

**Social Values and Self-Regulation: Distinct Effects of Centrality
and Motivational Content**

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Thesis Summary

This thesis examines the role of social values in self-regulation. Across eight studies, I investigate the distinct self-regulatory processes influenced by specific types of social values. Chapter 1 reviews research on the concepts of social values and self-regulation, and highlights the main issues that are addressed in the subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2, four studies tested the hypothesis that social values (e.g., equality) vary in the extent that they act as self-guides that people hold as “ideal” standards versus “ought” prescriptions. Results revealed that central values function as ideal self-guides, whereas peripheral values function as ought self-guides. In addition, violations of central values evoked dejection-type emotions, whereas violations of peripheral values evoked agitation emotions, but only in a public setting. Focusing on a second stream of research, Chapter 3 utilised three studies to test the hypothesis that the role of social values as self-guides depends on the type of motivation that they serve. Results revealed that openness values (e.g., freedom) are more likely to serve as ideal self-guides than as ought self-guides and perceptions of failure to fulfil openness values uniquely predicts the experience of more dejection-type emotions. Chapter 4 demonstrated that, following central value violation, subsequent value-affirmation dissipated dejection-type emotions. Finally, Chapter 5 reviews the contribution of the present research to theories that examine the manner in which social values influence cognitions, affect, and behaviour and outlines potential directions for future research. Overall, these results provide the first direct support for longstanding assumptions about a close link between social values and affect, while providing more precise information about which types of social values elicit which types of emotion.

Contents

	Page
Chapter 1 Social Values and Self-Regulation: Concepts and Background 1
1.0 Chapter Overview 1
1.1 Social Values 1
1.2 Conceptualisations of Social Values 5
1.2.1 Rokeach's Model of Social Values 5
1.2.2 Schwartz's Model of Social Values 7
1.2.3 Inglehart's Model of Social Values 11
1.3 Social Values Summary 12
1.4 Self-Regulation 13
1.4.1 Models of Self-Regulation 13
1.4.2 Carver and Scheier's Model of Self-Regulation 14
1.4.3 Higgins's Approach to Self-Regulation 15
1.5 Self-Regulation Summary 17
1.6 Integrating Our Understanding of Values and Self-Regulation 18
Chapter 2 Central and Peripheral Values as Self-Guides 21
2.0 Chapter Overview 21
2.1 Differences Between Central and Peripheral Values 21
2.2 Study 1 26
2.3 Study 2 34
2.4 Study 3 38
2.5 Study 4 41
2.6 Discussion 44

Chapter 3 Motivational Content Influences Self-Regulatory Focus and Experienced Emotion 51
3.0 Chapter Overview 51
3.1 The Motivational Content of Social Values and Self-Regulation 52
3.2 Study 5 54
3.3 Study 6 57
3.4 Study 7 62
3.5 Discussion 65
Chapter 4 Value Affirmation as a Means to Cope with Central Value Violation ...	71
4.0 Chapter Overview 71
4.1 Study 8 71
4.1.2 Discussion 75
Chapter 5 Evidence and Summary 77
5.0 Overview 77
5.1 Recapitulation 77
5.2 Limitations 78
5.3 Future Research 82
5.4 Conclusion 89
References 91

CHAPTER 1

Social Values and Self-Regulation: Concepts and Background

1.0 Overview

The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief review of social values and self-regulation. This review describes definitions, properties, and potential consequences of both concepts. Conceptualisations of values are introduced using three influential models: Rokeach's (1973) value theory, Schwartz's (1992) circumplex model of values as motivations, and Inglehart's (1971) model of societal values. Explanations of self-regulation are introduced using Carver and Scheier's (1981) model of self-regulation, and Higgins's (1987, 1996a) self-discrepancy theory and self-regulatory focus theory. I will then describe how my research has attempted to integrate conceptualisations of values and of self-regulation to yield a more complete understanding of the values construct.

1.1 Social Values

Social values can be conceptualised as abstract ideals that are important guiding principles in one's life (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). Examples include freedom, equality, helpfulness, and achievement. As such, social values have long been regarded as some of the most important aspects of people's self-concept. They predict diverse attitudes, psychological states, and behaviours (Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960; Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996; Maio & Olson, 1998; Maio, Olson, Allen, & Bernard, 2001). For example, values have been used to predict voting behaviour (Schwartz, 1996), consumer behaviour (Kahle, 1996), education (Feather, 1996), intergroup attitudes (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993), vocation (Roe & Ester, 1999), and subjective well-being (Schwartz, Sagiv & Boehnke 2000). Hence, values have a pervasive influence on people's everyday lives.

In the extant literature, valuing is viewed as an automatic process (Mandler, 1993), and people often appear ready to defend values vigorously (cf. Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003). As such, values serve a rationalisation function (Eiser, 1987; Schwartz, 1999), and an evaluation function akin to that of attitudes. That is, values allow people to comprehend, interpret, and evaluate objects they encounter in their physical and social worlds, and people strive to defend values because of their utility. This defence can be maintained even in contexts that invoke high opinion conflict (e.g., debates over abortion, euthanasia). In these situations, people may differ in their use of relevant values to justify opposing attitudinal positions (Eiser, 1987), whilst not necessarily viewing opponents' values as less important. In support of this notion, Kristiansen and Zanna (1988) demonstrated that participants with opposing attitudes to abortion and nuclear weapons perceived different values as relevant to the issues. For example, anti-abortion participants viewed "salvation" and "true friendship" as relevant to the issue, whereas pro-abortion participants viewed "a comfortable life" and "freedom" as relevant. These differences in value relevance remained after controlling for value importance.

There are many similarities between values and the broader construct of attitudes. In particular, values and attitudes comprise three elements: cognitions, affect, and behaviour (Rokeach, 1973; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). In the context of values, however, there is evidence that the cognitive component is relatively weak, whereas it can be strong or weak for attitudes (Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989). According to the values-as-truisms hypothesis (Maio & Olson, 1998), values are so widely shared that people fail to perceive a need to build cognitive support for them. Consequently, values possess strong affective support, but not cognitive, support. Many experiments have supported this hypothesis and its implications (Bernard,

Maio, & Olson, 2003; Maio & Olson, 1998; Maio, Olson, Allen, & Bernard, 2001). For example, Maio and Olson (1998) predicted and found that participants who are asked to analyse reasons for their self-transcendence values changed their ratings of these values, a result that should happen only if people lack prior cognitive support for their values. Indeed, the principal findings indicated that value change only occurred for participants not provided with a prior opportunity to develop cognitive support for these values. Participants who did receive cognitive support did not evidence value change.

This finding has important implications for understanding value-based behaviour. Maio et al. (2001) demonstrated that making salient cognitive support for values motivates increased pro-value behaviour above the effects of merely priming the value. In one of their experiments, discrimination in favour of participants' in-group was lowered among those who had contemplated their reasons regarding equality compared to participants who had been primed with the value. Thus, as expected, building cognitive support for a value can support value-congruent behaviour. This impact on behaviour raises several interesting issues, which I will discuss in Chapter 5.

There are other important differences between values and attitudes. According to Eagly and Chaiken (1993), an attitude is a disposition to evaluate an attitude object with some degree of favour or disfavour. Hence, it is possible to have an attitude concerning any object one may encounter. In contrast, values are finite in number and comparatively few (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). In fact, values are considered to occupy a central and hierarchical position in mental networks (Rokeach, 1973), therefore influencing attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour on a range of topics (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Seligman & Katz, 1996).

Thus, values are abstract concepts that transcend specific situations or contexts (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Moreover, attitudes can be positive or negative, favourable or unfavourable, whereas values possess degrees of positivity or favourability. That is, values are always supportive of something (Roe & Ester, 1999).

Another important difference is that values can be considered as desired goals, behavioural standards, and desired modes of conduct (Joas, 1996; Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). In contrast, many attitudes are merely preferences that do not carry such implications (e.g., attitudes toward works of fiction, music). As such, values uniquely contain a moral imperative. For example, supporting a value may evoke the belief that one *should* possess a particular attitude towards an attitude object. This distinction also causes differences in the way values and attitudes are measured. Typically, people are asked to rate or rank the importance of values as guiding principles in their lives. This “forced choice” reflects the way that people prioritise specific values. In contrast, attitudes are often measured using scales from low to high degrees of favourability (Feather, 1990; Maio & Olson, 1998) or using an implicit associations paradigm that taps positive and negative associations. This difference in method occurs partly because people tend to rate most values as important (Schwartz, 1992), whereas people can possess positive and negative attitudes. Also, importance ratings and centrality measures (i.e., the degree of association between the self- concept and the value) are separate concepts (Verplanken & Holland, 2002) because an individual may judge a value to be important, but it may not occupy a central position in their self-concept. As a result, unimportant peripheral values may exert less influence than values that are more central to the self.

1.2 Conceptualisations of Values

Early attempts at conceptualising values emphasised that values exert influence on behaviour through implicit and explicit processes, and operate at individual and societal levels (Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973). In these models, values were represented as stable individual preferences for particular types of behaviour (Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1951). However, as described below, the three most influential models of social values differed in how they categorised values.

1.2.1 Rokeach's Model of Social Values. Rokeach suggested that the motivational and cognitive effects of values are so pervasive that all areas of social science can be understood by utilising values. Rokeach's (1968, 1973, 1979) seminal work suggested that values are evident in all cultures, but people prioritise them differently. These differences can be discerned in situations where values are in opposition: People hierarchically organise values according to their personal beliefs and only the values at the top of this hierarchy influence behaviour when values conflict. That is, only a small number of "central" socialised values meaningfully function as subjectively important guiding principles. Such central values are considered very important, closely linked to the self-concept and sense of self-identity (Kluckhohn, 1951, Rokeach, 1973), acting as a form of self-promotion, directly influencing cognitions and behaviours (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Values that exist at lower positions in the value hierarchy are considered peripheral to the self-concept, exerting indirect influence via compliance-type behaviours in value-relevant situations.

Such theorising gave rise to the notion of value *systems* (Rokeach, 1973) wherein specific values are favoured by an individual, groups, and society. Within this approach, values are socialised and transmitted generally and within subsections

of the population. For example, individualistic societies are likely to foster individualistic type values such as social power. Nonetheless, certain groups within a society are likely to organise themselves around a rejection of such values and promote opposing values. Indeed, Rokeach (1973) argued that differences between social groupings based on religion, class, and political affiliation could be understood as differences between groups' value priorities. In other words, there is a synergistic relationship between socialisation of social values, individual experience, personality, and temperament, resulting in a distinct coherent system of social values within the individual. Single values do not exert an influence in isolation from other values. Rather, the value system operates as a whole. Thus, supporting a specific value introduces compatible and competing motivations related to other values in the value system.

Rokeach also explored the notion that social values act as desired "end-states of existence" and "modes of conduct" (Rokeach, 1973, p.5). The end-states were labelled terminal values (e.g., freedom, inner harmony), and the modes of conduct were labelled instrumental values (e.g., forgiving, polite). Extending this categorisation, Rokeach organized terminal values into personal and social value groupings, and he grouped instrumental values into moral and competence value groupings. Personal values (e.g., inner harmony) are self-orientated and possess an intra-person focus, whereas social values (e.g., a world at peace) are societal with an inter-person focus. Competence values (e.g., self-actualisation) possess a personal focus related to self-interest and contravention of these values evokes feelings of personal inadequacy. Moral values possess an inter-personal focus concerning prescriptive norms and contravention of these values evokes guilt.

Rokeach's research has demonstrated the utility of conceptualising values as a hierarchical system of value compatibilities and conflicts because the value-ranking technique predicts diverse attitudes and behaviour (e.g., Ball-Rokeach, 1973; Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1994; Ball-Rokeach, & Rokeach, 1987; Grube, (1982); Rokeach, 1973;). Nonetheless, Schwartz (1992) found no empirical support for the instrumental-terminal distinction. Moreover, Bond (1988) suggested that the Rokeach Value Survey does not cover the whole range of human values and is formulated from a Western perspective. Although influential, Rokeach's model has been criticised for its subjective and arbitrary nature (Braithwaite & Law, 1985; Braithwaite & Scott, 1991, p.664) and for its lack of underlying theory connecting individual values and value types (Rohan, 2000, p.260). This latter point has been addressed in Schwartz's (1992) model of social values.

1.2.2 Schwartz's Model of Social Values. Although there have been many conceptualisations of social values (Rohan, 2000), most have not provided a theoretical and empirical basis for identifying values that are related in a predictable manner across cultures. Schwartz's (1992, 1996) model addresses this concern and forms the basis for conceptualising values in the present research. Schwartz sought to develop an understanding of the underlying dynamic relations between values across cultures. He suggested that values serve three universal, human needs: Individual biological needs, co-ordination of social interaction, and facilitation of group survival. Satisfying these needs produces ten basic motivations that are served by values (Table 1). As shown in Figure 1, these values are subsumed within four higher order value domains arranged on two orthogonal continuums, comprising openness versus conservation and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement. Openness values subsume stimulation and self-direction values; conservation values subsume

conformity, tradition, and security values; self-transcendent values subsume universalism and benevolence values; self-enhancement values subsume achievement and power values. Hedonistic values can be related to either openness or self-enhancement value domains because they represent individual sensation seeking.




Figure 1. Schwartz's (1992) circumplex model of values

According to Schwartz's (1992) model, the values are related in a circumplex manner (Figure 1). Values that appear opposite in the circumplex serve motives that often conflict, whilst those appearing in an adjacent position serve motives that are often compatible. For example, individuals who believe that conservation values (e.g., national security, obedience) are important tend to attach less significance to values orientated towards openness (e.g., freedom, creativity), but may be neither more nor less likely to attach significance to values orientated toward the needs of others (e.g., forgiving, helpfulness). Analysis of patterns of correlations between ratings of values have supported this circumplex pattern of relations in over 60 countries, suggesting that it provides a useful conceptualisation of the link between values and motivations (Schwartz, 1992, 1996).

Table 1

Schwartz's (1992) Ten Value Types (value labels appear in parentheses)

Power: Social status and prestige, and control or dominance over people and resources (social power, wealth, authority, preserving my public image).

Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (successful, ambitious, capable, influential).

Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life).

Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (varied life, daring, an exciting life).

Self-direction: Independent thought and action (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals).

Universalism: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all (broadminded, wisdom, a world of beauty, equality, unity with nature, a world at peace, social justice, protecting the environment).

Benevolence: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (honest, loyal, helpful, forgiving, responsible).

Tradition: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self (respect for tradition, humble, accepting my portion in life, devout, moderate).

Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms (self-discipline, obedient, politeness, honouring of parents and elders).

Security: Safety, harmony, and stability of society, relationships, and the self (family security, national security, reciprocation of favours, social order, clean).

This circumplex facilitates the prediction of a general pattern of relations between value priorities and any concept or variable of interest. For example, Schwartz and Huisman (1995) demonstrated that participants high in religiosity preferred tradition and conformity values to hedonistic, stimulation, and self-direction values, which represent opposing motivations to tradition and conformity. Patterns reflecting value opposition have also been revealed in studies of values and behaviour (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003), trust in institutions (Devos, Spini, & Schwartz, 2002), gender (Prince-Gibson & Schwartz, 1998), the meaning of work (Ros, Schwartz, & Surkiss, 1999), social contact with outgroup members (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995), cultural values and work (Schwartz, 1999), worries (Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000), culture, age, and gender (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005), and opinions concerning human rights (Spini & Doise, 1998). These studies also reiterate the notion that studies of individuals' and groups' value priorities should consider multiple values, rather than single values.

