshed (appendix 2.3.5). Beakers may have been preserved in *particular* middens at Mount Pleasant, where oral histories would have connected them to acts of feasting or consumption in the past. Such narratives might link sherds to communities in general rather than particular persons, but this would in no way have affected their inalienability. Indeed when communities of that time may have been associated with acts such as the construction of Site IV, or the cove say, this may have enhanced the power of particular middens, and the Beakers within. In this context it is no surprise to see that the major moment of deposition of Beakers at Site IV comes from the layer 5 in segment XIII (Wainwright 1979; Thomas 1996). This layer is contemporary with the

erection of the palisade and the putative destruction of the cove (Pollard 1992). At this point people were reworking the past, altering their architecture, and whilst they did so they drew on a technology that referenced the past. If Peterborough Ware too was a technology that referenced the past it is interesting to note that these two kinds of pottery are found together at Mount Pleasant, although their relative chronologies suggests they only overlapped briefly in use, if at all (Wainwright 1979, 53; Thomas 1999a, 120-5; fig. 7.8)[xix]. Mount Pleasant was a site where the narratives to which Beaker sherds were connected could be weighed and judged against the monumental force of memory that the henge embodied. It was this inalienable nature of Beakers, I suggest, that later led to them being included within grave assemblages (appendix 2.3.6).

It is interesting to here to consider in more detail the numbers of Beakers that were deposited at Mount Pleasant. The deposition of Beakers may actually have been played out at a relatively small-scale at Mount Pleasant, although it is difficult to be exact about the numbers deposited. Single sections of ditch, even single layers can grossly distort the overall numbers of pots. Thus far too small a proportion of the ditch, or even the palisade have been excavated to claim any certainty over the numbers of Beakers deposited. One area this is not true of is Site IV that was excavated in its entirety. There a total of 864 sherds of Beaker pottery were recovered, which translates to 56 separate vessels (Longworth 1979). Now once again we run into the traditional difficulty with dates, but Beakers probably began to be deposited at Mount Pleasant about 2400 cal BC and continued until well after 2000 cal BC. So if we take a minimum 500 years then the number of Beakers being deposited runs at about one every ten years. Even this would be a gross exaggeration, however. Half the Beakers from Site IV date from layer 5 of segment XIII, 28 vessels to be exact. This layer is contemporary with the destruction of the cove and the creation of the palisade, a moment of remarkable change at Mount Pleasant (appendix 2.3.2). Thus the numbers are closer to one Beaker every 20 years, or to be more exact parts of one Beaker every 20 years. Of course others were being deposited around the monument, but there is no evidence that this was taking place in notably higher numbers.

This in my opinion strengthens the argument for Beakers being viewed as inalienable possessions, as they were hardly disposed of with great abandon at Mount Pleasant.

Other than one unique period of time Beakers may have been carefully preserved, perhaps often kept in middens even when already broken. Indeed the consequences of breaking an inalienable possession may have been extremely shocking as I suggested in chapter 5. This may hint again at the histories, the mnemonic and emotional geographies that Beakers embodied; geographies that could literally be broken apart on occasional, perhaps remarkable, occasions. The numbers of Beakers deposited do not support an interpretation which sees these as being smashed and thrown away on a regular basis. Rather they may have been rare and important items, constituted by their links to people, places and events. Thus even when the pots were broken it appears their remains may still have been curated (Bradley 2000; A. Woodward 2002). Perhaps their breaking made them appropriate for deposition as other parts of them could still be kept in circulation. The reverence attached to sherds may only have enhanced the importance of whole Beakers.

Thus we might imagine that intact Beakers were largely caught up in three particular processes: authentication (discussed here), exchange, and deposition in graves (discussed in appendix 2.3.5 and 2.3.6 respectively). The emotions embodied by Beakers would have been enhanced by their inclusion as a form of grave good (appendix 2.3.6), and by the highly emotive processes of exchange (appendix 2.3.5). Sherds meanwhile were curated, perhaps in middens, thus preserving their inalienable links to various people and places. Each sherd would initially have captured the links the pot had had embodied, its histories, and its relationships with various people. These may have been preserved, if the sherd was curated by itself, or dissolved into a midden, to become part of the general associations carried by *those* Beakers from *that* place. These may have reflected links between particular groups of people. The sherds may then later have become more appropriate for deposition and thus we find them in a variety of interesting contexts across Dorset.

Examples of this can be seen at a number of older monuments. Beaker sherds were discovered in the upper ditch silts of the Alington Avenue long barrow, the Dorset Cursus, Hambledon Hill, Thickthorn Down long barrow, Handley Down round barrows, Wor Barrow, Wyke Down 1 and in the central pit at Monkton Up Wimborne (Davies *et al.* 2002; Barrett *et al.* 1991; Chadwick 2004, 221; Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Beakers would have gained further associations with the past through

such moments of deposition. In the case of Alington Avenue we can imagine Beaker sherds being deposited in the silting ditches as people left Mount Pleasant and made their way along the ridge. The use of Hambledon Hill is particularly interesting. Although out of use for at least 800 years, in parts of the main enclosure ditch slots were cut to the base and Beaker pottery deposited (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). Beaker sherds offered a way of connecting people with the past, much as Peterborough Ware had done before it, but in a quite different way. Beakers with their preserved and curated quality, their specific and inalienable histories, would have allowed particular claims on the past to be put forward. The mnemonic geography of a site like Hambledon would have changed. Not only was this place associated, through myth perhaps, with past peoples but through the deposition of particular forms of pottery those connections would now be being made to particular people, or groups of people, in the present. Perhaps alternative conceptions of time were at play, and people saw little difference between the then and the now, and stressed the direct connections between themselves, embodied in the identities created by Beaker pottery, and the people who had originally dug the ditches at Hambledon Hill (cf. Campbell 2006). People may also have been having the last word on the past, sealing these monuments through a final act of deposition, much as people did elsewhere in Southern Britain at megalithic tombs (Chadwick 2004, 220).

Authenticating Beakers at Mount Pleasant

I have already discussed how henges created a notion of the social person, that is the broader community, through both the architecture and the events that took place at such monuments. I have also suggested that henges may also have been caught up in the authentication of inalienable possessions, and Beakers may have been one example of this. The architecture of the henge monuments created a backdrop against which the broader community could stand and from which others could be separated. Such a moment returns us to partible conceptions of personhood (cf. M. Strathern 1988; chapters 2 and 5). Within partible personhood, people, or groups, can be conceived as making up a whole, from which certain parts are then objectified and externalised. At Mount Pleasant the broader community may have objectified and externalised certain people, who may then have engaged with the community in the authentication of inalienable possessions. The community, like the single person, could objectify part of itself and separate it off (fig. 7.11). These parts, perhaps

coming from several different groups within the broader community, could then meet inside the henge to appeal for authentication of their Beakers. I also suggest in appendix 2.3.5 that exchange may have taken place in this arena as well. So whilst it might appear that various *individuals* engaged in acts of authentication and exchange within Mount Pleasant whilst being watched passively by the wider community, in fact something quite different may have happened. Different conceptions of personhood reveal how the broader community stood as the social person, which parted from itself those that would be appealing to that community for the authentication of inalienable possessions such as Beakers. The social person here was actively involved in the act authentication. Those people inside the henge, of whom there may have been many, were objectified and separated off, and this may have had led to particular forms of gender being emphasised on both sides of the ditch (appendix 2.3.4). Later of course, all being well, they would be reincorporated within the community, once people turned from the more formalised ceremonies to the more general acts of improvised feasting, celebrations, story-telling and ceremonies.

Different acts of consumption may also have helped to define who was being separated from the broader community. The large amount of cattle butchery waste from Mount Pleasant, particularly the Site IV ditch, suggests that cattle were being killed within Mount Pleasant (Wainwright 1979; Thomas 1996, 205). In contrast there is much lower amounts of 'primary discard' material from pigs suggesting they were being killed outside the site and then being brought in (Wainwright 1979; Thomas 1996, 205). It may be possible to develop my argument and suggest that this correlation might refer in part to the kinds of acts of separation I have suggested may have been going on. People within Mount Pleasant may have been involved in the slaughter and consumption of cattle. The broader community, the social person as I have termed it, may have been slaughtering pigs outside and bringing them in for consumption. The act of killing the animals in itself may have been important, as a form of social display, including perhaps the symbolic hunting of domesticated animals (cf. Albarella and Serjeantson 2002).

Such acts of feasting on different meats would have been one way in which different identities could have been expressed at certain times, and it may also have been a way of conditioning and preparing particular people for the process of exchange and

authentication (appendix 2.3.5). The absorption of certain substances may have prepared them to act in the right ways, and their bodies may have acted as conduits for those substances (Londoño-Sulkin 2000). 27% of the animal bone recovered from Mount Pleasant was from cattle in the Neolithic and 28% in Beaker times (Harcourt 1979, 220). It must be remembered, however, that whilst pigs out numbered cattle, cattle still provided more meat in total, varying between 60 and 68% of the total meat consumed through the Neolithic and Bronze Age, whilst pig provided around 16% (Harcourt 1979, 219). Thus for much of the time cattle may have provided the meat for the majority of people there.

The power and authenticity of Beakers could only have been asserted with the consent of the broader community at Mount Pleasant. I suggest it was not a case that these people could be deceived by what they could not see, in other words that the hidden nature of Site IV disguised what took place there (*contra* Thomas 1996). The power of inalienable possessions *depended* on the acclamation of those watching, and without their authentication they would be useless for meeting debts or giving gifts. Such an acclamation may have been as much an emotional judgement as one made on the basis of 'evidence'. To pretend to have what one did not, or to refuse to give what one should would have been an extremely shameful experience in such an auditorium. This is not to say that people within the monument were at the mercy of those who watched, they could still have exerted much agency in terms of what was or displayed, or what they sought to be authenticated, but they operated within the bounds set down by the community. Thus the power, far from being the preserve of a specialised minority, in fact was the domain of the majority. The particular acts of deposition, at the entrances to Site IV or in the enclosure ditches, took place to appease those watching, to meet with what was expected and to follow the aesthetics of conviviality. Conducting these offerings in the right ways may have been as important to the process of authentication as the history of the Beaker itself. People here drew on the way life was led day by day, and on the new ways people were engaging with their past to assert the right to authenticate these inalienable possessions, including Beakers. In so doing, Mount Pleasant became a tool with which hierarchy was defeated, rather than its source.

Figure 7.11: Diagrammatic representation of the separating effects of Mount Pleasant architecture, pottery use and exchange of inalienable possessions. The community here objectifies and separates part of itself, those parts which are considered inalienable for authentication and exchange. The possible gendering consequences of this are explored in appendix 2.3.4.

	Social Person	**Separated dividuals**
Location	Henge banks	Inside henge
Pottery	Grooved Ware	Beaker
Actions	Authentication, observation, consumption of pig?	Appealing for authentication? Exchange, gift giving, consumption of cattle?
Identity	Relational and generalised	Relational and specific
Personhood	Permeable	Partible
Agency/identity	Corporate	Single

Figure 7.12: Separation of Neolithic community at certain times at Mount Pleasant.

Conclusion: Beakers as agents?

Beakers are one example of inalienable possessions that would have had profound consequences for how people engaged with each other, their world, their memories and their understandings of the past. To what extent can agency be attributed to Beakers in this context as well as to the people who made, used, curated and deposited them? In a recent paper Chris Gosden has suggested that classes of material culture act as agents through the way they impact emotionally and mnemonically on people, and stretch through time (2005, 198; chapter 1). He argues that 'the ability of objects to reorder their effects should not be underestimated' (Gosden 2005, 208). Objects, in this sense, can have agency, they create dynamic scenarios which alter the ways in which people and objects are perceived. Beakers were emotionally and mnemonically powerful, they evoked memories and emotions (appendix 2.3.5), they altered identities and through deposition they would have altered the shape and experience of domestic sites, monuments and burials. This was a consequence of, and a reason for, their preservation. The practices in which they were involved, the broad histories of the class of artefact and the specific histories of curation, exchange and deposition created Beakers as agents. Beakers were one of many different kinds of

agents in the Late Neolithic and earliest Bronze Age, and they exerted their own kind of agency. Another agent was the henge of Mount Pleasant itself, the architecture of which created certain types of engagement and, like Beakers, its longevity allowed its agency to extend beyond the lifetime of particular people.

Concluding Materiality

In this section I have examined two forms of Late Neolithic materiality, two forms of pottery, and argued they were both caught up in very different but related processes. Grooved Ware acted as the creation and citation of community. The large size of the vessels allowed people to share the substances that flowed through it, and as a materiality it brought people together (Hamilton and Whittle 1999). The ad hoc ceremonies that dominated much of the time at Mount Pleasant were linked through the use and deposition of Grooved Ware and it in turn allowed other places to be linked to the broader community through its use and deposition at other sites such as Fir Tree Field on Cranborne Chase (M. Green 2000). Beakers played a very different role in Late Neolithic Dorset. Although a form of pottery, its exotic origins and new technologies initially meant that it was preserved through middens and curation. These in turn led to particular pots and sherds developing biographies and histories that made them inalienable from the contexts in which they had been produced. This does not mean that Beakers stood for the individual whilst Grooved Ware stood for the communal. Instead Grooved Ware stood for the general and Beakers for the specific. Different kinds of narrative and history were caught up in each. The use of Beakers thus had a number of consequences. First it involved citing a sense of partible personhood, whereas Grooved ware involved citing a more permeable sense. This meant that, through the architecture of henges, those involved in appealing for authentication could be separated off from the community, their identities objectified and externalised (and this may have had consequences in terms of how gender was produced at these sites – see appendix 2.3.4). Power lay, however, not with those within the henge, as might be predicted, but rather with those who watched those who judged the authenticity of claims to particular histories and biographies of objects, Beakers and, effectively, themselves. The authentication of Beakers was thus a highly emotional and memorable event that played a crucial role in the formation of people's identities. The exchange of Beakers was also very important, as was their use in funerals and these topics are discussed in appendices 2.3.5 and 2.3.6.

Deposition in the Late Neolithic

Turning to deposition allows us to confront more of the detail of events that took place during the Late Neolithic. It will also allow me to expand my narratives around a number of issues I have already engaged with in this chapter. Identities, relationships, senses of belonging and community, were not certain or fixed. Even the existence of the world, the flowering of plants, the birth of people and animals may have been contingent on people observing the right ways with which to engage with the landscape in which they dwelt. Deposition was perhaps *the* crucial way people did this, though other ways also involved continually moving round, attending to the environment, and of course building and using monuments. Deposition was part of the performance of identity, part of how people created senses of place and space, part of how convivial communities were maintained. It was crucial because it tied the world into the exchange networks that linked people and animals together. The landscape was an exchange partner to which everybody was indebted and thus after meals, encampments, or ceremonies these debts were met through acts of deposition. Deposition was also more than this, it was a way of making sense of the world, a way of juxtaposing different elements (chapter 6) or laying out a metaphor for a rite of passage (O. Harris 2005).

I want to begin this section by examining the deposits that people made away from monuments, and inspect in detail the ways in which people shaped their world through deposition, memory and emotion. I will then return to henge monuments, and examine how deposition played out at Maumbury Rings and the smaller so-called pit henges at Wyke Down and Conygar Hill. This will give me an opportunity to engage with these latter sites, analyse their role within Late Neolithic communities, and examine how deposition both shaped these sites, and helped people to cite differing scales of community.

Deposition away from monuments

In this first section I want to look at acts of deposition that took place away from what have been termed monuments. This analysis will mainly focus on the site of Fir Tree Field on Cranborne Chase, close both to the site of the Dorset Cursus and the Down Farm Shaft (M. Green 2000).

Fir Tree Field consists of 16 Late Neolithic pits, divided into two groups (figs 7.13 and 7.14). The northern group consists of seven closely spaced pits and an outlier (pit 29), the southern group has eight pits. An additional three pits were also found 140 metres to the northeast, close to the Fir Tree Field shaft (M. Green 2000, 71). Quite different acts of deposition took place between the northern and southern groups, and the outlier of the northern group was different again (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 79; M. Green 2000, 70-1). The northern group, which was surrounded by stakeholes, contained more pottery, almost all Grooved Ware, a minimum of 35 vessels compared to 8 in the southern group (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 79). This latter group by contrast featured many more types of artefact. Pit 7 for example featured a Group VIII axe from Graig Llwyd in North Wales, next to a boar's tusk and a large scraper (M. Green 2000, 70). The same pit also featured another boar's tusk (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 77). Other pits in the southern group contained remarkable deposits like such as Pit 11a. This pit featured a complete ox skull on top of an antler pick. Above this in the fill was a roe deer antler a fragment of polished stone axe and the bone of a brown bear[xx] (M. Green 2000, 70). Pit 5, also from the southern group, featured a fragment of greenstone axe, along with a striking banded pebble and another boar's tusk (M. Green 2000, 70). In total five axes or axe fragments were found, all but one coming from the southern group, and the exception came from the outlying pit, which is quite different in character to the rest of the northern group (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 81). Differences also emerge in the kinds of flints in each group of pits. The southern group contained tools, flakes and cores made from fresh chalk flint, whilst the northern group contained weathered flints from river gravels (Brown 1991, 107-8; Gosden 1994, 94).

Figure 7.13: Plan of pit clusters, Fir Tree Field (after Barrett *et al.* 1991, 76, fig. 3.9).

Figure 7.14: Grooved Ware pits in Fir Tree Field (after M. Green 2000, 73, fig. 44a-c).

The pits also differed in form as well as content. The southern groups tended to be deeper and steeper sided than their northern counterparts. These differences are not the product of change over time as the two groups appear to be roughly contemporary. This is indicated by two radiocarbon dates[xxi], that although broad certainly overlap, and the presence of two sherds probably from the same vessel in northern pit 25a and southern pit 6 (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 77). The contrast between the two has led Martin Green to argue that the northern group, with the stakeholes and less complex deposits may represent the traces of 'domestic' settlement, whilst the southern group has ritual overtones (2000, 71). Yet such an argument is problematic (cf. Bradley 2005). I want to suggest here that *no* act of deposition took place that was *merely* domestic in

character, nor was any act purely ritual either. The differentiation of ritual and daily life creates an ontological separation. It literally creates two ontologies, or theories of being. On the one hand there are the unthinking actions of mundane daily life that are tied up with issues of survival, reproduction and subsistence. Acts of deposition here serve to get rid of rubbish, or at best close a period of settlement. On the other hand there is the ontology of ritual, where great contests are played out between different world views, and people make complex statements about identity, being and personhood. Such a dichotomy in fact rests on the old Cartesian dualism of body and mind (cf. Thomas 2004)[xxii]. The experience, even significance, of placing a deposit, such as a deer skull, in the great shafts of Maumbury Rings (Bradley 1975), may have been very different to that of placing a batch of flints in a pit at Tolpuddle Ball or Middle Farm elsewhere in Dorset (Birbeck 1999, 16; Butterworth and Gibson 2004). They were not, however, ontologically separate, I suggest. They were not based upon radically different ways of seeing and engaging with the world. Instead they were ontologically connected; they both made sense within the same sensuous schemas of thought and tropes of understanding (chapter 1).

Such a claim is supported by a closer analysis of the material from the northern set of pits. Although the material lacks the more notable objects deposited to the south, or the complexity and variety of those deposits, they are still interesting in their own right. Pit 6, for example, features a large sherd of pottery placed so that the decoration faced up (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 77). Six antlers were also placed on the base of pit 32 along with a boar's tusk (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 77). The outlying pit also included a 'striking association between a pig mandible and a stone axe' (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 77), although as Barrett *et al.* point out (1991, 81), and as I noted above, this pit is quite different to the rest of the northern group. Nevertheless these descriptions of the northern pits point out that even their deposits were not purely domestic in character. This is worth considering at Tolpuddle Ball, where a cache of flints were found in a pit (Hearne and Birbeck 1999). Such a deposit may not have involved polished stone axes, and there may not have been any deliberate acts placing one flint next to another, but even so this was not a 'domestic' act. It was not the unthinking consequence of domestic activity and may have carried resonances and aesthetic qualities of its own (Pollard 2001).

People may well have lived over and around the northern group of pits, but those pits were not somehow the automatic outcome of that activity. They are not a record of what took place. The pits in the two groups may well be of very different character, and differing concerns may have been at play in both cases, but they were both the outcome of a way of living in the world, of a particular aesthetic of conviviality that placed great emphasis on the interring of objects within the ground (cf. Pollard 2001).

Such a conclusion leads into another area for discussion. What concerns did these acts of deposition address? Why was it important at these kinds of sites to deposit items in particular juxtapositions with others? If there is no radical difference between the southern and northern pit groups, why are there such different deposits in each group? I hope that a further consideration of Fir Tree Field will answer such questions. The act of deposition, whether at or away from monuments, was part of the way that people maintained an ongoing relationship with the world around them. Life, in the Late Neolithic, was not something that just happened, nor was it in anyway automatic. Instead it was something that had to be worked at, something that required effort and continuing attention. Notions of the *play of work* developed in anthropology (e.g. Overing 2000; M. Strathern 1988) help us to think about such deliberate efforts as part of the way in which people formed senses of place, person and community. Deposition tied the views of partible and permeable personhood together, and we can see this in the acts of deposition at Fir Tree Field. The deposition of inalienable possessions like the stone axes was an act of paying one's debts to the world. If the first gift was seen as that from the land to the people, then perhaps the last gift was from the people to the land. Thus a sense of partible personhood was formed at the beginning, when the world gave up part of itself to people, and in the end, when people gave part of themselves back to the world.

Yet deposition was more than this. It not only maintained the relationships between people and the world in general, it maintained relationships between people and the world *in particular*. That is to say that the place, the objects and their positioning could all be used to create and recite identities, narratives and connections between people and the world. The deposition of marine shells in southern pit 11a (M. Green 2000, 70), for example, connected that place to the sea, and perhaps to particular people, or certain myths and stories associated with the sea (cf. Fowler and

Cummings 2003). Deposition of pottery also helped form and maintain a permeable sense of personhood, as pottery connected people through flows of substance (chapter 5). The acts of deposition are not a *record* as such of either ritual or domestic behaviour. They were part of the material conditions of life through which people constantly engaged with the fluid and temporal world in which they found themselves.

This of course leaves the final question I posed in the previous paragraph. Why is it, if this is the case, that we can trace such different acts of deposition between the northern and southern groups? The answer, I would suggest, is that although complex juxtapositions and metaphors were at play they were still influenced by other factors. In the case of the two pit groups, it is noticeable that the southern group, the one closer to the Cursus, is the one with the greater variety of deposits. Thus the location of acts of deposition certainly influenced what was placed there. The fact that people appear to have lived amongst the northern group of pits also led to the acts of deposition there having a different quality. Yet this quality was not one we should describe as domestic as opposed to ritual; it was a different set of affordances that were being played with. The differences in the items deposited were not the outcome of two different kinds of practice, one ritual and one domestic. Instead they were two outcomes from the same practice, the practice of deposition. Deposition helped people in the Late Neolithic to texture their landscape (cf. J. Evans 2003). By choosing to deposit different items in different areas they helped to shape their world, and create senses of space and place. The memories and emotions associated with each place would be changed through these acts of deposition so that when the physical traces of such acts vanished, the affective texturing of the world remained. This was the creation of emotional and mnemonic geographies (cf. Sheller 2004): a way of shaping the world through memory and through the practices associated with it.

These connections with memory can be enhanced by further considerations of the material deposited in the pits. Evidence from much, but not all, of the animal bone and pottery suggests that this material was exposed for some time prior to deposition (Cleal 1991; Legge 1991). The flints were also probably old, and most likely were drawn from middens (Brown 1991, 113)[xxiii]. The exclusive relationship between type of flint and pit group, however, suggests that the two different kinds of flint were

drawn from different middens. The acts of deposition in each pit group thus drew upon *particular* sets of material, some old, some fresh, and placed them into a particular kind of pit. People here were working with the physical remains of community, with the materiality of memory and emotion, and engaging with it shaped themselves and their world together. These were not revolutionary acts but rather they reworked the affordances already offered by the landscape. Thus those pits closer to the Dorset Cursus saw different acts of deposition from those further away as the acts of deposition drew on and reworked the resources around it. Memory and emotion played crucial roles within this, and the pots, flints, bones and axes were deposited as the physical expression of those connections.

Daily life in the Late Neolithic drew upon the aesthetics of conviviality which in turn were centred on the ongoing choreographies of movement, exchange and deposition. Within this, agency and notions of texture were at play, as people decided how best to maintain the aesthetics of conviviality through their actions, or how to undermine them and create other kinds of feelings and textures around the landscape. Perhaps the strange outlier near the northern group represents a challenge to how people normally understood the texturing of their landscape. The three pits nearby to Fir Tree Field again contain complex deposits, including a unique splayed flint axe and a perforated flint nodule (M. Green 2000, 71). The proximity of the Down Farm Shaft offers us an explanation for the particular textures that these pits created. Clearly at sites with particular foci, like the Dorset Cursus, or the Shaft, different textures of experience were created through acts of deposition. They provided a focus for that aspect of people's daily lives that focused on the past, on monuments and natural features of continuing importance to people. The northern group in Fir Tree Field stressed other concerns. The greater use of Grooved Ware around where people lived indicates that these deposits were focused on the maintenance of community in the present, rather than connections with the locales of the past. The aesthetics of conviviality, of making sure people got on well together and the flow, the flux and the fluidity of life were central to what was deposited where, to how the world was textured (J. Evans 2003). It is this we encounter at Fir Tree Field; the differences between the pit groups did not embody two different ontological ways of approaching life.

Deposition at henges

It is no surprise that deposition also took place at henge monuments. It was particularly crucial at Maumbury Rings, but also at the smaller, so-called pit henges, such as Wyke Down 1 on Cranborne Chase. These sites were engaged with, indeed were shaped at least in part, through deposition. It was also through deposition that people cited and created senses of a physical community, one in which people were bound together through the monuments they created.

Figure 7.15: Maumbury Rings, looking north, as it appears today (photo: author).

Deposition at Maumbury Rings

Maumbury Rings was excavated in the early 20th century and consisted of a single bank and internal ditch, with a circumference about 231 metres (Bradley 1975). The two radiocarbon dates obtained suggest a date for the use of the monument between 2880-2042 cal BC (Bradley 1988, 140; Woodward 1991, 170)[xxiv]. The bank would have offered a perfect opportunity for people to watch and listen to the events that took place in this henge. Deposition clearly played an important role as items were placed in perhaps as many as 45 deep shafts that ran from the bottom of the ditch into the soil for some 6 metres or more. Interestingly these acts of deposition followed particular patterns, beginning with pottery, then carved chalk objects and deer skulls,

finally human bone was found towards the top of the shafts (Bradley 1975, 18-9; Bradley 2000, 124; fig. 7.16). All but one of the fully excavated shafts had archaeological material at the base, which were then deliberately covered by chalk rubble (Bradley 1975, 33). The filling of the shafts then intersperses archaeological material with chalk rubble (Bradley 1975, 21). The make up of the deposits is also interesting. There are at least four fragmentary or complete deer skulls, one of which was placed against the side of the shaft with its antlers still attached, along with many other antler deposits (Bradley 1975, 20). There were a few human bones, although as noted above these were limited to the upper parts of the fills, as were pieces of unused antler and the flints (Bradley 1975, 19). The potsherds, animal bone, worked antler and chalk objects by contrast were scattered throughout the different levels. Many of the items were found in isolation, although antler tools, animal bones and flints tended to be found together (Bradley 1975, 18). The analysis of the deposition by Bradley (1975) also shows a distinct difference between the east and west sides of the monument. There were more animal bones, antler tools and flints on the western side compared to the eastern (Bradley 1975, 21). Also the chalk objects were divided between particular areas to the west and the east (Bradley and Thomas 1984, 132-3). The western side featured a phallus, three chalk balls and a possible chalk drum, whilst the east revealed a perforated block, smaller decorated fragments and a possible phallus (Bradley and Thomas 1984, 132-3). The role of burning may have been important here. In two shafts, 15 and 14, burnt and un-burnt materials were mixed together (Bradley 1975, 20-1). A similar mixture was also found in shaft 1 (Bradley 1975, 21).

