Social Intervention and Visual Culture: A Psychosocial Investigation into Art Education and Young People's Relational Aesthetics in a Devolved Museum and Gallery Space.

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Thesis Summary

The work carried out in this research concerns the use of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in relation to learning, experience, and intervention. The research was carried out in two stages. First, by working with two groups of young people from Valleys Kids, a charity organization located in the heart of the Rhondda South Wales, the first phase consists of a psychogeographical dérive of Cardiff Museum, Wales. Based on the Situationist International approach to studying the emotional effects of place and environment, psychogeography allows young people to become attentive to their sense and emotions in relation to art and culture. This enables researchers, art educationists and those working in the area of youth arts to produce pedagogical documentation which records the processes of lived experience. The second stage of the study consists of a series of poetry workshops: informing the areas of education, micro-politics, and therapeutic intervention.

By developing a complex theoretical scaffold using Deleuze, Spinoza, Peirce and Bergson, this research considers art as a relational encounter (Bourriaud, 2002) and approaches it as an unrestricted pattern and structure of experience which flows from perception to recognition (Dewey, 2005). From Deleuze and Spinoza the research sets the empirical inquiry within a bodily logic. As a constructivist approach towards subjectivity and experience, this allows us to look at young people’s encounters with cultural artefacts as produced through a multiplicity of processes and practices. Peircean semiotics permits us to explore how these processes of lived experience communicate through a variety of both signifying and a-signifying registers. In addition, Bergson’s phenomenology of minds allows researchers to detail the relation of lived experience to time and the material body. The result is a form of empirical inquiry that allows researchers to understand the meaning of empiricism in relation to what experience is.

In aligning itself with the pedagogical strategies and outreach initiatives currently being deliver by the Museum of Contemporary Art of Barcelona (MACBA) Independent Studies Program (PEI) this research addresses the gap which exists between museum institution and university. Accordingly, by re-drawing its boundaries and modifying its cognitive architecture, practice-led research in the area of youth arts can transform the museum into a workshop for experimentation (Bourriaud, 1998) and challenge the curatorial hegemony of the exhibition apparatus. Indeed, by engaging in experimental practices with young people, and working at the intersection between theory and practice, we can re-evaluate our perceptions of what art is for, and how art might be treated in a devolved museum and gallery space.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.0. What is art for?

Think of yourself entering a gallery of an art museum. Suppose your eye catches a picture at the end of the room that attracts your attention. Better still, look around your immediate environment. Have you found something that catches your attention? Now allow yourself to be infected by an emotional union with that object. Are you excited or irritated? Do you imagine yourself to feel gladness, sorrow, despair, courage or despondency? Is there a transition from one feeling to another? If so, then your designs for living have been widened and enriched as the emotions attached to the drama of events and objects move towards an issue that is desired or disliked. If not, then do not worry. We are close to practical significance of art. For the poignancy of your experience signifies the somewhat anaemic conditions of modern life. That is, social objects - and this inevitably includes museum artefacts - can often feel removed from the qualities of real, ordinary experience.

Shortly, I will address how art might potentially deal with this shortcoming. However, one aspect of history is so relevant to the problem that it must receive at least passing notice, particularly if I am to argue that art has a purpose. That is, much of our experience as it is actually lived under our present cultural conditions is marked by the economic and institutional separation of emotion, thought, and doing. For example, Dewey (2005) highlights that our interests are related to one another externally and mechanically. Intrinsic meanings are positioned within static institutional classes which separate practice from insight. We undergo sensations as mechanical stimuli or irritated stimulations without having a sense of the reality that is in them and behind them.

“We see without feeling; we hear, but only a second-hand report, second hand because not reinforced by vision. We touch, but the contact remains tangential because it does not fuse with qualities of sense that go below the surface. We use the senses to arouse passion but not to fulfil the interest of insight, not because that interest is not potentially present in the exercise of sense but an excitation on the surface” (Dewey, 2005: 21).
In as much as we experience our different senses, and engender in lived-experience the immediately felt rhythms of our emotional interchanges with social objects, the senses do not unite to tell a more common and enlarged story of ordinary experience if their connection with those objects is attained by some objective basis. This, of course, is no less true of art.

For example, think of an experience, or an event, that stands out as an enduring memory, something which marks that experience out from what went before and what came after. It might be something of tremendous importance. A quarrel with a close friend, a catastrophe averted at the last second. Or it may be something that appears quite small in comparison. There is that peaceful walk through the wooded hillside which gave stillness to a hectic workload, or that big storm which kept you in class at school; the storm that seemed, in its fury, to sum up all that a storm can ever be. In such experiences, the vital sense defined by these situations is complete in itself. They are situations and episodes that we might spontaneously refer to as being “real experiences.” Or say, in recalling them: “that was an experience” (Dewey, 2005: 37). If, then, we find that such sources or real events are missing from our engagement with art, it is merely on account that art has been separated from the objects and scenes of ordinary experience.

Let us repeat our thought experiment. Having discovered these roots of experience, you may wish to follow the course of their growth and develop them into more refined forms of art - say a painting, a poem or even a ceramic object. Now, think of yourself entering a gallery of an art museum. Suppose your eye catches a picture at the end of the room that attracts your attention. Your own experience tells you that the activity of art is based on the fact that you are receiving an expression of feeling by another person. That is, through the receptivity of your senses, you are capable of experiencing such feelings which moved the artist to express it in a picture; like the single quality of grief pervading the artist’s entire experience of that rupture of friendship, or the fear individualizing that storm. This act shows that there is continuity between art and the operations of enduring experience. But from this we can also propose the following condition of contagion:

“Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected by these feelings and also experience them” (Tolstoy, 1994: 179).
Art is not only evidence that human hopes, fears and purposes find a basis and support in nature but that it connects with the activities of a live organism in its environment. Art is, therefore, prefigured in the normal processes of living, in the sense that our evoked responses are testament to the direct use of art by way of its incorporation in sensuous form (Dewey, 2005: 30). In fact, if it is granted that sensuous form is arrived at whenever a stable, even though moving, equilibrium is reached, then art is at the same time the initiation of a new relation with our environment through an internal process of movement and rest (Dewey, 2005: 16). For example, as movement and rest by definition represent the flow from something to something as a single unity, then the living attainment of sensuous form makes clear the potency of new adjustments when equilibrium is reached. This is because, as Dewey (2005) explains, it signifies the temporal organisation of our change and growth:

“Time as organisation in change is growth, and growth signifies that a varied series of change enters upon intervals of pause and rest; of completions that becomes the initial points of new processes of development”

“Form as it is presented in the fine arts, is the art of making clear what is involved in the organization of space and time prefigured in every course of a developing life-experience” (Dewey, 2005: 24).

The time of consummation is also one of beginning anew (Dewey, 2005: 16). The manifestation of an ordered temporal experience possesses continuity from something to something: the culmination of a continuous movement, and internal integration of a sudden shock that changes existing perceptual arrangements. In these operations, an organic stimulation becomes a bearer of meaning, and motor responses are changed into instruments of expression and communication (Dewey, 2005: 25). There is a unity that punctuates and concludes experience and gives its name to that walk, that storm, that rupture of friendship: a conclusion that is not a separate, independent thing, but the consummation of a movement that marks an experience out from what went before and what comes after (Dewey, 2005: 39). For this reason, artistic products consist of future possibilities felt as a possession of what is now and here in the present.

These thought experiments give us a strong account of a view that the purpose of art succeeds when it transmits, arouses and unifies emotion, and when its function brings people together and enriches a common humanity (Ross, 1994: 177). This presents a powerful vision of art’s potential. In this view, the arts do more than just provide us with fleeting moments of elation and delight. They can expand our horizons and give meaning and value to future experience. In this sense they modify our ways of
perceiving the world, leaving us and the world itself irrevocably changed (Jackson, 1998: 33). We can, therefore, propose that art is an invitation to compose an experience that stands out as an enduring memorial. Moreover, if we are willing to grant this position, if only by way of temporary experiment, then artistic products not only have the potential to restore new social relations, but they can also be used as a tool to aid our own individual development and growth.

Despite all of this, our encounters with art do not always go as well as they might. It is often the case that artistic products in museums and galleries reflect the cold aura of cultural status, separated and segregated from common life. Under such conditions we are likely to leave respected museums and exhibitions feeling underwhelmed, or even bewildered and inadequate, wondering why the changes or the transformational experience we had anticipate did not occur. It is natural to blame oneself, to assume that the problem must come down to a failure of knowledge, comprehension or capacity for feeling (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 4). But in truth, in most cases we find that we only ever have passive and mechanical connection to art products, embedded as they are in institutions and habits of life that absorb time and energy. This is by no means the fault of the individual. Rather, it is more the extent to which processes of living are reduced to labelled situations (Dewey, 2005: 25).

“We live in a world in which there is an immense amount of organization, but it is an external organization, not of the ordering of a growing experience, one that involves, moreover, the whole of the live creature, toward a fulfilling conclusion” (Dewey, 2005: 84).

If I see a sculpture in a museum that reminds me of a figure on grandma’s mantelpiece, or a piece of pottery that absorbs itself into memories of the past, then it can be respectively argued that I have a personal connection with these objects: I have an immediate story to tell (Simon, 2010: 127). But in such an institutional context, it is more than likely that any encounter or personal experiences I have will not complete their movement from perception to recognition as a singular, unobstructed, flow of becoming in the moment. The singular flow or continuity of experience as an experience from percept to recognition will be stopped in mid flow. As Dewey (2005) points out, there is always some excess on the side of receptivity which is entered upon so speedily that it cuts short our experiences by placing miscellaneous demands upon our thoughts (Dewey, 2005: 85). Here, I can only imagine Dewey to be referring to discourse. In particular, the curatorial discourse of artefacts. The curatorial discourse that pre-determines our experiences, and hangs on each object like a burden, acting as a strategic agent in
the development and cultivation of national identities, culture, history and memories (Bennett, 2006; Mason, 2007).

Part of the enduring nature of curatorial discourse is that it indicates theories arising from specifiable extraneous conditions, like economic forces and the rise of nationalism and imperialism – specifically with regards to European art galleries and museums (Dewey, 2005: 9). But then there are also words and labelling which also perform a particular function. Let us look at a concrete example, in the form of Vincent Van Gogh’s *Sunflowers*, as presented by The National Gallery.

*Sunflowers* by Van Gogh (1888)
(http://www.vangogh.museum.nl)

“This series dates from 1888, when Van Gogh left Paris to paint the brilliant sunshine of the South of France, inviting Paul Gauguin to join him. Waiting for Gauguin to arrive, Van Gogh painted a series of sunflowers to decorate his friend’s bedroom. They were meant as a sign of friendship and welcome, but also Vincent’s allegiance to Gauguin as his artistic leader. The pair worked together throughout autumn 1888 – but it ended very badly as the close of the year when Van Gogh seemed to have a nervous breakdown, famously cutting off part of his ear and entered an asylum” (www.nationalgallery.org.uk).
Embedded as they are in the institution and in our habits of perception, theories operate so effectively because they work so unconsciously. These isolate art and its appreciation by placing it in a realm of its own, disconnected from other modes of experiencing (Dewey, 2005: 9). However, in the instance provided above, words are symbols which represent objects and actions, in the sense that they have meaning (Dewey, 2005: 86). Statements set forth the conditions under which the experience may be had, with descriptions of emotion - presented in intellectual and symbolic terms - offering directions and guiding our experience to other forms of inquiry. That is, statements try to regulate by conscious intent the nature of the emotion aroused (Dewey, 2005: 87).

This function creates a universal work of art, and a formula of “truth” that rests on the assumption that the kind of value or meaning that the work possesses is so unique that it is without community of connection with other modes of experience (Dewey, 2005: 51). It is possible then, to misconceive its purpose through interpretation and analysis, and to conclude that the work of art has emotion at its heart, in the form of significant content, or a “truth” complete in itself. For example, that sincere friendship ruptured by Van Gogh’s depression. Consequently, the problem can now be defined: that of recovering experience both in its movement and becoming, as a singular uninterrupted flow from perception to recognition, rather than a conceptual, abstract truth.

This thesis argues that the problem is not primarily located in the individual. It lies in the way that art is taught, theorised, researched and presented by the art establishment. Indeed, since the beginning of the twentieth century, our relationship with art has been weakened by the institutional reluctance to address the question of what art is for (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 4). The slogan: “art for art’s sake” has done much to leave us in doubt about the purpose art. Thus, the idea that art might not be for the sake of anything in particular has left art in a vulnerable position. Its importance, although still held in high esteem, is too often assumed, rather than explained. Its value is taken to be a matter of common sense. Go to any modern art museum, and you will more than likely find that you will be led into galleries set out under headings such as "the 19th century," "the Italian School" and “French Impressionist.” These reflect the academic traditions in which museum curators have been educated to handle the collections entrusted to them.

“[It is] easy for staff members to forget that members of the public may not have a personal relationship with many artefacts. Staff and volunteers who care for, study, or maintain objects often have very personal connections with them. One of the challenges of cultural professions is remembering that
visitors don’t come in the door with the same emotional investment and history with artefacts that professionals have...” (Simon, 2010: 130).

I will come back to how we might address this particular issue shortly, but for now, we might as well note straight away that in order to make collections more interesting, and more accessible to a wider range of people, not only does the professional culture within museums and galleries have to change but the content and presentation style of what is displayed needs to be re-thought.

If my discussion up to this point has emphasised what is art for, we should at least devote some time with regards to why art matters. With this in mind, the problem with modern museums of art is that they fail to tell people directly why art matters. For example, imagine yourself going to a museum; at the end of a gallery Van Gogh’s *Sunflowers* catch your attention. As you approach it you begin to see a sign which says an incredibly basic but extremely vital thing as: “Look at this painting of *Sunflowers* if you want to remember what friendship is like" or “look at this painting of *Sunflowers* if you want a lesson in leadership.” The crucial point here is that the simplicity of the message does not leave us in any doubt about what Van Gough’s *Sunflowers* are for. They are for remembering friendships which are in danger of being forgotten. They are for rebalancing relationships and work routines. Yet, while implying nothing whatsoever about the quality of the work itself, I think we can still get a sense that this object matters. It matters because it explicitly feels like it is an object for something, rather than a cold dutiful attempt to force a reaction.

Through these simple messages, the work does continue to retain some of its intellectual value. If we compare the synopsis provided by the National Gallery to that of my more modest messages, then it can be seen that both confront the issue of friendship and leadership. In this respect I am not setting out to negate any historical discourse. What I am trying to do, however, is show that emotion can be a moving and cementing force, which is also part of an inclusive and enduring situation that contains objects and their issues (Dewey, 2005: 43). In both of the examples given above, we can see that the painting makes possible a ground-plan for human experience. The meaning of this thing is presented to immediate experience through visual reception, but the meaning and sense of the object requires its illumination in a directly embodied experience, manifest through the intimate nature of emotion.

“The emotion selects what is congruous and dyes what is selected with its colour, thereby giving qualitative unity to materials externally disparate and dissimilar. It thus provides unity through the varied parts of an experience” (Dewey, 2005: 44).
The “taking in” in any vital experience is something more than placing something on top of conscious thought or over what was previously known. Rather, it involves a reconstruction of experience which may in some cases be joyous or painful, desired or disliked. Moreover, the reconstruction, making or experimental process of production during this “taking in” of the objective materials and energies of our environment through our receptive organs may display the undergoing of a flow of sentiment or reverie that qualifies the experience as a unity (Dewey, 2005: 22/42). Let us briefly explore how this might inform a real experience. Take a look at the following image.

This painting entitled *The Conversion on the way to Damascus* by Caravaggio (1601) depicts St Paul’s conversion from persecutor to apostle. Now imagine someone felt ill at ease in front of this painting. If you were to ask the viewer what was off-putting about the work, they might ascribe the problem not so much to its style or genre but to a set of negative associations – mainly with autobiographical origins (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 72). Hostility towards a work of art can, therefore, grow out of a genuinely distressing experience. Likewise, it may be the case that the visitor gains a sense of hope
from the painting and that it brings back reminiscences out of which purposes are formed. With this realization, the material of reflection might be incorporated into the object to signify its meaning as an artwork (Dewey, 2005: 14). This is why art matters.

“Getting something out of art won’t just mean learning about it – it will mean investigating ourselves. We should be ready to look into ourselves in response to what we see. Art will be deemed not good or bad per se, but good or bad for us to the extent that it compensates for flaws: our forgetfulness, our loss of hope, our search for dignity, our difficulties with self-knowledge, and our longings for love...” (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 72).

We can now return to the issue of make collections more interesting, and more accessible to a wider range of people. The challenge for this thesis is to explore a different kind of pedagogical agenda for our museums and galleries. One by which the artefacts and collections can begin to serve the needs of their community, where a walk in a museum and gallery would not be a simple matter of engaging with static, isolated, theories or statements, which condition experience. Instead, a walk could be a learning experience about life, a learning experience about our own hopes and fears, and an encounter with the social and/or political injustices that impact on community relations, visualized and expressed by those voices that are marginalised and segregated, yet which need to be heard, as these voices are often the most qualified to speak of societies failings.

What I am aiming for, then, is two-fold. One the one hand, we need a new way of visualising the arts through a politics of emotion. By this I mean a way of using museums and galleries relationally, and as a tool that researchers and art educationists can use to reignite the movement of our own becoming, and set in motion the events of lived experience as an uninterrupted flow, a flow that can contradict the curatorial discourse of pre-determined facts, and open up new vistas of experimentation for those marginalised voices that need to be heard. As a result, I feel that such an ambitious endeavour is best practiced by situating the phenomenological sense-events of young people’s encounters with art and culture – notably, those marginalised young people who are exposed to multiple social and economic deprivations – within the unfolding activity of affective and spatio-temporal happenings that develop in between perception and recognition. On the other hand, the display and presentation of museum and gallery artefacts requires a new imaginative vision, one that can allow curators to group together artworks from across genres and eras according to our inner needs. This means a more fertile indexing
system, aided by captions and labels that can connect museum and gallery collections to marginalised voices (Thomson, 2008) and the very processes of lived experience and desire.

1.1. Using pedagogical documentation to democratize young people’s art encounters

This thesis, therefore, sets out to explore a more ambitious and beneficial arrangement of gallery and museum space by recruiting marginalised young people’s to re-imagine what art is for through the use of pedagogical documentation. Originating in Reggio Emilia (Italy) but used throughout the world, and widespread in Swedish pre-schools, the use of pedagogical documentation plays an important role in making practice visible or material. However, its application as an experimental, multi-purpose tool is not only used to make the materiality of the public gaze subject to research, dialogue, reflection, and interpretation (meaning-making), it is used to welcome the plurality of different subjectivities and, in doing so, provides a means by which multiple and diverse perspectives can bring new theories, new ideas, and offer different understandings and new directions for practice-led research and pedagogical work. As Lenz Taguchi (2010) notes: “it produces different kinds of [democratic] knowledge depending on the ontological and epistemological perspectives we bring with us in our usage of it” (Lenz Taguchi, 2010: xiii). Indeed, seen from this angle:

“...Pedagogical documentation becomes a form of visualization, which brings forces and energies into a project work, forces and energies that can open us up to new possibilities, to the possibility of transformations” (Dahlberg, 2003: 284).

Our experiences of museum and/or gallery collections become dominantly intellectual and practical when ordinary experiences are omitted. They are intellectual in the sense that our experiences have meaning, yet practical in the sense that we can visually and, sometimes even physically, interact with the events and cultural objects exhibited. However, the conclusions to these experiences are often pre-determined by ready-at-hand discourses, which help guide our experiences by giving us the pre-conceived notion that collections have value on their own terms, independent and often superior to any sense, meaning, or experience that a viewer may bring to the encounter.

By ignoring the spectator’s contributions, which make the object something new (Dewey, 2005: 85) we miss out on the personally felt feelings and emotions guiding the selection and assemblage of the
material presented (Dewey, 2005: 71). As a result, pedagogical documentation appears to be a novel way to bring people closer to the experience of art making when engaging with museum and gallery objects (Dewey, 2005: 50). That is, the use of pedagogical documentation in practice-led research can be seen as a method that brings the visual and material performance of constructive doing (making), and undergoing (affective), closer to the intimate drama of bodily experience (Dahlberg, 2003: 283). In the sense, by uniting the relation of outgoing and incoming energy, which makes an experience an experience of becoming-in-the-moment (Dewey, 2005: 50), pedagogical documentation allows us to investigate how material forms of visualization can be empirically presented in new, interesting, and remarkable ways.

Because many of our emotional experiences towards museum and gallery collections, are attached to the events of our past, the unity of unobstructed experience as the actual movement from something to something, from perception to recognition, from the past to the present in a sensuous form, invites us to consider a “definite reconstruction of objective materials” (Dewey, 2005: 44) through movement and contradiction (Sewell & Woods, 2011). For example, Dewey (2005) suggests that: “emotion is the moving and cementing force that selects what is congruous, and dyes what is selected with images of colour, giving qualitative unity to materials externally disparate and dissimilar through varied parts of experience” (Dewey, 2005: 44). This sort of vital experience is more than a process of recognition; it is a reconstructive process, where the imagination functions as a period of dialectical gestation, and the past a period of social awareness which recognises the immanent and material presence of an external body (i.e. a gallery artefact) affectively mingling with our own (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999: 17).

With this in mind, by accounting for young people’s vital experiences through the use of pedagogical documentation, this research will explore how the qualities of young people’s experience can have a transformative and reconstructive effect upon the material object of an art encounter. Consequently, this research report will bring pedagogical documentation closer to the creative and artistic processes involved in every work of art in that it will render a plan and/or pattern of complete experience more intensely and concentratedly felt (Dewey, 2005: 54), whilst also placing marginalized, and segregated youth subjectivities at the forefront of a democratic art. That is, connect art not only to the individual and collective past of young people, but also to the material reality of life’s exceptions.
1.2. Using art as a social tool: contrasting paradigms in contemporary art intervention

“What if art had a purpose that could be defined and discussed in plain terms? Art can be a tool, and we need to focus more clearly on what kind of tool it is – and what good it can do for us” (De Botton, 2013: 3).

For De Botton (2012) the failure of museums to address the question “what is art for?” or “why does art matter?” is the result of the modern aesthetic in which curators are trained. Indeed, this modern aesthetic has led to a deep suspicion of any instrumental approach to culture. Consequently, “to give an answer that anyone could grasp with regards to the question of why art matters, is quickly viewed as reductive” (De Botton, 2012: para. 2). Here, however, I have to say that I am in disagreement with De Botton.

In the mid-1990s, the realization that the economic impact of galleries and museums was reductive (Landry et al, 1993; Matarasso, 1997) led to the “instrumental turn” of our more prominent cultural institutions. This is, there was a determined shift by government cultural policy to set about making the arts integral in the delivery of extrinsic, social and economic benefits, and to value them on that basis (AEA, 2005).¹ Indeed, the adoption of Labour led policies, dedicated as they were to community regeneration and the reduction of social exclusion (DCMS, 2001)² placed new targeted initiatives and a renewed agenda on museums and galleries. In addition, this, also coupled with the conviction that the social impact of culture should be measured to assess the effectiveness of this new policy (DCMS, 2001) led the drive for more instrumental research.

The drive for measurement - propelled by the government’s campaign to reform public services - has produced a shift from seeing the arts as “subsidised” to seeing it as the subject of “public investment for which there must be a measurable return” (AEA, 2005). Within this agenda, the measurement of how arts organisations can have a “social impact on individuals’ confidence, self-esteem, motivation and social skills, and effect the regeneration of small communities” (AEA, 2005) is paramount. Public bodies require “hard evidence.” That is, “quantitative data is preferred over qualitative information of any kind” (AEA, 2005).

¹ AEA Arts Consulting
² Department for Media, Culture & Sport
From this point of view, the idea of anecdote is frowned upon since mere stories cannot be the basis of generalisation. They cannot be used to measure the effectiveness of policy in terms of community renewal and reductions in social exclusion (DCMS 2001). Hence, for museums such as the Tyne and Wear Museum (TWM) and Bristol Museums, Galleries, and Archives (BMGA) the consequence of this quantitative and instrumental approach to social policy has been:

- A new focus upon on measuring performance and delivering value for money that has led to the implementation of quantitative data-gathering techniques designed to assist analysis of resource use, efficiency and effectiveness. Another consequence is the adoption of an analytical vocabulary derived from Best Value, such as inputs, outputs and outcomes, with which they can evaluate performance.

- Increased energy devoted to audience development and, in particular, the growth in programmes and initiatives for schools and non-traditional audiences designed to widen access to collections.

- The shift from seeing museums as places to house, conserve and display things to seeing them as agents of social change where people, not things, are at the heart of the institutional mission. This is exemplified in the mission of TWM: ‘To help people determine their place in the world, and define their identities, so enhancing their self-respect and their respect for others’.

- A determination by museums to find ways of capturing and representing the social benefits of outreach and community arts programmes that will satisfy the recommendations of the Quality, Efficiency and Standards Team (QUEST) in order to improve their case for government funding. This has meant not only recording the museums’ outputs (e.g., the number of visitors and the number of programmes) but also looking for long-term outcomes (Travers, 2006).

In this respect, the arts have been used instrumentally to further political interests, with consecutive British governments since the late 1970s prioritising educational policies, and funding social exclusion strategies, in a determined effort to improve the accountability of national and regional museums in terms of monetary value in the public sector (Hooper-Greenhill, 2013: 66).

For this reason, cultural industries such as museums and galleries have found themselves having to embrace a plurality of funding systems, in addition to developing partnerships with stakeholders and the private sector (i.e. business and corporate foundations, individuals, trusts, associations and other charitable bodies), whilst also increasing their role within the community (Sandell, 2003; Law & Fiske,
As a result, De Botton’s (2012) assertion that museums do not take an instrumental approach to culture and art cannot be justified. If anything, the instrumental approach to the cultural industries, whereby the goal of both public and private sector funding is to use the cultural industries to produce, distribute, and regulate immaterial goods such as ideas, concepts, thoughts, experiences and desires, has seen the educational role of museum and galleries become intertwined with cognitive capitalism, and the knowledge economy – cognitive capitalism being the idea that the very notion of subjectivity, and this includes our language, passions, thoughts, ideas, creative practices and desires etc., are all of major economic interest (Boutang, 2011: 51). As Xanthoudaki et al (2003) states:

“In an age which recognises the power of the consumer, education is being used as part of the instrument, for audience development...” (Xanthoudaki et al, 2003: 1).

Here, the role of meaning-making and the reception of art, either as form of entertainment or a tool for community intervention, is relationally equal to the production of information, and the real-time regulation of that production (Boutang, 2011: 53) for social and economic purposes. For example, the consumption of art and culture is seen as being relational to the production and cultivation of creative thought, which in turn can create geographical clusters of innovation integral to urban development, education, and economic progress (Grodach et al., 2014). Consequently, museum and galleries can be seen as industries of knowledge that can be used educationally to cultivate the power of innovation, a life skill that is marketable and which has real use-value (Boutang, 2011: 52). This is why, as Bellamy et al (2009) note: “museum learning is more important than ever for young people, as they now need to develop skills for the future economy” (Bellamy et al, 2009: 19).

The purpose of museums, then, is not only to produce exhibitions and entertainment, but to provide different types of educational services, aimed at mainstream schools and marginalized and segregated groups, which can deliver extrinsically social, economic benefits (AEA, 2005) - the ideological position, here, being the use of social intervention/social inclusion policies to create young cultural consumers of the arts. Not in order to fulfil any emancipatory objectives, whereby learning to interpret the visual might empower disenfranchised young people to problematize the social and political realities of their experiences through experimental meaning-making (Sayers, 2011: 411) but to appropriate egalitarian principles towards knowledge and culture for their economic use value. As Sayers (2011) explains, the egalitarian approach to knowledge - located within a constructivist epistemology - places emphasis on the creative activity of the learner above the status of the knowledge constructed (Sayers, 2011: 412).
Accordingly, it is the strategic and pedagogical nurturing of compulsive creativity, as an act or activity in and of itself, which is seen as an important, individual, marketable asset (Boutang, 2011: 52) able to tackle the problem of economically marginalized subjectivities.

If this is the case, and museums and galleries are to become effective agents for social inclusion, then I am in agreement with Sandell (2003) proposal that: “a paradigmatic shift in the purpose and role of museums in society, and a concomitant change in their working and educational practices is required” (Sandell, 2003: 45). As a consequence, I believe that an instrumental approach to social exclusion and the creative industries, supported by outreach programmes aimed at quantifiably measuring the social impact of culture (DCMS, 2001) cannot accomplish any sort of transformative or regenerative agenda, if its ideological use of the arts positions marginalized and socially segregated subjectivities as one targeted consumer amongst multiple consumers (Kotler et al, 2008) - and by this I refer to the “at-risk” consumer of the arts (Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 55) - and where “cerebral discoveries” integrate creative learning with market forces’ ever increasing desire for innovative immaterial goods.

This ideological framework echoes interpretations of nineteenth century museums’ roles as civilizing instruments of the state, where the scrutiny of “at-risk” groups were defined in terms of moral panic discourses (Bennet, 2006). Indeed, Thorpe (2000) has likened the UK government’s policy initiatives as a disturbing attempt at social control. Not disciplinary or coercive in their methods, but grounded in the neo-liberal idea of a “self-regulating” market, where the optimization of compulsive creativity and immaterial labour shows itself to be a democratic part of a knowledge economy. Consequently, rather than being used as a psycho-social tool to address the hopes and fears of young marginalized subjectivities, and a medium through which new solutions, theories and concepts might be mapped against existing social and political realities, museum and galleries support the liberation of creative potential without addressing existing social and political conditions that might be a barrier to young people’s psychological development (von Osten, 2011: 138).

With all this in mind, then, I believe the best that museum and galleries can hope to achieved from an instrumental approach to social exclusion, is that their pedagogical use of arts can equip marginalized and segregated young people with a fettered gaze, where through the use of arts and culture, the act or activity of perceiving is ideologically aligned with the consumption and production of immaterial goods, and where young people, through the strategic promotion of creativity, find a more lively and constructive place in society (Callaghan, 1976) by being discursively transformed into model economic
actors (von Osten, 2011: 137). As a consequence, such a pedagogical approach does not equip young people with the necessary means by which to both imaginatively and relationally engage with art and reality and, more crucially, to discover how to experimentally participate in its transformation (Freire, 2001). This is an important distinction, and one through which new models of inspiration are needed.

1.3. A new vision for museum and gallery education: The Museum of Contemporary Art Barcelona (MACBA)

This thesis positions itself alongside Marxen’s (2009) exploratory review of contemporary art, and its potential use as a tool in the field of politics, community engagement, and therapeutic intervention: specifically with reference to museum and galleries. Marxen draws on the Museum of Contemporary Art Barcelona (MACBA) as a model whereby such practices are taking place. Since 1999, the policy of the MACBA has been to consider art as a social and political tool, something that is often reflected in exhibition programming, with many exhibitions having political content. For example, it might be the art of a prominent activist, a piece of anti-establishment performance, or “case studies of moments and situations in which there have been a confluence of artistic activity and political activity” (Ribalta 2004: 6). But the purpose of MACBA is not only to produce exhibitions; its purpose is also to provide different types of services aimed at a variety of groups and subjects within the community. MACBA’s director of Public Programmes, writes:

“Beyond the idea of visibility whose paradigm is the exhibition, we believe it is possible to restore forms of subjective appropriation of artistic methods in processes outside the mainstream and outside the museum” (Ribalta, 2004: 9).

This necessarily involves removing art from its elitist pedestal, and taking it to groups within the local community that would not ordinarily visit a museum of contemporary art; achieving a new audience for art amongst the working classes. As Walter Benjamin might otherwise have put it: “the end of art in its traditional bourgeois form” (Buck-Morse, 2005: 238). In keeping with this, MACBA programmes include short and long-term training, together with socialisation activities like workshops, seminars and conferences; the former having been a specific concern for UK funded museums in the past with reports suggesting that few were focussed on staff development given the growing demands placed on them (Wistinghausen et al, 2004: 56). With this in mind, some of these activities address subjects such art and therapy, art and psychoanalysis, and anti-psychiatry - this resource not available in such
areas of Health and Education (Marxen, 2009: 133). In fact, the term “education” can be substituted for the preferred concept of “mediation” (Ribalta, 2002: 74). As such, an educational model emerges designed to favour “relational spaces” and the experimentation with:

“...forms of self-organisation and self-education. The purpose of this method is to produce new structures both in terms of artistic and social processes (networked, horizontal, decentralized, delocalized structures). It is a matter of giving the public agency, of providing conditions for their capacity for action, of overcoming the limitations of the traditional divisions of actor and spectator, of producer and produced” (Ribalta, 2006: 29).

Unlike the traditional role of museum, the MACBA does not see itself as part of traditional education and entertainment industries. This is in contestation to rather more conservative attitudes in the UK. Indeed, the Renaissance in the Regions report was very clear that there was considerable resistance to cultural change:

“Museum and gallery governing bodies and managements have proved unwilling or unable to use the opportunity afforded by the project/challenge-funding schemes to bring public services such as learning, education and inclusion from the periphery to the core of institutions” (www.museumsassociation.org).

Furthermore, a recent study commissioned by the Museum Association (2013) on public perceptions and attitudes towards museums and galleries found that people continue to see these institutions as places whose purpose it is to facilitate knowledge and learning through discovery and entertainment and to preserve heritage (www.museumsassociation.org). In terms of what the report called “broader museum objectives” (www.museumsassociation.org), which included interventions into areas such as mental health/well-being, it found that public perceptions and attitudes regarded the “entertainment value” of museums objects as having a significant role to play in peoples’ lives because they were seen as offering forms of inspiration. The findings read as follows:

- Rather than being about broader objectives of mental health and wellbeing, this purpose was regarded by participants as being more about ‘entertainment’ for participants. This was inherently linked to a museum’s educative purpose, particularly in relation to the importance of active engagement in learning – as distinct from, say, a theme park or cinema (www.museumsassociation.org).
• This purpose was reinterpreted by participants as being about entertainment - educational as well as inspirational (www.museumsassociation.org).

These findings can be considered from a slightly different perspective. That is, people’s perceptions and attitudes would suggest that the public do consider themselves to be active transformers of the arts. They consider themselves, in all intent and purposes, to be passive contemplators. Conversely, this cannot be said in light of the activities at the MACBA. In taking an altogether different approach to exhibition programming, the interpretation of art, together with its function or, rather, pragmatic role in political, social, and therapeutic fields (Marxen, 2009: 132) the MACBA reaches beyond what might be called the perfect image of an instrumental monument. But how did the MACBA set about redefining its relationship with art? Marxen (2009) concludes that this change was facilitated by the relational turn of contemporary art in the late 90s, the central tenets of which can be found residing in Nicholas Bourriaud’s (1998) manifesto: Relational Aesthetics.

Many contemporary artworks follow the same ideas as discussed above. That is, using art as a social tool by taking it out of official art institutions, like galleries and museums, to different groups, some of which are marginalized and socially disadvantaged. Nicholas Bourriaud labelled this phenomenon “Relational Aesthetics” (Bourriaud, 1998). According to Bourriaud, in participatory art, the material reality of an object establishes a spontaneous relation to sensuous and embodied meaning making. This relation, which becomes an artwork due to a process called aestheticization of communication, connects the spectator to the same intimate union of doing and undergoing as the maker. Moreover, if we return to Dewey’s (2005) theory of art, we can clarify this as “a process consisting of a series of responsive acts that accumulate toward objective fulfilment” (Dewey, 2005: 54). Bearing this in mind, the artist, or what might otherwise have traditionally been called the spectator, inserts him or herself into pre-existing social relationships (i.e. social objects such as that found in a museum and gallery) simply by a method of interaction or, alternatively, creates a social relationship in order to extract a form, this too becoming a work of art.

“Unlike an object that is closed in on itself by the intervention of a style and a signature, present day art shows that form only exists in the encounter and in the dynamic relationship enjoyed by an artistic proposition with other formations, artistic or otherwise” (Bourriaud, 1998: 42).
The essential thing to note is that the materiality of art becomes a tool for producing subjectivity. Or as the MACBA’s director of Public Programs stated in the previous quote: “forms of self-organisation and self-education.” But in saying that, Winnicott’s concept of the transitional object becomes useful in this situation, since objects can stand between the outside and the inside world, and bridge these two worlds in a creative way. That is, artistic expression - in this case a sensuous and embodied form - can obtain personal meaning and become a form of constructive communication (Winnicott, 1971). Furthermore, the very activity of doing art in this context helps the participant to bring their situated knowledge and experience of the “relational sphere” into a corporeal form, which can be developed, transformed, and changed.

1.4. Making young minority voices heard: using pedagogical documentation to reflect lived experience

This kind of art appears as: “a rich field of experimentation” and represents “the production of space in a specific social context” (Bourriaud, 1998: 16), and can achieve political dimensions if social fields are problematized (Marxen, 2009: 133). Foucault’s Fearless Speaking, for instance, which is based on the Greek concept of parrhesia or truth-telling (Foucault, 2001) reflects on the public spaces that are often monopolized by the institutional voices which are born to speak on behalf of others. This more or less occurs: “at the expense of those who cannot speak because they have no confidence anyone will listen to them” (Phillips, 2003: 36) and unfortunately, their experience has taught them that they are right to suppose this. Moreover, they lack the sophisticated language that allows them to speak in public (Marxen, 2009: 133). Quite often people “are locked in a post-traumatic silence,” and find it difficult or cannot even verbalise their own experiences. Yet, as Phillips (2003) states: “these are the most important speakers in a democracy. They should speak because they have directly experienced its failures and indifference” (Phillips, 2003: 36).

This thesis will attempt to create the conditions of this sort of public engagement through the use of art workshops, and “truth-telling” as a deeply felt, embodied experience. This will be done through a series of poetry workshops. Obviously there are ethical issues. The workshops, although open to the lived experiences of marginalized and segregated young people, many of which exposed to multiple deprivations (http://valleyskids.org) will not be likened to “art therapy” and will not be analysed and imparted as therapy in the traditional sense. Rather, the workshops will be used to give informants a
democratic voice, and a language to communicate this voice by indirectly provoking discussion about social relations.

To give structure to these poetry workshops, pedagogical documentation will provide young people with a creative platform to experiment with non-representational forms of communication through movement, sensation, and affect. Furthermore, pedagogical documentation will function as a point of continuity, when connecting young people’s poems to individual and collective histories through patterns of affect, sensation, and the processes of lived experience. Indeed, this will provide young people with an opportunity to experience the art making process not only as an activity that can be used to connect with their own affectively “contained” subjectivities (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012: 34) but also a method of communication that can give them a “voice” (Thomson, 2008) that shows the affective dimensions of their material conditions.

As a consequence, to support our understanding of young people’s experiences the whole productive process and the use of poems as a democratic form of social action will have to be explained (Marxen, 2009: 136). The poems will therefore, also be subject to empirical analysis. As Dewey (2005) explains: “every work of art follows a plan, and pattern of, a complete experience, rendering it more intensely and concentratedly felt” (Dewey, 2005: 54). With this in mind, the analysis will not be applied in such a way as to dominate, monopolise and, indeed, legislate young people’s experiences by theoretically and critically positioning them in accordance with the researcher’s voice (Massumi, 2002; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000), but will instead try to show how problems relating to social behaviour, coexistence, and the “relational sphere” can be approached indirectly through psychosocial mechanisms and the processes of lived experience. Moreover, it will show how these can be pragmatically communicated through the use of aesthetically creative tools like poetry.

Through policies based on “relational aesthetics” and the “aesthetization of communication” MACBA has shown that museums can be proactive in embracing “relational loci” (Ivinson & Renold, 2013) in a way that provides groups with a means of extracting a form out of their existing social relationships. Indeed, these creative forms can take on both a political and therapeutic dimension if problematized (Bourriaud, 1998). However, it is an aesthetic and ethical challenge to find new ways of giving form to social relationships; particularly ones that allow individuals to produce lived experiences during the art-making process, and who may be transformed by such experiences (Marxen, 2009: 139). Indeed, such work is not without its critics with Foster (1995) so fervently describing it has having a
“pseudoethnographic” character that deals in “ethnographic self-fashioning” (Foster, 1995: 306). The consequences of art based research often resulting in vulnerable groups or what may be deemed the “other” being “fashioned in artistic guise” (Foster, 1995: 306).

1.5. Cultural devolution: an opportunity for cultural modernization

For museums and galleries to develop effective policies that address social exclusion, they first need to understand an individual’s knowledge and collateral experience: particularly with regards to their emotional and corporeally embodied relation to concrete situations (Marxen, 2009). However, with DCMS policies having previously established a social intervention agenda that has principally set out to instrumentally enhance socially disadvantaged and marginalised people’s involvement in culture, (DCMS, 1999) and not their active production of culture, particularly by virtue of both the area lived in, and its connection to local cultural industries such as museums and galleries. This lack of synergy has inevitably created public attitudes and perspectives that give low priority to museum objectives that seek to serve community needs, and which inspire therapeutic approaches and political effects (www.museumsassociation.org) by using contemporary art practices.

Again, I must reiterate that in referring to therapeutic approaches, I am not using it in the traditional sense of art therapy. Rather, I mean giving people the opportunity to verbalise their own experiences in a relational space or what Winnicott (1971) might call a “potential space” (Winnicott, 1971: 135). This space, however, is more an area of experience that can be explored through “truth-telling” exercises which attempt to give a voice to socially disadvantaged and marginalised groups (Foucault, 2001: 10). In this sense, it is more comparable with Lygia Clark’s work in that it might be seen as traversing the edges of two fields; art and therapy (Rolnik, 1998: 347). Consequently, if museums and galleries are to make this transition then perhaps a more fertile ground for change can show the way.

In an effort to support and possibly develop more effective policies that can address social exclusion but also the cultural agenda of museums and galleries, this project recognises that the devolution of cultural industries provides a window of opportunity for cultural modernisation.

Because this thesis is dedicated to carrying out its research agenda at Cardiff Museum, Wales, i.e. a site that will allow me to explore an educational pedagogy that can also be reserved for the concept
of “mediation” (Ribalta, 2002: 74) it also recognises that devolution in Scotland and Wales has led to a crucial re-articulation of the role national collections, principally in the context of both cultural and educational provisions across the two countries. However, for Wales, and the strategic change in its funding initiatives with the establishment of Cymal (Museums, Archives, and Libraries Wales), there has been a make-up of an Integral Civil Service Department within the Welsh Assembly government (www.nationalmuseums.org). This has not only created a different vantage point from which to start thinking about the social value of creativity in Wales, but also facilitated cultural debates about how museums can play an important role in educating a post-devolved nation.

For example, important questions have surfaced about the contribution art education can make in re-shaping and re-defining Welsh culture, and how the visual arts can nurture concepts of place and heritage, contributing to a nation’s cultural identity and a sense of belonging in Wales (Crozier, 2005; Carter, 2003). With this in mind, however, Housley (2005) draws our attention to the various tensions and controversies surrounding the role of the visual arts as a signifier of cultural identity.

“The politics of recognition are of import to a small country such as Wales as this form of politics is related to cultural capital and power (as expressed through the allocation of resources) and issues concerning remembering and forgetting of communities, peoples and struggles...” (Housley, 2005: 8)

“A developed visual culture will be an important dimension of this process. However, the form of cultural identity/ies adopted will be crucial in promoting or inhibiting inclusion and exclusion...” (Housley, 2005: 10)

While Crozier (2005) and Carter (2003) argue that the visual arts can have a significant impact on the cultural identity in post-devolution, Housley (2005) believes that its influence is one that is crucial to introspective versus international notions of cultural modernisation. That is, the decision about what type of visual narrative Welsh policy wishes to establish for its visual arts is also one that will provide a careful restructuring of visual practices, such as seeing and remembering, and one that embodies a nascent tension between top-down cultural re-engineering and bottom-up grass-roots development (Housley, 2005: 11). Accordingly, it is my contention that the ability to judge the value of democratic transformation is severely compromised when post-devolution policies on cultural modernisation do not set out to resist the more dominant social representations and political discourses that have long been associated with art education, visual practices, and the “rationalisation” of cultural identity and citizenship (Hoy, 1986: 225). Which citizens should recognise themselves in the visual arts, how they should recognise themselves, and for what purpose and for whose benefit cannot be ignored in such
debates (Hooper-Greenhill, 1989; Bennett, 2006: 265). Indeed, it is one thing to implement a process of national reassessment, but quite another to employ a model of cultural modernization in terms of the planned rationalisation of cultural recognition, participation and identification.

The conclusion of this thesis will, therefore, endeavour to assess what a policy structured around the lived processes of experience might look like in practice, as opposed to the post-devolution policy of cultural rationalisation that threatens to embrace art education and the visual arts in Wales. In some respect, I do agree with Housley (2005) that Welsh institutions, as a consequence of devolution, are still relatively in their infancy. Welsh institutions may well feel a “distinct lack of scholarly and critical appreciation” and transformation and change might well have created “contemporary anxieties that concern Welsh identity” (Housley, 2005: 13). Nevertheless, the possibilities afforded by institutional change in post-devolution Wales, do provide us with an opportunity to create a Welsh dimension to art education. It is my belief that devolved spaces like museums and galleries could possibly be used to articulate contemporary anxieties by producing cultural narratives that can inform political, social, educational, and therapeutic fields. Here, appreciation would be gained in terms of relational spaces which serve to inspire new ways of considering art, and which can champion the needs of its citizens and local communities. This, however, would require a change in policy directives, and an alternative conception of art as a tool. In what follows, I will explore how such initiatives might be achieved and demonstrated.

1.6. The use of Deleuze and Guattari in this study, and how it will contribute to the field of art education

The present study will contribute to the field of art education – principally in relation to museum and galleries – having constructed the problem: how do we work with movement and experimentation in subjectivity and learning in the field of youth intervention and research. Having seen how movement and experience are important factors in Dewey (2005) conception of art, and how the specific use of experimental art practices are used by MACBA, this problem signifies a coalition between theory and practice. Moreover, in accordance with previous efforts in art education that have profitably worked with problems of movement and experimentation in subjectivity and learning in the field of preschool education (Olsson, 2009: 6) the present study will organize itself around three structuring statements: these providing the premises upon which pedagogical research with young people might go about re-imagining the arts and cultural industries as a social, political, and transformative tool.
As my research takes inspiration from Olsson’s (2009) work on movement and experimentation in pre-school learning, similar choices have been made in terms of taking a slightly different starting point on the way research questions are strategically and theoretically produced. This is because the traditional approach to research questions can often disavow its own inventiveness as much as possible, in that it sees itself as attempting to uncover something it claims is hidden or, similarly, debunk something it desires to subtract from the world (Massumi, 2002: 12). The result of this is that there is a bracketing or justificatory modus operandi, which clings to the idea that research questions mirror a reality or a priori truth outside themselves, and that theoretical concepts may be applied to practices objectively, critically positioning them socially, politically, culturally etc, yet without ever being seen as complicit in the processes of their becoming, and without unmediated processual involvement (Massumi, 2002: 12). Instead of specific research questions, then, Olsson (2009) uses what she terms “decisive points” to identify concepts that allow her to construct problems in between practices.

Consequently, although Olsson (2009) frames her research questions as decisive points, they are not research questions which are complicit in subject positioning. In fact, they are not research questions but more like structuring statements, the themes of which identify important problems to work upon in terms of a theory of education, and young people’s encounters in pedagogical settings - in my case, art education, and young people’s visual encounters in a museum and gallery space. That is why, and in a similar vein to how Olsson uses her “decisive points” to strategically connect theoretical resources to the construction of the problem, structuring statements will be strategically placed throughout the chapters to show how ideas and concepts function, together with their practices, to construct one of three problems related to art education, and young people’s practical encounters. Moreover, to each structuring statement I will add a description of how the texts and concepts of Deleuze and Guattari might contribute both practically and theoretically to art education and youth intervention. The first of these structuring statements is:

1) There is an on-going struggle in art education to again introduce movement and experimentation in subjectivity and learning through putting into practice the idea of a relational field and through experimenting with new tools. For this to be theoretically workable, there is a need to work out how to turn the focus on positions and change as moving from one position to another, into a focus on movement as something that forgoes positions and thereby open up possibilities for collective and intense experimentation.
The struggle in recent times, primarily with regards to education and pedagogical tools, has been the effort to regain the ideas of movement and experimentation in the area of subjectivity, learning, and the relational field (Olsson, 2009). Consequently, this has produced a renewed effort by educationists and researchers to create new tools that can work against traditional pedagogies which normatively produce subject-positions, and the terms and conditions by which bodies of knowledge are obtained and legitimised (Walkerdine, 1984). Deleuze and Guattari (2004a) call this dominant signifying scheme “molar segmentarity” and believe it has a real impact on our lives. For instance, normative discourses, reinforced pedagogically, produce distinct systems of reference, segmented conceptions, and binary choices that end up shaping our perceptions and expectations. However, in Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* (2004b) there are texts and concepts that allow us to put together a micropolitical perspective as a theory of movement that precedes subject positions, and experimentation as a way for art educationists to work with learners relationally:

“connection indicates the way in which decoded and deterritorialized flows [of belief and desire] boost one another, accelerate their shared escape, and augment and stoke their quanta; the conjunction of these same flows, on the other hand indicates their relative stoppage, a point of accumulation that plugs or seals lines of flight, performs a general reterritorialisation, and brings the flows under the dominance of a single flow capable of over-coding them” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 243).

This is a difference between two distinct systems of reference and implies a multiplicity of molecular or affective combinations that bring into play different relations and assemblages. The predicament for art educationists is no longer to explain how ideological accounts produce normative subjects by way of systematic structuring or positioning (Massumi, 2002: 2) but, rather, to place an emphasis on the process of formation of lived experience before more dominant schemes of signification, coding and discourse intervene to structure perceptions (Massumi, 2002: 7). Consequently, with a renewed emphasis on the processes of lived experience, micro-political pedagogies of affect require methods that can account for a series of responsive acts that accumulate toward objective fulfilment. In more layman terms, a method that substitutes perception for recognition: the latter arresting the former in its course of development and which allows us to fall back on stereotyped identifications rather than relations connected to the experience of making.
This will requires art educationists to come up with a different approach to conceptualising learning and subjectivity, but it also requires a rigorous empirical method of communicating the processes of lived experience. This problem leads us to the second structuring statement:

2) In art education all participants – children, teachers, teacher students, teacher educators and researchers - can work together through collective, intense and unpredictable experimentation. In this process art educationists and learners are caught up in a relational field. For this to be theoretically workable, the reliance on the transcendent principle of conscious critique needs to be rethought and reinforced by other possible and alternative scientific methods.

As long as transcendent principles continue to position creative and critical enquiry, then subjectivity and learning are treated separately from research. That is to say, if scientific empiricism continues to follow classical definitions of empiricism, based on the logic of representation, and the principle that atomist sensations need to be organised and systemised by abstract logical thinking, then “empirical features” will always be immobilized by the researcher, and by the research perspective influencing the empirical material. As long as this transcendent principle is present, then the production process or, rather, processes of subjectivity and learning are always treated as taking place “separately from the undertaking of research, which can only register them, and thereby immobilize them as effects” (Olsson, 2009: 50). Consequently, Deleuze’s (2008) “transcendental empiricism” makes it possible to account for scientific methods that can account for collective experimentation between theory and practice, and involves a non-hierarchical community of inquirers (Dahlberg & Bloch, 2006: 114). This creates pedagogy of a different style to the one where the researcher and/or educationist functions as a transmitter of knowledge. Rather, it creates an affirmative pedagogy where the researchers and educationist becomes a listener, installed in the “here and now” with learners.

A transcendental empiricism tries not to create conditions of thinking greater than that which can be thought about in the here and now. Furthermore, it acknowledges that our immediate, spontaneous and involuntary experiences can add something to the world. It, therefore, suggests an alternative in the idea that there is no need to reduce of the world through a “framework of culturally constructed significations” and positional references that limit us to a set of predetermined terms and definitions of experience (Massumi, 2002: 2). That is, a model based on binary representations that cut up each experience into categories and classes.
Although research in the past has concentrated on processes of cultural and ideological resistance to such practices (Hall & Jefferson, 1989) this has, nevertheless, been predominantly part of a mediated process of signifying and counter-signifying moves, constituted in predefined “discourses” (Massumi, 2002: 3). Consequently, resisting dominant cultural codes through critical positioning may appear as a radical and transformative act, however, such practices merely strengthen the view that:

“The subject appears as a pre-coded concept within an ideological master structure: a [conceptual] abstraction amongst a series of possible determinations or “a repertoire of possible permutations on a limited set of terms” (Massumi, 2002: 3).

Although critical and conceptual approaches to research aim to open the window on local resistance and for change (Massumi, 2002: 3) it is often the case that argument, analysis and the application of theoretical ideas and change are determined by a definitional and signifying network that constructs the possible on a limited set of representational and predetermined terms. Under no circumstances do these approaches seek to account for movement and experimentation as a principle of transition “between” binary relations. Indeed, movement is entirely subordinate to the positions it connects or the regime that establishes a correspondence between classes or segments. There is a displacement in terms of changing someone’s discursive position but no transformation (Massumi, 2002: 3). There is only change in terms of moving from one position to another.

Transcendental empiricism presents us with a methodological approach that differs from traditional empirical approaches. Moreover, it is possible to do research as well as pedagogy in terms of looking for, and engaging with, the processes and ongoing construction and production of “sense, problems, learning and culture in empirical material” (Olsson, 2009: 52). As such, the ground and conditions for thinking, as well as the act of thinking, is considered fragile and temporary, but a continually moving feature of lived experience (Olsson, 2009: 26). Indeed, the conditions of thinking are “created at the same time that thinking proceeds” (Spindler, 2006: 28). This somewhat odd thought that the activity of thinking creates itself, is not too dissimilar from Peirce’s semiotic approach to the self (Colapietro, 1989) and his concept of “collateral experience” (CP, 8.183, 8.178).3 According to Deleuze (1994) and in contrast to the thought of interiority that has principally marked the history of philosophy (Olsson, 2006: 26), this thought is constructed through encounters and relations:

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“Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition, but of a fundamental *encounter*” (Deleuze, 1994: 139).

Inseparable from a “becoming” or a relation, which includes the “coexistence of contraries” (Deleuze 1994: 141) with the world around us, this “image of thought” differs from the thought of recognition and representation and presents thought as something created, and always continuously created, in and through, relations and encounters. As a consequence, this “image of thought” has the feature of unpredictable, intense, experimentation.

Again, we might liken this operation to Peircean “semeosis.” Or, to put it another way, inferences by signs of the mind produced from signs of experience (Deleuze, 2000: 153). Hence, Peirce tells us: “a *mind* may be roughly defined as a *sign-creator in connection with a reaction-machine*” (CP, 3.18). It is the minds capacity to investigate (CP, 7.327) and experiment with the movement of its own becoming in relation to it material conditions, then, that enables us to challenge the truth of representation. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994) note:

“To think is to experiment, but experimentation is always that which is in the process of coming about - the new, remarkable, and interesting that replaces the appearance of truth and [is] more demanding than it” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 111).

Experimentation here concerns the not yet known. It concerns that which comes about and that which is new, and demands more of us than just recognising and representing habitually constructed truths. Instead of representation, recognition and identification, it points towards how learning processes are produced, and how they function in relation to our extrinsic, material conditions, including the social effects they have upon us.

Consequently, this directs us to towards the processes of lived experience, and a vitalistic vision of the self, whose processes and relational encounters should not be judged by their results but, rather by how they proceed and continue. Indeed, in terms of pedagogical material and research data, the idea that language is a given, and the thought that words directly correspond the world “out there,” for the idea of “meaning making,” which should be replaced implies that each individual constructs meaning in relation to a specific society and context (Glaser, 1991: 24). It is this philosophy that brings Deleuze’s experimental empiricism close to what actually takes place in everyday practices.
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy seems well worth using when constructing the problem of how to work with movement and experimentation in art education practice and research. However, it is not a philosophical system that constructs a theory of knowledge about the world and its inhabitants. By this I mean that it is not a philosophical system that you can apply to a practice in order to critique it. It is not an epistemology (Deleuze, 2001; Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b). Rather, it treats concrete life in new and different ways by creating the conditions for thinking. In other words, it is an ontology that takes part in producing reality, and in the production of thought as it goes on. Hence, in The Logic of Sense, Deleuze (2004a) puts forward the idea that it is possible to account for this work of producing, inventing, and augmentation of the world through the concept of the “event.” That is, the production and expression of sense (Deleuze, 2004a: 56). As a result, we are no longer forced to rely on the codes and habits of everyday life (Olsson, 2009: 27), but can create new ideas and concepts relevant to our sense of existence.

For Deleuze, the event is related to language, and expressed by linguistic propositions. But the event is more than just an abstract order of “signifying regimes” that give us access to what is true or false. For instance, “denotation” - that dimension of a proposition that points out external states of affairs; “manifestation” - which concerns the subjective interpretation of things and the world, and relates a proposition to the person who speaks and expresses themselves; and “signification” - the dimension of language that relates words to meanings and concepts (Deleuze, 2004a: 16-18). Rather, the “event results from the passions of the body” and represents the embodied actualisation of a “sense effect” which unfolds, and gives “expression” to itself, in language (Deleuze, 2004a: 45).

Consequently, there is no ontological separation between a body’s relation to its material conditions and environment, and that of sense (Crockett, 2013: 58). Also, instead of the term language, Deleuze (2004a) is often occasioned to replace it with the term “thought” (Deleuze, 2004a: 254) meaning that the event is what happens when the body is linked to thought in a certain way (Crockett, 2013: 179). With that in mind, then, I can now introduce the third structuring statement:

3) In art education all participants – children, teachers, teacher students, teacher educators and researchers - are caught up in the desire to experiment with subjectivity and learning. They are acting in a relational field through collective, intense and unpredictable experimentation. To work with this theoretically the relation individual/society need to be rethought. The notion of desire needs to take on another meaning.
The event offers a methodological approach to pedagogical research in regards to museums studies, art education, and intervention. It offers researchers a way of engaging in the ongoing construction and production of sense, problems, learning and culture in the empirical material. Starting out from the event, the focus is on how all participants construct and produce sense problems in processes of learning (Olsson, 2009: 53). However, because sense-events are conditioned by passions of the body they are intimately related to desire. As a consequence, when doing research, one chooses a way of treating events in one’s empirical material starting out from a specific way of viewing language, and linguistic propositions and their relation to “assemblages of desire.”

In an assemblage of desire, there is a different logic involved to that of conscious thinking; there is a bodily logic. Deleuze and Guattari account for this by turning to Spinoza’s concept of affect. Affect is used by Deleuze and Guattari to present an alternative to treating subjectivity and learning solely in terms of conscious thinking. For example, “as a pre-personal intensity corresponding to the passage from one state of the body to another” and processes of “augmentation or diminution in the body’s capacity to act” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2008: xvii). Affect, therefore, accounts for the body’s potential, and offers researchers a new model of inquiry based on the following question: “what can the body do?” (Massumi, 2004: 4). It should be firmly stated, however, that this is not a question of ignorance but more a provocation for researchers to understand the body’s state of invention (Massumi, 2003: 103). Indeed, because the body could potentially enter into a relation with any number of things it is hard to predict what the body can do (Yang, 2014: 66). As a result, this question incorporates bodily potentiality, and offers an alternative to treating subjectivity and learning solely through conscious thinking.

1.7. Chapter summaries

Foucault’s work is central to much current work in the humanities and the social sciences. It is also an important theoretical tool for looking at how architectural spaces such as museums and galleries can construct ways of seeing and talking about art. In Chapter 2, I will foreground the encounter between ways of seeing and knowing, and work through the processes by which perspective is interiorized and consolidated by meaning. Here, Berger’s (1972) highly influential book Ways of Seeing will help guide a textual analysis of images to show how ways of seeing are treated and surveyed by a series of learnt assumptions and conventions. We might say that the principle of this chapter is connectivity, which in
itself involves the theorisation of art practice as a form of discipline. I am particularly interested here in developing a notion of art as that which operates on a variety of signifying and asignyfing registers, and the unconscious forces that are visible in “discourse” – ways of thinking and speaking that we take for granted as naturally or inevitably there, but that are constructed over time and preserved by those who act without question. The chapter, in general, operates as an intervention within the field of visual arts, and also as a manifesto for future art practices. In relation to the rest of the thesis, this is where I deal with ways of seeing “outside” discourse.

In Chapter 3, I switch my focus to Deleuze’s concept of affect. This chapter also looks briefly at two of Deleuze’s philosophical precursors, Henri Bergson and Baruch Spinoza, and another individual that we might call Deleuze and Guattari’s pragmatic ally, specifically Charles S. Peirce. In this chapter affect is thought in two ways: as the effect of an art object on the body, and as that which constitutes the art object. In both cases the notion of affect is orientated against an overemphasis on signifying regimes, but also against habit and opinion (O’Sullivan, 2006: 6). In the first part of this chapter my approach is to build up a case for introducing a notion of affect into a discourse of the visual arts. Here, I am keen to correct the overemphasis on discursive approaches to art, by attending to the affective dimension of the art experience. We might see this as a restoration in how we see the aesthetic, opposed to the various habitual and reified forms of perceptual experience. The second section will narrow the focus further to the actual object, including its operations and functions. In particular, it involves a reading of schizoanalysis through Peircean semiotics, which is intended to bring a pragmatic working through of aesthetic experience, but also the general production of subjectivity. This chapter ends with a very brief summation, as a short corrective on the discursive function of art.

Education is central to the process of cultural democratization. Moreover, according to studies which have explored the fostering of democratic principles in education (Greene, 1993; Hooks, 1994; Nieto, 1995), the classroom environment appears to form a sufficient base for the experience of democratic ideals like equality, freedom and justice. Indeed, research has shown that pedagogical methods used in schools have an impact on pupils’ knowledge about democracy (Almgren, 2006; Ekman, 2007; Hahn, 1998a; Ochoa-Becker 2007; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). But Ochoa-Becker et al. (2007) also stress that “the climate in both the school and in the classroom needs to reflect democratic principles in action” (Ochoa-Becker et al, 2007: 211). Consequently, since the late 90’s there has been a growing trend for intra-active pedagogies – particularly with regards to early childhood education in Sweden – whereby material objects are understood to be part of a more complex and performative relationship with the affected body and processes of meaning-making. This includes the relationship between learners and
adults who are seen as interdependent co-constructors of culture and knowledge (Dahlberg & Taguchi, 1994). Indeed, central to this relationship is pedagogical documentation which is understood as a vital methodological tool in collaborative meaning-making and the production of democratic principles.

In Chapter 4 an attempt is made to account for the close relationship marked by collective and intense experimentation. This is an attempt to regain movement and experimentation in-between theory and practice in subjectivity and learning. As a consequence, a pedagogical and methodological perspective is presented and discussed that can possibly account for movement when approaching documented events in a devolved museum and gallery space: a methodological approach where both researchers and learners can do research and pedagogy in terms of looking for, but also engaging in, the ongoing construction and production of sense, problems and learning in empirical material. This also makes it possible to focus on how young people use language in a different way (Olsson, 2009: 102), and how young people may use affective practices to create the terms in which new ways of seeing and talking about art can be stated. Our focus here, then, is lived experiences and the construction of meaning by talking and verbalizing events into existence.

Accordingly, in Chapter 5 I will lay the foundations for an independent studies program that I believe will enable both educationists and researchers to empirically explore young people’s encounters with art, but also poetic writing practices that endeavour to create new sensory landscapes by mapping multi-sensory patterns of experience in their becoming.

Chapter 6 will contain an exploratory analysis of a psychogeographical method carried out at Cardiff Museum with 14 young people aged 11-18 from a charity organisation called Valleys Kids. In forming the first part of a pedagogical intervention, the analysis of pedagogical documentation - approached here as a type of visualization, which brings forces and energies into a work project (Dahlberg, 2003: 283 – 284) I will look at how young people’s experiences are produced through their encounters with art. Moreover, by working with the complex theoretical ideas of Deleuze and Guattari, Spinoza, Peirce and Bergson, this analysis will attempt to move beyond any interpretive work that applies theoretical concepts to practices in an abstract way, and instead produce a relational model of subjectivity where theoretical concepts function together with their practices through a bodily logic.

In Chapter 7 I will develop part two of the pedagogical intervention or mode of praxis by again working with 14 young people aged 11-18 from the charity Valleys Kids. Designed and implemented through a series of poetry workshops, I will apply Peircean semiotics to explore the potential of affective, multi-
sensory, and non-representational modes of communication. The main objective of this analysis is to move beyond the confessional accounts of individual experiences - particularly those of marginalized and segregated young people - so dominant in policy discourses, and so often steeped in discourses of risk, lack, and salvation (Hickey-Moody, 2013a; Kelly, 2001, Tait, 1995).

In Chapter 8 the study is summed up, and will offer findings that will contribute to the areas of youth arts and education, curatorial experimentation, and the production of cultural and social intervention strategies.
Chapter 2

Ways of Seeing and Knowing in Museum and Gallery Space

In this chapter we will address some of the assumptions about art. It is not so much the artwork that I want to consider, but the ways in which we see them. Through this exploration, then, we will discover something about ourselves, and the situation we are living in with regards to art, museums, galleries, and pedagogical practices. Here, I am interested in the processes of seeing itself, and how seeing art and art objects is a less spontaneous affair than we tend to believe. That is, a large part of how we see depends upon habit and convention.

2.0. Constructing models of subjectivity and sociability through the visual gaze

Often, when we visit a museum or gallery, we find that art is an integral part of the building for which it is designed. You may feel that artefacts and images are what we might call records of the building’s interior life, and that together they make up a building’s memory, so much are they part of the life and individuality of the building. An artwork, and everything around it, appears to confirm and consolidate its own meaning, which gives it a sense of uniqueness that sets it apart from other objects. But behind the artwork there is a diagram of a mechanism of power, and a generalisable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of an optical system. In this way, meaning no longer resides in the unique surface of the artwork. Instead, as Berger (1972) puts it, the “very image of the artwork becomes transmittable” (Berger, 1972: 5), and through a body of knowledge that can be reproduced in different ways, museums and galleries can use art to describe and recreate our experiences (Berger, 1972: 8). That is, through our visual gaze, works of art are cognitively reproduced. However, because images can be used like words to communicate ideas, which we rationally, and associatively, connect to other experiences and models of sociability, they can be used for other purposes.