As stated earlier, Schwartz posits that values are conscious goals directed at achieving three basic universal needs. Due to repeated expression of value priorities, the dynamic relations within an individual's value system should also be evident at the implicit level. To investigate this notion, Pakizeh, Maio, and Gebauer, (2006) presented participants with a target value and then asked participants to respond to values that were compatible, conflicted, unrelated, or orthogonal with the target value. In support of Schwartz's model, the results indicated that priming a target value facilitated responding to compatible values (i.e., values that serve a similar motivation) and conflicted values (i.e., values that serve an opposing motivation), both of which tap motives that are relevant to the primed values. This evidence

reveals important support for Schwartz's hypothesised pattern of motivational compatibilities and conflicts at an implicit level.

1.2.3 Inglehart's Model of Societal Values. Inglehart's (1971, 1977, 1997) approach is compatible with that of Rokeach and Schwartz, but operates at the societal level. Drawing on Maslow's (1962) hierarchy of needs, he suggests that material conditions influence the predominant values favoured by a society. Specifically, the prevailing hegemony is constructed through the interplay between satisfaction of primary materialistic needs (e.g., economic and physical security) and the populist desire for postmaterialist needs, such as intellectual and aesthetic fulfilment (e.g., equality, freedom). To elaborate, values that express postmaterialistic needs become more important as materialistic needs are fulfilled.

Research offers support for this model. For example, Abramson and Inglehart (1995) subjected data from 40 societies to factor analyses and found evidence of a materialistic-postmaterialistic value dimension (see also, Inglehart, Norris, & Welzel, 2003). Furthermore, following a general trend for improved economic conditions in advanced industrial societies, generations born following World War 2 tend to endorse postmaterialistic values, whilst those born prior to World War 2, an era of comparative economic deprivation, tend to endorse materialistic values (Inglehart, 1990, 1997). Furthermore, Norris and Inglehart (2003) have demonstrated that increasingly wealthy Western nations have changed further over the last two generations, becoming more liberal regarding equality, a postmaterialistic value, on a range of issues from sexual behaviour to gender roles.

Because this approach is rooted in Maslow's hierarchy of needs, it implies that satisfaction of material needs is a necessary precondition for people's pursuit of postmaterialistic needs. However, it is possible to argue that pursuit of

postmaterialistic values precedes and facilitates change relating to satisfaction of materialistic needs. For example, the UK labour movements that gave rise to socialist parties and the welfare state drew on moral outrage at the material inequalities in society, during a time of poverty. That is, people who had not fulfilled their materialistic needs sought collective emancipation, a postmaterialistic need, and, as a secondary consideration, a method to alleviate their materialistic deprivation. Furthermore, most world religions favour an approach to life that is typified by focusing on spiritual fulfilment, rather than materialistic fulfilment. For example, Christianity and Islam advise adherents to place an emphasis on spiritual concerns ahead of material concerns, and Eastern religions encourage adherents to forgo any material possessions. These examples are difficult to address within Inglehart's model.

1.3 Summary

Social values are important psychological constructs, operating at the individual and societal levels. They are crucial to understanding cognition, affect, and behaviour as they influence all facets of human activity. The three most influential models of social values share a number of assumptions. They assume that values are (a) important constructs across all cultures, (b) abstract concepts that transcend contexts (c) cognitive representations operating in a pivotal position within cognitive networks, (d) hierarchically organised within the individual in a coherent value system of compatibilities and conflicts, (e) contain a moral imperative pertaining to desired modes of conduct and end states, and, (f) operate as a part of rationalisation and evaluation processes.

Each model also has important unique features. For example, Rokeach emphasises differences between values that are central versus peripheral to the self.

Building on Rokeach's approach, Schwartz's model facilitates comprehension of the interconnections between values and allows predictions to be made regarding patterns of relations between values and behaviour. Inglehart's model uses societies as the unit of analysis and highlights trends value prioritisation values at the macro level. Although all of these contributions are important, Rokeach's distinction between central and peripheral values and Schwartz's distinction between higher order value domains will be the primary bases for the research presented in subsequent chapters

1.4 Self-Regulation

Self-regulation concerns goal-directed behaviour. When we regulate our pursuit of a goal, we seek to have harmonious relations between the self and the social and physical environment. This process is crucial to understanding many different aspects of psychological functioning and occupies a central position in theories of the self (Vohs & Baumeister, 2004). Indeed, failures of self-regulation in the pursuit of beneficial goals is associated with problems concerning interpersonal relationships, violence, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, eating disorders, emotional, and financial problems (for a review, see Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). Thus, self-regulation has effects at physiological and psychological levels.

1.4.1 Models of Self-Regulation

Although models of self-regulation offer different descriptions of the process and the levels at which it operates (e.g., conscious and nonconscious processes), there are a number of elements that these models have in common. They all conceptualise the existence of a desired goal or goal state and an assessment mechanism that compares the actual self-state with the desired state. If discrepancies are detected, then remedial action is sought to reduce these discrepancies.

1.4.2 Carver and Scheier's Model of Self-Regulation. One of the most prominent models of self-regulation was developed by Carver and Scheier (1981). In this model, a feedback loop monitors the individual's progress towards a desired goal or goal state. This loop is part of a test-operate-test-exit (TOTE) system. For example, people assess their current standing on a particular dimension. If discrepancies are present, they perform actions designed to move themselves towards the desired goal. At this phase, secondary testing occurs to assess whether such remedial actions have resulted in acquisition of the goal or have reduced the distance from the goal. If acquisition occurs, the system is exited. If acquisition has not occurred, actions and testing continue until no further remedial actions are required. By comparing their actual self with a desired self, this action-based loop acts as a discrepancy-reducing system and moves the individual from a negatively valenced reference point towards a positively valenced reference point (Carver, 1996).

The action-based loop is itself monitored by a secondary feedback loop that acts in tandem with the action-based loop, but is based on affect and performs a "metamonitoring" function (Carver & Scheier, 1990, p.30). Phenomenologically, the action-based loop is consciously experienced, whereas the meta loop is driven by a nonverbal sense of expectancy and sense of valence relating to the progress made by the action-based loop. A subjective standard is used to compare the rate of progress of the action-based loop over time, whereas the *rate* of progress of discrepancy reducing actions is especially important in this model and linked to the sense of valence. Hence, it is not only the actual actions undertaken, but also the subjective sense of those actions, that influences experienced affect. If no subjective discrepancy is detected, then individuals experience no related affect. If the rate of progress of goal attainment is lower than the subjective standard, negative affect is

evoked. Conversely, if the rate of progress is higher than the subjective standard, positive affect is evoked.

The action-based loop is particularly relevant to this dissertation, because it can be divided into two sub-systems; a discrepancy-reducing loop and a discrepancy-enlarging loop. Whereas the former loop moves the individual towards the desired goal, the latter loop causes the individual to avoid an undesired goal. For example, an individual might wish to possess certain attributes and actively attempt to attain them. Conversely, the same individual might attempt to avoid attributes perceived to be the opposite of the desired attributes. Positive emotions are evoked when both loops are effective, and negative emotions are evoked when both loops are failing to succeed (Carver, 2004). However, each loop is related to distinct affective reactions.

Following Higgins (e.g., 1997), the approach and avoidance systems possess two bipolar affective dimensions. The approach loop evokes affect along an elation-dejection continuum, whereas the avoidance loop evokes affect along a calmness-anxiety continuum (Carver & Scheier, 1998).

1.4.3 Higgins's Approach to Self-Regulation. The relationship between self-states, self-regulation, and emotion is explored further in Higgins's (1987, 1989a, 1989b) self-discrepancy theory. This theory offers a framework for "understanding the development and structure of self-state representations and for considering the consequences of congruency and discrepancy among various aspects of this structure" (Moretti & Higgins, 1999, p.189). This approach highlights the notion that, in order to match desired end states, people can approach a desired goal, or take steps to avoid moving away from the desired goal. This process can involve the activation of actual, ideal, and ought self-representations. The actual self comprises the current state of the self, pertaining to a particular dimension. In Higgins's approach, this self

corresponds to the traditional notion of the self-concept. Ideal selves are the individual's or others' hopes, wishes, and aspirations regarding the person. Ought selves are the individual's or others' beliefs regarding the responsibilities, duties, or obligations regarding the person. These possible selves act as self-guides. That is, by comparing the actual-self with the ideal or ought selves, congruencies and discrepancies are made obvious to the individual.

Individuals can increase the likelihood that they will attain or maintain a particular ideal or ought self-representation by engaging in self-regulatory strategies that Higgins (e.g. 1998) described as promotion and prevention focused. Promotion focus is concerned with nurturance, accomplishment, gains, and non-gains for the individual. In contrast, prevention focus is concerned with security, protection, loss, and non-loss for the individual. Sensitivity to positive outcomes should predominate when ideal self-regulative processes guide self-focus, and evoke a promotion focus. This sensitivity allows the individual to engage in behaviours likely to result in a desired end-state by reducing the distance from the goal. Conversely, sensitivity to negative outcomes should predominate when ought self-regulative processes guide cognitions and evoke a prevention focus. This sensitivity causes an individual to avoid mismatches between the actual self-state and a desired end state by avoiding an increase in the distance from the goal. By extension, promotion focus induces a state of eagerness or approach and a willingness to try novel methods or combinations, whilst a prevention focus induces a state of vigilance or avoidance and a desire to rely on tried and tested methods of problem solving (risk aversive strategies).

According to Higgins (1996a), an actual-self assessment that produces a match with either an ideal or ought self-guide should induce positive emotions, whereas failure to match an ideal or ought self-guide should induce negative emotions. More

important, these congruencies or discrepancies motivate distinct cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses. Higgins and colleagues (e.g., Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997) have predicted and found that actual-ideal congruencies evoke cheerfulness type emotions, such as happiness, whereas actual-ideal discrepancies evoke dysphoric or dejection type emotions, such as sadness or discouragement. Actual-ought congruencies evoke quiescence type emotions, such as calmness, whereas actual-ought discrepancies evoke anxious type emotions, such as agitation.

Of importance, self-discrepancy theory also regards this system as context-sensitive; that is, any goal can be conceived as either promotion or prevention focused, depending upon chronic or temporary self-regulatory orientation (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Friedman, 1999; Liberman, Chen Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999; Spiegel, Grant-Pillow, & Higgins, 2004). Thus, some situations will activate a goal as a promotion focused ideal or as a prevention focused obligation, and some types of goals might be chronically held as promotion focused ideals and others a prevention focused oughts (e.g., Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Forster, Higgins, & Chen Idson, 1998; Friedman, & Forster, 2001; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; Liberman, Chen Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 2001; Liberman, Molden, Chen Idson, & Higgins, 2001; Shah & Higgins, 1997). The chronic differences were of particular interest in the present research.

1.5 Summary

Self-regulation plays a crucial role helping the self interface with its social and physical environment, thereby promoting well-being. Carver and Scheier's (1981, 1990) model of self-regulation highlights the notion that people attempt to move towards desired goals and distance themselves from undesired goals. These distinct self-regulatory processes are linked to different types of emotional experience.

Successful self-regulation evokes positive emotions and unsuccessful self-regulation evokes negative emotions. Higgins's (1987) model complements this approach by identifying distinct self-regulative strategies for ideal and ought self-guides. These self-guides are linked to distinct self-regulatory processes that Higgins labelled as promotion and prevention focused, respectively. In turn, these processes evoke distinct emotions. Successful promotion focus leads to cheerful affect, whereas failed promotion focus evokes dejected affect. Successful prevention focus leads to quiescent emotion, whereas prevention focus failure evokes anxious emotion. Higgins's approach integrates social and clinical psychological domains and allows specific predictions to be generated regarding goals, methods of achieving goals, and affective reactions to both.

1.6 Integrating Our Understanding of Values and Self-Regulation

To summarize, this chapter introduced, defined, and examined the concepts of social values and self-regulation. Both of these concepts are viewed as important influences on cognitions, affect, and behaviour. I noted that values operate at individual and cultural levels and that specific values are prioritised for individuals and societies (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Central values are highly associated with the self-concept, operating as context free, intrinsic motivations. Conversely, peripheral values act as contextual, compliance orientated, motivations. In addition, as described by Schwartz's (1992) model, values vary in the motives that they serve.

There are two ways in which I have sought to interpret these elements in this thesis. First, I considered that differences between central and peripheral values have important ramifications for how values operate in self-regulation, because they indicate that a value may be construed as an idealised or ought end state. A central value may act as a promotion focused ideal-self-guide, whereas a peripheral value

may act as a standard that *must* be met and pursued as a prevention focused ought-self-guide. For example, an individual may highly identify with the value of equality until it becomes a central value and dominant guiding principle in their life. At this point, the person becomes intrinsically motivated to act in an egalitarian manner and would then appraise his or her own behaviour (actual self) in terms of matching or failure to match this desired end state. In practical terms this involves asking oneself, “Am I acting in an egalitarian manner?” If the answer is no, then an ideal self-discrepancy has been identified, which should cause dejection-related emotions. If the answer is yes, then they have identified an ideal self-congruency and are likely to experience cheerful affect. To provide a contrasting example, a person may merely hold this as a minimum standard. If this minimal standard is not reached, an ought self-discrepancy should be identified, which should evoke anxiety-related emotions. If this standard is reached, then they produce an ought self-congruency occurs, which should evoke quiescent emotions. This topic will be addressed in Chapter 2. In this chapter, I present evidence that the relation of central versus peripheral values to the self-concept influences the self-regulatory strategies that people use and the cognitive and emotional outcomes associated with values.

The relation between self-guides and the circumplex model could also be posed in a different way. I considered that people may view some motivational types of values as ideals, others as oughts, and yet others as a mixture of both. For example, people may be likely to hold a strong conviction that they *wish* to be “free” (an “openness” value; Schwartz, 1992) and an equally strong conviction that they *should* be “free”. In contrast, they may believe that they *should* show self-discipline (a “conservation” value; Schwartz, 1992), but not *wish* it. This asymmetry may also apply to other values that serve openness and conservation goals (e.g., creativity Vs

respect for tradition). More remains to be discovered about intrinsic connections between values serving different motivational goals and self-guides. This topic will be addressed in Chapter 3. This chapter describes evidence that the motivational content of values influences the self-regulatory strategies and emotional outcomes associated with values.

In Chapter 4, I present data testing whether some of the value differences observed in prior studies are malleable through experimental intervention. Finally, in Chapter 5, I summarise the present research and highlight relevant topics for future research.

CHAPTER 2

Central and Peripheral Values as Self-Guides

2.0 Overview

In this chapter, I focus on the manner in which people deploy central versus peripheral values. Researchers have suggested that highly prioritised values are closely associated with the self-concept and an individuals' sense of self (e.g., Hofstede, 1982, Rokeach, 1973). To date, few studies (e.g., Verplanken & Holland, 2002) have investigated the mechanisms that link highly prioritised and non-prioritised values to the self-concept. In this chapter, I address this aspect of self-concept functioning and suggest that the manner in which people use values is related to the degree to which values are subjectively associated with the self-concept.