Patterns of deposition in the Maumbury shafts

- More finds in western than eastern half of the enclosure

- Human remains near surface

- Carved chalk objects often found with deer skulls

- Antler picks mainly in the middle and lower parts of the shafts

- Pottery tends towards the lower part of the shafts

- Animal bone, antler tools and flints typically found together

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Figure 7.16: Deposition at Maumbury Rings (after Bradley 1975; 2000).

Deposition at Maumbury played with several themes. The first of these was exchange. I have already suggested that deposition can be seen as an act of exchange with the world, with the landscape. At Maumbury it was also an act of exchange with the past. The deep shafts, I suggest, were deliberate attempts to traverse time as well as space. Dorset is replete with deep shafts cut into the chalk, whether by natural or human agency. These include not only the shaft at Fir Tree Field, the deep pit at Monkton Up Wimborne but also other possible shafts near the Knowlton henge complex (Joshua Pollard pers. comm. 2006). Perhaps the infilling of these holes stood as testament to the passing of time, thus the cutting of shafts may have represented people digging, literally, into the past. Perhaps the multiple acts of digging ditches and pits always referenced such concerns, but in digging 6 metres below the ditch, 10 below the contemporary ground level, people may have been actively reaching into a more distant past[xxv].

The deposition of deer skulls may again here be of interest. The absence of other bones from deer suggests that antlers and skulls were being brought to the site, rather than carcasses (Bradley 1975, 20)[xxvi]. As such the skulls do not represent the idle consequences of other processes or practices. They were deliberately brought to the site, and deliberately deposited, often with carved chalk artefacts. The natural habitat of red deer is woodland, an increasingly rare form of habitat at this time. The deer skulls would have thus come from other places, away from the monument, and like the posts at Greyhound Yard, may have stood for ancestral forests, places in which people used to dwell (appendix 2.3.1). As Sharples (2000) has cogently argued, deer may well have been seen as particularly liminal animals (appendix 2.2.2). Their patterns of movement, and the way people had interacted with them since Mesolithic times, may have placed them between different categories of animal. They may have stood as external to community standing for the past, they may even have been seen as the embodiment of ancestors, as persons in a very real sense. The citation and performance of community, present at Maumbury as at Mount Pleasant, would thus have acknowledged and recognised its past through the digging of shafts and the placement of deer skulls and antler within it[xxvii].

Liminality represents a second theme of deposition at Maumbury. The digging of the shafts from the bottom of the ditch suggests that these were neither inside nor outside

the henge, instead they were somewhere in between. Why was this? First, I would argue that the digging of such deep shafts may have been dangerous, not only physically, through collapsing walls, but also through the threat of spirits, demons or monsters that may have been seen to lurk in both the ground and the past. The liminal quality of the act of digging and deposition would also then have been highly performative. The small size of the shafts meant that only a few people could be involved in digging at any one time; equally, only a few may have been involved in the actual placing of deposits, such as the deer skull resting against the wall. The danger of digging these holes may have made the process exciting to those watching, as well as hard work for those involved in digging.

The placement of chalk objects into the shafts would have maintained this liminal quality. In the previous chapter I suggested that the liminal quality of chalk objects, their sexualised designs[xxviii], and the quality they had to mark the hands of those who held them may have meant that other genders, neither male nor female, were involved in their production and deposition (appendix 2.3.4). At Maumbury we find, in the most liminal of locations, objects I have suggested were deeply liminal in themselves. I would therefore suggest that perhaps we might identify the digging of the shafts and acts of deposition within them as something that may have performatively gendered people as neither male nor female[xxix] (cf. Nanda 1999). These dangerous acts may have been handled by alternative genders as they may have represented this liminality, and may have been able to engage with this liminality, through the way they used and shaped chalk objects. Third gender groups, anthropologically, have often taken up these liminal positions (e.g. Herdt 1996b; Holliman 1997; 2000). Part of the ability of people to deal with the dangers inherent in digging deep into the ground may have come from their ability to draw on both male and female aspects, as Mandelstam Balzar has suggested for the shaman of Siberia (1996). If deer were liminal animals, perhaps their skulls were caught up in the costumes of the people digging in the ditches, and were worn both to cite identity and to offer protection, from the dangers that liminality inherently contains (Van Gennep 1961; Turner 1969). The putative association of chalk objects and deer skulls is enhanced by the fact these objects were often deposited together in the shafts (Bradley 1975, 18). The burning present in three of the shafts may have been part of the dramatic nature of deposition,

set in the theatre of the henge and including costume, bodily practice and the performative citation of gender.

Deposition at Maumbury thus offered an opportunity for people to interact with their past, to safely engage through the performance of others with the world deep beneath the ground, and such moments would have been powerful both emotionally and mnemonically. The geography of the henge would be altered by the acts of deposition that connected people and place. The emotional and mnemonic impact of the monument would be entirely altered by the placement of human bone within the shafts, yet other items may also have offered personal connections between people's daily lives and the monument. Bradley points out that the only types of material consistently found together at Maumbury were animal bones, flints and antler tools (1975, 18). These, I would suggest, may have come from particular people or families and represented a connection between them and the henge. More than this, it would connect their daily lives with particular parts of the henge where those tools were deposited and created specific mnemonic links between them. The power and efficacy of these kinds of materials may have come, as Pollard has argued, from 'their intricate involvement in daily social life' (2001, 323). The acts of deposition at Maumbury thus entextured the site with feeling, and these textures would be differently experienced by those visiting the site.

The division of the site into two halves and the differences in deposition on each side would facilitate further emotional and mnemonic variations and allow the experience people had of engaging with that monument to change as they moved around it. The deep shafts, in their liminal setting and with their liminal qualities, allowed particular people to place the stuff of everyday life, flints, bones and antler alongside other deposits and shape and texture how the site would be experienced. Each visit to the site may have involved the digging of another shaft, as there is no reason to believe that they were all the result of a single episode of digging (Bradley 1975, 17, 31). The emotional and mnemonic geographies of the site were sculpted through such moments. The placement of human bone towards the top of these shafts can be interpreted in two ways. If the shafts were open at the same time this might represents a renewal of people's relationship with the site as a whole, as I suggest happened at Wyke Down 1 below. Alternatively the deposition of human bone might be associated

with the closing of the shafts, whether they were open at the same time or not. In either case people could renew their connections with the past that lay beneath their feet, with a world that may have been seen as co-present, but separate: a world that was encountered along the Alington ridge that led from Mount Pleasant to Maumbury, and a world that digging allowed people to encounter anew.

Deposition at pit henges

Other monuments too provided the foci for acts of deposition, if on a somewhat smaller scale than Maumbury Rings. The so-called pit henges saw important acts of deposition too, and this was particularly true of the two on Cranborne Chase, the Wyke Down henges. The term pit henges, or pit-circle henges as they are sometimes referred to (e.g. Gale 2003) is slightly misleading. The monuments I will examine here have little in common with the great henges of Dorset. The claim of any similarity rests on their circularity, and on the possible presence of external rather than internal banks (Gale 2003, 61)[xxx], although this is far from clear cut. The scale, architecture and physical experience of these monuments would have been qualitatively different from the grand architecture of Mount Pleasant or Maumbury Rings, or the towering posts at Greyhound Yard. Nevertheless I want to argue that connections did exist between sites like Wyke Down and the great henges, and that their existence tells us something of the multiple, overlapping scales of Late Neolithic existence and identity (Thomas 1996)[xxxi].

Wyke Down 1, the larger of the two pit henges on Cranborne Chase, had a diameter of 19 metres in one direction and 17.5 metres in the other (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 92; fig. 7.17). It was made up of a series of pits, with another pit at the centre of the monument (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 92)[xxxii]. Deposition played a vital part in the way this monument would have been experienced and understood, and artefacts have been found in all three main stratigraphic levels (M. Green 2000). Animal bone and antler were deposited in the primary levels along with flint implements and carved chalk objects (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 97). These artefacts can be associated with the first acts that followed the digging of this monument. Acts of deposition here began to give meaning to the monument and connect it to the wider world. Bone, antler and flint are amongst the most common items discovered in Neolithic deposition. This does not mean, however, that we should dismiss them as merely the detritus of life, as I pointed

out above. Instead it was through deposition of these items that people formed connections with place, and formed a sense of space: space to move in, space to work in and space to live in (cf. Pollard 2001).

Figure 7.17: Plan of the two phases of Wyke Down 1 (after Barrett *et al.* 1991, 94, fig. 3.18).

The acts of deposition helped form understandings of Wyke Down 1, of the meanings of the pits, and of the site as a whole. The deepest pits were either side of the 3m wide south-facing entrance, and at the back of the enclosure. The pits flanking the entrance seem to have been the most important with more animal bone and flint implements

occurring, particularly in the western terminal which was the largest of all the pits. This featured a flint arrowhead, knife, borer, chopping tool, scraper and a retouched flake (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 97). Chalk objects also favoured the last three pits on the east side and the penultimate two pits on the west side, though not the large terminal pit. The final chalk object was placed in the pit at the back of the monument (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 97). The concentration of deposits in these pits begins to hint at an axis for the enclosure, and the importance of making deposits as people entered and left the site. We can imagine that on entering the monument people turned left, passing the west terminal, perhaps placing a flint tool or an animal bone. They then might move round the monument, making occasional deposits until they left, this time marking the pits to the east of the entrance. Of course one could also argue that people circled to the right, and ended with the western terminal - either is possible - and it may be the case that different people demonstrated their identity by moving in a particular way. The carved chalk objects, including a possible phallus, again suggest the presence of particular kinds of gendered people. Their presence, and the act of depositing chalk, may have been central in sanctifying the site, in creating it as a place where the people could conduct their ceremonies and make the necessary acts of deposition.

After these primary acts of deposition the pits were allowed to fill naturally for a few years, after which smaller pits were dug into this fill and new acts of deposition made (M. Green 2000, 86)[xxxiii]. This included Grooved Ware and human bone, in the form of a skull and two deposits of cremated bone. Again the pits around the entrance have the greatest levels of deposition, including the most flints, decorated pottery, animal bone and both the deposits of cremated bone. The Grooved Ware deposited in these phases included two sherds from the same pot in different ditches, one in the western terminal and one in the third pit back from the eastern terminal. These secondary phase deposits thus have much in common with those of the primary phase and yet also reveal new concerns; Grooved Ware is deposited for the first time, as is human bone. I would like to suggest two things, first, that this represents a renewal of the site, and a re-engagement with its concerns, and second, a subtle change in focus.

Crucial to this act of renewal was the deposit of human bone. Human bone, I have suggested, carried with it a variety of mnemonic and emotional associations. These associations would have included the memories and emotions surrounding the dead,

their identities and relationships and also the history of exchanges with which the bones may have been involved, and the stories that may have been associated with the person in life (see also chapter 5). Thus the deposition of human bone re-connected the people to the site in very personal, emotional and memorable ways. The stories and histories of these bones would become part of the story and history of the site itself, and so would people's emotional connections to those bones. Such connections would enhance the importance of the site as a location for deposition.

Yet there was also a subtle change in deposition at this point. Grooved Ware was being deposited for the first time. It was also in the second phase of the smaller, nearby, pit henge Wyke Down 2 that we find Grooved Ware. Here the remarkable Grooved Ware vessel mentioned earlier was found (M. Green 2000, 87). This featured facets of all three southern British Grooved Ware styles, an externally decorated base and carbonised food remains on its interior (Cleal 1999; M. Green 2000, 87). Grooved Ware, I argued earlier, was a complex form of materiality that drew people together and allowed them to express a common sense of identity. It was also Grooved Ware that carried the memory and message of the great henges out into the wider world. By bringing Grooved Ware to, and depositing it at, Wyke Down 1, people were making new statements about their place in the world, about their relationships to one another. This was an extension of the new sense of community and the *power* of community that was engendered by the larger henge monuments. Wyke Down 1 now extended that feeling of community and referred to and drew on those feelings through the use, and crucially deposition, of Grooved Ware. The acts of deposition were vital because they fixed that relationship between the community and the monument; they made it permanent in a very real sense.

What was different, of course, about both Wyke Down 1 and Wyke Down 2, and indeed the pit circles with Grooved Ware on Conygar Hill, was their scale. These sites were much smaller, and lacked the dramatic architecture of the larger henges. Such sites would have been inappropriate for the kinds of *large-scale* feasting and ceremonies that took place at the bigger sites. This change in scale may be taken to reveal not only that different kinds of event were taking place at these monuments, but that different scales of community were being created and maintained (cf. Whittle 2003, 67-8; fig. 7.18). The use of Grooved Ware may well not only have created a

shared sense of identity at the larger sites but also at the more local level. Sites like Wyke Down 1 and 2 or those on Conygar Hill helped give people another sense of identity[xxxiv]. Ad hoc events, like those that took place at Mount Pleasant would be present at these smaller sites too. Indeed many of the acts of deposition may have been the results of small groups visiting the site and conducting impromptu rituals or celebrations. Interestingly, however, in the moment of renewal where human bone and Grooved Ware began to be deposited we can perhaps detect a more formal switch, a deliberate decision to change the acts that took place at the monument.

At one level people would have felt part of the community at the widest scale, created through the architecture and ritual of the larger henges. At another, senses of personal identity might be informed by the items given to people or given away, by the roles played in life and by the gendered positions people took up. These levels of identity were fluid and relational, they were not fixed or permanent; people were not born into an identity nor were those identities fixed by the body. Rather people had to continually form and transform their relationships and it was here that identity at the single or communal scale was brought into being: in the tensions of giving and receiving, of moving and engaging, and watching and performing. At the smaller henges of the Late Neolithic, people were able to create a sense of local identity, of local community, through gathering, deposition and small-scale feasting, indicated by the pig bones at Conygar Hill 52118 (Healy 1997c, 50). The use of Grooved Ware would have tied this community into the larger one, and thus to the power of those henges. People's understanding of partible and dividual personhood would have been at the heart of these understandings of the nested levels of community and identity. A person was made up of objects and bones, which could be separated from them and given to others. Small-scale communities were made up of people, and perhaps animals and objects, that could be separated from them and given to others. Finally the largest scale of community brought everyone together. Here exchange happened through the separation of parts of the community and exchange between those parts. It is these acts of separation and exchange I examine principally in appendix 2.3.5.

Large-scale community: based perhaps on annual or bi-annual gatherings, identity at this level is created and recited through acts of feasting, movement, exchange and deposition at large henge monuments such as Mount Pleasant. Building of such monuments would also have been crucial to the creation of a communal identity. Connections between differing groups much looser, and emotional tensions may have run high during encounters with distant friends, family and rivals.

Medium sized gatherings: People gathering on occasions, often related to one another, including regular exchange partners and such like. Sense of group's identity formed at small monuments through movement and deposition. Pit henges are one example of this. Ad hoc as well as organised rituals would be important here too.

Small-scale groups: family groups, animals, familiar and intimate links cited and reinforced on a daily basis around acts of knapping, eating, digging and deposition in pits. Again much of the way people interacted with their world may have been improvised, playing with themes, rather than controlled and dictatorial.

Figure 7.18: Scales of community (after Healy 1997c, 40, fig. 37; Thomas 1999a, 113, fig. 5.12; Wainwright 1979, 242, fig. 100).

There is an interesting contrast in architectures around the Wyke Down monuments. To the west of Wyke Down 2, two round buildings have been excavated (M. Green 2000, 73; fig. 7.19)[xxxv]. One was larger than the other, being some 8 metres in diameter and both featured four central post holes, arranged in a rectangle (M. Green 2000, 73)[xxxvi]. Much burnt material, including both daub and decorated plaster were recovered from these post holes, suggesting the structures were burnt down (M. Green 2000, 73). The excavator, Martin Green, suggests that the decorated plaster and four post holes may represent a 'finely rendered and decorated enclosed wall' which defined a sacred space (2000, 73). If this is the case the private and closed nature of these structures differs most strongly with the public, open architecture of the two pit henges nearby. The inside of the structures would have been hidden and secret, undoubtedly open only to a few people at a time, particularly within the sacred space. Such places may have been a dangerous and liminal space, where rites of passage may have taken place. It could also be suggested tentatively that these acts might be associated with the first phase of Wyke Down 1. With the arrival of human bone and Grooved Ware, this may have been the point when these structures were burnt down, as Grooved Ware was inserted into the post holes after the burning (M. Green 2000, 75). The burning too may have been extremely important. Rather than destructive it may have been seen as an act of renewal, perhaps (cf. Tringham 2005). In either case it would certainly have been spectacular, and may have formed an impressive backdrop to the second phase of deposition at Wyke Down.

Figure 7.19: Plan of Wyke Down 2 and nearby buildings (after M. Green, 2000, 74, fig. 46).

The pit henges, therefore, played their own crucial role in the formation of community and identity in the Late Neolithic. Although I have concentrated on the Wyke Down henges and Wyke Down 1 in particular, one can imagine similar concerns being at play on Conygar Hill. Here the two pit rings, 52118 and 52100 were located (fig. 7.20). The former of these consisted of seven pits and included Grooved Ware and animal bone in its fills (Healy 1997c, 50). 52100 by contrast consisted of eight pits with eight postholes arranged inside (Healy 1997c, 52). Both the Conygar Hill and Wyke Down sites seem to have drawn on both the past and present in their location. The Conygar Hill sites faced towards the henges of Maumbury Rings and Mount Pleasant yet were located close to an Early Neolithic flint scatter (Healy 1997b). The entrance to Wyke Down 1 faced towards the Dorset Cursus, and to the flint scatter and pits at Chalk Pit Field, yet it was also located close to the source of a river that runs within a few hundred metres of Knowlton Rings (M. Green 2000, 88). These pit henges thus stood between the past and the present, between the broader community and the single person. It was here that people renewed their connections to the world and one another through feasting, display, oratory and exchange, both exchange with the earth and with one another. It was here too that the logic and the power of the

wider community were played out through the use and deposition of Grooved Ware, and here too that other senses of identity were created.

Figure 7.20: Conygar Hill pit rings (after Healy 1997c, 49, fig. 37).

Concluding deposition

Deposition was vital in the Late Neolithic to how people continued to make sense of a fluid and changing world. The deposition at Fir Tree Field revealed that no set of practices should be classed as purely ritual or domestic in character, as such a difference represents an ontological dualism that prevents us from realising the

complex metaphors and acts of texturing at play. Deposition was also central to the practices at Maumbury Rings. The digging of deep shafts into the ground may have allowed people to engage with their past, and the placing of ancestral deer skulls into these locations may have added to this. In addition performative citations of gender may have been caught up in the practices that took place here. Deposition played crucial roles at smaller henges too, however, and at Wyke Down I traced the way in which deposition created both a sense of space and shape to the monument and was vital to the performances that took place there. Central to this was the creation of a multi-layered sense of identity which took in many different groups of varying size. Deposition was also tied into exchange, one of the key organising principles of this period (Whittle 2004). Both the world at large and particular places were exchange partners with the community. Just as people were locked into a series of acts of giving and receiving, and just as these were central to the formation of community, so people were locked into a relationship of giving and receiving with the world that was central to their very existence.

Late Neolithic Dorset: the three strands together

Once again new forms of practice and new forms of dwelling emerged during the Late Neolithic. On Cranborne Chase people began to live in greater numbers, encountering their past, in the form of the Dorset Cursus, in new ways and from new directions. At the same time people began to build a series of new kinds of monument: henges. These were both small in scale, such as the Wyke Down henges, and very large, such as Mount Pleasant. Both the acts of movement and the henges themselves were crucial to the creation and performance of community. It was by dwelling over their past, and by interacting with one another at henges, that people formed a sense of belonging, of the relations that formed them through both the permeability and partibility of their bodies. The different size of gatherings allowed different scales of community to be understood, from small gatherings of families around campfires, via the pit henges where greater numbers could gather, up to the large henges where the broad community could come together. Grooved Ware was a crucial form of materiality that through its portability extended these understandings and metaphors out into the landscape. The use and deposition of materialities including pottery,

human and animal bone, flint tools and stone axes allowed places to be shaped emotionally and memorably, and these textures may have been central to how places were created and experienced.

Beakers interacted with people quite differently to Grooved Ware. As inalienable possessions, sometimes curated over an extended period of time, their exchange would have acted to alter the identities of the giver and the receiver (appendix 2.3.5). The partible sense of personhood still at play allowed people to incorporate items like Beakers within themselves, thus in placing a Beaker within a grave part of the living person became part of the dead (see appendix 2.3.6). These acts of exchange would carry with them memories and emotions, both positive and negative, just as the objects did themselves (appendix 2.3.5). Other objects such as axes would also have continued to be exchanged altering identities in similar ways. The exchange and authentication of inalienable possessions along with the architecture of henge monuments combined to ensure that hierarchy did not emerge in this period, *contra* to the popular view (e.g. Barrett 1994; Renfrew 1973). Community was created, cited and empowered through these corporate monuments. None of these acts of building or exchange were in any way *designed* to prevent chiefdoms, for example, emerging. Rather this was one of the unintended consequences of their construction and use.

The theoretical tropes of this study, identity, memory, emotion, agency and dwelling, have once again all added to the narratives offered here. Through movement, materiality and deposition people formed senses of themselves and senses of each other. They understood and remembered, but just as crucially felt, what it was to be part of the community during the Late Neolithic, to build and move through henges, to exchange items, to sup from Grooved Ware. Whilst some undoubtedly rejected such understandings, or refused to play their parts these would have been in the minority. The Late Neolithic of Dorset was a time when community, in its importance and its power, was perhaps the dominant concern. In any case, individual power, control and dominance certainly were not. The creation, citation and empowerment of convivial community lay behind the grand monumental complexes of this period, and these were central to its performative reiteration.

[i] There are several ethnographic examples of pigs being bred specifically for occasional mass-consumption. Amongst the Tsembaga of highland New Guinea pigs are sacrificed on mass as part of the Kaiko ceremony that is used to bring to an end particularly violent periods of conflict (Edwards and Horne 1997, 125; Rappaport 1968). Not all of these pigs are then eaten. Another example comes from the Wahgi tribe of the same area. Pigs there are reserved for festivals, which can occur as rarely as once a generation (O'Hanlon 1989).

[ii] Although it is important to note that buildings, that may be houses, have recently been discovered outside Durrington Walls, so we should not be dogmatic about their existence in Dorset.

[iii] Hengistbury Head also experienced fairly unusual occupation, featuring a large collection of very high quality Late Neolithic flint work, including eight plano-convex knives, at least nine polished flint axes and a polished discoidal knife (Gardiner 1987, 29-38).

[iv] Throughout this chapter there will be references, endnotes and tables that bemoan the current chronology of the third millennium BC. The majority of sites are very badly dated, with only one or two radiocarbon dates available, in contrast to the increasingly clear chronology for the fourth millennium. This is an issue I will return to in chapter 8, but not one, unfortunately that can be solved within this thesis.

[v] Although the date for the palisade has also been questioned (e.g. Whittle 1997b).

[vi] The possible coexistence of wood and stone in this monument offers and interesting contrast with the situation around Stonehenge, where wood and stone may have been opposed to one another (Parker Pearson and Ramilisonina 1998).

[vii] This probably took place after the introduction of Beaker pottery to the site, a change I will deal with more fully in the section on materiality in this chapter.

[viii] This emphasis upon the visual is something that Thomas has criticised in his later works (e.g. 2004). Indeed he associates the beginnings of the emphasis upon the visual with the emergence of the modern world view (Thomas 2004, 178).

[ix] The preservation of material culture is central to my consideration of Beakers in the next part of the chapter.

[x] This suggests something different to the more permanent structures recently found at Durrington Walls.

[xi] It is interesting here to note the recent re-analysis of bone from Durrington Walls (Albarella and Serjeantson 2002). Close analysis has revealed that pigs were roasted as virtually whole animals, although the relatively low proportion of skulls suggest that either they were brought to the henge already slaughtered or the skulls were removed and taken elsewhere (Albarella and Serjeantson 2002, 37-41). Equally it is interesting to note that Albarella and Serjeantson have identified three pig bones and one cattle bone as having been shot with arrows (2002, 44). This suggests the performance of killing in which hunting was referenced even if it was practised on domesticated animals. No such comparable evidence exists for Mount Pleasant, but the possibility of slaughter as a central part of the performances inside and outside the henge must be entertained.

[xii] The possibility of a routeway running up to the eastern entrance (Barber 2004, 13) suggests the possibility that acts of movement ran from Mount Pleasant in both directions.

[xiii] It is impossible to be more specific with these dates, as they are too few in number and have no stratigraphic relationship to one another. Recent dating programmes have demonstrated the benefit that rigorous dating combined with Bayesian statistics can bring (e.g. Whittle et al. in prep.; see chapter 8).

[xiv] The role of Grooved Ware in the expression of community at Barnhouse on Orkney has been examined by Andy Jones (1999; 2002). His in-depth analysis allows him to differentiate in detail between different sizes, fabrics and tempers of Grooved Ware, along with how differences in the site of production, use and deposition tied into the particular biographies of particular vessels (A. Jones 2002). The history of use of Grooved Ware on the site and at nearby monuments also allows him to trace the changes in its production and a move towards increasingly communal acts of consumption at the monumental structure 8 at Barnhouse (A. Jones 2002, 149-50). The act of making Grooved Ware, Jones suggests, with its combination of clays and tempers, provided a metaphor for the creation of links between households and communities (2002). Jones' detailed study is an excellent and detailed engagement with pottery, and undoubtedly the relationships he detects between vessel biographies and social identities are informative and enlightening. Such relationships are difficult to trace in Dorset in the absence of an equally detailed study of the pottery and indeed in the absence of the sites of production and domestic architecture of Barnhouse. Obviously the emphasis on the relationship between consumption, pottery and community are ideas I would broadly agree with, and have much in common in Dorset. What I believe Jones' account misses, however, is how the production and use of Grooved Ware did not merely stand for the relationships between houses, people and communities (A.

Jones 2002, 156-7) but actually produced them. Archaeology often slips back into a textual analogy where practices and actions *represent* or *stand for* other meanings, in effect where material culture acts as signifier (Barrett 2006). In contrast what I am suggesting for Dorset is that the production, consumption and deposition of Grooved Ware did not stand for the making of community, it *produced* community (following Butler on citation and performativity (e.g. 1993)).

[xv] Mark Edmonds has written about how the display and deposition of materials at causewayed enclosures can be seen in a similar vein as 'tournaments of value' (1993, 124; after Appadurai 1986b, 21).

[xvi] There are many who continue to see Beakers as the signature of an incoming population, however. Brodie (1997) argues that migration was at least partly the cause, whilst Needham goes further (2005), attributing the arrival of Beakers entirely to a new population. People were undoubtedly arriving in Britain from the continent at this time, much as they had done throughout the Neolithic and before. The breakdown of the package of Beaker items, not to mention its co-existence with other forms of pottery, suggests to me that an explanation based on migration tells us very little. Much more interesting is why Beaker pottery fitted in with the concerns of Late Neolithic peoples and was thus adopted by people who continued to use Grooved Ware.

[xvii] Other possibilities also present themselves. Were there undetected recuts in the Site IV ditch? Does the special character of the segment XIII layer 5 deposit disguise a more normal sequence elsewhere. It is difficult to be certain about any of these possibilities, but I argue that the suggestions by A. Woodward (2002) and Bradley (2000) do seem to offer the currently most plausible option.

[xviii] Barrett (1994), of course, is quite correct to say that people in Britain would not necessarily have known the full extent of Beaker distribution across Europe, but this does not mean that they would have been unaware that this was a new, and possibly alien, form of material culture.

[xix] The association between Peterborough Ware and Beakers are widespread (Thorpe and C. Richards 1984, 77), despite their chronologies, at best, only just overlapping. Thomas suggests that the connections tend to be fairly loose, and the material relates to continuities in the practices (1999, 123).