The way we see things is affected by what we know and what we believe. For instance, in the Middle-Ages when men believed in the physical existence of Hell (Berger, 1972: 5) the vision of fire in a work of art would have symbolised and meant something completely different from what it does today. As Berger (1972) notes, for Middle-Age man the sight of fire would have had religious connotations, and may have been used by a painter to represent and, indeed, transmit a moral message, and a warning
as to the consequences of living a less puritanical and more dutiful life in the presence of God. But let us consider another example. Take time to observe the following image:

![Reclining Bacchante by Trutat (1824-1848)](http://mba.dijon.fr)

What is striking about this story? In this painting, the social presence of a woman can be observed as being different in kind from that of a man. That is, social convention suggests or, rather, dictates that to be born a woman, is to be born within an allotted and limited space, and into the keeping of men. Consequently, the figurative nude, as a sexist genre or trope, conventionalizes the naked female body in a way that not only determines relations between men and women, but also the relation of women to themselves (Robinson, 2015: 294). But how is this achieved?

The man’s haunting presence in this picture might be easily be mistaken as that of a voyeur, but this would discount the promise of power which he embodies. What is being depicted is that men survey women before treating them. Her actions - whatever their direct purpose or motivation - are read as an indication of how she would be judged and seen by another. Accordingly, how a woman appears to the man, determines the moral imperative about how she will be treated and objectified socially.
2.1. The relation between art and ourselves:
the surveyor and the surveyed

What are we saying by this? To acquire some control over this process of being surveyed by another it is necessary for us to contain it and interiorize it. As a consequence, we come to consider both the surveyor and the surveyed within us as two constituent, yet always distinct, elements of our identity. In addition, and what will be of crucial importance in terms of what will be discussed later on, is that our own sense of being in itself can do nothing but become supplanted by a sense of being seen and judged by another. What results, is that part of the self which is the surveyor of our own being treats the part which is surveyed so as to demonstrate to others how the self would like to be treated: the exemplary treatment of the self, by the self, constituting our sense of “presence” (Berger, 1972: 46).

If we return to the picture, we can now make the following analysis:

“One might simplify this by saying: men act and women appear. Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at. This determines not only most relations between men and women but also the relation of women to themselves. The surveyor of woman in herself is male: the surveyed female. Thus she turns herself into an object – and most particularly an object of vision: a sight” (Berger, 1972: 47).

The depiction presented above is one that never strays too far from our own essential character. We never look at just one thing; we are always looking at the relation between things and ourselves. Our vision is always active. Soon after we see, we are aware that we can also be seen. As a result, it is the eye of the other which combines with our own eye to make it more fully credible that we are part of a visible world (Berger, 1972: 9). For example, if we accept that we can see that hill over there, then it is natural to suppose that from that hill we can be seen. In such instances, we can propose that the reciprocal nature of vision is more fundamental than that of spoken dialogue (Berger, 1972: 9). But, having said this, I did allude earlier to the fact that the way we see things can change over time. That is, many of our assumptions no longer accord with the world as it once was. Let us consider a typical example of how such a modification might work.
This is a landscape of a cornfield with birds flying out of it. Look at it for the moment. Examine it and try to reach a conclusion about what the image is about. Then look at the same image together with the accompanying description.

*Wheatfield with Crows* by Van Gough (1890)
(http://www.vangoghmuseum.nl)

*Wheatfield with Crows* is one of Van Gogh’s most famous paintings and probably the one most subject to speculation. It was executed in July 1890, in the last weeks of Van Gogh’s life. Many have claimed it was his last work, seeing the dramatic, cloudy sky filled with crows and the cut-off path as obvious portents of his coming end. However, since no letters are known from the period immediately preceding his death, we can only guess what his final work might really have been (www.vangoghmuseum.nl).
The spectator might need time to examine each element in the painting, but whenever they reach a conclusion, the painting maintains its own authority. The image now illustrates the sentence. It may be tricky to define exactly how the words have changed the image, but undoubtedly they have. But with this in mind, perhaps one way to explain how the meaning of an image is changed according to what one sees immediately beside an image or what comes immediately after, is by way of what we already know about the two constituent, yet always distinct, elements of “presence” discussed only a moment ago. That is, when we “see” the landscape, we situate ourselves in it through the relation of surveyor and surveyed.

Here, there is an analogy to be made between the picture possessing and treating our way of seeing. For example, the words quote the painting, and by doing so confirm their own verbal authority. Such authority is distributed over the whole context of the painting. That is to say, it contains references to both time and experience, which allows it to hold its own against other information transmitted upon it. The image, therefore, permanently retains its authority, and gains a sense of “authenticity.” But it equally embodies the promise of power.

The way in which we see a painting is affected by a whole series of learnt assumptions that must be interiorised to acquire some control over this process. Assumptions concerning:

- Beauty
- Truth
- Genius
- Civilisation
- Form
- Status
- Taste

The dialogue around the painting is an attempt to verbalise the reciprocal relationship between you and your perception of the image, and explain, either metaphorically or literally, how you see things. Indeed, if the language around the image were different then, likewise, how you see or perceive the image would also be transformed. However, there is something more interesting about this process. Its meaning now becomes transmittable. That is to say, the image becomes reproducible information when its meaning is put into use (Bergson, 1999: 24). For example, imagine that you see: Wheatfield with Crows by Van Gogh in a museum. You are so taken aback by your encounter with the work that you are compelled to tell someone about it. It becomes a talking point with a friend. You discuss the colours, its symbols, its history and how it made you feel. It is reproduced. Well, almost. You are not
sure if it was his final work or one that was discovered after Van Gogh’s death. And then there is the date which is hazy. Nevertheless, in your reproduction, you might have modified its meaning or even totally changed it. But the message said nothing about how it should make you feel emotionally.

It is not a question of your reproduction failing to reproduce certain aspects of an image faithfully; it is more a question of reproduction - through discourse - making it possible, even inevitable, that the image will be used for many different purposes (Berger, 1999: 25). Let us examine some of the ways in which the reproduction of the image lends itself to such usage. Take a look at the following image. Does it resemble *Wheatfield with Crows* by Van Gogh in any way?

![Copyright Restricted](http://www.moma.org)

*The Starry Night by Van Gogh (1889)*

The current image is entitled *The Starry Night* by Van Gogh. Now, a keen observer might have drawn a comparison by pointing to the rolling sky or to the colour yellow used to depict the stars and moon in *The Starry Night* and the wheat in *Wheatfield with Crows*. You may even have noticed a likeness in the type of brushstroke or technique. However, it must be made quite clear about what this involves as it will help support our understanding of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of segmentation later on. In doing this exercise, it more likely that you isolated a detail from the whole, for example the colour yellow, and used it as a reference point for the other image. In this sense, you reproduced the image of *Wheatfield with Crows* through the colour yellow to make the analogy between the two paintings.
But unlike the discussion with your friend, *Wheatfield with Crows* was not reproduced through direct verbal discourse; it was reproduced through ways of seeing. This irreversible reproduction, as well as making its own references, becomes a reference point for other images, which leads you as a viewer to other conclusions (Berger, 1999: 29). In isolating the style of painting you may conclude: “this is a Van Gogh.” In isolating the sky, you may conclude: “dramatic cloudy skies that resemble *Wheatfield with Crows*.” Finally, you may even conclude that: “*The Starry Night* depicts the emotional turmoil of an omen.” In each case, the isolated detail is transformed by lending itself meaning that is not in the present. That is, information is transferred and incorporated into the image of the other by how you isolate and see each detail.

### 2.2. Visibility in museum space: the relationship between power, knowledge and practice

Today, we see the art of the past as nobody ever saw it before. We actually perceive it in a different way (Berger, 1999: 16). Images are no longer the preserve of the absent, magical or sacred ritual set apart from the rest of social life: precisely in order to exercise power over it (Berger, 1999: 32). They are readily available sources for social and psychological development. In fact, the whole concept of National Cultural Heritage exploits the authority of art so as to glorify present social systems and their priorities (Berger, 1999: 29). Consequently, the art of the past no longer exists as it once did. Bearing this in mind, what matters now, is who uses it and for what purpose. This, funnily enough, returns us to the start of this chapter: the way we see things is affected by what we know and what we believe.

However, we now know that our awareness of our own body can be acquired through the effects of an investment of power in the body (Foucault, 1980: 56), and that knowledge can function as a form of power, but also disseminate or reproduce the effects of power (Foucault, 1980: 56). Our next step then might be to look at how the language of images has been used differently, and how, through their use in institutions such as museums and galleries, images have conferred the effects of power which constitute personal identity and beliefs. If my discussion up to this point has emphasised the relation between images and the self, then let us devote some time to considering museum space as a model of constructed visibility.

Visitors to art museums can sometimes be overwhelmed by the number of works on display, and by what they take to be their own culpable inability to understand why such works are confirmed to be of great importance or considered outstanding. In fact, such a reaction is altogether reasonable. Art
history and, more to the point, the visual arts have generally been inseparable from the preserve of innocence and knowledge. However, this is an important pedagogical component of museum space. What public museums provide is a set of resources that allows visitors to fashion themselves within a particular vision of history, and contribute to their own development as “progressive subjects” by providing visitors with prompts so that they can actively insert themselves within routines served to induct them into an improving relationship with the self (Bennett, 1995: 47). Notice, here, how social performance is also directly connected to “progressive effects” in that the opportunity to civilize our relationship to the self is both a continuous course of “improving” and “re-fashioning.” The museum functions, therefore, as a site in which the visitor or the subject is continuously reassembled from its fragmentation across a series of separate histories. Let us consider a typical example.

Imagine you are walking through a gallery and in one room you see the Renaissance painting on your left, and in another, the 18th Century image on the right. By way of this simple example, the dispersal your constituting sense of “presence” starts to emerge as a series of separated histories as you move from room to room: meaning that your unity as a visitor can no longer be regarded as pre-given, the museum allowed that unity to be reconstituted in the construction of a subjectivity as a project to be completed through time (Bann, 1984; Hooper-Greenhill, 1989). Sequential locomotion is required as you, the visitor, articulate the relationship between your experience, and that of measurement and order, identity and difference, as a simple act of passing from one thing to another by means of what
feels like an absolutely uninterrupted movement. What is more, we already know how such a classic episteme functions when we looked at the concept of reproduction a moment ago. In terms of what is referred to as measurement, we visibly practiced dividing a whole image into isolated parts; these were then ordered and defined by morphological differences. However, my intention, here, is not to concentrate too much on forms of knowledge but how seeing is arrested by the function of museum space, and how unknown yet controlling micro-worlds are rendered constantly visible to themselves. As Bennett (1995) notes:

“To see and be seen, to survey yet always under surveillance; the object of an unknown but controlling look: in these ways, micro-worlds rendered constantly visible to themselves” (Bennett, 1995: 69).

The value of referring back to our example on the reproduction of images shows that isolated details are often attached to pedagogic principles of intelligibility, which exercise control over a fragmented human subject, and discipline the formation of what is seeable, in a specific way. These micro-worlds that Bennett talks of might sound a little overstated, but considering that isolated parts also serve as link sights to a range of institutions, the development and circulation of other disciplines (history, art history, archaeology, anthropology, biology etc), and their discursive formations (the past, evolution, aesthetics, man) the concept of micro-worlds does not seem too embroidered, and adds credence to the idea that the human subject is often fragmented between systems of isolated visibility, between micro-worlds that claim to be representative of a larger totality of universal knowledge.

From this point of view, every image embodies a way of seeing, routines serving to induct the visitor into an improving relationship with the self. But of course, to state that visibility is isolated gives the impression that knowledge is somehow immediate, transparent, uncomplicated, and direct (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992: 157). This, however, is not the case. Earlier we saw that there are often unconscious rules that govern how we see, enforcers that are visible through “discourse.” For example, it is often the case that the way in which we think and speak is taken for granted. The world seems as naturally and inevitably there.

However, when we produced a “discourse” around The Starry Night by Van Gogh, it was possible to detached Wheatfield with Crows by Van Gogh from the place and time of our first encounter with it, so allowing us to take up a form of critical positioning in front of the object, by using the interiorised
knowledge from one space, to actively “survey” our position in another. Again the power supplanted itself in a sense of being seen, the exemplary treatment of the self by the self, which constitutes our sense of “presence.” But with one minor exception, the surveyor is knowledge itself. Consequently, it is this relationship between what is seeable, and what is sayable, that allows Foucault (1977a) to set about reconciling the notion of visibility with the principle of non-corporal subjection, i.e. the notion that “visibility is a trap” (Foucault, 1977a: 200) caught between power/knowledge.

“There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1977a: 22).

In this sense, the rationality that explains the structure of knowledge that informs ways of seeing can be understood, to some extent, through a combination of elements. The museum might be regarded as a machine for producing “progressive subjects” through “progressive effects.” That is, it deploys a machinery of representation within an apparatus whose orientation is primarily governmental in the sense that: “exhibition involves instruction in history, culture, periods and schools that in both order and combination is fundamentally pedagogic” (Fisher, 1991: 7), and “produces new types of conduct and self-shaping” (Bennett, 1995: 44). Furthermore, validating relationships between the seeable and sayable, signs and images, and object of knowledge that these dyads signify, means that “knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting” (Foucault, 1977b: 88) a process that Deleuze and Guattari (2008) call segmentation.

2.3. Cutting and segmentation: creating systems of representation

According to Deleuze and Guattari, segmentarity takes on different shapes and functions in different ways. On the one hand, segmentarity can be rigid, and exemplifies how rational thought can operate in a binary fashion, following dualist oppositions such as social classes, men-women, adults-children, and so forth. On the other, we are segmented in a linear fashion, along a straight line or a number of straight lines, of which each segment represents an episode or, better still, a “proceeding”: in that as soon as we finish one proceeding we begin another (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a: 230). This challenging but, necessary, distinction between two types of segmentation points to two different ways in which
the processes of living, seeing and knowing may be encountered. A useful intervention, at this point, is provided by Dewey’s (2005) discussion on the act of perceiving a work of art:

“But receptivity is not passivity. It, too, is a process consisting in a series of responsive acts that accumulate towards objective fulfilment. Otherwise, there is not perception but recognition. The difference between the two is immense. Recognition is perception arrested before it has time to develop freely. In recognition there is a beginning of an act of perception. But this beginning is not allowed to serve the development of a full perception of the thing recognised. It is arrested at the point where it will serve some other purpose, as we recognise a man on the street in order to greet or avoid him, not as to see him for the sake of seeing what is there” (Dewey, 2005: 54).

In recognition we fall back, as upon a stereotype, upon some previously formed scheme. Some form of detail or arrangement of details serves as a cue for bare identification. For that reason: “it suffices in recognition to apply this bare outline as a stencil to the present object” (Dewey, 2005: 54). We are then, segmented beings. Life is spatially and socially segmented. Indeed, like a house, the museum is segmented according to each room’s assigned purpose, and the nature of the operations performed in it. This is no different to how Foucault’s power/knowledge cuts perception up into segments; into “binary choices” ingrained in institutions which not only, and simultaneously, become self-sufficient habits of recognition, but predetermine segmentations-in-progress. That is, the flow and movement of perception as a single, uninterrupted unit of recognition qualified by some form of external object of affectability (Deleuze, 1978): the articulation of this single unity representing an emotional “phase of a whole experience” and an “intellectually” embodied thought-sign, which provides meaning, but also the practical ground for further, uninterrupted, meaning-making (Dewey, 2005: 57).

The idea of segmentations-in-progress, therefore, can also be said to be analogous to Peirce’s theory experience – also known as “semiotics” (CP2.227), and its communicative processes through triadic sign activity or unlimited “semeiosis” (CP, 5.473) - of which a more detailed exploration will form part of our next chapter on transcendental empiricism. But, for now, the following definition will suffice:

“Whilst Saussure established the general principle that signs always relate to other signs, within his model the relationship between signifier and signified was stable and predictable. Umberto Eco coined the term ‘unlimited semiosis’ to refer to the way in which, for Peirce (via the ‘interpretant’), for Barthes (via connotation), for Derrida (via ‘free play’) and for Lacan (via ‘the sliding
signified’), the signified is endlessly commutable-functioning in its turn as a signifier for a further signified” (Chandler, 1994a: 246).

“There must be thoughts therefore which are determined by previous thoughts. And such a faculty of producing thoughts from others must belong to every mind which can investigate” (CP, 7.327).

The state exercises power over the segments it sustains or permits, but also possesses, and imposes, its own segmentarity. Words and symbols represent objects and actions, whilst statements set forth the conditions under which experiences may be had, and used as directions by which one may arrive at an experience (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b; Dewey, 2005). As such, Deleuze and Guattari (2008b) use the example of totalitarian administrations that have worked by organising and micro-managing petty fears, through the political segmentation of perception, affection and conversation. However, this is by means restricted to such regimes. It is more a case that: “segmentarity is inherent to all the strata composing us.” We experience it in our dwellings, when working, playing, and getting around: life is spatially and socially segmented” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 230). Accordingly, every society and every individual are plied with both segmentarities simultaneously: the one being a “molar” and rigid system of reference defined by representations, and the other, a molecular system of reference defined by existential affects, desires, and embodied beliefs.

Institutions such as museums and galleries become a centralised apparatus or “power centre” in the production of “molecular subjectivity” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 230). Furthermore, these power centres, which are always defined by a State apparatus, function at points where flows of perception are converted into segments (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 230) of recognition. That is, the interval or point where perceptions are projected into the imagination - interacting and mutually modifying one another - and where the plan and pattern of a single, unitary, complete experience is more intensely and concentratedly felt (Dewey, 2005: 54). It suffices to say that Deleuze and Guattari (2004b) present a distinction between two types of seeing and knowing that are inseparable: a co-presence between molar and molecular segmentations.

“It distinguishes between the molecular aspect and the molar aspect; on the one hand, masses or flows, with mutations, quanta of deterritorialization, connections, and accelerations; on the other hand, classes or segments, which binary organizations, resonance, conjunction or accumulation, and line of
over-coding favouring one line over the other” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 243).

In short, the conduct of self-shaping enacted within museums testifies to a correspondence between the molar and molecular or a “macropolitics and micropolitics” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 235). As such, molar identities are those aspects of the self formed by large edifices of social production: “it is your class, race, gender, nationality, political allegiances, culture etc.” It is these categories or “social assemblages are the structures that both inhibit and provide a basis for identity” (Elliot, 2012: 25). In contrast, the molecular self is that which exists beyond rigid, discursive structures of representation that arrest perception. The molecular is how you feel in the moment. It is a “feeling or sensation that emerges and quickly disappears” (Elliot, 2012: 26), and that sense or feeling in which seeing appears to come before words - knowledge and explanation never quite fitting the sight (Berger, 1972: 7). It is, therefore, non-linguistic and defines logical meaning, always threatening to disrupt the most rigid aggregates of perception and, in doing so, dismantle the segmented concretions of the self (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 227). The self giving way to the fluid, ever-changing, yet temporary evanescence of lived experience, the perception of which, as Dewey (2005) previously stated, may serve some other purpose. How is it, then, that museums can supplant disciplines and discourses on this microphysical fabric? Here, we must turn to Foucault and his discussion of space.

2.4. The practice of spatialization: visual techniques and mechanisms of power

During an interview devoted to space, Foucault declares:

“I think it is somewhat arbitrary to dissociate the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and the spatial distributions in which they find themselves. If they become separated, they become impossible to understand. Each can only be understood through the other” (Rabinow, 1984: 86).

Foucault’s discussion of “space” is devoted to the problem of visibility or how spaces are designed to make things seeable, and seeable in a specific way. However, the most interesting feature about this quote is that Foucault primarily feels that the spatial distributions in which (people) find themselves,
and this includes such institutional spaces as museums, schools, homes, hospitals etc, are all viewing spaces in which cultural technologies are concerned with organising a voluntary, self-regulating, and self-surveying citizenry by reconstituting a rational and elaborate construction of what could be seen and articulated in any given space. In terms of this discussion, we will now prioritise Foucault’s work in its capacity to unravel the relations between knowledge and power caused by the technologies of vision embodied in the architectural forms of the exhibition complex (Bennett, 1995), and the exploit of the image to transform the inner lives of people, and alter forms of life and behaviour. But before we do, it will be necessary for us to define museum space in terms of Foucault’s work on Panopticism: a technique or technology of power regulating vision. I will now give a brief summary.

To distinguish a movement from enclosed disciplines, to an infinitely more extendible "panopticism," Foucault curiously begins his examination of the seeable and the sayable with a description of spatial partitioning, measures that were carried in the advent of the plague during the seventeenth century. For example, Foucault lists precautions such as the partitioning of space, the closing of towns and its outlying districts, constant surveillance and registration, and, finally, the processes of quarantine and purification. Here, I place particular emphasis on the following quote as I feel its importance in terms of Foucault’s visual idiom is not often considered, but will form a basis for further thoughts when we get to the strategic use of olfactory perception towards the end of the chapter:

“Perfume is poured around the room; after carefully sealing the windows, doors, and even the keyholes with wax, the perfume is set alight. Finally, the whole is closed while the perfume is consumed...Four hours later, the residents are allowed to re-enter their homes” (Foucault, 1977a: 227).

Foucault’s interest in seventeenth century prohibition is used to discern a particularly fraught period of cultural and political discourse, mostly concerned with rituals of exclusion. What is brought to our attention is the extent to which a whole set of spatial techniques and institutions for measuring and supervising abnormal beings is created. Disciplinary mechanisms created not only by such fear of the plague, but also the contagious memories of confusion and disorder that the disease would supplant in the imagination of citizens. Foucault repeats: “the plague as a form, at once real and imaginary, of disorder had its medical and political correlative discipline” (Foucault, 1977a: 198). As a consequence, the plague stands as the image against which the idea of discipline is implemented both as corporeal and non-corporal measure of regulated visual spatialization. As such, it produces two distinct ways in
which things can be visible: inspection and surveillance based on a system of permanent registration from magistrate reports.

In a moment, I will show how the spatial partitioning became institutionalised. However, before this, it is important that two techniques of making things visible are made part of the wider conception of seeing. Deleuze calls these modes “visibilities” (Deleuze, 2006a: 52). Foucault’s hypothesis is that the “visionary space” in which something like a “disease” can be seen is very different from the visionary space enunciated as a property of discourse, which determines what is seen. Foucault’s careful use or deliberate rendering of the plague, therefore, follows in the footsteps of George Canguilhem’s study of the reflex between “the history of theories” and the “history of concepts” that account for distinct kinds of historical development (Méthot, 2013: 123-4). That is, the history of concepts through which things are seen, is separate from the history of theories about them (Rajchman, 1988: 99).

As Foucault realised, in “classical” medicine disease had once formed part of conceptual schemes of spatialization based on recognising painted portraits of the disease located inside the body (Foucault, 2003: 5). The “invisible but not hidden” events of the body were, therefore, marked by small, iconic, signs of perceptual resemblance: both the portrait and body defining an analogical space of essences (Rajchman, 1988: 98). However, as medicine began to use a new theoretical vocabulary towards the end of the seventeenth century, with observational reports beginning to localise concepts in relation to more institutional types of discourse and practices, we start to see the construction of a “space” in which theoretical observations become possible. The concept takes its position next to the functions and propositions of science (Rajchman, 1988: 98).

The difference between observable spatial schemes of “contents” as a form of knowledge is not only distinct from the theories that occur within it; it often precedes and makes them possible. Foucault’s analysis of the plague, for instance, shows the singular manner in which “magistrates have complete control over medical treatment” but also how the concept of “exclusion” is to be seen, preceding the elaboration of the classical theory of exclusion that was to emerge during the nineteenth century. In addition, the spatial partitioning of an excluded people during the seventeenth century precedes the new theory of crime and the architectural reorganisation of prisons. As a consequence, the “relation between theory and visualization in knowledge is not fixed or given” or “locked in any deep recesses of human soul,” but “contingent [on] historical configurations” and larger historical links “between a wide range of institutions, practices, and related fields” (Rajchman, 1988: 99). Moreover, it concerns
the link between theory and experimentation, this link determining the very sense of Foucault’s use of the term “technologies.” In particular, those rational “self-evidences” which make ways of seeing or visual thinking accountable to techniques that exercise power.

“As a context, we must understand that there are four major types of these ‘technologies,’ each a matrix of practical reason: (1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; (3) technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault, 1988: 18).

Foucault is not so much interested in the hysteria and anxieties of seventeenth century professionals to alleviate pain, to cure and provide comfort for those at risk of the plague; Foucault is interested in the history of how the concepts of visualisation - such as disease - become embedded in institutional practices – or “tertiary spatialization” - during that period; especially with regards to those disciplinary tactics imposed on the excluded through the architectural apparatus of visibility, which differentiates and judges subjects (Foucault, 1977a: 184). For example, state sanctioned practices that brought into play the “dualistic mechanisms of exclusion” proceeded to separate plague victims into “normal and abnormal” subjects (Foucault, 1977a: 228). This was then followed by more and more spaces of binary division and disciplinary segmentation, which partitioned the mad from the sane; the dangerous from the harmless; the vagabond from the thief; all different projects of division and segmentation, but no less incompatible with the process of differentiation.

Consequently, Foucault is focused on those practices of “spatialization” which are more complex and more deeply embedded in the external processes of visual becoming. It is not simply the mere exercise of the naked eye, supported by a theoretical vocabulary, which is important (Rajchman, 1988: 99). It is the fact that technological practices are productive agents of observational experimentation, never losing contact with the way “real” social problems are and/or must be seen.
While studying the problems of the penal system, Foucault noticed that the all the great projects for prisons during the nineteenth century take up the same theme of architectural reform. That is to say a strict spatial partitioning while at the same time carefully separating individuals under observation. Moreover, in an interview, Foucault (1980) explains that there was “scarcely a text or proposal about [early nineteenth century] prisons which did not mention Bentham’s ‘devise’ – the Panopticon.” The principle is this: a circular building is divided in cells. In the centre a tower, pierced by large windows, making it possible for the guard or “overseer” to observe each cell in which an inmate is incarcerated in daylight (Foucault, 1980: 36).

As a consequence, each prison cell has two windows, an inside window facing the central tower, the other, on the outside, allowing daylight to pass through the whole cell. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in the central tower, who can see but cannot be seen by the inmates, and to allow the presence of invisibility to gradually take the form of a self-regulating gaze that guarantees order.

“Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power...That architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught in a power situation in which they are the bearers” (Foucault, 1977b: 230).

“There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself” (Foucault, 1980: 155).

The Panopticon itself does not amount to a disciplinary regime; it is simply a technique or a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad (Foucault, 1977b: 232). But saying that, like all techniques its “potential effects are not exhausted by it deployment within any of the regimes in which it happens to be used” (MacArthur, 1983: 192-3). For example, Bennett (1995) explains that the: “peculiarity of the exhibition complex is not to be found in its reversal of the principles of the Panopticon. Rather, it consists in its incorporation of aspects of those principles together with those of panorama, forming a technology of vision which serves to regulate a crowd, rendering it visible to itself” (Bennett, 1995: 68). The technique of panopticism can, therefore, be applied to wide range of institutions, practices,
and related fields (Rajchman, 1988: 99) including museums and galleries. Let us look these principles when applied to a museum and gallery space.

2.5. Civic seeing and cultural regulation: the invisible eye of pedagogic reform

As museums are spaces of constructed visibility, ways of seeing and talking about artworks and other exhibits could frequently be used to inspire communities to be morally self-regulating - both on mass as well as individually. As such, exhibitions appropriate some of the ideals of panopticism in that they can be used as a device to turn crowds into a continually surveyed, self-watching, and self-regulating public. But how is this achieved?

If the purpose of the prison is to discipline and punish, with a view to modifying behaviour, then the purpose of the museum is to show and tell, so that people might look and learn. For example, let us imagine that we are walking through a museum, and suddenly we come across these two paintings. Although, we were introduced to them earlier when we examined fragmentation and subjectivity, it is useful to look at how these images might reconstitute the subject discursively. Consider the image in relation to its title.

*Triumph of Knowledge* by Spranger (1546-1627) (http://www.khm.at/en)  
*A Rakes Progress* by Hogarth (1697-1764) (http://www.soane.org.uk)
Traditionally, a certain moral value has always been ascribed to the study of the classics. It is seen as offering a system of etiquette, providing examples of how heightened moments of life can be found in heroic action, and dignified exercises of nobility. Consequently, whatever their intrinsic worth, the classics have supplied the ruling classes or the higher strata with a system of reference for their own forms of idealized behaviour. The idealized appearance found in *Triumph of Knowledge* by Spranger, therefore, represents the allegorical figure Hermathea trampling over ignorance, and functions as an aid and a support for the viewer to internalise this view of himself. In this appearance, the beholder is to find a guise for their nobility. In contrast, *A Rake’s Progress* by Hogarth - one of eight paintings - depicts Tom Rakewell, a young man who inherits a fortune, spends it all on fashionable pursuits and gambling, marries for money, gambles away a second fortune, and then ends up in a debtor’s prison and dies in a madhouse. In this picture of low life, the opposite of the mythological, the viewer finds vulgarity instead of nobleness. The purpose of this painting is to prove that virtue and progress is not defined by social and financial success, but by good moral standing.

With this in mind, the exhibition complex was also a response to the problem of order but one which worked differently in seeking to transform that problem into one of culture. From this perspective, it provides new instruments for the cultural regulation, discipline, and training of bodies - mainly those of the working classes. The difference between, on the one hand, disciplined knowledgeable looking and, on the other, ignorant and vulgar gawking; such as that portrayed in the following illustration of a group assembled before an exhibit at the 1876 Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia.
Relations of space and vision are organised not merely to allow a clear inspection of the objects, but also to allow the visitors to be the objects of each other’s inspection: a movement that simultaneously helped to form a new public and inscribe in it new relations of sight and vision.

“Museums and expositions, in drawing from the techniques and rhetoric of display and pedagogic relations developed in the early nineteenth-century exhibitionary forms, provided a context in which the working and middle-class publics could be brought together and the former – having been tutored into forms of behaviour to suit them for the occasion – could be exposed to the improving influence of the latter” (Bennett, 1995: 73).

In this way, museums and gallery spaces furnished a crucial component of the material and symbolic infrastructure around which new forms of class-based segregations were developed (Bennett, 2006: 169). A division which: “emphasised rather than dispelled its less educated members’ inferior status” (Sherman, 1989: 218). The role of museum practices in the “aesthetization of the primitive” took the
form of the middle classes, in a formally and undifferentiated sphere, educating the working class by way of new forms of social management. Joy Kasson, in discussing this image, draws attention to the knowledgeable and focussed attention of the well-dressed couple at the left of the assembly and the other spectators who “stand amazed, mouth agape” in an “awkward posture” which “marks them as visually unsophisticated” (Kasson, 1990: 38). In being allowed to come mingle, the working classes could learn to adopt new forms of behaviour through imitation. Hegemony can be understood as a form of social cohesion achieved by programming behaviour, rather than through methods of consent which Gramsci (1971) puts forward.

In this respect, the museum, viewed as a technology of behaviour management, served to organize new types of social cohesion precisely through new forms of and aligning populations it bought into being. Museums, through offering a space of “supervised conformity” presented a context in which new forms of behaviour might, in being internalised, become self acting imperatives (Bennett, 1995: 100). However, the same end is achieved by new architectural means of regulating the spectacle. As an example, the reciprocity between seeing and conversation - revealed by the well-dressed couple at the left of the group - represents the exercise of power by virtue of the mere fact that people are incorporated into a more “general politics of the invisible” (Bennett, 1995: 172) that simultaneously organizes a division between those who can see, and those who cannot see the significance of a work of art.

Consequently, those elite social strata, which have acquired a competence in the language and theory of the arts, and who are culturally equipped to see codes in the form of symbolism or intertextuality, are able to organise the relation between space and vision for those groups unable or not schooled in the art of iconography. That is, they can rhetorically incorporate a less knowledgeable citizenry into a set of power-knowledge relations. Thought out in relation to the role of schooling, rhetoric functions like a form of training in the competences of visualisation. As each art object performs the role of a pedagogical tool, the social elite become active devises in the mediation of the invisible signs, codes, symbols and significances, and “give ‘the eye’ to those who do not ‘see”’ (Bourdieu & Darbel, 1997: 53).

The terms in which curiosity and wonder were constructed played a pivotal role in articulating a civic ethics and a civic education. The museum, therefore, was seen as having pedagogic benefits, central to the promotion of refined restraint and the management of rowdy or coarse observations. As such,
the distinction between the elite and the vulgar was seen as one as a civic difference between visual practice and sensory comportment within the developing class dynamic of early capitalism (Bennett, 2006: 274). However - and it is here that we must now take into account the embodied nature of the visitor’s visual capacities and the way that these might be affected by specific social conditions - “the way in which such distinctions of visual capacity work, and are marked by, social distinctions, have to be understood as being also conditioned by different accounts of the mechanisms of seeing.” That is, the pedagogic reform of vision, to attune it to the requirements of civic seeing, was a developmental rather than a restorative project in the sense that it had to take into account the embodied nature of physiological optics rather than the classic model of geometric optics (Bennett, 2006: 275). From this viewpoint, the affective responses of the visitor, absorbed in the luminous presence of a work, could now be determined by the calculated organization of external stimuli.

As Jonathan Crary’s work also illustrates, an important shift occurs between 1810 and 1830 from the geometrical optics which “governed European accounts of vision in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the physiological optics that governed nineteenth accounts of vision” (Crary, 2001: 154). This “played a key role in redefining the terms in which class anxieties associated with the politics of vision were posed” (Bennett, 2006: 214). Here, we can recall Bentham’s Panopticism, and the model and regulatory use of daylight as a strategy for interiorising a self-governing gaze. Within geometric optics, based on the Cartesian model of the detached observer, the subject and object were defined as two stable and separate positions. The convention of geometric optics is separated from reality in such a way that there is no visual reciprocity between the seer and the visual world. It is like a beam from a lighthouse, only instead of light travelling outwards, appearances travel in. The conventions of geometric optics called those appearances reality, and all images of reality were seen to address a single spectator who, unlike God, for instance, could only be in one place at one time.

Within physiological optics, by contrast, vision was viewed as rooted in the physiological structure of the body and, thereby, emerged as something simultaneously subjective - different from one person to another - and social - to the degree that the body is affected by the social conditions in which it is formed (Bennett, 2006: 275). Consequently, the classical separation of subject and object is one that masks over a more powerful dispersal and circulation of affect (Crary, 2001: 214). Indeed, perception is acknowledged as a process consisting of distinct physical events, apprehending external images as an infinite number of “durational” and visual temporalities that implicitly disavow the stable identity of either the image or the observer (Crary, 2001: 153). That is to say, images are not timeless; rather,
the notion of time passing is inseparable from the experience of the visual. But, what is considerably noteworthy - and vital with regards to how techniques like Panopticism might go about ensuring the effects of power of the whole social body down to its smallest particles (Foucault, 1980: 156) - is that the retina, and the passage of light that enters the eye, is recognised as anything but unmediated.

“Here [the retina] is a metonym for the seeing body within new conceptions of visuality. It invokes the body not as a unified receiver of orderly representations but as a composite apparatus on which external stimuli are able provisionally to produce luminous and chromatic effects” (Crary, 2001: 153).

Light from an artwork, for instance, would be viewed as luminous energy that strikes a dense mosaic of receptors, setting off a complex of processes in a compound organ that eventually culminates in a visual perception. The “duration of light impressed on the retina coincides with physiological regime of visuality” (Crary, 2001: 153). However, there is also another important distinction to be made with regards to this new embodied observer. We are, inevitably, “optical mixtures” of sight and sound, of smell, touch, and taste; all of which apprehend the “visual” world as an infinite number of durations. That is, we are sensory beings in lived time. As a consequence, given the phenomena of durations or the distribution of sensory forms of “light” on the metonymic “retina” of the body, “synthesis” - as a dynamic and self-organising process - is an unavoidable result, and cannot be detached from a larger intellectual uncertainty about the nature of cognitive and perceptual unity. A central dilemma which became more acute to the requirements of “public instruction” and “practices of directed vision,” as it was increasingly clear that perception was not just a matter of a relatively passive perception of an image of an exterior world, but that the bodily makeup and capacities of an observer, contributed to the making of perception and the appearance of reality.

2.6. Is there a free autonomous subject? Memory, perception, and the zone of indetermination

The degree of independence of which a living being is master is discussed in Bergson’s (2004) Matter and Memory – a text interwoven with a broad range of debates and investigations into the nature of perception and attention. To sketch briefly, as Bergson’s theories will form a more expansive part of the next chapter, Matter and Memory demonstrates that attention always operates on two axes. On
the one hand, a subject is attentive to the flow of external sensations and events, on the other, they are attentive to the way memories coincide with, or diverge from, the “present” perception.

“Memory, inseparable in practice from perception, imports the past into the present, contracts into a single intuition many moments of duration, and thus by a twofold operation compels us, de facto, to perceive matter in ourselves, whereas we, de jure, perceive matter within matter” (Bergson, 2004: 80).

Accordingly, every perception, not matter how apparently instantaneous, constitutes a duration that prolongs an ever present past, into the present. Here, and writing in the late 1980’s, Bergson refers to available research data indicating “the smallest interval of empty time which we can detect equals .002 seconds” (Bergson, 2004: 34). The main problem that occupies Bergson’s argument, then, is the various ways in which memory and perception interpenetrate each other. With this in mind, Bergson focuses on what is ignored within the general concept/model of the stimulus-response circuit, which is: the complexity of what happens between our awareness of stimulation and our reaction to it. It is this gap or “zone or indetermination” (Bergson, 2004: 23) that is equivalent to lived experience, and is where our attention to our material conditions performs a pivotal role.

“The degree of independence of which a living being is master, or, as we shall say, the zone of indetermination which surrounds its activity, allows, then, of an a priori estimate of the number and the distance of the things with which it is in relation” (Bergson, 2004: 23).

The more immediate the reaction is compelled to be, the more perception resembles a mere contact (Bergson, 2004: 22). However, with indetermination, accepted as a fact, the nervous system not only delays a response to a stimulus but impregnates “variable” responses with a “thousand details out of our past experience,” which penetrate and “mingle” with the senses. The subject then has a choice of actions inspired by past experiences, analogous to the present situation (Bergson, 2004: 24). The fact that the nervous system not only delays a response to a stimulus, but has the choice to use “variable” responses, is a precondition of a free and autonomous subject.

Bergson provides extended commentary on what goes into determining the particular quality of this “mingling” of memory and perception. He indicates that the interaction can happen in ways that are creative or habitual, but makes it clear that the latter is what occurs most often. We will explore the
empirical nature of this process in more depth in the next chapter. However, for now, it is Bergson’s theory of the human subject as a centre of indetermination, which allows us to envisage the human subject as an agent who has the capacity to recreate the present, by using experiences analogous to his or her material conditions, and to use the affordances presented by those environing conditions to survey their own power of action.

Consequently, the more conditioned, predictable and determined a person’s behaviour becomes the fewer openings there is for memory to penetrate the senses and play an inventive, life affirming, role (Crary, 2001: 318). This is because the degree of vital autonomy possessed by any subject is only ever proportional to the indetermination and imprecision within which memory intersects with perception. That is, the more habituated and more repetitive a subject’s perceptual responses become in relation to their immediate environment, then the less autonomy, and freedom, characterises their existence. However, if perceptual action is allowed to follow a stimulus “without the [habituated] self interfering with it” then one “becomes a conscious automaton” (Crary, 2001: 317) open to new possibilities, and new powers of action.

Rather than articulating the distinction between the elite and the vulgar, Lost in Wonder can be seen to show the “oscillation between the idea of a synthesis that is externally controlled and imposed on the subject (i.e. rationalisation of aesthetic response illustrated by the well-dressed couple), and the synthesis that are the free subjective invention of active autonomous subjects” (Crary, 2001: 154). It is, therefore, the latter synthesis that provides the ground for the gradual rationalization and tactical instrumentalization of the senses” by way of the “transfer of their function to machinic and technical devices” (Crary, 2001: 320). If we can recall the earlier use of perfume as a purification device during the seventeenth century, for instance, it is possible to suggest that the technological regulation of an olfactory synthesis was determined under a discourse of exclusion. But with the “rapid accumulation of knowledge about the workings of a fully embodied observer – which appeared with the transition or dislocation of vision from the stationary relations of classic geometric optics – it disclosed possible ways for vision to be open to procedures of normalisation, quantification, of discipline” (Crary, 2001: 12). That is, embodiment as both the location and operation of power.
2.7. Conclusion

The modern museum conceived as an instrument of public education is an apparatus whose purpose is not to know the populace but to allow the people, addressed as subjects of knowledge rather than objects of administration, to know; not to render the populace visible to power but to render power visible to the people, and at the same time, to represent to them that power as their own (Bennett, 1995: 98). The behaviour of the population is subject to new forms of social management. In spite of museums formally addressing an undifferentiated public, the practices of the museum serve to drive a wedge between the public it attracts and the wayward portion of the population whose behaviour is unpredictable and spontaneous as a result of a free autonomous “synthesis” of perception. In this sense, paintings and other artefacts, as a system of isolate visibility, are put into practice. Collections are built and serve to give the same effect of visibility as panopticism but with the additional feature: the artefact, as a central observation point, serves as the focus of the exercise of power and at once, the registration of knowledge. The space of representation constituted in the relations between the disciplinary knowledge. It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disindividualises power.

“Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up” (Foucault, 1977a: 232).

The museum is a machine which, whatever use a governmental strategy or policy maker may wish to put on it, produces homogenous effects of power. Moreover, ever since the late nineteenth century, museums have ranked highly in funding priorities of all developed nation-states, and have proven to be remarkably influential cultural technologies in recruiting the interest and participation of national citizens (Bennett, 1995: 66). But the Panopticon was also a laboratory for experiments; its aim, to set about altering behaviour, to train and correct individuals, to teach different techniques, and practice pedagogical experiments whilst monitoring their effects. It served to reform prisoners, but also treat patients, to instruct school schoolchildren, to confine the insane, to supervise workers and, finally, to put beggars and idlers to work (Foucault, 1977a: 236).

It is no coincidence, then, that familiar patterns of intervention reside within government and policy based agendas regarding the use of the arts and cultural industries to manage different forms of
social exclusion (DCMS, 1999; ACE, 2004; Hughes, et al, 2007). In each of its applications, it makes it possible to perfect the exercise of power; power as a “discipline, with its structures and hierarchies, its inspections, exercises and methods of training and conditioning” (Foucault, 1980: 158). Indeed, it is this disciplinary power, which enables government assemblages to construct different subjects by way of “different systems of thought” (Foucault, 1977a: 235). Consequently, Foucault’s exploration of different forms of knowledge, but also different techniques of disciplinary power, has an important, yet, disturbing effect on how we view the subject in museum space.

In museum space, visual knowledge is not only socially distributed and/or shared between different individuals; it is “socially distributed and shared by different types of individuals” (Luckmann & Berger, 1991: 46). This distribution serves to discipline subjects in ways of seeing and thinking, turning them into the sort of objects society needs. However, the extent to which disciplinary power is successful, for example, the extent to which we become complicit in its maintenance is the result of disciplinary techniques on the micro-logical fabric of perception. As Foucault (1980) explains:

“But in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives...a synaptic regime of power, a regime of its exercise within the social body, rather than above it” (Foucault, 1980: 39).

From this point of view, an artwork, or any artefact for that matter, is not an independent given that is separate from the body. Moreover, it is not a geometrical optic which defines two stable, separate positions, operating on detached observers. It is a reciprocal, psychological optic that roots itself into the physiologically structure of the body. Consequently, there is a “micro physics of power operating between institutions and bodies themselves” (Foucault, 1977a: 26). Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction of the “molar” and “molecular” provides a further way of distinguishing “reciprocity” as an “affective movement” that is limited by State apparatus (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 399). But they also proffer, like Dewey’s (2005) theory of perception that, molecular aggregates, if allowed to develop unabated without arrest, can serve some other purpose.

“The molar organisation does not preclude the existence of an entire world of unconscious micropercepts, unconscious affects, fine segmentations that

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grasp or experience different things, are distributed and operate differently” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 235).

In the next chapter, we will look at how the movement of experience in the encounter with a Rothko painting can stir the molecular beneath the molar. Rothko’s paintings have often been described, as: “transcendental... as representative of the void; as opening onto experiences of the sublime” (Phillips & Crow, 2005: 1). I will argue that the perceived atmospheric element, which is both simultaneously absent and present, may be more productively understood as affect. As Massumi (2002) notes, there is “no affect without an accompanying movement in or of the body” (Massumi, 2002: 188). With this in mind, the usefulness of defining an “affective encounter” is that it will support the conceptual and theoretical development of the first structuring statement:

1) There is an on-going struggle in art education to again introduce movement and experimentation in subjectivity and learning through putting into practice the idea of a relational field and through experimenting with new tools. For this to be theoretically workable, there is a need to work out how to turn the focus on positions and change as moving from one position to another, into a focus on movement as something that forgoes positions and thereby open up possibilities for collective and intense experimentation.

Furthermore, because Deleuze and Guattari (2004b) imply that the molecular “flow” of movement, or what I believe to be part of the physiological optics of perception based in the metonymic “retina” of the body, is a genuinely semiotic phenomena formed of a process of interrelating icons, indexes, and symbolic sign-activity (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 586) the forthcoming chapter will set out to build a semiotic model of lived experience inspired by Peircean semiotics. This will open up the idea of art encounters to the: “receptive” phase of “aesthetic experience” and the act of “reconstructive doing” (Dewey, 2005: 55). From this view, art is the name of the object that we encounter in a museum and gallery space, but it is also the name of the encounter itself: a procedure known in contemporary art as relational aesthetics (O’Sullivan, 2006: 2). The purpose of applying Peirce’s semiotic to movement and affectivity is that it opens up the possibility of examining subjective experiences empirically, as a system of relational signs bound to our encounters with art. It, therefore, connects us to the second structuring statement:
2) Art educationists and learners can work together through collective, intense and unpredictable experimentation. In this process art educationists and learners are caught up in a relational field. For this to be theoretically workable, the reliance on the transcendent principle of conscious critique needs to be rethought and reinforced by other possible and alternative scientific methods.
Chapter 3

A Pragmatic Approach to Learning Through Bodily Becomings and Aesthetic Encounters

In the previous chapter, we saw how Foucault’s analysis of Panopticism could be applied to museum and gallery spaces. Through disciplinary techniques that opened up a general formula between light and language; we found that pedagogical strategies could create the conditions by which the content of art was a series of determinable visibilities and determined by statements (Deleuze, 2006: 52) that assured the automatic functioning of disciplinary power through a self-reflexive gaze (Foucault, 1977a: 210). In this chapter, however, the operation of visibility, as a state of conscious permanence, will be explored from a different perspective. That is, from a point of view that considers both the optical and luminous arrangement of visual art as a spatialized surface of actions and passions. This point of view is one that owes much to Deleuze’s use of Bergson and Spinoza, in that the surface of an artwork can be likened to a material encounter with qualities that are selectively reduced, and which corresponds to the passage from one experiential state to another, implying a change in the body to act (Massumi, 2004b: xvi). Furthermore, this passage of becoming-in-the-moment clarifies our capacity to affect, and be affected by a work of art. Hence, by drawing on this approach, we are able to advance beyond the material surface of an artwork, and start exploring its intensive, virtual, and affective features. That is, how an artwork functions in generating an experience.

3.0. Schizoanalysis: a pragmatic analysis of affects, haptic images, and becoming-in-the-moment

With recourse to Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004a) account of schizoanalysis this Chapter will expand on the affectious circumstances of encountering the act of becoming-in-the-moment. A schizoanalytical perspective challenges the Cartesian structure of thought by concentrating on the linkage and events that take place between two bodies, for instance, the body of the painting and the body of the viewer. Hence, schizoanalysis is at once a “transcendental and materialist analysis” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a: 109) that can provide educational researchers and those interested in youth intervention with a form of cultural criticism, whilst opposing interpretative work; an activity which merely reinforces semiotic despotism through codified representations. As Holland (2001) explains:
“If Foucault’s discourse analysis examines the codes operative in specific discursive formations, and the effects of power they achieve in a particular historical context, Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis examines the other side of the coin: the forces at work in discourse and society...” (Holland, 2001: 770).

Consequently, schizoanalytic criticism is primarily a pragmatic analysis of texts and surfaces, and can be used to understand culture in terms of particular forms of semiosis, operative in a particular form of social formation (Holland, 2001: 765). Deleuze and Guattari’s articulation of the imperceptibility of forces and affects, then, brings to mind classical discussions of the perceptible, or the “image and its qualities” (Zohar, 2013: 177). Accordingly, Charles S. Peirce (1839 - 1914) will provide us with a series of special characteristics which will allow us to explore what a pragmatic conception of schizoanalysis looks like, whilst allowing us to identify the relation between art, image, and perception, as a process of semiosis. With this in mind, and given limited time and space, I will try and present Peirce’s theory of sign as economically as possible. This will, inevitably, require me to ignore some important aspects of Peirce’s terminology. Otherwise it will become somewhat overloaded with undesirable conceptual baggage. But, hopefully, the pairing down of parts of Peirce’s sign theory in order to streamline it will not cause irreparable damage, and we will be able to bring "semiotics" to bear on our contemporary cultural scene, and open up a more affective understanding of surfaces, bodies, and encounters with art.

Foucault’s analysis of spaces of constructed visibilities brought out how museums serve to constitute the subject. The art of light and the visible, which spaces are designed to deploy, is one which serves to make certain kinds of properties of our own subjectivity stand out as being self-evident. Museums are, therefore, spaces that help form the evidences of the way we see ourselves and one another. But as we saw, one of the reasons why we do not see discipline as a form of power, is because we do not “see” power as a strategy. It is a micro-politics or, rather, a physiological optics of light and discourse that forms the content and expressive enunciations that enable us to articulate our experiences and our encounters within already established discourses i.e. theories of learning, theories of art history, etc. (Deleuze, 2006: 41). In that way, the architectural form of a museum helps to visualize power in other ways than simply manifesting it. It is not simply a matter of what a building shows symbolically or semiotically, but what it makes visible about us and within us.
In an aim to uncover the logic of “visibilities” and “self-evidences” rather than a consistent argument concerning discursive practices that circulate via words and images, and which produce certain kinds of subjectivities, we might now turn to how un-thought systems of “light” traverse the interior of the subject. With this in mind, Deleuze distinguishes sight from the field of visibility, and in the following extract gives an indication of how a physiological optics creates an image of thought: “visibilities are not defined by sight but are complexes of actions and passions, actions and reactions, multisensorial complexes, which emerge into the day of light” (Deleuze, 2006: 50). Each of our experiences with art can be seen as a material encounter with a luminous arrangement of affects. The abstract formula of museum architecture is, therefore, to impose a particular conduct on a particular human multiplicity of affections by determining them discursively. Deleuze explains:

“We need only insist that the multiplicity is reduced and confined within a tight space and that the imposition of a form of conduct is done by distributing space, laying out and serializing time, composing in space-time, and so on” (Deleuze, 2006: 29).

For there to be perception there must be a world. Indeed, there must be perceivers on the one hand and perceived on the other. However, contrary to the idea that perception constitutes a representing relation to what is out there, Deleuze is following in Bergson’s footsteps by insisting that the world is made up of material images which outrun perception on every side (Bergson, 2004: 303). Perception is in things. It is in the luminous images of matter themselves, which are diffusing and propagating in all directions without resistance or dwindling (Deleuze, 1991: 62). Our conscious perception of things in the world, then, must consist of these images being selectively reduced (Moore, 1996: 31) through the actions and reactions of bodily movement: bodily movements which, in their selection of passing images, measure the sensations between action and reaction, and preserve a particular combination of qualitative space and quantitative time, imminent to the properties and/or qualities that matter is pictured as having.

This implies that images exist in themselves, and have the qualities and properties they are pictured as having. That is, these extensive images depict real objects, really possessing the qualities they posses, and can be perceived as possessing those qualities when actualised in consciousness. Furthermore, as Deleuze (2005a) states: “if they do not appear to anyone, that is to an eye, it is because light is not yet reflected or stopped, and passing on unopposed, are never revealed” (Deleuze, 2005a: 62-65). We will examine how material images are selected later on in the chapter when we look at Bergson’s zone of
indetermination, however, for now, we can see that by alluding to the metonymic eye of physiological optics (Crary, 2001: 153) Deleuze is able to present a theory of pure perception, where virtual images or, rather, extensive qualities of extensive objects can be seen to impress their potential capacities on the image we call our body. Let us look at an example:

Yellow and Blue (Yellow, Blue on Orange) by Rothko (1955) (http://www.cmoa.org)

We can begin by asserting that this object has its own exacting colour (Yellow, Blue, on Orange). This is definite and invariable. But, when the tone of the paint mixes to become yellow or blue, instead of saying that we see the colour of the painting change from yellow to blue or change under the influence of an increase or diminution of light, we should really say that the colour remains the same. That is to say, it is our encounter with “sensation” and with the luminous intensity of the painting that increases or diminishes (Bergson, 2004: 51) with the hue of the painting. Accordingly, whether we will it or not, Yellow, Blue, on Orange produces affects and passages of intensity that react in or on the body at the level of matter (O’Sullivan, 2006: 41). In fact, following Deleuze and Spinoza, we might define “affect” as the effect that another body, for example a painting, has upon our body, and upon our body’s own duration (Deleuze, 1998: 139).
“The capacity for being affected is manifested as a power of acting insofar as it is assumed to be filled by active affections, but as a power of being acted upon insofar as it is filled by passions...The capacity for being affected itself remains constant within those limits, but the power of acting and the power of being acted upon vary greatly, in inverse ration to one another” (Deleuze, 1988: 27).

While our capacity to be affected always remains constant, it is our affections that express our state at a given moment in time, and determine a passage to a “more” or to a “less” affected state. Affect, understood here, then, is precisely the body’s passage from one state of affection to another; like in those instances when we encounter an external body which does not agree with our own, and whose relation brings about passions of sadness. Conversely, in cases where we encounter a body that does agree with our own nature, compounding an agreeable relation, then those passions which affect us will be those of joy (Deleuze, 1988: 27). Thus, Spinoza’s tells us: “by affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained” (Kinser & Youpa: 2014: 167).

Affect, then, for both Deleuze and Spinoza, names the rising and fallings – that is to say, becomings – of our own body, always experienced in time, as duration - particularly when we encounter another body such as a painting (O’Sullivan, 2006: 41). It follows that different encounters will have different characters, and that certain encounters will be more productive and beneficial to our wellbeing than others.

In general, this means once more attending to the production of subjectivity. For example, a painting is customarily understood in relation to materials, arrangements, compositions and surfaces. While a painting can be seen as being more than just a surface - in that it has traditionally been used to build or create a representative image - it is primarily the painting’s surface, its characteristic qualities, and its arrangement, which forms the material aspect of a painting: elements which include canvas, gesso, pencil, pigments, fluids or liquids etc. However, with this rather simple understanding of surface, it is possible to elucidate a novel conception for describing what a painting does in terms of its operation and functioning. Let us examine this process, again, this time using Orange and Yellow by Rothko.
In *The Logic of Sensation* Deleuze (2005b) develops the notion of haptic vision to account for the way in which qualities of colour – such as *Orange and Yellow* – create sensations on the paintings surface via their relationship with each another. As such, it is by way of the arrangement and relationship of colour that the spatialization of energy is affirmed and takes effect (Deleuze, 2005b: 86). Moreover, it is Deleuze’s (2005b) assertion that: “if a painting has nothing to narrate and no story to tell something is happening all the same, which defines the functioning of the painting” (Deleuze, 2005b: 13). Crucial to this observation, then, is the notion that we sense the material aspect of this painting - that is, the combinations of colour in Rothko’s *Orange and Yellow* - as a multiplicity of material and physiological affections on the metonymic retina of the body.

Consequently, with each art encounter we are afforded a multi-sensory experience, which engenders an expressive unit of sense: otherwise known as the event of the painting. Deleuze (2005b) describes the process of this event as follows:

“I *become* in the sensation and something *happens* through the sensation, one in the other. And at the limit, it is the same body which, being both subject and object, gives and receives the sensation. As a spectator, I
experience the sensation only by entering the painting, by reaching the unity of the sensing and sensed” (Deleuze 2005b: 25).

This formulation indicates how the haptic vision of affection emerges as a relation between the body of the painting and the body of the viewer. The operation of sensing the object suggests that it is the application of colour that creates sensations. But it is sensations happening that can be explained as the painting function. Indeed, while sensations happening in the viewer’s body can help us elucidate how the painting functions, it is the singular event, the unity of sensing and the sensed, mediated by an embodied sense of durational becoming which gives cause to a sense of self during the encounter with the painting. That is, durational becoming, actualized in the body as a causal, imminent, feeling-effect, represents a transcendental process of embodied self-otherness, indicating that the material qualities of the painting have exerted an intense movement of effort in the body.

It is this event-effect, then, which is susceptible to the radical reductions associated with methods of discipline or disciplinary power, in that these event-effects, formed of bodily sensation, are mobilised and given their meaning, significance and, indeed, truth by institutional discourse. How we interpret, talk about, and make sense of our own experiences increasingly becomes defined and legitimized by the discourses surveying our sense of self in any given place, at any given time.

It is through the spatialization of an “event” that an architectural form, like a museum, can construct models of intelligibility which connect an artworks function to pedagogical practices. This practice is similarly identified by Dewey (2005) in his account of arrested perception, which we briefly explored in our discussion on segmentarity in the last chapter. To re-cap momentarily, Dewey (2005) suggests that our reception of art is frequently underdeveloped, in that we often fall back on pre-determined schemes which enable us to identify the form and narrative of an artwork: “recognition is perception arrested before it has time to develop freely” (Dewey, 2005: 54). With this in mind, any event can be constructed in order to facilitate examination procedures that both rank and judge people according to the events “visible” characteristics.

This technique of spatialization makes new classifications disciplinary (Rajchman, 1988: 105), in that disciplinary techniques help construct spatial events into categories. Thus, into these categories the “character” of people is slotted and made “visible” in them. As such, disciplinary practice can create in people an “individuality” that is endowed with “essential” or evident properties (Rajchman, 1988: 105).
70). For example, the curational procedure of the museum, often presents viewers with a singular sort of visual intelligibility through captions, and labelling. Here, the pedagogy of the visual acquires the status of essence, universality and necessity (Rajchman, 1988: 108). Indeed, the visual adopts the status of truth.

With this in mind, we must, therefore, look for the singular and contingent processes that make the experience of becoming-in-the-moment self-evident, and acceptable as truth. A search that informs the first structuring statement:

1) There is an on-going struggle in art education to again introduce movement and experimentation in subjectivity and learning through putting into practice the idea of a relational field and through experimenting with new tools. For this to be theoretically workable, there is a need to work out how to turn the focus on positions and change as moving from one position to another, into a focus on movement as something that forgoes positions and thereby open up possibilities for collective and intense experimentation.

With help from Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004a) account of schizoanalysis and Deleuze’s (2004c) view of the encounter, a painting’s surface can be conceived of as a plane of preparatory forces, while the event is the body’s relation to these forces, felt as incoming energy through the different intensities of sensation. Consequently, a schizoanalytic approach towards a painting would attempt to advance beyond the material aspects of a paintings surface, and begin by exploring its relation to the body in terms of its intensive and affective features (Eckersley, 2014: 205). That is to say, map these features as a process from perception to recognition, and as a single flow of temporal becoming.

Like other multi-sensory methods, which seek to understand the role of sense perception and affect, and its relationship to the physical environment (Ingold, 2000; Porteous, 1990), culture (Pink, 2006; Coleman, 2013), and young people’s learning (Sefton-Green et al, 2011; Thompson & Sefton-Green, 2010), schizoanalysis can be used to generate an account of a painting’s surface which goes beyond the assumed dominance or ocularcentrism of visual methodologies (Pink, 2009). A painting, or any artwork for that matter, is not seen as an independent reality appropriated by representations in the mind (Ingold, 2000: 286), but part of a dynamic relational encounter (O’Sullivan, 2006), an aesthetic “event” that takes place between two bodies - the body of the painting and the body of the viewer – between the material action, or force of a painting as a sensory form, and the spatio-temporal event.
of a viewers becoming-in-the-moment: the experience of which brings previously unrelated histories, languages, and thoughts together (Casey, 1996: 24).

Schizoanalysis suggests that the functioning of an artwork ought to be understood in affective terms; as an intensive force of affect (Eckersley, 2014: 215). As Deleuze (2006) suggests: “the outside always concerns force” (Deleuze, 2006: 72). Consequently, given that these forces from the “outside” always compound a relation with our own bodily forces (Deleuze, 2006: 72) to form a total experience, and by that I mean an embodied experience, the question then arises as to what forces from the outside do viewers enter into a relation with, and what form is created as a result. As Deleuze (2006) reiterates in the following passage:

“One needs to know with what other forces the forces within man enter into a relation, within a given historical formation, and what form is created as a result from this compound of forces” (Deleuze, 2006: 102).

Consequently, it is this relation between bodies, and the collision of bodies and forces, that interests us in relation to painting, in so far as affect is the change that occurs when the surface which makes up the body of the painting encounters the body of the viewer; namely, the surface of space whereby the event takes place at the time of the encounter (Eckersley, 2014: 213). When attempting to focus on the encounter in the event of painting, then, it is necessary to elaborate on what an artwork does but also put forward ideas with regards to what constitutes an artwork in relational terms. Deleuze’s (2005) The Logic of Sensation goes some way in explaining art as a system of operations that function through sensations. Even so, the account of painting presented by Deleuze leaves some unanswered questions surrounding the nature of what a painting does. What exactly is a painting, or any artefact doing when spatializing forces unfold on its surface, and how does this transcendental surface work?

The argument that Deleuze (1994) presents in Difference and Repetition is that transcendence is based on differential relations, and that:

“Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as a reason behind qualitative diversity” (Deleuze, 1994: 56-7).
Schizoanalysis is, therefore, equal to a “transcendental and materialist analysis” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a: 109) in that it accounts for people’s imminent connections to things, not separately, and deals with things in their movement, not statically. Like dialectical materialism, it prioritises the self-creation of thought, and the general laws of its development, as a form of motion which contradicts impartial facts (Sewell & Woods, 2000). The “molecular, microphysical...and productive” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 109) nature of our own bodily logic, showing that nothing can endure before it. That is to say, our relation to the world and our material conditions is an uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, and an endless ascending from the lower to the higher (Sewell & Woods, 2000) via the direct apprehension of our material conditions in the sensible.

Schizoanalysis provides educationists and researchers with a new pragmatic approach (Wilson, 2014) to visual methods and the arts. Moreover, it provides educational practitioners who work with young people through arts based learning (Hickey-Moody, 2013a; Olsson, 2009; Sefton-Green et al, 2011; Thomson, 2008; Thompson & Sefton-Green, 2010) with an opportunity to show how young people’s emplaced, sensory, and emotional experiences and ways of knowing, can be used to challenge ready-made curatorial discourses attached to art. As such, by taking into consideration motion as a process comprised of general laws developed through the sense-events of self-creative thought, it is possible for young people to challenge and transform “common sense” truths into something new, interesting and remarkable. As Sewell and Woods (2000) explain, the idea of “movement implies contradiction” (Sewell & Woods, 2000: 5) and contradiction not only negates the old, but incorporates it into a new form (Sewell & Woods, 2000: 7).

However, by identifying the term pragmatic, and by making reference to general laws, there is a need to situate both the transcendental and the empirical within a pragmatic logic of subjectivity. As such, I feel the best way to do this is by treating the “general laws” of empirical experience and a bodily logic through semiotic modalities. I will now turn to Peircean semiotics.

3.1. Constructing a schizoanalytic model of subjectivity using Peircean semiotics

Traditional models of educational pedagogy usually assume a hierarchical cognitive architecture that serves as the primary foundation for developing methods of instruction. These methods assume that there is a correct body of knowledge and, in our case visual knowledge, for teachers to communicate
to students (Cunningham, 1987). In order to move away from this traditional model it is necessary to develop an entirely different framework. With this in mind, there are a number of semiotic approaches that have been developed, each attempting to enhance our understanding of human experience and context by placing an emphasis on codes, signs, and their interactions (Barthes, 1967; Bourdieu, 1977; Culler, 1981; Eco, 1979; Jackobson, 1980; Johansen, 1993; Maritain, 1957; Morris, 1946; Ricoeur, 1981; Saussure, 1966; Sebeok, 1972; Volosinov, 1976). However, where the present study differs from other accounts of semiology and semiotics is that by taking the image of an encounter as a major theme, it relegates the verbal to secondary status. This is one of the main contributions made by schizoanalysis in that it tries to draw out a relation between a-signifying and signifying semiologies within discursive regimes, whilst also proposing that such relations are themselves generative productions (Burrows & O’Sullivan, 2014: 253) of a semiotic process.

Unfortunately, the semiotic pragmatism of schizoanalysis is notoriously challenging to decipher. First expounded by Deleuze and Guattari in their book Anti-Oedipus (2004a), and then continued in their next collaborative work A Thousand Plateaus (2004b), the concept of schizoanalysis, like many of their ideas and concepts, swamps the first-time reader in neologisms, and terms deployed in novel contexts. As Appleby (2000) acknowledges: “this can put off many people, particularly those with more traditional philosophical leanings,” and is not helped by commentators “who do little more than deploy samples of the more colourful terminology, with no clear understanding of what its role is...and who display a poor or partial understanding of the works themselves” (Appleby, 2000: 239). With this in mind, I will not attempt to deconstruct or guide readers through the conceptual intricacies of schizoanalysis, but translate its pragmatic laws and processes through another idiom, principally Peircean semiotics. The advantage of this is that it prevents the writerly process from getting bogged down in deconstructing Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalytic neologisms and, instead, allows for the dynamic elucidation of its pragmatic function in relation to art and young people’s subjectivities.