2.1 Differences Between Central and Peripheral Values

“To attain perfect purity one has to become absolutely passion-free in thought, speech and action; to rise above the opposing currents of love and hatred, attachment and repulsion. I know that I have not in me as yet that triple purity, in spite of constant ceaseless striving for it. That is why the world's praise fails to move me, indeed it very often stings me.” (Ghandi, 1927)

Ghandi's famous description of his struggle to attain perfect detachment (“Ahimsa” in the Hindu faith) reveals how a person can experience dejection at the failure to achieve a value that is of utmost importance to the person (detachment in this example). In this case, praise for his accomplishments merely serves as painful reminders of the gap that he perceives between his behaviour and his ideal. Thus, this example illustrates how discrepancies between cherished values and actual behaviour may have negative affective consequences.

Consistent with this view, perspectives in clinical-cognitive psychology have suggested that values affect self-esteem and general well-being (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), but there is no evidence demonstrating mechanisms that might elicit these effects. For example, the cognitive behavioural approach (e.g., Beck, 1989) posits that negative emotions are caused by unrealistically difficult to achieve values, negative self-views, and a predisposition to interpret ongoing experience in terms of perceived negative attributes. Broader theories of emotion have suggested a complex social basis for a link between values, motivation, and emotion (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; Keltner & Haidt, 1999).

Despite the tendency for social values to be interrelated in a predictable manner, it is also clear that cultural, social, and individual factors cause idiosyncratic variation in the links between values and the self-concept. This variation is stressed in Rokeach's (1973) model of values. Rokeach proposed that, for any particular individual, some values will be central to the self-concept and others will be more peripheral. Central values are believed to guide an individual's cognitions and behaviours, which then act as a form of self-definition (Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985). Peripheral values have less influence on relevant cognitions and behaviours because they are not directly linked to the self-concept (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Peripheral values relate more to concerns about self-presentation and social desirability so that behavioural support is linked to context. In theory, then, all of the values identified by Schwartz (1992) can vary in the extent to which they are central or peripheral to an individual.

More important, these potential differences between central and peripheral values should affect the manner in which they are pursued as goals, and this difference is illustrated in Higgins's (1998) discussion of self-regulation. As

discussed in Chapter 1, Higgins (1998) has found that desired end states, of which values may be an example (Rokeach, 1973), can activate two distinct types of self-guides. An ideal self-guide is comprised of an individual's representations of attributes that he or she would ideally possess. In contrast, an ought self-guide includes the individual's beliefs regarding the obligations, duties, or attributes the individual should or ought to possess. Ideal self-guides function as aspirations, whereas ought self-guides function as minimal standards or norms. Higgins (1987) has also discussed the actual self-guide. The actual self can be viewed as the degree to which one possesses an attribute or goal. In this sense, an actual self-guide represents an appraisal relating to the degree to which an actual behaviour is performed or a goal is currently attained. For example, I may wish to be extremely fit, but know that I am actually moderately fit.

This distinction between aspirations and norms may also distinguish between central and peripheral values. As noted by Verplanken and Holland (2002), the capacity of central values to be activated across diverse situations presumably occurs because they are strongly linked to the one thing that is common to these situations, the presence of the self. In contrast, peripheral values are presumed to serve as a means of ensuring compliance with norms in a situation. Because central values are more intrinsically self-driven, this difference may make central values more likely to serve as ideal self-guides than as ought self-guides. So, although ought self-guides may be potent influences on behaviour, their source of influence is derived from others (introjected), so they are extrinsically driven (Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, & Kasser, 2004). Thus, peripheral values are more likely to serve as ought self-guides than as ideal self-guides.

The potentially unique role of central values as ideal self-guides has three important implications that are examined in the present research. First, if central values serve more as ideals than oughts, then people should see themselves as affirming these values in the actual self. This affirmation should occur because ideal values are intrinsically motivated and therefore, people should ensure that they perform behaviours that are consistent with these values, perhaps as a method of self-verification (Sedikides, 1993). Second, value centrality should affect the extent to which participants attempt to fulfil the values using the self-regulatory strategies that Higgins (1998) described as promotion focused or prevention focused. As noted in Chapter 1, promotion focused strategies are concerned with approaching matches to a goal, whereas prevention focused strategies avoid mismatches to the goal. Promotion focus induces a state of eagerness or approach, which causes behaviour designed to attain a goal. In contrast, prevention focus induces a state of vigilance or avoidance, causing behaviour geared to avoid moving away from a goal. According to Higgins (1998), sensitivity to positive outcomes should predominate when ideal self-regulatory processes induce a promotion focus, and sensitivity to negative outcomes should predominate when ought self-regulatory processes induce a prevention focus. If central values are more likely to function as ideal self-guides, thoughts about central values should reflect more expressions of eagerness and approach and more reflection on positive outcomes than thoughts about peripheral values, which should emphasise vigilance and avoidance and more reflection on negative outcomes.

Finally, the potential unique role of central values as ideal self-guides has implications for understanding the emotional consequences of successful and failed attempts to fulfil the values. The precise link between values and emotion should depend on the values' centrality to the self because of their potential role as ideal self-

guides. According to Higgins (1989a), actual-ideal discrepancies lead to dejection-orientated emotions (e.g. sadness), whereas actual-ought discrepancies lead to agitation-orientated emotions (e.g., anxious). If central values serve as important self-guides, violation of central values should cause dejection-related emotions. In contrast, peripheral values' role as ought guides may occasionally cause violation of these values to elicit agitation-related emotions (e.g., uneasy), but only in situations where the value violations are made more self-relevant (e.g., by virtue of public display). Because of their weaker association to the self, violation of peripheral values should typically have little or no emotional impact. This prediction follows from Higgins's (1999) summary of the conditions that link self-discrepancies to distinct emotions: self-discrepancies have affective consequences when they are self-relevant, applicable, associated with negative consequences, and highly accessible (as accessibility is linked to activation potential). By extension, this system is based on outcome focus, not valence (Higgins, 1996a). For example, an actual-self assessment may produce a match with either an ideal or ought self-guide inducing positive emotions (either cheerfulness or quiescence type emotions), whereas failure to match an ideal or ought self-guide may induce negative emotions (either dejection or anxiety type emotions).

Thus, social values should be most closely associated with dejection-related emotions, but only when the values are central to the self. In many situations peripheral values lack self-relevance hence they are vulnerable to change through lack of cognitive support. As such, Studies 2 and 3, in this chapter focus on the effects of central value violation.¹

¹ Obviously, people may wish to fulfil a value and believe they should fulfil the value. However, in this case the ought self-guide is derived from intrinsic, context-free motivation rather than introjected extrinsic motivation.

2.2 Study 1

Study 1 tested whether central and peripheral values activate different self-guides. To ensure the measurement of value centrality in a manner congruent with prior literature, I asked participants to rank the importance of the values to them as guiding principles in their lives. Researchers who have used the ranking method have assumed that the uppermost values are more central to the self, whereas the lowest ranked values are peripheral (e.g., Rokeach, 1973).

I expected that central values would function more as ideal self-guides than ought self-guides, whereas peripheral values would function as stronger ought self-guides than ideal self-guides. To provide the first test of this hypothesis, items utilised by Higgins (1987) were adapted to assess the roles of values as self-guides. Higgins asked participants to provide self-related attributes and rate the degree to which they ideally wish to possess (ideal self-guide), should possess (ought self-guide), and actually possess the attributes (actual self-guide). Subsequently, self-discrepancies were computed by subtracting the actual scores from the ideal and ought scores. Similarly, my participants were asked to rate the extent to which they ideally would possess specific values (ideal self-guides), the extent to which they should possess the values (ought self-guides), and the degree to which they actually possessed the values (actual self-guides). I expected that central values would be rated as stronger ideal self-guides than ought self-guides, whereas peripheral values would be rated as stronger ought self-guides than ideal self-guides.

For a second test, I examined participants' reasons for their central and peripheral values. Based on the values-as-truisms hypothesis (Maio & Olson, 1998), I expected that participants would provide more reasons for central versus peripheral values, because they have been the focus of greater reflection (Bernard, Maio, &

Olson, 2003). More relevant to the hypothesis, I expected that participants would provide more reasons focusing on the promotion of positive outcomes for central values than for peripheral values, because central values act as ideal self-guides. In contrast, because peripheral values are likely to act as ought self-guides, the reasons provided for peripheral values should focus on the prevention of negative outcomes.

2.2.1 Method

Participants and Procedure

Thirty-nine undergraduate students (26 women, 13 men) received £5 or course credit for participating. Participants took part individually and were told that they would take part in several studies.

The first two studies asked participants to rate the importance of a variety of social values and the values' roles as ideal, ought, and actual self-guides. The order of these studies was randomised across participants. Two subsequent studies were irrelevant to the present hypotheses, and the last study assessed participants' reasons for their central and peripheral values. Finally, participants were given a funnel style debriefing (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Fitzsimmons & Bargh, 2003). No participants indicated any suspicions during debriefing.²

Value Measures

Value importance. Participants were presented with a list of 20 social values derived from the Schwartz Value Survey (1992). The list included two values from each of Schwartz's value domains, and each value appeared with a brief standard description in parentheses. The experimenter asked participants to take a few minutes to become familiar with the value labels and descriptions. Participants then rated the

² Participants also rated the degree to which each value was self-descriptive (see Verplanken & Holland, 2002). This scale highlights the notion that actual behaviour should be strongly influenced by central values. Results indicate a significant difference between central ($M = 26.36$) and peripheral ($M = 11.10$) values, $t(38) = 14.17$, $p < .001$.

degree to which each value was a guiding principle in their lives, using a scale from 1 (not important) to 7 (extremely important). Participants read the instructions set out below.

“On the following pages there is a list of values. People vary tremendously in their ratings of the relative importance of these values. We would like you to rate each value according to its importance as a guiding principle in your life. You can rate the values using the scale that appears below each value. For each scale, circle the number that most accurately reflects the importance of the value to you.”

Direct support for the use of the ranking task as a measure of value centrality was obtained from the within-subjects and between-subjects correlations between value rankings and ratings of actual behaviour. The mean within-subjects correlation, $r(18) = .53$, $p < .001$, and the mean between-subjects correlation, $r(37) = .50$, $p < .001$, were highly significant.

Value centrality. Next, participants completed a measure of value centrality. Participants ranked the 20 values by placing a number from 1 to 20 next to each value, so that “1” represented their most important value and “20” represented their least important value. Participants read the instructions set out below.

“Set out below is a list of 20 social values. We would like you to write a number from 1 to 20 next to each value on the list. This number should reflect the degree to which the value acts as a guiding principle in your life. For example, the most important value would receive ‘1’ and the least important value would receive ‘20’. Please read the entire list of values before proceeding. If you have any questions please ask the researcher at any time. Please begin when you are ready”.

Values ranked in positions 1 to 3 were considered central for a subsequent task (see below), whereas values ranked 18 to 20 were considered peripheral.

Values as self-guides. The measures of values as self-guides were presented on a computer running DirectRT (Empirisoft Corporation). Participants read the following instructions:

“In this task, you will see each of the social values you saw earlier. Your task is to rate the degree to which you would IDEALLY, SHOULD, and ACTUALLY possess the value.”

On separate screens, for each of the 20 values, participants rated the extent to which they (a) ideally, (b) should, and (c) actually possess the value. Participants' ratings utilized a scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (very much so). The order of presentation of the ideal and ought rating scales was randomised after each value, and the actual scale appeared last for each value. Two extra values were used at the start of the task in order to act as practice.

Following extensive use of Higgins's approach (e.g., 1987), I believe that participants are able to conceptually distinguish between the degree to which they “actually”, “ideally” and “ought to” to possess a value. The task instructions specify how to interpret these different concepts and participants did not report difficulties when responding.³

Value Supporting Reasons

Promotion vs prevention-focused reasons. Participants read written

³ In line with Higgins's methodology (e.g., 1987), my measures attempted to capture the degree to which people actually use the value by asking “to what degree do you actually possess this value?” To control for the possibility that participants may have not equated this with the degree to which they actually used the value in daily life, during debriefing in a subsequent study, we asked participants if they understood this question to mean “to what degree do you actually use this value?” The vast majority of participants understood that both statements captured the same concept and stated that they would have answered the question in the same manner. I thank Jochen Gebauer for his help on this matter.

instructions on the computer screen that asked them to provide reasons why different values should be considered important or not important.

“In this task, the researcher will randomly select a number of values from the list shown to you earlier in this session. Your task, is to type-in the value and provide reasons for considering the value to be important or unimportant. Please provide each reason on a new screen. Each reason should be provided as quickly and accurately as possible. If you cannot provide a reason, type ‘no’ and then press enter.”

Utilising an open response format, participants provided each reason on a separate screen. They were asked to provide as many reasons as they felt appropriate and to notify the researcher when they had finished providing reasons for a value. At that point, a new value would be provided. Participants were informed that the researcher would randomly pick some values from the list they had seen at the start of the study. In fact, the researcher verbally provided the central and peripheral values identified from the ranking task. Each value was presented individually and participants typed this value into the program. This value remained visible as participants provided up to ten reasons regarding the value, and the time taken to enter the reasons was recorded. The central and peripheral values alternated in the presentation order.

Participants’ reasons were then coded for promotion, prevention, or neutral focus. Following Higgins’s approach (e.g., Forster et al., 2001), reasons were coded as promotion focused when they expressed the positive nature of the value and went beyond the immediate concrete value outcomes (e.g., “ambition provides competition hence goals and achievement”; “important because it helps build/define a friendship”). Reasons were coded as prevention focused when they were normative

in tone, based on satisfying needs, or ensured avoidance of negative outcomes (e.g., “important because it enables you to avoid doing wrong”; “to hold our nation together so that it does not break down”). Reasons were coded as non-regulatory when they were neither promotion nor prevention focused, did not directly address the task, or seemed out of context (e.g., “don’t live in London”; “not a career I want”). A second trained rater coded a subset of participants’ reasons (Cohen’s Kappa = .81).

Disagreements were resolved by discussion between raters.

2.2.2 Results and Discussion

I compared participants’ ratings of value importance for the central and peripheral values. Results indicated that the central values ($M = 15.82$) were rated significantly more important than the peripheral values ($M = 5.44$), $t(38) = 17.23$, $p < .001$.

Function as Ideal Versus Ought Self-Guides

To test whether central and peripheral values act as distinct self-guides, I conducted a 2 (value: central, peripheral) x 3 (self-guide: ideal, ought, actual) repeated measures ANOVA on ratings of the values as self-guides. There was a significant main effect of value centrality on the overall self-guide ratings, $F(1, 38) = 175.7$, $p < .001$, such that the central values ($M = 7.45$) served as stronger self-guides than peripheral values ($M = 3.89$). There was also a significant main effect of self-guide, $F(2, 76) = 95.17$, $p < .001$, such that the values were held more strongly as ought ($M = 6.72$) and ideal ($M = 6.31$) self-guides than as actual self-guides ($M = 3.99$). More important, there was a significant interaction between value centrality and type of self-guide, $F(2, 76) = 22.61$, $p < .001$. As shown in Table 2, participants identified the central and peripheral values as stronger components of their ideal and ought selves than their actual selves, but the pattern for ideal and ought selves

depended on value centrality. Ideal ratings were higher than ought ratings for central values, $t(76) = 2.18, p < .05$, whereas ought ratings were higher than ideal ratings for peripheral values, $t(76) = 4.66, p < .05$ (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. Study 1: Social values as self-guides

Reasons for Central and Peripheral Values

Participants were faster overall when asked to provide reasons for central values ($M = 66.00s$) than for peripheral values ($M = 79.48s$), $t(37) = -3.30, p < .05$.