[xx] This is one of only two contexts in which bear has been found in the British Neolithic (M. Green 2000, 70). Space prevents a full discussion of those implications here, but one can easily imagine how a bone from such a dangerous carnivore may have carried with it a host of stories, and in effect become an inalienable possession.

[xxi] Radiocarbon dates from the two pit groups overlap. Pit 11a from the southern group produced a date of 2900-2600 cal BC, whilst Pit 32 from the northern group produced a date of 2780-2480 cal BC (Barrett *et al* 1991, 77; Garwood 1999, 148). They thus could easily be of different date, but the radiocarbon dates are too broad to allow us to be definitive.

[xxii] In effect the body dominates the ontology of daily life, through concerns around survival, hunger, thirst and other corporeal drives. The ontology of ritual by comparison takes place in the mind, it is a battle of ideas, beliefs and cosmologies. The difference between them is thus once more one of body and mind.

[xxiii] The flints were not knapped into the pits, as there are few conjoining flakes in either pit group (Brown 1991, 110). They also appear not to have been trampled, and thus were probably middened (Brown 1991, 110). In this sense the pits contrast with other Late Neolithic pit groups close to earlier monuments, such as those on the southern slopes of Windmill Hill (Whittle *et al*. 2000, 176).

[xxiv] There are a number of difficulties with these dates, not least that there are only two of them. The first (BM2282N) is taken from antler at the base of shaft 1 and offers a date of 2858-2300 cal BC at 2-sigma (Bradley 1984, 110; Woodward 1991, 170). The second (BM2881R) comes from antler at the highest undisturbed level of shaft 3 and gives dates of 2880-2042, again at 2-sigma (Bradley 1984, 110; Woodward 1991, 170). The first of these two dates was on an antler pick that could have been used in the cutting of the shaft, yet we have no way of placing the cutting of shaft 1 in relation to any of the other shafts; all we know is that it must have happened after the cutting of the ditch. It must also be remembered that if material was being curated, as it seems to have been at Mount Pleasant then these dates may not relate to the cutting or filling of the shafts at all. Once more the need for a radical programme of radiocarbon dating for all Neolithic sites is emphasised here (compare the chronologies available for Hambledon Hill and Maiden Castle in chapter 5 to those of Mount Pleasant and Maumbury Rings and see chapter 8).

[xxv] It could be argued that I am imposing a modern, and particularly archaeological metaphor onto the Neolithic here. To dig into the ground is, for an archaeologist of course, to encounter the past. Yet in the Neolithic people regularly dug into the ground, often deliberately in places that had been dug before. Examples of this in Dorset included Rowden (Woodward 1991a), Hambledon Hill (Mercer and Healy forthcoming) and Flagstones (Smith *et al*. 1997). Thus I think people would have been aware of

the relationship between entering the earth, and encountering the past. A quite different conception of time, one in which the past and the present ran alongside each other, would have meant that the past could be made present through digging, rather than just re-encountered.

[xxvi] This contrasts with Mount Pleasant where other deer bones are found, and skulls are less well represented (Harcourt 1979, 214-5).

[xxvii] It is also possible that the past was represented by the reworking of Maumbury at one point in its existence. Like Mount Pleasant, it appears Maumbury Rings may have been altered on at least one occasion as the bank appeared to seal evidence of an earlier enclosure, amongst other features (Bradley 1975, 17, 31).

[xxviii] Sexualised objects are common at southern British henges such as Mount Pleasant (Wainwright 1979), and Durrington Walls, where recent investigations have found new examples (Parker Pearson pers. comm.).

[xxix] Whilst I accept that this suggestion is highly provisional, I do not believe that the existence of alternative genders other than male and female in the Neolithic is a particularly speculative statement. Third genders have been identified in numerous anthropological and historical contexts (e.g. Herdt 1996a; Petra- Ramet 1996; see chapter 2). Sabina Lang (1996, 187) has linked the presence of two-spirits in Native American groups to the themes of ambiguity and transformation that are prevalent in their societies. These are themes we can well imagine at play in the Neolithic (cf. Fowler 2003). Even in our own society, wedded as it is to biologically defined notions of male and female we find transgendered and transsexual people. It is thus rather likely, I would suggest, that alternatively gendered people existed in the Neolithic. The question, therefore, is of writing explorations of material conditions that include the possibilities of alternative genders, rather than dismissing them out of hand.

[xxx] Richard Bradley has discussed in detail the possible importance of circularity in this context (1998, chapter 8).

[xxxi] There are other putative small henges, or hengiforms, in Dorset. These include examples at Lanceborough and Came Down, and possibly at Litton Cheney (Woodward 1991, 136). Another possibility was also discovered along with several Late Neolithic pits during excavations at the Thomas Hardye school in modern day Dorchester (Smith 2000, 73).

[xxxii] The pits, which were up to 2 metres in depth, echo the shafts at Maumbury Rings to a certain extent, both in the sequences of deposition (with human bone at the top), and in form, though obviously they were far shallower (Bradley 2000, 124).

[xxxiii] Martin Green estimates this process would have taken less than 5 years (2000, 86).

[xxxiv] These can be compared to the hengiform structures found near Dorchester in Oxfordshire (Barclay and Halpin 1999).

[xxxv] In the light of the rectangular buildings now being found around Durrington Walls a reconsideration of the shape of the Wyke Down structures may be in order.

[xxxvi] It is interesting to compare these buildings to those found in 2005 outside Durrington Walls. Whilst the purpose of these latter buildings is not yet entirely clear, it has been argued that they do represent dwellings, where people lived for at least some of the year (Parker Pearson 2006). Further research on these houses should reveal much more. They appear, however, to be significantly smaller than the structures on Wyke Down.

Chapter 8: Identities, emotions, memories, conclusions

Introduction

In this thesis I have attempted to set out a theoretical approach that develops archaeological narratives rooted in dwelling and practice. These perspectives lie at the heart of much of what I have found to be convincing, powerful and inspirational within the discipline in recent years. Yet, as has been pointed out by Brück (2001), these perspectives can homogenise the past, and present its people as rational, modern, male, agents (chapter 1). In order to deal with this powerful critique I have developed current and new theoretical positions with regard to identity, emotion and memory. By recognising that these interrelated arenas of being and practice are historically and socially contextual, I have tried to develop a position that enhances, but remains consistent with, the central themes of the dwelling perspective (Ingold 2000) and the best agency driven approaches (e.g. Barrett 2001).

This forms only the first half of my thesis, however. There is little point in developing complex theoretical positions if they are not applied to particular case-studies in the past. There is no dichotomy between theory and practice; they are developed together, through a process of engagements with past materialities that provoke and challenge us, as archaeologists, to see the world differently (Thomas 2004, 237). Thus in the second half of the thesis I have engaged in detail with Neolithic Dorset, with the ways in which people in that period made, moved, and deposited their worlds. In this concluding chapter I want briefly to bring the two halves of this thesis together in a new way. In order to do so I shall return to each of the critical theoretical themes and set out a selection of examples of their centrality to people's practices in Neolithic Dorset[i]. Unbounded by the temporal and thematic divisions used to structure the main case-study chapters, such a move will allow the importance of identity, emotion and memory to be emphasised. I will also, on occasions, go beyond the boundaries of Dorset to cite other examples where these ideas can enhance our understandings. Once I have done so, I will move on to the conclusion of the thesis and set out how I feel these ideas can be developed and expanded in future work.

Identity

Identities in the past would have been very different from the bounded modern individual that is often presented to us as the absolute *sine qua non* of humanity (Thomas 2004)[ii]. In this thesis I have developed a number of alternative positions with regard to identity, and suggested that different concerns may have been at play in the past. These have involved considerations of embodiment and moving at Hambledon Hill (chapter 5) and identity and building at sites like Thickthorn Down and Mount Pleasant (appendices 2.1.1 and 2.3.1). I have also considered how age may have been important and how children and adults may have had very different views of their worlds (chapters 5 and 6). In this concluding section on identity I would briefly like to return to two aspects in particular: personhood and sex/gender.

Personhood

Personhood has been a central trope of my encounter with Neolithic Dorset. The studies of personhood in anthropology and archaeology (e.g. Bird-David 1999; Busby 1997; Fowler 2004; M. Strathern 1988; Trudelle Schwarz 1997; Whittle 2003) have shown that conceptions of bounded individuals are inappropriate when applied to non-Western situations (but see endnote two again). Instead we need to consider how other forms of being human, indeed conceptions of what it is to be human, are produced through practice. In chapter 5 I suggested that two notions of personhood may have *co-existed* in the Neolithic. Drawing on the work of Marilyn Strathern (1988) and Cecelia Busby (1997) these were glossed as partible and permeable. In turn throughout the Neolithic, notions of what it was to be human were caught up in multiple aspects of people's lives. Materiality, for example including bones, axes, pots and chalk, was central to how people engaged with personhood. The movement of axes, I suggested, may have been caught up in partibility, as people transferred inalienable objects between themselves. This would have permanently altered understandings of identity of both person and axe (my distinction, not theirs) as aspects of a body were objectified and separated. This may have been why we see axes moving over such great distances in the Neolithic.

I also tied this conception of personhood to the movement of Beakers, which I also suggested were inalienable. By this I mean they could not be parted from the contexts of production, use and exchange in which they were enmeshed. Like axes they carried

identities of their own, and could combine and separate from people through processes of exchange (appendix 2.3.5). They could become parts of people, yet parts that could later be objectified and externalised. As such the deposition of Beakers within a grave acted as a moment where identities of the living and the dead were transformed as parts of the bodies of the living could be placed within a grave (see appendix 2.3.6). In such a context the burial of the Amesbury Archer in Wiltshire is interesting, as here five Beakers were placed into the grave with the body (www 4). The presence of these 'elite' items has led to the body being termed the 'king of Stonehenge' (www 4). Yet when one takes the position advocated in chapter 7 and in appendix 2.3.6, very different understandings emerge. Instead of the number of Beakers reflecting status, they are instead caught up in complex and ongoing negotiations around identity and the body. Bodies are not fixed and bounded, but continually reconstituted through movement, materiality and exchange. Rather than reflecting our ideas around identity, these understandings instead challenge us to think in new ways about the past, and through that the present (O. Harris 2006).

Permeable conceptions of personhood, by contrast, were caught up in how substances flowed between animals, pottery and people throughout the Neolithic[iii]. It may also have been central to animistic conceptions of cosmology, and may thus have been caught up in the creation of animals, or places, as persons (appendix 2.2.2). If people and animals were both created through flows of substance then both may have been seen as being created out of similar things. Thus both, on occasions, may have been created as persons. The use of Grooved Ware, in the Late Neolithic, may have created flows of substance through animals, communities and the wider world and so have constituted the relationship between each. The attainment of personhood by animals was also created through the manipulation of other, partible, forms of identity: the bones of animals and people. These were juxtaposed at sites like Hambledon Hill where parts of a cattle pelvis were placed in conjunction with a human femur (Mercer and Healy forthcoming; appendix 2.1.3).

At another causewayed enclosure similar statements were being made about the relationships between people and animals. At Windmill Hill in Wiltshire there are several examples of the juxtaposition of animal and human bones (O. Harris 2003; forthcoming; Whittle et al. 1999). Two in particular stand out. The first came from the

outer ditch and consisted of the cranium of a 3-4 year old child nested within the frontlet of an ox (Whittle *et al.* 1999, 89). The second came from the inner ditch where a child femur was inserted into a cattle humerus (Whittle *et al.* 1999, 110). Thus across southern Britain people were playing with the boundaries between animals, particularly cattle, and people. When we consider both animals and people to be made up of permeable (flesh, milk and other substances) and partible (bones) aspects, and the kinds of practice in which people and animals were caught up, we can begin to make sense of this[iv]. A consideration of personhood is central to our understandings not only of bodies but of materiality and place too. At Mount Pleasant I suggested that the very structure of the site may have been caught up in the creation and citation of different forms of personhood (chapter 7). The way the architecture separates those people on the banks from those in the centre may have acted as a form of partibility in itself. Thus communities may have been able, through this kind of architecture to be partible, just as people were. At the same time permeability may have been emphasised amongst the broader community, the social person, as Grooved Ware stressed the flow of substances amongst them. Personhood must become central to our accounts if we are to challenge the normative and essentialised narratives that dominate our understandings of the past (Fowler 2004; Thomas 2004; Whittle 2003).

Sex/gender

As Butler has clearly demonstrated modern forms of sex are not the inevitable products of genetic code (1993). Rather they are produced through the citation and reiteration of regulatory ideals. Far from presenting a truth about human beings they instead disguise the fictive origins of all genders and sexes. There is no *truth* about human gender or sexuality; rather gendered bodies are produced through practice, through being-in-the-world. Such a position does not deny bodily realities but rather recognises, following Ingold (2000), that these too are produced in conjunction with being, and are not somehow *a priori*. If we are to prevent current gender models being unquestioningly accepted, and so disenfranchising those who attempt to challenge them in the present, we must recognise this in our studies of the past.

In Dorset I have suggested moments in which differing genders may have been produced through citation. These genders may not have been permanently attributed but rather emerged under different circumstances. For example the nature of practices

at Mount Pleasant may have created gendered distinctions between those on the outside of the enclosure ditches, and those on the inside (appendix 2.3.4). Because of the permeable and partible nature of personhood gender may only have emerged on occasions. At certain times, whether in the act of exchange, in making certain forms of materiality, or in building, certain forms of gender may have been being performatively cited. At other times people may have been conceived of as being made up of more than one gender, and that different parts of themselves (bones, axes, flesh) embodied those different genders. Exchange and consumption may thus have been crucial practices through which gender was cited just as they are in Melanesia (M. Strathern 1988) and India (Busby 1997). At other sites away from Dorset we might think about how if certain materialities were caught up in gendering practices then deposition may have gendered certain *locations* in certain ways. If the making of or consumption from pottery, for example, were caught up in citations of a particular gender then it is interesting that at the Etton causewayed enclosure pottery is almost exclusively deposited in the eastern half of the enclosure (Pryor 1998, 67). Could this be an example of how particular halves of that enclosure were gendered in differing ways?

There is no need, however, to slip into simple binary, structuralist, narratives. Once again there would have been moments where such conceptions were undermined, or subverted, such as on the single occasion where pottery can be found in the western half of Etton (Pryor 1998, 67). At such moments of subversion other genders may have emerged that were more permanently marked on the body by physical alteration or through certain forms of practice. In Dorset I have suggested that these may have included the working of chalk into sexualised objects (chapter 6), and the deposition of items into the deep shafts at Maumbury Rings (chapter 7). At these dangerous, liminal, moments, practices may have come to the fore that gendered people in new ways, ways that might utterly escape our understandings of male and female[v].

It is for this reason that it is important to give consideration to other kinds of gender that exist today and in the recent past, both in Western society and elsewhere (chapter 2). The consideration of gender and identity more broadly is an essential part of conducting archaeological research. Not only does a failure to consider identity radically weaken any understanding of the past itself, identity politics are also at the

heart of modern-day power struggles. They are caught up in discourses that have profound effects on inequalities within British and Western society. Examples of this include the ongoing levels of homophobic violence, the role of Britain within the European Union, and perhaps most crucially, the role of immigrants and their descendants within British society. It is essential that archaeology challenges dominant and repressive descriptions of identity within its own discourses so that the discipline as a whole can prevent its use as support for normative and hegemonic arguments. Thomas has argued that 'our attitude towards the distant people whom we study is indicative of our attitudes towards other human beings in general' (2004, 238). I would go further. The two are not merely indicative of one another, they are *formative of one another*.

Emotion

I argued in chapter 3 that emotions are socially contextual, that they are produced through practice, discourse and being-in-the-world. Emotions are a classic example of something that blurs the outmoded Western distinction between body and mind. It is simply not acceptable to dismiss them as unavailable for study because they are somehow unrecoverable. To claim that status, for example, is *visible* in the archaeological record but emotions are not misses the vital point made by Barrett (2001): that there is no such thing as *the archaeological record*. Thus discussions of what and what is not represented by it entirely misconstrue the argument (chapter 1). Archaeologists do not merely recover a record of past actions that they then examine for visible social structures. Rather archaeologists engage with, and explore, the material conditions through which past lives were led (Barrett 1994; 2001; O. Harris 2005; chapter 1). Thus in exploring the material conditions of past lives, in writing about how they must have been inhabited, we cannot choose to either ignore emotions (both ours and theirs) or to confront them. Rather the choice is to either acknowledge their centrality to both the present and the past or to suppress them, deny their importance and refuse to openly engage with debate. Anthropological and sociological studies (e.g. Lupton 1998; Overing and Passes 2000a) have convincingly demonstrated that no adequate explanations of any human practice can be undertaken without considering emotion. To limit areas of human existence that archaeologists can study does not offer us an opportunity to generate secure narratives, but rather represents a 'recurring failure of nerve' (Thomas 2004, 157). In this section I want to

consider two areas of emotion I considered within my case-studies: the importance of conviviality, and how emotion, materiality and deposition combined to create what Sheller terms 'emotional geographies' (2004).

Conviviality

Conviviality, a concept developed in Amazonian ethnography (Overing and Passes 2000a), offers powerful tools for archaeologists to begin to think about the care and effort people in the past put into getting along, to feeling the right way and maintaining emotional aesthetics (Whittle 2004). Such concerns may have been as important to people in the past as gathering resources, building monuments or herding cattle. More than this, they may have been central to exactly those kinds of activities. It may have been *why* people gathered, built and herded in the ways that they did and at the places they did. I have suggested that conviviality was at the heart of the acts of building and movement that took place at Hambledon Hill (chapter 5). There people constructed a series of enclosures and earthworks that allowed, perhaps insisted, that people interacted, moved and engaged with one another in the right ways. People had to feel that Hambledon was a place where the dead could be excarnated, and where pottery and stone axes could be exchanged. The numbers of people coming together would inevitably have created tensions that the architecture of a site like Hambledon Hill, along perhaps with the consumption of various substances, helped to soothe, for some at least.

The burning of the palisade offers an interesting counterpoint to this interpretation. Was this a moment where the aesthetics of conviviality failed? Or was it part of ensuring that people felt the right way, because it felt like the right thing to do? This may sound like a banal explanation but it is far from that. The evidence for violence also suggests that these tensions were not always managed successfully. Yet anthropological research does not suggest that in such moments of violence emotions and conviviality were irrelevant, rather it further enhances their importance. As both Rosaldo (1993) and Alès (2000) have shown, violence within small-scale socialities is much more likely to be motivated by anger or love than by more traditional archaeological explanations of assaults, warfare and resources disputes. This is because, as Overing and Passes (2000c; see chapter 3) have demonstrated a central concern of sociality is that people get along, feel the right way at the right time, and

attend to the good/beautiful life. Even at sites elsewhere in the Neolithic where more wide-scale assaults may have taken place, for example at Carn Brea and Crickley Hill, there is no reason to dismiss emotion and conviviality from their explanation.

Conviviality is a concept that ties communities together. It begins to allow us, as archaeologists, to consider the effort that went into maintaining communal ties at multiple scales. This is a subject that has been repeatedly important within my study of the Dorset Neolithic. In the Late Neolithic, for example, I examined the way in which community was performatively cited at a number of different scales, through a variety of monuments (chapter 7). These included the smaller henges at Wyke Down and Conygar Hill through to the enormous monuments at Knowlton and Mount Pleasant. Outside Dorset, similar performative citations of community may have taken place at Late Neolithic hengiforms such as ring ditch 611 at Barrow Hills in Oxfordshire. There, like at Wyke Down, people appeared to have renewed the community's connection to the monument, and thus with each other, by depositing Grooved Ware in the later silts of the monument, rather than in the initial phases (Barclay 1999, 35).

Communities only exist because people create them and thus *feel* them to exist. These sites were crucial in that they created emotional and affective bonds between people, the acts of building and the practices that took place there. Community was produced and maintained through the ways such actions made people feel: through conviviality in other words. The formation of community is often taken for granted. Archaeologists, perhaps still silently locked into a bands-tribes-chiefdoms-states-model, presume some level of communal interaction, and the automatic, normative existence of family groups. Yet such aspects of sociality are not some how *natural* any more than sex or gender, or the hierarchies I attacked in chapter 7. Rather they are produced through dwelling and practice. Central to the production of convivial community, I suggest, is how people feel about themselves and their worlds, how they feel about each other.

Emotional geographies

Although emotions are crucial in understanding how people interacted and their forms of community and sociality, it is important to remember that emotions may also have

been central to their engagements with both material objects and places. Indeed given the discussion of personhood above, and in the main body of the thesis, distinctions between objects and people may often not have been recognised by people in Neolithic Dorset. The term emotional geographies, taken from sociology (Sheller 2004), begins to get at how emotions may have been central to how places were experienced. More than this, the interaction of emotionally laden materialities with the specificities of practice and place meant that particular locales could have been shaped by emotion, and this may have had long-term consequences for how they were experienced and understood. A good example of this comes from Rowden (chapter 5). Here material that included several pigs was placed into a large pit, probably after a process of middening (Pollard 2001; Woodward 1991a). This material would have been replete with emotional elements, with the links embodied by the pig bones, the flint and the pottery. By placing the material into the ground people sealed their *emotional* connections with place. It fixed for perpetuity how they would feel, affectively and bodily, on re-encountering that site. Such powerful emotions may have transcended generations and it may be for these emotional reasons that we see people cutting a new pit into the fill of the old some 100 years or more later, though once more the dating of this is far from precise.

The consequences of these emotional geographies can be seen in more spectacular fashion at a site like Hambledon Hill. In chapter 5 I argued that the extraordinary similarities between the two child burials separated by at least 160 years demonstrated that how people *felt* about parts of the monument was shaped through deposition. Here the chronology is not in question, produced as it is through sophisticated bayesian modelling (Healy 2004; Mercer and Healy forthcoming). I have also suggested that forgetting was at play here, as whole bodies were deposited, denying people access to the mnemonic bones of the dead (chapters 5 and 6 and see below). It does not matter in this context whether the first burial was remembered in detail or not. In either case it was *felt* that the north-west part of the enclosure was an appropriate place to bury these kinds of people in this particular way. Monuments are often written about as being directly connected with memory (Bradley 2002; Campbell 2005), and indeed they often are. Yet they are equally tied in with emotion, and are shaped by the affective geographies of experience that their re-encounter inevitably brings. The crucial role of deposition at these sites, whether of children at

Hambledon Hill or of pottery at Etton, shaped how people would feel about these sites, and parts of these sites for generations, indeed centuries to come. I am not dismissing the role of memory here[vi], indeed as I have argued throughout this thesis (and see below) a consideration of memory is essential to our understandings of the past. But if burials like this were remembered, then they were remembered *because* of their affective impact and the emotional geographies they formed. Indeed it would not be stretching the point to describe emotional geographies as *a form of social memory*.

Memory

Memory represents another important theoretical concern of this thesis. Rather than viewing memory as an act of recall from a storage, I have instead argued that, in the terms of Bartlett, it is an 'effort after meaning' (1932). This forms the basis for a view of memory once more situated within both dwelling and practice. Memories here emerge, on occasions unbidden, from the process of being-in-the-world. Memories, people and being are thus produced together. This position also allows us to consider how social memory works, and how this can be extended beyond a single person's lifetime. I have also considered how materialities are caught up in material objects and how bones, for example, might acts as mnemonics not only for the persons from whom they came but also their own histories or biographies of exchange, and the multiple social relations in which both were enmeshed. In this brief section I would like to return to two key themes: how memories can return involuntarily through movement, and the crucial role that deliberate forgetting may have played.

Movement and memory

Within this thesis my principal discussion on memory and movement focused on the Middle Neolithic Dorset Cursus (chapter 6). This 9.8 kilometre long monument created a series of bodily encounters between people and the landscape, in a specific order, that would have led to memories returning, on occasions involuntarily. These sequentially ordered experiences, both memorable in themselves and reliant in turn on memory, allowed specific narratives about the past to be agreed. A similar set of encounters may have been created around the Maiden Castle bank barrow, Flagstones enclosure and Alington Avenue long barrow to the south (Davies *et al.* 2002; appendix 2.2.1). Here, however, no cursus was created to insist upon a particular narrative of engagement; rather the monuments could be encountered in a specific

sequence, or not, depending on what was felt to be appropriate. The sequence of encounters in this area may have had increasing power in the Late Neolithic as Mount Pleasant was constructed on the Flagstones ridge along with several round barrows. The recent suggestion that an avenue may lead up to Mount Pleasant's east entrance suggests movement in the other direction also (Barber 2004).

Of course controlled approaches to monuments is something that is very familiar to the north, in Wiltshire. Here, in the Late Neolithic, an avenue was created that ran between the Avon and Stonehenge. Further north again, two stone-lined avenues ran away from Avebury, towards Beckhampton and West Kennet. It is this latter avenue that is especially interesting to compare with the Dorset Cursus. Although significantly later in date, the West Kennet avenue links a number of new and old sites just as the Cursus does. It runs from The Sanctuary in view of several long barrows, including both West and East Kennet. It then runs in sight the West Kennet Palisade Enclosures and Silbury Hill to Avebury's south entrance (Pollard and Reynolds 2002). Just as the Dorset Cursus links old sites with new ones (such as the enclosure at Monkton Up Wimborne) so does the West Kennet Avenue[vii]. Clearly in the Neolithic it was important on a number of occasions to create particular sequences of encounter through movement. What the Dorset Cursus and the West Kennet Avenue do is to create a particular narrative, drawn both from myths and, as people moved along them, from memories that may have returned involuntarily.

It is thus insufficient, though not unimportant, to consider the embodied nature of walking the Dorset Cursus (Tilley 1994). We also need to contextualise this, to link it back to the other sites seen and encountered, to consider the effects which encountering monuments would have had for *them* and not just for us. This requires us to consider how various people may have experienced the monument differently, and how understandings and memories may have been negotiated as well as experienced. Thus considerations of the socially contextual nature of memory, emotion and identity are again important here. The Cursus was not just an encounter with history, it created and produced history. In a world where time may not have been viewed as linear, but as cyclical or in other forms, the encounter with older monuments may have been intensely mnemonic as history and the past were made present, physically, emotionally and memorably.

Forgetting

Forgetting is the essential counterpoint to memory (Forty and Küchler 1999). This may seem self-evident. Forgetting, however, can also be a social practice, one aided and abetted by materiality, even monumentality (Küchler 1999; Rowlands 1999). It is often comparatively easy to suggest occasions where things may have been remembered in the past, it is much less easy to identify technologies of forgetting. I have suggested in this thesis that one example of forgetting, in the Early and Middle Neolithic at least, may have been the deposition of whole bodies. Bones may have been involved in multiple sets of relations, but one of these may have involved them acting as mnemonics of the dead. This interpretation runs counter to the commonly held view that the break-up of the dead was tied into their dissolution into a body of nameless ancestors. Such an argument seems to rely on the apparent lack of distinctiveness between single human bones. Thus whilst a skeleton is recognisable as a person, a femur is not. Such a distinction obviously loses its power in the face of my earlier discussions of personhood. When people, and thus bodies, are not limited to the bounded individual the break-up of a skeleton need not imply their forgetting. Indeed if axes, Beakers and other inalienable possessions were regularly moving from person to person then the bodies of the living were regularly being broken up too.

Therefore the burial of intact bodies may have acted as a technology of forgetting rather than remembrance. At sites like Flagstones this was enhanced by the deposition of standing stones above some of the burials (Healy 1997a). These would have created new narratives around the site and acted to focus attention away from the burials themselves. Equally at Monkton Up Wimborne the hiding away of the burials in the north face of the large central pit would have acted as a technology of forgetting, aided this time by the explicitly memorable events that later took place there (chapter 6; cf. M. Green 2000). It is important not to replace one absolute distinction with another, however. On other occasions the burial of whole bodies was remembered, and we see this in the burial of bodies under round barrows. Thus forgetting or remembering was only partially conditioned by the treatment of the body; it also directly involved the circumstances and the marking of any interment that took place.