Although Deleuze was only partially explicit on the subject of pragmatism, and appropriated Peirce’s thinking mostly in terms of his own work on cinema (Deleuze, 2005a) Peirce’s concept of a sign, based on a triadic logic, can serve as a context from which to make a reasoned connection between images and experience. Experience is rendered meaningful not by grounding empirical particulars in abstract universal concepts, but by a process of experimentation in the immanent becoming-of-the-moment, where an image, like an artwork, becomes an object of a person’s encounter with motion, movement, and change (Deleuze, 1994) the knowledge of which is gained through the empirical logic of affective
signs (Guattari, 1995). Here, the logic of affect allotted to Peircean semiosis meaning the translation of a sensuous feeling in perception, to a rational, formal quality in recognition (Merrell, 2000). There will be more on this shortly.

If contextualising this in terms of young people’s encounters with art, then the object of an encounter implies a condition by which young people can make, remake, and unmake concepts along a moving horizon (Deleuze, 1994: xx-xxi). Indeed, in terms of any art intervention strategies with young people in museum and galleries, it also implies that young people, as Bourriaud (1998) proposes, “should no longer see art and creativity as the fabrication of new objects, but as a choice” (Bourriaud, 1998: 23) Creativity is the art of choosing an object amongst all those that already exist in order to both use and modify it according to a specific intention: the intention being to “decode readymade objects through the production of different story lines and narratives” (Bourriaud, 1998: 25). A process that Bourriaud calls “aesthetic communication” (Bourriaud, 1998: 25) and an activity that I think can be read through Peirce’s logic of signs.

3.2. Peirce’s Triadic Logic of Signs

To understand how Peirce’s semiotic approach to human subjectivity can help us develop a practical or empirical model of “aesthetic communication” that accounts for movement and experimentation we must consider subjectivity in terms of Peirce’s treatment of semiotics as a logic of necessary and/or probable inferences (CP, 5.83). In addition, since, for Peirce, reasoning and the attainment of new knowledge can only be accomplished by means of signs, it inevitably follows that a semiotic logic can help pragmatically articulate molecular assemblage’s correlative to forms of perception. Accordingly, and in terms of foregrounding an analysis of museum encounters with visual signs, whether pictorial or otherwise, how are we to understand the term logic? In order to answer this I adopt the following definition provided by Stephen Kleene: “logic has the important function of saying what follows from what” (Kleene, 1967: 3).

That a subsequent idea should follow from a previous one leads us towards a dynamic conception of logical interpretation. It also introduces the idea that signs function inter-relationally. Seen from this standpoint, a sign cannot be considered as a sequence of dyadic associations between signifiers and signifieds, but as a: “dynamic movement of reasoning that involves three terms or dynamic stages” (Jappy, 2013: 2). Let us look at Peirce’s logic of signs before moving onto more challenging elements.
“Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C” (CP, 1.346).

In a general sense Peirce’ sign is independent of its object. It is the form that the sign takes – but this does not, necessarily, have to be material. A sign is merely that which we might define as a formal or existent quality. In our example, the formal qualities of Orange and Yellow are constrained or rather, determined by the object. That is, the thing to which the sign refers or, in our case, Rothko’s painting expressing basic human emotions. As such, the interpretant should be understood as the translation of the sign - it is the sense or meaning made of the sign when we encounter it visually. However, this is not the termination of the process: “a sign is not as sign unless it translates itself into another sign in which it is more fully developed” (CP, 5.594). It is by analysing this process that we will learn more about movement and experimentation. That is to say, discover that the interrelationship and, indeed, interdependency between signs of the body, and signs of the mind, is a moving operation of repeated inferences and changes which emerge in thought/language.
We can see, then, that Peircean definition of a sign involves triadic elements, in that: “A gives B to C” (CP, 1.346). This is a genuinely triadic relation in that we cannot analyse this prescription into say “A moves B and C takes the B,” since this leaves out “A’s intention that C own B” (Meyer, 1995: 25). This might be put another way. The qualities Orange and Yellow denote the fact that I have encountered an object, in our case a painting. As a consequence, these qualities give the object to some inference in thought. As Peirce put it, when A gives B to C, he transfers the right to C (Meyer, 1995: 25). That is to say: “it consists in A’s making C the possessor according to Law” (CP, 8.331). Also, when: “A stands for B to C, we can say that this is irreducibly triadic since A can stand for B only by virtue of having its meaning expressed by C” (Meyer, 1995: 25). With this in mind, there are two important aspects that we need to take from Peirce’s logic of sign. However, before we continue, let us look at what Orange and Yellow by Rothko looks like when depicted through Peirce’s triadic formula:

A (the qualities of colour) +AB (the qualities of colour felt as an object) +ABC (the qualities of colour, felt as an object, interpreted in thought as a painting) = (Sign).

Each of the triadic sign components must enjoy the company of the other two in order to stand for a fully developed composite sign: A+AB+ABC = (Sign). The sign relation involves three elements bound together in a semiotic moment (Permentier, 1985: 26). However, looking at how each element in the triad is brought into articulation with each other we can observe the mediating role of component C. Hence, mediation, as defined as any process in which a: “third element intervenes, and serves as the vehicle or medium of communication between two elements” (Permentier, 1985: 26) leads us to one of the most fundamental insights regarding Peirce’s logic of sign. For in the act of mediation, which is most prevalent with the interpretant or element C, all the component parts of the sign (A+AB+ABC = Sign) enter into “interrelated interdependency” (Permentier, 1985: 26). But, the wider implication of this is that a “ground” is formed for another sign.

For example, when A gives the qualities of object B, to the inferential law of C, a new sign is created. As a result, the power of the interpretant is to create a new entity by way of Peirce calls “hypostatic abstraction” (CP, 5.449) which involves taking a quality or predicate as an abstract subject and using it as a sort of idea that informs the representation of something (CP, 2.228). It is not a representation in the conventional sense, but a rule whereby a sign “grounds” its claim to represent its object (CP, 1.559) through an idea of meaning (CP, 2.239). It is, therefore, called a representamen, rather than a
representation, and forms the ground for another sign in the production of meaning; a process that Peirce calls "ratiocination" or reasoning.

Accordingly, a sign or *representamen* is a signal, which indicates that the entire triadic process must start again (CP, 1.559). Our experiential encounter with Rothko’s *Orange and Yellow* can be depicted in the following way:

\[
A + AB + ABC = (\text{Sign1}) \rightarrow A_1 + A_1B_1 + A_1B_1C_1 = (\text{Sign2}) \rightarrow A_2 + A_2B_2 + A_2B_2C_2 = (\text{Sign3}) \rightarrow 
\]

This is by no means a full and comprehensive account of Peirce’s typology of signs. Indeed, as we will become aware, Peirce subdivides each core element of his triadic sign into three “phenomenological categories” and their corresponding “presentative” and “representative characteristics” (Liska, 1996: 34-40). All these, more or less, are involved in the conscious accumulation of knowledge, and involve the inferential dynamism of “ratiocination.” That is, the inferential action of a sign in the process and development of knowledge or what Peirce refers to more technically as the: “power of semiosis” (EP 2: 11-12). These features of Peircean semiotics will be addressed in further discussions, however, for now, we will occupy ourselves with the following three definitions of sign presented by Peirce; these being variants descriptions of the nature of the action that permeate Peirce’s philosophy of the sign:

1. [A Sign] is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without (CP, 1.339).

2. A Sign is something by knowing something that we know something more (SS, 31-2).  

3. A Sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps, a more developed sign. That sign that it creates I call an *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object (PWP, 99).

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3.3. Peirce's first definition of sign: the triadic structure of empiricism

The Peircean definition of sign is based on the notion that a sign stands for another sign. However, it is to this definition that we must add a dimension which other classical theories lack i.e. reference to mind (Colapietro, 1989: 4). Unlike the classical definition of sign as aliquid stat pro aliquo: something which stands for or serves in place of something else (Kneale & Kneale, 1962: 250), Peirce conceives of a definition which incorporates within this dyadic structure, the material effect of a sign conveyed to a mind with reference to the signs of the physical world. That is, a “sign is something which stands for another to a mind” (CP, 3.80). The implication of this is that the triadic sign undoubtedly becomes a more complex phenomenon than the classical definition indicates, in that the nature of mind is not a separate, self-contained system, that classifies the material world independent from the evidences of our senses or imaginations (Descartes, 1985: 75). Rather, the mind is a triadic formula “developed under the action of experience” (CP, 5.564). Moreover, the triadic mind is produced in experience as the effect of an independent reality (CP, 5.564). Consequently, from an epistemological point of view it is interesting to compare Peirce and Saussure’s theory of signs.

Descartes suggests that our ideas of the world are already there in the mind prior to any contact with the world. Accordingly, we are only able to clarify and understand the experiential world that we are in contact with through a system of classification already present in the mind. What Saussure does is replace this conception of mind with a semiological system based on a modern version of rationalism; namely, a principle of classification that subordinates knowledge to a theory of a general linguistics: it is only through language, not experience, that we have knowledge of the world. Language underlines a “subtle” system of units, each associating an acoustic image with its concept, respectively known as a signifier and signified, and it is through these units or signs, that the world stands as a surrogate for representation. It is therefore a system of description of which notions of reference and referent are completely absent. Furthermore, language is likened to a sheet of paper, signifier on the one side and signified on the other: “thought is the front sound at the back” (Saussure, 1966: 113). As a result, with regards to language: “one can neither divide sound from thought nor thought from sound” (Saussure, 19: 113). Quite simply, then, linguistics is to be taken as the “master pattern” by which general and individual ideas can be subordinated to semiological analysis.

As far as Peirce is concerned, the intellect is in contact with the desperate mass of external stimuli in the form of sensible data, over which, it has no control, since such stimuli are never known directly
by some system of classification already in the mind. That is, they are not known immediately (Jappy, 2013: 59). The construct that is known, however, is the percept or what Peirce calls “the evidence of the senses” (CP 2140), which “the intellect records a-critically as positive, fallible but incorrigible and irreversible perceptual fact” (Jappy, 2013: 61). For example, the impression of having seen a painting that is Orange and Yellow in a gallery exhibition is a perceptual judgment on my part. The perceptual fact involved here is positive in that the belief actually occurred, but it is likewise fallible to the extent that the vision I saw may have been an advertisement poster for a Rothko exhibition, or a sign giving me directions. In terms of incorrigibility, I cannot change my original perceptual judgement, although I may learn later on that it was something completely different, like a different artwork by a different artist. Indeed, even if the whole thing was nothing but my imagination playing a trick on me I would not be able to reverse the original perceptual fact. That is, it does not depend on what I may think of it — it was and is real.

Avoiding Saussure’s vacuous psychologism of attempting to examine the original sense data by way of a relation between linguistics and psychology (Bloomfield, 1935: 19), Peircean pragmatism holds that in some unconscious, unfathomable way, we experience the percept upon us in its entirety, and that we think of this in the form of positive proposition sui generis (CP, 7.624). As a result, we cannot help think this to be true and best we can do is unconsciously test the evidence of our senses by means of inferences - the subject of which we will return to in a moment. In what intelligible manner, then, do we represent this percept logically? For Peirce, it is through the empirical movement and experimental nature of signs which - through their development - semiotically enrich our minds, and our ability to interpret the world around us as a function of our knowledge stored up from experience.

“I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former...” (SS, 80-81).

By this initially intimidating formulation, Peirce simply means that the sign mediates between what it represents, that being its object, and the interpretant, which is the effect the sign produces upon the person interpreting the sign (Jappy, 2013: 4). Put in another way, a “sign represents the object to the interpretant” (Jappy, 2013: 3). Every sign has a “physical connection” to the object it represents, and possesses a material reality. In that sense, and although Peirce does not provide a comprehensive or even basic account of how the movement of semiosis is constituted in thought through physiological
and bodily states, Peirce never rebuts the idea that human thought is a physiological process (Peirce, 1991: 10), something which I will explore in more depth later on, and attempt to disclose in Chapter 6. However, for now, and from a strictly Peircean point of view, Saussure’s conception of the relation holding between language and thought is an oversimplification of the process involved.

3.4. Peirce’s second definition of sign: the pragmatism of experiential encounters

Signs are part of the fabric of reality. They are, in some sense, there, extended in matter and physical reality, independent of our conventions and our consciousness (Colapietro, 1989: 33). Consequently, in a similar vein to Kant, Peirce’s philosophical concern is with providing an explanation as to how we acquire scientific knowledge. That is to say, how the knowledge of the world we live can be validated by way of logical analysis. Peirce is, therefore, interested in disproving the doctrine of scepticism and the notion that our knowledge of the world can never be certain. His contribution to this debate is to claim that our knowledge is acquired and shared by others in the form of signs. It is this theory which forms the foundation for Peircean pragmatism and, amongst other things, provides an elaborate and complex theory of how inference, also a triadic class of signs, contributes to a greater understanding of scientific concepts and, consequently, the growth of knowledge (Jappy, 2013: 3). These inferences are predicated on events mediated in the course of experience and under certain kinds of existential circumstances (EP, 401-402). Here, I provide a brief outline of the inferences involved in experiential encounters. They are defined as follows:

1. The whole operation of reasoning begins with Abduction. Its occasion is a surprise in real experience and is a logical operation that introduces any new idea (EP, 2.287; CP, 5.171). The mind seeks to bring new discoveries into order by forming a generalised conception. However, in cases where no new law is suggested, but only a peculiar state of “facts” that “explain” the surprising phenomenon through law of recognition, then the phenomenon under consideration would not be surprising (EP, 2.287). Abduction, then, concerns is the first stage of synthesis, and concerns the process of inventing, selecting and entertaining explanatory hypothesis. It merely suggests that something may be (CP, 7.202; CP, 5.171).

2. The second kind of reasoning is Deduction. This evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis and proves that something must be (CP, 5.172). It is a mode of reasoning that examines the state of things asserted in
the premises, and forms a diagram of states which are not perceived in those premises. As a result, it relationally traces out by way of mental experimentation that which is not explicitly mentioned in the premises. Upon this diagram, then, rests a certain proportion of cases that must be in proportion to the cases presented to it experience (CP, 6.144). The purpose of deduction, then, is that of collecting the secondary condition - or consequents - of the initial hypothesis, and relating to them a certain number of ideal objects, with the aim concluding their necessary or probable truth (CP, 1.66; CP, 8.209). The inquiry then enters upon its third stage (CP, 6.470).

3. **Induction or experimental reasoning** shows that something is actually operative (CP, 5.171) within an experience, and concerns the function of ascertaining how far the consequents accord with that experience (CP, 6.472). That is, it involves the experimental testing of the hypothesis. But not in the narrow, scientific sense of an operation by which one varies the conditions of a phenomenon as one pleases (CP, 5.168). Rather it concerns an operation in which a rule is applied to the hypothesis to judge whether it is sensibly correct, requires a modification, or whether it should be rejected (CP, 6.472). Consequently, it is based on the supposition that a certain sensible result should be expected under certain circumstances (CP, 5.168).

In our encounter with Rothko’s *Orange and Yellow*, the act of Abduction leads only to the suggestion of sensorial questions or hypothesis to be considered (CP, 8.209). It, therefore, poses a problem to be answered during the inferential process. It consists in studying qualitative facts and devising a theory to explain them (CP, 5.144). We might say, then, that the hypothesis produces a sensuous element of thought and this consists in our deductive reasoning constructing an image or diagram in accordance with a general percept. In observing in that image certain relations of parts not explicitly laid down in the percept, deduction draws out a prediction of the phenomena encountered by relating it to other cases and similar objects previously experienced. For Peirce, this is how *embodied* learning is bought about (CP, 5.171). As Peirce explains:

“As for deduction, which adds nothing to the premises, but only out of the various facts represented in the premises selects one and brings the attention down to it, this may be the logical formula of paying attention, which is the volitional element of thought, and corresponds to nervous discharge in the sphere of physiology” (CP, 2.643).
On the one hand, a number of sensations are followed by one reaction, becoming united under one general idea. This is then followed by the same reaction. Consequently, here, induction infers a rule, and as a belief of a rule is a habit, establishes an association, whereby, a general idea is followed by the similar reaction (CP, 1.44). On the other hand, in the “hypothetic process” a number of reactions called for by one occasion i.e. our encounter, are united with a general idea which gets called out to attention on the same occasion. Through deduction, then, induction is able to lay down the habitual element of an experience, and it is this habit of belief that goes on to fulfil the important function of calling out certain reactions experienced on certain occasions (CP, 6.144). In addition, it is because of deductive reasoning that we are able to convince to ourselves that similar relations will always occur when the percept is followed out (CP, 8.209).

3.5. Peirce’s third definition of sign: the human subject as semiosis

The rather informal definitions given in (1a) and (2a) suggest how signs contribute to the acquisition of knowledge through experiential encounters and at the same time, demonstrate the triadic nature of the relation into which signs enter. The first makes the important point that, whatever the nature of mind, signs do, at some stage, have to journey through a perceivable world. The second definition affirms the thesis that it is through signs that we acquire knowledge. However, definition (3), affirms the idea of human repetition, and introduces both an alternative name for the sign to be named and discussed as the “human element” in semiosis. Indeed, it recognises that a sign creates an event in a person’s mind, equivalent to a more developed sign, which represents the signs object in a variety of ways: “in some respect or capacity.” In this sense, Peirce is stating that: “every thought is essentially the nature of a sign” (CP, 5.470). In Peircean terms, then: “man is a sign” (CP, 7.585). However, a sign is not a sign - and by this we should also include our own subjectivity - unless it: “translates itself into another sign in which it is more fully developed” (CP, 5.594). That is, a form of meaning. Let us look at how Peirce examines this process:

“Form is really embodied in the object, meaning that the conditional relation which constitutes the form is true of the form as it is in the object. In the sign it is embodied only in the representative sense, meaning that whether by virtue of some real modification of the Sign, or otherwise, the Sign becomes
endowed with the power of communicating to an interpretant” (PMSW, 793).  

Peirce talks as if something “emanates” from the object of the sign-vehicle into a thought-sign. That is, “in every case an influence upon the Sign emanates from its Object and, this emanating influence then proceeds from the sign” and “produces an effect called the interpretant or interpreting act that consummates the agency of the sign” (CP, 6.34; CP 2.230). Another way of saying this is that what emanates from a sign is the dynamic or, rather, absent object which guides the semiotic process. For instance, when looking at Rothko’s *Orange and Yellow* you may see various indications of doubt and uncertainly emanating from translucent areas less opaque in colour. This might remind you of a time when you were doubtful and uncertain. Or the colours might remind you of a particularly joyous and memorable sunset. The point here is that you can identify with these emotions because you have, by virtue of collateral experience, already acquired habits related to emotional objects. The experiences you have had in the past allow you to interpret the immediate object of representation (i.e. emotion) in Rothko’s work of art, by “hint” of the absent but real dynamic object on which this representation is dependent.

“It is usual and proper to distinguish tow Objects of a sign, the Mediate without, and the Immediate within the Sign. Its Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. The Mediate object is the Object outside of the Sign; I call it the Dynamoid Object. The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its substance, is the Immediate Object” (SS, 83).

It might be argued that that Rothko’s particular configuration of lines and shapes of shading offer no proof of emotionality. It is not like Rothko’s emotional canvases work like a photograph, in the sense that you could see joy or uncertainty on the face of an existent object. Rothko’s paintings afford very little certainty, as these figments belong to the purely fictitious world of the artist’s imagination. This is no doubt true. While a photograph can provide evidence of a real emotion, by capturing the facial gestures of its subject, this is clearly not the case for the colours and forms in the paintings of Rothko and what we see are really only the immediate objects of possible dynamic objects. That is to say, the series of immediate objects introduced in the sequence of colour denotes, pictorially, a set of objects both belonging to the possible world of the artist, and defined by the possible world of the artist. As

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a result, when we read the painting we enter this denoted world, and the lines, forms and colours of
the painting take on a different form of existence. Here, Peirce explains:

“We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, - i.e. the Object
represented in the Sign, - and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is
altogether fictive, I must choose as different term, therefore), say rather the
Dynamical object, which from the nature of things, the sign cannot express,
which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by collateral
experience” (EP 2, 498).

Returning now to the subject of the interpretant, we saw previously that every sign, in order to be a
sign, must be interpreted as such. That is, every sign must be capable of determining an interpretant
which, in its most general sense, can be understood to be the translation of a sign into meaning. But
with this, the destiny of a sign demands that it be interpreted or translated into another sign. In that
sense, thought-signs are relational. They relate to themselves and the world semiotically. As a result,
our reality can be construed as a semiotic world of semiotic objects which can only make themselves
available to semiotic agent’s who are continually engendered in, but also continually emerging from,
the triadic process of semiosis (Merrell, 1997: 12). Indeed, translation almost certainly includes what
might be called objects “out there,” to be sure. We experience sensations only by entering the object
(Deleuze, 2005b: 25).

Yet, this object is not an unmediated “real world object.” It is a “semiotic object” available to some
semiotic agent, mediated by “semiotic realities” which take on breadth of meaning as the relation
between signs and their semiotic objects are translated in different signifying systems and networks.
Physical reality remains as it is, while different reality versions take on more and more expansive
meanings. That is, different translations.

1. Meaning [is] in its primary acceptation, the translation of a sign into another system of signs”
   (CP, 4.127);
2. The meaning of a sign is the sign it has been translated into” (CP, 4.132)
3. There is no exception [to] the law that every thought-sign is translated or interpreted into a
   subsequent one...” (CP, 5.284).

The translation of an artwork can, therefore, be understood in three different ways. The interpretant
is determined by the sign through the medium of some translator, or what we might otherwise call a
sign interpreting-agency. It should quickly be noted, however, that for Peirce this interpreting agency
need not be a human agency. Take a simple sunflower; a sunflower that turns towards the sun bears witness to the presence of the sun, the function of its turning being linked to the function of sunlight (CP, 1980: 2.24). An essential feature of an interpretant, then, is that it correlates with, and represents its object, which for Peirce can be almost anything ranging from a belief to a desire, a known existing thing to something that is drawn in the imagination, just as long as it makes something an object of a sign (CP, 2.232). Accordingly, this act of making implies that translation itself is the product and result of some process. That is to say, the process of semiosis itself, which has some effect on the translator: “the effect upon the interpreter being brought about by the semiosis of the sign” (CP, 5.484). Bearing this in mind, we can now attempt to reconcile the various definitions that Peirce gives to the concept of the interpretant, each one stressing some important aspect of meaning-making (Linska, 1996: 25) in the “here-and-now” of our encounters with art.

3.6. Pierce’s immediate interpretant: the semiotic production of existential signs in thought

Keeping in mind that the interpretant is a process, product and effect of translation then meaning, by its very nature, must also include the complex theory of inferences addressed earlier. The immediate interpretant can therefore, be understood as the “total unanalysed effect” that a sign is intentionally designed to produce or might naturally produce (SS, 110) - Rothko’s Orange and Yellow falls into the latter category when viewed from the position of the encounter. But the immediate interpretant can also be understood as the process which allows the beholder or “interpreting agency” to interpret its sign as interpretable as such, and is the principle means by which a viewer is able to communicate to oneself with regards to extra-linguistic phenomena like sound, taste, or colour (Eco, 1976: 158). As a result, its product would include the metaphysical category of Firstness, like the quality involved in a feeling when you first encounter a painting.

Because the presentative character of Firstness absorbs the qualitative characteristics of an object, in our example, the colours orange and yellow, then it also serves as an existential qualisign, a sign that presents the object of experience as a sort of vague impression of an idea of effort, and which forms the foundation for its representative character as an icon (Linska, 1996: 26). The icon aspect signifies its meaning by sharing at least one character, likeness or resemblance with its object. For example, a photograph or caricature presents an object through likeness and resemblance. However, iconic characteristics are also prominent when we listen to a piece of music. In such cases we are absorbed
into the qualitative structure of the sign itself (CP, 5.475). The immediate interpretant, then, acquires
the more experiential name of emotional interpretant. As any interpreting agency capable of feeling,
is engendered in the initial feeling produced by this sign.

The immediate interpretant shows us that the body surpasses the knowledge that we have of it, and
that thought likewise surpasses the consciousness that we have of it. Consequently, following Deleuze
and Spinoza, the immediate interpretant captures the power of the body beyond the given conditions
of our knowledge, capturing the power of the mind beyond the given conditions of our consciousness
(Deleuze, 1988: 18). For instance, earlier we looked at how the encounter compounds relations of joy
and sadness. Moreover, it is important to remember that there are two types of affections. There are
passive affections which are produced from external things, and there are active affections explained
by the subjects own essence (Deleuze, 1988; Deleuze, 2004c). If we run this perspective alongside the
immediate interpretant then, we can see that it follows the presentative character of Firstness in that
any interpreting agency, capable of feeling, is engendered in the initial feeling produced by a quality
or qualisign. That is, passive affections as qualisigns, allow us to perceive external bodies only insofar
as they affect us, and correspond to the effect that an object, such as an artwork, has on our body. It
would signal the effect, trace and physical impression that an external body would make on our body
and, in a figurative sense, leave an “image” or “idea” of an affection which makes an object known to
us only by its effect (Deleuze, 2004c: 147).

3.7. Peirce’s dynamic interpretant: the semiotic
production of embodied sense-events in thought

On the other hand, the dynamic interpretant would consist in the direct or actual effect produced by
a sign upon some interpreting agency (CP, 4.536). As the world of thought is continuous, then, this is
a continuum or translation of the emotional interpretant in the meaning-making process. Its product
is, therefore, the metaphysical category of Secondness: this corresponds respectively to actions and
events in singularly produced ideas (Linska, 1996: 26). Consequently, with regards to our experiential
encounter with Rothko’s Orange and Yellow, it is: “the matter of something actualized in the manner
of this happening here, now, for some contemplator of the sign.” However, at this point is not (yet) a
“painting” as it is set apart from any self-conscious contemplation. That is to say, it is not a word-sign
that can be used to identify it as a thing and, in doing so, bring with it large amounts of cultural ideas
with regards to art and art history (Merrell, 2000: 22). As Peirce is inclined to put it: “Secondness is a
brute fact” (CP, 5.469). It is, thus, the effect of a quality provoking one into thought (CP, 5.475), and in our case, this would manifest itself in the presentative character of otherness or a sinsign of Rothko’s Orange and Yellow.

Now, whereas the Firstness of an Immediate or emotional Interpretant serves to present “existential characteristics” through qualities of feeling, the sinsign serves to present these qualities of feeling to a viewer or interpreting-agency by way of singular, embodied events (CP, 2.245). With this in mind, if any quality of feeling is to follow from our encounter with Rothko’s Orange and Yellow, it must do so by way of a mediated effort. The dynamic interpretant can, therefore, be given its experiential name of energetic interpretant, which is the “effect of exertion any sign has on an interpreting agency” (CP, 5.475). However, Peirce also tells us that this exertion can be both physical and mental (CP, 5.475). As Peirce proposes: “the energetic interpretant effects a muscular or mental effort..., generating feeling and action in the inner world of an interpreting thought” (CP, 5.491). As a consequence, it is within the Secondness of singular, embodied events that an interpreting-agency enters the domain of Cartesian mind eternally divorced from body (Merrell, 2000: 22). Let us examine this in more detail, as this will enable any visual or multi-sensory method to account for the corporeally embodied construction of our affective encounters in spatio-temporal terms.

For Peirce, the interpreting-agencies mediated effort is an energetic interpretant. Consequently, and bearing in mind the relational role of mediation, it necessarily requires that two interpretants should follow from the emotional interpretant at the same time. The first of these is articulated by Peirce as being the mental energetic interpretant. This takes the emotional interpretant after its form, and is a singular occurrence or a one-time instance (sinsign) of an iconic nature. As such, and looking at this in terms of affect, it would indicate that our capacity to be affected is being exercised at that particular moment by certain qualities (Deleuze, 1992: 220). It would be similar to Spinoza’s concept of affectus in that it “measures the material equation of an interaction, and the gain and loss recorded in a body, as the result of an embodied encounter” (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 79). Here, the emphasis being on the iconic image of affectus as an embodied spatial representation of the qualities of affection in the form of a resemblance: this image becoming part of the personality of the individual.

The second principle is called a physical interpretant and, again, takes the emotional interpretant as a singular one-time occurrence. However, distinct from the iconic form of resemblance constituted in the mind, this is a muscular effort that takes form in the shape of an index which signifies that a temporal relation or correlation has been made between the affective quality and its object (Linska, 1996: 37).
It is this temporal, durational, aspect of the physical energetic interpretant that individuates the object of an event (CP, 228), and enables a new instance of thought. We are now in a position to trace out a second line, which differs from the first.

In order to establish the first we needed affections which placed our perception directly matter. That is, our perception coincided with the perceived qualities of the object, independent of our embodied perception of them and whose force of action created an existential modification in our own body. To paraphrase Deleuze: “this is caused by the mixture of the external body [of the artefact] with our own body” (Deleuze, 1988: 147). We can, therefore, imagine this same process to function semiotically in terms of emotional and energetic interpretants: existential feeling and embodied effort. Now Bergson suggests that as a consequence of our own embodiment that there can be no pure perception without affect: the latter, if taken in a Spinozian sense, linked to passions that fill affection with either a sense of joy or sadness (Moore, 1996; Deleuze, 1988). Accordingly, one the one hand, we can know our own body by perceptions from the outside; on the other hand, we know the body from the inside through affects and passions. However, there is an important distinction to be made. When affection is added to the pure perception of a qualitative impression, we no longer have instantaneous perception but a perception “impregnated by memories” which complete it as they interpret it (Bergson, 2002: 124). If this is reasoning is afforded to the Peirce’s mental energetic and physical interpretant, then, it may be possible to impart the following process within the function of dynamic meaning-making:

“Even though a perception to us seems to be short, it still takes some time and requires an inset of the memory, which merges several sequential moments into a unity. Even the “subjectivity” of the sensorial qualities consist, mainly, by contracting what is real by means of memory. In short, the memory forms in two ways the main part of our individual consciousness in perception, first by weaving the immediate sensory input into a network of remembrances, and second by contracting a plurality of moments” (Bergson, 2002: 19).

Here Bergson mentions two kinds of memory. We have, on the one hand, a specific episodic memory organised by contiguity relationships of a spatial, temporal, causal and motivational kind, and on the other, a generalising (semantic) memory, which binds the sensory impressions conceptually into one thing, or situation, or constellation of situations (Bartsch, 2005: 68). The latter, more conceptual kind of memory would, in this instance, fall within the domain of Peirce’s final interpretant: the subject of which we will look at in more detail in a moment. However, if we look at episodic memory closely we can see that it corresponds to an instantaneous slice of space and time. Peirce’s dynamic interpretant
therefore, operates by cutting the flow of sensorial becoming into the action of the past, whereby our body, as a sensory motor nexus, occupies the centre (Moulard Leonard, 2008: 35). Accordingly, within the meaning-making processes of the dynamic interpretant, the actions of past images are preserved in: “the form of motor arrangements and of motor arrangements alone” (Bergson, 2004: 77). We can in this instance, then, put forward the idea that both mental energetic and physical interpretants are involved in the recording of affection images as sensory-motor information, especially with regards to the “muscular effort” involved in this very process.

3.8. Peirce’s final interpretant: the semiotic production of symbolic laws in thought

Peirce makes it clear that the dynamic and energetic interpretant cannot articulate the meaning of a sign (CP, 5.475), only its singular effects. But energetic interpretants are integral to the establishment of logical interpretants (CP, 5.476), just in the same way that emotional interpretants are essential to the establishment of energetic interpretants (CP, 5.475). In this sense, higher-order interpretants are developed through the mediation of lower interpretants (CP, 5.475). The final interpretant is any rule like or law like effect a sign has on any interpreting agency (SS, 110). It is, Peirce notes: “the ultimate effect of the sign [insofar] as it is intended or destined, from the character of the sign, being more or less of a habitual and formal nature” (SS, 547). Its products are, therefore, thirds such as laws, dispositions, and regularities. These may be in-born (CP, 2.297) or acquired by convention (CP, 2.297; CP, 2.307) but, ultimately, their presentative or metaphysical characteristics is always that of a logical quality in the realm of thought that has the capacity to represent an object to some interpreting mind as a law: a case in point being the colour red conventionally to signal danger, love, anger, passion. It is what Peirce calls metaphysical law or a legisign.

“A Legisign is a law that is Sign. This law is usually established by men. Every conventional sign is a legisign [but not conversely]. It is not a single object, but a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant...” (Peirce, 1996: 102).

The fact that orange might conventionally be used to signal warmth and yellow to gesture happiness would, therefore, help give Orange and Yellow by Rothko a certain capacity to represent its object. In this way, a qualisign and legisign can be seen to cooperate, forming a particular semiotic component that might be called the action of orange and yellow in the mind of an interpreting agency. Following
this, its representative characteristic would be that of a symbol, which would signify the fact that the
general mode of succession has run its course, and that the triadic nature of semiosis had established
itself as a habit or acquired the status of law. However, this is not all. The subject will always progress
towards the signification of its own consistency (CP, 5.313).

3.9. A pragmatic model of experience: material encounters and the semiosis of sensation

This means that all experience and every encounter, is a guide for action. Consequently, any semiotic
experience that is unrelated to, or contradicts a previous experience, will not be easily integrated. For
example, a shock or surprise might be seen as a more passively determined dynamic interpretant
(CP, 8.315) which forcibly commands and provokes us into having an unexpected sensation, or causes
an involuntary experience to rise up and flood the event with a combination of sensation and
memory; giving it what Peirce calls a state of “contiguity” or material contact, and “unity in thought”
as a sign (CP, 5.313). Deleuze (1994) might refer to this in the following way:

“Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of
recognition but of a fundamental encounter....It may be grasped in a range of
affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary
characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense, it is opposed to
recognition” (Deleuze, 1994: 176).

This opposition to recognition is important. Recognition is a habitual element in the experience of an
encounter with any form of art, and is the welcoming acknowledgement of that which is experienced
(Clay, 2010: 93). It is opposed to the intensities that Deleuze cites here, i.e. wonder, love, hatred and
suffering, and is a powerful element of reification and the acceptance of dominant discourses, which
can enclose meaning within habits of recognition. The encounter, on the other hand, is fundamentally
deterritorializing, disrupting habits of recognition (Clay, 2010: 93) and provides what Deleuze refers to
as the: “conditions of a true critique and a true creation” (Deleuze, 1994: 139). If I refer back to our
reference to Dewey’s (2005) ideas surrounding unrestricted perception, then what Deleuze is referring
to is a method of seeing which involves the “cooperation of motor elements that serve to complete a
new perception of a the thing recognised” (Dewey, 2005: 54). But what is the method of critique, how
does it work, and why is it so important? Let us look at how it works first.
The selection of reactions of the body on the stimulations by the object or other bodies is determined by our previous experiences or as Peirce would say: “collateral experience” (CP, 2:498). In keeping with Bergson, however, these reactions do not take place without re-activating remembrances or what we might call “relics of analog events and processes” (Bartsch, 2005: 67). It is clear then, that the amount of momentary real, sensory impression, of which our perception of the external world is built, is small compared to what memory adds to it (Bergson, 2004: 56). But as the dynamic interpretant showed us in the splitting and recording of spatio-temporal events, there is also no capturing of the future of the final interpretant without an equal, respective look backwards into the past (Bergson, 2004: 56). This means that in planning and experiencing we make use of memory, the general use of memory linked to the more general concepts and routines of the motor mechanism, as well as the specific memory of individual episodes, and historical ordered causes and events indexed to muscular memory. Bergson, therefore, distinguishes between a memory based on images of repeated experiences, and a memory based on re-imagined specific, episodic images, which are integrated by contiguity relationships with surrounding episodes and especially actions (Bartsch, 2005: 67).

The mental and physical interpretant of embodied experience, therefore, provides a synthesis which connects the final interpretant to the past in the form of habit, and to another past in the sense that temporality creates a durational or, rather, thick present, so that we perceive the immediate past on the backside of the instant. In the first, repeating memory distinguishes general images based on the fact that it repeats spatially stored perceptions and generalizations of repeated actions and routines. That is, habitual memory informs a recollection. Subsequently, a temporal re-imagining memory thus follows the general repeating memory which provides repeated images for the re-imagining memory; this initiated by sensory input, actions and routines, and which informs the side of representation. We therefore have two forms of memory which provide two forms of recognition that both inform each other in any one encounter. While the former is a passing present that is always already past, the latter is a past that is in the process of becoming present for the sake of the future i.e., utility (Moulard-Leonard, 2008: 39). Indeed, Deleuze’s (2008) analysis of Proust’s work shows us that life is frequently immersed in these episodes of the imagination, produced by way of an interaction between current, situational impressions, and remembrances.

As a viewer moves through the spatialized effects of Rothko’s Orange and Yellow they are continually buffeted by a quantitative affectus, and images and/or feeling ideas of a qualitative nature. However, what this actually does is thrust the viewer into a sensational proximity with the painting. This makes the viewer complicit with it. Indeed, the means by which the proximity of intensities is produced and
conveyed to the beholder are manifest in a brute fact that incites cultural references, which enables the reception of qualisigns to be discursively enunciated through symbolic means. However, the rapid shock of the production of this percept can also incur an “involuntary experience” (CP, 5.475). As such, whereas our voluntary recollections are merely isolated snapshots of past episodes of lived experience and represent individual sensory events that have been abstracted from their context, and can be recalled at will, involuntary memories involve an entire nexus of sensations, thoughts and impressions of the past (Epstein, 2004: 217-218). As a consequence, in contrast to our spontaneous remembering, involuntary remembering conceptualizes the situation. That is to say, the situation is understood as a special episode (Bartsch, 2005: 112). As Deleuze (2008) explains:

“That we do not proceed from an actual present to the past, that we do not recompose the past with various presents, but that we place ourselves, directly, in the past itself. That this past does not represent something that has been, but simply something that is and that coexists with itself as present” (Deleuze, 2008: 38).

Consequently, when we encounter a painting there is a real possibility that its spatialialized effects or qualities can cause an involuntary memory to intervene as an old sensation tries to superimpose itself, and unite with the present sensation and “extend it over several epochs at once” (Deleuze, 2008: 40). The operation of involuntary memory, therefore, works by coupling together the present sensation of an encountered force - the force of affection itself - and the past sensation of an altogether different collateral experience. What manifests is a reminiscence that is irreducible to either sensation; a type of intensive memory irreducible to both the past as well as the present, the formation of which giving us an experience especially rich in “aesthetic quality” (Deleuze, 2008: 47). Namely, in taking a quality which is common to the two sensations, the sensation common to two moments, involuntary memory rises to make their relation internally subjective and, in so doing, recalls something that was previously presented to experience and presents it in a form that is absolutely different and new (Deleuze, 2008: 35). An example of which is perfectly depicted by Proust’s sensorial experience of tasting a Madeleine in the novel In Search of Lost Time:

“No sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched my palate than a shudder ran through me and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary thing that was happening to me. An exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses, something isolated, detached, with no suggestion of its origin. And at once the vicissitudes of life had become indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory – this new sensation having had on me the effect which love has of filling me with a precious essence; or rather this
essence was not in me it was me. I had ceased to feel mediocre, contingent, mortal. Whence could it have come to me, this all powerful joy? I sensed that it was connected with the taste of the tea and this cake, but that it infinitely transcended those savours, could, no, indeed, be of the same nature. Whence did it come? What did it mean? How could I seize and apprehend it? ...

And suddenly the memory revealed itself. The taste was that of the little piece of Madeleine which on Sunday mornings at Combray (because on those mornings I did not go out before mass), when I went to say good morning to her in her bedroom, my aunt Léonie used to give me, dipping it first in her own cup of tea or tisane. The sight of the little madeleine had recalled nothing to my mind before I tasted it. And all from my cup of tea” (Proust, 1981: 48).

But here we can observe something else going on. The self with all its current interests is not involved within the context of bringing about the conceptualization of the object encountered. Instead, a past situation is re-lived with emphasis on its sensorial qualities. It internalizes the context, and makes the past context inseparable from the present sensation. Furthermore, at the same time, the resemblance between two moments is transcended, and given a more profound identity in the form of difference. The object of the reminiscence rises up again in the present sensation in which its difference from the past sensation is internalized (Deleuze, 2008: 39). Consequently, this amounts to a form of critique in that there is no judgement or evaluation under the present encounter that can be attributed to either goal-directness or the controlling activity of a reflexive self (Bartsch, 2005: 112). That is, it provides a particular form of critique in that it reveals the differential truth of place, of a moment. But, similarly, the encounter is also general, in the sense that it grants this revelation in a sensation common to two places, two moments (Deleuze, 2008: 40). As Deleuze further states: “the essence of Combray would not be realized in the recovered flavour of the madeleine, if there had not first been a real contiguity between the madeleine as it was tasted in Combray as it was present” (Deleuze, 2008: 41). If we were to formulate the conditions of critique in this instance, then, it would be founded on the nature of the essence. In Proust’s example, this would be the essence of joy.

As such, getting something out of a work of art does not mean learning about it abstractly. Rather, it means investigating ourselves: “we should be ready to look into ourselves in response to what we see” (De Botton, 2013: 72). Yet, this is not a reflexive investigation based on recognition. Everything depends on and derives from an affirmative conception of essence, and the choice of this essence in terms of its dependence of external data which refers in the last instance to experiential states of joy or even sadness (Deleuze, 1988: 102): the latter implying a “zone of indetermination” that allows for
a durational *a priori* estimate between external affections that act on our body and those passions of affect that we frame and select in accordance with our needs (Bergson, 2004: 23).

It is this indexing of subjective variation that communicates our capacity to be affected, delaying our reactions in the act of weaving the immediate sensory input into a network of remembrances, and contracting a plurality of moments (Bergson, 2004: 19). As a consequence, instead of judging artworks from predefined schemas or symbolic concepts of logic, the question now turns to what viewers desire, and what they produce in relation to an encounter.

Earlier we saw that involuntary memory sets up a resonance between two remote objects. In Proust’s example, it was a notable resonance between the Madeleine dipped in tea, and the town of Combray. However, through these impressions it was found that Combray did not conceal a past sensation, but a truth and splendour that never had an equivalent in reality (Deleuze, 2008: 37). The image, then, is not simply a remembered episode, it is redesigned, producing something new and different (Bergson, 2004: 83). This is because in the case of sensuous signs they are related to the operations of Firstness and - if by way Deleuze and Spinoza’s reasoning - refer to the *effort* of desire and the iconic figures of the imagination (Deleuze, 2008: 98) before presenting themselves as an involuntary brute fact in the form of Secondness. Indeed, since Spinoza regards the imagination as a form of existential awareness of our own body mixing with affection or other bodies, then the inter-relation between Firstness and Secondness essentially involves desire. That is, “desire is a subject’s essence insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, to do something” (Gatens & Lloyd, 1997: 27). This *something* is an action, which organizes the chaos of affections that continually impress their qualities upon our body into an immaterial unity: a unity of “common notions” which determine the “essence” of the moment i.e., joy or sadness (Deleuze, 1988: 262). Our encounters with art, through the force of sensuous signs, can therefore break the subjective aspect of reflexive recognition, to produce a more spiritual equivalent; the essence of a time regained as it was never seen before.

In regards to young people’s encounters with art, the incorporation of Peircean semiotics into multi-sensory approaches to museum and gallery space, allows educationists and researchers to view young people as active co-producers of art and culture. Indeed, unlike some phenomenological approaches that take cultural models of perception as their starting point (Howes & Classen, 1991; Howes, 2003) a Peircean analysis of young people’s visual experiences would not, as Ingold (2000) writes, reduce the body to a “locus of objectified and enumerable sense whose one and only role is to carry the semantic
load projected onto them by a collective, super-sensory subject – namely society” (Ingold, 2000: 284) but show how art and culture can be subjected to the active power of a lived body, and the productive semiosis of becoming-in-the-moment. With that in mind, art and culture becomes an inter-relational, inter-dependent encounter with different semiotic modalities, both inner and outer.

From this point of view, a painting would not impose its vision upon young people as a continuation of its own sovereign existence (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 131). That is, a painting would not be looked at as having an essence or truth in and of itself, independent of the subject. But this does not mean that truth is contained within young people as viewing subjects. If this were true, then meaning, emphasis or emotions attached to “ways of seeing” by marginalized and segregated young people would create a cultural model of perception (Howe, 2003), and the assumption that various social deprivations are attached to each of the modalities of perception (Pink, 2009: 12). Indeed, this would create the idea that marginalized young people continually perceive themselves as being in a state of crisis, that crisis is their dominant method of seeing and engaging with their environment, and that various groups or “cultures in crisis” need to be strategically regulated and governed through policy discourses steeped in risk, lack, and salvation (Hickey-Moody, 2013b).

3.10. Conclusion

When Foucault talked of visualities, then, he was mainly concerned with the image: an image being the idea of an affection which makes an object known to us only by its effect. In the strictest sense, this image can be seen as an imprint, a trace or a physical impression: an affection of the body itself. However, such knowledge is not knowledge in the strictest sense of the word. It is not a conceptual or even intellectual kind of knowledge; although they are involved in our power of thinking. It is not as if affections “explain” or “express” the objective essence of an external body; for that we have to resort to discursive formations or statements, which would articulate and express such dynamic and abstract principles as if they were defining features of socially governed relations. With this in mind, all visualities must be understood as part of an affective and, intra-active relationship, with material objects and artefacts. That is, seeing and knowing should be understood as resulting from a semiotic or sign process where the material and discursive are mutually implicated in the dynamics of semiosis or what Barad (2007) calls: the dynamics of intra-activity (Barad, 2007: 152). As she explains:
“The relationship between the material and the discursive is one of mutual entailment. Neither discursive practices nor material phenomena are ontologically or epistemologically prior. Neither can be explained in terms of the other. Neither is reducible to the other. Neither is articulated or articulable in the absence of the other; matter and meaning are mutually articulated” (Barad, 2007: 152).

The sign itself cannot be understood independently of the processes in which it occurs, namely, sign-action. But the way in which Pierce conceives of sign-action transmutes into numerous definitions of signs. Unfortunately, this puts us into an entirely different world of ethereal abstractions and theory, which is often compounded by Peirce’s own inability to communicate his ideas and his own concepts and language effectively (CP, 5.271). Nevertheless, a consistent thread that runs throughout Peirce’s work is the triadic nature of signs occurring in strict relation: a first term represents the second term to a third term or, more concretely, the sign represents the object to the interpretant, which then in a process of “ratiocination” or reasoning, becomes a sign called a representamen - signalling that the entire triadic process must start again. However, when an interpretant turns into a representamen it is not a representation. This is because the “semiotically real objects” that form our sense of smell or taste, our sense of touch, sight and sound, can never be identical to what we might call the “really real objects” in our physical world. Our knowledge of the world can never be absolute (Merrell, 2000: 12). Rather, it is a mixture of affects, sensations, habits and memory that forms a mediating approximation of meaning in a process of transcendental becoming.

Through our efforts so far, we have seen that that the cultural arts present us with an opportunity to challenge the idea that recognition and representation as has a fixed position with regards to learning and subjectivity. That is, the cultural arts should not be approached as a small world protected and cut off from the rest of the practices and events in everyday life. But that they are open to the movement and experimentation of our own bodily logic, and potentially new ways of seeing and talking. Ways of seeing and talking about the art and artefacts which not only deconstructs discursive codes and habits, but actually connect them together in new and unexpected ways. From this point of view, the cultural arts, society, as well as pedagogy, is seen as process of experimentation rather than a contract. In the next chapter, then, we will look at methodological strategies that might allow us to vitalize thought and practice in strategies of pedagogical visualization when engaging youth and young subjectivities.
Chapter 4

Methodological Approach: A Strategy for New Visual Narratives in a Devolved Museum and Gallery Space

New conditions in post-devolution Wales have reinvigorated debates not only about citizenship and identity, but have also opened up cultural spaces, such as the visual arts, to the potential development of new social representations with regards to art education (Ivinson, 2005: 47). That is to say, in post-devolution Wales, the visual arts have been sufficiently deterritorialized, so as to open the arts up to the recovery of new visual narratives and new forms of social representation. As Lord (2000) stated in his discussion paper, Imaging the Nation: “the culture of Wales is in a process of re-shaping itself, of redefining itself, perhaps even re-inventing itself” (Lord, 2000: 9). With that in mind, post-devolution in Wales has led to a re-evaluation of the specific set-up between material bodies, in the form of the visual arts, and ways of seeing and speaking about cultural spaces. Whereas prior to post-devolution, the visual arts in Wales surveyed, sustained and produced identities of social class, ethnicity, gender, etc. under the discursive “presence” of UK governance, the re-appropriation of visual culture in post-devolution Wales can be likened to a re-appropriation of the material effects of aesthetic space. The advent of post-devolution in Wales, then, opens up new possibilities in terms of using the operations and functions of the visual arts, to regenerate and democratize both physical and mental landscapes, and the way in which we relate to our encounters with art.

The dominant notion in the field of education and, indeed, art education is that there is a gap between what is understood as theory and practice (Nelson, 2013; Olsson, 2009). As such, theory and practice often constitute a binary opposition in the way we often think about and do learning. These principles, however, are not unfamiliar to academic writing. Moreover, in the literature on academic writing, for example, the constructed binary divide puts forward a dominant thinking which sets out standardised norms of “correct” academic writing often geared towards, as Richardson (1997) claims: a “totalizing vision” of academic writing (Richardson, 1997: 13) but also complexity reduction (Taguchi, 2010: 142). With this in mind, then, and following current educational projects and research trends in Stockholm (Dahlberg & Bloch, 2006, Olsson, 2009; Reggio, 2008; Taguchi, 2010) the present Chapter will explore a methodological strategy towards art education programming which will develop, and use, a hybrid-writing process. That is, by mixing a traditional methodological scheme with theoretical imports I will disclose the production of meaning in relation to operational consequences.
4.0. Reclaiming art education through movement and process

The research carried out in this study, then, concerns the use of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in relation to the field of art education. What kind of validity can this research claim for such a research effort? Well, this question will be seen in relation to the reasoning outlined above, on the recovery of new visual narratives, but also in relation to sense, problems and solutions. Here, the recovery of new ways of seeing and speaking about art in the cultural space of Wales’ National Museum Cardiff will be set against any transcendent or conceptual approach, which would otherwise restrict practice to the critical application of concepts, whilst also attempting to recover new visual narratives by positioning young people’s “aesthetic” experiences within argument, analysis, and the application of theoretical ideas (Smith & Dean, 2009: 4).

Consequently, in this study the idea of new visual narratives will be explored by looking at how young people construct sense in relation to sensed affects. That is, the entire research is, from this viewpoint, about formulating a visual narrative that approaches art entirely as a relational surface, which operates by presenting ontological questions in the form of “aesthetically” derived affections. This means that the conclusions or solutions that are presented through the visual narratives of young people must be evaluated in terms of a “construction of a problem” in relation to their sense, and not from a position of being true or false (Olsson, 2009: 123). As a result, when applying this theoretical perspective, and evaluating the construction of visual narratives of young people, educationists and researchers should be mindful that other categories other than true and false can be used.

By approaching visual social phenomena through aesthetically derived affections, and using the visual to study “sense” events under construction, rather than taking an authoritative position of producing generalisable categories, which would implicate the researcher’s “thread of power” into how young people’s visual narratives both relate to, and/or have a stake in the world (Haraway, 2003: 110), this research methodology, necessarily, folds into its endeavour “the crisis of representation” (Henriques et al, 1984; Hall, 1997). As Thomson (2008) explains, this “crisis” is generally taken to mean that life is both lived and premised through “language games” (Derrida, 1976, 1978; Wittgenstein, 1976), where language and language systems (i.e. words, numbers, images, movement etc) are an approximation of the material world, rather than an exact equivalent (Thomson, 2008: 9).
As a Consequence, if notions foundational to research and scientific endeavour, such as “objectivity,” “truth,” and “fact,” are undermined (Philips & Burbules, 2000; Game & Metcalfe, 1996; Scheurich, 1997; Silverman, 1997) then it naturally entails that questions of reliability, validity, and truthfulness are less straightforward (cited Thomson, 2008: 9). Hence, a new way of thinking about and doing research is required.

With this in mind, and what I would like to acknowledge at this point, is that this research endeavour, by focusing on movement, experimentation, and the interrelationship and interdependency between visually produced affects and “sense” events is not an attempt to create “truths” about marginalized youth and young people, but an account of bodily logic as a logic of motion which is methodologically, empirically, and theoretically convincing (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000: 97). Furthermore, it is an attempt to create a science of semiotic interconnections, which can map a young person’s material encounter with art through a-signifying affects (Guattari, 1995: 64), sensory becomings, and the performance of energetic-spatio-temporal mediation. Hence, by installing itself at the very foundation of the subject-object relation (Guattari, 1995: 64) it will endeavour to give meaning to material phenomena through the embodied formation of sensation and memory (Guattari, 1995: 27).

As a result, unlike other methodological approaches, which have attempted to analyse visual images and movement in relation to empirical research practice (Coleman & Ringrose, et al, 2013; Coleman, 2011; Ingold, 2011; Munster, 2006; O’Sullivan, 2006) this research will not set about documenting or explaining the relation between bodies and images by displacing the subject/object model for a logic of becoming (Coleman, 2008) but, rather, situate a logic of becoming in between the subject-object relation. The consequence of this is that the empirical analysis will construct a general law of motion, movement and change, rather than a law of identity, whereby young people’s experiential accounts can be positioned in a definite relationship to those theoretical and conceptual notions of experience reflexively drawn out by the researcher. Furthermore, young people’s experiences will be presented as process involved in the transformation of material conditions, rather than something separate, isolated, and detached.

For instance, in research where the relation between body and image has been investigated through bodily motion, and the transformative potential of bodily processes (Coleman & Ringrose, et al, 2013; Ingold, 2011; Olsson, 2009) there is still a prevalence to frame narrative and documented accounts of an image as being equal to a concept (Sewell & Woods, 2000: 9) - the fundamental error, here, being
that if an experience of say, image A, is equal to concept A, then A cannot be equal to concept B or C.
That is, it does not show how experiences and concepts are in a constant state of motion and change through the process of becoming-in-the-moment. In contrast to this idea, then, I will look at how an image, as a quantity of affectus (Hickey-Moody, 2013b) related to an aesthetic surface, is transformed into a quality of experience through the semiotic activity of interrelated signs and concepts, and how this movement produces a change of state (Sewell & Woods, 2000: 9) in young people’s subjectivities.

4.1. Valleys Kids

The sample group in this study was recruited from Valleys Kids. Located in a de-industrialised mining community in South Wales, Valleys Kids is centred in the heart of the Rhondda Valleys. Once famous for its high levels of coal production, the Rhondda Valleys currently rank as one of the most deprived areas of Europe: the community suffering from high levels of multiple deprivations. With this in mind, the purpose of Valleys Kids is to offer a variety of community and art based initiatives aimed at young people at risk from the negative effects of de-industrialisation, many of whom face an extensive range of complex social problems such as drugs, alcohol abuse, alienation etc: all of which have a negative effect on young people’s education and life choices (http://valleyskids.org). As a result, and although Valleys Kids does not fit into a traditional model of art based education, it does utilize the creative arts to cultivate problem-posing pedagogies (Freire, 2001) which work within the definition of the Welsh governments approach to using arts to alleviate poverty.

The aim of Valleys Kids, then, is to explore and transform potentially alienating fantasies of inferiority and failure, caused by de-industrialisation and the enduring harm of urban degeneration - the central medium for this dynamic refashioning of young people’s subjectivities being the use of play, as Lloyd George (1926) said:

“The right to play is the child’s first claim on life. No community can infringe that right without doing deep and enduring harm to the minds and bodies of its citizens” (cited http://valleyskids.org).

Play is often the first doorway into the world of Valleys Kids, and is used as a co-productive strategy to organise collaborative work between young people and Valleys Kids staff. Using this method, both young people and Valleys Kids staff work together to create new forms of expression, which critically
explore ideas, concepts, hopes, doubts, values and challenges that are lived, felt, and experienced in the Rhondda Valleys. Indeed, whether it is through the medium of photography, drama, dance, music film or creative writing, the activity of play and creativity creates a climate for dialogue and increases the scope of critical perception towards previously inconspicuous events and phenomena. The value of play, then, is that it allows Valleys Kids to co-produce thematic diversification related to the epoch or historical theme of de-industrialization but, moreover, play formulates its own projects which can often pose problems for pre-existing discourses surrounding de-industrialisation and social exclusion because meaning-making is produced by using the raw materials of lived experiences i.e. ideas which are affectively traced on the memorial narratives and personal biographies. Consequently, whereas a political discourse surrounding arts based intervention may remain silent until they find the necessary language to form people into semiotically well-defined bodies (Genosko, 2009: 40), Valleys Kids takes more of a co-productive approach art based practice in order to problematize the existential order of de-industrialisation as a “limit-situation” (Freire, 2001). Furthermore, the problematic effects of urban degeneration can, therefore, cease to exist objectively, and assume the character of a problem to be solved.

According to Dahlberg and Moss (2005), we live in a time when it has become of highest importance to raise questions of the possibilities of social institutions for young people; particularly with regards to museums and galleries. For Massumi (2003) this is more of a political question concerned with how the affective potential of institutions can practiced on through acts of unpredictable experimentation to explore unknown and unexpected ways of thinking, talking and doing (Massumi, 2003: 20). The issue then, is no longer about using social institutions, such as museums and galleries, to help young people reproduce culture, identity, and knowledge in a completely de-contextualized way, rather, it is about using institutions, everyday situations, and the ready-at-hand, to explore how experiences of agency relating to corporeality can be harnessed for educational purposes, and used to bridge the gap which exists between social institutions and lived experience.

With this in mind, this study will attempt to understand how de-industrialized corporeal identities are affectively practiced (Walkerdine, 2010) by a group of young people from the Rhondda Valleys. Affects can be seen as entanglements of intra-acting phenomena (Barad, 2007), located in time, history, and place. That is, a composite of duration and memory, which adds the past to an immediate perception or affect (Bergson, 2004: 310). So, and as Invison and Renold (2013) also explain in their research on gendered experiences and agency de-industrialised communities, when we consider the practices that
young people undertake in de-industrialized locales, we have to see these as affective practices which carry historical traces of the past, and in our case, an industrial past (Invison & Renold, 2013: 710). To capture these dimensions in an affective pedagogy, then, is to explore the dimensions of community life through the affective dimensions of a museum and gallery locale. In turn, art and cultural artefacts cannot be separated from the places, history, and corporality of post-industrial bodies. Furthermore, it implies that art and artefact can become a tool for a politics of belonging.

4.2. Pedagogical documentation: a democratic approach to contemporary art education

The research being undertaken in the present study is situated in the discipline of pedagogical work. As stated in the introduction, since the beginning of the twentieth century, our relationship with art has been weakened by a profound institutional reluctance to address the question of what art is for (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 1). This has created problems not only in the way art is taught but also in how art is theorised, researched, and presented by the art establishment. However, it is my belief that pedagogical work can go some way into addressing these problems. The discipline itself is fairly new, and has emerged as a prominent feature in the Swedish curricula since the National Agency for Education (2006) set an educational policy of active democratic citizenship. Here, “democracy forms the basis of the national school system” (National Agency for Education, 2006, 3), with the discipline of pedagogical work finding its use through the democratisation of knowledge in the classroom. It is by no means, however, simply concerned with teaching pupils about democracy. Rather, it is a case of getting young people actively involved in the production of democratic principles.

With this in mind, then, and in accordance with John Dewey’s (1937) sentiments on democracy that, besides being a political form, the use of pedagogical documentation is also treated as a way of life in the Swedish curricula. But how can this sit alongside art education, and contemporary art practices? An interesting example is provided by the Museum of Contemporary Art of Barcelona, Spain (MACBA)
4.3. Art, subjectivity and learning: using relational pedagogies to problematize contemporary art space

Using art as a social, political and democratic tool is a pedagogical practice that has formed an integral part of the methodological practices informing the Museum of Contemporary Art of Barcelona, Spain (MACBA) Independent Studies Program (PEI). Since 2008, the (PEI) has been a central pivot between the museum and university, continually rejecting the traditional division between knowledge and the more traditional museum-based logic of the cultural industries. In that sense, it also rejects the desire to educate an “educational workforce” in a neoliberal context (http://www.macba), instead fulfilling the need for a pedagogy based on “subaltern forms of knowledge” (Preciado, 2014: 3) with emphasis on critical theory, political imaginations, and micro-political experimentation; most notably informed by figures such as Surely Rolnik, Lygia Clark, and Felix Guattari (Preciado, 2014: 5) - the latter forms of pedagogy converging therapy and art theory, with the aim of approaching art practices as a means of experimenting with the production of subjectivity. Accordingly, the aim of (PEI) is to explore the field of artistic practices connecting art to the human sciences but also to social, political, and institutional intervention (http://www.macba). Indeed, one of the ways in which it does this is through a series of collective workshops.

“The PEI is organised around a series of collective workshops linked to MACBA archives or exhibitions, which allow students to begin specific research projects in the academic or production fields, depending on their interests. Through the workshops, students actively participate in creating a group (or individual) project in an institutional context, based around a specific exhibition or archive or the MACBA Collection” (http://www.macba).

The programme is conceived as an interdisciplinary education forum that can prepare participants to embark on critical professional work in the field of art and culture. With it, the notion of knowledge as private property is challenged through “radical” and “militant” pedagogies which are commitment to continuously redefining classrooms, research seminars and workshops as democratic spaces. This also includes a questioning of the hegemonic exhibition apparatus, together with the omnipresent figure of the curator. Instead, by working on the very borders of the museum, and restoring forms of subjective appropriation of artistic methods in processes outside of the museum, that is, the necessary removal of art from its traditional elitists pedestal towards groups within the community who would not usually visit a museum of contemporary art (Ribalta, 2004: 9), the (PEI) enables MACBA to collectively invent new languages and technologies of dissident subjectivation for its collections (Preciado, 2014: 1).
museum is, therefore, approached as a research laboratory in which art engages with critical practices and with social production.

By appropriating artistic space and redrawing its cognitive architecture MACBA attempts to transform the ideas of the museum itself. This approach, in which the interactive, relational and/or participatory practices towards the arts can, therefore, be seen as a type of contemporary art practice also known as relational aesthetics (Bourriaud, 1998). For example, MACBA feels that in order for museums and galleries to develop effective policies that address social exclusion, they first need to understand how an persons knowledge and experience of reality affectively intertwined with their “relational sphere” (Marxen 2009). With this in mind, museum and gallery artefacts are considered part and parcel of our everyday social relationships. That is, the affective transitivity between artwork and viewer creates a sphere of sociability that represents today’s aesthetic objects (Bourriaud, 1998: 28).

Nicholas Bourriaud’s (1998) *Relational Aesthetics* is not so much a method but a manifesto that takes the idea of participatory art - where neither object nor the beholder is the focus of our attention - and looks at how those working in the contemporary arts might use the concept of relationality to create social exchanges and, potentially, alternative forms of sociability. That is, the criterion of co-existence, as the very act of creation, which takes place between a readymade work of art and an individual, is a space of temporal and affective relations that brings together, or as Bourriaud says coalesces, the past and the present in a sensory encounter (Bourriaud, 1998: 84). Here, we might turn to Deleuze’s (1978) example of Spinoza’s social affectus in continuous variation for additional clarification:

“In the street I run into Pierre, for whom I feel hostility, I pass by and say hello to Pierre, or perhaps I am afraid of him, and then I suddenly see Paul who is very, very charming, and I say hello to Paul reassuringly and contentedly... When I pass from the idea of Pierre to the idea of Paul, I say that my power of acting is increased; when I pass from the idea of Paul to the idea of Pierre, I say that my power of acting is diminished. Which comes down to saying that when I see Pierre, I am affected with sadness; when I see Paul, I am affected with joy” (Deleuze, 1978: 3).

In this extract, the notion of affectus depicts the operation of continuous variation in a subject’s body upon encountering another body. Moreover, this continuous melodic line of variation constitutes the force of a subject’s existence, insofar as the variation is determined by the ideas the subject has, and the way in which those ideas are continuously affected between the two pole passions of joy and sadness (Deleuze, 1978: 3-4). As Deleuze further explains:
When I pass from the idea of Pierre to the idea of Paul, I say that my power of acting is increased; when I pass from the idea of Paul to the idea of Pierre, I say that my power of acting is diminished. Which comes down to saying that when I see Pierre, I am affected with sadness; when I see Paul, I am affected with joy (Deleuze, 1978: 4).

Such an encounter can easily be applied to Bourriaud’s (1998) idea of relational art. That is, like inter-human relations, the notion of including the other (i.e. a readymade work of art) in the self is not just a theme, it is critical to our understanding of an artwork as a form of social exchange and a transitive ethic, this representing the democratization of the visual image (Bourriaud, 1998: 23). As Bourriaud explains: “art lies in its ability to produce a sense of human existence” (Bourriaud, 1998: 53). Hence, if I apply the same principle to art, as Deleuze does to forms of social interaction, then by passing from one art object to another, say for instance in a museum and gallery, and in accordance with the whole time of ideas which succeed one another, then our power of acting or force of existing will increase or diminish in a continuous manner (Deleuze, 1978: 4). But this also allows for the ethical and political problematization of art.

As Deleuze (1978) points out, for Spinoza, the notion of ethics is a problem of power, never a problem of duty (Deleuze, 1978: 9). Hence, Deleuze’s fundamental question: “how does it happen that people in power [pouvoir], in whatever domain, need to affect us in a sad way?” (Deleuze, 1978: 4). That is to say, the activity of “inspiring sad passions is necessary for the exercise of power...sadness is the affect insofar as it involves the diminution of [our] power of acting” (Deleuze, 1978: 4). Consequently, if this premise is equally applied to Bourriaud’s (1998) concept of relational art, in that art should be seen in terms of an aesthetic experience being offered (Bourriaud, 1998: 43), then it takes on a more political dimension when considered through the whole time of ideas, which succeed one another during our encounters with art, and where this encounter can increase or diminish our force of existing (Deleuze, 1978: 4).