Participants also produced more reasons for central values ($M = 16.41$) than for peripheral values ($M = 13.77$), $t(38) = 4.47, p < .001$.

A 2 (value: central, peripheral) x 2 (regulatory focus: promotion, prevention) within-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the number of promotion and prevention reasons counted for each type of value. There was a significant main effect of value centrality, $F(1, 38) = 23.21, p < .001$, such that participants produced more reasons of both types for their central values ($M = 7.18$) than for their peripheral values ($M =$

5.60). In addition, there was a significant main effect of focus, $F(1, 38) = 19.56, p < .001$, such that participants produced more promotion-focused reasons ($M = 8.23$) than prevention-focused reasons ($M = 4.56$). These effects were qualified by a significant interaction between value centrality and reason focus, $F(1, 38) = 95.20, p < .001$. Specifically, participants produced more promotion focused reasons for central values ($M = 12.13$) than for peripheral values ($M = 4.33$), $t(38), 9.36, p < .001$; participants produced more prevention focused reasons ($M = 6.87$) for peripheral values than for central values ($M = 2.23$), $t(38) 8.05, p < .001$.

2.2.3 Summary

Results indicated a closer link between central values and ideal self-guides than between peripheral values and ideal self-guides. Two sources of evidence supported this conclusion. First, the central values were rated by participants as being stronger ideal self-guides than ought self-guides, whereas the peripheral values were rated as being stronger ought self-guides than ideal self-guides. Second, participants provided more promotion focused reasons for central values than for peripheral values and more prevention focused reasons for peripheral values than for central values. In addition, participants generated more reasons for central values than peripheral values and generated the reasons more quickly, supporting the hypothesis that central values are the subject of greater prior reflection. Overall, these results provide consistent support for my hypothesis about the role of central values as ideal self-guides, and the results reveal an important behavioural implication of this role. Specifically, central values should be the subject of greater promotion focused self-regulation and peripheral values should be the subject of greater prevention focused self-regulation.

2.3 Study 2

Study 2 began to explore the emotional implications of the link between central values and promotion-focused, ideal self-guides. Given the evidence from Study 1, actual-ideal discrepancies in achieving the central values should predict dejection-type emotions. In contrast, actual-ought discrepancies in achieving these values should have no effect on dejection-type emotions. For peripheral values, neither type of discrepancy should matter because these values are not held as self-relevant, which is a necessary pre-condition for self-discrepancies to have a negative emotional impact (Higgins, 1999). I assume that central values are more likely to direct behaviour on a daily basis and that chronic central value discrepancies evoke distinct emotional experiences.

Study 2 used a measure of recently experienced emotion to test these predictions. I chose a week as the unit of time for the measure of emotion because it seemed unrealistic to expect participants to accurately recall their qualitatively distinct emotions over longer periods of time.

2.3.1 Method

Participants and Procedure

Forty-eight undergraduate students (44 women, 4 men) received course credit for participating. They were told that they would complete several studies.

Participants completed two studies that were irrelevant to the present hypotheses followed by the values-as-self-guides task and the value ranking task and value importance task from Study 1. Finally, using DirectRT, participants completed a four-item measure of dejection (disappointed, discouraged, sad, and low, $\alpha = .89$) and a four-item measure of agitation (agitated, on edge, uneasy, and tense, $\alpha = .86$). Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they experienced each

emotion during the last week (see Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). Responses to each item were made on a four-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (extremely). Finally, participants were given a funnel style debriefing (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Fitzsimmons & Bargh, 2003). No participants indicated any suspicion during debriefing.

2.3.2 Results and Discussion

As in Study 1, I first compared participants' ratings of value importance. Participants' ratings indicated that central values ($M = 8.21$) were held as more important than peripheral values ($M = 2.48$), $t(48) = 19.87$, $p < .001$.

Function as Ideal Versus Ought Self-Guides

As in Study 1, participants' ratings of the values as self-guides were subjected to a 2 (value: central, peripheral) x 3 (self-guide: ideal, ought, actual) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of value centrality, $F(1,47) = 186.87$, $p < .001$, such that the central values ($M = 7.33$) served as stronger self-guides than the peripheral values ($M = 3.73$). There was also a significant main effect of self-guide, $F(2, 94) = 143.80$, $p < .001$, such that the values were held more strongly as ought ($M = 6.28$) and ideal self-guides ($M = 6.26$), than as actual self-guides ($M = 4.04$). More important, there was a significant interaction between value centrality and self-guide, $F(2, 94) = 4.21$, $p < .001$. Although participants identified the central values as stronger components of their actual, ideal, and ought selves than the peripheral values, the central values were held more strongly as ideal self-guides ($M = 8.23$) than as ought self-guides ($M = 7.81$), $t(94) = 3.14$, $p < .05$. In contrast, the peripheral values were again held more strongly as ought ($M = 4.7$) than ideal self-guides ($M = 4.33$), $t(94) = 2.08$, $p < .05$ (see Figure 3). These results fully

replicate the results from Study 1, adding further support for the hypothesis that central values uniquely function as ideal self-guides.




Figure 3. Study 2: Social values as self-guides

Value Discrepancies and Affect

Using the value rankings, participants' mean ideal and ought self-discrepancy scores were calculated for central and peripheral values. Following Higgins et al. (1997), ideal self-discrepancies were calculated by subtracting the actual self-guide rating from the ideal self-guide rating. This procedure was repeated for the ought self-guide to produce the ought self-guide discrepancy scores. The self-discrepancy and emotional frequency scores were standardised. To examine the unique relations between each type of self-discrepancy and each type of emotion (i.e. controlling for the other emotion; see Higgins et al., 1997), each emotional frequency score was regressed on the other emotional frequency score (e.g., dejection regressed on

agitation) and a type of self-discrepancy (e.g., actual-ideal), for either the central or peripheral value discrepancies. As expected, dejection and agitation were significantly related in all regressions. More important, central actual-ideal discrepancy predicted dejection over and above the effect of agitation, $\beta = .24$, $t = 2.06$, $p < .05$. As expected, no significant effects of self-discrepancies on agitation were obtained for central values, nor were effects on dejection and agitation obtained for peripheral values (see Table 2). Thus, as expected and supporting Higgins's (1997) self-regulatory theory, emotions were predicted uniquely by the effect of central actual-ideal value discrepancy only for dejection related emotions.

Table 2

Study 2: Zero-Order Correlations for Type of Discrepancy by Type of Experienced Negative Affect

<i>Experienced Negative Affect</i>	<i>Types of Discrepancy</i>			
	Central Ideal	Central Ought	Peripheral Ideal	Peripheral Ought
Dejection	.26*	.18	.06	.04
Agitation	.05	.14	.06	.08

$p < .05^*$

2.3.3 Summary

These results offered further support for the hypothesis that central values are uniquely related to ideal self-guides, by replicating the pattern of self-guide ratings in Study 1. More important, the results indicate that this link may have important affective consequences, because participants who showed high actual-ideal discrepancies for their central values exhibited more dejection-related emotions. These results support Higgins's self-regulation theory and regulatory focus theory

using a different and important motivational construct (social values), while providing the first direct evidence of values' affective implications as a function of self-regulation. The importance of these affective consequences led me to re-examine them with different paradigms in Study 3.

2.4 Study 3

Although the association between actual-ideal discrepancies for central values and dejection-related emotions is consistent with the hypothesis that central value violation induces dejection-related emotions, it is not possible to assert a causal mechanism from this correlation. Study 3 attempted to provide evidence for a causal effect of central value violation on dejection by manipulating whether participants performed a behaviour that opposed their central values or a similar behaviour that did not oppose their central values. Specifically, participants were asked to perform a behaviour that opposed either a central value (central value discrepancy condition) or provide their attitude to an irrelevant topic (control condition). To achieve this, participants were asked to provide a written argument against the value or the consumption of a beverage. In general, arguing against a personal view elicits aversive emotions (e.g., Fazio & Cooper, 1983). In studies of these cognitive dissonance effects, Elliot and Devine (1994), showed that participants experience psychological discomfort in the form of agitation-type emotions. In this case, I expected that participants in the central value discrepancy condition would experience more dejection-related emotions, but not more agitation-related emotions, than participants in the control condition. Thus, the predicted pattern is different from the general dissonance effect, because of the unique role of central values as ideals.

My choice to focus specifically on behaviour opposing central values is important because these values should not change after value opposing behaviours,

because they are firmly endorsed in the self. In contrast, because peripheral values are not as self-relevant, they should be susceptible to behaviour-induced change in order to reduce feelings of dissonance (Cooper, 1999; Holland, Verplanken, & van Knippenberg, 2002). Such change would reduce the perception of a value discrepancy, and work against the aim of the manipulation, which is to increase perceived value discrepancy. I will revisit this topic in Study 4.

2.4.1 Method

Participants and Procedure

Sixty undergraduate students (48 women, 12 men) received £4 or course credit for participating. They were told that they would complete three studies. The first two studies contained the experimental manipulation, and the third study contained the measures of dejection and agitation-related emotions. Participants were then given a funnel style debriefing (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Fitzsimmons & Bargh, 2003). No participants indicated any relevant suspicions during debriefing.

Experimental Manipulation

Central value opposition. Participants first completed the ranking task from Study 1. In what was described as a second study, participants were informed that the researcher would randomly select a value from the list that they had seen in the previous study. In fact, the researcher verbally provided the most central value (rank 1) from the ranking task. In order to induce a discrepancy between the chosen value and the relevant self-guide, participants were instructed to write a short essay arguing against the central value. They were asked to identify reasons why this value is unimportant and to elaborate the negative consequences associated with this value.

Control condition. Participants in this condition first completed a modification of the ranking task used in Study 1, by ranking 20 well-known beverages

instead of 20 social values. In the “second study”, participants were informed that the researcher would randomly select a beverage from the list that they had seen at the start of the study. In fact, the researcher provided coffee as the target beverage. Participants were asked to write a short essay arguing against the consumption of coffee.

Emotions

In both conditions, the “third study” was introduced as a pilot study for a new emotion measure. Participants completed a paper-and-pen version of the eight-item measure assessing dejection ($\alpha = .69$) and agitation ($\alpha = .82$) used in Study 2. Participants were asked to indicate how they felt at the time.

2.4.2 Results and Discussion

A oneway (value opposition vs control) ANCOVA was conducted on participants’ dejection or agitation ratings using the corresponding negative emotion as a covariate. The covariate produced a significant main effect in both analyses. More important, there was a significant main effect of central value opposition on dejection, $F(2,57) = 4.12, p < .05$, such that participants experienced more dejection in the central value opposition condition ($M = 3.28$) than in the control condition ($M = 2.29$). As expected, participants did not experience more agitation in the central value opposition condition ($M = 3.04$) than in the control condition ($M = 3.76$), $F(2,57) = 1.72, ns$. These results add further support for the hypothesis that central values uniquely function as promotion focused, ideal self-guides. In this case, the experimental manipulation yielded evidence that, violations of central values cause increases in dejection-related emotions, but not increases in agitation-related emotions.⁴

2.5 Study 4

In Study 4, I began to investigate the emotional experience derived from violation of peripheral values. As discussed in Chapter 1, peripheral values represent “others’ standards”. Although such standards may be powerful sources of motivation, they are extrinsically motivated (e.g., based on fear of consequences), rather than intrinsically motivated by self-derived standards. As a result, these distinct motivations are likely to evoke distinct types of emotions (Deci & Ryan, 1985), and it may require a particular type of situation to cause negative emotions after violation of peripheral values.

As stated in Study 3, self-discrepancies derived from peripheral values are unlikely to evoke negative emotions due to their inherent lack of self-relevance. However, there are instances when peripheral values can be perceived as self-relevant. Public accountability causes peripheral values to become self-relevant, because an individual’s behaviour can be scrutinised by their peers. Hence, public peripheral value violation can evoke aversive consequences for the individual and the expectancy of such consequences is likely to evoke negative emotions.

From this perspective, violation of central values should evoke dejection-type emotions in public or private because these values represent ideal self-standards. For peripheral values, as seen in Study 2, private violation of peripheral values is unlikely to evoke negative emotions, because they lack meaningful self-relevance. However, public peripheral value violation should evoke anxiety-type emotions rather than dejection-type emotions. I tested this reasoning by manipulating whether participants

⁴ The majority of participants across all studies highly ranked the self-transcendence and openness values. I checked the possibility that these participants represent a specific group or that the content of specific values, rather than centrality per se evoked dejection emotions. This involved re-analyses of the data from this study utilising participants with at least one conservation or self-enhancement value as central, and one self-transcendence and openness value as peripheral (N = 25). These analyses yielded the same results as reported in Study 2. Thus, centrality evoked dejection-type emotions independent of motivational content.

violated a central or peripheral value in either a public or private setting.

2.5.1 Method

Participants and Procedure

Fifty-three undergraduate students (35 women, 18 men) received £3 for participating. They were told that they would complete three studies. The first two studies contained the experimental manipulation, and the third study contained the measures of dejection and agitation-related emotions. Participants were then given a funnel style debriefing (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Fitzsimmons & Bargh, 2003). No participants indicated any relevant suspicions during debriefing.

Experimental Manipulation

Value opposition. Participants first completed the ranking task from Study 1. In a so-called second study, participants were informed that the researcher would randomly select a value from the list that they had seen in the previous study. In fact, the researcher verbally provided the most central value (rank 1) or a peripheral value (rank 10) from the ranking task. I chose to focus on a mid-ranked peripheral value because values ranked 20 may have represented values that were diametrically opposed to participants' central values. As such, violation may have acted as indirect fulfilment of participants' central values, evoking positive emotions rather than negative emotions (I return to this topic in Chapter 5). In order to induce a discrepancy between the chosen value and the relevant self-guide, participants were instructed to write a short essay arguing against the values. They were asked to identify reasons why this value is unimportant and to elaborate the negative consequences associated with the value.

Public versus private setting. Half of the participants in each of the value conditions were randomly assigned to either the public or private settings. In the

public condition, participants were told that the researcher would copy their reasons and distribute them in order to influence participants in subsequent studies.

Participants in the private condition were told that the reasons were very rarely examined and to maintain their privacy participants should seal the reasons in an envelope provided by the researcher.

Emotions

As in Studies 2 and 3, the “third study” was introduced as a pilot study for a new emotion measure. Participants completed a paper-and-pen version of the eight-item measure assessing dejection ($\alpha = .82$) and agitation ($\alpha = .86$) used in Studies 2 and 3. Participants were asked to indicate how they felt at the time.

2.5.2 Results and Discussion

A 2 (value: central, peripheral) x 2 (setting: public, private) between-subjects ANCOVA was conducted on participants' dejection and agitation ratings using the corresponding negative emotion as a covariate. The covariate produced a significant main effect in both analyses. There was a significant main effect of value centrality, $F(1, 48) = 13.17, p < .001$, such that participants experienced more dejection in the central value opposition condition ($M = 3.46$) than in the peripheral value opposition condition ($M = 1.66$). In addition, as expected there was no main effect of setting, ($M_{public} = 2.78, M_{private} = 2.38$) $F(1,48) = 1.36, ns$, and no significant interaction $F(1,48) = .52, ns$.