Forgetting on these occasions was a social practice, and like all social practices was formed through the conjunction of people, materials and places. These technologies would not force people to instantly forget the burial of a friend or loved one, but they constructed discourses around what it was appropriate to remember and recall. No doubt other, more subtle, technologies of forgetting were at play throughout the Neolithic. Indeed many memorable deposits, such as the middens potentially deposited at Rowden, or at Coneybury for that matter (Pollard 2001; J. Richards 1990), may have acted as vehicles for both remembering *and* forgetting. By burying these middens in particular locations, statements may have been being made about how that place should be remembered. In so doing other, alternative, subverting, narratives may have been forgotten. Equally one might see the acts of burial themselves as acts of subversion, challenging previous practices of accumulation. In either case new acts which would have been memorable inevitably directed attention away from other acts, other memories, and thus this too could have acted as a technology of forgetting.

It is essential when we engage with memory in archaeology that we conceive of the multiple ways in which it can work. It is present in the retelling of stories, myths and legends. It also returns, perhaps involuntarily, in ceremonies, rituals and acts of movement. It is present in the knapping of a flint blade or the decoration of a pot, it is entwined with forgetting, and exists at social as well as individual levels. What I have tried to demonstrate through this thesis is the need to consider memory at all these levels and how it interacts with gender, emotion and power (Seremetakis 1991). Although memory is now becoming a common topic of discussion within archaeology, the narratives offered here have been an attempt to develop that debate and to suggest some new directions for consideration.

Conclusions

We cannot aim as archaeologists to recover the 'true' identities, memories, or emotions of past peoples. Nor can we access them through empathy, or a shared humanity. Rather what we can do is engage in an embodied experiential act of our own, and explore the material conditions in which other people have lived. In so doing we *can* consider how memories, identities and emotions may have been

important and may have been conceived. The aim of archaeology must surely be to offer as complex, challenging and intellectually satisfying narratives as possible. The choice is not between telling a partial but truthful account or one that is fanciful and fulfilling. Instead we need to conduct engagements that are rigorous, yet continue to question our own assumptions about the past and the present. It is no more impossible to consider the emotional impact of Beaker exchange than it is to consider its economic value. Both are *equally* difficult to engage with yet both are equally possible. That one is often viewed as legitimate for study and the other not is no more than a consequence of the traditions of thought from which archaeology emerged (Thomas 2004, 234); it does not represent a *truth*. What both offer is an opportunity for new and different narratives to emerge that challenge the silent Western, androcentric, capitalism of much of what is written.

This thesis is in no way intended to provide answers, or to offer solutions, to the archaeological problems that we, as a discipline, continue to set ourselves. Rather this thesis has tried to move the discussion forward, to engage with critical debates around the nature of archaeology. Situated alongside, though not necessarily within, current calls for a symmetrical archaeology (Witmore 2006), and a counter-modern archaeology (Thomas 2004; 2006), it has challenged the ways in which most archaeologists have approached identity, memory and emotion. The theoretical chapters of the thesis set out a cogent position from which these important aspects of being-in-the-world can be approached. In doing so, this thesis deliberately challenges views that see identity, emotion and memory as unrecoverable. The choice, to emphasise the point, is not between engaging with the topics of this thesis or rejecting them. Rather it is between discussing them, and quite probably coming to very different conclusions than I have, or ignoring them. This is not simply a matter of academic choice; rather both are political strategies: one that looks to challenge, broaden and deepen our understanding and one that homogenises past and present and in so doing legitimises political inequalities today. As Thomas points out, how we consider people in the past has direct ethical and moral consequences in the present (2004, 235).

Moving on

Where do we go from here? There are numerous directions in which the study I have conducted here could be advanced both by others and myself. This thesis represents one encounter with the past, one which I hope will provoke new questions and new approaches. What I want to do here, however, is set out some of the ways in which the thesis could be built on in the future, and the possibilities that new ideas, approaches and techniques can offer us.

Chronology

There is much that needs to be developed to further the aims of this thesis and to develop the narratives I have offered. Improved chronologies should be on the top of the agenda. Chronology remains as important today as it has always done yet for quite different reasons. Whereas previously the chronological relationships between forms of materiality, or monument, needed to be investigated for their own sake, or to reveal the movements of people, we can now appreciate how differing temporalities allow much more detailed narratives to emerge. The kinds of dating programme currently being carried out on the fourth millennium cal BC, by Alex Bayliss, Frances Healy, Alasdair Whittle and others, have already transformed our understandings of long barrows and causewayed enclosures; not just our understanding of their chronologies, but of their histories, narratives and places in people's worlds (Whittle *et al.* in prep.). A similar study of the third millennium cal BC is now surely called for. A study of Mount Pleasant to match that at Hambledon could transform our understandings of that place and allow much more detailed and satisfying narratives to emerge. New chronologies would help to develop more sophisticated understandings of the temporalities of people's engagements with different monuments, particularly at the end of the fourth and into the third millennium. It would help answer crucial questions within Dorset about the relationships between Alington Avenue and Flagstones for example (appendix 2.2.1). Alongside that one of the aspects that I have underplayed in this thesis is conceptions of time in the past (cf. Lucas 2005). New chronologies can help us to engage with the rhythm of engagements which people had with certain sites, and with that how understandings of time itself may have been formed.

Encounters and community

I would also like to develop theoretical understandings in a number of different areas. Can we develop more sophisticated understandings of encounter (cf. Goffman 1963)? What social processes, specifically, were at play when people came together? How might face-to-face encounters have been created and managed within larger gatherings? What were the specific tensions encountered in the act of exchange? At a broader level, and drawing on the understandings of conviviality developed here, this notion of encounters might be developed into a more sophisticated, detailed and specific consideration of community. I have referred to how community may have existed at a number of different scales within Late Neolithic society, but can we develop this? What kinds of size might these various groups be? How were they made up? What different kinds of identity might have been at play? This is the exact opposite of importing notions of bands or tribes. Instead we need to develop understandings from the ground up and think about the ways in which dwelling through Neolithic material conditions of being might lead to certain, and particular, types of community existing. The trick will be to develop coherent narratives that work on specific scales, and perhaps even more in-depth studies than have been offered here. It will be necessary to consider the kinds of sociality implied by causewayed enclosures, the numbers of people this must have involved and the rhythms inherent in coming together and moving apart. What kinds of social relations existed amongst and between groups? Can we consider if they were exogamous or endogamous? One way of teasing out such structures might be to compare two particular areas, over a similar time span. For example one could compare Ireland in the 37th century cal BC, with the multiple 'house' structures that date to that period, and southern Britain with the emergence of causewayed enclosures during the same century. Such a study would allow a direct consideration of community and sociality to emerge that would build upon the considerations of conviviality, for example, that this thesis has argued for.

Movement and diet

Considerations of sociality, community, encounter and being-in-the world would also be helped by the expansion of new isotopic studies of food consumption and movement. What were people eating and where were they living? Did they move into and out of Dorset? These may be old questions but within the more sophisticated

theoretical positions developed here and elsewhere the answers can help us write the more complex and satisfying narratives I have called for. The techniques that are now being applied by archaeologists will also require sophisticated theoretical understandings. If groups were moving around over great distances, or eating this kind of food but not that, how can we explain this in terms of sociality? How would it have tied in with different cosmologies, beliefs and identities? Discussions of taboos may offer one way forward (e.g. Thomas 2003), but this is only one solution. Undoubtedly this will have to be combined with detailed considerations of identity and gender, of the kind I have offered in this thesis, as more evidence of dietary variation and people's mobility emerges. What is certainly the case is that scientific techniques such as isotope studies will never, in themselves, give us 'the answer'. Rather they offer the opportunity for more detailed, but even more complex, theoretical narratives to be constructed.

Subversion

The notion of subversion is also one I would like to consider more closely, and perhaps this can be linked to Bakhtin's notion of the carnivalesque (1984 [1964]; cf. Cochrane 2005). I have suggested a number of moments where regulatory ideals, memories and emotions may have been subverted, or turned upside down. How can we begin to investigate these? How can we differentiate between moments of reiteration and moments of subversion (Salih 2000)? The answer, I think, is to work at both a broader and narrower scale. To consider, for example, how pottery is treated over a regional or even nation-wide scale, and then to consider specific moments where broad patterns are reacted against. It may be that the origins of monumentality lie in a moment of subversion or alteration. Again the benefits of detailed chronologies present themselves here. The sudden and dramatic springing up of causewayed enclosures in the 37th century cal BC is intriguing. Does this represent the subversion of older beliefs across a wide scale? What kinds of variation, subversions within subversions, can we detect? How do they relate to other kinds of Neolithic enclosure? How do they relate at a broader level with enclosures that are still causewayed but later in date, be that Maiden Castle, Flagstones or Stonehenge I? It is essential also that possible causewayed enclosures outside the main spread be investigated as soon as possible.

Boundaries

This thesis has also constantly thrown up questions around boundaries, and this forms the final aspect that I want to set out here for future research. The concept of boundaries seems to exist at every level of discourse I have touched upon. At the highest level it divides archaeology from other disciplines, it divides the Neolithic from the Bronze Age and divides my chapters on emotion and memory. On another level within the Neolithic there were boundaries created by rivers, enclosures, ditches and cursus monuments. In this thesis I have tried to question the boundaries that are sometimes seen to exist between rationality and emotion, between male and female and between nature and culture. Yet boundaries continue to infiltrate all aspects of academia, and in a period full of pits, enclosures and henges it is difficult not to see them in the past. Yet the study of emotion and personhood shows how all views on boundaries are socially contextual, and produced through practice and dwelling. A new study of boundaries in the Neolithic, alongside an archaeology of boundaries in Western thought, is surely called for. Ideally this should be situated alongside new fieldwork investigating directly how enclosures create, or perhaps fail to create, the kinds of boundary we are familiar with. Thinking about boundaries and their subversion ties us back into many of the issues I have already set out as essential for future research.

Endgame

In this thesis I have set out and developed understandings of identity, memory and emotion. I have then taken these understandings and shown that they can profitably be applied to one particular period of the past in one regional area. I hope the position I have developed here will provoke debate and suggest ideas to others who can then develop them and move forward. The thesis is not a user's guide to emotion, or anything else. Rather it is a creative encounter with one set of material conditions informed by approaches that I find powerful, convincing and essential.

I have argued here that approaches rooted in dwelling and practice offer us powerful tools to engage with the past, but they do not offer enough in themselves. Rather they are the foundations on to which other kinds of analysis can be built. In this thesis I have taken three areas that I believe are essential both to political situations in the present, and to our understandings of the past and developed ways in which they can

be understood from within dwelling and practice. These positions on identity, emotion and memory have proved essential in developing new narratives about Neolithic Dorset as I conclude above, and as set out in chapters 5, 6 and 7. These insights allowed me to suggest that emotion was crucial to how people shaped a site like Hambledon Hill, that memory played vital roles in movement of people down the Dorset Cursus and that identity was constructed through the exchange of inalienable possessions in the Late Neolithic (appendix 2.3.5). Without the considerations of identity, emotion and memory the narratives I have offered here would be inevitably weakened. There are many other narratives I could have created about Neolithic Dorset from these perspectives, and undoubtedly others will take issue with what I have written here. The aim of this thesis though has not been to tell the 'real story' about the past, but rather to show that new narratives emerge when we consider these aspects of human existence.

Yet this remains only the beginning. The problem from here on is to maintain these new insights whilst consistently challenging and improving them alongside new techniques, new theoretical ideas and new approaches yet to be developed. I have outlined a few of the areas that I see as immediate priorities above. One must always continue to question what is accepted and to challenge what is assumed, by oneself as much as by society at large or other researchers. Improving our understandings of the past allows archaeologists to challenge dominant hegemonies in the present that argue that current economic and political inequalities are the inevitable result of progress or the consequence of human evolution. To 'bear witness to the past other' (Thomas 2004, 238) whilst challenging our own experiences and beliefs is the challenge that faces us as archaeologists, and one to which I hope this thesis makes some contribution.

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[i] Obviously this represents only a selection, as this is a conclusion it would be meaningless to reiterate every example made in the full text. Instead I will draw on some of the crucial ideas here that will elucidate my argument.
[ii] Indeed I would argue that modern identities are also very different to this partial, political, description so often offered (cf. LiPuma 1998).
[iii] Again these understandings are clearly contextual, however (see chapter 5 and endnote iv below). Beakers could contain substances, of course, and thus on occasions have been caught up in permeable flows between people. On the whole, however, the smaller capacity of Beakers along with the curation of their sherds, I suggest, related to their role within partible conceptions of personhood.

[iv] It is important to note again here, however, as I did in chapter 5, that these distinctions are not absolute. At times bones may have been understood as substances rather than objects and pottery (indeed as I argued with Beakers) may have been seen as objects rather than central to flows of substance. The understandings I advocate here may have been dominant, but they remained, nevertheless, contextual.

[v] It is difficult to discuss gender in the past without using terms such as male and female. Yet to do so risks imposing normative and essentialised views onto the past. To combat this we need to be clear that when one uses these terms they may have stood for very different things, they may have applied to people that would have been gendered differently today, and they may have been temporary rather than permanent performances. We also need to accept that other kinds of gender may well have existed alongside them, and that the polarised male/female dichotomy we idealise today cannot be thrust whole sale onto the past. In appendix 2.3.4 I develop a speculative engagement with gender at Mount Pleasant where I deliberately avoid the words male and female instead using the neutral terms 'gender A' and 'gender B'.

[vi] Memory was certainly important at causewayed enclosures, for example, throughout the Neolithic. Etton, again, is perhaps the best example of this. Here not only do the deposits in the ditches build on former acts of deposition, but the many small filled pits that never intercut despite their digging and filling over a considerable span of time (O. Harris 2003; Pryor 1998).

[vii] Indeed so does the Beckhampton Avenue. It passes to the south of Windmill Hill and at its end it overlies an older enclosure, which at one stage had stone settings (Pollard and Reynolds 2002).

Appendix 1: Background to Neolithic Dorset

Introduction

This appendix is designed to offer a brief introduction to the various sites discussed in the main body of the text. It is not intended to form a total catalogue of Neolithic sites in Dorset, nor is it an attempt to offer a complete analysis of the sites that are mentioned. Rather it provides a summary of those sites discussed in the case-study chapters, offering description, dating and the major references from which further information can be obtained. Neither the list of finds nor of references is comprehensive. The locations given are based on the site's relationship to three mini-regions: Cranborne Chase, the Flagstones Ridge and the South Dorset Ridgeway. Figure 1, located on the next page, should be consulted for more precise locations, the numbers on the map refer to the corresponding entry in the appendix.

Figure 1: Map of all sites listed in appendix 1.

Alphabetical list of sites discussed in the text

1: Alington Avenue long barrow

Location: Flagstones Ridge.

Date: 3370-2910 cal BC.
        Second phase of use in the Early Bronze Age

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic
            Appendix 2.2.1
            Appendix 2.3.6

Description: This long barrow was constructed in well-established grassland. It was 75 metres in length and 16 metres wide and orientated east-west. Two ditches flank each side made up of 10 and 11 lobate pits. It was built at around the same time as the Flagstones enclosure, and is only 150 metres to the west of this site. In the Early Bronze Age three burials were placed in the ditches of a double ring ditch at its western end, and four cremations placed in a bipartite ring ditch at its eastern end.

Major finds: Deliberate deposition of an inverted cattle skull, other cattle bones and a fox bone at the base of the primary fill of the north ditch. Also a miniature stone axe was found in the tertiary fill, but this may well have been redeposited and thus originally associated with the earlier phases of the monument.

Major references: Davies *et al.* 2002.

2: Bincombe

Location: South Dorset Ridgeway, south of Maiden Castle.

Date: Early Neolithic (?).

Featured in: Chapter 5: Dorset in the Early Neolithic

Description: Group of pits containing Portland chert artefacts.

Major finds: Portland chert artefacts.

Major references: Woodward 1991a

3: Broadmayne bank barrow

Location: South Dorset Ridgeway, south east of Maiden Castle.

Date: Middle Neolithic (?).

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic

Description: The barrow is some 183 metres in length. It has seen no modern excavation and is thus dated by association with the Maiden Castle bank barrow. The lack of excavation means no acts of deposition in either the ditches or under the barrow have been recorded.

Major finds: None.

Major references: Bradley 1983; Gale 2003; Tilley 1999.

4: Chalk Pit Field

Location: Cranborne Chase, overlying the Cursus.

Date: Middle – Late Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic
Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic

Description: Occupation site made up of a flint scatter and three pits overlying the Dorset Cursus due west of where Down Farm stands today. The site is notable as the activities that took place there, including flint knapping were strongly influenced by their spatial relationship with the Cursus. Peterborough Ware was also deposited here.

Major finds: Peterborough Ware, 3393 worked flints, a blunted axe and a polished axe flake. Also two human long bones, probably from different people.

Major references: Barrett *et al.* 1991; M. Green 2000.

5 and 6: Conygar Hill pit circles

Location: Conygar Hill, one kilometre south of Flagstones Ridge.

Date: Late Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic

Description: Two circles of pits, 52118 (5) and 52100 (6). 52118 contained Grooved Ware below the primary chalk rubble and this has been used to date the two circles to the Late Neolithic. 52100 contained more material but it was undiagnostic. Both were dug in established grassland.

Major finds: 4 fresh Grooved Ware sherds from 52118, animal bone and struck flints from both.

Major references: Healy 1997b.

7 and 8: Dorset Cursus

Location: Cranborne Chase.

Date: 3360-3030 cal BC.

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic

Description: The Dorset Cursus stretches for 9.8 kilometres, and is in fact made up of two cursus monuments. The first part, the Gussage Cursus, runs from Thickthorn Down (7) in the south to Bottlebush Down in the north. At Thickthorn Down the end of the cursus mimics the axis of both the long barrows there. The Gussage Cursus also includes one of the Gussage Cow Down long barrows within its ditches; indeed it changes direction in order to enclose this long barrow. The second part of the cursus, known as the Pentridge Cursus, runs from Bottlebush Down to Martin Down (8), and was a later addition. Here a long barrow, Pentridge 2, was extended after the construction of the cursus to create a much lengthier barrow. This part of the Dorset Cursus also included the Pentridge 19 long barrow within its western bank.

Major finds: Antler pick.

Major references: Barrett *et al.* 1991; Barclay and Bayliss 1999; Tilley 1994.

9: Fir Tree Field Pits

Location: Fir Tree Field, Cranborne Chase, close to the Dorset Cursus.

Date: Late Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic

Description: This site is made up of two groups of Late Neolithic pits, there are 16 in total. The northern group, associated with stakeholes, contains an assemblage of Grooved Ware; the southern has a greater range of material culture, and is closer to the Dorset Cursus. Further pits cluster around the Fir Tree Field shaft to the north.

Major finds: Grooved Ware, boars' tusks, ulna of a bear, Group VIII axe.

Major references: Barrett *et al.* 1991; M. Green 2000.

10: Fir Tree Field Shaft

Location: Fir Tree Field, Cranborne Chase, close to the Dorset Cursus.

Date: Mesolithic to Bronze Age.

Featured in: Chapter 5: Dorset in the Early Neolithic
            Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic

Description: This is a natural shaft that was at least 25 metres deep and four to five metres in diameter. Finds have been recovered from the top three metres, within the weathering cone. This was visible into the Beaker period and affected acts of deposition in nearby Late Neolithic features.

Major finds: Microliths, axe roughout, two parts of polished flint axes, Peterborough Ware and a transverse flint arrowhead.

Major references: M. Green and Allen 1997; Allen and M. Green 1998; M. Green 2000.

11 and 12: Flagstones

Location: Flagstones Ridge, between Alington Avenue and Mount Pleasant.

Date: Early Neolithic (11), 3850-3660 cal BC.
       Middle Neolithic (12), 3300-3000 cal BC.

Featured in: Chapter 5: Dorset in the Early Neolithic
            Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic

Description: The first phase of human activity at Flagstones appears to be the two pits dug there during the Early Neolithic (11). The pits, 00221 and 00274, contained Early Neolithic pottery, and 00221 also contained animal bones and some burnt material. Both pits appear to have been dug in open conditions.

The second phase of activity may have begun with the creation of a stone setting. In any case this was swiftly taken down and a circular enclosure was dug (12). The enclosure witnessed the deposition, at least in part, of 5 different people, all of them associated with slabs or fragments of different kinds of stone. Four carvings were also made on the chalk walls of the enclosure, although there was no association between these and the burials. The enclosure too was dug in open grassland.

Major finds: Phase 1: Early Neolithic pottery. Phase 2: Two cremations, two burials and the femur of another person. 4 carvings in the chalk walls.

Major references: Healy 1997a; Healy 1997c; Woodward 1988.

13: Fordington Farm round barrow

Location: The Flagstones Ridge.

Date: 2300-2200 cal BC

Featured in: Appendix 2.3.6

Description: One of a pair of round barrows, the other slightly later on the Flagstones Ridge. Six people were interred either under the mound or in later cuts through the barrow. Some of these burials were re-accessed, the bodies broken up and a few bones removed.

Major finds: Six burials, one with a number of cattle scapulae.

Major references: Bellamy 1991

14 and 15: Greyhound Yard

Location: Northwest of the Flagstones Ridge, close to the river Frome, 600 metres west of Maumbury Rings and 1.5 kilometres west northwest of Mount Pleasant.

Date: Phase 1: Early Neolithic (14).
     Phase 2: Late Neolithic – c. 2700 cal BC (15).

Featured in: Chapter 5: Dorset in the Early Neolithic
     Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic
     Appendix 2.3.1

Description: Phase 1 – A possible Early Neolithic pit surrounded by woodland (14).

Phase 2 - This was a sub-circular enclosure made up of some 519 oak posts, each of which would have been some 11 metres in length and one metre in diameter (15). It was constructed in scrubby, open, woodland. Pig bones were found, suggesting feasting, along with 15 sherds of Grooved Ware.

Major finds: Grooved Ware, large numbers of pig bones.

Major references: Woodward *et al.* 1993.

16: Grey Mare and her Colts

Location: West of the South Dorset Ridgeway

Date: Early Neolithic

Featured in: Chapter 5: Dorset in the Early Neolithic

Description: A possible megalithic tomb of the Cotswold-Severn variety. It has seen only antiquarian investigation.

Major finds: Vague antiquarian reports of human bone and pottery.

Major references: Grey 2003

17: Gussage Cow Down long barrows

Location: Cranborne Chase, within and next to the Dorset Cursus.

Date: Early/Middle Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic

Description: Two long barrows, on the same alignment. Gussage Cow Down 1 is located within the ditch and bank of the Dorset Cursus (location marked on map). Indeed the Cursus changes direction so as to include it within its ditches. When standing at the Bottlebush Down Terminal of the Gussage part of the Dorset Cursus, not only does this long barrow appear to be on the horizon, the midwinter sun also sets behind it. Gussage Cow Down 2 lies to the south of this monument, outside the ditches of the cursus.

Major finds: Both have now seen limited investigations. Flint caches found in the ditches of long barrow 1.

Major references: Barrett *et al.* 1991; French *et al.* 2005; Tilley 1994.

18: Handley Down

Location: Handley Down, Cranborne Chase.

Date: Early Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 7: Dorset in the Early Neolithic
            Appendix 2.1.3

Description: Early Neolithic pits and mortuary enclosure, located on Handley Down, close to both Wor Barrow and Handley 26 and 27 round barrows. The pits held pottery and flintwork, and one contained a disarticulated burial above 12 ox bones. Early Neolithic pottery was found in the ditch of the mortuary enclosure.

Major finds: Disarticulated human body, pottery, flint work including leaf shaped arrowhead.

Major references: Barrett *et al.* 1991; Gale 2003; Piggott 1936; Pitt Rivers 1898.

19 and 20: Handley 26 and 27 round barrows

Location: Handley Down, Cranborne Chase.

Date: Middle – Late Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic
            Appendix 2.3.5

Description: Two Neolithic round barrows. Handley 26 (19) contained two bodies, one accompanied by a jet belt slider. Handley 27 (20) contained one, disturbed, burial. Both barrows are focused on Wor Barrow and had Peterborough Ware in their ditches.

Major finds: 3 human bodies, jet belt slider, Peterborough Ware.

Major references: Barrett *et al.* 1991.

21: Hambledon Hill

Location: Just of Cranborne Chase, 10 kilometres west of Thickthorn Down.

Date: 3690-3300 cal BC (period of enclosures construction and use).

Featured in: Chapter 5: Dorset in the Early Neolithic

Description: This site consisted of no less than two causewayed enclosures, the main enclosure and the Stepleton enclosure, and two long barrows. In addition there were four cross dykes and five outworks. The site, surrounded by woodland, witnessed numerous acts of deposition, recutting and re-use over the period of its history, and also saw phases of burning and violence. The main causewayed enclosure ditch saw eight phases of activity from initial silting through various cuts and recuts, although the sequence in each ditch segment is different. The site saw the exposure, disarticulation and deposition of multiple bodies that were manipulated in a variety of ways. Feasting, particularly the consumption of cattle, seems to have beef prevalent across the site.

Major finds: Too many to list, see chapter for full discussion.

Major references: Healy 2004; Mercer 1980; 1988; 2004; Mercer and Healy forthcoming.

22: Hell Stone

Location: West of the South Dorset Ridgeway.

Date: Early Neolithic

Featured in: Chapter 5: Dorset in the Early Neolithic

Description: A possible megalithic tomb badly reconstructed in the antiquarian period. There are no reports of any finds.

Major finds: None

Major references: Gale 2003.

23: Hengistbury Head

Location: East Dorset, on the coast between modern day Bournemouth and Christchurch.

Date: Late Neolithic flint scatters.

Featured in: Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic

Description: Over 5000 struck flints have been found on the headland, many diagnostically Late Neolithic. Grooved Ware and Peterborough ware have also been found.

Major finds: Flint work, flaked axes, Grooved Ware, Peterborough Ware.

Major references: Cunliffe 1987.

24: Kingston Lacy round barrow

Location: 10 kilometres south of the Dorset Cursus, between the Allen and Stour rivers, just off Cranborne Chase.

Date: 2900-2600 cal BC.

Featured in: Appendix 2.3.6

Description: Neolithic round barrow discovered after the great storm of 1987. A young woman between 10 and 30 was buried there. Some animal bone was also present, along with part of a saddle quern.

Major finds: Articulated body of a young woman.

Major references: Papworth 1999.

25: Knowlton Rings

Location: Just off Cranborne Chase, south-east of the Dorset Cursus.

Date: 2570-2190 cal BC.

Featured in: Appendix 2.3.3

Description: This complex of monuments includes two clear-cut henges, the still upstanding Church Henge and the larger Southern Circle. In addition the Northern Circle may represent a third henge and the Old Churchyard another, contemporary enclosure. East of the Church Henge is the Great Barrow, a large round barrow, possibly Neolithic in date, that may parallel the Conquer Barrow at Mount Pleasant.

The sites have seen only minimal excavation. A single cow scapula found in the primary fill of the Southern Circle produced the date given above.

Major finds: Cow scapula.

Major references: Burrow and Gale 1995; Gale 2003.

26: Long Bredy bank barrow

Location: South Dorset Ridgeway, west of Maiden Castle

Date: Middle Neolithic (?).

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic

Description: This bank barrow runs for some 197 metres. It has seen no modern investigations and so little can be ascertained as to its date or what acts of deposition may have taken place in either the ditches or under the barrow itself. It is possible that the monument represents an extended long barrow (Bradley 1983, 16). The lack of excavation means that no firm date can be attributed to the monument. Two cursus monuments are located nearby.

Major finds: None.

Major references: Bradley 1983; Gale 2003; Tilley 1999.

27: Maiden Castle bank barrow

Location: North of the South Dorset Ridgeway.

Date: 3500 cal BC.

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic

Description: This is the longest of the three bank barrows in Dorset, running for some 546 metres. It is made up three slightly differently orientated sections, and this has raised the possibility that it may represent the extension of a smaller long barrow (Sharples 1991, 54). Five auroch skulls were found in the ditch of this monument.