Ultimately, then, through Relational Aesthetics our encounters with art enlists the act of constructing theories from the reminiscences or emotive memories of our aesthetic exchanges: these functioning as a form of political activism because they “lead to the experimental realization of energy in everyday social settings” (Bourriaud, 1998: 84) and how this increases or diminishes our capacity to act when it is expressed through affective pathways, and the sensorial reminiscences connected to individual and collective histories.
It is not so much that we have ideas when we look at art objects but that ideas are affirmed in us by the affective dimension of the artwork. This affective practice, itself, has a social dimension in that all our affective encounters involve a mixture of bodies: every mixture of bodies, that is, the surface body of an artwork and the body of the viewer, being what we might call affection, an idea or “image” which indicates the nature of a viewer modified body in terms of joy or sadness. Here, Guattari’s reference to Spinoza adds further clarification:

“From the fact that we imagine someone like us to be affected, we are affected with a like affect,’ from which resulted what [Spinoza] called an emulation of desire’ and the unfolding of multi-polar affective compositions” (Guattari, 1995: 204).

That fact that an artwork impresses on our imagination an action or effect, produced by a mixture of two bodies, and forces the viewer to desire a form of action related to the sensorial trace received by our haptic vision, means that artistic forms should no longer be approached as coherent credible units or as independent discursive structures, ideologically harmonizing features of the world in the form of pre-determined sense and meaning, rather, form is the creative imaginings that take shape during the an encounter with an artwork or artefact. As Bourriaud (1998) explains:

“Unlike an object that is closed in on itself by the intervention of a style and a signature, present day art shows that form only exists in the encounter and in the dynamic relationship enjoyed by an artistic proposition with other formations, artistic or otherwise” (Bourriaud, 1998: 42).

It is this emphasis on the dynamic organisation and “formation” of aesthetic experience, rather than the artwork itself, which is important for this project. Relational art moves away from the old artistic strategies that try to establish relations between the audience and the art object by way of meaning and representations and instead places renewed emphasis on the lived processes of the “encounter” or, rather, the interaction between object and subject. Like Dewey’s (2005) theory of aesthetics, the real work of art is the sensuous formation of a continuous experience built up in perception, moving in constant change and development with the qualities perceived, placing us in direct relation to the external. As Dewey (2005) declares: “the real work of art is the building up of an integral experience out of the interaction of organic and environmental conditions and energies” (Dewey, 2005 67). It is
no longer acts of critical reflection that matter, but rather the dialogue that takes place within direct experience: this being the coalescence between object and subject.

Consequently, this becomes significantly more important than the reified ideas and representations that are imposed on us as a viewer. Indeed, when working with museum and galley spaces, as a site for youth interventions, educationists and/or researchers must consider the beholder as the one who makes the artwork. This proposition might seem to borrow from Duchamp’s notion of “cultural displacement” where one culture, for example, the institutional arts and its art forms, is displaced by the cultural production of another, through the manipulation of signifiers and conceptual structures (Zepke, 2008; D’Alleva, 2005). For instance, the retinal choosing of one object or work amongst many (Lazzarato, 2011: 47) and its turning into new types of discursive-information (Zepke, 2008: 36).

However, here, *Relational Aesthetics* takes things one step further. That is, by postulating dialogue as the actual origin of the image-making process, rather than just conceptual information, all readymade objects are approached in terms of their ontological function instead of their epistemological function (Guattari, 1995: 77). Accordingly, the difference is this. Art, as the simple act of “choosing” one object amongst many, which indicates that a conceptual decision has been made and, thus, reveals its epistemological condition as a nominated truth, is instead determined by the relational trajectory of the affectual (Guattari, 1995: 66) and its manifestation through feelings as memories.

By using a relational approach to art, then, young people’s expressions become indiscernible from the spatio-temporal reality created by affect (Zepke, 2008: 34). As a result, young people’s expressions go beyond the “linguistic turn” and the content distinctions that underlie more representational schemas (Zepke, 2008: 34). Rather, young people’s expressive accounts coincide more with what Benjamin calls “dialectical images,” where the past and present both emerge at the same time (Benjamin, 1991: 45) to produce involuntary reminiscences, or feelings as memories, which express emotionally contained histories and social references (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012). Hence, in terms of museum and gallery art, young people are no longer monopolised by those omniscient curatorial voices which are trained to verbalize experiences on the viewer’s behalf. Instead, questions arise as to what sort of democratic and ethical concerns inform the ontological function. Questions such as:

“Does an artwork give a [young person] the chance to exist in front of it, or does it deny them as a subject? Does the space-time factor suggested by the work, together with the laws that govern it, tally with a [young person’s]
aspirations in life? Does it criticise what is deemed criticisable? And could we live in a space-time structure corresponding to in reality?” (Bourriaud, 1998: 57).

4.4. Transcendental empiricism: an alternative methodological approach

The first thing I felt about this issue in discussion of art and art education was that it was necessary to examine how this relation might be constituted. Although, it might be argued that the fostering of an active citizenship has been a significant feature of educational documents in liberal state curriculums for some time (Lindblad, 2002, 94), the steering of pedagogical documentation in the Swedish school system points out different kinds of methods and democratic knowledge to achieve active democratic citizenship, often with a desire to experiment in and through processes of action, so as to create new ways of thinking about democratic principles (Vinterek, 2010). Developing this theme, Taguchi (2010) sources the “material turn” as an active agent in such practices. Contrary to the linguistic turn, which understands reality as conditioned by collectively constructed discourses that structure a conceptual order in language, thereby constituting our practices and realities, the material turn builds on this but goes further by including the material environment - such as objects and artefacts, spaces and places that we occupy in our daily practice - as a dynamic force in the on-going production of discourse and reality (Taguchi, 2010: 12). This means that material objects and artefacts can be understood as being part of the performative production of forces of affection.

In the previous chapter, the concept of affect was presented, and put to work, in order to account for movement as preceding positions. In this chapter, a schizoanalytic approach to art, and museum and gallery education, will be used to explore subjectivity and learning in a relational field. Schizoanalysis, as we saw in the last chapter, can be used to advance beyond the material aspects of a surface, so as to explore its intensive, virtual and affective features. It is, therefore, an approach which attempts to “show the imperceptible” (Deleuze, 1995: 45) by bridging the gap within each encounter, that is, the intervening space between the sensible and the intelligible, which is otherwise known as the “event” of an experience.

Here, then, the relational impetus of schizoanalysis allows us to explore Deleuze's (1995) method of transcendental empiricism in relation to subjectivity and leaning in art education - empirical because it has to account for the insertion of a sensible unconscious into consciousness, and transcendental
because the foundation of empirical principles are left outside the common faculties of perception as we transcend them in practice (Semetsky, 2013: 79). Thus, the concept of “schizoaanalysis” is used in this study to account for the ongoing work of collective, intense, and unpredictable experimentation that takes place in between practice and research. The issue of which informs the second structuring statement:

2) In art education all participants – children, teachers, teacher students, teacher educators and researchers - can work together through collective, intense and unpredictable experimentation. In this process art educationists and learners are caught up in a relational field. For this to be theoretically workable, the reliance on the transcendent principle of conscious critique needs to be rethought and reinforced by other possible and alternative scientific methods.

From the perspective of transcendental empiricism - as it is being treated in this study - a researcher cannot put a theory into practice. Moreover, what is needed is a kind of encounter in between theory and practice, where neither has the right to function as a highest organizing or defining principle in a collaborative process of learning through experimentation (Olsson, 2009: 97). Indeed, in a discussion with Foucault, Deleuze (2004d) informs us that the relationship between theory and practice can often end up being a totalizing relationship between those who speak, and those who act. Likewise, theory, according to Deleuze, always runs into a brick wall. As Deleuze, explains: “impediments create a need for a theory to be relayed by another kind of discourse, eventually causing the theory to migrate from one domain to another” (Deleuze, 2004d: 207). Consequently, neither theory nor practice must totally embrace, explain, apply or be the cause of the other (Olsson, 2009: 97). That is, to use transcendental empiricism as a method is to create the conditions of thinking no greater than what is thought about in the moment of an encounter. This means attending to the sensorial qualities of an encounter in its relation to its environing conditions.

4.5. Collecting empirical data

This study will use psychogeography to explore how young people can relate to art objects at Cardiff Museum. Although psychogeography has a long complicated history, its usefulness principally resides in the idea that a sensory subjectivity can be used to study the precise laws and specific effects of our geographical environment – consciously organized or not – and its relation to individual emotions and
behavior (Debord, 1958). This is usually achieved through the practice of dérive or drifting, and often involves small groups quickly traversing their way through the research terrain, mapping their chance encounters with sensation and reverie: these encounters providing experiential data in the variety of psychogeographic articulations or “ambient” narratives, which operate as maps or surveys that detail those areas of a research field affectively discouraging entry into or, exit from, certain zones (Debord, 1958: 120). That is, and here dérive appropriates traits from ecological science and psychoanalysis, it enables small groups to map the qualitative “properties” or “affordances” (Gibson, 1966: 127) that an environment offers in relation to desires, and their causal presentation as exits or defences (Debord, 1958: 103/121).

We will return to the subject of desire later, but for now we might as well know that in terms of how desire is being used in the present context, that is, from a Deleuzian–Spinozian point of view, it refers to external affections causing an idea in thought relative to feelings of joy or sadness i.e., an affect or desire (Deleuze, 1988: 99). Consequently, these intensive feelings can provide us with the necessary means to map and survey artworks in Cardiff Museum.

4.6. Détournement: reality testing through feeling, memory and multi-sensory modes of expression

The concept of détournement is defined by Debord (1959) as: “the negation of value of the previous organization of expression” (Debord, 1959: 131). This means expression, conceived as any produced form or body of statements applied to the sensorial qualities and indirect discourse of an object- say for instance, a museum and gallery artefact -is diverted and displaced so as to devalue its ideological purpose (D’Alleva, 2005; Marcus, 2004). For this reason, detournement describes an activist critique of social forms, and class division through the political use of Duchamp’s reciprocal readymade. That is, any object, no matter where it is taken from, can be used to make new combinations of meaning through is displacement from a system of signifying codes. But how does this fit into the practices of dérive, and Deleuze and Guattari’s transcendental empiricism when working with young people? Here we can expand on our discussion on schizoanalysis in the previous chapter.

Drawing on Gabel’s (1964) analysis of false consciousness, the characteristic that dérive appropriates from schizophrenia is the process of spatializing time (Hetherington, 2011: 66) or what Bergson would call the process of solidifying duration by effort of our imagination (Bergson, 1999: 30). The processes
which are attended to in a psychogeographic dérive, therefore, are not too dissimilar from that of the schizophrenic process, in that being-in-time is partially revealed by its own dissolving (Deleuze, 1991: 32). For example, from our discussion of Peircean semiotics in Chapter 3 we now know that the order of general ideas and psychological experience is spatial time. This is because the intellect is the faculty that organises experience into spatially different parts in order to bring the physical world under our practical control. Let us look at this through a practical example:

"One function of the intellect is to present the continuous flux of matter in the guise of static, discrete objects. Thus, when we perceive the sensory quality like yellow, our visual apparatus is condensing trillions of vibrations into one stable appearance. Our minds immediately interpret this as a yellow surface located in a certain region of space. But the reality itself has no such simple location. Vibrations stream out indefinitely and interpenetrate with all the other vibrations in the physical world. From the flux of energy, the intellect “carves” individual things and happenings” (Goudge, 1999: 19).
The intellect proceeds by this function. It resolves the succession of affective states which have been given to it by material reality by way of analysis: this being the carving out and translation of physical reality into symbols, abstract ideas and conceptual objects, and which allows a viewer to narrate and relate to the world via comparative differences (Bergson, 1999: 31). Consequently, it is these abstract, general, and simple ideas that end up structuring our point of view, and which form the static partial objects that immobilise the durational and, indeed, successive flow of experiential states into spatial units of quantitative time. Hence, the conduct of rationalism which seeks to interpret our experience of the world in light of some fixed order of thought, and empiricism which assumes that experience is the permanent structuring and re-structuring of immutable thoughts and phenomena (Bergson, 1999: 240).

Against this, psychogeography sees the schizophrenic process as a perceptual form of reality-testing which goes beyond comparative forms, visual symbols and conceptual representations, towards the continuous inner experience of inner states. This brings us closer to Bergson’s (1999) intuitive method rather than any clinical interpretation. Indeed, it is not about miming schizophrenic tendencies, but a case of attending to the generative thought processes which are often associated with schizophrenia and creative thinking and action (Guattari, 2013; Martindale, 1999) - the process of which sometimes enhancing solutions to representational problems (Kris, 1952: 33). Consequently, psychogeographical dérive is more of a method of enacting our durational processes to apprehend experience in its living reality as a ceaselessly changing process of becoming. Furthermore, through duration it is possible to discover the presence of an enduring self, and seize our personality from within the pure duration of time itself:

“Inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present, the present containing in it a distinct form of ceaselessly growing image of the past, or, more probably, showing by its continual change of quality the heavier and still heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older” (Bergson, 1999: 40).

Since there is no consciousness without memory, and no continuation of a state without the addition of a memory of a past sensation to the present feelings of a memory, every moment always contains within it the memory of the past, and every feeling containing within it the whole of the past and the present. The unity of our inner duration, therefore, forms a multiplicity of collateral experiences that prolong singular events in the present; moments of our virtual past bound together like beads along
a temporal thread (Bergson, 1999: 31). As a result, performing a psychogeographical dérive is to place oneself in duration by an effort of intuition: to place oneself in the past in general, and then a certain region of the past (Deleuze, 1991: 56). This inner life may then be compared to the unrolling of a coil as dériver then gradually makes their way back to the present; duration indirectly suggesting affection images to intuition which are picked up our memory on the way (Bergson, 1999: 26/30): this union of sensorial reminiscences eventually becoming an important criterion for personal transformation and change. That is, new ways of seeing and talking about relational objects.

To identify art through a psychogeographical dérive is to view an object from the inside. By this I refer to an act of intellectual sympathy. We will learn more about this later on, but for now it only interests us to know that by intuition Bergson also means a kind of intellectual sympathy, by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it (Bergson, 1999: 24). As a result, what is often regarded as unique, actually relates to our own personality in its flowing through time – our self which endures (Bergson, 1999: 24). In this way, art loses its power of representation because it enters the immense indirect-discourse of “transcendental experience” which subjects habitual ways of seeing and talking about art to an incorporeal transformation (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 93).

The moving force of experience takes up something that has gone before and, in some way, modifies the quality of those that come after. Moreover, every experience influences in some degree the objective conditions under which further conditions are had, thereby determining to some extent the external environment in which a subject will act in the future (Dewey, 1997: 37). Experience does not merely go on inside a person, then. Every genuine experience has an active side which changes the objective conditions under which experiences are had (Dewey, 1997: 39). To render oneself more sensitive and intuitively responsive to the conditions of museum and galleries, therefore, provides us with new ways of seeing by influencing the formation of attitudes of desire and purpose.

Deleuze and Guattari (2004) affirm something analogous to dérive and the process of détournement in Anti-Oedipus when they propose: “a schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a: 2). Again, referring to schizophrenic process and its capacity to transgress institutionally refined power relations - in this case psychoanalysis - the act of roaming finds its momentum as a creative force that displaces more rigid and segmented lines of institutional discourse: the relationship between the dynamic objects of environing conditions and subjectivity or bodymind.
“While taking a stroll outdoors, on the other hand, he is in the mountains, amid falling snowflakes, with other gods or without gods at all...Everything is a machine. Celestial machines, the stars or the rainbows in the sky, alpine machines – all of them connected to those of the body...The self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a: 2).

The schizophrenic is seen as a person who experiences intensive qualities, ambiences, sensorial signs and affection-images without memory. That is, the intense feelings of transition stripped of all shape and form (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a: 20). As a consequence, the schizophrenic experiences all events in a continuous now, and is unable to diminish before and after. This means that discursive or coded situations enter a zone of proximity or co-presence and take on a certain molecular relation with the flow and movement of durational becoming: scrambling codes, shifting their meaning and creating a new coded assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 38). In this sense, the schizophrenic process can be likened to the intuitive method, which engenders an unrestrained intellectual sympathy in a living act of détournement.

“The schizophrenic is the universal producer. There is no need to distinguish here between producing and product. We need merely note that the pure “thisness” of the object produced is carried over into a new act of producing” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a: 7).

It is not simply a matter of remodelling young people’s subjectivity around the schizophrenic process or incorporating those people from de-industrialized backgrounds, and who may suffer high levels of multiple deprivations, into a medical discourse. Rather, it is about working with objects and material artefacts in a more open way, and contributing to the creation of a more authentic relation with one another (Guattari, 1995: 7). This does not discount the possibility that therapeutic interventions can be made as a result of dérive, however. By making a reference to the “analyst’s couch” Deleuze and Guattari (2004a) certainly feel that the schizophrenic process – like Bion’s truth-in-the-moment – can produce unknown forms of knowledge – some of which may have therapeutic potential:

“Patients from poor agricultural backgrounds will be invited to take up the plastic arts, drama, video, music, etc. whereas until then these universes had been unknown to them. Bureaucrats and intellectuals will find themselves attracted to material work, in the kitchen, garden, pottery, horse riding
Each cultural element, losing its original sense or made to disappear as it becomes “reinvested” with a new scope and effect (Debord, 1958: 130) the resource of ambient effects, is not lost on Relational Aesthetics either, as Bourriaud (1998) states:

“Artists might seek to rematerialize these functions and processes, to give shape to what is disappearing before our eyes. Not as objects, which would be to fall into the trap of reification, but as mediums of experience: by striving to shatter the logical of the spectacle, art restores the world to us as an experience to be lived” (Bourriaud, 1998: 32).

For this reason dérive embodies a process of recovery. It recovers an expressive experience of space. This means that psychogeographic dérive can allow young people to confront the spectacular images organised around the relative values of intellectual exchange so as to generate social relationships in a practical field traditionally earmarked for representation (Bourriaud, 1998: 9). A case in point being the practical field of art history directly experienced in museums and galleries. With this in mind, not only does psychogeographys use of detournement challenge the perceived representations of space and the social relationships mediated by images and their socio-economic relations (Lefebvre, 1991), but it implies that we can inherit – through the readymade and what is already a hand - new ways of living and models of action within the existing real.

4.7. Reformulating theory and practice through transcendental empiricism

To be able to account for how practices and research can work together, research efforts must find a different means to engage in practice other than through theory or conscious critique. Use of critical thinking in scientific and social research methodology is often based on the long standing tradition of transcendent logic, where our experiences and sensations of the world are seen as being in need of a critical position alongside other abstract thoughts and concepts (Olsson, 2009: 51). Hopefully, then, it can be seen that transcendental does not mean the same thing as transcendent; transcendent logic is
that which treats thought as the great organiser of sensations, and consciousness as our rational and practical capacity to grasp empirical features of the world and ourselves as objects of representation. Now, as long as this transcendent principle is at stake, there will always be a self-imposed problem in terms of a methodological approach to subjectivity, learning and new visual narratives. That is, a new way of seeing and talking about art. This can happen two ways. The first concerns the researcher and the research perspective influencing the empirical material, and is a self-imposed problem that has its origin in the researcher’s claim that they are apart from the empirical reality investigated yet capable of revealing and subtracting hidden feature from the world:

“Critically thinking disavows its own inventiveness as much as possible. Because it sees itself uncovering something it claims was hidden or as debunking something it desires to subtract from the world, it clings to a basically descriptive and justificatory modus operandi. However strenuously it might debunk concepts like ‘representation,’ it carries on as if it mirrored something outside itself with it had no complicity, no unmediated processural involvement, and thus could justifiably oppose” (Massumi, 2002: 12).

What does this imply for theory and practice? It may be more fruitful to connect this to research and practice. Research normally approaches what takes place in practice through the conscious critique of practice. Through this kind of transcendent approach, conscious critique takes the position of subject while the practice and people in it function as objects (Olsson, 2009: 51). Hence, by putting ourselves apart from and above the rest of the world, and observing it from the outside, research cannot easily understand our inter-dependence with other organisms and matter (Taguchi, 2010: 57). Everything in the research context becomes dependent on discursive human thinking and a transcendent ontology (Colebrook, 2002; Grosz, 2005). This leads to a second problem.

When educationists or researchers ask young people to reflect upon their visual learning experiences with art, what young people are really being asked to do is to become conscious of their own learning and experiences through acts of critical self-reflection (Olsson, 2009: 96). However, here, attention is drawn to the dominance of “child-centred pedagogies in operation” (Walkerdine, 1984: 155) whereby learners are ideologically viewed as being “an expert in their own world, already rich in knowledge, and fashioned to the cultural context in which they operate” (Burke, 2008: 34). Indeed, while the use of critical self-reflection, introspection, and the imagination is often united with visual-based research methodologies (Hughes, 2012; Pink, 2012; Sefton-Green et al, 2011) and used as an emancipatory tool or mode of transformative action, which can enable young people to acknowledge the inequalities of
power that frame their lives (Frohmann, 2012; Freire, 2001: 84), there is an argument to suggest that critical self-reflection, via visual frames of reference, serves a performative function in conceptualising and reproducing dominant power relations by turning the self into an object of discourse.

Using critical self-reflection in visual methods implies using art, or any visual medium, as a mirror, and then applying the cognitive activity of self-reflection to identify and challenge basic values, beliefs and assumptions (Burnard, 2011; Matsunobu, 2011). Furthermore, it is thought that this shift in cognitive activity, might assist young people to see aspects of their lives previously unrecognized or ignored, in that it provides insights into areas connected to a young person’s immediate environment, significant relationships, perceptions of the self, and perceptions of experiences (Frohmann, 2012: 67). However, as Taylor (2013) points out: “the image is not simply a reflection of a pre-existing reality but a cultural artefact constructed to social norms, values, contexts and processes. In addition, it possesses specific histories of production and viewing” (Taylor, 2013: 45). Consequently, and drawing on Butler’s (1993) work on mechanisms of performativity, critical self-reflection coupled with visual-based methods can only allow young people to use visual imagery as a form of citation. That is, a way of abstractly citing their identities and experiences to new roles, beliefs, and discursive norms.

With this in mind, then, and despite on the surface giving the impression that is a mean which allows young people can challenge established routines, judgements and beliefs, the coupling of critical self-reflection with visual-based methods can be seen as a form of performative “self-fictioning” in that it takes existing signifying material, and allows young people to re-order and reframe their experiences and identities into a workable programme, which helps in the abstract production of new subjectivities (O’Sullivan, 2008: 108). As a result, while critique allows young people to exert power, since if critique were not powerful it would not bring about change (Reynolds, 1998) it only creates “new mental and structural models of organisation” (Vince, 2001: 1347). Moreover, and in accordance with Deleuze’s idea that critical self-reflection is the strongest indication of transcendent logic - as subjects are asked to become conscious of themselves as objects in the world - the habit of naming the self “I” in relation to the empirical features of an image, is a process that sets the self apart from the qualities of matter that intra-act with the subject (Olsson, 2006: 96). Again, the force of what we call learning and knowing is disconnected from the empirical self.

When attempting to use Deleuze and Guattari’s transcendental empiricism what seems to be needed is a reformulation and revitalization of the status of research and practice. This implies that research
and theory has to be considered as being in practice. This practice would no longer bring forward the sole ambition of using conscious critique as an approach to empirical data. It is, to reiterate, to create conditions of thinking no greater than that which is thought about. This means that research needs to expose itself to the encounter with empirical data in a way which tries to avoid copying transcendent discourses and presuppositions onto the empirical, so as to experiment with the new, interesting and remarkable (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 111).

The process of re-shaping, redefining, and perhaps even re-inventing new visual narratives about art and cultural spaces, therefore, means to collectively and co-productively invent, rather than discover at a distance, new ways of seeing and speaking about art. This implies fully recognising that when doing research, one is also inventing and adding things to the world. As Olsson (2006) notes: research and practice can, through collective experimentation, produce and invent situations, making it possible to account for things that we do not yet know about (Olsson, 2006: 97). This means focusing on the immanent construction of sense and events in the moment.

When working with pedagogical documentation there is a risk of just retelling or nailing down a story of the already obvious. There is a risk that we can position young people and learning discursively, and see them either developmentally or culturally as people we already know. Accordingly, by doing this, pedagogical research often risks closing down pedagogical documentation. Indeed, it can apprehend experience only by grounding it in abstract concepts which discount new, interesting and remarkable ways of working with pedagogical documentation to create alternative visual narratives. But another way of working pedagogically may be to approach learners as a community or group of inquirers who generate depersonalised narratives through the collective production and immediate creation of sense and events (Dahlberg & Bloch, 2006: 115).

For example, as we shall see shortly, the event for Deleuze subsists in language (Deleuze, 2004a: 30) and is what makes language possible (Williams, 2008: 33). If we look at it from a Peircean perspective it relates to an indexical sign that links or correlates qualities of emotion to the symbolic signs of language and thought. For all intent and purposes, then, it is that which is assignable to a convention, concept or truth in the shape of denotations, manifestations and significations (Deleuze, 2004a: 16-18). However, what if we considered the event as something which was not immediately obvious or important? The focus would then have to shift in terms of that which is coming about. That is, the
unconditioned production of truth in a proposition. A possible avenue of exploration, therefore, may be to introduce sense as the fourth dimension in a visual narrative.

In the *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze introduces sense as the fourth dimension of language (Deleuze, 2004a: 22). For Deleuze, signifying regimes have a habit of closing the production of truth down within truth claims. This is because they ground all truth in presuppositions that comment, interpret and/or reflect upon the conditions of truth as if they already pre-existed in language. However, Deleuze approaches the subject of truth as that which escapes subjective representation and signifying concepts. Truth is something that is continuously produced in events both intimately and proportionally related to sense. This is why it subsists with the event in language, rather than being language itself. As Deleuze states in the following quote:

“Sense is inseparably the expressible or the expressed of the proposition, and the attribute of the state of affairs. It turns one side towards things and one side towards propositions. But it does not merge with the proposition which expresses it any more than with the state of affairs or the quality which the proposition denotes. It is exactly the boundary between propositions and thing [...]. It is in this sense that it is ‘event’: on condition that the event is not confused with its spatio-temporal effectuations in a state of affairs” (Deleuze, 2004a: 22/34).

If we think back to our analysis of Peircean semiotics, the attribute of “sense” to which Deleuze refers is easily equated to the pure imminence of Firstness, which lays the foundation of thought. This is why, I believe, Deleuze concedes that sense is produced pragmatically from the unfolded limit of experience (Deleuze, 2004a: 23). Sense is, therefore, irreducible to rational representation, personal beliefs, and universal concepts. Furthermore, it is also irreducible to particular images or what we might otherwise call, following Deleuze-Spinoza’s use of the term image, ideas of affection (Deleuze, 2004a: 23). This is why Deleuze can also claim truth to be something unconditioned in a proposition. It can be expressed by language and propositions, but it never merges with it in the way discursive regimes would have us believe. That is, and again noting our analysis of Peircean semiotics in the last chapter, we should not confuse the sense-event with the energetic spatio-temporal effects, which produce a state of affairs in the form of law-like symbolic signs, either in-born (CP, 2.297) or acquired by convention (CP, 2.297). Accordingly, language and propositions always remain external to the operations of sense and events which establish ways of commenting, interpreting and reflecting on the world.
When we see truth as being an unconditioned production within language and propositions, the event - which to reiterate makes language possible - can be connected to language in such a way as to free it from discursive regimes that close it down within claims of truth. Deleuze attempts to establish this by introducing a fourth dimension in the proposition: that of sense. And it is through seeing language and propositions in this way, that is, as producing truth in terms of a *proportional* relation to sense-events that we can begin to avoid closing down pedagogical documentation within claims of truth. As Deleuze explains:

“For the condition of truth to avoid this defect, it ought to have an element of its own, distinct from the form of the conditioned. It ought to have *something unconditioned* capable of assuring a real genesis of denotation and other dimensions of the proposition. Sense is the fourth dimension of a proposition” (Deleuze, 2004a: 22).

In relation to pedagogical documentation, youth narratives would conventionally be treated as events by adding something to them like a *commentary*, which would treat narrative as if it were an already made fact, an *interpretation*, which would treat a narrative through one’s own subjectivity, or finally, *reflection*, which would treat narrative events through acts of deconstruction with the aim of looking for signifying regimes. In every instance, the focus consists on creating truth from the outside by way adding qualities, states of affairs and representations, thus, always closing narrative events down. But when we consider truth as something that is continuously produced in the event that make language possible, what we get is a truth proportionally related to the sense under construction. Let us look at an example of how this works. Here, we can return to Rothko’s *Orange and Yellow* as explored in the last chapter.
If, for example, a class of young people were asked to explore the function of this image through signs of affect, we might not be too surprised if they provide emotional narratives, symbolically associated, with orange and yellow. That is, a young person might say that yellow is the colour of happiness and orange the colour of warmth. Accordingly, they might say it reminds them of a happy time; of a time spent on a family vacation, or a cold winter scene when all you can think about is being warm. But if they abandon this process of interpretation and reflection, and explore the unconditioned sense under production, so that they are held in the moment of being on the cusp of something not yet known or understood, sense will proportionally relate its truth to a dimension of a proposition. In a similar vein to Proust’s madeleine that we discussed in the last chapter, which produced the event of “Combray” in a seemingly incomprehensible, incorrect, and even nonsensical way of measuring the affect of the madeleine, sense was the very moment of becoming truth in the word Combray i.e. the event. If in a hypothetical situation, then, we substituted Proust’s madeleine with Rothko’s *Orange and Yellow*, and in an act of imagination placed Proust as the beholder, the painting would deserve its own truth in the event of Combray - if that was the truth it deserved. This is because *we always have as much truth as we deserve in relation to the sense we start from.*
From Deleuzian point of view, a seemingly nonsense word like that of Combray is a word that says its own sense. As a result, a nonsense word is not easily denoted, manifested, or dependent on its place and function as a presumption or conclusion in a signifying chain (Olsson, 2009: 113). For example, in the *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze uses the fourth dimension of sense in relation to Lewis Carroll’s invention of the word “Snark” in his poem, *The Hunting of the Snark* - a word that designates a composite animal shark + snake. The hunting of the Snark, therefore, represents nothing more than the search for, and rediscovery and restoration of meaning, produced by the word or event Snark. With this in mind, like Lewis Carroll’s Snark, a seemingly nonsense word such as Proust’s Combray, induced by the madeleine dipped in tea, refers to nothing else but itself, it has a certain kind of self presence. There is a presence of nonsense within sense (Deleuze, 2004a: 28-83).

Deleuze shows us, then, that sense and nonsense find themselves in a more complex relation than we might first imagine. The important thing to note from Proust’s reference to Combray is that not only does it have a self-presence, but that all words, even those words that we consider make sense, must pass through a moment of self-referring and self-presence. An interesting thing about Proust’s use of the word Combray, however, is that it, like Lewis Carroll’s Snark, is also a composite word. That is, it is a word composed of a present sensation and a past sensation, common to two moments in time (i.e. the madeleine dipped in tea and memories of Combray). Consequently, in contrast to the perspective on language where each word in a proposition seemingly depends upon other words in a proposition to make sense, from Deleuze’s perspective, each word must, momentarily, enjoy a nonsense status - self-presence - to be able to produce sense together with the others (Olsson, 2009: 114). As suggested by Deleuze in the following quote:

“It is thus pleasing that there resounds today the news that sense is never a principle or an origin, but that it is produced. It is not something to discover, to restore, and to re-employ; it is something to produce by a new machinery” (Deleuze, 2004a: 83).

When installing notions of sense and nonsense in an intimate relation of creation and production, it is possible to escape sense as already predetermined. Language, linguistic propositions and events take on a complex, open-ended which account for the pragmatic becoming of sensation. In relation to the use of pedagogic documentation, efforts must, therefore, be made to look for and construct
sense in terms of the production of sense. And what appears to be nonsense must be considered as important as that which appears to be sense in this process of production (Olsson, 2009: 114).

With this in mind, then, installing the idea of sense-events alongside language production seems a promising way of approaching new visual narratives, particularly with regards to processes of lived experience, since Proust shows us that it is possible to use language and the event without making sense and nonsense opposites. Consequently, by treating pedagogical documentations as an event that produces sense through nonsense, it is feasible to account for the inter-relational processes by which meaning is negotiated. Moreover, it might be a productive way of accessing young people’s learning about art and other museum and gallery objects without closing down the empirical events that they are taking part in.

4.8. Working with empirical material: language, desire, and constructed sense-events

According to Deleuze, the event is related and in close connection with language and is expressed by linguistic propositions in the shape of denotations, manifestations and significations. These linguistic propositions are usually thought of as that which gives us access to what is true or false in the events in which we take part (Deleuze, 2004a: 16-18). For instance, denotation can function within language as a truth claim by pointing to the exterior state of things; examples being words like ‘this,’ ‘that,’ ‘it,’ ‘here’ and ‘now,’ all implying a direct correspondence between language and its object.

Manifestation can be understood as the way in which a proposition refers to the one who is speaking. It refers language to the personal utterances, desires, and beliefs of the speaker. For example, words like ‘I,’ ‘you,’ ‘everywhere,’ and ‘always’ indicate subjective interpretations of the world. Accordingly, and in regards to pedagogical documentation, truth claims would no longer be considered as residing within the object but within the subject itself. That is, truth claims as depicted by through manifested propositions, terms, and statements point to an interpreting subject who is putting forward their own view of the world (Olsson, 2009: 108).

Finally, the role of signification can be understood in terms of how a proposition relates the world to universal concepts. That is, words or signifiers within one proposition connect with another to signify something (Olsson, 2006: 108). It does not work by pointing out what is true or false, nor whether or
not the subjective “I” is correct in its beliefs and desires. Instead, it simply works by pointing out the conditions under which truth comes about (Deleuze, 2004a: 18). Thus, when using signification as a condition of analysis, research would relate linguistic propositions to the event of viewing an artwork by reflecting on the construction of signifying regimes. For instance, the presumptions made through words like: ‘imply,’ ‘then,’ and ‘therefore,’ would be reflected upon as part of signifying chains which condition the truth they express.

Research practice has become dependent on human discursive thinking and a transcendent ontology. All three linguistic approaches in their respective ways close the event down within truth claims. This is because they all ground truth in presuppositions that define the event as a closed system. In cases where presuppositions close down the event within a system of designation, there is the assumption that truth can be found when there is a correspondence between linguistic propositions and things – as if truth resided in the inner essence of things (Olsson, 2009: 111). However, as we saw in the last chapter, and in terms of a Deleuzian point of view, this is not the case.

The essence of a painting or, indeed, any other artwork does not exist outside the subject expressing it. But neither is it reducible to a psychological state. It is not the subject that explains essence rather it is “essence that implicates, envelops, wraps itself up in the subject” (Deleuze, 2008: 28) to reveal a truth in a sensation common to two places and two moments (Deleuze, 2008: 40). As Deleuze notes: this involuntary production of essences can present themselves to experience as a resemblance that are absolutely different and new (Deleuze, 2005b: 35). Consequently, if the focus is no longer on using pedagogical documents to close an artwork down within a denotative commentary or a commentary of appearances, then it is fruitful to explore them as events that introduce sense through involuntary produced essences or affective truths. Indeed, the real “theme” of a pedagogical document would not be the subject-matter designated by a researcher’s interpretation of the words and/or language used by young people, but the unconscious themes produced when the sensorial qualities of an artwork assumes its meaning and life through an involuntary reminiscence.

Now the presupposition that closes the event down within the system of manifestation is founded on the assumption that the manifesting I is correct in its beliefs and desires – as if truth was to be found within each person and as if truth was a personal question (Olsson, 2009: 109). Here, truth is seen as an inner causality, with respect to a subject’s personal desire towards a particular object of existence or corresponding state of affairs. Correlatively, personal beliefs are the anticipation of this object, or
state of affairs, insofar as its existence must be produced by an external causality. Belief and desire in this sense, then, can be seen as causal inferences and not as associations (Deleuze, 2004a: 17).

However, when desire is thought of as causal, what we are more than likely to get is an interpretive approach to pedagogical documentation that looks at subjective statements in terms of lack or need. For example, the traditional logic of desire is usually understood from a psychoanalytical perspective as a wanting or yearning for something that we do not have (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a). Accordingly, this logic of lack presents the object of desire as a fantasy object (Brooker & Edwards, 2010: 87) and, as a consequence, any narrative account of an art object’s meaning is individualized and interpreted as being representative of a lack of a fantasized object. Hence, a subject may look at this painting by Henri Matisse and see it as an image of hope and optimism. But, within this gaze there is always one ever present caveat.

From the traditional logic of desire, if the themes of hope and optimism appear as important features in a subject’s visual narrative, it is because the subject does not have hope or optimism. That is, under the psychoanalytical notion of lack, understood on an ontological level as the necessary condition for
the maintenance of desire, a subject desires hope and optimism because they do not possess it as an object of their being (Grosz, 1994: 165) As such, rather than see this interpretation as a construction of a problem, say, the need for tools that can preserve hopeful and optimistic dispositions (De Botton, 2013: 16), a traditional logic of desire would see it, and reduce it to the features of a fantasy. The fact that the subject does not have what they are missing would make Henri Matisse’s *Dance* (II) an unreal object, a fantasized object. Moreover, the subject desires something that they do not have, so logically it does not exist apart from in their dreams and/or wishes.

“To a certain degree, the traditional logic of desire is all wrong from the very outset: from the very first step that the Platonic logic of desire forces us to take, making us choose between *production* and *acquisition*. From the moment we place desire on the side of acquisition we make desire an idealistic (dialectical, nihilistic) conception, which causes us to look upon it as primarily lack: as a lack of an object, a lack of a real object” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a: 25).

Viewed like this, any democratic principles can only advance by judging associations between objects and narrative through pre-defined schemas, representations and definitions which talk about desires like hope and optimism as needs. From this perspective, subjects act the way they do in relation to a work of art based on their inherent needs, and it is the analyst’s task to fill up what is needed with pre-defined schemes of development, which set about redirecting desired democratic principles into the attainment of predetermined goals and standards: these goals and standards defining exactly what a person is lacking. Analysis proceeds, therefore, by redirecting needs towards the wished for outcome defined by models and categories of normal development, and has the ambition of helping people to develop ideas of hope or optimism normally (Olsson, 2009: 143). For instance, hope may be idealized and endowed with something or someone (a place, profession or person/s) with virtues more glowing than they actually posses: go there, do this or be more like this person, and you will find the hope you desire, lack and need. However, if we understanding desire as a *process* involved in the production of qualitative, affective, forces, then, it is possible to treat the relation between art and visual narratives as the production of new involuntary realities taking place within a relational field. With that in mind, themes such a hope or optimism can be seen as the sense construction of a problem in relation to an object encountered.

From this perspective, learning is to enter a problematic field in which young people’s construction of a problem relates to sense-events under production. Indeed, according to Deleuze, the event concerns
problems: the mode of the event is the problematic (Deleuze, 2004a: 64), while sense is located in the problem itself (Deleuze, 1994: 157). Indeed, here is how Deleuze defines the event in accordance with their problematizing function:

“The event by itself is problematic and problematizing. A problem is determined only by the singular points which express its condition” (Deleuze, 2004a: 64-65).

But what are these singular points? Well, as Olsson (2009) points out. They seem to range from ways of being, speaking, feeling and thinking, as well as to physical phenomena. But most importantly, they are not denoted things, neither manifesting subjects nor signifying concepts (Olsson, 2009: 115). They are what we might call, pre-individual, non-personal, a-conceptual signs of an embodied nature. They are points of fusion between tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety. These singularities are, therefore, “sensitive” points (Deleuze, 2004a: 63). Consequently, if we again use our exploration of Peircean semiotics from the previous chapter, events are singular effects of a muscular and mental kind. An effort which generates both feeling and action in the inner world of thought (CP, 5.491).

It is this effort, or generating power of thought, that brings us back to Deleuze and Spinoza’s concept desire, which expresses the body’s capacity to be affected. The problematization of art, then, is to do with the body’s capacity to be affected, and desires unconscious assemblage of external affections as feelings or affects of joy or sadness. As Deleuze (1994) states: “this is the condition of real experience [and] it is how the being of the sensible reveals itself” (Deleuze, 1994: 68/82). This is something totally different than imagining a problem that is already set and waits for its corresponding solution.

If we look at events and problems in terms of affect, then, pedagogical documentation might be used to record and map the way in which young people’s capacity to be affected is being exercised at that particular moment by certain qualities (Deleuze, 1988: 220). That is, the relational encounter between artefacts located at Cardiff Museum Wales, and the bodily logic of the viewer or young people taking part in the study. Furthermore, this should not be thought of as an abstract intellectual operation, by which a mind compares two states. It is more a case of bodily awareness through which feelings, and their ideas, assert a concrete relation to continuous duration:
“Thus to every idea that indicates an actual state of our body, there is necessarily linked another sort of idea that involves the relation of this state to an earlier state” (Deleuze, 1988: 220).

The fact that duration is involved in the conditioning of experience means that the problematization of art objects, and other museum and gallery artefacts, leads us to go beyond the state of experience towards the conditions of real experience (Deleuze, 1991: 19). Consequently, this leads to a superior empiricism capable of stating problems at the level of our concrete conditions. Indeed, as we saw in previous chapters one of the defining features of Bergson’s theory is his notion that pure perception places us at once in matter. That is, something similar to haptic vision coincides with external objects by way of being affected. But in order to take advantage of our environing conditions, an interval, in the form of a cerebral delay, creates a “zone of indetermination” placing us at once in two directions that differ in kind:

“That of perception which puts us at once into matter and that of memory which puts us at once into the mind...Perception identical to the whole of matter, and pure memory identical to the totality of the past” (Deleuze, 1991: 30).

Perception and recollection interpenetrate each other so that we can take advantage of the embodied becomings which unfold through sensory-motor effects (Deleuze 1994: 23) - equivalent to the spatial and temporal conditioning of external qualities found in Pierce’s dynamic interpretant. As a result, on the one hand, we have affectivity that fills up the body with figures and ideas of sensation - and which give the body volume in space - and on the other, we have durational recollections of memory, which links temporal instants to each other, and interpolates the virtual past into the present. However, let us not forget another form of memory. That is to say, memory in the form of nervous contractions of matter that makes the external quality appear in the form of motor schemes (Deleuze, 1991: 25) and which adopt recollected images to perform present actions (Deleuze, 1991: 68).

As a consequence, it is the effort of desire and the imagination - an effort of invention - that consists in raising the problem of how we are being affected, discovering how we are different in kind from the affections presented to us, say by an art object, then apprehending these in real time memories. It is the reminiscences of which we experience during our encounters with art objects, then that create the terms of a solution which will be stated (i.e. joy or sadness). Furthermore, if we remember
that sense is also inseparable from language and propositions to which it attributes a state of affairs, then memories of joy, or even sadness, can provide visual narratives that bring the condition of art back to the conditioned state of lived experience.

4.9. Traversing conceptual reality through sympathetic understanding

Finally, with all this in mind, we can now approach the signification in pedagogical documentation in a new light. We know that sense is inseparable from the expressible or expressed of the proposition, and attributes a state of affairs to language and proposition. But we also know that sense is duration or, rather, our experience of affection-time relative to recollected memories and events. Language is, therefore, not a ready-made structure. It is memory composed of sensory-motor activity and speech reflexes (Bergson, 2004: 99/134). Moreover, language translates movement and duration in to space (Bergson, 2004: 250). And as Peircean semiotics showed us in the last chapter, it is the intellect which carves out and presents the continuous flow of durational semiosis into symbols, concepts and, more to the point, conventions. That is, discrete static objects of habit.

As a consequence, for Bergson, for us to know a reality in the usual sense of the word “know” means taking ready-made concepts, portioning them out into propositions, then mixing them together until a practical equivalent is obtained (Bergson, 1999: 38). With this in mind, the problem of approaching our relation to the world solely based on these practical equivalents then, means that our knowledge of the world can become purely relative to human understanding, imprisoned in what might be called a “network of reality” already prepared in advance, with all possible experiences being made to enter a framework of conceptual understanding.

To label an art object with a certain concept is to mark it - in precise terms - with the kind of action or attitude one would like the object to suggest to us. If we look at this pedagogically in terms of museum and gallery artefacts, then the curatorial labelling of objects can also be seen as an attempt to assign objects with a concept. As Bergson (1999) explains, to try and fit a concept on an object is an attempt ask what one can do with the object, but also what it can do for others (Bergson, 1999: 39). This is the method of operation use in most museums and galleries. By determining an artefact conceptually the viewer is made to pass from concept to thing, rather than thing to concept. Accordingly, the viewer is made to use the object in such a way that they obtain a disinterested knowledge. That is, the manner
of knowing inspired by a determinate interest, consisting by definition in an externally-taken point of view, frames the artefact as an object of representation. Let us look at this works.

The painting was thought to represent the decline of Britain's naval power. The 'Temeraire' is shown travelling east, away from the sunset, even though Rotherhithe is west of Sheerness, but Turner's main concern was to evoke a sense of loss, rather than to give an exact recording of the event. The spectacularly colourful setting of the sun draws a parallel with the passing of the old warship. By contrast the new steam-powered tug is smaller and more prosaic.

The painting presented above is Turner's *The Fighting Temeraire*. The extract of labelling underneath is taken from the National Gallery's online gallery collection. From this labelling we can see that ideas and concepts are laid side by side in order to mark it with a presence. The boat is travelling east, away from the sunset, for instance. However, the label itself actually never gives us anything more than an artificial reconstruction of the object. Moreover, it can only symbolize general and impersonal aspects. That is, each of the concepts presented (i.e. the decline of navel power, travelling east or the sense of loss, etc) can only symbolize a particular property by making it a general equivalent to other concepts and things. It does not say: “look at this painting if you want to remember a sense of loss.” It replaces the metaphysical object of loss, to which this painting belongs, and makes this property coincide with other objects. The result of this is that it moulds itself onto other concepts like the decline of Britain’s navel power, and adopts the same outline. Extracted from the metaphysical object, and presented in
a concept, it grows indefinitely larger and goes beyond the painting itself, with many different systems of thought offering ever increasing external points of view, and more concepts from which to theorise and critically approached the reality of the painting.

The problem with concepts is that they can only ever give us an artificial reconstruction of reality. By this I mean that symbols are often substituted for the object they symbolize and, ultimately, express little more than comparison between objects and others which resemble it. As a result, this demands no effort on our part to investigate what is essential and unique about museum and gallery objects. It merely requires a movement amongst intellectual equivalents (Bergson, 1999: 27). A representation taken from a certain point of view, a translation made with certain symbols, which will always remain imperfect in comparison to knowing the object as an accomplished passage of movement from thing to concept. That is, from the absolute movement of bodily semiosis. Far from recomposing sense on the basis of external points of view, Bergson puts forward the notion that we place ourselves at once in the element of sense in order to view objects from the inside.

“It follows from this that an absolute could only be given in an intuition, whilst everything else falls within the province of analysis. By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible” (Bergson, 1999: 24).

Analysis is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known; to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyse a painting or artefact in the way we have become accustomed to when we visit a museum or gallery, then, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself (Bergson, 1999: 24). Consequently, if there is a means of possessing an object absolutely instead of just knowing it relatively, and by this I mean placing oneself within an object instead of looking at it from an outside points of view, then it is intuition.

Bergson explains that there is one reality that we can seize from within by way of intuition; this being our personality as it flows through time - our self which endures (Bergson, 1999: 24). This presents us with an alternative approach to language and visual symbols. That is to say, by allowing young people to treat their own pedagogical documentation intuitively, they may be able to penetrate into it in the same way they would a memory, and explore its ontological foundation. This is not as farfetched as it might first appear. It simply involves inverting the habitual direction or work of thought. Such actions
are notably present in philosophy, whereby the practice often involves a movement from concepts to things, and then a reconstruction from things to concepts. Philosophy is, therefore, a tradition which consists in placing oneself within an object by effort of intuition (Bergson, 1999: 40) in order to create new concepts which speak the event (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 5/21). This brings philosophy close to art in that it also implies an effort of imagination in order to challenge the habits of mind more useful to socially constructed ways of life.

Similarly, then, working intuitively may enable young people to play a part in the very creation of new concepts and/or new visual narratives. But how might this work? Let us look at an example presented by Bergson.

“Consider, again, a character whose adventures are related to me in a novel. The author may multiple the traits of his hero’s character, may make him speak and act as much as he pleases, but all this can never be an equivalent to the simple and indivisible feeling which I should experience if I were able for an instant to identify myself with the person of the hero himself” (Bergson, 1999: 22).

First, this implies that we move around the object: symbolic points of view placing us observationally without (i.e. character traits, comparisons with other persons and things, etc). However, to grasp the essence of the character, we must perceive them from the inside. This means that by an effort of our imagination, we direct our attention inwards to contemplate our own self. Furthermore, by an act of intuition we enter into a kind of intellectual sympathy with the indivisible feelings presented to us by the words, gestures and actions of the character (Bergson, 1999: 22). Next, we might notice memories which more or less adhere to these perceptions, and which serve to interpret them. These memories will have been detached, as it were, from the depth of our personality. From our inner duration which prolongs life in a continuous memory.

“Inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present, the present containing in it a distinct form of ceaselessly growing image of the past, or, more probably, showing by its continual change of quality the heavier and still heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older” (Bergson, 1999: 40).
Drawn to the surface by the perceptions which resemble them, our memories allow us to grasp from within our own life, the durations of life being lived by the character. Lastly, the stir of tendencies and motor habits form a crowd of virtual actions, firmly bound to these perceptions and memories. From this intuition, we move towards the elementary symbols, which would reconstitute its expression. At once the ongoing construction and production of sense-events puts each letter in its proper place and joins them up without difficulty by continuous connection (Bergson, 1999: 24/33). Our personality in this respect finds unity in a concept, and leads us to a simple yet unique representation.

4.10. Conclusion

The way in which art objects and visual culture are interpreted forms part of a more general process of cultural modernization and development. Culture is the primary means through which a change or transformation of our ways of being can be achieved, but not without the raw materials of affect from which we can start to develop methods that have an awareness of the politics of aesthetics: a “micro-politics” or an “affective pedagogy” (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 80) that demonstrates how our embodied capacities are increased or decreased by sounds, lights, smells, the atmospheres of places and people, and the mental images and forms that emerge with these physical changes (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 80).

Methods towards art education then, ones that are responsive to the transcendental empirical nature of affective pedagogies might, therefore, recognise that sense-event processes, meaning-making, the craftsmanship of our emotional responses and, indeed, the production of images in thought, can play a pivotal role in democratizing traditional social representations of art located in museum and gallery spaces, whilst similarly performing political acts and, possibly, creating the conditions for therapeutic interventions around young people’s individual and collective histories (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012). As a result, social representations of art in this context could then be defined as:

“System(s) of values and practices with a twofold function; first to establish an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and second to enable communication to take place amongst the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history” (Moscovici, 1973: xiii).
Historically “high art” has been viewed as a means to civilize the masses, based on the argument that good art makes good people, and good people make good societies (Ivinson, 2005: 47). These cultural conditions, however, are decidedly marked by the economic and institutional separation of emotion, thought, and artistic doing. Indeed, art education frequently encourages us ask the question: What is art? Rather than: What is art for? This seemingly innocent question elevating art to such a degree that it becomes remote, distant, and idealized, instilled with a power to govern. This was one of the issues that concerned Dewey (2005), the dislocation between our everyday experiences of art and the growth of capitalistic “high art” as a certificate of cultural taste. That is, extracted from its native contents art becomes the stuff of galleries, museums and displays; serving as cultural insignias reflecting economic cosmopolitanism (Dewey, 2005: 7). In relation to art education, then, Dewey insists on the importance of forging significant connections between everyday life, and the esthetic experiences and knowledge encountered in subject lessons.

By using a methodological scaffold - informed by relational aesthetics - MACBA’s Independent Studies Program (PEI) highlights how art, education and culture can establish relationships with those who are traditionally considered mere spectators of the arts. Indeed, by creating inter-disciplinary spaces for professional training, education, and critical and social experimentation, MACBA’s (PEI) put together radical pedagogies that are committed to redefining the image of museums and galleries as “vectors for counter narrative” and “political emancipation” (Preciado, 2014: 1). This includes the provision of cultural and social intervention strategies whose aim is to work with communities and individuals who are most at risk from social exclusion (Marxen, 2009). Furthermore, by embracing political, social and therapeutic fields and their function, MACBA is proactive in giving a public voice to those who usually remain unheard, often compensating for a deficiency in special care services not yet available through the areas of Health and Education (Marxen, 2009: 133). This is not art therapy in the traditional sense of using art to employ psychological treatments, but an impulse to use creative processes to give form to social relations through aesthetic communication.

With this in mind, if pedagogical documentation could treat artworks in this way, then the re-shaping, re-defining, and re-invention of cultural spaces through new visual narratives would not be set apart from the real world. Museums could be regarded as forums for popular education which vitally expose the divide between the contemporary arts and society. This kind of art education would itself appear as a “rich field of social experimentation” that represents “the production of space in a specific social
context” (Bourriaud, 1998: 10/16). But it would also appear as a visual narrative with inter-disciplinary potential, crossing political, social and therapeutic fields. Accordingly, in the forthcoming chapter we will look at how art, relation, and the reality of lived experience can be connected through methods of aesthetic communication, and how affective social imaginings might be put into practice to transgress the curatorial programs which served to normalize the body and subjectivity, whilst also reproducing patriarchal systems of difference, colonial logic as well as the orders of capitalist production (Preciado, 2014: 1).
Chapter 5

**Methodological Approach: A How to Guide**

The central tool for learning practices in an “affective pedagogy” is pedagogical documentation. In this research, pedagogical documentation is somewhat of a main character, taking a lead role by allowing young people from Valleys Kids to collectively engage in the production of cartographies that capture the function of sense-events in sensorial language, and which map young people’s embodied relations with art, artefacts and artistic surfaces in Cardiff Museum, Wales. Embedded in this process of inquiry is Deleuze-Spinoza’s belief that the materiality of sensation is part of our imagination grounded in our body. To feel or sense is to imagine, and to imagine it to negotiate – through our feelings and desires – the affective aspects of our body as it is shaped by aesthetics encounters (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 80). Pedagogical documentation can help us, then, to address the third structuring statement:

2) *In art education all participants – children, teachers, teacher students, teacher educators and researchers – are caught up in the desire to experiment with subjectivity and learning. They are acting in a relational field through collective, intense and unpredictable experimentation. To work with this theoretically the relation individual/society need to be rethought. The notion of desire needs to take on another meaning.*

One of the ways in which pedagogical documentation is employed in this project is through Debord’s psychogeographical dérive: a method of mapping the “ambiences” of affect in a given situation. With this emphasis on context in mind, Spinoza argues that the affections of the human body also lay down a range of paths in thought (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999: 25). Moreover, these paths arise from our patterns of experience. As a consequence, a variety of individual patterns of experience exist in correlation with different people’s lived experience. That is, all paths are: “the product of an individual’s engagement with the community” (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 83).

Pedagogical documentation, as worked through the imaginings of a psychogeographical dérive, might then enable researcher’s to bridge the institutional space of the museum by imaginatively connecting to urban spaces and communities existing outside its borders: in my case, the ex-industrial community of the Rhondda Valleys. Indeed, by mapping the “politics of feeling” (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 84) that are negotiated through a psychogeographical dérive, pedagogical documentation could be considered as
a political act grounded in the aesthetics of the practical (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 84) - the narratives of lived experience being performative agents and, as such, a “methodological” tool that endeavours to combine learning and change in pedagogical practice (Lenz Taguchi, 2010: 10). I will now illustrate how this course of action was implemented.

5.0. Subjectivity and learning is a relational field put to work: the importance of the sample group in collaborative meaning-making

It is a strange notion that personal identity, and qualities of mind and character, might be discovered not only in people, but also in objects, picturesque landscapes, vases, jars or boxes. If this seems a bit odd, then it is because we have, by and large, emptied the visual realm of any personal character. Yet when we feel a kinship with an artwork, or any object for that matter, it is because the values that we sense that an object or artwork carries somehow appear to be clearer in it, rather than they usually do in our minds (De Botton, 2013: 47).

Accordingly, the purpose of recruiting volunteers from Valleys Kids is to explore how art, culture, and museum and gallery collections can be used as a tool to extend young people’s experiences, while at the same time using these experiences to create new civic voices. Consequently, the volunteers were recruited to explore the role of art and culture as a civic resource, allowing young people to remember experiences, people, places and eras in history, which may have something important to offer us as a public. Thus, it was felt that young people from a deprived de-industrialized community in South Wales have important socio-political narratives to offer us in terms of life, community, and/or relationships in a de-industrialized landscape because they are directly exposed to complex sociological problems that need to be voiced.

In this study, 2 groups of young people aged 11-18, were recruited from a charity called Valleys Kids. Based in the heart of the Rhondda Valleys, a de-industrialized mining town and currently rank as one of the most deprived areas of Europe, Valleys Kids offers several community art based initiatives aimed at young people exposed to the negative effects of de-industrialisation i.e. drug abuse, alcohol abuse, alienation etc: all of which can effect young people’s education and life choices. Bearing this in mind, the 2 groups of young people involved in this study were put forwards by Valleys Kids’ Artworks Artistic Director. Moreover, the present study was seen as being compatible with the type of projects
Valleys Kids would use to engage these groups. As such, the present study was seen as fitting in with
the ethos of the organisation.

The reason for engaging young people (aged 11-18) exposed to high levels of social deprivation is to
give them a voice. That is, although these young people may lack a sophisticated language, which
might allow them to speak in public, for instance a political rhetoric, these people are often the most
important speakers when it comes to democracy, because they are often the ones who have directly
experienced its failures and indifference (Phillips, 2003: 36). Rather than producing a comprehensive
analysis on trends regarding poverty and exclusion in an area of South Wales (http://www.jrf.org.uk)
or identifying and evaluating the impact of community arts on regeneration practices (Adamson et al,
2007) this study would, therefore, allow those most at risk from social marginalisation to represent a
range of experiences and, potentially, complex social issues in a different way i.e. through the sensory
creation of meaning and a politics of affect.

5.1. Acknowledging the research field

In phase 1 of the study, a meeting was arranged with Valleys Kids’ Artworks Artistic Director and, as a
result, a preliminary 3 week visitor’s timetable negotiated: the meeting itself was held at Chapter Arts
Centre Cardiff. During this meeting I was assigned two staff mentors - each of which would become a
valuable coach, mentor and source inspiration as the project developed. The initial timetable was set
alongside 2 of the 8 community projects run by Valleys Kids (i.e. ArtWorks and Dinas Community and
Family Hub). ArtWorks is a programme delivered by Valleys Kids which allows young people aged 8-25
to explore different areas of their lives and the lives of others creatively in a positive way. Likewise, it
is through Dinas Community and Family Hub that young people can access a range of activities which
help build trust, community partnership and personal growth. The purpose of creating this timetable
in the context of the present study, then, was to observe how Valleys Kids worked in practice but also
reduce the possibility of getting too enamoured by the power normally included in the role of being a
researcher (Olsson, 2009: 103). In this respect, the relation between theory and practice as well as the
relation between me, my Valleys Kids mentors and, indeed, young people would take on the features
of co-production.

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In this respect ethical considerations in the research would take on a new light. That is to say, I would have no inherent right as a researcher to know better than the participants about their own problems and questions. It is not about making people aware of their own ignorance with regards to Deleuzian theory and his ideas concerning practice: this is not the point of doing research. Yet at the same time mentors, and the wider field of art education, might benefit from the encounter with researchers and research that assumes a position in between theory and practice. The encounter between theory and practice would only be possible, then, through collective experimentation. From this perspective, the process of working between theory and practice would, therefore, involve relating to the sense being produced in the problematic field. For instance, although individual contributions count when solving problems encountered in the research field, the focus will be more on the way we are caught up in a collective process.

This implies a different approach to predicting, planning, and supervising the field other than simply adapting it to predetermined problems with corresponding solutions. It requires attending to a bodily logic that derives conclusions from the consummating phase of every developing experience (Dewey, 2005: 39). Premises emerge only as conclusions become manifest through our affective responses to what is taking place in between theory and practice and, as a consequence, were open to change and ethical questioning throughout. Indeed, the whole research process would work like this, moving back and forth from theory and practice and vice versa - usually in the form of a debrief at the end of each workshop session.

5.2. Putting the encounter to work in a museum and gallery space: psychogeography and unpredictable experimentation

In phase 2, the concept of the encounter would be put to work through psychogeographical dérive in order to address the third and final structuring statement:

3) In art education all participants – children, teachers, teacher students, teacher educators and researchers - are caught up in the desire to experiment with subjectivity and learning. They are acting in a relational field through collective, intense and unpredictable experimentation. To work with this theoretically the relation individual/society need to be rethought. The notion of desire needs to take on another meaning
The encounter is an alternative way of understanding the relationship between young people and art objects but accounts for movement and experimentation in subjectivity and learning: the focus, here, being on the relational field through which collective, intense and unpredictable experimentation can take place. A total of 14 young people aged 11-18 volunteered to take part in a walking dérive of the museum and gallery. These young people were put forwards by Valley’s Kids’ Artworks Artistic Director as this study was seen as being compatible with projects, run by Valley Kids, aimed at engaging these young people.

Although a psychogeographic dérive can be done alone, small groups of at least two-three people are far more productive (Debord, 1958: 120). This is because large group sizes of more than two-three can often fragment into several groups or what Debord calls “drifts” (Debord, 1958: 120) which reduce co-productivity. The practice of roaming the Cardiff Museum would last for approximately 2 hours, with no roaming restrictions placed on young people’s movement through the museum. Indeed, although the duration of a dérive has no formal restrictions, and can be conducted with the same group over a course of a day, a week, or even over several months, Debord (1958) notes that the onset of fatigue can diminish results (Debord, 1958: 120). The dérive would, therefore, be deliberately restricted to 2 hours.

In October 2011, the first psychogeographical dérive of Cardiff Museum was conducted: this included 11 young people (1 male and 10 female) aged 11-15. Valley’s Kids’ Artworks Artistic Director and one Staff Member were also present. As a method which situates itself alongside other visual and mobile methodologies that use walking as a way of capturing, and framing, multi-sensory experiences (Pink, 2008) place-making (Pink, 2007; Lynch, 1960) and identity construction via a mobile body (Anderson, 2004) a psychogeographical dérive will enable these young people to record static art images, which can be attributed to a moment, whilst also allowing them to understand that these static images can be contested and re-constituted through the spatio-temporal sequences of a mobile body (Grimshaw & Ravetz, 2005).

Although the dérive of Cardiff Museum would last approximately 2 hours, 15 minutes was set aside at the start so that each young person could be presented with filing wallet that included 10 worksheets (i.e. pedagogical documents: Appendix). By adapting Whites (2005) notes on remembering narratives in workshop therapy, the design of the pedagogical documentation would enable each young person
to document the resources drawn on when imagining themselves becoming-in-the-moment (Thomson & Holland, 2005). It would also present each young person with a scaffold for re-authoring art objects through the unfolding of spatio-temporal contradictions in involuntary memory; “two sensations, the sensation common to two moments” (Deleuze, 2008: 39) engaging with the past and the present in a continuing search for intelligibility (Crawford, et al 1992). Indeed, in developing this scaffold I included 3 sections which would prompt "landscape of action" and/or "landscape of identity" questions (White, 2005: 10), allowing the young people to compose events, linked in sequence, through time, according to their reminiscences.

1. List down as many of the images that come to mind as you can. Note down the things that stand out in your imagination. This may include, people, place, events.

2. List the things that stand out most in your imagination. Describe the objects, places, and events through your senses. This may include the sound, smell, taste, and colour of places and objects or things that make you feel heavy or light, big or small, warm or cold etc.

3. Describe how objects, places, and events in your imagination feel. This may include feelings linked to emotions like happiness, sadness, love, fear hope, regret etc.

This method of re-authoring invites young people to do what they routinely do in everyday practices, that is, to link events of their lives in sequence through time according to spontaneous memory. But this would also serve other purposes. The scaffold would assist young people in recruiting their lived experience, but would also stretch and exercise their imagination and their meaning-making abilities. Moreover, it would assist young people to identify more neglected events of their lives, allowing them to fashion more alternative narratives. Consequently, in doing this, the practice of re-authoring would re-invigorate young people’s efforts to understand what is happening in their lives, what it is that has happened, how it happened, and what it all means (White, 2005: 10).

When revisiting the pedagogical documentation with the young people at a later stage, then, it would not be a question of aiding them to remember what they did last time, so as to establish some kind of linear or chronological learning, but to help focus on what kind of problem is under construction and, most importantly, to find where the potentials are for continuing the construction of the problem are located (Olsson, 2009: 19). This would be the purpose of the poetry workshops, the subject of which I will discuss shortly.
Each young person was provided with 1 pen, an information sheet, and a map diagram taken from Cardiff Museum’s information services. The purpose of including the diagram was that it contained a layout of Cardiff Museum, and could be used if any young people found themselves separated from the group. If this was the case, each young person was instructed to ask an official member of staff at the museum to direct them to the entrance hall. This meeting point was agreed upon by all members of the group, and would also be designation point after the 2 hour period had concluded. Each group member was instructed to put their name on their folder, and told that this folder would be theirs for the duration of project. I then asked each young person to take a participation information sheet from their folder, and I read through it aloud. The group was then asked if everything was okay, and helped if questions were raised. All members of the group were then reassured that help was always at hand if needed; either through myself, the Artworks Artistic Director or Mentor 1. Finally, each member of the group was asked to take the worksheets out of the folder, and I again read through the task. Each member of the group was again asked if everything was okay, and then reassured that help would be at hand if needed. The following statements were used to guide young people’s approach to the task:

1. This task is about memory.
2. Choose an object in the museum that stand out to you.
3. Put the name of the artist, and the title of the artefact in the section provided at the top each worksheet.
4. Try to avoid reading any label next to the artwork.
5. Think about how the object makes you feel.
6. Quickly write down the things that the object reminds you of (this may include people, places or events going on in the memory etc).
7. Quickly write down how that memory makes your body feel.
8. Imagine how the memory sounds and smells; feels and tastes.