In the ANCOVA examining agitation, there was a significant main effect of setting, $F(1, 48) = 12.48, p < .001$, such that participants experienced more agitation in the public condition ($M = 3.96$) than in the private condition ($M = 1.50$). In addition, as expected, there was a significant main effect of centrality, $F(1,48) = 5.98, p < .05$, such that participants experienced more agitation for peripheral ($M = 3.08$)

than central ($M = 2.46$) values. However, there was no significant interaction $F(1, 48) = 1.47$, *ns*. Despite the lack of statistical significance for this interaction, my *a priori* hypothesis gave reason to investigate the differences between central and peripheral values and type of setting. I therefore conducted two one-way ANCOVA's with dejection as a covariate (the covariate produced a significant main effect in both analyses). As expected there was a significant main effect of centrality in the public condition, $F(1, 24) = 5.11$, $p < .05$, such that participants experienced more agitation for peripheral values ($M = 5.17$) than central values ($M = 3.00$). In the private setting, as expected, there was no significant main effect of value centrality ($M_{\text{central}} = 1.85$, $M_{\text{peripheral}} = 1.54$), $F(1, 23) = 1.03$, *ns*.⁵

These results add further support for the hypothesis that central values uniquely function as promotion focused, ideal self-guides. As in Study 2, violations of central values evoked increases in dejection-related emotions, but not increases in agitation-related emotions. As expected, ratings of dejection were equivalent in the public and private settings, supporting the notion that central values are self-relevant.

The results also revealed that peripheral values evoke anxiety-type emotions, particularly in public settings. If this experiment had included only the private setting (which was the same as in Study 2), the effect of centrality on agitation would have been non-significant (as in Study 2).

2.6 General Discussion

The present research sought to explain the cognitive and affective consequences of values role in self-regulation. Results across four studies offered consistent support for the hypothesis that central and peripheral values are related to

⁵Additional analyses checked for interactions between the covariate and the predictor variables that were included in the ANCOVAs within Studies 4 and 7. None of these analyses revealed interactions between the covariates and the predictors. These null interactions support a key assumption for the utility of the ANCOVAs.

distinct self-guides. In Study 1, central values were supported by more reasons that emphasised promotion of positive outcomes, consistent with the hypothesis that central values uniquely act as ideal self-guides. Peripheral values were supported by more reasons that emphasised vigilance, consistent with the hypothesis that peripheral values act as ought self-guides. In addition, central values were rated as stronger ideal self-guides than ought self-guides, whereas peripheral values were rated as stronger ought self-guides than ideal self-guides. This pattern was replicated in Study 2, which also found that actual-ideal discrepancies in central values were associated with experienced dejection, but not with increased agitation. Peripheral value discrepancy was not related to either negative emotion. Using a manipulation of value violation, Study 3 revealed that violations of central values cause increases in dejection-related emotions, but not in agitation-related emotions. These results consistently revealed that central values function uniquely as ideal self-guides, with important implications for processes of self-regulation and emotion.

Finally, Study 4 again revealed that violations of central values cause increases in dejection-related emotions, but not in agitation-related emotions. As expected, this result occurred across public and private settings. In contrast, violation of peripheral values evoked agitation-type emotions, and, as predicted, only in a public setting. This result suggests that people are unlikely to experience negative emotions when privately violating their peripheral values, but public accountability induces agitation-type emotions after violation of a peripheral value. Thus, peripheral values can elicit specific emotional consequences in public contexts.

On a broader conceptual level, the experiments help to integrate research on values with research on the self. A large amount of theory and research has speculated about the importance of values in self-regulation, and there is abundant

research on different processes of self-regulation. My approach integrates an important perspective on the role of values with the self (i.e., the distinction between central and peripheral values) with an important perspective on self-regulation (i.e., the distinction between self-guides). By forming a priori predictions about the links between these perspectives, it was possible to learn a great deal about the connection between central values and self-guides, and these results have important implications for conceptualisations of values. Together with Verplanken and Holland's (2002) recent research (see also Rokeach, 1973), these findings reinforce the importance of distinguishing between values that are central and peripheral to the self. Verplanken and Holland (2002) showed that central values are better predictors of behaviour. The results show that central values regulate behaviour in a different way than peripheral values, with unique emotional consequences.

Conceptually, this research helps to integrate important models of values. These models differ on a number of crucial points. Firstly, unlike other values researchers, Verplanken and Holland (2002, p.5) do not view values as abstract goals (Feather, 1990; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Instead, they adopt Lewin's (1952) notion that values define a situation, elicit goals, and guide action in pursuit of these goal (see also, Nelson, 2004). For example, a person can never really fulfil the value of honesty as an ideal, but can act in an honest manner within a given situation. My approach concurs with Verplanken and Holland (2002, p.8) in the sense that I view the degree of association between self-concept and values as crucial to predicting the role of values as self-guides. Further support comes from Schwartz's (1999) contention that individual behaviour can be more confidently predicted from individual value priorities than from cultural value priorities. In other words, individuals' central values directly relate to behaviour, whereas other values

(peripheral to the self-concept) are merely acknowledged as being present in society and supported if necessary. When these motivations are in competition, it is the central values (individually prioritised values) that actually guide behaviour. This hypothesis concurs with the values-as-truisms-hypothesis (Maio & Olson, 1998), which posits that many central values enjoy cognitive and affective support, whereas peripheral values merely possess affective support. Integrating the models discussed above, I suggest that central values are predictive of behaviour and resistant to change (see Verplanken & Holland, 2002) because they enjoy cognitive, affective, and behavioural support, are defended as self-aspects, and, as ideal self-aspects, guide behaviour across both private and public situations.

Given this evidence, one might ask whether central and peripheral values are properly regarded as part of the same system. (I return to this issue in Chapter 5.) That is, is one model required for central values and one for peripheral values? If so, do models of values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992) work better for values that are central or peripheral? Because of the abundant recent evidence supporting Schwartz's (1992) circular model (see introduction), it is particularly interesting to consider the implications for it. As noted earlier in Chapter 1, this model emphasises values' capacity to encompass motivational goals (e.g., achievement), which vary in compatibility to the goals expressed by other values. It could be the case that this model of motivated interrelations best fits values that are peripheral or are somewhere between being peripheral and central. That is, the importance of all but the most central values might be guided by the basic motivational compatibilities and conflicts suggested by Schwartz (1992). This possibility is raised by the fact that the evidence supporting this model has asked participants to rate the importance of numerous values, most of which are unlikely to be central for any one individual. Nonetheless,

it is not yet clear that the model is any less applicable to central values. Prior research shows that central values are more likely to predict behaviour (Verplanken & Holland, 2002), and possess cognitive support (Bernard & Maio, 2004; Maio, Haddock, Valle, & Hutchinson, 2006), while the present research reveals that central values are more likely to predict dejection-related emotions. It is possible that these unique aspects of central values may attenuate the motivational relations predicted by Schwartz.

The results also raise further questions about the potential emotional effects of values. For example, would treatments of chronic depression benefit from the identification of central values? People might experience depression because of actual-ideal discrepancies in these values, but be unaware of the role that these values are playing. Even though the values are central, people might not realise (until probed) that they are failing to meet the standards for fulfilling such values. Similar to the way in which strong attitudes tend to guide perception and behaviour automatically (Fazio, 2000), central values might often influence behaviour outside of awareness, consistent with Verplanken and Holland's (2002) claim about their link to implicit motives. Identification of these values and the role that they are playing may help people to adjust the values' emotional influence, by altering relevant behaviours or levels of expectation for value fulfilment or both.

It is also interesting to consider potential effects of value discrepancies on physical well-being. Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) predicts that self-guides activate motivational systems related to physiological arousal. Specifically, Higgins, Vookles, and Tykocinski (1992) suggest that ideal self-guides are linked to a conservation (inactivity) or withdrawal pattern of behaviour, which is linked to clinical depression and cardiovascular disorders. In contrast, ought self-guides are

linked to a defence system that is related to the “fight or flight” response, which is linked to anxiety. Indeed, Strauman and Higgins (1987) found that priming ideal self-guide discrepancies caused less physiological arousal than priming ought self-guide discrepancies. Furthermore, Strauman and colleagues (Strauman, Lemieux, & Coe, 1993; Strauman, Woods, Schneider, Kwapil, & Coe, 2004) have demonstrated that priming ideal and ought self-discrepancies lowers immunological functioning in somewhat different ways. Such evidence suggests that self-discrepancies negatively impact people’s psychological and physical health. The evidence also supports the practical importance of understanding and treating effects of central value violation, given the unique link between these values and the ideal-self.

These potential implications show how central values might serve as a source of inspiration and a source of desolation. There may be a fine line between using them in a constructive way and being subjected to torment from them, as illustrated in the opening quote. An important issue is how people might achieve a balance between these outcomes. Does achieving this balance require a cognitive distortion of the extent to which there has been a failure to achieve values (Taylor & Brown, 1988)? If some central values are concretely coded and elaborated (see Bernard et al., 2003; Maio et al., 2001), such distortions may be difficult to achieve. Instead, it is possible that some degree of self-forgiveness is crucial, where people simply give themselves permission to fail in the pursuit of these values to some degree. People may pragmatically blame circumstances for hindering total fulfilment of their central values, as long they perceive themselves to have engaged in all reasonable effort in fulfilling the value.

I expect that this delicate balancing act is necessary because of the pervasive influence of values on the way in which people think, feel, and behave. The present

research illustrates the potential importance and utility of asking how values act to regulate cognition, emotion, and action.

CHAPTER 3

Motivational Content Influences Self-Regulatory Focus and Experienced Emotion

3.0 Overview

Striving to attain a self-determined goal evokes different kinds of motivation than merely complying with contextual norms (Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, & Kasser, 2004). A self-determined goal involves intrinsic motivation associated with matching self-standards (Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). In contrast, compliance with norms involves extrinsic motivation associated with contingent rewards from others (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). Both types of goals can be encompassed in social values, which can be defined as abstract ideals that are regarded as important and prescriptive goals in one's life (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). These abstract values are cited in rhetoric over controversial issues, important issues, and judicial decisions (Hart, 1961). It is therefore not surprising that values hold a special place in theories of attitudes and behaviours (Rokeach, 1973), the self (Steele, 1988), and intergroup relations (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988; Sears, 1988). In most of these theories, however, there has been no attention paid to whether people wish to fulfil values as personal ideals and believe that they ought to possess them. I expect that the motivational content of some values makes them more suited to roles as "ideals" than as "oughts". For example, people may imagine the value of "freedom" as involving the pursuit of a desired personal ideal, rather than as the pursuit of a required obligation. In this chapter, I propose that the *types* of motives evoked by social values, affects their role as ideal versus ought self-guides. To describe this hypothesis, I draw on Schwartz's content and motivational model of

values, Higgins's (1987, 1997) approach to self-regulation, and Deci and Ryan's (1985) self-determination theory. I then describe tests of this hypothesis and its implications for understanding value relevant behaviour and emotion.

3.1 The Motivational Content of Social Values and Self- Regulation

It may be quite a different thing to pursue values that promote independence and self-determination, than values that involve obligation to others. Yet, in the abundant research that examines values, I am unaware of any prior research addressing the motivational content as a substantive moderator of their effects. For example, do the effects of value priming depend on the motive that is served by the primed value (cf. Macrae & Johnston, 1998)? Is the psychological process of self-affirmation served by expressing the importance of any type of value or only by values serving specific motives (Fein & Spencer, 1997)? Differences in the motivational implications of values are never explicitly considered, outside of the research testing the Schwartz (1992) model of values.

The potential importance of this issue is highlighted in general theories of motivation and in more specific theories of social values. Self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985), in particular, proffers a meta-theory for conceptualising the outcomes of distinct goals and their distinct types of motivations as well as the environmental factors that support or hinder people's pursuit of these distinct motivations (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Ryan, 1995). According to this approach, well-being is increased if people satisfy three basic organismic requirements of autonomy, relatedness, and competence. Pursuit of these needs is aided by self-determined intrinsic motivation and thwarted by controlling extrinsic motivation. In general, needs satisfaction from the intrinsic motivation causes distinct affective and behavioural outcomes from the introjected extrinsic motivation (Sheldon, Ryan, Deci,

& Kasser, 2004). Sheldon et al. (2004) demonstrated that intrinsic motivation is associated with higher levels of well-being compared to extrinsic motivation.

Sheldon et al. (2004) have also demonstrated that the content of goals, over and above the intrinsic or extrinsic motivation used to pursue goals, has distinct effects on well-being. Their research suggests that pursuit of goals that fulfil autonomy, relatedness, and competence promote well-being, whereas pursuit of goals that are based on image, status, or material gain negatively impact on well-being.

Most recently, this research has led to a measure of personal goals that taps these dimensions (Grouzet, Ahuvia, Kim, Ryan, Schmuck, Kasser, Dols, Lau, Saunders, & Sheldon, 2005). Grouzet et al. (2005) point out that their measure emphasizes personal goals and is quite different from extant models of social values, because the goals are conceived as personal aspirations or projects, whereas values are “higher order conceptions of the ideal that organize people’s goals” (p.801). Thus, it remains to be seen whether similar dimensions are reliable predictors of differences in the function of values in self-regulation and emotion. In theory, these potential goal differences are relevant to values because of consensus that goals are products of values (Grouzet et al., 2005; Verplanken & Holland, 2002).

From Schwartz’s (1992) model, it is immediately obvious that openness values are unique. Openness values (e.g., independence) are associated with stimulation and self-direction motives (Schwartz, 1992), which can be more suitably pursued by a promotion focused ideal self-guide, with its emphasis on creative pursuit and approach motivation. Openness values also promote autonomy (i.e., freedom) and, more indirectly, competence and relatedness. The latter are indirect relations because many openness values allow freedom to pursue intellectual (e.g., creativity) and social goals (e.g., exciting life) that fulfil these needs. In contrast, conservation

values (e.g., obedience) usually function as prescriptions representing the minimal standards expected by others, and are therefore more suited to a prevention focused ought self-guide, with its emphasis on avoiding negative outcomes. Although they promote inter-relatedness, they do so in an externally driven manner. Similarly, self-transcendence (e.g., helpfulness) and self-enhancement (e.g., achievement) values focus on particular motives (relatedness and competence) to the potential exclusion of autonomy. Thus, openness values are the primary values to embrace explicitly the intrinsic pursuit of autonomy, competence, and relatedness.

Because openness values emphasise the intrinsic pursuit of stimulation and self-direction, while explicitly allowing for competence and relatedness, they are simply suited to function as ideal self-guides. Other value types invoke a mix of ideal and ought components. This effect should cause unique affective consequences for perceived discrepancies between openness values and actual behaviour. Specifically, perceived violation of openness values should elicit dejection-type emotions. The present research provides tests of this reasoning.

3.2 Study 5

In Study 5, as in Studies 1 and 2, items utilised by Higgins (1987) were adapted to assess the roles of Schwartz's (1992) higher order value domains as self-guides. Specifically, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they ideally would possess the values, the extent to which they should possess the values, and the extent to which they actually possessed the values. In addition, I assessed the centrality of each value domain by asking participants to rank them in terms of their importance as guiding principles in their lives (see, for example, Rokeach, 1973). This task enabled me to verify that differences in self-guides across value domains were not explained by differences in average value centrality across domains.

The participants, procedures, and completed materials were the same as in Study 1 (i.e., thirty-nine undergraduate students completed the value ranking task). That is, the study is simply a re-analysis of the data from Study 1, but with a completely different focus. The analyses are presented here, rather than in Study 1, because of their close relation to the studies that follow (i.e., Studies 6 & 7).