Major finds: Animal bone, including auroch skulls.

Major references: Bradley 1983; Healy *et al.* in prep.; Sharples 1991; Tilley 1999.

28: Maiden Castle causewayed enclosure

Location: North of the South Dorset Ridgeway.

Date: 3580-3520 cal BC.

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Early Neolithic
         Appendix 2.1.2

Description: Causewayed enclosure, consisting of two interrupted ditches, the inner of which was filled with midden-like material. The site had a comparatively high percentage (9.1 per cent) of imported gabbroic pottery and many stone axes, several of which originated from Cornwall also. Inhumations and disarticulated bone was also found in the ditches. Pits inside the monument varied in date from the Early to Late Neolithic. The bodies of two children were found under one such pit, sealed by the bank barrow. The enclosure appears to have been placed at a boundary zone between woodland and more cleared ground. Maiden Castle can now be seen as an extremely short-lived enclosure, and offers a notable contrast to Hambledon Hill.

Major finds: 17 stone axes, gabbroic pottery, animal and human bone.

Major references: Healy *et al.* in prep.; Sharples 1991; Wheeler 1943.

29: Maumbury Rings

Location: Present day Dorchester, west of the Flagstones Ridge. 1500 metres west of Mount Pleasant and 600 metres south of Greyhound Yard.

Date: 2858 – 2300 cal BC.

Featured in: Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic

Description: This henge monument, which may have overlain an earlier enclosure, consisted of a large bank and ditch with a circumference of about 231 metres. Within the ditch up to 45 shafts were sunk, going on average 6 metres below the bottom of the ditch. These shafts saw major acts of deposition including human and animal bone, antler, flint and carved chalk objects. A single north facing entrance pointed towards Greyhound Yard.

Major finds: Deer skulls, human bone, carved chalk objects including phalli.

Major references: Bradley 1975; Bradley and Thomas 1984; Bradley 1988.

30: Middle Farm, Dorchester

Location: At the western edge of present day Dorchester, north of the Thomas Hardye school.

Date: Early and Late Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 5: Dorset in the Early Neolithic
Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic

Description: This site consists of a cluster of Early and Late Neolithic pits. The earlier pits contained worked flints, including a leaf shaped arrowhead and sherds of Early Neolithic pottery. The Late Neolithic pits included a chisel arrowhead, microdenticulates and a number of hammerstones and grindstones.

Major Finds: Flintwork and Early Neolithic pottery.

Major references: Butterworth and Gibson 2004.

31: Monkton Up Wimborne

Location: Cranborne Chase, south of the Dorset Cursus.

Date: 3500-3100 cal BC.

Featured in: Chapter 7: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic

Description: This enclosure was made up of 14 oval pits, dug in a cleared environment. In the centre a large pit was dug, 10 metres wide by 1.5 metres deep. In the side of this pit a grave was dug and three children and a woman inserted. DNA analysis has revealed that the woman was the mother of the youngest child, and the other two were probably brother and sister. This pit also had a seven metre deep shaft cut into one corner, into which a series of deposits were placed.

Major finds: Four articulated human bodies, butchered piglet and a sandstone ball.

Major references: Budd *et al.* 2003; M. Green 2000; Montgomery *et al.* 2000.

32: Mount Pleasant

Location: On the Flagstones Ridge, 1.5 kilometres east of Maumbury Rings and Greyhound Yard.

Date: 2881 – 1900 cal BC.

Featured in: Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic
Appendix 2.3.1
Appendix 2.3.2
Appendix 2.3.4

Description: This massive henge monument, measuring 320 metres north south and 370 east west is the largest henge monument in the study area. It featured five entrances, and also contained a second enclosure, Site IV, which surrounded a series

of post and stone settings, the latter known as the cove. Acts of deposition across the enclosure featured Grooved Ware and carved chalk objects. Pork appears to have been the choice meat for consumption. The henge was built in open grassland, although there is evidence for later woodland regeneration. Later in its history a palisade was built around the inside of the entire monument, this may have coincided with the destruction of the cove at Site IV. Different parts of the palisade were treated differently, some bits were left to rot, some were pulled out and others were burnt where they stood.

Major finds: Grooved Ware vessels, smashed polished stone axe, chalk balls and phalli.

Major references: Pollard 1992; Thomas 1996; Wainwright 1979.

33: Pamphill

Location: West of Dorchester and South of Cranborne Chase, close to modern day Poole.

Date: Early Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 5: Dorset in the Early Neolithic

Description: This large Early Neolithic pit is similar in shape and fill to Rowden. The pit itself is about 2 metres by 3 metres and 1 metre deep. The fill included flint, Early Neolithic pottery and dark charcoal rich soil. The fill may represent the deposition of a midden. No animal bones were found, unlike at Rowden, but this is probably due to preservational factors.

Major finds: Early Neolithic pottery and flint work.

Major references: Field *et al.* 1964; Pollard 2001.

34 and 35: Pentridge 2 and 19 long barrows

Location: Cranborne Chase, respectively next to and within the Pentridge section of the Dorset Cursus.

Date: Early and Middle Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic

Description: These two long barrows are closely related to the Dorset Cursus. The Cursus terminal at Martin Down finishes up next to Pentridge 2 (34) which 'faces' away from it, pointing east. By this I mean the higher part of the long barrow is at its eastern end, facing away from the Cursus. This end of the monument was later extended making it a much larger mound. The fact that the 'wrong' end appears to have been extended, suggests that the original mound pre-dates the cursus, but that the

extension post-dates it. Pentridge 19 (35) certainly predates the Dorset Cursus as it was incorporated within the western bank of that monument.

Major finds: Not excavated.

Major references: Barrett *et al.* 1991; Tilley 1994.

36: Poundbury

Location: Northwest of modern day Dorchester, and the Flagstones Ridge, close to the River Frome.

Date: Middle – Late Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic
            Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic

Description: This site is made up of a scattering of pits featuring flint, hazelnuts, cereal grains and pottery. The pottery is made up of plain bowls, Peterborough Ware and Grooved Ware. The pits appear to have been dug in an environment of mixed scrub and grassland.

Major finds: Peterborough Ware, Grooved Ware and the butt of a granite axe.

Major references: Sparey Green 1987.

37: Rowden

Location: Due west of Maiden Castle between the South Dorset Ridgeway and the South Winterborne River.

Date: Pit 327: 3950 – 3541 cal BC.
        Pit 282: 3640 – 3209 cal BC.

Featured in: Chapter 5: Dorset in the Early Neolithic

Description: This site consists of two pits. The first was nearly two metres across and about one metre deep. The pit contained 644 sherds of Early Neolithic pottery and 225 animal bones, some of which had been burnt. The most commonly represented animal here, unusually for the Early Neolithic, is pig. Charcoal from multiple species was also found. A second pit was later cut into the earlier one, and both were dug in a shady environment.

Major finds: Pottery sherds, pig bones.

Major references: Pollard 2001; Woodward 1991a.

38: Sutton Poyntz

Location: Just south of the spot on the South Dorset Ridgeway where the Broadmayne Bank Barrow would later be constructed.

Date: Early Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 5: Dorset in the Early Neolithic

Description: A single pit was excavated here which contained an Early Neolithic bowl and flints.

Major finds: Flints and Early Neolithic bowl.

Major references: Farrar 1958; Woodward 1991a.

39: Thickthorn Down

Location: Cranborne Chase, at the southern end of the Dorset Cursus.

Date: Early Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 6: Dorset in the Middle Neolithic
                 Appendix 2.1.1

Description: The end of the Dorset Cursus is set at an angle here in order to mimic the alignment of the two long barrows also present. It has also been built up to resemble a long barrow itself. One of these has been excavated, and was revealed to have been made up of a series of bays. No contemporary burials were found in the barrow. Undecorated pottery was found in the ditch however. Early Neolithic pits were also sealed by the monument and contained worked flints, including a probably residual microlith. Auroch bones were found in both the ditch and on the old land surface.

Major finds: Early Neolithic pottery, auroch skull and caches of flint in the ditch.

Major references: Drew and Piggott 1936; Barrett *et al.* 1991; Bradley and Entwistle 1985.

40: Thomas Hardye School

Location: Modern day Dorchester, 2km north-east of Maiden Castle.

Date: Late Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic

Description: 33 Late Neolithic and Early Bronze Age pits, 8 barrows or ring ditches and a pit circle similar to that at Conygar Hill.

Major finds: Grooved Ware, four Beakers, worked flints, three complete early Bronze Age inhumations .

Major references: Smith 2000.

41: Tolpuddle Ball

Location: 15 kilometres (approx.) west of Mount Pleasant and the Flagstones Ridge.

Date: Late Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic

Description: This consists of three features. The first was a small sub-circular pit containing 307 flints, many diagnostically Late Neolithic. The second a quarry pit, again containing Late Neolithic flintwork including a transverse arrowhead. The final feature was posthole near the quarry pit in which a roughout for a flint axe had been placed.

Major finds: Flint axe, Late Neolithic flintwork.

Major references: Hearne and Birbeck 1999.

42: Wor Barrow

Location: Handley Down on Cranborne Chase, north of the Dorset Cursus.

Date: Early Neolithic, 3790-3100 cal BC.

Featured in: Appendix 2.1.1

Description: This long barrow has a complex history of construction. It appears to have begun with a ditch being dug around two D shaped pits, a stone bank and a burial area where the remains of six skeletons were found, three articulated three not. A mound was then raised over these features. Later a second larger mound was constructed, doubling the height of the monument from one and a half to three metres.

Major finds: Three articulated and three disarticulated skeletons.

Major references: Barrett *et al.* 1991; Pitt Rivers 1898.

43 and 44: Wyke Down 1 and 2

Location: Cranborne Chase, north of Chalk Pit Field.

Date: Late Neolithic.

Featured in: Chapter 7: Dorset in the Late Neolithic

Description: Two henge monuments and two round structures. Both of the structures appear to have been burnt down and both appear to have contained small enclosed spaces. Burned daub and decorated plaster were found within the buildings, and Grooved Ware was deposited in the postholes after burning.

Wyke Down 1 (43), the larger henge, consists of a series of pits a round a central feature. 19 metres by 17 metres in size, this monument saw a range of acts of deposition over three phases. Items deposited included Grooved Ware, human and animal bone, flints and chalk objects. Wyke Down 2 (44) was only 12 metres in diameter, but also saw deposition of Grooved Ware amongst other items. One vessel deposited here is worthy of special mention, as it featured aspects of design from all three southern British Grooved Ware styles.

Major finds: Human bone, carved chalk objects, Grooved Ware including one very notable vessel from the Wyke Down 2. Grooved Ware and decorated plaster from the buildings.

Major references: Barrett *et al.* 1991; M. Green 2000.

Appendix 2: Other Dorset narratives

Introduction

This appendix sets out a series of engagements with Neolithic Dorset. These are designed to be selective, supporting, narratives. Where those chapters make points that are expanded or covered in the appendix they are referred to in the text. The reader may thus choose to tack between the various chapters and the appendix, or read the appendix separately. The appendix moves through the Early, Middle and Late Neolithic and these are numbered accordingly 1, 2 and 3. The sections are then subdivided into the separate engagements and these are then numbered again. Thus the first narrative is 1.1, referring to building in the Early Neolithic and the last 3.6, referring to single burial in the Late Neolithic. Within the main body of the text these numbers are prefaced by the number 2, referring to the fact that all are located in appendix 2. Thus an in-text reference such as appendix 2.2.1 refers to the first of the Middle Neolithic narratives which this appendix contains – an engagement with movement around monuments in south Dorset. This appendix is thus a development of the themes set out in the main body of the text and provides an opportunity to include some other narratives and speculative readings. In particular the appendix contains six supporting studies from the Late Neolithic. These offer more in-depth engagements with that period and are thus important in providing support for that chapter's broader style.

1) Early Neolithic

1.1 Small-scale movements, bodies and quick architecture

Traditional accounts of moving have focused on mobility, occupation records and ideas about transhumance and pastoralism. Post-processual accounts (e.g. Barrett 1994; Tilley 1994; Thomas 1996) on the other hand have examined how monuments help focus movement in certain directions and condition experience through this. Recently, however, Lesley McFadyen (forthcoming) has started to consider how bodies interact through the process of building and construction. In particular she has developed the idea of 'quick architecture' the idea that monuments were built rapidly, and thus construction becomes a visceral process that ties people together through

their movements and interactions (McFadyen forthcoming). McFadyen's evocative description of the construction process at Ascott-under-Wychwood is worth quoting at length here:

> People would literally have had to prop up stone work with their bodies and hands, or have jammed wooden panels in place with their bodies while other materials were dumped against those junctions. Imagine the intensity and entwined movements of people and things, propping each other and everything else up in close proximity. Bodies building were smeared with the soil and stone matrix of the worked earth. There was an intermingling of people, grass, wood, rubble, marl, clay and stone. In this space, bodies were made to matter through a negotiation of junctions with other materials or living things (forthcoming).

There are two possible megalithic barrows in Dorset and neither has seen modern investigation. Nevertheless, I feel that this detailed description echoes the intensity of bodily movement that surrounded construction both of the long barrows that litter Dorset and of the enclosures, outworks, barrows and cross-dykes of Hambledon Hill. What impact would these visceral engagements have had? It is my argument that these acts of building were fundamentally tied up with notions of conviviality, with the life people led day-by-day. These were not ritual moments that opposed the somehow mundane actions of flint knapping and herding animals. These activities, the way bodies moved and interacted, made sense during construction because they played out within people's understandings of life (cf. Passes 2004, 6). That is not to say they were considered exactly the same as day-to-day activities, nor that they would not have stood out as special or as important in people's lives. Nevertheless they were not exterior to people's understandings of the world[i].

Figure 1.1.1: Plan of Thickthorn Down long barrow. The lines in the section depict the likely location of the bays (after Barrett *et al.* 1991, 41, fig. 2.10).

Crucial here were people's senses of identity. I have argued that notions of gender and identity are created through performative practice (O. Harris 2005; chapter 2); these notions implicit in day-to-day life would become explicit at these moments of building. Who took on what role? Who supported the stacked turfs that defined the different bays at the Thickthorn Down long barrow (Bradley and Entwistle 1985; Drew & Piggott 1936; fig. 1.1.1)? Who filled in the earth? It was at these moments that particular regulatory ideals might be cited or even undermined, as people took on roles that might previously have been denied to them, or refused to behave as expected. These moments of construction built on earlier episodes of use of the site. At Thickthorn Down, the site had previously been occupied earlier in the Neolithic, as evidenced by pits that predate the monument (Drew and Piggott 1936; Barrett *et al.* 1991, 34)[ii]. Thus the building on the site was in part a continuation of former acts of occupation, not just a radical transformation of the site. The lack of comparative dating unfortunately prevents a detailed discussion of the development and relationship between the different periods of occupation of the site, which could reveal the relative balance of continuity and transformation (cf. Whittle forthcoming; McFadyen forthcoming). The previous acts of digging and deposition certainly helped people come to understand this locale in a particular way, however, a way that led people in turn to alter and modify the way they dwelt there.

Construction at Thickthorn Down drew on memories of the past, of previous occupations, and helped in turn to create bodily memories of the feeling of weight and dirt and of earth and grass. The physical acts of moving over where others had dwelt before may have offered opportunities for people to revisit their history and to come into immediate physical contact with it: memories made real through the materiality of the past and the movement of human bodies (cf. Harrison 2004). People digging may have encountered evidence of former acts of occupation; they may have had to sweep bones and flints to one side as they raised the mound. Memory and emotion would have run through the building of the site, people would have *felt* the past around them and this may have been important in the maintenance of conviviality and the aesthetics of the good/beautiful life. They may have been important, in other words, in how people felt about each other, as well as about their history. Altering and building at past occupation sites may have cited people's relationships with the broader world, it may have situated themselves in relation to the past, and the monument may have embodied this. Senses of community may thus have been created through people's shared feelings of time, space and belonging. These engagements with the past in turn would have affected how the site would be experienced in the future. Identities, bodies and understandings of personhood were forged in these acts of construction and these were then played out throughout people's life course. Of course these were not the only moments at which such aspects of identity were constructed, but they were central to it nonetheless. As such it now comes as no surprise that no human bones were recovered from a primary context beneath Thickthorn Down long barrow when one realises that is was the act of construction itself that was central (McFadyen forthcoming).

Figure 1.1.2: Plan of Wor Barrow. X marks the locations of burials (after Barrett *et al.* 1991, 40, fig. 2.9).

One can compare Thickthorn Down with the other fully excavated long barrow on Cranborne Chase, Wor Barrow (Pitt Rivers 1898; Barrett *et al.* 1991). This barrow does contain human bone, six bodies to be exact, three articulated and three disarticulated, all likely to have been male (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 43; Thomas 2002, 41). This might be seen as a contrast with Thickthorn Down, but other aspects of its construction hint instead that similar concerns were at play. Principally Wor Barrow, like Thickthorn Down, was not constructed at a random point in the landscape. Instead it was built over an earlier set of features (fig. 1.1.2). These included two D-shaped pits, a scatter of flint and a stone bank (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 34-43). This was the burials where the six male skeletons were interred. Again construction drew on earlier uses and understandings of place. It did not, however, follow an identical pattern to Thickthorn Down. Rather Wor Barrow was constructed in at least two phases (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 38; fig. 1.1.2), and did not consist of a series of bays. Instead a post-trench was originally dug surrounding the burial area. This also had a porch, guiding movement into the burial area. A ditch was subsequently dug around this that produced material for a 1.5 metre high mound revetted by the wooden uprights (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 43). Later a larger ditch was dug and a second mound was built over the top of the original barrow, doubling the height to at least 3 metres (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 43). Finally two crouched burials were inserted into the ditch at a later point after silts had begun to form. One was an adult, again a male, and it appears his death may have been the result of violence, indicated by the arrowhead he was found with (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 85). The temporality of these acts of building is frustratingly absent, but they speak of moments of digging, deposition, enclosure and construction.

This series of constructions shows a different kind of building process to that at Thickthorn Down. Perhaps here slower, more considered, acts of building took place as people dug pits and laid stones to form the bank, added bodies, dug postholes and ditches, and raised mounds. Once again of course the visceral aspects of construction would have had powerful roles to play, especially during the raising of the mound, but there would have been other moments where bodies stood still and watched as certain things were deposited. Several of these acts of construction may have been separated by years, even; a quite different temporality of building than that implied by the bays at Thickthorn Down (cf. McFadyen forthcoming). Different opportunities for people

to move into and out of the burial area and ditches existed, allowing different aspects of identity to be stressed. This is especially true of the trench stage of construction, which featured an open 'porch' at one end, directing movement in and out in certain ways. The bodies of the dead may have been important in the acts of building here too; they may have been one material from which the site was constructed. In that context perhaps the articulated and disarticulated bodies may actually have been very different. The articulated bodies may have represented the inclusion of certain people as an important building material. The disarticulated material, which appears to have been in circulation for some time (Thomas 2002), may have embodied other histories and exchange relationships as well as being mnemonic of certain people (chapter 5), and thus brought other emotions and memories from which the site might be built.

On the surface both Wor Barrow and Thickthorn Down long barrow appear to archaeologists to be very similar; they are both the same type of monument. Then we discover that one contains bones and the other does not and this causes confusion. This is only added to once the very different scales and speeds of construction at these sites are understood. This confusion is generated at least partly, however, by our own systems of classification. Once we move away from seeing the items deposited and the final form of the monument as what defines it we can begin to consider the *practices* that brought them about. Thus although Thickthorn Down and Wor Barrow are similar in final appearance, the ways that bodies moved through the acts of building and deposition and the temporality of those movements are actually quite different. At the same time, however, the practices caught up in building both monuments made sense to people as they drew on conceptions of memory, emotion and identity at play in people's daily lives.

1.2 Temporalities of building at Hambledon Hill and Maiden Castle

The description of movement at Hambledon Hill offered in chapter 5 may be accused of offering a somewhat a-temporal view of the monument. It examined the acts of movement taking place at around 3500 cal BC. The kinds of movement it described were not unique to this moment. The narrative I constructed there was designed to recognise that the ongoing acts of building were caught up in reinforcing, rather than revolutionising, movement on the hill. Nevertheless, that narrative did not place those movements within the sequence of acts building that have now been identified at

Hambledon (Bayliss *et al.* forthcoming a; Healy *et al.* in prep.). I now wish to engage with the temporality of those acts of building specifically so that they can be contrasted with the new understandings of Maiden Castle that are now emerging.

Temporality of building at Hambledon Hill

Phase	Constructed	Dates cal BC
1a	Main enclosure	3680-3630
	Inner east cross dyke	3690-3620
	South long barrow	3680-3640
	North long barrow?	?
1b	Shroton spur outwork	3650-3570
	Stepleton enclosure	3650-3570
	Middle Stepleton outwork	3650-3580
2	Inner Stepleton outwork	3630-3500
2 or 3	Hanford outwork (partial)	
3	Outer Stepleton outwork	3530-3360
	Inner south cross dyke	3570-3390
4	Outer east cross dyke	3360-3310
	Western outwork	3510-3360
	Outer south cross dyke	?
	Hanford outwork (segment 3)	3360-3320

Figure 1.2.1: The chronology of Hambledon Hill (after Bayliss *et al.* forthcoming a; Mercer and Healy forthcoming, fig. 4.2).

As figure 1.2.1 suggests, Hambledon was under construction off and on for almost the entire period of its principal use, between 3690 and 3300 cal BC (Bayliss *et al.* forthcoming a; Healy *et al.* in prep.). Beginning with the construction of the main enclosure people returned regularly to Hambledon, often making alterations to the architecture of the site. Within the first 100 years the inner east cross dyke, the south long barrow (and probably its northern counterpart), the Shroton spur outwork, the

Stepleton enclosure and the inner and middle Stepleton outworks had been created (Bayliss *et al.* forthcoming a). The repeated nature of these acts of construction suggests that people reaffirmed their connection to the site through building. If deposition was a regular, perhaps annual, event at Hambledon, then building may have been rarer but still regular, taking place around larger gatherings or festivals at more special occasions every decade or so. The feasts represented by the slaughter of cattle, which could have fed several hundred people, may have been associated with these acts of construction, which were spread over a couple of months (Healy *et al.* in prep.). Throughout the rest of the time, more small-scale, ad hoc, gatherings would have taken place involving the excarnation of one or two bodies and smaller acts of exchange or consumption (Healy *et al.* in prep.). After the first century or so the frequency of acts of building may have decreased before another major phase of construction took place towards the end of the enclosure's use. Here the Hanford outwork and possibly the western outwork were constructed (Healy *et al.* in prep.). Healy *et al.* (in prep.) connect this with a switch in Hambledon's focus from the west to the east, towards Cranborne Chase, and the emerging importance of the Dorset Cursus. This has been previously interpreted as being built around 3300 cal BC (Barclay and Bayliss 1999), in other words shortly after the end of Hambledon's main period of use, but Healy *et al.* (in prep.) suggest this may in fact represent a *terminus ante quem* for its construction. Thus the building of the Cursus may have taken place in the 34th century cal BC, at the same time as the final acts of building at Hambledon (Healy *et al.* in prep.).

Whatever the relationship between Hambledon and the Cursus it is clear that building formed crucial part of how the broader community renewed its connection with Hambledon, at least once every generation. These acts of building helped to develop the forms of movement I described in chapter 5 and to confirm the central enclosure as a nested space. They also reinforced and reworked the community's emotional and mnemonic links with the site, whilst acting to create new connections between new people and new acts of building. Alongside this acts of deposition helped to reinforce on a more regular basis the links between different parts of the community and the site itself.

Temporality of building at Maiden Castle

Inner ditch	Outer ditch	Bank barrow
3560-3540 cal BC (68% probability)	3560-3535 cal BC (68% probability)	3550-3500 cal BC (40 % probability)
3580-3535 cal BC (98% probability	3580-3525 cal BC (95% probability)	3480-3385 cal BC (55% probability)

Figure 1.2.2: The chronology of Maiden Castle (after Healy *et al.* in prep.).

Maiden Castle offers a striking counterpoint to the repeated acts of deposition and building that took place at Hambledon Hill. Rather than a yearly sequence of deposition and rarer but regular acts of building over three centuries, Maiden Castle was a remarkably short-lived site (Healy *et al.* in prep.; fig. 1.2.2). The Bayesian statistical analysis and new radiocarbon dates obtained by Healy *et al.* (in prep.) suggest that the inner ditch at Maiden Castle was probably dug between 3560 and 3540 cal BC (68% probability), and certainly between 3580 and 3535 cal BC (98% probability). The outer ditch was probably either contemporary with this or followed soon after. It dates to either 3580-3525 cal BC (95% probability) or 3560-3535 cal BC (68% probability) (Healy *et al.* in prep.). It is certainly possible that both were built in the same year, and even possible that the outer may predate the inner. At most 40 years separate the two (Healy *et al.* in prep.). Healy *et al.* estimate that the outer ditch may have been filled within a single year, whilst the inner ditch probably took around 35 years (in prep.).

This dating sequence offers a striking counterpart to that from Hambledon Hill, and shows the value of Bayesian statistical dating programs. Whereas in recent archaeological narratives both Hambledon and Maiden Castle had drawn out, extended, chronologies, we can now see that the former has a specific, if still long-term history, whilst the latter is remarkably short-lived. It is likely that both ditches had been dug and infilled within 35 years. The temporality of engagement at Maiden Castle is thus quite different to that at Hambledon. This was a site that lacked the long-term repeated acts of building. Instead the enclosure ditches were an important aspect of people's lives, but perhaps only for a generation. The acts of construction may thus have been more intense than at Maiden Castle, especially if both ditches

were constructed together. This may have required twice the labour of any one phase of construction at Hambledon (Healy *et al.* in prep.).

The brief period of Maiden Castle's use as an enclosure was followed by the construction of the bank barrow (chapter 6). The gap between the two phases of monumentality remains elusive, however (Healy *et al.* in prep.). It may have been remarkably soon after the end of the enclosure's life, though certainly enough time had passed for a turf line to have formed over the silted inner ditch. The gap may stand at as little as perhaps 20 years but a lapse of 70 or 80 years may be more likely. Healy *et al.* (in prep.) give the possible dates as 3550–3500 cal BC (40% probability), 3480–3385 cal BC (55% probability), 3545–3515 cal BC (33% probability) or 3440–3395 cal BC (35% probability). Overall a date sometime around 3500 thus now seems likely. The importance of Maiden Castle thus continues despite its short-lived life as an enclosure, and this is reflected in its likely continuance as a site for the production, exchange and deposition of flint and stone axes (Healy *et al.* in prep.).

1.3 The attainment of personhood by animals

If memory and emotion were crucial to why certain deposits were placed where they were, deposition in turn helped to create and affirm understandings of the world (chapter 5). In the Early Neolithic it was not only human bones that were treated and deposited in a variety of fashions. Animal bones were also deposited in a multitude of ways, some of which seem to indicate that they too might have been ascribed personhood of one kind or another. The evidence for this is not only in the close parallels between the treatment of some human and animal bones, but also in deliberate and particular deposits, where human and animal bone were closely associated. This should not necessarily surprise us. Throughout the Neolithic examples exist where animal bone is treated in very similar ways to human bones. For example at Hambledon Hill the treatment of a dog skeleton in the inner outwork was similar to that of some human interments (Mercer and Healy forthcoming).

It is with cattle, however, that there is a particular association (O. Harris 2005; forthcoming). At Beckhampton Road long barrow in Wiltshire, three cattle skulls were discovered, in a context where one might often encounter human bone. Indeed cattle bone has been found in 14 megalithic barrows of the Cotswold-Severn type

(Ray and Thomas 2003, 37). On Handley Down on Cranborne Chase, a pit contained both disarticulated human bone and arranged cattle bone (Ray and Thomas 2003, 37). At Hambledon Hill itself it is in the ditches that contained the two articulated child burials that the highest level of articulated animal bone has been found (chapter 5).