Because people are more likely to respond to “landscape of identity” questions by generating identity conclusions informed by well known structuralist categories of identity; for example, needs, motives, attributes, strengths, deficits, characteristics, etc (White, 2005: 11) I wanted to give young people the opportunity to generate sensory landscapes (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 88) which would inform well known non-structuralist categories of identity like intentions and purposes, values and beliefs, hopes,
dreams and visions etc (White, 2005: 11). The purpose of doing this, then, was to explore whether it is possible for young people from a post-industrial community, categorised through a theses of social exclusion and an “at risk” discourse (Hickey-Moody, 2013a), to ground imaginings of the social within a politics of feeling, thereby, giving aesthetics a practical and political agenda (Hickey-Moody, 2013b).

After the task was explained, I then asked for the consent forms which had been handed out prior to the study commencing (See Appendix). All consent forms adopted current BPS and BSA ethical codes of conduct and were constructed to meet the guidelines (See Appendix) concerning research contact with voluntary organisations working with young adults (i.e. rules regarding information, consent and confidentiality). A consent form was sent out to parents asking for permission to use documentation produced in the research context (see Appendix) and all parents whose children were involved in the study gave permission to use observations and analyses: the consent form was distributed to parents via Valleys Kids. In addition, all consent forms, participation information sheets, and handouts used in this study were passed by Cardiff University's ethics committee. The naming Valleys Kids was agreed upon by mutual consent, and in accordance with ethical guideline 26.

All consent forms were checked for signatures and then filed in a folder for safe keeping. The group then proceeded to the Modern Art section of the Museum. I felt that the Modern Art section of the museum was a good place to start the psychogeographical dérive as I felt that more modern, abstract and conceptual art it offered more of a manual starting point for engaging in affective relations with art objects. Indeed, I felt that these elements might be missed if the group had began the dérive in an area of the museum which contained more representational images of objects, people, spaces and events: encouraging more formalist readings (Eckersley, 2013: 220). The purpose of doing this as a purposefully structured activity was to allow the young people to begin practicing and developing a routine in learning how to work with the idea of micro-perceptions to generate geographies of human feelings and sensory landscapes (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 88) - this being in accordance with the chosen time constraint of 2 hours. I then read out the statements following statements again:

1. This task is about memory.
2. Choose an object in the museum that stand out to you.
3. Put the name of the artist, and the title of the artefact in the section provided at the top each worksheet.
4. Try to avoid reading any label next to the artwork.
5. Think about how the object makes you feel.

6. Quickly write down the things that the object reminds you of (this may include people, places or events going on in the memory etc).

7. Quickly write down how that memory makes your body feel.

8. Imagine how the memory sounds and smells; feels and tastes.

The young people were again told that help would be at hand if needed, and then instructed to roam around the museum.

One of the keys to ensuring that any research practice is ethical is to ensure that is, as far as possible, collaborative. As Pink (2009) explains: “this means engaging the subjects as participants in the project, rather than as objects of an experiment” (Pink, 2009: 58). As such, this idea is essential to generating a sensory psychogeography of museum and gallery spaces. Indeed, similar to ideas behind a sensory ethnography, it is not so much a study of other people’s sensory values, beliefs, and behaviours that are important, but the collaborative exploration of how these might inform an appreciation of change with regards to our physical environment and other people’s ways of knowing (Pink, 2009: 59).

However, it must also be stated that before intruding on the sensory consciousness of young people, or any participant for that matter, the ethical implications for conducting this kind of research should be thoroughly considered. As Hinton et al (2006) state, “traumatic events are encoded into memory by auditory, olfactory and visual cues,” all of which may trigger or lead to flashbacks (Hinton et al, 2006: 68). Indeed, this is a powerful reminder that sensory memories do not always invoke the nostalgia of good times past (Pink, 2009: 58).

Consequently, having a staff member/s from Valleys Kids present during the psychogeography of the museum and gallery would go some way in ensuring the safety and welfare of the young people taking part, because these familiar relationships would function as a “safe container” (Bion, 1962) for those young people who might suddenly need to feel safe and, indeed, supported by a familiar voice, or may want to engage in reflective processes (Leitch, 2009: 53) about their individual and collective history.
The second psychogeographical dérive of Cardiff Museum was conducted one week after the first, and included 3 young people (3 male and 0 female) aged 14-18. These volunteers were recruited from the Dinas Community and Family Hub. As Dinas Community and Family Hub often deals with some of the more challenging aspects of disadvantaged youth, participation in projects can frequently fluctuate in terms of numbers, and the time of recruitment there were 4 attendees (1 of which dropped out prior to the museum visit). The purpose of including this group, as discussed with the Valleys Kids’ Artworks Artistic Director, was to give those young people who are consistently excluded from opportunities to be given the chance to get involved in a project that would challenge them but, equally, bring creative and productive rewards in terms of self-development and learning. In addition, it would also provide another dimension to the research in terms of examining whether it could engage those young people who were more inclined to vote with their feet.

Present at the second session was the Pen Dinas Community Co-ordinator and a staff member. Again, the dérive would last approximately 2 hours and a period of 15 minutes was set aside at the beginning so that each group member could be given a folder which included 10 worksheets, 1 pen, and a map of Cardiff Museum’s. Similarly, a designation point was agreed upon by all members of the group, just in case anyone got separated during the dérive. Each member was instructed to put their name on their folder, and told that the folder would be theirs during the course of the project. I then asked the group to take the participation information sheet from their folder and I again read through it aloud. Each of participants was then asked if everything was okay, and helped out if questions were raised. Again, all members were reassured that help was at hand if needed. Finally, the group was asked to take a look at the worksheets in the folder, and I again read through the task using the following instructions:

1. This task is about memory.

2. Choose an object in the museum that stand out to you.

3. Put the name of the artist, and the title of the artefact in the section provided at the top each worksheet.

4. Try to avoid reading any label next to the artwork.

5. Think about how the object makes you feel.

6. Quickly write down the things that the object reminds you of (this may include people, places or events going on in the memory etc).

7. Quickly write down how that memory makes your body feel.
8. Imagine how the memory sounds and smells; feels and tastes.

The group was then asked if everything was okay and reassured that help would be at hand if needed. I then collected all consent forms and checked that they were signed. I then filed them in a folder for safe keeping. The group then proceeded to the Modern Art section of the Museum. Once all members of the group were gathered, they were told that there was no pressure to complete the 10 worksheets provided within the 2 hour period, but that they should put the name of the artist and the title of the artefact in the section provided at the top each worksheet. The group was instructed to avoid reading any label next to or connected with an artwork or object, and I again repeated the statements above. The group was then asked if everything was okay, and reassured that help would be at hand if needed. The group was then instructed to roam around the museum freely, accompanied by myself, the Dinas Community Co-ordinator and staff member, who offered help and support when needed.

5.3. Using pedagogical documentation to analyse the affective dimensions of art and experience: a constructivist approach

In this study I wanted to supplant the notion of affect into the discourse of art history but, moreover, I wanted to challenge the overemphasis of ideological critique and structural semiotic approaches to art by attending to the more "affective dimensions" of the art experience: this means focusing on the notion of the aesthetic as immanence (O'Sullivan, 2006). The idea of art, then, would be the name of the object encountered at museum, but it would also the name of the encounter itself. That is, the term art would denote the total, unrestricted, pattern and structure of experience from perception to recognition (Dewey, 2005: 45). As such, this meant developing an analysis of the art encounter which would account for a variety of signifying but also a-signifying registers.

The way in which I approached this objective was to create an analytical hybrid that would bring into partnership ideas from Deleuze and Spinoza, Peirce, and Bergson. From Deleuze and Spinoza I would set scientific inquiry within a bodily logic. Using this constructivist approach, which rejects the notion that truth is already there in the world and, instead, sees it as produced within experience through a variety of processes and practices (Shapiro, 2002: 108) I would use Peircean semiotics to explore how the processes of lived experience inter-relate, and communicate information, in order to produce the
art encounter. Finally, Bergson phenomenology of mind would allow me to detail the relation of lived experience to time and the material body.

As one the primary research agendas is to understand how art exhibits in a museum space can be used to create a link with people’s lived experience, a constructivist account of the generative elements of an aesthetic surface body will be analysed by focusing on the operations and function of two sorts of affect: those produced from external things that allow young people to perceive external bodies only insofar as they are affected, and those affects or “feelings” which correspond to the trace or physical impression: the latter indicating the effect of an encounter during the psychogeographical dérive.

It is necessary then, to establish the intimate relationship between the processes of actual experience and the patterns of affect narrated through the pedagogical documentation. Consequently, to do this I will analyse the pedagogical documentation and an image of the artefact side by side, continually looking at how the artwork rises up and emerges through young people’s use of emotive and sensorial language. This language would then be conceptualised through a bodily logic, which means looking at how the image, felt as an external affective cause, impresses internal feelings of joy and/or sadness on a young person’s body.

To know the meaning of empiricism we need to understand what experience is (Dewey, 1997: 25). As a result, in order to understand the processes used by young people to select the affective forces of an artworks surface, and how these work to pattern and shape young people’s experiential encounters, I will turn to Bergson’s concept of perception. This entails building a model of subjectivity that allows us to see how patterns of affective feeling are structured through the material body. For example, the nerves, muscles, brain etc). As a result, Bergson’s ideas of active selection, or what Moore (1996) calls “filtering” and “framing” (Moore, 1996: 26), will be a useful concept for looking at how the affective imagery of each young person’s aesthetic encounter, depicted in pedagogical documentation, relates to the material processes of the body.

For example, filtering involves the selection, elimination, and extraction of affective qualities from our environing conditions (Moore, 1996: 28). Received as preparatory qualities and forces, filtering sets in motion the body’s nervous system, and sensori-motor activity - eventually giving rise to what Deleuze calls the active ideas of joy or sadness (Deleuze, 1978: 4). However, filtering also relates to the body’s capacity to draw a motor diagram of all the external qualities impressed on it, framing these affective
causes as “vibratory impressions” on the nervous system, giving rise to existential experiences in pure perception (Moore, 1996: 26). As a result, by reasoning that pedagogical documentation is conjoined to the pure, vibratory, perceptual activity of a young person’s filtering, framing and selection of an art objects surface, it will be possible to show how young people can break with forms of representation, via their material encounters, and create new visual narrative that can give them a voice.

By analysing the motor diagram through Peircean semiotics I will show how the imagination works in conjunction with desire to pragmatically create an emotional event: connecting the immediately felt and consciously experienced to the surface of an artefact through a relay of signs. Here, I will attempt to show how the diagrammatic process of the cerebral interval creates what Bergson’s calls a “zone of indetermination,” allowing the imagination to trace a relations between past and present, sensations and memory. Consequently, pedagogical documentation will be seen as being part of a paralinguistic form of communication. That is, an assemblage of iconic signs which communicate feelings or images of affect, indexed to the affective causes of an artworks exterior. Accordingly, Peircean semiotics will allow me to analyse these sense events as a law of tension that either increases or decreases a young person’s sense of well-being in relation to the sensorial reminiscences evoked.

Finally, the analysis will focus on how memory intervenes in the interpretation of an artefact. But with this in mind, I will consider memory from the perspective of a certain truth of experience. This means drawing a model of the sensuous sign in a young person’s experience i.e. involuntary memory. Unlike voluntary memory which, as Deleuze (2008) suggests, is content only with illustrating or narrating the past that has been and is so no longer (Deleuze, 2008: 37), the analysis of involuntary memory draws our attention to the quality between two sensations, the sensation common to two moments in time (Deleuze, 2008: 39). For instance, the qualitative sensation felt by a young person’s encounter with an artwork, and its sensorial resemblance to a past sensation - the identity common to these sensorial qualities rising in an act of involuntary remembrance; this conjoining both the past with the present in a single flow of becoming-in-the-moment (Deleuze, 2008: 39).

As a consequence, I will approach the sensorial accounts offered by young people in the pedagogical documentation as a sequence of signs and actions linked to memory (Bergson, 1999: 22). Words will be seen as depicting the assemblage of a past context, and the unfolding of biographies (Thomson & Holland: 2005) inseparable from the present sensation and the present context i.e. a young person’s encounter with an artwork. Moreover, I will analyse the artwork in relation to the object of sensorial
recollection which involuntary rises up in and through the pedagogical documentation. Furthermore, because involuntary memory is process that internalizes context, making the past context inseparable from the present sensation, but at the same time “making two moments belong to the past” (Deleuze, 2008: 39) it can elicit a profound change in the way we experience objective conditions (Dewey, 1997: 39). I will, therefore, investigate whether young people’s narratives open up possibilities for new ways of seeing and talking about art.

5.4. Using remembering narratives as a form of sensory learning

Over a 5 month period I would work consecutively with both the Dinas and Artworks group in a series 2 hour workshops aimed at producing new visual narratives. Here, the concept of desire would be put into practice through poetry workshops. These workshops will allow each young person to enter the production of sense affects, together with their problematizing capacity, in order to insert doubt into habitual schemes of thought. Moreover, it is intended that these poetry workshops would give young people the opportunity to create new ways of seeing and talking about museum and gallery artefacts by connecting them to community, context and experience in new, interesting, and remarkable ways.

To begin this process, however, a one month period was set aside (two weeks for each group) so that remembering activities could be practiced. This would take the form of young people walking around their community loci, and using photography (digital cameras provided by the researcher) to produce and/or storyboard their own multi-sensory landscapes (Pink, 2012; 2009). Law’s (2005) ethnographic analysis of public spaces and the sensory-experiencing body, for instance, shows that people regularly incorporate elements of history and memory, of past and present times and spaces, to create a sense of interdependency and familiarity with a place (Law, 2005: 236).

As a result, young people would be encouraged to lead the way in taking photographs of local places like the nearby park and rural areas where local youths would hang out in the evening. Objects, places, and spaces that were of interest and felt to have a particular emotional and sensory resonance were photographed. These scenes would then be printed, and explored in terms of the memories and the affective, involuntary, reminiscences they evoked. As Pink (2009) notes: “photographs have a certain capacity to invoke embodied reactions, and can offer routes into our own subjectivities via memories” (Pink, 2009: 136).
It must be stated that although this exercise would not form part of the actual data collection process, it would serve as a practice exercise - the outcome including enhanced knowledge, greater thinking in terms of visual learning, and developments in learning through multi-sensory creativity (Pringle, 2010: 37). This would be useful later on when young people produced “sensory landscapes” through poetry writing. However, it would also show young people that they could be agents in their own practices, in that they could use the sensory-experiencing body to learn in real life situations, and illuminate their unheard voice through visual based stories (Thomson, 2010: 26). It was, therefore, an exercise that would strengthen sensory learning, but also build trust in the research relationship. And by this I mean establishing the view whereby young people are seen as being capable of providing testimony to their own experiences, associations, and lifestyles (Thomson, 2010: 1).

In order to practice remembering narratives, each young person was given a pen and a sheet of A4 paper and asked to create a story line connected to the photograph. The following instructions were given:

1. Write a short sentence or write down a few words about the image.
2. Pretend that a person has never seen the image before.
3. What unknown discoveries are in the image?
4. Use your own experience to tell them what they might find.
5. Describe the things that it reminds you of.
6. Describe how the image makes you feel.

The purpose of using this preliminary exercise is that it allows young people to come into contact with their own knowledge of life, and their own skills of living, which have been co-generated in relation to other people’s lives, by being part of a community, and experiencing significant events (White, 2005: 13). Indeed, a young person’s relational experiences contribute very significantly to a person’s sense of being knowledgeable (White, 2005: 13) and provide the basis for young people to develop specific proposals about their engagements with significant figures, places, and events in their individual and collective history, including the identities of potentially significant figures, places, and events in their present life. As White (2005) explains:
“These figures and identities do not have to be directly known in order to be identified as significant to person’s lives. For example, these figures and identities may be the authors of books that have been important to persons, or characters in movies or comics. And these figures do not have to be people. For example, it may be the stuffed toy of a person’s childhood, or a favourite pet, and so on’’ (White, 2005: 13).

Learning is emphasised by the event that takes place between sensing and the sensed. Consequently, whether it is an event that takes place in real world practices or simply the *happenings* that take place between the surface of an image and the body of a viewer, what we are really dealing with is the act of remembering is the embodied “sensory-motivity” (Deleuze, 1994: 23) which unfolds in the process of learning through lived experience. As Deleuze (1994) explains:

“As a result, ‘learning’ always takes place in a through the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound complicity between nature and mind” (Deleuze, 1994: 165).

Over the course of a 1 month period, then, creative workshops would be used to focus on how young people can create new visual narratives through bodymind learning. That is, remembering narratives would be initiated through two sets of inquiry. The first set of inquiry would invite:

1. A recounting of what the significant figure, place, and/or event contributed to the young person’s life in terms of its affective and sensorial qualities (i.e. its contribution to person’s life).

2. The person to enter the consciousness of this figure on matters of the person’s identity, initiating a rich description of the ways in which this connection shaped/had the potential to shape the person’s sense of who they are in terms of its sensorial affect, and what their life is about in relation to this affect (i.e. a person’s identity through the eyes of the figure).

In these sessions, learning would comprise of in-depth discussions that would take the form of a focus group session with young people passing images to each other, and forming their own remembering narratives which they would present to the group. Here, the act of sharing would form a preliminary condition for the poetry exercise but it would also serve another important function. That is, sharing allows young people to communicate their experiences and convey a message. In this sense, then, it
also functions as a form of positive recognition. Consequently, after each young person had shared an experience, they were praised for their contribution, and the group invited to further discuss their own ideas and, indeed, relationship to what was said. This would be initiated either by the researcher or a staff member.

5.5. Reading innovative poetries as blocs of sensation

The type of visual narrative chosen in this study was poetry. As this study was interested in capturing the “pattern of a complete experience, rendering it more intensely and concretely felt” (Dewey, 2005: 54) as bloc of sensations (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 176) poetry was seen as way of documenting the language of sensation through narratives of remembering. Indeed, as poetry possesses and organizes the movement of the immediately felt (Dewey, 2005: 40), it offers researchers a way of exploring the action, movement, and processes of lived experience through their affective and temporal dynamics. As a consequence, poetic narratives often do what description fails to do i.e. “enact a total situation” (Wilkinson, 2009: 164). The idea of poetic enactment, therefore, provides researchers with a way of approaching the language of sensation as process of sign-activity or Peircean semiosis.

Poems are more effective when the subject has meaning for the person creating the poem. If the poet is bored with the topic, then the poem will probably be boring as well. This is especially important to remember when working with young people with different educational requirements. As a result, one of the ways in which I will engage young people is to encourage them to select a topic that fits in with their own experience rather than outside it. As such, the first step in the poetry exercise will be to let each young person decide upon a subject or an idea that has meaning for them. Hence, the best way to approach this part of the poetic process is to encourage each young person to select a topic that they have strong feelings about, and to fit this topic around their own experience (Green & Punla, 1996: 9-14). The pedagogical documentation use in the psychogeographical dérive will be integral, here, as it will now be used as a word gathering resource.
5.6. Poetry and word gathering: composing innovative poetic space

The first step in writing a poem is to decide upon a subject. This means encouraging the young people to select a topic that they have strong feelings about. As such, the pedagogical documentation used in the dérive of Cardiff Museum will now serve a dual purpose. For example, in the first stage the dérive was used to generate a: “geography of human feelings” (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 88). However, now the pedagogical documentation will be approached as a collection of gathered words, phrases and pieces of information that can be used to make a poem. In this sense, young people have already completed the second step of writing a poem (i.e. word gathering) and will be ready to move onto the third step of creating a poem, extracting the “best” words (Green & Punla, 1996: 11).

Consequently, each young person was instructed to circle the best words from their own pedagogical documentation. That is, choose the words that created the most vivid picture in their minds. This step was derived from Bergson’s discussion on language.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the event makes it possible for us to focus on how young people use language in different ways (Olsson, 2009: 102). But from a Bergsonian point of view, the analyses of language can be approached in the same way as memory. That is, the way in which we find what is said to us is identical to the same way we find a recollection (Deleuze, 1991: 57). Consequently, when listening to someone read a poem or, better still, when reciting a poem to ourselves either out loud or in our thoughts, we at once place ourselves in the element of sense, then in a particular region of this element. By the same token, a reader can and will often feel the language in their mouth as they read in their own accent, and feel the actualization of the poem’s language physically (Clay, 2010: 52). But how does this happen? It starts with a true leap into the past.

What does it mean to recover a recollection, to evoke a period of history? We become conscious of an act *sui generis* by which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first, in the past in general, then in a certain region of the past – a work of adjustment, analogous to the focusing of a camera. But our recollection still remains in a virtual state; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting the appropriate attitude. Little by little it comes into view like a condensing cloud; from the virtual past it passes into the actual state, and its outlines become more distinct and its surface takes on colour, it tends to imitate perception (Bergson, 2004: 171).
It is only after this process that sense is actualized in the psychologically perceived sounds, and in the images that are psychologically associated with the sounds. Indeed, far from just recomposing sense on the basis of sounds heard, together with their associated images, it is a process which recomposes the past with the present. We can, then, imagine a kind of transcendental and ontological foundation to language (Deleuze, 1991: 57). But this is not all.

Again, by encouraging young people to choose a particular word/s that are strong in feeling, I wanted them to choose on the basis of need. For Bergson, need is not concerned with wants or desires, it is a method of subtraction. It chooses, from an image, all that is needed for perception. Everything else is subtracted away. As Bergson (2004) points out: “need goes straight to the resemblance and quality of affection and cares little for individual differences” (Bergson, 2004: 60/206). Accordingly, when choice is extended to words, memory, and the search for feelings, need subtracts one resemblance amongst many, and chooses a recollection to actualize it.

Consequently, because bodily memory consists of the sum total of our habits organised and stored by our sensori-motor system, the body itself is a quasi-instantaneous memory to which the true memory of the past serves as a base (Bergson, 2004: 197). With this in mind, then, the degree of contraction or tension facilitated by need, or in this case a young person’s search, will correspond to the elicitation of a durational event, the manifestation of which is evoked or created externally by each young person’s choice of word from the pedagogical documentation, working in direct conjunction with the: “greater development of the sensori-motor system” (Bergson, 2004: 296).

The major innovation that Bergson’s theory of memory brings to the third step of poetry making is the reconciliation of involuntary memory with choice. Indeed, by encouraging young people to extract the “best” words in terms of their feeling, their needs would spontaneously choose which level of the past they leap into, and what recollection they would actualize. As a result, Bergson’s conception of choice not only prevents any separation between each word case and its ontological rule, but it also prevents any separation between decision and process (Lefebvre, 2008: 161). To leap into memory at the level of words and language, then, presents young people with an opportunity to actualize the right rule at the appropriate level of movement and tension with regards to body, sensation, affect, and memory-image. With this in mind, each youngster would choose a word from their pedagogical
documentation and use it to construct an object poem. This object, however, would be treated from a Peircean point of view as an immediate object of experience.

As a repeat of the remembering task, each young person would recount their own identity and their own sensory knowledge of life in relation to an image. However, this time they would work with their pedagogical documentation alongside an image of an artefact they had chosen during their dérive of Cardiff Museum. The reason behind doing this is to see if pedagogical documentation can be used as a tool to democratise art objects by challenging their cultural status as an object of recognition. That is to say, its function as a signify discourse that can only yield its value and purpose when experienced through the curatorial prestige of scholarly art history. With this in mind, then, rather than producing stories or narratives about what they feel their chosen art object represents, each young person used their pedagogical documentation to assemble an economy of sense and feeling around a point of emotional intensity (i.e. a poetic narrative structured around a meaningful word or topic chosen from the pedagogical documentation).

Each art object/s used in the poetry task were be independently chosen by the young people during their psychogeographic dérive of Cardiff Museum. The images were then sourced and reproduced in the form of coloured printouts. For instance, most of the artefacts identified in the museum could be sourced from Cardiff Museums Online Collections (www.museumwales.ac.uk) library. These were then copied and pasted onto a Word document, and used alongside the pedagogical documentation. Any artefact chosen by a young person, but not available through Museum Online Collections, either because of copyright restriction or a delay in its online digitisation, would then be sourced via Google Images (https://www.google.co.uk) or through academic library and archive resources: in such a case the image would be scanned and then placed in Word format. All of the images chosen by the young people were filed in their respective folder, and kept for safe keeping.

To keep the multi-sensorial aspect of poetry exercise active, the young people were always instructed to create their poem alongside their chosen image. The following instructions were then given:

1. Look at your image, and then choose a word from your worksheet that stands out (i.e. pedagogical documentation). Choose a word that you can easily picture in your mind. A word that has memories and feelings attached to it. This will be the subject of your poem.
2. Try to concentrate on that word. Picture it as a memory. Concentrate on how it feels; tastes; smells and sounds.

3. Use your senses to explore how the memory it makes your body feel. How does it move your body? For example, does it make you feel big or small, heavy or light? I then handed the young people with a list of movement words (see Appendix).

4. The young people were then asked if they were okay with the task. They were then reassured that help would be at hand if needed. I then gave each young person a handout containing the following poetic structure.

   The [...] is a [...].
   When I [...] it [...].
   It turns my [...] into [...].
   This makes me feel [...].
   It makes me feel like [...].

5. I then instructed the young person to spend some time concentrating on their chosen word and to start writing their poem when they felt ready. When they felt ready, they should put their chosen word in the first space of the first line after the word ‘The.’ I then pointed to the space and asked the young people if they were okay. I then instructed the young people to begin writing their poem when they felt ready. They were again reassured that help would be at hand if it was needed. With this in mind, myself and one or both of the mentors were always present during the poetry workshops.

The poetic template, constructed by myself, would yet again provide a scaffold for the development of sense and experience in motion. Indeed, by encouraging each young person to fill in the sequence of gaps, the scaffold would help assist them to engage in the “sense becoming” of an experience as it develops in the moment, whilst again stretching and exercising their imagination and their meaning-making resources. It was envisaged that the outcome of this practice would create new, interesting, and remarkable narratives about young people’s lives, whilst enveloping the pragmatic construction of meaning-making within a more deeply rooted history of place, space, and figures of time. It would also offer readers a specific encounter with a narrative text which moves between different registers of the intelligible and sensible, whilst simultaneously opening up the possibility of a sympathetic and tactile engagement with young people’s experiences through words.
As Pink (2009) states: “the written word allows for sensory knowing” (Pink, 2009: 135). But in making this point, Pink is not suggesting that the written word is superior or an exclusive medium for bringing sensation, emotions, and experiences into representation. Rather, writing should be used in relation to other modes of textual expression, like the visual and/or auditory (MacDougall, 2005: 60), in order to reflexively acknowledge the processes through which knowing and knowledge are produced (Pink, 2009: 136). It should demonstrate how the fusion of the intelligible and the sensible can be applied to practices and representations (Stoller, 1997: xv) so as to compose embodied experiences, and make a crucial connection with the movement of sensorial evocation, enabling the readers of the written text to encounter otherly forms of intimacy and awareness; the comprehension of which, offering different and/or alternative ways of knowing, arguments based on emplaced experience, and new possibilities for mutual meaning-making (Pink, 2009: 135).

Accordingly, as the gaps in each line sequence are filled, and the poem begins to identify, name, and reawaken the domains of living central to young people’s participation in life (i.e. home, school, peer context, familial relationships, the relationship to oneself, friends, purposes, hopes, fears and dreams) it is expected that forms of recognition will be problematized, and put into continuous variation by a language of sensation which, through the production of unusual combinations, will radically dislocate familiar concepts from familiar contexts, thereby, recomposing the way we see and talk about them (Raunig, 2010: 43). In addition, by relating an artworks surface to a sensorial mode of expression, it is envisaged that young people will work on the textual language of a visual image from the inside, and work phonologically on its syntactic and semiotic components to produce permanent variations in its plane of content and form of expression. That is, make perceptible what is not perceptible, and make enunciable what is not enunciable (Ospina, 2010: 28-29) about the lived experiences of marginalized and segregate young people.

The use of poetry was decided upon in this study as it appears to offer a way of composing an image of an artefact through the movement of sensation. Consequently, this is consistent with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) view of art as a bloc of sensations:

“We paint, sculpt, compose and write sensations. We paint, sculpt, compose, and write sensations... [T]he smile on a canvas is made solely with colours, lines, shadow and light. If resemblance haunts the work of art, it is because sensation refers only to its material...the smile of oil, the gesture of fired clay,
The poem is not composed, first and foremost, with signifiers and significations, but with rhythms and sounds, images, feelings and perceptions. Although, with due recognition, these are produced through language, the ways in which different sensational elements of a poem interact, and their relationship with symbolic signs of signification, is more of a conventional relationship than a primary one. That is to say, sensorial events are related to language and, indeed, expressed by linguistic propositions, but, as we observed in Chapter 2, there is no necessary correspondence between the force of a sensorial image - felt as an idea of affection and the visual content of discursive propositions - and any meaning that might be connected to it through explicit signification. Language is an external element imposed on the image or idea of an affect (Massumi, 2002 26). Consequently, with the image considered as a carrier of affect, and language considered purely as signification that indexes the strength or duration of the images effect or intensity (Massumi, 2002: 26) poetry becomes a useful pedagogical tool when signifiers are needed to operate in the service of sensation. J.H. Prynne’s ‘The Numbers’ is an example of how a poem reveals the movement of sensation in its own right:

The whole thing it is, the difficult matter: to shrink the confines down. To signals, so that I come back to this, we are small/in the rain open or without it, the light in de-light, as with pleasure amongst not merely the word, one amongst them, but the skin over the points, of the bone.

The poem by Prynne takes an immediately reluctant stance in relation to the reader. There is little or no certainty of reference and, while there are self-referential personal pronouns (singular and plural I and we) that work with a broad sense of this poem as a lyric, they are quite slight and do not help us to grasp what “it” is, or what “this” is (Clay, 2010: 21). In fact, we could say that this poem is a general refusal to make sense, and creates a disorder that is evident to a reader who assumes that all poetry must be representational. Consequently, while the poem makes use of entirely accessible references, it does not seem immediately clear who or what is being represented. There are meanings here, and
references there, but there is no *meaning*. That is, no overall representation. All we appear to have is the movement of shrinking, the forces of expansion and contraction (i.e. small and open) amongst an unknown pleasure of skin, over points of bone. That is, the movement of affect and sensation.

A poem presented through the movement of affect and sensation, whilst on the surface appearing to have some similarities to a poem read through the assumption that it is representational, is different from such a reading. The poem is not a passage of communication between the poet and the reader, whereby the reader recognises the poet as a more sensitive and intelligent version of themselves, but something that affects the reader in its own right and as such is potentially productive (Clay, 2010: 47). The poem becomes an enacted process of unfolding movement in conjunction with a reader (who is also, for the time of the enactment, the actualization of the poem). That is, it is an embodied, enacted performance: the performance being the sensational and temporal unfolding of the poem in relation with a self of a reader (Clay, 2010: 47).

For instance, in the process we discover sensations: sensations of shrinking, being confined, and of being small. The initial sense of a representational disturbance is also a sensation, too. It unbalances the reader and forces them to search for sense. Consequently, we can say that this is what the poem does. It does *something* to the reader. Indeed, if we take the word “rain” the reader is compelled to register the sensation produced by the words significance. However, because the word does not draw attention to itself as a self-effacing representation of reality through any self-referential personal pronouns, it disrupts the reader, leaving them open to other operations i.e. a body in motion.

When a body is in motion, it does not coincide with itself. It coincides with its own transition: its own variation (Massumi, 2002: 4). That is, a continuous variation of joy and sadness. Guattari (1995) terms this the “unfolding of multi-polar affective compositions” (Guattari, 1995: 204). Poetry can, therefore, have social implications. For example, because Bergson (1999) proposes that we can intuitively enter language through a kind of *intellectual sympathy*, we can make contact with indivisible feelings which are presented to us by the words, gestures and actions presented to us by a poem (Bergson, 1999: 22). This is achieved by effort of our imagination (Bergson, 1999: 22). However, as Guattari (1995) states in reference to Spinoza’s view of the imagination:

“From the fact that we imagine someone like us to be affected, we are affected with a like affect, from which results an emulation of desire and the unfolding of multi-polar affective compositions” (Guattari, 1995: 204).
With regards to a poetic reading, our imagination involves an awareness of the action of the poem at the same time as our body is in motion. That is, it creates a “connection that is in the mind according to the order and connection of affections of the human body” (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999: 23). However, according to both Bergson and Spinoza it is our bodies that retain traces of the changes bought about in them by the impingement of other bodies and not our cognitive faculties. This means that the body never forgets (Bertrand, 1983: 66). Accordingly, the apprehension of affect in so far as our experiences is volitionally affected functions as an ethical evaluation of objective knowledge. Moreover, it implies that a reader encounter as “self-referential communication with the lived and felt body in relation to the transitive character of affect” (Guattari, 1995: 61), and that via this movement of affect, a reader relates to him or herself as “encompassing the outside of content” and the “feeling of generating both meaning and evaluation” (Guattari, 2013: 205). This means a feeling of engendering both an emotional and volitional order, and the sensation of moving towards meaning-directed activity.

The shift away from representation gives poetry a real position in society. It becomes praxis in its own right, and creates the conditions for an “authentic self-activity rather than self-effacement before an idealized meaning” (Clay, 2010: 47). This opens up an opportunity look at what Foucault terms *Fearless Speaking*, which itself is based on the Greek concept of *parrhesia* or truth-telling (Foucault, 2001). The word parrhesia, as discussed by Foucault, refers to the type of relationship between the speaker, and what the speaker says about certain social situations (Foucault, 2001: 12-13). Truth, in this instance, is always an exact coincidence between a person’s experiential belief, and the specific relationship that the person takes up with themselves in an act of expression (Foucault, 2001: 12-13). Indeed, avoiding any rhetorical form which would otherwise discursively veil the relationship between belief and truth, Foucault suggests that the parrhesiate must use the: “most direct worlds and form of expression that they can find” (Foucault, 2001: 12) to problematize institutions, practices and habits of behaviour that function by silencing out discussion. This means interrogating some hitherto unproblematic relations between freedom, power, democracy and education (Foucault, 2001: 73-74). With this in mind, those involuntary and sympathetic worlds folded within the events of poetry, may give young people a way of verbalizing experiences important to democratic narrative, functioning as transitional object which serves as a bridge between interior and exterior worlds.
5.7. Sensation and contemporary poetry: working with transformative intensities

As already hinted, when a poem is absent of any personal or self-referencing pronouns poetry opens representation up to the pre-communicable process of experience. The structure of the poem would, therefore, provide young people with the necessary tool to write a pragmatic account of experiences relationally incumbent on the movement of sensation in memory-images. What would be clear in this instance is that although properties of signification are directly involved in the poems composition, its role is used in the production of sensation: the latter having priority in the composition of the poem in that signification is essentially an event or tool used to produce sensation (Clay, 2010: 50). The overall movement of the poem, then, co-opts signification to present what Deleuze and Guattari term a “bloc of sensations.”

“Art is the language of sensations. Art does not have opinions. Art undoes the triple organisation of perceptions, affections and opinions [doxa: the ‘essence’ of a body] in order to substitute a monument composed of percepts, affects and blocs of sensation that take the place of language...A monument does not commemorate or celebrate something that happened but confides to the ear of the future the persistent sensations that embody the event” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 176-7).

As compounds of percepts and affects, blocs of sensation have their own affective force or quality, and can create new sensory landscapes for their beholder. Indeed, similar to Peirce’s triadic sign, blocs of sensation can inspire different connections to bodies, or compound different feelings about subjects. For instance, the percept of a poem might is equivalent to the stress and rhythm that that each of the words carries. This can be likened to Pierce’s Firstness. Similarly, an affect - which can only function by way of a relationship with its percept - involves the embodiment of that stress or sensation. This can be likened, then, to Pierce’s Secondness or its emotional significance.

As a consequence, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that people who experience the force produced by an affect can retain this force and be changed as a result (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 166). However, as Hickey-Moody (2013b) points out: “the way the sensory affect is experienced will always be specific to a body” (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 86). That is to say, sensation acquires a body through the organism and is immediately conveyed in the flesh through the nervous wave or vital emotion (Deleuze, 2005b: 161).
40) and the ever-varying degree of tension of memory-images (Bergson, 2004: 97). This is not to say, however, that a poem will necessarily change its viewer in a prescribed way. Rather, it may: “create new associations and habits by clustering emotions around new images” (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 87).

The first line sequence was constructed in way as to directly communicate the subject and idea of the poem. This would be complemented by an additional object that the writer of the poem perceives as sharing the same qualities. The definitive article “The” was used at the beginning of each first line, so as to direct each young person’s attention towards the dynamic properties of each memory-image. An extract from one of the young person’s poems is provided to illustrate how this was done.

**The [...] is a [...].**
**E.g. The [rainbow] is a [colourful beaming of strong love].**

The tone of the poem would, therefore, be set by the iconic feature that relates to, and resembles the idea of the poem. It terms of experience, this should be approached as a qualisign which serves as the pre-conscious ground or existential feeling related to the idea of the poem.

**When I [...] it [...].**
**E.g. When I [see one] it [makes me feel fresh].**

In the second line sequence the poem performs an indexical function. This is used to relate the iconic feature of the poem to its existential qualities, but also a young person’s volitional awareness of these qualities. The principle feature of the second line sequence is that it will show how it interrelates with the image or sensible feature of the first line sequence, but it will also show us how a young person’s qualitative experience of a memory-image is actualised through a visceral effect or reaction. In terms of experience, this is considered a Peircean sinsign and brings together body and mind in an embodied state of awareness. It also indicates a temporal occurrence rendering the memory-image as something real and existent.

The third line sequence encourages each youngster to try and make contact with the extralinguistic or pre-communicative aspect of experience. It will be also used to explore “acts of doing,” which Dewey (2005) believes are integral to real creative experiences (Dewey, 2005: 52). Furthermore, because the
semiotic sequence: “It turns my...” is a proposition that is concerned with movement, it will highlight how transitions of occur in relation to the idea or memory-image in the first line sequence. That is to say, how the memory-image establishes itself as a general rule related to feeling, habit and belief.

**It turns my [...] into [...].**
E.g. It turns my [world] into [a world of happiness].

In both the fourth and fifth line, respectively, the line structure beginning with: “This make me feel...” will be used to explore how the memory-image determines a young person’s sense of self and well-being. The structure beginning with: “It makes me feel...” will, therefore, allow us to see the sensory and involuntary auto-suggestive nature of the memory-image as a form of action.

**This makes me feel [...]**.
**It makes me feel like [...]**.
E.g. This makes me feel [full of joy].
   It makes me feel like [a leprechaun dancing].

### 5.8. Exiting the Field

The final stage of this approach makes the point that a researcher rarely fully leaves the field. Indeed, even though we have to physically leave it at some point, in an emotional and, possibly even spiritual sense (Watt & Scott-Jones, 2010: 119) the relationships that are made with young people, place, and community, inevitably leave traces on our thoughts, remembrances, and future research endeavours, in the sense that a recurring past will overlook, guide, and inform how we conceptualize theories and translate concepts into practice. However, before starting this research, I had not considered my exist strategy. Indeed, at the beginning of the research I had been so focused on planning, constructing, and shaping theoretical concepts into a practical methodology that I had omitted to think about how I would leave the field.
As Mackie (2012) points out, while a researcher is engaged for a fixed period of time on an issue that interests them, the issue of what happens at the end of the project is often neglected (Mackie, 2012: 184). For instance, while exiting the field may only happen once, does not impact on the outcome or results of the research, or require any theorisation, the end of a project might seem, from the inside, to be of little relevance (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011). However, like when entering the field, exiting the field also generates a period of transition in the researcher-researched relationship (Michailova et al, 2014: 139).

While an academic will continue in their role as researcher, young people, and particularly those who are marginalized, segregated, and exposed to multiple social deprivations, are unlikely to have a clear direction of travel (Mackie, 2012: 184). Consequently, France (2000), claiming this as one of the shortcomings of a Joseph Rowntree Foundation funded project, acknowledges that not having a clear exit strategy can create difficulties for young people moving on (France, 2000: 1). Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, the process of undergoing, re-establishing and re-negotiating one’s identity as a subject in the field, plays a powerful part in establishing a researcher’s personal and professional identity. It cannot be surprising, then, that while some participants might perceive themselves primarily as providers of data, others undergo serious identity changes when being active participants in the research journey (Clarke, 2010: 400).

As this research provided young people with an opportunity to express themselves emotionally, and allowed them to enact their own role as a co-producer in practice-led activities - this facilitated by an environment of “interpersonal connection” and “partnership” (Pitts & Miller-Day, 2007) marked by high levels of self-disclosure and, indeed, negotiation with regards to the success of the methods and practices used in the study - it was important to come up with an exit strategy that empowered young people collectively; in the sense that they could look back and see themselves as being collaborators in the same exercise (Alfred, 2008: 892) rather than equating their contribution with personal failure (Sharpe, 2012: 82). Consequently, and in a joint negotiation with the Artistic Director at Valleys Kids, and two other members of staff, the following exit strategy was devised.

The first part of the exit strategy would basically consist of informing the young people of my plans to leave the field ahead of time. This would be done at the beginning of the project by telling the groups taking part that this was a 6 month research project (i.e. one month allocated to a psychogeographic walk of Cardiff Museum, and five months to poetry exercises) and a month in advance of leaving the
field. The rationale behind this is that it would give the young people taking part in the study enough time to mentally and/or emotionally get used to me leaving the field, and to foresee the closure of the fieldwork and the termination of the research relationship (Michailova et al, 2014: 142). It would also avoid any perception of me, as an academic researcher, appearing to leave the field abruptly (Lofland & Lofland, 1995: 126). However, to counter this overly simplistic approach to leaving the field, which purely focuses on the researcher’s instrumental or “goal orientated” management of the field (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 87) a concluding workshop would be set aside so that young people’s work could be shown and discussed with other members of the group.

After long intensive fieldwork, ending relationships with young participants, albeit anticipated, may result in feelings of separation and/or loss (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Dutton & Heaphy, 2003). But in accordance with the view of theorizing a relational framework, and considering the outcome to be jointly produced by the researcher-researched relationship, the final workshop session would consist in arranging the art images, selected by the young people, on a wall together with their poems: the poems substituting the more traditional curatorial labelling, found at Cardiff Museum, with forms of multi-sensory communication.

The rationale behind using display as part of the exit strategy is that it offers a space which not only recognizes young people’s work, but acknowledges their efforts in the co-creation of insights on how the relationship between art, sensory experience, and remembering narratives can create new ways of seeing and talking about art. With this in mind, although it could be argued that this strategy only serves to stylize the dominance of the researcher (Macdonald & Hellgren, 2004) or even exhibit the researcher’s self-serving attitude to please research participants (Reeves, 2010) my intention behind doing this was more aligned with Coffey’s (1999) ideas on enacting new types of practice that allow the world of the participant to sit alongside that of the researcher. That is, displaying young people’s work was intended to exhibit a joint mental space, and a mutual understanding about the relational and social value of art, and practice-led research.

Finally, it is important to appreciate that the efforts exerted by an organization to help maintain the researcher’s field of enquiry can be substantial. Consequently, an exit strategy that recognises these efforts should also be carefully considered. With this in mind, a letter of acknowledgement would be written to Valleys Kids, thanking them for their help and consent over the course of the project, but
also directing them to Cardiff University’s institutional repository ORCA (http://orca.cf.ac.uk/) where the thesis report can be accessed (see Appendix).

5.9. Conclusion

As there are many ways to understand and look at culture I will outline the way the concept is used here. As Vinterek (2010) notes, we can look at culture in a broad meaning including ideas (including knowledge, understanding and values) as activity (actions) or, we may look at it in terms of artefacts (Vinterek, 2010: 371). Bates and Plog (1990) offer this definition:

“[…] the system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviours, and artefacts that the members of society use to cope with their world and with one another, and that are transmitted from generation to generation through learning” (Bates & Plog, 1990: 7).

Looking at culture in this way, we might say that there are ideational, social, and material dimensions to how we perceive culture and, particularly with regards to the culture of the artefact, embedded as it is in the ideas, values and activities of the museum and gallery. Indeed, Gidden’s (1984) theory of structuration, would argue that individuals make the society of the museum but, equally, dependent on it. This would tend to make the relationship between a museum and/or gallery, and the visitor or viewer reciprocal, the structure acts upon individuals and vice versa. From this point of view, then, a culture can be perceived as a structure, and to be situated in that culture entails being in a kind of give and receive situation. That is, individuals act upon culture and the culture acts upon individuals. As a result, culture is maintained and changed through actions but, as we can see above, culture also sets the limits on what knowledge, values, customs and behaviours take place.

“Culture, conceived of as a system of competence shared in its broad design and deeper principles, and varying between individuals in its specificities, is then not all of what an individual knows and thinks and feels about his world. It is his theory of what his fellows know, believe, and mean, his theory of the code being followed, the game being played, in the society into which he was born” (Keesing, 1974: 89).

This implies that what creates a culture and becomes part of the culture, at the same time is not only made up by individuals’ perceptions of society itself, but also includes all individuals’ thoughts about
everyone else’s perceptions (Vinterek, 2010: 372). The construction of what we perceive as culture is, therefore, a technical practice built around a particular kind of cognitive-instrumental-performative-utilitarian rationality that justifies ethical and political actions in a systematic and structured manner. (Olsson, 2009: 81). Artefacts function by providing us with stylistic facts and historical information, a specific kind of scientific and objective knowledge that complements rational theorisation by giving us access to generally formulated laws that describe the order of the world. Furthermore, related to this knowledge are technologies that will ensure the process of accessing outcomes most effective for this type of “orthodox thought” (Deleuze, 1994: 132). For instance, developmentally appropriate curricula, tools for evaluation, and different instruments for measuring quality.

In the next chapter we will see how the young people of Valleys Kids problematised this orthodox way of seeing, talking, and thinking about art and cultural artefacts. Furthermore, it will acknowledge that problems are not givens but produced in relation to sense under construction. Indeed, because there is no single analytic method available to do this kind of investigation, it is more a matter of making use of the cultural artefact, and mapping its affective pathway in relation to a bodily logic, and a particular problem under construction as it is engaged through lived experience, and becoming-in-the-moment.

As a result, contextualizing an artwork in relation to the pragmatic coordinates of lived experience will figure prominently throughout. This means accounting for the logic of affect, sensation and memory in process, rather than looking at young people’s encounters with artefacts and sense-making as a more rational process based on rational choice decisions. This would only lock lived experience in discursive modes of thought. Indeed, the purpose of applying a bodily logic is to see if it is possible to use ready-made artefacts as a “re-sensitization tool” (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 65). That is, a tool to guide and extend our experiences, and to recover our sensitivity. In this sense, it may be possible to use art to look at the old in new, interesting and remarkable ways.
Chapter 6

Analysis 1: Psychogeographical Dérives and Pedagogical Documentation

In this chapter I will explore how an affective pedagogy may be practiced in a museum space; namely Cardiff Museum, and how cultural forms can be analysed through pedagogical documentation. With this in mind, the Chapter will start with a short reflexive account on the psychogeographical method and how this approach can condition a complex formation of purposes in the here and now. As such, this demands that the researcher recognise their own knowledge, wider experiences and subjectivity during the psychogeography. Indeed, it involves the researcher observing the surrounding conditions and using their own impulses and desires to produce questions and problems relationally conjoined to the event being undertaken. This might entail the rescheduling of immediate action, until observation and judgement has informed foresight of consequences (Dewey, 1997: 69). However, it must be also be acknowledged that the following report does not provide researchers with a formulaic model for conducting a psychogeographic dérive, but what it will do is exercise observations for a philosophy of art education based on a philosophy of experience.

Following some brief considerations about the practicalities of psychogeography as a data collection tool, I will then set out analyse the pedagogical data collected during the psychogeographical dérive. This will be done by exploring and pragmatically mapping young people’s “unconscious processes of production of the real” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 313). That is to say, the passage and movement of affectus from one bodily state to another, and the correlative variation of these states as they prompt an affection or “feeling of affect” in consciousness (i.e. passions of joy or sadness) - this indicating the difference in nature between a qualitatively existential image or idea of affection, which is registered by haptic vision, and the embodied feeling affect as a volitional felt event. The analysis of pedagogical documentation will, therefore, be presented and communicated as a bodily logic, which traces ideas, interactions and shifts in young people’s corporeal encounters with art objects. Furthermore, young people’s narratives will be seen as a product of a diagrammatic imagination which uses the processes desire to map sensory meaning onto thought. As a result, this will allow us to observe whether young people’s geographies meaning, by offering us a unique and distinctive extension of body and context (Hickey-Moody, 2013, 83), can rework cultural objects in a devolved museum space.
6.0. The museum and gallery as a site for research: some reflections on practice

When I first gave the instruction for the young people to roam around the museum and gallery space freely, there appeared to be a slight hesitancy, a slight disorientation, and a reluctance to break away either from a specific group or individual, and to roam around the large museum and gallery space of their own accord. The majority of young people had not been to the museum before, and this might have accounted for their restricted movement. Accordingly, a researcher might assume the traditional role of an educator and recognize this behaviour as acting in a way of a “needing child.” Moreover, it might be tempting at this point to exert some kind of control and to intervene, feeling it necessary to start directing young people in acts of tuition or demonstration, fixing and subordinating the aims and methods of instruction in rules of conduct and discipline (Dewey, 1997: 45).

Mindful of these issues, and frequently caught between my standing as an adult guardian but also that of a field researcher who now had a theoretical knowledge about disciplining young people’s creative freedom and desires, I began to question my own relation to the group. That is, should I let the young people taking part in the activity continue to negotiate their own experiences and problems, and their own effecting alterations of subjectivity, or should I be a source of guidance?

In accentuating the senses to novel experience I often felt reluctant to intervene. This was in part due to my own institutionally established and ingrained customs towards educational philosophy. Having orientated theoretical beliefs and attitudes about traditional educational models and how they might repress young people’s through the gaze of lack or perceive them developmentally as psychologically and inherently needy (Olsson, 2009: 146), I had developed a resistance towards organizing any group dynamic through this scheme of learning, and was more sensitive the practical affairs of freedom and agency. For example, Dewey (1997) explains that traditional models of education impose schemes of classification, rules of conduct and moral training consisting in forming habits of action in conformity with these rules and standards. Consequently, teachers are more inclined to become agents through which knowledge and skills are communicated, and rules of conduct enforced (Dewey, 1997: 25). This kind of external imposition, therefore, opposes the cultivation of individuality and the freedom of the learner. Bearing this in mind, I had a conscious aversion about becoming acquainted with these rules of conduct, and the consequences which result from their application.
In rejecting the static aims and methodology of traditional educational models I was inclined to reject methods of instruction and discipline. Moreover, I was concerned that patterns of organization could create conditions in which the activity of thought, desire, and purpose would become far too socially controlled through my intervention. However, there is always the danger that in rejecting the aims and methods we would like to supplant, that we end up developing our own principles negatively instead of positively and constructively (Dewey, 1997: 20). It does not always follow, then, that the intervention of an authority figure should be rejected (Dewey, 1997: 38). Rather, it is more a case of searching for a more affective source of authority. As Dewey (1997) states:

“There is no point in an educator being more mature if, instead of using his greater insight to help organize the conditions of the experience of the immature, he throws away his insight” (Dewey, 1997: 38).

It is the responsibility of the educator and, indeed, researcher to see in what direction an experience is heading. It is simply not enough to insist upon the necessity of experience as an activity. Everything in this study would depend on the quality of the experience being had. Furthermore, the quality of the young people experience would, ultimately, determine how they would perceive the psychogeographic dérive as a method and, as a consequence, how they would relate to their material encounters in the museum and gallery.

It was not just about discovering a connection with the present or becoming acquainted with the past in such a way as for it to be a potent agent of transformation and appreciation of the living present, it is about basing art education on personal experiences, and building towards more progressive ways of working with young people so that they can have richer and less restricted experiences in the future. It would have been disloyal to the principle of using experience itself as a method of progressive praxis if I did not consider that genuine experiences did not have an active side which changed the objective conditions under which those experiences where had. For example, it is not too difficult to imagine an instance from our own past in which we may have needed help to progress or move forward in a task. Better still is to remember a time when help was needed but not forthcoming. Such instances can be detrimental to future experiences. They render us more sensitive and responsive to certain conditions. The capacity for sympathetic understanding is something that our own experience has given us, and is part of a democratic social arrangement that promotes a better quality of human experience.
The wisdom of our own wider experience is more than acquainting our own past to the conditions of a reactionary attitude. That is, the effect of an experience sets a problem for the researcher. It is their business to arrange the kind of experience that can promote desirable future experiences; calling on our capacity for sympathetic understanding, which gives us an idea of what is going on in the minds of those who are learning. As a result, if any young person seemed to be having difficulty or felt restricted by the psychogeographic dérive then the researcher should preferably be at hand to encourage them explore and feel safe in doing so. If needed, the researcher/s should offer assistance and take shared responsibility during the task by offering immediate thoughts, feelings and involuntary reminiscences. This is by no means a concession towards trying to control the situation. Rather, demonstrations are intended to show young people how to utilize their surroundings - both physical and social - in order to extract from them subject-matter that can contribute to a worthwhile experience.

The total set-up of the situation in which young people engaged can give the researcher the power to regulate the experience. It can also happen through the objective conditions put in place. This includes the equipment, materials and apparatus with which the individual interacts. Here, the methods used in instruction can operate to impose a sense of social control. The words spoken and the tone of voice in which they are spoken can inhibit a young person’s own reflection and judgement in a task. However, I found that demonstration and instruction during the dérive did not show any sign of being detrimental to personal freedom.

In cases where young people required some initial guidance, the use of demonstration and instruction helped establish a principle of co-production. For example, after a demonstration, some of the young people would frequently form a community with other young people who did not routinely require an educator to intervene or exercise control over their individual impulses. That is to say, they would help other young people through demonstration. There is another argument, however.

It might be argued that efficient compliance is more pronounced when a situation does not require an authority to continually issue personal commands. And it is difficult to deny that a great deal of social control is not felt, in the sense that it does not involve any actual, physical restriction on our personal freedom. However, it might be argued that the progressive absence of intervention by the researcher in those cases where young people did not feel they needed help, was also due to the young person’s enthusiasm to engage in the freedom of movement and the shared co-operative activity. In that case,
the use of demonstration and instruction was not perceived as a form of social control, but a starting point in a co-operative enterprise.

Bearing this in mind, the development of a co-operative enterprise can only occur through reciprocal give-and-take. This requires a researcher to take the capacities, needs, and past experiences of those under his or her guidance into account, and to discover ways of bringing them within experience. It is undoubtedly possible to take control of these factors and force the activity of the young into channels that express the researcher’s own purpose. That is, in the formation of purposes the researchers own desires can be activated, and imposed, through the personal commands of the researcher. However, the maturity of the researcher, together with careful foresight, cannot be underestimated. This does not mean that the researcher needs to exert social control through a rigid scheme of rules. Rather, the researcher is also part of a co-productive community. This means that a researcher’s own experience can be used to arrange the conditions which are conducive to community activity. Their contributions can act as a plan through which education and learning operates as social process. Everyone is seen as being engaged in the learning process and, as a consequence, young people come to understand that the researcher is a member of a process of exchange in which all participants have a share.

6.1. Pedagogical analysis: subjectivity and learning as a relational field

When young people encountered an artefact they began working on the construction and production of sense and problems in relation to the artefact. The qualitative features of colour, density, and form would be registered as the repetition of affective causes but not as a conscious feeling. Consequently, one of the ways I tried to analyse how artworks and cultural artefacts acted on young people’s bodies was through each young person’s material relation to the field, together with their capacity for being affected. Let us look at Ela’s encounter with *Pet* by James Rielly.
On encountering *Pet* by James Rielly, Ela sits on the floor with her friend Rachel, and starts to explore the objects, places, and events evoked through her immediate sensation with the painting. This is an extract from the pedagogical documentation.

**Ela:** “If my mother took my teddy off me I would scream my head off. It reminds me of when I had bright blonde hair [and] me crying all the time in my living room. It gives me strong, heavy, and big memories. It is loud and I can hear pop music and people talking. It is icy cold, freezing, and refreshing, different colours. I felt furious because I loved the teddy and my mother tried taking it off me.”

By using the idea of a bodily logic, it is necessary to understand Ela’s experience relationally. Hence, Ela’s encounter with James Rielly’s *Pet* must involve some sort of transference. From the painting to her body some force and/or energy is immediately felt. Another way of saying this is that the surface of *Pet* by James Rielly impresses itself on her subjectivity, and causes her to select particular feelings and sensations adequate to her own ideas and understanding of those feelings and sensations. That is to say, Ela’s subjectivity repeats the intensity of affective causes.
Consequently, for Ela, *Pet* by James Rielly can be seen as being experienced through the repetition of affective causes. Indeed, as affective causes express our capacity to be affected by extrinsic signs, and lead to our power of comprehension through common notions which retain the extrinsic signs of the relational encounter (Deleuze, 1988: 45) we can say that the intense qualities of the painting give Ela an experience that is felt through affectus, which refers to the passage or movement from one state to another, and the feeling affects presented as an image of “joy” and “sadness” and the more active ideas they give rise to.

But in order to understand the process of how this selection was made, we need to understand how Ela made James Rielly’s *Pet* function as organic material. This is because the painting is not treated by Ela as solely non-organic matter. Rather, it is treated as if it had a proper life. For instance, Ela tells us that it is both “strong and heavy” as if the surface image is an object of force pressing on her muscles. Furthermore, Ela describes it as an auditory experience that is “loud,” and she has the idea of hearing “pop music.” Indeed, Ela describes “people talking” as if the image were communicating via multiple voices. It is also given a sense of presence. It is felt as being “icy cold” and “freezing.” Ela states that this feeling is “refreshing.”

With this in mind, Ela is not alone in her experiences as other young people also visualised artworks as if they are materially located within their own subjectivities. For instance, when Clare encounters *Castle Caernarvon* by Richard Wilson, she seems to change her perspective of discovery.

**Clare:** “It reminds me of Bridge to Terabithia. I feel like I’m in the picture myself and living the dream. The sound is gentle. It makes me feel light and small because I can place myself in the picture. I can hear little birds tweeting. I can taste hot cross buns cooking. The colour is moving me. It makes me feel happy. It also makes me feel like I am in a totally different world.”

The way that these young people related to their artefacts appears to make it something more than just an artefact. The qualities of the artworks appear to be encountered as problematic forces which set the body in motion. Indeed, we might say that both Ela and Clare’s identity is no longer positioned or discursively constructed by the object. Rather, both Ela and Clare feel that they have encountered a problematic field, and the particular problem presented must be undertaken affectively as they cannot rid themselves of its trace. That is, a mixed assemblage of affection images prompts feelings of affect in consciousness which, ultimately, brings about agreeable or disagreeable thoughts. Thus, we
might further conclude that this productive process resembles Peirce’s immediate interpretant, and that the immediate selection of affective forces and energetic causes become embodied, volitional ideas, produced by the dynamic interpretant.

6.2. Filtering an framing: isolating the art object through the encounter

In order to understand the process by which the selection and shaping of experience comes about we must turn to Bergson’s concept of filtering or isolation. Filtering is involved in the activity of selection, elimination, and extraction of environmental qualities so as to resist and take away something that is useful. From this standpoint, when Ela encountered Pet by James Rielly it made vibratory impressions on her sensory nerves. The purpose of the nerve fibres is to filter and sieve the affective causes of the body’s environing conditions: this producing images or ideas of affection. We can, therefore, say that the physical and social context of the museum contributes to the “building up of experiences that are worthwhile” (Dewey, 1997: 40). That is, Ela is involved in an act of transference where she receives and repeats affective causes which eventually designate feelings of joy and sadness in consciousness. Moreover, these act as preparatory qualities through her nervous system and give rise to active ideas related to “love” and “fury.”

The immediate chaos of qualities presented by the surface of Pet by James Rielly becomes conducive for Ela in that it allows her to draw an isolating space with these affective causes. Furthermore, the isolation or framing of these images of affection shows us that this is the simplest means by which Ela attempts to break the discursive nature of the artefact. The curator label reads as follows:

We are confronted by a child with a black eye. She holds a toy dog with an identical injury. It may be imagined that the girl has been the victim of an accident or physical abuse. However, she is smiling, which introduces ambiguity into this unsettling painting. The subversion of an idealised or sentimental view of childhood is a recurrent theme in Rielly’s work (www.museumwales.ac.uk).

Ela does this by repeating, isolating, and framing affective causes that related to feelings of joy and sadness. These give rise to both auditory and tactile sensations which correlate to adequate ideas of feeling “furious” towards her mother and “love” towards her teddy.
Ela: “It gives me strong, heavy, and big memories. It is loud and I can hear pop music and people talking. It is icy cold, freezing, and refreshing, different colours. I felt furious because I loved the teddy and my mother tried taking it of me.”

The affective causes of these immediate sensations present Ela with an operative field conditioning her “unconscious process of production of the real” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a: 19-20). The relation of the painting as an affective cause transferring sensorial images to the body signals the appearance or presence of immediate sensations isolated in tactile ideas, of which her body cannot rid itself of their trace. Ela’s bodily logic, then, serves to frame a qualitative image of the painting surfaces in the form of affective causes, and in the process becomes a framed figure of sensation.

In accordance with Spinoza’s bodily logic, in order for someone to understand an affective cause they must experience it as though they were the cause of the affect. For example, Ela would understand the feeling of “icy cold” and “freezing” as being feelings that are expressed internally, and as being cause by her own body and, not James Rielly’s Pet. But, if we are consistent with a materially located logic of experience, one that is relationally intertwined with our environing conditions, then we must also assume that Ela had no embodied knowledge of these affective causes prior to her own acts of self-comprehension. They would be unknown causes of affective experience to which she would have no conscious awareness of the emotive feelings. In Ela account, however, there is what appears to be an interpretation similar to the themes identified in the curator label. Ela, then, might have used the curators label to interpret her own feelings through a practical equivalent.

When people encounter new and novel experience through a bodily logic, the relationship of affective causes are matters of fact as opposed to intelligible relations. This implies the unconscious of thought as well as the unknown of the body. Matters of fact are not objects of love or hate, that is, they are not adequate ideas that would give Ela, for instance, clearly defined feelings related to joy or sadness. It is the framing of a painting surface as a series of affective causes, which define it as a “fact.” The fact being that Ela’s body is submitted to forces of contraction, tension, movement, isolation and then an act of dissipation through the various sensory nerves. Moreover, this is why we get the appearance of different sensations. The paintings surface is not experienced as a single affective experience but as a series of multiple affective causes brought together in a singular event. For example, Ela does not say it causes affective ideas related to “strong” or “heavy” or that it feels “icy” or “cold.” Instead, we are
often treated to a series of isolated and disassociated ideas with different intensities that are brought together as a singularly compounded experience. For example, Allison’s encounter with, John Piper’s *A Ruined House* shows similar occurrences.

Allison: “It reminds me of the old ruined church. The music of it has a horror feel to it. It feels heavy like you are drawn in. It feels big like you would get lost inside. It feels cold like you are in the snow. I feel cold, warm, happy, sad, fear, hope and regret all at once”

When looking at Allison’s relation with John Piper’s *A Ruined House* - and how it is make her feel - we might assume her visual narrative assumes qualitatively distinct categories. However, when explored through a bodily logic, Allison’s productive efforts are to bring together or assemble different affective causes, encountered as different intensities of sensation, within a singular located experience that is agreeable with her body.

As a non-organic object, *A Ruined House* by John Piper has qualities of colour, density, form and shape. It might also have representational qualities related to theme and context. But can we really say that a non-organic object can represent or capture qualities of feeling without us also taking into account

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*A Ruined House* by John Piper (1935)
(http://www.museumwales.ac.uk)
the materially located presence of an organic body? As a consequence, what takes place when Allison encounters the surface of affective causes called John Piper’s *A Ruined House* concerns the notion of a body materially framed by the artefacts affective and communicative potential. The body uses these communicative potentials or signs to produce an experience of the artefact that is both subjective and personal. These are experienced as what we might call a-signifying causes without recognition. Thus, from a Peircean perspective, the filtering of affective causes through Allison’s sensory nerves and the isolated figure of the body which frames them becomes a pure iconic image of resemblance (Deleuze, 2005: 2). That is to say, Allison’s body relates to and resembles the affective causes of the artefact. It is, therefore, Allison’s task to distinguish her own body from the pure force of affective causes by way of producing ideas of feelings, which she durationally experiences herself as being the cause. It is this durational gap which finds memories to relate to the ideas of affection.

Despite their appearance, the artworks that have been narrated through young people’s experiences no longer have a representational story to tell. Indeed, if we were to approach these discursively then we could start to build a picture of how representational images appropriate experience. Ela would use the artefact to reference and legitimate her feelings. For example, she might observe young people using “denotative” words such “this,” “that,” or “it” in order to relate to an exterior state of things, and use these in conjunction with a propositional “manifestation” that would correspond to a young people personal utterance of her own beliefs and desires. If this were the case the Ela might well have used words to this effect: “I think that the girl in the painting is feeling heavy, icy cold and freezing.” But in her narrative Ela does not do this. However, there is an example shown by another young person called Adell when she encounters Howard Hodgkin’s *Bedtime*. 
When conducting her psychogeographical dérive of Cardiff Museum, Brigitte encounters the Howard Hodgkin’s *Bedtime*. The painting is organized as a series of thick, layered brushstrokes that submerge the canvas and envelop the frame. Interpretatively, I could make an attempt to make sense of image symbolically by suggesting that it appears to challenge ideas of containment, with its title of *Bedtime* making an appeal to the non-restrictive libertine of dreamwork whose passions of unrestrained excess challenge the border of our wakened world of consciousness. Likewise, in Adell’s account we can see a similar kind of interpretivism through the dual aspect of “manifestation” and “denotation.”

**Brigitte:** “It reminds me of school. It reminds me of my bedroom. It reminds me of being frustrated and drawing, mixing colours, and experimenting in the art lesson. The brush strokes, to me, show anger. It reminds me of drawings that I’ve done that plaster my bedroom walls and of being frustrated. I feel anger, frustrated, and alone.”