3.2.1 Results and Discussion

Value Ranking by Domain

The average ranking for each value domain was computed by dividing the sum of value domain rankings by the number of values used in that value domain. Self-transcendence ($M = 7.76$) and openness ($M = 8.96$) values produced the highest rankings and conservation ($M = 11.66$) and self-enhancement ($M = 12.96$) values yielded the lowest average rankings. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on rankings of the values. There was a significant main effect of value domain on the overall rankings, $F(3, 111) = 26.35, p < .001$. All pairwise comparisons between value domains were significant, $ps < .05$, except for the comparison between openness and self-transcendence values.

Values and Self-Guides

A 4 (value domain: openness, conservation, self-transcendence, self-enhancement) x 3 (self-guide: ideal, ought, actual) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on ratings of the values as self-guides. There was a significant main effect of value domain on the overall self-guide extent ratings, $F(3,38) = 38.51, p < .001$, such that the self-transcendence values ($M = 2.32$) and openness values ($M = 2.11$) served as stronger self-guides than conservation values ($M = 1.85$) and self-enhancement values ($M = 1.72$). All pairwise comparisons among these values were significant, $ps < .05$. There was also a significant main effect of self-guide, $F(2,38) =$

166.37, $p < .001$, such that the values were held more strongly as ideal ($M = 2.31$) and ought self-guides ($M = 2.19$) than as actual self-guides ($M = 1.50$). Again, all of the pairwise comparisons between the self-guides were significant, $ps < .05$.




Figure 4. Study 5: Higher order social value domains as self-guides

More important, there was a significant interaction between value domain and type of self-guide, $F(6,38) = 5.60$, $p < .001$. As shown in Figure 4, participants' ideal and ought selves were stronger than their actual selves across value domains, but there was a change in pattern for ideal and ought selves across value domain. Only openness values produced a significant difference between ideal ($M = 2.54$) and ought ($M = 2.13$) ratings, $t(38) = 6.83$, $p < .05$.

3.2.2 Summary. Conservation, self-transcendence, and self-enhancement values were equivalent as ideal and ought self-guides, whereas openness values functioned more as ideal guides than as ought self-guides. Moreover, this unique aspect of openness values cannot be explained by differences in value centrality between openness and other values. Both the openness and self-transcendence values were ranked as significantly more important than conservation and self-enhancement values, but only the openness values were held as stronger ideal self-guides than as ought self-guides. Thus, openness values function uniquely as ideal self-guides, whereas the self-transcendence, conservation, and self-enhancement values function equally as ideal and ought self-guides.

3.3 Study 6

Study 6 began to explore the emotional implications of the unique link between openness values and ideal self-guides. Recall that actual-ideal discrepancies represent promotion-focused failure, hence evoking dejection-type emotions. In contrast, actual-ought discrepancies represent prevention-focused failure, evoking agitation-type emotions. As discussed in Chapter 1, past research has examined the unique links between self-guides and emotion. The role of discrepancies has been assessed by examining the effect of type of discrepancy (e.g., actual-ideal) on dejection and agitation, while controlling for the other emotion (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). These analyses can reveal whether the discrepancies have a unique net effect on one emotion over and above another. Thus, as in Study 2, I calculated participants' mean ideal and ought self-discrepancy scores. In this instance, the means were calculated across each of the four value domains, rather than across central and peripheral value domains.

Given the evidence from Study 5, actual-ideal discrepancies in achieving openness values should predict dejection-type emotions because these values are uniquely the subject of promotion-focused ideal self-guides. In contrast, actual-ought discrepancies in achieving these values should have no effect on dejection-type emotions and agitation-type emotions (because these values are not held as ought self-guides). For conservation, self-enhancement, and self-transcendence values, neither the actual, ideal, nor ought self-guides emerged as uniquely important in Study 5. Thus, self-discrepancies in the fulfilment of these values should have parallel effects on dejection and agitation, causing no unique net effect on one emotion over and above the other. Study 6 used a measure of recently experienced emotion to test these predictions.

3.3.1 Method

Participants and Procedure

Forty-five undergraduate students (41 women, 4 men) received course credit for participating. They were told that they would complete several studies. Participants completed the value ranking task and values as self-guides task utilised in Study 1. Finally, using DirectRT, participants completed the four-item measure of dejection (disappointed, discouraged, sad, and low, $\alpha = .78$) and the four-item measure of agitation (agitated, on edge, uneasy, and tense, $\alpha = .66$) utilised in Study 2. Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they experienced each emotion during the last week (see Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). Participants were then given a funnel style debriefing (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Fitzsimmons & Bargh, 2003). No participants indicated any relevant suspicions during debriefing.

3.3.2 Results and Discussion

Value Ranking by Domain

A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the mean rankings in each value domain. There was a significant main effect of value domain on the overall rankings, $F(3, 132) = 39.08, p < .001$. As in Study 1, self-transcendence ($M = 7.24$) and openness ($M = 8.87$) produced the highest rankings and conservation ($M = 13.1$) and self-enhancement ($M = 13.38$) the lowest average rankings. All pairwise comparisons between the value domains were significant, $ps < .05$, except for the comparison between conservation and self-enhancement values.

Values and Self-Guides

A 4 (value domain: openness, conservation, self-transcendence, self-enhancement) x 3 (self-guide: ideal, ought, actual) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on ratings of the values as self-guides. There was a significant main effect of value domain on the overall self-guide extent ratings, $F(3,44) = 85.84, p < .001$, such that the self-transcendence values ($M = 2.49$) and openness values ($M = 2.16$) served as stronger self-guides than conservation values ($M = 1.92$) and self-enhancement values ($M = 1.74$). All pairwise comparisons among these values were significant, $p's < .05$. There was also a significant main effect of self-guide, $F(2,44) = 344.54, p < .001$, such that the values were held more strongly as ideal ($M = 2.37$) and ought self-guides ($M = 2.28$) than as actual self-guides ($M = 1.58$). Again, all of the pairwise comparisons between the self-guides were significant, $ps < .05$.

More important, there was a significant interaction between value domain and type of self-guide, $F(6,44) = 7.34, p < .001$. Participants' ideal and ought selves were stronger than their actual selves across value domains, but there was a change in pattern for ideal and ought selves across value domain. Only openness values

produced a significant difference between ideal ($M = 2.49$) and ought ($M = 2.18$) ratings, $t(44) = 4.60, p < .05$.




Figure 5. Study 6: Higher order social value domains as self-guides

Value Discrepancies and Affect

Participants' mean ideal and ought self-discrepancy scores were calculated for each of the value domains. Following Higgins et al. (1997), the self-discrepancy and emotional frequency scores were standardised. To examine the unique relations between each type of self-discrepancy and each type of emotion (i.e., controlling for the other emotion; see Higgins et al., 1997), each emotional frequency score was regressed on the other emotional frequency score (e.g., dejection regressed on agitation) and a type of self-discrepancy (e.g., openness actual-ideal), for each of the

value domains. As expected, dejection and agitation were significantly related in all regressions. More important, the openness actual-ideal discrepancy predicted dejection over and above the effect of agitation, $\beta = .33$, $t(44) = -2.60$, $p < .05$, and there was no significant effect of openness actual-ideal discrepancy in the regression analysis used to predict agitation, $\beta = .03$, $t(44) = .19$, ns (see Table 3). No significant effects of self-discrepancies on dejection or agitation (controlling for the other emotion) were obtained for the other value domains. Overall, these results offered further support for the premise that openness values are uniquely related to ideal self-guides. The results also show that this link may have important affective consequences, because people who show high actual-ideal discrepancies for openness values exhibit more dejection-related emotions.

3.3.3 Summary. Replicating the prior analysis, self-transcendence and openness values were both highly ranked; and only the openness values were held as stronger ideal self-guides than as ought self-guides. As expected, Study 6 further extended these findings by revealing that only the openness values predicted dejection-type emotion. These results are consistent with my hypothesis that openness values function uniquely as ideal self-guides. As outlined by Higgins (1998), failure to reach a goal that uniquely functions as an ideal self-guide should elicit dejection-type emotions and a failure in openness values is clearly associated with such affect. Moreover, as expected, openness values were associated with dejection, but not agitation.

Table 3

Study 6: Zero-Order Correlations for Type of Discrepancy by Type of Experienced

Negative Affect

<i>Types of Discrepancy</i>	<i>Experienced Negative Affect</i>	
	Dejection	Agitation
Openness Ideal	.44 *	.23
Conservation ideal	-.11	-.03
Self-Transcendence Ideal	.03	-.06
Self-Enhancement Ideal	.07	.06
Openness Ought	.24	.24
Conservation Ought	-.20	-.15
Self-Transcendence Ought	.02	-.01
Self-Enhancement Ought	.17	.08

p < .05*

3.4 Study 7

Although the association between actual-ideal discrepancies for openness values and dejection-related emotions is consistent with the hypothesis that openness value violation induces dejection-related emotions, it is not possible to assert a causal mechanism from this correlation. Study 7 attempted to provide evidence for a causal effect of openness value violation on dejection by manipulating whether participants performed a behaviour that opposed an openness value. Specifically, participants

were asked to recall and write about an instance when they were responsible for curtailing their own freedom (openness value discrepancy condition) or simply completed the final measure (control condition).

As noted in Study 3, prior research on cognitive dissonance has revealed that arguing against a personal view produces aversive emotions, in the form of agitation-type emotions (Elliot & Devine, 1994). In this case, I expected that participants in the openness value discrepancy condition would experience more dejection-related emotions, but not more agitation-related emotions, than participants in the control condition. Thus, the predicted pattern is again different from the general dissonance effect, but this time because of the unique role of openness values as ideals.

3.4.1 Method

Participants and Procedure

Fifty-two undergraduate students (48 women, 4 men) received £4 or course credit for participating. They were told that they would complete several studies. The first two studies contained the experimental manipulation, and the final study contained the measures of dejection and agitation-related emotions. Participants were then given a funnel style debriefing (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Fitzsimmons & Bargh, 2003). No participants indicated any relevant suspicions during debriefing.

Experimental Manipulation

Openness value opposition. Participants first completed the ranking task used in Study 1. In the second study, participants were informed that the researcher would randomly select a value from the list that they had seen in the previous study. In fact, the researcher provided the openness value, “freedom”. In order to induce a discrepancy between the chosen value and the relevant self-guide, participants were

instructed to write a short essay detailing an instance in which they were responsible for curtailing their own freedom.

Control condition. Participants in this condition completed the ranking task used in Study 1 and then completed the measure of emotions.

Emotions

In both conditions, the “final study” was introduced as a pilot study for a new emotion measure. Participants completed a paper-and-pen version of the eight-item measure assessing dejection ($\alpha = .88$) and agitation ($\alpha = .89$) used in Study 2.

Participants were asked to indicate how they felt at the time.

3.4.2 Results and Discussion

Openness Value Discrepancy and Affect

A oneway (value opposition vs control) ANCOVA was conducted on participants' dejection or agitation ratings using the corresponding negative emotion as a covariate. The covariate produced a significant main effect in both analyses. More important, there was a significant main effect of value opposition on dejection, $F(2,49) = 6.63, p < .05$, such that participants experienced more dejection in the openness value opposition condition ($M_{adj} = 6.53$) than in the control condition ($M = 4.31$). As expected, participants did not experience more agitation in the openness value opposition condition ($M_{adj} = 5.56$) than in the control condition ($M_{adj} = 5.40$), $F(2,49) = .02, ns$. These results add further support for the hypothesis that openness values uniquely function as promotion focused, ideal self-guides. In this case, the experimental manipulation yielded evidence that violation of an openness value caused increases in dejection-related emotions, but not increases in agitation-related emotions.

Openness Value Discrepancy and Affect Controlling for Value Centrality

To investigate whether participants' ranking of the target value influenced their responses, we repeated the analyses using participants' value ranking of "freedom" as a covariate. There was again a significant main effect of value opposition on dejection, $F(1,48) = 8.36, p < .05$, such that participants experienced more dejection in the openness value opposition condition ($M_{adj} = 7.58$) than in the control condition ($M_{adj} = 3.27$). Value rankings did not produce a significant main effect on dejection, $F(1,48) = 1.81, ns$. As expected, participants did not experience more agitation in the openness value opposition condition ($M_{adj} = 7.15$) than in the control condition ($M_{adj} = 3.81$), $F(1,48) = .76, ns$. Value ranking did not produce a significant main effect on agitation, $F(1,48) = 2.86, ns$.

3.4.3 Summary. An experimental manipulation of violation of an openness value (freedom) caused increases in dejection-related emotions, but not increases in agitation-related emotions. Moreover, this difference remained significant after controlling for participants' centrality of the openness value. These results complement the correlational finding from Study 5, by finding that an experimental manipulation of value violation elicited the postulated effect on dejection, but not on agitation-type emotions.

3.5 General Discussion

The research presented in this chapter sought to explicate the functioning of Schwartz's (1992) higher order value domains as self-regulatory goals. The results revealed support for the notion that specific value domains are associated with distinct self-guides. In Studies 5 and 6, ideal and ought self-guide ratings were equivalent within the value domains of self-transcendence values, conservation values, and self-enhancement values. As predicted, for openness values, ideal self-guide ratings were

significantly higher than ought self-guide ratings. Thus, openness values uniquely function more strongly as ideals than as prescriptive norms. That is, people are intrinsically motivated to reach a lifestyle that is typified by these values.

This unique basis of openness values has important affective implications, as shown in the results of Study 6 and Study 7. Consistent with Higgins's (1998) self-regulation theory, the results of Study 6 indicated that only the openness actual-ideal discrepancy predicted dejection-related emotions and that this discrepancy did not predict agitation-related emotions. As expected, no significant relations between values self-discrepancies and dejection or agitation were obtained for the other value domains. Using a manipulation of openness value violation, Study 7 revealed that violations of openness values cause increases in dejection-related emotions, but not in agitation-related emotions.

In Chapter 2, I found similar effects for central values. For this reason, it is important that self-transcendent values were ranked as highly as openness values across all three studies, and yet were not uniquely identified as ideal self-guides, over ought self-guides (Study 6 and Study 7). In addition, self-transcendent actual-ideal value discrepancies did not predict dejection or agitation (Study 6). Also, in Study 7, I controlled for value centrality and yet still found that violation of openness values evoked dejection-type emotions. These results consistently support the hypothesis that openness values uniquely function as ideal self-guides and show that this role has important affective consequences. Thus, motivational content per se matters here: the motivational content of openness values is uniquely suited to a promotion focused ideal self-guide (Higgins, 1997).

These findings should be considered in the light of arguments about the psychological costs and benefits of "freedom". Barry Schwartz (2000) suggests that

the costs do not support the obsessive level of pursuit of this value in American culture, and perhaps Western cultures more generally. Schwartz (2000) has suggested that ever-increasing opportunities for self-determination have resulted in increased individualism and increased expectations for positive outcomes in people's lives because they believe "life is what you make it". Having developed increased expectations for self-determination and a sense of individualism, Americans and Westerners in general blame themselves for failure to attain their goals without sufficiently taking into account external constraints. The intrinsic, ideal nature of freedom and openness values as self-guides makes them uniquely susceptible to increased dejection-related emotion, consistent with Schwartz's (2000) speculation that the emphasis on freedom has increased depression within the general population. Thus, it is reasonable to ask whether people's well-being is negatively affected by an over-emphasis on those values.