Perhaps most extraordinary of all, in segment 6 of the ditch of the inner Stepleton outwork, parts of a cattle pelvis were found lodged in a fissure alongside the head and shaft of a left adult human femur (Mercer and Healy forthcoming). This must have taken place shortly after the construction of the outwork between 3630 and 3500 cal BC (Bayliss *et al.* forthcoming a). Placing a cattle pelvis with a human femur was not an accidental reference. Ray and Thomas argue in their recent paper that cattle are 'congealed lumps of social relations' (2003, 41). In other words, through the exchange of cattle, and of their meat and milk, human groups as much as cattle herds could become intertwined, and those links would become embodied in the cattle. In a similar way I suggested in chapter 5 how social relations could become embodied in stone axes, and we can imagine how people too became embodied forms of social relations through their exchange between different groups. Human, animal bone and axes may all thus have shared a similar quality of substance. Perhaps all three, though seen as different, were believed to have been originally modelled on the same thing (Trudelle Schwarz 1997).

Thus cattle, people and axes all stood as clumps of social relations, dividual parts of a group from which they could be separated and exchanged. In this way the lines between people, axes and cattle would have become blurred, as all three were partible, combinable and permeable in different ways. The hard bones of cattle and people could be combined in the ground to physically demonstrate to spectators the relationships between these different communities. The permeability of cattle, the fact they could take part in unmediated exchange with other cattle through breeding and could literally allow substances to flow from themselves, through pottery, to others, meant that they took on particular roles within a spectrum of personhood. These senses of personhood were more attained than ascribed, and needed to be cited and performed to be so. It is in these peculiar deposits of cattle and human bone that the explicit relationship between these two groups emerges. Perhaps with other deposits

of human bone similar statements are being made about the relationship between different human groups.

Affective feeling, of course, was central to these relations and exchanges. As Ray and Thomas so rightly point out, 'they reflect ties of emotion as well as lineage' (2003, 42). Over the 300 or so years that the Hambledon Hill complex was in use, Legge suggests that some 140 cattle may have been killed (forthcoming). It is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of this claim as Legge points out that 'there are many factors both known and unknown that have worked against the survival of bones at these sites' (forthcoming). Nevertheless when one examines that figure it suggests that it was only on certain occasions that cattle would be killed and never in large numbers. This suggests that particular cattle were being selected for slaughter, and this is supported by the skeletal evidence which shows that young adult females were preferentially chosen for the kill (Legge forthcoming). The selection of particular cows, perhaps from symbolically powerful stock (cf. Crandall 1998), supports the suggestion that these were known, possibly named, animals who linked particular people, those sponsoring the feast perhaps, both socially and emotionally. I return to the discussion of animals and personhood in appendix 2.2.2 below.

2) Middle Neolithic

2.1 Movement via the monuments: transformation and control

Figure 2.1.1 Movement via monuments (after Davies *et al.* 2002, 191, fig. 89).

In the discussion in chapter 6 I touched on the fact that the Dorset Cursus may have monumentalised an already existing axis of movement through the landscape. Elsewhere in Dorset I believe we can trace similar patterns of movement between different monuments, although these have not been fixed by the addition of a cursus. Again I want to argue that a controlled series of engagements with the past, or the *perceived* past, were central to these acts of movement.

The area I wish to consider in this section lies between Maiden Castle to the south and the Flagstones ridge to the north. Within this I will focus our attention on three key sites: the Maiden Castle bank barrow, the Alington Avenue long barrow and the enclosure at Flagstones. It has previously been suggested that there was a circuit of movement from the Maiden Castle bank barrow via the Lanceborough barrow to the Flagstones ridge and then along past the Alington Avenue long barrow to the Flagstones enclosure (Davies *et al.* 2002, 189; fig. 2.1.1). This can be developed when we consider how parts of the topography such as the edges of the chalk and the River Winterbourne may also have been caught up in this (fig. 2.1.1). I wish to enhance

such suggestions by again considering in more detail the impact of such an axis of movement. I will also examine how the transformation of sites like Maiden Castle and Flagstones helped to create this, and to affect the nature of the experience once this had been done.

Figure 2.1.2: Maiden Castle enclosure and bank barrow (after Thomas 1999a, 53, fig. 3.5).

Maiden Castle bank barrow[iii] is a monument of undoubted size. It stands an impressive 546 metres long and some 17.5 metres wide (Sharples 1991, 54). It has been suggested that the bank barrow began life as a shorter long mound next to the causewayed enclosure and was subsequently lengthened (Bradley 1983, 16). There is no stratigraphic evidence to either confirm or deny such a suggestion (Tilley 1999, 203; Healy *et al*. in prep.). The bank barrow was certainly constructed on three subtly different alignments, however, running roughly east-west over the infilled inner ditch of the causewayed enclosure (Sharples 1991). The dating remains problematic but the barrow was probably built shortly after the end of the enclosure's life around 3500 cal BC (Healy *et al*. in prep.; appendix 2.1.2). Leaving the bank barrow, the suggested schema of movement then turns north past the Lanceborough long barrow. This has not been excavated and is thus also difficult to date. Its form is interesting, however, being both long and narrow in shape, and thus more like a bank barrow than a traditional long barrow, although at 97.5 metres long it is nowhere near the length of the bank barrow at Maiden Castle. From the Lanceborough barrow the route turns east and traverses the Flagstones ridge, coming first to the Alington Avenue long barrow (Davies *et al*. 2002). This monument only has a single date, from a cattle skull,

placing the construction of the monument between 3370-2910 cal BC (Davies *et al.* 2002, 17). The long barrow is again particularly narrow for this kind of monument, although it widens slightly at the east end from a width of 10 metres to 14 metres (Davies *et al.* 2002, 13). Interestingly, its narrow width and relatively shallow ditches led its excavators to suggest that it had been deliberately constructed to represent a weathered long barrow of some antiquity (Davies *et al.* 2002, 187). I shall return to this suggestion in a moment.

Figure 2.1.3: Alington Avenue long barrow (after Davies *et al.* 2002, 14, fig. 5).

The long barrow at Alington Avenue, intervisible with both the Broadmayne and Maiden Castle bank barrows, and the Lanceborough barrow, points directly towards another monument on the Flagstones ridge only 150 metres away, the Flagstones enclosure itself (Davies *et al.* 2002, 189). Built directly next to the site of the Early Neolithic inhabitation I described in chapter 5, the site consisted of a series of unevenly spread segments enclosing a space 100 metres or so in diameter (Healy 1997a, 33). The causeways between these segments ranged in size with two particularly wide spaces, one to the north and one to the west. It is this wide causeway to the west that the Alington Avenue long barrow points directly towards (Davies *et al.* 2002, 181). Three primary burials were placed in the ditch of the enclosure, two under large stone slabs, and the third near a large sarsen fragment (Healy 1997a, 37)[iv] (see discussion in chapter 6). These large stone slabs, along with the possibility of shallow sockets for stones around the edge of the enclosure have led Frances Healy to suggest that a stone setting may have preceded the enclosure (1997b, 283). The enclosure is dated to between 3300 and 3000 cal BC (Healy 1997b, 284).

So here we have a series of sites, linked not only by a postulated schema of movement but also by similarities in form, and, in the case of Flagstones and Alington Avenue, direct spatial links. The dates, although far from clear cut, are at least comparable in range, and all the monuments *could* have been built within a hundred years of each other. The temporalities of construction are glossed here, but it is difficult to be specific in the absence of firm dating evidence. If further dates were available it might be possible to trace the development of this sequence of movement, how it changed over time, rather than give a narrative that simply posits that all the monuments were already constructed. The question remains, however, how did this complex of monuments interact with the movement of people? What were the consequences of the transformations that took place at Maiden Castle or at Flagstones for example? What impact did they have on people's understandings of landscape, memory and the past in general?

The monuments in this area created a series of encounters with both the past and the present and helped to guide people around the landscape. The construction of the huge linear bank barrow at Maiden Castle and the Lanceborough barrow began to guide people's movements around the landscape to a series of locales, such as the Flagstones ridge, that were riddled with evidence of former occupation. There would have been numerous ways of tracing human occupation of the landscape which we know took place on the Flagstones ridge from the Early Neolithic at least (Smith *et al.* 1997). The clearances there were well maintained from at least the early fourth millennium (Smith *et al.* 1997), as both the Early Neolithic pits and the Middle Neolithic monuments were constructed in grassland. Although grassland was common from the beginning of the Neolithic (though by no means ubiquitous), regular grazing may have continued in this area and it might have been recognised as a site of former residence. Along with this, evidence from Mount Pleasant revealed an Early Neolithic occupation of the site with pottery, food remains and flints being found sealed below the bank (Wainwright 1979, 8). The evidence of those remains may have been visible to people in the Middle Neolithic as a flint scatter, or in other ways. In either case these people whose lives were led dwelling skilfully through the landscape would surely have been able to detect evidence of former occupation through all manner of environmental alterations and artefact remains. Interestingly people then chose to monumentalise this occupation with a barrow that reached into the past. The Alington

Avenue long barrow appeared much as other long barrows of that time may have looked: small, weathered and eroded. This physical act of construction did not transform the landscape, but it confirmed people's occupation of it, and created a new directionality east-west across the ridge. Whether this barrow was *pretending* to be of greater antiquity may not have been important. People may have known that they built it only last year and it may still have been seen as a much older construction. That time works in simple, linear, fashion may be our understanding of it, but it may not have been thought of like that in the Neolithic. The barrow could have been seen as both ancient and modern simultaneously[v].

At about the same time people may have built a stone setting 150 metres east of the long barrow, but in any case this was swiftly transformed and a new enclosure was dug. These constructions on a site previously occupied in the Early Neolithic linked the past and the present together. The site had become increasingly open since the Early Neolithic and was heavily grazed by the time the enclosure was dug (Allen 1997, 174). Situated within these former acts of occupation Flagstones was tied into the landscape around it, and through the axis of Alington Avenue, tied into other monuments around the area and a new access of movement that had been constructed. The old enclosure at Maiden Castle too was now linked through a series of monuments to the new, admittedly much smaller, enclosure of Flagstones (Davies *et al.* 2002). People, much as they could on Cranborne Chase, could move down a set route and encounter a series of monuments and topographic features that were tied into both the past and the present (chapter 6).

There are a number of important differences between what took place on Cranborne Chase and here, further south in Dorset. The most obvious is that no cursus was ever created to fix a particular route between a series of monuments. This has important ramifications for our understanding. The lack of a cursus indicates that any axis of movement was much less entrenched in this part of Dorset; it was not *fixed*, for lack of a better word. People could encounter the monuments, if they chose, from other directions or in different orders, and this perhaps explains why Flagstones has two entrances, one pointing west to the Alington Avenue long barrow and one pointing north (Healy 1997a, 33). Thus the exact nature of the encounter with these monuments seems less crucial. Although it may have been important at certain times

of the year to move past monuments in a particular sequence, perhaps that suggested by Davies *et al.* (2002), at other times people may have visited a single monument or visited several in a different order. There was no architecture of engagement here to insist upon particular sequences of experience, unlike on Cranborne Chase.

This realisation affects how we consider the emotional and mnemonic impact of engaging with these monuments through bodily movement. It was the (pre)scripted route of the Dorset Cursus that encouraged, I suggested, people to feel similar things and remember similar moments *involuntarily* as they were confronted with a series of encounters (chapter 6). This performative reaction, the feeling or remembering of the *right* thing allowed people to cite their identities, to demonstrate their belonging and to share in an agreed narrative around the past on Cranborne Chase. In southern Dorset the encounters were less about the emotional or mnemonic aspects of these sites. Instead what may have been important here were people situating themselves and their understandings of the world within flows of movement and flows of time that spread across the landscape in which they dwelt. Thus movement around the landscape between the bank barrow, Lanceborough barrow, the Alington Avenue long barrow and the Flagstones enclosure linked a series of sites from both the past and the present together.

Often this collapse of temporalities occurred within a single monument. This is true both of the bank barrow at Maiden Castle, that tied the old enclosure with the big new linear monument, and of Alington Avenue which linked the past and the present in that it was a recently built monument that visually represented the past. It is also true of Flagstones which linked the previous phases of use, the Early Neolithic pits and the stone settings, into a new monument in which stone was placed into a circular set of pits. Only the Lanceborough barrow does not reveal any trace of the past and the present colliding, but who knows what detailed excavation might reveal? In any case these monuments helped reconcile the past and the present and allowed people to situate themselves within a world where the physical traces of history were becoming ever more evident and required explanation within people's cosmologies, mentalités and world-views. The monuments would still of course have evoked memories and emotions from people, but along with this they helped to physically frame people's understandings of the world and of the past. That there seem to be no burials at the

two excavated barrows is thus not surprising. Once we forget about typology or form of these monuments, the effect they had on people's understandings of place, space and time comes to the fore. Yet again we find ourselves needing to look less at what these monuments were, and more at what they did (D. Bailey 2005; Cochrane 2005).

Objections may be raised to these arguments here: that the route that Davies *et al.* (2002) have suggested is speculative, for example, or that Healy's (1997b) suggestion of a stone setting at Flagstones is merely that: a suggestion. Whilst these criticisms are valid the argument I have made does not solely depend upon either point. The relationship between the past and present at Maiden Castle, Alington Avenue and Flagstones remains important, and the connection between these latter two is relatively clear cut. Furthermore the two examples of movement and monuments that I have examined here and in chapter 6 are joined together at the Long Bredy bank barrow which is located next to two cursus monuments (C. Bailey 1984; Woodward 1991). Indeed the relationship between cursus monuments and bank barrows has been discussed for some time (e.g. Atkinson 1952; Bradley 1983). Although there is little space to discuss this complex here, it is worth considering that other examples of controlled or directed movement may have existed, apart from the two I have examined in detail. It is also important to point out that the links between past and present and between these monuments were not the only ways in which they worked. The metaphorical connections of Maiden Castle bank barrow or the acts of burial at Flagstones were also important and these are explored in the studies of materiality and deposition in chapter 6.

2.2 Ancestral animals? Animism, totemism and the deposition of the 'wild' during the Middle Neolithic

What I want to examine here are the large numbers of wild animal bones deposited at various sites during the Middle Neolithic. I want to suggest that this may not actually represent an increase in hunting. Instead the deposition of this kind of materiality was another mechanism for bringing the past into the present, not by harking back to a kind of Mesolithic existence, but rather because wild animals may have been seen as beings of power, and in some cases as ancestral. I also want to suggest that we can trace different forms of understanding of animals by tying in my considerations of

permeable and partible personhood in chapter 5 with notions of animism and totemism (Bird-David 1999; Ingold 2000).

It is important here to stress that I do not wish to return to a wild versus domestic dichotomy. This has been thoroughly critiqued by amongst others Pollard (2004), Ray and Thomas (2003) and Whittle (2003). Nevertheless I would argue that wild animals would have been understood differently in the Middle Neolithic because they played a different role in people's socialities. Domestic animals would have been an intimate part of people's daily life. They would have helped to constrain the way people moved around the landscape and had much influence over the rhythms and sequences of the yearly round (Whittle 2003, 93). Wild animals on the other hand would have been encountered in different circumstances, either by chance or deliberately as part of a hunt. This does not mean they stood at either end of a dichotomy of understanding, rather they were understood through encounter and experience on a spectrum of meanings. Niall Sharples (2000) has written persuasively on how deer may have been seen as liminal animals, neither wild nor domestic, and we also need to include animals that have no domestic counterpart: foxes, bears and birds of various sorts, for example. People would have distinguished between animals in a number of ways depending on their symbolic and cosmological understandings and the way they were caught up in practice.

That people distinguish strongly between the same animals has been shown by Crandall's examination of the pastoral Himba of Namibia, and in particular their symbolic categorisation of cattle (1998). The key point that he wishes to stress is that 'in any given African pastoral society cattle are not uniform in symbolic value' (Crandall 1998, 101). Himba separate cattle into two distinct groups, the first, patrilineally-controlled, are special, their meat and milk being sacred (Crandall 1998, 102). They are seen as the possessions of particular ancestors unique to one's heritage, and indeed to represent the ancestors themselves. The second group, matrilineally-controlled, are non-sacred and you can do with them what you will. Notably though it is possible for a non-sacred cow to become sacred, it is impossible for a sacred cow to do the reverse (Crandall 1998, 102). The latter group are still used in rituals, but their symbolic value is minimal. Crandall explains this distinction by drawing on Himba conceptions of time (1998, 109-11). Himba have two conceptions

of time, temporality and timelessness (Crandall 1998, 107). Each group of cattle is associated with one of these conceptions of time, which are present simultaneously. The timeless world of the immortal ancestors is represented by patrilineal cattle and the temporal, transitory and mortal world by matrilineal cattle. Thus time is the key to understanding Himba valuations of cattle (Crandall 1998).

What this indicates is that differential valuing of animals of the same group can exist at the same time within a single pastoralist society. If the Himba distinguish between different cattle it is perfectly possible for people in the Neolithic to have distinguished between wild boars and pigs and cattle and aurochs, for example. Indeed such distinctions are far more obvious in terms of behaviour and habitat than the distinctions the Himba draw (Crandall 1998). Such a view is supported, as Ray and Thomas point out, by the fact that cattle were deliberately not bred with aurochs (2003, 42). I argue that animals we think of as 'wild' were instead considered to be powerful beings with agency in their own right, and that in particular these animals had ancestral overtones, both of their domestic counterparts, where they existed, but also perhaps of different groups of people as well (cf. A. Jones and C. Richards 2003). Animals were very much part of the human world; indeed I have suggested that in certain circumstances they could become human (appendix 2.1.3). It may also have been the case that people in certain circumstances could become animals (Mandelstam Balzer 1996). In the contexts in which wild animals were encountered they may have taken on ancestral roles, and hunting them may have held many symbolic overtones. The animal captured, be it a fox, an auroch or a wild boar may have told people much of what was going to happen over the following months. This was not because these animals were 'wild' as opposed to 'domestic' but because they were encountered in different situations, killed, perhaps, in different ways and their bodies too often treated differently. This may have been a continuation from how animals were thought of in the Mesolithic, and the Neolithic should certainly not be seen as a radical disjuncture from earlier times in this regard (Pollard 2004, 57).

Tim Ingold (2000, chapter 7; see also Fowler 2004, 122-6) draws a contrast between two different ethnographic understandings of animals. On the one hand there are totemistic ontologies in which life and energy are locked into the landscape, 'congealed in perpetuity in the features, textures and contours in the land' (Ingold

2000, 112). This point of view, held by Aboriginal Australians, also sees energy as tied into the land's occupants: the animals, plants and other beings (Ingold 2000, 113). Animism by contrast involves the understanding that 'life itself is a generative form', as Ingold puts it, that 'a complex network of reciprocal interdependence, based on the give and take of substance and vital force... extends throughout the cosmos, linking human, animal and all other significant forms of life' (2000, 113). This position is typical of the native peoples of the circumpolar North (Ingold 2000, 113). These contrasting systems of thought, Ingold points out (2000), are not structured political doctrines, but rather represent the way in which people relate to their world. I want to argue here, following Descola (1996, 88), that these ways of thinking are not mutually exclusive (see also Tilley 2004, 20). Rather as with concepts of partible and permeable personhood in chapter 5, these views may have emerged in the Neolithic in certain contexts. Indeed the concept of permeable and partible personhood can be drawn on again here. Totemism offers strong parallels with partible senses of personhood, the power and efficacy locked into the landscape, and its inhabitants. That people can separate off parts of themselves and give them to others fits well within such an ontology and as such it is no surprise to find that the people of the Mount Hagen area hold both a totemistic understanding of the world *and* a partible view of personhood (Ingold 2000, 129). On the other hand notions of permeability go well with the idea of forces, or substances, flowing between people and around the landscape within an animistic ontology. In both cases a sense of relatedness is crucial (Bird-David 1999, 72).

Thus in the Neolithic partibility and permeability, totemism and animism were contextual understandings that emerged through performative practice, rather than pre-existing notions of how the world worked. In the Neolithic people lived a mobile lifestyle. They herded and hunted animals, they gathered and they grew different plants. All of this required people to attend to the world around them, and the differences between the experiences of hunting and herding or gathering and growing were qualitative not absolute, contextual not permanent. The differences in context in engagement with different animals would lead to particular understandings of whether their energy or spirit was locked into the flesh and bones of the animal (totemism), or flowed out between the human and animal (animism). It was the varied tempos and

schemas of sociality between humans and animals that would have led to what Jones and Richards have described as 'differing ontological statuses' (2003, 46).

Furthermore, if these animals were seen as ancestral beings who dwelt alongside their human counterparts, it is interesting that their remains are deposited at monuments with increasing frequency in the Middle Neolithic. This chimes with the concerns throughout this period with the past. If people were worried about encountering the past in certain ways, then it is unsurprising that materialities associated with the past, such as Peterborough Ware(chapter 6), would be deposited with greater frequency at monuments in this period. In this context the deposition of 'a higher percentage of wild animal bones than usual' at Chalkpit field (Barrett *et al.* 1991, 72), or the red deer antler at Flagstones (Healy 1997a, 38) or the auroch skulls in the ditches of the Maiden Castle bank barrow (Armour-Chelu 1991, 139), do not merely represent the aftermath of hunting. Nor does any increase necessarily refer to an increased reliance on wild animals as a foodstuff. Such explanations are overly simplistic and economically determinist. Instead the deposition of this form of materiality, of the bones of these dead animal ancestors, was another way in which people could interact and engage with the past. They provided another way of increasing the potency of these sites by imbuing them with aspects of this powerful, totemistic, materiality.

Deposition provided the key mechanism for this, linking the way these animals were encountered in daily life with one of the dominant concerns of this period: the way people engaged with their past. The flesh of wild animals may have been seen as permeable and animistic, its consumption releasing certain energies into the world, their bones as partible and totemistic. The treatment of animal bone demonstrates these parallel concerns which people had. The totemistic and partible aspects of animals were returned to the ground, to the land from which their power may have come, in ditches and pits at various sites. The permeable and animistic aspects of the animal would have been encountered through the slaughter and consumption of the substances that the animal had to offer. Wild animals offered three-fold ways of engaging with the concerns that people encountered in daily life. They were ancestral animals that offered a chance to manipulate both the power of the land and the powers of their flesh and bones. The different relationships they had with human beings compared to domesticated animals may have meant that in the Middle Neolithic, with

its increasing concern with the past, that the powers located in these animals became more important.

One specific example of this comes from the Alington Avenue long barrow, where a fox bone was deposited in the north ditch (Davies *et al.* 2002, 21). The act of depositing this bone would have drawn upon the power of this materiality. This deposit might be dismissed as merely a single bone, and therefore meaningless. To do so would be misleading, however, providing that the bone did not end up there by chance. The view of the excavator is that the context of deposition with other bones means that the fox bone was probably a deliberate deposit (Davies *et al.* 2002, 21). Thus there is no problem with a detailed consideration of even this single bone. The fox bone may have provided another way of connecting this monument to the past, just as its construction did by making it appear to be a weathered long barrow (Davies *et al.* 2002, 187; appendix 2.2.1). In addition the use of a fox bone, rather than that of an auroch say, may have drawn on associations around it being a carnivore. As Pollard has argued, carnivorous and omnivorous animals may have been seen in a different light as they consumed flesh, possibly including human flesh during excarnation (2004, 61). The animistic aspect of the animal may thus have been released through the burning of its flesh, perhaps, rather than consumption, in order to avoid the polluting qualities this brought. Depositing a bone into the ditch employed its totemistic aspects, locked within the skeleton, just as with other animals throughout the Neolithic. This metonymic act drew on multiple references, and engaged with different temporalities and different ways of understanding the world. Wild animals appear in these contexts to have offered another mechanism for people to imbue these sites with meanings and metaphors. They offer another tool that people might use to reach into the past. Again identity may have been central, as roles in hunting animals, or handling wild animal bone, marked people out as being of a certain age or gender.

3) Late Neolithic

3.1 Building a henge

I have already discussed the way in which bodies interact whilst building monuments in some detail in appendix 2.1.1. There, drawing on the work of Lesley McFadyen (forthcoming), I argued that the visceral, physical nature of construction would have interacted with human bodies to produce different notions of role and identity. More than this, the acts of building would have helped create emotional attachments to place, and formed memories that would engage with the construction to help produce the meanings associated with the complex architecture of a monument. The same would have been true for the henge monuments of the Late Neolithic. If anything the experiences of building a henge monument would have been even more powerful. The numbers of people who gathered together to facilitate the construction of a site like Mount Pleasant must have been considerable. When we consider the many who might have been present not only building, but preparing food, making pottery and carrying on the business of daily life, then the numbers would have been substantial.

Mount Pleasant is a truly enormous henge. It has a north-south diameter of 320 metres and an east-west one of 370 metres, enclosing some 12 acres (Wainwright 1979, 4). It was defined by an external bank, which may have stood four metres high and 18 metres wide, and an internal, irregular, ditch, broken by at least five entrances (Barber 2004, 9; *contra* Wainwright 1979, 35). The shape of the ditch, which was largely made up of intersecting pits, hints at the way in which persons might have started to interact and interweave with one another. Which part of the ditch was dug may have been a way of performing identity, yet the way in which all the pits joined together, unlike at Maiden Castle or the nearby Flagstones, stressed the way in which this monument emphasised the wholeness of community, and challenged the right of any one person to dominate it. The interaction of multiple bodies, sweating, working, digging and lifting must have brought a range of emotional rhythms. Perhaps rather than stress or anger that we might associate with hot, physical tiring labour, people found satisfaction in the *play of work* (Overing 2000), or in the very work itself. People may have enjoyed the change in routine of daily life, enjoyed the chance to meet with distant friends or relatives. If this monument was a communal effort, one

that stressed the togetherness and indivisibility of a group, then emotions similar to satisfaction or joy may have been expressed. Equally, however, those whose power or possessions were being challenged by the act of construction, by the very way bodies were moving and interacting may have felt emotions approaching anger, or perhaps shame played more of a part (cf. Battaglia 1990).

Similar acts of construction, though on slightly smaller scales, took place at Knowlton, where a possible three henges were built, and at Maumbury Rings, only 1500 metres or so from Mount Pleasant. Yet something quite different took place at Greyhound Yard (Woodward *et al.* 1993). Here, instead of a ditch and bank being dug, people erected 519 posts in sub-circular shape, surrounded by a small gulley, with an entrance to the south (Woodward *et al.* 1993, 354-5). When one considers that each post represented an 11 metre long oak trunk, one metre in diameter then the scale of work becomes apparent. Woodward *et al.* have argued that these represent the felling of trees spaced over some 74 hectares, presuming an average of seven suitable trees per hectare (1993, 355). Whilst this may be accurate as a minimum requirement it does not get at the actual experience of cutting, moving and transporting these massive trees. Taking them from the smallest area may not have been the point. Instead we might think about people from different areas bringing trees with them. Trees of this magnitude would have been recognised, used as markers in the landscape over hundreds of years, just as other 'natural' features were. Yet they may have been seen as no more natural than any aspect of humanity, or human building. By bringing these trees to Greyhound Yard, between 2900 and 2340 cal BC (Woodward *et al.* 1993, 25), perhaps from a very wide area, people were bringing the wider landscape to a particular spot. A cleared area was thus surrounded by trees, perhaps from numerous different locations, and each may have had its own past, stories and myths.