In Brigitte’s account of Bedtime by Howard Hodgkin, we can see that it reminds her of being both at school and at home in bedroom. This presents her with a feeling of “being frustrated” in an art lesson. Brigitte then makes the following interpretation: “the brush strokes, to me, show anger.” As a result, Brigitte shows a change in perspective. Brigitte now interprets the object as an exterior state of mind and makes an external reference towards the image which works to project her own experiences and
ideas of feeling frustrated onto the object. Indeed, following Peirce we might even say that it has now taken on legislative, symbolic value and gives Brigitte a mediator for her own feeling. She is no longer the cause and meaning of her own experience. Instead, Howard Hodgkin’s *Bedtime* is perceived as an object that represents ideas and feelings of anger, frustration, and isolation. In addition, the painting somehow captures, portrays, and represented what it is like to be frustrated. In this instance, then, it is the artefact which is perceived as the legislative law of her experience. It is both the cause and the meaning. Similarly, another in-depth and moving account of abandonment is presented by Bella when she encounters at Shaun Rhys Jones’ *Black Cot & Glove*.

*Bella*: “She looks unhappy. She is imprisoned in her cot. It looks like she is in hospital or in care. It reminds me of my friend who went into care. She looks scared, cold, not loved. She is small and the colour is black so she is scared of that. It has a weird lingering taste that wouldn’t go away. It looks old. I can hear people talking. I can hear heart monitors etc. She is not loved, really sad. She cries a lot. I hope that someone will help her. I regret her going there.”

Here is Allison’s encounter with Allison Shaun Rhys Jones’ *Black Cot & Glove*
Allison: “It reminds me of when my mother loves me. The mother hates, must be because she don’t want no kids. It looks so cold and feared because someone could hurt her. She wants a good family, and she wants to be loved”

The figurative qualities of an artefact are relieved of their representative role when they enter directly into a relation with the order of “celestial sensation” which envelops each young person’s body (Deleuze, 2005b: 7). These are multiple, disassociated, but no less connected as a singular affective experience because they appear to immerse the body. Moreover, in order for affective causes to feel like they are a singular experience caused by the body they need to compound the effects of external causes such as passions of joy and sadness into a relation: a case in point being Kathy, who is another young person that formed a relational encounter with Howard Hodgkin’s Bedtime. In the following extract we can see that she compounds a series of affective accounts in the following way:

Kathy: “I am at school painting. There are infant children and the teacher is making a loud noise. There are voices, screaming, laughing, and crying. The paint is warm and wet, it is smelly and dirty. It is loud and children are laughing. It tastes like soapy water, and it’s hot and cold. It makes me feel happy, sad, and angry.”

This experience compounds a relation of passions that are both joyous and sad. Moreover, affective ideas are relationally compounded in ideational objects such as happiness, sadness and anger. From this perspective, we might say this represents an “incorporeal universe” (Guattari, 1995) of affective causes which form the preliminary condition for a Peirce might term a diagrammatic encounter. Each affective cause or immaterial sensation (affection not affect) is an incorporeal image or idea marking a category and conception of being. These, however, remain immaterial and independent of anything else as long as they remain affective causes. That is, in order to be experienced as a passionate affect or emotion Kathy’s affective causes must be connected like a drawing and/or a diagram. This diagram becomes a general pattern of experience, and like a night-time constellation that may be revealed by interconnecting lines, an image or figure of affect is drawn out in the same way. Through this general condition Kathy is able to pattern a memorial image that is imbued with experience, together with its emotional traces that are agreeably or disagreeably related to her environing conditions.

In Kathy’s encounter she experiences the affective causes of Howard Hodgkin’s Bedtime as immaterial passions of joy and sadness. Taking a look at Kathy’s account diagrammatically I could be confident in making the assertion that passions of joy are experienced in the feeling effect of happiness. Equally, I
think we can be confident in claiming that passions of sadness are experienced and exhibited in ideas of “sadness” and “anger.” In constructing a relationship between human passions and sensory images, then, happiness, sadness and anger can all be seen as derivatives of the more general verb to love or to hate. Furthermore, we could also suggest that the passions diagrammed through Kathy’s adequate ideas are experienced as actions within her body. However, it is slightly more difficult to recognize the independent causes that compound this relation of ideas. Should we say that it is the imagined idea of painting or laughter that makes Kathy happy? Is it the screaming voices or the smelly, dirty paint that makes Kathy sad and angry? From a diagrammatic perspective it is my conclusion that all these things are interrelated.

The ideas produced by Kathy’s bodily logic allow her to emotionally comprehend her experiences. In Kathy’s diagram each affective cause is like the presence of a flickering and flashing light which passes across her nervous system. Indeed, this metaphor of light is appropriate because it can depict both the movement of energy as a quantitative difference in intensity. But each affective cause is also a virtual object such as “love” or “hate” in a diagram that connects the effect of affective causes like passions of joy and sadness. From a Peircean point of view we might say that the diagram is a more developed icon. That is to say, the bringing together and connection between the passive affects such as joy and sadness represents a bodily logic that pragmatically but, nonetheless, unconsciously reasons between causes and passions that agree or disagree with Kathy’s own body of experience. It is not a pure icon, as mentioned before, but rather an iconic diagram. There is still a resemblance between the qualities or surface of Howard Hodgkin’s Bedtime and those affective causes filtered by Kathy’s nervous fibres, but it is not as pure and immediate as before.

Kathy’s bodily relation to Bedtime by Howard Hodgkin can be looked at as a resemblance between the conceptions of situation and of interaction. The experience is a transaction between Kathy, and what constitutes her environing conditions at the time. The environing conditions are whatever conditions interact with Kathy’s personal needs, desires, purposes and capacities to create the experience which is had. It contains affective causes which create passions that are either agreeable or disagreeable to Kathy’s nature of existing. In addition, the diagrammatic function represents the emotional symptom of a subtracted resemblance to the environing conditions, its lines representing an “embodied affect” and the “imagination” as “lines, planes and bodies” (Spinoza, 2001: 98) as reason negotiates (makes a road map) with the imagination to understand the way the mixture of bodies makes us feel (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 82).
Bringing together nothing but the sensations that resemble the affective causes in Kathy’s material environment (Deleuze, 2005b: 46) the diagram also has an instrumental function. That is to say, it is a principle of continuity. Every experience is a moving force. As a result, as Kathy passes from one state to another so her environment expands or contracts, bringing together muscular memories through sensori-motor recollections. Kathy does not find herself living in another world, but in a different part or aspect of the same world. What she has learned previously in one situation becomes an instrument of understanding for dealing effectively with situations in another: the past rises to meet the present as the diagrammatic imagination traces the: “residues of experience that live on in though and in the body” (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 81) taking up something from those experiences that have gone before and modifying the quality of those that come after. There is continuity in every case.

Through the principle of the encounter we can explore each and every experience as a force of actual causes. However, the diagrammatic imagination reveals an active process of selection that constructs a fully integrated subjectivity. That is, it affords a certain principle of continuity which allows Kathy to distinguish between passions of joy and sadness in each situation or encounter. This allowed Kathy to create a fully integrated experience through ideas of “love” and “hate.” But she could only enter into her experience when successive experiences were integrated in one another: otherwise the course of her experience would be disorderly, fragmented and, as a result, split. A diagrammatic account of the imaginative processes would, therefore, suggest that experience can only be built up as a world when related objects are constructed. By integrating successive experiences the “principle of continuity” or “diagrammatic function” acts as a criterion for discrimination. That is to say, it discriminates between the inherent passions linked to different image affections or ideas and, then, selectively constructs a relationally intertwined pattern that connects ideas with their affective causes.

**Kathy:** “I am at school painting. There are infant children and the teacher is making a loud noise. There are voices, screaming, laughing, and crying. The paint is warm and wet, it is smelly and dirty. It is loud and children are laughing. It tastes like soapy water, and it’s hot and cold. It makes me feel happy, sad, and angry.”

Kathy’s narrative is not so much as an account of an experience but more a kind of existential map. The diagrammatic imagination allows Kathy to create a complex image of her environing conditions but its serves to survey those conditions for their utility i.e. through joy and sadness. In Kathy’s case, she has
mapped *Bedtime* by Howard Hodgkin with ideas related to a prior experience. For better or for worse these ideas are Kathy’s way of meeting and, more to the point, responding to her present conditions. Furthermore, the continuity of Kathy’s experience modelled something from her previous experiences and modified them to meet the untraveled world of the museum and gallery. The basic character her *habit* memory affecting the quality of her experience.

It appears that every experience takes something from those experiences that have gone before. If an art object impresses causes and affective passions that result in ideas of “love” or “hate” then we can pragmatically engage with environing conditions through our capacity to be affected. However, when explored through the diagrammatic imagination we can see that experiences are changed or modified in some way. The quality of a previous experience modifies and influences the present. It is, therefore, plausible to assume that our experiences influence learning to some degree, but also, to some degree, influence the objective conditions under which further experiences will be had (Dewey, 1997: 35). By this I mean our environing conditions are not only shape actual experience but they are also conducive to growth (Dewey, 1997: 35). Through this exploratory investigation, then, we can observe that when young people encounter affective causes which give them agreeable or disagreeable ideas, then these are likely to increase or decrease their sense of well being. In other words, a particular artefact can be observed as compounding an agreeable or disagreeable relation with their subjectivity.

Kathy’s experience exemplifies the diagrammatic and imaginative process of lived experience. But from a Peircean and semiotic point of view it also shows us how a bodily logic communicates experience by way of a relational sign of emotive resemblance. That is, the diagrammatic imagination is a relational icon that compounds a resemblance between people’s environing conditions and their own immediate experiences. For example, Kathy’s pedagogical documentation presents her diagrammatic account as a series of feeling-affects. This also represents a semiotically constructed cartography of her environing conditions, and the mapping of her experience onto an artefact. For Kathy, her feelings condition both reality and the materiality of the object as it is lived out experientially. However, Kathy’s “capacity to be acted upon” but also her “power to act” (Deleuze, 1988: 35) within those conditions brings to light differences in agreeableness and disagreeableness. It follows, then, that depending on our historically determines residues of the past [*affectio*] the quality of our experience with the same artworks will be more agreeable to some that to others.
If we compare Kathy’s encounter with Howard Hodgkin’s *Bedtime* and Clare’s encounter with Richard Wilson’s *Castle Caernarvon* compare the quality of experience being undertaken. In Kathy’s encounter we can see passions of joy are agreeably experienced in ideas of “happiness,” in tactile sensations of “warmth” and auditory ideas of “laughter.” This is not to say, however, that laughter should always be considered agreeable with ones sense of well being. It may indicate that someone is being singled out or the recipient of ridicule.

**Kathy:** “I am at school painting. There are infant children and the teacher is making a loud noise. There are voices, screaming, laughing, and crying. The paint is warm and wet, it is smelly and dirty. It is loud and children are laughing. It tastes like soapy water, and it’s hot and cold. It makes me feel happy, sad, and angry.”

In this visual cartography passions of sadness and disagreeableness are experienced in auditory ideas of the teacher making “loud noises” - presumably shouting instructions or telling children off - and the sound of infant children “screaming” and “crying.” Kathy’s account further introduces olfactory ideas of the paint being “smelly” but also tactile ideas of the paint being a somewhat “dirty” substance. This is further supported by oral ideas related to sense of taste i.e. “soapy water.” Kathy then finishes with the concluding remark: “It makes me feel happy, sad and angry.” Kathy’s lived experience, therefore,
shows a compound relation of agreeableness and disagreeableness. It is an encounter that makes her both happy but also sad and frustrated. In comparison, Clare’s encounter with Richard Wilson’s *Castle Caernarvon* is somewhat different in that it shows considerably more agreeableness.

*Castle Caernarvon* by Richard Wilson (1714-1782)
(http://www.museumwales.ac.uk)

Clare: “It reminds me of Bridge to Terabithia. I feel like I’m in the picture myself and living the dream. The sound is gentle. It makes me feel light and small because I can place myself in the picture. I can hear little birds tweeting. I can taste hot cross buns cooking. The colour is moving me. It makes me feel happy. It also makes me feel like I am in a totally different world.”

In Clare’s diagrammatic cartography we can see passions of joy are agreeably experienced in ideas of happiness. Auditory ideas are “gentle” and it produces tactile ideas that make her “feel light.” She has more auditory ideas and Clare can sense the sound of “little birds tweeting.” Clare is greeted with the idea of tasting “hot cross buns cooking” which simultaneously combines ideas of both taste and smell. Furthermore, there appears to be little indication of disagreeableness experienced in Clare’s relation to Richard Wilson’s *Castle Caernarvon*. We might conclude from comparison that Kathy’s relation is a singular compound by composed of more disagreeableness. Her relation to the artefact is such that it impresses its affective causes on her body and reduces her sense well being. However, in must also be mentioned that experience does not simply go on inside a person. It does go on there, and later we will explore its influence on the formation of attitudes of desire and purpose. Experience is also social. In
that case is there something about the quality of the environing conditions? Is there something about the painting themselves?

6.3. The diagrammatic imagination: emerging worlds in the art encounter

The moment a young person encounters affective causes - or what we have semiotically termed pure icon of emotive resemblance - they leave signs or involuntary marks upon the body. These marks or traits are irrational, involuntary, accidental, free and random. They are non-representative, non-illustrative and non-narrative: sensorial signs and asignifying traits that are devoid of any illustrative or narrative function (Deleuze, 2005b: 3). For an individual these almost blind, manual marks attest to the intrusion of another world through affective causes filtering through the nervous system to reveal the presence of the vibratory yet anonymous qualia or percept of experience, and attests to our intuitive capacity to form a sympathetic relation with an object. For instance, in Clare’s encounter with Richard Wilson’s Castle Caernarvon we can see that she makes such a sympathetic relation:

Clare: “It reminds me of Bridge to Terabithia. I feel like I’m in the picture myself and living the dream. The sound is gentle. It makes me feel light and small because I can place myself in the picture. I can hear little birds tweeting. I can taste hot cross buns cooking. The colour is moving me. It makes me feel happy. It also makes me feel like I am in a totally different world.”

Through this sympathetic relation, Clare intervenes in the figurative and representational structure of the painting. Clare reveals this relation on two occasions, first, when she comments: “I feel like I’m in the picture myself and living the dream” and, second, when she states: “It also makes me feel like I am in a totally different world.” The artefact no longer has the sovereign optical organization it once had. For Clare the pictorial depictions in presented in the painting are neither significant nor signifiers: they are broken up by the body’s nervous system into multiple asignifying traits. Indeed, these are traits of sensation, but confused and fragmentary (Deleuze, 2005b: 71). It is, rather, a chaos of affective causes and a catastrophe of asignifying traits. Clare is removing Richard Wilson’s Castle Caernarvon from the optical organization that reigning over it in advance.

Chaos and catastrophe do imply the collapse of all the figurative and representational givens (Deleuze, 2005b: 78) of an artefact. But not all figurative givens have to disappear. That is, the chaos of repetition
and affective causes is like being immersed in wave. The body joins the wave of chaotic forces in such a way that the body is must to learn how to work with the tide of passions that will either submerge it within sadness or joy. But with a little help from the diagrammatic imagination, we see the beginning of a creative and productive process, through which something begins to emerge from the chaos and catastrophe. The diagrammatic is the operative set of asignifying and non-representational lines and zones (Deleuze, 2005b: 71). A new figuration starts being assembled and emerges from the diagram in the form of passions and active affections. The diagram is an iconic sign of resemblance which works by making the sensation clear and precise (Deleuze, 2005b: 77). Here, then, we can see the emergence or, rather, the conditions for the emergence of an involuntary sensation memory.

6.4. The novelty of surroundings: chaos and rhythms of immersion in young people’s learning

The term chaos is a way of presenting the pure force of sensation through affective causes. Within it we are continually immersed and hesitant. For example, it is often the case that things appear more chaotic when presented with an unfamiliar course of action. With this in mind, nearly all of the young people that took part in this study had not visited Cardiff Museum before. Hence, one might assume that amongst unfamiliar surroundings, each young person may have been more sensitive to all of the affective causes and sensory ambiences of the museum. That is, the sights, sounds, and even smell of the museum may have seemed amplified and more pronounced to their sensibilities. As a result, they would have been more sensitive to the chaotic qualities of their material conditions, as well as their immersion in them. Thus, Clare, Ela, and Allison all provide us with instances of being moved by the intensity and chaotic force of a novel encounter.

Clare: the colour is moving me.
Ela: heavy, big
Allison: the music of it would be like a horror feel. It feels big like you would get lost inside.

The more we are placed in novel situations the more we become aware of a principle of permanence. The sources outside us give rise to a quality of experiences which seems like an inflexible dictate. But this does not mean that we should subordinate external conditions to internal ones (Dewey, 1997: 45). Rather, the term catastrophe assigns equal rights to both factors in experience - objective and internal conditions. Though this interaction they form situated rhythm that stabilizes and organizes a pattern.
or schematic image of our sensory experience. For Deleuze (2005b) this schematic diagram is: “a germ of order or rhythm” (Deleuze, 2005b: 72). That is, it organizes our passive affects of joy or sadness into what Peircean semiotics would term an emotive interpretant. The operation or function of the diagram is to be “suggestive” or, more to the point, introduce “possibilities of fact” (Deleuze, 2005b: 71). In this case, then, it is responsible for arranging the conditions under which each young person experiences the external and novel conditions of an artwork.

**Clare:** the colour is moving me.

**Ela:** heavy, big

**Allison:** the music of it would be like a horror feel. It feels big like you would get lost inside.

From a Deleuzian point of view, catastrophe is the diagram and its involuntary interruption (Deleuze, 2005b: 83). To take Clare’s statement above, we can see that when she encounters *Castle Caernarvon* by Richard Wilson, she experiences this as a defenceless immersion in its affective causes. It renders her passive to the actions of the percepts impressing themselves on her haptic vision. The diagram in this instance would, therefore, involve the repeated and constructive design if these chaotic causes.

From Peirce’s semiotic point of view the ideas and images of sound and rhythm in Allison’s encounter would signify the “emotive character” (Deleuze, 2005b: xv) of the emotional interpretant. Peirce often uses the example of music or song to illustrate how we often experience emotional signs independent of interpretation and self-comprehension (CP, 8.335). Similarly, Deleuze uses the image of a refrain to account for affective causes captured in vibrations along nerve fibres. Nerve fibres are like the strings of a violin carrying vibratory detail through distorted vibratory movements. Movement of contraction and tension appear as if a tactile hand pressed its fingers on these string fibres at various intervals. It is these rhythms that function like memorial notes in a piece of music (Deleuze, 2005b: xv). Each note, each contraction, each tension on the vibratory nerve signalling an affective cause and the appearance of different sensory experiences. Interestingly, some of the young people did relate the image of sound either with feelings or with the movement of colour as a qualitative intensity. For example:

**Allison:** “It reminds me of the old ruined church. The music of it has a horror feel to it. It feels heavy like you are drawn in. It feels big like you would get lost inside. It feels cold like you are in the snow. I feel cold, warm, happy, sad, fear, hope and regret all at once”
Allison does not say that John Piper’s _A Ruined House_ reminds her of a house she might have seen in a horror film. And neither does she offer a purely emotive narrative by stating that the painting sounds like a piece of eerie music you might hear in a horror film. Allison documents her experience through resemblance: “the music of it would be like a horror feel.” There is an indexical relation between the artefact and the feeling of an idea of horror. If we draw upon Peirce’s account of an index, he likens it to a breath of wind turning a weather vale: a sign which represents the wind as an object by way of a real correspondence (W 1.475). In this instance it is as if the image establishes a real correspondence with Allison’s body through her haptic vision and, as a consequence, she experiences the action of the paintings surface. It might be argued that Allison’s use of modal term “would” actually function so as to place her experience in the past tense. However, a modal expression such as this may also be used to denote something that is habitual, routine, and frequent. In this case, the auditory idea connected to John Piper’s _A Ruined House_ as an action: “its music acts like a horror feel.” Furthermore, the use of the term “like” would also indicate a resemblance. The indexical action of John Piper’s _A Ruined House_, therefore, resembles a feeling of horror in relation to Allison’s sense experience of encountering the trace, presence or impression of such qualities of feeling. When looking for how an individual relates to an aesthetic surface, then, it may be productive to search for similar indexical actions presented in the pedagogical documentation.

This line of inquiry indicates that we have found something that resembles Peirce’s semiotic account of emotion in bodily logic. It also shows that Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004b) concept of the refrain can be used in conjunction with Peirce’s ontological account of Firstness. The refrain refers to the rhythm of our nervous system, and like a musical composition the harmony of contraction and tension captured within the figure of the body creates an emotional interpretant. Accordingly, our bodily logic must use its pragmatic instruments of iconicity to annotate and orchestrate these asisignifying signs of vibratory matter into an indexed embodied feeling. This is not a symbolically determined interaction, but more of a purely iconic and diagrammatic relation. The transcendental ground for an aesthetic encounter is, therefore, is the interplay between these two conditions.

**Allison:** “It reminds me of the old ruined church. The music of it has a horror feel to it. It feels heavy like you are drawn in. It feels big like you would get lost inside. It feels cold like you are in the snow. I feel cold, warm, happy, sad, fear, hope and regret all at once”
Like a rough sketch of a musical score the diagrammatic imagination is a process that brings a calm and stable centre at the heart of chaotic and fragmentary experience (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 312). As a result, in Allison’s narrative she feels the chaotic intensities of force related to qualities of: “horror” and “heavy,” “cold” and “warm,” “happy,” “sad,” “fear,” “hope,” and “regret.” Indeed, Allison appears to undergo all these sensations all at once. Consequently, emotions move like analogue notes of resemblance, and the rhythms of the body’s nervous system alone become characters or objects that are stabilized within a single sign.

Allison’s iconic or diagrammatic narrative illustrates the creative process that brings together affection images in a singular event or experience. For Allison, her experience resembles the structural qualities of the artefact. Once more, it implies that a relationship can be affectively formed between the viewer and an object and, possibly, between other persons in the group, too. It is also possible to conceive of a relation between sensation and a the rhythms of contraction and tension that moves John Piper’s A Ruined House through the nervous system like asignifying notes of a piece of music. The visual and the sonorous are enacted within lived experience. Consequently, there is a relation between the action of asignifying signs, and the trace they leave on her passive nervous system. Moreover, the impressions the produce can be likened to the images or an ideas of affection that Deleuze and Spinoza account for in their theory of bodily logic (Deleuze, 1988: 49) and which that resonates along her nervous system at different rhythmic frequencies or intensities of joy and sadness. This vibratory asignifying presence is an effect that we unable to rid from our body, and locates us within the artefact itself.

The notions of situation and interaction appear to be inseparable from each other. What we see when young people encounter an artwork is a transaction that takes place between a body, and that body’s environment (Dewey, 1997: 43). For example, when a young person encounters a painting they often experience it as a force of action that transfers a multiple qualitative impressions. These qualitative traces or nervous vibrations may then be stated as a passage of movement travelling along the nerve fibres like a “thread of a tune” (Deleuze, 2005b; Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 311). However, the action of the painting on the sensory nerves also gives way to a reaction, which constitutes the movement of qualities back towards the painting. That is, from the body’s central nervous system back towards the periphery. Accordingly, this idea introduces the notion of an active subject, but equally challenges the idea that we are simply passive recipients of affective causes. Indeed, the way in which this is achieved is through the activation of memory; as Clare illustrates with her encounter with Castle Caernarvon by Richard Wilson:
Clare: “It reminds me of Bridge to Terabithia. I feel like I’m in the picture myself and living the dream. The sound is gentle. It makes me feel light and small because I can place myself in the picture. I can hear little birds tweeting. I can taste hot cross buns cooking. The colour is moving me. It makes me feel happy. It also makes me feel like I am in a totally different world.”

Clare’s reaction marks the customary path by which she grafts herself onto the painting. In travelling along the sensori-motor lines of the nervous system feeling-affects begin to bud through diagrammatic lines of drift. This brings together the fragmentary imagery of affective ideas/feelings of affect that are agreeable to Clare’s wellbeing (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a: 312). The diagrammatic imagination can be considered a germ of rhythm in relation to the new order of painting (Deleuze, 2005b: 72) that couples a relationship between distinct affects and figures of the imagination that begin to reveal themselves in memory. The diagrammatic imagination is, therefore, a “principle of continuity” of experience as a criterion of discrimination between affects (Dewey, 1997: 35) that produces the in the appearance of memory vibrations are as distinct images of experience (Deleuze, 2005b: 72).

6.5. Forces and movement: enveloping the outside/inside

The direct action of affective causes fall directly upon the nervous system (Deleuze, 2005b: 73). This is experienced as a movement and “tension” making the presence of affective causes known, but which can only be felt passively, and without consciousness. Indeed, during the psychogeographic dérive the young people experience this action of invisible forces on the body as movement enveloping the body (Deleuze, 2005b: 30). It is through the movement of affective causes, then, that the material structure of an artwork goes from the field of enironing conditions, to the body. And, as a result, it represents an immediate figure of sensation (Deleuze, 2005b: 11). Moreover, accompanying this first movement is a muscular “tension” that structures all of the affective force imposing themselves on the felt body (Deleuze, 2005b: 11). Indeed, the material structure of the artwork often appears as an idea of colour, but one that is isolated within a completely closed world of reminiscence (Deleuze, 2005: 23). We can see this in Karla’s encounter with Some Tree and Snow by Ernest Zobole:
Karla: “It reminds me of home because I used to go up to the forest and play with the snow. It’s warm, quiet, smell of burnt wood. It is dark and everything is green around. There is open space, and it makes me feel quite happy.”

It is here that a second movement is brought into play. That is, the action of affective causes appears to be followed by a second reactive movement or “tension” towards the material structure of the art object. This means that Karla’s bodily logic does not simply wait for something from the structure but is waiting for something inside itself. Her body exerts an effort upon itself in order to become an idea of affection (Deleuze, 2005b: 11). We might say, then, that something transformative happens in both directions. A translation occurs between the movement of two spasms or between two movements of contraction or tension in one place (Deleuze, 2005b: 30/31) to create a singular event similar to Peirce’s dynamic interpretant i.e., the first contracted movement is the repetition of affective causes, but the second contracted movement is difference. The first movement is the development of space, while the second is that of time and the form of a memorial trace. This is why Karla’s experience makes a direct appeal to both the present, but also reminiscence of the past.

The body is a place of exchange between two directions of movement and tension. It is both a place of exchange between the material structure of the artefact and contracted muscular body, and between
the contracted muscular body and the field of affective causes. From the temporal, pulsating rhythms conducted through the nervous fibres into the nerve roots, muscular contractions automate the body to repeat the action of our environing conditions. It is through this function, then, that the field is felt as closing in around the figure of the body. Indeed, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004b) terminology, we might say that it is caught in a giant fibrous “rhizome” which expands throughout the body, unable to free itself from the causal traces of interaction. It is as if the body is caught in its own net in a wave of affective causes and it can do nothing but receptively participate in the immediacy of the environing conditions. Consequently, as our bodily logic begins to assemble these traces into a single event which will constitute an embodied experience we can see the formation of these traces beginning to emerge as continuity: in the form sound intermingling with touch, smell inter-related with taste.

**Karla:** “It reminds me of home because I used to go up to the forest and play with the snow. It’s warm, quiet, smell of burnt wood. It is dark and everything is green around. There is open space, and it makes me feel quite happy.”

The sensorial figure of the body mobilizes the nervous system. It then expands to rejoin the field in an act of sympathy. Indeed, we might associate this process with Bergson (1999) intellectual sympathy as an intuitive rhythm that communicates, and which takes complete possession, of our thought and will. This is a kind of physical sympathy that enters into a feeling of *suggestion*. The artefact does not work in a way that implies that it is *expressing* how we should feel but, rather, impresses feelings upon us. It is an inward movement towards ourselves that brings us into a state of responsiveness. As a result, the ideas suggested to us set into motion our imagination, and we are placed in the richness of the feeling that takes hold of us. It is the intensity of these “aesthetic” feelings or “passions” that will distinguish the degree of depth and elevation known as joy or sadness. That is, ideas that we will manifest in our thoughts as being agreeable or disagreeable to our nature. This is an ethical affinity corresponding to qualitative alterations in the whole of our psychic states. However, in order to bring this about, there must be a process that instrumentally transforms the structure.

The movement of visceral sensations points to a process that allows the affected and affecting figure of the body to merge with the field (Deleuze, 2005b: 31). We can conceptualize this process by looking at the motor tendencies. The body’s process of motor organization leads from the bone to muscle: the tendon being the mediatory between these two. Now the roots of a fibrous rhizome are seeded within the core of the body transferring rhythms. That is, this is when visceral lines of contracted movement and muscular tension, but also the colouring qualities of asignifying affective imagery, are freed from
the demands of socially determined discourse. For example, up to now the affective causes have been attributed to the artefact i.e. an artefact as an object in an objective environment has certain qualities discursively structured to give them meaning. For instance, the synopsis of James Rielly’s *Pet* reads as follows:

*Pet* by James Rielly (2000)
(http://www.museumwales.ac.uk)

We are confronted by a child with a black eye. She holds a toy dog with an identical injury. It may be imagined that the girl has been the victim of an accident or physical abuse. However, she is smiling, which introduces ambiguity into this unsettling painting. The subversion of an idealised or sentimental view of childhood is a recurrent theme in Rielly’s work (www.museumwales.ac.uk).

As a result, we can observe in Ela’s encounter that the artefact no longer has anything to represent or narrate. Indeed, representation no longer appears to have anything to do with the artefact. Rather, the artefacts structural qualities come together through all the areas of sensation and through all the levels of different feelings. For example:

**Ela:** “It gives me strong, heavy, and big memories. It is loud and I can hear pop music and people talking. It is icy cold, freezing, and refreshing, different
colours. I felt furious because I loved the teddy and my mother tried taking it of me."

It might be argued that Ela’s reference to the Teddy is a direct reference to the child holding the toy dog in the painting. Moreover, it might be argued that Ela is using a combination of denotation and manifestation to relate to an exterior state of things through her own beliefs and desires. For instance, Ela feels that she is represented by the child holding the toy dog. This would be evidenced by Ela’s use of the possessive “It” at the beginning of her narrative encounter, and manifest in her account of feeling “furious” towards her mother confiscating the teddy she loved. Like the girl in the picture Ela feels that she has been injured or ill-treated by the act of confiscation.

However, if we remember that the chaotic, catastrophic gives of affective causes do not necessarily imply the collapse of all the figurative and representational gives, then Ela’s account shows us that not all representational and figurative gives have to disappear. Indeed, these gives can be used to help Ela anchor and ground her subjectivity in the immediate present whilst allowing her to explore and develop affective causes without the risk of fragmentation. A further example can be taken from John Piper’s A Ruined House. Its synopsis reads as follows:

“The late sixteen century manor house at Hampton Gay, abandoned after a fire in 1887, is a picturesque ruin in a desolate spot. The picture is one of a number of oil paintings of derelict farm buildings executed in the early 1940’s. There subject matter may have been partly suggested by the series of pictures of British Churches and other historic buildings devastated in the blitz which Piper undertook for the War Artists’ Advisory Committee. However, these rural paintings that depict the effects of decay and dilapidation rather than sudden destruction also relate to a traditional theme of English romantic art...” (Evans, 1989: 48).

The process of producing affective ideas from affective causes is a process of also producing existential changes or states in the body, and translating these into expressive ideas that indicate these changes. This kind of existential communication constitutes the “pathic” and non-representative movement of sensation (Deleuze, 2005b: 30). Moreover, these domains of sensation refer to different sense organs. As Deleuze (2005b) notes “each organ referring to each other independently of the representing object they have in common” (Deleuze, 2005b: 30). Hence, it would be incorrect at this moment to talk about feeling-affects or feeling-content that we would understand as having meaning.
There are no feelings because there is no distinction between the young person and the object. That is to say, the body only interprets itself as a passive ontological presence of being created. For example, in Ela’s account, we can see a relation between the domains of colour and taste, of a touch and smell, and between a noise and weight. But from Peirce’s semiotic perspective, these can only be emotional signs immediately interpreted as categories of Firstness.

6.6. Diagrammatic deterritorialization: working with rhythms of filtered affect

As we have already seen the diagrammatic imagination is an image that is made up of two things. It is, as Deleuze (2005b) points out, made from the intertwining of sensation and the isolating frame of the body’s nervous system (Deleuze, 2005b: 78). But a second difference appears at the level of the filters. Earlier I stated that the primary function of the filter is to modify those affective causes which impress themselves on the body for their utility. Furthermore, through these accounts I have tried to illustrate that modification should be thought of as a transformation of affective causes into affective ideas. We have observed this in young people’s accounts when the form a basic colour of a sound, the rhythm of a taste or timbre of a smell. The process of filtering or its function is to constitute or vary the vibratory rhythms received through our sensory nerves (Deleuze, 2005b: 80) and then diagrammatically imagine a feeling affect, which is agreeable to the well being of the individual. These points apparent in Clare’s encounter:

**Clare:** “It reminds me of Bridge to Terabithia. I feel like I’m in the picture myself and living the dream. The sound is gentle. It makes me feel light and small because I can place myself in the picture. I can hear little birds tweeting. I can taste hot cross buns cooking. The colour is moving me. It makes me feel happy. It also makes me feel like I am in a totally different world.”

Through the idea of filtering and repetition of affective causes I have tried to establish that a museum and gallery artefact can travel through the nervous system as a series of pure qualisigns. However, it only when these qualisigns are referred to motor movements that the body is capable of housing such affects in order to experiment. It, therefore, points to an “instrumental” deformation of the structure. This is why young people who experience the same artefact have different experiences. Deformations of the structure are immediately transferred to the figure of the body in the form of an experimentally designed diagram.
That an affective idea is the sensible form of an idea or object related to a sensation is evident. Many of the young people appear to go beyond the illustrative and the figurative. And although an artefact acts immediately upon the nervous system and makes its presence felt as an affective idea, there are evidences of compounded relations which show an increase and decrease a young person’s sense of well being. This often takes the form of emotive objects comprehended through ideas of joy or sadness. For instance, Karla’s feeling of being in cold in freezing snow and Clare’s lightness of being, are seemingly joyous, while Allison’s haunting horror is an intensity of sadness. However, from the perspective of a bodily logic it is important to investigate these ideas as a constructive process. As a result, there must be an instrumental function that operates to produce such a compound relation. Here, I will now turn to the more complex analysis of these assemblages.

Art has an indexical relation to the body through the imminent, immaterial effect of affective causes. But Bergson’s suggestion that there is a contracted movement that travels from the core of the body towards the material structure introduces a process of cortical production. As a result, this means that there is a variety of functions that can be observed. Throughout the course of this exploratory analysis I have maintained that the nervous system has the function of passively receiving affective causes and that these are expressed as vibratory repetitions which travel from the periphery, towards the body’s central nervous system. For Bergson, it is the function of the brain to receive these messages or signs from our environing conditions through the body’s central nervous system. However, this represents the instrumental function of indetermination. Indeed, forming part of the central nervous system the brain is involved in an activity of choosing those excitations that are most useful to us. That is, it exerts an effort to distinguish what is agreeable or disagreeable to our well being. It is an organ that delays, discriminates, and assembles that which will aid our capacity to act.

6.7. Imagination and desire: the relationship between art, assemblage and the material body

Through the course of this analysis, I have proposed that young people encounter artefacts through the rhythm of affective causes (Deleuze, 2005b: 30). In addition, the causes move through a nervous system as a series of pure icon signs. However, if I am to be consistent with line of thinking, affective causes must be received by the brain at some point in the process, maybe as a chain of paralinguistic features such as tone and pitch. For example, a case in point is found in The Logic of Sensation when
Deleuze (2005b) states: “analogical language belongs to the right hemisphere of the brain” (Deleuze, 2005: 79). Moreover, his colleague Guattari (2009) also talks of “synaptic operators” which generate sign-ideas, and give rise to the physiological organization of “non-discursive affects” (Guattari, 2009: 188/191).

Taking this as a starting point, then, vibratory rhythms of the nervous system may also be conceived as a paralinguistic language that is translated and deciphered in the right hemisphere of the brain. As the right side of the brain is also generally considered to be associated with the creative, emotional, and interrelated power of personal experience, as opposed to the abstractive, law-based, analytical power of the left hemisphere (Bolte, 2008; Tweedy, 2013) it can be suggested that vibratory rhythms of a sensory kind enter the body’s physiological core as a paralinguistic language composed of many analogical signs (Deleuze, 2005b: 79). Indeed, as analogical signs can be likened to optical signals that travel across nerve fibres, representing continuous, physical, time varying quantities similar to when experiencing music (Vijayachitra, 2013: 5) it is also possible to liken paralinguistic language with the notion of affectus presented by Spinoza, which refers to the passage from one state to another, and takes into account the correlative variation of the affecting bodies (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 81) but also to Peirce’s idea of Firstness, as a sensible feeling produced by a piece of music (CP, 4.447). Hence, it can be proposed that the right hemisphere of the brain is involved in the act of semeiosis that brings together common notions to create an emotional interpretant as a sense-event.

Thinking is always experiencing and experimenting. It is not a matter of interpretation but experiencing and experimenting with what is coming into actuality. For example, in the pedagogical documentation we often see different affects coming into being. These experiences are dynamic, and take shape as if compatible relations are entering into a reasoned composition with each other (Deleuze, 2005b: 106). This is because the brain is: “involved in the act of forming a totality of compatible relation” (Deleuze, 2004a: 262). However, as Deleuze (2004a) also explains: “reason is not without profiting from one of the features of imagination” (Deleuze, 2004a: 262). In addition, Bergson (2004) also presents the brain as that which creates a motor diagram or virtual image by filtering affection images, and then selecting and adding this affection image to the ones already retained by our corporeal memory (Bergson, 2004: 147). As such, Deleuze (2005b) believes that it is the right hemisphere is involved in the construction of ideas (Deleuze, 2005b: 38). These ideas are formed from analogical signs that appeal to the cerebral creativity of the right hemisphere, and the place where common relations find in the imagination the
very conditions of their formation. In its practical function, it applies to passions that can be imagined and desired (Deleuze, 1992: 295).

The imagination is our awareness of our own body mixing with other affecting bodies (Deleuze, 1988: 49). More precisely, it is the sum total of affection images continually procured from the effects that follow from affecting bodies or causes. Insofar as feelings of joy increase our sense of well being, and increase our capacity to act in the world without fear or threat, affection images also determine us to desire. That is, desire is a process that uses the images of the imagination to find those images that will increase our sense of well being and our capacity to act in the world (Deleuze, 1992: 241). Indeed, we say it is the force or power behind the diagrammatic function. Desire uses the imagination to produce, assemble and preserve a single image and an event that is joyous. In doing, so it will assemble enough affection images from the body it encounters in order to procure the most agreeable object for us to act in the word (Deleuze, 1992: 241). Let us look at an example. Here is Clare’s encounter with Castle Caernarvon by Richard Wilson:

**Clare:** “It reminds me of Bridge to Terabithia. I feel like I’m in the picture myself and living the dream. The sound is gentle. It makes me feel light and small because I can place myself in the picture. I can hear little birds tweeting, I can taste hot cross buns cooking. The colour is moving me. It makes me feel happy. It also makes me feel like I am in a totally different world.”

The affective causes in Clare’s encounter are compounded by a common relation between an auditory and tactile sensation. There is also an oral sensation that is connected to olfactory ideas. Here, desire is using the imagination to search and draw lines between disassociated images, and then linking them in order to distinguish what the surface of the artefact is designating in terms of its material attributes. For Clare, the statement: “I can taste hot cross buns cooking” would indicate that, desire, in creating a diagram by using the traces of interaction, is relationally compounding an idea of taste in an image of smell: the residues of experience that live on in thought and in the body, as a consequence, going on to add this image to a previous memory.
In Clare’s encounter she appears to form a sympathetic relation to this object. If we look at the image itself, we can see that there is a figurative castle in the background and that the landscape does seem to gentle and scenic. We could say that with all the clouds floating in the distance that it does appear to give it dream like quality. Moreover, the three figures in the painting - who do appear to be holding hands and dancing - do produce a scene that is harmonious and idyllic. The colours of the sky are soft and light with shades of purples and blues, and the slow diminishing energy of a luminous peach that hazily falls across the gentle and tranquil water. Indeed, we may even imagine the sound of bird song in this scene. However, the most important part of Clare’s encounter is her reference to the movie: *The Bridge to Terabithia*. In order to understand this better, I provide the following synopsis.

The Bridge to Terabithia is a story centred on the young and artistically talented Jesse Aarons, who, together with his four sisters, comes from a poor farmer’s family. Jesse is often exposed to stresses and concerns surrounding money, and he finds no respite at school where he is often teased or bullied.

Jesse has trained all summer to become the fastest runner in school, and is upset when new pupil - the adventurous, imaginative and non-conformist - Leslie Burke outruns him and everyone else. Leslie is a city girl but like Jesse she is also teased by her fellow students. However, unlike Jesse she does not let it bother her (resistance to disruption of extrinsic affects or her cohesion). Despite their obvious differences – i.e. that she is rich, and he is poor, she from a city, he from the country – they share a common interest in stories and the magic of the imagination. As a result,
they eventually become best friends and set out on an adventure to cross a creek into the woods. Leslie teaches Jesse to open his mind to all possibilities and to leave reality behind. Using their imaginations both Leslie and Jesse they create a Bridge to Terabithia (a land of imagined monsters, trolls, ogres and giants) and together they pronounce themselves King and Queen Terabithia. This imaginative world becomes a haven from their struggles at school and at home, and as they begin to share adventures, they begin to teach each other how to stand up to the bullies at school.

One day, Miss Edmunds, the music teacher at Jesse’s school, invites Jesse to spend a day with her touring the art galleries in Washington. Jesse takes up this opportunity, and the trip does much to expand his mind and imagination. This makes him feel as if he is special; a feeling that he has only previously felt in Leslie's company. Jesse has a perfect day, but when Jesse gets home he is told that Leslie has drowned that very morning trying to cross the creek into Terabithia on the rope swing they used for that purpose.

Jesse is completely devastated and goes through the stages of grief—denial, anger, fear, and sorrow. As the King of Terabithia, and without Leslie he does not see how he is to go on, and feels he has no choice but to revert to the old Jesse, a person plagued by fear and insecurity. But Jesse must trust in what Leslie has taught him to overcome the difficulties that reality can bring. Eventually Jesse realizes that he can only keep Leslie’s memory and his own newfound sense of self alive by continuing the fantasy of Terabithia. Accordingly, Jesse brings his little sister May Belle to Terabithia and makes her its new queen, assuring the legacy of Leslie will live on as well.

It would be several weeks later - during a poetry workshop - that Clare’s encounter would reveal itself as having more emotional significance. That is, Richard Wilson’s Castle Caernarvon reminded Clare of her close relationship to her grandmother who had recently passed away. This I believed was possible because Clare had remembered her grandmother by way of recognising the elderly figure playing with the children in the painting, and then associating this to own past. For Clare, the adult or older figure in the scene represented her grandmother. From this perspective, therefore, the painting represented something symbolic.

On further inspection, I saw no sign of a bridge depicted in the image. However, one way in which we might approach this is to look at this is through thematic signs that Clare’s reminiscence of The Bridge to Terabithia generates. The sensorial impressions presented by the painting might have brought to memory at moment in time where Clare watched The Bridge to Terabithia. The idea of the film acts as a catalyst for setting up a diagrammatic constellation of references related to non-discursive affects.
such as grief, denial, anger, fear and sorrow. This is evidenced by the thematic nature of the character Jesse’s coming to terms with the death of his close friend in the story.

Now if, as I argued earlier, the process of desire works alongside the imagination to connect images which are agreeable to our nature, then, in this instance it would appear that desire connects images of grief, denial, anger, fear, and sorrow to an agreeable object of love. That is, the object of love has been brought together in a compound relation of grief, denial, anger, fear and sorrow. Although this may appear to be a more disagreeable assemblage related to sorrow, desire works by generating an assemblage of images, and ideas from the past, to create the best agreeable object. This means that Clare, as a result of her grandma passing away, finds it difficult to experience the love for her grandma simply through joyous memories. There are also traces of affection, and experiences of sadness, that are intimately related and connected to the object of “love.” Consequently, in experiencing the affect traced by her relation with grandma, Clare must also experience the image and ideas of sadness that desire relationally and diagrammatically compounds this relation to be in its essence.

As young people roam around the museum and gallery, looking and interacting with different objects and artefacts, there is a tendency for them to search for what is most agreeable outside, and then to assemble an agreeable relations inside. Indeed, even if it does not on first sight appear agreeable, it is agreeable to their capacity for action i.e. it enables them to continue interacting with an object or the interaction suggests they should leave it and move on.

In both cases, their body as a multi-sensory organ places them directly within the material conditions of their environment and, equally, within the action of affective causes. As a process, it could be said that the nervous system registers the changes of intensity as signs travelling through the nerve fibres. Thus, these signs are related to affective causes. Furthermore, if we look at this process semiotically through a Peircean perspective, then it may be likened to a communicative function which processes the pure iconicity of a sensory resemblance. The young person’s immediate experience is, therefore, a series of contracted, communicative, vibrations which are felt as expressive movements across the nervous system. To this we may add the movement of contraction and tension directly connects each youngster to their environing conditions.
6.8. Bodily logic and Peircean semiotics: creating semiotic patterns of experience with affect

The paralinguistic images experienced in the brain points to the “instrumental” transformation of the art object and its structure. Through Peircean semiotics we can document this process pragmatically. Bergson (2004) tells us that the transmission of external perceptions to the brain can be compared to switchboard through which centripetal and centrifugal forces transfer impersonal, non-subjective and purely material signs: the nerves fibres acting as wires (Bergson, 2004: 30/45). The imagination is the operative set of asignifying and non-representational lines and zones that constitutes the diagrammatic mind and the operations of the dynamic interpretant. Its course of action is to make affection images and ideas clear, and represent parts of one thing as analogous to its own parts. As such, diagrammatic reasoning uses desire as a connective link between affections of the body, and functions to depict and render intelligible the form of a relation. In this sense, the diagrammatic imagination is connected to pure iconicity of affection images, but different in that it correspond to a process or pattern of design which maps and indexes feelings of affect with traces of experience (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 81). It can therefore create an iconic and emotive image out of a set of rationally related objects indexed to our corporeal embodied experiences.

The pure iconic images of affection used to diagrammatically assemble a map of lived experience has been filtered and selected because of their relational resemblance. Another way of saying this is that affection images have been filtered and selected because of their agreeableness. Diagrammatic icons are imaginative signs that are associated with agreeable objects of resemblance. The diagram, then, is an active function involved in assembling, constructing and producing experience, rather than a just a passive enterprise. And, as we have seen, this interaction essentially involves desire. Desire is actively involved in creating something new. It works like a cartographer drawing and redrawing patterns of a sensorial landscape, bringing together related objects in the form of an iconic resemblance. But it also brings together many objects in order to produce a singular object: a singular object which is although multiple, represents a definite and compounded form of a relation. This helps the individual to create a sense impression of the extrinsic factors through an emotional interpretant.

Every feeling of affect in consciousness is a passion linked to traces of interaction caused by affection images. These impressions are subjective in that they relate to residues of experience that already live on in thought and the body (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 81). Furthermore, desire produces a diagrammatic
assemblage from these passions to form emotive signs of joy and sadness. It is these emotive signs of feeling affect that end up being incarnated into a series or a general form of an idea. This iconic form assumes the generality of a theme or Idea and serves as a law for the series of our passions. In Clare’s encounter, we can see that the series of passions have been constructed into the theme of Hope and Love. This is the essence of Clare’s encounter. Hope and Love become the general form of an idea that determines the series of her subjective states.

**Clare:** “It reminds me of Bridge to Terabithia. I feel like I’m in the picture myself and living the dream. The sound is gentle. It makes me feel light and small because I can place myself in the picture. I can hear little birds tweeting. I can taste hot cross buns cooking. The colour is moving me. It makes me feel happy. It also makes me feel like I am in a totally different world.”

Essence indicates that desire is creative and diagrammatic. In the construction of a compounded and relational essence, desire uses the diagrammatic imagination to invent new possibilities of experience. This is done by using the qualitative signs of our passions and indexing them the previous experience. Desire reveals such qualities of lived experience through an ethical cartography thought, which maps the context of the body’s social relations. In this way, desires function is also an ethical activity, in that uses the qualities of our immediate environment to create what Peircean semiotics might call a law or a general symbolic idea. This general idea is difference itself (Deleuze, 2008: 27/48) in that is uses our own unique and person experiences to rework the environing conditions.

For example, Clare’s visual encounter reworks the curatorial discourse of Richard Wilson *Castle Caernarvon* in such a way that it might possible become a general law of habit to think about it through the event she has stated. This then, can be treated as an ethical activity because each series of sensual images received through the nervous system, and relationally compounded into a general idea, is either agreeable or disagreeable to our nature in accordance with our capacity to act, which uses the traces of our lived experience to guide our future actions. Consequently, desire has both an active side which can change the objective conditions our experience, and also an ethical side which can reveal ways of existing related to social, political and even environmental subjectivities.

As Deleuze (2005b) states: “the nature of analogical language can be understood as a diagram inserted into the head or brain (Deleuze, 2005b: 79). That is, the diagram results from an affective and emotive language or event assembled by the brain from the pure iconic state of affective causes. These express
changes in the body. Consequently, the analogical diagram can be defined by a certain obviousness or evidence of the paralinguistic sign making its presence felt (Deleuze, 2005b: 80). In Peircean semiotics, this may be conceived as the immediate interpretant that allows the interpreting agency to interpret its sign as interpretable as such. That is, to communicate the extra-linguistic phenomena as an initial feeling of effort caused by affection images or Firstness. Bearing that in mind, we might now present the dynamic interpretant as the diagrammatic function: a de-territorializing function. Here, the truth of desire “effects a muscular or mental effort... generating feeling and action in the inner world of an interpreting thought” (CP, 5.491).

This diagrammatic reasoning is first of all an isolation of affections and affects. Desire isolates a series of images from the bodily continuum and selects those images that are agreeable with traces of lived experience. The relational compound which is created is an essence identified with the annihilation of a portion of associations. This helps guide our perceptions but also our future actions. As a result, this implies that the presentative structure corresponding to the artwork has undergone an instrumental transformation. For example, although the function of desire and diagrammatic reasoning compound a relational sign that indicates what is common between the body of the artefact, and the body of the viewer, in isolating and grouping affection images together, in order to create a general idea or essence of feeling, desire and diagrammatic reasoning also produces an immaterial unity which transforms the representative structure of the artefact. The incarnation of the artworks essence as a form of “truth” then, depends on the extrinsic conditions of the artwork, felt as affective forces from the outside, but also on the internal “contingencies” created by the subjects desire and diagrammatic reasoning. This is what marks an encounter as truly relational.

Earlier I said there were two contracted movements: the first towards the core, the second movement back towards the periphery. The work of human action is productive as well as receptive. There is also a movement of tension that travels from the diagrammatic core of the brain to the material structure of the surface of an artefact. This is the condition of real experience and how the sensible is revealed. The movement from the core back towards the periphery forces the new and assembled structure of desire to participate around the nervous system and the muscular “contractions” of the body. These muscular reactions introduce an index. Accordingly, it is where we can identify an actual modification is of an artefact in terms of a young people bodily logic.
With this in mind, the indexical function of an embodied dynamic interpretant is the visual apparatus through which a subject begins to experience themselves as the cause of our environing conditions. That is, they are no longer passive recipients of extrinsic factors. For example, the appearance the index “It” in Ela’s account, which is also a relative or demonstrative pronoun, indicates the how Ela’s encounter *Pet* by James Rielly not by way of any recognition or representational description, but embodiment.

**Ela:** “It gives me strong, heavy, and big memories. It is loud and I can hear pop music and people talking. It is icy cold, freezing, and refreshing, different colours. I felt furious because I loved the teddy and my mother tried taking it of me.”

In Peircean semiotics the *Indexical* sign has an actual connection with its object. It is a sign that refers to the object that it denotes because it is totally affected by that object. An index may simply serve to identify its object and assure us of its existence and presence by exciting in consciousness an image of the object features. The most important thing, however, is that an indexical sign is a real reaction with the object denoted, and indicates the volitional, muscular reaction that brings about a sensation; this being the object of the Ela’s desire i.e. her teddy. The instrumental deformation of the structure, by the diagrammatic imagination, are immediately transferred to through the body and felt as a physical connection or symptom of the encounter. The perception of the entire indexical structure playing the role of a giant mirror experienced as a series of transformations (Deleuze, 2005: 25).

This movement can be depicted as the triad passage from the periphery to body’s central core, from core to periphery, and then from mirrored periphery of subjective experience i.e. external repetition, internal difference, repetition of difference to the subject; this similar to Peirce’s triad sign function in which element: “A gives B to C” (CP, 1.346). Indeed, it is through the mirror of muscular reactions that Ela begins to experience a sense of being-in-the world of sensation. That is to say, the feeling of affect is sensed as emerging from the Ela’s own subjectivity, and that something is happening and becoming through the sensation, or a series of sensations, connected by the dynamical relations of this sensorial movement.
6.9. Tension and affect: the diagrammatic evocation of feeling as memory

Each young person can only experience the sensation of an artworks surface by entering the unity of the sensing and the sensed. The sensing part of our experience is both direct and physical. This would be our materially perceived “sensed” contact with an artwork via sight, sound, touch, smell and taste. Consequently, the sensed aspect of our experience is what we might call the resulting assemblage of these sensations into a sense emotion or essence. The emotional essence of our experience provides the existential atmosphere of an experience before it is translated into a feeling. It can designate any one of the following states: fear, anger, joy, surprise, grief, disgust, hate etc. Each of these “essences” then, provides us with the thematic ground to build an experience, and is the dynamic object that gives our experience a time and context. Our store of lived experience is, therefore, composed of essences which result from having collaterally lived through events, occurrences, and entanglements of intra-acting phenomena (Barad, 2007). Moreover, these essences or impressions form the sum total of the history of our individual lives.

The sensing and the sensed provide us with two forms of memory that can be observed. By exploring affection images diagrammatically we know that memories cannot be stored in the brain. There is no storehouse of fixed images (Bergson, 2004: 147). Rather, the brain is a system in-between the truth of contact with the surface of an artwork, and the inventions resulting from the attraction of images and their repulsion back toward the surface through the sensori-motor system. It is because of the brains capacity for image formation, then, together with the repulsion this relationally composed compound through our muscular actions, that our participation in another system is revealed. Following Bergson (2004) and his theory of perception and memory, we can suggest that our body stores, in the form of motor habits, those intensities selected for our needs.

Accordingly, via a contemplative mind we perceive what is useful then act in view of that perception. If it is agreeable to our nature then we will install that relation as an agreeable motor habit. Likewise, if a relation is disagreeable we will store it as a disagreeable motor habit. Hence, this implies that the construction of a general essence has a certain law of tension related to memory. Both the repulsion and the repetition of essences refer to a future orientated action, and a guided perception actualized in the muscular “contractions” and “tensions” installed as bodily habits.
Now these bodily habits must also be connected to a pure memory. If we concede that there is a contracted movement that progresses towards the diagrammatic core, then the tension caused by the vibrations of an artworks surface must pass over habits which have already been formed by our motor activity. Habits must already be contained within a muscular memory. This invites us to conceive of a pure sensory memory that includes the totality of our own past: a virtual past or a quasi-instantaneous memory that subsists in multiple levels of contraction and tension. This means, then, that the body is a connecting link between two forms of memory. Consequently, if we look at Ela’s encounter we can explore how these forms are brought into focus.

**Ela:** “If my mother took my teddy of me I would scream my head off. It reminds me of when I had bright blonde hair [and] me crying all the time in my living room. It gives me strong, heavy, and big memories. It is loud and I can hear pop music and people talking. It is icy cold, freezing, and refreshing, different colours. I felt furious because I loved the teddy and my mother tried taking it of me.”

Extended in space the body is a sensory-motor system that enables the present to encroach upon the past and the future. From this perspective the present encroaches upon Ela’s motor (future) insofar as it invites and prepares motor movements that can be exercised. When she encounters James Rielly’s *Pet* the artefact provides her with feeling-affects that allow her to act. However, this suggests that her present environing conditions first encroach upon her sensory (past) insofar as the durational present condenses the vibrations of light, transferred from the surface of the artwork, into Ela’s “immediate past.” This means that Ela’s immediate past is essentially her perceptual present.

For example, when affection images or ideas in the form of “contractions” make their way towards the diagrammatic core they produce muscular “tensions” that have habits and experiences of the past already stored in them. In Peircean terms these serve as icons of resemblance. Accordingly, if the intensity of one contraction resembles or has a likeness in intensity to a previously stored motor habit in muscular memory, then it may be argued that the sensory system produces a feeling of affect from pure memory. Indeed, in the encounter provided by Ela, this appears to constitute a present future action by assembling a motor schema linked to movements of avoidance.

Each strongly felt invitation - received from sensation - can be conceived from a Peircean perspective as qualisigns which present Ela with useful motor schemas. These affection images installed in Ela’s
muscular memory as indexical habits that are episodic and dated: durations of time and space, which are installed as sensual memories, but memories indexed to past experiences. This means that Ela’s acting present is also connected to her past in the form of motor habits. If this is the case then habit is also open to change and, possibly, transformation. This would, however, depend on the quality of the encounter. For instance, if habits do coexist with each passing present, then they too must make their way towards the diagrammatic core. If this encounter is perceived in a new or problematic way, then new and problematic muscular contractions and tensions will be subjected to the diagrammatic imagination and the operations of desire, which will be work to assemble them into a new compound relation. When this essence is then transferred back through the body in the form of a motor scheme, the tension caused by this repulsion will internalize this essence as a new muscular memory or habit. Furthermore, this would imply that habits can be transformed into other images with the help of new and novel experiences which allow us to construct sense events in interesting and remarkable ways.

Memory intervenes in the interpretation of the artefact. However, as long as we remain at the level of conscious perception, the artefact will only have an external relation to the viewer. For example, if we look at Ela’s encounter might conclude that her relation to the teddy in the painting and the blonde haired girl displays a voluntary method of recognition. If this is the case then Ela remains at the level of voluntary memory. She is making a voluntary effort to interpret the painting by way of proceeding from the present to the past. That is, using the visual objects in her present to recompose a memory.

Ela: “If my mother took my teddy of me I would scream my head off. It reminds me of when I had bright blonde hair [and] me crying all the time in my living room. It gives me strong, heavy, and big memories. It is loud and I can hear pop music and people talking. It is icy cold, freezing, and refreshing, different colours. I felt furious because I loved the teddy and my mother tried taking it of me.”

Ela’s reference to the “teddy” and the memory of having “blonde hair” means that she continues to be subjected to the textual discourse of the artefact. In that case, Ela’s subjectivity remains external to the artefact as a separable context. In other words, Ela’s relation to the artefact is dependent on an explicit decision to narrate the image through a voluntary effort of recognition.

In this exploratory analysis I have been looking for a certain truth of experience. On the one hand, we can see that the truth of an encounter is written with the help of affection images. Their clarification
is identified with the development of diagrammatic sign or essence. Indeed, essence, and the general idea that it generates in relation to memories of joy or sadness, is a sign of truths authenticity. On the other hand, the search for truth is also the characteristic adventure of involuntary memory. This is to say, because our extended body is a haptic system of physical relations between the truth of “contact” and the inventions of memory resulting from the attraction and repulsion of our motor system, if we take our previous discussions on the sensori-motor system then we can see that truth of contact can only intervene in terms of a sign of a particular type. That is, as Deleuze (2005b) states: “the sensuous sign” (Deleuze, 2005b: 38). It is these sensuous signs or feeling of affect that mobilize all the recourses of involuntary memory, and allow us to rediscover the complete essence of a past memory-sensation internalized in the contractions of embodied, volitional, and muscular recollections.

Whilst voluntary memory is content to narrate the past, our involuntary memory succeeds in making pure affective causes and passions appear. We already know that the nervous system with its network of fibrous interconnecting pathways separates the qualities of an artworks surface into heterogeneous components: each qualitative element a sensuous sign. However, when these sensuous signs begin to make their way the through the rhizome of our nervous system, the operation of involuntary memory emerges when sensations are coupled together. For instance, sensations of sight, sound, touch, smell and taste traverse already established sensations installed in pure memory. We can see this in Karla’s and Allison’s encounters as sensations of the body are bought together.

Karla: “It reminds me of home because I used to go up to the forest and play with the snow. It’s warm, quiet, smell of burnt wood. It is dark and everything is green around. There is open space, and it makes me feel quite happy.”

Allison: “It reminds me of the old ruined church. The music of it has a horror feel to it. It feels heavy like you are drawn in. It feels big like you would get lost inside. It feels cold like you are in the snow. I feel cold, warm, happy, sad, fear, hope and regret all at once”

It is because sensorial experiences and memories of the past reside at different parts of the body that traces of interaction cause aspects of the body to communicate with each other (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 81): each commutative state having its own essence specific to a certain intensity. As a result, a quality or sensorial sign common to two sensations of the same intensity can produce an involuntary memory and give us a sense of time regained at the heart of lost time.
Ela: “If my mother took my teddy of me I would scream my head off. It reminds me of when I had bright blonde hair [and] me crying all the time in my living room. It gives me strong, heavy, and big memories. It is loud and I can hear pop music and people talking. It is icy cold, freezing, and refreshing, different colours. I felt furious because I loved the teddy and my mother tried taking it of me.”

In Ela’s encounter it may be argued that objects of voluntary recognition such as the blonde hair and the teddy are contingent on denotative self-reflexive statements. This would be like to Ela looking at *Pet* by James Rielly and saying to herself in a voluntary monologue: “that is a girl with blonde hair like me” or “that is like the teddy that my mother tried taking from me.” This would mean that the act of dérive or roaming through Cardiff Museum was an inactive exercise and only gives the appearance or pre-text to activity. However, it might be argued that other things also force Ela to think. These would be sensuous signs that do not answer to voluntary effort. From this viewpoint, when Ela encountered the painting an old sensation tried to unite itself with the present sensation and, in doing so extended Ela’s present over several epochs at once (Deleuze, 2005: 14).

As a consequence, when Ela encounters the artwork, the force of affective causes and the passions that follow them, are exerted on her body. Force is closely related to sensation (Deleuze, 2005: 14). Ela’s body seizes the present sensation and past sensation simultaneously, so as to make something appear that is irreducible to either the past or present. If this is the case, then Ela’s encounter does not recall the past like a voluntary memory, but offers the past in itself in its pure essence. Ela’s past does not represent something that has been, but rather the past coexists with the present (Deleuze, 2005: 38) through an involuntary memory.

### 6.10. Conclusion

By using methods of psychogeographic dérive in conjunction with pedagogical documentation, we can explore ways of thinking about the body as a changeable assemblage that is both highly responsive to aesthetic surfaces and context. Through this exploratory analysis of young people’s encounter with art in a museum and gallery space, I found that young peoples’ subjectivity is an embodied accumulation of actions related to affections of the body, which can either increase or diminish the body’s capacity to act. For example, it appears that each mental image or idea of an artwork effects a change not only in a young person’s physical response, but also in a young people imagining of that object.
By understanding the imagination as the awareness of one’s own body in relation to another body we can suggest that in order to comprehend something in thought, a young person must have a previous emotional relationship to the subject (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999: 22, 79). For example, a fondness or even a prejudice against it, based on an initial, imagined feeling of Peircean Firstness, which is experienced immediately as an impression felt on the body (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 84). As a consequence, it is the young person’s relationship to this essence that generated affections, such as a sense of fury or sense of love, happiness or horror, and which presented itself in consciousness as an emotional recollection.

Thinking more broadly in terms of research in art education and social intervention strategies, it does appear that psychogeography and pedagogical documentation can be used in the construction of new visual narratives that rework artistic surfaces and cultural forms through a diagrammatic imagination. Through this conceptual lens, the production of new visual narratives requires an opening up to chaos and the experimental nature of desire which works to assemble and compound affection images and emotional events. As a result, aesthetic surfaces enter a process of de-territorialisation and difference. Through this creation and presentation of differences yet unknown, something like Bion’s idea of truth-in-the-moment opens up the possibility for learning and mental growth.

“We may have memories of truths experienced in the past, and desires for truths as we would like them to be (now or in the future). However, these are constructions that fall into the realm of the known. The unknowable but immanent reality is available only in and for the moment. Once the moment has passed, our minds may have grown, we may have learned, but we do not have the truth; what we are left with is knowledge. We are left to pursue truth in each and every moment as it occurs. We must resist the temptation to believe that somehow, in our knowledge, we know the truth” (French & Simpson, 1999).

Truth-in-the-moment opens up a potential for learning. However, truth-in-the-moment can never be known as such insights cannot be controlled or predicted. Yet, glimpses are possible – as it were. We can sense the immanent reality of things (French & Simpson, 1999). New ideas, for instance, depend on our being in touch with truth-of-the-moment: the ‘ultimate reality’ of immanence, becoming and intensity forming the basic necessity for mental health and growth. A case in point is Proust’s narrator In the Search of Lost Time, who cites a divine sensation when leaning over to unbutton his boots.
“It was only in that moment – more than a year after her burial, on account of that anachronism that so often keeps the calendar of facts from coinciding with the calendar of feeling – that I realised that she was gone forever” (Proust, 1981: 180).

The boot causes an involuntary memory to intervene. However, similar to Proust’s Madeleine there is a distinction to be made. That is, in this encounter an old sensation also tries to impose itself and unite with the present situation. As a consequence, the present experience is extended over several epochs at once. In this case, an involuntary memory brings to the narrator a recollection of his dead grandma: the formation of which affords the acute sentiment of death, and the painful experience of time lost. Indeed, we explored a similar occasion through Clare’s encounter with Castle Caernarvon by Richard Wilson. For this reason, it is only through the sensuous sign that truth-in-the-moment makes known memory’s ambivalence, and in doing so allows us to reach other truths by other paths in the alteration and disappearance of time. As Deleuze (1994) continues in reference to Proust’s narrator:

“But it suffices that the present sensation set its “materiality” in opposition to the earlier one for the joy of this superposition to give way to a sentiment of collapse, of inseparable loss, in which the old sensation is pushed back into the depths of time...happiness immediately gives way to the certainty of death and nothingness” (Deleuze, 1994: 176).