This speculation resonates with arguments that freedom and other openness values can be met through an emphasis on more socially orientated values. Indeed, positive social relations and networks can act as a support mechanism during personal difficulties (e.g., Cohen, Underwood, & Gottlieb, 2000; Pierce, Sarason, & Sarason, 1996). Perhaps pursuing autonomy through openness values without considering the consequences to others is likely to undermine relatedness. For example, being totally free implies a lack of meaningful connectedness to others as this may place limits on one's freedom. Consistent with this view, Hegelian philosophy argues that extrinsic social constraints can actually promote the net freedom of the individual (Houlgate, 2005). In a simple example, the release of personal freedom and privacy at airport checkpoints gives us the security of travel to destinations that we would otherwise fail to reach; that is, compliance with these frequently onerous social constraints grants

greater freedom in the long run. Congruent with this view, Schwartz (2000) argues that society should identify constraints that help rather than hinder individuals and provide boundaries that help people navigate their social worlds. The other value domains may partly serve or elicit such constraints and thereby ultimately help to promote openness values without a depressogenic overemphasis.

This issue is important because clinical theories have long suggested that depression and anxiety can result from skewed values (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Consequently, interventions designed to alleviate depressive symptoms may benefit from identifying the problematic values and helping clients to understand the role of these values. Identifying social constraints that frustrate value fulfilment can further help to alleviate the dejection-related affect evoked by self-discrepancies, thereby allowing the individual to maintain positive self-regard. For example, people may lack opportunities to fully pursue openness values because of important and worthwhile responsibilities and commitments.

Another interesting issue is whether the role of openness values and other value types as self-guides varies across cultures. Collectivist cultures place greater importance on conservation values (Hofstede, 2002; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995; Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000; Smith & Schwartz, 1997), perhaps also causing members of these cultures to regard conservation values as ideal self-guides. In other words, it is feasible that people in these cultures could wish to follow tradition and conform. In contrast, the content of openness values means that, although people may aspire to be creative or free, hence pursue them as ideals, it is unlikely that they will feel pressured into being more free or creative by their group or culture because their content is in many ways determined by the individual. In other words, the motivational content of openness values is distinct from the other domains. Given

that the population samples were drawn primarily from young, Western, undergraduates, it would be interesting to compare results with studies conducted utilising different cultural groups.

Nevertheless, another possibility is that such effects of culture depend on identification with one's cultural groups. The majority of our sample had experienced similar cultural and socialisation experiences, resulting in similar value priorities. This is important because a group's value profile can be considered a component of group members' social identity (Bettencourt & Hume, 1999) and discrepancy-relevant emotion follows Higgins's predictions only for high identifiers (Petrocelli & Smith, 2005). Indeed, people who seek to distance themselves from typical group characteristics (e.g., low identifiers) may actually experience positive affect as a response to a self-group discrepancy (Bernard, Gebauer, & Maio, 2005). Future research should explicitly assess group identity and level of identification in order to reveal any nested effects of value discrepancies within group identities.

Understanding how cultures and groups are motivated to support values can facilitate cultural integration, social interaction, and negotiation between groups. Based on the approach described in this chapter, one could envisage and devise self-regulatory strategies for the pursuit of openness values that facilitate integration, social interaction, or successful negotiation. It "feels right" and seems morally appropriate to people when there is a fit between self-regulatory focus and the strategic means used to pursue a desired goal (Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003). Thus, the pursuit of openness values should feel "right" in the context of a promotion focus, more than in the context of a prevention focus. This sense of fit may help to explain some sources of moral controversy. A relevant example concerns the recent controversies over cartoons published in Europe that enraged many Muslims around

the world. One could suggest that the European press tend to support the value of freedom by adopting a promotion focus, whereas some Muslim cultures support the value of tradition with a prevention focus. Not only do these values support conflicting motivations, each group finds it difficult to comprehend the way that the opposing group morally supports their own views. This difficulty may occur partly because the values are supported by different means (promotion versus prevention). I expect that an understanding of the manner in which people are motivated to support culturally prioritised values may eventually help us to understand conflicts between groups with different value priorities. At a more basic level, the results make clear that there is a unique emotional price to pay for the pursuit of freedom as opposed to other values. Many would say that the price is not worth it; others argue that we should simply learn how to better manage the intrapsychic and relational costs.

CHAPTER 4

Value Affirmation as a Means to Cope with Central Value

Violation

4.0 Overview

Having demonstrated that central value violation elicits dejection type emotions (Studies 2 and 3) and that openness value violation elicits these negative emotions (Studies 6 and 7) it is worthwhile considering interventions that alleviate the potential harmful impact of value violation. As stated earlier, few studies to date have investigated the mechanisms operating within the self-concept related to highly prioritised and non-prioritised values (cf. Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Moreover, few studies have investigated the mechanisms that link values and emotions. In this chapter, I address this aspect of self-concept functioning by focusing on the manner in which people can dissipate the negative emotions evoked by value violation. In order to address this issue, I draw on self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) as a means of restoring self-integrity.

4.1 Study 8

According to my reasoning, central value violation can be viewed as promotion-focus failure, hence evoking dejection-type emotions. If this theorising is correct, then restoring congruency between the self and a cherished aspect of one's self-image, one's central values, should dissipate any dejection-type emotions evoked by central value violation.

This hypothesis is relevant to research on self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), which predicts that an aversive tension arises from perceptions that there is a threat to the integrity of the self-system (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993, p. 893).

This aversive tension can result from behaving in a manner that contradicts personal values, and people often seek to reduce this tension by changing their attitudes toward the behaviour. This change is reduced however, when people get an intervening chance to re-affirm their cherished values (Steele, 1988). To my knowledge, prior research has not examined the effect of value affirmation on distinct emotions, but my conceptualisation of central values as ideal self-guides implies that central value affirmation can reduce the dejection-type emotions evoked by prior value violation.

This issue is also relevant to research on cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Festinger (1957) suggested that such dissonance arises from an inconsistency in individuals' cognitions and evokes an aversive state experienced as psychological discomfort. This aversive state acts to motivate remedial action resulting in alleviation of psychological discomfort. For example, people can change their attitude in line with their cognitions. However, in three studies designed to explicate the distinct roles of cognitive dissonance as motivation and psychological discomfort, Elliot and Devine (1994) found that psychological discomfort was typified by emotions such as "uncomfortable", "uneasy", and "bothered". These emotions are related to measures of anxiety, rather than dejection.

Consistent with the evidence in Study 3 and Study 7, I expected participants in the present research to experience dejection-type emotions arising from central value violation, rather than anxiety-type emotions from cognitive dissonance per se. More important, I expected that this dejection would be reduced by an intervention that promotes self-affirmation of central values.⁶

The test of this hypothesis was derived from Gollwitzer's (1999) approach to goal-orientated behaviour. Gollwitzer distinguishes between goal intentions and implementation intentions. Goal intentions are associated with a desired outcome or

end point. Goal intentions commit and obligate the individual to attaining a goal (Gollwitzer, 1999). Implementation intentions are subordinate to goals. They specify how, when, and where the individual will instantiate goal-directed responses. Such anticipatory responses take the form of “if situation x occurs, I will perform response y ” (Gollwitzer, 1999, p. 494). This distinction between goal and implementation intentions is relevant because people who use their central values as ideal standards have already committed themselves to attaining their central values as a goal. In my view, violation of a central value is unlikely to change this goal because of its centrality to the self. As a result, re-affirmation of the goal intention is likely to have little impact. In contrast, novel implementation intentions should help to elicit clear and concrete anticipation of a value’s fulfilment. This concrete anticipation of value fulfilment may help people to achieve a deeper sense of value fulfilment, similar to the way in which concrete value reasoning in general elicits value-congruent behaviour, over and above mere value salience (Maio et al., 2001) helping to relieve dejection. Thus, I elicited value affirmation by asking participants to specify the steps they planned to take in order to plan to support the value in the future. To further introduce novel support for the value, participants were also asked to generate reasons for considering the value to be important, a task that has elicited concrete value-supportive reasoning in past research.

⁶ According to self-affirmation theory (Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999; Nail, Misak, & Davis, 2004; Steele, 1988; Stone & Cooper, 2001), affirming any important aspect of the self reduces the aversive tension caused by a perceived self-discrepancy (e.g., central value violation). Thus, affirmation of central values other than the violated value may have a similar, dejection-attenuating effect. Nonetheless, this possibility is not relevant to my hypotheses about the role of central values as self-guides and is not tested in the present research.

4.1.1 Method

Participants and Procedure

Sixty-eight undergraduate students (47 women, 21 men) received £4 or course credit for participating. Participants took part individually and were told that they would take part in several studies. In the “first study”, they completed the measure of value ranking utilised in Study 1. The value ranked in position 1 was considered central for a subsequent task (see below). In the “second study”, participants completed the experimental manipulation. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.

Experimental Manipulation

Central value violation-affirmation. In the second study, participants were informed that the researcher would randomly select a value from the list that they had seen at the start of the study. In fact, the researcher provided the most central value (rank 1) from the ranking task. In order to induce a discrepancy between the chosen value and the relevant self-guide, participants were instructed to write a short essay arguing against the central value. I then attempted to alleviate any negative affect caused by opposing central values. Specifically, participants were asked to value-affirm by writing an essay stating how they would plan to support the value in the future and then asked to provide reasons supporting their central value. In order to value-affirm participants were asked to read the following instructions.

“There are many ways in which people could support values. We’d like you to think of plans or steps you could take in the future to support the value written below. Think of it like planning any type of venture, such as a journey. If your goal is arrive at a specific time, perhaps you’d think about the time you need to leave, what you’d need to take with you, what kind of transport would be most convenient etc.

For example, if the value you planned to support were equality, your goal would be to treat everyone in a fair manner. You could list important steps in successfully achieving this goal and write about each step, such as, where, when, and how you plan to support the value. The way you would support the value is up to you, but please take a few moments to consider your options before you start writing.”

Participants then rated the extent to which they felt dejection-related emotions (disappointed, discouraged, sad, and low; $\alpha = .88$), and agitation-related emotions (agitated, on edge, uneasy, and tense; $\alpha = .79$) at that time (see Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997) using scales from 0 (not at all) to 3 (extremely). Thus participants in this condition violated and affirmed the central value prior to the dependent measure. For ethical reasons, I then attempted to alleviate any residual effects of central value violation by asking participants to provide reasons that supported their central value.

Central value violation. Participants in this condition completed the same procedure as in the central value violation-affirmation condition except that the value-affirmation task and value support task occurred after the measures of negative affect.

Control. Following the ranking procedure, participants in the control condition completed the measures of dejection and agitation.

4.1.2 Results and Discussion

A oneway (value violation vs value violation-affirmation vs control) ANCOVA was conducted on participants' dejection, while controlling for agitation ratings. The covariate produced a significant main effect in both analyses. More important, there was a significant main effect of the manipulation on dejection, $F(2,67) = 16.70, p < .001$: participants experienced more dejection in the central value violation condition ($M = 3.96$) than in the condition that elicited value affirmation after value violation ($M = .82$), $t(65) = 5.01, p < .001$, or the control condition ($M =$

.87), $t(65) = 4.98$, $p < .001$. The level of dejection did not significantly differ between the value violation-affirmation condition and the control condition $t(65) = .08$, *ns*. As expected, a similar ANCOVA on participants' agitation ratings did not reveal more agitation in the central value violation condition ($M = 1.78$) than in the condition that elicited subsequent central value affirmation ($M = 1.95$) or the control condition ($M = 1.35$), $F(2,67) = .431$, *ns*.

Study 8 showed that violation of central values evoked dejection-type emotions and that this experienced negative affect is dissipated when participants have the opportunity to self-affirm by planning central value-promotion following central value violation. These results augment the conclusion that central values function uniquely as ideal self-guides, with important implications for processes of self-regulation and emotion.

The results also eliminate a trivial alternative explanation for the prior results. Specifically, they eliminate the possibility that mere value salience and not value opposition yielded dejection. The opposed value was equally salient across the value opposition and value affirmation conditions, but only the value opposition condition revealed increased dejection.

It is also interesting to consider the motivational content of the opposed and affirmed values. Consistent with the prior evidence that openness values and self-transcendence values are highly central these values were the most likely targets of value opposition and affirmation. Unfortunately, my design did not include enough participants to enable a powerful analysis of self-selected motivational content as a factor. Congruent with my prior findings, I would expect this analysis to reveal that the predicted effects are stronger for openness values than for self-transcendence values. (Nonetheless, random assignment to value type would be ideal.)

CHAPTER 5

Evidence and Summary

5.0 Overview

This chapter reviews the findings from all eight studies and considers the implications for future research. Implications of the findings for understanding the manner in which people pursue values, extant models of values, and the processes of value centralisation are considered.

5.1 Recapitulation

The present research has examined effects of value centrality on distinct strategies of self-regulation and emotion. In Chapter 2, I investigated the notion that central and peripheral values are associated with distinct self-regulatory strategies. Specifically, in Study 1, I utilised Higgins's (1987) approach to self-regulation to demonstrate that central values are held as ideal self-guides and that peripheral values are held as ought self-guides. In Study 2, this finding was replicated and extended by demonstrating that, as expected, violation of central values was associated with dejection-type emotions, but not agitation-type emotions. Peripheral values, due to their lack of self-relevance, evoked little overall negative affect. Study 3 demonstrated a causal effect of central value violation on dejection-type emotions, but not agitation-type emotions. In Study 4, I demonstrated that peripheral values evoked anxiety-type emotions when peripheral value violation was made explicitly self-relevant by means of a public setting. In Study 8, I demonstrated that central value-affirmation dissipates the dejection-type emotions evoked by central value violation.

Studies 5 to 7 tested whether the motivational content of values affects strategies of value self-regulation and emotion. Specifically, Study 5 showed that, because of their unique motivational content, Schwartz's (1992) higher order openness values are

held as ideal self-guides. Consistent with this result, actual-ideal discrepancies for openness values evoked dejection-type emotions, but not agitation-type emotions; actual-ideal discrepancies did not predict dejection-type emotions for other value types. Study 7 showed that this effect of openness value discrepancy is causal: Violation of an openness value elicited central value dejection-type emotions, but not agitation-type emotions.

It is noteworthy that the results of Study 7 remained significant when controlling for value centrality. Indeed, throughout studies all the studies reported in this thesis, self-transcendence values were the highest ranked values, but in Studies 5, 6, and 7, only openness values produced differences in self-guide ratings and emotional experience.

5.2 Limitations

The effects of value violation on dejection were clear and consistent across both streams of research. There can be no doubt that violation of central values causes dejection. Nonetheless, for both streams of research, one limitation is created by the choice of control conditions utilised in Studies 3 and 7. For Study 3, I had considered eliciting the violation of peripheral values in the control condition, but later rejected this idea. The reason was that their peripheral nature should make them vulnerable to change because they lack self-relevance and cognitive support. As a result, arguing against peripheral values should cause the values to change (which is not expected for central values). In fact, if arguing against peripheral values did elicit agitation (which is the emotion responsible for dissonance effects, Elliot and Devine, 1994) then value change should certainly emerge as a means of agitation reduction. This effect could prevent the detection of agitation as a function of the manipulation. This issue was addressed in Study 4, which focused on one context wherein peripheral value

violation has the potential to evoke negative emotions, namely, public scrutiny. As stated in Chapter 1, peripheral values are utilised in a self-serving manner in order to facilitate social interaction, maintenance of self-image, or reward from others.