The monument as a whole, through its construction, moved different parts of landscape into a single place. It created a rupture in the normal linear movements required for people to traverse the landscape and instead offered the possibility of moving from place to place simply by stepping from tree to tree. So whilst the bodies of people were important in building here too, it was not just their alteration, or the transformation of Greyhound Yard, that was important. By bringing the trees to the

site people had moved the world, and the trees stood as testament to that. The effort, the dangers and the risks involved would have added another level of emotional and mnemonic attachment to particular trees and through them to the monument itself (cf. C. Richards forthcoming). Greyhound Yard was concerned with creating a sense of place that, far from being separated from the outside world, was tied physically to multiple places within that world. Although the monument was surrounded by a gulley, this was rather shallow and would have probably silted up in a short period of time (Woodward *et al.* 1993, 25). This can hardly be compared to the ditches at Mount Pleasant or Maumbury Rings. Instead this site tied people into particular parts of the wider world. Joshua Pollard (2004, 63-4) has recently written powerfully about the relationships people may have had with woodland in the Early Neolithic (cf. C. Evans *et al.* 1997). He points out that trees played multiple and powerful roles in people's everyday existences, as they would have regularly have ventured into forests (Pollard 2004, 63). Although there was less woodland in the Late Neolithic it must still have been important to people, both as a resource and as a source of memory and power[vi]. As I have already said, these trees would have been living things that connected people at one time to hundreds of years into the past. To transport that tree to a particular spot some distance away would have created multiple resonances.

Brian Morris (1995), writing about the people of rural Malawi, has identified their ambivalence towards woodland. For them woodlands are seen both as 'fundamentally hostile and antagonistic to human endeavours' and simultaneously as 'the external source of life-generating powers' (Morris 1995, 302). Similar concerns may have been at play within the Late Neolithic where woodland might have been seen as home to wild, ancestral (appendix 2.2.2) and violent animals, that were both the site of danger and power. To move these trees, which stood for that woodland in a way no animal or person ever could, transferred much of that power and danger to a single place. So within Greyhound Yard people interacted with a powerful and dangerous architecture and moved between different parts of the landscape, simply by stepping from post to post. This may have acted as a way of revealing the relationships that existed between people and the world.

3.2 Mount Pleasant and the palisade

At around 2000 cal BC a series of changes took place at Mount Pleasant[vii]. These included the narrowing of the west entrance, the erection of a palisade that completely enclosed the site, leaving only two, very narrow, entrances. This period may also have seen the destruction of the stone cove (Pollard 1992). Other changes, recently detected by Martyn Barber, may also date to this period, including the heightening of the bank and a digging of an external ditch on the south side (2004). These latter changes are undated, however, and could belong to any period of the monument (Barber 2004). Nevertheless significant alterations took place at Mount Pleasant at around 2000 BC. How did the changes to Mount Pleasant affect how the site was experienced? Did the construction of the palisade put an end to the ad hoc activities that I argue dominated at Mount Pleasant after its construction (chapter 7)? Why might the cove have been destroyed at this point?

Figure 3.2.1: Plan of the Mount Pleasant palisade (after Wainwright 1979, 242, fig. 100).

The most clearly demonstrated change at this point is the construction of the palisade. This involved the digging of a trench all the way round the inside of the ditch, some 3m deep and 1.5m wide (Wainwright 1979, 50). In total this ditch ran for 800m and held as many as 1600 oak posts, each one standing up to 6m above ground level

(Wainwright 1979, 50). This monumental construction had only two entrances, one in the north and one in the east. The palisade was interpreted by Wainwright as a defensive structure (1979, 241), whilst Thomas sees it as an elaboration of the controlled movement and discrete knowledges he argues were central to Mount Pleasant from the beginning (1996). I want to suggest here that the destruction of the cove and the building of the palisade represent a reassertion of community at Mount Pleasant. Furthermore I argue that in fact that the palisade itself was a relatively short lived structure, at least in part, and was created so that it too could be destroyed.

It is without question that the construction of the palisade represents another moment of communal agency. The digging of the ditch, the transportation of 1600 posts and their erection represents a monumental amount of effort. These acts, on the surface at least, cut off the bank and ditch from the inside of Mount Pleasant and would certainly have restricted movement into and out of the enclosure. Yet I want to argue that this communal renewal of the monument does not represent a restriction of access in an absolute sense. People were not now being excluded from the monument. Firstly it was their labour that erected the palisade and once again I am drawn to McFadyen's explorations of the visceral nature of building (forthcoming), and Colin Richards' (in prep.) powerful analysis of the inevitable risk involved. Secondly the palisade may only have stood, in places, for a short time. Some of the posts were certainly left upstanding until they rotted, but others were pulled out and yet more were burnt where they stood (Wainwright 1979, 54; fig. 3.2.2). Although these events are undated, I want to suggest they represent a return to the ad hoc nature of engagement with the site, after another period of sustained communal action. The evidence for this comes from the change in forms of deposition that took place between the enclosure ditch and the palisade ditch.

Up until the construction of the palisade the main enclosure ditch saw sequences of deposition that included chalk objects, notably balls, antler, pottery and animal bone (Wainwright 1979, 44). Contemporary with the construction of the palisade new forms of deposition appeared in the ditch. This included the burial of two infants in the east terminal of the north entrance, which represent almost the first occurrences of human bone in the enclosure ditch, and certainly the first complete skeletons. These bodies, added to the work creating the palisade, emphasised the communities' on-

going physical and emotional engagement with the monument. Such acts of deposition do not merely represent the outcome of ritual, an attempt purely to re-sanctify a site, though it may have had that consequence. Rather the bodies of the infants would have reconfirmed, for some people at least, their *affective* commitment to Mount Pleasant. What is equally revealing in the analysis of deposition at Mount Pleasant is the absence of chalk objects in the enclosure ditch after the construction of the palisade (Thomas 1996, 217). From this point on chalk balls are deposited in the palisade trench (Thomas 1996, 217). The majority of finds from the palisade trench come from layer 3, towards the top of the trench (Wainwright 1979, 53). Wainwright argues that these presumably accumulated whilst the palisade was standing (1979, 53). I want to argue that an alternative explanation suggests itself – that is that the deposition took place after at least some of the posts had been removed and other burnt. In cutting III for example, from the western side of the palisade over 1700 artefacts were recovered from the upper layers of the palisade trench (Wainwright 1979, 53). These included a polished flint axe and two adzes, a complete polished green stone axe and a fragmentary one, 30 chalk balls and other carved chalk objects. The posts in cutting III had been burnt away, yet no mention of the material having been burnt is made. It seems more than possible then, that these acts of deposition began after the palisade had been burnt in this area. Chalk balls stop being deposited into the enclosure ditch after once the palisade is constructed. Instead they turn up in the palisade trench. Either there was a hiatus in the deposition of chalk balls, one possibility, or at least parts of the palisade were burnt down or pulled out soon after its construction. It is this latter explanation I prefer.

At around 2000 BC people reasserted their communal involvement with Mount Pleasant through new acts of deposition, the construction of the palisade and the destruction of the cove in Site IV. People were altering and renewing their connection with Mount Pleasant and in so doing, renewing their connection to community. Shortly after this, parts of the palisade were burnt down, and other parts were dug up (fig. 3.2.2). These must have represented an on-going communal engagement with the site to a certain agree. The effort required to burn, and keep burning large lengths of the palisade would have been considerable, but this would have been negligible compared to the enormous effort required to uproot parts of the palisade. A significant stretch of palisade was removed, perhaps 70 metres or so, and so well over 100 oak

posts were torn from the ground. When you consider each one was embedded up to 3 metres into the ground the scale of labour becomes apparent.

At the same time a certain ad hoc nature returned to Mount Pleasant. Different people may have been responsible for the construction of different parts of the palisade those people or groups may have chosen what happened to it afterwards. The conflagration that took place in certain parts would undoubtedly have been spectacular and could have been watched either from within the monument or from the perhaps enhanced banks around the outside (Barber 2004; Tringham 2005). Feasting continued and people now moved to deposit items into the remains of the palisade. People again acted to texture the site by burning parts of the palisade, uprooting others, and depositing objects into the trench and into the ditch. The uprooting seems to have taken place principally around the north side of the monument, so perhaps this was a deliberate decision to texture this part of the monument with memories of effort that matched the earlier sequences of construction. If those were visceral moments that interweaved with emotion, memory and identity, then so, surely, was this.

New emotional and mnemonic geographies were laid down through these acts of creative destruction and through the new kinds of deposition that were taking place. Thomas has recently argued that the deposits placed into recuts at the southern circle of Durrington Walls were an architecture of memory (2006), and we can imagine something very similar at play here. People placed objects into the ditch that commemorated both the effort of the palisade's construction and its spectacular destruction. People created a new emotional and mnemonic geography around the monument by connecting themselves with the communal palisade and through that to the broader community. At least some of the material deposited here appears to have been curated (Wainwright 1979, 58). In cutting XVIII Wainwright found that the posts had been removed and material deposited in its place, including animal bone. Radiocarbon dating revealed that this material was largely contemporary with the construction of the henge itself rather than with the palisade. Material was undoubtedly thus preserved at Mount Pleasant.

Figure 3.2.2: The methods of destruction of the palisade at Mount Pleasant (after Wainright 1979, 240, fig. 99).

People in small groups could come together and deposit items in the palisade ditch to stress their attachment to community, and to renew that attachment. By placing polished axes, chalk balls and pottery, convivial sociality was renewed and re-choreographed. Some of this material was much older than the people who placed it into the remnants of the palisade. Memory, an effort after meaning (Bartlett 1932), was constituted through these acts of deposition, as people shaped their understanding of the site through the formation of new emotional and mnemonic geographies. Multiple scales of memory were at play here as people referenced the construction of the palisade, its destruction and much older concerns. Convivial community was a concern *of* the present, but not a concern purely *with* the present. Midden material can be thought of as the very materiality of memory (O. Harris 2005); the animal bones, pieces of pot and stone tools that had sustained and nourished the very past itself. To engage with, and handle, such material was to employ another form of movement, a

temporal movement which brought the past once again into the present. Flows of substance are once more entwined here. People, objects and monuments had permeable boundaries that allowed substances to flow from past to future, person to monument, midden to ditch. People cited the past by physically engaging with it, handling the very stuff of myth and history, the very proof of the communities ongoing engagement with Mount Pleasant.

That there are similarities in deposition across the palisade trench is not surprising. This does not suggest to me an overarching structure controlling what was appropriate to deposit where. Rather the affordances of the site, the memories and emotions locked into the charred remains of the palisade and the object that were themselves to be deposited, created opportunities for certain items to be deposited, and denied others. The construction and destruction of the palisade are moments that capture the two sides of engagement with Mount Pleasant that people had. It was both a communal construction and a place where that communality could be expressed, acknowledged, but also on occasions deferred, through people's ongoing and ad hoc acts of feasting, ritual and deposition.

Acts of burning and destruction also took place at Site IV where, following Pollard (1992), I have argued that the cove was destroyed around 2050 cal BC. One suggestion might be that such an act of destruction freed bodies from the schemas of movement undoubtedly imposed by the wood and stone settings. This may have been the case, but a sequence of movement seems to have remained around the inside of the enclosure ditch, as the major acts of deposition continued to take place at the back of the enclosure and at its western terminal (Thomas 1996, 218). Rather than a complete rejection of previous controls on movement, the destruction of the cove, crucially through fire, sweat and effort was another alteration of the site. The acts of destruction might thus better be understood as ones of *transformation* (cf. Seremetakis 1991). The great stones were broken up, some of the fragments left in the stone holes, others taken and deposited in the ditch. Still more may have been taken and deposited elsewhere around the landscape. In a world where people may have been partible, where people were broken up and moved around, it is intriguing to see stones being treated in such a manner. At almost the same time as the stones were destroyed so the two infants were being placed in the enclosure ditch and with them a human adult

femur. The stones were broken up, through fire, and this may symbolically have stood for the stones' death. Thus as the stones died so they too could be deposited, along with the material remnants of those who had built them, the preserved pottery and animal bone that was placed in certain places in the palisade trench, and in the ditch at Site IV as well (Bradley 2000). Indeed this was a moment of major deposition at Site IV where half the total number of Beakers deposited was placed into layer 5 of segment XIII (chapter 7). Clearly these moments of transformation were accompanied by intense depositional activity at Site IV along with new forms of deposition in the main ditch itself.

3.3 Knowlton

Knowlton Rings is made up of a complex of enclosures that, unfortunately, have seen only small-scale excavation. Nevertheless, analysis of the site can allow one to speculate on the practices and performances that took place. Knowlton consists of the Church Henge, which is still visible today. It has a bank that remains upstanding to some two metres and a maximum diameter of 110 metres (Gale 2003, 58-9). Nearby is the Southern Circle which although now completely ploughed out, was much larger, perhaps twice the size of the Church Henge (Gale 2003, 59). The little excavation that has taken place of this monument reveals that the ditch was originally some 4.5 metres deep (Gale 2003, 59). There are two other enclosures, one, the Northern Circle may in fact be an oval barrow or mortuary enclosure, as one side appears to be open, but the internal ditch also suggests that it is a possible henge (Gale 2003, 60). The other enclosure, the Old Churchyard, is not a henge, as the bank is internal to the ditch, but it may still be contemporary with the other enclosures (Gale 2003, 60). This latter point is suggested by the scattering of burnt flint discovered there (Burrow and Gale 1995, 131). Thus at Knowlton a series of monuments exist, consisting of at least two and possibly three henge monuments. The sequence of architectures here offered a different series of possibilities to that of the other henges I have examined, although the lack of excavation means I cannot comment on the importance of deposition in this case. Were different items suitable for authentication at different henges? Were they used at different times of year? Did people of different identities use the differing henge monuments? Or did people move from one to the other either being followed, or being attended to, by differing groups at each stage? The differing scale of the monuments suggests that they were caught up in a series of

different tempos of engagement, rather than a simple processional sequence, however. The power and authority generated by henge monuments may have enabled other activities to take place nearby, such as dealing with the dead. Equally the different scales of the Church Henge and Southern Circle indicates perhaps that different acts of exchange and authentication took place there, along with the acts of feasting and consumption that we find evidence for at other henges, like Mount Pleasant. Until further excavations take place, however, it will remain difficult to identify the relationships between these various monuments and how the ways in which people engaged with them.

Figure 3.3.1: The Church Henge and other enclosures at Knowlton from the air (www 5).

3.4 Grooved Ware and Beakers: a gendered account?

Can we expand the engagement with personhood, Grooved Ware and Beakers that I set out in chapter 7? I want to suggest here that we can speculatively develop a gendered account contrasting Grooved Ware with Beakers and inalienable possessions in this period. Gender, I have argued, is a performative concept that can be cited by people through their actions and agency (chapter 2). Within partible personhood, however, gender can emerge through separation and objectification (M. Strathern 1988); exactly the kinds of process I have argued were at play at Mount Pleasant in chapter 7. In Melanesia both men and women are composed of male and

female parts; thus gender differences only emerge under certain conditions of social action (Gosden 1999, 133). As Strathern puts it, 'being "male" or "female" emerges as a holistic unitary state under particular circumstances' (1988, 14). If gender emerged in Late Neolithic society at certain times, rather than being a permanently fixed attribute, then these moments of formalised ceremony, authentication and exchange may have been among them.

At certain times, Late Neolithic sociality may have separated itself on each side of the Mount Pleasant ditch. The wider community would position itself on the bank whilst those who were seeking the authentication of Beakers, or perhaps taking part in exchange (appendix 2.3.5), would enter the monument. In these moments the broader community, the social person, acted to objectify and separate off part of its body. In so doing the community may have suppressed the multiplicity of genders of which it was made up (both within and amongst people). Partible personhood is made up of 'relations that separate' (Fowler 2001, 140). Here, through the objectification and separation of particular aspects of community, gender became objectified and separated too. That people who within a Western, biological, understanding would be defined as male and female remained on both sides of the henge ditch may not have been important. Entering the henge and exchanging Beakers (see appendix 2.3.5 for a discussion of this) may temporarily have allowed a particular aspect of a person's gender to be foregrounded whilst others were repressed. We might refer to the gender of those exchanging Beakers within the henge as 'gender A', and that of the broader community as 'gender B'. These terms stand here as signifiers. It might be tempting to refer to them as male and female, but to do so inevitable imposes a set of assumptions on to the past, thus I have chosen these neutral terms to avoid this. It is important to tie several strands of the argument together at this point. If Beakers, human bone, axes and other inalienable possessions were circulated in such a way that they revealed the partibility of the human body, then a logical extension of my argument is to suggest that this partibility was gendered as 'A'. Furthermore, the flesh, blood, milk and other substances that flowed through pottery as part of the permeable sense of personhood may have been gendered as 'B'. This emphasis here then is on the fact that different parts of the human body were gendered differently. Bones and axes, both equally parts of people's bodies may have been seen as 'gender A', flesh and other substances as 'gender B'. Thus whether you were A or B in the

Neolithic of Dorset may have had little to do with any kind of 'biological' sense of gender. Instead the body had the capacity to be either, and gender emerged under particular circumstances, be that the making of Grooved Ware or the authentication or exchange of Beakers.

Liminal area in ditch? (third gender?)

Social person on the banks (gender B?)

Separated persons in the central area (gender A?)

Figure 3.4.1: Possible spatial distribution of temporally emergent genders at Mount Pleasant.

These differently gendered ways of viewing the body were certainly not diametrically opposed, but at times they did fall on different sides, physically, of the ditch at henge monuments like Mount Pleasant. Inside the ditch were people involved in the exchange of inalienable possessions, including Beakers, gendered as A. On the outside was the watching community, using Grooved Ware pottery, stressing the flows of substance that bound them together and gendered as B. The community at these moments, therefore, was gendered as B. The 'A' aspect of the body of the community – its inalienable possessions – was separated off and placed within the henge monuments. The people that remained outside, the dividual social person, was gendered as B. That the various bodies that made up the social person were what we in the West might describe as being of different biological genders does not matter

here. Gender was not defined in those terms. The power of authentication and the defeat of hierarchy, therefore, rested in gender B hands, as opposed to those, apparently more active people, involved in the paradox of keeping-while-giving. Power was gendered in the Late Neolithic of Dorset. This does not mean that henges themselves were gendered in anyway. At other times Grooved Ware was again used and deposited binding the whole community together. Equally differing gendered divides could be cited and referred to during the more ad hoc moments of ceremony. People were gendered neither as one thing or another automatically, but rather their bodies once again encapsulated both. At moments of exchange and authentication, however, people emerged as gendered (M. Strathern 1988). In its making and in its use Grooved Ware may have gendered people as B, in so doing it helped to gender the community as B at henge monuments and, therefore, to gender power and one form of agency (cf. Dobres 1995).

Beakers would only have been present at Mount Pleasant after 2400 cal BC, and this is 200 years, perhaps, after the site was constructed. Does this mean that the engagement with gender I have offered above only applies after this point? On one level the answer, of course, is yes. The exact relationship between Grooved Ware and Beakers only existed after this point. The broader relationships between other inalienable possessions and Grooved Ware may have pre-existed this, however. Items such as axes, boars tusks and others (chapter 7, fig. 7.9) may also have been authenticated, and perhaps exchanged, within the architecture of Mount Pleasant. If so the gendered relationships may have incorporated Beakers within a pre-existing understanding. The specific relationships between Grooved Ware and Beakers were not part of the initial use of the site, however, but rather a later part of its history.

One question remains: is this too simple a bifurcation? I would in fact suggest that it is. In chapter 6 I suggested the possibility that other genders may have been involved in the shaping and working of chalk, if this was seen as a dangerous and liminal substance. In this context it would seem possible that people of other genders would have been involved in the examination and exchange of inalienable possessions. The liminal nature of moving inside and outside the enclosure, entering the ditch, and leaving it again may have been a set of acts that transgressed gender boundaries. Such acts may have defined people as neither A nor B, but as taking up a third gendered

position. Gender may have been fluid in this period but perhaps it was fixed for those who were took up third gender positions, and enhanced perhaps by bodily alteration (cf. Nanda 1999). Third gender groups are often involved in liminal activities (Herdt 1996b; chapter 2). The 'aqi of the Chumash were undertakers, the Hijra are closely linked to fertility and Siberian shaman drew their powers from their liminal gendered status (Holliman 1997; Mandelstam Balzer 1996; Nanda 1999). Acts of transgression, of crossing boundaries carrying liminal objects, may have been moments of performance and display within the henge. This too is often associated with third gender groups, such as the Māhū of Tahiti (Besnier 1996, 312). In this context then it is no surprise that worked chalk artefacts including phalli have been found at Mount Pleasant (Wainwright 1979).

3.5 Exchanging Beakers

In this part of the appendix I want to suggest that Beakers may have been exchanged at Mount Pleasant as well as being authenticated. The evidence for particular locales of exchange will always be difficult to identify, as exchange does not necessarily alter a site where it takes place. There are two reasons why I suggest that the exchange of Beakers may have taken place at Mount Pleasant, however. First, we know Beakers were present on the site as this is indicated by the clear evidence for deposition and, perhaps, for curation. The knowledge that Beakers certainly entered, and presumably left the henge, suggests at least the possibility that exchange may be taking place. Second, when I considered deposition in chapter 7 I suggested that it may in itself represent an act of exchange between people and the world. If this is accepted then we already have evidence for exchange of Beakers of one form at Mount Pleasant[viii]. It is important to note, however, that the discussion of exchange below does not depend on it taking place *at* Mount Pleasant. Indeed such exchanges would almost certainly have taken place at a range of locales in any case. Rather this discussion follows the process of exchange within an understanding of Beakers as inalienable and authenticated, at least, at Mount Pleasant. The concerns around identity and emotion I discuss below would have been important *wherever* Beakers were exchanged, however, that importance would merely have been enhanced by the architecture at Mount Pleasant. Thus whilst one might question whether Beakers were exchanged at the henge, this would not effect the main thrust of my discussion below.

In the Late Neolithic exchange may have taken many forms, but it was probably one closer to gift giving than the monetary exchanges familiar today (Mauss 1954 [1925]). Thus it may not, immediately at least, have been a two-way procedure. The term exchange often implies this, but the temporalities at play may have meant that at anyone time it was acts of giving from one person, or one group, to another that took place. These might then be reciprocated in time, but not necessarily immediately. The people within the henge might be caught up with giving to some and receiving from others, only for these relationships to be reversed at a later date.

There were many concerns and processes caught up in exchanging Beakers. The act of exchange may well not have been a simple thing in itself. I want to look at two areas in particular. First, acts of exchange offered opportunities for identities to be cited, performed or denied. If people had a fluid sense of identity in the Late Neolithic, then entering a henge monument to engage in exchange may have temporarily marked someone out as a different kind of person (appendix 2.3.4). The giving and receiving of Beakers would also have changed people's identities. Second, emotion would have been central to these acts, as has been argued for Oceania (e.g. Battaglia 1990; Maschio 1998; A. Weiner 1992). Both of these aspects, the fluid senses of identity and the power of emotions would have been exacerbated by the architecture of the henge monument and the interaction of bodies within that, if that was, as I suggest, a locale where exchange took place. Alasdair Whittle, in a recent article, has argued that the process of exchange 'may have been a means by which identities were kept fluid, permeable and open' (2004, 18). Although he is referring in this quotation to the Körös culture of the Great Hungarian Plain, it can begin to suggest how exchange may have helped people to perform, and transform, their identities throughout their lives.

Exchange and identity

Acts of both giving and receiving may have been 'drawn into a narrative of self-creation' (Maschio 1998, 86). The memories evoked by particular Beakers as a materiality preserved from the past, the way in which they reminded people of others, would have played key roles in how people created their own sense of identity (Maschio 1998, 86). Whilst still involving choice, of what to give and who to give it to, this sense of identity is more fluid than that which we get when we concentrate

solely on the performative (cf. Butler 1993). Self-formation does not happen in isolation but in the midst of a complex and relationally interlinked world. Again choice and agency, improvisation and relationality are as important as performance itself in the creation of identity (cf. chapter 2; O. Harris 2003). Thus as Beakers were made and given identities were transformed. Again a sense of partible personhood is crucial here; people could literally take part of their bodies and give it to somebody else, transforming both identities at the same time (M. Strathern 1988, 178). Beakers would have embodied certain histories that could be incorporated within people through exchange, altering the identity of giver, receiver and the pot itself. This series of giving and receiving has been termed by Maschio 'the narrative of the gift' (1998). The materiality of the item played a vital role both as the signifier *against* the changing and fluid sense of identity, and as the bearer of memory. The items exchanged may have acted as fixed points against which identities could be former and performed.

Beakers may have played a further role in people's identity formation. Beakers, and sherds of Beaker pottery, could have evoked a particular world in relation to which people could position themselves (Holland *et al.* 1998, 63). Beakers forced people to attend to the past, to the histories in which they themselves were enmeshed. This was not only the histories of production and exchange, but the longer term origin of Beakers. Their materiality may have spoken of the myths and narratives of other technologies emerging on the horizon, of people's first engagements with metal work. Identity can be seen as an outcome of 'participation in communities of practice' (Holland *et al.* 1998, 57; Wenger 1998). Beakers offered crucial preserved evidence of the practices of those communities, and of their histories. As Holland *et al.* have argued, 'to attend to the materiality of cultural artefacts is also to recognise the force of their use in historical practices - practices responsive to historical circumstances' (1998, 63). Beakers became part of the way certain people began to stress their identity, a way in which particular identities could be outlined against the backdrop of the broader community which Grooved Ware and henges emphasised. At the moments of exchange people may have been temporarily gendered in particular ways (appendix 2.3.4), but exchanging Beakers may have had more long-term consequences for identity, their incorporation into bodies could permanently alter identities. It was not the case, however, that Beakers arrived as fully constituted

identity markers. Rather that their origin, their difference from Grooved Ware and their form led them to be preserved and curated. This in turn created Beakers as inalienable possessions and as a technology of the past. The sequence of middening, display and exchange that Beakers underwent at Mount Pleasant created particular histories and narratives that the wider community could authenticate. These practices and histories meant that the Beakers in turn became central to the identities of people who used them, exchanged them and preserved them. It was *in this context* that Beakers were incorporated within single burials (appendix 2.3.6).

Emotion and exchange

Acts of exchange would also have been strongly emotional events, on three levels. First, there is the Beaker itself, which, as a mnemonic device, as a bearer of memory, also carries emotion (Maschio 1998, 96). This is not somehow separate from its role in generating identity. Giving and receiving would have been, in themselves, emotional acts (Battaglia 1990, 56). Relational forms of identity, which the gift embodies, are as much emotional as anything else. Indeed as Battaglia has pointed out 'enactments of emotion are part of the definitive syndromes of giving and taking that are established deep beneath the flow of relating, at the very core of self-constitution' (1990, 56).

These need not only be positive emotions, the history of a Beaker, the hands through which it has passed, may have stimulated negative feelings through painful memories (Maschio 1998). The item may have been in the possession of a dead relative or friend, and thereby in its very existence have demonstrated the reality of death, which would have provoked powerful emotional responses. Maschio has teased out how, in south-western New Britain, gifts can embody a range of people simultaneously (1998, 87). They can embody the various people 'who, for instance performed the songs of initiation for them, who gave them a name as a gift, who taught them everyday routines and tasks, who provided them with food, with physical as well as spiritual nurture' (Maschio 1998, 87). The exchange of these items would reveal their association with those people and in doing so may have drawn out highly emotional responses, both from those directly involved and from those who watched. Indeed perhaps the authentication of an item depended on its ability to draw out the correct emotional response, to make people *feel* its history, its inalienability.

The third level of emotionality at play, is referred to when Annette Weiner says 'this dilemma over keeping-while-giving is fraught with emotional and political vitality' (1992, 103). That is to say that people will have intense desires to keep, or to get, particular inalienable possessions in part because of their mnemonic and emotional qualities. Part of the *drama* of exchange (A. Weiner 1992, 145), therefore, will have been the dramatic swings of emotion as certain items were given and received. People would have been delighted or devastated as particular Beakers were passed from hand to hand. This may well have been crucial in the maintenance of peaceful conviviality. People who entered into exchange relationships, perhaps giving a series of gifts, may have felt anger, or a similar emotion, if those debts were not met. The return of a Beaker, however, may have dissipated that anger, and allowed the maintenance of the good beautiful life (Maschio 1998, 85). Thus although disappointment or sorrow might emanate from those whose struggle to carry on keeping-while-giving has come to an end, this would have been outweighed by the relief felt by those whose dues were being met (Maschio 1998, 85). The possibility of things going sour, however, of not receiving the desired object is absolutely central, however, to the process. Indeed as Maschio points out 'the style of self-fashioning and the moral imagining that I have called the narrative of the gift would not have worth for people if they were unable to imagine other ways of being and feeling' (1998, 91).