Unpredictable, unbidden and involuntary, young people’s chance encounters with the materiality of sensuous signs can perplex the enduring self of inner duration and provide problematic intensities in the form of multiple affective responses. But the fact that these responses can only be sensed in the movement of inner duration and the interval, or rather, tension between knowing and not-knowing means that we should not discount the transformational potential of existential time. Indeed, it can ground and guide our experiences (Deleuze, 1994: 176) and generate unknown thoughts new to the thinker (Crociani-Windland, 2009: 61). That is, the effect of the involuntary through the sensuous sign forces the mind to search for meaning in the affordance of lost time.

In the next chapter, I will explore how pedagogical documentation can be used in order to guide other experiences; namely the sensory creation of meanings through feelings and poetry. Poetry is used so as to allow the young people from Valleys Kids to enmesh percepts and affects into blocs of sensation (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 176). It is envisaged that these entities will propel the political agendas for those for whom they speak, and create new sensory landscapes and a system of affective relay which
will serves to problematize domesticated significations for their readers: each bloc of sensation having its own affective force or quality. Consequently, in suggesting that a bloc of sensations has an affective capacity, I am arguing that poetry has the aptitude to change a body’s limits, but also inspire different connections between bodies that can re-adjust what an individual is or is not able to feel, understand or know about different subjects.
Chapter 7

Analysis 2: A Pragmatic Cartography of Poetic Narratives

A reader that approaches a poem in terms of sensation approaches it on its own terms. It has its own sense. Although sensation is often produced by signification it does not rely on it. Sensation is active; it does not mean something, it does something (Clay, 2010: 50). This means that each individual poem is praxis, and each individual reading is necessarily an experimental praxis with the becoming of sense and affect. Each reading then can become part of an ongoing and permanent process of individuation. Here, the principle of enactment is important. Enactment implies a unique event which differentiates and individuates on each occasion. This means that poetry has the potential to transform our ways of seeing and talking about objects in the world.

Consequently, this shift away from representation gives poetry a real position in society. It becomes praxis in its own right, and creates the conditions for new social relations through “affective practices” (Walkerdine, 2010). That is to say, poetics can grant us a truly relational aesthetic (Bourriaud, 1998) that can allow young people to communicate embodied locales (Ivinson & Renold, 2013b) that unfold in conjunction with body and mind. In this chapter then, we will see how young people constructed a “sensory landscape” or, rather, a “bloc of sensations” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 176) to inspire new visual articulations about lived experience.

The process of creating a poem was installed as an activity that would allow young people to explore their experiential reminiscences through the pragmatics of their own bodymind. Accordingly, it is my belief that the effects of particular affective, psychosocial phenomena (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012) can be explored through the signs produced by such reminiscences. That is to say, corporeal traces of affection and residues of experience, which live on in thought and body (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 81). It is, therefore, envisaged that the poetic construction of a “bloc of sensation” will allow young people to articulate sense-events in their becoming, both in and through sign-action, or what Charles Sanders Peirce terms the process of semeiosis.

By using Peircean semiotics to investigate how young people poetically construct multi-sensory images around emotionally embodied points of intensity (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999: 40) this chapter will
explore the psychosocial mechanisms used to organise and contain patterns of affect (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012) through bodily recollections. This will allow those working in youth arts to explore how young people choreograph connections and resistances to people, places and events (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 81) whilst providing them with a way to discover how collateral knowledge may communicate and function in the lives of others as a public voice. Indeed, it is envisaged that poetry may provide a public voice for those who usually remain unheard, whilst also operating as a methodological tool for fearless speech.

Charles Sanders Pierce is not interested in determining what a given signs means. This is because what a sign means to someone is very much a private and individual concern. Peirce is more interested in the general aspects of a sign and sign-action: technically known as semeiosis. Accordingly, in this chapter I will explore how the action of a singular essence related to memory traverses its way through a poetic field of imagery. As explored in our previous chapter, a singular essence is a general idea composed of affective causes. It is created relationally through a diagrammatic imagination, which uses the power of desire to construct a sensation that is felt as a feeling of joy or sadness, and whose presence or trace of is necessarily integrated into muscular memory as a recollection.

If these factors are taken into account then the classification of some of the various species of sign by the subject can be understood as universally valid. That is to say, it is of no benefit to try and interpret and investigate what a young person’s experience of a particular aesthetic sign or art object means in terms of its interpretative and hermeneutic meaning (Sayers, 2011: 413) because each young person’s experiential account of a sign’s “social phenomena” should be seen in the wider context of corporeally co-productive processes. Indeed, the more we develop our understanding of an aesthetic sign’s effects the more it is possible to understand the socio-cultural phenomena surround that sign in terms of its relation to psychosocial affect.

7.0. Experimenting with words as partial objects: constructing a poem using pedagogical documentation

To do this, I first instructed each young person to choose a particular word from their pedagogical documentation. In the creative sense of constructing a poem this method was not too dissimilar from word gathering. The technique of word gathering is often used initially as a means of collecting pieces of information to use later in a poem (Green & Punla, 1996). As such, my intention was to appropriate
this technique, and use it as an alternative strategy for extracting “partial objects” from pedagogical documentation. That is, the experiential accounts taken during the psychogeographical dérive. If we take Allison’s poem, for instance, we can see that the partial objects that she decided to gather from her experiential encounter with *A Ruined House* by John Piper were the words “fairytales,” “painting,” and “ruin.” These nouns form the character or quality of each stanza in the poem.

**A [Fairytales]** is a happy ending.
When I read it I turn into a cloud.
It turns my imagination into a soft fluffy blanket.
This makes me feel happy.
It makes me feel like melted chocolate.

**A [Painting]** is a magical world.
When I explore it, I feel like I am on an adventure,
I start to glide.
It turns my legs into jelly.
This makes me feel good.
It makes me feel like a flowing river.

**The [Ruin]** is a musical regret.
When I walk through it, I feel a sharp pain in my chest.
It turns my body weak.
This makes me feel heavy.
It makes me feel like a dull, cold metal weight.

By Allison

**7.1. Peirce’s immediate and dynamic object: the semiotically visible and the semiotically absent**

If we want to explore these partial objects in more detail, it is important to recognise that Peirce’s semiotic account makes a distinction between two objects of a sign. That is, the object of each sign has an active and dynamic object which comes from outside and, therefore, accounts for a sign’s external meaning, and an immediate object *within* the sign that accounts for its internal meaning. As such, we can comprehend how this distinction works in the following way.

For instance, if we take the idea of a simple photograph, then the dynamic object would be the “actual” model or thing having their photo taken. It would be the actual reality and circumstances contained in the photograph. Conversely, the immediate object would be the trace of the model or
thing in the photograph itself. More specifically, it would be the traces of the actual models features found amongst the patterns of light and shade on the photograph (Jappy, 2013: 25).

The immediate object of experience, then, is the visible object represented within a particular sign, while the dynamic object is the absent object, and the actual real which determines the sign in the first place (Jappy, 2013: 25). Consequently, to understand how the gathering of partial objects works we need to focus of the dynamic object of experience.

Making the distinction between dynamic and immediate objects can create certain difficulties when it comes to mobilizing partial objects. As such, I am aware that this might cause confusion or obscure a researcher’s comprehension of Peirce’s conception of the object. However, in the example just given above, the partial objects can be easily identified as the qualitative features of the model. The partial objects are the real features of the sign’s logical form and can be defined as the semiotic components forming the signs dynamic object.

Bearing this in mind, why restrict ourselves to non-verbal signs? Indeed, these principles must equally be applicable to nominal expressions, too. Thus, in a text entitled ‘Meaning’, Peirce (1996) gives us an example of how this may work by analysing the sentence ‘Cain Killed Abel’- Peirce, making a reference to the Biblical brothers. The sign’s partial objects, here, are the proper nouns Cain and Abel, which function to denote the immediate object of two existent individuals in the sentence. That is, the words Cain and Abel. However, the words Cain and Abel also collectively frame the immediate objects of two possible dynamic or absent objects (i.e. Cain and Abel as people who exist outside of language in the real world or in an imaginary universe). Let look at how this works when it is applied in practice.

The following accounts are provided by Clare and Allison:

“It reminds me of a castle in a dream I once had. It reminds me of an enchanted place. People play by the sea. It reminds me of a beach with something like Buckingham Palace. It makes people feel enchanted, drawn in, special. I can relate to the picture. I can hear children and a family laughing. I can see children smiling. I can taste warm bread just coming off the oven.”

Clare’s account of Caernavon Castle by Richard Wilson:

“It reminds me of the old ruined church. The music of it would be like a horror feel to it. It feels heavy like you are drawn in. It feels big [like you would get
lost inside. It feels cold like you are in snow. I feel cold, warm, happy, sad, fear, hope and regret all at once.”

Allison’s account of *A Ruined House* by John Piper:

The accounts by Allison and Clare are equally made up of partial objects. Following Peirce, it may be even more suitable to say that each extract or experiential account determines a sign in its complexity and as a totality of partial objects. However, in every case each extract is also an object and a universe of which nominal expressions are a special object or part. For instance, in the first extract we can safely identify “castle in a dream” as two nominal expressions which refer to an “enchanted place.” Likewise, in the second extract we can identify nominal expressions such as “church” and “music” which make a reference to the feeling of “horror.” These, as in Peirce’s example of “Cain killed Abel,” identify partial objects (i.e. “church” and “music”) together with what we might call the sign’s referent (i.e. “horror”). Furthermore, they determine a dyadic structure between two nominal expressions. Accordingly, and in each case, each dynamic object can be correlated with its referent.

If youth encounters during the sequence of walking are likened to a young person taking an emotive photograph, or the creation of a diagrammatic landscape of their own experiences through a series of nominal signs or expressions, then the visual narratives contained in the pedagogical documentation can be seen as a particular dynamic sign. The nominal expressions contained within each visual being the signs partial objects, which collectively constitute it as a dynamic object. It could be argued that in truth, the artefact in the museum and gallery is the real absent or dynamic object. Indeed, if this line of thought is carried through to its necessary conclusion then the pedagogical documentation would also have to be likened to a representation of an artefact. As such, the pedagogical documentation would merely provide us with a reality that cannot be proven by nominal expressions alone.

It is interesting to note that while in the case of a photograph we can show the dynamic object to be a model or a real existent thing in the world, it may be argued that something like a painting, sketch or graphic mage may not have an existent dynamic object at all: at least, if it has one it can offer no real proof of its existence. Indeed, this can also be true of narrative structures or other rhetorical forms of communication such as storytelling. However, although we can assume that the nominal expressions “church” and “music” to be co-referential in Allison’s narrative account of John Piper’s *A Ruined House*, and Allison’s feeling of “horror” to be the second referent, the dynamic-object-as-referent theory fails
to explain what gives the structure of Allison’s poem its communicative and/or rhetorical force. I will now turn to the analysis of Allison’s poem and, in particular, the third stanza.

The [Ruin] is a musical regret.  
When I walk through it, I feel a sharp pain in my chest.  
It turns my body weak.  
It makes me feel heavy.  
It makes me feel like a dull, cold, metal weight.  

By Allison

If the real dynamic object or existent thing is to be the determinant of the sign, then the referent must somehow and at some stage be related to Allison as both the speaker and writer of the nominal sign, since Allison conceived of the sign in the first place. As a consequence, it is necessary that we account for the adversative “it reminds me” since this involuntary reminiscence contributes to the utterances distinctive syntactical form. But how can we account for the full range of dynamic objects in Allison’s poem? Again, an extract from Peirce’s manuscript “Meaning” can help:

“In the sentence [Napoleon is lethargic] Napoleon is not the only Object. Another Partial Object is Lethargy; and the sentence cannot convey its meaning unless collateral experience has taught its Interpreter what Lethargy is, or what that is that ‘lethargy’ means in this sentence […] For the Object of ‘Napoleon’ is the Universe of Existence so far as it is determined by the fact that Napoleon being a Member of it. The Object of the sentence ‘Hamlet is insane’ is the Universe of Shakespeare’s Creation so far as it is determined by Hamlet being part of it” (CP, 8.178).

Peirce’s use of Napoleon introduces a proper noun as an index. This sign creates a logical “universe of existence,” or what we might otherwise call an ontological relation (Jappy, 2013: 98). I will explore this idea in more detail later on, but for now we need only acknowledge that if this theory is applied to the opening line of Allison’s poem: “The [Ruin] is a musical regret” works in the same way as: “Napoleon is lethargic.” We can effectively say, then, that the opening line of Allison’s poem creates a universe of existence and, as a result, an ontological relation with the reader. Indeed, this is initially determined by Allison with the noun “Ruin,” which Allison will then continue to explore and develop throughout the rest of her poem in the universe of “musical regret.” Consequently, if based on their own experience the reader is convinced that there is such an dynamic or real and existent thing as a “ruin,” and based on their own experiences that there are emotional feelings of “regret,” then Allison’s poem will begin
to function as a fact, and not as fiction. As such, we can now explore the empiricist nature of Peircean semiotics.

7.2. Collateral knowledge: a universe of signification, experience and existence

In the extract provided above, the Napoleon example illustrates the importance of Peirce’s approach to signification and interpretation. In order to understand a sign at all, we have to reason about it from whatever knowledge we possess. That is, we cannot understand a sign unless we have obtained what Peirce often refers to as “collateral knowledge.” Collateral knowledge can be given by our experience, observation or rational interpretation of our interactions with the world. However, Peirce’s reference to the historical figure of Napoleon equally suggests that knowledge can be obtained by acts of fantasy and imagination. Likewise, Peirce’s reference to the “universe of Shakespeare’s creation” is evidence that Peirce also thought that our imaginations can be a mental complement to collateral experience: something we will address later on. As a result, Peirce’s account of semiotics is such that although the sign can represent its object, in order for it to produce an effect upon the interpreter, the interpreter must have had prior “collateral experience” with that object: be it an object of the real world of things or an object of feeling and imagination. How is this empirical approach applicable to Allison’s poem?

The [Ruin] is a musical regret.
When I walk through it, I feel a sharp pain in my chest.
It turns my body weak.
This makes me feel heavy.
It makes me feel like a dull, cold, metal weight.

By Allison

If the reader of Allison’s poem has never seen, heard of, or had any collateral experience whatsoever with anything that could be interpreted as a “ruin” then there is little chance that Allison’s reference to the object “ruin” will function completely. That is, the reader could only presume that there is such and such a person that has experience an object called a “ruin”, and that the “ruin” is affected by the indexical and ontological condition of a “musical regret.” This now leads us to the object of qualities.

In Peirce’s letter, the term “lethargy” is also described as an object. It is another partial object, and yet again cannot covey its meaning unless the interpreter has gained knowledge and been determined by
this sign through collateral experience. For this cannot determine the mind unless the word “lethargy” brings to our attention a habit that has been established and calls up a variety of attributes attached to the sign. In the same way, Allison’s reference to a “musical regret” can also be considered a partial object: the emotional feeling of “regret” being the object. However, unlike the noun “ruin,” the feeling or symptom of “regret” is not an individual existent thing but a condition or a set of qualities: they are purely qualitative referents. This idea, of course, is the same when it comes to multi-sensory qualities like sight, sound, taste, and touch. Indeed, this is exemplified in a series of poems produced by Adam.

The [Rock] is a bright diamond.
When I pick it up it sparkles in the sun.
It turns my hand into a glow stick in the dark.
This makes me feel joyful
It makes me feel like a bright star.

The [Funfair] is an earthquake
When I walk through its sharp shiver burst into excitement
It turns my thought into a quick pause
This makes me feel surprised
It makes me feel like a frozen stilt

The [Donut] is a tingling twitch
When I walk past a delightful smell
It turns my eyes into a romantic feeling
This makes me feel like an enjoyable moment
It makes me feel like a relaxed chill

By Adam

Peirce informs us that the object is not Napoleon himself, the referent of Napoleon, but the ontology determined by Napoleon being a member of it. Likewise, in Allison’s poem, she is not so much telling us what the object of the “Ruin” is but, rather, where to find it. The “Ruin” takes us to a certain type of universe – the universe of ruined churches – of which Allison’s “Ruin” is a member. Peirce explains in a similar example.

“The Object of the Command “Ground to arms!” is the immediately subsequent action of the soldiers so far as it is affected by the molition expressed in the command. It cannot be understood unless collateral observation shows the speaker’s relation to the rank of soldiers. You may say, if you like, that the Object is the Universe of things desired by the Commanding Captain at the moment. Or since the obedience is fully expected, it is in the Universe of his expectation. At any rate, it determines
the Sign although it is to be created by the Sign by the circumstance that is
the Universe is relative to the momentary state of mind of the officer” (CP,
8.178).

In this example, the object originates from the officer’s will that the butts of the muskets be grounded.
The sign itself is the “Ground to arms!” This, to be heard, has to pass through the existential medium
of air as a series of sound waves of various intensities and amplitudes. It might be noted at this point
that Peirce is also suggesting that the dynamic object does not necessarily have the same logical value
in every case of semeiosis but, rather, in conjunction with the relation holding between the creator and
his universe of expectation. As a consequence, the dynamic object takes its value in conjunction with
the sign’s speaker or creator by constituting a universe or ontology related to their respective states of
mind – “things desired” or “expected” or judged by the utter or creator – and will, therefore, assume
a value according to those circumstance (Jappy, 2013: 100). Can we really say this is any different from
the universe of object of desire in Allison’s account?

7.3. The immediate object of experience: words, images and commands

The basic structure of a written poem - or any sign for that matter - is determined by the presence of
its dynamic objects which create a compound of specific referents related to partial objects or nouns.
This structure is also known as its logical form: this logical form not only accounting for the compound
of partial objects, but also the internal organization of the “event” represented by those partial objects.
In the case of the immediate object, however, the problem is much simpler, if only because a dynamic
object is open to inspection. For this we will turn to another of Peirce’s militaristic interpretations of
semiosis:

“If a colonel hands a paper to an orderly and says “You will go immediately
and deliver this to Captain Hanno” and if the orderly does so, we do not say
the colonel told the truth; we say that the orderly was obedient, since it was
not the orderly’s conduct which determined the colonel to say what he did,
but the colonel’s speech that determined the orderly’s action” (CP, 5.554).

In this extract, the object of the command is located in the universe, world, and/or ontology of things
desired and required by the colonel. This is shown by the sign “You will go immediately and deliver this
[letter] to Captain Hanno.” However, there is more to it than just this. The orderly, the letter, and the
captain are also objects in their own right. Respectively, the orderly is the subject, the letter the direct object, and the captain the indirect object of the second clause. Consequently, a reader of a poem, in a similar vein to the orderly, must also make sense and interpret these references in order to obey the command.

In a verbal sign the various partial objects composing the dynamic object are located outside the sign, and are related to the speaker’s desire for an object to be delivered to some interpreting mind, while among the immediate objects of a verbal sign we have nominal or symbolic expressions such as nouns, pronouns, denotative and connotative words, etc. To simplify, then, we can say that when we decide to use sentences and nominal expressions to convey a message, whether these be simple or complex, we create a structural analogue of the pictures, faces, objects, and events, etc, similar to those found in a visual document like a poem. However, the universes in which the dynamic objects are located in the two cases are very different. In short, the series of immediate objects introduced in the course of a sequence of lines - for instance, the image of a ruin - denotes pictorially a set of objects belonging to the possible world of the poem defined by Allison’s imagination. As a result, when we read the poem we enter this denoted world and the forms, colours, feelings and sensations that the poem produces take on a different existence.

**7.4. Collateral experience: knowledge, difference and the principle of continuity**

The empiricist nature of Peirce’s conception of semiotics is such that although the sign represents the object, in order for it to produce an effect upon the interpreter, the interpreter has to have had prior “collateral experience” with the object. This means that the each experience is not only a differential process, but that each person’s experience of the same object can vary considerably. For example, in the previous chapter we observed that an individual’s experience of an artefact - and in particular the same artefact - can be different. This, as Dewey (1997) points out, is largely down to the “principle of continuity.” That is, every experience both takes up something from those that have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those that come after (Dewey, 1997: 32).

With this in mind, then, Peirce’s empiricist conception of sign-action or semiosis follows a similar non-deterministic position, in that each dynamic object is dependent on each person’s unique experience.
Furthermore, if we compare two poems constructed around the same art object, then we can see this works. Here, I have chosen Brigitte and Clare’s poem about *Castle Caernarvon* by Richard Wilson.

![Castle Caernarvon by Richard Wilson](http://www.museumwales.ac.uk)

The **[River]** is a flowing dream  
When it glistens it makes me smile  
It turns me into an innocent child  
This makes me feel like there is hope  
It makes me feel like a bright blue day

By Brigitte

The **[Bridge]** picks me up, and makes me feel like I’m in the picture.  
When I dream of it, it makes me feel like I’m in the real world.  
It makes me feel like a bird approaching the scene.  
This makes me tremble because it’s so beautiful.  
It makes me feel light and small because I’m watching over them.

By Clare

Each poetic thought is based upon experience. It is what Peirce defines as the: “cognitive resultant of our past lives” (CP, 2. 84). In other words, and here we might deploy Spinoza’s idea of the imagination as that faculty or sense which records each trace of human experience (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999: 40), as we go through life each “portion” of lived experience leaves its mark on our cognitive make up, and so
contributes to our ability to adapt to each new situation in the forms of a sign perceived and reflected in the form of an embodied sign. However, these traces of interaction are more than just responses to context; they are the semiotic enrichment of our mind as events, and the spatiotemporal registers that allow us to interpret the world as a form of knowledgeable experience correlated to time, history, and place.

7.5. The empiricism of semiosis: knowledge and experience through signs

The conscious stage of thought and knowledge is the evolution of human cognition in symbols. That is, verbal language in the form of conceptual signs. As a result, collateral experience and common social knowledge is connected intimately with our mastery of symbolic signs: a case in point being our use of symbols in everyday life. For instance, many a time - and without acknowledging it - we find ourselves caught up in the written word, the graphic symbol on the monitor of a computer screen, or the image of an advert on the television. However, Peirce also claims that symbols such as nouns and verbs, for example, can grow in meaning:

“Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking in the nature of likenesses and symbols. We think only in signs. The signs are of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbol. A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use and in experience, its meaning grows. Such words as force, law, wealth, marriage, bear for us very different meanings from those the bore to our barbarous ancestors” (EP2, 10).

This again brings us back to Peirce’s non-deterministic empiricism. Every symbolic sign, whether that is verbal, written or non-verbal, is indeterminate to some extent and is open different interpretations (CP, 5.447). This is because everything that we experience, and self-consciously interpret, is mediated to some extent through the symbolic signs of thought. However, no sign can be absolutely determinate as its meaning is continuously open to the continuity principle. Evidently, in use and in experience, the meaning of a symbol grows as a concept: the processes of translation determining each sign or symbol differently depending on the interpreter’s experience. A symbol or conceptual idea can, therefore, be interpreted differently by different people who have different experiences and different presupposed knowledge (CP, 5.446). Accordingly, every symbol or concept is objectively indeterminate, and in that
respect objectively vague. Let us now draw upon our own imagination to explore this by using Adam’s poem *The Rock* as our example:

The [Rock] is a bright diamond  
When I pick it up it sparkles in the sun  
It turns my hand into a glow stick in the dark  
This makes me feel joyful.  
It makes me feel like a bright star.

By Adam

A sign can become another sign and in the process take on radically distinct meanings, depending on the set of experiences, and the expectations of the signs’ interpreters. For instance, a piece of quartz rock, to which Adam is referring, is just one rock amongst many others if you take a leisurely stroll on the beach. It may draw no interest or significance amongst the numerous rocks and pebbles, amongst which it owes its anonymity. With each passing tide it might be transferred from one place to another, threatening to be buried from sight under the sand or even washed out to sea. The rock is a sign, and its semiotic object (this rock here in its existence, which disturbs no one) interrelates with your sense of leisurely indifference, giving the sign a negative value and meaning (interpretant). Indeed, the sign is of little concern to you; it is merely one rock amongst many others. However, one day while you are taking a leisurely walk across the beach you meet a young gentleman holding a piece of quartz rock in his hand. But...what is that? The young gentleman recites the following:

The [Rock] is a bright diamond  
When I pick it up it sparkles in the sun  
It turns my hand into a glow stick in the dark  
This makes me feel joyful.  
It makes me feel like a bright star.

By Adam

Why it is no rock at all. The young person tells you that it is a bright diamond. You then spy the rock as he holds it up against the sun: it sparkles in the sun as it catches the light. He tells you that it turns his hand into a glow stick in the dark. What could this strange metaphor mean? Is it a meaning conceived through nonsense? Or does this so called transformation of the hand reveal some sort of strange but significant insight or wisdom? Does this young person mean that the sunlit hand and the sensation of
touch can be used to illuminate the darkness of an unknown vision, and if so, a vision of what? He then suddenly reveals that the discovery makes him feel happy. It makes him feel like a bright star. He then offers you the quartz rock and says: “well, you can take it off my hands if you like. I’ve finished looking at it.” This single quartz rock, with its once negative interpretant, has now become another sign. It has now taken on a positive interpretant: this simple quartz rock can make you feel joyful if you look at it through the sun. You raise the small quartz rock against the sun and...?

Adam’s Poem is a striking instance of the continuity of semeiosis achieved in poetry, and illustrates the way in which both simile (i.e. “The [Rock] is...”) and metaphor (i.e. “It turns my hand into...”) are used to progress the identity and meaning of a simple quartz rock. But semiotically it is also interesting for two reasons. The object of the opening first line is, of course, the absent “Rock.” For Adam, this written word is the immediate object of the poem which principally refers to the dynamic object of his desire.

The [Rock] is a bright diamond
When I pick it up it sparkles in the sun
It turns my hand into a glow stick in the dark
This makes me feel joyful.
It makes me feel like a bright star.

By Adam

In addition, the poem also illustrates the manner in which Adam seeks to identify the dynamic object by invoking his collateral knowledge. Linguistically, the sequence of the first line begins with the definite article “The” in front of the noun “Rock.” Moreover, this is held together by the use of the *adnominal demonstrative* “This” in the fourth line, and by the *anaphoric personal pronoun* “It” which also appear in the third and fifth line, respectively. However, it is the demonstrative that illustrates this important aspect of Peirce’s empiricist theory of signification, for while both of the personal pronouns refer back to the object “Rock” in the first line sequence, it is the adnominal demonstrative which has a particular “bonding” function. Indeed, the value of this bonding function is that it provides a sense of continuity during the development of the interpretive process. In other words, it allows the reader, for instance, to “recognise” where the intended referent is to be identified during its development throughout the poem. Consequently, this creates a specific shared knowledge in that Adam does not have to refer back to the word “Rock” in order to give a situational clue. The demonstrative “This” is the means by which
the poem declares that the noun “Rock” should be placed here. But this is not all. It also indicates that the noun has undergone a transformation from the first line to the fourth. How is this achieved?

In the first line sequence of the poem, we notice that the definitive article “The” forces the attention of the reader towards a singular dynamic object. Likewise, this was also true for Adam as the creator of the poem, because the design of the poem is set out to do just that. For example, in Adam’s poem the definite article “The” appears in front of the noun “Rock.” The design of the first line, then, creates the conditions by which Adam is able to establish a nominal expression as a symbolic sign but, equally, allows it to function as the grounding principle for further semiotic inquiry and development.

Consequently, the definite article “The” encourages Adam to explore the movement of the dynamic object through a bodily logic and, in agreement with this logic, set about revealing something further about this absent object in terms of its presentative and representative characteristics. In doing so, it allows us to explore whether young people like Adam can use poetry as a foundation for establishing Pierce’s “continuity principle” i.e. a method by which alternative meanings associated with traditional concepts of thought might be developed independently of the user, forming the basis of learning and development (Jappy, 2013: 36).

Poetry naturally leaves the right for further exposition, in so far as it reserves further determinations to be made in some other conceivable sign. One of the main reasons for this is that poetry is the art of making the familiar appear unfamiliar. For example, in Adam’s poem the sign “Rock” is increasingly and progressively transformed into another sign as we move through each line sequence of the poem. As a result, by the time we get to the adnominal demonstrative “This” in the fourth line of the poem we can seen that the referent has transformed into a feeling of affect. That is to say, the information and meaning attached to the word “Rock” no longer represents a geological object or form - not even the resemblance to a diamond as Adam has stated earlier - but an emotional feeling of joy. However, it is also my belief that the introduction of the personal pronoun “It” does more than just refer to a verbal entity already mentioned. Rather, it allows Adam to set about transforming the semiotic object. Let us now explore this in more detail.

All language signs are general. If they were not, then our communication with others would require us to create different words each time. Peirce calls this general type of sign a legisign. The legisign is like an entry in a standard dictionary and establishes a habit or law which can be repeated in instances of communication. Evidently, every legisign signifies some kind of convention and through its application
can be regarded as an occurrence, single event, or instance of a replica known as a sinsign. As a result, every concept or legisign requires a sinsign, which is the “sense” of the concept (PWP, 102). In Adam’s poem, the replicas are the pattern of nouns and adjectives that make up a perceivable and, therefore, existent sinsign. That is, the poems “constitution” is not determined by a random jumble of characters just thrown together, they are words that we recognise as having identities and so, a particular law or legisign “governing” them, and which makes them generally understood as a form of communication. When put together in a single poetic stanza, then, we can say that the qualities that compose it make for a single legisign or governing principle.

In the case of the photograph discussed earlier, it is evident that a singular act can constitute a simple sinsign without being part of an actual system of legisigns. This is because a sinsign, which is the event that produces the embodied terms related to the production of symbolic and conceptual utterances, can also be one-off singular and spontaneous occurrence. As Peirce explains:

“A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken a meaning ‘being only once,’ as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a particular kind and can only form a sign through being embodied” (PWP, 101).

We might well then ask: what is the difference between an ordinary sinsign or what Peirce defines as a “peculiar occurrence” (PWP, 102), and the perceivable replicas or sinsigns governed by the legisigns of natural languages? Peirce anticipates this problem, and in doing so provides us with a rather unique example in the form of the weather vane, and the fact of its veering as the wind changes direction. For instance, the object of the weather vane is, usually, the changing of direction of the wind. An original sign or peculiar occurrence of a sinsign is, therefore, the new position of the weather vane (CP, 2.265). Alternatively, a replica sinsign governed by a verbal legisign might be carried by a typical street cry for scrap metal like: “Any Old Iron!?” Consequently, the following consideration arises in terms of poetry and change. That is, does the poetic structure used in this exercise enable young people to transform the meaning or direction of a sign - like Peirce’s veering weather vane - or does it merely allow young people to experiment with series of legisigns through the replication and repetition of general law-like instances?
The [...] is a [...].
When I [...] it [...].
It turns my [...] into [...].
This makes me feel [...].
It makes me feel like [...].

It is my conclusion that this poetic structure allows Adam to transform the semiotic object of his poem into something entirely different, and in doing so create an interpretant that is radically distinct. This is because the “bonding” function of the demonstrative “This” operates in such a way that it presumes the reader’s ignorance of an unknown, ambiguous referent. Likewise, in Shakespeare’s *Macbeth*, the soliloquy: "Is this a dagger which I see before me..?" employs the demonstrative “this” to manufacture a relationship with the addressee, then intersubjectively exploit the deontic and epistemic features of the ‘I-You’ dimension of the communicative act by guiding the reader’s expectation (Han, 1999).

This is also true of Adam’s poem when, in line four, he proposes: “This makes me feel joyful.” In both cases the epistemic feature of the demonstrative encourages the addressee to express their opinion about the truth of the proposition, while the deontic feature presents the addressee with a request: it asks them to respond to proposition expressed by the sentence, and report on whether they think it is obligatory or permissible according to some normative background such as law, morality, convention, etc, (Han, 1999). But what is the demonstrative in Adam’s proem referring to?

The demonstrative “This” in Adam’s poem does not refer, as we might initially expect, to the semiotic object “Rock.” Rather, the demonstrative “This” refers back to the personal pronoun “It” in line three:

The [Rock] is a bright diamond
When I pick it up it sparkles in the sun
It turns my hand into a glow stick in the dark
This makes me feel joyful.
It makes me feel like a bright star.

By Adam

It can be argued that the use of the personal pronoun “It” introduces a structural element that allows the sequence of the poem to be inordinately vague from the third line onwards (Merrell, 2000). That
is, the ambiguous pronoun “It” determines something other than the semiotic object by removing any prior consciousness of that semiotic object (Merrell, 2000: 30). Moreover, from the third line onwards the expressive noun “Rock” is cut from its shared semantic component “diamond” as a symbolic form of reference, and which might otherwise have allowed the reader to associate it with a member of an internal cluster of legisigns governed by a mineral series - it must be remembered that Adam’s “Rock” is not semantically separate from a mineral because he is referring to a particular quartz rock which he encountered at Cardiff Museum. Furthermore, all this implies that language is intimately connected to sensory objects in an ongoing process of change; but how? Let us look at two other poems by Maisie and Ela for further clarification:

The [House] is a haunted horror.  
When I see it I want to cry.  
It turns my head into a blank blur.  
This makes me feel scared.  
It makes me feel like a heavy machine.  

By Maisie

The [Scream] is a strong heavy memory.  
When I scream the living room down, it fills my mother with fury.  
It turns my insides into an ugly roaring monster.  
This makes me full of adrenalin.  
It makes me feel like a terminator.  

By Ela

It is because the personal pronoun “It” is vague that “It” cannot help but remain incomplete. It is not the semiotic object “House” that turns Maisie’s head into a “blank blur” but the exceedingly vague “It” that culminates in the fifth line: “It makes me feel like a heavy machine.” This now leads us to Merrell (2000) second observation:

“and yet [despite being vague] ‘it’ is capable...of extending our awareness and hence perhaps even our knowing, especially our tacit knowing, by expanding the breadth and depth of our sensory awareness” (Merrell, 2000: 30).

It does appear that in line sequences three to five, young people are caught up in a variety of sensory experiences. That is, the semiotically constructed sequence “It turns my...” evokes in the bodymind a
semiotically real happening. As in: “It does” or “It does its doing.” As a result, because there is doing there must also be changing. For instance, if we take the semiotic line sequence: “It turns my...,” we can see that it functions to create a condition by which each young person can sense themselves in a multitude of different ways: both mentally and physically. It allows them to connect with a particular symbol or convention, and then submit this concept to a process of inward inquiry. This investigation then allows young people to exercise some degree of control over other varieties of possible semeosis. With this in mind, there are two essential features that we can use to explore this process of modifying habits and concepts of thought.

7.6. We need new signs: a break, a becoming and habit-beliefs

The contention in this is study that traditional forms of art education construct common-sense beliefs which are learned and accepted without doubt. Furthermore, by engaging young learners in schemes of visual representation which subordinate the principles of learning to traditional methods of inquiry, instruction and discipline, the rudimentary foundations of collateral experience and, indeed, collateral knowledge, are controlled and governed at the level of emotional conduct. Moreover, this is achieved, as we saw in Chapter 1, because the volitional reaction stage of embodied knowledge and learning is engendered in discursive regimes. That is to say, our extralinguistic and non-verbal cognitive reactions to real and existent dynamic objects are disciplined by pre-existing terms and conditions that work by rationalising our embodied knowledge so that we end up relating to the world in a specific ways, and in accordance unity with particular aims and objectives, beliefs and habits. Of course, this must also be true of written and verbal signs. Learning a language and following the rules is a matter of developing the capacity to project well-established words into a properly constructed sentence, which take on a particular sense meaning in the context of their emergence (Merrell, 2000: 72). Take Allison’s poem:

The [Ruin] is a musical regret.  
When I walk through it, I feel a sharp pain in my chest.  
It turns my body weak.  
This makes me feel heavy.  
It makes me feel like a dull, cold, metal weight.

By Allison
Words like: “It,” “me” and “a,” are hardly ever used alone but in conjunction with other words such as “makes,” “feel,” “like,” “dull,” “cold,” “metal,” “weight,” to form the sentence. In this case: “It makes me feel like a dull, cold, metal weight.” Indeed, this entails the recognition of a signs by means of our own habituated and culturally constructed pathways of thought. For instance, rules must be followed or communication will be considerably reduced. However, when these words and rules are sufficiently habituated with our motor-system, we can argue that what is said, written and understood becomes a function not only of our bodily processes but, equally, our visceral ways of thinking. To some extent, then, we can say that patterns of life not only exist abstractly in the common concepts, principles and categories of language, but also in the cultural and symbolic signs and sounds - or signs of sounds - of language. Conventional symbols, therefore, allow us to represent our emotions and communicate our visceral responses (Merrell, 2000: 61-73) through habits of conduct or acquired law (Liska, 1996: 28).

By reasoning and communicating our everyday lives we operate with concepts and symbols that have become general rules of learned habits. Moreover, since thought operates symbolically in controlling propositional thinking and written signs, it is only through symbolic signs that we can control ourselves critically at the rational level of self-consciousness (Allen & Hauser, 1991: 224-8). For example, in the logical planning and construction of a poem, it is likely that the creator becomes highly self-conscious about the meaning of each word or symbol in a sequence and, accordingly, would have to control the transitions from one stage or sequence of operation to the other by selecting words or logical symbols that would conventionally fit the structure and sequence of the poem (CP, 1.633-1648). But is not the purpose of poetry to form new ideas, establish new interrelations, and to make people’s experiences and relations to their environment more efficient? As Peirce explains:

“It appear to me that the essential function of sign is to render inefficient relations efficient – not to set them into action, but to establish a habit or general rule whereby they will act on occasion” (CP, 8.332: cf. 4.531).

Each symbol depicts a general class of object, act, or event (Merrell, 2000: 35). However, poetry, and in particular poetry writing, must be considered a practice that aims to transform a symbols nature as a generality. A poems function as a symbolic sign is to render inefficient relations efficient. It must be remembered that a linguistic symbol can appear in the form of a term or a word, a proposition such as a sentence or combination of terms, or even an argument such as a text or combination of sentences (Merrell, 2000: 35). Each of the poetic stanzas created by each young person, therefore, functions as a symbol. However, the transference of the poems meaning also depends on the creators experience
and knowledge being interpreted successfully. Again, we are brought back to the empirical principal of continuity and indetermination.

In contrast to semiotic perspectives that define the symbolic through conventionality, arbitrariness or code, Peirce puts forwards a much broader concept of the symbol. He defines it as having “the virtue of a growing habit” (CP, 2.293). That is to say, a symbol becomes progressively symbolic by embodying and taking on new habits of meaning. If we examine Allison’s poem, for instance, we can see that each sentence, statement, and proposition make up signs of a class: each of which can impart information.

The [Ruin] is a musical regret.
When I walk through it, I feel a sharp pain in my chest.
It turns my body weak.
This makes me feel heavy.
It makes me feel like a dull, cold, metal weight.

By Allison

But a symbolic sign also contains within itself - and usually implicitly - the makings of an index and an icon. In this case, the sign “Ruin” indicates and interrelates with images and ideas of disintegration in one’s memory. This may point towards the world of the present or in terms of some expected event. For instance, one may have encountered a ruin in the form an ancient monument or perceived a set of conditions that you may foresee as ruinous. Equally, the sign implies an image or icon in the bodymind, a feeling felt as a quality of feeling such as a touch, taste, sight, sound, or smell. Again, one may have heard music on the radio that has suddenly taken them to a time of regret. One may have felt a pain in the chest related to a sense of loss, and experienced in the body as a weakening illness. Moreover, it is possible that one has exerted their body until it feels heavy with exhaustion, seen dull clouds which mark an otherwise beautiful day, felt the winter cold wind, or lifted a weight of metal. The important thing to remember is that the information conveyed in Allison’s poem would remain deficient without other interrelated signs making up an entire narrative, text or argument. That is, without a recipient’s volitional memories of past experiences being actualized in the present in the form of a symbolic sign (Merrell, 2000: 45).

It is only by way of our memories that our immediate knowledge of seemingly inefficient relations can begin representing and presenting efficient relations to our mind. As a result, something like Allison’s
“Ruin” - if it compounds a relation with my body - can help creates a “general rule” of habit or mental efficiency, which could then be applied interpretatively when encountering such an existent object in the future. Ultimately, then, the addressee must connect with the poem and its objects: “by virtue of the idea of the symbol-using mind, without which no connection would exist” (CP, 2.224-2.295). Only then can the use of poetry be acknowledged as a method by which a sign or symbol can connect and become interrelated with another system of signs i.e. the signs of a bodily logic. Indeed, we might say that it is only through an addressee’s sensorial memories and interpretative abilities that symbols, and poetic symbols in particular, can be translated “into another system of signs” (CP, 4.127).

In Peircean semiotics, a system is “a set of objects comprising all that stand to one another in a group of connected relations” (CP, 4.5). Consequently, this interpretive process requires the recipient of the poem to bring words and symbols to a level of consciousness awareness so as to examine them. That is, it requires an experimental attitude and a new way of looking at our habituated signs and symbols. It is not simply a matter of reading them automatically without thought (Merrell, 2000: 32). Rather, it is a matter of operating at some level of self-consciousness, and at some degree of self-control, so as to maintain what Nesher (1994) terms an: “awareness of the signs efficiency in a connected group of relations” (Nesher, 1994: 116) - these being interrelated in such a way that they create generalisable effects (Liska, 1996: 27). The result of this is the systematic translation of a sign, and the creation of an efficient representation of a real object that can be applied as a “general rule” of habit.

The formation of a habit also entails the formation and construction of common-sense beliefs. These different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise (CP, 5.398). As a consequence, the understanding of this rule is such that if and when circumstances described by this habit-beliefs occurs, then a specific kind of object designated by that particular case is expected to appear and a particular act should be undertaken. However, if a belief is conscious and deliberate, or a self controlled habit then that belief is not only a rule of habit, but also an entire rule itself working in the mind as a rule of action (Nesher, 1994: 120). That is to say, the habit-belief is functioning at the level of self-conscious and self-controlled semeiosis. Accordingly, in order to understand the function of belief-habit, we should the first analyse the general forms and functions of belief in the context of the semiotic process. For this we will again focus on Allison’s poem: Ruin.
The [Ruin] is a musical regret.
When I walk through it, I feel a sharp pain in my chest.
It turns my body weak.
This makes me feel heavy.
It makes me feel like a dull, cold, metal weight.

By Allison

If Allison’s poem is evidence of a habit-belief then poetry can be seen as an endeavour that can bring the function of a habit-belief into recognition. Because the general principles of habit-beliefs cannot be criticized the symbolic concept “Ruin” becomes a general rule of action that works instinctively or practically. It, therefore, becomes a habit of thinking and reasoning. It helps Allison to understanding her readiness to act in the world. However, what about the proposition of change and transformation of habits and beliefs?

If we have no reason to doubt a belief-idea then it will continue to work as a rule of action i.e. a belief-habit. A belief is what we are ready to act on when the time comes. Moreover, that which cannot be doubted cannot be criticized. This, Peirce suggests, is one of the characters of common-sense beliefs (CP, 5.515).

With this in mind, Nesher (1994) proposes that the reasons why we cannot criticize habit-beliefs are twofold. First, it is impossible to criticize habit-beliefs that we do not doubt. Second, because words, language, and symbols are sufficiently vague, indeterminate, and open on account of people having different experiences who can bring different, pre-supposed knowledge, then common-sense beliefs can be interpreted in many different ways. Consequently, habit-beliefs, and symbolic signs, are liable to different interpretations, and the concepts which often determine their meaning avoid any serious criticism because they cannot be objectively be falsified (CP, 5.544). In order to criticize habit–beliefs, then, their conceptual and symbolic affordances need to go through a process of doubt (Nesher, 1994: 124). As Peirce explains:

“But the mere putting of propositions into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There must be a real and living doubt, and without it the discussion is idle” (CP, 5.376).
It is because reasoning, by itself, is severed from any confrontation with reality through the symbolic sign that any “artificial scepticism about established beliefs will be mere self deception and not a real doubt” (CP, 5.265). For instance, when we read a poem or study a text we often pass over words and register them virtually automatically. This ability, therefore, enables us to get on with more important and less customary words, which are not part of our active and habituated vocabulary. However, this seemingly effortless ability also shows that words and symbols can easily indoctrinate and control us. They can blind us to doubt and reduce us to automata-like behaviour. In such cases we might become slaves to a social group, ideologues, and the vigilance of social discourse. Indeed, for even if we doubt such established beliefs by decree we are still subject to the “artificiality of self deception” that might well bring us back to accept our basic prejudices when needed (Wittgenstein, 1969: 115/451). In that sense, the explanatory power of doubt through the symbolic signs of thought and reasoning can only be considered an abstract formal operation of empty signs in respect to meaning and truth.

Belief and doubt are different type of cognitions (CP, 5.371). Moreover, a cognitive doubt is what we might call an uneasy dissatisfied state, from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into a state of belief: the latter being a calm, satisfactory state (CP, 5.372/5.442). However, strong beliefs cannot be doubted at will. As Peirce explains:

“A proposition that could be doubted at will is certainly not believed. For belief, while it lasts, is a strong habit, and as such, forces the man to believe until some surprise breaks up habit. The breaking of the belief can only be due to some novel experience, whether external or internal. Now experience which could be summoned up at pleasure would not be experience” (CP, 5.524).

To doubt we must experience a living doubt. A belief must meet with some surprising fact that begins its dissolution (CP, 5.416-417). That is to say, our expectations must be disappointed, and our habit of mind put into a state of irritation. Only then will a doubt force us into a mode of inquiry, and force us to question a previously established belief-idea (Nesher, 1994: 124). And yet, despite this, Peirce also presents us with the idea that we do not have to wait for a surprising experience to occur in order to doubt some of our beliefs (CP, 5.370-376). Furthermore, it is possible for us to intentionally imagine a situation in which doubt can arise. This is often the case when we prepare ourselves for future action or scientific conduct. In the course of scientific inquiry, for instance, scientists often come to a stage in which some common-sense belief does not fit with some new fact or concept. As a consequence, the
scientist sets out by “imaginary expectation” (CP, 5.517) to refute and/or overthrow a common-sense belief. Accordingly, Peirce states:

“...the critical Common-sensist sets himself in serious earnest to the systematic business of endeavouring to bring all his very general first premises to recognition, and of developing every suspicion of doubt of their truth, by the use of logical analysis, and by experimenting in imagination. If...he is also a pragmatist, he will further hold that everything in the substance of beliefs can be represented in the schema of his imagination; that is to say, in what may be compared to composite photographs of continuous series of modifications of images; these composites being accompanied by conditional resolutions as to conduct” (CP, 5.517).

7.7. Experience, experimentation and imaginative becomings

The imagination is often considered a method of experimentation, a method for creating new images. For instance, we might imagine or dream up new things and new ways of doing things. However, this definition of the imagination has nothing in common with Peirce’s notion of the term. For Peirce, the imagination accompanies the body’s muscular action, it is an “inward effort” which allows us to bring into realisation the effect of a general habit: primarily in cases where circumstances do not permit the required practice or allow us to reiterate the desired conduct in the outer world (CP, xxxv/5.478). This view of the imagination is one that is also expressed by Vaihinger (1924) whose understanding of the term refers to the formation of an actual image that cannot be directly sensed or be actually present to the senses (cited in Merrell, 2000: 58). In other words, our imagination helps bring into realization that which is created in the mind as a mental effect (Merrell, 2000: 58). Consequently, and by force of an intuitive inward effort of inquiry (Bergson, 1999), it is possible to make visible that which has been imagined but cannot be directly sensed so as to re-new our awareness of what appears “as if” it were new (Merrell, 2000: 57). A practical example springs to mind. Let us try a “thought experiment” so to speak. Construct in your mind the imaginary persona of a tightrope walker.

Imagine yourself walking across a tightrope. Do not simply imagine yourself swiftly walking along the taut line of a rope. You will never feel it or sense the image of your imagination that way. You have to get into the imaginary act. Try and feel the firm line of the rope making contact with your foot. Try to sense what the taut line feels like pressing against your sole of your foot and your outstretched toes.
Now imagine the feel and the weight of the balancing pole in your hands. Feel your muscles tensing in your arms as you begin to find its centre of balance. The balancing pole is firm in your grip but it has a bit of weight to it that will stop your body from twisting and rotating whilst also lowering your centre of gravity. Now begin by slowly placing one foot in front of the other. Feel your calves tensing as with each step you try to find your balance. Feel the balancing pole moving and working your arm muscles as you use it to settle you balance along the line. You are now enveloped in sustained concentration.

In the documentary *Man on Wire* (2008) tightrope performer Philippe Petit explains that such acts of imaging form part of his daily preparations. Imaging involves creating visual thought experiments that can be used to virtually demonstrate, prepare, and consolidate technique. As a consequence, thought experiments like these utilize the imagination to experiment with experiences that move from feeling to realization. That is, imagining allows us to connect with the image or percept of a habit (CP, 7.629). This image being the qualitative and volitional counterpart to whatever the image is an image of. It is as if the body can be utilized to re-create affection images related to habit-beliefs then imaginatively sense itself to be the cause. This is the other end of the Spinozian position, which sees the imagination as bound up with external causes (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999: 40). Whilst becoming aware of these causes, then, it is possible to scheme, follow impressions, and perceive as much as possible as a whole virtual experience, realizing the entire affair in the imagination (Merrell, 2000: 60). Bearing this in mind, how does this imaginative enterprise work as a semiotic construct or process?

### 7.8. Learning and change: imagination, movement and the convulsive life of transformation

If a person who has never tried such a thing before tries to stand on a tightrope, and place one foot in front of the other, they will find that they cannot at first do it. Peirce explains that this difficulty is due to the lack of a unitary concept (CP, 5.479). That is, a series of learned or habituated efforts needed to succeed in completing the action. But through the repetitive action of practicing the different parts of the movement, while attentively observing the kind of effort necessary in each part, there is no doubt that any person who does not know how to walk a tightrope can develop an idea or a unitary concept needed to complete the action. But where does the imagination fit in? Peirce argues that no degree of muscular effort or practice alone will allow us to perform these actual motions (CP, 5.479). The effort of our imagination must also be our teacher (CP, 5.479). Accordingly, if we did not perform the actual
motions but merely imagined them vividly we would still acquire a series of efforts with only so much additional practice.

Through a combination of muscular effort and unaided imagination, Peirce concludes that we learn the efforts needed to construct a unitary concept of actual habit or action (CP, 4.579). For Peirce, the imagination allows us to exercise more or less control over our actions by way of modifying our habits or beliefs. Indeed, it is possible to practice and train ourselves to learn a considerable number of feats through a series of alteration to these habits-beliefs. This is because the mental effort of imagining is a tool that connects us to our habits, and then allows us to alter these natural dispositions and create new associations or what Peirce calls “transassociations” (CP, 5.479). Moreover, Peirce also suggests that the imagination can allow us to create “dissociations” between habits (CP, 5.479). But apart from a “thought experiment” how does this apply to poetic semeiosis? In order to understand this we must apply the same semiotic principles of imagination to the written and spoken word.

7.9. The significance of sensation: imagined spaces and poetic places

Each and every person can exercise more or less control over themselves by means of modifying their own habits-beliefs imaginatively. This is achieved by connecting with the image of a sign. In this study the method of using poetry as an exercise became a thought experiment with blocs of sensation. This is because a poem requires us to imagine and connect with an affection image of a conventional and habitual sign from the perspective of a stream of feeling. Accordingly, each young person would bring an image into realization through the process of semeiosis. That is, each young person was encouraged to use their imagination to “sense” the dynamic partial object of experience, and to search for images intimately connected to it, and then sense its volitional actualization as an instantaneous event and a becoming in the “here and now.”

This required each young person getting into the imaginary act. Not just making any mechanical and habituated thought associations, but really getting into the act of imagining. With Allison, this meant using her imagination to scheme along the atmosphere of the Ruin, following the impressions of the Ruin, and seeing what needed to be seen through the qualities of feeling. Indeed, by becoming aware and perceiving it all - or as much as possible - as a whole, she could create a bloc of sensation.
7.10. Poetic semiosis: the first line sequence of a bloc of sensation

It is through the symbolic that critical self control is exercised. However, Peirce also proposes that the only way of directly communicating an idea is by way of an icon: the latter being a sign which signifies at least one shared characteristic or quality with the object that it represents (CP, 2.278). For instance, a rose is red whilst similarly a painting of a rose is red. Subsequently, the single quality red represents a qualitative image or “qualisign” of redness. In this respect, then, an object can be similar to another object because it partakes of or shares the same qualities with that object. With this in mind, the first line sequence of Allison’s poem functions in a similar way by portraying the representative character of the [Ruin] as having the qualities and presentative characteristic of a [Musical Regret].

The [Ruin] is a musical regret. 
When I walk through it, I feel a sharp pain in my chest. 
It turns my body weak. 
This makes me feel heavy. 
It makes me feel like a dull, cold, metal weight.

By Allison

In Peircean semiotics, we would say that the image of a Musical Regret is the qualisign or tone of the poem. Indeed, for Allison the representative character or iconic object of the Ruin resembles certain sensible features which resemble an image or affective idea of regret. The idea of regret, then, is the sensible object enveloped in the Ruin. However, the capacity for regret to reveal and represent itself to Allison is done so through her auditory perception of music. That is, the percept of music serves as a sign, and becomes the pre-conscious ground for the semiotic development of the Ruin to become a general symbol of regret. If we think back to Peirce’s depiction of a sign in Chapter 2, we can present the first line sequence as follows:

“Now a sign is something, A [Music] which denotes some fact or object, B [Regret] to some interpretant thought, C [Ruin]” (CP, 1.346).

This is why the idea of the Ruin has representative characteristics that resemble or have a similarity to an auditory composition. The Ruin is like being presented with a particular feeling when listening to a piece of music. For Allison, the idea of the Ruin presents her with an emotional interpretant of regret.
Before we continue, one essential thing to note at this point is that in normal circumstances a proper noun also functions as an index. That is, an index represents an existential relation between the name of the designated thing or person. For example, whenever we read nouns in a novel or poem, or hear them verbally mentioned, they automatically create worlds of existence. This is often the pleasure we gain from reading a good book. It can occasion a world to which we become ontologically committed (Jappy, 2013: 90). Consequently - and just to refer back to the methodological design of the poem for a moment - by structuring a first line sequence that forcibly committed Allison to focus on her chosen partial object, Allison became ontologically committed to the Ruin, which she explored and activated through her imagination.

7.11. Poetic semiosis: the second line sequence of a bloc of sensation

The first line of Allison’s poem depicts the representative character of the Ruin in a symbolic sentence connected to a Musical Regret. In the second line sequence the poem performs an indexical function that directs us to the musical regrets location in terms of its existential qualities. That is, a sign which depicts Allison’s volitional awareness. For instance, the indexical function of the expressive noun Ruin directs Allison to the quality and the location of the musical regret: it points to a sharp pain located in Allison’s chest. The indexical function of the noun here, then, not only points Allison to the qualitative characteristics of the Ruin, it also points to or, rather, indicates the location of the immediate object like a weather vane, directing her imagination to this point.

It is because the pointing function of the index incorporates and inherits the iconic sign function that Allison is also able to represent the existential function of the Ruin as a physically embodied entity. In addition, because the index has the iconic object of the Ruin “nested” within it, Allison’s imagination can function so as to establish a correspondence with the qualities of the Ruin. As a consequence, by inheriting some of the nouns expressive qualities, Allison is able to interpret and represent the causal and existential effects of the object. That is, feelings of affect. Furthermore, we can say that Allison’s imagination has become attentively “moulded” to the icon features of the Ruin through the indexical feature of embodiment, this allowing Allison to expresses her ontological relation or correlation with the Ruin. Indeed, this is can be explored and analysed by focusing on the presentative characteristics in the second line sequence.
The [Ruin] is a musical regret.
When I walk through it, I feel a sharp pain in my chest.
It turns my body weak.
This makes me feel heavy.
It makes me feel like a dull, cold, metal weight.

By Allison

The presentative character of an indexical sign always functions in terms of it embodies qualities. For Peirce, this designates a sinsign or token (CP, 2.245). One of the principle features of a sinsign is that it interrelates with the sensible feature of experience so as to actualise it, and present the quality of the sensible image to the bodymind as an instant act of volitional awareness. For example, if we analyse the second line sequence of the poem, the image of regret is experienced ontologically as a muscular effect of brute action. The semiotic agent is actualised, and Allison is presented with an awareness of muscular movement in her legs. Allison interprets this visceral reaction and represents it as an idea or sensation of walking through the image of the Ruin. Furthermore, this embodied awareness presents Allison’s imagination with a singular event. The embodied location of the Ruin presents Allison with a state of awareness imagined in her chest, whilst the quality of image itself is experienced through the emotional awareness of a singular sharp pain: a transassociation between two points. This functions as a temporal occurrence and, ultimately, presents Allison with a unique location that operates like a map designating a place, and rendering the image as something real and existent.

In terms of the transformative potential of imaginative and creative based practices, there does seem to be evidence of transassociation in the second line sequence of the poem (CP, 5.479). For example, Allison creates a new association or, rather, dissociation between one volitional location and another. Indeed, between Allison’s visceral awareness of walking through the Ruin - muscular memories which have been acquired through sensori-motor activities - and the emergent image of regret felt through the idea of a sharp pain in the chest, Allison’s imagination seems to have reached into the very depth of the Ruin’s existential universe, explored the assemblage of affection images that comprise its form of relation, and then made a choice between these images based on need.

However, in order for this to have happened, the function of the indexical sinsign would have had to allow Allison to “sense” that such a singular image was part of her collateral knowledge, and in the process of becoming aware of it, created a new appropriate impression. This perception would then
have been interpreted through Allison’s verbal scheme of thought. If this is the case, then there must be some-thing in the design of the second line structure that also encouraged Allison’s imagination to create this new, metaphoric, type of association, allowing her to bring it to the interpretative surface of self-conscious contemplation.

In order to understand how transassociation might have worked in this instance, we need to go back to the structural design of the poem. I had initially introduced the pronoun “It” into the design of the poem because I thought that it would provide each young person with a point of reference that would allow them to index a state of iconic remembrance or, rather, a state of parallelism in something else, i.e. the partial object/expressive noun. This I believed would allow the young people to create a “base domain” between two partial objects. That is, a relation between two conceptual domains which, as a result, create a counterpart mapping of a single part object (Jappy, 2013: 120). However, by way of the present analysis I believe that the pronoun “I” might have momentarily caused the proposition to become indeterminate. By this I mean it produced a “zone of indetermination” (Bergson, 2004) which Allison experienced as a sense of immediate doubt with regards to the Ruins identity. But how would this have worked?

Peirce tells us that “demonstrative and relative pronouns are nearly pure indices because they denote things without describing them” (CP, 3.361). Accordingly, by designing a poetry template that utilized the indexical affordance of the pronoun “it” in the second line sequence, I had, therefore, introduced a pre-determined condition that would allow Allison’s imagination to connect with the assemblage of images, which composed the expressive noun Ruin or, more specifically, the partial object. But Peirce also tells us that demonstrative pronouns and other indicators can only point out the denoted object of a sign in a vague way. This means that the pronoun “It” is intrinsically vague. For example, it is not determined explicitly and is open to a wide range of interpretations (CP, 5.508). It is possible, then, that the pronoun “it” serves as a sleight injunction in the process of conscious becoming, which produces a sudden jolt in awareness. As Merrell (2000) explains in relation to indexical indicators:

“Yet, these signs are a sudden awareness, perhaps like a slap in the face, that something is radically new, that there is danger, or that something or someone longed for has suddenly appeared out of the clear blue” (Merrell, 2000: 50).
Consequently, it may be suggested that the idea that Allison’s scheme of imagination is unexpectedly forced by the indeterminacy of the pronoun “It” to find a new “composite image.” The result of such a translation would have been a modification in the continual series of images, conditioned by a new resolution of conduct expressed in verbal thought and reasoning (CP, 5.517). Moreover, it would have created a new association or, more to the point, a “transassociation” (CP, 5.479) between two tokens of volitional awareness.

This is an important detail with regards to the imagination because the pronoun “It” appears to be a sign that connects Allison’s imagination to an impression, but that which is impressed on her mind is only very vague. In this instance, the act of imagining entails Allison to connect with an image but an image of something that she does not yet know because the image which enters Allison’s awareness is also exceedingly vague. “It” is neither nameable nor perceived, since the image is not a sign at all if by sign we mean something of which we are aware (Merrell, 2000: 51). Its presentative character as a sign is barely an emergent state. It is a merely a sign of “feeling” which is unrecognisable, unidentified and unrelated to anything else. Consequently, the Ruin ceases to be endowed with a definite noun or label, and is instead imbued with a vague doubt, and sense of indeterminacy. Yet, having said all this, Allison can still translate what it is because she can feel the image being sensed. Why is this?

By encountering the demonstrative pronoun “It” Allison’s imaginative processes are forced to survey the “general rule” of the Ruin, and to explore its presentative characteristics. Furthermore, if we refer back to our analogy at the beginning of the chapter which likened the collateral objects of immediate experience to a kind of emotive and haptic form of photography, then I think we can easily situate this alongside Peirce’s discourse on thought experiments; this being his suggestion that imagining entails a mode of inquiry into a comparative composite of photographic like imagery: the result of this inquiry potentially leading to a real modification of an habitual and continuous series of images and, equally, the conditioning of new resolutions of conduct within thought and reasoning (CP, 5.517). This is to say that in the vague indeterminacy of doubt caused by the demonstrative pronoun, Allison’s imagination searches, explores, and compares the emotive images which determine the essence of the Ruin. As a result, it then produces a transassociation i.e., a volitional awareness that moves from her legs to her chest.
7.12. Poetic Semiosis: the third line sequence of a bloc of sensation

In the third line sequence of Allison’s poem the sign Ruin hardly resembles anything more than “that thing, there, now.” But the process or act of doing is something that appears in the semiotic sequence “It turns my body weak.” Indeed, these acts of doing consistently appear in each poem because they are incorporated into semiotic design of the poem. The purpose of creating this proposition or, more to the point, semiotic sequence of terms, was to encourage each young person to make contact with the extralinguistic aspects of their experience. Furthermore, it would encourage them to engage in an act of inquiry with regards to their chosen part object or nominal expression. As a result, the analysis of the third line sequence would not only allows us to explore whether a poetry exercise can be used practically to help young people engage with the meaning making aspects of their imagination, but help us analyse the structural dynamics of this experience of making.

Because the semiotic line sequence “It turns my...” is a proposition concerned with the movement of a vague indeterminate object, it means that we can explore the pragmatic attributes of the “It” during its process of production. That is, turn our attention to the experiential production of feeling, sensing, and thought as a process of information gathering. As a result, we can focus on what the referent “It” is doing when “It” was doing its “iting” as it were. As in: “It does” or “It does its doing” (Merrell, 2000: 58). However, if there is doing, then there must also be a change occurring within the general rule of the partial object Ruin (Merrell, 2000: 59). More specifically, there must be a change in relation to its presentative feature as a legisign, and its common-sense feature as a habit-belief.

The [Ruin] is a musical regret.
When I walk through it, I feel a sharp pain in my chest.
It turns my body weak.
This makes me feel heavy.
It makes me feel like a dull, cold, metal weight.

By Allison

The semiotic sequence “It turns my...” is a proposition that is explicitly vague. This is again due to the indeterminate pronoun “It” which follows on from the second line sequence. However, this is not all. The verb “turns” implies the ongoing process of sign-action, while the first-person normative pronoun
“my” encourages Allison to perceive herself as the point of reference. As a consequence, it demands that Allison focus her attention on motion and change from the outside in, that is, on the doing of the vague and indeterminate “It” of the proposition, [but] then from the inside out.

In translating the semiotic line sequence “It turns my...” Allison enters into an existential relation with the object of the referent “It” through her bodily logic. Moreover, we already know from our previous analysis of the second line sequence that an index has a relation with the image of regret and Allison’s volitional awareness of a pain in her chest. In Allison’s case, then, the object of the index must relate to the pain of regret. That is, in Allison’s imagination there appears to be a direct, existential relation holding between this sign, and the object of regret that causes or produces it. As a consequence, this produces a pointing action towards her own body to, which she senses herself to be the cause of her own feeling affect (Deleuze, 1988: 63). This is then prolonged as a form of sensorial awareness in her bodymind.

However, Allison is also forced to interpret this action in terms of movement and change through the verb “turns.” This term allows Allison’s imagination to make contact with the “doing” of the referent “It” and explore the object of regret in terms of sign-activity. In addition, because there is a relational bond or correlation between the image of regret as a qualisign, and volitional awareness as a sinsign, Allison can experience this sign-activity through her sensory organs as an embodied form of sensorimotor activity. Consequently, the virtual objects, acts, and events located in Allison’s sensory organs are habitually charged with detecting collateral knowledge in muscular memory. When these are put into movement they begin to emerge through her sensory awareness. Moreover, Allison is then able to feel, examine, and think about how “It” affects her body both mentally and physically. The result of this is that “It” functions by turning her body weak.

7.13. Poetic Semiosis: the third and fourth line sequence of a bloc of sensation

In the third line sequence the proposition “It turns my...” allows Allison’s imagination to feel through the qualisign, examine through the sinsign, and think about how the object of the referent “It” moves and changes both mentally and physically through the legisign. However, in doing so Allison implicitly senses the way of doing and changing. This reveals itself as a heightened awareness and sensitivity to her “whole body.” The way in which the object of regret determines her sense of self and potentially her wellbeing is by affecting her whole body. This leads us into the fourth line sequence of the poem,
and a more extended sequence of semeiosis. The regret makes her whole body feel weak, because it impresses on her volitional awareness a sensation that makes her feel heavy. This is then represented as a dull, cold, metal weight in the final sequence.

### 7.14. Poetic Semiosis: the fifth line sequence of a bloc of sensation

In the fifth line sequence the proposition “It makes me feel...” formed part of the structural design of the poem. Here, young people could intensify a conceptual habit-change with regards to their chosen partial object. That is to say, the concept “Ruin” would be intensified and modified by a simple effort of repetition. A method that Peirce terms auto-suggestion:

“In particular, there is a peculiar kind of effort, which may be likened by to an imperative command addressed to the future self. I suppose the psychologist would call it an act of auto-suggestion” (CP, 5.478).