Because rewards are contingent on others' reactions to value-orientated behaviour, public accountability should publicly influence the way in which people respond to a peripheral value. If people feel accountable for their violation of a peripheral value, it is difficult for value change to reduce the elicited agitation, because the behaviour still conflicts with obligations. The results of Study 4 supported the hypothesis that the mechanism that drives the experience of negative emotions following value violation may be linked to self-relevance.

Unfortunately, however, I have not yet had the opportunity to use a similar design to evaluate the emotional effects of values that differ in motivational content. For example, I expect that violation of self-transcendence values should elicit both dejection and agitation, because these values do not function uniquely as ideal or ought self-guides. Thus, unlike central values (which are held as ideals) they should not elicit significantly more dejection, and, unlike peripheral values (which are held as oughts) they should not elicit significantly more agitation. Hence, self-transcendence values should evoke equivalent amounts of dejection and agitation following value violation. Evidence for this pattern would form an important complement to the present research.

Furthermore, at present, I have not had an opportunity to investigate the motivational content of values derived from other spheres of human activity. For example, do work values act as ideal or oughts, or a mixture of both? If a person works in a value-orientated profession (e.g., health care), or if they believe their job to be a vocation (e.g., clergy), then they are likely to invest themselves in their jobs,

focus on the symbolic nature of their profession, and pursue work related values as ideals. In contrast, people who work only for financial rewards are likely to attach little personal investment in their jobs and focus on work as an ought.

Overall, the findings of the present research are supportive of my hypotheses, but their interpretation may be limited for several reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter 3, all participant samples were drawn from a narrow age range. This might not only have influenced value rankings, but also have affected the degree to which participants use particular self-guides. For example, younger people may reject authority and not support any type of value strongly as an ought. Conversely, because older people are likely to have made many important life choices, they may focus on oughts to the exclusion of ideals.

In addition, it was not possible to utilise a long-term measure of affect. Episodes of central value violation in real-world contexts are likely to have a deeper meaning than central value-violations used in a typical psychology study. This could lead to a protracted experience of negative emotions and require a more complex long-term measure. In the present context, participants are unlikely to have experienced dejection-type emotions beyond completion of the study. A longitudinal design would be useful for addressing these issues.

Values exist in a coherent system, so that changes in one value directly impacts on the overall value system (Rokeach; 1973; Schwartz, 1992). If, as Schwartz (1992) argues, each person's value system is a balance between latent motives, then a large shift in the importance of one value should cause a rethink concerning all values from that domain and perhaps values in the domain that serve an opposing motive. For example, a person who starts to prioritise the value "freedom" is likely to also prioritise other values that promote self-determination (e.g.,

independence, creativity). In contrast, this person is likely to de-emphasise values that constrain such openness values (e.g., conformity, obedience).

This issue highlights the potential need to move beyond the central-peripheral dichotomy by exploring the role of peripheral values that are diametrically opposed to central values. For simplicity, I label this subclass of peripheral values “opposed values”, in order to express the idea that they encompass motivations that thwart the fulfilment of central values. Most models of values assume that even values that are not actively supported are viewed as positive, but according to my theorising opposed values are inherently problematic for central values, making them somewhat negative. By extension, they represent a threat to one’s world-view and sense of self because individuals not only use values to direct thoughts and actions, but also to justify their thoughts and actions (Schwartz, 1999). Consequently, opposed values are likely to be elaborated in order to build arguments against them and so defend central values (see also Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003). In some instances, they would be elaborated as counter-positions to central values. As such, opposing values are likely to be activated simultaneously with central values because opposed values represent the category of behaviours excluded by the person’s most central values (Pakizeh, Maio, & Gebauer, in press). In other words, people are likely to avoid such values or even to derogate others who hold them as central. In contrast, lack of self-relevance for peripheral (unopposed) values makes it more likely that they remain unelaborated and truisitic.

This implies that central and opposed values reside in a distinct value system associated with value centrality, whereas peripheral values reside within context-related multiple value systems. By extension, strategies that attempt to facilitate pro-value behaviour should allow for the differences in use of these distinct value

systems. For example, according to my approach people view central values as ideals, peripheral values as oughts, and opposed values as values that should be avoided and even derogated. Thus, exhorting people to support central values should be comparatively simple because these values already possess cognitive support and are likely to be supported regularly through pro-value behaviour. Because peripheral values lack self-relevance, people are likely to resist appeals to support such values unless they are accompanied by other inducements such as public accountability, threats of social sanctions, or potential rewards. Opposed values are likely to be actively resisted, or if supported, to produce negative psychological consequences for the individual. This has important implications for efforts designed to induce pro-value behaviour. For example, people who are coerced to support opposed values may practically benefit from their increased pro-value behaviour, but experience negative emotions or even lowered self-esteem. Indeed, attempts at evoking pro-value behaviour in one domain may cause a type of reactance (Brehm, 1966), so that the opposite value behaviour occurs.

5.3 Future Research

Future research relevant to each set of studies has been considered in each of the prior chapters. The text below describes several other potential avenues of research that are worthy of consideration.

5.3.1 Value Centralisation

Most theorists agree that individuals', groups', and cultures' value priorities are enduring (Rokeach, 1973). Most shifts are gradual. Individuals' value priorities change as a result of a gradual process associated with age, occupation, and personal experience (e.g., Schwartz, 1999). At the cultural level, Inglehart (e.g., 1990) has demonstrated a gradual shift in prioritisation from materialistic to postmaterialistic

values in Western countries over the last century. However, value priorities may change due to a rapid re-organisation and re-prioritisation of values is also conceivable. For example, individuals' central values might change due to political events, religious experiences, childbirth, or bereavement.

Such rapid change is feasible because most social values are truisitic, possessing only affective support (Maio & Olson, 1998). Value socialisation often deals with values as abstract concepts and confers objective importance on values (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1984; Hofstede, 1990; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995), but fewer values are prioritised by a culture (Bernard, Maio & Olson, 2003) and fewer still actually attain subjective importance for the individual (Schwartz, 1999). To achieve subjective importance, values need to be increasingly associated with the self-concept. One way (among others) to move a value from a peripheral to a central position may involve a process of cognitive elaboration, wherein people develop and store cognitive reasons that support the newly prioritised value (Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003). Consistent with this view, Schwartz and Bardi (2001) posit that successfully supporting a value, or using a value to justify one's actions, increases its subjective importance. In addition, Maio, Olson, Allen, and Bernard (2001) revealed that value elaboration evokes behavioural support for a value. Of importance, these effects of value elaboration occur after less than 10 minutes of value elaboration; days and weeks of value contemplation are not required for an immediate effect to occur.

However, it is unclear whether value elaboration can move a peripheral value to a more central position for an extended period of time. This change may require a long-term period of value elaboration, wherein people contemplate a value on successive occasions. Indeed, attitude effects of value elaboration on resistance to value change have been observed when elaboration occurs on two occasions separated

by several days (Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003). Consequently, an interesting issue is whether such an approach also makes the value more likely to serve as an ideal self-guide. If so, the value should begin to elicit the self-regulation and emotional effects described in this thesis.

A related issue is the overall composition of the value system when a peripheral value becomes centralised. Above, I have discussed potential changes in effects of this newly centralised value, but what happens to other values, including the central value that is displaced? Do they exhibit a decline in their influence? What about peripheral values that serve similar motives to the value that has become central? Do these values become more central as well?

In summary, future research is required to investigate the process of value centralisation. Specifically, research is required that investigates the effect of cognitive elaboration and the “distance” of a value from the self. This is an important goal, because although value elaboration facilitates value congruent behaviour, a person may fully endorse a value (e.g., think the value is important) without being motivated to behaviourally support the value (unless extrinsically motivated to do so). For example, the majority of people may believe that protecting the environment is important, but only avoid littering when others are around. Movement to a central position may attenuate this duplicity, while creating the self-regulatory and emotional effects described here.

5.3.2 Value Centralisation, Violation, and Unique Emotions

The defining features of central values are that they are highly self-defining, spontaneously guide behaviour (Verplanken & Holland, 2002), are strongly associated with the self, and enjoy high subjective importance (see results of Studies 1 and 2). This combination promotes enduring behavioural support even in the face of

opposition or situations that make it difficult to enact the value. For the lone student protester facing tanks in Tianamen Square, it is preferable to endure great distress in order to support freedom than to not support the value. In order to preserve one's sense of self, and by extension, one's world-view, people sometimes would rather endure physical discomfort or even death than compromise their central values. Indeed, if their central values are orientated towards self-transcendence, they may be required to sacrifice their own concerns for the safety for others.

The level of commitment does not imply that people never violate central values. I suspect that the abstract threshold set by values make it possible to avoid perceptions of value violation from time to time. A critical question is how people deal with perceived violations when they happen, perhaps even when unforeseen circumstances have forced value violation. Violation of central values or support of central-opposed values at the abstract level may be tolerated or even encouraged (e.g., playing devil's advocate, which is useful when defending their legitimacy), but individuals may possess a threshold of tolerance. Above this threshold, violations of one's central values may produce negative outcomes for individuals and evoke remedial action to protect the value and self-integrity. Akin to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), individuals would be motivated to reaffirm their sense of self by undertaking actions that dissipate the negative emotions evoked by central value violation. The most appropriate action would be to behave in a manner that supports the central value. Below this threshold, value violation may be ignored or fail detection.

Of course, it is fundamentally important to discern how this threshold is derived. In other words, how do people "draw the line" in protecting the values that are important to them? I expect that this process is flexible, causing the threshold to

vary across situations for the same person. In each context, people may form beliefs about what is a reasonable expectation and what is not. Expectations may seem reasonable when they do not conflict with other cherished values, but not when other cherished values are threatened by behaviour. For example, a person may prioritise self-transcendence and openness values and live their life guided by the maxim “live and let live” until others’ behaviour violates their individual freedom or threatens to harm others. This hypothesis is speculative, but serves to highlight the importance of this issue for understanding value self-regulation.

A related issue arises when people are being coerced to support values they do not wish to support. As stated earlier in Chapter 1, all values may be viewed as objectively important (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). This view is facilitated by their existence as abstract concepts. However, if people are induced to concretely support values that they do not wish to support, there may be an emotional backlash. A pilot study I conducted indicated the potential for this backlash. In this study, participants were asked to provide reasons to support their most peripheral value or to merely complete measures of the value’s centrality and importance. Half of the participants in the cognitive support condition were given further instructions that they should provide concrete plans on how they would support the value in the future. The participants induced to provide cognitive support did not provide centrality ratings that were significantly different from the control group. Thus these results fail to support the aforementioned hypothesis about effects of value elaboration on value centrality. This null effect may be due to numerous factors (e.g., participants may not have generated sufficient quantity or quality of arguments), however. The more important result from this pilot study was that the group of participants who also formed concrete plans gave value centrality ratings below that of even the control

condition, suggesting a backlash effect. This result has implications for persuasion strategies. For example, exhorting people to live healthier lives may cause them to actually ignore or even downplay the value's importance. This possibility makes it potentially important to discern whether a value is peripheral because of ambivalence or lack of self-relevance. The positive effect of value elaboration may be less likely in the former case than in the latter case.

Future research could explore other potential affective consequences of value violations. Shame has been associated with the self-attributed indiscretions, whereas the related emotion of guilt has been associated with harm caused to others (Rodriguez, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002; Tangney, 1995). Moreover, abundant evidence (e.g., Tangney, 1993) indicates that shame arises when people globally evaluate themselves negatively because they have committed a transgression ("I am a bad person"), whereas guilt arises when behaviour concerns a specific transgression ("I did a bad thing"). Do people feel shame rather than guilt in response to central value violation? Because central values are more strongly related to the self as personal ideals (rather than as external obligations), it is possible that people who argue against their central values will experience more shame than people who violate a peripheral value.

An extension of this approach suggests that people will experience negative emotions if they witness others derogating one's own central values. If all that matters is the effect for the value, then witnessing others violating one's own central values may cause the same dejection-type emotions as the self-violation of the values. However the relationships with those who violate a central value may vary, and there could be different emotional implications of witnessing close others violate cherished values than witnessing others less associated with the self. The dejection-type

emotions may be even more strong when close others violate one's central values than when distant others act against one's central values, because close others are more strongly merged with the self (Aron & Fraley, 1999). On the other hand, close others may elicit agitation: previous research has demonstrated that high identifiers with an ingroup often derogate deviant ingroup members more than outgroup members (Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 1992). Future research is needed to examine these possibilities.

Finally, it is worth considering positive emotions associated with value change. Although rearranging central self-conceptions can undermine self-certainty and evoke aversive emotions (Sedikides, 1995), embracing values that give one a new outlook may lead to positive emotions. For example, religious converts may experience guilt or shame based on their past, but also quiescence, awe, and clarity of focus from their "revelation". The way in which people come to terms with this process is worthy of future research and may in part be determined by value content, the speed of change, and type of change.

In summary, more research is required on the types of affective reactions that are likely to ensue following central value violations. Also, more research is required to investigate the processes associated with value change and value content. A rapid realignment of central values may evoke uncertainty and confusion, but also provide clarity and focus. An understanding of these processes may help promote individual and group well-being.

5.3.3 The Issue of Multiple Value Systems

The orthodox view of values as stable dispositions (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992) is opposed by research suggesting that values can also be transient and that people use different values for different situations (Eiser, 1987; Seligman and Katz,

1996). Seligman and Katz (1996) provide evidence of multiple value systems, rather than the traditional value system. However, they caution that it is over-simplistic to view value systems as completely malleable and suggest that the traditional view of a single value system reflects the manner in which people wish to view themselves and that multiple value systems may reflect the pragmatics of dealing with the vagaries of everyday life.

My approach may provide a useful starting point for addressing this issue. I suggest that central values, as cognitively and affectively supported self-aspects, act as ideal promotion-focused self-guides and are trans-situational. In contrast, peripheral values, due to their lack of self-relevance are truisitic and are transient. From this perspective, central values may exist in a relatively stable system, whereas peripheral values may exist in multiple systems.

However, some issues are more personally relevant than others. A deciding factor governing the use of central versus peripheral values should be the personal relevance of the issue. On encountering an issue, people may decide on the level of personal involvement in the issue and its subsequent relation to their self-integrity. If sufficient self-involvement is detected, people may use central values to guide attitudes and behaviour. If there is insufficient self-involvement (below an activation threshold), they may use contextual information to reach a judgement and then justify this view posthoc, with values (Seligman & Katz, 1996).

5.4 Conclusion

Values can act as ideals or minimal standards. This has implications for the manner in which people support values. Higgins's (1987) approach to self-regulation highlights the way that distinct self-guides and self-regulatory strategies of promotion-focused ideals and prevention-focused oughts evoke different cognitions,

emotions, and behaviour. Utilisation of this approach allows specific predictions to be formed about the manner in which people support values that are central or peripheral to their self-concepts and their emotional consequences. The evidence presented in this thesis supports these predictions, revealing that the promotion-focused role is elicited primarily by central values and by openness values. As a result, violation of these values uniquely affects dejection-type emotions.

The pervasive use of values in everyday life, from informing individual behaviour to justification of national actions, emphasises the importance of this understanding of the way in which people support or contradict values.

Understanding how people utilise values facilitates strategies designed to promote pro-value behaviour and psychological well-being.

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