3.6 Round Barrows: remembering the body without the bones

In this section I want to examine the changing burial practices of the third millennium cal BC and the incorporation of Beakers within this. It would certainly be incorrect, however, to suggest that the burial of the intact human body first emerged in the Late Neolithic. In chapters 5 and 6 I have detailed examples of intact inhumation at the causewayed enclosure at Hambledon Hill (Mercer and Healy forthcoming), at Monkton Up Wimborne (M. Green 2000) and at the Flagstones enclosure (Healy 1997a). It would equally wrong to suggest that communal burial and excarnation disappeared in this period, these practices in fact extended well into the Bronze Age (Gibson 2004). What did emerge for the first time at the end of the Middle Neolithic was the practice of placing intact bodies under round mounds[ix]. At Handley 26 two Neolithic bodies were interred under a low mound, surrounded by a ditch some 13 metres in diameter (Barrett *et al*. 1991, 85; fig 5). One body was unaccompanied; the

second was buried with a jet belt slider. A disturbed burial was also found under the nearby mound Handley 27. These are not the only examples of round barrow burial in the Neolithic, though they may be amongst the earliest, as indicated by the Peterborough Ware in their ditches. Another Neolithic burial, probably originally underneath a round barrow, was discovered at Kingston Lacy after the great storm of 1987 (Papworth 1999). Here a woman between 21 and 30 was found (Papworth 1999, 156). A single radiocarbon date form the skeleton places this burial between 2900 and 2600 cal BC (Papworth 1999, 155). The Piggotts also excavated another Neolithic round barrow on Cranborne Chase (S. Piggott and C. Piggott 1944; S. Piggott 1954). With the blurred divide between the Late Neolithic and Early Bronze Age many more burials under round mounds appear, often accompanied by Beaker pottery[x].

Wor Barrow Complex

Figure 3.6.1: Handley Down barrows 26 and 27 in relation to Wor Barrow (after Barrett *et al.* 1991, 85, fig. 3.12).

Many different explanations for the emergence of round barrows have been proposed. Jan Harding has suggested that these burials were places where 'specific individuals were glorified after their death' (2003, 113). These were locales, he argues, where

certain people were deposited to mark them out as high status, and he contrasts this with the anonymous body of ancestors he sees as standing for the dead in the Earlier Neolithic (Harding 2003, 113). John Barrett sees round barrows as marking particular places in the landscape where certain people were buried (1994). This then offers the opportunity for others to be inserted into the monument after death, and in so doing to claim a genealogical relationship with the barrow's original occupant. Julian Thomas has argued that the creation of a ditch and mound served to distance the dead from the living community, contrasting this to the intimate relationships people had with the bones of their ancestors in earlier periods (2000). He follows Barrett, however, in arguing that the fixing of the dead in the landscape placed the dead into the past and into a genealogical history (Thomas 2000, 665).

Much of these arguments holds true for Late Neolithic Dorset. It is certainly the case, as Barrett argues (1994), that fixing bodies in the landscape created new opportunities for relationships with the dead to be reconfigured, and genealogical claims to be made. What I wish to examine, however, is the crucial roles of memory and identity in this process, and the role played by Beakers in the citation of identity of both the living and the dead.

Reworking burial: reworking memory

What was new about the burial of persons under round barrows was the interaction between people, landscape and memory (Last 1998; Mizoguchi 1993). The crucial aspect that emerged in the Late Neolithic was not that certain people were buried intact, since that had always been a part of Neolithic life, but that their bodies were interred in memorable ways, and marked by memorable architecture. Unlike the burials at Monkton Up Wimborne they were not hidden behind a chalk panel, or covered in stone as at Flagstones. Instead at Handley 26 and 27, and at Kingston Lacy, bodies were interred into graves that were both highly memorable and clearly marked. This was not a dramatic revolution in burial practices, rather new and old practices were subtly reworked together. A round barrow such as that at Fordington Farm provides a good example of this (Bellamy 1991; fig. 3.6.2).

Figure 3.6.2: Fordington Farm round barrow (after Bellamy 1991, 111, plate 1).

The Fordington Farm barrow lies on the Alington Avenue ridge, between Mount Pleasant and Maumbury Rings. It is one of a pair of barrows, the other probably being slightly later in date (Sparey Green 1994). The first activity to take place there consisted of the cutting of two grave pits, into which wooden mortuary structures appear to have been inserted (Bellamy 1991). One pit (grave 70) contained the bodies of an adult male and a child, the other that of an adult male, an adult female and a very young or foetal infant (Bellamy 1991, 108-9; fig. 3.6.3). All of the bodies were disarticulated when excavated, but the bones had been neatly piled and kept separate from one another. One possible explanation might be that the bodies were excarnated and kept separate from one another in containers. It is more likely, however, that the bodies were placed within the graves sequentially, and thus repeatedly re-accessed and reorganised (Bellamy 1991, 127). The presence of small bones within the grave certainly suggests that the bodies were not excarnated elsewhere. Equally interesting is that when the graves were reopened some bones were removed, including a humerus, a mandible and some pelvic bones (A. Jenkins 1991, 121). Once the bodies had all been placed in the ground, a circular interrupted ditch was dug around the

graves, and the material used to erect a mound. This took place after the bodies had decomposed and been rearranged. At a later point people came back and dug through the mound, and cut a third grave in the bedrock (grave 61). Here a semi-crouched young adult male was deposited along with a barbed and tanged arrowhead (Bellamy 1991, 115; fig. 3.6.3)[xi]. His head rested on a cattle scapula, his feet on an axis vertebra, also bovine in origin, and two pieces of cattle humerus lay behind his legs (Bellamy 1991, 115). In the fill of this grave a further three cattle scapulae were found along with a fragment of cattle pelvis. All three acts of burial probably date to between 2300 and 2200 cal BC (Bellamy 1991, 116). The third moment of internment may have coincided with the refurbishment of the mound through the addition of turves covering several stake circles (Bellamy 1991, 129).

Both old and new practices were at play at Fordington Farm. The burial of intact corpses in mortuary chambers, then returning to remove certain bones and to rearrange the bodies, was a practice that referred back to earlier practices. Similar events may well have taken place in the early phases of numerous earthen long barrows in Dorset, few of which have been excavated. Indeed disarticulated remains were found underneath Wor Barrow (Barrett et al. 1991). The act of covering these remains with a mound also drew on older practices, as did the digging of an interrupted ditch. At the same time, however, the internment of the intact body with grave goods, shortly afterwards, referred to new practices of the third millennium, as did the round shape of the mound.

Grave 59: Adult male and child.

Grave 61: Young adult male with cattle bone.

82

Barbed and tanged arrowhead

Key

Animal bone

Grave 70: Adult male, adult female and young infant.

0   1   2

Figure 3.6.3: Burials at Fordington Farm round barrow (after Bellamy 1991, 110, fig. 3).

Memory was crucial to the activities that took place here, at several scales. One example is the way in which the practices referenced older styles of burial, even though it must have been some centuries at least since the last burials were placed under long mounds in Dorset. Even Alington Avenue, very young for the long barrow tradition was *at least* 700 years older than Fordington Farm, and it contained no burials in any case. It is almost certainly true that processes of excarnation continued through that period, but we have little evidence for people being interred under mounds of whatever shape. The first two graves thus played off older, perhaps almost mythical, stories of bodies under barrows. New concerns were at play here too. Although some bones were removed, acting perhaps as mnemonics of the dead, the bodies were kept separate, the bones were not intermingled. I do not wish to return to old narratives here of the emergence of individuals, this seems especially unlikely when the dead included an infant and a child, and when bones were being removed. An ongoing sense of permeable and partible personhood seems far more likely (see chapter 5 and above).

Instead I want to suggest that memory was again important here, and that by keeping the bones separate people physically compartmentalised the act of remembering. Each burial was associated with particular connections; these were not dissolved or intermingled by the bodies being intermeshed. The notion of sequence here is important; each body probably represents a separate act of interment, drawing on and referencing the last (Last 1998, 46). When the bodies were uncovered the bones may have been examined, touched, removed from the grave and passed around. These moments would have been replete with emotion and memory. It might also be the moment when narratives about the lives of the deceased, their links and relationships, the very stuff that had formed them could be discussed. This would be true of the child too, who may have been formed out of physical connections of others, and constituted at birth as part of the community. Marks upon the bones may have been examined and other counter-narratives may have emerged (Seremetakis 1991). Yet when (most) of the bones were returned to the grave they were kept in separate piles, and particular narratives may thus have been agreed upon for each person. As Jonathan Last puts it in his insightful study of a round barrow in Cambridgeshire, 'people were encouraged to remember the past (and thereby understand the present) in specific ways' (1998, 47). The mound was then raised over the grave, sealing access

to the bodies, and ending the acts of reinterpretation that may have offered competing narratives of memory about both the people and the place.

Funerals as focus

The sixth burial was then placed into the mound. Memory here was not constituted through a later re-engagement with the bones of this young man, however. Instead it was at the funeral itself that memory was constituted. The mound by this stage was already in existence, the bodies buried within would probably have been remembered by some of those who were present, and may have been described in stories to others. The site itself thus stood as a physical mnemonic[xi], located in a landscape that was full of other stories, from the Alington Avenue long barrow, via the Flagstones enclosure to Mount Pleasant. The funeral of the young man must have been impressive. First, it consisted of the deposition of not only the young man, but of bones that came from at least three cattle. The body was laid out in a very particular fashion, in relation to the cattle bone (see above), and other cattle bones were included in the fill. It is probably not the case that all these cattle were consumed at the funeral as three large animals would have produced enough meet for several hundred people, and at least two of the cattle scapulae had been gnawed by animals, suggesting that they were not immediately deposited.

Perhaps instead we can suggest again that some older material was being deposited with the body to stress the links the young man had with different parts of the broader community. Each of those scapulae may have been defleshed as part of other acts of feasting, where people came together and cited and restored convivial community. In doing so the bones would come to stand for those acts of feasting, as well as, perhaps, the particular cattle from which the bones had come and the relationships which had produced those animals (cf. Ray and Thomas 2004). By laying the head on one scapula, and the feet on the vertebra, people were making explicit claims on memory. People were being asked, through an effort after meaning, to place the dead person within a specific set of relationships (Barrett 1994). As the grave was infilled, other less stringent claims were made through the deposition of other scapulae in the fill. The use of the same bone that had been placed under the head was surely not accidental, and referenced this earlier act. Here something quite new was at play. An intact body was buried in such a way as to make it explicitly memorable. In the Early

and Middle Neolithic I argued that the burial of intact corpses, for example at Monkton Up Wimborne and Flagstones, was centred on the forgetting of the dead through the absence of bones, their material mnemonic. With this burial at Fordington Farm, however, an intact body was buried in such a way as to be explicitly memorable. The burial of this person tied him into the broader landscape of memory, the specific place and the people who had already been buried there. It was an explicitly memorable act, which represented part of a new way of remembering people, one that did not rely on bones as specific mnemonics of the dead (chapter 5).

One of the consequences of these changes may have been that the repeated opportunity to negotiate and interact with those who were interred like the young man at Fordington Farm receded. This meant that there were no further chances to engage with the body of the dead person, to read narratives from the bones, to move them round the landscape. Relationships with the dead, the narratives which may have been seen to constitute a person, these could no longer be negotiated once the funeral was at an end. Thus the funeral became the crucial site for the negotiation of relational identities. Who was related to the deceased, and how, indeed who the deceased was, could no longer be negotiated afterwards, as may have been the case with earlier burials at Fordington Farm. The mnemonic power of the funeral became the sole arbiter of the dead person's relations with the living, and perhaps an important part of the living's relationships with each other.

Negotiating and performing identities at funerals

It has long been noted that funerals offer opportunities for identities of both the living and the dead to be renegotiated (Barrett 1994; Bloch and Parry 1982; Parker Pearson 1999; Thomas 1999a). What I want to consider here is funerals as a setting for performance where the formation of specific memories was one of the crucial considerations. Axes of deposition were often important at round barrows, as Last has demonstrated (1998). At Fordington Farm Bellamy suggests that the spacing of causeways in the ditch along with the axes of the original burials (NNW-SSE) created a focal point to the monument's south (1991, 128). This would have created a theatre for performance for the later funeral of the young man and, given the importance of this axis at the barrow, it is little surprise that his body lies on the same orientation as the older grave cuts. This theatre for performance gave the perfect opportunity for

people to demonstrate their relations with the dead, to make claims, and to have those claims judged. It was here that bodies of both the living and the dead could be materialised through practice (Butler 1993; Taylor 2005).

Undoubtedly emotions would have been central to such moments. The performative nature of grief may have empowered people to make their claims, indeed the power of grief may have been what legitimated and structured the rights of certain people to speak on behalf of the dead and to judge the claims on their relationships (Seremetakis 1991). Within relational senses of personhood such claims may have been constitutive of a person in the broadest sense, thus they would also have been central to what was remembered about the funeral, and about the deceased. The arena to the south of the round barrow created an arena where such claims could be performed. It also helped to structure the funeral itself, ensuring that the older axes of burial was referenced. Whether remembered or not the earlier burials created certain affordances that could be reworked in later rites, and may have formed part of the claims on memory that the funeral made.

The performative nature of emotion allowed identities to be cited at funerals. It created a space in which people could cite certain aspects of their identity whilst displaying claims about others. Thus grief or other emotions, perhaps, could be expressed which were legitimate given that person's relation to the deceased. At the same time, however, this may have allowed other identities to be cited and referred to, and contrasting claims may have been made by others. The identity of the dead may not have been settled before death, and perhaps this was one of the key aspect of the funeral. Whereas before the deceased's identity was continually negotiated through the movement, exchange and deposition of their bones around the landscape, or else forgotten, now the identity of the deceased had to be settled on at the graveside. As Thomas has suggested, this switch represents a change from a '*processes of transformation* to an *event of deposition*' (1999a, 157, original emphasis). From this perspective it is time to turn to grave goods, and to Beakers in particular.

Beakers and identity in the grave

Grave goods, Thomas has rightly pointed out, 'did not simply reflect a social persona, they were instrumental in the performative construction of identity for the dead

person' (1999a, 159). Furthermore he suggests that they represented 'material signifiers whose role was to ensure that an intended reading of the corpse was made by the audience within the temporally restricted conditions of the funeral' (Thomas 1999a, 159). There is much to agree with in these quotations, particularly in the former. I want to suggest, however, that they miss much of the way in which grave goods would have acted as the 'performative construction of identity', to borrow Thomas' phrase, for the living too. I also suggest that the second quotation misses the way in which funerals would have permeated through memory to have much more lasting effects upon identities, locales and landscapes at the end of the Neolithic. In order to develop some specific examples of how identity may have been cited, maintained or transformed through the deposition of grave goods I want to look now at the inclusion of Beakers in graves in Dorset, notably on Cranborne Chase.

That Beakers were an addition to the single grave assemblage, rather than being associated with its foundation is clear at the barrows on Crichel Down and Launceston Down on Cranborne Chase (C. Green et al. 1982; S. Piggott and C. Piggott 1944). The earliest burial on Crichel Down, B13, was of a man with a leaf-shaped arrowhead, and was thus probably Neolithic in date (S. Piggott and C. Piggott 1944, 51)[xii]. Three burials with Beaker pottery were also excavated by the Piggotts (1944). One of these burials, B11, had a grave that was cut 3 metres below the natural chalk. The performance of funerals can thus be detected here. Why was such a deep grave cut? Was it to bury the body as deeply as possible? Or was it a reference to other deep shafts at Monkton Up Wimborne, Maumbury Rings and Fir Tree Field? It is this latter suggestion that I find most convincing, especially given the deposition of Beaker at the top of the Fir Tree Field Shaft (M. Green 2000)[xiii]. People here again referenced the past by digging a deep grave. They then placed the body of the dead into the past, and so made specific associations between the dead, themselves and the earth.

More recently two other barrows associated with Beaker pottery were excavated by Charles Green (C. Green et al. 1982). Launceston Down 5 featured the burial of a child with a Bell Beaker, and a second grave under the barrow featured the body of a man, lying on his left hand side, and a Beaker placed by his feet (C. Green et al. 1982, 40). I have already argued that Beakers were inalienable possessions (chapter 7),

which could alter identities through exchange (appendix 2.3.5). The act of depositing Beakers in graves may have linked people around the graveside with the deceased. It was an act of exchange where an inalienable possession was placed into the grave. In effect this was an act of gift giving. Within a partible sense of personhood we can develop this point further. In effect people were placing part of their own bodies within the graves; they were giving something of themselves up to be buried. This further destroys any dichotomy between multiple graves and single inhumations. Where grave goods are present parts of other people *were* being deposited in the grave. Interestingly at Launceston Down 7, Beakers were not found with the burials. Instead Beaker pottery appears to have been included within the mound as it was erected, 99 sherds were found altogether (C. Green *et al.* 1982, 47). The importance and possible curation of sherds at Mount Pleasant demonstrates that we should not underestimate the deliberate nature of this act. Each of the sherds may have carried particular histories, biographies, memories and emotions but in scattering them through the mound those connections were more with the barrow itself. Thus here we have people, perhaps communities, citing their bodily connections to the dead under the mound in general, rather than a specific citation of identity connecting a particular pot to a particular person.

It is interesting in this context to note that many of the Beakers deposited in graves were probably made purely for that purpose (Boast 1995). Beakers found in burials tend to have been made from poorer fabrics but have a high standard of surface treatment (Boast 1995, 71-2). The decoration on Beakers also tends to be more complex in burial contexts (Boast 1995, 76). Thus it appears that it was not the curated Beakers sherds deeply entwined with history, such as those deposited at Mount Pleasant, that tended to be placed in burials. Instead new pots were being made, specifically whole pots that were meant to be appreciated from a distance, as they paid particular attention to the visual motifs[xiv]. People were connecting themselves to others through immediate relations here. Beakers as a form of pottery may have hinted at their external origin, as I suggested, but it was not the case that these specific vessels had extended histories on which to draw, as perhaps the curated sherds at Mount Pleasant, and other Beakers, did. Here the Beaker was not the object of immediate concern; its inalienability may not have been authenticated, but this may not have mattered in this context. Instead it was the bodily partible relationship cited

by the placing of the Beaker in the grave that was central. The relationship rather than the object was what was crucial. The giving of the object did not *represent* the relationship, it *was* the relationship. By placing Beakers in the grave people created memories of relationships. More than this, they demonstrated and created relationships. Thus it was not merely that the Beakers created 'an intended reading of the corpse' (*contra* Thomas 1999a, 159), because the Beakers were not representational in that sense. In a very real way as an aspect of the body they *created* the corpse.

Within this broad creation of the corpse the detailed nature of placing Beakers may also have been important. I have already noted how the spread of Beaker sherds within the Launceston Down 7 burial may have created links between the barrow and the broader community. What about the detail of where whole pots were placed in the grave? Beakers are often found by the deceased's head in graves, and also often by the feet. Examples of the former include one of the Beaker burials inserted into Thickthorn down long barrow (Gale 2003, 69). Examples of the latter include the adult male buried under Launceston Down 5, the burial under Crichel Down 14 and one of the burials under Barrow 1004 at the Thomas Hardye school in Dorchester (C. Green *et al.* 1982; S. Piggott and C. Piggott 1944; Smith 2000). The regularity with which Beakers are placed in certain positions within the grave has long been noticed (e.g. Clarke 1970, 454).

Thomas has argued that the act of placing the Beaker in a specific location was one way of creating an identity for the deceased (1999a, 161). This is certainly the case, but we can, I suggest, speculate beyond this. The placing of the Beaker in the grave behind or in front of the head, by the feet, or elsewhere may have related to how people perceived the body as being constituted. If bodies were still conceived of as partible, then different groups may have been responsible for the production of those different parts. Maternal and paternal sides of clans or families may have been conceived of as providing particular substances that formed the body and its constituent elements. These may have been represented as flows of substance that entered by the head, or feet for example. If this was the case then by placing a Beaker in a certain spot in the grave persons or groups may have been using widely understood symbols to claim and maintain certain relationships with the deceased.

These actions thus tie back to the way cattle bones were placed under the head and feet of the young man buried at Fordington Farm (Bellamy 1991). The connections would have been even more powerful elsewhere, however, due to the added textures provided by the Beaker, but the location of cattle bone in the grave may have drawn on similar understandings. Thus placing a Beaker by the body's foot at Launceston Down 5 may not only have said something about the deceased (Thomas 1999a) but also about the living and their specific relations with the dead. Thus the outcome of the emotional contests beside the graveside may have been that (usually) a single Beaker was placed in the grave creating and affirming the primacy of one relationship, a relationship revealed in the position of the Beaker.

The role of Beakers in creating and citing identities around the graveside would have affected their role as a form of material culture in daily life. Beakers came to be included within single graves, I suggest, because they were perceived as inalienable possessions, because they could be used in constructing and changing identities, through exchange, of both the living and the dead (see also chapter 7). Their role in funerals, in these highly charged emotional practices would have affected their very materiality, however. Objects, particularly inalienable objects, are bearers of both memory and emotion (cf. Gosden 2004). By creating relationships at the graveside through the placing of Beaker pottery with the corpse, people would have indirectly affected *all* Beakers, not just the individual object in the grave. Once Beakers had begun to be incorporated in grave assemblages this form of pottery would have been textured emotionally in a new way. People would react differently to seeing, using and exchanging Beakers as a result. Thus Beakers from this point, whether whole pots or sherds, would have carried with them not only their particular biographies and histories, but a certain set of broader associations that would have increased their emotional and mnemonic complexity.

Conclusion

The third millennium was one in which people began to remember the dead in this new way, by fixing memorable acts of deposition in specific places in the landscape. These places were often already memorable in themselves. Alington Avenue long barrow saw three burials placed in the ditches of a double ring ditch at its western end, and four cremations placed in a bipartite ring ditch at its eastern end (Davies *et*

al. 2002). Here, again, particular people were being placed into particular places in the landscape, rather than being broken up, and associated with multiple locations, both above and below ground. Of course the excarnation and the manipulation of some decayed corpses certainly continued as we have seen at Fordington Farm, and the Piggotts demonstrated on Cranborne Chase (Bellamy 1991; Gibson 2004; S. Piggott and C. Piggott 1944). Nevertheless funerals appear to have become the central focus of rituals that surrounded the dead, and part of the way people renegotiated identities. Memories began to focus less on ongoing relations with the dead, expressed through people's engagement with bones, and more on a fixed period of encounter: the funeral. Of course such meanings and memories were not left unchallenged. People re-opened graves on occasions, perhaps to have another say, to challenge what had gone before. Barrow B16, excavated by the Piggotts had been reopened in antiquity, the bones scattered and the skull removed (S. Piggott and C. Piggott 1944, 52-3). Bones were also removed from the skeleton of the child at Launceston Down 5 when the barrow was later reused.

It was categorically not that one mode of burial replaced another therefore; indeed as I have shown there never was a single method of dealing with the dead[xv]. Rather what changed was that memories and identities became less a matter of ongoing negotiation through the materiality of the deceased and more a fixed act of engagement at the grave side. One way this was done was by the placing of Beakers in the grave. The creation of the barrow, the digging of the grave, these would act as the bodily creation of memory, touched upon when other moments of digging took place. Memory was now written on the landscape and through the body, not carried in the physical remains of a person. The dead were distanced, physically, from the rest of the community, but not in any other sense (cf. Thomas 2000).

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[i] Even in situations that might be termed *carnivalesque*, where the world is turned upside down, the understandings are still from within a prism that fits with people's day-to-day life, even with people's roles inverted (cf. Bakhtin 1984 [1964]; Cochrane 2005).

[ii] The site may even have been occupied or at least visited in the Mesolithic too, as indicated by a microlith found under the barrow.

[iii] Recently Chris Tilley (1999) has postulated a metaphorical relationship between the bank barrows of Dorset and the nearby Chesil Beach. I consider this aspect of the bank barrows in more detail during the materiality section of chapter 6.

[iv] This is certainly a topic worthy of more lengthy consideration elsewhere.

[v] C. Evans *et al.* comment on the potential 'dilemma of memory' that the use of wood in monuments represents (1999, 251). It is both the referencing of other times and other places, and their destruction through the cutting down of trees (C. Evans *et al.* 1999).

[vi] Although these changes may have involved the use of Beaker pottery, we should not associate these changes with the introduction of Beaker pottery. Beaker pottery is present on the site from earlier periods and was present in Southern Britain from c. 2500 cal BC (Needham 2005). I discuss the role of Beaker pottery chapter 7, and in appendices 2.3.4, 2.3.5 and 2.3.6.

[vii] Both these arguments could be dismissed, a sceptic might argue that hard 'evidence' is lacking for them. This returns us to a view, however, that sees archaeology as seeking 'proof' of its arguments in the material record. By contrast what I have set out to do in this thesis is follow Barrett (e.g. 1994; chapter 1) in exploring the material conditions of life. There is sufficient evidence from those conditions, I suggest, to speculatively discuss exchange at Mount Pleasant.

[viii] It is interesting to note that the two largest round barrows in Dorset, the Conquer Barrow and the Great Barrow have both been suggested as being of Late Neolithic date (Sparey Green 1994; Gale 2003). It is even more interesting that next to these barrows the two largest henge complexes in Dorset were constructed, Mount Pleasant in the former case and Knowlton Rings in the latter. Although the excavator interpreted the Conquer Barrow as being later than the henge monument (Wainwright 1979), this is now disputed. Both Sparey Green (1994) and Davies *et al.* (2002) have suggested that it may in fact predate the henge monument. At Knowlton Rings no dates or stratigraphic relationships exist that might inform us of the comparative chronologies of the henges and the Great Barrow, but that is no reason to declare definitively that the latter postdates the former. In both cases the dating is thus far from clear cut, indeed it is hotly disputed, but if this sequence was correct a bold statement was certainly made when these henges were built next to these two barrows. The Conquer barrow is in fact incorporated within the bank at Mount Pleasant, and one could easily construct arguments around how specific memories and stories were being incorporated into the very henge itself (Sparey Green 1994; Wainwright 1979). Until more information is known about the date of these two barrows and their relationship to the henges, however, this must remain a speculative suggestion.

[ix] Other Late Neolithic round barrows may well exist amongst the many examples of this kind of monument in Dorset (Thomas 1984). Few have been adequately excavated, and in common with elsewhere in the country, it is generally assumed that in the absence of other evidence they are Early Bronze Age in date.

[x] There is no way of knowing if this arrowhead was a grave good, or a part of the young man's death, but arrowheads are often found in burials of this period, so there is no reason to assume that it was necessarily the cause of death.

[xi] Funerals may have been even more important as the focus of memory for those persons who were buried in flat graves during this period, such as the flat Beaker grave discovered by Pitt Rivers south of Wor Barrow (M. Green 2000, 91; cf. Thomas 1999a). Equally we might recast these moments as ones where forgetting and single burial connected again, but in new ways.

[xii] Interestingly although the mound covering this grave was insignificant its location was obviously important as a post was placed at the foot of the burial, and later replaced, perhaps after it had begun to rot (Piggott and Piggott 1944, 51).

[xiii] Though the large numbers of Beakers found across Dorset means this could, of course, be coincidence

[xiv] Andy Jones has pointed out how different layers of memory are caught up in the fabric and decoration of pots (2002, 131). The fabric of the pot represents one layer with its distinct, but later invisible, history of extraction and tempering, whilst the decoration represents another highly visible layer of memory (A. Jones 2002, 131)

[xv] This is further supported by the contrasting treatment of bodies at Launceston Down (C. Green *et al.* 1982). Bodies were interred whole at Launceston Down 5, whereas at Launceston Down 7 the initial burials appear to have been deposited as a bundle of bones, held together by a leather thong (C. Green *et al.* 1982, 47). Although no pottery was found with these burials, Beaker sherds were scattered through the primary mound.

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