Ultimately, then, by identifying the “way” in which the vague referent is doing its “doing” we are also addressing the means by which the “way” implies the “what” or the agent of the doing. As a result, in Allison’s poem the agent was the idea of regret related to the Ruin. However, as the poem progresses and the action and consequences of the Ruin gain maturity in Allison’s perception, the agent of regret gradually impresses its image body. What is more, Allison’s idea of a weak and heavy body becomes a passionate vision and the expressive form for the Ruin. Moreover, Allison’s body becomes the physical material and aesthetic instrument through which the affective, and the extralinguistic qualities of the real, existent dynamic object of the ruined church, located not too far from where she lives, perform their distinct manner of activity.

### 7.15. Conclusion

Through this exploratory analysis I believe that poetry can be used as a pedagogical tool to the extent that it can allow young people to crafts new elements of difference and imbue them on its addressee (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 88). That is to say, by using specific materials such as words from pedagogical documentation and using them in conjunction with a carefully created syntax, it is possible for young people to craft percepts and affects into compounds or blocs of sensation (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994:
Indeed, by forming a sympathetic relation with the ontological foundation of language (i.e., the memory of a dynamic object) percepts, as a quality of feeling, can be wrested from the perception of an immediate object of experience. Likewise, a felt affect, as the awareness of brute muscular action, can be extracted from affection (i.e., a passional assemblage of joy or sadness). As a consequence, by coupling percepts and affects, young people can use poetry to create a “universe” or bloc of sensation that differs in kind from interpretation or opinion (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 176). They create frames of excitation-reaction, which compound the body’s capacity for being affected.

In constructing a relationship between sensory images and passions, a bloc of sensation immediately pulls in two directions simultaneously. The narrative aspect of the poem, in actualizing references to recognised objects of place and space, territorializes perception. However, delicate lines of flight are also traced, as uncertainties in reference are introduced through the use of demonstrative pronouns. What is “it”? The narrative, as might initially be presumed, becomes something less defined and more problematic. “It” produces a vague anti-place that borders an area with something yet unnamed. As a result, territorialisation moves into deterritorialization as familiarization turns into de-familiarization. That is, “It” imbues the indeterminacy of doubt into conceptual habits and beliefs. With that in mind, however, the fusion created by the terms “This makes me...” produces a resonance which extends the vague indeterminate “It” across a different plane of reference: a process of transassociation that pulls words and images of affect together, connecting the grammaticality of “It” with a new general rule in the form of a single matter of fact; this product of reterritorialisation, then, indicating the movement of individuation, differentiation and, ultimately, innovation of a part-object.

What the lines of poetry have revealed in this analysis is how poetic sensation, rather than producing a stated opinion, may produce an encounter with the marginalized and their experience that is more intimate and forceful than hearing a representative voice (Clay, 2010: 155). Moreover, the encounter with marginalization itself is not reduced to information and, more to the point, stereotypical themes and ideas about socially marginalized youth (Hickey-Moody, 2013a; Te Riele, 2006). That is, it does not substitute an “at risk” discourse for democratic speech (Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 14) but neither does it settle on biographical and self-reflexive opinion, which might otherwise be assimilated into political rhetoric and governmental discourses that make marginalization visible through themes such a moral panic, risk and salvation (Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 44). Rather, poetry provides us with a tool that allows young people to re-inscribe the sensation of marginalised histories, memories, lived experiences and collectivities onto materials of expression. This does not require interpreted: it only needs to be read.
Chapter 8

Conclusions

Over the past 20 years, both museums and governments have taken the museums’ role in learning and education increasingly seriously (Boddington, et al 2013; Hooper-Green, 1992). As a result, museums that have taken the initiative have been aided, enabled, and supported by government initiatives and funding such as the Museum and Galleries Education Programme, Renaissance in the Regions, Strategic Commissioning, and Creative Partnerships. In spite of these developments, however, higher education has continued to remain a margin collaborator compared to primary and secondary schools, and other forms of adult education. As Boddington et al (2013) notes:

This has meant that partnerships between universities, colleges, museums and galleries have remained relatively unexplored, especially with respect to their potential for generating new and innovative patterns of learning, research, and scholarship (Boddington et al, 2013: 3).

As such, one of the reasons for the development of a new discipline in art education is to address the gap that exists between museums and universities. Indeed, since the DCMS commissioned the report Renaissance in the Regions in 2001 calling for more dynamic relationships between the university and national museums, there has been a great need to create a research field that grants a closer working relationship between research and practice.

One of the aims of the pedagogical work carried out in this study, then, was to design and explore an independent studies programme that might close the gap which exists between museum institution and university, and between theory, practice, and research (Preciado, 2014: 5). One that can develop an experimental ethos but, equally, a place from which to craft forms of unknown knowledge, multi-sensory communication, and meanings that can be shared collectively, and which might also function as political and therapeutic vectors of emancipation (Preciado, 2014: 1). That is, make it possible for young, marginalized, and segregated subjectivities to use culture institutions to formulate questions and problems closely connected to their lives through sense-events in their becoming. I will now give a brief re-cap on how this report set about achieving this objective.
In order to make visible the dynamic movement of young people’s subjectivities, and the interrelated rhythms, forces, and semiotic processes, which underlie the notion of becoming-in-the-moment as a sensorial sense-event, produced through the evocation of feelings as memories, and traced in terms of affective content and discursive forms of expression (Walkerdine, 2011: 261) this thesis reports an innovative and experimental psycho-social design that brings theory and practice (praxis) together to develop a schizoanalytic map of youth experience: understood, here, as the involuntary construction of a spatial and temporal feature in the “here-and-now” of a young person’s encounter with art. As such, this report attempted to push the boundaries in terms of how educational, art-based, outreach interventions with young people, can re-imagine what art can do, be and become, when approached through the ideas of movement and experimentation in a devolved museum space.

By working with the complex ideas of Deleuze and Guattari, Spinoza, Peirce, and Bergson, this report attempted to re-frame how young people’s encounters are seen, talked about, and analysed. In doing so, experience, art, and affect were redefined through a model of subjectivity that was used to draw up two key research objectives. These objectives informed two pedagogical interventions - or modes of praxis – with 14 young people (aged 11-18) accessed through the charity organization Valleys Kids. The first was a structured activity using a psychogeographic approach, designed specifically to enable young people to experience the affective dimensions of contemporary art in Cardiff Museum. The second intervention involved designing and implementing a series of poetry workshops to explore the potential of affective, multi-sensory, non-representational modes of communication. The purpose of this being to move beyond the confessional accounts of individual experience (Vaz & Bruno, 2003: 272) so dominant in policy centred on marginalized youth (Te Riele, 2006: 129), and so often steeped in risk, lack, and salvation (Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 65).

With all this in mind, then, the question arises at how such a methodological approach can contribute to the current field of emancipatory pedagogies aimed at young people through museum and gallery research programmes.

Well, over the past 25 years or so, the emerging philosophy filtering across contemporary museum and gallery education has progressively involved strategies aimed at empowering young people through new pedagogies (Sayers, 2011: 409). New pedagogies that respond to increasingly varied constituent groups - required to meet the demands of looking at art - by repositioning them as participants in the
meaning-making process (Bal & Bryson, 2001). For example, by taking a more hermeneutic approach to person-centred situationism, Hall and Meecham (2003) have shown that by producing knowledge and local significances conversationally, learners and facilitators can incorporate what they know into what they see, thus, abandoning any notion of the reified artwork (Hall & Meecham, 2003: 154), and undermining it representational value as a self-referential body of knowledge.

As a consequence, such interpretative and/or language based methods have been at the forefront of peer-led strategies (Galloway & Stanley, 2004) - these methods perceived as enabling young people to use their lived experiences as an interpretive tool (Gallagher, 1992) in order to challenge the role of the gallery as “expert” in the production of knowledge and meaning (Sayers, 2011: 409) whilst also empowering them to contribute to the undoing of privilege (Addison, 2008) through the dismantling of distinguished “cultural capital” so prevalent within the “knowing” discourses of the scholarly elite i.e. people with a priori knowledge who can intellectually access exhibitions as the curator intended (Bourdieu 1979, 499).

But in reaching an understanding of what different pedagogical practices try to do, there are still, as Sayers (2011) acknowledges, crucial questions that remain to be addressed. For example, how do we understand the processes of emancipation? And how emancipatory are they really? The use of multi-sensory and non-representational methods goes some way in addressing these questions, but only if they are considered in relation to movement and experimentation. Hence, I will now present some conclusions in regards to the first structuring statement:

1) *There is an on-going struggle in art education to again introduce movement and experimentation in subjectivity and learning through putting into practice the idea of a relational field and through experimenting with new tools. For this to be theoretically workable, there is a need to work out how to turn the focus on positions and change as moving from one position to another, into a focus on movement as something that forgoes positions and thereby open up possibilities for collective and intense experimentation.*
8.0. Significant moments: movement, experimentation and young people’s personal encounters with art and voice

I believe that one of the strengths of this report is that it goes some way in identifying the processes underscoring the importance of affect and embodiment when thinking about issues of power within the field of visibility (Foucault, 1979b: 202) but equally provides possibilities for understanding how social and subjective change requires a complex mapping of micro shifts in young people’s affective relations (Ringrose, 2011: 600). For instance, in regards to ways of seeing and talking about the visible, while it is duly noted that strategies and tactics of domination are often discursive - hidden beneath everyday language and discursive tactics, which typically work by regulating our sense of self and our positioning to the other (Davis & Harré, 1990), this report shows how language and discursive tactics can be used to intervene in the undifferentiated movement from perception to recognition, thereby, regulating the spatial and temporal processes involved in becoming Other, of moving forward, and of being different (Walkerdine, 2011: 261). This is also true of interpretative and/or hermeneutic based pedagogies.

By experimenting with the visual semiotics of a work (Shapiro, 1972) interpretive and language based approaches do allow young people to examine the openness of a work of art, and gain an insight into how a visual sign may be transposed from one place to another through connotative and associative references. But, here, the emancipator process can only submit itself to the movement of theoretical positioning. For example, by exploring some of the contextual issues generated by these hermeneutic micro-shifts, I might have looked at the ideas or the types of “code” that allow young people to make a connection or juxtaposition with a visual image. I might have taken a Marxist approach and looked at what ideas shape the reception of the image. Looked at how feelings of alienation, marginalization, and segregation are negotiated and shaped by ideological, social and economic power (Adorno, 2001, Eagleton, 1990). Alternatively, I might have taken a more Feminist approach, and looked at how the reception of an image reflects young people’s social values in a post-industrial mining town. Do males respond to images differently to females? (Jones, 1998; Nochlin, 1989). And if so, are patriarchal values reinforced or challenged by young people? (Ivinson & Renold, 2013a; Renold, 2013).

It is fair to say that such positioning exposes a certain weakness in my methodological approach, in the sense that this idea of movement is more or less equated with “intertextual” micro-shifts in the visual semiotic of an artwork, where each text - or sign - is seen as referring to another, rather than,
as my approach to movement shows, being part of a complex process that creates the condition for thinking as it proceeds. Consequently, the strength of a more intertextual approach to movement is that each visual sign is seen as circulating not only through the viewer, but also through society and culture, connecting diverse discourses and system of knowledge to those everyday rituals, activities, tasks, gestures, attitudes, uses of time, habits etc, that form part of young people’s lives. As Kristeva (1969) tells us, “every text is from the outset under the jurisdiction of other discourses which impose a universe on it” (Kristeva, 1969: 146). Young people’s judgements, interpretations, and expressions can therefore, be positioned within a wide-ranging corpus of readymade theoretical knowledge and, from this position, it is possible to construct a theory of knowledge about the world of young people, whilst framing inquiries and setting agendas for “good practice” on the basis of what is true, right or wrong.

Even so, and although this is done with good intentions, and supposedly in the best interest of young people and, indeed, everyone, the problem with this sort of work is that it systemizes living practices into what Deleuze (1994) calls the “technical practices of orthodox thought” (Deleuze, 1994: 132). As Olsson (2009) tells us: “orthodox thought embraces ethical and political questions surrounding young people as a matter of technical practice” (Olsson, 2009: 82). This is a naturalizing feature that harbours “given solutions, which correspond to given problems, and given answers, which correspond to given questions” (Olsson, 2009: 82). As a result, under these conditions it is possible for researchers to arrive quickly and effectively at a predetermined outcome when working with marginalized and segregated young people through critical positioning.

For example, because critical and theoretical positioning makes it relatively easy to map the affective, and multi-sensory processes involved in young people’s interior “containment” of a marginalized and segregated subjectivity (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012) onto predetermined outcomes with preformed solutions and corresponding methods of “good practice” (Olsson, 2009: 83), young people have been consistently been subjected to a deficit model of subjectivity that has interiorised and located social problems in the individual. As a consequence, marginalized subjectivities are discursively assembled by methodological and theoretical invocations of risk, panic and salvation (Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 66). The intentions of the thinker doing the critical positioning can, therefore, lead to the demonization of those most vulnerable to social and economic factors. I will come back to this again shortly.
According to Deleuze this image of thought has played a repressive role: it stops us thinking (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 13). It subordinates thoughts and actions to representations, which are organized by disciplines that secure the stable foundations of knowledge. But we can go further by suggesting that it stops us from listening to the marginalized and segregated “voices” of young people: the process of “naming” young people’s experiences, where things going on in one context are supposed to be used and understood in another, ultimately de-contextualizes the meaning of a situation, and how it is experienced, felt, and perceived by young people (Dahlberg, 2003; Lave & Wenger, 1991). This is why art intervention programmes aimed at youth at risk, but also the inclusion of the arts in assemblages of governance, can (but not always) produce diminished art practices that take away young people’s “voices” (Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 23/61). As Thomson (2008) points out:

“While the interests of children and young people are of interest to contemporary social scientists precisely because they offer unique insights into everyday life, including their hopes and fears for the future, the omission of these perspectives can easily lead to researcher’s making short-sighted interpretations, and producing representations which miss the point” (Thomson, 2008: 1).

At the heart of this debate then, are issues relating to the power of the “authoritative voice,” which speaks on behalf of a group, and how power intersects with a young person’s civil and political right to express and, indeed, form their views freely in all matters affecting them; being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the young person/s (Thomson, 2008: 3/203). As a result, while there is an increased focus towards articulating the voice of young people, bringing previously unheard voices into scholarly and associated professional conversations (Thomson, 2008: 3) the use of “voice” in research and practice has raised concerns over the appropriateness of existing methods and mechanisms currently used to facilitate and construct the “voice” of those already marginalized and ignored (Thomson, 2008: 3).

These concerns have, therefore, led to the privileging of experience, over theory and training, as the basis for understanding young people’s lives. For example, that youth experiences of marginalization can give meaning to a particular issue or activity is a theme that runs through the literature, and one that is intended to favour excluded, silenced or subordinated “voices” over more dominant voices in research to initiate and guide change (Thomson, 2008: 203). But as Thomson (2008) also points out, this privileging of experience relies on the notion of “interior authenticity”- something which is hard to demonstrate (Thomson, 2008: 203). Consequently, I feel that this reports approach to movement
is one that demonstrates the interior modulation of affect in relation to young marginalized “voices” and, in doing so, recognises the proliferation of different youth “voices” through the complex nature of experience, sense-making, and understanding.

Now, by using the idea of movement created in this report, it is possible to treat concrete, everyday life in new and different ways. Indeed, by adapting a relationally aesthetic approach to art and life as creation, young people’s “voices” can be pragmatically linked to issues of activism, participation, and empowerment (Thomson, 2008: 203). That is, by giving young people the opportunity to “encounter” art, and allowing them to get caught up in the movement of processual creation (Guattari, 1995: 107) young people’s “voices” become visible through intense and unpredictable experimentation (Olsson, 2009: 85) These voices not only contest what we think we know about the world and ourselves, from the point of view of young marginalized subjects, but produces new ways of understanding via multi-sensory, and non-representational ways of talking, thinking, and acting, which opposes the technical and goal orientated instrumentality of orthodox research, and orthodox thought.

For example, by trying to demonstrate the “interior authenticity” of young people’s “voices” through Peircean semiotics, it is possible to show that movement, interrelationship, and the unrestricted flow between sensory experience, mentally energetic forms of spatial expression, and physically energetic forms of temporal content, are vital elements in the construction of sense-events, and new instances of thought: the tradic assemblage of Peirce’s concept of sign showing us that each micro-shift in the process of semiosis is an interpretative procedure, and a general law, carried out on a modulation of affect. In addition, the use of Spinoza’s bodily logic shows us that young people’s voices are ethically relational to the movement of external forces, like the surface of a painted artwork, through feelings, affects, and a social imagination. Hence, youth “voices” which show how an encounter can increase a body’s capacity to act, and bring about joyful passions, or decrease a body’s capacity to act, bringing about sad passions. Finally, Bergson’s phenomenology of mind shows how the use of young people’s “voices” can contradict formal and orthodox ways of understanding by bringing a quality common to two sensations (past and present), the sensation common to two moments (past and present), upon an internalized context: the movement of an involuntary memory rising up to produce difference in a localized essence of time (Deleuze, 2008: 39).

Consequently, instead of using an existing theory or, rather, the process of theoretical positioning to stifle young people’s “voices” by moulding and shaping them to fit into existing scientific procedures
and results (Olsson, 2009: 93) this report puts forward the idea that it is possible to use a theoretically relational approach to art and/or culture (Bourriaud, 1998), in practical conjunction with pedagogical documentation and poetry, to carry out memory work with marginalized young people (Thomson & Holland, 2005). This endeavours to take social-cultural imagery, and transform it affectively through micro-political shifts in bodily processes (Coleman, 2015). Indeed, rather than seeing the “image” as something which is external and representational, the image, as it is used in this report, is considered in terms of a corporeal trace that leaves an idea of a certain state on an affected body (Deleuze, 1988: 48). The movement, transition and passage of this state giving rise to different forms of visualization that bring affective forces and multi-sensory energies into a work project (Dahlberg, 2003: 283-284), and which open up new possibilities of understanding through experimental forms of expression.

The use of visualisation in sensory research pedagogies, therefore, no longer concerns the relatively safe practice of reducing ways of seeing and talking by young marginalized subjectivities to the most effective method of “good practice,” where the thinker thinks with the best intentions, and listens by putting theory onto practice. As Thomson (2008) states, “the validity of any ‘voice’ relates to who is speaking, rather than through the warrant of those who are listening” (Thomson, 2008: 203). Thus, I do not agree with Coleman and Ringrose (2013) when they state that it is not “important to examine how we do method, given that theory is practice” (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013: 14). Rather, methods should set about encompassing the complexity of relations between theory and practice so as not to depersonalize young people’s “voices,” but discover young people’s “voices” in their movement and becoming, through which unique events produce experimentation and change.

Consequently, I believe that this thesis report presents a methodology which does not reduce young people’s “voices” to predetermined outcomes through theoretical positioning, but uses pedagogical documentation and poetry, in conjunction with sensory and non-representational methods, to build a certain kind of case-by-case logic, where the focus is on the actual process of formulating a general law of experience, rather than simply applying set laws and codes: this being both a democratic and political practice where knowledge, meaning, and values are continuously constructed by the young people themselves (Olsson, 2009: 83/85). That is, by using the paths of production, guided by unique patterns of experience (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 83) and bodily affections laid down in thought (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999: 25) we are required to listening to young people “voices” by taking note of how affect functions (Olsson, 2009: 79) through remembering narratives. This means engaging in a certain kind of ethic.
In *Doing Sensory Ethnography* Pink (2009) asks the question: “is there a particular sensory approach to ethics?” (Pink, 2009: 42). With regards to this report, I offer the following reply. In using relational, affective, and multi-sensory methods with young marginalized subjectivities, we need an ethics that does not judge youth experiences on the basis of predetermined systems or codes. For example, the individuation of risk, which uses a deficit model to disavow social, cultural, and economic factors by locating social problems in the individual (Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 53). Instead, we need an ethics that expands our knowledge of sensorial relationality (Renold & Mellor, 2013: 36), whilst also allowing us to map the conditions we are creating environmentally, socially, and psychically (Guattari, 1995) i.e. an ethics that traverses the realm of psychosocial politics, and which shows how young marginalized people often “inhabit a world that is uncertain” (Massumi, 2002: 7).

Consequently, by using psychogeography, and focusing on how affect works as a relational feature, it is not only possible to use multi-sensory methods to trace the affordances in every location (Ingold, 2000; Rodaway, 1994) but show how different contexts or situational affects ethically inform what a body can do. As a result, a difference emerges between an ethics based on the moral classification of actions through positive and negative value judgements, like the construction of moral panic around youth delinquency (Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 54) and a situational ethics that is entirely pragmatic, and where the values pertaining to one’s actions are considered in terms of more relational variations in existence. That is, the relations which bring about an increase or decrease in our emotional wellbeing (Deleuze, 1988: 27).

From this point of view, then, a sensory ethics can be understood as the emotionally embodied value of joy and sadness, qualitatively measured, and attributed to our capacity to act, when encountering sense-events relationally connected to objects, situations, and contexts of remembrance.

Accordingly, this distinction in ethics becomes important when integrated with creative pedagogical programmes, as the impact agenda of a project begins to move away from the more person-centred approach, and towards multi-sensory ways of understanding about how community, people, events, places and spaces form an affective psychosocial contract with the very being of the past itself. Or to put it another way, all of our affective and sensorial encounters, which inhabit our visceral feelings as memories, and map our existential boundaries in space and time, form part of the psychic geography used to interpret, understand, and make sense of, our own relational beingness to people, place and
space (Walkerdine, 2011: 261). Indeed, this was made evident when the young people taking part in this research encountered an art object at Cardiff Museum.

It is only by generating, accounting for, and more to the point, modelling the pragmatic movements and processes behind the “incorporeal events” (Guattari, 1995: 86) that punctuate a young person’s collective history, can the impact agenda of any creative pedagogical programme start to develop an emancipatory ethics. An ethics that focuses on how young people reference the affective aspects of their existential path and the bodily process that map feelings and memories onto what can be said, and onto the discursive positions that keep subjectivities in place (Walkerdine, 2011: 261). Only then can we begin using creative industries and arts education to connect with communities by looking at how the situational affects of poverty, multiple deprivation, and social marginalization are “encoded” into young people’s bodies through long use (Thomson et al, 2013: 3), and start taking responsibility for the kind of conditions we need to collectively transform.

Finally, then, while interpretive and language based pedagogic strategies seem to give young people an emancipatory route into arts and culture, in that they affirm the openess of a work, the primacy of the non-expert voice (Jacob, 2000: 1) and demonstrate how multiple voices can be heard through the reproduction of an artworks meaning (Gallagher, 1992: 15) they only ever make space for critical forms of positioning, which presuppose an inequality in the pedagogical relation (Atkinson, 2011: 46). Indeed, unlike a relational aesthetic approach (Bourriaud, 1998) which attends to the relational work carried out between the viewer and art object (Sayers, 2011: 417) interpretative and language based pedagogies do not recognize the agency of young people as post-productive collaborators (Bourriaud, 2005). That is, they only recognize a person’s ability to reproduce their own subjectivity adequate to the subject-matter encountered, which leaves the validity of the reproduction open to the question: Is the interpretation correct? And the answer, ultimately, in the “authority of experts” (Sayers, 2011: 414).

As a consequence, by only focusing on the reproduction of subjectivity to subject-matter (Gallagher, 1992: 12) interpretive and language based pedagogies ignore the extent to which young people can take cultural forms and art spaces, use them to create their own aesthetic experiences and, in doing so, produce ethically problematized social impacts that inform self-emancipatory learning (Atkinson, 2011: 46). Learning which not only helps young people to use cultural forms and art space to explain how their communal beingness is developed and affectively maintained (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012:
through embodied and multi-sensory place-making (Pink, 2009: 77), but also builds social capital to help policy makers understand how physical co-presence, and multi-sensory participation in areas of high social deprivation, create contextualized spatio-temporal rhythms (Lee & Ingold, 2006; Lund, 2005) that can regulate collective identities, and root communities to a sense of place (Grodach, 2011: 76-79). This is particularly important to remember when expanding the potential of community art to address issues of social inclusion and development (Kotler et al, 2008).

For while the use of cultural spaces, and sensory methods can enable young people to bring about a consciousness awareness of the plights, issues, and experiences of youth in communities relationally connected by a discourse of de-industrialization (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012: 39) to reinforce social networks aimed at enhancing community and economic development opportunities (Grodach, 2011: 76), policy makers should never lose sight of the micro-political containment of “rhythms.” These are the enduring shifts in felt time that underlie the ontological foundations of memory (Bergson, 1999: 24) and which pattern everyday life both mentally and emotionally (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012: 77). That is, they can hold subjectivities and communities in place, and provide what is looked back on as a place of safety and security. For example, the ambience of buildings, patterns of work organization, and the rhythms of the gendered organization of work and domestic life, all provide a sense of space that allows a community to feel emotionally contained (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012: 77).

Thus, when practically using movement and experimentation in pedagogical outreach work, or when using art and culture in governmental strategies to revitalize and redevelop urban areas (Grodach & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2007) it is essential to understand that any form of resistance is part of a complex psychosocial and affective relation that itself defends against the threat of annihilation (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012: 77). Caution must, therefore, be taken in order to avoid eliciting trauma by hastily re-organizing the rhythms that provide a sense of beingness, and the relations that map patterns of individual and collective belonging to class, gender, and community history.

8.1. Segmentation and micropolitics: the case for a new aesthetic paradigm

Through the idea of segmentation and micro-politics, it is possible to treat ways of seeing and talking about art as flows of movement in subjectivity and learning. Moreover, all change in subjectivity and learning departs from the haptic flow of our perception, and the movements of affect, belief and desire
in singularly occurring embodied events. Transcendent logic, which finds its home in the propositions of discursive apparatus, amounts to a technological treatment of aesthetic surfaces, and the conscious taming of subjectivity and learning by predicting, preparing, controlling, and supervising according to pre-determined standards. However, this never really functions that well. A first condition of society is that these structures are always leaking raw affective material. An independent studies programme might, therefore, benefit from adding to the conscious logic of subjectivity and learning, a certain kind of haptic visualizing practice that requires experimenting with these affects as a distinct, *uninterrupted* unit of recognition. Researchers and art educationist can, therefore, look out for what escapes already determined definitions and critical positions regarding art, and engage in collective experimentation with young people to make space for more democratic ways of seeing and talking. With this in mind, I will now present some conclusions in regards to the second structuring statement

2) *In art education all participants – children, teachers, teacher students, teacher educators and researchers - can work together through collective, intense and unpredictable experimentation. In this process art educationists and learners are caught up in a relational field. For this to be theoretically workable, the reliance on the transcendent principle of conscious critique needs to be rethought and reinforced by other possible and alternative scientific methods.*

By using the concept of affect it is possible to treat learning processes from a different logic than that of consciousness. This necessarily involves a bodily logic, and puts the focus on each specific situations potential. That is, the kind of problems and sense events people formulate through affective learning or, rather, those lived experiences related to images and ideas of joy and sadness. Bearing this in mind, transcendental empiricism offers a methodological approach where researchers can do research and pedagogy in terms of looking for, and engaging in, the ongoing construction and production of sense, problems, and learning with regards to visual culture and empirical documentation. Indeed, this gives those researchers currently working in the area of art education and, particularly, the locale of youth arts an excellent opportunity to create an encounter between theory and practice. Through it we can treat pedagogical documentation as an intra-active event, which maps out both the complexities and diversities of doing, making and thinking. Furthermore, it enables us to understand the operations of the artistic process in the sense that we can see how qualities perceived have controlled the question under production, bringing us closer to those relations comparable to artistic producer (Dewey, 2005: 50-56).
Pedagogical documentation is not a tool or “apparatus” of observation, but neither is it apparatus for documenting practice as a representation of what the practice was at the moment of documenting it. It is, in itself, an active agent in the material (re)configuration of discursive practices (Barad, 2007:184) and the production of discursive knowledge. Pedagogical documentation is, therefore, important in so far as it puts pedagogical practices in motion by means of making visible phenomena produced in the inter-relations and intra-active processes in-between young people and art objects, matter and things (Taguchi, 2010: 65). As a consequence, by treating pedagogical documentation as an event intimately related to the material body and language, it makes it possible for researchers to focus on how young people can use the relation between art, body, and language in a different way. That is to say, it opens up a kind of transcendental approach to sense problems through the ontology of language, intuitively linked to duration and the “universe of existence” which is our collateral experience. By using efforts of invention like poetry in conjunction with pedagogical documentation, then, it is possible to explore this universe of existence whilst raising problems but, equally, creating the terms in which they can be stated.

This is a reminder that the politics of art has two rather different meanings. On the one hand, there is a politics of the arts that involves legislation, government, policy papers etc. On the other hand, there is a politics of collective life. Consequently, those teachers and researchers working in the area of art education need make decisions and choices. What is art for? And why should they work with this form of knowledge and content with young people? These decisions and choices must be made not only in relation to ontological questions but also political and ethical features of co-production. What kind of learning and knowledge do we want to produce with young people in projects? How does this project relate to on-going political and ethical features in a community or society? How do we as researchers want to contribute to young people’s encounters with these features, which have either already taken place or will inevitably do so sooner or later?

In this project for instance, one can imagine that a study of different theoretical and methodological perspectives on art would have been appropriate. I could have looked at how young people evaluate the aesthetic value of art from a technical, historical, political or even therapeutic perspective. I may have even explored the shock-value of art in relation to haptic vision, and then looked at how young people might use this as a tool to disrupt the artificiality of discursive norms. However, had I not used Deleuze and Spinoza’s idea of a bodily logic, I would not have been able to treat the features of affect as a perceptual force, and connect it to vision in a way that allowed me to build a pragmatic principle
around ways of seeing and talking, which traversed historical, political, and therapeutic dimensions of collective life.

The question is also about what theories to use? This is an ontological question, political, and ethical question because, as Olsson (2009) points out, it depends on what kind on what kind of practice one struggles for. Moreover, this choice must take place through the collective experimentation between research and practice (Olsson, 2009: 184) but equally between those decisions and choices mentioned above. As seen with my work with Valleys Kids, this can probably only be done in a local context based on very specific conditions in each case: these allowing those subjectivities involved to creatively and experimentally explore the rituals, routines and micro-intensities of everyday life (Coleman & Ringrose, 2012) whilst also pursuing new visual horizons, but without losing a sense of place (Ivinson & Renold, 2013b). Of course, under these conditions method gives way to long periods of preparation about how to raise young people’s receptivity to theoretical ideas in and through practice, and to make possible the making of choices as an ongoing activity. As a consequence, when one actually meets with young people and begins such research, one must also be capable of letting go and, potentially, be willing to make unexpected decisions and choices that account for young people’s desires.

This does not mean, however, that a researcher should give up and leave everything to young people. It is not a question of following young people’s desires to the extreme, and letting them do whatever they choose. This was very clear in the psychogeographical dérive of Cardiff Museum. Researchers are also part of the group and, as a consequence, also part of the community affectus i.e. those mixtures and alterations that increase or decrease the community’s power of acting, and those assemblages of change effecting alterations in subjectivities. For instance, in a psychogeographic dérive young people never stop desiring and constructing problems around artworks linked to mental images and physical responses. As a result, young people can very quickly pick up on what the focus and interest is for the researcher, they are prepared to go into the construction of problems and questions with researchers.

However, at this point, it is a misunderstanding to believe that researchers must give up and give sole responsibility to the young people. Equally, social control should not be enacted through a researcher in such a way that they facilitate the development of inequality through hierarchical power relations and pedagogical strategies. Rather, as Dewey (2005) proposes, social control should be an act that: “resides in the shared work being done as a social enterprise” (Dewey, 1997: 56). Through the use of psychogeography, I believe this can be achieved.
Because psychogeography creates a community of interest that is held together by a common activity in which all members take part, the situation does not force an adult or young person to be an agent of control. Instead, groups engage in a community of inquiry and co-operative learning. For instance, because psychogeography is flexible enough to permit free play for individuality of experience yet, in light of advanced planning, firm enough to arrange conditions conducive for individual contributions and community activity, the normal and proper conditions of control were lacking.

Consequently, I did not become a representative of authority, or an agent that sought to govern the interests of the group, but a mature point of contact that could offer knowledge and subject-matter in cases where feelings of personal freedom were restricted by problems which needed to be solved. But neither did any of the young people attempt to exert their will on others. When “authority” was exercised, it was often done in a personal and performative way. That is to say, through experiential accounts that served the interest of the group and not as an exhibition of power. Indeed, it appeared that it was not the desire of any one person to establish a pattern of order, but to use reciprocal give-and-take to develop and shape a co-operative enterprise. Thus, I will now present some conclusions in regards to the third and final structuring statement

3) In art education all participants – children, teachers, teacher students, teacher educators and researchers - are caught up in the desire to experiment with subjectivity and learning. They are acting in a relational field through collective, intense and unpredictable experimentation. To work with this theoretically the relation individual/society need to be rethought. The notion of desire needs to take on another meaning.

8.2. The production of the new: using desire and experimentation in practice-led pedagogies

Through the concept of desire, it is possible for research and practice to show that young people and art practices have things and assemblages going on all the time, and that these things could be viewed as part of a diagrammatic unconscious that produces new, interesting, and unexpected realities in the form of sense events and essences: the latter being a relational compound of sensation and memory. Bearing this in mind, questions about change, transformation, and development in relation to the art,
subjectivity, and learning should no longer then be posed within a cause-effect relationship based on the dualism individual/culture.

By looking at desire as a productive force, embedded in a process of imaginative inquiry that shapes our aesthetic encounters, it is possible for researchers and educationists working with visual sensory methods and marginalized subjectivities (Coleman, 2012; Coleman & Ringrose, 2013; Hickey-Moody, 2013b, Pink, 2013; 2009; Sefton-Green et al, 2011, Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012) to maintain a focus on the subject’s material conditions, whilst arguing that these conditions are part of a wider universe of existence. That is, embedded in entanglements, and relational process of engagement, that occur by virtue of the body’s existence in its material conditions, and which produce patterns of experience that offer unique articulations of affect, and distinctive extensions of context (Hickey-Moody, 2013b: 82). Moreover, desire makes us sensitive to the creation of meaning through feeling, acquainting us with the involuntary in such a way that it makes the living present a potent agent of transformation.

By approaching desire as a productive force it is no longer necessary to ask what young people at risk from high levels of social deprivation are lacking. Indeed, art education and youth arts must question the very notion that these terms seek to imply for young people. As Hickey-Moody (2013a) points out, the popular positioning of youth arts as practice is only possible because the arts are located within a specific assemblage of governance that composes a moral discourse that characterises specific youth subjectivities as “deviant” (Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 14). Thus, what is implicit in this portrayal is the idea that art programmes run for youth, by adults, can provide a conceptual framework for governing the moral problematic of keeping risk at bay: risk which is often individuated or located within the family as a lack of self-governance, rather than society or culture (Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 56).

Consequently, it is often the case that those young people who are constituted by art education or art intervention practices end up being configured around specific cultural ideas and value systems, which then inform choices and tastes about how they should consume the arts, and for what social, political purpose. The idea of social inclusion through the art education and intervention can, therefore, end up operating as a form of social regulation where young people use the arts to self-governing themselves through specific forms of rationalization, which reinforces their position as a problematic group.

The inclusion of the arts in assemblages of governance not only produces impoverished arts practices; it can also (but not always) take away young people’s voices (Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 14). Furthermore,
arts practices can routinely extend the risk discourse by focusing on different points of an individual’s psychohistory, such as stress life occurrences, situational triggers, and critical singular events in youth: this, ultimately, manufacturing a totalizing discourse within educational and intervention policy which disavows the fact that young people’s lives have both context and meaning within the broader social, cultural, economic and, indeed, environmental affordances in which they live (Cuban, 1989; Dryfoos, 1990; Hickey-Moody, 2013a: 14).

With this in mind, rather than targeting young people as little more than endless sets of crisis, research in the field of youth arts intervention should focus on affective pedagogies, which emphasise young people’s capacity to mobilise the relational field through multi-sensory vocabularies, so as to produce corporeal geographies of human and, indeed, community feeling that explore how social, cultural and economically determined material conditions, increase or decrease a subjects capacity to act through individual and collective histories.

Rather than continuing to create clichéd representations and stereotypical ideas about marginalized youth (Te Riele, 2006), and popularising specific figures of marginalized youth through arts practices (Hickey-Moody, 2013b) pedagogical programmes delivered through culture industries like museums and galleries, need to develop a collective knowledge base with community led organizations so as to open up popular and high art to innovative art-based practices. For instance, by using a relational and participatory approach to art, this report found that it is possible to use co-production to reconfigure or “deterritorialize” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b) the deficit discourse that surrounds “at risk” youth, and reshape the image of marginalized young people by producing new, interesting, and remarkable “voices” that materialized their affective resonance with the world (Mühlhoff, 2014; Robinett, 2012). Furthermore, this approach allows for the analysis and assessment of young people’s experiences that is both relational and ethically democratic.

Although Bishop (2010) is inclined to critique relational dialogue as frequently ill defined in terms of assessment, and often “automatically assumed to be democratic and therefore good” (Bishop, 2010: 34) the idea of dialogue as a relational sense-event that pragmatically assembles affect onto sensory histories, and which maps the body’s relational field onto what can be said (Walkerdine, 2011: 261).

through a social mode of imagining, means that young people can create a sensorial dialogue that is neither morally good or bad, but rather democratically ethical in the sense that the sensorial qualities
assembled in a sense-event will either compound a relation with our body, and increase its power of action, or not. As Deleuze (1988) explains:

“Good and bad are doubly relative, and are said in relation to one another, and both in relation to an existing mode. They are the two senses of the variation of the power of acting: the decrease of this power (sadness) is bad; its increase (joy) is good. Objectively, then, everything that increases or enhances our power of acting is good, and that which diminishes or restrains it is bad; and we only sense good or bad through the feeling of joy or sadness of which we are conscious” (Deleuze, 1988: 71).

As such, democratic assessment is never about applying “assessment regimes” (Arnot & Reay, 2007: 311) that differentiate between young people’s talk but, instead, it is about looking past the surface discourse of what young people say to discover the tacit rules, categories, and processes that govern young people’s expression (Thomson, 2008: 5) in relation to the ambiences of joy and sadness which traverse young people’s power to act.

8.3. Art in contemporary society: practical ideas and implications for devolved museums and galleries

A modern museum might seem highly organised, but this masks and deeper and very serious disorder when it comes to the true purpose of art. A museums devotion to academic categories actually gets in the way of creating and sustaining emotional order and insight. That is, museums are often prevented from taking up the idea of the transformative, redemptive power of art (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 92) because they focus on providing stylistic and historical information that helps guide the response of the viewer. For example, in order to experience a sense of time, history, and place the viewer often has to make objective use of the propositions and facts provided by curatorial labelling - these simply allowing the viewer to comment on adjectives of interpretation, and relate to pre-defined concepts (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 90). As a result, our experiences of culture and, indeed, contemporary art space is often passive, in that the viewer is rarely given the chance to complete an experience or, rather, an encounter from perception to recognition, because some discursive fact is entered upon so speedily. Indeed, this is how we are often taught to experience art and culture.

The problem with museums and galleries extends from the labelled captions to the whole philosophy of how rooms are laid out. Indeed, the way that cultural institutions display their works always tends
to be overtly academic and historical, and is often in line with the education of curators (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 91). The ideology of museums and galleries, then, is entirely self-serving, in that the pretence to democratic access always reinforces notions of cultural exclusiveness (Xanthoudaki et al, 2003: 2). As a consequence, museums and galleries are always hampered by a tradition that honours intellectual knowledge about objects, over more irrational and creative ways of experiencing cultural symbols: the latter of which may re-connect individuals to deeper levels of beingness, to other people and, to an individual and collective past (Misztal, 2003: 215) which can create new possibilities for re-anchoring subjectivity (Walkerdine, 2011: 260).

The problem with museums and galleries, then, not only extends to the philosophy of how rooms are laid out, but how the viewer progresses through the building (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 91). As such, a more ambitious and beneficial curatorial arrangement might set its sights on arranging works more in line with those rhythms that constitute the affective basis of our existence, together with the corporeal events that punctuate both individual and collective histories (Walkerdine, 2010: 261). That is, bring together and arrange works which, regardless of their more genealogical origins in space and time, address the concerns of our ordinary experiences and normal processes of living, including those troubled areas of existence that manifest and reference themselves as existential indices: these often pointing towards the relation that fixes the embodied object of experience to the existential feeling of affect. As a result, affect becomes central.

Rather than just displaying content for the purpose of making information available, as would be the case with curatorial labelling, poetry may afford a more embodied coupling between art spaces and the viewer by creating what Merleau-Ponty calls: “potential movement” (Merleau-Ponty, 1969: 108). That is to say, because the performance of a poem is performative, in the sense that its actualization produces affects that problematizes habits of recognition by enacting changes in a reader (Clay, 2010: 52) poetry enables a subject to relate to a series of potential situations through the felt integration of sensory information, and its patterning across motor habits (Gallagher & Cole, 1995: 376). As Merleau-Ponty explains:

“In the case of the normal subject, the body is available not only in real situations into which it is drawn. It can turn aside from the world, apply its activity to stimuli which affect its sensory surfaces, lend itself to experimentation, and generally speaking take its place in the realm of potential” (Merleau-Ponty, 1969: 108).
Indeed, this allows a subject to exist, in a sense, beyond its actuality, in virtuality (Hanson, 2006: 42). As a consequence, the idea that a viewer can interact with the performance of sensory information increases the likelihood to that poetic labelling may provide people with a more affective experience when encountering artworks and cultural artefacts: this revealed by the presence of a certain haptic tension within the frame-work of the anatomical apparatus. Furthermore, because poems afford the expansion of the body schema through the immediately given (Merleau-Ponty, 1969: 143) poems or poetic labelling may enable museums and gallery spaces to link a viewer’s phenomenal “protosensory bodily sense” with “perception and motility” (Hanson, 2006: 42) to actualize cartographies that show how socio-economic conditions are affectively marked on affective bodies, and revealed via sensory memories and involuntary reminiscences.

For example, in this study visual material was used to produce poetic “blocs of sensation” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 176) that mapped residues of experience through body and thought. Furthermore, in constructing a relation between words, human passions, and visual material, this thesis report found that sensory images clustered around points of emotional intensity (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999: 40). Thus, in producing a complex sign that mapped out a diagram of life, the use of poetic “blocs of sensation” functioned as sense-events that did not discursively position experience, but created a vantage point from which to survey the travails of our own condition as relational subjects. Most notably, by using the quality common to two sensation, the sensation common to two moments, and presenting them in new, interesting, and remarkable ways.

Hence, by replacing traditional curatorial captions with poetic labelling, museums and galleries could take on the form of a sensorial invitation. Art and culture could allow people to explore elusive parts of their own thinking by enacting experiences through intensities, emotions, and/or ideas associated with the chief institutions of social life (Dewey, 2005: 21). Indeed, this is particularly important if the museum is to unlock the potential of its collections, become a more inclusive place for both learning and inspiration, whilst making its collections far more representative of regional populations. As the “Renaissance in the Regions” report states:

“Major Museums should develop outreach services underpinned by research, involving communities in the work of collecting and interpreting objects so that exhibitions tell the stories, interpret their experiences, and contribute to local community issues” (MAL, 2001: 8).
With this in mind, by using sensory methods towards curatorial labelling, individuals can encounter an object that seems to latch onto something they, or maybe even all of us, have felt in some way or another, but never really recognised before. Thus, those thoughts and inclinations that we have only ever experienced as being half-formed, find a clearer form of expression in a sensory narrative. Not because they are represented on our behalf, but because they are directly experienced and formed through our own relationship and semiotic enactment with affect, sensation, and reminiscences. As De Botton and Armstrong (2013) suggest:

“Aided by wise and forthright labels, a tour of a gallery would keep in front of our minds the things we most need to hold on to, but which so easily fall from view” (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 91).

At present, then, most labels focus on giving stylistic or historical information. Moreover, at the very moment when it has the best opportunity to guide the beholders response, the gallery nearly always gives priority to facts. As De Botton and Armstrong (2013) recognize, the caption imagines the visitor approaching the work with complex questions in mind. Consequently, to these questions, the gallery provides a perfect 200 word answer (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 91). But what if a different label was present? Something like a poem that captures the sensation of a work art as a processural event related to the act of lived experience? That is, a poem which does not try to represent an artwork on the viewer’s behalf, but instead invites a viewer to become part of a relational exchange? Or part of a social relationship in an ongoing and permanent process of sensuous individuation? Art spaces would, indeed, extend their objects relationally (Bourriaud, 1998: 124) and become affective places where a sense of existing is produced.

8.4. Cultural devolution and cultural modernization: the democratic potential of constructing a psychosocial art space in Wales

If Wales is to claim a visual cultural tradition in post-devolution then an accompanying narrative needs to be composed. Housley (2005) recognises that cultural intellectuals traditionally move towards the mobilization of narrative as a means of creating the conditions in which successive cultural moves can be realized (Housley, 2005: 10). At present, this ethos seems to particularly prevalent with regards to Cardiff Museums’ core development plan and collection management policy, which takes the cultural ownership of narrative as the most fruitful democratic principle.
“The underlying theme of ‘Ownership’ is that the Museum is a body that holds, develops and interprets collections that actually belong to the people of Wales. This obligation was placed on the Museum when it was created by Royal Charter in 1907, and in order for it to carry out better these functions it was made a registered charity. One of the main tasks of the Trustees of the charity and their staff, accordingly, is to ensure that the collections that the Museum holds in trust on behalf of the Welsh people are properly looked after. They also have a duty of accountability to the Museum’s prime funder, the Welsh Assembly Government” (www.museumwales.ac.uk).

This is not to say, however, that Cardiff Museum does not value a commitment to learning and social inclusion through its collections (www.museumwales.ac.uk). It is more a case that ideas of ownership and social inclusion can present a very complicated and muddled set of messages about art, one that creates a very impersonal approach to art and culture. In general, it takes the view that in order to be inclusive artworks deserve an effort of scholarly knowledge on the viewer’s part before they can even begin to start unlocking their secrets. Indeed, this all sounds impressive because it accords with the idea that the meaning of an artwork should be complicated and that grasping it must reflect a great deal of information that is not widely known. This, again, is a question of choices with regards to what kind of learning and knowledge we want to our cultural institutions to produce.

The assumed task of art education is to teach us intellectual facts about what art and culture means. This naturally teaches us to ask “what is it?” or “what does it mean?” rather than “what is it for me?” As Zepke (2005) explains, in asking “what is it?” the viewer is led to assume that artworks represent an essence and truth (Zepke, 2005: 17). As a result, the viewer is also led to believe that by studying art in a way that is tied up with the reputation, influence, and trends of the great academic machines of art-history then they too can come closer to possessing this rarity of truth. The question: “what is it for me?” however, is rarely brought to people’s attention.

By asking the alternative question: “what is it for me?” a viewer is led to ask the following: “what are the forces that take hold of my subjectivity, and what are the sensations, feelings, and emotions that posses them?” This question, then, also implies another. It implies that the viewer should search for what this “me” is, in relation to the forces and/or energies expressed through it. For example, in this project art, as a sense-event, was never separable from its relations with the material world. That is, the question of “what is it for me?” was an open-ended question tacitly asked by affects, incorporeal becomings, and corporeal happenings, felt through a young person’s bodily logic. Consequently, this
did not result in “what is it?” judgements or evaluations organised around a subject/object binary, but instead revealed the aesthetic traces of an ethical experience which increased or decreased a viewer’s power of perfection through passions of joy or sadness during the sense making process (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013: 12). As such, the “what is it for me?” question defined the movement and becoming of an art encounter, while the answer located life in the evocation of feelings as memories.

The important task for art education, then, is to extend art into our lives, which is where the message really belongs. Today’s museums are all too pleased to draw visitors by making claims for the rarity of the objects in their collections. They suggest that what they possess is not only good, but also unusual and scarce (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 92). In contrast, the true ideal of the museum should be to make what is good and important very normal and widely distributed, whilst also encouraging visitors to engage socially around content. A more ambitious and beneficial arrangement would, therefore, be to arrange collections in line with the concerns of our deepest thoughts and feelings, particularly with regards to those groups and communities who would not ordinarily visit a museum of contemporary art, perceiving it, as they might, to be completely distanced from their own experiences and knowledge. Hence, the challenge would be rewrite museum and gallery policy agendas so that art and/or culture could serve the social, political, and psychological needs of its community.

If we want art to be more powerful and more consequential in our individual and collective lives, then we should be ready to embrace art as a re-sensitization tool which can help us identify what is central to ourselves and our community life. The young people of Valleys Kids showed us that such a strategy could be claimed if we approach art as a process of inquiry though patterns of experience: patterns of place and time that exist in correlation with different lived experience but, nonetheless, all a product of a young person’s engagement with social institutions; these experiences forming “geographies” of meaning, which bind subjects to their communities (Hickey-Moody, 2013b) through complex patterns of psychosocial and affective organization (Walkerdine & Jimanez, 2012). Implementing such a vision would, however, risk undermining current aesthetic categories - a strategy that many museums with collection management policies based on “ownership” may be hostile to. But let us just imagine for a moment.

An alternative to this guarded devotion to art and culture may be the use poetic themes to organize works. Indeed, Winnicott’s (1971) idea of “potential space” is useful, here, since potential space is a
transitional, therapeutic meeting place between the outside and inside world: a bridge that can only be realized through the creative processes of the imagination. As Walkerdine (2011) notes:

“The work of the imagination [is one which] creates the possibility of movement to another place...This play is creative, it is the link between the inside and the outside, and is the central basis in Winnicott of the possibility of creativity and so change and newness” (Walkerdine, 2011: 262-3).

An art gallery recognized according to a therapeutic vision would not need to change, only the way it is arranged and presented. Each gallery would focus not on dates and stylistic and historical facts but on the important rebalancing emotions encouraged by particular works. Such an arrangement would offer a perspective that strengthens our capacity to bear our afflictions, and remove the stigma that is sometimes attached to admissions of anguish. Consider some of the essential sorrows we face: panic around money, unhappy family relations, adolescent uncertainties, regrets over unfulfilled ambitions and anguish over one’s mortality and the mortality of loved ones (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 79). A gallery system re-arranged through this approach would allow us to appreciate things such as hope, love, and tenderness. Indeed, rather than providing rooms dedicated to Italian Renaissance art of the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, we could have a gallery space dedicated to focusing our minds on the important aspects of our emotional functioning.

For example, a gallery named Tenderness could help us to understand what this quality is, and why it is so difficult to perceive in the conditions of our daily life (De Botton & Armstrong, 2013: 79). Indeed, rather than being subsumed under headings enriched by historical and stylistic facts, art would teach us how to make tenderness more active in our lives. Art, therefore, would become a choreographer of experience, rather than a recorder of experience. Furthermore, the point of such images would not be to cast us down, leaving us depressed or lacking in drive or a sense of purpose. On the contrary, its function would be to sober our perceptions to what is really important in the present. It would inspire visceral reminders, and give us a serious sense of our own human experiences.

Consequently, by using art relationally, to focus on those psychosocial areas of life that we presume we know enough about already, devolved museum and gallery space could render perceptible those affective reminders that bind us to some place, some time, or perhaps even someone so undeniably valuable that their very essence, revealed through the intertwining of sensation and memory, could
bring unexpected solutions and insights. The question of “what is art for?” would therefore amount to a search for change and transformation through our own individual and collective histories.

8.5. Summing up

It has been argued that with more sustainable funding, museums and galleries could properly engage with the more challenging sectors of our society, whilst continuing to appeal to more traditional user groups (DCMS, 2005). However, in order for cultural institutions to develop effective policies that can address socio-political issues, they first need to understand an individual’s knowledge and experience of reality in their relational sphere (Marxen, 2009). Moreover, research suggests that art can have an important role to play in regenerating socially, economically and culturally disadvantaged areas, while also supporting community development (Jermyn, 2001). This has led some museums and galleries to use insights from the past to inform the present.

For example, The Henry Moore Institute defines the past as: “a place full of objects and ideas outside the immediately visible and graspable present.” This can inform intellectual investigations, and allow viewers to create a dialogue relating to the broader socio-political issues at large (http://www.henry-moore.org/hmi/research). Our encounters with art, sculpture, and culture, then, might be likened to a connection with a transcendent past, or a conceptual “truth” historically contained within itself, and which can be used as a pedagogical reference point for broadening both our intellectual and aesthetic horizons. However, to this we may add the following caveat.

The trouble with treating art and art history outside of the immediately visible and graspable present is that it negates any transformative potential by conceptually and discursively governing the limits of what can be seen, said, and imagined in terms of speculative futures. That is, by placing concepts and material objects outside of our own ordinary lived experiences, we not only neglect the individual and collective histories of our own past, which are shaped and patterned by the psycho-social complexities of our material conditions (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012: 17) but also the micro-political movement by which our own past can rise up through our own emplaced social, economic and politically assembled subjectivities to problematize the material conditions of the present.

By using a relational approach to art space (Bourriaud, 1998) this report contributes to the field of art education and youth intervention outreach by showing researchers how to mobilize the past through...
a new aesthetic paradigm; an ethico-aesthetic paradigm (Guattari, 1995) that places both objects and ideas inside the immediately sensible and visibly graspable present, and which enables young people to construct new and inventive concepts (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) that traverse the field of politics, community engagement and, potentially, therapeutic intervention.

Art and the experiential past can, therefore, be used produce new ideas connected to transformation and wellbeing. Also important to this conception of relational art, then, is the movement of sensation and affective memory. Indeed, by using art as a relational psychosocial tool, this report contributes to contemporary trends in sensory methods (Coleman, 2012; Ingold, 2011; Pink, 2009) and psychosocial research (Coleman et al, 2013; Ivinson & Renold, 2013a; Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012) in that it allows pedagogical workers in the field of youth arts (Thomson, 2008; Hickey-Moody, 2013a; Sefton-Green et al, 2011) to connect art, relation, and reality together to reanimate the complexities of young people’s environmental, situational, and material conditions through movement and experimentation (Olsson, 2009).

Accordingly, the idea of movement and experimentation, in relation to contemporary art and culture, is essential because it demonstrates that art and cultures discursive, representational, and conceptual form is always open, rather than closed and static, and always connected to a process of motion and change. Consequently, by working at the intersection between theory and practice, this thesis report offers new analytical insights into how psychosocial mechanisms and affective processes connected to desire, the imagination, and diagrammatic reasoning can inform art-based intervention programmes. Indeed, by bridging the gap between theory and practice (praxis) this report shows that it is possible to foreground the material conditions of art and subjectivity as a working model for experimentation, transformation, and change.

For example, by mapping the affective processes and psychosocial mechanisms associated with young people’s encounters with art, this report shows how young people can transform an aesthetic surface into a quality of experience through the movement, and becoming of involuntary reminiscences. As a consequence, by evaluating a quality common to two sensations (i.e. past and present), the sensation common to two moments in time (i.e. past and present) this research contributes to art education and emancipatory pedagogies (Sayers, 2011) by demonstrating how young people’s life-processes and the movement of their material production, can contradict “common sense” beliefs, truths, and orthodox forms of knowledge (Deleuze, 1994). That is, this contradictory process (the movement between two
sensations, the sensation common to two moments) can support a new dialectical materialism in arts based, practice-led research (Xanthoudaki et al, 2003).

In this respect, emancipatory pedagogies in art education should always involve movement. Art is not just a lifeless object, but a reference point for motion and change, a place of mutual interdependence and interaction with the sensual signs of life. However, through these sensual signs we find that life is a contradiction. Through the movement of involuntary reminiscences or feelings as memories we find a contradiction between being in the same place, and being somewhere else at the same time. Hence, rather than being a stable, self-contained entity: “a being is at each moment itself, and yet something else” (Engels, 1877: 167). Indeed, in this thesis report young people constantly absorbed the affective affordances of art, whilst simultaneously assimilating them with feelings and the past.

It is through this juxtaposition of art and life that new theories about art can be developed, theories that not only “negate” the old, but incorporate them into novel forms (Sewell & Woods, 2000). As a contribution to emancipatory pedagogies, then, this research report allowed young people to create new ways of seeing and talking about art, youth, and reality.
Appendix
Consent Form

- I am willing to take part in the interview for this research and for interviews to be recorded.
- I understand that no-one will have access to the recording beyond the researcher and her two supervisors.
- I understand that any personal statements made in the interview will be confidential. As far as possible all comments will be made anonymous in any reports that are produced as a result of the research. People’s name and/or location will not be included in reports.
- I understand that I will be offered a copy of my interview transcript and provided with the opportunity to take out or amend any part of the transcript that I do not wish to be reported in the findings.
- I understand that taking part in the research is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time.
- I understand that the data from this research will be used for three things:
  1. PhD thesis
  2. Academic research papers and presentations
  3. A summary report to be circulated to all interested participants or other interested parties

Name of Respondent .............................................................................................................

Signature of Respondent ............................................................................................................

Signature of Parent/Guardian ......................................................................................................

Date ..........................................................................................................................................

Name of Researcher ....................................................................................................................

Signature of Researcher .............................................................................................................

Address slip – to receive a copy of the transcript or summary of research findings

If you would like to receive a copy of your interview transcript please provide your contact details here

Name ...........................................................................................................................................

Contact Address ...........................................................................................................................

E-mail ............................................................................................................................................
Participant Information Sheet

This project will explore art, the imagination, and 3D technology. First, it is hoped that this will help us find new ways of knowing and learning about ourselves and our environment by using our senses (i.e. touch, taste, sound, vision and smell). Second: it is hoped that we can use our imagination and our senses to investigate problems and solutions linked to our environment by using art/museum space. Third: to see if a 3D museum space can help us display our lived experiences in a creative way. It is thought that this project will enable us to use art and the imagination to develop a critical voice.

The task will involve:

Writing down what the artwork reminds you of. Link this to your own experiences, and write down as many of the images that come to mind as you can; note down the things that stand out in your memory. This may include:

- People, events, and places.
- The sound, smell, taste, and colour of objects.

Describe objects, places, and events in your memory by using your senses. This may include:

- Touch, taste, sound, vision and smell. Feelings you might describe as heavy or light, big or small, warm or cold etc.

Describing how objects, places, and events make you feel. This may include:

- Feelings linked to emotions such as happy, sad, love, fear hope, regret etc.

Contact Information

If you would like further information about the study please do not hesitate to contact me on the following details. Alternatively, if you have any queries about the project which involved speaking to an independent ethics advisor, then please contact Professor Tom-Horlick Jones.

Liam Rowley (PhD Student): Email: rowleyl@cardiff.ac.uk

Professor Tom Horlick-Jones - Chair of the School Research Ethics Committee
Tel: 029 208 75004. Email: horlick-jonesT@cardiff.ac.uk

Cardiff University, Cardiff School of Social Sciences, Glamorgan Building, King Edward VII, Avenue, Cardiff, CF10 3WT
## Pedagogical Documentation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Artist</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title of Artwork</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List down as many of the images that come to mind as you can. Note down the things that stand out in your imagination. This may include:

- People, events, and places.

List the things that stand out most. Describe the objects, places, and events through your senses. This may include:

- The sound, smell, taste, and colour of places and objects.
- Things that heavy or light, big or small, warm or cold etc.

Describe how objects, places, and events in your imagined feel. This may include:

- Feelings linked to emotions such as happy, sad, love, fear hope, regret etc.
Poetry Template

The [...] is a [...].
When I [...] it [...].
It turns my [...] into [...].
This makes me feel [...].
It makes me feel like [...].
Ethics Statement

1. Departmental records of contact made will be kept and maintained throughout the duration of the research. This will include information about failed access, completed and uncompleted research, names of contacts, appointments where scheduled contact took place and/or failed to take place.

2. All parties will be informed about the role and position of the researcher, his or her supervisor, and the funding body.

3. As the research will draw on psychosocial methods, all parties will be informed about the competencies of the researcher. Implicit assumptions about the role of the researcher to make clinic judgements will be addressed.

4. All parties will be informed that only data will be subjected to analysis and not the informant.

5. Each interview transcript will be accompanied by a set of notes identifying key themes and experiences as well as theoretical observations of psychosocial mechanisms related to affective-imagery (e.g. embodied experiences, counter narratives etc).

6. If, in the course of research, informants or other involved parties seek advice which the researcher is not qualified to provide (e.g. on educational, clinical or health issues), the researcher will clarify their lack of competencies and, if reasonably possible, advise the party where professional advice can be obtained (e.g. gatekeepers).

7. The researcher will be responsible for obtaining the organisation’s own procedures and guidelines for research and working with vulnerable young adults. Were the researcher has doubts about any of the organisation’s guidelines, a consultation will be sought with the members of that organisation and the researchers supervisor.

8. Informants will be given as much information as possible prior to participation. The study will not be informed by ‘deception’ as no stage of the study requires a covert operation.

9. The researcher will take reasonable steps to assure informants that they are not a covert authority (e.g. teacher, police officer, social services etc).

10. Where informants have impairments that prevent them from understanding issues surrounding consent, procedure, debriefing, feedback and confidentiality, they will be direct towards a responsible adult such as a guardian and/or a gatekeeper for adequate support.

11. For the purpose of informant and researcher protection, all researchers working with children, young people and/or vulnerable adults are requires to undergo a current Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) check. This will be organised through Cardiff University.

Consent and Withdrawal

12. The procedure will be explained clearly to informants and their consent obtained prior to their participation.

13. Where appropriate, gatekeepers will be provided with enough information relating to the research so that they can answer any question informants might ask them.

14. Care will be taken to ensure informants that they can withdrawal at any time. Where appropriate, gatekeepers will be asked to reiterate this point if informants seek advice.
15. Where initial contact is not with directly with parents, a letter and further information about the project will be sent to the voluntary organisation.
16. Where voluntary organisations do not respond, and/or further contact is not organised after the initial approach, this will be deemed as NOT giving permission to act as a gatekeeper.
17. Instances where young adults did not initially want to participate in the project but then decide otherwise will be required to partake in consent procedures prior to participation.
18. Instances where young adults did not initially want to participate in the project but then decide otherwise will be informed that they can withdrawal at any stage of the project.
19. If throughout any course of the procedure the informant feels uneasy about undertaking in a task, s/he will be reassured. If the informant continues to feel uneasy or shows signs of distress then the procedure will be stopped.
20. All parties will be given the opportunity to ask questions prior to participation.
21. All parties will be made aware that the researcher’s supervisor and Cardiff University’s independent ethics advisor will be available to discuss any problems and/or questions that any involved party might have.
22. Consent will be obtained at every stage of the research.
23. If any informant withdrawals retrospectively they will be asked if they wish any data pertaining to them be destroyed.
24. Informants will be made aware that data may be used at conferences, and consent will be obtained for photographs and similar data prior to viewing.

Confidentiality

25. Reasonable steps will be taken to preserve the confidentiality of informants and other associated parties.
26. No organisation will be named and/or identified unless prior consent is given.
27. Data and information made available to the researcher by an organisation or an individual will be treated as confidential unless otherwise stated.
28. Departmental records of contact and failed access will be made confidential.
29. All data gathered throughout the course of the project will be made anonymous.
30. Serious incidents that affect an informant’s safety will be disclosed to only to a named professional that works within the voluntary organisation.
31. Incidents pertaining to the safety of an informant will be brought to the attention of the researcher’s supervisor.
32. Particular account will be taken of local and cultural values, and the possibility of intruding and/or divulging the privacy of those cultural values.

Rewards

33. All parties will be informed that rewards will be given (e.g. group events).
34. All informants will be informed that they will still received participatory reward if they withdrawal.

Debriefing and Feedback

35. Debriefing will occur immediately after participation. Feedback will be provided as soon as the research is completed.
36. All informants will be given a clear explanation of procedures and outcomes of the research. Where informants have particular impairments that prevent them from understanding research outcomes, and which cannot be addressed satisfactorily by the researcher, informant’s will be directed towards a responsible adult such as a guardian and/or a gatekeeper who can provide adequate support.

37. All organisations that participate in the research will be provided with written feedback.

38. All parties will be given information on how to contact the researcher.

39. Caution will be exercised when discussing the results of the research to account for any potential effects of evaluative statements that carry unintended weight.

**Material Held on Computer Databases**

40. Appropriate measures will be taken to secure research data in a secure manner.

41. All on-line security settings will be implemented to avoid inadvertent disclosure and to maintain the security of data.

42. Care will be taken to prevent data being published or released in a form that would permit the actual or potential identification of informants.

43. Methods will be used to preserve the anonymity of informants through the removal of identifiers, the use of pseudonyms and other technical means for breaking the link between data and identifiable individuals.

**Health & Safety**

The researcher will acquaint themselves with, and adhere to, the current health and safety procedures.
Dear Valleys Kids

I would like to thank you for helping me conduct my PhD research: *Social Intervention and Visual Culture: A Psychosocial Investigation in Art Education and Young People’s Relational Aesthetics in a Devolved Museum and Gallery Space*.

I really appreciate that you took so much time to acquaint me with the work that you do at Valleys Kids, and the wonderful members of staff who create such an inspirational environment. I feel that I have learned a great deal from you, and would certainly enjoy working with you again in the future.

I would also like to thank the young people at Valleys Kids for making me feel welcome, and for giving me inspiration throughout the course of the project. They have taught me a great deal about meeting the needs of young people, but they also gave me the strength and courage to follow in their footsteps, and to be as creative and imaginative in my work as possible. I will endeavour to use what they have taught me to help others.

Finally, I would like to thank Valleys Kids for the fantastic work that was produced. An electronic copy of the research project can now be found at Cardiff University’s institutional repository ORCA (http://orca.cf.ac.uk/) and is available to anyone, free of charge.

Thank you again for supporting me during my PhD research.

With kind regards

Liam Rowley
Bibliography


Marxen, E. (2009) Therapeutic Thinking in Contemporary Art or Psychotherapy in the Arts. The Arts in Psychotherapy, 36 (3) pp 131-139


